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**DECONSTRUCTIONS  
OF  
SUBJECTIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY:  
JACQUES DERRIDA'S  
ECO-POLITICAL  
AND  
BIOETHICAL  
THOUGHT**

**DOCTORAL THESIS  
PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT  
UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA  
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## **ABSTRACT**

The first chapter explains Derrida's notion of the trace as the opening of subjectivity to alterity. Autonomy must be rethought as a heteronomic relation with nonhuman others—beings of the world, ecosystems, etc. The second chapter explains the ethical relevance of Husserl's thought for Derrida's project. The third chapter explains many of the implications of Derrida's thought in *Of Grammatology*. Some of the distinctions between humans and other animals are rethought. In the fourth chapter, Derrida opens Rousseau's conceptions of pity and justice to include nonhuman animals. Next, the deconstruction of Being-towards-death has many implications, such as opening *Dasein's* responsibility to nonhuman animals. Chapter six claims that we must move beyond the duty of Kant. We must do so in order to be more responsible to the uniqueness of the other, including other cats and horses. Finally, the essential condition of the opening of the ethical and the political is the affirmation of nature and animality, contrary to the thought of Hegel.

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**DECONSTRUCTIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY:  
DERRIDA'S ECO-POLITICAL AND BIOETHICAL THOUGHT**

**INTRODUCTION**

By this time, numerous commentators have discussed the works and thought of Jacques Derrida. Some commentators, such as, Rudolphe Gasché, have extensively discussed the ethical relevance of Derrida's deconstructions.<sup>1</sup> Some, like Niall Lucy and Caputo, have even noticed that Derrida's thought is explicitly relevant to considerations of environmental ethics and animal rights.<sup>2</sup>

Caputo discusses the Derridean notion of:

the obligation I have to you ... and the both of "us" to "others." Even the notion of "others" must be spread out and disseminated, so as to include not only other human beings but what is other than humans—animals, e.g. or other living things generally, and even the earth itself.<sup>3</sup>

Caputo also claims that Derrida's notion of the 'new international' is an ethical coalition of all types of individuals who have been excluded from ethical significance and legal representation, which applies to human races and to other species.<sup>4</sup>

Other commentators do not dispute the ethical relevance of Derrida's deconstructions. They do, however, dispute the efficacy of Derrida's thought for politics in general, and for politics as it relates to environmental ethics. Simon Critchley, for example, does not recognize any basis for a politics or for political

action in Derrida's thought. He argues:

Deconstruction can certainly be employed as a powerful means of political analysis ... But how is one to account for the move from undecidability to the political *decision* to combat that domination?<sup>5</sup>

Arran E. Gare claims that although Derrida has written on ethical and political issues, his work does not provide any solutions for politics and environmental ethics. Gare claims:

The work of Derrida ... is of little help ... despite the efforts of Derrida to demonstrate the political relevance of his work.<sup>6</sup>

David Harvey has written, perhaps, the strongest accusation against the political contribution of Derrida's deconstructions.

He states:

Consider, for example, Derrida's extraordinary fantasy in *Spectres of Marx* in which immersion in the flows is thought somehow to be radical and revolutionary in itself. The move that makes this possible is to separate "dialectics" from all tangible sense of historical-geographical conditions as well as from any rootedness in a tangible and organized politics.<sup>7</sup>

V.A. Conley understands Derrida's project to have much political potential. However:

in the environment of his deconstructive manoeuvre, Derrida's allusion to geopolitics is not kept in view. In a world of human-made commodities, geopolitics float away and lose their environmental force.<sup>8</sup>

These writers, then, have not been able to comprehend how Derrida's project is relevant to political thought and action. They have also failed to understand any connection between Derrida's discussion of political and ethical issues and environmental thought. For those who have noticed such a

connection, they have left this topic in the margins of their own commentaries.

The purpose of this essay, then, is to demonstrate that Derrida's project is very concerned with and relevant to ethical and political thought in general. More specifically, Jacques Derrida's deconstructions offer a very comprehensive approach to thinking in those areas of study that are commonly designated as environmental ethics, bioethics, and eco-politics.

Therefore, the first reason for attempting this project is in order to provide a comprehensive elucidation of the eco-political, environmental ethical and bioethical significance of Derrida's texts. The second reason for this study is to demonstrate that Derrida's project offers a new approach to the problems that philosophers, political thinkers, and environmental ethicists have been debating. In some cases, his claims and conclusions may be the same as other environmental thinkers. However, Derrida's thought offers a different perspective. Similarly, Derrida can be understood as one of many authors who are critical of the humanist philosophical tradition of the West. That is, one might include him in the environmental ethicist camp. However, not only does his project challenge the humanist tradition, Derrida's thought also challenges the conceptual systems in which these environmental and bioethical thinkers produce their arguments.

One might argue that many of these environmental thinkers fall prey to what Derrida calls logocentrism.<sup>9</sup> More specifically, they think within the parameters of metaphysical language and concepts. In the case of Aldo Leopold it is obvious, even though his Land Ethic has close affinities with Derrida's project. One such affinity is the ethical significance of the "call of the wolf" on the mountain.<sup>10</sup> Still, Leopold uses traditional metaphysical and scientific concepts that Derrida's thought puts into question. According to Leopold, "the trend of evolution is to elaborate and diversify the biota."<sup>11</sup> The extension of ethics to other species is also regarded as a process of evolution.<sup>12</sup> As a way of discussing the relation between species in the "food chain," Leopold discusses the biotic pyramid. Both issues assume what Derrida's thought of the trace puts into question, namely, a process that started at a simple point and develops into a more elaborate system.

Derrida also puts into question the "idea" of a "natural" state of things, which Leopold and others like to think as being pure from relations with man. Eric Katz writes:

I argue that value exists in nature to the extent that it avoids the domination of human technological practice. Technology can satisfy human wants by creating the artifactual products we desire, but it cannot supply, replace, or restore the "wild."<sup>13</sup>

Eric Katz affirms the following position of Thomas H. Birch:

The entire process of creating and maintaining wilderness reservations by human law is contradictory, for the

wilderness is destroyed by the power of the human technological system.<sup>14</sup>

Birch, Katz and others have a Rousseauist outlook which represents "Nature" as pure and innocent, as something that man's activities corrupt. These thinkers still use the nature/culture distinction and regard man as nonnatural. Therefore, any and all relations between humans and beings of other species are regarded as "interference" with nature. Even laws to protect an ecosystem or forest are regarded as technologies, artefacts, and foreign externalities to the purity of nature. Fundamentally, some of these environmental thinkers are like the humanist thinkers in that they want a clear distinction and separation between nature and humanity. Derrida's deconstructions provide a new approach to thinking such issues.

Peter Singer also has many threads of agreement with the project of Derrida. He develops a perspective that centres on the moral principle of equal consideration of interests, which he extends to animals.<sup>15</sup> This is similar to the Derridean extension of ego and subjectivity in the deconstructions of Husserl and Rousseau as a basis for reciprocity. However, Singer still uses a conceptual hierarchy in his thought about beings. J. Baird Callicot refers to Singer's approach as extensionism. Peter Singer and Tom Regan attempt to articulate a moral ground for animals "by extending ... traditional Western humanistic moral theory so that it recognizes the moral standing of some nonhuman

natural entities."<sup>16</sup> On the one hand, Derrida certainly works within the same parameters. However, his project also goes beyond those limits, as is clear throughout this essay. For Derrida's project deconstructs one of Singer's most important arguments for extending moral consideration to other animals, namely, that some animals have self-consciousness.<sup>17</sup> And even if Singer represents animals as self-conscious, still he will not represent them as being responsible.<sup>18</sup> Derrida's thought also argues for the animal's ability to represent itself, however, it does so in a new context. Furthermore, Derrida does not limit ethical significance to what have been called sentient beings. And he provides the condition of possibility of representing animals as responsible.

Thinkers like Tim Hayward argue that Kant's system offers the basis of a comprehensive, anthropocentric environmental ethic.<sup>19</sup> There is no doubt that Hayward is correct. However, the deconstruction of Kant will reveal the limits of Kant's thought, especially with regard to justice and responsibility for animals and others.

John Llewelyn's *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience* is a book that finds a space for ecological consideration in the thought of Heidegger.<sup>20</sup> The question is what type of ecological conscience does Heidegger's work provide? Derrida is very critical of Heidegger with regards to Heidegger's representation

of animality and the privilege of *Dasein*. Even though Derrida affirms and incorporates much of Heidegger's thought, he is critical of the metaphysics of presence found in Heidegger's existential analytic of *Dasein*'s Being-toward-death as the self-realization of *Dasein*. Similarly, even though Derrida would find much to affirm in the project of Arne Naess, the traditional theme of self-realization as the blossoming of a being is addressed by Derrida's work.<sup>21</sup>

The focus of this essay will be on two concepts, subjectivity and responsibility. As for responsibility, Derrida's deconstructions are attempting to think and articulate a "... sense of responsibility without limit."<sup>22</sup> What is at stake is thinking a conception of responsibility beyond traditional theories of ethics and politics, which assume a particular theory of ego, self-consciousness, liberty, etc.<sup>23</sup> More specifically, Derrida's project includes an attempt to account for the very condition of possibility of responsibility. This condition of possibility of responsibility will not only provide an account of how and why we are responsible for another human being, but also how and why we are responsible for animals, and beings of all species. What is needed, therefore, is a conception of subjectivity that can account for this sense of responsibility.

Many of Derrida's deconstructions have focused on the notion of subjectivity. The problem with the traditional theories of

subjectivity is that they have been "carno-phallogocentric." To analyse this notion into its elements, logocentrism can be defined as Derrida's interpretation of the philosophical tradition's conception of the human being as the thinking and speaking subjectivity. Derrida writes:

logocentrism is first of all a thesis regarding the animal, the animal deprived of *logos*, deprived of the *can-have-the-logos*: this is the thesis, position, or presupposition maintained from Aristotle to Heidegger, from Descartes to Kant.<sup>24</sup>

The "phallic" element is Derrida's suggestion that the philosophical tradition has regarded the male as a higher form of subjectivity compared to the female. And the "carno" prefix implies that the philosophical tradition has always regarded the male human subjectivity as a meat eater.<sup>25</sup> That is, with few exceptions, the philosophical tradition has conceived of the male human subject as having no responsibility to animals, or any other type of nonhuman beings. Furthermore, as Derrida points out, the major thinkers in the philosophical tradition have also excluded animals from having a sense of responsibility.<sup>26</sup>

Therefore, one might define "carno-phallogocentrism" as the conception of the male, thinking, understanding and speaking subject who has no responsibilities to animals or other species.

Derrida claims that this has always been a primary concern of his deconstructions. He writes:

the two big "deconstructive" type questions, or the subject of "deconstruction": that of the concept of history and of

phallogocentrism ... And even of sacrificial "carno-phallogocentrism."<sup>27</sup>

By attempting to deconstruct what he calls sacrificial carno-phallogocentrism, Derrida is telling us that he does not agree with those philosophers who have believed that it is not immoral and not unethical to sacrifice an animal, either kill it or use it, because the animal is represented as not having the ability to speak, think or understand.

In this respect, Derrida is following the tradition of Bentham. Concerning responsibility towards animals, Derrida claims:

The *first* and *decisive* question will rather be to know whether animals *can suffer* ... "Can they suffer?" asks Bentham simply yet so profoundly. Once its protocol is established, the form of this question changes everything ... No one can deny the suffering, fear or panic, the terror or fright that humans witness in certain animals.<sup>28</sup>

Although one can never be present to the lived experience of another, there is massive empirical evidence that animals show signs of suffering, fear, terror, etc. For Derrida, like Bentham and a few others, namely, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, what matters morally, ethically, politically and legally, is not whether something can think and speak, but if it suffers.

The following chapters contain an exposition of Derrida's deconstructions of subjectivity in the projects of Husserl, Rousseau, Heidegger, Kant and Hegel. These chapters also contain an exposition of Derrida's thought of responsibility in the

context of ethics, including environmental ethics and bioethics, and politics, including eco-politics and animal rights. One can understand Derrida's project as rethinking the traditional conceptions of subjectivity in order to provide a basis for a thought and experience of responsibility, which is radical in the sense that it has not been conceived by the above mentioned philosophers, and certainly radical in the sense that it extends equally to animals and beings of other species.

The first chapter is Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's subjectivity. It is the first chapter because it is the frame of reference and the basis for understanding what follows. Derrida's interpretations of the trace and signification are the themes on which the remainder of the essay depend. Furthermore, this chapter establishes the basis of Derrida's account of the condition of possibility of responsibility, namely, the irreducible relation with the other. Finally, this deconstruction can be construed as Derrida's deconstruction of the notion of self-consciousness, that is, as one of his most essential deconstructions of logocentrism. The result is that the distinction between man and animal is aporetic. Man would have an irreducibly constitutive relation with animals and nature. This is the condition of possibility of responsibility for animals and others.

The second chapter demonstrates the basis of Derrida's

ethical thought in that of Husserl's phenomenology. It consists of the clarification and development of the ethical implications of the trace within the context of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As another facet of the deconstruction of logocentrism, the distinction between man and animal is revealed to be aporetic due to Husserl's teleological notion of Reason. With these deconstructions of logocentric subjectivity, Derrida is rethinking the limits and criteria that have precluded animals and other species from philosophy's conceptions and applications of justice. As a result of the thought of the trace, ex-appropriation is Derrida's description of intersubjective interactions. Derrida applies this new conception of subjectivity to all beings.

The third chapter is Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau's articulate subjectivity. In general, this can be read as an attempt to rethink the idea of the logocentric, speaking subject. This chapter continues the work of the first chapter as it develops Derrida's understanding of signification and language. It also builds on the discussion of the trace and reveals its many consequences for our thinking of the attributes of humans and animals. Some of the major consequences that Derrida's thought produce are the following: the aporetic distinction between man and animal regarding passion, articulation, imagination, freedom, representation, culture, society, nature;

the claim against hierarchies of language, culture and society, including animal languages and societies; the representational character of speech and the impossibility of speaking the thing itself; that all beings are supplements to one another; and the possibility that animals and others have self-representation.

The fourth chapter discusses how imagination and signification are at work in ethics. Derrida discusses Rousseau's notion of compassion for others. Compassion implies the identity with the suffering of the other. However, a Husserlian difference must be maintained, otherwise, the suffering of the other would become one's own. In the context of Rousseau's formalized conception of pity as law, Derrida discusses justice and responsibility for animals with reference to emancipation battles. If animals are represented as having the faculty of imagination, which this chapter and the previous chapter argue, then humans must recognize that animals can represent to themselves images of the past and anticipations of the future, including an idea of their own death. Finally, Derrida discusses imagination as imitation. The resulting claim is that representation is the possibility and impossibility of ethics.

The deconstruction of Heidegger's *Dasein* and conception of responsibility focuses on Heidegger's discussion of Being-toward-death. Once again, the thinker's conceptual distinction between man and animal breaks down. The implication of this

deconstruction, Derrida argues, is that hospitality, mourning and politics are justifiably attributable to animals. This chapter relies heavily on the previous discussions of the trace and signification. Although Derrida affirms Heidegger's thought of Being as a condition of responsibility, the trace and signification are used to show the limits of Being. Being cannot think the gift as unconditional affirmation. The trace is the possibility of the relation to the other in the movements that Derrida calls double affirmation. And this is the possibility of responsibility and justice. It is also the condition of thinking the "I" as responsible. Furthermore, the responsibility of the double affirmation opens up the thought of a new conception of "we" and "world" in which humans find their identities and responsibilities in responding to the calls of animals and every other type of being.

The deconstruction of Kant's conception of the moral subject is an attempt to demonstrate that Derrida's thought of a responsible decision moves philosophy into environmental ethics, bioethics and eco-politics. What Derrida names the 'passive decision' is the outcome of the trace, double affirmation and gift. One is responsible for the other as one invents a decision with the other. Will and autonomy, therefore, must be rethought on the basis of heteronomy.

Next, the conditions of a responsible decision, the three

aporias, as Derrida defines them, are briefly discussed in the context of Kant's moral law and law in general. At this point, Critchley's misunderstanding of Derrida's term "undecidability" is addressed in order to clarify Derrida's position on the ethical and political nature of his conception of the responsible decision. The Derridean claim is that one must recognize a sense of responsibility in the decision that goes beyond Kant's sense of duty.

Derrida rethinks Kant's Categorical Imperative as unconditional double affirmation, which applies equally to animals and other beings. Double affirmation recontextualizes Kant's teleological system, which has represented man and his political culture as the end of nature. Derrida's claim is that thinkers like Kant have irresponsibly represented animals, such as horses, as essentially 'instruments' of man. The recontextualization of Kant's metaphysico-ethico-political system rethinks hospitality as duty beyond Kant's humanist perspectives of duty. The trace and ex-appropriation as double affirmation open man to the command of other species. The "end" of man, then, is the promise of responsibility and justice for all beings.

The final chapter is the culmination of Derridean thought in its major claim. That is, the condition of possibility of ethics and politics is the unconditional affirmation of and the unlimited responsibility for what we call animals and natural

beings. Therefore, ethics and politics must essentially be environmental ethics, bioethics and eco-politics. This is presented as the unthought aspect of Hegel's ethics and politics, which is based on the sacrifice of nature, animality, and animals.

The possibility of Derrida's claim is in his thought of the trace and the gift. The discourse on the gift is elaborated further. It is described as the affirmative force that precedes and gives rise to all beings, including the movement of Hegel's dialectical thought, and Hegel's interpretation of consciousness. The gift is constricted into presence as the economy of exchange. This is another way of explaining the work of the trace as ex-appropriation, which is the matrix of philosophical thought and existence in general. Finally, this chapter provides further elaboration of the responsible decision. The passive decision must be invented such that it is unconditionally affirmative of and responsible for both the natural singularities and the Hegelian universal.

The criteria for choosing the deconstructions of these particular philosophers are simple. Husserl and Heidegger must be included because their projects have had the most influence on the thought of Derrida. Husserl is discussed first because the deconstruction of Husserl's transcendental subjectivity is the fundamental departure of Derrida's thought. The discussions of

the trace, the sign, and the relation with others are the bases for understanding the Derridean project and this particular essay.

Heidegger is also essential to understanding Derrida's thought. That chapter of deconstruction is positioned where it is for a couple of reasons. First of all, the trace, signification and the relation with the other are assumed. Secondly, the deconstruction of the articulate subject, and the elaboration of Derrida's thoughts of the trace and signification were necessary in order to point out the limits of Heidegger's Being. And so, a deconstruction of Rousseau was necessary.

Furthermore, this project is moving from the most basic condition of responsibility, namely, the account of the relation with the other, to more specific accounts of relating to the other. And so the second chapter develops, to use metaphysical language, the implications of the first. The chapters on Rousseau use the claims from the chapters on Husserl to provide a more detailed account of an ethical relation with others, including animals. For example, one of the major claims of the Rousseau chapters is that animals have societies. In the chapter on Heidegger, the next claim in that regard is that animals can be thought of as political. One might look at this as an elaboration or development of the consequences of the arguments.

The chapter on Heidegger is a more detailed account of

Derrida's thoughts of responsibility, which assumed the discussions of the previous chapters. These discussions of the double affirmation, gift, justice and responsibility are the basis for the discussion of the passive decision in the deconstruction of Kant. The ethical and political approach to Derrida's thought is more specific here. Finally, there is the move from the obvious environmental ethical and eco-political facets of Derrida's thought to the claim that ethics and politics must essentially be thought as environmental ethics, bioethics and eco-politics. So the chapter on Kant is in the second last position because Derrida's texts on Kant have much to do with decision and duty. The deconstruction of Hegel occupies the final chapter because the radical Derridean claim arises from the Hegelian context. Furthermore, this chapter assumes the previous discussions of the trace, ex-appropriation, double affirmation, the passive decision and political recontextualization.

## CHAPTER I

The main point of this chapter is to show that Derrida's reading of Husserl provides a deconstruction of Husserl's notion of subjectivity. The major operation of this particular deconstruction is to reveal within Husserl's discourse the impossibility of his claims and conclusions regarding the Transcendental Ego. The problem with Husserl's discourse is that although he argues for a clear distinction between the Transcendental Ego and what we may refer to as the "natural" self, his conceptual system is aporetic.<sup>29</sup> The implication is that Husserl's clear and distinct concepts and notions are incomplete or unactualized and therefore intimately related to the other and alterity. What is crucial to the over all argument of this project is that what Husserl would regard as the distinctness of man is inevitably interrelated with what he would call nature, and natural beings in general.

Husserl attempts to construct his discourse around what he calls his "essential distinctions." There are two forms of signification in the human sphere, indication and expression. Indication is the natural, worldly form of signification. Its function is to communicate with the other human in the real world. Because it transmits meaning to the other through real signs, indication implies a certain nonpresence or appresentation

of the lived experience of the other.<sup>30</sup>

The other form of signification is "expression." This is the nonworldly form of intentionality that suspends the natural world, the other and spatiality in general, and maintains a strict presence of meaning to the Ego. Expression's signs have no reference to existence and, therefore, show only ideal significations or representations.<sup>31</sup> Caputo sums up Husserl's position:

"Husserl has two arguments against allowing indicative signs to play a role in solitary mental life. First, any such interior dialogue of the self with the self is purely pretended and imaginary--there is no genuine, effective, real communication of anything to the self by the self. Second, signs are ultimately without purpose (*Zwecklos*) in the monological sphere ... Signs are useless in solitary life ... because there can be no need to indicate mental acts to oneself."<sup>32</sup>

These expressions silently spoken by the phenomenological voice are ideal objects. The attribute that is most important to the ideal object is that it is not empirical. It is therefore the paradigm of objectivity because it is capable of infinite repetition while it remains ever the same.<sup>33</sup>

The ideal object demands a medium of repetition from sense to ideality and the repetition of ideality *ad infinitum* that does not interfere either with the immediate proximity of the object in intuition nor with the self-presence of one's intentionality. So the medium must not have an empirical and "worldly" form. This can only be the phenomenological voice as the pre-expressive and

self-present consciousness. The voice is silent. Signs would be useless because in the absolute proximity to the self in self-presence of the living present there is no indication or showing of the self to the self.<sup>34</sup> The phonic signs of the phenomenological voice would be heard by the transcendental ego as if signs do not distance themselves from or produce difference within the subjectivity. Nor is there transcendence of the subjectivity in this auto-affection. Neither the word nor the subject is expropriated into the world during the act of expression within the phenomenological voice. It protects signification and expression from falling outside the transcendental ego.<sup>35</sup> And only these "phonic signs" are without reference to spatiality and the world. This absolute reduction of spatiality is the possibility of the pure auto-affection of the voice. This "pure" auto-affection of the voice is the very possibility of subjectivity. One might claim, then, that Husserl's phenomenological voice *is consciousness*.<sup>36</sup> That is, the phenomenological voice, one might claim, is absolute self-consciousness.

The "now" as the self-present instant "sanctions the whole system of Husserl's essential distinctions."<sup>37</sup> The living present now is the form of all experience and the foundation of ideality. But the ultimate form of Being as ideality is the presence of the living present now. Presence as ideality is unreal and

nonempirical. Husserl therefore thinks the presence of the now as the formal identity and the undivided unity of one's experience. There is absolutely no alterity at work in Husserl's "now". This identity of presence as self-presence and absolute proximity with oneself in the "now" implies that subjectivity has a temporal essence.

But Derrida questions if Husserl's essential distinctions can be applied to language in general.<sup>38</sup> On the contrary, language is the very basis of Husserl's conceptuality and essential distinctions. And language cannot be absolutely differentiated between ideal and real.<sup>39</sup> Derrida argues that since any sign in general is essentially characterized by repetition, there is always an interweaving of Husserl's "essential distinctions". In order for a sign to remain the same in repetition, it must have a formal identity. This formal identity is the "ideal" aspect of any sign. This ideality of the formal identity of the sign permits us to recognize the sign in its empirical usage in which the sign is always deviating in the flux of experience. Therefore, the ideal or representative structure of expression is a necessary attribute of signification in general, without which a sign would appear only once and would not be recognizable in its constant change in the real world.<sup>40</sup> Staten explains Derrida's thoughts:

The sign-type is constituted in its conceptual essence by its

"iterability," its repeatability in principle in a series of tokens that, as distinct spatio-temporal things, to some extent differ from each other ... if the type were not iterable it would not be a sign ... On the other hand, if there were not "a certain self-identity" of the sign that would permit its recognition "across empirical variations of tone, of voice, etc.", the varying sign phenomena could not function as signs either. (Margins, p 318)<sup>41</sup>

Derrida is calling for a new perspective on the sign in general. He wants to think of a sign as "primordial" rather than as derived from and secondary to an originary presence. And since the ideality of expressions and their ideal meanings are based in the repetition of the sign in general, according to Derrida, the sign is originary. Derrida's reversal, here, implies that the presence of the present is derived from repetition, and not the reverse. Therefore, *Vorstellung* (ideality) depends upon *Vergegenwärtigung* (reproductive repetition).<sup>42</sup> The repetitive structure of the sign is an originary power that enables Husserl to claim that there is an unreal, transcendental sphere of consciousness. But what he has *actually* done is abstracted the formal identity or ideality of the sign in general, isolated this aspect of ideality and argued for insulated purity in its functioning. In sum, Husserl was able to invent his unreal, ideal, transcendental layer of human life only by abstracting from the primordially of the sign, which itself would include as much nonpresence as presence in its repetitive structure. That is, Husserl almost seems to have forgotten that his claims about

the transcendental and the ideal are impossible without the signification in which his discourse about these matters takes place.

Derrida questions Heidegger's *Being and Time* view of Husserl's temporality.<sup>43</sup> Heidegger claims that Husserl breaks with Aristotle's *Physics*. But Derrida says Husserl only appears to have moved beyond the punctual instant. If one thinks about it a little more, one would find that Husserl's "spread" now is based on the self-identity of the now as a point of presence and the real unity of temporal presence. In short, the form of the now is a punctual unity. And since the punctuality of the formal or ideal identity of the real, actual now defines philosophic thought and consciousness, what is at stake is the privilege of the actual, real now and the history of the philosophy of presence.<sup>44</sup>

So Derrida puts into question the whole history of philosophy through his interrogation of Husserl's discourse. Firstly, Husserl's descriptions are not consistent with his claims. Husserl may claim the being of a simple punctual unity of the present now, but he does not describe a simple unity or presence of the present. Rather, Husserl's descriptions confirm the irreducibility of re-presentation to presentative presentation, of memory to retention, imagination to primordial impression. Therefore, the presence of the living present now can

appear as such only if it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception. According to Derrida, Husserl's descriptions show that "they are essentially and indispensably involved in its possibility."<sup>45</sup> What Husserl describes is an essential interweaving of presence and nonpresence.<sup>46</sup>

What is absolutely critical about this is that *alterity* is allowed access into the unity and self-identity of the instantaneous *now*. This alterity or otherness is the nonpresent or nonpresence in the continuity of perception and non-perception passing over into each other in the living present. Furthermore, alterity as nonpresence is the very condition of presence, presentation, *Vorstellung*, ideality in general. The nonpresence of another *now*, a nonpresent *now*, makes possible the renewed upsurge of the present *now*. Moreover, the nonpresence of another *now* destroys the possibility of the simple identity of a unitary *now* in the *flux* of one's experience in the living present *now*. Husserl's conceptuality and essential distinctions are disrupted according to his own descriptions that show that there is no simple *now*. Only a simple *now* and its ideal presence could underpin Husserl's claims for an irreal solitary mental life of the transcendental ego and its signless but meaningful expressions.<sup>47</sup>

The result of this is that Husserl would have to admit that signs are not useless, but rather necessary to expression and the

solitary mental life.<sup>48</sup> One needs a representation of oneself, since one is not fully present to oneself. One's living present is contaminated with nonpresence, alterity, the real other in general.<sup>49</sup>

Derrida points out the aporetic condition of Husserl's discourse on this point. Instead of drawing a limit between now and not-now, Husserl draws a limit between two forms of nonpresence as a restitution of the present, namely, retention (perception as primary memory/imagination) and re-presentation (secondary memory as reconstitution), both of which depend upon ideality and repetition.<sup>50</sup> According to Derrida, the common "root" of retention and representation would be:

the possibility of re-petition in its most general form, ie. the constitution of the trace in its most universal sense ... a possibility which must not only inhabit the pure actuality of the now but must constitute it through the very movement of *différance* it introduces .... Such a trace is ... more "primordial" than what is phenomenologically primordial. For the ideality of the *form* (*Form*) of presence itself implies that it be infinitely re-peatable, that its return, as a return of the same, is necessary *ad infinitum* and is inscribed in presence itself. It implies that the re-turn is the return of a present which will be retained in a finite movement or retention and that primordial truth ... is only to be found rooted in the finitude of this retention.<sup>51</sup>

Therefore, Derrida is arguing that the presence of the living present and the actual now itself are constituted "essentially" by the trace as the possibility of repetition and its corresponding movement of *différance*.<sup>52</sup> Husserl has not

recognized the trace and *différance*, otherwise he would not have described a continuity of perception and non-perception, present now and not-now, passing over into each other. Instead, he would have thought and described an essential constituting synthesis of nonpresence and presence as the possibility of the repetition of presence. For this reason, the trace is even more "primordial", if one can still use this term, than Husserl's phenomenological source of "sense" in the lived now of perception. Phenomenology's "truth", then, is also constituted in this movement of repetition, that is, one that essentially synthesizes nonpresence and nonperception to the "intuition" and "sense" in the lived now. Meaning, presence or ideality are also constituted in the power of repetition. The trace and *différance* give continual birth and renewal to ideality in its infinite repeatability as the same, making it always different, too, since numerous finite movements of the trace constitute infinity.<sup>53</sup>

Furthermore, this movement of repetition, since it is constitutive of presence and self-presence, and since:

this trace or *différance* is always older than presence and procures for it its openness, prevents us from speaking about a simple self-identity "*im selben Augenblick*" [... lived by us in the same instant ...] Does this not compromise the usage Husserl wants to make of the concept of "solitary mental life" and consequently of the rigorous separation of indication from expression? Do indication and the several concepts on whose basis we have thus far tried to think it through (the concepts of existence, nature, mediation, the empirical, etc.) not have an ineradicable origin in the movement of transcendental temporalization?<sup>54</sup>

Since the presence of the present is constituted by the power of repetition in the form of a return from or with nonpresence, there cannot be a simple, absolute self or self-identity even at the ideal and unreal level of the transcendental ego's consciousness as intentionality, the phenomenological voice and its expression. As the condition of presence, this bending back of the trace is that which opens the ideality of presence to itself and to its others. The ideality of self-presence in "expression" is irreducibly "intertwined" with indication. That is, the "solitary mental life" of the transcendental ego is opened to and inevitably interacting with the other human, as well as oneself, in "effective" communication. Indication brings with it the attributes of existence, the empirical world of intuition, nature and mediation. Therefore, one's transcendental ego must recognize not only the existing, "natural" body as one's self, but also the other human as a natural self. One must also recognize that one is also opened to the other in general, human or not as natural and earthly. Therefore, according to Derrida, Husserl should have recognized that the transcendental ego is interweaved with existence and all of nature, and not beyond in an absolute sense.

Derrida claims that we must rethink the concept of time based on nonpresence and repetition rather than on the presence of the present:

"[T]ime" has always designated a movement conceived in terms of the present .... Is not the concept of pure solitude--of the monad in the phenomenological sense--undermined by its own origin, by the very condition of its self-presence, that is by "time", to be conceived anew on the basis within auto-affectation, on the basis of identifying identity and nonidentity within the "sameness" of the "*im selben Augenblick*"?<sup>55</sup>

Temporality, based on the trace's repetition, constitutes the self-presence of the transcendental ego in the living present now, but it also deconstitutes it at the same time. We must recognize the essential power of difference, trace, repetition within the presence of the present. And Derrida points out that:

Husserl himself evoked the analogy between the relation with the *alter ego*, constituted within the absolute monad of the ego, and the relation with the other present, the past present, as constituted in the absolute actuality of the living present, (*Cartesian Meditations*, 52).<sup>56</sup>

Derrida is claiming that the otherness of temporality is fundamentally the same opening that permits the *alter ego* to break into the monadic ego. Both openings are productions of the trace.

Derrida refers to a Heideggerian insight that claims that the movement of temporalization must be recognized as pure auto-affectation.<sup>57</sup> First, the "now" as "source point" or primordial impression is:

a pure production, since temporality is never the real predicate of a being. The intuition of time itself cannot be empirical; it is a receiving that receives nothing. The absolute novelty of each now is therefore engendered by nothing, it consists in a primordial impression that

engenders itself.<sup>58</sup>

The "irreal" now is therefore a pure production out of nothing. Secondly, the movement of temporalization is a pure spontaneous production. A "now" is not so much a creation since the temporal movement does not create a present being or "real" thing. What it *is*, if one can use the present indicative of the verb to be in an obviously awkward manner, is an "impression" or effect of the differential forces within the flux of pure movement rather than a being or produced object.<sup>59</sup>

If temporalization, as this pure movement of the living now produced in spontaneous generation, is auto-affection, what would be called pure auto-affection must include the other. Therefore, auto-affection as the basis of subjectivity implies that subjectivity as self-presence includes the other in the relation to self, creating a self-other relation:

The process by which the living now, produced by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a now and to be retained in another now, affect itself without recourse to anything empirical but with a new primordial actuality in which it would become a non-now, a past now--this process is indeed a pure auto-affection in which the same is the same only in being affected by the other, only by becoming the other of the same. This auto-affection must be pure since the primordial impression is here affected by nothing other than itself, by the absolute "novelty" of another primordial impression which is another now.<sup>60</sup>

This non-presence or temporal difference with the self of self-presence is structurally necessary to auto-affection. Husserl has

failed to recognize that this nonpresence is inextricably operating within the living present now. This nonempirical trace of the other is also the nonempirical trace of the other subjectivity.

Temporalization's pure movement as the basis of auto-affection, which is in turn the basis of subjectivity, would have a profound affect on how we think "subjectivity" in the future of philosophy. Departing from the Husserlian movement of reconstituting the original sense and the Heideggerian destruction of the history of metaphysics for a primordial understanding of Being, Derrida, too, is concerned with what the history of philosophy has "buried" under many metaphysical layers:

We speak metaphorically as soon as we introduce a determinate being into the description of this "movement," we talk about "movement" in the very terms that movement makes possible. But we have been always already adrift in ontic metaphor; temporalization here is the root of a metaphor that can only be primordial. The word "time" itself, as it has always been understood in the history of metaphysics, is a metaphor which *at the same time* both indicates and dissimulates the "movement" of the auto-affection. All the concepts of metaphysics--in particular those of activity and passivity, will and nonwill, and therefore those of affection or auto-affection, purity and impurity, etc.--cover up the strange "movement" of this difference.<sup>61</sup>

In other words, the history of metaphysics has unwittingly been dominated by what Heidegger would call an ontic metaphor of time. To put it concisely, then, since the movement of temporalization

would be the operation of auto-affection and the basis of subjectivity, there is, therefore, no determinate "being" or substantial subjectivity. There is only "movement" and the differences of movement. What we have always called "subjectivity" will have been a "trace." Furthermore, this "movement" of temporality is also the basis of what philosophers such as Kant have referred to as the "will" of the rational subjectivity.

Husserl himself refers to the properties of absolute subjectivity as being in a state of perpetual "flux", and thereby "indescribable". He also refers to these same properties of subjectivity as metaphorically named for what is constituted in terms of the present.<sup>62</sup> But Derrida claims that Husserl's "intentions" must be further radicalized. We must acknowledge that the absolute subjectivity is a metaphorical conception cloaked in terms of the present, *ousia*, and the constituted. Husserl's descriptions really tell us that the temporal "movement" of auto-affection is flux. Absolute subjectivity, the living present now based in auto-affection, is constituted and interrupted in the movement of the flux. Husserl did not follow his own advice, according to Derrida. Husserl continued to use terms that implied the present in order to save absolute subjectivity from nonpresence and the flux of pure movement. Furthermore, the temporality of the absolute subjectivity,

"time", man's consciousness, would also be a metaphor that fails to capture the power of Husserl's description of pure movement or the trace. Ultimately, the failure to recognize the pure movement or trace as the condition of the possibility of these movements and time is also the failure to recognize that man's defining attribute of "will" (free will and therefore freedom and responsibility) is based in this impersonal and inhuman trace. One's will is, therefore, not constituting, rather, one's will is "constituted" and therefore deconstituted, *both at once*.<sup>63</sup>

In other words, as Derrida says in his Heideggerian terms, absolute subjectivity is "crossed out." Since temporality is essentially auto-affection, this Husserlian and Heideggerian perspective is accepted as objectively valid for Derrida, and since the present now is based in difference, flux and the inescapable relation to the not-now, subjectivity is therefore based in difference. And if subjectivity is based in difference, the same goes for Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity. Subjectivity is inseparable from temporalization, as is intersubjectivity. The lived present now of auto-affection is opened unto another now, another lived experience outside of itself. Therefore, subjectivity and intersubjectivity are "constituted" and de-constituted in difference. Consequently, subjectivity is always already intersubjectivity.<sup>64</sup>

And more generally, subjectivity is always already

interweaved with the empirical, worldly, and natural other in general. Derrida writes that:

pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, introduces into self-presence from the beginning all impurity putatively excluded from it. The living present springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace cannot be thought out on the basis of a simple present whose life would be within itself; the self of the living present is primordially a trace.<sup>65</sup>

The self of the living present now can only be named a "trace." For auto-affection in the living present now implies the power of repetition of the pure movement of the trace. That is, the "pure movement" of the trace is the possibility of auto-affection and subjectivity in that the continuity of the present now and not-now permits the continuity of the flux and present in one's experience. In this sense, the trace, movement and flux are primordial. Therefore, the trace opens the ideal internality of temporality to the externalities of nature, world and existence in general.<sup>66</sup>

If the transcendental subjectivity's ideal consciousness is open to the externalities of existence because of the trace, Husserl's notion of "sense" is also impacted by Derrida's thought of the trace. And so, the primordial consciousness of the worldly objects of our experience, which are conceptually appropriated and generalized into an understandable language and ideal

expressions, would be constituted by the trace. As our preconceptual interpretation of the world, "sense" is temporal and "never simply present."<sup>67</sup> Being temporal, for the "sense" of the world comes in the present now, sense is "... always already engaged in the "movement" of the trace, that is, in the order of "signification".<sup>68</sup> Sense is already "interweaved" with expression. Derrida elaborates:

Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, the openness upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not "one's own", etc., the temporalization of sense is, from the outset, a "spacing." As soon as we admit spacing both as "interval" or difference and openness upon the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside, for the "outside" has insinuated itself into the movement by which the inside of the nonspatial, which is called "time", appears, is constituted, is "presented".<sup>69</sup>

"Space is "in" time."<sup>70</sup> The "sense" of a worldly object is always already engaged with the trace, signification, meaning, concept, universality, ideality and transcendentality. That is, indication and expression are interweaved, without being blended into an indeterminate mixing of the two. The preconceptual would always already be engaged in a referential network with the conceptual, sense with meaning, the singularity of experience and intuition with the universality of expression and meaningful language. Therefore, one's primordial intuition of the world is already engaged with, but not "blended" with the ideal temporality and its "movement." There are no clear distinctions between intuition

and intentionality, indication and expression, the pre-linguistic and the linguistic, the pre-conceptual and the conceptual, sense and meaning, the singular relation to objects in the world as one's personal experience of the world and the universal meaning of objects and the world. Therefore, sense is already in reference with intentionality, meaning, and expression. Consequently, Derrida is claiming that Husserl would be precluded by the logic of his own texts from "digging" down to a primordial experience of the lived world where he would hope to find a simple "present" thing as *ousia*, etc., without the trace, meaning, language and transcendental temporality's spacing. Any experience of the world would suffer from and be conditioned by the trace, including signification and the ideality of meaning and the flux of temporality.

At the same time, Husserl's absolute interiority of the transcendental ego as well as the worldly soul and the pre-expressive silence are essentially open to and by spatiality. The self-relation of time, as the auto-affection of subjectivity, occurs outside itself in space. There is therefore an inside of subjectivity, but not an absolute interiority in the ideal or transcendental conception. And the movement of the trace and spacing is the very condition of this conditional difference between interiority and exteriority. There would be no clear limit between the two. Derrida's subjectivity would therefore

have a meaning that essentially, but not clearly, includes time, space, and the exteriority of the other in general "within" the self. That is, the self is opened to and by the world.

This spacing of the trace that Derrida identifies in Husserl's transcendental sphere is the condition of one's experience of a world. In this sense, Derrida fully affirms the transcendental reduction of Husserl. On the one hand, the transcendental irreality depends upon the real world in so far as the "sense" of the world is idealized (conceptualized and universalized) in the transcendental. However, "sense" also depends upon the transcendental, or at least, on the spacing of the trace that Derrida finds in Husserl's transcendental. That is, pure phenomenological psychology concerns itself with lived experience and the "sense" of the world while ignoring its existence. The psychological discourse would simply describe the experience of a self-objectifying monad. As Derrida claims, "it makes no appeal to any signification transcendent to consciousness."<sup>71</sup> So psychology is limited to providing a discourse on the soul and its necessity to the world. Derrida argues that the spacing of the trace in the internal time consciousness of the transcendental ego is necessary to the experience of the appearance and existence of the world.<sup>72</sup> The self-objectifying monadic soul could not open itself to the world to which it belongs if not for the supplementary nothing of the

trace.<sup>73</sup>

So the temporality of subjectivity, which Husserl had wanted to protect as the pure interiority of the voice of consciousness, is opened to spatiality—real spatiality:

If we recall now that the pure inwardness of phonic auto-affection supposed the purely temporal nature of the "expressive" process, we see that the theme of a pure inwardness of speech, or of the "hearing oneself speak", is radically contradicted by "time" itself. The going-forth "into the world" is also primordially implied in the movement of temporalization. "Time" cannot be an "absolute subjectivity" precisely because it cannot be conceived on the basis of a present and the self-presence of a present being. Like everything thought under this heading, and like all that is excluded by the most rigorous transcendental reduction, the "world" is primordially implied in the movement of temporalization. As a relation between an inside and an outside in general, an existent and a nonexistent in general, a constituting and a constituted in general, temporalization is at once the very power and limit of phenomenological reduction. Hearing oneself speak is not the inwardness of an inside that is closed in upon itself; it is the irreducible openness in the inside; it is the eye and the world within speech.<sup>74</sup>

Temporality or time consciousness cannot be regarded as absolute subjectivity or even the basis of absolute subjectivity because time cannot be conceived on the basis of the present or self-presence. Absolute subjectivity has implied the present or self-presence. Therefore, even the irreal or transcendental realm and its basis or its key attribute of temporality is not an adequate account of a subjectivity or basis for absolute subjectivity. There is no absolute refuge, or monadic, unified, segregated, nonspatial sphere "on" or "in" which one can predicate the attributes of

"absolute subjectivity." Husserl thought that temporality was the basis of these attributes. But there is no simple or absolute presence or present in which to predicate. Derrida is claiming, therefore, that what Husserl has argued to be the originary subjectivity is not and cannot be since nonpresence and the external, spatial world are already implicated in what Husserl would call the transcendental temporality of the lived present.

And since the movement of the trace would be another name for Husserl's temporalization, temporalization is the opening of the inside onto the outside, the unreal onto the real, the nonexistent onto the existent, the transcendental onto the Earth, etc. Therefore, "I" gather the "world" into myself when I hear myself speak. This all entails a "primordial" interweaving of the "subjectivity" and "world." The "world", the meaningful environment of the "subjectivity", must be thought as constitutive of human subjectivity. On this point, we must acknowledge a general agreement between Derrida's project and that of Michael E. Zimmerman who writes that "... in some sense the world is my body: I and world interpenetrate."<sup>75</sup>

But this is not to suggest that my experience of the world in general would give the world as absolutely present to me, as if I were absolutely one with the world in the fashion that Husserl had wished that the subjectivity were one with itself as absolute self-presence. The world is still nonpresent to me in

the way that the other human's lived experience is not present to me. That is, one must acknowledge that the other in general appears to me and simultaneously is also not phenomenally perceived by me. But this does not preclude an interpenetration of the "I" and the "world." It simply means that even though the other in general or world essentially interpenetrates me and constitutes me, it is not present to my consciousness. Flux, or the movement of the trace, which Derrida has attempted to convey as the basis of temporality and subjectivity, opens self-presence and self-consciousness to the other. The nonpresence of the other and the nonpresence of the world have always been at work in the subjectivity, even though Husserl and others have tried to exclude it.

This description of the relation of the "I" and "world" is one of *différance* or supplementarity. Derrida defines supplementary difference as "to be conceived prior to the separation between deferring as delay and differing as the active work of difference."<sup>76</sup> These operations of differing act to fissure and retard self-presence with a primordial division and delay in the movement of the trace and its repetition. So this supplementary structure of *différance* and the movement of the trace constitute the "for itself" or "self-giving" of subjectivity in the repetition of ideality.<sup>77</sup> That is, the Derridean concept of "primordial supplementation" includes the

"nonplenitude of presence" as the "nonfulfillment of an intuition" and the "in the place of" structure which is an attribute of signification. Derrida claims:

the for-itself of self-presence ... arises in the role of supplement as primordial substitution, in the form "in the place of" (*für etwas*), that is, as we have seen, in the very operation of significance in general. The *for-itself* would be an *in-the-place-of-itself*: put *for itself*, instead of itself.<sup>78</sup>

The for-itself of subjectivity is really a result of the inextricable functioning of signification by which one of the structures of signification, "in the place of", substitutes for the nonplenitude of presence or the intuition of the self. There is no intuition of self. A primordial substitution is employed as an attempt to fill the void and give the impression that this supplement is actually the originary presence.

This nonpresence within presence includes the nonpresence of the other human's lived experience within my lived experience. Although Husserl would claim that expressions could be transmitted between Egos, Derrida would claim that the Alter Ego's lived experience and expression would be closed to me according to Husserl's own discourse. This nonpresence of the other's lived experience, expression and ideal signified must be supplemented by an indicative sign.<sup>79</sup> The relation between the Ego and Alter Ego, if we can still call them that, is one of supplementary *différance*, the meaning and expression of the other

is automatically delayed and different, that is, not fully present to me as it appears to be to the other. In the end, the indicative sign, with its Husserlian attributes of spatiality and existence, would be regarded as distant from the ideality which the expression signifies. However, we have seen that the more ideal the signified, the more power of repetition with which it operates. Therefore, the expression cannot claim to be superior to the indicative situation in not having any distance, delay or nonpresence in its operation.

Husserl, on the other hand, would attribute full presence to expression. Full presence would include not only expression's meaning in immediate proximity to the "self," but also the immediate proximity of expression's meaning to the intended and intuited object. Derrida states, however, that Husserl attempts to reduce and exclude intuitive cognition from expression. What is left is only the animating intention of the subjectivity which Husserl claims can give life to the body of the sign in general without actually fulfilling its aim of intuiting the object.<sup>80</sup> That is, we speak meaningfully about the other, and ourselves and, yet, my self and the other self are not fully present to me. Derrida states:

It belongs to the original structure of expression to be able to dispense with the full presence of the object aimed at by intuition ... Fullness therefore is only contingent. The absence of the object aimed at does not compromise the meaning ...<sup>81</sup>

According to Derrida, Husserl demonstrates the ideality of *Bedeutung* as well as the noncoincidence between expression, the *bedeutung* and the real object. The absence of the real object is not the absence of meaning, since Husserl's discourse assumes the approach of a pure logical grammar. And this perspective on meaning would only exclude nonsense. The falsity of meaning is tolerated as long as it does not violate grammatical rules. Due to the logic and necessity of the matrix of distinctions involved in Husserl's logical grammar, for example, the distinctions between ideality and reality, falsity and nonsense, Derrida concludes that meaning essentially excludes the intuition of the real object in Husserl.<sup>82</sup>

But instead of fully excluding the intuition of the real object from intuition, Husserl maintains a "blended unity" of intention and intuition. That is, Husserl opts for a blended unity of the real sound of worldly speech, the meaning and intentionality of the phenomenological voice and the real object.<sup>83</sup> Husserl's "hearing-oneself speak" would then be a complex of the worldly and the unreal even though the logic of his discourse would negate his claims and conclusions. That is, on the one hand, Husserl's logical grammar has freed language from functioning within the bounds of truth. On the other hand, since Husserl also claims that language is both phenomenological

and real and that it melds with the intuition of the real object, language's freedom to function without the truth of the intuition of the object is negated.

Derrida denies that Husserl can blend intuition and intention into a homogeneous unity. A difference must be recognized or meaning would disappear during the intuition. In this claim, Derrida is following the insights of Husserl which Husserl himself had neglected. And the crucial claim that results from this is the following:

To use Husserl's language, are we not in principle excluded from ever "cashing in the draft made on intuition" in *expression*.<sup>84</sup>

That is, expression cannot ever fulfill its intentional meaning within it by intuiting the object of its aim. A fully present expression is therefore impossible. One can claim, therefore, that the possibility and impossibility of meaning is the absence of the intuition of the object intended by speech.<sup>85</sup> The full presence of expression and its meaning is impossible.

This applies to the case of expressing a statement even as I intuit that about which I am speaking. According to Husserl's own discourse, Derrida claims that it is structurally implied that the content of the expression is ideal. And this ideality grants unity to the meaning and expression, even without the perception of the actual object. Therefore, the possibility of speech lies

in the structural capacity of its functioning beyond the here and now actual perception of an intuited object:

My nonperception, my nonintuition, my *hic et nunc* absence are expressed by that very thing that I say, by *that* which I say and *because* I say it. This structure will never form an "intimately blended unity" with intuition. The absence of intuition--and therefore of the subject of intuition--is not only *tolerated* by speech; it is *required* by the general structure of signification, when considered *in itself*. It is radically requisite: the total absence of the subject and object of a statement--the death of a writer and/or the disappearance of the objects he was able to describe--does not prevent a text from "meaning" something. On the contrary, this possibility gives birth to meaning as such, gives it to be heard and read.<sup>86</sup>

Therefore, according to Husserl's own insights there is no blending of intuition and intention, since signification and the ideality of expression require the absence of intuition of the subject and object of the expression. And since there is no presence of the subject or object, there is only the middle, the between, or the movement of signification and meaning without the simple mover or the moved. There is the chain of signification without a simple present beginning or end. Writing and signs function despite the death or absence of the subject/author and because of and beyond his/her death. Writing, the signification without an absolute beginning and end, inaugurates and completes, in a sense, the movement of idealization. Death, idealization, repetition and signification are intelligible only on the basis of one and the same openness to alterity and to the other in

general.

Husserl attempts to harmonize his meanings with reality by a theory of the "essentially occasional" function of the "I". Husserl tries to distinguish between an "objective conceptual representation", which is univocal in meaning, a mathematical expression, for example, and his "occasional" representations that take account of the singularity of the subject in question. This would lead to an ever altering "I". Expression would function indicatively in these "occasional" expressions:

Indication thus enters into speech whenever a reference to the subject's situation is not reducible, wherever this subject's situation is designated by a personal pronoun, a demonstrative pronoun, or a "subjective" adverb such as *here, there, above, below, now, yesterday, tomorrow, before, after,* etc. This ...[is a]... massive return of indication into expression ...<sup>87</sup>

The root of indicative expressions is to be found in the zero point of the subjective origin, "I", *here, now*. That is, as we have seen, the real existents of the world are already at work in what Husserl had tried to save as the transcendental temporality in the living present now. The world is already interpenetrating the origin of subjectivity in the movement of the trace. And the expression certainly becomes indicative when it is intended as a real speech act for the other. Husserl, on the other hand, would claim that meaning is fulfilled in relation to the object as actual self for the speaking subjectivity.

Derrida questions this view of the speaker's fulfillment of the meaning of "I" "here" "now". It is a question of the realization of intuition. The ideality of the "I" is a general concept, and this is contrary to Husserl's "individualized concepts". The "I" "here" "now" does not blend with the living present's ideality as general or universal concept. Furthermore, since it is not necessary to determine who is speaking, there is an unclear difference between solitary speech and communication, reality and representation of speech.<sup>88</sup> That is, the "I" is understood as a meaningful signification regardless of who and where the speaker is and regardless of whether the "self" to which the "I" refers is absent or not. Consequently, the intuition of the "self" as the actualization and full presence of meaning is unnecessary to the functioning of the meaning of "I."

Derrida questions Husserl on whether the "I" can name a different person in each case. Is an ever altering "I" possible? At the same time that Husserl concerned himself with the problem of the ever altering I, which would name and mean a different person in each case, he also argued for the freedom of language and independence of intention from intuition. If intentional meaning can function without intuition, then it is unnecessary to intuit the self in order to understand the meaning and existing reference of the "I". But, the possibility of nonintuition constitutes *Bedeutung* as such, according to Derrida. Therefore,

the meaning of the signifier "I" essentially includes the possibility that there is no intuition of the "self." Derrida claims, therefore, that this necessitates the absence of the relation to self, or the preclusion of Husserl's absolute self-presence, in the meaning of "I" as expression or real utterance.<sup>89</sup>

According to Derrida, the distinction between the word "I" and the intuited self is the "normal situation" of signification. The word "I" functions as an ideality. An immediate representation of or relation to the self is unnecessary. The "I" appears to remain the same for an I-here-now in general. "I" keeps "... its sense even if my empirical presence is eliminated or radically modified ..."<sup>90</sup> Derrida elaborates:

When I say *I*, even in solitary speech, can I give my statement meaning without implying, there as always, the possible absence of the object of speech--in this case myself?<sup>91</sup>

Therefore, "I" is an ideality, a meaning that signifies without the actuality of myself. Therefore, "I am" is an expression that must function in the absence of the intuition of its object. And since "I" is ideal, its universality does not blend with a unique I, here, now, that is, with the uniqueness of each subject and its situation.<sup>92</sup>

The ideality of the "I" is the *ergo sum*, the "I am present" of the history of philosophy and the possibility of the

transcendental ego:

Whether or not I have a present intuition of myself, "I" expresses something; whether or not I am alive, I am "means something." Here also the fulfilling intuition is not an "essential component" of expression. Whether or not the *I* functions in solitary speech, with or without the self-presence of the speaking subject, it is *sinnvoll*. And there is no need to know who is speaking in order to understand or even utter it. Once again the border seems less certain between solitary speech and communication, between the reality and the representation of speech."<sup>93</sup>

The word "I" means something whenever or wherever it is used. Its capacity to function without the presence of the real or intended referent is the very possibility of ideality and the transcendental ego. Because the meaning of the "I" is functional with and without the presence of the referent, one can never be certain whether the word "I" is an utterance in the world or an imaginary representation of the phenomenological voice.

