

**The Islamic State versus the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq:
An Ethnic Challenge and Its Consequences for the Country's Christian Minority**

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Chapter 1: General Introduction: Context, relevance, and overview

1.1 Context, relevance, scope, and method

This thesis is written with a backdrop of an increasingly conflicted world. Power relations at the international level are shifting. The unipolar world is slowly giving way to a nonpolar one. The United States is not in terminal decline; rather global politics are witnessing the empowerment of other actors. The United States has been embracing isolationism since the end of the George W. Bush presidency. The neoconservative rhetoric of exporting democracy has been thoroughly rejected by the American public. President Barack Obama, backing down over his red lines in Syria, spoke to his disinterest in getting directly involved and enforcing the international norm against the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian **dictator** Bashar Al-Assad against civilians. Obama's alternative was an ever-greater embrace and cooperation with the Iranian regime. In exchange for limiting its nuclear program, the Iranian regime saw a financial windfall. Also, Iran was given free rein in managing its proxy militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. The security of the Middle East had been increasingly contracted out to Iran. The monarchies in the Arabian Gulf that had long relished having American protection found themselves sidelined.

Donald Trump's presidency has further reinforced this isolationist trend in US foreign policy. Trump throughout his tenure derided the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), without facing any pushback from his base, leaving its future in doubt. Trump's disenchantment from any commitments in East Asia, along with his embrace of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has spurred a reaction on the part of South Korea and Japan. These two US allies have dramatically increased their military spending and are eyeing their own atomic weapons

programs.¹² Trump, even more isolationist than Obama, withdrew from the nuclear accords his predecessor signed with Iran, leaving it to enhance its **nuclear armaments**/enrichment program. Iran's nuclear program will no doubt incentivize its regional rivals in the **Persian Gulf** to initiate their nuclear weapons program, which in turn will lead to a nuclear arms race. The advent of US President Joe Biden has not changed this isolationist dynamic. His withdrawal from Afghanistan confirmed the United States' disinterest in Central Asia, even at the price of a humiliating defeat. Ukraine stands as a partial exception to this isolationist trend in US foreign policy. Russia by overestimating American isolationism has walked into a quagmire. The United States is not willing to completely abandon Europe. It has chosen to contain Russia. The United States sent enough aid for the Ukrainians to stave off defeat at the hands of the Russians but not enough for them to achieve victory. This is not sustainable from the perspective of the Ukrainians, especially because Republican frontrunner Donald Trump's views on this war align closer to Russia's when compared to President Biden's.

States in general, including the United States, are facing challenges from non-state actors. Non-state actors such as multinational corporations, and ethnic, and tribal players are increasingly in a position to fulfill the functions of declining states. This is not to romanticize the hegemony of the United States, nor to suggest that its hegemony was a stabilizing one. Rather, the nature of conflicts and how they are managed is shifting. Conflicts are increasingly being controlled by sub-state actors, which in the case of the Middle East are **ethnic powers**.

Ethnicities consist of numerous identity markers including religion. Also, religious actors are not

¹ Richard Lloyd Parry, "It's Time Japan Considered Nuclear Weapons, Says Shinzo Abe," *The Times*, February 1, 2023, sec. world, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/its-time-japan-considered-nuclear-weapons-says-shinzo-abe-mqztd0tfx>.

² Takahashi Kosuke, "Japan, South Korea Wonder: How Strong Is the US Nuclear Umbrella?," *The Diplomat*, January 7, 2023, <https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/japan-south-korea-wonder-how-strong-is-the-us-nuclear-umbrella/>.

a monolithic bloc. Viewing groups such as the Islamic State as ethnicities illuminates their internal cleavages. This leads to a concomitant increase in power struggles, whereby ethnicities are mobilized. The fragmentation of states has served to further the complexity of ethnic conflicts while enabling interminable international interventions. These difficult circumstances have correlated with the rise of new religious ideologies. These new religious ideologies form a key component of these ongoing ethnic conflicts, whereby they form a salient factor in these contemporary ethnic identities. This pattern has been echoed in Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq. The extreme violence characterizing these ethnic conflicts is causing a humanitarian crisis. Many civilians, despairing of their situation, have attempted to seek refuge in an increasingly less welcome Europe. The demographics of the region are being re-written. In some cases, religious minorities are ending their presence in the region. In brief, this thesis considers the primacy of ethnic factors in contemporary Middle Eastern conflicts. The research question is to what extent the Muslim Brotherhood's Iraqi branch can counteract the Islamic State's ethnic project, specifically regarding Iraq's Christian minority. Moreover, why does IS/IIP challenge the minorities in Iraq? How does their ideology conceptualize them? How does IS/IIP implement their hegemonic strategies? How does the application of their ideologies shape their ethnic claims? What constitutes the response of the Christian minority?

This dissertation's hypothesis is that the IIP (Iraqi Islamic Party) has been ineffective in countering the Islamic State (IS)'s ethnic project vis à vis Iraq's Christians. The IIP did not challenge the religious message of IS. If anything, the IIP indirectly amplified it. Both organizations have competing ethnic projects. These ethnic projects consist of multiple identity markers. Among these identity markers is a fundamentalist reading of religion and a concomitant rationalization. The polity partially established by the IIP was wholly corrupt and ineffective, such that IS was able to establish its caliphate as a powerful alternative. The IIP is the official

branch of the international religious movement known as the Muslim Brotherhood. IS is a splinter faction of Al Qaeda, dedicated to establishing a Wahhabi Caliphate. In a broader sense, this thesis will contribute to the literature regarding the rise of **new religious ideologies** in the Middle East. **These ideologies are being established in the context of state fragmentation and foreign occupation.**

These ethnic conflicts are taking place in the context of the collapse of the Christian community in Iraq. “Before the American invasion, as many as 1.4 million Christians lived in the country. Today, fewer than 250,000 remain—an 80 percent drop in less than two decades.”³ Further accelerating this process, countries such as Australia have explicitly favored Christian immigrants, even though they represent a minority of Iraqi refugee-seekers. Seventy-eight percent of the 18,563 refugees from Syria and Iraq granted entry to Australia from July 1, 2015, to Jan. 6, 2019, self-identified as Christians.⁴ With regards to the Christians who elected to stay in Iraq, 67 percent belong to the Chaldean Church while another twenty belong to the Assyrian Church of the East. The rest of them belong to the Syriac Catholic Church, the Syriac Orthodox Church, the Armenian Churches, and new protestant denominations. Thus, the smaller churches are in terminal decline.⁵

The methodology of the study is qualitative. It is predicated on textual analysis by which the **Weberian rationalization** of these fundamentalist groups will be elucidated. The religious works of these two organizations namely IS and IIP will merit particular attention. Books,

³ Emma Green, “The Impossible Future of Christians in the Middle East,” *The Atlantic*, May 23, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/05/iraqi-christians-nineveh-plain/589819/>.

⁴ A. Odysseus Patrick, “Opinion | Australia’s Immoral Preference for Christian Refugees,” *The New York Times*, May 3, 2017, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/opinion/australias-immoral-preference-for-christian-refugees.html>.

⁵ *Ibid.*

interviews, and audiovisual materials put out by these groups formed the research's loci of focus. Their importance lies in the fact that they are primary resources. The methodology aims to identify overlaps between IS and the IIP in terms of their religious **paragons**. This allows the thesis to compare and contrast how IS and the IIP self-identify and justify their deeds. Also being studied are the policies and practices of the political entities established by the IIP and IS, specifically regarding Christians. What will be employed is the comparative method, which will examine areas of agreement and disagreement between IS and IIP, in terms of the ethnicities they are attempting to construct.

Theoretical Framework

The thesis will make use of various sociological theories to structure the comparisons. These theories will be explored in-depth in their respective chapters, as well as their theoretical interlocutors. This thesis views IS and the IIP as ethnicities, engaged in an ethnic conflict. **These terms are defined according to Donald Horowitz**, who conceptualizes ethnicity as being predicated on shifting identity markers. The *second chapter* studies fundamentalist rationalizations, as they form a significant identity marker for these two ethnicities. The second chapter also studies key names that were instrumental in developing these fundamentalist rationalizations. The *third chapter* elucidates another identity marker of these competing ethnicities, which is the polities they established. This chapter utilizes Jürgen Habermas's theory on the legitimation of nations and nation-states to examine how IS's and IIP's polities compete with one another. The *fourth chapter* will incorporate more identity markers to examine the various ethnicities which are collectively referred to as Christians and/or Iraqi Christians by IS and the IIP.

The **scope of the study encompasses post-invasion Iraq and its regime to the present day**. The invasion of the United States represented a radical break in Iraqi politics. In addition, both IS and the IIP were not able to establish a foothold in Iraq until after the ouster of Saddam Hussein by the United States in 2003. This thesis will **monitor** the relationship between these two groups until the end of 2022. This will ensure that my thesis pertains to contemporaneous events. My thesis will be well-placed to make predictions about the two organizations, and their relationship with Iraq's Christian community.

While IS is a global movement, and the IIP is part of an international network, this thesis will focus on their activities in Iraq. Many of IS's senior leaders are Iraqis. All the group's "caliphs" are Iraqis.⁶⁷ The caliphate was declared in Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul. Understanding IS necessitates understanding Iraq. The IIP, following Iraq's invasion, was one of the Brotherhood's more powerful branches. The IIP was assigned the role of representing Iraq's Sunni Arab community. This enabled the IIP to access senior political positions, such as the vice presidency, and the speakership of the house, among others. This empowerment is all the more stark when compared with the Brotherhood's lack of fortunes in neighboring Syria, and the Persian Gulf, and that is not for the lack of trying. This will allow my thesis to have a more focused comparison. **This narrower focus will also allow my dissertation to limit the independent variables, as the areas of the Brotherhood's international activities do not neatly overlap with IS's.** For example, the Muslim Brotherhood has a legal presence in Canada,

⁶ Reuters, "EXCLUSIVE New Islamic State Leader Is Brother of Slain Caliph Baghdadi - Sources," *Reuters*, March 11, 2022, sec. Middle East, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/exclusive-new-islamic-state-leader-is-brother-slain-caliph-baghdadi-sources-2022-03-11/>.

⁷ Martin Chulov and Mohammed Rasool, "Isis Founding Member Confirmed by Spies as Group's New Leader," *The Guardian*, January 20, 2020, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/isis-leader-confirmed-amir-mohammed-abdul-rahman-al-mawli-al-salbi>.

the United States, and the United Kingdom. IS is banned in these countries, whereby a strong government reaction has led to the crushing of the group's cells. Conversely, IS has been able to attain power in parts of northern Nigeria, while the Muslim Brotherhood has not focused its energies on that area.

Regarding the resources utilized, this dissertation makes extensive use of **primary sources**. Primary sources include newspaper interviews and works of religious outreach published by these two groups. The utilization of primary sources serves a key goal of this thesis, which is to present the groups being studied in such a way that they can recognize themselves. This in turn ties in with the use of Marin E. Marty's theorization of **fundamentalism as a theoretical framework**. Of particular interest are the sources of the fundamentalists' religious conduct. It allows this research to show how these fundamentalist groups justify their actions. This dissertation also makes use of secondary resources, namely academic literature about this topic. It is important to point out that my topic fulfills a niche in the literature. Volumes have been written on IS. The Brotherhood's experiences in Egypt, Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Syria have been explored in other works. They are important for contextualizing the objectives of the Brotherhood. However, when it comes to the Brotherhood's experiences in Iraq, such resources become scarce. Thus, a comparison between IS and IIP is a veritable addition to the literature.

This thesis will not content itself with making exclusive use of Western sources. Instead, it will make a conscientious effort to include indigenous voices and academic works produced by minorities. This study incorporates the major theoretical discussions in sociology when structuring its analytical frameworks. To gain a certain perspective, it also utilizes the studies written by scholars working for the British colonial regime. This thesis also employs works written by former US soldiers regarding their experiences with Iraq's ethnic conflicts. However,

my dissertation will encompass a broader **range of works** available in English, Arabic, and French. These works include academic studies and religious polemics. I have made a determined effort to incorporate books and studies authored by Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, and female academics among others. Naturally, when the thesis discusses Lebanon, Lebanese academics are brought to the foray.

1.2 Methodology

The methodology of the study is qualitative. In a broader sense, the methodology reflects the multidisciplinary nature of this thesis. The research question is to what extent does the IIP's ethnic project offers an alternative ethnicity to IS specifically vis a vis Iraqi Christians. This thesis makes primarily use of theories from sociology and psychology. The thesis also incorporates theories from comparative politics and of course conflict studies. The methodology in its essence is a study of ideas and their application. It is predicated on textual analysis by which the Weberian rationalization of these fundamentalist groups will be elucidated. Consequently, this thesis is a study of thought and praxis.

The religious works of these two organizations namely IS and IIP will merit particular attention. Books, interviews, and audiovisual materials put out by these groups formed the research's loci of focus. Their importance lies in the fact that they are primary resources. The methodology aims to identify overlaps between IS and the IIP in terms of their religious paragons. The thesis goes through the religious writings of these two groups to determine their religious referents, through examining how they are addressed. The thesis will determine who the IIP and IS refer to as Mujadid, Imam, Sheikh, and Sheikh Ul-Islam. It will provide the names of those who attempted to develop fundamentalist rationalizations in the name of Islam, and in doing so influenced IS and the IIP. Consequently, this thesis delves into the fundamentalist

rationalizations of Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyah, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, Sayyid Qutb, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, and Osama Bin Laden. This allows the thesis to compare and contrast how IS and the IIP self-identify and justify their deeds. This thesis will then compare and contrast four key concepts which form the cornerstone of the two group's beliefs, which are Aqeedah, Jihad, People of the Book, and the Caliphate.

Also being studied are the policies and practices of the political entities established by the IIP and IS, specifically regarding Christians. What will be employed is the comparative method, which will examine areas of agreement and disagreement between IS and IIP, in terms of the polities they are attempting to construct. A central aspect of this thesis is determining the treatment of Iraqi Christians by said polities. The role allocated to religious minorities forms another aspect of the ethnicities of IS and IIPs. In tandem with that, the polities form a core part of the ethnicities built by IS and IIP.

1.3 Literature Review

To engage with these pressing questions, this **literature review** is predicated on *four* themes. The *first* theme reviews the current research that has been done on the ethnic project of the Islamic State. The *next* part of the literature review examines the works on the ethnicity of the Iraqi Islamic Party. The *third* theme discusses the literature on fundamentalism. Fundamentalism provides the theoretical framework by which these two movements are compared and contrasted. The *last* part of the literature review addresses prior works that have already attempted to compare and contrast the Iraqi Islamic Party vis à vis the Islamic State. To further strengthen the methodological underpinnings of this research, the literature review will also incorporate in this section works that compare and contrast the ideologies of the other

religious movements; which in turn will inform the comparison of the Islamic State and the Iraqi Islamic Party.

1.3.1 The Islamic State: The Ethnic Project

My thesis views IS as an ethnicity, which is the original focus of my thesis. This section will identify the various ethnic markers that construct IS's ethnicity. This section will attempt to highlight some of the more notable contributions in this regard, in terms of their relevance. Cole Buznel's *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State*⁸ published by the Brookings think tank examines an important component of IS's ethnicity, which is the group's ideology. Buznel splits the group's ideological components into two categories; the first is the broader notion of Jihadi Salafism, and the second is the Islamic State's unique orientation within that thought. Building on that, Buznel demonstrates how the Islamic State reproduces the religious works of self-proclaimed Salafi scholars to legitimize its actions. A key contribution of that work is its demonstration of how the Islamic State's conceptualization of Jihad directly shapes its policies, specifically its military campaigns against Shiites.

However, the ideological elephant in the room is Sayyid Qutb. While the author does acknowledge in one sentence that Qutb's thought is similar to Al Qaeda's, he does not go any further than that. The reason why Qutb does not get more than a passing reference is that Buznel conceptualizes the Islamic State as being an exclusively Salafi organization, and Sayyid Qutb did not present himself as a Salafi. Rather, he was the chief theoretician of the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, Buznel's conceptual straitjacket fails to fully encompass the ideological origins of

⁸ Cole Buznel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State," *Brookings*, March 9, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/from-paper-state-to-caliphate-the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state/>.

the Islamic State. This, in turn further underlines the importance of an ideological comparison between the Islamic State and the Brotherhood's Iraqi branch, the Iraqi Islamic Party. As such, Buznel overlooked the possible ideological overlaps between IS and the Brotherhood, owing to their shared affinity to Qutb. Moreover, while this work attempts to denote the relationship between the Islamic State's ideology and its aggressive stance towards the Shiites, what is lacking is a more systematic understanding of how the Islamic State's ideology shapes its actions towards other religious minorities (such as Christians).

A new addition is *The ISIS Reader Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement* by Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter.⁹ It purports to fulfill a niche in the scholarship on IS by putting forth primary materials from the group. By presenting IS's speeches and writings, this book allows the group's adherents to tell their story. This study builds on this book to establish a comparison between IS and the Brotherhood, vis à vis the Christian minority. Among the key takeaways of that book for the development of my research proposal is the role Ibn Abd Al Wahaab plays in the construction of IS's and Al Qaeda's ethnicity. It also showcases how the concept of the caliphate is core to IS's ethnicity and how it distinguishes its ethnic project from Al Qaeda's.

Yosef Jabareen's "The emerging Islamic State: Terror, territoriality, and the agenda of social transformation"¹⁰ highlights how the Islamic State's notions of territory are a fundamental aspect of its ethnicity. By examining the Islamic State's ideology and tactics in this regard, Jabareen attempts to demonstrate how the Islamic State's concept of territoriality makes it

⁹ Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter, *The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020).

¹⁰ Yosef Jabareen, "The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and the Agenda of Social Transformation," *Geoforum* 58 (January 1, 2015): 51–55.

unique when compared to all other self-proclaimed Islamic groups. Moreover, this concept challenges the territoriality of modern states. This work contributes to the literature by further demonstrating the relationship between specific aspects of the Islamic State's ideology, i.e. its conceptualization of territoriality, and its broader ethnic project. This research also seeks to showcase the relationship between the Islamic State and other religious discourses, namely Hassan Al-Banna's views on the caliphate. It is worth pointing out that Al-Banna is the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, which from its Egyptian birthplace would spawn many branches worldwide.

Charles Lister: *The Syrian Jihad*.¹¹ The book aims to assess the emergence of Al Qaeda in Syria (AQS) and the Islamic State (IS) during the Syrian Civil War. By honing its focus on the role played by foreign fighters, Lister's work aims to account for the influence enjoyed by these foreign fighters on the internal dynamics of these groups. By the same token Lister stakes out how the foreign fighters have shaped IS and AQS's military tactics and political strategies, based on their experiences from other conflict zones. This work also brings to the fore the ideological tensions between and within these groups, caused by their foreign component. This work will further my research's efforts to examine how foreign fighters challenged the IS's conceptualization of ethnicity, as the groups developed new religious modes aimed at specifically attracting recruits. This reconceptualization came with ethnic tensions between local and foreign fighters. This also ties in with Weber's definition of ethnicity, which is group status.

Thus, ethnic groups are people of the same status, in terms of religion and money. The financial stratification within IS, IIP, and AQS brings about the rise of new ethnic groups. When combined with the fact that the foreign fighters tend to be better educated, and come from higher

¹¹ Charles Lister, *The Syrian Jihad* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016).

socioeconomic strata, this leads to new forms of ethnic conflicts within these factions. Lister brings a unique perspective to the Syrian conflict, as he works for the Qatar-funded Brookings Doha Center. His work is particularly useful in elucidating the position of one of the Syrian conflict's main belligerents, namely Qatar. Moreover, Qatar has been a major funder and propagator of the Muslim Brotherhood through its well-funded media outlets. Understanding the Brotherhood necessitates contextualizing them.

Le combat vous a été prescrit by Pierre Puchot and Romain Caillet.¹² This book attempts to sketch out what it deems to be the history of Jihad in France. This book adds to my research by examining the ethnic markers that underpin IS's ethnicity. Puchot and Caillet's main thrust is to undermine the concept of "express Jihad," whereby the act of Jihad and its religious subtext is deemed to be an ephemeral phenomenon. Rather, the book argues that Jihad as an ideology has developed in France for over thirty years. Consequently, the evolution of that ideology has been reflective of the society that nurtured it. Starting with the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and leading to the Islamic State's current campaign of terror, the book aims to uncover the personal connections forged between GIA's former members and IS's current operatives. The book makes use of four sources, judicial, police, intelligence, and the jihadists themselves. The authors aim to make use of the jihadists' very words to extrapolate their political projects and the reasons behind their bloody internal feuds. Furthermore, Puchot and Caillet attempt to explain the jihadists' motivations for attacking France, as well as the jihadists' predictions for the future. This work also adds context to my analysis of fundamentalism. The reinterpretation of religion as the book suggests is a central pillar of these movements, which ties in with Marty's definition of fundamentalists.

¹² Romain Caillet and Pierre Puchot, *Le combat vous a été prescrit* (Paris: Stock, 2017).

Gerges, Fawaz A. (2017). *ISIS: A History*.¹³ Gerges attempts to provide the unique historical backdrop that gave rise to IS(IS). Accordingly, the genesis of that group goes hand in hand with the chaos unleashed in Iraq following its 2003 invasion by the United States. Gerges also dwells on how the group was strengthened by the suppression of the Arab Spring and by the war in Syria. Gerges hones his focus on the role played by decades of dictatorship, poverty, and rising sectarianism in the Middle East. Lastly, Gerges addresses how foreign interventions acted as a catalyst for IS's growth. Gerges's book further clarifies the construction of IS's ethnicity by showing the shifting power relations that accompanied the group's establishment in Iraq.

الثورة السلفية في مصر ما بعد [Salafis in Egypt After the Revolution] by Mustapha Zahran et al.¹⁴ is a comparative analysis of the Wahhabi movement in Egypt right after the 2011 revolution. This book is relevant to my thesis because it examines some of the key identity markers that constitute IS ethnicity: Fundamentalists who have attempted to develop rationalization in the name of Islam. The book identifies different political parties and clergymen who subscribe to Ibn Taymiyah's religious precepts. Building on that, the text examines the Wahhabis' varying willingness to engage in the official political process. Of particular note is the willingness of these Wahhabi factions to establish licensed political parties and concomitant participation in elections. The Wahhabis' willingness to engage in armed action is also considered. While this book pertains to a different country, its methodology for comparing different religious factions is noteworthy. This will be particularly useful for sketching out the relationship between the Wahhabi factions within the IIP, and their IS counterparts. The book analyzes the relationship

¹³ Fawaz Gerges, *ISIS A History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017).

¹⁴ Mustapha Zahran et al., الثورة السلفية في مصر ما بعد الثورة [Salafis in Egypt After the Revolution] (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: مؤسسة الانتشار العربي [Arab Propagation Institute] and مركز الدين و السياسات [The Religion and Policies Center for Studies], 2012).

between Wahhabi groups and the Muslim Brotherhood in an Egyptian context. This helps my thesis in situating their relationship in another Arab country.

ISIS Inside The Army of Terror, by Michael Weiss, and Hassan Hassan.¹⁵ This book, by the American and Syrian-American duo, aims to sketch out the rise and fall of the terror movement. To that end, it examines to find out what drew so many people to IS(IS), the group's governance, ideology financing, and external terrorist operations. All of these are identity markers for the ethnic project of IS. The book provides a chronological presentation of the terror group, starting with the activities of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. In addition, Zarqawi was the founder of the group *Tawhid wal Jihad*, IS's forerunner

William McCants's *The ISIS Apocalypse, The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of The Islamic State*¹⁶ is a comparative study between IS(IS) and Al Qaeda. McCants, writing in 2015, sought to explain why IS succeeded and Al Qaeda failed. He details how IS and Al Qaeda were divided over the issue of IS's caliphate, which is a core element of IS's ethnicity as opposed to Al Qaeda. McCants sees these divergences stemming from different strategies, rather than being religious conflicts. Strategy is another ethnic marker that forms IS's ethnicity. While both groups wanted to establish a caliphate, Al Qaeda favored a more gradualist approach to IS's. McCants also shows the split between IS and Al Qaeda concerning IS's ambition to spark a sectarian conflict with the Shiites. This book benefits my research in clarifying how IS envisioned the caliphate, which will be a point of comparison between it and the IIP. McCants's comparative study on Al Qaeda and IS regarding Shiites also helps my research in further

¹⁵ Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror* (New York, NY: Regan Arts., 2015).

¹⁶ William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: Picador, 2016).

showing how IS deals with those who reject its religious vision. **That in turn will aid my study of how IS deals with the Christian minority and the IIP.** How IS treats Iraq's Christian minority as part of its ethnic project directly pertains to the thesis's research question.

ISIS The State of Terror by Jessica Stern, and J.M.Berger,¹⁷¹⁸ is like McCants's book, a comparison between IS(IS) and Al Qaeda. The key differentiator between IS and Al Qaeda is the former's appreciation of gratuitous violence. IS embraced absolute violence to draw attention to itself, recruit more followers, and intimidate its rivals. Al Qaeda, in contrast, was more reluctant to make use of such a strategy, as it perceived the use of mass violence would hinder its efforts to recruit Muslims. Underlying the differences in strategy are competing visions: On one hand, Al Qaeda saw itself as a vanguard group, which would bolster likeminded affiliates. IS's foremost priority was the establishment of a caliphate and bringing Muslims under it. Al Qaeda was an elitist movement while IS was a populist one. Like McCants's book, this work clarifies how IS views Jihad and the caliphate, which are key concepts and ethnic markers whose definition by IS pertains to the group's ethnicity and how it deals with those who disagree with its religious precepts.

The Master Plan, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory by Brian Fishman.¹⁹²⁰ This book is an attempt to predict the future of IS(IS) and Al Qaeda, by studying their strategic documents and formative personalities. Fishman benefits my project by discussing in detail "The Management of Savagery," a strategic document penned by Al Qaeda's senior

¹⁷ Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (New York, NY: Ecco, 2015).

¹⁸ "MUSINGS ON IRAQ: Review ISIS The State of Terror," *MUSINGS ON IRAQ* (blog), July 29, 2020, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2020/07/review-isis-state-of-terror.html>.

¹⁹ Brian H. Fishman, *The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).

²⁰ "MUSINGS ON IRAQ: Review The Master Plan, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy For Final Victory," *MUSINGS ON IRAQ* (blog), September 10, 2020, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2020/09/review-master-plan-isis-al-qaeda-and.html>.

leadership, and implemented by IS. Fishman’s relevancy is due to his examination of individuals who shaped both Al Qaeda and IS. He started with Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda’s branch in Iraq, which would later split off and become IS. Fishman brings to the foray Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi, who was Zarqawi’s religious mentor. Fishman delves deeper into the religious influences at play and correctly identifies two more key influencers: Sayid Qutb and Taqi al-Dîn Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah. These individuals attempted to develop fundamentalist rationalizations in the name of Islam. These fundamentalist rationalizations are essential to IS’s ethnicity. Fishman demonstrates how Ibn Taymiyah was used by both IS and Al Qaeda to declare all Muslims as apostates. Qutb shaped IS and Al Qaeda’s views on dominion. Following in Qutb’s footsteps, IS and Al Qaeda deemed everyone who refused to rule according to Islamic law, as they saw it, as a blasphemer.

Selim Öztürk’s Ph.D. thesis, “The Role of Political Salafism in the Formation of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban Regime,”²¹ pertains to the thought of IS. His thesis offers a comparative study of Wahhabism, which Öztürk refers to as Salafism, in different political contexts. He examines the genesis of the Wahhabi creed, by looking at the political context. The thesis addresses how Wahhabism perceives threats and unites and mobilizes its followers. Based on these three themes, Öztürk examines how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established, and how the Taliban came to power. This thesis provides an alternative look at Wahhabism, examining its political mobilization. It aids my thesis by highlighting the ethnic markers that underpin IS’s ethnicity.²²

²¹ Selim Öztürk, “The Role of Political Salafism in the Formation of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban Regime” (Turkey, Middle East Technical University, 2018).

²² Abd Al Baree Atwaan, [*The Islamic State: The Roots The Truculence The Future*] الدولة الإسلامية الجذور التوحش المستقبل, Third Edition (Beirut, Lebanon: دار الساقى [Al-Saqee Press], 2015).

Abd Al Baree Atwaan's الإسلامية الجذور التوحش المستقبل الدولة [The Islamic State: The Roots, The Truculence, The Future] attempts to provide a history of IS. He uses as a theoretical framework Donald G. Dutton's theory on the psychology of genocide and massacres. Atwan as a result takes a sociobiological understanding of violence. The use of excessive violence can be triggered in varying cultural contexts, owing to **specific genetic markers**. Atwan makes use of biological arguments to explain IS's proclivity towards excessive violence. What Atwan's book also adds to the literature is its incorporation of unique primary sources. Atwan himself has worked as the editor of two pan-Arab newspapers. His network of contacts enabled him to obtain an exclusive interview with Osama Bin Laden in 1996. Atwan argues in his book that IS's religious views and state-building strategy have been characterized by their consistency, and consequently can be directly traced to Bin Laden's interviews. The relevance for my thesis is that these interviews showcase Bin Laden's fundamentalist rationalization. The book however misses the point when characterizing IS as being representative of "radical Islam." My thesis further utilizes this book when examining IS's religious terminology, which are key ethnic markers of its ethnicity. Another lacuna in the book is its date of publication. Published in 2015 when IS was at the height of its power, Atwan's book is overlaid with pessimism. Consequently, Atwan overstates IS's popularity and military prowess.

1.3.2 The Muslim Brotherhood and its Iraqi Branch: Situating the Available Literature on the Iraqi Islamic Party:

This thesis examines the degree to which, if at all, the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood undermines IS's ethnic project, especially vis-a-vis Iraqi Christians. Consequently, this section examines the research on the ethnic project of the Muslim Brotherhood, in terms of relevance. Mohamed Abdel Kadir's "Contradictory paths: Islamist experiments of Egypt and

Turkey"²³ compares and contrasts the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) with the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) to account for the reasons which saw these two parties enjoy dramatically different fortunes. The FJP was the Muslim Brotherhood's political branch and enjoyed electoral success in the wake of Egypt's democratization following the ouster of the country's then-dictator Husni Mubarak. However, opposition against the FJP coalesced, leading to its overthrow and interdiction after a popularly-backed military coup. The parties in Abdel Kadir's paper were compared with each other based on their organizational structures, relationships with the religious factions embedded within them, and their incorporation of non-religious actors. This work strengthens my research by demonstrating how one of the Brotherhood's national branches (Egypt in this case) can be compared with other politico-religious movements in the Middle East.

Stefano Maria Torelli's "The AKP Model and Tunisia's al-Nahda: From Convergence to Competition"²⁴ provides another comparative study involving the Brotherhood (and by extension the Iraqi Islamic Party). Accordingly, it examines how the different models presented by the AKP and al-Nahda, which is the Brotherhood's Tunisian branch, affect regional politics. To that end, Torelli's research compares the historical and structural contexts presented by Turkey and Tunisia, and how these contexts in turn affect the relationship between the state and Islam. His research then moves to demonstrate how these two models have developed divergent socioeconomic frameworks, and by extension, different ways of conceptualizing the role of Islam in the public sphere. It concludes by stating that the AKP model cannot be applied in the Tunisian context. This work showcases the political project of Brotherhood factions, which is a

²³ Mohamed Abdel Kader, "Contradictory Paths: Islamist Experiments of Egypt and Turkey," *Turkish Review* 4, no. 4 (2014): 406.

²⁴ Stefano Maria Torelli, "The" AKP Model" and Tunisia's al-Nahda: From Convergence to Competition?," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012).

key ethnic marker in the Brotherhood's ethnicity. This in turn sheds light on the IIP's ethnic project and its relationship with Iraq's Christian community.

Maher Azziz's *The Kurds of Iraq*²⁵ touches upon the Muslim Brotherhood's engagement with Kurdish nationalism, which in turn reflects on its ethnic project. Azziz, an Iraqi scholar, focuses on the ideational currents shaping Iraqi Kurds, and how Kurds construct their national identity, using Benedict Anderson's theory on nationalism as his framework. His methodology is survey research, which utilizes questionnaires sent to graduate students studying in Iraqi Kurdistan, about their self-identification. Azziz also addresses the role played by the Brotherhood's Kurdish branch, the Kurdistan Islamic Union in furthering Kurdish nationalism via a religious framework, all while competing with the more established secular Kurdish parties.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria by Dara Conduit.²⁶ The book seeks to answer the question of why the Muslim Brotherhood's Syrian faction was unable to capitalize on the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime. This failure to mobilize support was despite the Brotherhood's historical presence in Syria, and its longstanding opposition to the ruling Assad family. To that end, Conduit makes use of in-depth interviews with members of the Brotherhood. She hones her focus on the Brotherhood's propensity to violence, dogmatism, and acceptance of democratic norms. This book is useful in contextualizing the IIP's relationship with its Brotherhood counterparts. Moreover, the Syrian and Iraqi sectarian conflicts and international interventions have intertwined, more so with the rise of IS. It is worth mentioning that IS has proclaimed the abolishment of the borders between Syria and Iraq to be one of its *raison d'être*.

²⁵ Mahir A. Aziz, *The Kurds of Iraq: Nationalism and Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan* (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

²⁶ Dara Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

This book will help clarify the relationship between the Brotherhood and IS, and to what extent their goals and practices are in opposition to one another.

By using interviews, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* by Lorenzo Vidino²⁷ assesses the goals, methods, and attitudes of the Brotherhood, and why it was able to expand at a rapid pace in the United States. This book sheds further light on the IIP's relationship with the occupying US army in Iraq. The book demonstrates the Brotherhood's aims and strategies to attain them in a political system managed in one manner or another by the US administration. It is worth noting that Vidino has worked in UAE-funded think-tanks and takes a critical view of the Brotherhood, in tandem with the UAE's hostility.

الحركات الإسلامية في الوطن العربي [*Islamic Movements in the Arab World*] by Aaliyah Alaanee.²⁸ The book's object of focus is the Muslim Brotherhood's Tunisian branch, and how it engaged with Tunisian society before the Arab Spring, in the context posed by the avowedly secular regimes of Habib Bourguiba and Zein El Abidine Bin Ali. The question this book seeks to answer is the reasons underlying the inability of the Brotherhood to gain a mass following in Tunisia. The book analyzes the shifting discourse of the Brotherhood and its organizational structure in response to the amenability of the political situation. Tunisia represents the Brotherhood's most successful participation in politics, from a philosophically liberal perspective. Its political engagement is a key ethnic marker of the ethnicity it is constructing.

This text helps me assess the IIP further and predict its ideological trajectory by

²⁷ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

²⁸ Aaliyah Alaanee, الحركات الإسلامية في الوطن العربي [*Islamic Movements in the Arab Nation*] (Cairo, Egypt: دار مصر المحروسة [Guarded Egypt Press], 2008).

understanding how its ideological brethren recalibrate their views on the state and Islamic rule, in tandem with a changing political system.

The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb,²⁹ by Sayed Khattab, is an analysis of Qutb's writings, in an attempt to sketch out what the author deems to be "Islamic radicalism and its intellectual origins." Khattab considers Qutb's concept of *Jahiliyah* worthy of particular attention, as he sees it as mature enough to be a confrontational theory. He delves further, by studying the political and economic influences on Qutb's *Jahiliyah* theory. Khattab also addresses how the United States influenced the theory. My paper will stand as a theoretical counterpoint to Khattab, as I use the term "fundamentalism," as opposed to his "Islamic radicalism." This is because "Islamic radicalism" entails a value judgment, which I do not agree with. Fundamentalism recognizes that Qutb is a modern phenomenon, and is against the traditional understanding of religion. Nevertheless, elements of Khattab's thesis will benefit my study, as they clarify the influences on Qutb's theories and their political consequences. Qutb was the chief theoretician of the Brotherhood and greatly influenced Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Qutb thus potentially represents a point of ideational overlap between IS and the IIP. Qutb's views on governance influence the Brotherhood's treatment of religious minorities, in terms of how much power the Brotherhood is willing to allocate to them.

1.3.3 Existing Research that Incorporates Comparisons between the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood:

دليل الحركات الإسلامية المصرية

²⁹ Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006).

[The Guide to Egypt's Islamic Movements] by Abd Al Mone'm Muneeb.³⁰ This unusual book was written by a person who had spent fourteen years in an Egyptian prison, held under emergency legislation. The book purports to discuss the establishment, ideology, and methodology of sixteen Islamic movements in Egypt, based on the author's conversations with his fellow inmates. Among the interviewees are adherents of Wahhabism, Qutbism, and the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) varying splinter factions; who represented a significant portion of Egypt's religious opposition during the rule of Anwar Al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak. As such, IS's religious discourse is a melange of Qutbism and Wahhabism while the IIP is the Muslim Brotherhood's Iraqi branch. Consequently, Muneeb's book benefits my research by offering insight into how the adherents of the above-mentioned religious schools self-identify and conceptualize their ideology. In doing so, the book acts as a counterpoint to the biases potentially exhibited by other scholars in that field. This work further enables my research on conflict and religious identity. Muneeb's book was penned in the immediate aftermath of a failed rebellion, in which many of the above-mentioned factions participated. The book provides a snapshot into the shifting religious discourses of the various movements to explain their fiasco and provide themselves with a differing identity in a less receptive popular context. It directly has a bearing on my thesis as Qutbism and Wahhabism have influenced both the IIP and IS. The book offers a unique, insider's perspective on these ideologies, and the various debates involved in their application. These debates in turn influenced the IIP's democratic project and IS's caliphate.

³⁰ Abd Al Mone'm Muneeb, دليل الحركات الإسلامية المصرية *[The Guide to Egypt's Islamic Movements]* (Cairo: Madlooby Bookshop, 2010).

Carter Malkasian's *Illusions of Victory*³¹ is a study of how the US-engineered tribal movement helped bring IS's predecessor, the "Islamic State in Iraq," to its knees. Coming from the perspective of a former marine posted in Al Anbar, it examines the popularity of IS's thought among the province's tribes the processes of completion and cooperation between the terror group and the tribes, and the influence of the United States in that regard. This text is useful in clarifying the relationship between the IIP, IS, and the local tribes, especially as the governor of Al Anbar was a member of the IIP. This relationship was assessed in terms of access to patronage networks, smuggling routes, and religious disputes.

Compulsion in Religion, Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq by Samuel Helfont.³² This book studies Saddam Hussein's religious policies. It examines their ideological sources, and how they were utilized in the service of Hussein's domestic agenda, and foreign policy. This book firstly helps my research by contextualizing the establishment of IS and IIP. Some authors have argued that³³ Saddam Hussein's Faith Campaign laid the ideological foundations for the rise of IS. This book argues to the contrary. It shows how the religious policies of the Baa'thist regime suppressed the Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, and their ideological brethren. The fact remains that despite the many hardships inflicted on the Iraqi people by the Baa'thist dictatorship, neither IS nor IIP was able to gain a foothold in Iraq until the ouster of Hussein. This reinforces the credibility of this analysis, by showing how Iraqi society was molded to resist them.

³¹ Carter Malkasian, *Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

³² Samuel Helfont, *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

³³ Kyle W. Orton, "Opinion | How Saddam Hussein Gave Us ISIS," *The New York Times*, December 23, 2015, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/opinion/how-saddam-husseini-gave-us-isis.html>.

Sectarianism in Iraq, Antagonistic Visions of Unity by Fanar Haddad.³⁴ This work by Haddad, an Iraqi scholar, seeks to explain the genesis of sectarianism in Iraq. Haddad argues that sectarianism is competition over the state, rather than a theological dispute. He provides a theoretical overview of sectarianism, focusing on myth-symbol complexes. Myth-symbol complexes are stories and memories that define a group. These myth-symbols can in turn cause a backlash in other groups. The Battle of Karbala represents a key myth-symbol for the Shiite community in Iraq, especially as its commemoration was banned during the rule of Saddam Hussein. The politicization of sects came with the US invasion of Iraq, whereby power-sharing was made on a sectarian basis. Shiites were able to impose their iconography on the state, which caused a Sunni backlash. The sectarian conflict in Iraq was the desire of different groups to impose their histories and symbols on the state. While this text covers the Sunni-Shiite conflict, it will be useful in contextualizing the differences between IS and the IIP. IS has made use of the sectarian conflict to win converts to its cause, by offering protection from the Shiites. The IIP's inability to protect its members, or Sunni Arabs, its purported broader community, has dented its support and correlated with its fragmentation.³⁵

The Occupation, War and Resistance in Iraq by Patrick Cockburn.³⁶³⁷ This book revolves around the mistakes the United States made during its occupation of Iraq. Underpinning this litany of errors is extreme hubris on the part of the United States. This book becomes pertinent to

³⁴ Fanar Haddad, *Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³⁵ "MUSINGS ON IRAQ: Review Sectarianism In Iraq, Antagonistic Visions of Unity," *MUSINGS ON IRAQ* (blog), August 14, 2020, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2020/08/review-sectarianism-in-iraq.html>.

³⁶ Patrick Cockburn, *The Occupation: War And Resistance In Iraq* (London ; New York: Verso, 2007).

³⁷ "MUSINGS ON IRAQ: Review The Occupation, War And Resistance In Iraq," *MUSINGS ON IRAQ* (blog), September 11, 2020, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2020/09/review-occupation-war-and-resistance-in.html>.

my research when Cockburn examines the early days of the occupation. The book covers the period when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ran Iraq, which was from 2003 to 2004. It concluded when the Iraqi government became officially in charge, which was from 2004 until 2006. The relevancy of that to my topic is manifest because the IIP was a key participant in the governing institutions setup by the United States. Cockburn further contextualizes the IIP's governance by clarifying how the United States' actions, and those of the Iraqi government, led to the outbreak of a sectarian conflict in Iraq. Such a context also enabled Al Qaeda in Iraq, IS's forerunner, to establish itself in Iraq.

1.3.4 Iraqi Christians: The Overlap of Several Competing Ethnicities

Muwafak Neesko's³⁸ [*Syriacs: The True Name of Arameans and Assyrians and Chaldeans*] السريان : الاسم الحقيقي للأراميين والآشوريين والكلدان provides a Foucauldian postmodernist analysis of the various ethnicities collectively known as Iraqi Christians. Neesko, an Iraqi academic, hones his focus on the concept of Assyrian ethnicity and deconstructs it by highlighting the power relations underlying its construction. Neesko problematizes the connection between the ancient Assyrian civilization and the modern-day Assyrian identity. According to Neesko, the connection between modern Assyrians and the ancient Assyrians is not more pertinent than that of the modern Assyrians with the Babylonians, Akkadians, and the other ancient civilizations that existed in modern-day Iraq. Rather, Neesko argues that the modern Assyrian identity can be traced to the 19th century, with political machinations of the Nestorian Patriarch and the British colonial agents. Per Neesko, The Nestorian Patriarch reinvented himself as an Assyrian to gain international prestige, as Assyrians were mentioned in the Christian Bible.

³⁸ Muwafak Neesko, [*Syriacs: The True Name of Arameans and Assyrians and Chaldeans*] السريان : الاسم الحقيقي للأراميين والآشوريين والكلدان, 1st ed. (Beirut, Lebanon: Beesan, 2012).

The British sought to promote ethnic nationalism among Iraq's Christian population to undermine their attachment to Iraq's churches and as a preliminary step to convert them to the Anglican Church. That in turn would have made them more amenable to British rule.

Neesko argues that it would be more precise to refer to Iraqi Christians as Syriacs. This is because most Iraqi Christians were originally ethnically Arameans. However, when they converted to Christianity, they self-identified as Syriacs. This is where Neesko's positionality comes in. Neesko identifies with the Syriac Orthodox Church. He deems it as being the original church and all the other churches being essentially splinter factions. It is that ideological position, which makes Neesko's views far from mainstream among those who self-identify as Christians and Iraqis. It explains why most Iraqi Christians do not identify with the Syriac ethnicity.

Afram Yacoub's³⁹ *The Path to Assyria: A Call for National Renewal* examines Assyrian ethno-nationalism from a psychological perspective. Yacoub, who is an Assyrian nationalist, attempts to determine why the Assyrian minority failed to establish a state even though in the Middle East the Jews were able to do so, while the Kurds established two all but in name. Yacoub's theoretical framework is Daniel Bar-Tal's theory on collective victimhood. Yacoub stakes the claim that Assyrians are afflicted with such a disorder. Assyrians encode long-term suffering into their collective memory. Assyrians' sense and belief of victimhood directly shape their culture and behaviors. This leads to apathy and the widespread belief among Assyrians that nothing can be done. Yacoub's proposed solution is for Assyrians to rework their ethnicity by emphasizing their common ethnicity and minimizing their religious differences. Yacoub argues

³⁹ Afram Yacoub, *The Path to Assyria: A Call for National Renewal*, trans. Lennart Simonsson (Södertälje, Sweden: Tigris Press, 2021),

that churches allow Assyrians to escape from the real world and needlessly engender sectarian differences.

Alda Benjamen⁴⁰ in *Assyrians in Modern Iraq: Negotiating Political and Cultural Space* examines the evolution of the Assyrian ethnicity under Iraqi Baathist rule in the 20th century. Benjamen studies the role played by Assyrians in leftist opposition parties and their gendered representation of women. Assyrians were successful in producing their own culture and asserting their own identity despite the immense pressure the Baathists brought to bear. Benjamen makes use of archives of the Assyrian Democratic Movement and interviews its members to show that a pluralist Iraq is possible and that Iraqis can transcend their ethnic and sectarian divides to participate in contemporaneous social movements.

Sargon Donabed⁴¹ in *Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in the Twentieth Century*, offers a narrative history of Iraq and shows how Assyrians were essential to Iraq's historiography. It compares the experiences of the Assyrians and the development of Iraq. This study of Assyrian ethnic history makes use of Gramsci's theorization on the subaltern, with Donabed arguing that Assyrians are Iraq's quintessential subalterns, whose narratives are purposefully suppressed by larger groups.

1.3.5. Alternative Theoretical Frameworks: Similar Subjects Studied Differently

This section pertains to the alternative theoretical approaches, selected by the thesis' theoretical interlocutors. The theoretical framework of this thesis has been previously discussed in the theoretical framework section. What this section aims to do is to explore works with topics

⁴⁰ Alda Benjamen, *Assyrians in Modern Iraq: Negotiating Political and Cultural Space* (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022)

⁴¹ Sargon Donabed, *Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in the Twentieth Century*, 1st edition (Edinburgh, the United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press, 2016),

similar to my thesis to showcase how my theoretical framework is unique. This similarity revolves around an attempt to study Islamic politics. My study on fundamentalist rationalization as an ethnic marker in a Horowitzian sense is an addition to the literature from the perspective of the theoretical framework.

A different approach is taken by Greg Barton's "The Gülen Movement, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama: Progressive Islamic Thought, Religious Philanthropy and Civil Society in Turkey and Indonesia."⁴² This article compares three religious movements, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and the Gülen Movement, with each other. One unit of analysis, by which this research was carried out, is spatial; the first two movements are based in Indonesia, while the third originated in Turkey. In addition, this comparison also factors in the movements' social and educational initiatives. Also, the organizational structures of these movements pass within the purview of this analysis. Lastly, sketching out their points of difference and concurrence enables the assessment of the movements' educational strategies, which are based on western philanthropic institutions that offer a thoroughly secular education. Rather than disseminating their message directly through these institutions, they demonstrate their confidence in the ability of their religious discourse to thrive in the modern world. The religious message of these movements is different, being traditionalist, Sufi, and modernist. Thus, this study provides further variables on which my research can be predicated. These variables include educational strategies and institutional structure.

⁴² Greg Barton, "The Gülen Movement, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama: Progressive Islamic Thought, Religious Philanthropy and Civil Society in Turkey and Indonesia," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 3 (2014): 287–301.

The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq by Faleh Jabar⁴³ is a book written by an Iraqi scholar aiming to fill a gap in the literature regarding non-Iranian Shiite activism. The focus of his study is the context that allowed for the emergence of Shiite revolutionary groups. This research studies ethnic conflicts in Iraq, which are also done in the name of Islam. Jabar's timeframe stretches from the 1950s to the 1990s, examining how these movements changed their philosophy and leadership. Three factors, according to Jabar, explain what fueled the activism of Shiite revolutionaries: The government's land reforms which led to the demise of sheik landlords, the family law which changed the status of women, and the rise of the Iraqi Communist Party and its popularity among the Shiite youth. Jabar compares numerous Shiite groups that arose, and how they interacted with the Shiite clergy, Iran, and the various regimes that controlled Iraq. This work can illuminate the political and social backdrop that led to the rise of IS and IIP. Moreover, it provides me with more variables by which to assess religious actors.

A methodological aspect of this research is illuminated in Yamao Dai's "Foreign Impacts Revisited: Islamists' Struggles in Post-War Iraq."⁴⁴ This is a study of two Iraqi religious parties, the Dawa Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and of how their differing ideologies relate to the politics of the countries that hosted them. While this paper does not study IS or the IIP, it nevertheless provides several methodologically useful avenues for analyzing the relationship governing the ideologies of "Islamic" parties and their political context. Accordingly, the paper demonstrates how the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, because it maintained cooperative relations with Iran during its opposition to Saddam Hussein, was more than receptive to *Wilayat Al Faqih* (Guardianship of the Jurisconsult), Iran's official ideology. In

⁴³ Faleh A. Jabar, *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq* (London: Saqi Books, 2003).

⁴⁴ Yamao Dai, "Foreign Impacts Revisited: Islamists' Struggles in Post-War Iraq," *World Political Science* 9, no. 1 (2013): 155–72.

contrast, the Dawa party had a more contentious relationship with Iran, which led it to adopt a more nationalist ideology. Consequently, this dissertation clarifies how the ideologies of “Islamic” religious parties are compared. It does that via interviews with the parties’ representatives, to ask about their strategies. The study also examined their publications and presented their political visions, especially those relating to democracy. Moreover, this work accounts for the sources underlying the shifts in the ideologies of said parties.

Bruce Lincoln’s *Theorizing Myth*⁴⁵ provides another means by which this research structures the comparison of the Islamic State’s and the Iraqi Islamic Party’s ideologies. While this book doesn’t concern itself with those two organizations, or religious organizations per se, it nevertheless yields crucial insights into the political underpinnings of myth-making. As such, Lincoln shows how certain narratives are legitimized at the expense of others and how these narratives correlate with strategies of political and ethnic domination. Lincoln utilized this theoretical framework to examine the origins of the stories, which served as the foundation on which nation-states could be legitimized. This work provides a postmodernist understanding of narratives, in which Lincoln claims that myths are ideologies structured via the form of narratives. Crucially, Lincoln purposely refused to define myth. Instead, he calls to attention the imperialist and racist underpinnings of such ideological constructs. In addition to its methodological novelty, this approach would benefit **this research by providing it with a means by which power relations underlie the generation and dissemination of competing religious ideologies.**

⁴⁵ Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

Another methodological avenue presents itself with Uğur Kömeçoğlu's "Islamism, Post-Islamism, and Civil Islam."⁴⁶ This study is an attempt to conceptualize various religious trends in addition to demonstrating their political significance. The focus is on these trends' compatibility with civil democratic modernity. To that end, the research hones its focus on the Turkish context starting with the Hizmet movement. Hizmet is viewed as being representative of Civil Islam due to its civic engagement with democratic institutions. In contrast, the AKP is presented as having its origins in Islamism then shifting towards a Civil Islam model, and then reverting to Islamism. The AKP's Islamism is represented by its intolerance of secularism, democracy, and the use of the state in promoting its ideological agenda. While this research doesn't directly address the Muslim Brotherhood, it nevertheless retains several redeeming features. Firstly, it provides another example by which contemporary "Islamic" movements have been compared in academia. Moreover, the variables by which the comparison took place can potentially augment my comparison of the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Islamic State. The methodological aspect that potentially will be incorporated into my research is how the movements' goals are presented in the context of democratic governance, via the use of their texts. The parties' actual exercise of power and its compatibility with their stated ideals is another point of interest.

Gerges, Fawaz A. (2015). *Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Popular Resistance and Marginalized Activism beyond the Arab Uprisings*.⁴⁷ This book offers an alternative perspective on the Arab Spring. While most studies on that topic have focused on structural factors to understand the limitations of these popular uprisings; Gerges hones his focus on the

⁴⁶ Uğur Kömeçoğlu, "Islamism, Post-Islamism, and Civil Islam," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 16 (2014): 16.

⁴⁷ Fawaz Gerges, *Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Popular Resistance and Marginalized Activism beyond the Arab Uprisings* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

role and complexities of popular agency in the Arab Spring. His analytical frameworks are contentious politics and social movement theory. Building on this, Gerges can stake out the formation and institutionalization of anarchical movements in Egypt, during the 2011 uprising. The Gerges text shows the multifaceted origins of ideological movements, further elucidating the bowdlerization aspect of fundamentalist organizations.

Karen Armstrong's *Fields of Blood*⁴⁸ provides another take on the concept of religious violence, and by extension, a theoretical alternative to my research focus on fundamentalist rationalization. Armstrong argues, by comparing different faiths, that the gratuitous violence that characterizes modernity has little to do with religion. She argues that in ancient times religions attributed to all aspects of life religious significations, including warfare and violence. Nevertheless, religion has considerable peacemaking potential in these modern times. A critical difference between Armstrong's and my theoretical approach is that the latter seeks to ensure that fundamentalists can recognize themselves when they are being described. Armstrong's approach does not share that emphasis and consequently risks becoming a vehicle for the writer to superimpose her opinions on the subject matter.

Anthony Giddens's *The Constitution of Society*⁴⁹ is an in-depth look at structuration theory, penned by its principal theoretician. Giddens's book identifies the main interlocutors of his theory, paying particular attention to evolutionism. The book also addresses how structuration theory can be used for the empirical study of conflict. Lastly, the text clarifies how the author was able to develop his theory, as well as showcasing his underlying assumptions.

⁴⁸ Karen Armstrong, *Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence*, (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2015).

⁴⁹ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

صور عن الخطاب الديني المعاصر [Snapshots of Contemporary Religious Discourse] by Ahmad Zayid.⁵⁰ This book is pertinent to my research in terms of its insight into the Brotherhood, as well as its methodology. The objects of comparison are the religious edicts published by Al Azhar University, and those put forth by the official magazine of the Egyptian Coptic Church. These religious texts in turn are compared with new religious actors with different, “modern,” discourses. Included are the editorials of a newspaper that presents itself as the voice of the Copts. The text analyzes the sayings of Amr Khalid, a television preacher with perennial leanings. Crucially for my research, the books of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi are also studied. **Al-Qaradawi is the Brotherhood’s most important religious figure.** Zayid compares Khalid’s and Al-Qaradawi’s writings. Zayid’s theoretical framework is deconstructionist theory. His methodology is textual analysis, which aims to detect changes in linguistic expression regarding a specific issue. To do so, he compares and contrasts the degree to which the above-mentioned religious figures refer to religious texts. Zayid states the extent to which these religious discourses are idealistic and/or calls for action.

“Christian-Muslim Relations: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow” by Hugh Goddard⁵¹ presents a comparative analysis of religions. Goddard’s approach is to examine “the six dimensions of Christian-Muslim Relations:”⁵² The theological, philosophical, historical, social, political, and cultural. He concludes that the relationship between the two religions was not always antagonistic and that there are positive models. Goddard’s topic doesn’t directly pertain to my thesis, as I am studying how two religious organizations interact with one another and Christians in Iraq, not Islamic-Christian relations in their totality. Nevertheless, **certain aspects**

⁵⁰ Ahmad Zayid, صور عن الخطاب الديني المعاصر [Snapshots of Contemporary Religious Discourse] (Cairo, Egypt: دار العين للنشر [The Eye Press for Publishing], 2007).

⁵¹ Hugh Goddard, “Christian-Muslim Relations: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 3, no. 2 (2003): 1–14.

⁵² Ibid, 6.

of its methodology could be useful in structuring my comparisons of the religious antagonists. The abovementioned six dimensions can be used to examine the IS-IIP relationship.

Mark C. Taylor's "Reconfiguring Religion"⁵³ surveys how religion was theorized and presented by various disciplines. It is relevant to my topic because I am studying religious conflicts. Taylor argues that the theoretical arguments about the study of religion were predicated on binaries. Consequently, academics making use of these theories would portray religion via sharp distinctions of what it is and is not. In some cases, the academic debate would make use of the same binaries, and revolve around the theoretical pole being advocated. In other cases, they would position themselves against other theories based on different binaries. Taylor finds these binaries to be problematic as they are simplistic and the result of their practitioners' uncritical acceptance. Following Jacques Derrida, Taylor argues against oppositional binaries. He argues for the rejection of these oppositions. By thinking beyond binaries, and focusing instead on the interplay between them, Taylor stakes the claim that religion can be understood as a complex adaptive system with connected nodes. Critically for my thesis, fundamentalism needs to be understood by identifying the significant nodes, and the connections that are perceived as knowledge. Fundamentalism is not just about the clash of ideas, important as they are. It is about understanding their origins, and how they interact with the world around them.

William T. Cavanaugh in "Religious Violence as Modern Myth"⁵⁴ argues that there is no particular reason to assume people are more likely to kill for God, as opposed to secular ideologies. Cavanaugh criticizes the widely-held belief that religions have a particular tendency

⁵³ Mark C. Taylor, "Refiguring Religion," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 77, no. 1 (2009): 105–19.

⁵⁴ William T. Cavanaugh, "Religious Violence as Modern Myth," *Political Theology* 15, no. 6 (2014): 486–502.

to promote violence. He argues this belief is false because the categories of “religious” and “secular” are invented. Scholars are not able to agree on a definition for religion, nor what distinguishes it from the secular. Cavanaugh shows how Martin E. Marty offers seventeen different definitions of religion and remains unable to choose one. Cavanaugh further argues that the myth of religious violence is linked with the promotion of the belief that the Western ideal of separating religion from public office is necessary for stability. Cavanaugh highlights some of the problematic aspects of Marty’s approach. While Cavanaugh does not directly examine the concept of fundamentalism, his approach nevertheless pertains to ethnic and religious conflict. I need to be aware of my own biases, and when using terms ensure that the subject being discussed can recognize itself.

Religion and Nationalism in Iraq, a Comparative Perspective, by Susan Lloyd McGarry et al.⁵⁵⁵⁶ Stemming from a conference held at Harvard University in 2005, the book is a comparative study of the ethno-sectarian conflicts then-raging in Iraq, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The book was organized into four themes, which represented possible areas of convergence between the countries in question. The first theme is the presence of ethno-sectarian groups in conflict. Modern Iraq is a failed state, with ethnic and sectarian militias directing official bodies. The second is a history of imperial subjugation, which in the Iraq case is British colonial rule. Third are failures in governance, and the final theme is current foreign interference. Ethnic conflicts in Iraq are influenced by the relationship between the United States and Iran. This text can show how international actors can influence local ethnic and sectarian

⁵⁵ Susan Lloyd McGarry et al., *Religion and Nationalism in Iraq: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. David Little and Donald K. Swearer (Cambridge, MA: Center for the Study of World Religions, 2007).

⁵⁶ “MUSINGS ON IRAQ: Review Religion and Nationalism in Iraq, A Comparative Perspective,” *MUSINGS ON IRAQ* (blog), July 3, 2020, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2020/07/review-religion-and-nationalism-in-iraq.html>.

conflicts, and how ethnic conflicts can be compared spatially. This text can add to the insights of Marty and Cavanaugh by presenting the international context that encourages the rise of fundamentalism.

1.3.6 Fundamentalism: Competing Definitions in the Literature

This section showcases the literature on fundamentalism. They prove that the concept of fundamentalism has gone through numerous changes, as it originally pertained to an American protestant sect. Fundamentalism now refers to a phenomenon that is expressed in the name of different religions. This section of the literature review shows that my thesis fills a niche regarding the scholarship on fundamentalism. This is because there are no studies that examine the rationality of fundamentalists. It is this thesis's position that such groups are not completely irrational. Rather, they attempt to construct a rationality based on their idiosyncratic values.

Fundamentalism: Perspectives on a Contested History, edited by Simon A. Wood, David, and Harrington Watt.⁵⁷ The book provocatively claims to “illuminate developments in modern Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.”⁵⁸ Moreover, the book admits that it is at “war with itself,”⁵⁹ because of its desire to represent different voices. The book’s main aim is to determine what fundamentalism, seen as a discourse, has resulted in. Fundamentalism is defined as the “literalist interpretations of the scriptures, firm commitment to patriarchy, or refusal to confine religious matters to the private sphere.”⁶⁰ The different views in the book debate the utility of the term, and the degree to which homogeneity exists between different fundamentalist movements. While this book’s alternative definition of fundamentalism is extremely useful regarding the

⁵⁷ Simon A. Wood and David Harrington Watt, eds., *Fundamentalism: Perspectives on a Contested History* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2014).

⁵⁸ Ibid, 1.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

issue of literalism, its presentation of fundamentalism doesn't allow fundamentalists to recognize themselves. It is worth pointing out that neither the Brotherhood nor the Wahhabis see themselves purely as a new development in Islam. Rather, they see themselves as returning to a golden age, one of the caliphate and the righteous Salaf. This in turn represents a core aspect of their identity.

Katherine A. Boyd and Charles B. Strozier in *The Fundamentalist Mindset* examine the psychological aspects of fundamentalism. They see fundamentalism as being a form of group paranoia. This theory clarifies a key dimension of the phenomenon of fundamentalism, namely its emotional repercussions. My dissertation will be making use of this theory in analyzing the rationalizations of fundamentalist organizations, and their internal dynamics.⁶¹

Mark Jurgensmeyer's *Terror in the Mind of God*⁶² is a conceptual interlocutor. Rather than focusing on the concept of fundamentalism, he engages with the concept of religious violence and the legitimation of terrorism. To build his case, Jurgensmeyer makes use of interviews to engage with those he deems as engaging in religious violence. He argues that commonality is the feeling of being under attack and that violence is an appropriate response. I will not be making use of Jurgensmeyer's terms. However, his use of the term terrorism is problematic. The organizations in question do not identify as terrorists. Rather, this is a value judgment on Jurgensmeyer's part. My theoretical framework needs to present these groups in a way they recognize themselves. Also, my research's theoretical framework and conceptual tools will have to be justified, considering Jurgensmeyer's alternative.

⁶¹ Katherine A. Boyd, *The Fundamentalist Mindset: Psychological Perspectives on Religion, Violence, and History*, ed. Charles B. Strozier, David M. Terman, and James W. Jones (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁶² Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God – The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

Mark Juergensmeyer in “Entering the Mindset of Violent Religious Activists”⁶³ aims to understand the role religion plays in contemporary religious-related violence and the passion involved. His main method of entering the mindsets of radical religious activists is by interviewing them and studying their writings. He argues such an approach, based on open-ended questions, yields far more information than a survey. The main issue with surveys is that they assume “we know what to ask before the question.”⁶⁴ Juergensmeyer instead argues for an interactive approach, which allows for understanding how the subject views the world. He suggests that we bracket out our assumptions so that we can understand the subject’s perception of the world. This article pertains to my research as it indicates the methodological advantages and implications of using interviews.

Mark Juergensmeyer in “Martyrdom and Sacrifice in a Time of Terror,”⁶⁵ provides a comparative analysis of martyrdom. He links it to the concept of sacrifice, and how different religions interacted with it. He stakes the claim that sacrifice is central to religion and agrees with Girard and Freud on the function of symbolic violence. Juergensmeyer adds that war should be seen as the context of sacrifice and not the other way around. Religious conflict consists of sacrifice and martyrdom. Sacrifice is fully expressed in a cosmic war, whereby the sacrificial victim represents the destruction inherent in conflicts. The enemy is out of place and is used as a symbol of disorder. This article provides me with new theoretical tools by which I can compare how IS and IIP perceive their enemies, view Jihad, and realize their political and religious goals.

⁶³ Mark Juergensmeyer, “Entering the Mindset of Violent Religious Activists,” *Religions* 6, no. 3 (2015): 852–59.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 855.

⁶⁵ Mark Juergensmeyer, “Martyrdom and Sacrifice in a Time of Terror,” *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (2008): 417–34.

Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local and Personal by Peter Herriot.⁶⁶ This book seeks to answer the question of why fundamentalists have embraced a countercultural worldview. **To answer that, the book makes use of textual interpretation, which seems extremely interesting from a methodological point of view.** Herriot defines fundamentalism as consisting of five features: Dualist thinking, perceiving things exclusively through a good/evil binary. This in turn justifies the hard boundaries between those who are members of the group and the outsiders. The second feature is fundamentalists' belief that their holy book holds supreme authority. The third feature of fundamentalists is their selective interpretation of their holy book, challenging traditional understandings in the process. Finally, fundamentalists have a millennialist view of history, believing that God shall establish His rule over the world in the future. The process of selective interpretation is of extreme importance for my study of fundamentalism. I aim to understand the dynamics of these selective interpretations, by addressing the power relations involved. Understanding this mechanism further clarifies the fundamentalists' relationship with the "other."

