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**AUTONOMY AND ALIENATION, ELEMENTS IN THE
CRISIS OF MODERNITY**

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**Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the M.A. degree in Political Science**

University of Ottawa



Salam Hawa, Ottawa, Canada, 1988.

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*To D.M., my warmest thanks for the help,
patience and most of all the friendship...*

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Introduction

In May of 1935 Edmund Husserl, while giving a lecture in Vienna, proclaimed that the European nations were sick, and that Europe itself was in a crisis¹. In his lecture entitled *Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity* Husserl set out to present the elements of the crisis through an advocacy of the "concept of Europe as the historical teleology of the infinite goals of reason"²; an advocacy which demonstrated how the European 'world' was the product of the ideas of reason, or, as he chose to call it, the spirit of philosophy. According to Husserl, the crisis is, therefore, the failure of rationalism to extract itself from the superficiality attributed to it through its close association with 'naturalism' and 'objectivism'³. For Husserl the value of reason and its infinite 'objectives' in the realm of the spirit have been completely undermined through its identification with science; the latter, being a pure and exact study of the material world, cannot explain the working of the human psyche and spirit. The crisis of rationalism lies primarily in its viewing of humanity through the eyes of an 'objective' and 'objectifying' science thereby reducing the status of spirituality in man to that of a mere object, and having the effect of alienating the subjectivity of man from his consciousness.

In his famous work *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl defines in very clear terms the crisis as being related to the eclipse of the classical Greek concept of reason and its replacement with a rationality that is "merely fact-minded" and that makes "merely fact-minded people"⁴. Whereas, claims Husserl, true Reason:

is the explicit theme in the disciplines concerning knowledge (i.e. of true and genuine, rational knowledge), of true and genuine valuation (genuine values as values of reason), of ethical action (truly good acting, acting from practical reason); here reason is a title for "absolute," "eternal," "supertemporal," "unconditionally" valid ideas and ideals. If man becomes a "metaphysical" or specifically philosophical problem, then he is in question as a rational being..."⁵

This very concept of reason surpasses empirical rationality in its capacity to relate to knowledge that surpasses the material, the factual. According to Husserl:

All these 'metaphysical' questions taken broadly ... surpass the world understood as the universe of mere facts. They surpass it precisely as being questions with the idea of reason in mind. And they all claim a higher dignity than questions of fact, which are subordinated to them even in the order of inquiry.⁶

In this sense, Husserl is making a distinction between teleological reason and instrumental reason. The former is seen as superior to the latter due to its infinite nature. Teleological reason implies the presence of a spiritual telos in humanity which cannot be detected nor defined through scientific research, for the latter is incapable of going beyond what is observable and what is calculable. Scientific, or instrumental reason is based upon mathematical processes which are but means to an end. It is in its nature neutral, it can neither pass judgement, nor can it argue a cause or a belief, it can merely present facts upon which man can base his decisions. If that is the essence of scientific reason, it would seem rather questionable to treat its presence as a crisis.

By all means, Husserl does not dispute the efficiency of science. He, however, does dispute a certain confusion which he treats as the essential promoter of the crisis.

This confusion consists in the restricting of rationality, the essence of human reason, to the status of instrumental reason. This restriction is considered a crisis as it suggests the stifling of the expression of the spiritual telos which was considered as the promoter of human reflection, consciousness and most of all cultural advancement. It is within this context that Husserl is in favour of teleological reason in particular, and of philosophy in general. For Husserl, the crisis of modernity is a crisis of reason whose primary victim is man.

Husserl's work, although the object of much opposition⁷, has the merit of having been one of the first in the twentieth century to have succeeded in defining the crisis of modernity as the crisis of rationality on the one hand, and of subjective self-consciousness on the other. Although the present work does not intend to study the theory of transcendental phenomenology, it does aim to study the crisis of modernity such as it was defined by Husserl through the analysis of a much more recent theoretical development of the crisis, namely that which is found in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. The choice of MacIntyre's work is based upon the fact that it defines the crisis of modernity as the failure of rationality, and it proposes a solution based upon what MacIntyre demonstrates as the failure of the project of subjective self-consciousness in the age of Enlightenment. According to MacIntyre, this project, which is represented in the Kantian theory of ethics, aims to render morality subjective while claiming for it a universal status. This project combines for MacIntyre a twofold development: it at once proclaims acute individualism while emphasising the impossibility of deriving moral obligation from fact. Hence, it declares the separation of 'Is' from 'Ought', thereby discrediting philosophy, for the latter's 'metaphysical

nature' has been taken to mean the science of things transcending what is natural or physical. The separation of facts from values and the belief in subjective morality are seen to give rise to a dissolution of a unified social theory of morality without which no teleology is deemed possible.

MacIntyre's work possesses a unique quality in its diversity of analysis (namely on the socio-political, economic and philosophical levels), and more importantly in the very solution he presents to modern society. In *After Virtue* (1981) MacIntyre, aware of the "metaphysical" status of philosophy (which is due to its derivation of obligation from facts) in modernity, attempts to render Aristotelean teleological reason applicable to modern thought by divorcing it from its anthropological vision of man which claims that man is 'social' by nature. With this purpose in mind, MacIntyre, through a demonstration of the impossibility of the realisation of a subjective teleological reason which he attributes to the evident failure of the project of Enlightenment to affirm the concept of subjective self-determination, will be shown to have arrived at a philosophical impasse. This impasse is generated due to the attempt which MacIntyre makes on behalf of philosophy: to render teleological philosophy rational; hence, to subject it to the same type of reasoning which directly negates it. This project will be shown to be self-defeating. Its study will bring to light the contradictions and the possibilities that face the realm of philosophy in particular, and that of humanity in general. For, it at once tries to deal with the contradictory issues in philosophy (namely of the possibility of the realisation of teleological subjectivity as the new type of modern freedom), and overcome them to reach a philosophically rational solution.

This work attempts, through the study of MacIntyre's project, to provide a definition of the crisis of modernity as not merely that of reason, but also of subjectivity. To do so, three theoretical elements will be presented: the concept of reason, the importance of the study of history as either an evolution towards progress or towards decline, and the definition of the nature of man. The above three elements constitute the basis for the discussion undertaken in this study. They at once aim to define the crisis and show its relevance to history and to the nature of human teleology found expressed in modern society. The definition of these elements will take shape throughout the course of this essay, their purpose consists in demonstrating the intricate connection that philosophy makes between reason, the nature of man and his outlook, for a teleology in history. All three elements are held, by modern socio-political authors, to be essential to the study of the crisis of modernity whose historical bases are located in the Age of the Enlightenment.

Despite of the presence of the notion of human advancement towards liberty through the power of human reason in the Renaissance, the age of Enlightenment has often been chosen by modern socio-political thinkers, such as Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MacIntyre among others, as the age within which man recognised that, as Hegel stated:

Never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around it had it been perceived that man's existence centers in his head, i.e. in Thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality. Anaxagoras had been the first to say that ~~noy~~ governs the world; but not until now had man advanced to the recognition of the principle that Thought ought to govern spiritual reality⁸.

It is during this period that a concrete development in almost all areas of socio-political life has taken place. This age laid foundations in the sciences for the industrial revolution, in the socio-political development of the modern state as a result of the thunderous French revolution, and in the teleology of man through a unique development of a new concept of reason. Despite of the diversity of its achievements the age of Enlightenment sought with great enthusiasm and candour the realisation of a unified 'end': that of the liberation of the individual from the limitations of his reality. Through the development of the sciences came an industrial system that meant to free man from material want; in the socio-political upheaval of the French revolution came the dismantling of the old social order whose tradition imposed a heavy burden carried out through its custom and religion.

In the French revolution men affirmed their human rights in a charter that advocated 'liberty, equality and fraternity' as not mere political demands, but also as anthropological, ontological fact. The French revolutionaries when declaring a universal equality were merely echoing the claims made by earlier Renaissance scientists and philosophers such as Geronimo Cardano, Philippus Paracelsus and Johannes Kepler among others, whose scientific knowledge led them to judge humanity by what may be called its 'cover'. Humanity, in this tradition, was seen as 'matter in motion' whose biological and spiritual constitution was identical to that of earthly nature. This entailed the assumption that humanity is homogeneous and is subject to the physical laws of nature. Thus identified, humanity lost much of its subjective superiority as opposed to nature; even in the realm of reason, man's superior faculty came to be considered as a

mere reflection of that of nature. However, it is through man's mastery of this faculty, that he becomes capable of seizing his freedom. It is also through this faculty that he may rise from the mere status of an animal to that of a God⁹.

Hence, it is evident that the motor behind the tremendous socio-political changes in modernity lies primarily in the significance of the concept of reason. Reason in eighteenth century thought was perceived as a vehicle which could elevate man to a stage of absolute liberty. It is absolute, for man is now not only capable of liberating himself through scientific discoveries from material want, but he is also capable of achieving a social and political expression of his autonomy; the actualisation of an expression of his existential freedom incited the belief that what he has realised within him was the faculty of decision and of creation. Man's confidence in his faculty of reason stems from the material success amassed in nature due to the latter's failure to resist the unravelling power of scientific reason. In the Enlightenment man's realisation of his freedom could not be expressed in terms of the philosophy of the Greeks, nor of the Epicureans, nor of the Renaissance, it was a freedom of a hedonist nature, freedom to be rid of the insecurity of existing. It is a freedom which was expressed in material acquisition and measured in calculable terms. It was devoid, at least to a greater extent, of spirituality.

The positing of human liberation as a type of freedom from material want suggests the dominance of matter over spirit. It has been noted by modern philosophers¹⁰ that this dominance indicated the impoverishment in the human conception of the actual value of humanity in this age. The rise in scientific discoveries and their promotion of a higher level of human subsistence, turned the hopes of the age towards the overcoming of

social discord through the elimination of scarcity. this became more acutely evident in the philosophy of the French socialists such as Comte de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Auguste Comte; hence those who saw the realisation of human equality to reside in an equality that can be measured; one that is demonstrable and physically realisable. The age of Enlightenment asked for results in all domains of social development, therefore, the realisation of "liberty, equality and fraternity" had to take shape within a social system that is capable of bringing them about in reality thereby suggesting that liberty is liberty from material necessity, and equality and fraternity are both materially demonstrable. The spiritual dimension of all three demands was thereby, to a great extent, undermined.

It is the above mentioned situation that drove Hegel in the nineteenth century to call the condition of humanity as the state of 'spiritlessness'. Development in science and the fall of philosophy into obscurity gave rise to the phenomenological works of Husserl and Heidegger who demonstrated all too clearly the inadequacy of science as a medium of human understanding, while simultaneously discussing the lot of humanity as being alienated from its very 'ego' or 'Being', i.e. its 'human' self¹¹. On the socio-political plane, Max Weber called the human condition that prevailed since the age of enlightenment as the "disenchantment of the world" whose consequences were the development of structures based upon empirical reasoning thereby stripping the social institutions from any humane quality¹². Although such a development, claimed Weber, meant to promote the development of privatised and rational individuals, it had a converse effect: man was found in a society that was mechanised, dehumanised and unfree¹³. Even in recent publications of authors such as Habermas and MacIntyre¹⁴, one can explicitly read of our crisis of education, of ethics, of thoughtful human content.

Moreover, this complaint is not merely heard on the philosophical level, but also in the fields of economics, of sociology, of politics and of theology. Journalists in magazines such as *Time* have also written about crises found in the ethical values of the public, and the latter's indifference to their environment and their world¹⁵.

Upon confronting such highly disturbing literature one is left with many questions such as : How has humanity, despite of its historical search for freedom, come to imprison itself within a world of its own creation? If, since the onslaught of the Renaissance, man has searched for his self-affirmation through the realisation of his subjectivity, why is he presently, and has been for the last three centuries, weaving the very cloth with which he masked his own humanity? and finally, how is he to recover, if at all, the traces of his original quest for true freedom of the human subject? These are questions which will be addressed in this work; however, since the space given cannot allow the answering of these questions in their required fullness, Alasdair MacIntyre's work has been chosen as a representative of current philosophical appraisals of the crisis of modernity. MacIntyre throughout his career has studied thoroughly the socio-political problems of the modern age, and has addressed the questions posed above; it is through the use of other sources that his work will be analysed while primarily concentrating on the addressed problems.

Alasdair MacIntyre's claim that modern society is suffering from a false sense of liberty is also shared by several modern philosophers such as the members of the Frankfurt school, Marcuse and Habermas among others, who also tend to find much in common in the philosophy of Max Weber. Throughout his writings MacIntyre has

probed tirelessly for the reasons underlying the dissolution of the relationship between individual and community as it is expressed in the morality of the age. According to MacIntyre the development of the modern concept of freedom, articulated by Kant and later by Hegel, has given men the illusion of liberty. MacIntyre claims that these doctrines allow the individual "to supply his own morality, and at one and the same time, to claim for it a genuine universality"¹⁶. MacIntyre claims that "men see themselves in the grip of personal powers and forces, which are in fact their own forms of social life, the fruits of their own actions falsely objectified and endowed with independent existence". He also sees them as incapable of realising that they believe in their freedom in areas of their lives "where the economic and social forms are in fact dictating the roles they live out". These illusions, for MacIntyre "constitute the alienation of man"¹⁷.

In his recent work *After Virtue* (1981) MacIntyre is committed to the identifying of two major aspects: first, the lost morality of the past which he views as being imbedded in the socio-political environment, and of evaluating its claims to objectivity and authority; second, he aims to make good his claim regarding the specific character of the modern age where he accepts Weber's socio-political appraisal regarding the role of instrumental reason in the '*disenchantment of the world*', and which he identifies as being emotivist in character. According to MacIntyre, emotivism is the ethical expression of modern society that claims that no objective and impersonal moral standards exist; hence implying a complete rejection of the social values that are believed to transcend history through tradition. MacIntyre's posing of the problem of modernity while identifying it with the Weberian doctrine of rationalisation and the modern emotivist tradition provides an important link between system(socio-political organisations) and humanity (modern man)

within which the problem of the failure of man to accomplish and exercise his right to self-determination can be posed.

It is through the qualification of the morality of the modern age as emotivist that MacIntyre presents his argument concerning the total dissipation of the teleological concept of reason into the present instrumental reason where the latter tends to dominate all facets of modern socio-political life. Through a historical and philosophical examination of modern and classical morality, MacIntyre seeks to show that the Aristotelean ethics, when divorced from their biological connection with the teleology of man, remains objective and is yet to be reimplemented in modern society. MacIntyre's affirmation of the dissolution of morality through his close study and interpretation of the emotivist tradition renders his solution rather weak and lacking in any realistic development. In his study he explicitly shows the anomic condition of the modern man; however, he remains attached to a self-made illusion picturing the awaiting of a miracle that may transform modern society into a Greek type Aristotelean polis. Analysis will show that MacIntyre's conclusions are based upon implicit hypotheses that ultimately lead him into such a pessimistic outlook. Responding to MacIntyre's theory, several questions arise permitting, not only the locating of the theoretical loopholes prevalent in his analyses, but also the formulation of a theory concerning the crisis of the modern individual based upon his socio-political relations. The questions that are posed within the context of MacIntyre's work will also serve to answer those originally posed above. They are: first, why has MacIntyre chosen the age of enlightenment as the unique developer of instrumental reason; would this have occurred at an earlier period and how? Second, why can MacIntyre not follow Hegel to a post-Kantian notion of the possibility

of moral self-determination (Sittlichkeit)? and thirdly, why is the concept of reason not a sufficient explanation for his account of modern moral crisis, and as a basis for his conclusion?

To answer these questions this work has been organised in three chapters. Chapter one's main purpose is the presentation of the crisis of modernity. It is divided in three sections: section one is concerned with the presentation of the crisis of modernity as the crisis of Scientific Value Relativism or instrumental reason which gave rise to the creation of the fact-value dilemma; the latter signifies the impossibility of deriving moral obligation from facts about human nature. Section two is concerned with the presentation of the nature of teleological reason and MacIntyre's account of Emotivism which represents in his analysis the moral theory of modern society. Section three aims to provide a brief survey of some of the modern arguments concerning the crisis of modern reason. These arguments are shown to be divided in two traditions. The members of the Frankfurt School who object to modern instrumental reason and compare it with Classical teleological reason are shown to have a vision of history as a decline; the second is represented in Habermas' theory of communicative action which treats history in terms of progress towards 'reason'.

The second chapter aims to provide a thorough account of MacIntyre's philosophy and a statement of his appraisal of the project of the Enlightenment. This chapter demonstrates the outline of his argument concerning the failure of the latter project to establish a rationally defensible morality. Although MacIntyre's argument is shown to be quite similar to the Hegelian appraisal of the same project, MacIntyre is shown to be

incapable, due to his own theory of man and society, to follow Hegel to a Post-Kantian theory of subjective self-determination. Also it is in this chapter that MacIntyre's philosophical elements of his own presentation of a rationally defensible theory of human teleology are presented and analysed.

Chapter three is primarily concerned with the presentation of the shortcomings present in MacIntyre's solution. These consist primarily of the latter's refusal to accept the presence of a subjectivity in humanity. For MacIntyre the failure of the project of the Enlightenment represents the impossibility of the presence of a moral order based upon "universal subjectivity", thereby indicating that any solution for the crisis of modernity must undertake a project to annihilate the presence of individualism and replace it with an Aristotelean theory of society. In this sense, MacIntyre is not treating the modern crisis as a crisis of reason and subjectivity combined, rather it is a crisis of reason and of society, caused by the illegitimate and impossible demands of instrumental reason. The second section of this chapter disputes the fact that a theory of "universal subjectivity" cannot exist by showing that the Enlightenment project is not the inventor of either the individual or the universal theory of subjectivity, rather these elements were present in the philosophy of the Renaissance wherein a false fusion between a dialectical conception of freedom occurred. This suggestion attempts to clarify the questions regarding the interconnection between the three elements: reason, historicity and human nature, and those which I have posed above concerning the reasons for which modern man has not succeeded in achieving a freedom which was at once spiritual and material. It is also in view to search for the reason underlying the incoherence of the Kantian theory of the categorical imperative, which is taken to represent the failure of the Enlightenment project

and of the impossible existence of a theory of "universal subjectivity" that this study is concerned to expound.

NOTES

1. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwest U.P., 1970) p. 270.
2. Ibid., p.299
3. Ibid., p.289
4. Ibid., p.6
5. Ibid., p.9
6. Ibid., p.9, The term 'metaphysical' refers to that branch of speculation which deals with the first principle of things, including such concepts as being, substance, essence, time, space, causes, identity, etc; theoretical philosophy is considered as the ultimate science of Being and Knowing.
7. Heidegger, in his letter to Husserl that appears in Ellison & Macormick's book *Husserl*, (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977), p. 299-300, was one of the first to object to Husserl's theory of Pure Psychology wherein Husserl saw the identification of the realisation of the Ego of its own nature to be accomplished through a process of reduction that tends to [bracket] the corporeal. According to Heidegger, Dasein denoted an entity's way of being, where such a separation of body and mind (spirit) cannot occur if man is to find the relationship that exists between man and his Being.
8. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibbree, (New York: Humanities Press, 1899), p.447
9. Cassirer, Kristeller and Randall, *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, (London; Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1965), p. 387. "A Fable About Man"; in this fable written by the Renaissance Spanish author J.L. Vives is found described with fantastic detail the capacity of man to embody all animals and even be mistaken for the master of the Gods. His skill and fantastic physical constitution seems to have left all the Gods in awe, hence giving them the incentive to elevate man to the highest of heavens and to give him the pleasure to share in food and celestial comfort with the most deserving of Gods, Jupiter. In this fable the author cites the multiplicity of human talent that allows man to become one of the rulers of the universe; in essence to become a god.
10. For reference see Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol I & II; H. Marcuse, *Culture et société, One Dimensional Man, Eros and Civilization*. André Gorz, *Adieux aux proletariats*.
11. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, ibid; Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
12. M. Weber, *From Max Weber*, (New York: Oxford U.P., 1970), sect. VIII on Bureaucracy.
13. R.J. Bernstein, *Habermas and Modernity*, (Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), P. 35-66.
14. A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, (London: Duckworth, 1981), and J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) Vol I.
15. Walter Shapiro, "What's Wrong?", *Time*, (May 25, 1987), p. 16-19; Richard Stengel, "Morality Among The Supplysiders", *Time*, ibid, p.20-22; Ezra Bowen, "Looking To Its Roots: At a time of moral disarray, America seeks to rebuild a structure of values", *Time*, ibid, p. 28-35.
16. A. MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1966), p.208
17. ibid, p. 212

Chapter One: Elements Of the Crisis

In *The Eclipse Of Reason* (1974) Max Horkheimer defines the crisis of modernity as:

The crisis of reason [which] is manifested in the crisis of the individual, as whose agency it has developed... The individual once conceived of reason exclusively as an instrument of the self. Now he experiences the reverse of this self-deification. The machine has dropped the driver; it is racing blindly into space. At the moment of consummation, reason has become irrational and stultified. The theme of this time is self-preservation, while there is no self to preserve.¹

In this short passage Horkheimer has succeeded in pointing out the most salient elements of the crisis that have been widely discussed in numerous lines of philosophical thought. For some time now modern society has been seen as suffering from a crisis which has been often associated with 'reason', of which the individual is taken to be the primary bearer, and so it seems its primary victim. Reason in modernity has become 'unreason', its irrational tendencies towards infinite material accumulation no longer serves its purpose for mere self-preservation; rather, it has become an instrument of oppression, not merely of those it deprives through its unsatiable machine, but of the very individuals it is said to serve. Man in modern society can be said to be the victim of a tug of war between 'reason' that is scientific, which is incapable of guiding him in questions concerning metaphysics on the one hand, and 'human nature' that tends towards the knowledge of spirituality which lies beyond any given or possibly proven experience on the other.

According to Horkheimer, this 'supposed' split between the nature of man and the type of reason that man is currently applying is due to the rise of individualism which took place at the end of the middle ages and at the outset of the Renaissance, while reaching its highest magnitude in the age of enlightenment. Horkheimer states here that once the individual "conceived of reason exclusively as an instrument of the self" reason became 'irrational' and the individual's selfhood fell into 'nothingness'. However, modern reason has become irrational as opposed to what 'rational' state of 'reason'? and consequently, man's identity has become 'nonexistent' with reference to what other? What Horkheimer left implicit in his definition of the crisis is the reference to an earlier concept of reason that originated with classical Greek culture wherein a vision of the nature of reason, of humanity and its 'end' were explicitly formulated in the writings of the ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, whose work represent the scholarly reference to social scientists concerned with the search for the ideal state of social existence.

Classical reason is seen as the original model, the authentic definition of the process of human intellectual activity to which it is posited as its end. Reason is teleological in the sense that it is not an immediate 'given'; rather it is posited as the end result of a serious intellectual enterprise. In comparison, modern reason is considered as irrational, for in its very being it is a given that aims to an end that lies beyond it. Modern reason is instrumental because it is used as means to an ulterior end. Classical reason, when achieved, aims to an end that is purely social and that reaches towards the social 'good' which is, for Aristotle, embodied in a city state (*Polis*). Modern reason, on the other

hand, is irrational in its very purpose, for the 'ulterior' end to which it aims is not social nor must it be considered a 'good' by others; rather, it is an individualist 'good' that may not have any benefit to others, but may in reality contradict the latter's interests.

The bipolarity of the two concepts of reason, teleological and instrumental, may only appear plausible when an understanding of each concept is acquired. It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate the plausibility of its claim as to the existence of a crisis of modernity, as well as to provide an account of its essential element, reason. To attain this end, section one is concerned with defining the very nature of modern scientific reason; its basic premises, its origins and their theoretical implications will be demonstrated through a study of Arnold Brecht's theory on Scientific Value Relativism. Also, a study of various texts written by Max Weber will help illustrate the actual implementation of Scientific Value Relativism in the socio-political organisation of society.

Section two shall present MacIntyre's formulation of the crisis which is based upon his study of modern scientific reason wherein he demonstrates how the doctrine of emotivism is the very expression of Scientific Value Relativism. MacIntyre's evaluation of the crisis suggests the primacy of teleological reason, and the reasons that are responsible for its neglect. A closer view of teleological reason will be taken within the context of MacIntyre's analysis.

Finally, section three shall present an overview of the crisis that is found in the work of the following modern socio-political philosophers: Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas, Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno. Despite of the diversity found in

their analyses, these authors affirm that modern society is ailing of a crisis of reason which is prevalent in all facets of its modern socio-political life.

Scientific Value Relativism in Social Science

*Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night
God said 'let Newton be', and all was light.²*

From the Renaissance onward the mental outlook in the western world differed from that of the medieval period in two important ways: the diminishing authority of the church and the rising authority of science. The rejection of ecclesiastical authority did not come as an immediate reaction to the espousing of scientific theory, rather, it came in connection to the study of the Greek and early Roman philosophies. On the other hand, the first considerable irruption of scientific knowledge came in the publication of the Copernican theory in 1543; however, this theory did not become important until it was revised by Kepler and Galileo in the seventeenth century. This development announced the beginning of the long struggle between science and dogma, wherein the traditionalists seem to have fought a losing battle against the new knowledge.

Scientific knowledge, whether theoretical or practical³ was welcomed for two basic reasons: theoretically, its teachings had none of the institutionalised bearings of the church; those who accepted or rejected it were free to do so, for it simply appealed to their reason. Moreover, it did not, like Catholic dogma, lay down a complete system that provided man with a concrete plan for his morality, his hopes and the future of the universe. Science provided simply whatever at the time was scientifically ascertained; it

provided a knowledge that could be seen in all its elements and properties, hence it provided tangible truth. Science did not merely provide theoretical bases for the learned, but it also provided practical innovations for the masses. As theoretical sciences, found in the work of Renaissance scientists such as Kepler and Paracelsus, provided ground for the *understanding* of the world, so practical science provided means with which to *alter* the world. The practical importance of science could be seen in the inventions of Leonardo Da Vinci in architecture, and in Galileo's improvement on the articles of war. Today one could discern with much ease the role science had in the creation of atomic bombs and other dangerous weapons. The triumph of science has been mainly due to its practical utility, and in the common view there has been a tendency to divorce it from its theoretical dimension, thereby making of science a mere technique rather than a doctrine. Theoretical science came to be associated in every day life with its results that were demonstrated through its practical dimension thereby letting theory fall into obscurity.

Alongside the development of science, came the emancipation of societies from the power of the church which ultimately led to a dissolution of communal ties, as well as to the rise of individualism whose acuteness could be seen to intensify as the evolution of historical events reached the age of enlightenment. In philosophy the acute call for subjectivity could be grasped in the philosophy of Descartes who built all knowledge from the certainty of his own being, and who would only accept clearness and distinctness as the criteria of truth, which was also subjective. On the social level, the emancipation from church authority left two gaps in the human social condition; the first consisted in the breaking down of communal ties; the second was the inherent dissolution of a unified system of values. Practical science with its efficient technique in the ordering

of reality was building up in men a certainty with regards to their power, only its realisation was not individualist, but collective. New scientific innovations demanded the collaboration of a tremendous amount of human power as means for its efficiency. One author suggested that a seventeenth century man would have been able to do more things for himself on a desert island than would a man of our century. However, this collectivity is not comparable with the collectivity of a Greek city state, for this scientific unifier, unlike religion and Greek ethics, is ethically neutral: it gives men the possibility to perform wonders, but it does not and cannot indicate to them what wonders to perform. Looked at in this way science is inadequate. In the practical realm it gives complete answers as to 'how' one may perform a task; whereas on the question 'to what end', scientific reason is silent. Ends no longer fall in question, only the effectiveness of the process is valued. It is at this point that the question concerning the validity of the applicability of scientific method as an adequate theoretical system according to which man can organise his social life, his aspirations and his telos can be raised. There are philosophical arguments that either support or reject such a proposition, therefore before espousing either position, a look at what scientific method can and cannot provide in way to help man in his decisions concerning the organisation of his life-world must be taken. For this purpose we now turn to a definition of Scientific Method, as well as to a study of the theoretical components of the philosophical doctrine of Scientific Value Relativism.

*Science! true daughter of Old Time thou art!
Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes:
Why preyest thou thus upon the poet's heart,
Vulture, whose wings are dull realities?*

*E.A.Poe
Sonnet-To Science*

Science, a word derived from the Latin *scientia* meaning 'knowledge', is a systematic and unbiased study of the world, including every thing that can be seen or detected in nature, man, and society, and the knowledge that grows out of such a study. Science is based upon the assumption that there is some order to the world-that is, that some events appear to happen as a consequence of some other events. Scientists try to understand, explain, and predict the manner in which everything in the world behaves and acts. To do so, they study various objects, forces, and events - such varied phenomena as stars, atoms, chemical reactions, social groups, and human attitudes. Science's flexibility is based, in the first instance, on its method. The Scientific Method is not a specific set of rules for discovering new scientific knowledge. Rather, it is the general procedure that scientists generally follow. Any acceptable scientific inquiry has to comply with a procedure that involves the studying of an identified problem through observation, description, measurement, acceptance, inductive and deductive reasoning, testing, correcting and predicting⁴.

Scientific inquiry is not a simple mechanical process whose unthinking mechanism is designed to produce a given product. Scientific inquiry requires from the outset, namely the act of definition of a subject of inquiry, the insight and experience of the human mind. The selection of the problem supposes in advance the already active processes of observation, classification and induction. Scientific Method cannot offer a substitute for the creativity of the human mind. It, as Brecht states, "merely insists - at least in its exclusive interpretation - that all ideas, however hazardous, mechanical, or creative in their origin, must finally be processed in line with Scientific Method in order to become a

part of the body of science"⁵. An idea is only considered scientific when it is capable of withstanding the scrutinizing test of Scientific Method.

