

**NATIONS WITHIN A STATE AND THE EMERGING HYDROCARBONS  
INDUSTRY IN UGANDA**

**SHINGIRAI TAODZERA**

Thesis Submitted to the University of Ottawa in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in International Development

School of International Development and Globalisation Studies (SIDGS)

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Ottawa

© Shingirai Taodzera, Ottawa, Canada, 2020

## ABSTRACT

This research investigates the shifting political settlements between the Ugandan state and the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms after the discovery of oil between 2007 and 2018. It seeks to answer the following questions using a historically, theoretically, and empirically grounded investigation: *What accounts for the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to benefit substantially from the discovery of oil on its territory? What lessons can be learnt from the Buganda kingdom's relative success in negotiating with the central government and developing its own political and economic capacity independently of the state?*

The Bunyoro kingdom, located in the oil-rich Albertine Graben region of western Uganda, has failed to access significant economic benefits from the country's emerging oil sector despite its historical ownership of the land on which the resource is found. This dissertation combines political settlements theory and the concept of extraversion to explain this empirical puzzle. It finds that the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM)'s imposition of an exclusive political settlement in Uganda, coupled with the Bunyoro kingdom's limited *holding power*, accounts for the kingdom's failure to derive financial benefits from the oil sector. The relative marginalisation of the Bunyoro from Uganda's oil sector results from the NRM's historical strategy of limiting the power of sub-state groups who are subsequently excluded from the governing coalition. The main beneficiaries of the oil industry in Uganda are political elites within the ruling NRM coalition and their close associates. The Buganda kingdom serves as a control case study and reveals the potential strategies and structural changes the Bunyoro kingdom could pursue to potentially bypass Uganda's exclusive settlement and therefore benefit from the country's nascent oil sector.

This dissertation also engages with broader debates on the struggles between the state and traditional kingdoms since independence in sub-Saharan Africa and how this intersects with the politics of natural resource governance. Since the inception of the modern state in the colonial era, kingdoms have engaged in a complex and dialogic relationship of indifference, cooperation, and contention with successive governing regimes. Some of the kingdoms challenged and resisted, albeit unsuccessfully the colonial imposition of a central state primarily because it led to their loss of political and economic power. Ultimately, the state and the kingdoms represent dual forms of nationality forced to co-exist in the post-colonial era, and this produces a complex mix of cooperation, contestation and *strategic coexistence*. The management and exploitation of natural resources, including oil, is embedded in this political context, and is often associated with adverse outcomes, such as rent-seeking, authoritarian governance, and sectarian violence. Some of these dynamics have accompanied the emergence of Uganda's new oil industry, with political contestation occurring between the state and the Bunyoro kingdom which has unsuccessfully attempted to capture a share of oil revenue.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is the product of years of guidance, support, and investment kindly conferred to me by several people and institutions. I am profoundly grateful to my supervisor Professor Rita Abrahamsen for her expert supervision and mentorship since my journey to attaining a PhD began in 2015. Thank you for your diligent support through the many stages of developing this research project and for your invaluable insight which brought this final product to fruition. I am also very thankful to the members of my dissertation committee Drs. Timothy Shaw and Chris Huggins for their excellent guidance and unwavering encouragement of my academic progress. I'd like to also thank the staff members of the School of International Development and Globalisation Studies at the University of Ottawa for all their administrative assistance throughout the duration of my studies.

This PhD would also not have been possible without funding. I would like to extend my gratitude to the Ontario Trillium Scholarship (OTS) Programme, whose generous scholarship enabled me to study at the University of Ottawa, the Mellon Mays Fellowship and the Social Sciences Research Council-Mellon Mays Graduate Initiatives Programmes (SSRC-MMGIP) for years of financial and professional support, and the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation (WWNFF) for the research and dissertation completion scholarships that enabled me to conduct field research in Uganda and complete this dissertation, respectively.

I am also exceedingly thankful to everyone who made my fieldwork experience in Uganda exceptional: Dr. and Mrs. Nkuuhe for welcoming me into their home and supporting me throughout my stay, the staff at the Centre for Basic Research, especially Mr. Dancan Muhanguzi, who provided a professional home and generous assistance with the various aspects of field research in Uganda, and my friends whose

companionship and support made my stay in Uganda memorable. I would also like to thank Makerere University's Research Ethics Board, the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST), the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU), Dr. Pamela Mbabazi from the Uganda National Planning Commission (UNPC), and the Uganda Commission of Inquiry Into Land Matters for granting my requests for research permission and access to information.

I am also grateful to all the interviewees and research participants who accommodated my requests for interviews despite their busy schedules. They include the staff of oil companies, non-governmental organisations, journalists and public intellectuals, legislators, officials from the Government of Uganda, and the leadership of the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms.

I have also benefitted from the support of several friends and colleagues over the years and would like to acknowledge some of them here: Gerald Bareebe, and Gino Vlavonou who offered constructive feedback on my work, and Nadege Compaore and Nathan Andrews for the sage advice and inspiration, and my colleagues at the Freedom Project at Wellesley College, especially our director Dr. Kathryn 'Cappy' Lynch for the kind and generous support for my academic and professional growth. Many thanks to Dr. Craig Murphy for the continuous encouragement and faith in my academic potential. To my wonderful friends Drs. T. Cushman and Inela Selimovic: here's the fruit of your unwavering support, encouragement, and years-long investment into my academics and life in general. I am eternally grateful.

To my parents, Mr. Dzinoreva and Mrs. Evas Taodzera, my siblings, Alex, Tatenda, Audrey and Blessing, thank you for your prayers and support over the years, through a seemingly endless quest to attain an education, as I sought to attain the first PhD in our family. *Ndinotenda zvikuru, Mwari vakuitirei nyasha.*

## **ABBREVIATIONS USED**

**ACODE:** Advocates Coalition for Development and the Environment

**AFIEGO:** Africa Institute for Energy Governance

**AGRC:** Albertine Graben Refinery Consortium

**ANARDE:** Advocates for Natural Resources and Development

**AUGOS:** Association of Oil and Gas Service Providers

**AusAID:** Australian Aid

**BBC:** Bunyoro Business Club

**BEAC:** British's East Africa Company

**BICUL:** Buganda Investments and Commercial Undertakings

**BUCADEF:** Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation

**CCEC:** Central Civil Education Committee

**CCM:** Chama Cha Mapinduzi

**CMI:** Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence

**CNOOC:** China National Offshore Oil Company

**COSASE:** Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises

**CPF:** Central Processing Facility

**CRED:** Civic Response on Environment and Development

**CRSG:** China Railway Seventh Group

**CSCOG:** Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas

**CSO:** Civic Society Organisation

**DFID:** Department for International Development

**DGF:** Democracy and Governance Fund

**DP:** Democratic Party

**DRC:** Democratic Republic of Congo

- EACOP:** East African Crude Oil Pipeline
- ESO:** External Security Organisation
- FDC:** Forum for Democratic Change
- FIA:** Financial Intelligence Authority
- FRONASA:** Front for National Salvation
- FUNA:** Former Uganda National Army
- GDP:** Gross Domestic Product
- GLISS:** Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies
- HKPPP:** Hoima-Kampala Petroleum Products Pipeline
- HMS:** Hermannsburg Mission Society
- HOGL:** Heritage Oil and Gas Limited
- IGG:** Inspector General of Government
- IMF:** International Monetary Fund
- ISO:** Internal Security Organisation
- KY:** Kabaka Yekka
- LC:** Local Councils
- LDU:** Local Defence Units
- LPG:** Liquefied Petroleum Gas
- MEMD:** Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development
- MPLA:** People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
- NGO:** Non-Governmental Organisation
- NIE:** New Institutional Economics
- NIMBY:** Not-In-My-Backyard
- NORAD:** Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
- NRA:** National Resistance Army
- NRM:** National Resistance Movement

**NSD:** National Supplier Database

**NSSF:** National Social Security Fund

**OECD-DAC:** Organisation for Economic Cooperation,  
Christian Aid, and Development's Development Assistance Committee

**ODA:** Official Development Assistance

**OSISA:** Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa

**PAP:** Project Affected Persons

**PAU:** Petroleum Authority of Uganda

**PDP:** People's Progressive Party

**PFOG:** Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas

**PPP:** Public-Private Partnership

**PPU:** Presidential Protection Unit

**PSA:** Production Service Agreements

**RAP:** Resettlement Actions Plans

**SAP:** Structural Adjustment Programme

**SFC:** Special Forces Command

**SFG:** Special Forces Group

**SRB:** State Research Bureau

**UFM:** Uganda Freedom Movement

**UN:** United Nations

**UNCST:** Uganda National Council for Science and Technology

**UNLF:** Uganda National Liberation Front

**UNOC:** Uganda National Oil Company

**UNRA:** Uganda National Roads Authority

**UPC:** Uganda People's Congress

**UPDF:** Uganda People's Defence Forces

**UPF:** Uganda Police Force

**UPM:** Uganda People's Movement

**URA:** Uganda Revenue Authority

**USAID:** United States Agency for International Development

**UTT:** Uganda Tax Tribunal

**LIST OF TABLES**

**Table 1**, Chapter 4. Graphical representation of ethnic and regional representation in Milton Obote's government, pg. 99

**STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY**

I hereby certify that all the work contained in this dissertation is the original work of the author. Any published and unpublished work derived from the work of others are fully acknowledged according to standard referencing practices.

**Shingirai L. Taodzera**

**May 2020.**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b><u>ABSTRACT .....</u></b>	<b><u>ii</u></b>
<b><u>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....</u></b>	<b><u>iv</u></b>
<b><u>ABBREVIATIONS USED .....</u></b>	<b><u>vi</u></b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>x</b>
<b><u>STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY.....</u></b>	<b><u>xi</u></b>
<b><u>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .....</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>
<b>CASE STUDY JUSTIFICATION: THE GOVERNMENT, BUNYORO AND THE BUGANDA KINGDOMS .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>DATA COLLECTION AND FIELDWORK.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>LIMITATIONS DURING FIELDWORK AND REFLECTIONS ON POSITIONALITY.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>DATA ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>CHAPTER OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b><u>CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .....</u></b>	<b><u>27</u></b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>THE IMPLICATIONS OF UGANDA'S EMERGING OIL SECTOR.....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>COLONIAL STATEHOOD AND TRADITIONAL KINGDOMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>TRADITIONAL KINGDOMS AND DUAL NATIONALITY IN POST-COLONIAL POLITICS.....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>TRADITIONAL KINGDOMS AND EXTRACTIVE NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>62</b>
<b><u>CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....</u></b>	<b><u>64</u></b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>A POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS CRITIQUE OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>TYPOLGY OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS .....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, POLITICAL IDENTITIES, POWER, AND INSTITUTIONS .....</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>JUSTIFYING THE ANALYTICAL VALUE OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS APPROACH.....</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>INCORPORATING THE CONCEPT OF EXTRAVERSION .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>91</b>
<b><u>CHAPTER 4: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE STATE, THE BUGANDA AND BUNYORO KINGDOMS.....</u></b>	<b><u>93</u></b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>THE BUGANDA KINGDOM'S CENTRAL ROLE IN THE COLONIAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT .....</b>	<b>94</b>

THE BUGANDA KINGDOM’S CENTRAL ROLE IN THE FIRST POST-COLONIAL INCLUSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.....	97
THE BUGANDA KINGDOM’S MARGINALISATION FROM IDI AMIN’S EXCLUSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT .....	103
THE NRA’S SUCCESSFUL GUERRILLA WAR AND THE RESTORATION OF KINGDOMS .....	108
MAPPING THE POST-OIL EXCLUSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN UGANDA .....	120
CONCLUSION .....	139
<b><u>CHAPTER 5: THE POLITICS OF GOVERNING UGANDA’S OIL SECTOR.....</u></b>	<b>141</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	141
THE MANIFESTATIONS OF OIL .....	142
FINDING COMMERCIAL OIL DEPOSITS IN UGANDA .....	145
THE OIL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK AND IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIVE SETTLEMENT .....	153
OIL COMPANIES, NGOs AND HOST COMMUNITIES: STRATEGIC CO-EXISTENCE AND MARGINALISATION.....	167
CONCLUSION .....	180
<b><u>CHAPTER 6: THE BUNYORO KINGDOM AND THE NRM’S EXCLUSIVE SETTLEMENT AFTER OIL .....</u></b>	<b>182</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	182
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE BUNYORO KINGDOM AND DIMINISHED HOLDING POWER .....	183
THE EMERGENCE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY AND THE BUNYORO KINGDOM’S UNMET EXPECTATIONS.....	195
THE BUNYORO KINGDOM AND THE NRM: FROM CONFRONTATION TO NASCENT STRATEGIC COEXISTENCE.....	199
CONCLUSION .....	208
<b><u>CHAPTER 7: THE BUGANDA AND THE NRM EXCLUSIVE SETTLEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE .....</u></b>	<b>209</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	209
BUGANDA’S POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE AND SOURCES OF POWER .....	210
THE BUGANDA’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS: ‘FEDERO’ AND ‘EBYAFFE’ .....	223
THE BUGANDA KINGDOM AND THE NRM REGIME: FROM CONFRONTATION TO STRATEGIC COEXISTENCE.....	231
CONCLUSION .....	244
<b><u>CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION .....</u></b>	<b>246</b>
NATIONS WITHIN A STATE VS. THE DURABILITY OF NRM REGIME .....	247
BUNYORO’S MARGINALISATION AND ATTEMPTS AT STRATEGIC COEXISTENCE .....	250
THE BUGANDA KINGDOM’S STRATEGIC COEXISTENCE AND ENDURING FISSURES WITH GOVERNMENT .....	252
THE OIL COMPLEX, CENTRALISED CONTROL, STRATEGIC COEXISTENCE, AND MARGINALITY .....	255
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS .....	258
AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH.....	263

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>265</b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 1: FORMAL INTERVIEWS LIST.....</u></b>	<b><u>286</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 2: RECRUITMENT NOTICE.....</u></b>	<b><u>289</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEWEE CONSENT FORM .....</u></b>	<b><u>290</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 4: UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA RESEARCH ETHICS CERTIFICATE .....</u></b>	<b><u>294</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 5: UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA RESEARCH ETHICS CERTIFICATE RENEWAL .....</u></b>	<b><u>296</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 6: INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION IN UGANDA .....</u></b>	<b><u>297</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 7: RESEARCH CLEARANCE, UGANDA NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.....</u></b>	<b><u>299</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 8: RESEARCH CLEARANCE, PETROLEUM AUTHORITY OF UGANDA</u></b>	<b><u>300</u></b>
<b><u>APPENDIX 8: RESEARCH CLEARANCE, PARLIAMENT OF UGANDA.....</u></b>	<b><u>301</u></b>

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Traditional kingdoms,<sup>1</sup> a prominent feature of post-colonial African societies, have shaped the evolution of state formation to varying degrees.<sup>2</sup> In Uganda, two powerful kingdoms play a central role in the country's politics: Buganda and the Bunyoro, the largest and second largest kingdoms in terms of territory and population size, respectively. These kingdoms have had complex relationships with successive colonial and post-colonial regimes, that oscillate between cooperation, contestation, and indifference. Uganda's central government has managed to keep the kingdoms' political power and influence in check, restraining their influence to ensure the governing regime's hegemonic control over the state.

The discovery of oil in the Albertine Graben region of western Uganda in 2006, on land occupied and owned by the Bunyoro kingdom since the pre-colonial era, had the potential to unsettle the distribution of power between the state and the country's kingdoms by elevating the Bunyoro's political profile and access to material wealth. However, the Kingdom has yet to realise any meaningful benefits from the oil sector. This research seeks to demystify this seemingly paradoxical outcome by analysing the interactions between features of Uganda's political system and the Bunyoro kingdom's relative power and capacity to access oil rents between 2007 and 2018. This eleven year-period under evaluation affords sufficient time to capture the impact of

---

<sup>1</sup> This dissertation uses the term 'kingdom' to refer to the monarchical leadership of each traditional kingdom. This does not, however imply socio-political homogeneity. Chapters 6 and 7, which provide in-depth discussions of the kingdoms' engagement with the state demonstrate the fissures that exist in each of the kingdoms, showing the existence of the different groups that are often in contention with each other.

<sup>2</sup> This dissertation uses the term 'state' to refer to the governing regime in charge of public institutions and arms of government. It defines the state in terms of the political settlements theory's definition of a governing coalition. Chapter 4, which discusses the governing coalition in Uganda demonstrates the various organisations that constitute Uganda's governing coalition.

Uganda's emerging oil sector on the country's political economy and the accompanying dynamics between the state and traditional kingdoms. Despite the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in 2007, Uganda still has not produced oil for the market. Notably, the industry standard from discovery to exploitation is typically a period of five years.<sup>3</sup>

The research questions that guide this inquiry are as follows:

*What accounts for the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to benefit substantially from the discovery of oil on its territory? What lessons can be learnt from the Buganda kingdom's relative success in negotiating with the central government and developing its own political and economic capacity independently of the state?*

This dissertation employs the theoretical framework of political settlements. Rooted in Institutional Studies, this approach critiques analyses which regard institutions as the singular determinant of political and economic outcomes in developing countries. Political settlements theory is attributed to the work of Mushtaq Khan and is increasingly employed in the study of various topics in African development. Khan defines a "political settlement" as the distribution of power between social groups or organisations in a society; arguing that the informal agreements and struggles between powerful groups determine how formal political and economic institutions function.<sup>4</sup> A settlement must be discernible over an extended time period, with its durable and self-reproducing existence denoting a form of equilibrium between the

---

<sup>3</sup> Christian Wolf, 'The Petroleum Sector Value Chain' (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Mushtaq Khan, "Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions," Unpublished Paper, School of Oriental Studies, 2010, 1–139; Mushtaq Khan, "Class, Clientelism, and Communal Politics in Contemporary Bangladesh," in *The Making of History: Essays Presented to Irfan Habib* (London: Anthem Press, 1995); Mushtaq H. Khan, "Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions," *African Affairs* 117, no. 469 (2017): 636–655.

powerful organisations and/or groups in a society.<sup>5</sup> Although political settlements are categorised in various ways in the literature, the three primary typologies can be categorised as: inclusive, exclusive, and transitional.<sup>6</sup>

Inclusive settlements incorporate the majority of a country's social groups and are characterised by strong public institutions that ensure transparency, accountability, and a meritocratic, rule-based and efficient governance framework.<sup>7</sup> Inclusive settlements are associated with broad-based developmental outcomes resulting from an open political space which allows for pluralistic participation of the governed, consistent with Western democratic political systems. Exclusive settlements, on the other hand, are narrower, with few elite social groups controlling political power. These settlements are often sustained by patronage, rent seeking, and are associated with weak institutions. Exclusive settlements are characterised by weak economies and poor developmental outcomes. A transitional settlement denotes a period of ongoing redistribution of power between groups and is characterised by instability. A transitional settlement can include elections, coups d'état, and/or defections in a governing regime that lead to previously excluded group(s) gaining more power.

I add a fourth sub-category to the three types of political settlement identified in the literature called 'strategic coexistence' wherein marginalised social groups existing within an exclusive political settlement develop their political and economic capacity within the rules of the governing coalition but without seeking to alter the distribution of power in the interim. I argue that strategic coexistence facilitates a better understanding of the methods that excluded organisations use to influence changes to the configurations of power, towards a transitional settlement. Strategic coexistence

---

<sup>5</sup> Khan, "Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions."

<sup>6</sup> Tim Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements" (London: Overseas Development Institute London, UK, 2016), 1–8; Khan, "Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions."

<sup>7</sup> Khan, "Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions."

can also help us distinguish between groups that draw benefits of patronage from the governing regime and those that seek to upset the balance of power in the future.

Power is a central feature of the political settlements approach and is generally defined according to its causal and relational aspects. Robert Dahl's definition provides a comprehensive conceptualisation of power in political settlements. Dahl defines power as the ability of one actor or group to influence the actions of another.<sup>8</sup> He identifies three main factors in the constitution of power: (a) sources, a base or domain, which refer to the inert resources such as finances or population size leveraged by actors to alter the behaviour and choices of others; (b) the means or instruments by which resources are exerted, including threats or promises to deploy resources in certain ways; (c) the range or scope of the power, which refers to the multiple forms in which power is deployed.<sup>9</sup>

A key feature of power central to the political settlements approach is the concept of 'holding power.' To 'hold power' signifies the extent of an organisation or group's capacity to successfully compete against others in contests over political and economic goods.<sup>10</sup> Political settlements theory also incorporates historical analysis, viewing the configuration of power between organisations and groups as being grounded in history and shifting over time.<sup>11</sup> The distribution of power is neither static nor path-dependent, but dynamic as social groups gain or lose power. Another feature of the political settlement framework is the identification of individual and group interests and the formation, operation, and fragmentation of political coalitions. This approach

---

<sup>8</sup> Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1 January 1957): 201–15, <https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303>.

<sup>9</sup> Dahl.

<sup>10</sup> Hazel Gray, 'Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019.

<sup>11</sup> Mushtaq Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions', *Unpublished Paper, School of Oriental Studies*, 2010, 1–139.

helps explain the complex interactions between various actors in a polity which result in the development and evolution of political settlements. Thus, the political settlements framework offers an incisive and theoretically supple characterisation of the internal dynamics of a polity.

The framework does not, however, adequately and systematically account for the role of exogenous factors in shaping domestic political outcomes.<sup>12</sup> To resolve this shortcoming, I incorporate Jean Francois Bayart's concept of extraversion into the political settlements framework to analyse how Uganda's governing coalition leverages strategic relationships with external actors to enhance the durability of its coalition. Strategies of extraversion encompass a mixture of acquiescence, collaboration, and resistance.<sup>13</sup> In contemporary Africa, governments and other key players strategically interact with foreign actors to secure financial gain, including bilateral and multilateral donor aid, taxes and fees, and export revenue. Global dynamics have influenced African political economy since the pre-colonial era, with actors employing strategies of extraversion to reach desired outcomes. Contemporaneously, the concept of extraversion identifies how regimes engage dialogically with external actors to strengthen their hold on power.

I use the political settlements framework and theory of extraversion to deductively analyse primary and secondary research evidence. I find that the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to obtain notable financial benefits from the oil sector results from a complex interaction of factors. First and foremost, the durability of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime and its policy of weakening sub-state organisations prevents the establishment of an inclusive political settlement. If the

---

<sup>12</sup> Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Sam Hickey, 'Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda: Towards a Research Agenda.', 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Jean-François Bayart, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion," *African Affairs* 99, no. 395 (2000): 217–267.

NRM were to afford the Bunyoro kingdom access to the oil sector, this could upset the balance of power by elevating the kingdom's holding power and, by extension, its ability to challenge the governing party. Conceding power to the Bunyoro could also set a precedent and inspire other kingdoms in Uganda to challenge the reigning political coalition and demand concessions, weakening the hegemony of the NRM. The Bunyoro kingdom currently lacks sufficient holding power to challenge the ruling regime because of its weak political and economic institutions, low capacity for political mobilisation, rural geography, internal divisions, and corruption. However, beginning in 2018, the kingdom set forth a series of political and economic reforms designed to improve its holding power and capacity for earning oil-derived revenue through increased market participation.

The Buganda kingdom provides a comparative case to illustrate the dynamics of Uganda's exclusive political settlement. The kingdom played a central role in the formation of the colonial Ugandan state and has demonstrated a capacity to extract political and economic concessions out of the successive central governments in the post-colonial era. The kingdom has made successful use of strategic coexistence and steadily increased their holding power relative to the Bunyoro kingdom. The Buganda kingdom is well-positioned to participate in any future transitional settlement because of its relative holding power. A possible transitional settlement could be brought about by President Museveni's departure from office due to old age or ill health and/or through internal fissures within the ruling coalition. Uganda's exclusive settlement has also compelled other groups that are part of the country's 'oil complex' – outside of the two kingdoms – to practise strategic coexistence. The oil complex describes the patterns of collaboration and competition between the various groups

attracted by the perceived and real benefits of the oil sector.<sup>14</sup> This includes non-governmental organisations, private oil companies, and host communities in oil-rich regions. These actors attempt to draw financial benefit from the oil sector without attempting to upset the ruling coalition's hegemony. Host communities in the rural Albertine Graben region, most of whom are subjects of the Buganda kingdom, remained marginalised from the prevailing political settlement since they lack the resources to participate in the oil economy.

### **Case Study Justification: The Government, Bunyoro and the Buganda Kingdoms**

The present-day impacts of Uganda's hydrocarbon sector must be understood within the context of the country's history and the various struggles between social groups which have produced current political, economic, and institutional outcomes. In this study, I analyse the power struggles between the Ugandan state and the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms. Processes of state formation in Uganda in the post-colonial era have been plagued by unrest, including military coups, dictatorships, armed insurgencies, and now-President Museveni's authoritarian democracy. The NRM assumed office through military coup in 1986 and has retained power since. President Museveni directly oversees and controls the development of the oil industry. Though Uganda's constitution provides the government with political and institutional control of all of Uganda's natural resources, including oil, President Museveni infamously described the resource as "my oil."<sup>15</sup> Apart from President Museveni's role, this study analyses the social actors within the governing NRM regime, and explains how the ruling coalition relates to groups excluded from the regime. The lack of government accountability in Uganda compounds the negative political and

---

<sup>14</sup> Michael J. Watts, 'Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate Social Responsibility', *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.* 30 (2005): 373–407.

<sup>15</sup> Vokes, "The Politics of Oil in Uganda."

economic effects of the oil sector, as depicted in the growing academic and policy literature on the issue.<sup>16</sup>

The NRM's relationship with the country's traditional kingdoms has been one of cooperation, conflict, and strategic coexistence. The kingdoms, particularly the Buganda, engaged the state since the colonial era in an effort to shape the political settlements of successive regimes. The political struggles between the state and the kingdoms continue into the post-oil discovery era. Tensions related to oil (in the Bunyoro's case) and federalism (in Buganda's case) between the government and the kingdoms intensified in the early 2000s and worsened in the post-oil discovery period, particularly between 2009 and 2016. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse these political dynamics against an emerging high-value oil sector.

I selected the Bunyoro kingdom because it is directly affected by the discovery of oil in Uganda, being located at the epicentre of the oil deposits and occupying the land on which the bulk of Uganda's oil resources are found. The Bunyoro kingdom includes the oil-rich towns of Hoima, Kabaale, Masindi, and Buliisa. The Banyoro consider the land in the Albertine Graben region, including its sub-surface resources, to be its historic property.<sup>17</sup> The kingdom, which has a population of approximately 2 million subjects, is the second-largest kingdom in Uganda and was the largest pre-colonial state in the present-day Great Lakes region before the arrival of the British in the late 1800s.<sup>18</sup> The power of the Bunyoro kingdom declined due to a combination of factors: attacks by the British during colonial occupation, internal fissures, its rural location, and the failure to effectively employ its institutions in the promotion of its

---

<sup>16</sup> This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

<sup>17</sup> Luke Patey, "Oil in Uganda - Hard Bargaining and Complex Politics in East Africa" (London: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2015).

<sup>18</sup> G. N. Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited: A Reevaluation of the Decline and Diminishment of an African Kingdom," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 48, no. 1 (2013): 16–34.

political and economic interests in the post-colonial era.<sup>19</sup> The Bunyoro kingdom's relationship with the central government shifted in the post-oil discovery era from violent confrontation to marginality and is now characterised by strategic coexistence. Confrontations occurred mostly from 2009 to 2012 and emanated from the Banyoro's demand for a 30% share of all oil revenues, which was later dropped to 12,5%.<sup>20</sup> The government's official position was that no social group could claim exclusive entitlement to oil revenues in accordance with Article 244 of Uganda's constitution, which vests control of all mineral resources to the central government. The Bunyoro kingdom maintains its desire to access 12,5% of oil rents despite the government's recalcitrance. The kingdom also begun reorganising its political and economic institutions to improve its relative power and thus its bargaining position.

The Buganda kingdom is the largest in Uganda with approximately 10 million subjects. Like the Bunyoro, the Buganda kingdom engaged in violent clashes with the central government in the post-oil discovery era. The kingdom's relative dominance in Ugandan politics dates back to the colonial period when it allied with the British authorities through the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which allowed the British to use Buganda as a base from which it colonised present-day Uganda.<sup>21</sup> The kingdom earned its inclusion in the country's first governing coalition when the Buganda King, Kabaka Mutesa I, became Uganda's first President at independence in 1962, alongside Prime Minister Milton Obote and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) party. The Buganda's subsequent alliance with Museveni and the NRM insurgency between 1980 and 1986, during a major transitional settlement in Uganda, brought the kingdom into

---

<sup>19</sup> John Hugh Marshall Beattie, "Bunyoro: An African Feudality?," *The Journal of African History* 5, no. 1 (1964): 25–36.

<sup>20</sup> David M. Anderson and Adrian J. Browne, "The Politics of Oil in Eastern Africa," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 5, no. 2 (2011): 369–410.

<sup>21</sup> Joe Oloka-Onyango, "The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1997): 173–189.

the post-coup governing coalition, albeit briefly.<sup>22</sup> It has since been edged out of the ruling regime but conducts ongoing negotiations with the central government with relatively more success than the rest of the country's kingdoms, including the Bunyoro. The Buganda kingdom has also leveraged its institutions effectively to develop increased political and economic capacity independent of the state. The Buganda kingdom is not directly impacted by the oil sector like the Bunyoro and thus it merits inclusion into this analysis as a control case. The story of the Buganda kingdom also provides potential lessons for the Bunyoro kingdom in terms of its engagement with the central government vis-à-vis the oil sector.

### **Qualitative Research Methodology**

This dissertation uses a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis. Qualitative analysis is a method of inquiry that focuses on understanding the concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things.<sup>23</sup> This approach is well-suited for studying complex and dynamic social phenomena because of its orientation towards revealing the deeper meanings underlying social structures and observable practices. Case-based qualitative research explores an issue through a setting, context or bounded system(s) over time.<sup>24</sup> The researcher collects data through multiple information sources, conducts analysis, and produces results from the inquiry. Denzin and Lincoln explain this process further:

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world.

It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world

---

<sup>22</sup> Giovanni M. Carbone, "Political Parties in a 'No-Party Democracy' Hegemony and Opposition Under 'Movement Democracy' in Uganda," *Party Politics* 9, no. 4 (2003): 485–501.

<sup>23</sup> Bruce Lawrence Berg and Howard Lune, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 9th ed. (Pearson Boston, MA, 2017).

<sup>24</sup> John Creswell W, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches*, 2nd ed. (Sage Publications, 2007).

visible... They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, qualitative research involves a researcher's immersion in the social, political, and economic context within which their research project is based. They subsequently make interpretations and conclusions on their topic of study, informed by both primary and secondary evidence and experiential knowledge. The researcher can use a deductive approach to interpret collected information through the lens of a theoretical framework.

This study also applies process tracing as a qualitative tool for understanding the causal mechanisms through which the discovery of oil impacts the political dynamics between the central government and the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms in Uganda. Process tracing entails the systematic identification of causal inferences in a sequence of events relevant to the subject under investigation with the purpose of explaining outcomes.<sup>26</sup> The researcher examines the collected data in light of the established theoretical framework and hypotheses guiding the research.<sup>27</sup> Process tracing also involves assessing evidence from a case study to support or disprove analytical explanations that address research questions.<sup>28</sup> A distinctive feature of process tracing is that it prescribes a focus on fine-grained details and testing them for empirical value

---

<sup>25</sup> Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (Sage Publications, 2005).

<sup>26</sup> David Collier, 'Understanding Process Tracing', *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 04 (2011): 823–830.

<sup>27</sup> David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 04 (2011): 823–830.

<sup>28</sup> Andrew Bennett, 'Process Tracing and Causal Inference', in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, Second Edition (United Kingdom: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

to explain causal outcomes.<sup>29</sup> This makes process tracing a useful tool for case-based analysis because it leads to a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter. I used process tracing to dissect the evolution of the political settlement between the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms and the central government in the period before and after the discovery of oil in Uganda. This approach included a historical review of the strategic political engagements between the state and the kingdoms during colonialism, the post-independence era, the National Resistance Army (NRA) insurgency, the establishment of the NRM regime, and the aftermath of oil discovery in 2006.

### **Data Collection and Fieldwork**

I collected data through the study of primary and secondary documents and the conduct of field research in Uganda. Primary documents included archival material, government, and kingdom publications, while secondary sources included books, journal articles, book chapters, and news reports. I also conducted field research in Uganda from January to August 2018 and returned for a follow-up visit in May 2019. I selected informants through varied channels, including by identifying them through their association with organisations or employers involved in the politics of the oil sector in Uganda, as well as through websites, published reports, academic articles, and news reports. Snowball sampling or chain-referrals yielded rewarding interviews due to an increased level of trust and especially considering the sensitivity of issues surrounding the oil sector in Uganda. I used semi-structured, in-depth interviews to gain knowledge from key informants. Formal and informal conversations facilitated a clearer understanding of the nature of the governing settlement in Uganda and key political developments following the discovery of oil. In embedding myself in

---

<sup>29</sup> Bennett.

Ugandan society, I was able to obtain context-specific information on the subject matters under investigation.

The interview questions focused on the effects of the oil discovery, the central government's relationship with the two kingdoms, and the social, political, and economic developments in the post-oil discovery period. I was based in Uganda's capital city, Kampala, and was affiliated with a local think-tank, the Centre for Basic Research (CBR). Kampala, being the capital city and the headquarters of oil companies and civil society organisations, provided increased access to informants. Kampala and its surrounding districts are also within the Buganda kingdom's territory. In addition to semi-structured interviews, I also conducted a focus group with District Natural Resources Officers (DNROs) during a day trip to Masaka, located in the central Buganda region, where several districts have been affected by the construction of oil pipelines and the primary distribution facility for finished oil products.

I also made two separate trips to Hoima, the capital of the Bunyoro kingdom in the western region of Uganda and the epicentre of the oil sector. Most of Uganda's oil wells are in this region, on the shores of Lake Albert. Being in Hoima provided access to informants from the Bunyoro kingdom, oil companies, local political leaders, and civil society activists. A visit to the oil installations was not possible since the government restricts access to the area through use of an elite military unit, the Special Forces Command (SFC). I conducted 54 formal interviews total with key informants from the central government, civil society, oil companies, academia, and the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms.<sup>30</sup> The interviews lasted between 45 minutes to an hour

---

<sup>30</sup> The breakdown is as follows: 20 civil society informants, and this includes directors of non-governmental organisations and journalists, 7 from the Buganda kingdom's leadership, 7 from government agencies, and this includes members of parliament, the state-owned Uganda National Oil Company, the Petroleum Authority of Uganda, and the National Planning Authority. I also interviewed 12 informants from the Bunyoro kingdom's current and former leadership, 4 informants from Total, CNOOC and Tullow oil companies and 4 academics from Makerere University.

depending on the participants' availability. Informants from the central government included retired and current Members of Parliament, officials from the Ministry of Energy and Minerals Development, the National Planning Authority, the District Natural Resources Officers, and District Councillors. I interviewed directors and programme staff of NGOs, whose work focuses on Uganda's political economy in general and the oil sector in particular. I also interviewed a senior official from the Royal Norwegian embassy since the Norwegian government is considerably involved in Uganda's oil sector. I attended workshops in Kampala and Hoima that were hosted by civil society organisations and oil companies and that dealt with issues related to the oil sector.

Other informants included local journalists, businesspeople, and the publisher and owner of a leading weekly newspaper. Oil sector-informants included current and former employees of the four international oil companies, namely Tullow Oil, Total E&P, China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), and the state-owned Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC). The employees were at the executive, mid- and junior staff level. I interviewed academics based at Makerere University, Uganda's largest public university, and current and retired cabinet members from the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms. Some of the informants also supplied primary and secondary data sources, including court petitions, reports, and books.

Furthermore, I monitored the media on an ongoing basis, including by reading daily newspapers and watching television programmes that dealt with national affairs. Informal conversations with people in group settings and individual day-to-day interactions were another crucial source of data which helped to improve my understanding of the country's socio-cultural, political and economic dynamics. This method of data collection included attending social events such as church services, weddings, and family gatherings.

I made digital recordings of some of the interviews and took notes by hand where informants were not comfortable with audio recording. Participants were asked to provide full consent to the interview, data recording and storage techniques, and the information to be used in the research at the outset. Information included their names and other personal identifiers presented in the dissertation. I maintained the interviewees' anonymity upon request and ensured the safety and security of my data to avoid unauthorised access by third parties. Most interviewees preferred anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the subject. I ensured interviewee anonymity by keeping the physical notes under lock and key and maintaining password access on all electronic devices that stored data. I complied with normative conventions and ethical standards in the conduct of field research, as provided for by the University of Ottawa's Research and Ethics Committee and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST).

### **Limitations during fieldwork and reflections on positionality**

Although field research yielded valuable data for this study, I encountered several challenges during my stay in Uganda. Firstly, the Ugandan government imposed stringent requirements for foreign nationals seeking to obtain research permits. The approval process for an ethics application to Makerere University and to the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) for the actual permit is costly, at USD\$300 each and involves considerable bureaucratic delays. Fortunately, I successfully navigated the process with the kind assistance of a colleague from the CBR and obtained the ethics clearance and research permit three months after my arrival in Uganda. Secondly, the CBR was considerably under-resourced due to funding constraints. This presented several challenges such as prolonged electricity and internet outages, an absence of printing services, and limited capacity to assist with procuring interviewees from the various organisations. These were part of

promised affiliation benefits that I ended up not receiving despite paying the required affiliation fees.

Recruiting interviewees from government departments, such as the Parliament (legislators), Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD), Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) and Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC), and the private oil companies (Total E&P, Tullow Oil and China National Offshore Oil Company-CNOOC) also presented several challenges. Most informants were reluctant to be interviewed, even off-record or with a guarantee of anonymity, because of the politically sensitive nature of issues surrounding the oil sector. For example, a prospective interviewee from one of the oil companies indicated that she had circulated my request for an interview throughout the company's head office and her colleagues expressed reluctance with being interviewed because of the likelihood of political backlash and concerns for safety. Some legislators, particularly those who had been subject to politically motivated arrests in the past, declined to be interviewed because due to concerns about the authenticity of my request or their safety. Some prospective participants also requested pecuniary benefits or 'sitting fees' and declined once told this was not possible.

Eventually, I was able to recruit interviewees from the government and oil companies through referrals and snowball sampling, which proved to be the most effective participant recruitment channel because of the trust and rapport built in advance to the meetings. Nevertheless, some interviewees from the oil sector and government tended to self-censor because of their institutional positionality. For example, employees from the oil companies often stated that the relationship between the government and oil companies was cordial despite evidence to the contrary. Likewise, civil servants spoke glowingly of the government's policies and approach to managing the oil sector. Interviewees from the diplomatic sector also declined to

answer some questions that they felt were beyond the ambit of their mandate in Uganda. Being aware of these inherent biases and limitations helped with guiding the interviews in ways that would facilitate the gleaning of useful information, for example, by avoiding sensitive issues or phrasing particular questions differently. I also allowed the interviewees to indicate whether or not they were comfortable discussing particular issues during the conversations.

My identity as a young black scholar of African origin conducting fieldwork from a Canadian institution also came into play in complex ways during fieldwork. It often intersected with some of the challenges indicated above but also provided some advantages. These layers of my personal identity certainly influenced participants' choices to grant me an interview and the nature of the information provided. Recognising the influence of my identity as a researcher is consistent with the auto-ethnographic nature of fieldwork and reflects Gayatri Spivak's important call to reflect on how a researcher's positioning, including socio-economic factors such as race, class, gender, cultural background, geographic origin, as well as institutional factors, influences researcher-participant interactions.<sup>31</sup> For example, some of the informants who were concerned for their safety and the potential of political backlash inquired about my nationality and citizenship, to ensure that I was not, in fact, gathering intelligence for the Ugandan government since I was an African national and spoke with an African accent. Other interviewees expected financial benefits from participating in the interviews because I was conducting research from an academic institution located in the global North. Another informant from the civil society sector indicated that he was sceptical about giving interviews to non-Ugandan researchers from the global North because he believed that they usually 'misrepresented' the state

---

<sup>31</sup> Ilan Kapoor, 'Hyper-self-reflexive Development? Spivak on Representing the Third World "Other"', *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (May 2004): 627-47, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590410001678898>.

of affairs in the country. The interview proceeded only after I assured him that my research design and motivations would guarantee a balanced and well-researched account.

I was also aware of my insider-outsider<sup>32</sup> positionality as a black researcher of African origin but who is not a non-Ugandan national, and how this influenced my interactions with interviewees, presenting both benefits and challenges. Being of African origin provided a basis for building rapport with some of the interviewees who had prior knowledge of issues relating to Zimbabwe or in some cases visited the country. This sense of shared experience and identity also made some participants more relaxed and willing to share information. In other instances, my outsider status as a non-Ugandan and a researcher from a university located in the Global North provided me with credibility in the view of some interviewees who were more willing to grant me an interview and refer me to their contacts due to a perceived higher-class status. In other instances, being a young student of African origin led some individuals to decline an interview appointment due to perceptions of limited potential benefits in meeting with me. Being aware of the varied and shifting impact of my identity and positionality in each interview was instrumental in guiding my interactions conversations with interviewees and thus in obtaining and interpreting the data accurately. I was also able to ensure productive and informative meetings by anticipating and addressing the ways in which these identity-driven dynamics impacted interviewee behaviour.

---

<sup>32</sup> Sonya Corbin Dwyer and Jennifer L. Buckle, 'The Space between: On Being an Insider-Outsider in Qualitative Research', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 8, no. 1 (2009): 54–63.

## Data analysis

I analysed the data using the two primary methods of content analysis and prefigured themes based on my theoretical framework. Content analysis is the systematic examination of communicated and recorded material for overt and latent meaning.<sup>33</sup> The information can be in a written, verbal, or pictorial format. Qualitative content analysis views the material as being influenced by context, including the background of the author and the target audience.<sup>34</sup> In this case study, the context is the political and economic situation in Uganda in the post-oil discovery period, which has spawned written, verbal, and pictorial information. This includes verbal and written statements made by key actors in the government and in the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms about the oil industry or Uganda's political settlement. A content analysis of this information reveals the interests, expectations, and justifications underlying the choices of political actors and their subsequent negotiation of power in the oil sector. Content analysis also facilitates the triangulation of information collected from multiple sources, allowing for the development of patterns which inform this study's final conclusions.

I use prefigured themes from the theoretical framework of political settlements, derived from the work of Mushtaq Khan, Tim Kelsall, Hazel Gray, and Behuria et al. to organise and analyse research data.<sup>35</sup> The first theme is historical factors. As Khan argues, analyses of political settlements historicize the distribution of power across

---

<sup>33</sup> Philipp Mayring, "Qualitative Content Analysis," *A Companion to Qualitative Research* 1 (2004): 159–176.

<sup>34</sup> George Gerbner, "Toward" Cultural Indicators": The Analysis of Mass Mediated Public Message Systems," *AV Communication Review*, 1969, 137–148.

<sup>35</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions'; Mushtaq H. Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions', *African Affairs* 117, no. 469 (2018): 636–655; Tim Kelsall, 'Thinking and Working with Political Settlements' (London: Overseas Development Institute London, UK, 2016), 1–8; Gray, 'Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa'; Pritish Behuria, Lars Buur, and Hazel Gray, 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa', *African Affairs*, 2017, 1–18.

organisations to understand how history influences institutions.<sup>36</sup> I analyse the data on the historical struggles between social groups in Uganda to understand how they have shaped processes of state formation and the associated development of institutions. I evaluated the extent to which the country's history of social relations influences or explains contemporary political settlements. The second theme is that of political power. Political settlements research looks at the sources and types of power that social groups possess, the distribution of power across different organisations, and how power influences political, economic, and institutional outcomes. Sources of power can be financial, numerical, military, or institutional. An organisation's capacity to mobilise these various sources of power in competition with other groups is defined as 'holding power.'<sup>37</sup> The higher the level of holding power of a social group, the better their ability to attain their goals and objectives at the expense of, or in collaboration with, other groups. I conduct a comparative analysis of the holding power of Uganda's governing regime and the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms, to explain their political interactions and outcomes associated with the presence of oil.

Thirdly, I consider the interests of the state and the two kingdoms and how these interests influence actor choices and strategies for achieving political and economic goals. Interests are a key feature of political settlements analyses. As Whitfield et al. argue, interests determine the success or failure of industrial policy in African economies. Powerful elites can support policies that promote their interests or undermine those that do not.<sup>38</sup> The fourth theme is coalitions, which refers to the conglomeration of social groups that constitute a political settlement. I analyse the NRM regime, its constituent groups, and how it engages with sub-state groups to

---

<sup>36</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

<sup>37</sup> Khan.

<sup>38</sup> Lindsay Whitfield et al., *The Politics of African Industrial Policy: A Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge university press, 2015).

constitute Uganda's current political settlement. I also use the theme of coalitions to examine how the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms are organised structurally and institutionally as sub-state social groups, and how they engage strategically with state-level actors. The fifth theme is that of institutions. Institutions are at the centre of political settlements inquiry. Institutions are both policies or regulations and the physical agencies and entities with distributive functions. The establishment, structure, and functions of institutions reflect the underlying configurations of power that shape a country's political settlement.<sup>39</sup>

### **Chapter Overview**

This dissertation consists of eight chapters, organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the political settlement between the state and kingdoms in African politics. Although the literature on Uganda's emerging oil sector is steadily growing, the impact of oil on political struggles between the state and the traditional kingdoms remains an under-researched area. Despite the state's de facto control over the natural resources sector in Uganda, crucial shifts have occurred in the relationship between the state and the kingdoms in the aftermath of oil discoveries. I analyse these shifts to understand how the presence of oil has altered the distribution of power between the state and the kingdoms. I take a holistic view of the political struggles between the state and kingdoms, examining their relationships since the inception of modern the Ugandan state during colonisation and in the post-colonial era.

Chapter 3 presents the dissertation's analytical framework, grounded in theories of political settlements and strategies of extraversion, to analyse the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to access revenues from Uganda's new oil industry. This chapter discusses the

---

<sup>39</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

foundations, features, and interdisciplinary character of political settlements theory, and its growing usage in analysing various topics of African development. Despite its analytical strengths, political settlements theory does not adequately account for external factors influencing domestic politics. For this reason, I incorporate Jean Francois Bayart's theory of extraversion into the analysis to provide a more incisive understanding of the ways in which external factors are interwoven with the politics of oil in Uganda. The chapter also assesses the value of this dissertation's theoretical framework vis-à-vis mainstream analyses that are underpinned by neo-Weberian and new institutionalism views of the state and society. In so doing, I further elucidate the impact of oil on the political economy of Uganda.

Chapter 4 explains the central role of the traditional kingdoms, particularly the Buganda and to a lesser extent the Bunyoro kingdoms, in defining Uganda's successive political settlements throughout processes of state formation since the colonial era. Using a historical analysis, the chapter details the strategies of extraversion employed by the Buganda kingdom in establishing an alliance first with the British colonial government, then with the UPC's post-colonial governing coalition, and finally in its struggle for political dominance against Prime Minister Obote. This last stage fundamentally reshaped Ugandan politics and had far reaching political consequences. Obote's regime turned Uganda into an exclusive political settlement by shifting power from the civilian government to the military and by banning kingdoms. The chapter deploys political settlements analysis to discuss the Buganda's strategic alliance with President Museveni and the NRA from 1979 to 1986, an alliance which led to the restoration of the country's kingdoms in 1993. The chapter closes by discussing Uganda's current governing regime and its relationship with the kingdoms, defined once again by an exclusive political settlement. It explains how the

governing coalition's sources of power, interests, and strategies for preserving power accounts for regime durability.

Chapter 5 discusses the political economy of the oil sector in Uganda and its embeddedness in the country's exclusive political settlement. The hydrocarbons sector has become a significant source of revenue for the NRM regime through taxes and the business opportunities arising at each stage of the value chain. Oil is an important source of power for the regime and thus the NRM seeks to limit other groups' access to its lucrative financial benefits. The linkages between oil revenues and power reveal the politically sensitive nature of the hydrocarbons sector in Uganda and explains the NRM's desire for exclusive control over the country's natural resources. Allowing groups currently excluded from the governing coalition, such as the Bunyoro kingdom, to participate in the oil sector would re-distribute power away from the political centre and put the ruling regime's holding power and hegemony in jeopardy. Even though the Ugandan Parliament passed strong legislation and established institutions designed to govern the oil sector, their functions are subject to the control of the governing regime. This reigning political settlement has forced some of the excluded groups into a state of strategic coexistence, where they seek to derive material benefits from the oil sector without shifting existing configurations of power.

Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of the reasons for the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to benefit from the oil industry. It discusses the kingdom's diminished holding power and its exclusion from processes of state formation in the colonial and post-colonial eras. The chapter argues that the discovery of oil provided the kingdom with a remarkable opportunity to shift its political standing in Uganda for the first time since the colonial era. The Bunyoro's forceful demands to receive a 12,5% stake of oil revenues and to take part in the institutions governing the oil sector represented an attempt to alter the Uganda's exclusive political settlement. The NRM coalition

resisted the kingdom's demands in an effort to maintain the regime's unfettered access to oil wealth, a crucial source of their power, and to avoid setting a politically inexpedient precedent whereby kingdoms could successfully pressure the government for material gain and political power. The chapter discusses additional factors accounting for the Bunyoro's unsuccessful bid for oil revenue, including historical, institutional, and geographical factors, as well as the durability of the governing coalition. Despite the Bunyoro's exclusion from the oil sector, the presence of oil has nonetheless provided opportunities for the kingdom to revive its holding power through engagement in oil-related business activities. At present, the Bunyoro kingdom is engaged in a process of establishing strategic coexistence, with the goal of revamping its political and economic institutions to enable its future participation in the oil economy.

Chapter 7 discusses the Buganda kingdom's strategic engagement with the governing coalition in the post-oil discovery era and compares this engagement with that of Bunyoro's. It analyses the sources of the Buganda kingdom's power and its capacity for political influence and assesses the notable concessions it elicited from the NRM regime since the political restoration of traditional kingdoms in Uganda in 1993. Despite its skill and holding power, the kingdom has been unable to obtain its primary political objective of re-instatement as a semi-autonomous federal region. Although the Buganda kingdom has several advantages over the Bunyoro, it faces similar limitations with regard to what is possible within Uganda's reigning political system. Like the Bunyoro, the basis of the Buganda's failure to attain federal status emanates from the NRM regime's desire to maintain an exclusive settlement, one which subjects all groups not formally incorporated into the governing coalition. However, the Buganda kingdom's practices of strategic coexistence provide important lessons for the Bunyoro in its quest to secure benefits from the oil sector.

These lessons revolve around the strengthening its political and economic institutions, the mobilisation of its subjects, and strategic partnerships with its diaspora and other external partners.

Chapter 8 summarizes the findings of this dissertation and concludes by discussing its theoretical and empirical implications as well as identifying areas of future research. The Bunyoro kingdom's failure to obtain financial benefits from the oil resources located on its territory can be explained by a combination of two factors: its limited holding power relative to the ruling coalition and the weakness of its political and economic institutions. These factors are rooted in the nature of Uganda's exclusive political settlement, an arrangement which limits the relative autonomy and governing influence of the traditional kingdoms vis-à-vis the state. At present, the Bunyoro kingdom has begun implementing practices of strategic coexistence in an attempt to secure economic benefits from the oil industry. This approach, however, does not involve shifting the established configurations of power. The case of the Buganda kingdom provides lessons for the Banyoro in terms of how the latter may build its holding power by revamping its political institutions and business entities. This study affirms the durability of the NRM regime and its complex governance structure, which is grounded in military power, the strategic manipulation of government institutions, and patronage. The NRM regime may even survive the departure of President Museveni, whether through old age or death. The dissertation also reaffirms the theoretical efficacy of the political settlements framework in analysing topics of African politics and development, including the impact of Uganda's oil sector on its political economy. The political settlements theory does not view African realities through the lens of Western institutional models but appreciates

the complex interaction between the factors conditioning political, economic, and institutional outcomes.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### Introduction

The growing literature on the political economy of Uganda's emerging oil sector depicts the ways in which the presence of oil will interact with Uganda's political and economic realities without sufficiently addressing the impacts of oil discoveries on the political struggles between the state and traditional kingdoms. This literature review delves into key themes that focus on the political settlements between the state and kingdoms since the establishment of the modern state in Africa, and the implications of the presence of oil for the distribution of power between these actors in Uganda. This chapter is structured as follows: the first section discusses the emerging literature on the discovery of oil in Uganda, which revolves around the natural resource curse hypothesis. The second section discusses the literature on the establishment of the modern state in Africa during the colonial era and the central role played by traditional kingdoms in this process. The third section examines the evolution of post-colonial political dynamics, particularly the struggles between the state and the kingdoms as *parallel forms of nationality*. The fourth section analyses the reasons underlying the exclusion of traditional kingdoms from Uganda's extractive sector and the implications of oil revenues on the distribution of power in resource-rich states. This literature review emphasizes the need to understand and incorporate the dynamism between the state and traditional kingdoms in the study of the oil sector's impact in Uganda, such as through the political settlements approach deployed in this dissertation.

### The Implications of Uganda's Emerging Oil Sector

The discovery of oil in Uganda 2006 spawned a growing body of work on the implications of a high-value extractive sector on the country's political economy. Questions about whether Uganda will face adverse political and economic outcomes from the oil sector underlie most of the burgeoning academic writing on the subject due to two interconnected reasons. Firstly, oil and diamond-producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, notably Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Sierra Leone, have experienced overwhelming adverse political and economic outcomes linked with resource abundance, lending credence to the *resource curse hypothesis*.<sup>40</sup> This concept holds that the presence of high-value natural resources leads to negative political and economic outcomes such as authoritarian governance, violent conflict, weak institutions, non-diversified and stagnated economies, and the monopolisation of resource wealth by ruling political elites.<sup>41</sup> For example, Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer and the seventh highest producer in the world, experienced several coups, military rule between 1966 and 1999, and armed violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta.<sup>42</sup> The country also experienced economic shrinkage despite earning over \$350 billion in oil wealth between independence in 1960 and 2006.<sup>43</sup> Its gross domestic capital (GDP)

---

<sup>40</sup> Well-known examples include Sierra Leone, which experienced a protracted civil war, Angola, which also experienced civil war, socio-economic inequality, and state-sanctioned corruption, Equatorial Guinea, which had a military coup and currently has an authoritarian regime, and Nigeria that had military coups, dictatorship and civil wars. Botswana is the most notable outlier since it has remained politically stable despite diamonds constituting more than half of its economy.

<sup>41</sup> Hossein Mahdavy, 'The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran', *Life* 1000 (1970): 1; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, vol. 4 (University of Oklahoma press, 1993); Jeffrey D Sachs and Andrew Warner, 'Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth' (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1995).

<sup>42</sup> Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, 'Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth', *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 01 (2006): 35–53.

<sup>43</sup> Weinthal and Luong.

per capita dropped from \$1113 in 1970 to \$1084 in 2000 while its poverty rate increased from 36% to 70% in the same period.<sup>44</sup>

Secondly, Uganda's background as a post-conflict society currently governed by President Museveni and the authoritarian National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime leads academics and development policy practitioners to focus parochially on the potential of harmful effects on account of oil discoveries. The country's weak public institutions, combined with considerable levels of corruption and neopatrimonialism, creates an unstable political environment.<sup>45</sup> Uganda also has a history of militarised violence and successive military coups beginning in 1966 and ending with Museveni's rise to power in 1986. The country experienced several instances of militarised insurgency since then despite enjoying relative stability under Museveni's NRM regime. Although the resource curse hypothesis is a useful starting point, it provides only a partial analysis of oil's complex interaction with the Ugandan political context. Political settlements theory, on the other hand, presents a holistic approach that appreciates the country's pre-existing power configurations within which the oil sector is embedded, thus yielding a more nuanced analysis.

The epistemological influence of the resource curse hypothesis is evident in the growing literature on the emerging oil sector in Uganda. Most existing scholarly work focuses on providing a historical account of the oil discoveries themselves, since oil production has yet to begin. For example, David Anderson and Adrian Browne discuss the unprecedented patterns of oil exploration in East Africa, with the Ugandan oil find representing the most significant discovery in the region at 6.5 billion barrels.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> Weinthal and Luong.

<sup>45</sup> Moses Khisa, 'The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda', *Africa Development* 38, no. 1 & 2 (2013): 191–226.

<sup>46</sup> Anderson and Browne, "The Politics of Oil in Eastern Africa."

They argue that the Ugandan government's lack of experience in dealing with foreign resource companies led to poor contracts and sub-par returns for the central government.<sup>47</sup> Anderson and Browne also document growing concerns among civil society organisations about the presence of oil and the potential for a resource curse in the country due to government corruption and the use of rents to prop up the NRM regime in lieu of much-needed investments in broad-based development programs.

Luke Patey and Richard Vokes also provide informative studies on the emerging oil sector in Uganda. Both argue that President Museveni and his small circle of loyalists have completely captured the sector through secret negotiations with oil companies and the militarisation of the oil fields via the deployment of the elite Special Forces Group (SFG), now known as the Special Forces Command (SFC).<sup>48</sup> The government passed legislation providing the President and the Energy Minister discretionary control over sensitive aspects of the oil sector such as licencing and contract negotiations, an arrangement that Patey argues could lead to the resource curse.<sup>49</sup> Other scholars such as Paul Collier, Ben Shepherd, and Terrel Manyak discuss several policy options for Uganda to avoid the resource curse. These policies centre around transparent and accountable governance, including parliamentary oversight of the oil sector and the mitigation of environmental impacts through regulation and monitoring.<sup>50</sup> Other prominent policies include minimising oil-funded public spending to reduce sharp exchange rate fluctuations and to ensure savings and

---

<sup>47</sup> Anderson and Browne.

<sup>48</sup> Patey, "Oil in Uganda - Hard Bargaining and Complex Politics in East Africa"; Vokes, "The Politics of Oil in Uganda."

<sup>49</sup> Patey, "Oil in Uganda - Hard Bargaining and Complex Politics in East Africa."

<sup>50</sup> Terrell George Manyak, "Oil and Governance in Uganda," *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 5, no. 1 (2015): 40–58.

prudent investment decisions by Uganda's Sovereign Wealth Funds, the Sovereign Resilience Funds, and the Sovereign Development Funds.<sup>51</sup>

I argue that the fate of Uganda's oil industry and the feasibility of the above policy options in particular rests on more fundamental political factors at the state and sub-state levels – not simply policymaking or 'strong' institutions. Improving the policies and institutions governing the oil sector would not likely change established patterns of political control and rent seeking in Uganda. Several scholars writing on Uganda's oil sector have considered the country's pre-existing governance realities and how they intersect with the oil sector. For example, Julius Kiiza and others predicted that the ruling coalition in Uganda will capture exclusive control over the oil sector due to its importance as a new source of patronage.<sup>52</sup> They identify the 'winners' or major beneficiaries as President Museveni, his close family, influential members of the ruling NRM regime, oil companies, and some local government officials in oil-rich districts. The country's patronage-based political system precedes the discovery of oil, a system which runs roughshod over formal state institutions meant to promote the fair distribution of public goods. The main 'losers' are the local or host communities in oil-rich areas who may experience forced displacement, the loss of agricultural areas, pastureland and fisheries, and environmental pollution. Scholars such as De Kock and Sturman, Wass and Musiime, and a ground-breaking 2015 report by the Civic Response on Environment and Development (CRED), describe these types of outcomes.<sup>53</sup> Host communities are left on the margins of the oil sector, experiencing the brunt of the industry's adverse outcomes without seeing any benefits.

---

<sup>51</sup> Collier, "Managing Uganda's Oil Discovery"; Shepherd, "Oil in Uganda."

<sup>52</sup> Julius Kiiza, Lawrence Bategeka, and Sarah Ssewanyana, "Righting Resources-Curse Wrongs in Uganda: The Case of Oil Discovery and the Management of Popular Expectations," Economic Policy Research Centre, 78, 2011, 1–40.

<sup>53</sup> Gabriella Wass and Chris Musiime, "Business, Human Rights and Uganda's Oil" (Action Aid, 2013); De Kock and Sturman, "The Power of Oil Charting Uganda's Transition to a Petro-State"; CRED, "Up against Giants: Oil

James Van Alstine and others analyse state-society relations in Uganda, focusing on "governance gaps" that increase the likelihood of the oil sector triggering adverse outcomes.<sup>54</sup> These gaps include weak local government capacity in the oil-producing districts due to a lack of funding and technical capacity, and the politics of patronage. Another gap is the dominance of foreign oil companies and the limited interaction between government representatives and communities in oil-rich districts.<sup>55</sup> Government-sanctioned restrictions on the participation of civil society organisations in host communities is another factor undermining coordinated responses to the adverse effects of oil exploitation. NGOs often times duplicate projects due to competition for donor funding, undermining the effectiveness of their efforts to assist communities negatively impacted by oil-related activities.<sup>56</sup> These governance gaps, academics argue, make the resource curse more likely since they weaken civil society and prevent attempts to mitigate the undesirable outcomes of resource extraction.

The dominance of the resource curse narrative in the relevant literature results in part from the epistemological influence of New Institutional Economics theory (NIE), which informs 'good governance agenda' undergirding the bulk of scholarly work on African development. New institutionalism and the good governance agenda argue that 'strong institutions' are the primary determinant of universally negative or beneficial political and economic outcomes. NIE gained influence in the 1980s with the work of scholars such as Ronald Coase, Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson's

---

Influenced Land Injustices in the Albertine Graben in Uganda" (Civic Response for the Environment and Development, 2015), <https://creduganda.org/2019/04/20/up-against-giants-oil-influenced-land-injustices-in-the-albertine-graben-in-uganda/>.

<sup>54</sup> James Van Alstine et al., 'Resource Governance Dynamics: The Challenge of 'New Oil' in Uganda', *Resources Policy* 40 (2014): 48–58.

<sup>55</sup> Van Alstine et al., "Resource Governance Dynamics."

<sup>56</sup> Van Alstine et al.

driving its growth, influence, and multidisciplinary diffusion.<sup>57</sup> The NIE theory seeks to explain the reasons underlying the varied organizational structures of states and why some are rich and others poor through a comparative study of institutions.<sup>58</sup> Douglass North argued that institutions are created to establish order and reduce uncertainty in social relations.<sup>59</sup> New Institutionalists argue that the quality of institutions is based on three main factors: transaction costs, property rights, and contracts.<sup>60</sup> In the absence of these factors, New Institutionalists hold that political and economic activities would most likely result in harmful outcomes, largely attributable to the 'free rider' problem or rent-seeking, which describes the tendency of individuals or groups to pursue self-aggrandisement at the expense of the general population.<sup>61</sup>

Scholars who subscribe to the resource curse theory are preoccupied with institutions and their relationship with the extractive sector. While a focus on institutions is helpful, it prevents an interrogation of the context-specific factors of a country's political system underpinning *what* institutions arise, and *how* they function. Scholars such as Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai, Sam Hickey, Angelo Izama, and others recognise the limitations of a singular focus on institutions and analyse the deeper configurations of power within Uganda to uncover how governing relations adapt to the presence of oil. These authors apply the political settlements

---

<sup>57</sup> Ronald Harry Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm', *Economica* 4, no. 16 (1937): 386–405; North, Douglass, 'Institutions', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112; Oliver E. Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2000, 595–613.

