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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1979-1983):

Its Life and Theological Implications.

by

Kim-Kwong Chan

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of Theology
of St. Paul University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology
And Doctor of Theology

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
1986

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UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA
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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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ABBREVIATIONS

<u>AAS</u>	<u>Acta Apostolicae Sedis</u> , the Vatican.
<u>AF</u>	<u>Asian Focus</u> , Hong Kong.
<u>AI</u>	Amnesty International
<u>AJ</u>	<u>Ampleforth Journal</u> , London.
<u>AP</u>	<u>Annuario Pontificio</u> , the Vatican.
<u>BR</u>	<u>Beijing Review</u> , Beijing.
<u>BSIMS</u>	<u>Bulletin of the Scottish Institute of Mission Studies</u> , Aberdeen.
<u>BSMEP</u>	<u>Bulletin de la Société des Mission Etrangères de Paris</u> , Kong Kong.
(c)	Published in Chinese.
<u>CAC</u>	Catholic Affairs Commission
<u>CB</u>	<u>China Bulletin</u> , Rome.
<u>CBA</u>	<u>Current Background</u> , Hong Kong.
<u>CBC</u>	Chinese Bishops' College of the Catholic Church in China
<u>CCC</u>	<u>Catholic Church in China</u> (<u>Zhongguo tianzhujiao</u>), Beijing.
<u>CCP</u>	Chinese Communist Party
<u>CD</u>	<u>China Daily</u> , Beijing.
<u>CECC</u>	<u>Catholics in Europe Concerned with China</u> , Brussels.
<u>CF</u>	<u>Ching Feng</u> , Hong Kong.
<u>CH</u>	<u>China Heute</u> , St. Augustin, Germany.
<u>CO</u>	<u>China and Ourselves</u> , Toronto.
<u>CMBA</u>	Combine abbreviation for <u>China Missionary</u> , <u>China Missionary Bulletin</u> , <u>Mission Bulletin</u> , and <u>Asia</u> , Hong Kong.

ABBREVIATIONS

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<u>CN</u>	<u>China Notes</u> , New York.
<u>CNA</u>	<u>China News Analysis</u> , Hong Kong.
CNAA	China News Analysis Archive, Hong Kong.
CPCA	Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association.
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
<u>CR</u>	<u>China Reconstructs</u> , Beijing.
<u>CSPB</u>	<u>China Study Project: Bulletin</u> , Tunbridge Well, England.
<u>CSPD</u>	<u>China Study Project: Documentation</u> , Tunbridge Well, England.
<u>CTUF</u>	<u>Collectanea Theologica Universitatis Fujen</u> , Taipei.
<u>CUP</u>	<u>China Update</u> , Oud-Heverlee, Belgium.
CYL	Communist Youth League
<u>DTSM</u>	Jones, F., and W.C. Merwin. <u>Document of Three-Self Movement</u> . New York: National Council of Churches, 1963.
<u>EAPR</u>	<u>East Asian Pastoral Review</u> , Manila.
<u>ECMM</u>	<u>Extracts from China Mainland Magazines</u> , Hong Kong.
<u>ER</u>	<u>The Ecumenical Review</u> , Geneva.
ET	English Translation
<u>EV</u>	<u>Eglise Vivante</u> , Louvain.
<u>IAIF</u>	<u>Informations</u> , Agence Internationale Fides, Rome.
<u>ICI</u>	<u>Informations Catholique Internationale</u> , Paris.
<u>IHT</u>	<u>International Herald Tribune</u> .
<u>IRM</u>	<u>International Review of Mission</u> , Geneva.
<u>IS</u>	<u>Issues & Studies</u> , Taipei.
<u>JTS</u>	<u>The Journal of Theological Studies</u> , Oxford.
<u>ME</u>	<u>Missions Etrangères</u> , Montréal.
<u>NCE</u>	<u>New Catholic Encyclopedia</u> . New York: McGraw-Hall Book Co., 1967.
NAC	National Administrative Commission of the Catholic Church in China

ABBREVIATIONS

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<u>NCNA</u>	<u>New China News Agency Bulletin, Beijing.</u>
<u>NCNA(Eng.)</u>	<u>New China News Agency English Bulletin, Beijing.</u>
<u>NPC</u>	National People's Congress
<u>NRT</u>	<u>La Nouvelle Revue Théologique, Louvain.</u>
<u>OR</u>	<u>L'Osservatore Romano, Rome.</u>
<u>OR(Eng.)</u>	<u>L'Osservatore Romano, English edition, Rome.</u>
<u>PBS</u>	Public Boardcast Service
<u>PDRNC</u>	Wurth, E. Ed. <u>Papal Document Related to New China.</u> Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1985.
<u>PRC</u>	People's Republic of China
<u>PS</u>	<u>Philippiniana Sacra, Manila.</u>
<u>PSH</u>	<u>Pi Shing (People), Hong Kong.</u>
<u>QLP</u>	<u>Les Questions Liturgiques et Paroissiales, Louvain.</u>
<u>RAB</u>	Religious Affairs Bureau
<u>RCDA</u>	<u>Religion in Communist Dominated Areas, New York.</u>
<u>RCL</u>	<u>Religion in Communist Lands, Kenston, England.</u>
<u>SCC</u>	<u>Studies on Chinese Communism, Taipei.</u>
<u>SCMM</u>	<u>Selections from China Mainland Magazines, Hong Kong.</u>
<u>SCMP</u>	<u>Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong.</u>
<u>SCMP(HK)</u>	<u>South China Morning Post.</u>
<u>SEAJT</u>	<u>South East Asia Journal of Theology, Singapore.</u>
<u>TE</u>	<u>Theological Education, London.</u>
<u>TF</u>	<u>Tien Feng (Celestial Wind), Shanghai.</u>
<u>TPS</u>	<u>The Pope Speaks, Huntington, Indiana.</u>
<u>TS</u>	<u>Theological Studies, Baltimore.</u>
<u>TSPM</u>	Three-Self Patriotic Movement
<u>UA</u>	<u>Urgent Action, London.</u>

ABBREVIATIONS

ix

<u>UCAN</u>	<u>Union of Catholic Asian News Bulletin</u> , Hong Kong.
<u>UFWD</u>	United Front Work Department
<u>URIA</u>	Union Research Institute Archive, Hong Kong.
<u>VSVD</u>	<u>Verbum SVD</u> , St. Augustin, Germany.
<u>YIC</u>	<u>Yi</u> (China Message), Chinese edition, Hong Kong.
<u>YIE</u>	<u>Yi</u> (China Message), English edition, Hong Kong.
<u>ZB</u>	<u>Zhong Bao</u> (Central Monthly), Hong Kong.
<u>ZC</u>	<u>Zhonglian</u> , Chinese edition, Singapore.
<u>ZE</u>	<u>Zhonglian</u> , English edition, Singapore.
<u>ZF</u>	<u>Zhonglian</u> , French edition, Singapore.
<u>ZMR</u>	<u>Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft</u> , Aachen, Germany.
<u>ZT</u>	<u>Ziyou Taipingyang</u> (Freedom Pacific), Saigon, Vietnam.
<u>ZTK</u>	<u>Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche</u> , Tübingen.
<u>ZYJ</u>	<u>Zhongguo Yu Jiaohui</u> (China and the Church), Hong Kong.

-TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

Since the beginning of 1979, all foreign language publications of the People's Republic of China have adopted the phonetic system called pinyin, which uses 25 letters of the Latin-English alphabet. It replaces the different systems used by Western scholars, including the best known, the Wade-Giles system. This dissertation uses the pinyin system of transcribing Chinese names, locations, titles, and words with the following qualifications.

For well-known places, names, and historical figures, the more familiar spellings may also appear. For example, Inner Mongolia instead of Nei Mongol. Some familiar spellings of places and names are supplied in brackets immediately after the pinyin transliteration. For example, Zhu Shide (Chu Shu-teh), or Guangzhou (Canton).

For Chinese towns and cities not well-known to Westerners, the name of the province is usually given immediately after the name of the town or the city. For example, Xamba, Inner Mongolia, or Taiyuan, Shanxi. In Chinese names, the family name is placed before the given name, e.g. Fu Tieshan. If that individual has a Christian name, the Christian name is placed before the family name, e.g. Michael Fu Tieshan.

For Chinese names, and for places outside of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore), two rules govern the transliteration. First, if that person or place has a conventional English name used in publications, this English name is used regardless of the system of transliteration. For example, Jonathan Chao instead of Zhao Tianen, Ku Pao-Ku

instead of Gu Baogao, Hong Kong instead of Xianggang. If there is no known English translation, the pinyin system is used.

For books and journals published in Chinese with English translation of the title supplied by the publisher, the translated English title appears as the formal title. Pinyin transliteration (in brackets) is given in the Bibliography only for publications from China, e.g., Catholic Church in China (Zhongguo tianzhujiao). The sign (c) following the bibliographical entry indicates that the publication is in Chinese. For example, Wan, W.Y. A Christian Introduction to Communism. Hong Kong: Tian Dao Publishing House, 1978. (c)

For books published in Chinese without an English translation of the title supplied by the publisher, this author has taken the liberty of translating the titles into English and using these English titles as the formal titles. The pinyin transliteration of the title is given in the Bibliography in brackets only for books from China. For example, Sun Xinhua et. al. Ed. Talks on Religion (Zhongjian wantan). 2nd edition. Zhejiang: Zhejiang People's Press, 1984. (c)

For journals published in Chinese without an English translation of the title supplied by the publisher, the transliteration, whether pinyin or the system used by the publisher, appears as the formal title and the English translation (in brackets) is given in both the list of Abbreviations and in the Bibliography, e.g., Pi Shing (People), or Ziyou Taipingyang (Freedom Pacific). Similarly, for the title of Chinese newspapers, pinyin transliteration usually provides the formal title unless the publisher has supplied an English title. For example, Remin Ribao, Kung Kao Pao, or Tung Fong Daily. The translation of the names of the newspapers appears only in the Bibliography, such as Remin

Ribao (People's Daily), or Xinhua Ribao (New China Daily).

For the title of articles published in Chinese, the cumbersome transliteration is omitted. Only the English translation is provided, e.g., Chen Yuewen. "Visit to the National Catholic Seminary." Liaowang, no. 8 (20 February 1984), p. 12. (c)

CAPITALIZATION

The word government is capitalized when it refers to the government of the People's Republic of China, for example, "the Government." The word bishop is capitalized under two circumstances: a) when it refers to a particular bishop, for example, Bishop Fu Tieshan, and b) when it is used together either with the capitalized word "Independent" or "Constitutional" to denote bishops who were consecrated without the approval from Rome, for example, "Independent Bishops." The word church is capitalized under the following conditions: a) when it refers to a specific church, for example, the Church of Rome, or b) when it refers to the Universal Roman Catholic Church. The word party is capitalized when it refers to the Chinese Communist Party.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1971 Karl Rahner brought to his readers' attention the changes that have taken place within the Catholic Church.¹ He mentioned, for example, that the number of Catholics in non-North Atlantic countries has increased tremendously and that the theological outlook has taken a major shift from a predominately Hellenistic worldview toward a "pluralism in worldview and multiplicity of new pastoral and theological problems unprecedented in Christian history."² The theological themes that Rahner points out, such as contextualization, inculturation, theological diversity, local theologies, and local church, are evident in current theological discussion. This is true especially in the Third World as Catholics struggle to find the faith responses that are appropriate to their various local contexts.

In the midst of the search for relevant expressions of faith, the reemergence of the Catholic Church in China has caught the attention of the Universal Church. In spite of prolonged isolation and total suppression for more than ten years, continuous rigid control by the Chinese Government, and internal conflicts between two groups of Catholics who hold different ecclesiologies, the Catholic Church in China has demonstrated, since 1979, that it is not only a growing community with vitality but also an ecclesial

¹K. Rahner, "Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretation of Vatican II," in TS 40 (1979): 716-727.

²R.J. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1985), p. xi.

community highly integrated into its society.

The Catholic Church in China offers an example of a Christian community that has developed an ecclesial structure which enables it to survive in an isolated and hostile environment. The existence of the Chinese Church poses many theological questions. What is the meaning of a local church in the present Chinese context? How does a local church contextualize in a socialist society? What is the selfhood of a church in a particular context? How can the concept of local church be reconciled with the idea of universality? Can a local church adopt an independent structure because of a specific political situation? What is the meaning of the Petrine ministry in the context of the local church? What is religious freedom vis-à-vis a Communist regime? All these questions are crucial theological topics especially among churches in the Third World.

A. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

Although the existence of the Catholic Church in China has raised many crucial theological issues, very little has been known about the ecclesial situation of the Chinese Church. Therefore, the objective of this research is to analyse the life of the Catholic Church in China from 1979 to 1983, to present theological questions raised by the Chinese Church, and to draw out the ramifications for the current theological development of the Church.

Since meaningful theological reflection has to be based on concrete reality, this study dedicates a fairly large portion of its research toward historically establishing the ecclesial reality of the Catholic Church in

China. Some chapters are lengthy and detailed examinations of the ecclesial events of the Catholic Church in China followed by theological discussions and reflections. The somewhat tedious historical narration is indispensable for the construction of a clear picture of the Catholic Church in China and an accurate interpretation of its theological significance.

The theological analyses of the situation of the Catholic Church in China examine the theological issues which emerge from it. This research does not seek solutions for various theological issues, but attempts to look at the responses the Catholic Church in China has made to these issues, and to examine the possible theological contribution of these responses to current discussions.

B. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

This research examines the situation of the Catholic Church in China from 1979 to 1983. This period of time has been selected for practical considerations. Following the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution in 1966,³ virtually all public Catholic activities were banned.⁴ There were no reports of the resumption of activities until 1978.⁵ In 1979, the Government began to allow Catholics to restore churches and to celebrate mass.⁶ Hence, for practical reasons, the year 1979 marks the beginning of the reemergence of the Chinese Church.

During the five years from 1979 to 1983, the Chinese Church emerged from the ruins of the Cultural Revolution and developed into a relatively stable and visible ecclesial community.⁷ At the beginning of 1984, it was estimated that there were more than three million Catholics in China⁸ and one

³For a recent official evaluation of the Cultural Revolution, see "The Resolution of Certain Historical Questions Concerning the Party Since the Founding of Our Nation," adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 11th Congress 6th Central Committee, in Hongqi, no. 337 (July 1981), pp. 3-37.

⁴All churches were closed in 1966. In 1971, the Government reopened the Nan Tang Cathedral (sometimes referred to as The Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception or the Xuan Wu Cathedral) to serve the diplomatic corps in Beijing. G. Zizola, "Sur invitation des autorités pour la première fois depuis cinq ans un occidental assiste à la messe à Pékin," in ICI, no. 398 (15 December 1971), pp. 3-5. For a slightly different account, see Wei Xiutang, "In a Catholic Church in Beijing," in CR 29 (January 1980): 49.

⁵In June 1978, King Juan Carlos of Spain and Queen Sophia attended a Tridentine mass celebrated by the Chinese Bishop Michael Yang. This is the first report on Catholic activities since the downfall of the 'Gang of Four', see SCMP (HK), 19 June 1978. The death of Archbishop Ignatius Pi of Shenyang, the head of the CPCA, was also publicly announced by the Government with honor, see Renmin Ribao, 25 May 1978.

⁶SCMP (HK), 22 January 1979.

⁷For an overall view of the activities of the Catholic Church in China during this period, see W. Gardini, El cristianismo llega a China (Buenos Aires: obras misionales pontificias, 1983), pp. 173-207.

⁸The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, The Basic Policy and Standpoint Our Country Should Have on the Religious Questions During this Period of Socialism, Zhongfa 19, JIMI (Institutional Secret), 31 March 1982, section 2, p. 6. Abbreviated as Document no. 19. For further studies on this document, see chapter one, B. 2.

thousand three hundred priests.⁹ A few hundred churches,¹⁰ six major seminaries and one minor seminary were open.¹¹ Therefore the year 1983 marks the end of this research period. Although it is occasionally necessary to examine events that occurred before 1979 or after 1983, the predominant emphasis of this research is on the period between these two dates.

The term "the Catholic Church in China" which is sometimes shortened to "the Chinese Church" or "the Chinese Catholic Church" requires some clarification. When the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CPCA) was

⁹ Document no. 19, section 5, p. 13; the CCP estimated that there are 3,400 Catholic religious workers but made no distinction between priests and nuns. Some China-Watchers estimated that as few as three hundred priests survived in China, see A. Lazzarotto, "A Dramatic Development in China: Six Seminaries Are Forming New Priests," in EAPR 22 (April 1985): 138. However, the most authoritative figure came from a leader of the Chinese Church who, while admitting that there were no recent statistics, estimated that there were one thousand three hundred priests and two thousand religious sisters in China in 1984, see Canada China Programme, Executive Committee Minute, March 22, 1984, p. 4. This figure is affirmed by Bishop Fu Tieshan of Beijing who, at the end of 1985, mentioned that there are one thousand priests, two thousand religious, forty-seven bishops and three hundred and fifty seminarians in the Chinese Church, see J.-M. Bosc, "Chine: Deng corrige Mao," Peuples du Monde, no. 189 (January 1986), pp. 24f.

¹⁰ In March 1983, there are three hundred churches reopened with resident priests, and over one thousand gathering place without resident priests open for worship, see "Fact Sheet # 5: The Roman Catholic Church in China," unpublished mimeography by Canada China Programme, Toronto, December 1983, p. 7. By the end of 1984, 800 churches [no indication of whether there are residential priests or not in these churches] had been reopened, personal correspondence with D. MacInnis, 3 December 1984.

¹¹ By the end of 1985, there were at least one national major seminary (Beijing), seven regional major seminaries (Beijing, Hebei, Shaanxi, Wuchang, Shengyang, Sheshan, and Chengdu), two minor seminaries (Shanxi, Jinan), and one preparatory seminary (Inner Mongolia). Except for the one in Chengdu which began classes at Easter 1984, the one in Hebei which started in late 1984, the one in Shanxi which began in April 1985, the one in Shaanxi which started in spring 1985, and the one in Inner Mongolia which started in October 1985, they commenced operation before 1984. Both A. Lazzarotto, "A Dramatic Development," pp. 137-146, and R.J. Schreiter, "A Note on Catholic Seminaries in China," Missiology 13 (July 1985): 291-296, failed to record the Hebei, Shanxi, and Shaanxi seminaries.

established in 1957,¹² the group of churches controlled by clergy belonging to the CPCA was referred to as the "Patriotic Church," "Independent Church," or "National Church." This included practically all churches openly existing in China. The Catholics who opposed the CPCA withdrew from the "Patriotic Church." Sometimes they carried out clandestine Catholic activities, and hence were referred to as the "Underground Church," "Silent Church," "Persecuted Church," or "Loyal Church." All these titles, which came into use in the 1950s and the 1960s were carried over into the 1970s and the 1980s.

In 1980, two new Catholic organizations, the National Administrative Commission of the Catholic Church in China (NAC) and the Chinese Bishops' College of the Catholic Church in China (CBC) were established.¹³ They function alongside the CPCA. According to their constitutions, they are organizations within the Chinese Church having distinct functions but they are not the Chinese Church itself. The NAC is the administrative body, the CPCA is the political wing, while the CBC is responsible for doctrinal and spiritual leadership. Even with their extensive functional coverage of Catholic activities in China, these three organizations still do not represent all Catholics in China. There are still many Catholic activities organized by the pro-Roman clergy functioning autonomously and independently from these three organizations.

There is also a vast overlapping between the pro-Roman faction and the

¹² Renmin Ribao, 3 August 1957. The formation of the CPCA is examined in detail in chapter four, A. 1. 1.; cf. Appendix IV.

¹³ NCNA (Eng.), 31 May 1980. Cf. CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), whole issue.

CPCA/NAC faction in the Chinese Church.¹⁴ The relationship between different factions of Catholics varies from place to place. It is not uncommon to have Catholic activities, neither pro-Government nor pro-Roman in nature, tolerated by the civil authority in the rural areas.¹⁵ It is well-known that many clergymen who are loyal to Rome and are not members of CPCA work in parishes under the auspices of the NAC.¹⁶ There are even some Catholic activities which follow directives from Rome that are tolerated by local civil officials and also acknowledged by the CPCA/NAC.¹⁷

In view of the complex ecclesiastical reality in China, neither terms such as "Patriotic Church," "National Church," "Independent Church," nor terms like "Underground Church," "Silent Church," "Suffering Church," adequately describe the Chinese Church. By adopting any of these terms, one is in danger of assuming a biased view which artificially categorizes Chinese Catholics into groups, and portrays a schismatic picture of the Chinese Church that is

¹⁴L. Ladany, in his article "The Church in China at the end of 1980," The Month 242 (February 1981): 42, wrote: "Sometimes it is asked, how many are there in the patriotic Church? The answer is, all or none. When the authorities summon them to a meeting, all have to go. When there is no compulsion, none. Only a handful are active in the Patriotic Church." See also J. Spae, "Catholic life in a Chinese Village," CUP supplement, no. 1, for private distribution, (September 1982), p. 8.

¹⁵In a village near Shijiazhuang, Hebei, the local priests were under the supervision of the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) officials, not the Bishop nor the CPCA officials. Private interview conducted by the author in May 1984 with a Chinese priest, Fr. X, who had been in that area in 1982. Cf. L. Ladany, "Behold, The Catholic Church in China," Part III, in PSH, no. 70 (April 16 1984), p. 31.

¹⁶L. Ladany, "Behold, the Catholic Church in China," Part I, PSH, no. 68 (March 16, 1984), p. 6.

¹⁷J. Spae, "The Church in China: New Faith, New Hope," in Crux (1 August 1983), p. 4. See also chapter three, C. 3. iv.

denied by the Chinese Church leaders.¹⁸ This author uses the term "Chinese Church" or "Catholic Church in China" to denote all Catholic existence in China, and titles such as CPCA/NAC, Rome Loyalist . . . etc. to denote specific factions holding different theological and political views within the Chinese Church.

Due to the limited availability of sources the presentation of the Chinese Church is necessarily limited. For example, there are a number of dioceses from which not a single word has been heard since 1949 and there is little documentation about Catholics in the rural areas. But, in any case, the examination of all Catholic activities in every region of China would be impractical, if not impossible.

This research cannot possibly examine the clandestine Catholic activities in a systematic manner, partly because of the lack of reliable accounts and partly because of the restrictions upon the use of the sources that are available.¹⁹ However, this research will look into some of these so-called "Underground" activities when they are pertinent to the discussion.

In spite of these limitations, the present sources dealing with Government-tolerated Catholic activities in China (mainly the CPCA/NAC sponsored activities) are more than sufficient for the intended purpose of this

¹⁸The bishops of the CBC always refer to the Chinese Church as one; they call pro-Roman Catholics "bad elements" within the Chinese Church. Even Bishop Dominic Deng, a prominent pro-Roman bishop, referred to the Chinese Church as one, until the end of 1983. But in spring, 1984, in a speech given to a group of Chinese-American Catholics, he mentioned that there are two types of churches in China, the Patriotic Church and the Rome Loyalist Church. See Kung Kao Pao, 10 March 1984.

¹⁹Because non-CPCA/NAC approved Catholic activities are de jure illegal in China, one must be careful about reporting clandestine Catholic activities to ensure that more sufferings are not inflicted upon Chinese Catholics.

dissertation. Because of the aforementioned limitations, it should be underlined that the results generated by this research are valid only within the parameters defined.

C. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

This research is primarily a theological study to uncover certain theological aspects of a Christian community by interpreting documents reflecting the social, historical, political, and theological contexts of this Christian community. This research is based on published documents and accounts of the Chinese Church. These published sources can be classified into four categories: Church publications, Government press, outside reports, and others.

1. Church Publications

The CPCA and the NAC (CPCA/NAC) jointly publishes a national journal entitled The Catholic Church in China which appears at irregular intervals. This journal is the major official document containing declarations, resolutions, regulations, and church policies established by the Chinese Church. It occasionally publishes articles written by Chinese Church leaders and also reports on Catholic activities in different parts of China. Its circulation is limited to seven thousand copies for internal use only.²⁰

²⁰ CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 8.

Various regional CPCA/CAC²¹ also publish regional bulletins, featuring local news and directives from the CPCA/NAC. Declarations and statements on specific events are sometimes released through these bulletins. However, they are more or less local echoes of the national journal.

The CPCA/NAC, along with their regional branches, also publish various catechetical materials, liturgical texts, hymnals, prayer books, devotional literature and Bibles. These publications, which are meant to educate the laity, reflect the theological views endorsed by CPCA/NAC.

The media in China must serve the political end of the Government. Therefore, the message that the media presents must be in harmony with the current political atmosphere and must also fit the political framework established by the Government.²² Consequently the content of CPCA/NAC's publications is what the Government permits the Catholic leaders to express.²³ Very often, one cannot take the prima facie value of these publications for granted²⁴ and, therefore, it is of paramount importance that these publications

²¹The regional office of NAC is called the Catholic Administrative Commission "CAC."

²²"Mass media is a tool used by the Chinese Communist to transmit the policy implementation of Government," "The press in Communist China, more than other mass media, teaches people a new and uniform political language... Every event reported is contextualized according to the Party line." in A.P.L. Liu, Communication and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 144f.

²³All religious activities in China are under the supervision of the Government's Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) and the CCP's United Front Work Department (UFWD). The functions of these two agencies are examined in chapter one.

²⁴A Chinese bishop (member of the CBC and the CPCA) told a close friend of his from abroad that his name would appear in the Catholic Church in China endorsing certain statements, whether he agreed or not. Private source from Fr. Y who has talked to this bishop. The interview with Fr. Y was conducted by this author in summer 1983.

be interpreted in the light of their political context. Sometimes what they avoid saying is more significant than what they actually say.

There are also church publications circulating within the Chinese Church that are not from the CPCA/NAC. These publications include catechetical materials that have been written and reproduced privately by some priests,²⁵ and instructions, liturgical text, regulations, or manuals that were issued by Rome and smuggled into China.²⁶ These two sources reveal the theological thinking of pro-Roman Catholics in China. Finally, there are also papal documents to China,²⁷ which reflect Rome's policy toward the Chinese Church.

2. Government Press

The news agency of the Chinese Government often publishes stories about the Chinese Church. Obviously, these stories meant for the general public interpret the Chinese Church from the Government's perspective. Since the press, like the other media, has political parameters that it has to respect, the stories published at any particular time usually bear political connotations reflecting the current political trend.

The Government press often interprets and elaborates the Government's religious policy. Its coverage of Catholic activities reflects the Government's implementation of the religious policy in regard to the Catholic Church.

²⁵ For example, see Questions on Baptism (Hong Kong: Privately Published, n.d.) (c); also see Chang Bihuang, "The Baptism Catecheism," in ZC, no. 5 (May 1982), pp. 8-10.

²⁶ Spae, Crux, p. 2.

²⁷ E. Wurth, ed., Papal Documents Related to the New China (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1985).

Sometimes it publishes news about the Chinese Church that does not appear in CPCA/NAC journals, for example, accounts of the arrest of pro-Roman Catholics.²⁸

3. Outside Reports

The reemergence of the Chinese Church has aroused an interest among Christian China-Watchers in the West. Many groups publish journals or newsletters. Besides commenting on Catholic activities in China in accordance with their specific theological and political perspectives, these publications often include accounts of the Chinese Church by both foreign visitors or reporters and overseas Chinese Catholics who visit their motherland. At times, these accounts provide a rare glimpse of actual Catholic life in China. Thus, these accounts made by visitors from abroad supplement the CPCA/NAC's official version of the life of Chinese Catholics and provide many insights into the Chinese Church.

These outside reports are free from the Chinese Government's political influences or propaganda but they do have their implicit biases depending on their pro-Roman or pro-CPCA ecclesiological preferences. Also, these reports are very sketchy and unsystematic, and often deal with isolated incidents limited to particular regions. Moreover, since they vary in quality, it is difficult to verify their authenticity. Despite all these weaknesses, they do provide direct and first-hand experience of Catholic life in China, an aspect which is often missing in CPCA/NAC publications.

²⁸Statement made by Ms. Fu Keyong of Religious Affairs Bureau concerning the arrest of Catholics, see SCMP (HK), 11 January 1984.

4. Other Sources

The Chinese Church has produced at least two films, "Catholic Life in Shanghai" and "New Branches on the Vine--Consecration of Bishops."²⁹ These two documentary films share the same purpose as the CPCA/NAC publications mentioned above. Although they are not 'published' documents per se, they will be included as part of the inventory of Church documents for they are presentations of the Chinese Church to the public.

There are also many non-published accounts, interviews with émigrés or visitors to China, personal correspondence, and internal documents both of the Chinese Church and of the Government. While some of them may perhaps be "fakes," exaggerated accounts, or even rumors that cannot be authenticated, many of them can be considered reliable sources of information. They are not published because of their sensitive nature. This research will utilize some of these unpublished accounts when their usage will not bring undesirable consequences to Catholics in China and such usage is crucial to the thesis of this research. In these instances, the names, places, and origins of these sources will be deleted.

In order to examine the life of the Catholic Church in China, this research uses four themes--the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government, the religious life of Chinese Catholics, the structure of the Chinese Church, and the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church--as points of entry to uncover the ecclesial reality of the Chinese Church. These four themes cover the Chinese Catholic leaders' prime concerns.

²⁹CO, no. 36 (October 1983), p. 19.

This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part One (Historical Survey of the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983) consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 examines the primarily sociopolitical context that influences the Chinese Catholic Church, namely, the religious policy of the Chinese Government (1949-1983).

The next four chapters study the life of the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983. Each chapter examines one of the above-mentioned ecclesial themes, and concludes with a theological reflection. Chapter 2 examines the conflicts between the Church and State and the compromises reached. The theological reflection, based upon the experience of the Chinese Church, views the Church as a minority group struggling for its survival and searching for its identity in the midst of an atheistic nation.

Chapter 3 examines the relationship between the Church hierarchy and the religious life of the laity. It touches upon the religiosity of the Chinese laity, their vision and expectation of the Chinese Church, the different ecclesiastical views held by Chinese Catholics, and the pastoral emphases of the Chinese Church hierarchy. The theological reflections focus on the faithful as the people of God living in a context characterized by the coexistence of seemingly antagonistic theological factions struggling together for social identity vis-à-vis sociopolitical pressure from Chinese society.

Chapter 4, which deals with the administrative structure of the Chinese Church, examines the different ecclesial roles of the CPCA, NAC, and CBC, and the structure of the Chinese Church hierarchy. The theological discussion deals with the unique ecclesiastical structure of the Chinese Church: an ecclesial community which claims to be Apostolic, is independent from Rome, and is heavily influenced by its sociopolitical context.

Chapter 5 looks at the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church. This chapter examines the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church, as well as the polemics of the Sino-Vatican relationship. It also explores the meaning of universality as seen by Chinese Catholic leaders. The theological discussion focuses upon the nature of a local church, the Petrine office, and the Universal Church as envisioned by Chinese Church leaders.

Part Two (Theological Evaluation of the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983) consists of chapter 6. This chapter discusses the theological issues arising from the situation of the Chinese Church. It assesses the Christian and Roman Catholic identity of the Chinese Church. It also explores the ramifications of the Chinese Church for current theological themes such as theological contextualization, Catholic ecclesiology, ecumenism and missiology.

D. ORIGINALITY

Several books have been published on the Chinese Church since its reemergence in 1979. J. Spae's Church and China: Towards Reconciliation? (Chicago: Chicago Institute of Theology and Culture, 1980) was written in January, 1980, four months before the reestablishment of the CPCA and the formation of the NAC and the CBC. Spae's main thesis speculates on the possible breakthrough of the Sino-Vatican relationship vis-à-vis the change of religious policies in China between 1977 and 1979. This book provides a good framework for grasping the political situation in China from 1977 to 1979 but does not deal with any significant theological issue.

A. Lazzarotto's The Catholic Church in Post-Mao China (Hong Kong : Holy Spirit Study Center, 1982), published both in Chinese and English, was written in October, 1981. Part One of this book deals with the political and religious situation in China in the period from 1977 to 1980, immediately prior to the re-emergence of the Chinese Church. Part Two studies the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government from 1980 to 1981, with special emphasis on the Sino-Vatican conflicts which occurred in 1981. This book does offer a good political analysis of the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1981 and raises some ecclesiological questions. It says very little about the ecclesial reality of the Chinese Church, and does not treat the theological issue in an in-depth manner.

C.W. Cheung, H. Hunke, and C.H. Forbert published a mimeograph entitled China and the Churches after Mao: An IDOC Study (n.p.: 1983). This mimeograph serves as a guideline for the Congrégation du Coeur Immaculé de Marie (C.I.C.M.) to formulate a mission policy on China at their China Session held in Rome in January, 1983. This private publication provides a general description of the political situation in China from 1978 to 1982, including a 21-page section dealing with the theological problems of the Catholic Church in China. This mimeograph offers a missiological framework and raises some stimulating theological questions, yet it is far from being a serious theological treatment of the Chinese Church.

T. Chu and C. Lind edited the book A New Beginning: An International Dialogue With the Chinese Church (Toronto: Canada China Programme, 1982). It contains addresses given by the Chinese Catholic delegates at a conference held in Montreal in October, 1981. Yet it contains no serious theological analysis of the Chinese Catholic Church.

Yu Yan wrote a book entitled Glimpses of Catholic Life Style in Mainland China and the Chinese Communist Policy Towards Religion (Taipei: Window Press, 1984) (c). This book presupposes an anti-Communist stand and is primarily based on secondary sources. The author interprets the Chinese Church from a political perspective and perceives the Open Church, viz. the CPCA/NAC, as the puppet of the Government. There is neither an objective examination of the life of the Catholic Church in China nor any serious theological discussion.

Since 1979, many periodicals have also devoted special issues to the Chinese Church. Many short comments, reports, articles on the Chinese Church have also appeared in various journals.³⁰ All of them comment or report on current events of the Chinese Church. Even though some touch upon theological issues, none, so far, offers any serious in-depth analysis.

Since there is no major work done on either the life of the Catholic Church in China (1979-1983) or on the theological ramifications of the Catholic Church in China, this research intends to analyse the life of the Catholic Church in China (1979-1983) based on available sources, to present the theological questions raised by the ecclesial situation of the Chinese Church, and to discuss the theological contribution by the Chinese Church to the current theological development.

³⁰Such as L. Ladany, "Church in China at the End of 1980," The Month 242 (February 1981): 41-47; Vox, "Jean Paul II et la Chine," in Etude, no. 358 (March 1983), pp. 391-400; B. Whyte, "The Catholics of China," The Tablet 237 (August 20 1983): 792-794; or T. Chu, "L'Eglise catholique dans la République populaire de Chine," in Univers 57 (September-October 1981): 11-18, 23-30. --

PART ONE

**HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE CHINESE CHURCH
FROM 1979 TO 1983**

CHAPTER ONE

THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a nation with a sociopolitical structure radically different from that of the Western World. Any study dealing with the PRC, therefore, has to be conducted with an understanding of its distinctive social values, political structure, cultural mentality, and historical background. This chapter attempts to illustrate the aspect of the sociopolitical context that has the most bearing on the Chinese Church, namely, the religious policy of the Chinese Government.

While many sinologists disagree on how the Government of PRC is conducted, all accept that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governs China.¹ The CCP provides the ideological leadership for formulating policies, and the Government implements these policies. The whole nation--its leadership and ideology, its political movement, social structure, cultural norms, and, the most important element, its people--is controlled by politics which reflect the policy set by Party (CCP) leaders for a particular period of time.² It is fair to say that in China all activities, including religious activities, take place

¹A.D. Barnett, Cadres Bureaucracy, Political Powers in Communist China (New York: Columbia University, 1967), pp. 428-430. The Constitutions of the PRC always place the Party leadership over the State, see J.R. Townsend, Politics in China (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), pp. 29f.

²F. Shumann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd enlarged ed. (Berkeley: University of California, 1975), pp. 40f.

within the framework of the Party's policy. Consequently, the fate of the Chinese Church depends on the religious policy established by the CCP.

Technically, religious affairs are under the jurisdiction of the State Council of the Chinese Government, not the CCP. Strictly speaking, then the religious policy should be referred to as the Government's policy, not the Party's policy. But during the 1950s, the religious policy was referred to as the "policy of the Party and the nation"³ and, though there were only a few occasions during this period when the religious policy was referred as the "Party's policy,"⁴ in the 1960s the policy was frequently referred as the "Party's policy."⁵ After the Cultural Revolution, it was always referred as the "Party's policy."⁶ The change was subtle and gradual. The religious policy was no longer recognized as a policy made by the civil administrative apparatus, such as the State Council, but as a policy decided by the CCP. For practical purpose, terms like "Government's policy" and "Party's policy" used in this research are interchangeable.

The religious policy in China changes with the Chinese political climate. Hence this policy can be conveniently divided into distinct phases corresponding to the major political shifts in China. This chapter, therefore,

³"For example, see "We Must Walk on the Path of Socialism," Minxi Ribao, 12 May 1958.

⁴For example, see "Under The Leadership of The Party, Freedom of Religious Belief is Protected and Respected," Yunnan Ribao, 27 August 1957.

⁵Zhang Zhiyi, "Correctly Understand and Implement the Party Policy on Religious Freedom," in Minciduanjie, no. 4 (April 1962); ET SCMM, no. 318 (April 1962), pp. 1-6.

⁶Xiao Xianfa, "Correctly Understand and Implement the Policy of Freedom in Religion," Renmin Ribao, 14 June 1980.

discusses the religious policy under two major sections: A. "The Immediate Historical Background of China's Religious Policy: 1949-1976," which explores the theoretical basis, the historical development, and the administration of the religious policy from the foundation of the People's Republic of China (1949) to the end of the Cultural Revolution (1977) and, B., "China's Recent Religious Policy: 1978-1983," which examines the religious policy in detail from the end of the Cultural Revolution till the end of 1983--the period on which this research is focused.

A. THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CHINA'S RELIGIOUS POLICY: 1949-1976

Many studies have been conducted on the religious policy of the People's Republic of China. The most important are the following: R.C. Bush, Religion in Communist China (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1970); D.E. McInnis, Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China: A Documentary History (N.Y.: MacMillan Co., 1972); H. Welch, Buddhism Under Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); T.M. Ko, "Christianity Under Communism: The History of Protestants in Mainland China Since 1949," Master of Christian Studies Thesis, Regent College, Vancouver, 1978; E.O. Hanson, Catholic Policy in China and Korea (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1978); C.K. Yang, Religions in Chinese Society (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1961); and Jonathan Chao, ed., Chinese Communist Policy Towards Christianity (Hong Kong: Chinese Church Research Center, 1983). (c)

Ko, Chao and Yang interpret the religious policy of the CCP as a dynamic process with the ultimate intention of eliminating religion. Bush and

McInnis regard the religious freedom guaranteed in Article no. 88 of the 1954 Chinese Constitution as the Chinese Government's policy for religion. Hanson argues that it is a historical tradition that the Chinese Government always suppresses religion. Welch comments more on the administrative structure than on the policy for religious affairs. Acknowledging the contributions of other authors, this Section basically follows the interpretation advocated by Yang, Ko, and Chao because they interpret the religious policy from the wider context of the Chinese Communist ideology and include the motive and the practice of the policy in their thesis.

This section is divided into three subsections. The first, "The theoretical basis of the religious policy," examines the ideological foundation of the policy. The second, "The historical development of the religious policy," surveys its major changes from 1949 to 1976. The third, "The administration of the religious policy," studies the functions of various Chinese Government agencies which deal with religious affairs.

1. The Theoretical Basis of the Religious Policy

The CCP, like all Communist parties, follows Marx, Lenin, and Engel's teachings in adopting atheism as the Party orthodoxy.⁷ Mao Zedong, the chief theoretician of the CCP, interprets religion as backward, superstitious,

⁷For some of the often quoted sayings of Engels, Marx, and Lenin on religion by the Chinese Communist theoreticians, see F. Engels, "Anti Dühring," (1878) in K. Marx and F. Engels on Religion, tr. from Russian edition (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publication House, n.d.), p. 145; K. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," (1844) in K. Marx and F. Engels on Religion, p. 42; and N. Lenin, Collected Works of Lenin, tr. and ed., by A. Rothstein, 45 Vols. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing Houses, 1960-1970), X: 83f.

unscientific, and as an instrument mainly used to exploit the masses.⁸ Members of the CCP are also convinced that religion is a product of ignorance and offers a distorted worldview that retards people's revolutionary spirit either by encouraging a false expectation of God or by encouraging an expectation of a false reality--God.

With such an understanding of religion the CCP has to eliminate religion in order to construct a true Communist state. Members of the CCP believe that the Chinese people can free themselves from the slavery of capitalism and feudalism only when religion is successfully irradiated from the Chinese society.⁹ Therefore, the CCP considers that it is its professed duty to liberate believers from their religious bondage and to offer them the freedom of atheism.¹⁰

Ideologically, members of the CCP are die-hard atheists¹¹ who reject every religion. However, at a pragmatic level, they tolerated the public existence of religion from 1949 to 1966. In the proto-constitution, the Common program (1950), Article no. 4 and no. 5 grant religious freedom to all citizens.¹² Also in the first PRC Constitution (1954), Article no. 88 reads as

⁸See Mao's "Report on an Investigation of Peasant's Movement in Hunan," (February 1927), in Selected Work of Mao Tse-tung, 5 Vols. (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1966-1977), I: 44-47. (c) Hereafter cited as Selected Work.

⁹"The Patriotic Movement of the Christians," in Renmin Ribao, 23 December 1950.

¹⁰Jonathan Chao, China's Religious Policies and Christian Missions (Silver Spring, Maryland: China Graduate School of Theology Inc., 1977), p.10.

¹¹"A True Realization of the Question of the Catholic and-Protestant Church," Renmin Ribao, 20 November 1950.

¹²D. E. McInnis, Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China: A Documentary History (N.Y.: MacMillan Co., 1972), p.21.

follows: "Every citizen of the PRC shall have freedom of religious belief."¹³

The ideological basis for allowing religion in an atheistic state can be explained from the vantage points of Mao's United Front Theory¹⁴ and his Theory on Contradiction,¹⁵ in the Government's policy on national minorities. The United Front Theory allows Communists to form coalitions even with anti-Communist groups, when confronted by a common enemy. For example, the Chinese Communists were willing to unite with their political enemies, the Chinese Nationalists, to fight against the Japanese, when Japan posed an immediate threat to the existence of China during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).

The Theory of Contradiction allows Communists to establish the priority of conflicts in a given situation. The Sino-Japanese War again provides an example. The Communists' major enemy during that period was the Japanese. Since the major conflict was the Sino-Japanese struggle, the CCP first joined hands with the Nationalists to fight the Japanese. After the defeat of Japan, the major conflict became the Communist-Nationalist struggle, and the CCP turned against their former ally--the Nationalists. In short, the Theory of Contradiction determines the priority of action, while the United Front Theory provides a basis for mobilizing joint efforts to confront major challenges.

The religious policy is also closely related to the policy for the

¹³ Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), p.39.

¹⁴ Mao's "The Duty of the CCP During the Anti-Japanese Resistance," in Selected Work, I: 232-248.

¹⁵ Mao's "On Contradiction," in Selected Work, I: 274-312.

national minorities.¹⁶ Traditionally some of the national minorities, such as the Hui, the Tibetan and the Uighur, are antagonistic towards the ruling Han Chinese. They live in strategic border regions such as Xizang (Tibet), Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia), and they are fervent believers in either Islam or Lamaism.¹⁷ In order to unite these national minorities, the Chinese Government grants them a high degree of social freedom, including freedom to practice religion. Consequently, Han's popular religions, such as Buddhism and Daoism, and some recently imported religions, such as Christianity are also benefitting from this policy toward the national minorities.

Since the CCP interprets religion as a distorted worldview existing only in oppressive and backward societies, it believes that people will discard religion when a true socialist society is formed. For the CCP, the temporary granting of religious freedom is a means to handle religious affairs during the transitional socialist period when the Government needs the support of the national minorities and the religious believers to strive for the building of a true socialist China.¹⁸ Therefore, the policy of granting religious freedom will help the development of the socialist society which, in turn, will eventually undermine religion.¹⁹

¹⁶ See Remin Ribao, 19 March 1979. Some regional governments even combined religious affairs and national minority affairs into one single office, see CCC, no. 12 (June 1985), p. 46f.

¹⁷ CNA, no. 1222 (18 December, 1981), p. 5.

¹⁸ Zhang Zhiyi, "Correctly Understand and Implement Party Policy on Religious Freedom," the whole issue.

¹⁹ Li Weihan, Questions on United Front Policy and Nationality Policy, (Beijing: People's Press, 1981), pp. 565-572. (c)

RELIGIOUS POLICY

9

2. The Historical Development of China's Religious Policy: 1949-1976

In the period from 1949 to the early 1950s, China faced a series of major challenges: the Korean War, the Land Reform Program, the first Five Years Plan, and the consolidation of the regime. These events took up a great deal of the nation's energy and effort. Relatively speaking, the issue of religion was perceived as a "contradiction among the people," but not as an "antagonistic contradiction,"²⁰ which required immediate attention.

However, the Chinese Government suspected that the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church in China were controlled by foreign missionaries, who were closely connected with the Western Imperialistic powers. With xenophobia and nationalistic sentiment, the Government was determined to clear all foreign stigma from these two religious groups. A general policy on religion was formulated in 1950 with special reference to the Catholic and the Protestant Churches. Its objectives were a. to eliminate any imperialistic element within religious groups so that religious institutions would not be exposed to imperialistic sabotage, b, to free religious groups from any foreign domination, and c, to build religious groups which supported the new Government.²¹

The implementation of this policy resulted in massive expulsion of missionaries and the arrest of uncooperative religious leaders. Some

²⁰ see Mao Zedong, The Correct Handling of Contradiction Among the People (Beijing: People's Press, 1957). (c)

²¹ Renmin Ribao, 23 September 1950; and Renmin Ribao, 23 November 1950.

interpreted this as a Government plot to destroy the Church.²² However, when viewed in the wider social and political context, the expulsion of missionaries seems to have been more a nationalistic desire to remove a foreign stigma from Chinese society than a deliberate attempt to destroy religion. Virtually all foreigners in China in fact, except those from the Soviet Union, were expelled by the Chinese Government.

From the early 1950s to the late 1950s, as the CCP gradually consolidated its control over China, different government-sponsored national religious organizations were established. The Chinese Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement Association, the Buddhist Chinese Association, and the Chinese Islamic Association were formed between 1953 and 1954. The Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association and the Chinese Daoist Association were established in 1957. These groups were meant to implement the Government's religious policy, to mobilize believers to support the Government, to please national minorities, and eventually to uproot the political enemies, those so-called "antirevolutionaries" or "rightists,"²³ from a particular religious group. Through these religious organizations the Government was able to influence and control religious believers more completely and directly.

From the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, there was a heated debate on

²²L. Ladany, Church in China: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (Hong Kong : CNA, 1975); J. Monsterleet, Les martyrs de Chine parlent (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1955).

²³Those who disagreed politically with the Government's policy were labelled "rightists."

religion between two schools of Communist theoreticians.²⁴ The debate affected the forthcoming religious policy. One group, headed by Ya Hangchang, advocated that, with proper education and enough propaganda promoting atheism, people would abandon their religious faith and religion would disappear naturally.²⁵ The other group, represented by You Xiang and Liu Chunwang, argued that force should be used to eliminate religion in order to hasten the realization of Communism.²⁶

At first, Ya's view was accepted by the CCP as its official interpretation of religion. His article entitled, "Freedom of Religious Belief," was published in the CCP's ideological journal Hongqi (Red Flag) in

²⁴For a list of the articles on this debate, see T.M. Ko, "Christianity Under Communism: The History of Protestants in Mainland China Since 1949," Master of Christian Studies Theses, Regent College, Vancouver, 1978, pp. 210-213. Many authors (Ko, Lazzarotto, Hang ...etc.) make reference to a Spanish booklet entitled: La Iglesia Catolica y Cuba: Programa de Accion (Beijing: foreign Language Press, 1959). Li Weihai, the director of the United Front Work Department, is the alleged author. No one has been able to produce the original Spanish version, yet there are many different translated versions available. Cf. ICI, no. 145 (1 June 1961), p. 25f; partial French translation is found in R.J. de Jaegher, "Comment détruire l'Eglise," EV 15 (1963): 365-375; partial ET in RCDA 7 (15 January 1968): 89-91; or CN 6 (April 1968): 6-10. According to these translations, the alleged document outlines the Chinese Government's plan to destroy religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular during the late 50's. After comparing the content of this alleged document with Li's view on religious policy during the same period of time (cf. Li, Questions on United Front Policy and Nationality Policy, pp. 565-572), and making enquiries in both Havana and Beijing (personal correspondence with Mr. Ying Lian of the Foreign Language Press in Beijing, 15 July 1984; and with Ms. Marina Atia, director of Public service of the Biblioteca Nacional Jose Marti in Havana, 27 May 1984), this author suggests that this document is probably a forgery made to discredit the Chinese Government.

²⁵Some of his important writings are "Concerning the Distinction Between Theism, Religion, and Feudalistic Superstition," in Xinjianxi, no. 182 (February 1964), pp. 1-6, and "On the Origin of the Concept of the Existence of God," in Xinjianxi, no. 169 (January 1963), and many more.

²⁶You Xiang and Liu Chunwang, "The Origin and Termination of Religion," in Wenhui Bao (S), 10 May 1964, and "The Class Struggle with Religion During the Transitional Period," in Guangming Ribao, 21 March 1962, and many more.

1959.²⁷ As You and Liu challenged Ya's view, different papers and journals soon covered their debate. Gradually, You and Liu got the upper hand, and their view was quoted by Renmin Ribao, the national newspaper.²⁸ Victory came to You and Liu in 1964 when their article entitled, "The Correct Recognition and Handling of the Problem of Religion," appeared in Hongqi.²⁹

The development of this debate can be viewed from another vantage point. This ideological debate reflected a power struggle between two political groups within the CCP, the moderate and the radical. The debate about the ideological interpretation of religion was only one of many battles. Ya represented the moderate faction; You and Liu, the radical. Shortly after the interpretation of Liu and You became the Party's official position on religion, the radical group launched a national all-out attack against the moderate group and brought forth the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1977).

In accord with the ideology of You and Liu, during the period of the Cultural Revolution, the Government implemented the policy of eradicating

²⁷ Ya Hanchang, "Freedom of Religious Belief," in Hongqi, no. 14 (July 1959), pp. 1-10; ET ECMM, no. 183 (September 1959), pp. 1-8.

²⁸ Editorial, "You Xiang and Liu Chunwang's Article on Religion," in Renmin Ribao, 17 October 1963; ET SCMP, no. 3099 (1963), pp. 1f.

²⁹ Liu and You, "The Correct Recognition and Handling of the Problem of Religion," Hongqi, no. 139 (February 1964); ET SCMM, no. 410 (March 1964), pp. 41-49.

religion by force.³⁰ Virtually all religious activities were banned.³¹ To believe in religion was considered a political crime; to practice religion, an antirevolutionary act. Those, who did not renounce their religious belief were subject to harsh and brutal treatment. The CCP, in a retrospective report (1982), described the religious situation during the Cultural Revolution as follows:

However, after 1957, the "Leftist" mistakes in our religious work began to aggravate and by the middle of the late 1960s became more serious. They became especially serious during the "great cultural revolution" because the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques wilfully exploited these "Leftist" mistakes and took them to the extreme. . . . They wrecked the religious organizations and the ranks of activists of the religious circles that loved the country and supported socialism and even forcefully banned the normal religious life of the masses of religious believers and destroyed and closed down all the places of religious activities. They regarded patriots in religious circles and even ordinary religious believers as "object of dictatorship," and framed up many wrong, false and misjudged cases. . . . They used violence in solving religious problems.³²

In summary, the religious policy, up to 1966, was a policy of controlled freedom. Religious groups were granted freedom, if they were willing to dissociate from foreign powers, to support the socialist Government, to promote the unification of the national minorities, and to meet other requirement of the CCP's leadership. When the radical group came into power in 1966, the religious policy required a total suppression of religion with

³⁰ Some interpreted this policy as a historical accident, see Paul Tong, "Religion in Contemporary China," in China: Development and Challenge, Proceedings of the Fifth Leverhulme Conference ed. by Lee Ngok and Leung Chi-keung (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1979), p. 259.

³¹ Chinese moslems were allowed to celebrate some of their religious festivals in assigned locations throughout the entire period of the Cultural Revolution, see SCMP, no. 3907 (March 1967), p. 20; SCMP, no. 4559 (December 1969), p. 12; or SCMP, no. 5025 (November 1971), p. 136.

³² "Concerning our Party's Basic Policy on Religion during the Socialist Era," in Hongqi, no. 400 (16 June 1982), p. 4. ET CSPD, no. 9 (October 1982), p. 8.

force. It was not until the political leadership changed from radical to moderate in the late 1970s that the religious policy gradually departed from the radical approach and became moderate again.

3. The Administration of China's Religious Policy: 1949-1983

As the Government began to design and to implement its religious policy, it became evident that some specific governmental agencies were required to administer religious affairs. This subsection attempts to show the development of the administrative agencies, namely the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) and the United Front Work Department (UFW), their administrative structure and functions, and the relationship between them. Because there was little change of the administrative structure of religious affairs between the period from 1979 to 1983 and the previous period (1949-1966), this subsection covers the administration of the religious policy from 1949 to 1983.

From 1949 to 1950, there was no specialized agency to handle religious affairs. At the national level, religious affairs were managed by the Cultural and Educational Affairs Committee of the Government's Administrative Council (GAC).³³ In different regions of China, religious affairs were handled by various local Government or Party agencies. For example, in the Province of Suiyuan (now part of Inner Mongolia), religious affairs was handled by the

³³ On December 29, 1950, the Cultural and Educational Committee of the GAC issued "Decision on the Policy for Dealing with Foreign Subsidized Cultural, Educational, Relief and Religious Organization," and "Regulation of Registration for Foreign Subsidized Cultural, Educational, Relief and Religious Organization." NCNA, 29 December 1950; ET SCMP no. 42 (January 1951), the whole issue.

Provincial Cultural and Educational Division,³⁴ whereas in Guangzhou, it was overseen by the Propaganda Department of the Municipal Communist Party.³⁵

As the Government formulated concrete policy on religion, a separate administrative organ was needed to deal directly with religious affairs. The Religious Affairs Division was formed on January 12, 1951 to meet this need.³⁶ This division was under GAC's Cultural and Educational Committee. By the end of 1951, it began to develop provincial and municipal branches in areas where religious activities were numerous.³⁷ With the formation of this division, a centralized structure of religious control began to take shape, with headquarters in Beijing and branches all over the country.³⁸ In 1954, the Religious Affairs Division was upgraded to the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB), directly under the newly-formed State Council.

Although the RAB was technically under the Government's civil administrative apparatus, be it the original GAC or later, the State Council, it apparently received its orders from the Central Committee of the CCP via the

³⁴"One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Catholics in Suiyuan Set up a Committee for Independent Movement," in Renmin Ribao, 5 and 23 January 1951.

³⁵"Canton Christian Bodies Formed Committee Against America and for Reform," in SCMP, no. 58 (January 1951), p. 8.

³⁶J. Lefevre, Shanghai: Les enfants dans la ville (Paris: Casterman, 1956), p.50. This Division was first known to the public on January 17, 1950, see Xinhua Yuebao, (February 1951); ET "Catholic personages invited to tea-party by GAC committee on Culture and Educational Affairs; Chou En-lai speaks," in SCMP, no. 52 (January 1951), pp. 15f.

³⁷The Hunan Provincial RAB started on 1 June 1951, see H.H. Welch, Buddhism under Mao (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 31. The Guangzhou municipal RAB was established in January 1952, see G. Patterson, Christianity in Communist China (Waco, Texas: Word Book, 1969), p.3.

³⁸Recently, some regional governments have combined religious affairs and national minorities affairs into one single office. For a provincial example, see CCC, no. 12 (June 1985), p. 47, a municipal example, *ibid.*, p. 46.

UFWD.³⁹ At the regional level, the local RAB (Religious Affairs Division or Office), though a Government unit, was under the direct control of the local UFWD.⁴⁰ Therefore, the RAB seemed to communicate directives from the UFWD to various religious groups.

The United Front Work Department was a working branch under the Central Committee of the CCP. Based on the United Front Theory, it tried to rally the influential non-Communist factions such as religious believers, overseas Chinese, national minorities, and intellectuals. It was responsible for formulating policies to deal with these groups and its authority seems to have extended even to the supervising of the implementation of these policies.

The extent of the UFWD's involvement in religious matters can be seen from the presence of its cadres at virtually every religious meeting. Every major religious meeting was presided over not only by the head of the local (or national, if it was a national meeting) RAB, but also by the director of the UFWD⁴¹ or leaders from the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which was an organization under the auspices of the UFWD.⁴² In some meetings, even though a representative from the RAB might be in attendance,

³⁹ Welch, p.30; Ko, p.30. Lo Shan (pseud.), "From 'the Scandal of the Church' to Look at the Secret Organization Which Plots to Seize the Property of the Church," part II, Nanbeizi, 16 February 1973, pp. 44f; part III, 16 March 1973, p. 60. Lo suggested that the URWD was directly responsible for the organization and the supervision of the RAB.

⁴⁰ Patterson, p.3.

⁴¹ Both the provincial UFWD director and the RAB director participated in Fujian's CPCA preparatory committee, Fujian Ribao, 27 November 1957.

⁴² Both the vice-chairman of provincial CPPCC and the vice-director of the RAB were present at the Shangdong provincial Catholic conference, Dazhong Ribao, 3 November 1957.

there were cadres from the CPPCC or UFWD present.⁴³ This phenomenon is further evidence of the seniority of the UFWD over the RAB in religious affairs.

With the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and the implementation of the radical policy of eradicating religion, the Government (controlled by radical leaders) saw no need to rally religious believers. They declared that "religion no longer exists in China" and that "religion has entered the museum of history."⁴⁴ As the result, the RAB and the UFWD were dismantled.⁴⁵

The UFWD and RAB were not rehabilitated until after the removal of the radical leadership. Both departments resumed regular operation in 1979⁴⁶ just before the restoration of the disbanded religious organizations.⁴⁷ Their functions and the relationship between them were reestablished as before. The UFWD gives directives from the Central Committee of the CCP, and the RAB

⁴³ Guo Ju, "Fully Implement the Policy of Freedom of Religious Belief," Renmin Ribao, 17 October 1979; ET CSPD, no. 2/3 (July 1980), pp. 1-6.

⁴⁴ Only members of the CPPCC were present, Shanxi Ribao, 13 December 1957; only members of the UFWD were present, Xiamen Ribao, 13 December 1957.

⁴⁵ Lo Shan, part III, p. 60. He wrote that the UFWD was still in existence in 1973. The UFWD had actually decided to relax the religious policy as early as 1973. One has to recall that the political situation in China in 1973 was nothing but chaotic: the Lin Biao clique had just been purged, the restoration of moderate leaders was underway, and the whole nation was in the midst of an intense power struggle among various leaders. Judging from the fact the the UFWD was not formally rehabilitated until early 1979, the UFWD was probably able to assume limited functions under the protection of the First Directorate of the Military Council. But the UFWD was politically not powerful enough to implement any of its policies in 1973.

⁴⁶ Renmin Ribao, 19 March 1979.

⁴⁷ By 1980, all five major religions had reestablished national organizations.

implements these directives through religious organizations.⁴⁸

The only minor administrative change in religious affairs since 1979 is the presence of religious affairs working units in the local UFWD.⁴⁹ These units probably serve as a liaison between the UFWD and the RAB, or assume the duty of the RAB if no local RAB branch exists.⁵⁰ They appear sporadically in some regions and have no significant impact on the over-all administration of religious affairs.

B. CHINA'S RECENT RELIGIOUS POLICY: 1977-1983

Like all other policies in China, the religious policy is affected by politics. It went through different stages of development from 1977 to 1983 as the political weather in China changed dramatically. Since it is beyond the scope of this section to give a detailed analysis of the political changes in China during this time,⁵¹ the following paragraphs provide a bird's-eye-view of

⁴⁸For more detail, see Jonathan Chao, "The Place of Religion in Contemporary China," (August 1981) Chinese Church Research Center Occasional Paper, no. 10, mimeographed, pp. 18f.

⁴⁹The existence of a Religious Department under UFWD of the Provincial Party Committee was mentioned in Nanfang Ribao, 21 April 1979. The existence of a Religious Work Department (or branch) within the UFWD was mentioned in Renmin Ribao, 19 March 1979.

⁵⁰In CCC, no. 10 (October 1984), p. 41, there was a reference made to a "Religious Affairs Office" of the county UFWD in Sichuan. In this case, the "Religious Affairs Office" of the UFWD seemed to replace the RAB. Cf. ZYJ 4, no. 11 (November 1985), p. 13.

⁵¹See writings of Lazzarotto and Spae mentioned in the Introduction, and also Jonathan Chao, ed. Chinese Communist Policy Towards Christianity (Hong Kong: Chinese Church Research Center, 1983) (c).

the political atmosphere during this period.

In October 1976, the radical leaders headed by Jiang Qing were arrested. From 1976 to 1978, Hua Kuofeng, the appointed successor of Mao, ruled over China. Deng Xiaoping reappeared on the political scene in 1978 and slowly out-powered Hua. Hua finally gave up his premiership in September 1980, and his chairmanship of CCP and of the Military Council in June 1981. These important posts were assumed by Deng and his followers.

From 1981 to 1982, Deng continued to strengthen his power by replacing Hua's followers in the key Government and Party posts with his own supporters. In 1983, when the new Constitution was implemented, Deng and his followers more or less controlled China. However, from time to time, they still had to face the challenge of "Leftists"⁵² who retained some important posts.

Since 1977, the whole nation's attention has gradually shifted from the class struggle⁵³ of the Cultural Revolution to the ambitious economic goal of the "Four Modernizations," namely, the modernization of agriculture, industry, science-technology, and defense. This can be described as a pragmatic policy to raise the standard of living in China.

In order to achieve this economic project, the nation had to achieve social stability and mobilize a large contingent of technicians. As the result,

⁵²"Leftists" are referred to as those who adhere politically to the radical line of the Cultural Revolution.

⁵³Mao believed that there was a need for a continuous revolutionary struggle. In 1971, Mao said, "There will be no struggle when Communism arrives? I don't believe that. Even with the arrival of Communism, there will still be struggles." in W.Y. Wan, A Christian Introduction to Communism (Hong Kong: Tian Dao Publishing House, 1978) (c), p. 188

the Government decided to relax religious restrictions.⁵⁴ It was hoped that the relaxation might gain the support of the national minorities, i.e., the Hui Moslems and Tibetan Lamaists who lived in the strategic border provinces and might encourage the participation of other religious believers.

The relaxation of religious restrictions was a gradual process from a total suppression of religious activities in 1976 to a relative freedom for religious activities in 1983. The development of the recent religious policy (1977-1983) can be divided into two stages: 1. the emergence of the religious policy: 1977-1980, and 2. the formulation of the policy: 1981-1983.⁵⁵ During the first stage, the whole nation was in a transitional phase changing from the radical, or Leftist, policy of the Cultural Revolution to the pragmatic policy of Deng. Religious policy was also searching for new direction. During the second stage, as Deng's pragmatic policy became the national policy, religious policy, too, received clear guidelines from the leadership of the nation.

1. The Emergence of a New Religious Policy: 1977-1980

Generally speaking, the religious policy of total suppression implemented during the Cultural Revolution extended into the first two years of Hua's ascent to power (1977-1978). Religion was continuously regarded as

⁵⁴Cf. Lo Shan, part III, p. 60. As early as 1973, the UFWD had planned to relax the religious policy, but the political climate did not permit this relaxation until six years later.

⁵⁵For a more detailed division, see Jonathan Chao, "The Political Changes in China and the Development of the Church 1977-1983, a Chart," ZYJ 3 (July/August 1984): 13f.

worthless.⁵⁶ Although religion was discussed in public during these two years, these discussions were politically motivated, and had an antireligious bias. For example, the article, entitled "Philosophy and Religion"⁵⁷ published in April 1978, was an attack on the doctrinization of the Leftists' political views during the Cultural Revolution. A lengthy article, entitled "Religion, Reason and Practice"⁵⁸ which appeared in September 1978, was published to support Deng's pragmatic ideology of making practice the highest court of truth. The formation of the Chinese Society on Atheism in 1978⁵⁹ was meant to demythologize the cultic image of Mao built during the Cultural Revolution.

From 1977 to 1978, there was little public evidence of religious activity aside from the few churches, temples, and mosques in Beijing which were open for foreigners. Generally speaking, there was no relaxation of religious policy during these two years. Despite the disappearance of "leftist" policies in many areas, there was no change in the Government's official position on religious matters. It was still based on the discriminative view that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution: "Citizens enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate

⁵⁶Ren Jiyi, "Study Religion, Criticize Theology," in Renmin Ribao, 27 September 1977.

⁵⁷Xing Bisi, "Philosophy and Religion," Renmin Ribao, 8 April 1978.

⁵⁸Yan Jiagi, "Religion, Reason, and Practice," Guangming Ribao, 14 September 1978.

⁵⁹Guangming Ribao, 6 January 1979. A meeting concerning the studies in religion was held in April, 1978. No association nor society was formed then, CNA, no. 1156 (June 8 1979), p. 3.

atheism."⁶⁰

In March, 1979, the Central Committee of the CCP approved the rehabilitation of the disbanded UFWD, as well as its working branches on religion and on national minorities.⁶¹ This event marked the official restoration of the policy of freedom in religious belief. Three months later, the director of the RAB, Xiao Xianfa, called religious leaders to a special meeting in Beijing. On this occasion, Xiao announced the policy of religious freedom and said,

We hereby reaffirm the religious policy of the Party and the State, and hope that religious believers and religious leaders, as a whole, will continue the patriotic tradition in contributing their share to the motherland's Four Modernizations.⁶²

It was clear that the Government had decided to allow a certain degree of freedom for religious believers in exchange for their support in achieving the national economic goal. The Government also began to restore and reopen temples and churches and to rehabilitate some religious believers who had been victimized during the Cultural Revolution.⁶³

The Government began to restore religious activities as early as February 1979 in some regions such as the Municipality of Shanghai⁶⁴ and the

⁶⁰ Article no. 46 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1978). This Article reads exactly the same as the Article no. 28 of the previous Constitution (1975); see Communique of the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, special supplement of CR 24 (March 1975): 11.

⁶¹ Renmin Ribao, 19 March 1979. The RAB was already in operation in March, Renmin Ribao, 15 March 1979.

⁶² NCAC (Eng.), 30 June 1979.

⁶³ Renmin Ribao, 3 July 1979.

⁶⁴ Wenhui Bao (S), 2 February 1979.

Province of Qinghai.⁶⁵ Many other regions soon followed.⁶⁶ In all places an identical pattern was followed. The local RAB called the representatives of various organizations to a meeting and announced the Government's policy. Religious believers were allowed to resume their religious activities and to restore their religious organizations on the condition that they participate in the Four Modernizations.⁶⁷

In 1980, all five main religions in China had revived their national associations. They were the Chinese Buddhism Association, the Chinese Daoism Association, the Chinese Islamic Association, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Church in China, and the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. Paralleled with these, three additional religious organizations were established: the Chinese Christian Council, the Chinese Bishops' College of the Catholic Church in China and the National Administrative Commission of the Catholic Church in China. All eight organizations were considered by the CCP as "national patriotic religious organizations,"⁶⁸ which were to assist the Party and the Government in implementing the religious policy, to help religious believers in raising their awareness of patriotism and socialism, to manage religious affairs, and to follow the Party and the Government.

⁶⁵Xining PBS 10 June 1979, in CSPD, no. 1 (November 1979), p. 13.

⁶⁶Hubei PBS 9 August 1979 in CNA; Shenyang PBS 17 July 1979 in CSPD, no. 1 (November 1979), p. 4; Hohhot PBS 11 August 1979 in CSPD, no. 1 (November 1979), pp. 13f; NCNA (Eng.), 20 September 1979.

⁶⁷For a typical example, see the resolution adopted at the "Heilungjiang CPCA Conference"; Heilungjiang PBS 14 October 1979 in CNA.

⁶⁸Document no. 19, section VII.

leadership.⁶⁹

Soon after the restoration of these national religious organizations, branches at provincial or municipal level were also formed. Under the auspices of these organizations, churches and temples began to reopen. They were staffed by the aged clergy who had recently been released from labor camp or transferred from other working units.⁷⁰ Soon after their reopening most of these churches or temples were packed with worshippers. The Government also allowed foreign visitors to make contact with Chinese religious believers. A gradual normalization of religious activities swept across China.

On the ideological front, the pragmatic group began to define, to defend, and to clarify the policy on religious freedom. A number of articles appeared in national newspapers to argue in favor of this policy, such as She Wen's "Discussion on World Religion,"⁷¹ Guo Ju's "Fully Implement the Policy of Religious Belief,"⁷² the open statement of Xiao Xianfa, national director of the RAB,⁷³ and the CCP's official affirmation of this policy.⁷⁴

The above-mentioned articles offer a clear picture of the rationale and the content of this religious policy (1979-1980). The Government realized that religion had great influence over the common people, the national minorities,

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ During the Cultural Revolution, clergy were sent to prison, labor camps, factories or farms. Cf. J. Liu [Michael Yeung], Inside China: Experience of a Chinese Catholic (Hong Kong: Privately Published, 1981), pp. 66ff.

⁷¹ Renmin Ribao, 27 May 1979.

⁷² Renmin Ribao, 17 October 1979.

⁷³ Renmin Ribao, 9 April 1980.

⁷⁴ Guangming Ribao, 30 November 1980. Cf. Opponent's view in Guangming Ribao, 28 June 1979.

and the international community, and since the Government had to face an important economic task, the Government had to compromise ideologically with religious believers and let religion coexist with atheism.

However, religious groups had to meet many requirements in order to exercise their religious faith. All religious groups had to consider national prosperity their priority, submit to the leadership of the Government, not to discriminate against nonbelievers, especially in areas where believers predominate (such as in Tibet or Qinghai), conduct no illegal activity, harbor no antirevolutionary elements, and be patriotic.

With the gradual implementation of this religious policy, the nation began to feel a relaxation of religious control.⁷⁵ Many persons were, therefore, attracted to religion: young people under 18 years of age,⁷⁶ Communist Youth League (CYL)⁷⁷ members, and even CCP members.⁷⁸ The Government was immediately alarmed by this situation and reacted with additional restrictions to religious freedom: namely, no CYL and CCP members could believe in religion,⁷⁹ and no religious faith could be taught to individuals under 18 years of age.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Books about religion began to be available to the general public, for example, Zhang Wenjin, The History of Religion (Jilin: Jilin People's Press, 1981). (c)

⁷⁶ Zhejiang Ribao, 1 December 1980.

⁷⁷ Membership in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) was the necessary preparation for later nomination in the CCP.

⁷⁸ Zhejiang Ribao, 19 June 1980; Zhongguo Qingnan Bao, 11 March 1980; and Zhongguo Qingnan Bao, 29 September 1980.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Gansu PBS 19 July 1980 in CNA; Zhejiang Ribao, 1 December 1980.

This pragmatic religious policy also faced much opposition. It was constantly challenged by the "Leftist" political ideologists. For example, in March, 1979, the RAB endeavored to make a distinction between organized religion and superstition.⁸¹ Organized religions, such as Buddhism and Catholicism, which have canons, doctrines, structures, liturgies, and histories, were to be allowed in China. Whereas superstitious beliefs, such as shamanism, fortune telling, faith healing, exorcism, were to be officially banned.⁸² However, at about the same time, in an article entitled, "Remove Obstacles to the Realization of the Four Modernizations," Ren Jiyu⁸³ argued that all forms of religion were unscientific, superstitious, and harmful to China's Four Modernizations. In his opinion, the way to achieve the Four Modernizations was to uproot religion from the mind of the people. His view differed from the policy of the pragmatists' who argued that one of the ways to achieve the Four Modernizations was to unite religious believers to the cause

⁸¹Renmin Ribao, 15 March 1979.

⁸²Qinghai PBS 30 July 1979 in CNA; Nanfang Ribao, 21 April 1979.

⁸³Renmin Ribao, 1 May 1979. The article originally appeared in a scholarly journal Jiaxue Yanjiu (April 1979). Ren was the President of the Society for the Study of Religions, the President of the Society of Tibetan Buddhism, and the Director of the Institute of World Religion under the Academy of Social Science. He defined the task of studying religion as follows: "Those who are engaged in theoretical and practical work in religion have an unshirkable duty to criticize the idea of believing in religion and religious theology. We must take action in criticizing all forms of religious belief, promoting Marxism, publicizing the science of democracy, toppling idols, emancipating our thinking and contributing towards the great revolution and realization of the Four Modernizations . . . Since science and culture are developed in the struggle against religious superstition, it is impossible to raise the level of science and culture of the whole nation and realize the Four Modernizations without first eliminating the idea of believing in religion and obscuratism, and uprooting superstitious ideas that have infected people's minds." Guangming Ribao, 6 January 1979, my translation.

by allowing them to practice their religion.

Ren and his staff in the Institute of World Religions challenged the validity of religion from a Communist-Socialist point of view, promoted atheism as the Party Orthodoxy, and criticized the pragmatic policy. They edited two influential scholarly journals,⁸⁴ and have published some books on religion.⁸⁵ The aim of these publications was to expose the fallacy of religion from the Marxism-Leninism worldview.

The "Leftist" resistance to implementing the Party's new policy of granting freedom to religious believers was also evident. For example, some county cadres in Tibet, instead of relaxing religious restrictions as instructed by the Government, actually stepped up the propagation of atheism among the Lamaist-Tibetans.⁸⁶ Promoting atheism among Tibetans was most likely to generate resentment towards the Government and to have an effect contrary to the Government's original intent--to draw the national minorities to the cause. What the local cadres did was an act of disobedience to the Central Government.⁸⁷ They may have been motivated by "Leftist" ideology or they may

⁸⁴Shijie Zongjiao Ziliao (Materials on world religion) and Shijie Zongjiao Yanjiu (Studies on world religion).

⁸⁵A member of the staff of this Institute, Zhao Fusan, published The History of Christianity, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Joint Publisher, 1979) (c) under the pseudonym of Yang Zhen. In this book, Zhao criticized Christianity from the Marxist perspective. Zhao Fusan is an Anglican priest and a prominent leader of the TSPM. In 1964, he, under the same pseudonym Yang Zhen, had written an article "How Does Western Christian Theology Serve the American Imperialism," in Hongqi, no. 21-22 (November 1964), pp. 38-44, to denounce Western Christianity as imperialistic and antirevolutionary.

⁸⁶Tibet PBS 10 May 1979 in CNA.

⁸⁷The groups of Deng and Hua have been engaged in a political struggle from 1978. Very often, the Government's order was not observed if local cadres belonged to a political faction at odds with the Government.

have tried to use this opportunity to discredit the policy of the Central Government for some other political reasons.

In summary, the religious policy from 1978 to 1980 changed slowly from the radical policy of total suppression to a more pragmatic policy of conditional freedom. It was inspired by the urgent need to motivate the entire Chinese population to support the Four Modernizations, the ultimate economic goal of the Government at the time. In order to rally more support, the Government temporarily compromised the purity of its ideology to make allowance for some religious activities in an atheistic country. Yet behind the seemingly optimistic picture for religion, there was, indeed, a continuous battle between two different ideological groups. In essence, the disagreement about the policy of religious freedom epitomizes the broader political struggle between Deng's pragmatic policy and Hua's more "Leftist" policy.

2. The Formation of this New Religious Policy: 1981-1983

When the pragmatic policy of more religious freedom was initiated in 1979, Chinese leaders assumed that the number of believers of all faith in China had decreased since 1949 due to the dissemination of scientific knowledge and the continuous atheistic education.⁸⁸ They did not consider religious affairs as an important issue, nor did they expect to face any major problem in implementing this policy.

Though the new religious policy appeared to be a simple directive, its implementation brought the Government a great many unexpected problems, such as an epidemic of "feudal superstition" among the masses, the resurfacing of many

⁸⁸ Zhao Kungwei, "China's Religion," in CR 29 (May 1980): 28.

underground religious groups, the interference of foreign religious organizations, and ideological confusion among CCP and CYL members.

From 1980 to 1982, as the Government relaxed its control on the public expression of religious faith, many popular practices of folk religion, such as fortune telling, geomancy, faith healing...etc., enjoyed a wide popularity especially in the rural areas. These practices, referred to as "feudal superstition" by the Government, spread so widely that cadres in some regions had to post warnings prohibiting these activities.⁸⁹ In other regions, such as in a commune in Jiangxi, they were so numerous that cadres could classify them into nine different categories (faith healers, sorcerers, sorceresses, etc.)⁹⁰

Although the Government's religious policy officially banned the practice of "feudal superstition,"⁹¹ it also stressed that religious affairs could not be dealt with by force.⁹² Hence cadres were given no effective means, other than persuasion and education, to handle this problem.

Not only the "feudal superstition," but also the Government-approved "organized religions," such as Buddhism and Christianity, grew rapidly between 1980 to 1982. The policy of suppressing visible religious activity, implemented during the Cultural Revolutions, did not destroy religion. Instead,

⁸⁹ Sichuan Ribao, 18 December 1981.

⁹⁰ Jiangxi PBS 26 November 1981 in CNAA.

⁹¹ Nanfang Ribao, 21 April 1979.

⁹² Renmin Ribao, 17 October 1979.

it promoted the development of clandestine religious activities.⁹³ The Government, later in 1982, admitted that the population of religious believers, contrary to the former Government's estimation,⁹⁴ had actually grown since the Liberation.⁹⁵ Now that the Government permitted the public expression of religious faith, many underground religious activities began to surface. The Government was unprepared to handle the sudden emergence of religious activities which had been thought to be nonexistent.⁹⁶

It was originally believed that this religious policy would improve the relationship between China and nations which have large numbers of religious believers.⁹⁷ However, the consequences of this policy went far beyond the original intention. Since foreign and overseas Chinese religious believers were able to reestablish contact with their Chinese counterparts in late 1970s, they seized this opportunity to propagate their faith with the collaboration of their Chinese brethren. Many of them launched their missionary campaigns to China by smuggling in Bibles, distributing religious literature, reestablishing ecclesiastical territory and influence, and broadcasting religious programs.⁹⁸

⁹³ Wu Daixing, "Correctly Know and Implement the Party's Policy on Religion," in Xinhua Ribao, 20 March 1981.

⁹⁴ Zhao Kungwei, "China's Religion," p.4.

⁹⁵ Document no. 19, section II, p.6.

⁹⁶ It was reported that there were many large scale religious (Christian) rallies held in some villages in Honan, see Zhongguo Qingnan Bao, 27 September 1980.

⁹⁷ Renmin Ribao, 17 October 1979.

⁹⁸ Many organizations had covert missionary activities in China, such as Far East Broadcasting Corporation, Asian Outreach, Christian Communication Limited, Underground Evangelism, Open Door, and even the Sacred Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples.

A government newspaper noted that,

In some regions, many enemies and undesirable elements, knowing that the policy of religion has not been fully implemented yet, and taking advantage of this fluid situation..., collaborated with some foreign forces to create social disorder and to conduct harmful activities.⁹⁹

It was also stated that "the oversea religious powers had penetrated [China], collected intelligence. . . and conducted illegal activities."¹⁰⁰ The Government officials were also caught unprepared for this.

The implementation of this policy generated confusion among CCP and CYL members. Obviously, they could not understand why there was religion in the Communist context.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, some religious practices were so closely associated with the cultural customs of some national minorities that it was difficult to distinguish between religion and culture. For example, the Hui, who were predominantly Moslems, abstained from eating pork.¹⁰² In order to unite the Hui minority behind Party policy, Party leadership considered abstention from pork a cultural custom and allowed CCP members of the Hui to abstain, even though the custom itself bore religious connotations. Yet at the same time the Party leadership repeatedly ordered other members of the CCP or the CYL to vigorously propagate atheism.¹⁰³ This inconsistent Party policy confused its members.

As a common practice, when there is no clear guideline from the

⁹⁹ Guangming Ribao, 30 November 1980, my translation.

¹⁰⁰ Fujian Ribao, 23 October 1981, my translation.

¹⁰¹ Zhongguo Qingnan Bao, 27 March 1982.

¹⁰² Renmin Ribao, 25 October 1981.

¹⁰³ Renmin Ribao, 19 March 1982. Party members were also warned that they would be expelled from the Party if they believed in religion. Cf. Beijing Ribao, 5 December 1981; Nanfang Ribao, 13 January 1982.

Government to deal with a specific problem, it is up to local cadres to interpret the policy and to devise means to meet the local situation. By 1982, when the problems of a religious nature increased so much that local cadres were evidently unable to handle them, the Government saw the need to issue Document no. 19 to provide more explicit direction.

Document no. 19, The Basic Policy and Standpoint Our Country Should Have on the Religious Question During this Period of Socialism, Zhongfa 19,¹⁰⁴ was issued by the Central Committee of the CCP on March 31, 1982. It is a medium level classified document to be distributed down to the county and regimental levels.¹⁰⁵

This document is by far the most comprehensive and authoritative commentary by the Chinese Government on religious policy. It is the foundation of the religious policy implemented from 1982 to 1983.¹⁰⁶ The following

¹⁰⁴ Central Committee of the CCP, The Basic Policy and Standpoint Our Country Should have on the Religions Questions During this Period of Socialism, Zhongfa 19, JIMI (Institutional Secret) 31 March 1982, mimeographed. The photocopy of the original version appeared in SCC 17 (15 March 1983): 107-136. A reset version is found in Important Documents Since the Third Plenum II (Internal Distribution) (Tianjin: People's Press, 1982) (c), pp. 1218-1240; ET, IS 19 (August 1983): 72-90.

¹⁰⁵ It carries the rubric "JIMI" (institutional secret), see K. Leiberthal, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China, Michigan Papers in China Studies no. 33 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1978), pp. 12-16.

¹⁰⁶ An abstract of this document appears under the title "The Basic Policy of Our Party on Religious Questions During the Period of Socialism," in Hongqi, no. 400 (16 June 1982), pp. 2-8. Many sinologists based their interpretations of China's religious policy on this abstract. For example, A.S. Lazzarotto, "The Chinese Communist Party and Religion," in Missiology 11 (July 1983): 267-290; also Sun Yifu's "Preliminary Comments on the Drafted Constitutional Article about Religious Freedom," in ZYJ 2 (September/October 1982): 7-11. Both authors did not seem to have Document no. 19 at the time of their writing. Chang Chi-peng, in his article "The CCP's Policy Toward Religion," in IS 19 (September 1983): 55-70, uses Document no. 19 as the basis for analysis. However, his anti-Communist presuppositions limit his discussion.

paragraphs are the highlights of this important Document no. 19.

Section I begins with the classic Marxist view on religion. It states that religion is a distorted worldview generated by an unjust society with little scientific knowledge. Accordingly, religion should disappear with the realization of socialism. However, this first section admits that it might take a long time to eliminate religion since religion can be stopped neither by force, nor by Government decree.

Section II deals with the current religious situation in China. The CCP admits that the population of believers has increased since the Liberation. Religion is regarded as a complicated matter intertwined with international politics and the problems of the national minorities. The Party, therefore, has to approach religion with extreme caution.

Section III deals with the evaluation of the earlier religious policies. The Party concludes that the policy implemented from 1949 to 1966 was basically correct but contained some minor errors. However, the policy used in the Cultural Revolution is considered to be totally wrong. This third section acknowledges the success of the Party in establishing the patriotic movement of the Protestant Church (TSPM) and the independent and autonomous movement of the Catholic Church (CPCA) during the first 17 years of the Communist regime.¹⁰⁷ It admits that the suppression of religion during the Cultural Revolution actually promoted the development of underground religious activities. After the denunciation of the radical leadership and their leftist

¹⁰⁷ In the Government's publications prior to this Document, all patriotic religious organizations were supposed to be organized by believers themselves and to be spontaneously formed in accordance with the will of believers. This Document is evidence indicating that the CCP was behind this "religious mass movement" to form pro-Government religious organizations.

religious policy, the Party puts forth the current policy which is a temporary measure to win over religious believers for the building of a socialist society.

Section IV elaborates the theoretical basis and principles for the implementation of this policy. It is meant to be a long-term policy that will last until the realization of total socialism when religions will disappear naturally. On the one hand, the CCP allows limited religious activities and on the other hand, the CCP has to actively propagate atheism. Religion should be restricted to a private affair that does not obstruct the Government's social program. Religion is not to be taught to children.

Section V lists the principles for dealing with religious leaders. The Party should win the hearts of these leaders because they influence believers greatly. The Party should educate leaders to be patriotic and supportive of the CCP. In dealing with Christian leaders, the Party should emphasize the importance of the "Independent, Autonomous, and Self-Governed" principle of the Church. Only those, who are politically reliable and patriotic and are approved by religious organizations, should be allowed to perform religious duties.¹⁰⁸ Other means of livelihood should be provided for those religious workers who do not submit to the Party leadership.

Section VI defines the "legitimate" activities and sets regulations for the governing of religious places such as temples, church buildings and mosques. The Government should facilitate the restoration and construction of places for religious activities. However, these buildings should not be

¹⁰⁸The CCP does not care much about the religious conviction and the religious morality of religious workers (clergy). It is primarily concerned with the political stand of these people.

restored or built indiscriminately. All religious restoration and construction must be approved by the Government, controlled by Government officials, and managed by religious organizations. The "legitimate" or "normal"¹⁰⁹ activities are those normally held in religious places or in a private home in accordance with religious customs. These activities include worship, prayer, preaching, mass, Bible study, requiem...etc. Protestant "house churches," in principle, were not allowed.¹¹⁰ With the approval of the Government, religious organizations may print religious literatures and produce religious articles. Religious beliefs may not be propagated outside of the designated places nor atheism propagated inside these places.

Section VII deals with the relationship between the Government and these religious organizations. All organizations are considered "national patriotic organizations" by the Government. Their duties are to help implement the Party's religious activities, and to accept the CCP and Government leadership.

Section VIII deals with the training of new clergy. Candidates who have good religious knowledge and are willing to submit to the CCP's leadership and to support the socialist system, are qualified to be trained as clergy.

Section IX gives explicit directives to CCP members. There are

¹⁰⁹The literal translation is "normal," yet in the Chinese social context, it could also be understood as "legitimate."

¹¹⁰Sister Theresa Chu told this author (March 1984) that the Anglican Bishop Ding Guanxun had objected to this rule and his objection was accepted by the Government. But there were still many arrests of house church leaders and many prohibitions of house churches in 1982 and 1983. It is possible that the Government's "revised" directive was not followed by local cadres. Or, a more likely possibility was that only those house churches registered with the TSPM were granted legal status by the Government.

different standards. Han CCP members cannot believe in religion. Unless they actively propagate atheism, they will be expelled from the Party. The Party is willing to be patient with members of the national minorities who are loyal to the Party but still under the influence of religion. None of the new recruits should be under religious influence. Cadres who work among the national minorities (Moslems and Lamaists), are allowed to participate in some religious activities in order to associate with the people with whom they work.

Section X draws attention to possible counterrevolutionary activities under the cover of religion. It also focuses on the prohibition of all "feudal superstitious" activities.

Section XI deals with the international aspect of religion. The Party allows friendly exchanges between international religious communities and Chinese religious organizations. However, any foreign powers who try to control Chinese religious organizations will be rejected. Religious organizations must uphold the principle of independence. They may not ask for financial help or accept donations from abroad without the approval of the Government. All foreign contacts without prior official approval are illegal.¹¹¹ The Party also encourages the development of talented people who can foster friendly relationship with international religious communities.