Scientific Method is based upon subjective study which relate primarily to the observer's own conception of reality. Due to its subjective nature every empirical study is left open to challenge in science (here study extends to encompass the process of observation, description, classification and logical reasoning). Even theories that have stood extensive tests, and that are called *Laws*, are not regarded as absolutely true statements. Rather, they are viewed as approximately true statements which will be changed, extended, and improved as more scientific knowledge is discovered.

Since the object of this work will not profit from a thorough discussion of the numerous stages of Scientific Method, it suffices for us here to relay the specific meaning of certain notions that will be of interest to the discussion on Scientific Value Relativism. These notions consist of the observation, truth, reality, and logical reasoning⁶.

Empirical observation in its very being is a process which demands a certain type of selectivity of objects to be studied. It, therefore, demands that the mind selects through intentionality the objects and subobjects of observation, using several prior knowledge, conceptions and experiences which may effect the very outcome of the inquiry.

Both types of observations, extrospective and introspective, are primarily subjective in nature. 'Extrospective' observation, or observation which focuses on objects that lie outside the self, is relatively less subjective than introspective observation which signifies

the act of observation within the self, where there is only one subject that observes itself. 'Extrospective' observation profits more from the possibility of others having a parallel impression regarding the same object. However, it should be emphasised that even 'introspective' observations are generally 'understood' by others although the same exact experience was not felt by them. This understanding stems from what Brecht calls as "consubjectivity", which he defines as the ability to have parallel impressions among different subjects. Brecht uses 'consubjectivity' rather than 'intersubjectivity', because it expresses "the truth of the common-sense assumption that one and the same thing often causes parallel impressions in different human-beings"⁷; whereas 'intersubjectivity' denotes the process of intercommunication. It is vital to realise that consubjectivity is necessary for intersubjectivity, as the latter is necessary for the existence of science.

Empirical observations are completely dependent on the observer's power of discrimination, personal interest and even physical capacity; for the means of observations depend totally on the limits of our human structure, and in case of introspective observation, they are limited by our emotional well-being. It is for this reason that Logicians emphasise that "immediate" empirical knowledge does not exist⁸, and that a verification of our observations is in order.

The criteria for the acceptance of an observation which is subjectively made depend entirely upon the degree to which it corresponds objectively to an actual fact. Scientific Method accepts an observation as a fact on the basis of a) sufficient accuracy in the report made, b) correct and adequate information, c) a support of the observed facts on actual

facts⁹. However, one may be tempted to ask what are actual facts? Facts are mainly what is held as the truth. According to Brecht, there are two main definitions of truth. The first corresponds mainly to reference to events that have been historically related (*events* such as 'Germany was defeated in World War II'). These truths may not have been observed, but are recorded as having actually existed. The second sense refers to a *statement* (such as 'John F. Kennedy was assassinated') is true or untrue. In this sense, a statement made that has not been recorded is not a proven truth and it may be erroneously accepted as truth although the said historical fact did not occur, and vice versa.

Scientific Method accepts the first type of knowledge as truth. According to this method only empirically tested, valid, verifiable hypotheses are considered truthful. This type of classification of the truth demonstrates the gulf between the truth that is held in faith and in religion, and scientific truth. Elements in religion that are taken for truth may not be accepted in relation to Scientific Method, for the latter will only retain as truth that which is empirically verifiable. This distinction is important for the analysis of Scientific Value Relativism, since the latter is the application of Scientific Method³ to the realm of philosophy, the acceptance of certain philosophical elements is denied to those that are not empirically verifiable.

Questions concerning the significance of fact and truth are seen to be directly connected to the question of subjective and objective facts. Until now the definition of "actual fact" as opposed to "subjective fact" is rather ambiguous, for the latter must be in accordance with the former to be accepted as truth, but the very definition Scientific

Method makes of 'objective fact' is still wanting. According to Brecht, an objective fact corresponds to what is 'real'. Scientific Method does not claim to be able to answer with certainty what is reality, it rather encourages scientists to accept what exists as 'real'. Scientific inquiry, unlike philosophical inquiry, is not concerned with the Platonic or Christian Truth which lies beyond the phenomenal world. Scientific inquiry attempts to show what is 'real', to verify its existence, but it does not enter into questions of metaphysics. The objective fact, although ontological in character, deals with the question of 'Being as Being' not in the metaphysical sense, but rather in the phenomenological sense. Modern ontological studies have recently attempted to direct ontological questions away from the realm of metaphysics into the realm of phenomena¹⁰.

In this respect, a question of reality is directly associated with the actual world. The world for the scientist is reality; its study provides him with the truth regarding his experiences within it. Scientific Method cannot enter into inquiries on metaphysical questions, for the latter's very existence cannot be proven by science. Nevertheless, science does not deny metaphysical existence, it merely considers it as a realm on which science has to remain silent.

Scientific Method demands that a hypothesis (a proposition so stated that its truth may be tested by making certain observations), formulated as to the nature of 'reality', be fully proven through logical reasoning, the latter being strictly analytical. Reasoning is analytical when a conclusion is derived from a proposition without adding anything to its meaning. To say that 'all birds can fly' and an eagle being a bird, it too can fly, is a strictly analytical statement. The conclusion is derived strictly according to the *meaning*

of the statement 'all birds can fly'. This statement does not conclude what is an eagle, nor does it explain the act of flight, it merely *deduces* the fact that in being defined as a bird, an eagle can fly. This constitutes the nature of deductive reasoning.

Deductive reasoning is analytical due to its strict adherence to the meaning of the proposition, and for this reason it is considered in Scientific Method as the *absolute* truth. In the same time logical reasoning ceases to be analytical whenever a proposition adds something to the meaning of a given term or proposition; it, as a consequence, becomes a 'synthetic' rather than an 'analytic' statement. The concept of eagle must fall within the definition of a bird, otherwise adding it to this definition of 'bird' will alter the meaning of the proposition thereby rendering it fallacious. One may pause here to ask the following question: if deductive reasoning is the process of turning generalisations into statements that apply to certain other observed facts, and that these statements must be analytical, hence must not be altered in meaning, how are statements generated, and where do they come from? The answer is based upon the second type of scientifically accepted reasoning, Induction. Inductive reasoning is the process of generalising from a number of observed facts. Induction consists of putting together the subjective observations into a pattern or generalisation. For instance, if one is acquainted with five or six businessmen who, although residing in different cities, vote for the conservative party, one would conclude by induction that there is a relationship between the business world and the ideology of the conservative party. On the other hand, the process of deduction consists of applying a principle²⁹ to arrive at a conclusion¹¹. From the example of deduction cited above, one reasons that 'all birds can fly', hence one can infer that if an eagle is a bird, it too can fly. Reynolds, a social psychologist who has written a

useful introduction to empirical theory calls induction "research-then-theory" and deduction "theory-then-research"¹².

Both methods of reasoning can also be found in antiquity: Plato's logic exhibited in *Parmenides* is deductive, whereas Aristotelean research, which included the collection of data in the field of politics, physics and biology among others, employs the inductive approach. In the Renaissance, Francis Bacon in 1620 wrote of the "two ways of searching into and discovering truth". The first, he stated, relies "on the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgement and to the discovery of middle axioms." The second which is the method he recommended "derives from the senses and particulars, rising by gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all". The first method Bacon refers to is deduction; the second, and the one he preferred, is induction¹³.

So far we have discussed some of the concepts of Scientific Method, what is now needed is an explicit statement as to the principles that make it into a theory. Although Scientific Method is primarily based on the result of its experiments, it, nevertheless, contains a certain number of a-priori principles. On this subject Brecht introduced a distinction between at least two types of a-priori principles; the methodologically repudiated a-priori and the immanent methodological a-priori. The first represents "all notions, propositions, or postulates that are extraneous to the system or method of thought underwhich the inquiry is conducted". It is any proposition not introduced in line with Scientific Method. This type of a-priori is rejected due to its "positive and substantive character", as they are propositions of the most hallowed type, such as "there

is an almighty God", or "All men are equal," or "All power corrupts". Such propositions are not admitted by Scientific Method as a-priori irrespective of experience. They are considered in scientific discussions as "out of order".

On the other hand, the immanent methodological a-priori is not ruled 'out of order', but, rather underlies the Method's operations although it too cannot be verified through scientific inquiry. This type of a-priori includes " 'consubjectivity'; the ability of observations to disclose 'facts'; causality, or at least regularity; and some human freedom of will"¹⁴. In the strict sense, Scientific Method does not incorporate these assumptions, but it, nevertheless, allows the scientist to accept them without being considered as guilty, in using them, of violating the standard rules of procedure. The justification of the use of such "immanent methodological a-priori", which are themselves not reached through Scientific Method lies primarily in the last instance "on the practical ground that only such knowledge as is supported by experience and logical analysis is capable of a conclusive transmission from person to person", or the ability to transmit knowledge *qua* knowledge from person to person; hence "intersubjectively transmitted knowledge"¹⁵.

Scientific Method's exclusivity is based upon a type of knowledge that is both transmissible and value-free. Both concepts are important to our discussion, for such an exclusivity denies the recognition of any type of knowledge that either cannot be transmitted intersubjectively, or a type of knowledge that, instead of presenting knowledge in the form of mere 'evidence', presupposes the presence of a 'value' in its very content. Scientific Method is zealous to exclude 'evidence' that cannot be transmitted, and in the same manner, when an 'evidence' is transmitted no criteria for its

acceptance or rejection is to be presented as a result of its transmission. This type of transmission of knowledge has succeeded within the realm of natural science, where matter is easily subject to empirical reasoning; however, how is this exclusivity possible when Scientific Method is applied to questions involving morality, social organisation and religion? Is Scientific Method applicable to questions concerning human values? These are the very type of questions that involve the theory of Scientific Value Relativism.

Is and Ought!

The theory of Scientific Value Relativism deals with the acceptance of Scientific Method in the realm of philosophy. According to Brecht "Scientific Value Relativism holds that:

1. *the question whether something is 'valuable' can be answered scientifically only in relation to*
 - a) *some goal or purpose for the pursuit of which it is or is not useful (valuable), or to*
 - b) *the ideas held by some person or group of persons regarding what is or is not valuable;**and that, consequently,*
2. *it is impossible to establish scientifically what goals or purposes are valuable irrespective of*
 - a) *the value they have in the pursuit of other goals or purposes, or*
 - b) *of someone's ideas about ulterior or ultimate goals or purposes.*¹⁶

Scientific Method is, therefore, capable of taking into account, or of classifying the type of purposes which are pursued by people at some definite place and time; it can

calculate the suitability of the means to achieve these chosen purposes. It can also provide an assessment of the quality of a person's character such as courage and patience, as well as the quality of a thing, such as a knife's sharpness etc.. However, Scientific Method cannot determine the kind of pursuit that an individual should undertake. In essence, Scientific Method cannot state in "*absolute terms*, whether the purpose pursued by us is good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust, nor which of several conflicting purposes is more valuable than the other"¹⁷. Scientific Method can only answer such questions in a "relative" manner with reference to other comparable purposes that are being pursued. Through its discovery of the meaning of the purposes that are valued, Scientific Method can influence their pursuit or their abandonment, but it can never say so in 'absolute' terms. It generally presents the evidence, normally presented through the meaning, or the demonstration of the consequences that the pursuit of a certain purpose may bring about, but it does not demand an acceptance of this evidence, nor does it qualify it with an 'evaluative' term.

Scientific Method's limitation lies, then, in its inability to claim itself as the provider of ethical determinable values. In its very subjective nature, Scientific Method is incapable of making a claim to universality. It is rather concerned with the study of unique combinations of circumstances that may not be repeated in the future. It is for this very reason that Scientific Method is unable to enter into the questions posed in normative theory. Posed clearly in normative theory is the question of 'values' or 'norms' to which man's activity 'ought' to aim. However, Scientific Method is primarily concerned with 'evaluations' and not with 'values'. It can observe what people value, and consider as valuable in a concrete sense, such as jewels or money or health. But the question of

whether these things are really valuable, apart from the purposes they serve and from the consequences they can produce, is not a thing that Scientific Method can inspect in the empirical realm, or the realm of 'Is'. Upon calling ultimate purposes or moral qualities 'values' apart from personal appreciation, it is meant that they are values that 'ought' to be achieved; or be approved. This cannot be achieved through Scientific Method, except in relation to an ulterior human purpose, or some human evaluation. In other words, Scientific Method cannot establish itself or any other value as a teleology, it is simply the empirical method, the means, used for the achievement of an ulterior 'end'. This defines the very nature of modern reason which has come to be known as "instrumental reason", and of which Scientific Method is the ultimate expression.

However, the definition of the nature of 'instrumental reason' does not fully explain the dangers of its application to socio-political life. Illustrating the effects of its application is the demonstration made by Max Weber of the nature of the modern state. Weber, in his lectures on "Politics as a Vocation", as well as on the nature of 'Bureaucratic Organization' gives a thorough demonstration of the effect of the application of 'rationalization' on the modern socio-political system. Through the latter's application, Weber shows the rise of a process of 'differentiation' of value spheres, namely, law, morality and culture wherein the implications of the inability of Scientific Method to assert a connection between fact and value comes in full view. Moreover, the effect of this rationalisation does not lie merely in the public sphere, but extends to the private sphere; this extension finds its highest expression in the formal separation of the private and public spheres in the very distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' law.

In *Politics as a Vocation*, Weber argues that the modern state bases its legitimation of domination in virtue of legality, hence in virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' which is based upon rationally created *rules*. This type of domination is seen by Weber to be "exercised by the modern 'servant of the state' and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him". The maintenance of political domination is made necessarily through an administrative apparatus that "requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience" to the bearers of legitimate power. The maintenance of this apparatus requires a specific type of administrative 'division of labour' which maintains the "separation" of the administrative staff, of the administrative officials, and of the workers from the material means of administrative organization"¹⁸. The administrative staff is also bound by obedience to the power holder for several reasons; on the personal level, the material reward, and social honor which is based upon respective wages act as an appeal to entice the joining of the bureaucracy. However, on a more functional level, the 'division of labour' within the system engulfs the individual civil servant on both the professional and personal level of his being within its machine without which he cannot have meaning or use for his existence¹⁹. However, the civil servants are not alone in being dependent on the bureaucratic system, the public is seen by Weber to be incapable of demanding its annihilation due to its own hopeless incapacity to organise its affairs, as well as its ignorance of the functioning of the administrative tasks.

In this same article, Weber makes an important distinction between political control and economic control. In his discussion regarding the revolution that occurred in

Germany in 1918, he acknowledges the success of the revolutionaries in gaining control over the political apparatus through public elections; however, Weber expresses doubt as to their success in "carrying through the expropriation within the capitalist enterprises". This apparent distrust of the power of the political body is indicative of Weber's recognition of the vast influence of the capitalist system on the organisation and application of political power. Seen in this light, the holders of legitimate political power within the capitalist system remain impotent when it comes to the control of their own country. This is seen by Weber to indicate the major contradiction found within the capitalist - democratic states, where capitalism pushes for bureaucracy and lack of ethos, and democracy is based upon ethical considerations. Here the bureaucratisation of the state reveals again the problem of the separation of fact and value in Scientific Method. For such bureaucratisation, which is primarily based upon the rationalisation of law and its procedures instituted to serve the increasing complex demands of economic life through the judicial system, cannot remain complete, it either overrides democracy's claim for ethical justice expressed in "equality for all", or it remains dissatisfied with its own progress towards total dehumanisation of the ruling apparatus. In either case, a constant friction between the ideology and the practice of the state gives rise to a total differentiation and incoherence between means (bureaucracy) and ends (democracy)²⁰.

Bureaucratic authority whether in a state or a capitalist enterprise is organised in a manner that maximises efficiency and the application of objective methods through the careful institution of a division of labour within its working structure. Its authority is expressed through jurisdiction in specific areas usually supplied through rules, laws or administrative regulation. Its principles, whether public or private, are firmly distributed

according to hierarchy where the lower offices are subordinated to, and checked by the higher offices. Moreover, office management presupposes thorough and expert training. This is true of private enterprises, and of state officials. Bureaucracy is, therefore, organised in a manner that closely resembles the operations of Scientific Method. The 'vocation' of a bureaucratic official resembles the 'vocation' of a scientist whose training and the application of Scientific Method is not merely a 'vocation', but also a *duty*. As it is the *duty* of a scientist to be true to his observations, and to operate the testing of his hypotheses in a professional and scientifically objective manner, so it is the *duty* of the official to be legally bound to promise not to exploit his position for rents or emoluments. According to Weber, "entrance into an office, including one in the private economy, is considered an acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management in return for secure existence"²¹. Bureaucratic organisation presupposes a strong demand for administration, and a strong and stable social differentiation wherein the official has a greater esteem than the governed, and whose position is guaranteed by law and order.

Bureaucratic organisation developed at an accelerated speed due to its technical efficiency, and thus superiority over the other modes of social organisation. Its efficient machine-like performance reassured the governed public of the high degree of certainty in the fulfilment of the increased demands for individual rights and their protection on the one hand, and the increased control of communication facilities on the other. Weber points out that in the modern state it is primarily the capitalist market economy which demands the institution of an efficient bureaucratic administration. Business management rests upon increasing precision, steadiness, and, above all, speed of operations which it achieves through the application of the elements of Scientific Method in the organisation.

of its administrative body. Its demand for further administrative organisation in the institutions of the state signifies its need to further the process of work dehumanisation within the very 'body' that advocates ideological and teleological expression of the public.

In its very nature, bureaucratisation allows, if not demands, the application of specialised administrative tasks according to purely 'objective' considerations. According to Weber, "objectivity" in business means "a discharge of business according to "calculable rules" and 'without regard for persons'". The latter expression indicates the ideology of the 'market', and in general all activities made in the pursuit of naked economic interests. The principle of "calculable rules" is seen by Weber to stand at the heart of bureaucratic success - for in its specific nature, which is demanded by capitalism, bureaucracy feeds on the "dehumanization" of its functions. Bureaucracy flourishes when it succeeds in eliminating any expression of love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. For Weber, this scientifically based process " is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue"²².

The legitimization of the domination of the state being primarily based upon the legal system is also subordinated to the effects of bureaucratisation. Its subordination is based upon the *rational* interpretation of law according to *formal conceptions* that is seen to stand in opposition to adjudication, and which is bound to *sacred traditions*. The latter being supported by judgements based upon ethical or other practical valuations is considered unapplicable due to its failure to deal with rational issues. Formal (rational)

justice, or as Weber refers to it as empirical justice, is rendered superior through the drawing on of 'analogies' (similarities) based upon the interpretation of concrete 'precedents'. According to Weber, only the empirical justice can be "sublimated and rationalized into a 'technology'"²³, whereas traditional or Kadi-justice may only advance to a prophetic break with tradition, and hence cannot be employed within rationalised units. A further bureaucratisation of the state and of the law is seen by Weber to bring about a clear distinction between an "objective" legal order and the "subjective rights" of the individual which it (the legal order) guarantees. As a result there appears a dichotomy of laws, namely public law and private law. The public law tends to regulate the relations between the 'public authorities' and the 'subjects'; whereas the private law regulates the relationships of governed individuals amongst themselves. This separation of public from private law reveals a conceptual separation of the state as the maker of laws from all personal "authorization" of individuals. Through this, the power of the state succeeds in transcending individualist existence thereby rendering the very idea of individualist freedom a sham. According to Weber, such a separation would have only become possible due to the "complete depersonalization of administrative management by bureaucracy and the rational systematization of law to realize the separation of public and private fully and in principle"²⁴.

Through the Weberian analysis of the modern state, one may venture to state that the several contradictions arising from the adherence of the principle of the socio-political structure to the logic of Scientific Method are primarily based upon the latter's inability to bridge the gulf between facts and values. The bureaucratic apparatus is defined by Weber to be the very example of a machine whose socio-political dimension lies in contradiction

with its very essence. For the machine may only solve problems that appear in the realm of reality, and cannot reflect upon problems of values, which are the very occupation of the socio-political realm. Due to its value-free nature, bureaucratic apparatus is also a means to an 'end' that is primarily associated with its leader. For Weber, the effects of bureaucracy on the socio-political system depend "upon the direction which the power using the apparatus give to it ... very frequently a crypto-plutocratic distribution of power has been the result"²⁵. The problem of fact and value appear in the contradiction existing between the capitalist system's drive towards total mechanisation and dehumanisation of labour, and the operation of the democratic ideology representing the teleology of the state. Here, the economic capitalist structure's demands for private accumulation tends to contradict the 'end' of the state which tends towards the equality of all.

The above discussion aimed to present the nature, the assets and short-comings of modern 'instrumental reason'. It also hoped to point out, at least in the introduction, the reasons that lay behind the adoption of instrumental reason as the ticket towards the ultimate liberation of humanity from the shackles of religious dogma. The latter crumbled in the face of the rational logic of Scientific Method thereby allowing the material emancipation of the individual to take place. However, its decline left, nevertheless, a gap in the unity of social ethical values due to Scientific Method's inability to solve the fact and value dilemma. This particular short-coming of scientific logic is considered as the primary reason underlying the symptoms that are shown by modern socio-political writers to plague western civilization. In a general sense, these writers tend to bring about a discussion of the failure of the concept of 'instrumental reason' through a comparison with classical 'teleological reason'; it is to a brief exposition of the latter's

nature, assets and shortcomings that we now turn.

Eclipse of Teleological Reason

The notion of teleology pertains to the doctrine or study of ends or final causes, especially as related to the evidences of design or purpose in nature; such a design is normally seen as exhibited in natural objects or phenomena. The 'final cause' of an occurrence is an event in the future for the sake of which the occurrence takes place. An inquiry into the nature of these events will ultimately bring about the appearance of the question 'why?' When one asks 'why?' concerning an event, one may imply either of two things. One may imply: 'What is the purpose of this event?' or one may imply: 'What are the circumstances that caused this event?' The answer to the former question is a teleological explanation, or an explanation of final causes; the answer to the latter question is a mechanistic explanation, or an explanation that involves the expertise of Scientific Method. Although both questions concern the same event, only the mechanistic question leads to scientific knowledge, while the teleological question does not. This distinction is not the product of modern scientific method, rather it originated in the philosophical discussions that took place in early Greek philosophy between the Atomists on the one hand, and Socrates, Plato and Aristotle on the other. The Atomists, unlike the teleological philosophers, sought to explain the world without introducing the notion of *purpose* or *final cause*; they asked a mechanistic question, and gave a mechanistic answer.

In *Science of Logic*, Hegel also made the distinction between 'Teleology' and

'Mechanism'. He based this distinction on the identification of the opposition between *causae efficientes* and *causae finales* - hence, between efficient and final causes. The importance of this distinction is seen by Hegel to determine a view of the "absolute essence of the World" as based upon either a "blind natural Mechanism" or upon an understanding which determines itself by its ends. This antinomy of world view is seen by Hegel to be directly linked to the antinomy of "fatalism or determinism and freedom"²⁶. Mechanism is fatalist in the sense that it manifests through the use of "efficient causes" no self-determination. It does so because it posits its determinateness in the 'object' that lies outside it; in a direct sense, its product is not a finality in and for itself, rather it is the means to another end that is in itself finite. Whereas in Teleology, the content is primary; for teleology presupposes a "Notion" that is determinate in and for itself, and "therefore, self-determining". Teleology, according to Hegel, makes a definite distinction between *form* and *content*, where the latter determines its unity. The teleological content cannot be finite, nor trivial, for in its very nature it is a totality that aims towards infinity. The true essence of Teleology may be, and indeed for Hegel, has been trivialised through the positing of finite objects as its end thereby rendering it insignificant and even contemptible. Due to the absolutist character of teleology, the positing of finite objects as an end, will necessarily drive "a more universal thought ...[to] feel infinitely cramped or even nauseated"²⁷. Hence, for Hegel, the very essence of freedom lies in the infinite rather than the finite.

Unlike Scientific Method, teleology asserts that reason does not merely lie in the individual mind but also in the objective world - hence, in relations among individuals and social classes, in social institutions, and in nature as a whole. In classical Greek

philosophy, such as those envisaged by Plato and Aristotle, and in German Idealism, systems are based upon an objective theory of reason wherein is found defined a hierarchy of all beings which include man and his aims. The quality of man's life is judged by the degree to which it is harmonious with this totality. Its objective nature is used to measure the quality of human thought and action. Within this teleology subjective reason can have no expression; it signifies a one-sided expression of the universal rationality from which facts concerning all things and beings were derived. In comparison to subjective scientific reason, objective reason concentrates on the ends rather than the means. In the Platonic *Republic* it is only those who are capable of acknowledging objective reason that can organise the state in a manner that allows the maximisation of the chances for the community to live a happy and successful life. The doctrine of objective reason puts more emphasis on the accomplishment of the greatest good, rather than on the means to achieve it.

Subjective reason on the other hand, represents the acute preoccupation with the means used towards the achievement of a given end. In its very nature subjective reason, as we have seen above, concentrates upon the relationships of an object or concept to a purpose, not to the object or concept itself. This signifies the importance of the object or concept for some other purpose than in itself; hence, subjective reason can only talk of means, not ends. The relationship between the two concepts of reason is not merely one of opposition, for as Horkheimer points out, the objective concept of reason or logos contained subjective expressions within it. In Platonic philosophy, the Idea is perceived through the intellect of the thinking subject. However, if this is so, how and why has the concept of reason shifted from the objective to the subjective realm. Horkheimer gives an

answer to this question by stating that this shift which defines "the present crisis of reason consists fundamentally in the fact that at a certain point thinking either became incapable of conceiving such objectivity at all or began to negate it as a delusion"²⁸. Although this does not answer the question how this shift came about, it, nevertheless, defines the very condition of the crisis of reason. A discussion on how this process has taken place will be taken up in chapter three on the development of instrumental reason in the Renaissance.

The subjectivisation of reason is claimed to be at the very roots of the crisis of modernity due to its immediate implications on the theoretical and practical levels. In its very nature, subjective reason posits the determination of a purpose for itself as an impossibility. Issues pertaining to ideals, ethical questions, political ideology, in other words all our ultimate decisions are made to depend on something other than reason. This has been shown in the above section concerning the applicability of instrumental reason to questions of value. In this sense, ultimate ideals acquire a subjectivist view, where they are considered as "matters of choice", and where the concept of truth becomes meaningless when considered as a moral virtue. In essence, values such as truth become relativistic, subject to personal interpretation.

As teleological or objective reason is in its very nature absolutist, it does not admit of the relativisation of values. Teleology, derived from the Greek Telos meaning the 'end' does not assume a different end for each accidental man, rather the conception of end is applied by Aristotle to the whole of nature. According to Aristotle all matter is determined towards the realisation of some form which constitutes its end. In his

philosophy there is a constant movement from matter to form, or from the 'potential' to the 'actual'. For Aristotle matter holds within its primary state the potential to arrive in its final stage of development to its preconceived end. Hence, just as a seed holds within its being the potential to become a tree, so has the fetus within its being the potential to become a political citizen. Similarly, the primary material of family association reaches its 'end' in the constitution of the state. The state, representing in Aristotelean philosophy the moral life, is the supreme association which includes other associations like the family: its end is the good life which involves in its nature other subordinate ends, like that of the quality of life or friendship²⁹.

The absolute character, or the infinite *content* of teleology is primarily moral. In Aristotelean philosophy, men have by nature an aim, a goal, such that they move to a specific *telos*; this aim can only be embodied within the totality of natural teleology which represents in this particular case the social *good*. Aristotle's philosophy aims to give an account of the *good* which is at once local and particular - that is located in and partly defined by the characteristics of the *polis* - and yet it is also cosmic and *universal*³⁰. The combination between the absolute (moral) and the infinite (universal) allows the teleology of man to be defined in moral terms within an infinitely defined notion of end. This explains Hegel's distinction between the form (universality) and the content (morality), wherein the latter may never embrace a trivial and immediate character.

The universal character of teleology implies a sense of unity and harmony, just as one finds in nature, which engulfs the whole of man, his life, family and community. The smooth progression towards this harmony consists in the unity of purpose to which all

natural phenomena evolves. Hence, one finds in the Aristotelean view the individual virtues, the moral values and the constitutional laws as evolving through the same nucleus towards the universal end. Aristotelean virtues, for instance, are those qualities whose possession and practice leads to the state of *eudaimonia* meaning happiness, blessedness and prosperity, and the lack of which hinders the movement toward that telos. It is important to point out that the exercise of these virtues and their achievement does not mean that once achieved the individual will live such a life. On the contrary, it is the constant exercise of these virtues that is the essential element of such a life. Here the virtues are not means to an end, but rather constitute in their very being the end. This definition of the 'good life' lies in glaring contrast with the subjectivist view of the 'good life' wherein the latter is measured in relativistic terms to the acquisition of some measurable value. Since instrumental reason cannot judge what is good and bad, the very exercise of the Aristotelean life can only be termed as good or bad with respect to some measurable criteria, such as the size of the house, income ... etc. The question as to the value of human qualities in their socio-political and cultural behaviour cannot be posed. Within the realm of Scientific Value Relativism, all values that pertain to morality are bracketed and are left to subjective evaluation thereby dismissing the very possibility of the existence of a harmonious moral end within society wherein a multitude of often contradictory value-judgements have appeared. This development has been identified by MacIntyre among others, as being symptomatic of the crisis of modern culture.