And just as the statement about perception does not depend upon perception or intuition, so the signifying function of the "I" does not depend upon the *life* of the *subject*:

Whether or not perception accompanies the statement about perception, whether or not life as self-presence accompanies the uttering of the *I*, is quite indifferent with regard to the functioning of meaning. *My death* is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the *I*. That I am also "alive" and certain about it figures as something that comes over and above the appearance of the meaning. And this structure is operative; it retains its original efficiency, even when I say "I am alive" at the very moment when, if such a thing is possible, I have a full intuition of it. The *Bedeutung* "I am" or "I am alive" or "my living present is" is what it is, has the ideal identity proper to all *Bedeutung*, only if it is not impaired by falsity, that is, if I can be dead at the moment

when it is functioning. No doubt it will be different from the *fact* that "I am dead". The statement "I am alive" is accompanied by my being dead, and its possibility requires the possibility that I be dead, and conversely. This is not an extraordinary tale by Poe but the ordinary story of language ... here we understand the "I am" out of the "I am dead". The anonymity of the written *I*, the impropriety of the *I am writing*, is contrary to what Husserl says, the "normal situation".<sup>94</sup>

Therefore, the statement or even the expression of the phenomenological voice of Husserl's transcendental ego that "I am" or that "I am alive" functions with the necessary implication that I may actually be dead, since the universality and repetition of any meaning implies that it can and will be meaningful beyond the existence of one who utters or thinks it. And, of course, as we have just seen above, the function of meaning as ideality includes the necessary possibility of the absence of intuition of the object of the speech.

Derrida is proposing the same freedom of language that Husserl had also acknowledged at one point--the autonomy of meaning from intuition. Derrida points out that the autonomy of meaning has its *norm* in the relationship with death and writing. We have seen Derrida's arguments for his claims that the meaning of the "I" necessarily includes the possibility of my death. More generally, as we have already seen, this possibility of my death would fall under the absence of intuition of the object of meaning as the necessary condition of meaning. For Derrida, this

absence of the referent has always been implied in written propositions or descriptions. And so Derrida is claiming that this structure of written signification is fundamentally the same structure as representations of speech in Husserl's phenomenological voice and as any communicative utterance in the real world. Therefore, Derrida generalizes the name of this basic structure of writing and argues that it is the essential condition of any meaningful speech, rather than a secondary supplement to speech:

This writing cannot be added to speech because, from the moment speech awakens, this writing has duplicated it by animating it. Here indication neither degrades nor diverts expression, it dictates it. We draw this conclusion, then, from the idea of a pure logical grammar, from the sharp distinction between meaning-intention (*Bedeutungsintention*), which can always function "emptily," and its "eventual" fulfillment by the intuition of the object.<sup>95</sup>

According to Husserl's own theoretical parameters, death and writing are not added to speech. They are, on the contrary, the very condition of speech and the phenomenological voice. What Husserl did not recognize is that death and writing/indication dictate the phenomenological voice. This is most obvious in a written text in which intention, meaning and sense are still operative in the absence and death of the author and the author's subjects or objects. We can include with writing and indication some other values in that series of distinctions made by Husserl. We can claim that the existing other, the natural other, and

death, or the nonpresent in general, "animate", condition and "command" the intentionality of the phenomenological voice of Husserl. Therefore, the other commands what Husserl tried to think as autonomous self-presence. And this is all the work of the trace, which opens the "other" into the "self."

Derrida claims that Husserl draws different conclusions than he does because Husserl's discourse is controlled by the themes and values of full "presence", intuition's necessity, and the project of knowledge. Because of this control, Derrida claims that Husserl describes and effaces, at the same time, the emancipation of speech as nonknowing. On the one hand, meaning is possible in the absence of the object, needing only the ego's voice and intentionality. On the other hand, genuine meaning is the "will to say the truth". "This subtle shift incorporates the *eidos* into the *telos*, and language into knowledge."<sup>96</sup> Derrida explains:

A speech ... attains its entelechy when it is true ... In truth, the *telos* which announces the fulfillment, promised for "later", has already and before hand opened up sense as a relation with the object.<sup>97</sup>

The norm of knowledge guides meaning to the truth of the object of intuition:

It is a full presence of sense to a consciousness that is itself self-present in the fullness of its life, it's living present.<sup>98</sup>

Meaning is fulfilled when the object intended is actually fully

present to the ego in the act of intuition, and when the sense of the object of intuition is then incorporated into the ideality of meaning for the ego, who is at the same time fully present to itself as absolute self-consciousness.

Derrida furthers his discussion of the importance of the object and of the real world, even though Husserl, at the same time, wants to reduce it and even though it is not essential to meaning. However, even the most formal aspects of Husserl's discourse refer to the real world. According to Derrida, "Form" is the form of "sense": the knowing intentionality relating to an object. Form, as pure intention of intentionality is always object related. Also the pure and empty forms of signification are epistemologically related to objects. In brief, for *sense* to be *logical*, it must have a relation to an object.<sup>99</sup>

In general, then, being as presence has been the matrix of the interdependence of the concepts of sense, ideality, objectivity, truth, intuition, perception and expression. Being as presence is:

the absolute proximity of self-identity, the being in-front of the object available for repetition, the maintenance of the temporal present, whose ideal form is the self-presence of transcendental *life*, whose ideal identity allows *idealiter* of infinite repetition. The living present ... is thus the conceptual foundation of phenomenology as metaphysics.<sup>100</sup>

The self-consciousness and relation to self as to an absolutely self-identical identity, which is infinitely repeatable, is due to

the very ideality or "irreality" of the meaning of the identity. This is ultimately attributable to the power of repetition of the trace. The human identity is ideal and would remain the same only thanks to the repetition of this ideal identity or unit of meaning. But this repetition of ideality would have always already assumed difference and, therefore, nonpresence, signification, flux and otherness, thereby, undermining any absolute sense of identity.

In other words, the living present may be the conceptual foundation of phenomenology, but there is a problem that may undermine this very foundation. The living present is deferred. So the transcendental ego never has full presence. The "living present now" thinks all things in terms of ideality. But, in fact, in reality, it is deferred *ad infinitum* because of the difference between the ideal and the real.<sup>101</sup> For Derrida, *différance* would be defined as the difference between the ideal and the real. It is a case of differing and deferral since the absolute objective ideality is inaccessible as Kantian ideality. Husserl claims that what would permit objectivity should permit the possibility of expression. However, we cannot attain this ideal and are therefore bogged down with indetermination. Derrida quotes Husserl who writes that:

what permits objective determination, must, ideally speaking, permit expression through wholly determinate word-meanings (*Bedeutungen*). We are infinitely removed from this ideal ... try to describe any subjective experience in unambiguous, objectively fixed fashion: such an attempt is always plainly

vain.<sup>102</sup>

Husserl acknowledges that ideality is deferred. Subjective experience is subject to indetermination. However, he must also recognize and admit that the unambiguous objective expression is also an inaccessible ideal. As one component of the essential distinctions, expression's impossibility would disrupt Husserl's entire discourse. Derrida claims therefore:

In its ideal value, then, the whole system of "essential distinctions" is a purely teleological structure. By the same token, the possibility of distinguishing between the sign and the nonsign, linguistic sign and the nonlinguistic sign, expression and indication, ideality and nonideality, subject and object, grammaticalness and nongrammaticalness, pure grammaticalness and empirical grammaticalness ... intention and intuition, etc. is deferred *ad infinitum*. Thus these "essential distinctions" are caught up in the following aporia: *de facto* and *realiter* they are never respected, and Husserl recognizes this. *De jure* and *idealiter* they vanish, since as distinctions, they live only from the difference between fact and right, reality and ideality. Their possibility is their impossibility.<sup>103</sup>

These distinctions work according to a teleological structure which requires a movement towards a fulfillment. However, this fulfillment is impossible since Husserl's ideality is a reinvention of the Kantian Idea. The distinctions are based on a *difference between* reality, indication for instance, and ideality, expression for example. But ideality is deferred indefinitely. Therefore, there is no clear difference between reality and ideality. Furthermore, there is no clear difference between the chains of attributes associated with reality and

ideality. There is no clear difference between subject and object, but also no clear difference between the attributes of the ideal ego and those of the empirical ego or the natural in general. A clear distinction disappears between will and nature, ego and animal, freedom and instinct, autonomy and heteronomy, responsibility and irresponsibility. The distinctions are never respected because they are based within a teleological structure that is never fulfilled.

From an ethical perspective in Derrida's sense of ethical, the indetermination of the essential distinctions makes all the ethical difference in the world. The indetermination or impossible ideal of expression, as the transcendental operation of the self-presence of the phenomenological voice of the transcendental ego, leads Derrida to claim, as we saw above, the essence of his ethical position, namely, that the absolute self-presence of the ego and its expression is impossible. What Husserl's discourse actually tells us without fully intending to is that the self is not a self-enclosed entity that can represent vocalizations to itself and exclude all otherness and communications in the process. What is actually the case is the fact that the "ego" is always in relation to others who are constantly animating and dictating to the "ego", commanding and demanding, asking and promising, calling to the "self" with whom these others are intimately related, and directing the very

intentionality of the self in such a way that "one" must recognize a "we" as primordial.

The aporetic structure of these distinctions leaves each and every concept involved with some indetermination.<sup>104</sup> Husserl adopted the notion of infinity as idea or ideality in the Kantian sense, which explicitly entails *indefiniteness*. Derrida claims that because Husserl's ideality operated according to an indefiniteness *ad infinitum*, one can easily think that Husserl:

never *derived* difference from the fullness of a *parousia*, from the full presence of a positive infinite, that he never believed in the accomplishment of an "absolute knowledge," as the self-adjacent presence of an infinite concept in the Logos.<sup>105</sup>

And even though the "metaphysics of presence" maintained a certain hold on Husserl's thought, Derrida believes that Husserl's work "shows" us that Husserl recognized the necessity of primordial difference and repetition rather than full presence, and that he "recognized its necessity" at work in the "articulation" of "difference in the constitution of sense and signs ..."<sup>106</sup> Therefore, a certain "flux" or indefiniteness would be more primordial and final than a beginning or end in absolute presence and determination of meaning.

This general indetermination or flux is a way of characterizing *différance*. And this positive infinity of Husserl, this infinite indetermination, is:

only produced within a relationship with my death in general. Only a relation to my-death could make the infinite differing of presence appear.<sup>107</sup>

As we saw above, ideality implies my death. Only the possibility of my death permits the ideality of presence in its contradistinction from or necessary interweaving with nonpresence. Because presence depends upon the possibility of my death, and because my death is an empirical accident, the appearance of infinite *différance* lasts only as long as I am alive. For *différance* is the difference or indefiniteness between my relation to death and my transcendental ego. *Différance*, then, is the finitude of life:

The appearing of the infinite *différance* is itself finite. Consequently, *différance*, which does not occur outside this relation, becomes the finitude of life as an essential relation with oneself and one's death. *The infinite différence is finite.*<sup>108</sup>

The ideal as indefiniteness or infinite *différance* appears only on the basis of the appearance of the possibility of my death. Without this possibility there is no ideality and chance for its indefiniteness *ad infinitum*. My actual disappearance brings this relationship between my relation to my self and death and ideality's difference from this to an end. Therefore, the flux is caught up with one's finite existence. Not only is there the flux of temporality and experience in general, there is also the flux and indetermination of one's being and identity. The infinite indetermination dies with one's death. Therefore, one's own

existence, identity, relation to self and other, and relation to death are indeterminate because of the ideality with which one thinks oneself. And both the indetermination of ideality and indetermination in general that characterize one's existence are rooted in the trace. The trace is the condition of the infinite repeatability of the ideal, the condition of the difference between the real and the ideal, the opening onto death and the opening onto the other in general.

In conclusion, Derrida's deconstructive interpretation of Husserl has attempted to show that the "essential distinctions" are interweaved or at least refer to one another rather than signifying absolutely separate things. Similarly, those concepts based on or associated with "expressive signs" would be interweaved with those concepts associated with "indicative signs." And as we have just seen, this has much to do with the impossibility of fulfilling the teleological structure of ideality, which is the structure of conceptuality in general and the concept of subjectivity in particular.

This Derridean critique provides a response to those philosophers and environmental philosophers who would attempt to think the relations between species in terms of grades of being. The human species would be granted the highest level of subjectivity with all of its attributes, while the other animal and plant species would be conceived as having lesser-developed

subjectivity. Frederick Ferré writes:

If these grades of subjectivity are present in human life, there should be no paradox in holding that significant subjectivity is present in the nonhuman world, though very probably not at the level of full personal self-consciousness.<sup>109</sup>

In thinking subjectivity in this manner, Ferré hopes to move beyond what he calls the Cartesian prejudice that draws an arbitrary line between the human and every other form of animal and refuses to grant any sort of "inner life" to these others.<sup>110</sup> This would permit us to distinguish but not separate the human from other mammals.

So the human would have the greater "inner life" and full awareness of the "I" who am aware. In other words, even for Ferré only the human would have attained a true or complete self-consciousness. Derrida has comprehensively addressed both of these issues in a Husserlian context. There would be no full awareness of the "I" and no way of measuring the "inner life" once subjectivity is regarded as temporal auto-affection. This would undo the hierarchy of subjectivities that would grant full subjectivity to the human and lesser forms of subjectivity to other mammals. These distinctions are aporetic, teleologically incomplete.

This critique would hold for many philosophical discourses which compare the human and the animal. It certainly holds for Aristotle's perspective:

In the great majority of animals there are traces of psychical qualities or attitudes, which qualities are more differentiated in the case of human beings ...

[F]or instance, just as in man we find knowledge, wisdom, and sagacity, so in certain animals there exists some other natural potentiality akin to these ... (588a20-31)

The traces of these differentiated characteristics ... are especially visible where character is the more developed, and most of all in man. The fact is, the nature of man is the most rounded off and complete, and consequently in man the qualities or capacities above referred to are found in their perfection. (608b3-8)

## Chapter II

Derrida's "deconstruction" of Husserl's Transcendental Subjectivity does not leave Husserl's thought in ruins. In fact, Derrida's thought is launched in and a departure from Husserlian thought. Furthermore, there is much in Husserl's thought that Derrida would regard as indispensable to philosophical and ethical thought in general. Interestingly, Derrida even defends the thought of Husserl from the critical attacks made by Levinas. The ethical claims of Levinas, Derrida argues, must be grounded in the insights of the Husserlian discourse.<sup>111</sup>

As a facet of his general critique, Levinas accuses Husserl of "totalizing" the other. Husserl would lack a thought of "desire" as a movement transcending toward the other but which keeps its distance from the excessive alterity of the other. Derrida claims, to the contrary, Husserl does not have an intentionality of adequation that would encapsulate the alterity of the other, once and for all. Rather, the imperfection of Husserl's notions of intentionality and perception leaves an irreducible space for the alterity of the other. Husserl's horizon is an indefinite opening which, as an Idea in the Kantian sense, is a repetition of objectivation to infinity. Therefore, the meaning and the perception of the other are always

incomplete. In sum, Derrida argues that Husserl's intentionality, as infinite inadequation to the other, is a mode of "carefully" respecting the other's alterity as the irreducible exteriority from one's self.<sup>112</sup> This ultimately amounts to the impossibility of accessing and appropriating in one's own living present the lived experience of the other as Alter Ego.

Without Husserl's description of the phenomenon of the other as other," contrary to Levinas' view of the other as absolutely beyond such intentionality, which an aspect of the other would always be, the *phenomenon of respect* for the other would not be possible:

The phenomenon of respect supposes the respect of phenomenality. And ethics, phenomenology. In this sense, phenomenology is respect itself, the development, the becoming-language of respect itself ... [Furthermore] ... ethics finds within phenomenology its own meaning, its freedom and radicality.<sup>113</sup>

To claim that ethics and respect suppose phenomenology is not to argue that ethics must presuppose premises or values from phenomenology. Ethics would neither dissolve in phenomenology nor submit to its approach. For phenomenology would make no political or ethical proscriptions. On the contrary, it is the "neutralization" of hierarchies and commands. But what phenomenology does offer are the absolutely crucial components for ethical meaning, namely, the thought of temporalization and alterity. It is the thought of non-presence in these two senses

by which respect is possible and in which ethical meaning finds its true sense, according to Derrida.<sup>114</sup> An ethical command or law is not respectful and not ethical, if it does not think the other in terms of temporalization and alterity.

Respectfully and responsibly thinking the phenomena of the other is the major point of Derrida's defense of Husserl. And this is something that Levinas ought not to have missed. Any discourse on ethics, or, even, "ethicity" of ethics in the case of Levinas, must recognize the Kantian discovery of Husserl's "objectivity", which leaves open the truth and alterity of any and all objects of experience and thought. Therefore, Derrida claims that in order to be responsible and respectful to the other, ethics must recognize the inadequation of the "object" of perception and of intentionality.<sup>115</sup>

But ethics must also recognize, at the same time, some sort of knowledge of the other. Derrida states:

It suffices that ethical meaning be *thought* in order for Husserl to be right. Not only nominal definitions, but before them, possibilities of essence which guide all concepts, are presupposed when one speaks of ethics, of transcendence, of infinity, etc. These expressions must have a meaning for a concrete consciousness in general, or no discourse and no thought would be possible.<sup>116</sup>

No discourse of any sort, including a discourse on ethics, could be meaningful, comprehensible or even thought, if it did not have a basis in a phenomenological evidence of the "sense" of an object or other in general. This is a fundamental critique

against the early works of Levinas for disregarding knowledge, concept, law and universality in his ethical discourse.<sup>117</sup> In order to be ethical, one must respect the alterity of the other, and, at the same time, one must incorporate the "sense" of the other into a universal, comprehensible meaning for oneself and for others.<sup>118</sup> In sum, Derrida insists that an ethical discourse must be regarded as a phenomenology of ethics. This is simply due to the fact that every meaning or *noema* depends upon the possibility of meaning or the possibility of the *noema* in general, and so ethical meaning depends upon this general possibility. One must therefore regard phenomenology as a condition of ethical discourse.<sup>119</sup>

Since Husserl is thinking about the general "possibility" of meaning with his transcendental phenomenology, there is no "real" priority or hierarchy of phenomenology over ethics, or anything else. Derrida claims on behalf of Husserl:

In particular, this means that from Husserl's point of view ethics *in fact*, in existence and in history, could not be *subordinated* to transcendental neutralization ... Neither ethics, nor anything else in the world, moreover.<sup>120</sup>

And this is a crucial point regarding Levinas' fear of the neutralization of the other through knowledge. Since Husserl's transcendental meanings of the experienced other are not "real", but the consequences of the power of repetition as signification, the infinite alterity of the experienced other is not neutralized

by these meanings and their constituting signs. Furthermore, as we have already seen, neutralization is precluded by the fact that meaning cannot be blended with intuition, and even implies the absence of intuition. The *possibility* of these meanings, therefore, does not have an inevitable negative impact on the Earth and existence. For these reasons, the Levinasian perspective on justice as the relation to the other is also not neutralized. But what these transcendental meanings and Husserl's discourse do permit us to do, Derrida claims, is to:

speak of ethical objectivity or of ethical values or imperatives as objects (*noemas*) ... without reducing this objectivity to ... theoretical objectivity ...<sup>121</sup>

Derrida is explicitly claiming that we should acknowledge and affirm the Husserlian insight into the conditions of the possibility of a form of ethical objectivity, values and imperatives. These would be regarded as ethical meanings and not as theoretical meanings of objects in the world. This would provide the sense of universality that Derrida claims is necessary to supplement any thought of the singularity of the other in the Levinasian sense. This universality of meaning would also provide a basis for ethical discourse and the possibility of any discourse of ethical matters beyond one's private, "secret" experience of the other. One might say that it would be the possibility of a type of "intersubjective" discussion of ethical issues. In sum, Derrida has attempted to defend the ethical

importance of transcendental phenomenology from the critical attacks of Levinas.

More specifically, Levinas would claim that Husserl's thought of the transcendental ego would reduce the other human to the same as a phenomenon of the ego. Derrida disagrees with Levinas and argues that Husserl is very respectful of the *meaning* of the other's irreducible alterity as it appears as "originary nonpresence." Husserl clearly recognizes the alterity of the other in a "non-phenomenality" which the ego can never experience as present to itself. So one could never have a Levinasian respect for the other without a recognition that it appears without fully appearing. Derrida writes:

One could neither speak, nor have any sense of the totally other, if there was not a phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence of the totally other as such. No one more than Husserl has been sensitive to the singular and irreducible style of this evidence, and to the originary non-phenomenalization indicated within it. Even if one neither seeks nor is able to thematize the other *of which* one does not speak, but to *whom* one speaks, this impossibility and this imperative themselves can be thematized (as Levinas does) only on the basis of a certain appearance of the other as other for an ego. Husserl speaks of this *system*, of this appearance, and of the impossibility of thematizing the other in person.<sup>122</sup>

It may be "impossible" to fully and completely thematize the other as such because of its *withdrawal* into non-phenomenalization. But this non-phenomenalization and non-thematization can be thematized in a meaningful way for an "ego" in a discourse on the other. This non-phenomenalization and non-

thematization of the other as the incomplete appropriation of the other is the basis of respect for the alterity of the other. The *meaning* of this *experience* of the other is an *ethical imperative*, according to Derrida.

Secondly, Derrida points out that Husserl's intentionality of the other is "irreducibly mediate." The "analogical appresentation" of the other does not reduce the other to the same, it testifies to its Levinasian *separation*. But it also includes mediation. The problem with the Levinasian discourse is the following: if there is immediacy, as he proposes, then there is no other. Although Levinas wants to keep a distance and prevent "communion", it is only through a Husserlian mediation that one can think it. Husserl's intentionality respects the "secret" of the other and her *separate origin* from one's self. Husserl's "appresentation" is his recognition of a radical separation of the absolute origins of the "world" of each and every human subjectivity.<sup>123</sup> With what we have seen in the first chapter, Derrida would not promote the idea of an "absolute" origin or simple origin of one's world. Because of what we have said about "spacing", "temporality", and the trace, the origins of the world would not be absolutely interior to oneself since "spacing" is a movement of exteriority.<sup>124</sup> One might say that one's "world" originates or is constituted "with" another. One's lived experience and intentionality are constituted with the

other's. However, within this interaction with the other, my lived experience is my experience and my intentionality is my intentionality, even though they originate with the other and her intentional experience.<sup>125</sup>

Although Derrida accepts that Husserl is a thinker respectful of the transcendent beings of the world, Husserl "carno-phallogocentrically" distinguishes between the alterity of the transcendental ego and every other form of being on earth, including the human body itself.<sup>126</sup> A non-human's alterity and the human body's alterity depend upon the incompleteness of a transcendental subjectivity's perceptions. It is this form of alterity that precludes any form of perceptual communion or experiential sameness between oneself and the other transcendental subjectivities. The other is, therefore, infinitely other, since I could never possibly have the same lived experiences that she does:

Never will this experience be given to me originally, like everything which is *mir eigenes*, which is proper to me. This transcendence of the nonproper no longer is that of the entirety, always inaccessible on the basis of always partial attempts: transcendence of *Infinity*, not of *Totality*.<sup>127</sup>

Again, one must start from one's "own" experience, although "one's own" is not absolute, thereby experiencing the "infinity" of the other in the endless flux of perceptions of the other's body. For this reason, there can never be an experience or even thought of the other human in its

"totality", to disagree with Levinas.

In contrast to Levinas, who wishes to speak of justice in relation to the other but without any discourse on the other as *such*, Husserl is justified in developing a discourse on the "infinitely" other because he starts with the fact that the other does appear, although with alterity as non-phenomenality. Without such a phenomenological description of the non-phenomenality of the other, Levinas is lacking any authorization for speaking meaningfully about the other. Derrida asks:

What authorizes him to say "infinitely other" if the infinitely other does not appear as such in the zone he calls the same?<sup>128</sup>

Derrida links this question of the right to discourse and the possibility of language to the *question of violence*. One may regard as violence the necessity of basing a discourse on the other in one's intentional experience, since to a great degree, the other does depend upon the same. But, if one regards this as "... the only possible point of departure ...", then we must recognize the "fact" of this "violence" as a condition of ethics, "... previous to every ethical choice, even supposed by ethical non-violence."<sup>129</sup> In other words, the relation to the other is one of violence in the sense that the other is regarded as it *appears* to me in perception, sense and meaning. Additionally, this limit is even more serious when one considers the alterity of the other as that which does not *appear*. One must accept this "violence" in

relation to the other. It is a type of "pre-ethical violence" which conditions ethics. And it is a violence which must be recognized by any discourse on the other, any ethical discourse, as it is only this experience of the other that "lends itself to language ..." <sup>130</sup> For even Levinas' own discourse on justice and the other must assume the "trace" of this "transcendental violence" or the violence of the trace. Levinas, then, has been even more violent to the other for not recognizing the Derridean-Husserlian insight into the originary violence necessary to all speech, meaning and ethics. <sup>131</sup>

Thirdly, Levinas argues that we must not think the other as *alter ego*, but as "what I am not" in order to save it from an unethical neutralization. Contrarily, for Husserl, the resemblance with the other human is based solely on its "form" as "ego", in contradistinction from nonhuman animals, plants, stones, etc. Derrida claims:

If the other were not recognized as a transcendental *alter ego*, it would be entirely in the world and not, as ego, the origin of the world. To refuse to see in it an ego in this sense is, within the ethical order, the very gesture of all violence. If the other was not recognized as ego, its entire alterity would collapse. <sup>132</sup>

Since for Husserl the other is an other origin of the world, it precludes the possibility of its inclusion within my ego and its likeness to me. "The other as *alter ego* signifies the other as other, irreducible to my ego ..." <sup>133</sup> If it was reducible to me, even

though there is a non-conscious relation, I would perceive its very origin and *its world*.

Contra Levinas, Husserl would claim that it is precisely its status as ego, or alter ego, that permits it to say "I", just as I say "I." The speaking and understanding self-reference is the capacity of the ego that distinguishes it as an other from an animal, plant, or stone in my "lived world."<sup>134</sup>

Again, and just as Husserl's insight into the originary violence is the condition of a discourse on ethics and the other, so Levinas must recognize that it is only on the basis of Husserl's descriptions of the ego and alter ego as the origins of the world and as subjectivities who can say "I" that Levinas can find a basis for his thought of the "face." Levinas cannot propose his "face" or *Dasein* as the *existing* being who *speaks, understands* and *commands me*, without recognizing Husserl's phenomenological insights.<sup>135</sup>

Therefore, it is Husserl's very phenomenology that provides the basis for the ethical discourse of Levinas. Derrida claims that Husserl's thought is the very condition for a Levinasian discourse on the other who would claim me morally, who commands me ethically. Furthermore, Derrida argues that there can be no Levinasian thought of dissymmetry, which Derrida also affirms, without Husserl's invocation of a fundamental symmetry.<sup>136</sup> And because the symmetry as the general "form" of the ego is not

"real", in the sense of being part of the world or "nature", even though Derrida has shown that it is opened to and by the Earth, this irreality does not neutralize the alterity and dissemmetry of the other, but makes these essential qualities of the other possible. For Husserl, it is the symmetry of the ego and the alter ego that permits the respect of the ego for the alter ego, and vice versa, in their empirical asymmetry. So Husserl's transcendental symmetry is the condition for Levinas' empirical ethic of dissymmetry. It is only because "I know" the "other" is also an "ego" such that it regards me as its other that we can relate as others rather than as beings or things which are not others, such as animals, plants, etc.<sup>137</sup> And it is only because of the other as the other "I" that it can be regarded as a victim of violence, where as an "animal" would not be so regarded by Levinas and Husserl.

Derrida introduces the thought of Parmenides into his analysis as a way of showing that Levinas is wrong to read the history of philosophy as he does. Ironically, even the philosopher who would consider that "all is being" would still find room for difference and respect for the other, according to Derrida. Contextually, the main point is to use Parmenides to argue that Levinas cannot legitimately describe the other as both "absolute" and "infinite". Derrida claims that the thought of Parmenides would be critical of Levinas when he writes of

"separate beings, unity, difference, the same and the other."<sup>138</sup>

Derrida asks:

To what exercises would Parmenides give himself over, at the frontiers of *Totality and Infinity*, if we attempted to make him understand that *ego equals same*, and that the other is what it is only as the absolute infinitely other absolved of its relation to the same. For example: (1) The infinitely other, he would say perhaps, can be what it is only if it is other, that is, other *than* myself. Henceforth, it is no longer absolved of a relation to an ego. Therefore, it is no longer infinitely, absolutely other. It is no longer what it is. If it was absolved, it would not be other either, but the Same. (2) The infinitely other cannot be what it is—infinitely other—except by being absolutely not the same. That is, in particular, by being other than itself (non ego). Being other than itself, it is not what it is. Therefore, it is not infinitely other, etc.<sup>139</sup>

In sum, then, if the other were not related to the ego, there would be no other, only the same, the One. Furthermore, the other cannot be completely other because it would also be other than itself. One of Derrida's most central claims is therefore the following:

... the other cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other, and that, consequently, the same is not a totality closed upon itself, an identity playing with itself, having only an appearance of alterity, in what Levinas calls economy, work, and history.<sup>140</sup>

Once again, Derrida has argued that the discourse of Levinas is lacking a Husserlian type ego. But Derrida has also introduced the very basic Derridean notion that the relation to the other depends upon the violence of an originary opening and play between what appear to be separate beings. And he poses a

fundamental question to Levinas:

How could there be a "play of the Same" if alterity itself was not already *in the Same* ...?<sup>141</sup>

There would be no play, work, activity or history without the play of alterity and otherness within the same.

Derrida continues his polemic of the Levinasian view of the relation to the other and his defence of Husserl. The Levinasian scheme must presuppose the same is the other's other, and the other is the same as itself. Levinas should not have excluded the necessity of thinking the same as well as the other.<sup>142</sup> Derrida argues that a thinking of the other must follow Parmenides and recognize that one cannot think the other except with reference to some form of the self or same.<sup>143</sup>

Without reference to some form of Being, self or sameness, *eteron*, the Levinasian other cannot be thought as the human existence which morally claims me, and to whom one must be just and hospitable in a "face to face" manner. Levinas needs Husserl's discourse to ground his relation to the other in order not to confuse the human other with some morally irrelevant "thing" in the world. "Alter ego" is not regarded as transcendental by Levinas; but for Husserl, the sameness of the ego and alter ego is the very condition of the other's absolute otherness.

Again, to accuse Husserl of reducing the other to a real

moment of his life, Levinas must presuppose Husserl's discourse on the relation between the ego and alter ego. This transcendental access to the other is not violent because it is transcendental rather than empirical. The Levinasian version of the violence to the other presupposes Husserl's pre-ethical, transcendental violence as *a priori* necessary. Without recognition of the other as another ego, without Husserl's evidence for this claim, it would not be possible for Levinas to claim a "desire" and respect for the other in ethical dissymmetry. Therefore, Husserl's transcendental violence "... originally institutes the relationship between two finite *ipseities*."<sup>144</sup> This is the condition of the possibility of gaining access to the *meaning* of the other on the basis of the ego's intentionality, which leaves the other in its alterity. We must clearly recognize that Derrida's view is the following: "I" relate to the other according to the structures of experience described by Husserl, which are "my" experiences of the other and her dissimulation. According to Derrida:

... these necessities are violence itself, or rather the transcendental origin of an irreducible violence ... For this transcendental origin as the irreducible violence of the relation to the other, is at the same time non-violence, since it opens the relation to the other. It is an *economy*. And it is this economy which, by this opening, will permit access to the other to be determined, in ethical freedom, as moral violence and non-violence.<sup>145</sup>

It is this economy's opening that will permit access to the other

as the condition of an ethics of respect, responsibility and justice for the other. That is, the experience of the other by the same and vice versa is the condition of ethical questions in general, such as the questions of freedom, responsibility and violence.

This "transcendental violence" would be beyond a purely ethical discourse, though, as part of Husserl's eidetic-transcendental analysis of relations between ego and alter ego, which, Derrida suggests, the ancient Greeks had already thought. This violence extends beyond ethics to the origin of speech and meaning. So Levinas must recognize it as conditioning his discourses on justice, speech and meaning.<sup>146</sup> Therefore, the condition of the ethical and a discourse on ethics would be the transcendental violence of access to the other. In other words, the condition of ethics and ethical discourse is the spacing of the trace.

But if the opening of the same to the other and vice versa is the originary violence which would open the possibility of ethics, responsibility, meaning and discourse, there is still the problem of "egoity" for a finite being which transcends itself to the other and is respectful within itself of the transcending other.

The problems of the transcendental ego have been addressed in chapter one. Derrida has reworked Husserl's ego and has

rethought the human subjectivity in some respects. But "reason" has not yet been mentioned. If egoity as subjectivity were problematic, then, as the most "essential" structure of the subjectivity, according to Husserl, reason would also be problematic. Man's trait is problematic. For Husserl, reason is uncovered and unfolded in a teleological manner. If reason is unfolded with the egoity of man, it too would be aporetic or indefinite in the same way that the ideality of the ego is infinitely indefinite.<sup>147</sup> Because reason is aporetic, this limit between man and ape is unclear. This is not to say that human beings do not have the attribute of reason or rationality of some kind, which is obvious in many forms. However, because Husserl represents the meaning of reason in a teleological manner, reason is "...[only] on the way ..."<sup>148</sup> The essential distinction between human, or philosophical human, and ape, too, is only on the way.

As we have seen above, the "ego," "self" and "I" are signifiers, a product of signification, and a substitute for the lack of intuition of a self. Since human "subjectivity" is a signifier, which does not represent a present or "real" entity in the objective sense, there seems to be no reason why "subjectivity" ought to be procured for certain members of the human species only. This seems especially reasonable if we take into account the unthought aspects of subjectivity that Derrida has uncovered. Also, Husserl himself has written that there is

nothing human, in the empirical sense, about the transcendental ego.<sup>149</sup>

If a form of "subjectivity" were attributed to animals, then a dog, for example, must also have an originary world and lived experience attributed to her as well. Husserl, in fact, has claimed that animals have a lower form of ego. He writes of animals as:

within the sphere of living things, i.e., those living not merely according to drives but also constantly through ego-acts, as opposed to those living only according to drives (such as plants). Among animals, human beings stand out, so much so, in fact, that mere animals have ontic meaning [as such] only by comparison to them, ... as variations of them.<sup>150</sup>

To say that animals perform lower "variations" of the transcendental "ego-acts" is to say that animals have lower variations of meaningful relations with others and "lifeless" things. Therefore, they have some lower forms of society and lower forms of worlds of signification. They ought to be regarded as being origins of their own worlds, with their own forms of lived experience.<sup>151</sup> If the various animals are individual origins of their "own" worlds, the spacing and temporality of the trace must apply here. Derrida, therefore, claims that the trace is not proper to mankind, but applies universally.<sup>152</sup>

The distinguishing factor between the transcendental ego and "ego-acts" of the animal is Husserl's conception of reason.

And because of reason and the transcendental ego, the human would have the possibility of language, descriptions and inferences, the capacity to ask questions of truth, to seek verification and to argue. In sum, the transcendental ego is the capacity to make a decision "in a rational way."<sup>153</sup>

It seems to be this claimed distinction by Husserl which precludes the various animals from moral significance. Since Husserl attributes a much lower form of "ego" to animals, he would not attribute an adequate level of "sameness" to these other beings. Carno-phallogocentrically, Husserl would regard the "animal ego" as an underdeveloped form of the transcendental ego, and therefore not as other in the Levinasian ethical sense. In order to recognize the dissymmetry of the other, symmetry is a prerequisite. However, it ought to be the non-phenomenalization of the lived experience of the other animal by which Husserl would regard the alterity of these others, and not merely the indefinite flux of the human's perceptions of the body of the animal. As Derrida sums it up in terms of this context, animals are both less the same as transcendental egos and less other. That is, because the egos attributable to animals are not the same as transcendental egos, there is no symmetry in the relations between humans and animals. And because this symmetry is lacking, the animal is less other in a morally significant sense.

This is perhaps why Husserl has written that the philosopher is responsible for all of mankind, but there is no mention of responsibility for animals or any other species. Husserl may be regarded as radically increasing the experience of responsibility by claiming that the philosopher is a "functionary" with the "responsibility for the true being of mankind."<sup>154</sup> But the sense and experience of an increased responsibility would have been radicalized to an excessive degree, if Husserl had made the claim that the philosopher is equally responsible for the individuals of all species.<sup>155</sup>

Derrida's deconstruction opens Husserlian thought to those infinite responsibilities. For Husserl, the philosopher would seek rationally for reason as the human's "innermost being."<sup>156</sup> The transcendental ego would be the bearer of reason.<sup>157</sup> But the ego and reason have been deconstructed, the infinity and ideality of both depend upon the trace. One might claim, then, that one's innermost being is not reason and ego, but the spacing of the trace. The "self" or "soul" is a trace. One's "innermost" being is also the trace of the other. The Husserlian perspective of rationally seeking to be rational in the attainment of the autonomous and responsible "I," which itself searches for its innate reason, as well as for the communal reason in intersubjectivity, is transformed in the Derridean deconstruction.<sup>158</sup> Derrida's thought of the trace is a

thought of the self and other in an aporetic, heteronomous relationship, which is the very basis of the autonomy of the ego and the autonomy of the intersubjectivity of mankind. The deconstruction of Husserl is the occasion to move from the thought of the philosophical autonomy of the individual and autonomy of mankind to the philosopher's and mankind's responsibility for others of all species and the biosphere as a whole. Therefore, the seeking out of the innate and infinite idea of reason must be rethought as the seeking out of the trace of every other, as one self. The thought of the trace is an infinite thinking of the respectful and responsible relation with every other, human, animal, plant, soil, air, etc. So, the infinite idea of reason is transformed into a thinking of the trace, which is a move to the Derridean idea of infinite responsibility. Mankind's autonomy is heteronomous and therefore already in relation with and responsible for individuals of every species.

The consequential moral significance and insignificance of the other would be illegitimate if one remains strictly within the parameters of Husserl's thought. Husserl and Levinas would have no justification for precluding the myriad individuals of countless species from the category of ethical other who would claim me ethically, and demand respect and responsibility for their alterity. Contra Levinas, a deconstructed Husserlian

discourse would recognize the "transcendental violence" at work in nonhuman species, which is the very basis of the possibility of empirical violence. In the name of deconstruction, and in the name of speaking of injustice, irresponsibility, violence and a lack of respect toward animals and other beings, Derrida has deconstructed the texts of Husserl and many others. Within this context of deconstructing subjectivity, Derrida has posed:

a set of questions on carno-phallogocentrism—we must reconsider in its totality the metaphysico-anthropocentric axiomatic that dominates, in the West, the thought of the just and the unjust ... From this very first step we can already glimpse the first of its consequences, namely, that a deconstructionist approach to the boundaries that institute the human subject ... as the measure of the just and unjust ... may, in the name of a demand more insatiable than justice, lead to a reinterpretation of the whole apparatus of boundaries within which a history and a culture have been able to confine their criteriology.<sup>159</sup>

Derrida is attempting to rework the whole Western philosophical tradition in order to reinvent a Western culture that would think about animals, plants, Earth and the biosphere in terms of justice and responsibility. This Western tradition refers back to Aristotle, for example, who made the following claims:

... [J]ustice is relative to people ... But a state's purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good. Otherwise it might be made up of slaves and animals other than man, and that is impossible, because slaves and animals do not participate in happiness, nor in a life that involves choice.<sup>160</sup>

Also:

Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and she has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of

speech. Speech is something different from voice, which is possessed by other animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure; for their nature does indeed enable them not only to feel pleasure and pain but to communicate these feelings to each other. Speech, on the other hand serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. It is the sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a household and a state.<sup>161</sup>

There is, on the other hand, a very significant sense in which humans and "animals" are the same. It is in the non-phenomenalization of the lived experience of the other, as the origin of his or her world, that all humans and animals are the same or "equal."<sup>162</sup> Derrida writes:

This interruptive dis-junction enjoins a sort of incommensurable equality within absolute dissymmetry.<sup>163</sup>

And:

Dissociation, separation, is the condition of my relation to the other.<sup>164</sup>

Without this "relationless relation" in which the lived experience and origin of the world of the other are recognized as not present to me, as absolutely "transcendent" to my world of experience, the other would be entirely appropriated within "my world."<sup>165</sup>

All that we have discussed regarding subjectivity and its relation to the other would be regarded as the universal structures of subjectivity and intersubjectivity or the "law of originary sociability."<sup>166</sup> Derrida names this "originary"

because it is "prior to" or the condition of all forms of organized society, political organization and government. He also claims that we must think this "law of originary sociability" as the parameters of the laws of any society and even as the basis of what has been called "natural law."<sup>167</sup>

The condition of this originary sociability would be the trace. The temporalizing spacing of the trace, which was discussed within the Husserlian context, is Derrida's most essential discourse on this topic. The spacing of the subject, it's opening to externality, is called "ex-appropriation" by Derrida. Ex-appropriation would signify the simultaneous "movements" involved in the spacing of the forces of the "subject" which are expropriation and appropriation. The double movement of the "subject" includes a gathering of itself and the other, as well as a dissemination of itself and the other from "itself."

This flux of movements, Derrida claims, cannot be "stabilized" in the form of a subject.<sup>168</sup> That is, the structures of these movements can be identified and analysed, but they cannot be definitively formulated in a theoretical way such that they can be justly presented "as such." Derrida's version of subjectivity will never be intuited as a fully present object, and, therefore, never as a stable underlying substance.<sup>169</sup> In other words, one's experience of one's self is

also an impossible experience and therefore one of alterity.<sup>170</sup>

The processes of "ex-appropriation" would preclude the possibility of an *atomic*, self-enclosed, totalizing ego. We have seen that Husserl's thought of the transcendental ego was an attempt to describe a self-enclosed, totality in the sense of the absolute self-presence of auto-affection in the structural process named "hearing-understanding-oneself speak." But the deconstruction of Husserl has attempted to show the necessary constituting work of the trace and the basis for the movements of ex-appropriation. Because of the trace and its movements of ex-appropriation, the functional structure of what Derrida has called "hearing-understanding-oneself speak" is impossible in itself, and, in fact, only a part of the appropriating movement of appropriation, since Husserl would attempt to preclude the other in this aspect of the relation to self in order to maintain an absolute self-presence of self-consciousness. According to Derrida, he has opened Husserl's subject to the ex-appropriation that was always already assumed within Husserl's thought. In sum, Derrida is arguing for a "dislocated singularity":

ex-appropriation does not form a boundary, if one understands by this word a closure or a negativity. It implies the irreducibility of the relation to the other. The other resists all subjectivation ...<sup>171</sup>

And because of the impossible closure of the subjectivity as

ex-appropriation, the other and its alterity will never be enclosed and totalized in an absolute sense. The gathering of the other will always include its dissemination.

What Derrida calls ex-appropriation is also the very movement of what he calls the essential "experience of affirmation" at the basis of all experience and at the basis of even nonconscious movements of ex-appropriation. Ex-appropriation is an affirmative, non-verbal "yes" to the other and to the self, the boundary being unclear, of course. That is, the spacing of the trace and the opening to and gathering in of the other are not only a "necessary violence," but also an "unconditional affirmation."<sup>172</sup>

Ex-appropriation as unconditional affirmation of the self and other would be, according to Derrida, the very condition of subjectivity. Derrida argues that the subjectivity understood in any other way cannot account for the most essential predicates that had been traditionally attributed to it. The most important for Derrida is that of responsibility. Derrida says "it is in relation to the "yes" ... that one must seek a new (post-deconstructive) determination of the responsibility of the 'subject'".<sup>173</sup> That is, without this irreducible relation to the other, in terms of the spacing of the trace, originary sociability, ex-appropriation, the necessary violence and the experience of affirmation as the nonverbal "yes",

responsibility cannot be thought as a predicate of the subject. The deconstruction of subjectivity, as it was performed within the discourse of Husserl, is the condition of responsibility and the responsible human subject. Derrida says:

In order to recast, if not rigorously re-found a discourse on the "subject," ... of the subject (of law, of morality, of politics ...), one has to go through the experience of a deconstruction ... A concept ... of responsibility comes at this price ... if there is such a thing as duty. The subject, if subject there must be, is to come *after* this.<sup>174</sup>

Subjectivity and obligation are based in the necessary violence and affirmation of ex-appropriation.<sup>175</sup> The problem with many conceptions of subjectivity is that they centred all of their attributes on the value of being-present and self-presence.<sup>176</sup> This would imply a preclusion of the relation to the other, in Derrida's sense, and therefore an impossibility of responsibility for others.

According to Derrida, even though Husserl attributes something of the ego to animals, and excludes all other beings, even the animal would not have a relation to self or to the other because it would lack the phenomenological "as such."<sup>177</sup> No animal or other form of being would have this relation to self and other "as such." Therefore, animals and others would not have a relation to self in any significant sense. But we have seen many reasons above why this "as such" is impossible, even according to Husserl's own discourse, from the

impossibility of experiencing the lived present of the other to the impossibility of fulfilling the teleological, intentional meaning. That is, one cannot experience the other "as such" without erasing the alterity of the other.<sup>178</sup> But Derrida disagrees with Husserl and most of the tradition on this crucial claim. For what he calls the logic of the trace and ex-appropriation are universal "movements" that function differently in each type of being:

Ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man. One can recognize its differential figures as soon as there is a relation to self in its most elementary form (but for this very reason there is no such thing as elementary) ... Nothing should be excluded ... The difference between "animal" and "vegetal" also remains problematic. Of course, the relation to self in ex-appropriation is radically different (and that's why it requires a thinking of difference and not of opposition) in the case of what one calls the "nonliving," the "vegetal," the "animal," "man," or "God."<sup>179</sup>

The ex-appropriation of the trace is universal and differentiates itself according to species, forms of being and individuals. As we saw above, Derrida will not bring in hierarchical assumptions of evolution and teleology in general.<sup>180</sup> He will not subscribe to the unnecessary violence of thought which interprets the value and significance of beings for humans in terms of a hierarchical chain of being, from the so-called "elementary" forms and least significant up to "man" and, finally, to "God."

Since ex-appropriation would be universal and

differentiating without hierarchy, the so-called non-living, such as air, water, fire and earth, the so-called nonconscious living beings, such as plants and trees, and the so-called conscious living beings, such as panthers and apes, would all have a relation to "self" or "same" and a relation to "others." They would have a relation to "self" or "same" and "other" amongst their own kind, and amongst others of different types and species.

For Derrida, the human subject is irreducibly related to all others of all kinds. Human responsibility would, therefore, be excessive in this sense, beyond the radical responsibility even of Husserl's thought. He said in an interview that:

... it is no doubt the case that there neither can be nor should be any concept adequate to what we call responsibility. Responsibility carries within it, and must do so an essential excessiveness.<sup>181</sup>

Derrida claims that responsibility is excessive because we are irreducibly related to the other who is always changing in the flux of my experience. We must recognize a surplus of responsibility because "the affirmation that motivates deconstruction is unconditional, imperative and immediate ..."<sup>182</sup> The affirmation of ex-appropriation is excessive, a surplus of duty to the singularity of the other beyond the traditional concepts of duty and responsibility, but not without these universal concepts.<sup>183</sup> Derrida attempts to think beyond the

ethical discourses which would begin with the sameness of egos. Instead, he wants to think the sameness of the human self and other as a double dissymmetry, "like a kind of reciprocal, respective and respectful excessiveness ..." <sup>184</sup> An excessive sense of responsibility, a surplus beyond the traditional concepts, because Derrida is calling for an extension of responsibility to include all beings within the circle of ethical and moral significance for man:

What is still to come or what remains buried in an almost inaccessible memory is the thinking of a responsibility that does not stop at this determination of the neighbour, at the dominant schema of this determination. <sup>185</sup>

Derrida has written that the questions of the neighbour and friendship may well be:

at least an example or lead into the two major questions of "deconstruction": the question of the history of concepts ... and the question of phallogocentrism ... and even of sacrificial "carno-phallogocentrism." <sup>186</sup>

We must think the neighbour and the friend beyond the dominant schema that goes back at least as far as Aristotle and the Bible. Derrida found the radicalisation of ethics as respect for the other human in Husserl's phenomenology. But Derrida has deconstructed Husserl in order to further radicalize ethics by extending phenomenology's respect and responsibility to other kinds of beings.

By rethinking the conditions of subjectivity as the spacing

of the trace and ex-appropriation, Derrida has fashioned the conditions for an ethical discourse in which all beings ought to be taken into account without the violence of the assumptions of a thinking of hierarchy and "speciesism."<sup>187</sup> Generally speaking, until recently, most discourses on subjectivity implied the very sacrifice of all other beings, especially other animals. Derrida even claims "that this carnivorous sacrifice is essential to our discourses on the subjectivity, the intentional subjectivity who is subject to the law and to justice as law."<sup>188</sup> A significant part of Derrida's project is to think subjectivity beyond this violence of what he has name sacrificial carno-phallogocentrism.

### CHAPTER III

Exemplary of our philosophical tradition, Rousseau was a thinker who "described" a very zealous delimitation between the languages of humans and the languages of animals. According to Derrida's reading, the most important factor in Rousseau's distinction between the various human and animal languages is the element of "supplementarity." Only civilized humanity would have the capacity for supplementarity. Therefore, they would have the possibility of substitutions, symbols, representations, articulate speech, and conventions in general. Animals would only be able to emit the innate, inarticulate cries of nature. Without supplementarity, animals would lack the condition of the possibility of imagination. Without the imagination, the animal would not be able to identify with the other, not relate to the other as such, and not feel passion or compassion for the other as civilized humans do. Only man in civilized society would have speech and song as the articulate languages of the voice and audition. Animals would have the natural, inarticulate languages of gesture and vision, which are languages of mere need rather than of passion and compassion. Humanity would have the capacity to transcend its daily needs in passion, thanks to imagination. Finally, without the supplement of imagination, animals and their

languages are relegated to unchanging ways of life and communication. Because of the civilized human's power of imagination, however, we would be free to perfect our lives, languages and societies.<sup>189</sup>

According to Derrida, supplementarity does not distinguish man from other animals or from any other earthling for that matter. The proper of man is not the supplement. Rather, the supplement makes possible what "man" tends to define as human. Supplementarity exceeds and precedes humanity, makes "man" possible.<sup>190</sup> At the same time, however, it also "dislocates" the proper of man and man's delimitation from other species. As it is the possibility and the impossibility of humanity, that which constitutes, precedes and exceeds, it applies to those who are not human and opens the limit to these others. Derrida argues that supplementarity is also applicable to animals and nature in general. Animals, too, would be de-constituted by supplementarity.

Before we can understand Derrida's notion of supplementarity, we must first understand its origin in the way Rousseau uses the term "supplement." Derrida defines the meaning of Rousseau's qualified term "dangerous supplement" as both an addition and a substitute, which would represent or replace a missing present or presence. The representation often deceives us into believing that presence is not lacking at all. Derrida

writes:

When Nature, as self-proximity, comes to be forbidden or interrupted, when speech fails to protect presence, writing becomes necessary. It must *be added* to the word urgently; ... speech being natural or at least the natural expression of thought, writing is added to it, is adjoined, as an image or representation. In that sense, it is not natural. It diverts the immediate presence of thought to speech into representation and imagination ... It is the addition of a technique, a sort of artful ruse to make speech present when it is actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny of the language.<sup>191</sup>

According to Derrida, Rousseau has understood "nature" as self-presence, or pure and absolute present being without any relation to another or to an outside, and without any lack within itself.<sup>192</sup> Animals would be self-enclosed totalities with no relation to any other, and with no concept of time or history because they live solely in the present experience of the moment, without memory of the immediate past moment and without anticipation of the immediate future, present moment. When the supplement of signs opens the self-present relation between thought and speech, written signs are used in an attempt to close the gap between the voice and mind. We have been misled by writing and our imaginations into thinking that writing does in fact reappropriate the present and self-presence.

Finally, we should note that the supplement includes two opposing ideas *at the same time*: addition and substitution. The "addition" is closer to signifying a surplus that enriches what is presently there. The "substitution" would signify the

replacement of what is lacking.<sup>193</sup> And both meanings include the idea of the "alien" force that infiltrates the present and self-presence as Nature.

This combination of ideas that interweaves two opposing values at the same time, *both at once*, and the value of exteriority, are the basis of Derrida's formulation of the "logic of supplementarity." This logic is revealed throughout Rousseau's conceptual system. In fact, the "supplement" reveals the general structure of conceptual systems within a text. Derrida claims that:

this theme describes the chain itself, the being-chain of a textual chain, the structure of substitution, the articulation of desire and of language, the logic of all conceptual oppositions taken over by Rousseau, and particularly the role and the function, in his system, of the concept of Nature.<sup>194</sup>

What it tells us is that concepts are not clear and distinct, independent atoms of meaning. Each "full" term is *both* itself and not itself. Each "full" term has a meaning identity that is opened to and by other meanings, including by its apparent opposite. The system of concepts is a referential web within a system of signification.

In contrast to Rousseau, who would argue that the supplement is an exterior force that infiltrates the presence of meaning to the human subject's thoughts and the identity of the meaning, Derrida argues that Rousseau has *described* the

inherent possibility of the supplement in all conceptual terms and in the relation of the ideality of meaning to the human self. So the supplement does not come by accident or as an "alien exteriority" in Rousseau's sense. In the case of "Nature," as we will see, it is *both* an addition and a substitute, as well as exterior to the system of Humanity. Nature would be an ideal limit both as the *arche* and the *telos* of human civilization. Also, animals, for example, would be able to exist within human society, even though Rousseau would keep the concepts of "Nature" and "Animal" outside of supplementarity.

