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**Affinity and Press: The Second-Level
Agenda-Setting Power of Japanese Print Media
Coverage on Sino-Japanese Relations**

Maki Nakayama

**Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the M.A. Degree in Communication**

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Abstract

The media in Japan is unique in the world. Even though Japanese Society today enjoys advances in digital technology, the major national newspapers remain one of the most reliable sources for the public to learn about domestic and foreign news. Many researchers have examined the Japanese press's influence on public opinion during election campaigns, but very few have examined the interactions of the press and national public opinion in the context of international relations. This thesis analyzes the effects of the print media on the formation of national public opinion by examining the Japanese press coverage of Sino-Japanese relations. By testing the *second-level agenda-setting theory* through a content analysis of the coverage of Sino-Japanese relations in two major Japanese national newspapers, this thesis argues that the Japanese press plays a central role in the formation of Japanese public opinion toward China.

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Maki Nakayama
June 27, 2008
Ottawa, Canada

Chapter 1: Introduction

When we think about newspapers, we think of stacks of thin paper with lots of small black words and photographs. Many people read newspapers either regularly or not very often at all. Some newspapers are sold at kiosks; discarded ones are left on a bench in the streets waiting to be picked up by a passerby. They are used to wrap up flowers or pottery to protect them from damage; children roll them up into balls and use them to play catch. Sometimes they are even used to clean up after dogs in a park. It is clear that newspapers are quite useful and have a function in nearly every aspect of our lives. When we think, however, about newspapers as one of the media that provides us with information, it means more than just papers with words.

In Japan, contrary to popular belief that the development of digital media could threaten the existence of the press news, newspapers are still believed to be very trustworthy by the majority of citizens. Having served as propaganda vehicles in wartime, Japanese newspapers still enjoy their credibility and strong sales. Their reporting style is often criticized by Western observers as being too monotonous and unbalanced. National and international scholars who study the nature of the Japanese press point out that the style and nature of the Japanese print media ensure that readers do not receive a variety of perspectives on a given issue.


1. Japanese Sentiment toward China

In 2005, Japan and China experienced a chill in bilateral relations due to a number of disagreements between them. A national public opinion poll revealed that the percentage of Chinese who did not have affinity with Japan reached a high of 71% and so did that of the Japanese (57 %) toward China (Nippon Research Center, 2005)¹. The relations had never reached such a low point since the restoration of diplomatic ties in 1978, 33 years after the end of the Pacific War. Relations became increasingly sensitive in 2005, when there were protests by Chinese citizens in China against Japanese foreign policy toward the country.

¹ The percentage is the total of survey respondents who “do not have affinity” and who “relatively do not have affinity” with either Japan or China.

The protests were against Japan's historical perspective² of its role in Asia and its development of gas fields in the East China Sea. The public opinion research conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office in 2005 showed that only 32.4%³ of Japanese citizens felt affinity with China. Considering that positive sentiment toward China had been over 70% a decade earlier (from 1982 to 1985), this drop in percentage is remarkable. Even when Sino-Japanese relations became unstable due to diplomatic conflicts over several incidents⁴ and the damage to China's image wrought by the violent suppression of dissent in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the affinity of the Japanese people for China stayed above 50%. The record low affinity in 2005, the lowest level since the Japanese government started public opinion research of foreign affairs in 1978, can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Changes in the Japanese Public's Affinity with China in Recent Years



(Reference: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2007)

After former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe succeeded Koizumi in 2006, Sino-Japanese relations became more stable. The Japanese public's affinity for China improved in 2006 according to the government's ongoing surveys (Cabinet Office, 2006). Abe visited China

² On this matter, there was an increased controversy over former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where Japanese war criminals were honored.

³ The percentage is the total of survey respondents who "have affinity" and who "relatively have affinity" with China.

⁴ For example, there are the textbook discord (in 1986), the legal case against ownership of a Chinese international student residence in Kyoto and Japan's increasing defense budget (both in 1987), the controversy over former Japanese chief of the National Land Agency Seisuke Okuno's comment about historical view (in 1988), and the Tiananmen Square incident (1989).

the day before the 2006 survey, and had a meeting with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and State President Hu Jintao (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, n.d.). Abe's visit to China broke the diplomatic chill between the two nations. Before the visit, the leaders of both countries had stopped communicating bilaterally for almost fourteen months. A Chinese Senior Officer of in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once attributed this intense diplomatic difficulty to Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits, pointing out that his visits hurt citizens of China as well as people in other Asian countries (Chugoku Joho Kyoku, 2005).

There have been a quite few diplomatic irritants in Sino-Japanese relations such as controversial descriptions about Japan's invasion and occupation of China in Japanese history textbooks, territorial discords, issues with Taiwan, but the relations had never become so fraught with tension.

Of all the causes which can be considered as reasons for the deterioration of these relations, the media's responsibility simply cannot be ignored. The Japanese mass media (TV and radio broadcasting, newspapers, magazine press and more) are unique among the national mass media in advanced industrial nations in that it has an extremely strong influence on both public opinion and politics. As Nester (1989) puts it, the Japanese mass media are "the most influential force in society" and have "vast political influence" at the same time (p.29) (see chapter 3 for more information about the Japanese media's influence on the society).

In support to Nester's point made in the 80's, a more recent media study (Genron NPO, 2007) reported that 91% of Japanese citizens and about 95% of intellectuals use the Japanese media as a reference in order to be informed about Sino-Japanese relations. The segmental breakdown shows that while the general public watches TV (78%) more than they read newspapers (13%), intellectuals read newspapers (56%) more than they watch TV (19%) to learn about Sino-Japanese relations. Even though Japan and China are neighbor countries with a small sea in between, the majority of Japanese (84%) do not have or have never had a Chinese acquaintance, or have never even visited China (86%). This data shows that for the Japanese, Chinese people are still so far away across the sea that they learn about the country and people mostly through media reports rather than through personal communications (Genron NPO, 2007).⁵

⁵ Numbers of the survey were rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

2. The Impact of Public Opinion on Japanese Politics

Additionally, and most importantly, there is now a sense of urgency to examine the relationships among Japanese media coverage, public opinion and directions in Japanese politics. In its diplomacy, the Japanese government is more willing to hear the views of its citizens rather than to react to the world, especially the United States. Hitoshi Tanaka, the former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted at a symposium in 2005 entitled 'Sino-Japanese political friction and the media [*Nichu masatsu to media*]' (Asahi Shimbun, 2005a) that the Foreign Ministry's reaction to domestic public opinion had been changing. According to Tanaka, Japan had been sensitive to international public opinion in the half-century since the end of WWII. However in more recent years, especially beginning with the Koizumi Diet in 2001, which featured greater national self-assertiveness, there was greater responsiveness to domestic public opinion on Japan's foreign policy.

Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, for example, stated divided public opinion as the main reason not to establish a religion-free national monument honoring the victims of war (Kawashima, 2005). Sensitive to national public opinion, he commented, "I'd like to consider the trend of public opinion [*Yoron no doukou wo shincyo ni mimamoritai*]" (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005h). Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, as well, reportedly was sensitive to public opinion trends with respect to his diplomatic attitude toward North Korea (Sugimoto & Akachi, 2007). If recent Japanese politics are affected by national public opinion in international diplomacy, the study of *agenda-setting* will acquire a greater importance.


3. Is the Media to Blame?

The dean of a media research center, the Chinese Academy of Social Science, Liu Zhi Ming (2005) points out that one of the causes of the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in recent years stems from irresponsible media reporting in China, which has widened the communication gap between the countries. In response to this, Watanabe Kohei, an assistant professor at Hokkaido University information initiative center, remarks that it is obvious that the Japanese media is also responsible for the growing percentage of Japanese people who

dislike China (Watanabe, 2005). According to Zhang (2002), the Japanese media, which purports to be objective and fair but is in fact heavily influenced by domestic political actors, creates a 'reality gap' in its coverage of China.

There was also a controversy over the Yasukuni issue and the textbook issue in the 1980s, but the issues were settled before they escalated and threatened the common goals of Japan and China to share in the growth of their economies. Takai (2005) suggests that the development of the Japanese media escalated the bilateral tensions early in the 21st century. Recent media studies suggest that the media indeed have some influence on the public. Some say media have more power in developing people's awareness on priority issues rather than people's attitude on those issues. The role of the mass media in a democratic society is believed to be based on fairness and objectivity. The Japanese media are no exception. Still there is a small, but considerable number of Japanese journalists who believe that the Japanese media are so powerful that they not only provide help in creating issue-awareness but that they can actually guide and influence the Japanese public on these issues through their reporting just like they used to do during the Pacific War (see Figure 2). Regarding the term "issue awareness", this refers to the media's role in the formation of public opinion by supplying the audience with priority issues in news coverage.

Figure 2. Japanese Journalists' Perceptions of the Role of Newspapers and Television
Report in Relation to Public Opinion (Reference: Okada, 2001, p. 126)



When we consider the insight of a small but influential number of journalists, it is as if the Japanese media are telling the public not only what issues they should think about, but also how to think about these issues, as well. This discussion points to not only the awareness the media bring to the public but also the attitude the media make the public have on issues. This brings us up a question, “Do the Japanese have an influence on people’s attitudes on certain issues?” On this matter, Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) found that a

foreign country which is portrayed negatively in the national media tends to be regarded negatively by the public.

4. Decreased Affinity and Media Coverage

The research question being proposed in this thesis is the following: “Did the Japanese mass media have a significant influence on the sudden decline in pro-Chinese sentiment in 2005 among Japanese citizens?” If the Japanese media are in part responsible for creating an unfriendly image of China in Japanese society, and as a result, contributed to Japan remaining distant in its relationship with China, then this responsibility should be revealed and pursued. Since 2002, the discussion of the responsibility of the national media in China and Japan in aggravating public sentiments has gained a lot of attention. Studies, however, have tended to focus on Chinese media reports on Japan rather than the other way around. Only a few have looked at how the Japanese media cover China, or covered both sides (Oh & Sakamoto, 2006). As for the coverage of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, there was only one study which reported that the audience of the particular Japanese media (print and broadcast) tended to track the dominant media frame of Koizumi’s approach to the Yasukuni Shrine⁶ visit (Kobayashi, 1990). The author did not find any quantitative studies examining the media’s coverage of Sino-Japanese relations.

This research thus aims to show how the Japanese press reported on Sino-Japanese relations in order to better understand their *agenda-setting* power. By examining the interrelationship between Japanese daily news coverage (Yomiuri and Asahi Newspapers) and public opinion on Sino-Japanese relations, this research will investigate how much Japanese print media coverage affects attitude formation in Japan. This research will test the influence of the Japanese press by applying the idea of McCombs and Shaw’s *second-level agenda-setting theory*. The theory will be carefully applied and tested through content analysis of the Japanese press.

The next chapter (chapter 2) provides the reader with background on the state of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in the post WWII period. Chapter 3, then, introduces Japan’s unique mass media system to the reader. Chapter 4 presents an overview of mass

⁶ See for more details in Chapter 2 for the Yasukuni Shrine issue.

media theories with a focus on *classic and second-level agenda setting*. Chapter 5 describes the methodology of content analysis that will be used to test the *agenda-setting theory*. Chapter 6 presents the results of the content analysis, followed by a discussion and analysis of these results in chapter 7. The conclusion in chapter 8 will provide suggestions for future research.

From a media communication perspective, this study will seek to investigate the responsibility of the Japanese press in influencing public opinion. It aims to contribute to understanding what role the print media plays in Japanese diplomatic relations with China by influencing Japanese society.

Chapter 2: Japan and China

Sino-Japanese relations are complex and often beset by conflict. Some of the bilateral issues stem from geography and some from economics, and others have roots in the Pacific War. All the sub-issues are related to each other on a certain level, increasing the complexity of the conflicts in relations. In order to understand newspaper coverage of bilateral relations, this chapter introduces the core bilateral issues and frames them for the reader.

1. Sino-Japanese Relations in Recent History

Japan and China's uneasy relations in the last several decades all stem from the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, which was eventually integrated into the Pacific War. The war started as a result of growing tensions between the two nations after Japan's invasion of the Republic of China (1912-1949) in the beginning of the 1930's. Japan established a puppet government named Manchukuo in the North Eastern part of China. As a result, this thickened the tension and led the two countries into the war. The war ended with the surrender of Japan in 1945, but left millions of soldiers and civilians from both countries dead.⁷ At the beginning of the war in 1937, massacres of Chinese soldiers, captive soldiers and civilians by Japanese troops took place, which is known as the Nanjing Massacre. The number of victims rose to, reportedly, about one hundred thousand to three hundred thousand (note that there is still a debate over the number of victims among researchers).⁸ See appendix I for a chronology of Sino-Japanese diplomatic events.

⁷ Regarding the number of Chinese victims, China reported in 1995 that it is over thirty five million, but this number lacks substantial evidence. Japanese victims are calculated to be about three million.

⁸ There is a debate over the number of victims. China's estimate is over three hundred thousand, but the Japanese government neither officially admits it nor reports their own estimate due to the lack of official record. There are various views on this matter, and researchers' estimates have a wide range from tens of thousands to close to two hundred thousand.

Taiwan Issue

Thirty five years after the war ended, China and Japan released a joint statement in 1972, and then signed the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. As a condition of the treaty, Japan broke its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Regardless of the lack of political relations, Taiwan and Japan have maintained a strong business relationship. International trade with Taiwan was approximately 64.4 billion dollars in 2006, making it Japan's fourth most important trade partner⁹ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007). The Japanese government's close relations with Taiwan, which had once been a part of Japanese territory and which still has pro-Japanese sentiment, has tended to upset Beijing, especially when former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited Japan in 2004. Chinese sensitivity towards Japan's relations with Taiwan persists despite public pronouncements by the Japanese government that it wishes for a "peaceful solution" between China and Taiwan.

Resource and Territorial Competition

As neighbors living next to each other across the ocean, debates over resources and territories have always been on the table between Japan and China. Since 1970, for example, there has been a territorial dispute among Japan, Taiwan, and China over Senkaku¹⁰ Islands in the East China Sea and possible resources around the area. Taiwan and China affirm that the islands are in their territory and Japan also insists the islands belong to them.

Gas field development in East China Sea between China and Japan is another ownership dispute. Japan objected to China's drilling locations where offshore gas fields were identified in the East China Sea, insisting that two of the six gas fields straddle the Japanese border. Despite Japan's unofficial request since 2004 to suspend operations and submit a subsurface structure map, China has neglected to accept these requests and continued the development of the gas fields. This made the Japanese government give an oil-exploitation right to a Japanese oil development company and consequently aroused strong opposition from China. From 2005, both countries have been negotiating for joint development of the gas fields (Sankei News, 2008).

⁹ The U.S., China and Korea were the top three trading partners to Japan in 2006.

¹⁰ In China, the islands are named Diaoyu Islands.

Different Perceptions of History

The most controversial incidents between China and Japan in the last decades occurred over controversial descriptions in Japanese history textbooks and former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. These issues are often categorized as historical perception issues [*Rekishininshiki*] since these issues have roots in the past at the time of the war.

Since the time the first controversy arose in 1982, the Chinese government has protested the characterization of Japan's past in Japanese school history textbooks. China complains that Japanese textbooks, which are required to pass the government's¹¹ screening of school textbooks, lack an objective view point, and does not adequately explain on Japan's invasion of China in the war. South Korea also expresses its complaints about the textbook descriptions concerning the annexation of Korea and wartime comfort women. In many cases, the description and evaluations of Japanese policies during the Pacific War in Japanese textbooks are sources of conflict with Japan's closest neighbors (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982; Jiang, n.d.).

Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians similarly stimulated China's anti-Japanese sentiment. The shrine is not a regular Shintoistic¹² shrine. It was built by the Meiji government in 1869. Until 1946, when American Occupation authorities started to oversee Japanese politics, the Army and Navy Ministry was in charge of the shrine. After that, the shrine became a private institution, running with Shintoist religious fees and donations, but still open to the public. What makes Yasukuni different from other Shinto shrines is that it honors 2.5 million people who died in wars, including Japanese soldiers and civilians. Alongside those victims of war, the Yasukuni Shrine also honors 14 executed class-A war criminals including Hideki Tojo.¹³ Every year on August 15th, a crowd of thousands dressed in dark attire consisting of citizens, government ministers, politicians, and even Yakuza, Japanese gangsters, visit the shrine to commemorate the day of defeat in WWII.

¹¹ To be more specific, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology is in charge of the screening.

¹² Shintoism is the native Japanese religion. It worships *kami*, or spirits of particular places or natural objects. For example, *Amaterasu* is the spirit for the sun. Shintoism was related to the worship of the Japanese Emperor during the war.

¹³ Tojo was a Prime Minister of war-time Japan who was also known as the "fiercest hawk" in the Orient.

Visits to the shrine by a Japanese Prime Minister remind China of Japanese militarism and nationalism. There is an opinion, however, that it is normal for a Prime Minister to visit his own country's historically important milieu. China and Korea, Japan's neighbors see this commemoration in a negative light. They were the victims of the war, and, to them, Yasukuni represents Japanese imperial identity, which they never wish to see rise again. The Chinese government blames Japan for not being considerate enough to Chinese citizens who are still hurt by its invasion. In May 2005, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Wu Yi, who was visiting Japan, cancelled her meeting with Koizumi and left for China because of Koizumi's visit to the shrine (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005e).

Koizumi, who visited the shrine every year from 2001 to 2006¹⁴, on the other hand, regarded his visiting to the shrine as a Japanese national issue as well as his private issue, and therefore other countries should not interfere with it (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005g). Even as a national issue, there is a debate within the country that a Prime Minister's visit to the shrine violates the separation of government and religion which is stipulated in Article 20 in the Japanese constitution. In September 2005, Osaka High Court judged Koizumi's visit to the shrine as unconstitutional (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005f). On this matter, in 2001, the Japanese government proposed to consider building a politically neutral, national memorial facility as a response to the Korean Prime Minister's request. The plan was waived in 2005, however, due to the controversy on the Yasukuni issue within the country (Asahi Shimbun, 2005d).

The frustration of Chinese citizens with Japanese policies finally erupted at the Asia Cup held in China in summer 2004. Chinese supporters booed the Japanese national anthem, and threw paper cups and bottles at the Japanese fans. When the Japanese team won the final game against China, some Chinese supporters became violent and broke the glass of an official Japanese vehicle (Asahi.com, 2004).

Following this disturbance, and stimulated by anti-Japanese demonstrations held in South Korea in March 2005 over the ownership of Takeshima Island¹⁵, protests against Japan by thousands of Chinese citizens and students occurred in April 2005. It first started off as a signature-collecting campaign against Japanese school textbook descriptions and Japan's

¹⁴ Visiting the shrine once a year was one of Junichiro Koizumi's campaign pledges. As he promised, the former Prime Minister of the 87, 88, and 89th Japanese Cabinet visited the shrine every year in his time.

¹⁵ Takeshima Island is a Japanese name. The South Korean government calls it Dokdo.

entry to the U. N. Security Council. The protests then spread to several cities including Beijing and Shanghai and some of the participants turned violent and started riots. The rioters burned a Japanese flag, broke the window of a Japanese supermarket, threw eggs at Japanese restaurants, attacked Japanese students, and threw rocks and bricks at the Japanese embassy, the ambassador's residence, and the consular office in China. Japan's complaints about the violent protests were rejected at first by China, who accused Japan of its biased historical perception as a cause for the unrest. However, the Chinese government eventually moved to settle the situation and contained the protests (Yomiuri Shimibun, 2005c; 2005d).

The anti-Japanese protests held in China also called for a further apology from the Japanese government for its colonization and invasion of China in the past. This apology from the Japanese government was first presented by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 in his speech:

...Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995)

This statement is understood as the official Japanese perspective on the past. Former Prime Minister Koizumi also referred to the Murayama discourse and showed sympathy and apology for Japan's neighboring countries at a summit meeting between China and Japan held in Indonesia during the Asian-African Conference in 2005 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). These official statements have not succeeded in muting the anger of the Chinese demonstrators.

Trade and International Business

Sino-Japanese relations were frayed when a trade conflict occurred in 2001. Japan tentatively announced safeguard on green onions, shiitake mushrooms, and rushed to protect national production. China, in retribution, imposed special duties on imported Japanese cars, mobile phones, and air conditioners. The attempt to make the safeguard imposition a formal decision was waived at the Sino-Japanese ministerial talk at the end of the year, and China agreed to stop imposing special duties on the three Japanese imports (The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, 2001).

In general, business ties between the two countries are developing extremely well. Since China's economic growth in the 1990's, China and Japan developed strong relations as business partners. Seeking less expensive labor, Japan started investing in China and this increased Japanese exports to China. Overtaking the U.S., Japan's key trade partner since WWII (Asahi Shimbun, 2005b), China became Japan's top trading partner in 2004: total trade combined with the total trade with Hong Kong rose to 22.2 trillion Japanese yen. In light of China's developing economy and growing industries, Japan suggested in 2005 that it would start cutting off yen loans to China gradually (the major part of Japan's Official Development Assistance to China). The Japanese government suggested stopping the yen loan by the 2008 fiscal year, but China is demanding further negotiations (Asahi Shimbun, 2005c).

Diplomatic relations, on the other hand, became worse in the last 5 years because of the different perspectives of the countries concerning historical events. Even though the relations improved slightly after Koizumi's resignation as Prime Minister, differences in historical perceptions between the countries remain a main source of tension in bilateral relations. Such relations are often referred to as "*Sei Rei Kei Netsu* [cold in politics, hot in economy]".

National Security

In November 2004, an unidentified submarine was found running within Japanese territorial waters near Ishigaki Islands for about two hours. Maritime Self-Defense Force

chased after it, but it disappeared in Chinese territorial waters. From the photographs and the analysis of the sonic wave obtained by the Japanese Coast Guard, the ship was identified as a Chinese military atomic submarine. The intrusion into Japanese territory by the Chinese military raised tensions even higher between the two countries. Regarding the submarine's violation of territorial waters, China admitted that it was their military submarine, and explained that it was lost because of technical trouble and wandered into Japanese waters (Okinawa Times, 2004). This fostered the pre-existing perception that the Chinese military is a threat to Japan. In order to contain and watch for suspicious ships and marine research ships occasionally appearing near Japanese territorial waters, as well as to research hydrographic conditions, Japan placed a radar on Okinotori Island, which is the southernmost island of Japan (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005a).

2. Tendency of the Coverage of China in Japanese Newspapers

Coverage of Political Relations and the Negative Tone

Oh and Sakamoto (2006) conducted a cross-country content analysis of Chinese and Japanese newspapers from 2001 to 2004. Their conclusion was that Japanese newspapers (Yomiuri and Asahi newspapers) have a tendency to concern themselves more with diplomacy between China and Japan in comparison with Chinese newspapers (People's Daily and Beijing Evening News). In their Japanese coverage, these Chinese newspapers covered Japanese sports for most of the experimental period. They also note that Japanese newspapers also ostentatiously portray issues between countries in a negative tone and through negative images. The ratio of Japanese news articles to report China's national issues or problems was 16.1 %, which was 5% higher than the coverage in Chinese newspapers (Oh & Sakamoto, 2006).

Research undertaken by Hagiwara (2006) also revealed that the China portrayed in the Japanese media tends to be covered in diplomatic relations with Japan. Among the U.S., China, and South Korea, which are the top three countries regularly appearing in the Japanese news media (television broadcasting and newspapers) from November 2003 to August 2004, the report on China was more in a context of Sino-Japanese diplomatic

relations rather than other news topics. Referring to a theory introduced by Rosengren (1974 & 1977), Ito (1990), and Ishii (1996), a country with a high political, economical, and military importance to another country tends to frequently appear in their news reports. Hagiwara suggests that the stabilized appearance of the U.S., China and South Korea in the Japanese media can be attributed to the countries' diplomatic importance to Japan, the U.S. as a politically influential country, and China and South Korea as neighboring countries¹⁶ (as cited in Hagiwara, 2006).

A longitudinal framing study conducted by Zhang (2002)¹⁷ reveals that three major Japanese newspapers (Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi Newspapers) constantly use frames formed by specific actors, mostly political actors such as Chinese and Japanese governments, pro-Chinese politicians, Sino-Japanese goodwill organizations, and Sino-Japanese issue specialists. Therefore the results which examined China are based on a narrowed perspective rather than reflecting various opinions in society. Those frequently appearing frames were Goodwill, History, External Pressure, Japan as Rushed to Response to an Issue, Suppressing China, China as a Threat, and Smiling China.¹⁸ The newspapers tend to ignore "irregular" frames employed by other media. This tendency, Zhang warns, could create a blind side in the readers' awareness about China, and as a result lead to the development of an awareness gap between the reality and the news coverage.

3. Conclusion

The main conflict in Sino-Japanese relations has deep roots in perceptions of the Pacific War. Even after diplomatic relations were restored, political conflicts between the countries occasionally destabilized relations. Territorial conflicts occurred as early as in the

¹⁶ As for another neighbor country to Japan, there is North Korea. News coverage on North Korea, however, was only high when Japan and North Korea had a kidnapping issue. Regarding this, Hagiwara (2006) analyzes that it is due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea.

¹⁷ Zhang (2002) observed the coverage of three major Japanese newspapers, the Yomiuri, the Asahi, and the Mainichi on China for thirty years.

¹⁸ The frames were translated to English by the author. The original Japanese names were, Yukou [Goodwill], Rekishi [History], Atsuryoku [External Pressure], Taiouni owareru Nippon [Japan as Rushed to Response to an Issue], Chinatsu no Chugoku [Suppressing China], Kyoui no Chugoku [China as a Threat], Bishou no Chugoku [Smiling China]. According to Zhang (2002), the last frame, Bishou no Chugoku is an awareness frame for China which became to be known since the end of the 90s in Japanese journalism. It describes China negotiating with Japan in diplomatic relations with certain intentions.

1970's but bilateral negotiations between the countries are still unstable. The international relations with Taiwan remain a sensitive topic since Japan abandoned diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to restore its relations with China. Recent Sino-Japanese history revealed that there is a strong level of disagreement about both countries' perceptions about their history during WWII. While these political issues remain extremely sensitive, the business relationship has relatively fewer barriers compared to the other issues. Overall, Sino-Japanese relations remain unstable at the political level.

A cross-national newspaper comparison conducted by scholars reveals that China tends to appear more in Japanese media coverage of diplomatic matters compared to the prominence of Japan in the Chinese media's coverage of diplomatic issues. Coverage of China in the Japanese press has a tendency to be influenced by political actors in the news formation process, and China is often reported in a negative tone.

This case study of Sino-Japanese relations and the coverage of China in the Japanese news media shows that negative coverage of the unstable state of Sino-Japanese relations is a standard feature of the Japanese press. The content analysis of Sino-Japanese coverage in the following chapter is expected to capture apparent reality which has been highlighted by these previous studies. How pervasive is the negative tone in the media's coverage of China in Sino-Japanese issues? This question highlights a core hypothesis: if such a feature still exists, then the negative tones identified in *second-level agenda setting* by the print media should be observed in the formation of a negative opinion in Japanese society toward China.

Chapter 3: Japanese Print Media Environment

Just as no countries share the exact same political perspectives, media environments differ from country to country. With such different national media environments, it can be conjectured that the influence of the media may differ from one country to the next. This chapter is designed to introduce the Japanese media system and its distinctive features in order to place this study's examination of *agenda-setting* into an appropriate context. The unique features of the Japanese media environment such as the high level of newspaper circulation, the ideological affiliation of the elite national newspapers, the homogeneity of content, the self-censorship of journalists, the existence of press clubs, and the existence of media companies within larger conglomerates helps to explain the high level of trust accorded to the print media in Japanese society and, consequently, why the print media are such important actors in the public policy process. Together the characteristics of the Japanese media environment point to the potential for the print media to have a significant agenda-setting affect on the Japanese public.

1. Japanese Newspapers and Characteristics

Even though Japan has had a history of free press for over 120 years since the middle of the Meiji period (1868-1912), the pendulum has been swinging between democracy and state control (nationalism). Before 1945, the press helped the spread of three major democratization social movements: civil rights in the 1980s, constitutional government in the 1980s, and universal suffrage in the 1990s. Ironically, however, it also turned into a vehicle for propaganda for the war in the 1940s. Despite the establishment of the democratic constitution and the further development of free press after the war, Japanese press still reveals signs of nationalism today.

Among many kinds of the media developed in Japan, the country historically has relied on newspapers as the major information source. Even in today's digital world with the flourishing of the internet, newspapers in Japan maintain their dignity among other media such as TV, magazines, radio, and the internet. Japanese citizens still see newspapers as one

of the most trusted forms of the media. What gives Japanese newspapers this reputation? How do Japanese newspapers differ from their counterparts in North America? This chapter will introduce Japanese newspapers' unique characteristics from the appearance of the newspapers themselves to their management strategies as companies.