The Fundamentalism Project, edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby⁶⁷ is a five-volume study of the phenomenon of fundamentalism. My theoretical framework will examine the texts' concepts and scope in greater detail, so to avoid repetition I will just present here the importance of Marty's project. What drew me to Marty's approach is that it offered a means for me to compare the Brotherhood and IS, in terms of their harkening back to a golden age. That approach underlines the degree to which these groups are a rejection of traditional religious authorities, which is crucial for understanding how these groups self-identify, and their

⁶⁶ Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local and Personal* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

⁶⁷ Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

objectives. However, despite the book's ambition, it suffers from a lack of detail concerning the religious concepts to be compared, the means to compare them, and the internal dynamics of fundamentalist groups. **Consequently, I aim to add to the literature by making use of Weber to examine the rationalization of fundamentalists and in doing so further clarify how they perceive the world, and how they seek to change it. Also, I aim to identify key words that underpin their beliefs and are necessary for any comparison of their ideology.** This is part of the originality of my thesis.

Fundamentalism: The Search For Meaning by Malise Ruthven.⁶⁸ This book concerns itself with the changing definitions of fundamentalism. While the concept of fundamentalism initially exclusively related to American Protestant sects in the 1920s, Ruthven argues that the term has over the years expanded to encompass different religions. The book offers a different reading of fundamentalism, presenting it as being essentially a fig leaf for political agendas. The problem with Ruthven's term is that it neglects the aspect of bowdlerization in fundamentalism and its adherents' hostility to traditionalists. If fundamentalism was simply the desire to implement religious rule, then it wouldn't be a modern phenomenon, as the book argues. However, Ruthven adds to the literature by examining how fundamentalism is connected to stereotyping. **It would benefit my research to address the ability to generate stereotypes and disseminate them. That would further clarify how fundamentalists construct their world and their interactions with it.**

Khalid Yahya Blankinship's "Muslim "Fundamentalism," Salafism, Sufism, and Other Trends" in *Fundamentalism* by Simon A. Wood and David Harrington Watt is a significant

⁶⁸ Malise Ruthven, *Fundamentalism: The Search For Meaning* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

interlocutor for my project.⁶⁹ Sometimes, his critiques hit the nail on the head. However, in other cases, they completely miss the mark. His problematization of the concept of fundamentalism is noteworthy. He points out the lack of clarity in the definition of fundamentalism. He shows how the term fundamentalism never pertains to the self. Rather, it's always used to describe the "other," in a delegitimizing manner. Blankinship accurately connects the use of fundamentalism (or lack thereof) with colonialism, as well as hegemonic and intolerant liberalism. This is Blankinship's most important contribution. My study treads carefully regarding these issues with "fundamentalism", in order not to implicitly propagate such value judgments.

Blankinship's critique shows the importance of my work, in bringing forward a more detailed description of fundamentalism. The issue of bowdlerization and proclaimed exclusivity to a past golden age narrows the scope of fundamentalism. Wahhabism is a key point of divergence between my position and Blankinship's. His portrayal of Wahhabism is unsound. He describes it as "standard doctrines from medieval law" and "the norm of general Sunni Muslim belief." However, Wahhabis deemed anyone who wasn't one of them to be a heretic. This especially applied to self-identified Sunnis who were Asha'rite or Maturidi. My definition of fundamentalism would highlight the deep creedal differences between traditionalist Asha'rites and fundamentalists. The traditionalist clerics were responsible for the imprisonment of Wahhabism's *de facto* founder, Ibn Taymiyah, further highlighting the rift between Wahhabism and the traditionalists. Blankinship's treatment of Asha'rites is peculiar for while he admits their existence, he never defines them nor does he indicate their conflicted relationship with Wahhabism. This is either because his conceptual framework does not allow for it, or because it would undermine his argument that minimizes the differences between Wahhabis and others. Other questionable decisions by Blankinship arise from his portrayal of Sufi criticisms of

⁶⁹ Wood and Watt, *op. cit.*, 1.

Wahhabism. Blankinship chose a self-proclaimed cleric, Muhammad Hisham Qabbani, who has striven to recruit chaplains for the United States military.⁷⁰ However, Blankinship cannot show how Qabbani represents Sufism. His only “evidence” in that regard was that Qabbani claimed to be a Sufi. However, that’s far from sufficient. Osama Bin Laden claimed to be a Salafi mujahid sheikh, and Blankinship would agree with me that Bin Laden is none of those. Rather, Qabbani seems to be connected to the sect founded by Abdullah Daghistani and Nazim Qubrusli aka Nazim Haqqani. Without going beyond the limits of this project, it’s clear that Blankinship is unable to show how Qabbani’s purported Sufi critiques against Wahhabism are representative of anything beyond Qabbani and his followers. Blankinship’s arguments become downright shocking, whether due to mistranslation or basic factual errors. This is evidenced in his statement: “The rather exclusivist Habashi movement founder and Rifai Sufi Abd Allah al-Harari.”⁷¹ Habashi refers to Abd Allah al-Harari, and not his movement. It’s a singular masculine word meaning “he who comes from Habesha i.e. Abyssinia.” His followers are colloquially referred to in Lebanon as Al Ahabash, and not Habashi. The formal name of Harari’s group is the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects (AICP). At which rate, AICP was previously led by Mustapha Ghlayani, Hussein Ouweini, and Mahmoud Al Ajooz, and was not founded by Abdullah Al Harari.⁷² All this shows that the data on which Blankinship predicated his argument is faulty or missing.

Muhammad Ali Aseere’s التنبؤ بالتطرف [*Predicting Extremism*]⁷³ provides an alternative to the concept of fundamentalism. Its substitute is the notion of “extremism.” Aseere offers an

⁷⁰ William Rory Dickson, “An American Sufism: The Naqshbandi-Haqqani Order as a Public Religion,” *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses* 43, no. 3 (2014): 411–24.

⁷¹ Wood and Watt, op.cit., 157.

⁷² “أضواء على الجمعية | Projects Association Overview,” *Projects Association Overview*, accessed September 16, 2020, <http://www.projectsassociation.org/files/overview/>.

⁷³ Muhammad Ali Aseere, التنبؤ بالتطرف [*Predicting Extremism*] (Beirut, Lebanon: المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر [The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing], 2018).

elaborate interpretation of that notion, which is imbued with a negative connotation. According to Aseere, extremism derives its origins from social traumas, geographic contexts, cultural legacies, and the psychological state of individuals. Per Aseere, extremism is a religious and sectarian sentiment that cannot accept any change appropriate to the modern age. Aseere's theory on extremism postulates that extremism is very much an emotional state, correlating with one's predisposition to follow orders and imitate others. Extremism is also, in Aseere's view, manifested in the beliefs people hold.

It is when examining the application of Aseere's theory, that its nature becomes clarified. According to Aseere, a paragon of countering extremism is the Saudi state broadcaster. Aseere, himself a Saudi academic, praises a Saudi prince who is also a mayor of a city for enabling his research. Aseere's theorizing on extremism thus serves as a piece of propaganda for the policies of the Saudi monarchy, targeted at an academic audience. It offers insight into the social changes driven by the Saudi monarchy. Aseere is a philosophical modernist, seeking a break with traditional mores. The United States represents his cultural exemplar, because of its dominance and popularity. However, Saudi Arabia's social liberalization does not entail any concomitant political liberalization. Aseere's book serves to celebrate the social shifts undertaken in Saudi Arabia while delegitimizing any opposition to them. Any critique of the Saudi monarchy's social reengineering is deemed to be extremism.

1.3.7 Analysis of the Literature Review:

This literature review has uncovered a serious lacuna concerning the available studies on the Islamic State and the Iraqi Islamic Party. **There is not a single study that compares and contrasts the ideologies of the Islamic State and the Iraqi Islamic Party.** This is even more

perplexing because both movements present themselves as being Islamic, as being the champions of the Sunnis, and whose core area is Western and Northwestern Iraq; all the while being politically completely opposed to one another. The available literature contains numerous cases of “Islamic parties” being compared with one another on various politico-religious bases. While these works will undoubtedly inform my research’s methodology, there is more to be done in that field. My methodological contribution seeks to systemize such a comparison, by identifying key terms and contextualizing them via the competing power relations. Additionally, while this literature review has highlighted numerous works, that compare elements of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State, **there is not one that systematically compares the groups’ religious ideologies and their policies.**

I have striven to include **indigenous voices and not just works written by colonial agents.** Rather, I have purposefully included the works of Iraqi scholars when discussing their country. By the same token, I have included Egyptian scholarship when discussing the Brotherhood, to further contextualize things. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the broader political context, when incorporating such scholarship. The ability of academics to express themselves is constricted. Egypt is a military dictatorship that brooks no opposition. While Iraq is supposedly a democracy, journalists, and academics have been imprisoned, tortured, and even assassinated by official or semi-official armed bodies. A particularly poignant case is that of Husham Al Hashimi. A prominent academic, he was assassinated for having criticized Shiite militias, which constitute the Popular Mobilization Units and fight in Syria. Hashimi had particularly incurred the wrath of one of such groups, Kataeb Hezbollah, who had issued Hashimi with public death threats. Engaging with scholarship from such a region needs to take into account such complexities, and the consequent limitations on the literature being generated.

1.4 Chapter Overview

The first chapter is this introduction. It includes the literature review, showing my **thesis's originality**. This originality is showcased in the thesis's theoretical framework, in terms of the theories used and how their concepts are merged. The thesis's originality is also demonstrated in the topic being studied, as it is unique. The *second chapter* presents key concepts to lay the groundwork for the rest of the thesis. It conceptualizes IS and IIP as engaging in an ethnic conflict, whereby the two groups are presenting competing ethnicities. **A key component of IS and the IIP's ethnicities is their fundamentalist rationalization. This thesis will make use of the definition of fundamentalism according to Martin E. Marty.⁷⁴ Fundamentalism is the reaction against modernity's perceived disrespect and marginalization of religion. This reaction entails the development of new ideologies and structures. Bowdlerization is a key mechanism by which fundamentalists construct these new ideologies. This dissertation will also build on that definition by making use of Charles Strozier's⁷⁵ reading of fundamentalism. Strozier adds to the definition of fundamentalism by incorporating the aspect of group paranoia. Francis Fukuyama's theorizing on the *thymos* and the desire for recognition will add further depth to this dissertation's conceptualization of fundamentalism. Rationalization is another marker of ethnicity.** This dissertation defines rationalization according to the theories of Max Weber, which is the systematization of ideas. By studying the rationalizations of fundamentalists, this thesis will further showcase how fundamentalists see themselves and the "other."

The *third chapter* builds on the insights gleaned in the second chapter regarding these new ethnicities, by exploring their political consequences. The second chapter discussed

⁷⁴ Martin Marty, *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), ix.

⁷⁵ Charles Strozier, et al. op.cit., 11.

fundamentalist rationalization as a marker of these ethnic projects. Another key marker of these ethnicities is their praxis in the political sphere, which will be examined in the third chapter.

Both IS and the IIP have made their polities a core part of their ethnicities. In the case of the IIP, its participation in the US-established political order was essential for its image as a moderate political actor. The IIP's ethnic identity was also predicated on it being the representative of the Sunni Arab community. This ethnic identity was only established in the context of the sectarian quotas that the United States decided would be suitable for Iraq.

As for IS, its caliphate was critical for the ethnicity it was attempting to make. It showcased its absolute commitment to Wahhabism and Qutbism, by implementing them in their totality (per the group's view). By claiming the mantle of the caliphate, IS's leader deemed himself the leader of the believers. In addition, the caliphate was a means for the group to claim the superiority of their ethnicity. This is because the caliphate religiously outranked the polities established by IS's Wahhabi rivals, such as emirates and kingdoms. The proclamation of the caliphate enabled IS to draw a sharper line between its ethnicity, and other ethnicities. The territory controlled by the group was the physical manifestation of what the group called the "abode of belief." Any other territory beyond the group's control was deemed to be the "abode of disbelief." It was the desire to join that ethnicity that drove many individuals from North America and Europe to leave their material possessions and families to join cities that were right in the middle of an extremely bloody conflict.

The two polities of IS and IIP existed in symbiosis. Both polities were only able to take root following the ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. They were locked in conflict over control over Iraq's population, the provision of services, and the acquisition of legitimacy. Both entities used to combat the other to justify their existence. IS claimed its armed campaign against

the Iraqi government was a Jihad, to oust a blasphemous government that was persecuting Muslims. In contrast, the Iraqi government presented itself as offering protection to the Iraqi population and the world as a whole from an international terrorist menace. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Iraqi government was corrupt to the core. Its sectarian makeup meant that the Iraqi state was fixated on alienating key segments of its population as opposed to uniting it against the threat of IS. The weakness of the Iraqi state ensured that IS was able to replace its presence in some areas. Were it not for the international coalition, IS would have maintained its grip on parts of Iraq. This does not bode well for the future.

The *fourth chapter* ties in with the previous chapter's analysis of IS and the IIP's ethnic projects, by laying the groundwork for how these ethnicities deal with Iraq's Christian minority. This chapter will argue that the term "Iraq's Christian minority" and/or "Christian minority" is essentially an exonym imposed by IS and the IIP. To understand how IS and IIP treat "Iraq's Christian minority," this paper clarifies the various ethnicities that are collectively referred to as "Iraq's Christian minority." Furthermore, understanding how these ethnicities self-identify elucidates their relationship with IS and the IIP. To that end, the third chapter will use Donald Horowitz's theory on ethnicity to examine these multiple ethnicities' relationship with IS and the IIP. This chapter will also shed light on how these ethnic identities interact with one another, and in doing so illuminate their political and religious cleavages. This will allow this chapter to examine these ethnicities' political strategies and their relationship with the polities established by IS and the IIP. The thesis concludes in the fifth chapter. The last chapter showcases what the thesis has proven. The IIP has been ineffective in countering IS's ideology and policies vis à vis Iraq's Christian minority.

Chapter 2: Fundamentalisms in the Name of Islam

A Comparative Study of the Genesis of Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood's Fundamentalisms, their Key Ideologues, and their Praxis

Chapter abstract: This chapter develops one of this thesis' key theoretical additions, which is the combination of Marty's fundamentalism and Weber's rationalization. This will be referred to as fundamentalist rationalization, which is a term coined by this thesis. Fundamentalist rationalization is in turn a key ethnic marker of ethnicity per Horowitz's definition. This chapter also identifies the names of those who have invented fundamentalist rationalizations in the name of Islam.

2.1 Introduction

This chapter lays the conceptual groundwork for the rest of the thesis. It identifies some of the key markers of IS and the IIP's competing ethnic projects. The key marker discussed in this chapter is the *fundamentalist rationalization* of both these groups. Both IS and IIP are fundamentalist organizations. Their perception of themselves and interaction with the "other" form a core part of their ethnicities, hence the identification of the key personalities who have developed fundamentalisms in the name of Islam. Also being studied is how they perceive and interact with this world. This research claims to be systematic and exact. This study names and identifies specific ideas and concepts. To that end, this paper will not use the term "Islamism" or the like. **Martin E. Marty's and Charles Strozeir's approaches will define fundamentalism.** I aim to understand how these fundamentalists see themselves and the "other" by studying their rationalizations. The concept of fundamentalism is a comparative construct, which must enable an assessment of a wholly modern attack on traditionalism. Fundamentalism can be traced to specific ideologues who attempted to revive and rationalize the faith per their understanding. Max Weber's theorization on value rationality will be made use of in that regard. The specificity of each of these ideologues is counteracted by their ideational commonalities.

Rationalization is analyzed from Max Weber's perspective. In doing so, this research compares the different fundamentalist rationalizations based on the following pattern: ideological genesis, controversies, mutual interactions, and the policies and polities promoted by them. Fundamentalist rationalization is a concept devised by this thesis to

understand the theory and praxis of the Islamic State and the Iraqi Islamic Party. **Comparing and contrasting the fundamentalist rationalizations of Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood further facilitates the examination of the Islamic State (IS) and the Iraqi Islamic Party's (IIP) ideological overlaps and political projects.** The IIP is the Muslim Brotherhood's Iraqi branch. **But to what extent can the IIP challenge IS regarding its designs on Iraq's Christian minority?**

2.2 Fundamentalist Rationalization: Conceptual Analysis

Fundamentalism is "a modern religious logic and a mode of politicized religion available to conservative, orthodox, and traditional as well as "disembedded" practitioners."⁷⁶ This definition was developed by the contributors to Scott Appleby and Martin E. Marty's *Fundamentalism Project*. This term is a "comparative construct," which pertains to modern and interpretive behavioral schools.⁷⁷ **Fundamentalism is defined by Martin E. Marty as the resistance to traditionalism,⁷⁸ secular life, and the harkening back to a real or imagined past.⁷⁹**

Fundamentalism presents itself as a unique reaction to the contemporaneous philosophical and material conditions known as modernity. **Fundamentalists believe traditionalists and modern**

⁷⁶ R. Scott Appleby, "Religious Violence: The Strong, the Weak, and the Pathological," in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ According to Marty, fundamentalism "serves to create a distinction over against cognate but not fully appropriate terms such as traditionalism, conservatism, or orthodoxy or orthopraxis."

⁷⁹ Marty states: "...members of the movement they observe [fundamentalists] no longer perceive themselves as reeling under the corrosive effects of the secular life. On the contrary, they perceive themselves as fighting back, and doing so rather successfully. Fundamentalists fight with resources/weapons they reach back to real or presumed pasts, actual or imagined ideal conditions and concepts and they select what they deem as fundamental... Fundamentalists are selective they consider they are adopting the whole of a pure past, but their energies go into employing those features which will best reinforce their identity, keep their movement together, build defenses around its boundaries and keep others at a distance."

cultural elites are equally culpable in marginalizing the true faith. To that end, fundamentalists craft new ideologies and organizational structures.

Regarding the ideology of fundamentalists, "...they [fundamentalists] select employing those features which will best reinforce their identity, keep their movement together, build defenses around its boundaries, and keep others at a distance."⁸⁰ This selective approach by fundamentalists is better characterized as bowdlerization. Bowdlerization implies the subtraction or deletion of ideas/values because they are deemed against the true faith. Both modern and traditional concepts are subject to such a process. Bowdlerization aims to construct an alternative worldview and institutions that challenge the dominance of secularism. To that end, fundamentalists embrace dualism and absolutism to further demarcate themselves from the traditionalists and modernists. To protect their religion from the attacks of modernity, fundamentalists select from their faith certain doctrines that are not easily reconcilable with modern scientific rationality. Fundamentalists then embellish and interpret these doctrines in a way that concerns their political ambitions. Because of this, fundamentalists portray themselves as being different from the westernized and lesser others. Fundamentalists also present themselves as "members of a sacred remnant,"⁸¹ as the elect who are uniquely positioned to defend the faith from their so-called coreligionists and the hostile West. Fundamentalists' religious core leads toward aggression. Their identity formation which is based on a demonized other, combined with their emulation of the dominant secular other, leads to their resentment and desire for power.⁸² By making use of Marty's theoretical framework, this research aims "to understand the fundamentalists' perception of an external world order that often developed in

⁸⁰ Marty, op.cit., ix.

⁸¹ Appleby, op.cit., 40.

⁸² Ibid.

contrast to the normative order prescribed by the religious tradition"⁸³ and elucidate their religiously perceived interests.

This thesis employs a sociological perspective, focusing on the drivers of significant societal changes and their consequences. Max Weber fits in by showing how class, status, and power underpin society. This relates to how these self-proclaimed Islamic groups are preoccupied with their stature. Status and class affect individuals' and groups' capability to disseminate ideas. This is pertinent to the study of competing religious factions. At the basis of Weber's theories lies rationality. However, Weber has a fluid conceptualization of rationalism, rationalization, and rationality.⁸⁴⁸⁵ This dissertation unpacks these terms. Weber's overarching goal was to determine the origins of Western rationality, and why that rationality is absent in other cultures.⁸⁶

Rationalism is an attitude of pragmatic orientation to the attainment of goals. It can be found in even the most primitive societies. As Weber put it:

“The most elementary forms of behavior motivated by religious or magical factors are oriented to this world. . . . Furthermore, religiously or magically motivated behavior is relatively rational behavior, especially in its earliest manifestations. It follows rules of experience, though it is not necessarily action in accordance with a means-end schema. Rubbing will elicit sparks from pieces of wood, and in like fashion the mimetical actions of a magician will evoke rains from the heavens.”⁸⁷⁸⁸

⁸³ Marty, op.cit., x.

⁸⁴ Stephen Kalberg, “Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History,” *American Journal of Sociology* 85, no. 5 (March 1, 1980): 1145.

⁸⁵ Ann Swidler, “The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber,” *Sociological Inquiry* 43, no. 1 (1973): 35.

⁸⁶ Sung Ho Kim, “Max Weber,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2019 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/weber/>.

⁸⁷ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittick (New York: Bedminster Press), 1968, 460. Cited in

⁸⁸ Swidler, op.cit., 36.

Thus, rationalism is characterized by its relationship with immediate desires. Such desires are not motivated by values.

Rationalization is the systematization of ideas. The more religions go beyond rituals, the more they are involved in the systemic ordering of ideas. According to Weber: “Prophets⁸⁹ systematized religion with a view to unifying the relationship of man to the world, by reference to an ultimate and integrated value position.”⁹⁰ Rationalization is the process by which ideas influence actions on a societal basis. Rationalization is also a means by which ideas evolve. According to Weber, this rationalization interacts with religions. It is only when specific values and images embodied in religions are rationalized into a coherent worldview do they gain influence.⁹¹ As Weber put it: “Yet redemption attained a specific significance only where it expressed a systematic and rationalized “image of the world” and represented a stand in the face of the world.”^{92,93} Rationalization provides a framework by which people understand their reality. Consequently, rationalization directly influences peoples’ interactions with their world, and actions generally. However, just as rationalization allows ideas to influence society, rationalization itself is affected. Per Weber:

“The nature of the desired sacred values has been strongly influenced by the nature of the external interest-situation and the corresponding way of life of the ruling strata and thus by the social stratification itself. But the reverse also holds: wherever the direction of the whole way of life has been methodically rationalized, it has been profoundly determined by the

⁸⁹ However none of the religious groups being studied define prophets the way Weber. At the same time, this paper is attempting to present these fundamentalist groups in a way that they would recognize themselves. Engagement with this issue is the key to identifying the limitations of Weber’s approach.

⁹⁰ Sung Ho Kim, “Max Weber, ”op. cit.,

⁹¹ Swidler, op.cit., 36.

⁹² Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, op.cit, 460.

⁹³ Cited in Ann Swidler, op.cit., 36.

ultimate values toward which this rationalization has been directed. These values and positions were thus religiously determined.”⁹⁴⁹⁵

Another characteristic of rationalization is the establishment of an internal dynamic of change within the ideas. As the ideas become more and more consistent, they allow for the conceptualization of new problems, which can be resolved within the internal framework generated by the ideas. As Weber argued:

“The need for an ethical interpretation of the meaning of the distribution of fortunes among men increased with the growing rationality of conceptions of the world. As the religious and ethical reflections upon the world were increasingly rationalized and primitive, and magical notions were eliminated, the theodicy of suffering encountered increasing difficulties.”⁹⁶⁹⁷

Rationalization in the Weberian sense is understood as a drive for calculability and predictability.⁹⁸ Rationalization is essential to ideas’ continuity and internal stability.

Rationalization according to Weber is how ideas develop their internal logic. This allows ideas to become well-established and influence other aspects of social life. The accomplishment of this enables their drive for world mastery. Thus, rationalization is a way to perceive the world. It is also a means for groups to change their worldview, as well as the world itself. It is worth noting that both movements (IS and IIP) believe that they are manipulating events rather than creating them.

Max Weber studies how long-term rationalization processes are rooted in values. This can be studied by understanding the relationship between rationalities and social actions. At the basis of Weber’s theory on rationalizations lie four forms of social action: affectual, traditional, value-rational, and means-end. These forms of actions are ahistorical, and not bound to any societal

⁹⁴ Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, ed. C.W. Mills, trans. H.H Gerth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 286-287.

⁹⁵ Cited in Swidler, *op.cit.*, 37.

⁹⁶ Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, *op.cit.*, 275

⁹⁷ Cited in Swidler, *op.cit.*, 37.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

context. Weber argued that man did not acquire his rationality with the French Enlightenment, making his scope broader and less Eurocentric. These forms of action were universal but only applicable to specific contexts. Weber sought to expand the scope of his theories to determine patterns. Traditional and affectual actions are done with little thought. The former is determined by habit and the latter is driven by emotion. The greater the extent to which ideas orient actions, the more these actions become rational actions. What differentiates value-rational action from traditional and affectual action is the extent to which ideas control the action. Rational action is oriented by ideas in their entirety. The results of such an action are considered and measured. Both instrumentally-rational and value-rational actions stem from a conscientious effort to organize them based on ideas. However, instrumentally-rational actions are characterized by a high degree of control by the ideas over the desired end, as opposed to value-rational actions. Value-rational actions are done for their own sake. Thus, per Weber, instrumentally-rational actions are more rational than value-rational actions. Societies are differentiated by the extent to which rationality affects their cultures and institutions.

Weber identifies four types of rationalities: practical, theoretical, substantive, and formal. Weber's typology on rationalities is designed for determining patterns. Practical rationality is defined as "every way of life that views and judges worldly activity in relation to the individual's purely pragmatic and egoistic interests as practical rational."⁹⁹ Theoretical rationality involves the mastery of reality through the development of ever-precise abstract terms. This form of rationality is not a call to action. Rather, it's a call for analyzing one's experiences as well as ordering thought processes through logical deduction. This type of rationality appears to be the

⁹⁹ Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," *American Journal of Sociology* 85, no. 5 (March 1, 1980): 1151

one favored by Weber himself. This is because Weber claimed that systemic thinkers throughout history have made use of this form of rationality.¹⁰⁰

Substantive rationality is like practical rationality in that it directly transforms actions into patterns. However, it is not done based on means-end calculation. Instead, this type of rationality pertains to clusters of values of varying content and comprehensiveness. Substantive rationality is the result of people's inherent capacity for value-rational action. According to Weber, there is no universal standard by which some values are more rational than other values. Value-rational action stems from individuals' preferences for certain ideas, and the systemized ordering of their actions to conform to these values. Formal rationality is a bureaucratic form of domination and comes only with industrialization. Formal rationality is a mean-end calculation aimed at generating universal laws or regulations. These calculations of abstract rules are done while disregarding individuals. Different personalities, charismatic or not, are treated the same way by these rational procedures. Bureaucratic domination exemplifies formal rationality because it is action-oriented. Also, it is governed by rules and the most efficient means to adhere to them. The aim of bureaucratic domination is the resolving of problems based on universal and abstract regulations in the most effective and precise manner possible.¹⁰¹¹⁰²¹⁰³

Rationality refers to a unique relationship between ideas and actions. Rationality to Weber is the control of action by ideas. These ideas, in turn, form the basis of society. Rationality, in contrast to rationalism, pertains to goals that have been arranged according to values. Weber

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 1152.

¹⁰¹ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner's, 1958), 77. Cited in:

¹⁰² Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," *American Journal of Sociology* 85, no. 5 (March 1, 1980): 1151

¹⁰³ Ibid, 1154, 1155.

argued that it characterized modern capitalism. Rational action is that which is efficient and methodical. The critical element underpinning rationality is the control exercised by conscious ideas. The more an idea influences a society and its institutions the greater its rationality.

According to Weber, Calvinist Protestantism represents an example of an idea fully controlling one's life:

The person who lives as a worldly ascetic is a rationalist, not only in the sense that he rationally systematizes his own conduct, but also in his rejection of everything that is ethically irrational, esthetic, or dependent upon his own emotional reactions to the world and its institutions. The distinctive goal always remains the alert, methodical control of one's own pattern of life and behavior.¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵

Weber understood the rationality of Calvinism and capitalism not in terms of the actions they encourage, but rather of the actions they imbibe with meanings.

A corollary to Weber's rationalization is Francis Fukuyama's insight into how the demand for recognition and dignity shapes collective identities.¹⁰⁶ The question of dignity offers a broader understanding of identity politics, beyond its economic dimensions. Fukuyama bases his arguments on Plato's understanding of human motivation. Fukuyama and Plato argued that the human psyche consists of desire, reason, and most importantly for Fukuyama, *thymos*. *Thymos* represents judgments of worth. Individuals desire positive evaluations of their worth. These evaluations are often made by others.¹⁰⁷ When one receives these positive evaluations, he/she feels proud. However, when one perceives himself or herself to be undervalued, that person feels anger. Fukuyama argues that *thymos* lies at the heart of modern identity politics. Liberal democracies have continuously accommodated new demands for recognition. However,

¹⁰⁴ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, op. cit., 280

¹⁰⁵ Cited in Swidler, op. cit., 37.

¹⁰⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), xv.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 15.

this increased accommodation of the identities of minorities has, in turn, caused a backlash. This reaction by the more established identity groups is a consequence of their decreased stature.

Identity has also become a critical issue in the “then-colonial” world, as Fukuyama calls it. Fukuyama applies his *thymos*-centric approach to the issue of Islamism which he holds to be valid. Fukuyama characterizes Islamism as a modern phenomenon. It takes place in the context of rapid and unplanned urbanization. Another driving factor behind Islamism is immigration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. Muslim immigrants to Europe have been confronted with a different lifestyle in which their traditional norms are challenged. Moreover, these immigrants are faced with Western societies that do not provide public support for their unique identity. Islamists provide an alternative that calls for pride in one’s identity.¹⁰⁸ While I disagree with Fukuyama’s use of the term “Islamism,”¹⁰⁹ his insights on the relationship between religious identity and social status are pertinent to my argument. One of the most powerful emotional arguments driving self-proclaimed Islamic groups is the reaction against modernity’s perceived disrespect for religion

Scott Appleby has provided an overview of the literature about fundamentalism. Unlike Fukuyama, Appleby focuses on the actual religious teachings. According to him, the debate revolves around whether or not religious movements seeking power are more violent than their secular counterparts. Some scholars have viewed fundamentalism as interpretations of religions that amplify their destructive power. It is worth noting that Appleby collaborated with Marty on the Fundamentalism Project. Appleby himself insists on a religious core for fundamentalism. The "weak religion" school does not ignore the structural influences of the religious community.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 6.

¹⁰⁹ This term is an exonym that obfuscates more than it clarifies.

However, it also emphasizes other factors, such as the encroachment of competing actors. Other factors considered are tensions over language, blood, and birth. In contrast, the "strong religion" interpretive approach claims that religion's history demonstrates that certain religions are a sufficient cause to inspire violence. The "strong religion" school calls for textual analysis of religious scriptures and interviews with the purveyors of violent religious thought. As Appleby puts it:

Strong religion is to cluster works which see religion itself as the source of, or justification for, deadly violence, or which emphasize distinctive religious practices, beliefs, and ideologies as the decisive ingredients in violent movements that may also draw on nationalist, ethnic, or other motivations. My second category, *weak religion*, refers to works that present religion as a dependent variable in deadly violence, the primary source of which is secular in origin (e.g., enacted by the state, or by nationalist or ethnic extremists).¹¹⁰

Among the adherents of that approach is Mark Juergensmeyer.¹¹¹ The pathological school instead argues that the followers of fundamentalism have embraced psycho-social deviancy. A notable proponent of that reading is Charles B. Strozier.¹¹²

Charles B. Strozier, who presents it as a mindset, offers a unique take on fundamentalism. Strozier utilizes psychoanalytical theory to develop his interpretive method. The *fundamentalist mindset* is based on binary thinking, anger intertwined with paranoia, in a group context. Fundamentalist groups have apocalyptic orientations that have distinct perspectives on time, death, and violence. These groups rely on charismatic leadership.¹¹³¹¹⁴ Strozier's interpretive

¹¹⁰ R. Scott Appleby, "Religious Violence: The Strong, the Weak, and the Pathological," in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 17.

¹¹³ Charles Strozier, et al., *The Fundamentalist Mindset*, accessed December 4, 2019, 12 https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Fundamentalist_Mindset.html?id=mWqLrJpSA4oC.

approach sees militant religions as the "distilled essence" of a mindset found in both secular and religious actors. What is in play is a "recurrent manifestation of a paranoid habit of the mind"¹¹⁵ shaped by an experience of deep humiliation or identification with those who were deeply humiliated. This phenomenon can be found in individuals as well as violent groups. Thus, fundamentalism, whether secular or religious, has a violent telos and trajectory. Fundamentalism invites chaos and creativity. Its adherents use selective religious traditions to construct a modern religious alternative to a hostile secular environment. One way by which this alternative religious state is attained is through extremist violence. However, it is important to point out that many fundamentalists have adopted that mindset without resorting to violence. Strozier and Marty's different approaches to fundamentalism are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they highlight various aspects of fundamentalism. Marty shows the elements underpinning fundamentalists' identities, while Strozier examines their group dynamics. Marty's and Strozier's theorizations on fundamentalism overlap regarding how charismatic authority is the cornerstone of fundamentalism.

In addition to paranoia, the fundamentalist mindset is characterized by a kairotic perception of time, according to Strozier. On one hand, Cartesian time is evenly spaced, accurate, predictable, and forms the backdrop of modern societies. On the other hand, kairotic time is uneven. It is experienced in varying degrees of intensity. Values affect the extent to which time is perceived. **Kairotic time is based on Sigmund Freud's conception of time in his theorization of the Oedipus complex. Key moments in childhood have transformative consequences. Freud's insights into the elastic perception of time, owing to an event of**

¹¹⁴ Luke Galen, "The Fundamentalist Mindset: Psychological Perspectives on Religion, Violence, and History," *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 21, no. 3 (2011): 237.

¹¹⁵ Strozier et al. op.cit., 12.

extreme misery, can be applied to trauma. Traumatic events shape how time is perceived, especially by groups with a paranoiac break from society i.e., fundamentalists. Kairotic time is predictive. The present is the proper context for the accomplishment of great actions. The future can only be conceptualized via a transformative event. Consequently, the end goal of fundamentalist groups is an apocalyptic transformation of society. It is a call for redemptive violence. The destruction wrought on corrupt societies is a prerequisite for a new, purer state of affairs. Kairotic time reinforces one's paranoia. The intensity with which sentiments are felt is reinforced. Kairotic time is always running out, and a belief in the imminent end affects fundamentalists' goals. The paranoid fundamentalist's empathy has dissolved into his emotional exaggerations. This in turn reinforces his aggression. The paranoid fundamentalist is grandiose; he sees history as being a narration of forces being aligned against him. Such a person suffers from victimization and negative grandiosity, whereby the extreme significance of the person generates a heightened degree of hostility. This furthers his drive for violence whereby the "other" is the personification of evil. Violence is seen as self-protection against a constant tormentor. Extreme measures are the natural remedy for ever-increasing threats.¹¹⁶

Mark Juergensmeyer examines what he calls cultures of violence. He argues that these cultures form the backdrop to religious terrorism. These cultures act as a community of support for religious terrorism. These cultures are characterized by a high degree of moral presumption. Overlapping with Marty's fundamentalism, Juergensmeyer's cultures of violence perceive that they are already under attack. According to these cultures' adherents, violence is simply the natural response to the violence they have experienced. Juergensmeyer argues that in certain

¹¹⁶ Charles B. Strozier, "The Apocalyptic Imagination and the Fundamentalist Mindset," *New England Journal of Public Policy* 29, no. 1 (2017): 7.

situations, religion in itself can be an explanatory variable in acts of terrorism and not merely a cover for socioeconomic concerns. Juergensmeyer's definition of culture comes from Michel Foucault. It is a paradigm that defines the connections of all knowledge. This approach draws a direct link between speech and acts. Juergensmeyer's methodology is based on unstructured interviews to obtain the terrorists' religious worldviews. His use of the term "terrorism" is problematic, as it is unlikely those who are accused of it self-identify as such. The use of that term hinders Juergensmeyer's goal of understanding his subjects' worldviews. Moreover, his conceptualization of violence is problematic as it leaves out state-sponsored acts of aggression. However, I share Juergensmeyer's assessment of religion's importance when studying actions and modes of their legitimation. Juergensmeyer's methodology of gleaning from individuals' sayings their perception of the other is another addition to the literature, which I will make use of when discussing Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, Qutb, Al-Qaradawi, Bin Laden, and IS.¹¹⁷

A counterpoint is offered by William Cavanaugh regarding the concept of religious violence.¹¹⁸ Cavanaugh argues there is no reason to assume that people kill for God as opposed to a plethora of secular reasons.¹¹⁹ Cavanaugh claims that the popular belief which holds that religions are more inclined to violence when compared to secular ideologies is a mere truism. Cavanaugh goes further, whereby the myth of religious violence serves to justify the violence emanating from secular actors. It is part of a constructed binary, between the West and the Muslim world. The West is presented as being rational and peacemaking, while Muslims are portrayed as being fanatical and characterized by religious violence. The myth of religious

¹¹⁷ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God – The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 14.

¹¹⁸ William T. Cavanaugh, "Religious Violence as Modern Myth," *Political Theology* 15, no. 6 (2014): 486

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

violence serves to justify Western military interventions, targeting Muslims. Cavanaugh rejects the secular/religious binary, as it is not a trans-historical and trans-cultural phenomenon. Instead, it is a direct expression of European power.¹²⁰ Regarding my research, I need to be cognizant of Cavanaugh's critiques when utilizing the theoretical approaches to fundamentalism and rationality. My aim, as previously mentioned, will be to present the religious groups I am analyzing in a way that they can recognize themselves. In doing so, I will have avoided regurgitating crude stereotypes that have served as a pretext for Western colonial ambitions.

Regarding my thesis, the religious thought of IS, the official religious institutions of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and elements of the Muslim Brotherhood can all be traced directly to the ideas of a 13th-century theologian: Ibn Taymiyah. **The following section engages with the thoughts of Taquiddeen Ahmad Ibn Taymiyah**, as his beliefs represent the intersection between the (so-called) Islamic State (IS) and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). I structure my analysis of Ibn Taymiyah via the overlap between the concept of fundamentalism and rationalization, which this study refers to as *fundamentalist rationalization*. Fundamentalism is the opposition to the pre-existing traditional authorities and a harkening back to a past golden age. This proclaimed exclusive relationship with the golden past is intended to delegitimize traditionalists, portraying them as religious deviants who have strayed away from the proper path. It is also a call to reject and possibly overthrow social and political norms. This supposed exclusive connection to a past golden age as expressed by IS's ethnicity, as well as elements of the IIP, is the *praxis* of a fundamentalist rationalization. This conceptual framework elucidates numerous aspects of IS's and IIP's arguments, providing a unique perspective of what they are.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 489.

2.3 The Praxis of Ibn Taymiyah's Fundamentalist Rationalization

Saudi Arabia and IS represent the praxis of Ibn Taymiyah's thoughts. Considering how it came into existence, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia increasingly resembles an "IS that made it."¹²¹ Saudi Arabia is the third iteration of a political entity underpinned by an alliance between the Wahhabi religious establishment and the Saud family. All three Saudi States thrived on massacres and starvation campaigns both in the Arabian Peninsula and in Iraq as they exterminated their opponents. These campaigns were glorified by Saudi clerics who utilized Ibn Taymiyah to justify their stances and actions towards anyone who did not abide by their religious precepts. A case in point is their views on apostasy. These disciples of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab and Ibn Taymiyah considered anyone who did not follow them to be guilty of apostasy and blasphemy. In doing so, they believed the killing of apostates to be an act of worship. Moreover, IS's mufti, Turki Ibn Mubarak Al Binali,¹²² approvingly noted the rise of the First Saudi State and claimed that his group is trying to emulate the state formation to bolster the group's "legitimacy."¹²³¹²⁴¹²⁵ Ibn Taymiyah is also an inspiration for a host of murderous extremist organizations,¹²⁶ such as but not restricted to, Al Qaeda,¹²⁷ Jund Ansar Allah, Boko Haram,¹²⁸¹²⁹

¹²¹ Kamel Kamel Daoud, "Opinion | Saudi Arabia, an ISIS That Has Made It (Published 2015)," *The New York Times*, November 20, 2015, sec. Opinion,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/opinion/saudi-arabia-an-isis-that-has-made-it.html>.

¹²² U.S. Central Command, "Coalition Forces Killed Turki-al-Bin' Ali," U.S. Central Command, accessed October 12, 2020, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1220221/coalition-forces-killed-turki-al-bin-ali/>.

¹²³ Cole Bunzel, "The Kingdom and the Caliphate," *Duel of the Islamic States*, Washington, Carnegie, 2016. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/18/kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of-islamic-states-pub-62810>

¹²⁴ He was also the highest-ranking Bahraini in the group.

¹²⁵ Alexander Alexander Dziadosz, "Islamic State Lays out Case for 'allegiance' to Its Leader," *Reuters*, October 2, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-idUSKCN0HR19820141002>.

¹²⁶ Djallil Lounnas, "The Failed Ideological Hybridization of the Islamic State," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 46, no. 3 (April 30, 2020): 281.

the Haqqani Network, Tahreek Taliban Pakistan, Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahideen,¹³⁰ the Nursah Front,¹³¹ Hay'at Tahreer Al-Sham,¹³² Fatah Al Islam,¹³³ Usbat Al Ansar¹³⁴ and so forth.¹³⁵

Ibn Taymiyah represents a rejection of the traditional Islamic authorities¹³⁶¹³⁷¹³⁸ as well as his contemporary political context. Ibn Taymiyah sought to carve out a middle position in the debates that were raging between the traditionalist Ash'arites and the Mutazilites. While the

¹²⁷ The Base

¹²⁸ Also known as the Islamic State in West Africa

¹²⁹ It has splintered into numerous subgroups. One faction is loyal to the group's founder Abu Baker Shekau and the other follows IS central's (the leadership based in Syrian and Iraq) replacement, Abu Musab Al Barnawi. None of these disparate factions have called into question Ibn Taymiyah, or the centrality of his thought.

¹³⁰ The Mujahideen Youth Movement

¹³¹ The Support for Victory Front

¹³² It is disputed whether Hay'at Tahreer Al Sham has splintered off Al Qaeda/ Jabhat Al Nusrah or represents a mere rebranding of it. I lean towards the former hypothesis, but that's beyond the scope of this project. Anyhow, these differences, if they do in fact exist, do not concern Ibn Taymiyah and the centrality of his thought.

¹³³ The Conquest of Islam

¹³⁴ League of the Partisans

¹³⁵ While I find the concept of terrorism not to be analytically useful, it is worth noting all these organizations are listed as proscribed terror groups by Canada, the United States, the United Nations, and often by all of them.

¹³⁶ Notable traditionalist enemies of Ibn Taymiyah are Abu Hayyaan Al Andalusi, Aladdin Al Bukhari, Jalal Al Din Al Suyuti, Abu Al Qasim Al Qushayri and Muhammad Murtada Al Zabeedi. Al Andalusi was originally a fan of Ibn Taymiyah, and then had a falling out with him over the issue of anthropomorphism. He consequently authored poems against Ibn Taymiyah. Al Andalusi, Taqi al-Din al-Subki, and Abu Saeed Al-Alaee were contemporaries of Ibn Taymiyah, and among his most vocal opponents. The other clerics listed all authored books against Ibn Taymiyah. Their critiques of Ibn Taymiyah mirrored one another, hence my collective referral to them as traditionalist. Salahudeen Al Safadi was originally a student of Ibn Taymiyah, before leaving him and siding with the traditionalists. Shams ad-Din Al Dhahabi represents a third case. While Al Dhahabi praised Ibn Taymiyah for his supposed fixation on the Prophetic method, Al Dhahabi criticized Ibn Taymiyah for his desire to be the leader of all sheikhs, and his disrespect for his greater forbearers. I personally believe Al Dhahabi's critique is manifestly important for understanding Ibn Taymiyah.

¹³⁷ A strategy of divide and conquer is play here, on the part of Ibn Taymiyah

¹³⁸ Eric A. Posner, Kathryn Spier, and Adrian Vermeule, "Divide and Conquer," *The Journal of Legal Analysis* 2, no. 2 (2010): 437.

Ash'arites and Mutazilites laid claim to reason in establishing their arguments, Ibn Taymiyah sought to downplay the role of reason in religious debates. Instead, Ibn Taymiyah appealed to *fitrah*,¹³⁹ or the basic human instincts in determining right from wrong.¹⁴⁰ In developing his *fitrah*-alternative, Ibn Taymiyah essentially claimed that he did not need to justify his arguments or make sure they were internally consistent. This study argues that his principal opponents were the traditional clergy. Many of his disputes were theological, such as Anthropomorphism¹⁴¹¹⁴²¹⁴³¹⁴⁴ and Intercession.¹⁴⁵ However, there exist numerous intersections between his religious and political oppositions.¹⁴⁶ His positions emphasized a refusal to eat from the table of a Muslim leader whom he deemed insufficiently pious:

"You claim that you are Muslim, and you have with you Mu'adhhdhins,¹⁴⁷ Muftis, Imams, and Shaykhs, but you invaded us and reached our country for what? While your father and your grandfather Hulagu [the Mongol Emperor who sacked Baghdad] were non-believers, they did not attack, and they kept their promise. But you promised and broke your promise."¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰¹⁵¹

¹³⁹ فطرة

¹⁴⁰ Sophia Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya's Theological Ethics* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2015), 4.

¹⁴¹ التجسيم

¹⁴² Ahmad Ibn Taymiyah, *مجموع فتاوى ابن تيمية* [*The Compendium of Ibn Taymiyah's Religious Edicts*], vol. 4, 37 vols. (Al Madinah Al Munawwarah, Saudi Arabia: مجمع الملك فهد لطباعة المصحف [King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Quran], 2004), 374 <https://ar.islamway.net/book/10573>.

¹⁴³ A notable traditionalist opponent of Ibn Taymiyah on the issue of anthropomorphism is Abu Baker Al Bayhaqi أبو بكر البيهقي. He authored a book aimed specifically at refuting Ibn Taymiyah's position. See *Al Asmaa' Wal Sifaat Names and Attributes*, by Al Bayhaqi.

¹⁴⁴ Abu Baker Al Bayhaqi, [Names and Attributes] *الأسماء والصفات*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Beirut, Lebanon: [Arab Book Publishing House] العربي الكتاب دار, 1994) 139.

¹⁴⁵ التوسل

¹⁴⁶ "How am I to eat your food and it is all from the sheep have stolen from the people and their trees that you have cut down?"

¹⁴⁷ Those who call the believers to the obligatory prayers

¹⁴⁸ انك تزعم أنك مسلم ومعك قاض وإمام وشيخ ومؤذنون على ما بدا لنا فغزوتنا وأبوك وجدك كانا كافرين وماعملا الذي عملت، عاهدا فوفيا وأنت عاهدت فغدرت وقلت فما وفيت وجرت

He characterized the traditional scholars as too submissive to tyrants who refuse to abide by Islam's judgments. This rejection meant that Ibn Taymiyah considered everyone other than his followers as blasphemers.¹⁵² This included the Caliph, who relied on these apostate scholars and the masses that followed them in their misguidance. The solution for Ibn Taymiyah was the wholesale reformulation of society. Ibn Taymiyah wanted a pure community, with religion permeating all aspects. This "reformed" community was to utilize his religious thoughts exclusively and not allow any heretical innovations.¹⁵³ Shifting power relations correlate with the rise of fundamentalist rationalization in the name of Islam. The weakness of the traditionalists paved the way for the alternative proposed by the fundamentalists. Ibn Taymiyah was able to exploit a permissible context characterized by a weak Abbasid caliphate which was badly mauled by the Mongol invasion. Ibn Taymiyah's popularity stemmed from a desire to challenge the traditionalist clergy who were allied to the Abbasids. In addition, the traditionalist clergy were not able to impose the punishment of apostasy on Ibn Taymiyah. Had the traditionalist clergy had its way, Ibn Taymiyah would have been executed for refusing to recant. Instead, local

¹⁴⁹ Muhammad Azziz Ben Shams and Ali bin Muhammad Al-Umran, كتاب الجامع لسيرة شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية خلال سبعة قرون [The Compendium of the Biography of the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyah Within Seven Centuries], Second (Mecca, Saudi Arabia: الفوائد دار عالم, [The World of Benefits Publishing House] 1422), <https://al-maktaba.org/book/33576/489>. Here, he cites *Al Muqfee Al Kabir* (a 14th century historiography)

¹⁵⁰ Ahmad bin Ali Al Maqrizi, الكَبِيرُ الْمُقَفَّى [The Great Assonance] (Beirut, Lebanon: [The Islamic West Publishing House] دار الغرب الإسلامي, 1990, 205.

¹⁵¹ Salih Al Diwani, شام يا يعودون أحفاد هولاءكو "[The Descendants of Hulagu are Returning O Greater Syria]," Watanksa, July 12, 2012, <https://wt.n.sa/a/11663>.

¹⁵² David S. Sorenson, "Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISIS," *Parameters*, 2014, Gale Academic OneFile.

¹⁵³ Sayyid Qutb claimed is that a person's faith is not true unless Islam is being fully implemented, in governance, as well as privately. Both traditionalists and Ibn Taymiyah are in opposition to Qutb. Like Qutb, Ibn Taymiyah considered everyone but himself to be a heretic. However, he came to that conclusion for completely different reasons. For Qutb, it was un-Islamic rule. For Ibn Taymiyah, it was religious innovations.

rulers attempted to placate both the traditionalists and Ibn Taymiyah's followers by imprisoning Ibn Taymiyah for the last two years of his life. Ibn Taymiyah's imprisonment was not particularly strict as he was able to continue writing, and in doing so further expanding his following.¹⁵⁴

Another aspect of fundamentalism, particularly apparent in Ibn Taymiyah's teachings, is his bowdlerization of the pre-existing traditional authority. By this, elements of the opposing authority are reconstructed to present new forms of legitimacy. Ibn Taymiyah's bowdlerization is exemplified by his supposed exclusive connection to a past golden age, the Salaf in his case, and the *bricolage* characterizing his theology. **This presumed exclusive connection to the past signifies that Ibn Taymiyah considered all Muslims throughout the previous six centuries to the time of the Salaf to be blasphemers.** In the name of Islam, Ibn Taymiyah thought all his Muslim religious opponents to be disbelievers. More specifically, Ibn Taymiyah claimed to be the only legitimate Sunni scholar. He dismissed all non-Sunni groups out of hand as being heretical.¹⁵⁵

It is essential to note the lack of originality in Ibn Taymiyah's religious theses. While Ibn Taymiyah positioned himself as a Sunni authority, he incorporated different ideas coming from various religious groups, all the while considering them to be blasphemous. For example, Ibn Taymiyah accepted Al Karaamiyah's¹⁵⁶ belief that God is above the throne¹⁵⁷ while rejecting

¹⁵⁴ Henri Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyyah | Biography, History, & Philosophy | Britannica," Britannica, January 1, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ibn-Taymiyyah>.

¹⁵⁵ Mohamed Badar, Masaki Nagata, and Tiphonie Tuani, "The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of Takfir," *Arab Law Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (May 1, 2017): 134–62, 134.

¹⁵⁶ A descriptive relating to Muhammad Ibn Karaam Al Sijjstani

¹⁵⁷ Abd Al Qaahir Ibn Tahir Al Tamimi, الفرق بين الفرق [*The Difference between the Sects*], (Beirut, Lebanon: دار الآفاق الجديدة [New Horizons Press] and دار الجيل [Generation Press], 1037), 202.

their ideas on faith. Regarding Al Bayaniah,¹⁵⁸¹⁵⁹¹⁶⁰¹⁶¹ he took their anthropomorphic theses while rejecting their postulate that parts of God will cease to exist. Crucially, while Ibn Taymiyah accepted some of the Karaamiyah and Al Bayaniah's views, he nevertheless dismissed them as being heretics for not being Sunni while simultaneously condemning the traditional Sunni authorities for rejecting the Karaamiyah and Al Bayaniah's anthropomorphic postulates. Ibn Taymiyah combined different religious views that have enjoyed a degree of popularity with diverse audiences. This *bricolage* indicates that Ibn Taymiyah aimed to unite a plethora of dissimilar religious trends gaining popularity and offering an alternative to the traditional religious authorities. It is also suggestive of Ibn Taymiyah's longer-term project, which is developing an alternative conceptualization and legitimation of Sunni authority. Ibn Taymiyah provided emotionally rich terms for new polities to take hold.

This pattern of bowdlerization and embellishment is repeated with Ibn Taymiyah's treatment of the Jahmiyah.¹⁶² Bowdlerization and embellishment are two core features of fundamentalism. Both are employed strategically and systemically. This type of fundamentalist argumentation is called fundamentalist rationalism. The Jahmiyah did not identify themselves as Sunnis. The Jahmiyah challenged the traditional Sunni authorities over the issue of the everlastingness of Paradise and Hell.¹⁶³ The Jahmiyah disagreed with the Sunni belief that Paradise and Hell do not come to an end, asserting that their existence is not everlasting. Ibn

¹⁵⁸ Tamimi op. cit., 227.

¹⁵⁹ As with a previous endnote, the word itself pertains to Bayaan Ibn Simaan. With the plural cognate it refers to his followers.

¹⁶⁰ To further clarify, these groups neither saw themselves as Sunni nor as Shia. They presented themselves as Karaamiyah Muslims and Bayaaniyah Muslims

¹⁶¹ The Tamimi text is a 11th century chronicle written by a contemporary of Al Karaamiyah and Al Bayaniyah

¹⁶² Followers of Jahm Ibn Safwan

¹⁶³ Al Tamimi, op. cit., 199.

Taymiyah crafted a novel middle position in his book called *The Deceptiveness of the Jahmiyah*. Despite the book's title, he accepts some of the Jahmiyah's arguments, for example, Hell does cease to exist. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyah claimed that the Jahmiyah were heretical in believing that Paradise would come to an end. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyah made his book an attack against both the traditionalists and the Jahmiyah, claiming both held the same belief.¹⁶⁴ Ibn Taymiyah wanted a movement that could encompass ideas gaining popularity while doing that in the name of traditional Salafi scholarship. On a personal note, this is one of Ibn Taymiyah's lesser-known positions. Based on his book's title alone, some of his followers believe that Ibn Taymiyah entirely repudiated the Jahmiyah.

Ibn Taymiyah's bowdlerization of Greek philosophy is particularly poignant. While Ibn Taymiyah presented himself as the guardian of the Salaf's orthodoxy, he freely borrowed from ideas and movements gaining popularity, all the while deeming them as heretical. A case in point would be the debate over the world's creation, which had been raging between the traditionalist Asha'arites¹⁶⁵/Maturidis¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁸ and some Mutazilites. On the one hand, Asha'arite traditional authorities believed that God is the creator of everything. On the other hand, some Mutazilite¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ “Bayan Talbis Al-Jahmiyyah - Ibn Taymiyyah (2 Volumes) ,” SifatuSafwa, accessed September 28, 2020, <https://www.sifatusafwa.com/en/salaf-books-on-sunnah/bayan-talbis-al-jahmiyyah-ibn-taymiyyah-2-volumes.html>.

¹⁶⁵ The followers of Abu Al-Hassan Al-Ash’ari

¹⁶⁶ The followers of Abu Mansur Al Maturidi

¹⁶⁷ On that point, Asha’rites and Maturidis are in agreement.

¹⁶⁸ Al Tamimi op. cit., 5.

¹⁶⁹ Note on the term Mutazilite: Traditionally the Mutazilites referred to themselves as *Ahl Al ‘Adl wal Tawheed*, People of Justice and Monotheism, while their opponents as labelled them as mutazilites, in reference to their creedal isolation. Al Tamimi op. cit., 15. (The root word عزل ‘Azl means isolating). However, a person by the name of Muhammad Ratib Al-Nabulsi is attempting to revive their thought, and refers to himself as a Mutazilite. While it very well might be the case that Nabulsi has not done his research, I nevertheless refer to the Mutazilites as such because this is how they self-identify today.

factions claimed that the substance or essence¹⁷⁰ of the world is beginningless with God. The root of the debate is the desire of some Mutazilite leaders, such as Ibn Sina¹⁷¹¹⁷²¹⁷³ and Al-Farabi,¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁶¹⁷⁷ to strengthen the faith by incorporating philosophy. They further argued that the use of philosophy was a tool to make more coherent arguments, just as in mathematics.¹⁷⁸ Consequently, the Mutazilites, borrowing heavily from Aristotle's ontology and physics, argued that the essence of the world is without beginning.¹⁷⁹ The traditionalists rejected that postulate, arguing that by claiming the essence of the world is eternal, Mutazilites have associated partners with God. As such, the traditionalists accused the Mutazilites of uncritically accepting ideas that ultimately led to polytheism.¹⁸⁰ Ibn Taymiyah weighed in on the ongoing debate through the process of bowdlerization, selecting different aspects of the two competing sides while being opposed to both. Ibn Taymiyah agreed with the Mutazilites' thesis on the uncreated nature of the world's essence, all the while deeming the Mutazilites heretical for not being traditional Sunni Muslims. At the same time, he opposed the traditional authorities on that same point. For Ibn

¹⁷⁰ The term in Arabic is نوع

¹⁷¹ Avicenna Study Group Conference, *Interpreting Avicenna: Science And Philosophy In Medieval Islam-Proceedings Of The Second Conference Of The Avicenna Study Group* (BRILL, 2004). 80

¹⁷² Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā

¹⁷³ "Avicenna | Biography, Books, & Facts," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed January 25, 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Avicenna>.

¹⁷⁴ Joep Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice* (Leiden, the Netherlands: BRILL, 1994), xv. https://books.google.fr/books?id=YPRPgD7PY_4C

¹⁷⁵ Oliver Leaman, "Ghazālī and the Ash'arites," *Asian Philosophy* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 17–27, 17.

¹⁷⁶ Muḥammad Ibin Tarkhān Ibin Awzalağ al-Fārābī

¹⁷⁷ Encyclopædia Universalis, "Al Farabi," Encyclopædia Universalis, accessed January 25, 2021, <https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/al-farabi/>.

¹⁷⁸ "Avicenna (Ibn Sina): Logic | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy," accessed March 15, 2018, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/av-logic/>.

¹⁷⁹ Stephen Menn, "Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good," *The Review of Metaphysics* 45 (1992): 543–573, 544.

¹⁸⁰ Leaman, op.cit., 18.

Taymiyah and like-minded fundamentalists, the issue is not of consistency but rather the assembling of a coalition. Their goal was to incorporate some heterodox ideas that were becoming prevalent in society while simultaneously reaching out to individuals who were uncomfortable with openly rejecting traditional authorities and Sunni Islam. Again, many of Ibn Taymiyah's modern-day followers believe that he holds the traditional belief and that he represents a stern return to the orthodoxy of the righteous forefathers.

Ibn Taymiyah's epistemology does not allow for logic or the use of mental proofs. Instead, it is a call to follow Islamic scripture exclusively through Ibn Taymiyah. As rationalization pertains to the perception of the world, epistemology examines the mechanisms leading to that perception. Following his stated rejection of heretical innovations to the religion, Ibn Taymiyah deemed those who attempted to introduce philosophy to Islam as being blasphemers. Ibn Taymiyah staked the claim that the human mind is limited, and by consequence, cannot be used for ascertaining the truth. He postulated that logic is simply of no mentionable value. Ibn Taymiyah's epistemic hostility to logic also stemmed from his belief that there is no way of genuinely isolating logic from its philosophical milieu. Per that reasoning, trust in logic is misplaced and a backdoor for the corruption of the true faith by introducing foreign polytheistic concepts. Ibn Taymiyah's amalgamation of philosophy with logic and contempt for both was articulated in his statement: "Philosophical logic is like the flesh of a camel at the top of a mountain. It is not easy to climb the mountain, nor is the flesh good enough to justify climbing, nor is the path leading to it easy to follow."¹⁸¹¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ "The Reality of Philosophy - Ibn Taymiyyah," The Salafi Centre of Manchester, October 24, 2011, <https://salaficentre.com/2011/10/the-reality-of-philosophy/>.

¹⁸² Ahmad Ibn Taymiyah, الرد على المنطقيين (نصيحة أهل الإيمان في الرد على منطق اليونان)

Modern organizations espousing Ibn Taymiyah's thoughts are **neither able nor willing** to debate or engage with the contradictions inherent in his opinions, which in turn are the outcome of bowdlerization.¹⁸³ That is not to say that automatically a person who subscribes to Ibn Taymiyah's thoughts is a violent terrorist. However, in Ibn Taymiyah's work is found a justification for mass slaughter. It sees Muslims as apostates and pretenders, whose killing is an act of obedience to God. This correlates with Ibn Taymiyah's belief that only he and his followers are true believers, whereas they deemed everyone else as being a blasphemer who has strayed from the path of Salaf. Ibn Taymiyah's thought regarding authority is revolutionary. It does not recognize any but its own. Ibn Taymiyah was utilized to justify an armed uprising against the pre-existing authorities, even if they claimed to be caliphates, such as the Ottomans. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyah's thought justifies mass slaughter and deportation. It presents these acts as acceptable means for dealing with the blasphemers and constructing a new, purer, polity.

Moreover, in Ibn Taymiyah's case, the process of bowdlerization is subtle. This is because Ibn Taymiyah never credits these previous religious traditions. Nor does he accept them in their entirety. Instead, he selectively chooses whatever he deems as *politically expedient* or merely appealing to his tastes. The implication is that it is for Ibn Taymiyah exclusively to decide which religious traditions are to be bowdlerized or discarded. While the main thrust of Ibn Taymiyah's attack is aimed at traditional scholarship, Ibn Taymiyah cannot conceptualize any

[*Answering the Logicians (The Advice of the People of the Faith in Response to the Logic of the Greeks)*] (Beirut: Al-Rayan Institute, 2005):157.

¹⁸³ On a personal note, it makes debating some of his followers to be extremely frustrating, as they openly reject using their minds. Instead, to them piety is the degree to which they follow Ibn Taymiyah, or his acolytes on YouTube.

legitimate political or religious challenge to his teachings. Also, there is no distinction between the two, so Ibn Taymiyah cannot accept any disagreement.¹⁸⁴

Ibn Taymiyah was not an adherent of perennialism, but rather a fundamentalist. On the one hand, perennialism is the belief in the "[c]ommon mystical experiences across cultures and traditions."¹⁸⁵ On the other hand, fundamentalism is the revolutionary rejection of religious and political competitors. Fundamentalists draw an exclusive connection to a past golden age, and that exclusivity leads fundamentalists to reject the words and deeds of anyone who does not follow their teachings. A cornerstone of fundamentalism and Ibn Taymiyah's thought is bowdlerization.

The fundamentalist mindset Ibn Taymiyah promoted, correlates with **deep humiliation and foreign domination**. This thesis utilizes **Strozier's definition** when using the expression "fundamentalist mindset." Feelings of paranoia stem from that mindset. Regarding Ibn Taymiyah, he presented himself as a legitimate figure, owing to his calls for Jihad against the pagan Mongol invaders. These Mongol hordes represented a mortal threat to a significant number of Muslims. Ibn Taymiyah and his followers were even more infuriated by the Mongol leaders who had converted to Islam but refused to completely abide by the religion's orders, as Ibn Taymiyah saw it. Instead, these Mongol leaders continued to rule via their customary law known as Yasa or Yasiq. Per the beliefs of Ibn Taymiyah, the continued influence of Mongol customary law on Muslims is concomitant with the believers' continuous humiliation. These

¹⁸⁴ Hamzah Adesola Dawood, "Conceptualization of Roadmap of Qur'anic Education in Nigeria: Tribute to a Pioneer (Sheikh Murtadha Abdul Salaam)," *International Journal of Education and Research* 2, no. 1 (January 2014): 1.

¹⁸⁵ Jerome Gellman, "Mysticism," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2019 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/mysticism/>.

repeated humiliations form the backdrop to Ibn Taymiyah's paranoiac break with the rest of society. Ibn Taymiyah argued that since traditionalists were ineffective in resisting the Mongols' cultural intrusions, they were part of the problem. He went further and perceived heretical innovations introduced in the religion, left, right, and center. Equally guilty in Ibn Taymiyah's eyes were the ruling Mongols, the acquiescent traditionalist clergy, and the ignorant masses.

Binary thought characterizes Ibn Taymiyah's thinking: Either one was a true believer, i.e., he or his followers, or one was a blasphemer. Ibn Taymiyah developed a new movement reacting to the perceived irreligiosity of the time. This new movement made selective use of tradition to portray its adherents as a sacred remnant.¹⁸⁶ Ibn Taymiyah did not have any specific apocalyptic orientations, nor did he engage in a revolutionary armed struggle against the political authorities. His inability to implement his teachings can be partially explained because Ibn Taymiyah had a minimal number of followers and was imprisoned before he could gain a mass following.

Ibn Taymiyah's perception of authority is a radical break with the status quo, which holds for now, as it did during the 13th century. By presenting a novel **ethnicity** whose adherents are the sole inheritors of a distant golden age, the ethnic groups stemming from Ibn Taymiyah's thought offer an alternative form of authority/legitimacy.¹⁸⁷¹⁸⁸ Ibn Taymiyah's ethnic project is predicated on *charismatic authority*, as opposed to the pre-existing traditional authorities in the areas it targets, namely tribal actors. A rational-legal authority in a Weberian sense would not

¹⁸⁶ Johannes J.G. Jansen, "Ibn Taymiyyah and the Thirteenth Century: A Formative Period of Modern Muslim Radicalism," *Quaderni Di Studi Arabi* 5/6 (1987): 391–96.

¹⁸⁷ T.H. Rigby, "Weber's Typology of Authority: A Difficulty and Some Suggestions," *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 2, no. 1 (March 1, 1966): 2–15, 2.