The final section reaffirms that this Party policy is correct and based on the orthodoxy of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao's thought. It propounds that it is the Party's duty to criticize and attack theism and to propagate atheism without, however, provoking bad feelings among religious believers. It reiterates that the only way to eliminate religion is to engage all Party

¹¹¹The Party's concern seemed to be political. Anyone that had unofficial foreign contact was suspected of espionage activities.

members in the building of a socialist society.

Soon after the release of Document no. 19, the Government revised the 1978 Constitution in an attempt to further detach the nation from the Leftists' policy and to prepare the way for the implementation of the pragmatic policies. The draft of the Constitution was released in April 1982 for public scrutiny.¹¹² the draft indicates that the Government made an effort to listen to the people and to solicit feedback from them.¹¹³ One of the many changes in the new draft was an elaborate article (no. 35) on religious freedom. The official English text of this Article (hereafter referred to as Draft no. 35) is as follows:

Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.

No organs of State, public organizations or individuals shall compel citizens to believe in religion or disbelieve in religion; nor shall they discriminate against citizens who believe, or do not believe in religion.

The State protects legitimate religious activities. No one may use religion to carry out counterrevolutionary activities, or activities that disrupt public order, harm the health of citizens or obstruct the educational system of the state.

No religious affairs may be dominated by any foreign country.

In comparison to the former (1975 and 1978) constitutional articles on religious freedom, Draft no. 35 takes a quantum leap towards the definition of

¹¹² The Draft of the Revised Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: People's Press, 1982) (c); for an English translation, see BR 25 (10 May 1982): 24-47.

¹¹³ Chinese officials claimed that the Draft was discussed by more than 80% of the Chinese adults, see NCNA (Eng.), 7 November 1982. Although there were doubts as to the accuracy of the figure "80%" and the openness of these discussion meetings, the action of getting feedbacks from people was already a "great leap forward" towards democracy in China. Cf. the receiving of the previous two (1975, 1978) Constitutions, see Xinhua Ribao, 27 December 1982.

freedom of religion by setting a clear parameter to religious freedom. Draft no. 35 subsequently led to the formulation of the final version (Article no. 36) of the new Constitution which was adopted in December 1982. This Constitutional article on religious freedom legitimized the religious policy as outlined in Document no. 19.

A number of suggestions led to the formulation of this Draft no. 35 and the final version found in the new Constitution. In September 1980, during the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) where Hua resigned from the premiership, there was a recommendation to revise the 1978 Constitution. Buddhist leader Zhao Puchu and a few other religious leaders requested that Article no. 88 of the 1954 Constitution, which stated that "Citizens enjoy the freedom of religious belief," replace the Article no. 46 on religious freedom in the 1978 Constitution.¹¹⁴ They argued that to endorse the right of propagating atheism and to deny the right of propagating theism was, in fact, an act of discrimination against religious believers. Therefore, the clause "the freedom of religious belief" was thought to be more appropriate, because its meaning implied that "freedom not to believe in religion" was also granted.¹¹⁵ This request was accepted. Article 88 became the first clause of Draft no. 35.

The second clause further reaffirms the right of both believers and nonbelievers. The third clause affirms the concept of separating religion from

¹¹⁴ Wenhui Bao (HK), 10 May 1982.

¹¹⁵ Ding Guanxun's interview by Ms. Woo, in CN 20 (Spring/Summer 1982).

the state.¹¹⁶ It confines religion to the domain of private affairs within "legitimate" boundaries. The term "legitimate" is subject to the interpretation of Government officials.

The term "foreign country" in the final clause referred mainly to the Vatican.¹¹⁷ There were, as one recall, many foreign Protestant groups which tried to influence the churches in China from 1979 to 1982. These "foreign influences" could be interpreted as "illegitimate" activities or "counterrevolutionary" activities. As far as the Catholic Church was concerned, the Drafting Committee was not naive about the ecclesiastical claim of the Roman Curia on the Chinese Catholic Church. This ecclesiastical claim was difficult to interpret as either "illegitimate" or "counterrevolutionary." Hence, a separate clause was needed to curb the Vatican's effort to control the Chinese Church.

It is evident that the Chinese Government regards all religious affairs as "internal affairs." Any sign of foreign influence is considered a hostile intrusion on the hardwon sovereignty of China. Hence the final clause is the Chinese Government's warning to foreign religious groups, and especially the Vatican, not to attempt to regain their influence over religious affairs in China.

Draft no. 35 was met with overwhelming praise by the religious leaders

¹¹⁶ Cf. Soviet Constitution no. 57 (adopted in 1977 by the Supreme Soviet) Article 57: "...Soviet practises the separation of the Church and the State, and the the separation of school and Church." in The Religious Policy in Soviet Union (Beijing: The Chinese Academy of Social Science, 1980) (c), p. 135.

¹¹⁷ See Ding's recollection of the drafting of the Constitution, CN 20 (Spring/Summer 1982); also Bishop Michael Yang Gaojian's speech on the revision of the Constitution, in CCC, no. 5 (September 1983), pp. 33f.

in China.¹¹⁸ Reactions from oversea Christian groups were mixed.¹¹⁹ The oversea Protestant groups were interested in knowing the meaning of the term "legitimate." They were more particularly concerned with the many existing Protestant house churches which were not associated with the Government-recognized Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM). It occurred to them that the fate of these house churches depended solely on the Government's interpretation of "legitimate" activities.¹²⁰ The overseas Catholics seemed to be more interested in discovering the implications of the last clause of the Draft no. 35 for the "Universal Church."¹²¹

Chronologically, Draft no. 35 was released after Document no. 19, hence Government officials already knew how Draft no. 35 should be interpreted. It was not surprising to see that all commentaries on Draft no. 35 that appeared in the Chinese media fell within the parameters established by Document no. 19.¹²² The Draft was approved in December 1982 with a few minor alterations. The official final version of this article in English reads as follows: (hereafter referred to as "NC no. 36" for New Constitution Article no. 36)

¹¹⁸For example, see Guangming Ribao, 2 July 1982; Renmin Ribao, 14 May 1982, Anhui PBS 7 May 1982 in CNA; or Wenhui Bao (HK), 11 May 1982.

¹¹⁹UCAN's article in CB 4 (June 1982): 10.

¹²⁰See "Comment on the Draft," in Do Not Forget China, prayer letter of Chinese Church Research Center, August 1982. (c)

¹²¹"Editor's comment," in Tripod, no. 9 (June 1982), p. 1.

¹²²For example, see Renmin Ribao, 14 May 1982; or Gongren Ribao, 15 June 1982.

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The State protects normal religious activities. No one may use religion to carry out activities that disrupt public order, harm the health of citizens or obstruct the educational system of the state.

Religious¹²³ bodies and religious affairs are not subject to foreign domination.

There are three minor changes in the NC no. 36. The phrase "counterrevolutionary activities" was dropped because some Buddhist leaders took it as a discriminatory statement singling out religious believers as potential counterrevolutionary elements.¹²⁴ The terms "Religious affairs" was replaced by the phrase "religious bodies and religious affairs," so that there would be no misinterpretation of the Government's intention.¹²⁵ The term "foreign country" was replaced by "foreign domination" which was a more inclusive term to connote all types of multi-national religious organizations and denominations abroad.¹²⁶ In the official English text, the term "legitimate" was changed to "normal," whereas there was no change in the Chinese text. The NC no. 36 received positive responses from all Chinese

¹²³See Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1983).

¹²⁴Xinhua Ribao, 27 December 1982.

¹²⁵The Chinese term in the Draft is simply "religion," hence it could be widely interpreted. The final wording of the NC no. 36 is much more precise with little room for misinterpretation.

¹²⁶With the former term, people could argue that religious organizations with multi-national character should be exempted. The Chinese term for "foreign domination" literally means "foreign forces."

media,¹²⁷ but was greeted skeptically abroad.¹²⁸

After the announcement of NC no. 36, there was wide government suppression of "feudal superstitious" activities in the city of Guangzhou,¹²⁹ Province of Honan,¹³⁰ Province of Guangxi, Province of Sichuan, and city of Tianjin¹³¹ and elsewhere. Some of these feudal superstitious activities involved CCP members,¹³² and many seriously disrupted public order.¹³³

There were also official reports on large scale "organized" religious activities, especially Christian activities, in the rural areas.¹³⁴ In response to the spread of religious activities, the Government increased its efforts to propagate atheism¹³⁵ and its attacks on superstition.¹³⁶ It produced propaganda showing Communist morality to be better than religious

¹²⁷ For example, see Renmin Ribao, 27 January 1983; CD, 9 December 1982; CD 13 May 1983; Wu Ji et. al. ed., Commentary on the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Legal Press, 1984), pp. 70-73. (c)

¹²⁸ Jesuit's China Apostolate Correspondence August 1982 (whole issue). It was based on Draft no. 35. See also J. Spae's "China's New Constitution and Its Importance in Religion," in CUP, no. 3 (Spring 1983): 31-43. Spae errs by quoting the Chinese version of Draft no. 35 as the NC no. 36 (p.43). This mistake affects his analysis.

¹²⁹ Nanfang Ribao, 25 August 1983.

¹³⁰ Ming Pao, 26 October 1983.

¹³¹ Tung Fung Daily, 1 September 1983.

¹³² Ming Pao, 30 July 1983.

¹³³ Yangcheng Wanbao, 14 September 1983.

¹³⁴ These activities were reported in Anhui, see Zhongguo Qingnan Bao, 10 September 1983; in Fujian, Fujian Ribao, 26 January 1983, or in Inner Mongolia, SCMP (HK), 6 December 1983.

¹³⁵ Renmin Ribao, 19 March 1983.

¹³⁶ Zhongguo Qingnan Bao, 29 January 1983.

morality.¹³⁷ It emphasized that only Marxism, the thought of Mao, and scientific materialism were allowed to be taught to children.¹³⁸ Some zealous Party theoreticians even went as far as to attack religion as superstition, and to argue that religion had to be eliminated from society.¹³⁹ Then attacks were immediately refuted by prominent religious leaders.¹⁴⁰

At the end of 1983, the Party launched a political campaign to attack "Spiritual Contamination."¹⁴¹ On the surface, it was a campaign to fight against incompatible foreign ideologies that had seeped into China during the recent open-door policy of the Chinese Government. In reality, this political campaign, like other political campaigns in China, was actually a power struggle among political leaders.¹⁴²

However, many local cadres probably read the wrong political signal and launched their attack on religion hoping to gain political merits.¹⁴³ Some

¹³⁷ Gongren Ribao, 7 October 1983.

¹³⁸ Sun Xinhua et. al. ed., Talks on Religion, second edition (Zhejiang: Zhejiang People's Press, 1984), p. 110. This book is the Party's commentary on religious policy for the popular readership. Many of the contents are taken verbatim from Document no. 19.

¹³⁹ Ren Jiyu, "Marxism is the Best Way to Cure Feudal Superstition," in CD 17 July 1983.

¹⁴⁰ Ding Guanxun's reply "Religion 'is not' superstition," in CD, 23 July 1983. This author learnt that there was an ideological confrontation on religious issues. The confrontation was internally referred to as the Nan Bei Duidiao (Chorus between North and South) which indicated the ideological difference between Ren in Beijing (north) and Ding in Nanjing (south). (Private source.)

¹⁴¹ It started in October 1983 and was officially announced at the Second Plenum of the Twelfth CCP Congress, see Renmin Ribao, 16 November 1983.

¹⁴² Renmin Ribao, 31 October 1983; Renmin Ribao, 11 November 1983.

¹⁴³ This campaign led to the removal of a number of top leaders from key Party posts. Among them was the Deputy Editor of Renmin Ribao.

zealous Party cadres used this campaign to label religion "Spiritual Contamination," and to group religion with pornography as something to be removed from Chinese society.¹⁴⁴ The Central Committee of the CCP then issued a classified Document to clarify this confusion by declaring that religion does not come under the label "Spiritual Contamination."¹⁴⁵ This document makes three important points: First, it reaffirms the present policy and reassures believers that the campaign is not aimed at religion. Secondly, it repeats warnings to stop the "foreign intervention" into Chinese religious affairs. Thirdly, it includes ancestral worship in the banned "feudal superstitions."

It is conjectured that this Document might have been released before mid-December, 1983, because in early December at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Buddhist Association, the new UFWD director, Yang Jingren, made an important speech¹⁴⁶ informing Buddhists that the Government's policy was to distinguish between religion and spiritual contamination. The Committee then made a resolution that religion was not a form of spiritual contamination and should not be under attack.¹⁴⁷ The resolution was reported by the press abroad but was not mentioned by the Chinese media.¹⁴⁸

It was not until the President of China, Li Xiannian announced in a

¹⁴⁴ Renmin Ribao, 31 October 1983.

¹⁴⁵ This Document was neither mentioned nor published outside of China. It was quoted and summarized by the director of RAB in Beijing when he addressed the Beijing's Protestant Conference, in Conference Report of the Joint Conference of the Beijing Fourth TSPM and the Second Beijing Christian Council, January 1984, mimeographed, pp. 10-12.

¹⁴⁶ An abstract of his speech appeared in CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), pp. 4-6.

¹⁴⁷ Sing Tao Daily, 12 December 1983.

¹⁴⁸ Wenhui Bao (HK), 6 December 1983; or Renmin Ribao, 7 December 1983.

speech welcoming the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. R. Runcie,¹⁴⁹ that religion and spiritual contamination were two entirely different things, that the Chinese media began to publish this Government decision.¹⁵⁰ This authoritative statement was later quoted in Chinese religious journals¹⁵¹ and in the Chinese Government's literature for foreign readers.¹⁵² Since then, there have ^{been} no major political harassments of religion. Religious activities may be enjoyed in the relative freedom dictated by the Chinese Government.

From 1978 to 1983, China underwent many changes: the replacement of Hua's Leftist political ideology with Deng's pragmatic policy, the opening of China to the West, and the gradual improvement of the living standard. As far as religion is concerned, Government leaders were willing to tolerate different religions in order to rally support from believers for the benefit of economic prosperity. The CCP issued Document no. 19 as the foundation of the Government's religious policy which was outlined clearly in Article no. 36 of the new Constitution.

A rapid growth of religious activities, including both officially-approved and the underground activities, resulted from the new religious policy. This phenomenon seriously challenged the validity of Communist ideology. Many efforts such as the propagation of atheism and the increase of attacks on religion were made by the Party to protect its ideological

¹⁴⁹ NCNA (Eng.), 16 December 1983.

¹⁵⁰ Renmin Ribao, 17 December 1983.

¹⁵¹ CCP, no. 9 (May 1984), pp. 4-6; TF, no. 13 (January 1984), p. 28.

¹⁵² Editor's reply, "Fighting Corrosion of the Spirit," in CR 33 (March 1984): 2.

orthodoxy. Measures and regulations were formulated restricting religious activities within designated boundaries under close Party supervision.

This new religious policy may be seen as a policy of contradiction: "On the one hand, it advocates atheism, on the other hand, it 'tolerates' religion; on the one hand, it struggles with God, on the other hand, it compromises with believers."¹⁵³ Ideologically, the Party disapproved of religion, yet pragmatically, the regime tolerated "controllable" religious activities. This tension is the essence of the this policy. Overstressing one side or the other would not accurately represent the policy.

¹⁵³Sun et. al. ed., p. 110

CHAPTER TWO

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

While Chinese Church leaders started to reorganize the Chinese Church out of the ruins of the Cultural Revolution, they inevitably faced many demands from the Government. Some of these demands were in conflict with traditional Catholic teachings, for example, loyalty to the Church versus loyalty to the nation, the Catholic practice of pedobaptism versus the Government's prohibition of the religious education of children.

It was evident that the Chinese Church had to seek a modus vivendi for its own survival in China. The search for a modus vivendi led to the compromising of many traditional Catholic doctrines and practices. It also challenged Chinese Catholics to rethink the suitability and the validity of many Catholic doctrines and stimulated them to develop a new ecclesiological understanding in the context of Chinese society.

This chapter intends to examine the conflicts and compromises between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government, the modus vivendi developed from this situation, and theological questions arising from this Church and State relationship. The chapter is divided into three sections: Section A. "Government Policy for the Catholic Church" looks into the most immediate challenge faced by the Chinese Church, Section B. "The Catholic Response to Government Policy" examines the theological formulations and practical

responses of the Chinese Church during its search for a modus vivendi, and Section C. "Theological Reflection" discusses the ecclesiological theses emerging from the Chinese Church (1978-1983) vis-à-vis the relationship between Church and State.

A. GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

The religious policy formulated by the Government from 1979 to 1983 was a set of general guidelines for all religious groups. It was often too general to address the particular issues of each religious group. Therefore, specific directives had to be drawn up and certain points of the general policy had to be elaborated to suit the nature of the different religious groups.

In the eyes of the Chinese Government, the Chinese Church bears many unique characteristics. First of all, it is a shameful stigma of the imperialist and colonialist past,¹ due to its prolonged submission to foreign control. Secondly, it is considered to be a potential political enemy of

¹Many missionaries came to China under the protection of Western imperialist and colonialist powers, especially those who came during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Some of them were interested in advancing the interest of their nations. Their superior attitude, and their ignorance of Chinese culture generated considerable resentment among the Chinese. Not only did historians in China denounce them, see Gu Changxing, Missionaries and Modern China (Shanghai: People's Press, 1981) (c), an anti-Communist Catholic scholar in Taiwan also has blamed foreign missionaries for their mistake in building a foreign church which was alienated from Chinese society, see John T.S. Mao, A Brief History of the Church in China During the Past 70 Years (Taipei: Window's Press, 1981), pp. 2f. (c) Cf. Appendix IV.

China.² Because the Vatican took an anti-Communist stand in the 1950s,³ the loyalty of the Chinese Catholics is seen as a political matter by the Government and not as a religious issue. Those who yield to the authority of Rome are regarded as traitors of the nation, counterrevolutionary elements, and unpatriotic people.⁴ Thirdly, the Chinese Church is considered to be an organization susceptible to the political influence of foreign enemies. It can easily be sabotaged by foreigners.⁵ Because of these attitudes the RAB and the UFDW formulated specific directives to govern Chinese Catholics.

Government directives are transmitted in a hierarchical fashion.⁶ At the national level, the intention of the Government is conveyed to the national Catholic representatives by national directors of the UFDW and the RAB at national Catholic meetings.⁷ At the regional level, regional officials of the UFDW and the RAB convey directives to regional Catholic delegates at regional

²Tien Wenque, The Vatican Which Serves the American Imperialism (Beijing: World Knowledge Publication, 1951). (c)

³L.T.S. Wei, Le Saint-Siège et la Chine de Pie XI à nos jours (Paris: Edition A. Allais, 1971), pp. 225-256.

⁴For example, see Shanghai Xinwen Ribao, 14 September 1955, or Qingdao Ribao, 5 November 1955. For recent examples, see Jiefang Ribao, 18 June 1981, or Hunan PBS 16 June 1981 CNA.

⁵Xie Xingyao, "How Did Imperialism Use Religion to Have Aggression in China," in Renmin Ribao, 13 April 1951. For recent example, see Renmin Ribao, 13 June 1983.

⁶K. Leiberthal, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China, Michigan Papers in China Studies no. 33 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1978).

⁷Xian Xianfa, the national director of RAB, spoke at the national CPCA Conference in 1980, see CCC, no. 1 (November, 1980), pp. 4-6.

Catholic meetings.⁸ During these meetings, cadres of the UFWD and the RAB outline the Government's policy.⁹ Catholic delegates then draw up specific regulations for Catholics to follow.

Generally speaking, directives given at regional meetings are different from those given at national meetings. They are much more specific and concrete. For example, at national Catholic meetings, Xiao Xianfa, the national director of RAB, made a general comment that the Vatican had tried to regain control over the Chinese Church.¹⁰ He did not specify how this has transpired and what was involved. At a provincial CPCA meeting in Hebei, the provincial RAB director elaborated more concretely on the same issue and stated that there were actually many Catholics who had actively collaborated with agents from the Vatican.¹¹ Although the provincial director warned Catholics about this issue, he did not name any individual as an agent. At a municipal Catholic meeting, local cadres pinpointed individuals who had associated with the Vatican and denounced them.¹² The above evidence suggests that the lower the level at which a meeting is held, the more concrete and specific the Government's intention becomes. Furthermore, the specification of the Government's intention to Catholics also reflects how local Government

⁸For example, the Heilungjiang provincial UFWD and RAB officials were present at the Heilungjiang CPCA meeting, see Heilungjiang PBS 23 November 1980 CNAA.

⁹Xinhua Ribao, 25 January 1981.

¹⁰CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 5.

¹¹Special Issue on the Third Hebei CPCA Representatives Conference and Hebei Catholic Representatives Conference, December 1980, mimeographed. Hereafter cited as Hebei.

¹²At the CPCA meeting in the City of Wuwu and Shuncheng, individuals were named as "bad elements," see CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 41.

officials interpret the national policy and how they implement the policy in the local situation.

By examining carefully the speeches of the Government or Party officials given at both national and regional Catholic meetings, one can arrive at a fair picture of the Government's policy for the Catholic Church. Three themes were persistently emphasized by the Government to the Catholic Church from 1979 to 1983. They were: 1. Patriotism, 2. Independence, and 3. Regulated Activities. The following subsections examine these themes separately in detail.

1. Patriotism

The Chinese Government considered the pre-Liberation¹³ Chinese Church unpatriotic because of its heavy foreign association.¹⁴ After the Liberation, despite the expulsion of western missionaries, Rome still strongly insisted on its authority over the Chinese Church. Many Chinese Catholics chose to obey Rome rather than their Government. The new Chinese Government felt that its sovereignty was under challenge and interpreted the loyalty to Rome of the Chinese Catholics as an unpatriotic action. Because of this "unpatriotic" image of the Chinese Church, the Government emphasized patriotism among Catholics.¹⁵

¹³The term "Liberation" is the term commonly used in China to refer to the formation of the PRC in 1949.

¹⁴See Xu Ping's speech in Hebei, pp. 3f.

¹⁵Since the early 1950s, the theme "patriotism" was stressed by the Government in its dealings with Catholics. The emphasis increased as the confrontation with Rome heightened. The Government-sponsored Catholic organization is called the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association to highlight the break with the "unpatriotic" past of the Chinese Church.

According to the Government, patriotism means faithful support for the welfare of the nation. In his speech at the Third CPCA National Conference (1980), Xiao Xianfa said, "For a Chinese citizen, regardless of his religious faith, politically, it is required of him to be patriotic and to observe the law. He also needs to contribute to the establishment of the nation, as well as to its unity and prosperity."¹⁶ Xiao stressed that patriotism is a duty for all Chinese citizens. Personal religious belief must not hinder one's patriotism, nor be used as an excuse for disobeying the Government. Also, loyalty to the country must always take precedence over loyalty to religion.

The meaning of patriotism is further defined as support for the policies implemented by the present regime. In a speech at a national Catholic meeting (1983), Cheng Ping, the Vice-Director of the national UFWD, stated that it is the responsibility of all Chinese citizens to accept the Four Cardinal Principles (adherence to the socialist road, adherence to the people's democratic dictatorship, adherence to the leadership of the CCP, and adherence to Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong's thought) as the most fundamental political basis. He further elaborated that it is the responsibility of religious leaders and faithful to be good citizens supporting the implementation of the Constitution and the political and economic system defined by the Constitution.¹⁷ Patriotism, therefore, does not mean supporting one's country according to one's volition but rather, the support of the ideology upheld by the authority of the country.

¹⁶ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 5.

¹⁷ CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 23. The guiding political principles of the Constitution are also the Four Cardinal Principles.

On the whole, the Chinese nation actively engaged in the realization of the Four Modernizations. The Catholic Church was supposed to be patriotic in supporting the political goal set by the Government and was expected to be a participant of this program. In 1980, the Hebei provincial RAB director told Catholics:

Both the clergy and faithful must contribute to the Four Modernizations. We evaluate departments, districts, units, and individuals by measuring their contributions towards the realization of the¹⁸ Four Modernizations. Religious groups are evaluated by the same standard.

In this context of patriotism, he praised priests who canceled Sunday mass to facilitate the peasants' production during the harvest season.¹⁹

Another important goal of the Government was union with Taiwan. Taiwan has been separated from, and in opposition to, China for more than three decades. The Chinese leadership regarded union with Taiwan as a political priority of the country. Consequently, the Catholic Church also had to cooperate with the Government, in its own capacity, to achieve this political task.²⁰

No matter what goals were set by the Government, be it the Four Modernizations or union with Taiwan, the Chinese Church would be directly affected by the slogan of patriotism. Patriotism requires total submission, loyalty, and obedience from a Chinese citizen to the Government, to the extent that he/she gives up personal goals or religious obligations in order to fulfill the Government's demand. Since there is only one ruling Party with only one accepted political ideology in China, to support the Government naturally.

¹⁸ Xu Ping's speech in Hebei, p. 6, my translation.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 4.

means to support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Therefore, to the Chinese Church, patriotism means the modification of its tradition, values, practices and religious activities to suit the national goals established by the CCP.

The Government did not seem sure that the Chinese Church was a faithful supporter of the regime and it gave harsh warnings to Catholics. Qiao Liansheng, the successor of Xiao Xianfa as the national RAB director,²¹ told Catholics, "It would be extremely erroneous if one forgot the leadership of the CCP; . . . the primary political duty of the religious believers is to demonstrate love for the Party and socialism . . ."²² He also stated that punishment would be meted out to those who did not follow this political doctrine of patriotism.

2. Independence

The Government always emphasized that the Chinese Church had to become an Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church,²³ viz. a church totally controlled by Chinese. Many commentators interpreted this Government policy on

²¹Xiao Xianfa died on 18 August 1981. Qiao Liansheng succeeded him. NCNA (Eng.), 29 August 1981. Qiao died on 15 January 1984, in ZYJ 4 (February 1985): 10.

²²CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 29.

²³The original slogan was the Three-Self principle of the Church: Self-Administrate, Self-Support, and Self-Propagate. As the Three-Self slogan was generally adopted by the Chinese Protestant Church, the Catholic Church then used a new slogan exclusively for itself. In Chinese, it is Duli, Zizhu, Ziban Jiaohui. It is usually translated as "Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church," in Chinese Christians Speak Out--Addresses and Sermons (Beijing: New World Press, 1984), p.66. or "Independent and Self-governing Character of Our Church," in CSPD, no. 4 (February 1981), p. 23, or "Principle of Independence and Run the Church Self-reliantly." See Xinhua (Eng.), 22 May 1980. This dissertation follows the translation found in Chinese Christians Speak Out.

the independence of the Chinese Church as a conspiracy to destroy the Catholic Church.²⁴ They argued that an independent Catholic Church would be a step leading towards the separation of the Chinese Catholic Church from the Universal Church and the creation of a schismatic Chinese Church. However, in light of the Chinese sociopolitical context, this Government policy on the independence of the Chinese Church has a different meaning.

In order to trace the motivation behind this policy, it is important to understand what the Western world stood for in the recent past. Ever since the mid-nineteenth century, China had suffered defeats and humiliations at the hands of the Western powers. Because of the unequal treaties signed with foreigners, China gradually lost its sovereignty and became a semicolonial state.²⁵ With the establishment of the PRC, China became an independent state governed by its own people again.²⁶ The most important achievement claimed by the CCP is the liberation of China from imperialism, colonialism, and feudalism.²⁷ Members of the CCP claim that the Liberation helped to restore sovereignty and national dignity to the Chinese. National pride has become the

²⁴For example, see Wu Yan's Glimpse of Catholic Life Style in Mainland China and the Chinese Communist Policy Towards Religion (Taipei: Window press, 1984), (c), and Chang Chi-peng's "The CCP's Policy Toward Religion," in IS, 29 (September 1983): 55-70. Some earlier writings such as F. Dufay's En Chine l'étoile contre la Croix (Tournai: Casterman, 1955) held the same thesis.

²⁵Many Chinese cities and territories were divided up by foreign powers and were under their influence. When China became a republic in 1911, there were still many "foreign concessions" within the Chinese territories.

²⁶During the first decade of the new regime, China was not yet truly independent because it leaned towards the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Soviet influence was seen as "Capitalist-Imperialistic exploitation" but as "Communist-Brotherly support."

²⁷They were commonly referred to as the "Three Great Mountains."

main motivational force for rebuilding China. China's image has changed from that of a second class, colonial, underdeveloped and poor nation to that of a strong, independent, self-sufficient, and leading nation respected by other major powers of the world.²⁸

Strong nationalism, in turn, led to antiforeignism, especially in relation to foreign images of a shameful past. Therefore, to retain a foreign image means the betrayal of the hard-earned national dignity. The concept of "independence" is, therefore, easy to understand within the context of Chinese nationalism. It is a political independence not from the Government nor from Chinese society, but from foreign control.

Strong nationalism motivated the Chinese Government to remove all foreign stigma associated with past humiliations. All Chinese social institutions, such as schools, hospitals, religious organizations, charitable organizations, had to be dissociated from foreign influence and nationalized. In this nationalization movement, the Chinese Church was not the only institution singled out to be "de-foreignized," but one of many institutions which had to face the social change brought about by the campaign for independence. As Xian Xianfa put it:

²⁸When the RAB director spoke to the Catholic representatives from the province of Hebei, he used a significant portion of his speech to mention the achievement of New China. He recalled that in the past (pre-Liberation) China had been a backward and underdeveloped nation heavily dependent on Western goods. Then he made a comparison with the present situation where China could produce virtually all the basic goods for her people. The transformation from a poor and weak nation to a modern and respectable country was an achievement which had to be carefully treasured. From his speech, one can sense that his urge for an independent Catholic Church was derived more from his national pride than from a xenophobic attitude. See Hebei, pp.1-3.

The Anti-Imperialistic Patriotic Movement of the Catholic Church and the 'Principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church' do not apply only to the Catholic Church in China, but should be considered as an integral part of the Independence-Liberation Movement of the whole Chinese nation and the Chinese people.²⁹

Because the Chinese Church was traditionally under heavy foreign domination, it suffered greatly from this policy of independence. In 1950, there were one hundred and fourteen foreign ordinaries versus only twenty-five Chinese ordinaries, and three thousand and forty-six foreign priests versus two thousand five hundred and forty-two Chinese priests, in the Chinese Church hierarchy.³⁰ When all missionaries were expelled, the Chinese Church suffered a shortage of clergy. However, this damage to the Chinese Church which resulted from the Government's policy, is due more to the Government's zealous nationalistic urge than to the Government's desire to plot against the Catholic Church.

This policy of an independent Chinese Church also seriously affects the relationship between the Vatican and China. It has to be seen in its sociopolitical context because the Chinese Government sees the Vatican as an unfriendly political force.³¹ Firstly, the Chinese Government accuses the Vatican of being reactionary because it believes that the Vatican supported the

²⁹CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 5, my translation.

³⁰Agenzia Internazionale 'Fides,' Le missioni cattoliche dipendenti della Sacra congregazione 'De propaganda fide' (Rome: P. Opera della propagazione della feda, 1950), p.288.

³¹The Chinese Government did not make a clear distinction between the Vatican, the Papacy, the Roman Curia, and the Holy See. This is probably because Chinese officials lacked a good knowledge of Rome and its complexity. From their political perspective, Papacy and the Holy See were facets of the same political entity: The Vatican.

German, Italian, and Japanese Fascists during the Second World War.³² Secondly, when Japan set up the puppet state of Manchuko in conquered Chinese territory, the Vatican was the second nation, after Japan, to recognize this puppet state.³³ The Roman Curia also created a Catholic Church in Manchuko to take over dioceses in the Chinese North-Eastern Provinces. This papal diplomatic move is seen by the Chinese Government as a provocative action that challenged Chinese nationalism. Thirdly, during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the apostolic delegate to China, Msgr. M. Zanin, issued a letter requesting all clergy to take a neutral stand. This implied that the Chinese clergy should not support their own nation in its defense against the Japanese invasion.³⁴ Finally, the Vatican does not recognize the Beijing Government but that of Taiwan, as the legitimate ruler of China. Due to these political

³²See Qiao's speech in CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 31. This accusation probably resulted from Qiao's reading of the Chinese translation of M.M. Selnmam's Russian edition: The History of the Vatican During the Second World War (Moscow: Institute of Historical Studies of the Soviet Academy of Science, 1951). The Chinese version of this book was translated by the Russian Translation Team of the Heilungjiang University, and was published by the Heilungjiang People's Press in 1979 as an internal document available only to high level CCP cadres.

³³The Chinese Government refused to recognize the puppet state Manchuko (1934-1945). See AAS 28 (1936): 118. Catholics in Taiwan have tried to avoid this embarrassing incident concerning the Vatican. In Ku Pao-ko's Short Chronological History of the Church in China (Taipei: Kuang Hsi Publisher, 1970), pp. 79f (c), John T.S. Mao's A Brief History of the Church in China During the Past 70 Years (Taipei: Window's Press, 1981), pp. 9f (c), and Lo Kuang's A History of Vatican Diplomatic Relationships with China (Taipei: Kuang Hsi Publisher, 1961), pp. 234f (c), all three authors denounce the puppet state, but they fail to criticize Roman Curia's acceptance of Japanese aggression. Recently, another Taiwan scholar has tried to interpret the Vatican's recognition of Manchuko as a diplomatic act to promote Catholicism, see Yeh Chin-ying, "A Study of Peking-Vatican Relations," in IS 20 (June 1984): 77f.

³⁴That letter was issued on 13 May 1939. The Chinese Government protested against it, but without success. See Lo, p.236.

factors, Chinese officials regard the Vatican as a hostile political entity.

The Chinese Government seems to be unwilling to assess the Church from any other perspective than the political one. The Chinese Government sees the connection with the Vatican always as a political rather than a religious issue.³⁵ This interpretation is reflected in the language used by Chinese officials. Whenever they refer to the relationship between the Vatican and the Chinese Church, they use the terms "control" and "dominate."³⁶ These terms have an exclusively political connotation and denoting submission to a higher political authority.

In the Chinese sociopolitical context, no organization should be under foreign control, particularly the control of an antagonistic political entity such as the Vatican. It was natural for the Chinese Government to order the Chinese Church to sever its relationship with the Vatican. It was more a political gesture to protect the independence and sovereignty of China³⁷ and to protest against the political stand and the patronizing influence of the Vatican, than an ecclesiastical action to terminate communion between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church. In fact, the Government also has promoted exchanges between the overseas Catholic Churches and the Chinese Church

³⁵This point has been repeatedly emphasized by Chinese officials, see Hebei, p.6. Cf. Ya Hanchang, "How to Distinguish Between Religion and Feudal Superstition," in Religion and Atheism, ed. by Chinese Atheism Association, (Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1985), p. 3. Ya originally presented this article at the Third Annual Conference of the Chinese Atheism Association in 1983.

³⁶These two words Kongzhi and Zhipai literally mean "control" and "dominate."

³⁷Qiao's speech, CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 30.

as long as these exchanges are based on mutual respect and equal status.³⁸

In summary, the Government's policy of an independent Chinese Church is part of a wider policy of nationalization. This policy is a nationalistic reaction against the former western domination of China. Although this policy resulted in the independence of the Chinese Church from the control of the Vatican, there does not seem to be a deliberate diabolic plot to destroy the Catholic Church via the building of an independent Chinese Church. This policy is meant to politically accentuate nationalism in the Chinese Church.

3. Regulated Activities

Besides requiring the Chinese Church to be patriotic and independent, the Government also demands that it be guided by regulations³⁹ which are formulated to restrict Catholic activities to a defined parameter.

All Catholic activities are carefully monitored so that they do not interfere with the Party's political ideology and the Government's administration. For example, all Church publications have to be approved by the Government before distribution.⁴⁰ Catholics must not object to the teaching

³⁸ Quoting from reports made by Chinese bishops, Qiao said, "The principle of an Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church is not a closed door policy. It is not a rejection of the outside, but is a friendly way to conduct equal relationship with foreign Catholic churches." See CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 32, my translation. The relationship with equal status was emphasized. This was probably an reaction against the previous patronizing attitude of foreign missionaries and foreign Catholic churches towards the Chinese Church.

³⁹ A forthcoming "religious code" was mentioned by Government officials, see CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 28. Since the scope of this dissertation extends to 1983, the Government's policy on the Catholic Church will be deduced from the speeches of government officials up to, and not beyond, 1983.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.27.

of atheism in school.⁴¹ Catholics must not violate the state's marital law by demanding that a nonbeliever accept Catholicism as a condition for marriage.⁴²

"Normal" Catholic activities are defined as activities which bring benefits to the socialist society, follow the direction of the national aspiration, conform to Government policy, and pose no challenge or threat to the Government. "Abnormal" activities are those which are potentially dangerous to the political stability of the regime or pose threats to the authority of the Government.

All approved church activities have to be conducted within designated church buildings or prayer-halls. The Catholic faith cannot be propagated outside of these sites.⁴³ It is evident that the purpose of restricting Catholic activities within defined areas is to separate the Catholic faith from society at large and to prevent direct interaction between believers and nonbelievers.

All designated areas for Catholic activities are ultimately under the authority of the Government. Qiao stressed that "No one, at any time, should forget the fact that all areas designated for religious activities should be under the control of the administrative leadership of the RAB, and be managed by religious organizations."⁴⁴ In essence, Church officials are only custodians of these sites.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Hebei, p.7.

⁴² CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 24.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ SCMP (HK), 30 June 1984.

"Abnormal" Catholic activities, such as spreading rumors, collecting money from believers, disturbing the public order, following directives from hostile foreign forces (the Vatican), collecting intelligence for foreign reactionary forces, leading Catholics to disobey the CCP leadership, and rallying believers to be unpatriotic⁴⁶ are considered as counterrevolutionary acts and are prohibited by the Government. Those who continue "abnormal" activities are considered criminals to be punished by the civil authorities.

The regulation to prohibit these "abnormal" activities is aimed at controlling "Underground" Catholics, the so-called "Rome Loyalists." The Government suppresses these Catholics because they follow orders from Rome, do not support the CPCA/NAC, pass on information about the Catholic situation to the outside world, conduct religious activities of which the Government disapproves, resist and show disrespect for the leadership of the Government, and spread anti-Communist messages.

B. THE CATHOLIC RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT POLICY :

The previous section illustrates the Government framework within which the Chinese Church has to operate. It is generally agreed that Catholic doctrines, such as the Trinity, the Immaculate Conception of Mary, or the Resurrection of Christ, do not cause any potential conflict with the Government's religious regulations for the Chinese Church. However, some Catholic doctrines pose problems to the Government's policy. For example,

⁴⁶CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p.30.

papal primacy clashes with the Government's demand for the independence of the Chinese Church from the Roman Curia.

The Chinese Church, like other social organizations in China, is expected to comply with the Government's demand or run the risk of losing even the chance of physically surviving in Chinese society. In complying to the Government's demand, from 1979 to 1983, the Chinese Church responded at two levels. At the practical level, the Chinese Church showed signs indicating its adherence to the Government's demands. The Chinese Church often made concessions to the Government's policy by giving up some of its practices. At the theological level, it had to seek justification for its concessions on some traditional Catholic beliefs, such as the papal primacy, and to search for a new ecclesiological explanation of its existence in Chinese society.

In an attempt to survive under the Government's demands, the Chinese Church began to adjust, to compromise and to develop a modus vivendi so that it could have an optimal level of cooperation from the Government and could, at the same time, retain maximum Catholic identity. This section both describes this modus vivendi, through the analysis of the speeches, statements, regulations, and articles given by Chinese Church leaders, and examines how Chinese Church leaders developed it. The section is divided into three subsections: 1. Chinese Catholic Patriotism, 2. Independence of the Chinese Church, and 3. Regulated Church Activities.

1. Chinese Catholic Patriotism

In the past, the Chinese Church was considered⁴⁷ more an annex of a foreign institution in China than an integral part of Chinese society.

Therefore, in the early 1950s, the Government only required that the Chinese Church discard its foreign image which connoted imperialism, as a proper gesture of patriotism.⁴⁸

Since the mid-1950s, the Vatican, in accord with its anti-Communist position,⁴⁹ has issued various orders to Chinese Catholics directly opposing the Chinese Government's intention. For example, the Encyclical letter Ad Apostolorum principis, issued to the Chinese Church in 1958, explicitly denounces the CPCA which was endorsed and promoted by the Chinese Government.⁵⁰ The Government began to emphasize that the proper patriotic attitude of Chinese Catholics was to reject orders from Rome⁵¹ and to totally support socialist China.⁵²

Some Chinese Church leaders considered the patriotism demanded by the Government a serious violation of the theological position of the Chinese

⁴⁷M.S. Bates, "The Church in China in Twentieth Century," in China and Christian Responsibility, ed. by W.J. Richardson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1968), p.66.

⁴⁸Zhang Yushi, "A Talk With Catholics on How to be Patriotic," in Xinhua Yeibao, no. 4 (April 1951), p. 1379. Professor Zhang, from the Tangku University which was operated by French missionaries, stressed that the building of a Chinese operated Church is an important act of patriotism.

⁴⁹AAS 41 (1949): 334; or AAS 42 (1950): 553.

⁵⁰AAS 50 (1958): 601-614. ET TPS 5 (Spring 1959): 189-199.

⁵¹In 1955 the Government began a massive arrest of Catholics who followed directives from Rome instead of the Government's orders. For example, see Changjiang Ribao, 29 October 1955; or Dazhong Ribao, 8 November 1955.

⁵²For example, see the Declaration of the Beijing Catholic Reform Committee in Renmin Ribao, 18 September 1951; or the message of some patriotic Catholics in Xi'an, in Xi'an Qunzhong Bao, 11 October 1952.

Church. They chose to follow Rome's directives and ended up in jail.⁵³ Other leaders, on the other hand, considered this demand a political and not a theological issue. They disobeyed Rome's orders and interpreted these orders as reactionary directives and political threats to China.⁵⁴

In the 1950s, those who disobeyed Rome's orders did not offer any serious theological justification to support their acts.⁵⁵ It may be partly because Chinese Church leaders saw no need to seek theological justification for a political decision and partly because they did not dare to do any innovative theological thinking contrary to the teaching of Rome in the period of pre-Vatican II. It may also be that Chinese Church leaders were very reluctant to develop theology beyond the parameter of the traditional dogmas because they were trying to show their Catholic orthodoxy. Likewise, the Chinese Church had not yet experienced the revolutionary changes brought by the Vatican II Council.

Two decades later, when the Government repeated the emphasis on patriotism, the focus was no longer on antiforeignism, anti-Imperialism, and reactionism, but on the participation in the Four Modernizations, the total support of the political leadership, and the building of an authentic Chinese

⁵³For example, Bishop Ignatius Gong Pinmei of Shanghai, Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming of Guangzhou, Apostolic Administrator Msgr. Paul Chang Zhenguo of Siping, and many more.

⁵⁴The resolution of the First CPCA National Conference emphasized that Catholics should retain religious fellowship with the Pope, but they should disobey orders from the Vatican when these orders contradict the political interest of China, see Renmin Ribao, 2 August 1957. This emphasis was repeated in regional CPCA meetings, i.e. Luoyang Ribao, 7 August 1957, or Xi'an Ribao, 8 August 1957.

⁵⁵There were a few slogans such as "To Love the Country is To Love the Church," or "Patriotism is to Love Socialist China."

Church. From 1979 to 1983, Chinese Church leaders actively participated in the national programs. At the same time, they began to establish some theological bases for patriotism and for the support of the socialist regime.

1. Theological basis for patriotism

In 1980, Bishop Zhong Huaide of Jinan, Shandong, the President of the CPCA, made a lengthy theological justification regarding patriotism.

To love the socialist motherland and to actively participate in the Four Modernizations are the common tasks of all Chinese citizens and the duty of all Catholics. We know that the teaching of the Church can be summarized into two principles: loving God and loving the people. Loving the people is the manifestation of loving God. If we depart from loving people, we cannot say we love God. During the thirty-three years of Jesus' stay on earth, he revealed to us the truth of self-sacrifice for others and the truth of a diligent life. Jesus always sought the welfare of others. . . . We should follow the spirit of Jesus, as well as the good examples of many saints, by suppressing our selfish desires and working hard for the benefit of the people. . . . We all know that the Church teaches that God gives the governing authority to the nation, and that patriotism is a commandment of God. When Jesus was on earth, he showed to us the truth of patriotism; he even set a good example of it. When he knew the forthcoming destruction of the capital of his motherland--Jerusalem, he wept and cried in order to arouse the conscience of the people... Apostles and Saints also repeatedly taught us to love our nation and to obey our Government. The Church teaches that patriotism is not only a moral duty, but also an obedience to God's commandment. The Church of Christ regards patriotism as a law; whoever disregard patriotism is not a full believer.⁵⁶

Bishop Zhong justified patriotism by stressing four theological principles: a. the Christological basis of patriotic acts, b. the divine ordinance of the nation's authority, c. traditional teaching of the Church, and d. God's commandment of love. Based on these principles, he put forth the case of patriotism as an essential Catholic doctrine. He further elaborated this teaching in a more concrete manner, by saying "According to the doctrine of the Church, the political power of a nation comes from God. Therefore, we

⁵⁶CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 8, my translation.

have to obey the Government's policy and regulations. By doing so, we respect and submit to God's power." Then he quoted Romans 13:5 to expound the idea that whoever disobeys the nation is, in fact, disobedient to God. He concluded with the warning that disobedience to God is a mortal sin.⁵⁷

Many of Bishop Zhong's theological justifications were repeated by others. Vicar Capitular Zhao Jingnong of Tianshui, Gansu,⁵⁸ expounded on the ruling authority of the nation given by God.⁵⁹ It was further elaborated in a national CPCA meeting that the CCP was the God-appointed ruling authority in China. Therefore, all believers had to demonstrate their love for the nation by supporting the CCP.⁶⁰ Bishop Fang Zhigang of Wenzhou, Zhejiang, also justified Catholic patriotism along the same lines.⁶¹

Different bases for patriotism were provided by other Chinese Catholics. Fr. Hou Hunwen⁶² interpreted patriotism from a dualistic perspective. He stated that "We love both our soul and our body; we love both our Church and our country."⁶³ Some leaders regarded patriotism purely as an obvious social obligation for all Chinese citizens including Catholics, and

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 8f.

⁵⁸ He was consecrated in July 1981.

⁵⁹ CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 23.

⁶⁰ CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 19.

⁶¹ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 48, such as Mt. 23: 37-39, 17: 24-27, 22: 17-22, Rm. 13: 1-7, II Pet. 2: 6-15, I Pet. 2: 13-17.

⁶² He is a priest from Baoding, Hebei.

⁶³ Hebei p. 21, my translation. These two sentences might have no relationship at all. However, judging on the basis of the juxtaposition of these two sentences, Fr. Hau seems to compare the soul with the Church, and the body with the motherland.

avoided theologizing patriotism. For example, Bishop Chang Shouyi of Xuanhua (titular), Hebei,⁶⁴ commented:

We Catholics are a community of Chinese people. Loving our socialist motherland and actively participating in socialist construction are the duties of every citizen, as well as the duties of every Catholic. Patriotism is our means to cultivate our spiritual virtues and to manifest physically the glory of our Lord Savior.⁶⁵

Bishop Chang focused mainly on the need to support the nation and did not discuss the necessity of submitting to the ruling authority as Bishop Zhong had insisted. It seems that Bishop Chang either did not see the need to seek a theological argument for patriotism, or that he tried to avoid taking a theological stand to endorse this controversial issue.

In 1983, a new theological basis for patriotism emerged in the conference of the professors and rectors of Chinese seminaries. This conference established a new methodology for theological construction. It declared that while Scripture could not be used as a proof-text to support outdated theological claims, it should be regarded as the source to expound and to interpret faith. Theological construction must be rooted in Scripture and must be able to reflect the social and political context of Chinese Society. Furthermore, the criterion of Catholic morality must be based on the interest of the majority. For example, since China's political power serves the interest of the majority, violating the civil law is an action against the

⁶⁴In October, 1980, the Xinhua Diocese was integrated into the newly created Zhangjiakou Diocese. This new diocese was headed by Bishop Pan Shaoqing who died in 1983. Bishop Chang therefore held a titular title.

⁶⁵Hebei, 13, translated by the author. Bishop Chang might not feel the need to argue for Patriotism theologically or he might just be trying to avoid any theological statement endorsing Patriotism since he was known for his sympathetic attitude towards non-CPCA priests. See Ladany's "Behold, The Chinese Catholic Church," in PSH, no. 68 (16 March 1984), p. 6.

interest of the majority and, therefore, is considered to be sinful.⁶⁶

Based on this new method of doing theology, the Chinese Church developed a new theological interpretation of patriotism, which had an important ecclesiological impact. Patriotism is the moral obligation to be in solidarity with the majority of the Chinese people. The common desire of the people becomes the most important criterion in setting goals for the Chinese Church. In other words, the Chinese Church had to become an integral part of Chinese society⁶⁷ and share the common interests, desires, aspirations, and concerns of the Chinese nation. It was a new ecclesial identity for the Chinese Church that changed it from an extension of a foreign institution which was alienated from Chinese society in the past, to an integral part of the Chinese nation in the present.

It is evident that the theological basis of the Chinese Catholics' patriotism had changed since 1980. In 1980, Bishop Zhong's statement on Catholic patriotism was based mainly on the traditional dogmatic method, i.e., on the deduction of applications from abstract theological principles. Three years later, the theologians of the Chinese Church began to use a biblical and contextual method which was a radical departure from Zhong's.

The impact of this methodology is twofold. Firstly, it is a theological methodology which departs from the traditional dogmatic and proof-text method to a biblical and contextual method, a change from the

⁶⁶CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), p. 39; Xinhua, 11 May 1984.

⁶⁷CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), p. 18, the Jiangsu CPCA produced a resolution which reads as follows (my translation): "... establishes national dignity and national pride; so that they [unpatriotic Catholics] may come back into the midst of the people."

deductive approach to the inductive approach. Secondly, it utilizes the Chinese social reality as a basis for theologizing. In a "collective" society, such as China, the collective goals naturally supersede all individual goals. Based on the theological concept of patriotism as solidarity with the people, the Chinese Church must share the common interest of the Chinese people. Thus the social reality has a direct ecclesial influence on the Chinese Church.

ii. Participation in patriotism

Besides being a demand of the Government, patriotism is also an important goal for the Catholic Church to achieve in order to be accepted by Chinese society. This aspiration can be seen in the joint resolution of the CPCA and the NAC, which stated:

We strongly feel that the pivotal factor for the success of the Chinese Church's effort to root itself in the Chinese soil and to bear fruit is whether or not the clergy and laity can contribute to national security, unity, and the goal of Four Modernizations.⁶⁸

The statement suggests that the Catholic Church would have to work hard to prove its patriotism before it could be accepted as a member of the Chinese society. In order to demonstrate its patriotic desire, the Chinese Church made adjustments in its religious activities for national interests, and actively promoted national social programs.

Church publications explicitly reported the many accomplishments of Chinese Catholics who made valuable contributions to the economic prosperity of the nation. The Chinese Church also attempted to prove that the majority of priests, religious brothers, sisters, and laymen contributed greatly to

⁶⁸CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), p. 18, my translation.

socialist constructions in various fields.⁶⁹

Attempts were made to show that even those Catholics who had been considered unpatriotic could now be regarded as patriotic. For example, Fr. Wang Jinning of Zhangjiakou, Hebei, mentioned how he received awards from his factory because ideas of his helped to improve production.⁷⁰ He specifically mentioned that he had worked in the factory for twenty-four years. His twenty-four-years service in a shoe factory implied that he had been labelled a rightist or a counterrevolutionary element in the 1950s. It strongly suggested that he was one of the priests regarded by the Government as uncooperative and unpatriotic who had been sent as a political criminal to labor in factories or farms.⁷¹ It is significant to see that in the new context in 1980, this formerly "unpatriotic" priest could be regarded as patriotic solely based on his laudable contribution to economic production.

There are also the stories of three priests: Fr. Zhao Quoxian, who had been on a farm since 1955, Fr. Ruan Junlian, who had worked in a paper factory since 1955, and Fr. Yu Enhui, who had managed to remain as a parish priest until 1966 and had labored on a farm since then for 15 years. They were regarded as unpatriotic in the past, but now were highly praised by their working units as excellent models of patriotic workers.⁷²

The reports of these personal testimonies were probably a defensive

⁶⁹ CCC, no. 1 (November 1983), p. 34.

⁷⁰ Hebei, pp. 29f.

⁷¹ In the mid-1950s when the confrontation between the Vatican and Chinese Government was at its peak, those clergy who refused to support the Government-sponsored CPCA or Reform Committees were removed from their ministerial posts and were assigned to labor camps or were sent to jail.

⁷² Hebei, pp. 18f.

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move by the Chinese Church to prove that the Chinese clergy, even some of those who were formerly accused as unpatriotic, could contribute towards the nation's economic prosperity as well as, if not better than, the rest of the Chinese population. "Let the world see that the Chinese clergy are not parasites."⁷³--this statement made by a Chinese Catholic clearly summarized the intention of the Chinese Church.

Bishop Fu Tieshan of Beijing, too, made an effort to tell stories about the contribution of Chinese Catholics to the Four Modernizations at an international conference. Not only did he mention individuals, but also Catholic communities. For example:

In a village in Zhangjiakou, Hebei Province, there are many Catholics who cooperate whole-heartedly with members of non-Catholic commune and do not spare any of their effort in productive labor. As a result, the standard of living has been greatly raised and the village is nominated as an advanced unit from which the Government urges the whole region to learn.⁷⁴

Chinese Church leaders made use of every opportunity to promote patriotism and to emphasize its importance.⁷⁵ Bishops and priests would give

⁷³Ibid., p.32. When Fr. Yu was sent to a village, no production brigade would accept him. The villagers thought that Catholic priests only sat and ate and did not know how to work, *ibid.*, pp. 18f. This perception of the clergy was generally shared by Chinese peasants. Whoever accepted him would have to be responsible for his provision. It would be a heavy burden to feed an extra mouth in a village in northern China where the food was scarce. Fr. Yu had to beg several times before they agreed to accept him. He later proved himself to be an excellent worker. Many production brigades fought to have him.

⁷⁴Fu Tieshan, "Witnessing to Christ by Chinese Catholic Clergy and Laity," in A New Beginning: an International Dialogue With The Chinese Church, ed. by T. Chu and C. Lind (Toronto: Canada Chinese Programme of the Canadian Council of Churches, 1983), p.27. Or see the examples of Catholic villages near Taiyuan, Shanxi, recorded in CCC, no. 5 (September, 1982): 55f.

⁷⁵CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 44.

talks to the congregations on patriotism after the mass.⁷⁶ Chinese Catholic scholars and scientists were praised by the Chinese Church for their scientific contributions. For example, Xu Guangxi (1561-1633), a prominent Chinese Catholic scholar, was commemorated by the Government for his scientific contribution.⁷⁷ The Government called him a patriotic scientist and a patriotic scholar,⁷⁸ but failed to mention his Catholic faith. The Chinese Church quickly used this opportunity to promote him as an example of a patriotic Chinese Catholic.⁷⁹

Some regional CPCA held special rallies to congratulate Catholics who had made significant economic contributions to the nation. These Catholics were called "Advanced Patriotic Catholics." Prizes were awarded to them, for example, Advanced Patriotic Catholics in the City of Fushun each received a transistor radio.⁸⁰ Even priests, who were formerly well-known for their "unpatriotic" position, presided at these rallies.⁸¹ Their appearance

⁷⁶For example, see CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 13-15.

⁷⁷He was a minister of the Ming Imperial Court and was also a close friend of Fr. Matteo Ricci. His main contribution was his introduction to the scientific text which was brought into China by the Jesuits.

⁷⁸Guangming Ribao, 26 October 1983; Guangming Ribao, 25 December 1983.

⁷⁹CCC, no. 8 (December 1983): 43-46; and CCC, no. 9 (May 1984): 43-52. The editors deliberately placed the preprinted articles from Guangming Ribao, alongside theirs.

⁸⁰These meetings were held in Fuzhou (Fujian), CCC, no. 4 (March 1982): 44f; and in Fushun, Liaoning, CCC, no. 6 (April 1983): 51f.

⁸¹Fr. Pius Jin Peixian of Fushun spent fifteen years in jail before he was reinstalled in his pastoral post in 1980, see "La situation actuelle des chrétiens en Chine: Rapport du voyage d'un prêtre chinois (31 août-5 octobre 1980)," in ME 20 (January-February 1981): 30. He was condemned as a Rightist in 1957, see Liaoning Ribao, 23 November 1959, or Heilungjiang Ribao, 19 November 1959.

evidently suggested that they also had become supporters of patriotism in the new context of economic achievement.

In order to facilitate patriotic support for the nation, the Church tried to respond promptly and appropriately to the Government's need to ensure cooperation between State and Church. When the Government decided to work for union with Taiwan, the Chinese Church issued an open letter to the Catholics in Taiwan.⁸² When the national goal was to increase the agricultural production, especially in the regions which suffered from drought,⁸³ the local CPCA and CAC announced new ecclesiastical regulations cancelling Mass or shortening the liturgy during harvest time in order not to hinder agricultural production.⁸⁴ Ordinaries were empowered to waive Catholic requirement to keep Sabbath, or Feast days, if and when required, so that more time could be devoted for production.⁸⁵ In short, Catholic religious life had to be adjusted to make way for the national economic prosperity.

Serious problems became evident when the Church was asked to support the Government's campaign of the One Child Policy.⁸⁶ Since artificial birth control and abortion contradict the traditional teaching of the Church, some

⁸²CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 58.

⁸³There is a mention of a draught in Hebei, see Hebei, p.34.

⁸⁴Ibid., p.27.

⁸⁵Ibid., p.15.

⁸⁶The One-Child policy national campaign was to control the population by allowing all families to have only one child. A quota of rights to bear children was allocated to working units. Menstrual cycles were closely monitored. Anyone who gave birth to a child without the approval from the Government had to undergo an abortion. In rural areas, the campaign was more lax than in urban areas. Sometimes two children were permitted in the rural areas where the demand for physical labor was high, cf. Bridge, no. 8 (November 1984), p. 9.

priests, who were loyal to Rome, objected to the Government's policy on family planning.⁸⁷ When Bishop Fu of Beijing was questioned on this subject, he refused to comment on it directly and said that it was up to the couple to decide. It seems that he would not positively support the One Child Policy, and at the same time, would not openly oppose it.⁸⁸ His ambiguous reaction suggests that the Chinese Church as a whole seemed to respond positively in public to the Government's policy on One Child family planning, birth control, and late marriage,⁸⁹ and ignored such requirements in private.

A report about a rural Catholic community written by an overseas Chinese priest illustrates how the Catholics coped with this dilemma.

As for birth control, our village acts in conformity with Party directives. Here Catholic ethics, coupled with an intense patriotism, combine to instill a spirit of pride and sacrifice in what for many Chinese rural communities had turned into a nightmare. Our families have agreed singly [sic] not to have more than two children as the authorities advise. When a third child is born to a couple, it is easily adopted by relatives or friends who have less than their quota. The villagers jointly hold themselves responsible for observing the law. As far as I know, abortion and sterilization are unknown.⁹⁰

The national Catholic journal, The Catholic Church in China, usually echoes the social programs promoted by the Government. However, despite the overwhelming propaganda on the One Child Policy in all sectors of the Chinese

⁸⁷ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28.

⁸⁸ SCMP (HK), 30 June 1984. In late 1984, Bishop Li Panshi of Jiangmen, Guangdong, reflected theologically on the issue of abortion. He opposed abortion, and he placed the moral responsibility on the Government and not on those who perform the abortion, see "Bishop Li Panshi Speaks on Abortion," in Bridge, no. 8 (November 1984), pp. 9f. Since Li's comment on abortion appeared after 1983, this research will not discuss Li's position on this issue.

⁸⁹ Hebei, p. 15.

⁹⁰ J. Spae, Catholic Life in a Chinese Village, p. 6. More than 90 % of the four thousand villagers are Catholics.

society, this journal seldom mentioned this issue. The silence, which is atypical to its responses to other Government social campaigns, might indicate its avoidance and even its disagreement regarding this issue.

The Government seemed to accept the Chinese Church's relative silence well, without attacking it during the intensive campaign on One Child Policy and family planning. There appears to have been a subtle understanding between Government and the Chinese Church. So long as the Chinese Church would not openly object to this policy, the Government, in turn, would not force the Chinese Church to take an open stand on it.

In summary, since the Chinese Church carried its "unpatriotic" past, all its members had to work extra hard to prove that they were just as patriotic as their fellow Chinese citizens, and that their Church, like other social organizations, could contribute greatly to national prosperity.⁹¹ Only through patriotic participation could the Chinese Church be accepted as an integral part of the Chinese social milieu.⁹² The responses of the Chinese Church--its adjustments to the national interests, its silence on seemingly controversial policies and its propaganda on patriotism--seemed to be appreciated by the Government, for there was no public complaint against the Catholic Church.⁹³

⁹¹CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), p. 18.

⁹²J. Charbonnier, in his article "The Catholic Church in China, Old Scars and Hopes," in Missiology 13 (July 1985): 309-322, also suggests that the Chinese Church will gain more social acceptance through its social contribution.

⁹³In the end of 1983, the Government condemned only those Catholics who had overseas connections and conducted unapproved (clandestine) activities.

2. Independence of The Chinese Church

The Chinese Government ascribed the principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church to the Chinese Catholic Church.⁹⁴ Theologically speaking, to respond to patriotism was much easier than to respond to this insistence on ecclesial independence, because the notion of independence might jeopardize traditional Catholic teachings on papal primacy and papal authority. If the Chinese Church yielded to the Government's demand on independence, it might easily fall into the state of schism⁹⁵ which Chinese Church leaders vigorously denied was the position of their church.⁹⁶ To respond to this polemic issue, Chinese Church leaders began to define carefully the meaning of the independence of the Chinese Church, to construct a theological justification for this independence, and to actualize it.

1. Definition of independence

In the opening speech of the Third CPCA National Conference held in 1980, Bishop Zhong Huide mentioned that the basis for the independence of the Chinese Church was the political independence of China as a nation.

We clearly remember that the old China was a colonial and semicolonial country. The Chinese Church also lived in a colonial state controlled by

⁹⁴Instead of repeating the slogan "Independence, Self-ruled...", this section simply uses "Independence" to denote this concept.

⁹⁵The Roman Curia refrained from using the term "schism" to describe the Chinese Church, cf. Wu, p.25.

⁹⁶When Bishop Fu Tieshan was confronted with the question: "Are you really Catholic if you have separated yourself from Rome?" he replied that Chinese Catholics have not founded a new Church, see Vox's "New Anti-Church Moves in China," in The Month 243 (February 1982): 58.

foreign missionaries. Chinese clergy⁹⁷ were treated as subordinate and were deprived of their rightful authority.

Zhong viewed the Chinese Church from the perspective of Chinese society. In his view, ecclesial independence is not an exclusive movement for the Catholic Church but a consequence of being a part of Chinese society, which had undergone a dramatic change. His notion of the independence of the Chinese Church implies the transfer of power from the hands of the missionaries into the hands of the Chinese clergy, just as the new Chinese Government regained national sovereignty from the Western powers. The sovereignty of the Chinese Church seems to be the key factor. Later, he said, "The PRC is a sovereign state; the Chinese Catholic Church is a sovereign church."⁹⁸ The joint resolution of the national CPCA and the NAC also echoes this theme:

In order to protect the dignity of our Motherland and the sovereignty of our church, we will not become a puppet (or subordinate) church under any foreign churches. We will not submit to the pressures from foreign churches, nor will we⁹⁹ allow any foreign forces to jeopardize the sovereignty of our Church.

Both Zhong's statement and the resolution rationalize the necessity of an independent Chinese Church by emphasizing the "Chineseness" of the Chinese Church. Antiforeignism is significantly highlighted. Under the general context of independence from foreign control, Chinese Church leaders advocate the rejection of the political control of the Roman Curia. They fear that this control might return them to their former colonial status.

Chinese Church leaders repeatedly and categorically rejected any control from the Roman Curia. The language used by them bears a strong

⁹⁷ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 10, my translation.

⁹⁸ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 8, my translation.

⁹⁹ CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 20, my translation.

political tone. They used phrases such as "to break away from the control of the Vatican,"¹⁰⁰ or "to firmly cast off the control of the Roman Curia."¹⁰¹ These phrases contain exclusive political terms commonly used in China. Many commentators take these phrases at face value and conclude that the Chinese Church intended to be autonomous vis-à-vis the Pope.¹⁰² However, a careful examination of these phrases in light of their sociopolitical context suggests a different interpretation.

Chinese Church leaders usually employed terms like "Roman Curia" and "the Vatican" instead of terms like "the Holy See," "the Apostolic See," or "the See of Rome." The former terms denote political status whereas the latter terms signify the religious and ecclesiastical dimensions. In Chinese, the term "Roman Curia," literally means the "Court of Rome," and this naturally has a strong political connotation.

The term "Roman Curia" is used in conjunction not only with political terms, but also with terms referring to antagonistic (reactionary) forces, which are hostile to China. An example of this can be seen in the resolution denouncing the Pope's appointment of Bishop Dominic Deng as the Archbishop of Guangzhou. The CPCA, NAC and CBC jointly declared, ". . . [we have to] determinedly resist the Roman Curia and all foreign reactionary forces, which try to sabotage and to interfere with the Chinese Church."¹⁰³ Thus, Chinese Church leaders seemed to deliberately clarify the fact that they rejected the

¹⁰⁰ CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 24.

¹⁰¹ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 24.

¹⁰² Vox's "New Anti-Church," p. 58.

¹⁰³ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 17, my translation.

political aspect of Rome, but not necessarily its religious aspect.

The verb "control" appears almost every time the terms "Roman Curia" and "the Vatican" are mentioned. For example, the episcopal promotion of Dominic Deng is interpreted as "the continuous effort of the Roman Curia . . . trying to regain control over the Chinese Church."¹⁰⁴ It suggests that Chinese Church leaders might have held some resentment towards their former parent and patronizer, Rome. It also suggests that they might have constantly feared the existence of a diabolic conspiracy by the Roman Curia to sabotage the sovereignty of the Chinese Church.

The "control" of the Roman Curia was further interpreted as an attempt to restore the former colonial status of the Chinese Church. In the past, the jus patronatus of the Chinese Church was first given by Rome to Portugal, then to France. Later, the Chinese Church was divided up among many missionary orders with various national interests. In the present Chinese social context, where nationalism is highly emphasized, Chinese Church leaders would naturally be very sensitive and regard any order from Rome as a possible threat to the present status of the Chinese Church, and consider submission to Rome as a regressive step in historical development. The statement, that "the Roman Curia treated the evangelistic work in China as a political privilege to be awarded to colonial countries as a means of achieving their colonial expansion,"¹⁰⁵ made by Wang Zicheng in 1981, the Vicar General of Yueyang, Hubei,¹⁰⁶ clearly shows the Chinese Catholic leaders' general interpretation of

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁰⁶He resided in Beijing and taught at the national Catholic Seminary.

the Vatican's political intention.

The Chinese verb for "to cast off" or "to break away from" is "baituo." Chinese dictionaries give many examples of the usage of "baituo" such as "to cast off the yoke of colonialism," "to be lifted out of poverty and backwardness," "to shake off the shackles of feudalism," "to get rid of reactionary ideas," or "to extricate oneself from a predicament." In the contemporary Chinese usage, the term is used to describe the extrication of oneself from adverse situations, especially adverse political situations.¹⁰⁷

This term "baituo" is used at the liturgy of episcopal consecration in the controversial question--"Are you willing to break away from the control of the Roman Curia, and to faithfully follow the principle of an Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church?"¹⁰⁸ The intention of this question was clarified by Bishop Tu Shihua.¹⁰⁹ He said that this question had been part of the liturgy since 1958 as a protest against Rome's "brutal" rejection of the Chinese elected episcopal candidates. It is not meant to reject papal authority, but merely to object to some actions taken by the Roman Curia which Chinese Catholics considered unjust.

Bishop Tu further commented that there is no reference made to the

¹⁰⁷ English Department of the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, The Pinyin Chinese-English Dictionary (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1981), s.v. "baituo," See also the examples given under "baituo" in Chinese-English Dictionary on Contemporary Words (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1977).

¹⁰⁸ The Consecration of A Bishop: Liturgy and Explanation, mimeographed, (No date, no place), p. 4. This liturgy is used in the consecration of Chinese Bishops without approval of Rome. See Appendix III.

¹⁰⁹ In 1983, Rhea Whitehead asked Bishop Tu Shuhua to clarify this issue, Tu's reply was in agreement with the text of the Liturgy which this author has obtained, see the previous footnote. Personal conversation with T. Chu of the Canada China Programme, November, 1983, Toronto.

rejection of papal authority during these consecrations, nor is there any vow to separate from the Pope. His comment is confirmed by the fact that there has been no official declaration by the Chinese Church to sever the religious link between the Chinese Church and the Holy See, or the Pope.¹¹⁰

The demand of the Government for independence required political detachment from any foreign forces. In complying to this demand, Chinese Catholic leaders made a deliberate effort to differentiate the political and religious dimensions of Rome. They clearly rejected the political control of the Vatican, but did not rule out a possible religious link with the Holy See. Furthermore, by heavily stressing the political dissociation from the Roman Curia, Chinese Church leaders were spared the open rejection of the Pope's religious authority.

The concept of an independent Chinese Church does not seem to advocate a schismatic church. It rather visualizes a fully autonomous Chinese Church vis-à-vis foreign churches. This aspiration is expressed by a Chinese bishop in following way:

Chinese Catholics feel the need to openly declare themselves against any form of colonialism. This, of course, applies also to the Church life. We cannot tolerate to be treated by Rome or any other foreign churches as

¹¹⁰Spae published a handwritten version of an "Oath of the New Bishop." At the bottom of this Oath, there is a line saying: "I swear to break off all relationship with imperialism and any control by the Pope of Rome." This line seems to be the only published evidence to suggest the existence of a vow made by Chinese Bishops to separate from the Pope. However, though Spae had reservations about the authenticity of this sentence, nevertheless, he published it. See CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), pp. 145-147. This line is missing from the version of the Oath which this author has obtained. This author's version is a photocopy of the original version which was actually used in one of the recent consecrations in China. Spae later admits that "The bottom line, as you [this author] say, is not part of the document [Oath]." Personal correspondence, 7 March 1984. Cf. chapter four, C. 1. ii; and Appendix III.

minors. We request to establish relationships with Rome or other foreign churches under the condition of peace and friendship.¹¹¹

He further wrote, "One has to respect the autonomy of a nation, the dignity of the people. One has to remove the colonialistic attitude, to abolish the 'Father-Son' relationship,¹¹² and to protect peace and friendship."¹¹³ His statements well summarized the intention of the Chinese Church regarding its ecclesial independence.

ii. Theological justification of ecclesial independence

Although Chinese Church leaders interpreted their independence from the Roman Curia's control as a political issue, they still recognized its significant theological implications. As these theological implications were discussed, some preliminary ecclesiological self-understandings of the Chinese Church began to emerge. Three theological themes emerge in these discussions: papal primacy, election of bishops, and the catholicity of the local church.

Papal authority has not yet been rejected by the Chinese Church in official publications, such as the Catholic Church in China, nevertheless, it is challenged. In October 1980, a booklet entitled: Some Doubts Concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff was published by the editorial board of the Catholic Church in China under the pseudonym Du Li, and was circulated in the

¹¹¹ Lazzarotto probably interviewed this Chinese Bishop between 1980 and 1981, in The Catholic Church In post-Mao China, (English edition) (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Center, 1982), p. 64.

¹¹² In the Chinese Church, the relationship between the Holy Father and the Chinese Church is traditionally referred to as a "Father-Son" relationship.

¹¹³ A. Lazzarotto, The Catholic Church in Post-Mao China, (Chinese Edition), p.40 (translated by this author). The English edition combines the spoken and the written statement of this Chinese Bishop, whereas the Chinese edition separates these two statements and has a more detailed record of both.

Chinese Church.¹¹⁴ The purpose of this seventeen-page booklet is to argue for the independence of the Chinese Church.

Du remarks that many Chinese Catholics still are faithful to the Pope and that this fidelity is considered a hindrance to the independence of the Chinese Church.¹¹⁵ He further describes the influence of the Roman primacy on the independence of the Chinese Church by saying that "It [the papal primacy] generates great resistance to our Anti-Imperialist Patriotic Movement. Even now, many clergymen and laity still cannot resolve this problem in their mind and their hearts."¹¹⁶

In the first part of this booklet, Du states that no conclusive evidence can be derived from Scripture,¹¹⁷ the writings of the Church Fathers and contemporary theologians¹¹⁸ to support the absolute claim of papal primacy. In the second half, he describes the historical development of the Roman Pontiff, and argues that the papal primacy is not a doctrine based on Scripture or the apostolic tradition of the Early Church, but that it is a product of

¹¹⁴ Du Li, Some Doubts Concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff (Beijing: Documentation office of the Catholic Church in China, October 1980).

¹¹⁵ Du wrote, "Our aim of an independent and self-coverning church does not run smoothly, because one of the so-called Catholic doctrines is the unconditional acceptance of the Roman Pontiff as the 'Representative of Jesus Christ on earth,' and 'The Head of the Holy Catholic Church.' Those who deny this doctrine are accused of apostasy or schism, and will be punished by Canon Law." Ibid., p. 1, my translation.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Some of Du's biblical arguments are similar to those which are found in the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission's The Final Report (Cincinnati: Forward Movement Publication, 1982), pp. 81-85.

¹¹⁸ Du quotes some theologians and says that there is no satisfactory evidence to support the claim of Roman primacy before the fifth Century A.D., in Du, p. 9.

historical circumstance. He then writes, "According to the tradition of the Apostles, we can say that the Roman Pontiff is only the Bishop of Rome. He is equal in status to all other bishops; all [bishops] are successors of the Apostles."¹¹⁹ Finally, he concludes that the demand that Chinese Catholics submit to the authority of the Pope is contrary to the teaching of Christ as well as the Apostolic tradition¹²⁰ and that the building of an independent, democratic, and self-governing Chinese Church is essential.

Du's arguments were repeated by others, such as Bishop Tu Shihua¹²¹ and Fr. Zhang Zhilai,¹²² and were also quoted in the resolutions of the National Catholic Conferences.¹²³ The message is clear that the Chinese Church has the sovereign right to govern itself and should not submit to the Roman Pontiff because papal primacy is merely a historical product and not a basic Catholic doctrine derived from Scripture or from the teachings of the Church Fathers. All churches, be it the Chinese Church or the Roman Church, enjoy equal status; no church should dominate another.

The second important theological issue of the Chinese Church is the right to elect and to consecrate bishops without approval from Rome. This controversial issue is the critical factor that led to the break of the Chinese

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 21, also Chu and Lind, pp. 99-103. Bishop Tu teaches at the National Catholic Seminary in Beijing. Recently, he did some research on the theological implication of the Papacy, see CO, no. 40 (Fall 1984), p. 11.

¹²² CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 24. Fr. Zhang also called for the establishment of an indigenous Chinese Church.

¹²³ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 3.

Church from Rome in 1958. Chinese Church leaders saw the pressing need to develop theological justifications for the legitimacy of their Independent Bishops. The arguments which were put forth by Bishop Zhong Huaide,¹²⁴ Bishop Tu Shihua,¹²⁵ and Vicar General Wang Zicheng¹²⁶ were of great significance.

Bishop Zhong cited many examples of the Early Church to show how bishops were elected. He pointed out that the first batch of bishops were appointed by the apostles, and subsequent bishops were elected by local Christian communities to share the common interest of the local Christian communities. Therefore, the election of bishops by local Christians themselves is in line with the Apostolic tradition.¹²⁷

Following the logic of the challenge to the absoluteness of papal primacy, Vicar General Wang claimed that a local church had the right to elect its own bishop. He questioned why the Chinese Church could not elect its bishops, since all churches were equal in status.¹²⁸ He acknowledged that the mode of Chinese episcopal election contradicted the ruling of Canon Law, yet, he argued that "The law of the Gospel is higher than the law made by man."¹²⁹

¹²⁹ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 27.

¹²⁴ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 7f.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 25-28.

¹²⁶ Chu and Lind, pp. 99-103.

¹²⁷ This point is a specific refutation by the Chinese Church of Rome's appointment of Dominic Deng as the Archbishop of Guangzhou in June 1981. Rome held no consultation with the Chinese Church leaders prior to this appointment. See chapter five, B. 1. i.

¹²⁸ All bishops who are elected and consecrated by the Chinese Church are not recognized by Rome and their titles are regarded as illegitimate. Technically, all of them are supposed to be excommunicated by the Pope. see AAS 43 (1951): 217f, and AIF no. 1376 (3 May 1958), pp. 151f. Cf. Chapter four, C. 1. iii.

Bishop Tu Shihua¹³⁰ thought that the College of Bishops was the successor to the College of the Apostles. All bishops receive the Apostolic power from God and not from the Pope. Therefore, he reasoned that no bishop should interfere, restrict, or deprive other bishops of their ordinary, immediate, and proper authority from God.¹³¹ Based on this argument, he defended the episcopal right and the legitimacy of the Chinese Independent Bishops who were consecrated without Rome's approval.

Regarding the role and the functions of a bishop, Tu's view is surprisingly similar to the ideas advocated by the Second Vatican Council, except on the role of the Bishop of Rome.¹³² For example, his ideas on the collegiality of bishops, the juridical independence of a diocesan bishop (not as the vicar of the Pope, but as the head of the diocese), and the ecclesiastical authority of a bishop, are similar to the Council's teaching.

The third theological issue that concerned Chinese Church leaders was the Catholicity of the Chinese Church. They vigorously held that their independence from the Roman Curia was theologically non-schismatic. Some leaders emphasized the fact that the Chinese Church had followed all the traditional doctrines of the Catholic Church. For example, when Bishop Fu Tieshan was asked whether the Chinese Church was still a Roman Catholic Church,

¹³⁰ Both Bishop Tu and Vicar General Wang did not work in their dioceses but taught at the national Catholic Seminary in Beijing.

¹³¹ Chu and Lind, p. 99.

¹³² It is highly possible that Bishop Tu utilized some of the Council's new ecclesiological ideas because many copies of Vatican II documents (in Chinese) had reached the hands of Chinese bishops as early as 1979. See also, Lumen gentium par. no. 22-30.

he replied that "Since the Gospel has been preached by Matteo Ricci four hundred years ago in China, we have not changed one thing. --Yes, we are Roman Catholics."¹³³ Other leaders, such as Bishop Tu Shihua, interpreted the Chinese ecclesiastical independence from the Roman Curia as an action adhering to the teaching of the Apostolic tradition.

We continue to expound the spirit of the Apostles, to insist on the policy of independence and autonomy and to build the NAC to administer to the Chinese Church affairs. Do we depart from the church tradition because of all these? Of course not! Do we deviate from church tradition when we follow the Apostolic tradition? Are we schismatic when we try to continue the brotherly relationship among Christian churches and try to reject the domination of foreign churches? It is ridiculous!¹³⁴

Bishop Tu elaborated the concept of the collegiality of the Apostolic leadership and used it as the model for church administration.¹³⁵ He argued that there is no biblical reference to support the claim of the primacy of Rome. Had there been one, primacy would more likely have been given to Jerusalem than to Rome. His underlining purposes in these arguments was to show that the Chinese Church is truly Catholic because of its strict abiding to the orthodox ecclesiastical tradition, and to emphasize that the Chinese Church's rejection of some doctrines, such as the papal primacy, does not affect its Catholic orthodoxy.¹³⁶

In spite of the weaknesses of their arguments, Chinese Church leaders managed to develop some theological justifications for the legitimacy of their

¹³³ Bishop Fu made this statement in an open forum at the Université de Montréal in October, 1981. This writer obtained the audio tape of that forum through the courtesy of Fr. Michel Marcil, S.J., of Montréal.

¹³⁴ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 21, my translation.

¹³⁵ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 21f.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

independence from the Roman Curia. With their limited theological resources,¹³⁷ they attempted to interpret Scripture and the teachings of the Church Fathers from the perspective of their ecclesiastical context.

iii. Realization of an Independent Chinese Church

In June 1980, the Chinese Church established the National Administrative Committee (NAC). Article Seven of the NAC Constitution announced the establishment of the Chinese Bishops' College (CBC). Technically, CBC is accountable to the NAC, but it has actually been given a higher level of authority and has become the highest spiritual and doctrinal authority of the Chinese Church.¹³⁸ Concerning the reason for founding the NAC and the CBC, Bishop Tu states:

. . . the traditional spirit of the Apostolic leadership is a collective leadership and a democratic administration. Presently our Chinese clergy and laity have established a national organization of church affairs. Through the collective coordination and the administration of church affairs, we manifest the traditional spirit of the Apostolic leadership.¹³⁹

The NAC and the CBC, in fact, have become the infrastructure of an independent church hierarchy and have the power to decide on all ecclesial issues without the need to consult any foreign ecclesiastical establishment. They, along with their regional equivalents--the CAC and the diocesan bishops, have authority to assign parish posts, to appoint diocesan leaders, to

¹³⁷The Chinese Church had been completely disbanded for a decade (1966-1978) and theological training had ceased for about two decades.

¹³⁸Bishop Yang Gaojian said, "Although the CBC is accountable to the national Catholics Synod and the NAC . . . Bishop is the successor of the Apostles, the highest authority of the diocese . . . the Catholic Representatives Conference and the NAC would naturally accept the decision made by the CBC..." in Ibid., p. 49, my translation.

¹³⁹CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 21, my translation.

consecrate bishops, to ordain priests, to suspend clergy or to grant or to restore faculties to members of the clergy, to punish or to discipline Catholics if they violate church regulations, to approve liturgy, to ban unauthorized activities, and to allocate places for religious activities.¹⁴⁰

This structure (NAC and CBC) was set up to reinforce the sovereign claims of Chinese Church leaders vis-à-vis the control of the Roman Curia, especially at the time when Rome tried to reestablish its own hierarchy in China.¹⁴¹ With the formation of the NAC and the CBC, there was no room left for any foreign ecclesiastical group to claim control over the religious affairs of the Chinese Church.

Although the Chinese Church claims to be independent, this independence has been realized vis-à-vis foreign churches, but not vis-à-vis the Chinese Government. Bishop Yu Chengcai of Haimen, Jiangsu, warns, "Our independence is not an independence from the leadership of the nation; our autonomy is not the autonomy from the Constitution and regulations of the law; and our self-governing is not a departure from the path of socialism."¹⁴² Bishop Yu's statement strongly suggests that the Chinese Church cannot act independently from its political context, viz., the Chinese Government.

Fr. Gu Tianxi of Changsha, Honan, attempts to draw a distinction between when the Chinese Church may act independently from the Government's control and when it may not. He states:

¹⁴⁰CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 17f.

¹⁴¹For example, there have been reports about the clandestine consecrations of Chinese bishops "in communion with Rome," CB 5 (March 1983): 2.

¹⁴²CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 40, my translation.

The Party's leadership on religion does not mean that the Party wants to lead religious faith. The Party has no intention of doing so. The freedom of religious faith has been protected by the Constitution. However, we cannot depart from the Party's leadership on religious affairs and religious activities.¹⁴³

Fr. Gu, in fact, tries to draw a line between religious faith and religious activities (or affairs) by pointing out that the former is under the care of the Chinese Church and the latter is under the Government. Such a distinction is difficult to put into practice; even Fr. Gu himself had trouble drawing such a distinction in the Chinese social context. For example, Fr. Gu at first thought that Bishop Dominic Deng's episcopal promotion by the Holy Father was a good act within the realm of religious faith. However, after "careful consideration," (probably after the Government and Chinese Church leaders had made official statements to denounce it), Fr. Gu changed his mind and started to condemn the appointment as a religious activity with political implications and, therefore, subject to the Government's political leadership.¹⁴⁴

Another interesting example that might shed some light on the extent of governmental control of the Chinese Church is the Supplementary Regulations issued by the NAC and the CBC in July, 1981¹⁴⁵ concerning the "Reaffirmation of

¹⁴³CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 4, my translation.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., Fr. Gu referred to this appointment as the Vatican's appointment instead of the Pope's. It might suggest that Fr. Gu tried to emphasize the political nature of this event.

¹⁴⁵CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 17f, there were five supplementary regulations.

the Right of Clergymen to Administer the Sacraments."¹⁴⁶ Article two of the Supplementary Regulations reads:

All those clergymen, who violate the civil law and are, under punishment, or are being deprived of their political right,¹⁴⁷ will automatically lose their faculty to administer sacraments. Even the restoration of the faculties must be approved by the regional or municipal CAC and by the recognized diocesan bishop or diocesan ordinary.

According to this rule, a clergyman can lose his ecclesiastical faculties, when he has committed a civil or political crime. In other words, a priest put in prison not only loses his civil and political rights, but also his ecclesiastical faculties. It implies that the condition of one's ecclesiastical faculties is determined by the civil authority before the Chinese Church can exercise its authority. The Chinese Church can exercise its independence only if it is within the political framework acceptable by the Government.

In some situations, the Government allowed the Chinese Church to exercise its authority independently. For example, Fr. Ding Luzhao and Bishop Matthew Wang Weimin who were alleged to be married were forbidden to administer sacraments by the clergymen of Jilin Province. Being faithful supporters of the Government,¹⁴⁸ they complained to the local RAB to protest their

¹⁴⁶CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 51. There were only two regulations: a. Clergy must be approved by the recognized diocesan bishop or ordinary before administering Sacraments, and b. Foreign clergy who visit China must seek permission from the diocesan bishop or ordinary before administering Sacraments or conducting evangelistic activities.

¹⁴⁷The deprivation of one's political right is a serious punishment in China. It would mean the loss of many privileges, such as promotion, education, chance of joining the army and entering the Party. In addition, whenever there is a political campaign, this individual might easily become the target of attack and criticism.

¹⁴⁸Fr. Ding was the Chairman of the Jilin CPCA. Bishop Wang was the Vice-Chairman.

chastisement by other clergymen. According to the source, local RAB officials refused to intervene, because they thought that it was a disciplinary matter within the Chinese Church and not a political or social matter under the civil authority.¹⁴⁹

It seems that the Government exercises its authority to intervene in ecclesiastical affairs whenever the public manifestation of Catholic faith might jeopardize the social and the political interest of the Chinese Government. The case of Bishop Deng's appointment is a good example. The Chinese Church seems ^{to} enjoy some freedom to control its own affairs whenever the religious issue in question falls within the acceptable social and political framework. The case of Fr. Ding and Bishop Wang illustrates the freedom the Chinese Church can exercise.

The realization of the independence of the Chinese Church seemed to take different forms in different contexts. In the context of the Universal Church, its independence was actualized through the building of an independent hierarchy, a separate entity accountable to no foreign authority. In the Chinese social context, the Chinese Church was not totally independent from the authority of the Chinese Government.^F The Chinese Church, like all other Chinese social organizations, has to follow the directives of the civil authority for the collective interest of the nation. It has a certain degree of independence to administer its ecclesiastical affairs as long as the affairs fall within the political realm accepted by the Government, and do not conflict with the interests of the civil authority.

¹⁴⁹"La situation actuelle des chrétiens en Chine," p.30.

3. Regulated Church Activities

To enable the Chinese Church to function in a regulated manner under the auspices of the civil authority, some specific ecclesiastical regulations and appeals have been issued by Chinese Church leaders.¹⁵⁰ These regulations and appeals are meant to demonstrate the law-abiding nature of Chinese Catholics. They are discussed as follows: i. Regulations to strengthen the ecclesiastical control, and ii. Appeals to promote Catholic support of the Government.

i. Regulations to strengthen ecclesiastical control

The government-recognized ecclesiastical authorities, namely the NAC and the CBC, were supposed to regulate, to control and to conduct all Catholic activities. Technically speaking, there should be no Catholic activities allowed other than those approved by the NAC and the CBC. It is assumed that Catholic activities outside of the jurisdiction of the NAC and the CBC would not be tolerated by the Government.