In his recent work *After Virtue*, MacIntyre discussed three major characteristics which he found defined the nature of modern socio-political debates attempting to advance specific moral values. The first falls primarily in the category of the fact-value

dilemma. MacIntyre provides three debates each of which advances an argument which is logically valid, and whose conclusion does indeed follow from the premises. However, all three debates provide rival premises from which it is rather impossible to choose only one conclusion according to 'rational' criteria due to the equal plausibility of the other two. This occurs for two reasons. The first, and the one presented by MacIntyre, claims that all three debates base their arguments on premises which rely upon rival normative views and which are also quite different from the others thereby allowing them to be all 'possible' conclusions and to completely negate each other at one and the same time. MacIntyre gives as an example in the first argument premises that invoke justice and innocence that are at odds with those which invoke success and survival³¹. The facility found in the use for different arguments diverse and rival normative concepts is shown by MacIntyre to occur due to modern society's lack of the possession of an "established way of deciding" between such claims. The second reason lies in close association to the first, holding that the absence of established norms in society is primarily based upon the subjective character of value-judgements. Due to the application of Scientific Value Relativism, the questions on moral values have been primarily associated with the deciding subject. This explains the reason why MacIntyre would call moral debates as a "matter of assertion and counter-assertion". Moreover, MacIntyre claims that this rivalry for the assertion of one value as opposed to another does not merely take place within public debates, but also within the mind of the subject himself. Before entering any form of debate, the moral agent needs to have a set of unassailable criteria according to which he has settled his choice of values. If this criteria does not exist he may not be able to convince anyone of his moral assertions.

However, faced with a system that views values as belonging to the subjective realm, how does this agent succeed in asserting his own established subjective moral code in public. In other words, how does he succeed in convincing others of his own views? The answer to this lies in the second characteristic which is defined by MacIntyre as the establishment of such arguments in a rational and *impersonal* manner. The appeal to the consideration of this or that value is uttered in a manner as to appear independent of the relationship between speaker and hearer. According to MacIntyre this type of impersonal criteria adopts the use of objective standards such as "justice, or generosity or duty" as a *good* according to which a moral decision is taken. However, this cannot occur under the normal criteria of subjective reason whose very nature does not include the passing of decisions on values, and even less on universal values. This development signifies the inadequacy of subjective reason as the ruler and guide of modern man on the one hand, and is symptomatic of the passing of morality from a state of order to a state of disorder on the other. The latter explanation is seen by MacIntyre to be the reason behind which he feels it necessary to "construct a true historical narrative in which at an earlier stage moral argument is very different in kind"³², and which constitutes the third characteristic.

When reflecting upon the nature of morality throughout history, MacIntyre claims that modern evaluation of morality tends to be "persistently unhistorical" in its treatment of moral philosophy to the extent that Plato, Hume and Mill are treated "as contemporaries both of ourselves and of each other". Such a *melange* is seen to have led to an abstraction of these writers from the "cultural and social milieus in which they lived and thought" thereby allowing the history of their thought to acquire a false "independence from the rest of culture"³³. This homogenisation of philosophy in history, or more

precisely this complete distinction of empirical history from philosophy has given rise not merely to the false independence of philosophy from culture, but also to the belief that the diverse expressions of morality in history is but a different expression of the same moral content. The latter condition explains the acceptance of the existence of various rival normative concepts as valid moral utterances. Within this context the effect of Scientific Value Relativism can be seen as having induced through its incapacity to bridge the fact-value difference the differentiation between empirical history (fact) and philosophy (value), thereby altering the nature of the content and the understanding of both disciplines.

Scientific Value Relativism's effect on moral theory can be seen as embodied in emotivism. According to MacIntyre, "emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more specifically all moral judgements are *nothing but* expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or of feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character"³⁴. Here emotivism can be defined as the very expression of Scientific Method where 'Is' and 'Ought' are completely separated. Values are separated from facts in the sense that only facts can be discussed in terms of scientific 'reason', whereas values, being subjective in character, are neither true nor false, and "agreement in moral judgement is not to be secured by any rational method, for there are none". MacIntyre's claim regarding the emotivist theory, wherein objective and universal criteria for morality and ultimate values are strictly unavailable.

The emotivist doctrine concerns itself with the theory that the *meaning* of uttered sentences is a direct expression of moral judgement. In uttering the sentence "this is

good", C.L. Stevenson claims that its implication suggests "I approve of this; do so as well" wherein the moral judgement of the speaker is expressed and aims at one and the same time to alter through its very expression the moral decision of the hearer³⁵. Despite of its success in characterising the dilemma of modern society's incapacity to bridge the fact-value gulf, MacIntyre claims that emotivism, as a theory of the meaning of a certain type of sentence, fails for three different reasons. First, emotivism's claim to the ability of identifying the types of feelings of approval or disapproval that are the expression of the utterer's moral attitude is seen by MacIntyre to be unfounded. In the first instance its explanation of such expressions occurs in a circular fashion where expressions are explained through morality and vice versa. Emotivism is seen to attempt the explanation of a faculty (morality) of which it is itself ignorant. This type of attitudinal explanation as expressed by a specifically moral judgement is seen to have "become vacuously circular" by MacIntyre.

The second reason for its failure lies in emotivism's concentration on the meaning of sentences as the utterances of moral judgements, rather than the use the speaker makes of these sentences in his manner of speech. A sentence uttered in a menacing tone does not necessarily express in its meaning a sign of disapproval, but it might very well do so in the tone and facial expression of the speaker, which in itself makes up the effect on the hearer. MacIntyre gives the example of the angry school-master who may vent his feelings of frustration and disapproval at the young boy who has just made an arithmetical mistake: 'seven times seven is forty-nine!'³⁶ in this situation the tone and the facial expressions define the utterance of the schoolmaster's feelings and not the technical meaning of the sentence uttered. Herein the emotivist theory may be rejected for placing

its emphasis on the meaning of the utterance rather than on its use. However, it must be stated that the use of an utterance cannot be proved through logical reasoning due to the difficulty of its measurement and classification. The tone of the voice of a speaker, his physical disposition portrayed in the characteristics of his face, which might be considered as pleasant by some and unbearably repulsive to others, ...etc, contain no consistency in observation thereby promoting the refusal to qualify moral utterance as purely based upon the use of speech. To suggest that emotivism may be considered applicable in basing its criteria on the use rather than the meaning of sentences, as MacIntyre does, is to suggest that emotivism bases its theory upon what might appear to it as 'irrational' or 'unreliable' observable criteria for its conclusion.

The third reason consists in emotivism's attempt to characterise as "equivalent in meaning" two types of expressions, namely subjective decisions and evaluative expressions (including morality), which are exposed through Scientific Method to be impossible to equate. Above, it has been discussed through MacIntyre's reflection on the characteristics of the crisis of culture that the very expression of a subjective moral preference, in order to acquire validity, must be expressed in an objective and universal manner. Here in the very theory of emotivism a similar contradiction arises. Emotivism, in its very claim "that there are and can be *no* valid justification for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist and hence that there are no such standards" falls in contradiction with its very theory when attempting to equate subjective personal preference and moral evaluation, wherein a suggestion to the latter's universality is indicated. Expressed in mathematical terms emotivism is suggesting that $a = \text{objective standards(values)} = 0$ is equivalent to $b = \text{subjective standards(fact)} = x$. Given such criteria

the equation $a=b$ cannot occur, unless $b=0$ as well, thereby negating the very existence of subjective standards, a claim that is completely inconsistent with Scientific Method.

This very attempt has been expressed by MacIntyre to be reflected in the reasons underlying the acceptance by D. McCarthy, J.M. Keynes, L. Strachey, and V. Woolf of G.E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* ³⁷ wherein the latter proposes three assertions rather than arguments. The first assertion concerns the definition of the 'good' as an indefinable property which is based upon the use of intuition. Second, that the right action is utilitarian in character; its value depends on its efficiency in maximising the 'good'. And finally, the 'greatest good' is primarily found in "personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments". According to MacIntyre, the falseness of the first assertion and the highly contentious nature of the other two leave many questions unanswered as to the reasons many highly intelligent and perceptive people have in accepting such a theory. The reason suggested claims that it is "the need to find objective and impersonal justification for rejecting all claims except those of personal intercourse" ³⁸ which lies behind their acceptance of Moore's theory. Emotivism corresponds to the need of universal validity in its very attempt to be an "empirical thesis" about the use of moral and other evaluative expressions as if they were "governed by objective and impersonal criteria" when all account of such criterion is no longer possible on the one hand, and when the very object of study falls in contradiction with the theoretical bases of empirical Scientific Method on the other.

MacIntyre's discussion on the emotivist theory seeks to achieve two primary objectives. In the first place, MacIntyre seeks to define the crisis of modernity to be

mainly embedded in the decline of morality due to the application of empirical Scientific Method to the various elements of culture. MacIntyre sees this decline to consist in three stages. The first stage consists in the use of objective and impersonal standards as the rational justification for the existence of particular policies, actions and judgements thereby rendering them susceptible to rational justification. The second stage finds these objective and impersonal standards incapable of withstanding the process of rational justification; this failure brought on not merely the disintegration of the policies and actions they supported, but also of the complete break-down of these very standards. The third stage representing the emotivist age, is found to secure an implicit acceptance of the theory which claims that objective and impersonal standards cannot be made good; this, although implicitly recognised, is, as shown above, theoretically untenable.

MacIntyre's second objective consists in aiming, through a historical and philosophical analyses, to deny emotivism's claim that "every attempt, whether past or present, to provide a rational justification for an objective morality has in fact failed" thereby asserting that no objective and impersonal standards exist, or have ever existed. MacIntyre through his study wishes to call into question and decry the verdict that emotivism conferred upon the whole history of moral philosophy wherein it aims to obliterate the distinction between present and past with respect to the evolution of objective moral standards. The effect of the emotivist theory on modern culture consists in the applying of the final blow to the residue of applicable moral standards that has trickled through the ages to modernity. The emotivist theory does not merely define the moral standpoint of modern man, but also indicates the marked loss and degeneration of culture. In his aim to decry emotivist claims, MacIntyre seeks to characterise the modern

culture as emotivist, and also to describe the lost morality of the past and to evaluate "its claim to objectivity and authority" through a historical and philosophical examination of Aristotelean philosophy.

In *After Virtue*, MacIntyre defines the social content of emotivism as entailing "the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations". This further entails the obliteration of the Kantian moral distinction between a moral and an immoral conception of subjectivity, for it does not make the distinction between the treatment of others as means or as ends. In the emotivist tradition "others are always means, never ends". The disintegration of the Kantian vision is both indicative of the second stage of the decline of morality cited above, and in the same time indicates the failure of values to be rationally justified through Scientific Method. Questions of ends are seen in the emotivist tradition as questions of value upon which empirical instrumental reason has to remain silent. The conflict arising between rival values cannot be rationally settled. As a result men in society are forced to choose arbitrarily, according to their needs (defined by Moore as personal desires) between political parties, classes, notions, moral causes and ideals³⁹.

Within the social context the emotivist theory is expressed through the *characters* of modern society. According to MacIntyre each society expressed its moral standard through certain characters. For instance the role of the Head-master in Victorian England and that of the professor in Wilhelmine Germany gave concrete bases for the moral code of their age. Characterising the modern moral attitude are two prominent professions: the manager and the therapist. Both professions hold, for MacIntyre, the epitome of the

emotivist tradition's separation of fact from value, of professional life from private life.

Although at first glance the function of both professions may seem completely incomparable; nevertheless, they have many aspects in common. The manager, whether engaged in the bureaucratic or the private sector, has a profession which demands the knowledge of available techniques which allows the maximisation of profit. His profession, while demanding of him a certain type of specialisation, gives him a predetermined end: the maximisation of profit within a given period of time. The methods he uses are purely rational and the result are calculable. The therapist, on the other hand, is trained to deal with human conflicts, his object consists in resolving neurotic problems and redirecting confused human capacities into channeled productive energy. His profession demands, just as the manager's, certain specialised scientific knowledge and at the same time poses for him a predefined end: efficiency. However, unlike the manager who works primarily with calculable matter, the therapist deals with individuals to whom he can only relate on rational and scientific level; questions relating to value judgements cannot be answered if they presuppose the giving of 'personal advice'. The therapist, like the manager, is not able to "engage in moral debate". Here within the social function of both professions is expressed the Scientific Method's separation between fact and value. Both characters are concerned with facts: the first with material availability, the second with the observable symptoms of a mental disturbance; neither may allow an expression of values, for they are relegated to the subjective realm. Here MacIntyre, as does Weber, defines the application of emotivism into the social context as the identification of a lack of a commonly accepted code of ethics wherein a lack of a common social 'end' is also indicated.

The crisis of modern society is seen to lie in the social end's relegation to the realm of matter which is in itself measurable and calculable. The emotivist tradition's characters are not defined through a *fusion* between the social and the personal attitudes and moral content; on the contrary they are defined primarily through a bifurcation of the modern social existence between 'bureaucratic' organisation within which ends are imposed and are not considered as subject to rational justifications and a personal realm wherein judgement on values need not be subjected to rational inquiry, but that are not allowed to have an objective and impersonal socio-political expression. This crisis is not merely felt on the social level through the absence of a common telos, but it is also and most importantly present in the crisis of the individual who is seen to acquire a sovereignty which "in its own realm lost its traditional boundaries provided by a social identity and a view of human life as ordered to a given end"⁴⁰. The establishment of subjective morality signifies the deprivation of the self of its own qualities. Through the development of a value-free society, the human self is seen by MacIntyre to have become "criterionless, because the kind of telos in terms of which it once judged and acted is no longer thought to be credible"⁴¹.

MacIntyre's uniqueness of style lies in his capacity to discuss the crisis of modernity on the bases of both historical and philosophical levels. Also, MacIntyre in *After Virtue* bases his analysis upon a study of what he terms as the failure of the Enlightenment project whose examination permits the study of the crisis of the individual and his demand for liberty on three planes: moral, social and political. MacIntyre's definition of the crisis permits the raising of questions regarding the implementation of 'instrumental

reason' within the social context, the role it plays in the constitution and interpretation of modern thinking, and the possibilities that are left for the resolution of modern socio-political problems. It is in this sense that MacIntyre's work has been chosen to demonstrate the problem of modern thought. Also, it is this that differentiates him from the other modern authors to whose definition of the crisis we now turn.

Modernity, Reason or Unreason?

The crisis of modernity as the crisis of reason has acquired several interpretations by modern socio-political thinkers. While Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer perceive it as the natural outgrowth of an 'irrationalist' evolution of modern capitalism, Habermas conceives it as the 'potential' for the 're-enchantment' of the modern man. This antinomy of vision lies partially in the authors' view of historicity, as well as in the method of analysis. The members of the Frankfurt School have a tendency to view the modern world in contrast to the world of the ancient Greeks, hence in comparing modern instrumental reason to classical teleological reason. Such analyses hold within their fold a conception of history that is regressive in character; for in such analyses modern society is seen as the product of devolution rather than evolution. Habermas on the other hand, has adopted a Hegelian vision of history where society and humanity in general are seen to evolve in a spiral fashion towards the realisation of a higher stage of rational consciousness which is infinitely superior to all prior rationality attained in history. This very distinction of historical views is important to the present enterprise; for as MacIntyre's analyses tend to join in their conception of history those implied in the work of the members of the Frankfurt School, the very solution he reaches will be shown to

have fallen in the very category of the view of regressive historicity, a solution which carries within its composition notes of pessimism whose negation lies in the realm of the superhuman. This, however, does not imply that the analyses made by Habermas provide a more fruitful solution; they simply signify the zeal to define and deal with modern problems through the use of classical critiques and the assets of modern reason. It is Habermas' attempt to use classical sources while meaning to go *beyond* their given scope of analysis which is considered as insightful. This, it should be emphasised, does in no way discredit the value and extent of the Frankfurt School's contribution to the knowledge of the contradictions which are shown to reside in modern western societies. The object of this section is twofold: first, it aims to provide a brief discussion of some of the most prominent studies made on the crisis of modernity. Second, it aims to provide an alternative assessment of the crisis, one which is not purely dependent on a definition of the crisis as the eclipse of teleological reason. This alternative is suggested in the theory of communicative action found in the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas.

In *Culture et société* Marcuse took on the analysis of the significance of industrialisation and capitalism in the work of Max Weber. In a short article⁴², Marcuse attempted to point out the following concepts: First, that contrary to Weber's claim as to the neutrality of science, science itself through its practical application acquires necessarily values that are foreign to it which come to be expressed in other fields (economy, bureaucracy, politics, ...etc). However, that in its formal conception, modern reason may not judge the question of ideal-being allows the question of what 'ought' to be to fall into 'irrationalism'. Second, that western instrumental reason which lies at the heart of the capitalist industrial system is responsible for the development of a certain type

of domination: total mechanical and mechanising bureaucracy. The idea of modern reason as mechanical is the notion which founds and invades all. Third, that capitalist rationality is abstract in character. This "abstract" rationality is concrete when it becomes "domination", calculated and calculable, a domination over nature and man.

While in the Congress of *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in 1909, Weber made a definite distinction between 'Is' and 'Ought' where he exclaimed science's power to speak of the nature of 'being' rather than of what 'Ought' to be. On the latter subject Weber claimed that in the question of the distinction between 'Ought' and 'Is', "ce n'est pas que je sous-estime le premier (le devoir-être), mais bien l'inverse: c'est que je ne puis accepter que des problèmes d'une portée universelle, aux implications immenses, des problèmes qui, en un certain sens, comptent parmi les plus graves qui puissent émouvoir un cœur humain, soient transformés ici en une question de technique économique, une «question de productivité», ..."⁴³. Here Weber defines the very nature of modern reason as calculating and technical in character and that in its very nature it may not englobe questions of a universal impact. For Weber, scientific data may not, for they cannot, form values for the "devoir-être". This distinction is seen by Marcuse to contain two counter-effects. On the one hand, by stating the incapability of science to deal with values allows the latter to be also dissociated from the qualification of reason, hence allowing it to fall into irrationalism; on the other hand, it also presupposes the high development of the modern industrial system through modern mechanical reason toward an unidentified social 'end' which has the merit of rendering the very function of the capitalist system irrational in character. The latter point demands further explanation.

For Marcuse there occurs necessarily in Weber's analysis the possibility for science to adopt a "value" which is universal in character. To prove this he gives an example where political economy became the servant of the expansionist policies of the "Politique de force nationale"⁴⁴ which denies science's claim for value-neutrality. The very value that is invested in modern reason may not, in the same instant, be subjected to the criteria of scientific testing, due to the latter's claim to value neutrality. Science is seen to acquire such values in practice rather than in theory; the political economy is rationally conceived to serve as a simple process of material production, however it acquires its value of an aide to expansionist policies when looked at in terms of its practical application. Likewise, the theory of bureaucratic organisation in its theoretical conception tends towards efficient management, whereas in practice it acts as an instrument of "domination" which in its mechanical nature tends towards the dehumanisation and domination of man. Bureaucracy is technical reason applied to socio-political organisation; it can produce and transform raw materials (nature and man), where this transformation is the object of a scientific and methodical machine whose rationality organises things and men.

According to Marcuse, whether in the capitalist industrial system, or in the organised hierarchy of the bureaucratic machine, or more precisely, whether in the case of material domination over men, or domination of man over man, the irrationalism of the modern society remains apparant. Formal rationality becomes irrationalist in its very lack of a decisive 'end' which is aimed at in and for itself. In becoming a theory of domination, formal rationality is subordinated, due to its internal mechanistic rationality, to a different rationality, that of domination. In the extent that it does not surpass its norm of

calculation and its preoccupation with facts and figures, it becomes determined "de l'extérieure" by something other than itself, it becomes a simple expression of the "matérielle". In this sense formal reason as the instrument of domination is the management of technical knowledge and becomes the reification of reason, or as Marcuse calls it "la réification-comme raison -, l'apothéose de la réification"⁴⁵. However, this very finality is self-repudiating for the very instrument that dictates to it its objective function is also an instrument, a means, and there exists no means "in itself". For in the capitalist system it is not merely the satisfaction of needs that is aimed at in the final instant, but as expressed in Weber's analysis there is more than the mere object of satisfaction that underlies the activity of the capitalist economic system; the ulterior motive is seen to reside in the concept of profit.

Marcuse sees the very ruling of political, industrial or bureaucratic systems as irrational in character, in the sense where the functioning of these systems is reduced to the mere execution of mechanical and calculable processes. Here Marcuse is directly attacking the very separation of fact from value, where the systems that affect in a direct manner the lives and thoughts of men are subordinated to the realm of fact and excluded from any value content. Through the use of "charismatic" leaders of the bureaucratic machine, men in the "democratic" system are allowed to have the false feeling of liberty by desposing of certain leaders and voting for their replacement. Their freedom is a sham, for the very structure of the bureaucracy, its system of domination which is in itself irrational in character, is not altered through the replacement of political leaders. Bureaucracy is a machine that is oblivious to its temporary driver. The type of democracy that is organised through such a machine is of a character that Weber calls "Plébiscitaire" or plebian which is "l'expression de l'irrationalité devenue raison"⁴⁶.

In view of the analysis of the irrationalism of the modern society, Marcuse suggests that although the technicality of the system is needed for the progress of economic satisfaction, the processes of mechanisation need not rule the thought of man. Marcuse sees the possibility of the appearance of a new rationality that is qualitatively different from the one presently adopted. This new rationality exercised by free men does not necessitate the presence of the antinomy between formal and material rationality. Due to the lack of the neutrality of "the machine" there must appear a new rationality that is capable of shaping the finality of the driver. Hence, in Horkheimer's own terms, the "machine" will be retrieved by the driver it temporarily disposed of, reified.

Horkheimer and Adorno⁴⁷ are also aware of the irrationalism of formalised reason. In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* they stated that "pure reason became 'unreason, a faultless and insubstantial mode of procedure". It is also apparent to them that the crisis of modern culture is primarily associated with the mechanisation of reason, where the latter is seen as "the organ of calculation, of planning; it [reason] is neutral in regard to ends; its element is coordination"⁴⁸. Following a similar pattern of analysis as cited in Marcuse's work, Horkheimer and Adorno view the development of reason as revealing an organisation of life as a whole which is deprived of any substantial goal. The lack of purpose or goal resides in the fact that organisation of a certain pursuit supercedes in principle the value of its very outcome. Unlike Marcuse, their analyses concentrate on the effect of this reification of reason on the quality of socio-political and cultural life.

Both authors hold that the "instrumentalisation of reason" endangers the very quality

of reason as an instrument. The quality of reflection without a marked end, is seen to reduce the very sharpness of this reflective faculty. Horkheimer for instance, views the very separation of intellectual labour from manual labour as an assault on the value of humanity as a complete social and biological entity. Moreover, through the mechanisation of reason, even subjective reason loses "all spontaneity, productivity, power to discover and assert new kinds of content - it loses its very subjectivity"⁴⁹. This type of degeneration in the realm of social evolution is seen to ~~be~~ parallel to the tremendous upswing in the development of a substantial growth of the productive forces.

The formalisation or the mechanisation of reason has been deemed by both authors to guide the human intellect towards "stupidity". The latter is the necessary and immediate product of the 'leveling' of society, where all individuals are coaxed, through the demand of labour market, into the development of similar patterns of thought, as well as similar expectations. It is also "stupidity" in the very acceptance of irrationalist stereotyped ideas that are picked up and abandoned at the will of their charismatic leaders. The process of 'leveling' of reflective capacities, claim Horkheimer and Adorno, is used as an instrument of the imperialist state. The state succeeds in controlling its population by stripping it of any source of autonomous reflection; this is done through the making of the state as the ultimate arbiter⁵⁰. The concept of domination through bureaucracy is also common to the philosophy of Horkheimer and Adorno.

Resulting from the analysis of the Frankfurt School is a vision of modern reason as a process of calculating technique whose 'end' has been reduced to the material plane. Its very use culminates in the founding of the social 'end' on irrationality. Moreover, the

use of reason as means rather than an end, poses the problem of a marked increase in the "leveling of social conceptions" through the power of reifying social organisation which allows the perfection of the process of domination to take place. The application of formal rationality to the organisation of state bureaucracy assures the extension of the process of domination from the industrial sector, where man is subjected to matter, to the public sector where man is subjected to man through state mechanism. The present shift from teleological reason to instrumental reason is seen as a process through which the power of the individual is impoverished not only in his liberty on the public level⁵¹, but also the very realm of subjectivity of which boasts the modern man is also annihilated. Liberty, especially the essential liberty of reflection is stunted; the liberty to reflect has now become a thing of the past whose only recovery lies in the teaching of history⁵².

The Weberian conception of rationality proposing the distinction between matters of facts and matters of values, his notion of responsibility, and his quasi-existentialist understanding of ultimate value choices are seen by Albrecht Wellmer to "articulate the world-view of someone for whom it is a matter of moral authenticity and intellectual honesty to no longer look for objective meaning or ultimate values in the domain of empirical facts". According to Weber "the world objectively speaking, is devoid of meaning and of values, can only be claimed by somebody for whom the process of disenchantment is a process of disillusionment, i.e., a process of enlightenment"⁵³. Unlike the reaction this method of differentiation received from MacIntyre and members of the Frankfurt School, Habermas saw the process of enlightenment as having made salient strides in gains in freedom, autonomy and social rationality. Unlike Adorno and

Horkheimer who saw in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* the appearance of domination and lack of freedom, Habermas believes in the positive results arising from 'cultural differentiation' (that is the separation of the 'value spheres' of science, morality, art). Habermas' project consists in exploring ways in which the "unfulfilled project of modernity" can be realised through the institutionalisation of emancipatory learning processes which will increase the possibility of the existence of a rational society. This project is theoretically dependent on his attempt to construct a complete theory of rationality⁵⁴.

Habermas' construction of a critical theory is primarily intertwined with the use of language in modern society. The importance of language lies in its power of transmitting knowledge through intersubjective communication. Analytical philosophy through its search to give foundations for knowledge gave a relativistic answer where the "finding of linguistic analysis (ideal or ordinary) is distorted by abstracting from the social dimension of our shared linguistic practices"⁵⁵. The abstractness of the "linguistic turn" seemed to Habermas to necessitate the existence of a "social turn", a project that lies at the heart of Habermas' work. Upon entering this project Habermas began to work on a new tradition which searched to question the limitations of the previous traditions, whether analytical or dialectical, materialist or historical.

Facing the analytic tradition's limitation, Habermas observed that the notion of 'social practice' was conceived as self-evident, a given on which inquiry was based. Following this observation Habermas took to explain the notion of 'social practice' by basing it upon a distinction between two categories: *labour* (purposive-rational action) and

interaction (communicative action). These categories originate in the distinction between *Techne* and *Praxis*, where *Techne* is the type of purposive action exhibited in making and fabricating (*Poesis*), and *Praxis* stated in Aristotelean terms, is *Lexis* (speech) a form of human interaction exhibited in intersubjective communication⁵⁶. Due to the importance of the understanding of 'social practice' as being inherent in both labour and language, Habermas asserts that the epistemological and systemic claims of philosophy have to be carried out as social theory. Moreover, in such a social theory philosophy must realise that its claim to an autonomous expression is, and always has been, distorted by social restraints and forms of social domination⁵⁷. It is in this sense that Habermas conceives of the "critical" side of his social theory. For Habermas, a critical social theory not only describes social reality, but also criticises it and looks for ways to alter it. Hence, the Habermasian theory underlies a "practical intent".

Within the context of modern debate on the fact-value separation, Habermas seems to be intent on avoiding two equally unacceptable alternatives. On the one hand he does not want to accept that the validity of fundamental norms is demonstrable through Horkheimer's "traditional theory", and on the other hand, he is equally opposed to the relativist contention claiming that these concepts are arbitrary, in the sense of being simply a product of convention or of biological adaptation. Although, according to Habermas, the validity of these principles may not be demonstrable in a completely compelling manner, he sees, nevertheless, 'good reasons' for their acceptance⁵⁸. It is in his latest work that Habermas attempts to develop a theory of "communicative rationality" which is to serve as a basis for a critique capable of providing a normative foundation for

critical theory. In this second sense, critical theory's function is also the reconstruction of the basic norms which guide it. Habermas' deepest intent in his account of communicative rationality lies originally, and in its purest form in its "important attempt to overcome the aporias of a theory of society with a practical intent"⁵⁹.

In his latest work Habermas, while developing a theory of communicative rationality, directed three major objections to current philosophical trends. Against the Marxist tradition, Habermas claims that the bourgeois forms of universalist morality and law cannot be considered as merely an ideological reflection of the capitalist mode of production. Despite of their emergence at the same time as the capitalist regime, they should be viewed also as being "expressive of an irreversible collective learning process which must be distinguished from science and technology". Here Habermas is indicating the importance of the content of social norms and social practice, thereby emphasising his distinction between labour and interaction. This same distinction is evident in his criticism of Weber where he states that the emergence of universalist morality and legal conceptions, and human rights, "represents a type of rationalisation process which has to be categorically distinguished from rationalisation in the sense of formal and bureaucratic rationalisation".

On the political organisational levels, as well as on the claim of irrationalism directed by the members of the Frankfurt School, Habermas states that the essential idea of a rational organisation of society, hence an organisation of society which is based upon free agreement among its members, is, although distorted, already in existence within the democratic institutions, the systems of legitimacy and the "self-interpretations" of modern

industrial societies. According to Habermas "for this reason alone a critical analysis of modern societies can share a common normative ground with its object of analysis and can assume the form of an *immanent* critique"⁶⁰.

In his theory of communicative rationality Habermas makes the distinction between Social Integration and Systemic Integration. The first operates through the *coordination* of action *orientations* of individuals in society; the second operates through the "steering media" like money and power *independently* of the action orientations of individuals⁶¹. Habermas claims that only in the modern world is real life separated from the world life; thus creating a "decentering of world conceptions" which equals Weber's "disenchantment of the world", the latter existing due to the differentiation of legality from morality which became evident after the rationalisation and the institutionalisation of economic and administrative systems. The latter process brought into existence the separation between formal law from the sphere of moral discourse and moral orientation. According to Habermas, in the modern world there is a connection between "system" and "life-world" which is achieved in the interdependence of both forms of integration. Habermas sees the forms of systemic integration as necessary for the simplification of the problems of social integration; communicative action is not an adequate mechanism of "action coordination" so as to be able to carry the whole process of integration on its own in modern western society. It is for this reason that systemic integration needs to be institutionalised, for in its very nature "it *presupposes* forms of social integration and legitimization of basic laws and institutions"⁶². This basic form of interdependence between the two systems of integration will result in the free association of producers in

the fully rationalised life-world. The full rationalisation of the life-world does not imply a complete reconciliation between formal and moral laws, but it indicates a "readjustment" of the laws to comply with moral and normative judgements. It is in Habermas' opinion that the autonomous character of systemic rationalisation which separated it from normative constraint embodied in the life-world allowing it to "instrumentalize the life-world and threaten to destroy it"⁶³.