¹⁸⁸ Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Abingdon: England, Psychology Press, 1991), 245.

apply, as it pertains to a modern, i.e., 20th-century German state. Charismatic authority revolves around a person with exceptional traits. In the case of Ibn Taymiyah, he is the only person whom his followers refer to as *Sheikh Ul-Islam*, literally the sheikh of Islam. This alternative poses a challenge to other authorities, notably the Abbasid Caliphate, its followers, and supportive clergy. Ibn Taymiyah's proposed authority is a replacement for the pre-existing religious and political leaders. Ibn Taymiyah sought to cultivate an image of a pious scholar, willing to challenge an authoritarian leadership. Ibn Taymiyah attempted to mold himself in the image of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, especially as Ibn Hanbal was quite popular in Ibn Taymiyah's days, in the area where he lived. Ibn Hanbal was a Sunni scholar and jurisconsult who refused to entertain the pro-Mutazilite policies of some Abbasid Caliphs. Ibn Hanbal maintained his religious stances, even though he was imprisoned and tortured. Ibn Taymiyah portrayed himself as a devout scholar who rejects any deviation from the true faith.¹⁸⁹ Ibn Taymiyah's followers to this day consider him to be an icon of personal bravery, steadfastness, and intellectual rigor.¹⁹⁰

2.4 Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab: The Reviver of Ibn Taymiyah's Fundamentalist Rationalization and the Ideological Founder of Saudi Arabia

Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, at the beginning of the 19th century, resurrected Ibn Taymiyah's ideas, his alternative ethnicity, and notions of authority. The relevance of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab¹⁹¹ is manifold, as he was able to implement Ibn Taymiyah's fundamentalist rationalization via the First Saudi State. This also applies to the Second Saudi State and the Third

¹⁸⁹ Alina Kokoschka and Birgit Krawietz, "Appropriation of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya," in *Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya*, ed. Birgit Krawietz and Georges Tamer (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 4, 11, 12

<https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/124096>.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ On the use of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab: This refers to Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab. When referring to his brother, Suleiman Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, his full name is used.

and its most recent iteration: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.¹⁹²¹⁹³¹⁹⁴ Ibn Abd Al Wahaab claimed an exclusive connection to a past golden age.¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁶ Just like Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab

¹⁹² The First Saudi State or the Emirate of Diriyah was established in 1744, as a direct result of the alliance between Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab and Muhammad Ibn Saud, in opposition to the reigning Ottoman Empire. An Ottoman counterattack in 1818 led by Ibrahim Pasha put an end to the First Saudi State. The Second Saudi State, or the Emirate of Najd, was established in 1824. It was destroyed in 1891 by another Ottoman army. The Ottomans were aided by local clans, most notably the Rashids. British-controlled Kuwait acted as a haven for the remnants of the Second Saudi state. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al Saud's wars of conquest in the Arabian Peninsula.

¹⁹³ Saudi Press Agency, "Diriyah: The Original Home of the Saudi State The Official Saudi Press Agency," Saudi Press Agency, November 20, 2019, <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2001219>.

¹⁹⁴ Joas Wagemakers, "The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' Wa-l-Bara'," International Journal of Middle East Studies 44, no. 1 (2012): 93–110, 95.

¹⁹⁵

قال محمد بن عبد الوهاب في كتاب مؤلفات الشيخ الامام محمد بن عبد الوهاب المجلد السادس الرسالة الثامن و العشرون ص 186 187 من محمد بن عبد الوهاب الى من يصل اليه هذا الكتاب من المسلمين سلام الله عليكم و بركاته و بعد...وأنا أخبركم عن نفسي قد طلبت العلم، واعتقد من عرفني أن لي معرفة، وأنا ذلك الوقت لا أعرف معنى "لا إله إلا الله"، ولا أعرف دين الإسلام قبل هذا الخير الذي من الله به، (معنى هذا الكلام أن قبل دعوته و قبل أن يفهم هو الاسلام كما يريد كان جاهلا بمعنى لا إله إلا الله") وكذلك مشايخي، ما منهم رجل عرف ذلك. فمن زعم من علماء العارض أنه عرف معنى "لا إله إلا الله"، أو عرف معنى الإسلام قبل هذا الوقت، أو زعم عن مشايخه أن أحداً عرف ذلك، فقد كذب وافترى،

He said from Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab to the Muslims whom this book reaches: Peace be upon you and His blessings. Furthermore ... [Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab wrote some verses from the Quran]. I [Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab] will tell you about myself. I have sought knowledge and those who knew me thought that I had knowledge, while I at that time did not know what "there is no god but Allah" meant. Nor did I know the religion of Islam before this goodness which Allah endowed upon me [This means that Ibn Abd Al Wahaab claimed that before his religious call and understanding of Islam, he was a disbeliever]. This was also the case regarding my sheikhs. None of them knew that [there is no god but Allah]. Whoever among the scholars of Al-'Aarid [an area in modern-day Saudi Arabia] claimed that he know the meaning of "there is no god but Allah" or knew the meaning of Islam before this time [the beginning of the Wahhabi call] or claimed that his sheikhs knew that, then he has lied slandered. [This is explicit proof that Ibn Abd Al Wahaab claimed that anyone who did not adhere to his religious precepts was a blasphemer, and that he had an exclusive connection to the Muslims of a previous era].

presented himself as the sole representative of the Salaf. He echoed Ibn Taymiyah's assertion that everyone who lived during the six hundred years between Ibn Taymiyah and the Salaf was a disbeliever.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹ Moreover, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab claimed everyone had blasphemed in the six hundred years that separated him from Ibn Taymiyah. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab was attributed by his followers the title of *Mujaddid*,²⁰⁰ i.e., the Reviver of the Faith. This reading of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's authority rejects the legitimacy of all actors who refuse to abide by Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's religious precepts. Thus, tribes, families, and individuals not following Ibn Abd Al Wahaab were portrayed as illegitimate heretics, whose extermination is not just permissible but rewardable. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's belief in the *permissibility to kill anyone who is a blasphemer*, namely anyone who disagrees with him, underpins the Wahhabis' perception of the world and how they interacted with it. This belief also led Ibn Abd Al Wahaab to imprison and execute his brother.

¹⁹⁶ Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, "الرسائل الشخصية" [Private Messages], in مؤلفات الشيخ محمد بن عبد الوهاب، الجزء السادس [The Writings of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab Section Six], ed. Salih Ibn Fawzaan Ibn Abdullah Al-Fawzaan and Muhammad Ibn Salih Al-Aleekee (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: جامعة الإمام محمد بن سعود [Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University], 2019), 230, 187. <https://shamela.ws/book/7629/136#p1>.

¹⁹⁷ Zubair Qamar, "Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Extremism," *AS Sunnah Foundation of America*, 2015, <http://www.sunnah.org/articles/Wahhabiarticleedit.htm>.

¹⁹⁸ Ahmad Zayni Dahlan, الدرر السنية في الرد على الوهابية [Sunni Pearls in Answering Wahhabis], nd ed. (Cairo, Egypt: شركة مكتبة ومطبعة مصطفى البابي الحلبي [Mustapha Al-Bani Al-Halabi and Sons' Company, Bookshop, and Printing Press], 1950 40 <https://www.noor-book.com/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%87-pdf>).

¹⁹⁹ This presentation of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab is a categorical affirmation, and echoes the primary sources regarding the Second Saudi State.

²⁰⁰ The word literally means that who renews. In a religious context, the word pertains to the renewal of the faith.

The relationship between Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab and his brother Suleiman Ibn Abd Al Wahaab illustrates how Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab interacted with his opponents among the traditionalist clergy, among which was Suleiman.²⁰¹ Suleiman was a vocal opponent of Wahhabism and authored two books against his brother.^{202203 204205} He argued against his brother's presumed exclusive connection to the past golden age of the Salaf. Suleiman rhetorically posed the question: If everyone, as his brother Muhammad argued, was a disbeliever, then who taught Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab the true faith? The dispute between the two brothers escalated until Suleiman was captured and executed. This execution was part of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab's broader campaign against the traditionalist clergy and anyone else who opposed him. Wahhabis' massacres²⁰⁶ targeted both Sunnis and Shias, extending from Hijaz²⁰⁷ to the West of the Arabian Peninsula, to Karbala in southern Iraq.²⁰⁸²⁰⁹ The firsthand

²⁰¹ Samer Traboulsi, “An Early Refutation of Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhāb’s Reformist Views,” *Die Welt Des Islams* 42, no. 3 (2002): 373–415, 373.

²⁰² الصواعق الإلهية في الرد على الوهابية [The Divine Thunderbolts in Refuting the Wahhabis]

²⁰³ فصل الخطاب في الرد على محمد بن عبد الوهاب [Elocution in Refuting Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab]

²⁰⁴ It is worth mentioning that in Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab’s official hagiography, written by Jamaal al-Din Zarabozo and published by Saudi Arabia, no details are given following his capture of his brother Suleiman. Based on the other primary sources listed (the Dahlan text), and the very nature of the movement he spawned, my personal assumption is that Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab had Suleiman executed.

²⁰⁵ Jamaal Zarabozo, *The Life, Teachings and Influence of Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhaab* (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawah, and Guidance The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2003), 16 <https://archive.org/details/the-life-teachings-and-influence-of-muhammad-ibn-abdul-wahhaab/page/n1/mode/2up>.

²⁰⁶ Followers of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab

²⁰⁷ Ahmad Zayni Dahlan, “فتنة الوهابية” [The Strife of the Wahhabiyah], مركز الأبحاث العقائدية [Center of Creedal Researches], accessed October 8, 2020, <http://www.aqaed.com/book/342/fetne.html>.

²⁰⁸ Simon Ross Valentine, *Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 61.

accounts of the massacres echo those of IS centuries later, adding further credence to these primary sources.²¹⁰ While the massacres targeted all who did not subscribe to Wahhabism, the Ibn Abd Al Wahaab brothers' relationship highlights how the traditionalists and the Wahhabi fundamentalists *prioritized one another*. The traditionalists and fundamentalists were fixated because both presented themselves as Sunni Muslims, who were steadfast in upholding the Salaf's ways. As such, they represented a critical threat to the dissemination and implementation of their ideas.²¹¹²¹²

Ibn Abd Al Wahaab promoted a fundamentalist mindset, to a similar degree to Ibn Taymiyah. As was the case with Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab relied on binary thinking. He presented himself and his followers as true believers and deemed everyone else to be a blasphemer. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's rage and paranoia were mainly directed toward traditionalists. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab argued that the traditionalists had allowed foreign religious innovations to corrupt the faith of all. These beliefs expressed themselves in a violent telos. This is so as Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, in words and deeds, argued that his religious enemies, namely everyone, had merited death. Neither Ibn Taymiyah nor Ibn Abd Al Wahaab had a particular apocalyptic bent. Unlike Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab was not interested in *the physical presence of foreign invaders*. Instead, his rage was entirely directed toward local tribes who refused to abide by his religious precepts. The focus on the local is a distinguishing mark of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's fundamentalism. His creativity was expressed in the establishment of the First Saudi Kingdom. That kingdom was a wholly modern political innovation underpinned by the alliance between

²⁰⁹ Ahmad Zayni Dahlan was a traditionalist scholar who wrote in the late 19th century on the religious and military conflict between the traditionalist Ottoman Empire (which he sided with) and the Second Saudi State.

²¹⁰ Particularly those of Ahmad Zayni Dahlan

²¹¹ Traboulsi, *op. cit.*, 373.

²¹² See their views on the Shiites: <https://twitter.com/MuftiFendi/status/1271479703325544448>

Ibn Abd Al Wahaab and the Saud family. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab made selective use of tradition to establish an exclusive link between himself, his new polity, and his followers to the Salaf and again deeming everyone else to be heretical in the process.

The **issue of authority** is a point of difference between Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Abd Al Wahaab. While Ibn Taymiyah appealed exclusively to charismatic authority, Ibn Abd Al Wahhab attempted to wield *traditional as well as charismatic authority*. As previously mentioned, Ibn Taymiyah's appeal to authority consisted in the religious status he attributed to himself. Ibn Abd Al Wahhab, like Ibn Taymiyah, presented himself as a unique religious paragon. However, Ibn Abd Al Wahhab attempted to assert his position by *marrying into* the clan of Muhamad Ibn Saud.²¹³ This partnership between Ibn Abd Al Wahhab and Ibn Saud was struck to gain what each lacked, but the other had: hard and soft power. Moreover, this joint fundamentalist project served to propel historically marginalized and impoverished male leaders to public view. It gave religious meaning to their challenge of a weakened Ottoman leadership.²¹⁴

Ibn Saud offered Ibn Abd Al Wahaab protection from the Ottoman Empire and the traditionalists so that Ibn Abd Al Wahaab could spread his teachings. In turn, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab sought to provide Ibn Saud with political legitimacy based on the correct understanding of the faith. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab justified Ibn Saud's territorial ambitions by deeming Ibn Saud's tribal rivals as blasphemers, as they had not subscribed to Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's thoughts. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab reframed Ibn Saud's wars into a *holy struggle* between belief and disbelief. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab enabled Ibn Saud to recruit beyond his tribal base by preaching an armed

²¹³ Leslie McLoughlin, *Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993).

²¹⁴ Bruce Lawrence, "Muslim Engagement with Injustice and Violence," in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17

campaign to purify the faith.²¹⁵ By extension, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab attempted to justify Ibn Saud's launch of an uprising against the traditionalist Ottoman Empire and establish his kingdom wherein the true faith (Wahhabism) could be implemented.²¹⁶ By appealing to different types of authorities simultaneously, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab could go beyond Ibn Taymiyah insofar as he succeeded in implementing his teachings. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab was able to establish a polity based on his and Ibn Taymiyah's fundamentalist rationalization.²¹⁷

The rise of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's fundamentalist rationalization correlates with yet another shift in power relations. The traditionalists were backed by the Ottoman Empire. However, in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had entered a period of decline. The Ottoman's decline went in tandem with the empowerment of the Wahhabis. The Ottoman Empire's weakness was so acute that it was given the moniker of the "sick man of Europe." The Ottoman Empire was less and less able to resist Wahhabism. This change in the power relations would enable the Wahhabis to entrench their rule and establish polities. These polities are the Saudi states, which were all based on the alliance between the Wahhabi clergy and the Saud family. While the first two Saudi kingdoms were destroyed by Ottoman counterattacks in 1818 and 1865 respectively, the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula following the conclusion of the First World War in 1918 enabled the Wahhabis to realize their political project.

²¹⁵ Abdullah Mohammad Sindi, "Britain, the Rise of Wahhabism and the House of Saud," *Kanaan* كنعان, eBulletin, January 20, 2015, <https://kanaanonline.org/en/2015/01/20/britain-the-rise-of-wahhabism-and-the-house-of-saud/>.

²¹⁶ Valentine, op. cit.,

²¹⁷ In Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, the Wahhabi establishment became especially powerful following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of British colonial rule. Qatar uses both Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood to advance to its international agenda, while the ruling Aal Thani family claims to be descendants of Ibn Abd Al Wahaab

The Saudi-Wahhabi alliance continued to accumulate power until the third Saudi kingdom was founded in 1932.²¹⁸

This allocation of traditional and charismatic authorities underpinned the distribution of power in Saudi Arabia since its establishment. While the Ibn Saud's descendants reign as absolute monarchs, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's family, known as Aal Al-Sheikh,²¹⁹ control the religious establishment. The religious clergymen²²⁰ are Al Saud's junior partners, whose primary role is to ostensibly purify the faith from heretical innovations and watch over the spiritual well-being of Saudis and Muslims worldwide.²²¹ The Wahhabi religious establishment seeks to empower the regime by inoculating the Saudi population with the *virtue of total obedience* to the monarchy. The Wahhabi religious establishment also serves as an instrument for Saudi foreign policy, providing religious edicts to justify its relationship with the world.²²²²²³

Wahhabi fundamentalist rationalization calls for different political strategies, ranging from all-out revolutionary warfare to arch-conservatism, depending on the politico-religious context. When Wahhabis were wholly excluded from power by the traditionalist Ottomans, the system was perceived as heretical. This perception emboldened Wahhabis to wage armed conflict against the pre-existing authorities and carry out massacres against the perceived

²¹⁸ William Ochsenwald et al., "Saudi Arabia | History, Map, Flag, Capital, Population, & Facts | Britannica," Britannica, August 13, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia>.

²¹⁹ The family of the Sheikh i.e. Ibn Abd Al Wahaab

²²⁰ Notable contemporary leaders of the official Wahhabi religious Saudi establishment are: Muhammad Al Arifi, Masharee Rashid Al 'Afaasy Muhammad Naasir Al Din Al Albani, Muhammad Ibn Salih Al Uthaymeen, and Abd Al Azziz Ibn Baz. Al Albani played the role of Wahhabism's preeminent *Muhadith*, an expert on the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Ibn Baz was Saudi Arabia's official mufti.

²²¹ Zarabozo, op. cit., 66.

²²² Volker Perthes, *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

²²³ David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006).

disbelievers. However, when the Wahhabi clergymen were allotted positions in the newly established monarchy, they gave it their full loyalty. The Saudi regime has since enjoyed the unwavering support of most Wahhabi clerics. This support continues even though Saudi Arabia, per its rulers' admission, is not wholly governed by Islamic law (hence its self-identification as a monarchy).

Nevertheless, the Wahhabi religious establishment considers the act of rebelling against a Muslim ruler, sinful as he may be, to be itself a greater sin. According to them, the Saudi king is the *Wali-Ul Amr*²²⁴ and must enjoy full *support from his pious subjects*. Any challenge to his authority, and by extension to the religious establishment, is seen as illegitimate. This conceptualization of authority cannot allow for any challenge to the political and religious status quo. It is on that very point Osama Bin Laden would split with the official Wahhabi establishment, following the decision to establish US army bases in Saudi Arabia in 1991.

2.5 Recent Changes in Wahhabi Fundamentalism: Official Wahhabism and the Sahwah

The clergy's subservient relationship with the Saudi monarchy has persisted to this very day. With the advent of King Salman and his son Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) as crown prince, the monarchy has moved away from religion. Instead, it has increasingly embraced *hyper-nationalism* to self-identify and to gain the Saudi populace's acceptance. This change in Saudi Arabia's ideology has been overtly encouraged by the United States to stem extremism and dry up IS and Al Qaeda's recruitment pool.²²⁵²²⁶ Nevertheless, the religious establishment

²²⁴ This term is in reference to the person legitimately in charge of the affairs of the Muslims. This term was originally used to refer to Caliphs, such as Umar Ibn Al Khattab. The Wahhabi establishment has reinterpreted to refer to the Saudi monarch.

²²⁵ C-SPAN, "User Clip: Tillerson on Saudi Textbooks |," C-SPAN, accessed October 15, 2020, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4684129/user-clip-tillerson-saudi-textbooks>.

²²⁶ Reduce the role of the religious established and introduce hyper-nationalistic discourse

continues to defend the Saudi monarchy. At the same time, Wahhabi clerics who speak out against the social or religious transformations are suppressed. Forms of Wahhabism are no longer being tolerated, with the advent of the hyper-nationalistic MBS era. Clerics from the Sahwah movement, a melange of Wahhabism and the Brotherhood's ideology, have been imprisoned or tortured to death. Notable examples include Salman Al Odah, Safar Al Hawali, and Awad Al Qarni. They have been jailed for allegedly calling on Saudi Arabia to lift its siege on Qatar or for tweeting an appeal for reconciliation between the two countries. These clerics were jailed as a rebuke for their ideological leanings. Forms of Wahhabism that do not call for total submission to political authorities are no longer tolerated in the kingdom.²²⁷

The cases of Ahmad Al Amaari Al Zahrani and Suleiman Ahmad Al Duwaysh are particularly instructive regarding *the ideological redlines*, which Wahhabi clerics are no longer permitted to cross. Al Zahrani was the dean of the Faculty of Quran at the Islamic University of Medina. It is worth bearing in mind that the Islamic University of Medina is wholly controlled by the state and a primary propagator of Wahhabi thought. Al Zahrani aroused the ire of the Saudi monarchy due to his pro-Sahwah leanings.²²⁸²²⁹²³⁰²³¹ As for Al Duwaysh, he worked for the official religious institution in Saudi Arabia and presented himself on his Twitter bio as a person "...interested in exposing the Islamic nation's enemies among the liberal hypocrites and

²²⁷ The word Sahwah صحوة itself means awaking

²²⁸ Rassd News Network, " [بعد أسبوع من إطلاق سراحه.. وفاة الداعية السعودية أحمد العماري.. تعرف عليه، " A Week After His Release.. The Saudi Proselytizer Ahmad Al Amaari is Deceased.. Get to Know About Him], " شبكة رصد الإخبارية (blog), January 21, 2019, <https://rassd.com/446335.htm>.

²²⁹ Al Jazeera Network, "عوض وعائض القرني.. رجلان تشابها في الاسم واختلفا في المواقف، " Al Jazeera, November 5, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2019/5/11/-عائض-القرني-عوض-القرني-السعودية>.

²³⁰ Rassd News Network is the Egyptian Brotherhood's media outlet

²³¹ Safar Al Hawali, Awad Al Qarni, Nasir Al Omar, and Salman Al Odah have the reputation of being the Sahwah's senior intellectual figures

their counterparts among the corrupt sects and the wicked degenerate ideas."²³² Al Duwaysh was committed to Saudi Arabia that existed before King Salman and Muhammad Bin Salman's advent and their social liberalizations.²³³²³⁴²³⁵²³⁶²³⁷ While Al Duwaysh never attacked the king or directly criticized his policies, Al Duwaysh indirectly rejected King Salman's decision to empower his son MBS, so that the crown prince could enact his social transformation of Saudi Arabia. That was enough for both Al Duwaysh and Al Zahrani to be imprisoned and tortured to death.

²³² Sulayman Ahmad Al Duwaysh, “@s_a_alduweesh / Twitter,” Twitter, accessed October 23, 2020, https://twitter.com/s_a_alduweesh.

²³³ Al Duwaysh used the word منافقين and while hypocrites is one of its linguistic meanings, in a religious context it can mean those who profess to be Muslims, while concealing their disbelief

²³⁴ Arabic Post, “كواليس وفاة داعية.. كواليس وفاته داعية” [They Put Him in Solitary Confinement, They Tortured Him so he Fell into a Coma Then They Released Him and He Died.. Behind the Scenes of the Death of the Saudi Preacher who Criticized the Ruling Family in a Book],” عربي بوست — ArabicPost.net, accessed October 23, 2020,

<https://arabicpost.net/%d8%a3%d8%ae%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b1/2019/01/22/%d9%85%d9%82%d8%aa%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b9%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%b9%d9%88%d8%af%d9%8a-%d8%a3%d8%ad%d9%85%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a/>

²³⁵ The full quote reads as following, across three twitter posts: A useful lesson in upbringing: Do not trust your spoilt adolescent son too much, and do not give him too many prerogatives without oversight and holding him accountable. Otherwise, everyday await a catastrophe that comes to you from him until it destroys your house. Your love for your son, and not holding him accountable leads to him holding you in increasing contempt, and makes him more selfish such that he cares not for your loss of your accomplishments, which you were so proud of. For a man to be cuckold regarding his womenfolk is horrendous. What’s worse is for him to be a cuckold regarding the womenfolk of his society, and nation and his acceptance of the harms and ills inflicted upon them in the name of freedom.

فائدة تربوية لا تفرط في منح ابنك المراهق المدلل مزيداً من الثقة والصلاحيات دون مراقبة ومحاسبة وإلا فانتظر كل يوم فاجعة تأتيك منه حتى تهدم بيتك محبتك لابنك وترك محاسبته تنمي عنده شعوراً يوصله غالباً إلى الاستخفاف بك والاعتداد بنفسه بحيث لا يبالي بخسارتك لمنجزاتك التي كنت تفخر بها ديانة الرجل على عرضه شنيعة وأشنع منها وأطم دياتته على أعراض مجتمعه وأمته ورضاه بالسوء والشر عليهم بدعوى الحرية والانفتاح

²³⁶ Sulayman Ahmad Al Duwaysh, “@s_a_alduweesh / Twitter,” Twitter, accessed October 23, 2020, https://twitter.com/s_a_alduweesh.

²³⁷ https://twitter.com/s_a_alduweesh

If this trend persists, the official Wahhabi establishment may find itself headed into irrelevancy, with Saudi monarchs having *alternative means of self-justification*. That substitute is Saudi nationalism, militarism, and xenophobia. Previous Saudi kings saw the value-rationality of the Wahhabi establishment. The status conferred by the Wahhabi establishment to the Saudi monarchs served to increase trust in them. King Salman's and MBS's new attitude takes a functionalist approach to religious politics. Such an attitude increasingly views the Wahhabi establishment as a burden. This new approach has caused cracks to fissure in the religious establishment, and only those overtly and utterly submissive to an increasingly secularized crown are allowed to exist. Another possibility is the weakening of the Saudi regime whether, by foreign misadventure or economic ruin (both of which are distinct possibilities, considering the record of King Salman and his son Muhammad Bin Salman). In such a case, probably, official Wahhabism could very well be replaced by other forms of Wahhabism, more influenced by Sayyid Qutb. Wahhabis designed their initial perception of authority to disseminate their teachings and shape minds and hearts while underpinning the political system that protects it. With the changed internal and external context, this very conceptualization of authority sows the seeds for the Wahhabi leadership's ouster.

2.6 The Muslim Brotherhood: How Hassan Al-Banna's Traditionalist Movement Morphed into a Fundamentalist Organization

The Muslim Brotherhood did not start as a fundamentalist organization, with its concomitant rationalization. Instead, the Brotherhood was founded by Hassan Al-Banna as a traditionalist movement. Hassan Al-Banna was a product of the traditionalist clergy and the anticolonial milieu in Egypt. When Al-Banna was an adolescent, he participated in the protests, which were part of the 1919 pro-independence revolution against British colonial rule, and in

support of the nationalist Wafd²³⁸ Party. When Al-Banna was in high school, he wrote a paper in which he sketched out his plan for re-establishing the Ottoman Caliphate, which would occur via the foundation of a religious organization.²³⁹ Following his secondary studies, Al-Banna decided to become a traditionalist clergyman by studying religion at Al Azhar University. During his stay at Al Azhar,²⁴⁰ Al-Banna further *aligned with the traditionalists* within a context of shifting political circumstances.

Under the Ottoman Empire, Al Azhar presented itself as the bastion of traditionalist Asha'ari knowledge. This correlated with the Ottoman Empire subscribing to the traditionalist Maturidi teachings. When the British Empire colonized Egypt, it viewed the traditionalist clergy as a threat. The traditionalists were loyal to the Ottoman Caliph and presented him as the leader of the believers.²⁴¹ Consequently, the British decided to support the traditionalists' enemies and ensure that they attained positions of power. To that end, the British decided to empower the modernists. ***Modernism, founded and led by Muhammad Abduh, called for the wholehearted embrace of British institutions and ideas.*** The modernists argued that Britain's values had enabled it to progress and dominate the world materially. Hence, Muslims must incorporate Britain's cultural influence so that they too can enjoy the fruits of the West's progress. Modernists portrayed themselves as protectors of the faith by integrating rationalist philosophies into Islam.²⁴² As a result, the modernists differentiated themselves from the

²³⁸ Wafd وفد means delegation, in reference to the delegation of Egyptian nationalists and liberals who petitioned the British governor for independence, but whose members were instead exiled.

²³⁹ Jansen, Johannes. "Hasan al-Bannâ's Earliest Pamphlet." *Die Welt des Islams* 32, no. 2 (1992): 258

²⁴⁰ The word Al Azhar الأزهر pertains to the nickname of the Prophet Muhammad's daughter, Fatimah. Her nickname was Al Zahraa', الزهراء in reference to the rosiness of her complexion.

²⁴¹ Ameer Al Mu'mineen أمير المؤمنين

²⁴² P. J. Vatikiotis, "Muḥammad 'Abduh and the Quest for a Muslim Humanism," *Arabica* 4, no. 1 (1957): 55–72, 44.

traditionalists by rejecting the existence of miracles, save for the Quran. Abduh argued that miracles are not compatible with modern science and must be allegorically interpreted.

Muhammad Abduh and his disciples railed further against the traditional clergy for allowing folk superstitions to take hold.

Moreover, Abduh held the traditionalists responsible for the moral and material decline the Muslim world was facing. Muhammad Abduh's new trend²⁴³ was seen favorably by the British colonial regime. Also, the British, who sought to develop a favorable narrative of their presence, assisted Abduh. To that end, Abduh was appointed as a mufti and a judge in the colonial regime.²⁴⁴ Later, the British appointed Abduh as the head of Al Azhar University, the traditionalist faculty, and students' objections notwithstanding. In the case of Al-Banna, it further drove him away from Al Azhar as an institution. Instead, Al-Banna *founded his organization*, free from the British's overt control: The Muslim Brotherhood.

Among Al-Banna's justifications for the movement he founded was the passivity that he saw among some traditional clergymen in asserting their values. In his *A Call to Worship to God*,²⁴⁵ Al-Banna said:

"What catastrophe has befallen the souls of the reformers and the spirit of the leaders? What has carried away the ardor of the zealots? What calamity has made them prefer this life after that? What has made them consider the way of struggle too rough and difficult?"²⁴⁶

²⁴³ This belief is now being propagated by Amr Khalid, whose preaching style is very similar to American televangelists in the 80's.

²⁴⁴ Muhammad Abduh, الأعمال الكاملة للإمام الشيخ محمد عبده [The Complete Works of the Imam Sheikh Muhammad Abduh], ed. Muhamad Amaarah (Cairo, Egypt: [Sunrise Publishing House] دار الشروق, 2009. 99

²⁴⁵ دعوة إلى الله "Da'wa ila Allah"

²⁴⁶ Cited in: Mura, Andrea. "A genealogical inquiry into early Islamism: the discourse of Hasan al-Banna ." *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2012:70

Al-Banna argued that religion has a *comprehensive role to play*. Concomitantly, the Brotherhood reflected Al-Banna's religious objectives: "We [the Brotherhood] are a political party, but we're also a Sufi mystical group; we are a youth organization; we are a charitable organization; we are a sports club."²⁴⁷²⁴⁸ Al-Banna's movement started with religious outreach and then established educational and scouting programs. As the movement gained influence, Al-Banna expanded its scope to realize its ultimate aim of *reviving the Caliphate*.²⁴⁹²⁵⁰²⁵¹ As the Brotherhood faced more internal and external challenges, it became more militarized. During the outbreak of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, it sent fighters to participate on the Arab side.²⁵² It is important to point out that Al-Banna was not a fundamentalist. He did not claim an exclusive connection to a past golden age. Instead, he situated himself in the *religious mainstream*, in an Egyptian context. He was willing to avail himself of various strategies, which would bring him closer to his ambitious goal. Accordingly, Al-Banna was willing to work within the pre-existing political institutions. While Egypt was a monarchy under indirect British rule, it theoretically had an elected parliament. Even though it was not an Islamic regime, Al-Banna attempted to change the system from within when he ran for office.²⁵³ However, he lost owing to the rigging of the election.

²⁴⁷ نحن دعوة سلفية ، وطريقه سنية ، وحقيقة صوفية ، وهبئة سياسية ، وجماعة رياضية ، وروابط علمية ثقافية ، وشركة اقتصادية ، وفكرة اجتماعية

²⁴⁸ Rifat Al Saeed, *البنّا حسن المسلح الشيخ* [Hassan Al Banna: The Armed Sheikh]₂ (Cairo, Egypt: Kotobarabia.com, 2005), 99.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 182.

²⁵⁰ Moussalli, Ahmad. "Hassan Al-Banna's Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State." *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 1993: 165.

²⁵¹ Ibid, 182

²⁵² On the one hand, Israelis refer to it as the War of Independence, while on the other hand Palestinians call it Al Nakbah النكبة i.e. the disaster; in reference to the losses and expulsions they faced at the hands of the Israelis.

²⁵³ Moussalli, Ahmad. "Hassan Al-Banna's Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State." *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 1993: 166

At the same time, Al-Banna prepared a secretly armed wing to militarily confront the British, known as “Al Tanzim Al Siree,” literally the Secret Organization.²⁵⁴²⁵⁵ Al-Banna's exclusion from office and increased backlash from the government led him to lose control over his organization. Al Tanzim Al Siree launched an armed campaign against the Egyptian government, culminating in the assassination of its Prime Minister Al Nuqrashi Pasha.²⁵⁶ Al-Banna openly rebuked the changes his movement was undergoing and distanced himself from the bombings of Al Tanzim Al Siree.²⁵⁷ Following this, Al-Banna was assassinated. Al-Banna's inability to realize his project, the internal changes to the Brotherhood, and their revolutionary bent would pave the way for Sayyid Qutb, Al-Banna's de facto successor. Crucially, Sayyid Qutb would consider the Wafd Party, the protestors who came out in support of it, and everyone who participated in the official political system (Al-Banna included) to be blasphemers and legitimate military targets. **This transition from Al-Banna to Qutb is critical for developing a different form of rationalization: a fundamentalist one.**

2.7 Sayyid Qutb: The Fundamentalist Rationalization of a Revolutionary

Sayyid Qutb's fundamentalist rationalization is predicated on an exclusive connection to a past golden age. He would claim that everyone from the time of the Prophet's companions had blasphemed, save for Qutb and his followers. Bowdlerization is a central aspect of Qutb's thought. Qutb made selective use of traditional religious teachings, Kharijite discourse as well as

²⁵⁴ Eric Trager, “The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power,” The Washington Institute, accessed October 21, 2020, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-muslim-brotherhood-from-opposition-to-power>.

²⁵⁵

التنظيم السري Literally meaning: The Secret Organization

²⁵⁶ Donald M. Reid, “Political Assassination in Egypt, 1910-1954,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 15, no. 4 (1982): 632.

²⁵⁷ Supposedly, Al-Banna’s last public statement was: “Among us are those who are not brothers, nor are they Muslims.”

Marxist revolutionary doctrines, all the while being utterly opposed to all of them. Some biographical details shed some light on the sources of Qutb's thoughts. Qutb was never a classically trained religious scholar. Rather, he was a journalist of a Marxist persuasion and a novelist.²⁵⁸ His newspaper articles and works of fiction both displayed a profound contempt for Egypt's social order. His 1948 visit to the United States was a turning point, making him more hostile to its influence and ideas. During his stay in the United States, Qutb experienced *overt racism* in a country where Jim Crow laws imposed racial segregation. Qutb was particularly aggrieved, as shown in magazine articles collectively titled *The America I Have Seen*, by the United States' materialism²⁵⁹ and loose social norms governing women.²⁶⁰²⁶¹ The assassination of Al-Banna caused a gap in the Brotherhood in terms of its religious leadership, which Qutb sought to fill. To that end, he rebranded himself as a religious thinker. Qutb made use of his considerable writing skills to become the editor of the group's newspaper. Qutb's position would enable him to become the Brotherhood's *chief theoretician*. He consequently played a significant role in transforming the Brotherhood from Al-Banna's vision to what it is today. Qutb, at the Brotherhood's helm, expounded his fundamentalist rationalization by calling for the wholesale revolutionary overthrow of Egyptian society.

²⁵⁸ See for example Sayyid Qutb's novel *Ashwaak* أشواك (thorns), which is a story of denied romance and oppressive social norms, set place in rural Egypt

²⁵⁹ Sayyid Qutb, "أمريكا التي رأيت [American That I Have Seen]," مجلة الرسالة [The Message Magazine], May 11, 1951,

https://ar.wikisource.org/wiki/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF_957/%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A_%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%8A%D8%AA:

²⁶⁰ Interestingly enough, Qutb stayed at a town that was extremely socially conservative, such that prohibition was still being enforced.

²⁶¹ Sayyid Qutb, "[America that I have Seen] رأيت أمريكا التي رأيت," مجلة الرسالة [The Message Magazine] March 12, 1951, http://islamarchive.cc/article_show/13058.

Qutb's manner of conceptualizing this world is a point of overlap between him and the Bayhasiyah. There is nothing original about Qutb's most emblematic theses; instead, he bowdlerized them from a Kharijite sect. The Kharijite movement was founded by some of Caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib's former soldiers who accused him of heresy, having just served under him. Their point of contention was Ali's acceptance of a mediation to end the fighting between him and the former governor of Greater Syria, Muwaiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan,²⁶² following the Battle of Sifeen. The Kharijites argued Ali's refusal to commit to a religiously obligated fight against Muwaiyah was nothing short of blasphemy.²⁶³ A faction among the Kharijites, the Bayhasiyah,²⁶⁴²⁶⁵ went further. They argued that any ruler who refused to rule according to *Sharia* completely was a heretic. Moreover, his subjects have followed him in blasphemy for not rebelling against him. The Bayhasiyah thus argued that everyone except them is a blasphemmer. Qutb essentially copied the arguments of the Bayhasiyah, going so far as replicating their interpretation of some Quranic verses, which the Bayhasiyah used in deeming their opponents of being disbelievers. Nevertheless, Qutb claimed to be a Sunni, not a Kharijite. He claimed an exclusive connection to the past golden age, the age of the companions and Salaf.²⁶⁶ This is because he alone was calling for *genuine Islamic rule*. Consequently, Qutb claimed that everyone, Sunnis and Kharijites included, who did not follow his teachings was guilty of disbelief.

²⁶² The mediation would hand power to Muwaiyah, enabling him to found the Umayyad Dynasty, following the end of the Rashidun Caliphate.

²⁶³ Tamara Son and Adam Farrar, "Kharijites," Oxford Bibliographies, accessed November 1, 2020, <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml>.

²⁶⁴ In reference to Abu Bayhas

²⁶⁵ Tamimi op. cit., 88.

²⁶⁶ Qutb never specified a year during which he believed the mass blasphemy of humanity occurred.

Qutb considered dominion to be equivalent to worship. Qutb considered rulers who refused to abide by Sharia completely guilty of polytheism, as they had associated partners with God (*shirk*). Moreover, he argued that anyone who works for the government has facilitated blasphemy and consequently fallen into it. Also, ordinary citizens have committed blasphemy because they have refused to revolt against the heretical rulers and have implicitly accepted heresy. Qutb laid out his views in writings that have spilled so much blood over the last few decades:

Humanity has apostatized to the worship of slaves, to the injustices of religions, and has shirked away from no one deserves to be worshiped except Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah. For while some have continued to say no one deserves to be worshiped except Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah on minarets, they have done so without realizing its connotations while repeating it, without meaning its connotations while repeating it, without rejecting the legitimacy people claim to themselves... Verily, humanity has returned to the *Jahiliyah*²⁶⁷, and has apostatized from no one deserves to be worshiped except Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger and has given those people the attributes of worship...²⁶⁸²⁶⁹

Qutb's role, as he saw it, was to form and lead the vanguard, which would export the revolution beyond manmade, irreligious, national borders. This argument is a bowdlerization of Leon Trotsky's. Bowdlerization in Qutb's case was the *adoption of revolutionary thought*, to be manipulated in the service of a religious uprising. Trotsky was a communist revolutionary who

²⁶⁷ The Age of Ignorance. This religious term refers to the time shortly before Prophet Muhammad, when there were not any Muslim humans on land. This is another way by which Qutb explicitly claims that everyone, other than him and his followers, is a blasphemer.

²⁶⁸ The full quote from Qutb reads as following:

فقد ارتدت البشرية الى عبادة العباد, والى جور الاديان, ونكصت عن لا اله الا الله, وإن ظل فريق منها يردد على المآذن (لا اله الا الله) دون أن يدرك مدلولها, ودون أن يعني هذا المدلول وهو يردد لها, ودون أن يرفض شرعية (الحاكمية) التي يدعيها العباد لأنفسهم إلا أن البشرية عادت الى الجاهلية, وارتدت عن لا اله الا الله, فأعطت لهؤلاء العباد خصائص العبودية

From the book *In the Shades of the Quran*, in his interpretation of the verse 19 of Surat Al An Na'aam

²⁶⁹ Sayid Qutb, *In the Shades of the Quran*, 32nd ed. (Cairo, Egypt: دار الشروق [Sunrise Press], 2003) 1057.

called for a permanent global revolution²⁷⁰²⁷¹ and stood opposed to Joseph Stalin's "Socialism in One Country" approach. Qutb reworked Trotsky to conceptualize a global *Jahiliyah* which must be combatted. This worldview meant that there were neither innocent civilians, nor are there bystanders. Either one partakes in Qutb's religious revolution, or one is a disbeliever who must be killed. Qutb made an argument similar to Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's, whereby anyone who does not subscribe to his thought is a blasphemer, and blasphemers must be put to the sword. However, the reasons why Qutb came to that conclusion *differ* from Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's, as he bowdlerized different religious and philosophical traditions.

Qutb had a kiarotic perception of time. As previously mentioned, Qutb believed all of humanity had in the past blasphemed. However, Qutb was unable to determine when this enormous event took place. This reflects Qutb's warped perception of time, which stemmed from his paranoiac break with society. Qutb was unable to make use of Cartesian time. Rather, Qutb expressed his visceral contempt for society through a vague presentation of history. *Urgency* characterizes Qutb's present. Following his thought, one must immediately engage in revolution. No delays are acceptable, or even conceivable.

Sayyid Qutb had a fundamentalist mindset, with not totally different characteristics when compared to Ibn Taymiyah's and Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's. Qutb's feelings of humiliation revolved around the imposition of an un-Islamic rule on Muslims. Qutb's turning point was when he visited the United States and was subjected to racial hostility, owing to his status as an

²⁷⁰ Trotsky said: "Without the direct State support of the European proletariat, the working class of Russia cannot remain in power and convert its temporary domination into a lasting socialistic dictatorship"

Cited in:

²⁷¹ Monty Johnstone, "Trotsky and the Debate on Socialism in One Country," *New Left Review* 1 (1968): 50.

African visitor.²⁷² His extremely negative interaction with the United States intensified his paranoia regarding Western society. This led to Qutb's break with society and his equating of non-Islamic societies with polytheism. Hence, Qutb's claim that anyone who rules or is ruled by non-Islamic laws has associated partners with God. He did not have an apocalyptic leaning. Instead, he was focused on an immediate revolution, i.e., in the present. Qutb's creativity expressed itself in a revolutionary call, articulated in his books. Qutb's flowery language justifies a total war against society and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Qutb's call for a global revolution continues to resonate to this day.

The form of authority Qutb appeals to is a mix of rational/legal and charismatic. Qutb made use of his senior position within the Brotherhood to disseminate and legitimize his religious arguments. His use of charismatic authority was expressed in Qutb's exceptional writing skills. I found his texts to be particularly easy to read. Moreover, Qutb structures his arguments in such a way that it is quite simple to understand and remember his main theses. Qutb's *charismatic authority* pertains to his experiences which enables him to generate sympathy and show his commitment to the cause. Qutb wrote his exegesis of the Quran while in prison, in the lead-up to his execution by Egypt's junta. Qutb's work continues to be presented as a justification for total revolution, targeting all aspects of society by elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, IS, and Al Qaeda.

²⁷² "Sayyid Qutb," in *Key Islamic Political Thinkers*, by John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (Oxford, United States: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2018), 69, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ottawa/detail.action?docID=5476830>.

2.8 Osama Bin Laden: Combining the Fundamentalist Rationalization of Wahhabism and Qutbism

Osama Bin Laden invented *a novel fundamentalist rationalization*, which is a melange of Wahhabism and Qutbism. Bin Laden was originally a creature of the Saudi state. His education was, for the most part,²⁷³ in state schools and universities. As a result, Bin Laden was a fervent Wahhabi, wholeheartedly accepting Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's conceptualization of the self and the world. Bin Laden believed in Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's alleged exclusive connection to the Salaf and his bowdlerized creed. The turning point for Bin Laden and his thoughts was his participation in the *fight against the Soviet invasion* of Afghanistan. Bin Laden went as a representative of the Saudi family, with the acquiescence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).²⁷⁴ As part of the fight against the Soviets, volunteer fighters with diverse backgrounds and ideological leanings joined forces against communism. This led to the cross-pollination of different ideas, whose adherents had never interacted with one another. A member of the Brotherhood, Abdullah Azzam, significantly affected Bin Laden. The next turning point was the decision of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to ask the United States to establish military bases in Saudi Arabia, following Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, the Saudi religious establishment, led by Ibn Baz, published a religious edict justifying the king's decision. The *US military bases* caused a rupture in the Wahhabi movement, between Bin Laden and the Saudi religious establishment, with mutual accusations of heresy.

Osama Bin Laden developed a rationalization that was a melange of Wahhabism and Qutbism, in opposition to the Wahhabi establishment, and eventually the whole world. Bin

²⁷³ He studied for a year in Lebanon, as a student in Brummana High School

²⁷⁴ It was originally planned for a member of the Saud family to go join the fight. However, since a suitable candidate was not found, Osama Bin Laden was chosen, as his family was closely connected with the Sauds.

Laden railed against *the presence of disbeliever armies in the holy lands* of Mecca and Medina. The Wahhabi establishment's position is that it was legitimate for the *Wali Ul-Amr* to ask for their help. Moreover, even if it were sinful for him to do so, it would be unjust to overthrow him as long as he remains a true believer (according to the Wahhabi establishment). Finally, if Jihad was to be waged to expel these foreign armies, then that can only take place when the *Wali Ul-Amr* sees fit. Bin Laden turned the argument on its head. Bin Laden argued that the *Wali Ul-Amr* must wage Jihad until the holy lands are liberated. If the *Wali Ul-Amr* refuses what is religiously obligatory upon him, and does not repel the invaders, then he is no longer a *Wali Ul-Amr* as he is no longer a Muslim. Bin Laden argued, as did Qutb before him, that the *failure to implement Sharia in its totality, especially on this critical issue, is blasphemy*. The Wahhabi establishment has followed the king in his disbelief by refusing to countenance the revolution necessary to remove the tyrannical Saudi monarchy and replace it with *genuine Islamic rule*. Instead, it continued to justify the king's decisions, causing them both to drown further in blasphemy. Bin Laden combined Qutb and Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's conceptualization of an exclusive link to a past golden age. Bin Laden claimed that everyone, including Wahhabis who refused to join him, was a blasphemmer and a legitimate military target.

Osama Bin Laden exhibited a *fundamentalist mindset*, to a greater degree than Qutb, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, and Ibn Taymiyah. This is because his break from society was to an even greater extent than that of the above-mentioned figures. While Qutb, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, and Ibn Taymiyah deemed anyone who did not adhere to their ideas to be a heretic, Bin Laden was even more exclusionary. Bin Laden considered Wahhabis who did not follow his brand of Wahhabism to be heretics, along with everyone else. Bin Laden's fundamentalist mindset was originally taught to him by the Saudi regime. Bin Laden was exposed to Ibn Taymiyah's and Ibn

Abd Al Wahaab's fundamentalisms during his studies at Saudi-run educational institutions. Bin Laden in turn wholly imbibed these fundamentalisms. Bin Laden's sentiments of rage and humiliation stemmed from the establishment of US military bases in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden was repulsed by the presence of American disbelievers at such proximity to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This led him to develop a more *exclusionary form of Wahhabism*. Making use of Qutb's revolutionary theses on Haakimiyah, Bin Laden developed a new reading of Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Abd Al Wahaab that deemed their followers to be deviants, save for those who agreed with Bin Laden. Bin Laden did not have an apocalyptic fixation. Instead, his immediate concern was driving the disbelievers, local and foreign, out of the holy lands. His more distant goal was the establishment of a caliphate, which would act as a legitimate replacement for the discredited Saudi monarchy. His strategizing did not incorporate any references to the end of times in that regard. His creativity and chaos manifested in deadly attacks against civilians on a global scale and a propaganda apparatus dedicated to the constant recruitment of new followers.

The conflict between Saudi and Bin Laden's Wahhabism is to an extent over authority. The Saudi monarch calls upon traditional and rational/legal authority. The Saudi clergy appeals to *rational/legal authority*, and to a lesser extent, charismatic. Conversely, Bin Laden had mostly appealed to charismatic authority, and a limited extent, to rational/legal authority. Authority in a Saudi context rests on the intertwined relationship between the monarch and the clergy. When the kingdom was founded, King Abdul-Aziz²⁷⁵ was

²⁷⁵ Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al Saud: The founder of the third Saudi kingdom, and its current iteration. Also known as Ibn Saud.

essentially the head of an extended family and ruled as such. The current Saudi king, Salman,²⁷⁶ has relied on traditional authority on occasion. This is expressed in the management of his relationship with members of his own family and his kingdom's foreign policy. As part of Saudi Arabia's geopolitical conflict with Qatar, King Salman held a family council to dispute the lineage of Al Thani (Qatar's ruling family) to Ibn Abd Al Wahaab. In doing so, King Salman attempted to undermine the prestige of a competing family in a Wahhabi context. The king has primarily called upon rational/legal authority to shore up his position. He staked his claim to power via a modern bureaucracy, intelligence services overseen by the United States,²⁷⁷ and membership in international organizations such as the United Nations. The Saudi monarch's official title is the *Custodian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries*, as an expression of his charismatic authority. The king's three forms of authority (charismatic, traditional, and rational/legal) have all received the acceptance, and the full-throated defense of the official religious establishment, which considers him to be the *Wali Ul-Amr*. In return, the Saudi mufti has the prerogative equivalent of a government minister. Wahhabi clerics are on the Saudi government's payroll and organized within its bureaucracy. While the Saudi monarchy has set about ameliorating the Wahhabi clerics' rational/legal authority, the Wahhabi clerics, in turn, have striven to augment the monarchy's charismatic authority. Saudi Arabia's establishment of religious international and non-governmental organizations further demonstrates this interconnected relationship. These organizations' purpose is to bolster the charismatic and rational/legal authority of its monarchy and clergy. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Muslim World League (MWL) provide a formal and international forum for the Wahhabi establishment, the former

²⁷⁶ Salman Ibn Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, son of King Abdul-Aziz, and brother of Saudi Arabia's other monarchs.

²⁷⁷ Saudi Arabia has long been the quintessential example of the rentier state

working directly with the United Nations (UN),²⁷⁸ and the latter with the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF).²⁷⁹ At the same time, these organizations reinforce the stature of the Saudi king as a religious figure at the international level.

Bin Laden attempted to imbue himself with a rational/legal authority, especially during the early days of Al Qaeda. Bin Laden called upon the rational/legal authority of Abdullah Azzam to legitimate his arguments. Azzam was a professor at King Abdul-Aziz University, a Saudi state university.²⁸⁰ Bin Laden appealed to his supposed religious training under Abdullah Azzam to present himself as a scholar of Islam, whereby his religious edicts carry the institutional weight of Azzam. Bin Laden sought out Omar Abdulrahman's perceived rational/legal authority for similar reasons. Abdulrahman was a huge fan of Ibn Taymiyah and Qutb,²⁸¹ a graduate of Al Azhar University, and the spiritual leader of two like-minded organizations: Abdullah Al Samawi's Al Gammaah Al Islamiyah and Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Tanzim Al-Jihad.²⁸² Abdulrahman would eventually be arrested for his suspected involvement in the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center. He would be imprisoned for the rest of his life in the United States, following his conviction for planning a bombing campaign in the United

²⁷⁸ Christopher Heaney, "GA Approves Draft Resolution 'Cooperation Between the UN and the OIC' - Press Release (Excerpts)," *Question of Palestine* (blog), accessed January 4, 2021, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ga-approves-draft-resolution-cooperation-between-the-un-and-the-ioc-press-release-excerpts/>.

²⁷⁹ Lina Elkurd, "The Muslim World League Supports UNICEF to Meet the Needs of Children in the Middle East and North Africa Region," UNICEF, accessed January 4, 2021, <https://www.unicef.org/mena/press-releases/muslim-world-league-supports-unicef-meet-needs-children-middle-east-and-north-africa>.

²⁸⁰ Andrew McGregor. "'Jihad and the Rifle Alone': 'Abdullah 'Azzam and the Islamist Revolution.'" *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 23 (2003): 100

²⁸¹ Omar Abdulrahman, مقوقف القرآن من خصومه [The Quran's Position on its Opponents] (Cairo, Egypt: دار مصر المحروسة [Guarded Egypt Press], 2006), 821.

²⁸² Muntasir Al Zayaat, رؤية من الداخل الجماعات الإسلامية [Islamic Groups a View from the Inside], Second (Cairo, Egypt: دار مصر المحروسة [Guarded Egypt Press], 2005), 46.

States.²⁸³ During Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri's first and only press conference, they passed around laminated copies of Abdulrahman's fatwa against Americans, Jews, and Christians.²⁸⁴²⁸⁵²⁸⁶ In doing so, Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri presented themselves as the *heirs of Abdulrahman's rational/legal authority*. The fatwa itself has rhymes and focuses on Abdulrahman's imprisonment, adding to its emotional impact. Bin Laden also invented his institutions to imbibe himself with rational/legal authority further. Bin Laden's 1998 fatwa against the United States was in the name of the World Islamic Front.

Bin Laden portrayed himself as a sheik, in reference to Azzam's rational/legal authority, and to emotionally bind his followers. To further his pretensions to religious scholarship, Bin Laden has on some occasions dressed as a Saudi cleric, while on other occasions as an Ikhwan cleric.²⁸⁷²⁸⁸²⁸⁹ Not to be confused with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ikhwan was a Wahhabi

²⁸³ Peter Bergen, "The Cleric Who Altered the Course of Modern History," CNN, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/19/opinions/9-11-spiritual-guide-dies-bergen/index.html>.
²⁸⁴

من الشيخ الأسير عمر عبدالرحمن إلى المسلمين في كل مكان: دمروا بلدان الأمريكيين واليهود والصليبيين.. دمروا اقتصادهم. أحرقوا شركاتهم وأعمالهم. أغرقوا سفنهم وأسقطوا طائراتهم. أقتلوه في البر والبحر والجو

....

النار له من الأمريكيين كي لا يذهب دمه هدرا

"From the captive Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman ... To all Muslims everywhere: Destroy the countries of the Americans, Jews and crusaders... Destroy their economies, burn their companies, destroy their businesses, sink their ships, and bring down their airplanes. Kill them in the sea, on land and in the air... [I demand] vengeance from the Americans so that his [my] blood is not wasted."

²⁸⁵ Peter Bergen, "[Opinion: The Death Abdulrahman Will Drive Al Zawahri to Call to Attack America] رأي: وفاة عبدالرحمن ستدفع الظواهري للدعوة لمهاجمة أمريكا," CNN Arabic, February 20, 2017, <https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2017/02/20/9-11-spiritual-guide-dies-bergen>.

²⁸⁶ Peter Bergen, CNN's national security analyst mistranslates in the above mentioned article crusader to Christian.

²⁸⁷ Daniel Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia: The Revolt of the Ikhwan, 1927-1930," *The International History Review* 4, no. 2 (1982): 222–48, 227.

tribal rebellion against King Abdul-Aziz, angered by his decision to prevent tribal raids into British-held Iraq, and the king's decision to allow for some Western innovations, such as cars. By copying the Ikhwan's fashion, Bin Laden sought to reach out to Wahhabis who were dissatisfied with the status quo and recruit them by channeling the Ikhwan's revolutionary spirit. Bin Laden's play at charismatic authority and his primary recruiting method was the audio-visual recordings, which showcased Bin Laden's oratory skills. Moreover, to increase his emotional appeal, Bin Laden cultivated an image of a "mujahid sheik,"²⁹⁰ as his followers called him. Bin Laden presented himself as a man so true to the faith that he abandoned a life of riches and luxuries to wage a religiously obligatory war. Bin Laden's relationship with dreams is a poignant example of his charismatic authority. Bin Laden attempted to recruit members into his organization based on his interpretation of dreams.²⁹¹²⁹² In addition, Bin Laden partially justified the 9/11 attacks in dreams his followers saw. Bin Laden claimed that the idea came to him when one of his acolytes dreamt of a *soccer game* being played between his followers and the Americans.²⁹³ Bin Laden presented himself as an exceptional leader via his supernatural capacity to interpret and realize these "visions." His ability to wage attacks on the West was a cornerstone of his charismatic

²⁸⁸ Abdullah F. Alrebh, "Covering the Building of a Kingdom: The Saudi Arabian Authority in The London Times and The New York Times, 1901–1932," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015): 187–212, 190.

²⁸⁹ Alamy Limited, "Stock Photo - Faisal al Duwaish 1930," Alamy, accessed November 2, 2020, <https://www.alamy.com/stock-image-faisal-al-duwaish-1930-167076103.html>.

²⁹⁰ A sheikh who also wages Jihad

²⁹¹ Bin Laden attempted to recruit Robert Fisk, a journalist hoping to interview him. According to Fisk, Bin Laden said one of his followers saw Fisk dressed as a Muslim. Following which, Bin Laden attempted to get Fisk to convert. See Robert Fisk's *The Great War for Civilisation*

²⁹² Robert Fisk, *The Great War for Civilisation* (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), 12.

²⁹³ James Poniewozik, "The Banality of Bin Laden," *Time*, December 13, 2001, <http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,188329,00.html>.

authority, which in turn kept his movement together. This is evidenced by his organization's fragmentation following Bin Laden's death and his inability to follow up on the 9/11 attacks.

Al Qaeda's other leaders have persisted in appealing to charismatic authority, as the case of Anwar Al-Awlaki demonstrates. Al-Awlaki was a senior Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) cleric, who oversaw its English propaganda, recruitment, and international attacks.²⁹⁴ Owing to his oratory and writing skills, fluent English, American citizenship, and most importantly, charisma, Al-Awlaki became one of Al Qaeda's most prolific members. A counterterrorism analyst described him as: "The second-most charismatic al-Qaeda leader after Bin Laden."²⁹⁵ Al-Awlaki's emotional appeals tied in with Qutb's. Al-Awlaki wrote about how Qutb inspired him during his imprisonment, such that he felt Qutb was with him in the prison cell when he read his books.²⁹⁶ Al-Awlaki crafted an image of a revolutionary scholar, willing to abide by the faith, irrespective of the rulers' wishes. Al-Awlaki portrayed his writings as a vessel for the radical overthrow of the political status quo, as Qutb did before him. In doing so, Al-Awlaki drew parallels between his suffering and Qutb's and demonstrated in the process how Qutb's charismatic authority and fundamentalist views shape Al Qaeda.

2.9 Splits among the Adherents of Bin Laden's Fundamentalist Rationalization: The War between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

Following the disappearance of Bin Laden's charismatic authority disputes over rational/legal authority have driven a wedge between IS and Al Qaeda. These divergences over

²⁹⁴ Al-Awlaki was connected to the Fort Hood shooting, the Boston Marathon bombing, the failed underwear bombing, and a stabbing attack against a British Member of Parliament, among other things.

²⁹⁵ Thomas Hegghamer, "The Last Jihadi Superstar," War on the Rocks, October 30, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-last-jihadi-superstar/>.

²⁹⁶ ICSR Team, "Challenging the Influence of Anwar Al-Awlaki," *ICSR* (blog), September 8, 2010, <https://icsr.info/2010/09/08/challenging-the-influence-of-anwar-al-awlaki/>.

authority were in turn seen within the lens of Qutbism. The divisions engendered were so deep that IS and Al Qaeda's members, having been part of the same organization, have accused each other of *blasphemy*. This has led IS and Al Qaeda to launch suicide bombings and beheadings targeting their former comrades, as these movements are wont to do. The issue was the *legitimacy* of IS's caliphate. According to IS, the caliphate symbolized the group's superior stature. IS claimed that its caliphate was a means for Muslims to reassert their dignity and undo the humiliation imposed by Western colonization. While other Wahhabi organizations, such as Al Qaeda, were mere guerrillas, IS was a *state*. Accordingly, IS argued that its religious importance superseded those of its Wahhabi rivals. As the group's spokesperson, Abu Muhammad Al Adnani,²⁹⁷²⁹⁸ put it:

“We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of *khilafah*, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the *khalifah* Ibrahim [Abu Baker Al Baghdadi] and support him. The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the *khilafah*'s authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.”²⁹⁹

IS argued that it had accomplished a *critical religious obligation* by establishing a caliphate and that it was incumbent on all believers to maintain Islamic rule, as expressed by the caliphate. In a similar vein, IS argued that true Muslims must pledge allegiance to Abu Baker Al Baghdadi. Al Baghdadi was IS's leader and caliph. Making use of Qutb, IS claimed that the failure to support the Caliphate entails the refusal to implement Islamic dominion fully and is nothing short of blasphemy. Conversely, Al Qaeda argued that Bin Laden had pledged an oath of

²⁹⁷ His real name was Taha Sobhi Falaha

²⁹⁸ BBC News, “Islamic State: Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ‘Killed in Aleppo,’” BBC News, August 31, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37224570>.

²⁹⁹ Charlie Winter, Craig Whiteside, and Haroro J. Ingram, “The Routinization of the Islamic State’s Global Enterprise,” Hudson Institute, April 1, 2021, <http://www.hudson.org/research/16798-the-routinization-of-the-islamic-state-s-global-enterprise>.

allegiance to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, i.e., the Taliban. Thus, IS's caliphate undermines Islamic rule and is therefore blasphemous.³⁰⁰³⁰¹

Both organizations have a fundamentalist mindset, to an even greater extent than Bin Laden. Their exclusivity has become even narrower, such that it excludes some followers of Bin Laden, in addition to all those excluded by Qutb, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, and Ibn Taymiyah. Their feelings of rage were further stoked by the inability of Bin Laden to realize his vision of expelling the infidels from the holy lands. Their paranoia was intensified by the factionalism that struck his followers after Bin Laden's death. Moreover, both IS and Al Qaeda saw the other faction as being renegades and apostates for needlessly splitting the ranks of Bin Laden's acolytes. Of particular note is IS's *apocalyptic thinking*. Unlike Al Qaeda, IS's apocalyptic thinking was highly present in their recruitment efforts and their self-identification. As the degree of paranoia increased within the group, it made increasing use of kairotic time. The group could only see its future through the prism of an apocalyptic event with the “caliphate” playing center stage. The group could not offer a specific, Cartesian, timeframe for the transformative event. Nevertheless, IS’s emotional attachment to ever-imminent apocalyptic events continued to ratchet up in tandem with the strengthening of the international campaign arrayed against it.

The apocalyptic Battle of Dabiq was first mentioned in passing by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, IS's previous organizational incarnation. IS's apocalyptic thinking became more central to its identity when the group developed a unique

³⁰⁰ Daniel L. Byman and Jennifer R. Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” *Brookings* (blog), February , 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/>.

³⁰¹ John Turner, “Strategic Differences: Al Qaeda’s Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 26, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 208–25, 208 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007563>.

belief system revolving around the Battle of Dabiq. Dabiq was the location of a supposed apocalyptic showdown between them and the forces of blasphemy.³⁰² So profound was IS's apocalyptic shift that the group decided to name its propaganda magazine Dabiq. Also, IS called their elite units on occasion *Jundi Dabiq*, or the Soldiers of Dabiq.³⁰³ In doing so, IS showcased its belief in the imminence of this battle. IS and Al Qaeda's feelings of paranoia, rage, and new apocalyptic narratives will continue to manifest in tandem with the appearance of new splinter groups. Their inability to attain their objectives, whether that pertains to establishing a Caliphate or the expulsion of the United States from the Persian Gulf, will only reinforce their fundamentalist mindset. This will also directly affect their perception and dealings with the Christian minority under their power.

2.10 On the Praxis of the Fundamentalist Rationalization: The Role of the Christian Minority in IS's Caliphate

2.10.1 Power sharing

Christians were not allowed any political power. IS predicated its rule on Wahhabi-Qutbism. IS's ideal type was one in which religion dominated all aspects of life, including politics. IS's perception of the role of religion stems directly from Taquideen Ahmad Ibn Taymiyah and Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's unique religious views. Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Abd Al Wahaab's fundamentalist rationalizations are another source of IS's conceptualization of religion. Wahhabi religious thought holds that its adherents are the only true believers. Following

³⁰² Harleen Gambhir, "Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State," Institute for the Study of War, accessed December 26, 2020, <http://www.understandingwar.org/dabiq-strategic-messaging-islamic-state-0>.

³⁰³ Taylor Luck, "ISIS Suffers Major Symbolic Defeat with Loss of Dabiq," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 16, 2016, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2016/1016/ISIS-suffers-major-symbolic-defeat-with-loss-of-Dabiq>.

Sayyid Qutb, IS holds that religion must be fully implemented such that failure to do so leads one to blasphemy.³⁰⁴ This Qutbist reading of religious rule is evidenced in numerous statements produced by Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi, the group’s founder and caliph. According to him: “The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement that will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy, and uncover its deviant nature.”³⁰⁵

This shows how IS considers any form of non-Islamic rule to be blasphemous. This belief can be directly traced to Sayyid Qutb, who claimed dominion to be equivalent to worship. This is why both IS and Qutb use the term “idol” when discussing non-Islamic (according to them) rule. Non-Islamic rule signifies for Qutb, IS, and Al Qaeda that one is associating partners with God and is as such polytheism. When these two views combined, IS deemed themselves to be the only true Muslims. IS like Qutb deems themselves to be the only true believers. According to Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi in the same speech:

“O ummah [nation] of Islam the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufur (disbelief) and hypocrisy-the camp of the Muslims and Mujahedeen [i.e. his followers] everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufur...”³⁰⁶

Significantly, Al-Baghdadi uses the term “today.” Therein lies his avowal that the ideology and politics that IS represents are a very modern phenomenon. **This speaks to my characterization of IS being a fundamentalist movement, a modern phenomenon that stands against**

³⁰⁴ Stern and Berger, op.cit., 271.

³⁰⁵ Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter, *The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 162.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, 162-163.

traditionalist understanding of religion as well as Western influences. Consequently, IS considers that permitting the Christians any form of political power in its state would cause the group to fall into blasphemy.