Derrida's attempt to think Rousseau's concepts in this way is also the attempt to think the history of the metaphysical tradition.<sup>195</sup> Rethinking, reinterpreting and opening the metaphysical totality which would encircle and enclose our histories is one of Derrida's deconstructive approaches. In sum, Derrida's critical description attempts to reveal the unthought and unheard of aspects of the metaphysical tradition and its implications.

Rousseau uses two meanings simultaneously with the word "supplement." Similarly, Derrida points out two contradictory values associated with "articulation." Affirmatively, articulation is constructive; it is essentially linked to the possibility of passion, language, society, and man. Negatively,

articulation is also responsible for the enervation of accent, passion, life and energy. Derrida reinterprets Rousseau's "supplement" in such a way as to make explicit what Rousseau expresses. This new logic beyond that of the excluded middle allows us, like Rousseau, to say or describe, both at once, contraries, opposites at the same time. This logic is the "graphic" of supplementarity. It is that in which articulation is immersed. Articulation is just another concept that manifests and demonstrates "supplementarity."

How is it possible that Rousseau's texts employ terms with simultaneously contrary values? Derrida's answer is the "trace" as the possibility of supplementarity, the logic of "both at once", of "contradictory unity".<sup>196</sup> The trace or difference is the "pure movement," the "movement of difference," that produces the determined differences that we experience in the "world."<sup>197</sup> The trace is an operation, not a state, a movement not a structure.<sup>198</sup> The trace has always already become. "As such," it will have been its own becoming-unmotivated.<sup>199</sup>

Because the trace is "unmotivated", lacking a guiding purpose or teleology, a signifier, such as "supplement", will not have a "natural" connection with or function in relation to a particular signified within what we call reality. We are not free to use any word in any context and expect to be meaningful or forceful, but signifiers are "arbitrary" in Saussure's technical

sense of having no natural attachment. In contradistinction to Saussure's sense of "natural bond," Derrida uses the term "instituted" to characterize the trace.<sup>200</sup> The trace cannot be thought:

...without thinking the retention of difference within the structure of reference where difference appears *as such* and thus permits a certain liberty of variations among the full terms ... The "unmotivatedness" of the sign requires a synthesis in which the completely other is announced as such—without simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity—within what is not it.<sup>201</sup>

Because of these traits of the trace, its becoming-unmotivated and its retention of difference with a referential web that produces otherness, difference as nonplenitude, as spacing, Rousseau's "supplement" would simultaneously include two opposing values. This movement of the trace is the very possibility of this logic or graphic of supplementarity, as the trace necessitates the essential retention of otherness on the part of each full term within a system of signification or referential structure. Thus, the "derived" opposition between nature and culture would "... have meaning only after the possibility of the trace."<sup>202</sup>

This referential structure extends beyond that of signification in the linguistic sense. These thoughts of the trace also clearly apply to the "entity." According to Derrida:

The trace, where the relationship with other is marked, articulates its possibility in the entire field of the entity ... The trace must be thought before the entity. But the

movement of the trace is necessarily occulted, it produces itself as self-occultation. When the other produces itself as such, it presents itself as self-occultation ... The presentation of the other as such, that is to say the dissimulation of its "as such," has always already begun and no structure of the entity escapes it.<sup>203</sup>

This clearly builds on Derrida's discussion of the spacing of the trace in his Husserlian texts. We have seen that the trace applies universally, beyond humanity. The trace is the very basis of the relation to any other in general. We must think the trace as the condition of an experience of any other, which will never be fully presented.

For Derrida, then, the trace is not only supplementarity's possibility, the trace will have been (almost) synonymous for supplementarity. In fact, the word "supplement" is an "other name for *differáncé*."<sup>204</sup> Derrida, therefore, makes reference to *the supplementary difference*.<sup>205</sup>

For Rousseau, "articulate speech" is the first convention and that which "distinguishes man among the animals ..."<sup>206</sup> Articulations in this context are the *differences* in general within human languages; the many signs, symbols, images, accents, intonations, and consonants within a human language.<sup>207</sup> The various animal languages would be inarticulate. There would be no differences and no consonants. In general, animals would have no signs according to Rousseau. Animals would therefore not have the "supplementary" aspects of language and no supplementarity in

general. Animals would only emit the "cry of nature;" "simple sounds [that] emerge naturally from the throat;" and, of course, "Natural sounds are inarticulate."<sup>208</sup> Only man would have the supplementary articulating differences of signs, which add to and substitute for the simple sounds of animals. Only man would have conventions and culture.

Furthermore, even though human language as articulated speech is a supplement to animal language and distinguishes the human from the animal, and the conventional from the natural, it is still regarded by Rousseau as an accidental attribute which is originally exterior to the natural presence of the animal languages. Articulation would be the alien force that disrupts the presence of the *voice of nature* to the animal's heart and mind. But it is also the condition of human speech and, therefore, essential to speech.

The most important rebuttal to Rousseau is Derrida's claim that if articulation is a supplement as human language, then it is "essential" rather than accidental. Articulation is the condition of both speech and writing.<sup>209</sup> Therefore, the supplement of articulation is not derivative.

The supplement is not the convention of man. On the contrary, Rousseau's texts reveal that the so-called convention of supplementary articulation is the very condition of the distinction between nature and convention, and nature's other

others. Derrida writes:

... the concept of substitute precedes the opposition of nature and culture: the supplement can also very well be natural - gesture - or artificial - speech.<sup>210</sup>

In the context of this claim, Derrida is referring to Rousseau's classification of languages as natural and conventional. If everything in language is subject to substitution, then the substitute is both natural and conventional. Supplementarity is the possibility of the supplementary relation between these two determinations of language, and between the concepts of "nature" and "convention" in general. The supplement precedes the distinction of nature/culture. The supplementary difference between "nature" and "culture" would open these concepts to each other in the referential system.

Rousseau regards articulation as the becoming writing of language in human speech, since these differences within language resemble, analogically, the difference and distance between one's thought and writing. Just as writing would be derivative of speech and its immediate presence to thought, so articulations and the proliferation of articulations would be secondary to the inarticulate stage of language. This becoming articulate would insinuate differences as human language progresses back to the presence of Nature.<sup>211</sup> A language of "pure articulation would be pure writing, algebra, or dead language."<sup>212</sup> This would be the furthest remove from nature, the voice of *Mother Nature* and the

natural self-presence of the voice to one's thoughts. Scientific writing's "universal" character would be the ultimate alienation from nature, the self-presence of speech to thought, from lived experience and from all "representeds."<sup>213</sup> Scientists and mathematicians would give us signs with meanings devoid of any real references to the self or to the world.

As an exemplary writer in the metaphysical tradition, Rousseau did not pose the radical question of writing:

One must now think that writing is at the same time more exterior to speech, being only its "image" or its "symbol," and more interior to speech which is already in itself a writing.<sup>214</sup>

Writing as originary exteriority, due to the movement of the trace, opens the inside to the outside, always already splits the same by the other. By the logic of supplementarity, or the spacing of the trace, the outside is inside.

The default in each thing is the nonpresence of the movement of the trace and, therefore, the nonpresence and presence of the other. Contrary to Rousseau's wish, writing as the supplement is speech, or speech as a supplement to the voice of nature is not an addition of a present to a present, but of a something to a nonpresence.<sup>215</sup>

The supplement is not a present, but it is not an absent either. It is, of course, both; neither present nor absent. Derrida writes of the "strange essence of the supplement which

does not have essentiality."<sup>216</sup> It does not have a definite and distinct form and meaning. And judged by its effects, it is definitely more than nothing. The neither/nor is the condition of all things as supplements. For any so-called present Earthling is a supplement of a supplement.<sup>217</sup> This thought of the supplement disorganizes the metaphysical tradition's worldview of present beings, as well as its thought of the sign. For Derrida interprets Rousseau and the tradition's unrecognised supplements in the following way:

The supplement comes in the place of a lapse, of a nonsignified or a nonrepresented, a nonpresence. There is no present before it; it is therefore only preceded by itself, that is to say, by another supplement. The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement. One wishes to go back from the supplement to the source: one must recognize that there is a supplement at the source.<sup>218</sup>

The differential trace, as the condition of existing beings and our differences, is also responsible for the inherent nonpresence in all things.

This systematic void and supplemental necessity in the process of becoming does away with the thing itself. Furthermore, in the referential network of supplementarity:

Representation enlaces itself with that which it represents. In the play of representation, the point of origin becomes indeterminable ... There is no longer a simple origin.<sup>219</sup>

In the infinite system of reference that is the movement of the trace, writing as an image of speech is reinterpreted as writing as representation of a representation. There is no represented

that is not already a representer in the play of the system. There is no simple present or represented about which one then forms an image or upon which one speculates. If not for the movement of the trace as difference, the speculative representation could not find its difference from and relation with the represented. This general rule also applies to subjectivity and one's world, of course.

If articulation is a supplement, and the supplement is difference, then articulation is difference.<sup>220</sup> That is, the movement of the trace gives rise to the determined differences of the world as a facet of the infinite referential web of difference. Articulation is difference. "Difference is articulation."<sup>221</sup>

Derrida is claiming that these differential articulations of the various human languages are fundamentally the same, and different, as all of the other differences that are articulated in the world. All differences become as supplemental bonds within difference. The systems of differences in the world, and the processes of differentiation, are referred to by Derrida as "originary articulation."<sup>222</sup> Articulation is therefore on the side of the animal and the natural, as well as the human and cultural. The possibility of any articulation as difference is with the spacing of the trace. Derrida's reading of Rousseau reinterprets what Rousseau "declares" in terms of what Rousseau "describes",

determining articulation as difference, as the process of differentiation. Articulation, as the supplement Rousseau had thought as condition of human speech, had in fact always already become.

The supplementary articulation did not originate with human speech and humanity. Articulation existed "prior" to and as the condition of mankind and human systems of speech. As difference, the movement of difference, or the process of differentiation, supplementary articulation had given rise to all the differences or articulations in the world and continues to do so.

Rousseau cannot appropriate articulation for human speech. Articulation articulates everywhere, even in the so-called "inarticulate" and "natural" cry of the "animal." This Derridean claim of supplementary articulation prior to or delimited as "nature" leads Derrida to claim that the conventional, supplementary articulation of Rousseau is not that which distinguishes the human from the animal, but the very possibility of the difference between convention and nature, man and animal. So supplementarity is *both* natural and conventional, animal and human, as it conditions these differences:

Man *calls himself* man only by drawing limits excluding his other from the play of supplementarity: the purity of nature, of animality ... The history of man *calling himself* man is the articulation of *all* these limits among themselves. All concepts determining a non-supplementarity (nature, divinity, etc.) have evidently no truth-value. They belong—moreover, with the idea of truth itself—to an epoch of supplementarity.

They have meaning only within a closure of the game.<sup>223</sup>

The metaphysical determination of man is the being with the supplement in its various forms. Philosophers, however, have failed to realize that the very concepts of man, nature and animality are ideal meanings, which arise according to the very structure of supplementarity and the movement of the trace.

Metaphysics has been the attempt to create a myth in which supplementarity is annulled and the trace effaced.<sup>224</sup> Nature and animality have been thought as simply exterior to culture and humanity, rather than as an ex-appropriating relation within the structure of supplementarity.

The forces of differentiation give rise to human speech; they do not arise with it, according to Rousseau. In Derrida's terminology, it "broaches" language. But it is also the inherent evil that Rousseau thought as exterior and accidental. The progress of articulation from the opening of human speech towards algebra in human language's becoming writing of speech had always already begun. Because supplementary articulation is essential to human speech, Derrida characterizes articulation as the condition of language and as the limit of language, both at once. So if progress in articulation is a degradation of human speech in its becoming writing, then human speech has always already been "writing" as articulation. Consequently, human speech has always already been algebraic. There was no simple origin of language.

One must recognize the supplement at the *source*.<sup>225</sup> The articulating supplement at the source of human speech precludes the idea of a signified/presence/nature to which speech's sign/convention is absolutely proximate.

Articulation's broaching of language and all other differences in the world imply not only that there is no simple origin of human language, but also that there was no center of human language. For Rousseau, the geographical differences amongst human dialects are a matter of articulation. If Rousseau had written of a sort of bipolar origin of human language, in Southern and Northern Europe, which supplemented each other, the truest form of human speech had formed only in the South. The Greeks passionately spoke "I love you." In the North, the more articulate languages spoke "I need you." Rousseau's own admission, according to Derrida, is that geographical differences in general imply articulated differences. Derrida takes this a step further and claims that geographical differences in general are functions of the articulations of *differance*. The Southern languages, then, would not be interpreted as primal, passionate and less articulate than the Northern, as if articulation intervened and then revealed language with its growth in the North.

The ultimate consequence is that if articulations are everywhere, then, in an absolute sense, languages cannot be

hierarchically determined according to the criterion of articulation. All we have is "... a play of correspondences, situations, relations ..."<sup>226</sup> For Derrida, this would include, at the very least, the languages of "animals." Consequently, Derrida differs with Rousseau by claiming that dogs, apes, whales, etc., do have articulate languages, including their various types of body language. These languages would also be determined to have the supplement in general, and signs, for example. Ultimately, both apes and civilized men can have supplementarity attributed to them. Neither apes nor civilized men can claim supplementarity as one of their distinguishing features since it gives rise to all of the different beings of the Earth. And if Rousseau emphasizes the physical causes of differences between the so-called primitive tongues of Northern and Southern Europeans, Derrida reinterprets Rousseau's notion of the geographical articulations between the dialectics of all the various species, subspecies and communities of animals. All of these "dialects" are as articulate as any other. There is no simple origin of language. And there is no hierarchy of languages in the absolute sense.<sup>227</sup>

To make this more clear, we will continue to interpret Derrida's notion of supplementary articulation, difference, or trace, as the condition of form in general, meaning in general, form and sense as signification, the articulation of speech and

writing as supplementary, the articulation of space and time and the condition of Rousseau's "linear" movement of speech to writing.

Though written in a Husserlian context, the analysis in the first portion of *De la grammatologie* is very relevant to the reading of Rousseau in the second half of the book. In order to understand the meaning of difference in general, Derrida claims that he must observe the trace's passage through *form* and through *imprint*. And this requires the diminishment of phonocentrism.

The sensible "plenitude" of phonetic language, the word, is conditioned in its very appearance and the form of its appearance by difference.<sup>228</sup> The condition of the difference that conditions the form of the term is itself based in the trace:

Here the appearing and functioning of difference presupposes an originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity. Such would be the originary trace. Without a retention in the minimal unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other as other in the same, no difference would do its work and no meaning would form.<sup>229</sup>

In order to differentiate any things or terms, and to distinguish them in such a way as to delineate one term from another according to an essence or form, one must recognize that difference is produced in the temporal experience of the world in which a certain otherness is maintained as other within the same. If there were only sameness or absolute self-presence without any otherness, there would be no possibility of difference.

Difference assumes the movement of the trace within plenitudes and as the condition of the differences amongst plenitudes of any kind. Therefore, the movement of the trace as the retention of otherness within the same is the condition of the differences that make possible the distinctions amongst the forms of present terms and beings in general. Therefore, according to Derrida, a civilized human language is far more articulate in this sense than Rousseau, and Husserl, for that matter, would have imagined. The supplementary articulation would be the very movement of the trace. But this is at work in nonhuman languages, as well, as the condition of the form of whatever vocalizations, movements or marks that the various animals produce.<sup>230</sup>

Difference is also "... the being-imprinted of the imprint."<sup>231</sup> In a very Husserlian move, Derrida claims that we must keep the insightful distinction between the being-imprinted and the imprint of one's experience. Derrida wants to remain very Husserlian here in claiming that it is:

...in the specific zone of this imprint and this *trace*, in the temporalization of a *lived experience* which is neither *in* the world nor in "another world," ... that differences appear among the elements or rather produce them, make them emerge as such and constitute the *texts*, the chains, and the systems of traces. These chains and systems cannot be outlined except in the fabric of this trace or imprint. The unheard of difference between the appearing and the appearance ... (between the "world" and "lived experience") is the condition of all other differences, of all other traces, and *it is already a trace.*<sup>232</sup>

This difference between the appearance and the appearing, or the

lived experience and the world, requires a phenomenological reduction.<sup>233</sup> We might say that the lived experience is the image of the world or the world as it appears to the subject, which leaves a type of psychic imprint on the subject. The structured appearing of the world in the lived experience is articulated in its "hylemorphic" style, according to Husserl. Derrida claims that the form of the lived experience is based in the articulations of difference of the trace and its movement. The articulated form of the structure of lived experience is real only in a sense, that is, it is not real in the sense that it is the articulation of the lived experience, which itself is equivalent to an image which leaves an imprint. The lived experience is an image or "sign" that leaves an imprint or impression on the subject. The imprint of the lived experience comes with the temporal spacing that we saw above. It is fundamentally the trace or temporal impression of the now, since all experience is temporal in nature, according to Derrida. Within one's lived experience, differences appear, for example, between the various objects in the world. Aspects of the world are formed or differentiated, as we said above, because of the movement of the trace. And we must certainly recognize the necessary differences and references to the immediate past present nows and those signs within those nows, which thereby forms temporal chains of significations. Therefore, the very

condition of the forming and differentiating of the aspects of the lived experience is the movement of the trace and its imprint or temporal impression. It is this spacing and retention of otherness within the same that produces difference. That is, without a relation to otherness, there would only be sameness; and without exteriority in the interiority this otherness and difference would be impossible. As that which is produced with the spacing of the trace, lived experience is that difference, identified in Husserl's phenomenological reduction, between the appearing of the world to the subject and the appearance of the world, which is the condition of all other differences or articulations within one's experience of the world. In sum, then, the trace as the origin of my world is the condition of the articulations and significations experienced within my world.

Derrida claims that meaning could not be articulated within a language without the movement of the trace.<sup>234</sup> As we saw in the first chapter, the trace is the power of repetition that provides for the ideality and the referential system from sense to Form. Here we have seen that it is also the condition of articulating differences in general, including between units of signification. We have also seen that it is the condition of linking those significations together in referential systems.

As systems of signification, the trace is also responsible for the articulation of speech and writing in general. Derrida

claims that the trace is the possibility of writing and speech, which is already a species of writing rather than the reverse:

If language was not already, in a sense, a writing, any derived "notation" would not be possible; and the classical problem of the relation between speech and writing would not arise.<sup>235</sup>

As we saw above, the movement of the trace and its logic of supplementarity is that upon which the relation between speech and writing depends. And as Derrida claims here, if speech were not already writing in the sense of these articulating differences to which the trace gives rise, writing in the colloquial sense would not have been invented.

Derrida has chosen to refer to speech as a species of writing because of the traits that had been traditionally used to distinguish writing from speech apply to the trace, difference in general, and to speech. As we saw above, writing would have been a secondary, exterior image of the speech that was proximate to one's thought. But the same difference and distance between writing and thought also exists between speech and thought. This was demonstrated in the first chapter. The above discussion has supplemented this argument.<sup>236</sup>

Finally, the trace is the possibility of the articulation of space and time on which depends the "linear" movement of speech to writing in Rousseau's sense:

Origin of the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the trace, permits the difference

between space and time to be articulated, to appear as such, in the unity of an experience (of a "same" lived out of a "same" body proper ... This articulation therefore permits a graphic ("visual" or "tactile," "spatial") chain to be adapted, on occasion in a linear fashion, to a spoken ("phonic," "temporal") chain. It is from the primary possibility of this articulation that one must begin. Difference is articulation.<sup>237</sup>

Derrida's thought of the trace is contained within the context of his interpretation of Husserl. The articulating differences that permit a difference between space and time in one's experience are a type of fundamental web or text within which other systems of differences function. Linguistic systems of all types, human and animal, would function within this infinite system of traces. The linearity of the progress and degeneration of speech works within the "tissue" of the traces. Articulations have always already existed, long before Rousseau's version of articulate speech had been invented.

The temporalizing synthesis of difference also leads to the "spacing" involved in language. Derrida reinterprets Saussure:

*Spacing* (notice that this word speaks the articulation of space and time, the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space) is always the unperceived, the nonpresent, the nonconscious.<sup>238</sup>

The articulating spacing of one's experience can also be called "arche-writing." We have seen in the sections on Husserl that the arche-writing of the trace and its power of repetition are responsible for meaning within language. Derrida points out that it is also the condition of "the fundamental *unconsciousness* of

language ..."<sup>239</sup> It is the interruption of presence, meaning and ideality, including as the very signs within any linguistic system. Therefore, it is the play of the trace and its fundamental spacing that permits the spatio-temporal experience of speech, writing and language.

Derrida's interpretation of auto-affection in Rousseau is a crushing response to the notion that man's language is a development over the natural cry. This can be read within the context of the difference between the world and the lived experience of the world as something of an image or system of signs that leave an imprint or arise with the trace and the temporality of experience. Rousseau describes the unrestrainable penetration of sound and voice "... to the bottom of one's heart ..."<sup>240</sup> Derrida interprets voice in Rousseau's texts as that which:

penetrates into me violently, it is the privileged route for forced entry and interiorization, whose reciprocity produces itself in the "hearing-oneself speak" in the structure of the voice and of interlocution.<sup>241</sup>

The voice violently penetrates oneself as it violates the other in the structure of "hearing-understanding-oneself-speak." But the violence of the voice carries with it a more profound and inseparable violation. "Within the voice, the presence of the object already disappears."<sup>242</sup> An "acoustic" sign substitutes for the visibly present object. The object appearing to our sense of vision is smothered by the combination of the so-called self-

presence of the voice and the process of hearing oneself speak. It is not the experience of the visible object about which one speaks that burrows into my heart and soul, but an acoustic sign, for the object does not break and enter into one's heart according to Rousseau's own descriptions. According to Derrida:

... it is the only way of interiorizing the phenomenon; by transforming it into *akoumene*; which supposes an originary synergy and an originary synthesis; but which also supposes that the disappearing of presence in the form of the object, the being-before-the-eyes or being-at-hand, installs a sort of fiction, if not a lie, at the very origin of speech. Speech never gives the thing itself, but a simulacrum that touches us more profoundly than the truth, "strikes" us more effectively ... It is not the presence of the object which moves us but its phonic sign.<sup>243</sup>

By Rousseau's own admission,<sup>244</sup> the earthlings of the world that present themselves to our visual consciousnesses are supplemented by human speech to such an extent that what reaches one's heart in interlocution is not the truth of the object, but a sign which Derrida and Rousseau both regard as fictitious. Human speech, then, is the process of falsely representing the world. The visually experiencable world, or Husserl's lived experience, therefore, already distinguished as an image different from the "real" world, is translated by the voice into a work of the imagination and representation.

Finally, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the capacity for auto-affection within the movements of ex-appropriation is universal, albeit infinitely differentiated

according to types, species and individuals. Derrida seems to extend this thought of universal hetero-auto-affection from the movements of ex-appropriation, which are not defined as necessarily self-conscious, to the universality of the consciousness or experience of the self. The "self" would be, of course, a symbol, which assumes the possibility of some form of language on the part of that being, whether it is a mushroom, dandelion or dolphin. Derrida says:

Auto-affection is a universal structure of experience. All living things are capable of auto-affection. And only a being capable of symbolizing, that is to say of auto-affecting, may let itself be affected by the other in general. Auto-affection is the condition of experience in general. This possibility—another name for life—is a general structure articulated by the history of life...<sup>245</sup>

All Earthlings are "alive" to the extent that all Earthlings are capable of auto-affection. Difference as supplementarity is that which allows for the difference within myself. This difference allows for the relation to myself. As we saw above in the first chapter, the differential relation to self is a supplement, image, or representation of self; the "self" or "ego" is a sign. If all living beings are capable of auto-affection in this sense of a differential relation to oneself as a sign and supplement for the nonintuition of self, then all "living" beings would be capable of using signs, supplements. Signs and supplements should be attributable to all living beings. And, in fact, even though Rousseau claimed that only civilized humans have the

supplementarity of articulation, by attributing a "natural" language to animals, Rousseau had already thought of animals as having the capacity of signs in some form.

But this implication of Derrida's thought appears to be unjustifiable or farfetched from our human perspective. Can we seriously represent to ourselves a world in which plants, mold and fungi use "signs" or representations of "themselves" in their relations with others? What type of self-consciousness would this imply? One might claim that these implications are overstated. Or, one might argue that Derrida himself has overstated his case in the above passage with his move from auto-affection in general, as the possibility of life, experience and symbolization, to the implication that all beings thereby use symbols in some way. Can we represent to ourselves in any way the possibility of the lived experience of a tree? That is, the tree's "experience" of the other and of itself. This is not to disagree with Derrida that all beings exist in the movements of ex-appropriation. But, it is extremely difficult for humans to even attempt to thematize our apperception of a tree's experience, even though that possibility shall not be ruled out absolutely. Out of respect for beings, perhaps we should follow the insights of earlier chapters and be responsible to the trace of those others, whether or not they are sentient beings with or without the use of signs. In contrast, it is not too difficult to

think that dogs, apes, dolphins, chimps, and a host of other "animals" or natural beings do have the capacity to use and understand signs, including those of human languages. It is clear, for example, that our dog understands that a particular sign refers to her, to herself, as she relates to these human beings.

This is the basis of two major claims. First, nonhuman animals must be rethought and reinterpreted by philosophers, scientists and other "persons" in order to account for this claim that other living beings have the ability of symbolization, signification, and, therefore, the capacity to relate to themselves or give themselves in some form of sign. Ex-appropriation is attributed to all beings, without a hierarchical value, whether or not ex-appropriation takes the form of what has been traditionally called self-consciousness. In order to auto-affect or appropriate herself consciously, a dog must represent and imagine to herself some sense or meaning of herself, perhaps in connection with her name, Sheba.

Secondly, the possibility of symbolization and the supplement of the sign in general are based in the power of representation and the faculty of imagination. The implication of Derrida's text is the very reasonable claim that nonhuman animals have this capacity of articulation with the supplement, symbols and signs. They would have the power to represent themselves or

imagine themselves to themselves in auto-affection. If we recognize that nonhumans have the faculty of the imagination, then, we must seriously consider attributing to animals all of those traits of the human subject which depend upon the power of imagination, representation and signification in general. For Derrida, of course, these traits must be thought in a very differentiated way, according to species and individuals, for example, but without a hierarchical conceptual system.

For Rousseau, passion would be at the origin of speech, inextricably linked with articulate speech, as defining attributes of civilized mankind.<sup>246</sup> Articulate speech is "born of passion."<sup>247</sup> But passion requires articulation in order to transform a "natural cry" into a speech, song or music by way of "consonants, tenses, and quantity."<sup>248</sup> In other words, the passion of a civilized human being can only be "expressed" with articulation's differences; the very same differences that would enervate passion.

Being inarticulate, the animal is also without passion. Passion and articulation supplement each other. According to Rousseau, the inarticulate sounds and gestures of animals would only convey need.<sup>249</sup> But there is a passionate gesture that can supplement speech. This is a gesture that does not precede speech in terms of development. It comes as an aid to speech when a certain distance or absence prevents the communication

of speech. Gesture is considered more natural, expressive and universal. It is a more immediate sign. But it is also no longer useful when too great a distance intervenes. Then the voice is used as a supplement of gesture. Human gesture and speech continually supplement one another as the very nature of human language. Thus, it is thought by Rousseau that the cry and gesture were transformed into human language by passion's articulation in speech and a passionate human gesture that can also supplement speech when necessary. Thus, Derrida has illustrated the supplementarity in Rousseau's speech. His notion of speech is aporetic.

Supplementarity is also Derrida's response to Rousseau's hierarchy of passion and need. So what Rousseau really describes is the "both at once" logic of supplementarity. Human language has always been in the process of decline, or change, from its inception to its ultimate development and demise. Rousseau has described passion and need within a structure of supplementarity. If passion was the origin of human language, need was just as necessary. It determined dialects in the "beginning" due to "natural," geographical causes, according to Rousseau himself.<sup>250</sup>

This supplementarity of passion and need is decisive in the demise of Rousseau's theoretical matrix according to Derrida:

This concept of writing designates the place of unease, of the regulated incoherence within conceptuality, both beyond the *Essay* and beyond Rousseau. This incoherence would apply

to the fact that the unity of need and passion (with the entire system of associated significations) constantly effaces the limit that Rousseau obstinately sketches and recalls. Rousseau *declares* this backbone, without which the entire conceptual organism would break up, and *wishes to think it* as a distinction; he *describes* it as a supplementary difference. This constrains in its graphics the strange unity of passion and need.<sup>251</sup>

How does writing demonstrate the impossibility of the notion of Rousseau's conceptual framework as the avoidance of supplementary difference? Derrida's point is that Rousseau makes the claim and tries to think a distinction between passion and need, and speech and writing. But what he actually describes is the supplementary, both at once, logic. According to Derrida, Rousseau undermines his whole discourse and interrupts his conceptual system by describing a historical instance in which a type of writing had existed prior to articulate speech. Derrida sums up Rousseau's story by claiming that writing "... precedes and follows speech, it comprehends it."<sup>252</sup> Derrida is not referring to the arche-writing of the supplementary articulation of difference, although this certainly applies. He is referring to a more literal form of writing. Derrida points out that according to Rousseau himself, the hieroglyph expressed a passion before passion, and a need before need, that is, writing before speech. This hieroglyphic form of writing is beyond Rousseau's conceptuality: the (Egyptian) writing before (Greek) speech, but writing should follow speech; the passion of writing before speech, though

passion should arise with speech; the need of writing before speech and writing, even though need and writing are to have followed speech. The strange thing is that even though Rousseau contradicts himself, "... he places writing on the side of need and speech on the side of passion."<sup>253</sup> However, Derrida thinks that Rousseau's notion of writing "... requires a new conceptuality ..." in order to account for the logic of supplementarity that Rousseau describes.<sup>254</sup>

This "new conceptuality" should transform Rousseau's notions of need and passion and include the attribution of passion to the so-called "animal." For the passion before passion is Rousseau's own admission that the pre-civilized man as animal lives according to passion as well as need. For Derrida, then, the unity of passion and need is the supplementary difference that applies to nonhuman animals as well as to "civilized man." One can claim, then, that animals can love. The so-called family dog, then, would not only be loved, but also love, in her own way, the rest of the family.

This new conceptuality must also acknowledge that nonhuman animals would also have writing. Writing would be more articulate than speech. This is yet more textual evidence that other animals have signs and the supplement.

Although Rousseau claims that imagination is the condition of passion, Derrida responds with the claim that imagination is

difference. Derrida pulls out two strands of signification from Rousseau's conceptual system:

... 1. animality, need, interest, gesture, sensibility, intentionality, reason, etc. 2. humanity, passion, imagination, speech, liberty, perfectibility, etc.<sup>255</sup>

According to Derrida, these strands of concepts that Rousseau claims to be distinguished are actually in a supplementary relation.<sup>256</sup> Rousseau would also like to preclude the notion of death from the first series. For Rousseau, freedom is the most uniquely human trait, including the liberty for self-improvement. Death, too, would be reserved for humanity. The "idea" of death depends upon one's capacity for freedom from the present experience in order to anticipate a representation of death.<sup>257</sup> What freedom of thought beyond the present moment and the anticipation of death really imply is the imagination.

Both the thoughts of freedom and the ideas of death are imaginings. As for death, Derrida claims that "death" is an image, a representation, and a supplement to life's nonpresence, in an attempt to reappropriate itself. These are "... the qualities that Rousseau expressly recognizes in writing."<sup>258</sup> Derrida determines imagination as difference, supplementary articulation, arche-writing. Consequently, there is a supplement as the possibility of human speech. *The supplement at the source is imagination, death as image, or the spacing of supplementary articulation.*

That is, imagination would precede and condition articulate speech and humanity as the condition of the thought of death and as the condition of freedom for ideas and choices. The imagination would therefore be attributable to some of those beings that Rousseau conceived as natural. If the imagination is also on the side of animality, the possibility of an image of death and freedom for ideas and choices beyond the experience of the present moment are also on the side of nature. Nonhuman animals, then, would have forms of liberty and forms of anticipation of death.

And if passion is conditioned by the imagination as difference, then imagination also gives rise to need. Need and passion are always already mingled in the same possibility. By Rousseau's own declaration that the animal functions according to need, it too has imagination.

In Rousseau's conceptual scheme, animals would not have song or music because music arises in song, which is a mode of speech, which implies articulation, passion and the imagination.<sup>259</sup> Passion would arise in relation to another human being, when the power of imagination permits identity with and compassion for this other person.<sup>260</sup> But we have already argued, with Derrida and against Rousseau, that the concept of animality in general should be predicated with passion as well as need, liberty as well as instinct, death as well as life,

and imagination as well as present experience. Animals, such as birds, then, should be thought to have the possibility of song and music. And since they have forms of imagination and passion, animals should be regarded as having the capacity for a relation with others in general, for identifying with others, and for compassion for others. This possibility of the relation to the other is the very basis for what Rousseau has called "society." According to what we have discussed above, the populations of various animal species should be characterized as "societies."

According to Rousseau, originary speech as song would develop beyond nature. Human song and music would attempt to return to nature, in a sense, by using the articulate music and song of humanity to imitate the inarticulate cries of nature. According to Derrida, Rousseau's discourse tells us that it intends to return to nature but without actually reuniting. Derrida writes:

On several levels, nature is the ground, the inferior step: it must be crossed, exceeded, but also rejoined. We must return to it, but without annulling the difference. This difference, separating the imitation from what it imitates, must be *almost nil*. Through the voice one must transgress the nature that is animal, savage, mute, infant, or crying: by singing transgress or modify the voice. But the song must imitate cries and laments. This leads to a second polar determination of nature: it becomes the unity—as ideal limit—of the imitation and what is imitated, of voice and song. If that unity were accomplished, imitation would become useless: the unity of unity and difference would be lived in immediacy. Such, according to Rousseau, is the archeo-

teleologic definition of nature.<sup>261</sup>

Voice, then, must take mankind beyond the inarticulate cries of animals and babies. In this sense, song is viewed as a progression of mankind away from nature and man's origin as savage animal in the state of nature. But this progress must regress in the sense of progressing back to nature. Surmounting nature with song moves *almost* full circle in song's imitation of nature - cries, moans, laments, etc. Almost full circle because imitation and nature, or culture and nature, and man and nature can never fully reunite. So nature remains the unattainable limit from which and towards which imitation, and any of nature's other others, such as law, morality, ethics, man, can only aspire but never return. Such a return would eliminate any distinction between nature and imitation and nature and man. Nature as ideal limit, as the unity of nature and its others, of signified and its signifiers, of presence and representation, as that from which man came and that towards which man ought to return, is that which can never be reappropriated by man. The difference must be maintained. However, the "state of nature" is an ideal limit; it does not exist. "Elsewhere is the name and the place, the name and the nonplace of that nature."<sup>262</sup> We have already seen that the ideal limit in Husserl is unattainable. There is no clear distinction between man and animal because the transcendental subjectivity is ideal. In Rousseau, nature is the

ideal that cannot be re-united with the ideal of humanity. Therefore, Derrida is showing that humanity is an ideal limit in a teleological future of nature, which is both the impossible *telos* of man and man's imaginary *arche*. Nature is also an ideal at both ends of history. As ideality, the same conditions and attributes apply here, according to Derrida, as they do for Husserl's ideality. That is, the meaning of nature is constructed with the repetitive power of signs. The repetitive power would be the trace. These meanings are differentiated in themselves because of this. And as ideals, they are unattainable images towards which we think and act in repetition *ad infinitum*. In this way, the full presence of nature is impossible at either end of mankind's history. And because of the nature of ideality, nature and humanity are indefinite concepts. For this reason, there is no clear distinction and distance between nature and humanity.

At the same time, because nature is an unattainable ideal, it is not and never has been completely different from humanity. Secondly, we have seen that some of the key attributes that Rousseau used in his attempt to distinguish humanity from animality are also predicates of animality. Therefore, from a Derridean perspective, one might argue that man has never departed from nature and animality. Therefore, there is no clear and simple origin out of nature and into humanity. And there

would be no "state of nature" towards which we should or have to return. Thus, humanity's cultures, societies, languages and songs may be rethought to be as natural as they are conventional. According to Rousseau, the possibility of the supplement in its various forms would be a condition of progress in general. Progress is a concept that would only be predicated to humanity in Rousseau's thought. The following pages will discuss facets of progress as Rousseau had thought they applied to humanity. The move to articulate language and society would be the most obvious issue. We will look at Rousseau's story of that move from prehistory to history and culture, as well as Derrida's response to it. Lastly, imagination will be briefly discussed as the possibility of the improvement and perfection of an individual.

Rousseau's texts refer to "primitive times" at which humans lived in the state of nature. During these prehistoric times, the human animal lived according to natural laws rather than human conventions. And their natural language consisted of gestures and inarticulate sounds.<sup>263</sup> Between the primitive times and society there is a transitional limit. Derrida calls this point of transition the "... ungraspable limit of the almost. Neither nature nor society, but *almost* society. Society in the process of birth."<sup>264</sup> It is a time, in Derrida's reading, in which Rousseau envisions a "purity" of language and society. Language exists as "pure song" and pure accentuation, with human passion but no

articulation. With passion the language crosses into the human; without articulation (phrases, syntax, grammar, etc), it remains animal. Without articulation there would be no contract.<sup>265</sup>

How do we move from the proto human language of pure song and the prescriptions of natural law to the articulated language and conventions of society? According to Derrida, there is no continuity between the pure, full, inarticulate song of the festival and the articulate language of man in society. Rousseau's prehistory of man as hunter and man as shepherd, at the festival, contains no "... structural ingredient to produce the subsequent ..." state of man in society.<sup>266</sup> So Rousseau uses a catastrophe as an explanation of the move from the state of nature to society. Rousseau is quoted:

Supposing eternal spring on the earth; supposing plenty of water, livestock, and pasture, and supposing that men, as they leave the hands of nature, were once spread out in the midst of all that, I cannot imagine how they would ever be induced to give up their primitive liberty, abandoning the isolated pastoral life so fitted to their natural indolence, to impose upon themselves unnecessarily the labours and the inevitable misery of a social mode of life.

He who willed man to be social, by the touch of a finger shifted the globe's axis into line with the axis of the universe. I see such a *slight movement* changing the face of the earth and deciding the vocation of mankind ..."<sup>267</sup>

So as Derrida points out, with "paradise" on Earth, and the human animal's aversion to work, nothing could have forced humans out of the barbarian way of life, and animal liberty, and into the miseries of society except necessity.

Society became necessary after a catastrophe, a "slight movement," induced by the finger of god. The catastrophe remains external to the system of Barbarian life; there was no element of Barbarian life that necessarily led to society. Society and language arose at some zero point in the past. Derrida writes:

Rousseau declares the centre: there is a sole origin, a sole zero point of the history of languages. It is the south ...<sup>268</sup>

From this point of origin, this inauguration of supplementarity, languages developed, differentiated, and replaced one another. Development and replacement are made possible by the very power of supplementarity, which any convention is. Human language can progress because it is "... not dependent upon any one organ, any one sense, is not to be found in either the visible or audible order."<sup>269</sup> Replacements, supplements, are always possible. As Derrida points out, incessant supplementarity or substitution is the order of language.

According to Rousseau, the becoming of articulation in the progression of human language also has a form relevant to climate and geography. If speech originated in the South out of passion, out of desire to communicate one's passions, it was replaced in the North by more articulate speech whose clarity was due to communication out of need. As cultures rise and fall, one language can replace the other. So there is no historical lineage

of pure progress. Derrida's interpretation of Rousseau reflects a notion of language and culture whose movements are analogous to nature's rhythms in the form of the four seasons. "Languages are sown." And just as the seasons move from one to the other so, too, do the stages of human language. That is, a language originates, grows, reaches its fulfilment, dies and is replaced. They originate from beyond language and begin to run their courses once passion is aroused by the imagination. In the north, languages are based more on need. So Rousseau has also distinguished his views of language according to the Earth's poles.<sup>270</sup>

In general, then, Derrida describes the Rousseauist historical progress in the following schemata:

... beginning with an origin or a center that divides itself and leaves itself, an historical circle is described, which is degenerative in direction but progressive and comprehensive in effect. On the circumference of that circle are new origins for new circles that accelerate the degeneration by annulling the compensatory effects of the preceding circle and thereby also making its truth and beneficence appear.<sup>271</sup>

This historical process describes the structural cycles of man's languages and cultures. Any movement from the origin is a negative for Rousseau. But supplements are added as an attempt to reappropriate the originary presence and purity. The new cycle is a catalyst for degeneration as it destroys the supplement of the previous language. But, as Derrida points out, this does not lead

to an infinite degeneration. "It is the infinity of a repetition."<sup>272</sup> Repetition in this case is one in which the new cycle that originates at the limit of the anterior one destroys the supplementary effects and leads the new supplement toward animality. Derrida says that this:

... progression-regression which, destroying the effects of the preceding one, brings us back to a nature yet more secret, more ancient, more archaic. Progress consists always of taking us closer to animality, while annulling the progress through which we have transgressed animality."<sup>273</sup>

Therefore, the historical cycle of languages would be the progression and regression in repetition *ad infinitum* towards the ideality of nature and animal. Therefore, there is no attainment of the *telos* or *arche* ideal. There is no clear and distinct limit between the civilized human and the animal. This failure to attain the *arche* and the *telos* occurs at the beginning and end of each cycle, which, of course, are without simple beginning and simple end. Nature and animal are supplements within the system of reference that allow the passage from one historical cycle to another. Nature and animality are the supplements at the source of each new cycle of what Rousseau calls human culture. In the grand scheme of Rousseau's historical movements, nature and animality play that supplementary role of addition, supplement and exteriority, which are actually interior to the system of reference as they are a point of reference between cultural cycles and therefore within the general referential system.

Nature and animality, and culture and humanity, supplement each other such that each concept is both at once, as each contains the trace of the other. Nature and culture are split in themselves, referring to each other. Man and animal are in a relationship of supplementarity or ex-appropriation.

The fundamental response to Rousseau's implied notion of a progression, or repetition of both progression and regression of language and culture, is that the "history" of philosophy has encrypted the "trace" with its concepts:

Thought within its concealed relation to the logic of the supplement, the concept of virtuality or potentiality (like the entire problematic of power and act) undoubtedly has for its function, for Rousseau in particular and within metaphysics in general, the systematic predetermining of becoming as production and development, evolution or history, through the substitution of the accomplishment of a *dynamis* for the substitution of a trace, of pure history for pure play, and ... of a welding together for a break. The movement of supplementarity seems to escape this alternative and to permit us to think it.<sup>274</sup>

Though supplementarity permits us to think the alternative of pure play/flux/becoming or history as teleology/dynamis, Derrida would claim that the power of becoming/flux/play in the unmotivated, non-teleological trace is the condition of the teleologico-dynamico-evolutionary interpretation of "history." That is, Derrida would not deny a form of the historical intentionality.<sup>275</sup> But because this intentionality is conditioned by the trace and its infinite, unmotivated web of reference, what is presumed to be an operation from *arche* to *telos*, from an acorn

to an oak, a dynamic movement of potentiality to act, to full and complete realization, the fulfillment of the intentionality is not possible.<sup>276</sup> For this process from the simple beginning to the simple end by way of all the mediate states is a very minute aspect of the forces of the trace and difference. It is only the portion that has come to presence. These aspects that have come to presence are "representatives" of the power of the traces. So Derrida has named the present the "sign of a sign."<sup>277</sup> In other words, what philosophers have taken as the simple beginning and end are, for Derrida, merely two points, which are not fully themselves, in an infinite system of references that "originate" in the nonpresent power of the trace. The same would go for Rousseau's simple origin of human language and its end in algebra. In fact, according to Derrida, Rousseau himself has actually "described" the inherent impossibility of attaining a telos. Human speech has already been a regression as a nonpresence to the signified of nature. Rousseau's historical cycle itself reveals the impossibility of a definite beginning and a final end.

However, Rousseau has declared that "zero point" at which the progress of man occurred as the move from the state of nature to society through the prohibition of incest and the introduction of the supplement. Rousseau thinks that the prohibition of incest was at the origin of society. During the golden age of the

festival, family was the only relation, so inbreeding provided the reproductive needs. But the prohibition is the fundamental institution of human society. Language, history, and supplementarity are born at the same time as the prohibition of incest. Derrida understands it as the " ... hinge between nature and culture."<sup>278</sup> In this sense, Norris points out that the prohibition is natural and cultural, natural in the sense that it is universal, and cultural in the sense that it implies a system of norms.<sup>279</sup> Moreover, Derrida writes:

It is the element of culture itself, the undeclared origin of passion, of society, of languages ...<sup>280</sup>

It is the "first supplementarity" and the condition of the substitution of the signifier for the signified. Mother and sister, as Nature, are replaced by another woman from outside of the family. Nature, too, is replaced by culture. These substitutions supplement and dislocate the immediate relation with the natural family. A relation to the signifier replaces natural presence to the signified. From that point on, language as signifier is a supplement to this distance from the natural presence of the signified.

As a supplement, human language is an attempt at the reappropriation of presence. Derrida points out the contradictory nature of Rousseau's notion of the "restitution of presence by language."<sup>281</sup> The contradiction lies in the fact that it is both

symbolic and immediate. The word as a sign is a supplement for the designated part of the world. As we saw above, the sign would be presented immediately to the subject. And the sign is still a mere symbol or supplement of the world.

If there are only supplements and no simple source, then there never was a prohibition of incest as the condition of society. Rousseau himself says that a substitution was at the origin of society. Society replaced nature and the mother/sister of the family with a substitute from outside the family:

The deplating of the relationship with the mother, with nature, with being as the fundamental signified, such indeed is the origin of society and languages. But can one speak of origins after that? Is the concept of origin, or of the fundamental signified, anything but a function, indispensable but situated, inscribed, within the system of signification inaugurated by the interdict? Within the play of supplementarity, one will always be able to relate the substitutes to their signified, this last will yet be another signifier. The fundamental signified, the meaning of the being represented, even less the thing itself, will never be given us in person, outside the sign or outside play. Even that which we say, name, describe as the prohibition of incest does not escape play. There is a point in the system where the signifier can no longer be replaced by its signified, so that in consequence no signifier can be replaced purely and simply. For the point of nonreplacement is also the point of orientation for the entire system of signification, the point where the fundamental signified is promised as the terminal point of all references and conceals itself as that which would destroy at one blow the entire system of signs. It is at once spoken and forbidden by all signs. Language is neither prohibition nor transgression, it couples the two endlessly. That point does not exist, it is always elusive or, what amounts to the same thing, always already inscribed in what it ought to escape or ought to have escaped ...<sup>282</sup>

There was no beginning. Society cannot find its referent at the

festival and water hole; nor does signification find its ultimate referent in God's understanding. The point of orientation is the trace, its spacing and otherness, which precludes the possibility of a sign ever being merely the image or representation of another, and not also a represented itself. That the trace is the terminal point suggests that there is no ultimate terminal point. Our human signification is only so much becoming in the plays of the trace. Human society is simply a member within the general economy of the Earth, rather than a progression beyond and out of nature.

This Heraclitean flux does not require the finger of Rousseau's God to tip the axis of the earth and coerce man to be sociable and to live beyond nature. The slight movement, which was thought to have brought catastrophe, has its possibility in the play of the trace.<sup>283</sup>

Speech is a property and condition of man's perfectibility. Man's perfectibility as well as the perfectibility of his languages is linked to his imagination. If speech is born of passion, imagination is the mother of passion. Imagination then is one of the conditions of improvement as it is the occasion for the progress of man and language. Imagination, then, would be one of the specific traits of man. Derrida goes so far as to think that, in Rousseau's text, imagination is more human than reason.<sup>284</sup> Perfectibility is liberty, free agency.<sup>285</sup> For no

progress is possible without freedom from what is given to reason and to the senses. Only imagination allows anticipation of progress, thought beyond the given and the freedom to act. No language or speech could possibly progress in any way without this power of the imagination that would allow the space, freedom and anticipation to make changes for the future, for the betterment of man and language. But none of this occurs without imagination first giving rise to passion as the origin of language.

Of course, we have seen above that Rousseau's texts also tell us that imagination is attributable to animals, too. Animals would then have the possibility of the liberty of self-improvement and the progress of the particular species. Animals would have signs and symbols. Animals would have the power of representative thought. And animals would have the relation to the other, identification with the other and compassion for the other.

## Chapter IV

Rousseau refers to pity as a natural sentiment by which the gentle voice of Mother Nature inscribes in our hearts the interruption of the love of self for the sake of the other.<sup>286</sup> In the logic of supplementarity, Rousseau thinks that pity is a "natural passion." And yet, "natural pity" would be thought as potential and virtual. It would only be activated and actualized as human "pity" by the human faculty of the imagination.<sup>287</sup> The natural passion of pity can be actualized and humanized by the faculty of the imagination because this faculty crosses the threshold of animality.<sup>288</sup>

Because Rousseau refers to natural compassion as potential, Derrida argues that the meaning of nature in Rousseau is that of a reserve, and not a real presence. Nature is thought as sleeping potential and virtuality. As a reserve, nature would be hidden actuality and the source of indeterminate power. The imagination brings forth this natural potential of pity as identification with and compassion for another civilized human being.<sup>289</sup>

The problem is that imagination not only actualizes the innate goodness that was lying dormant in the heart of the human animal, it also brings with it the possibility of vice and evil. This is so, according to Derrida's interpretation,

because the faculty of the imagination would be one of signs and representations. It actualizes the natural potential of pity at the same time that the imagination supersedes nature with numerous passions and desires. It reveals natural pity and reveals what is beyond natural pity's power. It thereby reveals the powerlessness of natural pity in the face of passions and desires which lead to human virtues and vices, goods and evils. But in general, imagination:

inscribes a difference between desire and power. If we desire beyond our power of satisfaction, the origin of that surplus and of that difference is named imagination.<sup>290</sup>

For Derrida, Rousseau has conceived of the faculty of the imagination as the difference between desire and the power to satisfy desire. Imagination is the basis of the surplus of desire over the ability to attain satisfaction of desire. It actualizes natural powers in their failure to attain a goal conjured up by the imagination itself. For example, the natural "love of self" may be turned into the human vice of "self-love" when the imagination leads one to believe that one ought to be concerned only with oneself.

According to Derrida, this reveals a "function of the concept of nature ... [as] ... the equilibrium between reserve and desire."<sup>291</sup> In the state of nature, one would have had desires that correspond with the ability to satisfy them. For Rousseau, the ethical path to true happiness is to imagine and desire in

accordance with one's natural powers and potential, that is, to go back to nature in this regard. But this equilibrium is impossible, according to Derrida, because the advent of the imagination in the human would also give rise to the transgression of this equilibrium. Imagination also develops out of this natural potential. But it is a faculty of signs and representation, which implies that it is not necessarily concerned with the ultimate truth of one's reality. It therefore cannot but lead to intangible goals as soon as it becomes.<sup>292</sup>

Derrida sums up his discussion of pity, nature and imagination with three points: 1) imagination is determined as the difference of or within presence, i.e., as the origin of the difference between potential/nature and desire/pleasure, i.e., as the supplement to presence as Nature; (2) the relationship to nature is impossible to fully attain, an impossible limit, and living ethically is a question of reducing the "distance" between civilized humanity and nature as the equilibrium of desire and power; (3) the imagination, which activates other faculties, is also a virtual faculty. Therefore:

the power of transgressing nature is itself with nature. It belongs to nature's resources. Better ... the power of transgressing nature holds the reserve in reserve. This mode of being-in-nature has thus the strange mode of being of the supplement. Designating at once the excess and the lack of nature *within* nature.<sup>293</sup>

The faculty of the imagination conveys the *both at once* logic of

supplementarity by being both a natural resource or potential and the condition of transgressing nature into humanity. The imagination functions *within* nature as a resource, and particularly as that resource of nature that expropriates nature out of itself. The imagination is an exteriority of nature within nature that acts as a passage out of itself. It would designate the excess of nature as the transgressor. It designates the lack of nature in that nature is only potential or virtual and has limited resources that the imagination far exceeds in human desires. Therefore, this natural resource is also a human faculty. The "natural" and the "human" open onto each other in the meaning of imagination in the texts of Rousseau. Therefore, the concepts of civilized man, animal and nature are not delimited from one another, but ex-appropriate one another.

The imagination also designates the logic of supplementarity in being both the condition of identification with and compassion for the other human, and the paradigm of auto-affection. The auto-affection of imagination is the reflexive structure that activates imagination itself and "awakens" it out of its natural virtuality. It creates nothing real and is affected by nothing real. According to Derrida, Rousseau's determination of the faculty of the imagination "is pure auto-affection. It is the other name of differ<sup>ance</sup> as auto-affection."<sup>294</sup> By differ<sup>ance</sup>, Derrida would have us think

of auto-affection as a facet of ex-appropriation. The fact that one can affect oneself implies that there is an *a priori* difference with oneself. The difference here is the representative nature of imagination, the faculty of signification, which interrupts the pure relation of self-presence. Imagination is the death of presence and the opening to the other.<sup>295</sup>

Derrida points out that Rousseau "delineates" humanity out of the possibility of the faculty of the imagination and its supplementary logic: both natural and the transgression of nature into humanity; both the possibility of the identification with the other and pure auto-affection. In the animal, the activation of the imagination as auto-affection is yet to have occurred. And without the imagination, the natural pity inscribed within our hearts would never be actualised into human compassion for others. Therefore, the animal would have neither auto-affection nor hetero-affection. The animal would not have the capacity for relating to itself nor would it have the capacity for relating to another of any sort.