<sup>58</sup> Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley, 'The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics', *Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, 11–29.

<sup>59</sup> North, Douglass, 'Institutions'.

<sup>60</sup> Douglass North defines transaction costs as the price of undertaking an economic activity, and this not only included monetary costs, but the overall level of risk. Property rights are the established protections and privileges due to those engaged in commercial activity, and these can both be legal rules and regulations, and customary practice. Contracts are agreements between two or more parties over terms of exchange, which are legally binding and enforceable.

<sup>61</sup> Douglass C. North, 'A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History', *Explorations in Economic History* 16, no. 3 (1979): 249–259.

approach to evaluate how political power and material interests are negotiated between social groups to shape the functioning formal institutions.<sup>62</sup> "Political settlements" focuses on the distribution of political power between social groups or classes in competition with one another. In the context of the oil sector, Hickey and Izama argue that:

...it might be more useful to avoid according "oil" a specific sense of political agency that is somehow independent of contextual factors and go beyond an obsession with institutional reform, to focus instead on the more profound *forms of politics* and *power relations* that underpin institutional performance.<sup>63</sup>

The authors expand on how the ruling NRM regime dominates Ugandan politics and, by extension, access to oil-derived benefits such as business contracts, taxes, and licencing fees accruing to the central government. President Museveni designed state institutions to ensure his direct control over resource rents, using these funds for patronage including during the 2016 elections.<sup>64</sup> Members of the ruling coalition who benefit from this patronage include the incumbent NRM party and senior government officials. The security cluster, composed of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), Internal and External Security Organisations, and the SFC underwrite the coalition's holding power. Members of President Museveni's family, including his younger brother General Salim Saleh, his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, and his wife Janet Museveni constitute the inner core of the coalition. Foreign oil companies,

---

<sup>62</sup> Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Sam Hickey, "Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda: Towards a Research Agenda.," 2013; Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai and Sam Hickey, "The Politics of Development under Competitive Clientelism: Insights from Ghana's Education Sector," *African Affairs* 115, no. 458 (2016): 44–72; Sam Hickey and Angelo Izama, "The Politics of Governing Oil in Uganda: Going against the Grain?," *African Affairs* 116, no. 463 (2016): 163–185.

<sup>63</sup> Hickey and Izama, "The Politics of Governing Oil in Uganda."

<sup>64</sup> Rita Abrahamsen and Gerald Bareebe, "Uganda's 2016 Elections: Not Even Faking It Anymore," *African Affairs*, 2016, 1–15; Hickey and Izama, "The Politics of Governing Oil in Uganda."

including CNOOC, Total E&P, and Tullow Oil work closely with President Museveni. Government agencies also form part Uganda's oil sector, including the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, the Uganda Revenue Authority, the PAU, the Finance Ministry, and the Bank of Uganda.<sup>65</sup> These agencies function as "pockets of effectiveness," negotiating contracts and taxes under President Museveni's direct supervision.<sup>66</sup>

The political settlements analysis provided herein reveals the embeddedness of the oil sector in Uganda's pre-existing political settlement. This dissertation seeks to describe how the presence of oil has reshaped political relations between the governing coalition and traditional kingdoms in Uganda, particularly the Bunyoro, which to-date remains an under-researched area. Uganda's kingdoms have proactively shaped configurations of state power since the colonial era, including by negotiating their political and economic interests with the central government(s) to varying degrees of success. The kingdoms, despite being banned by former President Milton Obote in 1967, remained politically active and vied for their restoration by President Museveni in 1993. This study fills an important research gap by conducting a comparative analysis of the factors explaining the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to benefit financially from and participate in the governance of Uganda's oil sector. A discussion of the literature on the dynamics between states and traditional kingdoms in Africa in the

---

<sup>65</sup> Hickey and Izama, "The Politics of Governing Oil in Uganda."

<sup>66</sup> The term "pockets of effectiveness," (PoEs), or islands of efficiency is part of the lexicon on developmental states and emerged in the authorship on the political economy of development in the East Asian Tigers. It describes agencies or bureaucracies of government that effectively provide goods or services within a political system in which such efficiency and competency is not the standard. For more on the discussion of PoEs, please see: Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975* (Stanford University Press, 1982); Peter B. Evans, 'Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State', in *Sociological Forum*, vol. 4 (Springer, 1989), 561–587, <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01115064>; Michael Roll, 'Pockets of Effectiveness: Review and Analytical Framework', in *The Politics of Public Sector Performance* (Routledge, 2014), 22–42; Sam Hickey, 'The Politics of State Capacity and Development in Africa: Reframing and Researching "Pockets of Effectiveness"', 2019.

post-colonial era is necessary to understanding the political outcomes of natural resource abundance in Uganda.

### **Colonial Statehood and Traditional Kingdoms in sub-Saharan Africa**

Colonial rule replaced traditional kingdoms as the primary form of socio-political organisation in Africa and gave birth to the modern state system on the continent. The resulting duality of political authority and legitimacy in post-colonial states produced a phenomenon wherein kingdoms have become *nations within states*. Pre-colonial African societies were characterised by various forms of governance which today represent the foundation of present-day kingdoms.<sup>67</sup> The sizes of pre-colonial societies ranged from small houses and villages to centralised, large kingdoms with well-developed political and economic systems. Chiefs and kings led societies together with clan heads. Leaders earned the right to rule through military skill, wealth, hereditary succession, or a combination of these factors. Legitimacy was derived from their ability to provide material goods to subjects and to protect communities from attacks by outside groups.

The growth of kingdoms resulted from a complex interaction of factors, including military conquest and the absorption of smaller/weaker groups, growing economic capacity through trade and the payment of tribute, and agricultural production.<sup>68</sup> Pre-colonial societies were organised around specific ethnic identities, a common language, and shared cultural values and practices. Collectively, these elements constituted "traditions," which were a crucial source of power for kings and chiefs.

---

<sup>67</sup> Jan M. Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).

<sup>68</sup> Vansina.

Examples of such large centralised kingdoms in the 17th and 18th centuries include the Bunyoro and the Buganda in Uganda, the Great Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe, South Africa's Bafokeng, Ghana's Ashanti, and the Ruanda-Urundi kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi, respectively. These kingdoms provided their subjects with security, sources of livelihood, and social stability, in addition to the preservation, and transfer of cultures and traditions across generations.<sup>69</sup>

Colonial rule set the stage for subsequent interactions between the state and traditional kingdoms in the post-colonial era as parallel forms of nationhood and sources of political authority. The analysis of how colonial rule transformed African societies is a well-beaten path; varied historical and theoretical approaches focus on the structural-institutional, political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions of colonialism. For example, Crawford Young's influential and classic work conceptualised the colonial state as "Bula Matari," or "breaker of rocks," to describe the brutal, extractive, and exploitive nature of colonial occupation in Africa.<sup>70</sup> Young attributes the rapid and merciless nature of colonial rule in Africa to the technological advancements enabled by the Industrial Revolution, such as advanced weaponry and new forms of transportation, and the corresponding demand for raw materials.<sup>71</sup> The modern state in Africa is based on predation and forcible extraction, a model antithetical to the liberal, contractual view of the state as a system of rule premised on constitutionalism, the promotion of civil rights and liberties, and the improvement of human livelihoods.<sup>72</sup> The *exclusionary hegemony* that characterised colonial rule

---

<sup>69</sup> Robert Thornton, "Chiefs: Power in a Political Wilderness," DI Ray and PS, 2003; Olufemi Vaughan, *Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa* (Africa World Press, 2005).

<sup>70</sup> Young.

<sup>71</sup> Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (Yale University Press, 1994).

<sup>72</sup> Young.

entailed a centralised, absolute form of state power and the violent repression of opposition and any sub-state groups seeking to challenge this hegemony.<sup>73</sup>

The violent, material nature of colonial rule transformed socio-cultural relations in Africa. Frantz Fanon and Achille Mbembe argued that colonial rule was an implicit and explicit process of social transformation through negation.<sup>74</sup> European powers imposed their culture, religion, language, and systems of education onto African societies. Their systems of political and economic organisation were presented as superior to native forms of governance and aspects of African identity such as cultural practices and values, religion, and language were presented as barbaric.<sup>75</sup> The colonial process, argued Fanon, consequently affixed an inferiority complex upon the collective psyche of African societies and became the "soft" underbelly of the "hard" structure of colonial domination.<sup>76</sup> Walter Rodney described these colonial conditions as resulting in *Africans' removal from history*, that is, through the erasure of their cultures and civilisations and the corresponding loss of power and control over their collective destinies.<sup>77</sup>

Nevertheless, the colonial project of social transformation was incomplete, in that the aforementioned aspects of European culture and institutions did not result in the total erasure of indigenous African cultures and traditions.<sup>78</sup> Chabal and Daloz attribute these continuities to the relative brevity of colonial rule (less than 70 years) and the

---

<sup>73</sup> Young.

<sup>74</sup> Frantz Fanon, 'Black Skin, White Masks', *New York*, 1967; Valentine Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Bloomington and Indianapolis* (Indiana University Press London, 1988).

<sup>75</sup> Frantz Fanon, "Black Skin, White Masks," *New York*, 1967; Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, vol. 41 (Univ of California Press, 2001).

<sup>76</sup> Fanon, 'Black Skin, White Masks'.

<sup>77</sup> W. Rodney, "Colonialism as a System for under Developing Africa," *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Pretoria: PANAFA Publishing, 2009, 246–291.

<sup>78</sup> Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument* (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999).

resilience of African cultures and institutions in the face of the colonial intrusion.<sup>79</sup> The continuity of some aspects of pre-colonial African socio-cultural organisation is reflected in the persistence of traditional kingdoms, and their political relevance during colonial rule and beyond. Mahmood Mamdani reflects on this phenomenon through an analysis of the institutional systems of colonial rule and the subsequent dualities produced between colonists and colonial subjects. He argues that colonialism transformed the role of kingdoms during the colonial era through both direct and indirect rule systems.<sup>80</sup> Direct rule entailed the concerted destruction of pre-colonial forms of social and economic organisation through land seizures, the relocation of communities, and the establishment of western political and market institutions.<sup>81</sup> Countries with large settler populations such as South Africa and Zimbabwe experienced these features of direct rule colonialism. Indirect rule, on the other hand, involved smaller settler communities who leveraged pre-colonial institutions to administer colonial rule.

Both systems entailed using kings and chiefs as colonial agents, transforming the role of traditional leaders from benevolent monarchs to administrators of an oppressive, extractive colonial hegemony. Their roles included enforcing tax collection, the suppression of rebellions, and the forced recruitment of plantation labour.<sup>82</sup> Described by Sara Berry as *hegemony on a shoestring*, indirect rule resulted from pragmatic considerations and expediency: European governments did not wish to underwrite the capital costs of colonies and preferred to have European settlers raise the necessary

---

<sup>79</sup> Chabal and Daloz.

<sup>80</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton University Press, 1996).

<sup>81</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton University Press, 1996).

<sup>82</sup> Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

funds and workforce from the colonies themselves.<sup>83</sup> Apart from budgetary reasons, the incorporation of traditional kings in the colonial enterprise was aimed at taking advantage of their political significance in pre-colonial society. Karen Fields notes that indirect rule was a product of the pre-colonial customary order in that colonial administrations sought to leverage the legitimacy of traditional chiefs to facilitate the imposition of a foreign political system that lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the native population.<sup>84</sup> However, in most instances, traditional chiefs lost credibility and legitimacy due to the reconfiguration of their benevolent customary into a predatory, violent arm of the alien colonial state.<sup>85</sup> Their inclusion into the nascent modern state system entrenched their role as a custodian of colonial rule throughout Africa.

The inclusion of traditional chiefs into the colonial state system also entrenched the spatial and legal dualities between urban and rural spaces, which Mamdani defines as a *bifurcated state*.<sup>86</sup> In the colonial state, urban centres were governed by a formal legal and constitutional order while rural areas were ruled by a customary law enforced by Native Affairs authorities and traditional kings.<sup>87</sup> For Mamdani, the main import of this structural differentiation was that rural communities were deprived of the rights and privileges afforded to those in the urban areas because they were *subjects*, not citizens. The rural-urban demarcation continues in the post-colonial era, with traditional kings still discharging customary law on the state's behalf. Although rural communities now possess constitutionally-enshrined rights and freedoms, the

---

<sup>83</sup> Sara Berry, "Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land," *Africa* 62, no. 3 (1992): 327–355.

<sup>84</sup> Karen Elise Fields, *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa* (Princeton University Press Princeton, 1985).

<sup>85</sup> For example, Ntsebeza argues that given their role during colonialism, traditional kingdoms ought not be involved in post-colonial governance. For more detail on this argument with a South Africa-based case study, please see: Lungisile Ntsebeza, 'Democracy Compromised : Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa', Book (monograph), 326, 2005, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/20609>.

<sup>86</sup> Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

<sup>87</sup> Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

state often depends on traditional kingdoms to guarantee these rights, accounting for the kingdoms' continued relevancy in post-colonial societies. This structural view, however, provides a limited and deterministic account that does not adequately capture the active participation of chiefs and colonial subjects alike in the co-production of governance systems as well the complex and often symbiotic interactions between the state and traditional chiefs.

A historical-sociological analysis such as Peter Ekeh's theory of the *two publics* is better suited to reveal the strategic interactions between the rural and urban spaces. He avers that colonialism created the *primordial* and *civic publics*, echoing Mamdani's rural-urban bifurcation.<sup>88</sup> The primordial public refers to the private, affective realm of social relations that finds its roots in the rural customary order whereas the civic public describes the formal institutions and processes of the state that are the preserve of the urban space. Ekeh argues that African actors navigated both spaces simultaneously in pragmatism, seeking not to dismantle them but to maximise their access to benefits found in the urban and rural spheres. He stipulates that actors engaged within the civic republic in an amoral manner, deriving material value through legal and illegal means, underlining much of the public sector corruption in contemporary Africa.<sup>89</sup> Ekeh also describes the flourishing of ethnic ties within atomising urban spaces where African bourgeoisie leveraged their social networks to participate in systems of patronage and social support. Despite the spatial dualism imposed by the colonial order, a *dialogic interaction* between the rural and urban spaces occurred both at individual and institutional levels. African societies were not passive

---

<sup>88</sup> Peter P. Ekeh, 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no. 01 (1975): 91–112.

<sup>89</sup> Ekeh.

subjects of colonial hegemony but sought to secure material benefits within its structural and organisational limits.

To this end, traditional kings used *strategies of extraversion* as part of a preservation process; they sought to maintain political relevancy amongst the imposition of a more powerful colonial authority. Bayart defines extraversion as the strategic use of foreign resources by African political actors to consolidate their domestic position.<sup>90</sup> For example, traditional kings often acquiesced to direct and indirect rule instead of resisting it outright. Strategies of extraversion allowed the monarchs to reinvent their political roles while preserving the institution of traditional authority. For example, Joe Oloka-Onyango and Pierre Englebert attribute the Buganda kingdom's cooperation with British to its desire to maintain the kingdom's existence. The Buganda kingdom, an already highly centralised and administratively sophisticated kingdom, secured a powerful ally against the Bunyoro, the then-largest kingdom in the region and its military foe in the pre-colonial era.<sup>91</sup> Sara Berry details the similar case of the Fulani Emirates in northern Nigeria, whose well-developed administrative system, including written legal codes, courts, and bureaucracies, compelled the British to enter into alliance with Fulani chiefs who became a part of the colonial administration.<sup>92</sup>

Other chiefs resisted colonial rule, especially those governing powerful and highly centralised kingdoms that enjoyed military hegemony over other pre-colonial societies. In these cases, the British would often resort to forceful methods of

---

<sup>90</sup> Jean-François Bayart, 'Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion', *African Affairs* 99, no. 395 (2000): 217–267.

<sup>91</sup> Oloka-Onyango, "The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics"; Pierre Englebert, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 3 (2002): 345–368.

<sup>92</sup> Berry, "Hegemony on a Shoestring."

domination, or a mixture of violence and strategic allyship. For example, Ghana's Ashanti King (Asantehene) rebelled against colonial rule and was subsequently deposed by the British who entered into alliances with chiefs formerly subordinate to him.<sup>93</sup> John Beattie and Shane Doyle also describe how King Kabalega of Bunyoro, the largest and most centralised kingdom in the present-day Great Lakes region, similarly resisted British occupation, resulting in the Bunyoro kingdom's military decimation, seizure of its territory, the exile of the King, and the appointment of rival Baganda chiefs over Banyoro territory.<sup>94</sup>

This discussion thus far describes the inclusion and exclusion of kingdoms in the structure of modern states in Africa. The dialogic interaction between traditional and colonial authorities was characterised by a complex mixture of acquiescence and resistance, whereby kingdoms sought to preserve their political and economic interests by joining the colonial administrative apparatus. The reinvention of the benevolent monarch into the tyrannical overlord was instrumental to the colonial authority's ability to enforce an extractive and violent forms of domination. Traditional leaders subsequently lost legitimacy to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, their inclusion into the administrative, legal, and spatial framework of the fledgling modern state during colonial rule explains their continued relevance in the post-colonial era, discussed in the next section.

---

<sup>93</sup> Berry, "Hegemony on a Shoestring."

<sup>94</sup> Beattie, "Bunyoro"; Shane Doyle, "From Kitara to the Lost Counties: Genealogy, Land and Legitimacy in the Kingdom of Bunyoro, Western Uganda," *Social Identities* 12, no. 4 (2006): 457–470.

### **Traditional Kingdoms and Dual Nationality in Post-colonial Politics**

Traditional kingdoms withstood colonial pressures and survived into the post-independence era, each with varying degrees of political power and influence. In some instances, their power remained unaffected by the transition from indirect colonial rule to a modern post-colonial dispensation, while other governments sought to dispose of them. Kate Baldwin and Pierre Englebert argue that traditional kingdoms have experienced a resurgence since the 1990s, with governments restoring abolished kingdoms and existing kingdoms adopting more formalised political roles in legislative and customary governance.<sup>95</sup> For example, in 1993, the Ugandan government restored the traditional kingdoms formerly abolished by Prime Minister Milton Obote in 1967.<sup>96</sup> Ghana's 1992 constitution established a National House of Chiefs which provides input on customary law issues and prohibits the central government from installing or refusing to recognise a traditional chief.<sup>97</sup> Zambia similarly established a National House of Chiefs in 1998.<sup>98</sup> Botswana's constitution formally recognises the country's kingdoms by establishing a House of Chiefs, which is a ceremonial and advisory arm of Parliament. The chiefs conduct regular public meetings (*dikgotla*) on proposed government policies to provide input from the grassroots level.<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> Kate Baldwin, "When Politicians Cede Control of Resources: Land, Chiefs, and Coalition-Building in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 3 (2014): 253–71; Pierre Englebert, "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of Power in Africa," *Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa*, 2005, 33–60.

<sup>96</sup> M. Doornbos and F Mwesigye, "The New Politics of Kingmaking," in *From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda*. (London: James Currey, n.d.), 61–77.

<sup>97</sup> Englebert, "Back to the Future?"

<sup>98</sup> K. Mengisteab, "Relevance of African Traditional Institutions of Governance: A Concept Paper," Submitted to the Development Policy Management Division, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2006.

<sup>99</sup> Richard L. Sklar, "The Significance of Mixed Government in Southern African Studies: A Preliminary Assessment" (*Wits History Workshop: Democracy, Popular Precedents, Practice, and Culture*, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 1994), 1–12.

Several reasons explain the continued existence and political relevance of traditional kingdoms in the post-colonial era. Fundamentally, the survival of the kingdoms rests on their essence as *alternative forms of nationhood* subsumed under the modern state. Benedict Anderson defines nations as *imagined communities* or cultural artefacts that are the product of specific historical periods.<sup>100</sup> Nations, by nature, are historically contingent and are borne out of the convictions and loyalties of individuals and social groups at both the elite and grassroots levels. Common histories, languages, cultures, and physical attributes provide substance to these imaginations, sustaining a sense of shared membership in a community.<sup>101</sup> The boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in a given community underlie sentiments of nationalism, which become the driving and mobilising force in the creation and maintenance of nations.<sup>102</sup> Although Anderson's analysis primarily applies to modern states, the same framework explains the nature of traditional kingdoms as a form of nation existing within a state. As discussed in the preceding section, traditional kingdoms were the primary form of socio-cultural, political, and economic organisation in the pre-colonial era. Although the imposition of colonial rule usurped their political power and altered their original functions as benevolent monarchies, the kingdoms retained their status as symbols of 'nationhood,' as custodians of the cultural artefacts of various ethnic groups, including their history, languages, cultures, and traditions.

*Traditions* are a lynchpin for the durability and continued existence of kingdoms. Tradition is to kingdoms what nationalism is to nation-states: a driving force that

---

<sup>100</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso Books, 1983).

<sup>101</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cornell University Press, 1983).

<sup>102</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

unites all citizens to champion their collective interests and objectives, giving populations a sense of shared identity.<sup>103</sup> Max Weber defined traditions as the fundamental cognitive patterns and concepts which act as the foundations, and building blocks for the values, belief systems and the ordering of social life in general.<sup>104</sup> Traditions include the histories, narratives, symbols, beliefs, and practices that provide social meaning. They represent a community's way of understanding the world, provide rituals for the conduct of social life, and guidance on social change for many communities in Africa.<sup>105</sup> Traditions are expressed through institutions, texts, symbols, and often consist of fixed principles that communities adhere to, often in an unquestioning manner. Traditions also evolve throughout history as communities adapt to external and internal changes. Weber argues that traditions are one of the primary sources of power and legitimacy for traditional chiefs and kings because they represent and embody a community's cultural practices and values, whereas modern rulers and elected officials derive legitimacy from their appointment into office through constitutional and rational-legal mechanisms such as elections.<sup>106</sup> Unlike elected officials, kings do not possess electoral limits to their terms of office, and this provides relative security of tenure and the ability to pursue long-term goals. Kings are therefore able to engage with the presidents of successive political regimes, lending to an extended institutional memory.

Ethnicity is another factor that interacts with traditions to reinforce the resilience of kingdoms due to the central role of identity formation and ethno-nationalism in politics. Ethnicity generally refers to a group of people that share the same race, nationality, or a distinctive culture. Jean and John Comaroff define ethnicity as a *loose*

---

<sup>103</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

<sup>104</sup> Weber, *Economy and Society*.

<sup>105</sup> Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests*.

<sup>106</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (University of California Press, 1968).

*repertoire* of signs through which people define, construct, and communicate social relations.<sup>107</sup> Groups also make sense of their collective consciousness and cultural likeness and give substance to the sentiment of shared identity through ethnicity. Claude Ake argues that pre-colonial societies in Africa were organised according to various ethnicities which was typical of communitarian pre-capitalist and preindustrial civilisations.<sup>108</sup> Ethnic identities were not static but were influenced by the movement of people between different groups as a result of conquest or voluntary assimilation.<sup>109</sup> This fluidity of identities changed during colonialism when Native Administration departments worked with anthropologists and missionaries to divide colonial subjects according to fixed homogenous ethnic identity markers, thus making ethnic divisions more permanent and central to social and political organisation.<sup>110</sup> This was an important historical factor in that it inextricably tied ethnicity and ethnic identity to competition for state resources and economic accumulation in the post-colonial era, particularly patron-client politics. Ethnicity is often associated with political crises in Africa, including ethnic violence, civil wars, rebellions, and weak public institutions due to patterns of rent-seeking.<sup>111</sup> However, ethnically-patterned violence is just one of the several dynamic manifestations of political competition tied to ethnic identities in post-colonial African politics.

---

<sup>107</sup> John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnicity, Inc.* (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

<sup>108</sup> Ake, "What Is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?"

<sup>109</sup> Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa," in *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge University Press, 1983).

<sup>110</sup> Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs* 97, no. 388 (1998): 305–341.

<sup>111</sup> See, for example: Claude Ake, "What Is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?," *Transformation*, no. 22 (1993); Ronald R. Atkinson, *The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Frank E. Muhereza and Peter O. Otim, "Neutralizing Ethnicity in Uganda," in *Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa*, Edited by MAM Salih and J. Markakis. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998.

The primordialism versus instrumentalism debate further captures features of ethnicity and their relevancy to traditional kingdoms. Colonial-era scholarship was largely essentialist, viewing African communities as essentially primordial or tribal and as characterised by groups of people with biological similarities and bound together by affective ties. For example, Clifford Geertz and Arnold Epstein described ethnicity as a set of socio-cultural norms and behavioural tendencies that are both inherited and produced by socialisation, consistent with premodern social life.<sup>112</sup> Harold Isaacs also argued that ethnicity serves the psychological purpose of providing emotional security and a feeling of belonging and safety among a group of one's kind.<sup>113</sup> The saliency of the primordial perspective lies in its emphasis on the content of ethnicity such as biological characteristics, affective ties, and kinship relations. The strength of these elements explains why, in some cases, the power and significance of ethnic ties supersede that of formal state institutions and processes. Blood ties and learned social behaviour also go hand in glove since these factors constitute the cultural and value systems that make up 'traditions' as well as individual and communal identities.

Instrumentalists, on the other hand, view ethnicity not as a given but as a socially constructed medium used by individuals and groups to attain their objectives. Instrumentalists emphasise the utilitarian nature of ethnic identity and minimise the importance of blood ties and affective aspects. For example, Charles Keyes argues that ethnicity was only visible where it served to organise groups in pursuit of their interests and when in competition with other groups possessing different identities.<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup> Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Africa and Asia* (New York: The Free Press, 1967); Arnold Leonard Epstein, *Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity* (Transaction Publishers, 1978).

<sup>113</sup> Harold Robert Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (Harvard University Press, 1975).

<sup>114</sup> Charles F. Keyes, *Ethnic Change* (University of Washington Press, 1982).

Joseph Rothschild agrees, arguing that the major political conflicts in both developed and developing societies are influenced by inter-ethnic rivalry and competitions that often result in inequalities.<sup>115</sup> Jean and John Comaroff also position ethnicity as a source of income; arguing that some African ethno-nations commodify aspects of their ethnicity and cultural identity for material benefit through 'ethno-commerce' or market-based strategies.<sup>116</sup> Ethnic groups may market various aspects and artefacts of their culture and identity to attract tourists and establish companies modelled around their ethnicity, as with the case of South Africa's Royal Bafokeng kingdom.<sup>117</sup> Thomas Spear and Bruce Berman also view ethnicity not as essentially primordial or atavistic but as a modern phenomenon, illustrated by how individuals and groups leverage ethnic associations in urban spaces in Africa for support, security, and patronage.<sup>118</sup> Likewise, traditional kingdoms deploy ethnic identity as a tool for mobilising the political support of their subjects and as leverage in negotiating access to economic goods vis-à-vis the state.

Neither primordial nor instrumental arguments provide a sufficiently nuanced account of the continued relevancy of traditional kingdoms in post-colonial African politics. The constructivist perspective combines both schools of thought by emphasising the fluidity, agency, and materiality of ethnicity. Ethnic identities are indeed drawn from common descent and similar physical traits, in some instances. At the same time, ethnic groups grow out of the assimilation of people that do not share blood ties. The notion of sameness, thus, is as much a social construct as it is a product of kinship ties.<sup>119</sup> The belief in community and common destiny becomes a unifying

---

<sup>115</sup> Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics, a Conceptual Framework* (Columbia University Press, 1981).

<sup>116</sup> Comaroff and Comaroff, *Ethnicity, Inc.*

<sup>117</sup> This case is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

<sup>118</sup> Thomas Spear, "Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa," *The Journal of African History* 44, no. 1 (2003): 3–27; Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State."

<sup>119</sup> Weber, *Economy and Society*.

factor that sustains ethnicity and its cultural values, beliefs, and institutions. Jan Mejer argues that a constructivist perspective focuses on the agency of individuals and groups and *how they participate* in the construction of their ethnic identity on an ongoing basis, particularly with regard to the institutionalisation of social practices into traditions.<sup>120</sup> Crawford Young also emphasises the importance of historical context in shaping the manifestations of ethnicity, noting how ethnicity evolved during of the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras. Like Berman, he argues that ethnic identities were relatively fluid during the pre-colonial period because of the absence of fixed borders and migration; communities became confined to national and regional borders due to colonial policies aimed at social control, tax collection, and the recruitment of labour.<sup>121</sup> Thus, the increased saliency of ethnicity resulted from colonial policies, the effects of which continued into the post-colonial era.<sup>122</sup>

The constructivist approach appreciates the complex nature and manifestations of ethnicity in politics within various historical contexts. Ethnicity is a malleable form of social capital employed by individuals and social groups for various reasons in different contexts. Traditional monarchs, subjects, and other political actors mobilise the *substantive qualities* of ethnicity according to the dictates of their context. For instance, Robert Bates argues that post-colonial inter-ethnic rivalry arose from competition for political power and the associated material benefits of modernity.<sup>123</sup> Ethnic groups became the most convenient and accessible form of political organisation that elites relied upon to establish political parties and gain electoral

---

<sup>120</sup> Jan Mejer, "Marxist and Neo-Marxist Interpretations of Ethnicity," *Sociological Focus* 20, no. 4 (1987): 251–264.

<sup>121</sup> Crawford Young, 'Nation, Ethnicity and Citizenship: Dilemmas of Democracy and Civil Order in Africa', in *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

<sup>122</sup> Crawford Young, "Nation, Ethnicity and Citizenship: Dilemmas of Democracy and Civil Order in Africa," in *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

<sup>123</sup> Bates, "States and Markets in Tropical Africa."

support. This was because other socio-economic factors that supported the creation of political parties in Western societies, such as a large middle class and active civil society were underdeveloped. Nelson Kasfir argues that in mobilising political support along ethnic lines, political leaders established mutually-beneficial and self-reinforcing relationships within their ethnic groups; the political victories of 'ethnic entrepreneurs' at the state level translated to patronage benefits for the entire ethnic group.<sup>124</sup>

Thus, ethnic identity is a source of political power and a vehicle for accessing financial benefits for state leaders and traditional monarchs alike. The political participation of individuals along ethnic lines results from multi-layered motivations: to support one's kith and kin on account of affective ties, uphold cultural values, out-compete political rivals, and access monetary benefits. These varying motivations make case-based empirical analyses crucial since ethnicity is embedded in the competition for power and economic benefit in processes of post-colonial state formation.<sup>125</sup> Constructivist analyses are crucial in revealing the dynamism and durability of traditional kingdoms who act as the custodians of tradition and ethnicity in the post-colonial era.

Traditional kingdoms have survived by engaging in strategic interactions with the colonial and post-colonial states and by adapting to changing political conditions. Scholar Olufemi Vaughan explains this longevity through the historical-sociological concept of *longue durée*.<sup>126</sup> Traditional kingdoms exist not as an antithesis to the state but as a complementary ethno-political organisation, and the relationship between kingdoms and states entails both political contestation and cooperation. In most cases,

---

<sup>124</sup> Nelson Kasfir, "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 365–388.

<sup>125</sup> Kasfir.

<sup>126</sup> Vaughan, *Tradition and Politics*.

kingdoms' political roles are circumscribed by constitutions and limited to customary practices. Nonetheless, kingdoms have managed to maximise their gains within the 'rules of the game' established by the state.<sup>127</sup> This historical-sociological view magnifies the agency of the kingdoms as an active participant in political governance who are committed to their survival in the face of the state's hegemonic power.

The political and economic crises plaguing post-colonial states also account for the continued relevancy of traditional kingdoms. Processes of post-colonial state formation in Africa have involved protracted struggles between social groups for control of the state and the material benefits associated with political incumbency. Crises of African statehood, prevalent in the first 30 years following independence, include weak political institutions, undifferentiated economies, high rates of unemployment, poor availability of social services, and political crises such as authoritarian dictatorships and ethnic violence.<sup>128</sup> Notable cases include the recurrent coups in Ghana, the first African country to attain independence in 1957; military dictatorships and civil war in Nigeria, Angola, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo; and economic crises in Zambia and Zimbabwe that deepened between 1990 and 2000. Some of these crises were produced by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) beginning in the late 1980s. Structural adjustment entailed the reduction of public spending and thus increased population vulnerability as people lost subsidised social goods such as housing, education, agricultural inputs, and employment in the civil sector.<sup>129</sup> During

---

<sup>127</sup> Vaughan.

<sup>128</sup> Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton University Press, 2000); Stefan Lindemann, 'Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset: The Case of Uganda', *Crisis States Research Centre*, 2, 76 (2010): 1–80.

<sup>129</sup> Rita Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (Zed Books, 2000); Claude Ake, 'Development and Democracy in Africa', *Washington, DC: Brookings Institution*, 1996.

this time of crisis, traditional kingdoms became more salient as an alternative realm of existence to the state; in other words, a nation where individuals could retreat to for mutual aid. Kinship ties were an important source of solidarity and provided access to information and material benefits as public institutions failed to deliver goods in a predictable and non-discriminatory way.

Influential studies seeking to explain the factors underlying the aforementioned crises and continued political relevance of traditional authorities are grounded in a neo-Weberian analyses of institutions that view the African state as a deviation from the ideal "rational-legal" model associated with Max Weber's conceptualisation of the "modern bureaucratic state" based on features associated with 19th century Europe.<sup>130</sup> These features include well-defined territories, citizens with national identities, state bureaucracies, financial systems, representative governance, and the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.<sup>131</sup> The pre-eminence of constitutionalism and universal equality before the law is another defining feature of Weberian statehood whereby an impersonal, rules-based order directs the affairs of human interaction, thereby creating a 'rational-legal' state. Bureaucratic institutions are also central to Weberian statehood in contrast to the personalised, informal forms of power that characterise post-colonial societies and are positioned as the root cause of statehood crises in contemporary Africa.

Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle's work on the neo-patrimonial state argues that crises in political governance result from a personalised, patronage-based rule,

---

<sup>130</sup> Khisa, 'The Making of the 'Informal State'in Uganda'.

<sup>131</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (University of California Press, 1968).

which they describe as the *distinctive hallmark* of African politics.<sup>132</sup> Neo-patrimonialism is contrasted with the impersonal, rules-based nature of Weberian bureaucracy. The informality that characterises neo-patrimonialism brings the private into the public realm, whereby personalistic relations such as kinship ties undermine the impersonal, rules-based functions of public institutions. Rent seeking and patronage-based rule emanates from both the legacies of the colonial state and post-colonial political dynamics. Bratton and van de Walle argue that African regimes lacked the organised coalitions between the state and non-state social interests necessary to processes of collective bargaining in the formation of public policy, as is the case in western democracies. For van de Walle, the dominance of personalised networks and weak institutions meant that African states lacked the features of modernity and instead reflected traditional and pre-modern forms of social organisation. Jean Francois Bayart's concepts of the "politics of the belly" and the "rhizome state" similarly characterize crises of post-colonial governance as resulting from personalised rule and kinship networks. The "politics of the belly" describes the efforts of state and sub-state actors to access political power and material gain through social networks, especially kinship ties, at the expense of fairness and equality in the distribution of public goods.<sup>133</sup> This phenomenon results in zero-sum struggles for political power, manifest in contested elections and civil wars.<sup>134</sup>

Likewise, Cooper's "gatekeeper state" concept captures how post-colonial African states deviate from the Weberian standard. Incumbents use public institutions to interact with external actors and derive financial gain. Sources of externally derived

---

<sup>132</sup> Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," *World Politics* 46, no. 04 (1994): 453–489.

<sup>133</sup> Jean-François Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (London: Longman, 1993).

<sup>134</sup> Bayart, "Africa in the World."

revenue include foreign aid, licencing and immigration fees, and tariffs.<sup>135</sup> This strategy was a legacy of colonial rule since colonial states functioned as channels for extracting natural resources for export to European markets. Jeffrey Herbst provides another neo-Weberian and historical analysis of state formation in Africa, arguing that modern juridical states did not take root in Africa because of the combined influence of three main factors: First, colonial rule did not adequately construct strong political and economic institutions, such as differentiated economies, efficient state bureaucracies, tax collection infrastructure, and consultative democratic politics.<sup>136</sup> Instead, aspects of pre-colonial civilisation such as traditional authorities and "premodern" cultural norms and practices remained salient. Secondly, the type of interstate conflict of pre-modern Europe that incentivised innovation and institutional capacity due to the imperative defending territory and sovereignty did not occur in Africa. Thirdly, low population density in Africa limited the state's ability to "broadcast power" throughout the artificial national boundaries created by colonialism.<sup>137</sup> Herbst also argues that political independence was mostly an urban affair whereas rural areas remaining "uncaptured" and omitted from processes of state formation.

Other scholars employ rational-actor approaches to explain the deviation of African states from the Western modern model. For example, Arthur Goldsmith argued that post-colonial African states experienced political crises because leaders acted according to the incentives created by their specific contexts. Data from independent African nations from 1960-1999 reveals a significant correlation between high levels of risk-taking and insecure tenure whereby political leaders resort to predatory rule

---

<sup>135</sup> Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present*, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>136</sup> Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*.

<sup>137</sup> Herbst.

as opposed to prudent policymaking, producing what Goldsmith dubs the *orthodox paradox*.<sup>138</sup> Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz take a similar rational-actor approach, arguing that political leaders in Africa prefer weak state institutions, along with the confusion, inefficiency, and uncertainty they produce, to maintain political control.<sup>139</sup> This *instrumentalization of disorder* means that social groups and individuals in control of the state avoid creating institutions designed to foster accountability, fairness, and transparency because this would translate to political risk.<sup>140</sup> Overall, the import of these neo-Weberian analyses view political crises as produced by an absence of rule-based governance and strong institutions.

Viewing the state in Africa as being the antithesis of the modern ‘Weberian state’ leads to a partial and negated understanding of African politics in general, and the political significance of traditional kingdoms in particular. Timothy Kelsall and Thandika Mkandawire critique the notion that patron-client politics are ubiquitous in Africa; they reconceptualize African politics away from “afro-pessimistic” neo-Weberian approaches that view African realities as a negation of the idealised Western state model.<sup>141</sup> They argue that academic research and policy responses ought to be directed towards understanding the complex factors underlying both the strengths and weaknesses of African countries.<sup>142</sup> Neo-patrimonial linkages, for instances are not necessarily an “anti-modern” form of rule. Anne Pitcher, Mary Moran, and Michael Johnson view the conflation of patrimonialism with bad governance as a misreading

---

<sup>138</sup> Arthur A. Goldsmith, ‘Predatory versus Developmental Rule in Africa’, *Democratization* 11, no. 3 (2004): 88–110.

<sup>139</sup> Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*.

<sup>140</sup> Chabal and Daloz.

<sup>141</sup> Tim Kelsall, ‘Going with the Grain in African Development?’, *Development Policy Review* 26, no. 6 (2008): 627–655; Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Thinking about Developmental States in Africa’, *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25, no. 3 (2001): 289–314.

<sup>142</sup> Kelsall, ‘Going with the Grain in African Development?’; Mkandawire, ‘Thinking about Developmental States in Africa’; Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa: Critical Reflections’, *World Politics* 67, no. 3 (2015): 563–612.

of Weber, who viewed patrimonialism as a specific form of authority and legitimation instead of an inherently corrupt system.<sup>143</sup> In fact, patrimonial politics have been correlated with stable politics and economic growth in some settings in Africa. The history of state formation in Africa is replete with cases of elites leveraging ethnic ties to facilitate the establishment of durable political and economic institutions. For example, David Sebudubudu, Patrick Molutsi, and Ellen Hillbom describe how the strategic partnerships between the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), dominated by the Bamangwato traditional chiefs from the Khama family, and their associates led to political and economic stability for Botswana, regarded as the most resilient democracy in Africa.<sup>144</sup> African states are not necessarily deviating from features of western modern statehood but are instead engaged in complex political processes of state formation following the formal conclusion of colonialism, a history which has shaped the modern form of the state and its institutions in contemporary Africa.

Neo-Weberian analyses also minimise the agency of traditional kingdoms in political processes, since they focus exclusively on the weakness of state-level institutions. Traditional kingdoms were involved in the various phases of state formation in Africa, from colonialism to the post-colonial era. Apart from political cooperation, kingdoms participated in executing economic policies, particularly pertaining to agriculture. Robert Bates describes how governing regimes collaborated with rural authorities to compel local producers to sell produce cheaply to government-owned Marketing Boards, which the state then exported for a higher price, the profits of which were

---

<sup>143</sup> Anne Pitcher, Mary H. Moran, and Michael Johnston, "Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa," *African Studies Review* 52, no. 1 (2009): 125–156.

<sup>144</sup> David Sebudubudu and Mokganedi Zara Botlhomilwe, 'The Critical Role of Leadership in Botswana's Development: What Lessons?', *Leadership* 8, no. 1 (2012): 29–45; Ellen Hillbom, 'Botswana: A Development-Oriented Gate-Keeping State', *African Affairs* 111, no. 442 (2012): 67–89.

subsequently distributed to patronage clients.<sup>145</sup> This strategy also kept food prices low in urban areas, minimising the likelihood of mass discontent. A symbiotic relationship between urban elites and rural authorities allowed actors to strengthen their political and economic power at the centre and periphery, respectively. These strategic, dialogic interactions persist to-date and account for the continued political relevance of traditional authorities in the post-colonial era.

This discussion above highlights the need for a holistic approach to studying the multifaceted nature of African politics. African statehood is shaped by a complex interaction of historical, structural, and agency-based factors. Understanding the nature of African statehood is essential to analyses of extractive governance. A tapestry of influences and relations characterised by a mixture of resilience and continuity coalesce to determine resource impacts. Christopher Clapham describes the varying outcomes of development in post-colonial Africa as *multiple Africas*.<sup>146</sup> Some African countries have experienced political and economic turmoil since independence while others have experienced relative stability. For example, Botswana possesses a durable dominant party democracy whereas post-conflict societies such as Uganda, Angola, and Rwanda have transitioned from armed violence to authoritarian, military-assisted dominant party regimes that fostered relative peace. These variegated political outcomes reflect the continual and ongoing interaction between social groups in African countries, including between actors at the state and sub-state levels. Political relations between social groups entail both cooperation and contestation, and it is within this context that sub-state kingdoms have continually engaged with the state in a dialogic manner despite being structurally subordinate to

---

<sup>145</sup> Robert Bates, "States and Markets in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policy," Berkeley: University of California Press, Series on Social Choice and Political Economy, 1981.

<sup>146</sup> Christopher S. Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction* (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

the state. The strategic decisions of kingdoms to both cooperate with and contest state authority explain their continued relevance in post-colonial politics.

### **Traditional Kingdoms and Extractive Natural Resource Governance**

Despite their continuing political relevance in the post-colonial era, traditional authorities in Africa have minimal control over the high-value extractive sector, except for unique cases such as South Africa's Royal Bafokeng. The state usually controls the entire extractive natural resource value chain. Where traditional authorities benefit, it is mostly through state patronage or the corporate social responsibility projects of private companies. Traditional authorities continue to possess customary authority over land in rural areas, and this governing arrangement does not tend to threaten the state's political interests. The primary reason for this phenomenon is rooted in political expediency: if the state were to allocate the mostly vast resource revenues to kingdoms, this would likely translate to a redistribution of power away from the political centre, potentially weakening the governing coalition's holding power.

As Kate Baldwin argues, several African governments deliberately devolved control over land to traditional authorities beginning in the 1970s as part of a strategy to share power and distribute spoils.<sup>147</sup> Ghana's 1979 constitution, for example, gave traditional leaders control over land in the country's northern region. South Africa's 1994 Ingonyama Trust Act accorded the Zulu kingdom control over a third of the land in the KwaZulu Natal province. The 1995 Land Act in Zambia formally empowered

---

<sup>147</sup> Baldwin, "When Politicians Cede Control of Resources."

chiefs in customary land administration.<sup>148</sup> Some of these reforms have also been accompanied by increased local-level competition between communal groups for access to land and associated monetary benefits. For example, Benjamin Campion and Emmanuel Acheampong's work describes the efforts of traditional chiefs to negotiate land purchase transactions with jatropha biofuel companies between 2005 and 2009 in Ghana, which led to clashes between chiefs, communal groups, and companies on account of the loss of land for community grazing and agricultural purposes.<sup>149</sup>

Traditional kingdoms with the institutional capacity and ability to promote their political and economic objectives may gain legal concessions from the state in the form of resource ownership. The Royal Bafokeng kingdom's ownership of a substantial portion of South Africa's platinum reserves is a rare case in the study of traditional kingdoms' participation in natural resource governance. The case of the Bafokeng, however, was shaped by context-specific factors, particularly South Africa's apartheid-era history and forms of land and mineral ownership.

Scholars such as Gavin Capps, Bridget Horner, and Susan Cook have analysed how the Bafokeng managed to gain control of South Africa's lucrative platinum industry. The kingdom grew in military and numerical strength in the 1830s as it absorbed smaller Sotho-Tswana groups fleeing attacks from the expanding Zulu state in South Africa's south-western region.<sup>150</sup> As an ethnic group, the Bafokeng kingdom developed on the basis of biological kinship ties and through the absorption of other groups that did not share its bloodline. The kingdom established strategic alliances

---

<sup>148</sup> Baldwin.

<sup>149</sup> Benjamin Betey Campion and Emmanuel Acheampong, "The Chieftaincy Institution in Ghana: Causers and Arbitrators of Conflicts in Industrial Jatropha Investments," *Sustainability* 6, no. 9 (2014): 6332–6350.

<sup>150</sup> William F. Lye, "The Difaqane: The Mfecane in the Southern Sotho Area, 1822–24," *The Journal of African History* 8, no. 01 (1967): 107–131.

with the incoming Dutch settlers or Afrikaner-Voortrekkers who created the Transvaal Republic in 1858.<sup>151</sup> The Bafokeng used strategies of extraversion by supplying the Transvaal colony with land and plantation labour in exchange for military protection, which in turn allowed the kingdom to survive the colonial incursion. Missionaries, especially from the Hermannsburg Mission Society (HMS), also assisted the kingdom to register Bafokeng land in the kingdom's name, which transitioned the kingdom from its pre-colonial customary models of ownership to private, contractual, and codified regimes.<sup>152</sup> The kingdom re-registered the land in the King's name in 1881 when the Transvaal Republic introduced tribal trust land ownership, which gave the kingdom autonomous legal rights over the land and any minerals discovered on it.<sup>153</sup>

When platinum mining began in the 1920s in the Bafokeng's Phokeng area, the kingdom began earning revenue from prospecting fees. By the mid-1970s, the Bafokeng kingdom began charging surface fees to platinum mining companies.<sup>154</sup> The kingdom successfully litigated its ownership rights to the land and platinum against both the Impala Platinum mining company and the South African government in the both 1970s and 2004, respectively. The kingdom also benefitted from the Mineral Rights Act of 1998 which allowed apartheid-era land and mineral ownership regimes to continue, making the Bafokeng one of the largest landowners and mineral concession holders in South Africa. The kingdom also purchased shares in the Impala Platinum Mining company and set up Royal Bafokeng Holdings, a diversified holding

---

<sup>151</sup> Mbenga and Manson, "People of the Dew."

<sup>152</sup> Mbenga and Manson.

<sup>153</sup> S. E. Cook, 'Community Management of Mineral Resources: The Case of the Royal Bafokeng Nation', *Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy* 113, no. 1 (2013): 61–66.

<sup>154</sup> Capps, "Tribal-Landed Property."

company invested in mining and non-mining industries, with the king serving as its chief executive officer.

The case of the Bafokeng kingdom is unique and resulted from a combination of contextual factors, namely the cumulative effects of history and the strategic actions of the kingdom's successive leaders. The Bafokeng have maintained their sovereignty through their legal ownership of land and minerals. For the most part, central governments in resource-rich countries have successfully marginalised kingdoms to ensure the state's exclusive ownership of the extractive sector, as is the case in Uganda. The literature on Uganda's extractive sector does not adequately assess the impact of oil discoveries on political relations between the state and the country's largest kingdoms, the Buganda and Bunyoro, despite the Bunyoro's claim to ownership of the land and sub-surface resources wherein the oil is located. This research seeks to fill this gap through an empirical analysis grounded in political settlements theory.

## **Conclusion**

The emerging literature on the political impacts of Uganda's oil sector is dominated by arguments about whether the country will experience the resource curse based on popular theoretical and empirical correlations between oil, politics, and economics. While Uganda's authoritarian NRM regime will surely condition resource outcomes, this chapter offers a more holistic and critical approach to understanding how the extractive sector is embedded in the political struggles of state formation processes in Africa. The historical cooperation and contestation between the state and traditional kingdoms in the post-colonial era involves both structural and relational factors and reflects the dual nationalisms produced by colonial rule. Traditional kingdoms of

Uganda have continually shaped the country's power configurations since the colonial era through their strategic interactions with the state and remain influential in the present-day. The struggle for power and material resources between the state and kingdoms underlies the exclusionary nature of the extractive sector in Uganda and Africa more generally, with the notable exception of South Africa's Royal Bafokeng kingdom. This chapter critiqued neo-Weberian and institutional approaches to statehood in Africa and instead sought to provide a more critical understanding of the historical, structural, and material political dynamics between the state and traditional kingdoms. The political settlements approach, which analyses struggles between the most powerful groups in society and the corresponding impacts to institutional outcomes, is a more useful framework for understanding the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to gain access to the oil economy in Uganda. In the next chapter, I discuss my theoretical approach to discussing the issue of natural resource governance in Uganda.

## **CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **Introduction**

This chapter describes the political settlements and extraversion theoretical framework employed in this dissertation. The first section presents the political settlements approach, explaining its origin as a critique of the New Institutional Economics school of thought. Second, I present a typology of political settlements, distilling the three main types of settlements conceptualised in the literature: inclusive, exclusive, and transitional. The third section outlines four themes which constitute the pillars of my theoretical framework, namely historical analysis, political identities, power, and institutions. I then justify my use of political settlements theory and describe its growing use in the study of African political economy. Next, I discuss the concept of extraversion and how I plan to incorporate this lens to complement political settlements theory to provide a systematic analysis of the influence of external factors in the shaping of domestic political settlements. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the saliency of this study's theoretical framework in investigating the emerging political dynamics between the state and traditional kingdoms in Uganda following the discovery of oil.

### **A Political Settlements Critique of New Institutional Economics**

The political settlements approach emerged in the mid-1990s beginning with Mushtaq Khan's seminal work on the political economy of development in East Asia.<sup>155</sup> The

---

<sup>155</sup> Mushtaq Khan, "Class, Clientelism, and Communal Politics in Contemporary Bangladesh," in *The Making of History: Essays Presented to Irfan Habib* (London: Anthem Press, 1995); Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia* (Cambridge

approach is rooted in a critique of New Institutional Economics (NIE) which focuses on the comparative study of political and economic institutions to understand developmental differences between countries. Although institutions are important in explaining variable levels of development between contexts, political settlements theory sees the distribution of power between social groups as the critical *a priori* factor influencing the formation, function, and outputs of institutions.<sup>156</sup> The political settlements approach gained traction in the early 2000s as an incisive critique of the donor-led, top-down “good governance” agenda in Africa which privileges the role of liberal democratic institutions in economic development.<sup>157</sup> The assumed correlation between ‘good governance’ and positive economic growth, political settlement theorists argued, was more complicated and nuanced than a strict focus on institutions: the quality of institutions rests on the distribution of power.<sup>158</sup> Political settlements analyses have since gained prominence in global development policy and individual academic research.<sup>159</sup>

“Political settlement” refers to the distribution of power between social groups; these configurations form the foundation upon which institutions are established.<sup>160</sup> Political settlement also refers to the coalitions and set of compromises made between

---

University Press, 2000); Mushtaq Khan, “State Failure in Developing Countries and Institutional Reform Strategies,” 2004; Mushtaq Khan, “Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions,” Unpublished Paper, School of Oriental Studies, 2010, 1–139.

<sup>156</sup> Hazel Gray, “Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2019.

<sup>157</sup> Gray.

<sup>158</sup> Gray.

<sup>159</sup> For example, these various works employ the political settlements to analyse issues in African political economy: Hickey and Izama, “The Politics of Governing Oil in Uganda”; David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, “Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda,” *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012): 379–403; Sylvia Croese, “State-Led Housing Delivery as an Instrument of Developmental Patrimonialism: The Case of Post-War Angola,” *African Affairs* 116, no. 462 (2017): 80–100; Hazel S. Gray, “The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania,” *African Affairs* 114, no. 456 (2015): 382–403.

<sup>160</sup> Jonathan Di John and James Putzel, “Political Settlements: Issues Paper,” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Emerging Issues Research Service, 2009, 1–29.

political actors in society. Institutions and policies are reflective of the power and influence of actors and their respective interests.<sup>161</sup> A political settlement is defined as such when it is discernible and self-reproducing over an extended period that spans several years.<sup>162</sup> "Settlement" thus denotes a balance of power between the relative capabilities of organisations or social groups and the related effects on the functioning of institutions governing human affairs. The notion of a power equilibrium is implicit in the idea of a settlement, although this equilibrium manifests differently in advanced capitalist societies than in developing countries.<sup>163</sup> In advanced capitalist societies, the equilibrium of power between social groups is reflected in the formal rules and policies enforced by public agencies. For example, powerful corporations can influence the legislature to pass laws that facilitate the ease of doing business, which courts subsequently enforce. In developing countries, this equilibrium occurs through informal means, primarily patron-client networks which undermine formal rules.<sup>164</sup> Khan notes that equilibrium is not always achieved and shifts in the distribution of power as political settlements evolve over time.<sup>165</sup> Political settlements theory also places conflict and the struggle for resources at the centre of human interaction. This struggle for power and economic resources drives social and institutional change. Institutions ought not to be viewed as purely technocratic but as the product of struggle between powerful groups in society.

Hazel Gray identifies two important perspectives within political settlements theorising. The first variant views political settlements as a *process* that is unplanned and results from the ongoing interaction between different groups who compete for

---

<sup>161</sup> Whitfield et al., *The Politics of African Industrial Policy*.

<sup>162</sup> Khan, "Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions."

<sup>163</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

<sup>164</sup> Khan.

<sup>165</sup> Khan.

power and rents.<sup>166</sup> The complex interaction between groups produces intended and unintended consequences that shape the institutional and social order.<sup>167</sup> Institutions guaranteeing property rights or property, for example, do not emerge because of their intrinsic goodness or “objective” beneficial outcomes but instead result from political struggles between groups with opposing interests.<sup>168</sup> The second perspective views political settlements as culminated *actions*, highlighting the role of bargains and negotiations made by elite groups which lead to the formation of institutions designed to deliver preferred outcomes.<sup>169</sup> Formal agreements may emerge during or after informal processes of political struggle. This type of political settlements theorising is frequent in studies of conflict and elite bargains.<sup>170</sup> However, Khan cautions against the simplistic view of settlements as ‘elite deal-making’, but as the combined influence of elite and non-elite actor participation.<sup>171</sup> A political settlement primarily emerges through a complex process of contestation, whereby organisations acknowledge the dominant power of an organisation or organisations and choose to accept the status quo due to the high opportunity costs of disrupting the settlement.<sup>172</sup> This study follows Khan’s approach, viewing political settlements as shaped by power distributions in society, while also recognising the importance of intentional deal-making between the competing groups as part of the complex interactive processes that shape the social, economic, and institutional order.

---

<sup>166</sup> Gray, ‘Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa’.

<sup>167</sup> Gray.

<sup>168</sup> Khan, ‘Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions’.

<sup>169</sup> Gray, ‘Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa’.

<sup>170</sup> Jonathan Di John and James Putzel, ‘Political Settlements: Issues Paper’, *Governance and Social Development Resource Centre*, Emerging Issues Research Service, 2009, 1–29; Lant Pritchett, Kunal Sen, and Eric Werker, *Deals and Development: The Political Dynamics of Growth Episodes* (Oxford University Press, 2017); Mariz Tadros and Jeremy Allouche, ‘Political Settlements as a Violent Process: Deconstructing the Relationship between Political Settlements and Intrinsic, Instrumental and Resultant Forms of Violence’, *Conflict, Security & Development* 17, no. 3 (2017): 187–204.

<sup>171</sup> Khan, ‘Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions’.

<sup>172</sup> Khan.

The strength of the political settlements approach lies in its pluralist and interdisciplinary nature; it incorporates several theories and concepts from neo-Marxist, historical, sociological, and institutionalist traditions.<sup>173</sup> For example, Gray notes that the notion of coalitions within political settlements theory is synonymous with the historical and sociological understanding of a "social contract" and elite bargaining, which describes the role of powerful social groups in defining a country's political and economic trajectory. However, political settlements theory does not singularly focus on elites but incorporates influential social groups at both the elite and non-elite levels to understand how their interactions shape political and economic outcomes.<sup>174</sup> Furthermore, political settlements theory draws on historical institutionalism in examining how historical power configurations determine the functioning of institutions and their evolution over time.<sup>175</sup> The placing of power and conflict at the centre of inter-group interaction reflects classical, neo-Marxist materialism, and neo-Weberian thinking on the primacy of conflict in social relations, the use of power and violence in state formation and political governance, and the formation of institutions.<sup>176</sup> This theoretical plurality contributes to a multi-pronged and holistic approach suitable to the study of African political economy and development.

---

<sup>173</sup> Gray, "Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa."

<sup>174</sup> For more on elite bargains, and its deployment in studies of African political economy, see: John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," *American Sociological Review*, 1989, 17–32; John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1992); Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Bargaining and State Breakdown in Africa," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1, no. 1 (1995): 54–72; Stefan Lindemann, *Inclusive Elite Bargains and Civil War Avoidance: The Case of Zambia* (Crisis States Research Centre, 2010); Amy R. Poteete, "Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral-Dependent Development in Botswana," *The Journal of Development Studies* 45, no. 4 (2009): 544–571.

<sup>175</sup> Theda Skocpol, *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge University Press, 1984); Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 369–404.

<sup>176</sup> Karl Duszka, "Max Weber's Conception of the State," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 3, no. 1 (1989): 71–105; Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–576; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (January 1, 1957): 201–15, <https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303>.

### Typology of Political Settlements

In this study, I consider political settlements as continuously evolving structures that reflect the distribution of power between social groups. Using Tim Kelsall and Mushtaq Khan's work, I categorise political settlements into three main types: inclusive, exclusive and transitional.<sup>177</sup> Inclusive settlements are characterised by cooperation between powerful elites and efficient institutions based on meritocratic rules.<sup>178</sup> This variant of settlement is commonly associated with well-developed capitalist societies where political power rests in formal institutions and bureaucratic structures instead of patronage and personalised rule.<sup>179</sup> In exclusive settlements, a minority of elites establish a ruling coalition that is sustained by rent-sharing, clientelism, and patronage. The omission of other influential groups makes zero-sum conflict likely. In this settlement, which is commonly associated with developing countries, public institutions are inefficient and unable to deliver public goods in a broad-based manner.<sup>180</sup> Finally, transitional settlements involve a redistribution of power between social groups, and this can be scheduled, such as elections, or a sudden rupture that upends the settlement. The latter include military coups, and civil wars, which may lead to extended periods of instability, or a quick return to stability once the triumphant group(s) attain control and the acquiescence of the vanquished. Although there may be pockets of efficiency and some functioning public institutions during prolonged transitional settlements, formal institutions are typically inefficient and permeated by patronage and rent seeking.<sup>181</sup>

---

<sup>177</sup> Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements"; Khan, "Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions."

<sup>178</sup> Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements."

<sup>179</sup> Khan, "Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions."

<sup>180</sup> Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements."

<sup>181</sup> Khan; Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements."

I also add the novel concept of strategic coexistence to this typology of political settlements. Strategic coexistence accounts for the tactics of sub-state social groups existing in an exclusive political settlement, a factor that is not adequately captured by the existing typologies of political settlements literature. Strategic coexistence occurs where weaker social groups excluded from the governing coalition pursue inward-looking strategies to augment their political, economic, and organisational power. The hope is to deploy this capacity in the future to achieve inclusion into, or dominance of, the governing coalition. These groups do not use violence or engage in other forms of overt resistance but augment their political, economic, and institutional capacity within prevailing power structures. Strategic coexistence occurs due to the marginalisation and deprivation of groups excluded from prevailing political settlements, a condition which incentivises and necessitates competition. Excluded social groups are cognizant of their limited holding power and the impracticality of overt resistance and thus do not attempt to shift power configurations through explicit challenges to the governing coalition. Instead, they harbour the longer-term objectives of either seizing power or future inclusion in the governing coalition, with the hope of receiving the attendant political and economic benefits that accompany a change in status.

The excluded groups may or may not draw financial resources from the governing coalition as part of a relationship of patronage. What distinguishes groups engaged in strategic coexistence is their expressed desire to covertly challenge the governing coalition and change the political settlement in the future. Groups engaged in strategic coexistence increase their holding power through several tactics, namely political mobilisation, establishing alliances with other excluded groups, and developing independent sources of income, all of which can increase the likelihood of successful

resistance against current or future governing coalitions. This novel concept provides insight into the interests and strategies of excluded groups whose actions may not have direct or indirect effects on power configurations in the short- to medium-term but whose ongoing activities may have long-term implications. The typology of political settlements described above is a heuristic tool and so the categories must be recognized as ideal types. Some countries may exhibit features of more than a single category, thus requiring case-based explanations.

### **Historical Analysis, Political Identities, Power, and Institutions**

In addition to the typology described above, this dissertation identifies four pillars of the political settlements framework to facilitate a comprehensive, evidence-based analysis. The first theme is that of history and its impact on contemporary realities and issues.<sup>182</sup> Historical analysis engages with information from the past to explain present-day social, political, economic, and institutional conditions. Quoting Khan, historical analysis in political settlements is,

“... an art, and it requires a deep understanding of the history, sociology, ideological and identity cleavages in a country, and how they have overlapped with and used to mobilise around resource issues.”<sup>183</sup>

Political settlements theory regards historical evidence as fundamental for understanding how the distribution of power across organisations determines the formation of institutions and their functioning.<sup>184</sup> Modes of social organisation, identity and interests, political competition and alliances, and the institutional structures emerging from interactions between powerful groups are elements relevant

---

<sup>182</sup> Kelsall, “Thinking and Working with Political Settlements.”

<sup>183</sup> Khan, ‘Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions’, p 640

<sup>184</sup> Khan.

to this type of historical analysis. Configurations of power between organisations must be viewed along a continuum, with moments of sudden change or critical junctures reshaping settlements.<sup>185</sup> This approach helps uncover both the enduring historical legacies and contingent political developments shaping configurations of power. Historical analysis is essential to this study and facilitates a deeper understanding of the struggles for power between the state and traditional kingdoms, including how these struggles shift and evolve in the post-oil discovery period.

The second theme is the mapping of political identities and actor interests.<sup>186</sup> Political settlement approaches take into account both individuals and groups at the elite and grassroots levels.<sup>187</sup> Identifying influential actors and the convergence and divergence of their respective interests informs our understanding of political struggles and their influence on the nature and function of institutions. This focus on identities and interests reflects the rational-actor ontology underlying political settlements theory, which views actor choices as being primarily driven by their political and economic interests, and their holding power *vis a vis* that of competing groups.<sup>188</sup> Political settlements also regards identity as an important subject of analysis since identity shapes patterns of affiliation, association, mobilisation, and, in turn, political struggle. Identities are also a source of power since effective mobilisation translates to increased political capacity for action. For example, post-colonial African societies are characterised by identity-based politics, especially ethno-linguistic party affiliation, religious alignments, and, to a lesser extent, class status. Ethnic identity is the most dominant political force in the post-colonial era and is associated with adverse

---

<sup>185</sup> Behuria, Buur, and Gray, 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa'.