IS considers even Wahhabi Qutbists who are not part of the group to be blasphemous. This is evidenced by their relationship with Al Qaeda. Both groups accused the other of being blasphemous, due to their laxity in fully implementing Sharia. The Wahhabi Qutbism of IS is not static. Instead, IS's fundamentalism is constantly constricting. Its definition of belief is ever-narrowing. It constantly considers more people to be blasphemous, due to them not complying with an aspect of its fundamentalist beliefs. When taken to its logical conclusion, the seeds of IS's disintegration are sown. By adopting Qutb's definition of worship, IS considers anyone who stands against any aspect of its political project to be blasphemous. However, disputes are bound to appear regarding strategy, policy, and religious doctrines within the group. The inevitable result is different factions within IS accusing one another of blasphemy, due to their neglect of fully implementing Sharia and/or deviating from its proper implementation.

This fundamentalist rationalization has already caused the first major split within IS. The issue of dispute was the group's commitment to a Qutbist understanding of worship. Some members of IS had asked their leader Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi if it was permissible for IS's operatives to defend themselves in Iraqi courts to escape the death penalty. Al-Baghdadi replied in the affirmative. He did so possibly aiming to preserve the lives of his experienced followers in the hopes of a future prison break. This approval infuriated some of IS's members. They argued that any engagement with the Iraqi courts, even in matters of life and death, was blasphemy. In addition, anyone who fails to consider that action to be blasphemous has himself become a

blasphemer.³⁰⁷ These dissidents used their positions within IS's bureaucracy to carry out a purge against those who disagreed with them on this point.³⁰⁸ IS's governing institutions, which had been a point of pride for the group, were turned against each other.³⁰⁹

Even though the group was the wealthiest terror organization in history, and possessed a high degree of organization, it was nevertheless splintered as a consequence of its fundamentalist rationalization. Other factors helped bring IS's internal tensions to the foray. With an international coalition arrayed against it in 2014, the fortunes of IS began to change. In the context of setbacks on the battlefield, IS's leaders blamed one another for the caliphate's decline. The ability of IS to manage its religious tensions was affected by the elimination of the group's mufti, Al-Binali, in a coalition airstrike. Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi was forced into hiding, reducing his ability to rapidly respond to religious controversies festering within his group. In all likelihood, these conflicts provided the opportune moment for intelligence agencies to stir the pot even further. It is for similar reasons groups with similar fundamentalist rationalizations have collapsed. Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al-Gamaa'ah Al-Islamiyah organizations, which were both

³⁰⁷ Romain Caillet, "Analyse: de l'usage du takfir au Nigéria – la controverse de Boko Haram avec l'État Islamique en Afrique de l'Ouest – Religioscope," Religioscope, September 2, 2016, <https://www.religion.info/2016/09/02/analyse-takfir-au-nigeria-controverse-boko-haram-etat-islamique/>.

³⁰⁸ Cole Bunzel, "Caliphate in Disarray: Theological Turmoil in the Islamic State," Jihadica, October 3, 2017, <https://www.jihadica.com/caliphate-in-disarray/>.

³⁰⁹ Romain Caillet [@RomainCaillet], "Le texte du document condamnant les thèses du shaykh al-Hazimi a été publié dans la revue an-Naba, l'hebdomadaire de l'#EI en langue arabe. <https://t.co/IL6cnsuHU4>," Tweet, *Twitter*, April 16, 2017, <https://twitter.com/RomainCaillet/status/853401533123362816>.

led by Omar Abdul-Rahman,³¹⁰ would have a falling out over similar ideological questions and splinter into many competing factions.³¹¹

2.10.2 Economic questions

Christians living in the areas conquered by the group were told to choose between conversion, paying a so-called Jizyah to IS,³¹² or death. Jizyah per IS's understanding was an option offered to Christians whereby they would pay IS in exchange for the opportunity to live in the areas controlled by the group. **The “Jizyah” was nothing more than propaganda, as the Christian leaders refused to meet IS's summons, fearing execution.**³¹³ Christians were given a fourth option invented personally by the group's caliph Abu Baker Al Baghdadi, which is exile. By choosing that option, IS deemed that these Christians have elected to forfeit all the property that they have left behind.³¹⁴ IS used that to provide housing for its international followers who had migrated to the so-called lands of the caliphate.

IS's objective was to rewire the demography of the areas it controlled in its image. That served a theoretical and practical purpose. Filling the area with its supporters would make it more difficult for foreign intelligence agencies to infiltrate it. In addition, IS exploited this new demographic reality to portray its new polity as a place where the authentic creed could be implemented fully, as it was the community of true believers. It served another objective of IS, namely a total break with the socioeconomic and political status quo, drawing a sharper contrast

³¹⁰ Ibid, 364.

³¹¹ Ibid, 368.

³¹² The group called it a Jizyah

³¹³ Sarah Myers Raben, “The ISIS Eradication of Christians and Yazidis: Human Trafficking, Genocide, and the Missing International Efforts to Stop It,” *Brazilian Journal of International Law* 15, no. 1 (2018.): 239–55, 242.

³¹⁴ Cathy Otten, “Christians Flee Iraq's Mosul,” Al Jazeera, July 22, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/7/22/last-remaining-christians-flee-iraqs-mosul>.

between IS and the rest of the world. This is evidence of a new media strategy on the part of IS. The group was previously content to broadcast to the world its killing of Christians. Its offering of “Jizya” was an attempt on IS’s part to differentiate itself from other Wahhabi-Qutbist organizations. Furthermore, IS sought to showcase how it had established a caliphate, a Salafist State, in full adherence to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyah. IS and Al Qaeda are not the only groups predicated on fundamentalist rationalization. The Muslim Brotherhood is also a fundamentalist group. However, the nature of its fundamentalism is different as the Muslim Brotherhood bowdlerized different religious and philosophical traditions, with concomitant repercussions for Iraq’s Christian minority.

2.11 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi: The Founder of the Brotherhood's Contemporary Fundamentalist Rationalization

Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is the most senior religious figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood on its website states: "Al-Qaradawi has been defined by the Muslim Brotherhood Movement perhaps as much it is defined by him."³¹⁵ Thus, Al-Qaradawi is the IIP’s most important religious figure. This is significant for a religious party, such as the IIP. Crucially, Al-Qaradawi has developed another form of *fundamentalist rationalization*, which is also predicated on the rejection of traditional authorities, harkening back to a golden age, and the process of bowdlerization. However, the religious doctrines that Al-Qaradawi bowdlerized do not entirely match those that Ibn Taymiyah bowdlerized. Al-Qaradawi bowdlerized Wahhabi thought, whereby he borrowed some elements of it all the while proposing his alternative. Al-Qaradawi’s fundamentalist rationalization reflects on the political strategies adopted by the Brotherhood as a

³¹⁵ Tamam, Hossam. *A Reading into Al-Qaradawi-Muslim Brotherhood Relation*. 2008. <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=17396> (accessed July 2020)

global organization as well as its Iraqi branch, **the ethnicity it is constructing**, and its relationship with IS.

The Mechanics of Al-Qaradawi's Bowdlerization in the Service of His Fundamentalist Rationalization

Yusuf Al-Qaradawi takes a *big-tent religious approach*, whereby he appeals to different forms of fundamentalism and non-fundamentalist ideologies while subsuming all of them under his leadership. Al-Qaradawi's bowdlerization is different from Ibn Taymiyah's and Qutb's, which is more subtle. Al-Qaradawi's bowdlerization is characterized by *selective appropriation and syncretism of competing religious trends*. From Al-Qaradawi's perspective, he has invented a new school of jurisprudence. While Al-Qaradawi bowdlerized different sources, he did not directly reject them. Instead, some of his religious sources are fundamentalists, namely Qutb and Ibn Taymiyah. Wherein, Al-Qaradawi endorses these fundamentalists' belief that anyone who does not follow them is a blasphemer and whose killing is permissible. In other words, Al-Qaradawi encourages the fundamentalists' mass *takfir*³¹⁶ of society and their concomitant violence. On the one hand, Al-Qaradawi has praised non-fundamentalists, like Abduh and Al-Banna. On the other hand, Al-Qaradawi considers anyone who does not rule by Islamic law to be a heretic. Like Qutb, Al-Qaradawi believes anyone who is not ruled by Islamic law has committed blasphemy.³¹⁷³¹⁸³¹⁹ Al-Qaradawi echoes Qutb in claiming an exclusive connection to

³¹⁶ Deeming someone to be a blasphemer.

³¹⁷ Al-Qaradawi said:

مقتضى الإيمان يحتم على الأمة أن ترجع إلى دينها و إلى كتاب ربها و سنة نبيها محمد صلى الله على عليه وسلم هذا هو منطق الإيمان و إذا احتكنا إليه يجب أن نعود إلى القرآن و إلى السنة و الإسلام حكماً و محكومين و إلا رُمينا بالنفاق و الكفر بالظلم و الفسق و الذي يرمينا بذلك هو القرآن

[Belief obligates the nation to return to its religion, to the book of its Lord, and the creed and judgements of its Prophet Muhammad Peace be Upon Him. That is the logic is faith and if we were to be judged by it, we must return to the Quran, the creed and judgements and Islam rulers

a previous golden age. Al-Qaradawi also makes use of Ibn Taymiyah in his rejection of traditionalists and portrays them as a hindrance to the return to the last golden age.

By including Wahhabis in constructing his thought, Al-Qaradawi attempts to seduce Wahhabis even though some of their leaders have deemed him as a heretic, most notably Muhammad Naasir Al-Din Al Albani and Masharee Rashid Al ‘Afaasy. Al Albani and Al ‘Afaasy³²⁰ represented the Saudi establishment and were extremely distrustful of Al-Qaradawi, owing to his acceptance of Qutb and his revolutionary program.³²¹³²² Al-Qaradawi was more

and ruled. Otherwise, we would be charged with hypocrisy and blasphemy via injustice and the committing of great sins, and who charges us with so is the Quran].

From Yusuf Al Qaradawi’s book:

[Why Islam] لماذا الإسلام

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³¹⁸ Yusuf Al Qaradawi, لماذا الإسلام [Why Islam] (Cairo, Egypt: [Wahbah Library] مكتبة وهبه, 2001), 7 <https://www.al-qaradawi.net/node/5111>, 7.

³¹⁹ Osama Al Sayyid [Al Qaradawi in the Open] القرضاوي في العراق (Beirut, Lebanon: دار المشاريع [Projects Publishing House], 2002), 17-18.

³²⁰ Al ‘Afaasi is in fact Kuwaiti. His religious positions align with the Saudi religious establishment.

³²¹ For Mashari Al ‘Afaasi, and Al Albani’s critique against the Brotherhood:

Abd Al Qadir Waheed, “[Masharee Rashid: Al Albani Described the Brothers as Being Hypocrites] المصريين [The Egyptians]، مشاري راشد: وصف الإخوان بالمنافقين” [The Egyptians], July 12, 2020, https://almesryoon.com/Section_45/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%86_1306959.

³²² Abd Al Qadir Waheed, “[Masharee Rashid: The Harm Caused by the Brothers is More Severe than that of the Jews],” المصريين [The Egyptians], July 1, 2020, https://almesryoon.com/Section_8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%86_1306959.

³²² Abd Al Qadir Waheed, “[Masharee Rashid: The Harm Caused by the Brothers is More Severe than that of the Jews],” المصريين [The Egyptians], July 1, 2020, https://almesryoon.com/Section_8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%86_1306959.

successful in reaching out to the Sahwah and has incorporated Sahwah clerics into his organization. In addition to the ideological overlaps that Al-Qaradawi has crafted, the Sahwah has thrown its lot with Al-Qaradawi owing to their shared hostility against Saudi Arabia. That, and the fact that Qatar sponsors both the Sahwah and the Brotherhood owing to Qatar's geopolitical rivalry with Saudi Arabia. However, when Al-Qaradawi deems scholars such as Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyah as legitimate, his ability to present an alternative to IS is limited. This is more so the case, as Al-Qaradawi and IS deem anyone not following them to be a heretic. In addition, both encourage suicide bombings. Even though Al-Qaradawi's type of fundamentalism is different from IS's, he is willing to accept some of their religious theses. For while IS deems Al-Qaradawi to be a deviant, Al-Qaradawi seeks to gain the support of their ideological cousins, i.e., fundamentalists with remarkably similar leanings. Opportunism reigns within fundamentalism in the name of Islam, especially because bowdlerization constitutes the main ideological and operational tool.

The Praxis of the Brotherhood's Fundamentalist Rationalization

The Brotherhood following Al-Qaradawi's religious tenets has developed a fundamentalist mindset, albeit to a lesser extent when compared to IS and Al Qaeda. This fundamentalist mindset can be traced to the affinity some of its members have to Qutb and his concomitant rejection of society. The Brotherhood is not a fully Qutbist group. It nevertheless tolerates his thought spreading in society. Al-Qaradawi has echoed Qutb's full rejection of society while not completely applying it in practice. This difference can be partially explained by the external pressures each organization faces. IS and Al Qaeda are listed as terrorist

%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF_1305663.

organizations and are on the receiving end of covert drone strikes and military campaigns. Their degree of paranoia is exponentially more significant than the Brotherhood's. While the Brotherhood is banned in some Arab countries, it is part of the political scene in others, such as Iraq. Also, neither the United States nor any European country has interdicted the Brotherhood. The aims and the ideology of the Brotherhood are different from IS and Al Qaeda's. The Brotherhood seeks to establish a mass movement. It accepts political liberals as well as Qutbists. Its primary aim is participation in the political process. It has run in and encouraged democratic elections when it considers them to be opportune. When the Brotherhood judges its chances of winning via democratic means to be slim,³²³³²⁴ or when it is excluded from the political process altogether, the Brotherhood allows its more Qutbsit members to take the reins. In such a case, the Brotherhood encourages the seizure of power by force. IS and Al Qaeda are more of a revolutionary vanguard, in the Qutbist sense. They are unwilling to embrace political liberalism for peaceful political participation. Their rejection of society is far more profound, such that embracing political liberalism is heresy in their eyes.

The praxis of Al-Qaradawi's thought lends itself towards extreme pragmatism. Al-Qaradawi's approach considers all means possible to *attain power and build religious coalitions*. Al-Qaradawi appeals to both extremes of the spectrum, as he has endorsed suicide bombings and encouraged his supporters to join the US military. Al-Qaradawi has spoken out forcefully in favor of democracy in Egypt while remaining silent on his patron host Qatar, an absolute monarchy. While presenting himself as a moderate, Al-Qaradawi has lavished praise on Ayman

³²³ The participation of Brotherhood factions in the 1989 military coup against Sudan's nascent democracy shows the Brotherhood's opportunistic views on democracy. The Sudanese Brotherhood's support of Omar Al Bashir's military junta was not in order to further the cause of political liberalism

³²⁴ See for example, the causes behind the outbreak of the Libyan Civil War.

Al Zawhari's Al-Jihad organization, which would later become Al Qaeda. Al-Qaradawi has expressed admiration for how the group "has raised its followers on the meanings of strength and resilience and the values of sacrifice and martyrdom for the sake of Allah."³²⁵³²⁶ That has not prevented the IIP from participating in the political process. Al-Qaradawi has praised Zionism while still being revered by Hamas. The form of fundamentalism Al-Qaradawi espouses is not anti-West, nor does it derive its legitimacy from it. Instead, it is open to working within official structures of the US-imposed order. It is equally amenable to cooperating with organizations blacklisted for terrorism. *The malleability of the Brotherhood's discourse* reflects Al-Qaradawi's vision. The form of authority he lays claim to is a mix of charismatic and rational-legal. Al-Qaradawi is the founder and leader of an organization called the International Union of Islamic Scholars. Al-Qaradawi has also called upon his Al Azhar education to bolster his rational/legal authority further. Al-Qaradawi's rhetorical skills showcased on Al Jazeera,³²⁷ spoke to his charismatic authority and broad appeal.³²⁸

2.12 Conclusion

In conclusion, fundamentalism informs the rationalization of the Iraqi Brotherhood and IS. These organizations perceive themselves and the world that they interact with via the process

³²⁵ Tanzeem Al Djihaad

³²⁶ The full quote reads as follows: [We do not forget groups and movements which had influenced and contributed to the Sahwah with their different directions and sources, in addition to the mother of and the largest of Islamic movements, the Muslim Brotherhood. Among them is Al Jihad group that has raised its followers on the meanings of strength and resilience and the values of sacrifice and martyrdom for the sake of Allah].

و لا ننسى جماعات و حركات كان لها أثرها و مساهماتها في مجال الصحوة على اختلاف اتجاهاتها و مشاربها بالإضافة إلى أمّ الجماعات و كبرى الحركات الإسلامية حركة الإخوان المسلمين. و منها: جماعة الجهاد التي ربت أتباعها على معاني القوة و الصلابة و قيم البذل و التضحية و الاستشهاد في سبيل الله

³²⁷ Qatar's extremely popular news network

³²⁸ As cited in Al Sayyid, op. cit., 63.

of bowdlerization. Both portray themselves as having an exclusive connection to a past golden age. The ideological genesis of both organizations can be traced to Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, and Qutb. While there is an ideological overlap, the two organizations differ in terms of the **ethnicities** they develop and the types of authorities they appeal to.

The IIP prefers the use of rational/legal authority, with its participation in a modern state as a political party. Its appeal to charismatic and traditional authority relies on Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Al-Qaradawi has opted for a broad religious appeal, and selective use of Wahhabism and Qutbism, all while overtly supporting the United States military and its actions. Consequently, the IIP's ethnicity relies on self-identification as a Sunni Arab actor, resulting from the constitutional arrangements in Iraq. The IIP has appealed to Wahhabi religious rhetoric to deem its religious rivals as being heretics. One of the IIP's leaders, who is influenced by Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Abd Al Wahaab, deemed his Shiite electoral competitors as being in league with the blasphemers to divide Muslims. This did not prevent another of the IIP's leaders from speaking out against sectarianism, all the while refusing to disavow the IIP leader who made the above-mentioned comments.³²⁹³³⁰ Simultaneously, the IIP has presented itself as a nationalist

³²⁹ Masaar Abdul Muhsin Raadi, “ نائب امين عام الحزب الاسلامي: العلمانية سبب دمار العالم العربي والاسلامي ” (وهذا سبب انسحابنا من الانتخابات (مقابلة خاصة [The Deputy Leader of the Islamic Party: Secularism is the Reason Behind the Destruction of the Arab and Islamic World and this is the Reason for our Withdrawl from Elections (An Exclusive Interview),” [The Voice of Iraq] صوت العراق, accessed January 26, 2021, <https://www.sotaliraq.com/2018/03/05/%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b2%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a/>.

³³⁰ Ikhwan Wiki, “ عبد المنعم صالح العزي ” - [Abdul Moniem Saleh Al Azzi],” Ikhwan Wiki | الموسوعة التاريخية الرسمية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين [The Historical Encyclopedia of the Muslim Brotherhood]], accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%85_%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A.

actor, willing to work within the official parameters of a democratic polity set up by the United States and recognized by the international community. IS, on the other hand, appeals to Al Baghdadi's charismatic authority. Al Baghdadi's unique religious stature is based on an admixture of Qutbism and Wahhabism, whereby he becomes the realization of the religiously obligated position of Caliph. IS's rational-legal authority is based on the replacement of the Iraqi state and does not make allowances for traditional authority. IS's ethnicity rests on the belief that the group's members are the Salaf, the only true believers. Moreover, they are religiously obligated to fight any person or entity to realize a real Islamic state.

The IIP has been ineffective in countering IS in terms of its construction of an ethnicity and views on authority. The IIP has accepted and reinforced the category of "Sunni Arab" in an official Iraqi context. The result is the construction of a politically disenfranchised minority and the complication of cross-sectarian and cross-ethnic alliances. Also, it allowed the IIP to establish its patronage network. By deeming Qutb and Ibn Abd Al Wahaab as religiously legitimate actors, the IIP serves to justify the ethnic projects and actions of groups that are more committed to these religious figures, such as IS. Naturally, the destruction of IS's ethnic project cannot be seen in a vacuum, IS was defeated by an international military coalition, not the IIP's patronage networks. IS is being replaced not by the IIP but by actors who appeal to traditional authority, and tribalism.³³¹

³³¹ Jeff Sole, "Management of Savagery' – A Model for Establishing the Islamic State," *Mackenzie Institute* (blog), June 2, 2016, <http://mackenzieinstitute.com/management-of-savagery-a-model-for-establishing-the-islamic-state/>.

Chapter 3: IS and IIP: State Building Aspirations

This chapter examines another ethnic market of IS and the IIP's ethnicities, which are their state-building projects. This thesis argues that the commonalities between IS and the IIP's ethnicities can be elucidated through their strategies of governance. The Muhasasah and Mutasirifyah were predicated on ethnicity. These two concepts are the conceptualization of religious diversity. Polities predicated on the Muhasasah and Mutasirifyah had a diverse population whose members were Muslims and Christians, such as Maronites, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. The Muhasasah and Mutasirifyah can be traced to the Ottoman Millet system. They conceptualize diversity as pre-modern religious pluralism, combined with non-territorial autonomy. This form of diversity is attributed to minorities and Christians by IS and the IIP, without actually enabling or realizing it. This chapter will make use of Habermas's insights on ethnicity as a theoretical framework. From that, this chapter will compare and contrast IS and IIP's religious terminologies and political concepts to better elucidate their political projects which underpin their ethnicities, vis a vis Iraq's Christian minority.

3.1 Introduction

This chapter builds on the insights generated by the previous ones to further examine the extent to which the IIP is an effective foil against IS from a religious and political perspective. The second chapter compared the two fundamentalist organizations from the perspective of their rationalizations. This chapter examines how the two groups seek to manage ethnic conflicts in service of their state-building ambitions. It analyzes how these two groups view themselves, the mutual "other," and their political ambitions by examining their religious terminology. Of note are points of overlap, and their consequences in terms of governance. IS has been able to establish its system of governance because of the weaknesses of the post-invasion Iraqi state, which the IIP has played a significant role in establishing and maintaining.

This chapter argues that state-building is a key element of IS and the IIP's conflict management processes. It further argues that the lacunae in IIP's state-building project regarding ethnic conflicts paved the way for IS's alternative state-building project. Both IS's and the IIP's empowerment can be directly traced to the same context: the 2003 United States' invasion of Iraq. The new Iraqi state is characterized by ethnic conflicts based on sectarianism. This

management of conflict through the empowerment of sectarian conflicts is based on the Lebanese model. This chapter will examine the concept of Muhasasah (meaning proportionalism) which denotes a sectarian quota system that governs the allocation of power in governance. It has been the cornerstone of Lebanese political life, ever since it was a Mutasirifyah, which was a limited form of self-governance on a sectarian basis. These political concepts inform the nature of post-invasion Iraq. The state-building projects of IS and the IIP will be contrasted vis à vis these political concepts. Habermas provides a theoretical lens by which the relationship between states' legitimation and their management of ethnicity can be addressed. This study hence shifts towards a comparative approach. It addresses key religious concepts which have a significant bearing on self-proclaimed Islamic groups. They pertain to their identity, their relationship with the other, and how they seek to implement their religious beliefs. By assessing how the IIP and IS define these concepts, this chapter will shed some light on the identity and practices of these two groups, using their language in such a way that they can recognize themselves. Furthermore, it will show to what extent the IIP challenges IS, in terms of its actual religious beliefs as well as their implementation.

From a theoretical standpoint, this chapter will examine the concept of ethnicity and its theoretical interlocutors. It will showcase the history of this concept, and how it is currently problematized. This better situates the study vis à vis the literature. It will also further clarify how ethnic conflicts occur in the context of IS and IIP's competing ethnicity and state-building projects. This in turn will lay the foundation, in the next chapter, to see how those groups in the context of their ethnic conflict deal with Iraq's Christian minority.

This chapter argues that the IIP does not challenge the IS concerning its ideology, due to the significant overlap between the two organizations. Due to the influence of Ibn Taymiyah and

Qutb on both IS and the IIP, their definitions of Aqeedah, Jihad, People of the Book, and the caliphate overlap significantly. The regimes established by IS and the IIP showcase the differences between the two groups. The IIP has paid little heed to its ideology. Instead, political expediency dominates its governance. The IIP has attempted to legitimize its political project by joining the pre-existing political process, whatever that may be. Hence, the party's simultaneous embrace of ethnic sectarianism and democracy. Conversely, IS has been more committed to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyah and Qutb. It is attempting to legitimize the polities it tries to establish by asserting its commitment to Ibn Taymiyah and Qutb's beliefs.

3.2 The Relevance and Deployment of Ethnicity

Ethnicity has been portrayed as a political resource by various theoretical frameworks. They provide competing explanations on how ethnicity has been deployed by Ba'athist Iraq. The *primordialist* explanation, which was predominant in academia until the 1960s, claims that ethnic identities are the result of deep attachments to culture and group identities.³³² It sees the Ba'athist leadership as the continuation of a pre-existing set of identities that consist of racial and religious categories. These ethnicities/identities would compete with one another, irrespective of the Ba'ath Party's desires. The Ba'athist leadership would be equally helpless when it comes to generating a new ethnicity, for such a process would take many years. The *instrumentalist* approach sees ethnicity as essentially a political strategy. Ethnicity is a means by which the elites control and manipulate the masses while not having an objective and independent reality of its

³³² Anja Katharina Becker, "Ethnicity as a Political Resource Viewed by Scholars from Different Academic Disciplines," in *Ethnicity as a Political Resource : Conceptualizations across Disciplines, Regions, and Periods* (Cologne: Transcript Verlag, 2015), 11, <https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/32687>.

own. Per such an approach, the Iraqi leadership invented competing ethnic categories as part of its divide-and-conquer strategy to control the gullible masses.

The *situational* approach argues that ethnicity is fluid and contingent. This approach is the dominant paradigm in anthropology.³³³ The situational approach is a study of the construction of ethnic identity in specific contexts. The situational theoretical framework explains how Ba'athist Iraq came to adopt a unique ethnic identity. The official ethnicity which was invented by the state was a blend of Iraqi nationalism and Pan-Arab nationalism. It was a reflection of pre-existing identities and Ba'athist regional ambitions. The situational approach conceptualizes *why* the Iraqi leadership has changed on numerous occasions its ethnic identity. Ba'athist Iraq has alternated between a desire to impose its ethnic identity and offering concessions to competing ethnic actors. These shifts are in turn based on changing power relations.

The deployment of ethnicity in Iraq has gone through numerous shifts, before the US invasion. The Ba'ath party would firmly establish control over Iraq in 1968. Concomitant to this was its unique management of ethnicity. Officially, the Ba'ath party stands for Pan-Arab nationalism. Per its official rhetoric, it sought to unify the Arab world under Ba'athist Iraqi leadership. At the same time, Ba'athist Iraq promoted Iraqi nationalism. The ideal modern Arab was presented as an Iraqi Arab. It sought to establish its hegemony over Arabs by reshaping Arab nationalism in its image. Ba'athist Iraq would redefine the contemporary Arab identity based on Iraqi culture and history. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the Ba'ath party managed ethnicity

³³³ Ibid.

through clan and familial connections.³³⁴ This trend was especially prevalent during Saddam Hussein's advent to absolute power in 1979, owing to an internal coup within the Ba'ath party.

The Iraqi-Arab identity put forth by the Ba'ath party was *an instrument of marginalization* of anyone who stood opposed to its construction of a new ethnicity. It involves the exclusion of the Ba'ath Party's political opponents and members of ethnic and religious minorities. Excluded groups included liberals, Kurdish ethno-nationalists, and Shiites who sought a greater role for religion. As a whole, non-Arab minorities were cast as potential internal enemies by the state, which sought to marginalize them when it could.³³⁵ Ba'athist Iraq has alternated between a scorched earth policy and limited concessions. The Ba'athist state has often resorted to extreme violence to maintain its grip on power. Chaldean, Kurdish, and Arab villages which were suspected of disloyalty were razed to the ground. At the same time, it has attempted to act pragmatically by offering limited concessions when the balance of power was not in its favor. To reduce support for the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq, Iraq in 1970 agreed to allow the Assyrians, Syriacs, and Chaldeans a form of limited cultural autonomy. They were allowed to publish their magazines.³³⁶ These minorities were also permitted to establish schools that taught in the inhabitants' native Syriac, as opposed to Arabic.³³⁷

³³⁴ Al-Haloush, op.cit., 203.

³³⁵ Craig Douglas Albert, "A History of Violence: Ethnic Group Identity and the Iraqi Kurds," *Iran & the Caucasus* 17, no. 2 (2013): 215

³³⁶ Suheil Kasha, سهل نينوى ومستقبل المسيحيين في العراق [*The Nineveh Plains and the Future of Christians in Iraq*] (Beirut, Lebanon: دار أبعاد [Distances Press], 2016), 10.

³³⁷ Benjamin Isakhan and William Gourlay, "State-Society Relations and Inter-Communal Dynamics in Conflict: Non-Muslim Minorities in Post-IS Iraq," *Nations and Nationalism*, 2022, 1.

3.3 Theoretical Frameworks on Nationalities and Nation-States

3.3.1 The theoretical framework: Jürgen Habermas's views on the legitimacy of state-building projects

3.3.1.1 Frankfurt School

The Frankfurt School/Critical Theory shows how state-building projects are faced with a crisis of legitimacy. The Frankfurt School was developed as a Marxist critique of modernity and capitalist societies.³³⁸ This theory stems from Karl Marx's prediction of how capitalist societies undermine themselves. Per Marx, capitalistic societies are characterized by a "crisis-ridden process of economic growth."³³⁹ Economic growth establishes and conceals unequal power relations. Increased economic growth means more complexity and ultimately more problems being generated. This is how capitalistic societies in their quest for continued economic growth ultimately end up destabilizing themselves.³⁴⁰

A key theoretical addition by Habermas is the legitimation crisis.³⁴¹ When conceptualizing nations and states, Habermas goes beyond Marx's fixation on economic processes. Habermas identifies three forms of subsystems underpinning social systems: economic systems, political-administrative systems, and socio-cultural systems.³⁴² Habermas theorizes that these social systems are surrounded by an environment. That environment is characterized by an inner nature and an outer nature. The outer nature denotes resources from

³³⁸ Claudio Corradetti, "Frankfurt School and Critical Theory," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 10, 2022, <https://iep.utm.edu/critical-theory-frankfurt-school/>.

³³⁹ Jürgen Habermas, "What Does a Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism," *Social Research* 40, no. 4 (1973): 644.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ James Bohman and William Rehg, "Jürgen Habermas," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/habermas/>.

³⁴² Jürgen Habermas, "What Does a Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism," op.cit., 645.

non-human sources. The inner nature consists of members of that society. Social systems expand toward their environment. This expansion of societies towards the outer nature is through the production of knowledge while a broadening towards the inner nature occurs through socialization.³⁴³

The legitimation crisis is a phenomenon occurring in societies going through late capitalism, whereby these societies' contradictions are bringing about their de-legitimation. Advanced capitalism is defined by Habermas as a stage in capitalism where the state is increasingly forced to intervene in the market due to "functional gaps."³⁴⁴ The legitimation crisis is the decrease in confidence in the state's administration, institutions, and leadership. Moreover, such a state does not have the administrative capability to attain its goals. Late capitalist societies threaten the continued existence of their members. These factors correlate with the disruption of the state's normative structures, which in turn leads to social disintegration. The legitimation system works as a reaction to market dysfunctions.³⁴⁵ The basic bourgeois ideology³⁴⁶ has collapsed owing to these dysfunctions. The economic system functions on the inputs of work and capital, and its outputs are consumables. The economic crisis,³⁴⁷ which is part of the legitimation crisis, refers to the destabilization of outputs. The distribution of rewards and burdens does not take place per the legitimating value system. This economic crisis leads to two types of crises within the political system: A rationality crisis³⁴⁸ and a legitimacy crisis.³⁴⁹ It is a rationality

³⁴³ Ibid, 650.

³⁴⁴ Ibid, 645.

³⁴⁵ Ibid, 656 .

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid, 644.

³⁴⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. McCarthy Thomas (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1973): 46 https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/habermas_legitimation_crisis.pdf.

³⁴⁹ Ibid, xv.

crisis when the state cannot meet the demands of the economic system: “the administrative system does not succeed in reconciling and fulfilling the imperatives received from the economic system.”³⁵⁰ It is a legitimization crisis when the political authority fails to continue to attract support. Thus, the state cannot meet the requirements of the economic system.

The Iraqi state is going through a legitimacy crisis right now. The Iraqi state’s institutions are going through **late capitalism** because they were modeled on the basis provided by the occupying powers in 2003. The Iraqi state has constantly gone through an economic crisis and its concomitant destabilization of outputs. This crisis is more acute in Iraq owing to the extreme corruption characterizing its institutions. Despite the country’s immense natural resources, the state has been consistently unable to provide basic services. This has led to a legitimization crisis, for the Iraqi state has been unable to attract massive support. This in turn requires a greater deal of legitimization from the state. The Iraqi state has resorted to violence to maintain its existence. It has also made use of sectarian and ethno-nationalist rhetoric to legitimate its control. As discussed in the second chapter, minorities, and members of civil society have been on the receiving end of the state’s crises. The self-replicating nature of Iraq’s sectarian system means that internal reform is all but impossible.

The IIP’s sustained participation in Iraq’s governance has led to the group being affected by the state’s legitimacy crisis. The IIP has hemorrhaged support among its target audience, the Sunni Arabs because they perceive it to be part of the problem. This provides an opening for IS. This crisis of legitimacy reflects on IS and IIP’s strategies for state-building. IS has been able to exploit the IIP’s inability to establish a legitimate state, by constructing its proto-state as an

³⁵⁰ Ibid, 46.

alternative, namely its caliphate. Despite its ideological overlap with the IIP, IS has been able to attract support with its project for an alternative state. This trend will continue.

3.3.1.2 Communicative Rationality

Habermas's theory of communicative rationality is a study of successful communication.³⁵¹ It provides insight into how IS and IIP communicate with one another, and how they reinforce each other's message. Habermas defined communicative rationality as being the rational potential built into ordinary speech. The concept of communicative rationality was developed by Habermas as part of his broader study of the modernization of society. His broader goal was to measure the positive and negative consequences of modernization and to challenge its rationalization.³⁵² Habermas aimed to show how modern culture has unbridled communicative rationality from its ideological constraints. The result is that in modern societies, no social norms are deemed valid unless they are subjected to critical reflection.

Communicative rationality occurs when individuals coordinate their speech in the pursuit of joint goals. This coordination works on the shared understanding that the goals are inherently sensible. Communicative action is possible when the actors agree that their goals merit cooperative behavior. It is a consensual form of social coordination, where individuals "mobilize the potential for rationality"³⁵³³⁵⁴ such that a rational agreement is attained. People have mastered the rules for reaching an understanding intuitively. Communicative rationality aims to transform that intuitive content into moral reasoning. Habermas claimed that communicative action allows

³⁵¹ Bohman and Rehg, op. cit.,

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ A. V. Satish Chandra, "Inculcating Democratic Sense and Sensibilities through Deliberative Processes: A Case for Overcoming the Limitations of Electoral Democracy," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 72, no. 1 (2011): 80

for dealing with validity claims. The validity of social and cultural claims is demonstrated through reflective argumentation.³⁵⁵ This argumentation connects with cultural traditions and social institutions. Habermas's communicative rationality highlights areas of intersubjectivity, allowing for an alternative **to postmodernism** and its inherent contradictions through its exclusive reliance on self-referential claims.³⁵⁶

Habermas's communicative rationality enables us to show how the IIP reinforces IS's message. This reinforcement occurs irrespective of the IIP's attempts to portray itself as a moderate political actor. The ideological overlap between IS and IIP, regarding Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyah, is crucial. IS and IIP have a shared understanding that Qutb and Ibn Taymiyah's goals are sensible. The more the IIP refers to Qutb and Ibn Taymiyah as being valid religious sources, the greater the degree of an intersubjective understanding between the Brotherhood and IS. The more IS and the IIP stay in power, the greater the potential for the social and cultural claims of Qutb and Ibn Taymiyah to affect Iraq's cultural traditions and social institutions. The confrontational stances of these two religious-political movements are nothing more than a mirage. **The religious differences between the two are minimal. The difference between IS's and the IIP's state-building projects is limited to praxis.**

3.4 Habermas's Interlocutors: Competing Conceptualizations of Ethnicity

³⁵⁵ Omid A. Payrow Shabani, *Democracy, Power and Legitimacy: The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003). 33

³⁵⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (Boston, USA: Beacon Press, 1984). Vill

3.4.1 A History of the Concept of Ethnicity

The concept of ethnicity was first problematized in anthropology. Based on his study of the Kachin people,³⁵⁷ Edmund Leach claimed that “social units are produced by categorical ascription [sic] that have no necessary relationship to observers’ perceptions of cultural differences.”³⁵⁸³⁵⁹ This led to a debate over whether units of analysis should be based on the observer’s criteria or indigenous indicators. That debate in turn led to another debate between Michael Moerman and Raoul Naroll³⁶⁰³⁶¹³⁶² regarding the possibility of analytical units which can be inferred from observed cleavages. Moreman’s position, echoing Leach, was that such an inference was not possible. It would be his position that would dominate the discipline. Leach and Moreman’s position on ethnicity would be further reinforced by Fredrik Barth’s, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, which essentially echoed their position that such cleavages cannot be observed.³⁶³ Barth argued that “that boundaries persist despite the flow of personnel across them.”³⁶⁴ Individuals can thusly change their ethnic identities and are not fixed. Ethnicities are not defined in isolation but rather are the product of contrasting relationships between groups. This approach is **social constructivism**, which conceptualizes changes in ethnic identities.³⁶⁵

³⁵⁷ Edmund Leach and David Nugent, “Imaginary Kachins,” *Man* 18, no. 1 (1983): 191–206, 192.

³⁵⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 1st edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 117.

³⁵⁹ G. Carter Bentley, “Ethnicity and Practice,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, no. 1 (1987): 24–55, 24.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 25.

³⁶¹ Michael Moerman, “Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization: Who Are the Lue?,” *American Anthropologist* 67, no. 5 (1965): 1215–30, 1215.

³⁶² *Ibid*, 1216.

³⁶³ Bentley, *op.cit.*, 25.

³⁶⁴ Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Marek Jakoubek, eds., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries Today: A Legacy of Fifty Years* (London: Routledge, 2018), 3.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

3.4.2 The Debate Today: Primordialism and Instrumentalism

Ethnicity is now being debated in terms of the relationship between ethnic identity and nationalism.³⁶⁶ One side of the debate, represented by Geertz, sees ethnicity as being the outcome of primordial identities. Opposed to that is Wallerstine's instrumentalist approach, which characterizes ethnicity as being the manipulation of culture in the service of political and economic goals. The two approaches overlap in several key aspects. Both approaches have simple explanatory variables. Both agree that ethnic conflicts have become increasingly common following the end of the Second World War. Both seek subjective understandings of modern realities. Moreover, these two theories have limited predictive value. Predicting how identity claims shape conflicts is simply not feasible. The main point of difference is how ethnicity changes. Instrumentalists hold that changing economic and political circumstances lead to the reworking of ethnic identities. Ethnic groups are seen "essentially as a weapon in pursuit of collective advantages."³⁶⁷³⁶⁸ The emotional aspects of ethnic identities only held if objective material interests were being furthered. Primordialists³⁶⁹ hold the opposite assumptions of instrumentalists. Entrenched sentiments allow people to deal with a constantly shifting social context. Ultimately they respond to deeply held emotional needs that manifest themselves even in the absence of economic and/or political necessities.

These two theoretical approaches have similar blind spots. Neither of these theoretical approaches explains how people recognize commonalities whether these are economic interests or sentimental attachments. Nor do they explain "what elements of commonality are embodied in

³⁶⁶ Anthony D. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (July 1, 1996): 445–58, 445.

³⁶⁷ Bentley, *op.cit.*, 25.

³⁶⁸ Instrumentalists such as Anthony D. Smith.

³⁶⁹ Primordialists such as Clifford Geertz.

particular symbols (name, descent, language, religion,) in settings.”³⁷⁰ Another issue that neither the primordialists nor the instrumentalists can adequately explain is the development and attachment to symbols, regardless of their economic or cultural benefits. Primordialism has been critiqued by Anthony Smith who has pointed out that it fails to explain why humans are so deeply differentiated by ethnic origins. Moreover, primordialism is unable to explain the mechanisms underlying the emergence and dissipation of ethnicities. Moreover, this framework is unable to identify much less explain the phenomena of people choosing to assimilate into other ethnicities. Another failure is its inability to explain why xenophobic ethnic nationalisms sometimes make way for a tolerant multicultural identity. Instrumentalism has the opposite problem, concerning its explanatory value. It cannot show why ethnic conflicts are intense or why they are so unpredictable if they are merely window-dressing for the ambitions of self-interested politicians. It also is unable to explain why ethnicity is so successful in mobilizing the masses, to the point where armed conflict breaks out. The durability of ethnicities, irrespective of political and economic transformations, represents another conceptual flaw in that theory.

3.4.3 Sociobiology

Pierre van der Berghe’s sociobiology is an attempt to combine the primordialist and instrumentalist reading of ethnicity. Common cultural attributes aid their members in crafting alliances when faced with economic and political threats. Ethnicity can thus be explained by a biological “predisposition towards kin selection.”³⁷¹³⁷² In addition, attachment to primordial symbols is a reinforcement of biological predisposition. Another attempt to square the

³⁷⁰ Ibid, 26.

³⁷¹ Ibid, 26.

³⁷² Pierre L. van den Berghe, “Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (October 1, 1978): 401–11, 401.

primordialist and instrumentalist conceptions is Charles Keyes's theory. Rejecting sociobiology, Keyes suggests that ethnic identities serve deeply rooted psychological functions. However, these identities are only relevant if they yield access to "means of production," products of labor, or facilitate any exchanges within the groups defined by said ethnicity.

3.4.4 Habermas on Ethnicity

Habermas's views on ethnicity are a consequence of his eclectic approach. Habermas was influenced by Max Weber, as well as by **critical theory, which is influenced by Marxism**. Following critical theory, Habermas sought to move beyond the Marxist focus on capital and class. Instead, he honed his focus on the relationship between "capitalist exploitation and bureaucratic state rule, and their implications for individual identity and collective political autonomy."³⁷³ Habermas rejected the deterministic Marxist reading of history, which saw the triumph of socialism over capitalism as being inevitable. Instead, Habermas, being influenced by other critical theorists such as Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, was concerned with how the Enlightenment, as a form of Weber's instrumentalist rationality, has become a means of enslavement. As Habermas put it: "My problem was a theory of modernity, a theory of the pathology of modernity, from the viewpoint of the realization – the deformed realization – of reason in history."³⁷⁴ Habermas's alternative is thus predicated upon the reworking of the classical theories, especially of Marx and Weber.

Habermas's alternative theory revolves around the "reconstruction" of the assumptions underlying people's communications, collaborations, and disputes. It clarifies the effects of the IIP's competing ethnic communications with IS. In turn, it influences how ethnicities are disseminated, disputed, and communicated. Habermas's theory of communicative

³⁷³ William Outhwaite, "Jürgen Habermas," in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists* (West Sussex, United Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2011), 339–60, 342

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

action argues that the use of language to describe the world assumes that what we are saying has a meaning and is truthful. Moreover, we are sincere in our declarations. Habermas describes it “as a speech act carried out in an attitude oriented to understanding.”³⁷⁵ According to Habermas, a rational agreement is only possible when no one is excluded, which led to his theory of truth. Habermas saw the truth as being embedded in assertions: “I am claiming that the proposition that I am asserting is true.”³⁷⁶ If one claims to be a member of an ethnic group, then it is because he is claiming that such is the truth. Truth is equated with the extent it can be justified. “Truth condition of propositions is the potential assent of all others.”³⁷⁷ Habermas has shifted his position regarding how such a justification can be attained. Initially, he saw the truth as being the outcome of agreements, i.e. an idealized consensus. More recently, Habermas has theorized that the objective world is the “truth-maker.” **When the Brotherhood assents to IS’s assertion that Ibn Taymiyah and Qutb are credible religious figures, they are justifying the implementation of Ibn Taymiyah and Qutb’s teachings, irrespective of their liberal platitudes. This consensus by IS and the IIP on the validity of Ibn Taymiyah and Qutb has a marked effect on the objective world, such as IS’s caliphate.**

Habermas’s idealized consensus carries on to his views on discourse correlating with his perception of ethnicity. Habermas developed the “discourse principle,” which can explain how ethnic conflicts are described. A choice is justified if all those affected by it deem it to be reasonable in their discourse. This was first seen as a principle for moral discourse, but Habermas now claims impartial justification for all types of discourse. An agreement that

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Bohman and Rehg op. cit.,

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

excludes no one is necessary, and evidence recognized as such by everyone determines to what extent an ethnic discourse is accepted.³⁷⁸

Habermas argued for a neo-Marxist reading of history, which also informed his critique of capitalism. Historical materialism,³⁷⁹ as understood by orthodox Marxism, needs to be reinforced by an appreciation of normative structures. Moreover, the context that Karl Marx theorized about was an industrialized Western Europe, which no longer holds for our modern reality. Habermas sought to bring into focus the role of the modern interventionist welfare state in generating conflicts. **Habermas's analysis revolves around the state, and how it displaces crises from the economic sphere to the political and cultural realms. This certainly holds for how ethnic conflicts are generated. While economic crises remain at the heart of the state's problems, what people experience are incoherent responses from the state to overt social, political, and ethnic tensions. This is what Habermas terms the "rationality crises," which serve to weaken the state's legitimacy. Among the unintended effects of the state's ineffectual interventions is the demotivation of individuals, as they increasingly suffer from a loss of meaning and direction.**

Habermas's theory of communicative action is a study of the conflict between different rationalizations in early modernity. That period is characterized by a clash between secularization and formal law on one hand, and the eroding appeals to authority on the other. The modern world would be dominated by market and bureaucratic structures.³⁸⁰ This is where Habermas draws his influence from and diverges from Max Weber. Weber saw a single rationalization process, influencing political, economic, and religious worldviews. **Habermas in**

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Outhwaite, op. cit., 345.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

contrast theorized two rationalization processes. These two processes consist of attitudes and practices. This “lifeworld” as Habermas calls it, is the world before philosophical or scientific analysis. For Habermas, the lifeworld consists of both attitudes and practices. It is a realm of informal cultural bases, understandings, and mutual accommodations. Modernity is characterized by the systemization of worldviews and the rationalization of the lifeworld. In tandem with that is the development of its markets and bureaucratic systems or as Habermas calls it, the colonization of the lifeworld. When human social arrangements are rationalized, they become rigid “social subsystems.” These “social subsystems” are analyzed but not criticized by studies on systems, such as sociological theories. Habermas agrees with Weber that these subsystems can become independent. The outcomes of which consist that these subsystems run independently of their moral and political origins in the lifeworld. According to Habermas: “Economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which social relations are regulated only by money and power.”³⁸¹³⁸²

3.4.5 Habermas’s “Systemically Distorted Communications”

Jürgen Habermas’s contribution to the study of ethnic conflicts is his concept of “**systemically distorted communications.**” Habermas originally came up with that concept to examine **class relations in a capitalist society.** However, Habermas now uses “systemically distorted communications” to describe ethnic relations, hence its relevancy.³⁸³ This framework starts from the postulate that one cannot know all the assumptions underpinning his encounter with the other, misunderstandings are inevitable. Thus, there is a gap between what we perceive in people’s behavior, and the generative mechanisms underlying them. Consequently, superficial

³⁸¹ Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. T. McCarthy, vol. 2, 2 vols. (London, Cambridge: Polity and Heinemann, 1981), 154.

³⁸² Cited in Outhwaite, op.cit., 346.

³⁸³ Bentley, op.cit., 34.

similarities between people, such as language will lead to incorrect assumptions of mutual comprehension. The result of these distorted communications is that feelings of confusion and alienation are generated. The incorrect attribution of motives and the invention of interethnic stereotypes are also a consequence of “systemically distorted communications.” **This theory explains to an extent how the Iraqi state manages ethnic conflicts. The segmentation of the Iraqi population on an arbitrary basis is the cornerstone of its mismanagement of ethnic relations.**³⁸⁴

3.4.6 Anthony Smith’s Ethnicity Versus the Modernist Theory of Nationalism

The modernist reading of nationalism sees it as a wholly modern phenomenon.

Nevertheless, the scholars who adhere to that approach, such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Eric Hobsbawm are not in agreement on the exact origins. The term modern is in itself contextual, which can partially explain the theoretical approaches. Gellner traced it back to the Industrial Revolution while Benedict Anderson has it to “between say, 1760 and 1830.” Eric Hobsbawm argued that “the principle of nationality [can be traced] to “the period from 1830 to 1878.”³⁸⁵ What these theories have in common is a common rejection of the primordialist belief that ethnic origins underlying nations have a long history. Anderson drew a contrast between “the objective modernity of nations to the historian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists.”³⁸⁶

Anthony Smith’s theory of “ethnosymbolism” stands as a counterpoint to the modernist theory of nationalism, and by extension, its reading of ethnicity. In *The Ethnic Origins of*

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Alexander Maxwell, “Primordialism for Scholars Who Ought to Know Better: Anthony D. Smith’s Critique of Modernization Theory,” *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 5 (September 2020): 826–42, 827.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

Nations, Smith argued against modernism's views on ethnicity and nationalism by highlighting the importance of traditions. Nations are not modern entities. Rather, nationalism can be traced back to the Middle Ages, if not to antiquity. "[n]ot merely the processes of modernization, but also to earlier pre-modern identities and legacies that continue to form the bedrock of many modern nations."³⁸⁷³⁸⁸ At the bedrock of both is the development of social and symbolic processes. Also essential are shared memories, values, and traditions. Smith emphasized the importance of traditions, memories, and symbolism of non-elites, in the construction of nations. Ethnosymbolism is Smith's main theoretical contribution to the study of nationalism. At its base is the concept of *ethnie*, the French word that Smith preferred over the ethnic community. *Ethnie* is Smith's means by which the pre-modern basis of the nation is understood. Smith's approach differs from primordialism to the extent that *ethnie* differs from the nation. Primordialism assumes the ongoing existence of ancient nations while Smith argues that the ancient *ethnies* transformed themselves into nations.

Eric Hobsbawm's contribution to nationalism theory and by extension the study of ethnic conflicts is his concept of invented traditions. Invented traditions are "taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past."³⁸⁹³⁹⁰ This process involves the selection of appropriate events in the past and the establishment of continuity with it. However, this

³⁸⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 47.

³⁸⁸ Cited in: Alexander Maxwell, "Primordialism for Scholars Who Ought to Know Better: Anthony D. Smith's Critique of Modernization Theory," *op.cit.*, 828.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 835.

³⁹⁰ E. J. Hobsbawm et al., *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1.

continuity between the new tradition and the past may be fictitious. As Hobsbawm put it: “Inventing traditions, it is assumed here, is a process of formalization and ritualization characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition.”³⁹¹ One final point of differentiation between the two is continuity. While Smith stressed the importance of continuities for the construction of ethnicities and ethnic conflicts, Hobsbawm was largely indifferent.³⁹²

3.5 Definitions to be compared:

The issue of definitions is important to show how ethnic conflicts are being expressed. With regards to IS and IIP, while they are involved in the construction of competing ethnicities, they do not perceive it as such. The conflicts that they engender are not justified in terms of ethnicity. Thus, it is crucial to show to what extent religious concepts are given different definitions by these two groups. It will show to what extent they are in opposition to one another. The terms to be compared are Aqeedah, Jihad, People of the Book, and the Caliphate.

3.5.1 Aqeedah

The issue of Aqeedah or creed is one of the fundamental points of a religious group’s identity. In the case of IS and the IIP, there are numerous points of overlap. A study of these groups’ Aqeedah provides insight into how these groups perceive themselves and others. It explains how they determine belief and blasphemy. Both groups, like any movement that claims to be Islamic, will state that at the base of their creed lies the belief that there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His messenger. The differences lie in how they believe in Allah and how they perceive the Prophet and his rules. With regards to IS, their melange of Wahhabism and Qutbism leads them to believe that they are the only true believers. As such, they deem the

³⁹¹ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, Reissue edition (Cambridge Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press, 2012),4.

³⁹² Maxwell, op.cit., 838.

IIP to be blasphemers owing to their participation in non-Islamic rule. Following Qutb's precepts, IS holds that participating in any manner in a regime that does not fully abide by Islamic law is blasphemy.³⁹³ IS holds that since it has established a caliphate, all other organizations are illegitimate.³⁹⁴

The IIP does not have a single, unified creed/aqeedah. Rather, different factions and leaders hold different beliefs. This phenomenon is not particular to the IIP, but rather it characterizes the entirety of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is characterized by its ideological malleability. Its ideology changes along with external political circumstances and the group's internal dynamics. Under the group's founder Hassan Al-Banna, the group was ideologically traditionalist, opposed to the British colonial presence, with the ultimate goal of restoring the caliphate. Al-Banna's vision of the caliphate, and by extension the Brotherhood's, was the Ottoman Empire.

The IIP's founder Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sawaaf was influenced by Al-Banna.³⁹⁵ After meeting Al-Banna, Al-Sawaaf would for a short while join Al-Banna's Brotherhood, which was growing in strength and momentum. Al-Sawaaf would then establish in Iraq his movement, the Islamic Brotherhood Organization (IBO).³⁹⁶ The IBO was supposedly meant to represent Sunni Muslims and assert their interests on a religious basis. Like Al-Banna's organization; Al-Sawaaf's group would be ideologically opposed to British colonialism as well as communism. The IBO's creed, when compared to Al-Banna's Brotherhood, was more open to different

³⁹³ Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, op.cit., 154.

³⁹⁴ Caillet and Puchot, op cit., 245.

³⁹⁵ Hussam Hadad, "[Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sawaaf-The Founder the Iraqi Brotherhood] محمد بوابة الحركات الاسلامية [The Islamist Movements Portal] مؤسس إخوان العراق, December 30, 2021, <http://www.islamist-movements.com/3653>.

³⁹⁶ جمعية الأخوة الإسلامية

ideological currents. Al-Sawaaf would call upon senior Shiite clerics, such as Talib Al-Rifai,³⁹⁷³⁹⁸³⁹⁹ to join his nascent movement. Al-Sawaaf would seek to cajole the Shiite clerics by arguing for a common front against their common enemy, communism. This was a step that Al-Banna was not willing to take, owing to the religious divide between him, as a Sunni cleric at the head of a Sunni movement, and the Shiites. Moreover, Al-Sawaaf's attempts to entice the Shiite clergy would prove to be unsuccessful.⁴⁰⁰ The creed of the Iraqi Brotherhood's forerunner was open to different religious views, even when these views were contradictory to one another. The IBO under Al-Sawaaf would officially join the Brotherhood in 1960 when it had completely transformed under the ideological leadership of Sayyid Qutb.

The creed of Qutb is revolutionary and radically exclusionary. The IIP incorporated that creed to an extent. Qutb, as previously mentioned, considered himself and his followers as the only true believers. The revolutionary aspect of Qutb's creed is illustrated by its call to overthrow the pre-existing blasphemous political order. Aside from joining Qutb's group, the IIP on numerous occasions would express support to Qutb personally. The IIP's founder and leader

³⁹⁷ Who is one of the founders of the Dawa Party

³⁹⁸ طالب الرفاعي من رئيس جماعة الإخوان المسلمين في العراق إلى قيادي و مؤسس لحزب [Ali Al-Khalidi, *Talib Al-Rifai From the Head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq to Being a Leader and Founder of the Dawa Party*], 2016, 3:17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pw9-s9xfn_I.

³⁹⁹ Rasheed Al-Khayeeon, "في تأسيس 'الدعوة الإسلامية' هذه روايات الدعاة الأوائل," [Iraq..Inside the Establishment of the 'Islamic Call' These are the Stories of the First Preachers], *المجلة* [The Magazine], April 6, 2013, <https://arb.majalla.com/2013/04/article55244007/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%90%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%91%D9%8E%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%B0%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%91%D9%8F%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84>.

⁴⁰⁰ This is why I am inclined to disbelieve the reports that the IBO was merely a front group for the Brotherhood, at that time.

Al-Sawaaf had a photographed visit to Qutb, signifying their bond.⁴⁰¹ The IIP would try to assist Qutb when he was imprisoned by Egypt's leader Jamal Abdel-Nasser, even calling on Shiite clerics to intercede with the Egyptian government on Qutb's behalf.⁴⁰²⁴⁰³ After Qutb's execution, the IIP would hold protests in condemnation. The IIP served as an instrument by the Iraqi republican regime against Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism, whose popularity was far greater than the IIP's.

It is worth noting that the IIP did not wholeheartedly embrace Qutb's creed. The IIP did not call for a violent revolution, even though Iraq was not under Islamic rule. At the same time, some of its members went into exile, with the United Kingdom being their primary destination.⁴⁰⁴ Others maintained an underground presence in Iraq. Neither of these two approaches complies with Qutb's thoughts. Qutbism sees only two options for the one who is living under a non-Islamic rule, and is seeking to preserve his faith: Either one rebels against the said blasphemous regime or one separates oneself from society. Neither those living under Saddam Hussein nor those in the United Kingdom were living under Islamic rule. Hence, the IIP did not become a fully Qutbist group. Instead, the IIP treated it as a valid ideology, among

⁴⁰¹ Ikhwan Wiki, "الشيخ الصواف" [Sheikh Al-Sawaaf], Ikhwan Wiki | الموسوعة التاريخية الرسمية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين [The Historical Encyclopedia of the Muslim Brotherhood], May 29, 2020, <https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81>.

⁴⁰² Rasheed Al-Khayoon, "سيد قطب... محاولة إسلاميين شيعة لإنقاذه" [Sayid Qutb... The Shiite Islamists' Attempt to Save Him], صحيفة الاتحاد [Al-Ittihad Newspaper], January 7, 2014, <https://www.alittihad.ae/wejhatarticle/76768/إنقاذه-إسلاميين-شيعة-لمحاولة-قطب>.

⁴⁰³ Ali Al-Mu'min, "حول تأثير حزب الدعوة الإسلامية بفكر جماعة الإخوان المسلمين" [On how the Islamic Call Party was Influenced by the Thought of the Muslim Brotherhood], [The Voice of Iraq] صوت العراق, April 17, 2018, <https://www.sotaliraq.com/2018/04/17/%d8%ad%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%aa%d8%a3%d8%ab%d8%b1-%d8%ad%d8%b2%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d9%81%d9%83%d8%b1-%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%a7/>.

⁴⁰⁴ Graham E. Fuller, "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein" (US Institute of Peace, 2003), 1 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12315>.

others. The IIP treated Qutbism as a networking opportunity, enabling it to establish connections with global movements. The execution of Qutb, the Brotherhood's failure to gather mass support as well as the influence of exile politics led the IIP to undergo yet another transformation in its creed, leading to the creed it adheres to today.

The contemporary creed of the IIP is heterogeneous, reflecting the different influences on the IIP over the years. The IIP has sought to be a legal entity and allowed to participate in the political process, whatever that process may be. The IIP's self-perception as a legitimate moderate actor is a direct consequence of its creed. The Qutbist and Wahhabi influences represent points of overlap with IS and Al Qaeda. Some factions within the IIP are perennialists, while others are Wahhabis. The perennialists have been used by the IIP to present an image of moderation vis à vis Iraq's Christian minority. With regards to IIP's Wahhabi operatives, they serve to mobilize Sunnis against the Shiite heretics. Their purpose was also to serve as a possible avenue from which the IIP could obtain financial support, whether from Saudi Arabia or Qatar. During Al-Sawaaf's leadership of the IIP, the group became particularly close to Saudi Arabia, whereas now it is allied with Qatar.⁴⁰⁵ **What sets the IIP's Wahhabism apart from IS's is that the IIP's Wahhabis refuse to be subsumed by IS's caliphate and military campaigns.**

⁴⁰⁵ Abduh Mustapha Dusuki, "محمد محمود الصواف.. رائد الحركة الإسلامية في العراق" [Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sawaaf.. The Pioneer of the Islamic Movement in Iraq], Ikhwan Online, January 20, 2022, <https://ikhwanonline.com/article/252361/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82>.

3.5.2 Jihad

How IS and the IIP view Jihad is essential to how they aim to implement their vision. With regards to IS, it argues that Jihad is an obligation upon every Muslim. Taking their cue from Qutb, IS holds that establishing a pure Islamic rule is the difference between belief and blasphemy.⁴⁰⁶ A person, who lives under a non-Islamic regime, is obligated to either overthrow this blasphemous regime or quit such a regime to preserve one's faith. Thus, one must migrate to the land of belief i.e. the caliphate. Conversely, lone wolf attacks are the direct outcome of such a view. This link is not merely theoretical. Rather, IS in its propaganda outlets such as its magazines, and speeches by the group's spokesperson directly called for such types of attacks as a religious duty.⁴⁰⁷ As for the Brotherhood, they have constantly reinterpreted their understanding of Jihad. The IIP does not engage with IS's theological reasoning for its attacks. It has to a very limited extent characterized IS's attacks as being terrorism.⁴⁰⁸ It critiques IS because of its actions, nothing more. **What the IIP does not do in its daily press releases is attack Wahhabism and Qutbism, lest it highlight its possible points of overlap between it and IS or alienate its Qatari support.**

3.5.3 People of the Book

How the People of the Book are perceived differs from the viewpoints of IS and the IIP. The IIP is willing to share power with Iraq's Christians.⁴⁰⁹ This political pluralism stands in

⁴⁰⁶ Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, op.cit., 284.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid, 286.

⁴⁰⁸ Ayad Al-Samarraie, “الحزب الإسلامي: لن ننسى ارهاب #داعش ووحشيته ولا بد من اتمام اعمار المحافظات #” المحررة وتحصين ارضنا من الأفكار المتطرفة لعدم تكرار ما حصل في حزيران ٢٠١٤. <https://t.co/1yDVgnbxS0> [The Islamic Party: We Will Not Forget the Terrorism of Daesh and its Brutality. The Liberated Provinces Must be Rebuilt and Fortify our Lands Against Extreme Ideas so that what Happened in June 2014 is not Repeated Again],” Tweet, @ayadalsamarraie (blog), June 10, 2020, <https://twitter.com/ayadalsamarraie/status/1270731214589214721>.

⁴⁰⁹ Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: Iraq's Governing Council,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2005, <https://www.cfr.org/background/iraq-iraqs-governing-council>.

marked contrast with IS. The IIP does not want to antagonize the United States. The IIP has desired international recognition as a legitimate actor. It is willing to adhere to the rules established by the United States, governing Iraq's political process. Consequently, the IIP's political participation came in tandem with political representation for Iraq's Christians on the IGC.⁴¹⁰ This is why the IIP participated within and praised official institutions that provided quotas for Iraq's Christians.⁴¹¹ The willingness of the IIP to share power also reflects its pluralist ideology. Aside from the quotas, the IIP is open to certain democratic processes such as the ballot box. It has no ideological qualms about working with politicians from different religions, including Christians. This is not to suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood in its entirety has adopted liberalism and democracy wholesale. Rather, the IIP has adopted political liberalism because it has provided the IIP with a means of presenting itself as a moderate actor in the United States. Political liberalism has also allowed the IIP to attain some power. The expediency is demonstrated by its stance on sectarianism. The IIP has no problem with the Iraqi sectarian quota system which keeps Sunni Arabs and Christians as permanent political minorities. The objective of the IIP is to represent the Sunni Arab minority, by presenting itself as a pliant interlocutor to other sects and foreign powers.

As for IS, its lack of political pluralism is one of its main differentiators from the IIP. While IS can tolerate the existence of Christians in its caliphate, under several caveats, what it cannot do is share power with them in any way. IS seeks to implement its religious rulings in all facets of life, especially governance. According to IS, all legitimate authority must be

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Ali Abd Al Aal, "محمد أحمد الراشد مفنداً حجج السياسيين السنة" [Muhammad Ahmad Al-Rashid Critiquing the Excuses of Sunni Politicians], Arab Times, 2008, http://www.arabtimes.com/portal/article_display.cfm?Action=&Preview=no&ArticleID=8747.

concentrated in the hands of the Caliph, or the deputies whom he empowers. A blasphemer has no standing to act as Caliph, nor any other position of religious standing. Concerning the issue of enslavement of the People of the Book, the sources begin to differ. It has been reported on a few occasions that Christians were enslaved by IS, according to the group's interpretation. In other cases, Christians were given privileges under IS's rule not allocated to people following other religions. Whoever IS viewed as apostates, namely those who identified as Muslims but did not adhere to IS's creed were given two choices: Embrace IS's creed or face immediate execution. The Yazidis were meted out a different treatment. This is the consequence of IS's perception of Yazidis as followers of a heretical religion, who were not among the people of the book. Thus, IS could not tolerate their existence in the slightest, especially in their caliphate.⁴¹² From that stemmed IS's policy of executions and enslavement. IS in its propaganda outlets justified their enslavement so that the new generation would be raised in the ideology of the group.⁴¹³

As for Iraqi Christians, as previously mentioned, in some cases, they were given the choice of paying a so-called Jizyah. In exchange for such a payment, Christians were permitted to stay in their homes and not subjected to IS's attacks. The other options offered to Iraq's Christians were conversion or expulsion. Christians who opted for the third choice saw their homes confiscated by IS. IS in turn would distribute these houses among its supporters, to encourage foreign fighters to move to the caliphate, along with their families. That became part of IS's program of demographic reengineering. IS did not simply seek to attract foreign fighters, but rather it attempted to lure entire families. The group's aim was the total reconstruction of society following its religious precepts. By replacing the population, IS would be in a position, per its perspective, to establish a community of true believers, while simultaneously punishing

⁴¹² Stern and Berger, *op.cit.*, 47.