Types of Newspapers and the “Big Five”

As Visgatis and Swenson (2006) note, Japan has “one of the world’s most vibrant newspaper environments” (p. 9), There are 123 daily newspapers in Japan with national, regional and local dailies of general interest, including a dozen sports newspapers. There are 4 regional newspapers; Hokkaido, Tokyo, Chunichi, and Nishi Nihon, and ninety-eight local papers in local prefectures. The Yomiuri, the Asahi, the Mainichi, the Sankei and the Nihon Keizai (often referred to as the Nikkei) are the “big five” national newspapers which represent Japanese journalism. These “big five” account for 41.3 million of the total papers in circulation. The total daily newspaper circulation is 71.5 million, thus these five newspapers constitute more than half of the total newspaper market share in the country (60%). Approximately 100 other companies constitute the other 40 percent. It is the five national newspapers which dominate the Japanese newspaper industry due to households subscribing to 1.2 newspapers per day (Freeman, 2000). This number is about 1.4 times the number in England and 2.2 times the number in the United States. Considering the population of Japan is about 120 million, Feldman (1993) notes “This number almost reaches the entire populace of Japan”(p.12). The circulation numbers for the big five are, 14.5 million for the Yomiuri, 12.9 million for the Asahi, 6.3 million for the Mainichi, 4.5 million for the Nikkei, and 3.2 million for the Sankei.

The readership of newspapers is stable. The average duration of a newspaper subscription in Japan is 12.9 years. Two thirds of all Japanese newspaper subscribers have had a subscription for at least ten years. The newspaper is read by multiple family members and in general, is read by an average of three people for a set of newspapers (2.9 people for morning edition, and 2.7 for evening edition). This demonstrates that Japanese newspapers have a stable readership and the information the newspapers carry reaches a maximum of three times their registered subscribers (The Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association, 2005).

With individual circulations, the five newspapers are among the world's top ten largest newspapers. Even though today's digital technology makes it possible to deliver on-time news on the internet or even to personalized mobile phones, newspaper subscription in Japan "ha[s] shown little change for the past several years" (Visgatis & Swenson, 2006, p.9). According to the 2002 report from the World Association of Newspapers, the top countries in terms of newspaper circulation were China at 117 million subscriptions, Japan at 71 million¹⁹, and the United States at 55 million. Compared with the average dissemination rate, on the other hand, Japan produces 664.0 papers per 1000 people, which lags only behind Norway at 705.5 per 1000. Hashimoto (2004) therefore calls Japan a "newspaper kingdom" (p. 41).


The major newspapers sell both a morning and an evening edition as a set. Therefore, subscribers receive the paper twice a day, in the morning and in the evening. Articles in both editions are written and edited to maintain continuity. Ninety three percent (98 percent for the nation dailies) of newspapers are sent as home-delivery to subscribers, and the other 6.5 percent are sold at kiosks in train stations and on the streets. 0.6 percent of these are delivered by mail service. However, these newspapers do not simply repeat the exactly same content throughout Japan. They adapt to different preferences in each area and issue separate editions, which are more than the number of newspaper editions in any other country in the world. For instance, the Yomiuri and the Asahi sell 18 major editions in the morning and about 10 in the evening. Surprisingly, they also produce 100 other local editions (Feldman, 1993).

Difference in Coverage and Political Flavor

There are differences in the coverage between newspapers (See Figure 3). The Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Mainichi used to be the three major newspapers until the 1970s, and their content resembled each other. In the late 1970s, however, the biggest newspaper the Asahi, which used to be known as the national-leading newspaper, lost to its rival newspaper, the Yomiuri.

¹⁹ Visgatis and Swenson (2006) introduce a different data on this. They say the circulation is 70.4 million, which makes Japan the third biggest newspaper country in the world (p.9). They refer to data from Japan External Trade Organization.

Figure 3. Ideological Understanding of Japanese Major Newspapers and the Circulations



The Yomiuri has been gradually changing its editorial policies and becoming more conservative. With its frequent use of large photographs and a focus on eye-catching stories to pull in readers, the Yomiuri soon increased its circulation (Feldman, 1993), selling over 10 million for the morning edition, and more than 4.5 million for the evening edition (Cho & Lacy, 2000; Japan External Trade Organization, 2005b; Lichtenberg, 2005 all cited in Visgatis & Swenson, 2006). Although it is sometimes cynically referred to as the newspaper of Japanese popular culture due to this company policy, it is at the same time often considered as a newspaper of record because it closely reflects the Liberal Democratic Party's point of view, meaning the Japanese government's opinion (Luther, 2001, 2002 cited in Visgatis & Swenson, 2006). Just like the Yomiuri, the Sankei is also conservative in tone (Feldman, 1993).

On the other hand, the Asahi, at one time a government and military propaganda medium, kept its leftist flavor after WWII. It is the biggest rival newspaper company of the Yomiuri, and considered more influential than the Yomiuri since it has more readers that are political elites (Cho & Lacy, 2000; Feldman, 1986, as cited in Visgatis & Swenson, 2006).

Feldman's (1986) survey of the Diet members' newspaper reading also proves that Asahi is preferred by many Japanese officials, with 43% of political elite readership in comparison with 11% who subscribe to the Yomiuri. This is because the Asahi covers more political events (as cited in Visgatis & Swenson, 2006). By covering news stories that are serious in tone, and simple and somber in makeup, particularly among the intellectuals, the Asahi is thus regarded as the "intellectual newspaper" and the most influential of all the national newspapers (Feldman, 1993). Additionally, the Asahi newspaper's articles as well as its famous editorial column, "Teiseijingo", often appear in Japanese university entrance examinations. This aspect adds circulation among students as well. Among 455 articles which appeared in 2007 university entrance examinations, about 10% were from this editorial ("Asahiguma.com", 2007). Furthermore, Cho and Lacy (2000) discovered that the circulation of the Asahi did not decrease but rather increased when any other national or local newspapers increased their circulations. In terms of its political stance, on some delicate and controversial issues like the imperial system, the United States-Japan alliance, and the Self-Defense Forces, it has a more liberal point of view.

Mainichi has not been able to recover from its loss of readers after the "oil shock".²⁰ Because of the heavy debt it incurred, the Mainichi was required to undergo financial reorganization in the late 1970s (Feldman, 1993). Its reporting tone is known as more liberal when compared to the Yomiuri or the Sankei.

The Nikkei is Japan's most influential business newspaper and has a conservative tone (Feldman, 1993). It is often described as the Japanese Wall Street Journal, and viewed as essential reading by most Japanese business companies and their executives. As a Japanese custom, every winter, fourth-year undergraduate students throughout the country all start reading this newspaper at more or less the same time in order to achieve success job hunting for the coming spring.

²⁰ Japan seriously lacked papers due to the oil shock in 1973.

2. Coverage of Newspapers in General


Uniformity and Homogeneity

When discussing about the Japanese press, it should be noted that the providers of news, that is to say, the coverage of newspapers are standardized. As previously mentioned, even though each major daily has a slight difference in reporting, or political flavor, these differences are insignificant when compared with Western newspapers. One of the biggest features of the Japanese press observed by Western scholars is, reportedly, their high degree of uniformity, homogeneity, and standardization (Freeman, 2000). Taketoshi Yamamoto, a sociologist and historian of the Japanese press remarked that “Rare indeed is the capitalist nation that has print and broadcast media that carry such uniform news as Japan. If you were to hide the masthead, it would be virtually impossible to tell from the content which newspaper you were reading” (Yamamoto, 1989, p.375). Indeed, Wolferen (1984), the former president of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, criticizes the Japanese media’s consensus-oriented view of news, insisting that they tend to avoid raising critical questions and therefore avoid giving the audience different views of reality. It will not be surprising then, that even a recent report conducted by the Newspaper Association revealed the finding that a large number of newspaper editors are concerned that Japanese newspaper lack unique individual front pages in news reporting (The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, 1992).

Limited Space in the Newspaper

The limitation of newspaper room is also a factor which causes Japanese newspapers to report the same content. Unlike many Western newspapers, in which news stories often continue on another page, each entire article can be found on a single page with related articles located close by. Each story is categorized under the name of general, political, economic, international, social, or sports. Although this makes newspapers easy to read, articles tend to be shorter than in Western papers (Freeman, 2000).

Major differences can be found in editorials too. While there are usually editorial pages in their western counterparts, Japanese newspapers do not have a similar category. There is a small space for an editorial, or a column, on the front page, on which some newspapers do not even show the name of the writers. This editorial is the only place where readers can see the characteristic of the paper in contrast to other articles which tend to report only facts (see Figure 4).



(Note: Japanese reads from top to bottom and right to left.)

Figure 4.
An Example of a Japanese Newspaper's Front Page
 (Source: Japanese newspapers handbook, 1997)

The Employment of Newspaper Companies

The key to a further explanation of the standardized coverage can be seen in the employment system of newspaper companies. Most newspaper companies hire elites who recently graduated from the best universities in Japan. Like other Japanese industries, newspaper companies practice lifetime employment, seniority wages, and enterprise unions. The collectivist atmosphere often prevents journalists from working as freelance writers. They often work as a team rather than as individuals. Furthermore, journalists are on a career track for promotion, generally reaching management positions by the time they are in their mid-forties. Since wages and promotions rise along with seniority, journalists are not likely to distinguish themselves by writing aggressive articles (Freeman, 2000). Reporters believe

that they should keep to the editorial guidelines of their newspaper although the policy is rather broad and does not exist simply to impose restrictions (Kim 1981).

Instead of feeling dissatisfied with such a work situation, Japanese reporters rather enjoy their hierarchical status and the weight of the seniority system, and take pride in their work. They gain their identities with the name of the newspaper they belong to, and accordingly they are loyal to the ethic and the policy of the work place. The level of work satisfaction among reporters has a tendency to increase with age and position (Manabe, 1983).

Taboos: Invisible Censorship

Even though there is no censorship to restrict freedom of the press, the press itself imposes several taboos on its coverage such as imperial gossip, new religions, diplomatic relations with China, and illegal business dealings of sponsors. When do report on these taboo topics, almost all of the major newspapers except magazines²¹ will moderate their tone and maintain a very conservative position.

During the mid-1980s, some press companies initiated a movement to review the use of honorific language in the reporting of imperial affairs²² and even a branch of Kyodo News Service²³ once tried to abolish the use of polite Japanese²⁴ for imperial members. There are, however, almost no newspapers that criticize the imperial family. When the Emperor Hirohito (or known as Showa Emperor) passed away, almost all newspapers reported his death with the greatest respect. A national newspaper journalist who was trying to uncover a scandal of a certain politician confessed that, "I was told by my boss to be careful with my work, then I thought he knows the politician, because many executives used to write about politics. They may be asked by politicians to go easy on them" (Kitamura, 2005). In summary, the space limitations of a paper, the lack of bylines and "groupism" in companies, as well as self-restraint reporting of some taboo topics, are aspects that make newspaper coverage uniform and standardized.

²¹ Japanese magazines provide more popular news than newspapers such as gossips of celebrities.

²² The highest level of honorific expression is always applied in the coverage of imperial family in all media in Japan.

²³ Kyodo News Service is a major nonprofit Japanese news agency.

²⁴ Japanese has honorific words and expressions. As a tradition, the politest honorific language is applied in Japanese journalism when to report about imperial family.

3. Journalism and Politics

Press Clubs and Political Influence on the Press

Newspapers voluntarily restrict their coverage of taboo topics which limits their journalists who report on these topics. There is, however, another obstacle for journalists outside the newspaper company, which as a result, does not allow journalists to gather enough material to write an article freely. The obstacle is their information source.

When examining the close relationship of the media and politics, imagine government officials having a party with journalists to win favors from them. This is not an exception in Japan, where the Prime Minister and his government officials constantly dine with newspaper presidents, editors, and writers in order to tame the mass media's reports of their government's policies. Besides these secret meetings Japanese media have enjoyed a deep-rooted relationship with politics on a daily basis. According to Nester (1989), the nature of Japanese media is deeply dependent on both the political world for the supply of information and on the economic world for resources. This is the background for their monotonous reporting which limits critical thinking.

In examining the media's political dependence, it seems that the Japanese government tries to control information they release to the media through press clubs (*kisha-clubs*)²⁵. Both before and since 1945, press clubs, to which every government minister and agency belongs, have played a key role in helping the government to maintain control of the press by supplying them with a limited amount of information. These clubs are located in most of the major business, political, prefectural, and local governmental organizations that control journalists' access to information concerning the organizations. The exact number of press clubs is not officially reported, but researchers estimate that there are from seven hundred to one thousand clubs nationwide, and more than one hundred in Tokyo alone.

The press club system is that only selected journalists who belong to the club in the organization can attend the press conference. Journalists without membership can neither listen to the announcement nor enter the press room. Moreover, the reporters in the clubs, usually members of top twenty news organizations will be eliminated from the clubs if they

²⁵ Japanese press clubs (*Kisha clubs*) are often referred to the organizations which hold press meetings, and sometimes the press rooms as places where these meetings are taken place.

break their promise, which is not to write anything sensational and over their “safe” line.

For business executives and political elites, this system provides of themselves a useful means to filter news and information, and to construct a favorable view by the public (Freeman, 2000).

The History of Press Clubs

There is no report which has examined exactly when press clubs have formed, but there is an old story about the origin of the clubs. “Journalists in past times looked for topics wearing straw sandals and having a lunch box in hand. At a certain time, they gathered under the big tree in Marunouchi (downtown Tokyo) and had lunch together exchanging information. That is believed to be the first press club” (Hashiba, 2004, p.16). In the fall of 1890 an official press club was established. When the first Imperial Diet was held, each newspaper and news agency company created a movement to argue for them. This movement spread throughout Japan. As a result, the Kyodo Shimbun Kisyu Kurabu (Cooperative Newspaper Press Club) was established. By the beginning of the 1900’s, each government agency already had a press club. At that time, press clubs were a means to establish the Meiji government by conveying political information correctly and effectively to the public (Hashiba, 2004). For journalists at that time, information was not to be acquired, but to be given by the authority (Murakami, 2001).

Professor of Meiji University, Kawakami (1998) says, “Through wars, press club was used as a propaganda organ by the government of the time. The club conveyed the information straight down to the public without adding opinions of the newspapers. In nationalism atmosphere of the war time, press clubs were not exceptions which have caught up in the tide of the times” (as cited in Murakami, 2001, p.75).

Closed Clubs and Their Unfairness

Press clubs produce unfairness among journalists and companies. Members of press clubs include the Asahi, the Mainichi, the Yomiuri, the Nikkei, and the Sankei from newspaper companies, Kyodo as a news agency, and several big TV stations including NHK. What is debated as a problem is that press clubs exclude other journalists. As a general rule, big companies are treated with privilege and companies that do not have membership in the

Japan Publishers and Editors Association [*Nihon Shinbum Kyokai*²⁶], (for example, magazines) cannot become members of the press club. Among 1,803 newspaper companies and institutions, only 110 companies belong to the association (Fall 2003) (Hashimoto, 2004). Murakami (2001) strongly criticizes this bias, “Nobody can be blamed to call the system information monopoly.”(p.12). In a court, for example, a member of the judicial press club has a seat as a priority though many citizens cannot easily get a seat in general. The press club member has freedom of the court while regular people are not allowed to go out. Members of the press club enjoy this privilege. They write most political, economic, and social articles based on the information they receive from press conferences. Major newspaper companies rely on this practice so much that they would face fear of bankruptcy if the press club function was abolished (Murakami, 2001). The press club has become essential in today’s Japanese journalism.

The application of press clubs contradicts the spirit of “freedom of the press” by making access to information difficult for journalists who are not members of clubs. Across the globe, only England, South Korea, and Taiwan have similar systems (Hashiba, 2004). In the United States, for instance, people are not concerned with which journalists or reporters come to press conference of the president as long as they have their identification. In Japan, for example, only chosen journalists are welcomed to the conference. Concerning this limited freedom of the press, Nagano prefectural governor Yasuo Tanaka abolished the press club in Nagano city hall in 2001. He opened up a press room to all journalists instead of press club members only. In the declaration of the abolishment of the press club, he claimed, “While the club has an aspect of get-acquainted meetings among member press companies, it cannot deny that it excludes other journalists out of the group. In fact, most press conferences are held by the club and it is difficult for non-members to attend them” (Murakami, 2001, p.11).

Another aspect of press clubs which has been criticized is that journalists tend to become not very argumentative at a press release. By hearing announcements over and over, journalists report the news as they hear it without modifying the information independently. This custom is criticized as “announcement journalism”. The viewpoint of both journalists

²⁶ The Japan Publishers and Editors Association is an organization established in 1946, representing some 150 daily newspapers, news agencies and broadcasters.

and the interviewee or the announcer at the press conference tends to be close or the same. In this situation, the press club is running as if it is a PR company (Hashiba, 2004).

Business Relationships

Just like newspapers in any other countries, the Japanese press has relationships with commercial enterprises in terms of selling spaces in their newspapers for advertisements. According to a report from the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, 2 major income sources of newspaper companies are circulation income and advertisement revenue. Recent newspaper businesses tend to lose earnings when advertisement revenues decrease especially because the circulation income has not seen a remarkable rise recently (Hashimoto, 2004). Dependence on selling advertisement spaces is as much as 50% of the total income. In addition, the media financially depend on their business cooperators as well. The top three newspapers, for example, have as much as an average of 95.2 % of dependency on outside help for paying their debts (Nester, 1989).

Another feature of the Japanese newspaper industry is that large companies have business cartels with companies in other industries. It is not well known by citizens, but most Japanese newspaper companies are joint-stock corporations. The large companies engage in many fields such as recording, travel, department stores, entertainment, and sports as their activities. The Yomiuri newspaper, for example, owns the foremost Japanese professional baseball team; the Yomiuri Giants, and an amusement park named the Yomiuri Land. They also have financial and information ties with national commercial television networks: Nippon Television Network with Yomiuri, Asahi National Broadcasting with Asahi, Tokyo Broadcasting System with Mainichi, Television Tokyo with Nikkei, and Fuji Television Network with Sankei. Nearly all of the regional broadcasting stations have business ties with them as well. These newspaper companies invest as much as or more than 50 % of the broadcasting stations share in the affiliated television station. Despite regulations which state that newspapers are not allowed to control commercial television stations, this business relationship is likely to influence a large percentage of the population. The newspaper industry in Japanese society is comprised of, as Feldman describes, "...empires whose powers extend to almost every sector of the society and whose involvement in society can be assumed to be total" (1993, p.13).

4. The Impact of Newspapers on the Public

Citizens' Trust in Newspapers

As proven by the fact that a Japanese household subscribes to 1.2 newspapers on average, most Japanese citizens are well accustomed to having newspapers in their daily life. The question here is how they view newspapers and its coverage compared to other media.

According to a survey conducted in 1997 (The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association), 80.9% of 4,000 adults answered positively to the question "Are newspapers trustworthy?" in contrast to 55.3 % for television. Also, according to research conducted by AD Data Archives (2005), 53.6 % of people regard newspapers as an essential information source while TV only acquires 38.5 % for commercial broadcasting and 35.4 % for NHK²⁷ public broadcasting (2005). As well, only 16.0 % regard radio broadcasting. People come in to contact with newspapers as much as 5.6 days a week, which is surprisingly ahead of the Internet (3.3 days) following TV (6.6 days). Individuals believe that it is important to read newspapers as a member of society (47.0 %) because newspapers are intellectual (50.7 %) (see Table 1).

Table 1. Impressions and Evaluations of Each Medium (multiple answers, n=3,443, %)

	Newspapers	TV (commercial)	TV (public)	Radio	Magazines	Internet
Essential as an information source	53.6	38.5	35.4	16.0	12.5	31.3
Has an influence on society	53.4	46.7	46.7	14.3	15.4	29.9
Provides useful local information	52.1	19.5	15.1	12.4	3.2	11.4
Intellectual	50.7	6.4	39.6	6.7	7.4	13.8
Important to have an access as a member of the society	47.0	23.9	27.9	12.1	8.2	23.0
Provides knowledge	44.9	12.6	37.2	9.0	15.8	19.9
Useful for daily activities	44.0	35.8	28.7	15.1	18.2	31.2

(Reference: AD Data Archives, 2005)

²⁷ NHK, or Nippon Housu Kyokai is a Japanese public broadcasting station established in 1946.

Furthermore, a study of one thousand younger Japanese by Feldman and Kawakami (1988) found that political reportage of the printed media is highly trusted, with no bias in the coverage, and newspapers are viewed as fulfilling their social role. To describe Japanese newspapers in other words, Freeman notes that the Japanese core print media are both “quality-oriented”, which is opposed to sensationalist, and “mass”, representing their wide readership. Therefore, “This combination has important virtues in terms of producing serious but widely read news” (2000, p.19).

The Public’s Frequent Exposure to News

Given the facts that the Japanese are keen readers who spend a great deal of time reading and trusting the printed word as more accurate than TV or radio, newspapers have an influence on readers by interpreting facts they report. Kawakami and Feldman point out that the press has a dominant influence on its readers and therefore affects the shaping of public sentiment and opinion, both on domestic and international issues (1988).

Similarly, Tsuruki (1982) claims that newspapers, with their direct and indirect influence, contribute to the homogenization of information and knowledge in society by influencing more than 30 % of the Japanese public who read the same major dailies everyday. As there are a small number of major newspapers widely read by a large portion of the population and limited TV channels²⁸ that collaborate with these newspapers, people are exposed to almost the same information repeatedly (Arai, 1989). According to Tsuruki (1982), the media, especially newspapers can have extraordinary power over their readers and as a result, standardize Japanese culture. To this extent, there are few differences in ways of talking, dressing, and living between areas, and extreme homogeneity of lifestyles in which 90 % of the population regard themselves as belonging to the middle class.

Remarkable research was conducted in 1980 by Kabashima and Broadbent (1986), which demonstrated how the mass media are viewed by different groups of people. The researchers gathered about 2000 leaders of sample groups, which are believed to have influence on the Japanese political system. They asked these groups to state what they considered to be the most influential force in Japanese society including their own. The

²⁸ There are only five commercial television channels and two public channels as regular service in Tokyo. This differs in areas.

groups included business organizations, bureaucrats, the mass media, members of the Liberal Democratic Party, farm organizations, intellectuals, labor unions, opposition parties, citizen movements, feminist groups, and the *Buraku*²⁹ Liberation League. Except for representatives of the mass media, the other ten groups considered the mass media to be the most influential force in Japanese society, and only the mass media representatives ranked themselves as second most influential force after bureaucrats (Kabashima & Broadbent, 1986; Kabashima, 1990).

The impact Japanese newspapers have on the society is much stronger than we think. This is because a small number of major dailies monopolize the industry with similar information and have strong social networks within the companies, between key organizations, and with industries including the television broadcasting service. The press club represents the old custom of Japanese journalism which focuses on the relationships between official news sources and journalists from major press companies, and excludes competing news companies. Business cartels make it possible for newspapers to have other vehicles to convey information in a different context. As a result, the Japanese media strongly influence both public and politics. As Nester (1989) puts it, the Japanese mass media are “the most influential force in society” and have “vast political influence” at the same time (p.29).

Without realizing that the news they consume is not fairly released in the context of freedom of the press, Japanese society is exposed to news almost everyday through reading papers, watching TV, and from every aspect of their daily life. Japanese newspapers, as a consequence, contribute to the homogenization of people’s knowledge and information, and therefore, their lifestyle.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, some of the characteristics of the Japanese media have been influenced by old social customs that were formed by Japanese history and culture. The media developed prominently with the adoption of freedom of the press after the end of

²⁹ *Buraku* refers to financially-challenged communities and/or inhabitants of those hamlets. The discrimination against these small communities and against inhabitants there has been a problem in Japanese society.

WWII. Since then, the Japanese media have developed and become one of the most influential industries in society.

The Japanese media feature very unique characteristics. Unlike the news media in the Western world, and as a reflection of Japan's culture of harmony, the press in Japan does not often stand out and voices its own opinion. There are several elements introduced in this chapter that explain this tendency, but the influence from political and economic actors seems to be an influential element which contributes to the formation of the Japanese media environment. .

Even though news stories are frequently covered in a similar manner in each newspaper, providing the public with a limited amount of information, the public shows a tremendous trust in such news media. Japanese citizens consider newspapers to be the most essential news source, and read more newspapers per capita than any other country (Chen, 1997). In such an environment, the Japanese media enjoy consistent support from the public today. In this way, the Japanese press appears to have an agenda-setting effect just like the Western media.

Chapter 4: Literature Review

1. Theoretical Understanding

This part of the thesis introduces a concept of *second-level agenda setting* and its related concepts as a core media effects theory. The chapter will track the theoretical achievements, explorations, and debates among both Western and Japanese communication researchers with respect the evolution of this theory.

Today, many communication researchers find that the media have a great deal of influence over the public. As Lang & Lang (1966) write, “The mass media force attention to certain issues... They are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, have feelings about” (p.468). It is because they can drive the public’s attention to a small number of issues. Chosen by the media, these issues will receive more attention than any other issues happening at the same time around the world. Lippman’s (1960)³⁰ classic ‘Public Opinion’ indicates that it is around these selected issues where the public opinion is formed. As the world is, for most people, “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” (p.29), news media automatically becomes the primary source with which people have pictures of the outside world regarding public affairs (McCombs, 2002). In contrast to the current research trend on media effects in recent decades, there were times scholars considered the media not very influential.

During the 1940s to the 1950s, a number of classic studies were undertaken which showed that media effects on attitude formation were weaker than expected. In 1944, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet published a book entitled ‘The People’s Choice’, which later received recognition as a classic in the study of voting behavior in political science. In the book, they noted that voters do not have frequent contact with political advertising unless it is an ad for a party that they support (as cited in Takeshita, 1998). This finding was supported and developed by Merton (1957), and Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) who said that undecided voters who showed little contact with political ads tended to attribute their final voting decision to advice given to them by opinion leaders such as family and friends. That

³⁰ @ 1922

is to say, personal influence was stronger than media influence in determining a person's decision-making (as cited in Takeshita, 1998). Klapper then introduced *the limited effects theory* in 1960 (Klapper, 1965).³¹ The theory, which is also sometimes called *the minimal effects theory*, is based on the idea that media effects are rather limited; the media do not make people change their existing attitude; rather, the media help people to support their existing attitudes. Klapper noted that people tend to selectively come into contact with information which supports their existing attitudes, and individuals' preferences are influenced by the group or community they belong to. This theory overturned the popular belief that media have considerable effects on the audience, and as a result, contributed for a time to a reduction in research on media effects (Klapper, 1965).

2. Setting the Agenda of the Public

The limited effects theory labeled media as mostly inefficient in persuading and changing people's existing attitudes. The media study, however, saw a new academic movement to reevaluate the power of mass media in the 70s.

It was McCombs and Shaw who empirically demonstrated what Lippman pointed out in the 1920s. Their theory, *agenda-setting*, transfers priority topics of news media to the public. By providing a great proportion of information and priority news placements for specific topics in the newspaper or in the newscast (Kim, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002), the mass media make people think as if these issues are more important to think about or talk about than any other issue in the world (Miller 2005). The agenda of the media is specifically described as the *media agenda* whereas the agenda of the general public is described as the *public agenda* in the study. When talking about this theory, Bernard Cohen's (1963) classic summarization of the idea is frequently quoted: "... [The press] may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*" (p.13). Therefore we can see that the basic understanding of classic *agenda setting* is based on the belief that the press has some power, but it is not so influential as to make individuals change either their opinion on the issue or their attitude toward it. They still have the decision to form their own opinions on the *media agenda*.

³¹ @ 1960

Based on this theory, public opinion reflects the *public agenda*³², the attention of the public in other words, and this can be assessed by observing public polls. By monitoring both public opinion polls and the *media agenda* for a specific time period before the polls, evidence of the media's power to set the agenda can be examined. Indeed, the correlation between how issues are ranked by the media and how the public values the importance of the same issues indicates correlations of +.50 or more in the majority of the case studies which were conducted by communication scholars. In America, for example, there was a substantial correlation of +.78 in the 1960s between news magazines and public opinion about "the most important problem facing the country" (McCombs, 2002). Moreover, Kioussis (2003) found a positive relation between media coverage and changes in public opinion concerning President Bill Clinton and the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Likewise, there are hundreds of studies proving that media coverage is correlated with public opinion. In 1995, Spain also found a high correlation (+.90) between the *public agenda* relating to the concerns residents in Pamplona³³ had about their living conditions and the media agenda of dominant daily newspapers in the residential area.

3. *Second-Level Agenda-Setting Theory*

In 1993, after exploring this field for 25 years, McCombs and Shaw's continuing research of *agenda setting* extended the theory to include the idea that "the media not only tell us what to think about, but also [tell us] how to think about it, and consequently, what to think" (McCombs & Shaw, 1993, p.65). This extended definition was the birth of a new level of *agenda setting*, which is called *attribute agenda-setting* or *second-level agenda-setting theory*.³⁴

While in the case of classic *agenda setting*, the focus of the study was the main issues which appear in the media independently from each other, the *second-level agenda setting* pays attention to the sub-issues within these main issues. Just as the former theory regarded a news issue where "...the attention of the media and the public are focused" and

³² Similarly, media has media agenda, and policy makers have policy agenda.


³³ Pamplona is the capital city of Navarre, Spain. It had major concerns about high unemployment rate and urban congestion at the time of the research.

³⁴ Because *second-level agenda-setting theory* is more about salience of attributes the media convey to the public, it is often referred as *attribute agenda-setting* as well.

as a result it becomes the item “that defines the agenda” (McCombs, 2002, p.5), these sub-issues within each news issue set the agenda of the individual news issue (see Figure 5). Sub-issues are characteristics and properties which construct the image of the issue. They are technically referred to as *attributes*. Kim & McCombs (2007) explain, “Each object on the agenda has numerous attributes...Just as objects vary in salience, so do the attributes of each object. And just as there is an agenda of objects, there is also an agenda of attributes for each object that can be organized according to the relative salience of those attributes” (p.300).