In the above discussion I have attempted to provide a sketch of the most prominent characterisation of the crisis of modernity. The object of the exposition consists in demonstrating the reality of the crisis, as well as the divergent approaches and solutions that are available. It should be noted that despite of the diversity of analyses the crisis as that of reason and rationality and its implications upon the socio-political level are invariably prominent. The choice of MacIntyre's work as the object of discussion does not reside solely in the above mentioned elements; rather it resides primarily in his analytical development of the case for the crisis of modernity as based on not merely the crisis of reason, but also on the crisis of man. The above cited authors (apart from Horkheimer who provided a short discussion on human subjectivity in the *Eclipse of Reason*) do not treat the crisis of modernity as a crisis of humanity as such, but more as a crisis of critical theory. It is to a further study of MacIntyre's theory of the crisis of modernity that the next chapter tends to expound.

NOTES

1. Max Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason*, (New York: Continuum, 1974), p. 128
2. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: Unwin, 1946), p. 523
3. Ibid., p. 516-523
4. This systematic exposition of the elements of Scientific Method has been largely taken from Arnold Brecht's *Political Theory*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University press, 1967), Chapters I-II.
5. Ibid., p. 31.
6. For further reference on the nature of scientific method, consult Brecht *ibid.*
7. Ibid., p. 33
8. See, e.g. in John Dewey, *Logic*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1938), p. 139; and A. Brecht, *ibid.*, p. 33
9. Brecht, *ibid.*, p. 49
10. Ibid., p. 53
11. William Buchanan, *Understanding Political Variables*, (New York: Scribner, 1969), p. 6
12. P.D. Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1971), p. 173-4
13. Buchanan, *ibid.*, p. 20
14. Brecht, *ibid.*, pp. 98-107
15. Ibid., pp. 106 and 113-114
16. Ibid., p. 117-118
17. Ibid., p. 124
18. Max Weber, *From Max Weber*, (New York: Oxford U.P., 1970), p. 79-80
19. Weber, *ibid.*, p. 229-230
20. For a full discussion by Weber consult *From Max Weber*, *ibid.*, Section VIII "Bureaucracy and Law" p. 216-221
21. Weber, *ibid.*, p. 199
22. Ibid., p. 215-216
23. Ibid., p. 216-17
24. Ibid., p. 239
25. Ibid., p. 230
26. G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers, (London: Unwin and Allan, 1966), Vol II., p. 374
27. Ibid., p. 376-77
28. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, *ibid.*, p. 6-7
29. Ernest Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, (London: Dover Pub., 1977) p. 218-236
30. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, (London: Duckworth, 1981), p. 139
31. Ibid., p. 6-7
32. Ibid., p. 10-11
33. Ibid., p. 11
34. Ibid., p. 11
35. Ibid., p. 12

36. Ibid., p. 13
37. Ibid., p. 28
38. Ibid., p. 15
39. Ibid., p. 22-25
40. For further discussion on the loss of traditional sovereignty of the individual and the nature of his 'false liberty' consult MacIntyre's *Short History of Ethics* (1966), and *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, (1971). A treatment of this subject will be done in chapter II below.
41. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, ibid., p. 32
42. Herbert Marcuse, *Culture et société*, trans. by Billy, Bresson and Grasset, (Paris: Edition Minuit, 1970), p. 274-293
43. Ibid., p. 272. "it is not that I underestimate the first [what ought to be], but on the contrary: it is that I cannot accept that problems of a universal impact, of immense implications, problems that, in a certain sense, are considered among the most important which are capable of moving the human heart, be transformed into a question of economic technique, a «question of productivity»,....".
44. Ibid., p. 272-73
45. Ibid., p. 283, 285
46. Ibid., p. 286. For further reading on Marcuse's view of irrationalism in modern society consult H. Marcuse, *Negations*, (Beacon Press, 1968) article on "The struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State", p. 3-42.
47. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, (New York: Continuum, 1987); also see Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, ibid, and Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, (1967)
48. Ibid., p. 90, 88
49. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, ibid., p. 55
50. Francavilla has been quoted to state "take its god from the people that you wish to subjugate, and then demoralize it; so long as it worships no other god than you, and has no other morals than your morals, you will always be its master...allow it in return the most extreme criminal license; punish it only when it turns upon you". *Histoire de Juliette* (Holland, 1797), Vol. V., p. 324. Also quoted in Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., p. 89.
51. Consult B. Constant, *De la Liberté des Anciens*, (Paris: Éd. Seuil, 1967).
52. In the *Phenomenology of the Mind*, Hegel states: "the struggle is too late; and every means taken merely makes the disease worse; for the disease has seized the marrow of spiritual life, viz., consciousness in its ultimate principle [begriff], or its pure inmost nature itself. There is therefore no power left in conscious life to surmount the disease... It is then the memory alone that still preserves the dead form of the spirit's previous state, as a vanished history, vanished men know not how..." trans. C.V. Dedeck, (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1981), p. 564-5.
53. Richard Bernstein, ed., *Habermas and Modernity*, (Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), selected articles, p. 42.
54. Rick Roderick, *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 20-21
55. Ibid., p. 6
56. Bernstein, ibid., p. 9
57. T. McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas*, (Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 165
58. Joel Whitebook, The Problem of Nature, in Habermas, *Telos*, vol. 40 (1979), p. 48

59. Roderick, *ibid.*, p. 12
60. Bernstein, *ibid.*, p. 51-52
61. *Ibid.*, p. 54
62. *Ibid.*, p. 55
63. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

Chapter Two: The Enlightenment And MacIntyre's Project

In *After Virtue* MacIntyre suggests that the crisis of modern morality and the roots of emotivism stem from the project undertaken in the philosophy of the Enlightenment to render morality subjective. This project is seen by MacIntyre to have given rise to two main problems: First, the individual moral agent, freed from social hierarchy and teleology, came to conceive of himself as sovereign in his moral authority. Second, the inherited and partially transformed rules of morality have now been left without a social setting wherein they could exercise their teleological character, and have now to be found some new status and function. In order to understand the historical and social factors underlying the coming into being of the Enlightenment project, it is best to quickly sketch an outline of the spirit of the age.

The Enlightenment is the period representing a complex of dynamic dialectical tensions in the socio-political matrix of the eighteenth century. The matrix included, among other elements, an increased tension of conflicting class interests, questions on the role and behaviour of political and ecclesiastical authority, religious and moral convictions, the rise in the importance of science due to the results of its significant progress, challenge to values, a change in the views of history, the appearance of new economic theories, conflicting views as to the nature of man, and over all political dissatisfaction. Major eighteenth century tensions centered around a proverbial tug-of-war between the role of nature and culture, individual and community, traditionalism and anarchy.

The Enlightenment's most noted historical development resides in the work of the

French *philosophes*. Although found frequently in constant conflict amongst themselves, they, nevertheless, had much in common. The author of the article *Philosophe* in the *Encyclopédie* defined a *philosophe* as one who "trampling on prejudice, tradition, universal consent, authority, in a word all that enslaves most minds, dares to think for himself, to go back and search for the clearest general principles, to admit nothing except on the testimony of his experience and his reason"¹. The *philosophes* were in general the fighters for the new spirit of reason whose primary objective lay in the achievement of social, economic and political progress. The notion of progress took on many forms: Among these were the conviction that an improvement in society can improve the quality of human life, and that this improvement is particularly dependent of the influence of the enlightened group on public opinion. Their ideas were mainly based upon a rejection of religious considerations and an emphasis on individualistic and critical spirit. In spite of their varying degrees in religious belief, the *philosophes* made a distinct separation between every day social existence and the role of the church. This separation relegated the authority of the church to the "salvation of souls", and not to the social, political or economic conduct of society. The concerns of the latter fields lay in the hands of critical reason whose judgement and efficiency ensured the progress of human affairs. Religious organisations were perceived as secular interest groups whose only concerns lay in the attainment of their own benefits. The critique of the religious organisation brought in its wake a complete rejection of religious beliefs thereby promoting atheistic and materialistic tendencies. Almost all movements by the *philosophes*, expressed in secularism or in humanism, advanced the conviction that, above all else, man is to be the ruler of his own life on earth and that he must act in a manner that would enlarge his control over it.

The concerns depicted in the Enlightenment are not, and cannot be seen as the mere

product of a century's reflection; rather they must be seen as the product of a gradually formed state of mind whose ancestors can be traced throughout history. The dynamic tensions that characterise the Enlightenment can be traced with relative ease to the Renaissance period. The latter signifying "rebirth", or more precisely the "birth" of modern man which expressed in its wake the earlier demand of the individual to an autonomous existence. When the *philosophes* asserted the demand for individual autonomy, they were merely formulating a louder, more emphatic cry of the demand of the Renaissance man, a demand for liberty. The reaction against the control of individual thought by the church found to lie at the origin of seventeenth century freethinking (*libertin*) movement would not have been possible to voice by Renaissance writers such as Pico Della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino; but their views on the nature of man and its importance "as the center of the world and the universe" made this freethinking movement possible centuries later. It was movements such as the Protestant Reformation, an outcome of diverse socio-political and cultural tensions marking the decay of Catholicism, which was responsible for the decline of the hegemonic power of the Roman Church and which expressed the growing public contempt of the clergy and church organisation. The degeneration of the latter diminished to a great extent the belief in the truth of the divine scripture which in turn gave rise to the development of hedonistic tendencies.

Religious conflicts and the development of diverse conflicting groups of fundamentalists, such as the Jansenists and Jesuits in France emphasised in the mind of many Frenchmen God's incomprehensibility in human terms which tended to abolish his *absolute* goodness. The religious disputes which were described in great skill by Pascal in *Lettres Provinciales* (1656-57), were made the object of public discussions wherein the

public would discredit both parties. These disputes expanded in sphere to enter political affairs in the eighteenth century².

Faced with such social disintegration the intellectual development of the age turned towards the establishing of an ideology which would prove more effective and less domineering than religious dogma. This philosophy came to be expressed in the Cartesian Meditations. Despite the objections it raised, Descartes' method- rationalistic deduction from 'clear ideas' and the basing of truth upon critical reasoning - became the guide of French intellectuals. Represented in the Cartesian spirit was the doubting of all traditionally entrenched knowledge in favour of the individual mind wherein man was to find the criterion of certitude. All knowable experience had to be reduced to mechanical steps, and later into mathematics, hence, to measurables. The world and nature were considered a machine that was indirectly built by God, but which functioned on basic mechanical principles. All living beings, including animals and men were also seen as machines, but of a more complex kind. Men were merely distinguished from animals by the presence of a soul. It was through the Cartesian method that the new reason, calculating and calculable, came to be applied to nature, men, and all other forms of existence, whether social, economic or political in nature. The application of this method came to be widely used not merely in the realm of science, but also in establishing the truth of religious divinity. The latter, based upon spiritual revelation, became totally discredited; its very being and the values it stood for were put into question. In the eighteenth century the divine truth came to be subordinated to individualist, scientific truth.

Although it was Descartes who first introduced the application of the Scientific

Method, it was not until Newton succeeded in his theory of universal gravitation (*Principia Mathematica*, 1687) that an acceptance of the view of the universe as a machine became widely acclaimed. The realisation made the idea of applying universal laws to social and political problems, for nature and for humanity more and more real. The latter possibility emphasised the need for an interaction between intellectual developments and scientific progress since the latter's applicability depended upon the transformations in the former. These transformations consisted of such changes as the dismantling of traditional notion of the cosmos, the application of mathematics (geometry) to space, and the invention of higher mathematics. Thinkers of the Enlightenment came to cite the advance of science as the main argument against the reestablishment of the philosophy of the ancients. This debate amounted to the distinction between happiness and unhappiness- the former being the result of the progress of science and technology affecting all facets of human experience. This involved the change in governments, laws, education, economic and social structure. Scientific Method became the bible for the "faith of the Enlightenment"³; whereas unhappiness signified the lack of such progress.

The claim made by the Enlightenment thinkers as to the positive product of the application of Scientific Method and reason to the social world came up against an intellectual impasse, that of morality and politics. In the sphere of moral values the eighteenth century encountered its deepest intellectual crisis. Based upon authoritarian and supernatural grounds, moral values came to be put in question since their validity was not easily expressed in terms of modern reason. Seventeenth and eighteenth century studies of human nature made continuous adherence to traditional moral values questionable. Effective works made by Restif and Laclos⁴ emphasised the evil tendencies in the essential nature of man.

Eighteenth century thinkers struggled with the definition of concepts such as "virtue," "pleasure," and the "good" bringing into direct conflict the traditional views and the newly acquired knowledge of human nature. It was not until the appearance of the work of David Hume that the impossibility of rationally justifying morality in terms that would convince the individual of their validity became known. This demonstration coupled with Rousseau's critique of the society which he described as essentially immoral underneath a hypocritical guise gave rise to a great deal of scepticism as to the validity of the moral virtues maintained in society and in the scriptures.

Directly linked to the problem of morality was the question of politics and government. The relationship between morality and politics resided in the on-going relationship between individual and society. Both psychological and political concepts of the time made a claim as to the dependence of man's development of his social consciousness of the government, law and education. Ensuing from the conflicts of morality there appeared two conflicting views on politics. On the one hand, there was the demand that the social laws be identical to the nature of man, hence in the name of pleasure seeking; or on the other hand, that the state should shape and mold the individual's behaviour to coincide with its own demands. The Enlightenment signifies the invention of various political theories that reflected the given writer's view of human nature; each writer based his moral and political theory on his own conception of the quality of human nature, on the kind of life man was destined to live, and on man's place in the "creation".

The incapacity of the Enlightenment thinkers to solve the problem of morality and

politics is seen by modern writers, in this particular work by MacIntyre, to have developed into a more chronic social disease, a deep crisis of which modern western societies remain to suffer. In a series of articles and books MacIntyre's deep interest in the problem of modern morality can be easily traced. In *A Short History of Ethics* (1966) he presents a superb discussion of the changes which occurred in the use of ethical language together with an account of their corresponding stages in social evolution. The account of the latter culminated in the exposition of several modern theories of ethics of which MacIntyre selected the moral theory of emotivism as the representative of modern morality, and which he discusses in greater detail in his latest book *After Virtue* (1981). It is in this publication that he explicitly formulates his theory on the decline of social morality and presents a theoretical solution to the crisis of modernity.

The present chapter will outline the philosophical bases of MacIntyre's argument concerning the failure of the "Enlightenment project". According to MacIntyre the failure of the Enlightenment thinkers to bridge the gulf between 'Is' and 'Ought' is due to their application of instrumental reason, or Scientific Method's rationality to the solution of the problem on the one hand, and to their attachment to the individualist theory on the other. Further theoretical elements are brought forth through a comparative study of MacIntyre's and Hegel's conceptions of history, subjectivity and freedom. Finally, a presentation of MacIntyre's solution for the crisis of modernity, as well as its ensuing implications on the nature of man and society will be made.

Basic Elements In MacIntyre's Philosophy

MacIntyre's analysis of modern moral philosophy has its foundations in *A Short*

History of Ethics. In his first book, MacIntyre sets the grounds for the development of his argument in *After Virtue* allowing him to characterise the crisis of modern morality, give explanations for its development, and propose a possible solution. In the 'History of Ethics' MacIntyre defines several elements pertaining to the nature of morality whose breakdown due to transitions from one social formation to another causes a distortion in their use through an alteration of their meaning. A primary example of this is stated in the definition of *agathos* or the *good* in the Homeric society, and its later interpretation in the Greek city state. In the former, *agathos* defines the social role of a Homeric nobleman normally referring to the latter's courage, skilfulness and success in war and peace. The transition from the pre-classical to the classical Greek culture is shown to bring with it a distortion in the use of traditional terms. *Agathos* no longer expresses the quality and social role of its owner, rather it has come to mean 'nobleborn'⁵. This deprives *agathos* of its reference to the quality of *actions* of its owner. In this sense *agathos* may be referring to anyone who is born of a noble family, whether courageous or cowardly, skilful or clumsy, successful or failing. Similarly, the notion of *virtue* has also been altered. In the Homeric society, the man who is capable of executing his social function correctly has *virtue*; whereas in the classical sense, *virtue* now denotes not the qualities that permit the execution of a function, rather it denotes certain human qualities that have no relation to the function in question. *Virtue* has become a personal quality, one which resembles our modern definition of a moral quality. It is MacIntyre's contention that modern language - and also to a large extent the practice of morality - is suffering from 'a grave disorder' arising from "the prevailing power of an idiom in which ill-assorted conceptual fragments from various parts of our past are deployed together in private and public debates which are notable chiefly for the unresolvable character of the controversies thus carried on and the apparent arbitrariness of each of the contending parties"⁶. This

also ties in with his definition of the emotivist tradition discussed above. The very nature of emotivism reflects the distortion in meaning, the diversity of use and the historical view of moral expressions in modern society.

The breakdown of the social formation causes in the same process the seeping of distortions in the meaning of evaluative predicates. This radical change gives rise to the need to find new social definitions of the human virtues. The uses of words such as *agathos*, *virtue*, and *justice* become unstable thereby raising doubt as to the nature of these very expressions. According to MacIntyre, the distortions appear as a result of the breakdown of the 'single moral order'⁷ in which all moral expressions have a specific meaning. The breakdown occurs due to the moral expressions' dependence on the structure of the social formation itself. There is a narrow, identical relationship between the social role and moral expressions necessitates the appearance of distortions of meaning as the very structure of society collapses. In such a society, it is not the individual who imparts through an act of personal judgement evaluative expressions, for the latter do not reside in humanity as such but are normally generated by society to approve or condemn individual actions portrayed in their specific social roles. A breakdown of this society causes inevitable weakening of the moral expressions transmitted through history.

The above analysis reveals MacIntyre's attachment to an Aristotelean view of society. For Aristotle the polis is not only the primary unit of society, it is also prior in nature to the individual. In this respect Aristotle states: "that the whole is necessarily prior (in nature) to the part" thereby expressing the predominance of the social to the individual. This also appears in his qualification of the pursuit of ethical life. On this subject he states:

True, the end of the individual is the same [in kind] as that of the political community, [and from that point of view we might also say that the end of the individual is the Good of man]; but, even so, the end of the political community is [in degree] a greater thing to attain and maintain, and a thing more ultimate, than the end of the individual⁸.

In the *Ethics* Aristotle is noted to have subordinated ethics to politics, this is seen by Barker not to mean for one moment "that political 'raison d'état' can over bear ethics, but only that 'community ethics' (the ethics of a political community living under a constitution which enshrines 'a way of life') is a higher stage in the march of human development than 'individual ethics'"⁹. In the Aristotelean philosophy the 'political community' is also the 'ethical community' in which the individual is but a functioning part, a social role whose fulfillment acts as the determining factor of the moral expressions associated with its actor.

The breakdown and disintegration of the social order gives rise not merely to distortions in meaning of moral expressions that are held by the society in general, but also, it gives rise to relativistic interpretations. The theory of subjective relativism is not seen to be the product of modern reason, but has its equivalent in the philosophy of the Sophists. MacIntyre makes a distinct - although implicit - parallel between the relativism of the Sophists and the modern emotivist tradition¹⁰. The Sophists' philosophy attempts to answer two specific needs: the establishing of a coherent set of definitions to the moral vocabulary, and of explaining the principles of a good life in the city-state. Their education has a direct and specific objective that of defining the elements needed for the establishment of a successful career in the city-state. The need for the establishment of a

moral vocabulary is necessary for the accomplishment of their enterprise, for in the classical city-state politics and ethics are intertwined. Hence, for Protagoras, the man who has *virtue* is the man who is successful in public city life. To acquire *virtue* or success he must learn *Techne*, the craft, or skill of public oration in order for him to mold his hearers successfully.

The Sophists' relativism emerged in their establishment of a theory of knowledge which is based on perception. Protagoras' statement that "man is the measure of all things; of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not,"¹¹ has been interpreted by Plato to mean that the notion of truth is based upon the perception of each individual percipient. In this sense, the 'truth' can have as many meanings as there are men. The state of 'being' also falls in question. There are no criteria for 'being hot' or 'being cold', there is only the truth that each person perceives. Reality of the condition and nature of things becomes also questionable. The theory of relativism falls in direct opposition with the Homeric type society, where all is ordered and given a function which is also qualified according to a specific norm.

If the concept of truth suffers from the evaluation of each man, then it would suffer even more when comparing one state's constitution and laws to another. The dilemma within which every individual finds himself immersed pertains to finding the answers as to which state must one belong, and to what rules must one adhere? The questions What am I to believe? How do I live? do not simply concern the followers of the Sophists, but they are also questions that are posed directly or indirectly by modern social individuals. Having lost faith in the conventions (whether religious or cultural) these modern men are advised by a complete philosophical tradition to act in accordance with nature; to act

according to their natural inclinations. The latter are readily supplied by these aspiring philosophers, and the modern dilemma is settled, right? MacIntyre answers 'no'. The reason lies in the distinction one makes between nature and convention. A man who lives according to the rules of society is a man of convention. Whereas a man who acts according to his own precepts in or out of a state is a man of nature. When evaluated in moral terms, the latter is considered as nonmoral and premoral. Such as this premoral or presocial man is evaluated whether in philosophical inquiries of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, or in the Sophist tradition, the presocial or premoral attitude appears primary, and the nature of the social man is secondary. In the Greek version of the natural man, Plato demonstrates (through Thrasymachus) that this premoral and presocial man is not the child of nature, but rather is the very definition of the Homeric hero¹².

According to this MacIntyre claims that the very definition of the natural man, whether in Greek or liberal philosophy, does not refer to man in a state of savage nature, but it merely indicates the nature of a man that comes from an earlier age. The reason for which he is considered 'natural' resides in the fact that he represents a set of moral expressions which are no longer valued in society. The actions which were considered as brave, courageous and skilful come to be described in the new society as brutal, aggressive and selfish.

In establishing this distinction MacIntyre succeeds in making two main points. First, that the relativist tradition has succeeded, through its theory of subjective knowledge, to render incoherent the theory of the natural man. It does so in failing to distinguish between the concept of man who stands outside society and is able to question its conventions, and the concept of the man who stands outside the society, hence, an

a-social man. The failure to make such a distinction gives rise to an error in the establishment of a coherent identity of the natural man (hence of the man who does not belong to a society). The latter having been evaluated according to what classical society thought of the moral qualities of the Homeric hero (hence, aggressivity, brutishness and selfishness) has come to be associated with a psychological makeup that is simple to define: he has one object in mind, and it is narrowly defined. To achieve it he will follow the rules of the convention and use the mastery of *techne* for its accomplishment. Hence, it is according to this psychological insight of the Sophists in the nature of man that their education is based. The second point made by MacIntyre consists in the very parallelism the first point has with the psychological nature of the "natural man" of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant. Although he does not explicitly state it, MacIntyre resolves to demonstrate the erroneous results of the attempt to base theories of political and sociological intent on a formulation of a subjective theory of the "natural man".

The relativism of the Sophists gives rise to questions as to the nature of knowledge. According to Socrates "virtue is knowledge"¹³. The knowledge which constitutes virtue does not simply indicate the knowledge of what is and what is not - it is hence not the Sophists' *techne* -, rather it is the ability to recognise relevant distinctions and a capacity to act. In this sense Socrates joins both *virtue* and *techne* among which he does not allow any distinctions. For Socrates no one who is the possessor of knowledge acts contrary to what he knows. Within this very virtue is a natural impulse to act upon what one believes is right. Aristotle objects to the Socratic theory of knowledge by suggesting that "the most important thing is not to know what it is, but how it arises; we do not wish to know what courage is, we wish to be courageous,"¹⁴ thereby making the distinction between knowledge and action. This brings to mind the Kantian theory of the

"categorical imperative" which claims that the development of a universal subjective consciousness renders it imperative that the man in possession of such consciousness must act upon it through the making of universal moral maxims; to this theory MacIntyre in *After Virtue* makes an Aristotelean objection¹⁵. It is both MacIntyre and Aristotle's contention that the mere knowledge of what is right and wrong remains subjective- which also indicates the inconsistency of its application - unless there appears a social authority capable of necessitating its enforcement. For MacIntyre the making of moral concepts cannot be done through a mere philosophical inquiry such as that of the Sophists, rather there must be "rules which could be taught and learned, rules which are socially established and socially shared"¹⁶ in order for the *meaning* of the moral expressions to be socially applicable. MacIntyre agrees with the Socratic employment of definitions for they suggest the search for objective standards of morality, and they also demonstrate the fact that in the Greek city state "moral usage has ceased to be clear and consistent"¹⁷.

The Project Of The Enlightenment

It is upon these basic philosophical analysis that MacIntyre constructs his study of the modern crisis of morality. In *After Virtue*, as well as in other earlier articles¹⁸ MacIntyre formulates a theory associating the total disintegration of a collective moral set of values with the Age of Enlightenment. MacIntyre contends that the project of the philosophers of the Enlightenment to render morality subjective has given rise to two specific -although interrelated- problems. On the one hand, the subjectivisation of morality emphasised the already present process of social breakdown. On the other hand, it helped mask

bureaucratic domination by giving the individual a false sense of liberty. For MacIntyre "individualist moral philosophers share in both the liberating and the constricting characteristics of bourgeois society. They represent both the genuine advance in human liberation which it represents and its specific form of human alienation". Individualist philosophy creates the latter condition due to its incapacity to develop a teleological theory of social existence. Its theory does not allow the bridging of the gap between the universal and the particular, nor can it consolidate the individual and his community. This dissociating effect of universal and particular, of individual and community is seen by MacIntyre to constitute the alienation of man from his own forms of social life by falsely objectifying their actions thereby endowing them with independent existence; they are equally convinced of being "free agents in areas of their life where the economic and social forms are in fact dictating the roles they live out". Both illusions, liberty and independence, contribute to man's "loss of the grasp of his own nature"¹⁹.

The Age of Enlightenment does not merely signify the rise in the value and status of science, but it also represents the onslaught of social class dissensions and the intellectual and scientific pursuit of the understanding of man through reason rather than through religious advocacy. Although this age characterised most of Europe, MacIntyre sees the elements of the 'project' to be mostly characteristic of northern Europe where the secularisation of Protestantism representing the change in belief, and hence the very stage at which a new set of definitions of moral expressions was in order. This is also accompanied by a shift in the status of the Latin language - which is very close in its interpretation of moral expressions to the Greek language - from being first to becoming second. MacIntyre's theory suggests that a breakdown in the coherence and unity of a set of moral expressions occurred with the development of the Protestant Reformation²⁰.

It is for this reason that he chooses Kierkegaard and Kant as the representatives of this age and prominent developers of the project.

Kierkegaard depicts the Crisis of the modern man to be primarily grounded in the latter's dissipation in the race and in society. Society for Kierkegaard is the ultimate cause for the alienation of man from his proper nature, reflective subjectivity. Man in modern society becomes a stranger to others and to himself. He is stricken with 'spiritlessness', selves become "mirages," "ghosts," "shadows," "living dead". "The man suffering from this condition is the "unhappiest man" who

*cannot become old, for he has never been young; he cannot become young, for he is already old. In one sense of the word he cannot die, for he has not really lived; in another sense he cannot live, for he is already dead. He cannot love, for love is in the present, and he has no present, no future, and no past; and yet he has a sympathetic nature, and he hates the world because he loves it. He has no passion, not because he is destitute of it, but because simultaneously he has the opposite passion. He has no time for anything, not because his time is taken up with something else, but because he has no time at all.*²¹

The social man is an entity with no purpose and no capacity to reflect; he is guided by forces that lie outside him and that constitute his life.

In the same work Kierkegaard presents a theory of ethical choice. The latter entails the possibility of a free choice between two distinct modes of life: aesthetic or moral. The reason lying behind this possibility of choice is the *freedom* to define one's subjectivity. For Kierkegaard the realisation of the self depends on subjective liberty; on this subject he states: "But what, then, is this self of mine: If I were to define this, my first answer would be: It is the most abstract of all things, and yet at the same time it is the most

concrete - *it is freedom*"²². This freedom of choice is seen by MacIntyre to be done so that the "principles which depict the ethical way of life are to be adopted *for no reason*, but for a choice that lies beyond reasons, just because it is the choice of what is to count for us as a reason"²³. The lack of the presence of an objective value, a purpose becomes prominent when attempting to answer MacIntyre's question: "How can that which we adopt for no reason have any authority over us?" or in other words, the act of choosing does not imply the presence of any criteria which acts as its reinforcer. The act of choosing is in itself subjective, thereby rendering its actual implementation on the social level questionable. Also, the very nature of the ethical choice - which is valued by Kierkegaard - signifies the limitation of choice between two distinct states of moral existence and behaviour, whereas Kierkegaard is suggesting that the *freedom* of the individual resides in the making of choices; however, these choices are in themselves limited in nature and in number. This incoherence in Kierkegaard's moral theory is seen by MacIntyre to reflect "a combination of novelty and tradition ... which is the logical outcome of the Enlightenment's project to provide a rational foundation for and justification of morality"²⁴. Kierkegaard's incoherence is an indicator of the earlier incoherences of Kant's moral theory. The latter is taken to be a "typical and supreme representative of the Enlightenment".