⁴¹³ Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, *op.cit.*, 144.

those who refused to adhere to its values. **IS's treatment of Iraqi Christians in that regard can be explained in terms of both value and instrumental rationality. The instrumental rationality of that policy was that it provided a financial windfall for the group. These added resources in turn enabled IS to construct a more sophisticated and efficient administration of its caliphate. The value rationality was the desire of the group to act following their religious precepts. Thus, for their caliphate to be legitimate from a Wahhabi-Qutbist perspective, it had to treat the People of the Book in such a manner.**⁴¹⁴⁴¹⁵⁴¹⁶

3.5.4 The Caliphate

IS and IIP have widely diverging views regarding the caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood, including its Iraqi branch, has constantly shifted its views regarding the caliphate. At the same time, none of the Brotherhood's varying conceptualizations of the caliphate are identical to IS's, though they have on some occasions come quite close. The changes to how the Brotherhood views the caliphate, as previously stated, can be partially explained as being a result of internal changes within the group. Another key factor shaping the Brotherhood's desire for a caliphate is to what extent the pre-existing political system is amenable to the Brotherhood's influence.

Originally, Hassan Al-Banna sought the resurrection of the Ottoman Empire. This objective correlated with the fact that the political space under the Egyptian monarchy was very

⁴¹⁴ McCants, op.cit., 122.

⁴¹⁵ There have been a few reports of Iraqi Christians who have been enslaved, per IS's religious tenets. The same was also said regarding US aid worker Kayla Muller, who was allegedly made the personal slave of IS's leader Abu Baker Al Baghdadi.

⁴¹⁶ Reuters Staff, "Convert, Pay Tax, or Die, Islamic State Warns Christians," Reuters, July 18, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-christians-idUSKBN0FN29J20140718>.

constricted. An elected parliament with limited powers existed. Moreover, the elections to the parliament were constantly rigged. At the same time, the Egyptian monarchy itself was a plaything of British imperialism, meaning that effectively, the Egyptians had no say in how their country was run. Al-Banna's goal of the caliphate thus involved the eventual overthrow of the then-ruling Egyptian monarchy, and the British colonial rule underpinning it.⁴¹⁷ Al-Banna's vision of a caliphate was quite different from IS's. In addition to the political context, Al-Banna's value rationality differed from IS's. The values Al-Banna pursued for their own sake were traditionalism and a creed shared by most of Egypt's population. In contrast, IS's value rationality differs significantly from Al-Banna's on numerous points. IS's value rationality is in total agreement with the Saudi uprisings against the Ottoman Empire.

Under Qutb, the concept of the caliphate was neglected in favor of total revolution against all pre-existing religious and political institutions, including the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Egypt had shifted from a monarchy to a military dictatorship. The junta, led by Jamal Abdul-Nasser had no interest in sharing power and had set about crushing the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood saw that as further justification of its value rationality of a Qutbist total revolution, as there was no political opening available to it. Following the death of Abdul-Nasser, the political system in Egypt became slightly more pluralistic. Abdul-Nasser's successor, Anwar Al-Sadat sought to undermine his leftist and Nasserite opponents. To that end, he allowed the Brotherhood and some of his other religious opponents⁴¹⁸ some political and social leeway. The Brotherhood was allowed to re-establish itself in Egypt and establish its recruitment networks in

⁴¹⁷ Muneeb, op.cit., 62.

⁴¹⁸ Muntasir Al Zayaat, *الجماعات الإسلامية: رؤية من الداخل [Islamic Groups a View from the Inside]*, Second (Cairo, Egypt: دار مصر المحروسة [Guarded Egypt Press], 2005), 59.

universities.⁴¹⁹ Following Al-Sadat's assassination, his successor Muhammad Husni Mubarak followed Al-Sadat's strategy for dealing with the Brotherhood. It was allowed to participate in the regime's rigged elections, enabling the group to have limited representation in parliament. The Brotherhood under Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, including the IIP, is simply not interested in re-establishing the caliphate. Rather, its goal is participation in the pre-existing political processes, whatever they may be. The IIP's contemporary (and revised) reading of politics does not extend beyond participating in a flawed democracy.

This is best exemplified by the IIP in its official obituary of Numan Abdul-Razzaq Al-Sammarai,⁴²⁰ one of the group's co-founders and its first leader. The IIP characterized Al-Sammarai's entire efforts as being a national educational renaissance. In doing so, the IIP was attempting to minimize its religious agenda. In another hagiography of Al-Sammarai posted by pro-Brotherhood religious clerics, the IIP was described as being Al-Sammarai's reformist and nationalist project.^{421,422} It is worth pointing out that when Al-Sammarai co-founded the group in 1960 it was a Qutbist group. While Al-Sammarai was in exile in Saudi Arabia, he taught at its

⁴¹⁹ Abd Al-^Aatee Muhammad, شيوخ بلا خناجر [*Clerics without Daggers*] (Cairo, Egypt: دار مصر المحروسة [Guarded Egypt Press], 2004), 107.

⁴²⁰ نعمان عبد الرزاق السامرائي

⁴²¹ The entire quote reads as follows:

وترك وراءه آلاف المنتمين إلى تنظيم الحزب الإسلامي العراقي

مئات الطلبة الذين هم اليوم يحملون اليوم فكره ومشروعه الإصلاحية الوطني و

[And he [Numan Abdul-Razzaq Al-Sammarai] has left behind thousands of adherents to the Iraqi Islamic Party and hundreds of students who adhere to his thoughts and his reformist nationalist project].

⁴²² Shafaq News, "الحزب الإسلامي العراقي ينعى رئيسه الأول," [The Iraqi Islamic Party Mourns its First Leader], شفق نيوز [Shafaq News], November 25, 2021,

<https://shafaq.com/ar/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%80%D9%85%D8%B9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%89-%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%84>

universities. This in turn led Al-Sammarai to shift his views closer to the Saudi monarchy's religious perspective.

As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the official Saudi stance on the caliphate is that the Saudi king is the rightful Islamic ruler. Thus, a caliphate would be illegitimate. The Saudi view of the Ottoman Caliphate is even more disdainful, as Saudi Arabia could only have been established via the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The *raison d'être* of Saudi Arabia, as per the justification of its Wahhabi clerics, was that the Ottoman Empire was blasphemous.⁴²³ This is because the Ottoman Empire had an improper creed, and had allowed blasphemous innovations to corrupt the faith of the believers. By extension, the Ottoman Caliphate was illegitimate, and overthrowing it was an act of worship on the part of the Saud family and the Wahhabi clergy.

Consequently, the IIP's leadership could only establish itself in Saudi Arabia by abandoning Al-Banna's cherished goal of re-establishing the Ottoman Caliphate. Having its leadership teaching in Saudi universities⁴²⁴ entailed further ideological repercussions for the group. Saudi universities, then and now have emphasized loyalty to the regime above all. Beliefs and ideologies that undermined the official ideology of the absolute monarchy were simply not tolerated. The IIP was co-opted by the Saudi monarchy in several ways, and not just through the group's political subservience. Rather, the IIP actively preached its loyalty to the Saudi government, in exchange for a haven and employment. At that time, elements of the IIP began incorporating the official Saudi ideology. Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sawaaf would go so far as

⁴²³ Matthew R. Simmons, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy* (Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2005), 7-9.

⁴²⁴ Abduh Mustapha Dusuki, "محمد محمود الصواف.. رائد الحركة الإسلامية في العراق" [Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sawaaf.. The Pioneer of the Islamic Movement in Iraq]."

to imitate the attire of the Saudi Wahhabi clergy.⁴²⁵ As such, the thought of Ibn Taymiyah began exerting an increasing influence on the group. Ibn Taymiyah was henceforth deemed to be a reliable religious source by the IIP and was used by some of its cadres in shaping their creeds. At the same time, the IIP members who did not adhere to Ibn Taymiyah's thought existed in symbiosis with those who did, the former accepting the latter's continued membership in the group, and vice versa.

This situation regarding Ibn Taymiyah continues to this day. When some senior IIP cadres make use of Ibn Taymiyah to deem Shiite political opponents as heretics who merit execution, other members would simply say that they do not agree with Ibn Taymiyah on that point. The IIP of today is that of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi: By following the religious precepts of the Brotherhood's most senior religious figure worldwide, the IIP has been attempting to rework its religious language. Al-Qaradawi has attempted to please different religious groups simultaneously. This involves holding different value rationalities within the group, while not seriously pursuing them. Unless the said value rationality can help the group attain power. Thus, under Al-Qaradawi, the Brotherhood has taken a more instrumentalist view of its religious precepts. Al-Qaradawi's value rationality is a hodgepodge of previously developed value rationalities that contradict one another. Al-Qaradawi has on some occasions claimed to have been inspired by modernists like Muhammad Abduh. Al-Qaradawi has on other occasions drawn directly from radical revolutionaries like Sayyid Qutb.⁴²⁶ Al-Qaradawi has deemed Ibn Taymiyah to be a reliable religious source, while taking the Qutbist perspective, as opposed to Ibn Taymiyah's, on numerous occasions. Al-Qaradawi has heaped praise on Ayman Al-Zawahiri

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Qaradawi, لماذا الإسلام [Why Islam] op. cit., 7.

as well as democracy.⁴²⁷ Thus, Al-Qaradawi's value rationality, which is predicated upon the bowdlerization of different value rationalities, can be viewed from its instrumental rationality: It allows the Brotherhood to gain many supporters quickly, by attracting a variety of individuals with different value rationalities all at the same time. The instrumental rationality of that approach is also exhibited by the fact that it allows for political flexibility. As such, the Brotherhood can maintain its international support by appearing to be a moderate group. The Brotherhood does so by giving the perception that the group has harmonized its thought with the dominant ideological trends, in the countries where it has set up its base.

In the case of the IIP's Speaker of the House, Saleem Algbure, he has adopted a perennial philosophy. This perennial philosophy has been expressed on numerous occasions, especially during his public interactions with Iraq's religious minorities. Algbure has wished his blessings to Christians on Christmas day.⁴²⁸ He also wrote that he blessed one of the religious holidays of the Mandaean Sabians.⁴²⁹ At the same time, the pro-Ibn Taymiyah faction continues to enjoy its influence within the IIP.⁴³⁰ These different factions exist within the same movement. Of the different factions within the IIP, the ascendant one is the one with a proclivity toward political liberalism. Thus, the IIP has been redefining itself as being focused on service provision and representing an ethnic group within the context of the Iraqi sectarian democracy. As a status

⁴²⁷ I've discussed these issues in detail in Chapter 2

⁴²⁸ Saleem Algburi, "Saleem Algburi," Tweet, @AljubouriorIQ (blog), March 14, 2021, <https://twitter.com/AljubouriorIQ/status/1371080252676575235>.

⁴²⁹ Saleem Algburi, "Saleem Algburi," Tweet, @AljubouriorIQ (blog), December 24, 2017, <https://twitter.com/AljubouriorIQ/status/945012354135314433>.

⁴³⁰ محمد أحمد الراشد الداعية المربي [Muhammad Ahmad Al-Rashid the Islamic Preacher and Educator], الموسوعة التاريخية الرسمية | إخوان Wiki [The Historical Encyclopedia of the Muslim Brotherhood], مركز الدراسات التاريخية [Historical Research Center], May 23, 2013, https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF_%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%89.

quo actor, the IIP is not pushing for a greater role for religion. Also, it does not challenge in the slightest Iraq's foreign policy concerning the United States and Iran. These changes in the group's value rationality went in tandem with a focus on instrumental rationality. ⁴³¹⁴³²⁴³³

3.6 An Overview of Iraq's Ethnic Conflicts

3.6.1 US Invasion

Iraq's contemporary **ethnic conflicts can be traced to the 2003 American invasion.**

Iraqi history is replete with religious wars, ethnic strife,⁴³⁴ and even genocides.⁴³⁵ However, the political structure established by the US informs Iraq's contemporary ethnic conflicts. Using as a pretext the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's non-existing weapons of mass destruction and fictitious connections with Al Qaeda, the United States and some of its allies invaded the country. Hussein was quickly ousted,⁴³⁶ leaving the United States and Iran to shape Iraq's ethnic fault lines, while generating new ones. One of the first acts of Paul Bremer, the United States' Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) of Iraq, and the country's de facto

⁴³¹ Yusuf Al-Ali, "نعمان السامرائي.. رئيس أول حزب إسلامي عراقي وفارس في العلم والدعوة"، [Numan Al-Sameraie..The Leader of the Iraq's First Islamic Party and a Knight in Knowledge and the Islamic Call], [The Independence Newspaper] صحيفة الاستقلال, November 25, 2021, <https://www.alestiklal.net/ar/view/11319/dep-news-1638047013>.

⁴³² The exact quote reads as follows:

من خلال عمله التنقيفي والتوعوي، وتوظيف خبراته الثرة من اجل نهضة العراق

[From his educational work and his raising awareness and the employment of his wealth of experience for the sake of Iraq's renaissance]

⁴³³ Abu Baker Abu Al-Majid, "رحم الله الداعية والمفكر د. نعمان السامرائي المناصر لقضية فلسطين"، [May God Have Mercy on the Islamic Preacher and Thinker Dr. Numan Al-Sameraie, the Supporter of the Palestinian Cause], [The Ummah Electronic Newspaper] جريدة الأمة الإلكترونية, December 3, 2021, <https://al-omah.com/%d8%b1%d8%ad%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d9%87-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b9%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%81%d9%83%d8%b1-%d8%af-%d9%86%d8%b9%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a7%d9%85/>.

⁴³⁴ Mahir A. Aziz, *The Kurds of Iraq: Nationalism and Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan*, First Edition (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 59.

⁴³⁵ Ronald Sempill Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrian Minority in Iraq*, First Edition (Routledge, 2017), 159.

⁴³⁶ Al-Haloush, op.cit., 363.

ruler was the de-Baathification laws.⁴³⁷ Ostensibly to prevent Saddam Hussein's loyalists from working in the government, these laws served to disenfranchise many Sunni Arabs from the new political process,⁴³⁸ as many were ousted from their governmental positions. All of Iraq's political processes following the invasion were governed by sectarianism. Along with the CPA, the United States established the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). The IGC was divided on an ethnic and sectarian basis. The genesis of Iraq's political institutions would be segmented based on ethnicity and religion, a pattern that would continue informing the country's political system. On one hand, Iraq's first "democratic" elections were mostly boycotted by Sunni Arabs. On the other hand, Kurds participated to maintain their regional autonomy. Crucially, these elections were dominated by an alliance of Shiite religious parties.⁴³⁹

The Muhasasah⁴⁴⁰ or the quota-based system formalized Iraq's ethnic conflicts. This new system offers yet another example of how a means to rationalize society has become a novel means of its subjugation. The Muhasasah was used to organize the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein, whose members were in exile. Members of the opposition included religious Shiite parties such as the Dawa Party⁴⁴¹ and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution. It also included ethno-nationalist Kurdish parties, such as the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The opposition in exile also encompassed the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). The IIP stood in as the Sunni Arab representative. The political opposition saw in the

⁴³⁷ It was explicitly called "Debaathification" by the memorandum of the Coalition Provisional Authority

⁴³⁸ Sharon Otterman, "Iraq: Debaathification," Council on Foreign Relations, February 22, 2005, <https://www.cfr.org/background/iraq-debaathification>.

⁴³⁹ Andrzej Kapiszewski et al., "The Iraqi Elections and Their Consequences. Power-Sharing, a Key to the Country's Political Future," Looking into Iraq (European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2005), 24, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07015.5>.

⁴⁴⁰ محاصصة

⁴⁴¹ الدعوة

The Call. In that context, it refers to the call to Islam

Muhasasah system a means by which Iraq's ethno-sectarian groups could be represented proportionally.⁴⁴² This form of social action was instrumentally rational, per the definition of Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas, whereby it is determined by expectations about people's behaviors. Institutions that represent the ethnic cleavages of Iraq's myriad opposition were expected to provide for the conditions by which the attainment of the rationally pursued ends could be realized. In this case, these rational ends are the establishment of US-friendly governing institutions, which could act as a replacement for the just-deposed Baa'thist regime.

The United States' efforts in that regard fall under their overarching attempts to rationalize Iraqi society. Rationalization, in a Western model, is reflected in the embryonic governing institutions developed by the Western-based Iraqi opposition. To that end, the rationalization of Iraqi society involved seeking efficiency.⁴⁴³ Instead of the corrupt and nepotistic Baa'thist functionaries, the opposition promised Iraq a new, Western bureaucracy. This new bureaucracy promised maximum results with minimum inputs,⁴⁴⁴ being leaner and less wasteful than Saddam Hussein's governance. Following the US invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took control of Iraq. Led by Paul Bremer, its American head, the CPA reworked Iraq's bureaucracy. The CPA's main instrument in that regard was the above-mentioned de-baathification law.⁴⁴⁵⁴⁴⁶ Its ostensible aim was the elimination of the retrograde

⁴⁴² Toby Dodge, "Iraq and Muhasasa Ta'ifia; the External Imposition of Sectarian Politics," *The Foreign Policy Centre*, November 12, 2018, <https://fpc.org.uk/iraq-and-muhasasa-taifia-the-external-imposition-of-sectarian-politics/>.

⁴⁴³ Gert H. Mueller, "The Notion of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber," *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie* 20, no. 1 (1979): 149–71, 157.

⁴⁴⁴ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: And Other Writings* (New York: Penguin, 2002), 365.

⁴⁴⁵ A case in point is Iraq's Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC), which is the current form of the country's de-baathification commission. It banned nine Sunni political parties and 458 candidates from participating in the Iraq's March 2010 parliamentary elections, allegedly

influence of the previous regime, and to bring about a modern Iraq. The supposed instrument of modernization was instead a tool for generating and increasing pre-existing sectarian divides. The result of the de-baathification law was that Sunni Arabs were excluded from their government jobs and the new Westernized order. At the same time, the unofficial embeddedness of sectarianism meant that institutions were working at cross-purposes. Society's predictability was one of the aims of the changes being imposed on Iraq, as a more rational society, per the understanding of Weber, was the overarching objective of the changes being imposed on Iraq. The sectarian application of the de-baathification law meant that irrespective of its rationality, sectarian segmentation was deeply embedded in the institutions of the new Iraq. The Iraqi opposition, including the IIP, agreed upon such a system⁴⁴⁷ during a series of meetings in the United Kingdom.⁴⁴⁸

The US invasion of Iraq would result in the Muhasasah system underpinning the country's political process. This is because the United States implemented the Muhasasah system to govern Iraq, ostensibly to provide an ethno-sectarian balance. This system was also conceived as a reaction to Saddam Hussein's ideology of pan-Arab nationalism, which disenfranchised ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the Muhasasah also served to counteract Saddam Hussein's

because they were affiliated with Saddam Hussein's regime or were apologists of the fallen regime. The JAC's head when this decision was taken was Ali Al-Lami. Al-Lami was simultaneously a candidate for the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). The INA represented most of Iraq's major Shiite political parties. This illustrates the conflict of interests and sectarianism governing Iraq's de-baathification efforts.

⁴⁴⁶ Marina Ottaway and Kaysi Danial, "De-Baathification As A Political Tool: Commission Ruling Bans Political Parties and Leaders," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed April 16, 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/01/26/de-baathification-as-political-tool-commission-ruling-bans-political-parties-and-leaders-pub-24778>.

⁴⁴⁷ Reidar Visser, "The Western Imposition of Sectarianism on Iraqi Politics," *The Arab Studies Journal* 15/16, no. 2/1 (2007): 83–99, 96.

⁴⁴⁸ Taif Alkhudary, "How Iraq's Sectarian System Came to Be," accessed February 14, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/3/29/how-iraqs-sectarian-system-came-to-be>.

perceived exclusion of the Shiites. It is worth noting that there was a minimal familiarity in Iraqi political culture with institutionalized parties, in the American sense. Parties served as political vehicles for religious movements or personalities, rather than being institutionalized entities. Despite their political divergences, these factions came to the de facto agreement that a strong state able to enforce the rule of law was not in their ideological interests. In tandem with such concerns, an ethno-sectarian quota system, or a Muhasasah, was the cornerstone upon which Iraq's new governing institutions were established. To that end, the distribution of positions within Iraq's first governing body following the invasion, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), was done on an ethnic and sectarian basis.

3.6.2 The Lebanese Precedent

It is important to note that Lebanon was a direct inspiration for the Muhasasah system.⁴⁴⁹⁴⁵⁰ It is no coincidence that both countries are plagued by endemic corruption and constant civil strife. Sectarianism is the foundation on which both countries' political systems were built. As in Iraq, these sectarian cleavages existed before the establishment of the Lebanese state, and its predecessor entities. However, the existence of a Muhasasah system would only serve to increase tensions, such that sectarian civil wars have been a fixture of Lebanese politics, ever since the country's inception. Both Lebanon's and Iraq's Muhasasah systems have led sectarian identities to become instruments of political mobilization.⁴⁵¹ Elite capture is another feature of such a system, as Muhasasah does not consider demographic changes nor does it

⁴⁴⁹ Adham Saouli, "Sectarianism and Political Order in Iraq and Lebanon," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 19, no. 1 (2019): 67–87, 84.

⁴⁵⁰ Nancy Ezzeddine and Beatrice Noun, "Iraq and Lebanon's Tortuous Paths to Reform," Iraq and Lebanon's Tortuous Paths to Reform (Clingendael Institute, 2020), 3.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28666.1>.

⁴⁵¹ Saouli, op.cit., 68.

incorporate the possibility of the population's changing preferences. Such a system does not envision a process by which the population is permitted to reduce political sectarianism.

Sectarian strife is not a bug, but rather a feature of such systems. The origins of Lebanon and Iraq's Muhasasah systems can be traced to 1840 when the European powers forced the enfeebled Ottoman Empire to grant the Maronite Christians and Druze residing in Mount Lebanon a form of autonomy.⁴⁵² **This offers yet another example of how Weberian instrumental rationality has become a means of enslavement, per Habermas.** The European Powers saw these religious minorities as a means by which they could undermine their Ottoman rival, and expand their influence in the Middle East. The French presented themselves as the protectors of the Maronite community, while the British established links with the Druze. The Russian Empire furthered its ties with the Greek Orthodox while the Prussians courted the Shiites.⁴⁵³ The involvement of international actors on a sectarian basis has further entrenched such systems. This is the case in Lebanon as it is in Iraq. In the Lebanese case, this sectarian autonomy would provoke more sectarian conflicts. The autonomous region of Mount Lebanon was divided into two prefectures (Qai'maqamatayn),⁴⁵⁴ one being populated mostly by the Maronites, while the other being of the Druze majority. The Druze district was led by a Maronite while the Maronite district was under a Druze leader.⁴⁵⁵ A system that further politicized sectarian tensions and was influenced by international tensions was not one to keep ethnic

⁴⁵² Fawaz Trabelsi, تاريخ لبنان الحديث [The Modern History of Lebanon], Fifth (Beirut, Lebanon: Riyad El-Rayyes Books, 2018), 45.

⁴⁵³ Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla, *Intervention in Lebanon and Syria, 1860–61, Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Manchester University Press, 2017), <https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526125125/9781526125125.00015.xml>.

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قائم مقاميتي جبل لبنان

⁴⁵⁵ Trabelsi, op.cit., 46.

conflicts at bay. The Druze and Maronites were soon at war with each other, which provided an opportunity for their European sponsors to get further involved in the Middle East. The conflict between the Druze and the Maronites⁴⁵⁶ represented an opportunity for the British and French to engage in yet another proxy war.⁴⁵⁷

The failure of the 1840 system led to the Mutasarifiya system in 1860. Mount Lebanon was to be ruled by a political system that once again enshrined sectarianism.⁴⁵⁸ The Mutasarifiya allocated power on a sectarian basis once more, the difference being that the Maronites were given a more prominent role vis à vis other communities.⁴⁵⁹ The Mutasarifiya was to be led by a Christian acceptable to both the Ottoman Empire and the European sponsors of the Mutasarifiya. The Mutasarifiya would implode under internal and external pressures, further showcasing the fragility of Muhasasah. The Ottoman Empire had a dim view of the Mutasarifiya, as it was essentially imposed on it by the European powers. The Ottoman leadership was attempting to centralize its rule, which put it at ideological odds with the Mutasarifiya. With the outbreak of World War One, the Ottoman Empire became at war with the Mutasarifiya's European backers. The Ottoman leadership perceived the Mutasarifiya as being a hostile entity and decided to do away with it. To that end, it laid siege to the Mutasarifiya. The Mutasarifiya soon became under a double siege, as the allies were blockading Ottoman ports. The Mutasarifiya's problems were compounded further still by an environmental catastrophe, as hordes of locusts destroyed the Mutasarifiya's agricultural sector.⁴⁶⁰ The Mutasarifiya's existence ended with a refugee crisis.

⁴⁵⁶ Leilia Fawaz, "Contemporary History: Understanding Lebanon," *The American Scholar* 54, no. 3 (1985): 377–84, 377.

⁴⁵⁷ Ozan Ozavci, "Beginnings: Mount Lebanon before 1840," in *Dangerous Gifts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852964.003.0010>.

⁴⁵⁸ Trabelsi, op.cit., 49.

⁴⁵⁹ Trabelsi, op.cit., 45.

⁴⁶⁰ Trabelsi, op. cit., 73.

Many of its inhabitants left Mount Lebanon to escape their impoverishment and perpetual lack of security. It is worth noting that the Mutasarifiya's sectarian allocation system would persist after the collapse of the Mutasarifiya itself, albeit with some modifications. However, a perpetually failed state and sectarian tensions would characterize the successor regimes that would employ such a Muhasasah.

The establishment of modern Lebanon is the direct result of the Mutasarifiya's economic and social failures. Following the conclusion of the war and per the 1916 Sykes-Picot accord, the areas consisting of modern-day Syria and Lebanon, including the Mutasarifiya, became colonized by the French.⁴⁶¹ The French decided the Mutasarifiya was simply too small to be economically sustainable. In its stead was Greater Lebanon, whose borders are unchanged to this very day. Beirut and Tripoli were given to Lebanon to provide ports to this new entity. Also, the Beka Valley and Akar were taken from the Damascus Wilayah⁴⁶²⁴⁶³ to provide a larger agricultural sector for Lebanon, irrespective of the inhabitants' wishes. The sectarian makeup of Lebanon was permanently altered, as it now had a greater number of Sunnis and Shiites. However, the political system of Lebanon did not reflect these new changes. Rather, parliament was dominated by the Maronite community, as was the presidency. All these institutions were window-dressing, as a French High Commissioner did as he pleased.⁴⁶⁴ Modern Lebanon would continue to be characterized by weak institutions tinged with sectarianism, long after the French

⁴⁶¹ Officially it was termed a mandate, the difference being that the mandate was legalized by the League of Nations. Seeing as the League of Nations was in fact a plaything of the French and British, one can appreciate a certain conflict of interests.

⁴⁶² Province. The Ottomans sometimes used the term Vilayet, as the letter "W" does not exist in Turkish.

⁴⁶³ Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1990), 17.

⁴⁶⁴ Farid El-Khazen, *The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact* (Oxford, Great Britain: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991), 27.

left.⁴⁶⁵ However, this was the starting point for the ineffective management of ethnic conflicts in that area, which constantly resulted in armed clashes breaking out, as well as international interventions.

3.6.3 Key Differences between Lebanon and Iraq

None of the religious groups in Lebanon were a monolithic block, as Lebanon's sectarian system perceived them to be. Rather, politics in Lebanon were, and still are, revolving around large families which could provide patronage. The Shiites did not have a religious organization⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶⁷ that represented them in Lebanese politics as a sectarian group. Consequently, the inhabitants of this new Lebanon were essentially forced to support a sectarian system that did not reflect them. It is worth pointing out some key differences with Iraq. Iraq has a stronger claim to a historic identity when compared to Lebanon. When the Umayyds combined the provinces of Basra and Baghdad, they named that new entity Iraq in 674.⁴⁶⁸ Lebanon as a state did not come into being until 1920, due to the political machinations of the French High Commissioner who was then ruling the area. Unlike Lebanon, Iraq has a stronger economic foundation.⁴⁶⁹ Iraq has some of the richest oil reserves on the planet. Lebanon does not have any oil deposits. Iraq also has natural gas. Throughout most of Lebanon's history, natural gas deposits were not yet discovered. A gas field has been discovered over the last decade, in the

⁴⁶⁵ Trabelsi, op. cit., 149.

⁴⁶⁶ That would change with Sabri Himayid, Abd Al Amir Qabalan, Musa Al Sader and others' establishment of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council in 1969.

⁴⁶⁷ This push, by pro-French elites, towards sectarian politics is especially ironic, when one considers the milieu which led to the emergence of the group called Hezbollah.

⁴⁶⁸ Dariouche Kechavarzi, "Simon Gundelfinger, Peter Verkinderen. 'The Governors of al-Shām and Fārs in the Early Islamic Empire – A Comparative Regional Perspective,'" *Abstracta Iranica*, Volume 42-43 (2020), 276.

⁴⁶⁹ "Iraq, Lebanon on the Verge of Collapse," Al Arabiya English, December 22, 2020, <https://english.alarabiya.net/in-translation/2020/12/22/Iraq-Lebanon-on-the-verge-of-collapse>.

Mediterranean Sea.⁴⁷⁰ However, it has yet to be exploited by the Lebanese side. When compared to Lebanon, Iraq has a much more expansive agricultural base along with some of the largest rivers in the region, the Tigris and the Euphrates. All in all, Lebanon is a much resource poorer country when compared to Iraq. By extension, its strategic value to other countries is of far lesser importance. Nevertheless, this study argues that both countries have failed to manage their ethnic tensions, and this correlates with the Muhasasah system.

Independence did not resolve Lebanon's spiraling ethnic tensions but instead hardened them. Following the departure of the French in 1946, an unwritten sectarian power-sharing mechanism between Lebanon's elites known as the "national pact" underpinned the country's politics. Instead of a sectarian system that better represents the country's sectarian makeup or doing away with it altogether, the Maronites were granted more power.⁴⁷¹ The presidency, which was informally granted to the Maronites, was given the powers of the French High Commissioner. Also, the head of the military and most seats in parliament were allocated to the Maronites. This is because the *raison d'être* of Lebanon, whether it was a *Mutasrifya*, a French mandate, or an independent country was to provide *a state for the Maronite Christians*. This is how the international powers, especially the French, saw Lebanon. The Prime Minister was to be a Sunni while the parliamentary speakership was a position allocated to the Shiites. Cabinet portfolios were also distributed on a sectarian basis. The rigidity of Lebanon's system meant that as in Iraq it never considered the possibility of the population changing its views on sectarianism. Nor did it foresee the possibility of Lebanon's sectarian makeup changing. Nor is it meant to. Such a sectarian system picks "winners and losers." It pits different sects against each other via

⁴⁷⁰ Coveted by the Israelis and the Cypriots as well, the gas field lies in territories that have yet to be demarcated. This could be a potential flashpoint for future conflicts.

⁴⁷¹ El-Khazen, op.cit., 7.

an unequal distribution of political goods and services. Groups are permanently disenfranchised. In the case of Lebanon, it served to entrench Maronite rule at the expense of members of other religions and Christian denominations. The Muhasasah was imposed from the top down and maintained via deals between political elites who in turn were beholden to their international benefactors. It encouraged sectarian mobilization as the most direct route to power. The destabilizing outcomes of such a system are manifold. It further weakens the state, whereby powerful religious groups with international backing have the potential to be not so much a state within a state, but rather a state within a failed state. Unlike the Weberian conception of the state, whereby it has a monopoly on violence, sectarian actors have been able to establish their security forces. These forces in turn are stronger than the national army. This applies to Lebanon as it does to Iraq, as both countries have a similar Muhasasah system, although Lebanon's is more formally enshrined in laws and national agreements⁴⁷².

Muhasasah has reinforced sectarian divisions, along with undermining feelings of national unity. Sectarianism and ethnic identity politics governed how power is attained within legal means. Muhasasah, as it has been practiced since its inception, has caused governmental ministries and their associated resources to be monopolized by political parties. Instead of providing services to the public, parties in control have gone about hiring their supporters in the government bureaucracy, to maintain their support. Such a system acts as legal cover for blatant corruption and nepotism. Muhasasah has served to undermine the Lebanese as well as the Iraqi state in other ways. The above-mentioned Shiite sectarian parties which attained power were originally based in Iran, and ideologically beholden to it. These newly empowered sectarian actors, along with other parties in Muhasasah, acted per their ideology. They self-identified as

⁴⁷² Such as the Ta'if Agreement.

religious actors, whose religious paragons were the leaders of Iran. The Muhasasah system empowered them, as members of a said ethnic group. Moreover, such a system encouraged foreign influences, as it kept a weak state with leaders ideologically driven to seek guidance from other countries.

The IGC (Iraqi Governing Council) was established in 2003, the interim government of 2004, and the governments formed after each national election, in 2005, 2010, and 2014 were all shaped by the sectarian Muhasasah. Consequently, the cabinet was divided on an ethno-sectarian basis. Ministries were allocated to the ethno-sectarian parties as their reward for mobilizing voters along ethno-sectarian lines. In turn, each party would then exploit the resources of the ministry they were awarded to further its patronage network. Getting employed in the government was contingent upon one joining a pro-Muhasasah political party.⁴⁷³ Muhasasah is an expression of how Iraqi politicians have resorted to ethnic nationalism and sectarianism as a cover for their corrupt patronage networks, all the while increasing tensions among their voters.⁴⁷⁴

The Muhasah's genesis is partially due to the Iraqi political culture when the United States invaded Iraq. Iraq did not have any broad institutionalized political parties, nor was there any familiarity with them. Of the political parties that were willing to participate in the new political process, **many of them had their private militias. Because the Iraqi state lacked a monopoly on violence, Iraqi politicians were disinclined to forge hard compromises, using**

⁴⁷³ Toby Dodge, "Tracing the Rise of Sectarianism in Iraq after 2003," The London School of Economics Middle East Centre, September 13, 2018, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/09/13/tracing-the-rise-of-sectarianism-in-iraq-after-2003/>.

⁴⁷⁴ Ziad Al-Aseel, "Will Sectarianism Prevail in Iraq's Parliamentary Elections?," Amwaj.media, October 8, 2021, <https://amwaj.media/article/as-early-elections-impend-will-sectarianism-prevail>.

exclusively peaceful means. There was no acceptance of the rule of law or the necessity of democracy in itself. Rather, the appearance of democratic rule was maintained by these ethnic and religious actors to please the United States, and bolster their image among the international community. That is not to say that the United States had no say in the matter. If anything, it was the main instigator of who got to participate in the political process, and in what manner. The United States wanted institutions that had the formal appearance of a democracy. Democratizing Iraq was one of the principal justifications for the US invasion. At the same time, the US sought to co-opt powerful actors so that it would not resist the presence of the United States. This arrangement also pertains to Iranian influence in Iraq. Iran saw in such an arrangement an opportunity **to eliminate its old Baa’thist foes** and ensure an ideologically hostile strong state would never menace it again.

The Muhasasah system in Iraq exemplifies the gap between the formal law and institutions, and its actual implementation. It is the practice by which politicians and bureaucrats are appointed based on their sectarian or ethnic identity. The state is thus run by those who attained their positions for reasons that have nothing to do with their merit or any sort of qualification. The Muhasasah system is not fully enshrined in law. What it does is represent and build upon pre-existing identities and ethnic tensions. The Muhasasah system is to an extent a reaction to Saddam Hussein’s Baa’thist regime. The Baa’thists, in the name of secularism, crushed the religious opposition, and in the name of pan-Arab nationalism oppressed ethnic minorities.⁴⁷⁵ The Muhasasah is applied on a top-down basis. Top-level executive positions are allocated on a pre-arranged basis to Iraq’s main ethnic groups. A points system handles the distribution of government jobs to the political parties and coalitions within an ethnic group. It is

⁴⁷⁵ Aziz, op. cit., 82.

worth noting that sectarianism can be a component of these ethnic identities, such as Sunni and Shiite Arabs.

The presidency, speakership of the house, and the position of the prime minister, the three most senior executive positions, are given to a Kurd, a Sunni Arab, and a Shiite Arab, respectively. With regards to government ministries, they are divided up using the approximate formula: 54% go to Shi'a Arabs, 24% go to Sunni Arabs, 18% are allocated to the Kurds, and 4% are for minorities. The minority seats are often given to Christians.⁴⁷⁶ For example, Adel Abdul-Mahdi's cabinet, which was in power from 2018 to 2020, was made up of 22 ministries: Twelve ministries went to the Shi'a, six to the Sunni, three to the Kurds, and one to minorities. Adding to the complexity of the system of sectarian allocations is the differentiation between sovereign and non-sovereign ministries. Sovereign ministries are perceived to have greater status and authority. Consequently, they have a larger budget allocated to them. Since 2006, the Ministry of Defense has gone to Sunni Arabs while the Shiites control the Ministry of the Interior, owing to yet another informal agreement. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are split between the Kurds and Shiite Arabs. If for example, the minister of finance is a Kurd, then a Shia Arab takes the ministry of foreign affairs. Coalitions in parliament lead to control over government ministries. Ministries with little political influence and small budgets are often given to minorities or women.⁴⁷⁷ Ministries allocated to women are distributed on an ethno-sectarian basis. Moreover, these women are representative of Iraq's main political

⁴⁷⁶ Hamzeh Al-Shadeed and Erwin Van Veen, "Iraqi Politics after Saddam Hussein: The Birth of a Sectarian Democracy | Iraq's Adolescent Democracy" (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael – The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, June 2020), <https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2020/iraqs-adolescent-democracy/1-iraqi-politics-after-saddam-hussein-the-birth-of-a-sectarian-democracy/>.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

parties. The result is women ministers who represent their parties' leadership and are opposed to offering any gendered critique or alternative to Iraq's governance.

The power-sharing system in Iraqi Kurdistan is also quota-based, incorporating an elite that is self-replicating. While there are some different nuances about the context in which it was established as well as the actual ethnic segmentation of the government, the fact remains that Iraqi Kurdistan has been dominated by the same ethnic actors since its inception, its democratic pretensions notwithstanding. Its relative stability can be partially explained by the limited penetration of the Wahhabi Qutbist value rationality as opposed to Kurdish ethnic nationalism, and traditional Ash'ari Sufi tariqas.⁴⁷⁸⁴⁷⁹

Concerning the instrumental rationality of the ethnic actors in power, Iraqi Kurdistan's management of conflicts can be traced back to 1998. Following a Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein, in 1991 and the establishment of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, a new form of managing ethnic conflicts was developed in the newly autonomous region in the Kurdish majority areas of northern Iraq. However, such a process was by no means smooth. The Kurds were in no way a monolithic ethnic actor. The two most powerful parties were the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Barzani clan, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is controlled by the Talabani family. Also, there is the question of ideology, with the KDP being more conservative, while the PUK exhibits more socialist tendencies. While both are dedicated to an independent Kurdistan, the KDP is backed by Turkey, having once been an ally

⁴⁷⁸ Kathryn Gregory, "Ansar Al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists), Ansar al-Sunnah," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed February 17, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ansar-al-islam-iraq-islamistskurdish-separatists-ansar-al-sunnah>.

⁴⁷⁹ Jonathan Schanzer, "Ansar Al-Islam: Back in Iraq," *Insight Turkey* 6, no. 1 (2004): 94–104, 94.

of Saddam Hussein. The PUK has long been supported by Iran. Both groups engaged in armed clashes against one another, in 1996. The result of this is that Iraqi Kurdistan has been de facto split into two, with separate bureaucracies and security services. This power-sharing mechanism was formalized in the 1998 Washington Agreement, which foreshadowed US plans for Iraq. Since then, the KDP and the PUK have controlled Iraqi Kurdistan via their patronage networks.⁴⁸⁰ That agreement brought stability to Iraqi Kurdistan, but not democracy. Rather, it entrenched the rule of these two factions.

Thus, while opposition factions are tolerated, and there exists a quota for women, the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) major positions fall under the purview of the PUK's and the KDP patronage networks. Such has been the case, since the signing of the above-mentioned Washington Agreement in 1998. At the same time, both parties enjoy friendly relations with the United States and are represented in the federal Iraqi executive and legislature. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) enjoys financial and administrative autonomy. This remains the case, even after the KRG held an aborted independence referendum in 2017. Thus, the instrumental rationality of both parties has been expressed via a state and a bureaucracy that has been distinctly influenced by the United States. Another outcome is that the KRG is under the effective duopoly of the KDP and PUK. These two parties have controlled the media, economy, security services, and bureaucracy, ever since the KRG's establishment. Other Kurdish factions and parties representing minorities are either incorporated within the patronage networks of the KDP and the PUK or are excluded from effective power and are relegated to serving as

⁴⁸⁰ Aziz, *op. cit.*, 87.

window dressing for the KRG clan-based rule, which in itself represents two clans, and by the extension the KRG's, value rationality.⁴⁸¹

In terms of instrumental rationality, the bureaucracy of the KRG was the brainchild of the United States. This applies to the whole entity of the KRG, whereby its control by two ethnic clans, is reflective of how the United States designed its political system. This system became closer to the Western model, especially when compared to how it was before Western intervention.⁴⁸² The value rationality of the KRG is ethnic nationalism, which the American intervention has only served to reinforce as being an acceptable way for gaining and attaining power, irrespective of its negative consequences for the region's ethnic conflicts.

This duopoly which does grant any real power to minorities is illustrated by the case of the Assyrian town of Alqosh. Kurdish political actors, especially the KDP, saw Alqosh as belonging to Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the inhabitants of Alqosh, saw themselves as being ethnically Assyrians and as such were not enticed by the KRG's Kurdish ethnic secessionism. Moreover, the inhabitants were bitter with the KDP Peshmerga due to its poor performance against IS, and its inability to protect their Christian coreligionists from the terror group. To square that circle, the KDP simply ousted Alqosh's mayor and replaced him with a KDP loyalist. This was done despite a court order from the Iraqi federal judiciary. Thus, Alqosh in 2017 was under its new mayor Lara Yusuf. Yusuf is a KDP apparatchik, but whose status as a Christian

⁴⁸¹ Tamara Kharroub, "The Quiet Kurdish Rivalry over Iraq's Presidency," Arab Center Washington DC, February 9, 2022, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-quiet-kurdish-rivalry-over-iraqs-presidency/>.

⁴⁸² Assyrian Policy Institute, "Assyrian Mayor of Alqosh Detained and Beaten by the Kurdistan Democratic Party," Assyrian Policy Institute, July 17, 2018, <https://www.assyrianpolicy.org/post/assyrian-mayor-of-alqosh-detained-and-beaten-by-the-kurdistan-democratic-party>.

and an empowered woman has been exploited to match the value rationality of the KRG with that which is predominant in the United States.⁴⁸³

Consequently, the Muhasasah system ensures its survival via the replication of its ruling elites. Such a system correlates with high levels of corruption. By constantly recycling its ruling elites, based on their sectarian affiliation, accountability becomes less attainable. A system predicated on sectarian quotas increases ethnic and sectarian tensions while downplaying other overlapping identities. Such a system also benefits sectarian and ethnic actors through their continuous empowerment, who would otherwise not be able to gain and maintain a majority. At the same time, it has generated cross-sectarian opposition due to its poor outputs. Such a system has failed to deliver accountability, regarding the country's endemic corruption. It is equally a failure when it comes to the government's provision of basic goods and services, which is either lacking or simply non-existent.⁴⁸⁴

The key turning point regarding Iraq's sectarian conflicts was the 2006 bombing of the Askari Shrine.⁴⁸⁵ That action was used as a justification by Shiite militias, whether or not they held positions in the government, to launch a campaign of sectarian bloodletting targeting Sunnis. Also, IS's predecessor known as the Islamic State in Iraq, which was then loyal to Al Qaeda, sought to increase sectarian tensions by bombing Shiite civilians. The United States decided to change the nature of the conflict, by breaking the cycle of mutually escalating

⁴⁸³ Wilson Fache, "Un Irréductible Village Chrétien En Révolte Contre Le Kurdistan « dictatorial »,» L'Orient-Le Jour, September 25, 2017, <https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1074388/un-irreductible-village-chretien-en-revolte-contre-le-kurdistan-dictatorial-.html>.

⁴⁸⁴ Al-Shadeed and Van Veen, op. cit.,

⁴⁸⁵ Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, op. cit., 35.

sectarian tensions. This is because the sectarian conflict was being exploited by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq to recruit the Iraqi populace.

The Sahwah⁴⁸⁶⁴⁸⁷⁴⁸⁸ shows how the sectarian conflict in Iraq was momentarily stopped, and how the mismanagement of the conflict resolution process led to the immense exacerbation of the sectarian conflict. The United States established the Sahwah tribal councils among the Sunni Arabs to launch a campaign against Al Qaeda in Iraq, in exchange for an official relationship with the Iraqi government.⁴⁸⁹⁴⁹⁰⁴⁹¹ The Sahwah tribal councils consisted of small Sunni Arab tribes, which sought to gain influence at the expense of their larger tribal competitors. This tied in with another key aim of the Sahwah, to undermine the tribal actors who were cooperating with Al Qaeda.⁴⁹² The members of the Sahwah were given arms and protection by the United States so that they would be empowered to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. An added incentive to the deal was the promise of the future employment of the Sahwah tribesmen within the Iraqi security services. From the perspective of value rationality, the dynamic of the Iraqi sectarian civil war changed because the Sunni Arab tribes were chafing under the rule of Al Qaeda. The value rationality that was being imposed by Al Qaeda did not accord with the religious beliefs of Iraq's Sunni Arabs. Beyond the issue of religion, the social norms that Al Qaeda in Iraq was imposing were alien to the tribal mores of Iraq's Sunni Arabs.⁴⁹³ Instrumental

⁴⁸⁶ الصحوّة

⁴⁸⁷ Literality meaning “the awakening.” It refers to the US-engineered tribal uprising against the “Islamic State of Iraq.”

⁴⁸⁸ There is no connection between this Sahwah, and Saudi religious movement discussed in Chapter 2, which is also known as the Sahwah.

⁴⁸⁹ Carter Malkasian, *Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 7.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid, 135.

⁴⁹¹ Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, op. cit., 138.

⁴⁹² Malkasian, op. cit., 119.

⁴⁹³ Ibid, 9.

rationality also explains how the Sahwah partially resolved Iraq's ethnic conflict. The instrumental rationality of a modern government that could provide a space for these actors was also another reason for which these tribes joined the Sahwah.

However, the Sahwah experiment proved to be short-lived, as well as the progress gained through the effective management of Iraq's ethnic disputes. The Iraqi government led by Nouri Al-Maliki had no intention of adhering to the agreement. Their value rationality led them to perceive the Sahwah to be a threat. According to the Maliki government, it was officially open to national reconciliation. However, reconciliation cannot come at the expense of the continued fight against **crypto-Baa'thists** and Al Qaeda's sympathizers.⁴⁹⁴ From the perspective of the Iraqi government, the bargain struck with the Sahwah would have led to the joining of security services, their political and religious enemies.⁴⁹⁵ Moreover, that bargain would have threatened Shiite control over the security services. At the same time, the United States' exit strategy was predicated on turning control over to the Iraqi government which it had empowered, irrespective of its treatment of the Sahwah, or the Sunni Arab tribes for that matter. Without the support of the United States, the Sahwah collapsed under the pressure caused by the sectarian policies of the Iraqi government on one hand, and attacks from IS on increasingly vulnerable Sahwah on the other.⁴⁹⁶

These shifting power relations correlated with a change in the instrumental rationality of some tribal actors. **They reconsidered IS as being a lesser threat, when compared to the Iraqi government.** Consequently, they threw their lot behind IS as a means by which they could

⁴⁹⁴ Mazen Al-Yasiri, المؤتمر الأول للقوى السياسية العراقية للمصالحة الوطنية [The First Conference of the Iraqi Political Forces for National Reconciliation] (Baghdad, Iraq: اعلام وزارة الحوار الوطني [The Ministry of National Reconciliation Media], 2007).

⁴⁹⁵ Malkasian, op.cit., 189.

⁴⁹⁶ Atwaan, op. cit., 105.

apply pressure against a sectarian central government. Combined with the corruption and complete ineptitude of the central government,⁴⁹⁷ IS would come back with a vengeance. IS's comeback was greatly facilitated by the utter collapse of the security services, resulting in the group's seizure of a third of Iraq, and its declaration of a caliphate. As a reaction to the rise of IS and the defeat of the security services, the Shiite community felt particularly threatened.⁴⁹⁸ The sectarian mobilization engendered by IS led to a sectarian backlash on the part of some Shiites.⁴⁹⁹ This change in their value rationality, whereby members of their community became more acutely aware of their identity because IS was targeting them.

This new context led to the establishment and rapid empowerment of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).⁵⁰⁰ The PMF was established following a fatwa⁵⁰¹ by Iraq's most senior Shiite religious figure, Ali Al-Sistani.⁵⁰²⁵⁰³ It would soon be dominated by pro-Iranian armed religious parties, at the expense of the Iraqi government and the Al-Sistani factions.⁵⁰⁴ The rise of the sectarian PMF went in tandem with a change in instrumental rationality among numerous Shiites. This is because, at the most basic level, the Iraqi state could not offer protection. Backed by an international coalition, the Iraqi army, and the PMF crushed IS, which de-escalated Iraq's sectarian conflict. The new context is shaped by the low-level insurgency carried out by IS and the exhausted Sunni Arab community. It is also characterized by the Shiites

⁴⁹⁷ James Verini, *They Will Have to Die Now: Mosul and the Fall of the Caliphate* (New York: WW Norton, 2019), 70.

⁴⁹⁸ Stern and Berger, op. cit., 16.

⁴⁹⁹ McCants, op. cit., 73.

⁵⁰⁰ الحشد الشعبي

⁵⁰¹ Religious edict.

⁵⁰² He is referred to as Great Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.

⁵⁰³ Ranj Alaaldin, "Containing Shiite Militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq" (Brookings Doha Center, 2017), 1.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

exploring other concerns beyond survival, all of which inform Iraq's contemporary ethnic conflicts.

3.6.4 Sectarianism-Attempts to Move Beyond it

Sectarian conflicts in Iraq are further clarified by the failure of the attempts to resolve these conflicts. In 2021, there was a concentrated effort by members of non-governmental organizations and civil society actors to challenge the sectarian status quo in Iraq. The failure of the civil society protests shows how deeply the sectarian Muhasasah system is entrenched. It also sheds some light on the principal actors benefiting from Iraq's sectarian tensions. The Muhasasah system would be seriously challenged by the civil society protests, as they argued that it embodied everything that had gone wrong. "The system underpins the corruption, collusion, and patronage networks that characterize public life in Iraq."⁵⁰⁵ The objective of the civil society protests was to take an explicit stand against the sectarian regime. A particular bone of contention was the blatant corruption that characterizes the Iraqi bureaucracy. In a similar token, the lack of government services was a principal motivator of these protests. Another key demand of the protests was an end to Iranian intervention, as Iranian influence had become manifest in military, social, economic, and political spheres. To that end, some protestors sacked an Iranian consulate. The alternative sought by the civil society protestors was a secular regime. Iraqi nationalism represented another ideal of the protestors, as they presented it as a means to overcome Iraq's sectarian difficulties. This social action was both instrumental and value-rational, from a Weberian perspective. The civil society protestors demanded a more efficient state that could provide services. At the same time, their value rationality was expressed in their calls for Iraqi sovereignty. The fact remains that those demands were not mutually exclusive.

⁵⁰⁵ Arwa Ibrahim, "Muhasasa, the Political System Reviled by Iraqi Protesters | Religion News | Al Jazeera," December 4, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters>.

Rather, the civil society protests viewed Iranian influence as being directly linked to the rise of sectarian actors, and a hindrance to the establishment of a modern Iraqi state.

In other cases, the protests took on a religious dimension. On numerous occasions, the protests would stop on Friday, so that the protestors would be able to listen to Shiite Marja'⁵⁰⁶⁵⁰⁷ Ali Al-Sistani's Friday sermon. Adding to the complexity of the situation, while Al-Sistani is an Iranian citizen, he represents the Shiite religious seminaries in Iraq as opposed to their Iranian counterparts. The Iraqi Shiite seminaries tend to be more apolitical and crucially, do not subscribe to the doctrine of Wilayat Al-Faqih.⁵⁰⁸⁵⁰⁹ The doctrine of Wilayat Al-Faqih calls for total loyalty to Iran's Supreme Leader because he is presented as being the Hidden Imam's representative. Thus, Al-Sistani represented for many of these protestors an alternative source of religious legitimacy while simultaneously providing a means by which their Iraqi identity could be respected. The civil society protests broke out mostly in Baghdad and in the south where the Shiites are the majority. Thus, even protests against sectarianism were colored by ethnic and religious divides. While there was some limited participation on their end, most Sunni Arabs chose not to participate in the civil society protests. This is because the protests where the Sunni Arabs formed a majority were brutally suppressed in 2013 by the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government justified its actions by accusing the protestors of being closeted Baa'thists and IS

⁵⁰⁶ A religious reference and a source of emulation. He is also attributed with the status of Grand Ayatollah

⁵⁰⁷ John Davison, "Abandoned and Attacked, Some Iraq Protesters Look to an Ayatollah," *Reuters*, February 6, 2020, sec. World News, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-sistani-idUSKBN2002PQ>.

⁵⁰⁸ ولاية الفقيه

Leadership of the jurisconsult. An idea originally developed by Ali ibn Abd al-A'l also known as Muhaqqiq al-Karaki- See:

⁵⁰⁹ Shahrugh Akhavi, "Contending Discourses in Shi'i Law on the Doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqih," *Iranian Studies* 29, no. 3/4 (1996): 229–68, 233.

sympathizers. The infiltration of some protests by IS sympathizers certainly did not help things. Another factor that hindered the Sunni Arabs' participation in these new protests was the feeling of exhaustion prevailing over most of them. The regions where they formed a majority were a battleground between IS and the international coalition aimed at dislodging it. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the secessionist values of some Kurds caused them to disregard what was happening in the rest of Iraq. Also, the failed independence referendum further poisoned inter-communal relations.

These protests would be violently suppressed by pro-Iranian armed groups, acting in their official or unofficial capacities. The role played by the mercurial cleric Moqtada Al-Sader in eliminating the protests is worthy of special mention. Al-Sader has always presented himself as a political maverick, constantly shifting his political positions so that his support would constantly be sought after.⁵¹⁰ Al-Sader has long portrayed himself as a champion of the downtrodden and oppressed Shiite masses of Iraq. Al-Sader attempted to co-opt the protests by utilizing them to undermine his Shiite political rivals, including the prime minister. Al-Sader attempted to reframe the protests as being part and parcel of his longstanding campaign against the corrupt Shiite oligarchies in power. To sweeten the deal, Al-Sader deployed his militia to protect the demonstrators. However, Al-Sader failed to rally the civil society protestors to his cause. This is because Al-Sader has been an integral part of the post-2003 order. His patronage network has a stranglehold on the Iraqi ministries of health and electricity. It is no coincidence that these two

⁵¹⁰ It appears that Al-Sader is imitating the Lebanese politician Walid Jumblatt. Jumblatt is the head of a prominent Druze family as well as the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Throughout his political career, Jumblatt has been able to punch above his weight due to his flexible political positions and ability to side with whomever is gaining ascendancy in the political sphere.

ministries are particularly riddled with nepotism and corruption.⁵¹¹ Their failures in providing even the most basic of services have been a rallying cry for the protestors. Moreover, Al-Sadr's militia has been heavily involved in sectarian massacres. Al-Sader would also be met with pressure from Iran to suppress the protests, as these protests were directly against its influence in Iraq. Consequently, Al-Sader turned against the protestors.⁵¹² Civil society protestors would suddenly see themselves being attacked by their erstwhile protectors.

The Muhasasah's resilience was further demonstrated by the PMF's deadly crackdown on the perceived menace to their patronage networks. Thus, these protests would be bloodily repressed by the Iraqi government, PMF factions, who subscribed to Wilayat Al-Faqih, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.⁵¹³ At the same time, the protestors received no protection from other militias within the PMF that did not adhere to Wilayat Al-Faqih, such as those loyal to Al-Sistani.⁵¹⁴ Moreover, the United States did not act. This is because reducing corruption in Iraq was not perceived to be in its core interests. By the same token, the establishment of a strong state was not deemed to be of any particular importance; hence **the international apathy** to the violent suppression of the civil society movement.

⁵¹¹ Kjetil Selvik and Iman Amirteimour, "The Big Man Muqtada Al-Sadr: Leading the Street in Iraq under Limited Statehood," *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal* (August 16, 2021): 1–18, 1

⁵¹² Mustafa Saadoun, "Iraq's Civil Movement Breaks Away from Sadr Protests," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, July 31, 2016, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/07/sadrists-protests-civil.html>.

⁵¹³ Suadad Al-Salhy, "EXCLUSIF : Des soldats irakiens ont tué des dizaines de personnes lors d'une attaque contre une manifestation à Bagdad en 2019," Middle East Eye édition française, juin 2021, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/actu-et-enquetes/irak-exclusif-soldats-massacre-manifestants-bagdad-2019-repression-dissimulation-gouvernement>.

⁵¹⁴ العراق 2003 - تعرف على أهم الأحداث والمحطات التي مر بها العراق منذ عام، [The Event], "Get to Know the Most Important Events that Iraq Went Through Since 2003," Tweet, @AlHadath, October 9, 2021, <https://twitter.com/AlHadath/status/1446777586932240386>.

Despite the manifold challenges listed above, the protests have nevertheless engendered some changes regarding how ethnic conflicts are managed in Iraq. They have also pushed Iraq towards a more Weberian and Habermasian instrumentally rational state, albeit to a very limited extent. Some civil society protestors were able to establish a political party that would serve to stand as a counterpoint to the sectarian parties from the ideational point of view. At the same time, the explicitly pro-Iranian parties suffered an electoral setback. Regarding Muqtada Al-Sader, he portrayed himself as an Iraqi nationalist, which enabled him to gain a plurality of the vote. As part of the broader trend against the sectarian status quo, **the IIP suffered** from the voters' wrath, failing to gain a single seat in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections. It is worth mentioning that by no means does this signify the end of sectarian politics. For one thing, the Muhasasah continues to govern Iraq. At the same time, Iran remains a powerful patron for the Shiite militias and is in a position to ensure that its assets and client militias are well protected.

3.7 The Regimes Established by IS and the IIP: A Parallel Collapse

The changes to the IIP's value and instrumental rationality have hastened the group's collapse. In fact, following the Iraqi parliamentary elections which were held in 2021, the IIP was completely wiped out. The IIP, which was a constant fixture in Iraqi politics since 2003 and the Sunni Arabs' supposed representative failed to win a single seat.⁵¹⁵ Its erstwhile electorate, Iraq's Sunni Arabs have been re-evaluating their instrumental and value rationalities. It is worth noting that the IIP came to power as the Sunni Arabs' nominal representative by default. Sunni Arabs had for the most part decided to boycott the political process established by the United

⁵¹⁵ Mehmet Alaca, "Iraq's Sunni Arabs Emerge as More Cohesive Political Force," Amwaj.media, November 5, 2021, <https://amwaj.media/article/halbousi-s-electoral-victory-may-trigger-changes-in-iraqi-sunni-geopolitics>.

States following its invasion of Iraq. Irrespective of the instrumental rationality of such a move, the Sunni Arabs made that move to register their opposition to the invasion and to a political system that marginalized them.⁵¹⁶ By participating in the political process, the IIP's value rationality endorsed the sectarian segmentation of the country. The instrumental rationality of the IIP was expressed in their desire to construct a modern Iraqi state. It sought to replace it with a more Westernized version, per the view of the United States. The shift in the value rationality of the IIP and the Sunni Arabs regarding sectarianism was shaped by a similar context: The outbreak of sectarian conflicts which only added to the Sunni Arabs', and the whole of Iraq's misery.

Instrumental and value rationalities are not fixed. The IIP further demonstrates that. The Iraqi state, with its sectarian quotas, failed to foster national unity. It was equally incapable of protecting its citizens. Iraqi democracy, which the IIP helped establish, was always at most a partial one. This is because the state did not have a monopoly over violence. Moreover, with its deeply ingrained corruption, the Iraqi state fell far short of that promised by the IIP's instrumental rationality.⁵¹⁷ While the IIP presented a value rationality tinged with ethnic sectarianism, Iraq fell into a full-blown civil war, between the Sunni and Shiite Arabs. Making a bad situation worse, IS and its precursor organizations purposefully stoked a sectarian civil war. The value rationality of the IIP would **shift along with a decrease in ethnic tensions**. The IIP has recently emphasized Iraqi nationalism as its value rationality, as well as bringing attention to

⁵¹⁶ Renad Mansour, "The Sunni Predicament in Iraq," Carnegie Middle East Center (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2016), 1
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_59_Mansour_Sunni_Final.pdf.

⁵¹⁷ Muhanad Seloom, "An Unhappy Return: What the Iraqi Islamic Party Gave Up to Gain Power," Carnegie Middle East Center, accessed February 28, 2022, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/11/19/unhappy-return-what-iraqi-islamic-party-gave-up-to-gain-power-pub-77747>.

the issue of service provision to Sunni Arab areas. The destruction of IS presents a potential common narrative around which Iraq's different ethnicities can unite around.

More to the point, the extreme violence engendered by sectarianism had run its course. Many Sunni Arabs, who had initially boycotted the Iraqi political process, had realized that they were unable to overthrow or radically alter the status quo. To that end, they began participating in the political process. Because of this, these formally politically disinterested voters chose new representatives, notably the parties founded by the businessmen Muhammad Al-Halbousi and Khamis Khanjar. The Sunni Arabs' newfound alternative to the IIP demonstrates a desire for a more secular leadership. Like the IIP, both Al-Halbousi and Khanjar had friendly ties with Iran and Turkey. All the above-mentioned parties have promised to improve services and facilitate the reconstruction of the Sunni-majority areas that were mauled during the war with IS.⁵¹⁸ The main difference between these political newcomers and the IIP was that they were overtly secular. This difference was expressed electorally, with new political parties all but annihilating the IIP in the ballot box.

These political newcomers were more in tune with the changes in the value rationality of the Sunni Arab community. In addition, the instrumental rationality of the new secular Sunni politicians has paid dividends. These new secular actors have demonstrated that they could carry out their promises concerning the physical reconstruction of Iraq. These new actors were able to further reinforce their popularity at the expense of the IIP by laying the groundwork for a modern state and a functional bureaucracy, in the Sunni Arab areas. This is not to sugar-coat the corrupt

⁵¹⁸ Akeel Abbas, "Iraqi Sunni Parties Compete for Parliament Speaker - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East," Al Monitor, December 21, 2021, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/12/iraqi-sunni-parties-compete-parliament-speaker>.

and sectarian nature of the Iraqi state. Rather, it showcases the alternative being embraced by the Sunni Arab community to IS's caliphate. This matters, in the context of reduced sectarian tensions, owing to the above-mentioned reasons. The more secular alternative, from the perspective of instrumental rationality, provided far more than what the IIP had been able to offer to the Sunni Arab community, under its religious rhetoric.

In brief, this chapter has addressed another dimension of IS and IIP's ethnicities, which is their competing polities. The situational theoretical framework, when compared to its primordialist and instrumentalist interlocutors, best explains how Ba'athist Iraq came to adopt a unique ethnic identity. The role of IS and IIP's polities in their ethnic conflict is further clarified by Habermas's legitimation crisis. Based on the Frankfurt school, the legitimation crisis provides a theoretical framework to explain how the lacunas in Iraqi state-building projects allowed an opening for IS's alternative polity. The legitimation crisis that the Iraqi state is going through is characterized by the Iraqi state's inability to inspire its population's confidence in its institutions and leadership. This undermines the normative message of the Iraqi state and the IIP, which has played a key role in its establishment. This in turn has made the IS's caliphate a more credible and alluring alternative in the eyes of some of the disenchanting Iraqi population. **Habermas's analysis of ethnicity underlines the importance of an idealized consensus. When IS and the IIP are following their religious paragons, the influence of these religious figures on the objective world becomes more manifest. Habermas illuminates yet another aspect of ethnic conflicts with his concept of "systemically distorted communications." "Systemically distorted communications" examines mutual failures of understanding between different ethnic groups owing to a lack of perception of the assumptions governing behaviors.** This leads to feelings of alienation and confusion between different ethnic groups. It also leads to the

generation of harmful stereotypes, further poisoning ethnic relations in the process. The Iraqi state has inflamed ethnic tensions due to the incorrect segmentation of its ethnic groups. By ensuring that power is based on these haphazard ethnic cleavages, the Iraqi state has become dysfunctional and has locked ethnic groups in zero-sum competitions. By supporting the Iraqi state, the IIP has hemorrhaged support. In contrast, the extreme alternative of IS gained traction. **These dysfunctional ethnic relations inform how IS and the IIP treat Iraq's Christian minority. The treatment of Iraq's Christians forms a crucial part of IS and IIP's ethnic identities.**

3.7.1 More Brotherhood Front Groups: The Resistance

3.7.1.1 Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq

The role of the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (AMSI) was to act as a pro-resistance religious body. Thus, the Brotherhood could influence the burgeoning anti-American resistance while not jeopardizing the political gains of the KIU and the IIP. This provides yet another example of the Brotherhood playing the “game of the interceder.” It is also demonstrative of the malleability of group identity, in the context of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood will adopt or even invent new identities when faced with a new political context. When it is unsure which side will triumph, the Brotherhood will invent new front groups through which politically useful alliances can be struck. It also speaks to the flexibility of the Brotherhood's ideology. The Brotherhood is willing to embrace competing ethnic claims to gain more supporters. This is evidenced by the Brotherhood's simultaneous embrace of Kurdish and pan-Arab nationalism.