Because civilized man has imagination and the ability to identify with the other in general, civilized humans can also identify with animals. Derrida interprets Rousseau:

Imagination inscribes the animal within human society. It makes the animal accessible to humankind.<sup>296</sup>

The animal can live within the human society and be the beneficiary of human pity. But the animal would not be part of this human society. For animals would lack imagination and therefore be incapable of identification with and pity for others. Animals would be isolated, atomic totalities, with no relation to any other and no possibility of sociability with other animals or other humans.<sup>297</sup>

Before pity is actualized in humanity, Rousseau disagrees with Hobbes and claims that animals, including savages, are not wicked but fearful. That is, animals would have no reflection and no imagination, and therefore no pity and no justice. But, according to Rousseau, that would not mean that animals are pitiless and unjust. Since there is no relation to the other and no relation to self, lacking imagination and reflection, animals and the pre-civilized human animal would be as incapable of being unjust as being just.<sup>298</sup>

According to Rousseau, Hobbes has unjustifiably used the values of society in his interpretation of the state of nature. For Rousseau, the distinctions of justice and injustice, pity and selfishness, etc., have no sense or value in the state of nature. Goodness and badness are as true as they are false, and therefore irrelevant when applied to the state of nature.<sup>299</sup>

According to Derrida, Rousseau has revealed the neutral origin of all ethico-political conceptuality. Thus, all

"oppositions" that follow in the wake of classical philosophy must be neutralized. To make it clear, Derrida agrees with the Rousseauist insight that would claim a neutralization of the *oppositional approach* to ethico-political values, but not a neutralization of these ethico-political values themselves.<sup>300</sup> According to Derrida, Rousseau has erased the opposition by affirming both of these so-called contrary values at the same time. Rousseau demonstrates the logic of supplementarity in his approach to ethico-political values. Rousseau does not privilege either of the two contrary values, that is something done by Hobbes. In sum, then, Derrida has revealed to us a case in which classical values are not understood in an oppositional way that would exclude the other values.

The question of pity is an example of Rousseau's ethico-political approach to the question of respect and responsibility for the other and the other's suffering. What Derrida would call imagination, representation and reflection in the texts of Rousseau are supplements that open the other to the self. That is, sensible presence is exceeded by an image or reflection by which one judges that the other feels and suffers. Most importantly, one is limited to the mere act of imagining, judging, reflecting or representing to oneself that the other suffers.<sup>301</sup> One cannot ever *experience* the suffering of the other. Rousseau does not think pity would have the

movement of identification as identification with the other, simply and entirely. According to Derrida, Rousseau's thought expresses a certain economy of reserve, which respects the alterity of the other, which is very much the same gesture of thought as revealed in Husserl's texts. The economy of pity and ethics is contained within the *limits* of what Rousseau would call *love of self*. It is only the love of self that can "illuminate" the good of others for us. That is, ethics and morality as compassion for the other starts from an understanding of what is good for oneself.<sup>302</sup>

Rousseau holds that it would be immoral to identify with the other in the sense of a full interiorization of the other by oneself because one would not recognize the suffering of the other as that of the other.<sup>303</sup> A difference and distance from, a non-identification with and a nonpresence to the other must mark the relationship between the self and the other. Even though the self and the other have a supplementary relationship, in order for there to be an other rather than just the sameness of the self, we must recognize the nonpresence of the other who interacts with me. Just as Husserl recognized the impossibility of appropriating the lived experience of the other, so Rousseau recognizes the necessity of keeping a certain *differance* (difference and deferral) with the other in the identification with the other in the ethical

relation of compassion.<sup>304</sup> This identification is *imaginary*, reflective, representative, *ideal*, since one cannot *experience* the other's suffering; one cannot feel the other's pain. One's experience needs the imagination to *compare* one's experience of suffering with what one imagines the other is feeling in her experience. We compare our nonpresent, past experiences or anticipatable, future experiences of suffering. Therefore, nonpresence, or difference, is the crucial supplement to the presence of and identification with the other and her suffering. Nonpresence is a condition of compassion just as presence itself is. The imagination designates both the presence and the nonpresence of the other. Derrida writes:

The imagination ... opens us to a certain nonpresence within presence. Pity would be impossible outside of this structure, which links imagination, time and the other as one and the same opening into nonpresence.<sup>305</sup>

Presence and nonpresence are inextricably woven together in the structures of imagination, time and the other. As we have seen above, there must be nonpresence and disjunction, or else there is only the self and the sameness of the self without any other, and without any relation to self. And without imagination, we cannot relate to the lived experience of the other, which is closed to me and therefore infinitely distant and different. Why would I not imagine the lived experience of a horse and therefore have compassion for her on the basis of an identification of

common elements?

The second reason why Rousseau thinks pure identification with the other is immoral is because this identification with the individual other would remain strictly empirical rather than attain universality. That is, Derrida interprets Rousseau as follows:

The condition of morality is that through the unique suffering of a unique being, through this presence and his empirical existence, humanity gives itself up to pity. As long as this condition is not fulfilled, pity risks becoming unjust.<sup>306</sup>

Derrida quotes Rousseau:

To prevent pity degenerating into weakness we must generalize and extend it to mankind. Then we will only yield to it when it is in accord with justice, since justice is of all the virtues that which contributes most to the common good. Reason and self-love compel us to love mankind even more than our neighbour, and to pity the wicked is to be very cruel to other men.<sup>307</sup>

Therefore, pity risks becoming unjust if the notion of pity is not conceptualized, and produced in the element of universality and formality, because one may pity a person who does not deserve it. Pity in this sense does not serve justice, nor does it serve the common good. Pity must function in accordance with justice as the common good. It must, therefore, function at a level of universality within the imagination of she who would experience pity. Pity must move beyond the empirical feeling to the imagination of pity on a universal level.

Some scholars have pointed out that Rousseau's organization

of the political state represses difference. Samuel Weber points out that the power of the state over its members is absolute, and the general will is distinct from particularity and individuality.<sup>308</sup> As Robert Bernasconi argues:

Rousseau maintains democracy by suppressing plurality, as is already clear from his insistence on the general will always being one. Moral freedom does not include freedom to disagree with the general will by definition.<sup>309</sup>

Derrida would disagree with Rousseau's view of pity and justice. Rather than focusing on the abstract notion of the common good, Derrida's notion of justice would focus on the uniqueness of the empirical other, and its lived experience. Derrida describes his notion of justice as:

an infinite "idea of justice," infinite because it is irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other, owed to the other, before any contract, because it has come, the other's coming as the singularity that is always other. This "idea of justice" seems to me to be irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason and without rationality. And so we can recognize in it, indeed accuse, identify a madness ... And deconstruction is mad about this kind of justice. Mad about this desire for justice. This kind of justice, which isn't law, is the very movement of deconstruction at work in law and the history of law, in political history and history itself, before it even presents itself as the discourse that the academy or modern culture labels "deconstructionism."<sup>310</sup>

The many details of this passage will be accounted for throughout the following portions of this project. And it should be noted that Derrida is also very concerned about the common good and

universality. However, his idea of justice is one that is concerned with the other as singularity, as a unique being, but not as an atomic totality, within the larger social context. Derrida is concerned that the uniqueness of a human being, for example, is violated by the universalising and generalizing powers of concepts, codes, rules and laws. Derrida's notion of justice:

hyperbolically raises the stakes of exacting justice; it is sensitivity to a sort of essential disproportion that must inscribe excess and inadequation in itself and that strives to denounce not only theoretical limits but also concrete injustices ...<sup>311</sup>

The idea is infinite because justice must be significant for the uniqueness of each and every being. One concept of justice must not fit all beings. And so this idea is not reducible to a definite and final determination. The idea must take into account the lived experience of the other who withdraws from one's experience. Also, one must take into consideration the constant flux of the experiences of the other and that one could never possibly have a complete experience of any other. This would be the case for an infinite number of very singular experiences of an infinite number of very unique beings. The generality of any word, concept or law would be disproportionate to this singularity of the other.

Derrida is mad or passionate about this excessive brand of justice. If we put this in the context of the disproportion

between the power of compassion and the imagination's promotion of desires, one finds that Derrida's notion of justice resonates with this line of Rousseauist thought. The emotion of compassion which would arise in a certain experience of the other would not be adequate to the idea of justice and its application to the other. Any experience, decision, action, concept, determination, or law would be forever inadequate to the other. So Derrida's idea of justice could never be fulfilled, since it could never adequately represent or imagine any experience of any other in any situation, at any present time, past or future. The work of justice would never be finished. Justice would always be to come in a sense that does not anticipate a fulfilment at some moment in the future; to-come, because there will never be a day when anyone could truly say in the present now that justice has been done to the infinity of unique beings on the Earth.<sup>312</sup>

It is obvious, as well, that Rousseau's notions of justice and pity are also excessive and to come. To do justice to all of humanity or even to the humanity within one's city-state is also an infinite task. Still, Derrida's experience of the excess of his infinite idea of justice is so much more excessive because Derrida would not limit his experience of justice to humanity.

One should note that this justice is owed to the other before any contract. This would include, presumably, Rousseau's Social Contract. We have discussed this issue in the previous

chapter. Because of the forces of ex-appropriation, an originary sociality exists between all beings of the Earth, and beyond. For Derrida, this is precisely the context of justice. Justice does not wait for a beginning of human civilization and the advent of civil and criminal law, as the story goes. Justice begins with this essential relation to the other in what Derrida calls the originary sociality of all others, which is the very basis of what we have typically thought of as justice, right and law. The possibility, not potentiality, of justice would have been with the state of nature and currently with what we call nature.

One could also get the impression that Derrida is deliberately suggesting that the idea of justice does work prior to and outside of the idea of the advent of civilized humanity. For this idea would be without reason, calculation, rationality, law, recognition, exchange, etc. Many or all of these predicates have traditionally been reserved for civilized humans only. Justice, then, would not be a matter only for sophisticated human societies. And to disagree with the view of Rousseau, who had been critical of Hobbes for importing the values of civilization into the state of nature, Derrida is claiming that justice and injustice apply to the "natural world."

The conditions for an experience of pity and justice would be available in nature. We have seen in the previous chapter that the faculty of the imagination, with infinite differentiations,

of course, must be recognized as a predicate of nonhuman animals, contrary to Rousseau's claims. And we have seen in this chapter that imagination is the supplementary bridge between nature and civilization. Rousseau's descriptions grant imagination to nonhuman animals. With the imagination, nonhuman animals can identify with others, as well as his or herself, and therefore experience the actualization of compassion and a sense of justice.

Furthermore, this would enable an animal, such as a German shepherd, to identify with those humans with whom s/he lives within the "civilized" society. Therefore, animals who live with humans can and should be regarded as part of the society because they would have the faculties and attributes which make it possible for humans to live as part of the society. Ex-appropriation is the basis of the originary sociality between all things. Rousseau has described the conditions of pity and justice and unwittingly extended these to animals as well as to civilized humans. Of course, one can easily extend this thought to animal societies of diverse sorts, within or without human societies. As Caputo points out, what Derrida calls the:

... new International would form an ethical and moral coalition of all those who are "secretly aligned in their suffering against hegemonic powers which protect what is called the 'new order.'" They would constitute a coalition of everyone who is done in or headed off by the dominant heading, every[one] who is left out, de-posed, "de-capitated" by their race, income, gender, nationality, language, religion,

religion, or even species (animal rights)—in a nutshell, by their "difference."<sup>1313</sup>

Even if we had not discussed the logic of supplementarity within the discourses of Rousseau, who had claimed that various predicates were entitled to civilized humans only, and, yet, also described what he would call natural beings with fundamentally the same predicates, Derrida's sense of justice would disregard most of those attributes that have traditionally been predicates of humanity, for example, rationality.<sup>314</sup> But this is simply to reiterate the main problem with the discourse of Rousseau. Conceptually it has not clearly distinguished culture from nature. The idea of humanity is confused and aporetic. This crucial idea is "indefinite" in two ways: in the sense of the Kantian idea, it is an impossible *telos*, and *arche* for that matter; and as we have seen with all of the shared attributes, it is not clearly distinguished from animality, as Rousseau had claimed.

What Rousseau's thought had attempted to claim as predicates of humanity, his discourse also described as applicable to animality and nature. For example, articulation, signs, symbols, imagination, passion, compassion, freedom etc., would open the boundaries of humanity and animality. Ideas such as progression, improvement, hierarchy and the move from potentiality to

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actuality, etc., ought to be regarded as illegitimate concepts within the discourse of Rousseau because of his own descriptions and because of the insight into the articulation of the trace. Humanity and its various predicates are clearly intertwined within the system of nature. Humanity is within nature, with nature as a supplement to nature, its excess and lack, and vice versa. Humanity is nature's difference with itself, one differentiation with itself among the myriad of other types of differentiation, including the differentiation of some fundamental animal properties. Nature and humanity have a relation of ex-appropriation.<sup>315</sup>

Because there is no clear distinction between nature and humanity, one can easily claim that mankind did not depart from the natural world or a natural way of life. What does this mean for the central precept of Rousseau's ethics which claims that the point of ethics is to live as closely to nature as possible? In a sense, humanity is already closer to nature than it would like to think. But as a reserve, potentiality and an ideal concept used within the discourse of Rousseau, it is clear that nature is another term for Derrida's trace, or it is, at least, directly conditioned by it, and exemplary of it and supplementarity. Instead of the presence and self-presence as nature, Derrida has attempted to show that Rousseau's concept of nature has a value of nonpresence as its most significant value.

So living closer to nature as ethics might be reinterpreted as living as justly as possible with the other, who's lived experience is forever not present to one's own. We may claim, then, that Rousseau's ethics could only be natural, since he cited the necessity of a certain nonpresence in the identification with the other within the structure of pity.

Nature must be rethought as other than an equilibrium between desire and the ability to accomplish desire. The imagination, in particular, is an attribute of nonhuman animals. They, too, would have desires and ideas without the ability to accomplish or fulfil them. Various animal societies and individuals would also be subject to the possible calamities and possible life promoting changes, which come with the freedom of the imagination. What we have called nature, natural beings and ecosystems would not be the pure, unchanging, and instinctually self-limiting beings or systems that we have traditionally thought. Ecosystems must be rethought with the recognition that nonhuman animals are agents in their own ways—a wolf in a wolf way, with wolf imagination; a deer in a deer way, with deer imagination; a mouse in a mouse way, with mouse imagination; etc.

Let us make it clear with the use of Derrida's texts that this view of thinking about the so-called natural world in terms of justice is not simply an implication of his project, but an essential facet of his project. Derrida is critical of most of

the major discourses of the Western philosophical tradition that have reserved justice and injustice for humans, to the exclusion of all others. The following passage makes it clear that Derrida is expressly concerned with what he would call violence, injustice and disrespect toward animals. In the context of a discussion of "emancipatory battles" and the "emancipatory ideal," which Derrida claims is still very necessary as of 1990, he writes:

But beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand geo-political scale, other areas must constantly open up that at first can seem like secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a violence, indeed a terrorism and other forms of hostage-taking are at work (the examples closest to us would be ... the homeless, ... without forgetting, of course, the treatment of what we call animal life, animality.<sup>316</sup>

Within the context of the essay from which the passage is taken, it is clear that Derrida is calling for the just treatment of animals.

And in an interview Derrida makes it clear that the boundary of moral significance would enclose humanity no longer:

If the limit between the living and the nonliving now seems to be as unsure, at least as oppositional limit, as that between "man" and "animal," and if, in the (symbolic or real) experience of the "eat-speak-interiorize," the ethical frontier no longer rigorously passes between the "Thou shalt not kill" (man, my neighbour) and the "Thou shalt not put to death the living in general," but rather between several infinitely different modes of the conception-appropriation-assimilation of the other, then, as concerns the "Good" [Bien] of every morality, the question will come back to determining the best, most respectful, most grateful, and also most giving way of relating to the other and of relating

the other to the self ... 'One must eat well.' It is a rule offering infinite hospitality ... One must eat well—here is a maxim whose modalities and contents need only be varied, *ad infinitum*. This evokes a law of need or desire ... respect for the other at the very moment when, in experience ... one must begin to identify with the other, who is to be assimilated, interiorized, understood ideally (something one can never do absolutely without *addressing oneself to the other* and without absolutely limiting understanding itself, the identifying appropriation) ...<sup>317</sup>

This makes it clear that Derrida's project does not preclude what we have called "animals" or "natural" beings from moral and ethical significance. Any experience of any other is a context of ethical importance. As we have already learned from Rousseau, one's experience of the other must not fully assimilate it to oneself in identification and compassionate understanding. If one is to relate ethically to the other human, for Rousseau, one must not become one with the other human. Paraphrasing Rousseau, Derrida says that one's very compassionate understanding of the other must be limited lest one appropriates too much. Respect for the other demands that one limit one's imagined identifying compassion and understanding, otherwise one's compassionate understanding risks becoming a violent terror. Of course, Rousseau has missed the universalization of this ethical experience, since he has limited it to humanity.

Rousseau held that human pity corresponds with justice when it has been articulated in law. This is a formal concept of pity. This concept of pity as law is temporal, since it applies in the past,

present and future. Imagination and temporality are the very conditions of this law. Derrida writes:

Imagination and temporality therefore open the reign of concept and law.<sup>318</sup>

The discussion of Husserlian ideality is applicable here in Derrida's view. That is, the repetition of the meaning of any concept and any law is dependent upon imagination for its ideality. The ideality of any concept or law is dependent upon temporality for its repetition within one's experience within a particular historical context.

And since humanity is "activated" in the conceptualization of pity, "... pity is contemporary with speech and representation ..."<sup>319</sup> Pity and justice must be spoken and conceptualized. Pity becomes human when it is articulated in speech and law.

Rousseau is very traditional in thinking that only the human subject is a subject of the law. But Derrida has made some arguments that would at least permit us to think that a relation to law is possible in the natural world. Nonhuman animals would have differentiated forms of the following predicates: articulation, the supplement of signs, imagination, passion and compassion. With these attributes, one can imagine that various wolf packs, monkey troops, elephant herds and killer whale pods have some sort of system of law, even though human scientists may be unable to identify such a thing. At any rate, Derrida claims,

as we have seen, that "originary sociality" is the law and the basis of every other type of law, "natural" or "conventional."

Finally, the previous chapter argued that Rousseau's notions of progress, development, articulation, the simple origin and the hierarchy of languages and cultures were illegitimate because what Rousseau actually described was only change, not a definite progress, and because of the underlying movement of the unmotivated trace. Because laws are ultimately so many signs with prescriptive meanings, Derrida would ultimately refer to them as traces or marks within a system, as any signification would be. And in order not to disrespect the forms of signification of nonhuman animals, Derrida would not, as we have seen, think of linguistic systems or systems of signification in a hierarchical way. And so, he claims that we should not preclude nonhuman animals from what we would call "law" and this type of signification.<sup>320</sup>

Rousseau acknowledges the unity of the concept of pity and the experience of time in memory and anticipation, in imagination and non-perception in general. Animals would have no such experience of time, no memory and no anticipation, and so humans would not feel obliged to pity animals. Not feeling obliged to pity animals, we would not include them within our realm of justice and law. In the following passage, Rousseau compares humans and animals on the memory and anticipation of suffering:

This is, I think, one of the reasons why we are more callous to the sufferings of animals than of men. Although a fellow feeling ought to make us identify ourselves equally with either. We scarcely pity the carthorse in his shed, for we do not suppose that while he is eating his hay he is thinking of the blows he has received and the labours in store for him.<sup>321</sup>

Therefore, one of the reasons why mankind is unethical to "animals" is because "humans" assume that animals do not have a sense of time and do not have an imagination. Animals would not, therefore, have either memory or anticipation of suffering. Rousseau says we should identify with them based on feeling, a fellow feeling.<sup>322</sup> In other words, from a human perspective, they should be included within human society and its laws based on the concepts of pity and justice. The Derridean response is that animals have signs and imagination. These are the two key conditions of memory, or representations of past experiences, and anticipation, or representations of the future. Therefore, humans should take into account the possibility of the horse's memory and expectations, her desires and dreams. If horses do have memory and anticipation in a temporal experience of life, then the formal concept of pity as justice and law ought to include horses and other animals as subjects of the law.<sup>323</sup> If we cannot imagine them as agents, then we ought to, at least, regard them as patients within what we call "human" societies.

The development of pity into human pity, as a universal concept and formal law that is articulated in speech, would occur

at the same point in history as the development of song. The origin of civilization would bring language, law and culture in general, such as the various forms of art. Derrida interprets Rousseau's notion of song within the framework of two types of arts: those which are spatial and therefore associated with death as the distance from life's self-presence; and those arts which are not spatial and therefore keep the relation of life's presence to self. The art of singing, as a vocal art, rather than a spatial art, would present life to itself.<sup>324</sup> As we have seen, presence is the meaning of nature for Rousseau. So song would be "natural" in this sense. But nature in general, and animals especially, would be regarded as "the inanimate face of life."<sup>325</sup> The animals as natural beings are associated with spatiality, exteriority and death in the thought of Rousseau. The human would be the one with self-presence and pure auto-affection in general, even though the animal would be confined to a type of self-enclosed totality without a relation to self or other.<sup>326</sup> Still, an animal is "dead nature" or "still life" for Rousseau.

The value of death, then, is on both sides of the human/animal conceptual distinction. Derrida claims:

One sees here what difference—at the same time interior and exterior—*divides the significations* of nature, life, animality, humanity, art speech and song. The animal who, as we have seen, has no relationship to death, is on the side of death. Speech, on the other hand, is living speech even while it institutes a relation to death ... It is presence in general that is thus divided.<sup>327</sup>

The concept of the animal would be on the side of Rousseau's conceptual chain with the dominant values of exteriority, spatiality, and inanimation, but it would not know death *as such*, nor would it have the capacity to anticipate that suffering leads to death. The concept of the human would include a relation to death *as such*, as the opening that is also the opening to time and the other, that is, to exteriority, but it would be on the side of life. The value of death functions as the supplement and reveals the *both at once* logic of supplementarity. Death is both interior and exterior to each conceptual meaning. The value of death is attributed to the animal and nature, and therefore interior to these significations. But the animal would not know death. Therefore, "death" is exterior to the signification of animality and nature. The inverse applies to humanity. "Death" is excluded from the auto-affection's interiority of humanity's living present voice, but included as a primary attribute of humanity's life. Death functions in *both* conceptual series.

Therefore, Rousseau should not have used death as an attribute that delineates humanity out of animality and nature. The value of death divides the self-presence of humanity's auto-affection. This places the opening of difference in the heart of presence and meaning, and permits the possibility of the opening of temporality, the other, the world, etc.

But the value of death also divides each signification, thereby opening the signification to its other, its so-called opposite. The concepts of nature and culture, animality and humanity, cannot be clearly distinguished. Death opens this disjunction to conjunction. Death forces the text of Rousseau to reveal its unjustified claims about the differences between humanity and animality, nature and culture, which are segregating limits. The function of death in the thought of Rousseau, Derrida points out, works against Rousseau's own claims. *Contra* Rousseau's intentions, his texts describe the confusion of the significations of humanity/animality, culture/nature, society/state of nature, liberty/instinct, etc. Instead of a limit that clearly distinguishes these conceptual meanings, these significations are limited by their aporetic, unclear, supplementary relations with other significations. Death, as the opening that also brings temporality and the other, also includes the trace of other significations because of its inclusion on both sides of Rousseau's conceptual system. Finally, since a relation to death in this sense is the work of the imagination, animals would also have a representation of death. Moreover, humans must acknowledge that a horse might also imagine that suffering could lead to death. This must be taken into consideration, if we are to attempt to be just with horses.

For Rousseau, song would have been on the side of the self-

presence of life. Song, however, is a form of imitation and, therefore, on the side of the inanimate, too. Song imitates both the articulate speaking voice and the inarticulate cries of nature. Song is another example of the logic of supplementarity at work in the thought of Rousseau.

Prior to the development of song as an art of imitation, Rousseau theorizes about the unity of the voice and song at the origin of human civilization, at the origin of the concept of man. This is another instance of Rousseau's use of nature. According to Derrida, nature signifies the following in Rousseau's texts: the inferior step or stage as *arche* and ground; and the ideal limit as the unity of the imitated and imitation, of voice and song. In the beginning, at the origin of humanity, at the limit between nature and society, the speaking voice was the same as the singing voice. And that was how it should have been and how it should be.<sup>328</sup>

One of the values of nature in the texts of Rousseau, then, would be the unity of voices, the voice of song and the voice of speech. According to Derrida, if the *good* origin were the unity of speech and song, the distinction between song and voice would have had no structural or genetic value.<sup>329</sup> That is, the archeo-teleological concept of nature annuls the structural perspective because "the modification becomes one with the modified substance."<sup>330</sup> The other of nature would become one with nature,

the new mode becomes one with the substance, genesis becomes one with the origin. In Rousseau's scheme of things, nature moves to become one with nature; the voice transgresses nature and moves toward becoming one with it. But the difference between imitation and what is imitated must never be overcome:

Through the voice one must transgress the nature that is animal, savage, mute, infant or crying: by singing transgress or modify the voice. But the song must imitate cries and laments. This leads to a second polar determination of nature: it becomes the unity—as ideal limit—of the imitation and what is imitated, voice and song.<sup>331</sup>

For Rousseau, at the origin of Greek culture, the voice of song and the voice of speech would have been the same, and the cry, too, would have been included.

Derrida argues, on the contrary, that Rousseau "describes" the possibility of *both* speech and song as already separate at the origin of society and language. Derrida will point out a difference or *tension* in language that operates as both an opening and a menace, constitutive and de-constituting, a principle of life and death.

According to Rousseau's concept of nature, and its archeo-teleological structure, song is united with speech at the origin. Over the course of history, singing would become independent.<sup>332</sup> This is Rousseau's story and claim. However, Derrida argues that Rousseau's *description* of his story does not justify his claim, and, in fact, proves the opposite. Rousseau should have

acknowledged that his descriptive story proves that there would have been a *fissure* or difference at the origin. "Rousseau says it without saying it."<sup>333</sup> As a general formula, the law of spacing as accident and supplement in the form of interval is part of the definition of song. And if song were the same as voice, then voice, too, would have to be characterized with interval, spacing and difference. The fact or possibility of interval in the originary speech/song places difference at the origin of articulate speech, culture, society and humanity.

Also, this difference would be internal to and essential to the originary presence of nature. Contrary to Rousseau's claim, this difference would not come from outside of this presence like a disease or an external evil, which Rousseau thinks would lead to the degeneration of song and speech and the initial separation of song and speech. Therefore, even if speech was sung at the origin, there were always already the differences of interval within this sung speech. The originary presence of nature was already *difference*. This spacing of difference is the principle of death, that is, of nonpresence within life. But it is *at the same time* the principle of life because, without it, song would be impossible—there would be no interval. And song is the art whose imitation promotes self-presence. Furthermore, this interval is the possibility of imitation, of song as imitation and imitation as voice. Therefore, song was already different

from itself.

In addition, Rousseau had already described the *voice of nature* as "twofold." The originary voice of nature is twofold in the sense that it both speaks and understands itself as signifying a melodious and moral law.<sup>334</sup> This metaphor of the voice of nature, as Derrida calls it, would be the "gentle," maternal voice:

Song as original voice, sung speech conforms to the prescriptions of the natural law. In every sense of this word, nature speaks. And to hear and understand the laws formed by her gentle voice ... it is necessary to find again the "oral accent" of sung speech, take possession again of our own lost voice, the voice which, uttering and hearing, understanding-itself-signifying a melodious law was the twofold voice of nature.<sup>335</sup>

The most important point here is to notice that Derrida is showing that Rousseau is explicitly writing that nature speaks. Nature speaks! Therefore, contrary to Rousseau's claim that only civilized man is articulate, Rousseau has also told us in the story of the history of how human civilization comes to be out of the state of nature and that nature had already been articulating moral law in the hearts of animals and in the inarticulate cries of nature. Animals, therefore, would have the gentle, maternal and moral voice of nature that would articulate prescriptive commands to the multitudes. That is, the voice of Mother Nature articulates itself and prescribes natural law within the "hearts" of all "natural" beings.<sup>336</sup>

In sum, the animal would have the attribute of supplementary difference as articulation with the voice of nature. This voice is "written" on the "hearts" and is therefore even more articulate than the vocal articulations of the civilized human. That is, for Rousseau, written language would be more articulate than the spoken language because of the progression of differences. At the same time, Rousseau is claiming that the less articulate voice is the moral voice. The voice that is closer to the cries of nature.

Secondly, the natural being would also have the attribute of morality. The animal has "moral" prescriptions written on her heart and manifested in her calls. Therefore, civilized man would not be the only being within the circle of morality. All of nature would already be included within the order of moral significance within the very discourse of Rousseau. His descriptions do not support his claims that only man is morally relevant. Derrida could claim that justice does in fact have a place in what we call the natural world.

And, yet, Rousseau will keep animals out of the moral circle as beings who are incapable of virtuous deeds. He likens the imitative acts of virtue by human children to the act of a monkey, who merely imitates actions without knowing or understanding the good as *such*. In this respect, both monkeys and human children are incapable of being moral agents because they

can merely imitate.<sup>337</sup>

Again, imitation was claimed by Rousseau to be an attribute of the civilized human, since imitation depends upon the use of signs or supplements. But he has also written that monkeys imitate. Imitation, therefore, also has the logic of supplementarity. The animal would, then, also have imitation, which is based in the possibility of the supplement, signs, art, imagination, etc.

Rousseau compares a child's imitation of good deeds to those imitations of a monkey. Both would be morally irrelevant. Derrida quotes Rousseau:

I know that all these imitative virtues are only the virtues of a monkey, and that a good action is only morally good when it is done as such and not because others do it.<sup>338</sup>

The virtue of a monkey, and child, for that matter, is the imitation of the human without love and understanding of the good itself.

Compassion, for example, cannot be a virtue in the human sense in the actions of a monkey who may have learned such behaviour from a human. And any display of compassionate behaviour on the part of a monkey for another can only be regarded as mere imitation of human compassion because the animal would have no faculty of imagination and no capacity for identification with the other.

Derrida points out that the possibility of imitation, which

is conditioned by the possibility of the supplement, sign and imagination, interrupts natural simplicity and presence. The animal and child can imitate. Therefore, imitation is *both* natural and cultural. The problem for Rousseau is that he also claims that imitation is the emergence out of animality.<sup>339</sup> That is, for Rousseau, imitation is the possibility of song, and only the human sings. However, imitation is on both sides of the man/animal conceptual distinction.

Furthermore, Rousseau both praises and condemns imitation. As "the possibility of song and the emergence out of animality, ..." he affirms *mimesis*.<sup>340</sup> According to Derrida, Rousseau praises the supplement of art, even though the reproduction "adds *nothing*" to what is represented. If supplementary *mimesis* adds nothing, it is not nothing. Not being nothing, it threatens the "integrity of what is represented" and the "purity of nature ..."<sup>341</sup> Therefore, according to Derrida, Rousseau's texts are constructed within the "system of supplementarity." Rousseau both denounces *mimesis* and art as supplements, possibly dangerous, useless, superfluous and disastrous, and praises *mimesis* and arts as supplements, which are man's good fortune, the expression of passion and the emergence out of the inanimate animality.<sup>342</sup>

Derrida points out that Rousseau's texts describe the *structure of relationships* and use of imitation among animals, children, and men in society, as he describes the structure and

problematics of pity. Both themes work with the values of potentiality and actuality. And both have the same paradox: "Imitation and pity have the same foundation: a sort of metaphorical ecstasy":

Imitation has its roots in our perpetual desire to transport ourselves outside of ourselves.<sup>343</sup>

The human would have become human by imagination's self-activation of its potentiality. Imitation, too, would be the transgression of animality. Both would be paradigms of auto-affection. Yet, both would also lead to the expropriation of oneself. Imitation is of another. Imagination permits the one's identity with the other. Each has their originary resource in nature's virtuality and potentiality. These activated faculties have their source in the potential, that is, *in its other*, and permits the human to open itself to the other. Rousseau does not recognize a problem with his conceptuality; but Derrida does:

As the value of *virtuality*, or *potentiality*, further introduces here an element of transition and confusion, of graduality and of shifts within the rigor of distinctions and within the functioning of concepts—limits of animality, childhood, savagery, etc.—one must admit that "moral impressions" through signs and a system of differences can always be already discerned, although confusedly, in the animal. [Quoting Rousseau] "Something of this moral affect is perceivable even in the animals." We realized the need for this hesitation in connection with pity and at the same time imitation:

So long as one insists on considering sounds only in terms of the shock that they excite in our nerves, one will not attain the true principle of music, nor its power over men's hearts. The sounds of a melody do not affect us merely as sounds, but as signs of our affections, of our feelings. It is thus that

they excite in us the emotions that they express, whose image we recognize in it. Something of this moral affect is perceivable even in animals. The barking of one dog will attract another. When my cat hears me imitate a mewling, I see it become immediately attentive. When it discovers that I am just counterfeiting the voice of its species, it relaxes and resumes its rest.<sup>344</sup>

The "moral affect" of melody introduces "confusion" within the conceptuality of Rousseau because the conceptual basis of the system of potentiality and actuality precludes any clear distinctions. It introduces moments of transition and gradual shifts that do not permit the idea of an exact boundary or limit between two moments in the process from animality to humanity. Keeping in mind the idea of the trace, one would not say that a move from animality to humanity is a progression or evolution to more complexity, but merely a change and differentiation without improvement, progress, or fulfillment; intentionality without final *telos*, repetitions with differences without end.

The other crucial topic is the place of imitation, representation or signification in general in moral and ethical considerations. Rousseau had claimed that the difference between an adult human and a child or monkey is that the adult, civilized human has the ability to know "the good" *as such*, while the monkey and child can only imitate compassionate deeds. These deeds would not be as morally significant because the agents do not have the moral insight into what they are doing.

But this representation of the ape as that being who can only imitate compassionate deeds, which implies the use of signs and imagination, is the universal ethical situation. The melody of the song offers us signs of the affections. It is the song as signs that stir these same feelings and emotions in one's heart. These signs are imitations, representations, not the thing itself, not the emotions, feelings or heart. In the previous chapter, Derrida claimed that Rousseau had recognized that when one speaks with another about an object, it is not even an image of the object that penetrates one's heart, but vocal signs. Speech does not present the truth of the object. Speech presents signs referring to an object. In the case of a melody, we hear, understand and are effected by vocal signs, not the heart and soul of the other. We do not have the truth of the other "as such." All that we have are signs, images and representations: of oneself, of the other, of nature, of the other's feelings, emotions and inner experience in general.

One does not have a present experience of the other's lived experience, including the other's emotions, feelings, such as suffering. One can only identify with the other's suffering in the compassionate experience with one's imagination. One can only represent the other's suffering to oneself. All that we have is an image or signification of the other's suffering. If one intended to address the suffering of another human, horse or

hare, one would not experience and know the suffering of the human, horse or hare as such. If we think of "the good" as that which would relieve the suffering, we must also know the source of the suffering and the experience of suffering itself in order to respond in an appropriate manner. This is not possible. If we think of "the good" as the compassionate experience for the other rather than the imitation of the compassionate experience and a deed based on this, still the compassionate experience and deeds are only signs of our feelings which are motivated by the signs of distress in the other.

In this sense, we can agree with Rousseau that imitation interferes with the thing itself or the referent. At the same time, however, this is our only context and possibility of ethical and moral relations. Morality and ethics have their possibility and conditions in representation and signification.<sup>345</sup> This is, perhaps, the condition and tragic limit of ethics and morality. We must work ethically and morally through significations, representations, images, and fictions. So the human adult in a civilized nation, such as Switzerland, is in the same situation as the ape in imitating ethical deeds. Neither the ape nor the Swiss citizen has direct access to the suffering of the other, which means that the ethical process begins with representation and fiction rather than the presence of the suffering itself and its truth. Our ethical deeds, too, are

representations of compassion and the desire for justice. Who, therefore, is the moral agent?

So we must persuade the descendants of Rousseau to recognize that the formal concept of pity as justice and law is also a representation. The laws are not justice and pity as such. Pity as justice could only move beyond the level of representation if the suffering of the other were indeed presentable in itself. This is impossible. And so Derrida claims that justice is not presentable: "Justice as the experience of absolute alterity is unrepresentable ..."<sup>346</sup> Clearly, then, justice could not be presented in law. Law could only ever provide a representation. That being the case, one must attempt to make laws as justly as possible. And in order to take into account the uniqueness and singularity of every other and every situation, laws must be reinterpreted, reinvented, reestablished and refounded in each case in order to attempt to represent justice as rigorously as possible.<sup>347</sup>

The ethical situation of civilized humans, then, would have made no clear advancement over what Rousseau had called the state of nature.<sup>348</sup> His animal would have had no relation to the other or self and therefore no pity or justice. The civilized human would have only representations of the self and other. Therefore, humans would have only representations of justice and compassion.

## CHAPTER V

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, there is a discussion of Derrida's affinities with Heidegger. Derrida argues that Heidegger's thought of Being is the thought of responsibility for the other. Second, the chapter discusses the reasons for Derrida's departure from Heidegger. The thought of Being is not responsible to animals, according to Derrida. Many themes come into play, including world, language, justice, responsibility and death. The focal point of the chapter is Derrida's deconstruction of *Dasein's* Being-toward-death. The absolute distinction between *Dasein* and animals is interrupted. This opens up the necessity for a reinterpretation of many themes for the sake of responsible conceptions of animals. One of the most significant claims to come out of this is that Derrida claims animals are also political animals. The key component of the chapter is a reinterpretation of *Dasein's* responsibility to the call of Being according to Derrida's thought of double affirmation and the gift. The thought of Being cannot think the gift and its responsibilities. Responsibility is increased infinitely, to include animals. A new sense of "world" is introduced in which animals and others assign humans their responsibilities.

Derrida regards the project of Heidegger as a crucial leap in thought in the history of philosophy. He has continuously used the texts of Heidegger as a basis for his own thought on a variety of issues. The thought of Being and letting-be is also regarded as absolutely crucial to a just, responsible and respectful thought of the other. Derrida thinks that Heidegger's project is so critical, he argues that even the ethical thought of Levinas, who is very critical of Heidegger, and ethics in general, require Heidegger's thought of Being and letting-be.

Levinas objects to Heidegger's thought of Being on the grounds that it subordinates ethics to ontology. Heidegger's thought of Being is understood by Levinas to be an "impersonal" relation of "knowing" the other in general rather than thinking every human other as infinitely other. Consequently, neither the ethical relation with the other nor the other as an individual is capable of being treated justly in the thought of Being. Heidegger's discourse would be another example of the domination of the alterity of the other by general laws and theoretical categories.<sup>349</sup>

Levinas' claim, put in a slightly different way, is that Heidegger has a priority of Being over existent, or, ontology over ethics. Derrida responds that there is no priority in this sense since priority is a relation that pertains between existents, not between Being and existent.<sup>350</sup> Moreover, Being

cannot be prior to the existent in temporal or valuational terms because Being is only with the existent. "Nothing is more clear as concerns this in Heidegger's thought."<sup>351</sup>

There is no subordination of ethics to ontology, as if Being were a foreign agent that violates and subdues the existent. Derrida argues that the thought of Being is Heidegger's exploration of the "existenthood" of the existent, the "Being-of" *this* existent. It is, therefore, an attempt to think the very existent or other in a very peculiar way.<sup>352</sup> According to Derrida, Heidegger is concerned with Being as "presencing." And there is no possibility of ethics without the presence of the other in one's experience.

Levinas imagines Being as a type of arche, ruling principle of the universe, which would also be represented in political organization. According to Derrida, however, Logos is not the faceless oppressor, but the "possibility of the name and responsibility."<sup>353</sup> That is, *Dasein* is responsible for hearing the call of Being, which is the condition of relating to the other as other, and, therefore, the condition of naming the other as other. The thought of Being, then, is not ethical violence. According to Derrida, "no ethics--in Levinas's sense can be opened without it."<sup>354</sup> For it is this thought of Being which makes possible a respectful relation to the other as other in general. Derrida writes:

Thought--or at least the precomprehension of Being--*conditions* ... the *recognition* of the essence of the existent (for example, someone, existent as other, as other self, etc.). It conditions the *respect* for the other as *what it is*: other. Without this acknowledgement, which is not a knowledge, or let us say without this "letting-be" of an existent (Other) as something existing outside me in the essence of what it is (first in its alterity), no ethics would be possible.<sup>355</sup>

Therefore, ethics in Levinas' sense, but also ethics in general, is possible only with the thought of Being as one's respectful "letting-be" of the other in its essence as other. One must think the presencing of the other in order to be ethical.

Levinas seems to think that Heidegger's discourse of letting-be is unjust since it subordinates the other as a being to be comprehended and, thereby, dominated. But Derrida argues that Heidegger's letting-be applies to all beings or existents and relates to their essences.<sup>356</sup> If the other is essentially an interlocuting existent, then that is what is let-be:

To let the other be in its existence and essence as other means that what gains access to thought, or (and) what thought gains access to, is that which is essence and that which is existence; and that which is the Being which they both presuppose. Without this, no letting-be would be possible, and first of all, the letting be of respect and ethical commandment addressing itself to freedom.<sup>357</sup>

So without Heidegger's letting-be, Levinas cannot speak of respecting the other, of the violence done to the other, nor of one's freedom to take up one's responsibility in the face of the other's command for justice. Just as we must *know* the other as

alter ego, or as what it is, with Husserl, so, more profoundly, we must acknowledge, at least, a precomprehension of the Being as presencing of the essence and existence of the other in order to be responsible and just to the other. Therefore, Being does not dominate the existent. It attempts to think the other as other.

Derrida points out that the ethical position of Levinas depends upon the thought of Being. Since Being "lets-be" all differences and determinations, a meaningful thought of the other would depend upon Being. In other words, responsibility depends upon Being. Derrida claims:

If to understand Being is to be able to let be (that is, to respect Being in essence and existence, and to be responsible for one's respect), then the understanding of Being always concerns alterity, and par excellence the alterity of the Other in all its originality: one can have to let be only that which one is not. If Being is always to be let be, and if to think is to let Being be, then indeed Being is the other of thought.<sup>358</sup>

One is responsible for one's respect for the other in the thought of Being, which does think the other and lets the other be as uniquely other.<sup>359</sup> And although the thought of Being is the thought of the other, there is no encapsulation of the existent and its characteristics. Only the thought of Being would permit Levinasian insight into the glance of the other, which commands respect and responsibility. So letting-be permits the other to command:

If the glance of the other is to command me, as Levinas says, and it is to command me to command, then I must be able to

let be the other in his freedom as other, and vice versa. But Being itself commands nothing or no one.<sup>360</sup>

Derrida is very clear that Heidegger's thought of Being is the attempt to let be the other by attempting to respectfully think the other. No moral or ethical command could be recognized as coming from the other unless the alterity of the other is first thought.

From a Heideggerian perspective, the problem is that Levinas has not interrogated the relation between men and Being. In the name of Heidegger, Derrida would ask Levinas if experiences of the human and divine "faces" are possible without the thought of Being? Derrida argues that the glance and speech of the ethical relationship between humans is only respectful if speech and glance are linked to the thought of Being, thereby allowing speech and glance to let-be. However, Derrida notes, Heidegger's thought of Being must pass through the medium of language and speech. That is, there is no Being without speech. Heidegger contends that Being must be spoken in a statement. Without this link of human speech and thought to Being, there is only the cry of need of the animal, which would have no capacity to let-be--no possibility of truth or justice.

Not only can Levinas not do without the founding of language in Being as the possibility of speaking justly of the other, the very ethical relation of transcendence would also depend on

Heidegger's notion of "Being-together". Derrida states:

... the possibility of a *Mitsein* much more original than any of the eventual forms with which it has often been confused: solidarity, the team, companionship. Implied by the discourse of *Totality and Infinity*, alone permitting to let be others in their truth, freeing dialogue and the face to face, the thought of Being is thus as close as possible to non-violence.<sup>361</sup>

Derrida expands upon this in the following note:

Sartre, like Levinas, had earlier interpreted the *Mitsein* in the sense of camaraderie, the team, etc. ... Let us add simply that the *with* of the *Mitsein* originally no more denotes the structure of a team animated by a neutral common task than does the *with* of the "language with God." (*TI*) The Being which can interpellate the *Mitsein* is not, as Levinas often gives us to understand, a third term, a common truth, etc. Finally, the notion of *Mitsein* describes an original structure of relationship between *Da-sein* and *Da-sein* which is prior to every meaning of "encounter" or of "constitution" ... (Cf. also *Being and Time*: "With and also not as categories")<sup>362</sup>

In these very explicit passages, Derrida makes it very clear that Heidegger's "Being-with" is an originary structure of *Dasein's* relation with the other. More importantly, this very originary structure of the relation to the other is one of non-violence, contrary to Levinas's interpretation, since "Being-with" includes the thought of Being. Any discourse that would attempt to do justice to the other must include and assume Heidegger's thought of Being.

However, ethics, Being, Being-with and letting-be require Derrida's thoughts in order to provide a more exacting account of the relation to the other, and the basis of respect and responsibility.<sup>363</sup> In particular, Derrida claims that Heidegger's thought of Being has not been respectful, responsible, or just to the myriad animals of the world:

The Heideggerian discourse on the animal is violent and awkward, at times contradictory ... There is no category of original existence for the animal: it is evidently not *Dasein* ... as if the animal remained a man enshrouded, suffering, deprived on account of having access neither to the world of man that he nonetheless senses, nor to truth, speech, death, or the Being of the being as such. Heidegger defends himself in vain against this anthropo-teleological interpretation ...<sup>364</sup>

Heidegger attempts to avoid a discourse that would think animals and other forms of life in ways that would imply a traditional metaphysical teleology. Derrida argues that Heidegger has not been able to think the animal as anything except subordinate to *Dasein* in a teleological sense. Derrida deconstructs aspects of Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* in order to attempt to do justice to animals, conceptually and empirically. Being-toward-death is a critical structure of *Dasein* that Derrida deconstructs in order to rethink the relations between *Dasein* and other animals. It is another example in the history of philosophy in which the discourse produced by a thinker is hiding a type of undecidability or *aporia*. It is this undecidability of the impossible possibility of death that interrupts the proper of

*Dasein*'s Being-there and the ability of *Dasein* to speak or name its death as such.<sup>365</sup>

It is Heidegger's claim that only *Dasein*, "standing in the clearing of being", can anticipate and experience death "as such".<sup>366</sup> This capacity of *Dasein* is linked to *Dasein*'s phenomenological structure of speech and ability to name. Derrida cites Heidegger who writes:

Mortal are they who can experience death as death [*den Tod als Tod erfahren können*]. Animals cannot do this [*Das Tier vermag dies nicht.*] But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought [*ist aber noch ungedacht*].<sup>367</sup>

The distinction that Derrida points out between *Dasein* and the nonhuman in the Heideggerian project is that only *Dasein*, which has access to death as death, can "properly" die, while the nonhuman "perishes". The "as such" is the difference which will determine the remaining differences between properly dying and perishing.<sup>368</sup> Furthermore, the very analysis of *Dasein as Dasein*, distinguished from other modes of Being, is dependent upon this access to death.<sup>369</sup> Although Heidegger will "juxtapose" the access to death and language, he leaves theoretical possibilities open for interpretation.<sup>370</sup>

Derrida uses the hedgehog as an example of animal that Heidegger's discourse does not think responsibly and justly. According to Heidegger, death does not "happen" to an animal,

such as a hedgehog. Unlike *Dasein*, the hedgehog does "... not see death coming."<sup>371</sup> But Derrida questions:

Is it certain that the human *Dasein* sees death coming as such? What is the "as such" in the case of death? And how can anyone maintain that the hedgehog has no apprehension of death when it rolls itself up in a ball?<sup>372</sup>

The phenomenological "as such" is that capacity which would distinguish *Dasein* from all others. Derrida attempts to demonstrate the impossibility of the "as such" as it applies to death. The result, *Dasein* would not be clearly distinguished from other existents.

Derrida introduces an intermediate distinction between properly dying and perishing, Heidegger's *Ableben*, the demise, which means "...to pass through the threshold of death."<sup>373</sup> The demise, too, is attributed only to *Dasein*. Upon death, a *Dasein* is pronounced medically and legally dead.<sup>374</sup> Demising is not dying, but a mode of Being-toward-death. However, *Dasein* never "perishes" as an animal would.<sup>375</sup>

Derrida accuses Heidegger's analysis of death of presupposing *Dasein* and of introducing a hierarchy of inquiry within the distinctions of dying, demising and perishing:

The hierarchy organizes itself around this form of limit which we will call ... the *problematic closure*.<sup>376</sup>

This limit organizes a supposedly complete determination, which would separate areas of knowledge and the corresponding thematic objects. In Heidegger's case, the existential analytic of *Dasein*

is regarded as the foundation to all other areas of research. And Being-toward-death must ground all ontic inquiries of death in anthropology, religion, etc.

Derrida has identified another limit in Heidegger's thought, the border, or *anthropological frontier*.<sup>377</sup> That is, the traditional and contemporary view is that only Man has political borders, which split up nations, territories, etc. Derrida explains:

... it is a concession to the dominant dogma according to which only man has such borders, and animals do not. One usually thinks that even if animals have territories, their territorialization (in predatory, sexual, or regular migratory drives, etc.) could not be encompassed by what man calls borders ... this gesture denies the animal what it gives to man: death, speech, the world as *such*, the law, and the border.<sup>378</sup>

The animal would not have the ability to identify and articulate a non-natural, cultural, artificial, spacing edge that would separate, for example, "two national, state-controlled, linguistic and cultural spaces."<sup>379</sup>

A third limit is the *conceptual demarcation*.<sup>380</sup> This limit would prescribe absolute purity and absolutely no contamination among individual concepts. Heidegger attempted to think the distinction between humanity and animality as an absolutely clean break. Derrida writes:

It is always a matter of marking an absolute limit between the living creature and the human *Dasein*, of taking a distance from all biologism and even all philosophy of life.<sup>381</sup>

Also:

The distinction between the animal (which has no or is not a *Dasein*) and man has nowhere been more radical nor more rigorous than in Heidegger. The animal will never be either a subject or a *Dasein*.<sup>382</sup>

The primary concern of this chapter is to rethink this limit between the human *Dasein* and the other animals.

Derrida claims that these three limits are all interweaved in the aporia of death. That is, the signification of "my death" with which Being-toward-death is concerned, as that impossible possibility that would grant singularity of identity to "my existence," is between all of these limits, and, yet, crosses over. Being-toward-death is a structure of *Dasein* that would condition these limits and cross these borders:

The thread that passes between two cultural or historical borders (being-to-death would here be without border, hence universal, but universal within the borders that separate *Dasein* from any other entity and from any other living thing, in particular from the animal); ... the thread between two problematic closures ... the thread that follows the line of logical demarcation among all the concepts ...<sup>383</sup>

In the end, the aporia of Being-toward-death will not only cross these borders, but open them as well.

Being-toward-death, *Dasein*'s anticipation of itself at the limit of death, as the most proper possibility, is the truth of the Being of *Dasein*. The existential unveiling of *Dasein*, its truth, is revealed at death. But the most proper possibility is the impossible. The truth of *Dasein* is the most proper

possibility of no longer existing.

While Heidegger regards the paradox of the impossible possibility as the condition of truth, Derrida claims it to be the collapse of Heidegger's "as such." That is, death as the most proper possibility is an impossibility and, therefore, the least proper possibility of *Dasein*. Impossibility is the "aporetic supplement" of the possible that ruins the "as such." Derrida writes:

... nous aurons à nous demander comment une possibilité (la plus propre) en tant qu'impossibilité peut encore apparaître en tant que telle sans disparaître aussitôt, sans que le "comme tel" sombre d'avance et sans que sa disparition essentielle fasse perdre au *Dasein* tout ce qui le distingue-- et d'autres formes d'étant et même du vivant animal en général, de la bête. Et sans que son mourir proprement soit originairement contaminé, parasité, contrebandé par le périr et par le décéder.<sup>384</sup>

The aporia of the impossible possibility ruins the "as such" as that defining attribute of *Dasein*, the attribute that would distinguish *Dasein* from other animals. More specifically, it opens the limit of dying as an exclusive property of *Dasein* to demising, as the multicultural determinations of death, and to perishing, an attribute of all living beings but *Dasein*. The distinction between *Dasein* and other species of animals as well as the distinctions between the various modes of death have been revealed to be undecidable.

Derrida's interrogation and claim against the "as such" of Heidegger is crucial to a thinking of justice and responsibility

for nonhumans. For the limits mentioned above, the anthropologico-cultural *borders*, the problematic closure, and the conceptual demarcations of the existential analysis, are erased as soon as they are articulated.<sup>385</sup> These limits erase themselves as they mark a space because the "articulating" movement of the trace conditions them. No thing, trait, or limit is itself. The nonpresent trace always already refers to another and opens up the "presence" of present things with its articulating spacing. To articulate these limits is always already to mark their impossibility because they *a priori* include the mark of others, which would include other types, species, forms, etc. The mark of belonging and delimitation would be always already divided. The movement of the trace, then, is the possibility and impossibility of limits in general. Because of the movement of the trace, these limits will inherently suffer from "... a principle of ruin, ... parasitism [*parasitage*], grafting, and divisibility."<sup>386</sup> Derrida's claim is clear:

This axiom of non-closure or non-fulfillment enfolds within itself the condition for the possibility and the impossibility of taxonomy ... This inclusion and this exclusion do not remain exterior to one another; they do not exclude each other ... The ... floodgate of genre declasses what it allows to be classed. It tolls the knell of genealogy or of genericity.<sup>387</sup>

*This principle of ruin is death as the movement and spacing of the trace.* It is the condition of the existential analysis but also its ruin, since it is a "... discourse of delimitation, of

guaranteed dissociation, of the border or determined closure ..." <sup>388</sup>  
Heidegger, Derrida thinks, should have recognized this  
"impossibility of taxonomy" as the impossibility of the  
fulfilment of any type of *telos* and the impossibility of any  
absolute distinction between any types of beings. Derrida is not  
denying differences. However, he is denying the possibility of  
absolute distinctions between beings and types of beings. As he  
writes in *Dissemination*:

What is lifted, then, is not difference but the different,  
the differends, the decidable exteriority ... <sup>389</sup>

As we have seen with Rousseau, there is both identity and  
difference. This is guaranteed by the trace and ex-appropriation—  
both fusion and fission.

