

The Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
and the Canadian Political Parties.
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INTRODUCTION

On February 20, 1959, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker announced that the Canadian Government had decided to discontinue the production of the Canadian Avro Arrow interceptor aircraft. He also announced the Government's intention to equip the Canadian air defence forces with American-made interceptor aircraft and Bomarc B anti-aircraft missiles. It was stated at that time that the Bomarc achieved maximum effectiveness only when armed with nuclear warheads.¹ Following Mr. Diefenbaker's announcement, and for the next four years, Canadians were faced with one of the most important issues since the conscription issue of the Second World War. The debate that took place among Canadian politicians, newspapers, magazines, as well as the Canadian public itself, was centered on the problem of whether Canada should or should not accept nuclear weapons for its military forces.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the attitudes of the Canadian political parties, newspapers, magazines, interest groups, and Canadian public opinion, on whether Canadian defence forces should be nuclear or conventionally armed. The author will do this by analyzing the arguments put forth by various segments of Canadian society representing both sides of the debate. The attempts of the political parties to represent and/or shape Canadian public opinion will be studied in detail. During the nuclear arms debate, the political parties often said that their policies represented the opinions of a majority of the Canadian voters. The thesis will attempt to discover whether in fact this was the case. Canada's defence policies from 1940 to 1963 will be

(1) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11, 1959. page 1223

described in general terms with special emphasis on Canadian-American joint continental defence measures.

This subject has military, moral and political significance. It is particularly important at the present time, for the NORAD agreement which was signed between the Canadian and American Governments in 1958, must be reviewed in 1968. The author hopes that the reader will become better acquainted with the background of the Bomarc issue and with Canadian public opinion as well as the opinions of the various political parties on this important issue.

CHAPTER TWO

MILITARY BACKGROUND

1: Canadian defence policies 1940-1957

The period of close cooperation between Canada and the United States in military matters begins with the Second World War. Between the date that Canada declared war on Germany (September 10, 1939) and the American declaration of war against the Axis Powers (December 7, 1941), Canada and the United States signed several military agreements. Some of these included supplying Canadian and British troops with American made weapons. Canada acquired military destroyers in return for leasing several military bases in Canada to the Americans. In 1940, talks between the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King and the American President, Franklin Roosevelt, resulted in the Ogdensburg Agreement, which stated that "the problems of defence co-operation between the United States and Canada could best be considered by a standing international committee on defence."² This led to the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. It was made up primarily of military officers from the three branches of the military in both countries as well as a diplomatic officer from each nation.³ The Canadian diplomatic officer represents the Department of External Affairs. Mr. Gordon Skilling stated that, "the function of the board has been advisory and relates to the planning of the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere."⁴ Its recommendations are submitted to the Chiefs of Staff of both nations for approval. The Ogdensburg

(2) Crane, Brian, An Introduction to Canadian Defence Policy, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1964, page 4.

(3) Skilling, H. Gordon, Canadian Representation Abroad. From Agency to Embassy, The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1945, page 306.

(4) loc.cit.

Agreement was very important in determining the future Canadian defence policy. Colonel C. W. Stacey said that,

"from this time, accordingly, an effective organ existed for continual international consultation upon and review of the problems of the joint defence of North America. From this followed all the many measures of joint defence taken as the war progressed. There had been a time, long ago, when the defence of Canada had meant defence against the United States, pure and simple; now Canada and the United States stood shoulder to shoulder." 5

On April 20, 1941, the Canadian Prime Minister went to the United States to talk to the American President at Hyde Park, President Roosevelt's residence southeast of New York City. The result of their talks was the Hyde Park Declaration, stating that Canada and the United States had reached agreement on the joint production of munitions and armaments and on military-economic co-operation. Joint committees were quickly established for administering these affairs.

After the war, Canada reduced the size of its military forces with a consequent reduction of military expenditures from three billion dollars in 1944-45 to one hundred and ninety-five million dollars in 1947-48. The strength of the forces was reduced because,

"there was optimism that the new international organizations would ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes in the immediate future and encourage the growth of a lasting international order." 6

During the 1950's, important discussions were taking place between Canadian and American air force officers.⁷

(5) Stacey, Col. C.P., The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, King's Printer, Ottawa, 1948, page 29.

(6) Crane Brian, op. cit., page 10.

(7) Conant, Melvin, "Canada's Role in Western Defence," Foreign Affairs, vol. 40, October 1961-July 1962, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1962, page 436.

These men were concerned with creating a viable defence of the North American continent against a possible air attack launched by the Soviet Union. The Joint Board of Defence was given the task of planning for the defence of the territorial seas, coastal waters, and air defence. Sovereignty over the control of overflights and the movement of troops would be maintained by each nation, but full military cooperation including the interchange of personnel would continue. Although air defence was to be a cooperative venture, this idea was rapidly modified with the threat of a Soviet bomber attack over the North Pole. The American military planners were of the opinion that the first target of a Soviet attack would be the air fields of the Strategic Air Command. They felt that Canada's role should be one of detecting incoming Soviet bombers and warning the Americans of an impending attack. Thus, in the early 1950's, three radar lines were built across Canada. The Pine Tree Line is situated near the Canadian-American border and it was later connected to a computing system, the semi-automatic ground environment system, (SAGE) which would direct the Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles towards enemy aircraft. The Mid-Canada Line was situated almost half-way between the Pine Tree Line and the Arctic Circle and finally, the Distant Early Warning network of radar stations stretched across Canada close to the Arctic Circle.