<sup>186</sup> Thomas Parks and William Cole, "Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice," Occasional Paper 2 (2010).

<sup>187</sup> Parks and Cole.

<sup>188</sup> Parks and Cole.

outcomes such as patron-client politics and zero-sum struggles for control of the state and economic resources.<sup>189</sup> With regard to traditional kingdoms, ethnic identities are considerably salient as a source of political power and legitimacy as well as an avenue for raising financial resources. Ethnicity is a key factor in explaining the resiliency of kingdoms as an alternative form of nation in the colonial and post-colonial eras.

Identities are also linked to claims for access to political power and economic resources. For example, the Bunyoro kingdom has claimed the right to a share of oil sector revenues because of their identity as Banyoro. Understanding the interests of political actors reveals sources of commonality and competition within a governing coalition and how these factors influence the durability of a settlement.<sup>190</sup> These multiple interests within a dominant coalition may also explain why certain groups seek to promote or undermine formal institutions in pursuit of their sectarian interests.<sup>191</sup> A higher degree of mutual interest results in a more stable settlement and provides an incentive to exclude other groups from joining the coalition in order to maximise benefits.<sup>192</sup> A shift in interests may lead to changes in the constitution of the dominant coalition, which has corresponding effects on the stability of the settlement. This analysis of actors, interests, and resulting coalitions is particularly important when studying developing countries like Uganda, where informal bargains and deal-making between powerful actors determine political, economic, and institutional outcomes more than formal institutions.<sup>193</sup>

---

<sup>189</sup> Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State."

<sup>190</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>191</sup> Parks and Cole.

<sup>192</sup> Parks and Cole.

<sup>193</sup> Kelsall, 'Thinking and Working with Political Settlements'.

The third theme of the political settlements approach is the nature and extent of organisational *power*.<sup>194</sup> Power is a primary feature of political settlements theorising. Power is multifaceted and is the currency of competition between groups, which in turn defines institutional outcomes. Drawing from Max Weber, power is defined as a political actor's capacity to act according to their interests or impose their will over competing actors in a given situation.<sup>195</sup> Robert Dahl similarly defined power in a relational sense, as the ability of one actor or group to influence or compel the actions of another.<sup>196</sup> Parks and Cole add that power is the acknowledged likelihood that an actor would prevail in a conflict over others. This 'acknowledged' power contributes to the stability and longevity of a political settlement.<sup>197</sup> The notion of *holding power* is central to the idea of a political settlement. Holding power describes the aggregate quantity and quality of an actor's capabilities; and this influences their ability to hold out in conflicts or competition against others, to withstand and absorb attacks, and to impose costs and constraints on other groups.<sup>198</sup> Holding power refers to the capacity of political organisations to mobilise resources, galvanise support, and establish strategic alliances through formal and informal means – tactics which enable an organisation to accomplish its objectives.<sup>199</sup> Political actors engage in struggles against other actors when they believe they have superior holding power and/or when they are uncertain of their opponents' capabilities. The victorious actor(s) compel opponents to submit, paving the way for a settlement.<sup>200</sup>

---

<sup>194</sup> Khan, "Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions."

<sup>195</sup> Weber, *Economy and Society*.

<sup>196</sup> Dahl, 'The Concept of Power'.

<sup>197</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>198</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'; Behuria, Buur, and Gray, 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa'.

<sup>199</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

<sup>200</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions'.

*Sources* of power are both material and immaterial. Material sources of power include resources such as finances, military capabilities, and violence. Non-material or ideational sources of power include political ideologies and identities which can function as tools for mobilisation.<sup>201</sup> Geographical location can also contribute to a group's the level of holding power, since location is tied to access to resources and thus to finance, business opportunities, and information. Political settlements theory unpacks these sources of power and analyses how they are deployed by actors in the process of political competition, struggles which subsequently shape institutions.

Although the idea of 'powerful actors' mainly denotes elite actors, non-elite actors also form part of the matrix and can possess important sources of power that influence the political settlement. For example, local and state-level leaders can mobilise the population size and ethnic identities of rural communities as a form of political power. Rural communities can in turn exert their power by voting for certain groups or political candidates, thereby impacting national politics despite lacking other forms of power such as financial and military capacity.

Changes to the distribution of power can be incremental or sudden, with differentiated effects on the political settlement. Changes to the configuration of power reflect the continual evolution of political settlements.<sup>202</sup> Incremental changes occur over time and result from fluxes in the holding power of organisations. Sudden changes can occur as a result of historical contingencies or through 'transitional' processes such as the death of a political leader, elections, protests, economic crises and/or the emergence of new political organisations, all of which can lead to a

---

<sup>201</sup> Pritish Behuria, Lars Buur, and Hazel Gray, "Studying Political Settlements in Africa," *African Affairs*, 2017, 1–18.

<sup>202</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

redistribution of power. These shifts in the configuration of power may allow for previously excluded groups to break into the settlement as those with holding power diminish in viability and importance. For example, electoral losses force incumbent parties into the opposition while victorious parties and their allies assume control of the settlement. The same principle also holds true for military coups.

The fourth theme is that of *institutions*. Although political settlements theory critiques the NIE, institutions are still a central feature of the PSA and viewed as essential to processes of development and social change. Political settlements adheres to the NIE definition of institutions: they are both abstract rules, policies, and procedures on one hand, and physical state agencies on the other, and are intended to minimise transaction costs and facilitate optimal outcomes in human interaction.<sup>203</sup> Institutions also impose constraints on the behaviour of social groups to achieve a more equitable distribution of public goods and common resources.<sup>204</sup> Douglass North defined institutions as the *scaffolding for human interactions* designed to create a social order and reduce uncertainty in the conduct of human affairs.<sup>205</sup> Institutions enforce rules, influence choices, and determine the feasibility and profitability of engaging in social, political, and economic activities.<sup>206</sup> Institutions can be informal or formal. Informal institutions are social codes of conduct derived from traditional customs and cultural practices whereas formal institutions are rules and organisations such as constitutions, laws, and government bureaucracies.<sup>207</sup>

---

<sup>203</sup> Khan.

<sup>204</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>205</sup> North, Douglass, 'Institutions'.

<sup>206</sup> North, Douglass.

<sup>207</sup> North, Douglass.

The quality of institutions influences economic growth and livelihood prospects.<sup>208</sup> In the NIE's view, the quality of institutions is defined by transaction costs, property rights, and contracts.<sup>209</sup> Transaction costs refers to the price of undertaking an economic activity; it is not exclusive to monetary costs but also involves the overall level of risk. Property rights are the established protections and privileges for those engaged in commercial activity and can involve both legal rules and regulations as well as customary practice.<sup>210</sup> Contracts are legally binding and enforceable agreements between two or more parties over the terms of exchange.<sup>211</sup> New Institutionalists argue that the model of political governance that best fosters these qualities is that of liberal democracy.<sup>212</sup> The features of liberal democracy conducive for developing strong institutions include a constitution guaranteeing the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. To New Institutionalists, institutions that lower transaction costs, protect property rights, and ensure contracts hold the key to optimal economic performance. Conversely, those institutions that deviate from these principles lead to adverse outcomes, particularly economic and political instability.

Prithish Behuria and others note that political settlements theory diverges from the NIE's understanding of institutions in several important ways. The political settlements view does not regard transaction costs, property rights, and contracts as the determinants of institutional strength and as automatically inducing positive developmental outcomes. Instead, informal influence and bargains between powerful

---

<sup>208</sup> North, 'A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History'.

<sup>209</sup> Douglass C. North, 'Understanding the Process of Institutional Change', *North: Douglass*, 2005, 89–108.

<sup>210</sup> Ménard and Shirley, 'The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics'.

<sup>211</sup> Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics'.

<sup>212</sup> Scott A. Beaulier, 'Explaining Botswana's Success: The Critical Role of Post-Colonial Policy', *Cato Journal* 23 (2003): 227.

groups determine the form and strength of the institutions.<sup>213</sup> Institutions are malleable and function as intended only if they are compatible with the interests of powerful groups. If they contradict these interests or shift the distribution of rents towards groups excluded from the settlement, powerful groups interfere to subvert their functioning or abolish them outright.<sup>214</sup> Political settlements theory accords institutions key political roles, such as creating rents and distributing benefits to those influential groups with control over institutional functioning.<sup>215</sup> This type of analysis goes beyond the integrity and utility of an institution's technical outputs.

The influence of powerful organisations over institutions for sectarian gain is not always absolute due to their bounded capacity for unilateral action and the imperative of incorporating broad-based interests to achieve short-term political objectives.<sup>216</sup> For example, governing coalitions may incorporate the interests of less powerful groups such as rural communities through informal patronage networks in the run-up to elections to secure votes.<sup>217</sup> International organisations and foreign governments often exert pressure on the governments of developing countries to adopt specific policies as condition for receiving bilateral aid.<sup>218</sup> In other instances, policies emerge out of the technocratic work of public agencies or bureaucracies and may attract support or opposition from social groups depending on their impact on the distribution of rents and power.<sup>219</sup>

---

<sup>213</sup> Behuria, Buur, and Gray, 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa'.

<sup>214</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>215</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

<sup>216</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>217</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>218</sup> Parks and Cole.

<sup>219</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

### **Justifying the Analytical Value of the Political Settlements Approach**

The use of political settlements theory in this study is justified by the saliency of its features and its utility as a school of thought. This section assesses political settlements' analytical value in comparison to the dominant or mainstream approaches to African political economy and development. The political settlements framework allows for a comparative analysis of levels of development, the variable success of specific policies and interventions in different contexts, and the gaps between the intended and actual outcomes of institutions.<sup>220</sup> Political settlements is particularly relevant to the study of the seemingly paradoxical outcomes of natural resource governance, including in the case of the Bunyoro kingdom whose failure to access oil revenues despite its physical location in Uganda's oil rich region provides a useful case study. Politics shape the power configurations of a given country, and thus the institutional processes of resource governance.

Political settlements questions the thesis of popular NIE theorists such as Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (AJR) who equivocate the presence of 'inclusive' institutions in developing countries to broad-based development.<sup>221</sup> The idea of 'inclusive institutions' is based on the underlying ontology of NIE which assumes that liberal democracy, defined by participatory governance, the institutional separation of powers, small government, and free market economics, will deliver positive economic outcomes.<sup>222</sup> The notion of inclusive institutions forms part of the 'good governance agenda' guiding global academic and policy interventions in the 'development' of Africa. The good governance agenda is rooted in mainstream neo-

---

<sup>220</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>221</sup> Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Dan Woren, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*, vol. 4 (SciELO Chile, 2012).

<sup>222</sup> Di John and Putzel, 'Political Settlements'.

classical institutionalism and regards liberal democracy and free market economics as the automatic and universal antidote to poverty and political instability.<sup>223</sup>

Political settlements problematises the concept of inclusive institutions by drawing attention to the power struggles that impede fair and equitable access to political and economic opportunities.<sup>224</sup> The inclusive institutions envisioned by AJR and other mainstream development analysts are actually a product of bargaining between powerful organisations and competing groups. For example, AJR and Scott Beaulier attributed Botswana's successful management of the diamond sector to its stable political system and to the strong, inclusive institutions characteristic of liberal democracies. However, as scholars Amy Poteete, Jonathan Di John, and James Putzel argue, the country's political system is in fact shaped by negotiations centred around the political and economic interests of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), traditional chiefs, and foreign actors such as De Beers and the British government.<sup>225</sup> Thus, institutions are not singularly responsible for Botswana's governance model; the balance of power and shared interests between these powerful groups is the *a priori* factor. The political settlements approach positions institutional design, as an analytical tool, as insufficient when considering social, political, and economic outcomes. Instead, the configurations of power underlying a country's institutions is central.

Political settlements theorists also critique neopatrimonialism, another leading school of thought in African political economy. Neopatrimonialism views patron-client

---

<sup>223</sup> Gray, 'Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa'.

<sup>224</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'.

<sup>225</sup> Amy R. Poteete, 'Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral-Dependent Development in Botswana', *The Journal of Development Studies* 45, no. 4 (2009): 544–571; Di John and Putzel, 'Political Settlements'.

relations as distinctively African and ubiquitous throughout the continent, and as rooted in pre-modern African socio-cultural dynamics. Neopatrimonialism is an influential meta-narrative of African political economy<sup>226</sup> which argues that patron-client relations and arbitrary rule undermine the growth of capitalism by weakening institutions through the violation of property rights, contracts, and transaction costs.<sup>227</sup> Political settlements, in contrast, consider power and institutions as the main units of analysis. Instead of seeing patron-client politics as an African pre-modern social malady that undermines capitalist growth, political settlements regard patron-client relations as rooted in the capitalist transformation of African society which began in the colonial era.<sup>228</sup> It seeks to appreciate how patron-client dynamics emerge and manifest differently across countries. Patron-client relations can result in harmful effects in one context but positive outcomes in another. In contrast, neopatrimonialism uniformly views patron-client relations as detrimental to capitalist economic development.<sup>229</sup> The growing theoretical perspective of 'developmental patrimonialism' acknowledges the ways in which rent distribution between powerful groups at the state and sub-state levels can lead to increased economic development, albeit through arbitrarily and largely exclusive processes.<sup>230</sup>

Neopatrimonialism is historically and culturally grounded in Weberian methodological individualism, unlike political settlements. Neopatrimonial critiques

---

<sup>226</sup> Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, 'Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa', *World Politics* 46, no. 04 (1994): 453–489; Behuria, Buur, and Gray, 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa'.

<sup>227</sup> Mkandawire, 'Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa'.

<sup>228</sup> Behuria, Buur, and Gray, 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa'.

<sup>229</sup> Mkandawire, 'Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa'; Kelsall, 'Going with the Grain in African Development?'

<sup>230</sup> Whitfield et al., *The Politics of African Industrial Policy*; David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, 'Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda', *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012): 379–403; Anne Pitcher, Mary H. Moran, and Michael Johnston, 'Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa', *African Studies Review* 52, no. 1 (2009): 125–156.

of governance in Africa<sup>231</sup> hold that African political leaders use bureaucratic institutions in service of a patrimonial rule wherein government agencies are staffed by the incumbent leadership's kith and kin.<sup>232</sup> There is a degree of epistemological ethnocentrism in this approach which views African political dynamics as the antithesis to Western Weberian bureaucracy.<sup>233</sup> Both neopatrimonialism and NIE share this comparative assumption, limiting a deeper engagement with the complex contextual factors characterising African political economy. In contrast, political settlements theory incorporates multiple ontologies, from rational-actor analyses, historical-structural studies, and institutional mapping to study the configurations of power underlying African political economy. Most importantly, political settlements analysis approaches case studies without imposing a supposedly universal, yet western-centric view, of how a state ought to be understood. This facilitates a critical, multi-pronged inquiry aimed at uncovering the inherent nuance and complexity in these case studies, rather than conformity to the neo-Weberian understanding of the state and economy.

Several scholars have adopted the political settlements framework in various academic studies of political and economic change in African societies. For example, Abdulai and Hickey conducted a study on Ghana's education sector to determine whether the distribution of political power in the ruling coalition influenced regional patterns of education spending between 1993 and 2008.<sup>234</sup> The authors mapped and measured the holding power of regional elites within the ruling coalition by assessing their access to influential positions in government, mainly cabinet positions and the

---

<sup>231</sup> Bratton and Van de Walle, 'Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa'; Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*.

<sup>232</sup> Behuria, Buur, and Gray, 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa'.

<sup>233</sup> Achille Mbembe, 'Provisional Notes on the Postcolony', *Africa* 62, no. 1 (1992): 3–37; Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa*.

<sup>234</sup> Abdulai and Hickey, "The Politics of Development under Competitive Clientelism."

presidency. They also used government data from the Ghana Education Service and Ministry of Education to draw correlations between the regional elites, their positions in government, and per capita expenditure on education in the respective regions. After analysing budget allocations and the distribution of funds, they found that the most influential determinant of resource allocation was the distribution of power within the ruling coalition. Indeed, the level of holding power possessed by regional elites had a direct impact on the level of education spending in their home regions. These results suggest a role for informal bargaining between high ranking government officials and regional elites in the pursuit of electoral support.<sup>235</sup> Abdulai and Hickey's analysis revealed education policy as an important 'bargaining chip' in the competition between social groups within a ruling coalition. This type of research goes beyond the study of government policy and institutional dynamics to understand how levels of elite power and informal negotiations influence formal processes.

Sylvia Croese employed the political settlements lens to assess the influence of neo-patrimonial rule on patterns of economic development in Angola since the end of the country's civil war in 2000.<sup>236</sup> As described above, neo-Weberian scholars position neo-patrimonial rule as antithetical to economic growth. Drawing from Mushtaq Khan and Tim Kelsall's work, Croese investigated forms of centralised rent-seeking and distribution during the presidency of Eduardo Dos Santos in the context of urban housing policy.<sup>237</sup> Croese argued that the success of the government's National Urbanism and Housing Programme under the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) rested on the regime's mutually-beneficial coalitions with foreign

---

<sup>235</sup> Abdulai and Hickey.

<sup>236</sup> Croese, "State-Led Housing Delivery as an Instrument of Developmental Patrimonialism."

<sup>237</sup> Croese.

and domestic political actors, including local MPLA supporters, the national oil conglomerate Sonangol, business partners from China, Brazil, Israel, and Lebanon, as well as individuals such as Manuel Vicente, the former head of Sonangol, and army Generals Kopelipa and Nascimento.<sup>238</sup> These actors buttressed President Dos Santos' regime and thus benefited financially from the policy. In deploying the political settlements approach, Croese challenged mainstream conceptualisations of statehood and liberal ideas surrounding good governance which view neo-patrimonial politics as an aberration. Instead, Croese mapped Angola's configurations of power to identify the key partnerships between local and transnational actors that resulted in broad-based development outcomes from the exclusive settlement in the form of affordable urban housing, while also contributing to regime survival and political stability through sharing of spoils between domestic and foreign actors.

Hazel Gray offered another insightful application of political settlements theory in her analysis of Tanzania's persistent government corruption. Gray dissected intra-elite struggles within Tanzania's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), in the context of the country's broader processes of social and economic transformation.<sup>239</sup> She examined four major corruption scandals in the public sector between 2000 and 2014, identifying the key actors involved, their factional affiliation within CCM, and the level of holding power possessed.<sup>240</sup> Gray's analysis represents a significant departure from other studies of corruption in Tanzania, including the neoclassical economics research of Michael Lofchie which viewed corruption and rent-seeking as a consequence of centralised state power.<sup>241</sup> In Lofchie's view, a singular and small

---

<sup>238</sup> Croese.

<sup>239</sup> Gray, "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania."

<sup>240</sup> For a detailed account of the corruption cases, please see Gray, "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania."

<sup>241</sup> Michael F. Lofchie, *The Political Economy of Tanzania: Decline and Recovery* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

elite can undermine economic growth; but this approach does not account for the internal factions within CCM and the internecine struggles between ruling elites that influence patterns of corruption in Tanzania. A political settlements analysis revealed the CCM ruling elite not as a unified group but as consisting of four competing factions.<sup>242</sup> Neither incumbent President – Benjamin Mkapa, Jakaya Kikwete – nor any other group could stop corruption since no actor controlled all factions. Despite its internal divisions, Gray found that the CCM regime could maintain control on power due to its complex linkages with other outside groups, particularly business elites who benefitted from corruption. Gray also explained the failure of foreign donors to implement anti-corruption programmes due to the intransigence of senior government leaders who refused to adopt reforms threatening their interests.<sup>243</sup>

Global development agencies such as the United Nations (UN), the Department for International Development (DFID), Australian Aid (AusAID), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation, Christian Aid, and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) have also increasingly adopted political settlement theorising in the implementation of development programmes worldwide.<sup>244</sup> These organisations have increasingly prioritised the study of power configurations, particularly the comparative mapping of the different sources and nature of political power possessed by groups and their affiliated capabilities, in the design and implementation of their interventions and programs in developing countries.<sup>245</sup> The realisation that power is a central factor to development is consistent with the notion of "bringing politics back into development," a growing theme in

---

<sup>242</sup> Gray, "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania."

<sup>243</sup> Gray, "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania."

<sup>244</sup> Kelsall, "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements."

<sup>245</sup> Khan, "Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions."

development literature.<sup>246</sup> Over time, it has become clearer that building the capacity of public institutions or supporting grassroots civil society organisations alone is insufficient to promote sustained development since interventions that run contrary to the interests of powerful organisations will likely succumb to interference by influential groups and/or grassroots-level groups.<sup>247</sup>

### **Incorporating the Concept of Extraversion**

Political settlements theory offers considerable analytical and explanatory utility, but current iterations do not sufficiently account for external influences beyond the confines of the nation-state. There is a methodological nationalism inherent to political settlements and to studies of governance and development more generally, which largely focus on the role of domestic political struggles and the impact of institutions in development.<sup>248</sup> Although Khan acknowledges the role of external factors such as changing global political and economic conditions on the choices of domestic groups and the corresponding influence on institutional changes, he does not proffer a systematic review of the ways in which political settlements interact with a dynamic transnational system and its constitute actors.<sup>249</sup> Scholars such as Sam Hickey and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi have also argued that the political settlements framework focuses parochially on domestic configurations of power without analysing the

---

<sup>246</sup> For example, please see: Leftwich, A., 'Bringing Politics Back in: Towards a Model of the Developmental State', *Journal of Development Studies*, 1995; Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Global Inequality: Bringing Politics Back In', *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 6 (2002): 1023–1046; John Harriss, 'Bringing Politics Back into Poverty Analysis', *Poverty Dynamics*, 2009, 205–24.

<sup>247</sup> Parks and Cole, 'Political Settlements'.

<sup>248</sup> Sam Hickey, 'Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a Relational Approach', 2013.

<sup>249</sup> Khan, 'Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions'; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 'Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda'.

multifaceted strategies employed by domestic actors to draw resources from international and transnational sources since the pre-colonial era in Africa.<sup>250</sup>

A systematic analysis of the impact of external factors on political settlements is crucial for several reasons. The social conflict inherent to processes of political settlements is defined by access to economic rents which often originate from external or supra-national sources. Exogenous influences have shaped the evolution of modern African states through pre-colonial trade, slavery, colonialism to modern-day neoliberalism, phenomena which have influenced the continent's political and economic institutions. Critical neo-Gramscian scholars such as Robert Cox and Immanuel Wallerstein have long theorised that the nation is not the singular determinant of life but that global-social forces influence the balance of factors shaping a country's domestic power configurations and patterns of economic development.<sup>251</sup> Analyses of African development such as Frederick Cooper's gatekeeper theory show that the consolidation of political power in post-colonial Africa is linked to access to resources from the global system, such as foreign aid, business opportunities, and loans.<sup>252</sup>

The outward-facing nature of African political economy is reflected in the literature on natural resource governance. Paul Collier and Terry Lyn Karl argue that a country's main export commodities shape the choices and preferences of political incumbents. The accrual of revenue from resource exports results in a "rentier state" whereby incumbents lack the incentive to establish well-functioning institutions

---

<sup>250</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 'Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda'; Hickey, 'Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development'.

<sup>251</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 04 (1974): 387–415; Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–155.

<sup>252</sup> Cooper, *Africa since 1940*.

designed to facilitate state-society accountability, such as strong tax regimes.<sup>253</sup> Michael Watts similarly analyses the ways in which the presence of oil influences domestic social relations from the community to the state. He argues that the entry of oil companies displaces authority structures at the local level; creates identity-based struggles for economic opportunities in host communities; and strengthens patron-client politics at the state level, which together cause political tension as the state and communities compete for access and control of the oil sector.<sup>254</sup>

I incorporate Jean Francois Bayart's concept of extraversion into the political settlements framework in order to analyse the foreign dimensions of the relationship between the state and traditional kingdoms following the discovery of oil in Uganda. Bayart emphasises the agency of African actors in arguing that African communities have actively and skilfully engaged with their external environment as a resource to draw upon in pursuit of their internal goals since the slave trade; they were neither passive victims nor mere bystanders.<sup>255</sup> Using *strategies of extraversion*, African actors negotiated a dialogic relationship with their external environment to accumulate political power and economic benefits. As discussed in the previous chapter, some traditional kingdoms acted as appendages of the foreign administration under regimes of indirect colonial rule, effecting the domination of their communities to preserve their own political power.<sup>256</sup>

During nationalist struggles for independence, which intensified during the Cold War, African leaders took advantage of the proxy war between the United States and Soviet Union to receive military training, weapons, and other forms of support in

---

<sup>253</sup> Paul Collier, 'The Political Economy of Natural Resources', *Social Research* 77, no. 4 (2010): 1105–1132.

<sup>254</sup> Watts, 'Righteous Oil?'

<sup>255</sup> Bayart, "Africa in the World."

<sup>256</sup> Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

order to wage wars of liberation in their countries.<sup>257</sup> After independence, African countries maintained close ties with former colonial powers and established new ties with western countries and international organisations to access resources, such as donor aid and bilateral and multilateral loans – resources which were vital to their consolidation of political power. The end of the Cold War in 1989 created a crisis for several fledgling post-colonial African regimes who could no longer profit from their participation in Cold War era proxy wars.<sup>258</sup> The extraverted ties of African states grew during the ‘third wave of democracy,’ also known as the ‘decade of development,’ between 1990 and 2000 when the IMF and World Bank offered loans in exchange for structural adjustment, a global development policy whose effects continue to this day.<sup>259</sup>

Amidst ongoing domestic struggles for political power and scarce resources, African incumbents sought aid from international financial institutions who required countries to implement liberal reforms, such as democratisation, economic liberalisation, de-regulation, reduced public spending, and increased political freedoms for civil society.<sup>260</sup> These newfound resources and the neoliberal policies that accompanied them usually reinforced the power of incumbent autocratic regimes rather than supporting the development of a well-functioning democracy and free market capitalism. The lack of local support for foreign-driven policy changes contributed to the almost universal failure of SAPs which faced considerable criticism for perpetuating Western hegemony and, in some cases, worsening poverty in the Global South.<sup>261</sup>

---

<sup>257</sup> Bayart, ‘Africa in the World’.

<sup>258</sup> Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State.”

<sup>259</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*.

<sup>260</sup> Ake, ‘Development and Democracy in Africa’; Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy*.

<sup>261</sup> James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and*

The export of primary commodities, particularly natural resources, is another strategy of extraversion. Colonial economic policy involved the extraction of raw agricultural and mineral goods from the continent for manufacture overseas, a policy continued in the post-colonial era. Frederick Cooper captures such strategies of extraversion in his concept of the 'gatekeeper state' whereby state Marketing Boards obtain cash crops from rural farmers at depressed prices to then sell them on the global market for a profit.<sup>262</sup> The export of natural resources continues to be dominated by central governments in the post-colonial era, as states control the value chain from exploration, contract negotiation, export, and revenue distribution. Most constitutions in Africa, including Uganda's, accord governments the right to manage natural resource revenues in trust on behalf of the 'nation,' an ownership structure which facilitates limited accountability and transparency and instead promotes rent-seeking.<sup>263</sup> Although some governments have adopted a nationalistic rhetoric around the extractive sector and in their negotiations with international corporations, including through Local Content regulations,<sup>264</sup> states primarily seek to create opportunities for rent-seeking in the resource sector in lieu of facilitating broad-based development programmes, as discussed in Chapter 5.

The concept of extraversion is thus a necessary complement to political settlements theory. It provides a historically grounded, systematic approach to analysing the interaction between the external and domestic factors influencing political and

---

Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); S. LaTouche, "Ch. 1 'Development's Castaways' Ch. 6 'The Standard of Living,'" in *In the Wake of the Affluent Society: An Exploration of Post-Development* (London: Zed Books, 2005).

<sup>262</sup> Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>263</sup> Luong and Weinthal, "Rethinking the Resource Curse."

<sup>264</sup> Jesse Salah Ovadia, "Local Content Policies and Petro-Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis," *Resources Policy* 49 (2016): 20–30.

economic outcomes in African states. There is a strategic interdependence between African states and external actors, including foreign governments, international or intergovernmental organisations, and private companies. The mutual benefits arising from cooperation make strategies of extraversion possible and desirable. Private companies benefit from accessing minerals and oil available on the continent while African governments benefit from the substantial revenue that the extraction and export of minerals and oil provides. The availability of resource rents, as a source of power, has important political implications. Social groups with access to resource revenue can build their capacity and attain or maintain a dominant position in the political settlement. Other groups may compete for access to rents, either by laying ownership claims or competing for control of the state. The competition produced by these struggles shape political dynamics and the formation, function, and survival of institutions.

## **Conclusion**

The theoretical framework described in this chapter combines theories of political settlements and extraversion to provide a holistic appreciation of the complex configurations of power between the state and Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms in Uganda. A focus on the struggles between powerful social groups facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the nature and consequences of Uganda's political economy, unlike the mainstream theoretical approaches grounded in liberal ontologies such as the New Institutional Economics and neo-Weberian schools of thought. The identities, interests, and actions of political groups underlie the creation and functioning of formal state institutions. This dissertation's theoretical framework considers both the national and transnational power configurations within which the

oil sector is embedded and focuses on the competition between political actors in the pursuit of beneficial outcomes. I incorporate Jean Francois Bayart's concept of extraversion to respond to political settlements' omission of external social forces and their role in shaping domestic issues and events. The following chapter applies this comprehensive theoretical framework to the case of Uganda where the presence of oil has reshaped the political settlement between the state and Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms.

## **CHAPTER 4: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE STATE, THE BUGANDA AND BUNYORO KINGDOMS**

### **Introduction**

This chapter provides a historical analysis of the political settlements between the state and Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms in colonial and post-colonial Uganda. Traditional kingdoms, particularly the Buganda, have played an influential role in shaping Uganda's political settlements since the establishment of the modern state. The historical analysis provided herein represents the starting point for understanding Uganda's contemporary political settlement. A historical analysis also helps explain the oil sector's impact on the prevailing political settlement by showing the patterns of competition between organisations prior to the resource's discovery. This analysis builds on Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Sam Hickey's 2013 work on the main drivers of political and economic development in Uganda.<sup>265</sup> While Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey focus on macro-level issues of structural transformation, the provision of public goods, and inclusive development, this chapter focuses on the evolution of political relations between the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms and the state in the aftermath of oil discoveries. The first two sections discuss the Buganda kingdom's role in politics during the colonial era, followed by a discussion of its marginalisation in Idi Amin's exclusive settlement. I then analyse the Buganda kingdom's collaboration with the NRM, a strategic interaction which contributed to the formal restoration of the kingdoms in 1993. The fourth section discusses Uganda's political settlement in the post-oil discovery era followed by a conclusion.

---

<sup>265</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 'Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda'.

### **The Buganda Kingdom's Central Role in the Colonial Political Settlement<sup>266</sup>**

Traditional kingdoms have shaped Uganda's governing political settlements since the inception of the modern state during the colonial era. The Buganda kingdom played the most significant role compared to Uganda's other traditional kingdoms due to its institutional structure and political agency. The foundations of present-day Uganda rest in British colonial rule which began in 1894 and ended in 1961. Colonialism produced many of the political dynamics seen today between the Ugandan state and traditional kingdoms. The Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms were the two largest pre-colonial societies in the Great Lakes region.<sup>267</sup> The Banyoro, a cattle-keeping society, was the most powerful kingdom between the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> century in both territory and population size. The Baganda, the second largest kingdom, was largely an agricultural society with a distinctively centralised governing system characterized by an absolute monarchy and advanced administrative institutions.<sup>268</sup>

There was a rivalry between the two kingdoms in their struggle to dominant the present-day Great Lakes region, which the British exploited after beginning their colonial incursion into present-day Uganda in 1894.<sup>269</sup> The British chose to collaborate with the Buganda kingdom for several reasons. The Banyoro, led by Omukama (King) Kabalega, resisted colonial occupation.<sup>270</sup> As the largest and most powerful kingdom, colonialism meant the loss of the Banyoro's political and economic dominance over other kingdoms in the region, including the Baganda.<sup>271</sup> The colonialists also sought

---

<sup>266</sup> Expanded historical analyses of both the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms are presented in chapters 6 and 7; this section emphasises the interaction between the kingdoms and state-level actors since the inception of the state in the colonial era.

<sup>267</sup> Donald Denoon, "„The Historical Setting to 1900",” Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood, New York: NOK Publishers International, 1982.

<sup>268</sup> A. Kasozi, *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985* (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1994).

<sup>269</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda* (Monthly Review Press, 1976).

<sup>270</sup> Jan Jelmert Jørgensen, *Uganda: A Modern History* (London: Croom Helm Publishers, 1981).

<sup>271</sup> Tarsis B. Kabwegyere, *The Politics of State Formation: The Nature and Effects of Colonialism in Uganda* (East African Literature Bureau, 1974).

to pre-empt a united Buganda-Bunyoro resistance to colonial occupation in developing an alliance with the Baganda. The British also favoured the Baganda's well-defined hierarchical structure which became the foundation of the Native Administration apparatus.<sup>272</sup> This pre-existing structure facilitated British control of indigenous communities as colonial subjects.<sup>273</sup>

The Buganda Agreement of 1900 formalised the alliance between the British and Buganda kingdom and thus Baganda's central role in Ugandan national politics.<sup>274</sup> The designation of the Buganda kingdom as a semi-autonomous protectorate of the British under the terms of the agreement allowed the kingdom to keep its pre-colonial social and political structures intact. As a result, the kingdom's sense of ethno-nationhood was less affected by colonial domination than that of the Bunyoro kingdom.<sup>275</sup> The exclusive political settlement between the British and the Buganda kingdom also permanently re-shaped landholding patterns in Uganda. The British introduced private ownership and allotted the Buganda king and chiefs 1000 square miles of land, known as "Mailo" in Luganda vernacular.<sup>276</sup> The pre-colonial system of communal ownership was thus transformed into a regime of private property, with the King and chiefs made into land barons who could financially benefit from this arrangement by leasing land to their subjects. The subjects, in turn, had to pay taxes to the colonial

---

<sup>272</sup>The kingdoms' socio-political organization influenced their reaction to colonialism and their relationships with both the colonial and post-colonial states. For example, David Apter categorised the kingdoms' political structures as being either instrumental or consummatory. The former were able to innovate efficiently by adapting their internal structures to prevailing historical conditions (such as Buganda), and the latter is hostile to change and slower to adapt and innovate, such as the pre-colonial era Bunyoro: David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," *World Politics* 13, no. 01 (1960): 45–68..

<sup>273</sup> Kabwegyere, *The Politics of State Formation*.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>275</sup> Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda"; Tom Goodfellow and Stefan Lindemann, "The Clash of Institutions: Traditional Authority, Conflict and the Failure of 'Hybridity' in Buganda," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 51, no. 1 (2013): 3–26.

<sup>276</sup> Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*.

government and leasing fees to the landowners. This structure provided an incentive for the Buganda kingdom's leadership to support the colonial political settlement.<sup>277</sup>

The British concretised the Buganda-Bunyoro rivalry by annexing to the Buganda kingdom counties seized from the southern half of the Bunyoro empire, commonly known as the *Lost Counties*: Buyaga, Bugangaizi, Buruli, Bugerere, Bulemezi, Buhekura, and Singo territories.<sup>278</sup> This loss of territory considerably weakened the Banyoro's sense of ethno-nationalism since the counties accounted for over half its land and population. The counties also contained prized artefacts of Banyoro cultural history, especially in Buyaga and Bugangaizi which held the kingdom's royal graves and sites for traditional rituals.<sup>279</sup> The British also sent the then-Bunyoro King Kabalega Chwa, who had resisted the British colonial occupation from 1893 to 1898 to exile in the Seychelles in 1899.<sup>280</sup> This demoralised the Banyoro and dented their sense of nationhood and pride, thus weakening its political position. This historical context explains the Bunyoro kingdom's exclusion from processes of modern state formation in the colonial era.

The Buganda kingdom, on the other hand, successfully employed strategies of extraversion: they collaborated with the British to ensure their political survival while simultaneously guaranteeing their dominance over the Bunyoro kingdom.<sup>281</sup> This historical background laid the foundation for Uganda's first post-colonial political settlements.

---

<sup>277</sup> Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*.

<sup>278</sup> Doyle, "From Kitara to the Lost Counties."

<sup>279</sup> Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited."

<sup>280</sup> Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited."

<sup>281</sup> As argued by Bayart, strategies of extraversion in Africa date back to colonial rule, where the pre-colonial chiefs who collaborated with the colonial state did so to ensure their survival in light of the colonial hegemony that they were incapable of resisting. Strategies of extraversion also allowed kingdoms to protect themselves against other more powerful kingdoms that they could not successfully repel.

## The Buganda Kingdom's Central Role in the First Post-Colonial Inclusive Political Settlement

The Buganda kingdom's central role in Uganda's post-independence political settlement yielded far-reaching consequences for other kingdoms. When formal colonial rule ended in 1960 and negotiations began for the transition to independence, the Buganda kingdom initially resisted incorporation into a modern, unified state due to the perceived threat to its political and economic interests.<sup>282</sup> The kingdom would lose the semi-autonomous status that it enjoyed during colonial rule and would have to submit to a central government.<sup>283</sup> The Buganda King and chiefs would have forfeited the economic benefits derived from this semi-autonomous political status, including the tax and rental fees derived from private Mailo land ownership. Most importantly, the Baganda's belief in the cultural supremacy of the King (Kabaka) meant that the kingdom would not recognize the sovereignty of any other political authority above that of the king.<sup>284</sup> For these reasons, Buganda used its well-organised bureaucracy, capacity for political mobilisation, and independent economic prowess in its negotiations with the British during the transition to independence.<sup>285</sup> The Baganda established the Kabaka Yekka party ("The King Alone" in Luganda vernacular) to champion the kingdom's interests in the transition to independence.<sup>286</sup> The kingdom also declared unilateral independence from Uganda in December 1960 to gain

---

<sup>282</sup> Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, 'Settling the Buganda Question', *Transition: An International Review*, no. 106b (2011): 10–25.

<sup>283</sup> Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited."

<sup>284</sup> Englebert, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa."

<sup>285</sup> Stefan Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset: The Case of Uganda," *Crisis States Research Centre*, 2, 76 (2010): 1–80.

<sup>286</sup> Chrispas Nyombi and Ronald Kaddu, "Ethnic Conflict in Uganda's Political History," *Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN)*, 2015, 1–27.

leverage in the negotiations and avoid complete assimilation into an independent Uganda.<sup>287</sup>

The kingdom's hard bargaining yielded several concessions that made the Buganda kingdom one of the most powerful social groups in Uganda's first post-colonial governing coalition. The kingdom was provided with full federal status that provided a significant degree of political and institutional autonomy.<sup>288</sup> The federal status accorded the kingdom several political, legal, administrative, and economic privileges, including the administration of public services, the collection of taxes, and its own court system and police force.<sup>289</sup> The rest of the country's kingdoms, including the Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro, and Busoga, received a semi-federal status, whereby their political leadership and institutions were absorbed into local government.<sup>290</sup> The Baganda's Kabaka Yekka party also merged with the then largest political party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), as part of the transitional agreement. The Buganda King, Kabaka Mutesa II, became Uganda's ceremonial President and the Head of State. Meanwhile, UPC party leader Milton Obote became the first Prime Minister and head of government.<sup>291</sup> The Buganda kingdom became the most powerful social group in newly independent Uganda's first governing coalition, preserving the material, political, and economic benefits that its ruling elite acquired during the colonial era.<sup>292</sup>

---

<sup>287</sup> Nyombi and Kaddu.

<sup>288</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

<sup>289</sup> Murindwa Rutanga, "Traditional/Cultural Institutions in Uganda's Democratic Transition, Political Stability and Nation Development: A Case of Buganda," *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2010): 125–166.

<sup>290</sup> Cathrine Johannessen, *Kingship in Uganda. The Role of the Uganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics* (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006).

<sup>291</sup> Johannessen, *Kingship in Uganda. The Role of the Uganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics*.

<sup>292</sup> David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Routledge, 2013); Englebert, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa"; Goodfellow and Lindemann, "The Clash of Institutions."

Despite the prominence of the Buganda kingdom in the post-colonial governing order, Obote sought to establish a broad-based, inclusive settlement between 1962 and 1970 in an effort to promote national integration.<sup>293</sup> As the graphic below demonstrates, Obote appointed government officials drawn from all of the country's ethno-national groups. The Baganda still possessed the lion's share of positions in part due to the KY-UPC alliance.<sup>294</sup>




Table 1: Graphical representation of ethnic and regional representation in Milton Obote's government<sup>295</sup>

The inclusive settlement established by Obote started to unravel as power struggles between the Buganda kingdom and the UPC alongside other ethno-national groups who resisted the political power and dominance of Buganda kingdom ensued.<sup>296</sup> Obote's UPC party used several strategies designed to diminish Baganda's holding power, including encouraging floor-crossing by Buganda legislators from the KY and

<sup>293</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

<sup>294</sup> Lindemann.

<sup>295</sup> Lindemann.

<sup>296</sup> Lindemann.

the Democratic Party, a Buganda-dominated opposition party.<sup>297</sup> Obote also exploited the Buganda-Bunyoro rivalry by endorsing a referendum in 1964 on the return of the "Lost Counties" from Buganda to the Bunyoro kingdom. The Buganda kingdom vehemently opposed this move since it would diminish its territory and population size. The counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi voted to return to Bunyoro, which Obote approved, infuriating the Buganda kingdom.<sup>298</sup> Buganda opted to restore its waning power by dissolving the KY and having its members join the UPC to establish an opposing bloc within the party.<sup>299</sup>

This strategy was a success; as Buganda-aligned legislators won all the parliamentary seats in Buganda's central region in the 1966 elections, allowing them to mount sufficient pressure to oust Obote from office.<sup>300</sup> The bloc moved a motion to investigate Obote on corruption and gold smuggling charges in 1965, in what became known as "The Congo Gold Scandal." They accused Obote, Defence Minister Felix Onama, and General Idi Amin of smuggling gold and ivory from eastern Zaire (known today as the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]).<sup>301</sup> The Buganda Parliament also passed a motion to remove the central government from Kampala, land that belonged to Buganda, on May 30th, 1966.<sup>302</sup> As Obote's power was increasingly challenged from within the UPC, he shifted his support base to Northern ethnic groups. These developments increased the saliency of ethnicity in Uganda's political power struggles. Obote replaced senior Buganda-aligned government officials with those from Northern tribes, particularly from his own ethnic group of Lango.<sup>303</sup> He also

---

<sup>297</sup> Jørgensen, Uganda.

<sup>298</sup> Juma Okuku, "Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda," Nordic Africa Institute, Discussion Paper Series, 17 (2002): 1–42.

<sup>299</sup> A. Kasozi, *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985* (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1994).

<sup>300</sup> Kasozi.

<sup>301</sup> Okuku, "Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda."

<sup>302</sup> Nyombi and Kaddu, "Ethnic Conflict in Uganda's Political History."

<sup>303</sup> Nyombi and Kaddu.

increased the proportion of military personnel from the Lango and Acholi tribes.<sup>304</sup> By 1969, the army consisted of 61% Northerners, 22% easterners, 12% westerners, and 5% Baganda.<sup>305</sup> Obote's move towards an exclusive settlement during this time represented a shift in the source of the UPC's holding power, from popular support to the Northern ethnic groups and the security sectors. Patronage was another important source of power for the UPC as army leadership, particularly Commander General Idi Amin, benefitted financially from state resources in exchange for his support of the Obote's regime.

These collapse of the inclusive settlement in 1966 due to competition between Buganda and Obote produced far-reaching changes in Ugandan politics. Firstly, Obote transferred his support base from the UPC to the army, having lost control of the UPC to Buganda's political machinations. With this move, the military became the most powerful and politically significant organisation in the country because of its role as the primary source of power for the Presidency instead of civilian democratic processes. The army ceased to be a neutral arm of government but a means by which political leaders could assume office and maintain power.<sup>306</sup> Obote deployed the army under General Idi Amin's command to the Buganda King's palace in 1966, forcing Kabaka Mutesa II to flee into exile in the United Kingdom (UK), where he eventually died from poisoning in 1969, allegedly by the hand of one of Obote's agents.<sup>307</sup> The army turned the Kabaka's palace into a military barrack and detention centre, where some of Obote's opponents were tortured and executed.<sup>308</sup> Buganda viewed this

---

<sup>304</sup> Goodfellow and Lindemann, "The Clash of Institutions."

<sup>305</sup> Amii Omara-Otunnu, "The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 3 (1992): 443–463.

<sup>306</sup> Ali Al-Amin Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy* (Sage Publications Beverly Hills, 1975); Ali A. Mazrui, "Between Development and Decay: Anarchy, Tyranny and Progress under Idi Amin" 2 (1980).

<sup>307</sup> Nyombi and Kaddu, "Ethnic Conflict in Uganda's Political History."

<sup>308</sup> Buganda tour guide, site visit, Kampala, 27 January 2018.

desecrating act as a an attempt to permanently efface Buganda's identity as an ethn-nation.<sup>309</sup> Today's Kabaka does not live at the palace; the kingdom turned it into a museum and a venue for ceremonial gatherings in 1993. Secondly, Obote abrogated the 1962 Constitution, abolishing the ceremonial presidency as well as the political status of traditional kingdoms, creating an Executive Presidency instead.<sup>310</sup> The political struggles between Buganda and Obote transformed Uganda's political settlement from a broad-based, inclusive settlement to an exclusive settlement overseen by Obote and dominated by the UPC party and Northern tribes, such as West Nilotic, Nubian, Acholi, and Lango. The army emerged as the primary source of power for Uganda's political leaders, as depicted by the subsequent regimes of Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni.

Obote, however, underestimated the political ambitions of army commander Idi Amin.<sup>311</sup> Amin's influence in the army and politics grew and inter-ethnic contestation within the security forces intensified between the Nubian, Kakwa, Langi, and pro-Obote Northern ethnic groups, such as the Acholi and Lugbara. This intra-military ethnic tension was both a legacy of British colonial rule and produced by post-independence power struggles. The British colonial regime used the Northern regions as a reservoir for recruiting military personnel and other labour-intensive activities, while economic activities were concentrated in the central and southern regions, particularly in Kampala and Jinja.<sup>312</sup> In the latter regions, the British provided better infrastructure and social services, such as education and hospitals.<sup>313</sup> This bifurcation

---

<sup>309</sup> Op. cit, 27 January 2018.

<sup>310</sup> Okuku, "Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda"; Rutanga, "Traditional/Cultural Institutions in Uganda's Democratic Transition, Political Stability and Nation Development."

<sup>311</sup> Holger Bernt Hansen, "Uganda in the 1970s: A Decade of Paradoxes and Ambiguities," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 83–103.

<sup>312</sup> Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda*.

<sup>313</sup> Goodfellow and Lindemann, "The Clash of Institutions."

created ethnic tensions between the Northern groups, who dominated the post-colonial government and the army, and Southern groups, who dominated the civil service and economic sectors. Amidst the intra-military tensions, Obote attempted to curtail Amin's growing influence by removing him as army commander and reassigning him as the head of the military training centre. This only increased anger among pro-Amin military officers against Obote, leading to a coup led by Amin in 1971.<sup>314</sup>

### **The Buganda Kingdom's Marginalisation from Idi Amin's Exclusive Political Settlement**

Given his violent seizure of power, Idi Amin established a military regime based on authoritarian rule. The decision to establish an exclusive political settlement stemmed in part from a sense of insecurity emanating from his forceful seizure of power. Amin also faced numerous coup and assassination attempts throughout his time in office, which prompted increasing paranoia and violent attacks on real and perceived opponents. His government provided very little opportunity for coalition-building with the Buganda kingdom and the rest of the country's traditional authorities. Although he did not restore the kingdoms, Amin made notable overtures to the Buganda kingdom in an effort to achieve reconciliation.<sup>315</sup> The Baganda were contemptuous of Amin because he led the army's invasion of the Kabaka's palace and forced King Mutesa II into exile in 1966. Amin returned the remains of the late Mutesa II to Uganda in April 1971 and provided a state funeral. He also allowed the kingdom to conduct traditional rituals for Kabaka's son, King Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II, who

---

<sup>314</sup> Omara-Otunnu, "The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda"; Hansen, "Uganda in the 1970s."

<sup>315</sup> Englebert, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa"; Goodfellow and Lindemann, "The Clash of Institutions."

was then able to ascend to the throne.<sup>316</sup> The opportunity to conduct the formal succession ceremony was significant since the Buganda kingdom was not able to do so while the kingdoms were formally banned. This event provided continuity for the Buganda kingdom's monarchy and led to the revival of ethno-national pride. Although Amin gained popularity among the Buganda for this decision, this goodwill was short-lived. In the end, Amin's use of military violence to stay in power meant the suppression of the kingdom's political interests: the Baganda sought restoration of its federal status as per the 1962 constitution, but Amin would not cater to influential sub-state organisations for fear of a possible uprising.

Amin declared Uganda a republic in 1972, abolishing the federation and the brief period of rapprochement between the state and Buganda kingdom.<sup>317</sup> Stefan Lindemann described Amin's exclusive political settlement between 1970-1979 as an "era of undisguised exclusion" because of the military leader's reliance on violent subjugation of all imagined and real political opponents to sustain his rule.<sup>318</sup> Amin established a one-party state and set out his governing philosophy in "The Common Man's Charter" manifesto which ended the federal system that existed during Obote's first republic, and which provided kingdoms with a measure of political autonomy.<sup>319</sup> He abolished Parliament and replaced it with a "Supreme Council," staffed mainly with senior army officials, with Cabinet playing a subsidiary role.<sup>320</sup>

Despite Amin's rhetoric around establishing an ethnic balance in the army, his power rested with groups from the Northern region, primarily from his own Nubian Kakwa

---

<sup>316</sup> Charles Peter Mayiga, *King on the Throne: The Story of the Restoration of the Kingdom of Buganda* (Kampala, Uganda: Prime Time Communications, 2009).

<sup>317</sup> Mayiga.

<sup>318</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

<sup>319</sup> Hansen, "Uganda in the 1970s."

<sup>320</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

tribe and Muslims (Amin was also of the Islamic faith).<sup>321</sup> Like Obote's regime, Amin's exclusive political settlement relied on mobilising political support from his ethnic group and its allies drawn from the Northern region of Uganda. For example, 15% of Amin's government appointees in 1973 were drawn from Northern tribes, mainly the Nubian-Kakwa ethnic group and West Nile, a figure which increased to 47,6% in 1977 and 78,2% by 1979.<sup>322</sup> Amin replaced high ranking Langi, Acholi, and Itesot military and government officers, who had represented the majority in Obote's army with mostly Nubian-Kakwa officers.<sup>323</sup> He also embedded foreign mercenaries from South Sudan and Zaire in the army to ensure loyalty and pre-empt the possibility of a coup.<sup>324</sup> By 1977, the army's senior military officers were 32% Nubian, 9% Kakwa, 18% Sudanese, 27% from loyal West Nile tribes, and 15% from other tribes in Uganda.<sup>325</sup>

Amin's establishment of a hegemonic military presence throughout Uganda thwarted any chance for the traditional kingdoms to revive their political standing. He created ten new districts, each governed by high ranking military officers.<sup>326</sup> He stationed military detachments in each of these districts ostensibly to support rural development programmes; in actuality, he sought to prevent military attacks.<sup>327</sup> He relied on specialized armed units for his own security and as a tool of repression. Intelligence agencies, namely the State Research Bureau (SRB) and the Public Safety Unit, committed targeted assassinations based on real or suspected opposition to Amin's regime.<sup>328</sup> His military hegemony extended to academia and religion. Agents

---

<sup>321</sup> Lindemann.

<sup>322</sup> Lindemann.

<sup>323</sup> David Martin, *General Amin* (London: Faber and Faber, 1974); Mazrui, "Between Development and Decay."

<sup>324</sup> Hansen, "Uganda in the 1970s."

<sup>325</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

<sup>326</sup> Lindemann.

<sup>327</sup> Hansen, "Uganda in the 1970s."

<sup>328</sup> Sabastiano Rwengabo, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing," *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (2013): 531–559.

from the military and intelligence apparatus closely monitored academics, especially at Makerere University, as well as religious organisations for any 'dissident' activity. He created the "Religious Affairs Department" in the Office of the President in 1971 to monitor non-Islamic religious organisations, shutting down those deemed to be subversive. This policy led to the arrest and assassination of famous Archbishop Janani Luwum of the Church of Uganda in 1977, a vocal critic of Amin's regime.<sup>329</sup>

Despite its repression of political activity, Amin's exclusive settlement was not immune to attacks from armed groups operating within and outside Uganda. Obote's supporters from the Northern region and Ugandan exiles allied with Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) to challenge Amin's rule.<sup>330</sup> The combined force of FONASA and the Tanzanian military toppled Amin's government in 1979, after Amin's army invaded Tanzania's north-western region of Kagera in November 1978 in pursuit of Ugandan dissidents.<sup>331</sup> A vast array of groups previously in competition with one another had united around a common objective of deposing Amin. These groups included Baganda royalists, led by prominent figures such as Professor Yusuf Lule, Andrew Kayiira, and Grace Ibingira; former members of the DP led by Godfrey Binaisa; Marxist radicals led by Yoweri Museveni; and former pro-Obote UPC forces led by Paulo Muwanga and David Oyite-Ojok.<sup>332</sup> The groups united under the banner of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and established a transitional Military Commission government led by

---

<sup>329</sup> Hansen, "Uganda in the 1970s."

<sup>330</sup> Mazrui, "Between Development and Decay."

<sup>331</sup> George Roberts, "Uganda-Tanzania War, the Fall of Idi Amin, and the Failure of African Diplomacy, 1978-1979," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 4 (2014): 692-709.

<sup>332</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

General Yusuf Lule in 1979.<sup>333</sup> The Military Commission organized elections in December 1980, wherein former president Milton Obote's of UPC won.<sup>334</sup>

The election result, however, was mired in controversy because the losing parties accused the Military Commission of manipulating the results in Obote's favour.<sup>335</sup> The UPC gained 74 parliamentary seats and 22 legislative appointees while the Buganda-aligned DP won 51 seats. Museveni's Uganda People's Movement (UPM), on the other hand, won only one seat.<sup>336</sup> Ensuing post-election conflict involved a multiplicity of groups, ethnic identities, and interests competing for political power.<sup>337</sup> The post-war transitional settlement was characterised by violence as old grudges between erstwhile foes came to the fore. Pro-Obote armed groups attacked pro-Amin groups in the northern region and Buganda in the central region.<sup>338</sup> The controversial 1980 election was followed by several armed struggles involving groups such as the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) from West Nile, the Buganda-aligned Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), and Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA).<sup>339</sup> While armed insurgencies were underway, Obote's second government succumbed to a military coup in July 1985 by the army, led by commander Tito Lutwa Okello and his brother, General Bazilio Okello. This insurgency resulted from ethnic divisions in the army in

---

<sup>333</sup> Okuku, "Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda."

<sup>334</sup> Okuku.

<sup>335</sup> Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, 'Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making', *Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science*, no. 27 (2008).

<sup>336</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

<sup>337</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, "Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda."

<sup>338</sup> Golooba-Mutebi, "Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda."

<sup>339</sup> Edward A. Brett, "Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no. 1 (1995): 129–152.

which the Acholi, the tribe to which the Okello brothers belonged, engaged in violent conflict with the Langi military officers, to which President Apollo Obote belonged.<sup>340</sup>

### **The NRA's Successful Guerrilla War and the Restoration of Kingdoms**

The transitional settlement described above, characterised by the frequent redistribution of power between competing organisations, provided the Buganda kingdom with a window of opportunity. The kingdom formed an alliance with the NRA and, in exchange for its support, Buganda expected the restoration of its federal political status in the event of the NRA ascension to power. The kingdom supplied a base for the guerrilla movement in the Buganda heartland of Luweero Triangle and encouraged young Baganda men to join the struggle.<sup>341</sup> The NRA also became a broad-based movement incorporating several organisations, including Yoweri Museveni's UPM party, the Buganda-aligned UFM and FEDEMU, and other armed groups such as Rwandese Tutsi exiles and soldiers drawn from Western tribes, particularly Museveni's own Banyankole-Bahima.<sup>342</sup> As a guerrilla movement, the NRA relied on rural communities in Buganda's Luweero region for food and supplies. It obtained armaments from conducting sporadic attacks on government forces.<sup>343</sup> Over time, the NRA expanded its sphere of influence in Uganda by creating 'liberated zones' (areas seized from the government) and establishing local committees to govern the districts. The NRA progressively built a 'state within a state' through this violence.<sup>344</sup>

---

<sup>340</sup> Edward A. Brett, 'Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no. 1 (1995): 129–152.

<sup>341</sup> Charles Peter Mayiga, *King on the Throne: The Story of the Restoration of the Kingdom of Buganda* (Kampala, Uganda: Prime Time Communications, 2009).

<sup>342</sup> Englebert, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa."

<sup>343</sup> Lindemann, 'Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset'.

<sup>344</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, "Uganda in Transition: Two Years of the NRA/NRM," *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (1988): 1155–1181.

The NRA attracted broad-based support for its armed movement by framing their insurgency as a 'people's war' – a grassroots struggle by peasants from Southern ethnic groups against the hegemony of Northern ethnic groups such as the Lango and Nubian-Kakwa who had controlled the state and military since independence.<sup>345</sup> Over time, the NRA gained the support of urban professionals in and outside of Uganda, some of whom still form part of the country's political and business elite.<sup>346</sup> The NRA successfully staged a coup against the military government of Tito and Bazillio Okello in January 1986, marking the beginning President Yoweri Museveni's long reign. The Buganda kingdom occupied the highest profile among the groups of the NRA's armed movement in the nascent years of Museveni's rule, particularly since the NRA coordinated the war from within the kingdom's territory. In exchange, the NRA extended political benefits to Buganda, however, this arrangement also became a source of tension, as elaborated upon in Chapter 7.

Once in power, Museveni's newly formed NRM party sought to establish an inclusive settlement through a coalition government that reflected the broad-based nature of the guerrilla movement, known as the "Movement System" or "No Party Democracy." In actuality, the Movement System entailed the suspension of political parties and political activities, such as rallies, delegate conferences, local party branches, or the organised sponsorship of election candidates.<sup>347</sup> Museveni brought former party leaders from the DP, UPM, FEDEMU, FUNA, and UPC to his cabinet to form a power-sharing coalition.<sup>348</sup> For example, he appointed the DP's former leader

---

<sup>345</sup> Oloka-Onyango, "The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics."

<sup>346</sup> Mamdani, "Uganda in Transition."

<sup>347</sup> Carbone, "Political Parties in a 'No-Party Democracy' Hegemony and Opposition Under 'Movement Democracy' in Uganda."

<sup>348</sup> Ogenga Otunnu, "The History of Political Crisis in Uganda: The Legacy Facing Museveni Regime, 1986 to Present" (Halifax, Nova Scotia, Saint Mary's University, 1989).

Paul Ssemwogerere to Internal Affairs Minister, who later defected and ran against Museveni in 1996. Former UPC leader and Obote ally, Ruhakana Rugunda, was appointed to Health Minister and Prime Minister.<sup>349</sup>

Although Museveni sought to include all parties, ethnicities, and religious groups into the Movement System, it was in fact dominated by Southern tribes, such as the Banyankole-Bahima, Tooro, and Baganda, and excluded Northern elites who had supported the Obote and Amin presidencies.<sup>350</sup> Leaders from Southern tribes occupied strategic positions in the government's coercive agencies, namely the army, police, and intelligence, which formed the bedrock of Museveni's presidency. Museveni's other initiatives at inclusivity and reconciliation included his call for the return of political exiles, including the families of former Presidents. He also extended amnesty to political prisoners and allowed pro-Amin and pro-Obote insurgent groups to demobilise and re-integrate into the army.<sup>351</sup> These policies represented an effort to prevent further violence and transition away from the country's turbulent past.

The Movement System incorporated rural communities into the regime as part of processes of consolidating power. This demonstrated the importance of grassroots-level actors as crucial for establishing and maintaining a political settlement, apart from the elite-level bargains discussed above. Mass support was crucial for the Movement System and important to the regime in terms of minimising the potential of insurgencies instigated by former leaders of the pre-1986 regimes. The NRA's 1980-1986 guerrilla campaign owed its success to rural support, and so the governing

---

<sup>349</sup> Moses Khisa, "Managing Elite Defection in Museveni's Uganda: The 2016 Elections in Perspective," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10, no. 4 (2016): 729–748.

<sup>350</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

<sup>351</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, "Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda."

regime understood the importance of implementing a grassroots system of political control. To this end, the NRM established a system of Local Councils (LCs) to govern the country's districts and the districts would, in turn, provide legislators for the Movement System's Parliament through regular elections.<sup>352</sup> The local governance structure consisted of villages, parishes, sub-counties, counties, and districts. The village, run by a local council (LCI), is the lowest unit, followed by a parish which consists of several villages run by a local council made up of chairpersons from the villages (LCII).<sup>353</sup> The sub-county is made up of several parishes and run by an elected local council and an executive committee (LCIII), followed by a county consisting of several sub-counties. Each county is represented in the national parliament by an elected Member of Parliament (MP) but is also administered by another local council (LCIV) made up of LCIII chairpersons.<sup>354</sup> The district is the final sub-state administrative unit and consists of several counties and municipalities in a given area. Districts possess an elected local council (LCV) led by a Chairperson and their executive.<sup>355</sup> This plethora of local institutions is a product of the NRM's regime security imperative, that is, the need for rural support to uphold the governing coalition and consolidate regime power at all levels of the state.

Museveni maintained laudable justifications for the Movement System to mask its primary purpose: entrenching the hegemony of the NRM's regime over Uganda's politics and establishing an exclusive settlement. Museveni argued that the zero-sum violence plaguing post-colonial Uganda was rooted in the ethno-religious biases of

---

<sup>352</sup> Carbone, "Political Parties in a 'No-Party Democracy' Hegemony and Opposition Under 'Movement Democracy' in Uganda."

<sup>353</sup> Richard M. Kavuma, "Explainer: Local Government Structures in Uganda," *The Guardian*, 2009.

<sup>354</sup> Kavuma.

<sup>355</sup> Kavuma.

political parties.<sup>356</sup> In Museveni's view, social divisions arising from party affiliation and electoral competition worked against the project of national integration and the creation of a single Ugandan nation-state.<sup>357</sup> Museveni described Ugandan society through a Marxist lens, arguing that the country's post-colonial economy was not sufficiently developed to yield a large middle class, which is a pre-requisite for a well-functioning pluralistic democratic system. These circumstances, he argued, favoured ethnically driven zero-sum politics as groups struggled to control the state to gain access to material benefits.<sup>358</sup>

A calculated need for self-preservation was at the centre of the Movement System; the NRM needed ensure its survival. A narrow support base after the coup would only undermine Museveni and the NRM regime; instead, Museveni required a broad-based coalition like that possessed by the NRA during wartime to consolidate power and guarantee regime longevity. Museveni could absorb potential rivals and competing organisations through an inclusive settlement, albeit co-opted. Integrating ethnic groups and opposition parties into a system of patronage negated the imperative of zero-sum politics. Deep-seated regional and ethno-national fissures were prevalent when Museveni took power, yet the NRM managed to successfully mitigate overt conflict. For instance, the NRA recruited almost all of its soldiers from the Southern region to fight against Obote's Northern-dominated army.<sup>359</sup> The NRA's victory and Museveni's ascension to power represented a significant victory for the Southern tribes over the Northern groups that had dominated the army and

---

<sup>356</sup> Yoweri Museveni, *What Is Africa's Problem?*, vol. 1 (University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Yoweri Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda* (London: Macmillan London, 1997).