As we can see in Figure 5, among these attributes, the most frequently emphasized becomes the agenda of attributes, and therefore, salience of the issue. Receiving the most prominently discussed characteristic of an issue (agenda of attributes), the public makes an evaluation of the event (Kim, et al., 2002). Iyengar & Kinger (1987) similarly remark that the perceived salience of an issue conveyed by the media can directly influence the public’s evaluation of the issue as the outcome of the *agenda-setting* power (as cited in Kim, et al., 2002). It is because when the media and the public think and mention certain issues, some characteristics receive more attention than others, and some can be totally ignored (McCombs, 2002). What happens is, as Kiousis (2003) explains, “media emphasis on attributes makes them more “accessible” to individuals who are making political judgments” (p.439).

Figure 5. Model of an Issue and Its Attributes



4. *Cognitive and Affective Attributes of Media Coverage*

Attributes can be divided into two dimensions or aspects: *cognitive* and *affective*. *Cognitive attributes* deal with topical traits that describe the issue (a candidate, object, or an event) based on a substantive point of view whereas *affective attributes* are emotional judgments or descriptions of these traits by the media, that is to say, the evaluative tone of the media's presentation of the issue such as positive, negative, or neutral (Sheafer, 2007). If we borrow the example Kim and McCombs (2007) introduce, in the case of a political candidate as an object, a news story might include his or her leadership ability as a *cognitive* component and quote the candidate's supporter talking in a positive tone about how great the candidate leads the public, which adds positive *affective* component to the attribute.

"Which attributes among the two component influences the public more?" is a controversial topic in the current *second-level agenda setting*. There seems to be no definite superiority between the two concepts so far. Some scholars suggest that *cognitive* elements work more influentially than *affective* ones in some cases. Golan and Wanta (2001) researched newspaper coverage of George W. Bush and John McCain in the 2000 presidential election and found that there was a direct proportional relationship between the media coverage and the four of the six *cognitive* attributes which respondents associated with the candidates. Such a direct relationship was not seen between the media's evaluations of the same issues and respondents' connection of them to the candidates (as cited in Hester & Gibson, 2003).

A recent study, however, remarks that public opinion forming and *affective* components of an issue's coverage also have a strong link (Kim & McCombs, 2007; McCombs & Estrada, 1997; Kiouisis, 2003). Kiouisis (2003), for instance, recently found a linkage between *affective attributes* and changes in public opinion of former U.S. President Bill Clinton. In this study, media coverage of the Monica Lewinsky scandal had positive correlation with the president's perceived favorability (more related to *affective* judgment), while his job approval (more related to *cognitive* judgment) found a negative correlation. In other words, when the public judged the former president, his scandal influenced the public more in his favorability but not as much in his job approval. This suggested that *affective attributes* of the scandal issue were transferred more influentially to the public than *cognitive*

attributes of the same issue.

Wanta et al. (2004), on the other hand, examined news reports of ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN and found that the countries covered by these media more often received more public attention as the countries with high importance to the U.S than other countries. In addition to that finding, they also realized that countries that were covered in a negative tone tend to be evaluated negatively by the audience. Their work showed that there is an influential relationship not only between the amount of the coverage and perception of the object, but also between the content of the coverage and evaluation of it (Hagiwara, 2006). Common to most of this communications research is a caveat that given the unique elements in each case study, it may be difficult to generalize the findings.

5. Agenda-Setting Models

The *agenda-setting* hypothesis has three types of models: the *awareness model*, the *priorities model*, and the *salience model*. The *awareness model* explains that an individual acquires awareness about an issue by receiving the information from the media. This idea is a foundation of the relation between the audience and the media and therefore it is usually taken into account in *agenda-setting* studies. The other two models which were advanced by McCombs illustrate the nature of *agenda-setting* effects on the audience. The *priorities model* assumes that the media's priorities become the individual's to a certain extent. Here, according to McCombs (1977), *agenda setting* transfers issue priorities from the media agenda to the individual's (as cited in Takeshita, 1993). The *salience model*, on the other hand, assumes *agenda-setting* to be the transference of only a few priority issues that are constantly emphasized by the media. The media are able to transfer their priorities to the top ranks of the individuals' personal agendas, but they are unable to determine their overall ranks of personal priorities (Takeshita, 1993).

6. Agenda-Setting Methodologies

Agenda-setting effects can be tested through several methods. According to pre-existing *agenda-setting* studies, McCombs classifies the methodological approaches (see Figure 6). The categories on the left sides concern the kind of the media issues the methodology uses; the first one is a set of issues whereas the second one is a single issue. Research of the first category observes a certain number of issues in the media's priority agenda and the audience's personal priorities to see any similarities between them. The second type of research examines how the individual's awareness about a single issue changes depending on the transition in coverage and contingent conditions on the audience.

The categories on the top of the square, "Aggregate Data" and "Individual Data" are types of data a researcher uses for the analysis. The difference between them depends on whether the researcher assumes the macro group of the audience as a single unit, or the individual as an analytical unit. McCombs notes that including his own study, most of the empirical studies fall into the model type I. The similarities between the media issues (or issue) and public (or individual) opinion data is calculated by applying rank-order correlation coefficient in most cases.

Figure 6. A Typology of Agenda-Setting Research (Reference: McCombs, 1981, p.124)

	Aggregate Data	Individual Data
Set of Issues	I	II
Single Issue	III	IV

7. *Optimal Span of Agenda-Setting Effects*

The definitive answer to how long it takes for media to affect the awareness of the audience is not yet known. There are several findings of note by scholars about the optimal span of *agenda-setting* effects of media. Brewer and McCombs insist, "...prior research has demonstrated significant *agenda-setting* effects both among policy makers and the general public within one to two months" (1996, p.9). Other findings were one month for Zucker (1978, as cited in Takeshita, 1998), four to six weeks for Winter and Eyal (1981), or two to six months for Stone and McCombs (1981) for the *media agenda* to be transferred to the public.

Regardless of the difference in the media sample, research designs, and public opinion surveys employed, it appears that strong *agenda-setting* results tend to appear not in a short observation period, but in a relatively long span of time. This point was also confirmed in Japanese *agenda-setting* research. Takeshita (1998) notes that the optimal span was two to three weeks for newspapers and three to four weeks for television broadcasting, in his study which took place in Wakayama city in 1982. Ogawa (1991) agrees with Takeshita's insight. According to Ogawa, the *agenda-setting* effects of media in a Japanese context are seen strongly after two to three weeks after the news report (Ogawa, 1991).

In terms of the *agenda-setting* effects of sub-issues in a news topic, Salwen (1988) found its optimal span longer than regular *agenda-setting* studies. In Salwen's test on the topic of the global environment, the strongest effect was seen in fourteen and seventeen weeks. The correlation started declining not suddenly but gradually after that. Considering this result, Salwen hypothesized that people learn about environmental issues by relying on media, and it could result in the retention of what they learn from media after the decline of news report on the topic (1988). Similarly, a Japanese sub-topical *agenda-setting* study on environmental issues resulted in supporting Salwen's finding that the audience learns sub-issues in a relatively long span of time. The peak of correlation between newspapers (The Yomiuri and the Asahi) and the public was seen in six to ten weeks before the opinion survey, and the correlation started to gradually decline after that (Mikami et al., 1995).

8. Priming

Specifically, the impact which *agenda-setting* gives to the way individuals evaluate an issue is known as *priming*. The *priming* concept hypothesizes that when individuals evaluate the performance of the government, political actors, or political candidates, they use issues most salient in their memory (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Takeshita, 1998). In this point, the *media agenda* influences people's evaluating process by affecting individual's criteria, in other words, by "...influencing the thematic areas or issues that individuals use to form their evaluations" (Kim et al., 2002. p.8). *Priming*, according to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), is an extension of *agenda setting*. The reasons they suggest are:

- (a) Both effects are based on memory-based models of information processing. These models assume that people form attitudes based on the considerations that are most salient (i.e., most accessible) when they make decisions (Hastie & Park, 1986);
- (b) Based on the common theoretical foundation, some researchers have argued that priming is a temporal extension of agenda setting (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). By making some issues more salient in people's mind (agenda setting), mass media can also shape the considerations that people take into account when making judgments about political candidates or issues (priming). (p. 11)

Iyengar and Kinder (1987), for instance, in their research observed the relationship between an individual's evaluation of how a president dealt with an issue reported by the media and the same person's overall evaluation of the president. The result showed a positive relationship between the two and suggested that the evaluation of the president depended on how the president dealt with the particularly notable issue the media was emphasizing among other political issues. It is also known, based on *priming* research, that when the public judges a political figure, the *priming* effects of news coverage affect performance assessment more than the personality assessment of the individual (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).

It was Iyengar and his research group who introduced the concept of *priming* in political communication, but the concept originally came from psychology. Generally it is referred to the influence of preceding information to the interpretation or searching of subsequent media reporting (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). That is to say, when individuals make an evaluation or judgment, they do not think of related issues objectively, but rather depend on

information which is more accessible than other information in their memory. Iyengar's attempt to include this psychological concept in the understanding of *agenda-setting* effects contributed to the illustration of the influential flow from media to the public.

Exploring the concept, Kim et al. (2002) introduced an expanded idea of *priming*, *attribute priming*, as an outcome of attribute (or *second-level*) *agenda setting*. *Attribute priming* is the influence of mass media on the evaluation of issues by the public. Specifically, the theory suggests that the issue attributes that were emphasized in mass media will become significant elements in the public's evaluation of the issues. Regarding this new theory, as noted previously in this chapter, Kim and McCombs (2007) write that the attributes can have both *substantive (cognitive)* and *affective* aspects. Previous studies have found links between the *affective* tone of news reporting on both political and non-political issues and public opinion of them.

9. Framing

Framing theory is referenced in much contemporary media-effects research. The primary difference of this concept from accessibility-based models such as *agenda setting* and *priming* is that *framing* theory questions "how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence of how it is understood by audiences" (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p.11). In general, approaches applied by Goffman (1974) and Bateson (1972) are based on a sociological understanding. They focus on the use of elements in media reports such as storylines, symbols, and stereotypes (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). What Goffman labeled the "schemata of interpretation" is the central the concept of *framing*: this allowed individuals or groups of people "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" incidents. In contrast, psychologists see *framing* as "changes in judgment engendered by alterations to the definition of judgment or choice problems" (Iyengar & Simon, 1993, p.369).

According to Entman (1993), framing is "... to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (p.52). *Framing* theory questions how news stories are organized in a way as to promote their effects (Reese, 2007).

Television news coverage demonstrates public issues in the shape of *episodic* or *thematic* frames (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). The *episodic* news frame introduces public issues with specific events and concrete terms such as a victim of racial discrimination, an employed worker, or the bombing of an airliner. The *thematic* news frame, on the other hand, reports issues by providing somewhat general or abstract context-based reports on changes in the nature of employment opportunities or the backlog in the criminal justice process. It is typical for the *thematic* news frame to feature “talking heads” and employ the reporting form of either “takeout” or “backgrounder” while the *episodic* frame consists of live coverage on the scene which is more visually appealing by making “good pictures” when compared to the *thematic framing*. Because of the nature of the television news report, the *episodic* frame tends to appear more often than *thematic* frames (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).

Iyengar (1991), in fact, conducted longitudinal research on poverty broadcasting from 1980 to 1986 and found that two thirds of all stories on the topic had episodic frames, focused on particular people’s stories. Iyengar and Simon (1993) additionally point out that television coverage on politics as well as stories on terrorism heavily rely on *episodic* frames.

10. Conceptual Distinction

This part of the chapter will try to categorize each concept for clearer interpretation. In short, classic *agenda-setting* is an argument about the media’s influence specifically limited to the *frequency* of contacts the public has with the coverage of certain issues. In other words, the *accessibility* of the media’s agenda to the public is discussed here as key to setting the public’s agenda. Kim et al. (2002) categorize *agenda setting* as an “accessibility-based” concept. *Priming* particularly is an outcome of *agenda setting* when the public evaluates the issue. *Second-level agenda setting*, on the other hand, is categorized as “applicability-based” (Kim et al., 2002). Accordingly, the mass media frame an issue to provide “important interpretive cues” to the public. If these cues are recognized and correspond with the public’s pre-existing interpretations or classifications, a *framing* effect will succeed and will be accepted (Kim et al., 2002, p.9).

Agenda setting, *priming*, and *framing* are conceptually related to each other. Particularly, *framing* and *second-level agenda-setting* are often referred to as similar

concepts, explaining similar phenomena using different terms. Researchers suggest that *framing* should be replaced by *second-level agenda setting* or *attribute agenda setting*. Some scholars, however, such as Weaver, McCombs, and Shaw (1998) consider that *framing* and *priming* are natural extensions of *agenda setting* and therefore not the same concept (as cited in Kim et al., 2002, p. 8). Kim et al. also argue that the attempt to group these ideas into one category will be, according to Scheufele (2000), “bound to further muddle the distinctions between already ill-defined concepts” (as cited in Kim et al., 2002, p.8). Regarding this controversy over the theoretical understanding of *framing* and *agenda setting* (as well as *second-level agenda setting*), Reese (2007) comments,

This turf battle is ironic, because I would view framing as in part a reaction against the theoretical limitations of its neighbor. This theoretical poaching is aided by a strong tendency in framing research to define the object too strictly as manifest content, captured in salience, and agenda setting works on the transfer of salience. (p.151)

11. Why Media Agenda Setting Matters

Study of the *media agenda* leads us to the next level where a *public agenda* set by the mass media forms a *policy agenda*. Now the media’s agenda is transferred to the political level. Walsh-Childers (1994), for example, commenting on the potential roles of the media in his study of health policy development, stated that they are “[1.] altering and informing them [the audience] about an issue, [2.] legitimating an issue by placing it on the public agenda, [3.] providing a frame for thinking, and affecting actual behavior, such as passing legislations or making appropriations” (as cited in Brewer & McCombs, 1996, p.8).


McCombs claims that media are not deliberately forming a *media agenda* in order to influence the public. It is because a media agenda is made from “countless day-to-day decisions by many different journalists and their supervisors about the news of the moment” (2002, p.2). Even if the media in democratic countries are freely discussed with their rights well preserved, the high accessibility of particular issues or frequently emphasized salience of the issues reaches the public and, in some cases, can even become a political discussion.

Concerning the effect of the press in policy-making, Cohen (1963) introduced major roles of the press in making foreign policy. The roles are “role of observer of foreign policy news, role of participant in the foreign policy process (along with policy makers), and the role of catalyst of foreign news”, as Wanta, Golan, and Lee (2004, p.367) explain the idea. Wanta et al. (2004) view the final function of the press as representing the central idea of media’s *agenda-setting* power over the public. Sato (2003) refers to Cook et al.’s (Cook, Tyler, Goetz, Gordon, Protess, Leff, & Molotch, 1983) idea and points out, “The media serve as a creator, as well as a mediator...of public concerns, depending on its environment, and facilitate policy change” (Sato, 2003, p. 35).

One idea of the flow of influence can be drawn, as discussed above, from media to the public, then from the public to politics. There are cases, though, when the media influence the policy agenda directly. For example, Cook et al. (1983) found that a special news program broadcast by NBC news about a welfare problem influenced political elites directly. The significance of the study is that policy makers’ change in interest happened not through the growth of public opinion but rather through policy maker’s assumption of media’s influence over the public.

This example suggests that sometimes media influence policy making directly. Rogers and Dearing (1988) illustrate the flow of influence among the three representative categories and the figure comprehends the image of media’s communication flow as well as a policy making process (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Three Main Components of the Agenda-Setting Process: Media Agenda, Public Agenda, and Policy Agenda (Reference: Rogers & Dearing, 1988, p.557)



In relation to the policy making process, Naoyuki Okada, a professor of sociology at Toyo University, Japan, defines the significance of *agenda-setting theory* in that it tells the public: 1) the point of political controversy and 2) the direction of political decision (2001). The former is understood as the result of the classic *agenda-setting* function of the media to set the agenda of the public, and the latter is the *second-level agenda-setting* function of the media to transfer the perspective of particular issues to the public.

12. Japanese Media Studies and the Agenda-Setting Function of the Japanese Press

Theoretical understandings of *agenda-setting* implies that the importance of keeping track of what the media report lies not only in realizing possible effects on the public's mind but also doing so on the government's policy making. As discussed, many North American communication specialists analyzed this matter and found positive correlations in many different cases between the media reports and the interest of citizens, and between the media reports and policy making. This raises the question: "Does the same thing happen outside of North America?"

Considering the rich, media-oriented information environment in Japan and the overall influence of the media on the public in their daily life (see more details in chapter 3 about Japanese media), however, it is not very difficult, but even natural to assume that they also have *agenda-setting* power just like cases reported in North America. The truth is, however, that the majority of *agenda-setting* research is concentrated on the American and European media, and this type of research has not been sufficiently conducted to generalize the *agenda-setting* power of the media outside of these regions (Cho & Lacy, 2000). Japanese political scientist, Kabashima (1990) also criticizes the Japanese mass media studies community for not having conducted enough case studies to examine the *agenda-setting* power of the Japanese media. Since many of the existing case studies are those of big policy changes, which are usually more attractive and eye-catching for researchers than small cases, the data has to be examined conservatively due to specificity of the cases (Kabashima, 1990). The following section of this chapter therefore introduces existing quantitative and qualitative knowledge about the Japanese media, *agenda setting*, and their relations with Japanese policy-making and politics

As one of the most senior experimental researchers, Toshio Takeshita (1993), observed, the *agenda-setting* effect of the media was identified in a 1986 Japanese mayoral election. A positive correlation of +.39 was found between what the voter in Machida city found as key issues in the election and what the four Japanese major newspapers reported.

The *agenda-setting* effect was tested in the 1993 Japanese general election as well. At the time of the election, the Japanese media were unanimously covering the need for political reform. Based on an analysis of 650 Tokyo voters, Takeshita and Mikami (1995) observed correlation between the public's salient attention to the issue of political reform and their level of exposure to TV news (correlation of +.24), and newspapers (+.27).

Subsequently, Mikami et al. (1995) found a stronger level of the Japanese press' *agenda setting* power. They researched the correlation between pictures in the public's (to be specific, Tokyo residents') mind about aspects of global environmental issues and the Japanese newspapers' coverage on it. Their finding was relatively weak in the relationship between television news reports and what the audience thought was salient in environment issues. The newspaper coverage, on the other hand, showed cumulative and gradual effects in transferring media salience. In comparison, there was a strong result of *agenda setting*

with a correspondence +.71 in the U.S. about a similar environmental topic³⁵ (McCombs, 2002).

A more recent case study analyzed by Potter and Belle (2004) demonstrated that Japanese news coverage influenced the allocation of the Japanese government's foreign aid. The study suggested that the more media coverage of a less-developed country, the higher development aid commitment the government tend to have on the country. The study found the media's coverage as an indicator of aid allocation and the finding of the study also suggested that the media's coverage more likely impacts policy makers directly rather than through influencing the public. This quantitative analysis therefore found that the *media agenda* transferred to the *policy agenda* in the Japanese context (Potter & Belle, 2004). They point out:

It does not matter if media leads or trails the public's agenda as long as decision makers believe that it does one or the other and can be used to represent public perceptions sufficiently to serve as a proxy for it ... public officials do not regularly survey public opinion polls when they make policy decisions, instead they assume... that media coverage is public opinion and act accordingly. (p.132)

This idea was, as they noted in their study as well, supported by Campbell (1996) who remarks that "propensity...for Japanese decision makers to take press attention as a surrogate for public opinion" (p.190). Among rare *agenda-setting* studies which are normally focused on the Japanese media context, Potter and Belle's study is one of the few that examined the media's role in Japanese policy making.

Long-time communications researcher, Sato (2003) also looked at the function of the Japanese media in Japanese policymaking on a particular social topic, smoking and health from 1945 to 1990. Throughout his study, media reports were found to constantly influence administrative policy-making and mobilize administrative agencies to act. As a result of the study, media set a policy agenda in the Diet for a limited time (before non-smokers rose to demand their rights), proving both that the media can set a policy agenda in Japan and that without media coverage a scientific report on the risk of smoking could not be brought to the attention of the Diet by its mere existence in the public domain (Sato, 2003). There was

³⁵ The topic was about constructing a man-made lake in Indiana. The correlation between media's coverage and the public's pictures of the issue was tested.

consistent involvement of interest groups which, Sato remarks, “affected the function and efficacy of mass media over time” (p.35). This study revealed that the Japanese media can influence policy-making by providing the Diet with the *policy agenda*.

Okada (2001) assumes in his book ‘*Media no Seiji Shakai Gaku* [Political Sociology of Public Opinion]’ that Japanese newspapers are becoming more ideological than they were thirty years ago and, therefore, the *agenda-setting* influence of the media on political decisions has become more prevalent. He insists that major Japanese newspapers more or less influence Japanese public opinion by providing both explicit and suggestive directions of political judgments to their readers (2001).

Visgatis and Swenson (2006) initiated a unique study of the news coverage of Japanese newspapers. Instead of looking at what the media included, they examined what they refrained from reporting. As a result, the Darfur crisis, the sample topic of their research, was virtually not reported on by major Japanese newspapers, nor did it influence the government enough to send Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Sudan on a peacekeeping operation. The way the newspapers framed the crisis was also examined and it turned out that the Yomiuri and the Asahi newspapers framed the group responsible for the crisis differently.

Inspired by Ito’s (1997) Japanese media study, which revealed that the mass media had created such a negative environment that the International Peace and Cooperation Law was never passed, Kusano and Kondo (2004) initiated another media study on Japanese security policy (as cited in Kusano & Kondo, 2004). They noted the direct influence of the media on Japanese domestic policymaking. According to these authors, the Japanese media exercised the greatest influence on the Diet when it reported that dispatching an Aegis destroyer to Afghanistan on a peacekeeping operation led by the U.S. military could be in violation of the Japanese constitution³⁶. Eventually the media coverage surrounding this particular use of the destroyer created such a controversial debate that the government reversed its decision to send the ship on a U.S.-led peacekeeping mission. Every major Japanese newspaper made an effort to inform the public about how powerful the ship could be by pushing the line of “support” given to the U.S. military, making the issue highly

³⁶ The current understanding of Article nine of Japanese Constitution allows the use of the self-defense military only when Japan is attacked by other country. It doesn’t allow collective self-defense, an attack to eliminate invasion against other country.

politicized. Given the rise of the controversy in newspapers, Japanese political figures started commenting on the issue at public occasions such as executive councils and committee meetings. For instance, one-time Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party Hiromu Nonaka commented at an executive council, “Why are we talking about sending a destroyer and doing whatever with it even though the U.S. hasn’t started any actions yet? It is kind of risky.”³⁷ Following this statement, Taku Yamazaki, the Secretary-General of the time, put it; “Whether we include the ship or not [to the support army] is an important political decision. I’m negative about it”³⁸ (Kusano & Kondo, 2004, pp.14-15). Finally the Prime Minister commented that, “The news report is not necessarily true. Former issues and this issue as well...the newspapers write many things, things that exist or do not exist, but there are many aspects which don’t go in the newspapers”³⁹ (p.15).

A similar case of the *media agenda* bypassing over the *public agenda* and going directly to the *political agenda* can be seen in the television news program “Teleport TBS 6”. This program featured a report on the deplorable conditions of unofficial child-care facilities, which attracted attention from the government and contributed to the amendment of the Child Welfare Law without fostering remarkable political movement or public opinion change⁴⁰ (Takeshita, 1998).

Regarding the Japanese media’s influence in respect to politics, Kabashima (1990) established a new model of the Japanese media environment called “Referent Pluralism [*Media Tagenshugi*]”. According to this idea, the media is regarded to be: 1) an independent, politically neutral sector, 2) equally willing to give wide latitude to any social group of different size and ideology, and 3) able to cast a strong influence over the public. Using this media pluralism model, Kabashima came to the conclusion that the Japanese mass media have a big role to play in Japanese politics (Kabashima, 1990). The mass media pick up an

³⁷ The English quote was translated by the author. The original Japanese for the quote was “*Beikoku ga koudou wo okoshiteinai noni ijisukan wo dasu toka dasanai toka iunoha doushitakotoka. Chotto kiken na kanji ga shinai demo nai.*”

³⁸ “*Ijisukan wo hukumerukadouka ha daijina seiji handanda. Watashiha shoukyokuron da.*”

³⁹ “*Shinbunhodo ga jujitsu toha kagirimasen. Imamade no rei ni oitemo, ijisukan no hapyo ni oitemo, ijisukan, mada hakenshiteinaishi, youi mo shiteinaishi, iroiro, arukotonaikoto wo shinbunhodo ha kakimasuga, shinbunhodo dakedehanaimenmo takusan arundesu.*”


⁴⁰ Takeshita explains this media phenomenon in which policy makers act without waiting for the public’s reaction to the news by applying Davison’s (1983) third-person effect. The theory suggests that a person underestimates the influence of media upon themselves, but tends to overestimate it over others who do not belong to the same group as you do.

issue or need from an interest group, inform the public and policy makers, and then eventually prompts them to act on it (Kabashima, Takeshita and Serikawa, 2007). This special function of the media made Kabashima include the media as a fourth sector which is located just outside the circle of the Japanese traditional power structure, the triangle of *Sei* (political groups and politicians), *Kan* (bureaucratic groups and government bureaucrats) and *Zai* (economy groups and business representatives) (see Figure 8 for Referent Pluralism Model).

Kabashima's model is based on the media's politically and ideologically neutral position, but resulted in causing a debate. Considering Kabashima's referent pluralism model, Kusano and Kondo introduced an adjusted model titled "Mass Media's Change in Function" (see Figure 9). This adjusted model features a ruling party, the government, and bureaucrats as mutually influencing groups. Kusano and Kondo note that these three groups ought not to be categorized into one group because in reality they influence each other (Kusano & Kondo, 2004). They also explain that Kabashima's pluralism reflects Japanese politics in the period when LDP had been an unparalleled, dominant party, and omits describing the directions of influence within the policy-making group. Especially since Koizumi's Diet in 2001, the relationships among the ruling party⁴¹, the government (Diet) and the bureaucracy are more separated from each other than in the past. Additionally, Kusano and Kondo believe that this adjusted model should be able to explain almost any policy-making process. Ishikawa (1990), on the other hand, insists that the Japanese media's influence is not as influential as scholars think. According to him, the political sector has a much greater influence on the Japanese media than the Japanese media have on the audience.

⁴¹ "parties", in recent Japanese politics. LDP is no more as powerful as it was before, so the ruling party is often constructed by more than two parties including LDP.


Figure 8. Kabashima's Referent Pluralism Model (Reference: Kabashima, 1990, p.21.)



* LDP stands for Liberal Democratic Party, the Japanese conservative political party which has been the ruling party in Japanese politics in recent times. The political link between LDP, agricultural and economical interest groups is traditionally strong.

Figure 9. Kusano and Kondo's Mass Media's Change-in-Function Model

(Reference: Kusano & Kondo, 2004, p.19)



Other than the discussion concerning which group is more influential, the political or media sectors, there is a cynical metaphor that the media were transformed from a watchdog to a lapdog, meaning they were absorbed into the current political and business structure and became a part of the political authority (Donohue, 1995 cited in Okada, 2001). On the other hand, there is another view that insists that the Japanese media has become the top authority in society (Nishibe, 1990, as cited in Okada, 2001) and they have become more influential than the watchdog, or the lapdog, as a source of influence behind the traditional authority groups of politics, bureaucracy, and business.

13. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that in comparison to the extensive research on the *agenda-setting* effects of the American mass media, there is considerably less research by the scholarly community concerning such effects of the Japanese mass media. The existing case studies of the Japanese media tend to focus on unique, sensational cases rather than on the more routine coverage of general issue-areas. The media effects literature in Japan tends to be more qualitative in nature; the quantitative studies that do exist are usually related to election coverage. Some case studies relying on qualitative methodologies suggest that media coverage is one of the main influences on political actors in Japan. Conversely, a lack of media coverage means that certain international political incidents can be ignored by the whole country. The Japanese literature tends to examine patterns of influence between the media and the political class rather than between the media and the public. The current state of media effects research in Japan therefore offers more scope for empirical case studies that examine the *agenda-setting* power of the Japanese media vis-à-vis the public agenda. There is a common understanding and expectation among researchers of the Japanese media that there will be positive correlations between the agendas of the media and the Japanese public, similar to that which is found between the agendas of the American media and the American public. Another conclusion to be drawn from this review of the literature is that the Japanese media have become more politicized, which in turn may affect public attitudes (see more details in chapter 3). This trend is an inspiration for this study's focus on testing the *second-level agenda-setting theory* in a Japanese context where there is even less existing research

in comparison to, for example, traditional *agenda-setting* studies. A greater understanding of *agenda setting* and *second-level agenda setting*, including *priming* and *framing*, within the Japanese media context will contribute to the Japanese media studies literature by providing concrete data on which to base commentaries about the power of the Japanese media to set the public policy agenda.

Chapter 5: Methodology

The aim of this study is to test the applicability of media *agenda-setting* theory in a Japanese context. The influence of the Japanese print media on Sino-Japanese relations will be tested through the content analysis of coverage of these relations in two prominent, national daily Japanese newspapers. The results of the content analysis will be compared with national public poll data in order to investigate whether a positive correlation exists between the Japanese print media's agenda and the Japanese public's agenda as defined by a selection of public opinion surveys. If there is a strong positive correlation, then there is a strong likelihood, given the relationship between the elite print media and politics in Japan, that the Japanese print media have had an important *agenda-setting* role in Japan's relations with China. This case study would, therefore, provide (a) an important contribution to the media effects literature in a country other than the United States and (b) provide an important perspective on the Japanese print media's potential influence on Japan's diplomacy.