This was the Canadian defence position at the beginning of 1957 in relation to North American defence. However, during 1957, the Soviet Union had proven to the world that it had developed long range inter-continental ballistic missiles, and American military, scientific, and political prognosticators were of the opinion that by 1960, the Soviet Union's missiles would outnumber those of the United States by 3 to 1.⁸ The result of the close cooperation

(8) Crane, Brian, op. cit., page 17.

between Canadian and United States air force personnel, coupled with the threat of a possible Soviet attack on this continent, resulted in an extension of this close military cooperation in the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD).

Canadian defence policies and action with regard to the defence of North America from 1945 to 1957 have been briefly described. Before examining the creation of NORAD, the crises over the Avro Arrow and the problem of accepting nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, Canada's role in NATO from 1949 to 1957 will be examined.

The peace that was established at the end of the Second World War and the feeling of security against aggression provided by the United Nations Charter soon gave way to fear of Soviet aggression and its use of revolutionary tactics. In 1947, the United States gave military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in order to prevent these nations from coming under Communist domination. This was followed by the Marshall Plan, a program of economic aid to Europe. After the major powers had failed to agree on the future of Germany, the Western European nations of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, along with Great Britain, signed the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948 in order to counter the Soviet military threat in Europe. Mr. King welcomed the Brussels Treaty as a step towards peace and offered Canadian support for the pact. Thus the new Canadian policy of involving itself with European defence problems in peacetime began to unfold. Canada's policy was more clearly stated on April 29 when the new Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent

"pledged Canada's willingness to participate in any appropriate collective security arrangements which might be worked out under Article 51 or 52 of the Charter." 9

(9) Spencer, Robert A., "Triangle into Treaty: Canada and the Origins of NATO, International Journal, Spring 1959, vol. XLV, no. 2, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1959, page 92.

Mr. St. Laurent's remarks were repeated and expanded upon by Mr. Escott Reid, Canadian Deputy Under-Secretary for external affairs, who stated at the Couchiching Conference held during the summer of that year, that a regional organization which would have teeth but no veto, should be established to prevent Soviet expansion in Western Europe.¹⁰ On June 11, the United States announced its Vandenburg Resolution which was similar to Mr. St. Laurent's statement in that it pledged military assistance to Western Europe to help defend it in time of attack. Negotiations were soon under way for the purpose of bringing the two North American countries into an expanded pact. The result of these negotiations was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, comprising the five powers of the Brussels Treaty, along with Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Italy, Canada and the United States. Greece and Turkey became members of NATO in 1952, and the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1955.

The day on which the North Atlantic Treaty was signed is one of the most important days in Canada's postwar military policy, for it had now committed itself to a clear and precise obligation to defend Western Europe through NATO. One of the reasons for the creation of the alliance was a lack of confidence of Western political leaders in the capabilities of the United Nations Organization to ensure world peace. Many problems resulting from the Second World War, such as the Korean demarcation line, the future of Trieste, the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, and the problem of a divided Berlin, remained unresolved. Many Western statesmen had given up hope that the solution of these problems could come from the United Nations. Prime Minister Mackenzie King said in a speech in September 1945

(10) Ibid., page 90.

that "the United Nations Charter is as dead after three months as the League of Nations Covenant after fifteen years."¹¹ The threat of the Soviet Union extending its control beyond the European nations it was already administering, was another reason for NATO's creation.

"The early organization of NATO provided for a series of regional groups of countries who could mutually support each other if attacked."¹² Thus for the first time Canadian troops were committed to defend an attached Western European nation. These defensive commitments satisfied the Canadian desire for independence from close cooperation with the United States, and at the same time, it allowed Canada to participate in a large and powerful military alliance. Canada was pleased with NATO and attempted to make it more than just a military alliance by urging the inclusion of an article supporting economic cooperation among the member states, an article that later became known as "the Canadian Article."

"NATO had another advantage from the Canadian viewpoint. It was supported both by the United States and Great Britain. Any agency making for cordial relations between the two great powers made the problems of Canadian foreign policy simpler and less perplexing than would otherwise be the case." ¹³

It allowed Canada to be less dependent unilaterally on Washington by continuing its role of "go-between," "bridge" or "interpreter" in London-Washington relations, although to a lesser degree than had previously been the case.

(11) loc. cit.

(12) Foulkes, General Charles, "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age," Behind the Headlines, vol. XVI, no. 1, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, May 1961, page 3.

(13) Masters, Donald G., Canada in World Affairs, 1953 to 1955, Oxford University Press, published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1965, page 184.

9

Due to the weakness and inability of the European countries to provide fighting forces to NATO, General Eisenhower, who took over as Supreme Allied Commander, urged Canada to help the United States fill the void until the European countries could contribute enough troops of their own to allow the North American contingent to return home.¹⁴ Canada responded by earmarking one division of troops for NATO, of which one brigade was to be sent to Europe and two other brigades were to remain in Canada. This was to be followed by a second division if necessary, an air division of twelve squadrons of day-fighters and a naval contingent of forty-two ships and forty-eight maritime aircraft.

However, the European nations were not able to raise the number of their conventional forces due to domestic economic and political problems. This failure, coupled with the acquisition of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in 1952, led to the American strategy of establishing nuclear weapon bases in Europe in 1954. This policy also included the plan to use atomic weapons from the outset of a war.¹⁵

"President Eisenhower's 'new look' at defence policy proceeded on the assumption that conventional weapons and ground forces should be reduced and the development of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons accelerated."¹⁶

This decision was taken in 1954 because it was only then that the U.S.S.R. had developed the capability of attacking Western Europe with nuclear weapons. In December 1954, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), was given a free hand by the North Atlantic Council to organize the

(14) Foulkes, General Charles, op. cit., page 4.

(15) NATO Information Service, NATO's Military Development, Aspects of NATO, NATO, Paris, October 1961, page 6. It did not specifically say the weapons would be used only in a "global" war, but referred to any war.