However, it is generally agreed that there were many Catholic activities conducted under the authority of Rome in China in 1979. An order entitled: Facultates et privilegia sacerdotibus fidelibusque in territoria

¹⁵⁰For example, see CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 52; or CCC, no. 3 (March 1981): 17f. Other religious groups issued their respective regulations, for example, see the "Henan Patriotic Christian Covenant," or the "Ningbo Regional Christian Common Covenant" in Jonathan Chao ed., Chinese Communist Policy Towards Christianity (Hong Kong: Chinese Church Research Center, 1983), (c), pp. 321-326.

sinarum degentibus concessa his perdurantibus circumstantiis¹⁵¹ (Faculties and Privileges Granted to Clergy and Laymen Who Reside in China under Difficult Circumstances) was issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (formerly known as Propaganda Fide) in December 1978. Through this order, Rome grants special ecclesiastical privileges to Chinese Catholics to conduct Catholic activities under emergency and clandestine situations.

The celebration of mass is allowed without proper vestments, without grape wine or unleaven bread, without lighting the candles, without chalice,¹⁵² and with a shortened liturgical version.¹⁵³ Priests are allowed to give Extreme Unction and Confirmation without the consecrated oil¹⁵⁴ and approval from the bishop.¹⁵⁵ They are even allowed to exercise their priestly faculties without regard to diocesan boundaries and without the supervision of any bishop.¹⁵⁶ Even lectors and acolytes are allowed to officiate at matrimony.¹⁵⁷ All these regulations seem to address an ecclesiastical environment that is in the state of persecution with no visible structure and

¹⁵¹Propaganda Fide, Facultates et privilegia sacerdotibus fidelibusque in territorio sinarum degentibus concessa his perdurantibus circumstantiis, Prot. N. 3242/78, (Hong Kong: Catholic Central Office, 1979). Hereafter referred to as Facultates. This decree was translated into Chinese by the Catholic Truth Society in Hong Kong, and had since been distributed in China. See Appendix II for the Latin text.

¹⁵²Ibid., III/a, p. 2.

¹⁵³Ibid., III/b, p. 2.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., V/a, p. 4.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., II/a, p. 1.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., IV/a, p. 3.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., VI/c, p. 5.

no legitimate ordinary.¹⁵⁸

The Facultates circulated in the Chinese Church in 1979, one year before the formation of the NAC and the CBC. As the NAC and the CBC began to take shape, divisions occurred between Catholics who submitted to the authority of the Facultates and those who followed the newly formed Chinese hierarchy. Some overseas Catholics also noticed the divided situation and tried to discourage the continued distribution of the Facultates to China.¹⁵⁹

It is understood that one of the conditions, which the Chinese Church has to fulfill in exchange for its right to give public expression to the Catholic faith, is that all Catholic activities must be conducted in a regulated manner with approval from the proper authority. Because of the Facultates and other subsequent directives issued by Rome, there were many organized ecclesiastical activities existing outside the control of the newly formed Chinese Church hierarchy.¹⁶⁰

These "unauthorized" activities¹⁶¹ not only seriously challenged the

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p. 1. This order specifically emphasizes the "episcopo legitimo." It seems that the order does not recognize the ecclesiastical status and authority of the Government-recognized Chinese Independent Bishops consecrated without permission from Rome.

¹⁵⁹Father John Tong, director of the Holy Spirit Study Center, told this author that their Center recommended that the Hong Kong Diocese no longer distribute the booklet Facultates in China. Personal conversation, August 1983, Hong Kong.

¹⁶⁰For example, a pilgrimage took place in Sheshan during March 1980, see RCL 10 (Spring 1982): 91-100; or the Pingyan Church Affairs Synod in Spring 1980 convened by a bishop [probably Msgr. Francesco Wang, the Rome-appointed Vicar General of Wenzhou, cf. AP (1982), p. 648] who was not recognized by the CPCA, see CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28.

¹⁶¹This term is used from the perspective of the Chinese Church. The activities are unauthorized by the Chinese Church, but not necessarily unauthorized by Rome.

authority of the Chinese Church hierarchy, but also threatened its stability and credibility within Chinese society. If the Government saw that there were still many Catholic activities which were associated with foreign forces (the Vatican) and not satisfactorily controlled by Chinese Church officials, the Government could easily use these foreign-related activities as excuses to accuse the Chinese Church of harboring potentially counterrevolutionary elements. The Government might even further restrict the meager religious freedom that the Chinese Church had been enjoying so far.

Initially, the NAC and the CBC seemed to be slow in protesting against these activities authorized by Rome. In 1980, there were only two regulations issued by the Chinese Church to control Catholic activities.¹⁶² These two regulations basically tried to convey the point that all clergy, be they Chinese or foreign, had to seek permission from the recognized diocesan bishop or ordinary before they could administer sacraments and conduct evangelistic work. Through these two regulations, the authority of Chinese Independent Bishops, whose episcopal authority was not recognized by Rome, was confirmed. They were implemented in some regional CACs.¹⁶³

In early 1981, Vicar General Wang Zicheng published an article entitled: "Some Truths Concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist" in the national Catholic journal.¹⁶⁴ He directly points out that the liturgical practices of the Facultates are improper and are contrary to Catholic tradition. He argues that if Eucharist is celebrated without grape wine and

¹⁶²CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 52.

¹⁶³Hebei, p. 48.

¹⁶⁴CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), pp. 21f.

unleaven bread, it would affect the efficacy of the sacrament in such a way that the Eucharist would not become the true body and blood of Christ. Wang's argument seems to reflect the dissatisfaction of Chinese Church leaders towards unauthorized activities.

Immediately after the episcopal appointment of Dominic Deng by the Pope, the Chinese Church protested strongly against Rome. To counteract Rome's various orders, five explicit regulations were issued:¹⁶⁵ a. No member of the clergy is allowed to alter the liturgy without prior approval from the NAC and the CBC, b. No member of the clergy may administer sacrament without approval from the local ecclesiastical authority, c. All members of the clergy must minister within the locality prescribed by the recognized diocesan bishop or ordinary, d. All consecrations and ordinations must receive prior approval from the CAC and records must be kept at the NAC and the CBC, and e. Clergy who commit civil crime will lose their ecclesiastical faculties.

The issuing of these regulations suggests that the Chinese Church could no longer tolerate unauthorized activities, especially when they were connected with Rome. These regulations seem intended to emphasize the ecclesiastical authority of the Chinese Church and to show the Government that the Chinese Church had made an effort to control its activities.

Based on these regulations, church activities were differentiated into two types: authorized and unauthorized activities. Authorized activities were the activities which were approved and controlled by Chinese Church leaders. They were to be protected, and not to be interfered with by the Government. The unauthorized activities were the activities which were not approved by

¹⁶⁵ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981): 17f.

Chinese Church leaders. They were to be discouraged and even prohibited.

Furthermore, Chinese Church leaders attempted to place unauthorized activities outside the scope of ecclesiastical responsibility. For example, Bishop Yang Gaojian referred to Rome loyalist Catholics as "counterrevolutionary and criminal elements who don the outer garb of religion."¹⁶⁶ He requested the Government to step in and deal with these Catholics. Hence, unauthorized Catholic activities were no longer considered to be an ecclesiastical matter, but a civil matter handled by the Government. This categorizing of Catholic activities would prevent the Government from using unauthorized Catholic activities as excuses to attack the Chinese Church.

These regulations may be seen as warnings to discourage Catholics from conducting unauthorized activities rather than a rigid policy to be implemented in the Chinese Church. Since the efficacy of these regulations depended on one's subjective readiness to accept the Chinese Church hierarchy as the proper ecclesiastical authority, these regulations would have no effect on those who submitted to Rome's authority. Therefore, it is logical to assume that Catholics who conducted unauthorized activities would not consider themselves to be bound by these regulations. Furthermore, since unauthorized activities were disciplined by civil authority, it would be up to the civil, not ecclesiastical, authority to stop them.

ii. General appeals to promote Catholic support of the Government

To respond to certain issues, such as the One Child Policy, the Four Modernizations, the prohibition against transmitting the faith to children,

¹⁶⁶ SCMP (HK), 13 June 1981.

Chinese Church leaders generally appealed to Catholics to support the Government's policies. No particular regulations were set up for believers. It was up to them to adjust their activities voluntarily to suit the national goals.

The general appeal of the Chinese Church received different responses from different regions. For example, the policy of prohibiting religious education to children was repeatedly emphasized by the Government¹⁶⁷ and was explicitly stated in the CCP's Central Document.¹⁶⁸ The initial response^a of the Chinese Church was a strong appeal at regional CAC meeting in 1980.¹⁶⁹ In some regions, such as the provinces of Hebei¹⁷⁰ and Hunan,¹⁷¹ and cities such

¹⁶⁷ Sun Xinhua et. al. ed., Talks on Religion, second edition (Zhejiang: Zhejiang People's Press) (c), p. 126.

¹⁶⁸ Document no. 19, section IV.

¹⁶⁹ Hebei, p. 48. In as early as 1958, some dioceses had modified Catholic practices to suit the Government's policy. For example, Catholics in the Liaoning Province had abolished pedobaptism, major feast days, and church law in marriage. These modifications took place in the context of the catastrophic Great Leap Forward campaign when the whole nation was engaged into a fanatic drive for agricultural and industrial productions. These modifications were isolated rather than national responses from the Chinese Church; see Liaoning Ribao, 28 December 1958. There is no evidence to suggest that these modifications had been rigidly implemented for any prolonged period of time.

¹⁷⁰ Hebei, p. 48.

¹⁷¹ Catholics in rural Honan called these baptisms of their children "surrogate baptism." See Bridge, no. 10 (March/April 1985), p. 10.

as Kaifeng,¹⁷² Guangzhou,¹⁷³ Beijing,¹⁷⁴ Nanjing,¹⁷⁵, it was reported that there were infant baptisms and religious education for children. The CAC instructions were evidently not followed and the Chinese Church's appeal was generally ignored.

However, the Diocese of Shanghai took a different approach. Fr. Joseph Ai told a foreign priest that they did not baptize infants except those in danger of death.¹⁷⁶ Fr. Shen Baozhi, also of Shanghai, told some visitors that not baptizing anyone under 18 years of age was not a matter of a Government regulation but a safe measure to ensure that young people clearly know the meaning of the Catholic faith before joining the Church.¹⁷⁷ The Diocese of Shanghai followed this policy.

It is fair to say that the Chinese Church was reluctant to comply to the Government's religious policy on the prohibition of propagating faith to children. The reluctance might be the reason why there was no national regulation until the mid-1983.¹⁷⁸ This regulation did not enjoy wide publicity, as it was never published in the national Catholic journals. It seems that the Chinese Church deliberately de-emphasized this issue and did not implement this regulation seriously.

¹⁷²CSPB, no. 7 (December 1981), p. 5.

¹⁷³Far East Economic Review, 20 December 1983.

¹⁷⁴CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 14.

¹⁷⁵CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 64; cf. YIE, no. 34 (March/April 1983), p. 9.

¹⁷⁶CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 64.

¹⁷⁷SCMP (HK), 9 May 1983.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

C. THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

Since the formation of the People's Republic of China, there has been an intense conflict between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government. Some scholars interpret this conflict from a historical perspective as the traditional refusal of the Chinese Government to tolerate any form of organized religion.¹⁷⁹ Some explain it from a political perspective by reasoning that the conflict is due to the nature of Communist ideology.¹⁸⁰ Still others ascribe the cause to the inflexibility of Sino-Vatican diplomacy.¹⁸¹ While appreciating the merits of these interpretations, this author suggests that the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church is also a major factor contributing to this conflict.

This thesis is based on the point that there is a clear ecclesiological difference in the understanding of the Church-State relationship between the 1950s and the 1979-1983 period. The 1950's were characterized by the direct confrontation between Church and State, while in the later period the Chinese Church clearly searched for a modus vivendi. This led the Chinese Church to formulate a new ecclesial self-understanding as the basis for a new harmonious relationship with the Government, different from the conflictual situation of the 1950s. 2

¹⁷⁹For example, see E.O. Hanson, Catholic Policy in China and Korea (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1980).

¹⁸⁰Two examples are T. Hang's Die Katholische Kirche im chinesischen Raum: Geschichte und Gegenwart (München: Pustet, 1963), and Ladany's The Catholic Church in China: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (Hong Kong: CNA, 1975).

¹⁸¹Such as Wei, *passim*.

This section examines the evolution in the Chinese Church's theological understanding of the relationship between Church and State. It highlights some theological questions emerging from the unique experience of the Chinese Church. This section falls into three parts, 1. The Ecclesiology of the Chinese Church (1949-1966): The Church Against China, 2. Need for a New Vision of the Church (1979-1983): The Church of China, and 3. Further Theological Implications.

1. The Ecclesiology of the Chinese Church (1949-1966):
The Church against China

This subsection discusses how the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church (1949-1966), with its various implications, led to serious conflicts between Church and Government. The scope of this discussion is restricted to a particular historical, theological and social context, namely, the Catholic Church in China during the 1950s and 1960s.

The conflict between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government seems to be a clash between two opposing worldviews shaped by their own ideological and historical background. In the 1950s, the Chinese Government, in accord with Communist ideology and the historical foreign image of the Chinese Catholic Church, regarded the Chinese Church as a foreign, aggressive, and hostile institution challenging the sovereignty of the nation.¹⁸² Policies dealing with the Chinese Church were then developed in light of this view.

¹⁸²For example, see Tien, *passim*.

The Chinese Church also possessed a definite view of the Church and State relationship. The ecclesiology, underlying its responses to the secular power, was a cause of serious conflict with the Government policy on the Chinese Catholic Church. This subsection will show this by scanning as follows: i. conflictual understandings of the Church-State relationship, and ii. their outdated contextual presuppositions.

i. Conflictual understanding of the Church and State relationship

Theological thoughts were transmitted to the Chinese Church by missionaries, and were usually one or two decades behind the latest theological developments in the West. Since the Chinese Church was cut off from the West in the early 1950s, it had no theological exposure to theological views later than 1950. Theology developed in the 1960s, i.e., Vatican II, had no influence upon the Chinese Church, at least not until the last few years. Therefore, it is fair to assume that the predominant theological thinking of the Chinese Church from 1949 to 1966 reflects those views commonly accepted during the 1930s and the 1940s in the West.

The ecclesiology of the Chinese Church of the 1950s was still deeply influenced by the "Institutional Model"¹⁸³ which dominated the international Catholic scene during the 1930s and the 1940s. This Institutional Model was developed after the Counter-Reformation, especially in the nineteenth century, and had reached a climax during the First Vatican council.¹⁸⁴ Part of this ecclesiology is a specific understanding of the relationship between the Church

¹⁸³Dulles, Models of the Church (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Book, 1978), p. 39.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., p. 41.

and State which had an immediate bearing on the conflict between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government.

First, one of the characteristics of this ecclesiology is that the Church regards itself as a "perfect society" as a Vatican I document states: "The Church is not part, nor member, of any other society and is not mingled in any way with any other society. It is so perfect that it is distinct of all human society and stands above it."¹⁸⁵

This image of a "perfect society" leads the Church to view the Church and State relationship as a two-leveled structure with the Church standing on the higher level and the world standing underneath the Church. The Church is, therefore, a supranational institution accountable to no secular jurisdiction. In theory, it is not subject to the secular domination nor is it willing to become part of the secular structure.

In the 1950s, the Chinese Church held this view of the Church and State relationship.¹⁸⁶ When the Government accused the Chinese Church of being an organization controlled by foreigners and serving the interest of the Western powers, the Chinese Church defended itself as a supranational organization which was subjected to no earthly domination.¹⁸⁷ When the Government also accused the Chinese Church of being alienated from Chinese society, and

¹⁸⁵J. Neuner and H. Roos, The Teaching of The Catholic Church (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967), pp. 213f.

¹⁸⁶Although the ecclesiological concept of the "Mystical Body" was introduced to the Chinese Church in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this ecclesiology seemed to have had no affect on the conflict between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government. Therefore, the predominant ecclesiology of the Chinese Church was still the Institutional Model.

¹⁸⁷For example, see the apologetical statement made by the bishops in China in the early 50's, "Declaration of Principles" in CMBA 3 (4) (May 1951): 384-386.

demanding that it be integrated into the social context, the Chinese Church, again based on this ecclesiological view, refused to be associated with any secular power.¹⁸⁸

It was very difficult for the pragmatic, materialistic and nationalistic-minded Chinese officials to comprehend the metaphysical vision of the Chinese Church as a "perfect society." The Chinese officials naturally interpreted the Chinese Church's denial of its national identity, alienation from its society, and defiance of the Government's wishes, as excuses to disguise its unpatriotic attitude.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, this ecclesiological view of a "perfect society" directly contradicted the nationalistic desire of the Chinese Government.

Secondly, the Institutional Model of the Church emphasizes the hierarchical concept of authority.¹⁹⁰ This emphasis is also in conflict with the Chinese Government's social policy. This hierarchical concept of authority places the Roman Pontiff at the apex of the Church hierarchy which calls for absolute loyalty from believers in religious matters. Like the pledge of loyalty to a king as the sign of a citizen's patriotism, loyalty to the Pope is the manifestation of fidelity to the Catholic Church.

Under this ecclesiological concept, Chinese Catholics were taught to relate to the Pope as they were expected to relate to the Church and to

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ For the Government's reaction to the defense of the Catholic Church, see J. Schlütte, Die Katholische Chinamission im Spiegel der rotchinesischen Presse, Missionswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Texte, 21, (Münster, Wesfalen: Aschendorff, 1957).

¹⁹⁰ See Dulles, pp, 43f.

Christ.¹⁹¹ Disobeying the religious authority of the Pope meant disobeying Christ. Loyalty to Catholicism was inseparable from loyalty to the Pope. Pius XII told Chinese Catholics that, " . . . it would be entirely essential that your Christian community, if it desires to form part of the Society divinely founded by Our Redeemer, be subject in all things to the Sovereign Pontiff, the Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth."¹⁹²

This demand of absolute obedience to the Pope caused serious problems between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government. Some orders issued by the Pope, such as the decree prohibiting all Catholics from supporting Communist organizations,¹⁹³ were viewed by the Church as touching purely religious matters. However, the Government interpreted these orders as touching political matters and saw them as a political challenge from the Church. Chinese Catholics were caught in a dilemma: should they submit to papal authority or obey the Government's order?

Thirdly, this Institutional Model has a strong sense of corporate identity,¹⁹⁴ and is incompatible with the Chinese Government's vision of a socialist society. This corporate identity promotes a high degree of institutional loyalty. The institutional loyalty encourages all its members to strive towards the common goal of becoming one homogeneous unit.

With the strong emphasis on corporate identity, Chinese Catholics were instructed to protect the Church from all attacks in order to preserve the

¹⁹¹CMBA 3 (4) (May 1951): 384.

¹⁹²"Ad Sinarum gentes," encyclical letter by Pius XII, in AAS 47 (1954): 5-14.

¹⁹³AAS 41 (1949): 334.

¹⁹⁴Dulles, pp. 47f.

Catholic identity which was the most sacred symbol of their faith. They were also expected to exhibit a strong loyalty to the Church.

As a regime that is proud of its socialist achievement and its nationalistic identity, the Chinese Government finds it difficult to accept that its citizens have a corporate identity other than the Chinese national identity. It would be even more difficult for the Government to accept that a social organization, such as the Chinese Catholic Church, would compete with it for the loyalty of its citizens. The Government would naturally speculate that the Chinese Church deliberately demands loyalty from its believers in order to challenge the authority of the Government.

From the above discussion it is obvious that the ecclesiological characteristics tied with the Institutional Model--the supranational dimension of the Church as a "perfect society," absolute submission to the Papal authority, and the ecclesiastical identity of Chinese Catholics--were totally irreconcilable with the social policy of the Chinese Government. This ecclesiology was an immediate source of conflict between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government during the 1950s.

ii. Outdated contextual presuppositions

Theology is a product of its context. It not only reflects, but also presupposes, this context. Likewise, the Institutional Model of the Church is a product belonging to a particular social, political, cultural and historical setting which presupposes a certain view of the Church and State relationship. Church and State conflict is likely to take place if this ecclesiology is applied to a context which is radically different from the one in which it was produced. The Church and State conflict in China during the 1950s can also be seen from this vantage point.

Firstly, the Institutional Model of the Church presumes a monolithic society. Before the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church was basically an Europocentric Church. It developed a whole ecclesiastical system with elements adopted from European society. Within the familiar social setting of Europe, the Church could establish an ecclesiastical structure which was similar to its surrounding social setting. It is in this social environment that the Institutional Model of the Church originated.

A monolithic worldview sees everything as static¹⁹⁵ so that every principle can be applied universally. Based on this worldview, the Church would naturally see universality as the manifestation of Catholicism in a uniform fashion by all churches in all areas, regardless of social, political and cultural factors.

As missionaries propagated the Catholic faith to other cultural settings, they also introduced the ecclesiastical structure, which was developed in the West, as the only ecclesiastical norm. Under the pretext of universality, Catholics in missionary territories were required to conform to this single ecclesiastical system. This resulted in the universal expression of a uniform ecclesiastical norm.

Conflict between Church and State naturally arises when Catholicism is introduced to places where this "universal" expression is seen as a foreignism incompatible with the local society. It can be further escalated if the local people possess deep xenophobia and strong nationalistic sentiment. It can also be worse if foreignism is associated with evil, such as is the case in contemporary China where foreignism and colonialism are closely associated.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., p. 44.

It is interesting to note that it was actually this "foreignness" and not its theological self-understanding that the Chinese Government held against the Chinese Church. However, based on the static worldview of the Institutional Model, the Chinese Church interpreted the Government's objection as an attack on the Catholic doctrine of universality. These different interpretations which led to conflicts between Church and State are the result of different worldviews: a monolithic society versus a pluralistic world.

Secondly, the Institutional Model of the Church suggests a triumphalistic view of the Church in society.¹⁹⁶ The Church is given a venerable status not subject to any civil authority. It is considered to be the leader and the judge of the secular world, and not vice versa. It also expects itself to possess total autonomy and sovereignty in conducting its affairs.

Such a triumphalistic view of the Church seems to be deeply rooted in the historical development of the Church in Europe. Ever since the time of Constantine, the Church has been a powerful institution. It is so powerful that it is probably one of the most important factors in shaping the history of the Western World. Surely such a powerful institution is not ignored but highly respected by all Western civil authorities. The Church, therefore, traditionally process great authority and autonomy in society. In the mind of Catholic leaders, possess sovereignty and autonomy in the conduct of ecclesiastical affairs is almost be a taken-for-granted right.

In Chinese society, religious groups seem to enjoy far less prestige than their western counterparts. Historically speaking, religious

¹⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 44f.

organizations have seldom become influential political forces that bear major and prolonged political impact.¹⁹⁷ In fact, monarchs in China did not require endorsement nor approval from religious institutions to legitimize their rule. Furthermore, it is also a historical reality that Chinese civil authorities have always exercised control over religious activities.¹⁹⁸ Religious groups seem to have no right of their own within the context of Chinese society. They are treated as a powerless group subject to the mercy of the civil authority.

Conflict arose as the Chinese Church, with its triumphalistic worldview, naively expected the Chinese Government to behave like the western civil authorities in granting the Church the right to exist autonomously. However, the Chinese Government traditionally does not grant any sovereignty to religious groups, much less to a group strongly associated with the colonialism that had once exploited China.

Thirdly, this ecclesiology seems to presuppose an apolitical Church. When the Church considers itself as a "perfect society," it suggests that the Church does not intend to side with any earthly government, but rather to maintain an apolitical status. Through its experience in Europe, the Church has learned to take an apolitical stand as the key to its survival. Otherwise, the Church can easily fall a prey to some ambitious political power.

In the Chinese context, the apolitical stand is interpreted as an antagonistic stance toward the Chinese Government. After the Liberation, there is only one major political party--CCP, one Government that rules over China--PRC, and one national goal--to build a socialist China. From the perspective

¹⁹⁷Yang, pp. 301-353.

¹⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 180-217.

of the Chinese Government, all citizens are expected to participate fully in the Government's social programs, and to support fully the current political system. Therefore, political neutrality is not a virtue but an antisocial crime. Anyone who does not politically support the Government is considered unpatriotic.

Obviously, the Chinese Church, based on the ecclesiological concept of an apolitical "perfect society," was not very keen to side with the civil authority, much less to support the Chinese Government whose atheistic ideology was in contradiction to Catholic beliefs. Logically, it did not support the Chinese Government's involvement in the Korean War, and did not help in the building of the Chinese socialist society.¹⁹⁹

The conflict between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government began to heighten when the apolitical stand of the Chinese Church was interpreted, by the Government as unpatriotic. The Chinese Church was then accused of being an enemy of the Government which conducted illegal activities under the cloak of religion.²⁰⁰ This conflict is in fact a perfect example of different understandings of the social function of religion in different cultural and political contexts.

It has been seen that the Institutional Model implies a certain view of the relationship between Church and State, deeply influenced by the worldview

¹⁹⁹For example, see the order (in Latin) from Bishop Jean de Vienne of Tianjian prohibiting Catholics from joining the Chinese Army or attending the Government operated schools, in Renmin Ribao, 29 October 1951; or Bishop Gong of Shanghai's order in T. Chu, "Christianity in China Today," in CO, no. 25 & 26 (May and July 1981), p. 9.

²⁰⁰For example, see "Case of Counterrevolutionary Activities under the Cover of Catholic Church Discovered in Xianxian, Hebei," in Renmin Ribao, 7 September 1953; or "The Sinful Catholic Central Bureau," in Renmin Ribao, 5 July 1951.

and the social context of the nineteenth century Europe. Within this context, the Church's raison d'être for existence is never questioned. With the triumphalistic view of the Church, it is logical for the Church to regard its existence in the world as a divine right. Furthermore, the Church not only exists, but exists above all civil structures.

However, when this ecclesiological model was applied in the post-Liberation Chinese society, it met a serious challenge. From the perspective of the Communist Chinese Government, the Chinese Church actually had very little ontological basis to exist in China other than the pragmatic cause of the United Front Policy. Hence all the former glory and prestige which the Church had enjoyed in the past was no longer available in the new Chinese social context. The Church and State conflicts arose as the Chinese Church struggled for its rights in Chinese society on the basis of an ecclesiology developed in a different context.

Therefore, we may conclude that the Church and State conflict of the Chinese Church, especially from 1949 to 1966, seems to have been a conflict between two different worldviews: a worldview that regarded the Church as having a triumphal right to exist in society versus a worldview that considered the Church to have no sovereign right of existence in society. During the 1950s, the Chinese Church, on the basis of the former worldview, vigorously defended its divinely bestowed power and did not submit to the civil authority. The Chinese Government, with the latter worldview, considered the Chinese Church a recalcitrant assembly that dared to reject the sovereign authority of the Government.

2. Need for a New Vision of the Church (1979-1983): The Church of China

The new relationship which developed between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government between 1979 and 1983, as it was shown in this chapter, enabled the Chinese Church to identify itself as a true member of Chinese society. This development also suggests that during this same period the Chinese Church came to a new theological understanding of the relationship between Church and State. The following pages describe the main features of this new ecclesiology which is obviously different from the one that dominated the 1950s. It is discussed as follows, i. Powerless church, ii. People's church, and iii. Catholic church.

i. Powerless church

Before the Liberation, China was heavily influenced by foreign powers. The Chinese Church, in various foreign spheres of influence, shared privileges similar to those given to foreigners in China. For example, through foreign missionaries, the Chinese Church could establish schools with the educational systems of Germany, France, Italy, Spain or America. Missionaries paid little attention to the Chinese interest in a national educational system. The Chinese Church could also conduct its ecclesiastical activities in Foreign Concession areas immune from the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government. Thus, with the backing of the foreign powers, the Chinese Church was a powerful institution enjoying many privileges.

After the Liberation, all the privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China were stripped away. It was a shocking experience for the Chinese Church. It was suddenly demoted from its former prestigious status to a powerless one totally dependent on the mercy of the civil authority. Even the ecclesiastical

sovereignty, which was traditionally claimed by the Church, disappeared as the Chinese Church entered into a new social reality.

One has to realize that in China, all power is centralized in the Government. Within the Government, the power is concentrated at the apex of the CCP--the Politburo. Then this political power descends to cadres of various levels. It can be said that all organizations and individuals in China, except the CCP and its members, are in a state of powerlessness unless the power is delegated to them from the Government.

Like any other organization, such as professional associations, or cultural groups, religious organizations in China receive no special privilege and cannot operate independently from the control of the Government. Therefore, the nonautonomous nature of the Chinese Catholic Church is not exceptional, but rather typical.

After the Liberation, the Chinese Church became a "powerless" church, and could claim no extraordinary right. It had to face its survival in this new Chinese society without protection from any foreign power. The new condition for its survival was a total submission to the leadership of the Government. It had to obey every Governmental demand, to sacrifice some of its traditional faith and practices, and to place the Government's interests above its ecclesiastical agenda.

This "powerlessness" stimulated the Chinese Church to search for a new ecclesiological identity in Chinese society. Its right to existence was no longer taken for granted but had to be earned by its own merits in the Chinese social context. The Chinese Church found a new role as being a practical contributor to society, a loyal supporter of the nation, a faithful follower of the Government's leadership, and a servant to society.

Ironically, the "powerlessness" of the Chinese Church has become its source of strength. Through its powerlessness, the Chinese Church has developed new strength, patience, tolerance, and diligence to transform itself into a worthy member acceptable to Chinese society. This strength has also bonded the Chinese Church with Chinese society, so that the Chinese Church can establish a new form of presence in a hostile context where Christianity is dispensable.²⁰¹

ii. People's church

The Chinese Church traditionally has been perceived by the Chinese people as a foreign institution grafted on to China. The church buildings were replicas of churches in Europe; the vestments and languages were Occidental; the ecclesiastical structures were modelled after systems that originated in Medieval Europe; the doctrines were formulated according to western philosophical systems; and the leadership was held mainly by foreigners.

The Chinese Church had its own interests and concerns which were different from the interests and concerns of Chinese society. Very often, the Chinese Church seemed to strive for the advance of foreign interests in China rather than to struggle alongside the Chinese for the advance of their interests. For example, the Chinese Church remained a neutral bystander while the whole nation defended its sovereignty against the Japanese invasion during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Although there were some exceptions, such as the personal support given to the Chinese Government by the Belgian priest

²⁰¹R.J. Schreiter proposed a similar theological theme--theology of presence--for the Chinese Church, in his article "A Theology of Christian Presence in a Secular Society," in CN 24 (Winter 1985-86): 378-382.

Fr. V. Lebbe, these actions represented the views of a minority within the Chinese Church and were repudiated by missionary leaders.²⁰²

The Chinese Church also operated many charitable organizations, such as hospitals, schools, and orphanages. The motive behind these charitable works seemed to be more compassion for the needy in general than a patriotic spirit and a sense of obligation to Chinese society. For example, the church-operated schools prohibited the promotion of Chinese nationalism when a national consciousness was badly needed in Chinese society. All these things seem to suggest that the Chinese Church remained an outsider to Chinese society more preoccupied with its own interests than concerned about the genuine interests and needs of the Chinese people.

After the establishment of the PRC, Chinese society became a collective and centralized society. Individual interests were encouraged to give way to the goals advocated by the Government. Every member of the Chinese society was expected to fulfill the national goal. Likewise, the Chinese Church had to pay careful attention to the common concerns and interests of the nation, and to treat these concerns as an ecclesiastical priority. Failure to do so was interpreted as an antisocial action.

Contrary to the past, the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983 responded positively to the needs of the nation. The interest of Chinese society became the interest of the Chinese Church. For example, the Chinese Church actively participated in the realization of the Four Modernizations, as well as other

²⁰²For a critical evaluation of the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Chinese society prior to the Liberation, see G.H. Dunne, "The Missionary in China: Past, Present, Future," in *AJ* 78 (Autumn 1973): 9-42. For a biography of Lebbe, see L. Levaux, *Le Père Lebbe, apôtre de la Chine moderne (1877-1940)* (Bruxelles: Editions universitaires, 1948).

social programs. It seemed to share the same national aspirations and burdens as the Chinese people, to identify itself with the Chinese society, and to regard itself as one of the members of this society. In reality, the Chinese Church became the people's church, a church that shared the common concerns of society and identified itself with the population.²⁰³

iii. Catholic church

The Chinese Church's claim of independence vis-à-vis the Roman Curia was seen by many commentators as a device to break away from the Roman Catholic communion. However, the evidence suggests the contrary. In spite of the pressure from the Government, the Chinese Church vigorously defends its identity as a member of the Roman Catholic Church.

In relation to certain controversial doctrinal stands, such as the challenge of papal primacy, the Chinese Church seems to have made a deliberate effort to avoid direct confrontation with these issues. For example, official publications seem to consciously avoid commenting on the rejection of the Pope as the religious leader of Catholicism. Instead, these publications try to underline that the Chinese Church has rejected only the political, and not the religious dimension of Rome. In this way, they hope that they can both fulfill the Government's political demand, and justify their claim to Roman Catholicity.

In some situations when the Chinese Church has apparently had to compromise in faith and doctrine in order to comply to a Government demand, such as the prohibition of pedobaptism, the One-Child Policy, or Birth Control,

²⁰³ On the search of self identity of the Chinese Christian in the PRC, see F.J. Woo, "The Political Challenge of China to Western Christianity and Chinese Religion," in CN 23 (Winter 1984-85): 327f.

the Chinese Church seems to have complied in word but not necessarily in deed. In this manner, it has been able to maintain a good relationship with the Government, yet still claims to maintain Roman Catholic orthodox practices.

If the Chinese Church wanted to depart from Roman Catholic tradition and to start a schismatic church in rebellion against Roman Catholicism, it could easily have used any theological controversy, i.e. pedobaptism, as a reason to declare its total independence. However, despite its unique and difficult situation, the Chinese Church has tried to preserve the cumbersome Roman Catholic tradition as much as possible, to defend vigorously its Roman Catholicity, and to identify itself as an authentic Roman Catholic Church in the Chinese social context.

In order to adjust itself to the new social and political context, the Chinese Church, during the period of 1979 to 1983, developed new ecclesial identities: it became a powerless church, a people's church, and it remained Catholic. These ecclesial identities enabled the Chinese Church to become an integral part of Chinese society, and to retain a strong Roman Catholic presence in China.²⁰⁴

3. Further Theological Implications

The Chinese Church's effort to develop a new ecclesial identity, between 1979 and 1983, not only affects the understanding of its own relationships to the Chinese Government, but also raises many theological questions pertinent to the Universal Church. This subsection intends to

²⁰⁴Cf. Schreiter, "A Theology of Christian Presence," pp. 381f.



highlight some of these issues which will be discussed in detail in the last chapter.

1. The Chinese Church experience: a contextual problem

The experience of the Chinese Church suggests that adherence to the Institutional Model of a church leads almost automatically to the assumption of a position antagonistic to the Chinese Government. This ecclesiological model, as it has been seen, proposes a particular understanding of the relationship between Church and State stressing the sovereignty and the independence of a local church with no submission to any civil authority. Derived from the particular sociopolitical and cultural context of nineteenth century Europe, where the Church enjoyed a very prestigious role in society, this church model functioned very well in Europe and in the European colonies. But outside this European and colonial context, this Institutional Model runs into serious problems.

This was the case in China. After the 1949 Liberation, one sees a new society emerging which vigorously rejects colonialism and foreignism and which promotes strong nationalism and collectivism. In addition to all this, the new Chinese society adopts an atheistic ideology! Nothing could be further away from the nineteenth century European context in which this Institutional Model of a church had flourished.

This particular experience of the Chinese Church raises an important ecclesiological issue: the need for contextual ecclesiologies which reflect the new structures of mankind all over the world, especially in the post-colonial era. Without these contextual ecclesiologies, the Church is in great danger of losing its relevancy and credibility. Its own survival is at stake here!



ii. Need for contextual ecclesiology

The ecclesial experience of the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983 indicates that the development of a contextual ecclesiology is absolutely necessary for the survival of a faith community in a particular sociopolitical context. The Chinese Church has demonstrated that it has transformed itself from a "perfect society" to a powerless church, from a hierarchical church to a people's church, and from a church alienated from society to a church integrated into society. This conversion has enabled the Chinese Church to secure a solid place in Chinese society.

This particular ecclesial conversion sets an encouraging example for other churches, especially for those in the Third World. Churches in the Third world face sociopolitical challenges similar to those the Chinese Church has faced, challenges such as socialism, Communism, national independence, decolonialism, and anti-Western sentiment. All these sociopolitical challenges push local churches to develop a new ecclesial identity, especially in the places where it continues to remain heavily dependent on foreign missionary interventions. Thus, the ecclesial conversion of the Chinese Church can become an ecclesiological paradigm for other churches in the Third World.²⁰⁵

iii. Other theological questions raised

However, this ecclesial conversion also leads to many crucial theological issues which need to be addressed. When a local church searches for a relevant ecclesial identity in a particular sociopolitical and cultural

²⁰⁵Based on the experience of the Chinese Church, J.E. Limman proposes a theology of the local church, see "Toward a Theology of a Local Church," in CN 22 (Winter 1983-84): 275-278. Similar trends of ecclesiological development can be seen elsewhere in the World, see V.J. Donavan, Christianity Rediscovered (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1978), or W. Bühlmann, The Coming of the Third Church,

context, to what extent does it affect its membership in the Roman Catholic communion? What are the basic characteristics which a local church must possess in order to be part of the Roman Catholic communion? Who defines these criteria?

If it happens that some of these ecclesial characteristics are in direct contradiction with a particular sociopolitical context, such as the papal primacy in the case of the Chinese Church, how should this problem be solved? In a pluralistic world with a great variety of political options and systems, how does a particular understanding of politics (cf. China) affect the ecclesiastical structure of the Universal Church, viz. Rome, the Vatican and the Pope? How does it affect the relationship between the local church and Rome? How can the development of local churches affect the concept of a centralized ecclesial leadership (Papacy)?

In view of the increasing trends of diversity and pluralism, how does the development of local ecclesiologies affect the understanding of universality and catholicity? What are the ecclesiological ramifications of the tension between the "independence" of a local church vis-à-vis Rome and its "independence" vis-à-vis local politics? What is the difference between the contextualization and the domestication of a local church?

CHAPTER THREE

THE LIFE OF THE CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH

In 1979, the Chinese Government relaxed its religious policy and allowed the Chinese Church to enjoy a legitimate presence. As the Chinese Church began to reestablish the religious life of the Catholics in post-Mao Chinese society, it faced many problems such as shortage of clergy and ecclesiological conflicts. This chapter shows how the Chinese Church normalized its ecclesiastical activities vis-à-vis these problems, and highlights some theological issues related to this situation.

Section one looks at the pastoral needs of Catholics and the response of the Chinese Church in meeting these needs. Section two examines the unique concerns of Chinese Catholics about their Catholic faith, viz. celibacy of priests and the preservation of Catholic traditions. Section three looks into the ecclesiological tension between pro-Roman and pro-Government Catholics, and the ecclesial consequences of this tension. The last section discusses some theological issues arising from the life of the Catholic Church in China.

A. PASTORAL NEEDS OF CATHOLICS

When the Government began to allow Catholics to resume their religious activities, the initial response from Catholics does not seem to have been very

enthusiastic. For example, in October 1979, only one hundred Catholics attended the first two masses celebrated at the newly reopened Sacred Heart Cathedral of Guangzhou¹ which has a seating capacity of more than a thousand. The low turnout suggests that Catholics were skeptical about the sincerity of the Government's policy.

As the political atmosphere in China began to relax and the Government repeatedly reaffirmed its new religious policy, the participation of Catholics in religion activities rapidly increased. For example, in 1981, one thousand people attended the Easter Mass at the above mentioned Sacred Heart Cathedral. In the following year, more than one thousand and two hundred attended the Pentecost Sunday Mass.²

A similar trend of increasing Catholic participation in public religious activities can easily be seen in most Chinese churches. For example, when the Cathedral in Shenyang, Liaoning, reopened at Christmas in 1980,³ only two thousand attended the Mass. At Christmas the following year, attendance increased three times to six thousand.⁴ A more striking example was the Church of Xamba, Inner Mongolia. In 1981, only two thousand attended the Christmas Mass.⁵ The following Christmas, twenty one thousand attended:⁶ a tenfold increase.

¹Wenhui Bao (HK), 22 October 1979.

²CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 49; CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 22.

³CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 10.

⁴CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 4f.

⁵CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 4.

⁶CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 62; CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 21.

This phenomenally large turnout at public religious activities suggests not only that Catholics began to have confidence in the Government's policy, but also that they had a strong urge to publicly express their faith. Such a deep desire for religious expression also indicates the urgent pastoral needs of Chinese Catholics.

This section looks into these pastoral needs of Chinese Catholics, and shows how the Chinese Church authorities responded to these needs. The first subsection, "Pastoral Needs of Catholics," examines needs such as sacraments, pilgrimages, devotions, and catechumenate. The second subsection, "Response of the Chinese Church," deals with the attempts of the Chinese Church to cope with these needs and the difficulties faced by the Chinese Church as it tried to meet these needs.

1. Pastoral Needs of Catholics

1. Celebrations of the sacraments

As churches began to reopen, satisfying the demand for the sacraments became an important task for the Chinese Church. The importance of dispensing sacraments can be easily seen from the emphasis placed on it by the Chinese Church publications. The national Catholic journal Catholic Church in China reports not only the detailed attendance record at mass, but also meticulously keeps statistics of sacraments dispensed. These tedious church registries can be seen in almost every issue. For example, at the Guiyang Cathedral of Guiyang, Guizhou, out of one thousand and five hundred Catholics who attended the Easter Mass in 1982, one thousand confessed and received the Eucharist.⁷

⁷CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 18.

Also, in the Diocese of Chengdu, Sichuan, seven hundred out of the one thousand, who attended the Christmas Mass in 1980, confessed.⁸

Chinese bishops also seemed to be preoccupied by the task of providing sacraments. When a church publication reported on the activity of a bishop, it always highlighted his pastoral ministry of dispensing the sacraments. For example, Bishop Zhang Xin of Taiyuan, Shanxi, confirmed almost five thousand while he was travelling in the villages.⁹ Bishop Wang Xueming of Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, confirmed more than three thousand as he visited some rural areas.¹⁰

The Chinese Church also made a deliberate attempt to ensure that the sacraments would be available to all believers, especially to those Catholics who lived in the rural areas and had little regular access to religious services. For example, in 1982, the Meixian Diocese, Guangdong, set up six parish outposts in rural areas where mass could be celebrated for the twenty thousand rural Catholics living in that county.¹¹ Catholic churches in Guizhou,¹² Shanxi, and Hubei¹³ regularly sent priests from the cities to the villages in order to dispense the sacraments to rural Catholics.

Priests who paid pastoral calls in rural areas were busy with nothing other than dispensing the sacraments. The demand for the sacraments seems to

⁸CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 13.

⁹CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 62.

¹⁰CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 56.

¹¹CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 26.

¹²CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 18; CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 43.

¹³CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), pp. 24-26.

have been extremely great. For example, a priest was sent from the Diocese of Hohhot to a remote town, Tuquan, Inner Mongolia, (formerly part of Heilungjiang Province) for a pastoral visit. During his stay, he single-handedly performed more than one thousand two hundred Confirmations, one hundred and thirteen Baptisms, more than one thousand First Communions, two hundred and eight Last Rites, twelve marriages, and ninety-six masses!¹⁴

The sacraments seem to have been very important to Chinese Catholics. During every major feast day, churches were packed with worshippers waiting to receive the Eucharist. Some might have to stand outside in the cold;¹⁵ and many would even travelled hundreds of miles for such an occasion.¹⁶ Those who received the Eucharist expressed their joy that they could, once again, experience a profound spiritual comfort.¹⁷

ii. Pilgrimages

Chinese Catholics have a long tradition of paying homage to Our Lady. Pilgrimages were traditionally organized in May and October to various Marian shrines. In May 1980, when the NAC and the CBC were not yet established and only a handful of churches were reopened, a unofficial pilgrimage had already taken place in Sheshan near Shanghai.

This pilgrimage, through which an intense devotion to the Virgin Mary was manifested, was organized by a few Shanghai priests who had just been

¹⁴CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 42.

¹⁵Tangshan of Hebei, CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 16; or Harbin of Heilungjiang, CCC, no. 5 (Sept. 1982), p. 13.

¹⁶CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 10; CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), pp. 62f.

¹⁷CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 13.

released from jail in 1979. They circulated some privately printed pamphlets announcing that the Virgin Mary would appear in Sheshan in March, 1980.¹⁸ The Government reacted to this pamphlet by publishing an article in January, 1980 denouncing such "superstitious beliefs."¹⁹

In spite of dissuasion from the Government and the Shanghai CEC, ten thousand Catholics went to Sheshan from May 14 to 17, 1980.²⁰ Most of these pilgrims were fishermen and peasants who had traveled many days from other provinces, some from as far as one thousand kilometers away, to attend this pilgrimage. The pious devotion of these pilgrims can be seen in this eyewitness's account:

When I passed through the mid-level church, an amazing spectacle appeared before my eyes. An immense number of people were on their knees on each level leading high up the hill. Nobody was walking. There was no room for walking. All were on their knees, slowly praying the Stations of the Cross. Many were waiting below at the first level to start the climb. They climbed slowly, knelt down at each level until they climbed to the top of the hill. It was an extraordinary spectacle.²¹

During this pilgrimage, civil authorities made no attempt to stop the Catholics' spontaneous devotional acts such as prayer, chanting, hymn singing, or the lighting of candle. They sent police and cadres to take pictures and to keep the crowds in order; they even arranged extra public transportations to facilitate the pilgrims travelling to and from Sheshan.²²


¹⁸ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28; also Japan Times, 22 December 1981.

¹⁹ Wenhui Bao (S), 28 January 1980.

²⁰ Wang Shaojin, "A Catholic Pilgrimage in China," ZB, (July 1980), pp. 38-43; ET RCL 10 (Spring 1982): 91-96.

²¹ Ibid, RCL, p. 94.

²² Ibid. p. 92.



Similar pilgrimages took place elsewhere in China as well.²³ For example, a recent report written by a French priest who traveled in China reads as follows:

In Guiyang, I have been shown many photos of a pilgrimage to Our Lady of Bliss (Notre Dame de Liesse). In other parts of Guizhou, I have seen photos of a hill bristling with wooden crosses brought there by the devotees to the Blessed martyrs of Guizhou. Particularly honoured a priest told me, are these four Martyrs of the XIXth Century: Joseph Zhang Dapeng, Martha Wang, Lucy Yi, and Jean Pierre Nèel.²⁴

Chinese Catholics often came on pilgrimage in groups of whole families or whole clans. They were even willing to risk defying the Government in order to participate in these pilgrimages. This participation reflects their deep desire to publicly and corporately manifest their fervent devotion.

iii. Prayer life of the faithful

Chinese Catholics also expressed their fervent faith by means of regular devotional gatherings. These gatherings were formed spontaneously by laity in rural areas²⁵ where there was no church and no regular access to a priest. For example, Catholics in a village near Hanzhong, Shaanxi, began to gather together every Sunday morning to recite the Rosary then again in the evening to recite the Vespers²⁶ before the formation of the local CPCA or CAC.

²³Some rural Catholics in Hunan organized a pilgrimage to the Cathedral in Changsha after the reopening of that church, see Bridge, no. 10 (April 1985), p. 9.

²⁴J. Charbonnier, "New Experience of Life in China," ZE, no. 8 (January 1985), p. 21.

²⁵Many Catholic communities existed all over the country, see ZC, no. 13 (January 1985), p. 13, and J. Spae "Catholic Life in a Chinese Village," in CUP Supplement, no. 1 (September 1982), privately distributed, hereafter cited as "Catholic Village."

²⁶CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 24.

Even some rural Catholic communities, which had long ceased holding any religious activities, began to organize religious gatherings. The Church—in Long Bow village, Shaanxi, was closed in 1948. In 1966, Hinton described the religious situation of this village as follows, "All the power of the Church and its efforts to convert Long Bow to Catholicism failed in the end."²⁷ However, in 1980, when Hinton revisited this village, he found that peasants had hung pictures of Mary and Jesus on their walls. On Sunday, groups of one hundred and fifty families held prayer meetings. Hinton later said, "It is mighty quiet in the village on Sunday now . . . the peasants would rather go to the service than go out to the field to work."²⁸

Very often, it was local Catholics, without prior directive or instruction from ecclesiastical or civil authorities, who gathered to conduct devotional meetings.²⁹ The civil or ecclesiastical authorities then stepped in to facilitate or regulate these fait accompli meetings.³⁰

Chinese Catholics not only, spontaneously held devotional meetings, but also greatly venerated devotional objects such as holy pictures, holy medals, rosaries, and crucifixes. The demand was so high that people would spend a great fortune to purchase them. For example, some Catholic fishermen in 1979

²⁷ William Hinton, Fanshen, A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (New York: Random house, 1966), p. 67.

²⁸ Fox Butterfield, China Alive in the Bitter Sea (New York: Times Books, 1982), p. 423. Hinton's daughter told McInnis that the Long Bow village "once nearly half Catholic, is once again nearly half Catholic." Personal correspondence with D. McInnis, 6 May 1985.

²⁹ CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 24.

³⁰ CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), pp. 7f.

came to Wenzhou to spend one thousand dollars (Rmb) on privately produced devotional objects.³¹

As the Chinese Church began to normalize ecclesiastical activities, many dioceses resumed the production of devotional materials such as holy pictures, holy statues etc. Usually, these holy objects were available to Catholics during feast days, such as Easter³² or Christmas.³³ When some priests paid visits to rural Catholics, they usually brought along devotional materials, which were eagerly sought after by local Catholics.³⁴

Holy water, too, was in great demand. For example, in Meiguiying, Inner Mongolia, the priests had to prepare six hundred kilograms of holy water to meet the needs of five thousand Catholics who attended the Easter Mass in 1981.³⁵ When Fr. Li went to some remote villages in the Hanzhong Diocese, Shaanxi, to celebrate Easter Mass in 1982, more than five hundred Catholics came to ask for holy water. Sixty buckets were prepared and were all gone overnight.³⁶

There was an intense devotion of Chinese Catholics to holy objects. A moving eyewitness account of this deep veneration for holy objects reads as follows:

³¹Rmb 1,000 was a large amount of money in 1979, because the average monthly salary for a worker was between Rmb 45 to 70.

³²CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 51; or CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 18.

³³CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 19f.

³⁴CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), pp. 24f.

³⁵CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 51.

³⁶CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 25.

At the back of the church there were two peasant families. One put up a small picture of Our Lady, and lit candles before it. The other family put up a mirror with a small holy picture attached, and lit two rows of candles in front of it. These two families were kneeling in front of these pictures. I say, some people from the city kneeling in silence with tears on their cheeks.

Through the spontaneous devotional gatherings and veneration to holy objects, Chinese Catholics showed an intense devotion to the Catholic faith. These devotional acts were carried out without formal organization or direction from Chinese Church authorities. Rather, they were natural and spontaneous responses reflecting the deep spiritual desire of Chinese Catholics.

iv. Catechumenate

Chinese Catholic families were very serious about the religious formation of their children. Children were usually baptized at birth by their parents and received the Catholic faith through their parents, regardless of the availability of regular ecclesiastical activities. Children of Catholic families usually knew the basic beliefs and practices of Catholicism, such as the sign of the Cross and the recitation of the Rosary.³⁸ It is not uncommon to discover that Chinese Catholic youth, who had never been in a church before 1979, were baptized at birth, and instructed in the basic Catholic prayers and doctrines at home.³⁹

As the Chinese Church began to restore its regular activities in 1979, many Catholic youth, who had been baptized by their parents, wanted to participate in a formal catechumenate before official initiation into the

³⁷Wang, in RCL, p. 96.

³⁸YIE, (October 1982), p. 12; see also YIE, (November 1982), p. 13.

³⁹Such a case can be seen in "The Story of a Sailor," in ZC, no. 10 (March 1983): 6f.

Church viz. confirmation or the validation of their baptism.

Besides young people who came from Catholic families, many new converts were also attracted to Catholicism and wanted to join the Church. For example, in a county in Anhui, there were about seventy catechumens during the period from 1979 to 1980; and in 1982, the number of catechumens increased to five hundred.⁴⁰ These new converts, too, needed the catechumenate.

Thus, the catechumenate became a pressing need in the Chinese Church, especially after the long interruption of regular church activity. Consequently, many dioceses regarded the catechumenate as one of their most important activities. For example, the Beijing Diocese began to provide religious instruction to new converts as early as 1979;⁴¹ the Tianjin Diocese began a catechumenate with two hundred students even before the official reopening of the Cathedral.⁴² Catechetical classes were also reported in almost all churches in major cities such as Guangzhou,⁴³ Nanjing, or Shenyang.⁴⁴

v. Rationale behind these needs

There seems to be a few reasons behind Chinese Catholics' accentuation of these four pastoral needs--sacraments, pilgrimage, devotional activities,

⁴⁰CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 16.

⁴¹Wei Xiutang, "In a Catholic Church in Beijing," CR 29 (January 1980): 50.

⁴²YIC, no. 11 (November 1980), p. 15.

⁴³Special Edition to Commemorate the Third Anniversary For the Reopening of the Sacred Heart Cathedral of Guangzhou (Guangzhou: The Catholic Diocese of Guangzhou, October 1982), p. 12, hereafter cited as Guangzhou.

⁴⁴YIE (March-April 1983), p. 9; and YIE (November 1982), p. 13.

and catechumenate. First, these needs correspond to the basic needs of all Catholic communities. Each community needs public expression of faith, objects or symbols of veneration, activities which can be identified with faith, and religious instruction for the continuity of faith. The Chinese Church is no exception to these needs.

Secondly, this particular accentuation of the Chinese Church reflects the pre-Vatican situation of the Church in general. In pre-Vatican II Catholic life, sacraments were seen as the centre of Catholic practice, devotional objects were treasured and regarded as essential for spirituality, pilgrimage and Marian devotion were also extremely popular and were emphasized by the Church. Since Vatican II has not been part of the Chinese Church experience, pre-Vatican II ecclesial practices naturally characterize the religious life of the Chinese Catholics in the 1980s.

Finally, these pastoral emphases of Chinese Catholics reflect the role of religion in the sociopolitical context of Chinese society. Chinese civil authorities define religion as a private affair without social influence and interference. With this sociopolitical limitation, Chinese Catholics can only emphasize their faith by the development of internal Catholic life, and cannot promote the social dimensions of Catholic teachings in church life, such as social ethics, the ad intra/ad extra mission, or the Church-World relationship.

2. Response of the Chinese Church

1. Training of new priests

Since only priests can administer sacraments, the demand for sacraments can only be met if there are sufficient priests available. However, the Chinese Church had suffered from an acute shortage of priests since 1950. In

1950, there were more than five thousand priests, half of them Chinese, serving in the Chinese Church.⁴⁵ Since then, all foreign priests had been expelled and many Chinese priests had died. With the closure of the seminaries in the 1950s,⁴⁶ no new priests were trained.⁴⁷ In 1982, it was estimated that there were about thirteen hundred priests still living in China.⁴⁸

Among the thirteen hundred priests who were still alive, some were married and were not actively involved in priestly ministry;⁴⁹ some worked in

⁴⁵ Pao-Ku Ko, Short Chronological History of the Chinese Church (Taipei: Kuang-Chi, 1970), p. 88. (c)

⁴⁶ In the early 1960s, Chinese Church leaders had a plan to reopen the seminary, see Guangming Ribao, 20 January 1962. But this plan was never actualized, see CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 8.

⁴⁷ There was a handful of priests ordained from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s. The last ordination seemed to be Fr. Paul Guo's ordination which took place in 1965, see T. Chu, China Trip 1983 (Toronto: Privately Circulated Mimeograph, 1983), p.5. Cf. A. Lazzarotto, "A Dramatic Development in China: Six Seminaries Are Forming New Priests," in EAPR 22 (April 1985): 137-145. Lazzarotto estimated the number of Chinese priests as five to six hundred which was too low as compared to the official estimation [see the following footnote]. Also, in the same article, he did not include the Hebei Provincial Seminary and the Shaanxi Provincial Minor Seminary.

⁴⁸ Canada China Programme Executive Minute, 22 March 1984, p.4. In 1985, Bishop Fu of Beijing mentioned that there were about one thousand priests in China, in J.-M. Bosc, "Chine: Deng corrige Mao," Peuples du Monde, no. 189 (January 1986), pp. 24f. Cf. Introduction, footnote no. 9.

⁴⁹ Ladany, Behold, The Catholic Church in China, (Hong Kong: Privately Published, 1984) p. 6, hereafter cited as Behold; see also Anonymous, "La situation actuelle des chrétiens en Chine: Rapport du voyage d'un prêtre chinois (31 août-5 octobre 1980)," ME 20 (January-February 1980): 28f, hereafter cited as "La situation."

schools⁵⁰ or factories;⁵¹ some had been arrested and sent to jails or to labor camps;⁵² and some were retired due to health or other reasons.⁵³ Most of the remaining priests who still actively performed their priestly duty (probably less than one thousand) were between sixty and eighty years of age. The few younger ones were between 50 and 60 years old.

The pastoral care of more than three million Chinese Catholics scattered all over the country had to be provided by these elderly priests. It was clear to all that the Chinese Church needed more priests not only to replace these old priests, but also to provide adequate care for the millions of Chinese Catholics. From 1980 to 1983, the Chinese Church ordained a few new priests.⁵⁴ All these newly ordained priests had been seminarians in the 1950s, and hitherto had not had an opportunity to be ordained. However, the number was still far too few to meet the needs of the Chinese Church.

Thus, the only way for the Chinese Church to have more priests was to build a seminary to train new priests.⁵⁵ In 1982, after the most urgent task of the Chinese Church--reopening of churches in major cities--had basically

⁵⁰ A well educated priest, Rev. Dr. Tien, was teaching French in Shanxi University, in J.T. Myer, "The Catholic Church: An Eye Witness Report," in Commonweal, 7 October 1983, p. 528.

⁵¹ YIE, (July 1983), pp. 5f.

⁵² SCMP (HK), 3 December 1981; Wu Yan, Glimpse of Catholic Life Style in Mainland China and the Chinese Communist Policy Towards Religion (Taipei: Window Press, 1984), p.24. (c) Cf. Bosc, pp. 22-24.

⁵³ Behold, pp. 5-8.

⁵⁴ Shanxi PBS 29 November 1980 CNA; CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 27; CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 27; CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 29; CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), pp. 20f; CCC, no. 10 (October 1984), p.19.

⁵⁵ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 52.

been achieved, the Chinese Church focused its attention on the opening of seminaries.

This ecclesial priority can be seen from the rapid increase of seminaries since 1982. The first seminary was the Sheshan Seminary near Shanghai, which was reopened in October 1982.⁵⁶ The Beijing Diocesan Seminary was also opened in the following month.⁵⁷ In 1983, three more seminaries were opened: the National Catholic Seminary in Beijing, the Wuchang Seminary, Hubei,⁵⁸ and the Shenyang Seminary, Liaoning.⁵⁹ In 1984, three new seminaries began to operate: Sichuan Provincial Seminary in Chengdu, Hebei Provincial Seminary in Shijiazhuang,⁶⁰ and the Jinan Minor Seminary, Shangdong.⁶¹ In 1985, the Xi'an Seminary, Shaanxi, the Shanxi Provincial Minor Seminary in Taiyuan, and the Preparatory School for the Inner Mongolia Provincial Seminary also began to operate.⁶² Within four years (1982-1985), the Chinese Church built one preparatory, eight major, and two minor seminaries, with a population of about three hundred and fifty seminarians.⁶³

⁵⁶ CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 31f.

⁵⁷ J. Tong, "First Visit to the Chinese Seminaries," in Tripod, no. 23 (October 1984), pp. 17-24, hereafter cited as "First Visit."

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 56.

⁶⁰ YIE, (December 1984), pp. 14f.

⁶¹ CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), pp. 22f. Some seminaries are named after the province; others, the city.

⁶² Xinhua (Eng.), 27 September 1984; CUP, no. 11 (Spring 1985), p. 64; CCC, no. 13 (October 1985), pp. 9f; CUP, no. 15 [sic, 14] (Winter 1985), p. 67; cf. CUP, no. 15 (Spring 1986), pp. 42-55.

⁶³ "Chine: Deng corrige Mao," pp. 24f.

Even with the rapid opening of these seminaries to train new priests,⁶⁴ the pressing sacramental needs of Chinese Catholics would not be reduced for years to come. The training of seminarians usually takes four to six years.⁶⁵ Provided that all the seminaries operate smoothly as planned, the Chinese Church will probably see the first group of seminarians graduate by 1987. From 1987 onwards, the Chinese Church will probably have one to two hundred new priests per year.

However, the newly trained priests will have to fill the vacant posts left behind by the death or the retirement of the elderly priests from 1984 to 1987. Under these circumstances, the Chinese clerical rank cannot begin to increase substantially until the majority of the old priests are replaced. It may take at least a decade (from 1984 on) to have all the clerical posts filled with young priests. By then, the Chinese Catholic population will also have increased.

Thus, despite the building of many seminaries, the number of the priests can hardly catch up with the need of the Chinese Church in the near future. If this speculation is correct, the sacramental needs of the Chinese Catholics will still be a major concern for the Chinese Church because of the shortage of priests.

There are also reports of the ordination of clandestine priests in China under the authority of Rome. Rome-recognized bishops or their appointed successors, who were still in communion with Rome, were granted privileges to

⁶⁴Some are on the planning stage, see CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 21.

⁶⁵"First Visit," pp. 17-24.

ordain priests without the requirement of formal theological training.⁶⁶ It is reported that Bishop Zhou Weidao of Fengshing, Shaanxi, ordained at least forty such pro-Roman priests.⁶⁷ Bishop Joseph Fan Xueyan of Baoding, Hebei, also ordained some priests in this manner.⁶⁸

These clandestinely ordained priests were called "black priests." Unlike other Chinese priests who celebrated mass in Latin, these "black priests" followed the instruction from Rome to celebrate clandestine masses in Chinese (few had any training in Latin). They were not recognized by the NAC and the CBC and were often rejected by other Chinese priests.⁶⁹ The NAC and the CBC issued explicit orders forbidding these priests to exercise their ministry.⁷⁰

The "black priests" could not operate in the open because their priestly role would be exposed and they would be arrested by the civil authority for conducting illegal activities. Their safety depended greatly on the Catholics they served secretly. Their activities were necessarily limited, since travel in China is tightly controlled by the Government. Many of them were reported to have been arrested as soon as they began to exercise their ministry.⁷¹ Yet, a few of them were able to continue their ministerial

⁶⁶ Facultates, VII/2; see Appendix II.

⁶⁷ CUP, no. 4 (Summer 1983), p. 30.

⁶⁸ Origins 13 (26 January 1984): 546.

⁶⁹ Private source from Fr. X. who had personally known these "black priests." Personal interview, May 1984.

⁷⁰ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 17f.

⁷¹ Ibid.

function until 1983.⁷²

Generally speaking, the impact of the "black priests" on the shortage of priests was negligible. First, the number of the "black priests" was small, because only a few pro-Roman bishops could ordain these priests. Secondly, the "black priests" were not recognized by the NAC and the CBC, therefore, they could not operate in the government-recognized ecclesiastical structure. Thirdly, their activities were illegal in the eyes of the Government and had to be performed in a clandestine situation. Fourthly, many of them were arrested as soon as they began to function. Due to these constraints the ministerial effectiveness of the "black priests" was severely limited, and their contribution to the pastoral needs of the Chinese Catholics was negligible.

ii. Organizing pilgrimages

The aforementioned unofficial pilgrimage held in Sheshan was immediately denounced by the Chinese Church authorities. Some Chinese Church leaders regarded this pilgrimage as a plot organized by reactionary elements who were trying to discredit the CPCA and the Government.⁷³ Some Catholics who helped in organizing this pilgrimage were later arrested by the Government, and some were charged with "disturbing production."⁷⁴

Although Chinese Church leaders outwardly disapproved of this pilgrimage, they realized that there was a need for this type of devotional expression among Catholics. Instead of letting this need be used by pro-Roman Catholics to their advantage, the Chinese Church organized official

⁷² Han Yi 34 (November 1984): inner cover.

⁷³ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28.

⁷⁴ SCMP (HK), 3 December 1981.

pilgrimages. Some of these pilgrimages were even publicized by the Government as the normalization of Catholic religious life resulting from the Government religious policy.⁷⁵

iii. Providing catechetical materials

It was noted earlier that a large number of Catholics all over China received Baptism or Confirmation from 1980 to 1983. In order to educate them in the Catholic faith, the Chinese Church tried to both publish catechetical materials and to conduct catechetical classes.

There was a shortage of catechetical materials because most of the religious publications had been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1977). In 1979, some Catholics were reported to be using hand-copied catechetical materials.⁷⁶ The Shanghai Diocese published the Catechismus Romanus as the appendix to the Collection of Major Prayers.⁷⁷ This Catechismus Romanus was similar to the one traditionally used by Chinese Catholics but with some minor alternations.⁷⁸ In 1981, the NAC published a booklet edition of the Catechismus Romanus.⁷⁹ This booklet was later available for sale in some dioceses.⁸⁰

⁷⁵CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 58-61; see "Catholic Life in Shanghai," Videotape produced by Shanghai Television in cooperation with the Catholic Diocese of Shanghai, 1981.

⁷⁶YIC, no. 7 (May-June 1980), p. 13.

⁷⁷Collection of Major Prayers, imprimatur by Bishop Zhang Jiashu of Shanghai (Shanghai: The Catholic Diocese of Shanghai, n.d.), pp. 167-192.

⁷⁸Ibid, p. 173. The questions on the papal primacy and on the role of the Pope were deleted.

⁷⁹CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 59.

⁸⁰YIE (October 1982), p. 13.

Some catechetical materials were privately written and distributed among Catholics. One example was the booklet entitled Questions on Baptism.⁸¹ This booklet was written by a priest during his stay in a labor camp. It was reproduced in Hong Kong and copies were probably brought back into China.⁸² The content of this booklet is basically an apology for Catholic belief in the context of an atheistic environment. The impact of these privately written catechetical materials on Chinese Catholics seems to have been insignificant because there was no official complaint or denunciation from the Chinese Church hierarchy of these unofficial publications.

Many catechumenates were held to prepare these Catholics prior to the rites of Catholic initiation. Usually these catechetical classes were conducted by priests.⁸³ With the small number of priests in China, this became a heavy workload for them. Many religious sisters helped share this burden. Furthermore, some dioceses organized special sessions to train lay catechists to lighten the workload of the priests. The first such program reported was the one organized by the Fujian Diocese in the summer of 1984.⁸⁴ It was a full-time program to prepare seminarian candidates and lay church workers. The effect of these training programs still needs to be evaluated.

⁸¹ Questions on Baptism (Hong Kong: privately printed, n.d.).

⁸² Zhang Biquan, "My Opinion on the Catechetical Booklet 'Questions on Baptism,'" in ZC, no. 5 (May 1982), pp. 8-10.

⁸³ Guangzhou, back cover; see also the videotape "The Catholic Life in Shanghai."

⁸⁴ CCC, no. 10 (October 1984), pp. 56f; CCC, no. 11 (December 1984), pp. 64f.

The production and distribution of catechetical materials, as well as the training of lay catechists, seems to have been taken place mainly in the major cities. Hence there seems to have been sufficient catechumenate opportunities available to urban Catholics. In remote areas, the situation was different. The demand for the catechumenate seemed to greatly surpass the supply. For example, in 1984, Msgr. Liu, the pro-bishop (Dai Zhujiao)⁸⁵ of Dali Diocese, Yunnan, told a visitor that there were many young people in his diocese who wanted to study the Catholic faith but there was no catechetical material available to them. It is apparent that, by 1984, the needs for the catechumenate were basically met in major cities but not in the remote areas.

iv. Conclusions

From 1979 to 1983, the Chinese Church faced many ecclesial problems such as the reopening of churches,⁸⁶ the pastoral needs of Catholics, the Sino-Vatican conflicts, and its relationship with the Universal Church. It appears that for Chinese Church authorities, the priority was to meet the immediate pastoral needs of Catholics before trying to deal with the Sino-Vatican conflict or the relationship with the Universal Church.

⁸⁵ The Chinese Church uses two terms to designate non-episcopal diocesan ordinaries: pro-bishop (dai zhujiao) and diocesan administrator (jiaoqu zhang). Apparently, there is no clear distinction between these two terms; they are often interchangeable.

⁸⁶ Virtually all church buildings in China had been occupied by other organizations since the Cultural Revolution. Although the Government had issued orders to return these properties back to the Chinese Catholics, it is not easy for the local Catholics, with little political power, to reclaim their church properties especially when the church buildings were occupied by units with strong local political powers. It is not uncommon that local Catholics had to go through lengthy legal battles in order to claim back their church buildings; see CCC, no 11 (December, 1984), pp. 57f; or CCC, no. 10 (October 1984), p. 38. Recent reports suggest that local Catholics have to pay the Government in order to get their church buildings back; CUP, no. 16 (Summer 1986), p. 64.

The Chinese Church put almost all its resources into an effort to meet the pastoral needs of Catholics. This effort included the opening of seminaries, the organizing of pilgrimages, the production of devotional materials and the establishment of the catechumenate. Despite this effort, the pastoral needs still far exceeded the supply. The basic problem seems to have been the extremely limited resources which the Chinese Church had.

First, the Chinese Church lacked public facilities. Virtually all church buildings and church-owned properties had been confiscated during the Cultural Revolution and converted to other usages such as schools or factories. The gradual return of these properties, which often needed major renovations before they could be used for religious purposes was a slow and a frustrating process.⁸⁷ Therefore, from 1979 to 1983, the Chinese Church regained only a few church buildings in which to conduct its activities.

Secondly, the Chinese Church lacked resources to train clergy. Even though there was no lack of vocations, and there were always many more seminary applicants than the seminaries could accept, there were only a few elderly priests with adequate training in theology. The problem was aggravated by the fact that most of the theological books in the library were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution and there was no theological text book for the seminarians. With limited personnel resources, the Chinese Church was caught in a dilemma. It had to reduce the badly needed pastoral service in some parishes in order to spare a few priests to train seminarians and to write theological text books.

⁸⁷ZC, no. 21 (January 1985), p. 13.

Finally, because of the principle of ecclesial independence and the sociopolitical situation of China, the Chinese Church could not receive any missionary assistance. The Chinese Church feared that missionaries would take away the sovereignty of the Chinese Church and degrade it into a colonial church. Thus, the Chinese Church was confined to its limited pool of resources.

B. MAIN CONCERNS OF CATHOLIC FAITH

Catholics in different parts of the world have their own concerns regarding Catholic faith because of the different contexts in which they live. For example, Catholics in the West currently put heavy emphasis on issues such as peace and abortion, whereas Catholics in Latin America focus more on poverty and development. During the period from 1979 to 1983, Catholics in China paid much attention to the following two themes, the celibacy of priests and the preservation of Catholic traditions. This section examines these two themes accentuated by Chinese Catholics and the impact of these two themes on the life of Chinese Catholics.

1. Celibacy of the Clergy

i. The situation

Reports on the Chinese Church suggest that there were many married Chinese clergymen. This situation is openly confirmed both by bishops of the

Chinese Church hierarchy, such as Bishop Fu Tieshan of Beijing,⁸⁸ Bishop Li Panshi of Jiangmen,⁸⁹ and Bishop Ji Huairang of Xi'an,⁹⁰ and by Western observers, such as Fr. Ladany.⁹¹

Not only priests, but bishops too, were said to have married. Some of these bishops included Bishop Wang Weimin of Jilin, Jilin,⁹² Bishop Kong Lingzhong of Kunming, Yunnan, Bishop Chang Shouyi of Xuanhua (titular), Hebei,⁹³ the late Bishop Zhou Yizhai of Bengbu, Anhui,⁹⁴ Bishop Li Depel of Tianjin, and Bishop Fu Tieshan of Beijing.⁹⁵ Some were even said to have raised children.⁹⁶

These allegations are difficult to authenticate. Some of these marriages might have actually taken place in a civil, but not in a sacramental, manner. In a letter addressed to the Pope, a group of Chinese priests of a diocese in northern China described their situation as follows:

⁸⁸ SCMP (HK), 30 June 1984.

⁸⁹ Bridge, no. 8 (November 1984), p. 10.

⁹⁰ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 29.

⁹¹ L. Ladany, Chinese Church as Seen in December, 1980, (Hong Kong: Privately Distributed Mimeograph, 1980), p. 8, hereafter cited as Church 1980; also cf. Behold, p. 6.

⁹² "La situation," p. 30.

⁹³ Behold, pp. 3f.

⁹⁴ He died in October 1983, Sunday Examiner (HK), 30 December 1983.

⁹⁵ CNA, no. 1186 (1 August 1980), p. 5.

⁹⁶ The alleged bishop was Bishop Fu Tieshan, CUP, no. 9 (Autumn 1984), p. 63. The alleged wife of Fu, a religious sister, told a relative who is a Chinese-American Jesuit priest, that although she had raised two children, there was no evidence to prove that she had given birth to them. Personal conversation with Fr. X., May 1984. Incidentally, this Fr. X. was an upper classman of Bishop Fu during their seminary time.

Many of us are married, but in all cases, these marriages are invalid and in many cases, the marriages are not consummated. It is under considerable duress that we went through ceremony, and we⁹⁷ intend to have these marriages civilly dissolved at the first opportunity.

Thus, the circumstances that caused the marriages of Chinese clergymen are probably beyond the comprehension of those who have not experienced such difficulties. Hence, it is not the intention of this research to evaluate the moral or the canonical implications of these marriages, but rather, to examine the ecclesial impact of the de facto marital status of some of Chinese clergy on the life of the Chinese Catholics.

ii. The nonacceptance of married clergy

Chinese Catholics normally placed an overwhelmingly strong emphasis on the vow of celibacy of the clergy, and they were very reluctant to accept these married clergy. This emphasis on celibacy can be seen in the following examples. Both the Chairman Fr. Ding Loucai and the Vice-Chairman Bishop Wang Weimin of the Jilin CPCA were alleged to be married. In 1979 when Bishop Wang planned to celebrate a special mass for the reopening of the first church in the Diocese of Jilin, not a single person showed up. The reason was attributed to the fact that Catholics in Jilin did not accept a married bishop.⁹⁸

At the Jilin Catholic Representatives Conference held in September 1980,⁹⁹ a source reveals that the Catholic delegates declared Fr. Ding and Bishop Wang to be unfit to hold ecclesiastical office because of their marital status and that these two clergymen withdrew from celebrating mass and

⁹⁷"Catholic Village," p. 9.

⁹⁸"La situation," pp. 29f.

⁹⁹Changchun PBS, 20 September 1980, in CSPD, no. 4 (February 1981), p. 25.

administering sacraments. The source notes that both of them, however, still retained their posts at the CPCA, and that after this Conference, Ding no longer attended Sunday mass, and that Bishop Wang attended every Sunday as an ordinary layman.¹⁰⁰

Although the content of the Jilin Catholic Conference was neither published nor mentioned in any official medium, later evidence suggests that reports of the Jilin Catholics' refusal to accept the ecclesiastical offices of these two allegedly married clergymen were probably true. The evidence is as follows.

First, it is observed that there is no mention of Bishop Wang in the ecclesiastical activities of the major feast days. In other dioceses, the masses of the important feast days, such as Christmas or Easter, are usually celebrated by the bishop, or pro-bishop, if one is available. Official reports then emphatically mention the presence of these prelates.¹⁰¹ Even if the bishop is not actually involved in this celebration, e.g. for health reasons, the official report still mentions his name in order to honor him.¹⁰² However, in the official reports of both the Christmas Mass and the Easter Mass in Changchun, Jilin, Bishop Wang's name is nowhere in sight.¹⁰³ The absence of Bishop Wang's name in these reports of important church occasions suggests that even though Bishop Wang still kept his episcopal title, he was no longer

¹⁰⁰"La situation," p. 30.

¹⁰¹For example, see CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 4-13; or CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), pp. 15-17.

¹⁰²For example, see the case of the Diocese of Hanzhou, in CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 35f.

¹⁰³CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 6; CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 62.

involved in the liturgical celebration taking place in his own church.

Secondly, Catholics in Jilin elected and consecrated a new bishop, Rocus Liu Dianci, in 1982.¹⁰⁴ It is significant to notice the absence of Bishop Wang on that occasion. Had Wang still been actively performing his episcopal duty, he would probably have been the first one to attend and to participate in this important church event, which occurred right in his own diocese. Furthermore, why would there be a need for two bishops in one diocese? The answer is probably that Catholics in Jilin wanted to replace Bishop Wang with Bishop Liu, who is a more suitable person for episcopal office because he was a celibate.¹⁰⁵

Thirdly, there seems to have been a deliberate public removal of both Ding's and Wang's ecclesiastical titles. In July 1983, the Jilin CPCA held the Fourth Executive Committee meeting. In that meeting, the newly elected Bishop Liu Dianci was referred to as the Bishop of Jilin Diocese, the Chairman of the Provincial CAC, and as the Vice-Chairman of the Jilin CPCA.¹⁰⁶ Hence, Bishop Liu held the ecclesiastical, the administrative (CAC), and the political (CPCA) positions simultaneously. Bishop Wang Weimin, however, was referred to simply as Vice-Chairman Wang of the Jilin CPCA, and Fr. Ding, as Chairman Ding of the Jilin CPCA, with their ecclesiastical titles intentionally deleted from the

¹⁰⁴CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 27f.

¹⁰⁵Catholics in Jilin had high respect for Bishop Rocus Liu, see Kyongyang (Seoul) (June 1985); ET AF 1 (12 July 1985): 5. Cf. CCC, no. 12 (June 1985), pp. 45f. Bishop Liu died in April, 1985. In May, 1985, the Jilin Diocese elected, and in September, consecrated Fr. Li Xuesong, as the Bishop of Jilin; CCC, no. 14 (December 1985), pp. 10f. Bishop Wang is mentioned in the report as the Vice-Chairman of the provincial (Jilin) CPCA without his episcopal title.

¹⁰⁶CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 43.

official report of the meeting. It suggests that the Jilin Catholics no longer recognized the clerical status of these two clergymen.

Lastly, there appear to be no reports whatsoever of ecclesiastical activities conducted by Bishop Wang. Most of the Chinese bishops actively involved in the pastoral ministry would have their names frequently mentioned in the church media. Bishop Wang was one of the very few Chinese bishops, who were never reported to have engaged in ecclesiastical activities. It seems that aside from holding political office (Vice-Chairman of the Jilin CPCA) and the ecclesiastical title (member of the CBC), he had no other function in the Chinese Church. The lack of reports on his ecclesiastical activities further indicates the nonacceptance of the Catholics in Jilin of the allegedly married bishop.

Other allegedly married bishops experienced a fate similar to that of Bishop Wang Weimin, viz. nonacceptance by Catholics in their ecclesiastical office. For example, Bishop Li Depai of Tianjin, who was alleged to have married twice, did not celebrate the first mass at the reopening service of the Tianjin Cathedral. That mass was celebrated by Fr. Yue Shude.¹⁰⁷ Also, there was no mention of Bishop Li's name on the important feast days celebrated at the Diocese of Tianjin.¹⁰⁸ Likewise, Bishop Kong Lingzhong of Kunming, an allegedly married bishop, was reported to have refrained from celebrating mass. The masses in Kunming were celebrated by two celibate priests.¹⁰⁹

Similarly, Bishop Chang Shouyi of Xuanhua, another allegedly married

¹⁰⁷ YIC, no. 11 (November 1980), p. 15.

¹⁰⁸ CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 9.

¹⁰⁹ Behold, p. 4.

bishop, refrained from religious duties such as celebrating mass and dispensing sacraments, and forsook his episcopal duty. In 1980, the Xuanhua Diocese was restructured and became part of the newly formed Zhangjiakou Diocese headed by Bishop Pan Shanxing.¹¹⁰ Bishop Chang moved to the Shijiazhuang Diocese and managed the administrative work of the Hebei CAC and CPCA. Despite the insufficient number of bishops in Hebei, only five bishops in eight dioceses, Bishop Chang did not take up the episcopal function and instead, appointed a diocesan administrator (Jiaoqu zhang), Fr. Wang Yaoshi, to lead the Shijiazhuang Diocese.¹¹¹ Chang's strange abstention from episcopal office might have something to do with his alleged marital status.

However, it is also reported that at least a couple of allegedly married bishops actively executed their episcopal duty. For example, the late Bishop Zhou Yizhai of Bengbu, Anhu, frequently celebrated masses and administered sacraments in his diocese.¹¹² Likewise, Bishop Fu Tieshan also actively performed his episcopal duty. However, the public exercise of their episcopal office did not necessarily indicate that married bishops were well accepted by Chinese Catholics. There are three possible reasons for this ecclesial phenomenon.

First, the religious activities of the allegedly married bishops may suggest the possibility that Catholics, in some areas, had difficulty expressing their dissatisfaction and had to tolerate the situation. For

¹¹⁰Hebei, p. 43. Bishop Pan died in early 1983, see CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 65.

¹¹¹Hebei, p. 43; see also YIE (December 1984), pp. 15f.

¹¹²CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 16; CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 7f; CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 15.

example, Beijing was well controlled by the Government as a showcase to the West. It would be extremely embarrassing for the Chinese Government, if Catholics in Beijing were allowed to openly reject the Government-endorsed prelate--Bishop Fu. Whereas in Jilin, or other remote places with little international exposure, local Government officials might grant more freedom to Catholics to express their preference concerning their ecclesiastical leaders. Second, Catholics might accept a married cleric if he had dissolved his marriage.¹¹³ Third, some Catholics might choose to receive sacraments from a married cleric rather than not receive sacraments at all.

iii. The response from the Chinese Church hierarchy

Since married clergy were not well accepted by Chinese Catholics, the Chinese Church hierarchy tried to avoid having married clergy perform religious functions. Priests in Shanghai made a pact among themselves that only celibate priests would celebrate mass and administer sacraments, while married priests would perform nonreligious duties, such as teaching in the seminary or carrying out church administration.¹¹⁴ Elsewhere, many married priests had voluntarily stopped celebrating mass.¹¹⁵ Some had completely abandoned their pastoral work¹¹⁶ and changed their career to work in schools or factories. Some had even planned to divorce their wives in order to resume their pastoral duties.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Some allegedly married bishops, such as Bishop Fu, were reported to have divorced their wives, CUP, no. 15 [sic, 14] (Winter 1985), p. 69.

¹¹⁴ Personal conversation with Sister Theresa Chu, March 1984.

¹¹⁵ Behold, p. 6.

¹¹⁶ SCMP (HK), 30 June 1984; see also CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 29.

¹¹⁷ "La situation," p. 30.

Both the Chinese Church hierarchy and Rome Loyalists showed a deep concern about the celibacy of the priesthood by emphasizing the condition of celibacy in relation to the newly ordained or consecrated clergy. For example, the official report on the ordination of Fr. Feng Jingde emphatically states that Fr. Feng had persistently remained celibate from his seminary days and had waited more than thirty years for his ordination. The newly ordained Fr. Sha Wenxiang, too, was reported to have remained celibate for three decades since the interruption of his seminarian formation in the early 1950s.¹¹⁸ As for the newly consecrated bishops, they all had to make a vow of celibacy.¹¹⁹ Even clandestinely ordained "black priests" had to remain celibate.¹²⁰

However, the mention of celibacy as a precondition for seminarians was conspicuously not seen in official church publications but was seen elsewhere.¹²¹ The official admission requirements for seminarian training were that the candidate be eighteen years of age or above, a high school graduate, have the approval of his parents, and the recommendation of his diocese.¹²² The requirement of celibacy was not stated. The avoidance of mentioning celibacy as a condition for seminarians in official church publications seems to have been intentional. If it is true that some bishops and seminary faculty members

¹¹⁸ CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 29; see CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), p. 21.

¹¹⁹ The Consecration of a Bishop: Liturgy and Explanation, (n.p., n.d.), p. 6. See also appendix II.

¹²⁰ Facultates, VII/6; see also Crux (1 August 1983), p. 2.

¹²¹ See ZE, no. 7 (July 1984), p. 6.

¹²² CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 17; or YIE (April 1984), p. 12.

were alleged to be married,¹²³ it would be very embarrassing for them to announce the requirement of celibacy. Hence, the requirement of celibacy for seminarians seems to have been an understood assumption implemented de facto, but not seen in print.

Unlike the Chinese Church hierarchy, which avoids publicly addressing seminarians on the vow of celibacy, the Chinese Government repeatedly emphasizes the issue of celibacy in their media coverage of Chinese seminaries. A Government report on Sheshan Seminary states that the seminarians have to be unmarried and have to remain celibate for life.¹²⁴ In another report on the National Catholic Seminary, it states that the most important criterion for considering seminary candidates is the condition of celibacy.¹²⁵ The two Government reports seem to convey the Government's concern about the issue of celibacy. By emphasizing this issue, the Government hopes to have a spotless Chinese Catholic Church¹²⁶ and to gain wide support from Chinese Catholics.¹²⁷

Overall, the issue of celibacy has raised many concerns in the Chinese Church. Not only the Chinese Church hierarchy, but also the Government, yielded to the desire of the Catholics to honor the vow of celibacy. As a result, most of the married clergymen abstain from exercising their pastoral work, and the clerical candidates are required to remain celibate.

¹²³CUP, no. 9 (Autumn 1984), p. 71.

¹²⁴Zhang Zeyu, "Training priests at the Sheshan Seminary," in BR 27 (11 June 1984): 25.

¹²⁵Chen Yuewen, "Visit to the National Catholic Seminary," Liaowang, no. 8 (20 February 1984), p. 12.

¹²⁶CUP, no. 9 (Autumn 1984), p. 71.

¹²⁷CNA, no. 1186 (1 August 1980), p. 5.

Despite the consistent lack of priests, the Chinese Church hierarchy still strongly insists on the issue of celibacy. There are two main reasons calling for this emphasis. First, the Chinese Church wants to place itself in line with the traditional practice of the Roman Catholic Church by keeping the celibacy regulation. If the Chinese Church alters this regulation, it fears that this alteration would be used by others to attack the Chinese Church as schismatic. Secondly, the Chinese Catholic laity, because of their training in faith, highly treasure the celibacy of the priesthood. They expect this regulation to be kept, at all costs, as a sign of genuine Catholic orthodoxy. Thus the emphasis on celibacy indicates that both the Chinese Church hierarchy and laity value Catholic orthodox tradition over pastoral expediency.¹²⁸

2. Preservation of Catholic Traditions

To visitors, the most striking impression given by the Chinese Church is probably the preservation of Catholic traditions, such as the Tridentine Mass, the tonsure etc. This distinctive ecclesiastical characteristic marks one of the most peculiar aspects of the Catholic faith emphasized by Chinese Catholics. This subsection attempts to look at the Chinese Catholics' preservation of Catholic traditions from three aspects: the phenomenon of traditional Catholic practices, the emphasis on such practice, and the rationale behind this emphasis.