As noted previously, this study is designed to analyze the *second-level agenda-setting* function of the Japanese media. Hypothesis one (H1) focuses on the transferred *cognitive attributes* and hypothesis two (H2) is designed to test *affective attributes* of the Japanese press media. Coverage of bilateral Sino-Japanese relations was chosen as the sample public issue for the testing of *second-level agenda setting*.

This chapter will begin with a statement of two sets of hypotheses. It will then provide an assessment of content analysis as an effective methodology for investigating the *second-level agenda-setting theory* in the case of Sino-Japanese coverage in the Japanese media. The second half of the chapter will provide details on the research design, including the public opinion surveys that were used to identify the public agenda.

1. Research Design

Even though there are a vast amount of studies on the relationship between the Japanese media and politics, there have been few specific studies focused on how the Japanese media influence national public opinion. The existing research on the Japanese

media focused on political elections and the image of political figures. There has been no research conducted on the Japanese media concerning diplomatic issues. This case study, therefore, will examine the *agenda-setting* power of the Japanese press on Japanese public opinion, typically on Sino-Japan relations. The study's aim is to promote better understanding of the Japanese media, especially the influence of print media on the formation of the public's attitude concerning diplomatic issues.

This study is designed to analyze the *second-level agenda-setting* function of Japanese media. H1 particularly focuses on the transferred *cognitive attributes* whereas the H2 is designed to test *affective attributes* of the Japanese press media. For both hypotheses, newspaper articles were examined based on content analysis to investigate whether there is any correlation between media coverage and public opinion. The sample public issue for testing *second-level agenda setting* was chosen as the coverage of Sino-Japanese relations since it was the most frequently appeared topic in newspapers during the observed time period.

Research Hypotheses

H1 investigates whether there is a transfer of topic salience within newspaper coverage of Sino-Japanese relations. H2 investigates whether the prevailing tones in the coverage of Sino-Japanese relations is transferred from the *media agenda* to the *public agenda*.

H1 observes the *second-level agenda-setting* function of the Japanese press in terms of setting the top ranks in the individual's personal priority ranking for Sino-Japanese relations (*the salience model*). The experimental sub-issues were chosen from the top ranks using aggregated opinion survey data to be compared with the top priorities in media agenda in the experimental period. This kind of methodology falls into type III in McCombs' categorization (see Figure 6). H1 is looking for *cognitive attributes* in the *second-level agenda-setting* function of the press, but theoretically-speaking and following from the discussion in chapter 4, it can also be understood as testing *classic, or first-level agenda-setting*. This is due to the fact that *second-level agenda setting* is an extension of *classic agenda-setting*; both theories share the same understanding about the transition of topical salience to the audience.

For H1, the findings of the content analysis of the media coverage will be compared with the existing national public opinion surveys in 2002 and 2006. Regarding the fact that the public's top priority issue in Sino-Japanese relations was economic in 2002 followed by a shift to historical issues as a priority in 2006⁴², the first part of the study proposes the following hypotheses as H1.

Hypothesis 1-a: The more the Japanese press covers the historical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, the more the public regards the historical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations as the most important issue in the bilateral diplomatic relations.

Hypothesis 1-b: The less the Japanese press covers the economic aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, the less the public regards the economic aspects of Sino-Japanese relations as the most important issue in the bilateral diplomatic relations.

The second hypothesis focuses on the decreased feelings of affinity with China among Japanese citizens in 2005. If, as the theory suggests, public opinion was influenced by the media coverage, the media should therefore be seen to have caused the Japanese public to have less affinity with its neighbor. Given that the *second-level agenda-setting* theory suggests that the *cognitive* and *affective attributes* of media coverage can be transferred to the public, the negative growth of the percentage of affinity with China can be hypothesized as:

Hypothesis 2-a: The Japanese media coverage on the sub-issues in Sino-Japanese relations is positively correlated with the decrease in affinity with China among Japanese citizens.

Hypothesis 2-b: The Japanese press coverage of a negatively or unfriendly China and Chinese representations in Sino-Japanese relations is positively correlated with the decrease in affinity with China among Japanese citizens.

⁴² In 2002, the public thought the primary issue in the relations was economical such as a trade conflict (47.6%). The historical issues including the Yasukuni discord and the controversy over expressions about the Pacific War in school textbooks⁴² were ranked as the second important issue (44.3%). On the other hand in 2006, the order was flipped to historical issues (58.9%) for the most important issue while economic issues (26.6%) were ranked as the fifth. See more details in Figure 8.

H2-a examines the transfer of *cognitive attributes*, or sub-topical issues in other words, from the press to the public. Similarly, H2-b examines the transfer of *affective attributes*. Since polls showed negative growth in affinity with China, if the sub-issues in Sino-Japanese relations in the press correlate with the reasons the Japanese public chose for the decrease of their affinity with China, it can then be conjectured that *affective attributes* were transferred from the print media to the public. Additionally, H2 examines if the *priorities model* of the *agenda-setting* function exists in this specific case. The methodology will adopt type I in Figure 6 by examining the agreement between media's issue priorities and the audience's personal priorities in aggregated survey data.

Independent and Dependent Variables

Theoretically speaking, the independent variable is the amount of media coverage (the *media agenda*), and the dependent variable is the public opinion on the issue (the *public agenda*) because the influence is believed to flow from the media to the public. This research, however, put them the other way around because the approach is taken paradoxically by checking the *media agenda* if there is any correspondence with the *public agenda*. Therefore, in this particular research, the *media agenda* is treated as the dependent variable, and the *public agenda* is the independent variable. This approach can be often seen in empirical *agenda-setting* research.

Agenda-setting studies of the Western newspapers demonstrate that there are correlations between the emphasis in newspapers and how the public regards the same issue. Such correlations were found with newspaper coverage of; economic news, child welfare, local environmental problems, international conflicts, gender debates, and a number of political campaigns and political figures in regular articles and editorials. As Cho and Lacy (2000) elaborate in their study of Japanese local dailies, whether non-Western newspapers have the same results as their Western correspondents is a big question and a hot research topic to explore. With regard to the small numbers of studies concerning the impact of the Japanese media on the formation of the Japanese public opinion, particularly not many in cases of foreign affairs⁴³, these hypotheses were drawn to contribute to the effort to answer such an academic question by observing the role of Japanese media in a diplomatic relations

⁴³ From the first substantial agenda-setting research of McCombs' and Shaw's, which was conducted in the election of 1968, elections have been a mainstream research field for the *agenda-setting theory*.

between China and Japan.

2. Content Analysis

Researchers who apply content analysis can be found in many communication studies dealing with texts and messages. This approach was also chosen as the best manner to investigate themes and news frames in newspaper articles. What features makes content analysis different from other approaches? What do the researchers who apply content analysis try to detail?

Definitions

There are three main categories of research goals which researchers try to reveal through content analysis: 1) The intention of the information sender; 2) The psychological condition of the information receivers; and 3) Communicational effects (Berelson, 1954; Hashimoto, 1998, as both cited in Arima, 2007). Content analysis is not subjective interpretation either inference based on arbitrary decision or bias but rather verification properly constructed using step-by-step procedures (Arima, 2007). Early research defined the approach as “The technique ... attempts to characterize the meanings in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion” (Kaplan, 1943, p.230, as cited in Franzosi, 2004), or “...a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1954, p. 489, as cited in Franzosi, 2004). Later definitions omitted the emphasis on quantifications, but included “inference”, “objectivity”, and “systematization” as requirements⁴⁴. Franzosi (2004) concludes that content analysis applies scientific approaches rather than simply interpretive techniques to understand text, whether or not it is quantitative or inferential.

The question of whether content analysis is a quantitative or qualitative approach depends on the features of the text in question and what kind of trends a coder tries to capture from it. George (1959, as cited in Arima 2007), for instance, found it was nonsensical to quantitatively analyze propaganda texts because in most cases propaganda

⁴⁴ See Holsti, 1969, for example.

messages hide qualitative implications in messages. On the other hand, conducting a qualitative analysis of hundreds of news transcripts would take longer than quantitatively analyzing them. When a coder judges that there would be elements which cannot be revealed using the quantitative approach, the approach will need to make a qualitative analysis to assess textual content. Likewise, when a coder judges that it is worth transforming the messages in the text to numbers without losing any intimate sense of the text, the quantitative approach will be the better choice (Arima, 2007).

Content analysis differs from typical qualitative approaches such as narrative analysis, conversation analysis, discourse analysis, or semiotics in terms of dealing with numbers in association with words. There is a wide range of specific approaches designed to better understand texts or messages, which are grouped under the category of content analysis. These approaches include examples such as word counts and keyword counts, thematic analysis, referential analysis, prepositional analysis, story grammars, and the study of social relations. Among these approaches, the thematic approach, or thematic content analysis, is the most common. The investigator, or often called in textbooks dealing with content analysis the “coder”, categorizes the thematic subjects (or dominant themes) of the texts following a coding scheme, which is developed with high familiarity with the examining text. Coding schemes are not universal, therefore each analysis needs to produce a well-constructed original scheme, which is concerned with the content of the text and is developed particularly for the analysis. Referential content analysis, on the other hand, is designed to uncover main themes in a text. Compared to the thematic approach, the referential approach is better suited to “capture the complexity of language in the production of meaning” (Franzosi, 2004, p.186), because it “...ascertain[s] how an existing phenomenon is portrayed” (Krippendorff, 1980, p.62, as cited in Franzosi, 2004). This is accomplished by observing how backgrounding/foregrounding information, salience/emphasis, choice of nouns/adjectives, or even passive or active syntactical constructs are used to describe the same thing in different ways (Franzosi, 2004).

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach

Most of the communication research which examines messages in texts applies content analysis to analyze their data. *Agenda-setting* research, for example, commonly employs this methodology. Researchers who employ this methodology in their studies assume that messages or the placements of messages in the media have power that influences the audience's perception of the issue, organization, or policymakers involved (Ferguson, 2000). Content analysis adds the additional question of "why?" to the communication study's "who says what to whom, how and with what effect" question (Lasswell, 1948). According to Ferguson (2000), the goal of content analysis is: 1) to infer characteristics of a message, 2) to understand the ideology of the media, 3) to propose the conditional aspects which brought about the demand for the message, and 4) to suggest possible effects of the message. One advantage of this approach, which Franzosi (2004) points out, is its efficiency. Content analysis discovers and reveals meanings or tendencies in large volumes of data. Its disadvantage lies in its inability to identify nuances. Franzosi emphasizes that evaluating which approach is superior between quantitative and qualitative approaches is an unhelpful way of thinking. He underlines that both have strengths and weaknesses.

The reliability of content analysis is known as intercoder reliability, and can be tested by making different coders code the same material. Its purpose is to verify the repeatability of the analysis, in other words, to see if the coding scheme, which is like the engine of the analysis, is objective enough so that different coders will reach a high percentage of agreement in their results. The more subjective, abstract, or theoretical the categories of a coding scheme, the more likely the results will tend to disagree (Franzosi, 2004). In order to capture reliable and accurate data from the material, a coder needs to develop a comprehensive but concrete coding scheme. For that, textbooks suggest that coders pretest the scheme several times and adjust it before beginning the analysis. Each coder, as well, needs training so that personal judgments shall not be included in the results (Arima, 2007).

3. Content Analysis Research Design

The Sample Newspapers

This case study will specifically observe Japanese newspaper coverage as one of the most influential media sources in Japan. The main reason for omitting television programs as a sample is two-fold: (a) the lack of a television archive for Japanese programs and (b) the constant flow of television news. Unlike the U.S. or South Korea which respectively have TV news archives⁴⁵, there is no archive in Japan which stores either the video recording or transcripts of news programs. As a result, media researchers record programs regularly for a certain period of time and then develop transcripts from the videos to conduct content analysis. This work is not only time consuming but also risks the possibility of compromising the study if the recorder happens to forget to record a program. Therefore the majority of Japanese TV news broadcasting is limited a short time period, usually one to three weeks (Hagiwara, 2006).

The second reason is that unlike newspapers which have “face”, or the front page of the day as the most obvious news and what the paper thinks is of great interest, TV reporting flows with time. Even if one program reports the most important news of the day right at the beginning of the program, the audience does not always watch the program from beginning to end. Actually, existing research shows relatively low *agenda-setting* effects of television news broadcasting on the audience when compared with the effects of newspapers reporting the same issue (Mikami et al., 1995; Takeshita, 1993). This contradicts the popular belief that television is more influential than newspapers. At the same time, research on the readership of newspapers shows that despite the popular belief that young people are not as familiar with reading a newspaper as adults are; youth tend to trust what newspapers report more than adults do. They believe the newspaper is an intellectual medium and a useful way to receive knowledge (The Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association, 2004).

⁴⁵ Vanderbilt University’s TV news archive ‘Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts’ is often used for a long-term TV news research in the U.S., and similarly major TV news stations in South Korea have their own service on their websites offering videos and transcript of news programs in the past (see Lee 2006).

Moreover, this study considered the risk of underestimating the possible linguistic effects of voiced messages as well as psychological effects of live reporting and moving pictures. Additionally, with the understanding that basic information from Japanese news programs comes from newspapers (Kabashima, 1990), examining newspapers was regarded as more reasonable for this research.

Considering the difficulties of researching *agenda-setting* effects of Japanese television news, this thesis employed only newspapers as samples for this case study. Among existing Japanese newspapers, the Asahi and the Yomiuri were selected as sample newspapers. The Asahi and the Yomiuri newspapers are both national newspapers published in most major Japanese cities. The Yomiuri, for example, has the largest newspaper circulation in the world, with well over 10 million readers daily. Founded in 1874, it has been one of the biggest newspapers representing the rightist and nationalist editorial position among major Japanese daily newspapers. It is also known to reflect the government's political position. In Japan, one of the world's leading countries in terms of daily newspaper sales, the Yomiuri's⁴⁶ influence on society can not be underestimated.

As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, Japanese scholars agree that the Asahi has a strong influence on Japanese society. As a rival newspaper of the Yomiuri, it sells over 12 million copies daily (Datamonitor, 2004, as cited in Visgatis & Swenson, 2006), and it has more political elites and elected officials as its readers than other Japanese newspapers. Having a continuously strong and stable penetration in society, the Asahi is regarded as an influential, intellectual newspaper with a liberal reporting tone (Cho & Lacy, 2000; Feldman, 1986).

Limited in terms of time and labor and following a Japanese *agenda-setting* research article which similarly examined the same newspapers as samples⁴⁷, this research will look at one representative newspaper from each ideological category: the Yomiuri from the conservative group and the Asahi from the liberal group. They are the top two biggest newspapers in major Japanese press (The Yomiuri has 14.5 million of the circulation and 12.9 million for the Asahi) and the total circulation of the two constitutes more than 66% of the total daily circulation of the five major Japanese newspapers (the others being the Sankei,

⁴⁶ The Yomiuri is also known as the Yomiuri Group, a financial patron of the baseball team the Yomiuri Giants, the soccer team the Tokyo Verdy, the Yomiuri amusement park and more.

⁴⁷ Visgatis & Swenson, 2006

the Nikkei and the Mainichi). Therefore the coverage of both newspapers is considered in this research as the news coverage the Japanese are exposed to on a daily basis. The Nikkei newspaper was excluded due to its nature of mostly business reporting.

The samples are chosen from reduced-sized editions of old newspapers, which Japanese newspaper companies respectively edit and publish monthly for the previous month. Choosing newspapers with major distribution as samples for the analysis was very important since the audience's exposure to media is such a key in *agenda setting*.

Time Frame

Considering that Japanese society is saturated by the mass media, this research will try to find a trace of media effects six months before the public opinion surveys until the very last day of the coverage before the polls.⁴⁸ The time period was set by following the findings of Salwen (1988) and Mikami et al. (1995), which both found a relatively long optimal time span for agenda-setting effects of news reports on an issue's sub-issues. This examination period should cover the span of time when the media have potentially the highest influence on the audience.

Development of Coding Schemes

The coding schemes for the research were created based on the scholarly works of Hagiwara (2006), Oh and Sakamoto (2006), and Lee (2006 & 2007). They respectively conducted content analysis on Japanese television news on foreign affairs such as Japanese newspaper coverage on China, Japanese television reports on North Korea, and South Korea. The fundamental suggestions on coding procedures given by Dr. Toshio Takeshita⁴⁹ also

⁴⁸ This attempt referred to the research by Kim, Scheufele & Shanahan (2002) which also set a time frame of content analysis of an American regional newspaper *Ithaca Journal* until the day before their opinion survey started to examine if the attributes of the issue of development in Southwest Park, a local area in Ithaca, New York, were transferred to the public.

⁴⁹ Dr. Takeshita is a political science professor at Meiji University in Japan, who is one of the most famous *agenda-setting* Japanese researchers and has been studying media effects in a Japanese context for over thirty years. His way of counting analytical units (paragraphs) in newspaper articles was employed under his guide by the author in the *second-level agenda-setting* analysis for H2 in order to effectively code detailed salience. Even though Dr. Takeshita's counting unit was borrowed, the coding schemes for this research were all designed originally by the author by reference to pre-existing Sino-Japanese media studies for a better

contributed to the development of the coding scheme specifically designed for this research.

Since H1 and H2 have different research features, two different coding schemes were created. Furthermore, because H1 has two independent research time periods, coding categories were developed individually based on the public poll questions in 2002 and 2006. Each coding scheme will be explained later.

Sample Newspaper Articles

Front pages of the Asahi and the Yomiuri morning and evening newspapers were collected manually from the compact editions of both newspapers. The compact editions are published monthly by the newspaper companies for recording purposes, and they are available for viewing at public libraries in Tokyo. Consulting the old compact edited newspapers rather than viewing them on archive was conducted to avoid the risk of including off-topic articles which could occur with electronic keyword searches. Instead, indexes of each compact edition were referenced to find articles more effectively. The categories checked in the indexes were “Diplomacy”, “National Defense”, and “China”. After selecting Sino-Japanese related articles under these categories, all front-pages were double-checked to make sure there was no single article being missed.

From these front pages, news articles, serial articles, columns, editorial columns⁵⁰ and editorials, contributed articles from intellectuals or famous persons, and letters from readers⁵¹ which deal with any aspect of Sino-Japanese relations were gathered based on the sample criteria (all of these writings will be described as “articles” henceforth). These articles consist of 1) news about Sino-Japanese relations; and 2) news about diplomatic relations between China and Japan within international organizations which consist of several other countries. Sino-Japanese relations are particularly defined in this research as relations between the two countries in general but not limited to the diplomatic level. The

adaptation to this particular case.

⁵⁰ In Japanese newspapers, serial columns always appear in the same placement (near the bottom of a front page just above advertisement, written in a long and thin article space) with a set title. Due to its high name recognition as a series, when people say “Shasetsu [Editorial]”, they tend to think about the front-page column instead of the official editorial each company independently places on different pages (Only occasionally does editorial appear on front pages). When it is needed to distinguish the serial column from the official editorial and regular column, this thesis will call the front-page column as “Editorial Column”.

⁵¹ The Asahi newspaper has a popular serial reading named “*Jinmyakuki*” occasionally appearing on front pages. This series of articles are mainly based on personal stories contributed by readers.

reason this definition was given was to correspond to the answer options in the sample opinion polls which asked about Sino-Japanese relations in general. It is also based on an assumption that the public learns about the relations not only from diplomatic or political news but also from the two countries' general relationships such as business and social aspects.

To qualify as a sample, the article was also required to contain at least 50 % of the topics given above. Coders were trained to compare the number of paragraphs devoted to one topic as compared to the number devoted to the other(s). For instance, when the topic of Sino-Japanese relations is covered in five or more paragraphs out of ten, the article was judged to support the criteria. Captions for the related pictures were excluded from the sample since the author believed article pictures could have a different psychological influence on the readers from what texts have.

Articles on Chinese relations with other countries besides Japan, China's national incidents, and citizens' personal stories or opinions were not counted as a sample (see coding schemes in appendix II for details). For instance, a Japanese political figure's comment about extending Chinese military force was counted as a sample, but an article about a crime in China committed by a Chinese was excluded because it is Chinese national news.

Because of the complexity of the political relations in the area, it is very common that Sino-Japanese relations appear in an article on a multinational issue. In such a case, only when the article focuses on the bilateral relations of the two countries within multinational politics was the article regarded as a sample. For instance, news reports like the expansion of Chinese military power and the U.S. and Japan's negotiations on this issue as well as the economical development of the Chinese market and the international trial to stabilize Chinese currency were also coded only if the articles were particularly describing the viewpoint of the Japanese government. Therefore, an article dealing with the same issue but being seen from another country's point of view, say the U.S. government's point of view concerning the Chinese government's currency policy was excluded.

Employment of Other Coders and Intercoder Reliability

Two Japanese natives were employed for this study. They were trained for this specific content analysis and each coded one newspaper. Coder A coded the Yomiuri for both H1 and H2, and coder B coded the same for the Asahi. About 17% of the coding for H1 was conducted by coder A, and coder B examined 27%.⁵² For the content analysis for H2, coder A coded 14% and coder B coded 24 % of the sample articles. The rest of the coding was conducted by the author following the same scheme.

Intercoder reliability was assessed following the procedures introduced in Arima's (2007) textbook. Intercoder agreement was tested by examining the percentage of coding agreement between coder A and the author, and coder B and the author.

Public Opinion Surveys

To test the inference of the relations between information senders and receivers accurately, the data obtained from content analysis should be compared with other pieces of verified data such as social surveys or experiment results. Mikami (1988) insists that through this process, media frames of the sender or the receiver can be inferred (as cited in Arima, 2007). Referring to Mikami's point, the result of the content analysis was compared with national Japanese public opinion surveys. The surveys used to compare the coverage in newspapers are: 1) the Public Opinion Survey on Sino-Japanese Relations⁵³ (conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2002); 2) the Public Attitude Survey on Sino-Japanese Relations⁵⁴ (conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2006); and 3) the Cross-Country Comparison Public Opinion Survey on Sino-Japanese Relations⁵⁵ (conducted by Nippon Research Center⁵⁶ in June 2005). They are all conducted and reported in Japanese and commonly do not have English names. Therefore, for research convenience,

⁵² There was a difference in the number of articles coder A and B each examined. It is because there were articles among sample articles which as a result did not meet the criteria and therefore were excluded after several verifications.

⁵³ The Original name in Japanese is *Nichukankei ni taisuru yoron chosa*

⁵⁴ *Nichukankei ni Taisuru Ishiki Chosa*,

⁵⁵ *Nichukankei ni tsuite no kokusai hikaku yoron chosa*

⁵⁶ Japan Research Center is a private research institution. It is also a member of Gallup International, an international research organization which has its headquarters in Zurich and conducts public opinion surveys.

the author unofficially named them in English. Each survey will be shortened henceforth

Specific data from the Public Opinion Survey and the Public Attitude Survey were used to test H1 with the result of the content analysis of Japanese newspaper coverage in corresponding time periods. Data from the Cross-Country Comparison Survey was adopted in order to test H2 by also comparing it with the result of content analysis of Japanese press coverage in the corresponding period.

The Cross-Country Comparison Survey was chosen because an alternative public poll, The Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy [*Gaikou ni Kansuru Ishiki Chosa*⁵⁷], that was conducted by the government and showed record low percentage of Japanese citizens feeling affinity toward China (32.4%) unfortunately lacked detailed reasons for why the respondents did not have an affinity with China, which was essential for this research.

The Public Opinion Survey conducted in 2002 does lack a question about the degree to which the respondents rely on the media for news information, but the other polls show a strong level of interaction from the respondents with media as a news source: 90.8 % for television broadcasting and newspaper coverage in the Public Attitude Survey in 2006 and 67.4 % specifically for newspaper coverage (79.6 % for television news) in the Cross-Country Comparison Survey. This is another reason these polls were considered reasonable to be examined in this study.

As is often the case in Japan, newspaper companies regularly conduct public opinion polls. There is, however, a controversy surrounding these polls. Masanori Takahashi (1974) from Komazawa University for instance, claims that surveys conducted by newspaper companies are biased. He points out that public opinion surveyed by these Japanese newspapers should not be regarded as reliable. The questions on the surveys are problematic because the newspaper asks questions based on its view point. In addition, public opinion is built upon the information, knowledge, and biased editorials provided by newspapers. For example, a question in another public opinion survey conducted by Asahi Newspaper in 1970, one which Takahashi debates, asks: "Japan has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. We

⁵⁷ This poll was conducted by the Cabinet Office in October 2005. The Japanese Cabinet Office releases an annual report of public opinion on China. The report is aired at the end of each year. It typically asks 3,000 Japanese adults, in the middle of October, for their opinions about China. This report has been released since 1978, and will therefore provide a way to see how public opinion about China has been changing in recent Japanese history.

do not have relations with China yet. Do you think Japan should have official diplomatic relations with China? Don't you think so?" (Takahashi, 1974, p.106). Another example is "There is an opinion that we cannot help giving up relations with Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with China. Do you agree with it? Do you disagree?" (p.106). Even though 64% of the respondents agreed on the first question and 46% of them disagreed with the second question, this suggests that many people agree to establish political relations with China but at the same time do not agree with breaking relations with Taiwan for this to occur. The Asahi newspaper simply print a headline saying "64% of people wish for relations with China" neglecting to emphasize the fact that many people do not wish to sacrifice Taiwan in the process (Yakahashi, 1974).

The fact that these biased public opinions are being reported by the same media which sell millions of papers at a time, leads Takahashi to confer that they are guiding the public as to adopt their news. Oishi (2005) also suggests that the media are intending to form public opinion more than researching public opinion through their opinion surveys. These media's opinion polls therefore can be considered to have an influence on the government's policymaking by reporting the results of the polls to the public (Oishi, 2005).

Considering these researchers' arguments, this thesis therefore used public opinion survey data gathered by non-media organizations or institutions.

Indicator of Correspondence between Media Coverage and Public Opinion

To effectively observe the connections between the media coverage and public opinion, the results of content analysis were compared by applying the rank-order correlation coefficient (Spearman's Rho).⁵⁸ A result with a high correlation means strong similarity between the press's emphasis pattern and the public's salience pattern while a low

⁵⁸ Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient can be calculated by making a use of the formula.

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{6 \sum_{i=1}^n d_i^2}{n^3 - n}$$

The "n" here is the total number of data sets from two independent variables. Thus they are pairs of ranks in coverage salience and ranks in public opinion survey in this particular research. Ranks were given within a variable following the highest amount or biggest size of the sample to the lowest or the smallest. The sample can be answer options when the variable is public opinion survey result, and it can be topics when the variable is press coverage. When there is more than one category to qualify for the same rank, an average rank is given to the categories. The each combination of the ranks mean how much attention press gave to a certain topic and how much the audience paid attention to the topic. The Spearman's correlation coefficient calculates how strong or weak the combination of the ranks from each variable is.

correlation means a weak similarity. Takeshita (1993) elaborates;

The agenda-setting hypothesis of the salience model postulates that increased media emphasis on an issue leads to increased salience of that issue among the public members. Thus if agenda-setting occurs at all, a similarity is likely to be seen in the ranking of media emphasis on various issues and the ranking of the proportion of voters [or of respondents of a public poll] who perceive each of the same issues as most salient. Therefore we can regard the degree of association between the two rankings as an indicator of the agenda-setting effects. (pp. 206-207)

Even though the coefficient provides a rough measure with a tendency to lead to unstable results with small samples, it is believed to be valid when considering cross-sectional analyses as well as when testing the *agenda-setting* effects (Takeshita, 1993).

4. Research Design for H1

H1-a: The more the Japanese press covers the historical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, the more the public regards the historical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations as the most important issue in bilateral diplomatic relations.

H1-b: The less the Japanese press covers the economic aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, the less the public regards the economic aspects of Sino-Japanese relations as the most important issue in bilateral diplomatic relations.

These questions will be examined to discover the Japanese press has a *second-level agenda-setting* function over the public. The hypotheses will be tested by comparing the content of the news coverage in two different time periods; 2002 and 2006.

The research for H1 is therefore a “before and after” comparison test of sub-topical *agenda-setting* effects (precisely speaking, *cognitive-attribute agenda-setting* effects in *second-level agenda setting*) on the issue of Sino-Japanese relations. This research particularly examined the shift of the media coverage on both the historical and economical aspects in Sino-Japanese relations and, later on, the results were compared with the shift in

corresponding public opinions to observe if the change of coverage influenced the people's awareness on these issues.

Public Opinion Indicator Polls for H1

There are two public polls to compare with the results of newspaper content analysis in order to test H1. They are: 1) the Public Opinion Survey (conducted in 2002) and 2) the Public Attitude Survey (2006). These public opinion polls were conducted by *Chuo Chosa Sha*, a Japanese national researching institute hired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to the fact that these two polls were conducted by the same institute, the surveys' questions and the categories of each question resemble each other, and therefore are considered to be an official tracking public poll about Sino-Japanese relations.