The origins of the AMSI were a series of efforts on the part of some Brotherhood clerics to reach an accommodation with the Baa'th regime. The rise of the AMSI⁵¹⁹⁵²⁰ can be traced to a more permissive attitude on the part of Saddam Hussein in the 1990s. As previously mentioned, the IIP was banned by the Baa'thist regime. In 1991, the Iraqi dictator took a more relaxed attitude towards the Brotherhood. The Baa'thist regime sought to use the Brotherhood to balance against Saudi-promoted Wahhabism via a more manageable alternative. To that end, several of the Brotherhood's leaders were released from prison. In the city of Fallujah, and elsewhere in the province of Al-Anbar, Brotherhood clerics such as Makki Hussein al-Kubaysi were permitted to preach openly.

This permissive context was informed by the Baa'th Party's Faith Campaign. Influenced by the religious fervor of Khomeini's supporters, Saddam Hussein sought to give religion a greater space. In doing so, the Baa'thist regime would reduce the opposition to it, in a context brought by military and economic ruin following its defeat in the First Gulf War. Al-Kubaysi was part of the Baa'thist Faith Campaign. His role was to promote a version of the Brotherhood that was loyal to the Baa'thist regime. The AMSI, following the fall of Saddam Hussein, attempted to act as the lynchpin between the Brotherhood, and the armed factions opposed to the new Iraq. Al-Kubaysi became one of the founders of AMSI. Under his direction, the AMSI

⁵¹⁹ هيئة علماء المسلمين في العراق

⁵²⁰ Al Jazeera Network, "هيئة علماء المسلمين في العراق" [Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq], Al Jazeera, March 22, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/organizationsandstructures/2015/3/22/%d9%87%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%86-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%82>.

channeled money to Brotherhood-influenced guerillas, such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades⁵²¹ and the Islamic Army in Iraq.⁵²²⁵²³

The AMSI has attempted to play the game of the interceder with both Al Qaeda in Iraq and the United States Military. In doing so, the AMSI was attempting to carve out a new group identity: The Sunni reference for the resistance. Such a role would permit the AMSI to act as a reliable interlocutor between the Iraqi government and the United States on one hand, and the Iraqi resistance on the other. By not participating in the Iraqi government, the AMSI sought to preserve its credibility in the eyes of the anti-government fighters. By not directly taking up arms, the AMSI aimed to not completely alienate the Iraqi government. The AMSI sought to construct a broad grouping such that the different ideological and identity markers of the resistance could be incorporated. The AMSI even attempted to co-opt Al Qaeda in Iraq's presence. The AMSI included Al Qaeda in Iraq as part of the resistance. This expanded grouping on the part of the AMSI was done to strengthen its hand when dealing with the Iraqi government. The AMSI equally aimed to control Al Qaeda in Iraq by grouping it as part of the resistance. The AMSI aimed to moderate Al Qaeda in Iraq's behavior, increasing the stature of the AMSI in the process in the eyes of both the United States.

The ideology preached by AMSI and its leader is a mixture of Wahhabism and the Brotherhood's.⁵²⁴ It is closely connected with Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's International Union of

⁵²¹ كتائب ثورة العشرين

⁵²² الجيش الإسلامي في العراق

⁵²³ Jeremy Hodge and Anand Gopal, "The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah," Text, *Conflict Research Programme Blog* (blog), November 16, 2020, World, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/>.

⁵²⁴ بيان علماء الأمة للرد على إساءات الحكومة الهندية لرسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم [A Communiqué from the Scholars of the Islamic Nation in Response to the Offenses of the Indian Government to the Prophet Peace Be Upon Him], 2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2v0gDdUNSWE>.

Muslim Scholars (IUMS).⁵²⁵ As mentioned in Chapter 1, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is the chief ideologue of the Brotherhood and is influenced by Ibn Taymiyah. It is this ideological affinity that led Osama Bin Laden to praise the leader of the AMSI, Harith Al-Dari.⁵²⁶ Irrespective of their ideological affinity, the ethnic identities constructed by Bin Laden and Al-Dari are not wholly the same. The AMSI's leader Harith Al-Dari has criticized Al Qaeda in Iraq's use of suicide bombers, and the use of foreign fighters.⁵²⁷ This went in line with the AMSI's vision of an Iraqi resistance.

Al-Dari has lavished praise on the Mujahedeen Shura Council in Iraq (MSCI), which was yet another Al Qaeda in Iraq front group. According to Al-Dari, the MSC is "part of the legitimate resistance."⁵²⁸ Al-Dari went further, claiming: "These factions attack the occupation forces and do not target the civilians because it is a resistance that broke out immediately at the beginning of the occupation. These factions do not receive support from any foreign party."⁵²⁹ The AMSI was attempting to drive a wedge between Al Qaeda in Iraq and its central leadership based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also, by severing Al Qaeda in Iraq's international links, the AMSI would have benefited the United States and Europe. This is because Al Qaeda's central leadership was committed to Osama Bin Laden's strategy of striking the "faraway enemy" i.e. the United States and its European allies. By shifting Al Qaeda in Iraq's focus to an exclusively local concern, the AMSI would have reduced the security threats emanating from Al Qaeda

⁵²⁵ الاتحاد العالمي لعلماء المسلمين

⁵²⁶ The Middle East Media Research Institute, "Bin Laden's Speeches 2003-2006," MEMRI, September 8, 2006, <https://www.memri.org/reports/bin-ladens-speeches-2003-2006>.

⁵²⁷ Awad Maani Al-Qahtani, "حارث الضاري في حديث للجزيرة" [The Leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq Dr. Harith Al-Dari in a Conversation to Al-Jazirah," Al-Jazirah, January 4, 2008, <http://www.al-jazirah.com/2008/20080104/du18.htm>.

⁵²⁸ Bill Roggio, "Sunni Clerics Turn on Association of Muslim Scholars," FDD's Long War Journal, November 17, 2007,

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/sunni_clerics_turn_o.php.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

while further empowering itself. Al-Dari's statement that "Ayman al Zawahiri doesn't represent Iraqis,"⁵³⁰ is yet another proof of AMSI's attempt to reconstruct the ethnic markers of Al Qaeda in Iraq such that they would align with those of the AMSI. That process would in turn empower the AMSI by bringing Al Qaeda in Iraq under its control.

The limits of the game of the interceder are evidenced in the rejection of AMSI by both the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda. The Iraqi government decided to shut down the headquarters of the AMSI, with the backing of pro-government clerics. This move was justified by one of these clerics, as being the consequence of AMSI's attempts to reach out to Al Qaeda: "The association [AMSI] has always justified killing and assassinations carried out by al Qaeda."⁵³¹ Furthering the divide between the Iraqi government and AMSI, the Iraqi government issued an arrest warrant for the leader of AMSI. The Iraqi government considered AMSI as belonging to the same group as Al Qaeda. AMSI's leader would spend the rest of his life in exile, further marginalizing his group. Al Qaeda would consider the AMSI as a collaborator with the Iraqi government. That group assassinated the nephew of Harith Al-Dari, who was a senior leader in the 1920 Revolution Brigades.⁵³² While the AMSI attempted to expand its identity markers such that it would encompass, and be valuable to both the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda, the opposite happened. Both the Al Qaeda and Iraqi government grouped AMSI exclusively with their enemies, leading to AMSI's total political neutralization.

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Lydia Khalil, "Leader of 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by Al-Qaeda," *Terrorism Focus*, The Jamestown Foundation, 4, no. 9 (April 10, 2007), <https://jamestown.org/program/leader-of-1920-revolution-brigades-killed-by-al-qaeda/>.

3.7.1.2 The Armed Factions

Issa Al-Sayir stood at the nexus between the Brotherhood's various front groups. Al-Sayir had long-standing connections with the clerics who would establish the AMSI. Al-Sayir transitioned from a Baa'thist to a guerilla commander; all while maintaining ties to the Brotherhood. Al-Sayir started his career as an officer in Iraq's security services, indicating his Baa'thist bona fides, as well establishing ties with the clerics **who would found** the AMSI. Al-Sayir belonged to the Fallujah-based Albu-Issa tribe. The Albu-Issa had contributed the most members to the Brotherhood in the region. In 2003, along with the changed political context, Al-Sayir switched from the pro-Baa'thist Brotherhood milieu to the IIP. The US occupation would enable the IIP to take control of municipal councils throughout Al-Anbar province, and its police departments. The provincial council of Al-Anbar would equally fall under the IIP's sway. These IIP-controlled councils would coordinate with the US military while discreetly funding the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Army in Iraq, and other armed factions.⁵³³

The 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) were the outcomes of the Brotherhood's attempt to construct a new identity: Resistance Iraqi Salafism.⁵³⁴⁵³⁵ The fall of Saddam Hussein led to a new power vacuum that the Brotherhood was keen to exploit. The IIP had an established identity as part of the Western-friendly opposition to Saddam Hussein in exile. That group's membership permitted the IIP to join the official governing structures of post-invasion Iraq. While the IIP was able to gain formal power, such a move alienated it from its supposed core constituency, Sunni Arabs. To remedy the situation, the Brotherhood established close contacts with armed groups hostile to the new order. The capture of Saddam Hussein

⁵³³ Hodge and Gopal, *op.cit.*,

⁵³⁴ Ahmed S. Hashim, *Iraq's Sunni Insurgency*, 1st edition (Abingdon, Oxon England: Routledge, 2009), 37.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid*, 20.

presented these groups with the opportunity to take control of anti-occupation resistance from the Baa’thist factions.⁵³⁶ The 1920 Revolution Brigades were among the earliest armed factions to be established. That group had a more heterogeneous makeup. Among its members were former Baa’thists who had abandoned their ideology, while others were self-professed Salafists. That group was closely connected with the IIP,⁵³⁷ the possibility of one group interceding on the other’s behalf underpinning their relationship.

In 2007, the IIP formed another armed front group: Hamas Al-Iraq, or Hamas of Iraq. The name itself is a nudge and a wink toward the group’s connections with the Brotherhood. Hamas Al-Iraq would focus its efforts on eliminating the IIP’s political rivals, while ostensibly being part of the resistance against the American occupation. Al-Sayir worked simultaneously as an aid to the city’s police chief and as a commander in Hamas Al-Iraq. Hamas Al-Iraq would end up joining the Sahwah,⁵³⁸ which was a tribal uprising led by the US military against the Islamic State in Iraq. This shift in the identity of this Brotherhood faction, from resisting the Americans, is due to a changed context in power relations. The Islamic State in Iraq was Al Qaeda in Iraq’s latest rebranding effort. It signified a decreased attachment to Al Qaeda’s central leadership, and importantly for Hamas Al-Iraq, a lesser willingness to cooperate with other armed factions. As the Islamic State in Iraq was gaining the upper hand over Hamas Al-Iraq, the US military offered an olive branch in the form of the Sahwah. This led Hamas Al-Iraq to reconfigure its identity. Crucially, Hamas Al-Iraq used its connections with the IIP to facilitate this transition. These two Brotherhood factions played the “game of the interceder” with the United States military.

⁵³⁶ Ibid, 32.

⁵³⁷ Ibid, 20.

⁵³⁸ Hodge and Gopal, op.cit.,

This speaks to the malleability of the group identities promoted by the Brotherhood. Their inception is linked to a new context in terms of power relations, whereby the political alignment of the pre-existing branch of the Brotherhood stands in the way of gaining supporters. The fact that the Brotherhood's various branches change their ideologies along with a different political context speaks further to the objectives of the Brotherhood, which is expanding these groups irrespective of the political concessions and new identity markers required. The game of the interceder is part of the Brotherhood's malleable group identity. **Ethnicity is defined by Horowitz as a belief in collective belonging⁵³⁹ which could be based on common descent, language, and history. However, the Brotherhood is willing to change these markers if it serves the Brotherhood's overall popularity.**

3.7.2 How Al Qaeda in Iraq Became the Islamic State: Ethnic Identities Being Remade

It is important to note that the ethnicity produced by IS is by no means fixed. Rather, the markers of the ethnicity being constructed have constantly shifted. While IS and Al Qaeda have the same ideology, the ethnicity they have attempted to construct is different. The changes in these identity markers have been willful. One **such marker pertains to the background** of the group's members. A constant in the strategy of IS and its predecessors is the continuous striving to go native. These organizations have purposefully transformed the makeup of their leadership and operatives so that the majority of both consist of Iraqis. The purpose of that transformation was to ensure the group's survival.⁵⁴⁰ **Another marker** of ethnicity that differentiates Al Qaeda and IS is their different objectives. The objective of Al Qaeda was to drive the *infidel* US

⁵³⁹ Donald L. Horowitz, "Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict" (Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C. The United States of America, 1998), 18.

⁵⁴⁰ Caillet and Puchot, op. cit., 236.

military out of its bases in the Persian Gulf, which were close to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Another objective, which was for the longer term, was the replacement of the Saudi monarchy with a true Islamic regime, per the thought of Bin Laden. IS's objective differs totally from Al Qaeda's. IS aims to establish a state, wherever it can.⁵⁴¹⁵⁴² When a power vacuum took place in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq, IS rushed to implement its state-building project there, even though the US military remained close to the two holy cities. The US bases in the Arabian Gulf were not IS's priority.

These differences in the strategies and objectives were directly reflected in competing ethnicities. Al Qaeda's members saw themselves as part of a Qutbist vanguard whereas IS's operatives saw themselves as belonging to a caliphate. The ethnic competition between the two groups is now characterized by IS attempting to supplant Al Qaeda's international network. The construction of different ethnicities on the part of IS and Al Qaeda, combined with their increasingly acrimonious relationship has led to the splintering of the Wahhabi-Qutbist milieu, and armed conflict breaking out within it.

The genesis of IS can be traced to Jama'at Al Tawheed Wal Jihad/ Congregation of Monotheism and Jihad.⁵⁴³ Its origins lie in the training camps established in Afghanistan in 1999 by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The naming of this group foreshadows the tenuous relationship between Al Qaeda and its Iraqi branch. While Osama Bin Laden agreed to finance Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's training camps owing to their shared ideology and objectives, Al-Zarqawi refused

⁵⁴¹ Ibid, 233-234.

⁵⁴² Stern and Berger, op.cit., 195.

⁵⁴³ جماعة التوحيد والجهاد (1999-2004)

to pledge an oath of allegiance to Bin Laden.⁵⁴⁴ The US invasion of Iraq provided a golden opportunity for Al Qaeda to establish a foothold there, as Al Qaeda was never able to expand its operations over there when Saddam Hussein was in power. In the ensuing chaos, Al-Zarqawi was able to establish his organization in Iraq.⁵⁴⁵ Al Qaeda and Al-Zarqawi's organization reworked their group identities to match this new context. Each had what the other desired: Al-Zarqawi offered Al Qaeda a presence in Iraq. Bin Laden offered Zarqawi international exposure and his network that could bring financing and foreign fighters.

This led to a new organization: Al Qaeda in Iraq.⁵⁴⁶ When Zarqawi pledged an oath of allegiance to Bin Laden in 2004, his organization became Al Qaeda's official branch in Iraq. However, all was not well between Al Qaeda's central leadership and their Iraqi counterparts. Al-Zarqawi disregarded Bin Laden's strategy of attacking the "faraway enemy." Instead, Al-Zarqawi focused his efforts on causing a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. He aimed to spread his ideology among Sunnis by forcing them to come to his organization for protection from the Shiites. Furthermore, Al-Zarqawi ignored Al Qaeda's central leadership when they rebuked him.⁵⁴⁷

The next transformation of Al Qaeda in Iraq and its ethnicity was expressed through the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (MSCI).⁵⁴⁸ This was an umbrella group led by Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al-Zarqawi. The goal of that new outfit was to further entrench Al Qaeda in Iraq's local

⁵⁴⁴ Mary Anne Weaver, "The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *The Atlantic*, August 2006, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/>.

⁵⁴⁵ Atwaan, op. cit., 96.

⁵⁴⁶ Its full name was *Tanzim Al Qaeda fi Bilaad Al Raafidayn* التنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في بلاد الرافدين / The Base of Jihad Organization in Mesopotamia (2004-2006)

⁵⁴⁷ Kangil Lee, "Does Al Qaeda Central Still Matter?," *UNISCI Journal*, no. 37 (January 2015): 15–48, 35.

⁵⁴⁸ *Majlis Shurah Al Mujahideen fi Al-Iraq* المجلس شورى المجاهدين في العراق (2006)

following. The MSCI was the vehicle by which Al Qaeda in Iraq could incorporate anti-occupation resistance movements. The overarching aim of MSCI was to monopolize the anti-US resistance in Iraq. Following Al-Zarqawi's death in 2006, the MSCI was led by an Egyptian named Abdel Moneim Ezz El-Din Ali Al-Badawi⁵⁴⁹ aka Abu Ayub Al-Masri. This reflected the limited inroads Al Qaeda had established in Iraqi society.⁵⁵⁰

In 2006, the MSCI dissolved itself and announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).⁵⁵¹ The ISI was a key step in the process of Al-Zarqawi's original organization going native. The leader of ISI was an Iraqi, Hamed Dawood Mohammed Khalil al Zawi, aka Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi.⁵⁵²⁵⁵³ As for Abu Ayub Al-Masri, he became the ISI's minister of war. This indicates that the process of incorporating Iraqis into the leadership was so important for MSCI's identity that its leader accepted a demotion to facilitate that development. The establishment of the ISI took place without the approval or even knowledge of Al Qaeda's central leadership. The objectives of the two organizations diverged further. The name of the new group, the Islamic State of Iraq, reflected the group's state-building aspirations as opposed to striking the far enemy. According to ISI, Al Qaeda in Iraq no longer existed. The only thing that bound the two organizations was the oath of allegiance between Al-Zarqawi and Bin Laden.

⁵⁴⁹ Mustapha Amin, "أبو حمزة المهاجر .. الغامض" [Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir.. the Mysterious], المركز العربي للبحوث والدراسات [Islamist Movements Portal], May 4, 2022, <http://www.islamist-movements.com/26756>.

⁵⁵⁰ Ghassan Al-Khalid, *داعش من خلافة الدولة الى دولة الخلافة* [Daesh from Succeeding the State to the State of the Caliphate] (Beirut, Lebanon: الفرات للنشر و التوزيع [The Euphrates for Publishing and Distribution], 2015), 66.

⁵⁵¹ Al-Dawlah Al-Islaamiyah Fi Al-Iraq (2006-2013) دولة العراق الإسلامية

⁵⁵² Bill Roggio, "US and Iraqi Forces Kill Al Masri and Baghdadi, al Qaeda in Iraq's Top Two Leaders |," FDD's Long War Journal, April 19, 2010, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/al_qaeda_in_iraqs_to.php.

⁵⁵³ Barak Mendelsohn, "Global Terrorism Research Project," Global Terrorism Research Project, March 19, 2010, <http://gtrp.haverford.edu/author/Abu%20Omar%20al-Baghdadi/>.

However, ISI would not assert that claim until 2013, with the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In the meantime, Osama Bin Laden was killed in 2011.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) represented a crucial step in the break-up between Al Qaeda and IS, and the construction of separate ethnicities. When the Syrian Civil War broke out, ISI sensed an opportunity to expand its influence and ethnicity. It dispatched Abu Muhammad Al-Jawlani to establish a seemingly independent group known as the Nusra Front (NF). The NF shows how ethnic markers are willingly manipulated by both Al Qaeda and IS (which were then officially aligned). The NF was presented as a local group, to attract support among the Syrian population as well as not to attract the wrath of the United States. When the NF became more powerful, ISI attempted to forcefully reincorporate the NF by exposing its historic ties with the NF. ISI also reinvented itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This re-identification took place without the approval of Al Qaeda's central leadership. When the NF attempted to pull rank and appealed to Al Qaeda's central leadership, ISIL officially broke with Al Qaeda when Ayman Al-Zawahiri ruled in favor of the NF.⁵⁵⁴

The Islamic State (IS) represents the final iteration of that ethnicity. It declared a caliphate in 2014, when it occupied Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, and was at the height of its powers. By removing Iraq and Levant from its name, IS reconceptualized itself as being a global phenomenon. In tandem with the reworking of its identity markers, IS sought to replace Al Qaeda's international network. IS aimed to monopolize control of Wahhabi Qutbism at the expense of Al Qaeda. By declaring a caliphate, IS fully actualized the differences between its ethnicity and Al Qaeda's. Identifying as a caliphate sets IS apart from all other Wahhabi Qutbist

⁵⁵⁴ Nidal Nazim Hamadah, *الصراع العباسي-الأموي بين داعش و النصرّة* [*The Abbasid-Umayyad Conflict between Daesh and Nusra*], 1st ed. (Beirut, Lebanon: دار أبعاد [Distances Press], 2020), 84-85.

organizations. This new ethnicity is also an assertion on the part of IS that all other Wahhabi Qutbist organizations have become illegitimate as they lack the stature of IS and its leader, who was portrayed as the leader of the believers. This new ethnicity was expressed by IS: “Thus he [Abu Baker Al Baghdadi] is the Imam and khalifah [caliph] for Muslims everywhere. Accordingly, the Iraq and Sham in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed.”⁵⁵⁵

The Brotherhood did not accept the caliphate of IS or its ethnicity. According to Al-Qaradawi, IS’s declaration of a caliphate was invalid. One of Al-Qaradawi’s issues with IS’s declaration of a caliphate was the group’s unsavory reputation. Also, what Al-Qaradawi found problematic were certain technicalities, specifically regarding the mechanisms of the caliphate’s declaration. This, as opposed to its ideology and actions:

“The declaration of the caliphate and the appointment of Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi the caliph of the Muslims does not satisfy numerous Sharia-related requirements, not least of which the caliph being a deputy for the entire Islamic nation, the principle of the Shura as well as tying the caliphate with a particular organization infamous among the people for its extremism.”^{556,557}

⁵⁵⁵ Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, op. cit., 170.

⁵⁵⁶ أن إعلان الخلافة وتعيين أبو بكر البغدادي خليفة للمسلمين لا يلبي عدة شروط شرعية، لاسيما مبدأ كون الخليفة "نائباً عن الأمة الإسلامية" بأسرها، ومبدأ "الشورى"، فضلاً عن ربط الخلافة "بتنظيم بعينه اشتهر بين الناس بالتشدد"، ما يؤدي إلى إلحاق ضرر بمشروع الخلافة.

⁵⁵⁷ Agence France-Presse France 24, “القرضاوي يعتبر إعلان الخلافة في العراق ‘باطلاً شرعاً’”, [Al Qaradawi Considers the Declaration of the Caliphate in Iraq to be ‘Invalid According to the Sharia,’] فرانس 24 / France 24, July 5, 2014, <https://www.france24.com/ar/20140705-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89>.

Al-Qaradawi, the Brotherhood's most senior religious figure, suggested instead "a modern alternative to the caliphate."⁵⁵⁸⁵⁵⁹ The crux of the Brotherhood's religious critique against IS's caliphate is modernist. According to Al-Qaradawi:

"The caliphate that can be established in this era can be via the several states governed by Sharia through rulers and populations who desire it. This can take the form of a federation or a confederacy, and not as it was once before."⁵⁶⁰

Essentially the fault of IS's caliphate, per Al Qaradawi, is that it is too faithful to the teachings of the Salaf. Al-Qaradawi does not criticize the ideology itself of IS. This is because any critique of Wahhabism and Qutbism would reflect on his teachings. Crucially, Al-Qaradawi does not accuse IS of misunderstanding Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Abd Al Wahhab, or Qutb. This is because Al-Qaradawi tacitly agreed with IS that their caliphate is a faithful praxis of their ideology. The Brotherhood's alternative is modern systems of government because they are more popular and more accepted by the West. **Al-Qaradawi offered two alternatives to IS's caliphate, Egypt under Muhammad Mursi and Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan.** Both were more appealing to Western sensibilities and the local populace. According to Al-Qaradawi:

⁵⁵⁸ Deutsche Welle, "القرضاوي: خلافة 'داعش' لا تستوفي الشروط المطلوبة", [Al-Qaradawi: Daesh's Caliphate does not fulfill the Necessary Requirements], DW.COM, accessed October 2, 2022, <https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9/a-17879916>.

⁵⁵⁹ The full quote reads as follows:

قال القرضاوي في حوار لوكالة "الأناضول" التركية: "الخلافة التي يمكن أن تقوم في هذا العصر، يمكن أن تكون من خلال عدد من الدول التي تحكمها الشريعة، من قبل حكام وشعوب يرغبون بذلك، على شكل فيدرالية أو كونفدرالية، وليس كما كان في السابق"

⁵⁶⁰ Deutsche Welle, op. cit.,

“[I refuse] to consider that political Islam failed in Egypt, rather it was victorious! Where in which, a general revolution (meaning the revolution of the 25th of January 2011), and all the Egyptian groups with their different beliefs and ages participated in it and the revolution succeeded.”^{561 562}

Turkey is Al-Qaradawi’s most contemporaneous political paragon, which he inaccurately characterized as being governed by democratic elections and Western norms: “The methodology of the elected leader Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his brothers with him in the Justice and Development Party is based upon the global, centrist, and balanced vision.”⁵⁶³⁵⁶⁴ According to Al-Qaradawi: “Turkey is the capital of the coming caliphate and ... Erdogan is blessed by Allah and could be the one to lead the Islamic world order.”⁵⁶⁵

3.7.3 The 2017 Kurdish Referendum

The 2017 Kurdish independence referendum was a watershed moment in Iraq’s ethnic relations. It led to increased tensions with Assyrians, Kurds, and Arabs, as previously mentioned. It worsened tensions between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central Iraqi government. The independence referendum is another identity marker in the construction of different ethnicities on the part of the IS, IIP, and KIU. IS portrayed the situation as being the vindication of its righteous strategy. IS argued these new tensions portended the collapse of the alliance against it. That in turn would remove the final obstacle towards the caliphate’s inevitable

⁵⁶¹ The full quote reads as follows:

رفض القرضاوي "اعتبار أن الإسلام السياسي فشل في مصر، بل انتصر!، حيث قامت ثورة عامة (يقصد ثورة 25 كانون ثان/يناير عام 2011)، وشارك بها كل أطراف المصريين بمختلف معتقداتهم وأعمارهم ونجحت الثورة

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁴ According to Al-Qaradawi:

وعن مواقف تركيا في المنطقة، رأى القرضاوي "أن منهج الرئيس المنتخب رئيس الوزراء رجب طيب أردوغان وإخوانه، الذين معه في حزب العدالة والتنمية يقوم على الرؤى العالمية والوسطية والتوازن

⁵⁶⁵ Aaron Kliegman, “Official in Turkey’s Ruling Party Refers to President Erdogan as ‘Caliph,’” *Center for Security Policy* (blog), March 19, 2015,

<https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/official-in-turkeys-ruling-party-refers-to-president-erdogan-as-caliph/>.

restoration. IS claimed: “By Allah’s grace, the sons of the Khilafah [Caliphate] continue to prove that they are the firm and solid rock on which will break the alliance of kufr [blasphemy]...”⁵⁶⁶

IS took a Qutbist reading of Kurdish nationalism and its praxis. According to IS’s spokesperson, Abu Al-Hassan Al-Muhajir [the immigrant]⁵⁶⁷:

“O tribes and Sunnis in Sham [Greater Syria] in general, and east of the Euphrates in particular, for a long time the Islamic State has warned and cautioned against the mistake of joining the ranks of the Kurdish atheists and made clear the atheism of this apostate sect, its disavowal of the divinity of Allah, and its socialism and licentiousness with possession and dignity, with its putrid jahiliyah call for Kurdish nationalism as a basis for its establishment of its so-called state.”⁵⁶⁸

IS portrayed the efforts to actualize Kurdish nationalism as being akin to atheism. Irrespective of the ideological and political differences within the Kurdish political factions in Syria and Iraq, IS constructed them as being a monolithic whole. According to IS, there was a binary: The Kurdish jahiliyyah and the true faith represented by IS. By extension, the independence referendum was yet another un-Islamic process in service of a blasphemous objective. It is important to note the IS not just copied Qutb’s ideas, but his terminology as well.

The IIP had a hostile view of the Kurdistan independence referendum. The IIP’s ethnicity was predicated upon being a Sunni Arab actor within the new Iraq. The party supported Iraqi sovereignty to showcase its nationalist credentials. By seeing itself as a Sunni Arab ethnic actor, the IIP was locked in a zero-sum competition with Iraq’s other ethnicities. While Kurds are mostly Sunnis, the IIP perceived Kurdish nationalism as being of no benefit neither itself nor its target audience, Sunni Arabs. In addition, Kurdish independence would undermine the post-2003 political order, and by extension would undermine the IIP’s privileged position in it. The General

⁵⁶⁶ Ingram, Whiteside, and Winter, op. cit., 280.

⁵⁶⁷ This denotes that he is a foreign fighter

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid, 284.

Secretary of the IIP, Iyad Al-Samarai⁵⁶⁹ explained his party's position the following way: "We are with the unity of Iraq, the unity allows for the participation of all the national constituencies. As for the complaint regarding sectarian policies and holding them responsible for the secession, that is not a justification."⁵⁷⁰ The IIP is very much a status quo actor; it is for preserving ethnic identities, even though it admits they have led to unjust sectarian policies. This has been expressed in Al-Samarai's statement: "We as Sunni Arabs suffer from sectarian policies tenfold that which is suffered by the Kurds, but we did not demand secession. Poor policies on the part of some political players do not lead us to blaspheme in Iraq's unity."⁵⁷¹⁵⁷²

Kurdish ethno-nationalism was a key marker of the ethnic identity being constructed by the Kurdistan Islamic Union. The KIU's leadership wholeheartedly supported the independence referendum. From the perspective of the KIU, Kurds were a nation and were thus entitled to self-determination. In the words of Salahaddin Bahaddin, the KIU's secretary general: "The referendum was a difficult step, and on the whole, the right of self-determination is a right for every Kurd."⁵⁷³ The KIU prioritized gaining a following among the Kurds through its ethno-

⁵⁶⁹ إياد السامرائي

⁵⁷⁰ The actual quote is:

"نحن مع وحدة العراق، الوحدة التي تعطي مشاركة لكافة المكونات الوطنية، أما الشكوى من السياسات الطائفية وتحميلها مسؤولية الانفصال، فهذا ليس مبررا".

⁵⁷¹ The statement is:

نحن كعرب سنة نعاني من السياسات الطائفية أضعاف ما يعانيه الأكراد، ولكننا لم نطالب بالانفصال، فالسياسات

السيئة لبعض الأطراف السياسية لا تدفعنا للكفر بوحدة العراق".

⁵⁷²

الحزب الإسلامي العراقي يحذّر من " [Quds Press International for News], وكالة قدس برس إنترناشيونال للأنباء [The Iraqi Islamic Party Warns Against the Imposition of Kurdistan's Secession]," قدس برس [Quds Press], September 25, 2017, <http://www.qudspress.com/index.php?page=show&id=36332>.

⁵⁷³

nationalist message, even though that involved poisoning ties with other ethnicities. As mentioned previously, Assyrians were not enamored with a Kurdish ethno-nationalist political project. The KRG replaced the mayor of an Assyrian-majority locality to facilitate its ethno-nationalist project. The referendum undermined ties with other minorities in the KRG. Muhammad Mahdi Al-Bayati,⁵⁷⁴ a member of parliament whose constituency is members of the Shiite Turkmen community⁵⁷⁵ saw the KIU's support of the referendum as a reason to increase the religious divide. According to Al-Bayati, the so-called Islamic parties' support of the referendum called into question their adherence to Islam. In the words of Al-Bayati: "O you who claim to be the only ones implementing the Sharia, as opposed to everyone else, have you heard of Massoud Barzani's [the then-president of the KRG and leader of the KDP] latest statement, he wants to divide Iraq. Is it not shameful that Iraq becomes divided during your time?"⁵⁷⁶ The referendum also undermined relations with the central government. As a direct reaction to the referendum, the central government carried out an armed assault against the security services loyal to the KRG. The outcome of these armed clashes between the KRG and the central government was a defeat of the pro-KRG forces.

Kurdistan 24, "Kurdistan Islamic Union: We Don't Regret Supporting the Referendum," Kurdistan 24, December 29, 2019, <https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/21548-Kurdistan-Islamic-Union:-We-don%27t-regret-supporting-the-referendum>.

⁵⁷⁴ محمد مهدي البياتي

⁵⁷⁵ He was a member of a Shiite religious party, the Badr Organization.

⁵⁷⁶

His exact words were:

يا من تدعون أنكم تطبقون الشريعة الإسلامية دون غيركم، هل سمعتم تصريح مسعود البارزاني الأخير، يريد تقسيم العراق، أليس عارا أن ينقسم العراق في زمانكم؟

⁵⁷⁷ Ahmad Fawzy Salim, "لماذا فشلت أحزاب 'كردستان' الإسلامية في تكوين موقف واحد من الاستفتاء؟" [Why did the Islamic Parties of 'Kurdistan' Fail to Form a United Front Regarding the Referendum?], نون [Noon Post], September 29, 2017, <https://www.noonpost.com/content/20064>.

Furthermore, the goal of an independent Kurdistan was undermined by the failure of the referendum. However, despite all these issues, the KIU continued to support the referendum. This is because the KIU prioritized its Kurdish ethnonationalism over all other considerations and identities. A key identity marker in the ethnicity being constructed by the KIU is an ethno-nationalist interpretation of religion.⁵⁷⁸ In the words of Hassan Shamerani, the head of the KIU's high council: "We believe, in terms of our religion and nationalism, in the rights of self-determination for the Kurdish people."⁵⁷⁹ **The foil of the KIU's ideology is communism.**⁵⁸⁰ The KIU used its opposition to communism as a justification for its ethno-nationalist ideology. The ICP is the only political party in Iraq to act as a pan-ethnic actor on an ideological basis. Furthermore, the ICP failed to gain a large following among Kurds. In a similar vein, the IIP was unable to attract a large Kurdish following. This is because the IIP has historically been unable to engage with Kurdish nationalism. The KIU embraced Kurdish ethno-nationalism owing to the popularity of that ideology in the KRG. The ethnicity pushed by the KIU was reflective of the pre-existing ethnic tensions in the target society.

In conclusion, the IIP and IS have competing ethnicities. These ethnic projects had significant repercussions for Iraq's Christian minority. Power sharing and economic projects were significant markers of these ethnicities. The IS's ethnic markers shifted with the

⁵⁷⁸ Mohammad Salih Mustafa, *Nationalism and Islamism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: The Emergence of the Kurdistan Islamic Union*, 1st edition (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 161.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid, 146.

⁵⁸⁰ Ikhwan Wiki, "تاريخ الإخوان الأكراد" [The History of the Kurdish Brothers], | Ikhwan Wiki | الموسوعة التاريخية الرسمية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين [The Official Historical Encyclopedia of the Muslim Brotherhood] |, accessed October 2, 2022, http://ikhwan.wiki/index.php?title=%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF.

actualization of its caliphate project. Along with these changes, IS's ethnicity diverged from Al Qaeda's. The IIP's ethnic markers were expressed with changing electoral quotas, in favor of Iraq's Christians. The IIP's ethnic project was supported by several front groups. The purpose of these front groups was to further the Brotherhood's reach by appealing to different ethnic groups. Ultimately, the Brotherhood's ethnic policies served to reinforce ethnic tensions. Its alternative to IS's caliphate was a failed state hobbled with corruption and ethnic conflicts. IS was able to establish itself and expand in such a context.

3.7.4 How the IIP and the Iraqi Government Engage with Iraq's Christians

3.7.4.1 Constitutional quotas

The first manifestation of the post-Saddam political order was the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Officially, it was granted significant powers to boost its legitimacy as well as to present the US army in a more benign light. The IGC was permitted to appoint diplomats on an interim basis. The IGC was also empowered to propose policies and budgets. However, all the decisions of the IGC were subjected to potential veto by the occupying authorities. Appointed by the United States, the IGC's members were divided on an ethno-sectarian basis. Thirteen seats were given to the Shiites, representing the majority of seats on the council. Other seats were allocated to Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. A solitary seat was accorded to the representative of the Christian minority.⁵⁸¹

It is notable that despite the Assyrian Democratic Movement's (ADM) anti-sectarian rhetoric, it accepted to participate in the IGC based on being a Christian party. Yonadem Kanna was the secretary general of the ADM and the ADM's representative on the council. Kanna alluded to the controversies surrounding the identity he was supposedly representing by playing

⁵⁸¹ Otterman, op.cit.,

it both ways: “In the beginning, I was a member of the Governing Council for the Christians and Chaldo-Assyrians”⁵⁸² This proves how the ADM, as the supposed representative of the Christians, attempted to appeal to an ethnic identity, Chaldo-Assyriansim, to garner the support of its constituents. It presented itself as a religious actor in response to the changed political context. This new context was wholly dictated by the US Army, which emphasized their religious identity. Ultimately, the identity of Christians who still speak the language of Jesus was far easier for the US occupation forces to conceptualize than **the ethnic divides discussed in Chapter 4**. This view was implemented irrespective of the lack of buy-in from the perceived community in question. However, this identity nevertheless leaves out Assyrians and Armenians who choose to emphasize their ethnic identity as opposed to their religious beliefs. Those who prioritized their religious identity did not necessarily belong to the same sect as Kanna’s. Consequently, from the very first day, the Iraqi system has set about making the Christian community a political minority after emphasizing their religious identity. It also reinforced divisions between pre-existing groups by making them more politically salient.⁵⁸³

It is this governing council in which the IIP decided to participate. The IIP’s role was to act as one of the Sunni Arabs’ representatives. The IIP proved its willingness to work with Christian political parties. From their perspective, the quota seat given to them served to empower the Christians by ensuring their representation. In the eyes of the IIP, the opportunity to work with an identity group being reinforced by the United States made the issue even more appealing. The fact that this council was not remotely democratic, its members being handpicked by the United States, was hardly a bother for the Brotherhood. Nevertheless, all the participants

⁵⁸² Lionel Beehner, “The Role of Christians in Iraqi Politics,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2006, <https://www.cfr.org/interview/role-christians-iraqi-politics>.

⁵⁸³ Otterman, op.cit.,

believed that they had offered their respective communities a real alternative to Saddam Hussein's rule which was a totalitarian dictatorship. It was important for both actors that they had laid the foundations for a democratic Iraq. This democratic Iraq has yet to be fully realized to this very day. Also, by participating in the political process, the IIP showed its detachment from Sayyid Qutb's thoughts. This is because Qutb would consider the IIP's participation in the IGC to be nothing short of polytheistic blasphemy. In doing so, the IIP would highlight the differences between it and more committed Qutbists who had split from the Brotherhood, such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri. This was a means for the IIP to show to the United States that it, like the rest of the Brotherhood, was a moderate actor.⁵⁸⁴

The IIP was doubly represented in the IGC. This is because it was allocated another seat to one of its front groups: The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU). Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaddin was the secretary general of the KIU⁵⁸⁵ and the representative of the party on the IGC. Moshen Abdul Hameed was a professor at an Iraqi university,⁵⁸⁶ a prolific religious figure, and the representative of the IIP on the IGC. The strategy of the Brotherhood as a global movement is to gain acceptance within a local context, even if it means ideological flexibility on the group's part. When faced with the deep entrenchment of Kurdish nationalism, the Brotherhood adapted its ideology to gain a following in Iraqi Kurdistan. The IIP was able to gain only a very limited foothold among the Kurds throughout its decades of existence. A notable example is Moshen

⁵⁸⁴ John Jenkins, "Ayman Al-Zawahiri Got the Death He Deserved," Policy Exchange, August 4, 2022, <https://policyexchange.org.uk/ayman-al-zawahiri-got-the-death-he-deserved/>.

⁵⁸⁵ The Washington Post Staff, "The Iraqi Council," The Washington Post, July 14, 2003, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/07/14/the-iraqi-council/292b3f83-fa96-42a7-a0c1-1b9741fc37bf/>.

⁵⁸⁶ Otterman, op. cit.,

Abdul Hameed himself. While the IIP presented itself as a Sunni Islamic actor, it could never shake the perception of being an Arab party.

Kurdish nationalists, such as the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), were able to gather and maintain a large following by directly challenging the depredations of pan-Arab nationalism.⁵⁸⁷ Pan-Arab nationalism meant a Baa'thist imposition of identity through extreme force. In addition, the Brotherhood's other branches, such as the Palestinian, have made rhetorical gestures that have indicated a certain openness on the Brotherhood's part towards pan-Arab nationalism. When challenged in that regard, the KIU justified its existence by stating that the only party that attempted to appeal to Iraqis as a whole was the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and it was a failure. Conversely, by presenting itself as a Kurdish actor, the KIU was able to obtain a far larger foothold in Iraqi Kurdistan when compared to the IIP's lackluster showing. The KIU's influence was also quite rapid, especially when compared to the IIP's historic popularity in Iraqi Kurdistan, or lack thereof.⁵⁸⁸

This strategy, of constructing new ethnicity in tandem with a changed political context, employed by the Brotherhood in Iraq has been replicated by the movement in other contexts. When Lebanon was facing a power vacuum owing to the possible retreat of the Syrian army in 2005 and the country was extremely polarized, the Brotherhood invented another front group. From the historical branch of the group known as the Islamic Group⁵⁸⁹ (IG) came forth a new

⁵⁸⁷ Aziz, op. cit., 73-74.

⁵⁸⁸ Rasheed Al-Khayeeon, *مئة عام من الاسلام السياسي بالعراق: الجزء الثاني السنة* [*One Hundred Years of Political Islam in Iraq: Section Two: Sunnis*] (Dubai, the United Arab Emirates: مركز المسبار للدراسات و البحوث [Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre], 2011).

⁵⁸⁹ In Arabic, this group is called الجماعة الإسلامية

faction called the Islamic Action Front (IAF).⁵⁹⁰⁵⁹¹ The difference between these two Brotherhood factions was that the former faction would oppose the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon while the latter would support it, in tandem with the political context.

To that end, each faction joined a political alliance dedicated to that respective goal. IG joined the March 14 coalition⁵⁹², which consisted of secular liberals, the Future Movement (FM)⁵⁹³⁵⁹⁴⁵⁹⁵, and Christian parties: the Lebanese Forces (LF)⁵⁹⁶ and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).⁵⁹⁷⁵⁹⁸⁵⁹⁹ The Future Movement is the political front of the Hariri family. Founded and led by Rafik Al-Hariri until his assassination in 2005 by Hezbollah. Al-Hariri's son Saad took the reins afterward. The FM represented Saudi interests in Lebanon.⁶⁰⁰ The LF was formerly a Christian militia involved in sectarian bloodletting against Muslims and Druze. It was originally the armed wing of the Phalange/Kataeb Party before splitting from the Kataeb in 1982

⁵⁹⁰ In Arabic, this group is called *جبهة العمل الإسلامي*

⁵⁹¹ Hussam Hadad, “صقر الإخوان اللبناني” [Fathi Yakan..The Lebanese Hawk of the Brotherhood], بوابة المركز العربي للبحوث والدراسات [The Arab Center for Studies and Research], *الحركات الإسلامية* [The Islamist Movements Portal], February 9, 2022, <http://www.islamist-movements.com/26004>.

⁵⁹² Named after a massive protest that took place on March 14, 2005 against the presence of the Syrian Army.

⁵⁹³ Popular mostly with Sunnis

⁵⁹⁴ *تيار المستقبل*

⁵⁹⁵ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Saad Al-Hariri | Biography & Facts |,” Britannica, April 14, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saad-al-Hariri>.

⁵⁹⁶ *القوات اللبنانية*

⁵⁹⁷ The Free Patriotic Movement would eventually switch sides. It is now an ally of the group called Hezbollah

⁵⁹⁸ *التيار الوطني الحر*

⁵⁹⁹ Lynn Zovighian, “Lebanon Is Not Two Camps Part 2,” Middle East Institute, March 2, 2008, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/lebanon-not-two-camps-part-2>.

⁶⁰⁰ This close relationship came to an end in 2017, when frustrated by Hariri's pro-Hezbollah stances; Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman kidnapped Hariri, even though he was the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Forced to release Hariri under French pressure, the Saudis were nevertheless successful in forcing Hariri and the FM to end its participation in Lebanese politics, as evidenced by the FM's refusal to introduce candidates during Lebanon's 2021 parliamentary elections.

and becoming a wholly separate faction. Backed by the Israelis, the LF was heavily involved in the Sabra and Shatila massacre committed against Palestinian refugees.⁶⁰¹ The LF also destroyed many opposing Christian militias and assassinated their leaders, along with their families.⁶⁰²⁶⁰³ The FPM was the vehicle for former army general Michel Aoun. Backed by Saddam Hussein, he attempted to unite the country by bringing it under his heel in 1988. To enforce unity, he had his men beat up the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir.⁶⁰⁴ He waged an inconclusive war against the LF, only to suffer a crushing defeat at the hands of the Syrian Army afterward. Aoun sought political asylum in France while neglecting to tell his soldiers to stand down. These myriad factions were united in seeing the Syrian army apply United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 and leave Lebanon. In doing so, Lebanon could attain its sovereignty, become more democratic, and improve its ties with the international community. Despite their differing ideologies, religious beliefs, and sordid history, the IG joined these momentarily coalesced allies out of sheer political expediency.

The March 8 coalition⁶⁰⁵⁶⁰⁶ was led by the group called Hezbollah. Listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, it is nevertheless widely popular among the Shiite community.

⁶⁰¹ Rita Kaban, “‘It Can’t Be Unseen’: The Survivors of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre,” *Middle East Eye*, September 16, 2022, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sabra-shatila-massacre-survivors-anniversary>.

⁶⁰² Jim Muir, “A Trial Tests Lebanese Justice,” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 11, 1994, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1994/0711/11022.html>.

⁶⁰³ Notable examples include Tony Frangieh and his Zgharta Liberation Army. Also, Danny Chamoun and the Liberal Tigers.

⁶⁰⁴ Nora Boustany, “Aoun Allies Manhandle Patriarch,” *Washington Post*, November 7, 1989, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/11/07/aoun-allies-manhandle-patriarch/17a2f06a-738e-4573-abc5-3be6d7145bda/>.

⁶⁰⁵ Chris Solomon, “The March 8 Alliance’s Effect on Lebanon’s Economy,” *Global Risk Insights*, June 26, 2015, <https://globalriskinsights.com/2015/06/the-march-8-alliances-effect-on-lebanons-economy/>.

⁶⁰⁶ Named after a protest that took place on March 8, 2005. The protest was in support of the presence of the Syrian Army in Lebanon.

Its popularity can be partially explained due to its guerrilla campaign against the Israeli occupation force in southern Lebanon, and the largess it receives from Iran. Hezbollah espouses the ideology of Wilayat Al-Faqih⁶⁰⁷ and consequently is religiously beholden to the Supreme Leader of Iran.⁶⁰⁸⁶⁰⁹ Thus, Hezbollah can protect its community while offering them social services. Opponents of the group have ended up assassinated,⁶¹⁰ which strengthened the group's hold further. Also part of the March 8 coalition was the Amal Movement.⁶¹¹⁶¹² Originally a Shiite religious party and militia, it is now a front for the patronage network of Nabih Berri, the party's long-lasting leader and Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. Established in 2005, the objective of the March 8 movement was originally to maintain the presence of the Syrian Army in Lebanon. The March 8 alliance also aimed to ensure that Lebanon would remain allied to the Syrian and Iranian resistance regimes. As was the case with the IG, the IAF joined forces with these groups irrespective of their religious and ideological differences.

The joint goal of the IAF and IG was to strengthen the overall position of the Brotherhood. Irrespective of whether March 8 or March 14 was to triumph, the Brotherhood would have chosen the “winning side.”⁶¹³ The combined strategy of the IG and IAF was to place

⁶⁰⁷ Guardianship of the Jurisconsult

⁶⁰⁸ From 1979 to 1989 it was Ruhollah Khomeini. Since then, it has been Ali Khamenei

⁶⁰⁹ Jason Wimberly, “Wilayat Al-Faqih in Hizballah’s Web of Concepts: A Perspective on Ideology,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 5 (September 3, 2015): 687–710, 687

⁶¹⁰ Notable examples include: Rafik Al-Hariri, Muhammad Shatah, Walid Eido, Pierre Gemayel, Antoine Ghanem, Jubran Tueni, George Hawi, Hassan Hamdan, Lokman Slim...

⁶¹¹ حركة أمل

⁶¹² The word Amal means hope. It's also an acronym for Afwaaj Al-Muqawmah al –Lubnaniyah. أفواج المقاومة اللبنانية, meaning the Lebanese Resistance Regiments

⁶¹³ Ultimately the March 8 coalition would come out on top. Following its armed takeover of Lebanon on May 7, 2008, Hezbollah has been the undisputed ruler of Lebanon. The March 14 coalition has collapsed, with the LF breaking with Hariri over his warming ties with Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia has also pulled its support from Hariri's FM, preferring to directly support the LF and defectors from the FM who have elected to take a harder (rhetorical) line against Hezbollah such as Ashraf Rifi and Fouad Al-Sinoura. Nevertheless, Hezbollah is by far the strongest

the Brotherhood in an advantageous position by which it could play both sides against each other. By making both the March 8 coalition and the March 14 forces reliant on the IAF and the IG respectively, the Brotherhood hoped to gain more supporters irrespective of their political persuasions, and ultimately empower itself.

This strategy employed by the Brotherhood is not particularly original. The same stratagem has long been utilized by the Al-Murr family. This is political intercession⁶¹⁴⁶¹⁵⁶¹⁶ and it has seen its practical application in the dealings of a Lebanese political dynasty. It works by having a political actor and a confederate take opposing sides in a conflict. Whoever wins, the secret allies will be on the victorious side. The actor will intercede on his confederate's behalf to his victorious allies. In the case of the Al-Murr family, Michel Al-Murr has long been an ally of the Syrian regime.⁶¹⁷ Helped in no small part with his links to the Syrian regime, Michel Al-Murr was a fixture in the Lebanese parliament. He also became the minister of interior and minister of defense on various occasions. He also became deputy prime minister, which owing to Lebanon's convoluted sectarian system, was the highest position a Greek Orthodox Christian like Michel Al-Murr could attain.

military actor in Lebanon, with its capabilities far superseding the Lebanese state. In addition, Hezbollah allies control key positions within the state, such as the presidency, the prime minister's office, and the speakership of the house. In addition, the Lebanese state is an utterly failed one. Blatant corruption is the norm. The Lebanese state represents absolutely no danger to Hezbollah.

⁶¹⁴ It has been informally referred to as the game of the interceder.

⁶¹⁵ لعبة الشفيع

⁶¹⁶ Maaïke van Berkel, "Political Intercession at the Court of Caliph Al-Muqtadir," *Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée*, no. 140 (December 30, 2016): vol 140, 181-190, <https://doi.org/10.4000/remmm.9692>.

⁶¹⁷ Saad Elias, «لبنان: الخلافات تضرب بيت المر مجدداً... وميشال يحاصر أباه غبريال بـ«القمصان السود»» [Lebanon: Differences Erupt Within the Murr House Once More... and Michel 'Besieges his Father Gabriel with Black Shirts,'] *القدس العربي* [*The Arab Quds*], April 9, 2019, <https://www.alquds.co.uk/لبنان-الخلافات-تضرب-بيت-المر-مجدداً-و/>.

Gabriel Al-Murr, Michel Al-Murr's son, stood at the other end of the political spectrum. Gabriel Al-Murr is a key member of all political groupings opposed to the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon. His media empire made his influence all the more palpable. Nevertheless, Gabriel Al-Murr has been spared from the full wrath of the Assad regime. While other opponents of the Assad regime were imprisoned or tortured to death, the Assad regime took a comparatively light touch with Gabriel Al-Murr. Gabriel Al-Murr was ousted from parliament and his television station was shut down, but Gabriel Al-Murr was not physically harmed in any way. His other financial interests were similarly not affected. The reason why is that his father, Michel Al-Murr interceded on his son's behalf. The mirror image of this strategy was played out when the Syrian regime withdrew in 2005. Michel Al-Murr was not harmed in the slightest, partially owing to his son's intercession on his behalf. Despite the numerous and rapidly occurring changes in the Lebanese political landscape, the Al-Murr family has remained well-connected and powerful. All that has in turn ensured that the Al-Murr family remains wealthy, politically relevant, and popular in its fiefdom, the Metn district. This same strategy, applied by a Christian Lebanese family, dictates the political strategy of the KIU and the IIP. Horowitz defined ethnicity as a belief in collective belonging, predicated on various identity markers. **The game of the interceder is a mechanism by which identity markers are changed in tandem with a change of ethnicity. This change in these identity markers takes place for the Murr family as well as the Brotherhood when there is a shift in power relations.**

The Al-Murr political dynasty is by no means a religious paragon in the eyes of the Brotherhood. However, its political dealings would greatly influence the political strategy of the Brotherhood in Iraq. This pattern would be repeated in Algeria and Morocco, as the Brotherhood's local franchises take opposed views regarding the Sahrawi independence

movement. The Algerian branch of the Brotherhood, the Movement of the Society of Peace (MSP),⁶¹⁸⁶¹⁹ wholeheartedly supports the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic led by the one-party rule of the Polisario Front. This support is reflective of the foreign policy of the military junta in Algeria. Algeria is the Polisario Front's strongest and most persistent advocate at the international level. In exchange for allowing the MSP a legal presence, the MSP supports the Algerian regime regarding its key policy goals. The Brotherhood, via the MSP, can recruit members, spread its message, and obtain limited political concessions. In return, it supports the foreign policy of Algeria. The mirror image of that strategy is the Moroccan branch of the Brotherhood. The Moroccan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD),⁶²⁰⁶²¹ an ostensibly completely separate entity from the MSP. As part of its efforts to gain the Moroccan monarchy's approval, the PJD wholeheartedly supports Moroccan claims over the Sahara.⁶²² Thus, when taking the global view, the Brotherhood is for and against Sahrawi independence under Moroccan sovereignty. By playing the game of the interceder, the Brotherhood can play both sides of the Sahara dispute against each other. In the event one of these sides can fully dominate the other, the Brotherhood will still come out on top. This is because the Brotherhood faction that has sided with the

⁶¹⁸ حركة مجتمع السلم

⁶¹⁹ Al Jazeera Network, "حركة مجتمع السلم" [The Peace Society Movement], Al Jazeera, June 6, 2016,

<https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/movementsandparties/2016/6/16/%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%83%d8%a9-%d9%85%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%85>.

⁶²⁰ حزب العدالة والتنمية

⁶²¹ Haoues Seniguer, "Genèse et transformations de l'islamisme marocain à travers les noms. Le cas du Parti de la justice et du développement," *Mots. Les langages du politique*, no. 103 (December 16, 2013): 111–20, 111.

⁶²² Anadolu Agency, "العدالة والتنمية المغربي يوجه انتقادات لحركة مجتمع السلم الجزائرية," [The Moroccan Justice and Development Criticizes the Algerian Society of Peace], *القدس العربي* [The Arab Quds], March 5, 2021, <https://www.alquds.co.uk/العدالة-والتنمية-المغربي-يوجه-انتقاد/>.

dominant faction will intercede on behalf of the other Brotherhood faction. The Brotherhood would then apply Al-Murr's strategy in Lebanon following the country's polarization, leading the game of the interceder to come full circle.

When forming the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the United States treated the KIU as the third largest Kurdish party, after the KDP and the PUK. The Brotherhood was doubly represented in the IGC, whereby the KIU and the IIP were treated as completely separate entities. Both the IIP and the KIU are official members of the Brotherhood.⁶²³ So porous is the divide between the IIP and the KIU that Moshen Abdul Hameed would become the leader of the KIU, following his tenure as the leader of the IIP and its representative on the IGC,⁶²⁴ as previously mentioned. It appears that the Brotherhood believed that Abdul Hameed would be more popular among the KIU's partisans owing to his Kurdish ethnicity. A key goal of the IIP and KIU's political involvement is to please the United States by participating in all the political projects that the United States has devised. In addition, both the KIU and the IIP are in complete agreement concerning the political participation of Christians. Both the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) have allocated quota seats for minorities, filled by Christians.

3.7.4.2 The 2006 Parliamentary Elections

The 2006 parliamentary elections yielded very similar results for Iraq's Christian community/Chaldeans/Assyrians/Chaldo-Assyrians. A single Christian was elected to Iraq's

⁶²³ Adel Bakawan, "Le mythe de l'indépendance du Kurdistan irakien," *Confluences Méditerranée* 91, no. 4 (2014): 165–79, 175.

⁶²⁴ Talha Abdulrazaq, "Le Parti islamique irakien abandonne les sunnites," Middle East Eye édition française, September 23, 2015, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinion-fr/le-parti-islamique-irakien-abandonne-les-sunnites>.

275-member parliament. This is demonstrative of Christians' slow and limited integration into Iraq's new political system. Younam Kanna, of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, was once more the voice of all these ethnic and religious groups. However, Kanna was pleased with the changes engendered by the new political status quo, as they allowed for greater cultural recognition for the Christians and the Chaldo-Assyrians. According to Kanna:

“In general, we are very pleased for the first time in history to be recognized officially in this country. In the beginning, I was a member of the [Iraqi] Governing Council for the Christians and Chaldo-Assyrians. Later on, we were in the National Assembly as well. I mean, politically, there's a big change. We are free to have televisions, radios, and publications; we are free to educate our kids in our model-language schools. The constitution recognizes our language—Aramaic—as an official language in our region.”⁶²⁵

Beyond the controversies surrounding quotas and the political alignment of various political parties, the Brotherhood along with the Christian parties had joined and empowered a fundamentally broken political system. The sectarian quotas **solidified ethnic tensions**. This new political system is characterized by high levels of corruption, with no legal mechanism for addressing torts. Instead, the Iraqi judiciary is part of the patronage networks of Iraq's myriad sectarian militias. Labeling Iraq's political actors as being political parties is a misnomer because they are essentially the political front of armed groupings. Ever since the US occupation, the Iraqi government has consistently failed to provide the most basic services such as clean water, a stable supply of electricity, and security. Iraqis who desire these services can only acquire them by joining the militias that are represented in the government and its bureaucracy. This applies to the Dawa Party, Muqtada Al-Sader's variously-named factions, the KDP, and the PUK. The

⁶²⁵ Beehner, op.cit.,

ADM itself would eventually form its militia, the Nineveh Plains Protection Units (NPU),⁶²⁶ tacitly admitting their lack of confidence in the Iraqi state and its institutions. Owing to their poor relations with Saddam Hussein, a failed state suited both Iran and the United States.

This is further shown by the fact that all of the above-mentioned parties have striven in recent years to have healthy relations with both the United States and Iran. For example, the KDP prioritizes its ties with the United States. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIR)⁶²⁷ emphasizes its relationship with Iran. Nevertheless, both the KDP and the SCIR have refrained from completely severing their relationship with Iran and the United States respectively. The IGC has made the results of elections meaningless, as the same parties, listed above, have monopolized rule ever since the occupation through “consociational governments” or “governments of national unity.” Notwithstanding Kanna waxing poetic about the new Iraq, in 2006, “Roughly 100,000 Iraqi Christians since the US-led invasion of March 2003—have either fled the country or been displaced.”⁶²⁸ In the words of Benjamin Sleiman, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Baghdad: “We live in a climate of fear.”⁶²⁹

3.7.4.3 Quotas for Provincial Councils

To further bolster the political presence of Christians in Iraq, the Iraqi parliament allocated a few seats to minorities on provincial councils on November 3, 2008. The underlying context was that the Iraqi parliament had attempted to pass a law in September governing the conduct of provincial elections, without giving any consideration to minorities. Christian

⁶²⁶ Gregory J. Kruczek, “Christian (Second-Order) Minorities and the Struggle for the Homeland: The Assyrian Democratic Movement in Iraq and the Nineveh Plains Protection Units,” *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 12, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 93–121, 93.

⁶²⁷ It has changed its name to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

politicians, including their only member of parliament, argued that they were being persecuted by the Shiite central Iraqi government. To that end, they demanded special protection from said government. To placate Christian concerns, the Iraqi parliament amended the proposed law. As part of these changes, Christians were allocated some of these quotas. However, these changes only served to alienate Christians from the central government. Furthermore, these quotas increased tensions between Christians and other minorities. In preparation for the upcoming regional elections, six quota seats on three provincial councils were reserved for Christians. Another three were for members of minority religions and ethnicities. They went to members of the Shabak ethnicity, as well as adherents of the Yazidi religion and the Sabian religion. The three provincial councils in question are those of Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra.⁶³⁰

These quotas frustrated Christians, who had demanded greater representation. Other proposals floated that were more amenable to their demands would have allocated either eight or twelve seats to minorities. The controversy surrounding the quotas shows the extent to which ethnic tensions have been reinforced by the sectarian quota system. It also illustrates the fear and loathing among legislators supposed to represent different ethnicities. This mistrust is more prevalent in ethnically heterogeneous areas. Ethnic conflicts are seen as a zero-sum game, even in a supposedly democratic framework. A Sunni Arab politician, Hassan Alaf, attempted to assuage the concerns of the minority politicians by suggesting that they run as candidates for the large political parties that essentially represent larger ethnicities. Per Alaf: “That would give them more seats in addition to their guaranteed quota if they had enough public

⁶³⁰ Tina Susman, “Iraqis Agree to Quotas on Minorities,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2008, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-nov-04-fg-iraq4-story.html>.

support.”⁶³¹ The allocation of quotas backfired, as it worsened ethnic tensions, particularly between Christians and Sunni Arabs. Younadam Kanna demanded that these proposals be vetoed. Kanna deemed the quotas as an “insult,”⁶³² Kanna went further and said these quotas showed the “fanaticism and racism of Arabs fearful of Kurdish influence. Arabs had feared that Christians would ally themselves with the Kurds and sabotaged this possibility by blocking the larger quotas.”⁶³³ Rhetoric like that served only to further poison communal relations, faintly echoing Yusuf Malek’s quixotic efforts at garnering support for his political projects while at the same time isolating his community through his stirring up racial animosities.

The Iraqi Brotherhood has approved the quotas on the regional council. This is shown by the vote of Mahmoud Dawud Al-Mashhadani.⁶³⁴ Al-Mashhadani was the Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives⁶³⁵ and a member of the Iraqi Accordance Front.⁶³⁶⁶³⁷ The Iraqi Accordance Front presented itself as a Sunni-Arab political coalition. The Iraqi Accordance Front was formed and led by the IIP.⁶³⁸⁶³⁹⁶⁴⁰ Further to that point, as Speaker of the Iraqi

⁶³¹ Ibid.

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ محمود داود المشهداني

⁶³⁵ Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani, “الدكتور محمود المشهداني (@MH_Al mashhadani) / Twitter,” Twitter, June 2021, https://twitter.com/MH_Al mashhadani.

⁶³⁶ I won’t use acronyms here because I don’t want to confuse the reader between the Iraqi Accordance Front and the previously mentioned Islamic Action Front

⁶³⁷ Al Jazeera Network, “انشقاق بجهة التوافق العراقية إثر إقالة رئيس البرلمان [Splits Appear Within the Iraqi Accordance Front After the Forced Resignation of the Speaker of the House],” Al Jazeera, December 25, 2008,

<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2008/12/25/%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b4%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%82-%d8%a8%d8%ac%d8%a8%d9%87%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%81%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%82%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a5%d8%ab%d8%b1>.

⁶³⁸ Susman, op. cit.,

Council of Representatives, along with the President and the Prime Minister, Al-Mashhadani had veto power over the proposed law. Nevertheless, Al-Mashhadani approved the project notwithstanding Kanna's concerns. From the perspective of the IIP, they had been more than accommodating to the Christian minority. They had allocated them quota seats that might have otherwise gone to the IIP. This speaks to the failure of the IIP and the ADM in managing Iraq's conflicts via sectarian quotas. The sectarian quotas, irrespective of the numerical changes Iraqi politicians will entertain, are part of the problem and not the solution.

At the root of this conflict is that, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Iraq's sectarian quotas are predicated upon Arend Lijphart's⁶⁴¹ theorizing on consociationalism. Ethnic tensions are the purview of elites, by design. Consequently, sectarian elites have little political incentives to reach out to members of different ethnicities. A case in point would be Kanna's public statements regarding Sunni Arabs. These statements betray Kanna's perception that his position is not dependent on the support of any of Iraq's myriad ethnic groups, save his own. Horowitz provides an alternative to that conundrum. Ethnic tensions can be mitigated through electoral changes. Electoral laws need to be reworked such that political parties cannot win elections without appealing to the various ethnic groups that make up a polity.

3.7.4.4 The 2021 Parliamentary Elections

The 2021 parliamentary elections saw more quotas allocated to Iraqi Christians, only for that to lead to more ethnic tensions. These tensions manifested between Christians and other

⁶³⁹ BBC News, "Guide to Iraqi Political Parties," BBC News, January 20, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4511450.stm.