<sup>357</sup> Museveni, *What Is Africa's Problem?*; Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed*.

<sup>358</sup> Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed*; John Ssenkumba, "The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy: Neutralising Ugandan Opposition Politics under the NRM," *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*, 1998, 171–94.

<sup>359</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey.

government since independence. Northern groups, especially those loyal to former Presidents Obote and Amin, launched insurgencies in the North (Acholi), North-east (Teso), and East (Samia) immediately after Museveni took power in 1986.<sup>360</sup> Museveni extended amnesty and voluntary demobilisation to Northern groups in an effort to dismantle armed opposition against the NRM regime, to reduce the proliferation of arms across the country, and to elevate the state's monopoly over the use of violence.

The NRM's rise to power opened a window for the Buganda kingdom to restore its federal status and dominant position in the country's governing coalition. Museveni, however, sought to curtail the kingdom's holding power through institutional means. His personal interests in centralising political power and the kingdom's goal of political autonomy did not align. The young Buganda King, Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II, returned from exile in 1990 and began negotiations with Museveni's government to reinstate the kingdom's pre-1966 political status as a semi-autonomous federal region. In July 1993, the NRM-dominated Parliament passed two constitutional amendments recognising traditional kingdoms as cultural institutions but not semi-autonomous federal entities.<sup>361</sup> The Constitution (Amendment) Statute 113 deliberately disallowed traditional kingdoms from engaging in political activities. Article (2) (a) (b) stipulated that traditional rulers

“shall not take part in partisan politics, stand for election to a political office, overtly favour or campaign for a candidate running for political office, and shall not have or exercise any administrative, legislative, executive, or judicial powers of central or local government.”

---

<sup>360</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey.

<sup>361</sup> Johannessen, Kingship in Uganda. The Role of the Uganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics.

The second amendment, “The Traditional Rulers (Restitution of Assets and Properties) Statute of 1993, provided for the return of the Buganda’s properties, including the kingdom’s Parliament building (The Bulange), the royal palace (The Lubiri at Mengo), the Prime Minister’s residence (The Butikkiro), the Buganda King’s 350 square miles of land (Mailo), and several buildings throughout Uganda’s central region belonging to the kingdom.<sup>362</sup>

These amendments imposed significant institutional constraints on the political aspirations of Uganda’s kingdoms and particularly for Buganda. As “cultural institutions,” traditional kingdoms could not participate in formal politics and were confined to activities aimed at cultural revival. Museveni also undercut the Baganda’s claims for restoration as a semi-autonomous region through these aforementioned constitutional amendments, a status previously guaranteed by the 1962 constitution which was later abrogated by Obote in 1967. This diminished the Buganda’s holding power and pre-empted the types of political contestations seen by Obote’s UPC government, contestations which almost cost Obote his position as Prime Minister in 1966 and led him to ban the kingdoms. Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate on how the kingdoms remained engaged in formal politics despite the NRM’s recalcitrance.

Traditional kingdoms still managed to obtain significant concessions from the NRM regime, including their restoration as cultural entities and constitutional guarantees for the return of their properties. Without a timeline for the return of the properties, however, the NRM could leverage this statute as a strategic bargaining tool whereby

---

<sup>362</sup> Cathrine Johannessen, *Kingship in Uganda. The Role of the Uganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics* (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006).

the regime promised to return of the properties only in exchange for the kingdoms' political support. By withholding outstanding properties, the NRM reinforced its dominance over the kingdoms. Museveni's government is yet to restore all kingdom assets and provide requisite compensation for land and buildings lost in the colonial era, such as Buganda's Mutesa House located in London.

The Buganda installed King Kabaka Ronald Mutebi in July 1993 while the Banyoro and other kingdoms, such as the Tooro, Busoga, and Ankole, followed suit by installing their own traditional kings in 1995. The Buganda kingdom rebuilt its institutions, including its Parliament (Lukiiko) which consisted of clan leaders from 52 districts and cabinet ministers appointed by the King.<sup>363</sup> Museveni's regime supported these processes of ethno-national reconstruction and, in exchange, the Baganda supported the NRM in the 1996 and 2001 elections. Buganda's continued support for the NRM was based in part on an erroneous belief that the NRM would eventually acquiesce to its demands for federal status. Museveni, however, operated in bad faith, and his refusal to restore the Buganda kingdom's former political status and restore its properties, led to a decline in the kingdom's support for the NRM in the early 2000s.<sup>364</sup>

### **Explaining the Bunyoro Kingdom's Political Marginalisation**

The historical analysis provided thus far demonstrates the Buganda kingdom's central role in shaping Uganda's political settlements since the inception of the modern colonial state. The Bunyoro kingdom, on the other hand, possesses limited holding

---

<sup>363</sup> Englebort, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa."

<sup>364</sup> This is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

power and thus was less influential in this history. The Bunyoro kingdom did, however, reconstitute its institutions following the formal restoration of kingdoms in 1993. Its current King (Omukama), Solomon Gafabusa Iguru, was reinstated in 1995 alongside the Bunyoro Parliament.<sup>365</sup> The kingdom's marginalised position in Ugandan politics rests in a variety of historical and institutional factors which together underscore the traditional leadership's inability to effectively capitalize on its sources of power.<sup>366</sup> Historical factors include the Bunyoro's subjugation by the British colonial authorities and the kingdom's subsequent failure to re-establish political influence in the post-colonial era. Unlike the Buganda, the Bunyoro kingdom could not effectively mobilise its subjects, strengthen the capacity of its institutions, lobby for the return of its properties, or establish independent sources of income in the post-colonial era. Shane Doyle captures the Bunyoro's position in Ugandan politics:

The [Bunyoro] kingship, restored in 1993, has regained nothing like the status and wealth enjoyed by the monarchy in Buganda or Tooro. Bunyoro leaders feel some degree of frustration at their low status and lack of influence and wealth. The most important outcome of this frustration was the decision taken in 2003 by the king of the Bunyoro to seek compensation (from Britain, the government of Uganda and Buganda kingdom) for alleged war crimes and illegal land transfers committed during Britain's war of conquest in the 1980s... for £3 billion (USD\$3,7 billion).<sup>367</sup>

---

<sup>365</sup> Ragnhild L. Muriaas, "Traditional Institutions and Decentralisation: A Typology of Co-Existence in Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Forum for Development Studies*, vol. 38 (Taylor & Francis, 2011), 87–107; Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited."

<sup>366</sup> Although some of the factors are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, a summarised account is crucial here to this chapter's narrative and analysis.

<sup>367</sup> Shane Doyle, 'From Kitara to the Lost Counties: Genealogy, Land and Legitimacy in the Kingdom of Bunyoro, Western Uganda', *Social Identities* 12, no. 4 (2006): 457–470., p 457

In an interview, a senior official from the Bunyoro kingdom confirmed the cause of the Bunyoro's subdued political power as being rooted in British subjugation following their attempted resistance to colonial rule. The Bunyoro leadership were left disorganized, weak, and lacking in morale.<sup>368</sup>

The British used a "scorched earth policy", which entailed destroying property, killing able-bodied men, and the seizure of property and land, especially the seven "Lost Counties". The kingdom never fully recovered from this attack to regain its pre-colonial status and institutional organization. After independence, the ban and confiscation of property by the Obote government in 1967 also set the kingdom back. This affected the leadership and subjects alike, and the kingdom's collective psychology in general, there was a sense of lost pride... and this undermined our capacity to engage with the central government since then. What we have focused on after independence are the issues of the return of Lost Counties, and our properties which we lost to the central government after Obote banned kingdoms, particularly land. Although Museveni promised to reinstate the properties or compensate the kingdom, he has not done so. We have also engaged with the British regarding restoring our cultural artefacts that were looted during the colonial era, and on display in museums in the United Kingdom.<sup>369</sup>

This senior official also indicated that in the contemporary era the Banyoro could not actively shape Uganda's political settlements due to the constitutional requirement that kingdoms only conduct cultural and not political activities. However, the

---

<sup>368</sup> Senior Bunyoro official, [RADK], Kampala, 22 May 2019.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid, 22 May, 2019.

discovery of oil compelled the kingdom to reorganise its political institutions. In the opinion of the interviewee, accessing revenue from the oil sector requires that the kingdom develop strong institutions so that it may gain sufficient holding power to lobby the government and draw concessions.<sup>370</sup>

The kingdom is only starting to get organized and trying to build capacity now because of the presence of oil; through building a stronger and more accountable cabinet and parliament that represents all areas within the Bunyoro region. We are also developing a new strategic plan, which includes the sustainable management of natural resources. Before oil, the kingdom only prioritized cultural issues. We strictly followed the dictates of the constitution, and thus had not invested in building our organizational capacity the way Buganda chose to. [In addition,] the spirit of Bunyoro nationalism did not arise in our kingdom the way it has existed in Buganda, especially after the British subdued the kingdom, so there has never been a push to make this happen after 1995.<sup>371</sup>

The Bunyoro official indicated that their kingdom is situated in a poor, rural setting with limited access to resources, unlike the Buganda kingdom which is centrally located in the capital region. The Buganda kingdom is able to regularly raise funds from its subjects based in Kampala and abroad whereas Bunyoro's subjects are mostly rural and subsistent. The Buganda kingdom has not been as successful as Bunyoro in maintaining the reverence and support of its subjects, thereby limiting the ability of the king and the institutions of the monarchy to mobilise politically:

---

<sup>370</sup> This is discussed in more elaborate detail in Chapter 6.

<sup>371</sup> Makerere University academic, [ABP], Kampala, 21 May 2019.

Buganda is very beholden to their King; he is revered and respected considerably. This allows Buganda to mobilise and organise their subjects better. Our case is quite different. Although the subjects do indeed respect and value the king and the institution of the Omukama (Bunyoro king), we have never been able to arouse the same passionate support such as the Baganda have, which, in their case has often led to violent clashes with the government. This goes back to the historical idea of the collective memory that our kingdom, which was the largest empire in this region (Great Lakes/East Africa) was systematically destroyed and weakened during British colonial rule.<sup>372</sup>

These historical, institutional, and leadership-related factors explain the Bunyoro kingdom's weaker position in Uganda's political settlements. Since the establishment of the modern Ugandan state, the Bunyoro kingdom has struggled to gain a foothold from which to negotiate access to oil revenues. The Buganda kingdom, on the other hand, has strategically negotiated with Uganda's successive governing regimes since the colonial era and steadily increased their holding power within the country's political settlements.<sup>373</sup> Both kingdoms contended with the NRM regime in the "restoration period" beginning in 1993. The nature of the NRM's holding power and its political and economic interests shape the kingdoms' engagement strategies with the state. The next section analyses Uganda's exclusive political settlement in the post-oil discovery era and the limits on the kingdoms' ability to obtain concessions from the governing coalition.

---

<sup>372</sup> Ibid, 22 May, 2019.

<sup>373</sup> This brief analysis was essential in this chapter to account for the Bunyoro's absence in the historical analysis of Uganda's political settlements since the emergence of the modern state. Chapters 6 and 7 provide more detailed analyses of both two kingdoms' political and institutional capacity, and political engagement with the state after the discovery of oil.

## Mapping the Post-Oil Exclusive Political Settlement in Uganda

President Museveni's pretence of inclusivity in the nascent years of the Movement System quickly succeeded to an exclusive political settlement, and it is within this context that oil discoveries were made in 2006. The NRM's sources of power and the nature of Uganda's exclusive settlement are foundational to understanding Bunyoro's failure to gain access to oil sector benefits. The NRM regime includes security agencies, members of the Museveni family and their close associates, individuals from the Banyankole-Bahima ethnic group to which Museveni belongs, and members of the NRM ruling party.<sup>374</sup> The NRM regime has considerable influence over the formation and functioning of public institutions. The governing coalition relies on a complex mixture of violence, patronage, manipulation of public institutions, and strategies of extraversion. President Museveni's style of governance involves strategically balancing the interests of the governing coalition's constituent members through formal and informal means and the selective use of force and patronage in dealing with political competitors. Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Sam Hickey describe the nature of political governance in Uganda's political settlement as follows:

Museveni's rule involves a continual process of recalibration and of balancing out across strategic nodes, whereby excessive shifts in one direction need to become re-embedded within the logics of the other over time if some sort of settlement is to be maintained. This underlines the sense that maintaining statehood in Africa requires constant engagement in processes of negotiation

---

<sup>374</sup> For example, please see: Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 'Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda'; Andrew M. Mwenda, 'Personalizing Power in Uganda', *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007): 23–37; Khisa, 'The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda'.

that occur at the interface between the public and the private, informal and the formal, the illegal and the legal.<sup>375</sup>

Traditional kingdoms are excluded from the governing regime but still benefit from state patronage. For example, Uganda's traditional kings (with the notable exception of the Buganda King) draw a Shs 5 million (USD\$1300) monthly salary from the government and are entitled to other benefits, such as medical aid, government-funded vehicles, and state bodyguards. The Buganda kingdom, though marginalised from the exclusive settlement, pursues strategic coexistence in an effort to secure the best political and economic outcomes within the confines of the existing governing framework, as elaborated upon in Chapter 7.<sup>376</sup>

The NRM's governing coalition draws on several sources of power to sustain its dominance in Uganda's political system. President Museveni's ascent to power in 1986 through military coup meant that security agencies became the NRM's primary source of power, namely the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), the Uganda Police Force (UPF), the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU), (later dubbed the Presidential Guard Brigade), and the elite SFC. President Museveni's son, Lieutenant-General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, commanded the SFC between 2008 and 2017.<sup>377</sup> The SFC is a highly trained, well-resourced commando unit that consists of officers drawn from various ethnic groups but is still dominated by Museveni's Bahima tribe. The

---

<sup>375</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, "The Master of Institutional Multiplicity?", p. 614

<sup>376</sup> They engage with the ruling coalition without seeking to change its composition or the underlying configurations of power. The kingdoms' limited holding power relative to the state and inability to establish an alternative coalition leads them to augmenting their own political and economic holding power with the expressed intention to alter the configuration of power in the event of a transitional settlement. Strategic coexistence is different from apathy, where social groups passively yield to the dominance of incumbent regimes, or clientelism, where weaker groups focus exclusively on obtaining resources through patronage without expressing a desire to shift power relations in the future.

<sup>377</sup> Rwengabo, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda."

SFC is responsible for providing security for President Museveni and critical infrastructure such as oil installations. The PGB has units in strategic areas throughout the country, including the Air Force headquarters in Entebbe, the State Houses in Kampala and Entebbe, Museveni's home area in Rwakitura of Western Uganda, and a military detachment in Barlege in Northern Uganda.<sup>378</sup> This countrywide deployment provides the governing regime a firm security foothold.

The military also controls formal government institutions. Former military officers hold key positions in parliament and state bureaucracies, contributing to fear among the civil service and thus to regime stability.<sup>379</sup> The UPDF Act of 2005 allowed former military officers to join formal politics, with several former senior army officers subsequently becoming legislators and cabinet ministers. The UPDF Act forms part of Museveni's strategy of patronage whereby ambitious high-ranking army officers are co-opted into the political system and provided with status and financial benefit. The 1995 Constitution also permitted the participation of active duty officers in Parliament through Special Interest Groups (SIGs). In this arrangement, ten seats of legislature are reserved for serving military personnel, namely commanders.

Uganda's multi-layered intelligence system is another source of power, and a component of the security complex that is critical to the NRM regime's political dominance. The Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) is the intelligence arm of the UPDF and reports to the Ministry of Defence.<sup>380</sup> The CMI investigates high-profile cases and often overshadows the Uganda Police Force. For instance, the CMI investigated the assassinations of the Assistant Inspector General of Police Andrew

---

<sup>378</sup> Rwengabo.

<sup>379</sup> Sabastiano Rwengabo, 'Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing', *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (2013): 531–559.

<sup>380</sup> Rwengabo, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda."

Kaweesi, the Assistant Superintendent of Police Muhammad Kirumira, Arua municipality NRM legislator Ibrahim Abiriga, as well as the criminal allegations against the former Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura in 2018. The Internal and External Security Organisations (ISO and ESO) came into force in 1987, when Parliament passed the National Security Act.<sup>381</sup> Director Generals, who report directly to President Museveni, lead these agencies. The ISO conducts domestic surveillance, which includes spying on political leaders in and outside of government. Agents are embedded in government departments, the army, and civil society.<sup>382</sup> This system allows Museveni and the NRM regime to pre-empt dissension from within or outside the ruling coalition and perpetuates a climate of fear and distrust. The ESO conducts intelligence surveillance of external organisations and foreign actors working with Uganda-based individuals or with operations or interests in Uganda. Former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi was the ESO's first Director-General, before his appointments as Defence Minister, Security Minister, and then Prime Minister in 2011. Members of ISOs and ESOs serve as representatives on the boards of civil society organisations, allowing the central government to monitor their activities. Recruitment to the intelligence organisations is highly secretive and intelligence officers are rarely identifiable.

Informal militia units are another feature of Uganda's security complex and represent a grassroots source of power for the governing regime. Their role is to buttress the NRM against coup attempts from within or outside the settlement. Informal militia provide the governing regime with a reserve of military-trained youth ready to counter insurgencies from formal security agencies.<sup>383</sup> Described by Sebastiano

---

<sup>381</sup> Privacy International, "For God and My President: State Surveillance in Uganda" (United Kingdom, October 2015), [https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Uganda\\_Report\\_1.pdf](https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Uganda_Report_1.pdf).

<sup>382</sup> Privacy International.

<sup>383</sup> Rwengabo, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda."

Rwengabo as *coup-proofing*, the strategy of establishing multiple formal and informal security agencies is grounded in the history of Uganda's post-colonial regimes, which all rose and fell through military coups.<sup>384</sup> Informal organisations function as a shadow security regime and report directly to President Museveni. The NRM regime combines formal institutions with informal groups to "cushion" its settlements against armed uprisings. This added layer of military security increases the opportunity costs of an attempted coup by groups excluded from the governing coalition. The groups are ad hoc with little to no command structure or systems of or accountability and can be both unarmed and unpaid.

The government deliberately frames the purpose of the informal groups in vague, contradictory terms so that they are amorphous and politically malleable.<sup>385</sup> The legal basis for militias rests in Article 17 of the 1995 Constitution, the 1994 Police Act, and the Uganda People's Defence Act of 2005, which together allow for the recruitment and training of civilians to provide security, when necessary. Apart from their direct role in security, the militias serve secondary political purposes that strengthen the governing settlement. For instance, they absorb some of the country's unemployed youth, thus becoming a form of social control and mitigating a potential mass uprising. This strategy is particularly expedient given the country's militarised background and the coup that brought the NRM into power in 1986: it provided employment for former soldiers, some of whom participated in the armed insurgencies of Obote and Amin, before and after the NRA's coup.<sup>386</sup>

---

<sup>384</sup> Rwengabo.

<sup>385</sup> Rebecca Tapscott, "Where the Wild Things Are Not: Crime Preventers and the 2016 Ugandan Elections," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10, no. 4 (2016): 693–712.

<sup>386</sup> Paul Omach, "Political Violence in Uganda: The Role of Vigilantes and Militias," *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 35, no. 4 (2010): 426.

A salient example of the political utility of militias are the Local Defence Units. These units operate as 'community police' in districts throughout the country.<sup>387</sup> They augment the work of formal security agencies by broadcasting state power and policing the political activities of opposition organisations, helping to safeguard the NRM's electoral victories. Some paramilitary groups act as a recruitment pool for shadow security agencies or auxiliary forces, such as the Amuka Boys (army), the Arrow Boys (police), and the Special Police Constables (intelligence).<sup>388</sup> The 'Crime Preventers' are another paramilitary group that gained notoriety in the 2016 elections due to their violent attacks and human rights abuses against opposition activists. Ostensibly, the purpose of the Crime Preventers is to conduct community policing under the supervision of the Uganda Police Force. In December 2015, they numbered 1 million.<sup>389</sup> Although the group is supposedly non-partisan, the Crime Preventers engaged in voter intimidation, especially in rural areas, through tactics of arbitrary arrest, torture, and extortion.<sup>390</sup> The 'Boda Boda 2010' is another paramilitary group consisting of Kampala motorcycle gangs; it functions as a militia that spies on and attacks opposition activists.<sup>391</sup> During the "Walk to Work" protests after Uganda's controversial 2011 election, the group violently attacked activists led by the former Forum for Democratic Change President Dr. Kizza Besigye.<sup>392</sup> The Boda Boda 2010 was funded by the patronage of the former Inspector General of Police General Kale Kayihura and operated under the command of former NRM leader of the Rubaga

---

<sup>387</sup> The LDU's are derived from the NRA's guerilla war-era strategy, where they established the LDUs as local police in areas that it had successfully wrestled from the government.

<sup>388</sup> Moses Khisa, "The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda," *Africa Development* 38, no. 1 & 2 (2013): 191–226.

<sup>389</sup> Tapscott, "Where the Wild Things Are Not."

<sup>390</sup> Connor Gaffey, "Who Are Uganda's Crime Preventers and Why Are They so Controversial?," *Newsweek*, January 14, 2016, <https://www.newsweek.com/who-are-ugandas-crime-preventers-415704>.

<sup>391</sup> Tapscott, "Where the Wild Things Are Not."

<sup>392</sup> Andrew Bagala, "How Boda Boda 2010 Emerged," *Daily Monitor*, January 22, 2018, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/How-Boda-Boda-2010-emerged/688334-4272860-7f3leiz/index.html>.

Division in Kampala Abdallah Kitatta.<sup>393</sup> The presence of such militia groups limits the extent to which traditional kingdoms can successfully mobilise their subjects in an uprising to challenge the exclusive settlement.

In addition to the extensive formal and informal security agency described above, the NRM's exclusive settlement relies on personalized rule and a well-documented network of patronage as an essential source of power.<sup>394</sup> Patronage contributes to the relative cohesion of the settlement since constitute social groups and individuals are able to access material benefits for livelihood security. The inner core of the coalition includes members of the Museveni family, the Banyankole-Bahima ethnic group, and a more extensive network of elite and grassroots loyalists connected to the ruling NRM party.<sup>395</sup> President Museveni has far-reaching decision-making powers and routinely issues directives to Cabinet Ministers and other government functionaries.<sup>396</sup> He provides numerous benefits to patronage clients and to his grassroots supporters:

Museveni also has a very personal approach to governing through personal relations. For example, he donates money to members of his inner circle during situations of difficulty or bereavement, and family celebrations as well. He personally visits some of them in hospital, pays school fees for their children, and things like that... He postures himself as the "father of the nation", and this starts with members of his inner circle. He uses state funds for personalized donations to various groups and communities in urban and rural areas, making it seem as though they came from his pocket. This way, they would feel indebted

---

<sup>393</sup> Bagala.

<sup>394</sup> Khisa, "The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda"; Izama and Wilkerson, "Uganda"; Ssenkumba, "The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy"; Aili Mari Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*, vol. 6 (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO, 2010).

<sup>395</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, "The Master of Institutional Multiplicity?"

<sup>396</sup> Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*.

to him, as their saviour, instead of the government.<sup>397</sup>

Some of Museveni's close family members also occupy positions in government. For example, his wife, Janet Kataha Museveni, is the Education and Sports Minister and their eldest son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is the former commander of the elite SFC and is now Senior Presidential Advisor on Special Projects (2017 – present). Museveni's younger brother General Caleb Akandwanaho, popularly known as Salim Saleh, is a senior officer of the UPDF and served as State Minister for Microfinance from 2006 to 2008. He is a leading power broker in Uganda, engaging in informal negotiations on Museveni's behalf and especially with political opponents from within the ruling coalition and in the opposition. Caleb Akandwanaho has been involved in several corruption cases, including related to the plunder of minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo.<sup>398</sup>

The patronage system has an ethno-regional dynamic, manifest in the dominance of leaders from the southwestern region and the Bankankole-Bahima ethnic group to which Museveni's belongs.<sup>399</sup> This reflects the ethnic patterning of Uganda's politics and the saliency of ethnicity as a source of power in post-colonial African politics. The Bankankole-Bahima occupy most senior positions, particularly in the security services sector and in cabinet, and as presidential advisers. For example, five out of six UPDF commanders since 1986 have been from the Banyankole ethnic group (Elly Tumwine, Salim Saleh, James Kazini, Aronda Nyakairima, and Mugisha Muntu).<sup>400</sup> In addition,

---

<sup>397</sup> CSO director, DTG, Kampala, 1 July 2018.

<sup>398</sup> Koen Vlassenroot, Sandrine Perrot, and Jeroen Cuvelier, "Doing Business out of War. An Analysis of the UPDF's Presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (2012): 2–21.

<sup>399</sup> Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, "Chiefs, Politicians, and the Community in Uganda: A Historico-Analytical Narrative," in 4th National Annual Local Government Conference, Durban, South Africa, 2007.

<sup>400</sup> Lindemann, "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset."

61% of all the highly ranked officers in the UPDF are from the Western region. However, the rank and file are more ethnically diverse because of the quota recruitment system.<sup>401</sup> The correlation between ethnicity and military seniority demonstrates the role of identity in Uganda's exclusive settlement. At the lower rungs of the patronage network are district leaders and grassroots supporters, such as Resident District Commissioners who are appointed by President Museveni and local district chairpersons who are elected by the ruling party during its annual congress.<sup>402</sup>

The NRM party is another important source of power that President Museveni uses as a vehicle for coordinating the distribution of rents and maintenance of political hegemony. There is a quid-pro-quo relationship between President Museveni and the legislators in which they collaborate to secure electoral wins and a parliamentary majority for Museveni in exchange for his financial and political support during elections and beyond. Legislators access the benefits of patronage through salaries and cash pay-outs from the central government, particularly during elections, while Museveni maintains the façade of a democratic system to gain legitimacy for the NRM's autocratic governing style.<sup>403</sup> As a Kampala-based director of a civil society organization shared,

The NRM is not just a traditional political party that is based on well-defined manifestos and mechanisms for vibrant internal debate. What we currently have is a mere façade, an institutional tool which Museveni coordinates his political clients, and discharges political power in the country's political system... it is a mechanism for both Museveni and those who wish to benefit

---

<sup>401</sup> Lindemann.

<sup>402</sup> Anne Mette Kjaer and Mesharch Katusiimeh, *Growing but Not Transforming: Fragmented Ruling Coalitions and Economic Developments in Uganda, 2012: 07* (DIIS working paper, 2012).

<sup>403</sup> Khisa, "Managing Elite Defection in Museveni's Uganda."

from his rule to organize themselves. It lacks genuine internal competition, and any dissent against Museveni is not tolerated. All party processes, such as the annual congress are a mere show because there can never be an internal challenger to Museveni's leadership of the party, which he has had since 1986.<sup>404</sup>

The NRM also employs state institutions in ways that ensure the continuity of the exclusive settlement. Weber's theory of the state stipulates that institutions facilitate the processes of a democratic political system, however, in the case of Uganda, they consolidate the NRM regime's power.<sup>405</sup> The NRM guarantees electoral victories through a mixture of tactics such as institutional bias, violence, bribery, and patronage that yield manipulated results. For example, Museveni appoints members of the Electoral Commission, thus thwarting the institutional independence of the electoral authority. He systematically deployed the UPDF and NRM militias throughout the country in the 2001, 2006, 2011, and 2016 elections to intimidate voters. For instance, former state Security Minister Henry Tumukunde coordinated attacks against opposition activists through the state funded Kalangala Action Plan militia during the 2001 elections.<sup>406</sup> Similarly, the NRM deployed the Crime Preventers to intimidate members of the public and coerce them to vote for the ruling NRM in the 2016 elections. Opposition leaders Kizza Besigye (Forum for Democratic Change) and Amama Mbabazi (Go Forward Coalition) were also attacked and detained.<sup>407</sup> The

---

<sup>404</sup> CSO director, [DTG], Kampala, 1 June 2018.

<sup>405</sup> Karl Duszka, 'Max Weber's Conception of the State', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 3, no. 1 (1989): 71–105.

<sup>406</sup> Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Uganda: A Group Called the Kalangala Action Plan; Its Activities and Organisational Structure, Whether It Is Affiliated with the Government" (Government of Canada, July 7, 2003).

<sup>407</sup> Abrahamsen and Bareebe, "Uganda's 2016 Elections."

NRM garnered 70% of the parliamentary seats thanks to violence, intimidation, and fearmongering.<sup>408</sup>

The NRM also engages in vote-buying to manipulate election results and thereby maintain parliamentary dominance. The party distributes food aid and cash payouts to rural communities and provides financial payments to legislators in the run-up to elections using public funds. For example, Museveni authorised the payment of \$8700 to each of the 330 NRM legislators before the 2011 elections to help fund their campaigns, especially in rural areas.<sup>409</sup> The NRM also spent over \$350 million in this same election, drawn from the government's Consolidated Fund and supplementary budgets, and by printing money at the Bank of Uganda.<sup>410</sup> The advantages of incumbency result in an unequal playing field, allowing Museveni and the NRM to win successive elections. The political strength of opposition parties and other sub-state organisations is undercut by the hegemony of Museveni's presidency and the NRM regime. Democratic institutions and processes such as periodic elections may offer the NRM regime a semblance of legitimacy, particularly to external actors, but the militarized nature of the exclusive political settlement is palpable.

The NRM maintains its parliamentary dominance by manipulating the Parliamentary Caucus system, and passing legislation that guarantees the governing settlement's hold on power. This includes the Political Parties and Organisations Act in 2002, which is designed to monitor and control the activities of opposition political parties. This act came into being shortly after the formation of the Forum for Democratic Change, an opposition party composed of NRM defectors and led by Museveni's

---

<sup>408</sup> Rita Abrahamsen and Gerald Bareebe, 'Uganda's 2016 Elections: Not Even Faking It Anymore', *African Affairs*, 2016, 1–15.

<sup>409</sup> De Kock and Sturman, "The Power of Oil Charting Uganda's Transition to a Petro-State."

<sup>410</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, "The Master of Institutional Multiplicity?"

former confidant and physician, Dr. Kizza Besigye.<sup>411</sup> Parliament also passed the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) to legalise arbitrary arrest and the detention of opposition party members and civil society activists, as well as to prohibit the media from covering opposition activities. Controversially, parliament voted to remove the constitutional limit on presidential term maximums in 2005, just before the end of the Movement System and the transition to the current multiparty system in 2006.<sup>412</sup> Museveni disbursed \$3000 to each NRM legislator in exchange for their support of this constitutional amendment.<sup>413</sup>

The “Age Limit Bill,” or amendment of Article 102 (b) of the 1995 Constitution, is another exemplary case of the NRM’s manipulation of the parliamentary system. The clause previously imposed an age limit of 75-years-old for any Ugandan President, which made Museveni, at the age of 74 in 2019, ineligible to hold office by the next general election in 2021. The removal of the presidential age limit allows Museveni to be President for life. NRM legislator Raphael Magyezi tabled a motion to amend the article in September 2017 despite protests in Kampala against the removal of the presidential age limit. Nonetheless, the NRM parliamentary majority passed the motion on December 20th, 2017. The bill also unsuccessfully attempted to include amendments that would have extended the term of parliament from five to seven years, which represented a quid pro quo concession for the legislators. The UPDF staged a sit-in of the parliamentary chapel to ensure that the opposition protests did not stop the vote from proceeding. Several petitioners, led by the Uganda Law Society, requested that the Uganda Court of Appeal strike down the Age Limit Bill but the appeal was dismissed on July 26th, 2018. The Court did, however, reverse the

---

<sup>411</sup> Juma Okuku, “Beyond Third Term Politics: Constitutional Reform and Democratic Governance in Uganda,” *East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights* 11, no. 2 (2005): 182–219.

<sup>412</sup> Andrew M. Mwenda, “Personalizing Power in Uganda,” *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007): 23–37.

<sup>413</sup> Okuku, “Beyond Third Term Politics.”

amendment extending the term of Parliament. This manipulation of institutional procedures in the form of partisan amendments to the constitution is part of a systematic, multi-pronged strategy to perpetuate the NRM and Museveni's reign, while limiting the political possibility of resistance from the outside.

Decentralisation is another institutional tool for the NRM to sustain its exclusive hold on power. The policy of decentralisation undercuts potential challenges from the grassroots level in urban and rural areas, particularly from the traditional kingdoms. The policy is rooted in the wartime era Resistance Councils developed by the NRA to maintain military and political control in areas seized from the government during the guerrilla war of 1981-1986. A commission led by prominent academic Mahmood Mamdani also recommended in 1987 that the NRM's war-era "Resistance Councils" be converted to Local Councils. The NRM also argued that the formation of districts in each region would improve public service delivery by increasing ethnic representation since each district would have political representatives at the local and national levels.<sup>414</sup> The high level of militarised conflict in Uganda following Museveni's ascent to power by coup in 1986 also led to the need of this type of securitised decentralised governance. Decentralisation is also a form of territorial power-sharing and distribution of rents, in that it incorporates the lower ranks of the regime into the governing coalition. The policy fragments the political system by transferring power from the political centre to the grassroots, while simultaneously extending the centre's control of the country.

In addition to this security imperative, NRM's policy of decentralisation is rooted in external sources. The IMF's Structural Adjustment Programme imposed

---

<sup>414</sup> Green, "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda."

decentralisation as a conditionality for aid,<sup>415</sup> believing that decentralisation would reduce the harmful effects of concentrated state power, especially corruption. The purported desirability of decentralisation and increased democratic participation is reflected in academic literature and development practice, especially since the 2000s. International donors and “development practitioners” heightened their focus on poverty reduction following the failure of free-market policies, emblemized by the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the previous decade.<sup>416</sup> Ironically, decentralisation and participation were a product of market-friendly economics since its underlying logic rested on transferring the responsibility of growth-based “development” to local communities.<sup>417</sup> In this framework, decentralisation and participation theoretically increase the impact of development projects by reducing corruption and promoting democratic accountability.<sup>418</sup>

Uganda’s Parliament formalised the creation of new districts in the Local Government Act of 1997, resulting in a proliferation of districts from 80 in 1989, 112 in 2013 to 134 by 2019. Contrary to the assumptions of development theory and practice, decentralization in Uganda served a mechanism for strengthening the ruling coalition’s hold on power. The NRM was able to more effectively distribute the spoils of patronage to the grassroots level. Despite the initial optimism of several scholars,<sup>419</sup>

---

<sup>415</sup> Terrell G. Manyak and Isaac Wasswa Katono, “Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda: Governance Adrift,” *African Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (2010): 1.

<sup>416</sup> Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty* (Public Affairs, 2012); Andrea Cornwall, “Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse,” *Development in Practice* 17, no. 4–5 (2007): 471–484; Robyn Eversole, “Remaking Participation: Challenges for Community Development Practice,” *Community Development Journal*, 2010, bsq033.

<sup>417</sup> Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock, “What Do Buzzwords Do for Development Policy? A Critical Look at ‘Participation’, ‘Empowerment’ and ‘Poverty Reduction,’” *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 7 (2005): 1043–1060.

<sup>418</sup> Gina MS Lambricht, *Decentralization in Uganda: Explaining Successes and Failures in Local Governance* (FirstForumPress Boulder, CO, 2011).

<sup>419</sup> Several scholars supported the system. For example, Furley argued that it was contributing to increased democracy and popular participation in Uganda, given its history of dictatorial governance Oliver Furley, “Democratisation in Uganda,” *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 38, no. 3 (2000): 79–102. Mamdani (1996) and Allen and Heald (2004) praised decentralisation for “detrribalizing” local government, by

the empirical limitations of decentralisation were revealed by the NRM regime's self-seeking political calculations that distorted decentralisation's theoretical aspirations. The central government in Uganda retains considerable control over the appointment of local councils and district officials, a reality which undermines the intended aims of decentralisation as a mechanism for dispersing power away from the political centre.<sup>420</sup> Most new districts depend on the central government for funding since they lack the resources or economic activity needed to raise revenue for salaries, operating costs, and development projects. On the whole, local service delivery remains sub-standard due to the lack of experience of political appointees, absenteeism, a lack of sufficient funds, and corruption.<sup>421</sup>

The NRM regime can weaken political organising at the sub-state level using decentralisation, including by co-opting the kingdoms, opposition political parties, and civil society groups. Local government officials, intelligence officers, and Resident District Commissioners closely monitor organisations and prohibit activities perceived as critical of the government or of President Museveni. I witnessed the latter during a couple of week-long workshops in Hoima hosted by the civil society and by oil companies in 2018. Local district leaders and intelligence officers attended and closely monitored the proceedings, making statements that glorified the government's management approach to the emerging oil sector. This resulted in self-censorship by both participants and workshop facilitators. In this way, the policy of decentralisation

---

sidelining the country's sub-state kingdoms. They regarded this as important because, as Mamdani, a prominent critic of traditional authorities argues, the traditional leaders inherently made rural communities "subjects", instead of "citizens" since they do not get to vote for the traditional leaders and keep them accountable Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Tim Allen and Suzette Heald, "HIV/AIDS Policy in Africa: What Has Worked in Uganda and What Has Failed in Botswana?," *Journal of International Development* 16, no. 8 (2004): 1141–1154..

<sup>420</sup> Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*; Elliott Green, "The Rise and Fall of Decentralization in Contemporary Uganda" (WIDER Working Paper, 2013), <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/80988>.

<sup>421</sup> Lambright, *Decentralization in Uganda*; Tripp, *Museveni's Uganda*.

serves a security and surveillance purpose.

Furthermore, strategies of extraversion are another critical source of power that sustains the NRM's exclusive political settlement. Jean Jacques Bayart argues that African leaders have engaged with their external environment in a dialogic and extractive fashion since the colonial era.<sup>422</sup> These leaders strengthened their control over the political and material interests they held in deriving resources from foreign sources. The case of Uganda illustrates the balancing act of extraversion; the NRM uses a mixture of resistance, acquiescence, and indifference when engaging international actors to access revenue and military assistance. In exchange, the NRM provides these actors with strategic access to the restive, but mineral-rich Great Lakes Region.

To illustrate, Museveni's strategic engagement with the United States (US) and its allies began in the context of the Cold War in the late 1980s.<sup>423</sup> The US and Soviet Union competed for access to oil, gold, diamonds, cobalt, uranium, and coltan – resources which are plentiful in Uganda and the DRC. During the fall of the USSR in 1989, the US feared the rapid spread of Islamic terrorism, especially from Sudan where an Iran-backed militant Islamist government took power in the country in 1989. Museveni became the US' principal ally in the Great Lakes region almost immediately after taking office through his 1986 coup.<sup>424</sup> As a result, Museveni has had more contact with senior government officials in the US and the UK “than any other living African leader.”<sup>425</sup> This cooperation has deepened since the onset of the War on Terror in 2001

---

<sup>422</sup> Bayart, “Africa in the World.”

<sup>423</sup> Epstein, Another Fine Mess.

<sup>424</sup> For example, Epstein (2017) indicates that Museveni met the then US president, Ronald Reagan consecutively between 1987 and 1989, which was unprecedented for an African leader who has just got into office, and who had also ascended to power through a coup.

<sup>425</sup> Epstein, Another Fine Mess.

as Uganda became the US' principal regional partner in the fight against Islamic terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab.<sup>426</sup>

The strategic considerations of the US government aside, Jonathan Fisher argues that Museveni has deceived foreign donors by presenting his government as an ally in the War on Terror.<sup>427</sup> The UPDF's participation in peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Sudan, Fisher argues, serves to reinforce a Western narrative of fragile statehood and precarious security in the Great Lakes region.<sup>428</sup> Helen Epstein makes a similar point, arguing that:

When it comes to post-Cold War US-Africa relations, Museveni has modelled himself on the wily, clever hare, and cast America's national security officials as the dim-witted lions, elephants, and hyenas. Whether they know it or not, [Museveni] manipulates them at his pleasure by playing on their fears, and then leaving the flummoxed and humiliated amid pandemonium they helped create, but do not understand, while he leaps from one briar patch to the next.<sup>429</sup>

US aid to Uganda is supplied through three main channels: the US Agency for International Development (USAID) which supports NGOs involved in humanitarian projects in Uganda; the US Department of Defence (DoD) which provides funding, military hardware, and training to the country's security agencies, particularly to the UPDF; and multilateral aid organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria who provide direct budgetary support to

---

<sup>426</sup> Jonathan Fisher, "Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda's 2007 Intervention in Somalia," *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012): 404–423.

<sup>427</sup> Jonathan Fisher, "International Perceptions and African Agency: Uganda and Its Donors 1986-2010" (PhD Thesis, Oxford University, UK, 2011); Fisher, "When It Pays to Be a 'Fragile State.'"

<sup>428</sup> Fisher, "When It Pays to Be a 'Fragile State.'"

<sup>429</sup> Epstein, *Another Fine Mess*, p33

the central government and ministries such as health, transport, and education.<sup>430</sup> While some funds are closely audited, particularly those of the USAID, others are susceptible to corruption due to government secrecy or 'discretion' in the dispensation of funds. Overall, the objective of these funders is to support political stability in Uganda so as to ensure the country's continued usefulness as a strategic partner of the United States in eastern and central Africa. Since coming to power in 1986, the Government of Uganda received \$20 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and \$4 billion in debt relief.<sup>431</sup> Uganda, under the NRA regime, also received forms of military assistance such as weapons and training for its security organisations, particularly for the elite SFC. Uganda is also host to the United States African Command (Africom), a network of strategic United States military installations, including camps, compounds, and port facilities, in various countries. The United States maintains three bases in Uganda (Entebbe, Kitgum, and Kasenyi), and the country is considered a critical transport and logistics hub for Africom operations in the region. The bases, composed mostly of military officers from African countries, provide the United States with a foothold in the region whereby they can swiftly mobilise in response to emerging security issues.

In addition to security cooperation, Museveni's regime secured external funding through the IMF and World Bank's Structural Adjustment packages beginning in 1987. Uganda accessed multilateral assistance on favourable terms, a leniency granted due to the pre-existing security arrangement between Museveni and the United States.<sup>432</sup> These externally-imposed neoliberal policy reforms required Museveni to abandon the NRM's Marxist ideology in order to cultivate a semblance of

---

<sup>430</sup> Epstein.

<sup>431</sup> Epstein.

<sup>432</sup> Fisher, "International Perceptions and African Agency."

international legitimacy and, most importantly, to open the channels of foreign aid that could enable his consolidation of power in Uganda.<sup>433</sup> The country received an average of \$500 million in funds each year between 1987 and 1996, and \$800 million annually from 1996 onwards through SAPs. The policy conditionalities accompanying the aid included the privatisation of public parastatals, the retrenchment of civil servants, the reduction of publicly-funded social services, decentralisation, and military demobilisation. Museveni created quasi-private state agencies to employ party loyalists who had lost their jobs through government downsizing. For instance, he created the Uganda Revenue Authority, the Privatisation Unit, the Uganda Investment Authority out of the Ministry of Finance, and the Decentralisation Secretariat, agencies ostensibly set up to trim government expenditure but which simultaneously increased the size of the public service. Nevertheless, donors continue to fund the new semi-autonomous entities. By 2003, there were 95 quasi-independent government agencies whose budgets were dependent upon donor support to the collective tune of \$230 million.<sup>434</sup>

The US continued to prop up the NRM regime with aid despite growing criticisms of the Movement System and calls for the reinstatement of multiparty democracy in Uganda in the late 1990s.<sup>435</sup> There was muted criticism among the 'international community' when Uganda invaded the DRC on two different occasions in 1996 and 1998 as well as during the country's corruption scandals of the 2000s.<sup>436</sup> In fact, Uganda

---

<sup>433</sup> Andrew M. Mwenda and Roger Tangri, "Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda," *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005): 449–467.

<sup>434</sup> Mwenda, "Personalizing Power in Uganda."

<sup>435</sup> Ellen Hauser, "Ugandan Relations with Western Donors in the 1990s: What Impact on Democratisation?," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 4 (1999): 621–641.

<sup>436</sup> Joe Oloka-Onyango, "'New-Breed' Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Uganda's Yoweri Kaguta Museveni," *Africa Today*, 2004, 29–52; Haggai Matsiko, "Uganda: Donors Cut Budget Support," *The Independent Uganda*, August 10, 2010, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201008101266.html>.

gained international praise for being one of the few developing countries registering high economic growth rates following the introduction SAPs, a status which elevated Museveni's profile in the eyes of its American and European allies.<sup>437</sup> The country's economy grew at a rate of approximately 7% per annum between 1990-2006, with poverty declining by more than half from 56% in 1991 to 25% in 2010.<sup>438</sup> The hegemony of the NRA regime provided Uganda with a degree of political stability, something not seen since independence, allowing for a measure of economic certainty. During the SAP period, agricultural export revenues from trade in coffee, fish, flowers, and vanilla grew.<sup>439</sup> The regime's exclusive focus on economic growth, defined by increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), however, did not translate to broad-based social transformation.<sup>440</sup> The middle class in Uganda remains small and is overly represented by Indian-Ugandans and individuals, some of whom have personal ties to the ruling party. Much of the country's economic growth is driven by exports, with manufacturing and value-added sectors underdeveloped and the overall level of industrialisation low.<sup>441</sup>

## Conclusion

The analysis provided herein of Uganda's political history shows the active role played by traditional kingdoms, especially the Buganda kingdom, in shaping the country's political settlements. The Buganda kingdom collaborated with the British colonial regime to establish the modern Ugandan state and then dominated the first

---

<sup>437</sup> Hauser, "Ugandan Relations with Western Donors in the 1990s."

<sup>438</sup> Kjaer and Katusiimeh, *Growing but Not Transforming*.

<sup>439</sup> Kjaer and Katusiimeh.

<sup>440</sup> Methodologically, using gross domestic product (GDP) measurement is a widely criticized method for determining the rate of social transformation. It does not capture other factors such as the availability of jobs, availability of economic opportunities to a broad spectrum of the population, income equality, and access to social/public goods such as education, health, housing, in a sustainable manner.

<sup>441</sup> Kjaer and Katusiimeh, *Growing but Not Transforming*.

six years of the post-colonial settlement with its King serving as the country's President. Buganda's subsequent struggles with Prime Minister Obote, however, led to the formation of a militarised state. The army became the main source of power for subsequent governing regimes. Buganda later participated in the transitional settlement that led to the NRM's reign as the kingdom collaborated with the guerrilla movement's armed insurgency. This historical fact contributed to the restoration of Buganda's political status as a kingdom in 1993. The Bunyoro kingdom, on the other hand, played a subdued role in Uganda's political history, informing its limited influence in the post-oil discovery era. The NRM's contemporary exclusive settlement is sustained by both domestic and external sources of power, which together allow the regime to effectively marginalise the kingdoms. In the next chapter, I discuss the oil sector's embeddedness in this exclusive settlement and the kingdoms' disadvantaged position in subsequent chapters.

## CHAPTER 5: THE POLITICS OF GOVERNING UGANDA'S OIL SECTOR

### Introduction

This chapter provides an analytical account of the politics of Uganda's oil sector and its intersection with the country's exclusive settlement. Through the lens of political settlements theory, I discuss the governing regime's unchecked control of the oil sector as a product of two imperatives: the need to access oil revenue for patronage that sustains the exclusive political settlement and to preclude a shift in the distribution of power from empowered sub-state groups. President Museveni's possession of direct and discretionary authority over the petroleum sector is a notable feature of this exclusive control. Marginalised social groups practise *strategic coexistence* in order to benefit from oil revenues without challenging the interests of the ruling coalition and thus the prevailing configuration of power. Meanwhile, the minimal holding power of rural communities in the oil-rich Albertine Graben region means they are unable to extract concessions from the ruling coalition, that is, to benefit from the oil sector. The first section of this chapter presents a background to the petroleum sector, highlighting the business opportunities that have accompanied the sector's development. The second section analyses Uganda's oil governance framework, showing that while the laws are prudent on paper, the exclusive political settlement overrides their function in practice. The third section discusses the social groups involved in the oil complex, mainly the oil companies, NGOs, and rural communities in the oil-rich region, and their relative positioning in Uganda's exclusive settlement.

### **The Manifestations of Oil**

Oil is a highly valuable natural resource with a variety of implications for socio-political and economic relations. It is biological matter produced by centuries of fossilisation that is subsequently extracted from the ground. It also coexists with natural gas, which is why most oil producers also export gas. Oil is finite; its natural quantities decrease over time, necessitating the continued exploration of new oil resources globally to feed demand. The world's significant producers include Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Angola, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea in Africa, and Venezuela in Latin America, and the United States. There has been a boom in oil exploration in Africa in recent years, with new discoveries in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.<sup>442</sup> Crude oil is extracted and processed into several by-products, which include gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, paraffin, grease, and bitumen, among others. These products are of immense value worldwide because of the crucial role they play in processes of contemporary modern industrialised civilisation, including ground and air passenger and commercial transportation, manufacturing, air conditioning, food processing, construction and infrastructure development, energy and power generation, medical services, and mining.

Oil is one of the most traded commodities on global markets and is susceptible to frequent cyclical boom-bust cycles that alter its price per barrel.<sup>443</sup> Its supply and cost have far-reaching implications for global political economy. The economic value of oil is also tied to the collective psyche of citizens in oil-rich countries. Its discovery evokes

---

<sup>442</sup> Jędrzej George Frynas and Manuel Paulo, "A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives," *African Affairs* 106, no. 423, (2007): 229–251.

<sup>443</sup> Factors that induce the boom-bust cycles include geopolitical tensions, political disruptions in the world's major producer states, and global crises that affect demand from the leading oil consumer economies, particularly the United States and China.

imaginations of the end of poverty and prosperous futures, as is the case in Uganda.<sup>444</sup> These visions contribute to the social impact of oil, as groups and individuals struggle to bring this prosperous oil-funded future into fruition. The temporal specificity of this study is notable in that production of oil has yet to begin in Uganda, making its impact immaterial – in one sense. The announcement of Uganda’s commercial quantities of oil in 2006, however, set off multiple processes that have already produced various social, environmental, economic, and political consequences.<sup>445</sup> These included the commencement of parliamentary debates to establish oil governance policies, the construction of infrastructure related to the oil sector such as oil wells and roads, and the resettlement of communities living in areas needed for oil-related installations. The Ugandan Government is also accruing oil revenue from licensing fees. The regional City of Hoima experienced increased in-migration as people sought to take advantage of the growing oil economy. Competition for access to oil revenue began after its discovery, with the Bunyoro kingdom petitioning the government for at least 12,5% of all oil revenue given its historical ownership of the land on which the oil discoveries were made. Despite its material absence, oil has already significantly impacted Ugandan society. This study in particular focuses on the effects of oil on political relations between the Ugandan state and the kingdoms of the Buganda and Bunyoro.

As a high-value commodity, oil has complex implications for the political economy of producer countries. While the oil sector is embedded in global and domestic

---

<sup>444</sup> Tom C. McCaskie, ‘The United States, Ghana and Oil: Global and Local Perspectives’, *African Affairs* 107, no. 428 (2008): 313–332; Musiime Chris Byaruhanga, ‘Expecting Eldorado? An Analysis of Ugandans’ Expectations of Their Country’s Oil Wealth’, *Centre for Research on Peace and Development Working Paper No. 67* (2018): 1–16.

<sup>445</sup> This is discussed in Chapter 4.

configurations of power,<sup>446</sup> it also functions in 'enclaves' due to its capital intensive nature and is thus intertwined with local-level politics and social cleavages.<sup>447</sup> This study adopts a holistic approach to consider the material, economic, political, and social impacts of oil through the lens of the political settlements approach, whose conceptual and theoretical tools provide insight into the multiple dimensions of oil in Uganda, an emerging oil producer. The impacts of oil manifest across multiple levels and spheres of human life, from the local, national, to the international. Social life at the community level is often reshaped by the presence of oil, with both positive and negative effects. Positive effects include new opportunities for income and better livelihoods for some, while adverse effects include forced removals, the loss of livelihoods, and pollution. Where the costs outweigh the benefits, communities have protested resource extraction projects, which, for instance is captured in environmental justice and Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) literature.<sup>448</sup>

At the national level, the state manages and regulates the oil industry through licensing and revenue distribution. State ownership of resource industries in Africa has largely been associated with corruption and fraud, with the notable exception of Botswana and its famed public-private ownership model with British company De Beers.<sup>449</sup> At the international level, foreign companies usually conduct the high-risk exploratory exploration activities, invest in infrastructure development, and engage in the production and export of oil to global markets. These companies also invest

---

<sup>446</sup> Annika Witte, *An Uncertain Future: Anticipating Oil in Uganda*, vol. 11, Gottingen Series in Social and Cultural Anthropology (Gottingen University Press, 2018).

<sup>447</sup> James Ferguson, "Seeing like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa," *American Anthropologist*, 2005, 377–382.

<sup>448</sup> For example, see Michael Watts, *Silent Violence: Food, famine, and peasantry in northern Nigeria*, University of Georgia Press, 1983 and Mary Stover et al., *Overcoming Exclusion In Rural Communities: NIMBY Case Studies* (Washington, D.C: Housing Access Council, 1994).

<sup>449</sup> J. Robinson, "Botswana as a Role Model for Country Success," *Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World*, 2013, 187–203.

capital derived from foreign shareholders into host countries. International NGOs are also a part of the oil complex and can be involved in civic education, the development of legislative and policy frameworks, the mitigation of negative social and environmental impacts, and the promotion of transparency and accountability in the management of oil revenues. Although some of NGOs are local without regional or international chapters, the majority still rely on external funding.

The above actors are not confined to a single sphere but can operate between the local-national-international levels. The perceived and actual benefits of oil compel interactions between actors and are defined by intricate patterns of collaboration and competition. These relationships create what Michael Watts dubs the “oil complex,” an assemblage of social, political, and economic actors involved in the hydrocarbon industry.<sup>450</sup> Actors within the oil complex include oil-producer and consumer countries, the communities where oil extraction takes place, armies and security agencies, international oil companies, banks and investment corporations, insurance companies, import and export companies, and academic and policy practitioners focused on the oil sector. Oil’s embeddedness in this complex network of local and transnational actors necessitates a holistic and contextual analysis of its impacts, one which goes beyond the financial implications of oil wealth alone.

### **Finding Commercial Oil Deposits in Uganda**

Uganda’s oil sector formally began in 2006 when the government announced that exploration activities revealed the presence of 300 million barrels of oil in the Lake Albert region of western Uganda on the border with the Democratic Republic of

---

<sup>450</sup> Michael J. Watts, “Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate Social Responsibility,” *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.* 30 (2005): 373–407.

Congo. The quantities increased to 6.5 billion barrels in 2016, of which 1.5 billion are recoverable.<sup>451</sup> However, oil exploration in Uganda dates back to the colonial era; in 1928 and 1938, geologists discovered oil seepages in Butiaba of the Buliisa district and Kibiro of the Hoima district, respectively.<sup>452</sup> Uganda's current oil deposits will sustain production for an estimated 20-25 years, if measured at peak production of 200,000 barrels per day (bpd).<sup>453</sup> These reserves gained considerable global attention as the most significant onshore oil discovery in sub-Saharan Africa thus far, superseding Gabon's 900 million barrels discovered in 1985.<sup>454</sup>

The discovery of oil in Uganda formed part of a broader boom in oil exploration in East Africa in the 2004-2008 period, which was driven by several factors: rising oil prices (then at \$147 a barrel), technological advancements, and the availability of capital for junior oil companies<sup>455</sup> to invest in oil prospecting.<sup>456</sup> The oil juniors that engaged in oil exploration in Uganda were Hardman Resources (Australia), Tullow Oil (UK), and Heritage Oil (Canada). A series of transactions, known as "farm downs,"<sup>457</sup> resulted in the three major companies gaining production licenses from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD), thus permitting the construction of oil infrastructure. The companies include CNOOC Uganda Limited which operates the Kingfisher Development Area in Kikuube District; Tullow Oil

---

<sup>451</sup> Anderson and Browne, "The Politics of Oil in Eastern Africa"; Vokes, "The Politics of Oil in Uganda."

<sup>452</sup> Arthur Bainomugisha, Hope Kivengyere, and Tusasirwe Benson, "Escaping the Oil Curse and Making Poverty History: A Review of the Oil and Gas Policy and Legal Framework for Uganda," ACODE Policy Research Series 20 (2010): 43.

<sup>453</sup> Bainomugisha, Kivengyere, and Benson.

<sup>454</sup> Anderson and Browne, "The Politics of Oil in Eastern Africa."

<sup>455</sup> "Junior Oil Company" refers to a small company, with a primary focus on engaging high-risk exploration and development of a natural resource deposit such as oil. Juniors target assets that have a high probability for commercial success, develop and prove the assets' commercial value, then invite larger companies to invest in the project through several mechanisms, such as joint venture partnerships, or share options.

<sup>456</sup> Anderson and Browne, "The Politics of Oil in Eastern Africa."

<sup>457</sup> This is where an oil company sells some or all of its shares in an oil exploration or production operation to another.

Uganda Operations (Tullow) which operates License Area 2 located in the Buliisa and Hoima Districts; and Total Exploration and Production Uganda BV (Total) which operates License Area 3 in the Buliisa and Nwoya Districts.

Uganda has yet to begin exporting oil despite the discoveries made in 2006, surpassing the industry-standard five-year period from discovery to commercial production.<sup>458</sup> The government postponed the projected oil export date several times, from 2018, 2019, and now 2021. The official explanation is that the delays are essential to allow for the prudent development of institutions to avoid negative resource curse outcomes.<sup>459</sup> However, the postponements result from a complex set of factors, including the establishment of oil-related legislation, the construction of physical infrastructure, and political negotiations between the government, oil companies, and communities in the Albertine Graben region, primarily over land.<sup>460</sup>

Uganda's Parliament began the process of developing the oil policy framework in 2006, leading to the National Oil and Gas Policy introduced in 2008. This policy served as the foundation for subsequent legislation developed between 2011 and 2015. Political contestation over corruption allegations and secrecy led to Uganda's Parliament imposing a moratorium on the signing of new exploration contracts in 2011 until the country's requisite legislative framework was completed (which it was

---

<sup>458</sup> Christian Wolf, "The Petroleum Sector Value Chain" (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2009).

<sup>459</sup> Stephen Isabalija, "Oil and Gas Sector in Uganda: Frequently Asked Questions" (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2017).

<sup>460</sup> The oil value chain consists of upstream, midstream and downstream phases. Upstream refers to exploration, establishing oil fields, and bringing crude oil to the surface (production). It also entails conducting geophysical evaluation and drilling of prospecting sites to determine the presence of commercially viable oil deposits. Midstream includes setting up transportation, refining and storage infrastructure such as pipelines, refinery, roads, trucking and tankers, and storage tanks. Downstream mainly involves distribution, marketing, and sale of refined petroleum products. Uganda is currently in the midstream stage, and this entails the development of physical infrastructure.

two years later in 2013). The construction of physical infrastructure also contributed to delays due to the need to secure financing and procure machinery and materials, some of which were imported. Finally, negotiations between oil companies, the government, and communities with regard to land acquisition, compensation, and resettlement have also contributed to the protracted timeline. The high demand for land in the Albertine Graben region resulted in increased speculation, whereby well-connected individuals and senior government officials with insider knowledge bought land cheaply, then sold it to oil companies and the government at inflated prices. This caused a long, drawn out bargaining process as well as criminal investigations in some cases.<sup>461</sup>

Delays also resulted from exogenous factors, mainly declining oil prices between 2008 and 2013 which caused a global slowdown in the rate of investment in extractive industries, affecting upstream activities. Furthermore, some of the contract negotiations between the government and oil companies resulted in litigation and international arbitration, contributing to extended delays.<sup>462</sup> Several tax disputes between the government and oil companies, starting with Heritage Oil and Gas in 2011, Tullow Oil in 2013 and 2018, and Total E&P in 2015 dragged on for months, with some disputes requiring international arbitration. These confrontations emanated from the government's nationalistic approach to negotiation, on the one hand, and the intransigence of oil companies (given the burden of capital investment), on the other. For example, the government and oil companies engaged in protracted negotiations over the establishment of an oil refinery in Uganda. Standard industry practice is for international oil companies to export all the oil they produce as crude for refinery

---

<sup>461</sup> | elaborate on the land speculation cases in section 5.

<sup>462</sup> Elaborated in section 2

abroad. This disagreement created substantial tension between the companies and President Museveni, who was negotiating directly with senior company executives. The parties eventually reached a compromise that allowed Uganda to have a relatively small refinery with a production capacity of 60,000 bpd, while the companies export crude through a pipeline from the oil fields to the port of Tanga in Tanzania.

Although oil production has yet to begin in Uganda, the country has already seen considerable inflows of oil-related revenues, opening a new avenue of material accumulation for the ruling coalition. The MEMD indicates that oil companies spent \$3,2 billion on various goods and services in Uganda during the exploration phase alone beginning in 2001.<sup>463</sup> The MEMD Permanent Secretary Robert Kasande said in April 2018 that the Ministry expects the country to accrue over \$15 billion in the infrastructure development stage between 2018 and 2021, after which Uganda can expect annual revenues of between \$2 to 3 billion dollars once oil production begins.<sup>464</sup> Oil-related income emanates from the petroleum sector's purchase of goods and services from multiple sectors of the economy, including: legal services; transport and logistics; automotive and machinery supply; food and catering; construction; hospitality and accommodation; and human resources management. The government earns revenue mainly through licensing fees, signature bonuses, capital gains tax (CGT),<sup>465</sup> withholding tax (income tax from employee salaries), and stamp duty.<sup>466</sup> Reports from the Bank of Uganda and the Ugandan Parliament show that the

---

<sup>463</sup> Francis Mugerwa, "Oil Exploration Brings Mixed Fortunes in Bunyoro," Daily Monitor, April 5, 2018, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Oil-exploration-brings-mixed-fortunes-Bunyoro/688334-4372458-h72hxqz/index.html>.

<sup>464</sup> Mugerwa.

<sup>465</sup> This is a levy that the government applies to the profit that a company realizes when it sells an asset, in this case, the value of the oil block had increased since it had proven reserves of commercial oil.

<sup>466</sup> This is a levy that the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) imposes on legal documents arising out of transactions, such as hire purchase agreements, composition deeds, leases, transfers, share warrants and deposits of title deeds

government earned a total of \$700 million between 2001 and 2017, with the bulk of this revenue received from the CGT.<sup>467</sup>

Construction is one of the lucrative business opportunities created by the emergence of the oil sector in Uganda, the benefits of which have mainly accrued to Uganda's political elite. Construction projects account for the vast of revenue earned from the oil industry's spin-off activities despite ongoing delays in production. The new infrastructure built includes personnel camps, which are temporary residential areas for the employees of oil companies conducting exploration or other development projects. Camps require large tracts of land, often in areas adjacent to oil fields. Oil companies hire local contractors to construct and manage the accommodations, which are later decommissioned when construction projects end. There are also several oil wells in the three main license areas where oil extraction and production will occur. The exploration phase requires the acquisition of land, leading to the displacement of communities residing in and adjacent to exploration areas in Uganda's Albertine Graben region. The Central Processing Facility (CPF) is another critical installation, where the process of converting oil produced from wells begins. The CPF transforms crude oil by separating it from other natural components such as gas, water, sand, and other chemicals used in the process of extracting oil. Crude oil can then be pumped into the refinery or export pipeline.