¹²⁸ Bishop Li Panshi of Jiangmen openly addressed the issue, and admitted that it was a difficult problem for the Chinese Church to face, see Bridge, no. 8 (November 1984), p. 10.

i. The phenomenon

All masses in the Chinese Church are celebrated in the Tridentine mode e.g., in Latin, in silence, and with the second Gospel.¹²⁹ An eyewitness' account of a mass in Taiyuan reads as follows:

The Mass was celebrated in Latin with the priest facing the Altar. As soon as one Mass completed [sic], a new priest appeared on the Altar and a new Mass began . . . They spent nearly the entire Mass on their knees and were clearly not putting on a performance for anyone's benefit . . . At one point during the Eucharist there rose a sort of responsorial chant. Everyone seemed to know the words without the benefit of hymnals, and even the smallest child knew the proper rituals.¹³⁰

It is reported that in order to preserve the Tridentine Mass, the Chinese Church reprinted the old Latin Missal.¹³¹ Even priests, who were known to be loyal to Rome, celebrated mass in Latin in spite of the instruction from Rome to celebrate mass in the vernacular.¹³² The Chinese Church also tried to explain to the faithful the purpose, the meaning, and the procedure of the Tridentine Mass so that this ancient liturgy would be more comprehensible to the faithful.¹³³

The liturgy used in the Chinese Church was conducted basically in the same way as it was conducted before the Council¹³⁴ with a couple^{of} noticeable changes. In the Litany of the Saints, the invocation to pray for Pope was

¹²⁹ Church 1980, p. 3.

¹³⁰ Myers, p. 525.

¹³¹ CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 16.

¹³² Behold, p. 4. The Catholic Church in Hong Kong published the Missale Parvum in simplified Chinese characters to be distributed among pro-Roman Catholics in China.

¹³³ CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), pp. 33f; CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), pp. 9-12.

¹³⁴ CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 31.

replaced by the prayer for "Our Superiors."¹³⁵ Also, the prayer for the Holy Father in the Collect of the mass was deleted in some missals published after 1981.¹³⁶ However, these changes were not followed by all priests. Some priests still publicly prayed for the Pope during the mass.¹³⁷

The training of new Chinese priests also followed the traditional method. Old manuals of theology were used¹³⁸ and Latin was mandatory.¹³⁹ The daily routine of the seminarians followed the pattern established in the late 1940s.¹⁴⁰ The curriculum, too, closely resembled the old curriculum, i.e., one or two years of philosophy followed by four years of theology. The only changes were the introduction of courses in politics, which are mandatory in all educational programs in PRC, and the reduction of the amount of scholastic philosophy.¹⁴¹ And the ceremony of tonsure was still practiced.¹⁴² Although there are indications that the training of new priests emphasized the tripartite role of Christ, viz. priest, teacher, shepherd,¹⁴³ which is similar

¹³⁵ Church 1980, p. 3.

¹³⁶ See Proper of the Seasons (Shanghai: The Catholic Diocese of Shanghai, 1982), p. 6. (c) Cf. Collection of Major Prayers, p. 40.

¹³⁷ Behold, p. 4.

¹³⁸ ZE, no. 3 (August 1982), p. 4.

¹³⁹ "First Visit," passim.

¹⁴⁰ A. Cracco, De seminariorum sinensium institutione (Shanghai: Don Bosco industrial School printing press, 1946), p.266; see also Congregatio Immaculate Cordis Mariae, Directorium seminariorum in Sinis (Peking: C.I.C.M., 1949), p. 657.

¹⁴¹ "First Visit"; cf. Cracco, pp. 254-261.

¹⁴² China Trip 1983, p.5; CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 29.

¹⁴³ See CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), pp. 20f.

to the teaching of the Council document Optatam totius,¹⁴⁴ the de facto training of Chinese seminarians still predominantly emphasized the traditional function of the priest as the dispenser of the sacraments.¹⁴⁵

ii. The emphasis

To visitors from outside, Chinese Catholics seemed to insist eagerly on the fact that there was no change of their Catholic faith and practice. Many of them would emphatically state that "the same masses are celebrated, the same prayers are said," or "we have not forgotten any of the teachings we have learnt before," or "we believe in the Church: One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic."¹⁴⁶ Chinese Catholics tried to eagerly show the world that they were faithfully following the traditional Catholic faith and practice, without any alternation or deviation from the past.

Not only Catholics themselves, but also the Chinese Government wanted to preserve Catholic traditions. The late director of RAB, Xiao Xinfu, in 1980, told Cardinal König that the Chinese Government valued greatly the efforts of the Chinese Catholic Church "to remain faithful in all respects to the tradition and to follow the Universal Catholic Church in all its outward practices."¹⁴⁷ Xiao also stated that there should be no difference between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁴⁸ Of course one could hardly expect Xiao to have extensive knowledge of the changes that had taken

¹⁴⁴Optatam totius, par. 4.

¹⁴⁵"First Visit," p.23.

¹⁴⁶ZE, no. 7 (July 1984), p. 7.

¹⁴⁷Cardinal König, "My Journey to China," in RCL 8 (Winter 1980):, 270f.

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

place in the Roman Catholic Church since the Council, especially, since he had just resumed his post in 1979 after more than a decade of inactivity. Hence what Xiao had in mind regarding the Roman Catholic Church was probably the pre-Council version of Roman Catholicism.

iii. The rationale

A number of factors led Chinese Catholics to emphasize the preservation of Catholic traditions. The first one is the apologetic factor. Though it vigorously denied it, the Chinese Church was long accused of being close to a state of schism. In defending the Catholic orthodoxy of the Chinese Church, Bishop Fu Tieshan stressed that the Chinese Church had made no change in the traditions of the Catholic faith.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, a Franciscan priest in Xi'an said, "We are Catholics and Franciscans [sic], sive vivimus, sive moriamur."¹⁵⁰ Bishop Chang of Hebei, too, did not hesitate to emphasize that Catholics in Hebei celebrated the same mass and said the same prayers as any other Catholics in the world.¹⁵¹

All this emphasis on the loyal adherence to Catholic traditions seems to have served as a subtle witness of the fidelity of the Chinese Catholics to orthodox Catholic faith. With this emphasis on Catholic tradition, Chinese Catholics tried to prove that they were part of the Roman Catholic community.

The second one is the pastoral factor. Some Chinese Church officials

¹⁴⁹ Fu made this statement in an open forum at L'Université de Montréal in October 1981.

¹⁵⁰ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 31. In fact, there was only one Franciscan priest in Xi'an.

¹⁵¹ YIE, (December 1984), p. 14.

were aware that the old liturgy, old prayers, and hymns,¹⁵² written in classical Chinese, might have little meaning for the faithful, especially the younger generations. They proposed that the traditional prayers be written in modern Chinese.¹⁵³ However, Chinese Catholics seemed to be satisfied with the traditional liturgy, prayers and hymns, and they did not demand that the traditional Catholic liturgy and prayers be modernized.

Furthermore, most of the resources of the Chinese Church were put into the reestablishing of the ecclesiastical structure, the reopening of churches, the training of new priests, and meeting the sacramental needs of the faithful. The Chinese Church simply did not have the resources to introduce a new liturgy to the faithful.¹⁵⁴ Consequently, the preservation of Catholic traditions seems to have been the optimal pastoral action in the context of the Chinese Church.

The third one is the theological factor. When Catholic activities ceased to exist for more than a decade, Catholic faith and practices were transmitted from parents to children during the period of religious repression. When the faithful were once again allowed to openly express their faith, it was observed that Chinese Catholics, even the young who had never been in church before, were very familiar with the traditional prayers, hymns, and the liturgical practices.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Cf. Hymnody (Guangzhou: The Catholic Diocese of Guangzhou, 1982). (c)

¹⁵³ In 1983, some Catholics proposed that traditional prayers be translated into modern Chinese, CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 61f; CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), pp. 53f. Some of these translations have been published, see CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), pp. 12f.

¹⁵⁴ ZE, no. 6 (January 1984), p. 5.

¹⁵⁵ Myers, p. 525; ZE, no. 6 (January 1984), p. 5.

Since Chinese Catholics had preciously preserved and transmitted Catholic traditions, i.e. old prayers, hymns . . . etc, to the next generation under very difficult circumstances, these Catholic traditions became the symbol marking the fidelity of the Chinese Catholics to their Catholic faith. Furthermore, Chinese Catholics identified these Catholic traditions as manifestations of their faith. To change such traditions would probably mean a loss of the symbol of faith which the Chinese Catholics had highly treasured.

The last factor is probably a political one. The preservation of Catholic traditions could be seen as a reaction against the new liturgical practices promoted by Rome in the Chinese Church. The reasons offered by Chinese Catholics favoring traditional Catholic practices seem a direct refusal of the liturgical modifications authorized by Rome via the Facultates.¹⁵⁶ Other objections against the simplification of the liturgy, such as the regulations issued by the NAC and the CBC,¹⁵⁷ seem aimed at the vernacular missal,¹⁵⁸ which was published in Hong Kong and distributed in China without prior approval from the NAC and the CBC.

Chinese Church authorities seemed to interpret the liturgical modifications advocated by Rome as attempts by Rome to challenge the autonomy of the Chinese Church. If the Chinese Church accepted these Rome-endorsed liturgical changes, it would be a sign of submission to the authority of Rome. Therefore, the Chinese Church vigorously preserved Catholic traditions as part of their protest against Rome's authority.

¹⁵⁶ Hebei, pp. 47f; CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), pp. 21f.

¹⁵⁷ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 18.

¹⁵⁸ Missale Parvum (Hong Kong: Catholic Church in Hong Kong, 1981). (c)

The adherence to Catholic tradition in the Chinese Church is the result of many factors. All these factors play important roles contributing to the preservation of Catholic tradition in the Chinese Church. Thus, the preservation of Catholic traditions seems to be the optimal pastoral action of the Chinese Church vis-à-vis its ecclesial context from 1979 to 1983.

C. TENSION AMONG THE CATHOLICS

Since the Chinese Church reappeared in 1979, Western observers have highlighted the ecclesial tension among Chinese Catholics. Some suggest that there are actually two separate Chinese Churches: the "patriotic" or the "official" church and the "silent" or the "true" church.¹⁵⁹ Some do not agree with this distinction, and speak rather of two different groups of Chinese Catholics within the same Chinese Church.¹⁶⁰ Some even suggest that there may be a third group of Chinese Catholics who are loyal to the "true" church and, at the same time, operate under the shelter of the patriotic church.¹⁶¹ Some sinologists, like Lazzarotto, think that the reality of the Chinese Church is so complicated that "it is not possible to draw a clear demarcation line within the Chinese Catholic community."¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹For example, see Behold, p. 2.

¹⁶⁰Wu, *passim*; or N. Brosseau, "La religion populaire: Foi et Pratique," in Univers 60 (January-February, 1984): 34.

¹⁶¹Vox, "New Anti-Church Moves in China," The Month 243 (February 1982): 58.

¹⁶²A. Lazzarotto, "The Church in Deng Xiaoping's China," in EAPR 21 (April 1984): 159.

Not only is the classification of Chinese Catholics' ecclesiological stand not agreed upon, the description of the relationship of the different groups of Chinese Catholics is also subject to diverse interpretations. Some suggest that there is a rivalry between "loyalist" and "patriotic" groups, which splits the Chinese Church.¹⁶³ Others speculate that the difference between these two groups may not be significant enough to have an impact on the religious life of the faithful.¹⁶⁴

In spite of the different views on the nature of Chinese Catholic groups and their interrelationships, all the commentators agree that there is an ecclesiological tension among Chinese Catholics. Further, this tension had important ecclesial implications for the life of Chinese Catholics from 1979 to 1983.

This section intends to examine this ecclesiological tension, and to discuss the implications of this tension for the life of Chinese Catholics. It is divided into four subsections: 1. The background of this tension: 1949-1966, 2. The manifestation of this tension from 1979 to 1983, 3. The ecclesial responses to this tension, and 4. The theological implications of this tension.

1. The Background of the Tension: 1949-1966

The ecclesiological tension existing in the Chinese Church originated with the conflict between Rome and the Chinese Government in the early 1950s.

¹⁶³ IHT, 14 May 1982; or Times, 17 September 1984, p. 72. See also L.T. Murphy, "A Visit to China's Catholic," in America 144 (21 March 1981): 223f.

¹⁶⁴ B. Whyte, "The Catholics of China," in The Tablet 237 (20 August 1983): 792.

To understand the nature of this tension, a historical view of the conflict is necessary. This subsection, therefore, examines some critical events contributing to the conflict between Rome and the Chinese Government from 1949 to 1966, which, in turn, led to subsequent ecclesiological tension.

In July 1949, the Holy Office issued an order to all Catholics instructing them to resist and to boycott any Communist influence.¹⁶⁵ The Chinese Church hierarchy, headed by the Inter-Nuncio Archbishop Riberi, followed this order and forbade Chinese Catholics to support the Chinese Communist regime. Later, the Chinese Church hierarchy issued explicit orders and regulations to prohibit Chinese Catholics from reading Government publications, attending Government schools, and joining the military service.¹⁶⁶ These ecclesiastical regulations laid down the foundation for the forecoming conflict between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government.

i. The development of the tension in the Chinese Church

The first public opposition to Rome's authority was declared in late 1950 by some Catholics in Guangyuan, Sichuan. Their declaration called for the "self-support and reform" of the Chinese Church,¹⁶⁷ and demanded that the administration of the Chinese Church should be managed by the Chinese clergy, and not by foreign missionaries. Later, Catholics in other areas began to issue similar statements asking for the autonomy of the Chinese Church and the

¹⁶⁵ AAS 41 (1949): 334.

¹⁶⁶ Renmin Ribao, 29 October 1951; or Guangzhou, p. 7.

¹⁶⁷ Xinhua, 13 December 1950; CBMA 3 (4) (February 1951): 149f.

termination of foreign (Vatican) intervention in China's internal affairs.¹⁶⁸ These statements were all denounced by Msgr. Riberi.¹⁶⁹ The Holy Office, in response, cited a decree warning those who supported these statements and stating that excommunication would be the punishment for their disobedient actions.¹⁷⁰

In the beginning of 1951, the Chinese Government started to expel foreign missionaries.¹⁷¹ As foreign ordinaries and superiors were expelled, more Chinese Catholics came out to rally for the autonomy of the Chinese Church and the separation of the Chinese Church from foreign domination.¹⁷² However, these rallies did not seem to gain a wide popularity because only a small number of Chinese Catholics openly endorsed this autonomous movement.¹⁷³

In January 1952, Pius XII issued the encyclical letter Cupimus imprimis to the Chinese Church condemning any form of local or particular church which

¹⁶⁸L. Wei, Le Saint-Siège et la Chine de Pie XI à nos jours (Paris: Edition A. Allais, 1968), p. 155; Renmin Ribao, 24 May 1951; SCMP, no. 107 (1951): 12.

¹⁶⁹J. Lefeuve, Shanghai: les enfants dans la ville (Paris: Casterman, 1966), 57; also Riberi was praised by Haughey for having "effectively sabotaged the invitations being proffered by the [Communist] party to develop an 'indigenous' Catholicism." See J.C. Haughey, "Religion in China II: Shredding the Catholic Church," in America 126 (22 April 1972): 418.

¹⁷⁰AAS 42 (1951): 601f.

¹⁷¹In January 1951, there were more than three thousand Catholic missionaries (priests and religious) in China. Twelve months later, less than two thousand remained. By the end of 1952, seven hundred remained in China and the majority of them were under detention pending for deportation. See R.C. Bush, Religion in Communist China (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), p. 60.

¹⁷²CBMA 3 (4) (February 1951): 150f; or Renmin Ribao, 5 & 23 January 1951; or Henan Ribao, 30 January 1951.

¹⁷³G. Palmer, God's Underground in Asia (N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crafts, 1953), p. 149.

claimed the right of autonomy.¹⁷⁴ This encyclical exerted a divisive effect on the Chinese Church. Chinese Catholics began to divide into two groups: one followed Rome's direction in resisting any attempt to form an autonomous Chinese Church, and the other envisioned a nationalistic Chinese Catholic Church with less control from Rome.

Many Catholics had reservations about accepting the words "autonomous" and "reform" because these two words could be easily identified with the theological concept of "schism." Therefore, at the Nanjing Synod held in August 1953, the delegates, composed only of Chinese clergymen, substituted a new name, the "Patriotic Movement," for the titles "Autonomous Movement" and "Reform Movement."¹⁷⁵ The concept of patriotism does not conflict with any Catholic doctrine. As a result of this change, more Catholics began to join the "Patriotic Movement."

The Chinese Government made a friendly gesture to the Catholic Church. In 1954, besides openly endorsing the Catholic Patriotic Movement, the Government also appointed some prominent Catholics to major political organizations, such as the National People's Congress, where no Catholic had hitherto been asked to sit.¹⁷⁶ However, those who responded positively to the Government's invitation risked their ecclesiastical status, because Rome had previously ordered them not to support the Communist regime.

Many Catholics who were loyal to Rome responded negatively to the Government's friendly gesture and actively resisted the civil authorities. For

¹⁷⁴ AAS 44 (1952): 153-158.

¹⁷⁵ Lefeuve, pp. 328-336.

¹⁷⁶ Renmin Ribao, 8 January 1956.

example, Catholics in Xianxian, Hebei, conducted clandestine Catholic activities.¹⁷⁷ They literally dug tunnels, underground chambers and caves. These secret activities were so widespread that in 1955 one Government official made the following comment, "Counterrevolutionary elements are still working under the cloak of religion."¹⁷⁸

At the end of 1954, Pius XII issued another encyclical letter to the Chinese Church entitled Ad Sinarum gentes,¹⁷⁹ which condemns the Autonomous Movement (by now called the Patriotic Movement) as unCatholic and urges Chinese Catholics to obey papal authority. This papal letter consequently widened the gap between pro-Roman Catholics and pro-Government Catholics.

In July 1955, the Government launched a national campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries. The Government took this opportunity to remove some pro-Roman and uncooperative Catholic leaders. The first major blow to pro-Roman Catholics was the arrest of the outspoken pro-Roman Bishop Gong Pinmei of Shanghai.¹⁸⁰ Other pro-Roman Catholic leaders in other areas, such as in Anhui,¹⁸¹ Jiangsu,¹⁸² Shanxi,¹⁸³ Hubei,¹⁸⁴ Shangdong,¹⁸⁵ and many more over the

¹⁷⁷ Renmin Ribao, 7 September 1953.

¹⁷⁸ Renmin Ribao, 29 July 1955.

¹⁷⁹ AAS 47 (1954): 5-14.

¹⁸⁰ Shanghai Xinwen Ribao, 9 september 1955.

¹⁸¹ Bengbu, Anhui, PBS, 13 September 1955 URJA.

¹⁸² Jiefang Ribao, 14 September 1955.

¹⁸³ Taiyuan, Shanxi, PBS, 19 October 1955 URJA.

¹⁸⁴ Changjiang Ribao, 29 October 1955.

¹⁸⁵ Qingdao Ribao, 5 November 1955; Dazhong Ribao, 6 November 1955.

country were subsequently arrested.¹⁸⁶

ii. The formation of the CPCA

The antagonism between pro-Roman and pro-Government Catholics was further deepened when pro-Government Catholics established the CPCA in June 1957. The establishment of the CPCA was the turning point for pro-Government Catholics. It was the first time that they could have their own national civil (non-ecclesiastical) structure with an endorsement from the Government to voice their challenge to the Vatican. The CPCA declared that patriotism was an internal policy of the Chinese Church and it was not subject to Rome's authority.¹⁸⁷

In response to the formation of CPCA, Rome immediately issued appeals to all Chinese Catholics to urge them to vigorously resist this association even to the point of martyrdom.¹⁸⁸ Rome also issued decrees to invalidate the ordinary power of the Vicar Capitular of Shanghai who joined the CPCA, and to reaffirm the rightful episcopal status of the incarcerated Shanghai Bishop Gong

¹⁸⁶Lo Shan, "From 'The Scandal of the Church' to Look at the Secret Organization Which Plots to Seize the Property of the Church," part II, Nanbeizi, 16 February 1973, pp. 44f. Lo Shan suggested that this arrest was not part of the Government's religious policy, but was part of a national political campaign undertaken by the Public Security Bureau. Other religious believers were equally affected by this campaign. Lo Shan also suggested that these arrests were against the will of the URWD.

¹⁸⁷L. Triviére, The Catholic Church in Mainland China (Hong Kong: Privately Circulated Mimeograph, 1959), p. 52, hereafter cited as Mainland.

¹⁸⁸AIF, no. 1335 (13 July 1957), pp. 234-236.

Pinmei.¹⁸⁹ This seemingly highhanded reaction of Rome caused resentment among many pro-Roman Catholics,¹⁹⁰ and forced many more Chinese clergymen to change to the pro-Government stand.¹⁹¹

The CPCA gradually consolidated its influence by establishing branches in many dioceses. The CPCA removed uncooperative pro-Roman Catholics through the national Anti-Rightist campaign launched by the Government. Uncooperative Catholics were labeled as Rightists¹⁹² and were subject to harsh punishment as political criminals by the civil authority. Those who joined the CPCA were called Patriotic Catholics, and the churches controlled by the CPCA members were referred to as Patriotic Churches. These included practically all the churches in China that still remained open.

iii. Consecration of Chinese Independent Bishops

Since most of the episcopal Sees were vacant due to the expulsion of the foreign bishops and the incarceration of the pro-Roman Chinese ordinaries, a diocese in Sichuan began to hold episcopal elections in December 1957.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹Wei, p. 104. The Holy Office issued a decree to grant extraordinary faculties to pro-Roman priests, so that they could function without a bishop (or needed to submit to ordinaries not recognized by Rome), see CBMA 9 (October 1957): 533f.

¹⁹⁰Thomas (pseud.), "The Inside Story of the CPCA," Part II, in ZT, no. 51 (16 March 1961), p. 140.

¹⁹¹Renmin Ribao, 2 August 1957; Guangming Ribao, 2 August 1957.

¹⁹²For example, see Nanfang Ribao, 7 February 1958; or Yanbian Ribao, 23 March 1958. Cf. J. Liu [Micheal Yeung], Inside China: Experience of a Chinese Catholic: 1948-1980 (Hong Kong: Privately Published, 1981), pp. 34f.

¹⁹³Sichuan Ribao, 18 December 1957.

Other dioceses soon held similar elections.¹⁹⁴ The first consecration of elected candidates was held in Hankou on April 13, 1958.¹⁹⁵ These episcopal elections and consecrations later significantly heightened the antagonism between pro-Government Catholics and pro-Roman Catholics.

The two new episcopal candidates, Bernardin Dong Guangqing and Marc Yu Wenhua were elected by their respective diocesan consultors (Hankou and Wuchang). These two diocesan consultors telegraphed the results of the election to Rome and asked for ratification.¹⁹⁶ They did not expect any problem about Rome sanctioning their nomination.¹⁹⁷

Rome's immediate reaction was disapproval of the election. It invalidated the elections, ordered the two candidates to withdraw from the consecration, and cited a decree stating that if there is no papal approval of an episcopal consecration, both the consecrator and the consecratee will be ipso facto excommunicated.¹⁹⁸ The two diocesan consultors were shocked to receive this negative reply from Rome, but they went ahead with the consecration. They later wrote a letter in Latin to the Pope explaining their difficult situation and justifying their action. Rome gave no reply.¹⁹⁹

In June, 1958, Pius XII issued the third encyclical letter to the

¹⁹⁴For the election in Suzhou, see Changshu Wabao, 1 March 1958. The election in Ningbo, see Xinhua Ribao, 14 March 1958.

¹⁹⁵Hubei Ribao, 14 April 1958.

¹⁹⁶AIF, no. 1376 (3 May 1958), pp. 151f.

¹⁹⁷CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), pp. 46f; G. Dunne, "Report on Recent Visit to China: 1982," in CUP, no. 4 (Summer 1983), p. 38.

¹⁹⁸AAS 43 (1951): 217f.

¹⁹⁹G. Dunne, "The Prisoners of Shanghai," CUP, no. 6 (Winter 1983), p. 53.

Chinese Church entitled Ad Apostolorum principis.²⁰⁰ This encyclical was made public in September after copies had been smuggled into the hands of some Chinese Catholics.²⁰¹ It denounces the CPCA as a tool used by the Communists to destroy the Catholic faith and condemns the independent consecration as a "cunning" plot of the Communists to establish a schismatic church. It ends with a plea to Chinese Catholics to fight against the apostasy (Patriotic Movement). In spite of the papal disapproval, the Chinese Church kept on consecrating its bishops. By 1965, more than fifty Chinese Independent Bishops were consecrated without papal approval. These Independent Bishops all openly took a pro-Government stand.²⁰²

The consecrations of Independent Bishops signified the transfer of ecclesiastical authority from the hands of pro-Roman Catholics into the hands of pro-Government Catholics. Before these consecrations, pro-Government Catholics had the national civil organization, the CPCA, to influence the Chinese Church, but the CPCA was limited in civil and political authority. Therefore, even though many pro-Roman prelates and their appointed successors were incarcerated and no new episcopal nominations were made by Rome, the tutelage of Chinese episcopacy was, technically speaking, still under Rome.

The situation changed when the Chinese Church consecrated many pro-Government Independent Bishops. These were probably theologically valid consecrations though illicit because they were not recognized by Rome. These Independent Bishops could claim to be legitimate leaders of the Chinese Church

²⁰⁰AAS 50 (1958), pp. 601-617.

²⁰¹Bush, p. 114.

²⁰²CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 56.

and could exercise ecclesiastical authority over the Chinese Church. Pro-Government Catholics, therefore, now possessed both political and ecclesiastical authority over the Chinese Church.

Because Rome refused to recognize the legitimacy of Chinese Independent Bishops, pro-Roman Catholics, too, rejected the ecclesiastical validity of these Independent Bishops. Pro-Roman Catholics regarded the so-called "Patriotic Church" as an apostate church, which departed from Roman Catholicism, and they formed their "True Church" clandestinely to consolidate their claim to Catholic orthodoxy. By doing so, they distanced themselves further from the pro-Government Catholics.

However, beneath this seemingly confrontational situation of Chinese Catholics, there existed a vast gray area between these two opposing ecclesiological groups. Some Catholics might be loyal to Rome at heart yet they might also publicly endorse the CPCA as a means to continue ministerial activities.²⁰³ Many Catholics might just simply ignore the complicated political and ecclesiological differences and participate in any available Catholic activities. Thus, the tension in the Chinese Church from 1949 to 1966 was very complex and cannot be polarized in simplistic terms.

2. The Manifestation of the Tension from 1979 to 1983

The animosity between pro-Government Catholics and pro-Roman Catholics seems to have carried over from the 1950s into the late 1970s. For example, the

²⁰³ See the account by Fr. Chen in Le missioni cattoliche (8 September 1962), pp. 294-314. An extract is contained in T. Hang, Il cattolicesimo cinese oggi (Milan: Editrice Missionaria Italiana, 1965), pp. 126-139, which is not available in Hang's original German edition.

Vicar General Lin Mingde of Guangzhou recalled that when he met some CPCA members working for the reopening of the Cathedral in 1979, he was very suspicious of them. He thought that they were there to spy on believers and to disturb the Church.²⁰⁴ Although he was later convinced that his suspicion was groundless, his account indicates the presence of tension among Chinese Catholics in 1979.

In early 1980, the Chinese Government and pro-Government Catholics openly acknowledged the existence of pro-Roman Catholics,²⁰⁵ and their clandestine activities, such as the Sheshan Pilgrimage held in May 1980.²⁰⁶ The Government and the pro-Government Catholics did not take any major action to prevent independent ecclesiastical activities other than some verbal denunciations. This toleration suggests that the confrontation between pro-Government and pro-Rome Catholics was not the most important issue for pro-Government Catholics and the Government in 1979 and 1980. They seemed to be preoccupied by other pressing issues, such as the reopening of churches, and the reestablishing of a hierarchical structure.

i. Escalation of tension

From 1980 and 1981, the whole nation experienced a dramatic change, a change from tight government control to a more liberal and relaxed policy. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Chinese Church underwent a phenomenal expansion. Both pro-Government and pro-Roman Catholics benefited from the Government's liberal policy and began to strengthen their ecclesiastical

²⁰⁴ Guangzhou, pp. 6f.

²⁰⁵ König, p. 271.

²⁰⁶ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28.

influences. As a result, the ecclesiological tension began to escalate.

In 1980 and 1981, pro-Government Catholics not only reestablished the CPCA, but also formed two new ecclesiastical bodies, viz., the NAC and the CBC. The formation of these two new bodies increased the popularity of the Open Church. Since the NAC and CBC were ecclesiastical organizations, technically speaking, they replaced some of the former duties of the CPCA. Catholics, who were disenchanted with the political image of the CPCA, could now feel more comfortable about joining the Open Church because it meant no longer necessarily identifying with the CPCA.

Having become the ecclesiastical authority of the Chinese Church, the NAC and the CBC then issued regulations to manage Chinese Church affairs,²⁰⁷ and engaged in many ecclesiastical activities, such as consecrating bishops, ordaining priests, opening seminaries, producing devotional objects, printing religious publications, and restoring churches. In short, pro-Government Catholics expanded rapidly with increasing influence, and began to create a self-sustained ecclesiastical community.

Under the same liberal religious policy, pro-Roman Catholics reestablished contacts with Rome. Many activities, such as pilgrimages, regional church affairs councils,²⁰⁸ and the production of devotional materials,²⁰⁹ were organized. In order to build a hierarchy loyal to Rome, some pro-Roman bishops, who did not join the CBC, secretly consecrated bishops

²⁰⁷ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 52; CCC, no. 3 (October 1981): 17f.

²⁰⁸ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28.

²⁰⁹ Wang, p. 93.

and ordained priests.²¹⁰ For example, before March 1982, Bishop Fan Xueyan of Baoding, Hebei, was alleged to have consecrated at least three bishops and ordained many priests.²¹¹ Likewise, in 1981, Bishop Zhou Weidao of Fengxing, Shaanxi, consecrated his successor Bishop Lucas Li Qinfeng and ordained more than forty priests prior to his death in February, 1983.²¹²

It is significant that these clandestine consecrations and ordinations of pro-Roman Catholics clergy place a heavy emphasis on loyalty to Rome and to the Pope. For example, consecrations are described as "following directions from Rome," or "in communion with the Holy See."²¹³ As for ordinations, although the original instruction mentioned in Facultates does not require a pledge of loyalty to the Pope from the priest candidates,²¹⁴ subsequent instructions from Rome emphasize this pledge as one of the most important conditions for ordination.²¹⁵ This heavy emphasis on papal loyalty not only challenged the ecclesiastical authority claimed by the NAC and the CBC, but also ignored regulations established by the NAC and the CBC.²¹⁶

²¹⁰"Update on Church in China", open letter by Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming, April 1984.

²¹¹Private source from Fr. X. who had met some of these bishops and priests. They were seminary classmates of Fr. X. in the late 1940s in Hebei. Interview conducted by this author in May 1984.

²¹²CUP, no. 4 (Summer 1983), p. 30.

²¹³Ibid.; also CB 5 (March 1983): 2.

²¹⁴Facultates, VII/1-4.

²¹⁵Crux (1 August 1983), p. 2.

²¹⁶Pro-Roman priests alleged that they had instructed Catholics not to attend nor to assist masses celebrated in newly reopened churches, because the priests who celebrated the masses belonged to the CPCA, see Dunne, "The Prisoners of Shanghai," p. 49.

ii. The arrests of pro-Roman Catholics

The new religious policy was part of the experimental policy advocated by pragmatic Chinese leaders. If this liberal policy had gotten out of control, their political opponents, the Leftist leaders, would have had a good excuse to attack them. Therefore, the Government leaders closely monitored the development of religious activities, especially the unauthorized activities conducted by pro-Roman Catholics. When these activities became too influential the Government would step in and suppress them. For example, in May 1980, Fr. Stanislas Shen Baishun of Shanghai was arrested because of his involvement in the unofficial Shenshan Pilgrimage.²¹⁷

As pro-Roman Catholics increased their activities, the Government tightened its control over them. In the national campaign, launched by the Government in 1981 to purge dissenters,²¹⁸ many pro-Roman Catholics were arrested and their activities suppressed. On July 22, 1981, three priests, two religious brothers and one Carmelite novice were arrested in Wuzhou, Guangxi.²¹⁹ On November 16, 1981, at least five priests and four laymen were arrested in Shanghai.²²⁰ Two more priests and six more laymen in Shanghai were

²¹⁷ AI, UA ASA/17/02/80.

²¹⁸ Renmin Ribao, 26 November 1981.

²¹⁹ "Catholic Village," p. 6. This arrest seemed to be a local affair rather than a part of the national campaign, which did not start until late 1981.

²²⁰ Private correspondence from China. The author of this letter was also arrested a few days later.

later arrested.²²¹ In the same month, Fr. Francis Xavier Zhu Shude, a priest of Shanghai, was arrested in Anhui.²²² In March 1982, Bishop Fan Xueyan and his Vicar General were also arrested.²²³ Unconfirmed reports indicate that similar arrests took place in three other provinces.²²⁴

After the arrest of many pro-Roman Catholic leaders, pro-Roman Catholics either operated in a more clandestine manner, or joined the Open Church.²²⁵ Their activities seemed to decrease greatly, but did not totally disappear. Some activities were still sporadically reported.²²⁶

From 1982 to 1983, pro-Government Catholics built more seminaries and opened more churches. The media attention focused predominantly on the Government-recognized Open Church. The ecclesiological tension between Chinese Catholics still existed after 1982, but it was not as tense as in the earlier period (1979-1981), when both groups openly confronted each other.

²²¹ SCMP (HK), 3 December 1981.

²²² If the Grain of Wheat Dies . . . Fr. Francis Xavier Chu Shu-Teh S.J., (n.p., n.d.), p. 79, hereafter cited as Fr. Chu. It has been suggested that this book was written by Sister Theresa of Jesus, a Carmelite in Macao, in 1984, see J.W. Donohae, "Citizens of the Celestial Kingdom," in America 152 (23 February 1985): 43.

²²³ The news of the arrest of these two prelates was officially released in December 1983, see Origins 13 (January 1984): 546.

²²⁴ Catholic Arrested in Shanghai, privately circulated bulletin by CNA, 1981, p. 1. Two priests in Xinjian were also arrested in October 1983, see Kung Kao Pao, 7 September 1984. For a list of the Catholics arrested in this period, see "Intolerance and Discriminations on Grounds of Religious Belief," Amnesty International mimeograph, November 1984, AI Index POL 03/05/84, pp. 6f.

²²⁵ B. Whyte, "The Catholics of China," in The Tablet 237 (20 August 1983): 792-794.

²²⁶ Han Yi Monthly 34 (1 November 1984): inner cover.

iii. The tension in the Chinese sociopolitical context

The charges laid against the arrested pro-Roman Catholics were all civil and political crimes, such as, "hampering productions and modernization" in the case of Fr. Shen Baishun;²²⁷ "colluding with foreign countries," "endangering the sovereignty and security of the motherland," "collecting intelligence reports," "fabricating rumors," and "carrying out incitements" in the case of Fr. Vincent Zhu Hongsheng;²²⁸ and "colluding with foreign forces to jeopardize the security of the motherland" in the case of Bishop Fan Xueyan.²²⁹

Apparently none of the charges made against them had any reference to the fact that they spurned and refused to join the Government-recognized Open Church. Yet, many observers speculate that this was the main reason for their arrests.²³⁰ Chinese Government officials confirmed this speculation by regarding the ties with Rome as a political matter subject to the ruling of the Government. For example, Zhang Ziyi, the deputy head of the UFWD, states clearly that those who were arrested were:

Counterrevolutionary elements hidden in religious circles, who followed the wishes of the Curia Romana, engaged in criminal activities against China and the Chinese people, and tried to undermine the independence of the Chinese Church.²³¹

²²⁷ AI, UA ASA/17/23/81.

²²⁸ AI, Canadian Bulletin, July-August 1983.

²²⁹ Ottawa Citizen, 11 January 1984.

²³⁰ AI, UA ASA/17/23/81/; SCMP (HK), 27 November 1981.

²³¹ Globe and Mail (Toronto), 15 December 1981.

In order to understand how an apparently ecclesiastical matter (church authority) was interpreted by the Chinese Government as a political issue, one has to view charges laid against the arrested Catholics from the Chinese sociopolitical perspective. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), any contacts with foreigners made by Chinese citizens, were immediately suspected by the civil authority as an indication of espionage activity. Although the liberal policy of opening to the West had affected Chinese Society since 1978, Government leadership still had a strong xenophobic mentality. Since the Vatican was still considered a political enemy of China due to the Vatican's diplomatic ties with Taiwan, contacts with Rome naturally were suspicious in the eyes of the Government.

It must be understood that a totalitarian regime, such as the Chinese Government, will not tolerate any activity lacking prior governmental approval. The implementation of Rome's orders by pro-Roman Catholics, without clearance from the Government-recognized Open Church, was logically seen by the Government as a violation of the sovereignty of China, which is, indeed a serious political crime.

Furthermore, China has a standard of national security different from the West. Information concerning social affairs, which is generally regarded as public information in the West, might be seen by the Chinese Government as a state secret. For example, Fr. Vincent Zhu, a pro-Roman priest, gave a cassette tape, part of which contained information about a planned strike in a factory, to overseas Catholic visitors. This action was seen by the Chinese Government as a action jeopardizing national security because a state secret

was released to the outside world.²³² Likewise, when pro-Roman Catholics sent information concerning their situation to foreign Catholics, their actions could easily be regarded as supplying state secrets to other countries.

Based on the differences between the Chinese and Western contexts, the government's suppression of pro-Roman Catholics could be interpreted differently. Western observers interpreted these arrests as violations of religious liberty by the Chinese Government.²³³ They praised pro-Roman Catholics as martyrs for the faith,²³⁴ and regarded them as prisoners of conscience.²³⁵ On the other hand, the Chinese Government viewed the sentences as punishment meted out to political criminals. The arrested Catholics were considered as counterrevolutionaries who conducted illegal activities under the cloak of religion,²³⁶ and as "a small minority who persist in their reactionary position and publicly say that they prefer to be controlled by foreign authority."²³⁷

The Catholics' Response to the Ecclesiological Tension

This subsection intends to outline the Catholics' responses to the two different ecclesiological stands existing in the Chinese Church. Although the

²³² Personal memorandum from Sister Theresa Chu, 15 August 1984, p. 2.

²³³ Cf. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Study Paper on Religious Liberty (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981), section 3.4, p. 9.

²³⁴ Wu, *passim*; Behold, *passim*; Fr. Chu, p. 87.

²³⁵ AI, IIA ASA/17/05/83.

²³⁶ SCMP (HK), 15 December 1981.

²³⁷ Jiafang Ribao, 5 July 1983.

responses varied from place to place according to the local Catholic communities and their respective local leaderships, most of the responses opt for pragmatic benefit to the pastoral needs of the faithful rather than for insistence on ecclesiological purity. They can be classified into five types: i. Ignoring, ii. Accommodating, iii. Utilizing, iv. Tolerating, and v. Confronting.

i. Ignoring

In some Catholic communities, the Catholics ignored the two stands and did not claim to belong to either one. For example, in a village in Shangdong, which was highly populated by Catholics, some Catholics were appointed by local officials to represent the community in the CPCA. They did not appear to take the CPCA seriously. All Catholics in this community showed a strong allegiance to the Pope. However, there was no evidence of their contacts with Rome. They regarded themselves as both Catholic and patriotic²³⁸ and did not classify themselves as belonging to either faction.

Similarly, many Catholic rural communities in Hebei, where the Catholics had their own priests, were controlled by neither the regional Catholic Affairs Commission nor Rome. Their religious activities were conducted with permission from officials of the local RAB,²³⁹ and not from the pro-Government bishop or from the pro-Roman bishop, even though both of them claimed ecclesiastical jurisdiction over these communities. In both examples, the Catholics simply ignored the ecclesiological tension, and concentrated their attention on striving for more religious activities.

²³⁸"Catholic Village," p. 8.

²³⁹Information from Priest X., interviewed by this author in May 1984.

ii. Accommodating

In some areas, Catholics responded to the ecclesiological tension by accomodating both stands. They would openingly join the CPCA, in order to be able to publicly organize Catholic activities, and they would simultaneously demonstrate a pro-Roman attitude by not openingly denouncing Rome. Through this, they could ease the ecclesiological tension and concentrate their effort on the pastoral work which was badly needed by the faithful.

This type of response could be seen in the Catholic Church of Fushun, Liaoning. Both Fr. Paul Zui and Fr. Pius Jin in this parish were known for their pro-Roman attitude.²⁴⁰ However, they actively participated in the CPCA. Fr. Zui was the Chairman of the local CPCA, and Fr. Jin, the Vice-Chairman.²⁴¹ The official ecclesiastical reports from this church overwhelmingly stress the pastoral activities and made none of the complaints against Rome²⁴² which usually appeared in similar reports from other churches.²⁴³ There did not seem to be any ecclesiological discord in this parish.²⁴⁴

iii. Utilizing

There is a report about some places in Hebei stating that Catholics with different ecclesiological stands took advantage of one another, and

²⁴⁰"La situation," p. 30.

²⁴¹CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 51f.

²⁴²For example, see CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), pp. 10f; or CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 21.

²⁴³For example, see the report on the reopening of the Catholic Church in Jiangyun near Suzhou, in CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 22f.

²⁴⁴Sunday Examiner, 25 May 1984.

cooperated with each other in a symbiotic relationship. For example, pro-Government Catholics, because of their political advantage, would provide a working environment for the pro-Roman Catholics, while pro-Roman Catholics, because of their popularity among the laity, would attract the faithful to join the Open Church.²⁴⁵ This symbiotic relationship could be seen in places where priests discreetly ministered to the laity beneath the shelter created by their pro-Government bishops. This was the situation in the Diocese of Xi'an where the bishop was member of the CPCA and priests under him were pro-Roman.²⁴⁶ Both groups seemed to utilize the other's strength to compensate for their own inadequacy for the pastoral benefit of Catholics at large.

iv. Tolerating

In at least one diocese, local authorities and pro-Government Catholics seemed to recognize the clandestinely consecrated pro-Roman bishops as the de facto Catholic leaders, and they seemed to tolerate the open existence of a pro-Roman diocese. This toleration of pro-Roman Catholics was probably due to the existence of a strong pro-Roman community, so strong that local authorities and pro-Government Catholics did not dare to interfere with them.

This phenomenon could be seen in the Fengxiang Diocese in Shaanxi. In communion with the Holy See, the Rome-appointed Bishop Anthony Zhou

²⁴⁵ Behold, p. 4.

²⁴⁶ Bishop Ji Huairang of Xi'an was independently consecrated by the Chinese Church, he is also a member of the CPCA. One of his priests, Fr. Antonio Liu Fudao, is the Rome-appointed Vicar General of the Diocese of Xi'an, see AP (1981): 543. Bishop Ji and his priests, including Fr. Liu, seem to enjoy a good working relationship, CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 20.

consecrated Fr. Lucas Li as his successor.²⁴⁷ Immediately after the consecration, Bishop Li went to the local Public Security Office announcing that he was the only lawful bishop there. Li disregarded the fact that there was already a Government-recognized ordinary.²⁴⁸ The chief of the local Public Security Office was reported to have shown his acceptance by shaking hands with Bishop Li and congratulating him.²⁴⁹

Later at the funeral of Bishop Zhou, even though more than ten thousand people attended, Bishop Lucas Li and a few other priests were absent. It was reported that they were deliberately removed from this big gathering and "were instructed by the local officials to attend a political meeting."²⁵⁰ This incident suggests that the local Government was reluctant to allow pro-Roman prelates to exercise their ecclesiastical authority too publicly, even though it acknowledged their de facto authority.

It is interesting to note that there was no mention of any arrest of pro-Roman clergy, even though local authorities must have been aware of the "illegal" (from the Government's perspective) status of pro-Roman clergy,

²⁴⁷UCAN, 30 March 1983.

²⁴⁸In 1981, there were two Government-recognized bishops in Shaanxi: Bishop John Ji Huairang of Xi'an, who was elected in February 1958 and was consecrated in December 1981, and Bishop John Li Shengxue of Hangzhong, who was independently consecrated before 1966 and died on 20 January 1984. It would be logical to assume that the Shaanxi CAC would either appoint one of these two bishops to oversee the Diocese of Fengxiang, or appoint a local priest to be the diocesan administrator of Fengxiang. In either case, there would be a Government-recognized ordinary in this diocese.

²⁴⁹Crux, (1 August 1983), p. 4.

²⁵⁰For example, the chief of the local Public Security Office, mentioned in the "Catholic Village" was himself a Catholic. This author also knew some high ranking Chinese officials who were secretly professed Christians. Many of them would not publically confess their faith because it would have jeopardized their careers, yet they were sympathetic and were very helpful to Christians.

especially, that of Bishop Li. The Government's toleration of pro-Roman Catholics activities, such as the funeral and consecration, indicates that either there was a strong pro-Roman Catholic influence, which pressured the local authorities to permit their activities, or local officials were sympathetic to, if not part of, the pro-Roman Catholic community.²⁵¹

The large turnout of people at the funeral in this small diocese indicates that Catholics were involved in their religious activities and formed a vibrant Catholic community. However, there was no mention of this vibrant Catholic life in the official Catholic publications. The only possible reference to this diocese that could be found in official publications was the mention that "some disturbance and confusions occurred in some regions of Shaanxi."²⁵² The minimal official mention of Fengxiang probably suggests that pro-Government Catholics had little, or no influence, in this diocese. Thus, the ecclesiological tension did not appear to be intense because not only pro-Government Catholics, but also the civil authority, had to tolerate pro-Roman Catholics and their activities.

v. Confronting

There are reports from some places, such as Wenzhou, Zhejiang, stating that Catholics of different ecclesiological stands confronted each other. The Government-recognized Bishop Fang Zhigang of Wenzhou is reported not to have fulfilled any pastoral duties.²⁵³ This may be due to the fact that he was not

²⁵¹CB 5 (March 1983): 2.

²⁵²CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 41.

²⁵³The only report on Bishop Fang's pastoral activity was his attendance (not celebrant) of a mass in Hanzhou, see CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 55f.

well-accepted by local Catholics because of his pro-Government stand. At the same time, many pro-Roman clergymen were arrested for their refusal to cooperate with pro-Government Catholics.²⁵⁴ Furthermore, pro-Government Catholics reported only their own activities as formal Catholic activities.²⁵⁵ They regarded many pro-Roman Catholic activities as illegal.²⁵⁶

Another piece of evidence which strongly demonstrates the existence of animosity between pro-Roman and pro-Government Catholics in Wenzhou is the fact that despite a large Catholic population and the flourishing of many Catholic activities since 1979, Catholics did not have their Cathedral reopened until December 1983,²⁵⁷ after parishes in even remote towns with fewer Catholics had already had their churches reopened. Since there must be a strong support of local Catholics for the reopening of a church, the delay of the reopening of St. Paul Cathedral in Wenzhou strongly suggests the existence of discord among Catholics in Wenzhou.

4. The Theological Implications of the Tension

Some Western observers suggest that the ecclesiological tension generated animosity among Chinese Catholics, and polarized Chinese Catholics into two antagonistic factions.²⁵⁸ However, evidence suggests that from 1979

²⁵⁴Wu, p. 24.

²⁵⁵CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 44.

²⁵⁶Wang, pp. 92f; CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28.

²⁵⁷Qiao, no. 7 (March 1982), p. 44.

²⁵⁸For example, see IHT, 14 May 1982.

to 1983, Chinese Catholics downplayed the ecclesiological differences and developed contextual responses for the pastoral benefit of the faithful. Chinese Catholics looked for pragmatic solutions vis-à-vis this ecclesiological tension. This ecclesial development bears profound theological implications.

1. The pastoral needs supersede theological differences

It is reported that animosity actually existed between pro-Government and pro-Roman Catholics. Some pro-Roman Catholics would find excuses not to attend masses celebrated by pro-Government priests,²⁵⁹ and would only attend the religious activities administered by pro-Roman priests.²⁶⁰

However, the animosity was not intense enough to create a big gap between pro-Government and pro-Roman Catholics. The faithful seemed to accept the de facto leadership of the pro-Government prelates.²⁶¹ Many visitors noticed that all the Open Churches were usually crowded with worshippers.²⁶² One reported that thousands attended masses in the Open Church with fervor and devotion.²⁶³ Another report said, "I have seen and I was told that practically all Catholics who can go to Open Churches do go."²⁶⁴ Many Catholics simply went for the sacraments, and did not care who administered them.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁹ Church 1980, pp. 1, 8.

²⁶⁰ Behold, pp. 4, 6.

²⁶¹ Whyte, pp. 792ff.

²⁶² Dunne, "The Prisoners of Shanghai," p. 50; Myers, passim.

²⁶³ G. Dunne, "Report on a Visit to China: 1982," CUP, no. 4 (Summer 1983), p. 31, 33, 37.

²⁶⁴ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 139.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

Some reports also show that some Catholics who had once been hostile to the CPCA and had refrained from attending the Open Church, began changing their attitudes.²⁶⁶ A Chinese Catholic wrote:

The difference is that, at that time (in the 50's) the majority of Catholics were with the opposition whereas the patriotic priests were a very small number. Now the situation has changed. People like my own relatives, who were not political to begin with, but who resisted the Patriotic Movement merely because they were told that they would be excommunicated if they went to Mass, have now figured out that it would not be a mortal sin to worship in the Church. With that understanding, more people have come back.²⁶⁷

Reports indicate that pro-Roman prelates served in the Open Church under the auspices of pro-Government Catholics.²⁶⁸ These observations indicate that the demarcation line dividing pro-Government and pro-Rome Catholics began to blur, and that Chinese Catholics did not regard this ecclesiological issue as a major hindrance preventing them from enjoying a normal religious life.

For the Chinese Catholics, to receive the sacraments from a valid ecclesial institution, which held a different ecclesiological view, seemed to be more fulfilling than not to receive the sacraments at all. Their eagerness to receive pastoral service led many of them to compromise their ecclesiological stand. Realizing the needs of the Catholics, the Catholic Church took a practical approach in facing the ecclesiological tension. In short, pragmatism overrode idealism.

²⁶⁶ See Chu, China Trip 1983, p. 3; or Guangzhou, pp. 6f.

²⁶⁷ Dunne, "The Prisoners of Shanghai," p. 54.

²⁶⁸ Behold, pp. 4, 7, 11.

ii. The contextual accommodation supercedes ecclesiological purity

This tension did not seem to paralyze Chinese Catholics. Rather, it stimulated them to seek a modus vivendi within their context. Such a modus vivendi, or contextual accommodation, emerged primarily for the pastoral needs of the faithful.

The contextual accommodation was shaped by three major factors. The first is the sociopolitical context of China. The Chinese Church is always under some form of governmental control, and cannot exist publicly without sanction from the Government. The only way for the Chinese Church to operate openly and to gain social recognition for its status was to pledge its allegiance to the Government. In practical terms, it meant joining the CPCA and submitting to the control of the RAB.

The second factor is the traditional Catholic theological context, which heavily emphasizes loyalty to the Papacy. The Chinese Church could not compromise or ignore this teaching, otherwise it would pose a challenge to a very basic tenet of Roman Catholicism.

The third factor is the enormous pastoral needs of the faithful. The faithful, after the prolonged denial of public religious expression, were eager to participate in religious activities. Also, it is the faithful who form the core of the Church. Thus, the needs of the faithful--the normalization of religious life--naturally become the top priority of the Chinese Church.

These three factors led the Chinese Church to two interrelated ecclesial dilemmas. The first dilemma concerned its loyalty. With open hostility expressed by the Chinese Government and the Vatican to each other, it was difficult for Chinese Catholics to decide to whom they should pledge their primary loyalty.

The second dilemma was about the popularity of the pastoral ministry of the Chinese Church. Since pro-Roman religious activities were illegal in the eyes of the Government and were clandestinely performed, they served only a small number of Chinese Catholics.²⁶⁹ The pro-Government religious activities did not draw large support from the faithful because the activities did not have the sanction of Rome. Hence, neither the pro-Government activities nor the pro-Roman activities alone could meet all the pastoral needs of the faithful.

Chinese Catholics dealt with these two dilemmas pragmatically by giving primary consideration to the needs of the faithful. They took a contextual accomodating stand which allowed them, on the one hand, to associate with the CPCA, and on the other hand, to be privately loyal to Rome.²⁷⁰ They officially denounced the political policy of the Vatican, yet discreetly exhibited a strong affinity for all Catholic traditions. They also deliberately emphasized political independence from the Vatican, yet subtly avoided any reference to the rejection of papal primacy in matters of faith and morality.²⁷¹ They stressed the pastoral duty of the Chinese Church instead of vigorously debating the ecclesiological orthodoxy of different stands. By taking this position, they avoided ecclesiological controversy and concentrated their effort on the the badly needed pastoral task.

The following words by a Chinese bishop, who is a member of the CBC and the CPCA, well summarizes this contextual accommodation of the Chinese Church:

²⁶⁹"Black Priests" are constantly hunted by the Government, Behold, p. 10.

²⁷⁰CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 140; and Behold, pp. 4, 7.

²⁷¹Dunne, "Report on a Visit to China: 1982," p. 33.

There was no way for us to resist the vexation of tortures we had endure until we gave in and agreed to join the Patriotic Church.²⁷² Moreover, the [Chinese] Church must survive. We must accommodate to the circumstances and wholeheartedly collaborate with the Government. What good did Bishops such as Gong Pinmei and Zhang Kexing (of Xiwanzi, now called Changli in Hebei Province; both are still in jail) accomplish by their stubbornness?²⁷³

D. THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

As the Chinese Church reestablished its presence from 1979 to 1983, it encountered challenges such as the enormous pastoral needs of the faithful, the shortage of virtually all ecclesial resources, the faithful adherence to traditional Catholic practices, and the presence of ecclesiological tensions. In response to this ecclesial situation, the Chinese Church developed a particular style of church life. This type of church life emphasizes a pragmatic approach in ecclesial matters, and is shaped around the needs and the aspirations of the faithful. In other words, this style of church life is developed from praxis, viz. the pastoral situation of the Chinese Church.

This section reflects on the characteristics of this unique church experience and highlights the ecclesial themes emerging from this situation.

²⁷²In Chinese, the shorten version for CPCA is Aiguohui, whereas the term for "Patriotic Church" is Aiguojiachui. There seems to be a confusion over these two terms. This Chinese bishop probably refers to the CPCA rather than to the "Patriotic Church," because Chinese bishops, especially those who belong to the CPCA and CBC, resent and object to the usage of the term "Patriotic Church." This term "Patriotic Church" implies the existence of a schismatic Church which all Chinese bishops have vigorously denied.

²⁷³CUP, no. 6 (Winter 1983), p. 28. This Chinese bishop said these words in late 1980. It is reported that Bishop Zhang has since been released from jail and has retired to his home village, see Lazzarotto's The Catholic Church in Post-Mao China, p. 71. Gong was granted parole on July 1985, Wenhui Bao (S), 4 July 1985.

Two ecclesiological themes, the Small Flock concept advocated by Rahner²⁷⁴ and the Praxical Ecclesiology advanced by Lau,²⁷⁵ may be particularly helpful in reflecting on the life of the Chinese Church. Both themes advocate a praxical and contextual approach in building Christian community, similar to the one adopted by the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983.

1. Rahner's Small Flock concept

The Chinese Church, from 1979 to 1983, can be described as follows. First, it was a powerless minority group. The Catholic population, according to official statistics, is 0.3% of the total population.²⁷⁶ This figure is not only numerically, but also socially, insignificant, because the Chinese Church had no social influence other than through a few representatives serving in political and legislative organizations.²⁷⁷ Thus, the Chinese Church was actually a voiceless minority in China.

Secondly, the Chinese Church was an underprivileged group. Since Catholic beliefs directly contradicted the State orthodoxy--atheism, it often

²⁷⁴K. Rahner, The Shape of the Church to Come (New York: The Seaburg Press, 1974), pp. 29-33. This concept of Small Flock is not to be confused with the Chinese Protestant indigenous movement, also called Small Flock, started by Watchman Nee in the 1930s. This movement later spreads to the United States under the leadership of Witness Lee.

²⁷⁵M.G. Lau, "The Possibility of a Praxical Ecclesiology," in Tripod, no. 5 (October 1981), pp. 42-46.

²⁷⁶Some estimated that the Chinese Catholic population in 1983 was between 6 to 7 millions, see Crux, (1 August 1983), p. 1.

²⁷⁷For example, there were a few Catholic representatives in the national CPPCA in 1983, see CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), backcover.

was the object of public ridicule.²⁷⁸ Catholics were often targets of abuse, especially during political campaigns.²⁷⁹ Thus, the Chinese Church existed at the mercy of the civil authority.

Thirdly, Catholics exist as a close-knit community reinforced by the strong Chinese familial structure.²⁸⁰ Chinese Catholics usually participate in religious activities in family²⁸¹ and clan units.²⁸² They preserve and transmit their faith from generation to generation²⁸³ and their faith has thus become a family tradition. A long history of family religious tradition²⁸⁴ is something to be proud of. In rural areas, clan and blood-related family members tend to live together. In the same way, Chinese Catholics are usually found living together in the same communities, which are commonly known as Catholic

²⁷⁸From 1979 to 1983, the Chinese Government published a lot of anti-religion literature, such as Talks on Religion published by the Zhejiang People's Press in 1983. The Catholic faith, too, was often interpreted as an unscientific worldview. For example, see the cartoon in Renmin Ribao, 10 December 1983.

²⁷⁹For example, see the death of Bishop Francis Zhou of Xianxian, Hebei, in CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 72-74; or the fate of Bishop John Ji of Xi'an, Shaanxi, in Dunne's "Report on a Visit to China: 1982," p. 32.

²⁸⁰The Chinese concept of family is broader than the nuclear model generally shared by Western sociologists. An ideal Chinese family is an extended family composed of more than one blood-related nuclear families. However, recent research suggests that the extended family has begun to lose its popularity, see Fei Xiaotong, "Changes in Chinese Family Structure," in CR 31 (July 1982): 23-26.

²⁸¹This phenomenon is observed by virtually all visitors to the Chinese Church.

²⁸²Wang, *passim*.

²⁸³For example, Bishop Michael Fu, of Beijing, came from a Catholic family of several generations of Catholics, in Wei Xiutang, "In a Catholic Church in Beijing," p. 48.

²⁸⁴Fr. Francis Xavier Zhu's family has been Catholic for three hundred years, in Fr. Chu, pp. 11-17.

villages²⁸⁵ or Catholic districts.²⁸⁶ The Chinese Catholic community, therefore, depends not only on the unity of faith, but also on the bond of the family.

Fourthly, Chinese Catholics have strongly witnessed to their Catholic faith, despite all difficulties and hardships. They underscored their faith by preserving all Catholic traditions; desiring the sacraments, and expressing an intense devotion. This witness of faith has been a silent, yet powerful, apologetic message in the midst of an unbelieving world.

The strong adherence to Catholic traditions has testified to their loyalty to the Catholic faith. It has been a message of Chinese Catholics to the Chinese society, as well as to the world, that their faith has not been changed, and it has indeed prevailed over adverse social conditions.

The desire of the Chinese Catholics for the sacraments revealed their dependency on the visible forms of grace for spiritual nourishment. The veneration and respect of the sacraments served as a silent witness to the spiritual value of religious mysticism in the context of an atheistic society, where religion was often criticized, ridiculed, and unjustly devalued. The intense devotion of Chinese Catholics showed the strength of their Catholic faith. The turmoils of the past did not weaken their faith, but rather strengthened it.

Finally, the Chinese Church was an expanding community. During the

²⁸⁵ For an example in Shandong, see "Catholic Village"; in Hebei, see CCC no. 13 (October 1985): 18f; in Liaoning, see CCC, no. 13 (October 1985), pp. 20f.

²⁸⁶ A well-known example is Xujiahui which was formerly known as Zikawei District.

period from 1979 to 1983, the Chinese Church did not diminish in size, but, on the contrary, it grew. It did not openly challenge the State ideology, nor publicly make an apologetical defence for its belief, nor launch any evangelistic campaign. It was the silent witness of believers to the Catholic faith in their daily lives that attracted the younger generations from Catholic families and those without any Catholic background as well to Catholicism.²⁸⁷

The ecclesial characteristics of the Chinese Church are strikingly similar to the ecclesial concept of the Small Flock in Karl Rahner's book The Shape of the Church to Come.²⁸⁸ Rahner's concept of the Small Flock refers to Christians who try to live out their Christian faith in the context of an unbelieving world. This ecclesiological concept presupposes that a closely bonded Christian group, which is serious about its faith and attends to its Christian value, is a minority with little or no social privilege in a non-Christian society.

The Chinese Church seems to possess all the essential elements of a Small Flock. The presence of Catholicism in China did not depend on a formal monolithic Catholic structure, rather, it relied on groups of close-knit Chinese Catholics, who kept, passed on and diligently witness to their faith. This Chinese Small Flock, although deprived of any social power and prestige, actually became a growing community that "silently and powerfully resisted the overwhelming pressure of atheism by living out a genuinely spiritual life."²⁸⁹ The life of the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983 was, indeed, a

²⁸⁷ Since 1979, many Chinese from non-Catholic backgrounds have joined the Catholic Church, for example, see CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 16.

²⁸⁸ Rahner, pp. 29-33.

²⁸⁹ Lau, p. 46.

concrete realization of the Small Flock envisioned by Rahner

2. Lau's Praxical Ecclesiology

In 1981, Maria Goretti Lau, a theologian in Hong Kong, proposed the concept of Praxical Ecclesiology. She developed this concept hoping to break new grounds in constructing a new ecclesiology for the Chinese Church.²⁹⁰ In her article "The Possibility of Praxical Ecclesiology," Lau argues that since Chinese society is greatly influenced by Mao's ideology, especially by Mao's epistemology on Theory and Practice,²⁹¹ it is appropriate for Chinese Catholics to develop a relevant theological methodology which is compatible with Mao's ideology.

This subsection suggests that the life of the Chinese Church from 1979 to 1983 closely resembles Lau's Praxical Ecclesiology. The first part of this subsection outlines Lau's concept of Praxical Ecclesiology, and the second part proposes that the life of the Chinese Catholic Church is a living illustration of this Praxical Ecclesiology.

1. Praxical ecclesiology

Lau's concept of Praxical Ecclesiology is based on two closely related themes: the Tripartite method of theologization and the epistemology of Mao. The Tripartite method is basically the Theology-From-Below methodology that uses praxis as the focus of theology. This methodology has three basic components:

²⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 42-46.

²⁹¹ Mao Zedong, "On Practice," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 5 volumes (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1966-1978), I: 259-310.

a. analysis of reality, b. theological reflection, and c. pastoral consideration. Praxis becomes the main criterion for doing theology, and any theological construction returns to praxis. Hence the whole process is a progressive and cumulative activity relevant to a given situation. This methodology is popular among Third World theologians.

Mao's epistemology is somewhat similar to the Tripartite method. Mao perceived that theory and practice cannot be separated, and that there is a dialectical relationship between them. In Mao's epistemology, knowledge is acquired through three stages with emphasis on practice: a. perception of the situation, b. conceptualization of the situation (creation of theoretical knowledge), and c. application of knowledge to the situation. Thus, the situation gives rise to knowledge which in turn changes the situation: a praxis-knowledge-new praxis cycle.

Lau proposes that the Chinese Church can reflect upon its ecclesial existence by means of the Tripartite method, because Mao's epistemology, which affects significantly the mentality of modern Chinese, is similar to the Tripartite method of doing theology.

What Lau proposed is, in fact, a revolutionary idea for the Chinese Church. Chinese Catholics have long adopted the traditional Theology-From-Above method, which deduces pastoral applications from abstract principles (dogma). Changing the starting point of theologization from dogma to praxis is indeed a great theological challenge to the Chinese Church. It is even harder for Chinese Catholics than other Catholics because they have been isolated from the trend of Liberation Theology which strongly advocates the importance of praxis for doing theology. Therefore, in 1981, Lau only spoke of the possibility, rather than of the reality, of Praxial Ecclesiology.

ii. Realization of praxical ecclesiology

Based on the data analysed in this chapter, it is fair to state that praxis became an important factor in the reconstruction of the Chinese Church between 1979 and 1983. The modus vivendi which emerged out of the devastating ecclesiological tension is more a result of praxis than a consequence of dogmatic principles.

The first step of the praxical process of ecclesialization is the analysis of the situation. Chinese Catholics realized that only with total submission to the Government could the Chinese Church gain sufficient freedom to provide pastoral care to the faithful. They also knew that the context did not allow them to maintain their former model of ecclesial existence, viz., total submission to Rome. Hence the practical reality was that if the faithful were to be served, the Chinese Church had to submit itself to the control of the civil authority, and to reject, at least verbally, Rome's authority.²⁹²

As Chinese Catholics realized that the traditional ecclesial model, which opted for submission to Rome, was unsuitable in the Chinese context, they began developing an unique ecclesial life which utilized the Oriental concept of "Both/And" to accommodate the ecclesiological tension.²⁹³ In practice, they both pledged loyalty to the Government in public, and witnessed faithfully to traditional Catholicism in deed.

The second step is the theological reflection. As they tried hard to

²⁹²CUP, no. 6 (Winter 1983), p. 28.

²⁹³J.Y. Lee, "The Yin-Yang Way of Thinking," in IRM 60 (July 1971): 362-370. For the theological implications of the "Both/And" category of thinking, see J.Y. Lee, The Theology of Change (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1979), pp. 120-130.

develop theological legitimation for this seemingly contradictory and inconsistent mode of ecclesial existence, they resolved to accept this contradiction as an optimal way of living in their specific context.²⁹⁴ They argued that the pastoral consideration of the faithful is the ultimate theological justification. Thus, orthopraxis overrides orthodoxy.

The third step is the application of theological reflection. Chinese Catholics came up with various ecclesial responses to the ecclesiological tension. These responses were mostly based on a praxical priority of the pastoral needs of the faithful. They enabled the Chinese Church to provide pastoral service to the faithful, and to grow qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

Through this praxical process, Chinese Catholics no longer based their ecclesial existence entirely on traditional dogma, but also on praxis. It was no longer a Theology-From-Above, but a Theology-From-Below. Praxis became an important criterion for determining the ecclesial life of this community. The result was that this community was pragmatic in nature and relevant to its social, political cultural and pastoral context.

This ecclesiology has one major defect affecting the ecclesial welfare of the Chinese Church. The Chinese Church was de facto separated from Rome. This ecclesiology made no provision for the Chinese Catholics to deal with the reconciliation with Rome because the Rome-Chinese rapprochement did not seem to be an urgent ecclesial matter for the Chinese Catholics vis-à-vis other urgent needs such as sacraments, devotions, and catechumenate.

²⁹⁴ The NAC and the CBC always emphasize the fact that their rejection of Rome's authority is the only viable option which the Chinese Church has and that it is the only way to keep the Chinese Church alive; see CCC, no. 7

3. Further Theological Questions

This praxical approach in shaping the life of the Chinese Catholics raises many profound theological questions which challenge many basic theological presuppositions. Some of these questions will be discussed in chapter six.

The Chinese Church manages its intra-ecclesial affairs with a pragmatic approach. Can the same approach also be used in dealing with inter-ecclesial issues such as the Chinese Church-Rome conflict? What will be the theological consequence if this conflict is handled from a pragmatic perspective? Will there be a danger of compromising certain essential ecclesiastical principles? How will such a pragmatic relationship effect the relationships between Rome and other local churches?

The praxical approach in dealing with ecclesial matters unavoidably leads to diverse, dynamic and contextual ecclesial communities. How can these ecclesial communities be reconciled with the ecclesiological concept of universality? Can this approach lead to a new realization of universality? And how will it affect the ecclesiastical administration of the Universal Church?

Praxis challenges traditional belief and practices, opens new ecclesial frontiers, and enriches ecclesial life. Yet, it also limits certain functions of the Church in a particular context. How can the limitation of the Church, caused by praxis, be resolved? Or is this limitation no longer an important ecclesial criterion to determine the wholeness and the fullness of the Church?

Obviously the Chinese Catholics did not take pastoral expediency as the sole ecclesial criterion to determine their religious life. They would not compromise some traditional practices such as priestly celibacy. Therefore, in a pastoral contextual situation, how does the Church discern between the

uncompromised principles and the changeable ecclesial elements? Is the axiom vox populi vox Dei (the voice of people is the voice of God) valid in the case of the Chinese Church where the Church hierarchy gave heed to the desire of the faithful?

The praxical approach in doing theology challenges the basis of theological methodology. Can dogma, or abstract theological principles, be changed by praxis? Or can praxis be restricted by dogma? Are dogma and praxis mutually exclusive, because of the difference in their presupposed methodologies? Or are they complimentary to each other? If so, what is the dynamic relationship between orthodoxy and orthopraxis?

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNAL STRUCTURES OF THE CHINESE CHURCH

The Chinese Church has an ecclesiastical structure that is composed of three unique organizations: the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CPCA), the National Administrative Commission of the Catholic Church in China (NAC) and the Chinese Bishops' College of the Catholic Church in China (CBC). These three ecclesial organizations form the core of the Chinese Church hierarchy. This chapter intends to study the internal structures of the Chinese Church via the examination of these three organizations and their interrelationships.

The Chinese Government does not functionally differentiate these three organizations from each other and refers to them globally as "national patriotic religious organizations,"¹ and the Government recognizes these three organizations collectively as the only legitimate ecclesial representatives of the Chinese Catholic Church.²

Some commentators have different interpretations on the ecclesial roles and functions of these organizations. They suggest that these organizations are puppets used by the Chinese Government to strengthen civil control over the Chinese Church and to promote Communist ideology among the Catholics. In other words, these organizations are seen as instruments of the Chinese Government to

¹Document no. 19, Section VII.

²Ibid.

achieve its political objectives³ as the Chinese equivalent of the Pax Movement.⁴ This interpretation is reinforced by Rome which denies the ecclesiastical legitimacy of these organizations.

As for the individual organizations, the CPCA is probably the most controversial of these three organizations. The ambiguity about whether it is a civil or ecclesial organization leads to diverse interpretations of its nature. Some see the CPCA as a heretical and schismatic means for the Chinese Government to destroy the Chinese Church.⁵ Some commentators simply view the CPCA as the Chinese Catholic Church.⁶ Others, especially Chinese Catholic leaders, emphasize that the CPCA is merely a political body of the Chinese Church with no ecclesiastical status, and that it is not the Chinese Church.⁷

³For example, see Chang's "The CCP's Policy Towards Religion," in IS 19 (September 1983): 67; Chao's "The Place of Religion in Contemporary China," Occasional Paper no. 10 (Hong Kong: Chinese Church Research Center, 1981), p. 19; P. Morrison's "Religious Policy in China and Its Implementation in the Light of Document No. 19," in RCL 12 (Winter 1984): 248; and P. Gheddo, Lettre di cristiani della cina (Bologna: Editrice Missionaria Italiana), p.78.

⁴L. Ladany, Behold, The Catholic Church in China (Hong Kong: Privately Published, 1984), pp. 10f, hereafter cited as Behold.

⁵Pius XII denounces the CPCA in his encyclical Ad Sinarum gentes (1954) and Ad Apostolorum principis (1958); ET PDRNC, pp. 38-45, 49-61. In Ad Apostolorum principis, Pius XII charges that the CPCA is aimed "to separate Catholic communities from the Holy See, and at making Catholics gradually embrace the tenets of atheistic materialism, by which God Himself is denied and religious principles are rejected." Thus this author does not agree with Barry's thesis that "Rome has never declared that Catholic Patriotic Association is heretical or schismatic," in Barry's "The Formation of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association," Part I and Part II in CF 24 (March 1981): 1-17, and 24 (June 1981): 119-141, hereafter cited as Barry I and Barry II.

⁶CB 2 (June 1980): 1.

⁷CCC, no. 1 (November 1980): 33; F. Pardinas, "A Visit to Red China," in Worldmission 17 (Fall 1966):63.

Regarding the functions and role of the NAC and the CBC, some commentators postulate that they serve as the contact points to attract Catholics, who are disenchanted with the highly politicized CPCA, to join the Open Church directly without identifying with the CPCA.⁸ Therefore, the formation of the "illicit" CBC and the NAC⁹ is thought to be a way for the Chinese Government to attract pro-Roman Catholics to the "schismatic" Chinese Church.¹⁰ However, other commentators speculate that the CBC and the NAC are parts of the ecclesiastical structure developed by Chinese Catholics to administer church affairs independently from the Chinese Government.¹¹

Granted that these diverse interpretations of the ecclesiastical structure of the Chinese Church are all valid in reference to their respective political and theological stands, this chapter attempts to interpret the Chinese ecclesiastical structure from the contextual perspective. The role and the functions of the CPCA, the CBC, and the NAC are interpreted in the light of the sociopolitical situation of Chinese society. Consequently, the internal structure of the Chinese Church hierarchy (from 1979 to 1983) viz. the CPCA, the NAC and the CBC, is hypothesized as a contextual development that emerged from the Chinese social reality.

⁸P.G. Andrew, "Catholics in China," Part I, in The Tablet 234 (18 October 1980): 1103.

⁹At the end of 1983, Rome recognized the Regional Chinese Bishops' Conference (composed of the Bishops in Taiwan and the missionary ordinaries who held Sees in China and who were expelled from China) as the only canonical representative of the Chinese Catholic Church, see AP (1983): 957. Consequently, the CBC is canonically illicit.

¹⁰Behold, p. 11.

¹¹For example, see CB 2 (September-December 1980): 16; also Lazzarotto's The Catholic Church in Post-Mao China (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Center, 1982), pp. 38f.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines the historical development, the civil and ecclesial status, and the functions of the CPCA. It interprets the role of the CPCA in reference to the Church and State relationship in China. The second section explores the structure of the NAC, and discusses the ecclesiastical functions of this organization in the context of the Chinese Church. The third section examines the controversial ecclesiastical status of the CBC, and the validity of Chinese Independent Bishops. The last section reflects upon this internal ecclesiastical structure of the Chinese Church and discusses the theological questions that arise from this unique ecclesiastical structure.

A. THE CHINESE CATHOLIC PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATION (CPCA)

This section attempts to explore the role and functions of the CPCA in light of the Chinese sociopolitical context. Because the CPCA came into existence in 1957, this section first examines the functions and development of the CPCA from 1957 to 1966. After this brief historical survey, this section then discusses the functions and roles of the CPCA in the new sociopolitical context from 1979 to 1983.

1. The CPCA: 1957-1966

It is generally agreed that the origin of the CPCA can be traced to the Guangyuan Manifesto issued on November 30, 1950.¹² This manifesto is the first

¹²Xinhua, 13 December 1950; Barry I, pp. 9-19.

Chinese Catholic declaration to call for a Chinese Church which would be free from foreign political influences. After that, a series of events took place that eventually led to the formation of the CPCA on August 2, 1957. Since there have been numerous studies done on the historical background of the CPCA (1950-1957),¹³ this subsection intends to highlight some incidents that are essential for understanding the nature and the role of the CPCA during the period from 1957 to 1966.

1. Formation of the CPCA in 1957

In 1957, the Chinese Church was in a state of turmoil. Not only did it have to face the Sino-Vatican conflict, it also had to deal with the control which the Chinese Government gradually exerted over all aspects of its life. In addition, because of the departure of the foreign missionaries and the incarceration of those Chinese prelates who refused to support the Chinese Government, the Chinese Church lacked a structured leadership to guide believers in facing the external crises and challenges. Under all these pressures, the Chinese Church had to seek ways to adjust its structure to the Chinese social context. The process of searching resulted in the formation of the CPCA.

¹³On the background and the formation of the CPCA (1950-1957), see R.C. Bush, Religion in Communist China (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), pp. 99-169; T. Hang, Die Katholische Kirche im chinesischen Raum: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Munich: Pustet, 1963), pp. 85-150; L. Wei, Le Saint-Siège et la Chine de Pie IX à nos jours (Paris: Edition A. Allais, 1970), pp. 225-256; L. Triviére, Catholic Church in China: Research Backgrounder (Hong Kong: Privately published mimeograph, 1959), pp. 79-97; E. Hanson, Catholic Policy in China and Korea (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1980), pp. 66-69; Ladany's The Church in China: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (Hong Kong: CNA, 1975), pp. 8-23; also Barry's Part I & II; and Thomas (pseud.) "The Inner Story of the CPCA," Part I and II in ZT no. 50 (16 February 1961), pp. 83-87 and no. 51 (16 March 1961), pp. 138-142, hereafter cited as Thomas I and Thomas II.

Three preparatory meetings were held to form the CPCA. The first preparatory meeting, which took place in Beijing in July 1956, established the parameters of the forthcoming CPCA. The CPCA would be a Catholic association to assist the building of the nation.¹⁴ The second preparatory meeting, which was held in February 1957 in Beijing, defined the CPCA as a political organization parallel to the Chinese Church, which though it would have no authority to change the doctrines of the Church, would serve as a necessary bridge between the Chinese Church and the Government.¹⁵

In the third preparatory meeting, which was held in Beijing's Xinqiao Hotel from June 17 to July 13, 1957,¹⁶ a consensus on the role and the political stand of the CPCA¹⁷ was reached among one hundred and twenty-four delegates from more than one hundred dioceses. As soon as the consensus was reached, the very same delegates immediately convened the National Conference of Catholic Delegates to officially form the CPCA.¹⁸

The third preparatory meeting was held in July 1957 concurrently with the national Anti-Rightist campaign, which was launched by the Chinese

¹⁴Renmin Ribao, 27 July 1956; Barry II, p. 119.

¹⁵Barry II, p. 120; L. Triviére, The Catholic Church in Mainland China (Hong Kong: Privately Published Mimeograph, 1959), p. 42, hereafter cited as Mainland.

¹⁶Thomas I, p. 85.

¹⁷Delegates knew that the formation of the CPCA was inevitable; for example, see Xin Hunan Ribao, 13 June 1957. They were concerned about the effect of the CPCA on the relation between the Chinese Church and Rome.

¹⁸This Conference began on July 10 and lasted till August 2, see Zhongguo Xinwen, 17 July 1957, and Renmin Ribao, 3 August 1957.

Government to eliminate those who rejected or opposed Government policy.¹⁹ Consequently, all those delegates in the third preparatory meeting who opposed the current political stand prescribed by the Government were under heavy political criticism.²⁰ Under the political pressure of this Anti-Rightist campaign, the delegates adopted a resolution which conformed to the political desire of the Government.

This resolution is summarized as follows.²¹ 1. Patriotism in the present Chinese context [1957] means the support of the Chinese Government and socialism. 2. Patriotism is a part of Catholic teaching. 3. The CPCA is a political organization assisting Chinese Catholics to fulfill their patriotic duty. 4. The Vatican is anti-Communist and anti-Socialist in nature, therefore, the Chinese Church has to break the financial and political relationship with the Vatican in order not to contradict the political stand of the Chinese Government. 5. The Chinese Church submits to the Pope in matters of doctrine and ecclesiastical practices and keeps only a religious tie with the Vatican. 6. The Chinese Church will work for an autonomous ecclesial community governed by Chinese clergy.

The function of the CPCA is clearly stated in the resolution, that is, to lead the Chinese Church to the new political reality of the Chinese Government and away from that of the Vatican (perceived as anti-Communist) by conveying the political direction of the Chinese Government to Chinese Church

¹⁹ It was a campaign to curb the former political campaign--Hundred Flowers Blossom which ran out of control. See Renmin Ribao, 8 July 1957.

²⁰ Thomas I, p. 86; Mainland, p. 50.

²¹ Renmin Ribao, 3 August 1957; Dagong Bao, 4 August 1957; ET see Mainland, pp. 46-49.

and guiding Chinese Catholics to accept this political reality. The CPCA regarded the Sino-Vatican conflict as essentially a political, and not a religious, matter, and it showed no inclination to separate the Chinese Church religiously from Rome or from the Pope.

After the CPCA was formed, its first important task was to help to launch the Anti-Rightist campaign in the Chinese Church. This campaign spread gradually to all churches throughout the country. Members of the CPCA outlined the Government's political stand and policy to the Chinese Church and pointed out that the Chinese Church should support socialism, endorse the concept of a self-governing local church, and reject those Vatican's orders that violated the political interest of the Chinese Government.²² Catholics who refused to accept what the CPCA proposed, even if they were prelates, were subject to severe criticism.²³ Recalcitrant Catholics who refused to cooperate with the CPCA were labelled as ~~Rightist~~ and treated as political criminals by the civil authority.²⁴ This campaign enabled the Government, with the help of the CPCA, to eliminate political nonconformists and to build a Chinese Church which politically identified with the Chinese Government.

²²For example, see Louyang Ribao, 7 August 1957; Chengdu Ribao, 15 September 1957; Fujian Ribao, 2 November 1957; or Liaoning Ribao, 23 November 1957.

²³Bishop Francis Han Tingpi of Hongtong, Shanxi, is criticized as Rightist, in Shanxi Ribao, 15 December 1957; so also Apostolic Administrator Paul Chang Chenguo of Siping, Jilin, in Heilungjiang Ribao, 19 November 1957; and pro-Bishop Liu Jan of Xichang, Sichuan, in Sichuan Ribao, 7 December 1957.

²⁴The pro-Bishop Wang Yauyuan of Ningbo, Zhejiang, along with a few of his priests, were arrested as counterrevolutionary elements and Rightists. They received jail sentences of at least ten years, see Zhejiang Ribao, 17 December 1957. The Apostolic Administrator of Guangzhou, Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming, was arrested as counterrevolutionary, see Nanfang Ribao, 6 February 1958.

From 1958 to 1962, the CPCA (including all its local branches) endorsed all the Government's social and political programs. It promoted the Great Leap Forward campaign,²⁵ denounced the uprising in Tibet,²⁶ endorsed the sentence of Bishop Gong Pinmei and Bishop James Walsh,²⁷ protested against Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan,²⁸ and condemned the United States of America's involvement in Vietnam.²⁹ In short, the CPCA lived out its original intention, that is to support whatever the Government supported.

Many commentators suggest that the CPCA has been officially involved with ecclesiastical matters such as episcopal elections and consecrations since 1957.³⁰ However, a careful examination of the documents strongly

²⁵ In support of this program, the clergy abolished the major feast days, participated themselves in labor productions, donated the church buildings to the State, and publicly praised this program, see Renmin Ribao, 27 April 1958; Liaoning Ribao, 28 December 1958; and Thomas (pseud.) "The Real Story Behind the 'Self-election and Self-consecration of Bishops' Under the Plot of the Chinese Communists," in ZT no. 52 (16 April 1961), p. 206.

²⁶ In 1959, many Tibetans followed their leader Dalai Lama to take refuge in India. The Tibetans regard this incident as a fight for their independence, whereas the Chinese Government interprets this event as a political conspiracy engineered by India and America to sabotage China. The CPCA embraced the Chinese Government's position in condemning the Tibetans; see Renmin Ribao, 27 and 29 April 1959. Cf. F. Moraes, The Revolt in Tibet (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1960).

²⁷ During the Cold War, the Chinese Government held an anti-America world view that interpreted America as the archenemy of China. Any move against the political interest of China, such as the Vatican made, was considered by the Chinese Government to be the action of an agent serving American interests. It was against this background that Gong was condemned as a spy working for America. See Renmin Ribao, 20 March 1960; Zhongguo Xinwen, 23 March 1960; Xinhua, 23 March 1960. He received parole on July 1985.

²⁸ Xinhua, 26 June 1960. Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan infuriated China because Eisenhower supported Taiwan's claim over China.

²⁹ SCMP, no. 3398 (February 1965), p. 25.

³⁰ Barry II, p. 124; Kung Kao Pao, 4 December 1959; or K. Hutten's Iron Curtain Christians; the Church in Communist Countries, tr. from German (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1967), pp. 434f.

indicates that from 1957 to 1961, the CPCA drew a clear distinction between civil and ecclesiastical affairs, and deliberately avoided involving itself in ecclesiastical matters, such as episcopal consecrations.

From 1957 to 1961, all episcopal elections were held by diocesan councils, diocesan Catholic representatives conferences, or diocesan consultors. For example, the first episcopal election was held by the Chengdu Diocesan Representatives Conference on December 16, 1957.³¹ Subsequent episcopal elections in the Diocese of Yibin,³² the Diocese of Rehe (Jehol),³³ the Archdiocese of Guiyang,³⁴ the Archdiocese of Fuzhou,³⁵ the Diocese of Hanyang,³⁶ the Diocese of Shanghai,³⁷ the Diocese of Wuhan, and the Archdiocese of Hankou³⁸ followed a similar pattern.

In some dioceses, e.g. the Diocese of Suzhou,³⁹ the Archdiocese of Guangzhou,⁴⁰ and the Archdiocese of Nanjing,⁴¹ the episcopal elections were

³¹Sichuan Ribao, 18 December 1957.

³²Sichuan Ribao, 20 March 1958.

³³Liaoning Ribao, 30 June 1958. Rehe (Jehol) Province had since become part of the Liaoning Province; it is now Jinzhou of Liaoning.

³⁴Guizhou Ribao, 8 June 1958; ET SCMP, no. 1864 (June 1958), pp. 20-23.

³⁵Guangming Ribao, 12 July 1958.

³⁶Changjiang Ribao, 27 July 1959; ET CBA, no. 610 (January 1960), p. 22.

³⁷Renmin Ribao, 8 May 1960.

³⁸Hubei Ribao, 14 April 1958.

³⁹Xinhua Ribao, 1 March 1957.

⁴⁰Nanfang Ribao, 7 March 1958.

⁴¹Xinhua Ribao, 26 March 1958.

held by the diocesan council of clergy. It is also reported that in some places, for example, in Guangdong,⁴² and in Heilungjiang,⁴³ episcopal elections were held by Provincial Catholic Representatives Conferences.

At least in Shanghai⁴⁴ and in Guangdong⁴⁵ the local branches of CPCA were formed at the same time the episcopal elections were held. In these two cases, there was a deliberate attempt to distinguish the two functions of the delegates to these two conferences: the civil function of forming the CPCA and the ecclesiastical function of electing a bishop. Furthermore, in some cases, such as the episcopal elections in Chengdu⁴⁶ and Guangzhou,⁴⁷ the local CPCAs were not even in existence at the time of the episcopal elections. Therefore, in no episcopal election held before 1961 is there any evidence to suggest that the CPCA played any official role in it.⁴⁸ In regard to episcopal consecration from 1958 to 1961, although the CPCA might have suggested the date for consecration on one occasion,⁴⁹ all consecrations were clearly overseen by the bishops and local diocesan councils, and not by the CPCA.

The above-mentioned evidence strongly suggests that all episcopal

⁴²Guangming Ribao, 8 July 1958.

⁴³Heilungjiang Ribao, 25 July 1959; ET CBA, no. 610 (January 1960), p. 8.

⁴⁴Renmin Ribao, 8 May 1960.

⁴⁵Guangming Ribao, 8 July 1958.—

⁴⁶At the time of the election, there existed only a "Preparatory Committee of the Sichuan CPCA," in Sichuan Ribao, 16 December 1957.

⁴⁷The Guangdong CPCA was formed three months after the episcopal election of Chen Yixin of Guangzhou, see Nanfang Ribao, 8 July 1958.

⁴⁸Guizhou Ribao, 18 June 1958; ET SCMP, no. 1864 (June 1958), p. 22; or Renmin Ribao, 18 April 1958.

⁴⁹Xinhua Ribao, 17 November 1959.

elections and consecrations, from 1957 to 1961, were officially conducted by ecclesiastical bodies, such as diocesan councils or Catholic representatives conferences, and not by the CPCA. Even though the CPCA played an important role in promoting and even setting dates for episcopal consecrations,⁵⁰ and all episcopal candidates and consecrators were members of the CPCA,⁵¹ technically speaking, there is no de jure involvement of the CPCA in ecclesiastical matters such as episcopal elections and consecrations during this period.

ii. Development of the CPCA since 1962

In January 1962, the CPCA convened its second national conference. Its function was expanded to include some ecclesiastical duties. This subtle change of function can be seen in three areas. First, the resolution of the conference delegates assigning the CPCA some ecclesiastical duties⁵² such as the restoration of seminaries and the planning of religious activities which hitherto had not been part of the CPCA's mandate.