The Kantian enterprise is expressed in the reflection that "two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe ... *the starry heavens above and the moral law within*"²⁵. Put against the eighteenth century background of rising scientific progress and a hesitant, if not diverse, moral attitude of Protestantism, Kant's interests are ultimately connected with the proposition of a comprehensive system of the universe

in which the foundations of scientific knowledge and morality are guaranteed. Kant objects to the scepticism regarding morality's validity and sees it as residing in the seeking of basis for certainty where it cannot be found, namely in the content of experience²⁶. Kant's theory undertakes a complete study of the nature of thought in order to show how one is able to obtain certain knowledge of both scientific empirical facts and of moral laws.

The theory demonstrates by an analysis of what Kant came to call "categories of understanding" the guarantee of the universality of scientific knowledge. These categories are the forms of all possible knowledge and are not limited to a specific content. For example, it is the nature of the mind to think that every action is connected to a cause. The principle of causality, being one of the categories of understanding, does not come into being as a result of an experience, on the contrary it is its very existence that orders experiences causally. The certainty of the presence of causes of events is derived from the mind and not from experience. As experience explains the action, the mind explains to us what necessarily happened. These categories are "a-priori" in character such that they are not derived from experience. They are the necessary preconditions for empirical knowledge. Experience is not taken to be a mere passive reception of impressions; it involves the active grasping and understanding of perceptions, and without the 'a-priori' categories by means of which one orders and comprehends perception, it would be formless and meaningless. According to Kant, "concepts without perceptions are empty; perceptions without concepts are blind"²⁷.

Kant's theory of knowledge makes two important claims. First, because causal relations are formulated in the instant the categories are applied to experience, then

knowledge cannot be derived outside of the realm of experience. The realm of experience, or nature is devoid of any values that are not also shared in the categories. In this sense, nature becomes neutral, it is neither moral, nor does it presuppose in its phenomenal existence the image of a moral agent, or a God. The second characteristic is seen by MacIntyre to reside in Kant's indifferent attitude as to the affirmation of a basis for knowledge, such as one finds in the Cartesian meditations. Kant seems to take the mathematical knowledge and Newtonian mechanics for granted and inquires about the consistency of our concepts with them. This is also reflected in his moral theory. Kant, states MacIntyre, takes the existence of ordinary moral consciousness for granted²⁸, for he treats them as 'a-priori', a given.

While defining the theory of the universal moral imperative, Kant introduces the theory that the validity of a moral principle is based upon the a-priori principles of morality if it is to be binding on all men. In other words, that a universally binding moral principle must be based on an a-priori foundations. In Kant's view, moral consciousness is universally binding on all men, and that its presence is *necessary*; moral principles are valid for all rational beings. The certainty of such an a-priori cannot be studied through empirical science for the latter concentrates on data such as human desires and inclinations which vary from one individual to another. The universal principle is based upon the premise if all men are rational, morality is valid in rational beings, then all men are moral, or have the consciousness of this universal morality; what men need to apply it is the *will*. The validity of this premise is based upon a test of consistency as the fundamental principle of the moral law, or the categorical imperative: right actions are those which conform to principles one can consistently *will* to be principles for all men; wrong actions are those based upon maxims that a rational individual *could not will* that

all men should follow²⁹.

According to Kant, through the use of the categorical imperative men are capable of distinguishing between right and wrong actions. This is not merely based on the consistency test, but it is also a means for directing action and controlling behaviour. Its binding effect lies primarily in each man's recognition of its rational nature; it is man's consciousness of its rational binding principle that secures its existence. In the instant of its recognition all men need is the will to apply it. The fact that it is not applied daily does not deter Kant, for he claims that its validity is not solely based upon its daily use.

The will in the Kantian theory of ethics has a prominent position, for no other aspect, whether health, wealth, or intellect is "unconditionally good". The good will is not good because it achieves good results. Even if it were unable to attain the ends it seeks, it remains good in itself and has a higher worth than the superficial things gained by immoral actions. A good will, according to Kant is good " simply by virtue of the volition", that is, "it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of the sum total of all inclinations" ... Like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself³⁰.

The nature of the good will is primarily associated with the concept of duty: a good will is one which acts for the sake of duty. The value of moral actions consist in their conception as *duty*. Actions which give rise to good results are not praiseworthy if they do not occur in accordance with duty; in this instance they are not *moral* actions. For example, a man preserving his life in conformity to duty is acting *according to* duty, but

not *from* duty; whereas a man who preserves his life when it has become a burden, only because he feels that it is his duty to do so, is *morally* correct. This however, does not indicate that Kant claims that doing ones duty should be unpleasant, he is, rather making the distinction between the actual desire, or the actual expression of good will and the expression of ulterior motives. The efficacy of dutifulness is best discerned when it stands alone or in opposition to other motives. The extreme drudgery of the example given by Kant is not made to disapprove of ordinary human motives such as happiness, but to best illustrate his point.

Kant's first ethical proposition, then, is that a moral act must be done from duty in order for it to be morally praiseworthy. His second proposition is closely associated to the first: an act done from moral duty derives its worth, not from the results it produces but from the principle by which it is determined. It is hence based on "the *principle of volition* by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire"³¹. Both propositions allow Kant to give a definition of duty: "*duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law*". Hence the morally right action is executed solely in reverence of the law, and its unique and unconditioned worth is derived from it: "an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the *law*, and subjectively *pure respect* for this practical law,..."³². The nature of this very law consists in the test of consistency of the categorical imperative which involves the generalisation of maxims where one would remain attached to those which he *wills* to be universal and discard those which he could not will to be universally valid.

In his theory of morality, Kant establishes a complete distinction between the

categorical imperative and hypothetical imperatives. The former is an *unconditional* directive which prescribes actions to be done because of the moral worth of the maxim, and not for the sake of some other human inclination. The hypothetical imperative is a *conditional* directive which prescribes what ought to be done for the achievement of a desired end or purpose. For example, 'one ought not to murder as a matter of principle' is a categorical imperative, whereas 'if you want to avoid punishment, you ought not to kill' is a hypothetical imperative. MacIntyre argues that the Kantian version of categorical imperative does not and cannot provide a coherent basis for its utterance. When one utters a Kantian moral precept he states: "you ought to do such and such", "why?" "There is no reason. You just ought"³³. This utterance makes the distinction between a conditional and a non-conditional precept, but it does not express the universal character of morality, nor the universal character of the moral uttered. MacIntyre claims that this inconsistency in Kant's theory is present due to modern society's lack of a rational, objective criterion for deciding which of the moral precepts are valid moral imperatives. I on the other hand will suggest in section two of chapter three, that Kant is able to affirm that the categorical imperative is universal due to his belief that men are aware of their universal subjectivity. This subject will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three below.

Kant's moral theory presupposes that man utters his moral precept to himself, and is therefore in a position to accept or reject it. His obedience to the precepts he utters does not imply an obedience to any other being than himself. In this context neither society nor the teachings of God may decide the validity of a moral imperative, for the individual is put in a position where he can rationally decide for himself the moral to follow. His autonomy puts him in a position to judge by himself if what God commands is right.

The possibility to do so gives rise to the presence of a moral authority which is in no need of the instruction of a divine moral agent. In this sense a universal, objective criterion for morality cannot exist. Also, this subjectively imposed moral authority cannot exist in itself unaccompanied with another type of motivation for its application. A simple belief in the precept "love thy neighbour" may only exist within a social and religious context. In his discussion on practical reason, Kant presupposes the belief in God, freedom and immortality. God is capable of crowning virtue with happiness; however, since in the social life happiness is undetermined and cannot be associated with earthly virtue, immortality and the promise of happiness in the next life is required for the establishment of a motive for virtue. Freedom in this sense is a presupposition of the moral imperative, or the action of choice. The choice of the categorical imperative signifies a recognition of duty that is wholly separated from any existing social role or purpose.

According to MacIntyre, Kant's theory of the categorical imperative acts at least in two ways as a representative of the emerging individualist capitalist society. In the first instance, this theory renders the individual morally sovereign; it enables him to reject any outside moral authority. It leaves him with a set of moral precepts that are laws, and which act in a negative rather than a positive sense. Kant's laws indicate what man should not do, rather than what he should. The adoption of a moral law is taken by the subject to refrain him from falling prey to his immoral inclinations, but not to give him a specific 'end', a purpose for which he must act in a moral way. This type of morality does not promote social formation, it allows the leading of a life which is compatible with telling the truth, keeping promises, ...etc.

The second point stated by MacIntyre concerns the test of consistency. In Kant's

doctrine of the categorical imperative no indication is made as to when and why must one formulate a maxim and subject it to the test. In fact, Kant's theory appears to be dependent on an already existing morality from which man is to choose the maxims that appeal to him through the test of consistency; the validity of the maxim also depends in return on the fool proof method of the test. However, this test for MacIntyre is not considered as reliable because one may invent through a play on words a maxim that will appear as universal while preventing through the citation of specific, unique situations the others from applying it. As an example MacIntyre claims that one may universalise the maxim that one may break promises whenever it is in his own advantage to do so. The formulation of such a maxim would proceed as follows: "I may break my promises *only when ...*"³⁴. This formulation would not have succeeded for the clause "only when" is conditional rather than unconditional as a categorical imperative should be. Also, it signifies the expression of an inclination rather than a deterrent from an inclination. MacIntyre himself in the same text noted the negative implication which is present in the Kantian moral theory³⁵. Although theoretically MacIntyre's illustration of the unreliability of Kant's test is not convincing, one may agree, nevertheless, with the claim it attempts to raise concerning the unguaranteed consistency in the application of a subjectively determined morality within a social setting. This is further amplified by the absence of a set goal, a perceivable end to which the application of this moral virtue would serve as a vehicle. However, this unreliability did not concern Kant for his theory presupposed the presence of a universal recognition of subjectivity.

The Enlightenment project, of which Kant is considered the leading author, sought to justify morality through the application of key premises characterising specific feature or features of human nature through which rules of morality could be explained and justified

as being those rules which a being possessing such a human nature could be expected to accept, and hence perform³⁶. The Kantian theory, or the Enlightenment project aimed to justify morality in terms of human nature through individualist postulates rather than to a set of socially constructed and administered laws.

According to MacIntyre such a project is bound to fail due to its very structure and purpose. To illustrate this, he compares the Kantian morality to traditional Aristotelean ethics. The traditional morality present in the *Nichomachean Ethics* constitutes the instruction of practical reason and experience that aim to transform man's human nature as it happens to be (hence human nature in its crude form) into human nature as it could be if it reached its telos. This form of morality cannot base its main attributes on the human nature in its crude form, but on the coming-into-being of human nature transformed by the realisation of its telos. In its proper traditional form, morality carries within its structure elements that must lie in opposition to the original crude nature of man, so that it can transform it. Traditional morality's essential element consists of the bringing into light of the 'human' telos; its instructions have an end which is identical to that of the socialised individual. The realisation of this social end holds obligational overtones: if one is to reach his socially given end, he *must* follow the moral teachings of society. As it is noted above, traditional morality distinguishes three stages of moral development: The original human nature in its crude uninformed state, the process of transformation, or the coming into being which consists mainly of the application of a set of moral rules of each social role, and finally, the realisation and perfection of this end.

The failure of the Kantian project is seen by MacIntyre to consist in the emphases it placed on the first two stages, and the complete disregard for the third. For, as the ethical

evaluation is necessarily based on a morality which is derived from the original crude nature of man, the realisation of human nature if it reached its telos cannot exist; in its very nature, the Kantian theory cannot indicate a moral telos, for the process begins and ends in the subject. The subject is already moral, he has no moral end outside of his own sphere of reflection and moral development. The Kantian moral theory being a mix of "novelty and tradition" expresses the necessity of a moral imperative, but distorts it by separating it from the social content. In its distorted form, traditional moral precepts become a series of arbitrary and subjective expressions which are devoid of any socially applicable dimension. This distortion indicates for MacIntyre the absence of a common social telos; the latter condition consists in the application of the rational Scientific Method by Kant to the social sphere thereby necessitating the separation of fact from value in the social content leaving man with a narrow subjective view of his world, alienated from society and purposeless.

MacIntyre's critique of the subjectivity of the Kantian philosophy and its underlying presentation of a socially fragmented modern society resembles to a great extent Hegel's critique of the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity". In a forward to a book by Hinrich Hegel describes the "evil of the *present time*" as "the *fortuitousness* and *caprice* of subjective feeling and its opinions associated with the *culture of reflective thought* which has proved to its own satisfaction that spirit is *incapable of knowing the truth*"³⁷. In a close study of the work of Kant, Fichte and Jacobi, Hegel sets out to demonstrate that eighteenth and nineteenth century theories on "reflective subjectivity" are the intellectual expression of the social, political and religious breakdown of modern life.

In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel defines the term reflection as "the

action that establishes oppositions and goes from one to the other, but without effecting their combination and realizing their thorough going unity". Reflection is understanding; it is primarily an analytical activity which allows the making of distinctions and the establishment of antitheses. It is also "thought" which "sticks to fixed determinations and the distinction of one thing from another: every such limited abstraction it treats as having a subsistence of its own"³⁸. The nature of the philosophy of "reflective subjectivity" cannot combine but separates (entzweit). It can divide (trennt) but cannot unite, it alienates but cannot reconcile³⁹.

Hegel believes that the most pronounced statement of "reflective subjectivity" resides in Kant's critical philosophy. It is evident for Hegel that this "reflective" characteristic can be perceived in Kant's theory of knowledge presented in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant's distinction between concept and possible experience effected a clear distinction between subject and object. This separation of subject and object brought his theory of knowledge to a halt, for this very separation indicates the impossibility of knowledge. Kant's distinction between the concepts or categories of understanding and the experiences forces him to distinguish between the things as we conceive them, and the things in themselves (Ding an sich). The latter remains to be an absolute limit to the reflective activity of the knowing subject. This absolute opposition of subject and object renders the knowledge of the object by the subject impossible.

Hegel views the Kantian critical theory of epistemology as a failure for it leads to an extreme type of subjectivism due to which the individual is incapable of knowing or acknowledging an objective end. According to Hegel Kantian "objectivity" is "to a certain extent subjective. Thoughts, ... although universal and necessary categories, are

only *our thoughts* - separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things, of whatever is an object to us"⁴⁰. The antithetical relation of subject and object pertains to a development of a subjectivity that is forever alienated from the objective knowable world.

With regards to morality Hegel's assessment of Kant's second Critique states that:

As theoretical reason is opposed to objective sensuousness, so practical reason is opposed to practical sensuousness, to impulses and inclinations. Perfected morality must remain a beyond [ein jenseits]; for morality presupposes the difference of the particular and universal will. It is a struggle, the determination of the sensuous by the universal; the struggle can only take place when the sensuous will is not yet in conformity with the universal. The result is, therefore, that the aim of the moral will is to be attained only in infinite progress⁴¹.

The dichotomy of Kantian philosophy is seen by Hegel to exist in both theoretical and practical reason. As theoretical reason seeks to bridge the gap between a-priori categories and a-posteriori sense-data, practical reason tries to bridge the gap between moral ideality and empirical reality. The opposition which separates the knowing subject from the empirical object is internalised in practical reason as the conflict between universal, objective categories and subjective desires of the individual⁴². The internalisation of the conflict gives rise to a shift from alienation in the world to self-alienation. It is Hegel's view that the implication of the implementation of practical reason develops a fundamental contradiction where the realisation of morality is at one and the same time its negation. The separation of 'Is' from 'Ought' must occur if any moral action is to take place. The moral duty as a result becomes an unrealisable must (Sollen) or an unreachable beyondness (Jenseits). Life becomes an unbearable burden within which man aims to

reach an end which is in principle unrealisable.

In spite of the apparent similarities between Hegel's analysis of the philosophy of 'reflective subjectivity' and MacIntyre's analysis of the failure of the Enlightenment project, MacIntyre cannot be branded a Hegelian. Much of their differences lie in their vision of the theory of the historical evolution of man. Hegel's view of history is that of a dialectical progress containing within it a drive towards rational consciousness brought on by a series of dialectical (opposition-reconciliation) processes in the course of human history. The achievement of human consciousness is the product of the accomplishment of a historical progress - hence, the crisis of today is seen as a crisis which will bring in its resolution a higher degree of consciousness leading yet again to another crisis whose resolution will attain again a higher knowledge and consciousness of subjective freedom. History signifies a continual progress towards a higher level of human consciousness through reason which, unlike understanding or 'reflection', represents for Hegel a higher mode of thought which sets the distinctions made through the process of 'understanding' back in movement, thereby bringing them to an "over-arching unity". Rationality is seen to involve a "clear consciousness of distinctions: between subject and object, self and other, the rational and the affective"⁴³.

It is this view of history as progress towards the rational consciousness of subjective freedom which allows Hegel to regard philosophical "reflective subjectivity" not simply "as a false direction in philosophy, but as a trend which *necessarily* came into being and whose errors also bear the stamp of necessity". Hegel's evaluation of the failure of 'reflective subjectivity' attempts to show the "logic of this necessity and of the limitations it entailed"⁴⁴. Historically, Hegel attempted to show that "reflective subjectivity" is the

product of the contradictions of the present and that this constituted its historical justification and its historical achievement. However, as a provider of a solution to the contradiction it exposed, "reflective subjectivity" is a failure. This is clearly stated in Hegel's study of the second and third Critiques of Kant's philosophy. The assessment Hegel makes of the latter demonstrates its incapacity to reconcile the very contradiction it exposed. As a matter of fact, the Kantian "categorical imperative" emphasises the contradiction rather than attempts a reconciliation.

MacIntyre on the other hand, far from viewing historical evolution as a progress towards rational consciousness, sees historical evolution - especially in terms of the evolution of the social formations and its accompanying devolution of moral language - as a decline, a distortion of human consciousness expressed in the distortions found in moral discourse. Reason and its essential role as the telos of social existence and interaction, becomes distorted, its significance and its clearness of purpose within the social context becomes obscured as the subject becomes aware of his own being and is alienated from society. The rise of subjective consciousness as the Hegelian concept of historical progress represents for MacIntyre the very breakdown of social formations through which a distortion in the moral vocabulary caused by alteration in the evaluation of social roles, and hence of values occurs. For Hegel, the process of subjective consciousness commenced with the appearance of religion where man while avowing his devotion to God became separated from his community. MacIntyre sees religion as much of a unifier as the Greek city-state; the actual division set in with the Protestant Reformation⁴⁵ which provided man with completely altered views of his own nature and of his telos. Therefore, what Hegel sees as a distinct realisation of subjective consciousness developing against the community's, and later the Church's abuse of its

powers, MacIntyre sees as a disintegration in the unity of social practice of virtues.

Hegel's theory of the progress of human consciousness in history is deeply intertwined with his idea of freedom. Hegel's theory on the dialectic of progress is expressed through an explicit demonstration of the coming into consciousness of subjective freedom. According to Hegel the progress towards reason is always a drive towards an extension of the exercise of responsibility; and freedom cannot be extended without increasing understanding. It is on these grounds that Hegel connects the notion of a historical progress towards freedom in rationality. With respect to freedom Hegel writes that "this idea itself is the actuality of men - not something which they have, as men, but which they are"⁴⁶. Hence, for Hegel, the concept of freedom is not merely a by-product of modernity, it is an essential characteristic of the nature of man which fashions history and guides the essence of human existence. In this historical progress the realisation of subjectivity through reason is paramount. But reason is not instrumental, it does not seek to separate, it seeks to reconcile the oppositions existing between human freedom and nature, the individual and society, the subject and the world, and the finite and infinite spirit (man and God); this reconciliation does not mean simply "undoing;" for Hegel there is no question of returning to our primitive condition before the separation of subject and object. On the contrary he aspires "to retain the fruits of separation, free rational consciousness, while reconciling this with unity, that is, with nature, society, God, and even with fate or the course of things"⁴⁷.

This is highly contradictory to MacIntyre's theory. In the first instance, MacIntyre plainly objects to the fact that there is, or has been a notion of an 'individual'. According to MacIntyre, the "project of Enlightenment" is the "inventor" of the "*individual*".

MacIntyre also objects to the notion of rights which he defines as those "which are alleged to belong to human beings as such and which are cited as a reason for holding that people ought not to be interfered with in their pursuit of life, liberty and happiness". He also finds it odd that there should be "human rights", hence rights attached "to human beings simply *qua* human beings" is a concept that did not arise before the close of the middle ages, a fact which suggests that "there are not such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns"⁴⁸. It is clear from MacIntyre's argument that there is no such thing as an individual, and the rights for such a fictitious entity are equally illusory, just as the notion of a subjective morality is an outrageous lie.

MacIntyre cannot follow Hegel into a post-Kantian theory of 'Sittlichkeit' because for him man is incapable of self-determination, of freedom of thought or otherwise of action. The failure of the Enlightenment project is not a step towards higher subjective consciousness, rather it signifies the absolute break with tradition, a break which he sees as almost irredeemable for it suggests in its very being the first stage in the process of social, and hence moral degeneration. It means the complete disintegration of social values, and of an overall dissolution of the value or quality of human life. Unlike Hegel, MacIntyre cannot accept this development in a positive light, as the coming into being of unity; for him it signifies rather the beginning of the end.

MacIntyre's theory of the individual and society is Aristotelean in character. Man within society is not a subject, but is a functioning part, an object. His morality is not his own, it is not an expression of his being as a human being, it is merely attached to his capacity to execute his social role to a perfection thereby acquiring a specific moral characteristic. His life, his whole existence is consumed within a society in which he

exists as a mere instrument. The fulfillment of any 'subjective' tendency can only have an expression on the public or political sphere. Hence, for an individual to attempt to stage his own life as his 'end', rather than having his 'end' be set in the Polis, is the primary factor in the breakdown of the unity of the social formation. Morality, a concept which is completely associated with the social roles becomes distorted as a shift is made from one social system to another, from one 'end' to a multiplicity of individual 'ends'.

At the same time MacIntyre disclaims the suggestion "that the self is and becomes nothing but the social roles which it inherits", for the self distinguished from its roles "has a history and a social history ..."⁴⁹. According to MacIntyre, the self is capable of passing judgement on situations only when it has a socially established criteria for evaluation. The emotivist self is incapable of judgement due to the absence of such criteria; it has no criteria to judge by. In his view, the modern democratised self has "no necessary social content and no necessary social identity". It can be anything, "because it is in and for itself nothing". The self is "no more than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung"⁵⁰. For MacIntyre, the emotivist self is "entirely set against the social world ... the social world is everything, the self is therefore nothing at all, it occupies no social space ... the self is in no way an actuality"⁵¹. This is the plight of the modern man.

Nevertheless, MacIntyre's characterisation of the emotivist character above, resembles his characterisation of the individual in classical society. On the subjective level, the Aristotelean man is subordinated to the social role he is forced to live out. The "judgement" of which MacIntyre boasts is not his own, it is based upon the socially set criteria; the classical man when found within a society which is for example emotivist is

as lost and as inadequate as MacIntyre's characterisation of man and his nature. For MacIntyre, man is primarily a social role, an entity whose shape is entirely molded by its social environment. His self-realisation is but the adequate expression of the social role he lives out in society. He resembles in his very being an empty and transparent vessel whose content varies with respect to the factors that surround it or occupy it. Man in essence is vacuous, he is in need of a social context and a social content to have an identity, a self. Subjected to such nature, he can never have an identity of his own; his nature is always determined by some "older social formation". Without his social content he is then *nothingness*. His 'telos' must always be 'objective' because he has *no subjectivity*.

A lacuna appears in MacIntyre's theory as he does not give any apparent reasons for the change and transference of one social formation to another. Although he brands this historical change as a demonstration of the process of deterioration or distortion of the moral language and usage, he does not suggest reasons for this shift. Moreover, although he defines the rise of individualism as an 'invention' he does not give a historical explanation of this act, nor does he discuss the conflict between individual and community. A denial of man's subjectivity does not eliminate its existence nor does it explain the need for its development. Nevertheless, it is upon this definition of man and his nature that he bases his solution to the crisis of modernity.

MacIntyre's Project

It is MacIntyre's contention that ever since the belief in Aristotelean teleology has been discredited there appeared multiple attempts to justify morality. It is through the

result of Nietzsche's critique of the plausibility of modern moral philosophies that MacIntyre can vindicate the validity of the Aristotelean philosophy. Nietzsche contended that the morality of the European society since the classics has been a sham, a disguise for the will to power; he also showed that its plausibility could not be rationally justified. In his theory of the *Übermensch* Nietzsche presents a man who "if he cannot lead, he goes alone; then it can happen that he may snarl at some things he meets on the way ... he wants no "sympathetic" heart, but servants, tools, ... There is a solitude within him that is beyond appeal"⁵². According to MacIntyre the Nietzschean concept of the "great man" "represents individualism's final attempt to escape from its own consequences". Its stance "turns out not to be a mode of escape from or an alternative to the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but rather one more representative moment in its internal unfolding"⁵³. By eliminating the plausibility of Nietzsche's moral theory, MacIntyre is now able to suggest that the modern crisis' solution consists in the restatement of the Aristotelean tradition in a way "that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments"⁵⁴.

According to MacIntyre the rendering of the Aristotelean tradition "rational" as such requires the elimination of three incoherent characteristics in Aristotelean philosophy. First, Aristotelean teleology presupposes the presence of an irrational theory of metaphysical biology. The latter is primarily associated in Aristotle's belief that some men are by nature free and other slaves, and that man is by nature a political animal. These are all suppositions which render Aristotelean teleology unacceptable in modern standards. Second, it has been noted by Barker⁵⁵ among others that the Aristotelean teleology is limited in its own concern with the city-state as an 'end' while ignoring the

growing expansionism of the Roman Empire whose development presented a glaring alternative; hence, MacIntyre viewing the same limits of the Aristotelean teleology suggests that the city-state be viewed in "an historical perspective as only one - even if a very important one - in a series of social and political forms in and through which the kind of self which can exemplify the virtues can be found and educated". Thirdly, MacIntyre disputes Aristotle's dislike of conflict thereby ordering its elimination or management. MacIntyre's argument is surprisingly Hegelian in the sense that he does see that it is only "through conflict that we learn what our ends and purposes are"⁵⁶.

MacIntyre proposes to perform his enterprise through a particular study of the history of morality by dividing it in four particular periods: the Homeric sagas, the classical city-state, the medieval period and the utilitarian period of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. This historical study is meant to show the regularity in the presence of 'virtues' as qualities in society, whether Homeric or utilitarian. MacIntyre attempts to demonstrate a common feature in history: that of practice. The concept of practice becomes paramount to his theory as it identifies the presence of virtues with their social implementation. For MacIntyre "practice" signifies any social form of cooperative social activity whose accomplishment requires the exercise of human excellence for a common goal. Practice is, therefore, not simply the mechanical or technical exercise of chess playing or baseball batting, it is rather an activity which is considered internal 'to a given 'telos'. It is 'internal' in the sense that its very activity carries within it an end which is not associated to external goods such as money and fame, but to 'internal' discipline of the soul; the discipline in virtues refers to such qualities as sportsmanship, honesty and justice. The pleasure of executing the exercise should not be separated from its purpose; it is therefore 'internal' pleasure. It is similar to Aristotle's view of the good life for man, which is not

an end that is accomplished through the accomplishment of some deed in particular; rather it is the very practice of virtues that is at once the *means* and the *end*, and which constitutes the good life; hence, the virtues are also internal means to the good life for man which is an 'end' that is at once public and private. Hence, for Aristotle the private practice of virtues is also internal to the *social end* which is also the good life for man, thus allowing the *end* of man and of society to be one with each other.

The very concept of practice is not complete if divorced from the overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life; a life that is conceived as a unity. Unity here does not signify the Hegelian vision of a union between opposites, rather it identifies the harmonious unity of the virtues exercised by the individual for a given telos. It is the unity of purpose and of the means to achieve it. MacIntyre intends to provide an adequate teleological account which is defensible and not related to Aristotelean metaphysical biology. Through an account of the human telos as the "good life for man" on the one hand, and a historically derived theory of virtues embedded in the normal constitution of society on the other, give MacIntyre the possibility of allowing the Aristotelean virtues to transcend metaphysical biology of teleology by becoming associated with the "good for man", the latter being the reason for which man would practice these virtues; hence the human telos is the "good for man" and the means consist in the practice of the virtues.

However, this solution carries within its folds an implicit 'a-priori': the Aristotelean a-priori concerning the nature of man, hence "man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis". Man without a polis for MacIntyre, who also advocated the vacuity of the self, would acquire a similar definition as that which is given by Aristotle who stated that

such a man is a "poor sort of being, ... he is like the man of whom Homer wrote in denunciation: 'Clanless and Lawless and hearthless is he'"⁵⁷. This a-priori is in Brecht's definition a 'classical type' which points to postulates that are considered true or necessary irrespective of experience or anterior to it; " in other words not derived from experience and considered valid"⁵⁸. These are a-prioris that are normally rejected by Scientific Method in general primarily for their prevalent arbitrariness; they are ruled out of order.

At least in this respect, MacIntyre's attempt to render Aristotelean teleology free of metaphysical biology failed. Its failure is based in the first instance on the impossibility of the separation of the elements of metaphysical biology from Aristotle's teleology. This impossibility I contend is due to the direct relationship existing between the concept of reason and its capacity directly to characterise human nature. Aristotle's teleology cannot be retained without the retention of its ensuing characterisation of the nature and telos of man. As MacIntyre attempts to render Aristotelean teleology rationally defensible, he commits to one of two things: he either alters the very nature of the 'telos' by instigating or implying a different nature of man, or he alters the nature of man through an alteration of his end. Hence, any attempt to alter one part will imply the altering of the other.

The stripping away of metaphysical biology from Aristotelean teleology in order to render it rationally defensible does not remain consistent with the presupposition of man's being as social "by nature". This incompatibility gives rise to several contradictions which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter; here it suffices to state that a rationalisation of Aristotelean teleology will surely give rise to a rationalisation of man's nature, hence to a view of man in terms of what is demonstrable

and explicable through direct proof, and not through a classical a-priori. In one sense MacIntyre's characterisation of the nature of man as vacuous is in accordance with the rationalist theory, whereas his theory of teleology being instituted within the practice of virtues in society indicates the Aristotelean theory of teleology with its metaphysical biology.