Derrida further interrogates the "as such" and the "possible  
impossibility" of death. According to Heidegger's own text's, the  
own most possibility as impossibility, as the relation to death  
as such, and death as the impossibility of existing, the end of  
*Dasein*, is the disappearance of the "as such":

L'impossibilité du "comme tel", comme telle, serait possible  
pour le *Dasein* et non, selon Heidegger, pour tout autre form  
d'étant et de vivant. Mais si l'impossibilité du "comme tel"  
est bien l'impossibilité du "comme tel", elle est aussi bien  
ce qui peut ne pas apparaître comme tel. <sup>390</sup>

So not only does the impossible's supplementarity act as a  
principle of death for the "possible" and the "as such," but the  
"as such" was always already impossible. <sup>391</sup> But this impossibility

of the "as such" appearing as such to authentic Dasein is also the impossibility that Heidegger attributed to inauthentic Dasein and to all living beings.<sup>2392</sup>

Derrida's claim is that no living being can experience death "as such." But this does not mean that all beings experience or imagine death in the same way:

Trait commun ne signifie pas homogénéité mais impossibilité d'une limite absolument pure et rigoureusement infranchissable (en termes d'existence ou de concepts) entre une analytique existentielle de la mort et une anthropo-théologie fondamentale, puis entre des cultures anthropologiques et des cultures animales de la morte.<sup>393</sup>

No one and no group thinks death in the same way. That the "as such" is impossible for all, does not mean that humans and animals experience death, face death and those of others, in the same way. Nor should we homogenize "death" for animality, as if all animal species were the same.

Clearly, Derrida has not forgotten his work on Rousseau in which animals and other natural beings were rethought in terms of some of those predicates that had been exclusively reserved for civilized man. Derrida is explicitly qualifying animality with culture. He is also explicitly recognizing the differences amongst animal species and animal cultures. Death would be

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regarded in different ways within the various animal cultures.

During the course of a colloquium on the thought of Heidegger, David Wood suggests that Derrida is blurring the differences between humans and animals. He claims:

If you start blurring the difference between people and animals, if you start to blur the difference between Auschwitz and battery farms, chicken farms ...<sup>394</sup>

Derrida interrupts David Wood with his response:

No, on the contrary, you have to *multiply* the differences, not *blur* the differences ... More differences, yes. For at the same time you will have to take into account other discriminations, for instance, between human society and animal society. There are a lot of things to be said and done. But there are also other partitions, separation, other than Auschwitz-aparteid, racial segregation—other segregations within our Western democratic society. All these differences have to be taken into account in a new fashion; whereas, if you draw a single or two single lines, then you have homogeneous sets of undifferentiated societies, or groups, or structures. No, no I am not advocating the *blurring* of differences. On the contrary, I am trying to explain how drawing an oppositional limit *itself* blurs the differences, the difference and the differences, not only between man and animal, but among animal societies—there are an infinite number of animal societies, and, within the animal societies and within human society itself, so many differences.<sup>395</sup>

Derrida provides a clear statement in the English language, which explains the overall agenda of his project. Each chapter of this thesis has demonstrated the impossibility of clearly distinguishing man and animal, the human and the natural. Here, Derrida provides further insight into his deconstructions and his thought. His project is not the attempt to blur the differences, but to think differences more justly and responsibly. In

upsetting the distinctions between man and nature which Husserl, Rousseau and Heidegger have posited, Derrida is not claiming that humanity and nature are simply the same. But he has also done that, in so far as we have seen that there are essential traits that have been unwittingly attributed to both man and animal. Furthermore, Derrida is arguing that these broad limits, which have been instituted by Heidegger, and others, of course, reflect an oversimplification of the thoughts of the Being of both humans, on the one hand, and animals, etc. on the other hand. There are certain samenesses between humans and other animals and other forms of life. If that is the case, then we must not draw limits of absolute difference between "us" and "them." And these same traits will also be manifested in a myriad of unique ways amongst those "singular" or unique beings who will live them in their own way. For example, not even two human individuals could possibly think, experience and act on a similar trait in an absolutely identical fashion, even within the same culture, and at the same period of time.

In sum, Derrida is attempting to be responsible to the concept of justice as respect for the uniqueness of the other. We have seen that sameness is essential to the ethical thought of Derrida, albeit a sameness as symmetry of asymmetry. But some thinkers who have attempted to be just with difference have presented an *ideology* of difference. They have recognized and

thought too few differences. These few differences become limits of sameness that exclude what is different, without recognizing differences within that sphere. They have also failed to recognize and think the differences that exist *within* the limit. On either side of the limit of differentiation there is homogeneity instead of a recognition and thought of differences.<sup>396</sup> Therefore, we should be just and responsible in thinking samenesses and differences in a more differentiated way.

In the previous chapters we have seen that the discourse of Rousseau had to be transformed to recognize the capacity of signs and the faculty of imagination within the "animal" being. One can only imagine one's death. One can create a meaning of death within one's culture. With this conceptual support, Derrida makes an empirical claim about the animal cultures of death:

Contre ou sans Heidegger, on pourrait ou bien mettre en évidence mille signes montrant que les animaux *meurent* aussi. Dans les différences structurelles innombrables qui séparent une "espèce" d'une autre et devraient nous rappeler à la vigilance devant tout discours sur l'animalité ou la bestialité *en général*, les animaux ont un rapport très signifiant à la mort, au meurtre et à la guerre (donc aux frontières), au deuil et à l'hospitalité, etc., mêmes s'ils n'ont pas rapport à la mort *comme telle* et au "nom" de mort comme tel. Ni du même coup à l'autre comme tel, à la pureté comme telle de l'alterité de l'autre comme telle ...<sup>397</sup>

This passage is a crucial statement by Derrida. It is yet another passage in which he explicitly reminds us to bring other forms of earthlings into the ethical limit. Not only does he state his opposition to the metaphysical tradition in claiming that other

types of animals relate to significations of death just as much as humans relate to significations of death, he thinks ethically and calls for the recognition of the diversity of relations to death amongst animal species and cultures. Furthermore, he is beyond a hierarchy of value and sacrifice in ethical relations when he claims that nonhuman animals should be considered in notions of murder. The sacrifice of an "experimental" animal by a scientist is, then, a murder; so, too, is the sacrifice of cheetah cubs by a lion.

One of the problems with Heidegger's discourse, as with most others, is that it permits the sacrifice of animals without any serious ethical or legal consideration. Derrida says:

... I am trying especially to underscore the *sacrificial* structure of the discourses to which I am referring ... In any case, it is a matter of discerning a place left open, in the very structure of these discourses ... for a noncriminal putting to death. ... Discourses as original as those of Heidegger and Levinas disrupt, of course, a certain traditional humanism ... [T]hey nonetheless remain profound humanisms *to the extent that they do not sacrifice sacrifice* ... *Dasein* are "men" in a world where sacrifice is possible and where it is not forbidden to make an attempt on life in general, but only on human life ... Heidegger does not say it in this way. But what he places at the origin of the moral conscience (or rather *Gewissen*) is obviously denied to the animal. *Mitsein* is not conferred, if we can say so, on the living in general, any more than is *Dasein*, but only on that being-toward-death that also makes the *Dasein* into something else, something more and better than a living thing.<sup>398</sup>

With the dissolution of the idea of an "as such" of death, and the consequential privilege of Being-toward-death, Derrida puts into question what he calls this sacrificial space within the

discourse of Heidegger. Most significantly, the ethically relevant Being-with of *Mitsein* would no longer have justification for its conferral upon *Dasein* only. Derrida is helping us think that this ethical relation with the other as *Mitsein* applies not only between humans, but has many forms amongst the animal cultures. Obviously, this would apply between the humans and other animals, too, between a dog and a human, for example.

Derrida writes:

I would like to speak of another "community" (... because of what this term connotes, ... the fusion of identification) ... I would like to speak of another being-together than this, of another assembly of singularities, of another friendship ...<sup>399</sup>

The Being-with of *Mitsein* as an originary structure of *Dasein* has been refused to other animals and living beings. Just as importantly, Heidegger's notion of *Mitsein* has not included a thought of an absolutely indispensable trait of an ethical relation with another *Dasein* or another hedgehog, namely, the Rousseauist and Husserlian insight into the necessity of difference, distance and deferral, or what Derrida calls *differánce*. Heidegger's Being-together must be rethought on the basis of the trace as spacing with and from the other.

Heidegger's thought of the Being of the other and letting-be are certainly necessary in order to think the other in its presence. However, any just, responsible and respectful relation to any other also demands a certain type of nonpresence with the other:

There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also and consequently, without absence, dissimulation, detour, différance, writing. The arche-writing is the origin of morality as well as immorality.<sup>400</sup>

Derrida attempts to think the trace of the other as the other's nonpresence to me and within me. The trace of the other would reveal the power of nonpresence, or death, within my very life.

Most significantly, Derrida is critical of Heidegger for not having included animals within moral and ethical considerations. By claiming that nonhuman animals partake of mourning and hospitality, Derrida is not only suggesting that humans ought to relate justly and responsibly with animals, but that animals also relate in ethically relevant ways amongst their various selves.

For Derrida, the notions of hospitality and mourning are fundamental to ethical thought and to relating to the other in a just and responsible way. As for mourning, it is an essential structure of the relation to the other. It is a more precise definition of ex-appropriation in which various types of subjectivities "constitute" one another at the same time that they attempt to limit the subjectivation of the other. Mourning would be:

... the attempt, always doomed to fail (thus a constitutive failure, precisely), to incorporate, interiorize, introject, subjectivize the other in me. Even before the death of the other, the inscription in me of her or his mortality constitutes me. I mourn therefore I am, I am--dead with the death of the other, my relation to myself is first of all

plunged into mourning, a mourning that is moreover impossible. This is also what I call ex-appropriation, appropriation caught in a double bind: I must and I must not take the other into myself; mourning is an unfaithful fidelity if it succeeds in interiorizing the other ideally in me, that is, in not respecting his or her infinite exteriority.<sup>401</sup>

As we saw in regard to imagination's identity and compassion for the other, one must not fully identify with the other in order to permit the alterity of the other. Similarly, in the experience of mourning, one is caught in double bind of the "both at once logic" which demands that one both keeps and loses the other. Successful mourning would mean a complete reappropriation of the other into the self, thereby leaving no other. The absolute failure of mourning as complete expropriation would rid oneself completely of the other, including the memory of the other.

Contrary to Heidegger, however, it is not one's own authentic death that would constitute one's authentic singularity and identity. Instead, Derrida claims that the meaning of one's "I" or "myself" is already mourning the other. One's very relation to oneself would be a heterogeneous relation, which essentially includes the death of the other.

According to Derrida, "mourning itself is affirmation ..."<sup>402</sup> Ex-appropriation entails a certain "hospitality" to and from the other, in the very crossing of the threshold of one another's being. We cannot but be essentially related to one another in this way, a way that is perhaps more fundamental and the very

condition of the *Mitsein* of Heidegger. If we must mourn each other in ex-appropriation, we must do so in the most hospitable ways possible. Derrida is calling for "infinite hospitality."<sup>403</sup>

Derrida refers to a politics of mourning.<sup>404</sup> Based upon what we have seen above, one can certainly attempt to rethink our political and legal views on the deaths of nonhuman animals within our human societies.

The failure of Heidegger's conceptuality and empirical evidence open the anthropological limit. Derrida claims that animals have significant relations to what we would call murder, war and borders. These territorial borders imply that the animal cultures are also political cultures. Animals, too, invent conventional boundaries for their territories, which are defended and patrolled. Ultimately, what the animals would be doing is attempting to determine a context. Of this Derrida writes:

Such an experience is always political because it implies, in so far as it involves determination, a certain type of non-"natural" relationship to others (and this holds as well for what we call "animals," since, without being able to go into it here, what I am saying implies a rather profound transformation of the concept of the "political" along with several others in order to be able to say that man is not the only political animal).<sup>405</sup>

Keeping in mind what we have learned in previous chapters, Derrida would not view these political cultures of nonhuman animals as less developed or as less valuable than human political cultures. Derrida attempts not to think according to

the traditional teleological approaches, which would regard an "animal" political culture, if at all, as a moment on the way to the essence of the political in humankind's societies.

There is still the issue of the link between *Dasein's* language and the ability to name death as such. The animal does not or cannot name death or the other as such:

But man cannot do so either! Nor can man as *Dasein* ...  
Who will guarantee that the name, the ability to name death (like that of naming the other, and it is the same) does not participate as much in the dissimulation of the "as such" of death as in its revelation and that *language* is not precisely the origin of the nontruth of death, and of the other.<sup>406</sup>

So neither the animal nor man is guaranteed of experiencing death or the other as such. In a Heideggerian way, Derrida even suggests that it is the so highly regarded language and naming of the human species that prevents man from experiencing death and the other as such. In the discussion of Rousseau, Derrida's view of signs and their relation to fiction are detailed. Derrida regards that insight as applicable outside of the Rousseauist context. Therefore, *Dasein* may speak and name the Being of death and the Being of the other, but the signs that are involved provide representations and fictions.<sup>407</sup>

What does this mean for Heidegger's perspective on language, Being and letting-be? Did Derrida not claim that Heidegger's discourse is necessary for a thought of ethics as a just and responsible relation with the other? Must ethics not assume the

thought of Being? Yes, the thought of Being remains a critical component of the ethic of ethical thought. However, Derrida claims that Heidegger's discourse is subject to a couple of essential criticisms. First, spoken language and signification in general function according to signs. These signs substitute for the things. One's speech would always have a fictive aspect. However, this does not mean that one ought not to speak as truthfully, justly, and respectfully as possible. One can still be responsible for the Being of the other. One must still be responsible for the "name" of the other, and the attributes with which the name is associated.

But Being must be understood within a new context. According to Derrida, Heidegger's sense of Being was discovered in a manner similar to other discoveries of the the ideality of "truth." Derrida compares Heidegger's "Being" to the transcendental *primum cognitum* of the Middle Ages. All words, statements and existents would imply "Being". It would be precomprehended through them, but remain irreducible to them.

The thought of Being, as the thought of the transcendental, would be best expressed in the voice. In the structural process which Derrida calls pure auto-affection, the self-proximity of the signified meaning, voice and self would occur at the same time that the signs would be erased. Pure auto-affection would occur without relating to the rest of the world, as spontaneity

from the self. The result would be the pure ideality of the truth of Being, isolated in the internal consciousness of ideality beyond signs. Derrida claims that truth is an illusion derived from this equally illusory process of auto-affection. According to Derrida:

This experience of the effacement of the signifier in the voice is not merely one among many—since it is the condition of the very idea of truth ... This illusion is the history of truth.<sup>408</sup>

Ultimately, Derrida claims that Being is another sign within the system of signification rather than an ultimate truth.<sup>409</sup> For example, as Heidegger claims, Being is only produced as history through language. Being is nothing outside of signification. And Heidegger himself attempts to move beyond the idea of Being as the transcendental signified. According to Derrida, Being is a signifying trace within the system of signification and difference, the infinite referential web. And the ontic-ontological difference is derivative of the trace/différance.<sup>410</sup>

Still, this does not negate the importance of the thought of Being for ethical thought. In order to produce an ethical "discourse," one must use language, signs in general, or *marks*. In order to "speak" justly of or to the other such that one would claim responsibility for the other and for oneself, one must use signs or *marks*. The thought of "Being" as a mark within a system of marks can be used in order to relate with the other as justly

and responsibly as possible. With the thought of "Being," one can attempt to think and speak the other as other. One can let-be the other. And one is responsible for one's letting-be of the other by way of one's marks. However, one must recognize that this experience of justice and responsibility is working within the limits of signification, representation and imagination. One must attempt to let-be the other in its essence and existence as other. But one must recognize that experience and signification relate one to the other in dissimulation. "Being" would signify this very dissimulation and alterity of the other, in its difference from oneself and difference with oneself.

This fundamental disagreement with Heidegger regarding the possibility of naming death and the other in general undoes Heidegger's distinction between *Dasein* and what he refers to as animality. Heidegger claims that "animals" cannot name others or death. Derrida explains this inability of "the animal" in Heidegger's thought:

This inability to name is not primarily or simply linguistic; it derives from the properly phenomenological impossibility of speaking the phenomenon whose phenomenality as such, or whose view "as such," does not appear to the animal and does not unveil the Being of the entity.<sup>411</sup>

As in Rousseau, "animals" would be incapable of articulating the other. The animal would be closed to the entity and to its Being. Regarding this lack of a relationship with the other, Derrida claims this is another example of the "absolute limit" drawn by

Heidegger between *Dasein* and what he calls animality.<sup>412</sup>

Without a relation to the other, Heidegger claims that the animal would therefore be "without" world. Without a "world," the animal would have no "environment." And since the world is "spiritual," the animal would not have any spiritual world either.

Derrida also refers to Heidegger's 1929-1930 Freiburg lectures in which he had announced that the animal is "poor in world."<sup>413</sup> This would imply that the animal would have some "world" and therefore some spirit. Derrida takes "without world" and "poor in world" to mean essentially the same thing. The animal would have a "world" in a limited sense, but not in the full sense of *Dasein*, because it does not have access to others "as such" and in their Being.<sup>414</sup>

If Heidegger draws an absolute limit between *Dasein* and animality in order to avoid anthropocentrism and humanist teleology, Derrida thinks that these values cannot be avoided in Heidegger's discourse. The notion of "privation" implied within both claims about the animal's relation with others and "world" reintroduces a teleological structure.<sup>415</sup> By this Derrida is not imputing an evolutionary conception of progress from the animal world to the world of *Dasein*. Derrida claims, however:

... the words "poverty" and "privation" imply hierarchization and evaluation. The expression "poor in world" or "without world," just like the phenomenology supporting it, encloses

an axiology regulated not only upon an ontology but the possibility of the *onto-logical* as such, upon the ontological difference, the access to the Being of the entity ...<sup>416</sup>

We have already seen Derrida's refutation of this conceptual structure above. In previous sections, Derrida's criticisms of teleological structures were discussed. For example, change rather than progress is a more legitimate conception. Also, the *telos* tends not to be accomplished. Without the realization of the "as such," of death and others, the hierarchical value and distinction from "animality" is not clear for *Dasein*. This limit would be opened. It is, therefore, unclear how to define *Dasein* and its world. Furthermore, Heidegger has not clearly defined either animality or its spiritual world.<sup>417</sup> What is animality "as such" and in its Being? In addition, Heidegger violently gathers all species of "animals" except humans into one concept, as if all species and individuals were the same.<sup>418</sup> Heidegger has not been responsible to the Being of animals. His discourse has "named" animals irresponsibly.

Without the world and spirit, Heidegger claims that animals would also lack the capacity for questioning. Underlying the metaphysical determinations of the human subject as soul, consciousness, ego, person or spirit, the *question* is that power of *Dasein* which separates *Dasein* from the animal kingdom. Only *Dasein* is opened to the question of Being.<sup>419</sup> Of course, it is question of the Being of *Dasein*. Only *Dasein* has care for its

*Being*.<sup>420</sup> The stone would have absolute indifference about its Being. But, again, there is no place for the animal in Heidegger's conceptuality. The animal would have no access to the other "as such" and no ability to unveil the Being of the other because it does not question Being. It cannot take responsibility for its own Being and in its own name without a question posed in speech. Derrida sarcastically responds:

There is no animal *Dasein*, inasmuch as *Dasein* is characterized by access to the "as such" of beings and the correlative possibility of questioning. It is clear that the animal can be in search of prey, can calculate, hesitate, track or follow a scent; but it would not properly know how to question. In the same way, it can use things, instrumentalize them, but it would not know how to gain access to *techne*.<sup>421</sup>

Derrida has already put the "as such" into question. He is also clearly questioning Heidegger's delimitation of the possibility of the question. What we call animals seem to manifest the capabilities for the possibility of a question and the technical.<sup>3422</sup> Consequently, according to Derrida, animals manifest the ability to think!

Derrida is concerned with the very possibility of a spoken question. Taking his cue from Paul de Man, Derrida claims:

... the promise which, opening every speaking, makes possible the very question and therefore precedes it without belonging to it: the dissymmetry of an affirmation, of a yes before all opposition of yes and no. The call of Being—every question already responds to it, the promise has already taken place

wherever language comes.<sup>423</sup>

Language, in general, and the question of Being, more specifically, which is posed only in certain human languages, according to Heidegger, both assume an unconditional affirmation and promise of affirmation. If one examines the possibility of Heidegger's question, it assumes the element of language.

Language, or marking, is already addressing us. According to Derrida, this being-there of the mark is:

a sort of promise of originary alliance to which we must have ... already said yes, given a pledge [gage] ...<sup>424</sup>

The possibility of using a common language in which to pose questions of Being, or to communicate with one another, is that we have already affirmed each other, that we have already affirmed the significance of the marks, and that we pledge to do so into the future as we remember this past promise.

The affirmation, which is translated into language as "yes," is prior to and beyond language in general, the German language and the German shepherd language.<sup>425</sup> Derrida refers to it as a "pre-originary pledge ... which precedes any other engagement in language or action."<sup>426</sup> However, it is not foreign to language and action. Any action pledges an originary affirmation. Every speech act or mark, such as the question, includes the affirmative promise. For Derrida, this would include, at least, the marks and actions of what we call animals. He asks:

But if one links the concept of the animal, as they all do from Descartes to Heidegger, from Kant to Levinas and Lacan, to the double im-possibility, the double incapacity of question and response, is it because the "moment," the instance and possibility of the *Zusage* belong to an "experience" of language about which one could say that, even if it is not in itself "animal," is not lacking in the "animal"? That would be enough to destabilize a whole tradition, do deprive it of its fundamental argument.<sup>427</sup>

Derrida clearly states in the form of a question that this performative power of the affirmative pledge extends beyond humanity into animality. Animals, therefore, are thought by Derrida to interact according to this essential and constitutive affirmative promise with the other.

So the *question* of Being would already be an affirmative pledge or promise as a response to the call of Being.<sup>428</sup> *Dasein* is responsible for its Being. *Dasein's* question and care for its Being is a promise to itself, and a resolution to its own most possibility of Being, as Being-toward-death. That is, Being-toward-death is *Dasein's* promise as self-affirmation. But the resolution articulated by *Dasein* would be rooted in the "pre-originary pledge" of affirmation.

Derrida wants to explain the conditions of Heidegger's discourse on *Dasein's* call of Being and Being-toward-death in terms of the promise. The promissory structure is named the double affirmation. As Levinas required grounding in Husserlian and Heideggerian insights, and as Husserl required the trace in order to account for his most radical thoughts, so, too,

Heidegger's thought of Being must think itself through to the structure of originary promise and affirmation. Derrida writes:

The discourse on Being presupposes the responsibility of the yes, ... I will situate the possibility of the yes and of yes-laughter in the place where transcendental egology, the onto-encyclopedia, the great speculative logic, fundamental ontology and the thought of Being open unto a thought of the gift and sending ... which they presuppose but cannot contain  
...<sup>429</sup>

Heidegger's *Dasein*, Husserl's ego, Rousseau's articulate subject, Hegel's absolute subjectivity and Kant's transcendental subjectivity presuppose the essential responsibility of the originary affirmation. The Being of the other *Dasein* and the Being of my own most possibility depend upon the yes structure, which introduces an "originary" responsibility for one's "pledge" of affirmation.

What Derrida names the double affirmation of the "yes, yes" is based in originary sociality's structural movement of ex-appropriation. According to these movements, a human "subject" or animal "subject" is always calling, responding, affirming and promising with others.<sup>430</sup> This occurs beyond the self-conscious intentionality, beyond intentional or unintentional actions, and beyond conscious experience in general. That is, at a nonphenomenal level, we are engaging one another, affirming one another, in alliance with one another. In addition, this nonpresent pledge of alliance is also functioning within and assumed by our conscious experience and intentional relations

with others.<sup>431</sup> One already pledges in response to the affirming pledge of the other. One's affirmative response is already "... engaged by it [the pledge of the other] in a responsibility it has not chosen and which assigns it even its liberty":<sup>432</sup>

... the experience of an "affirmation," of a "yes" or of the "en-gage" ... that "yes, yes" that answers before even being able to formulate a question, that is responsible without autonomy, before and in view of all possible autonomy of the who-subject, etc. The relation to self, in this situation, can only be difference, that to say alterity, or trace. Not only is obligation not lessened in this situation, on the contrary, it finds its only possibility, which is neither subjective nor human. Which doesn't mean that it is inhuman or without subject, but that it is out of this dislocated *affirmation* ... that something like the subject, man, or whoever might take shape.<sup>433</sup>

That is, it is the very existential condition of beings on this Earth, including, at least, animals, that we perform a *priori* pledges of promise and responses of affirmation to every other. We are, therefore, a *priori* responsible for our pledges and responses.<sup>434</sup> And as Geoffrey Bennington explains:

The trace shows that no *autos* is possible without an inscription of alterity, no inside without a relation to an outside which cannot be simply outside but must remark itself on the inside. [It] ... implies that autonomy is impossible.<sup>435</sup>

These pledges and responses of affirmation are only possible because the trace conditions this very structure of affirmation, which we have already discussed as mourning, originary sociality and ex-appropriation. As the spacing or opening with the other, the trace is the condition of responsibility to the other, including other animals, and other others, with whom we interact

in the play of double affirmation. And as Bennington so succinctly writes:

... responsibility is therefore situated at the limit where the same and the other touch in the very interruption.<sup>436</sup>

Derrida's account of the trace, therefore, is the condition of possibility for any thought and discourse on responsibility. It is the condition of possibility for a thought and discourse on human responsibility to and for other animals.

More radically, the thought of the trace and the double affirmation are also the condition of the responsibility of the animal, such as, Derrida's cat for itself in relation to the other. Contrary to Heidegger's view, the cat would respond in its own name to Derrida's call. Derrida writes:

If I say "it is a real cat" that sees me naked, it is in order to mark its unsubstitutable singularity. When it responds in its name, ... it doesn't do so as the exemplar of a species called cat, even less so of an animal genus or realm ... I see it as *this* irreplaceable living being that one day enters my space, sees me, ... Nothing can ever take away from me the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized.<sup>437</sup>

According to Derrida, his little cat does respond in its own name in relation to Derrida. The little cat responds to Derrida as a unique being. And Derrida thinks of the little cat as exceptional, in accordance with the idea of justice as the affirmation of the singularity of the other.<sup>438</sup>

What Derrida has identified as the circle of self-sending, or re-appropriation, in Heidegger's discourse on *Dasein* and

Being is opened in the double affirmation. When *Dasein* attempts to head the call of Being and appropriate itself in its singularity and properness, it is also expropriating itself as it affirms the other. Self-sending, as Derrida puts it, is also a sending of the other. "I" is dislocated in the relation with the other. When I say "I" it is an affirmation of the other in its singularity, as well. The nonpresence of the intuition of self in the Husserlian context would be that spacing with the other which is the very basis of Derrida's claims for ex-appropriation, originary sociality, semi-mourning and the double affirmation.

Derrida goes even further and claims that the "I" is based in the double affirmation of ex-appropriation:

Before the *Ich* in *Ich bin* affirms or negates, it poses itself or pre-poses itself: not as *ego*, as the conscious or unconscious self ... but as a pre-performative force which, for example, in the form of the "I" [je] marks that "I" as addressing itself to the other, however undetermined he or she is: "Yes-I," or "Yes-I-say-to-the-other," even if *I* says *no* and even if *I* addresses itself without speaking.<sup>439</sup>

The "pre-performative force" of the subjective "I" would be its affirmative response to the other, which is ultimately based in the spacing of the trace.

We have seen that "I" is a sign based in the nonpresence of the intuition of the self. It also includes the nonpresence of the *alter ego*. The "I" is, therefore, undecidable. Because of the movement of double affirmation in the spacing of ex-

appropriation, there is no clear and distinct limit to what one would call an individual subject or "I."

The undecidability of the "I" implies that it is not clear "who" sends what to "whom." Derrida writes:

The yes comes—from me to me, from me to the other in me, from the other to me.<sup>440</sup>

In gathering myself, I send myself to myself through the other, and send myself the other. It is not clear who sends what to whom. It is not clear who initiated the play of call and response. It is not clear from where the responsibility had originated. But because the others have always already been in relation with me, with their pledges and responses of affirmation, and my pledges and responses of affirmation, responsibility has always already been there, prior to one's intentional choice to embrace it or to refuse it. Furthermore, the movement and structure of responsibility's force would be instituted prior to and beyond Being.

Derrida has assumed the relation with the other in this process because of the spacing of the trace. Heidegger, on the other hand, does not have such a view. The "Being-with" of *Dasein* and other *Daseins* does not entail such an intimate relationship. Derrida interprets Heidegger in the following passage:

Heidegger ... speaks of the originary and essential responsibility of the *Dasein*. Within the hearing of this call (*Ruf*) on the basis of which it is experienced as originally responsible, guilty (*schuldig*), or indebted before any fault

in particular and before any determined debt, the *Dasein* is in the first place not responsible to any determined being who looks at it or speaks to it ... [T]he silent voice that calls the *Dasein* is immune from all possible identification. It is absolutely indeterminate, even if "the peculiar indefiniteness of the caller and the impossibility of making more definite what this caller is, are not just nothing (*"Die eigentümliche Unbestimmtheit und Unbestimmbarkeit des Rufers ist nicht nichts"*) (\$57, 275 [319]).<sup>441</sup>

The essential difference between Derrida's thought and Heidegger's thought centers around their respective interpretations of this indeterminate call and the resulting conception of responsibility. Heidegger has decided that this indeterminate call and caller are ultimately contained within oneself, as *Dasein* is called to become itself. *Dasein* is ultimately and fundamentally responsible to its own Being. As Gasché points out:

At stake, indeed, is a displacement of thought's duty and responsibility toward Being, as well as the limitation of its essence to thinking Being. Indeed, for Heidegger, the essence of responsibility is suspended from thinking's call by the One ... the essence of Being. Responsibility thus becomes defined by thinking's adequate corresponding to Being. The analyses performed in *Ulysses Gramophone* serve, however, to cut the essentializing link between response and Being, and to prepare for an "increase in responsibility," one that no longer engages thinking as the thinking of Being alone.<sup>442</sup>

Derrida argues that the inter-subjective and intra-subjective movements of affirmations are movements of calls, responses, and requests, all of which are affirmations of the other. Any call, response, or action is a yes to the other and a yes as a request for a yes from the other toward me. Any word,

mark, action or movement is a yes to the other. This affirmation is always already response to the other's call for a yes, a call for an affirmation from the other, and a request that the other both affirms my yes and remembers to affirms its yes to my yes. And so, according to Derrida, any affirmation is always already haunted by another affirmation in a structure of undecidability, supplementarity and ex-appropriation.

The double affirmation is analysed into two types of forces, which function according to the supplementary logic, the active and reactive forces. The active force is that of affirmation, re-affirmation, the promise and the oath of eternal affirmation. The active force is gift without debt. The reactive force is that of gathering, appropriation, mastery, mourning and memory. It is the memory of the promise, a commitment of indebtedness into the future.

The supplementary forces of the yes and its *a priori* double affirmation are the conditions of two ordinary responsibilities. The active force of the gift is the basis of justice and responsibility to the singularity of the other—other human, other dog, or other as event of Being. Any affirmation, according to Derrida, is a promise of a repetition of the affirmation. This implies a sense of responsibility as a debt and memory into the future.<sup>443</sup>

According to Derrida, these forces organize the structures

of *Dasein's* return to self in its responsibility to the call of Being. However, the histories of the concepts of subjectivity and *Dasein* have emphasized what Derrida calls the reactive force, while understating the active force of the gift. Not only re-appropriation, but also a "capitalization" of surplus value has been the very definition of the subject *as such*.<sup>444</sup> Derrida is not disputing this force of subjectivity. However, the condition of the gift in general is the trace and spacing that is discussed above:

But throughout and despite this circulation and this production of surplus-value, despite this labour of the subject, there where there is trace and dissemination, if only there is any, a gift can take place, along with the excessive forgetting or the forgetful excess that ... is radically implicated in the gift. Now the gift, *if there is any*, would no doubt be related to economy ... But is not the gift ... also that which interrupts economy? ... That which opens the circle so as to turn aside the return in view of the no-return? ... If the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain aneconomic.<sup>445</sup>

The gift interrupts the encircling reappropriation of self-sending. The self has never left a simple point of origin and will never arrive. There is no present point to which to return. Interrupting this economy of the self also permits the "breach necessary for the coming of the other ..."<sup>446</sup> The gift to the other is the affirmation of the singularity or uniqueness of the other beyond general categories and beyond the expectation of a reciprocal exchange. There can be no reciprocity when responsibility to the infinite idea of justice would demand a

response to the other other's uniqueness. The gifts of affirmation with the other must interrupt the economies of law and ethics, both of which assume a basic symmetry between egos. Economics, in this sense, is working according to general and universal terms. The meaning of the ego is basically universal and their rights, duties and demands would be basically the same. Derrida's notions of justice and responsibility move beyond law and ethics toward the singularity of the other in its difference from all other egos. In this type of relation with the other, one cannot expect to capitalize on one's actions. One's spacing with the other is simply a *gift* of affirmation to the other, beyond experience and beyond the temporal present.

This gift would be unconditional. As the opening of all contexts, the gift would function beyond all contexts, including "animal" contexts:

Of course, this unconditionality must be absolute and uncircumscribed. It must not be simply declared while in fact dependent in its turn on the condition of some context ... be it general or specific (among human beings, for example, to the exclusion of, for example, "animals").<sup>447</sup>

Derrida makes it clear that this question of the gift as the basis of a just and responsible relation with the other is universal in its unconditionality. As Derrida states, the gift "... will always be *without border*."<sup>448</sup> This obviously includes the gift without what Derrida has named anthropological borders, demarcations, etc. The gift of affirmation, therefore, opens

"natural" contexts, as well as applying within them. The double affirmation of the yes, yes, and its play of call and response, is a universal movement which applies within what we call animal societies, within ecosystems, between humans and dogs, etc.

Derrida is very critical of Heidegger for not recognizing the gift within the relations amongst apes.<sup>449</sup> According to Heidegger, apes have organs that can grasp, but not give.<sup>450</sup> Derrida cites an extensive passage from Heidegger and attempts to succinctly state the essence of the argument. It assumes, according to Derrida, an "assured opposition" between giving and taking. Man can give, in the form of thoughtful speech, for example. The ape can only take, take hold of and grasp with its organ. "The organ has no access to the essence of the being [etant] *as such* ..." <sup>451</sup> The argument boils down to two types of giving and two types of taking. The animal would not be able to do either *as such*, according to Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger.<sup>452</sup> The problem is that Heidegger has not provided any evidence or reasons to defend his claim:

Dogmatic in its form, this traditional statement presupposes an empiric or positive knowledge whose titles, proofs, and signs are never shown ... Like most of those who, as philosophers or persons of good sense, speak of animality, Heidegger takes no account of a certain "zoological knowledge" that accumulates, is differentiated, and becomes more refined concerning what is brought together under this so general and confused word animality. He does not criticize it and does not even examine the sorts of presuppositions, metaphysical or otherwise, it can harbor ... In its very content, this proposition marks the text's essential scene,

marks it with a humanism that wanted certainly to be nonmetaphysical ... but with a humanism that, between a human *Geschlecht* one wants to withdraw from the biologicistic determination ... and an animality one encloses in its organico-biologic programs, inscribes not *some* differences but an absolute oppositional limit. Elsewhere I have tried to show that, as every opposition does, this absolute oppositional limit effaces the differences and leads back, following the most resistant metaphysico-dialectic tradition, to the homogeneous. What Heidegger says of the ape without hand ... without thinking, language, gift,--is not only dogmatic in its form because Heidegger knows nothing about this and wants to know nothing, has no doubt studied neither the zoologists (even were it to criticize them) nor the apes in the Black Forest.<sup>453</sup>

Derrida points out that the concept of "nature" within the philosophical tradition of the West has an essential relation with what he names the gift. Derrida very broadly characterizes this relation of nature and the gift. Firstly, nature would be *phusis*, the generous giver of all things, and that to which all things return, including nature's others--art, law, freedom, society. Secondly, nature was the given, or natural necessity in opposition to art, law, etc. In both cases, nature or the natural is present, as are the gifts that are given.

Secondly, nature would have been the "originary authenticity."<sup>454</sup> The thought of the gift must move beyond that type of determination of a morally and ontologically pure source. Rousseau offers an example of this form of thought of generous nature. However, Rousseau's discourse was a move in Derrida's direction since the "state of nature" was and never will be

present to humanity.

And yet, Derrida wants to honour the idea of "donating nature" because of its association with the movements of "originary productivity" which can only be the spacing of the trace:

But is not the *phuein* of *phusis* ... the originary productivity that engenders, causes to grow or increase, brings to light and flowering? Is it not what gives form and ... unveils or develops the truth of *that which* it gives?<sup>455</sup>

Beyond the concept of nature as present or originary authenticity, that is, beyond any present point of origin, or even a nonpresent point of origin, the spacing of the trace is the affirmative opening to, with and of the other. It is also the spacing that allows for the other's growth, including the articulation of its form and "truth." This gift of affirmation as a space for the blossoming of all beings is a movement beyond presence. It is, according to Derrida, a movement beyond Being.

Derrida argues that Heidegger thinks Being and *Ereignis* (event, appropriation, dis-appropriation, as Derrida interprets it) as conditioning each other. In fact, Heidegger would think Being as *Ereignis*. Derrida argues, therefore, that the question of the truth of Being is not capable of addressing the question of the proper, that is, appropriation, in the form of appropriation and expropriation, including becoming what one is in Being-toward-death. Because the question of Being is already inscribed in the

question of appropriation, as ex-appropriation and the giving of the gift of Being, it cannot think the question of ex-appropriation and gift. The fact that the question of Being assumes ex-appropriation and the gift precludes the possibility that the question of the truth of Being can think them.<sup>456</sup> The question *what is ... ?*, in the sense of what is something as such, in its properness, is inscribed in the process of appropriation. The very language, ontological statements and question are already engaged in the movements of gift, promise and ex-appropriation, and, therefore, cannot account for them. The consequence is what Derrida calls a dehiscence and disorientation within Heidegger's discourse.<sup>457</sup> The problem is that Heidegger has inscribed the truth of the meaning of Being, the proper, within the process of what Derrida calls appropriation. According to Derrida, this "... surely leads to this proper-ty's (*propre*) abyssal structure ... It passes into the other."<sup>458</sup> With the abyssal structure of the *proper* in ex-appropriation, opposition in general, which Derrida regards as a metaphysical notion, must be rethought within the graphic of supplementarity.

Consequently, the question of production and event as *Ereignis*, unveiling the truth of Being, are disengaged from ontology. The result is that the process of the appropriation of the proper is proper, in the absolute sense, to nothing and no *Dasein*. Derrida writes:

Truth, unveiling, illumination are no longer decided in the appropriation of the truth of Being, but are cast into its bottomless abyss as non-truth, veiling, and dissimulation. The history of Being becomes a history in which no being, nothing happens except *Ereignis*' unfathomable process.<sup>459</sup>

Finally, Derrida points out that Heidegger himself submits the question of Being to the movement of the gift:

In his development ... of the *es gibt Sein* Heidegger demonstrates that the giving (*Geben*) and the *gift* (*Gabe*), which in fact amount to nothing (to neither a subject being nor an object being), cannot be thought of in terms of Being. Because they constitute the process of appropriation, the *giving* and the *gift* can be construed neither in the boundaries of Being's horizon nor from the vantage point of its truth, its meaning.<sup>460</sup>

One cannot think the essence of Being's giving or gift. Being as *Ereignis* can only be thought on the "basis of the gift ..."<sup>461</sup>

There is no possibility of the attainment of an authentic, properness of Being. Being assumes the gift, the affirmative pledge, promise and responsible response, which have their possibility in the trace. These very forces interrupt the "gathering" of Being into its properness.

In Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger, the concepts of gathering, the proper, Being, temporality, accord and justice are all linked with one another. Derrida claims that Heidegger's notion of *dike*:

Is thought on the basis of Being as presence ... "[J]ustice" is first of all, and finally, and especially *properly*, the jointure of the accord: the proper jointure to the other ... Injustice would be the disjointure or disjoining ...<sup>462</sup>

The gift of justice would be an offering that lets the other be,

which affirms what is *proper* to the other.<sup>463</sup> And what is let be as proper is the accord with itself of the other, its presence, lingering in the present time, as a "jointure" between two absences.<sup>464</sup> The gift of justice would let the other *Dasein* be in its anticipatory resoluteness in Being-toward-death as its ownmost possibility. As such, it would reveal the totality of the *Dasein's* Being as temporality in the three ekstases of time.

Derrida defines ethics as the discourse of learning to live in accordance with justice.<sup>465</sup> One of the conditions of justice is to come to terms with death. In this context, Heidegger's thought of Being-to-death has not come to terms with death, according to Derrida. Consequently, Heidegger has not thought justice and its conditions. The deconstruction of Being-to-death has exposed the aporia of *Dasein's* Being. For Heidegger, death would have been the final possibility of *Dasein's* existence, thereby providing its limit. With clear limits, authentic *Dasein* would understand its Being as a totality of three temporal ekstases, past, present and future. However, the deconstruction of *Being and Time's* Being-to-death has exposed the aporia which de-limits the totality of *Dasein*. *Dasein's* Being would not be closed to others. Rather, alterity would have always already interrupted the proper, authentic Being of every *Dasein*. This is a move away from justice as accord to Derrida's view of justice as discord. Neither one's relation to self nor one's relation with another

can be completely interpreted according to the Heideggerian thought of the gift of justice as letting be the reappropriation of what is proper. One's Being and one's relation to the other's Being is disjointed by the aporia of nonpresence.

Furthermore, Derrida argues that "time is out of joint."<sup>466</sup> The spacing of the trace is that which conditions Heidegger's thought of temporality and that which interrupts its possibility of gathering into a totality of self-presence. However, the de-totalization of Heidegger's temporal horizon is not a nihilistic move. On the contrary, disjunction, according to Derrida, is the very condition of the relation with others. It is also the very condition of possibility of justice and responsibility.<sup>467</sup> Derrida agrees with Heidegger that justice is beyond law, calculation, symmetry, distribution, morality and vengeance. However, it is also beyond the gathering of justice into harmony. Rather, "justice as incalculability of the gift and singularity of the an-eco-nomic ex-position to others ..." depends upon the disjointure of Being, time, space and experience, that is, presence.<sup>468</sup> Justice, as the relation to the other, implies:

non-gathering, dissociation, heterogeneity, non-identity with itself, endless inadequation, infinite transcendence.<sup>469</sup>

We have seen above in the sections on Rousseau that compassion, justice and ethics depend upon an identification with and difference from the other. This difference permits ethical

relation. Similarly, *Dasein* must not be one with itself and must not be completely gathered (*Versammlung*) with others, if others are to live in their singularity, difference, or uniqueness.

Keeping in mind the Husserlian insight:

The structure of my relation to the other is of a "relation without relation." It is a relation in which the other remains absolutely transcendent. I cannot reach the other. I cannot know the other from the inside ... So, dissociation is the condition of community, the condition of any unity as such.<sup>470</sup>

Of course, this absolute transcendence is that of the other's living present. The trace of the other, which keeps the secret of the other from "my" experience, is also that which expropriates me and gathers "us" simultaneously, therefore, without absolutely gathering or disseminating. The gift of justice in the call and response of double affirmation and the possibility of responsibility occur in this disjunction that unfurls the gathering of time and space as the lived experience of the present.

Again, the issue of the connection between mourning and justice in Derrida's thought is very relevant. Beyond the experience of the outer being of the other, all that one has of the uniqueness of the lived experience of the other is the trace. One must do justice to this trace of the other. In a certain sense, the other is dead, as nonpresent, and one must, therefore, mourn the other's trace. Similarly, one must mourn the trace of

the no longer living and those who are not yet living.

This trace disjoins one's self-presence. It also disjoins the gathering of beings, even as the spacing opens our being to one another. This is in contrast to the strictly exterior relations of Being-in-the-world. As opened to the other, Derrida has reinterpreted the obligations of *Dasein*. For Heidegger, *Dasein* would be, first of all, responsible to itself. But, as its Being is essentially opened by the alterity of the other, *Dasein's* responsibility is originarily focused on the other, whose trace I mourn.

And since *Dasein* would not be able to attain its ownmost possibility, it would not, then, attain its singularity and authentic identity in contradistinction from the "they" of everydayness. For Derrida, in contrast, it is the other with whom one acquires something like an identity, a singularity and a task for which one must be resolute. One is differentiated, singularized, and identified by one's response and responsibility to the call of the other, not by Being-to-death. One is responsible for the pledges of affirmation and response. My task is defined according to the responsibility and justice demanded by the other.

Responsibility is infinite because the gift of justice must affirm the other beyond the present. Derrida discusses a "politics of memory" which would attempt to be just and

responsible to the calls of the others from the past—another form of mourning. And justice and responsibility must address the calls of the others into the future. Moreover, Derrida argues that we must think and act responsibly and justly to those who do not yet exist.<sup>471</sup>

For Heidegger, the future, according to which one would live in the present, is anticipatable as one's ultimate possibility. In contrast, Derrida attempts to think the future as unanticipatable, in order to let the other come in its singularity, as "absolute arrivant," instead of in a predetermined fashion, which would reduce the uniqueness and surprise of the event of the other as a disjoining rupture in the history of Being.<sup>472</sup>

Due to Derrida's interpretation of the idea of justice as a gift of unconditional affirmation to the other, responsibility to the other must be thought as excessive or infinite. That is, one is responsible to the singularity of the other. This singularity, on the one hand, is the trace of the other, that nonpresence to me of the lived experience of the other. In this sense, the other is infinitely distant from me, inaccessible, infinitely other. Justice demands that one take up the responsibility to affirm the very uniqueness and difference of the lived experience of the other. In this sense, justice is incalculable because one's thought of the other reaches its limit at the abyssal aporia of

the inaccessibility of the other.

On the other hand, the singularity of the trace implies the unique movements of its spacing and gift. The nonphenomenal movements of the double affirmation are unique at each moment. At both levels, the singularity of the trace is beyond the meaning of Being. For Derrida, the thought of Being thinks the other as other in its presence. The thought of the trace is the attempt to think the nonpresence of the other.

Responsibility would be infinite because of the above: first, one must think the other along Heideggerian lines in terms of her Being as possibility, into the future, as present and past. However, the future possibilities of the Being of the other are indefinite, unanticipatable, and incalculable, in an absolute sense. Secondly, justice demands that one is responsible to the singularity and absolute uniqueness of the other, as nonpresence, trace, including as the inaccessible lived experience. One is also responsible for the spacing of the trace, for its gifts, pledges, and responses to the other. Finally, responsibility is infinite because the trace of the other is beyond concept, calculation, and complete determination. The other is infinitely other in its undecidability.

Responsibility to the other is also infinite, excessive, and irreducible because of the futural aspects of the other and of responsibility. Derrida has deconstructed Heidegger's Being-to-

death, thereby circumventing Heidegger's conception of the future of *Dasein* in the anticipatory resolution of its final possibility. Justice to the singularity of the other is a responsibility that promises justice beyond the present now of oneself and the other, at the nonphenomenal level and within the living present. One promises the affirmation of the event of the other, as unique, different, singular, unanticipatable, and beyond the meaning of Being.

The play of call and response is a play of forces without clear determination, without definable substance, and without clear origin and end. Double affirmation is open and indeterminate. Infinite responsibility is required to do justice to the call, response and trace of the other, at this moment, beyond the present now, and toward a future which will not have been present. This is a promise of justice and responsibility into the future, and beyond the future present, beyond calculation, expectation, programming, and representation.

If the other assigns one's identity, then one's identity is assigned by the world. "I" is constituted by the world. The meaning of one's "self" is constituted by the world, as the relations of all others. Beyond Heidegger's Being-in-the-world, Derrida thinks the relation to the other as the spacing of the trace, ex-appropriation, originary sociality, double affirmation, gift and mourning. Thus, one is related to the other in a more

profound sense than Being-in-the-world, although Heidegger's view is not rejected, only reinterpreted on the basis of the trace. In this sense, others already constitute one's Being. In sum, then, the "world" and the Earth assign one's identity, meaning, and responsibility. One must conclude that one's identity and responsibility are essentially bound to the "world" and Earth. This relation of identity can only be thought according to the logic of supplementarity, which takes account of the undecidability and aporetic structures involved in the relations with others.

A new concept of "world" must be thought. Heidegger's notion of "world" is dependent upon a relation to another "as such" and in its Being. However, the other is irreducibly inaccessible in a profound sense. The trace of the other in one's lived experience and the spacing of the trace in the present now interrupt being. A new sense of "world" and "spirit" must be thought which include the phenomenological fact that the other is inaccessible, even for humans or *Daseins*. This new "world" would then be more inclusive since humans would not have the special privilege of having a world, or a more spiritual world than animals. The sense of world and spirit would then be extended far beyond humanity.

With this new sense of "world," a new conception of "we" can be invented. It is clear from Derrida's thought that this "we" would be inclusive to all beings of the Earth. One's identity

with this "we" of the "world," as Earth, arises with one's resolution to act on one's assignments of infinite responsibility from the "world."

This new sense of "world" is linked with a new sense of friendship. Derrida thinks that Heidegger has remained Aristotelian in so far as he has claimed that only *Dasein* has friends or friendship in a proper sense:

The animal has no friend, man has no friendship properly so called for the animal. The animal that is "world poor," that has neither language nor experience nor death, etc., the animal that has no hand, the animal that has no friend, has no ear either, the ear capable of hearing and of carrying the friend that is also the ear that opens *Dasein* to its own potentiality-for-being ...<sup>473</sup>

Without the voice of Being, and the possibility of the phenomenological "as such," the possibility of the friend and friendship is impossible for the animal. But Derrida has shown the limits of Heidegger's discourse of Being. The implications are that Heidegger cannot draw a clear limit between a proper sense of friendship, which would apply only to *Dasein*, and inauthentic forms of friendship and those relations between animals that would not be regarded as friendship at all. No absolute or proper sense of friendship is attainable due to the trace. And due to the universality of the trace and its gift of affirmation, the condition of possibility of friendship is universal. For Derrida, friendship and world and politics extend far beyond humanity. Derrida's new sense of world would bring

with it a call for a politics of friendship. The accord of the Heideggerian world is based in the discord or disjunction of the universality of the trace and affirmation of its gift, which is the very basis of this new politics and ethics.

## Chapter VI

The purpose of this chapter is to put into question the ethical significance of Kant's moral law and duty. This is done primarily by contrasting Kant's system with Derrida's thought of a responsible ethico-political decision. A responsible decision is concerned with the giving of justice to the singularity of the other. Questions are raised about the moral law that jeopardize the Kantian view. Derrida also shows the limits of the moral law and Kant's thought in general as they apply to animals. Derrida is critical of Kant for his "violent" conceptions of animals, conceptions that have promoted the real mistreatment of animals.

According to Derrida, Immanuel Kant's conception of subjectivity cannot account for the possibility of a responsible decision. The conception of subjectivity has not been thought in such a way that the subject can be regarded as essentially responsible, and thereby responsible for its choices.<sup>474</sup> Derrida writes:

Undoubtedly the subjectivity of a subject, already, never decides anything; its identity in itself and its calculable phenomena make every decision an accident which leaves the subject unchanged and indifferent.<sup>475</sup>

Derrida's point is that Kant's subjectivity would remain unaffected in its autonomy of will and freedom. And yet, the

subject would be regarded as the initiator of the act of decision.

Based on the discussions of the previous chapters, it would be clear that Derrida has an alternative conception of the affect of a decision on a subject. The "event" of a decision, as Derrida calls it, would "surprise" both the freedom and will of Kant's subjectivity. Simply stated, one's decision would be an event that alters one's being.<sup>476</sup> For Derrida, of course, the trace opens one's limits to the other. The spacing of the trace in ex-appropriation involves some passivity.

Therefore, in order to supplement the thought of the act of choice or choice of action, Derrida explains the necessity of thinking a responsible subject as being, in part, fundamentally passive in relation to its decision. This "passive decision" would still be regarded as responsible, and, in fact, as the condition of responding responsibly to the other.

For Derrida, it is the *other in me who must decide*. This decision of the other "rends" me, alters me in its event. That is, the call of the other and the performance of the decision affect me in such a manner that is more than accidental. For Derrida, a just and responsible decision must aim at the uniqueness of the other. A decision must, therefore, be singular. In order for one to invent the event of such a decision, one, too, must be or act in a unique fashion:

Absolutely singular in principle ... the decision is not only always exceptional, it makes an exception for/of me. In me. I ... the other than myself, the me as and other than myself, he makes or I make an exception of the same ...<sup>477</sup>

We have seen above that Derrida's discourse attempts to think the other as a constitutive basis of my identity, as the source of my task, as the heteronomic opening of my will and as that which exceeds my freedom. This passive decision is another reflection of the movement of the trace and its double affirmation, in which one's being is determined by the other in an "essential" way. The other's call for justice to its singularity demands that I respond responsibly, that is, exceptionally, rather than universally.