(16) Crane, Brian, op. cit., page 16.

introduction of nuclear weapons into the defence plans of Europe. The decision to accept nuclear weapons for NATO's forces was opposed by some of the smaller nations which belonged to the alliance. They carefully weighed the consequences of accepting nuclear weapons by examining,

"the relative dangers of provoking a war of mass destruction on the one hand, and on the other, relying on the hope that by not introducing these weapons into NATO's armoury, they would avoid encouraging... potential enemies from introducing them into theirs. " 17

The Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, was of the opinion that massive nuclear retaliation, as advocated by President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, would likely encourage conventional assaults rather than deterring such action. Canada was one of the countries that opposed the policy of massive retaliation, favouring the use of the Western world's conventional forces to gain limited political objectives, mainly to deter aggression or to localize it and defeat it. But NATO yielded to the doctrine of relying on a nuclear deterrent due to the insufficient number of conventionally armed troops capable of being sent into battle. Although the conventional forces had continued to increase by 1957, both American and European military officers saw them as having only a limited value, to be used in the pause before nuclear retaliation.

It was originally planned that the U.S. would be the sole nation to provide air support for NATO's ground forces, through the use of the Strategic Air Command.¹⁸ However, the McMahon Act allowed the release of nuclear information from the U.S. to its allies on a reciprocal basis. It was not long before Great Britain began manufacturing nuclear weapons and

(17) NATO Information Service, op. cit., page 6.

(18) Foulkes, General Charles, op. cit., page 7.

a Strategic Bomber Force. To prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons, the United States entered into bilateral agreements with its NATO allies, equipping their forces with tactical nuclear weapons, while the ownership and custody of those weapons remained in American hands. Canada's commitment to NATO in terms of air power, consisted of twelve fighter squadrons, one aircraft control, and a warning squadron which were located at Marville and Crostenquin in France, and at Baden-Soellingen and Zweibrücken in Germany. The decision by the Canadian Government to accept nuclear weapons for those aircraft which were allocated a "strike-reconnaissance" role, was not taken until 1958. This will be examined later on in this chapter.

These were the defence policies adopted and followed by Canada during the first twelve years after the Second World War. The time for the crucial decision, that of accepting nuclear weapons for its North American and Western European defence forces, was drawing near. We will first examine the problem in the light of North American air defence, and then of NATO defence.

11. Canadian defence policies, 1957-1963.

A joint Canadian and American military group met to discuss the future command structure of NORAD. They recommended that,

"all Canadian and U.S. forces assigned to continental air defence be under a NORAD commander-in-chief, who would be a U.S. officer, and his deputy, who would be a Canadian." 19

The NORAD commander reports directly to the Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa and Washington.

(19) Conant, Melvin, op. cit., page 436.

"In the event of an air attack the interceptor aircraft and missile defences of Canada and the United States will be directed by NORAD, subject to the policy directives approved by the Canadian and the United States governments." 20

As NORAD headquarters could recommend and advise for the instant use of all its forces, it was in effect, the highest military level for the contingents of both countries. The Liberal Government is assumed to have given its approval to this plan as the Defence Minister's Report of 1956-57 stated that the defence of Canada, through NATO and close cooperation with the United States was Canada's principal defence policy, along with our obligation to U.N. peacekeeping operations. General Charles Foulkes stated before the Special Committee on Defence in 1963, that in 1957, the main problem concerning the creation of NORAD was the problem of financing its operations. The NORAD proposal,

"was looked at by the St. Laurent Government in the last few months and they decided at that time, with the election on their hands, that this was one of the first things they would have to get at when they came back because it could not be carried within the present appropriation." 21

After the 1957 election, the Progressive Conservatives ousted the Liberal Party from power. The new Minister of National Defence was faced with three important problems; NORAD, the Avro Arrow programme, and the CF-104 programme. The first question was settled when the government accepted the creation of NORAD in August, in its first few days in office.

(20) Crano, Brian, op. cit., page 30.

(21) Special Committee on Defence, Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1963, page 510.

During the nine months that elapsed between the creation of NORAD in August 1957, and the Canadian Government's approval of the organization in May 1958, the integration of Canadian and United States air force contingents functioned on an interim basis. The Canadian Government and the parliamentary opposition argued over the purposes to be served and the risks involved in an integrated defence system, the role of the U.S. commander-in-chief and his Canadian deputy and other problems. It was felt at the time that the Canadian decision to take part in an integrated system was made "by Canadian military officers without the full and proper approval of the Cabinet."²² This was substantiated by General Charles Foulkes in statements made by him before the Special Committee on Defence, on October 22, 1963. He referred to the meetings that took place between the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the United States and said,

"the chiefs of staff have no power, but act only on the direction of the government. On the question of dealing with important issues such as the 104 and 105 aircraft, NORAD and so on, the general policy has been that the chiefs of staff would prepare a paper for the government."²³

Referring to NORAD, he added, "the chiefs of staff of both countries worked out the agreement which had been approved by the United States administration in 1957."²⁴

Nevertheless, the exchange of notes in May 1958, between the Canadian and American governments stipulated the necessity of an integrated defence system to counter the threat of an attack by the Soviet Union. The two governments

(22) Conant, Melvin, "Canada and Continental Defence: an American View," International Journal, Summer 1960, vol. XV, no.3, page 223.

(23) Special Committee on Defence, op. cit., page 526.