He is also not concerned with the knowledge arising from the numerous historically documented conflicts between individual and community. Here too the arbitrariness of his analysis prevail in the solution; for MacIntyre man is necessarily born in a society that shapes him. His life (good life in society's standards) should, through practice, aim towards this pregiven social standard; any deviation from it is explained through the incoherence of the practices which sets in due to a sudden and unacknowledged social change. Here MacIntyre can be seen to be expressing a Platonic view of the perfect state. Plato in the *Laws* states that the *Republic* will eventually disintegrate due to the impossibility of the constant flawless expression of the *Idea* in the realm of *phenomena*. Could MacIntyre be expressing a Platonic *idea* of the virtues rather than an Aristotelean idea of the *mean*? This may well be the only answer to his historical study of morality.

MacIntyre's historical study of morality is specifically based upon the theory that moral discourse becomes less intelligible as social formations are replaced by others, the latter representing but a distorted copy of the original. It is evident that, in this sense, the rise of individualism does not reveal the necessary presence of "individuality" as such, but it is rather the expression of a distorted and misunderstood moral language. Also, such a distortion is seen as independent from any specific 'individualist' reaction, it is rather a social deterioration brought on by *time*. In his denial of any presence of

'individualist' action the conflict between individual and society cannot take on the same significance as it does for Hegel and Marx. It cannot be interpreted as the individualist cry for freedom, for there can be no such thing; it is merely the expression of a morally distorted society. In the same way, society can never become oppressive, it is merely the oppression brought on by a distortion of the moral language that is being expressed.

MacIntyre's characterisation of the individual also resembles to a great extent a Platonic shortcoming. Barker discusses Plato's destruction of the basis of personality by demonstrating the implied vacuity of the citizens of the *Republic*. For Barker "too often it is true that it is an ineffective, unindividual type of mind which identifies itself with a wide range of interests" as the character of such a citizen. MacIntyre's assessment of the individual can be objected to, as does Barker to the Platonic idea of the citizen when he states: "we must first know ourselves as separate individuals, in order to transcend such knowledge, and to know ourselves as part of a wider order, and as serving a wider purpose. It is exactly this power of knowing ourselves as separate individuals which Plato really destroys, ..."59. Plato does so through the abolition of property, an action which has been interpreted by Hegel to constitute Plato's denial to humanity of its subjectivity. In Chapter three below, it shall be shown that both Plato and MacIntyre resolve to abolish the essence of subjectivity in order to preserve social unity.

Like Plato and Aristotle, MacIntyre does not seem to concern himself with the very oppressive nature of the "distorted" virtues. Although his solution points back to a society wherein the virtues expressed were coherent, he ignores the very oppressive nature of these societies which abounded not only through slavery, but also through state oppression of farmers and artisans. Not every citizen in Athens was a respected man, for

his function had much to do with the respect he received. Although Aristotle did associate the value of the virtues with man rather than with his Homeric social function, he nevertheless, considered men of virtue as relating to one class of Athenian noblemen. Hence, unconsciously Aristotle remained to express Homeric standards. The definition of an "Athenian nobleman" did not include those who were not owners of slaves, nor did it include those Hellenistic farmers who lived in the outskirts of Athens. Even if Aristotle was not expressing a Homeric evaluation of virtues, would not the distortion that occurred in the transition from the Homeric society to that of fourth century Greece be a hindrance to the purity of the Aristotelean virtues, even in MacIntyre's standards? Undoubtedly they must if MacIntyre's theory is to remain consistent thereby admitting that even Aristotelean philosophy is not the perfect model of society which he claims it to be.

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the content of MacIntyre's philosophy while placing it within its intellectual and historical content. MacIntyre's study of the crisis is shared by several authors primarily on the analytical level wherein the crisis is seen as due to the eclipse of teleological reason and its replacement by an instrumental reason which separates facts from values. The uniqueness of his analysis lies in his solution, for it reveals how the theory of man should be seen as connected with the theory of reason; since it is my contention to demonstrate that the crisis is not merely a crisis of society, but also of the individual, MacIntyre's formulation seemed perfectly suited. MacIntyre's conclusion in *After Virtue* states that "unless that tradition (Aristotle's) could be rationally vindicated, Nietzsche's stance would have a terrible plausibility"⁶⁰ thereby indicating the absence of any modern alternative. By modern I mean an alternative which stems from a modern comprehension of humanity, of its nature

and demands and of its aspired telos. Can this suggestion be true? Are we caught in such a crisis as to not be able to hope for a better solution than that which might bring us back in history to antiquity? It is to a study of these questions that chapter three addresses itself.

NOTES

1. L.G. Crocker, (ed.) *The Age Of Enlightenment*, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969); p.2ff.
2. The Jansenist courts (Parlement), which represented the upper-middle classes were pitted against the King (Louis XV) in the eighteenth century. On Jansenism, see Robert Shackleton, "Jansenism and the Enlightenment", *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, (Geneva: Institut et Musée Voltaire, *Les Délices*), LVII, 1387-97.
3. For further discussion on the nature of the debate refer to Crocker, *ibid.*, p.10-14
4. Crocker, *ibid.*, p. 25
5. A. MacIntyre, *A Short History Of Ethics*, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1966), p. 6-9
6. A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, (London: Duckworth, 1981), p.238
7. MacIntyre, *Short History of Ethics*, *ibid.*, p. 10
8. E. Barker (ed.), *The Politics of Aristotle*, (London: Oxford U.P., 1980), p. 355
9. *Ibid.*, p. 355
10. MacIntyre, *Short History Of Ethics*, *ibid.*, p. 11-13, also see *After Virtue*, *ibid.* ch. 10-13
11. MacIntyre, *Short History of Ethics*, *ibid.*, p.15
12. *Ibid.*, p. 17
13. *Ibid.*, p. 21
14. *Eudemian Ethics*, 1216b, also cited by MacIntyre, *ibid.*, p.22
15. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, *ibid.*, p. 42-45
16. MacIntyre, *Short History of Ethics*, *ibid.*, p. 24
17. *Ibid.*, p. 24
18. A collection of MacIntyre's articles is published under the title, *Against The Self-Images Of The Age*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), mainly Part II of the work.
19. MacIntyre, *Short History of Ethics*, *ibid.*, p. 212
20. According to MacIntyre, "an Aristotelean moral psychology and christian view of the moral law are synthesized even if somewhat unsatisfactorily in Thomist ethics. But the Protestant Reformation changes this. First, because human beings are totally corrupt their nature cannot be a foundation for true morality. And next because men cannot judge God, we obey God's commandments not because God is good but simply because He is God. So the moral law is a collection of arbitrary fiats unconnected with anything we may want or desire". *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, *ibid.*, p. 123-124
21. Søren Kierkegaard, *Either - Or*, Vol I, translated by David F. and Lillian Marven Swenson, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U. P., 1971) p. 224. Also quoted in M.C. Taylor, *Journeys to Self-hood: Hegel and Kierkegaard*, (New York: University of California Press, 1980), p. 61-62
22. *Either - Or*, Vol II, translated by Walter Lowrie, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton U.P., 1971), pp. 218, p. 192 emphasis added.
23. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, *ibid.*, p. 41
24. *Ibid.*, p.42
25. Immanuel Kant, "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals", tr. T.K. Abbott, from *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898) p.7
26. Albert, Denise, Peterfreund, *Great Traditions in Ethics*, (New York: University of California Press, 1975), p. 204ff.
27. MacIntyre, *Short History of Ethics*, *ibid.*, p. 190-191
28. *Ibid.*, p. 191

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29. *Great Traditions in Ethics*, *ibid.*, p. 205
 30. Kant, *ibid.*, Sect. I. p.10
 31. *Ibid.*, p. 16
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 17
 33. MacIntyre, *Short History of Ethics*, p.194
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 198
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 197
 36. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 31
 37. Hegel, Foreward to H. Fr. W. Hinrich, *Die Religion Im Inneren Verhältnisse Zur Wissenschaft* (1822) tr. A.V.Miller, in *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. F.G.Weiss (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 240. Also cited in M.C. Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 41
 38. Hegel, *Lectures On The Philosophy Of Religion*, 3Vol, tra. Speirs and Sanderson, (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), Vol I, p. 191, 197
 39. Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 42
 40. Quoted in Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 42
 41. Hegel, *Lectures On The History of Philosophy*, trans. by Haldane and Simson (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), Vol 3, p. 461
 42. M.C. Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 45
 43. Charles Taylor, *Hegel And Modern Society*, (London: Cambridge U.P., 1979), p. 14
 44. Georg Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, (London: Merlin Press, 1975), p. 261
 45. For a complete statement of MacIntyre's view on the history of Ethics refer to *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, *ibid.*, p.123-24
 46. MacIntyre, *Short History of Ethics*, *ibid.*, p. 211
 47. Charles Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 14-15
 48. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 59, 66, 67
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 30
 50. *Ibid.*, p. 30-31
 51. *Ibid.*, p. 31
 52. F. Nietzsche, *Will To Power*, ed. and trans. by Walter Kaufman, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), p.213
 53. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, *ibid.*, p. 240-241
 54. *Ibid.*, p. 241
 55. E. Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, *ibid.*, p. 226. According to Barker: "Teleology taught him (Aristotle) that there had been a development of the state: it did not teach him that there was a development still to come. On the contrary, it led him to see in the city-state the final goal and completion of all political progress, and to shut his eyes to the universal empire, which even in his own days was already beginning, and which was destined to endure as long as the name of the Roman Empire was used among men ..."
 56. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, *ibid.*, p. 153
 57. *The Politics of Aristotle*, *ibid.*, p. 5
 58. Arnold Brecht, *Political Theory*, *ibid.*, p. 99
 59. *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, *ibid.*, p. 156
 60. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, *ibid.*, p. 238

Chapter III: Anthropological Telos: Freedom or Servitude?

When describing the state in which individuality has come to be expressed in modern society, Horkheimer pleads the case for the modern individual and his suppressed autonomy. Of this case he states that:

From the day of his birth, the individual is made to feel that there is only one way to get along in this world - that of giving up his hope of ultimate self-realization. This he can achieve solely by imitation. He continuously responds to what he perceives about him, not only consciously but with his whole being, emulating the traits and attitudes represented by all the collectivities that enmesh him - his play group, his class mates, his athletic team, and all the other groups that ... enforce a more strict conformity, a more radical surrender through complete assimilation, than any father or teacher in the nineteenth century could impose¹.

Horkheimer's discussion is not intended as an outright attack against society, rather it is an attack against the diverse characteristics of individuality. It is a critique of a society which aims to mold humanity into rigid social forms designed to benefit society itself. This type of society is seen by Horkheimer to be expressed not merely in modern society but also in ancient Greek society. Both tended towards a homogenisation of humanity through social arbitrary means.

It is not Horkheimer's contention to eliminate society, nor socially conceived virtues, rather he views the problems giving rise to conflict between individual and community as due to the process of 'leveling' of human identity within a collectivist society. For Horkheimer:

the most esteemed personal qualities, such as independence, will to

*freedom, sympathy, and the sense of justice, are social as well as individual virtues. The fully developed individual is the consummation of a fully developed society. The emancipation of the individual is not an emancipation from society, but the deliverance of society from atomization, an atomization that may reach its peak in periods of collectivization and mass culture*².

Horkheimer agrees with MacIntyre on the importance of the society in the shaping of the lives of its members. He does not, however, agree with MacIntyre's definition of the nature of man, nor does he believe that it is solely the role of society to "form" the individual through adherence to a set of virtues. Horkheimer does not admit to the theory which implies the shaping of man and his views. In this respect Horkheimer states that "in relinquishing his prerogative of shaping reality in the image of the truth, the individual submits himself to tyranny". The latter condition is seen by Horkheimer to "impair individuality" as society demands each individual to "shift from himself"³. For MacIntyre, this cannot happen, for the impairment is not simply of individuals, but is primarily an impairment of society which produces impaired citizens.

MacIntyre's solution, hence his call for the reimplementation of Aristotelean philosophy in modern society presupposes the presence of "objective" or teleological philosophy of progress which, although lies in opposition to the subjectivist philosophy, is also oppressive of the individual's autonomy. According to Horkheimer, objective and subjective societies in their demand for progress and its elevation to a status of a 'supreme ideal' disregard the contradictory character of any progress which gives rise to the mechanisation and oppression of the natural tendencies that dwell in society, especially in individuals. The idealisation of progress whether in terms of classical virtues or in terms of modern materialism becomes static thereby rendering any natural

opposition to these processes impossible to voice; for Horkheimer "both objectivist and subjectivist forms of philosophy - forget about man"⁴. Here Horkheimer seems to be pointing out what MacIntyre neglects. He is pointing out the shortcomings of society with respect to individuals. Although MacIntyre speaks of conflict as the primary contributors to the knowledge of society, he does not proceed to treat the conflict of individual and society as a conflict signifying the differences in, or what Horkheimer calls as the "natural contradictory tendency" of, the human character. Rather MacIntyre treats it as a social "distortion". This historical treatment of the coming into being of the dissolution of culture leaves the individual with an absence of will and determination. The individual does not guide changes in society, he merely submits to changes brought on through time, he is definitely not the maker of his own destiny; in his theoretical conception MacIntyre is also guilty of 'forgetting about man'.

This chapter is divided into two sections. Section one answers the question why the solution of MacIntyre's project is inadequate in dealing with the very crisis he defines. It puts in question the basis for the definition of the 'nature of man' and shows how MacIntyre's project is deemed a failure in this respect. It also takes a closer look at how his theory of teleology fails to come to terms with its theoretical basis, namely how in ignoring the role of subjectivity, the very objectivity of the telos is thereby undermined.

Section two aims to provide an alternative to several aspects of philosophical analysis. On the historical level it argues that it is during the Renaissance and not the Enlightenment that the rise of individualism and its accompanying instrumental reason came into being. It is the 'rebirth' of the classics and the rise in scientific advancement

that brought into being the separation between man and community. On the philosophical level, it argues that the Renaissance philosophy of man did not possess one but two definitions of the concept of freedom. The first was primarily associated with science wherein the individual was considered a biologically 'natural being' whose liberty consists in his overcoming of his material necessity; in other words the first conception of freedom represented modern instrumental reason. The second conception of freedom called for self-realisation wherein man can only know his place in nature after his accomplishment of self-knowledge. This I called freedom as the realisation of subjective self-knowledge through a teleological subjective reason. It is teleological because reason is the telos, the end of humanity; it is also subjective because it necessitates the realisation of self-knowledge as means to reach the end.

The argument consists in the contention that only instrumental reason was chosen in the Renaissance due to its material power, its capacity to materialise changes in reality. The teleological subjective reason became engulfed by the first thereby giving rise to the Kantian theory of the categorical imperative, which held that subjective self-realisation is a given thereby allowing him to take for granted the presence of a universal consciousness of subjectivity, hence of a universal equality. My argument suggests that this false combination between the two Renaissance conceptions of freedom, if proven, will allow the retention of a theory of subjectivity which is not instrumental but teleological. It should also provide an alternative to either classical teleological reason or subjective instrumental reason. In the process of analysis the argument shows the reasons behind this false combination, as well as the manner with which the Enlightenment inherited instrumental reason found exemplified in the writing of Thomas

Hobbes.

Why MacIntyre's Project Had To Fail?

MacIntyre's project is primarily based upon an Aristotelean teleology rationally defensible, freed from any trace of an arbitrary metaphysical biology. His theory of a social telos is based upon the virtues whose constant 'practice' is to lead man to the 'good life'. The concept of the 'good' includes within it the virtues of justice, courage and temperance. The *good* defines the specific characteristics of excellence of men who move by nature towards a specific *telos*. The very concept of the *good* does not merely embrace the "local and the particular" but also what is "cosmic and universal". The *good* in essence defines human nature's telos as such on a local and universal plane. The 'good life for man' is therefore *eudaimonia* or broadly translated *happiness*.

Unlike Aristotle, MacIntyre makes the distinction between means and ends. For Aristotle the *end* is also the means. For MacIntyre, it is the practice of virtues which is the means towards the end. This type of practice which is discussed above is *internal* in character thereby joining the Aristotelean definition of end while making the modern distinction between means and ends. Internal practicing of virtues is made to contrast with *external* practice. The latter's object consists in the practicing of virtues which lie outside the definition of the 'good life'; they are executed with a view to external goods such as money, recognition and fame. Internal practice of virtues signifies the execution of virtues for their own sake. It is in MacIntyre's view that although they are distinct,

they are also interconnected. They are connected in the sense that they should beget each other. They do so through the virtue of *excellence*. The perfection of the internal practice would eventually beget happiness of an external nature. For example, a fencer who excels in his sport will eventually receive medals and fame; however, his excellence must necessarily stem from a deep appreciation of the sport in which he has developed several virtues such as courage, sportsmanship and patience, as well as other physical attributes such as agility and quickness of mind. The factor which effects the internal practice of these virtues resides in the sport itself and from the conscious perseverance of its supporting institution wherein standards for excellence are necessarily maintained.

In MacIntyre's attempt to make a distinction between the means and ends he joins to a certain degree Hegel's definition of teleology. Hegel sees the structure of teleology to resemble Kant's method in the third Critique wherein the latter introduces a distinction between *relative* or *external*, and internal adequacy to an *end*⁵. According to Hegel, Kant's achievement lies in his introduction of the teleological theory of a reflecting faculty of judgement thereby making a connection between the universality of reason and subjective intuition; he also succeeded in distinguishing between the reflective universal faculty of reason and the determining faculty which allowed him to consider the latter to merely subsume "the particular under the universal". The subsuming nature of the universal is "an abstract which becomes concrete only in an other, the particular". The end is therefore the "concrete universal which contains in itself the moment of particularity and externality, and consequently is active and is the impulse to repel itself from itself"⁶. Kant succeeded in presenting the notion of 'life' or the Idea as the outcome of a syllogistic argument wherein there exists a major premise, a minor premise and a

conclusion. This is how Hegel has come to view the process of *end-realisation*. According to Hegel, this process is realised through three stages of the end: Subjective end, the Means to the end, and end-realisation. In this process the *end* is realised through the other, through the means, hence, in externality; what allows this other to be subsumed in the universal is the reflective teleology of the subjective end, the latter being expressed through intentionality of the *Idea* of the *end*. According to Hegel, this externality does not affect the nature of the telos, rather the relation between the telos, the subject and the other constitute the "truth which is in and for itself, which judges objectively and absolutely determines external objectivity"⁷. The relation between the three factors is syllogistic⁸, hence whose outcome or end is necessarily internal, it expresses an internal truth. "The End" is seen by Hegel "to be the complementary third term of Mechanism and Chemism; it is their truth"⁹.

The syllogistic argument of teleology is constructed in a manner as to extend from the particular to the universal through the 'other'. According to Hegel in the centrality of the objective sphere the concept of the subject discovers and posits the "negative point of unity". Through the positing of objective realm as the "notion-determination", subjectivity has now posited its determinateness in externality thereby rendering its very unity as "self-repelling" while admitting a process of "self-preserving" unity. This expresses the unity of opposites or the unity of freedom and necessity. The end is here expressed as subjectivity's impulse towards external self-positing. According to Hegel the external positing of subjectivity channels force and cause from accidental and opposing effects into the content which must be "reasonable" in its existence. Its "reasonableness" is due to its capacity to express "the concrete notion which preserves

the objective distinction in its absolute unity"¹⁰. This unity of opposites by virtue of its own self-relation is seen by Hegel to combine both "intro-reflection of form" and "individuality". The nature of this reflection is "(1) inner universality of the subject, and (2) Reflection outwards"; it is in this manner that the end remains subjective while its activity "is directed against external objectivity". As the telos of the subject the end is now "this total intro-Reflection of Objectivity, and is so immediately"¹¹. As objectivity it is first posited as self-determination or particularity distinct from the concrete form; it is also finite although it is posited in infinite subjectivity. This is so due to the form it takes wherein the determinateness is expressed through objective indifference thereby acquiring the form of a "presupposition". Its finite character is mainly associated with its need to express its objectivity in reality. The subject's need to express its objectivity renders its self-determining activity, or identity "immediately external to itself, and as much as it is intro-Reflection it is Reflection outwards"¹².

This subjective positing of the end contains within it an absolute negative unity whose overcoming presupposes the necessity to transcend the "positing of the negative as against the subject". This positing, being the first step in the negation of the objective world, does not realise the end but rather it signifies the means, the first step to the end. For its very realisation the end requires a means, "that is, a Mean, which at the same time has the shape of an external Determinate Being, indifferent to the End itself and to its realisation". The means for Hegel represents the "formal middle of a formal syllogism; it is external as against the extreme of the Subjective End, and consequently also against the extreme of the Objective End"¹³; in its particularity the nature of the means is indifferent to the purpose it serves, its place can be taken by any other. The means is also a particularity

only because "it is determinateness in relation to one extreme and universal in relation to the other"¹⁴ thereby rendering its very nature to belong to relativity and is expressed through others. The relationship of the means to the end is purely external, its only immediate relation is present in intro-reflection found in the realm of the subject. Hence, the end remains at first as merely "external determinateness" in the means, and so it is realised outside it as a "negative unity"; the means itself is a "mechanical object" which is shaped by the end as a mere "determinateness and not as simple concretion of the totality"¹⁵. The end as an "activity" and not a mere impulse or "tendency" remains in need of an objective return to itself in order for it to acquire its totality.

Due to the external relationship of the *means* to the *end*, the process of realisation of the determinateness of the means will always be external to the end. It can only reach the objectivity of the end by transcending this externality through intro-reflection. In *Science Of Logic* Hegel argues that the very nature of the means, as an activity which carries within it the "Notion" of the end remains subjective unless this "Notion" reaches beyond subjectivity to include the universality and infinitude of the "objective". The consistent presence of the "Objective Notion" in the two previous stages, hence through the "Subjective End" expressed in intro-reflection and through the means posited by this End ensures the realisation of the end. The end is here realised through its Other to which it is identical and whose very embodiment is subsumed in the "Notion". The product of the means being an external object becomes the Objective Other, whose identity is subsumed and transcended by the "Objective Notion". For Hegel the full realisation of the end through its identical Other cannot be the product of a finite Notion of Subjectivity, rather it is the product of a subjective activity within which the Objective and "Universal

Notion" is necessarily present, and which in turn directs and shapes its action, hence its means. In this respect Hegel explains:

the subjectivity of the finite Notion contemptuously casts aside the Means - and, reaching its goal, has reached nothing better than this. But the reflection that the End is reached in the Means and that in the fulfilled End the Means and mediation are preserved, is the last result of the external End-relation, - a result which, after transcending itself, this relation has exhibited as its truth¹⁶.

According to Hegel this process of end-realisation represents the passage of "Subjectivity or Being-for-self of the Notion ... over into its Being-in-self or Objectivity". In this process the Notion or the Idea determines itself in such a manner that its concreteness or particularity is external Objectivity, and its concrete unity is self-realisation. Within its very process of realisation lies the unity of opposites, where the identity of Objectivity is the simple Notion, hence *immediate* Objectivity, but it is in the same time a process of *mediation* and "is that simple immediacy only through the latter as self-transcending mediation"¹⁷.

Hegel's theory of teleology presents a process of end-realisation which is at once teleological and employs Means for its external actualisation. The realisation of the end is primarily connected with the intro-reflection of subjective determinateness; hence it is based upon the subject's capacity to perceive an Objectivity and to employ means by which the Notion of Objectivity may be realised. It, therefore, presupposes a certain development of subjective consciousness for its realisation.

MacIntyre's theory of teleology employs just the same conception of means to ends wherein the means is not necessarily conducive to the end intended but becomes so in the event that its moving purpose is identical to the end. Let us consider MacIntyre's example of the child and chess-playing¹⁸. According to MacIntyre in order to tempt the child to play chess one must tempt him by appealing to his subjective ends, hence by proposing to give him candy if he plays the game and to increase the amount of candy if the child wins. Motivated by this subjective end, the child will commence to play chess, a process through which he will inadvertently acquire a knowledge of the virtues connected to chess-playing through frequent practice. According to MacIntyre this process will eventually teach the child certain analytical skills thereby giving him the virtues found in the practice of chess-playing. These virtues will become part of the child's personality, hence announcing the realisation of the end which is the impression of certain characteristics through means (practice) in the character of the child. This example would not have been accepted by Hegel due to the lack of one major element, the element which necessarily brings about the realisation of the *end*, subjective consciousness.

The child in MacIntyre's example is completely unconscious of the adult's design; this unconsciousness will necessarily lend to the failure of the enterprise. The child's interest lies primarily in the acquisition of candy and not of virtues, hence the game he plays will constantly lie as an externality to his own subjective end. At best the child will learn the technique but not the virtues, for the concept of virtues is not present within the subjective end. In the case that certain virtues are transmitted they are transmitted in an unconscious manner thereby reducing the effectiveness of end-realisation. The Means in

this sense is not the carrier of a subjective Notion of Objectivity, rather it carries a simple Notion of finite subjectivity which cannot achieve objectivity for the consciousness of the Objective Idea is lacking.

The impossibility of the realisation of teleology in MacIntyre's theory results from the lack of individual consciousness through which a distinct telos can be posited. This lacuna is directly related to MacIntyre's complete disregard to individuality within society. Again, it is clear that MacIntyre's theory of society and the realisation of the telos is derived from the premise that there is no such thing as "individuality" and that the individual is a vacuous human entity whose actions are primarily based upon the content of the social virtues; the latter define his criteria for judgement and his moral character. This aspect in MacIntyre's theory raises at least one pertinent question: Why does MacIntyre arrive at this definition of the nature of man, and how does it affect his solution? To answer it, it is best to look first at what normally defines the nature of man.

In the *Politics* Aristotle distinguishes man from the rest of the animal world through his power of reason. On this Aristotle states that:

It is the peculiarity of man, in comparison with the rest of the animal world, that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of just and unjust, and of other similar qualities; and it is association in [a common perception of] these things which makes a family and a polis¹⁹.

According to Aristotle man's nature distinguishes itself from that of the animal in its unique possession of the faculty of reason. Man, according to Aristotle, due to his power of reflection has managed to reach the summit of organic life. In fact, human

nature since the dawn of history came to be associated and defined with reason.

According to Aristotle:

It would be a strange thing to make the happy man a solitary: no one would choose to have all the good things in solitude; man is a being meant for political association, and whose nature it is to live with others²⁰.

Man in this classical tradition is seen to possess a nature that is rational, and whose 'end' or 'telos' can only be realised within a polis. The latter is posited by nature as the end to which man moves to develop and realise his innate capacities. There is a distinction between the highest 'end' and the human 'end'. The highest 'end' is the social 'end' or the 'good' to which everything must aim; whereas the human 'end' is the development of reason that will allow it to aim for the highest 'end'²¹. Man's capacities may only be realised within a polis which is considered as the highest desirable 'end'; the latter being desired for itself and not for the achievement of some other objective. The faculty of 'reason', when fully developed, is that which allows man to aim rationally for the highest 'good' which is embodied in the realisation of a political association. This statement reveals two essential points concerning man's role and nature within his social context. First, the community is a social whole of which man can only be seen as a part; to this end Aristotle states "that the whole is necessarily prior (in nature) to the part"²². Second, Aristotle claims that the whole is prior to the part in the sense that the part presupposes it; the idea of the whole must first be there before the part can have or exercise a function. Here, man's nature and its potentialities can only be exercised according to the limits of the socially imposed role; all other qualities are necessarily deprived of any immediate expression. Human nature is therefore as diverse as the

number of the identified social roles beyond which all other elements are socially refuted.

Modern man is also identified with reason. Thomas Hobbes defines the nature of man through an instrumental definition of reason. Human reason is seen by Hobbes to be the means to one 'end': the desire to accumulate and actualise endeavours; reason thus defined is purely mechanistic and egocentric, and so, Hobbes acknowledges, is the nature of man. Man is seen by Hobbes as a vacuous individual, devoid of any will or determination. His own desires are the product of the interplay of the external objects on the five human senses. This interplay affects the movement of human emotions and solicits an outward reaction from the human body; the latter reaction is defined as the endeavour or the appetite or aversion. The power of reason is normally used as the faculty that allows him to calculate how to arrive at his desire while avoiding aversions. Man's rationality is no longer an 'end', but it is rather a mechanical device allowing him to arrive at his desired end in the most direct manner.

For Hobbes, man is vacuous, his only motion is propelled by the world that surrounds him. His will is not his own, it is dependent on the objects displayed before him. On this Hobbes states

that which is really within us, is onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects ... So, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the reall effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving²³

Although the Hobbesian man employs reason as an instrument, he is, nevertheless

acutely identified with its very presence, with its very nature. Just as Aristotle conceives of man as a naturally social being whose end is to live in a Polis due to the nature of his reason (which is defined as socially teleological), Hobbes also sees man as the reflection of the nature of his reason. In this sense, Hobbes identifies man with a nature that is calculating and devoid of any social inclinations. Reason in the Hobbesian philosophy is also defined in these very terms. It is therefore understood that both teleological and instrumental reason define in their own terms the nature of man.

The above exposition of the definition of the nature of man and its direct connection to the definition of reason is important to our analysis in at least two respects: First, it explains the criteria upon which humanity based its own conception of its Being and telos. Second, it shall be used to demonstrate the basic reasons underlying MacIntyre's failure to render Aristotelean teleology rationally justifiable. As each tradition constructs its own definitions on specific bases, a justification of one tradition by the other will result immediately with difficulties which render the enterprise questionable.