Derrida claims that this description of the structure of the passive decision does not circumvent one's responsibility. On the contrary, it is an account of the possibility of a more than accidental responsibility of a subject for another being. Due to the trace, ex-appropriation, gift, etc., one is "originarily" responsible for the other:

I am first of all and also responsible for the other before the other. This heteronomy ... does not contradict, it opens autonomy on to itself ... It matches the decision to the gift ... as the other's gift.<sup>478</sup>

It is the opening of the other that opens the possibility of responsibility for the other. One could not have any possibility of a just and responsible decision if there were no constitutive relation with the other, who commands me absolutely, and calls

for a responsible response. One must think autonomy and freedom on the basis of the relation with the other.<sup>479</sup>

This decision is based in the gift.<sup>480</sup> This means at least two things. First, the decision is based in the forces of affirmation. Secondly, since the gift is not present and nonphenomenal, Derrida is claiming the responsible decision has an "unconscious" element to it. We have seen that Derrida has appropriated the Husserlian and Heideggerian insights into the conditions of ethics and responsibility, including the necessity of knowledge, meaning, and Being as presence. In order to assume one's responsibility, one must know the other, the context, etc. At the same time, however, one must open a space between oneself and knowledge and the anticipated possibilities of Being. A decision:

can only exceed (and *must* do it) the order of theoretical determination, of knowledge, of certitude, of judgement ... more generally and more essentially the order of the present or of presentation. Each time that one reduces them to that which they must exceed, one gives to error, to the unthought, to irresponsibility, the figure so presentable of good conscience ...<sup>481</sup>

If one's decision is simply and only based on knowledge, then the decision has been authorized by the discourse of knowledge, meaning and law. One has abdicated one's responsibility. One's decision would not even be accidental to one's subjectivity. It would simply be the sum or conclusion of a preprogrammed calculation. Furthermore, if I "actively" know that "I" am making

the decision, then I am claiming that "I know" what to do, which cancels the responsibility of the decision.<sup>482</sup>

Derrida claims that a decision requires the passage through the aporia in order to be responsible. One aspect of the aporia is named "the urgency that obstructs the horizon of knowledge." The horizon of knowledge, as Derrida calls it, implies a period of waiting for a future achievement, such as in the case of the Kantian regulative idea. It is a horizon of expectation.<sup>483</sup> According to Derrida's idea of justice, however, justice is required here and now.<sup>484</sup> He writes:

... justice, however, unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait. It is that which must not wait ... [A] ... just decision is always required immediately, "right away." (Ibid)

In order to be responsible, one must make a decision with and for the other immediately. One cannot spend an infinite or indefinite amount of time studying theories of ethics, morality and law. One cannot wait and hope to promote a historical progression. In an instant of madness, one must cut off all knowledge and invent the most just decision. The realm of the possible is interrupted. One must live through the experience of the aporia, the "night of nonknowledge" and the inaccessibility of the other. One invents a decision beyond the horizon of anticipated possibilities, with "sensitivity to a sort of essential disproportion that must inscribe excess and inadequation."<sup>485</sup> That is, one's decision can only ever be incapable of capturing the inaccessibility of the

lived experience and singularity of the other. But one must respond to the other with urgency.

The invention of the decision must happen in another facet of the aporia named the *epokhé of the rule*. Derrida argues that there is a traditional acceptance of the thought of a just, responsible and free decision as being based in a prescription, injunction, rule or law. This is a calculable or programmable operation. Is there any responsibility, justice or freedom in simply applying a law, in enacting a calculation?

According to Derrida, a responsible decision must reinvent the rule, law or moral law in a "reinstating act of interpretation." The law is assumed, approved and confirmed in its value, even as it is reinvented for the sake of justice as the relation to the other in its uniqueness.

The reinvention of the law or rule implies that it is suspended from its previous context. The law must be reinvented and reinterpreted in the new context, in relation to the exceptionality of the others. This reinvention must be within the aporia of the exceptional context, which is an event beyond knowledge, of the relation with the other, whose lived experience is inaccessible, of which I only have representations, and whose very being is exceptional, and of the the inaccessibility of having to have interrupted knowledge, or its representations, which is necessary to ethical discourse. One must leave behind

the realm of the possible, that is, the discourses of Husserl, Rousseau, Heidegger, and Kant. One leaves behind knowledge, meaning, conceptual frames of reference, clear cut determinations and presuppositions.

The moment of decision would be "without regulation." One leaves the references of possibility behind. In the abyss of the aporia, one deals with the "impossible." This is the moment of one's responsibility. One must do the impossible, that is, reinvent a law that would invent the other, and beyond even the letting be of the other.

But without a type of regulation, Derrida argues that the decision would be lacking in responsibility. The reinvention of the law is a reaffirmation of the law, according to the infinite idea of justice. Therefore, Derrida argues that:

For a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper moment, if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation; it must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its principle. Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation ...<sup>486</sup>

The decision must be made in the aporetic experience. It must be guided by the promise of justice to the other. For the sake of freedom and responsibility one must suspend the law. But responsibility also demands that one refer to the law, ethics, knowledge, meaning and presence. There must be regulation,

otherwise, the incalculable idea of justice might lead to bad or even the worst possible inventions.<sup>487</sup>

The aporia of the responsible decision can be summed up with the name "undecidability." For example, regulation and deregulation, suspension and conservation, destruction and reinvention, are aspects of undecidability. The decision must also take into account the values of universality, including the calculation of possibilities of meaning, knowledge, rules and law, and the incalculable values of singularity, the impossible, the unanticipatable, the unique, the exceptional and the inaccessible. Without this aporia of undecidability, responsibility, freedom, and justice are only words. Derrida states:

*this particular undecidable opens the field of decision or of decidability. It calls for decision in the order of ethico-political responsibility. It is even its necessary condition. A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable program that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into a programmable affect of determinate causes. There can be no moral or political responsibility without the trial and passage by way of the undecidable ...*<sup>488</sup>

Derrida thematizes the aporia, the impossible, as the possibility of a responsible decision in order to account for the possibility of moral, ethical, and political decisions.

Simon Critchley, however, disagrees with Derrida's conclusions about the possibility of ethical and political responsibility. More precisely, Critchley denies that Derrida's

discourse can account for a move to politics or political responsibility.<sup>489</sup> Which is to say that Critchley does affirm the importance of Derrida's texts for its thought of ethical issues and the question responsibility.

Critchley cites a passage from Derrida's *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the question* in which Derrida affirms the "indecision" in Heidegger's discourse, in so far as it indecisively oscillates between metaphysical and nonmetaphysical significations.<sup>490</sup> Critchley calls this "indecision" the undecidability within Derrida's reading of Heidegger's texts. Derrida does not choose one possible reading over the other. According to Critchley:

... it is precisely in the suspension of choice or decision between two alternatives ... that the ethical dimension of deconstruction is opened and maintained. I have argued that an unconditional duty or affirmation is the source of the injunction that produces deconstruction ...<sup>491</sup>

Therefore, Critchley recognizes the unconditional affirmation of the gift as the source of responsibility and justice in Derrida's thought. In this context, Critchley discusses the affirmation as a promise prior to the question, as a pledge of responsibility to the other.<sup>492</sup> However, he claims that Derrida can take us no further in addressing ethical and political responsibility.<sup>493</sup>

Critchley even cites the above mentioned quote on undecidability from *Limited Inc.* He acknowledges that such passages run throughout Derrida's works. In order to defend his

interpretation of undecidability as indecidability, he provides examples of the double duties discussed in Derrida's *L'autre cap*. Again, he claims that the double duties listed by Derrida exemplify responsibility and unconditional affirmation, but in the form of the suspension of decision. Critchley asks:

Is not politics precisely the domain of questioning ... conflict and dissension? What is the relation in Derrida's work, between the rigorous undecidability of deconstructive reading and the necessity of political decisions and political critique? ... Deconstruction can certainly be employed as a powerful means of political analysis ... But how is one to account for the move from undecidability to the political *decision* ...? If deconstruction is the strictest possible determination of undecidability in the limitless context of ... experience, then this entails a suspension of the moment of decision. Yet, decisions have to be taken. But how? ... I would claim ... that an adequate account of the decision is essential to the possibility of politics, and that it is precisely this that deconstruction does not provide.<sup>494</sup>

Critchley goes on to oversimplify Derrida's discussion of the decision, in a brief acknowledgement of the "madness" of the moment of decision, and the interruption of the basis in knowledge and law. He agrees with Rorty's estimate of Derrida's discourses as politically useless. Derrida's work would be too formalistic, abstract, contingent and empty. It would also ignore the ontic, factual and the empirical. In other words, Derrida's work is a "refusal of politics."<sup>495</sup>

We have seen many instances throughout this essay that show Derrida's ethical and political concern for others, human, animal, etc. From the discussion of the spacing of the trace

which opens the transcendental subject to the empirical world, to the inclusion of nonhuman animals within the human society in Rousseau's context, to the call for the deconstruction of our concepts of law, responsibility, justice and subjectivity for the sake of the emancipation of animals, to the recognition of the social, political and ethical relations amongst animals, to the acknowledgement of the hedgehog's relation to death, murder, war, boundaries and hospitality, Derrida has provided numerous thoughts about concrete, real individuals, including his cat, and real situations.

As we have seen throughout this essay, as well, Derrida is clearly not rejecting the importance of knowledge, meaning, Being and law, including Kant's moral law, but also the real laws of one's country, as the conditions of responsible political decisions. Critchley has clearly missed much of Derrida's thought on these subjects. The three aspects of the aporia make it clear that a responsible decision does not exclude the realm of the possible and the lived experience of the empirical. Furthermore, the responsible decision is a promise of justice to the other, the real other. It is a promise to "invent" the other, which is to invent words, concepts, laws, judgements, and space for the exceptionality of the other. At the same time, however, and this is the impossible or the aporia, one must reaffirm the universality of the laws, rules, and codes according to which one

really and empirically lives.

Finally, Critchley has misunderstood the ethico-political use of Derrida's notion of undecidability and confused it with his use of indecision, which is used in a totally different context.<sup>496</sup> Indecision is a term Derrida applies to the heterogeneity of texts, their significations, etc. The passage that Critchley cited is a good example of undecidability as indecision. Derrida is being just and responsible to Heidegger's text by recognizing and affirming its undecidability. In this way he affirms the text. In the above mentioned passage from *Limited Inc.*, Derrida makes it clear that "this particular undecidability" he is discussing is not one which must remain as indecision. On the contrary, the context of this undecidable demands a decision. Critchley's references to *L'autre cap* are not examples of indecision. They are examples of the aporetic conditions of just and responsible political decisions. That is, in order to be responsible, two opposing imperatives must be taken into account. Derrida provides ample passages in which he states clearly that undecidability is the condition of a responsible decision in ethics and politics. Derrida's French text claims the following:

Disposer d'avance de la generalité d'une regle comme d'une solution a l'antinomie (c'est-a-dire á la double loi contradictoire et non á l'opposition de la loi et de son autre), en disposer comme d'une *savoir* et d'un *pouvoir* qui précéderaient, pour la régler, *la singularité de chaque*

*decision, de chaque jugement, de chaque expérience de responsabilité en s'y appliquant comme à des cas, ce serait la définition la plus sûre, la plus rassurante de la responsabilité comme irresponsabilité, de la moral confondue avec la calcul juridique, de la politique organisée dans la techno-science. L'invention du nouveau qui ne passerait pas l'endurance de l'autonomie serait une dangerous mystification*  
...<sup>497</sup>

Derrida clearly states that the aporia of the undecidability of the double law, for example, a universal law and the law of singularity, as Derrida calls it, is the condition for a very singular decision, which must attempt to be responsible to both the universal and the singular. One's decision is not responsible if one simply applies a general law to another case:

*La condition de possibilité de cette chose, la responsabilité, c'est une certaine expérience de la possibilité de l'impossibilité: l'épreuve de l'aporie à partir de laquelle inventer la seule invention possible, l'invention impossible.*<sup>498</sup>

A responsible political or ethical decision must endure the aporia, the three facets described above, and especially the undecidable. It is only when one leaves the realm of the possible for the impossible that one's responsibility for the other is truly apparent. One's decision is obliged to invent the impossible, that which is absolutely new, which is beyond anticipation, including both a new interpretation of the moral or political law, which is to invent the other, that is, as a gift of justice to the other, within the socio-political context. In the impossible situation of being responsible to both the

universal and singular, one must invent a decision that reinvents the universal in such a way that affirms the universal and does justice to singularity. And so Derrida says, deconstruction is "... inventive or it is nothing at all ..." <sup>499</sup> That is, a deconstruction "opens up a passageway, it marches ahead and marks a trail ... it produces rules—other conventions." <sup>500</sup> Deconstruction attempts to invent rules that would open a space for the irruption of the uniqueness of the other within the given socio-political context.

Critchley refers to the "limitless context" of deconstruction. In fact, Derrida did use this phrase. But he did so in a very specific context in which he was arguing that "there is nothing outside the text" means that "there is nothing outside of a determinate context," and that we "... can call "context" the entire "real-history-of-the-world" ... in which this value of objectivity and, even more broadly, that of truth (etc.) have taken on meaning ..." <sup>501</sup> One might say that that is the broadest context, but it is being recontextualized continuously. And within this context are an infinite number of other very determinate contexts, each of which is being recontextualized. According to Derrida this recontextualization is a new or different determination of a context. And any determination of a context, for example, speaking, is political to Derrida, as it is a type of non-"natural" relation with others. Thus:

Once this generality and this a priori structure have been

recognized, the question can be raised, not whether politics is implied (it always is), but which politics is implied in such a practice of contextualization.<sup>502</sup>

Critchley wants to imagine the abstraction of Derrida's texts and thought from their context. Derrida, on the other hand, recognizes that everything he thinks, writes and says is within a very determinate political context. One's thoughts, words and actions recontextualize the context. One's decisions must attempt to recontextualize responsibly for the other in the reinvention of just codes, rules, laws, etc.<sup>503</sup>

This Derridean view of the decision, its conditions and context, is in contrast to the discussion of the decision's basis in the moral law in Kant's thought. In the *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*, Kant writes: "Moral law is actually a law of the causality of free agents ..."<sup>504</sup> In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Morals* Kant argues:

*Duty is the necessity of an action, resulting from respect for the law ... Only the law itself which is connected with my will by no means as an affect but as a principle which does not serve my inclination but outweighs it; ... only such a law can be an object of respect and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will objectively except the law, and [determine the will] subjectively except pure respect for this practical law, and hence [pure respect] for the maxim to follow this law ... Therefore the pre-eminent good which we call moral can consist in nothing other than the concept of law in itself, which is certainly only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will ...*<sup>505</sup>

Kant makes it clear that one's actions and decisions ought to be

based in respect for the moral law. According to Derrida's thought, however, if one acts only on the moral law as the command of reason, one has not made a responsible choice and one has not responded to the command of the law of the singularity other. According to Derrida's "idea of justice," one has not been responsible. To match the decision and the gift, one must exceed even the discourse of Kant in order to respond justly and responsibly to the uniqueness of the other. One must exceed duty and reinvent the universal laws and maxims with passion and compassion in order to be responsible to the other.

Derrida addresses what he calls the well-known problem of "respect" for the moral law. First, respect for the law is "caused" by the law. But causality is a concept of the understanding, which would only work in the experience of the empirical world. Secondly, respect would be linked to "sense," sensibility and to "affection" in general. Derrida claims that these are inscribed at the heart of Kantian morality at the same time that his morality "sacrifices" sensible inclination in general.<sup>506</sup>

Derrida puts into question the morality and responsibility of intending to be moral and responsible simply by acting out of a "sense" of duty, simply out of respect for the law.<sup>507</sup> One would thoughtlessly obey one's duty. Where's the responsibility? One simply acts on a preauthorisation of what is held to be morally

good.

Derrida also takes issue with Kant's notion of respect for the other person. The problem is that of exemplarity. The other person is only deserving of respect in so far as the person is an example of the moral law. As Kant writes, "Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law."<sup>508</sup> One's respect, therefore, never accedes to the person, as ego, subject, or exception.<sup>509</sup> The gift of justice, according to Derrida, would exceed this respect of the person as an example, and, instead, affirm it as exceptional. The moral law must be reinvented for every other. Derrida explains his conceptions of justice and responsibility in terms of politeness and friendship:

An axiom from which it is not necessary to conclude further that one can only accede to friendship or politeness ... by transgressing all rules and by going against all duty. The counter-rule is still a rule.<sup>510</sup>

This is an example of deconstruction inventing a rule, and producing a new path in ethical thought. This new rule of responsibility is the following:

Never to believe oneself free of any debt and hence never to act simply according to a rule, in conformity to duty not even *out of duty*, ... Nothing would be more immoral ...<sup>511</sup>

There is another problem with the exemplarity of the moral law, namely, that there are only examples of it, signs, representations, and no presentation of the law itself.<sup>512</sup> Its presence is always deferred. On the one hand, this distance from

the law is a condition of respect; "one must interrupt the relation."<sup>513</sup> However, the rapport with the law can only ever be postponed because of the basis of signification in the trace. Therefore, the examples of the moral law are representatives of the trace. In Derrida's view, therefore, one's relation with the moral law is aporetic. Any example of the moral law is a repetition of the trace. The "law of the law" is that one does not access the presence of the moral law since it is a representative of the trace, which itself cannot be accessed "as such."<sup>514</sup> Furthermore, the law of the law is that the trace of the other is the command of the other, the undecidable double affirmation. This law will never be present. Derrida writes:

Here one does not know the law ... The law is produced (without showing itself, thus without producing itself) in the space of this nonknowledge.<sup>515</sup>

This interpretation of Kant's moral law accords with Derrida's thought of the decision. Kant's moral law must be reinvented in the aporia of nonknowledge.

Because of this aporia of the inaccessibility of the moral law, the subject is free and responsible to determine himself. Man would be capable of self-legislation. Kant writes:

Man was seen to be bound to laws by duty, but no one realized that he is subject *only to his own general laws* and that he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will, a will designed by nature to *make general laws*.<sup>516</sup>

Kant is clear that one's own free will invents general laws to

which one is subject. According to Derrida, however, the moral law of Kant is an example of the opening of the limits between the universal and the singular:

The law is neither manifold nor ... a universal generality. It is always an idiom, and this is the sophistication of Kant's thought. Its door concerns only you ... a door that is unique and specifically destined and determined for you.<sup>517</sup>

The aporia demands that one legislate. The trace necessitates that the invention of the law is a repetition that is always other than the previous repetition, and therefore, an exception. The trace and gift also necessitate that the other determines one's decision heteronomously. One must act exceptionally in the reinvention of the law, as a just and responsible action for the exceptionality of the other who commands it. In Derrida's view, Kant's discourse has a space that leaves a "practical freedom" and opens up responsibility for one to reinvent the moral law. One's decision *must* reinvent the law. And this is what it must do responsibly, in accordance with the gift of justice, which interrupts its basis in knowledge and possibilities, and which moves by the force of the spacing of the trace, which has already opened and interrupted the relation with the moral law. That is, Derrida is claiming that this relation of non-relation with the moral law is the condition of possibility of inventing the impossible, that is, the just and responsible decision. In sum, if one is to take up one's duty to legislate, one must move

beyond Kant's sense of duty in order to reinvent the law as a gift of justice to the other. Responsibility depends on it.

Derrida has identified a crucial statement in the texts of Kant that illustrates the uncertainty about the origin of the moral command. Kant writes:

The veiled goddess before whom we ... bend our knees is the moral law in us ... We do indeed perceive her voice and also understand very well her command. But when we are listening, we are in doubt whether it comes from man, from the perfected power of his own reason, or whether it comes from an other, whose essence is unknown to us and speaks to man through his own reason ... [S]uch research is only speculative ...<sup>518</sup>

Kant is clearly stating that the voice of the moral law commands. However, the source of the law and its command are not certain. Is it man? Is it man's Reason? Is it God? Kant can only speculate. Regardless, man must fulfil his duty, which means that one's will must legislate in accord with the moral law.<sup>519</sup>

Derrida notes that the voice of the moral law's command is intended to be autoaffective and autonomous. However, the text of Kant reveals the "textuality" of the commanding voice and law. It is apparent to Kant that some sort of alterity and heteronomy are involved. The deconstruction of Husserl's subjectivity applies here. What Husserl and Kant would attempt to think as auto-affective and autonomous constitutively includes hetero-affection and heteronomy, that is, the call of the other, even the call of Kant's dog. For animals do address us. According to Derrida, Kant and others:

have taken no account of the fact that what they call animal could *look at* them and *address* them from down there, from a wholly other origin.<sup>520</sup>

Kant refers to a "superior tone" in the texts of his day. Derrida, on the other hand, attempts to think the tone of Kant's description of the commanding voice of the moral law. According to Derrida, the origin of the command, the voice and their tone are unknown. Therefore:

As soon as one no longer knows who speaks or who writes, the text becomes apocalyptic ... In that case, if the apocalypse reveals, it is first of all the revelation of the apocalypse, the self-presentation of the apocalyptic structure of language, of writing, of the experience of presence, in other words, of the text or the mark in general: that is, of the divisible *envoi* for which there is no self-presentation nor assured destination.<sup>521</sup>

Derrida's discussion of the double affirmation in Heidegger applies here. There would be, according to Derrida, no clear and simple origin or destination for the calls and responses of affirmation. Each is always already haunted by or in constitutive reference with others. Kant's commanding voice of the moral law is subject to the same attributes of the "textuality" of the trace. That is, due to the power of the trace, any command is always constitutively in reference with other commands, for example, the singular and the universal, any command is always already differentiated, since meaning is generated in the repetition of the trace, and one's response is referential.

The indefinite origin of the command and its indefinite

destination are effects of the trace and gift, according to Derrida. Because of the trace of the other in me, it would be impossible to determine who is commanding and the origin of the yes yes. In this context, Derrida uses the word "come" as the supplement to the word "gift" in order to distinguish that missive force and affirmative tone from the other. It can be defined as that gift from the other whose affirmation is always already a call and a response, beyond words, meaning and message. It is simply the affirmative "call" from the other, for which our words, signs or marks must be responsible.

"Come" is Derrida's word for the gift of the other which constitutes one's passive decision, the other's gift and command. This decision, in order to be responsible, must choose and act in the spirit of this "come" as the gift of justice. That is, as the other demands justice for itself, its "come" is always already affirming me. So the decision is based in the movements of double affirmation, and must do justice to and be responsible for the other and oneself, the other as oneself. That is, one's decision affects oneself, and therefore affirms oneself. One's identity is made exceptional. Justice to the other is at the same time justice to the self.

The gift and the affirmation from the other, in the undecidable scene of call and response, are not targeted at decidably conceived identities, as a fully determinate self. The

self is always other, in flux. The affirmation of the "gift" and the "come" are generated in the incalculable aspects of our being. They also function such that they preclude a final determination and calculation of our selves. Gift/come promises affirmation of the alterity of beings, of another determination of each being which cannot be anticipated or calculated in advance. It affirms the ex-appropriation of Husserl's subjectivity and the Being-toward-death of Heidegger's *Dasein*. It is a promise without predetermination of what is to come. There would be no anticipability except the affirmation of the other, and the otherness of the other, including its incalculable futural aspects and its inaccessibility.

But there is also a secret, inaccessible aspect in one's relation to oneself. Self-presence as self-consciousness is a function of the repetition of the trace. Therefore, one's consciousness is always affected by nonconscious difference. Let us recall the spacing that interrupts self-presence. One's consciousness is always different, as well. Derrida is putting into question the unity of the subject's consciousness. He thinks that, strictly speaking, it is impossible to justify the claim that one can "posit that the same "I think" accompanies all "my" representations ..."<sup>522</sup>

In this context, we have said that the trace is the possibility of responding to the other. However, the interruption

of the unity of consciousness has implications for the ability to answer for oneself, and, therefore, to be responsible for oneself. That is, one cannot say in an absolute sense that "I" am responsible for such a deed, for such a promise, etc. The traditional metaphysical conception of responsibility as that which "one takes in one's name and before the other ..." must be thought with the above insights.<sup>523</sup> "To answer for oneself" before the other precludes a strict gathering of oneself into a totality, of one's experiences, of what one presumes to know, etc. One must recognize not only the alterity of the other with oneself, but also the alterity of oneself, one's flux of differentiation and change at phenomenal and nonphenomenal levels. In this sense, one cannot say strictly that "I" have responded responsibly. One cannot say that "I" have fulfilled "my" duty, which originates at the preconscious level of the relation with others.

We have seen that the "pledge" and the "gift" function beyond the human, according to Derrida. One of the consequences for ethical and environmental ethical thought is that the other who is involved in the "passive decision" is an animal, such as Derrida's cat or Kant's dog, or the worm examined by Leibniz.<sup>524</sup> The distinction between the moral agent and the moral patient, then, is undecidable. For, in fact, Derrida's cat acts as an agent through Derrida in order to affect a just and responsible

decision with regard to both of them. In other words, what Derrida has attempted to explain as the scene of the double affirmation of call and response is the basis for responsibility for others and the basis of ethico-political claims for oneself from the other. In the spirit of Bentham, Derrida's thought has thought beyond the link between morality, rights, reason and the human articulation of moral and legal claims. Addresses and claims come in many forms, a gaze, for example. It is only the few, such as Montaigne, Bentham, Buber, Charles Scott and Derrida, who have recognized these addresses and claims. Of course, Derrida is even arguing that these claims can be articulated in a human language through a passive decision.

Tim Hayward argues that Kant's thought offers a reasonable basis for environmental ethics.<sup>525</sup> By comparison, however, Derrida's thought pushes the limits towards animal rights, and beyond. Hayward recognizes that Kant claims that a human being does not have direct duties to a dog, that a dog has no rights and that injustice cannot be done to a dog. Kant writes:

If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.<sup>526</sup>

Hayward is clearly correct in arguing that man's duties "with regard to" animals would benefit them, and provide them with

something of a moral standing. And when you take into account Kant's feeling of awe for nature, there is a reasonable basis for environmental ethics. For example, Kant states:

No man ought to mar the beauty of nature ...<sup>527</sup>

And:

For then we may look upon it as an objective finality of nature in its entirety as a system of which man is a member. We may regard it as a favour that nature has extended to us, that besides giving us what is useful it has dispensed beauty and charms in such abundance, and for this we may love it, just as we view it with respect because of its immensity, and feel ourselves ennobled by such contemplation ...<sup>528</sup>

And, of course, Kant writes of the "... ever new and increasing awe and admiration" for the "starred heaven above me ..." <sup>529</sup> And clearly with a heightened state of cosmological and ecological spirituality, Kant writes:

The first [the wonder of the starred heaven] begins with the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and expands the connection in which I find myself into the incalculable vastness of worlds upon worlds ... The second [the moral law within] starts from my invisible self, from my personality, and depicts me as in a world of true infinitude ... With this I recognize myself to be in a necessary and general connection ... Through this recognition I also see myself linked with all visible worlds. The first view of a numberless quantity of worlds destroys my importance, so to speak, since I am an *animal-like being* who must return its matter from whence it came to the planet (a mere speck in the universe), ... The second view raises my value infinitely, as an *intelligence*, through my personality; for in this personality the moral law reveals a life independent of animality and even the entire world of sense. This is true at least as far as one can infer from the purposeful determination of my existence according to this law.<sup>530</sup>

Kant's texts demonstrate that his thought is in the line of

thought of a certain anthropocentric type of environmental ethics.

Kant is even against unwanton cruelty to animals. But, this is a duty to humanity not to the animals. Kant explains that:

Violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being's duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural disposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relations with other men. The human being is authorized to kill animals quickly (without pain) and to put them to work that does not strain them beyond their capacities ... Even gratitude for the long service of an old horse or dog (just as if they were members of the household) belongs indirectly to a human being's duty *with regard to* these animals; considered as a *direct* duty, however, it is always only a duty of the human being to himself.<sup>531</sup>

Hayward points out that the dog and horse greatly benefit from a man's duty to humanity. The dog and horse would not benefit any more even if one had a duty directly to them. Furthermore, the situation of the horse and the dog would not be any better even if Kant had argued for animal rights.<sup>532</sup> Hayward's claims here are unreasonable because the well being of the horse and dog in question would depend upon what the duty is and what the right is under the law. They could vary widely depending upon one's thoughts on subjectivity, animality, etc. That is, if the dog and the horse were treated as persons, the situation would, perhaps, differ greatly.

Kant does not recognize a moral obligation directly to nonhumans. Only a human being can bind another human being and be

bound by another human being because of man's reason and freedom.<sup>533</sup> Freedom is the power of the human being that allows one to sacrifice one's natural drives to the moral law prescribed by reason and its Idea of duty.<sup>534</sup> One must have this freedom in order to be obliged by reason and the will of the other human.

Derrida would think freedom or the "secret" as the trace.<sup>535</sup> As we saw above, there is a type of freedom from the present that is manifested in the imagination. The nonpresent spacing of the trace as the origin of one's world in lived experience provides a certain freedom. One's lived experience is free from any other on a level of presence. This type of freedom also applies to animals. However, the spacing of the trace opens one to others at a nonphenomenal level. The spacing of the trace opens the freedom of the autonomous will to its basis in a heteronomous relation with others, including the animality or nature of oneself, that is, one's passions, drives, appetites, etc. One must rethink the autonomous and free will as based in relation with the other and the double affirmation. The command of reason must be reinterpreted in order to be open to and responsible for the call of the dog and the horse.

Without this recognition of the process of the double affirmation with other animals, as the basis for a responsible relation with them, the anti-cruelty strain of Kant's thought would leave billions of animals to suffer incredible violence and

"torture." Kant is only against animal experimentation if the results are of no use to humans. He writes:

Agonizing physical experiments for the sake of mere speculation, when the end could also be achieved without these, are to be abhorred ...<sup>536</sup>

However:

Vivisectionists, who use living animals for experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as man's instruments; but any such cruelty for sport cannot be justified.<sup>537</sup>

Kant is, therefore, advocating cruelty to animals, as long as it can be justified for its benefit to mankind. After all, animals are "our" instruments.

Derrida takes issue with the violent treatment of animals.

He argues:

In the course of the last two centuries these traditional forms of the treatment of the animal have been turned upside down by the joint developments of zoological, ethological, biological, and genetic *forms of knowledge* and the always inseparable *techniques* of intervention with regard to their object, ... namely, the living animal ... [T]he reduction of the animal not only to production and overactive reproduction ... of meat for consumption but also for all sorts of other end products, and all in the service of a certain being and the so-called human well being of man ... No one can deny seriously, or for very long, that men do all they can in order to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from themselves, in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence that some would compare to the worst cases of genocide (there are also animal genocides: the number of species endangered because of man takes one's breath away).<sup>538</sup>

Derrida characterizes the traditional and current forms of treatment of animals as cruelty, violence and genocide. Unlike

Kant, Derrida does not see any justification in this treatment of animals, even if it is serving human culture.

As we saw above, Derrida deconstructs in order to rethink a sense of justice and responsibility that would apply to animals and other beings. What Derrida is arguing for is a duty beyond the duty conceived by Kant. That is, the universal laws must be reinvented to address the singularity not only of the human, but for animals, too. In order to do so, Derrida has attempted to rethink Kant's "categorical imperative" as the thought of the double affirmation. He says:

I have on several occasions spoken of "unconditional" affirmation or of "unconditional" "appeal" ... Now, the very least that can be said of unconditionality (a word that I use not by accident to recall the character of the categorical imperative in its Kantian form) is that it is independent of every determinate context, even of the determination of context in general. It announces itself as such only in the opening of context. Not that it is simply present (existent) elsewhere, outside all context; rather, it intervenes in the determination of a context from its very inception, and from an injunction, a law, a responsibility that transcends this or that determination of a given context. Following this, what remains is to articulate this unconditionality with the determinate (Kant would say, hypothetical) conditions of this or that context; and this is the moment of strategies, of rhetorics, of ethics, and of politics. The structure thus described supposes both that there are only contexts, that nothing exists outside context, ... but also that the limit of the frame or the border of the context always entails a clause of nonclosure. The outside penetrates and thus determines the inside ... This unconditionality also defines the injunction that prescribes deconstructing.<sup>539</sup>

We have referred to this affirmation many times. Unlike Kant's determination of the categorical, its unconditionality, as we

have seen, means that it functions beyond human contexts. The structural process of double affirmation is at work within all contexts, forever opening, reopening and recontextualizing contexts in order to reinvent strategies, ethics, politics and laws that would be more just and responsible to the uniqueness of the given context, and to the exceptionality of the others involved. The unconditional affirmation would be the very motivation, passion and source of the obligation that commands the recontextualization and reinvention. In this context, the affirmation is obliging us to recontextualize and reinvent our practices, policies and laws for the sake of nonhuman animals, and other species.

Derrida's unconditional affirmation for animals and other beings commands a recontextualization of Kant's teleological system in which man is the end of nature. Because man would be the only being on Earth that possesses an intellect, "he is certainly titular lord of nature ..." <sup>540</sup> He would be the sole being who could give "ends" to himself and to nature. <sup>541</sup> The ultimate end of nature would be man's culture, for which nature is at our service. <sup>542</sup>

Based on what we have seen from Derrida's thought, we can dispute Kant's claims. Derrida's thought is a challenge to conceptions of teleological systems. Derrida's claim is that what might be regarded as a final point, such as man, is simply

another point in the web of traces. Therefore, there is no hierarchical distinction between different forms of life, even if it is true that humans are different from other animals in the way that Kant claims. Also, there is no final presence to be attained, as if nature culminates in man and his culture. There is change without finality. To add to what we have just written above about freedom, since it is an idea, subject to the repetition of the trace, and therefore indefinite, Kant cannot legitimately use this aporetic concept as a distinction between man and other animals. The spacing of the trace is the condition of a certain freedom as distance between all beings.

The moral law, too, is indefinite, and always to be reinvented. According to Derrida, the biblical and philosophical traditions of the West have attributed to the animal the ignorance of its nudity. This reflects an ignorance or lack of consciousness of the knowledge of good and evil.<sup>543</sup> But the very condition of possibility of a responsible decision is the impossibility of knowing at the instant of the decision. Derrida says:

That is why the distinction between good and evil doesn't depend on knowledge; that is why we should not know, in terms of knowledge, what is the distinction between good and evil. To have to make such a distinction, which depends precisely on responsibility, is ... both a terrible and tragic situation in which to find oneself ...<sup>544</sup>

Derrida is disputing the conventional wisdom that only man knows

good and evil. The condition of a responsible ethico-political decision is that one does not know, that one reinvents the distinction in repetition without end. Based on the trace, gift, affirmation and passive decision, one could argue that animals participate in this infinite reinvention of good and evil.

As we saw in the sections on Husserl, reason too is always to come. And Derrida points to Montaigne as one of the few thinkers who refuses to reject the attribute of reason in animals. Montaigne claims that animals have the power of signification, which "testifies that they have an inward power of reason ..." Montaigne asks how a human could know the "secret" workings of the lived experiences and minds of animals. "By what comparison between them and us does he infer the stupidity that he attributes to them?"<sup>545</sup> This is certainly a worthy question. Where has Kant proved that animals do not have reason and freedom? What evidence could he possibly give in order to justify those claims, when all that one has of the other's lived experience are the signs and representations produced in one's own imagination?

Kant's claims are violent and permit violence against billions of beings. Derrida calls such conceptions of animals a "crime of the first order against the animals, against animals."<sup>546</sup> According to Derrida's thought, a just and responsible conception of the "end" of man and his culture,

including his politics, must be a promise to the alterity of man, the flux and infinite differences within the species of man, as well as the alterity of man as the constitutive relations with the other animal species and species of every kind.<sup>547</sup>

This just and responsible "end" of man, his culture and politics, must include a reinterpretation of Kant's view of the shared feeling of suffering between humans and animals. To think seriously about this experience of a "fundamental compassion," Derrida argues, would "awaken us to our responsibilities and obligations with respect to the living in general."<sup>548</sup> According to Derrida, this recognition of compassion directly for animals, rather than as training for one's relations with other humans, must be used to rethink law, ethics and politics.<sup>549</sup> The laws of any jurisdiction must be reinvented in the spirit of Derrida's notion of the possibility of a just and responsible decision in order to reflect one's compassion for other animal's as one heeds their calls and as one decides with them. According to Derrida, it is this very recognition of the call, address, and "right" of response as ethico-political claim of the other animal that opens the limits of humanity and animality:

As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called animal offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human; the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say the bordercrossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself ...<sup>550</sup>

Derrida recognizes the fact that animals can look at us, that

they have their own points of view as equally ethically relevant others.<sup>551</sup> Contrary to the thought of philosophers, such as Kant, that claim animals do not look at us, that they do not have a lived experience of us, because they are not self-conscious, Derrida has offered arguments and observations to the contrary.<sup>552</sup> The result is theaporetic limit between humans and animals, rather than a clear and distinct defining limit. And in this instance, due to theaporetic or opened limit, Kant cannot justifiably ostracize the family dog or horse from the ethico-political circle. Man must redefine himself based on the recognition of the constitutive relations and shared qualities with other animals, plants, etc., in the ex-appropriation of the double affirmation.

Derrida tries to save horses from Kant's "criminal" conception of the horse in the *Critique of Judgement*. Kant defines two basic types of beauty: errant beauty, which is a free, wild beauty, without concept of a definite end for that being; and adherent beauty, which applies to a being who has been designated by man as having a determinate end. Examples of the free beauties of nature are such animals as birds and crustaceans. The horse is an example of adherent beauty.<sup>553</sup>

Kant also makes a distinction between two types of finality, subjective and objective. Objective finality relates the organization of a content and form to an end determined by its

concept. Objective finality is analysed into internal objective finality and external objective finality. The external objective finality can easily be thought of as the utility of a thing for man. It is an "anthropocentric determination."<sup>554</sup>

The problem is with the internal objective finality. Derrida asks, "how can the human reference be introduced into internal finality, which Kant calls perfection ...?"<sup>555</sup> This is the problem of Kant's conception of the horse, which results in its being "anthropological." Derrida asks:

But what about the horse? What is the finality which one cannot disregard, as in the case of the birds or crustaceans? And does this finality have an essential relation to man? One ought to be able to disregard the internal finality of the horse and consider it ... as a wild and errant beauty of nature. But it is its external finality that Kant does not disregard. And it is in its external finality that he identifies its internal finality: the horse is *for* man, in the service of man, and perceived by man only in its adherent beauty. Such is its internal destination: the external.<sup>556</sup>

Derrida is pointing out that Kant has unjustifiably conceived of the very genetic essence of the horse as designed to be an instrument of man. That is, the misconception is that of thinking that because man has found a use for the horse, that the horse has been created by nature with the essential attribute of being an instrument of man. According to Derrida, Kant's third *Critique* "depends in an essential manner ... on a pragmatic anthropology and on ... a reflexive humanism ..."<sup>557</sup> The anthropologico-humanist assumption "... weighs massively, by its content, on this

supposedly pure deduction of aesthetic judgement."<sup>558</sup> Derrida argues:

For me to be unable to disregard the external finality of the horse at the moment when I ascribe to it a beauty of adherence, to be unable to disregard its objective finality which can only be external, the animal must first of all and solely be for man.<sup>559</sup>

Kant unjustifiably thinks the conception of the horse on the basis of his conception of human culture. Of course, this does not accord with Derrida's conception of justice. Nor does it accord with his conception of "eating well," which recognizes that we must eat and, therefore, use other beings, but we must do so according to the most just and responsible conceptions, laws and practices. Finally, we have seen above that one's end, task or identity is, according to Derrida, assigned by the other. In this case, Kant, too, has assigned an end for the horse. But it is an unjust and irresponsible assignation. On the contrary, the end of man, the end of each human, the end of each nonhuman animal and the end of each being, is assigned in the relationship that Derrida calls ex-appropriation and double affirmation. One's purpose or perfection would be a promise of justice, responsibility and respect for the other. And as we have seen above, there is no justification for a priority of the human over the animal. The referential web of traces, as we saw in Derrida's discussion of Rousseau, disputes the thing in itself and the end in itself.

Politically speaking, Derrida argues that we must rethink Kant's notion of "universal hospitality." The problem with Kant's notion is that hospitality is offered only under certain conditions. To this view, Derrida opposes what he calls "unconditional" or "pure" hospitality, "not for speculative or ethical reasons, but in order to understand and to transform what is going on today in our world."<sup>560</sup> Unconditional hospitality demands that one is "prepared to be unprepared, for the unexpected arrival of the *any other*."<sup>561</sup> This general statement can be understood to mean that our human political systems must offer the gift of justice as hospitality to every other that is excluded from its system. Of course, it must incessantly reinvent and recontextualize the system in order to offer this unconditional hospitality to the uniqueness of every other. This gift of hospitality would attempt to offer a respectful place for all animals and other beings in our political systems. This unconditional hospitality, as justice to animals, at the very least, would demand that Kant's conception of politics be rethought such that man gives up "mastery of ... space, ... home, ... nation."<sup>562</sup> Man would no longer be the lord of nature, nor even of the nation-state.

## Chapter VII

The purpose of this chapter is to argue that Derrida's deconstruction of Hegel's subjectivity opens ethics and politics to the affirmation of nature and animals. More specifically, the condition of Hegel's ethics and politics is the affirmation of nature and animals. The consequential claim is that ethics and politics have unjustifiably excluded and suppressed nature and animals as their basis.<sup>563</sup> According to Derrida, a responsible ethico-political decision must be invented in the undecidable situation, which attempts to affirm both the natural singularities and the universality of human laws. The result is that Hegel's state must be reinvented in order to promote and reinvent the rights of natural singularities according to the unconditional affirmation of the gift of justice.<sup>564</sup> At the same time, the universal is reinvented also in order to do justice to the universal, to the institutions, laws, customs and the general public. Derrida's thought does not point to a utopia where this love and affirmation of beings will save us all from violence. Living and eating will involve sacrifice of the other. This is simply the tragic situation of living. Responsibility is excessive, infinite. We are responsible for all beings. But the finitude of one's life and power is the impossibility of

fulfilling such duties. Sacrifice is the tragic necessity. Responsibility is always to come.

Hegel discusses the many moments of subjectivity. But the most important determination of subjectivity in this context is the definition of the constitution of the nation-state as the actuality of consciousness. Hegel writes:

The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is ethical mind *qua* the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it. The state exists immediately in custom, mediately in individual self-consciousness, knowledge and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essence and the end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom ... The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality.<sup>565</sup>

This is the ethico-political realm in which only the human being participates because only the human is self-conscious.<sup>566</sup> Only man "is" free will. Therefore, man is absolute. Because only humans are ends in themselves, we would have the right to use "things" and animals, as things, in whatever fashion we decide to impose our "wills" over them. Hegel argues:

Everyone has the right to ... make the thing his will, or in other words to destroy the thing and transform it into his own; for the thing, as externality, has no end in itself; it is not infinite self-relation but something external to itself. A living thing too (an animal) is external to itself in this way and in so far itself a thing.<sup>567</sup>

The human has the right to use and transform natural

singularities, such as animals, because only humans have self-consciousness and will their own ends. "Animals ... have no right to life, because they do not will it."<sup>568</sup> Dogs and cats, for example, would be lacking the internal relation to self of self-conscious will. As a human, I would be free to determine myself. I would be free to choose. The universality of my will also enables me to appropriate other things.<sup>569</sup> Because the animal has no will, he is not free to appropriate or suppress his impulses, desires and inclinations. A dog, therefore, would not be free to choose herself or to impose her will and determine another. She could only "devour" another.<sup>570</sup> A dog has no will to impose on another thing and make it its property; nor can it give the other a purpose that was not inherently its own. As Kant imposes the representation of external finality onto the objective internal finality in the horse, Hegel thinks that when "... the living thing becomes my property, I give to it a soul other than the one it had before, I give to it my soul."<sup>571</sup>

Derrida's thought of the trace puts into question this traditional approach to thinking. We have seen that the will must be thought according to the trace. If that perspective is taken, then the autonomy of the will must be rethought as heteronomy. Heteronomy includes the openness to externality. Thinkers such as Kant and Hegel attempt to defend the position that only humanity can appropriate externalities. As the condition of self-

consciousness and will, the trace fundamentally opens the interior to the exterior, beyond the possibility of absolute appropriation. The end in itself of the Husserlian, Rousseauist, Heideggerian, Kantian and Hegelian subjectivities would be fundamentally determined by the other, including their "free choices." Kant and Hegel argue that only humans have "intrinsic" value, whereas humans can impose their values onto the very essences of other beings. However, the heteronomy of ex-appropriation opens the intrinsic value of humans to the call of animals and other others. Instead of imposing an idea on another animal that would transform and violate it, Derrida thinks that one is called to promise the gift of justice to the uniqueness of the other, to let the other be, and to unconditionally affirm the inaccessibility of the lived experience of the other.<sup>572</sup> One must acknowledge that the relation to the other as ex-appropriation necessarily entails an irreducible violence of appropriating the other. In a certain sense, one is always already making the other one's own. This possibility is not exclusive to humans. However, to recognize and affirm appropriation as the condition of ethics and responsibility, and as the very structural process of existence is one thing, but philosophers like Kant and Hegel have raised the concept of appropriation to a level of unnecessary violence. One must eat, but Derrida instructs us to "eat well." Appropriation of the other must be limited by the recognition and

call for responsibility for the other in the unconditional affirmation of the gift.<sup>573</sup> Appropriation is also limited by the trace of the other's lived experience. No form of empirical or conceptual appropriation can erase this facet of the "intrinsic value" of the origin of the other animal's world.

Derrida explains the functioning of the gift in the thought of Hegel. Ultimately, the gift is the condition of the dialectical movement.<sup>574</sup> As we have seen, the affirmation of the gift occurs outside of contexts and opens contexts, but it does not function beyond all contextuality. It is always engaging a context. Therefore, as soon as the gift is performing its affirmative function, it begins to be.<sup>575</sup> In the context of Hegel's teleological dialectic, the limitless dissemination of "pure burning light" must be constrained and determined as being-for-self.<sup>576</sup> As soon as the dissemination of the gift is constrained into being-for-self, the constriction of the "mad energy of the gift" produces exchange and the space of debt.<sup>577</sup> We have seen this in the above discussion of the double affirmation. There is gift without return in conjunction with repetition, which includes the promise, memory and debt. According to Derrida, dialectical thought can only conceive of the gift from this perspective of the gift as exchange. Therefore, even though the gift gives rise to dialectical movement, dialectical thought cannot think it.<sup>578</sup> It can only think the gift as an exchange

between subjects. But the gift is the affirmative force "before all," including human subjectivity. Derrida says the gift sacrifices itself to the "annulus" of exchange. In the language of philosophy, to give always means to give an annulus, which implies debt and exchange. Moreover, the gift as exchange is also the guarding and keeping of the present. The economy restricts itself as the pure gift of affirmation sacrifices itself.<sup>579</sup>

According to Derrida, this is assumed by Hegel's discourse, that is, it structures its very movements without being thought within its categories:

The (con)striction no longer lets itself be circumscribed ... as an ontological category, or even ... as a category, even were it a trans-category, a transcendental. The (con)striction ... or transcendental ... is therefore also in the position of transcendental transcategorization, the transcendental transcendental.<sup>580</sup>

The constriction of the pure gift "produces" the philosophical effect of reappropriation, in Hegel's case, the reappropriation of the spirit from nature. But it is also the "matrix" that constrains the philosophical discourse to place this very matrix outside the system. This constriction is ultimately the function of ex-appropriation as the matrix of philosophical thought. These are the forces that explain the movement of philosophical thought in general, as well as the movement of giving as exchange in philosophical thought.

In Hegel's descriptions of the movements of the dialectic,

he does not account for the forces of ex-appropriation as gift and constriction. In the movement from nature to spirit, from animality to ethico-political humanity, Hegel's discourse describes the violent repression of nature and animals. Hegel writes, for example:

With disease the animal transgresses ... the limits of its nature; but animal disease is the becoming of the spirit.<sup>581</sup>

Also:

The purpose of nature is to kill itself and break through its shell of the immediate, of the sensible, to consume itself like a Phoenix, in order to upsurge, rejuvenated, from this exteriority, as spirit.<sup>582</sup>

Derrida's interpretation is that the "... concept's spiritual unity must do violence to these figures of nature in order to free itself from them."<sup>583</sup> Derrida also discusses the restriction of natural pressures in Hegel's thought as the production of ethical objectivity.<sup>584</sup> The natural is "violently veiled" in Hegel's "conjugal repression" of marriage as the first movement of the ethical.<sup>585</sup> One can make the general claim that Hegel's dialectical movement to the ethical is conditioned by the restriction and repression of nature. In Derrida's terms, Hegel's discourse includes a sacrificial structure that sacrifices nature and animals, in order to move consciousness up into the spirituality of ethics.

Derrida argues that the basis of the movements of Hegel's dialectic is the "transcendental transcendental." Ultimately,

this is the trace working itself out in the form of the functioning of the gift and restriction, as constriction or ex-appropriation.<sup>586</sup> As the basis of dialectical thought, the functioning of the constriction of the pure gift of affirmation is unthought by Hegel's system. This philosophy does not recognize that the affirmation of the gift is the condition of the possibility of the passages of consciousness, a transcendental as transcategorical. The gift also "guards" the affirmative opening to what would be gathered in the *Aufhebung*. In the case of nature and animals, the condition of the passage to ethics and politics is the disease and death of nature. Nature and animality must be violently restricted, repressed and sacrificed. Derrida's text tells us that the gift is the condition of the opening of the ethical political state. The unconditional affirmative force of the gift works with the force of restriction as the condition of the articulations of all beings in the real world, as well as the condition of the articulations of the dialectical conceptuality in Hegel's texts.

The result of Derrida's insight is the following claim. Hegel thinks the condition of ethics and politics as the restriction and sacrifice of nature, animality and animals. His philosophical thought does not think the unconditional affirmation of the gift as an absolutely necessary force in the opening and functioning of ethics. Derrida's thought reinterprets

Hegel's thought with his insight. Therefore, the condition of possibility of ethics and politics includes the gift's unconditional affirmation of natural singularities, plants, animals, air, etc. In other words, the opening of ethics and politics is not the suppression, murder, suicide and sacrifice of nature and animals, but the gift of justice and responsibility for them. The gift is the unconditional affirmation of natural singularities. The double affirmation is constricted into the promise of affirmations to-come and gift as exchange. The pledge and exchange, as we have seen, are the basis of a thought of responsibility and debt, according to Derrida. Therefore, one can further claim that the conditions of ethics and politics are responsibility *for* and duty *directly to* natural singularities. Because Hegel does not think the "transcendental transcendental," the constriction of the gift, his conceptualizations of nature and animals are unnecessarily violent, disrespectful, unjust and irresponsible.<sup>587</sup>

Derrida's texts offer reinterpetive reinventions of Hegel's ethico-political thought. He begins with the law of man and the law of woman.<sup>588</sup> Derrida refers to these two laws as the general representations of singularity and universality. Universality represents the publicly known laws of man within a state. The law of singularity represents the secret, nocturnal, divine law. It is predicated with the attributes of the unconscious, the

familial, the feminine, and the natural. Hegel's system depends upon the functioning of both laws.<sup>589</sup> However, the opposition is sublated such that the universal law of man reappropriates the law of singularity.<sup>590</sup>

We have seen above that Derrida attempts to think justice and responsibility beyond the traditional ethical and legal systems, which function according to universality. He reinterprets Kierkegaard's interpretation of the biblical tale of Abraham and Isaac on Mount Moriah.<sup>591</sup> Derrida writes:

The moral of the fable would be morality itself, at the point where morality brings into play the gift of death that is so given. The absolute of duty and responsibility presume that one denounce, refute, and transcend, at the same time, all duty, all responsibility, and every human law. It calls for a betrayal of everything that manifests itself within the order of universal generality, and everything that manifests itself in general, the very order and essence of manifestation; namely, the essence itself ... Absolute duty demands that one behave in an irresponsible manner (by means of treachery or betrayal), while still recognizing, confirming, and reaffirming the very thing one sacrifices, namely, the order of human ethics and responsibility. In a word, ethics must be sacrificed in the name of duty. It is a duty not to respect, out of duty, ethical duty. One must behave not only in an ethical or responsible manner, but in a nonethical, nonresponsible manner, and one must do that in the name of duty.<sup>592</sup>

We have seen this above. Derrida thinks that the gift of justice to the singularity of the other is a duty beyond the duties of Kant's moral law, Rousseau's formalized compassion and Hegel's ethico-political laws. One cannot respond with an absolute responsibility to the uniqueness of the other if one is bound by

generalities and universality. One must sacrifice ethics, law and philosophy. A responsible decision is "heretical" because it is "... a dissident and inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule or doctrine."<sup>593</sup>

But as we have seen above, the general universal must be reinvented. Responsibility to the singularity of the other leaves out an infinite number of other others. Derrida points out:

As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request, love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can only respond by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all others. I offer a gift of death, I betray, I don't need to raise my knife over my son on Mount Moriah for that day. Day and night, at every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this world, I am doing that, raising my knife over what I love and must love, over those to whom I owe absolute fidelity, incommensurability.<sup>594</sup>

Every other is owed incommensurable responsibility. However, responsibility to any one entails the sacrifice of every other and ethics in general.

There is no justification for acting on one's responsibility for one other at the expense of all the other others:

What binds me to singularities, to this one or that one ... rather than that one or this one, remains finally unjustifiable ... These singularities represent others, a wholly other form of alterity: one other or some other person, but also ... animals ... How would you ever justify the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in the world to the cat that you feed at home every morning for years, whereas other cats die of hunger at every instant ... There is no language, no reason, no generality or mediation to justify this ultimate responsibility which leads me to absolute sacrifice ... the sacrifice of the most imperative duty (that which binds me to the other as a singularity in general) in favor of

another absolutely imperative duty binding me to every other.<sup>595</sup>

Once again, Derrida makes it clear that his ethico-political discussion apply to animals, in this case, his cat. There is no solution to the sacrifice of all the other others. This is the tragedy of existence. One can love every other and recognize that one is responsible for every other. However, one's decisions and actions necessarily restrict one's responsible response.

The best that one can do is to reinvent the universal duties and laws in order to be as responsible as possible to the other others. That is, one's decisions must attempt to be responsible to both the law of singularity and the law of universality.

Derrida writes:

Such is the *aporia* of responsibility: one always risks not managing to accede to the concept of responsibility in the process of forming it. For responsibility ... demands on the one hand an accounting, a general answering-for-oneself with respect to the general and before the generality, ... and, on the other hand, uniqueness, absolute singularity, ... What I am saying here about responsibility can also be said about decision.<sup>596</sup>

The undecidability of responsibility is due to the necessity of acting and deciding on the basis of two equally imperative duties. Kant and Hegel have thought morality and ethics on the basis of acting according to one imperative.<sup>597</sup> Derrida thinks that responsibility can only be experienced, as much as one can experience or think an *aporia*, as an *aporia*. It is the *aporia* of the incommensurable duties toward the singularity of the other,

who one happens to have experienced obligation towards at the time, and the other others, in the form of duty to the laws of the land, customs and values of the community, as well as to ethics, morality, and knowledge. One must answer for oneself before the law, before the others and their institutions. One must attempt to justify one's crime in sacrificing the economy of law and ethics for the sake of responsibility to the singularity of the other. One must attempt to justify one's subversion of universality. One must attempt to show that this decision was an attempt to be responsible both to the law of singularity and to the law of universality. Both laws must be incessantly reinvented in each decision if the "agent" is to be in any way called responsible, and if the other and other others are to be responded to justly and responsibly.