(24) loc. cit.

agreed to such a defence,

"by delegating to an integrated headquarters the task of exercising operational control over combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries." 25

The American air defence forces had been equipped with more modern weapons than were their Canadian counterparts. Due to the threat of a nuclear attack against the North American continent by the Soviet Union, and due to the closer cooperation between the American and Canadian air defence forces, the United States wanted the Canadian air force to be equipped with, and trained to operate, nuclear weapons. This was regarded by the United States as a means of increasing the security of the continent should a crisis occur.²⁶ However, the Canadian Government did not consider the problem of acquiring nuclear weapons as being a simple one, as there were moral and political questions involved. It was thought that by acquiring these weapons, Canada's efforts in disarmament negotiations, as well as our position with the neutral nations of the world, would be seriously affected. There were some who thought the acquisition of nuclear weapons would make Canada a prime target rather than a secondary target as would otherwise be the case. For Canada to receive these weapons, the U.S. President would have to authorize his Department of Defense or the United States Atomic Energy Commission, or both, to cooperate with Canada. Then the transfer of nuclear material would be made, provided that Canada was making a substantial contribution to the mutual defence of the continent. While ownership and custody of these warheads would remain in American hands,

(25) Conant, Melvin, op. cit., page 224.

(26) Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1962, page 96.

their use on Canadian territory would be subject to an agreement given by the Canadian Government.

Another problem that had to be dealt with by the Canadian Government was that of the Canadian designed Avro Arrow jet interceptor aircraft. Production of the CF-105 Avro Arrow had commenced in 1952. The programme began as an airframe programme only, with the engine to be supplied by Great Britain or the United States, and with American weapons and communications systems. When a Canadian firm began building an engine which seemed suitable for the CF-105, the Canadian government decided to develop the airframe and the engine. When the American Sparrow II weapon system was discontinued, the Canadian government took that project over. A similar situation occurred when the Americans abandoned the communications and electronics systems. The cost of the project became over-burdening, and the death knell for the entire project was the cut-back in the number of Arrows required by the R.C.M.P. from 400 to 100. This occurred when it was discovered that neither the United States nor Great Britain wanted to purchase the aircraft. General Foulkes said while testifying before the Special Committee on Defence on October 22, 1963,

"when you start to divide these increased costs, which were mounting because we had taken over the development of the engine, the production of the weapon and the electronics, and start to divide that by something less than 100, we found that the cost comes to something like \$8 million a copy." 27

However, it was only at this time that Canadian officials discovered that neither the United States nor any other NATO nation was willing to purchase the Avro Arrow.

(27) Reford, Robert, "Making Defence Policy in Canada," Behind the Headlines, vol. XXIII, no.2, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, December, 1963, page 14.

On February 20, 1959, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker announced that the Arrow programme was going to be abandoned and that it would be replaced by the American Voodoo interceptor aircraft and the unmanned Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles. One reason for this decision was that at this time, the threat of a manned bomber attack on North America was now considered to be less likely than was originally believed. The Canadian Minister of Defence, the Honourable George Pearkes, said that,

"by 1962 when the CF-105 would have come into operational use in the R.C.A.F., the main threat is expected to consist of long range missiles rather than manned bombers. In view of these circumstances, the production of such an aircraft as the CF-105 in Canada was not considered justified." 28

The operational life of this extremely expensive aircraft would have been relatively short. Another reason for abandoning the programme was the increasing cost of producing these aircraft, described above.

But there were many voices raised in support of the Arrow, including those of Air Marshal W.A. Curtis and the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD, Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon. Although it was said that the Arrow was scrapped because it was not economical to produce such an expensive aircraft for only nine R.C.A.F. squadrons, these distinguished Canadian officers did not support this view. The commander-in-chief of NORAD at that time, United States General, Earle Partridge, held the same view. He said that the Arrow "was in fact superior to anything the USAF had on or near production."²⁹

(28) Pearkes, Honourable G.R., Defence 1959, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1959, page 10.

(29) Alexander, Fred, Canadians and Foreign Policy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1960, page 45.

Whether or not the Americans were intending to manufacture an aircraft similar to the Arrow, it seemed, from General Partridge's statement, that he was very impressed with the Arrow and might have been persuaded to adopt the Arrow as part of the continental defence forces. Therefore, if Canada could have supplied the United States air force with the Arrow, it would have reduced the cost of its production to a reasonable sum, thus preventing thousands of men from losing their jobs.

Canadians criticized the government for the apparent waste of money on uneconomical defence production programs.³⁰ They also criticized the government for putting 14,000 men out of work, and for abandoning the Arrow project after \$400,000,000 had been spent in manufacturing two prototypes of the CP-105. Canadians also expressed concern over the loss of Canadian sovereignty in matters of defence due to the close alliance with and reliance upon American forces and weapons. Defence Minister Carleton replied to this sentiment by saying,

"you might say the very presence of American troops in Canada is in some degree a surrendering of our old-fashioned conception of sovereignty, but Canada is not surrendering any command over her air force squadrons. Canada is a partner. She has not given up any land or anything else in that sense." 31

(30) The Boomer personnel carrier suffered a similar fate shortly afterward.

(31) Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on External Relations on the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), June 25, 1958, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1958, page 17.

Despite the opposition to scrapping the Avro Arrow, the policies taken by the professional officers and government representatives,

"followed a course that aimed to meet the requirements of Canada's geographic position and secure the maximum cooperation which both formal and informal negotiations could secure from the more powerful strategic partner to the south while continually seeking to preserve Canada's identity wherever possible." 32

Thus, if Canadian air defence forces are to come under foreign control in NORAD, there is to be no consideration for personal pique. However in 1960, both countries agreed to the creation of the Defence Production Sharing Programme which allowed Canadian industries to compete for contracts in the United States. Since then, more than three hundred Canadian firms have done more than \$605 millions of defence business in contracts secured south of the border.³³

The Prime Minister said that the Bomarc missiles had been accepted by Canada as part of its military commitments to Western defence and he added, "the full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads."³⁴ Mr. Diefenbaker said that the decision to accept the Bomarcs was "based on the best expert advice available."³⁵ (The Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the United States were of the opinion that the Bomarc missiles were the most effective means of defence during the late 1950's). On May 25 of the same year he said in the House of Commons,

(32) Ibid., page 42.