Although a study of the method according to which both teleological and instrumental reason define the nature of man is important, it does not specifically demonstrate how MacIntyre, while using a teleological vision of society, succeeds in denying the individual his subjectivity. In other words, there remains the mystery regarding the philosophical bases upon which MacIntyre built his theory of human nature. This will be shown to have been inherited from the Platonic conception of the rights of man within the *Republic*. The following exposition is made through Hegel's critique of Plato.

In *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel makes a distinction between

substantial morality and reflective morality²⁴. Substantial morality represents the principle of common Greek morality which is already established in society and has in general the relation of the "substantial"; it is, therefore, socially maintained and is divine. On the other hand, reflective morality is the expression of the Subjective *will* of the individual. It is the action based upon individual reflection and not on the prescriptions of state institutions. It is the action of individuals which stems from their own convictions, and after moral deliberation. Individuals come themselves to a decision and determine their actions accordingly.

According to Hegel this distinction is not to be found in Plato's writing. Plato's concern concentrated on the need for subjective evolution in relation to the state, but he neglected the recognition of freedom of the individual conscience and his right to subjective reflective morality. According to Plato "the content is but the whole; the nature of the individual, no doubt, but as reflecting itself into the universal, not unbending, or as having absolute validity; so that practically the state and the individual are the same in essence"²⁵. Although Plato does include the individual subject in the empirical actions of the will, he does so while conceiving man in the universal sense. Plato's systems of reality in the moral realm includes all the functions pertaining to the common wealth, and the supplying of daily individual wants such as agriculture and cattle rearing. He, however, relegates these functions to the realm of external necessities, hence, as lying outside of the Objective Idea; they are found universally without being developed out of the Idea of the mind itself.

Plato's theory of the state is basically concerned with the notion of *justice*. In

speaking of justice Plato meant "that the mind in its totality makes for itself a law as evidence of the existence of its freedom. In a highly abstract sense my personality, my altogether abstract freedom, is present in property"²⁶. Since justice is for Plato the entire being which realises itself when each man learns to do the work he is born to do to a level of perfection, then it is only as "determined individuality that man reaches what is law for him; only thus does he belong to the universal Spirit of the State, coming in it to the universal of himself as a "this" "²⁷. Hence, what Plato calls 'universal' comes into being and is realised necessarily outside of the Idea, while expressing a content which is identical to it. Hence, the realisation of the Idea must be done through a function which is a means, the latter in turn acquires its intent through the subjective will of the individual, within which the Objective Idea is necessarily present, and which demands an act of subjective reflective decision for its enactment.

According to Hegel the "individual conscience proceeds from the subjectivity of free-will, connects itself with the whole, chooses a position for itself, and thus makes itself a moral fact"²⁸. This very aspect of individuality is ignored by Plato who felt that this very subjective quality of individual social existence is what had wrought the ruin of Greece. It is therefore not surprising that MacIntyre who seems to have adopted a Platonic view of historical social evolution proceeds to deny the individual his subjectivity as well. MacIntyre's theory of teleology has succeeded in inheriting the shortcoming found in classical Greek philosophy. While this explains the criteria according to which the nature of man is defined, as well as the reason why MacIntyre develops such a theory of human nature, it does not explain how this theoretical development affects the theoretical outcome of his solution.

The answer to the above question lies primarily in the theoretical makeup and purpose of MacIntyre's solution. The latter consists in his rejection of the Enlightenment project, of its attempt to render morality subjective, hence of its separation between 'Is' and 'Ought'. MacIntyre's solution consists in rendering Aristotelean teleology defensible by ridding it of all objectionable characteristics, hence characteristics which cause it to be considered as rationally untenable, and which brought on its rejection by modern Scientific Method. MacIntyre's project is not successful, and its lack of success is due to this very attempt to join the old with the new; to render a teleological theory of reason applicable within the rules of instrumental theory of reason. The failure resides in his very attempt to separate Aristotelean teleology from its metaphysical biology within which it defines the nature of man. To separate these two concepts involves the very alteration of the nature of both. However, before discussing the elements of the failure of MacIntyre's project, let us study the elements of his solution.

In his discussion of the failure of the Enlightenment project MacIntyre aspires to demonstrate the incoherence of a project which aimed to render morality subjective. In this sense it aimed to separate the realm of fact from the realm of value, a separation which meant to give the individual the liberty to decide his own values, hence his freedom for self-determination (Sittlichkeit). MacIntyre's definition of the crisis of modern society demonstrates how the failure of the project succeeded in separating fact from value and in giving a false sense of liberty to the individual. Liberty is false because men have now become separated from their social system, a separation which gives the individual the sense of liberty while at the same time subjecting him to a "reality" that is

of his own making; hence by subjecting him to a system in which he lives but from which he is alienated. This separation gives man a sense of liberty that is a sham, because it is the social system which transcends his liberty thereby restricting it.

MacIntyre's project seeks to provide an alternative to the Enlightenment project which is meant to undo what the latter succeeded in establishing, hence to reintroduce a teleological philosophy which is capable of bridging the gap between facts and values. MacIntyre's analysis has led him to propose an Aristotelean teleology which is based upon a theory of virtue. However, in order to render this teleology applicable to modern society, MacIntyre took on the task of relieving it from its arbitrariness, mainly from the elements which render it rationally untenable.

MacIntyre set out to achieve his objective through several steps: First, he attempted to separate the Aristotelean teleology from metaphysical biology, hence from the positing of a teleology in nature. To achieve this he forwarded a theory of the virtues. In his analysis he speaks of virtues in the plural rather than a virtue in singular in order to make the distinction between the authentic theory of virtues as opposed to the modern idea of virtue. Virtues stand for the evaluative predicates which describe the excellence in the performance of certain social roles. This is distinct from virtue which has acquired in modern society the meaning of a quality of persons and is primarily connected with sexual behaviour. In basing his theory on the virtues MacIntyre's success is twofold: through a historical study of the nature of virtues, MacIntyre affirms the presence of virtues in society rather than through a teleology in nature. Hence, through a historical study it is possible to show that the presence of virtues transcends social formations.

Also, the very nature of the virtues which ascribes them to action, or social roles rather than to a metaphysical quality in man allows MacIntyre to bridge the gap between 'Is' and 'Ought'. It does so as it shows that the evaluation of man is done in terms of the results of his actions rather than in terms of some inpalpable quality whose evaluation varies with the personal criteria or reflection of the subject. Evaluative criteria based on the practice of activities places the evaluativeness in the social realm and divorces it from the subjective realm, thereby denying the individual the freedom of subjective self-determination. It is therefore imperative for MacIntyre to deny the individual this subjectivity in order for him to reach a solution which allows him the bridging of the fact-value gap.

The theory of virtues presupposes a social teleology. The latter is an end which is posited within the social life itself. Man is bound to aim towards "the good life" in society, hence according to the virtues. The virtues are then posited in society as the means whose practice will achieve the 'good life for man'. Man's telos is bound to society and to the achievement of the virtues which implies that man is basically social and aims to live a 'good life' within society, guided by social rules. Man's telos lies in contradiction with the type of nature MacIntyre attributes to him. For according to Aristotle, reason is the telos of man within which he also defines his nature. Reason, telos and human nature are all social; the structure of human teleology is syllogistically derived wherein the telos is reached through a subjective acknowledgement and positing of its objectivity in the means which is also an object through which the telos is realised, if only externally. For Aristotle, Reason is social teleology, man is *social* by nature; therefore man's telos is reason. Whereas MacIntyre states: Virtues are social, man

practices virtues, man is social. For MacIntyre man is neither virtuous nor social, he becomes both as he *practices* virtues in society. A question is bound to arise at this point: if man is neither virtuous nor social, why would he enter a society and practice the stated virtues and posit them as his telos? Only a Hobbesian may answer this question; an Aristotelean may not. The Hobbesian would say that it is the necessity to preserve his life which would prompt him to enter into the commonwealth and accept all arbitrary laws of society except those which might put his life into danger. An Aristotelean can only affirm that it is man's nature, being primarily social, which prompts him to enter into society. Man is "by nature" a social and political animal whose 'end', the "good life" can only be achieved in a polis. As to MacIntyre, the answer consists in the fact that the individual was never outside of society, he therefore has never made the choice to enter within it. This answer remains to lack an answer to the second part, why would man posit the virtues as his means to an end, why would he not posit material accumulation, agriculture,...etc as means to the same end? MacIntyre remains silent.

Another question may be raised: if MacIntyre aspires to render Aristotelean teleology applicable to modern society, why does he seem to affirm a Hobbesian theory of the state and of man? In fact, theoretically speaking, MacIntyre has failed in his enterprise, and his failure consists in his attempt to render Aristotelean teleology *rational*. Aristotelean teleology is strictly associated with a theory based upon human nature. Man, for Aristotle is *social*, he is so by nature. It is this very nature of man which permits Aristotle to develop a teleological theory of society. Aristotle bases his theory on metaphysical biology. Similarly, Hobbes also bases his theory of the state on a definition of human nature. Man, for Hobbes, is an empty entity whose actions are directed by

outside sources. The Hobbesian man is basically asocial; he is rational, only this rationality is not social, it is subjective. This is the very rationality which defines modern instrumental reason, and which is prevalent in Scientific Method. In order for MacIntyre to render Aristotelean teleology "rational" he subjects it to the methods of scientific reasoning, hence, he subjects it to a rationality which demands the separation of 'Is' from 'Ought'. This subjection results in the stripping of Aristotelean philosophy of its basic premise, the nature of man. As the nature of man becomes vacuous and non-social the Aristotelean theory of teleology crumbles leaving in its stead a series of seemingly arbitrary laws of virtue and of society.

In Chapter two above, I have demonstrated MacIntyre's use of a classical a-priori which contradicts his own purpose, that of rendering Aristotelean teleology rational. This very use of classical a-priori and his inability to maintain an Aristotelean theory of teleology should be seen as two sides of the same coin. In order for MacIntyre to presuppose the dominance of society he must establish it on such an a-priori which holds within its folds Aristotelean metaphysical biology. His inability to perform both lies primarily in his attempt to mix the ancient with the novel, a shortcoming which he pointed out as bringing about the failure of the Kantian enterprise in his critique of the Enlightenment project.

MacIntyre's refusal to recognise the presence of human subjectivity has still further implications. According to MacIntyre, the possibility of the implementation of Aristotelean teleology in modern society is based upon his view of the individual as a vacuous entity. Man is seen to be an entity which is completely formed within society; it

is flexible because it is lacking in any specific content. To this theory there are two implications which become highly interrelated. First, his view of man as vacuous has been shown above to signify the presence of the basic traits of the Hobbesian liberal man. From this implication rises another which can be expressed in the following question: How does MacIntyre envisage the coming into being of the transition from the modern social formation to a society which has adopted his solution for a 'rationalised' Aristotelean theory of teleology? In other words, how is man, a vacuous entity incapable of self-determination, to choose the road toward the virtues when he is presently living within a society which corresponds to his nature (hence the nature MacIntyre attributes to him)? MacIntyre's answer in *After Virtue* is highly unsatisfactory, for he suggests a solution similar to that which is made at the turning point in history which took place after the decline of the Roman Empire: he suggests a construction of "new forms of community within which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the ... new dark ages which are already upon us". The construction of these new communal forms, he suggests, is to be made through a slow evolution in history of virtues; as to the latter's possibility for survival, MacIntyre states "if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope"²⁹. MacIntyre's solution reflects again a Platonist view of history. According to Plato, society is able to recover its purity through a slow and steady return to its origins. However, neither Plato nor MacIntyre are able to suggest how is man to decide to turn from his present society towards another which is guided by social virtues.

Again, MacIntyre's shortcoming resides in his refusal to accept the very need for a

theory of subjectivity within his theory of teleology. Human consciousness is not always achieved *en masse* within a precise social setting, it has been seen throughout history to arrive gradually as it is expressed through constant heroic attempts of individuals. MacIntyre's analysis suggests that society is now at an impasse awaiting the miraculous appearance of a "very different St Benedict". His pessimistic conclusion and the failure of his project stem from his affirmation that there is no such thing as human subjectivity, and it is for this reason that one is forced to wait for a miraculous upturn in society. In fact, MacIntyre's analysis, his belief in the predominance of society over man, and his equal horror of the upsurge of individualism lead him, as it did Plato, to deny human subjectivity a social expression, while suggesting a society which can only be based upon an expression of the human will.

An Alternative Suggestion?

This section I will try to dispute the fact that Kant's failure was actually based on the combination of "ancient and novel" traditions, and would suggest that Kant's failure is based upon the very type of philosophy that the Enlightenment inherited from the Renaissance. In an exposition of the false fusion of a dialectical concept of freedom in the Renaissance, I will show that the implication of the presence of the consciousness of a universal subjectivity gave rise to the failure of the Kantian project. In essence, the Kantian project's shortcoming will be shown to be based upon an earlier philosophical shortcoming. This exposition's purpose is twofold: first, it attempts to resituate the historical period of the rise of individualism from the Enlightenment to the Renaissance;

and second, it attempts to show that, unlike MacIntyre's premise which states that the failure of the Enlightenment project indicates that there is no such thing as subjectivity, indeed there is subjectivity, but that its very expression was stunted due to the presence of historical and theoretical impediments.

The above suggestion does not indicate an immediate resolution of the fact-value dilemma. It does, however, try to give an explanation to the rise of such a dilemma of which the Kantian theory is the expression. It also attempts to give hope as to the realisation of a universal subjectivity which might join the particular with the universal thereby giving rise to the presence of a consciousness of a morality which is the expression of a much higher consciousness of the human mind.

In his famous work *Lo Spaccio Della Bestia Trionfante*, Giordano Bruno talks of the possibilities that lay open to the power of the human will. In the following passage he gives this advice:

Let us put in order the heaven that intellectually lies within us (che intellettualmente è dentro di noi) - and then that visible heaven that presents itself bodily to your eyes. Let us remove from the heaven of our mind the bear of roughness, the arrow of envy, the foal of levity, the dog of evil calumny, the bitch of flattery; let us ban the Hercules of violence, the lyre of conspiracy ... the Cepheus of hard heartedness. When we have thus cleansed our house and created our heaven anew, then, too, shall reign new constellations, new influences and powers and new destinies. Everything depends on this higher world, and out of contradictory causes must necessarily flow contradictory effects. Oh we happy ones, we truly blissful ones, of we only rightly cultivate our minds and our thoughts. If we want to change our condition, we change our habits; if we want the former to become good and better, the latter should not become worse. If we purify the drive within us, then it will not be hard to pass from this transformation in the inner world to the reformation of the sensible and outer world³⁰.

Bruno's doctrine of man's will and its power of transformation both spiritually and in the realm of nature helped set the pace for humanity whose valiant strides made tremendous leaps towards civilisation. Bruno's philosophy, influenced by the German philosophy of Nicholas Cusanus, meant to break away from the traditional chains of medieval scholasticism to provide a new ground for man. Renaissance philosophy signified in history the awakening of humanity to its subjectivity. Man became aware of his own being as the maker of history rather than the object of its very evolution. In its wake, this philosophy meant to bring a resolution, an equilibrium to man's consciousness of his subjectivity in nature, community and divinity. Man in the Renaissance was considered the centre and the initiator of all activity, whether economic, socio-political or spiritual³¹. In her book *Renaissance Man*, Agnes Heller described this awakening of humanity as a 'dynamic' activity that held in its sway a plurality of human values. The 'dynamism' of man and the multiplicity of his values were derived from a direct result of the disintegration of the unity of the ideal man. Heller stressed that a "plurality of human ideals emerged within one and the same concept of man", hence "the most contradictory human ideals cannot themselves be interpreted except by a dynamic concept of man"³². the latter conception held that there is a concept of man and an ideal of man; the first was founded on the idea of depravity, the second on grace. The contradictions which ensued from their combination could not but promote a human activity which searched endlessly to acquire grace and shun depravity. To do so, Renaissance man emerged as a seeker of his own private salvation; his methods of achievement were guided by a "philosophy ...[that] came to derive all morally positive action from self-love (and altruism), from rational egoism, or from the categorical

imperative³³. This suggests the break up in social unity and the development of the social origins of Scientific Method and the project of Enlightenment.

Medieval christianity's emphasis on grace as being the responsibility of the individual developed a shift from all that was communal to all that was private in the Renaissance. The stress on the dynamism of the individual was linked to the atrophy of social values, hence exaggerating the tension which existed between man and society. Custom was wholly separated from ethics, so that social ties were no longer based on a system of virtues, such as those cited by MacIntyre of the Athenian virtues which were considered as a social duty, but these were ethical elements which demanded far reaching individual decisions. Custom is seen by Heller to have become a set of stereotypes that regulate conduct in all its details, hence creating tremendous tension between the possibility of freedom and the kind of freedom that really existed. Here custom has become what MacIntyre calls as social 'characters' that have no other function but to introduce the individual to a set of rules which are no longer defined by a traditional moral concept, but merely to indicate the function of his given role or character. Heller argues that as a result of the growing social and technical division of labour the stereotypes have become numerous, while involving man less and less, and increasingly building up the personality in a variety of often contradictory stereotypes. To Heller "people not only ceased to think of the content of demands which these stereotypes made, but also about the way they applied them. Custom because of its mechanical character always 'gives up' and becomes helpless in the face of new phenomena"³⁴.

This shift in responsibility from community to individual brought with it several

changes in man's attitude towards his society which took on various forms. In the field of ethics and social norms there developed a twofold split in tradition. On the one hand, there was an exaggerated emphasis on various ethical practises which demanded that their development be expressed into concrete systems of morals whose values were not basic, but very much partial, local and customary. These 'values' were normally organised by the members of the social strata who adopted those which corresponded to their various interests. On the other hand, there appeared a general human attitude bound up with certain abstract norms (hence, what MacIntyre would call as certain fragments of abstract traditional values), where unlike traditional prescriptive values defined by the society, men chose on the basis of certain positive ethical attitudes, the right values by which to abide in their active life. The social norm developed into a unity of heterogeneous principles whose value content tended to be contradictory thereby acting as a hindrance rather than an achievement of a unified goal. Social custom, claims Heller, was not considered as hindrance because "in and of itself it is *bad or wrong*, but because it has *become bad, become wrong*, for developing reality had pulled the carpet from under it"³⁵.

Renaissance society's traditional values crumbled in the face of the 'dynamic' activity of man and its social modes of conduct were thrown into complete disorder. Traditional values such as 'courage' and the 'good' took on a completely new and individualist meaning. The traditional virtue of 'courage' defined in Aristotelean ethics as a mode of social integration came to be understood as what Heller called "civil courage", defined with reference to the ability of each man to hold his own against 'social degeneration' through respecting and abiding by his own principles. The 'good' defined by Plato as

the inpalpable 'truth' and by Aristotle as the social 'end' became what is merely possible. According to Geronimo Cardano the pursuit of ethical life does not take on a social telos, rather it finds its expression within the possibility of each man. For Cardano: "I determined upon a course of life for myself, and in this my purpose was not single or constant ...; I acted as seemed advantageous when each occasion arose"³⁶. Cardano's doctrine implied that one may know what is good, but that one must act according to what is possible. Here the 'good' took on not only the limits of possibility, hence diminishing the need for constant striving towards a higher ethical achievement, but also indicated that the good is what one acknowledges as his own and not that of the community as a whole. The customary demands of the community became external demands on the 'end' of the individual which did not necessarily coincide with the 'good' he has chosen. The unity of the ethical within the community dissolved into a plethora of "mutually contradictory systems of value and into a variety of interpretations of individual virtues, again often mutually contradictory"³⁷.

The end of the Renaissance period saw a further need for the advocacy of human freedom which was expressed in terms of freedom from material want in the classical liberal tradition on the one hand; and the realisation of human subjectivity within the realm of reality on the other; it should be emphasised that these two conceptions of freedom are distinct in the very dependence of each on a specific type of reason which also defines a specific type of human nature. The scientific or material definition of freedom is based on instrumental reason and a definition of man which associates him with the material, whereas the second definition of freedom suggests a teleological theory of reason and has a universal subjectivity as the realisation of humanity. Despite of their

distinctness from one another, both conceptions of freedom were present at some instance in the work of the same Renaissance philosopher. For example, Giordano Bruno's call for freedom through reflective subjectivity, was also the one who saw in science the vehicle towards liberation. Renaissance thought represents the birth of these two conceptions; it represents a time in which a tremendous rise in the number of speculative ideas for the future took place. It is therefore understood that a certain amount of incoherence, or more precisely a mixture of several contradictory ideas was present in one and the same philosophy. Although in this study there is a decided call for a distinction between both conceptions, it is done for two specific reasons: First, to make an earlier distinction between the two concepts of freedom which were to be inherited by the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Hence, to make an earlier distinction between the birth of the conceptions of the classical liberals on the one hand, and the authors advocating freedom as the realisation of universal subjectivity (Rousseau and Kant in particular) on the other. Second, this distinction aims to show the differences and the connections between the two conceptions of freedom, as well as the contradictions which arose from their synthesis which was the form in which the age of Enlightenment received the fruits of Renaissance philosophy.

The demand for freedom was seen by Heller as a "sign that the old natural communities were breaking up, and that mankind was entering a new era of its socialisation, in which process (the process of becoming free) an unbounded activity would dominate"³⁸. The result of this social dissolution gave rise in the Enlightenment to a demand for socially tangible results. It was in the Enlightenment that man developed a society within which modernity remains to dwell and suffer from an acute sense of

spiritlessness and human alienation. Man, despite of his efforts to reconcile matter with spirit is seen to have failed and is in need of reassessing his original goal. Man's failure consists in his inability to express his own subjectivity within society. This is due, as I will try to show, to the Renaissance's inability to actualise the conception of freedom as the realisation of-universal human subjectivity, hence the realisation of the individual of his essential equality to all other human subjects.

In the following exposition it will be argued that Hobbes, and all the philosophers who followed him in the Enlightenment took the universal realisation of human subjectivity as a given, thereby basing their theories on grounds that were in reality socially unfounded. This theoretical shortcoming will be shown to have arisen due to the false amalgamation of the two concepts of freedom in the Renaissance. This is meant to suggest that in effect this type of freedom did not materialise, not because there is no such thing as 'human subjectivity' such as it has been suggested by MacIntyre, but on the contrary, that this type of freedom as the realisation of 'universal human subjectivity' is yet to be achieved, and that it is man's present alienation which will force man to realise his own mistake, a process by which he will be able to correct it.

In his *Oratio Hominis Dignitate* the Renaissance humanist Pico Della Mirandola, while celebrating the birth of the individual, gives man the following message:

...you (man) can degenerate to animality or be reborn towards divinity ... Animals bring forth ... from the bodies of their mothers everything they ought to have. The higher spirits are, from the beginning or soon afterwards, everything they will be for eternity. But for man, the Father conferred, at the moment of his birth, the seeds and germs of every form of life. Those which he cultivates will grow in him and bear fruit. If they are the plant seeds, he will

*vegetate; if he follows the senses, he will become an animal; if he cultivates the power of reason within him, he will become a celestial creature; if he follows intelligence, he will become an angel and a son of God*³⁹.

Pico's doctrine in the *Oration on the Dignity of Man* is noted by Burckhardt to summarise with "grand simplicity" and in "pregnant form" the entire purpose of Renaissance philosophy: that is to establish the identity of man and his new relationship to community and God. Man's new identity is "dynamic" and is no longer seen as a product of society (such as that found in the polis) nor is he a simple creation of God with a limited life and nature. Man, states Cassirer, "breaks through every such barrier"⁴⁰ for his activity is no longer associated with his being; rather it is filled with fantastic possibilities allowing him to attain unprecedented heights.

Theories regarding man expressed in Renaissance philosophy respond to a much greater need than simply the glorification of the human subject; rather they are also an expression of man's optimism and of his confidence embodied in his own nature and its diverse possibilities, to be realised only when left unchained from the shackles that hindered its development. For until the dawning of Renaissance the status of the individual was necessarily inferior to that of the collective body. Illustrating this tendency is Walter Ullman in his book *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, where he states that traditional society arrived at "the theory that the individual did not exist for his own sake, but for the sake of the whole society. This organological thesis was to lead in time to the full-fledged integration theory of the corporate body politic, in which the individual is wholly submerged in society for the sake of the well-being of society itself"⁴¹. It was thus prevalent that the Aristotelian vision of the ultimate end

posited in the collective body of the polis remained intact until it was shaken to the ground by the awakening of Renaissance man. There, in the Renaissance, man began to cultivate the idea of his supreme worth and proclaimed it rather openly. Italian humanists such as Petrarch concluded that "nothing is admirable but the soul in comparison to which if it is great nothing is great", and Marsilius Ficino described the human soul as "the greatest of all miracles in nature... the centre of nature, the middle term of all things, the series of the world, the face of all, the bond and juncture of the universe"⁴².

This same age did not merely bring man to admire his own nature, but also to admire the God-given nature from whose knowledge he was inspired. The Renaissance finds man's relationship to nature paradoxical. On the one hand, certain philosophers such as Paracelsus and Kepler hold that man is identical to nature but on a smaller scale; he is, therefore, incapable of learning about himself without learning and understanding nature; and on the other hand, Renaissance philosophy draws a sharp distinction between subject and object, where nature is just that object. Philosophers such as Pico Della Mirandola, Giordano Bruno, Carolus Bovillus and others hold that the freedom of man and its fullest expression can only be attained when man arrives at what Pico calls "the power of Reason" that is of "reflexive knowledge", knowledge of the self. According to Pico:

it is not being that prescribes once and for all the lasting direction which the mode of action will take; rather the original direction of action determines and places being. The being of man follows from his doing; and his doing is not only limited to the energy of his will, but rather encompasses the whole of his creative powers. For all true creativity implies more than mere action upon the world. It presupposes that the actor distinguishes himself from that which is acted upon, i.e. that the subject consciously stands opposed to the object.⁴³

Here the Socratic virtue of "know thyself" is present only it has a different end; it is no longer the Platonic 'good' of society associated with the 'truth', rather for the Renaissance man, states Agnes Heller, it became a "truth " that "was one; it could be compelled and it could be grasped, in all its mystery and complexity; it bore a human face"⁴⁴. It is seen as the truth that allows the man who grasps it the mastery, not only of material nature, but also, and most importantly, of his destiny. Here the liberation of man can only come from the truth he finds within; the realisation of his subjectivity is hence paramount.

This paradoxical relationship gave rise to the development of a dialectical of the nature of man which in turn gave rise to the appearance of a dialectical expression of freedom. The first definition whose leading scholars were mainly scientists, such as Paracelsus and Kepler, brought an identification of man's humanity, his intellectual capacities, with a material world that could never be reflective, but could only inspire reflection. Paracelsus' argument claiming that man could learn nothing from himself, and that his knowledge emerged from his immediate surroundings providing him with experience, could only emphasise a belief in the vacuity of the individual 'self', and a total identification of man's capacities with the material. Kepler, also in his theory concerning the reflection of man's humanity in nature claimed that it was but a reflection of the macrocosm (nature) on the microcosm (man)⁴⁵. The second tradition, while keeping in common the same elements (man, nature) and a similar theory (microcosm, macrocosm) with the first, saw man's relationship with nature as not of equality but of superiority. For Bovillus the microcosm is the reproduction in thought of the macrocosm, the structure of the two systems is the same, but while the macrocosm is substantial, the

microcosm is the intellectual mirror of that substantiality. Bovillus, as quoted by Heller, states that "the world has a maximum of substance and a minimum of knowledge. Man has the minimum of substance, but a maximum of knowledge"⁴⁶. Despite of the multiplicity of human possibilities expressed in the Renaissance, the nature of man and his relationship to natural phenomena was, nevertheless, firmly expressed in line with these two definitions.

The significance of these bipolar conceptions lies in their definition of the nature of man as such; for the Renaissance did not merely celebrate the 'birth' of man, but it also helped in the qualification and definition of his nature and his 'end'. Those authors of the first definition sharing Paracelsus' and Kepler's vision identified human nature with the material objective world; they studied man through the eyes of scientists, hence qualifying him as a biological entity whose spirit is identical to nature whom Kepler deemed as "mechanically structured"⁴⁷. With nature regarded as the "divine watchworks", man's identification to it gave rise to the assumption that even his rationality was also 'mechanical'. Man in this tradition was reduced to mere natural phenomena whose being could be known through little more than mechanically applied scientific observation. Man's end was also identified with that of nature : namely that of continuous regeneration. This view implied that humanity regenerates itself in a cyclical fashion repeating identical patterns throughout history thereby affirming that man is not a product of a "historical evolution". Here a teleology of being does not lie in reason, for reason has become mechanical, incapable of finality; it can only be used towards an 'end' that lies outside it. Reason has become a means to an ulterior 'end', that of the 'liberty' to 'regenerate'. This definition was to find a direct political expression in the philosophy

of Thomas Hobbes.

The second definition represented by those sharing the vision of Pico, Bruno and Bovillus, contrary to the vision of the first, insisted on making the distinction between man and nature. They were not merely content with the distinction made between man as 'subject' and the material world as 'object', but also extended it to claim that human realisation as subjecthood through action could not materialise before man was made aware of this very distinction. Man's nature is seen as departing from its essential being which it shares with nature as part of its reality through the four steps which Bovillus calls "*esse, vivere, sentire, intelligere*"⁴⁸, the last being the accomplishment of 'reflexive knowledge', or self-consciousness. In this tradition man is seen as a being filled with potentialities whose ultimate 'end' consists in the realisation of self-knowledge through which the knowledge of the cosmos may be achieved. "Reason", in this tradition states Cassirer, "is the power in man by which 'mother nature' returns to herself", it is hence the "passage from the 'object' to the 'subject', from simple 'being' to 'consciousness of self'"⁴⁹. For Bovillus objective nature is incapable of realising its own self-knowledge, only nature embodied in man can intellectually, after having traversed the four mental stages of its journey, reach its consciousness of self. Here 'reason' is posited as an 'end'; however, this teleology of 'reason' is no longer that of the Greek polis which is social, rather 'reason' is an 'end' that is 'universal'. The universe represents the unity of nature and that of humanity. Humanity no longer appears in nature as a mere part of the universe "but as its eye and mirror;" and, indeed, states Bovillus "as a mirror that does not receive the images of things from outside but that rather forms and shapes them in itself"⁵⁰. It can do so because it is the intelligent expression in nature. It is only man

who can grasp nature's totality in its 'principle', rendering him the very consciousness wherein nature finds its most eloquent intellectual articulation.