Foreign companies are also involved in the construction of oil infrastructure in Uganda, particularly the high-cost and skills-intensive projects. For instance, the Albertine Graben Refinery Consortium (AGRC) will construct a 60,000 bpd oil

---

<sup>467</sup> Transparency International Uganda.

refinery in Buseruka, a sub-county in the Hoima District.<sup>468</sup> The consortium is a group of companies led by US-based General Electric, AATRA Ventures, Italy-based Saipem, and LionWorks Group.<sup>469</sup> The refinery will cost \$3 billion, funded by a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) between the AGRC and the central government. The refinery will occupy five square kilometres and will process a proportion of the crude oil for local consumption and for export to the East African region. The finished products include Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), diesel, petrol, kerosene, jet fuel, and Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO). The refinery represents an outstanding feature of local ‘value addition’ in Uganda since most African oil producers export crude oil for refinery in Europe and the United States, which is then resold locally as costlier petroleum products. The Hoima-Kampala Petroleum Products Pipeline (HKPPP) and storage facility is another piece of critical infrastructure. The 211-kilometre pipeline will pump finished oil products from the AGRC refinery to storage tanks in Mpigi, on the outskirts of Kampala, and to the shores of Lake Victoria. The products will include jet fuel, gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel. The storage terminal at Mpigi will be the primary distribution point for domestic consumption and the sale of finished petroleum products from Uganda to the domestic market and the rest of the East African region.<sup>470</sup>

The governments of Uganda and Tanzania, along with oil companies, will also construct the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), an electrically heated pipeline that will pump crude oil from Uganda’s fields to the port of Tanga in Tanzania. Heating is required for the underground pipeline because Uganda's oil coagulates at

---

<sup>468</sup> Veazey, Matthew. “Saipem clears hurdle for Uganda refinery”, Rigzone, 12 March 2019, [https://www.rigzone.com/news/saipem\\_clears\\_hurdle\\_for\\_uganda\\_refinery-12-mar-2019-158362-article/](https://www.rigzone.com/news/saipem_clears_hurdle_for_uganda_refinery-12-mar-2019-158362-article/), accessed 29 March 2020.

<sup>469</sup> Veazey, Matthew. “Saipem clears hurdle for Uganda refinery”

<sup>470</sup> Tom Ogwang and Frank Vanclay, “Social Impacts of Land Acquisition for Oil and Gas Development in Uganda,” MDPI-Land, 2019.

room temperature and therefore must be heated to 40 degrees Celsius to flow through the pipeline.<sup>471</sup> The pipeline will be the longest of its kind in the world at 1443 kilometres, 296 kilometres of which are located in Uganda and the remaining 1147 kilometres in Tanzania.<sup>472</sup> The governments of Uganda and Tanzania agreed to construct the EACOP through both countries in 2016. The estimated total cost of pipeline construction is \$3,5 billion, paid for by financial institutions and project partners, who are the Ugandan and Tanzanian governments and foreign oil companies.<sup>473</sup>

Furthermore, the government and oil companies have been constructing a network of newly tarred roads, totalling 700 kilometres, which will be used to the oil fields and transport equipment and construction material for oil-related infrastructure. The Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) contracted the China Railway Seventh Group (CRSG) to construct the new roads in April 2019.<sup>474</sup> The China EximBank and United Kingdom Financing will provide the \$500 million needed to build the roads. The government and oil companies will also construct the Hoima International Airport in Kabaale district to shorten travel times for the transportation of oil-related equipment and personnel given the long distance between the oil fields and Kampala (200km) and Entebbe International Airport (233km), the country's only airport currently.<sup>475</sup> Long term plans for the airport include supporting the region's tourism industry and general passenger transport. The MEMD contracted SBC Limited, a joint venture company between UK-based Colas Limited and Israel-based SBI International

---

<sup>471</sup> East African Crude Oil Pipeline website, "Overview", <https://eacop.com/about-us/overview/>, accessed 29 March 2020.

<sup>472</sup> East African Crude Oil Pipeline website, "Overview".

<sup>473</sup> East African Crude Oil Pipeline website, "Overview".

<sup>474</sup> Jonathan Kamoga, "Uganda Now Secures Contractor for Oil Roads," *The East African*, April 2, 2019, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Uganda-now-secures-contractor-for-oil-roads/2560-5053338-y9g8dn/index.html>.

<sup>475</sup> Jonathan Kamoga, "Uganda Now Secures Contractor for Oil Roads."

Holdings, to construct the airport.<sup>476</sup> Airport construction is scheduled for completion before the projected oil production date of 2021.

### **The Oil Governance Framework and Impact of the Exclusive Settlement**

Uganda's Parliament passed several pieces of legislation between 2008 and 2015 to regulate various aspects of the oil sector. The legislation and associated government structures are intended to facilitate efficiency, transparency, and the decentralisation of power and control over the oil sector.<sup>477</sup> The ineffectiveness of these institutions in ensuring prudent and responsible governance, however, reflects the continued influence of country's exclusive political settlement. On paper, Uganda's oil governance framework resembles that of Norway, which is one of the world's best in managing the oil sector.<sup>478</sup> Norway's reputed management system separates the political, regulatory, and commercial agencies engaged in oil sector activities. This division of power is reflected in Ugandan legislation, largely due to the considerable capacity-building support provided by the Norwegian government.<sup>479</sup> However, unlike Norway's, these institutions do not guarantee proper governance of the oil sector; instead, politics interfere to undermine democratic accountability. In this section, I discuss the critical features of Uganda's oil industry laws and analyse their interactions with Uganda's political settlement.

---

<sup>476</sup> Jonathan Kamoga, "Uganda Now Secures Contractor for Oil Roads."

<sup>477</sup> Here, I define institutions according to the New Institutional Economics definition, as both the legislation, and physical agencies that are created as a result of the legislation.

<sup>478</sup> Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults, and Patrick RP Heller, "Exporting the 'Norwegian Model': The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance," *Energy Policy* 39, no. 9 (2011): 5366–5378; E. Røed Larsen, "Are Rich Countries Immune to the Resource Curse? Evidence from Norway's Management of Its Oil Riches," *Resources Policy* 30, no. 2 (2005): 75–86; Bent Sofus Tranøy, "Norway—The Accidental Role Model," in *The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds* (Springer, 2010), 177–201.

<sup>479</sup> Interview, Senior Norwegian Diplomat [SSOU], Kampala, 7 June 2018.

Parliament began processes of 'stakeholder engagement' in 2006 by holding meetings with various social groups throughout Uganda, ostensibly to ensure that policies and institutions protect the public interest. These meetings informed the National Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP) adopted in 2008, which later served as the foundation for subsequent Acts of Parliament regulating aspects of the oil industry. The NOGP is meant to promote the responsible management and equitable distribution of oil revenues in the interests of all Ugandas. Both the stakeholder engagement process and the final policy fostered an open, inclusive, and meaningful consideration of the Ugandan people's aspirations, especially those citizens directly affected by the oil sector in the Albertine Graben region. However, Parliament subsequently enacted legislation that afforded President Museveni and the ruling coalition direct control over the oil industry and that did not, in fact, meet the needs of all 'stakeholders'. The prevailing politics of the exclusive settlement overrode the laudable aims of Uganda's institutions and legislative processes.

For instance, the Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Act of 2013 creates decentralised institutions but provides 'clawback' clauses that give the MEMD minister discretionary control over these same entities. The Act created the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU), which regulates the oil sector through the licensing of oil companies, the review of Production Service Agreements (PSA)s, and the monitoring of company compliance with established industry practices and standards. The Act also establishes the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC), which manages the government's commercial investments in the oil sector. In theory, having specialised government agencies responsible for the various regulatory and operational aspects of the oil sector decentralises power from MEMD and promotes checks and balances in the political system to reduce opportunities for corruption.

The semi-autonomous national oil company is another key feature of this Act. The UNOC allows the government to act as an 'industry insider' while its relative autonomy provides a measure of insulation from political influence. Government participation in the industry through the UNOC increases the likelihood of market-friendly policies due to the possibility of public-private joint ventures. In theory, the profit earned by the UNOC could be used to fund social welfare programs and fulfil the government's broad-based development goals. However, the Act empowers the MEMD to appoint the directors and board members of the PAU and UNOC. Given that the MEMD Minister is appointed by, and directly responsible to, the President, the independence of these supposedly semi-autonomous entities is limited given their exposure and vulnerability to political influence.

The Public Finance and Management Act (PFMA) of 2015, which governs Uganda's fiscal and macro-economic affairs, includes provisions that undercut the legal entitlements of communities negatively impacted by the oil sector, particularly the Bunyoro kingdom. Article 75 of the Act provides the central government with 94% of all oil revenues while local governments within the petroleum exploration and production areas receive the remaining 6%. The Act provides the Energy Minister with discretion over who the recipient local governments are and how revenue is distributed, which increases the likelihood of the public funds being used for patronage. Article 75 of the Act stipulates that the government will give 1% of its 94% share to a gazetted cultural or traditional institution, which, in effect, is the Bunyoro kingdom. In framing this clause in vague terms, however, Parliament sought to limit Bunyoro's direct legal claim to oil revenues. This 1% indirect share is far less than 12,5% demanded by the kingdom. Once again, the Act gives the Energy Minister

considerable discretion over who the recipients of this 1% cut are, lending to politically motivated allocations. This clause also negates the Bunyoro's claims for special consideration in the allocation of oil revenues despite the fact that its communities will bear the brunt of the oil industry's adverse effects.

In addition, the Act establishes a Petroleum Fund and Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve (PRIR), held by the Bank of Uganda, to independently manage oil revenue, with transactions approved by Parliament. This entity ideally protects oil revenues from fraudulent use and theft, and ensures that monies are invested into other sectors of economy to ensure financial sustainability and prevent outcomes commonly associated with the Dutch Disease such as the rapid appreciation of the value of Uganda's currency, inflation, and economic recession in the event of the decline of the price of oil.<sup>480</sup> In practice, however, President Museveni has 'personalised' Uganda's oil management strategy, frequently describing the resource as "my oil."<sup>481</sup> During a stakeholder workshop, a high-level official with the PAU indicated that the Authority and other government institutions must "act in accordance with the politics of the day."<sup>482</sup> This statement implies that, despite the legislative provisions guiding the purpose and function of the PAU, the agency cannot operate independently of the governing coalition's interests, particularly those of President Museveni. For example, in July 2010, Museveni wrote a letter to the then-MEMD Minister Hilary Onek stating,

---

<sup>480</sup> Christine Ebrahim-Zadeh, 'Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely', *Finance and Development* 40, no. 1 (2003): 50–51.

<sup>481</sup> Vivian Salama, "Museveni's Oil Bet," *Foreign Affairs*, February 19, 2014, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2014-02-20/musevenis-oil-bet>.

<sup>482</sup> Workshop presentation, high-level PAU officer, [COSG], Kampala, April 2018

In the case of petroleum and gas, I direct that no agreement should ever be signed without my express written approval of that arrangement...<sup>483</sup>

President Museveni has made withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund for expenditures not subject to Parliamentary oversight. For example, in 2011, he instructed the Governor of the Bank of Uganda, Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, to avail \$740 million for the purchase of six SU-30 MK2 fighter jets from Russia's Sukhoi Aviation Corporation.<sup>484</sup> Apart from the fighter jets, Museveni also procured tanks and other military hardware. Russian military and diplomatic sources revealed that the Government of Uganda had mortgaged future oil production for the payment of these arms.<sup>485</sup> During a 2013 Parliamentary investigation into this sale, the Bank of Uganda Governor said he disagreed with the expenditure at the time, but still obeyed President Museveni's directive to disburse the funds without parliamentary approval on account of a promise that they would be replenished with future revenues from the oil sector.<sup>486</sup> In response to criticisms from opposition legislators, Museveni argued that the purchase was necessary to upgrade the UPDF's military capacity to keep the country secure.<sup>487</sup>

This scandal highlights the impact of the nature of Uganda's exclusive political settlement: although the country possesses the elements of a functioning democracy, including a Parliament, and, in this case, legislation that affords a degree of efficient management of the oil sector, its institutions are unable to make decisions that

---

<sup>483</sup> Alex Benkenstein, "What Will Uganda's Elections Mean for Parliamentary Oil Governance?," South African Institute for International Affairs (blog), January 2011, <https://www.polity.org.za/article/what-will-ugandas-elections-mean-for-parliamentary-oil-governance-2011-01-18>.

<sup>484</sup> Martin Ssebuyira, "You Don't Wait for War to Buy Fighter Jets, Says Gen. Museveni," Daily Monitor, 2011, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-1207808-a76ofiz/index.html>.

<sup>485</sup> De Kock and Sturman, "The Power of Oil Charting Uganda's Transition to a Petro-State."

<sup>486</sup> Ssebuyira, "You Don't Wait for War to Buy Fighter Jets, Says Gen. Museveni."

<sup>487</sup> Ssebuyira.

contravene the interests of the governing regime even when in the public interest. The army maintains physical control of the oil assets in the Albertine Graben region, a policy consistent with the NRM's security imperative. By controlling the high-value oil sector, the regime can pre-empt challenges to their power by social groups excluded from the prevailing settlement. President Museveni established a new military base in the Kyangwali sub-county in 2009 and deployed the Special Forces Group (SFG, now the SFC) to the Albertine Graben area in early 2010.<sup>488</sup> Museveni's son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, was the commander of the SFG at the time of this deployment. Saracen Uganda Limited, which has links to President Museveni's younger brother General Salim Saleh, has provided security for Tullow Oil, protecting the company's oil installations.<sup>489</sup>

The failure of Ugandan institutions to effectively enforce transparency in PSAs also reflects the governing coalition's unfettered dominance over the country's oil sector. PSAs are contracts between the government and oil companies which distribute responsibility for the various aspects of oil exploration and production such as licensing and revenue sharing. Sections 148-153 of the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act (Upstream) and Sections 76 and 77 of the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act (Midstream) Act mandate the public's access to information regarding the oil sector, including agreements and licences as per the Access to Information Act (2005). In practice, however, secrecy is typical. The 'below board' negotiations between oil companies, President Museveni, and the MEMD Minister are a longstanding issue of concern.<sup>490</sup> These negotiations occur in secrecy at the State

---

<sup>488</sup> Yasiin Mugerwa, "First Family 'Too Close' to Oil Sector," Daily Monitor, November 11, 2010, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-1051166-b7droez/index.html>.

<sup>489</sup> Mugerwa.

<sup>490</sup> Pamela K. Mbabazi, "The Oil Industry in Uganda; A Blessing in Disguise or an All Too Familiar Curse," Claude Ake Memorial Lecture, 2012; Kiiza, Bategeka, and Ssewanyana, "Righting Resources-Curse Wrongs in Uganda";

House, with President Museveni overseeing the proceedings and making the final decisions before the ratification of agreements by MEMD. The two laws provide the MEMD Minister and oil companies leeway to determine what is confidential, thereby justifying their refusal to make information public. The laws also allocate the Energy Minister considerable discretion in deciding the terms of contracts and in the awarding and revoking of oil licenses.<sup>491</sup> This top-down arrangement undermines transparency and accountability since the Minister is subject to political directives from the Executive. Ratified without parliamentary oversight, these sensitive contracts determine the amount of revenue Uganda earns from the oil sector, reflecting the dearth of transparency and accountability in resource governance.

Secrecy also lends to self-serving bargaining and deal-making between the members of the governing coalition and oil companies who are exempt from public scrutiny. The government and oil companies' refusal to make the PSAs public has often been the subject of controversy in Uganda. Leaked copies of these agreements reveal the ways in which the NRM regime has put the country at a disadvantage. For example, a 2010 report by the UK-based civil society organisation Platform revealed that the PSAs signed between the Government of Uganda and Heritage Oil in February 2008 afforded the company with disproportionate profits<sup>492</sup> since the company could inflate their recoverable costs<sup>493</sup> and defraud the government.<sup>494</sup> An audit report of Heritage

---

Tumusiime, Mawejje, and Byakagaba, "Discovery of Oil"; Lay and Minio-Paluello, *Contracts Curse*; Wass and Musiime, "Business, Human Rights and Uganda's Oil."

<sup>491</sup> Mbabazi, "The Oil Industry in Uganda; A Blessing in Disguise or an All Too Familiar Curse"; Global Witness, *A Good Deal Better?: Uganda's Secret Oil Contracts Explained* (Global Witness, 2014).

<sup>492</sup> Global Witness.

<sup>493</sup> Recoverable costs are rebates due to the oil company based on their expenditure in developing the physical infrastructure of the oil sector. Isabalija notes that, the rebates are calculated based on work programmes and budgets that the IoCs present to an Advisory Committee, which includes representatives from the IoCs and the host government. The government's Auditor-general conducts an audit of the IoCs' books on an annual basis, which would also determine approval of the IoCs' recoverable costs.

<sup>494</sup> Lay and Minio-Paluello, *Contracts Curse*.

Oil's exploration projects between September 2004 and October 2006 by Ernst and Young showed that the company artificially increased their recoverable cost expenses by USD \$586,511, a cost ultimately borne by the government since they extract a lesser profit from future oil production.<sup>495</sup>

Platform also leaked copies of the PSA that the MEMD made with Tullow Oil in February 2012 without parliamentary oversight.<sup>496</sup> The reports revealed that the government had given the company a 30-35% return on Block 2, which is substantially above the industry standard.<sup>497</sup> The PSA also permitted the oil companies to use international courts for litigation and arbitration, undermining national legal mechanisms and Ugandan jurisdiction.<sup>498</sup> The PSA also contained stabilization clauses obtained by Tullow that would shield the company from changes in Ugandan legislation, which was anomalous since Parliament was in the process of developing oil legislation for the first time.

The National Content legislation enacted in 2016 ostensibly aims to provide for the universal participation of Ugandan citizens in the oil sector, however, its provisions mainly allow for members of the ruling coalition, their allies, and foreign elites to benefit from the business opportunities produced by oil. Articles 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the statutory instruments (SI 2016/44) define National Content as,

The level of use of Ugandan local expertise, goods and services, Ugandan companies, Ugandan citizens, registered entities, businesses and financing in

---

<sup>495</sup> Lay and Minio-Paluello.

<sup>496</sup> Platform UK, "Wikileaks Cable Shines Light on ENI Corruption in Uganda; Heritage Offered to Pay Bribes in Congo," December 15, 2010, <https://platformlondon.org/2010/12/15/wikileaks-cable-shines-light-on-eni-corruption-in-uganda-heritage-offered-to-pay-bribes-in-congo/>.

<sup>497</sup> Vokes, "The Politics of Oil in Uganda"; Wass and Musiime, "Business, Human Rights and Uganda's Oil."

<sup>498</sup> Wass and Musiime, "Business, Human Rights and Uganda's Oil."

petroleum activities, and the substantial combined value-added or created in the Ugandan economy through the utilization of Ugandan human and material resources for the provision of goods and services to the petroleum industry in Uganda.

The legislation requires companies to procure all goods and services related to the oil industry from Uganda, however, companies are allowed to import products when they are unavailable in-country. There are several limitations to the local content policy framework in both theory and practice. In theory, there are gaps and ambiguities in the legislation that can be exploited by foreign oil companies to subvert its requirements.<sup>499</sup> For example, an oil company has the discretion to determine whether the quality of goods and services available in the country are of acceptable quality and standard. As such, a company can procure from a preferred external supplier if it is within its interest to do so.<sup>500</sup> The requirement that Ugandan companies have preferential access to business opportunities is also prone to manipulation. The regulations define a Ugandan company as one that is registered under the Companies Act (2012), provides economic value to Uganda's economy, uses locally available raw materials, has a minimum of 70% Ugandan citizens as employees, and is approved by the PAU. However, a foreign-owned company can meet these requirements and access the spinoff opportunities from the oil sector, without providing sufficient value to the local economy.<sup>501</sup> A significant proportion of goods and services are of inferior quality or absent in Uganda, such as specialised drilling machinery and construction equipment given the novelty of the sector.<sup>502</sup> An analysis of the companies supplying

---

<sup>499</sup> Jesse Salah Ovadia, 'Local Content Policies and Petro-Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis', *Resources Policy* 49 (2016): 20–30.

<sup>500</sup> Global Witness, *A Good Deal Better?*

<sup>501</sup> Ritwika Sen, "Enhancing Local Content in Uganda's Oil and Gas Industry" (WIDER Working Paper, 2018).

<sup>502</sup> Sen.

goods and services to the oil sector revealed that there is a limited amount of domestically manufactured products.<sup>503</sup> As such, the sector's real economic value to the country is limited. Most oil companies are involved in the importation of goods, especially oil and gas machinery, as well as automotive parts and accessories.<sup>504</sup>

In practice, the dearth of broad-based domestic participation in oil sector-related businesses shows the limits of the local content policy and the effect of Uganda's exclusive settlement on access to benefits from the oil sector. Several interviewees, who included investigative journalists and civil society professionals, singled out the dominant firms in the oil sector and their links to the ruling NRM regime. These include Bemuga Shipping and Forwarding and Three Ways Shipping which are both shipping, clearing, and forwarding companies involved in the import of machinery and equipment into Uganda; law firms ABMAK Associates and K&K Advocates; Motorcare Uganda, a logistics management company; Mineral Services Limited (MSL) which provides a vast array of goods and services to oil companies, from food and catering, accommodation, transportation and fleet management, and oil equipment handling.<sup>505</sup> Businesspeople with ties to the central government benefit the most from oil sector-derived business opportunities instead of host communities in the Bunyoro region, for example.

The central government has made efforts to facilitate equal access to business opportunities as part of the Local Content policies, including through the formation

---

<sup>503</sup> Sen.

<sup>504</sup> Sen.

<sup>505</sup>The interviewees who provided this information included a leading investigative journalist, senior NGO director and former high-level employee in the NRM administration, and a human rights lawyer who also directs an NGO. However, given the secrecy in the oil sector and political sensitivity of the issue, the exact information on the contracts, their value and duration is not publicly available and thus could not be ascertained.

of business associations. These initiatives, however, do not facilitate broad based benefits in practice. Uganda's political and economic elites dominate these networks and disproportionately benefit. In 2012, the government facilitated the creation of the Association of Oil and Gas Service Providers (AUGOS), a national-level membership-based business network that provides various services to the oil and gas sector and has over 100 members. The AUGOS emerged as part of the government's plan to boost the economic benefits of oil to Uganda through Local Content.<sup>506</sup> Some of the companies cited above, which have close links to top government officials, form part of the association. The membership fees reflect the exclusive nature of the AUGOS: new Uganda-based companies must pay USD\$2000 (Shs 7,3 million) and then an annual fee of USD\$1000 (Shs 3,6 million) while multinationals must pay \$5000 (Shs 18,4 million) annually.<sup>507</sup> Smaller start-up companies are less likely to join and maintain membership. In effect, AUGOS functions as a fraternity for well-connected individuals and organisations to better coordinate their exclusive access to the material gains associated with the oil sector.

In the Albertine Graben region, entrepreneurs from the seven districts that make up the Bunyoro kingdom (Hoima, Masindi, Kiryandongo, Buliisa, Kakumiro, Kibale, and Kagadi) formed the Bunyoro Business Club (BBC) with the government's support in 2012. The club, which has over 70 members, was created as a platform for business coordination in the region to maximise Bunyoro's ability to benefit from the oil and gas sector. However, the Chairperson of the BBC, Sam Mugisa, indicated that very few businesses were successful in tapping into oil sector opportunities because they were dislodged by business people and local and regional leaders with links to the

---

<sup>506</sup> AUGOS, "About AUGOS," About Augos, accessed August 3, 2019, <https://augos.org/about-augos.html>.

<sup>507</sup> AUGOS.

governing coalition.<sup>508</sup> He also mentioned that some local businesses have since become dormant as their owners have given up hope on accessing oil sector contracts.<sup>509</sup> A senior member of the BBC in Hoima acknowledged in an interview that political connections, not capital or business acumen, mainly determine the success of local businesses in accessing economic opportunities and commercial success.<sup>510</sup>

Another interview with a Buliisa-based businessperson illustrated the politically motivated dispossession that local entrepreneurs succumb to frequently. The interviewee, who started a meat supply company in 2008, indicated that he was driven out of business by 'big oil,' that is, multi-national companies who began providing contracts to firms owned by or aligned with senior government officials:

By 2010, I was supplying ten cows a week to the oil exploration camps, and business was going well. However, by 2014, oil companies began actively disqualifying local businesses, and I lost the business. The oil companies prefer those owned by well-connected people, such as MSL, Equator Catering, and Supreme which provide services to Total and Tullow... Government has not been intervening to allow local people to benefit because they want the business opportunities all to themselves. Cultural leaders, including the Bunyoro kingdom, do not do anything to help, and since the government pays them, they do not have any leverage. Local content would thus never work.<sup>511</sup>

The lack of resources and capacity in the oil-producing region of Albertine Graben contributes to the failure by host communities to tap into opportunities in the oil

---

<sup>508</sup> Mugerwa, "Oil Exploration Brings Mixed Fortunes in Bunyoro."

<sup>509</sup> Mugerwa.

<sup>510</sup> Interview, senior BBC official, [MBSH], Hoima, June 2018.

<sup>511</sup> Interview, Buliisa-based entrepreneur, [BMBM], 27 June 2018.

sector. Rural-based entrepreneurs have failed to obtain contracts to supply goods and services to the oil sector, especially since the establishment of the National Supplier Database (NSD)<sup>512</sup> which forms part of the local content policy. The NSD involves an expensive and complex registration process, including obtaining tax identification numbers (TINs) and meeting the specific requirements dictated by oil companies for each product or service.<sup>513</sup> For example, participants in a stakeholder workshop in Hoima complained that oil companies prefer to procure agricultural products such as potatoes, fruits, and chicken from companies in Kampala. Yet, agriculture is the primary economic activity in the rural Bunyoro region.<sup>514</sup> An oil company representative responded that they were required by company policy to purchase goods and services that met specific standards and quality. The oil companies neither had an obligation to conduct business with service providers from the rural region nor to develop local company capacity to facilitate better quality to ensure host communities' greater access to contracts and the equitable dispersion of benefits. In the view of oil companies, these elements were the government's responsibility.<sup>515</sup> Despite its prudence, the local content legislation is unable to facilitate equitable access to economic benefits from the oil sector due to the prevailing exclusive settlement.

Corruption scandals are another symptom of institutional ineptness, that is, the lack of transparency and fairness in Uganda's oil sector. The oil sector has become a lucrative source of patronage for the ruling coalition. In 2009, Tullow Oil's Vice

---

<sup>512</sup> Article 11 of the SI on National Content established a National Supplier Database (NSD) that the PAU administers, which contains a list of Ugandan companies that provide goods to the petroleum sector. It states that companies that are not on the database would not be allowed to provide any goods and services to the sector. The PAU shall develop criteria for qualifying companies that would be registered on the database in consultation with oil companies.

<sup>513</sup> Stakeholder Workshop Discussion, Hoima, April 2018

<sup>514</sup> Ibid.

<sup>515</sup> Ibid.

President for Africa, Tim O’Hanlon, accused former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi and former MEMD Minister Hilary Onok of accepting bribes from Italy-based oil company ENI S.p.A (ENI).<sup>516</sup> ENI was accused of paying Mbabazi bribes through London-based holding company TKL Holdings. At the time, Mbabazi was Security Minister and considered the second most powerful leader in Uganda.<sup>517</sup> Mbabazi and Onok held their political tenure despite these accusations, although Mbabazi had a fall out with Museveni and even launched an unsuccessful run for President in the 2016 election. Current Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa<sup>518</sup> was also accused of accepting over 30 million euros (USD\$33 million) from Tullow Oil through his company, the East Africa Development Limited Company.<sup>519</sup> Investigations conducted by the Uganda Police and the Ugandan Parliament controversially exonerated all Ministers involved in this scandal in July 2012. These types of corruption cases are symptomatic of the country’s underlying configurations of power and rent-seeking behaviours that characterise the exclusive nature of the political settlement.

The infamous “Presidential Handshake” incident is another case in point. In a letter dated November 2015, President Museveni instructed Finance Minister Matia Kasaija to pay-out UGX 6 billion (approximately USD\$1,6 million) to 42 government officials<sup>520</sup> involved in the government's contract dispute against Heritage Oil and Gas

---

<sup>516</sup> Platform UK, “Wikileaks Cable Shines Light on ENI Corruption in Uganda; Heritage Offered to Pay Bribes in Congo.”

<sup>517</sup> Platform UK.

<sup>518</sup> Sam Kutesa is President Museveni’s relative by marriage; Museveni's son Muhoozi Kainerugaba married Kutesa’s daughter Charlotte Kutesa.

<sup>519</sup> Kathleen Brophy and Peter Wandera, ‘Keeping Corruption in Check in Uganda’s Oil Sector? Uganda’s Challenge to Let Everybody Eat, and Not Just the Lucky Few’, *Centre for Research on Peace and Development, KU Leuven*, no. No. 58 (2018).

<sup>520</sup> The litigation team consisted of officials from the URA, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, and the MEMD. The principal beneficiaries of the payout included Peter Nyombi, former Attorney General and head of the Uganda Government Legal and Technical Team; former Deputy Attorney General Fred Ruhindi; former MEMD Permanent Secretary Fred Kabagambe Kaliisa; Presidential Advisor on Oil and Gas and URA Commissioner-General Allen Kagina; URA

Limited (HOGL). The case arose from the company's refusal to pay a \$434 million CGT in February 2015.<sup>521</sup> Uganda's Parliamentary Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities, and State Enterprises (COSASE) investigated the pay-out and other irregularities in the oil and gas sector. The Committee, chaired by opposition FDC legislator Abdu Katuntu, recommended in June 2017 that the funds be returned.<sup>522</sup> President Museveni accepted the findings but defended his decision to award the funds to the civil servants. He did say, retrospectively, that he ought to have used monies from the Presidential Donation and Pledges Budget instead, promising to refund the URA from this same budget.<sup>523</sup> President Museveni flouts the integrity of Uganda's parliamentary and legislative processes all whilst appropriating oil revenues. Even Parliamentary Committees that may investigate the President cannot change the power configurations underpinning Uganda's exclusive political settlement, leaving resource governance outcomes unaltered.

### **Oil Companies, NGOs and Host Communities: Strategic Co-Existence and Marginalisation**

Given the limited effectiveness of institutions in facilitating equitable access to financial gains from the oil sector, other groups in the oil matrix either exercise strategic coexistence or become marginalised from accessing benefits. In this section, I focus on oil companies, NGOs and host communities in the Albertine Graben region.

---

Commissioner of Board Affairs and Rulings Doris Akol; and Jennifer Musisi, URA Commissioner of Legal Services and Board Affairs.

<sup>521</sup> Godfrey Ssali, "Katuntu Committee Recommends Refund of Sh6bn 'Presidential Handshake,'" The Independent Uganda, June 22, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.ug/katuntu-committee-recommends-refund-sh6bn-presidential-handshake/>.

<sup>522</sup> Ssali.

<sup>523</sup> Alex Otto, "Presidential Handshake Refund Draws Mixed Reactions :," Uganda Radionetwork, April 28, 2017, <https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/mixed-reactions-over-musevenis-gesture-to-refund-ugx-6bn-handshake>.

Oil companies are an integral component of Uganda's oil complex even though they are excluded from the political settlement. They serve the NRM regime by providing oil rents and thus are an important source of power for the regime. Their role is transitory in that once Uganda's oil reserves are depleted, the companies will cease operations and depart from the country. The complex relationship between oil companies and the government oscillates between cooperation and contention. During fieldwork, research informants from the oil sector generally described the relationship as "cordial" but empirical evidence and informal conversations painted a more nuanced picture. Both parties possess mutual interest in seeing that the oil industry produce an economic profit. The role of oil companies is to secure the capital and skills required to develop the sector. The government provides exploration and production licenses and a stable regulatory, security, economic, and political regime to permit a flourishing oil sector.

Oil companies have direct access to President Museveni and thus can circumvent the bureaucratic delays involved in dealing with the MEMD or PAU. This type of personalised rule and resulting secrecy, however, leads to underhanded dealings between the oil sector and governing coalition. Oil executives engage in frequent informal and direct consultations with President Museveni and his small team of advisors, including PAU Director Ernest Rubondo, MEMD Minister Irene Muloni, and Kabagambe Kaliisa, Senior Presidential Advisor on Oil and Gas at State House.<sup>524</sup> These meetings always precede their formal engagement with the MEMD, PAU, URA, and other relevant government agencies.<sup>525</sup> This informality is a double-edged sword

---

<sup>524</sup> Interview, prominent NGO-sector lawyer, [NLAM], Kampala, 6 June 2018.

<sup>525</sup> Interview, *ibid.*

in that there are no avenues for domestic legal recourse when disputes with President Museveni arise; companies are often forced to resort to international arbitration.

Oil companies and the Ugandan central government frequently disagree on taxation, revenue sharing, and infrastructure development. Disputes pertaining to taxes have resulted in several arbitration cases. For example, the URA and HOGL entered into arbitration at the Uganda Tax Tribunal (UTT) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in London in 2011.<sup>526</sup> This dispute emanated from HOGL's 'farm down' sale of two oil blocks (1 and 3A) to Tullow Oil in July 2010, worth a total of \$1,45 billion. The URA sought to collect a 30% CGT from the transaction which translated to \$434 million in revenue. HOGL disagreed with the amount, arguing that the PSAs it signed with the government did not require the company to pay a tax on such a transaction. The Government of Uganda won the case before both the UTT and the ICSID in 2013.

The URA engaged in another tax dispute with Tullow Oil in 2013 after Total E&P and CNOOC each bought 33,3% in oil assets from Tullow for \$2,9 billion, a transaction which enabled these companies to begin their operations in Uganda.<sup>527</sup> URA imposed a \$473 million CGT on the transaction, which Tullow disputed, resulting in a hearing before the ICSID. The dispute was resolved on the condition that the government reduce Tullow's tax bill to \$250 million, which Tullow could pay to the URA in instalments.<sup>528</sup> Tullow Oil and the URA were embroiled in another tax dispute in June 2018, which ended with Tullow's sale of all of its assets in Uganda to Total E&P in

---

<sup>526</sup> The ICSID is an arm of the World Bank created in 1966 that provides dispute resolution between international investors.

<sup>527</sup> Frederic Musisi, "URA, Tullow Oil in Fresh Tax Row," Daily Monitor, June 12, 2018, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/URA-Tullow-Oil-fresh-tax-row/688334-4607080-ng5cdez/index.html>.

<sup>528</sup> Musisi.

April 2020. In this case, the URA demanded a CGT of \$167 million from Tullow after its farm down sale of 21,5% of its assets in Uganda, worth \$900 million, to Total and CNOOC.<sup>529</sup> Tullow disagreed with the URA once again, arguing that will not repatriate the profits but would instead reinvest \$900 million into the EACOP as its share of the construction costs. However, the government viewed the transaction as “deemed sale” and thus it necessitates a CGT levy. Tullow terminated the farm down sale in August 2019 in protest. The Ugandan government eventually issued a statement in December 2019 indicating that it reached an agreement with Tullow without disclosing its details.<sup>530</sup> However, Tullow announced in April 2020 that it had divested its entire operation in Uganda to Total for \$575 million.<sup>531</sup>

President Museveni was involved in an infrastructure-related dispute with all three oil companies (Tullow, Total, and CNOOC) in 2010. Museveni insisted that an oil refinery be constructed in Uganda, with a capacity of refining 150,000 bpd. Museveni believed this refinery was necessary to enhance the value of the petroleum industry to Uganda's economy.<sup>532</sup> The Ugandan government contracted a US-based company, Foster Wheeler A.G, to conduct a feasibility study on the refinery in 2010. The study confirmed the viability of the refinery and predicted \$1 billion in profits annually. Oil companies argued that constructing a large refinery in Uganda would saturate a small market with finished oil products, thus negating its value. The two parties reached an agreement in 2015 wherein the Ugandan government would reduce the size of the

---

<sup>529</sup> Haggai Matsiko, “Museveni Locks out Oil Investors,” *The Independent Uganda*: (blog), June 17, 2019, <https://www.independent.co.ug/museveni-locks-out-oil-investors/>.

<sup>530</sup> Elias Biryabarema, ‘Uganda Reaches Deal on Tax Dispute, Paves Way for Tullow Stake Sale’, *Reuters*, 2 December 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-uganda-oil-idUKKBN1Y612G>.

<sup>531</sup> Burkhadt, Paul, and De Beaupuy, Francois. “Tullow takes ‘major step’ to reviving fortunes with Uganda deal”, *Bloomberg*, 23 April 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-23/tullow-sells-stake-in-uganda-project-to-total-for-575-million>, Accessed 1 June 2020.

<sup>532</sup> Sebastian Wolf and Vishal Potluri, “Uganda’s Oil: How Much, When, and How Will It Be Governed?” (World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), 2018).

refinery to 30,000 bpd (with a maximum output of 60,000 bpd) and the oil companies would export their crude oil through Tanzania.<sup>533</sup> This lengthy negotiation also contributed to further delays in bringing Uganda's oil reserves to market.

The profit-making imperatives of private oil companies often clash with the rent-seeking strategies of the governing coalition. President Museveni has gained notoriety for his hard-bargaining approach to negotiations with oil companies, employed under the guise of a nationalist rhetoric about maximising universal societal benefit for Uganda. However, this strategy is aimed at maximising economic rents for members of the ruling coalition. Creating new avenues to access rents from the oil sector increases the value of collaboration and cohesion within the exclusive settlement, thereby reducing the value of defection and thus contributing to the durability of the governing regime.

NGOs are another significant social group in Uganda's oil complex that benefit from oil rents through practises of *strategic coexistence*. They engage with the prevailing political and institutional system and derive financial gains without seeking to alter the configurations of power. Their holding power emanates from their technical expertise on various aspects of the petroleum sector, their access to donor funding and other material resources, and ability to provide services to urban and rural communities. Prominent NGOs working on oil-related issues in Uganda include the Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas (PFOG), the Advocates Coalition for Development and the Environment (ACODE), Action Aid, Global Rights Alert, Advocates for Natural Resources and Development (ANARDE), Transparency International, and the Africa Centre for Energy and Mineral Policy (ACEMP). Some of the NGOs formed an umbrella organisation, the Civil Society Coalition on Oil and

---

<sup>533</sup> Wolf and Potluri.

Gas (CSCOG), which functions as a platform for coordinating the activities of NGOs working on oil and gas-related issues. As of 2018, the coalition has over 90 CSOs.<sup>534</sup> The NGOs also use strategies of extraversion to secure foreign donor funding to support their activities. The leading donor organisations to Uganda are the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation (FES).

Since the emergence of the oil sector, the majority of NGOs maintained that Uganda will succumb to the resource curse mainly due to features of the NRM's exclusive settlements such as an authoritarian government, high levels of public sector-corruption, and the limited degree of transparency and accountability in the oil governance regime.<sup>535</sup> The lack of transparency around PSAs and revenue sharing agreements and the use of oil revenue for political patronage underlie the civil society's criticism of the government's management of the oil sector. They also express pessimism about the potentially harmful environmental effects of the oil sector, such as pollution and the disruption to rural livelihoods. NGOs adopted a "we against them" posture, purporting to represent the interests of the rural communities against a government that has sidelined local needs.<sup>536</sup> This antagonistic stance often results in open conflict between NGOs and the government.<sup>537</sup> The government, on the other hand, constantly speaks optimistically about the potential for an oil-funded socially and economically prosperous future.

---

<sup>534</sup> Interview, senior CSO official, [ARIW], Kampala, June 2018.

<sup>535</sup> Kiiza, Bategeka, and Ssewanyana, "Righting Resources-Curse Wrongs in Uganda."

<sup>536</sup> Annika Witte, "Bright Prospects or Ominous Future: Anticipating Oil in Uganda," *Tsantsa* 22 (2017): 18–27.

<sup>537</sup> Witte.

NGO work in the oil sector involves conducting investigations, organizing awareness-raising workshops, training parliamentarians in the development of petroleum legislation, and providing free legal services to rural communities facing land acquisition disputes and the adverse effects of construction. The training of parliamentarians by NGOs in the development of oil legislation has far-reaching impacts on Ugandan politics. Foreign donors believed that legislators, despite being responsible for the design of petroleum management laws, lacked the necessary knowledge on the subject and thus organized the formation of the Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas (PFOG) in 2010.<sup>538</sup> The PFOG is a civic group and the primary vehicle by which legislators are trained on oil and gas laws. The PFOG received substantial funding from International Alert until 2017 and now works with the FES. The organisation, whose offices are located directly opposite from the Ugandan Parliament, employs 110 people as of July 2018.<sup>539</sup> The PFOG provides training on various issues related to the petroleum sector and partners with other CSOs such as the AFIEGO to conduct workshops in the Albertine Graben region with communities directly affected by oil infrastructure development.<sup>540</sup> The PFOG also brings legislators to the oil region to meet with affected communities, as a way of informing subsequent debates on legislation and policy. In this way, the PFOG functions as a convener between legislators, communities, CSOs, as well as academics.

The PFOG's exposure of irregularities in Uganda's PSAs with oil companies influenced Parliament's decision to impose a moratorium on new oil and gas contracts in 2011.<sup>541</sup> This move led President Museveni to launch attacks against NGOs, describing them as "agents of foreign interests" and accusing them of bribing MPs on

---

<sup>538</sup> Interview, senior CSO official (IOGL), Kampala, May 2018.

<sup>539</sup> Interview, senior PFOG official (PGMT), Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>540</sup> Interview, *ibid.*

<sup>541</sup> Interview, opposition MP, [MPNW], Kampala, 20 July 2018.

behalf of donors to undermine government progress in developing the oil sector.<sup>542</sup> He also singled out prominent young legislators from the ruling NRM party who were active members of the PFOG and critics of government corruption in the oil industry, such as Barnabas Tinkasimire (Buyaga West, NRM), Muhammad Nsereko (Kampala Central Division, formerly NRM, now Independent), Theodore Ssekikubo (Lwemiyaga, NRM), and Wilfred Nuwagaba (Ndorwa East, formerly NRM, now Independent).<sup>543</sup> Museveni further accused the NGOs of bribery for paying the MPs' expenses during workshops, including their accommodation, transport, and sitting fees. In a speech to Parliament in December 2012, Museveni said:

All attendees have been earning Shs 1million (USD\$260), while facilitators earn Shs 5million (USD\$1300)... where does this money come from? I have written to the Inspector General of Government (IGG) because it is wrong for politicians not to declare any gift of economic value...The saboteurs [unnamed foreign interests] don't want our oil sector to succeed because that will mean financial independence for Uganda. <sup>544</sup>

Museveni identified several NGOs, including ACODE, PFOG, Global Alert, and AFIEGO in this attack. Soon afterwards, the Bank of Uganda and the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA) launched an investigation against ACODE for financial impropriety in April 2012.<sup>545</sup> The political pressure led then-AFIEGO Director Godber Tumushabe to leave the organisation in 2013. He went on to establish another NGO,

---

<sup>542</sup> Interview, senior CSO official, [GDTG], Kampala, June 2018.

<sup>543</sup> The three legislators, also known as "rebel NRM MPs" have consistently criticized government corruption, and this resulted in attempts to expel them from the ruling party. For example, see more details here: [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1461530/-nrm-rebel-mps-tell-museveni](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1461530/-nrm-rebel-mps-tell-museveni)

<sup>544</sup> New Vision, "MPs Were Bribed to Fail Oil Bill - Museveni," [www.newvision.co.ug](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1311364/mps-bribed-fail-oil-museveni), December 14, 2014, [http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1311364/mps-bribed-fail-oil-museveni](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1311364/mps-bribed-fail-oil-museveni).

<sup>545</sup> Haggai Matsiko, "ACODE under Investigation," The Independent Uganda (blog), April 9, 2012, <https://www.independent.co.ug/acode-under-investigation/>.

the Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies (GLISS), which the government subsequently raided and froze its bank accounts in October 2017 on accusations of sourcing funds to support “opposition political activities.”<sup>546</sup> The Bank of Uganda also froze the accounts of the international NGO Action Aid in September 2017 for three months and the police raided its offices on accusations of money laundering.<sup>547</sup>

The relationship between NGOs and the central government is no longer as acrimonious, with NGOs gradually shifting their approach from contention to strategic coexistence.<sup>548</sup> The government allows NGOs to operate on the condition that they self-censor and conduct politically benign activities that do not provoke social unrest or embarrassment for President Museveni and his government. The government exercises stringent control of the sector by requiring NGOs to apply for clearance from the police and by employing District Intelligence Officers to monitor public workshops held with rural communities, especially when the subject of discussion is oil-related. If the security agencies deem the workshop material to be politically sensitive, they disallow the meetings.<sup>549</sup> NGO activists strategically coexist within this restrictive political space, allowing them to continue benefitting from donor funding and maintaining the lucrative careers. Many NGOs have established oil and gas-related projects to tap into newly emerged issue-specific donor funding.<sup>550</sup>

---

<sup>546</sup> Paul Ampurire, “Staffers Sucked in as Govt Freezes Bank Accounts of GLISS for Funding Opposition Activities,” *Online News from Uganda and the East African Region - SoftPower News* (blog), October 21, 2017, <https://www.softpower.ug/staffers-sucked-in-as-govt-freezes-bank-accounts-of-gliss-for-funding-opposition-activities/>.

<sup>547</sup> Paul Ampurire, ‘Staffers Sucked in as Govt Freezes Bank Accounts of GLISS for Funding Opposition Activities’, *Online News from Uganda and the East African Region - SoftPower News* (blog), 21 October 2017, <https://www.softpower.ug/staffers-sucked-in-as-govt-freezes-bank-accounts-of-gliss-for-funding-opposition-activities/>.

<sup>548</sup> Interview, senior CSO official, [ARIW], Kampala, June 2018.

<sup>549</sup> Interview, civil society officials (ITIBKE), May 2018.

<sup>550</sup> Interview, *Ibid*.

NGOs provide frequent, free research and advisory services to the government on oil-related issues, especially to the MEMD and PAU who are responsible for negotiations with oil companies.<sup>551</sup> An active NGO sector contributes to a façade of democratic legitimacy for the governing coalition, enabling the NRM regime to access external sources of revenue. In this way, Uganda's seemingly independent civil society sector works to legitimise rather than challenge the ruling coalition.

Unlike NGOs, rural communities in the Albertine Graben region have been unable to successfully engage in strategic coexistence to access benefit from the oil sector. Most communities bear the brunt of the oil sector's adverse effects, especially as it pertains to land speculation. Corrupt individuals from the central government and districts in the Albertine Graben region have preyed upon rural vulnerabilities and fraudulently acquired communal land, forcibly removing occupants in order to sell or lease land to oil companies. As discussed earlier, the construction of infrastructure related to the petroleum sector led to an increase in demand for land and thus property prices. The phenomenon of "land grabbing," whereby property speculation results in the forced displacement of rural communities, became prevalent in the region. Article 26 of the Ugandan Constitution empowers the government to acquire land for public interests on the condition that the landowners receive fair compensation before ceding control. In this process, the government identifies the areas needed for oil infrastructure and then conducts Resettlement Actions Plans (RAPs) which involve assessing the value of the land for compensation purposes. The government then establishes where project affected persons (PAPs) will be resettled after completing a survey of pre-

---

<sup>551</sup> Interviews, civil society officials (ITIBKE), May 2018, and senior PFOG officer, (PGMT), Kampala, July 2018.

existing land tenure regimes and constructing alternative accommodations for those PAPs who choose resettlement instead of compensation.<sup>552</sup>

The resettlement process has been fraught with controversy due to the fraudulent acquisition of land by politically-connected individuals. In the context of Uganda, I use Samuel Mabikke's definition of land grabbing as,

“the acquisition of land by the public, private enterprise, or individual in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, unfair, taking advantage of power differences, corruption, and breakdown of law and order in society.”<sup>553</sup>

Land grabbing processes in Uganda are rooted in the country's tenure system defined by Section 2 and 3 of the 1998 Land Act (1998). Customary ownership is land recognized as belonging to an individual, family, or traditional institution, and is owned in perpetuity. The Land Act provides for the registration of communal land and acquisition of customary ownership certificates. Freehold ownership is where a property owner holds title in perpetuity or for fixed period and is vested with the full powers of ownership. The owner can sell or utilize the land as they see fit. A land title provides legal proof of ownership. Mailo ownership, on the other hand, was established in 1900 when the British colonial government apportioned 1000 square miles of land to individuals to own as private property, as discussed in chapter 4. Mailo land is registered in perpetuity and affords both the owner and bona fide occupants statutory rights to utilize the land freely. Leasehold ownership emerges through contractual arrangements between the owner and tenants or lessee and involves the possession of land for a fixed period or on a rental basis.

---

<sup>552</sup> Ogwang and Vanclay, “Social Impacts of Land Acquisition for Oil and Gas Development in Uganda.”

<sup>553</sup> Samuel B. Mabikke, “Escalating Land Grabbing in Post-Conflict Regions of Northern Uganda: A Need for Strengthening Good Land Governance in Acholi Region,” in International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 2011, 6–8.

The bulk of the land in the Albertine Graben area, like most rural areas in Uganda, is under customary ownership. However, it is typical for rural communities to neither possess land titles nor customary ownership certificates. A 2014 study by the NGO Civic Response on Environment and Development (CRED) revealed that 79% of their rural respondents did not have any form of documentation for their communal land ownership.<sup>554</sup> The lack of ownership ‘proof’ has allowed politically-connected individuals to fraudulently obtain titles to seize land from rural communities. The Ministries of Land and Mineral Development, along with private companies, keep the locations of the oil infrastructure (including pipeline paths and construction camps) secret to prevent land speculation but this has proved ineffective due to corruption.<sup>555</sup> In an interview, a district councillor from Hoima revealed that,

People from Kampala acquire land titles for land here in Hoima without the knowledge of the people who live on it. Once they acquire the titles, they chase away those who have lived here for years, and sometimes the issues end up in court. Most of our people here cannot afford the long and expensive court proceedings; so they give up their ancestral land. Local Committee (LC) Chairpersons here in our region are also involved; they collaborate with high-level government officials in Kampala to identify the land that they corruptly acquire. Unfortunately, our people here do not have a leg to stand on because they cannot afford to pay for the process of registering for a land title.<sup>556</sup>

---

<sup>554</sup> CRED, “Up against Giants.”

<sup>555</sup> Focus group discussion, DNROs, Masaka, July 2018.

<sup>556</sup> Interview, District Councillor, [CDJT], Hoima, June 2018.

In an interview, a District Natural Resource Officer (DNRO)<sup>557</sup> from Hoima explained that corruption occurs during different stages of the land acquisition process:

When the oil companies, the ministries of energy and mineral development, or Uganda National Roads Agency (UNRA) need to acquire land, they award contracts to private consultants, who travel to the rural areas to collect data on the value of the land, which they subsequently forward to the Chief Government Valuer. The consultants have considerable discretion, which they use to promote their interests—they often collect bribes from influential landowners to increase the value of their land. Although we, as DNROs also provide our rates of the value of the land, the consultants' rates supersede ours. Sometimes the consultants defraud rural landowners, who often lack sufficient knowledge on the value of their land, into selling at low prices. This has frequently resulted in conflicts. For example, when neighbours realize that their land has been valued differently, they start agitating for a more fair rate. However, once they have signed the contracts, there's very little that can be done.<sup>558</sup>

A seminal report by CRED entitled “Up Against Giants” presents several case studies of land grabbing in the Albertine Graben. For example, six officials<sup>559</sup> from the Hoima District Land Board fraudulently obtained titles for almost the whole of Kiryamboga

---

<sup>557</sup> District Natural Resources Officers are government employees who monitor and enforce compliance with the country's environmental regulations in their districts. Their work involves regulating all forms of natural resources, including land, forestry, and water.

<sup>558</sup> Interview, district natural resource officer, [NJDO], Hoima, June 2018.

<sup>559</sup> The report names the officials as Asimwe Edward, secretary of the district land board, former chief administrative officers for Hoima, (CAOs), Kiiza Keneth Alfred, and Kyamanya, former sub-county chief for Buseruka county, Byaruhanga Ireneo, Agaba Edgar, former executive director of the Hoima Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA), and Ahimbisiwe Bernard and Kabasharira Bugahya (CRED 2015).

Village, a population of 400 households near Hoima, in 2014 without the community's knowledge.<sup>560</sup> The village owned the land through customary joint ownership but did not possess ownership certificates. The corrupt officials used their positions at the Hoima District Land Board, which is responsible for enforcing land laws in the area, to clandestinely register titles that enabled them to lease or sell the land to oil companies. Another incident occurred in the Buliisa District of the Albertine Graben region where there is a high concentration of oil-related activity and over twenty wells. A well-known landowner, Francis Kahwa, fraudulently obtained titles for 427 acres of land belonging to 12 families in the Bikongoro Village of the Buliisa District in 2010.<sup>561</sup> Kahwa falsified a land transfer agreement between himself and the families who unwittingly signed the land over to Kahwa due to inadequate legal literacy. Kahwa, who owns vast tracks of land adjacent to oil infrastructure, reportedly has connections with unnamed "top government officials," including MPs from the area who are able to provide privileged information.<sup>562</sup> These cases demonstrate the state of marginalisation and vulnerability that host communities in the Albertine Graben region experience, an unfortunate reality which emanates from the country's exclusive settlement. Predatory practices, patronage, and corruption forces groups excluded from the settlement to either engage in strategic coexistence or fall victim to coerced political marginalisation.

## Conclusion

This chapter focused on the politics around the establishment of the oil sector in Uganda and discussed the experiences of the groups involved in the oil complex. It

---

<sup>560</sup> CRED, "Up against Giants."

<sup>561</sup> CRED.

<sup>562</sup> CRED.

highlighted the business and income opportunities produced by the oil sector, prior to actual production. I argued that the oil sector is vulnerable to the corrupt dynamics of Uganda's exclusive political settlement as individuals who are incorporated into the governing coalition engage in rent-seeking activities and subvert the proper functioning of legislation and institutions. The oil sector further entrenches the NRM regime by providing it with a new source for patronage. Patronage contributes to the durability of the ruling coalition by increasing the value of compliance for groups incorporated into the settlement. The NRM enacts hegemonic control of the oil sector to prevent the disruption of existing power configurations. This chapter also analysed the behaviour of social groups involved in the oil complex but excluded from the political settlement, such as oil companies, NGOs, and rural communities. Whereas oil companies and NGOs practise strategic coexistence in order to extract benefits from the oil complex, rural communities suffer from the harmful effects of the sector. The relative marginality and holding power of groups determines their ability to engage productively with the governing coalition in the post-oil discovery era. In this way, the oil sector is embedded in Uganda's existing configurations of power and also contributes to the enduring nature of the country's exclusive political settlement. The Bunyoro kingdom has been unable to access benefits from the oil sector, despite the existence of oil deposits on Bunyoro land. The next chapter discusses Bunyoro's engagement with the NRM regime in the aftermath of the oil discovery and analyses the factors underlying its weak position in the oil complex.

## **CHAPTER 6: THE BUNYORO KINGDOM AND THE NRM'S EXCLUSIVE SETTLEMENT AFTER OIL**

### **Introduction**

In 2012, Bunyoro King Solomon Gafabusa Iguru stormed the Ugandan Parliament demanding that government allocate a 12,5% oil royalty to the kingdom. This request, however, fell on deaf ears. There has been a de-escalation of hostilities between the kingdom and central government since this eventful climax. The Bunyoro kingdom continues to demand a 'fair share' of oil revenue, although there is no indication that the government will extend any concessions in this regard. This chapter analyses how Uganda's exclusive political settlement prevents the Bunyoro kingdom from accessing oil revenue despite its location in the region of the oil deposits. The Bunyoro kingdom's limited holding power relative to the governing regime explains its inability to shift power configurations within the exclusive settlement. Furthermore, the kingdom's weak institutional capacity makes practices of strategic coexistence difficult, including attempts to access oil benefits through the businesses opportunities produced by the oil sector. The Bunyoro kingdom has, however, begun working towards strategic coexistence, including by overhauling its political institutions. This chapter first evaluates the kingdom's holding power and discusses its participation in, and engagement with, the oil complex and the governing coalition (or lack thereof). Secondly, I analyse the kingdom's response to the emergence of the oil sector and the NRM's refusal to grant it access to oil revenue. Finally, I discuss the Bunyoro kingdom's interactions with the ruling regime and its failure to shift the prevailing political settlement in Uganda.

### **Historical Background: The Bunyoro Kingdom and Diminished Holding Power**

The Bunyoro kingdom is located in Western Uganda and consists of the Hoima, Masindi, Buliisa, Kibaale, Kiryandongo, and Kikuube districts. It is Uganda's second largest kingdom with a population of approximately 2 million. The people of Bunyoro are known as "Banyoro" or Munyoro in the singular. "Runyoro" is the kingdom's vernacular. The kingdom's weaker political status relative to the Buganda in Ugandan politics is rooted in the history of Bunyoro's resistance to British colonialism in the late 1890s, briefly discussed in Chapter 4. Bunyoro was the largest kingdom in the present-day Great Lakes region from the 1500s onwards until its decimation by the British in 1899.<sup>563</sup> The most prominent kingdoms in Uganda, such as the Buganda, Busoga, Tooro, Kooki, and Ankole, were historically part of the Bunyoro kingdom until the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>564</sup> Being the most powerful king in the pre-colonial era, King Kabalega Chwa strongly resisted the British colonial incursion from 1893 to 1898, resulting in his exile to the Seychelles in 1899 – a notable political blow.<sup>565</sup> The King represents the embodiment of Bunyoro history, culture, values, and nationhood, and serves as the centralising force for the chiefdoms that constitute the kingdom.<sup>566</sup>

In 1933, the British signed the Bunyoro Agreement which reinstated King (Omukama) Tito Winyi as the titular head of the Kingdom, though Bunyoro was only recognized as a district in colonial Uganda.<sup>567</sup> The Banyoro's frustration over its emaciation throughout the colonial era led the kingdom to launch lawsuits, though unsuccessful, in the High Court of Uganda against the British government, the Ugandan

---

<sup>563</sup> Doyle, "From Kitara to the Lost Counties."

<sup>564</sup> Henry Ford Miiirima, "Bunyoro-Kitara/Buganda Relations in 19th and 20th Centuries." (University of Texas, 2005), [www.repositories.lib.utexas.edu](http://www.repositories.lib.utexas.edu).

<sup>565</sup> Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited."

<sup>566</sup> Beattie, "Bunyoro."

<sup>567</sup> Uzoigwe, "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited."

government, and the Buganda kingdom for £3 million (USD\$3,7 million) in 2003, 2010, and 2013, respectively. The kingdom sought compensation for its loss of land to the Buganda and the killing of its people during the violence of colonial occupation. It also sought reparations for the sub-surface resources seized by the British during the colonial war of occupation in 1899, under the leadership of then-High Commissioner of Uganda Colonel Henry Colvile.<sup>568</sup> The High Court judge, Justice Richard Okumu-Wengi, dismissed the lawsuit, and the British opted for an out-of-court settlement.<sup>569</sup> The British Government promised to pay £700,000 (USD\$871 850) to the Government of Uganda in 2012 which the kingdom is still trying to recover.<sup>570</sup>

Despite its re-establishment as a semi-federal region at independence in 1962, the kingdom could not reclaim its pre-colonial glory. As discussed in Chapter 4, its quest to restore the Seven Counties from the Buganda set off a chain of events that led to the abolition of all kingdoms by Obote's government in 1967.<sup>571</sup> The Bunyoro, along with other kingdoms, lost properties and assets during this time in Uganda's history.<sup>572</sup> President Museveni reinstated the status of kingdoms as cultural (but not political) institutions in 1993 and returned land to the kingdoms through the Traditional Rulers Restitution of Assets and Properties Act of 1993. The Prime Minister of the Bunyoro kingdom, Apollo Nsibambi, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the central government in 1994 wherein the government committed to returning 113

---

<sup>568</sup> Oliver W. Furley, "The Sudanese Troops in Uganda," *African Affairs* 58, no. 233 (1959): 311–328.

<sup>569</sup> Stephen Muwambi, "Bunyoro Loses Case Against Britain," *New Vision*, August 23, 2005, [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1118561/bunyoro-loses-britain](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1118561/bunyoro-loses-britain).

<sup>570</sup> David Ayebale, "Bunyoro to Sue Britain over Losses," *Daily Monitor*, February 25, 2013, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-to-sue-Britain-over-losses/688334-1703570-format-xhtml-o6p6nt/index.html>; Interview, senior member of the Bunyoro leadership, [RADK], Kampala, May 2019.

<sup>571</sup> Rutanga, "Traditional/Cultural Institutions in Uganda's Democratic Transition, Political Stability and Nation Development"; Goodfellow and Lindemann, "The Clash of Institutions."

<sup>572</sup> For a comprehensive list of the assets, please see this article by Francis Mugerwa, who is also the Bunyoro kingdom's information minister: Francis Mugerwa, "Bunyoro Demands 440 Assets from Government," *Daily Monitor*, May 4, 2014, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-demands-440-assets-from-government/688334-2302400-gd0yrjz/index.html>.

properties to Bunyoro, including schools, health centres, markets, and administrative and residential buildings.<sup>573</sup> This crucial historical development allowed Bunyoro to re-build its political, economic, and cultural institutions for the first time since 1967. Although the Ugandan Government returned important assets such as the Karuziika Royal Palace, the kingdom's headquarters, 440 are still outstanding, including forest reserves, sub-county headquarters, district kingdom headquarters, residences for kingdom officials, health centres, schools, counties, markets, and burial lands.<sup>574</sup> The kingdom meets regularly with the government over this issue of property restitution.<sup>575</sup> The delays limit the kingdom's rebuilding efforts since these assets, especially the land and commercial properties, could bolster their political and economic capacity and thus their autonomy and holding power vis-à-vis the central government.

The Bunyoro kingdom, despite its well-structured institutions, has failed to effectively leverage its status as a "nation-within-a-state." Without sufficient holding power, the Banyoro cannot successfully challenge the governing coalition over access to oil revenue. The governance structure of the Bunyoro kingdom involves the Omukama (the King) who embodies the ethno-nation's history, traditions, and identity.<sup>576</sup> The current King is Dr. Solomon Gafabusa Iguru. The King governs with the assistance of a Council of Notables known as Bajwara Nkondo and County Chiefs (Abamasaza) who work with sub-county chiefs (Abagomborozi). The King also appoints a Prime Minister (Omuhikirwa) who acts the head of the kingdom's government and serves as the King's political representative since the Ugandan Constitution only permits

---

<sup>573</sup> Mugerwa.

<sup>574</sup> Mugerwa, "Bunyoro Demands 440 Assets from Government."

<sup>575</sup> Interview, senior Bunyoro leader and academic, [BPMP], Kampala, May 2019.

<sup>576</sup> Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom, "Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom Administration," Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom, November 4, 2019, <https://bunyorokitarakingdom.org/about-bkk-2/bunyoro-kitara-kingdom-administration/>.

traditional kings to perform cultural functions. The current Omuhikirwa, appointed in January 2018, is Andrew Byakutaga. In consultation with the Omukama, the Prime Minister appoints a cabinet composed of high-profile Banyoro professionals. The King can dissolve the Cabinet and dismiss the Prime Minister at any time.