Secondly, there was a change of title. The CPCA was originally called Zhongguo Tianzhujiaoyou Aiguohui, which literally means "The Patriotic Association of Chinese Catholics." All the local CPCA branches used this title

⁵⁰For example, see Hebei Ribao, 18 December 1957; or Sichuan Ribao, 7 December 1957; or CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 15.

⁵¹The only exception is Bishop Jin Luxian, consecrated in 1985; it was emphasized that he is not a member of the CPCA. However, he was not a bishop before 1966. In fact, he had been in jail and labor camp since his arrest in 1953 and was not released until the late 1970s.

⁵²See Guangming Ribao, 20 January 1962; and Renmin Ribao, 20 January 1962.

and added the regional prefix.⁵³ However, in this conference, the title was changed to Zhongguo Tianzhujiao Aiguohui; you, a term which literally means "member" or "friend," was deleted from the original title. The new title could mean "The Patriotic Association of the Chinese Catholic Church."⁵⁴ It was soon adopted by all local CPCA branches and was also anachronistically used to refer to the CPCA from 1957 to 1961. It has been the official title for the CPCA ever since.⁵⁵

The implication of the change of title is significant. In Chinese, the term Tianzhujiaoyou means Catholics or members of the Catholic Church. This term does not bear the notion of "the Church." Whereas the term Tianzhujiao simply means "the Catholic Church." Therefore, such a change in title can imply that the CPCA is no longer a civil organization belonging to Catholic members, but an organization belonging to the Chinese Church. In other words, the CPCA crossed the civil boundary and stepped into the ecclesiastical domain.

Thirdly, the CPCA publicly consecrated seven bishops immediately after this Conference.⁵⁶ It is the first time that the CPCA (with the new title)

⁵³For example, see the Shanghai CPCA, in Renmin Ribao, 8 May 1960; the Sichuan CPCA, in Xinhua Ribao, 26 March 1960; and the Guangdong CPCA, in Xinhua Ribao, 27 March 1960.

⁵⁴The plaque hanging at the gate of the Changchun CPCA reads Changchun Tianzhujiaoyou Aiguohui, see YIE, (November 1982), pp. 12f. This is the only CPCA which keeps the old title. It is possible that the Changchun CPCA has not bothered to make a new plaque because this particular branch of the CPCA is rather inactive. Therefore, the you remaining on this title seems to be more accidental than intentional.

⁵⁵A cursory reading of the CCC shows that all the references made to the CPCA (before 1962) have been anachronistically changed to the new title (without the you). The rewriting of history to suit the present situation is a common practice in China. For example, the Chinese mass media deleted the names and the pictures of the Gang of Four after the fall of this group.

⁵⁶Zhongguo Xinwen 22 June 1962.

assumed the ecclesiastical duty of episcopal consecration. This action suggests that the CPCA openly expanded its civil and political duty and entrenched itself in the ecclesiastical realm.

iii. Ecclesiastical role of the CPCA before 1966

The precise ecclesial role of the CPCA probably eludes many observers. On the one hand, high ranking Chinese bishops, such as the erstwhile Chairman of the CPCA, Archbishop Ignatius Pi of Shenyang (Mukden) openly declared that the CPCA was not an ecclesiastical organization but a political one. He stressed strongly that he was not the primate of the Chinese Church, and that bishops were the real religious leaders of the Chinese Church.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the CPCA has been publicly involved in ecclesiastical affairs since 1962, and seems to assume that it is the de facto church hierarchy.

The basic question is whether the CPCA is an ecclesiastical or a civil organization. If it is an ecclesiastical organization, as indicated by its de facto ecclesiastical involvements, it may be interpreted as a puppet church sponsored by the Government in order to create a schismatic church.⁵⁸ However, if it is an civil organization, as claimed by Chinese prelates,⁵⁹ it is difficult to justify its ecclesiastical involvements.

One has to situate the CPCA in its sociopolitical context in order to understand its role in this environment. To survive in the Chinese social

⁵⁷ Pardinas, p. 63.

⁵⁸ For example, see Ad Apostolorum principis; Sunday Examiner, 12 September 1958; SCMP (HK), 14 September 1961; or Hong Kong Standard, 26 April 1958. Also Haughey's "Religion in China II: Shredding the Catholic Church," America 126 (22 April 1972): 418-423.

⁵⁹ Pardinas, pp. 63, 69f.

reality, all social organizations have to have their respective representatives take a pro-Government political stand. The CPCA is the Catholic political body, sanctioned by the Government, to represent the Chinese Church in the Chinese social context.

As the only national Catholic organization to represent the Chinese Church before 1966, the CPCA would naturally assume an administrative role and become the de facto Chinese Church hierarchy. As a matter of fact, all bishops and most of the clergy who could still freely exercise their ecclesiastical duties were also members of the CPCA.

Despite its de facto involvement in ecclesiastical affairs, the CPCA strongly denies that it is an ecclesiastical organization. It justifies its ecclesiastical duties as political tasks. For example, independent episcopal consecrations are interpreted as political acts protesting against the Vatican's political hostility towards China and the Chinese Church.⁶⁰ Similarly, to build a seminary is seen as a political step towards training patriotic clergy.⁶¹

One has to keep in mind that to endow events of daily life with political value is a common practice in China. This practice need not be taken too seriously on its face value. It can, however, be seen as a survival tactic in the sociopolitical reality of Chinese society.

The CPCA's vigorous denial of its ecclesiastical nature suggests that the CPCA has no intention of becoming a schismatic church. It regards itself as a civil organization and consciously retains this identity. If the CPCA had

⁶⁰ Renmin Ribao, 18 April 1958; or Hubei Ribao, 18 April 1958.

⁶¹ Renmin Ribao, 20 January 1962.

a schismatic intention, it would not repeatedly affirm its civil status.

It seems fair to state that the CPCA (from 1957-1966) cannot be interpreted simply as either a civil or an ecclesiastical organization because this distinction cannot be made clearly in the Chinese sociopolitical reality. In such a highly politicized society, Chinese Catholics had no other channel through which to handle their ecclesiastical affairs than the CPCA. Therefore, the CPCA (1957-1966) was an unique ecclesial structure which was shaped by its particular sociopolitical context and was officially a political organization with the obligation to assume some ecclesiastical responsibilities for the survival of the Chinese Church.

2. The Reemergence of the CPCA: 1979-1983

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1977), the CPCA ceased to function. In 1979, it began to resume its role and functions. This subsection examines the functions and the ecclesial role of the CPCA from 1979 to 1983.

1. Functions of the CPCA

The reemergence of the CPCA can be divided into two phases: from 1979 to June 1980 and from June 1980 to 1983. The holding of the Third National CPCA Conference and the National Catholic Representatives Conference, at which the NAC and the CBC were formed, in May and June of 1980 can be seen as the demarcation of these two phases.

During the first phase, it is observed that the CPCA played a role similar to the role it played before 1966, viz., to function as a political organization to handle ecclesiastical affairs. Fu Tieshan was elected as the Bishop of Beijing at the Third Enlarged Session of the Beijing CPCA held in

July 1979.⁶² The Guangzhou GPCA decided to reclaim church properties from the Government,⁶³ to reopen the Shishi Cathedral,⁶⁴ and to restore this Cathedral for religious service.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the CPCA, on behalf of the Chinese Church, protested against Rome's objection to the episcopal election of Fu.⁶⁶ In fact, almost all public Catholic activities that took place before June 1980 were under the auspices of the CPCA.⁶⁷

In short, the functions of the CPCA in this phase can be summarized as follows: to organize religious activities, to rally Catholic support for current social programs, to cultivate friendship with foreign Catholics, to promote the autonomy of the Chinese Church, and to elect bishops.⁶⁸

In the Third National CPCA Conference, which was held in May 1980, a new constitution was adopted. This constitution initiates a new phase and confines the functions of the CPCA to a narrower scope. Article Two of this constitution defines the new objectives of the CPCA as follows:

⁶²J. Polumbaum, "Beijing Catholics Enjoy Renewed Freedom of Belief," in CR 31 (July 1982): 59; SCMP (HK), 12 August 1979; Dagong Bao, 20 August 1979.

⁶³Special Edition to Commemorate the Third Anniversary for the Reopening of the Sacred Heart Cathedral of Guangzhou (Guangzhou: The Catholic Diocese of Guangzhou, 1982), p. 6, hereafter cited as Guangzhou.

⁶⁴SCMP (HK), 31 July 1979.

⁶⁵Ibid.; Ming Pao, 21 January 1980.

⁶⁶SCMP (HK), 20 August 1979.

⁶⁷There is one possible exception: the official media emphasized that the consecration of Fu Tieshan, on December 21, 1979, was not under the auspices of the CPCA but under the auspices of the Diocese of Beijing; see Dagong Bao (Eng.), January 10, 1980. In early 1980, once the Chinese prelates had decided to establish the NAC and the CBC they began to dissociate episcopal consecration from the CPCA.

⁶⁸Wei Xiutang, "In a Catholic Church in Beijing," CR 29 (January 1980), p. 49.

The CPCA is an association made up of the masses of the Chinese Catholic clergy and laity who love their country and their religion. The goals are: i. to unite the entire country's clergy and laity under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China, ii. to extend the spirit of patriotism, iii. to observe the Government policies and decrees regarding religion, iv. to actively participate in our country's socialist reconstruction, v. to increase friendly relations with international Catholic groups, vi. to oppose imperialism and hegemonism, vii. to safeguard world peace, and viii. to assist the Government to implement the policy of religious freedom.⁶⁹

Likewise, the main functions of the CPCA are listed as follows:

To unite all the clergy and laity to actively participate in developing the socialist modernization program; continue to adhere to the policy of independent administration of the [Chinese] Church and oppose any foreign interference or control of churches in China; to raise vigilance against and prevent a small number of evil elements from making use of the name of religion to create rumors and hoodwink the people, sow dissension among the people and create and carry out splittist and illegal activities; to consolidate and develop the triumphant achievements of the anti-Imperialist patriotic movement for the past 30 years; to help the people's government implement the policy of religious freedom and, at the same time, conduct education among the clergy and the laity in loving their country, abiding by the law and consciously observing the state's policies and decrees; and to strengthen friendly ties with foreign countries and contribute to the cause of opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace.⁷⁰

The CPCA's main function is to deal with the external and political affairs of the Chinese Church. Externally, the CPCA represented the Chinese Church by attending international conferences, by receiving foreign Catholic guests,⁷¹ and by refuting foreign comments, such as Rome's messages to the

⁶⁹ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 19; ET Tripod, no. 5 (October 1981), p. 61. Regional CPCA uses the same constitution with the regional suffix added; cf. Special Edition on the Hebei Provincial Third Catholic Patriotic Association Representatives Conference and the Hebei Provincial Catholic Representatives Conference, October 1980 (Hebei: Hebei CPCA/CAC, 1980), p. 16, hereafter cited as Hebei.

⁷⁰ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 17-19; an abridged version appeared in Xinhua (Eng.), 30 May 1980 which has a strong political tone.

⁷¹ CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), pp. 7f.

Chinese Church.⁷² Politically, the CPCA actively promoted the Four Modernizations program and propagated exemplary patriotic deeds of Catholics.⁷³ It also organized meetings for Catholics to study important political documents of the Government, and conveyed the Government's religious policy through various discussion sessions.⁷⁴

In order to implement the Government's religious policy, the CPCA helped the NAC (or CACs) to restore religious life,⁷⁵ to set political parameters for Catholics,⁷⁶ to reclaim church properties which has been confiscated during the Cultural Revolution,⁷⁷ to transfer residential permit of clergymen back to their former parish posts,⁷⁸ to organize religious activities,⁷⁹ to establish the CAC,⁸⁰ to build chapels in cemeteries,⁸¹ and to organize seminaries.⁸² However, in all these religious activities, the CPCA emphasized that it was a civil body assisting the dioceses and the NAC, and not

⁷²CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 50.

⁷³CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 10; CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 44f; no. 6 (April 1983), pp. 51f.

⁷⁴CCC, no. 7 (August 1983): 7-9; CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 13.

⁷⁵CCC, no. 3 (October 1981): 70; CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 12.

⁷⁶Guangzhou, p. 20.

⁷⁷CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 12; CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), pp. 9, 13.

⁷⁸CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), p. 31.

⁷⁹CCC, no. 2 (March 1981): 9; CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 5; CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 9f.

⁸⁰CCC, no. 2 (March 1981), p. 20.

⁸¹CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 63.

⁸²CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), pp. 15, 17.

an ecclesiastical organization responsible for overseeing these ecclesial activities.

As one compares this new role of the CPCA⁸³ with its former role (before June 1980), one notices a few major differences. First of all, the CPCA now puts more emphasis on its political duties. To provide political leadership to the Chinese Church seems to be the main function of the CPCA. It is only through the CPCA that the Government's policies, conveyed to Catholics, can be properly understood.

Secondly, the CPCA conspicuously avoids any direct involvement in ecclesiastical affairs. It assumes no responsibility for ecclesiastical matters such as ecclesiastical regulation or episcopal election and consecration.⁸⁴ The CPCA sole claim is that it supports and assists, but does not supervise, various religious matters.⁸⁵ Fellowship with foreign Catholics is described not as an ecclesiastical link with the Universal Church, but as a political duty to develop international friendship.⁸⁶ This description justifies the dissociation from any ecclesiastical implication.

Thirdly, the CPCA no longer monopolizes the Chinese Church as the only Catholic organization. The ecclesiastical authority is shared with the other two organizations, the NAC and the CBC. The image of the CPCA slowly changes from the de facto ecclesiastical structure which governs the Chinese Church to

⁸³CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), pp. 5-12. It contains the official report on the achievement of the CPCA from 1980 to 1983.

⁸⁴Ecclesiastical regulations are issued by the NAC and the CBC. Also, after June 1980, bishops were elected by diocesan representatives conferences; see CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 6, or CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 20f.

⁸⁵For example, see CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 28.

⁸⁶CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 17-19.

a political organization that assists and helps the Chinese Church.

The changing role of the CPCA seems to reflect the attempts of Chinese Catholics to give it a new image. Before June 1980, the CPCA was the only structure to administer church affairs and it was seen as the de facto Chinese Church hierarchy. The CPCA could, therefore, easily be seen as a puppet church. Further, the image of the highly-politicized CPCA also prevented the Chinese Church from gaining wide popularity among Catholics.⁸⁷ If the CPCA had been allowed to continue its erstwhile image, the Chinese Church would have had little ecclesial credibility.

In order to gain ecclesial credibility for the Chinese Church, Chinese Catholics began to withdraw the CPCA from ecclesiastical matters as early as December 1979.⁸⁸ In June 1980,⁸⁹ Chinese Catholics not only officially defined the CPCA as a nonecclesial political body in the CPCA's new constitution, but also publicly formed the NAC and the CBC as de jure ecclesial organizations to oversee all ecclesiastical matters.⁸⁹ After this, there would be no confusion about the civil nature of the CPCA.

ii. Ecclesial roles of the CPCA

The existence of the CPCA demonstrates a special ecclesiological manifestation: the need to form an ambiguous civil structure for the open existence of the Catholic Church in China. This ecclesial phenomenon is not

⁸⁷ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 70.

⁸⁸ Consecration of Fu Tieshan was not conducted by the CPCA but by the diocesan council; see Dagong Bao (Eng.), 10 January 1980.

⁸⁹ Bishop Dominic Deng argues that the CPCA is not a church but a civil organization within the Chinese Church; see CECC, no. 9 & 10 (April-July 1981), p. 18.

only seen in China, but also in Eastern Bloc countries.⁹⁰ Its ecclesial role can only be seen vis-à-vis its particular context.

Some what as before 1966, the CPCA from 1979 to 1983 cannot be regarded simply as either an ecclesiastical or a civil organization. Despite the fact that there are distinctions between the NAC and the CPCA, these two organizations are staffed basically by the same people. Ninety-five percent of the NAC committee members also serve as CPCA committee members.⁹¹ The CPCA also overlaps with the NAC in many areas.

In a strict sense, the CPCA is clearly not an ecclesiastical organization for it executes the authority, directives, and policies of the Government. It seems to represent the political interest of the Government in the Chinese Church. From the ecclesiastical perspective, the CPCA seems to be a government organization.

However, it is equally difficult to define the CPCA purely as a government organization. Unlike the RAB, which is a government apparatus under the State Council, the CPCA emphasizes that it is an organization within the Chinese Church, and is formed by patriotic Catholics under the authority and mandate of these Catholics. Also, it seems to represent the ecclesial interests of Catholics before various Government's agencies, to negotiate for

⁹⁰ Churches in Eastern Bloc countries have the Pax Movement which is a pro-Government organization within churches which has a strong influence on Catholics. For example, clergy in Czechoslovakia have to join the Pacem in Terris organization [the pro-Government organization of the Czechoslovakian Catholic Church] in order to obtain a work permit; see Times, 15 July 1985, p. 61. There is also a similar "Catholic patriotic association" in the Catholic Church in Vietnam.

⁹¹ Cf. the lists of CPCA and NAC committee member, in CCC; no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 54f.

church properties, to rebuild churches, to collect rents on church properties and to rehabilitate Catholics held in detention. From the Government's perspective, the CPCA is a Catholic mass organization which helps Catholics to support the Government and to seek better adjustment^a of the Chinese Church to Chinese society.

In this unique sociopolitical context of Chinese society, the CPCA can be seen to play the following ecclesial roles. Firstly, it is a necessary liaison body between the Church and the State. In Western countries, church life is relatively free from civil control, and does not need to submit to the civil authority. However, in China, the adherence to Party leadership and the unreserved support to the regime are the a priori conditions for ecclesial survival. Under these circumstances, there is need for a close relationship between the Church and the State, so that the Chinese Church can follow closely whatever the Government requires. In order to achieve this relationship, a liaison body, such as the CPCA, seems to be appropriate.

Secondly, the CPCA serves as a control device to restrain Catholics from acting beyond the political parameters, dictated by the Government. Through the CPCA, the Government can assure that Catholics will not act against its wishes and will fully support its policy and social programs. Conversely, this control device also allows Catholics to gauge the limitation of their freedom and their autonomy within this limitation. Catholics, through the CPCA, can know the extent of the political duty they have to fulfill in exchange for the liberty to practice their faith.

Thirdly, the CPCA also serves as a buffer between the Church and the State. Since the CPCA is the political front of the Chinese Catholics, it absorbs the political impact from the Government and also gives feedback to the

Government. If the Government were to deal directly with the Chinese Church, viz. through the RAB, it would give the impression that the Government directly intervenes in the Chinese Church. Such a situation is not desirable. Thus, there is a need for a semi-civil and semi-ecclesial body to communicate between the Government and the Chinese Church and to present the desires of both parties in a format that is acceptable to both sides. In this way conflicts between Church and state can be minimized.

In the regimented Chinese society, where virtually nothing can exist without some form of government supervision or control, the CPCA has some unique roles that help the Chinese Church to survive in this context. By playing the roles of a liaison, a control device, and a buffer, the CPCA can help the Chinese Church to become an integral part of Chinese society. It can also gain more freedom for Catholics to practice their faith in a highly controlled society. If there were no CPCA, the Chinese Church might become a catacomb church, illegal in the eyes of the civil authority and alienated from Chinese society, or it might be domesticated as a state church under the direct control of the Government with no ecclesial autonomy.

However, this positive value of the CPCA can only be achieved by the good faith of its leaders. If leaders of the CPCA have good intentions for the Chinese Church, they can use the CPCA to shield the Chinese Church from Government pressure and the Chinese Church can exercise its authority with lesser Government control. However, if they have diabolic intentions, they can easily use the CPCA as a mean to achieve personal gains and political ambition at the expense of the Chinese Church.



B. THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION OF
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA (NAC)

With the formation of the National Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church (NAC) at the National Catholic Representatives Conference, which was held from May 31 to June 2, 1980, begins a new era of the Chinese Church. The NAC became the first Chinese hierarchical structure possessing ecclesiastical authority.⁹² This section intends to examine this ecclesiastical structure from three perspectives: 1. Origin and Structure of the NAC, 2. Ecclesiastical Functions of the NAC, and 3. Theological Implications of the NAC.

1. Origin and Structure of the NAC

On the last day of the Third National CPCA Conference (May 30, 1980), Bishop Yang Gaojian presented a report regarding the forthcoming National Catholic Representatives Conference. He mentioned that the preparation of a national Catholic administrative organization had already started before the Cultural Revolution, but had been interrupted. Since December 1979, Chinese Catholics had resumed the preparatory work and had formed a preparatory committee, which was composed of six bishops, one priest and one layman. This committee decided to convene the National Catholic Representatives Conference,

⁹²There is a rumor that Rome considered recognizing the ecclesiastical authority and status of the NAC, see CB 3 (March 1981): 9f.

immediately after the Third CPCA Conference,⁹³ to organize the NAC.⁹³ In this National Catholic Representatives Conference, delegates adopted a constitution for the NAC and elected officers of the NAC.⁹⁴

The NAC is defined as an executive committee to carry out the resolutions of the National Catholic Representatives Conference, and to administer ecclesiastical affairs of the Chinese Church under the supervision of the RAB.⁹⁵ It is responsible for the overall administration of the Chinese Church at the national level.

The NAC possesses a hierarchical structure. At the apex of this structure are the director and the secretary, following by the deputy directors, the standing committee members, and the committee members.⁹⁶ Further down in the hierarchy are the provincial Catholic Affairs Commissions (CACs), which are formed in the provincial Catholic representatives

⁹³CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 48f. In the Spring 1980, most of the Chinese churches had not been reopened yet. It was impossible to have Catholic representatives "democratically" chosen from various dioceses because Catholic activity had not been restored in most places. It is most likely that the Catholic representatives who attended these two conferences were former local Catholic leaders. These representatives were probably invited by the preparatory committee or were summoned by local RAB officials to these two conferences. One can question the legality of the representation of these delegates. However, the practical issue is that without the delegates, the NAC could not be formed and the restoration of Catholic activities could not be done. Without the normalization of Catholic activities, proper procedure for choosing delegates who truly represent the grassroots Catholics could not be set up.

⁹⁴Xinhua, 2 June 1980.

⁹⁵CCC no. 1 (November 1980), p. 51. See chapters one and two on the discussion about the relationships between the RAB, the UFWD, and the Chinese Church.

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 51, 54, 55.

conferences, and the diocesan CACs, which are formed in a similar fashion.⁹⁷
 These CACs execute orders from the NAC.⁹⁸

Since the relationship between the NAC and provincial CACs is defined as a directive relationship, (like the relationship between provincial CACs and diocesan CACs),⁹⁹ all the authority resides in the NAC. The CACs are, therefore, agents to carry out orders from above, and to give feedback to the NAC. They act only within the parameters set by the NAC.

In theory, the NAC is totally independent from the CPCA. Both organizations execute different mandates and receive their mandates from separate authorities. In practice, the organizations work closely with one another. A Chinese Catholic leader describes the relationship between the NAC and the CPCA as follows:

Presently our Chinese Church has both the NAC (or CAC) and the CPCA. These two organizations have their distinctive duties, yet they cooperate with each other The CPCA must respect the authority of the CAC, and must actively support the work of the CAC Similarly, the CAC must also coordinate its work with the CPCA Both organizations cannot function independently from the other, yet they are not the same organization. They must cooperate with each other for the prosperity of the [Chinese] Church.¹⁰⁰

The NAC also enjoys an unique relationship with the Chinese Bishops' College (CBC). Bishops are usually the leaders of the NAC and CACs, and all

⁹⁷ See Explanatory Note on the Constitution (draft) of the Hebei CAC (n.p.: mimeographed, 1980), p. 2.

⁹⁸ The constitution of the CACs is basically the same as the constitution of the NAC with regional suffix added. It also includes an article stating that the CAC submits to the leadership of the NAC; see the Constitution of the Hebei CAC, in Hebei, p. 42.

⁹⁹ Explanatory Note on . . ., p. 2; the Chinese word is Zhidao guanshi, which denotes a direct descending of authority from above.

¹⁰⁰ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 70f, my translation.

members of the CBC are also standing committee members of the NAC. According to the constitution of the NAC, the CBC, which is composed of valid diocesan bishops, is technically under the auspices of the NAC. However, Chinese Catholic leaders agree that the NAC will submit to decisions made by the CBC and regards the CBC as having authority over the NAC.¹⁰¹

2. Ecclesiastical Functions of the NAC

The functions of the NAC are defined by Article Two of the NAC Constitution which reads as follows:

To continue and to develop the traditional spirit of Jesus Christ in establishing His Church and the mission of His Apostles according to the Bible; to promote the endeavor of glorifying God and saving souls; to lead the clergy and laity to observe God's commandments; to uphold the principle of independence, self-governance, and democratic administration; to deliberate and decide major questions of the [Chinese] Church affairs; to manage the Chinese Catholic Church satisfactorily.¹⁰²

From 1980 to 1983, the NAC, in conforming to this ecclesiastical mandate, carried out many ecclesiastical functions. First, the NAC restructured diocesan boundaries. The former Chinese ecclesiastical provincial boundary was established in accordance with pre-Liberation Chinese Government administrative structure. This boundary became obsolete as the Chinese Government changed many provincial boundaries.¹⁰³ Thus, the CACs in the provinces of Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Guangdong restructured their ecclesiastical boundaries to catch up

¹⁰¹CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 49.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 51; ET Tripod, no. 5 (October 1981), p. 63.

¹⁰³For example, the disappearance of the former provinces such as Charhar, Rehe (Jehol), Suiyuan, and Xikang, in CSPB no. 24 (August 1983), p. 112.

with the change.¹⁰⁴

An excellent example of this restructuring of diocesan boundary can be seen in the province of Hebei where one-fourth of the Chinese Catholics reside.¹⁰⁵ The former ecclesiastical province of Hebei corresponds geographically to the former province of Hebei and has thirteen dioceses and one prefecture apostolic, with Beijing as the Metropolitan See.

In 1980, the Hebei CAC reformed the ecclesiastical administrative structure in alignment with the Government administrative structure. Several changes occurred. Since the cities of Beijing and Tianjin both had become autonomous municipalities under the state Government (State Council) and not under the provincial government, the CAC decided to place Beijing Diocese and Tianjin Diocese under the authority of the NAC and not the authority of the Hebei CAC. Even the erstwhile Chengde Diocese, which is located within Beijing Autonomous Municipality, was also placed under the auspices of the NAC. The remaining eleven dioceses and one prefecture apostolic in Hebei were reorganized into eight dioceses corresponding to the eight provincial administrative districts established by the Hebei provincial government.

Not all restructurings were done in accordance with civil administrative structures. Some of these changes were carried out by the CAC viv-à-vis the local ecclesiastical situation. For example, the Autonomous

¹⁰⁴CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), pp. 15f. A few changes of diocesan boundary had taken place before 1966. For example, Catholics in the provinces of Heilungjiang, Jilin and Liaoning had restructured their diocesan boundary in November 1958, see Liaoning Ribao 28 December 1958. In June 1958, Catholics in Guangdong created the Huiyang Diocese out of part of the former Hong Kong Diocese and restructured the Jiangmen Diocese which included part of the former Macau Diocese, see Guangming Ribao 8 July 1958.

¹⁰⁵In 1984, Bishop Chang Shouyi mentioned that there were 800,000 Catholics in Hebei, see YIE, (December 1984), p. 14.

Region of Inner Mongolia, one of the largest provincial districts in China, formerly had six dioceses.¹⁰⁶ The Inner Mongolia CAC, headed by Bishop Wang Xueming (Archbishop of Suiyuan, consecrated in 1951 with approval from Rome), combined all six dioceses into the one single diocese of Inner Mongolia. A report suggests that Bishop Wang "resists efforts of the [Chinese] government to establish more dioceses in [Inner] Mongolia, fearing that unworthy [episcopal] candidates might be appointed."¹⁰⁷

Secondly, the NAC established new ecclesiastical administrative structures by abolishing prefectures apostolic and eliminating archdioceses. For example, Harbin of Heilungjiang and Dali (Tungchow) of Shaanxi, were formerly prefectures apostolic and are still listed as such in the Annuario Pontificio. However, all Chinese Church media to refer them simply as dioceses. Furthermore, the total lack of mention of the category of prefecture apostolic suggests that the NAC has abolished this ecclesiastical structure.

The NAC also seems to have totally eliminated archdioceses and archbishops. Since 1980, the Chinese media have made only one mention of the

¹⁰⁶ The former ecclesiastical province of Mongolia consisted of six dioceses (Suiyuan, Xiwanzi, Jining, Ningxia, Rehe, and Chifeng). Since 1949, the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia had expanded its territory which includes districts formerly belonged to provinces of Heilungjiang, Liaoning, Ningxia, Hebei, and Gansu. Therefore, the present (1986) ecclesiastical province of Inner Mongolia, which geographically corresponds to the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, should have more than six dioceses under the former ecclesiastical division.

¹⁰⁷ CUP, no. 15 [sic, 14] (Winter 1985), p. 64. Also, all official reports about the numerous Catholic activities in Inner Mongolia refer to various "Catholic districts" rather than dioceses.

title "archbishop" in referring to current Chinese bishops.¹⁰⁸ This particular mention seems to have been accidental because all other official church documents refer to this particular bishop simply as a bishop. Furthermore, the NAC also replaced the role of the archdiocese with the provincial CAC. An example of this is clearly seen in the province of Hebei. The provincial capital is Shijiazhuang, but the Shijiazhuang Diocese does not play the leadership role as an archdiocese. It is the Hebei CAC, rather than any individual diocese, which assumes the role of an archdiocese governing this ecclesiastical province.¹⁰⁹

Thirdly, the NAC performed many administrative duties to facilitate Catholic activities. For example, it organized the reopening of the seminaries, the printing of Catholic literature, the production of liturgical supplies and devotional materials, and interdiocesan exchange visits.¹¹⁰

Fourthly, the NAC claimed ecclesiastical authority to govern the Chinese Church autonomously. This exercise of authority can be clearly seen from its protest against Rome's appointment of Dominic Deng as the Archbishop of Guangzhou.¹¹¹ In this protest, the NAC argued that it has supreme authority and divine right to govern the internal affairs of the Chinese Church, and

¹⁰⁸Inner Mongolia PBS, 12 July 1981 CNAA. This particular mention of "Archbishop" Wang Xueming of Hohhot seems to be accidental, because all other official documents, either of the Chinese Church or of the Chinese Government, refer to Wang simply as a bishop. Further, the Chinese Church media refers to all former archdioceses simply as dioceses, and to archbishops as bishops. The omission of references to archdioceses and archbishops suggests that the Chinese Church has since eliminated this ecclesiastical structure. Cf. L. Ladany, "Beijing-Rome Dialogue," RCL 14 (Spring 1986), p. 101.

¹⁰⁹For further detail, see Hebei, p. 43.

¹¹⁰CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), pp. 15f.

¹¹¹CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 12-17.

that it will not tolerate any foreign (Rome) ecclesiastical authority which wants to violate this divine right.

Fifthly, it exercised authority over episcopal elections and consecrations. From 1980 to 1983, the Chinese Church elected and consecrated at least fourteen bishops.¹¹² All these episcopal elections and consecrations were under the auspices of the NAC. Furthermore, all new episcopal appointments had to be approved by the NAC in order to be validly recognized by the Chinese Church.¹¹³ In other words, the NAC had the authority to ratify episcopacy.

Sixthly, the NAC claimed the authority to regulate the ecclesiastical faculties of the Chinese clergy. The first regulation requires all clergymen to seek permission from diocesan bishops or diocesan administrators, who are appointed and recognized by the NAC, before they administer sacraments.¹¹⁴ Subsequent regulations grant the NAC (and the CAC) not only the power to approve, but also the authority to strip clergy of ecclesiastical faculties.¹¹⁵ These regulations were implemented by all local CACs.¹¹⁶

Finally, the NAC considered itself to be the only ecclesial body representing the Chinese Church in the context of the Universal Church.

¹¹² CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 15.

¹¹³ CCC no. 3 (October 1981), p. 18; also, the restoration of Dominic Deng's episcopal duties was ratified by the NAC and the CBC, see Wenhui Bao (HK), 12 June 1981.

¹¹⁴ CCC no. 1 (November 1980), p. 52. These two regulations were technically made by the CBC. Since the CBC is under the NAC, these regulations can be considered as under the authority of the NAC.

¹¹⁵ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 18.

¹¹⁶ Hebei, p. 43; Guangzhou, p. 20.

Although the CPCA also claimed that it represents the Chinese Church in external affairs, its representation is limited to civil and political matters. It is the NAC which represents the Chinese Church in the international ecclesiastical community,¹¹⁷ and speaks for the ecclesiastical interest of the Chinese Church to other churches. The representation of the NAC at the international level suggests that the NAC regards itself as the legitimate ecclesial representative of the Chinese Church, both internationally and domestically.

3. Theological Implications of the NAC

The formation of the NAC signifies an important ecclesiological development of the Chinese Church. The Chinese Church could now have its own internal governing structure with ecclesiastical authority. This structure is a significant step leading towards the realization of an autonomous and self-governed Chinese Church. The ecclesiological implications of the NAC can be seen from three vantage points: i. an autocephalic ecclesiastical structure, and ii. a contextual ecclesiastical hierarchy, and iii. theological questions emerging from the NAC.

i. Autocephalic ecclesiastical structure

Before the establishment of the Holy hierarchy of the Chinese Church in 1946, the Chinese Church had the status of a missionary church ruled by various

¹¹⁷ See the constitutions of the NAC and CPCA, in CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 19, 51; and cf. CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 16. It is significant that all Chinese Catholic delegates to the Montréal Conference in 1981 presented their credential as officers of the NAC even though they all held office in the CPCA, see CO, no. 27 (September 1981), p. 1.

missionary orders. Even after 1946, more than eighty percent of all episcopal posts were occupied by foreign bishops. It was not until the early 1950s when missionaries were expelled from China, that Chinese Catholics began to dominate leadership posts in their church. However, Chinese Catholics were still not free to make their own decisions for the Chinese Church because Rome assumed that Chinese Catholics had to follow its orders.

The formation of the CPCA in 1957 enabled the Chinese Church to have a national structure, but this structure bore no ecclesiastical authority due to its civil status. The independent episcopal consecrations, which began in 1958, did provide the Chinese Church with a certain degree of ecclesiastical leadership. But these bishops could only exercise their leadership in their respective dioceses. The Chinese Church still needed a national structure with ecclesiastical authority in order to claim ecclesial autonomy. The formation of the NAC in 1980 fulfilled this need.

The NAC is an autocephalic ecclesiastical structure. Firstly, it is self-initiated by local Catholics, not by any foreign Catholic community nor missionary orders. It was formed at the National Catholic Representatives Conference and received its authority and mandate from the Catholic representatives who represented different dioceses in China. Thus, the NAC presents a model of a self-governing ecclesial structure which is, in theory, initiated by local Catholics and receives its authority and recognition from local Catholics.

Secondly, the NAC represents the highest ecclesiastical authority of the Chinese Church. There is no higher authority, other than the CBC whose members, in fact, serve as the leadership of the NAC, to rule over the Chinese Church. Thus, it has no extrinsic ecclesial body to which it is accountable.

ii. Contextual ecclesiastical hierarchy

The NAC is heavily shaped by its sociopolitical context. First of all, the administrative structure of the NAC has the same type of administrative subdivisions as the Government administrative structure. For example, reorganization of diocesan boundaries often reflects the civil administrative structure of the Government.

Secondly, the hierarchical structure of the NAC also models itself after the hierarchical structure of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government establishes many levels of administrative authority, with the national level at the apex, following by the provincial level, the district level, the municipal level, the county level . . . etc. The NAC patterns itself after this hierarchical structure. Consequently, the NAC is the Catholic administrative structure at the national level with the highest authority, and it governs the Chinese Church through branches at lower administrative levels, such as the provincial CACs and the municipal CACs.

Thirdly, the NAC also reflects the political changes in China. After Liberation, China proclaimed itself as a sovereign state free from any foreign domination. Following this political change, the Chinese Church also proclaimed its political independence from Rome and its autonomous ecclesiastical maturity. Because of its realization of this political change, the NAC abolished the ecclesiastical structure of prefecture apostolic, which indicates a premature diocese, and elevated all prefectures apostolic to the status of full diocese in order to affirm that the Chinese Church had reached maturity.

This ecclesial phenomenon of the NAC illustrates the direct influence of the sociopolitical context on the ecclesiological development of a local

church, i.e., the political independence of a nation hastens the ecclesiological autonomy of a local church.

iii. Theological questions emerging from the NAC

The nature of the NAC also raises a few theological questions. Since the NAC claims the ecclesiastical right to govern the Chinese Church autonomously, is the establishment of the NAC not leading to a de facto situation of schism? What kind of relationships can be established between the NAC and the Papacy, so that a physical tie between Rome and the NAC can be retained and, at the same time, the autocephalic nature of the NAC be preserved?

What constitutes the maturity of a local church? Does the political independence of a nation necessarily correlate directly with the maturity of a local church of that nation? What is the relationship between national independence and ecclesiastical sovereignty? Does the reorganization of its ecclesiastical structure make a local church more "mature" than before?

To what extent does an autocephalic ecclesiastical structure, such as that of the NAC, represent the genuine aspiration of the grassroots Catholics? Are there not political influences from the civil authority involved in the establishment of the NAC, given the highly regimented Chinese society? If there is strong influence coming from the secular authority, to what extent can the NAC be considered as "autonomous" and as truly representative of the Chinese Church?

C. THE CHINESE BISHOP'S COLLEGE OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA (CBC)

The third ecclesiastical structure of the Chinese Church is the Chinese Bishops' College (CBC) formed as part of the NAC structure. The NAC regards the CBC as the supreme ecclesiastical authority of the Chinese Church. However, the CBC's ecclesiastical status and authority are not recognized by the Roman Curia. Furthermore, most of the members of the CBC had been consecrated without papal approval and, therefore, have an ambiguous canonical status.

This section intends to examine the controversies surrounding the canonical status of the Chinese bishops, the composition of the CBC, and the ecclesiastical role of the CBC in the context of the Chinese Church. This section is divided into three subsections: 1. The Creation and the Canonical Status of Chinese Independent Bishops, 2. The Composition of the CBC, and 3. The Ecclesiastical Role of the CBC.

1. The Creation and the Canonical Status of Chinese Independent Bishops

There are two types of Chinese bishops: those who are consecrated with, and those without, papal approval. The latter group is composed of the majority of Chinese Independent Bishops. The main controversy that surrounds the Independent Bishops is the allegation that they have to make a vow to separate from Rome. If this allegation were true, then they would be schismatic, and their episcopal jurisdiction within the Roman Catholic Church would be questionable. This subsection first looks at i. Historical context of this controversy, then examines ii. The Mode of Independent Consecrations, and iii. Questions on the validity of the Chinese Independent Bishops.

1. Historical context of this controversy

In the mid-1950s, many episcopal posts were vacant because almost all foreign bishops and ordinaries had been expelled from China. From 1950 to 1955, Rome appointed twenty-two Chinese clergymen to fill these vacant posts.¹¹⁸ However, these appointments were far too inadequate to meet the need. This shortage of prelates became more severe as many Chinese ordinaries and their appointed successors were arrested by the Government for various reasons.¹¹⁹

Rome made no new episcopal appointments after 1955.¹²⁰ Even if it had done so, these ordinaries would most likely have been incarcerated by the Government like their predecessors. Many dioceses elected vicars capitular, diocesan administrators, or pro-bishops¹²¹ to temporarily maintain the ecclesiastical function of the Chinese Church. But the shortage was so severe that, in early 1958, one hundred and twenty out of the one hundred and forty-five dioceses (or prefectures apostolic) in China had no functioning diocesan bishop.¹²²

In the National Conference of Catholic Delegates (1957), Government officers suggested to the delegates that they consider the option of

¹¹⁸For a list of episcopal appointments from 1950 to 1955, see Wei, pp. 204f.

¹¹⁹For example, Bishop Gong Pinmei of Shanghai, Bishop Fan Xueyan of Baoding, Archbishop Zhou Zhishi of Nanchang, and many more, were arrested.

¹²⁰The last appointment (before 1980) by Rome was the nomination of Antony Yang Guangci as the Bishop of Yuci, Shanxi, on September 1955. He did not receive consecration, and had been in prison since 1957. He died in the 1970s; see Globe and Mail, 12 June 1981; and AAS 48 (1956): 530.

¹²¹For example, Vicar Capitular Zhang Zhilan of Shanghai and Diocesan Administrator Lin Quan of Fuzhou were both elected by their respective dioceses.

¹²²CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 29.

consecrating their own bishops regardless of papal approval. This suggestion did not gain any support from the delegates because no-Chinese bishops were willing to consecrate without papal approval.¹²³ In December 1957, Chengdu Diocese held the first episcopal election.¹²⁴ Many dioceses soon followed.

In March 1958, two dioceses (Hankou and Wuchang) elected their bishops, and planned for the consecration in April. These two dioceses then requested ratification from Rome. Propaganda Fide, which had jurisdiction over these two dioceses, declared these two elections void because these two episcopal candidates did not have papal approval.¹²⁵ Further, Propaganda Fide called attention to the decree issued by the Holy Office in 1951, which states that both consecrators and consecratees, if they do not have approval from the Pope, will be ipso facto excommunicated.¹²⁶

Rome's strong rejection and severe warning came as a surprise to Chinese Catholics because they did not expect any problem from Rome in ratifying their elected episcopal candidates.¹²⁷ The Chinese prelates were caught in a dilemma: To consecrate would mean facing excommunication, not to consecrate would lead to the diminishing of the Chinese Church. Bishop Li Daonan and the clergy of these two dioceses discussed this problem for about two weeks and arrived at the following conclusion:

¹²³Thomas II, p. 140.

¹²⁴Sichuan Ribao, 18 December 1957.

¹²⁵See AIF, no. 1376 (3 May 1958), pp. 151f; or PDRNC, p. 48.

¹²⁶AAS 43 (1951): 217f.

¹²⁷G. Dunne, "The Prisoners of Shanghai," in CUP, no. 6 (Winter 1983), pp. 52f.

The Chinese Church and the Roman Curia are situated in different societies. The present [sociopolitical] reality of the Chinese Church is not the same as in the past. It is a righteous act for the Chinese Church to propagate continuously in the present social reality of Chinese society. This is also a just act for the clergy. In order to fulfill this mission, we have to realize that since the Roman Curia lives in a society different from ours, it [Roman Curia] cannot possibly understand our feelings and our thinking, much less understand our righteous act. As a matter of fact, we cannot deny the reality that the Roman Curia takes a different political stand than ours. In other words, the Roman Curia holds an anti-Reactionary position against the New China. This [political stand] is destructive to the present reality of the Chinese Church and is provocative to the politics of China. Under this situation, we can only act in accordance with the precedent in the history of the Church, [viz.] on the ground of the establishment of the Chinese Holy Hierarchy, the Chinese Church has to reserve the right to elect and consecrate its bishops in order to build a true Chinese Church. The Roman Curia does not understand Chinese society. Political position limits its [Roman Curia] understanding. Its rejection of our righteous act is an obvious conclusion. We are responsible to God, the [Chinese] Church, and to the three million Chinese Catholics. We have to ignore the illegal intervention of the Roman Curia and to consecrate our duly elected bishops.¹²⁸

With the aforementioned justification, Chinese prelates ignored the warning from Rome and went ahead with their planned consecration. They believed that it was the only alternative if the Chinese Church was to survive in China.

¹²⁸ Thomas (pseud.), "The Real Story Behind the 'Self-election and Self-consecration of Bishops' Under the Plot of the Chinese Communist," in ZT, no. 52 (16 April 1961), p. 207. my translation.

By 1966, more than fifty Chinese bishops had been consecrated independently.¹²⁹

These Independent Consecrations segregated the Chinese Church further from Rome. Pope Pius XII issued the encyclical letter Ad Apostolorum principis¹³⁰ to emphasize that "complete freedom in the nomination of bishop is the right of the Roman Pontiff,"¹³¹ and that excommunication would be automatically incurred on those who violated this papal right.¹³²

This conflictual incident receives diverse interpretations. Rome accuses the Chinese Church of having been rebellious and disobedient, while the Chinese Church has refuted this charge by labelling Rome unreasonable and discriminatory. Some put the blame on the Chinese Government, and state that Rome was totally faultless.¹³³ For example, Ladany argues that since only the Pope has the authority to appoint bishops, and since in 1958, the Pope could not obtain sufficient data on qualified episcopal candidates, the Pope could

¹²⁹ The exact number and the identity of these Independent Chinese bishops (before 1966) have never been released. The Chinese Church puts the total figure vaguely as "more than 50" and has never published a complete list, see Xinhua (Eng.), 22 May 1980. Fr. L.T.S. Wei has documented 45 episcopal elections with 43 names, and 42 consecrations with 41 names, see Wei, pp. 279-281. To supplement Wei's record, one of these three elected bishops, Bishop Xa Xueqian, had been consecrated in 1962, see Zhongguo Xinwen, 22 January 1962; the other one, Ji Huairang, was consecrated on December 1981; and the third, Kang Yinnan, died in June 1981. Also the two "unidentified" consecrated bishops are Bishop He Qunming of Kaifeng, Henan, and Bishop Liu Anci of Zhengding, Hebei.

Even the Chinese Church officials seem to have difficulty about the ecclesiastical status of these bishops. For example, Fr. Kang Yinnan was elected as Bishop of Jiangmen in 1958 (Wei, p. 280), and is referred to as a bishop in CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 4 and in Nanfang Ribao, 5 July 1981; yet he is not a member of the CBC, and was never consecrated.

¹³⁰ AAS 50 (1958): 601-614; ET TPS 5 (Spring 1959): 189-199.

¹³¹ TPS, *ibid.*, p. 195.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 194ff.

¹³³ Behold, p.10.

not possibly make any episcopal appointments. Ladany then suggests that to seek ratification from Rome for an episcopal candidate was to force Rome to accept a fait accompli reality. He states that it was a Communist plot to challenge papal authority in order to domesticate the Chinese Church.¹³⁴

Others argue that Rome made a grave mistake in not giving sanction to the Independent Chinese Bishops. They place the responsibility entirely upon Rome. This interpretation is commonly used by the Chinese Church to justify its stand. For example, Bishop Tu Shihua reasons that episcopal authority comes not from the Pope, but from God, and that many bishops in the history of the Church were elected by dioceses and not appointed by the Pope. He further states that many countries do have a say in episcopal elections because they have signed treaties with Rome. Therefore, he argues that Rome's refusal to allow the Chinese Church to select its own bishops was a discriminatory act which treated the Chinese Church as a colonial rather than a sovereign church.¹³⁵

Regardless how one interprets this historical incident, it is a fact that the existence of the Independent Chinese bishops generated strong hostility between the Chinese Church and Rome. It is within this historical controversy that the Chinese Church formed the CBC in 1980, and consecrated more Independent Bishops from 1980 to 1983.

¹³⁴ Ladany follows the same argument used by Pius XII in the encyclical Ad Apostolorum principis in which Pius XII expresses his anti-Communist sentiment and his objection to choosing pro-Government (those who do not oppose Communism) Chinese clergy as ordinaries. The underlying motive of Pius XII's rejection of these elected Chinese episcopal candidates is the fact that these candidates hold a pro-Government stance—a political position which makes them unqualified in the eyes of Pius XII.

¹³⁵ CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 28-30.

ii. The Mode of the Independent Consecrations

The Chinese Church makes a point of emphasizing that all Independent consecrations are conducted as close to ecclesiastical tradition as possible,¹³⁶ and that all Independent Bishops are consecrated by valid bishops. If possible, the consecrations of Independent Bishops are performed by senior bishops (erstwhile archbishops) of the ecclesiastical division to which the new Independent Bishop belongs. This can be seen in the consecrations held in the provinces of Sichuan and Hebei.¹³⁷

However, because of the acute shortage of bishops in China, many ecclesiastical divisions do not have even a single bishop. In these cases, it is impossible to have any senior bishop as the consecrator.¹³⁸ Therefore, Bishop Zhong Huaide, Chairman of the CPCA and the Vice-Chairman of the CBC, usually acts as the consecrator and bishops from neighboring provinces or bishops who happen to be in the vicinity act as co-consecrators.¹³⁹

The consecration liturgy is basically the same as that of the

¹³⁶For example, see the documentary film "New Branches on The Vine--Continuing The Lord's Work," on the consecration of five bishops held in July 1981, produced by the NAC, hereafter referred to as "Consecration film."

¹³⁷CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 18; CCC, no. 13 (October 1985), p. 9.

¹³⁸Someone puts forth the argument that it would be illegal if the consecration is not carried out by the president of the ecclesiastical division. It seems that this individual does not take into consideration the abnormal situation (no bishop in many provinces) in the Chinese Church; see CUP, no. 15 (Spring 1986), p. 37.

¹³⁹CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 4; CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), p. 10; CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 27; CCC, no. 14 (December 1985), p. 10.

Pontificale Romanum¹⁴⁰ with some alterations in the Oath, Formal Introduction, and the Examination.¹⁴¹ The alterations or modifications in the liturgy stress the following themes: the autonomous nature of episcopal nomination, the rejection of the Roman Curia's control, the avoidance of any mention of the Pope, and allegiance to the civil authority.¹⁴²

These alterations of the liturgy have become the source of controversy about the validity of these Independent Bishops. They are interpreted by people, both inside and outside of China, as signs of the rejection of papal authority and of a break away from the Roman Catholic communion.¹⁴³ If this interpretation is correct, the validity of these Independent Bishops is under question. However, a careful examination of these alterations of the liturgy in light of its context suggests a different interpretation: these alterations are more a political protest against Rome's treatment of the Chinese Church in the 1950s, than a theologically intended step to break away from Roman Catholicism.

This liturgy begins with the episcopal candidate reading an Oath before the Formal Introduction, whereas the Pontificale Romanum has it in

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Pontificale Romanum. Sacre d'un évêque selon le Pontifical romain (Paris: Desclée, 1950), hereafter cited as Pontificale.

¹⁴¹ The Consecration of a Bishop: Liturgy and Explanation (n.p., n.d.), (c), p. 2, hereafter referred to as Liturgy. See Appendix III.

¹⁴² Liturgy, pp. 2, 16.

¹⁴³ For example, see CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), pp. 145f.

reverse order.¹⁴⁴ The content of this Oath indicates that a. the new bishop is elected in the spirit of the historical tradition of the Holy Catholic Church, b. he will obey the Government, c. he will lead his diocese to unite with the people for the prosperity of the nation, and d. he will also lead his diocese in accordance with the Principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church.¹⁴⁵

A controversial sentence: "to break off all relationship with Imperialism and any control by the Pope of Rome" is alleged to be part of the Oath. It appears in a handwritten version.¹⁴⁶ Theologically speaking, such a sentence implies a denial of all papal authority even in religious matters and a total separation from the Pope. These two implications further suggest the possibility of schism.

However, this controversial sentence is not found in the original version of the Oath.¹⁴⁷ Even Spae, who obtained and published the handwritten version, has reservations about the authenticity of this sentence.¹⁴⁸ Spae

¹⁴⁴ Liturgy, p. 16. Cf. Pontificale. In January 1985, a different Oath was used at the consecration of two auxiliary bishops of Shanghai. This new Oath has a milder political tone and places more emphasis on the religious duty of the bishop, cf. YIC, (April 1985), p. 7. This new Oath is not discussed here because it appeared in 1985--beyond the parameter of this dissertation.

¹⁴⁵ An English translation of the Oath appeared in CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 146. However, this translation has some errors: for example, it wrongly translates the "Principle of Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church" as the "Three-Self Principle" which is exclusively used by the Chinese Protestant Church. It also misses a sentence which appears in the original Chinese version (. . . together to protect the unity of the nation . . . etc.). Cf. Appendix III.

¹⁴⁶ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 147.

¹⁴⁷ Liturgy, p. 16.

¹⁴⁸ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 145.

later admitted that this sentence is not part of the Oath in a letter to this author.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, this controversial sentence is evidently not part of the Oath, and is probably a personal comment later added to the Oath.

With this controversial sentence out of the way, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Independent Chinese Bishops have to swear to separate from the Pope during their consecrations. The Oath, as it stands, puts the emphasis on the patriotic attitude of the new bishops and is silent on their relationship with Rome. Therefore, there is little ground for a schismatic interpretation of this Oath.

After the reading of the Oath, the consecrating bishop begins the Formal Introduction. Instead of asking: "Habetis mandatum Apostolicum? (Do you have the Apostolic mandate?)" to confirm the papal mandate as required in the Pontificale Romanum, the consecrating bishop asks, "Is he [the episcopal candidate] supported and elected by the clergy and the laity?" The co-consecrating bishop replies: "Yes." Then the diocesan secretary announces the democratic election procedure and emphasizes that the episcopal election has been held according to the tradition of the Catholic Church.¹⁵⁰

The consecrating bishop then examines the faith and the commitment of the new bishop.¹⁵¹ Thirteen out of the fifteen examining questions are exactly the same as those found in the Examination section of the Pontificale Romanum. The two inserted questions (no. 1 & no. 15) are the most polemic. Question no. 1 states: "Are you willing to break away from the control of the Roman

¹⁴⁹Personal correspondence with Spae, 7 March 1984.

¹⁵⁰Liturgy, p. 4. Cf. Pontificale, p. 3.

¹⁵¹"Consecration film."

Curia; and to faithfully follow the Principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church?" Question no. 15 states: "Are you willing to administer the Catholic Church of _____ (Diocese) in accordance to the Principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church?"¹⁵²

At the same time, three questions found in the Pontificale Romanum are deleted from this liturgy. Two of them are about submission to the Roman pontiff: "Vis traditiones orthodoxorum . . . docere ac servare?" and "Vis beato Petro . . . per omnia exhibere?" The other is the refutation of heresy: "Anathematiza etiam omnem haeresim . . . Ecclesiam catholicam?"¹⁵³

In order to understand the intentions behind the changes of these questions, one has to situate them in their proper context. Historically speaking, these changes were made in 1958 primarily as part of the protest against Rome's rejection of the elected Chinese episcopal candidates.¹⁵⁴ They are not meant to reject papal authority, but to express the discontent of the Chinese Church towards the patronizing attitude of Rome and, at the same time, to foster a better relationship with the Government by refraining from an attack on atheism.

Semantically speaking, Chinese Catholics deliberately try to single out the political aspect of Rome as a target of rejection. First, it is the Roman Curia, not the Pope nor the Holy See, which is under attack. Roman Curia in Chinese literally means "the court of Rome," and it signifies the political and administrative dimensions of the Roman Catholic Church. Secondly, it is the

¹⁵² Pontificale, pp. 9, 14.

¹⁵³ Liturgy, pp. 6f. Cf. Appendix III.

¹⁵⁴ See chapter two, B. 2. ii.

"control" of the Roman Curia, not the authority of the Church or the Pope, from which the Chinese Church has to break away. Thirdly, the verb "break away from" (baituo) expresses a strong political connotation,¹⁵⁵ which implies that the Chinese Church intends to detach itself from the political control of Rome but not necessarily to break the religious link to Rome. If those involved had wanted to reject the religious authority of the pope, they could easily have done so without going to the trouble of painstakingly underscoring the political aspect of Rome.

Phenomenally speaking, Chinese Church leaders consciously avoid making any direct reference to the Pope, the Church of Rome, or the Holy See by deleting the questions, which contain these references, from the consecration liturgy. Otherwise, they would have to openly denounce the Pope by answering the questions under the pressure of the civil authority. Thus, the avoidance of references to the Pope suggests that the Chinese Church tries to avoid publicly denouncing the Pope.

Furthermore, in the documentary film of the consecration liturgy, the editor deliberately deletes Question no. 1, (. . . break away from the control of the Roman Curia?) from the content, as if this question is never part of the liturgy.¹⁵⁶ This editing suggests that the Chinese Church does not want to highlight this Question, a subtle signal to indicate the desire of the Chinese Church to be linked to the Pope. It was also reported that some bishops even omitted the Oath against Rome during their consecrations held in

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ In the "consecration film," there is a clear gap between the beginning of the episcopal examination and Question no. 2, which indicates that Question no. 1 has been deleted.

remote areas.¹⁵⁷

One cannot draw theological arguments or implications from the face value of the Mode of Independent Consecration, for there may not be a theological intention behind it. The Mode of Independent Consecration, in fact, reflects the agony of the Chinese Catholics. On the one hand, Chinese Catholics want to express their dissatisfaction with Rome's attitude towards them, on the other hand, they are under pressure from the Government to denounce the political position of the Vatican. On top of these, they also want to remain part of the Roman Catholic communion.

Under these conflicts, they artificially dichotomize the authority of the Pope into the political and the religious realms. Although they may well be aware that this distinction is ecclesologically impossible, their point is not the theological distinction between these two realms, but a practical solution of their dilemma.

By loudly rejecting the "political" aspect of Rome and remaining silent about the "religious" authority of the Pope, they can fulfill not only the Government's political demand but express some of their discontent with Rome while feeling in their conscience that they are nonschismatic.

iii. Questions on the validity of Chinese Independent Bishops

There are three main questions concerning the ecclesiastical status of the Independent Bishops. Are they valid bishops? Are they schismatic? Have they been excommunicated from the Roman Catholic Church? These three questions raise not just theological but canonical issues. Since this research is a theological reflection, but not a canonical examination of the Chinese Church,

¹⁵⁷ L. Ladany, "The Beijing-Rome Dialogue," RCL 14 (Spring 1986), p. 102.

this part limits the discussion to highlighting the main canonical issues involved in these three questions. This research does not intend to draw any canonical conclusions because such a conclusion requires a qualified canonist.

First, there is little doubt about the validity of these Independent Consecrations. These Independent Consecrations are performed according to the Apostolic tradition, and are conferred by valid bishops.¹⁵⁸ The Chinese Catholics themselves do not seem to question the validity of these Independent Bishops.¹⁵⁹ Even Pope XII implies that these Independent Bishops are valid.¹⁶⁰ However, these Independent Bishop are considered to be illicit because their consecrations lacked papal approval.

As for the question of schism, schism is defined in Canon Law as "the refusal of submission to the Roman Pontiff or of communion with the members of the Church subject to him."¹⁶¹ These Independent Bishops have to declare their independence from the Roman Curia, which is a member subject to the Pope, and to reject the political stand of the Papacy. Superficially, these Independent Bishops seem to be in the state of schism.

However, one has to consider the following factors. These Independent Bishops never openly and explicitly reject the Pope. They reject the control

¹⁵⁸ Codex juris canonici (1983), Code of Canon Law, Latin-English edition. Tr. by Canon Law Society of America (Washington, D.C.: Canon Law Society of America, 1984), no. 1169, hereafter referred to as Canon Law.

¹⁵⁹ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 145.

¹⁶⁰ In Ad Apostolorum principis, Pius XII wrote that "Acts requiring the power of Holy Orders which are performed by ecclesiastics of this kind, though they are valid as long as the consecration conferred on them was valid, are yet gravely illicit, that is, criminal and sacrilegious." In TPS 5 (Spring 1959), p. 196.

¹⁶¹ Canon Law, no. 751.

of the Roman Curia but do not refuse communion with it. They are under tremendous political pressure from the civil authority. They are resentful and bitter because they consider Rome's attitude towards them as unfair, unsympathetic and patronizing. And they have also experienced prolonged isolation and physical and psychological abuse. Therefore, there is doubt about whether what they say actually reflects their true intention.

Finally, as to the question of excommunication, Pius XII stated that excommunication would automatically be incurred by the Chinese Independent Bishops, as well as the consecrators.¹⁶² Canon Law also states that schismatic or bishops consecrated without pontifical mandate will incur automatic excommunication.¹⁶³ Many commentators also assume that excommunications have actually occurred.¹⁶⁴

However, there are a few things to consider. Canon Law states that no one is punished unless a sin has been committed. External violation of a law or precept presumes, but does not definitively prove, that sin is committed.¹⁶⁵ Thus there is doubt about whether these Independent Bishops consciously and freely go through the illicit consecrations, or whether they are forced to do it against their will. If the latter case is true, these Independent Bishops have committed no sin because this deed is done against their free will.

It is also interesting to observe that Rome issued no formal decree of

¹⁶² Ad Apostolorum principis, ET PDRNC, p. 58.

¹⁶³ Canon Law, no. 1364 and no. 1382.

¹⁶⁴ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 141; Behold, p. 10; also "Letter to The Pope on The Ex-communication," by China Commission of The German Catholic Mission Council, mimeographed, April 1983.

¹⁶⁵ CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), pp. 141, 144. Cf. Canon Law, no. 1321.

excommunication to any of the Chinese Independent Bishops and their consecrators.¹⁶⁶ The only explicit decree of excommunication ever publicly issued to a Chinese prelate is the one addressed to Vicar General Li Weiguang, who was consecrated independently as bishop after the excommunication. Therefore, his excommunication had nothing to do with episcopal consecration.¹⁶⁷

Furthermore, Rome retains all the ecclesiastical titles of these supposedly excommunicated Independent Chinese Bishops and their consecrators. According to Canon Law, excommunicated persons cannot validly acquire a dignity, office, or function in the Church.¹⁶⁸ The aforementioned case of Li Weiguang shows that Rome publicly stripped Li of his ecclesiastical post immediately after his secret excommunication.¹⁶⁹ Yet none of the names of these Independent Bishops and their consecrators have been deleted from the Annuario Pontificio nor does this book indicate that they have been demoted.¹⁷⁰

Therefore, it is suggested that even though Independent Chinese Bishops may technically fall into the category of excommunication, there are still serious doubts about whether or not they have really incurred this punishment. Even Rome seems to give them the benefit of the doubt despite the de facto external violation of the law.

¹⁶⁶ PDRNC p. 48.

¹⁶⁷ He was excommunicated on February 1, 1952 because of his rebellious acts against his superior. The excommunication order was made public in 1955; see AAS 47 (1955): 247.

¹⁶⁸ Canon Law, no. 1169.

¹⁶⁹ AP (1951): 283; cf. AP (1952): 288.

¹⁷⁰ For example, AP (1983): 578, for Bishop Wang Xueming (Wang Hsueh-ming)'s post.

2. The Composition of the CBC

According to Article no. 7 of the NAC constitution, the CBC is composed of all rightful diocesan bishops.¹⁷¹ The number of the CBC members constantly changes. At the formation of the CBC in June 1980, thirty-three names are listed,¹⁷² but only thirty bishops actually appeared in the officially released group photos.¹⁷³ The number of bishops in the CBC increased to thirty-five in July 1981. All thirty-five bishops appear in the official pictures,¹⁷⁴ which even includes those who did not appear in the first CBC group photo.¹⁷⁵ From July 1981 to the end of 1983, at least three bishops passed away,¹⁷⁶ and fourteen new bishops were consecrated.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, by the end of 1983, the total number of bishop in the CBC would be at least forty-six. However not all

¹⁷¹CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 51.

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁷³In the groupphotos inserted in CCC, no. 1, Bishops Shi Qishui of Ningbo, Wu Gouhan of Hangzhou, and Deng Jizhou of Jiading are missing from the pictures. It is possible that these three bishops were included in the CBC in absentia, or that they missed the picture for other reasons such as ill health.

¹⁷⁴CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 3.

¹⁷⁵Bishop Deng Jizhou appears at the extreme left corner of the front row in the CBC group photo, in CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), front inner cover.

¹⁷⁶Shi Qishui of Ningbo and Pan Shauxing of Zhangjiakou, CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 9; Zhou Yizhai of Bengbu, CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 63.

¹⁷⁷CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 15.

of them were active because many of them were reported to be in bad health.¹⁷⁸

The identity of the thirty-three bishops, who were listed in 1980, is difficult to trace¹⁷⁹ because the Chinese Church only released a list of thirty-three names with no further information about the individuals. Likewise, in the first official picture of the CBC, which is published in the Catholic Church in China, the thirty bishops, who appear on the picture, are not identified with their respective names and dioceses. A list of names identifying them later appears with the photo in a magazine, which is published in Hong Kong.¹⁸⁰ Through careful scrutiny of various reports regarding the ecclesiastical activities in the Chinese Church, all thirty-three Chinese bishops can be traced to their respective dioceses.¹⁸¹

The identities of those bishops consecrated after 1981 were well publicized. Many reports concerning the background and current activities of these bishops have been published by the Chinese Church,¹⁸² the Chinese

¹⁷⁸ For example, only forty bishops attended the CPCA/NAC Joint Conference held in April 1983; others were excused from the meeting for health reasons, see CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 3. By the end of 1985, Bishop Fu reported that there were forty-seven Bishops in the Chinese Church, see J.-M. Bosc, "Chine: Deng corrige Mao," in Peuples du Monde, no. 189 (January 1986), pp. 24f.

¹⁷⁹ CSPB, no. 24 (August 1983), pp. 13-19, publishes the names of some of these Chinese bishops. However the information given by CSPB is not accurate. For example, it has no information on the diocesan restructure in Hebei, which occurred on October 1980, see Hebei, passim. Also, some of the bishops listed as "inactive" had actually passed away long ago, such as Bishop Yang Guangci, see Goble and Mail, 12 June 1981. However, it is the most extensive information yet published on the identity of Chinese bishops.

¹⁸⁰ YIC, no. 13 (January-February 1981), p. 19.

¹⁸¹ See Appendix. I.

¹⁸² CCC (August 1983), p. 5.

Government,¹⁸³ and overseas visitors.¹⁸⁴

Not all bishops in China are members of the CBC. Two principles seem to govern the membership of the CBC. First, CBC members must be validly consecrated. For example, Fr. Kang Yinnan was elected as Bishop of Jiangmen in June 1958,¹⁸⁵ but had not yet been consecrated. He is referred to as a bishop both by the Government¹⁸⁶ and by the Chinese Church officials,¹⁸⁷ but never as a member of the CBC.¹⁸⁸

So long as the consecration is valid, there is no discrimination against the bishops who are consecrated under the authority of Rome.¹⁸⁹ At least four bishops, who have been appointed and consecrated with papal approval, are members of the CBC; they are Bishops Deng Zizhou of Jiading, Wang

¹⁸³ Wenhui Bao (HK), 25 July 1981; Renmin Ribao, 26 July 1981.

¹⁸⁴ There is much information available on the Chinese bishops from the accounts of various visitors; see YIC; or CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), pp. 27-30.

¹⁸⁵ Wei, p. 280; also ICI, no. 89 (1 February 1959), p. 26.

¹⁸⁶ Nanfeng Ribao, 5 July 1981; he died on June 24, 1981.

¹⁸⁷ See CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 4; CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 9.

¹⁸⁸ He is listed as the standing committee member of both the NAC and the CPCA; see CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 47, 55.

¹⁸⁹ Xinhua (Eng.), 22 May 1980 read: "In China, bishops ordained by Rome or by Chinese Catholics are given equal treatment."

Xueming of Hohhot, Duan Yinming of Wanxian, and Han Tingpi of Hongdong.¹⁹⁰

The second principle is that all CBC bishops must politically hold a pro-Government stand. It is observed that not all validly consecrated bishops in China are members of the CBC. There are at least nine bishops who have not joined the CBC. Five are Rome-appointed bishops consecrated between 1949 and 1951. They are Bishops Zhou Weidao of Fengxiang, who died in 1983; Bishop Deng Yiming, who had briefly served as the Bishop of Guangzhou before he was exiled to Hong Kong since 1981; Bishop Gong Pinmei of Shanghai, who had been in jail since 1955 and was granted parole in July 1985; Bishop Fan Xueyan of Baoding, who had been released from jail in 1979 and was again arrested in 1982; Bishop Zhang Kexiang of Xiwanzi, who is reported to be inactive in his home village.¹⁹¹ At least four bishops have been clandestinely consecrated in communion with Rome since 1979. They are Bishop Wang who was arrested in 1983,¹⁹² Bishop Li Qinfeng of Fengxiang who was consecrated by Bishop Zhou Weidao, and at least two other Bishops who were consecrated by Bishop Fan

¹⁹⁰ Xinhua (Eng.), 22 May 1980. All of these bishops remain in the AP (1983) with the titles and posts given them by Rome. Missionary ordinaries, who had been out of China since the early 50's, still had their name listed as legitimate ordinaries of certain dioceses and prefectures apostolics in China. For example, the Prefects Apostolic of Weihai, Yangzhou, Qiqihar, Shiqian Kweilin, Jiamusi, in AP (1983): 934f, the Apostolic Administrator of Yongping, in AP (1983): 662, and the Bishop of Wuzhou, in AP (1983): 656. All foreign Apostolic Administrators and Prefects Apostolic of sees in China had been asked to resign and their names had been deleted from the AP 1984 edition. Foreign bishops of sees in China also resigned and retained the title of vescovo emerito, for example, see AP (1984): 656.

¹⁹¹ Lazzarotto, p. 71.

¹⁹² It is reported that a bishop, whose surname is Wang, was arrested in 1983. This bishop is from Northern China and was probably consecrated by Bishop Fan Xueyan in communion with Rome. Kung Kao Pao, 7 September 1984.

Xueyan around 1981-1982.¹⁹³ All nine reject the Government-recognized Chinese Church and remain loyal to Rome. Their dioceses had already been claimed by other bishops who are members of the CBC.¹⁹⁴

3. The Ecclesial Role of the CBC

Before 1957, the Chinese Church closely abided by instructions from Rome. After 1957, Chinese Catholics rejected the rulings of the Vatican because they considered these rulings as not suitable to the Chinese context. However, the Chinese Church had not yet established any teaching office to replace the Magisterium of Rome.

According to the constitution of the NAC, the CBC is "designed to study and explore doctrines of faith and commandments and precepts, to exchange experience in propagating the Gospel, and to expand friendly contacts with foreign Catholics."¹⁹⁵ One of the important duties of the CBC is to be the teaching office of the Chinese Church, viz. the Magisterium of the Chinese Church. Consequently, the Chinese Church no longer needs to depend on Rome to deal with doctrinal matters.

Within the scope of its teaching authority, the CBC, in cooperation with the NAC, exercises authority by setting up ecclesiastical regulations,¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 8.

¹⁹³ Fr. X., who is a classmate of one of these clandestinely consecrated bishops, told this author that Bishop Fan Xueyuan had consecrated at least three bishops clandestinely. One of these bishops died a few months later, and another one might be Bishop Wang who was arrested in 1984.

¹⁹⁴ For example, Baoding to Bishop Wang Keiwei, Guangzhou to Bishop Yi Yinyun, and Shanghai to Bishop Zhang Jiashi.

¹⁹⁵ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 52, my translation.

dispensing ecclesiastical faculties, revising the liturgy, and conferring ecclesiastical orders (ordination and consecration). Furthermore, it also exercises authority over episcopal ratification.¹⁹⁷

The CBC also assumes the role of pastoral leadership of the Chinese Church. Chinese Catholic leaders affirm that bishops are the successors of the apostles and are the supreme spiritual leaders of the diocese.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, the CBC becomes the spiritual head of the Chinese Church in ministering to the pastoral needs of Chinese Catholics.

The CBC also has the duty to cultivate friendship with foreign Catholics. From 1980 to 1983 all receptions of foreign Catholics were carried out by the CPCA and the NAC.¹⁹⁹ The CBC did not issue invitations nor receive any foreign Catholic group. It seems that the CBC could relate to foreign Catholics only at the formal episcopal level,²⁰⁰ which differs from the NAC's foreign function of relating to foreign Catholics in general and to ecclesial organizations or from the CPCA's foreign function which deals with foreign civil or political bodies.²⁰¹

The formation of the CBC changed the Chinese Church into an autocephalic church which enables the Chinese Church to experience a fuller

¹⁹⁷ CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), inner front cover.

¹⁹⁸ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 49.

¹⁹⁹ CCC, no. 7, (August 1983), pp. 8, 16.

²⁰⁰ In 1985, the CBC officially received a delegation from the Diocese of Hong Kong which was headed by Bishop John Baptist Wu of Hong Kong, CCC, no. 12 (June 1985), 23.

²⁰¹ The visit of Cardinal Sin of Manila was handled by the CPCA and the NAC rather than by the CBC because Sin's visit was personal without any ecclesial mandate, CCC, no. 11 (December 1984), p. 53.

realization of a local church.²⁰² Being the teaching authority and the pastoral leadership of the Chinese Church, the CBC becomes the spiritual head of the Chinese Church, which leads the Chinese Church in religious matters. Chinese Catholics no longer need to depend on foreign ecclesial authority for guidance in matters of faith.

The CBC also reflects the development of a collegial leadership in the Chinese Church which did not exist formerly. From 1946 to 1957, the Chinese Church had lived under the absolute authority of the Pope. From 1957 to 1966, although the Chinese Church rejected papal authority in certain areas, it had not established any ecclesiastical authority to replace papal authority.

In 1980, Chinese Church leaders emphasized that the Early Church, according to the Bible, was governed by the collective leadership of the Apostles, and not by any individual.²⁰² Therefore, they pattern the CBC after this biblical model of ecclesiastical management which stresses collegiality. Since then, the Chinese Church has had its own source of spiritual authority, which operates in a democratic and collegial manner with biblical justification.

D. THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

The internal structure of the Chinese Church, viz., the CPCA, NAC and CBC, appears to be a Roman Catholic hierarchy and yet demonstrates total autonomy as a contextual ecclesial community. It is an unique ecclesiological

²⁰²CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 21.

phenomenon which is not found elsewhere in the Universal Church. It exhibits some unique ecclesiological features which have resulted from its particular context. These ecclesiological features bear profound theological implications and are discussed as follows: 1. The Tripartite Structure, 2. The Democratic Structure, 3. The Contextual Structure, 4. The Apostolicity of the Chinese Church, 5. The Collegial Leadership, and 6. Further Theological Questions.

1. The Tripartite Structure

The inner structure of the Chinese Church is composed of the CPCA, the NAC and the CBC. This tripartite structure was established in the unique environment of Chinese society in which politicization is a social norm. In this context, the CPCA is an indispensable organization to link the Chinese Church with Chinese society. However, the Chinese Church also needs ecclesiastical structures, such as the NAC and the CBC, not only for ecclesial credibility but for the justification of its ecclesiastical autonomy.

There are some theoretical distinctions between these three organizations. The CPCA deals primarily with the Government and claims a civil status. The NAC and the CBC regard themselves as ecclesiastical organizations and confine their function to the ecclesial realm. Within the ecclesial realm, the CBC exercises spiritual, pastoral and teaching authority, while the NAC manages the daily ecclesiastical administration.

However, it is difficult to make a precise distinction between these organizations. First, these three organizations are staffed basically by the same people. Almost all bishops belong to all three organizations at the same time. Thus, it is often very confusing to distinguish their names from their offices. Secondly, the functions of these three organizations overlap in some

areas. For example, all three have the mandate to deal with foreign visitors. Thirdly, there is a tendency for media to focus on the well-known CPCA, to accredit all ecclesial events in the Chinese Church to the CPCA, and to ignore the newly formed CBC and the NAC. Therefore, the media may present a distorted picture of the structure of the Chinese Church and further confuse the already complicated interrelationship between these three organizations.

2. The Democratic Structure

From 1979 to 1983 the Chinese Church embraced a radical ecclesiastical concept viz. the self-governing of the Chinese Church through a democratic ecclesiastical structure. With this structure, the Chinese Church claimed the sovereign right to govern its own affairs, i.e. to appoint its own leaders and to decide its own destiny, free from any foreign intervention. Furthermore, the authority of the Chinese Church leaders no longer came from an external ecclesial authority, but internally from its members.

In actualizing this democratic structure, the NAC is theoretically formed by, and is accountable to, the National Catholic Representatives Conference which represents the Chinese Catholic population. Therefore, the administrative authority of the NAC is entrusted to it by Chinese Catholics, and not by any foreign ecclesiastical authority.

The CBC also exhibits this democratic characteristic. Chinese bishops are elected by Chinese clergy and are recognized by Chinese Catholics. This procedure of episcopal election highlights the right of Chinese Catholics to choose their spiritual leaders. In other words, the spiritual authority of the Chinese bishops is delegated to them by Chinese Catholics, and not by the Pope.



The concept of democratic ecclesiastical structure evidently implies that the ecclesiastical authority of a local church does not belong to any foreign ecclesial party, but to those Catholics who belong to that particular local church. In other words, ecclesiastical authority over local ecclesiastical affairs is not monopolized by a small group of foreigners, but commonly shared by all local Catholics who, in turn, exercise this authority to shape their destiny. This concept further suggests that only an ecclesiastical authority which emerges democratically can be effective and valid.

This concept of a democratic ecclesiastical structure bears important ramifications for the ecclesiology of the Universal Church. If ecclesiastical authority comes from democratic procedures, as claimed by the Chinese Church, the authority of the Papacy then would be regarded as power entrusted by various Catholic communities within in the Roman Catholic communion, rather than a taken-for-granted divine right. It further implies that no ecclesial community can claim authority over another community,²⁰³ and that a new understanding of the authority and the role of papal primacy vis-à-vis the preservation of the unity of the Church in the Universal context will emerge.²⁰⁴

3. The Contextual Structure

The inner structure of the Chinese Church strongly reflects the contexts in which it is situated. Two elements particularly influence the

²⁰³For example, see CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 21.

²⁰⁴The ecclesiological implications of the Chinese Church on the concept of the Universal Church is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Chinese Church: the sociopolitical context of Chinese society, and the ecclesial isolation from the Universal Church.

It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that many commentators view the structure of the Chinese Church as a means for the Chinese Government to control the Chinese Church. These commentators seem to interpret the Chinese Church with a Western Church and State presumption. They presume that the Church and the State are separate entities. If a local church submits to the political control of a government, it would naturally be considered as a puppet church domesticated by the civil authority.

The structure of the Chinese Church demonstrates a high degree of political submission to the Government. The CPCA, a political organization, dictates the political attitudes of the Chinese Church and serves as a bridge between the Church and the State. The NAC and the CBC, in spite of their nonpolitical status, also publicly declare a pro-Government stand.²⁰⁵ These politically biased characteristics of the Chinese ecclesiastical structure easily convey an image of a puppet church.

However, from a contextual perspective, the structure of the Chinese Church can be seen differently. In the Chinese sociopolitical context, all public organizations have to profess their allegiance to the Government in order to have the sanction exist publicly. Further, they also have to submit to the political control of the Government under the pretext of patriotism. This sociopolitical system is radically different from Western society.

Thus, the unique political characteristic of the Chinese ecclesiastical

²⁰⁵ For example, the NAC could strip ecclesiastical faculties from clergy who committed political crimes, see CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 17.

structure cannot be evaluated with the Western social standard as sign of a domesticated church. Rather, this structure is perhaps the only means for the Chinese Church to survive in the highly politicized Chinese society.

The other important element that contributes to the structure of the Chinese Church is the ecclesial isolation of the Chinese Church from the Universal Church. The Chinese Church has been physically isolated from the Universal Church since 1957 because of its dispute with Rome. This isolation forced the Chinese Church to develop a self-sustained theologically justified ecclesial structure with its own ecclesiastical authority, administrative structure, and political body.

Although the Chinese Church lives in isolation, evidence suggests that it desires to establish fraternal fellowship with other Catholic churches under the condition of mutual respect and equality. This desire has led the Chinese Church to develop an ecclesiastical structure compatible with other Catholic churches. The formation of the CBC seems to be the Chinese counterpart of the national Episcopal Conferences advocated by Vatican II.²⁰⁶

4. The Apostolicity of the Chinese Church

Although the ecclesial structure of the Chinese Church resembles an independent ecclesial community which seemingly departs from the Roman Catholic communion, careful examination suggests that it retains a strong Apostolic identity and does not want to depart from Roman Catholic tradition.

First of all, the structure of the Chinese Church reflects an episcopal hierarchy that follows Apostolic tradition. The CBC represents the spiritual

²⁰⁶ Christus Dominus, par. no. 37-39.

authority of the Chinese Church at the national level; the diocesan bishops, at the regional levels. Administrative structures like the NAC and the CACs are also led by the bishops.²⁰⁷ Despite the heavy political pressure that surrounds the Chinese Church, the role of the bishops remains unchanged; they are still the supreme spiritual and pastoral leaders of a local church.

Secondly, the Chinese Church leaders place heavy emphasis on the Apostolicity of the Chinese ecclesiastical structure. They claim that their ecclesiastical structure is built in the spirit of the Apostles. Theologically, they stress that the bishops are legal successors of Apostles.²⁰⁸ Since the Apostles are directly linked with Jesus Christ,²⁰⁹ they also deduce that the episcopal hierarchy of the Chinese Church is linked with Jesus Christ who is the head of the Church.²¹⁰ Practically, all Chinese clergymen, who form the ecclesiastical structure of the Chinese Church, are ordained or consecrated according to the Apostolic tradition.

Thirdly, the ecclesial structure of the Chinese Church is not necessarily schismatic. This structure enables the Chinese Church to manifest a total political and administrative independence from Rome vis-à-vis its internal affairs. Unlike the Anglican communion or the Orthodox Church, which claim complete separation from the Roman Catholic Church, the Chinese Church does not seem to reflect this ecclesiastical intention. On the contrary, the

²⁰⁷The Chairman and 10 out of the 12 deputy directors of the NAC are bishops; see CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 54. Also, it is usually a bishop who heads the CAC.

²⁰⁸CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 14.

²⁰⁹Ibid., p. 11.

²¹⁰Ibid., pp. 15, 36.

ecclesial structure of the Chinese Church suggests that the Chinese Church wants more local independence in the context of the local church, but not ecclesiastical separation vis-à-vis the Universal Church. It still claims to be part of, and linked to, the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church of the Roman Catholic communion.²¹¹

5. The Collegial Leadership

The concept of collegiality, viz., a democratic and self-governing structure via collective leadership, is advocated by Chinese Catholics with biblical and historical justifications. Bishop Tu Shihua uses the examples of the election of St. Matthias, the selection of the Seven, the Sending of St. Peter and St. John, and the missionary report of St. Paul to the Church of Jerusalem, to argue for the traditional spirit of the Apostles as collective leadership and democratic administration. Tu points out that the NAC and the CBC are operated in accordance with this spirit.²¹²

Besides seeking a biblical justification for the collegial model of ecclesiastical structure, Tu also challenges the doctrine of papal primacy.

²¹¹This concept had been emphasized by the Chinese Catholics. Three bishops jointly declared that: "Our actualization of an Independent, Self-manged, and Self-ruled Church is a righteous act. It is neither heretical nor schismatic. Rather, it is totally in accordance with the traditional spirit of how Jesus Christ established His Church and how the Apostles evangelized. None of the basic doctrines and regulations have been changed. We are just like all Catholic churches elsewhere in believing the same God, following the same Holy Scripture, dispensing the same Seven Sacraments, offering the same Mass, observing the same Ten Commandments and the same ecclesiastical regulations, preaching the same Gospel, wearing the same vestments, and venerating the same icons and holy objects." in CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 23f, my translation.

²¹²CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 20-23. The local CACs, too, claim this biblical basis, for example, see Hebei, pp. 39f.

He suggests that there is no definitive biblical data to support the claim of Petrine Primacy and the Primacy of Rome.²¹³ Other Chinese Catholics further elaborate Tu's argument. Bishop Chang Shouyi suggests that the official structure of the Papacy and the Roman Curia were created under specific social and historical circumstances, and that there was no explicit form of Papacy before the 5th Century.²¹⁴ Fr. Hou Hongwen further argues that, historically speaking, the Roman Pontiff came into existence only after the 5th Century.²¹⁵ Du Li even goes as far as to question the validity of the papal primacy.²¹⁶

All these arguments for collegiality seem to be discussed strictly within the context of collegial authority in the local church. They are used to defend the legitimacy of the Chinese Church's creation of a collegial authority to govern its ecclesiastical affairs. Even questions about papal

²¹³ Ibid.; see also J. Tong's commentary in his article: "The Primacy of the Pope and the Collegiality of the Bishops--a Theological Problem Discussed by the Catholic Church in China," in Tripod, no. 3 (May 1981), pp. 49-55.

²¹⁴ Chang states that "the first Pope was elected in the 5th Century," in Hebei p. 11; Ladany comments on it as "a absurd statement," in Behold, p. 3. Many contemporary Catholic theologians and historians made numerous studies on the controversial dating of the Papacy. Many agree that the concept of Papacy began in the Early Church and was fully realized (in the present structure) a few centuries later. See P. Granfield, The Papacy in Transition (Garden City, N.Y.: Double Day & Company, Inc., 1980), p., 37; T.G. Jalland, The Church and the Papacy (London: SPCK, 1944), p. 302; W. Ullmann, "Leo I and the Theme of Papal Primacy," in JTS N.S., 11 (1960): 25; or C. Ernst, "The Primacy of Peter: Theology and Ideology--I," in New Blackfriars 50 (1969): 354.

²¹⁵ Hebei, p. 20. Fr. Hou is from Baoding, see A List of Candidates for the Third Committee of the Hebei CPCA (n.p., mimeographed, 1980).

²¹⁶ There has been no official declaration from the Chinese Church rejecting the Papacy in principle. The closest it comes to this seems to be Du Li's Some Doubts Concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff (Beijing: Documentation Office of the Catholic Church in China, October 1980), which expresses Du's personal challenge to the historical and Biblical claims of papal primacy. This issue is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

primacy are not used to argue against papal authority over the Universal Church, but specifically against possible papal intervention in the affairs of a local church.

The concept of collegiality indicates an ecclesiological development of the Chinese Church. Through the experience of the sociopolitical context of Chinese society, Chinese Catholics became aware of the need to seek for autonomy and freedom from the control of the Roman Curia. In the process of searching for a suitable model of autonomous administration, they have found themselves in conflict with traditional ecclesiology which emphasizes the centralization of ecclesiastical authority in Rome.²¹⁷ Chinese Catholics have, therefore, turned to Scripture and Early Church history to rediscover the ancient ecclesiological concept of collegiality. This process of searching has taken place without dependency on the developments of Vatican II.

The concept of collegiality in the Chinese Church is in a very preliminary stage of development. It is a crude theological notion developed within the restricted context of the ecclesiastical authority of Chinese Church. It has not been elaborated or refined in the wider context of the Universal Church, in the precise collegial mode of ecclesial leadership, nor in the area of collegial authority. Nevertheless, the emergence of this concept, developed totally in isolation from post-Vatican II ecclesiological developments, suggests the ecclesiological necessity of collegiality and decentralization of ecclesiastical authority in the Universal Church.

²¹⁷ It was mentioned earlier that the theological development of Vatican II has not had any major influence on the Chinese Church. Therefore, the Chinese Church develops this concept of collegiality vis-à-vis the traditional ecclesiology --absolute papal primacy over all ecclesiastical affairs.

6. Further Theological Questions

The inner structure of the Chinese Church raises many theological questions which go beyond the context of the Chinese Church. In view of the tripartite structure of the Chinese Church, to what extent can a local church establish its own mode of ecclesiastical structure in reference to its context? What will be the impact of diverse ecclesiastical structures on the communion of the Universal Church and on the concept of universality?

To what extent is a democratic ecclesial structure truly democratic? Does the absence of foreign ecclesial influence guarantee a local ecclesial community the freedom necessary to decide its destiny? What about the influence and pressure from political and secular powers? Are these powers simply to be considered part of the context in which the democratic ecclesial structure has to live?

How will the ecclesiastical structure of the Chinese Church affect the relationship between Rome and other local churches? To what extent can the papacy exercise authority in a local church? Is the criterion of the balance of ecclesiastical power between Rome and local churches a contextual decision or a universal norm?