Among the questions which involve Sino-Japanese relations, one specific question from each was chosen to be compared. "What do you think is typically a big issue in current Sino-Japanese relations?"⁵⁹ from the Public Opinion Survey, and "What do you think is a concrete issue which exists in Sino-Japanese relations?"⁶⁰ from the Public Attitude Survey. These are regarded as corresponding questions (see Figure 10-A and B).

There are three main reasons for choosing these two questions from the polls for the research: 1) both polls are undertaken by the same institute for the same ministry, 2) both polls are collected by the same examination method from the same number of samples following the same extraction procedure (see Table 2 for survey overview), 3) both questions ask for multiple choice answers for up to three answer options from the list, and 4) the two questions share most of the answer options. (8 out of 11 answer choices in the Public Attitude Survey were the same as those in the Public Opinion Survey. An option concerning "Japan's economic cooperation with China" was eliminated and "Lack of understanding among citizens" and "Disagreement in international politics" were added in 2006). Even though there had been a slight change noted in these answer options, the two questions were considered very similar in terms of asking about the primary issue in Sino-Japanese relations.

⁵⁹ The exact wording in Japanese was: "*Genzai no nihon to chugoku no kankei de, tokuni okinamondai ha nandatoomoimasuka?*"

⁶⁰ "*Nichukankei ni sonzai shiteiru gutaiteki na mondai ha nandatoomoimasuka?*"

Table 2. Research Overview of Sample Indicator Polls for Hypothesis 1


	Public Opinion Survey on Sino-Japan Relations (2002)	Public Attitude Survey on Sino-Japan Relations (2006)
Requested Institute	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
Conducting Institute	Chuo Chosa Sha	Chuo Chosa Sha
Purpose	Research citizens' feelings about Sino-Japanese relations for future reference	Research citizens' feelings about Sino-Japanese relations for future reference
Survey Topic	Feelings about Sino-Japanese relations	Feelings about Sino-Japanese relations
Survey Sample	Male and female over 20 years-old	Male and Female over 20 years-old
Number of Respondents	2,000	2,000
Extraction Method	Two-stage stratified random sampling	Two-stage stratified random sampling
Survey Period	March 7- March 10, 2002	February 10- February 13, 2006
Method for Investigation	Individual interview	Individual interview
Valid Collection of people (Rate %)	1,397 (69.9%)	1,314 (65.7%)

One limitation was that, as introduced just above, these two questions do not take the exact same question forms. The researcher nonetheless chose these paired questions simply due to the lack of tracking public polls in Japan which ask the exact same question to Japanese citizens about what they think is the most important issue in Sino-Japanese relations.⁶¹

⁶¹ On this point, a Japanese non-profit organization, Genron NPO started tracking public opinions of both Japanese and Chinese citizens about Sino-Japanese relations from 2005. Even though their polls did not match the research period of this research, their original continuous report and the annual tracking poll will be of such value in the near future for Sino-Japanese-relations researchers. Other than that, Japanese Gallup international organization, Nippon Research Center conducted a poll on Sino-Japanese relations in 2002 (with Kyodo wire service) and 2005.

Figure 10. Public Opinion Indicator Questions for Hypothesis 1


A. What Do You Think Is Typically a Big Issue in Current Sino-Japanese Relations?
(2002, multiple answers)



Source: The Public Opinion Survey on Sino-Japan Relations by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2002) (Translated into English by the author)

B. What Do You Think Is a Concrete Issue Which Exists in Sino-Japan Relations?

(2006, multiple answers)



Source: The Public Attitude Survey on Sino-Japan Relations by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2006) (Translated into English by the author)

Time Frame for H1

Research period was the same for both analyses; six months before each opinion survey until the day before the polls were conducted. Therefore, the examining periods were set: from September 5, 2001 to March 6, 2002 for Period 1; and from August 11, 2005 to February 9, 2006 for Period 2. Each time frame of the media monitoring was given as six months, starting six months ahead of each public opinion poll research until one day before the polls were conducted.

Unit of Analysis for H1

The counting unit for H1 is an article. Based on the idea of *agenda setting* that issues which are covered in the media coverage gather attention and awareness from the public, the content analysis for H1 required coders to code for the main topic in each sample article according to the coding rules set by the scheme. One article basically has one main topic, but only when there were two main topics equally discussed within the same article was double-coding allowed for up to two choices. In such a case, the criteria for judgment were set as the number of paragraphs devoted to each topic. If more paragraphs were devoted for one topic compared to the other, the first one was coded as the main topic. Other than topics, questions were added on the answering sheets to view the tendency in the coverage such as: newspaper title, date, morning or evening edition, and type of article.

Coding Scheme for H1

Main topics within the collected articles were respectively segmented and coded into categories which were developed following the survey categories of the sample question from Public Opinion Survey for Period 1. Topic categories: “A. Economy and Business”, “B. Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War”, “C. Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan”, “D. Resource and Territories”, “E. “Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense”, “F. Economical Distribution to China from Japan”, and “G. Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan” were respectively developed from the original answer categories: “Economic issues”, “Historical issues”, “Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan”, “Resources and Territories”, “Chinese Military Force”, “Japan’s Economic Cooperation with China”, and “Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan”. The last category from the Public Opinion Survey “I Don’t Know” was eliminated because it was not appropriate to be included for the content analysis.

Similarly, categories were developed based on the Public Attitude Survey for Period 2. The exception was that two new coding categories, “C. Mutual Understanding about Each Other on the Citizen Level” developed from “Lack of Understanding Among Citizens” and “D. China’s and Japan’s Policy in International Politics” developed from “Disagreement in International Politics” were added instead of “F. Economical Distribution to China from Japan”, which was eliminated from the options in the Public Attitude Survey.

5. Research Design for H2

H2-a: The Japanese press coverage on the sub-issues in Sino-Japanese relations is positively correlated with the reasons the public attributed for the decrease in their affinity with China.

H2-b: The Japanese press coverage of a negatively or unfriendly portrayed China in Sino-Japanese relations is positively correlated with the reasons which the public attributed for the decrease in their affinity with China.

The second hypotheses was similarly tested by comparing the content of the news coverage with the result of the public opinion poll. The only difference from the content analysis for H1 is that the content analysis for H2 observes media reporting in more detail than H1. While the content analysis for H1 observed the salience of sub-issues in Sino-Japanese relations in media such as the historical aspects, the economical aspects, the military aspects, the content analysis for H2 observed the salience of both *cognitive* and *affective* attributes attached to the issue concerning Sino-Japanese relations in media coverage.

Public Opinion Indicator Poll for H2

For H2, the Cross-Country Comparison Survey was compared with the results of the newspaper content analysis. This public opinion poll was conducted by Nippon Research Center in June 2005. The organization is also known as the Gallup research organization in Japan (see Table 3 and Figure 11).


The public opinion research concludes that Japanese citizens' perception of China is changing for the worse by demonstrating that 57% of Japanese respondents indicated they do not have an affinity with China, a 14 % growth from 2002, whereas people who had an affinity with China in 2005 were only 16%, a 39% decrease in three years.

The specific question to compare with the results of the content analysis is one that asks the respondents for their reasons of not having an affinity with China. The choices were given as follows: “Difference in Historical Perceptions”, “Territorial Dispute”, “China’s Strong Anti-Japanese Sentiment”, “Dispute between China and Japan in International Politics and Security”, “Frequent Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan”, “Chinese Expansion of Armament Policy”, “Threat in Economy and Business”, “Through an Experience of the Use of Products Made in China”, “Frequent Competitions in Sports”, “Through a Traveling Experience to China”, “Lack of Freedom of Press Stemming from the Autocratic Communist Party”, and “Other”. Multiple answers for up to three choices were allowed and the result showed 76.0% for “China’s Strong Anti-Japanese Sentiment” and 44.4% for “Difference in Historical Perceptions” as the top two answers.

Table 3. Research Overview of Sample Indicator Poll for Hypothesis 2

	Cross-Country Comparison Public Opinion Survey on Sino-Japanese Relations (2005)
Survey institute	Nippon Research Center
Survey area	Whole of country
Survey sample	Male and female individuals from 20 to 79 years-old
Method for investigation	Personal interview in combination with take-home survey
Extraction method	Multistage stratified random sampling (sampled from the Basic Resident Resister)
Survey period	June 2- June 13, 2005
Valid collection of people	1,144

Figure 11. Public Opinion Indicator Question for Hypothesis 2



Source: The Cross-Country Comparison Public Opinion Survey on Sino-Japanese Relations (2005)
Translated into English by the author

Time Frame for H2

As with H1, the research period for H2 began exactly six months ahead of the time the indicator opinion survey was conducted. Unlike the content analysis for H1, however, the news coverage on Sino-Japanese relations at this time was obtained for six months until the day before the last day the public survey interview ended. The purpose of the research period

is to evaluate the maximum effects of the press coverage since the poll for H2 took place for more than a week (11 days) whereas the public poll indicators for H1 questioned people in only three days.

Unit of Analysis for H2

Due to the *second-level agenda-setting theory* feature which concerns the salience of attributes, or accessibility in other words, of both *cognitive* and *affective* components in coverage, the counting unit for H2 was required to be more detailed than for H1. The counting unit for the content analysis for H2 was therefore set as a paragraph. Coders were required to code for both the main topic and the tone of the coverage in each paragraph according to the coding rules set by the scheme. Just like the content analysis procedure for H1, one article was defined as having basically one main topic. Only when there were two main topics equally discussed within the same paragraph, was double-coding allowed for up to two choices. In such a case, the criteria for judgment were set as the number of sentences devoted to each topic.

Coding Scheme for H2

The coding scheme for H2 was created to observe both the *cognitive* and *affective* components in the coverage of Sino-Japanese relations. In addition to a question where each paragraph is categorized according to the main topic, several other questions to judge the tone of the coverage were added (see section 3, 4, and 6 in the coding scheme for H2 in appendix II).

a. Cognitive Attributes, the Topical Categories

The topical categories were developed from the answer options in the Cross-Country Comparison Survey, particularly from the question which asks for the reasons respondents did not have an affinity with China. Answer options which are obviously reflecting personal experiences such as “Through an Experience of the Use of Products Made in China” and

“Through a Traveling Experience to China” were regarded as not appropriate for the research and therefore excluded from the list. Other topical categories were defined as: “A. Historical Perceptions”, “B. Resources and Territories”, “C. China’s Sentiment toward Japan”, “D. International Politics and Security”, “E. Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan”, “F. Chinese Military Force”, “G. Economy and Business”, “H. Interactions through Sports”, “I. Chinese Ideology”, and “Other”. These were respectively developed from original answer options (see Figure 11).

As a common feature, the answer options given to the respondents all reflect negative elements of China. It is simply because the public poll question was to ask for “reasons for not having an affinity with China” to respondents who do not have an affinity with China. The topical categories were set, however, not to identify the tones of the coverage but to examine the accessibility of each *cognitive* attribute without any *affective* features. Therefore, this negative tone from the original answer was designed to be removed from options. Despite this attempt, a category such as “E. Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan” could not but generate a negative meaning with the word “crime”.

b. Affective Attributes, the Tonal Categories

Affective attributes in the coverage of Sino-Japanese relations were observed by the use of three basic tonal categories: *positive, neutral, and negative*. These tone options were developed by the common tonal categories of positive, neutral, and negative in *agenda-setting* research. In order to more accurately reflect the manner in which the coverage is positive, neutral, or negative, some questions employed alternative options of *friendly or pro-Japanese (Chinese), neutral, unfriendly or anti-Japanese (Chinese)*. When reporting tones for the relations were asked during the process of content analysis, a question was asked to discern whether the coverage contained positive, neutral, or negative tone toward the relations. When the scheme asked tonal questions of a specific representation such as a country or a person in the coverage, the options were replaced by the alternative choices, asking if the coverage contained *friendly (or pro-), neutral, or unfriendly (or anti-) tone* in order to discern and categorize “to whom” the representation is covered in such tones. Tones which fell under the option of *neutral* were defined as either coverage with no notable feature in the reporting tone or without any reporting tone (remainders, in other words).

Representations of China and Japan, the Tone of the Coverage

The coding scheme for H2 also asked for whose, or sometimes which idea or organization's, actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions in Sino-Japanese relations appear as a Chinese representation in a paragraph in addition to the informational questions asking for newspaper title, date, morning or evening edition, and type of article. Coders then coded for those coverage tones. Tones are defined in the scheme, and there are three options: "Friendly or Pro-Japanese tone", "Unfriendly or Anti-Japanese tone", and "Do Not Know or Neutral". The judgment should be made according to the tone in the description of the representative actions, attitudes, or opinions on the topic. Direct comments were also noted as keys to making the judgment.

For example, a sentence such as "Chinese high-school students visited Tokyo last weekend to meet and interact with their Japanese correspondents. The purpose of the visit is to understand their neighbor country and its culture better." should be regarded as a positive element. On the other hand, "The Chinese State President criticized Japanese political activity, especially Yasukuni Shrine visits, history textbooks in schools, and Taiwanese issues." should be judged as an unfriendly/anti-Japanese element in the paragraph.⁶²

Similarly, the coding scheme at the same time asked the coders to code for who and whose, or sometimes which idea or organization's, actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions in Sino-Japanese relations appear as a Japanese representation in the paragraph. The reason for including those Japanese representatives in addition to Chinese representatives for counts is that it can easily be assumed that the public also gets affected by Japanese representatives' pro-Chinese or anti-Chinese actions, attitudes, or opinions in forming intrapersonal opinions about the bilateral relations.

This element was inserted into the scheme with the expectation to find a tendency of pro-Chinese coverage and anti-Chinese coverage. For example, does pro-Chinese coverage take place through admiration of China's attitude to Japan, or does it occur through criticism by Japanese politicians who act badly toward China? What about anti-Chinese coverage? Does it take place through criticism toward China's attitude to Japan? Or does it happen

⁶² Example sentences for reporting tones henceforth are not referring to any particular news articles or paragraphs so that coders are not influenced when they code them individually.

through approving Japanese politicians who are against China's political position?

For example, a sentence such as "The Japanese government decided to cooperate with China on developing environmentally-friendly technology." should be regarded as a positive element. On the other hand, "The Japanese Foreign Minister described the Chinese military as "a great threat"." should be judged as an unfriendly/anti-Japanese element in the paragraph.

Opinion of the Writer or the Newspaper Company on China and Japan

When there were commentaries such as opinions, evaluations, or judgments made by the article writer (editor, or the newspaper), which were often found in opinion articles such as editorials, columns or critiques rather than news articles, these commentaries were also coded into the three tonal categories: "Friendly or Pro-Chinese tone", "Unfriendly or Anti-Chinese tone", and "Do not know or Neutral". An additional question to the commentary then asks how the writer regards China in the paragraph. Answer options were provided as: a) Cooperator or Partner, b) Achiever of Experiment, Invention or Finding, Pioneer, Starter, or Subject to Respect; c) Japan's Fan, Camp Follower, or Admirer; d) Subject to Blame, or Criticize; e) Subject to Fear, or to Be Threaten by, f) Equally Placed Rivals, or Competitor, g) Reference Point (for comparison), and h) Other.

Similarly, how the writer or the newspaper company regards Japan's policy toward China is coded in the same three tonal categories. For example, a statement such as "China's reaction to the Yasukuni issue is understandable. Japan should be more understanding about the neighbor country's feelings on the issue." should be regarded as a friendly/pro-Chinese element. Instead, when the writer remarks, "Chinese leaders had better try to respect Japanese leader's attitude regarding his visit to the shrine." the statement is an unfriendly/anti-Chinese element considering the fact that China was against the visit.

This strategy can be also applied when the writer's statement on Japan is coded. "The Japanese government should change its diplomatic style with China because it is not considering Chinese people's feelings about the Pacific War", as another example, can be a friendly/pro-Chinese element. In contrast, "I agree with the Japanese government's policy not to care too much for what China feels about the Yasukuni issue as it is a domestic matter." can be regarded as an unfriendly/anti-Chinese element.

Overall Judgment of the Tone of the Coverage

Considering the answers from these several *affective* attributes, the coders finally drew a tonal judgment from the paragraph from the three options of: “Friendly”, “Unfriendly”, and “Do not know or Neutral”.⁶³

c. Perception of Current Sino-Japanese Relations in the Coverage

Independent from these attribute questions, another set of questions were added to assess the description of Sino-Japanese relations. The purpose of these questions was to capture how Sino-Japanese relations at that time were described in the coverage and how they were predicted to change by the writer or the newspaper company. When they attribute either country for the change, it was also added in coding. The purpose of including these questions was to add insight on how the relations were described by the press at that time. See more details in the coding scheme for H2 attached in appendix II.

⁶³ See the coding scheme for H2 attached in appendix II for the tonal calculation.

Chapter 6: Results

Two sets of content analysis were conducted based on the rules defined in each coding scheme. The analysis for H1 showed which sub-issue was most salient, or not as salient. In contrast, the advanced analysis for H2 showed which sub-issues were salient in terms of attributes.

1. Results for Hypothesis 1


Tendencies in Coverage for H1

a. Overall Numbers of Articles on Sino-Japanese Relations and the Shift in Press Coverage for H1


Thirty-two articles (16 from the Yomiuri and 16 from the Asahi) on Sino-Japanese relations were gathered from 646 front pages (323 pages each from the Yomiuri and the Asahi) of both the morning and evening editions of the Yomiuri and the Asahi which were published in the experimental period 1 from Sep.5, 2001 to Mar. 6, 2002. Likewise, 75 articles (34 from the Yomiuri and 41 from the Asahi) were found from 652 (326 pages each) front pages for Period 2 from Aug. 11, 2005 to Feb. 9, 2006 (See Figure 12).

On average, the content analysis shows that 10.7 front-page news articles reported on Sino-Japanese relations each month while only 4.7 articles each month covered Sino-Japanese relations in Period 1. The coverage of the relations more than doubled in 4 years.

Figure 12
Period 1: The Yomiuri and the Asahi's Coverage on Sino-Japanese Relations for H1 (Articles by Month)



Period 2: The Yomiuri and the Asahi's Coverage on Sino-Japanese Relations for H1 (Articles by Month)



Among the 32 articles retrieved from Period 1, “Economy and Business” was the most covered sub-issue with almost half of all the coverage on Sino-Japanese relations (44%). This topic was covered most frequently, peaking in November and December, 2001. The frequency can be explained by the press coverage of China and Japan’s negotiation of the trade conflict on agricultural products in relation to China’s entrance in the WTO from the middle of October to the end of the year. In March 2002, it was reported that an unidentified ship had appeared in Japanese waters in December 2001, which contributed to the higher coverage on “Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense (19%)” in March. The relatively little attention paid to China or Sino-Japanese relations overall for this

period is due to the terrorist attack in the U.S. in September, 2001; consequently, other topical categories, especially resources and territories, Japan's economic cooperation with China, and diplomatic controversy over Taiwan, were almost ignored on front pages.

In Period 2, on the other hand, "Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War" had the greatest concentration of coverage. By August, the month of the memorial of the end of the Pacific War and WWII, the coverage on the sub-issue started to increase and it consistently appeared on front pages until February, 2006, peaking in October 2005 when Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine. Once Koizumi visited the shrine, the newspapers tirelessly reported his rationale for visiting the shrine including the debate on whether it was a personal or an official visit. The coverage also included a great deal of articles on China and Chinese officials' reactions to the issue including China's rejection of the former Foreign Minister's visit to China which was planned to take place six days after the shrine visit. The second most frequently covered topic, with 30% less coverage, was the economy. The issue of revaluating the Chinese yuan was the main issue in this category. Topics such as China's and Japan's Policy in International Politics, Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan, and diplomatic controversy over Taiwan were almost ignored in the coverage.

Table 4. Shift in Sino-Japanese Coverage

(article)

Period 1 Sub-issues		Sep 2001	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan 2002	Feb	Mar	Total (%)
A	Economy and Business	1	2	4	5	1	0	1	14(44%)
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3 (9)
C	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	4 (13)
D	Resource and Territories	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 (0)
E	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	6 (19)
F	Japan's Economic Cooperation with China	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1 (3)
G	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1 (3)
H	Other	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	3 (9)
Total		2	8	5	7	4	0	6	32 (100)
Period 2 Sub-issues		Aug 2005	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan 2006	Feb	Total (%)
A	Economy and Business	0	3	2	2	1	0	0	8 (11)
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War	6	2	12	1	7	3	0	31(41)
C	Mutual Understanding about Each Other on the Citizen Level	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2 (3)
D	China's and Japan's Policy in International Politics	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)
E	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 (0)
F	Resource and Territories	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	4 (5)
G	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense	0	1	1	0	1	3	0	6 (8)
H	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1 (1)
I	Other	3	3	2	5	4	4	1	22 (29)
Total		9	13	19	9	13	11	1	75 (99)*

*The percentages were rounded off to the whole number, and as a result made totals not 100% sometimes.

b. Types of Articles for HI

Articles on Sino-Japanese relations consisted mainly of news articles. In Period 1, all the news on the topic appeared in news articles except one contributed article. In Period 2, 76% of the news was treated in newspaper articles, 15% in serial articles, and 9% in editorials and columns. Even though both newspapers reported on Sino-Japanese relations with about the same amount of focus as in Period 1, the Asahi showed higher numbers for

reporting about the relations in Period 2 (8 articles, or 20% of the total coverage), which is 8 times more than Period 1 and more than double the Yomiuri in the same period. In Period 1 no editorial or column was written on Sino-Japanese relations. However, in Period 2, 9% of all coverage on Sino-Japanese relations was editorial/column, which shows the significance of the growth in interest that the two newspapers had on this diplomatic issue. This reveals that the newspapers increasingly focused on Sino-Japanese relations between the research periods.

Table 5. Types of Articles for H1 (article)

Period 1	News Article		Opinion Article		Total
	Independent Article	Serial Article	Editorial/Column	Contributed Article	
The Yomiuri (%)	15 (94)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1(6)	16 (100)
The Asahi (%)	16 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16 (100)
Total (%)	31 (97)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (3)	32 (100)
Period 2	News Article		Opinion Article		Total
	Independent Article	Serial Article	Editorial/Column	Contributed Article	
The Yomiuri (%)	28 (82)	3 (9)	3 (9)	0 (0)	34 (100)
The Asahi (%)	29 (71)	8 (20)	4 (10)	0 (0)	41 (101)*
Total (%)	57 (76)	11 (15)	7 (9)	0 (0)	75 (100)

*The total figure sometimes adds up to more than 100% due to the rounding of calculations.

Emphasis on each Sub-Issue for H1

News coverage of the Yomiuri and the Asahi showed an emphasis on different issues in the study periods (correlations between the newspaper coverage: 0.35 for Period 1, and 0.33 for Period 2 when calculated with the option “Other” excluded from the list). The content analysis of Sino-Japanese articles clearly illustrated which topic was of greater importance to each of the newspapers. The combined figures for the Yomiuri and the Asahi revealed that 44 % of the coverage was on the economy, 19% on the Chinese military and 13% on crimes committed by Chinese residents. Other topics were covered with less than 10%. In Period 2, on the other hand, historical issues comprised 41 % of the coverage, the economy with 11%, and other topics were below 10%. Chinese military force (8%) and territory & resource (5%) followed. Certain issues had limited coverage. For example, in

Period 1, “Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War” and “Japan’s Economic Cooperation with China” were covered in the Yomiuri. Topics such as “Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan” and “Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan” were covered in the Asahi. Neither newspaper covered on “Resource and Territories”. Similarly, only the Yomiuri reported “Mutual Understanding about Each Other on the Citizen Level”, “Resource and Territories”, and Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan” whereas “China’s and Japan’s Policy in International Politics” and “Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense” were only introduced by the Asahi in Period 2. Neither newspaper covered on “Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan” during the period.

Table 6. Sub-Issue Emphasis by the Newspapers for H1 (article)

Period 1		The Yomiuri	The Asahi	Total (%)
A	Economy and Business	5	9	14 (44)
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War	0	3	3 (9)
C	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan	4	0	4 (13)
D	Resource and Territories	0	0	0 (0)
E	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense	3	3	6 (19)
F	Japan’s Economic Cooperation with China	0	1	1 (3)
G	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan	1	0	1 (3)
H	Other	3	0	3 (9)
Total		16	16	32 (100)
Period 2		The Yomiuri	The Asahi	Total (%)
A	Economy and Business	5	3	8 (11)
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War	15	16	31 (41)
C	Mutual Understanding about Each Other on the Citizen Level	2	0	2 (3)
D	China’s and Japan’s Policy in International Politics	0	1	1 (1)
E	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan	0	0	0 (0)
F	Resource and Territories	4	0	4 (5)
G	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense	0	6	6 (8)
H	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan	1	0	1 (1)
I	Other	7	15	22 (29)
Total		34	41	75 (100)

Agreement of Coverage with Public Polls for H1

The ranking of Sino-Japanese sub-issues that were emphasized by the newspapers were compared with the rankings of the Public Opinion Survey & the Public Attitude Survey to observe relationships between them. The comparison was made by applying Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient. The option of "Other" was excluded from both of the rankings because it is irrelevant for the calculation. Positive correlations were found for Period 1 (0.56) and Period 2 (0.49) but the correlations were not of strong significance. The top ranks of press coverage of both periods corresponded with the top ranks of the public opinion, but the second ranks did not show a strong correspondence.

Table 7. Rank-Order Correlations for H1

Period 1		Rank of Coverage	Rank of Public Polls
A	Economy and Business	1	1
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War	4	2
C	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan	3	3
D	Resource and Territories	7	4
E	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense	2	5
F	Japan's Economic Cooperation with China	5.5	6
G	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan	5.5	7
Correlation		0.56	
Period 2		Rank of Coverage	Rank of public polls
A	Economy and Business	2	5
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War	1	1
C	Mutual Understanding about Each Other on the Citizen Level	5	2
D	China's and Japan's Policy in International Politics	6.5	3
E	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan	8	7
F	Resource and Territories	4	4
G	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense	3	6
H	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan	6.5	8
Correlation		0.49	

Note: Significance was tested by comparing the result of each calculation with the critical value for the same amount of items. Only when the calculated correlation exceeded these critical values, significance was confirmed.

Intercoder Reliability for H1

Table 8 illustrates the intercoder reliability that was assessed between the author and coder A, and the author and coder B. Out of 10 randomly chosen articles, the author and coder A coded for main topics in the articles identically. The author and coder B individually coded another set of 10 randomly chosen articles and 9 was coded the same. This makes the first assessment for author and coder A 100% in agreement and 90% for author and coder B.

Table 8. Intercoder Reliability for H1

		Author and Coder A		Author and Coder B
H1	Number of Articles	10		10
	Number of Data Categories	Period 1	8	8
		Period 2	9	9
	Number of Data Points	10		10
	Number of Points in Agreement	10		9
Intercoder Agreement (%)		100%		90%

2. Results for Hypothesis 2

Tendencies in Coverage for H2

a. Overall Numbers of Articles on Sino-Japanese Relations and Shift in Coverage for H2


From a total of 644 front pages (322 from each newspaper) in morning and evening editions of the Yomiuri and the Asahi from Dec. 12, 2004 to June 12, 2005, 122 articles were identified and retrieved as coverage on Sino-Japanese relations (see Table 9 & Figure 13). The Yomiuri covered Sino-Japanese relations more frequently than the Asahi with a difference of 18 articles. The Yomiuri's Sino-Japanese coverage started to gradually increase in January and as many as 36 articles were written about the relations in April. Compared

with December 2004, when the newspaper only released one article on the relations, the emphasis on the news related to the issue had increased. Even though the coverage decreased in the next month, the Yomiuri still covered almost twice as many as the Asahi on Sino-Japanese relations. Similarly, the Asahi devoted 29 articles in April and 8 in the following month. The number of articles released each month revealed the sudden increase in coverage on the relations, peaking in April and then gradually decreasing in the following months.

Table 9. Articles on Sino-Japanese Relations (article, n=122)

	Dec 2004	Jan 2005	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total
The Asahi	3	5	1	2	29	8	4	52
The Yomiuri	1	7	4	5	36	14	3	70
Total	4	12	5	7	65	22	7	122

Figure 13. The Yomiuri and the Asahi's Coverage on Sino-Japanese Relations for H2 (Articles by Month)



b. Types of Articles for H2

Sino-Japanese coverage was found mostly in independent news articles (77%), followed by editorials and columns (16), serial articles (4), and contributed articles (2) (see Table 10). More than 80 % of the bilateral relations were reported as a form of a news article rather than an opinion article. The Yomiuri discussed the bilateral relations more actively in opinion articles such as editorials and columns (20% of the Yomiuri's coverage on the issue) as well as contributed articles (4%), whereas the Asahi dealt with diplomatic issues mostly within news articles (88% of the overall coverage on the issue was in news articles).

Table 10. Types of Articles for H2 (paragraph, n=122)

	News Article		Opinion Article		Total
	Independent Article	Serial Article	Editorial Column	Contributed Article	
The Yomiuri (%)	49 (70)	4 (6)	14 (20)	3 (4)	70 (100)
The Asahi (%)	45 (87)	1 (2)	6 (12)	0 (0)	52 (100)
Total (%)	94 (77)	5 (4)	20(16)	3 (2)	122 (99)*

* The percentages were rounded off to the whole number, and as a result made totals not 100% sometimes.

In terms of the genres, 75 % of Sino-Japanese relations coverage fell into "Politics and Diplomacy". 15% of the coverage in "Other" reflects the coverage in editorials and columns. 4 % was on Economy, and 2% on "Community", "Science and Technology" and "National Defense and Military Affairs". There were no articles about Culture and Entertainment.