⁶⁴⁰ The Iraqi Accordance Front would collapse a month after enacting these changes

⁶⁴¹ Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009), 274–94, <https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28345/chapter/215164772>, 66

ethnicities as well as within the Christian community. The Christian quota was raised to five seats, having been in 2006 a single seat. Abnaa Alnahrrain, an Assyrian nationalist party, boycotted the vote. While self-identifying as an Assyrian party, it saw the Christian quotas as its prerogative. Thus, the sectarian system has changed the identity of some Assyrians whereby they perceive their religious identity to supersede their ethnic belongings. Its boycott was an expression of its frustration with the way the Christian quotas were handled. However, Abnaa Alnahrrain was unable to persuade other Christian or Assyrian parties to join its boycott. A new wedge thus appeared between such parties, between those willing to participate in the elections and those who were not. A senior party official “said that the party knew the results will not be fair as long as voting mechanism [sic] is not fair for the Christian quota.”⁶⁴²

A key concern of that party was that while quota seats are supposed to represent Christians, those who can vote for the candidates competing for these seats do not have to be Christians. According to Abnaa Alnahrrain, their future participation in elections is predicated on: “the change of the current voting system, in which people from different regions of Iraq and even non-Christians [sic] can vote for the quota of the five Christian seats”.⁶⁴³ Consequently, the vote of the community is effectively suppressed. According to the same representative: “Fatah movement which is a Shia's party backed by Iran, made their supporters vote for their affiliated party (AL-Babilyoon)[sic] [The Babylonian Movement], led by Mr Ryan Alkeldani.” Furthermore, “the outcome of the Christians quota was known long long time [sic] before the elections, therefore, we decided not to participate and boycott this

⁶⁴² Ninos Emmanuel, “Why Did Assyrian Parties Lose the Christian Quota in the Iraqi Parliament Elections,” SBS Assyrian, October 16, 2021, <https://www.sbs.com.au/language/assyrian/en/podcast-episode/why-did-assyrian-parties-lose-the-christian-quota-in-the-iraqi-parliament-elections/6lx0scjai>.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

election.”⁶⁴⁴ The consequences of the Iraqi political system, quota’s notwithstanding, are that the majority imposes its decisions on minorities.

Christian parties are stuck within the Lijphart paradigm and are unable to conceive of any solutions beyond tinkering with the quotas. A case in point would be the statement by the leader of Ethad Bayt al-Nahirain party, another Assyrian nationalist party,⁶⁴⁵ in which he claimed:

“The rights of the minorities are not taken not into consideration at all; the majority decides on behalf of us. They impose the decisions on the minorities, so the quota seats have to be increased to prevent such violations.”⁶⁴⁶

This fixation on quotas to manage Iraq’s ethnic conflicts correlates with Younam Kanna’s comments cited previously in this chapter. Whether or not the Christian quota is raised, the shortcomings of the Lijphart model remain. The Christian vote has been in constant decline, correlating with the community’s emigration from Iraq. This is also indicative of Christians’ disaffection with their socioeconomic as well as their political status quo. There is a lack of faith in the ability of Christian parties to affect significant changes whether that concerns their constituents’ economic prospects or security. There is no correlation between quota seats on the one hand and a reduction of corruption on the other. Quotas do not ensure that Christian parliamentarians are seen as genuine representatives by their supposed constituencies.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁵ Beth Nahrain Patriotic Union, “اتحاد بيت نهرين الوطني (2) :: Beth Nahrain Patriotic Union | Facebook,” Facebook, September 27, 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/bithnahrin>.

⁶⁴⁶ Ammar Aziz, “Religious and Ethnic Minorities Quota Seats between Fragmentations and Rivalries of Dominant Political Parties,” Kirkuknow, May 9, 2020, <https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/62182>.

Chapter 4: The Ethnic Dimension: Determining How Iraq's Christians Self-Identify

Chapter Abstract: This chapter examines the ethnic identities of the “Christian minority” using Horowitz’s theorization of ethnicity. It is essentially the mirror image of the previous two chapters examining how the minority in question perceives itself. While IS and IIP’s ethnicities treat this minority exclusively as a religious actor, this chapter shows that the ethnicity “Christian minority” refers to numerous ethnic identities which partially overlap in their religious ethnic markers.

4.1 Introduction

This fourth chapter examines how Iraq’s Christian minority interacts with the ethnic identities of IS and the IIP, discussed in the previous chapters. Both groups claimed their legitimacy and ethnicity stem from their exclusive connection to a past golden age, despite their bowdlerization. IS and IIP aim to undermine the others’ claimed exclusive connection to the Salaf without undermining their own claims. Christians are seen by both groups as mere pawns in their ethnic battle over legitimacy. This chapter undertakes to show that the term “Iraqi Christian” or “Christian Minority” is an exonym that supersedes numerous identity markers. Both IS and the IIP have imposed that exclusively religious term, irrespective of the ethnic identities of the group in question. Hence, the term “Iraqi Christian” is employed in this thesis as a comparative construct. By examining the ethnic identities of the groups collectively referred to as “Iraqi Christians,” this chapter elucidates how that minority perceives and responds to the politics and ethnic projects of IS and the IIP. The theoretical groundings of this analysis are established through Donald Horowitz’s theory on ethnic groups in conflict. While paying attention to the historical context, this chapter studies the linguistic, religious, and political markers that form the basis of the different ethnic groups collectively referred to as Iraqi Christians by IS and the IIP. A key marker of these various ethnic groups is diaspora politics. The Iraqi Christian diaspora has a noticeable influence on the Christian community in Iraq. The diaspora has also been engaged in a highly organized international lobbying effort while playing a significant role in the sustainment of their

group's identity. This thesis argues that the Christians' political participation and internationalization of their cause, did not lead to any lasting success. This study concludes with a comparison of how the so-called Islamic State (IS) and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) interact with that minority. This thesis predicts that equal participation of Christians and other religious minorities in Iraq is impossible. These minorities will continue opting for emigration. This will lead to the annihilation of Iraq's smaller ethnicities and churches.

4.2 A theoretical framework to determine how Iraqis self-identify: Horowitz's theory on "Ethnic Groups in Conflict"

Donald Horowitz's theory on ethnic groups in conflict is predicated on the assumption that individuals need to belong to groups. This is because groups enable the cooperation that individuals require. Groups allow individuals to develop social links and live in communities. This sociality that groups provide is not wholly exclusive. When groups are constituted, members of these groups perceive boundaries that separate them from other groups. The desire to form groups and differentiate them from others is extremely powerful and can be exploited with ease. The markers that constitute group identities can be widely varied. It is not necessary for groups to be constituted on shared biological markers any more than it is for them to be built based on a shared history. **Ethnicity is defined by Horowitz as a belief in collective belonging**⁶⁴⁷ **"which could be based on common descent, language, history, culture, race, or religion (or some combination of these)."**⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁷ Horowitz, op. cit., 18.

⁶⁴⁸ Varshney, op. cit., 278.

4.3 Social Identities

Cleavages between groups generate comparisons. Members of a group tend to deem themselves superior to outsiders. The same applies to the products generated by these groups, vis à vis their external competitors. This belief persists even in the absence of any evidence of intergroup competition. This remains the case even when positive outcomes are possible for both groups should they choose to cooperate. Members within a group overstate the resemblances among themselves, while they exaggerate the differences with members of other groups. Horowitz terms this concept as assimilation and contrast effects. Individuals deem themselves as being of greater value owing to their belonging to a group. Furthermore, members of a group obtain satisfaction from the group's success. This satisfaction takes place, even when the contribution of these individuals to that success is minimal, or even nonexistent.

Ethnic groups, like other groups, tend to manifest a desire to compare themselves with other ethnic groups. They also associate themselves with positive qualities and have an in-group bias. Exaggeration of differences between members of other groups also takes place. Also present is the potential for individuals to sacrifice themselves for collective interests. The difference, however, is that ethnic groups exhibit these attributes to a far greater degree when compared with other groups. They generate a greater degree of loyalty as opposed to other competing group categories. Conflicts between ethnic groups tend to be more severe. The most salient feature of ethnic groups is their strong belief in their in-group similarity. This belief in turn stems from socialization or a genetic basis, or both. Belonging to an ethnic group entails the perception of individuals that they possess attributes representative of the ethnicity that they embrace. It is this perception that leads individuals to submerge their own identities in the collective identity as well as make sacrifices for members of the same ethnicity.

In some extreme cases, individuals do not conceptualize a boundary between themselves and the ethnic group. Members of ethnic groups are attracted to others who share their beliefs. However, an attraction based on a *supposed commonality* in such a context often leads to an exaggerated belief in the similarity of members of the same ethnic group.⁶⁴⁹ This belief leads to group egocentrism, whereby individuals favor others whom they say are like them, owing to their belonging to the same ethnicity. Moreover, this belief in a commonality causes a greater degree of attraction. Egocentrism leads to ethnocentrism and an ethnic realization of sacrifice.

Horowitz's solution for managing ethnic tension in a democratic context is through electoral reform. He suggests writing electoral laws in a manner that makes it impossible for political parties to win elections without appealing to the various ethnic groups that make up a polity. Horowitz's theoretical interlocutor is Arend Lijphart's⁶⁵⁰ consociationalism. Lijphart stakes the claim that ethnic tensions are best managed by elites. Ethnic group elites are empowered to manage their ethnic communities' cultural and political affairs. By extension, compromises are only made at the elite level. Lijphart's approach has been utilized to manage ethnic conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq, the former since 1840 with the establishment of the Quamiaqtayn and the latter following the 2003 US invasion.⁶⁵¹ Horowitz's counterpoint to Lijphart's consociationalism is that it locks ethnic tensions in place. In addition, it's more likely to end in violence.

The prominence of ethnicity in conflicts is contextual. Ethnicity is particularly salient in divided societies. Many conflicts across different sectors become intertwined with ethnic

⁶⁴⁹ Horowitz, op. cit., 16.

⁶⁵⁰ Varshney, op. cit., 16.

⁶⁵¹ Horowitz, op. cit., 16.

tensions.⁶⁵² The saliency of ethnicity is also related to the international context. Ethnicity can be a more dormant factor when wartime alliances are established.⁶⁵³ Conversely, ethnicity becomes more relevant through wars or by their termination. Ethnicity's increased political saliency lies in the 18th-century concept of popular sovereignty. It became more prevalent with the outbreak of nationalistic wars in Europe in the 19th century and the German and Italian state-building projects. Following the conclusion of both the First and Second World Wars, ethnicity's influence on conflicts became more pronounced. This correlated with the extensive spreading of the doctrine of self-determination.⁶⁵⁴ After the collapse of large multiethnic empires following the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson's espousal of self-determination for Eastern Europe brought ethnicity to the foray. A similar process occurred after the end of the Second World War, and the end of colonial empires.

Internal factors play a role alongside external ones in making ethnicity more pertinent in conflicts. During colonial rule, resistance movements were not representative of all ethnic groups. In some cases, such as in Syria, ethnic groups that were not represented in the independence movements attempted to delay the termination of colonial rule. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions were for the most part suppressed until the end of colonial rule. As independence approaches, ethnicities are reorganized to produce larger "ethnic agglomerations." These "ethnic agglomerations" were designed to be better suited for conflicts encompassing the whole territory that was to be independent. This phenomenon is called "supertribalism."⁶⁵⁵ After independence was gained, these larger ethnic identities persisted, in symbiosis with the smaller and older ethnic

⁶⁵² David Carment, "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 2 (1993): 145.

⁶⁵³ Horowitz op. cit., 10.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid, 34.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid, 26.

identities.⁶⁵⁶ These larger ethnic identities can now be mobilized in conflicts, just like their smaller and older counterparts.

4.4 Iraq's Ethnic Cleavages

When applying Horowitz's theory on Iraq's ethnic fractures, what immediately stands out is their multiplicity and overlapping nature. Some of Iraq's ethnic groups are socially constructed while others have a biological basis. Common descent informs Iraq's tribal structures. Tribal affiliation segments various ethnic groups. Iraq's Arab, Kurdish, and Assyrian communities are not a monolithic ethnic bloc. Rather, ancestry determines tribal belonging. **Tribal identities can cut across religious affiliations. For example, the Shummar tribal confederation has Sunni and Shiite members.**⁶⁵⁷ **Around seventy-five percent of Iraq's population belongs to a tribe.**⁶⁵⁸ The existence of tribes contextualizes conflicts. Tribes can provide a unique forum by which individuals with religious differences to inter-family quarrels are enabled to discuss divisive issues because of a common identity. Conversely, criminal organizations such as protection rackets have been organized on a tribal basis. Per Horowitz, tribes form another marker by which individuals compare themselves. Members of Iraqi tribes may overstate differences between them and members of other tribes.

Regionalism and political affiliations shape the degree tribal identities have an influence. Tribes are more influential in the countryside, while their influence is minimal in the cities. Most of Iraq's population is urbanized. Nevertheless, Iraq's tribes are quite powerful. Iraqi tribes, especially the Arab tribes of southern Iraq, are heavily armed. The tribes' strategic location on

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Yitzhak Nakash, "The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shiism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26, no. 3 (1994): 445.

⁶⁵⁸ Haley Bobseine, "Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq," The Century Foundation, November 7, 2019, <https://tcf.org/content/report/tribal-justice-fragile-iraq/>.

the border with Iran and Syria⁶⁵⁹ allows them to control the smuggling routes. These tribes form a key element of Iran's strategy to undermine the international sanctions targeting it. Tribes have become a law unto themselves, imposing their idiosyncratic norms on women irrespective of the view of religious authorities and the international treaties that the Iraqi government has signed. Tribes have engaged in full-on warfare over control of the smuggling routes.

Concerning Kurdish tribes, political and regional differences also shape their pertinence. Western Kurdistan is more socially conservative, controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP is essentially a vehicle for the Barazani tribe. More specifically, the KDP founder Mullah Mustapha Barazani, and his family control the party. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controls the eastern part of the KRG and is the KDP's main Kurdish rival. The PUK owing to its modernist and socialist leanings pays even less attention to tribal matters. However, like the KDP, the PUK is a family-based patronage network. The Talabani family controls the PUK. The Talabani and the Barazni families essentially replicate the functions of Kurdish tribes.⁶⁶⁰

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is particularly prevalent in Yazidi areas. Owing to its Marxist ideology it is opposed to tribalism and has worked to undermine traditionally powerful Yazidi clans and religious figures.⁶⁶¹ Yazidis, unlike all other ethnic actors in Iraq, are

⁶⁵⁹ Jacques Charmelot, "Reportage: Le shérif d'al-Qaïm, l'homme de fer du « Far West » irakien," *L'Orient-Le Jour*, July 29, 2008, https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/595808/ReportageLe_sherif_d%2527al-Qaim%252C_1%2527homme_de_fer_du_%253C%253C%2BFar_West%2B%253E%253E_iraki_en.html.

⁶⁶⁰ Michael Eppel, "Kurdish Leadership in Post-Saddam Iraq: National Challenges and Changing Conditions," in *Iraq Between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present*, ed. Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2010), 79.

⁶⁶¹ Amberin Zaman, "Yazidi Militia Says Iraqi Army Attacks Linked to Turkey's Anti-PKK Campaign - Al-Monitor: Independent, Trusted Coverage of the Middle East," *Al-Monitor*:

segmented into castes. The political and religious leadership of the Yazidis is controlled by a few families belonging to the Pir Caste.⁶⁶² Most Yazidis belong to the Murid Caste, with caste mobility being non-existent. Inter-caste marriage has been strictly prohibited by both the Yazidi religion and its leadership.⁶⁶³ IS's attacks on the Yazidis in the service of its caliphate-building project have significantly altered Yazidi ethnic identities.⁶⁶⁴ The Peshmerga, which represented the armed forces of the KRG, failed to defend Yazidi areas from the IS's onslaught, having previously disarmed Yazidi villagers.⁶⁶⁵ This has poisoned Kurdish-Yazidi relations, with many Yazidis seeking a better arrangement with international benefactors such as the United States and Iran. In addition, it has reinforced the drive of Yazidis to carve out a distinct ethnic identity, and not to be subsumed in the larger Kurdish milieu. The prominence of various ethnic markers shifted following the change in power relations. Yazidis' Kurdish identity has declined at the expense of political and religious markers. The Yazidis aim to highlight their differences with Kurdish Muslims. This is contrasted with the KDP and the PUK's leadership who present themselves as secular actors to minimize their dispute with the Yazidis.

The internal dynamics of the Yazidi community have also changed. The traditional leadership, led by the Baba Sheikh for religious affairs and the Mir for political leadership, was also unable to offer security to their community. Conversely, the PKK was backed by the United

Independent, trusted coverage of the Middle East, May 4, 2022, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/yazidi-militia-says-iraqi-army-attacks-linked-turkeys-anti-pkk-campaign>.

⁶⁶² Dave Van Zoonen and Khogir Wirya, "The Yazidis: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict" (Erbil, Iraq: Middle East Research Institute, 2017), 8.

<https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Yazidis-Perceptions-of-Reconciliation-and-Conflict-Report.pdf>.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵ Zaman, op.cit.,

States, Russia, and Iran. The PKK's success against IS, as well as its international backing,⁶⁶⁶ has served to bolster its popularity among Yazidis. Disputed succession processes for the positions of Mir and the Baba Sheikh have further complicated Yazidis' internal ethnic relations. The PKK backing its candidates for the post of Mir⁶⁶⁷ and Baba Sheikh in opposition to the traditional leading families serves only to further destabilize Yazidi leadership. An added complication is the further entanglement of the above-mentioned Yazidi ethnic conflicts with the Turkish-Kurdish ethnic conflict. The PKK was backed by these countries, to contain Turkey and as a reprisal for its permissive attitude towards IS and the Nusrah Front. However, Yazidi areas have become a contested space, and at times a battlefield. Turkey has expanded its fight against its mortal enemy in areas where the group had taken root. The fact that the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States enabled Turkey to frame the conflict as being part of the Global War on Terror. This does not auger well for the prospects of a peaceful resolution of that conflict.⁶⁶⁸

Throughout the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the relevance and popularity of tribes have been on the decline. The greater the ability of the KRG to provide services to its population the greater the extent the popularity of tribes wanes. The relevancy of tribes is also generational. The younger generation tends to be more loyal to the KRG as opposed to their older, tribally oriented counterparts. Education plays a key role in the relevance of tribes in the KRG. University-educated Iraqis in KRG have been socialized with Kurdish nationalism and are

⁶⁶⁶ International Crisis Group, "Turkey's PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer," International Crisis Group, July 18, 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer>.

⁶⁶⁷ Dana Taib Menmy, "Yazidi Leader Baba Sheikh Leaves Legacy as Champion of Women Seized by Islamic State," Middle East Eye, October 5, 2020, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/baba-sheikh-yazidi-spiritual-leader-dies>.

⁶⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, "Iraq: Stabilising the Contested District of Sinjar" (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, May 31, 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/235-iraq-stabilising-contested-district-sinjar>, 9.

consequently to act in such a manner.⁶⁶⁹ The prevalent desire to work in the public sector that characterizes the Iraqi population in general also has an influence. The ability of the KRG to provide protection and economic opportunities correlates with the KRG's ascendancy over tribes as a political unit. However, this process has been undermined by nepotistic hiring practices. The KRG's political elite has resorted to the mass employment of its erstwhile electorate in the public sector as a rapid means to obtain the public's consent. This pattern is bipartisan, with the KDP and the PUK both engaging in this hiring process in a sustained manner. This is by no means sustainable and the KRG has experienced an economic crunch partially owing to corruption and an inefficient public sector. It in turn suffocated the potential of the private sector to develop further hindering the KRG's ability to employ its population.

When Iraq was a powerful totalitarian state during the beginning of Saddam Hussein's regime in 1979, the power of tribes was greatly circumscribed. The exception was Saddam Hussein's tribe, the Albu Nasir.⁶⁷⁰ Saddam Hussein placed members of his family and extended relations in key positions. Consequently, Albu Nasir was by far the most powerful tribe in Iraq, irrespective of its actual popularity among the Iraqi population. However, after the First Gulf War's conclusion and imposition of international sanctions the power of tribes vis à vis the Baa'thist regime changed in the former's favor. Saddam Hussein relied on these tribes' smuggling networks to circumvent sanctions. *Modern Iraq is a failed state*, with the Iraqi government, again and again, proving its inability to provide security and basic services. Non-state actors have far more sway than the central government, with the fragmentation of the state becoming a self-reinforcing mechanism. Tribes have been utilized by Shiite militias as a

⁶⁶⁹ Aziz, op. cit., 117.

⁶⁷⁰ Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Saddam System," Iraq Memo (The Brookings Institution, July 8, 2003), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-iraqi-tribes-and-the-post-saddam-system/>.

reservoir of manpower, as previously mentioned.⁶⁷¹ Religious affiliation represents another major marker of identity. Language greatly affects ethnic affiliation. This in turn intertwines with tribal affiliation. However, this is not an ironclad rule. Self-identification plays a significant role.

4.5 Ethnic cleavages among Iraqi Christians

Iraqi Christians' ethnic identity is formed within this broader context. The term "Iraqi Christians" is a controversial one as it highlights their religious identity at the expense of their ethnic markers.⁶⁷² Some members of that supposed community would go so far as to argue that the term "Iraqi Christians" is an exonym. The Armenian community has its heritage, language, and churches. Others prefer Assyrians or Assyrians- Chaldeans or Syriacs. The fact is that there is no one overarching identity. The terms suggested are by no means interchangeable nor are they universally accepted. Chaldeans represent the largest Christian denomination. Chaldean leadership has long proven its reluctance to associate itself with the Nestorians on religious grounds. It is unwilling to minimize its religious particularities for the sake of ethnic solidarity. The term Syriacs is also problematic to some, as not all Iraqi Christians are native Syriac speakers.

To square this circle, this thesis refers to groups and individuals based on how they self-identify. **Assyrian in this paper will be used to refer to those who self-identify as such.** This includes members of the Assyrian Church of the East and its recent breakaway faction, the Ancient Church of the East. Assyrian will also be used to refer to those who believe that their

⁶⁷¹ Tamer Badawi, "The Growing Tribal Role in Iraq's Post-Election Shia Politics," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 17, 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87147>.

⁶⁷² Maxim Edwards, "Ethnic Dimension of Iraqi Assyrians Often Ignored - Al-Monitor: Independent, Trusted Coverage of the Middle East," Al-Monitor: Independent, trusted coverage of the Middle East, October 10, 2014, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/10/iraq-assyrians-ethnic-rights-ignored.html>.

ethnic identity takes precedence over their religious beliefs. A member of the Chaldean Church who considers himself to be an Assyrian due to his ethnic background will be referred to as such. Conversely, an ethnic Assyrian who is a member of the Chaldean Church and considers himself to be a Chaldean will be considered in this study to be a Chaldean. This thesis will not seek to impose ethnic identities on people. Self-identification in that regard is the most objective standard that can be used.

The term Assyrian in its classical meaning refers to the land in northern Mesopotamia which became the birthplace of one of the most powerful empires in the ancient world: The Assyrian Empire. It was the first military empire in history, with a professional standing army.⁶⁷³⁶⁷⁴ The Assyrian Empire came to an end in 612 BCE after its conquest by the Chaldeans. Chaldea refers to the land which lies to the south of modern-day Iraq.⁶⁷⁵ In the 9th century BCE,⁶⁷⁶ it was the homeland of a powerful state, the Chaldean Kingdom. The sworn enemy of the Chaldean Kingdom was the Assyrian Empire, the latter being able to conquer the former on occasion. The Chaldean Empire's existence would come to an end at the hands of the Achaemenid Empire. The Assyrians had their Semitic language. However, the lingua franca in the region was Syriac. The modern adoption of the Chaldean and Assyrian identities is reflective of individuals' desire to showcase their aboriginal status, which is fundamental to their identity. The construction of groups predicated on ancient ties with the land enables individuals to develop social links with one another and live in communities of fellow native inhabitants.

⁶⁷³ Ronald Sempill Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrian Minority in Iraq* (New York, the United States of America: Routledge, 1935), 15.

⁶⁷⁴ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Assyria," Britannica, May 1, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Assyria>.

⁶⁷⁵ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Chaldea," Britannica, August 29, 2013, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Chaldea>.

⁶⁷⁶ Before the Common Era

4.5.1 Linguistic divides

Language is another key component of group identity. The language choices of groups are often intentional and serve to show their connections with early Christianity as well as their historical presence in this region. Language use is a cleavage by which ethnic groups draw a contrast between themselves and others. Chaldean Christians tend to be urbanized, have merged more with the dominant culture, and as a consequence are for the most part native Arabic speakers.⁶⁷⁷ Syriac is, for the most part, only spoken in liturgical contexts.⁶⁷⁸ Assyrians in contrast are rural, live in mountainous regions, and are native Syriac speakers.⁶⁷⁹ In addition to being a means to differentiate between Chaldeans and Assyrians, it is also a way of internally segmenting the groups. Different individuals express their attachment to Syriac in different ways. Some, especially the clergymen, continue to speak classical Syriac, closely resembling the language spoken two millennia ago. Other⁶⁸⁰ localities have chosen Sureth. Sureth is a modern construct based on simplified classical Syriac while incorporating influences from other languages,⁶⁸¹ making it a pidgin. It is extremely important to note that Syriac is not seen in Iraq as an exclusively Christian issue. On one hand, Chaldeans and Armenians as previously mentioned do not use Syriac as their native language. On the other hand, there exists in Iraq a non-Christian religious community whose primary language is based on Syriac. The Mandaeans' religious texts are in Mandaic. In a similar vein, the first language of that religion's adherents is Mandaic. Mandaic is also based on classical Syriac, which has taken another direction over the

⁶⁷⁷ Sargon Donabed, *Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in the Twentieth Century*, 1st edition (Edinburgh, the United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 40.

⁶⁷⁸ Alda Benjamen, *Assyrians in Modern Iraq: Negotiating Political and Cultural Space* (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 4.

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 6.

⁶⁸⁰ Tijmen C. Baarda, *Arabic and the Syriac Christians in Iraq: Three Levels of Loyalty to the Arabist Project (1920–1950)*, vol. 5, *Christians and Jews in Muslim Societies* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2020), 143.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*, 163-164.

years.⁶⁸² Mandaic is a means by which the Mandeans maintain their identity and distinguish themselves from other language speakers, even those who speak other variations of Syriac.

4.5.2 Religious Divides

Assyrians used Christianity to construct their ethnicities. Centuries after the collapse of the Assyrian Empire, the establishment of separate churches in Assyria shows that Assyrians continued to view themselves as a separate ethnicity.⁶⁸³ Assyrians formed their churches, to ensure their independence from the Catholic Church. The overall aim of the Assyrians was to preserve their unique ethnic identity, and not be dissolved into the wider Christian community. When Islam became the majority religion in Iraq, Assyrians remained Christians to maintain their unique identity.⁶⁸⁴ Originally, the Assyrians belonged to two churches: the Assyrian Church of the East and the Syriac Orthodox Church. The Assyrian Church of the East is also referred to as the Nestorian Church, in reference to the Archbishop of Constantinople who rejected the Council of Chalcedon. The Syriac Orthodox Church is otherwise known as the Jacobite Church. These churches split apart in the 5th century CE, officially over different textual interpretations. These splits were also the construction of new ethnicities in tandem with a changed political context. Assyrians were split between Eastern Roman and Persian rule. Both empires demanded the unwavering loyalty of their subjects. To avoid any aspersions cast regarding their fidelity, Assyrian Churches constructed new ethnicities to separate themselves from their Assyrian counterparts living under the hostile power. Church affiliation would become a key marker in the

⁶⁸² Hezy Mutzafi, *Comparative Lexical Studies in Neo-Mandaic*, 1st ed. (Leiden, the Netherlands: BRILL, 2014), 38.

⁶⁸³ Afram Yakoub, *The Path to Assyria: A Call for National Renewal*, trans. Lennart Simonsson (Södertälje, Sweden: Tigris Press, 2021), 10

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 17.

Assyrians' identity, to the point where it superseded for some individuals their other identity markers.⁶⁸⁵

Under the Ottoman Empire's Millet system, religious leaders were responsible for the conduct of their community as well as their relationship with the central authorities. When some members of the Assyrian Church of the East converted to Catholicism,⁶⁸⁶⁶⁸⁷ their members informed the Ottoman governor that they were now a new Millet which had a new religious leader. In the 16th century, a rival candidate to the Patriarchate of the Assyrian Church of the East appealed to the pope. A century of negotiations over papal power continued until in 1680 Pope Innocent XI appointed Patriarch Yusuf.⁶⁸⁸ One hundred years later, Elia who was a rival of Shimun, the patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, officially split from the church and became a Catholic. Elia's followers were henceforth known as Chaldeans.⁶⁸⁹ Group boundaries in the Assyrian and Chaldean contexts are by no means fixed, as the primordialists would suppose. Rather, ethnic groups have reworked their identities while comparing themselves to other ethnic groups. Shifting religious affiliations and disputes over the churches' leadership were the impetus for the construction of new ethnic groups. These ethnic tensions did not happen in a vacuum. Instead, the relationship with the Sublime Porte and the Pope was another space that was contested by competing ethnic groups.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid, 10.

⁶⁸⁶ Donabed, op. cit., 54.

⁶⁸⁷ Suheil Kasha, الهجرة و التجذر بين المشرقين [Oriental Christians between Becoming Rooted and Immigration] (Beirut, Lebanon: دار أبعاد [Distances Press], 2012), 41-42.

⁶⁸⁸ Stafford, op. cit., 22.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid, 22.

A parallel process took place with the Syriac Orthodox Church when some of its members converted to Catholicism and founded the Syriac Catholic Church⁶⁹⁰ with its own religious leadership. The changes in the churches' group formation represented how their identities were influenced by external factors. The Millet system informed the relationship between the Ottoman Sultan and some of the religious leaders of the non-Muslim communities. Assyrians and Chaldeans were engaged in such a relationship. The religious leaders were responsible for collecting *jizya* for the Ottoman Sultan and assuring their loyalty toward him. In exchange, the community would enjoy the Sultan's protection and some control over their religious affairs. The patriarchs would attempt to use this system to maintain their institutions.⁶⁹¹

Traditional identity markers of the Assyrians served as the conflict catalyst which in turn led to two large-scale massacres, Several Assyrian activists have deemed these massacres to be acts of genocide and have campaigned for their recognition as such. The group identity markers of the Assyrians have also dramatically changed, in response to the genocides that they faced. The different experiences with the shared past are markers of Assyrian unity and a point of difference with other ethnic groups. Tribalism is another identity marker that segments the Assyrian community. **Assyrians, not Chaldeans are segmented into different tribes. The tribes are grouped into the Tiyari, Jilu, Tokhuma, and Baz.** Tribes in that context are essentially extended families.⁶⁹² Every tribe is led by a Malik. The Assyrian community is traditionally led by the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East. The patriarch's leadership is

⁶⁹⁰ Kasha, op.cit, 42.

⁶⁹¹ It would make for a very interesting comparative study regarding the survival of religious institutions in the millet system versus those in Western liberal democracies. The very rapid increase of atheism nowadays in liberal democracies provides a salient data point in that regard. Perhaps in another paper.

⁶⁹² Stafford, op.cit, 13.

both a function of the community's religiosity as well as external influences.⁶⁹³ The Ottoman Millet⁶⁹⁴ system conceptualized the Assyrians as being on such Millet, whose leader is the patriarch. The position of the patriarch has been hereditary since 1450.⁶⁹⁵ It is passed on from uncle to nephew. It is on this issue the Ancient Church of the East would split from the Assyrian Church of the East in 1964. It is extremely important to note that while the Assyrians/Chaldeans/Syriacs had different religious identity markers, they were by no means a monolithic religious bloc. While the religious leaders held significant sway over their respective communities, there was an interaction between the communities, irrespective of their sectarian differences.⁶⁹⁶ However, intermarriage between Assyrians and other communities was extremely limited.⁶⁹⁷

The *Sayfo*⁶⁹⁸ caused a traumatic rupture in how the Assyrian ethnicity was constructed. The genocide also entailed significant repercussions for Assyrians' relations with other ethnic groups. The rise of ethnic nationalism in the Ottoman Empire correlated with the weakening of the empire throughout the 19th century. Ethnic nationalism began changing how different ethnic communities in the Ottoman Empire, including the Assyrians, perceived themselves. Particularly affected were the Assyrians living in modern-day Syria, Turkey, and Iraq, as they were all under the direct control of the Ottomans. The mobilization of ethnicities was a means to challenge the power of the Ottoman sultan. This new dynamic affected both, those who were members of Millets and those who were not. The Assyrian ethnicity would be eventually mobilized in such a manner in tandem with the continued weakening of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the

⁶⁹³ Ibid, 14.

⁶⁹⁴ The word derives its origins from the Arabic word *مِلَّة* (Millah) which means nation

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid, 21.

⁶⁹⁶ Benjamin, op.cit., 6.

⁶⁹⁷ Stafford, op.cit., 19.

⁶⁹⁸ The First Assyrian Genocide

20th century. Ever since the end of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1517, the Ottoman Empire presented itself as being its legitimate successor, as a caliphate. The Ottoman Sultan was the caliph, the leader of the believers. It is from this context the Millet system was established. Ethnic nationalism instead promised the construction of new groups and changing the political power of other pre-existing groups. A shift in the construction of ethnicities in the Ottoman Empire took place in 1869, under Sultan Abdul-Aziz. The Ottoman Empire issued the Law on Nationalities which defined *Ottoman citizenship* without any references to religion.⁶⁹⁹ This law served to encourage individuals who sought to transform ethnic markers into nation-states.

A key actor in that regard is Boutros Al-Boustani. Al-Boustani promoted secular nationalism, based on the French notion of the *patrie*.⁷⁰⁰ Al-Boustani's secular nationalism was an attempt to empower the Maronite community in the Ottoman Empire. *Secular nationalism* was also an attempt to reduce religious tensions with the Druze, especially those residing in symbiosis with the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon and Damascus. The Druze were a more powerful actor than the Maronites. The Druze had played on different identity markers to maintain their internal cohesion.⁷⁰¹⁷⁰² The Druze religion is syncretic. A key marker of its

⁶⁹⁹ Wajih Kawtharani, "The Ottoman Tanzimat and the Constitution," *AlMuntaqa* 1, no. 1 (2018): 51–65, 55.

⁷⁰⁰ Mohammad Salih Mustafa, *Nationalism and Islamism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: The Emergence of the Kurdistan Islamic Union*, 1st edition (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 11.

⁷⁰¹ دروز

⁷⁰² The name Druze comes from the name Muhammad Al-Darazi. The origins of this sect can be traced to Al-Hakim Bi 'Amr Al-Allah. Al-Hakim Bi 'Amr Al-Allah presented himself as the leader of the Fatimid Caliphate i.e. a caliph who reigned from 996 to 1021 CE. The Fatimids were the sworn enemies of the Abbasids, the former being of the Ismaili Shiite faith while the latter were Sunnis. Based in Egypt, Al-Hakim Bi 'Amr Al-Allah is reported to have dispatched Muhammad Al-Darazi to drum up support for him in Palestine, Mount Lebanon, and what is today the south of modern Syria. It is from this context that the Druze religion and its secretive nature arose. The Druze consider Al-Hakim Bi 'Amr Al-Allah to be a manifestation of God and Muhammad Al-Darazi to be his prophet. The Druze also do not believe in judgement day, but

adherents, paradoxically, is the masking of their religious beliefs. Its adherents pass themselves as being part of the larger and stronger pre-existing community. The Druze community throughout the existence of the Ottoman Empire presented itself as Sunni Muslim, to curry its favor. The Druze appealed to their heterodox beliefs and hostility to the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate to entice the British Empire to act as their benefactor after the 1860 Civil War. During the 1840 and 1860 conflicts between the Druze and Maronites, the Druze feudal families appealed to their common faith to ensure that the Druze peasantry remained mobilized with them against the Maronites, irrespective of their social class. In contrast, the Maronites were internally segmented by different identity factors. That cost them militarily at the hands of the Druze twice, in 1840 and 1860.

Maronite intellectuals promoted secular ethnic nationalism, such as pan-Arab nationalism, as a means to eradicate the internal cleavages within the Maronite community. The 1840 and 1860 civil wars were not merely wars of religion between the Maronites and the Druze. Class divisions were profound in the Maronite community, which led to inter-Maronite conflicts between the Maronite peasantry and their feudal overlords.⁷⁰³⁷⁰⁴ As part of that conflict, a semi-literate peasant named Tanyous Shaheen⁷⁰⁵ overthrew the Khazin⁷⁰⁶ gentry. In their stead,

instead believe in reincarnation. The Druze do not believe in the Quran. The Druze's sacred scripture is called Kitab Al Hikmah or the Book of Wisdom. The Druze have kept the nature of their faith a secret over the centuries as to not attract the wrath of the Abbasid and Ottoman Caliphates.

⁷⁰³ Mustafa, *op. cit.*, 11.

⁷⁰⁴ A comparative study on the management of conflict through the use of occultation promises to be interesting. Comparing and contrasting the actions of adherents of secret religions such as the Druze, Yazidis, and Yarsani in a particular war is a study waiting to be done. Perhaps in another paper.

⁷⁰⁵ On one hand, the Maronite Shaheen family has no political power in modern-day Lebanon.

⁷⁰⁶ On the other hand, the Khazin family remains today this day one of the Maronite community's more powerful families. The political dynasty's scion is Farid Haykal Al-Khazin

Shaheen briefly established a peasant republic in 1859, in Kesrwan which lies in modern-day Lebanon. The peasant republic was short-lived, as it had to contend with armed resistance from the Druze. Religious tensions between the Druze and the Maronites precluded any attempts from the peasant republic to reach out to the Druze peasantry. Instead, Shaheen would dispatch fighters to aid his fellow Maronites against the Druze. However, the final blow to the peasant republic would not be at the hands of the Druze. It was crushed at the hands of a Christian warlord, Yusuf (Bek) Karam.⁷⁰⁷⁷⁰⁸⁷⁰⁹

Secular nationalism served to put an end to the minority status of the Maronites, an approach that will be copied by the Assyrians joining the Iraqi Communist Party. Boutros Al-Boustani,⁷¹⁰ known as the father of Syrian nationalism, and the leading advocate of secular nationalism belonged to the Maronite Catholic Christian community. Al-Boustani's advocacy for secular nationalism took place immediately following the 1860 Civil War and in reaction to it. The Maronites were the largest Christian denomination in modern-day Lebanon. However, in the context of the Ottoman Empire, the largest Christian Millet was the Coptic Millet. Thus, the Maronite community was a double minority. The religious conflict between the Maronites and the Druze in 1840 and 1860 contextualizes the Maronites' increased mobilization of ethnic

who is currently a member of the Lebanese parliament and was previously a government minister. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

⁷⁰⁷ His real name is Yusuf Karam. Bek is his title.

⁷⁰⁸ Muhammad Shihabi, “يوسف بك كرم غادر لبنان حفاظاً على أهله” [On This Day... Yusuf Bek Karam Left Lebanon to Safeguard Its People],” *annahar.com*, January 31, 2022, <https://www.annahar.com/arabic/say7at/31122021105435408>.

⁷⁰⁹ Claire Grandchamps, “Quand Tanios Chahine Menait l’« armée Paysanne de Libération »,” *L’Orient-Le Jour*, March 12, 2020, <https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1208617/quand-tanios-chahine-menait-l-armee-paysanne-de-liberation-.html>.

⁷¹⁰ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 3 (1980): 287–304, 289.

markers, as opposed to religious.⁷¹¹ Secular Arab nationalism was a means by which commonalities were explored between the Druze and the Maronites. Both shared an Arab ethnicity and spoke the same language. In addition, the Druze and the Maronites had a shared hostility toward the Ottoman Empire. Maronite intellectuals sought to mobilize different identity markers to put an end to the Millet system governing the Maronite community. This secular nationalism, originating in Lebanon and Syria, would spread to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. It would eventually influence the Assyrians, as they too sought to undermine the Millet system. This ethnic identity is malleable, in tandem with internal changes and shifts in the international context. However, the identity through which IS and IIP perceive and categorize Assyrians is exclusively religious and fixed. It has little interest in such dynamics. By assembling these various ethnic groups under the collective religious identity marker, IS and IIP's polities experienced less buy-in from these ethnic groups.

4.5.2.1 The First Assyrian Genocide and How It Transformed the Assyrians' Ethnicity

The rise of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) occurred at the expense of Sultan Abdul Hameed II and the Millet system.⁷¹² On the one hand, Sultan Abdul Hameed II was willing to maintain the presence of the Millet system, which didn't prevent the outbreak of Assyrian tribal rebellions. On the other hand, the CUP aimed to modernize the Ottoman Empire along Western European lines. They initially courted the French and then the German Empire. The CUP's desires were predicated on the centralization of the state and the promotion of Turkish ethnic nationalism. The Assyrian uprising happened in the context of what is commonly

⁷¹¹ Ibid, 293.

⁷¹² Önen Nizam and Özer Özbozdogli, "The Internal Opposition, the 1911 Congress and the Program of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress," *Journal of Academic Value Studies* 3, no. 16 (2019): 237–56, 237.

known⁷¹³ as the Armenian genocide.⁷¹⁴ However, the Assyrian events are far less known in terms of popular consciousness. Nevertheless, Raphael Lemkin, the jurist who coined the term “genocide,” saw both the Armenian and Assyrian cases of being examples of it.⁷¹⁵ In addition, both took place simultaneously during the First World War. The British sought to mobilize the Assyrian tribes, noted for their martial spirit, against the Ottoman Empire. In doing so, the Allies would open another front against the Ottomans, who were part of the Central Powers. Highlighting the strategic importance of their position, the Assyrian leadership was courted by both the local Ottoman governor and the Russian Empire. The Russian Empire, which was part of the Allies along with the United Kingdom against the Ottomans, appealed to the Assyrians on religious grounds.⁷¹⁶ The Assyrian leadership consisted of tribal Maliks, under the overall direction of the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East.

The Ottomans decided to strike against the Assyrians preemptively.⁷¹⁷ Assyrian and Armenian units under Russian leadership were routed and their villages were destroyed.⁷¹⁸ Assyrians living in Hakkari, which lies in modern-day Turkey, were forced on a trek to Russian-controlled Iran. Making the Assyrians’ position more difficult was that the local Kurdish tribes had sided with the Ottoman Empire. After arriving in Urmia, Iran, the leader of the Assyrians, and the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, Shimun XIX Benyamin was slain by a Kurdish chieftain, Agha Simko Ismail Shikak. An Ottoman advance supported by the Kurds

⁷¹³ Turkey refuses to characterize it as such

⁷¹⁴ Taner Akçam, “The Ottoman Documents and the Genocidal Policies of the Committee for Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) toward the Armenians in 1915,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no. 2 (2006): 127–48, 133.

⁷¹⁵ Raphael Lemkin, *Lemkin on Genocide* (Plymouth, the United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2012) 83.

⁷¹⁶ Stafford, *op.cit.*, 28.

⁷¹⁷ Donabed, *op. cit.*, 61.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid*, 63.

drove 30,000 Assyrians from Urmia to Baqubah, which became part of Iraq. The Assyrians of Urmia refer to their forced displacement as the “raqa raqa,” or the “Flight.”⁷¹⁹ Following the war’s conclusion, many Assyrians who originally lived in Hakkari and Urmia found themselves refugees in a brand-new country. The history of Assyrians in modern Iraq starts with their extremely hostile relations with the Kurds, which constituted the country’s second-largest ethnic group.⁷²⁰ Also undermined were the Assyrians’ relations with the Chaldeans. This is because the Chaldeans elected to remain neutral throughout the First World War, the “raqa raqa,” and the Assyrians’ conflicts with the Ottomans.⁷²¹

4.5.2.2 One Genocide Leading to Another

The constitution of the Assyrian identity was influenced by the rise of new international norms and institutions following the end of the First World War. The inability of Assyrians to mobilize international support for their ethnic nationalism as well as their religious leadership served to isolate them vis à vis the Iraqi government. The Assyrian community was deeply affected by US President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points. Of particular concern to them were those about self-determination and autonomy.⁷²² A cross-denominational Assyrian delegation was constituted to attend the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.⁷²³ That delegation also included members of the diaspora. A protestant group called the Assyrian Association of America was able to persuade Assyrians to include its members in the delegation,⁷²⁴ showcasing the sustained connections between the diaspora and the Assyrians who remained in their home territory. It also

⁷¹⁹ Ibid, 64.

⁷²⁰ Ibid, 58.

⁷²¹ Ibid, 64.

⁷²² Ibid, 68.

⁷²³ Ibid.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

speaks to the influence of the former over the latter, owing to their elevated socioeconomic status.

Assyrians attempted to reconstitute themselves in a manner that reduced their sectarian tensions and constituted themselves in a group that could attain self-determination per the definition of the fourteen points. However, the Patriarch retained his predominant role in Assyrian political life. The Assyrian delegates to the conference insisted that Assyrians would not accept any Turkish rule, because of their victimization by the Ottoman Empire and the ethno-nationalist agenda of Turkey's new leader Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk." Rather, the demand was for an Assyrian homeland.⁷²⁵ Instrumental in getting the delegation to adopt such a position was the Nestorian Bishop, Severius Afram Barsoum. In a letter to the conference, Bishop Barsoum stated:

"Nous avons l'honneur d'exposer à la Conférence de la paix que S.B. notre Patriarche nous a chargé de venir lui porter l'écho des malheurs et des vœux de notre nation syrienne, ancienne descendante de la race assyrienne, qui réside en générale en Mésopotamie et en Arménie."⁷²⁶

However, the demands of the Assyrians were completely ignored by the conference.⁷²⁷ The British colonial desires for Iraq and its petroleum resources⁷²⁸ superseded anything the Assyrian delegation had to say. The relationship between the British and the Assyrians was circumscribed by the British's recruitment of the Assyrians into the Levies. The Levies were a pro-colonial militia that used to suppress anti-colonial rebellions by Kurdish and Arab tribes.

⁷²⁵ Ibid, 69.

⁷²⁶ Ibid, 70.

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

⁷²⁸ Ibid, 72.

4.5.2.3 The Second Genocide: The Simele Massacre and How It Reconstructed the Assyrian Group Identity

The conflict regarding the privileges of the Patriarch of the Church of the Near East, and the traditional leader of his Millet led to the breakout of the second anti-Assyrian genocide, the *Sayfo*, in 1933. The context was the termination of the British mandate over Iraq. Large oil deposits were found in Iraq, and the British were willing to grant Iraq its independence in exchange for concessions for the British in the oil sector. In 1931, the Permanent Mandate Commissions League of Nations admitted Iraq into the League of Nations as a sovereign member. The Permanent Mandate Commissions also recommended that the rights of minorities be guaranteed.⁷²⁹ This recommendation was not followed up with anything meaningful, neither on the part of the League of Nations nor on that of the British.

As a reaction, the Assyrians under the leadership of Shimun XXIII Eshai⁷³⁰ held a conference to present their grievances to the League of Nations. The Patriarch sought to conserve the privileges accorded to him during the Millet system, which essentially was a form of autonomy.⁷³¹ Specifically, he aimed to preserve his temporal authority over the Assyrians.⁷³² The temporal powers of the patriarch under the Millet system were as follows:

“(a) to exercise its religion and custom, and to administer its own laws of status and personnel. (b) to be a “millet,” that is a community over which its chief Bishop presided and which its chief Bishop represented in all communal relations with the Islamic sovereigns of the land.”⁷³³

⁷²⁹ Ibid, 94.

⁷³⁰ Due to theological disputes within the Assyrian Church of the East, he is sometimes referred to as Mar Shimun XXI Eshai

⁷³¹ Ibid, 93.

⁷³² Ibid, 95.

⁷³³ Stafford, op.cit., 101.

The goals of the Patriarchal family shifted between independence and autonomy.⁷³⁴ The Patriarch's aunt, Lady Surma was reported to have proclaimed: "We will be kings or we will be killed."⁷³⁵ Moreover, Assyrians deemed themselves to be culturally superior to the Arabs and resented being under their tutelage.⁷³⁶

The Patriarch's demands went directly against the desire of the central government to establish a modern state. Moreover, the central government feared that any concessions to the Assyrians would spark similar demands from Iraq's myriad ethnic and religious groups.⁷³⁷ From the perspective of the Iraqi government, many of the Assyrians who were agitating for increased self-rule were not even Iraqis. Rather, they were refugees from Turkey and Iran. This sentiment was not shared by the Assyrians themselves. Assyrian communities did in fact (and still do) exist in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. However, these communities have remained in contact with each other over the years. Historically, Assyrians have migrated to each other's communities. Thus, the refugees who streamed from Iran and Turkey have long-standing connections with their Iraqi kin. Consequently, the Iraqi government's perception that Assyrian refugees from Turkey and Iran were foreigners is not altogether accurate.⁷³⁸

The controversy over the Patriarch's temporal powers was augmented by British interference. The British made use of the Patriarch's influence to boost Assyrian recruitment in the levies. Despairing of their international neglect and British duplicity, the Patriarch wrote to the League of Nations asking for his community's resettlement outside Iraq. The international community saw Iraq and its minorities as the preserve of the British, and as such neglected to

⁷³⁴ Donabed, op. cit., 95.

⁷³⁵ Ibid

⁷³⁶ Stafford, op.cit., 112

⁷³⁷ Ibid, 118.

⁷³⁸ Benjamin, op.cit., 6.

intervene. The British only saw in the Assyrians a recruitment pool for its Levies.⁷³⁹ The British betrayed their promise to the Hakkari Assyrians of facilitating their return to Turkey.⁷⁴⁰ The failure of the Patriarch to adequately secure the status of his community led to the restructuring of the Assyrian identity. Subgroups, chafing under the leadership of the Patriarch, began asserting themselves. Some tribal Maliks, such as Malik Yosip Khoshaba of the Lower Tiyari tribe,⁷⁴¹ began to openly break with the Patriarch and sought to reconcile with the Iraqi government. These tribal actors agreed to be settled by the Iraqi government, irrespective of the Patriarch's wishes. In doing so, they established a direct relationship with the government and undermined the control of the patriarch over them.

A key trigger in the genocide was the imprisonment of the Patriarch. Acting on the advice of the British, the Iraqi government detained the Patriarch after inviting him to Baghdad for talks. This move alienated the Patriarch's followers, most notably Malik Loko of the Tkhuma tribe and Yacu Ismail, the son of Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiyari tribe.⁷⁴² Yacu Ismail and Malik Loko set about touring Assyrian regions to persuade them not to accept any form of cooperation with the Iraqi government. They directly challenged the identity the central government was attempting to construct by urging Assyrians to refuse disarmament, and not to accept Iraqi citizenship or any settlement proposed by the Iraqi government. From the perspective of Yacu Ismail and Malik Loko, they were particularly concerned with the increased standing Malik Yosip Khoshaba enjoyed. They feared that the Iraqi government would impose Malik Yosip Khoshaba as a leader over all Assyrian tribes, irrespective of Yacu Ismail and Malik

⁷³⁹ Donabed, *op. cit.*, 97.

⁷⁴⁰ Stafford, *op.cit.*, 112.

⁷⁴¹ Donabed, *op. cit.*, 101.

⁷⁴² Stafford, *op.cit.*, 132.

Loko's social stature.⁷⁴³ A new cleavage broke out within the Assyrian identity, with Assyrians being classified as either members of the pro-patriarch or the anti-patriarch faction.

The genocide was a pivotal event in constructing a new Iraqi identity. Finalizing their rejection of the new order, Yacu Ismail gathered his followers and crossed the frontier into French-controlled Syria. The French disarmed the Assyrians, then without notifying the Iraqis, rearmed them and sent them back across the borders. While it is not clear who fired the first shot, what is clear is that after some armed clashes, the Iraqi forces were routed. The Iraqi army set about disarming and massacring Assyrian villagers, irrespective of whether they belonged to the pro or anti-Patriarch faction. The British met these attacks with absolute indifference.⁷⁴⁴ The Iraqi government sought to make an example of the Hakkari tribesmen,⁷⁴⁵ making use of anti-Western and anti-separatism rhetoric.⁷⁴⁶ Sunni and Shiite Arab tribes joined in on the attack, desirous of expanding their wealth and influence. Local Kurds also sided with the Iraqi government, owing to their storied history with the Assyrians. In addition, Yazidis joined in on the killing and looting. The result was that the power of the Assyrian religious and tribal leadership was broken and internationally isolated.

A crucial consequence of the first and second genocide was the weakening of the Patriarch's political influence. His exile to Cyprus and later to the United States meant that there was a void in the Assyrian leadership. So profound was the isolation of the Patriarch from his erstwhile community that the seat of the Patriarchate of the Assyrian Church of the East remains in the United States to this very day. The Millet system and the Patriarch's traditional

⁷⁴³ Ibid, 102.

⁷⁴⁴ Donabed, op. cit., 108.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid, 117.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid, 118.

prerogatives were gone. The Patriarch himself would be assassinated by a member of his community over a theological question. Patriarch Shimun XXIII Eshai would be killed in 1975 over his belief that a clergyman could get married.⁷⁴⁷ This showcases the weakened position of the Patriarch and his isolation from his community. The Patriarch's views were increasingly dismissed, whether they concerned religion and/or politics. It was a far cry from the powers the Patriarch enjoyed as a head of a Millet.

4.6 Political Divides:

4.6.1 The Iraqi Communist Party

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) represents Assyrians' first sustained political engagement following the establishment of an (officially) independent Iraq in 1932. It reflects the transition from the leadership of tribal chiefs and the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the Near East. While the ICP officially stood against ethno-nationalism and sectarianism, it was able to attract a large following from among the Assyrian Nestorians. This is reflected by the senior leadership of the party⁷⁴⁸ as well as its mid-level cadres.⁷⁴⁹ The reasons why the ICP was able to enjoy significant support among the Assyrians are manifold: The two genocides suffered by the Assyrians had deeply shaken the community's faith in its traditional leadership. It had also escalated sectarian tensions, as the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church and the Chaldean Church did not support the Nestorian Patriarch's political ambitions. In addition, the Syriacs and Chaldeans feared the wrath that the Patriarch had incurred, and so reinforced the differences between them and the Assyrians. For example, Yousef VI Emmanuel II Thomas, the Patriarch of

⁷⁴⁷ Atour: The State of Assyria, "1975: From the Public Records of The Trial Proceedings of The Assassination of His Holiness Mar Eshai Shimun XXIII," July 17, 2000, <https://www.atour.com/history/1900/20000717a.html>.

⁷⁴⁸ Benjamin, op.cit., 30.

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid, 35.

the Chaldean Church hosted King Faisal I at a lavish reception in the Mar Oraha Monastery in 1931 while the killings were going on.⁷⁵⁰ A similar appeasement policy vis à vis the monarchy was followed by Syriac Catholic bishops. This in turn served to reinforce the Assyrian community's alienation.

The cleavages between the Assyrians and other Christian denominations persist to this day over this issue. A case in point is Father Suheil Kasha's, an academic and a bishop in the Syriac Catholic Church, portrayal of these historic events. According to Kasha, the Simele massacre, in reference to the 1931 killings, can be directly attributed to two factors: Firstly, the decision of some Assyrians and Christian Iraqis to join the British Levies. Secondly, the "unbalanced" behavior of the militiamen, which in turn sparked a popular backlash.⁷⁵¹⁷⁵² Kasha put the blame squarely on the Assyrians who decided to throw their lot with British colonists, in opposition to every other Iraqi. Moreover, Kasha argued that these killings of Assyrian civilians were not acts of genocide. Rather, they were the by-product of armed clashes that both sides were engaged in. Kasha's arguments indirectly support Yusuf Malek's point that Assyrians were not supported by other Christian leaders. Moreover, Kasha's presentation of the Simele killings serves to highlight the continued alienation of Assyrians from the Iraqi body politic, including other Christian denominations, because of these events in 1931.

⁷⁵⁰ Yusuf Malek, *The British Betrayal of the Assyrians* (Chicago, the United States of America: The Assyrian National Federation and The Assyrian National League of America, 1935), 74.

⁷⁵¹ The full quote reads as follows:

و كان عدداً كبيراً من الاشوريين و المسيحيين قد انخرطوا بالجيش الخاص الذي أسسه الانكليز و المعروف الجيش اللفي. فأثارت بعض تصرفاتهم غير الموزونة حفيظة شعب موصل و الجيش العراقي. فاصطدم الجانبان و كانت مقتلة سميل...

[Many Assyrians and Christians had joined the private army which the English had founded and was known as the Levy Army. Their unbalanced actions enraged the people of Mosul and the Iraqi Army. The two sides clashed, which led to the Simele killings...]

⁷⁵² Suheil Kasha, سهل نينوى ومستقبل المسيحيين في العراق [*The Nineveh Plains and the Future of Christians in Iraq*] (Beirut, Lebanon: دار أبعاد [Distances Press], 2016), 9.

Another key factor contributing to the popularity of the ICP among the Assyrian community is the reaction against the British. Ultimately, the Assyrians felt betrayed by the British. The British encouraged the Assyrians to rise against the Ottoman Empire only to abandon them to the Ottomans' counterattack. After the British established their mandate over Iraq, i.e. colonized it, their treatment of Assyrians did not change. While Assyrian leaders and intellectuals in 1920 petitioned the Paris Peace Conference, as well as the League of Nations for an autonomous zone, their pleas fell on deaf ears.⁷⁵³⁷⁵⁴ It is worth noting that the Assyrians' international lobbying efforts further drove a wedge between them and Iraq's other communities. The primary objective of the Assyrian delegation was to represent the interests of the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the Near East. They sought to maintain the prerogatives that were granted to the Patriarch under the Ottoman Millet system. The delegation made no allowances to members of other Christian denominations such as the Syriac Catholic Church and the Syriac Orthodox Church. In addition, members of the Assyrian delegation made declarations and published works that were extremely racist toward Arabs. For example, Yusuf Malek one of the Patriarch's international representatives would state:

Though unfortunately the Assyrian men, women, and children, who, in defence of their very honor, have been most brutally massacred with the usual Arab savagery, are lamentably and irretrievably lost, yet it is not too late to save the remnant if only as a monument to British perfidy and injustice...⁷⁵⁵

Another one of Malik's sayings is: "Among the Turks, one can find a great many gentlemen, but, among the Arabs, it would not be an easy task to find a real one. This is the author's experience with the Arabs."⁷⁵⁶ Needless to say, the Assyrian intellectuals' ethno-nationalist

⁷⁵³ Malek, op.cit., 37.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid, 42.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid, i.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid, 75.

vitriol further damaged communal relations. It also alienated them from Christian Arabs who might have been otherwise sympathetic to these Assyrians' cause.

A key objective of the Assyrians was the establishment of their polity funded by oil sales. Malek's international travels and writings as the Patriarch's representative were in service of that goal. From the Assyrians' perspective, they sought to establish their entity that stretches from the Nineveh Plains which is in modern-day Iraq to Hakkari, which lies nowadays in Turkey. The area's oil resources were to provide an economic backbone to this new entity. The British in turn exploited the Assyrians' irredentist desires to obtain territorial concessions from the newly established Republic of Turkey and then split the planned Assyrian state between Iraq and Turkey. During the border negotiations between the British and Turkey over where the border between Turkey and Iraq would be struck, the British used the presence of the Assyrian community in Turkey to argue for connecting these areas with the Assyrian-majority area in Iraq. This situation undermined relations between the Assyrians and Turkey.

Instead of the Patriarch, the British decided to empower another one of their clients, Faisal Ibn Hussein.⁷⁵⁷ Faisal was the son of the Sharif⁷⁵⁸ of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali. His clan led an uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1916. The *raison d'être* of the "Great Arab Revolt" was a desire for closer ties with the British Empire and the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism. The pan-Arab nationalism of Faisal Ibn Hussein was not particularly appealing to Assyrians. To add insult to injury, the British's idea of consulting with the indigenous population was an

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid, i.

⁷⁵⁸ Literally meaning the "honorable." The Sharif of Mecca was a title given to a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, charged with governing Mecca. The Sharif was responsible to the Ottoman Sultan.

“election” in which 96% of the population voted to make Faisal Ibn Hussein the king of Iraq.⁷⁵⁹ Needless to say, the election was a total sham and is indicative of the contempt the British colonizers had toward the Iraqi population in its entirety. This election would be copied by autocrats all over the region, such as Saddam Hussein, Muhammad Husni Mubarak, and Bashar Al-Assad, each boasting an equally ridiculous vote count. King Faisal I was a Sunni Arab who was not from Iraq, but rather from Hejaz which is in modern-day Saudi Arabia. The only reason why he became king of Iraq was because of his loyalty to the British. This all served to further strain relations between the British and Iraqi monarchy on one hand and the Assyrians on the other.

Assyrians’ grievances towards the British would only increase over time, which in turn would boost the recruitment efforts of the ICP. The British encouraged the Assyrians to join the Levies (which were a militia established by the British colonists to keep the colonized in check). In a classic case of divide and conquer, the British recruited heavily among the Assyrian minority. This in turn further poisoned relations between the Assyrians on the one hand and the Arabs and Kurds on the other. However, in 1933 the British decided to further empower the Iraqi monarchy by making Iraq nominally independent. As a consequence, the Levies lost the protection of their British overlords. The Levies became under the formal control of the Iraqi monarchy. When clashes broke out between the central government and the Levies, the British declined to intervene. The British laissez-faire approach remained, even when the armed clashes became ethnic. This in turn further drove a wedge between the Assyrians and the British.

⁷⁵⁹ Martin Walker, “The Making of Modern Iraq,” *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 27, no. 2 (2003): 29–40, 30.

British control over Iraqi oil fields would further alienate the Assyrians. The ICP exploited this situation to the hilt. Following the 1933 genocide, many Assyrians left their mountain villages and moved to the cities. Many found employment in Kirkuk, in Iraq's booming oil sector. This forced urbanization had numerous consequences for the Assyrians' group identities. Interdenominational marriages increased. Assyrians married members of the Syriac Orthodox and the Chaldean communities.⁷⁶⁰ Familial connections eased the boundaries between the different Christian communities. Tribal divisions also eased, as members of different tribes freely intermingled with one another. The genocides increased geographic distance, and new employment opportunities meant that the Assyrian traditional leadership became more isolated. This led to an opening that the ICP was able to fill. The ICP's rhetoric did not celebrate British imperial rule. Iraq's supposed independence notwithstanding, Iraq's national oil company was under the control of British managers. The Iraqi oil sector reflected this distinctly uneven power hierarchy, whereby senior-level positions were monopolized by the British.⁷⁶¹ The native population, including the Assyrians, were relegated to more dangerous jobs that paid less. Another point of contention was the British's haughty attitude towards the native workers. The ICP honed its message by focusing on workers' conditions such as pay, benefits, and vacations. A key instrument in that regard was the ICP's dominance of labor unions.⁷⁶² The British for their part interpreted the attraction of the Assyrians to the ICP as being the mere by-product of successful Soviet propaganda directed towards that community.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶⁰ Benjamin, *op.cit.*, 24.

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁷⁶² *Ibid.*

⁷⁶³ *Ibid.*, 33.

4.6.2 The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP): A Kurdish Outlet for the Assyrian Ethnicity

The Kurdish uprising in 1961 against the central Iraqi government presented new opportunities for the Assyrians to assert themselves, at the expense of both the central government and the Kurdish secessionists. The principal actor in this uprising was Kurdish leader Mullah Mustapha Barazani, and his political party: The KDP. The main point of contention of the KPD was the marginalization of the Kurdish periphery by the central government.⁷⁶⁴ As previously mentioned, Iraq was led by a patronage network whose members were Sunni Arabs empowered by the British. This did not particularly endear them to ethnic minorities such as the Kurds and the Assyrians. The 1958 coup by Abed Al Karim Qasim led to a new, more strained relationship.

Abed Al Karim Qasim abolished the monarchy and established a republic, removing the previous patronage network. Qasim changed his country's political orientation. He reached out to the Soviet Union and sought its protection against the previously dominant British. Qasim would be inspired by the Soviet model, if not completely enamored by it. Qasim's vision of Iraq was a *strong centralized secular socialist state*. Qasim's approach would gain him few allies and many enemies. On one hand, the pro-Soviet leanings of Qasim would endear him to the ICP. Qasim's warm ties with the ICP would be sustained until the very last days of his regime. Several members of Qasim's government were from the ICP. The ICP would deploy its militias, the Popular Resistance,⁷⁶⁵⁷⁶⁶ to crush a military uprising, backed by pan-Arab nationalists, against Qasim in Mosul in 1959. Consequently, quite a few Assyrians, who were members of the ICP,

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid, 87.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid, 44-45.

⁷⁶⁶ المقاومة الشعبية

would be supportive of Qasim.⁷⁶⁷ These were for the most part urbanites, workers in the oil sector, or members of the middle class. The ICP's relations with the KDP in turn would be poor for the duration of Qasim's reign.

Qasim's secular model would further endear him to the ICP while alienating the religious segments of Iraqi society as well as its social conservatives. A particular point of contention was the inheritance laws. Qasim stopped implementing the Islamic rulings in that regard. Instead, Qasim applied a new set of laws predicated on gender equality.⁷⁶⁸ This in turn strengthened the message of the ICP and strengthened its alliance with Qasim. Qasim's desire for a strong central state would put him directly at odds with Kurdish and Assyrian tribal leaders. His land distribution policies would be perceived by these tribes as a direct threat to their livelihoods. Mullah Mustapha Barazani and his party were quick to exploit these sentiments. The pro-Soviet policies of Qasim, in the context of the Cold War, would lead to Iranian and American support for the opposition to Qasim. This assistance was manifested in the form of international assistance to the Kurdish secessionists and their Assyrian allies. The outcome of Qasim's project, from the perspective of the Assyrians, was the segmentation of the community along new lines.