Just as the pure gift is restricted in constriction, Derrida thinks it is necessary that the gift be constricted in the ethico-political relation of the decision. It is necessary that one is also conscious of the gifts that one gives, that one is responsible for the gifts one gives and for those one receives.<sup>598</sup> This supplements what was described earlier about the necessary nonphenomenality of the gift and nonconsciousness of the passive decision.

The responsible relation to the other and the responsible decision includes all that has been argued above. The Husserlian

background of Derrida tells us that the sameness, symmetry and reciprocity of the definition of the selves are necessary for a meaningful recognition of the other as other. Respect for the other as other includes objective ethical values. At the same time, Derrida's Husserlian influence argues for the necessity of the inadequation of the lived experience of the other. The other is also beyond concept, knowledge and essence in its trace and singularity.

Derrida would not reject the formality of Rousseau's formalized compassion in the form of law. Compassionate laws can express the objective ethical values and meaning of respect for the other. They must be reinvented as representations of justice and responsibility in Derrida's sense, which is based in his Husserlian context.

As we have seen, Heidegger's thought of Being is one of responsibility for the other. Being is a linguistic representation of the other as other in its presence. Something like a discourse on Being is necessary for a responsible thought of the other in its presence. The discourse, however, must be supplemented by Derrida's discourse on the trace, gift and justice.

Derrida supplements Kant's thought of subjectivity and choice with his description of the passive decision, which brings the thought of the gift into the conception of a decision. In

this context, Derrida is critical of the idea that one can be regarded as absolutely responsible for one's responses to the other. There is the nonconsciousness of language, as we saw in the section on Rousseau, and the nonconsciousness of the trace as the very basis of the relation to the ideality of the self. Furthermore, the nonpresence to self, the lack of an intuition of the self, is necessary for the opening with the other and responsibility. So the condition of responsibility is the condition of the impossibility of absolute responsibility.

Still, Derrida argues that conscience and consciousness are required in order to respond responsibly for one's compassionate decisions. One must be conscious in order to calculate one's representations of the incalculable other. Therefore, Derrida's reinterpretation of Hegel assumes what has gone before in describing the aporia of singularity and universality, the nonphenomenal trace and the phenomenal, the pledge and the call of Being as presence, the gift and exchange, dissymmetry and symmetry, the incalculable and the calculable, the impossible and the possible.

In order to rethink Hegel's ethics and politics according to the affirmation of animals and natural singularities in general, the law of singularity and the law of universality must be reinvented incessantly. For example, instead of thinking of animals as things that we have the moral and ethical authority to

use, transform and kill at our discretion, we must think of them on the basis of Derrida's fundamental ethico-political aporia of the absolute duty to the law of singularity and the absolute duty to the law of universality. One's decision in response to/with the call of the other animal must give the gift of justice and promise of responsibility to the animal, the dog, for example, and, at the same time, give the gift of justice and pledge of duty to the laws of the land. Any decision would demand the reinvention of both laws within the uniqueness of the given context. In this context, the laws of the land would be reinvented in order to be just and responsible to the animals and other natural singularities within the borders of the given human political context.

We must also think animals as selves, that is, symmetrically in order to relate to them dissymmetrically. We must acknowledge a certain sameness of these others in some respects, even if it is only the sameness or universality of differentiating alterity, that is, the trace, as a basis for objective ethical values, which would offer nonhuman animals protection by suitable and relevant universal rights. Finally, we must think them in their Being, in order to linguistically represent their presencing as others and the differences amongst individuals and species.

## Conclusion

The main point of the first chapter on Husserl is to explain Derrida's notion of the trace as the opening of subjectivity to alterity. It is Derrida's attempt to provide an account of the condition of possibility for a relation with the other. His claim is that the relation with the other is irreducible. Autonomy must be rethought according to a fundamental conception of heteronomy. Heteronomy's possibility is in the spacing or general nonpresence of the trace. Nonpresence is also the very condition of the relation to self in the lived present now and lived experience. The opening to the other in general, as temporal nonpresence and the alterity of others, also includes the irreducibility of the alterity of death. The nonpresence of death is implied in the very meaning of the "I" because of the necessary impossibility of a full intuition of oneself in the statement "I am."

These forms of nonpresence are at work in one's relation to self. Therefore, a representation of the self is necessary. Since the ego is a sign, representation, and fiction, Derrida is attempting to *invent* a conception of the *self* that can correspond with and account for his experience and thought of responsibility. The conception of a subject must accommodate this level of responsibility. Derrida is clear that his thought of

responsibility applies to the world, Earth, animals, etc. His deconstructed Husserlian self gathers in the world, Earth, and others such that "Man" cannot be definitively delimited from other beings. Furthermore, the heteronomic "will" of man is constituted and commanded by these real others. In this context, Derrida is not only rethinking Husserl, but also objecting to those in the history of philosophy, such as Kant, who think pure auto-affective autonomy as a condition of freedom, responsibility, ethics, politics and humanity.

The second chapter on Husserl attempts to show some of the ethical implications of Derrida's Husserlian thought. Derrida deconstructs the Husserlian subject in order to think the necessity of the trace and nonpresence in the relation with the other as a basis for ethics and responsibility. And so, in this chapter, the ethical imperative of the inadequation of perception and intentionality is defended against the objections of Levinas. The meaning of the nonphenomenalization of the other must be thought. At the same time, however, one must recognize the necessity of phenomenology's descriptions of the presence of the others. Responsibility and respect for others require both alterity and essence. This anticipates the supplementary logic of undecidability that requires the imperatives of singularity and universality in order to invent a responsible decision.

Derrida also uses Husserl to respond to Levinas with the

claim that the ethical experience, or the condition of respect, responsibility and justice for the other, must begin with me. The relation to the other is irreducible. Contrary to the atomic pluralism of Levinas, the other is not absolutely exterior to me. This is the transcendental violence of the trace. At the same time, however, the other's lived experience is inaccessible to me, and, therefore, exterior. Derrida also argues for Husserl and against Levinas that the thought and recognition of the fundamental sameness of the egos is the condition of respect for the dissymmetry of the other. Derrida moves this in the direction of double dissymmetry, or the symmetry of asymmetry. Again, Derrida is thinking the aporia of universality and singularity as the condition of responsibility.

The distinction between man and animal is put into question again in this chapter with a discussion of "reason." It is also argued that since the self is a sign, ideality, and fiction, it should be attributed to animals in order to grant to them the universal ethical value of equality. One would then regard one's relations with animals symmetrically with regards to their presence, and symmetrically with regards to their nonpresence. This will grant them the objective ethical significance that supplements one's dissymmetrical relations with them. That is, they will be thought of as equally other.

Responsibility to animals and others demands a

deconstruction of those criteria that exclude nonhumans from inclusion within the question of justice. The main criterion is subjectivity. Thus, Derrida deconstructs the notions of subjectivity of many thinkers. Based on the thought of the trace as the condition of the relation with oneself and the relation with others, Derrida rethinks subjectivity according to the movements of ex-appropriation. He also argues that these structural movements are universal. Consequently, we ought to attempt to think of as many beings as humanly possible as subjects, according to their own types and individual uniqueness, and without teleological hierarchy. The unconditional affirmation of justice is the condition of this new thought of subjectivity as ex-appropriation. This infinitely differentiated conception of subjectivity is Derrida's attempt to account for his thought of responsibility, which makes humans, at the very least, irreducibly responsible for others of all kinds.

Based on the evidence provided by this essay, one can easily argue that although Habermas provided a faithful summary of a portion of Derrida's thought in his essay, entitled in English translation as "Beyond a Temporalized Philosophy of Origins: Jacques Derrida's Critique of Phonocentrism," his concluding remarks are an irresponsible caricature of that portion of Derrida's thought and of Derrida's thought as a whole. Habermas claims that Derrida's thought:

"achieves an inversion of Husserlian foundationalism inasmuch as the originative transcendental power of creative subjectivity passes over into the anonymous, history-making productivity of writing ... Derrida by no means breaks with the foundationalist tenacity of the philosophy of the subject: he only makes what it had regarded as fundamental depend on the still profounder—though now vacillating or oscillating—basis of an originative power set temporally aflow. Unabashedly, and in the style of *Ursprungsphilosophie*, Derrida falls back on this *Urshrift*, which leaves its traces anonymously, without any subject ... Derrida's deconstructions faithfully follow the movement of Heidegger's thought. Against his will, he lays bare the inverted foundationalism of this thought by once again going beyond the ontological difference and Being to the difference proper to writing, which puts an origin already set in motion yet one level deeper ... Derrida inherits the weaknesses of a critique of metaphysics that does not shake loose of the intentions of first philosophy. Despite his transformed gestures, in the end he, too, promotes only a mystification of palpable social pathologies; he, too, disconnects essential (namely, deconstructive) thinking from scientific analysis; and he, too, lands at an empty, formulalike avowal of some indeterminate authority. It is, however, not the authority of a Being that has been distorted by beings, but the authority of a no longer holy scripture ... a scripture that testamentarily documents the absence of the holy ... He, too, degrades politics and contemporary history to the status of the ontic and the foreground, so as to romp all the more freely, ... in the sphere of the ontological and the archewriting.<sup>599</sup>

Habermas would have us believe that Derrida's deconstructions destroy all conceptions of subjectivity, leaving as a remainder only anonymous traces, and the ruin of all forms of knowledge, meaning, sociality and politics. Habermas has clearly misconceived the intentions, results and implications of Derrida's thought. For the "arche-writing" of the trace is not a deeper foundation in the sense of a substantial origin, but an account of the impossibility of these types of foundationalisms.

Nor is it the degradation of the social, political or the sacred, but the condition of possibility of thinking, experiencing and living these concepts. Of course, it is the very possibility of increasing their scope.

The relation to self and other as ex-appropriation is made possible by the movement of the trace. What was assumed in the second chapter is made explicit in the third chapter, namely, that the possibility of "supplementarity" is universal. That is, animals, for example, would have the capacity for the sign, and therefore the capacity for a representation of self. In general, one might claim that self-consciousness is fundamentally a representation of self. Ultimately, one can claim that self-consciousness is simply an experience of a fictional representation of self. This structure would apply to humans and other species. The question of the supplement as the inclusion of the nonnatural into self-presence opens the strict delimitation that would separate man and nature based on the criterion of culture.

The distinction between humanity and animality proves to be aporetic due to the notion of articulation. Articulation is generalized beyond the usual linguistic context into the wider context of naming the movements of difference throughout one's entire experience of the world, as the condition of one's spatio-temporal experience, and as the articulation of the real and

conceptual differences between humans and every other form of life on Earth. The trace as articulation would be the supplement at the source of humanity and culture. According to Derrida, the trace as articulation would function on both sides of the distinction between humanity and animality. Therefore, the very traditional thought of distinguishing humanity from other animals according to the criterion of articulate speech is refuted. The articulate speaking subject is claimed to be the expression of the articulations of the trace that are functioning everywhere throughout the world, and doing so without teleological hierarchy. The languages or forms of communications used by various types of animals are regarded as equally articulate systems of differences and meanings. Similarly, there would be no teleologico-hierarchical evaluation of societies and cultures, including the myriad animal societies.

Derrida's claim of "originary articulation" in the referential web of the differences of the trace should be thought in conjunction with the notion of ex-appropriation. The result is that each entity that one experiences in the present, including oneself, is ultimately dissimulating the secret trace, the irreducible opening of exteriority into interiority. Therefore, what appears to be a self-contained entity, with a definite beginning and end, is ultimately a supplement within the system of supplements. Thus, there is no simple beginning or end, to

oneself, to human history, to a culture, to an ecosystem, etc. And there would be no thing itself.

The fact that one has a sign or representation of oneself assumes the faculty of imagination. With imagination, animals would have the condition of possibility of representing an idea of their own death. Heidegger, too, must admit that *Dasein's* Being-toward-death is also a representation, and therefore a fictional linguistic account, which substitutes signs, spoken or written, for the nonpresence of *Dasein's* death.

The imagination, as a function of the nonpresence of the trace, allows freedom of thought, which assumes the articulation of a difference and distance between one's present experiences and one's thoughts, memories and anticipations, all of which are representations. It is claimed that animals have this capacity.

Liberty takes another form, too, namely, the freedom for progress and self-improvement. Ultimately, Derrida rejects progress in the sense of teleologico-hierarchical advancement toward the truth of presence, from a simple origin to a more and more articulated and differentiated, final accomplishment. In the case of Rousseau, the beginning and end is the supplemental ideality of Nature. It is simply a "pro-regressional" movement without hierarchical advancement, and infinite repetition without end. Nature is ideality, a representation, a fictional supplement, never to be intuited in one's lived experience. And

so the accomplishment of humanity in animality is never lived, but moves *ad infinitum*. Nature, animality and humanity are aporetic concepts in Rousseau's text. One can claim, therefore, that there is no simple origin of humanity, and that human cultures have never clearly moved beyond animality. We must attempt to think of differences without hierarchy.

The "end" of humanity is aporetic. It is simply a supplemental point in the system of reference. Because of the attributes of signs and imagination, one could also claim that animals and others have the capacity for thinking of themselves as ends, and the power to project ends for themselves. However, these are still only fictional representations, and any "end" is ultimately another referential point in the system. This is a clear rejection of some of the systematic evaluations of other thinkers, such as Kant and Hegel, both of whom defended teleogico-hierarchical systems of thought in which humanity and their political cultures would accomplish the processes of nature and history.

Derrida's interpretation of the faculty of imagination is also critical to ethical thought. With the imagination, one identifies with the suffering of the other. As a function of the trace, imagination is the condition of possibility of compassion for others. The trace both opens the relation with the other and prevents a full appropriation of the other, including in one's

imagination and one's identification with the other. If one fully identified with the other's suffering, one would appropriate it. There would be no other. The suffering would be mine. In this way, the nonpresence of the trace is the condition of the difference with the other. The trace is therefore the condition of compassion.

For Rousseau, pity takes the form of justice as law, which applies only to humanity. Derrida argues for animal rights, for example, in the form of "emancipation battles." Animals live within our human societies, but they are excluded from any form of rights or justice. Derrida is calling for the inclusion of animals into our legal system. He also wants to think of animals and nature in terms of his own conception of justice. The boundaries of moral significance, Derrida claims, must be extended far beyond humanity. There is no justification for maintaining the moral significance of only humans, when many of the defining attributes of man, including autonomy, freedom, reason, imagination, passion, articulation, convention, society, relations with others, and self-consciousness have been proven to be aporetic, and even attributable, in infinitely differentiated ways, to animals. One can even claim that Derrida's thought argues for the possibility of attributing to animals infinitely differentiated experiences of justice, responsibility and compassion.

Rousseau claims that animals have no sense of time, and therefore he does not feel so bad about the treatment of animals. He assumes that they will forget the beatings they have taken, and what is in store for them. However, the universality of the trace opens animals to relationships with others, but also to the possibility of temporal experience. With the capacity of imagination, animals would have the capacity to represent to themselves the past and to anticipate the future. They might even imagine that violence against them could lead to death. This is also a response to Heidegger, who refuses to recognize temporal experience and a representation of death in the Being of animals.

More radically, Rousseau's texts imply that ethics and morality are already at work in nature, in the form of the moral laws that are inscribed in the hearts of animals. This thought could act as a supplement to Kant, who refused to attribute the moral law to animals. Furthermore, Rousseau also observed moral affects in animals. Derrida rejects any clear distinction between the moral affects in humans and the moral affects in dogs. Animals, therefore, are claimed to be moral creatures.

Finally, "imitation" is another aporetic concept which helps us think about ethics in this context. Rousseau argues that monkeys can only imitate virtuous deeds, since they do not know the good as such. But the "as such" is impossible in this world of the trace and supplements. And as we have seen above, the good

must be invented in the responsible decision. Furthermore, a human only ever has an image, sign, representation and fiction of the lived experience of the other's suffering. Therefore, morality and ethics have their possibility and impossibility in imagination, signification, and representation. I only ever have a representation of myself, of the other, and of justice. Laws are representations. Therefore, justice as the singularity and uniqueness of the other is unrepresentable.

One of the major issues in the chapter on Heidegger is that of the ethical relevance of the thought of Being. Derrida argues that the thought of Being is necessary as a thought of the other as other in its difference. So respect and responsibility for the other depends upon Heidegger's thought of Being. However, Derrida argues that the thought of Being must be supplemented for various reasons. First, if man is the only being who could name and speak Being, signs constitute the meaning of Being. Letting-be is performed through signification. Therefore, the thought of the Being of the other is ultimately only a representation, that is, fictional. And so the naming and thinking of death are also representations. Insofar as *Dasein's* "world" is the Being of entities, the spiritual world of *Dasein* is only a linguistic representation. Furthermore, Heidegger's representation of animals and his representation of the animal "world" are aporetic and contaminated by teleological values.

Finally, the limit of Being is its impossibility of thinking the gift, as the unconditional affirmation of the singularity of the other. Because the trace is universal, that is, including all beings, and the gift is a possibility of the trace, Derrida claims that animals and others exist with others in an unconditional affirmation, which pledges unconditional affirmation into the future. The basis of responsibility in the double affirmation is universal in Derrida's sense. At the very least, humans are responsible for their pledges of affirmation of all others with whom we are in relation.

Derrida explains the responsibility to the call of Being on the basis of double affirmation. The responsibility of the subjectivity of *Dasein* is therefore increased dramatically as it becomes essentially responsible for its responses to others as well as for its responses to the call of Being. *Dasein's* responsibility to the call of its own Being would be one facet of the process of the double affirmation. In this play of call and response, according to Derrida, the initiator and receiver of the call and response are undecidable. It is the unconditional affirmation of ex-appropriation in which the "I" is posited. Any move to reappropriate oneself in a structural process, such as Being-toward-death, *a priori* includes the irreducible relation with the other within one's very being. "I" would be undecidable for this reason. *Dasein's* return to self is interrupted. Any

projection of oneself or one's "end" irreducibly includes alterity, as the supplementarity of both representation and others.

Finally, Derrida rethinks Heidegger's notion of justice and responsibility on the basis of this interruption of the totality of the Being of the self. "Time is out of joint." Discord is the opening of the gift of justice and responsibility with others. Infinite responsibility must be recognized as the others of the world, including animals and other species, assign one's responsibility and meaning. This new responsibility also promises justice into the future and into the past.

According to Derrida, we have no justification in the Heideggerian context for excluding animals and others from "our" world. Animals and others constitute the new conception of "we" and the new conception of the spiritual "world" in which responsibilities are assigned by the gift's promise of double affirmation. The absolute distinction between *Dasein* and animality is disrupted in the deconstruction of Heidegger's Being-toward-death. The distinction between the authentic relation to death and other human representations of death breaks down, and with it the distinctions between the relation to death in human cultures and those in the various animal cultures. The interruption of absolute limits does not mean that there are no differences. Derrida argues that we must maintain the thought of

differences of death among all species of animals and humans, but we must not think them hierarchically, as if only humans would have a true relation with death. Derrida claims that all animals have relations with death. Furthermore, because of his thought of ex-appropriation as the universal relation to self and other, animals also partake of mourning and hospitality. Humans ought to regard the life and death of an animal with hospitality and hospitable mourning. Ex-appropriation guarantees this at one level. However, one must consciously assume that responsibility with the thought of Being and the thought of justice.

Furthermore, another consequence of the deconstruction of Being-toward-death is the interruption of the "anthropological border," which results in Derrida's claim that not only do various animals have societies and cultures, these societies are also political cultures. Therefore, animals are political. And the universal form of relations with others in ex-appropriation and the double affirmation are the conditions of what Derrida is naming a "politics of friendship," or what this essay is referring to as an eco-politics of responsibility.

In the chapter on Kant, one finds that the outcome of thinking subjectivity as ex-appropriation and double affirmation is the passive decision. Kant's notions of will and autonomy must be reinterpreted in the context of heteronomy. One's decision is responsible for the other as it arises with the gift.

The three aporias are also explained as the conditions of a responsible decision. Derrida's thought of the aporia of undecidability as the situation for the invention of a responsible political decision is defended from Critchley's misunderstanding of undecidability. Deconstruction and the decision made in the undecidable abyss are defended as inventive. They attempt to invent the other. They are political in so far as they recontextualize the political context.

This is contrasted with Kant's moral choices, which are determined on the basis of respect for the moral law. Derrida's decision is invented out of respect for the other human, dog, horse, etc. Derrida's ethics and politics exceed the duty of Kant. Derrida discusses various problems with Kant's respect for the moral law and duty. One of the issues is that Kant argues for the respect of the other only as an example of the moral law. For Derrida, it is a duty to act against duty. Furthermore, the moral law is not present. We only have representations of the moral law, which we invent. Finally, the origin of the command of the moral law is uncertain. This entails inevitable heteronomy. "Come" is the supplemental call from the other in ex-appropriation. In affirming the call of the other, one also unconditionally affirms oneself. In this scenario, the self and the self of the other are always other, always to come.

Derrida also argues for the interruption of self-

consciousness on the basis of his Husserlian deconstruction. Because of the interruption of the self, one is responsible for the other, but one cannot ever claim that one is absolutely responsible for oneself and for the other. Therefore, there is excessive responsibility, without an absolute "I" and without absolute responsibility. Furthermore, because of ex-appropriation, the moral agent/patient distinction is undecidable, in Critchley's sense.

Tim Hayward argues that Kant's thought is a reasonable basis for environmental ethics. Animals would benefit greatly even from the indirect duty. Hayward is correct, to an extent. However, if one thinks one's relations with animals on the basis of double affirmation as Derrida does, there are beneficial consequences for animals far beyond Kant's indirect duties. For example, one cannot justify animal cruelty in the form of experimentation.

Derrida rethinks Kant's Categorical Imperative as double affirmation. Therefore, the gift of justice to animals and others is a duty beyond Kantian duty. Derrida's thought of unconditional affirmation is the motivating force that leads to the deconstructions or recontextualizations of ethics, politics, laws and thought. Unconditional affirmation recontextualizes Kant's teleological system of nature, which includes rethinking the place of man's political culture as the "end" of nature. According to Kant, man "gives" himself ends, and gives himself as

the end of nature. However, this gift does not accord with Derrida's gift of unconditional affirmation of justice.

According to Derrida, the "end" of man is the promise to the alterity of man, namely animals and other beings of the world. Moreover, the experience of a fundamental compassion, in which one identifies in difference with the other animal, awakens us humans to our infinite responsibilities to animals and other living beings. Since compassion and responsibility are directly to and for other animals, Kant's ethics and politics must be recontextualized in order to be more inclusive.

Derrida discusses Kant's unjust conception of a horse. Kant has irresponsibly represented horses by supplementing their "internal finality" with "external finality" such that the very essence of a horse would be the instrument of man. Derrida argues that one ought not impose a representational "end" on a horse, or any other being. This inevitably restricts its becoming.

Derrida attempts to rethink and recontextualize Kant's political system of thought on the basis of unconditional affirmation as unconditional hospitality. This is the gift of justice as the responsibility to be prepared for the unexpected arrival of any other. One must unconditionally affirm the singularity of the other, and the singularity of alterity as it becomes.

We must eat. But we must eat well, Derrida tells us. We will

inevitably use, consume and, therefore, treat what we eat as "instruments" of our survival and health. However, we must treat these plants and animals and others as justly and as responsibly as possible, as ends in themselves at all times. If we must kill, and kill we must, we must do so as hospitably as possible. We must also mourn the other with great respect. This would inevitably call for the invention of new customs, rules and laws regarding the treatment of all living beings.

The section on Hegel begins with a discussion of the state as the actualization of consciousness. For Hegel, man is an "end" and has the ability to impose his will on things, including animals. Animals are things and have no right to life because they have no will, and because their relations to self are external. The trace, however, does two things. It opens the internal spiritual unity of man to the externalities of nature and matter. And it permits the opening of externality into internality, thereby opening something of a spiritual unity in animals in ex-appropriation. We have already discussed interiority, will, autonomy and ends in other contexts, the results of which apply here. The end of man is determined by other beings. And the intrinsic value of humans is also opened by other beings. Ex-appropriation gathers in the supplementary call of the other natural singularity. This call of the other is a call for justice and responsibility, which would reinvent Hegel's

ideas concerning man's right to transform, violate and destroy natural singularities in appropriation. Derrida's thought promotes the right to life of animals and others. Propriation and appropriation are existential facts. They are movements of ex-appropriation. But Kant, Hegel and others have emphasized appropriation too much. Their systems of thought and the consequences of their systems of thought lead to unnecessary violences against animals and natural singularities. Derrida's unconditional affirmation calls for a limit to appropriation. Furthermore, a sense of intrinsic value is saved in Derrida's thought since the trace of the other, including that of other animals, will always expropriate appropriation.

Derrida also expands on his thinking of the gift in his readings of Hegel. He argues that the gift gives rise to dialectical movement, even though dialectics cannot think the gift as unconditional affirmation, but only as exchange. For Derrida, Hegel's texts reveal the gift before all present things, including human subjectivity. The gift as the disseminating force of unconditional affirmation is sacrificed to the gift as exchange, debt and presence. Derrida reveals to us that ex-appropriation is the matrix of the movement of philosophical thought. Hegel's descriptions of the dialectical movements do not account for ex-appropriation as gift and constriction. Because of this, Hegel's thought assumes the violent repression of natural

singularities. Ethics and politics are based in the sacrifice of nature and animals.

When one does think ex-appropriation, gift and constriction, as the basis of dialectical thought, one understands that the trace's gift is the condition of passage from one moment of consciousness to the next, from animality to ethics and the political. The claim that comes from Derrida's text is that the opening of ethics and politics is not the sacrifice of nature, but the unconditional affirmation of nature. Therefore, the condition of human ethics and politics is responsibility for natural singularities. Derrida's thought is calling for the reinterpretation and recontextualization of all theories and applications of science, philosophy, ethics, politics and law on the basis of justice and responsibility for all living beings, including animals, plants, and insects.

Derrida further explains the conditions of a responsible ethico-political decision. In this context it is made clear that Derrida's responsible decision includes the respectful reinvention of both the law of universality and the law singularity. Any context must be recontextualized politically on the basis of the passive decision, which fulfils its duty both to the singularity of the other, dog, cat, hare, horse, etc., and the universal, laws, customs, general public, etc.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> Niall Lucy, *Debating Derrida*, Melbourne: University Press, 1995, p. 15.
- <sup>3</sup> John D. Caputo, *Against Ethics* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 5.
- <sup>4</sup> John D. Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida* New York: Fordham University Press, 1997, p. 53.
- <sup>5</sup> Simon Critchley, "The Question of the Question: An Ethico-Political Response to a note in Derrida's *De l'esprit*." *Of Derrida, Heidegger, and Spirit* Ed. David Wood. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1993, p. 101.
- <sup>6</sup> Arran E. Gare, *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis* London: Routledge, 1995, p. 97.
- <sup>7</sup> David Harvey. *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 8.
- <sup>8</sup> V.A. Conley, *Ecopolitics: The Environment in Poststructuralist Thought* London: Routledge, 1997, p. 9.
- <sup>9</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* trans. C. Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 2-3.
- <sup>10</sup> Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic" *Ethics in Practice: An Anthology* Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 1997, p. 642.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 636.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 634.
- <sup>13</sup> Eric Katz, "The Call of the Wild: The Struggle Against Domination and the Technological Fix of Nature" *Postmodern Environmental Ethics* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 164.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.
- <sup>15</sup> Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, Cambridge: University Press, 1993, p. 55.
- <sup>16</sup> J. Baird Callicot, "The Search for an Environmental Ethic" *Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy* Ed. Tom Regan. New York: Random House, 1980, p. 395.
- <sup>17</sup> Peter Singer, "Animals and the Value of Life," *Matters of Life and Death*, p. 355.
- <sup>18</sup> Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 71.
- <sup>19</sup> Tim Hayward, *Ecological Thought: An Introduction* Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 6.
- <sup>20</sup> John Llewelyn, *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- <sup>21</sup> Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement" *Philosophy For A New Generation* Ed. A.K. Bierman and J.A. Gould. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1977, p. 154.
- <sup>22</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Force de loi: le 'fondement mystique de l'autorité'" *New York: Cardozo Law Review*. Vol. 11. no. 5-6, July/Aug, 1990, p. 952.
- <sup>23</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Altérités*. Ed. Pierre-Jean Labarri et al. Paris: Osiris, 1986, p. 70.
- <sup>24</sup> Jacques Derrida, "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)" *Trans. David Wills. Critical Inquiry* 28 (Winter 2002) p. 396.
- <sup>25</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Il faut bien manger, ou le calcul du sujet: entretien (avec J.L. Nancy) *Points de suspension, Entretiens*. Paris: Editions Galilée, 1992, p. 294. "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject," *Points ... Interviews, 1974-1994* Ed. E. Weber. *Trans. Peggy Kamuf et al.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 255-287.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 292.

<sup>27</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié* Paris: Galilée, 1994, p. 309.

<sup>28</sup> Derrida, *Animal*, p. 396.

<sup>29</sup> Husserl writes:

"... the alliance of difference and identity—which is no longer an enigma for us, but has been clarified—between the psychological ego (the human ego that is made worldly in the spatiotemporal world) and the transcendental ego, its ego-life and its accomplishment ..." *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 205.

<sup>30</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Le voix et le phénomène: introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967, p. 40/37.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 48/43.

<sup>32</sup> John D. Caputo, "The Economy of Signs in Husserl and Derrida: From Uselessness to Full Employment," *Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida* Ed. John Sallis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 100-101.

<sup>33</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 84/75.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 65/58.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 85/76.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 89/79,80.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 68/61.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 68/61.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 55,56/50.

<sup>41</sup> Henry Staten, *Wittgenstein and Derrida* Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1984, p. 22-23.

<sup>42</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 57,58/52.

<sup>43</sup> Staten correctly writes:

"Following Heidegger, Derrida sees the principle of the Now-point as defining classical metaphysics, the "metaphysics of presence," which has determined the form of the entity as presence in the Now, the Now as "the intemporal kernel of time," and time itself as the not-now and therefore not-being." p. 19.

<sup>44</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 70/62.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 72/64.

<sup>46</sup> Husserl writes:

"Our focus on the world of perception ... gives us ... only the temporal mode of the present; this mode itself points to its horizons, the temporal modes of past and future. Recollection, above all exercises the intentional function of forming the meaning of the past—apart from the fact that perception itself, as the "flowing-static" present, is constituted only through the fact that the static "now" ... has a horizon with two differently structured sides, known in intentional language as a continuum of retentions and protentions. These first prefigurations of temporalization and time, however, remain in the background. In the recollection founded upon them we have before us, in original intuition, a past—a present which has passed." *Crisis*, p. 168-169.

I would agree with Staten's following estimate:

"We could take this moment in Derrida's critique of Husserl as the opening to the deconstructive divagation from classical philosophy. Husserl himself prepared the way for Derrida; even though Husserl maintains the privilege of the Now in classical fashion, the concept of retention of a past Now within the present Now provides Derrida with the basic structure he will adapt for his own purposes. It is what he calls the trace." Staten, p. 19.

And Caputo correctly writes:

"According to Derrida, Husserl discovered this more radical repetition but

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always kept it under the close guard of a metaphysics of presence. The aim of deconstruction, then, is to liberate Husserl's own most radical discoveries ..." Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 121.

<sup>47</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 73/65.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74/66.

<sup>49</sup> Caputo claims:

"In defending the rights of signs to useful work--against Husserl's intentions-Derrida likewise defends the rights of things themselves--against his own intentions ..." Caputo, *Economy of Signs*, p 108. To disagree with Caputo, Derrida argues that we can never, ever, "fully" know any other. Furthermore, the lived experience of the other human is unknown to me! Furthermore, the sign is paradigmatic of that which would be beyond Being and beyond the fully present thing-itself.

<sup>50</sup> "That is not a difference in principle. Retention and reproduction are but variant degrees of representation, different only in virtue of the extent to which they are differentiated from the simple now-impression." Caputo, *Economy of Signs*, p. 102.

<sup>51</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 75/67.

<sup>52</sup> Staten explains the trace and *différance*:

"The essentially divided essence has a trace structure. The trace is the retention within the same of the reference to an other which itself has never been present. The trace structure is the transcendental structure of experience; no this-here is given to experience except as its identity is marked by *différance*, by reference to a not-this and a not-now. The trace structure, as the structure of the Now and of the sign, is the possibility of experience and meaning." p. 53.

<sup>53</sup> The major claim that Derrida is making here is that the finite movement of the trace and all of the implications of nonpresence and alterity, or, contamination with otherness in general, are the conditions of those aspects of Being which have been revered as absolute, eternal and other-worldly. The trace would be the condition of the conceptions of the other world, just as it is the very condition of one's experience of the "world" and Earth.

<sup>54</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 76/68.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68,69/77.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93/83.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93/84.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 94,95/85.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95/85.

<sup>62</sup> Derrida quotes Husserl:

We can only say that *this flux is something which we name in conformity with what is constituted*, but it is nothing temporally 'Objective.' It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be denoted metaphorically as 'flux,' as a point of actuality, primal source-point, that from which springs the 'now,' and so on. In the lived experience of actuality, we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation ... For all this, names are lacking ... (ITC, § 36; ET, p. 100; italics added). *Ibid.*, p. 94/84, no. 1.

<sup>63</sup> This should be enough to demonstrate to John H. Smith that Derrida does, in fact, recognize the significance of and discuss the notion of "will". See John H. Smith, "Of Spirit(s) and Will(s)" in *Hegel After Derrida* Ed. Stuart Barnett. New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 64-90. Smith argues that Derrida's project ignores the will in general and takes up the issue with Derrida's reading of Hegel. We should also note that this question of the de-

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constitution of the will and its relevance to making a responsible decision is thoroughly discussed in Derrida's *The Politics of Friendship*. Trans. George Collins. New York: Verso, 1997.

<sup>64</sup> Merleau-Ponty wrote:

As Husserl stated in his last years, the last subjectivity, philosophical, ultimate, radical subjectivity, which philosophers call *transcendental*, is an *intersubjectivity*. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "*Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man*" in *The Primacy of Perception*, trans., 1964. Derrida is clearly in agreement with Merleau-Ponty and Husserl on this general point. However, Derrida's view of intersubjectivity and subjectivity would be more in tune with Merleau-Ponty who wrote:

"If we now wish to characterize a subject capable of this perceptual experience, it obviously will not be a self-transparent thought, absolutely present to itself without the interference of its body and its history. The perceiving subject is not this absolute thinker; rather, it functions according to a natal pact between our body and the world ..." "An Unpublished Text" *The Primacy of Perception* Ed. James M. Edie. Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 6.

<sup>65</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 95/85.

<sup>66</sup> Staten writes:

The trace as a "retention" in the "minimal unit of temporal experience" fundamentally displaces the privilege of the Now as intemporally present form of time, ... by the relation ... to a not-now that inhabits the Now, and then by the relation to a constitutive outside in general--that is, by the relation to a whole series of determinations of the outside, such as space, materiality, animal nature, ... all of which have been classically defined as the Other . p. 19-20.

<sup>67</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 95/85.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96/86.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12/12.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13/13.

<sup>73</sup> With this one sees it is clear that Derrida is claiming that the spacing of the trace in the transcendental ego's internal temporality of the now opens the transcendental and natural self to the appearance and the existence of the world, but also of nature in general and the Earth. The biosphere would be constitutive of the human self. Staten, on the other hand, would claim that Derrida is simply concerned with pointing out to Husserl that one's experience is not all clearly and distinctly perceivable and idealizable because of the inescapable work of indefiniteness or flux. Staten writes:

"This "outside" or worldliness would be, not the exteriority of a material object, but the exteriority of nonessence, of what is not reducible to the act or correlate of wakeful consciousness."

*Wittgenstein and Derrida*, p. 57.

But as we have seen, spacing of the trace opens the solitary mental life to all that it had tried to exclude, namely, the empirical world. Caputo writes:

"The destructibility of the world is not merely a surface disruption, which would only clear the way to a deeper reorganization of experience, but also a radical one in which there just would not be a world any longer. (Hua III.191/*Ideas I* 109)"

Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project*, p. 143.

The empirical world, then, is at stake as that which we experience in its existence and as that which constitutes the subjectivity.

<sup>74</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 96/86. This anticipates the later discussion of "ex-

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appropriation." Also, what one had thought as the solitary voice of one's own ego is always already the voice of the other, human, animal, earth, etc., since the "voice" is open to and gathers in the world.

<sup>75</sup> Michael E. Zimmerman, "Quantum Theory, Intrinsic Value, and Pantheism," *Postmodern Environmental Ethics* ed. M. Oelschlaeger. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 278.

<sup>76</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 98/88.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99/89.

Husserl writes of his *Logical Investigations*:

"in which for the first time, the *cogitata qua cogitata*, as essential moments of each conscious experience as it is given in genuine inner experience, comes into their own immediately to dominate the whole method of intentional analysis. Thus "self-evidence ... is made a problem for the first time, freed from the privilege given to scientific evidence and broadened to mean original self-giving in general." *Crisis*, p. 234.

The trace would be the condition of possibility of the flow of inner experience and self-giving. It would also be the condition of possibility and impossibility of the unity of the intentional meanings that one gives oneself. The trace as repetition is the power of the sign which substitutes for the lack of intuition of the self.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100/90.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102/92.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102,103/92.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103/92.

<sup>85</sup> One cannot completely intuit an object. And this absence of intuition is the opening to and necessity of signs and meaning. Husserl writes:

"In the alteration of the manners of appearance, ... they are conscious of "the" things, the relations, likewise the persons and groups of persons ... and they are conscious of them as the same but appearing now one way, now another, to them and different persons." *Crisis*, p. 318.

<sup>86</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 104/93.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105/94.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106/95.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107/96.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106/95.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> This is the basis for Derrida's ethical approach that includes the undecidability of both the universal and the singular. Derrida is not interested in "mixing" these values that have been traditionally

regarded as opposites. Rather, Derrida's intention is to demonstrate that these "opposites" do not "blend" in their aporetic relation with one another. Furthermore, each of these values must be affirmed at the same time.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106-7/95.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107-8/96-97.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108/97.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109/98.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110/98.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110/99.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111/99.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111-2/99.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113/100-1.

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 113/101.

<sup>104</sup> Staten puts it wonderfully:

"The value and necessity of pure concepts and categories are not denied, but they are no longer the last word. We no longer simply note and then set aside the factual or empirical contamination of our unities, but see that they are impure always and in principle, and pursue the implications of this essential law of impurity." p. 19.

<sup>105</sup> Derrida, *voix*, p. 114/101.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., p. 114/102.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Frederick Ferré, "Personalistic Organicism: Paradox or Paradigm?" *Philosophy and the Natural Environment* Ed. R. Attfield and A. Belsey. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1994, p. 65.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>111</sup> According to the summary of Christina Howells:

"while attempting to preserve the key notion of intentionality, Levinas misrepresents Husserl on both questions of adequation and that of the relationship of the *cogito* to the infinite ... Finally, Derrida contests Levinas's interpretation of the phenomenological *alter ego*. Christina Howells, *Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 26.

<sup>112</sup> Derrida, "Violence et métaphysiques", p. 120/177.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p. 121/178.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 121-2/178-9.

<sup>117</sup> Derrida acknowledges a sense of the necessity of both alterity as singularity and universality in the works of Kierkegaard, that is, a relation to the other beyond concept but with ethical law and concept. VM, p. 110.

<sup>118</sup> Of course, this meaning of the other is transcendental ideality. It is infinitely repeatable within a horizon which is infinitely inadequate to the other. Secondly, ideality implies that a fulfilling intuition of the other is impossible in principle. Finally, no such intuition is possible in principle because of the inadequation of perception and intentionality to the other or object and because of the impossibility of experiencing the lived experience of the other.

<sup>119</sup> Howell points out:

"In *De la grammatologie* Derrida insists that he is not "rejecting" logocentric notions of meaning and intelligibility ... because nothing is thinkable without them. *Phenomenology*, p. 128.

Christopher Norris writes:

"This squares with what I have said about Derrida's stress on the need to keep faith with enlightened reason, to think through the problems of the epistemological tradition, even while essaying that tradition's limits." *Derrida*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 234.

Jean-Luc Nancy discusses this point within the context of a rigorous discussion of the sense of duty in Derrida's thought. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Free Voice of Man," *Retreating the Political* Ed. Simon Sparks. London: Routledge, 1997, p. 41.

This all points to the fact that some commentators have recognized the importance of the ethical and the epistemological in the thought of Derrida. Of course, acting on these meanings, especially as if they were essentially complete or "adequate", is the very possibility of violent interaction with others. As we will see, Derrida argues that we must reinvent concepts, meanings, and laws in each decision we make in order to attempt to be just and

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responsible to the other.

<sup>120</sup> VM, p. 122/179.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 123/181.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 123-4/180-2.

<sup>124</sup> Holmes Rolston III has commented that the traditional view of subjectivity and those who would be valuable to subjects are those who would have "insides." "Value in Nature and the Nature of Value" *Philosophy and the Natural Environment*, Cambridge: The University of Cambridge, 1994, p. 29.

<sup>125</sup> Howell has claimed that Derrida's interpretation of the transcendental subjectivity runs throughout his project. She claims that it seems closer to the structuralist non-subject than a radically deconstructed subject. Finally, she claims that Derrida moves from the "I" to the "we." *Deconstruction*, p. 127,135,137. I would respond that Derrida's deconstructed subject is, in fact, a responsible subject who is essentially in relation to the other in such a way that the "I" is a "we" in intersubjectivity and originary sociality. This is implied and expressed from the very beginning of Derrida's work and runs throughout his project.

<sup>126</sup> VM, p. 124/182-3.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 124/183.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 125/183.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 125/183-184.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p. 125/184.

<sup>131</sup> Of course, Husserl does not fully recognize it either, since only Derrida elaborates the notion of the "trace" and its consequences within Husserl's context. In fact, Derrida adopts the term "trace" from Levinas and radicalizes it within the Husserlian discourse.

Peter Quigley is critical of Derrida, whom he categorizes as a "postmodern" thinker. He claims that Derrida and the postmodernists may be helpful "... for challenging the hierarchical assumptions of our relations with the living and the nonliving things, but not as a basis for the cosmic administration of violence." "Rethinking Resistance: Environmentalism, Literature, and Poststructural Theory." *Postmodern Environmental Ethics* Ed. Max Oelshlager, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 181.

Of course, Derrida is attempting to understand the relation to the other and the necessary "violence" involved in order to minimize empirical violences. Of course, there is a certain violence at the heart of language, for example, describing the unique with general concepts. But language does not subsume all experience within its system. And this is an issue on which Derrida may differentiate himself from other "postmoderns."

<sup>132</sup> VM, p. 125/184.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> This disagrees with Stephen Clark who has argued that respect for the world is based in a Levinasian ethical logic of world as other. "Global Religion," *Philosophy and the Natural Environment*, p. 126. Clark even writes that we must think the world as other than the human world. But he does not point out the importance of symmetry and dissymmetry. Howell has noted the importance of the symmetrical relationship and Derrida's critique of Levinas for not recognizing it as the condition of meaning. *Deconstruction*, p. 126.

As Cornell puts it: "Ethical asymmetry, then, must operate within phenomenological "symmetry" if it is to be ethical." *The Philosophy of the Limit* London: Routledge, 1992, p. 85.

<sup>137</sup> VM, p. 126/185.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid. Norris puts this point into its historical context with reference to the mastery of the other by way of dialectical reason, from Socrates to Hegel. Derrida, p. 231.

<sup>140</sup> VM, p. 126/186.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, p. 126-7/186.

<sup>142</sup> Derrida writes:

"The Stranger in the *Sophist* who, like Levinas, seems to break with Eleatism in the name of alterity, knows that alterity can be thought only as negativity, and ... can be said only as negativity ... that differing from Being, the other is only relative ... which does not prevent it from being an *eidos* ... that is, from being the same as itself ..." VM, p. 127/186.

<sup>143</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy writes:

"It is not even a question of reintroducing an Other into the originary sphere; it is a matter of an alterity or Otherness of the ego in its egoity and even before any *alter ego*. "The Free Voice of Man," p. 49.

This is clear from the previous chapter.

<sup>144</sup> VM, p. 128/188.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 128-9/188-9.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 129/189.

<sup>147</sup> Husserl has written the following:

"Reason is the specific characteristic of man ... Human personal life proceeds in stages of self-reflection and self-responsibility ... to shape oneself into the true "I," the free, autonomous "I" which seeks to realize his innate reason ... and also the necessity of allowing individual-personal reason to come to ever more realization only as communal-personal reason and vice versa ... [Philosophy would have the function of] ... making possible mankind's development into a personal autonomy and into an all-encompassing autonomy for mankind—the idea which represents the driving force of life for the highest stage of mankind ... it is *ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation* ... But finally it discovers that this rationality is an idea residing in the infinite and is *de facto* necessarily [only] on the way ... [And] ... It is precisely with this ... [distinction between traditional philosophy and transcendental philosophy] ... that there begins a philosophy with the deepest and most universal self-understanding of the philosophizing ego as the bearer of absolute reason coming to itself, of the same ego implicating, in his apodictic being-for-himself, his fellow subjects and all possible fellow philosophers; [this is] the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity (objectified in the world as the whole of mankind), as that in which reason, in obscurity, in elucidation, in the movement of lucid understanding, is in infinite progress; ... mankind understanding itself as rational, understanding that it is rational in seeking to be rational; that this signifies an infinity of living and striving toward reason; that reason is precisely that which man *qua* man, in his innermost being, is aiming for ... that being human is teleological being and an ought-to-be ..." *Philosophy as Mankind's Self-Reflection; the Self-Realization of Reason* in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 338-341.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Referring to the ego, Husserl has written:

"it follows *eo ipso* that nothing human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life nor real psychophysical human being ..." *Crisis*, p. 183.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 277.

<sup>151</sup> Husserl writes:

Thus the attitude which is oriented toward men and animals is a new one--...as men (or animals) who have their bodies as living bodies, who have their personal surrounding world, oriented around their living bodies as the near-far world ... *Crisis*, p. 331.

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<sup>152</sup> Derrida, "The Almost Nothing of the Unpresentable" *Points*, p. 79.

<sup>153</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 336.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>155</sup> Frodeman claims that his postmodernist view of absolute respect for difference is incoherent. That is, postmodern thinkers such as Derrida suffer from the: "failure to distinguish which differences make a difference" "Radical Environmentalism and the Political Roots of Postmodernism: Differences That Make a Difference" *Postmodern Environmental Ethics*, p. 125. Derrida's perspective clearly differs on this matter. Responsibility becomes excessive. We will see in later chapters that one must make decisions in which sacrifices must be made. That is, Derrida's thought also recognizes the necessity of violence, subordination, hierarchy, exploitation, which Frodeman claims are fundamental to the thought of Naess and other Deep Ecologists. Derrida would simply attempt to be as ethical as possible within those parameters. For sacrifices must be made in an ethical decision. Finally, Frodeman mistakenly thinks that Derrida does not differentiate amongst differences, as if Derrida does not celebrate the uniqueness of each being and each context.

<sup>156</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 338.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 338-341.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>159</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Force de loi: le "fondement mystique de l'autorité," Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, New York: Cardozo Law Review, 1990, p. 953.

<sup>160</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, BK III ix, trans. T.A. Sinclair, London: Penguin Group, 1962, p. 195-6.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>162</sup> Derrida writes:

"Such a dissymmetry and infinite alterity would have no relation to what Aristotle would have called inequality or superiority. They would indeed be incompatible with all sociopolitical hierarchy *as such*. It would therefore be a matter of thinking an alterity without hierarchical difference at the root of democracy ...this democracy would free a certain interpretation of equality ..." *Politics of Friendship* London: Verso, 1997, p. 232.

<sup>163</sup> Derrida, *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 65.

<sup>164</sup> Jacques Derrida, "The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida" *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, Fordham: University Press, 1997, p. 14.

<sup>165</sup> There is always the question of the anthropocentrism. Derrida says that we can never completely get beyond it. All that we can do is strategically work through it in an attempt to get beyond its inherent violences. (see Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. For this is "my" experience of the world as a human being. A dog would have "her" experience of the world as a dog. Mary Midgely argues that what is necessary to save the planet and other species is the very thing which is necessary to save humans. Therefore, an anthropocentric view would not necessarily be a bad thing. "The End of Anthropocentrism?" *Philosophy and the Natural Environment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 103-112. True, however, Derrida is concerned with justice and responsibility as one relates to individual beings, as well as to various senses of universality. Thus, aspects of anthropocentric thought must be overturned.

<sup>166</sup> Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, p. 231.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup> Derrida, *Eating well*, p. 270.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261.

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- <sup>171</sup> Eating well, p. 268.
- <sup>172</sup> Eating well, p. 268.
- <sup>173</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 272.
- <sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 261.
- <sup>176</sup> Ibid., p. 274.
- <sup>177</sup> Ibid., p. 261.
- <sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. 261.
- <sup>179</sup> Ibid., p. 269.
- <sup>180</sup> Interestingly, Charles Darwin himself not only recognized a kinship of all of life, but he also attempted to think "evolution" without the prejudice of hierarchy, higher and lower, etc. Roderick Nash, *The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, p. 42.
- <sup>181</sup> Ibid., p. 272.
- <sup>182</sup> Ibid., p. 286.
- <sup>183</sup> Derrida, "A "madness" must watch over thinking," *Points*, p. 360.
- <sup>184</sup> Derrida, "Choreographies," *Points*, p. 107.
- <sup>185</sup> Derrida, Eating well, p. 284.
- <sup>186</sup> Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, p. 278.
- <sup>187</sup> One of the main points that Peter Singer tries to get across is that to treat animals equally, humans ought to relate to nonhuman animals according to the principle of equal consideration of interests. And one should approach the interests of the other animals based on their suffering. In this context, he quotes the immensely powerful passage of Bentham:  
"The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum*, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a fullgrown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, can they reason? Nor can they talk? but, *can they suffer?*" Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 55-57.
- <sup>188</sup> Derrida, *Force of Law*, p. 953.
- <sup>189</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'originalité parmi les homes. Les Integrales de Philo: Rousseau*. Nathan: Paris, 1998, p. 60, 61.
- <sup>190</sup> Jacques Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, Paris: Minuit, 1967, p. 335.
- <sup>191</sup> Ibid., p 207. *Of Grammatology* trans. G. Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1976, p. 144.  
Cornell writes:  
"Derrida uncovers in the Rousseauist vision of equals forming themselves into a community in the burst of life of the festival ... the dream of life without difference and indeed life without mediation. In the dream, the participants are fully present to one another in a direct meeting of equals ... The festival is an originary ritual which allows for a nonviolent opening of ethics."  
Drucilla Cornell, *The Philosophy of the Limit*, Routledge: New York/London, 1992, p. 50.
- <sup>192</sup> The thought of the supplement must be taken into consideration when the issue of man's relation to nature arises. Rousseau, like many ecological and

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environmental thinkers, sees Nature or wildlife as pure and fully itself only when it has not been in any way disturbed by "human culture." This obviously assumes that man and his cultures are not natural. It also assumes a pure presence of a "wildlife" ecosystem, for example, whose integrity and properness can be disseminated by the non-natural human and his artifacts. The project of Derrida offers an attempt to overcome this approach to thinking this traditional view of the relation between man and nature. Attfield discusses these notions of Nature and Man's relation to it within the context of Mill, Elliot, Katz, Sylvan, Callicot, Leopold, and Rolston. Because Derrida argues for the basis of both culture and nature in supplementarity, conceptually and in "reality," the rehabilitation of an ecosystem would be a question of respect, responsibility and justice, rather than a problem of thinking this "man-made" wetland, for example, as a technology or "artifact." Robin Attfield, "Rehabilitating Nature and Making Nature Habitable." *Philosophy and the Natural Environment* Ed. Robin Attfield and A. Belsey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 45-58.

To say that Nature, too, is subject of supplementarity is to admit that what we refer to as Nature is heavily influenced by how we conceive of it. Our representations are ultimately fictive. The concept of Nature is therefore fictive. For a discussion of the "fetishizing" of "Nature" by Locke and Rousseau, see Peter Quigley's "Rethinking Resistance," *Postmodern Environmental Ethics*. As Norris points out:

"Derrida finds this Rousseauist mythology of origins and presence still very much at work in the modern sciences of man." *Derrida*, p. 127, 128.

<sup>193</sup> OG, p. 144.

<sup>194</sup> OG, p. 163.

Irene Harvey, "Doubling the space of Existence: Exemplarity in Derrida—the Case of Rousseau," *Deconstruction and Philosophy: the texts of Jacques Derrida*, Ed. John Sallis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 62.

Harvey correctly writes:

"... Rousseau is a good example for Derrida in the following respect. Rousseau's texts, in their overt, explicit denunciations of writing and privileging of the the voice, the subject and immediacy in general, also have a covert, unintended, implicit side or aspect (performative side) which does not cohere with or support the overt side. These two aspects of the text Derrida refers to as the *declared* (thematized) and the described, undeclared and unthematized. Together they exhibit a peculiar "logic," a peculiar law of textuality ..."

<sup>195</sup> See Dg, p. 227. Derrida argues that Rousseau had inherited his language and concepts. The tradition imposes itself on the thinker while the thinker brings some uniqueness to this inheritance. So a writer both dominates and is dominated by the tradition. This, of course, also applies to Derrida.

<sup>196</sup> OG, p. 245.

<sup>197</sup> OG, p. 62.

<sup>198</sup> OG, p. 51.

<sup>199</sup> OG, p. 47.

<sup>200</sup> For a concise discussion of this topic,

see Geoffrey Bennington, "The Sign," in *Jacques Derrida*, Trans. G. Bennington. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 23-41.

<sup>201</sup> Dg, p. 68,69/OG, p. 46, 47.