Ministerial positions are served on a voluntary basis and possess considerable prestige.<sup>577</sup> Like a juridical state, the kingdom has a Parliament (Orukurato) that consists of Chiefs from its 90 clans and which functions as a legislative forum for the discussion of kingdom affairs and the passing of resolutions. The Orukurato also provides an avenue for open and democratic engagement between the King and the kingdom's administrative and cultural leadership. The Banyoro also possess several agencies that help manage kingdom affairs. For example, the Land Board manages kingdom-owned land and the Education Fund coordinates educational support activities. The Kabalega Foundation, which is the Omukama's charitable trust, is another key agency that provides a salary, allowances, medical coverage, transportation, security, and other benefits to the King. The kingdom also carries important symbols of nationhood, such as an anthem and a flag.

Apart from these governance institutions, the kingdom promotes and preserves its ethno-national identity and cultural heritage through various social activities which represent a latent source of power for the Banyoro. The power of traditional kings is largely derived from their status as cultural custodians and their embodiment of ethnic identity. Events like Empango, the annual coronation ceremony on the 11 of June, are critical to enhancing subject loyalty and political cohesion in the kingdom.

---

<sup>577</sup> Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom, "Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom Administration," Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom, November 4, 2019, <https://bunyorokitarakingdom.org/about-bkk-2/bunyoro-kitara-kingdom-administration/>.

Empango is the kingdom's premier cultural event and is well attended by Banyoro as well as invited guests from the central government, private sector, and other kingdoms in Uganda. The Banyoro conduct reciprocal visits to the Buganda kingdom for their annual coronation ceremonies. The Amasaza Soccer Tournament is another example of a cultural activity that strengthens cohesion among the kingdom's sub-tribes and clan groups. The kingdom also retains several sites of historical significance, such as the Kings' Mparo Royal Burial Grounds, royal palaces, the Kibiro salt producing village, and underground tunnels and granaries.<sup>578</sup>

Despite its relative unity, internecine conflict between different clans, particularly the ruling Babiito and Bagungu, undermines Banyoro nationhood, and, by extension, the holding power of the kingdom. These fissures are rooted in the historical formation of the kingdom in the pre-colonial era wherein larger kingdoms like Bunyoro absorbed smaller groups like the Bagungu.<sup>579</sup> The emergence of oil has exacerbated political tensions in the kingdom as contending parties struggle to access a percentage of the oil revenue allocated to the traditional authorities recognised by the Public Finance Management Act (2015). Some local leaders are seeking to collaborate with the central government to further their parochial interests, which drives political instability and factionalism within the kingdom.<sup>580</sup> The majority of the Bagungu are located in the oil-rich Hoima, Masindi, and Buliisa districts. Recently, a lobby group from Buliisa District, the Bugungu Revival Cultural Association, has pressured the Ugandan Government to recognize the Bagungu kingdom as a separate cultural institution from

---

<sup>578</sup> However, it lacks funds to properly maintain and promote these sites, which are a potentially lucrative source of revenue from tourism.

<sup>579</sup> Co-option was either voluntary or forced. Very often, the coopted groups would fuse into the larger kingdoms, but in other cases such as this one, clan elites opt to secede from the larger kingdoms for political and economic reasons. Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests*; Capps, "Tribal-Landed Property."

<sup>580</sup> Paul Kiwuuwa, "Bunyoro Kingdom Rejects Bagungu Breakaway," *New Vision*, February 14, 2019, [http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1494149/bunyoro-kingdom-rejects-bagungu-breakaway](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1494149/bunyoro-kingdom-rejects-bagungu-breakaway).

the Banyoro.<sup>581</sup> The group's coordinator and spokesperson, Samuel Mugema, justified their separatist movement as necessary due to the sidelining of Bagungu within the kingdom.<sup>582</sup> Mugema believes that the incorporation of the Bagungu into the Bunyoro kingdom has cost the society its sub-ethno-national identity and values, along with the perceived benefits that come with independence.<sup>583</sup> In April 2018, the group issued a public statement announcing its formal resolution to secede from the Bunyoro kingdom after the king dismissed former Prime Minister Norman Lukumu, a Mugungu.<sup>584</sup>

This secession did not happen materialise. Some research informants from the Bunyoro kingdom characterised the Bugungu Revival Cultural Association as a small group motivated exclusively by a desire to benefit from the perks of leadership, especially access to oil revenue, and not a broad-based social movement. A senior member of the Bunyoro leadership, who is also a Mugungu, described them as a small coterie of opportunists based in Masindi vying for patronage from the central government:

I am a Mugungu myself, but I can say in confidence that the agitators for an independent Bangungu nation lack broad based support—even the Member of Parliament for Buliisa, Stephen Mukitale is not aligned to their cause. Numerically, the Bagungu as a people are also few and have no real political clout. They have dropped the demands for now because they have weak reasons for their secession bid. However, some of our past Prime Ministers

---

<sup>581</sup> Daily Monitor, "Bagungu Resolve to Secede from Bunyoro Kingdom - Daily Monitor," April 17, 2018, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bagungu-resolve-secede-Bunyoro-Kingdom-Norman-Lukumu/688334-4397092-lak595z/index.html>.

<sup>582</sup> Daily Monitor, "Bagungu Resolve to Secede from Bunyoro Kingdom."

<sup>583</sup> Daily Monitor, "Bagungu Resolve to Secede from Bunyoro Kingdom."

<sup>584</sup> Daily Monitor.

have neglected them in a way by not communicating consistently, and they have also faced problems with foreign land invaders, Balaalo. But there is a change of approach now, for example the King visited and met with them this year, and our new Prime Minister has also promised to engage with them and address their concerns.<sup>585</sup>

In addition to the complications of internal political struggles, the Bunyoro kingdom has yet to establish independent sources of income. This lack of financial capacity undermines its holding power and relative autonomy from the governing coalition.<sup>586</sup> The Bunyoro kingdom depends on the central government for patronage and donations from private companies to fund its political activities and cultural events. The kingdom lost its only business investment, a 10% share in the Masindi-based Kinyara Sugar Limited company, due to a fraudulent sale conducted by former Prime Minister Norman Lukumu in 2017. The company, which is Uganda's second largest sugar producer, was founded by former Bunyoro King, Tito Owinyi in 1955, in partnership with the colonial British government.<sup>587</sup> Kinyara Sugar Limited ceased operations during Uganda's period of political upheaval between 1970 and the late 1980s.<sup>588</sup> It resumed operations in 1995 until 2017, when the aforementioned scandal occurred. The kingdom owned 10% of the company while a Mauritius-based company, the Rai Group, owned 70%; the rest was privately-owned.

The kingdom relies on fundraising, though is minimally effective in contributing to the kingdom's attaining financial self-sufficiency. For example, it launched a

---

<sup>585</sup> Interview, senior member of the Bunyoro leadership, [FMKP], Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>586</sup> For example, independent income would allow the kingdom to provide social services to its subjects. The social services would be a form of benevolence and patronage that would increase the level of loyalty that subjects accord to the kingdom and this would increase the kingdom's holding power.

<sup>587</sup> Zurah Nakabugo, "Kinyara's Sweet Success Story," Daily Monitor, January 17, 2006.

<sup>588</sup> Zurah Nakabugo, "Kinyara's Sweet Success Story."

fundraising drive known as “Omuganda” (translated “bundle”) in 2015 to support the reconstruction of the Karuziika Royal Palace, to which the Buganda kingdom contributed Shs 10 million (USD\$2,702).<sup>589</sup> The fundraising drive received modest support from Bunyoro subjects due to high poverty levels in the rural region. Private companies also provide donations for Bunyoro cultural events. For example, the telecommunications company MTN Uganda allocated Shs 20 million (USD\$5,404) to the 2019 Empango annual coronation anniversary.<sup>590</sup> The kingdom mostly depends on such ad-hoc donations to fund specific events since it does not have access to reliable source of incomes, such as through business ventures.

The kingdom’s institutional and financial capacity is largely limited by its rural location, a key factor underlying the Bunyoro kingdom’s diminished holding power. The kingdom is located 200 kilometres outside of Uganda’s capital city of Kampala and thus it is distant from elite networks and business opportunities. The Buganda kingdom, in comparison is located in the heart of Kampala and its immediate surroundings, which contributes to its access to business opportunities, valuable information, as well as human and financial capital. The Bunyoro kingdom’s rural location also lessens the extent to which it can be an immediate political threat to the central government compared to Buganda. For example, Buganda urban youth constitute a major support bloc for opposition politics in Uganda, as elaborated in the next chapter. The rural location of Bunyoro also contributes to the region’s higher levels of poverty relative to the rest of Uganda. The Economic Research Policy Centre, a Makerere University-based think-tank, issued a report in 2011 which reveals the

---

<sup>589</sup> Francis Mugerwa, “Bunyoro Launches Omuganda Campaign,” Daily Monitor, June 9, 2015, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-launches-Omuganda-campaign/688334-2744558-fcbbjuz/index.html>.

<sup>590</sup> Justus Lyatuu, “Bunyoro Gears up for Gafabusa’s 25th Coronation Anniversary,” The Observer - Uganda, June 9, 2019, <https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60963-bunyoro-gears-up-for-gafabusa-s-25th-coronation-anniversary>.

Albertine region's lower level of economic growth; that is 1,4% below the national and Rest of Country (RoC) averages.<sup>591</sup> Communities in the region have poor access to social services such as health, education, clean drinking water, and electricity.<sup>592</sup>

The relative poverty of the Bunyoro kingdom explains why opposition parties do not possess the same incentive to court its political allegiance as they do with Buganda. The Bunyoro region is one of the NRM's electoral strongholds; the party wins over 90% of the parliamentary seats on average in this region each election cycle.<sup>593</sup> A senior member of Bunyoro's leadership, who is also a prominent academic, attributed the Bunyoro people's ongoing support for the ruling party as a consequence of the kingdom's weak "social contract" with its own subjects, a vulnerability that makes rural voters prone to manipulation by local NRM leaders:

The kingdom is not very well connected to its subjects because they feel that the leadership has neglected them and is not protecting their interests, especially these last few years as the negative impacts of the oil sector, like forced removals increase. Political operators in the region actually prefer to operate as individuals or connive with the ruling party instead of the kingdom because of this limited political influence. This also allows the NRM to entrench the narrative that the peasants owe it their peace and freedom, and so they are seldom critical of the party and government. When it comes to elections, local power brokers selfishly align with the ruling party because of the benefits that come with the party's electoral wins in the region.<sup>594</sup>

---

<sup>591</sup> EPRC, "Preliminary Economic Study of the Oil Producing Region of Uganda" (Kampala, Uganda: Economic Policy Research Centre, 2011).

<sup>592</sup> Tumusiime, Mawejje, and Byakagaba, "Discovery of Oil."

<sup>593</sup> Interview, senior Bunyoro leader and academic, [DMFA], Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>594</sup> Interview, *Ibid.*

Another factor undermining the kingdom's holding power are its frequent leadership changes, including at the level of the prime minister and cabinet ministers. Corruption scandals, ineptitude, and internal power struggles between different factions result in high turnover rates. The kingdom also does not remunerate cabinet members, and this contributes to corruption.<sup>595</sup> For example, in 2012, the King appointed two prime ministers and multiple cabinets within the same year. In February of that year, the King announced a cabinet led by Prime Minister Bonny Kiiza. Two months later in April, he appointed a new Prime Minister, Reverend Jackson Nsamba Kasozi, as well as a new cabinet. Three months later in July, the King reshuffled the cabinet, dropping seven ministers.<sup>596</sup> A year later in August 2013, he reshuffled the cabinet once again, this time making eight new appointments. The King subsequently dismissed Nsamba Kasozi along with half of his cabinet three years later in 2015, citing the need to reinvigorate the kingdom with new leaders and fresh ideas.<sup>597</sup> He appointed a former teacher, Noah Lukumu, as the new Prime Minister, along with a younger cadre of ministers. During this same period, there were alleged attempts to poison the King by unnamed members of the royal family, adding to the political intrigue.<sup>598</sup> Former Prime Minister Jackson Nsamba justified the frequent changes as being within "the King's prerogative,"<sup>599</sup> a sentiment echoed by several of my research informants who

---

<sup>595</sup> Interview, senior advisor to the Bunyoro administration and academic, [KZJA], Kampala, August 2018.

<sup>596</sup> Fred Kiva, "Bunyoro King Makes 3rd Cabinet Reshuffle in Six Months," Uganda Radio Network, July 21, 2012.

<sup>597</sup> George Muzoora, "Omukama Iguru Announces New Cabinet, Drops 7 Ministers," Uganda Radio Network, March 27, 2015, <http://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/omukama-iguru-announces-new-cabinet-drops-7-ministers>.

<sup>598</sup> The attempted poisoning of the Bunyoro king was widely reported in the local media, but police investigations did not result in a conviction. For example, see: Albert Tumwine, "Mysterious Person Attempts to Poison Bunyoro King," Daily Monitor, February 24, 2015, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Mysterious--person----poison--Bunyoro--King/688334-2633294-rnotw3z/index.html>.

<sup>599</sup> Kiva.

are current or former part of the kingdom's Cabinet. This view perhaps masks the ugly infighting that is typical of Bunyoro politics.

Further scandals ensued when the King changed the cabinet two and a half years later in January 2018, dismissing Prime Minister Lukumu following serious allegations of corruption. Lukumu allegedly fraudulently sold off the kingdom's 10% share in Kinyara Sugar Limited.<sup>600</sup> These accusations led to the formation of a Royal Commission in 2017, which now functions as a shadow cabinet under the direction of the King. The Chairperson of the Royal Commission, Kabagambe Kaliisa, is the former Permanent Secretary of MEMD. Kaliisa argued that the change in government was necessary and that the King was within his rights to appoint a new team capable of strengthening the kingdom's capacity to manage its financial, human, and land resources, and, most importantly, who could champion the Bunyoro's interests in the oil sector.<sup>601</sup> Lukumu filed a High Court lawsuit<sup>602</sup> against the kingdom for his dismissal, which the court threw out in March 2018, paving the way for Byakutaga's premiership.<sup>603</sup> A high ranking member of Bunyoro administration described the kingdom's endemic corruption scandals as such:

Our King is surrounded by corrupt, self-seeking officials, and this has often cost the kingdom several opportunities to move our agenda forward in one

---

<sup>600</sup> The accusations have neither led to a formal court action at the time of writing. The case was widely reported in Uganda's media such as this report in the New Vision paper: Robert Atuhairwe and Pascal Kwesiga, "Omukama Dissolves Cabinet, Appoints New Prime Minister," [Www.Newvision.Co.Ug](http://www.newvision.co.ug), January 16, 2018, [http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1469175/omukama-dissolves-cabinet-appoints-prime-minister](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1469175/omukama-dissolves-cabinet-appoints-prime-minister).

<sup>601</sup> Thembo Kahungu, "Why Bunyoro King Dissolved His Cabinet," *Daily Monitor*, January 18, 2018.

<sup>602</sup> Francis Mugerwa, Felix Basiime, and Ismail Bategeka, "Sacked Bunyoro Premier Refuses to Leave Office, Sues Successor," *Daily Monitor*, March 22, 2018, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Sacked-Bunyoro-premier-refuses-to-leave-office--sues-successor/688334-4353142-k97qou/index.html>.

<sup>603</sup> Priscillar Nyamahunge, "Court Dismisses Case against Bunyoro's Premier," [Www.Newvision.Co.Ug](http://www.newvision.co.ug), March 24, 2018, [http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1474072/court-dismisses-bunyoros-premier](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1474072/court-dismisses-bunyoros-premier).

way or another. Offers to engage in corrupt activities typically come from the political centre, and our Omuhikirwas (Prime Ministers) are often used by these government officials sometimes without the King's knowledge. Some of the problems also arise from divisions within the royal family itself, because different members of the family connive with external actors for their own benefit. For example, our current Prime Minister has been unable to fully discharge his duties, because some members of the royal family, such as (name supplied) have their own interests and lord over him, so he has no power at all.<sup>604</sup>

A senior civil servant and former Bunyoro Cabinet Minister also acknowledged the corruption among Bunyoro leadership and the frequent dismissals of prime ministers and members of cabinet:

The real struggle is about the integrity of the Prime Minister's office. Bunyoro has had relatively frequent changes of Prime Ministers since the restoration in 1993 because the kingdom's riches are plundered by the leadership mostly... the King and the kingdom have a clear vision, but members of the kingdom administration and their handlers have their own... successive prime ministers and their cabinets engage in corruption because they have short term visions and selfish interests... (Some) have dubiously sold kingdom properties, company shares, land, and forests without following proper procedures.<sup>605</sup>

---

<sup>604</sup> Interview, senior member of the Bunyoro leadership, [RADK], Kampala, May 2019.

<sup>605</sup> Interview, Former Bunyoro cabinet minister and senior government official, [BSCO], Kampala, June 2018.

The kingdom's limited holding power results from its lack of political, economic, and organisational capacity. Although Museveni's government restored Bunyoro's status as an ethno-nation in 1993, providing the kingdom with a constitutional right to exist, it has since been unable to build strong and effective institutions. The kingdom relies on the patronage of the central government, which provides the King's salary. Some local political leaders also enjoy the benefits of patronage during election cycles, which guarantees the electoral dominance of the NRM party in Bunyoro. The Ugandan government also controls the pace at which the Bunyoro's properties are restored, highlighting the kingdom's weak bargaining position and modest political capacity. The kingdom's weak business portfolio further disables its participation in the oil industry as a private corporation or otherwise. The Bunyoro have proven unable to challenge the government or even engage in sustained negotiations regarding the oil sector and the distribution of royalties. In the following section, I explain how the Bunyoro's leadership troubles hinder the kingdom's ability to successfully negotiate favourable terms with regard to oil sector benefits.

### **The Emergence of the Oil Industry and the Bunyoro Kingdom's Unmet Expectations**

As the host region, Bunyoro leadership and subjects alike share high expectations of the oil industry and its potential benefits. Bunyoro demands for special consideration, however, are incompatible with the interests of the governing coalition. The kingdom has been marginalised from prevailing governance arrangements since the inception of the petroleum sector. The kingdom's claim over oil deposits is justified by its historical and customary ownership of the land on which the oil deposits are located. The kingdom traces its origins to the area to the 15<sup>th</sup> century, well before British colonisation and the subsequent establishment of the Uganda Republic in 1962.

Bunyoro claims, however, have a tenuous legal basis. The Bunyoro kingdom's former King, Tito Gafabusa Winyi IV, entered into what became known as the Bunyoro Agreement with the Governor of colonial Uganda, Sir Andrew Benjamin Cohen, in September 1955. Article 36 of the Agreement states that,

In the event of any mineral development taking place a substantial part of the mineral royalties and the revenue from mining leases shall be paid to the Native Government of Bunyoro-Kitara.<sup>606</sup>

In 2009, a lawyer and former member of the Bunyoro kingdom's administration, Shem Byakagaba, argued that this agreement still possesses legal force despite being signed during the colonial era since it was never formally annulled.<sup>607</sup> In 2012, Omukama Iguru announced that oil companies violated this 1955 Agreement when they began conducting exploration activities without consulting the kingdom.<sup>608</sup> The Ugandan government submitted that the agreement was null and void. Further, the government contended that it had invited the participation of Bunyoro leadership in the multi-stakeholder exercise that led to the National Oil and Gas Policy in 2008. In 2006, Bunyoro King Solomon Iguru had appointed a team of representatives to participate in the consultative meetings carried out by the MEMD. The team included the King's Private Secretary, Yoram Nsamba, then-Mineral Wealth Minister George Kyaligonza and then-kingdom Spokesman Henry Ford Miriima. Despite the participation of Bunyoro, the National Oil and Gas Policy neither took into account the kingdom's demand for at least 12,5% of oil revenue, nor does afforded it any

---

<sup>606</sup> "The Bunyoro Agreement, 1955" (Government of The United Kingdom and Uganda Protectorate, September 3, 1955).

<sup>607</sup> See: New Vision, "Why Is Bunyoro Demanding a Share of Oil Money?," New Vision, May 1, 2009.

<sup>608</sup> See exclusive interview here: Oil In Uganda, "Colonial Agreement on Resources Still Stands, Says Bunyoro King | Oil In Uganda," Oil in Uganda, June 20, 2012, <https://oilinuganda.org/features/land/colonial-agreement-on-resources-still-stands-says-bunyoro-king/>.

special recognition, much to the kingdom's consternation. The then Prime Minister, Yebezi Kiiza accused the central government and oil companies of secrecy and of excluding the kingdom from the negotiations to establish production sharing and revenue sharing agreements.<sup>609</sup> In 2009, the Omukama demanded that the Ugandan government assign the kingdom at least one oil exploration block and to pay royalties on the rest of the oil wells in the region on the basis of the 1955 Agreement.<sup>610</sup>

The kingdom feels entitled to oil revenues due to the fact its communities will bear the brunt of the petroleum sector's negative impacts. Receiving a share of the revenues could help the kingdom mitigate the risk to human livelihoods, including air, land, and water pollution, the loss of agricultural land, and diminished access to fisheries on Lake Albert.<sup>611</sup> As discussed in Chapter 5, several communities have faced resettlement due to the construction of roads and other oil-related infrastructure. The oil sector, in this way, disrupts communities' way of life and social relations. Some have lost access to livelihood sources such as pastureland and fisheries, resulting in increased poverty levels and food insecurity.<sup>612</sup> Oil exploration and extraction also results in significant adverse environmental consequences. With oil extraction comes gas flaring wherein the excess gas that naturally coexists with oil deposits is burned off. This process contributes to increased temperatures due to the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, disrupting the ecological balance of affected areas.<sup>613</sup> Gas flaring releases other chemical compounds into the air such as methane and sulphur,

---

<sup>609</sup> Edward Ssekika, "Oil Cash: Bunyoro Plans to Invoke 1955 Agreement," August 6, 2009, <https://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/4530-oil-cash-bunyoro-plans-to-invoke-1955-agreement>.

<sup>610</sup> Ssekika.

<sup>611</sup> Musiime Chris Byaruhanga, "Expecting Eldorado? An Analysis of Ugandans' Expectations of Their Country's Oil Wealth," Centre for Research on Peace and Development Working Paper No. 67 (2018): 1–16.

<sup>612</sup> Annette Kuteesa, "Local Communities and Oil Discoveries: A Study in Uganda's Albertine Graben Region," Brookings (blog), February 25, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/02/25/local-communities-and-oil-discoveries-a-study-in-ugandas-albertine-graben-region/>.

<sup>613</sup> Kris Christen, *Environmental Impacts of Gas Flaring, Venting Add Up* (ACS Publications, 2004).

which are associated with respiratory ailments. Oil extraction also creates the risk of water contamination due to spills and the seepage of chemicals. Like in the case of the Niger Delta in Nigeria, the bulk of Uganda's oil deposits are located beneath a freshwater lake (Lake Albert), heightening the risks of pollution.<sup>614</sup> The lake is a major source of livelihoods for the region's fishing communities and so contamination poses a serious danger to environmental and human health. Some of the roads and oil installations are also located in protected nature reserves which disrupts wildlife. The noise from construction, including rock blasting, has driven away animals from Murchison Falls, a protected wildlife reserve and negatively impacted tourism.<sup>615</sup>

The Bunyoro kingdom expected to obtain special budgetary support from the central government for development projects, including the construction of an affordable and reliable electricity supply for domestic and commercial purposes.<sup>616</sup> The kingdom also demanded that its subjects receive preferential access to jobs in the oil sector to help address the longstanding problem of unemployment, especially among its youth. In addition, the kingdom's leadership requested that all oil companies operating in the region appoint Bunyoro representatives to their corporate boards, to ensure that Bunyoro interests are met at all stages of the value chain.<sup>617</sup> These expectations have yet to be fulfilled. The kingdom believes that "outsiders" have mainly benefitted from employment opportunities, with expatriate workers occupying the few highly skilled jobs. Meanwhile, oil revenues have exclusively accrued to political elites in the central government.<sup>618</sup>

---

<sup>614</sup> Collins NC Ugochukwu and Jürgen Ertel, "Negative Impacts of Oil Exploration on Biodiversity Management in the Niger De Area of Nigeria," *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 26, no. 2 (2008): 139–147.

<sup>615</sup> Catrina A. MacKenzie et al., "Drilling through Conservation Policy: Oil Exploration in Murchison Falls Protected Area, Uganda," *Conservation and Society* 15, no. 3 (2017): 322.

<sup>616</sup> Kiiza, Bategeka, and Ssewanyana, "Righting Resources-Curse Wrongs in Uganda."

<sup>617</sup> Kiiza, Bategeka, and Ssewanyana.

<sup>618</sup> Tumusiime, Mawejje, and Byakagaba, "Discovery of Oil."

Uganda's power configurations undermine the Bunyoro kingdom's ability to access oil wealth. As discussed in Chapter 4, the governing NRM coalition systematically thwarts the growth of any sub-state group that could potentially challenge regime stability. Extending 12,5% of oil revenue, potentially amounting to several billions of dollars, to the Bunyoro could strengthen the kingdom's political position as a nation within a state and considerably, creating an unstable situation. In this scenario, Bunyoro could potentially upset the prevailing political settlement by challenging the NRM regime. With regard to employment, the capital and skills intensive nature of the oil industry means few jobs are created along the petroleum value chain.<sup>619</sup> As James Ferguson argues, oil is a "point source" resource that generates "enclave economic development" in Africa with limited benefits for the broader population due to the oil sector's limited linkages with other aspects of the economy.<sup>620</sup> This is true for both offshore and onshore oil extraction. In the next section, I discuss the Bunyoro kingdom's engagement with Uganda's governing coalition.

### **The Bunyoro Kingdom and the NRM: From Confrontation to Nascent Strategic Coexistence**

Since its restoration in 1993, the Bunyoro kingdom has been excluded from the governing coalition but enjoyed the benefits of political patronage nonetheless. As described earlier, Museveni's government restored some assets to the kingdom which renewed the Bunyoro's sense of ethno-nationhood. The central government also agreed to pay a salary and other benefits to the King. The kingdom complied with the

---

<sup>619</sup> Philippe Le Billon, "Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 98, no. 2 (April 15, 2008): 345–72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600801922422>.

<sup>620</sup> Ferguson, "Seeing like an Oil Company."

terms of the restoration, which defined kingdoms as cultural, not political institutions. Unlike Buganda, Bunyoro neither participated in national politics nor developed its own governance capacity. However, the discovery of oil altered the kingdom's political calculations and produced a desire to overcome its marginality. The kingdom adopted a combative stance when the government declined to accommodate the Bunyoro's demands for a 12,5% share of oil revenue in the National Oil and Gas Policy in 2008. Bunyoro leaders insisted on their involvement in government negotiations with oil companies and an end to secrecy around the industry. The kingdom's gradual adoption of a confrontational approach translated to an attempt to reshape the governing political settlement. Although the aggressive rhetoric was a show of the kingdom's holding power; its posturing, however, was ultimately insufficient to challenge the NRM regime.

For example, in August 2009 the kingdom criticised the government's refusal to share details of revenue sharing agreements signed with oil companies and the Bunyoro's exclusion from negotiation processes. Then-Private Secretary to the Omukama, Yolam Nsamba, shared,

Why should we be ignored in the oil policy, in the arrangement for sharing royalties? The central government is behaving as if Bunyoro never existed, as if it has no obligation to Bunyoro, we are not happy, no doubt about that.<sup>621</sup>

President Museveni subsequently created the Bunyoro Affairs Ministry in 2011 which the kingdom considered a notable concession, albeit its symbolism as a gesture of

---

<sup>621</sup> Statement quoted in: Ssekika, "Oil Cash: Bunyoro Plans to Invoke 1955 Agreement."

“affirmative action.”<sup>622</sup> The creation of Bunyoro Affairs Ministry also fulfilled a campaign promised made by President Museveni in the 2011 elections. Museveni indicated that the Ministry would champion the kingdom’s interests in government and thus incorporate the kingdom into the governing coalition. The creation of this new agency, however, did not lead the government to grant the kingdom access to oil revenue or even to increase its representation in oil governance structures. As such, the Bunyoro kingdom remained outside the political settlement. Museveni’s appointment of a non-Munyoro Minister, Kamba Ssale, as the inaugural Bunyoro Affairs Minister revealed the President’s reluctance to concede political control. The President reversed this appointment after vociferous criticism from the kingdom, resulting in the subsequent appointment of Ernest Kiiza, a Munyoro, as Minister in 2013. Nevertheless, the Ministry continues to function as a symbolic institution rather than as a vehicle for the transfer of tangible political and monetary benefits to the Bunyoro kingdom, especially as it pertains to oil.<sup>623</sup>

The kingdom recognized this fact early on and made repeat efforts to escalate the ‘stakes’ so as to threaten ruling coalition’s interest and thus the governing political settlement. On June 1, 2012, King Solomon Iguru staged the most dramatic expression of the kingdom’s demands yet in an attempt to force the government’s hand on the oil issue. The King made an unscheduled appearance before the Natural Resources Committee of Parliament during the debates on the drafting of new petroleum laws and presented a petition demanding a 12,5% royalty. Iguru was accompanied by then-

---

<sup>622</sup> Museveni uses such special ministries, located in the Prime Minister’s office as vehicles for patronage for various regions that are regarded as having considerable need. Other “affirmative action ministries” include the Ministry of Teso Affairs, Karamoja Affairs, Northern Uganda, and Luwero-Rwenzori affairs.

<sup>623</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, “Support to Bunyoro Development,” Office of the Prime Minister, November 3, 2019, <https://opm.go.ug/support-to-bunyoro-development/>.

Prime Minister Jackson Nsamba Kasozi.<sup>624</sup> According to Bunyoro cultural practice, Kings must not appear before Parliament or any institution of government and must take meetings at the Palace only.<sup>625</sup> The aforementioned incident, though highly unusual and unprecedented, was a deliberate move by Iguru to demonstrate the kingdom's resolve. The kingdom also disseminated incendiary rhetoric in the aftermath of the king's appearance to counter government criticism of its demand for a share of oil revenues. Then-Bunyoro Spokesman Henry Ford Miriima stated,

Previously the king wouldn't have gone to parliament but would rather have just declared war. The President is taking the kingdom and the people of Bunyoro for a ride. You can't tell us that the demand for a share of royalties from oil is premature when the bills are in Parliament. The Omukama is planning to storm Parliament again in case the kingdom's demand is not granted.<sup>626</sup>

A youth leader in the Bunyoro kingdom, Allan Bamuha, issued an equally combative public statement:

We all know that this [oil] is a national resource. But Bunyoro as a region is bound to suffer the negative effects of oil drilling, which will automatically lead to environmental degradation, and for that matter, the Bunyoro deserves special attention... Bunyoro must get the 12,5% shares, and that should not be debatable, conquer or die is the Kabalega's motto. Enough is enough!<sup>627</sup>

---

<sup>624</sup> Henry Sekanjako, "Bunyoro King Storms Parliament Over Oil Revenue," *New Vision*, June 1, 2012, [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1302151/bunyoro-king-storms-parliament-oil-revenue](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1302151/bunyoro-king-storms-parliament-oil-revenue).

<sup>625</sup> Sekanjako.

<sup>626</sup> See quotation in Emma Mutaizibwa and Edward Ssekika, "The Observer - Uganda," *The Observer - Uganda*, June 21, 2012, [https://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=19407:bunyoro-angry-with-museveni-on-oil-sharing](https://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19407:bunyoro-angry-with-museveni-on-oil-sharing).

<sup>627</sup> Mutaizibwa and Ssekika.

The former principal secretary to the Omukama, Yolamu Nsamba, also dismissed notions that the kingdom lacked the technical capacity to manage oil revenues:

They may eat our money like they are eating government money. We have the capacity. The kingdom has existed for over 600 years under Babiito, and 2000 years in history. If we did not have capacity, how were we surviving? The British came yesterday, they found this kingdom existing and already working.<sup>628</sup>

The kingdom's combative approach stemmed from the fear that the government, widely regarded as corrupt, would deprive the region of oil revenues for the benefit of the ruling party and its supporters at the expense of Banyoro.<sup>629</sup> Nevertheless, Bunyoro rhetoric was not backed up with concrete action; the kingdom did not possess sufficient holding power to compel the governing coalition to grants its demands. The redistribution of power in post-colonial Uganda has only occurred through armed violence, a capacity not held by the Bunyoro kingdom. The potential for mass opposition against the ruling NRM party is a source of power possessed by the kingdom but not deployed. Public demonstrations and a campaign to swing the regional vote in favour of opposition parties in the next election, for example, could have potentially redistributed power in the country and incentivised concessions from the governing coalition.

---

<sup>628</sup> Oil In Uganda, "Colonial Agreement on Resources Still Stands, Says Bunyoro King | Oil In Uganda."

<sup>629</sup> For example, see: Mwenda and Tangri, "Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda"; Mwenda, "Personalizing Power in Uganda"; Tripp, Museveni's Uganda.

Internal disagreements over strategy, however, resulted in the kingdom's failure to sustain a coordinated and forceful attack, and contributed to the eventual acquiescence of the Bunyoro Kingdom. Kingdom Spokesman Henry Ford Miriima stated that internal divisions, along with the failure of legislators from the region to adequately represent the kingdom's interests in Parliament, compelled the King's drastic action to appear before the Ugandan parliament.<sup>630</sup> Lawyer and former senior Bunyoro leader Shem Byakagaba criticized the move as an "unnecessary embarrassment" that conveyed desperation. In his view, the kingdom failed to effectively and appropriately employ its own institutions and channels of influence to achieve its objectives.<sup>631</sup>

The governing coalition remained unaffected by Bunyoro rhetoric and the King's appearance in Parliament. The durability and superior holding power of the ruling regime, together with the Bunyoro's limited capacity for altering power configurations, compelled the kingdom to revert to the marginalised position it held within the political settlement prior to the discovery of oil. A Bunyoro Cabinet Minister confirmed this fact during an interview, sharing that,

The kingdom currently enjoys cordial relations with the government, although there were tensions at the beginning. The king's trip to Parliament in 2012 shows the level of tensions that we had then... Bunyoro has a history of fighting and challenging opponents, we are not weak. We also have leverage, we can mobilise the masses if need be, and use other available tools like the law, our legislators, and so on to achieve our objectives. But the kingdom does not wish

---

<sup>630</sup> Mutaizibwa and Ssekika, "The Observer - Uganda."

<sup>631</sup> Mutaizibwa and Ssekika.

to use force and violence to engage the government, we prefer dialogue... also, these days we have more engagement with all the stakeholders, like oil companies, non-governmental organisations, and the government itself.<sup>632</sup>

The governing coalition has relied upon its institutional sources of power to squash Bunyoro challenges to the political settlement. As discussed in Chapter 5, Article 244 of the Constitution vests ownership of mineral resources to the central government on behalf of all Ugandans.<sup>633</sup> This Article precludes the Bunyoro kingdom or any other group from claiming legal entitlement over natural resources, rendering the 1955 Bunyoro Agreement null and void. That said, Section 75 of the Public Finance and Management Act (2015) provides a modest concession in the form of revenue sharing. Cultural institutions in the regions affected by oil production are owed 1% of oil royalties. However, this section does not mention the Bunyoro kingdom specifically, nor does it indicate the exact amounts and procedures for allocating oil revenues. This ambiguity imposes limits on the kingdom's bargaining power. This Article also partly accounts for the decision of some Bagungu leaders to clamour for a secession from the Bunyoro kingdom, since the status of being an independent cultural entity increases the likelihood of one receiving oil revenues. The government has not yet paid out any royalties since oil production has not begun. If the Bunyoro kingdom possessed sufficient holding power perhaps it could extract concession from the government through the introduction of new legislation. For example, parliament could amend the Constitution to accord the Bunyoro and host communities a special status in relation to oil royalties. The government could have operationalised Section 75 of the PFMA

---

<sup>632</sup> Interview, Bunyoro cabinet member, [MGMI], Hoima, June 2018.

<sup>633</sup>This is a standard feature of all resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with the notable exception of the Bafokeng kingdom in South Africa, which successfully litigated its ownership of platinum mines in the country's north west region partly because of the country's transition from apartheid to majority rule. For more information on the kingdom, see Susan E. Cook, "Chiefs, Kings, Corporatization, and Democracy: A South African Case Study," *Brown J. World Aff.* 12 (2005): 125.

to allocate a higher percentage of royalties to the Bunyoro kingdom. The law was employed instead to deprive the kingdom access to oil revenue, thus precluding it from elevating its holding power in the prevailing political settlement.

Although the kingdom acknowledges these limitations, it remains intent on receiving a share of oil revenues. In an interview, kingdom spokesman Francis Mugerwa said:

The kingdom is still engaging in ongoing negotiations with the government on the issue of 12,5% royalties. The 1% that is codified in legislation is a good starting point, we see it as a springboard for further demands.<sup>634</sup>

The kingdom is in the process of shifting from a position of marginality to strategic coexistence by prioritizing the development of its political and economic institutions. In January 2018, a new Bunyoro Prime Minister was appointed, Andrew Kirungi Byakutaaga. Byakutaaga is a petroleum geoscientist and taxation expert whose goal is to reframe the kingdom's oil sector strategy. The Prime Minister also created his own task force focused on reorganizing the kingdom's administrative and financial institutions and developing 30-year Development Plan.<sup>635</sup> Members of the task force include political leaders, academics, and business professionals, such as Edgar Isingoma, a senior partner in the multinational auditing firm KPMG; professors from Makerere University Business School (Vincent Bagire and Fred Muhumuza); Uganda Management Institute lecturer Dr. Sylvester Kugonza; petroleum geologist Abdul Byakagaba; and the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) Board Chairman, Patrick

---

<sup>634</sup> Interview, Bunyoro kingdom spokesman, Francis Mugerwa, Hoima, June 2018.

<sup>635</sup> Francis Mugerwa, "Bunyoro King Swears in New Prime Minister," Daily Monitor, January 19, 2018, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-king-swears-in-new-prime-minister/688334-4269338-j35813/index.html>.

Kaberenge.<sup>636</sup> A Kampala-based academic and advisor to the kingdom recognized the task force as a necessary and long overdue initiative:

The [kingdom] leadership is only starting now to get organized and trying to build capacity---we neither had the institutional capacity, nor the spirit of nationalism to help us mount an appropriate response to the discovery of oil. This is partly influenced by the kingdom's choices after the restoration in 1993—they mainly focused on cultural affairs, and not the quality of our political institutions. Now we are rebuilding our political institutions, and we will start from the sub-county level upwards.<sup>637</sup>

For the Bunyoro kingdom, strategic coexistence holds more promise than a confrontational approach in terms of realising economic benefits and transforming the political settlement. The kingdom has limited institutional and financial capacity currently; it ought to develop its business activities around the oil sector such as logistics, hospitality and tourism, and food if it wishes to access opportunities for development. This strategy does not require the kingdom to challenge the governing coalition but allows it to increase its holding power in the interim. The strength of the Bunyoro kingdom lies in its ethno-national nature and the considerable degree of guaranteed political support it receives from the majority of its subjects. The kingdom's social and cultural capital could translate into the financial capital needed for business investment in oil spin-off activities. For example, the kingdom could engage in further cultural fundraising such as the "Omuganda" initiative mentioned earlier<sup>638</sup> or something like the Buganda kingdom's 'Etofaali' successful fundraising

---

<sup>636</sup> Mugerwa.

<sup>637</sup> Interview, academic and member of the Bunyoro Royal Commission, [BPMP], Kampala, May 2019.

<sup>638</sup> Mugerwa, "Bunyoro Launches Omuganda Campaign."

campaign that raised over \$828,000 in 2013 alone. The kingdom's ability to access to oil revenue is dependent upon its institutional potential. By elevating its holding power in the interim, the Bunyoro kingdom can better participate in political coalitions and possibility challenge the NRM regime in a potential future transitional settlement.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the ways in which the Bunyoro kingdom has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to shift Uganda's exclusive political settlement. The Bunyoro have made forceful demands for their inclusion in the oil sector, including their request for a 12,5% royalty. If granted, such a royalty would strengthen the kingdom's holding power and its status as a nation within a state, leading to a potential redistribution of power between the governing coalition and the kingdom. This transfer of holding power did not occur in practice. The kingdom was unable to secure concessions from the central government due to the strength and durability of the NRM regime and the kingdom's corresponding limited holding power. Historical and institutional factors, namely the Bunyoro's administrative weakness, its internal divisions, and its rural locality, forced the kingdom to revert to its marginal position in the oil assemblage and in the political settlement at large. As of 2018, the kingdom has begun to shift towards a state of strategic coexistence so as to slowly build the kingdom's holding power, emblemised by the appointment of a new prime minister who is an expert in the oil sector and a cabinet intent on increasing the Bunyoro's participation in the oil economy. A comparative discussion of the Buganda kingdom's practises of strategic coexistence in the next chapter provides insight into the possible outcomes of Bunyoro's new-found approach to engaging the governing coalition.

**CHAPTER 7: THE BUGANDA AND THE NRM EXCLUSIVE SETTLEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE****Introduction**

This chapter provides a comparative account of the Buganda kingdom's political settlement with the NRM coalition in the post-oil discovery period relative to the relationship between the Bunyoro kingdom and the central government discussed in the preceding chapter. The Buganda kingdom is incorporated into the oil complex, albeit marginally. The EACOP passes through some of the Buganda kingdom's districts, and the primary distribution terminal for finished oil products and feeder pipelines is located in Mpigi, within Buganda territory. As discussed in earlier chapters, Buganda has been more central than Bunyoro in shaping Uganda's political settlements since the advent of colonial rule. Whereas the Bunyoro kingdom's activities since the discovery of oil has been geared towards accessing revenue derived from the sector since 2009, the Buganda kingdom's primary objective is its re-establishment as a semi-autonomous federal entity, a status that it previously possessed in the first four years of independence from 1962-1966. Like Bunyoro, Buganda failed to secure concessions from the ruling NRM regime because of the governing regime's desire to subjugate and exclude sub-state organisations from the governing settlement. However, unlike Bunyoro, Buganda's failure to shift power configurations in Uganda's political settlement led to its more skilful use of strategic coexistence, especially since 2013. This approach increased the kingdom's holding power and its future capacity to participate in a transitional settlement. The first section of this chapter discusses the political institutions of the Buganda kingdom and its corresponding holding power as the strongest kingdom in Uganda. Despite institutional similarities between the two kingdoms, Buganda more effectively

developed and deployed its institutional capacity to promote its interests vis-à-vis the NRM regime. The second section examines the kingdom's strategies for attaining its goals relative to Bunyoro. The third section analyses the kingdom's shifting approach to engagement with the governing coalition in the post-oil discovery era, from confrontation to a state of strategic coexistence, explaining how these strategies elevated its holding power.

### **Buganda's Political Architecture and Sources of Power**

The people of Buganda are known as "Baganda" or Muganda in the singular. "Luganda" is the kingdom's vernacular. The Buganda kingdom is by far the largest ethno-nation in Uganda, with a population of 10 million. It possesses several sources of power that account for its pre-eminent position in Uganda's political settlement relative to the Bunyoro kingdom. The kingdom's traditions, institutional capacity, geographical location, population size, and strong sense of nationhood are the primary factors that constitute its holding power. These sources of power are interwoven and continually interact to maintain the kingdom's dominant status in Uganda's national politics. Although Bunyoro shares some of these factors, such as traditions, a population, and administrative institutions, Buganda has made more skilful use of these elements than Bunyoro. The Buganda kingdom's political power and legitimacy is rooted in the cultural traditions and narratives of ethno-nationhood that bind the kingdom and its ten million subjects together. Traditions are to the kingdoms what national identity and pride are to a juridical nation-state. Traditions are the fundamental beliefs and practices that provide meaning to individual and collective identities in an ethno-national community and thus serve as an effective

political tool.<sup>639</sup> Kings and chiefs embody and champion the practice and preservation of the kingdom's cultural values, accounting for the subjects' political loyalties to the traditional leadership and cultural institutions. Traditions are also malleable and evolve over time, allowing kingdom leadership to reshape and reinvent their ideational and physical aspects for political survival. The enduring nature of traditions and the depth with which they are entrenched in subjects' individual and collective identities accounts for the continuity of traditional kingdoms throughout Uganda's processes of state formation.

Tradition is a key source of power for the Buganda kingdom; its exceptional ethno-nationalistic spirit is a distinguishing feature. The Baganda are the largest ethno-national population in Uganda, representing approximately 22% of the country's total population.<sup>640</sup> The factors that account for the strength and resilience of the Buganda's sense of nationalism include its privileged position during colonialism, the participation of its leaders in national politics in the post-colonial era, and the kingdom's ability to galvanise its subjects through regular cultural activities.<sup>641</sup> The kingdom views itself as Uganda's pre-eminent society in part due its role within the colonial administration as a 'nation within a state.' Scholars such as David Apter, Pierre Englebert, Tom Goodfellow, and Stefan Lindeman argue that the force of "Buganda nationalism" drives the kingdom's enduring desire to re-establish itself as a semi- autonomous region of Uganda and its continual engagement with successive governing regimes in pursuit of this goal.<sup>642</sup>

---

<sup>639</sup> Jan M. Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).

<sup>640</sup> Englebert, "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa."

<sup>641</sup> Golooba-Mutebi, "Settling the Buganda Question."

<sup>642</sup> Pierre Englebert, 'Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 3 (2002): 345–368; Tom Goodfellow and Stefan Lindemann, 'The Clash of Institutions: Traditional Authority, Conflict and the Failure of 'Hybridity' in Buganda', *Commonwealth &*

Informal and formal interviews with members of the Buganda kingdom also reveal a shared sense of ethno-national pride. Several of the interviewees remarked on the Baganda's distinction of being the 'original occupants' of the present-day Uganda, referring to the fact that 'Uganda' is an adulterated form of the kingdom's name. Ethnic cleavages created by political competition in Uganda in the post-independence era, as discussed in Chapter 4, amplify Buganda ethno-nationalism. The NRM coalition is dominated by the Banyankole-Bahima group from the country's south-western region and other ethnicities in Uganda. Ethnic groups left out of the exclusive settlement often rebuke their marginalisation. Citizens identify as Ugandan and recognise state authority and legitimacy, but value their ethno-national identities, that provide for the foundational aspects of human life such as language and culture. These elements constitute an important source of power and political affiliation for the kingdom. Pierre Englebert describes this as the 'compartmentalisation of allegiance,' that this, the bifurcation of identity in post-colonial politics whereby ethnicity serves as a foundation for struggle.<sup>643</sup>

The kingdom organizes several events and activities which contribute to identity construction and cultural preservation, and which nurture the sense of Buganda nationalism. Despite conducting similar, but fewer, activities, the Banyoro have not garnered significant power through these activities in comparison to the Buganda. The Buganda kingdom holds over 30 events and functions throughout the year, including the annual "Amatikkira Jubireewo" celebration to commemorate the coronation of the King (currently Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II). The event is usually

---

*Comparative Politics* 51, no. 1 (2013): 3–26; David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Routledge, 2013).

<sup>643</sup> Englebert, 'Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa'.

held at the Buganda King's ceremonial palace, the Lubiiri in Kampala's Mengo District, or in other parts of the kingdom. The ceremony involves the Chiefs (Amasaza) from the kingdom's 18 counties publicly reaffirming their loyalty to the Kabaka. The Kabaka invites another king to the annual celebrations as the guest of honour. For instance, he invited the King (Asantehene) of Ghana's Ashanti Kingdom to the 2018 Jubireewo, which I attended and observed during my fieldwork. Both the Kabaka and Asantehene's speeches spoke to the importance of traditional kingdoms in modern life and criticised corruption in Uganda's national politics. The Buganda kingdom also conducts charitable activities, including an annual major soccer tournament known as the Masaza Cup in which players from the kingdom's 18 counties compete, as well as the Kabaka's annual Birthday Charity Run which celebrates the King's birthday and raises funds for various causes in the kingdom. Several private companies sponsor these events, reflecting the connections between the kingdom and the private sector. These events promote political cohesion and enhance the organisational strength of the Buganda kingdom, allowing it to maintain a predominant position in Ugandan politics.

Despite its elevated holding power relative to other kingdoms, the Buganda kingdom is not a politically homogenous, conflict-free society. It has also experienced intra-kingdom fissures like the Bunyoro kingdom, albeit with varying causal factors and political consequences. There are important divisions and conflicting interests among influential social groups within the kingdom. The most influential group is the royal family, descendants of former Baganda kings. The Mutesa family is currently in power.<sup>644</sup> Other influential groups include the heads of the kingdom's 52 clans, private landowners, commercial farmers, and younger educated elites who are part of the

---

<sup>644</sup> Englebort.

country's middle class but with no historical or familial ties to the monarchy, commonly known as *'bazukulu'* (literally translated 'grandchildren').

There are also religious cleavages, particularly between Catholics and Protestants, which manifest in the kingdom's politics. David Apter notes that religious differences can be traced to colonial rule when Protestant and Catholic missionaries competed for converts through kings and chiefs and set up competing school systems and parishes.<sup>645</sup> The Buganda monarchy aligned with the Protestant British while non-royalists who opposed the colonial alliance gravitated towards the Catholic faith introduced by French missionaries. This led to the establishment of two different opposition parties at independence in 1962: Kabaka Yekka, consisting of the Protestant/Anglican royalists, and the Democratic Party, mainly composed of Catholics. The Buganda kingdom is composed of 52 clans, some of which were historically a part of the Bunyoro kingdom until the British colonial authorities transferred control of them to the Buganda. Some of counties, such as the Baruuli clan in the Nakasongola district and the Banyala clan in the Kayunga district, forcefully and routinely confront Buganda leadership by asserting their independence from the kingdom, as discussed later in this chapter. Despite these political struggles, the Buganda royal leadership and its cabinets have managed to govern the kingdom and ensure cohesion among the majority of its subjects. The Buganda kingdom has been able to champion its interests more effectively than any other kingdom in Uganda.

The Buganda kingdom's well-defined and resilient administrative institutions account for its political power, unlike Bunyoro's weaker and less organised governing

---

<sup>645</sup> David E. Apter, 'The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda', *World Politics* 13, no. 01 (1960): 45–68.

system. The kingdom's institutional structure resembles that of the Bunyoro and mimics a constitutional monarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is the King (Kabaka) who is the cultural leader of the kingdom and the embodiment of the kingdom's history, traditions, identity, and survival. Any harm to the Kabaka, perceived or real, elicits a passionate response from the Baganda. This sense of ethno-nationhood gives the institution of the Kabakaship considerable political power, parallel to that of the Ugandan President. The Kings do not engage in political dialogue outside of the kingdom's institutions and only make speeches during the kingdom's ceremonies and events. The Prime Minister (Katikkiro) of the kingdom is the second most powerful figure in Buganda's institutional hierarchy. The King appoints the Prime Minister from a pool of eminent Buganda professionals, who also are a part of the kingdom's powerful families with historically close ties to the kingship. The current Prime Minister is Charles Peter Mayiga, a lawyer and businessman. The Prime Minister is the de facto leader of the Buganda government but serves at the King's pleasure. The Prime Minister expresses and amplifies the King's political objectives since traditional kings are disallowed from making overt political statements by Uganda's Constitution.<sup>646</sup>

The Katikkiro chairs the Buganda Cabinet, composed of the King's handpicked ministers, who are either retired or active professionals and who serve the kingdom on a voluntary basis. Considerable prestige is attached to the position of a Cabinet Minister. The Cabinet acts as the kingdom's brain trust, informing its strategies and strengthening its political and institutional capacity. The portfolios of Cabinet Ministers resemble that of a state, including land, public infrastructure, information, health, finance, and an attorney general. The kingdom also has a Parliament (Lukiiko)

---

<sup>646</sup> For example, senior Buganda official, [KMCB] interviewed in Kampala, July 2018.

which consists of clan elders, district representatives, and chiefs (Amasaza). The Parliament is the kingdom's main forum for discussing all issues pertaining to kingdom affairs. It is a democratic mechanism for interaction between the Chiefs, King, and the kingdom's administration. The Buganda's institutional structure provides the kingdom with a vehicle for formulating its collective objectives in a systematic and sustained manner. This governing system fosters political unity and an administrative efficiency which enables the kingdom to promote its interests in negotiations with the central government and other external actors, thus contributing to its holding power.

The Buganda kingdom employed strategies of extraversion to preserve its institutions in the colonial and post-colonial eras. Its well-defined system of administration served as the foundation of British colonial bureaucracy through the system of indirect rule. Then-Buganda King, Kabaka Mwanga, forged an alliance with the British East Africa Company (BEAC) to protect the kingdom from attacks from Bunyoro, the most powerful kingdom in the region at the time.<sup>647</sup> These strategies of extraversion enabled the Buganda to maintain its political autonomy and its access economic privileges in the face of external domination.<sup>648</sup> As discussed in Chapter 4, the kingdom used strategies of extraversion in securing an alliance with the ruling UPC at independence in 1962, which led to its eventual designation as a semi-autonomous federal region and the appointment of King Kabaka Mutesa II as the first President of Uganda. The Buganda employed similar strategies of extraversion during the transitional settlement that brought the ruling NRM regime into power and which resulted in the restoration of the Buganda and the rest of Uganda's kingdoms in 1993. The Bunyoro

---

<sup>647</sup> David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Routledge, 2013).

<sup>648</sup> Apter.

kingdom, in comparison, proved unable to effectively employ strategies of extraversion to preserve its institutions and promote its interests in the way the Buganda did, accounting for its weaker holding power.

The Buganda kingdom possesses several businesses and social welfare agencies that contribute its holding power by enabling its economic independence and the provision of public goods and services, thereby strengthening the ties between the King and his subjects. For example, the Buganda Land Board is an agency which manages the kingdom's vast land portfolio. It is located in the administrative headquarters (Masengere Building) of the kingdom in Mengo, Kampala and is staffed by a full-time chief executive and administrative staff. The kingdom also owns the Buganda Investments and Commercial Undertakings (BICUL), a holding company that manages its business activities and investments. These businesses are an important source of revenue for the kingdom which contribute to its financial capacity and self-sufficiency, thus limiting Buganda's reliance on the Ugandan government or other external organisations for funding. The kingdom also provides social services to its subjects through the Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF), a non-profit organisation that supports development projects, including health, education, food, agriculture, and community-based entrepreneurship programs. The kingdom fills a governance gap left by the central government which has failed to provide the necessary social services to Ugandan citizens, cementing the Buganda's role as an alternative 'nation,' that is, a source of survival and security.<sup>649</sup> The kingdom is able to command subject loyalty and mobilise its people for various social, economic, and political purposes through such institutions.

---

<sup>649</sup> Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, "Settling the Buganda Question," *Transition: An International Review*, no. 106b (2011): 10–25.

Furthermore, the Buganda kingdom's central geographical location, in proximation to Uganda's capital city of Kampala and surrounding areas, contributes its holding power. As Robert Bates argues, post-colonial African states have "nodes of modernity" or geographical spaces where the material benefits associated with post-colonial modernity are located and accessed.<sup>650</sup> The Buganda kingdom, thus, is at the epicentre of modernity in post-colonial Uganda and has benefitted from this positioning, unlike the rural Bunyoro. The kingdom owns land in and around the capital which has high commercial value and therefore provides an important source of revenue in the form of housing rentals. The kingdom recruits its cabinet and other professional staff from a highly educated pool of candidates, most of whom who are based in the city. The kingdom's leadership are also embedded in the city's political and economic networks which further supports its business ventures and its ability to conduct informal negotiations with members of the governing coalition. Buganda youth constitute the majority of the capital city's urban youth. The large portion of youth who are unemployed and experiencing economic hardship represent a powerful political resource. For instance, the youth ignited mass protests against the government in the 2009 and 2010 riots. This 'reserve' of urban youth makes the kingdom a proximate and potent political threat to the central government. The factors enumerated above give Buganda considerable advantages over Bunyoro as well as other kingdoms in the country.

Unlike Bunyoro, Buganda manage a vast and diversified business portfolio, consisting of a mixture of joint venture partnerships and privately held investments through the

---

<sup>650</sup> Robert H. Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 6, no. 4 (1983): 457-484.

BICUL agency. The kingdom's largest economic asset is land; they are the largest private landowner in Uganda primarily due to their colonial-era cooperation with the British government, when private landholding was introduced for the first time. The vast territory occupied by Baganda subjects bolsters the kingdom's stature as a 'nation within a state.' The Buganda Land Board manages over 10,000 square miles of land in Uganda on behalf of the kingdom.<sup>651</sup> Land ownership is a source of revenue for the kingdom through the development of residential and commercial buildings in Uganda, such as the kingdom's Bulange administrative headquarters in the Mengo suburb of Kampala, Lubiri Palace, and a 180 unit low-cost housing complex under construction in Kampala on the shores of Lake Victoria.<sup>652</sup> The kingdom owns commercial and residential real estate in Kampala suburbs such as Katwe, Makindye, and Mengo.<sup>653</sup> In 2018, it constructed the high-end Mirembe Villas residential estates on the Kigo peninsula near the shores of Lake Victoria in a joint venture between its Namulondo Investments real estate company and a Chinese company, Henan Guoji Industry Group Ltd.<sup>654</sup> The kingdom also launched the Ssentema Housing Project, a low-cost housing initiative for its subjects in Wakiso District on the outskirts of Kampala in 2018.<sup>655</sup> The kingdom is invested in agriculture projects, particularly commercial coffee farming for export,<sup>656</sup> and produces Buganda-branded bottled water and Ngule Beer through a joint venture with Uganda Breweries Limited.<sup>657</sup> It owns a television station (BBS Terefayina), CBS Radio, and a telecommunications company, K2 Telecom. The media outlets enable the kingdom to disseminate

---

<sup>651</sup> Interview, Senior member of the Buganda Land Board, [KMCB], Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>652</sup> Interview, Senior member of the Buganda government, [KNSL], Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>653</sup> Buganda Kingdom, "Why Partner With The Kingdom? Investment Profile" (Buganda Investments and Commercial Undertakings Limited, 2018).

<sup>654</sup> Sharon Kyatusiimire, "Buganda Kingdom Partners With Chinese Firm to Build Low Cost Housing Units | ChimpReports," December 19, 2018, <https://chimpreports.com/buganda-kingdom-partners-with-chinese-firm-to-build-low-cost-housing-units/>.

<sup>655</sup> Kyatusiimire.

<sup>656</sup> Interview, Senior ranking member of the Buganda government, [KNSL], Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>657</sup> Interview, *ibid*.

information directly to its subjects, representing a potent tool for political mobilisation in potential struggles against the central government.

The 'Etofaali' (literally translated to 'brick'<sup>658</sup>) is a voluntary system of annual financial contributions which represents another significant source of income for the kingdom, which is similar to the Bunyoro kingdom's less successful Omuganda system. Since his appointment in 2013, Prime Minister Mayiga has taken countrywide and international tours to solicit funds from Baganda. The kingdom invests the funds in projects such as the reconstruction of the royal Kasubi Tombs, a mausoleum which contains the remains of Buganda kings. An arson attack destroyed the tombs in 2010 and reconstruction has been ongoing. The Etofaali programme also bankrolled the construction of a new Masengere administrative building (the kingdom's headquarters in Bulange, Mengo) and other real estate projects, such as the Muganziwazza commercial building.<sup>659</sup> Mayiga raised a total of Shs 3 billion (approximately US\$ 828,000) during the first Etofaali campaign of 2013 and Shs 161 million (approximately US\$ 44,178) in 2016.<sup>660</sup> The Etofaali is a lucrative source of revenue for the kingdom and an effective form of voluntary taxation that increases the cohesiveness of the kingdom as a political entity. Etofaali buttresses the social contract between kingdom leadership and subjects in the way that formal tax systems do between the state and the public.

These independent sources of revenue enable the Buganda kingdom to achieve autonomy from the central government. A high ranking official from Buganda said

---

<sup>658</sup> The term is based on the idea that each person contributes a brick to build the shared house, and in this case, individual contributions would contribute to the kingdom's projects, some of which involved real estate development.

<sup>659</sup> Edward Bindhe, "Premier Mayiga Refuses to Call Off Etofaali Project :: Uganda Radio Network," December 4, 2014, <https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/premier-mayiga-refuses-to-call-off-etofaali-project>.

<sup>660</sup> Bindhe.

that the kingdom plans to become financially self-sufficient by 2030.<sup>661</sup> The Buganda kingdom currently pays for the King's salary and benefits, rather than accepting the Shs 5 million (USD\$1,357) monthly salary that is paid by the central government to all recognised traditional Kings in Uganda.<sup>662</sup> This refusal to accept state patronage provides the kingdom with more leverage and clout in its ongoing negotiations with the government. A veteran member of Buganda's leadership said in an interview that the Ugandan government continually tries to "purchase" the kingdom's support, including through the appointment of prominent Baganda into government positions:

The government tries to patronise the country's kingdoms, especially ours with gifts and money. We have chosen to remain independent, but [President] Museveni tried to co-opt some former Buganda cabinet ministers into his government, such as former youth and tourism minister Florence Kiyingi (appointed as state minister for youth and children's affairs in 2017), and former Buganda minister for education, Chrystestom Muyingo (appointed as state minister for primary education in 2015). He also appoints Baganda as Vice Presidents, such as (the current vice president) Edward Kiwanuka Ssekandi, and former Vice Presidents Gilbert Bukenya (2003-2007), and Samson Kisekka (1991-1994). However, by and large, our senior leaders have resisted co-option.<sup>663</sup>

The kingdom's annual budget illustrates the kingdom's significant financial capacity. The kingdom's Finance Minister Waggwa Nsibirwa presented a Shs 73 billion (approximately USD \$20 million) budget for the 2016/2017 financial year, Shs 96 billion (approximately US \$26 million) for the 2018/19 year, and Shs 121 billion

---

<sup>661</sup> Interview, Senior ranking member of the Buganda government, [KNSL], Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>662</sup> Ibid.

<sup>663</sup> Ibid.

(approximately USD\$33 million) for the 2019/2020 year.<sup>664</sup> These figures also reflect the magnitude of the kingdom's earnings through its various business ventures. The kingdom directs its fiscal spending towards real estate development, commercial agriculture, social welfare, health infrastructure, and educational institutions such as the Muteesa Royal University, Lubiri Secondary School, and the Kabaka's Education Fund which provides scholarships to Baganda.<sup>665</sup> These investments in social welfare heighten subject loyalty to the kingdom and increase the ability of its leadership to mobilise the population for political or economic causes when needed.

These factors enumerated above account for the Buganda kingdom's elevated holding power relative to Bunyoro and the rest of the traditional kingdoms in Uganda. Buganda has periodically deployed its holding power against the government in a bid to secure its political and economic interests, albeit with limited success, leading to the adoption of strategic coexistence. Like Bunyoro, the Buganda kingdom attempted to shift the country's governing political settlement but for a different reason: it seeks to re-establish itself as a federal region. The reinstatement of the Buganda as a semi-autonomous federal region would effectively reconfigure the distribution of power in Uganda. The governing coalition, however, would not allow such a policy to pass, because it would put the NRM regime at a disadvantage. I now turn to an analysis of the Buganda's political and economic interests in the post-oil discovery era and then discuss the kingdom's interactions with the governing coalition in pursuit of these interests.

---

<sup>664</sup> Jeffrey Lule, "Buganda Passes Sh73b Budget," June 21, 2016, [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1427532/buganda-passes-sh73bn-budget](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1427532/buganda-passes-sh73bn-budget); Buganda Kingdom, "Buganda passes a budget of UGX 96 BN FOR FY 2018/19 - Buganda Royal Kingdom," July 9, 2018, <https://www.buganda.or.ug/index.php/news/909-buganda-passes-a-budget-of-ugx-96-bn-for-fy-2018-19>; Buganda Kingdom, "Buganda Kingdom Pass Budget Worth 121bn for Financial Year 2019/2020 - Buganda Royal Kingdom," 2019, <http://www.buganda.or.ug/index.php/news/975-just-in-buganda-kingdom-pass-budget-worth-121bn>.