How can the concept of collegiality be applied in the context of a local church without regard to the context of the Universal Church? Can a bishop exercise his episcopal authority without a collegial relationship with the Pope?²¹⁸ How does this concept affect the authority of the Pope, the structure of the Universal Church, and the ecumenical polemic of Christian unity?

²¹⁸ For example, Christus Dominus (par. no. 3 and 4) states that bishops

What are the ecumenical ramifications of the Apostolicity of the Chinese Church? Is the Chinese Church not more Apostolic than the Anglican communion or the Orthodox Church? To what degree can the reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church have an impact on the ecumenical dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and other Christian traditions?



CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHINESE CHURCH AND THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH

The previous three chapters have examined several internal aspects of the Chinese Catholic Church between 1979 to 1983, viz. the Church and State relationship, the religious life of the Chinese Catholics, and internal structure of the Chinese Church. These considerations lead directly to the question of the particular position of the Chinese Church within the Universal Roman Catholic Church given that the Chinese Church has de facto separated from the Roman Catholic communion.

This chapter moves beyond the internal situation of the Chinese Church to examine directly the Chinese Church's efforts to restore full relationship with Rome and with other local churches between 1979 and 1983. During this period of time, many events took place which affected the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church.

A careful analysis of these events, as well as of official documents commenting on them, suggests that the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church during the 1979-1983 period can be divided into two phases clearly separated by Pope John Paul II's appointment of Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming in June 1981.

This chapter is therefore divided into three sections: A: "The Explorative Period: 1979-June 1981" examines the general optimism about reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church that was generated by the

reestablishment of contacts between the Chinese Church and foreign Catholics, the visitation of two Cardinals to China, and Rome's reaction to the reemergence of the Chinese Church. B. "The Confrontational Period: June 1981-1983" analyses the controversy surrounding the episcopal appointment of Bishop Deng Yiming, and the aftermath characterized by the deteriorating relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church. C. "Theological and Ecclesiological Implications" discusses the development of an ecclesiology of the Universal Church vis-à-vis the sociopolitical context of China and the theological ramifications of this ecclesiology.

A. THE EXPLORATIVE PERIOD: 1979-JUNE 1981

During this period, the Chinese Church began to reappear in Chinese society. It also began to develop an ecclesiology of the Universal Church in reference to its own sociopolitical context. As it explored the ecclesial situation of the Universal Church, it maintained a cold, yet unhostile relationship with Rome and a cautious attitude in dealing with foreign Catholic communities. This period is discussed under three subsections: 1. The relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church, 2. The relationship between the Chinese Church and other foreign Catholics, and 3. The emergence of a proto-ecclesiology of the Universal Church.

1. The Relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church

After the Chinese Church separated from Rome in 1958, Rome adopted a hostile attitude towards it. Before Vatican II, all papal messages to the

Chinese Church had the harsh tones of anti-Communist condemnation. For example, Pope John XXIII uses the term "schism" to describe the Chinese Church on at least three occasions.¹ His writings also describe China as a nation of slavery and a modern "Tower of Babel."²

Because of the hostility between Rome and the Chinese Church, physical contact between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church was minimal from 1957 to 1966. Only a handful of foreigners were able to visit the Chinese Church and to contact Chinese Catholics.³ None of the Chinese bishops were invited to the Vatican II Council.⁴ There is only one report of the attendance of Chinese Catholics at an international gathering.⁵

After the release of Gaudium et Spes and Ecclesiam Suam, the papal messages to China and the Chinese Church appear to be more conciliatory and

¹"Pope John XXIII's "To a Secret Consistory," on December 15, 1958, in AAS 50 (1959): 981-994. "Prayer for China," Letter to Clement Cardinal Micara, January 12, 1959, in TPS 5 (Summer 1959): 321f. "Sorrows and Joys of the Church," Papal address on May 12, 1959, in PDRNS, pp. 86-89.

²Pope John XXIII's "Christmas Message" on 1959, in TPS 5 (Spring 1959): 132f.

³For example, a Mexican Jesuit was allowed to meet Chinese prelates in 1965, see F. Pardinaz, "A Visit to Red China," in Worldmission 17 (Fall 1966): 62-70. For other foreign visits to the Chinese Church, see T. Hang, Die Katholische Kirche im chinesischen Raum: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Munich: Pustet, 1961), pp. 146-149.

⁴Fr. Tu Shihua (consecrated in 1959) attended the 6th International Youth Festival held in Moscow, see BSMEP (April 1959): 316f.

⁵Only bishops from Taiwan and bishops (Chinese and foreign), who held a See in China but did not reside in China because they had been expelled or exiled, were invited to the Council. No Chinese bishop in China was invited, see L. Wei, Le Saint-Siège et la Chine de Pie IX à nos jours (Paris: Edition A. Allais, 1970), pp. 292-299.

less condemnatory.⁶ Furthermore, Pope Paul VI supported China's entry to the United Nations,⁷ sent New Year's messages to Chairman Mao Zedong,⁸ and suggested that there be direct contacts with the Chinese Church.⁹ Rome's friendlier attitude probably results from the Catholic Church's determination to dialogue with the Modern World, and to reach out to even its atheistic regimes.

Despite the friendly gestures of Pope Paul VI toward China and the Chinese Church, Rome not only continued its recognition of Taiwan (Republic of China) as the legitimate government of China,¹⁰ but even raised the Internunciature in Taiwan to Nunciature.¹¹

China and the Chinese Church did not respond to these friendly papal gestures. It was partly because of Rome's recognition of Taiwan, which led the Chinese Government to categorize the Vatican as an unfriendly state, and partly because during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1977) there was no Chinese Church to respond to Rome.

In 1978, the political atmosphere in China changed with the shift from a leftist policy to a more moderate one. As a consequence, religions were

⁶For example, see "The Catholics in Modern Catacombs," delivered by Pope Paul VI on September 12, 1965, in TPS 10 (Fall 1965): 357.

⁷PDRNC, p. 105.

⁸R. Laurentin, Chine et Christianisme: après les occasions manquées (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1977), p. 188.

⁹See "An Appeal to China for Liberty and Peace," Epiphany Homily of Pope Paul VI on January 6, 1967, in TPS 12 (Winter 1967): 5-8.

¹⁰Ibid., "To Formosa Delegation," on December 3, 1970, in PDRNC p. 119, and "Pope Paul Accepts Credential of the New Ambassador of China," on February 9, 1978, in PDRNC, pp. 128f.

¹¹It was announced at Christmas 1966.

allowed to exist openly, and religious activities flourished. Rome seized this opportunity to express its desire to unite with the Chinese Church, and Chinese Catholics in turn gave positive responses to Rome's reconciliatory gestures.¹² Explorative contacts were made between Rome and the Chinese Church. They are presented and discussed in their chronological order.

i. Fu's consecration and John Paul II's first public message to China

On August 10, 1979, two weeks after Fu Tieshan had been elected Bishop of the Beijing Diocese, the Roman Curia publicly expressed its disapproval of this election which it regarded as illegitimate because it had not received the consent of the Vatican.¹³ A spokesman of the CPCA called this rejection a "crude interference." He also stated that the Vatican "has no right to say in the affairs of the churches of other countries," and that "the Vatican is absurd and totally erroneous."¹⁴

On August 19, 1979, in the Angelus message at his summer residence, Pope John Paul II made the first public statement to the Chinese Church. The following quotation is the portion of this Angelus message which relates to the Chinese Church:

In the year 1949, the Chinese Catholics were more than three millions and the hierarchy numbered about one hundred bishops, of whom about forty were native Chinese. There were five thousand eight hundred priests, of whom two thousand seven hundred were Chinese. It was a living Church,

¹²For example, see John Paul II's Angelus message on August 19, 1979, entitled "Prayer for the Great Chinese People," in PDRNC, pp. 132f. Also, after being elected as the Bishop of Beijing, Fu Tieshan expressed the desire of the Chinese Church to reestablish relationship with Rome but with conditions, see SCMP (HK), 24 August 1979.

¹³SCMP (HK), 20 August 1979.

¹⁴SCMP (HK), 20 August 1979.

which maintained perfect union with the Apostolic See. After thirty years, the news that we have had about these brothers of ours is very little and uncertain. We do not cease, however, to nourish the hope to be able to establish once again with them that direct contact which spiritually was never interrupted. In fact, those who because of the lack of the possibility of a visible relationship might have seemed absent, have never ceased to be present in a particular way in our prayers. We wish to do everything possible, so that the memory and the care which the Catholic community in the modern world nutures for them, may lead to a drawing closer and eventually to a meeting. It is difficult to say anything on this matter. However, certain reports about recent events which can make one think that there is a new respect with regard to religion, allow us to express some new confidence. With all my heart, I express the wish that there can be positive developments, which for our brothers and sisters of the continent of China may be the sign of the possibility of enjoying full religious liberty.¹⁵

This message reflects a few significant points in Rome's attitude towards the Chinese Church. First, the Pope stresses the "union with the Apostolic See" in response to the Chinese Church's claim to autonomy. Secondly, the praises that the Pope gives to pro-Roman Chinese Catholics seem to suggest that the Pope endorses and affirms this pro-Roman position. Thirdly, the Pope makes no reference to Fu's recent episcopal election. This lack of condemnation of Fu's episcopal election suggests that the Pope may want to leave some room for reconciliation with pro-Government Chinese Catholics. Lastly, the Pope shows his optimism about the future relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church. Overall, the Pope does not condemn pro-Government Catholics yet strongly insists on the importance of the Apostolic See and praises those who are loyal to Rome.

The reaction of Chinese Catholics to the Pope's appeal was cold, but not entirely negative. According to a spokesman of the Beijing CPCA, the ecclesiastical normalization between Rome and the Chinese Church would be possible under two conditions: the normalization of Sino-Vatican diplomatic

¹⁵ For full text, see PDRNC, pp. 131f.

relation, and Rome's recognition of the patriotic nature of the Chinese Church.¹⁶ Bishop Fu also commented that Rome would have to accept the ecclesiastical independence of the Chinese Church and that the Pope would have to respect the "realities in China and to deal with China correctly."¹⁷

ii. The visit of two Chinese Vatican officials to China

Although there was no official contact between Rome and the Chinese Church in this period, some semi-official contacts were reported. For example, two Chinese priests employed in the Vatican, Fr. Michael Chu S.J., advisor to the General Superior of the Jesuits on China affairs, and Fr. Peter Tchao, director of Radio Vatican's Chinese language program,¹⁸ paid visits to China in Fall 1979. During their visits, they contacted Chinese Catholics, both members and nonmembers of CPCA.

Fr. Michael Chu comes from a prominent Catholic family in Shanghai and is the younger brother of the famous Roman loyalist, Fr. Francis Xavier Zhu Shide (Chu Shu-teh) S.J.¹⁹ During his visit, he contacted many Roman loyalists.

At first, Chinese Church officials acknowledged that Chu made contact with the CPCA as a semi-official representative of the Vatican.²⁰ But later,

¹⁶ Sing Tao Daily, 21 August 1979.

¹⁷ SCMP (HK), 23 August 1979.

¹⁸ SCMP (HK), 24 August 1979; Dagong Bao, 23 August 1979.

¹⁹ See If the Grain of Wheat Dies. . . Fr. Francis Xavier Chu Shu-teh S.J. (n.d., n.p.). He had spent almost thirty years in jail and died in a labor camp in 1983.

²⁰ SCMP (HK), 24 August 1979.

they condemned Chu and interpreted his visit as a plot of the Vatican to sabotage the Chinese Church by secretly establishing a clandestine hierarchy, organizing and strengthening the reactionary Underground Church, and creating discord and schism in the Chinese Catholic Church.²¹

iii. The visit of two Cardinals to China

In Spring 1980, new hope for improving the Sino-Vatican relationship emerged as the Chinese People's Association For Friendship With Foreign Countries invited Cardinal Roger Etchegaray of Marseilles and Cardinal Franz K nig of Vienna to visit China as private guests.²² Cardinal K nig stressed that his trip was totally initiated by the Chinese Government. He emphasized that even though he was an official of the Roman Curia,²³ he travelled as the Archbishop of Vienna without any mandate from the Pope.²⁴

Their visits were well planned by the Government. Arrangements were made for them to meet with Government officials and Chinese religious leaders including Catholic leaders.²⁵ The thoughtfulness of the Chinese host is especially reflected in the arrangement made for Cardinal K nig to meet with Bishop Wang Xueming of Hohhot, who is a Rome-appointed archbishop.²⁶ Evidently, considerations of K nig's ecclesiastical rank prompted the Chinese

²¹CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 28.

²²For example, see Sing Tao Daily, 2 March 1980.

²³In 1980, Cardinal K nig was the president of the Roman Curia's Secretariat for Non-believers, AP (1980): 1051.

²⁴F. K nig, "My Journey to China," RCL 8 (Winter 1980): 268-273.

²⁵Dagong Bao (Eng.), 20 March 1980.

²⁶The Government arranged for Bishop Wang to be flown in from Inner Mongolia to Beijing just to meet Cardinal K nig, Dagong Bao, 21 March 1980.

Government to arrange a meeting with a Chinese counterpart of equal ecclesiastical status, viz. a Rome-recognized archbishop.

During his visit, Cardinal K nig met with Xiao Xianfa, the late director of RAB. In their meeting, Xiao indicated clearly that the Chinese Church would remain independent from Rome because of the unpleasant experiences of colonialism and the foreign missions, and would form its own ecclesiastical structure in the near future.²⁷ He further stressed that there was no need of any contact with Rome at present.²⁸

Many speculate that the visits of the two Cardinals were signs showing the readiness of the Chinese Government to normalize the Sino-Vatican relationship. However, careful analysis suggests that this speculation is not well grounded. First, from mid 1979, the Western media responded to China's new religious policy with skepticism. The invitation to the two Cardinals seems to have been more a gesture of the Chinese Government to show the world its determination to implement the new religious policy than a gesture to reestablish relations with the Vatican.

Secondly, the Chinese Government did not seem ready for the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The Chinese Government was preoccupied with the Four Modernizations program and concerned only with how to utilize the religious groups to achieve its goal. Thus, the Sino-Vatican relationship, as emphasized by Xiao, would have been a low priority for the Chinese Government.

²⁷The NAC and the CBC were formed in Summer 1980.

²⁸K nig, pp. 270f.

Thirdly, the Chinese Church did not seem to be ready to normalize its relationship with Rome. The Chinese Church had just been granted permission to restore its presence in Chinese society. It was preoccupied with the normalization of its religious activity rather than with the normalization of its relationship with Rome. Moreover, though the Chinese Church had plans to build an ecclesiastical structure, at this time it still lacked a leadership to respond to Rome.

The optimism about a possible breakthrough on the issue of Sino-Vatican relationship vis-à-vis the visits of these two Cardinals seems to have been premature. This optimistic speculation probably resulted from over-sensitivity in reading the signals from China. Cardinal König also concluded that China was not ready for diplomatic normalization with the Vatican. However, he did not rule out the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough in the future.²⁹

iv. Official statements from Chinese Catholic national organizations

The next events that drew attention to the Rome-Chinese Church relationship were the Third CPCA National Conference and the Chinese Catholic Representatives Conference held in May and June, 1980. Some Catholic

²⁹ See SCMP (HK), 21 August 1980; Dagong Bao, 21 August 1980; and Dagong Bao (Eng.), 20 August 1980.

delegates, such as those from Jiangsu³⁰ and Shanghai,³¹ explicitly denounced the Vatican in their statements. The statements of the others³² and the "Open Letter,"³³ issued jointly by these two conferences, implicitly condemned the action of the Vatican.

These hostile statements against the Vatican were probably the reaction of the Chinese Church to the Facultates which had been issued to Chinese Catholics by Rome since 1979.³⁴ The content of the Facultates gives the impression that the Chinese Church is still under the control of a foreign ecclesiastical authority. Furthermore, the Facultates totally denies the

³⁰ Delegates from Jiangsu said: "Dear delegates, the Imperialists, with the support of the Vatican, consistently used the Chinese Church to serve aggression in China. After the Liberation, [the Imperialists] still sabotaged New China under the cover of Church activities. Even today, reactionary elements from certain churches abroad still employ various means to spread rumors and to create discord hoping to regain control over the Chinese Church." See CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 39, my translation.

³¹ Similarly, a delegate from Shanghai said: "The Vatican opposes our Principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church, and it tries to infiltrate [into China] in order to build up its clandestine reactionary Underground Church. . . . The Vatican employs bad Catholic elements, who commit antirevolutionary crimes, and who are rejected by the people. . . . We shall have no illusions about the Vatican." See CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 40, my translation.

³² Three bishops made a joint statement saying that: "We have to be alert, and we have to strictly prevent the infiltration and the sabotage organized by international Catholic forces. . . ." This "international Catholic forces" refers to the Vatican. See CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 24, my translation.

³³ Another example is the "Open Letter" issued jointly by these two Conferences: ". . . and on top of this, the reactionary elements in certain churches abroad who rashly carry out destructive activities in order to control the Chinese Church, and are still able to confuse the thoughts of some people, the task of independence, autonomy and self-direction for the [Chinese] Church is still a long and arduous one." See "A Letter to All Catholic Clergy and Laity of China, in CF 23 (June 1980): 110.

³⁴ See chapter two, A. 3. 1.

ecclesiastical authority of the Independent Chinese Bishops.³⁵ Therefore, Chinese Catholic leaders interpret the Facultates as Rome's deliberate interference and a provocative challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the Chinese Church.

When the Chinese Church reemerged in 1979, there was no visible ecclesiastical structure to rule over it. Technically speaking, the Chinese Church is still under the tutelage of the Propaganda Fide (Sacred Congregation for Evangelization of Peoples).³⁶ In 1979, it was impossible for the Propaganda Fide to consult with any Chinese Catholic leaders about major decisions. Facing the pressing need of Chinese Catholics for the sacraments, Propaganda Fide issued the Facultates in the hope that this would help to meet the Catholics' pastoral needs. Therefore, the original purpose of the Facultates was to grant extraordinary power to Chinese clergymen so that they could have more flexibility in administering the sacraments and could under special circumstances simplify the liturgy to serve the pastoral needs of the Chinese Catholics.

It is interesting to observe that the hostile statements of these two conferences reject specific practices of the Vatican in relation to the Chinese Church but not the Vatican in general. Catholic delegates in these conferences seem to have respected the existence of the Vatican in the context of the Universal Church.

It is also significant that there is no explicit mention of the Holy

³⁵ See also Lazzarotto, The Catholic Church in Post-Mao China (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Center, 1982), p. 123, and note 19 in p. 177.

³⁶ The old name, Propaganda Fide, is more widely known in the Chinese Church than the new name (Sacred Congregation . . .). Therefore, the old name is used here.

See or the Pope in the official documents of these two Conferences. The silence of the Chinese Church on the relationship with the Pope or Rome probably indicates that the Chinese Catholic leaders had not decided how to relate to the Pope and to Rome. Remaining silent was a way to keep the issue open while waiting for further political signals from the Government and ecclesiastical signals from Rome.

Rome also kept silent on the formation of the NAC and the CBC. It neither recognized nor denied the ecclesiastical legitimacy of the NAC and the CBC.³⁷ Although Rome seems to have silently acknowledged the de facto ecclesiastical authority of these two organizations,³⁸ it did not seem ready to canonically endorse them.

Rome was not ready to make any move because endorsement bore serious ecclesial implications. For example, if Rome had recognized the CBC, it would have had to grant canonical legitimacy to the Independent Chinese Bishops, and to retract its excommunication. Furthermore, if Rome had recognized the NAC, it would have implied that Rome was willing to give greater authority to local churches. In 1980, Rome was not ready for these ecclesial changes.

v. Papal address in September 1980

On September 7, 1980, during an address to the pilgrims gathered at Castel Gandolfo, Pope John Paul II sent his greetings to Bishop Dominic Deng of Guangzhou, who had just been released from jail after twenty years of

³⁷ In 1958, Rome condemned the CPCA, see Ad Apostolorum principis, in PNRNC pp. 49-61. Since then, Rome has not officially altered its position, hence the denunciation of the CPCA is still in effect.

³⁸ Chinese Catholic leaders calculated that Rome would not object to their newly formed CBC and NAC, see SCMP (HK), 8 June 1980.

imprisonment, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of his religious life.³⁹

In his greetings, the Pope expressed his desire for the reunion with the Chinese Church and gave his indirect response to the two Chinese Catholics Conferences.

The recent news of the release of this well deserving Prelate after 22 years in prison (which were spent, as he himself had the opportunity to specify, for his obedience to the Pope), filled my heart with deep joy, emotion, gratitude and due appreciation. With the same emotion and deep appreciation I think of all the brothers and sisters who, as Catholics, witness their faith, prayer and religious practice, and express their unfailing attachment to the Apostolic See and to the Successor of Peter, servant of the servant of God and sign of the visible unity of the Church, according to the will of Christ.

The Lord, who sent his Apostles into the whole world recommending that they should teach all nations, is surely close, in a particular way, to these sons and daughters of the Church in China; while keeping the Catholic faith in the Gospel, they show at the same time (their) love of their Country and their work with greater good will toward its prosperity. The Church in fact has always been anxious that her confessors should contribute to the good of each worldly country. We find proofs of this fact in the history of many peoples of the world.

I, as a son of my own Nation, know how much I owe my love for (my) Country to the teaching of Christ and to the mission of the Church in the history of my nation.

For this reason, in expressing heartfelt greetings for the golden jubilee of Mons. Tang's religious life, I shall continue to keep in (my) prayer all the sons and daughters of the Church in his Country, and implore from God a future of prosperity and progress for the entire Chinese people.⁴⁰

In his address, Pope John Paul II strongly stresses that the crucial condition for rapprochement is the acceptance of papal authority by Chinese Catholics.⁴¹ This emphasis seems to respond to the Chinese Catholics' question on the issue of papal primacy. John Paul II also uses his Polish background to illustrate that there is no contradiction between a patriotic

³⁹ Nafang Ribao, 10 June 1980.

⁴⁰ PDRNC, p. 134.

⁴¹ SCMP (HK), 9 September 1980.

attachment to one's nation and loyalty to the Catholic faith and that allegiance to the Pope does not interfere with one's patriotism.⁴² Overall, this message seems to affirm the patriotism advocated by the Chinese Church and, at the same time, to insist on the uncompromised acceptance of papal primacy.

vi. Chinese Catholic publication on papal primacy

In October 1980, a booklet entitled: Some Doubts Concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff was published.⁴³ The author, Du Li, expresses his personal opinions about the issue of papal primacy.⁴⁴ Du Li argues that the papal claims to be the "representative of Christ on Earth," and the "head of the Holy Catholic Church" are based on flimsy grounds⁴⁵ and were developed in specific historical circumstances.⁴⁶ He concludes that the doctrine of papal primacy is not a divine ordinance. Therefore, he suggests that Chinese Catholics can reject the control of the Papacy.⁴⁷

Although Du Li questions the authority of the Papacy, it does not necessarily imply that the Chinese Church rejects the Papacy. First, Du Li's viewpoints represent only a sector of Chinese Catholics, and definitely not the whole Chinese Church, because he clearly states that his writing reflects his

⁴² SCMP (HK), 8 September 1980.

⁴³ Du Li, Some Doubts Concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, (Beijing: Documentation Office of the Catholic Church in China, October 1980).

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

personal views. Secondly, his arguments questioning the validity of the doctrine of papal primacy are based mainly on historical and biblical grounds. Other bases, such as the pastoral, and ecumenical grounds for this doctrine are not mentioned. Lastly, he limits his argument against papal primacy to the context of the ecclesiastical authority of a local church. The ecclesial role and functions of the Papacy in the context of the Universal Church are not discussed. Thus, Du Li's argument is a personal view which questions papal primacy in a specific context.

vii. Papal address to the Bishops of Taiwan

In November 1980, the Pope addressed the bishops from Taiwan on the occasion of their ad limina visit. In his speech, the Pope repeatedly stresses the importance of the doctrine of papal primacy as a fundamental truth of the Universal Church which can never be compromised, and emphasizes that it is important for all Catholics to submit to this visible head as a sign of unity. He refers to himself as ". . . the Bishop of Rome, who by the will of Christ, is also the Pastor of the Universal Church," and mentioned that ". . . The Roman Pontiff, as the Successor of Peter, is the perpetual and visible source and foundation of the unity of bishops and of the multitude of the faithful."⁴⁸ He also praises pro-Roman Chinese Catholics by saying:

From various parts of that immense territory [China] I receive information that attests to perseverance of very many Catholics in the faith, in prayer and in religious practices, and that shows their firm attachment to the See of Peter.⁴⁹

In spite of his insistence on the issue of papal primacy, the Pope

⁴⁸ PDRNC, p. 136.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 137.

seems to subtly recognize the political legitimacy of the Chinese Government, a sine qua non condition insisted on by the Chinese Church for reconciliation with Rome. The Pope, in this speech, referred to Taiwan as a regional authority, and not as a nation.⁵⁰ This reference to Taiwan implies that the Pope recognizes the de jure authority of the Chinese Government over China. This is a major concession of Rome to prepare ways for reconciliation with the Chinese Church.

viii. Papal address to the Chinese Church at Manila

On February 19, 1981, Pope John Paul II addressed the Chinese Church in Manila during his visit in Asia. His message is the most explicit papal statement on the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church. This message reveals several changes in Rome's attitude towards the Chinese Church (see Appendix V for the complete text).⁵¹

First of all, the Pope downplays the importance of papal primacy which he had greatly emphasized in the past.⁵² Throughout the entire message, he refers to himself as the Bishop of Rome and the successor of Peter; he does not elaborate further on his papal role.⁵³

Secondly, the Pope does not insist on the fact that loyalty to the Pope is necessary for Chinese Catholics to express their authentic Catholic faith.

⁵⁰For example, see "Pope Paul Accepts Credentials of the New Ambassador of China," in PDRNC, pp. 128f. In his speech, the Pope refers to Taiwan as the Republic of China.

⁵¹OR (Eng.), 25 February 1981; see Appendix V.

⁵²For example, see his previous addresses that concern the Chinese Church in PDRNC, pp. 134-138.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 134, 136.

Instead, he insists on the "communion in," "faith in," and "union with" the Lord Jesus Christ as the sign of true Catholic faith.

Thirdly, the Pope implies that the Church had done wrong in the past by citing that the Church had wrongly condemned Ricci's insight on the Chinese Church. However, he falls short of pointing out the exact nature of these wrong-doings of the Church, and immediately shifts the attention to the future instead of the past.

Fourthly, the Pope addresses his message to both pro-Roman Catholics and pro-Government Catholics by using the term "all." In previous papal addresses, Chinese Catholics are usually categorized into two groups: those who are "in peace and communion (pax et communio) with the Apostolic See," and those who are "false shepherds, members of the Association [CPCA]."⁵⁴ The usage of an inclusive term suggests that the Pope wishes to reach the pro-Government Catholics.

Finally, the Pope uses a tone of concern, compassion, and reconciliation which is very different from the condemnatory tone used before. This message seems to have been meant to be readily acceptable by all Chinese Catholics, pro-Roman Catholics and pro-Government Catholics alike.

In addition to the Pope's reconciliatory message, Cardinal Casaroli also hinted that the Roman Curia would probably consider the legitimization of the canonical status of Independent Chinese Bishops, who were still illegitimate in the eyes of Rome. He said that "it cannot be ruled out that

⁵⁴ Cf. "Cupimus imprimis," AAS 44 (1952): 153; "Ad Apostolorum principis," AAS 50 (1958): 601-614.

something that is illegitimate can be made legitimate."⁵⁵ Both the Pope's Manila message and Cardinal Casaroli's statement show positive signs of Rome's willingness to improve its relationship with the Chinese Church.

Without knowing the exact content of the Pope's Manila message, Bishop Fu Tieshan immediately expressed appreciation of the Pope's friendly gestures towards Chinese Catholics.⁵⁶ He commented that the present hostile relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church is caused by the Vatican's past policy towards China and the Chinese Church. He also pointed out that the Vatican's diplomatic tie with Taiwan is the main obstacle and that it would be up to the Vatican to take action to demonstrate its genuine desire to be reconciled to the Chinese Church.⁵⁷

After the Chinese leaders had read the full papal message, they did not seem to reject it.⁵⁸ They formally proposed four conditions for the rapprochement with Rome.⁵⁹ These conditions are: ecclesiastically, Rome has to accept the independent nature of the Chinese Church; canonically, the Roman Curia has to recognize the legitimacy of the Independent Chinese Bishops; politically, the Vatican has to sever diplomatic relation with Taiwan; and pastorally, Rome has to stop its attempt to build a pro-Roman Underground

⁵⁵ Japan Times, 22 February 1981.

⁵⁶ IHT, 20 February 1981.

⁵⁷ Dagong Bao, 22 February 1981; and Sing Tao Evening Post, 21 February 1981.

⁵⁸ After meeting with Chinese Catholic leaders, M. Hurley, S.J. reported that they were positive about the Pope's Manila message, and they looked forward to the normalization between Rome and the Chinese Church, see M. Hurley, "Christian Spring in China," in The Tablet 235 (23 May 1981): 493-495.

⁵⁹ See Newsweek, 19 March 1981; SCMP (HK), 3 March 1981; and Japan Time, 3 March 1981.

Church which is in direct confrontation with the Open Church. These four conditions summarize the expectation of the Chinese Church.

From the events mentioned above, it is evident that the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church gradually improved from 1979 to 1981. Rome's former hostile attitude towards pro-Government Chinese Catholics was softened and the possibility of legitimizing the fait accompli ecclesiastical status of the Chinese Church was expressed. The Chinese Church seemed to be eager for reunion with Rome and did not reject Rome's conciliatory gestures. Both sides suggested concrete conditions for further negotiations and were exploring the next step towards rapprochement.

2. The Relationship between the Chinese Church and Foreign Catholics

From 1979 to Spring 1981, the Chinese Church also made contacts with many foreign Catholics. The Chinese Church began to emphasize two conditions to govern these contacts. These two conditions seem to reflect the contextual attitude of the Chinese Church towards interecclesial relations in the Universal Church.

1. Equality

The condition of equality in the relationship between the Chinese Church and all other (foreign) churches had been emphasized since 1979.⁶⁰ Equality means that all churches are equal in status.⁶¹ The Chinese Church

⁶⁰For example, see Wenhui Bao (HK), 22 December 1979; Newsweek, 9 March 1981; SCMP (HK), 24 May 1980; and Wenhui Bao (HK), 31 May 1980.

⁶¹Newsweek, 9 March 1981.

insists that it be regarded as an ecclesial partner with equal status in the context of Universal Church.⁶² Other churches must stop treating the Chinese Church as a minor church.

The desire of the Chinese Church for equal footing with foreign Catholic churches is caused by two factors. From a political perspective, since China has regained its sovereignty and independence in the international community, the Chinese Government demands that its subordinate institutions also claim independence from foreign control. From a historical perspective, the urge for ecclesial equality is probably a reaction of the Chinese Church against its past history of missionary domination.

ii. Noninterference

The second condition is ecclesial noninterference. This condition is defined as "the mutual respect for independence."⁶³ In other words, if friendly relationships are to be established, foreign Catholics must respect the sovereignty of the Chinese Church and must refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Chinese Church.⁶⁴

This condition of noninterference seems to be a negative reaction and a caution against missionary activities that might be conducted in China by

⁶² Bishop Fu Tieshan said that in the eyes of God, both the Church of Rome and the Chinese Church are equal, in Japan Time, 22 February 1981.

⁶³ Wenhui Bao (HK), 22 December 1979. See also the protest of Chinese Catholic leaders about foreign interference in the Chinese Church, in SCMP (HK), 2 June 1980; and Renmin Ribao, 3 June 1980.

⁶⁴ For example, one of the two regulations approved by the CBC in 1980 states that all Catholic priests with foreign nationality have to seek approval from the local ordinary before exercising their faculties to administer sacraments or conduct evangelistic activities, in CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 52.

foreign Catholic religious orders. In the past, over one hundred international congregations from more than twenty different countries conducted missionary activities in China.⁶⁵ Although all foreign members of these religious orders had left China in the early 1950s, many of them maintain contacts with the Chinese members of their congregations and keep the hope of resuming missionary activities in China.

As China gradually opened to the West in 1979, many foreign Catholic religious congregations had been able to contact the Chinese members of their congregations.⁶⁶ Some religious orders even attempted to rebuild their communities in China by sending instructions and regulations to help the Chinese religious to recruit and to train novices.⁶⁷

These contacts between foreign religious orders and their Chinese members had generally been made without prior consultation and approval from the leaders of the Chinese Church. Very often, this consultation did not take place either because most foreign religious orders simply did not recognize the ecclesial legitimacy of the Chinese Catholic leaders, or because of the nonexistence of church leaders during the initial phase of reemergence of the Chinese Church in 1979.

⁶⁵ Msgr. P. Giglio, chargé d'affaires of the Apostolic nunciature in Taipei, reported that in 1949 there had been 42 international congregations of men and 69 international congregations of women working in China, in One Spirit 15 November 1980, cited in CECC, no. 9 & 10 (April-July), p. 39.

⁶⁶ In 1979, Fr. Michael Chu S.J. reported that he had contacted two of the eight Chinese Jesuit communities, see SCMP (HK), 9 December 1979.

⁶⁷ Sister Theresa Chu of Toronto told this author that she had been asked to translate the revised rule of a religious order hoping to rebuild its community in Northern China. Sister Chu recalled that the content of this rule was irrelevant to the Chinese social reality. She declined the request. Personal conversation with this author in October 1983. Cf. CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 34.

As the Chinese Church was reestablished, these contacts between foreign religious orders and their Chinese members became a threat to the sovereignty of the Chinese Church⁶⁸ and could not be tolerated by officials of the Chinese Church.⁶⁹ Therefore, the Chinese Church stated the condition of ecclesial noninterference to affirm its control over the Chinese Catholic vis-à-vis the authority of international religious communities in China.

3. The Emergence of a Proto-ecclesiology of the Universal Church

During this explorative period, the Chinese Church leaders not only began to normalize Catholic religious activities in China, but also made a consistent effort to theologically legitimize their situation in the context of the Universal Church. This effort included a rethinking of the universality of the Church.

The Chinese Church leaders began to interpret the universality of the Church from two perspectives. First, Chinese Catholics constructed their ecclesiology from below rather than from above, and from the local context rather than from the centre.⁷⁰ They regarded the Universal Church as a

⁶⁸ " . . . some reactionary forces from foreign Catholic Churches try to regain control of the Chinese Church by means of sabotage . . . " in CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 56, my translation.

⁶⁹ A Chinese Church leader said, "[We] must scrupulously respect the politics and laws of the State and resolutely counter illegal activities conducted under the pretext of religion by a handful of bad internal elements and foreign reactionaries who in reality are seeking to spread rumours." See Renmin Ribao, 3 June 1980; ET see SCMP (HK), 8 June 1980.

⁷⁰ See CCC, no. 7 (August 1984), p. 21.

communion of local churches.⁷¹ Consequently, this ecclesial emphasis led to an almost exclusive insistence on the local church in the theological construction of the Church's universality. Local church became the ecclesiological locus of the Universal Church.

Secondly, in the particular sociopolitical context of China, the Chinese Church seemed to define local church by sociopolitical criteria rather than by theological criteria.⁷² A local church is a Catholic community which lives within the same sphere of political influence. It implies that the political parameter defines the ecclesiastical parameter. This definition of local church is different from the conventional theological definitions which emphasize the pastoral leadership of the bishop or centre on the Eucharist.

These particular ways of viewing the universality of the Church seem to indicate that the Chinese Church is searching for practical ways to solve its conflicts with Rome vis-à-vis the Chinese sociopolitical reality and looking for an acceptable definition of papal primacy in view of the ecclesial reality of the Chinese Church.

⁷¹Cf. CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 20-22; CCC, no. 7 (April 1983), pp. 20f.

⁷²In the national Catholic conferences held in 1980, Catholic delegates regarded the Catholic churches in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau as part of the Chinese Church. These delegates voted to reserve representation seats for Catholics from these three regions as if they were part of the Chinese Church, see CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 57. It suggests that Chinese Catholic leaders follow the Chinese Government's political view of including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan as part of China. In 1984, as the Chinese Government began to treat Hong Kong as a special region with a high degree of autonomy (see the Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain of Northern Ireland on the Question of Hong Kong, released by both Governments on September 26, 1984), the Chinese Church also began to treat the Catholic Church in Hong Kong as a local church independent from the Chinese Church. This subtle change in ecclesiastical outlook suggests that the political parameter defines ecclesiastical parameters in the Chinese Church.

In this context, some seemingly radical and hostile theological challenges to the Papacy, such as Du Li's writing, can be seen in a different light. These challenges do not necessarily imply that the Chinese Church wants to discard the centrality of the Papacy in the Universal Church. Rather, they can be seen as an effort to seek for a new understanding of the ecclesiology of the Universal Church in the particular context of the Chinese Church.

B. THE CONFRONTATIONAL PERIOD: JUNE 1981-1983

From June 1981 to 1983 a series of disputes between Rome and the Chinese Church brought the improvement of their relationship to an impasse. During the same period, the Chinese Church actively cultivated friendship with other Catholic communities. This section intends to examine these ecclesial developments during this defined period of time. It is divided into two subsections: 1. Relationship between the Chinese Church and Rome, and 2. Relationship between the Chinese Church and other Catholic communities.

1. Relationship between the Chinese Church and Rome

Two incidents during this period put a definite halt to the ~~hitherto~~ optimistic development of the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church. They are the promotion of Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming S.J. and the issuing of the Pope's letter to urge the world to pray for the Church in China. This subsection does not intend to enter the historical debate on these issues, not only because of the lack of vital data and because of the emotional controversy surrounding them,⁷³ but also because of the purpose of this research, viz. a

theological reflection. It intends to examine the impact of these incidents on the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church. It is divided into two parts: i. The Bishop Deng incident, and ii. The Papal Letter and the aftermath.

1. Bishop Deng incident

Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming S.J., was consecrated a titular bishop and appointed the Apostolic Administrator of Guangzhou in 1951.⁷⁴ In 1958, he was arrested by the Government as a counterrevolutionary element.⁷⁵ In June 1980, he was released from prison⁷⁶ and was restored to the Bishopric of Guangzhou.

⁷³ These incidents receive diverse interpretations which often lack objectivity and result in emotional condemnations. For example, Fr. Paul Pang blames the Chinese Church for rudely rejecting Rome's conciliatory gesture, see CB 3 (June 1981): 3. Fr. John Tong blames Rome's insensitivity to the feelings of Chinese Catholics, in his article "Overview of the Appointment of Archbishop Deng Yiming to the See of Guangzhou--the Vatican's Approach and the Feeling of the Chinese," in Tripod, no. 4 (August 1981), pp. 29-39. Hereafter cited as "Overview."

⁷⁴ The See of Guangzhou has historically been under the patronage of the M.E.P. (Société des missions étrangères de Paris). This patronage was supposed to be terminated in 1946 as the Chinese Holy Hierarchy was established. In 1947, Archbishop A. Fourquet (1892-1952) M.E.P. left Guangzhou and handed in his resignation, see Wei, p. 147, also see AP (1949):477. Pope Pius XII did not appoint a Chinese to fill this archbishopric, instead, he appointed another M.E.P. missionary, Bishop G. Deswazières of Beihai (Pakhoi), as the Apostolic Administrator of Guangzhou, see AP (1948): 139. Therefore, this See was still in the hands of the M.E.P. missionaries. Bishop Deswazières was expelled from China in 1950. Rome had no choice but to appoint a Chinese ordinary. However, Bishop Deng was appointed not as the residential Archbishop but as a titular bishop to act as the the Apostolic Administrator of the Archdiocese of Guangzhou. In this way, the see itself would remain vacant in order to keep this See under the authority of the M.E.P. Both appointments suggest that Rome had no desire to hand this see over to Chinese clergy and this reluctance can easily be interpreted as a prime example of the foreign domination and patronization of the Chinese Church.

⁷⁵ Nanfang Ribao, 6 February 1958.

⁷⁶ Dagong Bao, 10 June 1980.

by the clergymen and laymen of Guangzhou in a diocesan meeting. His episcopal post was subsequently approved by the NAC and the CBC.⁷⁷ At the end of April in 1981, he went to Rome for his ad limina visit and met with the Pope twice.⁷⁸

Bishop Deng had expressed no resentment or bitterness about his imprisonment nor had he condemned those Catholics who joined the CPCA, even though it was well-known that he was loyal to Rome and to the Pope.⁷⁹ He spoke positively of the Chinese Church and of the Chinese Government.⁸⁰ He was optimistic about the future of the Chinese Church and about rapprochement between Rome and the Chinese Church.⁸¹ In spring, 1981, he became the first

⁷⁷ Both the Chinese official report and Deng's own account suggest that Deng was restored to his episcopal post not by the CPCA, but by the Catholic Diocese of Guangzhou via a diocesan representative meeting (at that time, the Guangzhou CAC had not yet been established), see YIC, no. 11 (November 1980), p. 3; or Xinhua Ribao, 25 June 1981. The restoration of Deng's episcopal post was subsequently approved not by the CPCA, but by the NAC and the CBC, see Wenhui Bao (HK), 12 June 1981. Thus, Pang's allegation of the CPCA being the organization which restored Deng's episcopal post seems to be based on his interpretation of the CPCA as a Church, see CB 3 (June 1981): 3.

⁷⁸ Deng's first meeting with the Pope took place on April 30, see SCMP (HK), 1 May 1981; also L'Attività della Santa Sede nel 1981 (Vatican: Tipografia poliglotta vaticana, 1982), p. 312. The dates of his second meeting with the Pope and of his visit to the Chinese Embassy in Rome have not been released, see Wenhui Bao (HK), 26 May 1981.

⁷⁹ Pope John Paul II openly praised Deng's loyalty to him, see PDRNC, p. 134. He also sent Cardinal Casaroli to greet Deng in Hong Kong.

⁸⁰ Deng repeatedly emphasized that there was no such thing as a "Patriotic Church," but rather only one Chinese Church. He also indicated that the CPCA is not a Church, but a civil organization within the Church, see CECC, no. 9 & 10 (April-July 1981), p. 18; or SCMP (HK), 21 April 1981. He also discouraged any clandestine activity because as he said, "If you want to help Catholics in China, you must first manifest sincerely that you are friends of China. If you wish to help, do it openly and go through the Chinese official channels." See YIE, (April and June 1981), p. 15.

⁸¹ Deng gave many interviews in Hong Kong. The most important one is the joint press conference with Cardinal Casaroli on February 28, 1981, see CECC, no. 9 & 10 (April-July 1981), pp. 11-15.

Chinese prelate accepted by both the Chinese Church and Rome.⁸² Therefore, he was thought to be the ideal mediator for the normalization of relation between Rome and the Chinese Church.⁸³

About the same time, John Paul II expressed his conciliatory attitude through his Manila message. Rome also indicated that it might consider legitimizing the de facto ecclesiastical status of the Chinese Church.⁸⁴ Hence, optimism about the reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church prevailed in ecclesiastical circles.⁸⁵ In June 1981, the Pope promoted Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming S.J.--the Apostolic Administrator of Guangzhou according to Rome and the Bishop of Guangzhou according to the Chinese Church--to be the Archbishop of Guangzhou.⁸⁶ Many immediately interpreted this episcopal appointment as a major diplomatic breakthrough between the Vatican and China.⁸⁷

The optimism about a Sino-Vatican breakthrough was soon cooled by a violent protest from the Chinese Church. On June 11, Bishop Michael Yang Gaojian, who represented the CPCA, the NAC, and the CBC, protested against the

⁸² Although there are four Rome-appointed Chinese bishops actively serving in the Open Church, they do not find favor in the eyes of Rome because they disobeyed Rome's order by joining the CPCA.

⁸³ For example, see CB 3 (March 1981): 8f.

⁸⁴ Cardinal Casaroli said, "If the members of the Association [NAC] and those of the Chinese Episcopal Conference [CBC], constituted after the Congress of the "Patriotic Association," accept the fundamental principles of the organizations of the Catholic Church, then obviously, talks can be initiated with them, leading either to a recognition of legitimacy or to its regularization." in CB 3 (March 1981): 9f.

⁸⁵ For example, see CB 3 (March 1981): 6f; Le Monde, 20 February 1981; and The New York Times, 29 March 1981.

⁸⁶ See AAS 73 (1981): 460.

⁸⁷ For example, see Ming Pao, 6 June 1981; SCMP (HK), 7 June 1981; Il messaggero, 8 June 1981; and Hong Kong Standard, 9 June 1981.

Pope's episcopal appointment which he regarded as a rude interference in the affairs of the Chinese Church. He also accused Deng of dishonoring the Chinese national dignity.⁸⁸ The Diocese of Guangzhou immediately endorsed Yang's protest.⁸⁹ On June 15, the Chinese Government also endorsed Yang's protest.⁹⁰ Soon, Catholics from Beijing,⁹¹ Jiangxi,⁹² Hunan,⁹³ Shanghai,⁹⁴ Heilungjiang,⁹⁵ Shangdong,⁹⁶ Zhejiang,⁹⁷ Fujian,⁹⁸ and Inner Mongolia⁹⁹ also supported it.

It is significant that the protest was initiated by the Chinese Church,

⁸⁸ Yang's statement appeared in some regional newspapers, such as Beijing Ribao, 12 June 1981; Jiefang Ribao, 12 June 1981; or Nanfang Ribao, 12 June 1981. The national newspaper--Renmin Ribao--picked up this story the following day.

⁸⁹ See Nanfang Ribao, 14 June 1981. Some Catholics in Guangzhou began recommending that the Diocese strip Deng of his episcopal duties, see Nanfang Ribao, 15 June 1981.

⁹⁰ This official statement by the RAB first appeared in the regional newspapers such as Jiefang Ribao, 16 June 1981; then later in the national newspapers, see Renmin Ribao, 17 June 1981.

⁹¹ Beijing Ribao, 17 June 1981.

⁹² Jiangxi PBS, 17 June 1981 CNA.

⁹³ Hunan PBS, 16 June 1981 CNA.

⁹⁴ Jiefang Ribao, 18 June 1981.

⁹⁵ Heilungjiang PBS, 19 June 1981 CNA.

⁹⁶ Dazhong Ribao, 21 June 1981. On June 12, this very same newspaper released a lengthy article about the meetings of local Catholics. It is interesting to note that unlike other regional newspapers in Shanghai, Beijing or Guangzhou, it did not mention Yang's protest. It was not until after the Chinese Government officially endorsed Yang's statement that this newspaper joined with other media in protesting against Rome.

⁹⁷ Zhejiang Ribao, 19 June 1981.

⁹⁸ Fujian Ribao, 23 June 1981.

⁹⁹ Inner Mongolia PBS, 12 July 1981 CNA.

and not by the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government issued its statement four days later.¹⁰⁰ Also, the denunciation in the Government's statement was milder in tone.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the Government's protest seems to have been a passive endorsement of the Chinese Church rather than a directive.¹⁰²

It is also significant that the protest of the Chinese Church is more against Rome's paternalistic attitude towards the Chinese Church than against the episcopal promotion itself. The various protest statements do not seriously discuss the legitimacy of the episcopal promotion itself. Rather, they attack Rome as parentalistic, rude, colonialistic, arrogant, and inconsiderate and label Deng shameless.

Besides protesting verbally, the Chinese Church also protested through its actions. On June 22, the Guangzhou Diocese formally dismissed Deng from

¹⁰⁰ Jiefang Ribao, 16 June 1981.

¹⁰¹ For example, the Chinese Church uses language such as "subvert and sabotage New China," or "reestablish colonial and controlling power over the Chinese Church," to describe Rome, while the Chinese Government uses milder language such as "interfering in the affairs of China" to describe Rome. Also, the Chinese Church employs harsh language to accuse Deng, such as, being "a running dog of the Roman Holy See," committing "treacherous acts against the Chinese people," and "betraying his country and his people," . . . etc. The Chinese Government merely states that Deng had acted privately behind the back of the Chinese Church and had violated the principles of the Chinese Church.

¹⁰² The delayed and mild response of the Chinese Government may suggest that there was a certain understanding between Rome and the Chinese Government prior to the episcopal appointment of Deng. It also may suggest that the Chinese Government did not want to be involved in the Deng affair, and had tried to keep this controversy within the realm of religious circles so that it would not have an undesirable diplomatic effect on China.

his episcopal duties,¹⁰³ and the Guangzhou CPCA also stripped him of the Vice-Chairmanship which it had probably given to him in absentia.¹⁰⁴ The dismissal of Deng from his ecclesiastical and civil posts was later endorsed by national¹⁰⁵ and regional Catholic organizations.¹⁰⁶ On July 24, the NAC and the CBC consecrated five new bishops¹⁰⁷ to demonstrate their ecclesiastical authority over episcopal nominations and to protest against Rome's authority.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ To strip Deng of his episcopal duties and to remove Deng from the vice-chairmanship of the CPCA are two distinct events pointily differentiated by the Chinese Church and the official media. The former was brought about by the Guangzhou Diocesan representatives because the Guangzhou CAC was not formed until after September 1981 (see Nanfang Ribao, 30 September 1981). The latter was effected by the Guangzhou CPCA. See Nanfang Ribao, 23 June 1981. Thus, Peng, in CB 3 (June 1981), p. 3, and Campell, in SCMP (HK), 1 August 1981, seemed to confuse the civil role of the CPCA and the ecclesiastical role of the Diocesan Representatives Meeting. Consequently, both Peng and Campell write as though the CPCA had been responsible for the dismissal of Deng from his episcopal duties.

¹⁰⁴ Deng claims that he had no knowledge of being elected the Vice-Chairman of the Guangzhou CPCA, see Ming Pao, 24 June 1981. However, the Vicar General of Guangzhou, Lin Mingde, went to Hong Kong on February 1981 to visit Deng and to tell Deng that he had been elected as the Vice-Chairman of the Guangzhou CPCA. Lin claims that Deng accepted this post, see CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ Nanfang Ribao, 25 July 1981; CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 12-17; also Resolution of the Wuhan CPCA/CAC, August 12, 1981 (Wuhan: CPCA/CAC, 1981), Mimeographed.

¹⁰⁶ Such as Catholics in Jiangsu, see Nanfang Ribao, 7 July 1981, and Catholics in Sichuan, see Sichuan Ribao, 27 June 1981.

¹⁰⁷ Dagong Bao, 25 July 1981. Two of the five new bishops had been elected at the Jiangsu (provincial) Catholic conference, which was convened to protest Deng's episcopal appointment, see Xinhua Ribao, 5 July 1981.

¹⁰⁸ One of the five new bishops, Paul Xu Zhenjiang of Shengyang (died in 1984) said, "This action [of consecrating five bishops] is a counter blow to the Vatican because it [the Vatican] ignored the sovereignty of the Chinese Church and illegally appointed Dominic Deng as the Archbishop of Guangdong Province," see Wall Street Journal, 27 July 1981.

The episcopal appointment of Deng may be regarded by Rome as a reconciliatory gesture to please the Chinese Church. Rome probably interpreted the release of Deng as a peace offer from Chinese officials, and wanted to make its own by honoring Deng.¹⁰⁹ Through promoting Deng, Rome probably wished to bestow honor on him and to pay respect to the Chinese Church as well.¹¹⁰ One spokesman of Rome even implied that the promotion of Deng had received the prior approval from the Chinese Government.¹¹¹ If this is true, it suggests that Rome received the blessing of the Chinese Government and did not expect any objection from the Chinese Church.

After all, from an ecclesiastical perspective, to promote the apostolic administrator to the rank of residential bishop is a common practice on the

¹⁰⁹ It is reported on the May 6, 1981, the Pope met with Casaroli and a few others to discuss the issue of the Chinese Church. It was at this meeting that the Pope decided to promote Deng, see G. Thomas, and M. Morgan-Witts, Pontiff (London: Grandon Publishing Limited, 1983), pp. 440f. In spite of many factual errors about the Chinese Church in this book, the interpretation on Rome's motive behind the promotion of Deng is reasonable and logical.

¹¹⁰ Deng states this as reason Rome's motive for his appointment, see YIC, no. 10 (July 1981), p. 17.

¹¹¹ This is a very controversial issue. Deng visited the Chinese Embassy in Rome on May 1981, but he has not revealed the purpose of his visit. The Vatican spokesman Fr. R. Panciroli implies that Beijing had agreed to Rome's promotion of Deng, see Hong Kong Standard, 9 June 1981. Yet Fr. P. Peng of the Urbana University in Rome has doubts about it; see CB 3 (June 1981): 4. Both the Chinese Government and Rome have not officially affirmed nor denied this alleged agreement over Deng's promotion. It is possible that the Chinese Government might have followed the new religious policy and, consequently, might have said that it would not intervene in internal ecclesiastical matters. And Rome possibly might have interpreted this attitude of the Chinese Government as approval from the Chinese Government to promote Deng. This misunderstanding might be due to the fact that communication and cooperation between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Church was not very efficient. It will be an interesting historical research, when more evidence is available in the future to clarify the existence of this alleged agreement between Rome and the Chinese Government on Deng's episcopal appointment.

death or resignation of the former bishop.¹¹² When the former Archbishop of Guangzhou, Fourquet, resigned from his archbishopric and was transferred to a titular see in December 1949,¹¹³ Deng then should have been appointed Archbishop. But he was appointed only the Apostolic Administrator of Guangzhou. Yet this irregular appointment was not mentioned by Rome and the Chinese Church. Both sides did not seem to care about it. Now that Archbishop Fourquet had died, it was obvious that Rome should give Deng the long overdue promotion to the office of Archbishop of Guangzhou at the earliest possible moment.¹¹⁴

However, Chinese Catholic leaders saw Deng's promotion very differently and regarded it as a humiliation. First, prior to Deng's promotion, Rome had not consulted with them.¹¹⁵ The lack of consultation was probably regarded as an act of disrespect.

Secondly, Rome disregarded the fact that Deng had already become the Bishop of Guangzhou under the ecclesiastical authority of the Chinese Church and that the archdiocesan structure had been abolished in the Chinese Church.¹¹⁶ Therefore, to promote Deng not from bishop but from apostolic administrator, to archbishop was an action spurning the ecclesiastical

¹¹² Sunday Examiner, 12 June 1981.

¹¹³ AP (1949): 471. Lazzarotto also mentions this irregularity as a potential excuse for the Chinese Church to attack Rome, see Lazzarotto, pp. 180f.

¹¹⁴ Deng justified his episcopal promotion for this reason, see Ming Pao, 24 June 1981.

¹¹⁵ Deng admits that Rome had not consulted and had not informed the Chinese Church prior to his promotion, see Wenhui Bao (HK), 23 June 1985.

¹¹⁶ Cf. chapter four, B. 3. 11.

authority of the Chinese Church and ignoring the de facto restoration of Deng's episcopal duty by the Chinese Church.

Thirdly, since Rome had not yet legitimized the ecclesiastical status of the Independent Bishops and the national Catholic organizations, such as the NAC and the CBC, the order of excommunication, which was issued in 1951 and had been restated in 1958,¹¹⁷ was still applicable to most of the Chinese Church leaders. This circumstance probably caused many Chinese prelates to see the promotion of Deng as an indirect humiliation of their dubious canonical status. Chinese Church leaders probably felt that if Rome really wanted to make peace with the Chinese Church, it would legitimize their ecclesiastical status rather than totally ignoring them and granting honor to a pro-Roman prelate.

Finally, Rome, despite its many reconciliatory verbal messages, still actively promoted and supported the building of a pro-Roman Underground Church which was antagonistic to the Open Church.¹¹⁸ The Chinese Church leaders were aware of this and constantly tried to stop these underground Catholic activities. In this context, the promotion of Deng can easily be seen as a more aggressive attempt on the part of Rome to exercise authority and to restore its former paternalistic control over the Chinese Church.

In light of the aforementioned reasons, it was reasonable for Chinese Catholics leaders to protest against Rome in this outrageous manner because they interpreted this promotion as a provocative challenge to their claim to ecclesiastical independence. However, it is also understandable that Rome

¹¹⁷ AAS 41 (1949): 334; AAS 42 (1951): 553; AAS 50 (1958): 601-614.

¹¹⁸ See chapter three, A. 2. 1., and chapter four, C. 2. on the clandestine ordinations and consecrations of pro-Roman clergy. The Chinese Church has continuously accused Rome of building a clandestine underground church in China, for a recent example, see Xinhua (Eng.) 11 April 1986.

regarded this promotion as a gesture of peace toward the Chinese Church.

Each side in its own way contributed negatively to the outcome of this incident. Rome seems to have been insensitive to the feelings of the Chinese Catholics leaders and to have acted within a juridical framework.¹¹⁹ Its goodwill gesture was seriously overshadowed by its continuous clandestine activities against the Chinese Church and thus appears to be hypocritical, superficial and premature.¹²⁰ On the other hand, the Chinese Church was also oversensitive and overreacted,¹²¹ by interpreting the whole incident from nothing other than its own frame of reference. Nevertheless, the whole event shows that a huge gap still existed between the Chinese Church and Rome. For future rapprochement, greater sensitivity, greater caution, and deeper understanding are definitely needed.

ii. The papal Letter and the aftermath

In January 1982, Pope John Paul II issued a letter to all bishops in the world inviting them to pray for the Chinese Church (see Appendix VI for full text).¹²² This papal campaign reached its climax on March 21 when the Pope

¹¹⁹"Overview," p. 8.

¹²⁰Some venture a conspiracy theory: someone in Rome intentionally provoked the anger of the Chinese Church in order to have the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church deteriorate, see YIC, no. 17 (June 1981), p. 3; C. Lind, "What Does the Vatican Really Want?" personal mineograph, 15 June 1981.

¹²¹For example, the Chinese Church unilaterally dismissed Deng from his episcopal duties without giving him a chance to defend himself. After Deng's promotion, the Chinese Church refuted the Pope's Manila message which they had formerly welcomed. See CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 31-42.

¹²²"Pope's Letter to Bishops of the World Inviting Them to Pray for the Church in China," January 6, 1982, see OR (Eng.), 1 February 1982. See Appendix VI.

himself celebrated a special mass for the Chinese Church and delivered a homily addressing to Chinese Catholics (see Appendix VII for full text).¹²³ These two events were considered an expression of Rome's pastoral care for the Chinese Church. However, Chinese Catholics leaders interpreted them as hostile provocation.¹²⁴ Consequently, the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church reached its lowest point since 1979. Despite the fact that Rome subsequently tried to express reconciliatory overtures,¹²⁵ the relationship remained unchanged until the end of 1983.¹²⁶

The papal Letter and the papal homily heavily emphasize four themes: 1. the categorical imperative of papal primacy, 2. the necessity of the visible union of the Chinese Church with Rome, 3. the total support for pro-Roman Chinese Catholics, and 4. the religious persecution experienced by the Chinese Church. These themes suggest a regression from Rome's previous attitude toward the Chinese Church--from the reconciliatory attitude expressed in the Pope's Manila message to a rigid superior mentality similar to the one held in the 1950s.¹²⁷

¹²³For the report on the mass, see YIE, (April-June 1982), pp. 21f. For the homily, see OR (Eng.), 21 March 1982. See Appendix VII.

¹²⁴CCC, no. 5 (September 1982), pp. 42-57.

¹²⁵Before the end of 1983, the Pope delivered three important messages which express his desire to be in contact with China and the Chinese Church. They are 1. "Pope's Letter to the Bishop of Marcerate," in September 1982, OR, 22 November 1982, 2. "Matteo Ricci--Bridge Between the Church and Chinese Culture," in October 1982, CB 4 (September-December 1982): 4-8, and 3. "The Blood of Two Missionary Martyrs the Foundation of Church in China," in May 1983, OR, 23 May 1983.

¹²⁶In December 1983, Archbishop Runcie of Canterbury visited China. He indicated that he would serve as a bridge between Rome and the Chinese Church, see SCMP (HK), 15 December 1983.

By emphasizing the definitiveness of papal primacy, Rome, in fact, challenged the sovereignty claimed by the Chinese Church. By accentuating that the Chinese Church was under religious persecution, Rome seems to have intentionally discredited the current efforts of the Chinese Government and the Chinese Church to restore Catholic activities, as if those who have not experienced persecution are not in the true Chinese Church.

By supporting pro-Roman Chinese Catholics and affirming the sufferings which they endured because of their loyalty to the Pope, Rome implied that it would continue to back the Underground Church and to express its disapproval of the Government-recognized Chinese Church. Rome also refused to regard the jailed pro-Roman Catholics as criminals, instead it perceived them as martyrs of faith and encouraged this martyrdom as the test of loyalty to the Papacy.

Furthermore, these two messages did not respond to the issues which had been repeatedly raised by the Chinese Church, such as the possibility of severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the recognition of the Independent Chinese Bishops and the autonomous nature of the Chinese Church hierarchy, the acknowledgement for the gradual normalization of the Chinese Church under the new religious policy, the withdrawal of the support for the pro-Roman Underground Church, and respect for the sovereignty of the local church. Therefore, the Chinese Church could not see these two messages as a genuine desire on the part of Rome to establish a constructive dialogue with the Chinese Church.

¹²⁷ All three encyclicals to the Chinese Church issued in the 1950s emphasize the following points: papal primacy, physical union with the Pope, affirmation of Roman loyalists, and condemnation of pro-Government Catholics. Also, they all are marked by a heavy parentalistic mentality which rigidly demands that the Chinese Church accept Rome's view.

These two papal messages also generated strong reactions from the hitherto silent party--the Catholic Church in Taiwan. These reactions had a significant impact on the Rome-Chinese Church relationship. With the endorsement of the Taiwan Government, the Church in Taiwan responded to the papal Letter with great enthusiasm. It turned this prayer campaign into an intensive propaganda campaign to portray the Chinese Communist Government as a tyrannical regime which brutally persecuted the Chinese Church.

All the mass media in Taiwan covered the papal Letter.¹²⁸ The Regional Catholic Bishops' Conference of China (Taiwan) sent a letter of gratitude to the Pope, and issued a special daily prayer for the use of Catholics in Taiwan.¹²⁹ In the letter and prayer, Taiwan bishops greatly emphasized the persecution of the loyal pro-Roman Catholics and highlighted the lack of religious freedom in China. On March 19, Archbishop Matthew Kia of Taipei celebrated a special mass for the Chinese Church and stated in the homily that the Church in China had experienced unprecedented calamity since 1949.¹³⁰

In order to understand the motive behind this reaction of Taiwan, it is necessary to comprehend the attitude of the Chinese in Taiwan towards China and towards the world. When the Chinese Nationalist Government leaders retreated to Taiwan in 1949, they formed an in-exile Government of China. As far as they

¹²⁸ The Taiwan Government's newspaper--The Central Daily--reprinted the entire Papal Letter on January 31, 1982. This Letter was soon covered by all major mass media in Taiwan.

¹²⁹ For the Letter to the Pope, see Han Yi (March 1982); also YIC, (April-June 1982), p. 23. For the Special Prayer, see Catholic Life Weekly (Taipei), (18 March 1982); also YIC, (April-June 1982), p. 23.

¹³⁰ Kia's homily was published one day before the mass, see Catholic Life Weekly (Taipei), (18 March 1982); also YIC, (April-June 1982), pp. 23f.

are concerned, China has been stolen from their hands by Communist bandits. Because they are determined to regain China one day, they regard their exiled Chinese Government in Taiwan as the only legitimate Government which represents China, and want the international community to recognize this claim.¹³¹ Therefore, it is in the political interest of Taiwan to prevent China from befriending other nations.

In 1981, the Vatican was the only nation in Europe which still recognized the Government in Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. If the Vatican was to normalize relations with China, the Government in Taiwan would lose its last diplomatic presence in Europe.

Likewise, if Rome were to establish formal relation with the Chinese Church, it would imply that Rome recognizes the NAC and CBC of the Chinese Church. This recognition would threaten the Regional Episcopal Conference of China in Taiwan (Conferentia Regionalis Episcoporum Sinarum).¹³² This Regional Episcopal Conference of China is composed of bishops of Taiwan and missionary ordinaries, who were expelled from China in the 1950s and still claim their Sees in China.¹³³ In spite of the "regional" suffix which appears on its official title, this Conference deliberately refers to itself as the

¹³¹ Catholics in Taiwan follow their Government's view and do not recognize the Government in Mainland China as legitimate, see Wu Yan, Glimpse of Catholic Life Style in Mainland China and the Chinese Communist Policy Towards Religion (Taipei: Wondow Press, 1984), p. 87. (c)

¹³² This Conference was formed on February 10, 1967, see AP (1968): 811.

¹³³ Until 1983, all missionary ordinaries who had been expelled from China in the 1950s still had their names listed as legitimate ordinaries of Sees in China, see AP 1983. They were also members of the Regional Episcopal Conference of China, and were supposed to represent their Sees in China at this Conference.

"Bishops' Conference of China" in church publications in Chinese and has long regarded itself as the only legitimate ecclesiastical authority over the Chinese Church.¹³⁴ Thus, the recognition of the canonical status of the CBC in China would cause the Regional CBC in Taiwan to renounce its former claims. The demotion in ecclesiastical status would certainly be a humiliation and an unbearable insult to the Church in Taiwan.

Based on its political and ecclesiastical interests, the Church in Taiwan would definitely not favor rapprochement between Rome and the Chinese Church.¹³⁵ This attitude can easily be seen from Taiwan's cold response to the Pope's Manila message.¹³⁶ The Taiwan Church, has, in fact, actively lobbied to oppose rapprochement so that Taiwan would not be diplomatically abandoned by the Vatican.¹³⁷ In light of this context, the zealous response to the papal Letter seems to have been part of the lobbying campaign of the Church in Taiwan. Through this lobbying campaign, the Church in Taiwan hopes to

¹³⁴ All Chinese publications in the Church in Taiwan refer to this Regional Episcopal Conference of China as the Bishops' Conference of China (Zhongquo Zhujiao Tuan). For example, see the Secretariate of the Catholic Bishop's Conference of China, Catholicism and Communism (Taipei: Catholic Affairs Promotion Office, 1977) (c) The term 'regional' has been deliberately deleted. It is interesting to observe that this Regional Conference (part of China) tries to convey the distorted image of being the conference for all Catholics in China.

¹³⁵ The strong reaction of Taiwan against the possible rapprochement can be seen in Yeh Chih-ying, "A Study of Peking-Vatican Relationships," in IS 20 (June 1984): 62-79.

¹³⁶ Both the Taiwan Church and the Taiwan Government are not pleased with the Pope's conciliatory gesture expressed in his Manila message. They made no official comment, but expressed their disappointment at the Pope's action, see the United Press report in YIE, (April-June 1982), p. 8.

¹³⁷ For example, in February, Archbishop Lu Kuong of Taiwan went to Rome. He lobbied among the Curists and solicited support from them for the continuation of diplomatic relation with Taiwan, see YIE, (April-June 1982), p. 29.

discourage other ecclesial communities from supporting the reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church.

The response of the Chinese Church to the papal Letter was very slow and did not come until three months later.¹³⁸ At first, Chinese Church leaders probably hoped that the papal Letter would not have any undesirable consequences for the Chinese Church. As Rome stepped up the campaign by calling on Catholic Churches in the world to designate March 21 as a special day of prayer for the Chinese Church¹³⁹ and as Taiwan exploited this opportunity to launch a propaganda campaign to discredit the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government, the Chinese Church leaders could no longer tolerate the situation and they voiced an angry protest.

Furthermore, the Pope's actual words and intent in that papal Letter are ambiguous and this contributed to the strong reaction from the Chinese Church. Chinese Church leaders understood that the Pope describes the Chinese Church as a "persecuted" church,¹⁴⁰ and this description may not be the original intention of the papal Letter. Nevertheless, the Chinese Church leaders took this description as an malicious accusation from Rome.

¹³⁸The first reaction of the Chinese Church appeared on March 19, 1982, see Renmin Ribao, 20 March 1982.

¹³⁹SCMP (HK), 20 March 1982.

¹⁴⁰The Pope's words are as follows: "We know very well that our brothers and sisters in China have had to face difficult and prolonged trials in the span of these thirty years. In those severe sufferings, they have given proof of their fidelity to Christ and His Church; such courageous witness can well be compared to that of the first centuries of the Church." in PDRNC p. 148. The Pope does not indicate clearly here whether he refers to the Chinese Church of the 1950s or to the one of the early 1980s. Two factors seem to influence Chinese Church leaders to take this letter as a hostile provocation from Rome: a. Chinese Church leaders are accused of "endangering the deposit of faith" in the Papal Letter, and b. The enthusiastic reaction of Taiwan to this Papal Letter.

On March 19, Bishop Michael Yang Gaojian, who represented the Chinese Church, issued an official statement to protest against Rome's "vicious distortion" of the reality of the Chinese Church. He also requested the Pope halt further attacks and accusations against the Chinese Church. Otherwise, he warned, the Chinese Church would "fight back."¹⁴¹ This statement was immediately echoed by regional Catholic groups.¹⁴²

On March 21, Pope John Paul II ignored the warning from the Chinese Church and officiated at his special mass for the Chinese Church. The Vatican even specially arranged to broadcast this mass and the papal homily live to China via Radio Veritas in the Philippines.¹⁴³

The Chinese Church and the Chinese Government quickly released their rebuttals.¹⁴⁴ These rebuttals argue that the Pope's skepticism of religious liberty in China is a distortion,¹⁴⁵ because Chinese citizens enjoy religious freedom. They claim that since the normalization Catholic life is rapidly under way, the Pope's suggestion of a "persecuted" Chinese Church is a vicious slander.¹⁴⁶ They further indicate that the arrests of Catholics have a political rather than religious cause and have been justly handled by the Government. Thus, the Pope's support for these criminal Catholics actually

¹⁴¹ See Renmin Ribao, 20 March 1982; or Jeifang Ribao, 20 March 1982.

¹⁴² Jiangxi PBS, 22 March 1982 CNAA; Dazhong Ribao, 20 March 1982; Dagong Bao, 22 March 1982.

¹⁴³ SCMP (HK), 22 March 1982.

¹⁴⁴ For example, see Renmin Ribao, 24 March 1982; Guzhou PBS, 26 March 1982 CNAA; or Heilungjiang PBS, 29 March 1982 CNAA.

¹⁴⁵ Wenhui Bao (HK), 23 March 1982; SCMP (HK), 23 March 1982; and cf. Ming Pao, 28 March 1982.

¹⁴⁶ Sichuan Ribao, 24 March 1982; Dagong Bao, 4 April 1982.

endorses evil; and deliberately distorts the truth.¹⁴⁷

Besides refuting Rome, these statements also restate the sine qua non conditions for reconciliation with Rome: an ending to the formal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan and the recognition of the sovereignty of the Chinese Church.¹⁴⁸

After these unfriendly exchanges¹⁴⁹ between the Chinese Church and Rome over this prayer campaign, the Chinese Church became more hostile to Rome than before. During mid 1982, it repeatedly reaffirmed its ecclesial nonsubmission to any foreign power which obviously meant Rome.¹⁵⁰ The name of the Roman Pontiff was deleted from some official prayer books published after this incident.¹⁵¹ The Chinese Church gave also negative responses to Rome's subsequent overtures.¹⁵² By the end of 1983, the relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church was at a confrontational standstill.

¹⁴⁷ Jiefang Ribao, 24 March 1982.

¹⁴⁸ A NCNA reporter wrote an article entitled "The Vatican Must Change Its Ways," see Wenhui Bao (HK), 23 April 1982.

¹⁴⁹ E. Tang of Pro Mundi Vita used the term "unfriendly" to describe this incident, see CECC, no. 12 (March 1982), p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ See SCMP (HK), 11 May 1982; Beijing Ribao, 25 May 1982; or Sichuan Ribao, 25 June 1982; Renmin Ribao, 2 July 1982; Renmin Ribao, 13 June 1983; or Dagong Bao, 13 August 1983.

¹⁵¹ Prior to 1982, some prayer books published in the Chinese Church still retained a traditional prayer for the Pope as part of the Collect in the mass, see Collection of Major Prayers (Shanghai: The Diocese of Shanghai, n.d.--this author obtained it before 1982), p. 40 (c); or Four Types of Prayer (Shanghai: The Catholic Diocese of Shanghai, 1981), pp. 76, 177. (c) However, the prayer for the Pope is conspicuously deleted from prayer books published after 1982, see Proper of the Seasons (Shanghai: The Catholic Diocese of Shanghai, 1982), pp. 6f. (c) It suggests that the Chinese Church felt more dissatisfied with the Pope after 1982.

¹⁵² SCMP (HK), 20 November 1982.

2. Relationship Between the Chinese Church and Other Churches

Unlike the rapid deteriorating relationship between Rome and the Chinese Church, relation between the Chinese Church and other churches enjoyed a gradual growth since mid-1981. The Chinese Church seemed to break out of its long isolation, and to reach out to the Universal Roman Catholic communion and the ecumenical community. This subsection examines the growing relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church (other than Rome) from mid 1981 to 1983. It is divided into two parts: i. The Chinese Church reaches out to the Universal Church, and ii. The reception of foreign Catholics by the Chinese Church.

i. The Chinese Church reaches out to the Universal Church

Before mid-1981, although the Chinese Church had expressed a willingness to establish friendly ties with foreign Catholics, there were no official contacts between the Chinese Church and other churches. Contacts between the Chinese Church and foreign Catholics remained at a passive and low-key level, viz., personal visits of foreign Catholics to the Chinese Church.¹⁵³

A major breakthrough came in October 1981 as the Chinese Church sent three official delegates to attend an International Christian conference held

¹⁵³ Prior to June 1981, all foreign visits to the Chinese Church were at a personal, rather than an official, level. Even the visits of the two Cardinals in Spring, 1980, were not conducted at an ecclesiastical level. They were invited not by the Chinese Church, but by the Chinese Government, and they came as foreign citizens, not as church officials.

in Montréal.¹⁵⁴ This event bears ecclesiological significance because it was the first time since 1949 that Chinese Catholics participated in an international Church event and dialogued directly with foreign ecclesial communities outside of China.¹⁵⁵ It marks an important step for the Chinese Church which entered into physical contact with the Universal Church. In March 1983, the Chinese Church also sent some Catholics representatives to an inter-faith peace conference held in Japan.¹⁵⁶

The Montréal Conference was an opportunity for the Chinese Christian leaders to present the situation of the Chinese Churches, both Protestant and Catholic, to foreign Christians and to learn about the changes which had occurred in other churches during the three decades of their isolation from the international ecclesial community.¹⁵⁷ The Conference organizers invited one hundred and seventy Christian leaders and scholars from all over the world, and one hundred and fifty-eight came. Among them, ten were from China. Although

¹⁵⁴It was an international conference, organized by the Canada China Programme of the Canadian Council of Churches, entitled "God's Call to a New Beginning," and held in Montréal October 2-7, 1981. Hereafter referred to as "Montréal Conference." Papers delivered at this Conference can be seen in T. Chu and C. Lind, ed., A New Beginning: An International Dialogue with the Chinese Church, (Toronto: Canada China Programme of the Canadian Council of Churches, 1983).

¹⁵⁵See note 4 of this chapter.

¹⁵⁶Two representatives from the Chinese Church attended the Inter-Faith Peace Conference held in Japan during March 9-17, 1983, CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), pp. 8, 16. After 1983, there is a significant increase on the visits of Chinese Catholic in other countries. For example, A Shanghai Catholic delegation visited the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Macau in June 1985, see Tripod, no. 29 (October 1985), pp. 103-111; CCC, no. 13 (October 1985), pp. 43f. Also, a Chinese Catholic delegation visited Belgium in November 1985, see CCC, no. 14 (December 1985), p. 9.

¹⁵⁷T. Chu, "God's Call to a New Beginning," in CO, no. 28 (December 1981), pp. 2-4.

the delegation from China was small, it was the prime focus of this Conference. Delegates from China contributed more than half of the total thirty official presentations to the Conference.¹⁵⁸

Among the ten Chinese delegates, seven came from the Protestant Church and three represented the Catholic Church (two bishops and one vicar general).¹⁵⁹ Chinese Catholic delegates gave five presentations and held two open forums, one before and one during the Conference.¹⁶⁰

Chinese Catholic delegates used this opportunity to defend their ecclesiastical status quo. Their presentations (see A New Beginning for complete text) focus on three themes: 1. justifying their ecclesiastical independence, 2. defending their Catholicity, and 3. soliciting acceptance and sympathy from the Universal Church.

First of all, Chinese Catholic delegates argued that the ecclesiastical independence of the Chinese Church was a just action. They reasoned that in the 1950s Rome issued a series of orders to the Chinese Church which caused it to take positions against its own country and, therefore, the Chinese Church had no other option but to reject these orders in order to ensure its survival in the new Chinese society.

Chinese Catholic delegates concluded that it was Rome's rigid orders

¹⁵⁸ CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 28-36.

¹⁵⁹ A fourth Catholic delegate, Lo Weido, canceled his trip due to illness. His paper was nevertheless distributed at the Conference.

¹⁶⁰ Catholic delegates, along with a few Protestant delegates, held an open forum at the University of Ottawa on September 30, 1981. Catholic delegates also held another open forum at the Université de Montréal during the Montréal Conference. The content of these two forums has not been published. This writer attended the first forum, and, through the courtesy of Fr. M. Marcil, obtained tapes of the second.

which forced the Chinese Church to run its ecclesiastical affairs independent from Roman control. They argued, in fact, that the Chinese Church was the victim of Rome's anti-China policy. Although they admitted that their independence from Rome was canonically unjustifiable, they still strongly insisted that it was a righteous deed and that the Church need not be bound by legalism.¹⁶¹

Secondly, they emphasized that the Chinese Catholic Church was always a bona fide Roman Catholic Church, the very same Church which had been founded by the Catholic missionary, Matteo Ricci, in the sixteenth century and that it has not departed from Roman Catholicism. The fact that all ecclesiastical traditions and practices have been painstakingly kept supports the claim that the Chinese Church has always been part of the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church of Jesus Christ.¹⁶²

They argued that their independence from Rome's control, which may tarnish their Catholic identity, was not meant to separate them from the Universal Church, but was meant to transform the Chinese Church into a genuine Chinese Church controlled by Chinese, and not by foreign missionaries. This transformation, they further argued, was a genuine manifestation of the Catholicity of the Chinese Church.¹⁶³

Thirdly, they wanted the Universal Church to accept the ecclesiastical

¹⁶¹ See Wang Zicheng, "From Blind Obedience to Independence," and Tu Shihua, "To Have an Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church is Our Sacred Right," papers delivered in the Montréal Conference, in Chu and Lind, pp. 97-103.

¹⁶² Ibid, pp. 99, 103. Also Fu Tieshan's statement at the forum at Université de Montréal.

¹⁶³ Ibid, p. 98.

status quo of the Chinese Church,¹⁶⁴ and hoped to gain sympathy and support from other local churches, especially from churches in the Third World, which may have experienced the paternalistic treatment of foreign missionaries. They also hoped to establish physical communion with churches in the Universal Church despite their antagonistic relationship with Rome.

Through these presentations, Chinese Catholic delegates presented an ecclesiological model, which, on the one hand, rejects the administrative authority of Rome in local ecclesial affairs, yet on the other hand, eagerly seeks full communion with the Universal Church. In other words, the Chinese Church presented itself as being a Roman Catholic local church without the obligation of submitting to the juridical primacy of Rome. This church model was welcomed by some Third World delegates with enthusiasm,¹⁶⁵ and was received by others, such as Douglas Roche, with reservation.¹⁶⁶

ii. The reception of foreign Catholics by the Chinese Church

As China rapidly opened to the Western World in the early 1980s, the Chinese Church, too, followed this national open-door policy. Even Chinese Church leaders regarded the establishment of relationships with foreign churches as an important ecclesiastical agenda.¹⁶⁷

From mid-1981, many foreign Catholics visited the Chinese Church and met with many Chinese Church leaders. Some were invited by the Chinese Church

¹⁶⁴ For example, see Tu Shihua's report of the Montréal Conference, in CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 26-28.

¹⁶⁵ CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 27f.

¹⁶⁶ Chu and Lind, p. 144.

¹⁶⁷ CCC, no. 1 (November 1980), p. 44; CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 21; cf. Wenhui Bao (S), 28 April 1983.

as official guests;¹⁶⁸ some paid their way as private individuals;¹⁶⁹ some were sent by their churches as official delegates;¹⁷⁰ some travelled as journalists for foreign Catholic publications.¹⁷¹ All of them were able to travel extensively in China, and could visit Chinese churches and church leaders even those in very remote areas.¹⁷²

To all foreign visitors, Chinese Church leaders expressed their desire to establish fraternal relations with all foreign churches based on mutual respect and equality.¹⁷³ They explicitly told foreign Catholic visitors that the internal affairs of the Chinese Church should not be interfered with and that no more foreign missionary activity would be welcomed in China.¹⁷⁴ The civil authority also discouraged foreign Catholic visitors from conducting unauthorized religious ceremonies by arresting Chinese Catholics who had collaborated with foreigners in undertaking "unauthorized" activities.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁸In 1982, the Chinese Church sent the first invitation to the Canadian churches, see CO, no. 33 (December 1982), pp. 1-3.

¹⁶⁹For example, see J. Spae's visit in CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984); or T. Chu's visit in China Trip 1983 (Toronto: privately circulated mimeograph, 1983).

¹⁷⁰For example, a Catholic delegation from Germany visited the Chinese Church, see CH 1 (December 1982): 14

¹⁷¹For example, the reporters of YI visited many dioceses in less well known areas, and reported on local Catholic life.

¹⁷²For example, in his seven-month visit, Fr. L.T.S. Wei of France visited more than thirty cities/counties in twenty provinces, and met with more than thirty bishops, see Wenhui Bao (HK), 29 July 1982.

¹⁷³CCC, no. 7 (August 1983), p. 21.

¹⁷⁴Renmin Ribao, 13 June 1983; Dagong Bao, 31 August 1983.

¹⁷⁵For "authorized" ecclesiastical activities, see chapter two, B. 3. i. For the arrests of Chinese Catholics because of their contacts with foreign Catholics, see chapter three, C. 2. ii.

Chinese Church leaders often send their messages to Rome via these foreign Catholics. Since there was no direct contact with Rome, their communications basically relied on short press releases,¹⁷⁶ which were often subject to misinterpretation. These visitors were, therefore, used as a means to convey messages to Rome. For example, Chinese Church leaders made it clear to some Canadian visitors that they did not oppose the papal primacy in principle.¹⁷⁷ On another occasion, they told some German visitors that they wanted to be accepted by Rome.¹⁷⁸

With the increase of foreign visitors to the Chinese Church, the relationship with the Universal Church rapidly developed. These visits served as a communication bridge between the Chinese Church and other churches. The Chinese Church was no longer veiled behind the Bamboo Curtain. Foreign Catholics were able to obtain first hand information about it. Unnecessary misunderstandings and speculations were minimized. Chinese Catholics, in turn, were able to hear of some of the latest ecclesiastical developments in the world via these visitors.

¹⁷⁶CECC, no. 12 (March 1982), p. 2.

¹⁷⁷CO, no. 33 (December 1982), p. 2.

¹⁷⁸"Letter to the Pope," by China Commission of the German Catholic Mission Council, Munster, April 1983, p. 2. Mimeographed.

C. THEOLOGICAL AND ECCLESIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

From 1979 to 1983, the relationship between the Chinese Church and Rome deteriorated from optimistic to confrontational. This deterioration not only continued to widen the gap between the Chinese Church and Rome in their respective understanding of major theological and ecclesiological issues, but also raised many ecclesiological questions concerning the universality of the Church. This section intends to examine the different views on the Universal Church held by the Chinese Church and by Rome, the theological ramifications of these differences on the ecclesiology of the Universal Church, and further theological questions that emerge from this discussion.

1. Different Views on the Universal Church

1. Different understandings of the nature of the Universal Church

It was mentioned in section A that the Chinese Church began to define the local church as the locus of the Universal Church. Chinese Catholics further elaborated this proto-ecclesiology of the Universal Church by stressing the concept of communion and equality within the Universal Church. Thus, the Universal Church was seen as a communion of all the local churches which are independent, equal in status, diverse in socio-cultural expressions, and non-submissive to any juridical primacy.

This model of the Universal Church is different from the traditional Roman-centric hierarchical model in three ways. First, it stresses unity in faith and diversity in manifestation of faith in accordance with concrete local situations, whereas the traditional model emphasizes uniformity in the expression of faith. Secondly, this new model regards the realization of the

Universal Church as a universal "koinonia" bounded by the same faith and tradition, whereas the traditional model perceives the Universal Church as a physical structure under the jurisdiction of the Papacy. Lastly, this new model defines the inter-ecclesial relationship as horizontal, noninterfering, and mutually respectful, whereas the traditional model stresses the vertical relationship between Rome and local churches and a hierarchy consisting of the Church of Rome, the Older (Western) Churches, and the Younger (Third World) Churches.

ii. Different views on the origin and extent of ecclesial authority.

The episcopal appointment of Dominic Deng reflects a basic tension in the Universal Church, viz., the question of ecclesiastical authority. Both Rome and the Chinese Church claimed to have absolute ecclesiastical authority over Deng's episcopal appointment. Their claims reflect two different views about the nature of ecclesiastical authority in the Universal Church.

Any office needs authority to fulfill its duty. The ecclesiastical realm is no exception. Rome needs to have some authority in exercising its primatial role for the unity of the Church. Local churches, too, need authority to administer their tasks in a specific context. Therefore, the issue is not the necessity of ecclesiastical authority in the Church, but the appropriate balance of ecclesiastical authority between Rome and the local churches. It can be seen from two perspectives: the origin of authority, and the extent of authority.

Both Rome and the Chinese Church claim that their ecclesiastical authority is a divine right. In the eyes of the Chinese Church, its authority is bestowed by God on the believers and, through them, then to the priests and bishops. Bishops then bestow the honor of spiritual primacy on the Pope. The

delegation of authority is, therefore, from below. However, Rome holds that God bestows authority on the Pope and, through the Pope, on bishops and on other priests. Therefore, the papal and Roman primacy is a divine ordinance and the delegation of authority is from above.

The difference in the origin of ecclesiastical authority leads to different conceptions of the extent of ecclesiastical authority. According to the from-below ecclesiastical concept advocated by the Chinese Church, the local church, entrusted to local believers by God, has self-governing authority. It logically rejects any external ecclesiastical authority which interferes with its internal matters. The local church's self-governing authority naturally includes the right to nominate residential bishops.

According to the from-above concept of delegating ecclesiastical authority, Rome has supreme authority over the Universal Church. Its unlimited authority virtually covers every ecclesiastical matter of the Universal Church as well as of the local churches. In light of this, Rome does not need to consult with local churches for the nomination of residential bishops. Thus, controversy over the episcopal appointment of Dominic Deng reflects the tension between two opposing views of ecclesial authority.

iii. Different views on the political preference of the local church

One of the conflicts between the Chinese Church and Rome is the issue of the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The Vatican insists on maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This action implicitly endorses the political claim of Taiwan over China. The Chinese Church, on the other hand, insists that the termination of the diplomatic relationship between the Vatican and Taiwan is the sine qua non condition for rapprochement between Rome and the Chinese Church. This conflict is basically a Church and State issue concerning

the political identity or preference of a local church.

From Rome's perspective, the Vatican State is supposed to protect the supra-national character of the Catholic Church. Because of the existence of the Vatican, the Church can maintain its political sovereignty without being influenced by secular powers. Papal diplomacy becomes a means of facilitating the mission of the Church in various countries rather than a means to advance any political ambition.¹⁷⁹ Thus, the Vatican aims at safeguarding the welfare of the mission of the Church in the world by being a symbol of the political influence of the Church and by determining the Church and State relationship of all local churches.