(33) Special Committee on Defence, op. cit., page 21.

(34) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11, 1959, page 1223.

(35) This was a phrase used in Mr. Diefenbaker's speech of February 20, 1959.

"provision is made for the transfer to Canada under mutually agreeable conditions of such non-nuclear parts of the atomic weapons systems involving restricted data as are jointly determined to be necessary to improve the state of training of Canada's armed forces and the operational readiness of these forces." 36

Thus it appeared that there was a political obligation imposed by the Canadian Government upon itself to accept the Bomarcas armed with nuclear warheads. It was expected that the acquisition of nuclear warheads for the Bomarcas would be shortly announced. The White Paper on defence which was issued in April 1959, stated that Canada would not manufacture nuclear weapons, and those that were stationed in Canada would remain under American ownership and control.³⁷

Along with the acquisition of the Bomarcas, the radar stations were to be equipped with a new communications system, the semi-automatic ground environment (SAGE) electronic control and computing equipment. The acquisition of this electronic equipment was considered to be necessary in order to strengthen the Pine Tree radar network. The SAGE computer collects all the information from the search radars in its sectors, plots and predicts the course of aircraft and shows this information to the controller. When it has been decided to launch interceptors, SAGE assigns one missile to

(36) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 1V, 1959, page 3966.

(37) Despite these statements, the Bomarc and Voodoo interceptors that Canada had acquired during 1961 and 1962 were armed with conventional weapons as were the Honest John rockets and Starfighter aircraft of the NATO contingents in Europe. They were armed with nuclear weapons only after the Liberal Party had been elected as Canada's new Government in the April 1963 federal election.

each attacker and guides it through radio-transmitted signals to the point of interception. The installation of SAGE computers was completed in mid-1961 and controlled the area of Eastern Ontario and Western Quebec and was connected with the U.S. controlled areas. Thus, any fighters or missiles launched in Canada, are controlled from below the border with the exception of the above computer which is the only computer in Canada which does not give its information directly to American air force control centers but rather to the R.C.A.F. St. Hubert air force base. The Canadian radars, therefore, fill the role of supplementing the American system. This led to the view, that was held by many Canadians that the SAGE-Bomarc system was established solely to warn the United States of an impending attack. The interception of enemy aircraft, and the detonation of nuclear bombs will take place in Canadian air space, and Canada would suffer from nuclear fallout while the United States would emerge from the crisis relatively unscathed.³⁸ In order that the SAGE-Bomarc system would offer the same protection to the industrial heartland of Canada as it offered to the United States, the defensive installations would have to be moved seven hundred miles further north. As the Canadian expert, K. R. Patrick said in 1957 about the speed of fighter aircraft, "fighter speeds then required a defensive zone 700 miles deep, all covered by ground controls, to provide for a chance of interception."³⁹ The automatic features of this new communications network eliminates human errors, increases the

(38) Mr. Pearson's parliamentary speech of September 5, 1960, referred to our providing protection to the Strategic Air Command.

(39) Barkway, Michael, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defence," International Journal, Spring 1959, vol. XLV, no.2, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1959, page 108.

capacity of the system and provides the commanding officer with an up to the minute picture of the situation in the air.

Some Canadians were of the opinion that in view of our past foreign policy which emphasized peaceful diplomacy rather than the threat of military force, and the desire that this type of foreign policy should continue, Canada should reject the acquisition of all types of nuclear weapons. Mr. Pearkes, the Canadian Minister of Defence, in order to placate this segment of public opinion, emphasized Canada's defensive rather than offensive military policy.

"We have no means of carrying out retaliation. We have no bombers and we have no means at the present time of carrying out any retaliation or counter offensive. All our air force can do here is defensive."40

This might be construed as an attempt on the part of Mr. Pearkes to differentiate between offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and making Canadians aware that the latter type of weapon was necessary to Canadian and continental defence.

Despite the fact that it appeared that the Conservative Government was about to accept nuclear warheads from the United States, Mr. Diefenbaker procrastinated in making a decision on this issue. This was due partly because Mr. Diefenbaker wanted to avoid creating another controversial issue similar to that caused by the cancellation of the Avro Arrow. A second reason for his hesitation to accept the nuclear warheads was a statement by United States military officials which was made shortly after Canada had accepted the Bomarc, that these missiles were no longer the "ultimate" weapon in continental defence. The Americans, at the same time, urged Canadian officials to accept American Voodoo interceptors which carried small, nuclear tipped missiles.

(40) Senate of Canada, op. cit., page 20.

They were considered to be more effective than the Bomarc because they were not stationary, therefore they were not as vulnerable as the Bomarc in the event of a surprise attack; and also, they could intercept the enemy farther north, away from Canada's heavily populated areas. This turn of events brought about a loss of confidence by Canadians in the judgment of their own government as well as the American government and military officials. Another reason for a lack of any decision by Mr. Diefenbaker was the political consequences that might result should he announce the government's acquisition of the American Voodoo Interceptor with its nuclear weapons, so shortly after it had cancelled production of the Canadian Arrow. Canadians remembered the fiasco of the Avro Arrow and the statements made at that time, that interceptor aircraft would no longer be the main weapon in the R.C.A.F.'s arsenal. The most effective Canadian defence against an enemy air attack was considered to be the Bomarc missile. Adding to his dilemma was the fact that during this time (and until the defeat of the government in 1963), the Cabinet was divided on whether or not nuclear weapons should be introduced into Canada.⁴¹