See Rodolphe Gasché. "Infrastructures and Systematicity." *Deconstruction and Philosophy*, p. 3-20. This is a very insightful essay which explains the Husserlian heritage of the trace. The author defends deconstruction from the charges of nihilism and anarchy. Instead, the arche-synthesis-trace-supplement provides an account for constitutive contradictions. However, Gasché seems to emphasize "structure" over movement, and "infra" or "inter" with regards to

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these structural movements. See also *Le tain du miroir: Derrida et la philosophie de la réflexion*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1986.

<sup>202</sup> Dg, p. 69/47.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p. 69/47.

<sup>204</sup> Dg, p. 215

<sup>205</sup> Dg, p. 261.

<sup>206</sup> OG, p. 229.

<sup>207</sup> OG, p. 225.

<sup>208</sup> OG, p. 240.

<sup>209</sup> OG, p. 145.

<sup>210</sup> Dg, p. 335.

<sup>211</sup> OG, p. 229.

<sup>212</sup> OG, p. 315.

<sup>213</sup> OG, p. 304.

<sup>214</sup> Dg, p. 68.

<sup>215</sup> Dg, p. 308.

<sup>216</sup> Dg, p. 442.

<sup>217</sup> OG, p. 298.

<sup>218</sup> Dg, p. 429/OG, p. 303.

<sup>219</sup> Dg, p. 55.

<sup>220</sup> OG, p. 248.

<sup>221</sup> Dg, p. 96.

<sup>222</sup> OG, p. 229.

<sup>223</sup> OG, p. 244, 245.

<sup>224</sup> OG, p. 167.

<sup>225</sup> Dg, p. 429.

<sup>226</sup> OG, p. 251.

<sup>227</sup> Caputo has a different understanding of Derrida's conclusions on signs. He writes:

"Derrida regards this attempt to set humanity off as something higher than animals as a hallmark of metaphysics. But he will certainly agree that the human use of signs is vastly superior to that of animals. His point is that this superiority is a difference in degree rather than a neat categorical difference, without overlap or partial convergence." "The Economy of Signs in Husserl and Derrida." *Deconstruction and Philosophy: the texts of Jacques Derrida*, p. 112, note # 4.

<sup>228</sup> OG, p. 62.

<sup>229</sup> Dg, p. 91, 92/OG, p. 62.

<sup>230</sup> Derrida writes:

"that when I speak here of law, of convention or of invention, I would like not to rely, as it might seem I do, upon the classical opposition between nature and law, or between animals alleged not to have language and man, author of speech acts and capable of entering into a relation to the law, be it of obedience or of transgression. It is in order to minimize this risk and to keep in reserve an entire deconstruction of onto-theological humanism (including that of Heidegger) that I prefer always to speak of the iterability of the mark beyond all human speech acts. Barring any inconsistency, ineptness, or insufficiently rigorous formulization on my part, my statements on this subject should be valid beyond the marks and society called "human."

Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, Paris: Galilée, 1990, p. 247, 248/134.

<sup>231</sup> Dg, p. 92.

<sup>232</sup> Dg, p. 95/OG, p. 65.

<sup>233</sup> OG, p. 63.

<sup>234</sup> Dg, p. 95.

<sup>235</sup> Dg, p. 92.

<sup>236</sup> See "Signature, Event, Context" in *Limited Inc.* trans. Samuel Weber and

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Jeffrey Mehlman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p. 1988.

<sup>237</sup> Dg, p. 96/OG, p. 65,66.

<sup>238</sup> Dg, p. 99/OG, p. 68.

<sup>239</sup> Dg, p. 99.

<sup>240</sup> OG, p. 240.

<sup>241</sup> Dg, p. 342/OG p. 240.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Dg, p. 342/OG p. 240.

<sup>244</sup> "L'impression successive du discours qui frappe-a coups redoubles, vous donne bien une autre emotion que la presence de l'objet meme ... J'ai dit ailleurs pourquoi les malheurs feints nous touche bien plus que les veritables ..." Dg, p. 342.

<sup>245</sup> Dg, p. 236/OG, p. 165.

<sup>246</sup> OG, p. 183.

<sup>247</sup> OG, p. 247.

<sup>248</sup> OG, p. 242.

<sup>249</sup> OG, p. 238.

<sup>250</sup> OG, p. 218, 219.

<sup>251</sup> Dg, p. 338/OG, p. 237,238.

<sup>252</sup> Dg, p. 339/OG, p. 238.

<sup>253</sup> Dg, p. 340,341/OG, p. 239.

<sup>254</sup> Dg, p. 339/OG, p. 238.

<sup>255</sup> Dg, p. 260.

<sup>256</sup> Dg, p. 261.

<sup>257</sup> Dg, p. 261.

<sup>258</sup> Dg, p. 262.

<sup>259</sup> Dg, p. 280.

Passion:

"That is to say in the transgression of need by desire and the awakening of pity by imagination." Rousseau writes: "It seems then that need dictated the first gestures, while passions wrung forth the first words." OG, p. 195.

<sup>260</sup> Rousseau writes:

"the first language of mankind, the most universal and vivid, in a word the only language man needed, before he had occasion to exert his eloquence to persuade assembled multitudes, was the simple cry of nature. But as this was excited only by a sort of instinct on urgent occasions, to implore assistance in case of danger, or relief in case of suffering, it could be of little use in the ordinary course of life ... When the ideas of men began to expand and multiply, and closer communication took place among them, they strove to invent more numerous signs and a more copious language. They multiplied the inflexions of the voice, and added gestures, which arein their nature more expressive, and depend less for their meaning on prior determination. Visible and movable objects were therefore expressed by gestures, and audible ones by imitative sounds: but, as hardly anything can be indicated by gestures, except objects actually present or easily described, and visible actions; as there are not universally useful - for darkness or the interposition of a material object destroys their efficacy - and as besides they rather request than secure our attention; men at length bethought themselves of substituting for them articulate sounds of voice, which, without bearing the same relation to any particular ideas, are better calculated to express them all, as conventional signs. Such an institution could only be made by common consent ..." *Origin of Inequality*, p. 67.

<sup>261</sup> Dg, p. 282/OG, p. 197.

<sup>262</sup> OG, p. 197.

<sup>263</sup> OG, p. 252. Rousseau writes:

"the first language of mankind, the most universal and vivid, in a word the

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only language man needed, before he had occasion to exert his eloquence to persuade assembled multitudes, was the simple cry of nature. But as this was excited only by a sort of instinct on urgent occasions, to implore assistance in case of danger, or relief in case of suffering, it could be of little use in the ordinary course of life ... When the ideas of men began to expand and multiply, and closer communication took place among them, they strove to invent more numerous signs and a more copious language. They multiplied the inflexions of the voice, and added gestures, which are in their nature more expressive, and depend less for their meaning on prior determination. Visible and movable objects were therefore expressed by gestures, and audible ones by imitative sounds: but, as hardly anything can be indicated by gestures, except objects actually present or easily described, and visible actions; as there are not universally useful - for darkness or the interposition of a material object destroys their efficacy - and as besides they rather request than secure our attention; men at length bethought themselves of substituting for them articulate sounds of voice, which, without bearing the same relation to any particular ideas, are better calculated to express them all, as conventional signs. Such an institution could only be made by common consent ..." *Origin of Inequality*, p. 67.

<sup>264</sup> OG, p. 253.

<sup>265</sup> Dg, p. 396.

Derrida quotes a "beautiful" passage from Rousseau:

"... in the arid places where water could be had only from wells, people had to rejoin one another to sink the wells, or at least to agree upon their use. Such must have been the origin of societies and languages in warm countries. That is where the first ties were formed among families; there where the first rendezvous of the two sexes. Girls would come to seek water for the household, young men would come to water their herds. Their eyes, accustomed to the same sights since infancy, began to see with increased pleasure. The heart is moved by these novel objects; an unknown attraction renders it less savage; it feels pleasure at not being alone. Imperceptibly, water becomes more necessary. The livestock become thirsty more often. One would arrive in haste and leave with regret. In that happy age when nothing marked the hours, nothing would oblige one to count them; the only measure of time would be the alternation of amusement and boredom. Under old oaks, conquerors of the years, an ardent youth will gradually lose its ferocity. Little by little they become less shy with each other. In trying to make oneself understood, one learns to explain oneself. There, too, the original festivals developed. Feet skipped with joy, earnest gestures no longer sufficed, the voice accompanied them in impassioned accents; pleasure and desire mingled and were felt together. There at last was the true cradle of nations: from the pure crystal of the fountains flowed the first fires of love." In OG, p. 262.

<sup>266</sup> OG, p. 255.

<sup>267</sup> Dg, p. 362/OG, p. 256.

<sup>268</sup> DG, p. 356.

<sup>269</sup> OG, p. 241.

<sup>270</sup> Dg, p. 312.

<sup>271</sup> Dg, p. 288/OG, p. 202.

<sup>272</sup> Dg, p. 289/OG, p. 202.

<sup>273</sup> Dg, p. 289/OG, p. 203.

<sup>274</sup> Dg, p. 265, 266/OG, p. 187.

<sup>275</sup> See *Limited Inc.*, p. 56 and p. 122.

<sup>276</sup> Husserl's intuition could not fulfill the intentionality. And the intentionality of history or of one's own life cannot be "fulfilled" either.

<sup>277</sup> OG, p. 298.

<sup>278</sup> OG, p. 265.

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<sup>279</sup> Norris, *Derrida*, p. 136.

<sup>280</sup> Dg, p. 376/OG, p. 266)

<sup>281</sup> OG, p. 153.

<sup>282</sup> Dg, p. 376/OG, p. 267.

<sup>283</sup> OG, p. 298,

<sup>284</sup> Dg, p. 182.

<sup>285</sup> Rousseau writes:

"... that in the operations of the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some share in his own operations, in his character as a free agent. The one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from an act of free will: hence the brute cannot deviate from the rule prescribed to it, even when it would be advantageous to do so; and on the contrary, man frequently deviates from such rules to his own prejudice ... Every animal has ideas, since it has sense; it even combines those ideas in a certain degree; and it is only in degree that man differs, in this respect, from the brute ... It is not, therefore, so much the understanding that constitutes the specific difference between the man and the brute, as the human quality of free agency. Nature lays her commands on every animal, and the brute obeys her voice. Man receives the same impulsion, but at the same time knows himself at liberty to acquiesce or resist: and it is particularly in his consciousness of this liberty that the spirituality of his soul is displayed ... Yet, if the difficulties attending all these questions should still leave room for dispute about the difference between men and brutes, there is another very specific quality which distinguishes them, and which will admit of no future dispute. This is the faculty of self-improvement, which, by the help of circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is inherent in the species as in the individual: whereas a brute is, at the end of a few months, all he will ever be during his whole life, and his species, at the end of a thousand years, exactly what it was the first year of that thousand. Why is man alone able to grow into a dotard? Is it not because he returns, in this, to his primitive state; and that, while the brute, which has acquired nothing and therefore has nothing to lose, still retains the force of instinct, man, who loses, by age or accident, all that his *perfectibility* had enabled him to gain, falls by this means lower than the brutes themselves? Rousseau, *Origin of inequality*, p. 59, 60.

<sup>286</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inegalite parmi les homes," *Les Integrales de Philo: Rousseau*. Nathan: Rue Mechain, 1998, p. 74-75.

<sup>287</sup> OG, p. 181.

<sup>288</sup> OG, p. 185.

<sup>289</sup> OG, p. 185.

<sup>290</sup> OG, p. 185.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid.

<sup>292</sup> OG, p. 185-186.

<sup>293</sup> OG, p. 186.

<sup>294</sup> OG, p. 186,187 Difference refers to the differing and deferral within auto-affectation. That is, the functionality of imagination is reflexive. The imagination acts on itself and relates to itself. The very relation to self implies a certain difference or alterity within the self as the relation's very condition. Without this difference with the self, there could be no reflexive structure, no self-reference and no reference at all. There would be a mere thing itself, an atomic totality, without any type of relation. Therefore, Derrida is claiming that the movement of the trace is the condition of auto-affectation in general. It would be the condition of the relation to self of the Husserlian transcendental ego and the condition of Rousseau's reflexive imagination. Of course, the Derridean claim would that both imply the break through of the external and the other. Therefore, the structural

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functioning of the imagination is also that of a certain ex-appropriation.

<sup>295</sup> Christina Howells, *Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics*, p. 59.

<sup>296</sup> OG, p. 186.

<sup>297</sup> Nash points out that Darwin had recognized that "sympathies" or "mutual aid" was a "rudimentary ethics" found within the "social qualities" of animals. Although Darwin would recognize a sociality among animals, and although he wanted to get beyond hierarchy, Derrida would still be critical of Darwin's discourse for its teleological implications of the "evolutionary" perspective. Roderick Frazier Nash, *The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, p. 44.

<sup>298</sup> OG, p. 188.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid, p. 189.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid.

<sup>302</sup> Derrida writes:

"Narcissism! There is not narcissism and non-narcissism; there are narcissisms that are more or less comprehensive, generous, open, extended. What is called non-narcissism is in general but the economy of a much more welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is much more open to the experience of the other as other. I believe that without a movement of narcissistic reappropriation, the relation to the other would be absolutely destroyed ... The relation to the other—even if it remains asymmetrical, open, without possible reappropriation—must trace a movement of reappropriation in the image of oneself for love to be possible, for example." "There is No One Narcissism" (Autobiographies), in *Points*, p. 199.

<sup>303</sup> OG, p. 190.

<sup>304</sup> Derrida writes:

"There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and consequently, without absence, dissimulation, detour, difference, writing." OG, p. 139, 140.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid, p. 191.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid.

<sup>307</sup> *Emile*, p. 303, 304, in OG, p. 215.

<sup>308</sup> Samuel Weber, "In the Name of the Law," *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*. Cardozo L. Rev. p. 1523.

<sup>309</sup> Robert Bernasconi, "Rousseau and the Supplement to the Social Contract: Deconstruction and the Possibility of Democracy," *Deconstruction and the Possibility of the Justice*, p. 1557.

<sup>310</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Force de loi: le "fondement mystique de l'autorité," *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, 11 *Cardozo Law Review*, Jul/Aug, 1990, p. 964/965.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid, p. 955/954.

<sup>312</sup> Keenan refers to Derrida's conception of justice as an ideal. Thomas Keenan, "Deconstruction and the Impossibility of Justice," *Cardozo L. Rev.*, p. 1680. Keenan is correct in naming the structure of the promise with regard to justice. However, there is no ideal to attain, which is clear from the whole of my argument and the many texts of Derrida. For a very insightful discussion of this issue, see Drucilla Cornell, "The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as Justice," *Cardozo L. Rev.*, p. 1060. Cornell explains that justice is not a projected ideal but an aporia—incomplete, inadequate, and never finished.

<sup>313</sup> John D. Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida*, New York: Fordham University Press, 1997, p. 121.

<sup>314</sup> Of course, just as Derrida stated clearly that the relation with self and other is unique and differentiated according to individuals and species, so

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such attributes as imagination, as a facilitator of the relation with self and with other, would be thought by Derrida as differentiated, but with teleological hierarchy.

<sup>315</sup> Watson explains in Derridean fashion:

"If completeness is threatened by undecidability, determinacy ... is not ..."  
Stephen Watson, "On the Critical Tribunal," Cordozo, p. 1449.

Watson discusses the problem of determinacy within the context of Searle and Habermas.

<sup>316</sup> Force of Law, p. 971, 973/970, 972.

<sup>317</sup> Eating Well, *Points*, p. 281-283.

<sup>318</sup> OG, p. 191.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid.

<sup>320</sup> See *Limited Inc.*, p. 247, 248.

<sup>321</sup> *Emile*, p. 186 in OG, p. 204.

<sup>322</sup> Rousseau had written of:

"a natural repugnance at seeing any sentient Being, and especially any being like ourselves, perish or suffer." Quoted in Bernasconi, "Rousseau and the Supplement to the Social Contract," p. 1552.

<sup>323</sup> Derrida is calling for animal rights and protection on the basis of his idea of justice. This is in accord with such thinkers as Singer and Stone.

See Christopher Stone, "Moral Pluralism and the Course of Environmental Ethics," *Postmodern Environmental Ethics*, p. 243. If a dog did not have memory, would she remember her name? Could she get excited over the sign "walk" if she did not have memory, that is, a representation, an imagination, of what that means, of what that has meant, and without anticipation, an imagination, of what that will mean?

<sup>324</sup> OG, p. 196.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

<sup>326</sup> Bernasconi points out that the subject is a "perfect and solitary" individual, an atomic totality, as Derrida would say. Cordozo, p. 1548.

<sup>327</sup> OG, p. 196.

<sup>328</sup> OG, p. 198.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid.

<sup>330</sup> Ibid.

<sup>331</sup> OG, p. 197.

<sup>332</sup> OG, p. 199.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid., p. 200. Again, one should recognize that Rousseau is clearly suggesting that dogs and cats function with signs, and therefore with imagination.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid.

<sup>336</sup> Derrida refers to the problem of articulation in *Speech and Phenomena*. See Bernasconi for a discussion of the problem of what is written on one's heart. Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> OG, p. 205.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid.

<sup>339</sup> OG, p. 203.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid.

<sup>342</sup> OG, p. 203, 204.

<sup>343</sup> *Emil*, p. 68, OG, p. 206.

<sup>344</sup> OG, p. 207.

<sup>345</sup> Niall Lucy argues the following in defense of Derrida:

"In so far as what a sign "is" can never be fully determined, signs can be said to be indeterminate. However, this does not lead necessarily to political inaction in the face of manifest injustice such as apartheid. On the contrary, I

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can think of no reason why I might read Derrida and not be opposed to domestic violence, racial intolerance, economic privilege, cruelty to animals, or the destruction of rainforests; nor why reading Derrida should prevent me from being touched by and responding to the call of the other."

Niall Lucy, *Debating Derrida*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995, p. 15.

<sup>346</sup> Force of Law, p. 971.

<sup>347</sup> Derrida refers to Stanley Fish and his view of reinventing the law as a "fresh judgement" in each and every case. Force of Law, p. 961.

Cornell discusses this aspect of the deconstruction of the law as conservation and reinvention in both essays: "The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as Justice" and "From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation." *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, Cordozo L. Rev., 1990.

<sup>348</sup> This is not to say that nonhuman animal have elaborate "discourses" on ethical themes or sophisticated ethical systems of thought. Nonhuman animals offer no evidence of systematic treatises in the human sense. However, the claim is simply that the condition of ethical relations involves signs and imagination, which Derrida attributes to human animals and nonhuman animals in infinitely differentiated forms.

<sup>349</sup> VM, p. 135. For discussions of Derrida's approach to Levinas and the Levinasian critique of the philosophical tradition, including Heidegger and Husserl, see the following essays:

Adriaan Peperzak, "Presentation," *Re-Reading Levinas*, Indiana University Press: Indiana, 1990; Jean Greisch, "The Face and Reading: Immediacy and Mediation," *Re-Reading Levinas*; Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas' Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality," *Re-Reading Levinas*.

<sup>350</sup> VM, p. 136.

<sup>351</sup> VM, p. 136.

<sup>352</sup> VM, p. 136.

<sup>353</sup> VM, p. 137.

<sup>354</sup> VM, p. 137.

<sup>355</sup> VM, p. 138.

<sup>356</sup> We will see that Heidegger does not let "animality" be, even though the thought of Being would appear to have good intentions towards nonhuman beings. Llewelyn explores this aspect of Heidegger's thought in *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience*. He writes:

Now if Heidegger's texts support the reading that responsibility toward being is inseparable from responsibility toward beings, there may be room in Heidegger's thinking not only for responsibility toward those beings that seem to get short shrift in Levinas's thinking, namely the non-human and non-divine, but responsibility too for those beings that are at the centre of Levinas's thinking, namely human beings ... p. 107.

And:

Hence whereas for Levinas, following Plato, primary justice is non-natural, for Heidegger, following Holderlin and the pre-Platonic Greeks, original justice is *dike* 'thought from being as presencing' ... Furthermore, according to Heidegger this primary justice or *Fug* is demanded of mortal beings toward every other being, to whatever presences itself, whatever whiles (*weilt*), whatever comes to be and passes away ... p. 128.

<sup>357</sup> VM, p. 138.

<sup>358</sup> VM, p. 141.

<sup>359</sup> Bernhard Radloff explains Heidegger's letting-be:

The letting-be is itself the turn of thought into the movement of withdrawal ... Leaving-be as letting-go is not the indifferent passivity of letting things drift, no more than the activity of conceptual thinking; it rather unfolds as

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simple attentiveness to the open, temporal horizon of arrival and departure. It allows the appearances sheltered in the mystery of the openness of the open to come to word, each according to its time. Attention to the withdrawal from representation attends to the design of language as the field of disclosive withdrawal. Bernhard Radloff, "Das Gestell and L'écriture: The Discourse of Expropriation in Heidegger and Derrida," *Heidegger Studies* Vol. 5. 1989, p. 24.

<sup>360</sup> VM, p. 141.

<sup>361</sup> VM, p. 146.

<sup>362</sup> VM, p. 319.

<sup>363</sup> Robert Bernasconi points out that what Heidegger calls the thinking that thinks the truth of Being can just as easily be called an "original ethics" as a fundamental ontology. He argues therefore that Heidegger's thought of Being is enacting an ethical relation. Robert Bernasconi, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics, Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida*, p. 123, 136. There is no doubt that Derrida agrees with Bernasconi here. However, Derrida's point is to work with Heidegger's thought and move in an even more just and responsible direction.

<sup>364</sup> Derrida, *Eating Well*, p. 277-278.

<sup>365</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Sauf le nom*, Paris: Galilée, 1993, p. 34.

<sup>366</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", *Pathmarks*, p. 247.

<sup>367</sup> Quoted from *On the Way to Language*, p. 215, in *Aporias*, p. 35.

<sup>368</sup> Derrida, *Aporias*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 36.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid.

<sup>370</sup> Derrida provides four possibilities:

"1. Ou'il n'y ait pas de lien essentiel et irréductible entre les deux, entre le "comme tel" et la parole ..."

"2. Que le croyance à une expérience de la mort *comme telle*, comme le discours accréditant cette croyance a une expérience de la mort elle-même et comme telle, dépende au contraire d'une capacité de parler et de nommer, mais plus quant à l'expérience de la mort comme mort, en vienne alors à perdre le *comme tel* dans et par le langage qui procurerait ici une illusion: comme s'il suffisait, et ce serait l'illusion ou le phantasme, de dire la mort pour avoir accès au mourir comme tel."

"3. Que le mort, par conséquent, se refusant comme telle, donc au témoignage, et marquant même ce qui refuse son *comme tel* et au langage et a ce qui déborde le langage, ce soit en ce lieu que toute frontière (rigoureuse et unique) entre la bête et le Dasein de l'homme de parole devienne inassignable."

"4. Que si enfin le vivant comme tel (la bête, la bête animale ou la vie humaine, l'homme comme vivant) est incapable d'une expérience de la mort *comme telle*, si en somme la vie comme telle ignore la mort comme telle, cet axiome permette de réconcilier des énoncés apparemment contradictoires, ceux dont je serais tenté de prendre les exemples les plus marquants à mes yeux, celui de Heidegger d'une part, bien sûr, mais aussi ceux de Freud et de Levinas ..."

*Aporias*, Paris: Galilée, 1993, p. 71, 72.

<sup>371</sup> Derrida, *Istrice 2, Points*, p. 312.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid.

<sup>373</sup> Derrida, *Aporias*, p. 72.

<sup>374</sup> "On ne parlera pas du décès d'un hérisson, d'un écureuil ou d'un éléphant (même et surtout si on les aime)." Derrida, *Aporias*, p. 73.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid, p. 76.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid, p. 77.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid.

<sup>378</sup> *Aporias*, p. 41/*Aporias*, p. 77.

<sup>379</sup> Ibid, p. 41/77.

<sup>380</sup> *Aporias*, p. 78.

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<sup>381</sup> *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 54.

<sup>382</sup> *Eating Well*, p. 268.

<sup>383</sup> *Aporias*, p. 100.

<sup>384</sup> *Aporias*, p. 125, 126. See possibility #3.

Keenan recognizes that the distinction between authentic and inauthentic *Dasein* has been disturbed. But he does not mention that the distinction between *Dasein* and animals is problematized because of Heidegger's discourse on death. Dennis King Keenan, *Death and Responsibility: The "Work" of Levinas*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 76.

<sup>385</sup> *Aporias*, p. 73.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid*, p. 73, 74.

<sup>387</sup> Derrida, "The Law of Genre," in *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 231. See Geoffrey Bennington's discussion of *Remark* in his co-authored text with Jacques Derrida, entitled *Jacques Derrida*, p. 9-14.

<sup>388</sup> *Aporias*, p. 74.

<sup>389</sup> Derrida, *Dissemination*, Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 210.

<sup>390</sup> *Aporias*, p. 131, 132.

<sup>391</sup> See possibility #3

<sup>392</sup> *Aporias*, p. 75. See possibility #4. David Farrell Krell thinks that Derrida's case against this aspect of the Heidegger's thought is understated: "Derrida's case is only made stronger if we insist on prolonging—as Heidegger does—the avoidance of spirit. Heidegger's effort to distinguish the world-relations of humanity and animality is fundamentally aporetic: it is, as Derrida says, "nonplussed," ... Although Derrida does not state it as baldly as I do here, I believe he would agree that the very effort to *define the singular difference* between humanity and animality inevitably *obfuscates the ontological difference*. I would stress far more than he does the fact that Heidegger uses *the very same word* to describe the world-relation of *animals* and the appropriate comportment toward being that characterizes *Dasein*; if the lizard sunning itself on a rock is benumbed (*benommen*), so is *Dasein*, not only when it succumbs to the world's distractions but also precisely when it confronts the uncanniness of its existence in anxiety. Appropriate *Dasein*, rapt to the ownmost possibility of existence, is an animal." "Spiriting Heidegger," *Of Derrida, Heidegger, and Spirit*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993, p. 22. Krell's point, then, is not only is Derrida correct in pointing out the aporetic distinction between the animal and *Dasein*, but that he should have also claimed that *Dasein* is an animal.

<sup>393</sup> *Aporias*, p. 132, 133.

David Farrell Krell keenly points out:

"The nothing invades animal life and disrupts the ring. Death shatters that ring and signal the way in which time—the marking of time—always bears a fundamental relation to the animal's life. The animal is thrown by way of its litter (*Wurf*), cast into its life and projected toward its death as no is ever thrown; the effects of that invasion, disruption, and shattering of the ring by (something like) the nothing are felt also at the center of *Dasein*'s hermeneutic circle. That circle and the ring of animality suddenly becomes coextensive, if only for a fleeting instant. If Heidegger returns to his bugs and his bees, apparently confident that the world of humankind will prove to be essentially different, just as Hegel was confident that spirit would assume essentially higher forms; if in other words the "troubling affinities" of Heidegger and Hegel on the question of animality continue to plague us ...; it remains the case that the daimonic, *to daimonion* combines for Heidegger in mysterious ways the matters of godhead, life, and the abyss of anxiety.

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"Spiriting Heidegger," p. 23.

<sup>394</sup> David Wood, quoted from the transcript of the discussion of Derrida's informal paper which David Farrell Krell has entitled "On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium," *Research in Phenomenology* 17, 1988, p. 183.

<sup>395</sup> Derrida, *On Reading Heidegger*, p. 183.

<sup>396</sup> Ibid.

<sup>397</sup> Apories, p. 132.

<sup>398</sup> Eating Well, p. 278-280.

<sup>399</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Sauf le nom*, Paris: Galilée, 1993. p. 38. "Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)." *On the Name*. Ed. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

<sup>400</sup> Grammatology, p. 139-140.

<sup>401</sup> Istrice 2, *Points*, p. 321.

<sup>402</sup> Dialanguages, *Points* p. 143.

<sup>403</sup> Eating Well, p. 282.

<sup>404</sup> Jacques Derrida, Ja, or the faux-bond II, in *Points* p. 67.

<sup>405</sup> *Limited Inc.* p. 136/251.

<sup>406</sup> Aporias p. 76/132-133.

Charles Scott disagrees with Heidegger's view that thought and language separate the human from the animal in the way that Heidegger thinks. He argues: I do not want to override the enormous differences that define the commonalities. But it is not only in the unique dimension of language and thought (in Heidegger's original and rich interpretation of them) that appearing happens, nor do language and thought happen apart from fleshly memories and experiences: to separate thought and language from our commonality with animals constitutes a great injustice to all three. Rather than in separation, a commonality of us and animals appears to me to be integral not only to the ways things come to light but also to the *appearing* of what happens. To live ... means at once enactment of animal commonality. Charles Scott, *Memory of Time in the Light of Fleth*, *Continental Philosophy Review*, 32: 421-432, 1999, p. 428.

<sup>407</sup> Heidegger would regard Derrida's view of language as inauthentic and lacking spirit. He thought of language as much more important to philosophy:

"It is in words and language that things first come into being and are. For this reason the misuse of language in idle talk, in slogans and phrases, destroys our authentic relation to things." *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Trans. Ralph Manheim. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961, p. 11.

Language would be essential to establishing proper modes of relations with the rest of the world.

<sup>408</sup> *Of Grammatology*, p. 20.

<sup>409</sup> *Of Grammatology*, p. 22, 23.

<sup>410</sup> OG, p. 24.

<sup>411</sup> *Of Spirit*, p. 53.

<sup>412</sup> *Of Spirit*, p. 54.

<sup>413</sup> David Farrell Krell argues that Derrida misses out on the Diltheyan and Schelerian background of Heidegger's discussion, as well as confusing Heidegger's discourses on animality and spirit. "Spiriting Heidegger," *Of Derrida, Heidegger and Spirit*, p. 21.

<sup>414</sup> *Of Spirit*, p. 53.

<sup>415</sup> OS, p. 55.

<sup>416</sup> OS, p. 56.

<sup>417</sup> OS, p. 56, 57.

<sup>418</sup> Ibid.

<sup>419</sup> Ibid, p. 17.

<sup>420</sup> Ibid, p. 19.

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<sup>421</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Heidegger et la question: De l'esprit et autres essais* Paris: Editions Galilée, 1987, 88/OS, p. 56-57.

<sup>422</sup> Derrida quotes Martin Buber, from *I and Thou*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, 1958, as a thinker who recognizes a more ethically relevant relationship with "animals": "The beginning of this cat's glance, lighting up under the touch of my glance, indisputably questioned me: 'Is it possible that you think of me? ... Do I really exist?' ... ('I' here is a transcription for a word, that we do not have, denoting self without the ego)" p. 97. Derrida, "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)", *Critical Inquiry*, p. 376.

<sup>423</sup> OS, p. 94-95.

Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, chapter 11, "Promises (Social Contract)," p 277.

<sup>424</sup> OS, p. 129.

<sup>425</sup> *Reading Heidegger*, p. 177.

<sup>426</sup> OS, p. 130, # 5.

<sup>427</sup> *Animal*, p. 407.

<sup>428</sup> For a discussion of the promise of double affirmation, see David Farrel Krell, in "Spiriting Heidegger," *Of Derrida, Heidegger and Spirit*, p 13.

<sup>429</sup> Ulysses, *Acts of Literature*, p. 302.

<sup>430</sup> Charles Scott claims:

Communicating and thinking enact kinship with animals that are evident as we find them calling each other or us, stalking their prey, following the customs of a herd or a pack, associating places with experiences, foreseeing movements, tracking, dreaming, holding affections and grudges, and teaching their young. *Light of the Flesh*, p. 429. Charles Scott also affirms that we humans can communicate with animals:

And while I agree with him that we really do not know how animals occur in their differences from us, our ability to communicate with them and our projections onto them show an unexpected memory of something that Heidegger usually leaves out of his thought... There are, however, also experiences of kinship with animals that exceed the projections that accompany them. We can find such kinship not only when we draw close and indefensively to an animal's pain or pleasure. We can also find it in moments of intuition or communication in which people sense deep and nonrational attunement with an animal. Sometimes that experience happens by means of eye contact. *Ibid*, p. 423-424.

<sup>431</sup> Derrida cites Montaigne as an example of a thinker who recognized the ability of response of in animals. Montaigne writes:

It is not credible that Nature has denied us this resource that she has given to many other animals: for what is it but speech, this faculty we see in them of complaining, rejoicing, calling to each other for help, inviting each other to love, as they do by the use of their voice? How could they not speak to one another? They certainly speak to us, and we to them. In how many ways do we not speak to our dogs? *And they answer us*. Michel de Montaigne, *Apology for Raymond Sebond*, in *Essays*, in *The Complete Works of Montaigne*, trans. Donald M. Frame Stanford, Calif., 1957, BK. II, chap. 12, p. 335.

<sup>432</sup> Derrida, *Of Spirit*, p. 76.

<sup>433</sup> *Eating Well*, p. 261.

<sup>434</sup> Gasché points out that Derrida inherits Heidegger's view of responsibility as responsiveness:

"For Heidegger, responsibility is primarily a response to which one commits oneself, or pledges oneself in return." *Inventions of Difference*, p. 228.

<sup>435</sup> Geoffrey Bennington, "Derridabase", in *Jacques Derrida*, by Bennington and Derrida. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington, p. 254.

<sup>436</sup> Bennington and Derrida, p. 310.

<sup>437</sup> *Animal*, p. 378-79.

<sup>438</sup> Derrida describes his relation with "his" little cat. He writes:

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the first time my gaze met that of a cat-pussycat that seemed to be imploring me, asking me clearly to open the door for it to go out, as she did, without waiting, as she often does, for example when she first follows me into the bathroom then immediately regrets her decision ... Other than the difference mentioned earlier between poem and philosopheme, one can only find, at bottom, two types of discourse, two positions of knowledge, two grand forms of theoretical or philosophical treatise regarding the animal ... In the first place there are those texts signed by people who have no doubt seen, observed, analyzed, reflected on the animal, but who have never been *seen seen* by the animal. Their gaze has never intersected with that of an animal directed at them ... They neither wanted nor had the capacity to draw any systematic consequence from the fact that an animal could facing them, look at them, ... and in a word, *address them*. They have taken no account of the fact that what they call animal could *look at* them and *address* them from down there, from a wholly other origin ... Clearly all those ... whom I will later situate in order to back up my thesis, arranging them within the same configuration, for example Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan and Levinas, belong to this quasi-epochal category. Their discourses are sound and profound, but everything goes on as if they themselves had never been looked at, and especially not naked, by an animal that addressed them. At least everything goes on as though this troubling experience had not been theoretically registered, supposing that they had experienced it at all, at the precise moment when they made of the animal a *theorem*, something seen and not seeing. The experience of the seeing animal, of the animal that looks at them, has not been taken into account in the philosophical or theoretical architecture of their discourse. In sum they have denied it as much as misunderstood it ... It is as if the men representing this configuration had seen without being seen, seen the animal without being seen by it, without being seen seen by it: without being seen seen naked by someone who, from the basis of a life called animal, and not only by means of the gaze, would have obliged them to recognize, at the moment of address, that this was their affair, their lookout ... Animal, p. 382-83. These philosophers, therefore, have not recognized their responsibility which is based in the yes yes relation with the other animal. However, the obligation, the responsibility would have been there *a priori*.

<sup>439</sup> Gramophone, p. 298. Gasché's discussion of the yes, yes and gift in *Inventions of Difference* seems to ignore that the yes, pledge, and gift occur at a nonconscious level. He seems to be discussing these themes as if they occur at a conscious level in which they are actually experienced in their presence.

<sup>440</sup> Ulysses, *A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds*, Ed. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 591.

<sup>441</sup> *The Gift of Death*, Trans. David Wills. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 31, 32. The influence of Heidegger on Derrida is obvious in the following explanation of *Dasien's* originary guilt and responsibility:

As an active being-with with others and as such, Dasein is *eo ipso* guilty, even when—and precisely when—it does not know that it is injuring another or destroying him in his Dasein. With the choice of being willing to have a conscience, I have at the same time chosen to *have become guilty*. Cited in Llewelyn, p. 22. Llewelyn explains the ethical basis of Heidegger:

What follows from this rethinking is that value and obligation ... are formative of the very structure of Being in the world. This is another way of saying that ontological *ethos* is prior to the distinction between theory and practice, and this explains why Heidegger says that an authentic way of being in the world is a responsible, careful, resolved and open ... way of responding to the call of being. *Ibid*, p. 76. For a discussion of the *Dasein* and the call of Being, see Samuel Weber, *The Debts of Deconstruction and Other, Related*

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- Assumptions, *Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis, and Literature*. Ed. J.H. Smith and W. Kerrigan. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, p. 61.
- <sup>442</sup> 442 Rudolphe Gasché, *Inventions of Difference*, p. 229.
- <sup>443</sup> "Ulysses Gramophone," *Act of Literature*, p. 308.
- <sup>444</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Given Time 1: Counterfeit Money*, trans. P. Kamuf. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 101. *Donner le temps, I. La fausse monnaie*. Paris: Galilée, 1991.
- <sup>445</sup> *Given Time*, p. 7.
- <sup>446</sup> *Grammatology*, p. 295.
- <sup>447</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Donner le temps 1: La fausse monnaie*. Paris: Galilée, 1991, p. 31. no. 1.
- <sup>448</sup> *GT*, p. 91.
- <sup>449</sup> John Llewelyn writes:  
*Gelassenheit* is also the name for what is distinctive of human responsibility ... It is to mortals that *es gibt Sein*. It is therefore to mortals that is given the responsibility to give being to non-mortal beings. *Middle Voice*, p. 133-134.
- <sup>450</sup> Heidegger, "What Is Called Thinking?" *Pathmarks*, p. 16.
- <sup>451</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Geschlecht II, Heidegger's Hand," *Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida*. Ed. John Sallis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 175.
- <sup>452</sup> *Ibid*, p. 195.
- <sup>453</sup> *Ibid*, p. 173-174.
- <sup>454</sup> *GT*, p. 162.
- <sup>455</sup> *GT*, p. 128.
- <sup>456</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, Trans. Barbara Harlow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 113.
- <sup>457</sup> *Spurs*, p. 115-117.
- <sup>458</sup> *Spurs*, p. 17.
- <sup>459</sup> *Spurs*, p. 119.
- <sup>460</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>461</sup> *GT*, p. 19.
- <sup>462</sup> Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 27.
- <sup>463</sup> *Ibid*, p. 26.
- <sup>464</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.
- <sup>465</sup> *Ibid*, p. xviii.
- <sup>466</sup> *Ibid*, p. 20.
- <sup>467</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22.
- <sup>468</sup> *Ibid*, p. 23.
- <sup>469</sup> *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, p. 17.
- <sup>470</sup> *Nutshell*, p. 14.
- <sup>471</sup> *Spectres*, p. xix.
- <sup>472</sup> *Act of Lit*, p. 405.
- <sup>473</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology," *Reading Heidegger: comme/notations*. Ed. John Sallis. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 172.
- <sup>474</sup> *Politics of Friendship*, p. 68.
- <sup>475</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>476</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>477</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>478</sup> *Ibid*, p. 69.
- <sup>479</sup> This is a much more radical view than MacIntyre's Kantian view of the necessity of thinking in "cooperation" with others. It is also a response to the Kantian view of the necessity of following the rules of one's office and the possibility of one's freedom in the public use of reason. See Alasdair

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MacIntyre's "Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered," *Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy*. Ed. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley. New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 247-249.

<sup>480</sup> Politics Friendship, p. 69.

<sup>481</sup> Jacques Derrida, *L'autre cap*, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1991, p. 79.

<sup>482</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility", *Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy*. Ed. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 67.

<sup>483</sup> Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, p. 69.

<sup>484</sup> Frederic Jameson misunderstands Derrida's promise of the future as a Utopia. "Marx's Purloined Letter," *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx* Ed. Michael Sprinker. New York: Verso, 1999, p. 59. David Harvey also misconceives Derrida's thought as Utopian. David Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, p. 12.

<sup>485</sup> Ibid.

<sup>486</sup> Force of Law, p. 961/960.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid, p. 971. This surely answers David Harvey's claim that Derrida's thought leads to an "anything goes" way of thinking. p. 347.

<sup>488</sup> *Limited Inc.*, p. 210/116. My italics.

<sup>489</sup> Critchley, p. 189.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid, p. 192.

<sup>491</sup> Ibid.

<sup>492</sup> Ibid, p. 193, 194.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid, p. 197.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid, p. 200.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid, p. 200.

<sup>496</sup> Frederic Jameson also misunderstands Derrida's notion of deconstruction and undecidability. He says, for example, deconstruction 'neither affirmeth nor denieth.' Marx's Purloined Letter, p. 33.

<sup>497</sup> Derrida, *L'autre cap*, p. 71.

<sup>498</sup> Ibid.

<sup>499</sup> Psyche, *Acts of Literature*, p. 218.

<sup>500</sup> Ibid.

<sup>501</sup> *LI*, p. 136.

<sup>502</sup> Ibid.

<sup>503</sup> This seems to be an adequate response to the claim by Montag that Derrida's notion of justice is politically irrelevant. Warren Montag, *Spirits Armed and Unarmed: Derrida's Spectres of Marx, Ghostly Demarcations*, p. 80. It would also answer Aijaz Ahmad's Reconciling Derrida: 'Spectres of Marx' and Deconstructive Politics, *Ghostly Demarcations*, p. 108.

<sup>504</sup> *Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings*, Ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: The Modern Library, 1949, p. 240.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid, p. 148.

<sup>506</sup> Derrida writes:

"It is well known that sacrifice and the sacrificial offering are at the heart of Kantian morality ... The object of sacrifice there is always of the the order of the sensuous motives, of the secretly "pathological" interest which must, says Kant, be "humbled" before the moral law; ... what I am looking for here, passion according to me, would be a concept of passion that would be non-"pathological" in Kant's sense." *Passions, On the Name*, p. 16.

<sup>507</sup> Ibid.

<sup>508</sup> Ibid, p. 149.

<sup>509</sup> "Before the Law," *Acts of Literature*, p. 196.

Stephen Watson states:

There will always be Kant's "wide abyss" between the contingent and the necessary in need of "bridging" ... Against it, rather, stands the necessity of

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a different sort: not the respect (*Achtung*) for the law, but for what escapes law, or the law of what escapes: the universality which withdraws from the "universality" of the concept, for what remains Other to the Same. Another *Achtung* which blocks Reason's advance. But that is precisely what Kant and transcendentalism, and perhaps philosophy must deny in order to stand their ground, refusing in principle to face this risk. The risk of the finite ... The critical tribunal is, in fact, nothing else but a tribunal which not only obliterates that risk through a profound forgetfulness, but in the last analysis destroys it: paradoxically, perhaps unveiling the nature on which Kant depended, dreamed about, and finally, invoked.

"The root of these disturbances, which lies deep in the nature of human reason, must be removed ... But how can we do so unless we give it freedom, nay nourishment to send out shoots so that it may discover itself to our eyes, and that it may then be entirely destroyed?" (A777-8/B805-6) *Deconstruction and Philosophy*.

<sup>510</sup> Passions, p. 8.

<sup>511</sup> Ibid, p. 21-22.

<sup>512</sup> Ibid, p. 201.

<sup>513</sup> Ibid, p. 203.

<sup>514</sup> Ibid, p. 205.

<sup>515</sup> Ibid, p. 207.

Stephan Watson says:

Kant himself thought that the moral law could be sufficiently expounded, and thereby, the external constraints requisite for the constitution of laws governing human affairs univocally instituted, thus sufficing for the will's strict determination, i.e., discipline. All this notwithstanding the indeterminacy and undecidability of its own possibility, one whose antinomial "undecidability" (his word) Kant had himself articulated. On the Critical Tribunal, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, p. 1478.

<sup>516</sup> *Moral Writings*, p. 181.

<sup>517</sup> Before the Law, p. 210. For a discussion of this issue in Derrida and Kant, see Geoffrey Bennington's *Jacques Derrida*, p. 252-254.

<sup>518</sup> Kant, "On A Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy," in *Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique* by Jacques Derrida, Ed. Peter Fenves. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 71.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid, p. 88, 89.

<sup>520</sup> Animal p. 382.

<sup>521</sup> Derrida, "Apocalyptic Tone," *Raising the Tone*, p. 157. Derrida explains his general notion of writing and experience:

"1) A written sign ... is one that subsists ... beyond the presence of the empirically determined subject ... 2) [A] written sign carries with it a force that breaks with its context ... This breaking force is ... the very structure of the written text ... 3) This force of rupture is tied to the spacing ... that constitutes the written signs: spacing which separates it from the other elements of the internal contextual chain (the always open possibility of its disengagement and graft) ... Are these three predicates ... not to be found in all language ... and ultimately in the totality of "experience" insofar as it is inseparable from this field of the mark, which is to say, from the network of effacement and of difference, of units of iterability ..., inasmuch as the very iterability which constituted their identity does not permit them ever to be a unity that is identical to itself?" *Limited Inc.*, p. 9-10/30-31. It is the power of the trace which is both the possibility and impossibility of the self-presentation of a missive.

<sup>522</sup> Passions, Name, p. 20.

<sup>523</sup> Ibid, p. 10.

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<sup>524</sup> Kant praises Leibnitz for his care of other creatures when he studied them: "Leibnitz used a tiny worm for purposes of observation, and then carefully replaced it with its leaf on the tree so that it should not come to harm through any act of his. He would have been sorry—a natural feeling for a humane man—to destroy such a creature for no reason." (Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, p. 240.

<sup>525</sup> Tim Hayward, "Kant and the Moral Considerability of Non-Rational Beings," *Philosophy and the Natural Environment*. P. 129-142.

<sup>526</sup> *Ethics*, p. 240.

<sup>527</sup> *Ethics*, p. 241.

<sup>528</sup> *Critique of Judgement, Moral Writings*, p. 323.

<sup>529</sup> *Critique of Pure Practical Reason, Moral Writings*, p. 261

<sup>530</sup> *Ibid*, p. 261,262.

<sup>531</sup> Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: University Press, 1996, p. 192-193.

<sup>532</sup> Hayward, p. 133.

<sup>533</sup> Kant writes:

When a human being is conscious of a duty to himself, he views himself, as the subject of duty, under two attributes: first as a *sensible being*, that is as a human being (a member of one of the animal species), and second as an *intelligible being* (not merely as a being that has reason ...) The senses cannot attain this latter aspect of the human being; it can be cognized only in morally practical relations, where the incomprehensible property of *freedom* is revealed by the influence of reason on the inner lawgiving will ... But the same human being thought in terms of his *personality*, that is, as a being endowed with *inner freedom* (*homo noumenon*), is regarded as a being that can be put under obligation and, indeed, under obligation to himself (to the humanity in his own person). *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 174 Derrida's trace is not thought as noumenal, and is the basis for both freedom as an essential solitude from the other as well as the opening for the other.

<sup>534</sup> *Superior Tone*, p. 68.

<sup>535</sup> *Passions*, p. 30.

<sup>536</sup> *Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 193

<sup>537</sup> *Ethics*, p. 240-241.

<sup>538</sup> *Animal*, p. 394.

<sup>539</sup> *LI*, p. 152-153. Critchley discusses Derrida's unconditional affirmation in relation to Kant's categorical imperative. *Ethics of Deconstruction*, p. 40-41.

<sup>540</sup> *Critique of Judgement*, p. 348.

<sup>541</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>542</sup> *Ibid*, p. 349.

<sup>543</sup> *Animal*, p. 373.

<sup>544</sup> Derrida, *Hospitality*, p. 66.

<sup>545</sup> *Animal*, p. 375.

<sup>546</sup> *Ibid*, p. 416. "Do we agree to presume that every murder, every transgression of the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" concerns only man ... and that in sum there are only crimes "against humanity?" *Ibid*.

<sup>547</sup> According to Kant, the ultimate end of nature is culture, and more specifically, civil and political organization. He writes:

"The formal condition under which nature can alone attain this, its real end, is the existence of a constitution so regulating the mutual relations of men that the abuse of freedom by individuals striving one against another is opposed by a lawful authority centred in a whole, called a *civil community*. For it is only in such a constitution that the greatest development of natural tendencies can take place. In addition to this we should also need a *cosmopolitan whole* ... It would be a system of all states that are in danger of acting injuriously to one another." *Critique of Judgement*, p. 350.

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<sup>548</sup> *Animal*, p. 395.

<sup>549</sup> Ibid.

<sup>550</sup> *Animal*, p. 381.

<sup>551</sup> Ibid, p. 380.

<sup>552</sup> Kant writes of "... the one property that distinguishes man from all other animals—*self-consciousness* by virtue of which he is a *rational* animal (to whom, because of the unity of consciousness, only one soul can be attributed as well)... Announcement of a Treaty, *Raising the Tone*, p. 8.

<sup>553</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, Trans. G. Bennington and I. McLeod. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 104.

<sup>554</sup> Ibid, p. 106.

<sup>555</sup> Ibid.

<sup>556</sup> Ibid.

<sup>557</sup> Ibid, p. 108.

<sup>558</sup> Ibid.

<sup>559</sup> Ibid.

<sup>560</sup> *Hospitality*, p. 70.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid.

<sup>562</sup> Ibid.

<sup>563</sup> Simon Critchley has noted this aspect of Derrida's reading of Hegel, which is critical of Hegel's sacrifice of animals and nature. Critchley does not comment on the issue. He merely cites Derrida's text. Simon Critchley, *A Commentary on Derrida's Reading of Hegel in Glas*, p 201-202. I cite the original:

"puissante et ample chaine, d'Aristote, au moins, à nos jours, elle lie la métataphysique onto-théologique à l'humanisme. L'opposition essentielle de l'homme à l'animal—ou plutôt à l'animalité, a un concept univoque, homogène, obscurantiste de l'animalité—y sert toujours le même intérêt. L'Animal n'aurait pas la Raison, la Société, ... le Langage, la Loi ... *Glas*, p. 35.

<sup>564</sup> Critchley does, however, recognize the the ethical implications of Derrida's discussion of Antigone as it applies to singularity. Ibid, p. 211 However, he does not make the connection with animals and others.

<sup>565</sup> G.H. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Trans. T.M. Knox. London: Oxford University Press, 1967, sec. 257-258, p. 155.

<sup>566</sup> This self-consciousness which apprehends itself through thinking as essentially human, and thereby frees itself from the contingent and the false, is the principle of right, morality and all ethical life." Ibid, sec. 21, p. 30.

<sup>567</sup> Ibid, Additions 26, para 44, p. 236.

<sup>568</sup> Ibid, p. 237.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid, p. 230.

<sup>570</sup> Ibid, p. 236.

<sup>571</sup> Ibid.

<sup>572</sup> Hegel writes:

"This forming of an object may in practice assume the most various guises. In farming land I impose a form on it ... Further, the preserving of game may be regarded as a way of forming game, for we preserve it with a view to maintaining the species. [The same is true of] the taming of animals, only of course that is a more direct way of forming them and it depends on me to a greater extent. Ibid, p. 238-239.

<sup>573</sup> Hegel writes:

"While in marking a thing I am taking possession in a universal way of the thing as such, the use of it implies a still more universal relation to the thing, because, when it is used, the thing in its particularity is not recognized but negated by the user ..." Ibid, p. 239.

<sup>574</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, Paris: Galilée, 1974. Eng. Trans. Richard Rand and John P. Leavey, Jr. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. p. 242/269.

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<sup>575</sup> Ibid.

<sup>576</sup> Ibid, p. 241/267.

<sup>577</sup> Ibid, p. 243/270.

With this simple mention of Hegel's discussion of the most elemental being-for-self at the prehuman level of light and energy, Derrida's being-for-self or relation to self and other in ex-appropriation without hierarchical determination does not sound so radical.

<sup>578</sup> Ibid

<sup>579</sup> Ibid, p. 244/271.

<sup>580</sup> Ibid, p. 244/271-272.

see John Llewelyn, *A Point of Almost Absolute Proximity Between Hegel and Derrida, Deconstruction and Philosophy*, p 90.

<sup>581</sup> *Glas*, p. 108.

<sup>582</sup> Ibid, p. 117/135.

<sup>583</sup> Ibid.

<sup>584</sup> Ibid, p. 196.

<sup>585</sup> Ibid, p. 197.

<sup>586</sup> For an insightful discussion of the gift and stricture in *Glas*, see Richard Beardsworth, *Derrida & the Political*. New York: Routledge, p. 60.

<sup>587</sup> In some way, this is a response to Hegel as quoted by Robert Bernasconi: "... the state of nature is itself the state of absolute and thorough ... injustice." In Robert Bernasconi, *Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti, Hegel After Derrida*, p. 57.

<sup>588</sup> Hegel writes of *Antigone*:

"... as principally the law of woman, and as the law of a substantiality at once subjective and on the plane of feeling; ... as the law of the ancient gods ... This law is there displayed as a law opposed to public law, to the law of the land. This is the supreme opposition in ethics and therefore in tragedy ..." *Philosophy of Right*, sec. 166, p. 114-115. For discussions of *Glas*, see *Joyful Wisdom: The Resurrection in Derrida's Glorious "Glas."* Ed. By David Goicoechea and Marko Zlomislic. St. Catherines: Thought House Publishing Group, 1997.

<sup>589</sup> *Glas*, p. 147/183.

<sup>590</sup> Ibid, p. 176/210.

<sup>591</sup> For an indepth discussion of this area of Derrida's thought, see John D. Caputo, *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

<sup>592</sup> *Gift of Death*, p. 66/66.

<sup>593</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>594</sup> Ibid, p. 68/68-69.

<sup>595</sup> Ibid, p. 71/71.

<sup>596</sup> Ibid, p. 61/61.

<sup>597</sup> However, Hegel writes:

"In an existing ethical order in which a complete system of ethical relations has been developed and actualized, virtue in the strict sense of the word is in place and actually appears only in exceptional circumstances when one obligation clashes with another." *Philosophy of Right*, p. 108. Hegel has obviously thought the experience of the undecidable as the basis of virtue, as the condition of one's responsibility, Derrida would say.

<sup>598</sup> *Donner le temps*, p. 8.

<sup>599</sup> Jurgen Habermas, "Beyond a Temporalized Philosophy of Origins," *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*. Trans. Frederick Lawrence. MIT Press: Cambridge, 1987, p. 178-181.

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