Table 11. Genres of Articles

Genres	The Yomiuri	The Asahi	Total (%)
Politics and Diplomacy	50	42	92 (75)
Economy	4	1	5 (4)
Community	1	1	2 (2)
Culture and Entertainment	0	0	0 (0)
Science and Technology	0	2	2 (2)
National Defense and Military Affairs	2	1	3 (2)
Other	13	5	18 (15)
Total	70	52	122 (100)

c. Current Sino-Japanese Relations and Predictions in the Newspapers

Table 12 shows how Sino-Japanese relations were described in the coverage. The relations during the period under study were frequently described in terms of tension, distrust and hate in both newspapers. As for the prediction of future relations, both newspapers shared a negative or pessimistic view (no paragraph described the relations optimistically), and the Yomiuri blamed China as the cause of the negative state of bilateral relations, while the Asahi blamed Japan. At any rate, due to the small number of descriptions which defined relations at that time or which predicted future relations, any finding should be treated with caution.

Table 12. Description of Sino-Japanese Relations

News- papers	Current Relations		Prediction				
	Tension, distrust, hate	Other relation	Due to which country?			How will relations evolve?	
			Japan	China	Other or no mention	Better	Worse
The Yomiuri	6	1	0	3	1	0	4
The Asahi	8	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	14	1	1	3	1	0	5

Note: Options with no correspondence were not listed in the table.

Emphasis on each Sub-Issue for H2 (*Cognitive Attributes*)

The emphasis on issues by the Yomiuri and the Asahi was somewhat similar (correlation between the two newspapers: 0.76). When segmented into sub-issues, the highest coverage was on “China’s Sentiment to Japan” (38%). With less than half of that attention which was paid to the Chinese sentiment; “Historical Perceptions” was covered by 15 % of articles devoted to Sino-Japanese relations. Including the third ranked sub-issue, “Resources and Territories” (13 %), the top three sub-issues that were most keenly reported on front pages covered 66 % of the overall news on Sino-Japanese relations (see Table 13). There was no coverage on the topic of sports between China and Japan during the examinational period.

Table 13. Sub-Issue Emphasis by the Newspapers for H2 (paragraph, n=872)

	Sub-issues	The Yomiuri	The Asahi	Total (%)
A	Historical Perceptions	62	70	132 (15%)
B	Resources and Territories	91	19	110 (13)
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	151	181	332 (38)
D	International Politics and Security	12	7	19 (2)
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	10	8	18 (2)
F	Chinese Military Force	0	7	7 (1)
G	Economy and Business	22	5	27 (3)
H	Interaction through Sports	0	0	0 (0)
I	Chinese Ideology	16	8	24 (3)
J	Other	122	81	203 (23)
	Total	486	386	872 (100)

Tonal Emphasis on each Sub-Issue (*Affective Attributes*)

a. Overall Tonal Emphasis

The overall tone of a paragraph was defined by the summation of tonal elements that the paragraph possessed (see the coding scheme in appendix II for more explanations and definitions). According to the result (see Table 14), all the topics had more negative tonal attributes than positive attributes except "Economy and Business". In most sub-issues, neutral tones were observed most often, but "China's Sentiment to Japan", "International Politics and Security", and "Chinese Ideology" contained more negative tones rather than neutral or positive tones. Even though all of the sub-issues except "Interaction through Sports" had at least one negative reporting attribute, there were four sub-issues with no single positive attribute: "International Politics and Security", "Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan", "Chinese Military Force", and "Chinese Ideology". The sub-issues which exceeded 50 % of tonal coverage were "Historical Perceptions", "Resources and Territories", "Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan", "Chinese Military Force", and "Economy and Business" leaning toward neutral coverage, "International Politics and Security" and "Chinese Ideology" had negative coverage, and none had positive coverage. No paragraph reporting was found about "Interaction through Sports" and that resulted in the absence of tonal attributes for the sub-issue.

Table 14. Overall Tones in Coverage

(paragraph, n=872, (%))

Newspaper		The Yomiuri and the Asahi			Total (%)
Attributes		Positive	Neutral	Negative	
A	Historical Perceptions	19 (14)	71 (54)	42 (32)	132 (100)
B	Resources and Territories	2 (2)	63 (57)	45 (41)	110 (100)
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	49 (15)	126 (38)	157 (47)	332 (100)
D	International Politics and Security	0 (0)	9 (47)	10 (53)	19 (100)
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	0 (0)	17 (94)	1 (6)	18 (100)
F	Chinese Military Force	0 (0)	5 (71)	2 (29)	7 (100)
G	Economy and Business	4 (15)	20 (74)	3 (11)	27 (100)
H	Interaction through Sports				
I	Chinese Ideology	0 (0)	9 (38)	15 (63)	24 (100)
J	Other	20 (10)	160 (79)	23 (11)	203 (100)
Total		94 (11)	480 (55)	298 (34)	872 (100)

Note: "H: Interaction through Sports" was not reported during the study period.

b. Tonal Emphasis on Chinese Representations

The next table illustrates how China was portrayed in each sub-issue. The totals of each coverage tone shows that China was portrayed more often in negative tones (48%) rather than in positive (14%) or neutral (38%) tones. Due to the strong emphasis by the newspapers, the sub-issue where China was most friendly (or positively), and neutrally, and unfriendly (or negatively) portrayed in terms of the numbers of the paragraphs was "China's Sentiment to Japan". The friendly coverage reflects the Japanese government and newspapers' appraisal of the Chinese government's attempt to settle the demonstration by Chinese citizens against Japan.

In "Historical Perceptions", "China's Sentiment to Japan", "International Politics and Security", and "Chinese Ideology", China was portrayed heavily in negative tones

(respectively, 64%, 53%, 80%, 53% in unfriendly coverage). All four sub-issues except “China’s Sentiment to Japan” had no single friendly description of China. Additionally, except for the Asahi’s news report on China’s sentiment with 13 % of Chinese description in a friendly tone, all the other sub-topics had less than 10% of China portrayed in a friendly tone. Other than the option “Other” and the topics which did not hold any Chinese description, the only topic which had more neutral than unfriendly was “Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan”. (However, this topic itself is a negative component because it is about a crime.) The newspaper introduced “Unfriendly” China in all the sub-issues except for “Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan” and “Chinese Military”.

Considering these results, it can be assumed that the tonal salience that the newspapers were conveying to the audience about China in Sino-Japanese topics was leaning toward a negative side with a great significance.

Table 15. Tonal Emphasis on Chinese Representations (paragraph, n=415)

Tones Attributes		Friendly		Neutral		Unfriendly		Total
		Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	
A	Historical Perceptions	0 (0)	0 (0)	13 (25)	5 (10)	17 (33)	16 (31)	51 (99)*
B	Resources and Territories	2 (6)	0 (0)	15 (43)	1 (3)	14 (40)	3 (9)	35 (101)*
C	China’s Sentiment to Japan	17 (7)	31 (13)	20 (9)	42 (18)	52 (23)	68 (30)	230 (100)
D	International Politics and Security	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (20)	0 (0)	3 (30)	5 (50)	10 (100)
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	0 (0)	0 (0)	7 (44)	9 (56)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16 (100)
F	Chinese Military Force	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
G	Economy and Business	1 (33)	1 (33)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (33)	0 (0)	3 (99)*
H	Interaction through Sports	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
I	Chinese Ideology	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (16)	6 (32)	6 (32)	4 (21)	19 (101)*
J	Other	2 (4)	3 (6)	25 (49)	11 (22)	6 (12)	4 (8)	51 (101)*
Sub-total (% within the tone)		22 (39)	35 (61)	85 (53)	74 (47)	99 (50)	100 (50)	415
Total (%)		57 (14)		159 (38)		199 (48)		415 (100)

Note: Y= The Yomiuri, A= The Asahi

*The total figure sometimes adds up to more than 100% due to the rounding of calculations.

When the study examined Chinese representations and representatives appearing in news coverage, politicians including a Prime Minister (PM) and official bureaucrat (GB) appeared with high frequency (see Table 16). Citizens (CZ) appeared in “China’s Sentiment to Japan” and “Chinese Ideology” but they were described or introduced as unfriendly to Japan almost all the time. This reflects the newspapers’ descriptions of their anti-Japanese attitudes especially during the protests held in April 2005. Chinese media were referred in various tones under the topics of “Historical Perceptions”, “China’s Sentiment to Japan”, and “Chinese Ideology”. An “unfriendly” China or Chinese representatives tended to be portrayed by quoting their words and opinions in direct quotations.

Regarding the types of Chinese representations introduced in Sino-Japanese relations coverage, “Chinese Sentiment to Japan” introduced a wide variety with 8 types of representations, followed by “Historical Perceptions” with 6, “Resources and Territories” with 5, “International Politics and Security”, “Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan” and “Chinese Ideology” with 4, “Economy and Business” with 2, and “Chinese Military Force” with no representation.

Table16. Chinese Representations in Coverage

C= Country, Nation (as a notion)
 SP= State President, President
 PM= Prime Minister, government, politicians, political parties
 GB = Government bureaucrat, public offices, civil officers
 B=Business person, private company, business associations, industrial league
 AC= Academic person, researchers, research organization, academic critic
 CZ=Citizens in general, community civilian, private organization
 CR=Criminals
 M= Media
 OT=Other

(paragraph, (quotation of comments))

Sub-issues		Tones		Friendly		Neutral		Unfriendly	
A	Historical Perceptions			1. GB	10	1. GB	22 (13)		
				2. SP	3	2. PM	6 (2)		
				3. OT	2	3. SP	4		
				4. C	1	4. C	1		
				4. PM	1				
				4. M	1				
B	Resources and Territories	1.C	1	1.C	9	1.C	8		
		1.PM	1	2.GB	3	2.GB	6 (3)		
				3.PM	2	3.SP	3		
				3.AC	2				
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	1. GB	28(8)	1.GB	20 (4)	1. CZ	64 (8)		
		2. PM	10 (3)	2. M	14 (5)	2. GB	27 (12)		
		3. C	4 (4)	3. PM	11	3. PM	12 (4)		
		4. SP	2 (1)	4. SP	6 (1)	4. M	6 (1)		
		4. M	2	5. C	5	5. C	5 (3)		
		6. B	1	5. CZ	5	6. SP	3 (2)		
		6.CZ	1	7. B	1	6. OT	3		
D	International Politics and Security			1.PM	2	1.PM	4 (1)		
						2.GB	2 (2)		
						3.C	1		
						3.SP	1		
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan			1. CR	9				
				2.OT	5				
				3.C	1				
				3.GB	1				
F	Chinese Military Force								
G	Economy and Business	1.B	2			1.C	1		
H	Interaction through Sports								
I	Chinese Ideology			1.PM	3	1.CZ	6 (3)		
				1.CZ	3	2.PM	4		
				3.GB	2				
				4.M	1				
J	Other	1.PM	3	1.PM	13	1.PM	5		
		2.GB	2	2.SP	9	2.GB	3		
				3.GB	8	3.C	2		
				4.C	4				
				5.B	1				
				5.AC	1				

Note: There was no paragraph devoted for "H: Interaction through Sports" in the study period.

c. Tonal Emphasis on Japanese Representations

Table 17 illustrates how Japan was portrayed in each sub-issue. The totals of each coverage tone show that Japan was portrayed to have a more neutral stance toward China (53%) rather than friendly (14%) or unfriendly (34%). Evidence of Japan being neutral toward China was seen in the sub-topics “Historical Perceptions”, “Resources and Territories”, and “Economy and Business”. In “China’s Sentiment to Japan”, “International Politics and Security”, “Chinese Military Force”, and “Chinese Ideology”, an unfriendly tonal description was applied more often than the other tones. Negative tone emphasis was the strongest in “International Politics” (100%) followed by “Chinese Military” (67%) and “Chinese Ideology” (67%). 50% was neutral and the other 50% was negative in the topic “Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan”. Friendly portrayal of Japan toward China was the strongest in “Business and Economy”. Except for “International Politics and Security” which contained neither friendly nor neutral components, “Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan”, “Chinese military” and “Chinese Ideology” which respectively did not contain a friendly tonal component, all other sub-topics had at least one description for each tone.

Considering these results, it can be assumed that the tonal salience that the newspapers were conveying to the audience about Japan in Sino-Japanese topics was mostly neutral, but very unfriendly to China in specific topics.

Table 17. Tonal Emphasis on Japanese Representations (paragraph, n=413)

Tones		Friendly		Neutral		Unfriendly		Total
Attributes		Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	
A	Historical Perceptions	1 (1)	14 (18)	17 (21)	30 (38)	5 (6)	13 (16)	80 (100)
B	Resources and Territories	3 (4)	0 (0)	36 (43)	14 (17)	23 (28)	7 (8)	83 (100)
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	3 (2)	15 (11)	7 (5)	47 (33)	24 (17)	46 (32)	142 (100)
D	International Politics and Security	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0(0)	0 (0)	1 (100)	1 (100)
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (50)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (50)	2 (100)
F	Chinese Military Force	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (33)	0 (0)	2 (67)	3 (100)
G	Economy and Business	1 (8)	3 (23)	7 (54)	0 (0)	2 (15)	0 (0)	13(100)
H	Interaction through Sports	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
I	Chinese Ideology	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (33)	0 (0)	2 (67)	0 (0)	3 (100)
J	Other	6 (7)	10 (12)	40 (47)	16 (19)	10 (12)	4 (5)	86 (102)*
Sub-total (% within the tone)		14 (25)	42 (75)	109 (50)	108 (50)	66 (47)	74 (53)	413
Total (%)		56 (14)		217 (53)		140 (34)		413 (100)

Y= The Yomiuri, A= The Asahi

*The total figure sometimes adds up to more than 100% due to the rounding of calculations.

Just like Chinese representations, Japanese representations and representatives in coverage also showed high appearance of politicians (PM) and official bureaucrat (GB) (see Table 18). The other results are shown in the table, but just as Chinese citizens that were portrayed mostly as neutral and unfriendly in coverage, Japanese citizens (CZ) also appeared with neutral and unfriendly tones toward China under the topic “Chinese Sentiment to Japan”.

Concerning the topics about Chinese sentiment, Japanese politicians and officials were actively portrayed as unfriendly to China by the use of their direct quotations. Other categories also applied direct quotations, but those appeared more randomly across the tones. In the historical issue, politicians including a Prime Minister (PM) were portrayed as friendly and unfriendly to China in about the same weight. This implied that Japanese government had undecided attitudinal stances on the topic.

Regarding the types of Japanese representations introduced in Sino-Japanese relations coverage, “Resources and Territories” had the widest variety with 6 types of representations, followed by “Chinese Sentiment to Japan” and “Historical Perceptions” with 5, “Economy and Business” with 4, “Chinese Ideology” with 3, “Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan” with 2, and “International Politics and Security” and “Chinese Military Force” each with only one Japanese representation which or whose actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions were reported regarding Sino-Japanese relations.

Table 18. Japanese Representations in Coverage

C= Country, Nation (as a notion)
 SP= State President, President
 PM= Prime Minister, government, politicians, political parties
 GB = Government bureaucrat, public offices, civil officers
 B=Business person, private company, business associations, industrial league
 EN= Art of public entertainment and organization
 AC= Academic person, researchers, research organization, academic critic
 CZ=Citizens in general, community civilian, private organization
 CR=Criminals
 M= Media
 OT=Other

(paragraph, (quotation of comments))

Tones		Friendly		Neutral		Unfriendly	
Sub-issues							
A	Historical Perceptions	1.PM 2.CZ	14 (9) 1	1.PM 2. GB 3.C 3.SP	33 (6) 12 1 1	1.PM 2.GB	15 (6) 3 (3)
B	Resources and Territories	1.PM	3 (1)	1.PM 2.GB 3.C 4.AC 5.B	21 (3) 16 (1) 7 4 2	1.PM 2. GB 3.C 3.SP 5.B 6.AC	13 (4) 8 3 3 2 1
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	1.GB 2.PM	10 (3) 8 (4)	1.GB 2.PM 3.CZ 4.B 5.C	26 (1) 19 (3) 5 3 1	1.GB 2.PM 3.B 3.CZ 5.C	46 (16) 9 (2) 6 6 3 (1)
D	International Politics and Security					1.C	1
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan			1.OT	1	1.GB	1 (1)
F	Chinese Military Force			1.PM	1	1.PM	2
G	Economy and Business	1.B	4	1.B 2.GB 3.C 3.PM	3 2 1 1 (1)	1.B 1.GB	1 (1) 1
H	Interaction through Sports						
I	Chinese Ideology			1. AC	1	1.B 1.EN	1 1 (1)
J	Other	1.PM 2.GB 3.B	9 (3) 5 (1) 2	1.PM 2.GB 3.C	30 25 (1) 1	1.GB 2.PM	8 (5) 6 (2)

Note: There was no paragraph devoted for "H: Interaction through Sports" in the study period.

d. Commentaries on China and Japan

Newspaper opinions mostly appeared in editorials and columns. Commentaries were also found in contributed articles, which represent opinions outside the newspaper companies. In some cases, personal opinions of journalists crept into supposedly neutral news articles. Those commentaries were coded and tallied up in Table 19. The table shows that both newspapers expressed their personal (or organizational) opinion toward China only in an unfriendly tone. The Yomiuri especially emphasized its opinion in its commentaries three times more than the Asahi. Coders also paid attention to how China was placed in the commentaries. According to the result, 44 paragraphs out of 46 paragraphs with journalists' opinions found China as a subject to blame or criticize. Two paragraphs with journalists' opinions found China to be a source of fear or threat.

The Asahi was more positively disposed to China in its coverage of China's approach to Japan. This shows that while the Asahi blamed China for the unstable relations by making unfriendly commentaries on China (see Table 19), it also blamed the Japanese government for making the relationship worse. The Yomiuri, however, maintained a negative portrayal of China's intentions in its commentary coverage. Since editorials and columns are the places where opinions tend to appear, the result appears to reflect the political color of each newspaper towards Japanese foreign affairs with China.

Table 19. Commentary on China and Japan by Japanese Newspapers (paragraph)

Commentary on <i>China</i>	The Yomiuri	the Asahi	Total
Friendly or Pro-Chinese	0	0	0
Unfriendly or Anti-Chinese	38	11	49
Neutral	0	0	0
China's placement			
Subject to blame, criticize	36	10	46
Subject to fear or feel threatened by	2	0	2
Other	0	1	1
Types of Articles	1. Editorial/Column (32) 2. Contributed Article (4) 3. News Article (1) 3. Serial Article (1)	1. Editorial/Column (7) 2. Serial Article (2) 2. News Article (2)	1. Editorial/Column (39) 2. Contributed Article (4) 3. News Article (3) 3. Serial Article (3)
Commentary on <i>Japan</i>	The Yomiuri	The Asahi	Total
Friendly or Pro-Chinese	0	14	14
Unfriendly or Anti-Chinese	1	2	3
Neutral	1	0	1
Types of Articles	1. Editorial/Column (2)	1. Editorial/Column (12) 2. News Article (4)	1. Editorial/Column (14) 2. News Article (4)

Agreement of Coverage with Public Poll for H2

a. Correspondence between Public Opinion and Cognitive Attributes


Cognitive attributes found through content analysis were converted to ranks from 1 to 9 and then compared with the ranks in the public opinion (Cross-Country Comparison Survey) in order to calculate the correlation. A positive correlation of 0.78 was found between the sub-topical coverage in Sino-Japanese and the public opinion result (see Table 20 & Figure 14).

Table 20. Rank-Order Correlations (Cognitive attributes)

(n=9)

Sub-topics		Rank of the Coverage	Rank of the Public Poll
A	Historical Perceptions	2	2
B	Resources and Territories	3	3
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	1	1
D	International Politics and Security	6	6
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	7	4
F	Chinese Military Force	8	7
G	Economy and Business	4	8
H	Interaction through Sports	9	9
I	Chinese Ideology	5	5
Correlation		0.78*	

* p < .05 (one-tailed test)⁶⁴



b. Correspondence between Public Opinion and Affective Attributes

Similarly, *affective* attributes in Sino-Japanese coverage were compared with public opinion. For overall tones, a correlation of 0.63 was found for positive coverage, 0.83 for neutral coverage, and 0.80 for negative coverage.

⁶⁴ See Zwillinger and Kokoska (2000) for Spearman's correlation coefficient.

Table 21. Ranks of Overall Tonal Coverage on each Sub-issue**(n=9)**

Sub-issues		Positive	Neutral	Negative	Public Poll
A	Historical Perceptions	2	2	3	2
B	Resources and Territories	4	3	2	3
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	1	1	1	1
D	International Politics and Security	7	6.5	5	6
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	7	5	8	4
F	Chinese Military Force	7	8	7	7
G	Economy and Business	3	4	6	8
H	Interaction through Sports	7	9	9	9
I	Chinese Ideology	7	6.5	4	5
Correlation		0.63*	0.83*	0.80*	

* p < .05 (one-tailed test)

The rank-order correlation coefficient was also applied to the result of tonal coverage on China and Japan (see Table 22 and 23). The correlations were 0.45 for friendly, 0.98 for neutral, and 0.80 for the coverage where China was portrayed as unfriendly. The correlation between the overall description of China in Sino-Japanese relations and the result of public opinion was 0.95.

The correlation between the tonal coverage on Japan and public opinion was 0.63 for the coverage where Japan was portrayed friendly to China, and it was 0.75 for neutral and unfriendly Japanese coverage. There was correlation of 0.72 between overall descriptions of Japan and the result of public opinion (The result of commentaries on China was added to the result of Chinese description tones.).

Table 22. Rank-Order Correlations for Tonal Emphasis on China

(after commentaries on China were added, n=9)

Ranks within each Coverage Tones		Friendly*	Neutral	Unfriendly*	Total (all portrayals)	Public Poll
Sub-issues						
A	Historical Perceptions	6.5	2	2	2	2
B	Resources and Territories	2.5	3.5	3	3	3
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	1	1	1	1	1
D	International Politics and Security	6.5	6	5	6	6
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	6.5	3.5	8	5	4
F	Chinese Military Force	6.5	8	8	8.5	7
G	Economy and Business	2.5	8	6	7	8
H	Interaction through Sports	6.5	8	8	8.5	9
I	Chinese Ideology	6.5	5	4	4	5
Correlation		0.45	0.98*	0.80*	0.95*	

*Friendly... Description or introduction of friendly or pro-Japanese China or Chinese representations

Unfriendly...Description or introduction of unfriendly or anti-Japanese China or Chinese representations

* p < .05 (one-tailed test)

Table 23. Rank-Order Correlations for Tonal Emphasis on Japan

(after commentaries on China were added, n=9)

Ranks within each Coverage Tones		Friendly*	Neutral	Unfriendly*	Total (all portrayals)	Public Poll
Sub-issues						
A	Historical Perceptions	2	3	3	3	2
B	Resources and Territories	4	2	2	2	3
C	China's Sentiment to Japan	1	1	1	1	1
D	International Politics and Security	5	8.5	7.5	8	6
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	7.5	6	7.5	7	4
F	Chinese Military Force	7.5	6	5	5.5	7
G	Economy and Business	3	4	5	4	8
H	Interaction through Sports	7.5	8.5	9	9	9
I	Chinese Ideology	7.5	6	5	5.5	5
Correlation		0.79*	0.75*	0.75*	0.72*	

*Friendly... Description or introduction of friendly or pro-Chinese Japan or Japanese representations

Unfriendly...Description or introduction of unfriendly or anti-Chinese Japan or Japanese representations

* p < .05 (one-tailed test)

Intercoder Reliability for H2

The intercoder reliability for H 2 was assessed by following the same procedure as for H1. The author and coder A coded for the same set of randomly chosen 87 paragraphs (from 10 random articles). The agreement was 88 % between the two. The author and coder B coded for another set of randomly chosen 83 paragraphs (from 10 random articles), and the agreement was 93 %. These relatively high correlations proved that the coding was reliable⁶⁵.

⁶⁵ Details of the agreements between author and coder A are: 1) "Topics": 99%, "Chinese representations": 80%, "Coverage tones (toward China)": 76%, "Japanese representations": 97%, "Coverage tones (toward Japan)": 90%, "Commentary tones and placements (of China)": 70%, "Commentary tones (on Japan)": 0%, "Current Sino-Japanese relations (current situation and prediction)": 0%. Agreements between author and coder B are: 1) "Topics": 98%, "Chinese representations": 98%, "Coverage tones (toward China)": 85%, "Japanese representations": 96%, "Coverage tones (toward China)": 89%, "Commentary tones and placements (of China)": 100%, "Commentary tones (on Japan)": 86%, "Current Sino-Japanese relations (current situation and prediction)": 100%. This results tell us even though the overall agreements are as high as 88% for author and coder A, and 93% for author and coder B, the results of a couple of categories such as "Commentary tones (on Japan)" and "Current Sino-Japanese relations (current situation and prediction)"

Table 24. Intercoder Reliability for H2

		Author and Coder A	Author and Coder B
H2	Number of Paragraphs	87	83
	Number of Data Categories	74	74
	Number of Data Points	361	355
	Number of Points in Agreement	316	329
	Intercoder Agreement (%)	88%	93%

3. Conclusion

The content analysis findings presented in this chapter captures directions and tendencies in the media coverage of Sino-Japanese relations. In the content analysis designed for H1, the coverage on the relations was published in only 32 articles with nearly 45 % of the coverage concentrated on economic relations. However in Period 2, 75 articles on Sino-Japanese relations were found. This was more than double the number of articles from Period 1. The attention of the press to this issue was much higher in Period 2, and the main topic discussed actively in the period was shifted to history with 41 % of the coverage on this area. As a result, positive correlations of 0.56 for Period 1 and 0.49 for Period 2 were calculated with the tendency in public opinion, but neither correlation had a strong significance. In both periods, both the press and the public shared the same perception of what was most salient in bilateral relations.

On the other hand, a high priority in the Sino-Japanese relations in coverage was revealed in the result of content analysis for H2. As many as 122 articles on bilateral relations were found with its coverage peaking in April 2005. Much of this coverage was due to the protests by Chinese citizens against Japan in this month. Overall, the Yomiuri covered Sino-Japanese issues more actively than the Asahi with 18 more articles. Compared to the

should be taken with a consideration. The possible cause of this low agreement can be attributed to the seldom appearance of the relevant elements in sample paragraphs. There categories with low agreements do not affect any other coding categories and therefore the reliability for other categories remains strong.

coverage tendency in Period 1 and 2 in content analysis for H1 which showed that 0% (Period 1) and 9% (Period 2) coverage in editorial and columns, the newspapers eagerly expressed their opinions in editorials and columns (16%) during the observation period for H2. Still, the most coverage on the relations was held in the form of news articles (77% coverage in independent news articles).

The Sino-Japanese coverage was extremely focused on “Politics and Diplomacy” (75%), and other genres were not covered very much. “Culture and Entertainment” was not covered at all during the period. Both newspapers expressed the relations at the time in terms of “tension”, “distrust” and “hate”, and there was no single prediction of the relations that was reported in a positive or optimistic view. In the negative prediction, the Yomiuri blamed China as the cause of future aggravations of relations whereas the Asahi blamed Japan.

The *cognitive* emphasis on sub-issues was mostly centered on the topic of “China’s Sentiment to Japan” (38%) followed by “Historical Perceptions” (15%). The content analysis found more negative (or unfriendly) *affective* attributes than positive (or friendly) attribute in each sub-issue except for “Economy and Business”. Chinese representations, which were of political figures most of the time, were heavily covered in negative tones (48%) as unfriendly elements toward Japan. On the other hand, Japanese representations, which were also of political figures most of the time, were portrayed to have a more neutral stance (53%) rather than friendly (14%) or unfriendly (34%) toward China. In commentaries made within opinion articles, as well, the coverage tone in Sino-Japanese relations was more negative (unfriendly) than positive (friendly). The editorial commentaries between the newspapers showed a slightly different insight. Even though both papers blamed China for the aggravation of bilateral relations, the Asahi also expressed its regrets to the Japanese government’s policy while the Yomiuri did not blame the Japanese government. The Yomiuri made commentaries three times more than the Asahi did.

Correlations between the coverage attributes and public opinion were 0.78 for *cognitive* attributes, 0.63 (positive), 0.83 (neutral), and 0.80 (negative) for overall tonal coverage in Sino-Japan relations. More focused analysis on tonal coverage for representations of each country revealed 0.45 (friendly), 0.98 (neutral), and 0.80 (unfriendly) for China and Chinese representations and 0.79 (friendly), 0.75 (neutral), and 0.75 (unfriendly) for Japan and Japanese representations.

Chapter 7: Discussion and Analysis

1. Discussion about the Findings of the Research

Both *agenda-setting* and *second-level agenda setting* hypothesize that the media transfer priority news topics to the public. To empirically test this theory in a Japanese media context, content analysis of two Japanese newspapers was conducted. The results were compared with public opinion data.

News Coverage and Hypothesis 1

The result of this research points toward some interesting findings for future research. The first set of the research did not see a strong linkage between media emphasis on Sino-Japanese relations and the importance of the issue to the public (0.56 for research period 1, and 0.49 for period 2). Nonetheless, a strong correlation was found between the top priority news item in the press and the top priority of the public. The press (the Yomiuri and the Asahi) actively reported on business issues in Sino-Japanese relations during the research period from 2001 to 2002, appearing on front pages in 40% of all Sino-Japanese related articles. Similar issue salience in the press could be observed in research period 2 from 2005 to 2006 when the press repeatedly covered historical issues at a rate of 40 %. This implies that the press was not very successful in defining all of the items on the agenda list of the audience, but they successfully transferred the priority issue salience to the audience.