<sup>665</sup> Lule, "Buganda Passes Sh73b Budget."

**The Buganda's Political and Economic Interests: 'Federo' and 'ebyaffe'**

The Buganda kingdom's primary goal is its restoration as a federal region (*'federo'* in Luganda) and the return of its properties and assets (*'ebyaffe'* or 'our things' in Luganda) from the government. The kingdom began negotiating its restoration as a semi-autonomous federal region in 1991 with President Museveni. The Buganda kingdom possessed federal status during the colonial period, which it retained at independence in 1962 whereas the Toro, Busoga, and Bunyoro kingdoms held only semi-federal status.<sup>666</sup> Buganda's maintenance of federal status at independence resulted from its aggressive bargaining, and capacity for skilful negotiating, and its sense of exceptionalism. The kingdom threatened to secede from the newly independent Uganda state, arguing that the Kabaka was the supreme and legitimate political authority and thus he could not submit to the authority of an elected President.<sup>667</sup> At the same time, the kingdom's royal elite sought to maintain their colonial-era privileges, particularly their ownership of land and control of the kingdom's finances. This group included the family of King Mutesa II, who was king at independence in 1962, as well as the chiefs, clan heads, landowners, commercial farmers, and property holders whose economic interests would suffer if the kingdom lost its autonomy.<sup>668</sup>

The move towards federalism in contemporary Uganda would have considerable political implications for prevailing power configurations and the exclusive political settlement. Federalism would afford the Buganda kingdom the exclusive power to: legislate with regard to the institution of the Kabaka and his powers; determine the

---

<sup>666</sup> Golooba-Mutebi, "Settling the Buganda Question."

<sup>667</sup> John Michael Lee, "Buganda's Position in Federal Uganda," *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 3, no. 3 (1965): 165–181.

<sup>668</sup> Englebert, 'Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa'.

status and functions of the Buganda cabinet and the public service; tax political subjects in consultation with the central government; decide on statutory holidays and festivals; manage local government councils; regulate land ownership; distribute social welfare such as health, education, water supply, agriculture, and housing; maintain the Kabaka's Police Force; enforce a judiciary system independent of the Ugandan Parliament and related legal institutions such as the High Court of Buganda.<sup>669</sup> Granting Buganda a federal status would thus drastically alter the country's exclusive political settlement in a way that lessens President Museveni and the NRM's grip on power. It could also produce a *domino effect*, whereby the rest of the country's kingdoms become inspired to make similar requests, thus further challenging the governing coalition's hegemony and centralisation of power. Museveni and the NRM refused to accede to the Buganda kingdom's demands for this reason.

President Museveni is not oblivious to the power of the Buganda kingdom and its capacity to reshape power configurations in the country. History demonstrates the formidable force of Buganda in the Uganda's successive political settlements in the post-colonial era. The kingdom played important roles during Obote's rule and the NRM/A's guerrilla war which brought Museveni to power in 1986. The Buganda kingdom also represented an influential voting bloc in the Constituent Assembly elections to draft the 1995 Constitution.<sup>670</sup> Importantly, the Buganda supported the NRM in maintaining the Movement System between 1987 and 2000.<sup>671</sup> Florence Brisset-Foucault studied the kingdom's participation in the 2011 elections, arguing

---

<sup>669</sup> Lee.

<sup>670</sup> Joe Oloka-Onyango, "The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1997): 173–189; Golooba-Mutebi, "Settling the Buganda Question."

<sup>671</sup> Joe Oloka-Onyango, "The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics", Golooba-Mutebi, "Settling the Buganda Question."

that the kingdom's effective collaboration with Uganda's political opposition led to high expectations that President Museveni would lose the election.<sup>672</sup> All the country's political parties, including the FDC, DP, and the NRM sought for the kingdom's political support and allegiance, purporting the alignment between their manifestos and the kingdom's interests.<sup>673</sup> The kingdom threw its support behind opposition parties due to ongoing political struggles against President Museveni and the NRM over the issue of federalism and the return of its assets. Although Museveni managed to win the election through several strategies that included vote buying, intimidation, and gerrymandering, as described in chapter 4, the Buganda kingdom demonstrated the extent of its holding power and influence nonetheless by forging alliances with other sub-state organisations.

The Buganda kingdom, though perhaps aware of the political calculations underlying Museveni's refusal to restore federalism, perceived this decision as a reneging of their guerrilla war-era agreement.<sup>674</sup> Specifically, the kingdom agreed to support the NRA's insurgency against the second Obote regime in exchange for the return of its assets and the restoration of its status a federal kingdom according to the 1962 Constitution.<sup>675</sup> In an interview, a senior member of the kingdom's leadership said that,

Although the NRA and Buganda did not sign a formal or official agreement in Luweero, actual cooperation existed. Kabaka Mutebi himself came from the United Kingdom to mobilise Baganda to support the [NRA's guerrilla] war

---

<sup>672</sup> Florence Brisset-Foucault, 'Buganda Royalism and Political Competition in Uganda's 2011 Elections', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 3 (2013): 509–529.

<sup>673</sup> Brisset-Foucault.

<sup>674</sup> Mayiga, King on the Throne.

<sup>675</sup> Interview, Senior ranking member of the Buganda government, [MKDK], Kampala, August 2018

when it began. He also relocated to Uganda from the UK in 1986 [when NRA came into office through a coup], and his early return emanated from the understanding that the kingdoms would be restored, and the Kabaka would be crowned. However, Museveni has since made statements that he did not go to the bush to fight for the Buganda or traditional authorities.<sup>676</sup>

Buganda suffered the most casualties from the war because its Luweero heartland served as the cradle of the NRM/A's military effort. While a return to semi-federal status may be unlikely during President Museveni's rule, the kingdom will seek to regain its autonomy whenever a shift in the configuration of power occurs in the medium- or long-term future:

Federalism is important to Buganda, because... the political centre is very corrupt, and inefficient. [However], the kingdom understands that this is not feasible anytime soon, but we will maintain the pressure. Hopefully this will work in five years or so. [For now], we need to take care of the people of Buganda...<sup>677</sup>

The Prime Minister of the Buganda kingdom, Charles Peter Mayiga, issued public statements reflecting on the importance of federalism to the Buganda:

Federalism doesn't make Buganda special or superior. It would simply empower all major regions in the country to govern themselves in a manner they see fit. They would also develop themselves better... [The] majority of

---

<sup>676</sup> Ibid.

<sup>677</sup> Ibid.

Ugandans, not just Baganda have demanded federalism for many decades now. Demanding for sharing power through a federal system of government is something we won't abandon.<sup>678</sup>

Like Bunyoro, the Buganda kingdom aims to restore its assets and properties (ebyaffe) seized by the Obote government and forfeited to the state in 1967, the same year Obote banned kingdoms. The properties include 9000 square miles of land and buildings in both Uganda and the UK. The kingdom also seeks compensation for those assets that cannot be returned, such as the Muteesa House in London sold by the Obote government and the land on which King Fahad's Plaza sits in Kampala, which Museveni donated to the Islamic University of Uganda in 1997.<sup>679</sup> President Museveni held out on returning all relevant properties and has made several unfulfilled promises since 1993. The return of these economically valuable assets to the Buganda kingdom would contribute to the kingdom's financial independence and could result in increased holding power for the kingdom as a sub-state organisation currently excluded from the governing settlement.

Museveni's refusal to fully restore all stolen properties has been an ongoing source of animosity between the Buganda kingdom and the central government. Prominent Buganda activist and opposition Democratic Party legislator Betty Nambooze accused President Museveni of leveraging the properties as "blackmail" in kingdom-state negotiations:

---

<sup>678</sup> Charles Peter Mayiga, "Katikkiro Mayiga's Reflections on Five Years in Office," Daily Monitor, May 12, 2018, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/Insight/Katikkiro-Mayiga-reflections-five-years-office/688338-4558154-i7xqhk/index.html>.

<sup>679</sup> New Vision, "Museveni Opens King Fahd Plaza," Wwww.Newvision.Co.Ug, October 8, 2002, [http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1071417/museveni-king-fahd-plaza](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1071417/museveni-king-fahd-plaza).

Buganda's assets and properties commonly known as "ebyaffe" rightfully belong to the institution of the Kabakaship of the Buganda, were confiscated under the constitution of 1967. They were not confiscated by president Museveni, [but] Museveni has, however seized the opportunity and perhaps furthered the continued holding onto the said properties as a tool of blackmail against the institution of the Kabakaship of Buganda. Like Apollo Milton Obote, Museveni's motive is to weaken the Buganda as a kingdom. All he has done is to employ a different tactic of making it seem like he desires to return the properties in question, while at the same time portraying the Buganda as the bad mannered, defiant, and ingrate child in the family who does not deserve the same... This explains the current impasse between Mengo (the Buganda kingdom) and the central government...<sup>680</sup>

Despite ongoing negotiations, President Museveni continues to defer the full payment of compensation to the kingdom. Museveni met with Buganda King Ronald Mutebi in February 2019 and directed the Ministry of Finance to pay the Buganda kingdom Shs 47 billion (USD \$12,8 million) in two payments as part of the government budget for the 2019/20 and 2020/21 fiscal years.<sup>681</sup> Museveni also asked the Finance Ministry to pay Shs 3 billion (USD \$82,000) in rental arrears for the government's use of Buganda land located in Kigo near Lake Victoria.<sup>682</sup> Finally, the President instructed the Ministry of Lands to expedite the processing and transfer of the titles for the Buganda's assets. President Museveni made similar pledges in 2013 when he signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the kingdom and again in 2018 after another

---

<sup>680</sup> Betty Nambooze Bakireke, "Museveni Arm-Twisting Buganda over Ebyaffe," *The Observer - Uganda*, April 25, 2013, <https://www.observer.ug/viewpoint/guest-writers/24938-museveni-arm-twisting-buganda-over-ebyaffe>.

<sup>681</sup> *The Observer*, "Museveni Orders Finance to Pay Buganda Shs 47bn," February 6, 2019, <https://observer.ug/news/headlines/59823-museveni-orders-finance-to-pay-buganda-shs-47bn>.

<sup>682</sup> *The Observer*.

meeting. However, the kingdom has yet to receive promised compensation and its requests are continually rebuffed by both President Museveni and the relevant government bureaucracies.

Land is another important a site of political contestation for the Buganda kingdom vis-à-vis the governing regime. Land is both an economic asset and a political resource as a territorial symbol of nationhood as well as a physical location. Land-related tensions have occurred between the government and Buganda kingdom over claims that the central government has been deploying “settlers” or communities of Banyarwanda, who have alleged ties to President Museveni to dispossess the Buganda of its ancestral land.<sup>683</sup> Senior members of the Buganda government described this process as a deliberate strategy by Museveni designed to undermine unity and cohesion in the kingdom by introducing non-Baganda into Buganda territories. They argue that Museveni’s plan is to have settlers take up positions as legislators and district officials in the kingdom’s districts to undercut the traditional leadership’s power and influence in Parliament while also weakening the socio-cultural bonds that account for the kingdom’s cohesion and political power.<sup>684</sup> A senior official in the Buganda kingdom described the conflict as follows:

There is a scheme of illegal occupation, where some people occupy Buganda land with the protection of the central government. This has mostly been happening in Mubende, Gomba, and Masaka. The kingdom continually engages the government on this issue, instead of using force to remove them.<sup>685</sup>

---

<sup>683</sup> Interview, Op. cit.

<sup>684</sup> Interview, Senior ranking member of the Buganda government, [KNSL], Kampala, July 2018.

<sup>685</sup> Interview, *ibid.*

The Executive Director of a Kampala-based civic society organisation expressed similar views, indicating that,

[President] Museveni has been reconfiguring the Buganda population, in a way, by allowing the internal migration of cattle keeping communities into the area from the south western region since the early 2000s. It is not surprising that a substantial proportion of members of parliament (MPs) from Buganda districts are not ethnically Baganda, but from the cattle keeping communities from the south west region, especially the Banyankole-Banyarwanda, who have ethnic ties to president Museveni. At the same time, it is unfeasible to make clear-cut ethnic identifications because of inter-tribal marriages. However, the illegal settlements are consistent with Museveni's strategy of diluting the power and cohesion of any social group that can undermine his power.<sup>686</sup>

Some of the areas affected by 'illegal land occupations' are in the Mubende, Kyotera, Rakai, and Masaka districts, the same districts through which the EACOP and Hoima-Kampala Petroleum Products pipelines will pass.<sup>687</sup> The EACOP passes through Buganda into Tanzania whereas the latter pipeline extends to the Kampala Storage Terminal in the village of Namwambula on the outskirts of Kampala. The oil companies and the MEMD engaged jointly in the mapping of pipeline paths and are involved in negotiations with affected private landowners. A senior official from the Buganda Land Board said that the kingdom is also a part of these negotiations and is meeting with MEMD officials to determine if any of the kingdom's land is affected by

---

<sup>686</sup> Interview, senior CSO official, [GDTG], Kampala, June 2018.

<sup>687</sup> Interview, Senior ranking member of the Buganda Land Board, [KMCB], Kampala, July 2018.

the planned projects which would require the kingdom to enter into land-use and compensation agreements.<sup>688</sup>

### **The Buganda Kingdom and the NRM Regime: From Confrontation to Strategic Coexistence**

Political relations between the Buganda kingdom and the central government shifted from confrontation in the 2007 to 2012 period to strategic coexistence from 2013 onwards. The period of conflict coincided with Bunyoro's own confrontations with the central government over access to oil. In this period, the Buganda kingdom pushed Museveni and the NRM to grant its request for federal status. The kingdom believed that the government was making deliberate attempts to undermine its holding power. The subsequent shift in kingdom-state relations beginning in 2013 resulted from negotiations, changes to Buganda leadership, the superior holding power and durability of the NRM regime, and specific political considerations on the part of the kingdom in pursuit of its interests in Uganda.

For example, proposed amendments to the Land Act in 2007 heightened tensions between the Buganda kingdom and the central government to a level not seen since the restoration of the kingdoms in 1993. The bill would make it illegal for landowners under the kingdom's Mailo system to evict tenants due to alleged humanitarian consequences.<sup>689</sup> The Buganda kingdom viewed the Act as trojan horse bill that would

---

<sup>688</sup> Interview, *ibid.*

<sup>689</sup> Samuel Muwanguzi, "The ICT Paradox in Uganda: The Convergence of Radio and Telephony in the Power Contest between the Resurging Buganda Nationalism and the Central Government," *Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 46, no. 1 (2009): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1002/meet.2009.1450460257>.

enable the government to dispossess Buganda of its land by allowing non-Baganda settlers to occupy Buganda territories indefinitely.

A war of words ensued between the government and the kingdom, and this culminated into a full-scale ethno-national campaign by the Buganda kingdom against the government. In 2007, Buganda formed the Central Civil Education Committee (CCEC), a 14-member team of radical monarchist legislators. The team included Betty Nambooze, Erias Lukwago, Medad Ssegona, Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda, and Moses Kisibante.<sup>690</sup> The CCEC used radio programmes such as the popular “ebimeeza” show broadcast on the kingdom’s Central Broadcast Services (CBS) FM Radio to publicly discuss the government’s land policy. It propagated the narrative that the government was plotting to seize all of the Kabaka’s land and to pass it onto the ‘*balaalo*’ (settlers) and ‘foreigners,’ referring to the Banyarwanda pastoralists.<sup>691</sup> Most of the radio programmes were interactive, with moderators visiting public areas throughout the kingdom to engage with citizens on live radio. This was an effective strategy for drumming up Baganda indignation against the government:

Through this strategy, all levels of the Buganda population were reached, the poor and the rich, men and women, rural and urban, the illiterate and the elite alike... coverage of the broadcasts was expanded to reach the economically and politically powerful Baganda community in the diaspora through web casting. In return, Baganda in the diaspora also weighed in by calling directly into the programs. The

---

<sup>690</sup> Brisset-Foucault, “Buganda Royalism and Political Competition in Uganda’s 2011 Elections.”

<sup>691</sup> Muwanguzi, “The ICT Paradox in Uganda.”

programs accomplished a phenomenal listener response in both Uganda and in the diaspora...<sup>692</sup>

This strategy of radio broadcasts achieved considerable success in undermining President Museveni and the NRM's control over public discourse regarding land ownership. Various organisations in the country, including opposition parties, the Catholic Church, the Uganda Joint Christian Council, the Uganda Law Society, and Parliamentary Caucuses from the Acholi, Lango, Karamoja, and Teso regions issued statements formally rejecting the Land Amendment Bill.<sup>693</sup>

Museveni responded to Buganda's campaign with a strongly-worded letter to the Kabaka in December 2007, accusing the kingdom of "intrigue, bad faith, seditious tendencies, and incitement of the public" with regard to negotiations over the Land Amendment Bill.<sup>694</sup> He subsequently requested a meeting with the Kabaka who rejected the overture. The police then detained Buganda officials for charges of public incitement in January 2008 on account of the radio broadcasts.<sup>695</sup> The officials arrested included former Buganda Attorney General Mr. Apollo Makubuya, CBS Radio producer Kawoya Mwebe, radio presenter Meddie Nsereko Ssebuliba, Kampala Central MP Erias Lukwago, and Makindye West MP Hussein Kyanjo.<sup>696</sup> Museveni criticised the kingdom in a public speech delivered at an Africa Day event in May 2008. Museveni argued that kingdoms did not have political legitimacy or relevance and that they had "lost the right to claim a place in modern Africa" due to their

---

<sup>692</sup> Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda, "Uganda: Swords Out," *The Observer - Uganda*, March 6, 2008, <https://allafrica.com/stories/200803060752.html>.

<sup>693</sup> Muwanguzi, "The ICT Paradox in Uganda."

<sup>694</sup> Muwanguzi.

<sup>695</sup> Robert Mwanje and Al Mahdi Ssenkibirwa, "Police Grills Buganda Officials over Land Debate," *Daily Monitor*, January 5, 2008, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/Education/688336-724608-kdyix3/index.html>.

<sup>696</sup> Mwanje and Ssenkibirwa.

historical collaboration with colonial authorities. In his view, the kingdoms could not “resurrect [an] artificial glory” in the post-colonial era.<sup>697</sup> These statements were followed by another series of arrests in July 2008. Buganda Spokesman and current Prime Minister Charles Peter Mayiga, legislator and then-Deputy Spokesman Medard Ssegona, and the head of the Buganda’s CCEC, Betty Nambooze, were arrested on accusations of terrorism and for inciting public violence and sectarianism.<sup>698</sup> These officials were eventually released when Museveni and the Kabaka agreed to meet and negotiate over the land question.

In October 2008, the government and the kingdom engaged in more political sparring, when then-Minister of Interior Affairs and current Prime Minister Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda instructed riot police and the UPDF to stop the Kabaka from travelling to Buruuli county in Nakasongola, a restive region of Buganda that asserted its independence from the kingdom and claimed support for the ruling NRM. The Kabaka planned to meet with the Chief of the Baruuli clan, Mwogeza Butamwanya, over his demands to secede from the Buganda kingdom. Butamwanya requested the central government’s intervention in blocking the Kabaka from visiting the area.<sup>699</sup> Rugunda subsequently justified the government’s decision on the basis of alleged “security threats” against the Kabaka.<sup>700</sup> However, the government long worried about the Kabaka’s tours to various parts of the kingdom. Though a traditional practice, the Kabaka’s grassroots presence was an effective strategy to rally Baganda subjects around the kingdom’s political struggle against the central government. This was the first time since the restoration of the kingdoms in 1993 that the army

---

<sup>697</sup> Muhumuza.

<sup>698</sup> Steven Kibuuka, “Buganda Arrests Bring Back 1966 Memories,” *The Independent Uganda*, December 25, 2008, <https://www.independent.co.ug/buganda-arrests-bring-back-1966-memories/>.

<sup>699</sup> Nganda.

<sup>700</sup> Kibuuka.

physically impeded the Kabaka's movements.<sup>701</sup> In this case, the central government interfered in an intra-Buganda power struggle in order to undermine the kingdom's cohesion.

A similar incident occurred in September 2009 wherein the army stopped the Kabaka's movements, leading to the most violent clash between the central government and the Buganda since 1966. The army and police prevented the Kabaka from conducting a planned visit to the Chiefdom of Banyala in the Kayunga district, which is located in the area seeking to secede from the Buganda kingdom. The Banyala chiefs disallowed visits from Baganda leaders unless expressed permission was granted. Like the 2008 incident in Nakasongola, the central government supported Banyala Chief Baker Kimeze, who was also an active Lieutenant in the UPDF.<sup>702</sup> Chief Kimeze claimed autonomy from the Buganda, arguing that his county historically belonged to the Bunyoro empire and as such he did not recognise the Buganda King's authority.<sup>703</sup> The Buganda kingdom dismissed Kimeze's demands and organised a tour of the Kabaka to his county. The Ugandan army and police intervened once again to stop this visit, triggering a three-day riot, the bloodiest since 1966. Violent clashes between Baganda youth and security forces led to 32 fatalities and 836 arrests.<sup>704</sup> The Ugandan Government shut down the Buganda's CBS Radio, accusing the broadcasters of inciting ethnic violence against members of President Museveni's

---

<sup>701</sup> Nganda, "How NRM Govt Blocked Kabaka in Nakasongola."

<sup>702</sup> Andrew Bagala, "How Bunyala Leaders Sparked the Storm," Daily Monitor, September 12, 2019, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/-Bunyala-leaders-sparked-storm--Kabaka--Tito-Okello/688342-5269650-2p9jv0/index.html>.

<sup>703</sup> Murindwa Rutanga, "Traditional/Cultural Institutions in Uganda's Democratic Transition, Political Stability and Nation Development: A Case of Buganda," *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2010): 125–166.

<sup>704</sup> Rutanga.

Banyankole ethnic group.<sup>705</sup> These violent incidents highlighted the incendiary nature of power struggles between the central government and the Buganda whereby the NRM exploits intra-kingdom schisms by supporting the defection of Buganda chiefs.

More violence broke out the following year in March 2010 when a suspected arson attack burnt down the Kasubi tombs, a mausoleum built in 1882. The Kasubi tombs are a revered burial ground for Baganda kings and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The four kings buried at the site are Mutesa I (1835-1884), Basamula Mwanga (1867-1903), Daudi Chwa, (1896-1939), and Frederick Muteesa (1924-1969).<sup>706</sup> The thatched buildings of the mausoleum are an important source of revenue for the kingdom since it is a popular tourist site. The arson attack led to riots by Baganda youth who accused the central government of being behind the fire.<sup>707</sup> Violence broke out when protesters prevented President Museveni from visiting the tombs by barricading the road and throwing projectiles at his security, who subsequently fired live ammunition into the crowd, killing three protesters.<sup>708</sup> This assault attracted international criticism against the government for its heavy handedness and the killing of unarmed civilians. Although the kingdom did not officially blame the Ugandan government for the burning of the tombs, there is widespread speculation this was in fact the case. This clash caused considerable tensions between the kingdom and the central government.

---

<sup>705</sup> Reporters Without Borders, "CBS Radio Station Allowed to Resume Broadcasting after Year-Long Closure | Reporters without Borders," RSF, October 26, 2010, <https://rsf.org/en/news/cbs-radio-station-allowed-resume-broadcasting-after-year-long-closure>.

<sup>706</sup> Tabu Butagira and Katherine Haywood, "Fire Destroys Kasubi Tombs," Daily Monitor, March 17, 2010, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-880860-c88eq8z/index.html>.

<sup>707</sup> Rutanga, "Traditional/Cultural Institutions in Uganda's Democratic Transition, Political Stability and Nation Development."

<sup>708</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, "Suspicion of Arson at Royal Tombs Fuels Deadly Clashes in Uganda," The New York Times, March 17, 2010, sec. Africa, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/world/africa/18uganda.html>.

Political relations between the Uganda government and the Buganda kingdom deteriorated between the 2007 and 2012 period, mirroring the high level of political tensions during the first Obote era. The Buganda's openly hostile approach sought to elevate its political position and challenge the NRM's exclusive political settlement through coercion. As discussed earlier, the Buganda kingdom generated broad-based political opposition among opposition political parties and other kingdoms in response to the government's planned amendment of the Land Act. The timing of this campaign in the run up to the 2011 election was politically inconvenient for Museveni. The Buganda leveraged its political capital to discredit Museveni's government and scuttle his plans for re-election 2011. The parliament, however, successfully passed the land governance amendments in 2010 on account of the NRM's parliamentary majority. Museveni's government also continued to support the secessionist ambitions of rebel Buganda chiefs in Buruuli and Banyala counties as part of a proxy war to weaken the kingdom.

The Buganda kingdom shifted its approach to engaging the government from confrontation to strategic co-existence beginning in 2013. This change of strategy can be attributed to several factors, all rooted in the nature of Uganda's exclusive political settlement. Firstly, the kingdom had little to benefit from sustaining acts of aggression against the government due to the unlikelihood of victory. Although its combative stance was a way of demonstrating its holding power, the kingdom recognised that open conflict could not draw substantial concessions from the NRM regime. The human cost of conflict<sup>709</sup> could also lead to resentment among Baganda subjects towards the monarchy and diminished morale over time, resulting in the weakening

---

<sup>709</sup> For example, see Human Rights Watch, "Uganda: Police Restraint Needed in Response to Protests," Human Rights Watch, September 11, 2009, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/11/uganda-police-restraint-needed-response-protests>.

of the kingdom politically. Unlike the government, the kingdom does not have an army, but a traditional police force that largely acts as the King's royal guard. There would be high civilian casualties in the event of further confrontations between the kingdom and the Ugandan army or police. Secondly, and related to this first point, a sustained campaign of violence against the Ugandan government could result in the abolition of the kingdom, reminiscent of when Obote banned kingdoms in 1966. Museveni threatened to do the same during the Kayunga riots in September 2009, accusing the Buganda of abusing the privileges of the restoration that he had bestowed upon them in 1993.<sup>710</sup> The end of hostilities benefitted President Museveni and the NRM since the Buganda kingdom's 10 million-strong population is the NRM's largest bloc of electoral supporters.<sup>711</sup>

President Museveni and Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II signed a Memorandum of Understanding in August 2013, witnessed by Mr. Mayiga, then-Buganda Attorney General Apollo Makubuya, and then-Attorney General of Uganda Peter Nyombi. Speaking on behalf of the government, President Museveni committed to restoring the Buganda's properties and paying financial compensation for those that could not be restored.<sup>712</sup> In return, the Kabaka committed to exercising his role as a cultural leader in accordance with Uganda's Constitution and to allowing the Banyala and Baruli sub-ethnic groups to exist semi-autonomously from the Buganda kingdom. Both parties agreed to "totally refrain from engaging in hostile propaganda against

---

<sup>710</sup> Museveni issued the threat in radio and TV broadcasts, as reported here: Edris Kiggundu, "I Can Abolish Kingdoms, Says Museveni," *The Observer - Uganda*, September 11, 2009, <https://www.observer.ug/news/headlines/5075-i-can-abolish-kingdoms-says-museveni>.

<sup>711</sup> For example, Nganda shows that Museveni lost support from the kingdom's 3 million voters between 1996 and 2006. He garnered 0.9 million in 1996, 0.7 million in 2001, and 0.4 million in the 2006 election here: Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda, "2008 CRISIS: Why Buganda Ministers Were Arrested," *The Observer - Uganda*, July 23, 2008, <https://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/603-ssemujju-ibrahim-nganda-sp-876391834>.

<sup>712</sup> "Buganda-Government MoU" (The Buganda Kingdom/Government of Uganda, August 2013).

each other which has tended to sour relations between the parties in recent years.”<sup>713</sup> The memorandum was not a formal, binding legal document that either party could enforce in the courts. The Ugandan government still has not returned the Buganda’s properties. The kingdom cannot compel the government to fulfil its obligations in accordance with the terms of the memorandum.

Although the government paid Shs 2 billion (\$543,000) in rental arrears for the Buganda’s properties that it still uses, Prime Minister Mayiga revealed in October 2017 that officials in government were renegeing on other commitments, such as the outstanding compensation for some of the Buganda’s assets and the establishment of a federalist agreement – though this latter demand was not a subject of the 2013 memorandum.<sup>714</sup> The memorandum was neither debated in Ugandan Parliament nor in the Buganda’s Lukiiko, an omission which attracted criticism from both sides.<sup>715</sup> Nonetheless, the memorandum ended confrontation between the kingdom and the central government. The kingdom has since shifted its focus to raising funds for social development projects, developing its business portfolio, and strengthening ethno-national cohesion through cultural activities. The kingdom maintains its relative autonomy from the central government by independently funding the Kabaka instead of accepting a salary from government, unlike Bunyoro and the rest of the country’s kingdoms. The kingdom remains disgruntled with President Museveni and his refusal to return all properties as well as his reticence in re-establishing Buganda as a federal entity.

---

<sup>713</sup> “Buganda-Government MoU.”

<sup>714</sup> Sadab Kitatta Kaaya, “Mayiga Frustrated over MOU with Museveni,” *The Observer - Uganda*, October 17, 2014, <https://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/34395--mayiga-frustrated-over-mou-with-museveni>.

<sup>715</sup> Timothy Kalyegira, “The Museveni-Buganda Agreement: A Memorandum or a Mockery?,” *Daily Monitor*, August 11, 2013, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/Museveni-Buganda-agreement--A-Memorandum-or-a-Misunderstanding-/689364-1943258-mfskmz/index.html>; Sadab Kitatta Kaaya, “MOU: Was Buganda Duped?,” *The Observer - Uganda*, June 10, 2014, <https://observer.ug/news/headlines/32211-mou-was-buganda-duped>.

President Museveni has long deployed a combination of carrot and stick strategies to neutralise political opponents. In this case, he pacified the kingdom by pledging to return its properties, issuing directives to government bureaucracies to that effect but with no commitment to actually fulfil the pledges. He convinced the Kabaka and Katikkiro to sign the 2013 memorandum without the participation of the Buganda's Parliament, contributing to internal dissention within the kingdom. Some senior Baganda leaders felt Museveni would deceive the kingdom through such "back-door deals."<sup>716</sup> Museveni also employed force or the threat of force to intimidate the Buganda and demand compliance with the governing regime. The NRM demonstrated that it would not hesitate to use violent military force against the Buganda, as seen in both the 2009 and 2010 riots. The kingdom saw the 2013 memorandum, though a non-binding agreement, as a means by which it could engage in strategic coexistence. The Buganda are buying time and building its political and economic capacity in the interim while waiting for Museveni to leave office, with the hope that they may successfully negotiate with his successor(s).

The leadership style and philosophies of Prime Minister (Katikkiro) is another important contributing factor in the Buganda's change of strategy and its holding power overall. As discussed in Chapter 3, the political settlements theory analyses the identities of individual actors and the influence of their participation in organisations.<sup>717</sup> A comparative discussion of the Buganda's post-restoration era prime ministers reveals the significance and impact of individual characters. Although they represent the Kabaka, each Katikkiro has shaped the Buganda's

---

<sup>716</sup> Kaaya, "MOU"; Kaaya.

<sup>717</sup> Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, "Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda."

approach to state-kingdom relations, whether that be open hostility or the current state of strategic coexistence. Kabaka Mutebi appointed Joseph Mulwanyamuli Ssemwogerere as the first Katikkiro upon the restoration of the kingdom in 1993, who served until 2004.<sup>718</sup> Ssemwogerere, a lawyer and banker by profession, was reputed for his diplomatic and non-confrontational approach to dealing with the central government. He successfully negotiated the return of some of the Buganda's properties, particularly the administrative building at Mengo (Bulange) and the old Palace (Lubiri). The buildings held considerable significance for the Buganda and meaning with regard to its restoration as a kingdom; they are both symbols of its nationhood and the physical headquarters for its leadership, and thus are necessary to re-establishing the kingdom's administrative institutions. This concession made Ssemwogerere popular with the kingdom's leadership and subjects; he was revered for his skilful diplomacy and for achieving this significant milestone in the kingdom's history.<sup>719</sup>

However, Ssemwogerere became unpopular in 2004 when he agreed to the government-proposed "regional tier system" as an alternative to federalism that would make the Katikkiro an elected position rather than appointed by the Kabaka and his advisors.<sup>720</sup> This change would undermine the power of the Kabaka and the kingdom's autonomy since the Katikiro would not be completely loyal to the Kabaka and the kingdom but to the central government. Ssemwogerere, who served as a guerrilla fighter with the NRA in Tanzania in the 1960s, was subsequently viewed as a Museveni sympathiser. The Kabaka replaced Ssemwogerere in 2006 with Dan

---

<sup>718</sup> Jonathan Buwembo, "Full Plate for Buganda's New Young Katikkiro," *The East African*, June 7, 2013, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/magazine/Full-plate-for-Buganda-s-new-young-Katikkiro/434746-1874122-7kqbcuz/index.html>.

<sup>719</sup> Buwembo.

<sup>720</sup> Buwembo.

Mulika, a radical monarchist who served the kingdom only for a year. Mulika adopted a combative approach to negotiating with the government, resulting in a complete breakdown of communication between the two organisations.<sup>721</sup> Mulika openly engaged in partisan politics, supporting the opposition FDC in the 2006 elections. Mulika had widely reported ties with then-FDC National Chairman Badru Kiggundu and the FDC Presidential Candidate Kizza Besigye.<sup>722</sup> This conflict of interest elicited pressure from Museveni and the NRM regime since they risked losing power.<sup>723</sup> The 2006 election was also significant in that Museveni and the NRM had ended the Movement System and returned to multiparty politics. The Kabaka dismissed Mulika in 2007, appointing Emmanuel Ssendawula as acting Katikkiro until 2008 when he tapped John Baptist Walusimbi as the subsequent premier.

A trained engineer, Walusimbi was a political moderate who continued with the negotiations to have the Buganda's assets restored. Despite the violent confrontations between the government and the kingdom during the nascent stages of Walusimbi's tenure in 2009 and 2010, he was widely perceived as an ally of President Museveni, making him unpopular in the kingdom.<sup>724</sup> For example, Walusimbi criticised the use of the kingdom's CBS Radio to attack the Museveni's government and chided cabinet ministers who issued hard-hitting statements against the NRM amidst the arrest of senior Buganda leaders in July 2008.<sup>725</sup> It was also revealed that Walusimbi's construction company conducted renovations at the State House in Entebbe, worth

---

<sup>721</sup> Buwembo.

<sup>722</sup> See Daily Monitor, "How Muliika Went down Fighting," Daily Monitor, accessed October 7, 2019, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/689844-785298-yfhdds/index.html>.

<sup>723</sup> Eriasa Mukiibi Sserunjogi, "Besigye Fails to Rally Buganda Power Brokers," The Independent Uganda, November 30, 2010, <https://www.independent.co.ug/besigye-fails-rally-buganda-power-brokers/>.

<sup>724</sup> For a more detailed account, see The Observer, "Katikkiro Walusimbi bows out with mixed scorecard", 11 December 2011, <https://observer.ug/component/content/article?id=16270:katikkiro-walusimbi-bows-out-with-mixed-scorecard>

<sup>725</sup> See Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda, "Katikkiro Accused of Selling Out," The Observer - Uganda, July 23, 2008, <https://observer.ug/news-headlines/597-ssemujju-ibrahim-nganda-sp-1088866097>.

Shs 1 billion (USD \$271,000).<sup>726</sup> Walusimbi's acceptance of the government's regional tier system made him increasingly unpopular among radical monarchists, leading to his replacement by Charles Peter Mayiga in 2013.

Mayiga is a young, charismatic lawyer and businessman who served as the kingdom's Spokesman prior to his appointment as the Katikkiro. His leadership style eschews open confrontation in favour of more measured negotiations despite his being a formerly radical Buganda activist. Mayiga's appointment signalled a change of strategy on the part of the Kabaka and a new approach to state-kingdom relations. Having worked for the Buganda since 1991, Mayiga is knowledgeable on kingdom affairs; he began his career as Administrative Secretary and later served as Information Minister. Mayiga adopted an approach of strategic co-existence to deal with Museveni and the NRM government. The 2013 memorandum represented his first milestone in this regard. Mayiga has focused on rebuilding the kingdom's political institutions and businesses and strengthening subjects' support and loyalty to the kingdom through the promotion of cultural activities all while continuing negotiations with the central government over relevant issues. Some research informants attributed this strategy to Mayiga's personality and training as a lawyer, describing his leadership style as issue-oriented, practical, and non-partisan.<sup>727</sup> These leadership-related factors have had a considerable impact on the Buganda kingdom's engagement approach with the government and the development of its overall institutional and policy framework.

---

<sup>726</sup> Eriasa Mukibi Sserunjogi, "Katikkiro Mayiga's Swipe at Museveni Raises Questions," Daily Monitor, December 19, 2016, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Katikkiro-Mayiga-s-swipe-at-Museveni-raises-questions/689844-3490138-99lyctz/index.html>.

<sup>727</sup> Interview, civil society official, [YKCD], Kampala, July 2018.

## Conclusion

This account of the Buganda kingdom's role in shaping the political settlement in Uganda yields several comparative findings that are relevant to Bunyoro's experience in the post-oil discovery era. Although Buganda shares institutional features with Bunyoro, the former managed to effectively deploy its holding power in both the pre- and post-oil discovery eras in ways that benefitted the kingdom politically, economically, and socially. In particular, Buganda's strategic collaboration with the NRM during the guerrilla war led to the restoration of the kingdoms in 1993. However, Buganda, like Bunyoro, failed to draw sufficient concessions from the NRM regime to shift the country's underlying configurations of power. The presence of oil has further entrenched the NRM's power and the exclusivity of the political settlement. As a new and lucrative source of patronage and power, the oil sector contributes to the durability of the NRM regime and increases its ability to weakening opposing political groups currently excluded from the governing coalition.

The differences between the Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms' political objectives and strategies explain the variance in their engagement with the state. Whereas Buganda possess a long-standing desire to be restored as a semi-autonomous federal region, Bunyoro's priorities lie in securing a share of oil revenue. The Baganda were at the epicentre of state formation processes since the colonial era and their proximity to the Kampala central region allowed the kingdom to be directly involved in Uganda's successive political settlements. The Banyoro's decimation during colonial rule, combined with its rural location, deprived the kingdom of the opportunities for involvement in the country's political settlements. Unlike Bunyoro, the Buganda kingdom has been more adept at engaging in strategic coexistence. The Buganda,

having acknowledged its inability to alter the political settlement, focused on increasing its economic, political, and institutional capacity, and political cohesion among its subjects. As such, the kingdom has elevated its holding power and bolstered its capacity to alter the distribution of power in the future. The Bunyoro, on the other hand, has signalled its intention to engage in strategic coexistence in an effort to access benefits from the oil sector but without directly challenging the governing coalition.

**CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION**

This dissertation conducted a comparative and qualitative political settlements analysis to explain the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to realise economic benefits from Uganda's nascent oil sector. The emerging literature on the implications of oil in Uganda neglects the sector's impact on political relations between the state and kingdoms in Uganda. This study addresses this gap by answering the following research questions: *What accounts for the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to benefit substantially from the discovery of oil on its territory? What lessons can be learnt from the Buganda kingdom's relative success in negotiating with the central government and developing its own political and economic capacity independently of the state?*

Kingdoms, particularly the Buganda and Bunyoro, have been integral to processes of state formation and to shaping the evolution of Uganda's political settlements since the colonial era. This dissertation discussed the literature on traditional kingdoms and the state in the colonial and post-colonial African politics and in Ugandan history. It analysed the evolution of political settlements between the state and kingdoms since the discovery of oil in Uganda and discussed the interactions between Uganda's exclusive political settlement in the post-oil discovery era and the politics of governing the oil sector. It argued that the oil sector is embedded in Uganda's political context, which resulted in the exclusionary politics being reflected in the way the oil sector is governed. This accounts for the marginalisation of the Bunyoro kingdom, which also failed to secure access to the hydrocarbons sector because of its limited holding power.

This dissertation employed a political settlements theoretical framework in tandem with the concept of extraversion. Political settlements theory prescribes the mapping

of social groups within a setting and offers an analysis of how power configurations between the groups resulting from competition and informal agreements influence formal political processes and the creation and functioning of institutions. The identities, interests, and forms of power of actors combine to determine the formation and durability of the political settlement. The political settlements theory also considers how historical factors influence and explain present-day political and economic outcomes. A country's political settlement informs the choices and strategies employed by social groups, especially those excluded from the settlement, in the struggle to obtain their parochial interests. I propounded the novel concept of strategic coexistence, which describes the strategies of social groups excluded from exclusive political settlements who seek to maximise their future capacity for reconfiguring the distribution of power in the event of a transitional settlement.

### **Nations Within a State vs. the Durability of NRM Regime**

The governing NRM coalition possesses superior holding power over Uganda's traditional kingdoms who are excluded from the political settlement due to the incongruence between their interests and those of the state. Kingdom demands for a return to federalism, a share of oil revenues, and the restoration of properties, if fulfilled, would elevate of the holding power of kingdoms relative to that of the state. The NRM government has been judicious in limiting the economic and political capacity of kingdoms, relying on its various sources of power to maintain hegemonic control of the state. The NRM's control of the security sector, its systems of patronage, and its rent-seeking strategies, along with its manipulation of public institutions, prevent challenges to this hegemony from traditional kingdoms. The dominance of security agencies in Ugandan politics is rooted in former Prime Minister Milton

Obote's military rule from 1966 onwards, a governing style repeated by the NRM through its armed insurgency and its seizing of power through the 1986 coup. The army remains the governing coalition's primary source of power, and this limits the kingdoms' ability to successfully challenge the NRM regime. A shift in the current configuration of power is unlikely in the short to medium-term because of the extent of control that President Museveni has over the governing NRM coalition, and the country's politics and security at large.

Rent-seeking and patronage is a prominent source of power for the governing NRM coalition. Its control of state institutions affords the regime access to revenues accrued by the government, including domestic and external tax revenues, donor aid, and oil revenue. The hydrocarbons sector has become a new, and lucrative source of rents that strengthens the governing coalition's holding power. There are pockets of efficiency within government to manage the rents, including the Uganda Revenue Authority, the Bank of Uganda, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and, in the case of oil, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. These institutions control public funds and provide the governing coalition a system of acquiring and managing rents for patronage. The NRM's access to public monies allows President Museveni and the regime to maintain a bloated and multi-tiered security system, composed of both formal and informal organisations.

Uganda's political institutions resemble that of a pluralistic democracy, adding to the complexity of the exclusive political settlement. The Constitution provides for the institutional separation of power between the Executive, Judiciary, and Legislative arms of government, the existence of political parties, and regular elections that Uganda has held since 2005. These structures, however, are a façade that the NRM

employs to fulfil its political and economic interests and entrench its extended hold on power. Government institutions are also a vehicle for patronage. This includes employment in the civil service at all tiers, from central government to the district and local government tiers. Patronage reinforces the ruling elites' hold on power at all levels of the state, thus underpinning the durability of the NRM's exclusive settlement. Another key institutional source of power is that of the constitution and legislative processes. The ruling coalition invokes constitutional articles and passes laws that reinforce its control over various aspects of Ugandan political economy, including the oil industry. The hegemony of the NRM has, however afforded a degree of order, stability, and economic development not seen since 1986 in Uganda considering the successive coups and militarised violence in the post-colonial era. Though insurgent groups have operated in Uganda since 1986, the NRM regime has managed to maintain an unprecedented level of political stability for an extended period of time.

Strategies of extraversion are another important source of power for the ruling coalition. Government institutions, particularly the islands of efficiency mentioned above, form part of these strategies. The NRM regime maintains mutually beneficial partnerships with foreign governments, especially the United States. The semblance of 'well-functioning' democratic institutions in Uganda allows the governing coalition to maintain legitimacy with external actors, which facilitates the conduct and sustenance of diplomatic relations. Features of democracy include regular elections, albeit manipulated, a large and vibrant civil society that includes the media and non-governmental sector that functions with government restrictions. This *status quo* allows the NRM regime to access multilateral aid that supports regime patronage and rent-seeking. President Museveni positioned himself as a key ally of the West in the

War on Terror, in peacekeeping missions, and in the securement of valuable resources in the Great Lakes region. As a result, the governing coalition is able to access financial and military resources, including elite tactical military training, which undergirds its overall holding power.

### **Bunyoro's Marginalisation and Attempts at Strategic Coexistence**

The emergence of the oil sector triggered the Bunyoro kingdom's demands for access to at least 12,5% of oil revenue. This led to aggressive rhetoric against the governing regime from 2009 onwards, which saw Bunyoro King making a dramatic appearance at Parliament in 2012 to assert the kingdom's entitlement to oil wealth. This attempt to shift power configurations within the country's exclusive political settlement failed due to the Bunyoro kingdom's limited holding power vis-à-vis that of the NRM. The NRM's exclusive settlement also entails the perpetual subjugation of social groups that are not included or co-opted into the governing coalition. Unlike the Buganda, the Bunyoro kingdom neither actively participated in the country's governing coalitions in the post-independence era, nor gained sufficient holding power in the post-oil discovery era to successfully challenge the governing coalition and induce a shift in power configurations in Ugandan politics.

The Bunyoro kingdom is also negatively affected by its rural location, high poverty levels, and limited opportunities for economic advancement. Its rural setting in particular undermines the kingdom's ability to retain talented cabinet members, who are mostly based in Kampala, Uganda's capital and the centre of economic opportunities. Furthermore, the kingdom's leadership has not sufficiently strengthened the support and loyalty of the kingdom's subjects, a key element needed

that would augment its holding power. The Bunyoro kingdom's institutional structures are similar to that of the Buganda, however, they have not functioned as efficiently. Reasons for this include the kingdom's internecine conflicts and intrigue, the limited access to resources in its rural setting, and inability to retain talented officers. As a consequence of these factors, the kingdom has been unable to mobilise subjects behind its cause of gaining access to oil revenues.

The central government also employed public institutions to thwart Bunyoro's attempts to access oil revenue. It leveraged Article 244 of the Constitution and the Public Finance Management Act of 2015 to dismiss the kingdom's demands for oil royalties. This is not unique to Uganda because resource-producing countries typically afford national governments ownership of oil and mineral reserves. However, Article 244 of the Constitution does not preclude parliament from passing legislation to accord special status to host communities. The Bunyoro kingdom could receive a larger share of oil sector benefits through the PFMA's provision of 1% for all affected traditional authorities. Giving the Bunyoro kingdom special status and access to an exclusive oil royalties, however, would create a politically inexpedient precedent for the NRM government: there are several other powerful sub-groups and communities within the country that may feel similarly entitled to resource revenues, creating a situation that could threaten the governing coalition's hold on power.

The Bunyoro kingdom is presently engaged in practices of strategic coexistence designed to facilitate its access to the financial benefits of the oil sector through business enterprises. The kingdom is focused on developing its political and economic capacity in a way that mirrors Buganda's experience. The kingdom is prioritising an oil-based political agenda, as reflected in its appointment of a new prime minister,

Andrew Byakutaga who is an expert in the oil industry and a former tax revenue official in the Uganda Revenue Authority. The kingdom continues to publicly express a desire to receive a special status vis-à-vis oil royalties but it has also turned inward to re-build its political and economic institutions as a means of bolstering its capacity for extracting benefits from the oil sector. The kingdom's appointment of a new cabinet, along with the King's creation of the Royal Commission on Oil and Gas, represents a new-found 'brain trust' designed to champion the kingdom's vision for the oil sector. The kingdom's approach to strategic coexistence is in its infancy at the time of writing and so measuring its success or failure is a prospective area for future research.

### **The Buganda Kingdom's Strategic Coexistence and Enduring Fissures with Government**

The Buganda kingdom provides a crucial comparative case study in light of the Bunyoro kingdom's failure to secure oil-derived benefits. Lessons can be drawn from its more organised and politically powerful economic infrastructure and its engagement strategies with the governing coalition. The kingdom has been at the centre of state formation processes since the colonial era in Uganda and has shaped the country's successive post-colonial political settlements. The Buganda kingdom is marginally incorporated into the oil complex through the construction of oil pipelines and the primary oil distribution terminal. Its primary objectives revolve around being re-established as a federal territory that is politically autonomous from the central government and the return of its assets, which includes real estate and land. The kingdom's federalist objective is driven by the monarchy and supported by the kingdom's subjects at large. The government's refusal to restore the kingdom to a

federal status is part of the governing coalition's strategy of limiting the holding power of social groups that are excluded from the regime. This has led to increasing tensions between the government and the kingdom, manifest in overt political violence between 2009 and 2012. The Buganda kingdom's differences with the governing coalition are deeply rooted in the history of the modern state in Uganda whereby the kingdom resisted incorporation as a non-autonomous sub-state organisation after the end of colonialism.

The lessons that Bunyoro can glean from Buganda's experience are encapsulated in the notion of *strategic coexistence*. Firstly, the Buganda kingdom maintains strong administrative institutions that resemble that of the sovereign government. The institutions are a source of power that provide the kingdom with tools for policy promulgation and implementation. They also facilitate political stability and the development of both short and long-term strategies and plans for achieving its objectives. Business agencies are another critical source of power in that they allow the kingdom to earn incomes independent of the central government. The kingdom's political stability facilitates the efficient management of its business agencies which in turn contribute to its elevated holding power. Having efficiently run kingdom agencies that deliver public goods such as health, education and the provision of support for income-generating ventures contributes to the support and loyalty that Baganda accord to the kingdom, improves political cohesion, and the Buganda's overall holding power. The kingdom's regular cultural events also strengthen subjects' affections for the kingdom, representing a potent form of power. The strength of the kingdom's political and economic institutions and practices contribute

its durability as a sub-state organisation and its ability to withstand both internal fissures and external political clashes with the central government.<sup>728</sup>

For the Buganda kingdom, the practices of strategic coexistence are geared towards preparation for a post-Museveni dispensation wherein it can hopefully successfully negotiate its restoration as a federal entity. Research informants from the kingdom's administration expressed dismay at the current state of affairs in Uganda, blaming the governing coalition for corruption, poverty, unemployment, and other socio-economic ills faced by Baganda. Nevertheless, the kingdom acknowledges the government's superior holding power and will unlikely challenge the NRM regime in the short to medium term. The Buganda kingdom's leadership's failure to court the support of other kingdoms such as the Bunyoro, Tooro, or Busoga in lobbying for a return to federalism can be explained by the history of the Buganda kingdom's position in Uganda's processes of state formation. The kingdom's drive for federalism is mainly geared towards elevating the kingdom elite's power and access to economic opportunities that come with a federal status, which it enjoyed during the colonial era since the British-Buganda Agreement of 1900, and the post-independence agreement between the Buganda kingdom and UPC from 1962-1966. The opportunity costs for its coordinating a broad-based campaign are also high because of the aforementioned implications of sub-state organising that threaten the ruling NRM's hegemony. The lack of capacity and interest among the other kingdoms who continue to rely on government patronage is an additional factor. Ironically, this lack of inter-kingdom cooperation undermines the Buganda's plans for a broad-based federalist policy since

---

<sup>728</sup> Nevertheless, Baganda simultaneously identify with both their ethnic Baganda and a national Ugandan identities, leveraging one over another when politically expedient, to gain access to elite networks and material benefits

the government would likely grant concessions in the event of a united front from all of the country's traditional authorities.

### **The Oil Complex, Centralised Control, Strategic Coexistence, and Marginality**

The emergence of the oil industry raised the hopes of several social groups in Uganda, including those of the host communities in the Albertine Graben region. The promise of oil wealth created expectations for the end of poverty, and improved living standards through oil-funded development programmes and economic growth. Although the Ugandan parliament passed laws to facilitate the efficient, transparent, and accountable management of the oil sector and associated revenues, the institutions are neither independent nor immune from the governing coalition's political influence. The legislative process was subject to vigorous debate and involved multi-stakeholder consultations in which the Bunyoro kingdom was also involved. Foreign governments, especially Norway, played an influential role in informing the content of the laws. However, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development and related agencies involved in oil governance, such as the Petroleum Authority of Uganda, retain discretionary control that allows Museveni to enjoy direct influence on the activities of these institutions, especially as it pertains to licensing, revenue collection, and negotiations with foreign oil companies.

The NRM regime's exclusive political settlement extends to the oil sector governance. As discussed above, the settlement is premised on patronage and the marginalisation of social groups excluded from the governing regime. The regime exerts absolute control over the oil sector through public institutions and the threat of military force. This totalitarian approach compelled the groups excluded from the settlement, and

yet incorporated into the oil complex such as the oil companies, NGOs, and host communities in the Albertine Graben region to engage in strategic coexistence or suffer the consequences of marginalisation. For example, the relationship between oil companies and the governing coalition is complex and involves both contestation and cooperation. The government provides a stable political and economic regime of licensing and profit-sharing through Production Sharing Agreements. In exchange, oil companies invest their foreign capital in the development of physical infrastructure needed for oil production. The companies will recoup their capital and earn additional revenues by recovering cost rebates and profiting from oil exports. Conflict between the government and oil companies largely emanates from tax revenue payments as well as President Museveni's insistence that oil companies construct a refinery in Uganda. Oil companies and the governing coalition both have a mutual interest in seeing the oil industry reach production and generate profits. For the NRM regime, the oil sector has become a lucrative source of rents and patronage, which reinforces its holding power and increases the costs of defection for the groups within the ruling coalition. The interest of oil companies in recovering sunk costs and ensuring that shareholders profit from investments accounts the stability and progress of Uganda's oil sector despite periodic disputes with the central government.

NGOs had a contentious relationship with the central government in the nascent stages of the oil sector but their approach has gradually mutated into strategic coexistence. NGOs incorporated into the oil complex provide a variety of services such as free legal assistance to local communities affected by forced removals, civic education on citizen rights, and other forms of humanitarian assistance. NGOs also deploy strategies of extraversion to obtain oil-derived rents by conducting donor-funded projects centred on government on transparency and accountability in oil

governance. In the initial years, the oil-related work of NGOs threatened the interests of the governing coalition. Opposition legislators, trained by NGOs, challenged the government on issues such as profit sharing agreements. The government attacked the NGOs in response, conducting raids, arrests and closing some of the organisations. This climax in tensions eventually led to the present-day state of strategic coexistence whereby NGOs self-censor and avoid direct attacks and criticisms against the central government in their work. The government also monitors NGO projects with rural communities, requiring that NGOs apply for security clearance and deploying intelligence agents to attend the NGO-sponsored events. The government, however, benefits from the free advisory services of NGOs regarding the oil sector as well as the semblance of democratic legitimacy it gains from permitting an 'open' civil society.

Local communities in the Albertine Graben region, most of whom are part of the Bunyoro kingdom, are located at the margins of the oil sector because of their limited holding power. They are unable to secure concessions for improving their livelihoods through oil-funded policies. Communities also fall prey to corrupt and well-connected elites from the Albertine Graben region or Kampala who are involved in land speculation. The elites arrange fraudulent transactions and drive up the price of land in oil-rich regions. Forced removals, either by the hands of wealthy elites or through compulsory acquisition by the government, has resulted in the loss of local livelihoods. Communities are unable to access former pastureland, agricultural land, and fisheries on Lake Albert. The threat of environmental pollution also looms large, although the oil production has not yet begun. The central and local governments have not adequately intervened to protect communities from the adverse effects of the oil sector, even in its initial stages. The limited holding power of the Bunyoro kingdom exacerbates the circumstances of its communities, because it has been unable to

participate in shaping Uganda's successive political settlements and correspondingly, its involvement in oil governance.

### **Theoretical and Policy Implications**

The findings of this study have several theoretical and policy implications pertaining to the realm of the political economy of extractive governance. The political settlements theoretical framework, as an analytical approach not steeped in mainstream ontologies and epistemologies of New Institutional Economics and neo-Weberianism, problematises the assumptions of the 'resource curse' thesis and the good governance agenda. Political settlements parse out and analyse the complex aspects of the African political economy and the unique contexts within which extractive industries are embedded. Historical analysis is a fundamental starting point because it allows for an examination of African statehood and its characteristics in the post-colonial era. The idea of statehood in Weberian and neo-Weberian or New Institutionalist conceptualisations differs vastly from the historical realities of state formation in Africa. The discrepancies in these theoretical frameworks are rooted in their respective historico-cultural, ideological, and normative influences, which together limit their universal application, particularly in non-Western societies. The neglect of the African forms of social, political, economic, and cultural organisation leads to parochial academic analyses and policy interventions that are disconnected from, and incompatible with, contextual realities in Africa. A political settlements approach provides a critical analytical lens that does not view African conditions as a negation of Western experiences but instead produces knowledge that is independent of universal value judgments.

Secondly, political settlements analysis shows the primacy of power structures in the political economy of resource-rich African countries. Politics are shaped by ongoing struggles for power and material gain. These struggles subsequently influence the constitutional, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions, and other formal processes of governance. The bulk of political interaction occurs 'behind the scenes' as the most powerful actors compete and undertake bargains that culminate into political coalitions. Formal institutions and other political manifestations reflect the convergence of these embedded interests. Viewing institutions as the product of specific power struggles goes beyond neo-Weberian and NIE assumptions which positions institutions as the determinant of positive or negative outcomes as it pertains to political and economic development. The global development industry is premised on the reproduction of Western institutions in African societies and its failure to promote equal and sustainable prosperity emanates from this assumption about the correlation between institutions and positive development outcomes. Instead, local political struggles, not institutions, determine the success of policies. The success or failure of policies is based on their alignment or dissonance with the interests of the powerful organisations and interests that control how the institutions function.

Third, the mapping of the identities and of interests of actors through the political settlements approach provides for a nuanced appreciation of contextual realities. Elevating the kingdoms in analysing the political implications of oil wealth is an important step in this regard, since it acknowledges their viability as political actors.<sup>729</sup>

---

<sup>729</sup> Although the kingdoms are largely treated as unitary actors in this analysis, this does not imply homogeneity. Analysing intra-kingdom fissures and cleavages would be an interesting area of future study, that would be guided by questions that seek to unpack the micro-groups, factions, and interests beyond what this dissertation has discussed and analyse their political significance. The treatment of the kingdoms as unitary bodies was based on the need to conceptualise them as an independent unit of study, juxtaposed with governing regime(s), to identify the nature and dynamics of political struggles that exist between these entities. The kingdoms' activities in the period under study are directed by the monarchical leadership, but to a considerable degree, the

This approach also re-imagines the labels commonly employed to analyse contemporary political phenomena such as “the state,” “ethnic groups,” or “political parties.” These concepts do not sufficiently capture the identities and political activities of sub-state social groups that are seemingly excluded from the political spaces of the state, but still struggle for power and material gains and thus influence outcomes. This logic is reflected in Stathis Kalyvas’ concept of cleavages in the study of civil wars; and James Ferguson’s idea of ‘micro-politics’ which focus on local-level politics, interests, and power dynamics in explaining conflicts and determining the success or failure of policies, respectively.<sup>730</sup> For example, diamonds were associated with the civil war in Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)’s invasion. However, a mapping of the country’s social groups revealed a generational cleavage in that unemployed rural and urban youth were attracted to the RUF’s campaign more than any other social group due to their relative disadvantages. Unable to attain social mobility, youth marginalised from the political settlement by elites and rural chiefs decided to join the armed struggle in an attempt to reshape power configurations.<sup>731</sup>

A fourth implication of this research is its significance for the grassroots development agenda. Localised development is often conceptualised as the best approach to address poverty in developing countries.<sup>732</sup> Decentralisation and participation form part of the Western good governance agenda which regards the devolution of political power from the state to community-based institutions as the panacea for inclusive

---

leadership has enjoyed significant support from the subjects, as demonstrated by the case of Buganda, for instance when its subjects have shown support in various ways, such as political violence and fund raising.

<sup>730</sup> Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’”; Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine*.

<sup>731</sup> Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone.*, Reprinted Ed. (James Currey Ltd., 1998).

<sup>732</sup> Johannes Jütting et al., “What Makes Decentralisation in Developing Countries Pro-Poor?,” *The European Journal of Development Research* 17, no. 4 (2005): 626–648.

growth and development. Despite the linkages between decentralisation and poverty alleviation identified in development policy and practice, this study demonstrates that development itself is a political exercise and not simply an outcome of policy decisions or the location of power. Decentralising power to the local level would affect power configurations on a national scale. In this case, allowing the Bunyoro kingdom to access oil revenue would be viewed as a prudent strategy for local-level development and poverty alleviation through natural resource revenue. However, such a policy would reconfigure the exclusive political settlement governing Ugandan politics. Thus, the NRM deprived the kingdom of oil revenue to maintain its hold on power.

The hegemony of the incumbent regime extends to the local and this dismisses the notion that the state and grassroots are separate political realms. Since the inception of the modern state, traditional kingdoms have continually engaged in power struggles and negotiations with political incumbents. Kingdoms are both a political resource and a threat for the central government. As a political resource, the power, legitimacy, and authority they wield in their respective ethno-nations and regions translates to electoral votes and local-level control for governing coalitions. Traditional kingdoms are also a political threat when they are marginalised from the governing coalition since their holding power can be deployed unilaterally or in tandem with other social groups to challenge prevailing power structures. Their relevance to state politics is enduring because their existence is tied to the ethnic identity of citizens. The loyalty and affection of subjects is accorded to the King as the embodiment of the kingdom's history and cultural values. This ethno-national allegiance is a potent source of power which explains the durability of traditional kingdoms over governing coalitions who occupy political office for a short time and are dependent upon election cycles.

Combining Jean Francois Bayart's concept of extraversion with a political settlements framework yields important insights on the linkages between domestic politics and external factors. Struggles for political power and material gains between social groups in Africa are considerably shaped by strategic interactions with external actors. Colonialism, the growth of capitalism, and the commodity trade beginning in the pre-colonial era incorporated African states into the global economy. The Cold War and post-Cold War globalisation further intensified the embeddedness of African countries into the world economic system. Both the NRM coalition and the Buganda have made skilful use of strategies of extraversion, and this is a key factor in their political dominance and durability. The Buganda used strategies of extraversion to establish an alliance with the British during colonialism. The NRA, on the other hand, employed extraversion once they entered into office in 1986 by making an alliance with the United States government and international financial institutions. The NRM's access to donor aid contributes to the holding power, stability, and longevity of the governing settlement. In the context of the extractive sector, resource wealth is intertwined with struggles for power since access to rents, derived externally, are intimately connected to the control of state power.

I put forth *strategic coexistence* as a new concept within the political settlements framework. This concept augments the theory by explaining the responsive approaches of marginalised social groups in exclusive political settlements. In this study, I characterise the behaviour of Buganda and to a lesser extent the Bunyoro kingdom in the post-oil discovery era as constituting strategic coexistence, as the two entities acknowledge their limited capacity to shift power configurations in the present context. During periods of transitional settlement, when configurations of

power shift, some social groups may emerge as more influential than others in part due to strategies of coexistence used to augment one's holding power in the interim phase. The Buganda kingdom has been more adept at strategies of coexistence than the Bunyoro, increasing its likelihood of incorporation into a post-Museveni governing coalition and the achievement of its goal of becoming a federal state. Conversely, Bunyoro's limited use of strategic coexistence undermined its ability to increase its holding power and access benefits from the oil sector. Thus, the concept of strategic coexistence explains the proactive and reactive activities of marginalised social groups, yielding an understanding of those circumstances which precede shifts in a political settlement. This does not imply that practices of strategic coexistence guarantee or lead to shifts in the political settlement but instead lends to a clearer picture of interim politics.