Canadians, in general, and the parliamentary opposition in particular, urged the government to adopt a clear defence policy. Mr. Diefenbaker issued a statement justifying his government's position. He gave various

(41) Macklin, W.H.S., "A Defence Policy for Canada," The Canadian Saturday Night, vol. 78, no. 4, Parkan Publications Limited, Toronto, April, 1963, page 25. He said Messrs. Harkness, Hees, and Seigny gave as their reason for resigning from the Cabinet, procrastination on the part of Mr. Diefenbaker. They said that Canada could not afford to delay its decision for even a few more weeks when the NATO parliamentary discussions would be held.

reasons why the government had not made any firm decision on this issue as yet. One reason was the recent announcement by United States military officers that the Bomarc was no longer as effective as it was thought to be. This resulted in the government questioning the wisdom of accepting these weapons. Another reason why no decision was made, according to Mr. Diefenbaker, was the possibility of Canada losing its sovereignty in accepting these weapons. In July, he said that nuclear weapons would be introduced into Canada only if their use in Canada would be determined by a decision of the Canadian Government. Then, in a speech to the Canadian Club in November, he gave another reason as to why no decision had been taken on the issue of nuclear arms by saying,

"we have taken the stand that no decision will be required while progress towards disarmament continues. To do otherwise would be inconsistent." 42

He implied that for Canada to accept nuclear weapons at this time may drastically affect the outcome of the disarmament negotiations detrimentally. The speech also came after the opinion of the Canadian press became more vociferous against the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

By mid-1961, the differences of opinion in the Cabinet between External Affairs Minister Howard Green and Defence Minister Douglas Harkness and their followers had hardened rather than mellowed into some form of accommodation. It was thought at this time that Mr. Diefenbaker was siding with his defence minister and that a statement from the government expressing its intention of accepting the Bomarc weapons was imminent when, on September 25, 1961, the American President John F. Kennedy addressed the United Nations General Assembly. In his speech he "proposed, among other things, a disarmament program that would prohibit 'the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to states that do not now own them.'" 43 This allowed Mr. Diefenbaker to further

(42) Conant, Melvin, op. cit., page 106.

(43) Ibid., page 109.

postpone making a final decision on the issue. Any statement at this time, announcing the Canadian Government's acceptance of the Bomarc (provided that the use of the Bomarc were to be determined by the Canadian Government), would seem to be a violation of the U.S. President's policy.

However, Mr. Diefenbaker found it difficult to clearly reject the acceptance of the Bomarc on account of the American President's speech. This was due to a speech made by General Laurence S. Kuter, the American commander-in-chief of NORAD on September 1. General Kuter said that a bomber attack was still highly possible and it was necessary to inflict the highest possible "kill ratio" against enemy aircraft. He said,

"the bomber remains a threat in increasingly sophisticated forms. It is NORAD's task both to anticipate these threats and to have the capability to reduce them to acceptable proportions." 44

He also stated that a nuclear explosion affects a larger area than a conventional explosion, thus allowing for a less accurate missile whose warhead would not have to explode as close to an aircraft as a conventional weapon in order for it to have the same degree of perfection. The necessity for nuclear weapons would increase with the threat of a missile attack. The second factor was the necessity of destroying the enemy weapon, not only the carrier. He referred to this as "weapon kill."

(44) Speech by General Laurence S. Kuter, Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence Command, delivered at a banquet of the Canadian International Air Show, Toronto, September 1, 1961, page 3.

"'Weapon kill' which could be expected of an accurately placed nuclear air defence weapon, would not only destroy the carrier but would also destroy the bomb which is being carried. It is not at all unreasonable to expect that enemy bombs will be designed with dead man fuzes. These fuzes permit the bombs to detonate, on impact, even though the aircraft or other device which is carrying them has been shot down in flames or has disintegrated in the air. There is, therefore, enormous military advantage in the use of a nuclear air defense warhead which will kill the weapon and not just the carrier." 45

The subsequent nuclear fallout would be insignificant when compared to the fallout resulting from a nuclear explosion when a bomber had crashed into the ground after being hit by a conventionally armed missile.

The indecision with which the Canadian Government approached the problem of accepting nuclear weapons, and the intense division of Cabinet members on this issue continued throughout the rest of the year and throughout 1962 as well. The Conservatives gave no clear indication whether they intended to honour the commitments which they had concluded in the past while the Liberal and New Democratic parties opposed the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. They repeatedly challenged the government in the House of Commons to issue a clear statement of where the government stood on the issue. The Canadian reluctance to allow American nuclear arms to be stationed in northern forward positions to be immediately mobilized during a crisis such as occurred in October 1962, in the Cuban crisis, brought the nuclear weapons issue to a head in Canada, while it also created tension in Canadian-American relations. During the height of the crisis, the NORAD headquarters had asked the Canadian Government to place its forces in a state of readiness and to take other measures which were necessary to improve

(45) Ibid., page 4.

the operational capability in its area of command. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff approved this request as did the Defence Minister. The Cabinet met the next morning, "with most of the ministers feeling that endorsement of the American move would be nothing more than a formality."⁴⁶ However, Howard Green made an impassioned appeal to reconsider the NORAD request as he did not favour following the United States blindly, and also because he felt that President Kennedy should have consulted with Canada before the request was made.

"Diefenbaker jumped into the ensuing debate to back up Green's statement, and that was enough to swing the Cabinet against Harkness who was ordered not to permit the alert of Canadian forces." ⁴⁷

111. Canada's defence policies with regard to NATO 1957-1963

The policy of "brinkmanship" and massive retaliation that the American Government had adopted in the early 1950's, was adopted by NATO a few years later. NATO's forces were equipped with American-made tactical nuclear weapons which remained under American control.