Among the sub-issues “Economy and Business” from Period 1 and “Historical Perceptions” from Period 2, there was a shift of issue salience in press coverage on each sub-issue over time. “Historical Perceptions”, increased from 9 % in coverage to 41 % of the coverage in Period 2. A similar phenomenon was seen in the public over time. The historical issue moved from the second place issue in Period 1 to the top priority item as an important issue in Sino-Japanese relations in Period 2.

Regarding these results, H1-a which states, “The more the Japanese press covers the historical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, the more the public regards the historical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations as the most important issue in the bilateral diplomatic

relations.” was supported.

On the other hand, “Economy and Business” was the center of Sino-Japanese relational topics in the newspapers in Period 2 (44%), but coverage on the issue decreased in Period 2 (11%). Similarly, public interest also decreased. The ranks of the issue within the public dropped from the top to the fifth ranking.

H1-b hypothesized, “The less the Japanese press covers the economic aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, the less the public regards the economic aspects of Sino-Japanese relations as the most important issue in the bilateral diplomatic relations”. This hypothesis was also supported.

This first set of the hypotheses was supported by comparing the result of content analysis and changes in public opinion over time. However, the correspondence of the press coverage and how the public views Sino-Japanese relations overall did not see strong correlations. This implies that only the issue salience of a strongly focused issue by the press transferred to the public’s issue salience, and it did not affect the rest of the items on the priority list. Therefore, the public’s intrapersonal priorities might have affected the rest of the items on the list. This result supports the *salience model* of *agenda-setting* effects defined by McCombs (1976) that the media successfully transfer only a few issue priorities that they constantly emphasize to the audience’s priorities rather than determining the audience’s overall priorities. However, the result did not show such strong *agenda-setting* influence as can be seen in the *priority model* where the public agenda of priority topic items is defined by the media agenda (as cited in Takeshita, 1998).

News Coverage and Hypothesis 2

The latter half of the research included a study of the *affective* component in the press coverage of Sino-Japanese relations in addition to the *cognitive* component, which was the only research domain for H1. The content analysis revealed very interesting findings. As presented in Table 25, the issue salience in the coverage of Sino-Japanese relations indicated a significant correlation with the issue salience of the same relations for the public (Cognitive attribute I, 0.78). When the same set of samples were divided into coverage tones, positively covered Sino-Japanese relations correlated with the public’s priority issues

with 0.63 whereas negatively covered relations showed correlations with 0.80. These results indicate that both *cognitive* and *affective*, especially negative component between the two tones, in the coverage of Sino-Japanese relations had strong association with how the public views the relations. *Affective* component showed a somewhat higher correlation than the *cognitive* component, but the difference was only 0.02.

Regarding Chinese and Japanese representations and how they are portrayed in the Sino-Japanese coverage, Chinese representations' coverage without consideration for the tones showed as high as 0.95 in correlations with the salience in the public. Japanese representations' coverage showed 0.80 (Cognitive Attribute II-A & II-B). When tonal consideration was added, the correlation changed to 0.45 for friendly coverage of China or Chinese representations, and 0.80 for unfriendly coverage (Affective Attribute II-A). Additionally, friendly coverage of Japan or Japanese representations indicated 0.79. Unfriendly coverage of Japan or Japanese representations showed 0.75 in correlations with the Japanese public's priority agenda in Sino-Japanese relations (Affective Attribute II-B in Table 25). These series of calculations revealed that the public's Sino-Japanese relational issue salience was most strongly associated with the salience in coverage on China in Sino-Japanese relations rather than coverage on Japan. When segmented by coverage tones, unfriendly coverage of China or Chinese representations showed more significant correlation than friendly coverage. In this case, the *cognitive* component rather than the *affective* component had a stronger linkage with the public's salience in Sino-Japanese relations.

Neutral tones were eliminated from the table, being considered irrelevant for the discussion since it includes coverage with no tonal features and no obvious tones.

Table 25. Comparison of Correlations

		Cognitive Attribute I	
Variables	A	Salience of Sino-Japanese Sub-issues in Press Coverage	
	B	Salience of Sino-Japanese Sub-issue in the Public	
Correlation		0.78 (n=9)	
Level of Significance		P<.05 (one-tailed test)	
		Affective Attribute I	
		Positive	Negative
Variables	A	Salience of coverage tones in Sino-Japanese Sub-issues	
	B	Salience of Sino-Japanese Sub-issues in the Public	
Correlation		0.63 (n=9)	0.80 (n=9)
Level of Significance		p<.05 (one-tailed test)	P<.05 (one-tailed test)
		Cognitive Attribute II-A	Cognitive Attribute II-B
Variables	A	Salience of coverage on <i>China</i> in Sino-Japanese Sub-issues	Salience of coverage on <i>Japan</i> in Sino-Japanese Sub-issues
	B	Salience of Sino-Japanese Sub-issue in the Public	Salience of Sino-Japanese Sub-issue in the Public
Correlation		0.95 (n=9)	0.72 (n=9)
Level of Significance		p<.05 (one-tailed test)	P<.05 (one-tailed test)
		Affective Attribute II-A	
		Friendly coverage	Unfriendly coverage
Variables	A	Salience of coverage tones on <i>China</i> in Sino-Japanese Sub-issues	
	B	Salience of Sino-Japanese Sub-issues in the Public	
Correlation		0.45 (n=9)	0.80 (n=9)
Level of Significance		non-significant	P<.05 (one-tailed test)
		Affective Attribute II-B	
		Friendly coverage	Unfriendly coverage
Variables	A	Salience of coverage tones on <i>Japan</i> in Sino-Japanese Sub-issues	
	B	Salience of Sino-Japanese Sub-issues in the Public	
Correlation		0.79 (n=9)	0.75 (n=9)
Level of Significance		p<.05 (one-tailed test)	p<.05 (one-tailed test)

* Significance was tested by comparing the result of each calculation with the critical value for the same amount of items.

These results support H2. The first hypothesis (2-a) states, “The Japanese media coverage on the sub-issues in Sino-Japanese relations is positively correlated with the decrease in affinity with China among Japanese citizens”. This first hypothesis was supported by the significant correlation of 0.78, calculated with the public opinion data, which explains why the public does not feel affinity with China.

The second hypothesis (2-b) states, "The Japanese press coverage of a negatively or unfriendly portrayed China and Chinese representations in Sino-Japanese relations is positively correlated with the decrease in affinity with China among Japanese citizens". This hypothesis was also supported by the results of content analysis which revealed a correlation of 0.80 between the negatively portrayed China and Chinese representations and the result of the public poll. The results additionally suggested that the *cognitive* component in coverage on China and Chinese representations in Sino-Japanese relations was also a significant predictor of the public's attitude towards the country.

The content analysis also underlines the fact that the top three items on the public's list of reasons for not feeling affinity with China coincided with the top three on the Japanese presses' Sino-Japanese sub-topical agenda priority list, as well as the presses' *cognitive*, and *affective* (specifically, negative) portrayal of China. This also supports the conclusion that the Japanese press is very successful in terms of transferring an issue salience of a few highly emphasized topics to its audience.

There are several tendencies in Japanese press' Sino-Japanese coverage. Firstly, the coverage heavily reported on politics, with diplomacy almost occupying the whole Sino-Japanese related news on front pages with a percentage of 92% of all the Sino-Japanese coverage accumulated for the study. Economy (2%), national defense and military affairs (2%), science and technology (2%), and community (2%) follow with small coverage, and no coverage on culture and entertainment was found. The news priority on politics and diplomacy resulted in the frequent appearance of politicians and public officials, and excluded other Chinese representations. The same tendency was found for Japanese representations.

Secondly, there was a different attitude in the two newspapers toward Sino-Japanese relations. The content analysis demonstrated that, limited to the research period for H2, both newspapers more often reported Sino-Japanese relations in a negative reporting tone than a positive tone. The Yomiuri, in particular, covered Sino-Japanese relations more frequently than Asahi with a tendency to portray China as unfriendly in the journalists' commentaries compared to the Asahi, which released similarly unfriendly commentaries on China but not as many. The Asahi, on the other hand, showed a tendency to criticize Japan for aggravated diplomatic relations with China more than the Yomiuri.

Finally, Sino-Japanese relations in coverage of the time were constantly described with a negative prediction. In the prediction of relations, there was also a difference in reporting. The Yomiuri blamed China as the cause of their negative prediction for future relations, and the Asahi blamed Japan.

Comparison of the Coverage in the Yomiuri and the Asahi

The content analysis not only provided important research on elements for *agenda setting*, but it also revealed the different reporting stance of the two major Japanese newspapers based on two elements: the number of Sino-Japanese articles and editorial directions.

The monthly shift of the amount of Sino-Japanese related articles (see Figure 12 & 13) showed an interesting result. When there was a series of anti-Japanese protests in China in 2005 April, the Yomiuri actively covered the issue. The difference of the coverage volume between the Asahi was 7 articles in the month, and during the 6 months of the analytical period for H2 including April 2005, the Yomiuri continued covering Sino-Japanese issues more than the Asahi (see Table 9 as well as Figure 13 for the difference). More specifically, there was a difference of 100 paragraphs devoted to Sino-Japanese relations between the newspapers (see Table 13). On the other hand, when there was a heated debate within the country and between Japan and China over the former Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine in October, the Yomiuri's coverage was not as much as the Asahi's (see Figure 12).

In addition, the tonal analysis of Sino-Japanese coverage designed for H2 revealed that during the 6-months-long examination period, the Yomiuri covered China and Chinese representations as less "friendly" than the Asahi (see the difference in percentages in friendly tones in Table 15). The "unfriendly" coverage toward China and Chinese representations did not show a significant difference, but this might reflect the unfriendly nature of incidents such as Chinese citizens' critical expression toward Japan in the protests. The coverage tone for Japanese representations in Sino-Japanese relations did not have an obvious trait in terms of the difference of coverage between the papers. The Asahi covered Japanese representations more than the Yomiuri in both "friendly" and "unfriendly" tones (see Table 17).

The political flavor of each newspaper was obvious in the opinion coverage, which was found mostly in opinion articles such as editorials, columns, and contributed articles. While the Yomiuri showed its tendency to blame China for the aggravation of the bilateral relations between the countries, the Asahi actively blamed the Japanese side as well. The Yomiuri did not reveal any assertion which showed criticism toward the Japanese side in the relations (see Table 19). These traits support the scholars' understanding of political orientation of the newspapers: the Yomiuri as relatively more pro-government and anti-Chinese, and the Asahi as more anti-government and pro-Chinese. As if to reflect the political orientation of each newspaper, the Yomiuri predicted the Sino-Japanese relations would become worse due to China being at fault, and the Asahi predicted so due to Japan being at fault (see Table 12).

To conclude, assertions in the opinion articles of the newspapers found the political flavor of the Yomiuri and the Asahi prominently displayed. The Yomiuri's editorial stance was more pro-government whereas the Asahi's was more anti-government. This editorial trait was not found as notable in regular news coverage in the Sino-Japanese relations.

2. Theoretical Discussion

Interest in media research diminished due to the rise of Klapper's (1965) *the limited effects theory*. Scholars began to believe that the media are not influential enough to change the audience's attitude. Since McCombs and Shaw's finding of agenda-setting in the 70s, a growing number of case studies have suggested that the media are powerful enough to influence the audience.

This *second-level agenda-setting* research of the Japanese media has added another empirical case study to the field of *agenda-setting* study. It has revealed that the reasons Japanese citizens attribute to their decrease in affinity with China corresponds in a significant rate (Spearman's $Rho=0.78-0.95$) with what the Japanese media were covering as prior news topics. According to the idea of Kim et al. (2002), *attribute priming* effects must have influenced the public's negative opinion of China.

Another finding suggests that the Japanese press coverage of Sino-Japanese relations tended toward negative reporting rather than positive reporting. As a result, the study

showed higher correlations for negatively covered issues than positively covered issues, which supports the similar finding of Golan and Lee (2004) that a negatively portrayed country tends to be regarded negatively in international news reports (as cited in Hagiwara, 2006). The high correlations support this theory. The discussion suggests that the Japanese media decreased national affinity with China through their coverage on Sino-Japanese relations because of its frequent negative tone. Through this quantitative analysis of the Japanese press coverage, the theoretical understanding that “The Japanese media were also responsible for aggravating the relations with China in 2005 other than political actors” was empirically supported.

Some suggestions can be made for future research of *agenda-setting*. The first is about the common methodology of using Spearman’s correlation coefficient. As a feature of the method, the salience of attributes is ranked from high to low. The calculation becomes difficult when there are attributes with almost the same quantity. (A small difference with only one attribute between 2 categories can result in making the categories divide into rank 1 and rank 2.) It would be helpful to create a new method to calculate ranking to more accurately represent the data. Additionally, regarding the character of the common methodology that the calculated value tends to be unstable with a small number of items, another method designed for testing the influence of the media of the salience model should be introduced.

Secondly, Japanese media researchers should conduct more *agenda-setting* case studies on public issues including national and international issues rather than simply elections. This thesis emphasizes the importance of analyzing the relations between diplomatic issues and the national media. In current *agenda-setting* studies, however, most research still focuses on the media’s coverage of political candidates and their image among potential voters. While this type of analysis can show the direct effect of the media on politics, it risks excluding the influence of public opinion being formed around a public issue and eventually influencing politics indirectly. By encouraging *agenda-setting* research on public issues, *agenda-setting* research will have a better balance in terms of analyzing the media effects on politics from both the election standpoint and the issue standpoint.

This research supported a relatively new idea within *agenda-setting*: that the media are more powerful than simply bringing awareness to the audience, but the media can affect

the audience's attitude by telling them what to think about a topic through the coverage. The research found that a strong agenda-setting power, which successfully transfers top prior issue salience (H1&H2) and transfers *affective* attributes as well, exists (H2) in the context of the Japanese media. Overall, both *cognitive* and *affective* components were found with significant correlations. It therefore does not contribute to the debate of "which attribute is more easily transferred".

Finally, the research question which was stated earlier, "Did the Japanese mass media really have something to do with this successive decline in pro-Chinese sentiment in 2005 among Japanese citizens?", can be answered with "yes, they did." based on the findings of this content analysis-based Japanese media research.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Recent media studies attempt to discover the influence of media reports on the public's awareness of issues. Scholars today are exploring the news field in which the media can exert more influence than simply telling people what topics are important through countless news reports. This empirical study was specifically designed to observe such a phenomenon in Japanese press coverage of Sino-Japanese relations from 2001 to 2006. Coverage of Sino-Japanese relations in major newspapers, the Yomiuri and the Asahi, were analyzed and compared with national probability samples of public opinion data. Even though some fundamental limitations stem from the adoption of probability data, the research supported the *second-level agenda-setting* hypothesis, and in particular, a feature of *the salience model of agenda-setting* effects.

The research period was chosen because at that time relations between Japan and China deteriorated for the first time after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1978. It was also the first time Japanese citizens showed a low affinity with China since 1978. The research period coincided with a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations by Chinese citizens in major cities in China in 2005, former Japanese Prime Minister's visit to a historically controversial shrine, and China and Japan's conflict over the right to develop a natural gas field.

The first set of content analysis of the news coverage aimed to find an association between the public's awareness of issue in Sino-Japanese relations and the press coverage of the relations. The result of the newspaper content analysis for two different time settings found that the media coverage was focused on a single topic at each time comprising more than 40 % of all Sino-Japanese topics: economy for the 6 months prior to the first public opinion poll, and history for the 6 month before the second poll. The correlation between the ranking of the media agenda and the ranking of the public agenda were not significant (Spearman's $Rho=0.49-0.56$). However, the issue that ranked first matched in both study periods. This result suggests that the Japanese press was very successful in delivering issue salience of specific news issues to the public, but was not influential enough to determine all of the items on the list of public agenda. This feature is identical to salience model of *agenda-setting* defined by McCombs'.

The next step of content analysis was to observe the association between the public's attitude to China and Sino-Japanese press coverage, which revealed a remarkable result. The Japanese public's reasoning for not feeling affinity with China was considerably correlated with the Japanese major press' prior coverage of Sino-Japanese relations (0.78), and highly correlated with the portrayal of China and Chinese representations in Sino-Japanese coverage (0.95). It also revealed that negatively covered Sino-Japanese relations and China's unfriendly portrayed attitude and action in the coverage had a strong association with the decrease in affinity with China among Japanese (each 0.80). Throughout the study period, news coverage of Sino-Japanese relations was more often found to be in a negative tone than a positive tone, which supports the findings of preexisting studies. The content analysis also found that Sino-Japanese coverage was frequently focused on political and diplomatic issues between the countries with a high appearance of politicians and government officials in such coverage. In addition, diplomatic relations in the coverage were consistently described and predicted in a negative manner.

The result of this research implies that both *cognitive* and *affective* attributes in Sino-Japanese coverage were transferred from the press to the public. Both *cognitive* component and negative *affective* components in Sino-Japanese relations coverage and both *cognitive* and negative *affective* components in the portrayal of China within the coverage showed significant correlations with the issue items Japanese citizens identified for their decrease in affinity. The highest correlation was seen in the *cognitive* component of China's portrayal (0.95). The prior intrapersonal agenda of the public coincided with both *cognitive* and *affective* components in the media agenda. This result also supports the conclusion that the Japanese media are effective in transferring attribute salience of a few of the top items on their priority list. In conclusion, it can be suggested based on the findings that when the Japanese public evaluated China, coverage of Sino-Japanese relations portrayed China in a negatively manner, and was cognitively and affectively *primed*. The *priming* was more significant for the Sino-Japanese sub-issues which obtained more attention from the media than other topics. Based on the result, it can be said that the public did not make a reference to Japan's attitude or actions in the relations when they judged China.

As this study has shown, there are limitations to this empirical research. The results

remain suggestive rather than conclusive because the public opinion data used in the analysis was not conducted by the author but was aggregate data accumulated by national and private organizations. This made it virtually impossible to adopt contingent conditions to the research and to observe which group of people reflects the media salience under which conditions such as sex, age, education, profession, general interest in Sino-Japanese relations. Additionally, as there was no information from the public opinion about the samples' readership of newspapers, the research was conducted based on a fundamental hypothesis that the samples include the coverage of the top two major Japanese newspapers. Based on the limitations of the sample, it is not possible to determine whether the sample was influenced by newspapers, from interpersonal interaction or from browsing a TV program which introduces the content of the coverage or another source. Therefore, the findings of the research should be always considered in light of these limitations.

Another discussion which has been deliberately introduced in media studies questions whether the influence on the public is actually a result of the media coverage.⁶⁶ A sample of the public poll might have been aware of the declining diplomatic relations between China and Japan through a real-world indicator; for example, he or she might have cancelled a trip to China because of a Japanese immigration officer's attitude at the airport. Future research should consider this point to accurately observe the effect of the media itself rather than the effect of real world.

This study tested the media's *second-level agenda-setting* effect on the public's attitude in the context of foreign affairs. Despite its research limits, the research presented positive correlations between the public's attitude and media coverage on Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. This considerable result has implications for future studies concerning media effects on diplomatic affairs. The impression that citizens of a given country have of another country with which it has diplomatic relations seems to be determined by the salience of both *cognitive* and *affective* attributes within media coverage of the relations, especially the salience of both *cognitive* and *affective* descriptions of the partner country. Further studies need to test whether this conclusion can be adapted to a different partner

⁶⁶ Funkhouser (1973) paid attention to a function of real-world indicator, an objective indicator of events, to observe if the influence on the public stems from the media coverage of the issue or from the actual event which occurred in the real world. Applying Funkhouser's idea to this particular research of Sino-Japanese coverage, we do not know if the public reacted to the media coverage or to the real-world indicators.

country in a diplomatic relationship with Japan, or in a different media context within or outside of Japan.

As a result, Japanese press' coverage on Sino-Japanese relations were observed to have a strong association with the citizen's attitude toward China rather than the citizen's awareness of issues. Throughout the study, the Japanese press was very influential in light of transferring not only substantial (*cognitive*) component but only tonal (*affective*) component in the coverage of heavily emphasized issues

The significance of the findings about media coverage and public opinion relies on the relations between politics and public opinions. As a country with a democratic political system, public opinion in Japan is an element the government cannot simply ignore. National public opinion trends can affect political decisions in Sino-Japanese relations too. Recently the idea of a nonreligious national monument honoring the victims of war, which has been a possible solution to settle historical argument among Japan, China and South Korea, was waived by the Japanese government because it was uncertain whether the public was in favor of it. How can we be too sure that, unlike the result of this research, the national opinion at that time was not influenced by the media coverage on Sino-Japanese relations?

Lippman's classic argument stated that media create the picture in our mind through prior news coverage around the world, where things are "out of reach, out of sight, out of mind" (Lippmann, 1960, p.29), meaning that people naturally rely on the media as an information source. 86 years have passed since Lippman's assertion. Even though internet technology has made it easy for people to discover what is happening in the world in real time, the Japanese press still enjoys strong circulations and consistent support from the public.

Even though Japan is only separated from China by the sea, to most Japanese, China still remains "out of reach, out of sight" but our "mind" should be aware that we are always under the influence of Japanese press which can sway us with the negative tone of its coverage.

Appendix I: Chronology of Political Events Related to Sino-Japanese Relations in Recent Years

Note: 1) Titles of political figures are of that time.

2) Comments originally made in Japanese were translated by the author to English from original quotes. Therefore they should be regarded with consideration.

Dates		Events
1996	Oct.7	Taiwanese activists entered Rekkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) territory and some of them landed.
1997	Apr. 2	Supreme Court judged that the Ehime Prefecture's act to pay for sacred Shinto tree brunch with public expense at Yasukuni Shrine was against the constitution, which demands separation of religion and politics.
	May. 6	A member of the House of Representatives, Shingo Nishimura, landed on Rekkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). China officially expressed strong protest against it.
	Jul. 8	Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo visited China and had a meeting with State President Jiang Zemin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji.
	Oct. 12	Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji. Visited Japan and had a meeting with Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro.
2001	April	Koizumi announced to the public at the general election of the Liberal Democratic Party that one of his campaign pledges was that he would visit Yasukuni Shrine on August 15th (the memorial day of the loss of the war) every year for sure despite any criticism.
	Apr. 22	Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited Japan, and China objected to it.
	Apr. 26	A new cabinet was constructed with Koizumi as the 87 th Prime Minister.
	Aug. 13	Prime Minister Koizumi's first visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. He signed his name on the visitor's register as "Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi".
	Sep. 8	Prime Minister Koizumi visited China and showed his sympathy to the war victims. Chinese President* Jiang criticized Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine in August and expressed his concern about Koizumi's shrine visiting after next year.
	Oct. 8	Prime Minister Koizumi visited China and had a look at Marco Polo Bridge. He had a meeting with State President Jiang Zemin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji.
	Dec. 11	China and Taiwan entered the World Trade Organization

2002	Apr. 21	Prime Minister Koizumi's second visit to the shrine. He commented, "I don't intend to make people inside and outside of Cabinet anxious by sticking to visiting the shrine on the End of the Pacific War Day."
2003	Jan. 1	Taiwan expressed protest against the Japanese government's renting private land in Rekkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).
	Jan. 14	Prime Minister Koizumi's third visit to the shrine.
	Oct. 20	Prime Minister Koizumi had a summit meeting with Chinese State President Hu Jintao.
2004	Jan. 1	Prime Minister Koizumi's fourth visit to the shrine. Koizumi: "As there is such a phrase as "New Year's visits to shrines", "It's Japanese tradition, isn't it?", "[China] will understand it eventually. I will visit the shrine every year."
	Jan. 29	Taiwanese government registered Diaoyu Islands (Rekkaku Islands in Japanese) on cadaster.
	Mar. 24	The Okinawan police arrested 7 Chinese who illegally landed on Rekkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).
	Apr. 7	Fukuoka district court ruled Koizumi's visit unconstitutional. Koizumi answered 'yes' to a question from a journalist group asking: "Do you keep going to the shrine?"
	Jul. 17 -Aug. 7	Chinese audience's booing of the Japanese team at the AFC Asia-cup game heated up. Excited Chinese audience burnt the Japanese ambassador's official vehicle.
	Oct. 25	There was a first director-general level talk between China and Japan about gas field development. Japan requested a submission of subsurface construction data to China, but China refused the request.
	Nov. 10	A Chinese military atomic submarine intruded into Japanese territorial waters. China explained that it was lost and wandered into Japanese waters.
	Nov. 21	State President Hu Jintao and Koizumi met in Santiago, Chile. Jintao required Koizumi to stop visiting the shrine. Jintao: "The biggest reason for political stagnation and difficult issues between China and Japan is that the Japanese leader visits Yasukuni Shrine."
	22	Koizumi: "I decided not to make a comment even if there are any questions about my Yasukuni visits. There are more [issues] between Japan and China." Answered to questions from a journalist group.
	Dec. 16	Chinese Foreign Minister in Japan Wang Yi expressed protest against the Japanese government's acceptance of former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Japan.
	Dec. 27	Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited Japan for sight-seeing.

2005	Apr. 9, 10,16	There were protests against Japan in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.
	13	At an unofficial foreign-ministerial-level meeting in Beijing, the Japanese government asked for an apology and compensation for loss or damage from the anti-Japanese protests. The Chinese government refused: "The responsibility belongs to Japan."
	14	The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a protest statement toward Japan's preparation for experimental drilling for the gas field: "It is a serious challenge against China's rights and international rules."
	17	Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka had an emergency visit to China. He asked for an apology and compensation, but it was not accepted by the Chinese government.
	23	A summit meeting between China and Japan was held in Djakarta, Indonesia during Asian-African Conference (This summit meeting was the last one Chinese and Japanese Prime Ministers had before Abe had a meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister in Apr. 2007). The Prime Minister expressed apology for the past: "In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations." A demonstration march took place against the Chinese government in Tokyo.
	26	Koizumi: "I don't think it (visiting Yasukuni Shrine) is such an issue to be brought to a court." Commented at the office of the Prime Minister.
	May 7	China and Japan had a conference of foreign ministers in Kyoto.
	16	Koizumi: "I will consider appropriately when I go [to the shrine]." Commented at the House of Representatives Budget Committee.
	21	Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe pointed out Chinese critique about the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the shrine, "Some say it is intervention in domestic affairs" at a meeting with Chinese Communist Party Head of the International Liaison Wang Jiarui.
	22	State President Hu Jintao criticized Japanese political moves, especially for Yasukuni visiting, history textbooks in schools, and Taiwanese issues expressing them as "moves I don't want to see".
	23	Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Wu Yi, who was visiting Japan, cancelled on meeting with Koizumi and left for China.

24	China reported officially that the reason Chinese Deputy Prime Minister cancelled on meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister was Japanese politicians' comments about Yasukuni Shrine made during the Deputy Prime Minister's stay in Japan.
June	Japan set up radar on Okinotori Island, the southernmost of Japan.
2	Koizumi: "I am not visiting Yasukuni as my official task." "Other countries should not interfere in Yasukuni visits which stem from my personal belief." Commented at House of Representatives Budget Committee.
7	Koizumi: "The campaign pledge is not the point." Commented at the office of the Prime Minister.
13	Koizumi: "It's my belief (So, one should not meddle with another's belief)." Commented at the office of the Prime Minister.
Aug. 15	60 th anniversary commemorating the end of the Pacific War. Koizumi released discourse of self-searching and apology. "I made a fresh determination that my country should never take its way to a war."
Sep. 29	Tokyo High Court judged Koizumi's visit is personal.
30	Osaka High Court judged Koizumi's visit unconstitutional.
Oct. 17	Koizumi's fifth visit to the shrine. Koizumi insisted it was his private visit. The Chinese government released an official statement declaring their regret; "Koizumi will have to pay for his responsibility and harsh political results this wrong act will cause in."
18	China denied Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura's visit which was planned for Oct. 23.
Nov. 18 -19	China refused to have a meeting with Japan at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Pusan, South Korea.
Dec. 4	China reported to delay a summit meeting between Japanese, Chinese and South Korean leaders at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
12	Chinese and South Korean leaders agreed to ask Japan for the correct historical perception about the past.
22	Koizumi reported that building a politically neutral, national memorial facility for all the war dead will not be included in the budget for the next year. The idea was proposed by the Korean government. Japanese Foreign Minister Asou commented about the Chinese military as; "a great threat". China criticized it as; "Groundlessas (comment)".

2006	Jan. 4	Koizumi criticized China and South Korea's attitude over his shrine visiting; "It (Yasukuni visiting) is not a diplomatic issue." "I can not understand some country intervening in a foreign politician's personal belief."
	Aug.15	Koizumi's sixth visit to the shrine. (This visit was the second shrine visit in Japanese history by a Japanese Prime Minister in-service on the anniversary of the end of the war after former Prime Minister Nakasone's visit in 1985. China and Korea released official statements of protest on his visit.)
	Oct. 8	Prime Minister Abe visited China for a summit meeting with State President Hu Jintao.
2007	Apr. 12	Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Abe in Japan for a Sino-Japanese summit meeting. (It had been six and half years since a Chinese Prime Minister visited Japan. Wen commented, "It will become a good foundation between the two countries if the history issue is settled well, but if not, it will become a boundary.")
	Aug.15	Prime Minister Abe ⁶⁷ did not visit the shrine commenting that "it has become a diplomatic problem."