### **Areas of Future research**

This study provides a foundation for future studies on the impacts of the natural resource sector on politics in Uganda and the country's political economy in general, and for comparative studies focused on political settlements theory in particular. Future studies could examine the possible growth of the oil sector from ongoing explorations of oil deposits in other parts of Uganda and the industry's impacts beyond the Albertine Graben region. Oil exploration is ongoing in the north-west and central regions, and additional commercial oil reserves could amplify the political, economic, and social ramifications of the industry on this region. This research could evaluate the degree to which social groups are incorporated into the oil complex, starting with host communities and their leadership. A second prospective research project could involve a comparative analysis of the Bunyoro kingdom's experience

with the hydrocarbons industry to that of other traditional kingdoms in new African oil-producing countries, including Ghana. Finally, there have been notable shifts in Ugandan politics since 2017 when musician and independent MP Robert Kyagulanyi, alias Bobi Wine, entered into politics to challenge President Museveni's regime. Kyagulanyi is a prominent opposition leader Baganda ethnicity who possesses significant support from urban youth, his popularity surpassing that of veteran opposition FDC former leader Kizza Besigye. An interesting study could investigate the likelihood of this new wave of opposition influencing a redistribution of power in Uganda and the potential impact to the oil industry, which is intimately tied to and reliant upon the NRM's exclusive political settlement.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdulai, Abdul-Gafaru, and Sam Hickey. "The Politics of Development under Competitive Clientelism: Insights from Ghana's Education Sector." *African Affairs* 115, no. 458 (2016): 44–72.
- Abrahamsen, Rita. *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*. Zed Books, 2000.
- Abrahamsen, Rita, and Gerald Bareebe. "Uganda's 2016 Elections: Not Even Faking It Anymore." *African Affairs*, 2016, 1–15.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "An African Success Story: Botswana." In *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, 80–119. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
- . "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." National bureau of economic research, 2000.
- Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Dan Woren. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*. Vol. 4. SciELO Chile, 2012.
- Ake, Claude. "What Is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?" *Transformation*, no. 22 (1993).
- Alence, Rod. "Where Did Africa's Resource Curse Go?" *Politics* 53, no. 3 (2014): 342.
- Allen, Tim, and Suzette Heald. "HIV/AIDS Policy in Africa: What Has Worked in Uganda and What Has Failed in Botswana?" *Journal of International Development* 16, no. 8 (2004): 1141–1154.
- Ampurire, Paul. "Staffers Sucked in as Govt Freezes Bank Accounts of GLISS for Funding Opposition Activities." *Online News from Uganda and the East African Region - SoftPower News* (blog), October 21, 2017.  
<https://www.softpower.ug/staffers-sucked-in-as-govt-freezes-bank-accounts-of-gliss-for-funding-opposition-activities/>.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso Books, 1983.
- Anderson, David M., and Adrian J. Browne. "The Politics of Oil in Eastern Africa." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 5, no. 2 (2011): 369–410.
- Apter, David E. *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism*. Routledge, 2013.
- . "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda." *World Politics* 13, no. 01 (1960): 45–68.

- Atkinson, Ronald R. *The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.
- Atuhairwe, Robert, and Pascal Kwesiga. "Omukama Dissolves Cabinet, Appoints New Prime Minister." *Www.Newvision.Co.Ug*, January 16, 2018.  
[http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1469175/omukama-dissolves-cabinet-appoints-prime-minister](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1469175/omukama-dissolves-cabinet-appoints-prime-minister).
- AUGOS. "About AUGOS." About Augos. Accessed August 3, 2019.  
<https://augos.org/about-augos.html>.
- Austin, Gareth. "African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies." *International Development Policy | Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement*, no. 1 (2010): 11–32.
- Auty, Richard M. "Patterns of Rent-Extraction and Deployment in Developing Countries," 2006. [http://wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2006/en\\_GB/rp2006-16/\\_files/78091771104134775/default/rp2006-16.pdf](http://wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2006/en_GB/rp2006-16/_files/78091771104134775/default/rp2006-16.pdf).
- Ayebale, David. "Bunyoro to Sue Britain over Losses." *Daily Monitor*. February 25, 2013. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-to-sue-Britain-over-losses/688334-1703570-format-xhtml-o6p6nt/index.html>.
- Bagala, Andrew. "How Boda Boda 2010 Emerged." *Daily Monitor*. January 22, 2018. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/How-Boda-Boda-2010-emerged/688334-4272860-7f3leiz/index.html>.
- Bainomugisha, Arthur, Hope Kivengyere, and Tusasirwe Benson. "Escaping the Oil Curse and Making Poverty History: A Review of the Oil and Gas Policy and Legal Framework for Uganda." *ACODE Policy Research Series* 20 (2010): 43.
- Baldwin, Kate. "When Politicians Cede Control of Resources: Land, Chiefs, and Coalition-Building in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 3 (2014): 253–71.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*. PublicAffairs, 2012.
- Bates, Robert. "States and Markets in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policy." *Berkeley: University of California Press, Series on Social Choice and Political Economy*, 1981.
- Bayart, Jean-François. "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion." *African Affairs* 99, no. 395 (2000): 217–267.
- . *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London: Longman, 1993.

- Beattie, John Hugh Marshall. "Bunyoro: An African Feudality?" *The Journal of African History* 5, no. 1 (1964): 25–36.
- Beaulier, Scott A. "Explaining Botswana's Success: The Critical Role of Post-Colonial Policy." *Cato Journal* 23 (2003): 227.
- Behuria, Pritish, Lars Buur, and Hazel Gray. "Studying Political Settlements in Africa." *African Affairs*, 2017, 1–18.
- Benkenstein, Alex. "What Will Uganda's Elections Mean for Parliamentary Oil Governance?" *South African Institute for International Affairs* (blog), January 2011. <https://www.polity.org.za/article/what-will-ugandas-elections-mean-for-parliamentary-oil-governance-2011-01-18>.
- Berg, Bruce Lawrence, and Howard Lune. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. 9th ed. Pearson Boston, MA, 2017.
- Berman, Bruce J. "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism." *African Affairs* 97, no. 388 (1998): 305–341.
- Berry, Sara. "Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land." *Africa* 62, no. 3 (1992): 327–355.
- Billon, Philippe Le. "Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 98, no. 2 (April 15, 2008): 345–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600801922422>.
- BKK Investment Department. "Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom Investment Guide." Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom, 2016.
- Booth, David, and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi. "Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda." *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012): 379–403.
- Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa." *World Politics* 46, no. 04 (1994): 453–489.
- Brett, Edward A. "Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no. 1 (1995): 129–152.
- Brophy, Kathleen, and Peter Wandera. "Keeping Corruption in Check in Uganda's Oil Sector? Uganda's Challenge to Let Everybody Eat, and Not Just the Lucky Few," 2018.
- Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom. "Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom Administration." Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom, November 4, 2019. <https://bunyorokitaringdom.org/about-bkk-2/bunyoro-kitara-kingdom-administration/>.

- Byaruhanga, Musiime Chris. "Expecting Eldorado? An Analysis of Ugandans' Expectations of Their Country's Oil Wealth." *Centre for Research on Peace and Development Working Paper No. 67* (2018): 1–16.
- Campion, Benjamin Betey, and Emmanuel Acheampong. "The Chieftaincy Institution in Ghana: Causers and Arbitrators of Conflicts in Industrial Jatropha Investments." *Sustainability* 6, no. 9 (2014): 6332–6350.
- Capps, Gavin James. "Tribal-Landed Property: The Political Economy of the BaFokeng Chieftaincy, South Africa, 1837-1994." London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2010.  
<http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.528664>.
- Carbone, Giovanni M. "Political Parties in a 'No-Party Democracy' Hegemony and Opposition Under 'Movement Democracy' in Uganda." *Party Politics* 9, no. 4 (2003): 485–501.
- Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. *Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument*. London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Christen, Kris. *Environmental Impacts of Gas Flaring, Venting Add Up*. ACS Publications, 2004.
- Christopher, Anthony J. "'Divide and Rule': The Impress of British Separation Policies." *Area*, 1988, 233–240.
- Clapham, Christopher S. *Third World Politics: An Introduction*. Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Coase, Ronald Harry. "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica* 4, no. 16 (1937): 386–405.
- Collier, David. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 04 (2011): 823–830.
- Collier, Paul. "Managing Uganda's Oil Discovery." *Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University*, 2011.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 625–633.
- Collier, Paul, and Anthony J. Venables. "Natural Resources and State Fragility," 2010.
- Comaroff, John L., and Jean Comaroff. *Ethnicity, Inc*. University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- Cook, Susan E. "Chiefs, Kings, Corporatization, and Democracy: A South African Case Study." *Brown J. World Aff.* 12 (2005): 125.

- . “The Business of Being Bafokeng.” *Current Anthropology* 52, no. S3 (2011).  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/657894>.
- Cooper, Frederick. *Africa since 1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- . *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Cornwall, Andrea. “Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse.” *Development in Practice* 17, no. 4–5 (2007): 471–484.
- Cornwall, Andrea, and Karen Brock. “What Do Buzzwords Do for Development Policy? A Critical Look at ‘Participation’, ‘Empowerment’ and ‘Poverty Reduction.’” *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 7 (2005): 1043–1060.
- CRED. “Up against Giants: Oil Influenced Land Injustices in the Albertine Graben in Uganda.” Civic Response for the Environment and Development, 2015.  
<https://creduganda.org/2019/04/20/up-against-giants-oil-influenced-land-injustices-in-the-albertine-graben-in-uganda/>.
- Creswell, John, W. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches*. 2nd ed. Sage Publications, 2007.
- Croese, Sylvia. “State-Led Housing Delivery as an Instrument of Developmental Patrimonialism: The Case of Post-War Angola.” *African Affairs* 116, no. 462 (2017): 80–100.
- Dahl, Robert A. “The Concept of Power.” *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (January 1, 1957): 201–15. <https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303>.
- Daily Monitor. “Bagungu Resolve to Secede from Bunyoro Kingdom - Daily Monitor.” April 17, 2018.  
<https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bagungu-resolve-secede-Bunyoro-Kingdom-Norman-Lukumu/688334-4397092-lak595z/index.html>.
- Davis, Graham A. “Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the Mineral Economies.” *World Development* 23, no. 10 (1995): 1765–1779.
- De Kock, Petrus, and Kathryn Sturman. “The Power of Oil Charting Uganda’s Transition to a Petro-State.” *South African Institute for African Affairs*, no. Research Report 10 (2012): 1–68.
- Denoon, Donald. “„The Historical Setting to 1900.”” *Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood*, New York: NOK Publishers International, 1982.
- Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Sage Publications, 2005.

- Di John, Jonathan. "Is There Really a Resource Curse? A Critical Survey of Theory and Evidence." *Global Governance* 17, no. 2 (2011): 167–184.
- Di John, Jonathan, and James Putzel. "Political Settlements: Issues Paper." *Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Emerging Issues Research Service*, 2009, 1–29.
- Doornbos, M., and F Mwesigye. "The New Politics of Kingmaking." In *From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda.*, 61–77. London: James Currey, n.d.
- Doyle, Shane. "From Kitara to the Lost Counties: Genealogy, Land and Legitimacy in the Kingdom of Bunyoro, Western Uganda." *Social Identities* 12, no. 4 (2006): 457–470.
- Dusza, Karl. "Max Weber's Conception of the State." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 3, no. 1 (1989): 71–105.
- Easterly, William. "What Did Structural Adjustment Adjust?" *Journal of Development Economics* 76, no. 1 (February 2005): 1–22.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.11.005>.
- Ebrahim-Zadeh, Christine. "Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely." *Finance and Development* 40, no. 1 (2003): 50–51.
- Englebort, Pierre. "Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Reconfiguration of Power in Africa." *Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa*, 2005, 33–60.
- . "Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 3 (2002): 345–368.
- EPRC. "Preliminary Economic Study of the Oil Producing Region of Uganda." Kampala, Uganda: Economic Policy Research Centre, 2011.
- Epstein, Arnold Leonard. *Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity*. Transaction Publishers, 1978.
- Epstein, Helen. *Another Fine Mess: America, Uganda and the War on Terror*. Columbia Global Reports, 2017.
- Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Evans, Peter B. "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State." In *Sociological Forum*, 4:561–587. Springer, 1989.  
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01115064>.

- Eversole, Robyn. "Remaking Participation: Challenges for Community Development Practice." *Community Development Journal*, 2010, bsq033.
- Fanon, Frantz. "Black Skin, White Masks." *New York*, 1967.
- Fearon, James D. "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 483–507.
- Ferguson, James. "Seeing like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa." *American Anthropologist*, 2005, 377–382.
- . *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
- Fields, Karen Elise. *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa*. Princeton University Press Princeton, 1985.
- Fisher, Jonathan. "International Perceptions and African Agency: Uganda and Its Donors 1986-2010." PhD Thesis, Oxford University, UK, 2011.
- . "Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda's 2007 Intervention in Somalia." *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012): 404–423.
- . "When It Pays to Be a 'Fragile State': Uganda's Use and Abuse of a Dubious Concept." *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2014): 316–332.
- Frynas, Jędrzej George, and Manuel Paulo. "A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives." *African Affairs* 106, no. 423 (2007): 229–251.
- Furley, Oliver. "Democratisation in Uganda." *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 38, no. 3 (2000): 79–102.
- Furley, Oliver W. "The Sudanese Troops in Uganda." *African Affairs* 58, no. 233 (1959): 311–328.
- Gaffey, Connor. "Who Are Uganda's Crime Preventers and Why Are They so Controversial?" *Newsweek*, January 14, 2016.  
<https://www.newsweek.com/who-are-ugandas-crime-preventers-415704>.
- Geertz, Clifford. *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Africa and Asia*. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Gerbner, George. "Toward" Cultural Indicators": The Analysis of Mass Mediated Public Message Systems." *AV Communication Review*, 1969, 137–148.
- Global Witness. *A Good Deal Better?: Uganda's Secret Oil Contracts Explained*. Global Witness, 2014.

- Goldsmith, Arthur A. "Predatory versus Developmental Rule in Africa." *Democratization* 11, no. 3 (2004): 88–110.
- Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. "Chiefs, Politicians, and the Community in Uganda: A Historico-Analytical Narrative." In *4th National Annual Local Government Conference, Durban, South Africa*, 2007.
- . "Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making." *Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science*, no. 27 (2008).
- Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick, and Sam Hickey. "Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda: Towards a Research Agenda.," 2013.
- . "The Master of Institutional Multiplicity? The Shifting Politics of Regime Survival, State-Building and Democratisation in Museveni's Uganda." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10, no. 4 (2016): 601–618.
- Goodfellow, Tom, and Stefan Lindemann. "The Clash of Institutions: Traditional Authority, Conflict and the Failure of 'Hybridity' in Buganda." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 51, no. 1 (2013): 3–26.
- Gray, Hazel. "Understanding and Deploying the Political Settlement Framework in Africa." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019.
- Gray, Hazel S. "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania." *African Affairs* 114, no. 456 (2015): 382–403.
- Green, Elliott. "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45, no. 1 (2010): 83–103.
- . "The Rise and Fall of Decentralization in Contemporary Uganda." WIDER Working Paper, 2013. <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/80988>.
- Hansen, Holger Bernt. *Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda: A Study of Ethnicity as a Political Factor in Uganda, Based on a Discussion of Political Anthropology and the Application of Its Results*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1977.
- . "Uganda in the 1970s: A Decade of Paradoxes and Ambiguities." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 1 (2013): 83–103.
- Hauser, Ellen. "Ugandan Relations with Western Donors in the 1990s: What Impact on Democratisation?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 4 (1999): 621–641.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press, 2000.

- Hesselbein, Gabi, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and James Putzel. "Economic and Political Foundations of State-Making in Africa: Understanding State Reconstruction," 2006.
- Hickey, Sam, and Angelo Izama. "The Politics of Governing Oil in Uganda: Going against the Grain?" *African Affairs* 116, no. 463 (2016): 163–185.
- Higley, John, and Michael G. Burton. "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns." *American Sociological Review*, 1989, 17–32.
- Higley, John, and Richard Gunther. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Horner, Bridget. "The Royal Bafokeng Nation: Cultural Identity and Spatial Expression." Accessed June 7, 2015.  
<http://www.sss8.cl/media/upload/paginas/seccion/8067.pdf>.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Vol. 4. University of Oklahoma press, 1993.
- IOL News. "Uganda Announces Oil Discovery | IOL News." IOL. October 9, 2006.  
<https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/uganda-announces-oil-discovery-296822>.
- Isaacs, Harold Robert. *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change*. Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Isabalija, Stephen. "Oil and Gas Sector in Uganda: Frequently Asked Questions." Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2017.
- Isham, Jonathan, Michael Woolcock, Lant Pritchett, and Gwen Busby. "The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth." *The World Bank Economic Review* 19, no. 2 (2005): 141–174.
- Izama, Angelo, and Michael Wilkerson. "Uganda: Museveni's Triumph and Weakness." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3 (2011): 64–78.
- Johannessen, Cathrine. "Kingship in Uganda. The Role of the Buganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics." CHR Michelsen Institute, Norway, 2006.
- . *Kingship in Uganda. The Role of the Uganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics*. Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006.
- Jørgensen, Jan Jelmert. *Uganda: A Modern History*. London: Croom Helm Publishers, 1981.

- Jütting, Johannes, Elena Corsi, Celine Kauffmann, Ida McDonnell, Holger Osterrieder, Nicolas Pinaud, and Lucia Wegner. "What Makes Decentralisation in Developing Countries Pro-Poor?" *The European Journal of Development Research* 17, no. 4 (2005): 626–648.
- Kaaya, Sadab Kitatta. "MOU: Was Buganda Duped?" *The Observer - Uganda*, June 10, 2014. <https://observer.ug/news/headlines/32211-mou-was-buganda-duped>.
- Kabwegyere, Tarsis B. *The Politics of State Formation: The Nature and Effects of Colonialism in Uganda*. East African Literature Bureau, 1974.
- Kahungu, Thembo. "Why Bunyoro King Dissolved His Cabinet." *Daily Monitor*. January 18, 2018.
- Kalyegira, Timothy. "The Museveni-Buganda Agreement: A Memorandum or a Mockery?" *Daily Monitor*, August 11, 2013. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/Museveni-Buganda-agreement--A-Memorandum-or-a-Misunderstanding-/689364-1943258-mfskmz/index.html>.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars." *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3 (2003): 475–494.
- Kamoga, Jonathan. "Uganda Now Secures Contractor for Oil Roads." *The East African*, April 2, 2019. <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Uganda-now-secures-contractor-for-oil-roads/2560-5053338-y9g8dn/index.html>.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. "Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and Economic Consequences." *Encyclopedia of Energy* 4 (2007): 661–672.
- . *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Vol. 26. Univ of California Press, 1997.
- Kasfir, Nelson. "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation." *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 365–388.
- Kasozi, A. *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1994.
- Kavuma, Richard M. "Explainer: Local Government Structures in Uganda." *The Guardian*, 2009.
- Kelsall, Tim. "Thinking and Working with Political Settlements," 1–8. London: Overseas Development Institute London, UK, 2016.
- Keyes, Charles F. *Ethnic Change*. University of Washington Press, 1982.

- Khan, Mushtaq. "Class, Clientelism, and Communal Politics in Contemporary Bangladesh." In *The Making of History: Essays Presented to Irfan Habib*. London: Anthem Press, 1995.
- . "Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions." *Unpublished Paper, School of Oriental Studies*, 2010, 1–139.
- . "State Failure in Developing Countries and Institutional Reform Strategies," 2004.
- Khan, Mushtaq H. "Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions." *African Affairs* 117, no. 469 (2017): 636–655.
- Khan, Mushtaq H., and Jomo Kwame Sundaram. *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia*. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Khisa, Moses. "Managing Elite Defection in Museveni's Uganda: The 2016 Elections in Perspective." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10, no. 4 (2016): 729–748.
- . "The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda." *Africa Development* 38, no. 1 & 2 (2013): 191–226.
- Kiiza, Julius, Lawrence Bategeka, and Sarah Ssewanyana. "Righting Resources-Curse Wrongs in Uganda: The Case of Oil Discovery and the Management of Popular Expectations." *Economic Policy Research Centre*, 78, 2011, 1–40.
- Kiva, Fred. "Bunyoro King Makes 3rd Cabinet Reshuffle in Six Months." *Uganda Radio Network*. July 21, 2012.
- Kiwuuwa, Paul. "Bunyoro Kingdom Rejects Bagungu Breakaway." *New Vision*. February 14, 2019.  
[http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1494149/bunyoro-kingdom-rejects-bagungu-breakaway](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1494149/bunyoro-kingdom-rejects-bagungu-breakaway).
- Kjaer, Anne Mette, and Mesharch Katusiimeh. *Growing but Not Transforming: Fragmented Ruling Coalitions and Economic Developments in Uganda*. 2012: 07. DIIS working paper, 2012.
- Kuteesa, Annette. "Local Communities and Oil Discoveries: A Study in Uganda's Albertine Graben Region." *Brookings* (blog), February 25, 2014.  
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/02/25/local-communities-and-oil-discoveries-a-study-in-ugandas-albertine-graben-region/>.
- Lambright, Gina MS. *Decentralization in Uganda: Explaining Successes and Failures in Local Governance*. FirstForumPress Boulder, CO, 2011.

- Larsen, E. Røed. "Are Rich Countries Immune to the Resource Curse? Evidence from Norway's Management of Its Oil Riches." *Resources Policy* 30, no. 2 (2005): 75–86.
- LaTouche, S. "Ch. 1 'Development's Castaways' Ch. 6 'The Standard of Living.'" In *In the Wake of the Affluent Society: An Exploration of Post-Development*. London: Zed Books, 2005.
- Lay, Taimour, and Mika Minio-Paluello. *Contracts Curse: Uganda's Oil Agreements Place Profit Before People*. Platform, 2010.
- Le Billon, Philippe. "Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975–2000." *African Affairs* 100, no. 398 (2001): 55–80.
- Lewis, Stephen R. "Primary Exporting Countries." *Handbook of Development Economics* 2 (1989): 1541–1600.
- Lindemann, Stefan. "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset: The Case of Uganda." *Crisis States Research Centre*, 2, 76 (2010): 1–80.
- . *Inclusive Elite Bargains and Civil War Avoidance: The Case of Zambia*. Crisis States Research Centre, 2010.
- Lofchie, Michael F. *The Political Economy of Tanzania: Decline and Recovery*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
- Luong, Pauline Jones, and Erika Weinthal. "Rethinking the Resource Curse: Ownership Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints\*." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006): 241–263.
- Lyatuu, Justus. "Bunyoro Gears up for Gafabusa's 25th Coronation Anniversary." *The Observer - Uganda*. June 9, 2019.  
<https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60963-bunyoro-gears-up-for-gafabusa-s-25th-coronation-anniversary>.
- Lye, William F. "The Difaqane: The Mfecane in the Southern Sotho Area, 1822–24." *The Journal of African History* 8, no. 01 (1967): 107–131.
- Mabikke, Samuel B. "Escalating Land Grabbing in Post-Conflict Regions of Northern Uganda: A Need for Strengthening Good Land Governance in Acholi Region." In *International Conference on Global Land Grabbing*, 6–8, 2011.
- MacKenzie, Catrina A., Rebecca K. Fuda, Sadie Jane Ryan, and Joel Hartter. "Drilling through Conservation Policy: Oil Exploration in Murchison Falls Protected Area, Uganda." *Conservation and Society* 15, no. 3 (2017): 322.
- Mahdavy, Hossein. "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran." *Life* 1000 (1970): 1.

- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton University Press, 1996.
- . *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*. Monthly Review Press, 1976.
- . "Uganda in Transition: Two Years of the NRA/NRM." *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (1988): 1155–1181.
- Manyak, Terrell G., and Isaac Wasswa Katono. "Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda: Governance Adrift." *African Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (2010): 1.
- Manyak, Terrell George. "Oil and Governance in Uganda." *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 5, no. 1 (2015): 40–58.
- Martin, David. *General Amin*. London: Faber and Faber, 1974.
- Matsiko, Haggai. "ACODE under Investigation." *The Independent Uganda* (blog), April 9, 2012. <https://www.independent.co.ug/acode-under-investigation/>.
- . "Museveni Locks out Oil Investors." *The Independent Uganda*: (blog), June 17, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.ug/museveni-locks-out-oil-investors/>.
- . "Uganda: Donors Cut Budget Support." *The Independent Uganda*. August 10, 2010. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201008101266.html>.
- Matsuyama, Kiminori. "Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Theory* 58, no. 2 (1992): 317–334.
- Mayiga, Charles Peter. *King on the Throne: The Story of the Restoration of the Kingdom of Buganda*. Kampala, Uganda: Prime Time Communications, 2009.
- Mayring, Philipp. "Qualitative Content Analysis." *A Companion to Qualitative Research* 1 (2004): 159–176.
- Mazrui, Ali A. "Between Development and Decay: Anarchy, Tyranny and Progress under Idi Amin" 2 (1980).
- Mazrui, Ali Al'Amin. *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy*. Sage Publications Beverly Hills, 1975.
- Mbabazi, Pamela K. "The Oil Industry in Uganda; A Blessing in Disguise or an All Too Familiar Curse." *Claude Ake Memorial Lecture*, 2012.
- Mbembe, Achille. *On the Postcolony*. Vol. 41. Univ of California Press, 2001.
- Mbenga, Bernard, and Andrew Manson. "People of the Dew": *A History of the Bafokeng of Phokeng-Rustenburg Region, South Africa, from Early Times to 2000*. Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana, 2010.
- Mejer, Jan. "Marxist and Neo-Marxist Interpretations of Ethnicity." *Sociological Focus* 20, no. 4 (1987): 251–264.

- Ménard, Claude, and Mary M. Shirley. "The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics." *Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, 11–29.
- Mengisteab, K. "Relevance of African Traditional Institutions of Governance: A Concept Paper." *Submitted to the Development Policy Management Division, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)*, 2006.
- Miirima, Henry Ford. "Bunyoro-Kitara/Buganda Relations in 19th and 20th Centuries." University of Texas, 2005. [www.repositories.lib.utexas.edu](http://www.repositories.lib.utexas.edu).
- Mugerwa, Francis. "Bunyoro Demands 440 Assets from Government." *Daily Monitor*. May 4, 2014. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-demands-440-assets-from-government/688334-2302400-gd0yrjz/index.html>.
- . "Bunyoro Demands Share of Pre-Production Oil Cash." *Daily Monitor*. December 27, 2015. <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-demands-share-of-pre-production-oil-cash/688334-3010746-11sx87wz/index.html>.
- . "Bunyoro King Swears in New Prime Minister." *Daily Monitor*. January 19, 2018. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-king-swears-in-new-prime-minister/688334-4269338-j358l3/index.html>.
- . "Bunyoro Launches Omuganda Campaign." *Daily Monitor*. June 9, 2015. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bunyoro-launches-Omuganda-campaign/688334-2744558-fcbbjuz/index.html>.
- . "Oil Exploration Brings Mixed Fortunes in Bunyoro." *Daily Monitor*, April 5, 2018. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Oil-exploration-brings-mixed-fortunes-Bunyoro/688334-4372458-h72hxqz/index.html>.
- Mugerwa, Francis, Felix Basiime, and Ismail Bategeka. "Sacked Bunyoro Premier Refuses to Leave Office, Sues Successor." *Daily Monitor*. March 22, 2018. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Sacked-Bunyoro-premier-refuses-to-leave-office--sues-successor/688334-4353142-k97qou/index.html>.
- Mugerwa, Yasiin. "First Family 'Too Close' to Oil Sector." *Daily Monitor*, November 11, 2010. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-1051166-b7droez/index.html>.

- Muhereza, Frank E., and Peter O. Otim. "Neutralizing Ethnicity in Uganda." In *Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa*, Edited by MAM Salih and J. Markakis. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998.
- Muriaas, Ragnhild L. "Traditional Institutions and Decentralisation: A Typology of Co-Existence in Sub-Saharan Africa." In *Forum for Development Studies*, 38:87–107. Taylor & Francis, 2011.
- Museveni, Yoweri. *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*. London: Macmillan London, 1997.
- . *What Is Africa's Problem?* Vol. 1. University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
- Musisi, Frederic. "URA, Tullow Oil in Fresh Tax Row." *Daily Monitor*, June 12, 2018. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/URA-Tullow-Oil-fresh-tax-row/688334-4607080-ng5cdez/index.html>.
- Musoke, Ronald. "Uganda's Ghost Refugees." *The Independent Uganda*: November 13, 2018. <https://www.independent.co.ug/ugandas-ghost-refugees/>.
- Mutaizibwa, Emma, and Edward Ssekika. "The Observer - Uganda." *The Observer - Uganda*. June 21, 2012. [https://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=19407:bunyoro-angry-with-museveni-on-oil-sharing](https://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19407:bunyoro-angry-with-museveni-on-oil-sharing).
- Muwambi, Stephen. "Bunyoro Loses Case Against Britain." *New Vision*. August 23, 2005. [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1118561/bunyoro-loses-britain](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1118561/bunyoro-loses-britain).
- Muzoora, George. "Omukama Iguru Announces New Cabinet, Drops 7 Ministers." *Uganda Radio Network*. March 27, 2015. <http://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/omukama-iguru-announces-new-cabinet-drops-7-ministers>.
- Mwenda, Andrew M. "Personalizing Power in Uganda." *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007): 23–37.
- Mwenda, Andrew M., and Roger Tangri. "Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda." *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005): 449–467.
- Nakabugo, Zurah. "Kinyara's Sweet Success Story." *Daily Monitor*. January 17, 2006.
- Neuendorf, Kimberly, A. *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Sage Publications, 2002.
- New Vision. "MPs Were Bribed to Fail Oil Bill - Museveni." [www.newvision.co.ug](http://www.newvision.co.ug), December 14, 2014. [http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1311364/mps-bribed-fail-oil-museveni](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1311364/mps-bribed-fail-oil-museveni).

- . “Why Is Bunyoro Demanding a Share of Oil Money?” *New Vision*. May 1, 2009.
- North, Douglass. “Institutions.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112.
- North, Douglass C. “A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History.” *Explorations in Economic History* 16, no. 3 (1979): 249–259.
- . “Understanding the Process of Institutional Change.” *North: Douglass*, 2005, 89–108.
- Nyamahunge, Priscillar. “Court Dismisses Case against Bunyoro’s Premier.” *Www.Newvision.Co.Ug*. March 24, 2018.  
[http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1474072/court-dismisses-bunyoros-premier](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1474072/court-dismisses-bunyoros-premier).
- Nyandoro, G., and W. T. Nyangoni. “Zimbabwe’s Independence Movements: Select Documents.” *Londra, Rex Collins*, 1979.
- Nyombi, Chrispas, and Ronald Kaddu. “Ethnic Conflict in Uganda’s Political History.” *Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN)*, 2015, 1–27.
- Office of the Prime Minister. “Support to Bunyoro Development.” Office of the Prime Minister, November 3, 2019. <https://opm.go.ug/support-to-bunyoro-development/>.
- Ogwang, Tom, and Frank Vanclay. “Social Impacts of Land Acquisition for Oil and Has Development in Uganda.” *MDPI-Land*, 2019.
- Oil In Uganda. “Colonial Agreement on Resources Still Stands, Says Bunyoro King | Oil In Uganda.” *Oil in Uganda*, June 20, 2012.  
<https://oilinuganda.org/features/land/colonial-agreement-on-resources-still-stands-says-bunyoro-king/>.
- Okuku, Juma. “Beyond Third Term’Politics: Constitutional Reform and Democratic Governance in Uganda.” *East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights* 11, no. 2 (2005): 182–219.
- . “Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda.” *Nordic Africa Institute, Discussion Paper Series*, 17 (2002): 1–42.
- Oloka-Onyango, Joe. “‘New-Breed’ Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Uganda’s Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.” *Africa Today*, 2004, 29–52.
- . “The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics.” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1997): 173–189.

- Olson, Mancur. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–576.
- Omach, Paul. "Political Violence in Uganda: The Role of Vigilantes and Militias." *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 35, no. 4 (2010): 426.
- Omara-Otunnu, Amii. "The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 3 (1992): 443–463.
- Otto, Alex. "Presidential Handshake Refund Draws Mixed Reactions :". Uganda Radionetwork, April 28, 2017.  
<https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/mixed-reactions-over-museveni-gesture-to-refund-ugx-6bn-handshake>.
- Otunnu, Ogenga. "The History of Political Crisis in Uganda: The Legacy Facing Museveni Regime, 1986 to Present." Saint Mary's University, 1989.
- Ovadia, Jesse Salah. "Local Content Policies and Petro-Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis." *Resources Policy* 49 (2016): 20–30.
- Parks, Thomas, and William Cole. "Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice." *Occasional Paper* 2 (2010).
- Patey, Luke. "Oil in Uganda - Hard Bargaining and Complex Politics in East Africa." London: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2015.
- Pitcher, Anne, Mary H. Moran, and Michael Johnston. "Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa." *African Studies Review* 52, no. 1 (2009): 125–156.
- Platform UK. "Wikileaks Cable Shines Light on ENI Corruption in Uganda; Heritage Offered to Pay Bribes in Congo," December 15, 2010.  
<https://platformlondon.org/2010/12/15/wikileaks-cable-shines-light-on-eni-corruption-in-uganda-heritage-offered-to-pay-bribes-in-congo/>.
- Poteete, Amy R. "Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral-Dependent Development in Botswana." *The Journal of Development Studies* 45, no. 4 (2009): 544–571.
- Privacy International. "For God and My President: State Surveillance in Uganda." United Kingdom, October 2015.  
[https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Uganda\\_Report\\_1.pdf](https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Uganda_Report_1.pdf).
- Ranger, Terence. "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa." In *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge University Press, 1983.

- Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. "Uganda: A Group Called the Kalangala Action Plan; Its Activities and Organisational Structure, Whether It Is Affiliated with the Government." Government of Canada, July 7, 2003.
- Richards, Paul. *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone*. Reprinted Ed. James Currey Ltd., 1998.
- Roberts, George. "The Uganda–Tanzania War, the Fall of Idi Amin, and the Failure of African Diplomacy, 1978–1979." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 4 (2014): 692–709.
- Robinson, J. "Botswana as a Role Model for Country Success." *Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World*, 2013, 187–203.
- Rodney, W. "Colonialism as a System for under Developing Africa." *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Pretoria: PANAFA Publishing, 2009, 246–291.
- Ross, Michael L. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, no. 03 (2001): 325–361.
- Rostow, Walt, Whitman. *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Rothchild, Donald. "Ethnic Bargaining and State Breakdown in Africa." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1, no. 1 (1995): 54–72.
- Rothschild, Joseph. *Ethnopolitics, a Conceptual Framework*. Columbia University Press, 1981.
- Rutanga, Murindwa. "Traditional/Cultural Institutions in Uganda's Democratic Transition, Political Stability and Nation Development: A Case of Buganda." *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2010): 125–166.
- Rwengabo, Sabastiano. "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing." *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (2013): 531–559.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D, and Andrew Warner. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth." National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1995.
- Salama, Vivian. "Museveni's Oil Bet." *Foreign Affairs*, February 19, 2014. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2014-02-20/musevenis-oil-bet>.
- Sekanjako, Henry. "Bunyoro King Storms Parliament Over Oil Revenue." *New Vision*. June 1, 2012. [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1302151/bunyoro-king-storms-parliament-oil-revenue](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1302151/bunyoro-king-storms-parliament-oil-revenue).

- Sen, Ritwika. "Enhancing Local Content in Uganda's Oil and Gas Industry." WIDER Working Paper, 2018.
- Shepherd, Ben. "Oil in Uganda: International Lessons for Success." London, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013.
- Sklar, Richard L. "The Significance of Mixed Government in Southern African Studies: A Preliminary Assessment," 1–12. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 1994.
- Skocpol, Theda. *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*. Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Spear, Thomas. "Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa." *The Journal of African History* 44, no. 1 (2003): 3–27.
- Ssali, Godfrey. "Katuntu Committee Recommends Refund of Sh6bn 'Presidential Handshake.'" *The Independent Uganda*: June 22, 2017.  
<https://www.independent.co.ug/katuntu-committee-recommends-refund-sh6bn-presidential-handshake/>.
- Ssebuyira, Martin. "You Don't Wait for War to Buy Fighter Jets, Says Gen. Museveni." *Daily Monitor*, 2011.  
<https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-1207808-a76ofiz/index.html>.
- Ssekika, Edward. "Oil Cash: Bunyoro Plans to Invoke 1955 Agreement." August 6, 2009. <https://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/4530-oil-cash-bunyoro-plans-to-invoke-1955-agreement>.
- Ssenkumba, John. "The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy: Neutralising Ugandan Opposition Politics under the NRM." *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*, 1998, 171–94.
- Stijns, Jean-Philippe C. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth Revisited." *Resources Policy* 30, no. 2 (2005): 107–130.
- Stover, Mary, Valerie Cloud, Jenny Garner, Sue Phillips, and Leslie Strauss. "Overcoming Exclusion In Rural Communities: NIMBY Case Studies." Washington, D.C: Housing Access Council, 1994.
- Tapscott, Rebecca. "Where the Wild Things Are Not: Crime Preventers and the 2016 Ugandan Elections." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10, no. 4 (2016): 693–712.
- "The Bunyoro Agreement, 1955." Government of The United Kingdom and Uganda Protectorate, September 3, 1955.

- Thelen, Kathleen. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 369–404.
- Thornton, Robert. "Chiefs: Power in a Political Wilderness." *DI Ray and PS*, 2003.
- Thurber, Mark C., David R. Hulst, and Patrick RP Heller. "Exporting the 'Norwegian Model': The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance." *Energy Policy* 39, no. 9 (2011): 5366–5378.
- Tranøy, Bent Sofus. "Norway–The Accidental Role Model." In *The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds*, 177–201. Springer, 2010.
- Transparency International Uganda. "Unveiling Petroleum Revenue Flows in Uganda." Kampala, Uganda: Transparency International, July 2017.
- Tripp, Aili Mari. *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. Vol. 6. Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO, 2010.
- Tumusiime, David Mwesigye, Joseph Maweje, and Patrick Byakagaba. "Discovery of Oil: Community Perceptions and Expectations in Uganda's Albertine Region," 2018.
- Tumwine, Albert. "Mysterious Person Attempts to Poison Bunyoro King." *Daily Monitor*. February 24, 2015.  
<https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Mysterious--person---poison--Bunyoro--King/688334-2633294-rnotw3z/index.html>.
- Ugochukwu, Collins NC, and Jürgen Ertel. "Negative Impacts of Oil Exploration on Biodiversity Management in the Niger De Area of Nigeria." *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 26, no. 2 (2008): 139–147.
- Uzoigwe, G. N. "Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited: A Reevaluation of the Decline and Diminishment of an African Kingdom." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 48, no. 1 (2013): 16–34.
- Van Alstine, James, Jacob Manyindo, Laura Smith, Jami Dixon, and Ivan AmanigaRuhanga. "Resource Governance Dynamics: The Challenge of 'New Oil' in Uganda." *Resources Policy* 40 (2014): 48–58.
- Vansina, Jan M. *Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa*. University of Wisconsin Pres, 1990.
- Vaughan, Olufemi. *Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa*. Africa World Press, 2005.
- Vlassenroot, Koen, Sandrine Perrot, and Jeroen Cuvelier. "Doing Business out of War. An Analysis of the UPDF's Presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (2012): 2–21.

- Vokes, Richard. "The Politics of Oil in Uganda." *African Affairs*, 2012, ads017.
- Wass, Gabriella, and Chris Musiime. "Business, Human Rights and Uganda's Oil." Action Aid, 2013.
- Watts, Michael J. "Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate Social Responsibility." *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.* 30 (2005): 373–407.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press, 1968.
- Weinthal, Erika, and Pauline Jones Luong. "Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth." *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 01 (2006): 35–53.
- Whitfield, Lindsay, Ole Therkildsen, Lars Buur, and Anne Mette Kj\ a er. *The Politics of African Industrial Policy: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge university press, 2015.
- Williamson, John. "A Short History of the Washington Consensus," 2013. <http://dspace.unive.it/handle/10579/3936>.
- Williamson, Oliver E. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2000, 595–613.
- Witte, Annika. *An Uncertain Future: Anticipating Oil in Uganda*. Vol. 11. Gotingen Series in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Gottingen University Press, 2018.
- . "Bright Prospects or Ominous Future: Anticipating Oil in Uganda." *Tsantsa* 22 (2017): 18–27.
- Wolf, Christian. "The Petroleum Sector Value Chain." The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2009.
- Wolf, Sebastian, and Vishal Potluri. "Uganda's Oil: How Much, When, and How Will It Be Governed?" World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), 2018.
- Wright, Gavin. "Resource-Based Growth Then and Now." *Processed*. Stanford University, 2001.
- Young, Crawford. "Nation, Ethnicity and Citizenship: Dilemmas of Democracy and Civil Order in Africa." In *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- . *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. Yale University Press, 1994.

## APPENDIX 1: FORMAL INTERVIEWS LIST

### a. Bunyoro kingdom

- i. Senior leader in the Bunyoro government, (RADK), Kampala, May 2019
- ii. Academic and advisor to the Bunyoro government, (BPMP), Kampala, May 2019
- iii. Senior leader in the Bunyoro government, (FMKP), Kampala, July 2018
- iv. Senior leader in the Bunyoro government, (MNBM), July 2018
- v. Former senior leader in the Bunyoro government, (MHFA), July 2018
- vi. Senior civil servant and former senior leader in the Bunyoro government, (BSCO), Kampala, June 2018
- vii. Senior leader in the Bunyoro government, (MGMI), Hoima, June 2018
- viii. Local-level leader in Hoima district, (NDJT), Hoima, June 2018
- ix. Local level leader in Hoima district, (NDKJ), Hoima, June 2018
- x. Local-level leader in Hoima district, (NJDO), Hoima, June 2018
- xi. Business leader in Hoima district, (MBSH), Hoima, June 2018
- xii. Former businessperson serving the oil sector, (BMBM), Hoima, June 2018

### b. Buganda Kingdom

- i. Senior member of the Buganda government, (KNSL), Kampala, July 2018
- ii. Senior member of the Buganda government, (MKDK), Kampala, August 2018
- iii. Senior member of a Buganda agency, (KMCB), Kampala, July 2018
- iv. Focus group with 3 local-level leaders in the Buganda region, (MGLD, DNBF, and NDMS) Masaka, July 2018
- v. Local-level civil society leader in the Buganda region, (YKCD), July 2018

### c. Civil society

- i. Civil society leader and consultant, (PINC), February 2018
- ii. Representative of church-owned civil society organisation, (DAA), Kampala, February 2018

- iii. Senior officer in a natural resource governance-based local NGO, (DDMC), Kampala, February 2018
- iv. Extractives governance officer in an international civil society organisation, (ADAM), Kampala, February 2018
- v. Leading journalist in independent media specialising in oil, (JIMH), Kampala, May 2018
- vi. Prominent lawyer employed in local NGO dealing with host community human rights, (NLAM), Kampala, June 2018
- vii. Extractives specialist in international NGO, (ARIW), Kampala, June 2018
- viii. Senior officer in extractives governance-based international NGO, (IOGL), Kampala, May 2018.
- ix. Programmes officer in extractives governance-based local NGO, (CPRO), Kampala, May 2018
- x. Extractives governance specialist in local NGO, (GRES), Kampala, May 2018
- xi. Extractives governance and legal specialist in local NGO, (MSMW), May 2018
- xii. Senior officer in a local NGO and prominent activist, (GDTG), June 2018
- xiii. Lawyer and prominent extractives governance specialist, (MJML), Kampala, June 2018
- xiv. Research fellow and academic at extractives governance-based local NGO, (RSFR), Kampala, June 2018
- xv. Prominent journalist reporting on oil-related issues, (JIIA), Kampala, June 2018
- xvi. Lawyer and senior officer in local NGO, (LPTF), Kampala, July 2018
- xvii. Senior officer in local NGO specialising on the politics of oil, (PGMT), Kampala, July 2018
- xviii. Senior officer and media specialist in local NGO, (DAMP), Kampala, July 2018
- xix. Group discussion with extractives governance specialists in international NGO, (ITI, BKE), Kampala, May 2018
- xx. Prominent thought leader and power broker, (PMSMA), Kampala, August 2018
- xxi. Senior officer in local NGO, (DMTB), Kampala, August 2018

**d. Government**

- i. Seminar with the Executive Director and senior policy staff of the Uganda National Planning Commission, Kampala, May 2019
- ii. Senior officer, National Planning Commission, (DGAP), Kampala, May 2019
- iii. Opposition legislator and oil governance critic, (NMPW), Kampala, July 2018
- iv. Ruling NRM party legislator from the Bunyoro region, (HMDB), Kampala, July 2018
- v. Senior officer in the Uganda National Oil Company, (KIVF), Kampala, July 2018
- vi. Senior officer in the Petroleum Authority of Uganda, (SDRE), Kampala, August 2018
- vii. Senior diplomat in the Norwegian embassy in Uganda, (SSOU), Kampala, June 2018

**e. Academics**

- i. Senior economist and academic at Makerere University, (DMFA), Kampala, July 2018
- ii. Senior academic at Makerere University and advisor to the Bunyoro kingdom, (MAKJ), Kampala, July 2018
- iii. United States-based Ugandan academic and political commentator, (KMNE), Kampala, June 2018
- iv. Senior academic at Makerere University Business School and lawyer, (AJRT), Kampala, May 2019.

**f. Oil companies**

- i. Officers in foreign oil company involved in developing Uganda's oil sector, (NIOS, MWIC), Hoima, June 2018
- ii. Officer in foreign oil company involved in developing Uganda's oil sector, (BDCN), Kampala, June 2018
- iii. Former oil industry executive and banking industry professional, (LGOT), Kampala, June 2018

## APPENDIX 2: RECRUITMENT NOTICE

### LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

30 January 2018

Dear ...

#### RE: REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT FOR RESEARCH INTERVIEW

My name is Shingirai Lenon Taodzera, a PhD Candidate at the School of International Development and Globalisation Studies (SIDGS) at the University of Ottawa, Canada. I am currently visiting Kampala as part of my PhD field research. My dissertation focuses on the effects of the emerging oil industry in Uganda between 2007 and 2018, with specific focus on the negotiation of political and economic interests between the central government, the Buganda, and Bunyoro kingdoms.

The project is entitled, **“Nations within a state and the emerging hydrocarbons industry in Uganda.”**

The University of Ottawa, and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) have granted me permission to conduct interviews in Uganda with individuals, and groups who have a great depth of knowledge on this topic. I would like to kindly request to meet with you in this regard. Given your busy schedule, I would be willing to meet at a date, location and time that would be most convenient for you.

The information that you would provide me with will be only be used for the purposes of my PhD dissertation. I will also maintain the anonymity and confidentiality of all research participants through anonymising the information provided, and work with you to ensure that the published information would not adversely affect you in any way. I would also commit to providing you with the final copy of my PhD dissertation.

You may kindly contact me on email (\*\*\*), or by phone on \*\*\*

Many thanks in advance for your assistance. I look forward to hearing from you and hopefully, meeting with you.

Yours sincerely,

Shingirai L. Taodzera  
BA (Hons), MA (IR), MA (CPS)  
PhD Candidate, International Development  
University of Ottawa  
Canada

**APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEWEE CONSENT FORM**

**University of Ottawa  
Consent Form**

**Title of the Study:**

Nations within a state and the emerging hydrocarbons industry in Uganda

**Investigator:**

Shingirai L. Taodzera

**Institution:**

University of Ottawa (PhD Proposal)

**Researcher's Telephone:**

\*\*\*

**Email:**

\*\*\*  
—

**Introduction:**

My name is Shingirai Lenon Taodzera, and I am a PhD Candidate at the School of International Development and Globalisation Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada. My supervisor is Professor Rita Abrahamsen, and she is based in the Graduate School for Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), at the University of Ottawa. I am fully funded by the University of Ottawa for the duration of my PhD programme, and this includes this field research. My dissertation research focuses on the impact of the emerging oil industry in Uganda, with a specific attention on the relationships between the central government, and the Buganda, and Bunyoro kingdoms.

The project is entitled, "*Nations within a state and the emerging hydrocarbons industry in Uganda*".

I am currently visiting Uganda as part of my dissertation research, and will be conducting interviews with individual participants who have a great depth of knowledge on this topic. I would like to kindly request to speak with you in this regard, given the nature of your work pertaining to the subject of the research.

The University of Ottawa and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology have granted me permission to conduct interviews in Uganda with individuals, and groups who have a great depth of knowledge on this topic. I would like to kindly request to meet with you in this regard. Given your busy schedule, I would be willing to meet at a date, location and time that would be most convenient for you.

**Background information:**

This study seeks to understand the ways in which the emerging oil industry has altered the way the central government of Uganda interacts with the kingdoms of the Buganda and Bunyoro between 2007 and 2018. It will also seek to understand the ways in which the kingdoms of the Buganda and Bunyoro have also interacted in the same time period. I will conduct interviews with a total of approximately 60 participants, as part of the fieldwork/data collection process.

**What the participant would be asked to do:**

I will request to conduct an interview with you, the participant, which will last for approximately 1 hour. I have a set of questions which I will pose to you, and will also ask some follow-up questions based on some of the information that you would have provided.

**Risks and benefits of being in the study:**

**Risks:** There are minimal risks to participation in the interview. However, in the event that any of the questions create any discomfort, the researcher commits to the following measures:

- i. Stopping the interview or moving to another question if it appears that the interviewee is not comfortable, or if the interviewee requests for a transition from the subject
- ii. The right not to respond to any of the questions

**Benefits:** Participation in this research may provide an opportunity for the participants to reflect on the issues that will be discussed, express their opinions freely, and improve the depth of their knowledge on the subject. The research findings may also assist the government to understand the political processes that accompany the discovery of natural resources, and potentially contribute to processes of policy making.

**Confidentiality:**

The researcher, Shingirai L. Taodzera will guarantee complete anonymity upon request through the following measures. The researcher will not cite the informants' name(s) in the interview notes, and anonymise all the sensitive parts of the information. The researcher will also replace any identifying information with codes, which only the researcher will know and have access to. If participants authorize the researcher to identify them in the research, the researcher will ensure that all the data and information will not cause any harm to me or others through my identification. The researcher will store all collected data, (audio recordings, interview transcripts, and copies of consent forms) securely, under lock and key. The researcher will store all data that is in an electronic format in his password-protected laptop, that only he has access to, which he will keep in his place of residence. Backup copies of the information will also be saved in a password-protected online cloud drive.

Any written notes and any other documentation will be kept under lock and key in the researcher's place of residence. The supervisor, Professor Rita Abrahamsen will also have access to the data, as part of the academic supervision process. At the end of the 10-year retention period, all the electronic data will be deleted, from the researcher's computer and cloud drive. Hard copies, such as notes and documents will also be destroyed through paper shredding.

**Voluntary Participation:**

Participation in the research is purely voluntary, and the participant's verbal and written consent will be requested for before beginning the interview. The participant is free to withdraw at any time, and refuse to answer any questions, without having any negative consequences thereafter. If a participant opts to withdraw from the research, all the data that the researcher would have received from the participant up to that point will be destroyed, unless the participant authorize the researcher to use it.

**Compensation /Reimbursement:**

There will be no remuneration for participating in the interview. However, I the researcher will reimburse the participants for any costs that they may incur in participating in the interview, such as transport (UGX15000), and refreshments (UGX10000).

**Feedback:**

The researcher will send feedback to the participants on findings and progress of the study, and they will also receive the completed research product upon completion of the research project. The information will be sent to the participants through a format that is most convenient to them, such as email, or printed hard copies.

**Contacts and Questions:**

The researcher(s) conducting this study are mentioned below. You may ask any questions you have now. If you have any questions later, you may contact them at:

**1. Shingirai L. Taodzera, Principal Researcher**

**Email:** \*\*\*

**Phone number:** \*\*\*

If you would like to talk to someone other than the researcher(s) about; (1) concerns regarding this study, (2) research participant rights, (3) research-related injuries, or (4) other human subjects' issues, please contact:

**Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research**

Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street

Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5

University of Ottawa, Canada

**Tel.:** \*\*\*

**Email:** \*\*\*

**OR**

**Dr. Stella Neema**

The Chair

Makerere School of Social Sciences

Research Ethics Committee

**Telephone:** \*\*\*

**E-mail:** \*\*\*

**OR**

**The Executive Secretary**

The Uganda National Council of Science and Technology,

Kimera Road. Ntinda P. O. Box 6884 Kampala, Uganda

**Telephone:** \*\*\*

Fax: \*\*\*  
Email: \_\_\_

Or

**Statement of consent:**

I have read the above information or had the above information read to me. I have received answers to the questions I have asked. I consent to participate in this research. I am at least 18+ years of age.

**Name of participant**.....

Signature or thumbprint/mark of participant:

..... Date: .....

Name of person obtaining consent.....

Signature of person obtaining consent:

..... Date: .....

**Witness of person in case person is Illiterate:**

**Name** ..... **of**  
**Witness**.....

Signature or thumbprint/mark of witness:  
.....

Date: .....

APPENDIX 4: UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA RESEARCH ETHICS CERTIFICATE

File Number: 02-18-05

Date (mm/dd/yyyy): 03/09/2018



**Université d'Ottawa** **University of Ottawa**  
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

**Ethics Approval Notice**  
**Social Sciences and Humanities REB**

**Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)**

<u>First Name</u>	<u>Last Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Role</u>
Rita	Abrahamsen	Social Sciences / Others	Supervisor
Shingirai Lenon	Taodzera	Social Sciences / Others	Student Researcher

**File Number:** 02-18-05

**Type of Project:** PhD Thesis

**Title:** Nations within a state and the emerging hydrocarbons industry in Uganda

<b>Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</b>	<b>Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</b>	<b>Approval Type</b>
03/09/2018	03/08/2019	Approval

**Special Conditions / Comments:**  
N/A

File Number: 02-18-05

Date (mm/dd/yyyy): 03/09/2018



**Université d'Ottawa** **University of Ottawa**  
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

This is to confirm that the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board identified above, which operates in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement (2010) and other applicable laws and regulations in Ontario, has examined and approved the ethics application for the above named research project. Ethics approval is valid for the period indicated above and subject to the conditions listed in the section entitled "Special Conditions / Comments".

During the course of the project, the protocol may not be modified without prior written approval from the REB except when necessary to remove participants from immediate endangerment or when the modification(s) pertain to only administrative or logistical components of the project (e.g., change of telephone number). Investigators must also promptly alert the REB of any changes which increase the risk to participant(s), any changes which considerably affect the conduct of the project, all unanticipated and harmful events that occur, and new information that may negatively affect the conduct of the project and safety of the participant(s). Modifications to the project, including consent and recruitment documentation, should be submitted to the Ethics Office for approval using the "Modification to research project" form available at: <https://research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms>.

Please submit an annual report to the Ethics Office four weeks before the above-referenced expiry date to request a renewal of this ethics approval. To close the file, a final report must be submitted. These documents can be found at: <https://research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms>.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Office at extension 5387 or by e-mail at: [ethics@uOttawa.ca](mailto:ethics@uOttawa.ca).

**APPENDIX 5: UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA RESEARCH ETHICS CERTIFICATE RENEWAL**

**File Number:** 02-18-05

**Date (mm/dd/yyyy):** 03/09/2018



**Université d'Ottawa** **University of Ottawa**  
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

**Ethics Approval Notice**  
**Social Sciences and Humanities REB**

**Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)**

<u>First Name</u>	<u>Last Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Role</u>
Rita	Abrahamsen	Social Sciences / Others	Supervisor
Shingirai Lenon	Taodzera	Social Sciences / Others	Student Researcher

**File Number:** 02-18-05

**Type of Project:** PhD Thesis

**Title:** Nations within a state and the emerging hydrocarbons industry in Uganda

<b>Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</b>	<b>Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</b>	<b>Approval Type</b>
03/09/2018	03/08/2019	Approval

**Special Conditions / Comments:**  
N/A

File Number: 02-18-05

Date (mm/dd/yyyy): 03/09/2018



**Université d'Ottawa** **University of Ottawa**  
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

This is to confirm that the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board identified above, which operates in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement (2010) and other applicable laws and regulations in Ontario, has examined and approved the ethics application for the above named research project. Ethics approval is valid for the period indicated above and subject to the conditions listed in the section entitled "Special Conditions / Comments".

During the course of the project, the protocol may not be modified without prior written approval from the REB except when necessary to remove participants from immediate endangerment or when the modification(s) pertain to only administrative or logistical components of the project (e.g., change of telephone number). Investigators must also promptly alert the REB of any changes which increase the risk to participant(s), any changes which considerably affect the conduct of the project, all unanticipated and harmful events that occur, and new information that may negatively affect the conduct of the project and safety of the participant(s). Modifications to the project, including consent and recruitment documentation, should be submitted to the Ethics Office for approval using the "Modification to research project" form available at: <https://research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms>.

Please submit an annual report to the Ethics Office four weeks before the above-referenced expiry date to request a renewal of this ethics approval. To close the file, a final report must be submitted. These documents can be found at: <https://research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms>.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Office at extension 5387 or by e-mail at: [ethics@uOttawa.ca](mailto:ethics@uOttawa.ca).

## APPENDIX 6: INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION IN UGANDA



## CENTRE for BASIC RESEARCH

15 BASKERVILLE AVENUE, KOLOLO  
P. O. BOX 9853, KAMPALA – UGANDA

Dear Sir/Madam

**Re: Letter of Invitation for Institutional Affiliation for Shingirai L. Taodzera**

This letter serves to confirm that the Centre for Basic Research (CBR), in Kampala, Uganda has invited Mr. Shingirai Taodzera to conduct his fieldwork in Uganda as a research affiliate of the CBR in 2018. Shingirai is a PhD Candidate in International Development at the University of Ottawa, Canada will conduct fieldwork in Kampala, starting in February 2018, for the dissertation entitled, *"Nations within a state and the hydrocarbons industry in Uganda."* The dissertation investigates the extent to which the new oil industry in Uganda has altered political and economic relations between the central government, and the kingdoms of the Buganda, and Bunyoro between 2007 and 2017. Shingirai's field research in Uganda will primarily involve conducting interviews with informants, mainly within the Kampala region.

The institutional affiliation period will last for 12 months starting in February 2018, and is renewable for another year. As Shingirai's local host institution, the CBR will provide several resources to support his dissertation research. This includes a computer workstation, internet access, library privileges, networking opportunities, and mentorship from academics and professionals from the CBR, and its affiliate institutions. The CBR will also avail Shingirai with opportunities to participate in the intellectual life of the Centre, through attending workshops and seminars, and opportunities to present his work and receive feedback.

Shingirai's research topic is timely, and of considerable importance to the CBR's areas of research interest, given the growing local and international interest in the effects of the new oil industry to Uganda's politics, economy, and human development. Therefore, the CBR looks forward to having Shingirai as an affiliated researcher, and visiting scholar, and will commit to making his stay productive, and successful.

For any further information, kindly contact us on the details provided below.

Kind regards,

Duncan Muhanguzi  
For Executive Director



**APPENDIX 7: RESEARCH CLEARANCE, UGANDA NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**



**Uganda National Council for Science and Technology**

*(Established by Act of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda)*

Our Ref: SS 4569

24<sup>th</sup> May 2018

Mr. Shingirai Lenon Taodzera  
Principal Investigator  
Centre for Basic Research  
Kololo

Dear Mr. Taodzera,

**Re: Research Approval: Nations within a State and the Emerging Hydro – Carbons Industry in Uganda**

I am pleased to inform you that on 14/05/2018, the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) approved the above referenced research project. The Approval of the research project is for the period of 14/05/2018 to 14/05/2019.

Your research registration number with the UNCST is **SS 4569**. Please, cite this number in all your future correspondences with UNCST in respect of the above research project.

As Principal Investigator of the research project, you are responsible for fulfilling the following requirements of approval:

1. All co-investigators must be kept informed of the status of the research.
2. Changes, amendments, and addenda to the research protocol or the consent form (where applicable) must be submitted to the designated Research Ethics Committee (REC) or Lead Agency for re-review and approval prior to the activation of the changes. UNCST must be notified of the approved changes within five working days.
3. For clinical trials, all serious adverse events must be reported promptly to the designated local IRC for review with copies to the National Drug Authority.
4. Unanticipated problems involving risks to research subjects/participants or other must be reported promptly to the UNCST. New information that becomes available which could change the risk/benefit ratio must be submitted promptly for UNCST review.
5. Only approved study procedures are to be implemented. The UNCST may conduct impromptu audits of all study records.
6. An annual progress report and approval letter of continuation from the REC must be submitted electronically to UNCST. Failure to do so may result in termination of the research project.

**Below is a list of documents approved with this application:**

	Document Title	Language	Version	Version Date
1.	Research proposal	English	2.0	March 2018
2.	Consent forms	English	2.0	March 2018
3.	Interview guides	English	2.0	March 2018

Yours sincerely,

Isaac Makhuwa  
For: Executive Secretary  
**UGANDA NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

Copied to: Chair, Makerere University School of Social Sciences, Research Ethics Committee

LOCATION:CORRESPONDENCE

COMMUNICATION

**APPENDIX 8: RESEARCH CLEARANCE, PETROLEUM AUTHORITY OF UGANDA**



**PETROLEUM AUTHORITY  
OF UGANDA**

Reference: PAU 81/241/01

4<sup>th</sup> May, 2018.

Mr. Shingirai Lenon Taodzera,  
PhD Candidate, International Development,  
University of Ottawa,  
Ontario, Canada,

**RE: CLEARANCE FOR PhD RESEARCH**

Reference is made to your letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> April, 2018, and that from the Centre for Basic Research, dated 19<sup>th</sup> April, 2018, seeking clearance to undertake research on the topic '*Nations within a State and the emerging hydrocarbon industry in Uganda*'.

This Authority has reviewed your request and has no objection to the proposed PhD Research.

You are required to ensure that you get any necessary approvals including those from the Office of the President and National Council of Science and Technology before proceeding.

Please also ensure that you submit the final copy of the Research to this Authority.

We wish you a successful research programme.

Ernest N.T. Rubondo  
**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

C.c: The Executive Director,  
Centre for Basic Research,  
**KAMPALA.**

**APPENDIX 8: RESEARCH CLEARANCE, PARLIAMENT OF UGANDA**



**PARLIAMENT OF UGANDA  
OFFICE OF THE CLERK TO PARLIAMENT**

Parliament House, P.O. Box 7178, Kampala Uganda.

In any correspondence on  
this subject please quote No. **AN: 210/331/01**

10<sup>th</sup> May 2018

To the Executive Secretary  
Uganda National Council of Science and Technology  
Plot 6 Kimera Road, Ntinda  
**KAMPALA**

**ADMINISTRATIVE CLEARANCE OF MR. SHINGIRAI TAODZERA**

Mr. Shingiria L. Taodzera, a PhD Candidate in International Development at the University of Ottawa, Canada approached Parliament of Uganda to do a research on how the new Oil Industry in Uganda has altered political and economic relations between the Central Government and the Kingdom of Buganda and Bunyoro between 2007 and 2008.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that permission is granted to Mr. Shingiria L. Taodzera to conduct his research within the precinct of Parliament.

Janet L. Kibirige (Mrs)  
**CLERK TO PARLIAMENT**

Cc: Director Research Services, Parliament of Uganda