In 1958, the Canadian Government accepted a nuclear role for the R.C.A.F. in Europe, that of a strike-reconnaissance duty. It was to be equipped with the CF-104 Starfighter aircraft which were to be armed with tactical nuclear weapons. However, the Canadian forces in Europe did not receive those weapons partly because the government feared creating another

(46) Newman, Peter C., Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, McClelland and Stewart Limited, Toronto/Montreal, 1963, page 337.

(47) loc. cit.

controversy similar to that which arose over the creation of NORAD, and partly because the Cabinet was divided over the question of whether Canada should or should not accept nuclear weapons. Another reason for the government not allowing the Canadian forces to be nuclear armed was the possibility that such a policy might hamper attempts to achieve disarmament. They feared that should Canada accept such weapons, other countries would follow suit, thus increasing the spread of nuclear weapons rather than contributing to disarmament or a possible agreement on disarmament.

In 1960, while the Conservative Government was still in the midst of doing very little to settle the question of whether or not to accept nuclear weapons for its strike-reconnaissance role in Europe, the Defence Minister, the Honourable George Pearkes, V.C., in his statements on defence policy and the implementation before the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures said,

"the basic role of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group is to assist in the protection of Western Europe by delaying any advance that might be made by enemy ground forces." 48

In order to effectively fulfil its role, the Canadian Army would have to be equipped with the Honest John and Lacrosse surface-to-surface missiles, armed with nuclear warheads. The Defence Minister, in his statements, did not explain why Canada had not consented to equip these missiles and the

(48) Canada, Department of National Defence, Statements on Defence Policy and its Implementation, made by the Hon. G.R. Pearkes, V.C., Minister of National Defence, before the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures, June 1960, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, Ottawa, 1960, page 14.

Starfighter aircraft with nuclear warheads.

"Moreover, when pressed, the most which was ever admitted by General Pearkes was that the plane 'could' be so armed; it was never mentioned that the 'strike' role was by definition nuclear, 'attack' being the NATO characterization for a similar role with conventional weapons." 49

The inability or unwillingness of the Conservative Government to formulate a definite policy on whether nuclear weapons would be accepted as part of Canada's contribution to Western defence, pertained not only to NORAD, but to NATO as well. Thus while Conservative indecision over the Bomares lasted throughout the administration's stay in office, the same indecision existed with regard to arming the Starfighters and the surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads. The reasons for this indecision are similar to those pertaining to the refusal to arm the Bomares with nuclear weapons. However, another reason for the government's procrastination in accepting nuclear weapons was the loss of Mr. Diefenbaker's parliamentary majority after the 1962 federal election, which made the Prime Minister wary of making any decision that might cause adverse publicity against his administration. Also, the lack of a clear consensus of opinion among the Canadian people (the number of people in favour of nuclear weapons was declining), and the opposition parties, gave the Prime Minister a further excuse to avoid taking a definite stand on the issue. Thus, it can be seen that Conservative inaction over the nuclear arms issue with regard to NATO, closely paralleled the situation with regard to the Bomares, and North American defence.

(49) Molin, Jon B., Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963. The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967, page 119.

IV. Summary

The nuclear arms crisis of four years duration came about as a result of our membership in the NATO and NORAD military alliances. While the value of our contribution to these alliances was marginal, Canada felt that by belonging to that group of nations known as the "Western world," it had an obligation to contribute to its common defence. Canada's decision to join these alliances was also based on the self-styled role of being an influential, important middle power, rightfully seeking a voice in matters of defence of the Western world.

However, the security of the Western nations depends upon the policy of the two superpowers. With the policy being concentrated in the capital cities of these two nations, and with the cost of belonging to military alliances increasing in financial terms and in matters involving the acquisition of modern, complex weapons, there is no longer any significant role for the middle powers in matters of defence. Initially, Canada was prepared to pay that cost, but as the weapons became more sophisticated, the burden rose to a level where it was no longer politically or economically acceptable. The cost of producing modern weapons rose at an alarming rate. "Their production was rendered uneconomic for any but the largest countries."⁵⁰

From this time on, Canadian officials who were responsible for formulating defence policy were unclear about what the ends of their defence policy should be. They were unable to cope with the changing role that Canada had to undertake. This applied not only to NORAD but to NATO as well.

(50) Ibid., page 215.

"It appears that the government woke up in 1959 and 1960 with some surprise and displeasure to the fact that it had committed itself to a variety of nuclear roles, including that of the air division. It neither renounced the commitments nor acquired the weapons needed to make them effective—it reacted by delaying." 51

The reasons for the delay are not clear, but they are partly political. The Diefenbaker Government was wary of creating another controversy of the magnitude of the Arrow debacle of 1959. Also, Canada's security was not immediately threatened, thereby posing no urgent need for a definite decision to be made on this matter.

(51) Ibid., page 216.

CHAPTER THREE

OPINION

1. Important Individuals

A. Important individuals in favour of nuclear weapons

Canadian opinion was seriously divided on the question of whether Canada should or should not accept nuclear weapons. This division was reflected in the nation's newspapers and in the various articles and books written by prominent Canadian individuals. This section of the chapter will first examine the arguments put forth by those prominent individuals who felt that Canada should accept nuclear weapons, and the opposing view will then be examined.