The dynamic nature of Renaissance man gave rise to a dynamic concept of freedom. Although both definitions combine to call for an essential universal equality of humanity they define and achieve it differently. In the purely scientific tradition equality is based on the physical criteria that are considered as given. Man is seen to be equal in his 'natural constitution' as a living biological being. He is thus identified as another expression of a mechanically conceived natural phenomenon. The definition of freedom as universal consciousness of subjectivity sees man as a subject whose 'divine' nature surpasses phenomenal nature in its superior intellectual potentialities. His force is seen to reside in his capacity for 'self-consciousness'; a consciousness of his subjectivity in nature. Equality is found in the potential whose development is left up to the consciousness of the individual of his subjective possibilities; he may, as Pico so eloquently stated "degenerate to animality or be reborn towards divinity...". Moreover, unlike the scientific definition, the teleology of man may not be realised in mere matter, for man is worthy of higher achievement: that of the development of the superiority of his intellect. Matter cannot be that towards which humanity aims, for it lies beneath humanity in value. This has been clearly stated by Pico in his criticism of astrology where he suggests that subjective universal freedom may only exist when the determination of man's will is the result of his own mind and not affected by any cosmic influence; for, according to Pico as stated by Cassirer:

To accept astrology means to invert not so much the order of being as the order of value--it means making of 'matter' the master of spirit.⁵¹

This view of astrology emphasises Pico's rejection of the expression of subjectivity through the material sphere. It appears even more significant when taking into account the popular view of astrology in Renaissance thought. Astrology imparted a 'spiritual' character to the stars and to the effect of their movements rendering their activity, their effect on earth and its inhabitants an act of God, a spiritual rather than a material effect. Pico's achievement in his rejection of astrology is twofold. He aims to free the concept of God from its status as the eternal dweller of the cosmos and elevates it to the realm of impalpable spirit thereby reducing the stars to their substantial being while leaving man to shoulder the responsibility for his own development and of the result of his own actions. Pico emphasises that man's potentiality develops through his own will and not through the expression of the material object upon it. Man, through the realisation of his own 'worth' and 'dignity' should be able to impress his will upon the natural, and contrary to the Hobbesian man, his will is innate and superior to the power of attraction of matter in nature.

In Pico Della Mirandola's philosophy one may find expressed in all its simplicity the formula for the achievement of individual autonomy, namely that of individual responsibility. Pico and Bruno put tremendous emphasis on the will of the individual as the shaper of his destiny. In this tradition one may recognise the idea that generated such tremendous historical development embodied in the French revolution. However, this idea alone could hardly spur on a revolution if left unaccompanied with a theory that would give it means for action: that theory was expressed explicitly in the scientific tradition of Kepler and Paracelsus. Science, and its methodical, mechanical and concrete

mastery of nature through reason, appeased the incertitude concerning humanity's potentialities through its very efficiency. The later Renaissance found refuge in science due to the latter's demonstration of infallibility in terms of its theoretical claims to knowledge. Knowledge in the Renaissance had also a dynamic interpretation; it was at once knowledge of matter and of spirit. In the scientific definition man's spirit was not wholly separated from that of matter due to man's subjection to the laws of nature, hence the laws of physics and of regeneration. The definition of man as the owner of a subjectivity capable of universal self-consciousness emphasised the knowledge of both worlds while keeping constant the superiority of the human spirit to material nature. Man was considered a natural being who was, nevertheless, chosen to articulate the beauty and intelligence of which nature was denied the expression; hence knowledge here extended from the realisation of the 'subject' of his 'subjectivity' to the expression of this knowledge of nature and of self in an artistic form. It should be emphasised, however, that the knowledge of the spirit necessarily preceded that of objective nature. In spite of these essential teleological differences, the Renaissance definitions of freedom affirmed that man's realisation of his independence would have to find an expression in the objective world, hence through an affirmation of his capacities; an affirmation that can withstand traditional scepticism. Needless to say this affirmation found its expression through the demonstration of scientific discoveries and scientific reason.

Scientific reason, as indicated above, was considered as the scientific definition's 'means' to a teleology of nature. What occurred here is that this very type of reason that was the 'means' of the scientific definition became the 'telos' of freedom expressed through a universal subjective teleology of reason. This occurred because the latter

definition, although seeking the realisation of human subjectivity not in the material but rather in its intellectual potentialities, expressed the realisation of its telos in the objective world or reason. Since this very 'telos' met with 'scientific reason' as its limited means for actualisation, it succumbed to a feigned unity with the telos of the scientific definition thereby binding it automatically to the world of matter. Freedom as the realisation of a consciousness of universal subjectivity can only be realised through 'reason' which it posits as its 'end'. In its very nature this type of freedom has to be realised in concrete terms in the social world. Its expression in the social world needs a society which is aware of the subjectivity of the individual and which is ready to undertake the establishment of such freedom. This, in spite of the definite development and rise of individuality in the Renaissance, was not socially possible. The social structure of the Renaissance was still hierarchical and subordinated to the power of the Catholic Church⁵². The very realisation of this freedom presupposed the existence of a society which is receptive of such freedom. Hence, incapable of gaining social expression, freedom as the realisation of subjectivity met with the rising power of instrumental reason through which it can be expressed, if only partially, on the concrete material plane. With instrumental reason it found a common notion of freedom, this was material freedom rather than subjective freedom. However, since freedom as universal self-consciousness can only be realised through a 'liberating' concept of reason, its realisation in the Renaissance could only be achieved through scientific or instrumental reason. Hence, equality in subjectivity, became in the Hobbesian sense, a given, it is no longer to be achieved but is already an achievement which in turn gives rise to consciousness of an equality based on the material plane.

One may be urged to ask the results of this theoretical amalgamation of both concepts

of freedom. Theoretically, as Alasdair MacIntyre will quickly point out, the definition of freedom as the realisation of universal subjectivity becomes the ideological bases, the spiritual dimension of liberty expressed in material means. Freedom as universal subjectivity whose telos is instated in the realisation of reason (which is now considered as instrumental) reaches its own realisation within instrumental reason, thereby becoming the ideological means to a material end (freedom from necessity). Several ideological modifications have now taken place, most importantly (and this will appear in a radical manner in the philosophy of the Enlightenment which is responsible for the outbreak of the French revolution) with regards to the essential nature of man and his telos. In the following paragraphs I will try to illustrate the alteration in the ideology which freedom as the realisation of universal subjectivity affected upon entering the scientific ideology of instrumental reason. However, it should be emphasised that this is an apparant unity signifying the eclipse of freedom as self-consciousness' essential charactaristic: the eclipse of reason as the telos of subjectivity.

Man as the possessor of 'dignity' and moral 'worth' has become the possessor of calculating and precise reason. The man whose "soul" as Ficino states "is not made up of the single parts that form the macrocosm; rather, it is directed according to its intention towards all of these parts, but without ever being completely fixed or exhausted in any one direction. And this direction comes not from without but from within the soul itself. No overpowering fate, no violence of nature draws the soul down to the sensible world; nor does it passively receive divine grace that raises it up to the super-sensible..."⁵³, has become the man of the industrial revolution whose soul seems forever enchained to the world of matter. Human spiritual self-knowledge became identical with physical

knowledge of the material universe. The vision of man as a part of nature which is endowed with the intellectual capacity to perceive and articulate its essence was dropped to be replaced by the instrumental reason's vision of man whose very being is subject to the material laws of physics. This transition reduced the knowledge of the quality of humanity to a question of quantitative measures. Man can know himself through science, a process of knowledge that reduces everything to matter beyond which man is considered a non-entity emptied of all spiritual content. Man, nevertheless, retained a fragment from the definition of freedom as the realisation of universal subjectivity, concerned with his realisation of self-knowledge and subjectivity in the real world which was to be achieved in the realisation of reason. However, since the concept of reason adopted was that of the sciences, it seemed as if the realisation of the telos of freedom as universal subjectivity became a given when one attained instrumental reason. As a result 'subjectivity' became synonymous with instrumental reason thereby allowing the spiritual side of humanity to fall into oblivion.

The 'end' of humanity remained identical to that found in the definition of liberty as freedom from necessity, but with one more ideological dimension. Liberty from traditional chains that inhibited the 'subject's' expression, as well as liberty as the realisation of human equality were retained, however, their attainment took on a material twist. Subjectivity and freedom of the intellect became synonymous with freedom from material want, and the achievement of subjective universal equality became materially obtainable. In the fusion of these two conceptions of freedom the spirituality of the human subject became indispensable for the actualisation of individualism in active socio-political upheavals such as the French revolution. It appeared so, simply because

matter alone could not inspire humanity into revolt; matter needed a human dimension through which it lodged itself, although artificially, in the mind and spirit of humanity. It is through its very precise study of humanity's search for idealism that mechanical reason could take hold and control humanity. This is the form in which the age of enlightenment received the philosophy of the Renaissance; the latter's very product as fusion of both conceptions of freedom was best illustrated in the liberal philosophy of Thomas Hobbes whose work and position in history will be shown to be the illustrator of the period of transition between the two ages.

The Age of Enlightenment received from the Renaissance the synthesis of a struggle between the conception of freedom as the realisation of universal subjectivity through self-consciousness and the conception of freedom as the overcoming of necessity. The last of the Renaissance philosophers, Thomas Hobbes, illustrated the predominance of the latter conception. In his philosophy, Hobbes attempted to free man from an overbearing and hierarchical society by suggesting to reduce the demands of society to a mere collection of laws which are subordinated to the purpose of human life preservation. These laws represent the set of rules which define the notions of 'good' and 'bad' in society. The equation of laws with social ethics necessarily associates Hobbes' theory of ethics with his political theory. In one sense this association may appear Aristotelean in character; it, however, differs from Aristotle's theory at least in one prominent feature, the material and conscious acknowledgement of human equality. In order to discover the importance of the latter we must first look at how Hobbes' political theory is the generator of his theory on social ethics.

Hobbes' most radical views were expressed in the *Leviathan* wherein he presents a

moral philosophy which is directly related to his psychological theory in which he constructs his mechanistic conception of motivation. By opposing the prevailing notion of his time, that which held that the mind and body are different substances, he maintains that mental phenomena are nothing but physiological motions. His method of psychology appears more strikingly in his mechanistic analysis of voluntary actions. These he relates and sees as a variety of "animal motions" which he calls endeavours, hence predispositions to act in a certain direction. Endeavours are mechanically initiated by sensory stimuli, inspired by the action of imagination and memory, and guided by a calculated appraisal of the situation. The most important kinds of endeavours are *desires* and *aversions*. Desires create the impulse to pursue objects, and aversions move one to avoid objects. Endeavours are not merely the chief determinants of behaviour, they are also the basis of evaluation. This relativist evaluation of objects suggests that no objects or actions are intrinsically good, hence, good by their very nature. Values are therefore transient, because the desire for a specific object in one moment may change to indifference or aversion in another. This entails that the same object may be desired, hated or perceived with indifference depending on the individual percipient.

A second aspect one finds in Hobbes' psychological theory is his theory of the nature of man. Man is purely egoistic. He is depicted as the possessor of a nature which is entirely selfish and devoid of any genuine feelings of sympathy, benevolence, or sociability. Every man is an individual whose main and sole preoccupation is the gratification of his immediately perceived desires, and his success in maintaining a continuous flow of gratifications is considered as the measure of the degree of his happiness. The means through which he attains his desired object is 'power'. In the

state of nature men have in general approximately the same degrees of power, mental and physical. Within the condition of constant struggle of equivalent 'powers', intense competition arises thereby eliminating virtually all chances for an individual to achieve happiness and, what is more grave, it can threaten his very existence⁵⁴.

It is at this point of the argument that Hobbes conceives of the voluntary collective organisation of individuals who are driven to it by the use of calculating reason. Within this organisation laws are enacted with the acceptance of every individual to obey them; these laws are mainly set to provide for the presence of the necessary and sufficient conditions of survival within which the conditions for moral obligation is present. As professors Albert, Denise and Peterfreund tell us "whatever is in accordance with the law of the sovereign is *right*, whereas that which deviates from it is wrong. Hobbes thus establishes civil authority and law as the foundation of morality"⁵⁵. Hobbes seems to argue that morality should be vested in the hands of social authorities who constitute the legislative power through the use of law. Although the power of the legislative authority is shown to be absolute in the *Leviathan*, it merely constitutes a limited amount of laws which forbid or allow, it cannot guide the behaviour of man in the actions of every day life. How is man to know what to do? It is surely not society who will dictate his daily behaviour, it is rather his nature which will guide him towards this knowledge; his nature will dictate to him, according to its own knowledge of its own subjectivity and its desires, the laws with which to abide. The latter are specifically based upon the knowledge of his universal equality with other individual subjects.

According to C.B. Macpherson⁵⁶ the subordination of the individual to the

commonwealth is based upon Hobbes' theory of obligation. For Hobbes, man is seen to be morally obligated towards the commonwealth, because of the latter's capacity to promote the preservation of the individual's life. Here Hobbes has been taken by post-Hobbesian theorists to be deriving 'Ought' from 'Is'. This is deduced from his affirmation that men ought to accept the arbitrary rule of the sovereign because of the evil which dwells in human nature. In other words, Hobbes is claiming that due to the fact that men are observed to be naturally evil, they 'ought' to follow the laws within society in order for them to attain self-preservation. This derivation of 'Ought' from 'Is' is seen by Macpherson to depend on an a-priori condition. According to Macpherson the moral obligation "can only be met if the society is one in which individuals are capable of seeing themselves as *equal* in some respect more important than all the respects in which they are unequal", hence it is only in such a society "can it be said, and accepted, that there is no reason why any man should claim superior rights"⁵⁷. Therefore, Hobbes' theory of society, despite of its prevalent scientific and mechanistic explanations of human nature, implies, nevertheless, the need for the recognition of the existence of a "universal subjectivity".

Hobbesian philosophy, as it appears in the middle of the seventeenth century, is representative of the type of philosophy with which the Age of Enlightenment was presented. Hobbes' theory on the moral obligation presupposes the presence of subjective self-consciousness acquired on a universal level thereby indicating that the definition of freedom as the realisation of subjective self-consciousness has been taken as a given by the definition of freedom as liberty from necessity. If my argument is correct it would be valid to assume that such a realisation of freedom as subjective

self-consciousness was never realised, for its very articulation was limited by the hierarchical social system of the Renaissance, and by the very effectiveness of instrumental reason. Pico, among other humanists, was aware of the incapacity of this type of freedom to be expressed within the Renaissance society; he is quoted by Cassirer as saying:

In the rigid hierarchical system, the value of freedom must always seem something foreign, something incommensurable and "irrational", because the order of mere being does not capture the meaning and the movement of becoming⁵⁸.

Hobbes' political theory is based upon a theory suggesting in implicit terms an acquired social sense of equality, of subjective self-consciousness. Man is seen to have recognised that as a biological creature he is equal to all other men, he is therefore conscious of his own subjective equality. This supposition caused the failure in the accuracy of the Hobbesian political theory. According to Macpherson:

The supposed factual equality from which he [Hobbes] argued directly to the necessity of political obligation was the equal ability of men to kill each other, which in the hypothetical state of nature entailed an equal insecurity of life and possessions. This supposed equality is not, however, a sufficient basis for political obligation of men in society⁵⁹.

Evidently, Hobbes' theory corresponds to a belief in the obvious knowledge of the "natural condition of mankind" which is available to who ever wants to observe it. This does not merely entail that he supposes the presence of an equality among men, but that this said equality is also widely known, hence, that men are conscious of their equality in

society. This however, as Macpherson points out, was not the case. For the equality within the hypothetical state of nature was not to be found within society, nor was the consciousness of such an equality evident in seventeenth century England. Hobbes' political theory represents the synthesis of the false unity between the two conceptions of freedom which occurred in the Renaissance. It demonstrates, also the type of incoherences which were inherited by the philosophers of the Enlightenment of which Kantian philosophy is a primary example.

Kant's theory of the moral categorical imperative is based upon the supposition that all men are subjects, they are aware of their subjectivity as one which is at once particular and universal. It is their awareness of this which gives them the possibility of formulating maxims which are only valid when they are universally applicable. Kant's theory has within its folds the latent belief in the actual presence of such a subjective consciousness within society. The natural man is for Kant a man who is already within society, whose consciousness of himself and of the universe is acutely developed. Moreover, Kant's support of the French revolution stems from his belief that it is the expression of the coming into being of this consciousness and its success in completely transforming the ideological basis of the social institutions. The French revolution meant for Kant the translation of this type of consciousness into action, not the transformation of these very institutions in order to obtain a socially instituted 'freedom from necessity' which was the actual purpose of the masses who stormed the Bastille and beheaded the French nobility. The very institution of the Age of Terror suggests quite plainly that a consciousness of universal subjectivity was not at hand; it did not in any ideological pattern follow the subjective consciousness of the Italian humanists. Where would the

French revolutionaries fit in Pico's scheme? One must realise that they did "fall into animality" for they were not employing their 'reason', they were, as the Hobbesian man, following their 'senses'.

If the suggestion that the Renaissance philosophy represents a false unity between the dialectical conceptions of freedom is correct, then it can be concluded that freedom as the realisation of subjectivity through self-consciousness is a conception which has been taken as a given upon which the philosophy of the Enlightenment built its project for rationalising morality. This suggestion indicates that the said definition of freedom is yet to be achieved thereby implying that humanity is not necessarily at an impasse as MacIntyre is suggesting. In its very nature this conception of freedom needed the alteration of the stifling social conditions found in the Renaissance for its realisation; does this suggest that Hegel's philosophy of History, and Habermas' belief in the "re-enchantment of the world" are awaiting conditions for their establishment? It is at least perfectly clear that the men who wrote of the *will* of man were aware of man's potentiality, it is therefore in our hands that lies our own re-enchantment, and it is up to us to follow C.S.Lewis' advice which states:

I do not think that all who choose wrong roads perish; but their rescue consists in being put back on the right road. A wrong sum can be put right: but only by going back till you find the error and working it afresh from that point; never by simply going on. Evil can be undone, but it cannot 'develop' into good⁶⁰.

The crisis which is upon us is not merely a crisis of 'reason' its major resolution does not merely lie in a comparison between teleology and instrumentality, it is also a crisis of

subjectivity within which the modern individual presently dwells. The realisation of the individual can only be made possible when the application of the teleology of reason within society extends to recognise the role of the subjective end within teleology. It is therefore paramount to regard the philosophy of the Renaissance man as an expression of humanity's deepest ambitions, to regard it not as a lifeless artistic expression, but also as the expression of man's ultimate purpose.

NOTES

1. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, ibid., p.141-142. Personal emphasis.
2. Ibid., p. 135
3. Ibid., p. 135
4. Ibid., p. 134
5. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, ibid., p. 377-78
6. Ibid., p. 379
7. Ibid., p. 380
8. For an explanation of syllogism or 'deductive reasoning' refer to chapter one on the problem of fact and value.
9. Ibid., p. 380. 'Mechanism is for Hegel the process of deductive reasoning found in the scientific method, and Chemism is the physical contribution of the subject to the realisation of the objective telos.
10. Ibid., p. 381
11. Ibid., p. 382
12. Ibid., p. 383
13. Ibid., p. 385
14. Ibid., p. 384
15. Ibid., p. 385
16. Ibid., p. 394
17. Ibid., p. 394
18. *After Virtue*, ibid., p. 175-76
19. *The Politics of Aristotle*, ibid., p. 6
20. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, ibid., IX, #13
21. Ibid., Bk I, 1097a15 - 1097b22
22. *The Politics of Aristotle*, ibid., p.6
23. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (London: Penguin classics, 1985), p. 121
24. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ibid., vol II, p.96-117
25. Ibid., p. 99
26. Ibid., p. 104
27. Ibid., p. 104
28. Ibid., p. 108
29. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, ibid., p. 244-245
30. Ernst Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 122
31. J.Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 149. On the perfecting of the individual in chapter II of Vol I., Burckhardt discusses the type of perfection to which the Italian Renaissance men evolved which he found as perfectly exhibited in the biography of Leon Battista Alberti who is shown to have contained within his soul, the courage and the agility of a knight and the sympathetic and emotional intensity of a poet.
32. Agnes Heller, *Renaissance Man*, trans. Richard E. Allen, (London; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1978), p. 20

33. Ibid., p. 307
34. Ibid., p. 327
35. Ibid., p. 326
36. Ibid., p. 306
37. Ibid., p. 305
38. Ibid., p. 436
39. Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos*, ibid., p. 85-6
40. ibid, p. 85
41. W. Ullman, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, (London, Oxford U.P., 1967), p. 40
42. P. Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Man in Italian Renaissance*, (London, Oxford U.P., 1947) p. 97
43. Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos*, ibid., p. 84
44. Heller, *Renaissance Man*, ibid, p. 393
45. Ibid., p. 384
46. Ibid., p. 388
47. Ibid., p. 384
48. Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos*, ibid., p. 89
49. Ibid., p. 89
50. Ibid., p. 92
51. Ibid., p. 118
52. For a profound discussion of the Renaissance man's struggle against the power of the Catholic Church, consult Georges Gusdorf, *Signification humaine de la liberté*, (Paris, Payot, 1962), p. 106-121
53. Cassirer, *Individual and Cosmos*, ibid., p. 64-65
54. The state of nature for Hobbes is necessarily a state of war, and in such a war "where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, ther is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; ... no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short". *Leviathan*, ibid., p. 186.
55. Albert, Denise & Peterfreund, *Great Traditions in Ethics*, ibid., p. 137
56. C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, (London: Oxford U.P., 1985), Chapter II. , p. 9-106
57. Ibid., p. 83
58. Cassirer, *The Individual and Cosmos*, ibid., p. 84
59. Macpherson, ibid., p. 84
60. C.S. Lewis, *The Great Divorce*, (London: Collins Founts, 1946), p. 7-8

The Crisis Revisited

In the present work I have attempted to demonstrate how the crisis of modernity may be conceived as the domination of the Scientific Method of all fields of epistemology. Through the presentation of the work of several modern authors, with a specific concentration on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, the present work aimed to demonstrate the method with which modernity is dealing with its crisis, and suggests that this same method is that of Scientific Method. This method studies the problems prevailing in modern society in a compartmentalising rather than a totalising manner. The breaking down of the elements of the crisis into the object of study of several modern disciplines such as economy, political science, sociology, communication, and the like is not merely indicative of the infiltration of the Scientific Method into all domains of epistemology, but it is also indicative of a grave problem which has occurred within the process of thinking itself. Through the study of the crisis in different unconnected (or at least distinct) disciplines there arises a definite lack in the unity of the whole. One comes to analyse the crisis as does MacIntyre: i.e. by concentrating on one part of the problem while completely undermining the other. In MacIntyre's case, this resulted in his claim of a supremacy of society and a denial of human subjectivity. This occurred due to MacIntyre's emphasis on the predominance of sociology over other fields of study (this he makes explicit in his book *After Virtue*). With such a view there is no totality, no teleology, but tyranny and overwhelming social domination. MacIntyre's failure represents in essence the crisis of modernity and its thought.

To clarify this point one must look at the manner social elements are pitted against

each other in modern political theory. When an author thinks of the problem of society, such as MacIntyre does, he forgets about man; similarly, when he thinks of the problem of man, such as does Nozick, he forgets about society. In this thought there exists a lack of harmony, wherein both society and man can coexist without a proverbial tug-of-war. It seems that in the struggle between individual and community, the latter almost always emerges as the winner. This power struggle between individual and community may only subside when the community includes within its telos (end) not merely its own survival, but also the positive growth of its members. This type of community may only attain its equilibrium when it can promote the recognition of the universal subjectivity of its members. Using Horkheimer's terminology, society must 'remember man'.

In order to emphasise the Idea of a 'unity', this work has tried to point out several theoretical links between reason, human nature and the creation of a political association. It has tried to show the dependence of the definition of the nature of 'man' to the definition of 'reason', and the product of the latter two's association as a direct link on the theory of the state. It has tried to demonstrate that this type of association is not merely the characteristic of the Greek society, but also of modern liberal society. In view of such an association, it would be then impossible to maintain a vision of society similar to that of MacIntyre's: i.e. in an exclusive mode, completely separate from any expression of a human nature or will. As one views society he cannot see it as separate from humanity, and when one views man he cannot view him as devoid of any substantial willful content. The theory of teleology itself aims towards an overarching unity between man, social telos and externality (the Other). Within this process no element can be undermined, any break will cause the deformation of the telos and will

hinder its realisation.

It is therefore the object of this work to point out the manner with which modernity fails to arrive to a solution to its crisis. This is seen as due to its failure to view the problem in terms of an interconnected, hence unified, set of factors rather than in terms of negative, stratified elements among which reigns the law of causality. This failure is prevalent in the manner it searches to overcome its crisis, which is plainly represented in the philosophy of A. MacIntyre. The answer to the crisis according to MacIntyre is based upon the success in the rendering of philosophy rationally defensible which entails the subjection of philosophy (normally a totalising science) to modern Scientific Method, hence, reducing it to *a science*. This very reduction, as we have seen in the case of MacIntyre's analysis, becomes theoretically incompatible with the realisation of a teleology of the state due to the elimination of one element: in MacIntyre's case, it is the elimination of human subjectivity and the subjective end, an elimination that the suggestion in chapter three above tries to dispute and replace. However, one may be tempted to pose the following question: what of the results and the shortcomings of the alternative suggested? In other words, how is a recognition of the historical origins of individualism and the remaining possibility regarding subjective self-consciousness are capable of providing a solution to the crisis, and how is this solution to be realised?

The suggested alternative is important for several reasons. In the first instance, it provides a suggestion indicating the importance of the Renaissance in the study of philosophy in general, and in political theory in particular. Its importance stems not from its apparent results as such, but from its capacity to indicated with much clarity the

original intentions of the 'reborn' individual. It demonstrates man's changing perception of his world and of his own telos. It also demonstrates man's awokeness to his humanity, to his own human capacity and worth. This recognition is vital to the understanding of the developments which occurred in the social and political spheres in the Enlightenment. Hence, a recognition of the historical origins of individualism as the product of earlier Renaissance thought is vital to the understanding of the concept of man by the Enlightenment project theorists.

In essence, it is through the study of the prevalent philosophy of man in the Renaissance that one was able to demonstrate the presence of an original notion of a 'subjective teleology' and explain its nature and purpose. In MacIntyre's analysis one may get the impression that a theory of a subjectivity is a Kantian invention. It is certainly not Kantian, but it is a product of Renaissance philosophy's awareness of humanity and its demand to be recognised as a holder of an 'end' in itself, and not merely a vessel which is discarded whenever society is no longer in need of it. This does not, however, answer the question how does this recognition provide a possible solution to the crisis?

The suggestion by all means does not imply a solution, it merely indicates a lacuna in the modern approach to the analysis of the crisis of modernity. However, its own recognition of this lacuna leaves us with many suggestions for a solution, of which I will only suggest one obvious example in order to illustrate the benefit of the suggestion.

The recognition that a 'universal consciousness of subjectivity' is yet to be achieved,

and that unlike the thought of late Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers it is not a given, an already acquired achievement. The fact that this is not a given can be illustrated in the presence of relations of dominance and power in all human association, as well as the glaring use of violence against others even in capitalist societies such as the United States. This recognition suggests that consciousness has not yet embraced the universal, it remains to be subsumed in the particular. This also suggests that in such a case no teleology may come into being thereby allowing society to drift endlessly in irrationalism. This suggestion lies in accord with the account of the crisis of almost all of the modern theorists mentioned herein (with the exception of perhaps Habermas). It, however, differs in one specific manner: it aims to provide the missing element to the process of end-realisation. It does not simply explain the present 'spiritlessness' of modern man as the result of instrumental reason, but goes beyond this to show that both classical and modern societies did not succeed in arriving at a teleological theory of society due to their denial of the 'subjective end', hence due to the fact that they both 'forget about man'.

As a solution, the recognition of the possibility of the realisation of a universal consciousness of subjectivity is not reliable on its own. Such a process is hard if not impossible to measure, and its efficiency in the solving of the modern crisis may be put into question. For its applicability, it needs to be implemented within a wider social scope. In its nature, it strongly suggests an increase in the promotion of social and universal consciousness which are only realisable within a certain social context. This is not to slip into the solution suggested by MacIntyre, it merely suggests that in order for such a consciousness to be highly developed it does not merely suffice to depend on the power of the individual for its realisation, it should also be practiced on the social level.

This suggestion differs from MacIntyre's in one important sense: it does not in any manner suggest the nonexistence of human subjectivity. The success of the realisation of this 'consciousness' would be based on a theory of knowledge promoting awareness of the relationship of the 'self' to the 'Other'. It is, in this sense, the overcoming of human alienation from the 'Other', a universal blending of particulars into an overarching unity. As a theory of knowledge it is able to suggest a unified telos whose implementation cannot be imposed as MacIntyre is suggesting, it has to develop through human awareness in order for it to be actualised.

The crisis of modernity is, as MacIntyre claims, a crisis of society, and as Husserl claims, a crisis of man. In essence, it is both, because one cannot exist without the other. Perceived thus, the crisis cannot be solved if one concentrates upon one or the other, it has to be derived from a unified study of both. Their coexistence and interdependence demands the recognition of their prevailing individuality within their ultimate unity.

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