The Chinese Church looks at the Church and State relationship from the perspective of the Universal Church with a different understanding. It assumes that local churches have the right to determine their own political stand and their relationship with the local governments in accordance with their respective contexts. It, therefore, envisions no centralized political representation of the Universal Church and no universal Catholic stand on particular political matters.

The conflict arose when Rome showed a political preference towards the regime in Taiwan which was totally incompatible with the one chosen by the Chinese Church. This conflict stimulated some profound theological questions: Who has the authority to decide Church and State relations for a local church? Should there be a universal political stand ascribed by Rome to the whole

¹⁷⁹ A. Chang, The Roman Pontiff in Catholic Faith (Taipei: The Doctrinal Committee of the Bishops' Conference of China, 1984), pp. 85-97. (c)

Catholic Church? Or, do local churches have the freedom to choose their own political preferences?¹⁸⁰

This conflict reflects different views on the unity of the Universal Church. Besides the matter of faith, should the uniformity of political preference be the crucial factor in defining the unity of the Universal Church? Can the Universal Church have diversity in political preferences without jeopardising its unity?

iv. Different understandings of Christian loyalty and witness

One of the many ecclesiological tensions that emerged from the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church concerned the different standards of Christian loyalty and witness. The jailed Roman loyalists were praised by Rome as martyrs of the faith who exhibited the highest virtue of Catholic faith. Chinese Church leaders condemned the very same group of people as criminals who were not worthy of their beliefs. Rome also condemned Chinese Church leaders as apostates, while these leaders regarded themselves as faithful servants of God and of the Church.

Rome seemed to evaluate Christian faith primarily on the basis of one's loyalty to the institution, viz., fidelity to the Pope and to Rome at the cost of incarceration or even martyrdom. Chinese Church leaders evaluated faith differently. Their evaluation was based on one's pastoral concern for the faithful, viz., the preservation of the Church in Chinese society at the cost of excommunication.

¹⁸⁰ The Apostolic Letter Octogesima Adveniens, May 14, 1971, par. 4.

The two different standards of faith reflected the tension of two different ecclesiologies of the Universal Church. One is the Roman-centric model which strongly emphasizes the institutional loyalty of the local churches in order to preserve the uniform expression of faith. The other is the contextual model which strongly emphasizes the practical needs of the local churches in order to ensure a variety of expressions of the same faith in different contexts.

This contextual view of the Universal Church challenges the absolute nature of Rome's standards for Christian faith. It questions whether there is an absolute set of standards of faith in the Universal Church, and asks who has authority to determine these standards. Further, it challenges whether there is a universal basis to establish this set of standards.¹⁸¹

v. Different understandings of inter-ecclesial fellowship

Rome and the Chinese Church differ significantly in their approach to inter-ecclesial relations. Rome tends to deal with these relationships from a legalistic perspective. It perceives the Universal Church as an institution defined by ecclesiastical regulations. Therefore, inter-ecclesial relations are systematically governed by these regulations. For example, Rome's dealings with the Chinese Church, such as its appointment of Deng, its nonrecognition of Chinese Independent Bishops, the NAC, and the CBC, and its support of the "Underground Church," highlight this tendency.

The Chinese Church sees the inter-ecclesial fellowship from a contextual perspective. It thinks that ecclesiastical regulations are not

¹⁸¹ Chinese Church leaders emphasized that they had not rejected the Holy See in principle, did not object to what the Pope says; and had not broken away from Rome in matters of faith and morals. See CO, no. 33 (December 1982), p. 2.

applicable in its unique sociopolitical situation. Thus, it requests understanding, sympathy, support, and acceptance from the Universal Church because of its long isolation and suffering, rather than a juridical judgement of its ecclesial status quo.

2. Contextual Perspectives on the Ecclesiological Differences

The ecclesiological differences between Rome and the Chinese Church concerning the concept of the Universal Church were deeply affected by their particular sociopolitical contexts such as the relationship between China and Taiwan, the diplomatic role of the Vatican in the Taiwan affair, the condemnation of pro-Roman Catholics in Chinese society, and the nationalistic mentality of the Chinese Government.

All these seem to indicate that the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church cannot be explained or evaluated from a strictly theological point of view alone. It would be naive to say that the Roman position was merely legalistic or institutional, while the Chinese position was exclusively pastoral and entirely righteous. Both positions were, indeed, deeply shaped by their respective sociopolitical contexts, and in assessing them it is impossible to isolate the theological factors from the political factors.

Thus, this subsection intends to go beyond a purely theological analysis by looking at these theological questions from a contextual perspective, i.e. from the vantage points of the Chinese Church and of the Universal Church (Rome). This contextual perspective we hope may stimulate fruitful theological discussion.

i. From the perspective of the Chinese Church

The Chinese Church seems to have been confronted with a survival situation which affected every dimension of the life of Chinese Catholics. In this survival situation, the Chinese Church had to find a way to relate to the Universal Church which did not on the one hand, jeopardize its survival in China, and would on the other hand, link it with the Universal Church as part of the universal Roman Catholic communion. In the search for this relation with the Universal Church, the Chinese Church had to face the following theological issues.

How can a local church survive and develop, practically or pragmatically speaking, in a society based on an atheistic ideology? What does it mean, in this context, to belong to an international ecclesial institution, or communion and at the same time, to bring an authentic local church into being? How high a price can be paid in terms of political compromise or pragmatic adaptation? Is there any role for the international religious communities in a local church situated in a nationalistic and xenophobic society? Can a local church have the freedom to choose its political preference? And on what basis does it make this selection without compromising the spirit of the Gospel?

ii. From the perspective of the Universal Church

If one looks at the situation from the vantage point of the Universal Church, one sees a different but not less politicized picture. The Universal Church cannot ignore the political dimensions of the Universal Church's international mission in a world which remains deeply divided by ideologies, by political, economic and other interests. In this mission, it cannot ignore its role in the universal struggle for justice, peace, religious freedom, and human

rights across these ideological boundaries. It also cannot ignore its prophetic role of challenging the world and various dehumanizing situations, in the light of the Gospel.

From the vantage point of the mission of the Universal Church, a different set of theological questions emerges. What is the amount of freedom required for the Universal Church to fulfill this international mission? What type of loyalty must it expect from its members in order to remain a truly international institution and communion? What is the balance of unity and diversity in the interpretation and realization of its mission? What are the limits of political compromise, in particular situations, along the road of fidelity to the Gospel? What is the role of the Church of Rome in this mission of the Universal Church? What is the relationship between local churches and Rome vis-à-vis this international mission?

3. Further Theological Questions

In the final analysis of the relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church, two questions, which are closely connected, constantly emerge: the universality of the Church and the universality of its mission. These two questions, raised by the Chinese Church, challenge the Church to rethink and reexamine the important ecclesial issue of universality.

More than ever before, the universality of the Universal Church has been challenged over the last twenty years, basically because of dramatic changes on the international political scene over which the Church has had no control. The creation and the constantly evolving situation of the People's Republic of China since 1949 is one of the most significant factors of this new political climate that cannot be ignored by the Church, even when it deals with

the theological interpretation of its nature and mission.

The first part of this research, chapters two to five, discussed different aspects of the revival and survival of the Catholic Church in the People's Republic of China since 1979. This ecclesial phenomenon is an important element in the contemporary history of the Roman Catholic Church for it is an example of a Catholic community which struggles to live out the authenticity of faith in an unique sociopolitical context.

The second part of this research, chapter six, will try to show that this unique ecclesial event, in spite of all its political ambiguities, does not constitute a threat to the universality of the Universal Church and of its mission. On the contrary, it will show that it is an important moment (kairos) for the Catholic Church to rethink its universality vis-à-vis the experience of the Catholic Church in China.

5

PART TWO

THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF THE CHINESE CHURCH

FROM 1979 TO 1983

CHAPTER SIX

THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHINESE CHURCH

The first part of this research, chapters one to five, provides an in-depth historical analysis of the Catholic Church in China from 1979 to 1983. Chapters one and two look into the Church and State relationship and raise questions about the tension between the sociopolitical context and Catholic identity. Chapter three focuses on the tension between ecclesial orthodoxy and orthopraxis in a particular sociopolitical context. Chapter four studies the relationship between sociopolitical context and ecclesiastical structure and looks at the autocephalic ecclesial structures as a possible realization of a local church. Chapter five examines the tension between the Universal Church and local churches and stimulates a rethinking of the notion of universality.

These chapters basically raise three theological themes: the identity of the Church in particular sociopolitical context, the development of contextual ecclesiology, and the relationship between local churches and the Universal Church. These three themes are important not only in the context of the Chinese Church, but also in the post Vatican II period of the Roman Catholic communion.

The second part of this research intends to theologically reflect on the ecclesial experience of the Chinese Church vis-à-vis these three themes. It shows the emergence of an unique form of ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church, evaluates the contribution of the Chinese Church to the development of

a contextual ecclesiology, and explores the ecclesial and theological challenges of the Chinese Church to the Universal Catholic communion with particular attention to the tension between local churches and the Universal Church. It is divided into three sections: A, "The Ecclesial Identity of the Catholic Church in China," B, "The Contribution of the Chinese Church to the Development of a Contextual Ecclesiology," and C, "The Theological Implications for the Universal Catholic Church."

A. THE ECCLESIAL IDENTITY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA

The Catholic Church in China reflects a faith community which struggles for a new ecclesial identity vis-à-vis its particular sociopolitical context. This new ecclesial identity is important for the survival of the Catholic Church in China because the Chinese Church needs to adjust itself to the drastic sociopolitical changes taken place in the Chinese society since 1949.

There are three important elements of the Chinese social context which decisively affect this gesture of ecclesial identity. First of all, the new Chinese society--characterized by Communism, nationalism, and antiforeignism--demands the erstwhile missionary-dominated Chinese Church to seek a new ecclesial identity. Secondly, restrictions that limit the manifestation of its faith forces the Chinese Church to search for new ways to preserve its Catholic identity. Thirdly, the difficulties between the Chinese Church and Rome also affect the ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church in the context of the Universal Catholic Church.

Since the ecclesial identity developed by the Chinese Church is

different from ecclesiologies found elsewhere, it needs to be verified as a bona fide form of Christian theology before any credible theological contribution can be drawn from it. Furthermore, the compatibility of this ecclesial identity with the current ecclesial models discussed within the Roman Catholic Church also needs to be ascertained in order to initiate meaningful dialogue between them. This section is divided into two subsections: 1, A Theological Assessment of the Christian Identity of the Chinese Church, and 2, A Theological Assessment of the "Catholicity" of the Chinese Church.

1. A Theological Assessment of the Christian Identity of the Chinese Church

The evaluation of the "Christian-ness" of a new theological formulation is, by no means, an easy task. The difficulty does not lie so much in the comprehension of the new theology as in the establishment of criteria to evaluate the authenticity and the orthodoxy of Christian identity. The criteria, on the one hand, have to be universally applicable to diverse Christian experiences and expressions, and on the other hand, must be free from biases found in particular Christian traditions, especially the more established theological traditions developed in the North Atlantic countries. In addition to these requirements, the criteria have to be faithful to the essential tenets of Christian faith.

In the light of the above-mentioned difficulties, this research selects Schreiter's "Five Criteria for Christian Identity"¹ to assess the "Christian-ness" of the ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church. Schreiter's criteria

¹R.J. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1985), pp. 117-121, hereafter cited as Local Theologies.

presuppose the diversity of Christian theological developments. Instead of being based on any particular Christian tradition or prescribed Confession, the criteria are based on the inner dynamics of a Christian community, such as the interrelationship of the community, faith, and tradition, and finally, interecclesial recognition. These criteria allow diverse expressions of the Christian faith yet recognize the unity of faith. Therefore, Schreiter's criteria can be considered as minimal requirements of any bona fide Christian theology.

1. The cohesiveness of Christian performance

Schreiter suggests that well-constructed theological formulations demonstrate an internal cohesiveness of doctrines and symbols, and that this cohesiveness is commonly acknowledged and accepted by all Christian churches. If a new theological formulation which is "at odds with the rest of Christian doctrines or requires a radical shifting of large parts of it [Christian doctrines]"² arises, this new theological formulation is most likely not a well-constructed Christian theology. In other words, any new theological formulation should not contradict the basic Christian doctrines which are shared by all Christian churches.

The Chinese Church does not seem to deviate from basic Christian beliefs. Chinese Catholics make it clear that they have faithfully adhered to Christian traditions, and that they have not formulated any new doctrine. There is no evidence indicating that the Chinese Church has deviated from essential Christian doctrines, and it has never been accused of being heretical.

²Ibid., p. 112.

Although some of the ecclesiological issues developed in the Chinese Church, such as the autonomy of the local church, the nationalistic identity of a church, and nonjuridical primacy are probably controversial in the context of the Roman Catholic Church, they are not at odds with many non-Catholic traditions. Therefore, it is fair to say that that the ecclesial developments of the Chinese Church basically demonstrate the cohesiveness of a Christian performance.

However, in the sociopolitical context of Chinese society, there are dangers that threaten this criterion of cohesiveness. The unavoidable political concessions in the Chinese society may force the Chinese Church to renounce some essential Christian doctrines, such as inter-ecclesial fellowship. The possible interference of Government in the selection of prelates may force the Chinese Church to abandon some of its ecclesial sovereignty. The limitations in religious freedom may also inhibit the Chinese Church's exercise of basic Christian practices, such as the evangelistic mission.

These possible dangers can be seen from different perspectives. There are always limitations and imperfections in any given ecclesial context, and these limitations are often opportunities for new theological venture. In the situation of the Chinese Church, these dangers may limit the Chinese Church in fully expressing some of the basic Christian doctrines. So long as they do not result in the repudiation of basic Christian doctrines, they do not affect the Christian performance of the Chinese Church. On the positive side, these dangers have stimulated the Chinese Church to seek for a new ecclesiological self-understanding in the Chinese society.

ii. The worshipping context and Christian performance

Schreiter stresses that a good theological formulation has to appear in the worshipping context and has to eventually become a valid form of Christian tradition. Within the worshipping context, this new formulation is constantly reaffirmed by the community. With such communal reaffirmation and enactment, this formulation becomes an essential aspect of the tradition. In other words, any valid Christian theological formulation has to be reflected in the liturgy.

From 1979 to 1983, the Chinese Church barely had sufficient resources to provide a minimum liturgical service to the faithful. For Chinese Catholics, the opportunity of celebrating the archaic form of liturgy was already a luxury. The introduction or incorporation of new theological formulations into their liturgy was probably beyond their capability.

Despite their limited resources, Chinese Catholics still managed to incorporate their new ecclesial identity into their liturgy. For example, two of the important ecclesial themes developed in the Chinese Church are the sovereignty of the local church and the objection to a juridical papal primacy. These two themes are reflected in the liturgy of episcopal consecration,³ as well as in the liturgy of the mass.⁴ The nonconfrontational attitude of the Chinese Church to atheism is also reflected in the liturgy of the mass.⁵

However, this criterion may not be fully applicable in the situation of the Chinese Church. First, it usually takes some time to incorporate new

³Cf. The Consecration of a Bishop: Liturgy and Explanation (n.p., n.d.), mimeographed. (c)

⁴Prayer for the Pope is deleted from the Collect of the mass, see Proper of the Seasons (Shanghai: The Catholic Diocese of Shanghai, 1982), p. 6. (c)

⁵The prayer for the heretics--"We pray for the heretics, may God destroy heresy, and lead heretics into the Church"--is deleted from the liturgy, *ibid.*

theological developments into the liturgy and the Chinese Church only began to rebuild itself and to develop its own ecclesial identity in 1979. It was practically impossible for the Chinese Church to fully introduce its new ecclesial identity into the liturgy in such a short time, especially since its limited resources were heavily strained by other urgent pastoral needs. Second, the Chinese Church adheres to the Roman Latin Tridentine Rite for a variety of reasons. This liturgical practice also limits the introduction of any new theological developments into the liturgy. Therefore, this criterion cannot fully evaluate the liturgical dimension of the Chinese Church in this context.

iii. The praxis of the community and Christian performance

Schreiter's praxis criterion evaluates the Christian identity of a new theological formulation through its praxical consequences. The maxim of "By their fruit shall you know them" is perhaps the oldest, safest, and clearest way of discerning Christian identity. In other words, a good Christian theological formulation must be able to reflect the power of the Gospel in some practical way.

There is little doubt that the ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church brings praxical benefits to both the Church and Chinese society. First, the Chinese Church is better accepted by Chinese society. The Chinese Church fosters patriotism among Catholics and helps to build a better Chinese society by sharing the common interests and aspirations of the Chinese people. The patriotic identity of the Chinese Church gives the Chinese Church a better image in Chinese society.

Secondly, the Chinese Church is better able to survive in an atheistic society. The concept of ecclesiastical independence allows the Chinese Church to build its own hierarchy via the consecration of Independent Bishops and the

establishment of ecclesiastical structures. These actions, though illegitimate in the canonical sense, seem to be necessary for the normalization of Catholic activities, and the provision of adequate pastoral care to the faithful. Their positive result has been a rapid expansion of the Chinese Church since 1980.

Thirdly, the Chinese Church is better integrated into Chinese society. Chinese, in general, are very sensitive to the issues of national dignity and national sovereignty. This social mentality is perhaps a reaction to the humiliation which China suffered from the Western powers in the past. The Chinese Church, by stressing its "Chineseness" and the ecclesial concept of self-reliance, has aligned itself with the social aspirations of Chinese society. This alignment has enabled the Chinese Church to identify with the current social trend. Consequently, the Catholic faith has achieved a more authentic inculturation in China.

The sociopolitical situation of Chinese society limits the Chinese Church from a development of praxical consequences of Catholic faith, such as promotion of social justice, human rights, or social ethics, which goes beyond the realm of economic prosperity. However, these limitations have to be seen in light of the survival situation of the Chinese Church. The Chinese Church should be given credit for what it has achieved with its limited resources and freedom, and not be criticized for what it has not been able to do.

Overall, the ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church has facilitated the efforts of the Chinese Church to rebuild its ecclesiastical structure, to have a closer alliance with Chinese society, and to develop a more authentic inculturation. All these positive benefits suggest that the Chinese Church has fulfilled the criterion of praxical performance.

iv. The judgment of other churches and Christian performance

Schreiter's fourth criterion is that any Christian theological development should enhance Christian unity and catholicity and should not result in the isolation of an ecclesial community. Practically speaking, this new theological formulation must allow the particular ecclesial community to have mutual dialogue with other churches.

The ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church implicitly requires other churches to respect its ecclesiastical sovereignty and it does promote inter-ecclesial communion. It should not, in theory, lead the Chinese Church into isolation; rather, it should foster horizontal communion among churches. In practice, the situation is quite different.

The ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church promotes some polemical themes such as the non-juridical primacy, the sovereignty of the local church, and the right of the local church to name its bishop. These ecclesial themes have generated tension between the Chinese Church and Rome, and have hindered full communion between them. Moreover, this ecclesial tension between Rome and the Chinese Church has had a negative effect on the relationship between the Chinese Church and other churches, and, in fact, has isolated the Chinese Church from the Universal Catholic Church.

This ecclesial isolation of the Chinese Church cannot be blamed totally on the ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church. Rome's policy towards the Chinese Church has also contributed to this isolation. Churches of the Eastern Rites enjoy ecclesiastical privileges that equal or even exceed those the Chinese Church has requested from Rome. Would it not be possible for Rome to grant the Chinese Church the type of independence or autonomy enjoyed by the different rites within the Roman Catholic Church?

The political policy of the Chinese Government has also contributed to this isolation. The Chinese Church cannot contact churches in nations, such as the Vatican, which are categorized by the Chinese Government as politically hostile to China. This political restriction severely limits the contacts of the Chinese Church with other churches and prevents the Chinese Church from establishing meaningful relations with the outside world.

Furthermore, the sociopolitical context of Chinese society has prevented foreigners from having full access to China and this has kept other Christian communities from knowing exactly what is going on in China. Without adequate knowledge of the true situation, it is difficult for other Christian churches to establish a meaningful dialogue with the Chinese Church.

In conclusion, the Chinese Church fulfills the criterion of dialogue with other churches only in theory. In practice, freedom to dialogue with other Christian communities is impeded by historical, social and political factors which are beyond the control of the Chinese Church.

v. The challenges to other churches in Christian performance

Schreiter's final criterion states that a new theological formulation should impel the Church to challenge or to interact with other churches. In other words, a credible Christian theology should contribute to other churches either by affirming what has already been known, or by extending the theological frontier into new circumstances. This contribution is usually made through activities such as missionary work which express inter-ecclesial communion.

The sociopolitical context and the limited resources of the Chinese Church obviously have limited the Chinese Church from sharing its development directly with other Christians. Nevertheless, the unique ecclesial mode

developed in the context of Chinese society can challenge the Universal Church. This ecclesial model which affirms the building of local churches with diverse expression of faith in today's pluralistic society, challenges the Rome centered juridical model of the Universal Catholic Church, and advocates the realization of a contextual ecclesiology. Therefore, the ecclesial identity developed by the Chinese Church has challenged, and will continue to challenge, other churches.

Schreiter's criteria seem to be able to measure the general Christian characteristics of the theological developments from the Chinese Church. The analysis suggests that the thinking of the Chinese Church can probably be considered a valid form of Christian theology. This conclusion is drawn with an awareness of the following qualifications.

First, it is not easy for Christians outside of China to fully understand and appreciate the exact inner-dynamics of the Chinese Church. Secondly, there is limited access to information about the Chinese Church. Finally, information coming from China has to be carefully interpreted in terms of the Chinese context in order not to misread the message behind these bits of informations. Therefore, the "Christian-ness" of the Chinese Church might not receive the same assessment if more information were available.

2. A Theological Assessment of the Catholicity of the Chinese Church

To evaluate the "Roman Catholic-ness," or the Catholicity, of a certain ecclesial community is a difficult task. There is, of course, always a legalistic approach to this problem in terms of Canon Law. However, the canonical approach appears to be inadequate to the context of the Chinese Church because no canonical approval nor disapproval of its status quo has yet

been pronounced. Furthermore, a legalistic evaluation, which presumes clearly-defined norms and practices in a clearly-defined situation, is not flexible enough to assess the Roman Catholic orthodoxy of new theological developments which usually take place in situations beyond the defined realm of the Canon Law. Thus, a more flexible approach is needed.

Although there is theological ambiguity regarding the notion of the local church within the Roman Catholic Church, the concept of local church has firmly been endorsed by the teachings of the Catholic Church and is described in many Church documents.⁶

On the basis of the decree Ad gentes Linnan puts forward eight criteria for evaluating the authenticity of a Roman Catholic local church.⁷ Since these criteria are situated within the framework of the official teachings of the Church, they can be regarded as valid standards for evaluating the authenticity of a local church within the context of the Roman Catholic Church.

Although meeting all eight criteria does not warrant an ecclesial community being declared de jure Roman Catholic local church, it strongly suggests that this community manifests all the essential ecclesial characters which are commonly shared by all local churches within the Roman Catholic communion. If a local church lacks any one of these characteristics, it is defective in its claim to be a Roman Catholic local church.

⁶Cf. Lumen gentium, par. 23; Evangelii nuntiandi, par. 62-64; Christus Dominus, par. 11; Ad Gentes, par. 6; or Orientalium Ecclesiarum, par. 2 & 4.

⁷J.E. Linnan, "Toward a Theology of a Local Church," paper presented in the Annual Conference of the Catholics in America Concerned with China, 3rd December 1983, pp. 4f. This paper is reprinted in CN 22 (Winter 1983-4): 275-278.

This researcher adds a ninth criterion, submission to the primacy of Rome, to Linnan's eight criteria. Linnan does not include this criterion because he probably takes this ecclesial condition for granted as an imperative of all churches in the Roman Catholic communion.⁸ However, in light of the ecclesial situation of the Chinese Church, it is necessary to include this criterion in order to evaluate the Catholicity of the Chinese Church.

1. Congregation of faithful people.

Linnan states that an indispensable condition marking any local church is the ecclesiological notion of a congregated people. A church is realized through the gathering of people who share the same faith. Therefore, a local church is not merely a structure or an abstract idea, but the reality of a congregation of people. Without this condition, there can be no communion.

The existence of the Chinese Church in China is not marked by church buildings or by ecclesiastical structures, but by the gathering of Chinese Catholics who number more than three million. For years, these believers spontaneously gathered together, even when they were lacking ecclesiastical structures, church buildings, and priests.¹⁰ Therefore, the Chinese Church is realized primarily by the congregating of Chinese Catholics.

However, there are limitations on the ecclesial realization of the Chinese Catholic congregation. Public manifestation of any religious faith in China is controlled by the civil authority. Catholic congregations established

⁸ Linnan mentions the recognition of the primacy of Rome as a crucial condition of "Catholicity," *ibid.*, pp. 7f.

⁹ Cf. *Ad gentes*, par. 15.

¹⁰ See chapter three, A. 1. iii.

without prior Government sanction can be considered illegal. Thus, in the Chinese social context, the congregated nature of the Chinese Catholic Church is restricted to the limits determined by the Government.

ii. Integration into the life of the society

Linnan states that a mature local church has to be rooted in the society in which it is situated. It has to be able to share the joy, the pain, the agony, and the aspiration of its society. This intimate sharing with society enables the church to feel the pulse of society and to undertake effective missions and ministries to meet the needs of that particular context. Without this integration into the life of society, a local church is not part of society but an alien group, which cannot be regarded as that society's authentic local church.

The Chinese Church seems to be well-integrated into Chinese society. It no longer bears the foreign image, which once alienated the Chinese Church from Chinese society. And it does not perpetuate ecclesial interests which contradict the wishes of Chinese society.¹¹ Instead, the Chinese Church closely identifies itself with the interests of Chinese society and shares the social aspirations of the Chinese people.

There is a potential drawback to this ecclesial integration into Chinese society. The Chinese Church seems to leave no critical distance

¹¹The editor of the China Missionary Bulletin wrote in 1950: "How very different is the picture of the Church in China today? The distinction of French or Spanish or German or Dutch or American Catholic missionary weighs heavily on us. Petty pride of an Order or Congregation often blinds us to the real purpose of our ministry. We carry the petty jealousies of our nationality or Religious Order into the sanctuary of the Church . . ." in M.S. Bates, "The Church in China in Twentieth Century," in China and Christian Responsibility, ed. by W.J. Richardson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1968), p. 66.

between itself and Chinese society, and it agrees with virtually everything that the Government propagates. Thus, the Chinese Church has no possibility of taking critical distance nor any freedom to criticize Chinese society. The prophetic role of the Chinese Church can easily be compromised in this integration.

iii. Adaptation to local culture

When missionaries plant new churches in mission fields, it is not uncommon for them to model these new churches after their own cultural expressions. Consequently, a missionary church will very likely retain a foreign image. If the missionary church wants to mature, eventually it has to develop its own expression of faith according to its own cultural context. Therefore, Linnan argues that failure to inculturate the faith reflects the inauthenticity of a local church.

Superficially, the Chinese Church does not seem to have adopted Chinese culture as its ecclesial expression, because for example, the mass is still celebrated in the Tridentine mode and seminarians are trained in the classic style. However, these phenomena of non-Sinocization seem more a reflection of the pastoral difficulties of the Chinese Church than the failure of the Chinese Church to adopt local culture.¹²

Careful analysis of the Chinese Church strongly suggests that it has already adopted, consciously or otherwise, many Chinese social and cultural norms into its ecclesial non-liturgical life. The hierarchical structure of the Chinese Church is modeled after the civil administrative structure. The

¹² R.J. Schreiter, "A Note on Catholic Seminaries in China," in Missiology 8 (July 1985): 291-296; also chapter three, B. 2. 1.

cultural language spoken by Chinese Church leaders is patterned after the standard political rhetoric used in China. The praxical approach to ecclesial issues is a common Chinese way of solving problems. The strong familial bonds of the Chinese culture are instrumental in shaping some of the Catholic communities. The sociopolitical situation affects the curricula of the seminaries.¹³ The mentality of the Chinese Government expressed in xenophobia, defensiveness, and national pride, also influences the ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church. Therefore, it is fair to state that the Chinese Church has, in fact, adopted a fair amount of cultural elements that are typical of contemporary Chinese society.

iv. Attainment of a certain stability and firmness

Linnan proposes that stability and firmness are signs indicating the maturity of a local church. If a local church lacks stability and firmness, it may have only a transient ecclesial existence that has no lasting effect, or be an incomplete and poorly developed local church which cannot face the challenges of its context.

Two factors seem to influence the stability and the firmness of the Chinese Church. First, the religious policy of the Chinese Government determines the stability of the Chinese Church in China. When the Government's policy was unfavorable to religion, the Chinese Church could not even exist in China. However, under the favorable religious policy implemented in 1979, the Chinese Church has gained the support of the civil authority and has consolidated its stability in Chinese society.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 293f.

Second, the relationship between pro-Roman and pro-Government factions has determined the internal stability of the Chinese Church. There is no doubt that the Chinese Church has suffered greatly from this painful division which has weakened the stability of the Chinese Church. However, the division has also stimulated Chinese Catholics to search for praxical solutions to ensure the survival of the Chinese Church and thus has strengthened the Chinese Church.¹⁴

Generally speaking, despite some discord among Chinese Catholics, and the sporadic Leftists' political attacks on religious policy, the Chinese Church attained a relative degree of stability and firmness between 1979 to 1983.

v. Provision for its own ministry.

Linnan also notes that a mature local church is a self-sustained ecclesial entity. It must have the capacity for self-generation, viz. the provision of its own ministry, religious life, and laity. However, this ecclesial criterion does not mean that a mature local church can develop or survive without any foreign input; rather, it emphasizes that local church should be able to develop without relying on outside assistance.

Practically speaking, a mature local church should have adequate resources and facilities to administer sacraments, to train new clergy, to provide proper pastoral care for the faithful, and to sustain its population. Above all, these endeavors have to be undertaken by local ecclesial resources.

The Chinese Church has made an astonishing recovery from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution when virtually all ecclesiastical institutions were

¹⁴Chapter three, C. 4. i & ii.

destroyed. Within a few years (1979-1983), it reopened a few hundred churches, formed a national ecclesiastical structure, reestablished seminaries, and provided basic pastoral care for the faithful. All these were achieved without any foreign help.

Although the Chinese Church still suffers from a shortage of priests especially in rural areas, a lack of church buildings for religious activities,¹⁵ and a lack of facilities for training seminarians, its determination to be self-reliant suggests its potential to provide ministry.

vi. Possession of ministries and institutions

Linnan states that a mature local church must also possess the ministries and institutions necessary for the people of God to develop under the guidance of its own leaders. In practice, a mature local church must have an episcopal hierarchy which can provide various ministries for the proper religious development of the faithful. Hence, a well-defined organizational structure and properly-defined offices of ministries are crucial signs of a mature local church.

The Chinese Church seems to fulfill this criterion. It has developed a nationwide episcopal ecclesiastical structure--the NAC (CACs) and the CBC--with different offices of ministry. From this ecclesiastical structure, Chinese Catholics can receive all the resources necessary for their development in faith, such as sacraments, catechumenates, liturgies, and ministries.

Although the ecclesiastical structure and its episcopal office function with a considerable amount of political interference from the Government, this

¹⁵ See chapter three, A. 1. i.

political interference does not necessarily negate the ecclesial validity of this ecclesiastical structure. Rather, this political influence can be seen as the unique characteristic of the Chinese Church in the context of Chinese society.

vii. Participation in the evangelizing mission

Another sign of a mature local church, proposed by Linnan, is participation in the evangelizing mission of the Church. If a local church fails to continue the mission of Jesus Christ in its time and place, it has not yet arrived at maturity.

Under the Chinese Government's religious policy, the Chinese Church is not allowed to propagate the Catholic faith outside of church buildings. However, the Chinese Church is still able to carry out its evangelizing mission. This evangelizing mission is not carried out through high-profile outreach programs, but through the silent witness to the Catholic faith in the daily lives of Chinese Catholics.

These living testimonies of Chinese Catholics bear two missiological consequences. In the narrow sense of gaining new converts, many people, particularly from non-Catholic backgrounds, have been attracted to Catholicism because they have seen the witness of the power of the Gospel in the lives of their Catholic friends or relatives. In the broad sense of mission to the world through serving the society, the patriotic contributions of Chinese Catholics express the love of God to China through the Chinese Church. Therefore, the living yet silent presence of the Chinese Church in atheist Chinese society is a powerful form of participation in the evangelizing mission.

viii. Theologization from its own culture and experience

One of Linnan's criterion for a mature local church is the evidence that the local church has arrived at a mature stage at which it can express the truth of revelation in appropriate ways to its own people.

Although the Chinese Church ascribes to almost all the traditional dogma in its particular context, it has developed some unique theological themes, such as the theological basis of patriotism and the ecclesiastical sovereignty of the local church.¹⁶ These theological themes which have not been elaborated with any degree of sophistication, have developed more from subtle ecclesial practices than from explicit theological writings. These themes evidently signify the ability of the Chinese Church to theologize its own reality.

ix. Acceptance of papal primacy

One indispensable characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church is the doctrine of papal primacy. This doctrine is the crucial determining factor distinguishing the Roman Catholic Church from other major Christian communions, such as the Anglican or the Orthodox. Hence, any ecclesial community which claims to be a Roman Catholic Local Church must not reject this doctrine.

There is considerable ambiguity about whether the Chinese Church has rejected this doctrine or not. At the first glimpse, the Chinese Church seems to reject papal primacy. However, in light of the Chinese sociopolitical context, careful analysis of this issue strongly suggests that while the Chinese Church may have strongly resented and protested against the ecclesiastical practices of the Roman Curia, and may have de facto rejected the

¹⁶See chapter two, B. 1. i. & B. 2. ii.

ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Rome, it did not explicitly and categorically reject the doctrine of papal primacy.¹⁷ Therefore, the evidence does not point to a definitive conclusion on whether or not the Chinese Church fulfills this ecclesial criterion of Catholicity.

Although it has been observed that the Chinese Church has de facto ignored the authority of the Holy See, and that this ecclesial position may easily make the Chinese Church a schismatic church, this is not to say that Chinese Catholics have to bear all the responsibility. One has to give credit to the Chinese Catholics' extraordinary effort to maintain their Catholic identity in very difficult political circumstances. It does not seem to have been their intention to build a schismatic church. Thus, their apparent rejection of papal primacy has to be seen in light of their context which has been affected by the Vatican's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, the conflicts between the Chinese Church and Rome in the 1950s, Rome's support of the pro-Roman "underground" Church, and the canonical status of the Independent Bishops.

Therefore, the de facto objection to the papal primacy is more a political issue in a particular situation than a theological issue. It may not necessarily suggest the non-Catholicity of the Chinese Church, but it does raise serious questions about the political dimension of the papacy and the Vatican, and the role of the Vatican in international politics. It also invites the Church to reflect in new ways on the nature and role of the petrine office vis-à-vis a pluralistic world with diverse political ideologies. This

¹⁷ See chapter two, B. 2. 1. and C. 2. iii; cf. chapter, four, C. 1. iii. and chapter five, A. 1. vi; A. 3; B. 2. 1 and C. 1. ii.

reflection might result in a different kind of relationship between Rome and the local churches.

In concluding the survey of Linnan's and Schreiter's criteria, it can be stated that the Chinese Church has basically fulfilled all these criteria with some qualifications. Since the Chinese Church lives in an unique sociopolitical context, there are difficulties, emerging from this context, which prevent the Chinese Church from fully satisfying some of these criteria. However, the Chinese Church seems to have tried its best to become a bona fide Christian and Roman Catholic local church.

B. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE CHURCH TO AN AUTHENTIC CONTEXTUAL ECCLESIOLOGY

The Chinese Church has developed its ecclesial identity from its very own experience and context. This theological endeavor may contribute to a better understanding of theological contextualization.¹⁸ This section intends to examine how the Chinese Church contributes to the theme of theological contextualization. It is divided into the following subsections: 1. Contextual Theology, 2. The Contributions of the Chinese Church to the Development of a Contextual Theology, 3. The Limits of Chinese Contextual Ecclesiology.

¹⁸ Contextual Theology is an important theological issue among churches in the Third World. See the biannual bibliography, Missionwissenschaftliches Institut Misso e.V. Theologie im Kontext: Informationen über theologische Beiträge aus Afrika, Asien, Ozeanien und Lateinamerika (Aachen: Missio, 1979-).

1. Contextual Theology

Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a rapid emergence of Third World nations which have gained their independence from their former colonial rulers. Churches in these Third World nations have begun to face social challenges such as the need for post-colonial adjustment, the demand of national identity, the pressure of cultural affirmation and economic development.¹⁹

As Christians in these Third World churches search for their Christian identities and the appropriate responses to their sociopolitical contexts, they realize that theologies received from Older Churches in the North Atlantic countries are not adequate to address these issues.²⁰ The theological insights of Older Churches are not necessarily applicable in the Third World context.²¹ In addition, theological methodologies, such as neo-Thomism in Catholicism, which were once thought to have a universal and perennial character appear to be only regional expressions of Western or European culture.²² Therefore, there is an urgent need for a new type of theology to deal adequately with the particular challenges related to this new situation. This subsection has two parts: i. The emergence of contextual theology, and ii. Present evaluation of this phenomenon.

¹⁹Cf. E.P. Nacpil, "The Critical Asian Principle," in Asian Christian Theology Emerging Themes, ed. by D.J. Elwood (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), p. 57.

²⁰Local Theologies, p. 1.

²¹P. Shen, "Concerns with Politics and Cultures in Contextual Theology: A Hong Kong Christian Perspective," CF 25 (September 1982): 129.

²²Local Theologies, p. 3.

1. The emergence of contextual theology

As Christians of the Third World churches reflect on their faith in their local circumstances, a whole new category of theological construction has begun to emerge. This theological construction bears many labels such as "adaptation," "indigenization," "localization," "inculturation," and "contextualization."²³ Its purpose is to develop theologies which respond to the particular realities of various churches.²⁴

While there is a general consensus among theologians on the needs and the values of local theologies, there is still a residue of skepticism, fear and suspicion about this development,²⁵ especially among some Christians of the Older Churches who regard themselves as the sole custodians of the revealed truth.²⁶ These reactions are partly the result of the paternalistic mentality of the Older Churches,²⁷ partly of the strain local theologies put on the concept of universality,²⁸ and partly of the concern about the uncertain Christian identity of these local theologies.²⁹

As Younger Churches become more independent and mature, the development

²³Ibid., p. 2.

²⁴For example, Schreiter lists a few particular theological issues which the churches in the Third World have to face, in "Issues facing Contextual Theologies Today," in VSVD 21 (1980): 267-278.

²⁵See Ad gentes, par. 22; Gaudium et spes, Chap. 2; Evangelii nuntiandi.

²⁶A. Amalorpavadass, "Evangelization and Culture," in Concilium, no. 114 (New York: Seabury Press 1979), pp. 61-63.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid, pp. 64f; Rendtroff, pp. 250ff.

²⁹D.J. Elwood, "Asian Christian Theology in the Making: An Introduction," in Asian Christian Theology Emerging Themes, p. 27. Cf. K. Haleblan, "The Problem of contextualization" in Missiology 11 (1983): 95-111.

of local theologies accelerates³⁰ and it is having a profound impact on the field of theology. In terms of content, it challenges the universality of the traditional understandings of Christian faith as interpreted by the Older Churches.³¹ It extends theological investigation into new frontiers by seeking dialogue with other religious traditions,³² or by relating faith to social reality. It also stimulates ecclesiologists and missiologists to develop new church models and mission concepts.³³

In terms of theological method, local theologies challenge the traditional deductive method, and develop other methodologies which are inductive in nature and are usually based on praxis.³⁴ Currently, these new methodologies have become almost the only acceptable way of doing theology in some Third World churches.³⁵

Local theologies have pastoral and social implications because they

³⁰The formation of the Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT) in 1976 greatly enhances this theological development.

³¹For example, see T. Rendtroff, "Universalität oder Kontextualität," in ZTK 74 (1977): 238-254; or L.M. Russell, "Universality and Contextuality," in ER 31 (1979): 23-26.

³²See G.C. Oosthuizen, Theological Battleground in Asia and Africa (London-New York: Hurst-Humanity Press, 1972); L. Gutheinz, "Asian Theology Today: Where is it? What is it About?" in CTUF, no. 43 (1980), pp. 35-50; or C.S. Song, "New Frontiers of Theology in Asia, The Theological Thesis," in SEAJT 20 (1979): 13-33.

³³For example, see V.J. Donovan, Christianity Rediscovered (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1982); and W. Buhlmann, The Coming of the third Church, tr. from German (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1976).

³⁴For some of these methodologies, see R.R. Bong, "Contextualization: Asian Theology," in What Asian Christians Are Thinking: A Theological Source Book, ed. by E.J. Elwood (Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publisher, 1978), pp. 47-58; also S. Bevans, "Models of Contextual Theology," in Missiology 13 (April 1985): 185-202.

³⁵L. Gutierrez, "Contextual Theology in Asia," in PS 19 (1979): 6-9.

seek a new Christian identity and a role vis-à-vis the new cultural, social, political, and economic context. For example, churches in Africa and in India pay attention to their local cultural identity and religious traditions, and formulate their liturgy accordingly while churches in Latin America focus more on issues of oppression and social justice, and search for Christian involvement in these issues.

ii. Present evaluation of this phenomenon

The current discussion on contextual theology focuses on three main areas. First, the need for a suitable term to describe this new theological phenomenon. Third World theologians previously employed terms such as "inculturation" and "indigenization" to denote the construction of local theologies. Presently, however more and more theologians prefer the term "contextualization" because this term bears a more appropriate connotation³⁶ than indigenization which suggests the static, past-oriented, and provincial and "inculturation" which turns attention to traditional culture, and easily ignores the rapid social changes taking place in the Third World.³⁷ The term "contextualization" not only includes the past, but also incorporates present reality.

Secondly, the discussion of contextual theology focuses on the need of a more precise theological definition of this phenomenon. Since theologians

³⁶Ibid., p. 7.

³⁷Coe, pp. 240-241. For the connotation of "inculturation," see A. Chang, "The Inculturation of Theology in the Chinese Church," in CTUF, no. 42 (1979), pp. 448-450; ET Gregorianum 63 (1982): 54-57. Chang strongly emphasizes the cultural and the philosophical dimensions and ignores the social and political dimension of local theology.

continue to propose their own notion of contextualization, there seems to be no universally accepted theological definition of this concept.³⁸ However, the definition put forth by the Theological Education Fund (TEF) in 1971,³⁹ and subsequently elaborated and sharpened by Coe,⁴⁰ seems to have received the widest acceptance.⁴¹

According to the definition given by the TEF, contextualization is the "capacity to respond meaningfully to the Gospel within the framework of one's own situation."⁴² The term "contextualization" not only reaches out to past cultural traditions but also takes the present historical moment of the society as one of the loci theologici.

The most difficult endeavour of contextualization is the establishment of a balance between the "context" and the "text." If contextual theology places too much emphasis on the text, it will become detached from concrete reality and become fossilized theology. If theology overemphasizes the context, it will become a chameleon theology.⁴³ In light of this difficulty of contextualization, the notion of contextuality emerges to ensure authentic contextualization. Contextuality is defined as

³⁸Cf. Bong, *passim*; B.J. Nicholls, Contextualization: A Theology of Gospel and Culture (Dowers Grove: IVP 1979).

³⁹Theological Education Fund, Ministry in Context: The Third Mandate Programme of The TEF, 1970-1977 (London: TEF, 1972).

⁴⁰S. Coe, "In Search of Renewal in Theological Education," in TE 94 (Summer 1973): 240-243.

⁴¹Cf. C. Arevalo, "Prenotes to the Contextualization of Theology," in PS 19 (1979): 24f; or Elwood, p. 26.

⁴²Theological Education Fund, p. 19.

⁴³Ibid., p. 24; cf. Elwood, pp. 27f.

That critical assessment of what makes the context really significant in the light of the Missio Dei. It is the missiological discernment of the signs of the time seeing where God is at work and calling us to participate in it.

Therefore, an authentic contextualization is not just an uncritical accommodation to a culture or a social context. Instead, it is a matter of challenging a particular context with the power of the Gospel and theologically assessing a particular historical moment in the light of the mission of the Church which is called to participate in the Missio Dei.⁴⁵

Thirdly, the current discussions on contextual theology are no longer centered on the necessity of this theological approach and its methodological problems, but on the concrete formulation of contextual theologies. Many theologians have already undertaken this theological task and the exciting results, such as Liberation Theology, Black Theology, or Asian Theology, are widely known.⁴⁶

However, this phenomenon must be allowed to develop further before a judgement can be made. The full impact of contextual theology is yet to be assessed because there are not enough examples of contextual ecclesiology available for a comprehensive evaluation of its real contribution. Without concrete examples, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the theological impact of contextualization except in the abstract.

⁴⁴ Coe, p. 24; cf. Arevalo, p. 29.

⁴⁵ Ibid.; Elwood, pp. 27f.

⁴⁶ For example, see D.J. Elwood, ed., Asian Christian Theology Emerging Themes (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980); E.P. Nacpil and D.J. Elwood ed., The Human and the Holy: Asian Perspectives in Christian Theology (Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publishers, 1978); S. Torres and V. Fabella, ed., The Emergent Gospel. Theology from the Underside of History: Papers from the Ecumenical Dialogue of Third World Theologians, Dar-es-Salaam, August 5-12, 1976 (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1978).

2. The Contributions of the Chinese Church to the Development of Contextual Theology

In view of the present evaluation of contextual theology, the ecclesiology developed by the Chinese Church is extremely valuable because it is a living example of contextual theology. Many valuable insights about theological contextualization can be gained from the ecclesial experience of the Chinese Church.⁴⁷ Contributions toward a better understanding of contextualization can be seen in three areas: i. Affirmation of the vital aspect of contextualization, ii. Praxis as locus theologicus, and iii. Discernment of the "signs of the time."

i. ~~A~~ffirmation of the vital aspect of contextualization

China has undergone drastic social changes in the past few decades. The Chinese Church has faced unprecedented social challenges and it has been forced to search for a new role and identity in this new social context in order to ensure its survival. The search for a new ecclesial identity has resulted in the development of a contextual ecclesiology. This ecclesiology is vital since the Chinese Church wants to survive and to be credible and faithful to its mission at a particular historical moment. Therefore, the ecclesial experience of the Chinese Church suggests that theological contextualization is an ecclesial imperative for the survival of churches which live in a rapidly changing world.

⁴⁷In 1980, Gutheinz doubted that Asian theologians in Communist countries, such as North Korea, China, or Vietnam, could develop meaningful theology; Gutheinz, p. 44. Before that date, Christians from these countries had not formed any theology to serve as a basis for discussion. Now the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church seems to cast away Gutheinz's doubt.

The contextual ecclesiology of the Chinese Church is also a sign indicating the inevitable trend of theological contextualization. Due to its isolation from the Universal Church from the 1950s to the early 1980s, the Chinese Church has developed its ecclesiology without participating in the theological discussions on contextualization among the Third World churches. Although the Chinese Church was not in contact with the theological trend of the world, it still managed to formulate this unique ecclesiology which closely resembles contextual theology. This phenomenon suggests that contextual theology is not merely an academic speculation of theologians, but also a necessary theological development for churches in diverse contexts.

ii. Praxis as locus theologicus

The ecclesiology of the Chinese Church provides an example of doing theology from the inductive method. The transnational and apolitical ecclesiology held by the Chinese Church prior to Liberation (1949)⁴⁸ is no longer appropriate to the nationalistic and xenophobic Chinese society. The Chinese Church had to find a new starting point from which to construct its ecclesiology.

The Chinese Church began its ecclesiological development not because of any theoretical or theological motive but because of the praxical need to face the ideological challenges of Chinese society. The reality of the Chinese society forced the Chinese Church to formulate new ecclesiological concepts, such as the autonomous local church and the People's church.⁴⁹ These

⁴⁸Cf. chapter two, C. 1.

⁴⁹Cf. chapter two, C. 1. i. & ii.

ecclesiological concepts in turn influenced ecclesiastical practices and led to independent episcopal consecrations and the restructuring of diocesan boundaries in order to meet the praxical needs of the Chinese Church. In fact, by doing this, the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church completed its praxical cycle by ending where it began, in praxis.

The ecclesial experience of the Chinese Church in using praxis as a locus theologicus also illustrates the potential shortcoming of the inductive method. There is the danger of forsaking some imperative truths for the sake of praxis or expediency. For example, the Chinese Church has come close to discarding one of the many basic identities of Roman Catholicism--the doctrine of papal primacy. Had it done this, the Chinese Church would have difficulty holding on to its claim to be a Roman Catholic church.

This danger exists in any serious attempt at contextualization. In fact, it illustrates the theological tension between orthodoxy and orthopraxis. The Chinese Church allows praxis to challenge many traditional taken-for-granted orthodox beliefs, such as the papal right of episcopal nomination. But it has not gone as far as to proclaim that praxis as the only means to verify orthodoxy. The Chinese Church still accepts many traditional beliefs, such as the deity of Christ, regardless of the atheistic social environment.

The experience of the Chinese Church shows that although it chooses praxis as the starting point for theological construction, it still believes that there are some imperative truths in Scripture and tradition, which cannot

be compromised by praxis.⁵⁰ Therefore, praxis is not the exclusive theological locus, but one of the many important theological loci to develop contextual theology.

iii. Discernment of the "signs of the time"

Contextuality is of cardinal importance in contextual theology because only authentic contextuality can ensure its credibility. Contextuality is, in practice, the discernment of the "signs of the time" (or Missio Dei),⁵¹ viz. the discernment of God's action and grace at a particular historical moment. Thus, the "signs of the time" is an essential theological factor for the construction of contextual theology.

The theological notion of the "signs of the time" has long been mentioned and endorsed by the Magisterium,⁵² and discussed by many theologians.⁵³ There seems to be a common consensus that the discernment of

⁵⁰ Bishop Jin Luxian, rector of the Sheshan Seminary near Shanghai, mentions that a Chinese theology (contextual theology) must be "faithful to the teaching of Christ, be founded on biblical revelation, and be built on the traditions of the Fathers of the Church." As for the praxical dimension, this theology should "also contribute to the construction of socialist China." See A. Lazzarotto, "A Dramatic Development in China: Six Seminaries Are Forming New Priests," in EAPR 22 (1985): 143.

⁵¹ The terms Missio Dei and "the signs of the time" are interchangeable here.

⁵² Cf. Humanae Salutis; Pacem in Terris; or Ecclessium suam.

⁵³ For example, see P. Valadier, "Signes des temps, signes de Dieu?" in Etudes, no. 335 (1971), pp. 261-279; M.D. Chenu, "Les signes des temps," in NRT 87 (1965): 21-34; or A. Anton, La Iglesia de Cristo: el Israel de la Vieja de la Nueva Alianza, Biblioteca de autores cristianos, serie maior 15 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1977), pp. 773ff.

the "signs of the time"⁵⁴ is the critical starting point of today's theological endeavors. However, the reading of these "signs" seems to be very difficult. There is as yet no precise and exact definition of the "signs of the time,"⁵⁵ and there is no standard method to actually discern these "signs."

In view of the difficulty of reading the "signs of the time," the experience of the Chinese Church in the development of its ecclesiology can shed some light on this theological theme. Chinese Church leaders interpret sociopolitical changes such as the Liberation, the downfall of the Gang of Four, the Four Modernizations, as "signs of God." They believe that God uses the Chinese Communist Party to bless China. Therefore, freedom from colonialism, oppression and poverty and attainment of selfhood, dignity, and prosperity--sociopolitical achievements of the Communist Party in China--are seen as actions of God in China. Consequently, Church leaders have joined with the Chinese Government to build a better China and have developed an ecclesiology to suit these "signs of the time."

The discernment of the "signs of the time" by the Chinese Church is very subjective and controversial. While the Chinese Church has interpreted

⁵⁴Although Congar does not explicitly use the term "signs of the time," he implies this notion. See Y.M.J. Congar, Situation et tâches présentes de la théologie (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), pp. 72f.

⁵⁵Arevalo, p. 29.

the social and political achievements of the Chinese Government⁵⁶ in China as the Missio Dei, other churches, such as the Church in Taiwan, have regarded the same historical era as an actio Satanae.⁵⁷ Even some Chinese Catholics in China regard the Chinese Government as a godless evil power trying to destroy goodness.⁵⁸ The different readings of the same historical event suggest that

⁵⁶ It is interesting to note that in the early 1970s, some Western theologians had a romantic notion of the experience of China during the Cultural Revolution. Based on Government propaganda materials, they interpreted the Cultural Revolution as the missio Dei: They theologized on the Cultural Revolution as God's action to create a selfless "New Man" and a classless "New Society" in China through Mao. See Christian Faith and the Chinese Experience: Papers and Reports from an Ecumenical Colloquium Held in Louvain, Belgium, September 9 to 14, 1974 (Geneva and Brussels: Lutheran World Federation/Pro Mundi Vita, 1974); or Theological Implications of the New China: Papers Presented at the Ecumenical Seminar Held in Bastad, Sweden, January 29 to February 2, 1974 (Geneva and Brussels: Lutheran World Federation/Pro Mundi Vita, 1974). A few years later, the Chinese Government denounced the Cultural Revolution as a national calamity. Churches in China followed suit. As stories of the hellish experience of the Cultural Revolution began to be known to people outside of China, the theological romanticization of the Cultural Revolution came to an end. Those Western theologians who tried to theologize on the Chinese experience during the early 1970s did not have any concrete experience of the Cultural Revolution nor did they really know the reality of China at that time. They discerned the "signs of God" in China not from the Chinese context but from the context of their academic interest. Consequently, they created a theology that was not based on reality and could not stand the trial of time.

⁵⁷ For example, see J.T.S. Mao, A Brief History of the Catholic Church in China During the Past 70 Years (Taipei: Window Press, 1981) (c) p. 16; Wu Yan, Glimpse Of Catholic Life Style in Mainland China and the Chinese Communist Policy Towards Religion (Taipei: Window Press, 1984) (c) pp. 88f; Letter From The Bishops Of Taiwan To All Bishops Of The World, To All Christians, To All Men Committed To Justice, 20 March 1979, Taiwan, mimeographed. Cf. P. Chang, The Good Shepherd Lays Down His Life For His Sheep (Death of the Blessed Aloysius Versiglia and Callistus Caravario, SDB) (Taipei: Window Press, 1984).

However, a Taiwanese theologian (living in Geneva), C. S. Song, regards the sociopolitical changes in China as a positive action of God, see his book The Compassionate God (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1982), pp. 216-234.

⁵⁸ A Chinese Catholic mentions that since he regards the Chinese Communist Government as a Satanic force, he will never work for the Government. He was arrested as a political criminal and spent about twenty years in prison and labor camp. See J. Liu [Michael Yeung], Inside China: Experience of a Chinese Catholic 1948-1980 (Hong Kong: privately published, 1981).

there is little hermeneutical agreement on the discernment of the "signs of the time," and that discernment depends very much on one's own context.

The experience of the Chinese Church also suggests that even the same discernment of the "signs of the time" does not ensure similar theological development and pastoral action. All Chinese Catholics regard the relaxation of the religious policy (1979-1983) as a "sign of God," through which God manifested His grace to the Chinese people. However, this discernment resulted in two opposing ecclesial actions. Pro-Government Catholics seized this opportunity to resume Catholic activities and to develop the ecclesiology of an autonomous local church, while pro-Roman Catholics used this occasion to build a catacomb church and to formulate the ecclesiology of a catacomb church.

The experience of the Chinese Church shows that the discernment of the "signs of the time" is highly existential, and that the consequence of this discernment is also a subjective matter which totally depends on various personal factors such as political preference, theological conviction, personal background, and personality. Therefore, there seems to be no precise rule governing the discernment.

The subjective dimension of the discernment of the "signs of the time" in fact touches the theological tension in contextualization between universality and particularity. The experience of the Chinese Church illustrates that there can be diverse, even opposing, contextualizations within the same context. Thus contextualization in its purest form means particularization for each individual life, at the personal level, in one's very own context. In theory, each individual may develop his or her own contextual theology. Therefore, by the very nature of contextualization, there can be no precise prediction or definition of its outcome. In practice, there

is a need to have collective theological responses in a particular collective context. Practical contextualization is, therefore, achieved by a group of people who live in the same environmental (or external) context but share similar personal contexts. The term refers, in other words, to a reality of limited universality with some common particularities.

3. The Limits of Chinese Contextual Ecclesiology

Since contextualization is a dynamic ongoing theological process which needs constant discernment of the Missio Dei and a continuous challenge to its faith, authentic contextualization is therefore a theologia viatorum. Technically speaking, it is not accurate to use the term "contextual theology" or "contextualized theology" as these terms denote a finalized product. Instead, one should speak of "contextualizing theology" to denote the state of continuous development.⁵⁹

The dynamic concept of "contextualizing theology" is vital for any authentic contextualization. It constantly demands that the ecclesiastical community be aware of the dynamism of the Missio Dei and to be ready for new developments of God's work. This awareness enables the contextualizing theology to be based on a present reality, rather than on past historical events, and renders this theology relevant to the ongoing situation.

As one applies the "contextualizing" concept to the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church, one realizes that this ecclesiology is able to simultaneously take into consideration many current contextual factors, such as political

⁵⁹Coe, pp. 241f.

reality, pastoral concerns . . . etc. However, there are some limitations to the Chinese ecclesiology vis-à-vis the concept of "contextualizing."

i. Its negative perception of Rome

A cursory reading of the comments of the Chinese Church about Rome and the Vatican indicates that Rome has been perceived as an enemy treating the Chinese Church as an inferior in its attempt to regain its parental control over China. This negative perception of Rome probably came from the unpleasant experience with Rome during the 1950s. Chinese Church leaders feel that they have been unjustly treated by Rome. Their resentments towards Rome have lingered on right up in the 1980s.

In addition to this past-oriented mentality, Chinese Church leaders have harbored suspicion about the conciliatory gestures expressed by Rome. They have interpreted these gestures as plots to sabotage the Chinese Church. With this "sabotage complex,"⁶⁰ Chinese Church leaders have exhibited a strong tendency to be prejudiced in their interpretation of the Rome-Chinese Church relationship. This past-oriented mentality may have led to a defective contextualization.

The Chinese Church has also been isolated from the Universal Church since the early 1950s. It has had no opportunity to be exposed to the Vatican II experience, and it has had very limited contact and dialogue with other Catholic communities. Therefore, the Chinese Church may face the danger of doing its contextual theology so much in isolation that it is only of limited relevancy to others.

⁶⁰A: Lazzarotto, The Catholic Church in Post-Mao China (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Center, 1982), pp. 120-125.

True contextualization requires that a church should develop a futuristic outlook, that is, a mind-set ready to discern the "signs of the time," and to participate in the work of God which advances into the future. The "contextualizing" of theology challenges the Chinese Church not only to discern the "signs of the time" in China, but also to outgrow its past-oriented mentality by discerning the "signs of the time" in the context of the Universal Church in its post-Vatican II eccesiological development. Otherwise the Chinese Church cannot become a part of the international ecclesial experience which is developing in the second half of the twentieth century.

ii. Scope of contextualization project

The Chinese Church seems to have focused its contextualization mainly in two areas: adaptation to the political structure of Chinese society, and adaptation to the Chinese mentality. Although Chinese Church leaders are well aware of the fact that they need to contextualize in other areas such as liturgy,⁶¹ and the formation program for Chinese clergy,⁶² in practice they have not extended this contextualization further. Moreover, there are theological areas such as the development of ministries, the formulation of Christian doctrine, ecumenism, and inter-faith dialogue, that have not been mentioned by the Chinese Church.

The limited scope of the theological contextualization in the Chinese Church is probably due to the "survival" situation of Chinese Catholics. The

⁶¹For example, see CCC, no. 4 (March 1982), pp. 46-48; CCC, no. 6 (April 1983), p. 61; or CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), pp. 53f.

⁶²Chinese Church leaders admit that they are still searching for a suitable model for priestly formation in the Chinese Church, see J. Tong, "First Visit To Chinese Seminaries," Tripod, no. 23 (October 1983), p. 31..

most important challenge for the Chinese Church has been to stay alive. Therefore, with limited resources and time,⁶³ the Chinese Church simply has not been able to undertake other kinds of "theological adventures" which do not effect the immediate survival of the Church in Chinese society. Perhaps in the future when the Chinese Church has attained a more stable position, it will have to expand its scope of contextualization in order to root the Catholic faith deeply in the soil of Chinese society.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNIVERSAL CATHOLIC CHURCH

The unique situation of the Chinese Church challenges many traditional aspects of Catholic ecclesiology. It has much in common with other churches, especially those in the Third World which have developed new ecclesial models. However, the situation of the Chinese Church remains unique because of the sociopolitical context; therefore, its challenges deserve more attention.

The ecclesial experience of the Chinese Church raises new questions about the following theological themes of the Universal Church: 1. Unity of the Church, 2. Petrine Office, 3. Christian Unity, and 4. Missiological Ramifications.

1. Unity of the Church

Prior to the Vatican II Council, the Roman Catholic Church was

⁶³CCC, no. 8 (December 1983), p. 18; CCC, no. 9 (May 1984), pp. 39f; Tong, p. 32; also cf. CUP, no. 9 (Spring 1985), pp. 39f.

generally regarded as ONE whole Church which consisted of many local churches. Then the view that each local church was not a partial church but a genuine and complete church was proposed by the Council.⁶⁴ Therefore, the reality of "oneness" (the Universal Church) becomes a universal communion of local churches.

This vision of the local church has stimulated a new awareness on the relative independence of local churches. Many local churches, especially those in the Third World, have begun to organize regional episcopal conferences to voice their specific concerns. They have also developed particular ecclesiastical structures, local theologies, and indigenous liturgies in order to actualize the full reality of the independent local church.

However, this independence movement of local churches has met resistance from Catholics who hold the traditional ecclesiology which heavily emphasizes the unity and the uniformity of the Universal Church. Thus, the Church is caught between two apparently opposite ecclesiological stands--the decentralization of church authority versus the centralized universal hierarchy.⁶⁵

This tension between the unity of the Church and the diversity of local churches raises a theological issue, viz. whether or not this concept of an independent local church is still compatible with the Catholic understanding of unity, even when this unity is understood as a "communion in diversity." In response to this question, the Chinese Church has strongly challenged the

⁶⁴For example, see Christus Dominus, par. 11.

⁶⁵For example, these two ecclesiological views are placed side by side in Evangelii Nuntiandi, par. 61-64. Cf. Lumen gentium, par. 18-29; and A. Acerbi, Due ecclesiologie. Ecclesiologia giuridica ed ecclesiologia di comunione nella "Lumen Gentium" (Bologna: Dehoniane, 1975).

Universal Church's understanding of unity by developing a totally independent model of a local church. (It did this not because it wished to offer a theological challenge to church unity but because the pastoral imperatives compelled it to seek a means to survive in a unique sociopolitical situation.

i. The independence of local church as condition of survival

One of the most important developments in the Third World since the Second World War has been the process of decolonization. It has led to the formation of many new sovereign nations. As these nations have searched for their new national, cultural, social, and political identities, they have begun to develop their own sociopolitical structures.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the Church has had to respond to the the social challenges posed by these diverse contexts. Since it has not hitherto experienced social challenges such as decolonialization and socialist patriotism, the Church has had to search for appropriate responses at specific historical moments. The practical question has been whether Rome or the local church should lead the local church in its response to social challenges.⁶⁶

The experience of the Chinese Church has shown that ecclesial responses formulated by the Roman Church bureaucrats without any direct experience of the situation in China leads to the catastrophic clashes between the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government. Therefore, the Chinese Church argues that local Catholics, not church officials in Rome, are the ideal candidates to develop appropriate ecclesial responses in the specific context because they alone can

⁶⁶ Cf. the Apostolic Letter Octogesima Adveniens, May 14, 1971, par. 4.

fully grasp the sociopolitical reality which confronts the local church.⁶⁷

Moreover, in order to execute the ecclesial responses effectively, a local church must have a certain degree of independence and the authority to decide its destiny in its specific reality. Consequently, the Chinese Church had to establish an independent local church model for its survival.

This formation of an independent Chinese Church has lent strength to the argument for the independence of local churches, especially those situated in the Third World where the social contexts are radically different from the West.

ii. Pastoral consideration of the independence of local churches

The realization of the ecclesiastical independence of the Chinese Church was not achieved easily. It was the consequence of a bitter and painful struggle with Rome. The Chinese Church still suffers from a de facto separation from Rome and an internal split into pro-Roman and pro-Government fractions. This painful experience generates hostility, xenophobia and suspicion among Chinese Catholics and this has a negative effect on the unity of the Church.

This painful experience of the Chinese Church illustrates that the ecclesiastical development of the independence of a local church can easily generate problems which go beyond the realm of theological discussion. Very often, the problems are more psychological, emotional, political and pastoral than theological and canonical in nature. Therefore, even though the issue of Church unity may well be a theological question, the realization of this unity

⁶⁷Ibid.

has to take into consideration the pastoral factors involved. Otherwise, this unity in diversity may easily become ecclesial disunity.

2. Petrine Office and Collegiality

In recent years, interest in the Petrine ministry has been stimulated among theologians by the introduction of the collegial concept into the texts of Second Vatican Council.⁶⁸ This concept of collegiality counterbalances the concept of absolute Papal authority advocated at the First Vatican Council and provides a theological basis for innovative models of the Petrine office.⁶⁹

The awareness of ecumenism has also contributed toward interest in the Petrine ministry. The Petrine office has been one of the major polemic issues hindering the realization of Christian unity. Ecumenists have tried to search for new models of the Petrine office so that the Papacy can be accepted by both Catholics and non-Catholics.⁷⁰ As a result, current discussions place more emphasis on the fraternal, pastoral, and collegial roles than on the paternal,

⁶⁸ See Lumen gentium, especially par. 22 & 27. In fact, the concept of collegiality had been discussed before the Vatican II Council. see B. Botte, "Le Sacre Episcopal dans le Rite Romain," in QLP 25 (1940): 23-37; Y. Congar, "Le Peuple fidèle et la fonction prophétique de l'Eglise," in Irenikon 24 (1951): 289-312 and 440-466; or K. Rahner and J. Ratzinger, The Episcopate and the Primacy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1962). For a review and a bibliography on collegiality, see R. McBrien, "Collegiality: The State of the Question," in J.A. Coriden ed., The Once and Future Church: A Communion of Freedom (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), pp. 1-24.

⁶⁹ P. Granfield, The Papacy in Transition (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980), pp. 62-95.

⁷⁰ For example, Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, The Final Report, Windsor, September 1981 (Cincinnati: Forward Movement Publication, 198), pp. 49-67 and 81ff.

juridical and monarchical roles of the Papacy.⁷¹

In light of the current discussions on the Petrine office, the Chinese Church strongly challenges the Universal Church's understanding of the Petrine office and episcopal collegiality by consecrating bishops without papal approval. The Chinese Church, indeed, raises some serious questions on the nature and role of the Petrine office, on episcopal collegiality in relation to the episcopal conferences and the Papacy, and on the structure of the Universal Church.

1. Petrine office in the Universal Church

The Chinese Church firmly rejects the juridical authority of the Papacy in the context of the ecclesial affairs of the local church. This rejection implies that the Papacy has no juridical authority in the administrative and the political affairs of the local church. This strong rejection of the Papacy

⁷¹For example, see H. Küng, The Church, tr. from German (London: Burns and Oates, 1967), pp. 476f. There have been many studies published on this topic. For a recent study, see F. Gomez, "On the Petrine Ministry," EAPR 21 (1984): 178-195.

is probably a reaction to some specific historical events⁷² which have brought the wisdom of papal intervention in certain historical incidents into question.

However, the Chinese Church has not rejected papal authority in the context of the Universal Church.⁷³ It seems to recognize the primatial role of the Church of Rome in the Roman Catholic Church as the symbol of spiritual leadership, but limits this primatial role to the juridical and religious authority pertinent to the welfare of the whole Universal Catholic Church. In short, the Chinese Church envisions a confederacy of the Roman Catholic Church with limited authority for the Petrine office.

41. Petrine office and local churches

The Chinese Church seems to emphasize the need for the Pope to consult with local church bodies before making any major decision that concerns both parties. The Chinese Church probably feels that the Pope has to be in

⁷²For example, in 1956, the Shanghai Diocesan Consultar elected Fr. Zhang Shilang as the Vicar Capitular to succeed the incarcerated Bishop Gong Pinmei. Rome refused to ratify Zhang and stated that the successor of Gong had to be personally appointed by Gong. Rome did not seem to realize that the two appointees of Gong were also incarcerated, and Catholics in Shanghai had no alternative to electing a Vicar Capitular. One year later, on July 10, 1957, Rome issued a special decree to strip Zhang of his episcopal faculties. This decree was a high-handed warning to discourage Chinese Catholics from joining the forthcoming CPCA, and to threaten them. See AIF, no. 1270 (7 April 1956), p. 112; Archbishop Riberi's letter "Instruction for the governing of the diocese and for the continuation of the ruling in consideration of the particular circumstance," in *Le Siège Apostolique et les missions* (Paris: Union missionnaire du clergé, 1956-) III: 328; AIF, no. 1335 (13 July 1957), pp. 234-236; Wei, p. 104. Cf. AAS 41 (1949): 334.

In 1957, a pro-Roman Chinese priest, frustrated by the Pope's high-handed paternalistic action, said: "You old folk [the Pope] don't know the situation in here. It is best not to give orders imprudently. We are no children; we know what is right and wrong." See Thomas (pseud.) "The Inside Story of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association," Part II, in *ZT*, no. 51 (16 March 1961), p. 140, my translation.

⁷³See *Renmin Ribao*, 2 August 1957; or *Guangming Ribao*, 2 August 1957.

collegiality with the local church before he can exercise his Petrine authority. It seems that the Chinese Church regards the authority of the Petrine office as a consequence of the collegial link between the Pope and local churches and not as an authority that can be exercised autocratically.

However, the Chinese Church does not require a local ecclesial community to be in collegial union with the Petrine office in order to exercise its authority. That means local churches have intrinsic ecclesial authority which can be exercised without the need to be in communion with the Pope.

This concept of the relationship between the Petrine office and local churches seems to be very similar to the concept of primus inter pares (first among equals) in Orthodox Theology.⁷⁴ This concept regards the primacy of the primatial see as an honor, and binds the authority of this see within the limits of its collegial union with other local churches. It is the local churches which bestow authority and honor on that primatial see.

iii. Collegiality within the Church

Although the Chinese Church highlights the spiritual authority of the bishops by placing the CBC in a supreme ecclesiastical position, it has also expanded the scope of ecclesial collegiality by calling upon not only bishops but priests, religious, and also laymen (and laywomen), to lead the Chinese Church as members of the NAC.

This ecclesial concept of collegiality has profound implications for the traditional male and clerical collegial leadership of the Church. It

⁷⁴ See J. Meyendorff et al., The Primacy of Peter in the Orthodox Church (Leighton Buzzard, Bedfordshire: The Faith Press, 1963). For a recent study, see J.H. Ericksen, "Common Comprehension of Christians Concerning Autonomy and Central Power in the Church in View of Orthodox Theology, in Kanon 4 (1980): 100-112.

implies that the leadership of the Church is no longer an exclusive episcopal privilege, but a responsibility shared by all Catholics regardless of their ecclesiastical rank. It also indicates that the laity which previously had little involvement in the leadership of the Church, can now play an important and decisive role as leaders of the Church.

This concept of collegiality may have some far-reaching practical implications for the structure of the Church. It may lead to the involvement of laity in the decision-making of the Church at all levels, and to the creation of regional Catholic administrative committees to counterbalance the present regional episcopal conferences. It may even imply a Council which would include priests, religious, and laity.

3. Christian Unity and Reconciliation

The Chinese Church is a challenge to the Roman Catholic Church's position on Christian unity.⁷⁵ It is ironical that while Rome is in dialogue with non-Roman Catholic Churches such as the Anglican, Orthodox, or Lutheran, in the hope of attaining full unity in the future, it is still not in full communion with the Chinese Church, a church which has tried to maintain a Roman Catholic identity in spite of its adverse situation. Therefore, the

⁷⁵ J.M. Calle, "Some Thoughts to Better Understand the Present Situation of the Catholic Church in China Today," in EAPR 23 (April 1986): 93. Calle wrote: "This extremely delicate situation where the unity and integrity of the Body of Christ in Chinese soil is at stake, brings a new challenge to the Universal Church. Obviously, the situation is complex and multi-faceted, still wide-open to contradictory interpretations. Furthermore, it is a situation that perhaps has no precedent in the history of the Church. For here, we have a tiny Catholic community in the midst of one immense non-Christian Tradition world with a philosophy and culture so different from our Judaeo-Christian Tradition and under a very vital communistic regime."

reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church would be an extremely important gesture that would lend credibility to the Roman Catholic Church's desire for Christian unity. The reconciliation is discussed under the following headings: i. Need for the reconciliation, ii. Problems of reconciliation and iii. Possible ways of reconciliation.

i. Need for reconciliation

One of the current ecclesiological developments is the awareness of the ecclesial completeness of the local church. The local church is no longer a partial church living within the Universal Church, but a complete church freely choosing to be in communion with other churches in one Catholica.⁷⁶ This ecclesiological awareness has led to the development of ecclesial diversity.⁷⁷

In the light of this ecclesial development, the reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church would be a significant landmark that would point the Rome-local church relationship in the direction of an actualization of ecclesial diversity within unity. Therefore, the Chinese Church is a test case to assess Rome's readiness to accept the genuine diversity of local churches. This reconciliation would also set a precedent for other local churches to

⁷⁶Gomez, p. 190.

⁷⁷K.E. Untener, "Local Church and Universal Church," America 151 (13 October 1984): 205.

follow, and would inevitably lead to the decentralization of ecclesiastical authority.⁷⁸

Reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church would also have important ramifications for the current ecumenical dialogues between Rome and other "catholic" traditions, such as the Anglican and the Orthodox.⁷⁹ The Roman Catholic Church pays careful attention to the ecclesiologies of these "catholic" Churches in the hope of developing a common base for unity.⁸⁰ In fact, the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church should be as "catholic" as, if not more than, the ecclesiologies of both the Anglican and the Orthodox. If Rome could be reconciled with the Chinese Church, it would be an encouraging step towards a better dialogue with other "catholic" Churches,⁸¹ and would offer possible solutions to some of the current ecumenical polemics.

One of the main ecumenical concerns is the way to achieve ecclesiastical autonomy within unity. A recognition by Rome of the status quo

⁷⁸ E. Tang wrote: "What is more, any recognition of the Chinese Church's right to run its own affairs will set a dangerous precedent. Rome already feels threatened by many centrifugal forces, be it women's movement, dissenting theologians or entire local Churches clamouring for autonomy. If Rome gives in to the demand of the Chinese Church, will it be able to refuse it to other local Churches, such as Holland, Indonesia, Brazil, or for that matter, Taiwan?" in The Church in China--After Two Revolutions, Pro Mundi Vita Dossier Asia-Australasia, no. 20 (January 1982), p. 16.

⁷⁹ See this section, 4. v. on "Ecumenical ramifications."

⁸⁰ For example, see J.M.R. Tillard, "La primauté romaine," in Irénikon 50 (1977): 291-324; or C.J. Dessain, "Le cheminement des Eglises Catholique romaine et anglicaine vers l'union," in NRT 99 (July-August 1977): 481-506.

⁸¹ One of the key issues of ecumenical dialogue is the authority of the Church. A decentralized ecclesiastical authority would definitely be a positive step toward the physical unity of Christians. About this issue, see The Final Report; or P.E. Emple and T.A. Murphy ed., Papal Primacy and the Universal Church: Lutheran and Catholics in Dialogue V (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1977).

of the Chinese Church would reflect Rome's willingness to allow local churches to have greater ecclesial autonomy. This concession would be a positive step towards ecumenical dialogue.

The rapprochement between Rome and the Chinese Church would also encourage a greater decentralization of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. If this rapprochement were to be achieved, Rome would have to grant more authority to the Chinese Church, and this would reflect Rome's readiness to grant more authority to other local churches. Indeed, it would start a process of decentralization of ecclesiastical authority and thus encourage the current ecumenical dialogue on ecclesiastical authority.⁸²

This rapprochement would set a precedent for Rome's acceptance of validly established ministers. The Chinese Church has validly consecrated bishops and ordained priests since 1957 without approval from Rome. A recognition by Rome of these autonomously established ministers would pave the way for Rome to recognize the validity of ministers in other "catholic" churches (Old Catholic, Anglican, or Orthodox).

Also, this rapprochement would help the ecumenical discussion of the Petrine ministry. The Chinese Church does not reject the principle of papal primacy, but it objects to the juridical authority of the Papacy on the local level of ecclesiastical affairs.⁸³ This view on the Papacy is very close to the Orthodox concept of primus inter pares. If Rome could be reconciled with

⁸²T. Chu, "Canadian Catholics in China," CO, no. 33 (December 1982), p. 2.

⁸³J. Tong wrote: "If the brethren of different denominations can sit together for dialogue, why cannot we, the brethren in the same Church [he meant the Chinese Church and Rome] begin our fraternal dialogue under the continuous guidance of the Spirit of Truth?" in "The Primacy of the Pope and the Collegiality of the Bishops," Tripod, no. 3 (May 1981), p. 54.

the Chinese Church on this issue, Rome would have to reduce the juridical authority of the Papacy. This development in the Petrine ministry would definitely be welcomed by the ecumenical community, because this definition of the Petrine office would be more easily accepted by other Christian churches.

Finally, reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church is important for the positive development of the Chinese Church. The present dispute between Rome and the Chinese Church forces the Chinese Church to live in isolation. Prolonged ecclesial isolation leads to the withering of faith as the example of the "hidden Christians" of Japan indicates.⁸⁴ Isolation may lead a church to develop an unhealthy theology which justifies the status quo but does not build up the faith.⁸⁵ Thus it is of the utmost importance that the Chinese Church - come out of its isolation and be reconciled with Rome. Otherwise, it may lapse into an ecclesial extremism further away from mainstream Roman Catholicism.

ii. Problems of reconciliation

First of all, an important issue that obstructs the reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church is the political problem of Taiwan. The Chinese Government, in principle, does not seem to object to the Chinese Church establishing ties with Rome, but it firmly objects to the Vatican's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The Chinese Government has repeatedly stated the sine

⁸⁴M.G. Lau, "A Reflection on 'Particular Church': Based on the experience of the Chinese Church," in Tripod, no. 19 (February 1984), p. 53.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 56. P. Welte also comments that contextual theology can not be achieved in isolation, "Sie zeigt vielmehr, dass (wenigstens heute) keine kontextuelle Theologie entwickelt werden kann, die hinter einer grossen Mauer, in einer 'splendid isolation' oder in einem getto sich befindet." in "Schwerpunkte des theologischen Denkens im Kontext der chinesischen Kultur," in ZMR 65 (1981): 171f.

qua non condition for Rome-Chinese Church rapprochement is the Vatican's termination of diplomatic relation with Taiwan.

The Vatican is caught in a dilemma. If it abandons Taiwan, and recognizes China instead, it will enrage the Catholics in Taiwan. Taiwanese Catholics will regard Rome as an untrustworthy leader of the Church which sways under political pressure. However, if the Vatican retains its ties with Taiwan, it can have no relationship with the Chinese Church. Furthermore, even if a Sino-Vatican tie is secured, there is no guarantee that the Chinese Church will be able to freely communicate with Rome,⁸⁶ or that the Chinese Church will embrace Rome unconditionally.

Secondly, even if the political problem were to be solved, the canonical problem would still have to be faced. Chinese Independent Bishops and the current Chinese ecclesiastical structures (the NAC and the CBC) have no canonical sanction. Their canonical status would have to be legitimized retroactively because some of these abnormal ecclesiastical practices go back as far as 1958. However, this retroactive ratification would imply that things Rome had done to the Chinese Church in the past, such as issuing excommunication orders to the Independent Bishops, were wrong. Rome may not be ready to accept this. Also, the legitimization would set a dangerous precedent which might undermine ecclesiastical discipline.⁸⁷

The legitimization of Independent Bishops and the Chinese ecclesiastical structures is coupled with another canonical problem, viz., the

⁸⁶C.Y. Yeh, "A Study of Peking-Vatican Relations," IS 20 (June 1984): 77f.

⁸⁷There are pro and con arguments for the rescinding of the Papal excommunication decrees against the Chinese Independent Bishops. See "Letter to the Pope," by China Commission of German Catholic Mission Council, Münster, April 1983; cf. CUP, no. 7 (Spring 1984), p. 141.

dissolution of the underground pro-Roman hierarchy. Currently, Rome recognizes only the underground hierarchy and its clandestinely-appointed prelates as the legitimate structure and representatives of the Chinese Church. If Rome were to recognize the NAC, the CBC, and all Independent Bishops, it would have to find ways to combine the underground hierarchy and the "independent" hierarchy into one unified structure.

The last difficulty and probably the most formidable is the psychological or pastoral problem. If Rome were to recognize the Open Church, Rome would have difficulty winning the confidence of the pro-Roman Catholics who, under Rome's former orders, sacrificed a great deal to reject the Open Church. These pro-Roman Catholics would feel a sense of betrayal and would have difficulty accepting that their loyalty to Rome no longer has value.⁸⁸ They might even form their own "loyal" church by separating from Rome and forming a Chinese parallel to the Petite Eglise in France which was formed in the wake of dissatisfaction over the Concordat of 1801.⁸⁹

In addition, pro-Government Catholics have long felt that they have been unjustly abandoned by Rome. Therefore, they will inevitably demand that their names be cleared. If Rome were to formally clear their names, it might further increase the sense of betrayal among pro-Roman Catholics who might question the integrity of Rome.

Despite these apparently insurmountable problems, the reconciliation

⁸⁸Untener, p. 205. Ladany voiced for the feelings of the pro-Roman Chinese Catholics, see his article, "A Brief Assessment of the Situation of the Church in China," in CUP, no. 16 (Summer 1986), pp. 70f.

⁸⁹NCE, s.v. "Petite Eglise," by L. P. Mahoney. Cf. C. Latreille, La Petite Eglise de Lyon (Lyon: H. Lardanchet, 1911).

between Rome and the Chinese Church is still an ecclesial imperative for the welfare of the Chinese Church, and of the whole Roman Catholic Church as well.⁹⁰

iii. Possible models for reconciliation

In the history of the Catholic Church, the Church has dealt with similar ecclesial situations of reconciliation with ecclesial communities that have been separated, or distanced, from Rome due to various circumstances. The situation of the Chinese Church is not the first ecclesial dilemma that the Church has had to confront. Perhaps the experience of the Church in developing different models to handle these ecclesial situations in the past can shed some light on this problem. Three models are discussed here: Ostpolitik, Eastern Rites, and the Concordat of 1801.

The Vatican has developed the policy of Ostpolitik to deal with ecclesiastical affairs in the Eastern Bloc countries. This policy presupposes that Communist Governments restrict the activities and influence of the Church, and that these regimes are relatively stable.⁹¹ Thus the objective of Ostpolitik is to develop a modus vivendi between the Church and State, so that Catholic churches in these Communist countries can have more opportunities for practical ministry and can gain a stronger position in society.⁹²

Superficially, this policy seems to be applicable to the Chinese Church

⁹⁰E. Wurth, "Reconciliation in China--A Holy and Urgent Task," in Tripod, no. 14 (April 1983), pp. 52-56. Wurth emphasizes on the reconciliation between the two fractions of Chinese Catholics.

⁹¹D. J. Dunn, Détente and Papal--Communist Relationship, 1962-1978 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 185.

⁹²Dunn, p. 181; H. Stehle, Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans, 1917-1975 (Munich: R. Piper, 1975), pp. 390f.

because the Chinese Church also lives under a stable Communist regime which seems to restrict the influence of the Catholic Church in Chinese society. Although Ostpolitik has achieved a certain success in Eastern Europe, careful examination of the situation of the Chinese Church suggests that this policy may not be a promising option.

First of all, the Catholic Churches in the Eastern Bloc have a strong social influence,⁹³ whereas the Catholics in China have negligible influence in society. Therefore, the Chinese Church is in no position to negotiate with the civil authority. In fact, the fate of the Chinese Church depends upon two factors totally uncontrollable by the Church: the general political climate of the Chinese Government,⁹⁴ and the Government's general policy on national minorities and on popular religions (Buddhism and Islam). The Catholic Church has little practical influence over the Chinese Government's religious policy. Thus, Sino-Vatican diplomacy would very unlikely achieve any major improvement in the welfare of the Chinese Church.

Secondly, the Chinese Church has gained a certain social position not with the help of any foreign influence, but by virtue of its own patriotic witness. It does not seem to need any outside influence to improve its social status and its relationship with the Government. Rather, it repeatedly states that foreign Catholic churches should not intervene in Chinese Church affairs, and that intervention may adversely effect the relationship of the Chinese Church and the Chinese Government.

⁹³The Polish Catholic Church is a good example.

⁹⁴B. Leung, "The Impact of Modernization on the Catholic Church in China," Missiology 8 (July 1985): 335f.

Finally, the whole concept of Ostpolitik is based on the assumption that the relationship between a local church and the socialist civil authority can be improved through the intervention of Rome. This concept presupposes that the local church needs the help from Rome in dealing with Church and State matters. However, the situation in China is very different. The Chinese Church had unpleasant experiences with missionaries and especially with Rome in the past. What the Chinese Church wants is the reconciliation with Rome,⁹⁵ but not the intervention of Rome in the Church and State relationship in China.

Another option for reconciliation is the example of the Eastern Rites. Churches of the Eastern Rites have their full autonomy and their Patriarchs. These autocephalic churches can preserve their own unique Rites and heritage, and still be in full communion with Rome.⁹⁶ Even in recent history, the Roman Catholic Church welcomed the Malankar Rite in 1932.⁹⁷ Therefore, the ecclesiastical privilege of the Eastern Rite seems to be a promising method in dealing with the problem of the Chinese Church.

If Rome establishes a Chinese Rite to facilitate the Chinese Church's preservation of its independence, two major problems may arise. First of all, the Chinese Church has no liturgical basis to start its own rite.⁹⁸ The fact

⁹⁵ A source reveals that the Chinese Government recently consulted Chinese Church leaders on eventual reconciliation with Rome. While most bishops agreed, three of them strenuously objected, see CUP, no. 9 (Autumn 1984), p. 63.

⁹⁶ See Orientalium Ecclesiarum.

⁹⁷ The Syro-Malankar hierarchy formally came into being in June 1932, see the Apostolic Constitution Christo Pastorum principis in ASS 24 (1932): 289-292; cf. NCE, s.v. "Malaka Rite" by C. A. Abraham.

⁹⁸ On the definition of Rite, see Y.M.J. Congar, Diversités et communion: dossier historique et conclusion théologique (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1982), pp. 114-125.

that it still follows the Latin Rite clearly reflects its unreadiness to establish its own liturgical tradition.

Furthermore, if a "Chinese-Latin" Rite were in indeed to be established with its own Patriarch, this Rite would probably split the Chinese Church. There is still an "Underground Church," which is loyal to Rome and follows the vernacular liturgy. These "Underground Catholics" would probably follow the Roman vernacular Rite while the "Open Church" would have their "Chinese-Latin" Rite alongside. This division would perpetuate discord rather than harmony.⁹⁹

The Concordat of 1801, which reconciled the Constitutional Church of France with the Papacy, seems to be a promising model because there are many striking similarities between the Constitutional Church and the Chinese Church.