References: Chugoku Joho Kyoku (2005); Asahi.com (2004); Asahi Shimbun (2005a-d); The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2005); Yomiuri Shimbun (2005a-h)

⁶⁷ Abe visited the shrine in April 2006 as a President of the Liberal Democratic Party, but he hasn't visited there since he was elected as Prime Minister.

Appendix II: Coding Schemes and Coding Sheets

I. Content Analysis Coding Scheme (for Hypothesis 1)

What is Coding?:

Coding is the organization of a set of messages in number form following the rules which are set by the scheme.

Samples:

Yomiuri and Asahi Newspapers' news articles appeared on front pages from: 1) From Sep.5 2001 to Mar. 6 (Period 1), and 2) From Aug. 11, 2005 to Feb. 9, 2006 (Period 2) dealing with:

1. News about Sino-Japanese relations
2. News about diplomatic relations between China and Japan within international organizations which consist of several other countries

Sino-Japanese relations are particularly defined in this research as relations between the two countries in general but not limited to the diplomatic level.

To qualify to be a sample, the article was required to consist of at least 50% of the topic given above in the article's coverage. When the number of paragraphs on a Sino-Japanese topic is more than the number of the rest of the paragraphs in an article, the article is considered as a sample.

How to judge an article as a sample:

In Japanese newspapers the bilateral relationship appears often in the shape of multilateral relations (e.g. Japan negotiates China's disarmament with support from the U.S.). In those cases, Japan and China are covered in relation with international issues, only the articles mainly discussing the two country's relations will be included. A clue to judge whether or not the article can be a sample is to find comments from Japanese officials in the article.

More tips to find sample articles...

- When China's reaction, situation, or attitude appear in forms of simile, metaphor or supporting information, not the main information, the article is not included. e.g.) This hot weather is like Hong Kong's summer.
- The definition of China in this content analysis includes Taiwan and Hong Kong.
- As long as it appears on a front page, news articles about business such as alliance or consolidation of Japanese and Chinese private companies is counted as a sample. (the genre for such article will be "Economy")
- The debate over the textbook expression about the Pacific War is more controversial between Japan and Korea than Japan and China. Sometimes, though, an article covers Chinese reaction on the topic. (topic of such an article will be "Perception of Pacific War")
- Due to the geographical features of East Asia, Sino-Japanese relations are often covered in the form of multilateral relations between Japan, China, and Korea. Samples include ones talking about Sino-Japanese

- relations in it, but exclude it if the main topic of the article is about Japan-Korea relations.
- The issue of Chinese yuan (currency) is counted as an economical issue since the yuan has business influence on Japan. Since the issue of Chinese yuan is being negotiated by the U.S. as well, the article should be excluded if it is covering the issue based on an American view point.
 - Serial articles like the Asahi's "Nippon Jinmyakuki" and "Boucyo Nippon" are categorized into "article".
 - The topic about the suspicious ship appearing in the Japanese sea is categorized as a "National Defense & Military Affair" genre, and so is "G. Chinese Expansion of Armament Policy" as a topic.

Unit of the Sample:

The counting unit is an article. Coders count the main topic in each sample article.

Purpose of the Analysis:

To quantitatively show how much the sub-topics of Sino-Japanese are covered on front pages of the Asahi and the Yomiuri, and by doing so, to observe the levels of priorities in those sub-topics on the coverage.

Procedures: Coding the Main Topic

A coding sheet is provided per article. First thing to do is to fill in the information of the article: the date, the newspaper name, morning or evening edition, and the headline so that the sheet can be easily found during the process.

Once an article is double-checked that it can be a sample, a coder's work is to find what topic each article is covering. Code it from the option of A to I, and in the case a paragraph doesn't fit anywhere, choose "J. Other" for it. Only when there are the same number of paragraphs discussing two independent topics in the sample article, is double-coding allowed.

Categories:

Categories are provided as below.

- A. Economic Issues: Subjects related to Japan and China's economy, or incidents that cause an influence over either or both countries' economies and businesses.
- B. Issues Based on Historical Perception and Understanding about the Pacific War (for Period 2 only): Subjects related to the history between Japan and China. The two countries' different or similar view points toward the Pacific War and the incidents during the war. Controversy or any political negotiations on this matter will also be included in this category.
- C. Crimes committed by Chinese Residents in Japan: Subjects about Japanese national news about crimes specifically committed by Chinese residents in Japan.
- D. Resources and Territories: Subjects related to negotiations over territory and resources.
- E. Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense: Subjects related to Chinese military and its influence over Japan's coastal or national security.
- F. Economical distribution to China from Japan (for Period 1 only): Subjects related to Japan's cooperation with China in economy.

- G. Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan: Subjects related to political discussions between Japan and China over Taiwan should be regarded or treated as a country.
- H. Mutual Understanding about Each Other on the Citizen Level (for Period 2 only): Subjects that report how citizens in both countries feel about each other.
- I. Disagreement between China and Japan in International Politics: Subjects on how Japan's policies in international politics are regarded by China, or *vice versa*.

Here is a list of keywords you will see in the paragraphs.

Keywords for finding topics

	Topic Categories	Keywords as hints to find a topic
A	Economic Issues	Alliance and cooperation of Japanese and Chinese companies, trade conflict, safeguard protection, China's WTO accession, intellectual property right violation, active employment of Chinese workers by Japanese companies, devaluing Chinese yuan
B	Issues Based on Historical Perception and Understanding about the Pacific War (for Period 2 only)	Historical perception, Yasukuni Shrine visit, national memorial for the dead, expression of the war in textbooks, apology of the Japanese government for the past (Read the paragraph carefully. When these topics are introduced as background information of China's anti-Japanese sentiment, choose A instead of B. In case both A and B are referred to, compare the number of the sentences describing each topic, and choose the one with more sentences. Only when there are the same number of sentences, is double-coding allowed.
C	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	Crimes committed by Chinese or Chinese residents in Japan. Includes arrest of smugglers. Fake visa provide company, Chinese owned illegal stock manipulation company...
D	Resources and Territories	Rekkaku islands, territorial dispute over offshore gas fields in East China Sea * Distinguish from 「D: crimes」 is that C is more about dispute over profit between the countries (including economical aspect) rather than personal profit, which is D.
E	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense	Chinese military expansion, invasion of suspicious boats to Japanese territory, Japanese constitutional amendment
F	Economical distribution to China from Japan (for Period 1 only)	economic cooperation • technical cooperation (ODA to China), yen loan
G	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan	Discussion about how Japan regards Taiwan, Japan's providing a visitor visa to Taiwanese president and criticism from China for the behavior.

H	Mutual understanding about each other on the citizen level (for Period 2 only)	Anti-Japan movement by Chinese citizens, anti-Japanese sentiment, anti-Japanese feelings, actions, or opinions, anti-Japanese education, favorable events between China and Japan
I	Disagreement between China and Japan in international politics	UN reform, Security council expansion idea (Japan's entry plan as a permanent member of the UN Security Council),
J	Other	China-Taiwan issues, Leprosy Litigation case, abandoned chemical weapon, war orphans, , Results of public polls, dismantling of visitor visa to Taiwanese, Interaction through sports (The Asian Cup (soccer), the World Cup, Football hooligans), Chinese ideology (Communism, Freedom of press, speech, undemocratic, Maoism, socialism, nationalism, democracy and Tiananmen square incident, rejection of foreign media coverage)

Coding Sheet for Hypothesis 1

Coder ID: _____

- Date: Month_Day_Year_____ ●Newspaper: 1. The Yomiuri 2. The Asahi
- Edition: 1. Morning 2. Evening ●Page: Page 1 Sample Article # on the page: _____
- Types of Articles: 1. News Article, Serial News Article 2. Contributed Article
3. Opinion Article, Column 4. Editorial, Column
- Headline: _____

Code articles about Sino-Japanese relations. Sample articles are defined to be ones discussing mainly about the influence of China over Japan or the influence of Japan to China. Exclude articles about Chinese national news, or Chinese international relations with other countries.

Read the article, and choose one from categories given from A to M which matches the main topic of the article. An article basically has one main topic, but only when there are the same number of paragraphs discussing about two independent topics in the paragraph, is double-coding allowed.

Main topic(s)

Period 1	Sub-issues
A	Economy and Business
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War
C	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan
D	Resource and Territories
E	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense
F	Economical distribution to China from Japan
G	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan
H	Other
Period 2	Sub-issues
A	Economy and Business
B	Historical Perceptions and Understanding about the Pacific War
C	Mutual Understanding about Each Other on the Citizen Level
D	China's and Japan's Policy in International Politics
E	Crimes by Chinese Residents in Japan
F	Resource and Territories
G	Chinese Military Force and Japanese National Defense
H	Diplomatic Controversy over Taiwan
I	Other

II. Content Analysis Coding Scheme (for Hypothesis 2)

What is Coding?:

Coding is the organization of a set of messages in number form following the rules which are set by the scheme.

Sample articles:

Yomiuri and Asahi Newspapers' news articles appeared on front pages from December 12, 2004 to June 12, 2005 dealing with:

1. News about Sino-Japanese relations
2. News about diplomatic relations between China and Japan within international organizations which consist of several other countries

Sino-Japanese relations are particularly defined in this research as relations between the two countries in general but not limited to the diplomatic level. To qualify to be a sample, the article was required to consist of at least 50% of the topic given above in the article's coverage. When the number of paragraphs on a Sino-Japanese topic is more than the number of the rest of the paragraphs in an article, the article is considered as a sample.

How to judge an article as a sample:

In Japanese newspapers the bilateral relationship appears often in the shape of multilateral relations (e.g. Japan negotiates China's disarmament with support from the U.S.). In those cases, Japan and China are covered in relation with international issues, only the articles mainly discussing the two country's relations will be included. A clue to judge whether or not the article can be a sample is to find comments from Japanese officials in the article.

More tips to find sample articles...

- When China's reaction, situation, or attitude appear in forms of simile, metaphor or supporting information, not the main information, the article is not included. e.g.) This hot weather is like Hong Kong's summer.
- The definition of China in this content analysis includes Taiwan and Hong Kong.
- As long as it appears on a front page, news articles about business such as alliance or consolidation of Japanese and Chinese private companies is counted as a sample. (the genre for such article will be "Economy")
- The debate over the textbook expression about the Pacific War is more controversial between Japan and Korea than Japan and China. Sometimes, though, an article covers Chinese reaction on the topic. (topic of such an article will be "Perception of Pacific War")
- Due to the geographical features of East Asia, Sino-Japanese relations are often covered in the form of multilateral relations between Japan, China, and Korea. Samples include ones talking about Sino-Japanese relations in it, but exclude it if the main topic of the article is about Japan-Korea relations.
- The issue of Chinese yuan (currency) is counted as an economical issue since the yuan has business influence on Japan. Since the issue of Chinese yuan is being negotiated by the U.S. as well, the article should be excluded if it is covering the issue based on an American view point.
- Feature articles like the Asahi's "Nippon Jinmyakuki" and "Boucyo Nippon" are categorized into "article".
- The topic about the suspicious ship appearing in the Japanese sea is categorized as a "National Defense &

Military Affair” genre, and so is “G Chinese Expansion of Armament Policy” as a topic.

Counting Unit:

The counting unit is a paragraph. Coders count attributes in each paragraph of every sample article.

Paragraph :

A paragraph is a set of sentences which starts from a sentence with an indent at the beginning and ends before the next sentence starting with an indent. In this coding, a headline is included in the following paragraph. Just like that, a sub-heading is included in a paragraph which follows it. If the article has a lead at the beginning of the main writing, it is also considered as an independent paragraph.

Example:

headline + 5 paragraphs in the text → 6 paragraphs in all

headline + lead + 5 paragraphs in the text → 6 paragraphs in all

Purpose of the Analysis :

To quantitatively show how much and in what kind of tones China is covered in Sino-Japanese relations on front pages of the Asahi and the Yomiuri, and similarly how much and in which tones Japan’s attitude and reaction to China is covered.

Procedures :

A coding sheet is provided per article. First thing to do is to fill in the information of the article: the date, the newspaper name, morning or evening edition, and the headline so that the sheet can be easily found during the process. (*Editorials go to “other” category)

Choose from the list below in which genre the article will match.

Keywords are provided for each category.

Genres	Keywords
Politics and Diplomacy	Top-level conferences, economic cooperation, technical cooperation (ODA to China), yen loan, anti-Japan movement by Chinese citizens, Rekkaku Islands, territorial dispute over offshore gas fields in the East China Sea, Japan’s entry plan as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Japanese politicians’ Yasukuni Shrine visits, provision of entry visa to the president of Taiwan, dismantling of visitor visa to Taiwanese, expanding Japanese visitor visa distribution in China, clearance of abandoned chemical weapon by Japanese military, Sino-Japanese summit meetings, etc.
Economy	China’s increasing GDP, Partnership between Chinese, Japanese companies, etc.

Community	Crimes, daily life, etc.
Culture and Entertainment	Festivals, cultural events, etc.
Science and Technology	Chinese development of space technology, exporting environmental techniques to China, introduction of Japanese express train technology to China, etc.
National Defense and Military Affair	Setting surveillance radars toward Chinese military on Okinoshima Island, Chinese military, Japanese military's abandoned chemical weapons, etc.
Other	Editorials , result of public polls, etc.

Then choose the kind of article.

Types of articles	Examples
News article and serial article	General articles which cover news. Includes serial articles: the Asahi's Jinmyakuki and the Yomiuri's Boucho Chugoku
Contributed article	Articles written by intellectuals and famous persons, also letters from readers
Opinion article	Idea or opinion of a journalist or an editor at the newspaper company.
Editorial and column	Editorials, and editorial columns (Yomuii Sunpyo, Henshutecho, the Asahi's Tenseijingo)

1. Coding by Topic : (Q1)

Once an article is double-checked that it can be a sample, a coder's first work is to divide the text into paragraphs and find what topics each paragraph is covering. Code them from the option of A to I, and in the case a paragraph doesn't fit anywhere, choose "J. Other" for it. Only when there are the same number of sentences discussing two independent topics in the paragraph, is double-coding allowed.

Categories:

Categories are provided as below.

- A. Historical Perceptions: Subjects related to the history between Japan and China. The two countries' different or similar view points toward the Pacific War and the incidents during the war. Controversy or any political negotiations on this matter will also be included in this category.
- B. Resources and Territories: Subjects related to negotiations over territory and resources.
- C. China's Sentiment toward Japan: Subjects that report how China or Chinese citizens feel about Japan or Japanese citizens. This category includes any actions caused by the Chinese which have roots in their sentiment toward Japan.
- D. International Politics and Security: Subjects on how Japan's policies in international politics are regarded by China, or vice versa.

- E. Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan: Subjects about Japanese national news about crimes specifically committed by Chinese residents in Japan.
- F. Chinese Military Force: Subjects related to Chinese military and its influence over Japan's coastal or national security.
- G. Economy and Business: Subjects related to Japan and China's economy, or incidents that cause an influence over either or both countries' economies and businesses.
- H. Interaction through Sports: Subjects related to the countries' communication through sports events or activities.
- I. Chinese Ideology: Subjects related to China's existing philosophical ideas or discussion about those ideas.

Here is a list of keywords you will see in the paragraphs.

Keywords for finding topics

Topic Categories		Keywords as hints to find a topic
A	Historical Perceptions	Historical perception, Yasukuni Shrine visit, national memorial for the dead, expression of the war in textbooks, apology of the Japanese government for the past, etc. (Read the paragraph carefully. When these topics are introduced as background information of China's anti-Japanese sentiment, choose C instead of A. In case both A and C are referred to, compare the number of the sentences describing each topic, and choose the one with more sentences. Only when there are the same number of sentences, is double-coding allowed.)
B	Resources and Territories	Rekkaku Islands, territorial dispute over offshore gas fields in the East China Sea, etc. (Distinguish this from "E: crimes". B is more about dispute over profit between the countries (including economical aspects) rather than personal profit, which is E.)
C	China's Sentiment toward Japan	Anti-Japan movement by Chinese citizens, anti-Japanese sentiment, anti-Japanese feelings, actions, or opinions, anti-Japanese education, etc.
D	International Politics and Security	UN reform, Security Council expansion idea (Japan's entry plan as a permanent member of the UN Security Council), Japanese constitutional amendment, etc.
E	Crimes Committed by Chinese Residents in Japan	Crimes committed by Chinese or Chinese residents in Japan. Includes arrest of smugglers, fake visa providing companies, Chinese owned illegal stock manipulation companies, etc.

F	Chinese Military Force	Chinese military expansion, invasion of suspicious boats on Japanese territory, etc.
G	Economy and Business	Alliance and cooperation of Japanese and Chinese companies, trade conflict, safeguard protection, China's WTO accession, intellectual property right violation, active employment of Chinese workers by Japanese companies, increasing the value of Chinese yuan, etc.
H	Interaction through Sports	The Asia Cup (soccer), the World Cup, football hooligans, etc.
I	Chinese Ideology	Communism, freedom of press, speech, undemocratic, Maoism, socialism, nationalism, democracy and Tiananmen square incident, rejection of foreign media coverage, etc. (Anti-Japanese sentiment goes to C.)
J	Other	China-Taiwan issues, Leprosy Litigation case, Japanese military's abandoned chemical weapons, war orphans, economic cooperation, technical cooperation (ODA to China), yen loan, results of public polls, dismantling of visitor visa to Taiwanese, etc.

*Anti-Japanese sentiment → C

*The Suspicious boat → F

*An editorial is categorized as "others" in genre, but it is categorized **depending on the content** in topical categories.

<What to pay attention to : see when you are unable to make a decision>

When these features appear in the paragraph, code it for the same topic as the topic of the whole article. (to judge the article topic well, consider what the headline and the lead say)

- **Background information or story of the past** on the article's main topic
- The **influence** of the main article's topic to certain individuals such as to a foreign minister or an ambassador
- Opinion of the writer, editor, or newspaper company on the topic
- Comments of officials or academic figures on the topic
-
-
-

↑ This list will be improved through the analysis as needed (need to negotiate with other coders)

Instead, when these features below appear in the paragraph, code it for a different category from the main topic of the article.

- Even though the paragraph is related to the main topic of the article, the main discussion in

the specific paragraph is of another topical category.

●Insert of a totally independent sub-topic

-
-
-
-

*Note that, as long as the flow of the writing does not go off track, the list of topics do not tend to have a variety. For example, when the article is mainly discussing Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit, the coding sheet for the article should be filled by topical category of B for most paragraphs. Remark, though, that sometimes coverage changes its flow by inserting a new topic as a transition in the middle of it.

2. Coding by Representatives : (Q2 & Q4)

After categorizing the paragraph in topical features, code, now, for representation of China that appears in a paragraph in Sino-Japanese relations. Similarly, code when there is representation of Japan in Sino-Japanese relations. Representation is not only persons, but sometimes it's an organization or an idea. Find who and whose, or sometimes which idea or organization's, actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions in relation with Sino-Japanese relations is introduced in a paragraph. When there is no representation, leave the spaces blank.

Representatives (persons, organizations, ideology)

#	Category	Examples	
		China	Japan
1	Country, Nation (as a notion)	When it says "China" and nothing more concrete	When it says "Japan" and nothing more concrete
2	State President, President	Hu Jintao State President, Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui, etc.	—
3	Prime Minister, government, politicians, political parties	"the authorities", Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Chinese Communist Party, etc.	Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, government, government circles, etc.
4	Government bureaucrat, public offices, civil officers	Chinese ambassador in Japan, Foreign Ministry (Minister, Press officer, Asia officer, etc.), the Public Security Department (the police), etc.	Ministries, Foreign Ministry (Minister, Japanese ambassador in China, sub-cabinet, Asia-Pacific officer), chief cabinet secretary, the police, etc.

5	Business person, private company, business associations, industrial league	Travel company, Organization of Pharmaceutical Products of China, etc.	Japan Iron and Steel Federation, Toyota, etc.
6	Art of public entertainment and organization		
7	Sport player and organization		
8	Academic person, researchers, research organization, academic critic		
9	Citizens in general, community civilian, private organization	Citizens attending anti-Japanese demonstration, students, anti-Japanese organizations, tourists, etc.	Japanese community in China, tourists, etc.
10	Ideology	Communism, Socialism, Nationalism, thoughts, thinkers (Mao, Mencius, Sun Zi, etc.), etc.	Shintoism, etc.
11	Criminals	(When Chinese citizens are covered as suspects or criminals in Japan, code them here.)	(When Japanese citizens are covered as suspects or criminals in China, code them here.)
12	Media	National telecommunication, journalists, websites, etc.	Journalists, etc.
13	Other		

Coding by Tones in the Coverage : (Q3 & Q5)

When there is any representation from either country in the paragraph, (skip this part if there is no representation) code the tone of the coverage which describes the representation itself, its actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions. When there is a quoted comment from the representation, code the tone from it. Tonal options are listed below.

Description of Chinese representatives:

- 1. Friendly or pro-Japanese :** Friendly or pro-Japanese attitudes, actions or sentiments (e.g. understanding, agreement, goodwill, applause, respect, trust, etc.)
- 2. Unfriendly or anti-Japanese:** Unfriendly or anti-Japanese attitudes, actions or sentiments (e.g. criticism, blame, mistrust, objection, disagreement, hate, hostility, etc.)
- 3. Neutral:** When there are the same amount of both pro- and anti-Japanese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions (count the number of sentences to compare) or when tones are not obvious enough to code. Also, the remainders fit here.

e.g.) “Chinese high-school students visited Tokyo last weekend to meet and interact with their Japanese correspondents. The purpose of the visit is to understand their neighbor country and its culture better.”⁶⁸

→ Choose Category #1 (friendly to Japan)

“The Chinese State President criticized Japanese political activity, especially Yasukuni Shrine visits, history textbooks in schools, and Taiwanese issues.”

→ Choose Category #2 (unfriendly to Japan)

Description of Japanese representatives:

- 1. Friendly or pro-Chinese :** Friendly or pro-Chinese attitudes, actions or sentiments (e.g. understanding, agreement, goodwill, applause, respect, trust, etc.)
- 2. Unfriendly or anti-Chinese :** Unfriendly or anti-Chinese attitudes, actions or sentiments (e.g. criticism, blame, mistrust, objection, disagreement, hate, hostility, precaution, etc.)
- 3. Neutral:** When there are the same amount of both pro- and anti-Chinese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions (count the number of sentences to compare) or when tones are not obvious enough to code. Also, the remainders fit here.

⁶⁸ Example sentences for reporting tones henceforth are not referring to any particular news articles or paragraphs so that coders are not influenced by them when they code them individually.

e.g.) “The Japanese government decided to cooperate with China on developing environmentally-friendly technology.”

→ Choose Category #1 (friendly to China)

“The Japanese Foreign Minister described the Chinese military as “a great threat”.”

→ Choose Category #2 (unfriendly to China)

4. Coding by Writer’s Opinion : (Q6 & Q7)

Now, see whether there is any subjective, personal, or emotional commentary such as opinions, evaluations, or judgments made by the article writer (editor, or the newspaper) on the topic. If there is any, code its tone according to the categories. Opinions tend to appear more in opinion articles such as editorials, columns, critiques rather than news articles. If there is any commentary, leave the space blank on the answer sheet.

When there is a commentary in the paragraph, who or which country is it toward? In what kind of tone is it described? Options are below.

Commentary on China: (Q6)

The newspaper writer’s commentary on China (or Chinese representation) is...

1. **Friendly or pro-Chinese**: e.g. understanding, agreement, goodwill, applause, respect, trust, etc. toward China’s anti- or pro-Japanese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions.
2. **Unfriendly or anti-Chinese**: e.g. criticism, blame, mistrust, objection, disagreement, hate, alert, etc. toward China’s anti- or pro-Japanese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions.
3. **Neutral**: When there are the same amount of both pro- and anti-Chinese commentaries (count the number of sentences to compare) or when tones are not obvious enough to code, this is the option. The remainders fit here too.

e.g.) “China’s reaction to the Yasukuni issue is understandable. Japan should be more understanding about the neighbor country’s feelings on the issue.”

→ Choose Category #1 (friendly to China)

“Chinese leaders had better try to respect Japanese leader’s attitude regarding his visit to the shrine.” → Choose Category #2 (unfriendly to China)

Additionally, what position does the writer place China according to his or her commentary?

In case the answer to Q6 was 1,

- a. cooperator, partner
- b. achiever of experiment, invention, finding, pioneer, starter, subject to respect
- c. Japan’s fan, camp follower, admirer

d. other

In case the answer to Q6 was 2,

- a. subject to blame, criticize
- b. subject to fear, feel threatened by threat
- c. other

In case the answer to Q6 was 3,

- a. equally placed rivals, competitor
- b. reference point (for comparison)
- c. other

Commentary on Japan: (Q7)

The newspaper writer's commentary on Japan (or Japanese representation) is...

1. Friendly or pro-Chinese: e.g.) understanding, agreement, goodwill, applause, respect, trust, etc. **toward Japan's pro-Chinese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions.**

or

e.g.) criticism, blame, mistrust, objection, disagreement, hate, alert, etc. **toward Japan's anti-Japanese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions.**

2. Unfriendly or anti-Chinese: understanding, agreement, goodwill, applause, respect, trust, etc.

toward Japan's anti-Chinese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions.

or

e.g.) criticism, blame, mistrust, objection, disagreement, hate, hostility, etc. **toward Japan's pro-Chinese actions, attitudes, sentiments or opinions.**

3. Neutral: When there is the same amount of both pro- and anti-Chinese commentaries (count the number of sentences to compare) or when tones are not obvious enough to code, this is the option. The remainders fit here too.

e.g.) "The Japanese government should change its diplomatic style with China because it is not considering Chinese people's feelings about the Pacific War."

→ Choose Category #1 (friendly to China)

"I agree with the Japanese government's policy not to care too much for what China feels about the Yasukuni issue as it is a domestic matter."

→ Choose Category #2 (unfriendly to China)

This coding section can be a little tricky. Understand both the feature of news content and the commentary of the writer at the same time, then draw in which tone the opinion is discussed.

5. Coding by Sino-Japanese-Relations Recognition in the Coverage: (Q8 & Q9)

Find out how Sino-Japanese relations at that time are remarked in the coverage.

Current Relation (of that time): (Q8)

If there is any description about Sino-Japanese relations, code it only in case it is about current relations.

1. tension, distrust, hate
2. competence
3. equal
4. relaxation in tension, cooperation, friendship, goodwill
5. other relation

e.g.) "Recent Sino-Japanese relations are becoming tense due to the Prime Minister's latest visit to the Yasukuni Shrine...."

→ Choose Category #1 (for tension)

Prediction in the Near Future: (Q9)

Code the prediction of how the relations go according to the coverage if there is any prediction included in the paragraph. If there is any additional description of which country is responsible for the change, code it too.

Due to ...

1. Japan
2. China
3. Japan and China
4. Other or no mention

the relations will evolve...

1. Good or better (relaxation in tension, cooperation, friendship, goodwill)
2. Bad or worse (tension, distrust, hate)
3. No change (in status quo)
4. Other relations

e.g.) "It is obvious that the Chinese government will object to Japan's foreign policy at the summit meeting. It will make any effort to improve relations difficult." → Due to China (or China's action), relations will worsen (2).

6. Overall Judgment of the Coverage Tone : (Q10)

Consider the tones of coverage for Chinese representations, Japanese representations, as well as the commentary of the writer, editor or the newspaper. That is to say, count up the results of Q3, 5, 6, and 7 and figure out the overall tone of the paragraph toward the topic.

When there are many tones in the paragraph and cannot make a decision, compare the number of sentences devoted to each tone then choose the one with more sentences.

1. Positive 2. Negative 3. Do not know, Neutral (the remainders)

* Think it like you are doing addition of tones, but note that 3 (Neutral) is weaker than the others.

Examples:

1 (pro-Japanese) + 1 (pro-Chinese) → 1 (Positive)

2 (anti-Japanese) + 2 (anti-Chinese) → 2 (Negative)

3 (Neutral) + 1 (pro-Chinese) → 1 (Positive)

3 (Neutral) + 3 (Neutral) → 3 (Neutral)

2 (anti-Japanese) + 1 (pro-Chinese) → (as they neutralize each other) 3 (Neutral)

* A writer's (or editor or newspaper) tone of commentary also counts. Therefore, opinion articles (such as editorials and columns) will have overall tones as well.

Example: 3 (Q3) + 3 (Q5) + 1 (Q7) → 1

Coding Sheet for Hypothesis 2

Coder ID: _____

●Date: Year _____ Month _____ Day _____ ●Newspaper: 1. the Yomiuri 2. the Asahi

●Edition: 1. Morning 2. Evening ●Page: 1page Article # on the Page: _____

●Kind of Article: 1. News Article (includes Serial Article) 2. Contributed Article
3. Opinion Article (includes Critique) 4. Editorial, Column

●Headline: _____ ●Genre _____

●Attribute coding (Counting unit is a paragraph) Total _____

Paragraphs

Paragr aph	Q1 Topic	China	Japan	China	Japan	Sino-Japanese relations		Overall	Memo
		Q2 Representation	Q4 Representation	Q6 Commenta ry	Q7 Commen tary	Q8 Current relation	Q9 Due to which	Q10 Overall tone	
		Q3 Description	Q5 Description	Placement			Evolve how?		
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									

6									
7									
8									
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