The KDP was successful in attracting some Assyrians to its 1961 rebellion against the central government. These Assyrians sought to play the Kurds and the central government off against one another. Owing to the military successes of the KDP against the central government in northern Iraq, some Assyrians joined the KDP for security.⁷⁶⁹ The central government was no longer able to protect them. The KDP's strategy of forced recruitment played a significant role in

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid, 46.

⁷⁶⁸ Noga Efrati, "Negotiating Rights in Iraq: Women and the Personal Status Law," *The Middle East Journal* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 577–95, 580

⁷⁶⁹ Benjamin, op.cit, 90.

the enlistment of Assyrians to their cause. Neutral Assyrian villages were systematically targeted by the KDP. A key factor in the KDP's attraction to the Assyrians was the organization Kheith Kheith Allap II (It is the Syriac acronym of a phrase that means Assyrian Unity and Freedom).⁷⁷⁰⁷⁷¹ Kheith Kheith Allap II was originally founded in 1961 to promote Assyrian political and cultural rights. Its name stems from Kheith Kheith Allap I, an organization with similar objectives that was established in Assyrian refugee camps run by the British. That organization was quickly banned by the British. By choosing to resurrect the previous incarnation of that organization, Kheith Kheith Allap II's leadership signified a desire for a more assertive and confrontational approach to the central government. When Kheith Kheith Allap II was banned by the central government, it re-established itself in areas controlled by the KDP. It found a receptive ear from Assyrian tribes in the rural hinterland. Kheith Kheith Allap II was politically independent but militarily allied with the KDP. The destruction of Assyrian villages throughout the 1960s led more Assyrians to join the ICP and the KDP's armed struggle.

The 1963 Baa'thist coup served to unify the efforts of the ICP and the KDP. The Baa'thist came to power riding on an anti-Communist agenda. As part of their purge of anything potentially remotely connected to the ICP, the Baa'thists began targeting Assyrian communities. This purge intertwined with the Baa'th Party's Pan-Arab ideology. Attacks against the ICP were seen as attacks against Assyrians and vice versa. This led to significant changes in how the Assyrian community was internally segmented. When the ICP and KDP sought to strike an alliance as part of their anti-Baa'th efforts, the Assyrians played a significant networking role in that regard. Assyrians in the ICP and the KDP reached out to one another and assured one another of their parties' intentions vis à vis ethnic minorities.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid, 86.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid, 91.

The establishment of an Assyrian transnational network correlated directly with this conflict and the international support the KDP enjoyed. The Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) was founded in 1968 by Assyrian members of the Iranian parliament.⁷⁷² It made use of the Cold War and its connections with Western capitals to raise international support for the KDP, and its war conflict against the pro-Soviet Qasim regime. Iran, under Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, presented itself as America's policeman in the Middle East. When the Baa'th Party seized power in 1963, relations with Iran did not improve in the immediate term. Iraqi-Iranian border tensions persisted as well and by extension Iran's proxy war against Iraq. Iranian support persisted until 1975 with the Algiers Agreement whereby Iran cut its support to the Iraqi opposition. This relationship was reactivated with the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War. The Gulf War would see a dramatic change in power relations between the KDP and the Iraqi government. The establishment of the no-fly zone greatly empowered the KDP in 1992. To gain international acceptance and domestic acquiescence vis à vis this new order, the Kurdistan parliament allocated five quota seats to minorities which were often occupied by Christians.⁷⁷³

4.6.3 The Chaldean Assyrian Syriac People's Council

The KDP has developed a new means to co-opt Chaldeans/Syriacs/Assyrians, which is the Chaldean Assyrian Syriac People's Council (CASPC).⁷⁷⁴ As a reaction to the increasing popularity of the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), the KDP decided to empower certain Assyrian personalities. This empowerment in turn serves as a means of furthering the KDP's

⁷⁷² Ibid, 86.

⁷⁷³ Farhad Hassan Abdullah and Hawre Hasan Hama, "Minority Representation and Reserved Legislative Seats in Iraqi Kurdistan," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2020): 381–402, 381.

⁷⁷⁴ Frederick Aprim, *The Betrayal of the Powerless: Assyrians after the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq* (Bloomington, IN, the United States of America: Xlibris US, 2021), 190.

objective of an independent Kurdistan led by the Barazani family. The CASPC is funded by Sarkis Aghajan. Aghajan is a Christian member of the KDP. Among his roles is to maintain friendly relations between the KDP and the Chaldean religious leadership. Aghajan has been able to channel foreign aid for the parochial aims of the KDP and CASPC. International aid aimed at bolstering the presence of Iraq's Christians has gone to "local authorities" i.e. the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KRG, which is dominated by the KDP, in turn, transferred that money to Sarkis Aghajan. Aghajan made use of that money to establish his patronage network, which in turn was part of the KDP's broader network.⁷⁷⁵ Aghajan was able to establish contacts with the diaspora as well as bolster his popularity among the Chaldean Assyrian Syriacs living in Iraq. The ultimate objective of Aghajan's CASPC is to undermine the ADM's calls for an autonomous province in Nineveh Plains as part of a federal Iraq. The KDP would then be able to add them to Kurdistan while simultaneously undermining Assyrian nationalism.

4.6.4 The Babylon Brigades and the Babylon Movement

Rayan Al-Kildani⁷⁷⁶ has established for himself a singular role in Iraq's political scene: An alternative to Iraq's established Christian political parties, which goes in tandem with a deeper **relationship with pro-Iranian political parties and militias**. Al-Kildani follows a similar modus operandi. He has a political party: The Babylon Movement, which participates in the political process. The political party is also backed by an armed wing, The Babylon Brigades.⁷⁷⁷ The Babylon Movement and Brigades were founded as a reaction to IS's takeover of large swathes of Iraq in 2014. Its trajectory is like that of the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF),

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁶ Meaning "the Chaldean"

⁷⁷⁷ Saman Dawod, "Interview: Babylon Movement Elbows out Iraq's Established Christian Parties," Amwaj.media, November 19, 2021, <https://amwaj.media/article/interview-ryan-al-kildani>.

of which the Babylon Brigades are a part. As previously mentioned, the PMF consists of pro-Iranian militias who draw their salaries from the Iraqi government. The PMF's foundation was a response to the failure of the Iraqi government to adequately defend against IS's blitz. By joining the PMF, the Babylon Brigades became the military subordinates of the aforementioned pro-Iranian militias. Al-Kildani has justified his actions as being the outcome of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, an invasion that has jeopardized the very existence of Iraq's Christians.⁷⁷⁸

Al-Kildani's friendly relationship with Iran has directly undermined his movement's ties with the United States. While the PMF was backed by the United States when fighting IS, the relationship has soured because of worsening US-Iranian ties. The United States has killed two of Al-Kildani's superiors, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis,⁷⁷⁹⁷⁸⁰⁷⁸¹ the deputy commander of the PMF and its military leader, along with Qasim Sulaymani. Sulaymani was the commander of the Quds⁷⁸² Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. He was responsible for overseeing all pro-Iranian militias in the region, including the PMF. Sulaymani was the actual leader of the PMF. Al-Kildani himself has lavished praise on Sulaymani stating: "Hajj Qasem Soleimani joined us on the battlefield. If he had not been there, it would have been impossible to win the battle [against IS]."⁷⁸³

⁷⁷⁸ Al-Kildani in his interviews has shown that he has no problem using the term "Iraqi Christians." However, his sentiment is not universally shared.

⁷⁷⁹ The name literally means the engineer father of Mahdi. Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis actually had a degree in engineering.

⁷⁸⁰ His real name was Jamal Jaafar Al-Ibrahim

⁷⁸¹ BBC News عربي [Arabic], "من هو أبو مهدي المهندس الذي قتل مع قاسم سليمان في بغداد؟" [Who is Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis who was Killed with Qasim Sulaymani in Baghdad], BBC News عربي [Arabic], January 3, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/arabic/50983574>.

⁷⁸² Jerusalem

⁷⁸³ The Middle East Media Research Institute, "Christian Iraqi Militia Leader Ryan Chaldean: If Not For Iran, ISIS Would Be in Baghdad by Now; Saudi Arabia the Cause of Iraq's

The United States' decapitation strike was driven by the PMF's attacks against the US's supply convoys as well as the pro-Iranian militias storming an American embassy. The assault was personally led by Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis. The origin of the tensions between the United States and Al-Kildani and his superiors was US President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and re-impose a host of sanctions on Iran. The JCPOA was supposed to settle the dispute between Iran on the one hand, and the United States and the European Union (EU) over Iran's nuclear program on the other hand. **The relevance of that international dispute is that the PMF along with Iran's other proxies was engaged in an armed campaign to force the United States to return to the JCPOA and withdraw its economic sanctions.**

Regarding Al-Kildani, he was sanctioned by the United States over his alleged corruption and human rights abuses.⁷⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Al-Kildani was granted an audience with Pope Francis when he visited Iraq in 2021.⁷⁸⁵ In addition, the Babylon Movement won four out of the five parliamentary seats allocated to Christians during the 2021 Iraqi elections.⁷⁸⁶ To expand its writ, the Babylon Movement has actively ensured gender equality among its successful candidates. Al-Kildani has tried to spin his close relations with Iran as a positive attribute: According to him, the Babylon Brigades, unlike the traditional Christian parties, enjoy a cross-sectarian appeal. In addition, the Babylon Brigades empower lower socioeconomic strata,

Destruction,” MEMRI, February 27, 2017, <https://www.memri.org/tv/christian-iraqi-militia-leader-ryan-chaldean-if-not-iran-isis-would-be-baghdad-now-saudi-arabia>.

⁷⁸⁴ Reuters Staff, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Four Iraqis over Human Rights and Corruption,” Reuters, July 18, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sanctions-iraq-idUSKCN1UD2BI>.

⁷⁸⁵ الطريقة الكسنزانية : لماذا تم إهمال المكون السني من جدول زيارة البابا الى العراق؟“ [Al-Iraq Net], العراق نت [The Kasnazi Order: Why were the Sunnis Ignored by the Schedule of the Papal Visit to Iraq?],” [الطريقة-الكسنزانية-لماذا-تم-إهمال-الم-](https://aliraqnet.net/الم-إهمال-لماذا-تم-إهمال-الم/) العراق نت [Al-Iraq Net], March 7, 2021, [https://aliraqnet.net/الم-إهمال-لماذا-تم-إهمال-الم-](https://aliraqnet.net/الم-إهمال-لماذا-تم-إهمال-الم/).

⁷⁸⁶ Dawod, op. cit.,

as opposed to the traditional Christian parties. This is also because the Babylon Movement’s members are among the youth. They have no memory of Saddam Hussein, nor do they remember his relations with the traditional Assyrian actors. According to Al-Kildani, the traditional parties are resentful towards him because unlike them, Al-Kildani and his allies have been able to protect their communities. The overarching objectives of the Babylon Movement are to ensure a sustained Christian presence in Iraq as well as the maintenance of healthy communal relations.⁷⁸⁷

Al-Kildani by no means has the unanimous support of the Assyrians or the Chaldean community. The Chaldean Church has recently spoken out against Al-Kildani, criticizing his politicization of Christian symbols. The fact that the same communiqué criticizes the incorporation by some Shiites of Christian symbols in their ‘Ashoura religious ceremonies⁷⁸⁸ indicates that the Chaldean Church is far from comfortable with Al-Kildani’s deep ties with pro-Iran Shiite militias. Al-Kildani’s detractors claim the only reason why he has attained power is because of votes outside the community. While the Babylon Movement has won seats allocated to the Christian community, the reason why it has been able to do so is due to the support of

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁸ Ultra Iraq Editorial Team, “البطيركية الكلدانية: المناسبات الشيعية لا تحتاج لأشخاص يستخدمون الرموز المسيحية [The Chaldean Patriciate: Shiite Events do not Need Individuals Using Christian Symbols],” الترا عراق | Ultra Iraq, August 14, 2022, <https://ultrairaq.ultrasawt.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1>

Shiite Arabs from southern Iraq. Christian politicians are not voted in by members of their community, Kildani's opponents point out. The same critique applies to the Babylon Brigades. The militia's popularity is so low with its community that it has not been able to recruit Christians into its armed forces. Instead, most members are Shiites who are ethnic Shabaks and loyal to Kataeb Hezbollah.⁷⁸⁹⁷⁹⁰⁷⁹¹ Kataeb Hezbollah was founded and led by Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis until his death. Thus, Al-Kildani's role is to boost the image of the PMF in the eyes of a Western audience. It is nothing more than religious tokenism.

4.6.5 Baa'thist Christians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians

Per Helfont,⁷⁹² a Christian Baa'thist philosopher directly molded how the Baa'th Party viewed Islam. This unique situation led the Baa'th Party under Saddam Hussein to take an instrumentalist view of religion. The Baa'th instrumentalist view of religion can be traced to the chief theoretician and co-founder of the Baa'th Arab Socialist Party, Michel Aflaq. Aflaq, like Boutros Al-Boustani before him, attempted to reconceptualize group formation in the region, to break his community's minority status. Aflaq was a member of the Greek Orthodox Church, and thus part of a minority twice over. Being a Christian meant that Aflaq was part of a religious minority in the region. His denomination marked him as a minority amongst Christians, both in the region and worldwide. Secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab nationalism were alternative identities that could make him part of a newly conceptualized majority. A state built on these

⁷⁸⁹ كتائب حزب الله

⁷⁹⁰ The term means The Battalions of the Highly Righteous Muslims, and not the Battalions of the Party of God as is often mistranslated. Sometimes Google Translate just doesn't quite cut it.

⁷⁹¹ Yousif Kalian, "Iran's Inroads into Christian Iraq," *The American Interest*, December 21, 2017, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/12/21/irans-inroads-christian-iraq/>.

⁷⁹² Samuel Helfont, *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq* (New York, New York, the United States of America: Oxford University Press USA, 2018), 27.

principles would allow Aflaq to attain political positions, which were far beyond his, and his religious community's reach during the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire. This was doubly true in the case of Aflaq as he was not a clergyman.

This instrumentalist approach would be applied by the Baa'th Party when dealing with Christians. The context would be in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein had purged his internal enemies and was thus secure in his position. The Baa'th regime was at war with Iran and sought to suppress any religious opposition. The regime aimed to promote a Baa'thist reading of Christianity through a mixture of cooptation and coercion. The regime offered financial inducements to loyal Christian leaders, as well as establishing institutions through which these loyalists could gain prestigious titles and have a greater following. When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, the Iraqi press carried Christians' denunciations of Rouhollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein's arch-foe. The goal of that media campaign was the portrayal of a contrast between Iran's theocratic regime, which oppressed Christians, and secular Iraq. Nevertheless, many Christian leaders refused to be co-opted by the Baa'th regime. To counter that issue, the Baa'th party relied on Christian Baa'thists to survey the political positions of the Christian clergy and to report on any deviations on the part of the religious leaders from the official message.⁷⁹³

The message itself promoted by Baa'thist Christianity is illustrated by the following report by a Christian Baa'thist operative regarding his interactions with a Syriac Orthodox Bishop in 1983.⁷⁹⁴ The main point of contention was that a two-day festival was held by the Syriac Orthodox Church ostensibly to celebrate "the historic decision of the Revolutionary

⁷⁹³ Ibid, 48.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid, 49.

Command Council to grant cultural rights to Assyrians.”⁷⁹⁵ However, the Christian Baa’thist was chagrined when observed that there were no banners at the festival celebrating the Revolutionary Command Council’s decision. Instead, the opening speech dealt only with Syriac Orthodox themes. This further troubled the Christian Baa’thist because the person giving the opening speech had been specifically instructed to lavish praise on the regime and its decision. The Christian Baa’thist informed the bishop hosting the event of his displeasure with the speech. Tensions increased between the Christian Baa’thist and the bishop when the Christian Baa’thist complained that apolitical Christian organizations were invited to the event. This was unacceptable to the Christian Baa’thists as these Christian organizations had refused to support the Baa’th Party.

To the surprise of the Christian Baa’thist the “bishop defended them.”⁷⁹⁶ The Christian Baa’thist also reported that the bishop “accused me [the Christian Baa’thist] of trying to sabotage the sect by spreading the ideology of the Party in its ranks. Accordingly, he told me not to interfere in the affairs of the sect.”⁷⁹⁷ The bishop then suspended the seminar if the Christian Baa’thist was in attendance.⁷⁹⁸ The Christian Baa’thist upped the ante by giving the bishop a set of orders:

“(1) The bishop must support the Party and the Baa’thist revolution in his blessings, and he must ensure that all religious organizations-including the one whose members were present at the event- supported the Party. (2) These religious organizations needed to hold elections and select people who carry the responsibility for the sect and the homeland (watan). Although he does not explicitly say so, it is clear that in these “elections” regime loyalists would be “elected.” And finally, (3) it was necessary to culturally indoctrinate

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

and raise the consciousness of the youth on the issues of patriotism (wataniyya) and progress.”⁷⁹⁹

That was not the end of the matter, as the bishop refused to obey the Christian Baa’thist’s diktats. In his report, the Christian Baa’thist stated “The bishop refused to comply, and he began to close the doors of the archdiocese and the churches for three consecutive weeks so that the seminar could not be held.”⁸⁰⁰ The Christian Baa’thist concluded his report by deeming the bishop to be against the Baa’th party. For added effect, the Christian Baa’thist accused the bishop of having links with the Muslim Brotherhood.⁸⁰¹

This message was extremely similar to what Sunni and Shiite clerics were expected to promote. It reflects the strategy of the Baa’th Party for controlling religious beliefs. The Baa’th Party sought to exploit pre-existing religious institutions owing to their popularity. The Baa’th Party strove to co-opt these religious institutions by filling them with loyalists so that these institutions echoed its doctrines on Pan-Arab nationalism and the supremacy of the Baa’th Party. This reading of religion can be directly traced to Michel Aflaq and his unique instrumentalist stance.⁸⁰²

The Baa’th party was able to make some limited inroads with the Assyrian and Chaldean communities. Paradoxically, the Baa’th Party was an avenue for a few Assyrians and Chaldeans to participate in politics and attain positions of prominence. Many workers in Saddam Hussein’s palaces were Assyrians. Assyrians were able to attain employment in sensitive positions because

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid, 50.

⁸⁰² Ibid, 48.

they were deemed as not threatening to the regime. The Baa'th regime's indulgence towards the Assyrians can be explained by the fact that these Assyrians lacked a large power base.⁸⁰³

The highest profile Christian Baa'thist is Tarek Aziz.⁸⁰⁴ Identifying Aziz's ethnic identity is an exercise in controversy. Aziz has been alternatively labeled as Assyrian due to his ethnicity,⁸⁰⁵⁸⁰⁶ or a Chaldean due to his Catholic faith.⁸⁰⁷ As for Aziz himself, he preferred to subsume his identity within the pan-Arab nationalist message promoted by the Baa'th party. He self-identified as an Iraqi Arab, and a pan-Arab nationalist. The Baa'th Party, when it was at the height of its powers, deemed Chaldeans and Assyrians to be Christian Arabs. Even those, whose first language was not Arabic, were given the Orwellian designation of Syriac-speaking Arabs.⁸⁰⁸⁸⁰⁹⁸¹⁰ Aziz himself was a central element of this Baa'thist attempt to Arabize and reconceptualize the Christian identity of Iraq into the Baa'thist mold.

Aziz was Saddam Hussein's vice president and minister of foreign affairs. Aziz also served as a propaganda prop for Baa'thist Iraq. Tarek Aziz's real name was Mikhail Yuhanna, which was Syriac. He changed it to "Tarek Aziz," an Arab name, to prove his commitment to the

⁸⁰³ Jonathan Eric Lewis, "Iraqi Assyrians: Barometer of Pluralism," *Middle East Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 49–57, 49.

⁸⁰⁴ Michael Ray, "Tariq Aziz," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, June 1, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Tariq-Aziz>.

⁸⁰⁵ A. B. C. News, "Son of Tariq Aziz Negotiated Surrender," ABC News, April 25, 2003, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79511&page=1>.

⁸⁰⁶ New York Times News Service, "Even Family Is Happy to See Aziz Deposed," *Baltimore Sun*, April 21, 2003, <https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2003-04-21-0304210112-story.html>.

⁸⁰⁷ John Lee Anderson, "Tariq Aziz and the Last of the Baathists," *The New Yorker*, June 8, 2015, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/tariq-aziz-and-the-last-of-the-baathists>.

⁸⁰⁸ Some academics to this this day persist in seeing Iraqi Christians as being exclusively Arabs, betraying their Arab nationalist orientations.

⁸⁰⁹ Hanan Mahmoud Jameel, *الهوية في الرواية العراقية بعد سقوط بغداد 2003 [Identity in the Iraqi Novel after the 2003 Fall of Baghdad]*, 1st ed. (Beirut, Lebanon: المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر [The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing], 2018), 156.

⁸¹⁰ Donabed, *op. cit.*, 209.

Baa'th party's *Arab ethnic nationalism*. His attraction to the Baa'th party stemmed from the party's secularism and stand against religious militancy.⁸¹¹ Reading between the lines, Aziz represented the stability of the Christian community in Iraq. Aziz showcased the potential for Christians to attain the highest levels of power. Threatening Saddam Hussein's regime by extension would jeopardize the gains Christians attained under a secular regime. Ultimately, none of these concerns would be sufficient to save the regime from the United States President George W. Bush's crusade,⁸¹² aka the War on Terror.

Baa'thist Iraq pursued contradictory policies towards the Assyrians and Chaldeans. On some occasions, the Baa'th party implemented assimilationist policies. On other occasions, the Baa'th party was more reconciliatory vis à vis its Assyrian and Chaldean minorities. These ethnic minorities were treated in a more conciliatory manner by the central government owing to a change in power relations between the Baa'th and the opposition. The Baa'th party was ideological, but ruthlessly pragmatic when pursuing its ultimate aim, maintaining its power. It had no problem granting temporary concessions to buy itself more time.

On March 11, 1970, the Baa'th party gave numerous cultural concessions to the Assyrian community.⁸¹³ These concessions included a greater role for Syriac, with official recognition by the state, the Baa'th party, and its pan-Arab ideology having focused exclusively on promoting Arabic. Chaldeans and Assyrians were permitted to open their own schools, through which Syriac was passed on to the younger generations. Moreover, both communities were permitted to publish books and magazines in Syriac to further entrench their culture. Cultural clubs were

⁸¹¹ Anderson, op. cit.,

⁸¹² Office of the Press Secretary, "President: Today We Mourned, Tomorrow We Work," The White House, September 16, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html>.

⁸¹³ Benjamin, op.cit., 113.

established, where the Assyrian and Chaldean intelligentsia could network with one another.⁸¹⁴ While they did not win over the entire Assyrian and Chaldean communities, these concessions were extremely popular among the churches and their clergymen. Writing ten years after the fall of the regime, Father Suheil Kasha of the Syriac Catholic Church waxed poetic about the cultural autonomy that his community enjoyed.⁸¹⁵ Moreover, Kasha continued to hold up these policies towards minorities as a positive example for modern-day Iraq.

4.6.6 The Assyrian Democratic Movement

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) is the first Iraqi Assyrian political and military actor, predicated on Assyrian ethnic nationalism.⁸¹⁶⁸¹⁷⁸¹⁸ The ADM was able to gain a widespread following among the Assyrians after its establishment in 1979, and it remains the most popular party among Assyrians to this very day. The ADM justified its existence as being a reaction to the excesses of Saddam Hussein's Baa'th Party, and its imposition of pan-Arab nationalism on minorities. A particular concern of it was the teaching of Syriac and Sureth, which the Baa'th party had started to undermine. This was part of a broader pattern of negating the Assyrian identity and assimilating it within its larger Arab milieu. A key factor in the rise of the ADM is the Baa'thists' decision to renege on their agreements with minorities following their 1975 border agreement with Iran. With the opposition bereft of regional support, Baa'thist Iraq acted in line with its Arab ethno-nationalist ideology, the concerns of minorities notwithstanding.

⁸¹⁴ Ibid, 119.

⁸¹⁵ Kasha, سهل نينوى ومستقبل المسيحيين في العراق [*The Nineveh Plains and the Future of Christians in Iraq*] op.cit, 10.

⁸¹⁶ It is also known as Zowaa, meaning "movement" in Syriac

⁸¹⁷ Benjamin, op.cit, 258.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid, 199.

The ADM is a politically leftist non-sectarian party, aiming to represent Assyrians irrespective of their religious or tribal affiliations.⁸¹⁹ It drew a connection between the Iraqi state and the Assyrian nation. The ADM's two founding slogans were: "(1) a free democratic Iraq and (2) for the recognition of Assyrian national identity."⁸²⁰ Thus, the ADM could establish alliances with the anti-Baa'th opposition while appealing for support in the West. According to Lincoln Malik, the ADM's representative in the United States and Canada, the ADM stands for the "inalienable human cultural political and administrative rights in our [Assyrian] homeland."⁸²¹ The ADM sought to intertwine the Assyrian rights with the nature of the Iraqi state. According to the party, a democratic Iraq would ensure minority rights. These rights would ensure that Assyrians are seen as an ethnic minority and not just a religious denomination. Assyrians' political, linguistic, and cultural identities would be constitutionally enshrined.

The ADM was able to find a suitable environment in northern Iraq, where governmental control was minimal. It was also able to establish alliances with other armed members of the Iraqi opposition operating in that area, the ICP and the KDP. However, the ADM was determined to maintain its organizational independence. Unlike the ICP and the KDP, the ADM was dedicated to Assyrian cultural causes. The ADM was made exclusively of Assyrian members, unlike the ICP and KDP. To get past the internal cleavages within the community, the ADM declared itself as a non-sectarian party. Thus, the Assyrian identity was reconceptualized as an ethnic cause, which could appeal to different groups irrespective of their religious beliefs. This *reconstructed Assyrian identity* was a reaction to the failures of the previous Assyrian leadership under Patriarch Eshai Shimun XXIII. The ADM sought a non-sectarian understanding

⁸¹⁹ Ibid, 200.

⁸²⁰ Ibid.

⁸²¹ Ibid.

of the Assyrian identity so that its leadership would not be monopolized by the clergy. The ADM was ideologically leftist to gain international support for the cause of an oppressed minority. The ADM's ideological leanings also served as a rebuke to the leadership of the Assyrian Church of the East. The Assyrian Church of the East's continued calls for it to be allocated the same powers that were under its purview during the Millet system were a failure. This fixation on resurrecting the powers of the church under the Millet system failed to gain traction on the international level while exacerbating sectarian tensions at the Iraqi level.

4.7 Diaspora Politics

The diaspora politics of the Assyrian community have remained deeply linked with the status of the Assyrians in Iraq. The rise of Assyrian diaspora politics can be traced to the exile of many Assyrians following their unsuccessful uprising against the Ottoman Empire, and the violent backlash that Assyrian civilians suffered during the First World War. The rise of this new diaspora was connected to the political activism of the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East. Following the Simele Massacre, the Patriarch was exiled to Cyprus and eventually to the United States. To this day, the Assyrian Church of the East, along with its patriarch, remains based in the United States. From this context arose the Assyrian American National Federation (AANF).⁸²²⁸²³ The AANF is an umbrella organization established in the United States in 1933 in response to the Simele Massacre.⁸²⁴ Its stated goals are the addressal of human rights abuses against the Assyrians in the Middle East and the development of Assyrian culture, religion, and language. Sam Andrews who was a member of the Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) would

⁸²² Malek, op.cit, cover page, 369.

⁸²³ It was originally named the Assyrian National Federation.

⁸²⁴ Benjamin, op.cit, 106.

serve as president of the AANF, showing how different Assyrian diaspora organizations were working towards the same goals.⁸²⁵

The Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) was founded in 1968 by Iranian-Assyrians. The AUA used its connections with the Iranian parliament to raise attention to the Kurdish cause, and a lesser extent the Assyrian plight. The AUA reflected Cold War politics as well as more parochial concerns. Iran made use of the AUA to increase ethnic tensions in Iraq. Iran's ultimate objective in that regard was to push Iraq to agree to a host of concessions regarding its disputed border territories. Iran's support of the AUA served its strategy of presenting itself as being useful to the United States. This is because Iran wanted to develop its image as America's policeman in the Middle East. For it to maintain such an image, Iran had to be able and willing to undermine the proxies of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, such as Iraq.⁸²⁶

These Assyrian organizations served to improve the image of Kurdish secessionists, who were backed by Iran, in the West.⁸²⁷ For example, on May 29, 1969, an Assyrian delegation met with officials from the US Department of State to request assistance for the Kurdish uprising. Among the Assyrian delegation was Sam Andrews, who had deep connections with both the AANF and the AUA. This joint delegation, composed of both AANF and AUA members, maintained close relations with Iran. Both the AANF and the AUA coordinated their activities with the US government officials whom the AANF and the AUA met in 1969. The point person was an Assyrian member of the Iranian parliament. This shows how ethnic groupings were maintained and reinforced irrespective of geographic divides. Furthermore, a key factor in the

⁸²⁵ Ibid.

⁸²⁶ Aprim, op.cit, 194.

⁸²⁷ Benjamen, op.cit, 86.

maintaining of ethnic boundaries is international pressures which benefit from the sustenance of ethnic conflicts.

Exile politics has had a significant impact on the Assyrian diaspora's construction of groups. A gaping fracture within the diaspora appeared when the Chaldeans attempted to assert their unique identity at the expense of their shared heritage with the Assyrians. The inflection point was the then-upcoming US census in 1990.⁸²⁸ There was a concerted effort by Chaldeans to be listed as a separate ethnicity. Moreover, bishops from the Chaldean Church spearheaded this effort.⁸²⁹⁸³⁰ By no longer having its members identify as Assyrians on the census, the Chaldean Church aimed to reinforce its members' religious identity. In addition, Chaldeans outnumbered Assyrian Nestorians. By asserting their own Chaldean identity within their community, the Chaldean clergy further weakened and isolated their religious rivals. This move poisoned relations with Assyrians. Assyrians in the United States, whom the Chaldeans separated from, belonged mostly to the Assyrian Church of the East. From the perspective of the members of the Assyrian Church of the East and Assyrian nationalists, the assertion of the Chaldean identity signifies the neglect of a common heritage based on the Syriac language, historical connection to the land, and the ancient empires that ruled over them. It also weakened their hand when dealing with both the United States government and the Baa'th regime. *Ultimately, Assyrian nationalists view their identity in ethnic terms as opposed to religious ones.* This in turn puts them at odds with the Chaldean Church, which did not want its influence over its community to be diluted. It is worth noting that the acknowledgment of multiple identities occurs often with immigrants. It is

⁸²⁸ Nicholas Kulish, "Ancient Split of Assyrians and Chaldeans Leads to Modern-Day Battle Over Census," Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2001, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB984352087849000961>.

⁸²⁹ Notable players in that regard were Bishop Ibrahim Ibrahim, and Bishop Sarhad Jamo.

⁸³⁰ Aprim, op.cit, 48.

narrowed down to a single identity or prioritizing one identity over others reflects pre-immigrant rivalries. A concrete case is that of the Tamil and Sinhalese Sri Lankans. These tensions between Assyrian nationalists and the Chaldean Church directly shaped how the diaspora prepared for George W. Bush's administration's plans for organizing the Iraqi opposition in the run-up to its 2003 invasion of Iraq.⁸³¹ As this thesis will show, these ethnic tensions regarding the construction of groups and who belongs to them have yet to be resolved.

A critical turning point in the role of the Assyrian diaspora organizations as well as how they constructed their groups is the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the run-up to the invasion, the opposition of the Assyrian diaspora organizations to Saddam Hussein became backed by hard power. This changed context also led to new splits within the diaspora and how the group identity was constructed. Several diaspora organizations waded into the census foray, concerned that these tensions would impact Assyrians' position in post-Saddam Iraq. The AANF proposed the Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac identity as a compromise, and to construct a grouping that could encompass the ethnic commonalities while allowing for their religious differences. The AANF further argued that by adopting this new composite grouping, Assyrians/Chaldeans/Syriacs would unify the community, boost their numbers, and potentially secure grants from the federal government, which could ultimately serve to empower the community.⁸³²

What gave this newly constructed group further impetus in 2002 were meetings between the ADM and the Chaldean Church to coordinate their preparations for post-Baa'th Iraq. The meeting itself further highlighted the influence of the diaspora organizations on Assyrian political parties in Iraq as well as Iraqi-based churches. A common concern was that the KDP

⁸³¹ Ibid.

⁸³² Ibid, 50.

would impose its Kurdish ethno-nationalist agenda at the expense of Assyrians, Chaldeans, and/or Assyrians/Chaldeans/Syriacs. Both the ADM and the Chaldean Church following a meeting on June 2, 2003, made use of the Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac identity. To that end, they referred to themselves as ChaldoAssyrian people.⁸³³ The compound name indicated the construction of a new group, whereby Chaldeans and Assyrians would perceive themselves as belonging to the same ethnicity, irrespective of their sectarian differences. However, this approach did not garner unanimous support. Some Chaldean bishops, most notably Bishop Sarhad Jamo, remained attached to the Chaldean identity.

Efforts to unify the Chaldean Church and the Assyrian Church of the East⁸³⁴ in 1994 led to a parallel reconstruction of ethnic identities. As these efforts were ongoing, Chaldean bishops in 1996 began referring to themselves as being ethnically Assyrian. For example, Bishop Ibrahim Ibrahim, a formerly prolific propagator of the Chaldean identity said: “All of us Assyrians, members of the Church of the East, Chaldeans, Jacobites, and Suryanis [Syriacs] are sons of one nation.”⁸³⁵ *The Chaldean identity was reconceptualized as being a religious marker, not superseding the common ethnic roots of Assyrians and those who called themselves Chaldeans.* However, by 1997 these efforts came to naught.⁸³⁶ The question of papal supremacy was too divisive a matter, with bishops of the Assyrian Church of the East threatening their patriarch to establish their own church, were he to go ahead with the planned unification. Following the failed unification efforts, Chaldean bishops in the United States galvanized their efforts to ensure that the United States 2000 census listed Chaldeans as a separate ethnicity, their proximity to Assyrians notwithstanding. These efforts sparked a backlash from the Assyrian Church of the

⁸³³ Ibid, 51.

⁸³⁴ Ibid, 46.

⁸³⁵ Ibid, 49.

⁸³⁶ Ibid, 48.

East. Bitter from the failure of the unification, media organs loyal to the Assyrian Church of the East began attacking the ChaldoAssyrian identity.⁸³⁷ Instead, the church argued for a narrower Assyrian identity, emphasizing their religious identity as opposed to their ethnic markers. Through the mutually reinforcing actions of the Chaldean Church and the Assyrian Church of the East, the Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac identity became more segmented along religious lines.

Chaldean diaspora organizations in the United States played a significant role in asserting their unique ethnic identity, to the chagrin of Assyrian diaspora organizations. The United States census in 2000 was another catalyst for the Chaldean diaspora organizations to assert their narrower group by focusing on their differences with the Assyrians. A key diaspora player in the propagation of the Chaldean ethnic identity, at the expense of the Assyrian, was the Chaldean Federation of America (CFA). The CFA aims to represent the largest Chaldean community outside Iraq, namely those residing in the United States. According to Sam Yono, the CFA's chairman, in arguing for the inclusion of a separate Chaldean identification on the census: "We have our own history and identity." Furthermore, according to Yono, the differences between Chaldeans and Assyrians must be respected in order "to preserve our [Chaldean] identity."⁸³⁸

This construction of a new group was rejected out of hand by nationalist Assyrian diaspora organizations. They attempted to delegitimize the very concept of "Chaldean." Rather, the only authentic ethnic identity in that regard is the Assyrian. According to Sargon Dadesho, the president of the Assyrian National Congress, (ANC) Iraqi intelligence agents "have infiltrated the Chaldean organizations."⁸³⁹ The subtext to his charge was that those who self-identified as Chaldean have been too submissive vis à vis, Saddam Hussein. Another charge

⁸³⁷ Ibid, 58.

⁸³⁸ Kulish, op. cit.,

⁸³⁹ Ibid.

from the ANC against the very existence of the Chaldean identity is that the Baa'th regime uses it. Assyrians in contrast can be characterized by their resistance to Baa'thist hegemony. In addition, Dadesho and the ANC filed an unsuccessful lawsuit to argue for the exclusion of the Chaldean identity from the census, claiming that it is an exclusively religious identity. These ethnic tensions within the diaspora all served to undermine the compromise identity of ChaldoAssyrianism, both in an Iraqi and an international context.

These organizations continue to remain active to this very day. They are focused on the desires of the Assyrian diaspora community. The AUA provides individual and family social, counseling, welfare, and referral services.⁸⁴⁰ Moreover, the AUA acts as a representative body of Assyrians worldwide. Established in France in 1968, the role of the AUA is “to serve as a powerful voice for the Assyrian nation, committing itself to spreading, upholding and enhancing the Assyrian voice around the world, and working to secure the sacred human and national rights of the Assyrian people in our homeland and in the Diaspora.”⁸⁴¹ The AUA seeks to establish linkages with democratic governments and international organizations. The AUA aims to build on these relations to convince these international actors “to defend the rights of the Assyrian people in their ancestral homeland to preserve their national identity, culture, heritage, language, and religion.”⁸⁴² The AUA continuously promotes and maintains solidarity and communication with all other Assyrian political, social, and religious denominations, organizations, and establishments worldwide.⁸⁴³

⁸⁴⁰ Bloomberg, “Assyrian Universal Alliance Foundation - Company Profile and News,” Bloomberg.com, 2022, <https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/9532474Z:US>.

⁸⁴¹ Assyrian Universal Alliance, “Mission Statement – Assyrian Universal Alliance,” Assyrian Universal Alliance, 2022, <http://aua.net/mission-statement/>.

⁸⁴² Ibid.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

International tensions within the Assyrian community in Iraq have directly reflected on diaspora politics. Fawzi Toma Hariri, an Assyrian who was the Iraqi minister of industry and a KDP loyalist has played a pivotal role in ensuring that different diaspora organizations were working at cross-purposes. On January 17, 2007, he paid a visit to United States Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, who was and still is the only Assyrian American in Congress. Congresswoman Eshoo was planning on submitting a resolution to Congress advocating the establishment of a Nineveh Plain administrative region for the Assyrian Christians of Iraq. This proposal had the support of many secular diaspora Assyrian and Chaldean organizations as well as Iraqi political parties, notably the ADM.⁸⁴⁴ However, Hariri and his advisor, Praidon Darmoo, who was a former member of the AUA were able to successfully lobby against that proposal. During their meetings with Congresswoman Eshoo's staff, Hariri and Darmoo were able to convince them that such a project was something Assyrians neither needed nor wanted. The KDP/CASPC argued that Assyrians did not have a population large enough, whether in the Nineveh Plains or anywhere else in Iraq, to justify a region of their own. In addition, Assyrians lack the resources and capabilities to administer themselves. The alternative suggested by Hariri and Darmoo is Aghajan's. This alternative is expressed with Aghajan's pro-KDP party, the CASPC.⁸⁴⁵

This lobbying against the proposed Assyrian administrative region fractured the diaspora in the United States. Some members of the diaspora were won over by Aghajan's arguments. They believed that throwing their lot with the KDP offered the most realistic prospects for their community in Iraq. They established their political groupings to undermine the ADM's influence in the diaspora and Iraq. To that end, the Assyrian National Congress (ANC) was established in

⁸⁴⁴ Frederick Aprim, *op.cit*, 193.

⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 194.

California. The ANC invited the AUA to attend its congress in 2007. This invitation divided the leadership of the AUA, as some were in favor of attending and others were not. These tensions led to the resignation of the AUA's secretary general, Dr. Emanuel Kamber.⁸⁴⁶ Kamber was replaced by none other than Praidoon Darmoo.

Darmoo represented closer relations with Iran and the Assyrian Church of the East, as well as the KDP. This is evidenced by the fact that Darmoo was the former advisor of the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, Dinkha IV. This tacit alliance between the AUA, the Assyrian Church of the East, and Iran goes back to the 1968 establishment of the AUA in Iran (as previously mentioned), during which Dinkha IV was the Bishop of Iran. Some members of the AUA, not happy with the direction their movement was taking with its friendly stance with the ANC and hostility towards the ADM, elected a new secretary-general and executive board. All this served to further divide the Assyrian diaspora. Conversely, the AUA led by Darmoo ended up attending the ANC congress. The ultimate goal was to unify the efforts of Aghajan's CASPC with the diaspora.⁸⁴⁷

The AUA's representative to the ANC congress was Yonatan Bet Kolia, an Assyrian member of the Iranian parliament (Majlis). These linkages show the continued influence of Iran on the Assyrian diaspora, and the diaspora's desire to survive between competing powers. This also speaks to the desire of the diaspora to act as a potential mediator between the United States and Iran, as neither side is actively seeking a full-scale war. However, Iranian influence was yet another wedge issue within the diaspora community. The trigger to these new divisions is Bet Kolia's decision to use his participation in the ANC congress as an opportunity to peddle

⁸⁴⁶ Ibid, 194.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid.

propaganda in favor of the Iranian regime. Bet Kolia complained that Western propaganda portrayed Iran's treatment of minorities in an unfair light. As the representative of AUA, Bet Kolia stated his position is proof of how much Iran respects religious minorities.⁸⁴⁸ This intervention hardly served the Assyrians' position in the United States and Iraq. Ultimately, the stance to be taken toward Iran is yet another of deep contention.

The efforts of the AUA and the AANF, and the diaspora movement in its totality are not without further controversy. A key contrarian in that regard was Father Suheil Kasha of the Iraq-based Syriac Catholic Church. Kasha was wholly dismissive of the efforts and accomplishments of the diaspora organizations whether they pertained to the Assyrian community, Chaldean or Chaldo-Assyrian. Instead, Kasha argues that the unique identity of Iraq's Christians can only be preserved in their country of origin. Kasha reconceptualized this issue as pertaining to Oriental Christians as opposed to Assyrians. Kasha preferred the term *Oriental Christians* over Assyrians to indicate that religion is the primary marker of their identity. It is also a rebuke to the AUA and the AANF's efforts to define the Assyrian identity in an ethnic, non-sectarian, manner.

According to Kasha, a distinctive element of Oriental Christians is their connection with ancient indigenous civilizations, such as the Assyrians, Babylonians, Canaanites, and Akkadians.⁸⁴⁹⁸⁴⁹⁸⁵⁰

Oriental Christians are also characterized by their singular interactions with the Muslim and Arab milieu. According to Kasha, Oriental Christians played a significant role in the construction

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid, 195.

⁸⁴⁹ Kasha, الهجرة و التجذر و المشركيون بين الشرقيون [Oriental Christians between Becoming Rooted and Immigration] op.cit, 11

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid, 20.

of the Islamic-Arab civilizations over the years. These historic relationships in turn form an integral part of the Oriental Christians' identity.⁸⁵¹

The unique identity of the Oriental Christians is threatened by their immigration to the West, the efforts of the diaspora organizations notwithstanding. Of particular concern to Kasha is the rise of atheism in the West,⁸⁵² which threatens the identity of Oriental Christians. In the West, churches no longer generate and propagate culture. Instead, the media and the film industry control culture in the West. This culture is a complete anathema to the identity of Oriental Christians. Crucially, Hollywood is a primary vector of atheism. Kasha stakes the claim that this multifaceted cultural war is something the Assyrian diaspora organizations simply have no counter for. However, an ethnic reading of the Assyrian identity would not consider atheism to be a complete erasure of it, showcasing the divide between the diaspora organizations on the one hand, and Iraqi Churchmen on the other.

The solutions that Kasha proposed are quite extreme. As he is completely dismissive of the work of diaspora organizations, Kasha would have preferred that the diaspora simply not exist. Kasha passionately demanded that European countries impose a travel ban on Iraqi Christians to safeguard their existence.⁸⁵³ Kasha's proposal by no means enjoys the unanimous

⁸⁵¹ Ibid, 13.

⁸⁵² Ibid, 25.

⁸⁵³ A similar proposal was voiced by the cardinal of the Maronite Church in Lebanon. He demanded that the Lebanese government legislate a ban on Maronites selling their property. His argument was that the property would keep his flock tied to their country of origin (Lebanon) and prevent any demographic changes to it. This proposal was not universally welcomed, especially by Maronites who were determined to immigrate. From their perspective, a piece of property or an old house in an economic backwater cannot compete with the opportunities provided by the West. A ban on selling these properties would profoundly affect the asking price of these family heirlooms. They would essentially become worthless. Also, the Maronite business community, such as realtors, was opposed to that legislation. This is because that

support of his target audience. If anything, it will strengthen the hand of the diaspora organizations who are seeking to reconceptualize their identity from a purely religious to an ethnic marker. This is because this new identity is more in tune with the diaspora's desires. Immigration means security, the opportunity for social mobility, and the potential for economic prosperity. That is a bigger concern than the religious markers. Furthermore, the sectarianism of the Iraqi churches has served to reinforce the status quo, hence the attractiveness of the diaspora organizations and their commitment to a post-sectarian reading of their ethnicity. Kasha's extreme proposal reflects the desperate straits in which his church finds itself.

Other than atheism, Kasha argues that the identity of Oriental Christians is threatened by a plethora of competing values in the West. The diaspora organizations are equally as ineffective in facing these threats.⁸⁵⁵ The West no longer adheres to Christian values as evidenced by the spread of homosexuality and abortion.⁸⁵⁶ Diaspora organizations have no counter to these social forces nor are they interested in doing so. The identity of Oriental Christians is further threatened by high divorce rates and the legalization of civil marriages. Thus, the West imposes values on its citizens that are against the teachings of the Oriental Churches. These issues are systemic and so entrenched that it will be impossible for a Christian community to sustain itself for long in such a hostile context. Even if the diaspora organizations took a stand against these values, their objections would be for naught. An unstated concern of Kasha is not just the adoption of these values by Oriental Christians. Kasha is worried by the prospect that once the adherents to his

interdiction would have handicapped their ability to compete with businessmen from other sects. In addition, the perspective of the cardinal getting involved in politics does not have the unanimous backing of his community.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid, 38.

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid, 28.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid.

church realize that his church's values along with Oriental Christianity are not compatible with Western values, many will choose these Western values and reject the Oriental Churches.

Socioeconomic concerns are another threat to the identity of Oriental Christians, per Kasha. Generally speaking,⁸⁵⁷ Oriental Christian immigrants to the West do not have graduate degrees nor do they have any experience working in high-tech fields. In addition, Oriental Christian immigrants to the West do not have any social networks nor do they have an in-depth knowledge of their new societies. All these factors combine to force these Christian immigrants to take low-paying jobs with minimal prospects for social mobility. Ironically, these Oriental Christians would have balked at taking such jobs in their "real societies," as Kasha put it. The dashed expectations of these Christian immigrants lead them to suffer from social isolation and depression. The problems engendered by the immigration of Oriental Christians are multigenerational. The first generation, faced with the above-mentioned social and physiological difficulties, ghettoized themselves out of fear of their new surroundings. This in turn serves to undermine relations between these Christians and their host societies. As for the second and third generations, they attempt to forget their original identities, as a reaction to their parents' social difficulties. However, what often happens is that these new generations are not fully assimilated nor are they accepted by their new societies. These new generations are consequently unable to acclimatize themselves neither with their host societies nor their countries of origin.⁸⁵⁸

The maintenance of religious particularities of the Oriental Christians is yet another point of disagreement between the Iraqi churches and the Assyrian diaspora organizations.⁸⁵⁹ Diaspora

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid, 29.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid, 29.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid, 38.

organizations are not interested in these matters. Diaspora organizations are resolutely anti-sectarian. One issue of particular controversy is relations with Judaism. According to Kasha, Oriental Churches continue to hold Jews responsible for the death of Jesus.⁸⁶⁰ According to Kasha: [It is as if the Jews are seeking vengeance from the Oriental Christians. For they still firmly believe that the Jews are those who crucified Jesus with premeditation, while Western Christians are no longer interested in the crucifixion of Jesus].⁸⁶¹ [My translation] Anti-Zionism is thus part and parcel of their identity. Per Kasha: [In the 19th century, global Zionism was established which set about fighting Christianity and Christians through overt and covert oppressive campaigns].⁸⁶²

In contrast, diaspora organizations are not interested in these religious feuds. Inter-church relations are another point of difference between Iraqi churchmen and the diaspora organization. This is evidenced by Kasha's numerous attacks against the Pope, accusing him of not caring for Jesus by refusing to hold the Jews accountable for his killing. Kasha indirectly stakes the claim that the identity of Oriental Christians is preserved by setting it up against a hostile and lesser other. This applies to members of other religions as it does to different denominations. The anti-sectarian message of the diaspora organizations indicates that they are

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid, 22.

⁸⁶¹ The full quote reads as follows:

و كأن اليهود يتأرون من المسيحيين المشرقيين إذ هم زالوا يؤمنون بعقيدة راسخة بأن اليهود هم الذين صلبوا السيد المسيح عن سبق إصرار, في حين ان المسيحيون الغربيون لم يعد يهمهم صلب المسيح

[It is as if the Jews are seeking vengeance from the Oriental Christians. For they still firmly believe that the Jews are those who crucified Jesus with premeditation, while Western Christians are no longer interested in the crucifixion of Jesus]

⁸⁶² The quote reads as follows:

في القرن التاسع عشر نشأت الصهيونية العالمية التي راحت تقارع المسيحية و المسيحيين بحملات اضطهادية خفية و علانية
[In the 19th century, global Zionism was established which set about fighting Christianity and Christians through overt and covert oppressive campaigns]

not keen to wade into inter-church disputes. Those who are inclined to emphasize their religious identity are not doing so from the perspective of the Syriac Catholic Church.

Another point of difference between the Oriental churchmen, and the diaspora organizations relates to inter-church conflicts. According to Kasha, the synods that Pope Benedict XVI established for Middle Eastern Christians were nothing more than talking shops. Thus, Oriental Churches attempt to prove their unique identity by asserting their superiority over clergymen within the same denomination.⁸⁶³ This is evidenced by Kasha's statement:

[The Catholic Church held a synod for the Oriental Christians opened in person by Pope Benedict XVI... I was not excited for that synod nor did I pay attention to it...I had no hopes for that synod and what happened in it and around it, as I was certain that it was like the previous synods].⁸⁶⁴

While Kasha did not cite his claim of representing Oriental Christianity on that matter, when he wrote his book his position was a bishop in the Syriac Catholic Church. Moreover, he continued to hold that position until his death, five years after the publication of his comments. In addition, he maintained his teaching positions in universities and religious seminaries. This proves that Kasha's religious views hold currency in his church. There are two ways of squaring this circle. Either Kasha was not being truthful when he claimed that other members of Oriental Churches shared his views. Or, his views are shared by a minority of clergymen from other

⁸⁶³ Ibid, 34.

⁸⁶⁴ According to Kasha:

اقامت الكنيسة الكاثوليكية من أجل مسيحيي المشرق سينودس افتتحه بشخص البابا بينديكتوس السادس عشر... و في واقع الحال لم أكن متحمساً لهذا السينودس و لم أرعه اهتماماً... لم اكن اعلق آمالاً جسيمة على السينودس و ما دار فيه و حوله اذ كنت على يقين بأنه مثل سابقه من السينودسات

[The Catholic Church held a synod for the Oriental Christians opened in person by Pope Benedict XVI...In fact I was not excited for that synod nor did I pay attention to it...I had no hopes for that synod and what happened in it and around it, as I was certain that it was like the previous synods].

Oriental Churches. Ultimately these claims represent another point of contention for the various ethnic groups.

The religious particularities of Oriental Christians are not seen by the diaspora organizations as essential to their ethnic identity. This is a stance to which Kasha took exception. Oriental Christianity is defined by its customs and traditions. When its adherents migrate to the West, these traditions and customs are forgotten. Kasha argued that it is an [indirect killing of Oriental Christianity]. [My translation].⁸⁶⁵ These societal pressures will be too much for Oriental Christians to bear, and as a result, they will join churches that have completely different beliefs and social norms. Kasha is particularly concerned by the sustained efforts of the Evangelical Churches to convert Oriental Christians. He deems these churches to be of completely different creeds than those of Oriental Churches and thus represent a mortal threat to the identity of their adherents. Kasha is quite repulsed by the Church of Latter-Day Saints i.e. the Mormon Church which he deems as being of utterly alien nature and thus particularly destructive to the identity of Oriental Christians.⁸⁶⁶⁸⁶⁷

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has made use of Horowitz's theory on ethnicity to elucidate ethnic cleavages among Iraqis in general, and Christian Iraqis specifically. Iraqi Christians are by no means a monolithic bloc. Rather, they vary widely in terms of how they self-identify. Some call themselves Assyrians in reference to their aboriginal heritage while others see the same term

⁸⁶⁵ The full quote reads as follows:

و هذا الارتحال و الاغتراب هو قتل غير مباشر للمسيحية الشرقية و أبنائها حيث تموت في نفوسهم عاداتهم و تقوسهم و تقالديهم

[and this migration and alienation is an indirect killing of Oriental Christianity and its sons as within them dies their habits, customs, and traditions]

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid, 22.

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid, 24.

reflecting their church denomination. Religious cleavages are one of the primary ethnic markers of Iraq's Christian community. The Chaldean identity reflects the emphasis on the religious aspect of ethnicity, as opposed to other cultural commonalities with Iraq's different Christian ethnicities. **Linguistic divides are another key differentiator** between these ethnicities. These different ethnic groups have accordingly carved out for themselves different roles during key historical moments, which in turn reinforced the variances between the ethnicities. Political divides are yet more identity markers that differentiate ethnic groups, irrespective of their religious commonalities. These different ethnic groups are also represented in the diaspora, which has directly affected their ability to lobby on behalf of their compatriots in Iraq.

Ethnicities are by no means fixed, as the markers on which they are predicated can constantly change in tandem with a shift in power relations. Iraq's ethno-sectarian system has hardened ethnic tensions, while not offering proper representation or decent governance. Following Horowitz's conceptualization of ethnicity, an alternative to this critical situation exists. Electoral laws need to be rewritten so that parties are forced to appeal to Iraq's different ethnicities. What Iraq sorely lacks is an effective judiciary, as well as its empowerment so that its decisions can be executed. This change in the power relations governing the country necessitates a complete overhauling of post-invasion Iraq. Otherwise, Christian Iraqis, along with Iraqis of other religions will vote with their feet and continue to emigrate. This desire to emigrate on the part of Iraqis is correlated with their lack of trust in their leadership. It is also correlated with their belief that the Iraqi state will fail to properly manage future conflicts and security threats. Christian Iraqis who have emigrated have long been engaged in the reworking of their identities, focusing on their ethnic commonalities. Conversely, the saliency of their religious identities, especially for members of smaller churches, will decrease or even cease to exist.

Chapter 5: Conclusion: Shifts in Ethnicities and their Consequences.

This thesis argues that ultimately, the failure to counter IS's ethnic project rests partially on the limitations of IIP's ethnicity. This hypothesis has been proven, in a multifaceted approach in this study. This final chapter concludes this thesis via a two-pronged approach: First by providing a summary argumentation of each chapter, and second, by showing how **the topics discussed in different chapters interrelate**. Contemporary Iraq is a constitutional democracy, endowed with a highly educated population as well as an abundance of renewable and non-renewable resources. It is also plagued with civil unrest, a dysfunctional government, and constant foreign interventions. Iraqi democracy is highly corrupt **and a factor in alighting ethnic conflicts**. The government does not have a monopoly on violence. Rather, it alternatively competes with and submits to sectarian and ethnic militias. The oil-rich country suffers from constant power outages. The population of what was historically known as Mesopotamia, the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates, suffers from an acute lack of potable water. The population is segmented along ethno-sectarian lines. This study attempts to explain how the country arrived at such a situation.

The first step in clarifying the present situation is the **second chapter's explanation of fundamentalist rationality**. It lurks behind Iraq's current divisive politics. Fundamentalism is characterized by a particular form of rationalization, whereby value rationality takes precedence over other forms of rationality. The reliance on charismatic authority is a constant in fundamentalist organizations and states. However, fundamentalists can rely on other forms of authority as well. A theoretical innovation of this thesis is the conceptualizing of fundamentalism as a spectrum as applied to Iraq, which further speaks to the originality of the thesis. Fundamentalists believe in an exclusive link to a past golden age. It is this belief that is malleable. This desire to construct an exclusive connection to the golden age corresponds with

an ever-expanding conceptualization of blasphemy. This in turn leads to splinters within fundamentalist groups. The bowdlerization of different religious traditions leads to the rise of new fundamentalisms. Ibn Taymiyah, Qutb, and Al-Qaradawi invented different forms of fundamentalism by bowdlerizing different religious traditions. When Bin Laden developed a narrower, more exclusive link to a golden age, he splintered Wahhabis. This process was further reinforced with the rise of IS. A crucial addition of this chapter to the literature is the development of a theoretical lens to compare different fundamentalisms, in terms of their geneses and divergences. Bowdlerization accounts for the rise of new fundamentalisms, while the construction of evermore exclusive links to a previous golden age corresponds with internal splits within fundamentalisms.

The second chapter explores the key personalities who have developed fundamentalist rationalizations in the name of Islam. It defines fundamentalism using Martin E. Marty's approach. **Fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon, acting as a counterpoint to both traditionalism and modernism.** Fundamentalists seek a dominant role for religion. More specially, fundamentalists seek to empower new interpretations of religion. The fundamentalist reading of religion is predicated on bowdlerization. **Max Weber's theories on rationality formed the theoretical framework for this paper's study of the rationalization of fundamentalists. The rationalization of fundamentalists was further examined through Fukuyama's theorization on how the desire for recognition and dignity shapes collective identities.** The fundamentalist rationalizations of the Islamic State (IS) and the Iraqi Islamic Party's (IIP) greatly overlapped. However, their political projects were opposites. This correlates with the IIP's lackluster challenge to IS regarding its designs on Iraq's Christian minority. The thesis provides this ethnic analysis without utilizing the Western's conceptualization of tribalism.

Hence, its alternative explanation of rationalization, is a counterpoint to Juergenmeyer's theorization on religious terrorism and its perceived complete irrationality.

The third chapter argued that state-building is a key element of IS and the IIP's conflict management processes. It further argued that the lacunae in IIP's state-building project, regarding ethnic conflicts, paved the way for IS's alternative state-building project. Ethnicity is predicated upon indigenous indicators. Ethnicity is perceived by this thesis as having a dual nature: It is an ideal type and simultaneously has a presence on the ground, which imperfectly reflects it. Ethnicity is predicated upon group behavior, shared beliefs, and inherent structures, which do not fully overlap in terms of perceptions and actions. Both IS and the IIP's ethnic identities were partially constructed on the belief in the establishment of a just rule through a greater role of Islam in governance. At the same time, ethnicity has been utilized as an instrument of marginalization by Iraq's rulers.

Habermas provides a theoretical lens by which the relationship between states' legitimation and their management of ethnicity can be addressed. The chapter addresses key religious concepts which have a significant bearing on self-proclaimed Islamic groups. They pertain to their identity, their relationship with the other, and how they seek to implement their religious beliefs. By comparing and contrasting how the IIP and IS define these concepts, this chapter has shed some light on the identity and practices of these two groups, using their own language. Habermas's theorizing on communicative rationality shows how IS and the IIP reinforce each other's religious messages, regarding their religious paragons.

The fourth chapter utilized Donald Horowitz's theory on ethnic groups in conflict to examine how Iraqi Christians manage their conflicting ethnicities. Ethnicity is defined by

Horowitz as a belief in collective belonging. This belief engenders the contrast effect. The Iraqi Christian community is by no means a monolithic bloc. Rather, it is segmented into different ethnic groupings which pertain to different religious, cultural, and linguistic markers. These divides have been reflected in the political choices taken by competing segments of the community. These ethnic cleavages also color Iraqi Christians' relations with the Iraqi state, as well as other sub-state actors. The ethnic identities of Iraqi Christians are in constant flux. Due in no small part to the pressures of exile, Iraqi Christians are reconceptualizing their identity in a manner that emphasizes their cultural heritage as opposed to their religious cleavages. In no small part due to their frustration with the political process, and their self-proclaimed leaders, many Iraq Christians are choosing the path of permanent exile. The multiplicity of ethnicities exogenously referred to as Iraqi Christians continue to witness a dramatic decline in their adherents. Should this trend continue, this decline will become terminal.

Appendix A: Christian candidates and their lists for the Iraqi parliamentary elections that took place on October 10, 2021⁸⁶⁸



Translation:

Teal: The Christians of Baghdad.

Number of seats 1

Number of candidates 9

Number of males: 3

Number of females: 6

Blue: The Christians of Nineveh.

Number of seats: 1

Number of candidates: 6

Number of males: 4

Number of females: 2

Purple: The Christians of Kirkuk.

Number of seats: 1

⁸⁶⁸ Naseem Sadiq, "The Christians Quota in the Iraqi Parliament Elections," SBS Assyrian, September 26, 2021, <https://www.sbs.com.au/language/assyrian/en/podcast-episode/the-christians-quota-in-the-iraqi-parliament-elections/oe0zqh3xs>.

Number of candidates:5

Number of males: 4

Number of females: 1

Red: The Christians of Dohuk.

Number of seats: 1

Number of candidates: 6

Number of males: 5

Number of females: 1

Violet: The Christians of Erbil

Number of seats: 1

Number of candidates: 8

Number of males: 5

Number of females: 3

Poppy Red: The Sabeen Mandeans of Baghdad. Number of seats: 1

Number of candidates: 8

Number of males: 7

Number of females: 1

Mustard: The Shabaks of Nineveh.

Number of seats: 1

Number of candidates: 1

Number of males: 8

Number of females: 0

Yellow: The Yazidis of Nineveh.

Number of seats: 1

Number of candidates: 7

Number of males: 7

Number of females: 0

Green: The Faylis [Shiite Kurds] of Waasit. Number of seats: 1

Number of candidates: 10

Number of males: 10


Number of females: 0

Total: 67

Males: 53


Females: 14

Appendix B: Major Christian Denominations in Iraq⁸⁶⁹



⁸⁶⁹ Suheil Kasha, الهجرة و التجذر بين المشرقين [Oriental Christians between Becoming Rooted and Immigration] op.cit., 41-42.

Appendix C: A Map of Modern-Day Lebanon⁸⁷⁰



⁸⁷⁰ JRC, "Lebanon Base Map," Archive, Wikimedia Commons, January 21, 2013, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lebanon_Base_Map.png.

Appendix D: A Map of Modern-Day Syria⁸⁷¹



⁸⁷¹ David Dean Commins, “Syria | History, People, & Maps |,” Britannica, May 27, 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria>.

Appendix E: A Map of Modern-Day Iraq⁸⁷²



⁸⁷² Klaus Kästle, “Map of Iraq,” Nations Online Project, 2022, https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/iraq_map.htm.

Appendix F: A Map of Modern-Day Turkey⁸⁷³




⁸⁷³ Klaus Kästle, “Political Map of Turkey,” Nations Online Project, 2022, <https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/turkey-map.htm>.

Appendix G: The Decline of the Ottoman Empire from the 18th to the 20th Century. ⁸⁷⁴



⁸⁷⁴ Wayfair.ca, “World History Wall Maps - Decline of Ottoman Empire,” Wayfair.ca, accessed August 21, 2022, <https://www.wayfair.ca/school-furniture-and-supplies/pdp/universal-map-world-history-wall-maps-decline-of-ottoman-empire-zo1318.html>.

Appendix H: The Fatmids at Their Zenith⁸⁷⁵



Translation: Inset box states: The political fragmentation of the Islamic countries in the year 391 Hijri (1000 CE)

Turquoise: Countries ruled by the Umayyad kings in Cordoba

Green: Countries ruled by Fatimid kings in Cairo

Beige: Counties nominally under the Abbasid rule in Baghdad

Note: The Arabian Peninsula is marked as the Qarmatian State (against the Abbasid Caliphate for 36 years)

Pink: The Byzantine Empire


⁸⁷⁵ Gifex.com, “The Fatimid Caliphate 909–1171,” Gifex.com, January 5, 2019, https://www.gifex.com/fullsize-en/2009-12-31-11551/The_Fatimid_Caliphate_9091171.html.

Appendix I: IS at the Height of Its Powers⁸⁷⁶




⁸⁷⁶ Zack Beauchamp, Max Fisher, and Dylan Matthews, “27 Maps That Explain the Crisis in Iraq,” vox.com, August 8, 2014, <https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-iraq>.

Appendix J: Iraq's Demographic Divides ⁸⁷⁷



877 Ibid.

Appendix K: This Thesis's Theoretical Frameworks



Appendix L: Fundamentalist Groups, their Founders, and the Authority they Appeal to

Fundamentalist Groups and their Founders	Types of Authority they Appeal to
Ibn Taymiyah	Charismatic
Ibn Abd Al Wahaab	Charismatic + Traditional
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Charismatic + Rational-Legal + Traditional
Qutb	Charismatic + Rational-Legal
Bin Laden	Charismatic + Rational-Legal
IS	Charismatic + Rational-Legal
Al-Qaradawi	Charismatic + Rational-Legal

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