The Constituent Assembly of the French Revolution, through the organic "Civil Constitution of the Clergy," demanded that the Catholic Church to be loyal to the French Revolution rather than to Rome. This Civil Constitution divided clergy and faithful into the Constitutional Church which favored the French Revolution, and the Refractory Church which sided with the Papacy. The Refractory Church, with the backing from the Pope, turned against the French Revolution, while the Constitution Church emphasized its patriotic support of the French Revolution. Both Churches claimed legitimacy and built their

⁹⁹ However, G. Neduugatt argues that believers have the right to change their ecclesial identity (rites) because of the changes in social structure, and that such changes in ecclesial identity may be a gain for the Church, see his article "Autonomy, Autocephaly, and the Problem of Jurisdiction Today," in Kanon 5 (1981): 19-35.

hierarchies by consecrating bishops and exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction.¹⁰⁰

(The Constitutional Church is very similar to the Chinese Church. It consecrated bishops without approval from Rome, claimed ecclesiastical sovereignty and jurisdiction, was supported by its Government, was confronted with a pro-Roman Church, had married clergy, rejected the authority of Rome, and had an ambiguous canonical status.

The Concordat of 1801 resolved the conflict between France and the ~~Papacy~~, and between the Constitutional Church and the Refractory Church. This Concordat asked all bishops, Constitutional and Rome-appointed, to resign from their sees. The Republic (First Consul) nominated bishops to Rome and Rome granted canonical approval. Bishops named pastors in accord with the Government. The clergy were required to take an Oath of obedience and loyalty to the Government.

In application, all Constitutional Bishops resigned. But almost half of the nonjuring bishops refused; some started the schismatic Petite Eglise. The French Government nominated the new bishops on the principle of amalgamation, about half were Constitutional Bishops and the other half Rome-appointed bishops. Rome reluctantly granted canonical confirmation to the Constitutional Bishops without the need for them to give formal disavowals (retractions) of the rejection of Rome they had made at their consecration. In addition, all married priests were laicized and their marital union validated. Thus, the

¹⁰⁰ For more details, please consult A. Latreille, L'Eglise catholique et la révolution française, 2 vols (Paris: Hachette, 1946-1950); L. Sciout, Histoire de la Constitution civile du clergé, 4 vols (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1872-1881).

Concordat of 1801 ended the dangerous schism of the French Church.¹⁰¹

Although the Concordat of 1801 seems to provide an ecclesiastical precedent to deal with the problems of independently consecrated bishops, the union of pro-Roman and pro-Government churches, the loyalty to civil authority, and the civil control over church affairs, it provides little solution to some of the unique problems in the conflict between the Chinese Church and Rome. Among these can be listed the political and diplomatic difficulties over Taiwan and the Vatican, the minority status of the Chinese Church in China, and resentment against the missionary domination of the Chinese Church in the past.

Fr. L.T.S. Wei, probably inspired by the Concordat of 1801, suggests an eight-points proposal which also includes a political consideration of the reconciliation between Chinese Church and Rome: a. The Vatican-Taiwan relationship has to be downgraded to the level of a chargé d'affaires, b. Beijing and the Vatican initiate high level talks, c. Rome recognizes China, the Chinese hierarchy, and the Independent Bishops, d. Rome releases the Chinese Church from the tutelage of the Sacred Congregation for Evangelization of Peoples, e. The Chinese Government grants conditional amnesty to imprisoned Catholics, f. The Chinese Church deals with the Government directly with no interference from the Nuncio, g. Rome recognizes the CPCA, and h. Rome sends an Apostolic delegate to Taiwan.¹⁰²

Wei's proposal seems to be a promising solution except that it may generate some pastoral problems in Taiwan. According to Wei, the Vatican should

¹⁰¹NCE, s.v. "Concordat 1801 (France)," by J. Leflon; Cf. A. Boulay de la Meurthe, Histoire de la négociation du Concordat 1801 (Tours: A. Mame, 1920).

¹⁰²L. Wei, "Esquisse d'un projet personnel en faveur de l'ouverture du dialogue entre le Saint-Siège et la République Populaire de Chine," Paris, 24 September 1984, mimeographed.

transfer its nunciature from Taiwan to China, and should send an Apostolic delegate to Taiwan. This change would inevitably foster a sense of betrayal among the Catholics in Taiwan. Rome would lose its credibility not only among them but also among Catholics who live under the threat of political superpowers. However, Rome could avoid this political entanglement if it were to send non-diplomatic representatives--Apostolic delegates--both to China and to Taiwan. An Apostolic delegate is accredited to the Church and not to the State, and his status, is therefore, ecclesiastical instead of diplomatic.

It is indeed encouraging to observe that since 1983, some of Wei's proposal has been actualized. The nunciature in Taiwan has been headed by a chargé d'affaires since 1973.¹⁰³ The Vatican has not appointed a Nuncio to Taiwan despite the vacancy. Rome seems to be willing to downgrade the diplomatic tie with Taiwan. Moreover, Rome requested the missionary bishops, who were still nominally bishops of the Sees in China, to resign from their Sees.¹⁰⁴ This act reflects Rome's desire to withdraw the foreign presence from the Chinese Church and to grant it a certain degree of independence. Furthermore, the bishops in Taiwan, with the acknowledgment of Rome, have issued a pastoral letter to prepare the Taiwanese Catholics to accept the

¹⁰³In 1966, the inter-nunciature in Taiwan was upgraded to nunciature. In 1973, the Pro-Nuncio Msgr. E. Cassidy was transferred to Bangladesh, AP (1974): 1084. In 1979, Msgr. Cassidy was transferred to Africa, and Msgr. L. Accogli was appointed as the Pro-Nuncio to Bangladesh. There has been hitherto no appointment of a Pro-Nuncio to Taiwan. The nunciature in Taiwan is headed by chargé d'affaires Msgr. P. Giglio, see AP (1979): 1113-1116. Cf. A. Chang, The Diplomatic Relations Between the Vatican and Our Country (Taipei: Window Press, 1980) (c), p. 42. Chang had different dates for these diplomatic changes.

¹⁰⁴See Chapter four, footnote no. 190.

eventual Sino-Vatican diplomatic tie.¹⁰⁵

The Chinese Church and Chinese Government have also made gestures of reconciliation. The Chinese Government has openly declared that it would not object to the reconciliation.¹⁰⁶ The Municipal Government of Shanghai has granted parole to the prominent pro-Roman Bishop, Gong Pinmei, who had been in jail since 1955. Bishop Gong who has not reclaimed his See submits to the authority of the Independent Bishop, Zhang Jiashu of Shanghai.¹⁰⁷ The Chinese Church has ceased its media attack on Rome. Furthermore, low profile contacts between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church continue to increase.¹⁰⁸

Church leaders may have to work hard to find more ways to clear the obstacles blocking the reconciliation of Rome and the Chinese Church. However, the most important factors in achieving reconciliation are not methods or

¹⁰⁵"One Shepherd, One Flock," the Pastoral Letter of the Regional Chinese Bishop's Conference in Taiwan, CB 6 (September-December 1984): 6-9.

¹⁰⁶An official in Beijing told Cardinal Sin that "If the Catholic Church in China wishes to establish ties with the Vatican, we [the Government] will not object." Ming Pao, 23 November 1984. However, Ladany suggested that the Beijing Government had no intention to negotiate with the Vatican, in his article, "The Beijing-Vatican Dialogue," RCL 14 (Spring 1986): 100-102.

¹⁰⁷Bishop Gong Pinmei was arrested on September 9, 1955; see Shanghai Xinwen Ribao, 9 September 1955. He was sentenced to prison for life on March 17, 1960, see Renmin Ribao, 18 March 1960. He spent about 30 years in a prison camp near White Grass Mountain in southern Anhui. During this period, he kept his faith and encouraged others. For an eyewitness's account of Gong's prison life, see F. Butterfield, China, Alive in the Bitter Sea (New York: Times Book, 1982), p. 182. Gong has been on Amnesty International's list of prisoner of conscience since 1978, see Appeal AI index ASA 17/07/78. He received parole on July 3, 1985, see Wenhui Bao (S), 4 July 1985; and AF 1 (12 July 1985): whole issue. He has also received some foreign visitors, see P. Barry, "Bishop Gong Pinmei Receives Visitors from Abroad," in Tripod, no. 30 (December 1985), pp. 72-76.

¹⁰⁸See YIE, (February 1985), pp. 2f; AF 1 (12 July 1985): 1; and Bulletin, no. 147 (May 1985), whole issue, published by the Mission Office of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, also in Kerygma 19 (1985): 101-119.

ways--for there are enough historical precedents to warrant this ecclesial reconciliation--but attitudes. Without the spirit of openness, understanding, humility, forgiveness, and unselfishness, both the Chinese Church and Rome may not be able to overcome the pride, resentment, and self-righteousness, which in fact are the predominant hindrances to the realization of unity.

4. Missiological Ramifications

The Chinese Church presents itself as an autonomous ecclesial community which is determined to run its affairs without any foreign influence. Chinese Church leaders specifically emphasize that the Chinese Church should be a sovereign Church exercising full control over Chinese Catholics and that it should never become a colonial (missionary) church again.¹⁰⁹ Their resentment against foreign missionaries is further expressed by their explicit orders forbidding foreigners from interfering in their ecclesiastical affairs.¹¹⁰ Because of past humiliations, indignation,¹¹¹ and pressures from the Government's religious policy,¹¹² Chinese Church leaders seem to have declared a moratorium on future missionary activities in China.

¹⁰⁹See Bishop Tu Shihua's paper delivered in Montreal, on October 1981, "To Have an Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church is Our Sacred Right," in T. Chu and C. Lind ed., A New Beginning: An International Dialogue with the Chinese Church (Toronto: Canada China Programme of the Canadian Council of Churches, 1983), pp. 99-103.

¹¹⁰CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 17f. Article no. 36 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China forbids foreigners to dominate ecclesiastical affairs in China, in The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1983).

¹¹¹For example, see CCC, no. 3 (October 1981), pp. 17f.

¹¹²See chapter two, A. 2. -

However, with a broader understanding of mission, and a careful analysis of the situation of the Chinese Church, the possibility of a certain kind of mission work is still evident in the Chinese Church. Furthermore, this type of mission work would benefit both the Chinese Church and foreign churches. This subsection examines the mission work under the following topics: i. Broader vision of mission, ii. Needs of the Chinese Church, iii. "Bridge-building" mission, and iv. Benefits of this mission to other churches.¹¹³

i. Broader vision of mission

Mission in the first half of this century was a unilateral action. It was seen as a giving process from the "haves" to the "haves not", and from the superiors to the inferiors. Zealous missionaries, especially those with a sense of superiority, often failed to respect native clergymen and their local cultures. Hence, it is not surprising that Catholics in the Third World, may share with Chinese Catholics negative feelings towards missionaries.

During the past three decades, the concept of mission has undergone drastic transformation. It has changed from a unilateral giving to a bilateral exchange characterized by a mutual sharing of equal partners. Missionaries no longer think that they are in unique possession of the Christian truth and commissioned to distribute it to the local people from on high. Instead, they come to share their faith with the local people and, at the same time, to learn from them so that their faith may also be enriched. They regard themselves as partners serving the local church in the mission field upon invitation, but not

¹¹³Cf. Kim-Kwong Chan, "Mission to the Catholic Church in China," in Ecumenism, no. 80 (December 1985), pp. 24-28.

as agents from the home church directing and controlling the local church. In short, mission enterprise has become an affair of mutual sharing.

The Chinese Church has not experienced the change in this missiological concept due to its separation from the Universal Church for three decades. What Chinese Catholic leaders have in mind when they think about mission is most likely the old unilateral concept to which they vigorously object. However, they may not reject the bilateral concept of mission because it does not contradict the ecclesiological stand of the Chinese Church.

This concept of mission honors the sovereignty and the dignity of a local church by treating it as an equal partner. With this missiological attitude, missionaries approach local Catholics with a learning attitude. Furthermore, this bilateral concept promotes mutual sharing between the missionary-receiving church and the missionary-sending church, which, in turn, enhances the universality of the Universal Church.

ii. Needs of the Chinese Church

No local church is a totally receiving church, or a totally giving church. The process of "give-and-take" takes place in the communion of the Universal Church. Each local church is unique and situated in a particular context, therefore, each has its own contribution to make towards the enrichment of the Universal Church. A local church may require support from other churches to help it through its own difficulties and struggles. This fellowship among churches not only enhances the universality of the Church, but also reinforces the development of individual churches.

The Chinese Church has many needs. It has only slightly more than about one thousand elderly priests to provide pastoral care for more than three

million Catholics.¹¹⁴ The shortage of clergy is the most urgent problem. Other problems are the task of operating several major seminaries and restoring Catholic activities after more than a decade of disruption.¹¹⁵

Chinese Catholic leaders fully realize their needs and problems. Because of their sense of national dignity, coupled with their unpleasant experience with foreign missionaries in the past, they have declined help from missionaries and are determined to solve these problems by themselves.

However, the Chinese Church has needs which cannot be met by Chinese Catholics. The Chinese Church needs to catch up with the new theological developments, such as ecumenism, the new liturgies, and the post-Vatican changes. This "catching up" endeavour cannot be achieved solely by the Chinese Catholics themselves because the Chinese Church lacks resources to undertake this task. Thus, this is definitely an area where other churches can share with the Chinese Church. But this sharing is difficult because the Chinese Church does not have normal relationship with Rome.

One of the problems preventing the Chinese Church-Rome rapprochement is the lack of understanding and communication between these two parties. Rome and the Chinese Church have no direct channel of communication and they often rely on short press releases to respond to each other. These press releases often lead to misunderstandings and increase the tension of their

¹¹⁴J.-M. Bosc, "Chine: Deng corrige Mao," Peuples du Monde, no. 189 (January 1986), pp. 24f.

¹¹⁵M.G. Lau, "The Catholic Church in China Today," in CSPB, no. 29 (January 1986), pp. 42f.

relationship.¹¹⁶ The Chinese Church somehow perceives Rome as trying to regain its former paternalistic control over the Chinese Church, while Rome suspects that the Chinese Church rejects the papal primacy. Thus there is a definite need for a better channel of communication between these two parties.

iii. "Bridge-building" mission

For better and deeper understanding between Rome and the Chinese Church, a genuine and direct line of communication certainly needs to be established. However, both parties have their own difficulties. Chinese Catholics are very suspicious of foreigners, because of their past experience of isolation, humiliation and suffering. They are also sensitive about their ecclesial status and their treasured independence. Rome, with a long tradition and ecclesiastical prestige, tends to emphasize the canonical aspect of the question and perhaps reacts in too intransigent a manner.

Foreign churches can play an important role in bridging the gap between the Chinese Church and Rome.¹¹⁷ This mission of "bridge-building" is a task that requires patience and understanding. Through friendship, foreign Churches can share with the Chinese Church the recent changes that have taken place in the Universal Church. With a better understanding of the post-Vatican II ecclesiastical changes, the Chinese Church may reduce its suspicion and fear of Rome. Likewise, Rome, with a better understanding of the Chinese Church gained through other churches, may rely less on its in-house "Chinese experts" who may

¹¹⁶The misunderstanding between Rome and the Chinese Church is, in fact, the misunderstanding of a wider context: the different social milieus of China and the Western World. Cf. J. Spae, "Church and China: The Painful Dialogue," VSVD 21 (1980): 153.

¹¹⁷Lau, "Praxical Ecclesiology," p. 56.

perpetuate certain political and ecclesiastical interests, and adapt a more sympathetic and understanding attitude towards the Chinese Church.

This mission of "bridge-building" has been slowly and quietly taking place for a few years. Many, such as Cardinal Etchegaray of Marseilles, Cardinal König of Vienna, Cardinal Sin of the Philippines, Bishop Wu of Hong Kong, the five bishops from the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences, Mother Theresa of India, a team of Canadian Catholics, and three bishops from Italy, have responded to this mission and paid cordial visits to the Chinese Church.¹¹⁸

iv. Benefits of the mission

The mission of "bridge-building" benefits the participating churches. Foreign churches can learn about Chinese Catholics' struggles for their faith in their context, and about their search for a more relevant manifestation of faith. This experience of the Chinese Church will, indeed, stimulate foreign churches to be more aware of their own contextual expression of faith.

The Chinese Church, despite its poverty of material resources, has many specific contributions to make to the Universal Church. Its ecclesiology on the independence of a local church echoes the aspirations of the Third World churches. Its experience in China may provide a theological paradigm for ecclesial development in socialist regimes.¹¹⁹ Moreover, its ecclesial

¹¹⁸YIE, (February 1985), pp. 3f; Bulletin, no. 147 (May 1985), published by Mission Office of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops; A.S. Lazzarotto, "Following the Footsteps of Ricci," in Tripod, no. 31 (February 1986), pp. 86f.

¹¹⁹J.R. Schreiter suggested the "Theology of Presence" from the ecclesial experience of the Chinese Church, in his article "A Theology of Christian Presence in a Secular Society," in CN 24 (Winter 1985-1986): 378-382.

autonomy calls for the rethinking of many ecclesiological themes such as papal primacy, diversity in the manifestation of faith, and ecclesiastical authority.

Also, this mission of "bridge-building" brings healing to the Universal Church. The Chinese Church is part of the Roman Catholic Church. However, it is de facto separated from the Roman Catholic communion. This separation is painful to the Chinese Church as well as to other Roman Catholic local churches. Beyond praying, the one thing that other churches can do to reduce the pain and suffering is to join in the mission of bridging in which Pope John Paul II asked the Taiwan bishops to participate.¹²⁰

¹²⁰The Pope to Taiwan and the Chinese Diaspora: "Be a Bridge-Church," speech delivered to the bishops of Taiwan, 28 February 1984. For the full text, see OR (Eng.), 12 March 1984. For the response of the Church in Taiwan, see Commission for Evangelization, Chinese Catholic Bishops Conference, Let's Spread Christ's Gospel for the Salvation of Our Countrymen (Taipei: Window Press, 1984). (c)

CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to examine the theological implications of the Catholic Church in China from 1979 to 1983. The first part of this dissertation, chapter 2 to chapter 5, systemically analyses different ecclesial facets of the Chinese Church and theologically reflects on the ecclesial situation of the Chinese Church. The second part of this research, chapter 6, evaluates the ecclesial identity of the Chinese Church and discusses the theological contributions and ramifications of the Chinese Church.

The findings of this research suggest that the Catholic Church in China has presented itself as a unique ecclesial phenomenon whose existence has profound implications for ecclesiology, contextual theology, ecumenism, and missiology. This findings are further discussed here under the following headings: A. The Ecclesiology of the Chinese Church, B. The Theological Contributions, C. The Prospects on the Chinese Church, and D. Recommendations for Further Study.

A. THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF THE CHINESE CHURCH

A preliminary form of ecclesiology begins to emerge from the examination of the life of the Chinese Church. This ecclesiology is in the early stage of development and is far from being a comprehensive theological treatment on the nature of the Church. It only focuses on ecclesial issues

which are pertinent to the Chinese Church and even within this narrow scope it has yet to solve many of its theological problems. In fact, this ecclesiology is more an ecclesial identity as understood by Chinese Catholics from their experience in China, than a systematic analysis of the nature of the Church by Chinese theologians. Despite its crudity, it manifests many distinctive ecclesial features.

First, it is a praxical ecclesiology. Chinese Catholics have developed their ecclesiology from their concrete ecclesial experience, rather than from abstract theological principles. It is from their own experience, viz., praxis, that Chinese Catholics have arrived at their unique understanding of ecclesial themes, such as the Church and State relation, or the autonomy of the local church.

Secondly, it is a pragmatic ecclesiology. Chinese Church leaders heavily emphasize the pastoral concern of the laity. To provide pastoral ministry to the faithful is, in fact, the top ecclesiastical priority of the Chinese Church. Consequently, the pro-Government ecclesiological attitude was developed in order that the Chinese Church might gain maximal freedom to provide the badly needed pastoral ministry. The coexistence of pro-Government and pro-Roman Catholics, in some regions, is the result of the pragmatic needs of the faithful.

Thirdly, it is a contextual ecclesiology. The Chinese Church, in search of its social identity in China, affirms that it is an integral part of this society. This affirmation leads the Chinese Church to consider the Chinese sociopolitical context as a major locus theologicus in constructing its ecclesiology. Consequently, the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church reflects many distinctive characteristics of Chinese society, e.g. its ecclesial

independence reflects nationalism, the Catholic social responsibility reflects patriotism, the rejection of its missionary past reflects antiforeignism.

Fourthly, it is an ecclesiology of a particular local church. This ecclesiology has evolved out of the unique circumstance in which the Chinese Church finds itself. It is simply an ecclesiology which reflects a particular ecclesial understanding and identity. Although it may have ecclesiological ramifications, it is not meant to be universally applicable to all Third World churches, nor to be generalized as a model for the Universal Church.

Fifthly, it is a survival ecclesiology. Survival seems to be the predominant factor shaping the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church. Many ecclesial developments in the Chinese Church, such as the consecration of Chinese Bishops, achievement of ecclesial independence via the NAC, or the submission to civil authorities, seem to be means for the Chinese Church to survive in its sociopolitical reality.

Finally, it is not a schismatic ecclesiology. The evidence suggests that Chinese Church leaders have not developed "another" Church. Rather, they have tried hard to sustain a Roman Catholic identity in spite of some ecclesiastical irregularities. Furthermore, they seem to have no intention of departing from the Roman Catholic communion, and show a desire to establish physical ties with Rome. The misunderstanding of outsiders of the intentions of the leaders of the Chinese Church seems to have political and pastoral, rather than theological causes.

B. THEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The ecclesiology of the Chinese Church has profound implications for contextual theology, Third World theology, ecumenical dialogue, and local church ecclesiology. These contributions are summarized as follows.

First, the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church illustrates the need to develop a contextual ecclesiology in today's pluralistic World. Living in diverse societies with political, cultural, ideological, and economical concerns, each local church has to search for its own ecclesial manifestation in its unique context in order to be relevant. The example of the Chinese Church demonstrates this urgent need for contextual responses not only for the relevancy of faith but also for the survival of the Church. Had the Chinese Church not developed an ecclesiology appropriate to its context, it would have already disappeared from Chinese society.

Secondly, the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church may provide an ecclesiological paradigm for the Third World churches. Since the end of the Second World War, most of the Third World nations have experienced drastic social transformations--the process of decolonization, the emergence of nationalism, the desire for economic development, an attraction to socialism, and the search for a cultural and historical heritage--transformations which have also been experienced by China.

All these social transformations have greatly affected the Third World churches which have usually been characterized by missionary control, a foreign image, identification with a colonial power, and an imitation of Occidental ecclesial traditions. These churches have had to search for a new ecclesial identity in the midst of social transformations. Otherwise, they would have

been alienated from their contexts.

The ecclesiology of the Chinese Church is an excellent example of this ecclesial quest for a new ecclesial identity in the Third World.¹ Through its ecclesial experiences, the Chinese Church has been able to preserve the essence of Roman Catholicism, to coexist with an atheistic regime, and to integrate into the Chinese social fabric. At the same time, it also illustrates the potential danger of this development: pragmatism at the expense of faith.

Thirdly, the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church advocates a radical decentralization of the Universal Church. Currently the Universal Church experiences a structural tension between the centralization and the decentralization of ecclesiastical authority, viz., to what extent should Rome concede ecclesiastical authority to the local churches? The ecclesiology of the Chinese Church suggests that local churches should possess full authority to deal with internal matters and this should extend to the nomination of bishops. It strongly endorses a decentralized Universal Church and implies a model of Papacy with limited authority.

Fourthly, the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church is a significant case to test the current ecumenical dialogue for Christian unity. One of the major disagreements on the issue of Christian unity is the distribution of ecclesiastical authority. Protestant traditions tend to defend the autonomy of local churches or Christian traditions, while the Roman Catholic Church opts for a highly centralized Church authority. The Chinese Church is an

¹M.G. Lau proposed a "Suffering Servant" model for the Chinese Church, see her article, "The Catholic Church in China Today," in CSPB, no 29 (January 1986), pp. 37-43; J.R. Schreiter suggested a "Theology of Presence" for the Chinese Church, in his article, "A theology of Christian Presence in a Secular Society," in CN 24 (Winter 1985-1986): 378-382.

interesting model which, on the one hand, is a local church with de facto Roman Catholic identity, and on the other hand, it possesses full autonomy. If the Chinese Church and Rome were to arrive at some agreement about their relationship, this relationship would be an ecclesial precedent for an autonomous local church under the authority of Rome and would be an important ecclesial breakthrough on the ecumenical issue of ecclesiastical authority.

C. PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE CHURCH

Since the Chinese Church reemerged in 1979, Christians abroad are very interested in two prospects of the Chinese Church: the survival of the Chinese Church, and reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church. In fact, these two concerns dominate the current discussions of the Chinese Church.

This thesis takes an optimistic view towards both of the aforementioned prospects. This view is based on the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church, the sociopolitical development of China, and the ecclesiological trend of the Roman Catholic Church.

In the wider historical context of China, religion has always been under the control of the civil authority. Governmental control over religious matters has become an accepted social norm. All Chinese Governments assume that they have the authority to rule over religious affairs, and to exercise authority over religious groups including the Chinese Church.

The extent of religious control seems to depend on the Government's current political policy. Presently, the Chinese Government is following a pragmatic policy to stimulate economic prosperity. In line with this policy,

the Government has relaxed its religious control in exchange for the cooperation of religious groups in striving for economic development. Under this policy, the Chinese Church can enjoy a certain degree of freedom as long as it makes contributions towards this national goal.

The ecclesiology of the Chinese Church emphasizes nationalism and patriotism. These emphases enable the Chinese Church to submit to the civil authority, and to support social programs. Consequently, the Chinese Church is not an antagonistic organization against the Government, but one which can be used to further the Government interest.

In view of the wider historical context, the current political policy in China, and the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church, the Chinese Church seems to be stable in China. First, it is realistic to assume that the Church will always be under Government control. Secondly, as long as the Government adopts pragmatism as the national policy, and there is little reason to predict a change, the Government will continue to regard the Chinese Church as an important contributor to the nation. Thirdly, because the Chinese Church holds a pro-Government stand, it can gain Government acceptance.

Unless the Government makes a drastic shift to a Leftist policy, or the Chinese Church decides to suddenly turn against the government, and neither of these things is likely to happen, the Chinese Church will most likely be able to survive in China in the coming future.

There is also reasons to be optimistic about the reconciliation between the Chinese Church and Rome. Both Rome and the Chinese Church have expressed the desire for reconciliation and initiated moves to better the relationship. However, there are some seemingly insurmountable obstacles hindering the reconciliation.

One of the most difficult problems preventing the reconciliation is the political issue of Taiwan. This political issue had, in fact, been a major diplomatic problem between China and many Western nations in the 1970s. As both the Governments of Beijing and Taipei have gradually demonstrated a high degree of diplomatic flexibility on this issue, a number of diplomatic solutions have since been developed. These solutions have enabled many nations to establish full diplomatic ties with the Beijing Government, and at the same time, to retain a strong civil (cultural and commercial) bond with Taiwan. Technically speaking, the Taiwan situation is no longer an impossible diplomatic task. Therefore, the Vatican can, if it wants to, easily solve the Taiwan issue by following one of the existing diplomatic formulas.

In fact, the Vatican seems to be working towards a diplomatic solution by steadily downgrading its diplomatic presence in Taiwan. From the mid-1970s until 1985, the nunciature in Taiwan was staffed by only a charge d'affaires, the lowest ranking diplomatic representative. Recently, the Vatican even recalled the charge d'affaires without making a replacement. The nunciature in Taiwan is practically vacant. Presently, the Vatican is only a small step away from the formal termination of diplomatic ties with Taiwan. This decreasing diplomatic relation with Taiwan is significant for the future reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church.²

Another major obstacle is the basic disagreement between Rome and the Chinese Church about the ecclesiastical authority of the local church vis-à-vis the authority of Rome and the Pope. However there seems to be a growing trend

²Recent report suggested that Chinese Ambassadors no longer publicly avoid papal representatives in diplomatic gatherings, a possible friendly gesture of the Chinese Government towards the Vatican, see L. Ladany, "The Beijing-Rome Dialogue," in RCL 14 (Spring 1986): 101.

in the Catholic Church to stress the decentralization of ecclesiastical authority and the contextualization of ecclesiology in order to make local churches relevant in a pluralistic World. Furthermore, the growing interest in the ecumenical movement also favors the decentralization of ecclesiastical authority. In the light of these current theological developments, what the Chinese Church has suggested may no longer be a major polemic in the future.

Historically speaking, the reconciliation between Rome and the Chinese Church was impossible between the 1950s and the 1970s because the political, psychological, and the theological conditions for the reconciliation were not in place. However, the situation in the 1980s is far different from the past. In view of the present political, theological and emotional factors, there seems to be a readiness for this reconciliation.³ If both parties approach this issue with great sensitivity, patience, sincerity, and wisdom, the reconciliation will soon be attained.

³Recent events indicate a positive development on Rome-Chinese Church rapprochement, J.M. Calle, in his article "Some Thoughts to Better Understand the Present Situation of the Catholic Church in China Today," EAPR 23 (April 1986): 92, commented: "In spite of the old scars and certain symptoms of internal malaise, the overall impression is that the Chinese Catholics live today in a climate that slowly brings them closer to one another in view of greater pastoral collaboration, mutual support and Christian fellowship, even though by incidents of the past some may feel somehow apart. In other words, recent events show that they are seriously engaged in a renewed and consistent effort to remain ONE CHURCH, though their ecclesial communion may appear in different shades and with visible manifestations. And it is the responsibility of the whole Church that such an effort may not end in a conflicting impasse. Should this happen, the Church of the future will lament it, but it will be already too late."

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Due to the limited availability of sources on the Chinese Church, this research is restricted to a narrowly defined scope. Thus, its results are valid only within the defined parameter, viz., the ecclesiology of the Chinese Church as reflected in the published documents. There are still many facets of the Chinese Church not being published and revealed to researchers. Therefore, this research is only a small step towards the unfolding of the mystery of the Chinese Church. Hopefully, this step can lead to further research as suggested below.

Very little is known about the Chinese Catholics living in rural areas. They constitute the majority of the Chinese Catholic population, yet they receive very little attention from the media. The few scattered reports reveal that these Catholics demonstrate a vibrant and fervent Catholic spirituality despite their isolation, the lack of priests, and the absence of religious activities.

It would be interesting to uncover the spirituality these rural Catholics have developed in their ecclesial experience. This research might throw some light on the contextualization of Catholic faith in an Oriental agrarian society, the integration of Chinese religiosity with Catholicism, and transmission, development (and possibly mutation) of the faith in an isolated environment.

Very often rural Catholics live as a close knit social community in a village with a predominantly Catholic population. It would be interesting to compare the ecclesial dynamics of these rural Catholic communities with the basic ecclesial communities in South America or in Africa. Both types of rural

communities are built by grassroots Catholics. Such a comparative study might yield new insights into the ecclesial understanding of these grassroots communities.⁴

Many rural Catholic communities in China preserve their Catholic faith in spite of the absence of clergy. This phenomenon indicates the possible emergence of a lay ministry which has taken over some of the ministry of the priest. Furthermore, the involvement of the laity in active ministry may be an important factor contributing to the survival of the Chinese Church even under adverse conditions. A study of the role of laity in the Chinese Church might offer insights to the theology of laity.

It would also be interesting to look at the ecclesial phenomenon of the Chinese Church from the perspective of Chinese society to see how the Chinese people look at the Chinese Church. This vantage point of looking at the Chinese Church could provide valuable data on the social acceptance of an ecclesial community in its process of contextualization as a social minority. There is a danger of self-deception if the evaluation of contextualization is done solely from an ecclesial perspective. After all, an authentic contextualization should have some impact on society as well.

The Chinese Church has gone through a very unique ecclesial experience. This experience is a valuable datum for the better understanding of theological frontiers, such as contextual theology, oriental spirituality, basic community, Catholicism and Communism, the local church, Third World theology, and many

⁴Cf. J.G. Healey, "Evolving a New Model of Church: A Comparison of the Basic Christian Communities in Latin American and the Small Christian Communities in Eastern Africa," in VSVD 26 (1985): 211-226.

more.⁵ All these potential areas of research are limited by the lack of sources. When more sources revealing the experience of the Chinese Church become available to scholars, the theological contributions of the Chinese Church will be even more fruitful.

⁵Cf. A. Brennan and M.F. Loftus, The People's Republic of China and the Christian Church (Rome: A Mimeograph Prepared for Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, 1984), p. 40; also see Lau, "The Catholic Church in China Today," pp. 40ff.

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APPENDIX I

BISHOPS IN CHINA FROM 1978 TO 1985

C=member of the CBC
R=Rome appointed bishop
I=Chinese Independent Bishop

Name	Diocese, Province	C	R	I	Ele./Nom.	Cons.	Die
Cai Ti yuan	Shantou, Guangdong	x		x			27-09-81
Chang Shouyi	Xuanhua, Hebei	x		x			20-04-58
Chen Duqing	Ganzhou, Jiangxi	x		x			09-10-58
Chen Xizhong	Yibin, Sichuan	x		x	13-06-85	14-06-85	
Deng Jizhou	Jiading, Sichuan	x	x		09-06-49	21-09-49	
Deng Yiming	Guangzhou, Guangdong		x		01-10-50	13-02-50	
Dong Guangqing	Hankou, Hubei	x		x	19-03-58	13-04-58	
Duan Yinming	Wanxian, Sichuan	x	x		09-06-49	18-10-49	
Fan Dacjiang	Nanchong, Sichuan	x		x			07-04-63
Fan Wenxing	Hengshui, Hebei	x		x			20-12-81
Fan Xueyan	Baoding, Hebei		x		12-04-51	24-07-51	
Fang Zhigang	Wenzhou, Zhejiang	x		x	04-06-58		<1966
Fu Tieshan	Beijing, Autonomous	x		x	25-07-79	21-12-79	
Gong Pinmei	Shanghai, Autonomous		x		09-06-49	07-10-49	
Han Tingpi	Hongdong, Shanxi	x	x		18-04-50	09-06-50	
He Qunming	Kaifeng, Henan	x		x	7-04-58	21-06-62	
Huang Ziru	Xiamen, Fujian				22-01-85	NOT YET	

Name	Diocese, Province	C	R	I	Ele./Nom.	Cons.	Die
Ji Huairang	Xi'an, Shaanxi	x		x	02-02-58	18-12-81	
Jin Luxian	Shanghai, Autonomous	x		x	07-12-84	27-01-85	
Kang Yinnan	Jiangmen, Guangdong				17-06-58	NEVER	24-06-81
Kong Linzhong	Kunming, Yunnan	x		x	11-02-58	15-06-58	
Li Depei	Tianjin, Autonomous	x		x	1963	1963	
Li Panshi	Jiangmen, Guangdong	x		x		27-09-81	
Li Qingfeng	Fengxiang, Shaanxi		x			1981	
Li Shengxue	Hangzhong, Shaanxi	x		x		<1966	20-01-84
Li Shuren	Changsha, Hunan	x		x	23-10-58	26-10-58	
Li Side	Shanghai, Autonomous	x		x	07-12-84	27-01-85	
Li Xiting	Chengdu, Sichuan	x		x	16-12-57	16-07-58	
Li Xuesong	Jilin, Jilin	x		x	7-05-85	22-09-85	
Lin Quan	Fuzhou, Fujian	x		x	20-06-58	21-01-62	
Liu Dianci	Jilin, Jilin	x		x		10-10-82	04-04-85
Liu Dinghan	Cangzhou, Hebei	x		x		10-10-82	
Liu Jinghe	Tangshan, Hebei	x		x		20-12-81	
Liu Zongyu	Chongqing, Sichuan	x		x	19-12-81	21-12-81	
Ma Longlin	Suzhou, Jiangsu	x		x	04-07-81	24-07-81	
Pan Shauxing	Zhangjiakou, Hebei	x		x		20-04-58	05-02-83
Pi Shushi	Shenyang, Liaoning		x		26-07-49	11-10-49	16-05-78
Qian Huimin	Nanjing, Jiangsu	x		x	04-07-81	24-07-81	
Qian Yurong	Xuzhou, Jiangsu	x		x		15-11-59	
Shu Qishui	Ningbo, Zhejiang	x		x	30-06-58	<1966	<1983
Tu Shihua	Hanyang, Hubei	x		x	19-07-59	7-01-62	
Wang ?	Northern China		x			<1983	

Name	Diocese, Province	C	R	I	Ele./Nom.	Cons.	Die
Wang Qiwei	Baoding, Hebei	x		x	05-07-58	20-07-58	
Wang Ruihuan	Harbin, Heilungjiang	x		x	7-07-58	25-07-59	
Wang Weimin	Jilin, Jilin	x		x	26-05-58	31-05-59	
Wang Xueming	Hohhot, In. Mongolia	x	x		19-08-51	07-10-51	
Wu Guohan	Hangzhou, Zhejiang	x		x		<1966	
Xu Zhenjiang	Shenyang, Liaoning	x		x		24-07-81	22-06-84
Yang Gaojian	Changde, Hunan	x		x	23-10-58	26-10-58	
Ye Yinyun	Guangzhou, Guangdong	x		x	17-07-58	22-01-62	
Yu Chengcai	Haimen, Jiangsu	x		x	20-04-58	15-11-59	
Zhang Jiashu	Shanghai, Autonomous	x		x		03-05-60	
Zhang Kexing	Xiwanzi, In. Mongolia		x		03-11-49	24-03-51	
Zhang Mingqian	Yichang, Hubei	x		x		<1960	
Zhang Shizhi	Mindong, Fujian				22-01-85	NOT YET	
Zhang Xin	Taiyuan, Shanxi	x		x	7-10-81	18-12-81	
Zhao Jingnong	Tianshui, Gansu	x		x		24-07-81	
Zhao Yongming	Jizhou, Liaoning	x		x	18-06-58	25-06-58	
Zheng Wenbin	Dali, Shaanxi	x		x		24-07-81	
Zhong Huaide	Jinan, Shandong	x		x	7-02-58	01-06-58	
Zhou Weido	Fengxiang, Shaanxi		x		31-05-50	01-10-50	02-02-83
Zhou Yizhai	Bengbu, Anhui	x		x		<1960	22-10-83
Zhu Huayu	Bengbu, Anhui				26-10-83	NOT YET	
NO NAME	Hebei		x			<1982	<1982
NO NAME	Northern China		x			<1982	
NO NAME	Wenzhou, Zhejiang		x		<1980	NOT SURE	

APPENDIX II

SACRA CONGREGATIO PRO GENTIUM EVANGELIZATIONE SEU DE PROPAGANDA FIDE

FACULTATES ET PRIVILEGIA SACERDOTIBUS FIDELIBUSQUE IN TERRITORIO SINARUM DEAGENTIBUS CONCESSA HIS PERDURANTIBUS CIRCUMSTANTIIS

Prot. N. 3242/78

[Appendices not included]

I--DE BAPTISMO

- a) Sacerdotes possunt administrare Baptismi sacramentum formula breviori (Cfr. Appendicem).
- b) Sacerdotes possunt--absente episcopo--benedicere oleum catechumenorum formula breviori (Cfr. Appendicem).

II--DE CONFIRMATIONE

- a) Sacerdote possunt administrare Confirmationis sacramentum omnibus fidelibus, nulla habita ratione finium dioecesium, absente tamen aut longinque residente vel impeditio quocumque Episcopo legitimo.
- b) Minister ducit in fronte confirmandi signum crucis pollice chrismate intincto, dicens: "Accipe signaculum doni Spiritus Sancti."
- c) His perdurantibus circumstantiis, sacerdotes possunt--absente Episcopo--consecrare chrisma (ex oleo et materia odorifera confectum) formula breviori (Cfr. Appendicem).

III--DE EUCHARISTIA

- a) Sacerdotes possunt, urgente necessitate, Missam celebrare absque paramentis, sine lumine, absque ara, utendo vitro vel alio vaso ordinario, adhibendo pane triticeo etiam fermentato et vino ex vite vel, in casu penuriae, etiam "grape juice."⁽¹⁾
 - b) Sacerdotes possunt, urgente necessitate, uti tantum prece eucharistica secunda et etiam formula consecrationis solum.
 - c) Sacerdotes possunt celebrare quolibet in loco, dummodo decenti, non observato ieiunio et qualibet hora. Fideles possunt in iisdem circumstantiis communionem seu eucharistiam recipere.
 - d) Sacerdotes, ob rationes pastorales, possunt quovis die pluries litare. Monitis fidelibus, sacerdotes plures intentiones cum unica celebrationes possunt satisfacere, retenta sibi unica elemosina. Coeterae stipes vero, si adsunt, devolvi debent pro necessitatibus ecclesiae vel sacerdotum vel pauperum. Si vero non adsunt stipes, missae applicentur ad mentem Summi Pontificis vel pro necessitatibus ecclesiae. Idem valet etiam pro sacerdotibus qui pluries eodem die celebraverint.
 - e) Sacerdotes possunt fideles seligere qui, absente sacerdote, Eucharistiam aliis fidelibus distribuunt et qui SS. Sacramentum, si causa ferat, in loco non sacro at decenti ac tuto custodiant etiam sine lumine.
- (1) i.e. musto, scilicet vino nondum fermentato (Explicatio addita a S. Congr. pro Doctrina Fidei, Prot. n. 117/78 die 26 Junii 1978).

IV--DE POENITENTIA

- a) Sacerdotes, in comunione cum Ecclesia extantes, excipere valent confessionem omnium fidelium, nulla habita ratione finium dioecesium.
- b) Sacerdotes possunt absolvere a peccatis quibusvis et censuris quomolibet reservatis et notoriis--absente loci Ordinario. Quoad vero censuras specialissimo modo reservatas, imponenda est congrua poenitentia et satisfactio and normam canonis 2254,3 C.J.C., sub poena reincidentiae.
- c) Sacerdote possunt absolutionem generalem sive singulis sive collective impertiri, quando christifideles nequeant oraliter confiteri, manente tamen obligatione confitendi quam primum possibile erit.

V--DE UNCTIONE INFIRMORUM

- a) Sacerdotes, absente legitimo Ordinario, valent benedicere oleum infirmorum confectum ex quolibet semine vegetali.
- b) Christifideles, qui pietatis obiecto (crucifixo, cruce, corona, scapulari, numismate) a quolibet sacerdote rite (solo signo crucis) benedicto pie utuntur, consequuntur indulgentiam partialem.
- c) Christifidelibus in articulo mortis constitutis, dummodo rite dispositis, absente sacerdote, pia mater ecclesia concedit indulgentiam plenariam. Ad hanc acquirendam laudabiliter adhibetur crucifixus vel crux.

VI--DE MATRIMONIA

- a) In Synis, perdurantibus his circumstantiis, fideles non tenentur impedimentis iuris ecclesiasticis, a qua ecclesia dispensare solet, neque forma canonica. Sufficit consensus valide datus, laudabiliter coram duobus testibus.
- b) Sacerdotes omnes fidelium matrimoniis adsistere licite--in toto territorio Synarum--valent, etiam sine testibus, dummodo constet de statu libero et de absentia impedimenti cuiusvis naturalis et divini.
- c) Ministri seu lectores ac acolyti idem faciant in suo territorio. Omnes vero curent ut in matrimoniis mixtis cautiones pro posse serventur.
- d) Christifideles hortandi sunt ut matrimonium contrahant modo a lege civili statuto.
- e) Sacerdotes applicare possunt privilegium paulinum licite et valide etiam si altera pars novi coniugii non est baptizata, cautionibus servatis.

VII--DE ORDINE

- a) Nunc in ecclesia sacri ordines sunt: episcopatus, praesbyteratus et diaconatus. Sacra Ministeria sunt: lectoratus et acolytatus.
- b) Episcopi viros seligere valent prudentia et caritate insignes, firmos in fide et Petro fideles, sana doctrina catholica pollentes--etsi institutio theologica non fuerit omnimodo absoluta--virtute praestantes et ad statum coelibatus servandum paratos, ut ii recipiant sacerdotium ad servitium ecclesiae et christifidelium.

- c) Episcopi fideles viros prudentes et christianae legis studiosos eligere valent in lectores et acolythos ad praedicandum evangelium, ad praesidendum coadunationibus christianis, ad baptizandum et matrimonio ad assistendum necnon ad christianis sepulturam ecclesiasticam procurandam.
- d) Memores antecessorum suorum, episcopi ac sacerdotes solliciti sint, ut iuvenes ac qui maturioris aetatis viri ad ministeria divina sese vocatos aestiment prudenter verbo opereque adiuventur ac debite praeparentur.

VIII--DE IEIUNIO ABSTINENTIA AC REQUIES FESTIVA

Ieiunum, abstinentia necnon requies festiva observentur tantummodo si possibile erit.

IX--MISCELLANEA.

- a) In matrimoniis mixtis, sacerdotes curam habeant de cautionibus tantum.
- b) In applicatione privilegi paulini, si novum coniugium est mixtum, sacerdotes curent tantum de cautionibus.
- c) In matrimonio rato et non consummato spectat ad episcopum eiusque delegatum conficere processiculum mittendum ad Sanctam Sedem.
- d) Impedimentum consanguineitatis secundi gradus lineae collateralis in Synis est suspensum quia est ecclesiasticum.
- e) De indulgentiis pro obiectis benedictis a sacerdote dictum es. in V, b.
- f) De celebratione missae et de elemosinis dictum est in V, c. et d.
- g) De reconciliatione apostatae et eius qui attentaverit matrimonium (sacerdotis): a) in periculo mortis, cfr. Can. 2252; b) extra periculum mortis, cfr. IV, b et Can. 2254,3.
- h) De reductione ad statum laicalem [] episcopus adeat ad Sanctam Sedem.

MONITUM

His facultatibus quisque utatur pro prudenti arbitrio et conscientia et, si Ordinarius adiri possit, de eius consensu.

Hoc valet specialiter pro facultate sub numero III, c. et d, quae uti debet magna cum prudentia ut in materia tam delicata omnes abusus accurate vitentur.

Datum Romae, ex Aedibus Sacrae Congregationis pro Gentium Evangelizatione, seu de Propaganda Fide, die XXVII mensis Junii A.D. MCMLXXVIII.

Agnellus Card. Rossi, Praef.
D. S. Lourduamy, Secr.

Concordat cum originali

Osvaldo Pisani. P.I.M.E.

Cancellarius

Curiae Dioecesanæ Sciamchiamensis

APPENDIX III

THE CONSECRATION OF A BISHOP: LITURGY AND EXPLANATION

[Page numbers refer to original document, my translation]

A. Pages 3-4.

In the Holy Catholic Church, the bishop is the direct successor of the Apostle. He is the true leader of the Church and the ruler of the diocese with full authority. Therefore he is called the head shepherd.

According to the tradition of the Holy Catholic Church, the newly elected bishop has to receive his consecration within a certain period of time. The consecration ceremony has to take place within a mass officiated over by a consecrator bishop who officiates at both the mass and the consecration.

Before the consecration ceremony, the consecrator bishop enters the cathedral with the procession party following this order: the Processional Big Cross, Candle holders, altar boys, priests, new bishop(s), co-consecrator bishops, consecrator bishop. While the procession party is entering the cathedral, the church bell should ring and the choir should begin to sing the hymn. The hymn says, "Behold, this is the high priest who pleases God. God exults him among the people and bestows on him the blessings of all people." The consecrator bishop then blesses the crowd. After the consecrator bishop enters the cathedral, he first worships the Host at the side altar and then

walks to the main altar to prepare for the consecration ceremony.

After the consecrator bishop approaches the main altar, he first has a moment of prayer, then puts on his vestments. The new bishop also puts on his vestment. Afterwards, the new bishop and the co-consecrator bishops stand in front of the consecrator bishop. The new bishop gives a deep bow, and the co-consecrator bishops make a nod of respect.

All then take their seats in accordance with the instructions of the Master of Ceremony. The new bishop sits opposite the consecrator bishop. Co-consecrator bishops sit next to the consecrator bishop (older ones on the left and younger ones on the right).

(1) Beginning of the consecration liturgy

1. After all have sat down, the new bishop and co-consecrator bishops remove their mitres and stand up. The oldest of the co-consecrator bishops walks to the consecrator bishop and says:

"Most honorable Bishop, Holy mother Church requests you to consecrate this priest, who is standing in front of you, bishop."

The consecrator bishop says:

"Is he elected and supported by the clergy and laity?"

The co-consecrator bishop replies:

"Yes."

Consecrator bishop says:

"Please announce the election procedure."

The diocesan secretary reads: ,

"Most honorable Bishop,

According to the traditional evangelical spirit of the Apostles and the

traditional spirit of how Jesus Christ established the Church, and according to the ecclesial principle of an Independent, Self-ruled and Self-managed Church, all the clergy (Brothers, Sisters, and Laymen) of our _____ Diocese, altogether _____ people, democratically elected Father _____ on the _____ day of the _____ month in the _____ year, as the rightful bishop of the _____ Diocese. We, the clergy and the laity of the _____ Diocese unanimously request you, most honorable Bishop, to consecrate him bishop."

Consecrator Bishop:

"Thank be to God."

B. Pages 5-7.

(2) Examen

2. The consecrator bishop explains the traditional spirit of the Church to the new bishop: namely, the episcopal candidate has to be carefully examined in order to ensure that he can take up the heavy burden of the episcopal office. Then the consecrator bishop asks the new bishop questions about the episcopal duties and the basic doctrines of the Church. The new bishop must respond positively on these questions.

Afterward, the consecrator bishop puts on his mitre and proclaims the questions. Co-consecrator bishops also put on their mitres and say:

"According to the regulation of the Holy Catholic Church, all elected episcopal candidates must be carefully examined; because the Apostle St Paul said not to consecrate anyone hastily. Furthermore, the Holy Catholic Church must also teach the new bishop how he should live in the Church of God after he receives the episcopal authority and duty. Also the Church requests that the

consecrator bishop should be blameless."

[Consecrator bishop] "Dear brother, from my sincere love, and the aforementioned authority and command, I ask you:"

[1] Question: "Are you willing to be detached from all control of the Roman Curia, and to insist on the ecclesial principle of Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Government?"

Answer: "I am willing."

[2] Question: "Are you willing to teach the truth received from the Bible to your clergy and laity through words and deeds ?"

Answer: "I am willing."

[3] Question: "Are you willing to depend on the grace of God, to keep poverty and celibacy, and to teach others as well ?"

Answer: "I am willing."

[4] Question: "Are you willing to concentrate on the ministry of God with all your human effort ?"

Answer: "I am willing."

[5] Question: "Are you willing to cultivate the virtues of humility and kindness, and to teach other as well ?"

Answer: "I am willing."

[Question no. 6 to no. 12 are not included here]

[13] Question: "Do you believe the Old Testament and the New Testament are inspired by the One and the Almighty God ?"

Answer: "I believe."

[14] Question: "Are you willing to rule the Catholic Church of _____ with the principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church?"

Answer: "I am willing."

APPENDIX III

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Finally, the consecrator bishop says, "My most beloved brother, may God increase your faith by his eternal blessing." Then the new bishop kisses the hand of the consecrator bishop as a sign of respect and gratitude.

C. Attachment. [Immediately following page 16]

Oath Of The New Bishop

I, _____, Christian name _____, through the wisdom of the Divine Providence and the blessing of the Holy Spirit, in accordance to the historical tradition of the Holy Church for the election of bishop, was elected as the Bishop of the _____ Diocese, on the _____ day of the _____ month in the year _____. I consider myself as unworthy for this office. Since God has called me with His grace, I humbly accept. Calling God to witness, I place my hand on the Bible and swear:

I willingly observe all the Commandment of God, firmly believe the Bible and the dogmas of the faith. I guarantee that I follow the teaching of the Apostles, viz. "Be subject to the civil authorities and obey what they order." Placing all my confidence in the help of divine grace, I will actively lead all the clergy and laity of my diocese to obey the Government and to observe the laws. With the support and the supervision of the clergy and laity of my diocese, I will carry out my duty as bishop, diligently cultivating virtue, doing good and avoiding evil. In accordance with the holy teaching of Jesus Christ, viz. "Blessed are the peacemakers," I am willing to lead all the priests, religious men and women, and laity of my diocese to unite with the people of the whole country, to safeguard the unity of the nation and the

security of society, and to contribute towards the prosperity for our motherland. I will carry-out the wishes of all the-priests and laity in insisting on the principle of an Independent, Self-ruled, and Self-managed Church, after the example of the Apostles, making the Church of _____ prosper, for the glory of God and the salvation of souls. For this, I offer my whole life.

I swear to the above.

Swearer [Signature] : ,

APPENDIX IV

A SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA FROM 1946 TO 1977

1. General Social Background of China in Early 1950s

Since the middle of the 19th Century, China has suffered heavily from exploitation by the West. Many unequal treaties were forced upon China by imperialistic powers. Foreigners, merchants, and missionaries were granted privileges and special rights which they occasionally abused to serve their interests.¹ This state of affairs caused a strong reaction against foreign interference to develop in China.²

Following the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese Government tried to affirm the national identity of Chinese institutions. This included religious organizations. Various Christian churches and organizations, bearing a strong foreign image, were asked to cut themselves free from foreign missionary aid and to support the Government's

¹J. Schütte, Die Katholische Chinamission im Spiegel der rotchinesischen Presse, Missionswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Texte, Vol. 21, (Münster, Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1957), p. 179.

²For a more detailed treatment of the origin of antiforeignism against missionaries in contemporary Chinese history, see P. A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Anti-Missionary Movement and The Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

various programs aimed at constructing a socialist and nationalistic regime.³

With the outbreak of the Korean War, China went to war against the Western nations. The Chinese Government feared and suspected that foreigners might sabotage China by serving as agents for their respective countries. With this xenophobic mentality, China began to expel foreigners under the pretext of state security. All missionaries were deported as spies or as agents serving imperialist aggression.⁴

2. The Chinese Church: 1946-1965

The establishment of the hierarchy of the Chinese Church in 1946 officially terminated the missionary status of the Church in China.⁵ However, the Chinese Church was still controlled by foreigners in 1949. One hundred and fourteen of the one hundred and forty ordinaries, sixteen of the twenty archbishops, and more than half of the five thousand and five hundred priests were foreigners.⁶ Above all, the Inter-Nuncio Archbishop Riberi considered himself primate of the Chinese Church. In 1947, he replaced the Synod

³"A True Realization of the Questions of the Catholic and Protestant Churches," in Renmin Ribao, 20 November 1950.

⁴The Chinese Government regarded the Catholic missionaries as agents who, under the cloak of religion, served the Western imperialistic powers. For example, see "The Espionage Activities undertaken by the Imperialist Missionaries in China," Renmin Ribao, 6 September 1951; "The Catholic Central Bureau--the Tool of the Imperialist Riberi," Renmin Ribao, 17 June 1951; "The Secret Reactionary Organization in the Catholic Church," Renmin Ribao, 5 July 1951.

⁵"Quotidie nos," in AAS 38 (1946): 301-313.

⁶See Agenzia Internazionale 'Fides,' Le missioni cattoliche dipendenti dalla Sacra congregazione 'De propaganda fide' (Rome: P. Opera della propagazione della feda, 1950), pp. 288-295.

Commission⁷ with the Catholic Central Bureau through which he controlled the Chinese Church and issued orders to various ordinaries in China.⁸

Besides bearing a strong foreign image, the Chinese Church also took an anti-Communist stand.⁹ Following directives from Rome, Riberi issued many orders to Chinese Catholics prohibiting them from associating with the Communist Chinese Government,¹⁰ joining the army to fight in the Korean War, participating in social programs, attending Government-run schools, joining the unions, or reading the Government's newspapers and literature.¹¹

These ecclesiastical actions to control the Chinese Church by various orders and decrees¹² were interpreted by the Chinese Government as an imperialistic intrusion into the sovereignty of China and a reactionary act to sabotage China. Chinese Catholics were caught in a dilemma: either to obey the order of the Church to undermine the building up of the new Chinese nation and run the risk of committing treason, or to follow the direction of the Government in joining in the socialist construction of the new nation and run the risk of being excommunicated by the Church. Catholics were torn between the Church and their own country and were forced to choose one or the other.

⁷L.T.S. Wei, Le Saint Siège et la Chine de Pie XI à nos jours (Paris: Edition A. Allais, 1968), p.147.

⁸Ibid., p. 387, note 273.

⁹For example, see "Divini Redemptorisi," encyclical by Pius XI, in AAS 29 (1937): 65-105.

¹⁰"The Crimes of Riberi," Dagong Bao, 6 September 1951. Cf. AAS (1949): 334.

¹¹"Tianjin City Public Security Office Discusses the Crime of the Imperialist Bishop Jean de Vienne," in Renmin Ribao, 29 October 1951.

¹²For example, see the decree from the Holy Office dated July 1, 1949 in AAS 41 (1949): 334; also the monitum in AAS 42 (1950): 553.

On November 30, 1950 a group of Catholics in Guangyuan of Northern Sichuan issued a declaration sponsoring a movement of "Self-Support and Reform" in the Church.¹³ This declaration, in response to rapid social and political changes in China, called for a "Three-Self" Principle in the Chinese Church: Self-Support, Self-Administration, and Self-Propagation.¹⁴ It was immediately denounced by Riberi.¹⁵ In the following year, a Chinese Vicar General, Li Weiguang, issued a statement calling for the autonomy of the Chinese Church and the termination of foreign (Vatican) intervention in Chinese internal affairs.¹⁶ Riberi, once again, condemned this statement and threatened to punish those who followed such a movement with excommunication.¹⁷ Similarly, other initial attempts to reform the Church did not succeed because the Chinese Church was still tightly controlled by foreign missionaries and by Chinese clergy who were loyal to them.

After the massive departure of foreign missionaries among whom were more than one hundred ordinaries between 1950-1954, the burden of running the

¹³NCNA, 13 December 1950; ET see CMBA III (IV) (February 1951): 149-150.

¹⁴On May 1950, some Chinese Protestant leaders issued a manifesto calling for "Three-Self Principle": self-administration, self-support, and self-propagation; it was commonly known as the "Three-Self Movement." See DTSM pp. 19-20. Though the Catholics, in the Guangyuan declaration as well as many subsequent Catholic declarations, propagated the same "Three-Self Principle" as the protestants did, they did not use the term "Three-Self Movement." They used the terms "Self-Support and Reform Movement" or "Autonomous Movement," and later, the term "Patriotic Movement."

¹⁵J. Lefevre, Shanghai: les enfants dans la ville (Paris: Casterman, 1966), p. 57.

¹⁶Wei, p.155.

¹⁷Riberi referred to the excommunication decree issued by the Holy Office in AAS 42 (1951): 601-602.

Chinese Church rested upon the shoulders of a few Chinese bishops. During this time, Pope Pius XII issued two encyclical letters (Cupimus imprimis in 1952 and Ad Sinarum gentes in 1954)¹⁸ to Chinese Catholics to encourage them to be loyal to the Pope and to condemn any autonomous movement within the Chinese Church. These two encyclical letters, along with some other decrees, widened the gap between Chinese Catholics and the new Chinese social reality. Chinese Catholics were caught more sharply on the horns of their dilemma as the antagonism between Rome and the Chinese Government increased.

In July 1955, the Government launched a nationwide Anti-Counterrevolutionary campaign to suppress the noncooperative political elements. Catholics who followed orders from Rome were targets purged by this campaign.¹⁹ In September 1955, Bishop Gong Pinmei of Shanghai²⁰ was the first major Catholic leader to be arrested as a "counterrevolutionary" element hidden in the Catholic Church. The arrest of other Catholic personages followed all over China.²¹

The incarcerated Catholic leaders were replaced by Catholics who held a

¹⁸"Cupimus imprimis," in AAS 44 (1952): 153-158; and "Ad Sinarum gentem," in AAS 47 (1955): 5-14. The latter was issued in 1954.

¹⁹Not only Catholics but Protestants, too, were oppressed during this political campaign. For example, on October, 1955, the Government arrested a few thousand members of the "Little Flock," a Protestant sect which had been founded by Witchman Nee in 1935, see Lu Shan "From 'The Scandal of the Church' to Look at the Secret Organization Which Plots to Seize the Properties of the Church," part II, Nanbeizi, 16 February 1973, pp. 45f.

²⁰Shanghai Xinwen Ribao, 2 August 1955.

²¹For example, the Province of Shanxi, see Transcript of Shanxi PBS, 19 October 1955, in URJA; the Province of Hubei, see Changjiang Ribao, 29 October 1955; or the Province of Guangxi, see Guangxi Ribao, 24 December 1955. Cf. J. Liu [Micheal Yeung], Inside China: Experience of a Chinese Catholic (Hong Kong: Privately Published, 1981), passim; see also ZE, no. 9 (July 1985), pp. 16f.

more sympathetic attitude toward the Government.²² Gradually, many Chinese ordinaries who were spared from the Anti-Counterrevolutionary Campaign changed their attitude and supported the Government.²³ By mid-1956, with the increasing number of the pro-Government church leaders, the Government felt confident enough to allow Chinese Church leaders to plan for the future of the Chinese Church.

In June 1957, two hundred and forty Catholic delegates from one hundred and four dioceses or apostolic prefectures as well as officials from the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) and the United Front Work Department (UFWD)²⁴ met in Beijing to form the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CPCA).²⁵ This organization recognized the Pope's spiritual authority, but not his commands which bore a "counterrevolutionary" purpose and were harmful to Chinese society.²⁶ As the CPCA established branches in various dioceses and parishes, Catholics were divided into two factions: those who joined the CPCA--the Patriotic Catholics, and those who did not--the Rome Loyalists.

Because of the expulsion of the foreign bishops and the lack of new appointments from Rome, most of the diocesan Sees were vacant. Even though Rome managed to appoint a few Chinese bishops and pro-bishops, most of these

²²For example, after the arrest of pro-Bishop Msgr. Huang Heiren, the Fuzhou Archdiocese elected a pro-Government priest Lin Quan (later consecrated as bishop) as the administrator of that See, L. Triviére, Catholic Church in Mainland China (Hong Kong: Privately Published Mimeograph, 1959), p. 62.

²³Such as Bishop Wang Wencheng, see Guangming Ribao, 8 January 1956; or Bishop Li Poyu, see Shaanxi Ribao, 6 April 1956.

²⁴RAB and UFWD are two Government organizations that deal with religious affairs. Their relationship with the Chinese Church is discussed in chapter one.

²⁵Renmin Ribao, 3 August 1957.

²⁶For full text of the Resolution, see Dagong Bao, 4 August 1957.

prelates were eventually jailed because of their loyalty to Rome. Some dioceses began to hold episcopal elections in 1957²⁷ and tried to get ratification from Rome. Rome rejected these elected episcopal candidates and threatened them with excommunication.²⁸

Despite Rome's disapproval, the Chinese Church went ahead with the episcopal consecrations. The first consecration took place in April, 1958.²⁹ By 1965, more than fifty Independent Bishops had been consecrated in China without Rome's permission.³⁰

In 1958, Pope Pius XII issued an encyclical letter (Ad Apostolorum principis) to Chinese Catholics.³¹ This encyclical letter condemned the CPCA as a schismatic and rebellious church. It rejected the illicit consecrations and urged Catholics loyal to the Pope to act against the CPCA. The gap between the Patriotic and Rome Loyalist Catholics was further widened by this encyclical letter. It also terminated the physical relationship between the Chinese Church and the Universal Church.

Little is known about the Chinese Church during the period from 1959 to

²⁷The first episcopal election was held on December 16, 1957 in Chengdu, see Sichuan Ribao, 18 December 1957.

²⁸See AIF, no. 1376 (3 May 1958), pp. 151-152; see also the decree of excommunication issued in 1951, AAS 43 (1951): 217-218; and PDRNC, p. 48.

²⁹The two newly consecrated bishops were Bernardin Tung Guangqin of Hankou and Marc Yu Wenhua of Wuchang. Bishop Tung is still (1986) alive and actively involved in the present work of the Chinese Church.

³⁰Wei (p.279-281) had a list of more than 40 names; however the Chinese source, CCC, no. 1 (Nov. 1980), p. 56, mentioned that more than 50 Chinese bishops had been consecrated, but did not provide a list.

³¹"Ad Apostolorum principis," in AAS 50 (1958): 601-614.

1966.³² The CPCA held its second national conference in 1962. It was similar to the first one in content.³³ Bishop Gong Pinmei and Bishop J. Walsh were tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for committing crimes of espionage and antirevolutionary activities.³⁴ There were also reports of some consecrations of Independent Bishops in 1959 and in 1962,³⁵ and ordinations of priests even as late as 1965.³⁶ The Government also launched attacks to the Vatican during the Anti-Religious-Superstition campaign in 1963.³⁷

3. The Chinese Church: 1966-1977

In 1966, Mao Zedong who believed that continuous revolution was

³² There is not a single bit of news about the Catholic Church in the Chinese media in 1961, Communist China 1961, 2 vols (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962), I: 99. In 1964, news concerning Catholic activities almost totally disappeared from the Chinese press, Communist China 1964, 2 vols (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), II: 5.

³³ Guangming Ribao, 20 January 1962.

³⁴ Bishop Walsh was released in 1970 as a goodwill political gesture on the part of the Chinese Government to foster the relationship with the United States. Bishop Gong received parole in July 1985, see Wenhui Bao (S), 4 July 1985.

³⁵ Heilungjiang Ribao, 25 July 1959; ET CBA no. 610 (January 1960), p. 8. Zhongguo Xinwen, 22 January 1962.

³⁶ Fr. Paul Guo Zhong of Inner Mongolia was ordained in 1965, in T. Chu, China Trip 1983 (Toronto: Privately Circulated Mimeograph, 1983), p.5; also F. Pardinias in "A Visit to Red China," in Worldmission 17 (Fall 1966): 64, mentioned that a few priests had been ordained in 1965.

³⁷ The Chinese media attacked the Pope as "a worshipper of Satan, a landlord of the Middle Age, a protector of Hitler and Mussolini, and a tool for the U.S. promotion of the peace strategy." The authorities also accused the Vatican of conspiring with the U.S. to carry out infiltration and subversive activities in the Socialist Countries, thus reducing itself to an accomplice of neo-colonialism. See Yangcheng Wanbao, 19 May 1963, and Guangming Ribao, 6 December 1963. ET Communist China 1963, 2 vols (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1964), II: 29.

necessary to prevent elitism and to regroup classes within the social structure, launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1977).³⁸

During this time schools were closed, intellectuals and religious believers were persecuted, the Party (CCP) was decimated, and industrial production deteriorated as factory workers engaged in "class struggle".³⁹ Church leaders were arrested and sent to farms or factories for "Labor-reform."⁴⁰ Church buildings were converted into schools, factories, or warehouses, and almost all public religious activities were banned.⁴¹ The only visible Catholic activity was conducted at the Nan Tang Cathedral which was reopened in 1971 to serve the diplomatic corps in Beijing.⁴² The Chinese Church seemed to disappear totally during this period.

³⁸Hua Guofeng, "Political Report to the Eleventh Party Congress, August 1977," in Hongqi no. 313, (September 1977), p. 16.

³⁹N. Fenn, "An Asian Team Visits China," in Youth (Geneva) 8 (September 1984): 6.

⁴⁰The Chinese Communists believe that one's political attitude can be changed from reactionary to revolutionary through labor. Hence, labor is employed as a mean to educate those who are considered to be politically backward. For a comprehensive explanation on "Labor-reform," see Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China: An Amnesty International Report (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1978), pp. 73-148.

⁴¹There was an exception: Chinese Moslems were allowed to celebrate some of their religious festivals, in assigned locations throughout the entire period of the Cultural Revolution, see SCMP, no. 3907 (March 1967), p. 20; SCMP 4559 (December 1969), p. 12; or SCMP, no. 5025 (November 1971), p. 136.

⁴²This Church is sometimes referred to as The Cathedral of Immaculate Conception or the Xuan Wu Cathedral. G. Zizola, "Sur invitation des autorités pour la première fois depuis cinq ans un occidental assiste à la messe à Pékin," in ICI no. 398 (15 December 1971), pp. 3-5. For a slightly different account, see Wei Xiutang, "In a Catholic Church in Beijing," in CR 29 (January 1980): 48-50.

APPENDIX V

THE POPE SPEAKS TO THE CHINESE CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES OF ASIA

Dear brothers and sisters in Christ,

I find it very significant and important to have the opportunity to say a brief word to Chinese Christians during my pastoral visit to Asia. I greet in a particular way Archbishop Matthew Kia and the other Bishops accompanying him, who have honoured me with their presence during my pastoral visit to the Philippines. Most sincerely I thank you for coming as the representatives of the Christians of Overseas Chinese Communities to meet me here in Manila. Some of you have lived for generations in the Philippines or in other Asian countries; others have come here more recently. I know that it is your desire to be fully integrated into the life of the country where you live, and to contribute by your work, as good citizens, to the prosperity of the nation that is now your home. At the same time you wish to remain united in spirit with your relatives and friends in China. You wish to preserve the traditional Chinese moral values and culture that link you to your families' country of origin, the country you will always love dearly and to the progress of which you are willing to offer all the help desired.

You are also members of the local Church communities. These strengthen your commitment to Christ, and imbue you with the same Christian spirit that has been, in the past, the hallmark of the Chinese Christian communities in various countries of the world. Famous people in Chinese history have encountered Christ and have become Christians through the contact they had with those fervent and dynamic communities. If you maintain that spirit, if you live inspired by the Christian faith and strengthened by the specifically Chinese moral traditions, you will in a profound way be truly Christian and truly Chinese, and contribute to the richness of the whole Church.

Through you who are present here, I now wish to reach out to all who are in China and to greet, with joy and affection, all my brothers and sisters in Christ who live in that vast land.

I, John Paul II, Bishop of Rome and Successor of Peter, greet you in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, my dear brothers and sisters in China. On my first pastoral visit to Asia I shall meet with the Bishops, clergy, religious and laity of the Church in the Philippines and in Japan, in order to speak to them about the merciful love of God, to proclaim the name of Jesus, «for there is no other name under heaven given by which we must be saved» (Acts 4:12), and to encourage them to witness to the Gospel. Travelling so close to the borders of your country, I also wanted to speak to you, for across the distances that separate us we are all united «in the name of the Lord Jesus» (Col 3:12). Ever since God's providence in its mysterious ways called me from my native Poland to the See of Peter in Rome, I have ardently desired to express my affection and esteem to all my brothers and sisters of the Church in China, and to praise the Lord in the great things that he has wrought in the hearts of those who profess his name in the cities and villages of your immense land.

The Spirit of the Lord is at work in all peoples and nations, and to this Spirit I have wanted to bear witness by making it the special goal of my pilgrimage to Asia to honour the Martyrs of Nagasaki. Through them I pay homage to all the men and women in Asia who have offered up their lives for the name of Jesus, giving proof thereby that the Gospel of Christ and his Church are not alien to any people or any nation but that they live in the hearts and in the minds of the people of all races and nations around the world. And so, in greeting you, I make my own the words of the Apostle Paul in his letter to the Church in Rome: « First I thank my God through Jesus Christ for all of you and for the way in which your faith is spoken of all over the world... I am longing to see you either to strengthen you by sharing a spiritual gift with you, or what is better, to find encouragement among you from our common faith » (Rom 1:8, 11-12).

Through my humble words, I also want to express my esteem for your great country. Your country is great indeed, not only in terms of geographical extension and population, but especially because of its history, the wealth of its culture, and the moral values that the people have cultivated all through the ages. The Jesuit, Father Matteo Ricci, understood and appreciated Chinese culture fully from the beginning and his example should serve as an inspiration to many. Others, at times, did not show the same understanding. But whatever difficulties there may have been, they belong to the past, and now it is the future that we have to look to.

Your country is indeed devoting all its energies to the future. It wishes to ensure, through scientific and technological development, and through the industrious collaboration of all its people, that its citizens can live in true happiness. I am convinced that every Catholic within your frontiers will fully contribute to the building up of China, since a genuine and faithful Christian is also a genuine and good citizen. A Christian — in any country of the world — is faithful to God, but he also has a deep sense of duty and of love towards his native land and his own people. He respects the things of the spirit and at the same time he consecrates his talent and skills to the common good. A good Chinese Catholic works loyally for the progress of the nation, observes the obligations of filial piety towards parents, family and country. Strengthened by the Gospel message, he will cultivate, like all good Chinese, the « five main virtues » of charity, justice, temperance, prudence and fidelity.

The Church seeks to respect the traditions and cultural values of every people, following what Saint Paul said when he entreated the early Christians of Philippi to treasure « whatever is true, whatever is honourable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious » (Phil 4:8). From earliest times, the Church has learned to express the truth of Christ through the help of ideas and in the culture of various peoples, because the message that she preaches is intended for all peoples and nations. The Christian message is not the exclusive property of any one group or race; it is addressed to everyone and belongs to everyone. There is therefore no opposition or incompatibility in being at the same time truly Christian and authentically Chinese.

In proclaiming Jesus Christ as the eternal Son of God and Saviour of the world, the Church has no other aim than to be faithful to the mission entrusted to her by her Divine Founder. She has no political or economic goals; she has no worldly mission. She wants to be, in China as in any other country, the herald of the kingdom of God. She desires no privileges, but only that all those who follow Christ may be able to express their faith freely and publicly and to live according to their consciences.

Christ came to serve and to bear witness to the truth. In the same spirit the Church will offer her contribution to fostering human brotherhood and the dignity of every human being. She therefore encourages her members to be good Christians and exemplary citizens dedicated to the common good and to the service of their fellowman, and collaborating through their personal efforts to the progress of their country.

All this I say to you, dear brothers and sisters, because I feel so near to you. The course of history, shaped by human decisions, has been such that for many years we have not been able to have contact with each other. Very little was known about you, your joys, your hopes, and also your sufferings. Recently however, from various parts of your immense land, information about you has reached me. But in those long years you have undoubtedly lived through other experiences which are still unknown, and at times you will have wondered in your consciences what was the right thing for you to do. For those who have never had such experiences it is difficult to appreciate fully such situations. Yet, I want you to know that, all through this period and up to the present day, I, and the universal Church with me, have been with you in thought, in prayer, in genuine brotherly love and in pastoral concern. I place my trust in your faith and in the Lord who promised: « Do not be anxious how you are to speak or what you are to say, for what you are to say will be given to you in that hour » (Mt 10:19). If you remain united with the Lord in faith and prayer he will strengthen and guide you.

I also wish to express my deep admiration of the testimonies of heroic faith that many of you have shown and are still showing today. The whole Church is proud of you and feels strengthened through your witness. At the same time she hopes that you in your turn have been strengthened by her continuous prayer and communion in our Lord Jesus Christ.

What unites us, dear brothers and sisters, is not a bond of physical nature or a political allegiance, but faith in him who is the Son of God and Saviour of the world and who has proclaimed the brotherhood of all men. It is he, Jesus Christ, who loves all people irrespective of their race or culture, or their social or political status. We are all brothers and sisters, and at the centre of Jesus' message is the call to universal brotherhood. Is it not inspiring to discover that a similar message is aptly expressed in your Chinese saying: « Between the four seas, all men are brothers »? More than at any other time, there is a need for us to proclaim this message all over the world, since injustice and discrimination among peoples and nations still linger on.

As I am travelling so near to your great country, let me send you a message that comes from my heart and from our common faith. At this time of grace and change, I say: open your hearts and minds to God, who in his divine providence guides all events and pursues his plan in all that happens. Out of human suffering and even out of weakness and error, the Lord creates new growth. It is my sincere and heartfelt hope that some day soon we shall all be able to join together, praising the Lord and saying: Behold how good and pleasant it is to dwell in unity as brothers » (Ps 133:1).

I entrust you all to Mary, Virgin most faithful, Queen of China. May the peace of Jesus Christ her Son be with you all. May God bless China!

APPENDIX VI

FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE CHINESE NEW YEAR

POPE'S LETTER TO BISHOPS OF THE WORLD INVITING THEM TO PRAY FOR THE CHURCH IN CHINA

Venerable Brothers,

Greetings and the Apostolic Blessing.

The love of Christ, which unites us in a brotherly way, and the grave responsibility entrusted to me as Supreme Pastor of the Universal Church induce me to open my heart to share with you, dear brothers in the episcopate, my deep concern for the Church in China. The situation in which it currently finds itself is well known to everyone, and I am sure that many of you unceasingly raise fervent prayers to the heavenly Father and to Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Good Shepherd of souls, for our beloved brothers and sisters of that great nation. I know, in fact, that there have already arisen in various parts of the Catholic world initiatives of prayers for China, animated by the spirit of deep communion and brotherhood which unites, and must unite, in joy and in suffering, the members of the Mystical Body of Christ (1 Cor 12:12-30).

This letter of mine has its origin in the invocations I continually raise to Almighty God for that beloved portion of his people, and it is intended to call to prayer, through you, the Catholics of the whole world. We know with certainty that the Lord is faithful to his word: "Ask, and it will be given you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you" (Mt 7:7). In fact, even when the normal human means that serve to maintain the bonds of relationships within a community are lacking, there always remains the power of prayer, which keeps alive the flame of the hope that does not disappoint, thanks to the work of the Holy Spirit who is within us. "The Spirit helps us in our weakness", St. Paul teaches us, "for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words" (Rom 8:26).

Continual concern for the Church in China

I ask you therefore to pray; I ask you to unite in the Spirit of God with the sons and daughters of the Catholic Church who live in China, with whom there has been no visible relationship for some decades now. Through prayer they remain in the very heart of the Church of Christ, even if externally they are deprived of all communication with us. Prayer will then obtain from Divine Mercy those gifts, lights and spiritual forces for the Church in China to be ensured the indispensable conditions to enjoy also visible union with the Church of Jesus Christ, which is "one, holy, catholic and apostolic".

In this connection, it is the particular task of St. Peter's Roman See to unite brothers in truth and love. Precisely to the Apostle Peter, in fact, the Lord Jesus entrusted the responsibility of strengthening his brothers (Lk 22:32), because the Lord wished his Church to be built on him (Mt 16:18-19). "The Roman Pontiff, as the successor of Peter", the Second Vatican Council affirms, "is the perpetual and visible source and foundation of the unity both of the bishops and of the whole com-

pany of the faithful » (*Lumen Gentium*, n. 23). It is he who makes the episcopate itself one and undivided (cf. *ibid.*, n. 18). The tie with Peter's See and with its apostolic ministry is, therefore, the indispensable condition for participating in the union of the large Catholic family.

Concern for the Church in China, which was always so deeply felt by my recent predecessors Pius XII, John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul I, has become the particular and constant anxiety of my pontificate, as I have shown more than once and in various ways. This anxiety springs from the very nature of the catholicity of the Church, which is one and universal, multiple in the variety of peoples which compose it and at the same time identical in the foundation of the faith and in the bond of communion. As the Second Vatican Council affirms, "the one People of God is present in all the nations of the earth, since its citizens... are taken from all nations... Since the kingdom of Christ is not of this world (cf. Jn 18:36), the Church or People of God which establishes this kingdom does not take away anything from the temporal welfare of any people. Rather she fosters and takes to herself, in so far as they are good, the abilities, the resources and customs of peoples. In so taking them to herself she purifies, strengthens and elevates them... This character of universality which adorns the People of God is a gift from the Lord himself" (*ibid.*, n. 13).

Bond of close communion between Churches

"In virtue of this catholicity", the Council continues to teach, "each part contributes its own gifts to other parts and to the whole Church, so that the whole and each of the parts are strengthened by the common sharing of all things and by the common effort to attain to fullness in unity... Holding a rightful place in the communion of the Church there are also particular Churches that retain their own traditions, without prejudice to the Chair of Peter which presides over the whole assembly of charity (St Ignatius M., *Ad Romanos*), and protects their legitimate variety while at the same time taking care that these differences do not hinder unity, but rather contribute to it. Finally between all the various parts of the Church there is a bond of close communion whereby spiritual riches, apostolic workers and temporal resources are shared. For the members of the People of God are called upon to share their goods, and the words of the Apostle apply also to each of the Churches, 'according to the gift that each has received, administer it to one another as good stewards of the manifold grace of God' (1 Pet 5:10)". (*ibid.*, n. 13).

Church's understanding

The Church of Rome has always wished to promote, like a mother (with tender and strong love, even if sometimes with human defects), the growth of her children all over the world, taking care that they do not lack good and capable pastors, the assistance of missionary personnel and means of evangelization. Once the communities have reached maturity of development, she is glad that responsibility for the government of their own Church should remain with the local clergy, maintaining the communion of faith and the common discipline derived from it with this Church. The presence, in ever increasing numbers, of native bishops within the episcopal conferences of the whole world, and likewise of prelates and bishops of every continent in the Roman Curia, eloquently proves the thoughtful solicitude of the Church in using to advantage the work of her sons, without any distinction of origin or desire for hegemony. Especially after the Second Vatican Council, the episcopal conferences are offered very wide room for initiatives for the good of the faithful of their own territory; they are fully aware, however, that in any difficulty and for any possible need they can always rely on the support, the understanding and the help of the Church of Rome.

Difficult trials

We know very well that our brothers and sisters in China have had to face difficult and prolonged trials in the span of these thirty years. In those severe sufferings they have given proof of their fidelity to Christ and his Church; such courageous witness can well be compared to that of the Christians of the first centuries of the Church. How consoling it is to receive news of the constant and courageous loyalty of Catholics in China to the faith of their fathers and of their filial attachment to Peter's See. All that, while it arouses our deep admiration, must urge us even more to offer them our affectionate support and fervent prayers.

For some time now, the demands of religious freedom have found greater understanding in that great country. It is necessary, therefore, to beg Almighty God, the Lord of nations, that, in application of the principles of this freedom, our brothers and sisters in China may be able to live their faith without impediments, remaining in the catholic unity of the Church.

The Apostolic See neglects no opportunity to try to let Catholics in China know what a deep place they have in the very heart of the Catholic Church, which looks with particular sympathy and affection to the admirable reality of traditions and culture, deep humanity and rich spirituality, which forms the historical and present heritage of the great Chinese nation, as I emphasized in my address at Manila last 18 February. In the name of the concern « for all the Churches » (2 Cor 11:28) which unites us, I insistently ask that you too, dear brothers in the episcopate, do as much, inviting the faithful entrusted to you to pray for, and with, their brothers and sisters in China.

So let us unite our prayers that they may remain strong in faith and persevering in active charity. We beg that the Lord will always keep alive and joyful in them the hope of the eventual rebirth of their Church and of a new Pentecost of the Spirit, which will make the message of Jesus flourish in that beloved land. Let us also pray that the Lord will touch the hearts of those who are tormented by doubts and fears, and also of those who have yielded in the face of hard trials, thus endangering the deposit of the faith which had been handed down to them. Finally let us raise our prayers to God for the whole noble Chinese nation, that it may always be able to walk along paths of justice and real progress.

A particular affection

Let us pray above all with the conviction of the Apostle of the Gentiles that God, who « is able to do far more abundantly than all that we ask or think » (Eph 3:20), will « work for good with those who love him » (Rom 8:28).

Let us entrust our supplications to the powerful intercession of the Blessed Virgin, whom the Chinese faithful invoke with fervour and such trust under the title of Queen of China, that she may obtain from her Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ, abundance of graces and heavenly favours for her beloved sons and daughters in China.

The celebration of the beginning of the Chinese New Year, now near at hand (25 January), offers me a welcome opportunity to manifest once more the affection and the esteem I have, and have always had, for the Chinese people. On this happy occasion, I join in the joy of all members of the large Chinese family, wherever they may be, and I wish them all a good and serene new year.

With great affection in the Lord I impart to you the Apostolic Blessing.

From the Vatican, 6 January 1982, the Solemnity of the Epiphany of Our Lord, the fourth year of Pontificate.

From China Bulletin 4 (March 1982): 4-6.

IOANNES PAULUS PP. II

APPENDIX VII

POPE'S HOMILY IN MASS FOR CHINESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

On Sunday morning, 21 March, Pope John Paul II celebrated a Mass in St. Peter's Basilica for the Christian communities in China and delivered the following homily.

1. « God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life » (Jn 3:16).

In celebrating the Eucharist, we wish to give glory to God: the almighty Father, Creator of heaven and earth, of all things, visible and invisible.

To him himself.

In fact, he not only created the world, but he also loved the world. And in a particular way, then, he loved man in the world, whom he created in his own image and likeness.

Through this image and likeness of God which he bears in himself, man is destined for eternal life, for participation in the divine life. God's love for man consists in destining man for eternal life in union with him.

Saving sacrifice

2. This love was still more greatly manifested after man, through sin, marred God's image in himself and exposed himself to the danger of the eternal loss of God. Then God, in order to manifest even more strongly the fact of having destined man for eternal life and desiring eternal life for him, gave to man — and also to the world in general — his only-begotten Son:

"He so loved the world that he gave his only Son".

In celebrating the Eucharist, we wish also in a special way to express our faith in Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, our Lord, who was conceived by the Holy Spirit and, thanks to divine power, was born of the Virgin Mary. The whole Church honours Mary as the parent of God, as the Mother of God.

The eternal Father gave his own Son, born of the Virgin, so that man — despite sin — "should not perish but have eternal life".

Jesus Christ, fulfilling the love of the Father, and at the same time by reason of his own love for us men, his brothers and sisters, gave his life on the cross amid terrible sufferings and torments.

Celebrating the Eucharist, we not only recall Christ's death on the cross, but we also renew in an unbloody manner his sacrifice for the salvation of the world.

We give this a particular expression after the Consecration, in the words: "When we eat this Bread and drink this Cup, we proclaim your death, Lord Jesus, until you come in glory".

Offering of the whole Church

3. It is this very Sacrifice of our redemption that we offer to the Most Holy Trinity together with the entire Church. The whole Church offers it when a priest, a bishop, or the Pope celebrates the Eucharist.

On the other hand, renewing in an unbloody manner, under the appearances of bread and wine, the Sacrifice of Christ on the cross, we offer to God himself "through Christ with Christ, and in Christ" all men and all creation; the entire world.

Taking our lead from the particular needs of the world and of men, we always offer this most holy Sacrifice with a precise intention.

For the Church in China

Today I am celebrating this solemn Holy Mass in St. Peter's Basilica in Rome for the intention of the Church in China.

Bishops and priests in the whole world are doing, or will do, likewise. I requested this of them and I invited them to do this as the Bishop of Rome and the Successor of St. Peter, to whom, through the institution of the same Christ the Lord, according to the apostolic and very ancient tradition of the Church, it belongs to "preside in charity". The whole Church, and especially our brothers and sisters in China, needs this love of ours, and awaits it.

Particularly loved

4. We wish also in a particular way to embrace, to understand, in the communion of this Eucharistic Sacrifice, these brothers and sisters of ours who are particularly loved.

We know that they too, in their own country, make the same offering of bread and wine, that it may become the Sacrifice of Christ, his Body and Blood for the salvation of the world.

In this Sacrifice they are expressing, together with us, their faith, inherited now by numerous generations of confessors of Christ in their mother country: a faith which has been tried amid various experiences and sufferings. They are expressing, besides, the traditions of their great nation, its culture, its daily work, its efforts, which have as a goal an ever better and more just life in their society.

Be united with us!

They bring all this as an offering in their hearts. And when they place on the altar the bread and wine as the fruit of the work of their hands, they wish to express all these offerings of theirs to God in the gift that will become in the Eucharist the very Gift of Jesus Christ: his Body and Blood.

O hearts of our brothers and sisters in the far-off land of China! Be united with us in this Sacrifice of Redemption, as we are united with you!

May the same Gospel of Christ, the same light and the same power of the Holy Spirit, the same adoration of the eternal Father, the Creator of heaven and earth, embrace you also.

"One faith, one baptism, one God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (Eph 4:5-6; 1:3).

O Mary, Mother of the Church and Queen of China, to you we entrust our brothers and sisters living in China. Intercede for them with your Son Jesus, our Lord and Saviour, that they may live their faith, remaining in the Catholic unity of his Holy Church. Amen.»