John Gellner, in a pamphlet entitled, Problems of Canadian Defence, outlined some of the reasons why Canada should accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles. In the same pamphlet, Mr. Gellner, who retired as an R.C.A.F. Wing Commander in 1958, completely rejected the possibility of Canada becoming a neutral nation by "opting out" of the cold war. The former wing commander said the Bomarc missile was cheaper to build and maintain than the Avro Arrow. Not needing an air crew, it is also less expensive to operate in that respect than is the CF-105 interceptor aircraft. However, because the Bomarc is only a one-shot interceptor and is a less flexible and manoueverable weapon than the Arrow, Mr. Gellner advocated that the Bomarc force should be supported by a manned interceptor. He also said that Canada, due to its geographic position, had to assist the United States in its air defence policies for protecting this continent against a possible attack by the Soviet Union. Mr. Gellner also said that, "deterrence has been defined as a

method of forcing good (rational) behaviour through the fear of self-destruction."¹ Thus the enemy, in order to stage a successful attack, must make it one hundred percent effective in order to prevent any counter-attack. The SAC bombers, some of which are continuously airborne, provide an effective deterrent to any Soviet aggression either by bombers or missiles. The more effective Canadian air defence, the stronger will be SAC's counter attack force. Thus, "Canadian air defence is indispensable to the security of the United States and through it, to our own security."²

Klaus Knorr, who was the director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University at the time of the Canadian Bomarc crisis was of the opinion, as were many other influential people, that the bomber remained a threat to the security of the North American continent. It was because of this threat, and because of the close relationship that exists between Canada and the United States in political, moral and national goals, that a close liaison in military affairs between the two nations was a necessity. He felt that the acceptance of nuclear weapons by Canadian air defence forces was important not only for destroying the enemy carriers, but for destroying the weapon as well.

It should be remembered that Mr. Knorr was an American, and the predominant mood in the decision making bodies of the United States Government with regard to defence matters, was that Canada should fulfil its role as a partner of the United States in matters of continental defence by

(1) Gellner, John, "Problems of Canadian Defence," Behind the Headlines, vol. XVIII, no.5, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, December 1958, page 6.

(2) Ibid., page 8.

accepting nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missile. A further example of this was the view expressed by Melvin Conant, another American, who greatly influenced Canadians by several of his books written on the problem of North American defence, especially his book entitled, The Long Polar Watch. Mr. Conant also held the view that the bomber still posed a threat to the security of Canada and the United States. Mr. Conant attempted to convince Canadians that Canada had an important role to play in NORAD as well as NATO. He said,

"so long as the manned bomber is an important part of the West's deterrent, Canada can directly contribute a great deal toward making the strategic force stronger, less vulnerable, and therefore more effective in dissuading the Soviet leaders from testing the chances of a nuclear war." 3

Mr. Conant added,

"to deter an attack upon North America it will be essential to provide a maximum of both warning time and protection for the U.S. retaliatory forces. In this, Canada had a very important role as it has in all phases of air defense, even though it may require most of the new equipment and weapons systems from the United States." 4

General Charles Foulkes, who was Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee until his retirement in 1960, advocated that Canada should continue to play its part in defending this continent against a bomber attack until it is fairly certain that the bomber threat no longer exists. He said that Canada should accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarc as they are necessary for our security. He added that the decision to launch a Bomarc missile is a decision of each

(3) Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1962, page 137.

(4) loc. cit.

national government involved, thus ensuring an independent Canadian decision on this matter. General Foulkes further stated that,

"we should always bear in mind that peace for Canada can be attained only through peace for the world, and unless we are prepared to take some risks, take some more responsibility, and make some sacrifices of sovereignty and prestige, we may not avoid the nuclear destruction which is only fifteen minutes away." 5

Mr. Brian Crane, in his booklet entitled, An Introduction to Canadian Defence Policy, was of the opinion that Canada must do what it can to assist the United States in the defence of North America. Mr. Crane discounted the theory that the acceptance of nuclear weapons by Canada would endanger the possibility of achieving world disarmament. He said that the major powers must move towards disarmament and he was doubtful whether the lesser powers could exert any influence in this direction. He believed that Canada's only policy was to remain closely allied, politically, economically and militarily with the United States. In return for American protection of Canada, this nation should continue to provide the United States with a warning system, and to continue to allow SAC airplanes access to our air space. Mr. Crane was opposed to the idea of Canada opting out of NORAD and NATO. He said that,

"Canada's influence and responsibilities are not those of a great power: peace or war will not be decided by what Canada does or does not do...its destiny must lie within the Western alliance rather than outside it." 6

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- (5) Foulkes, General Charles, "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age," Behind the Headlines, vol. XXI, no. 1, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, May 1961, page 18.
- (6) Crane, Brian, An Introduction to Canadian Defence Policy, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1964, page 62.

Mr. Peyton Lyon, in an article in the Globe and Mail on May 1, 1961, stated that Canada's role in matters of defence should be a non-nuclear one. He favoured a Canadian conventional contribution to the NATO alliance. In this article he said,

"there is, I believe, a case for the extension of control over nuclear weapons, under strict conditions, to some further countries. Canada, however, is not one of them. If we obtained an independent nuclear potential, our own security would not be enhanced...indeed, the overall situation would be rendered a degree worse.

It is not even clear that nuclear weapons need be on our soil or in the hands of our soldiers overseas." 7

However, in 1963, in his well-known book, The Policy Question, Mr. Lyon advocated that Canada should become more closely aligned to the United States in matters of defence policy, even to the extent of sacrificing our national independence in advocating defence policy and deciding the role that our armed forces were to follow. Mr. Lyon advocated that we continue to fulfil the role of warning the United States of any impending attack by enemy aircraft, and rejected the idea that Canada should become a neutral nation. He also rejected the possibility that Canada could adopt a strictly conventional role for its military forces. Mr. Lyon believed, that officials in the United States government paid heed to advice given them by Canadian officials. He said that Canadian foreign policy is more diplomatic than that of the United States and that Canada's restraining influence on the need to use force was essential to Western, and especially American, foreign policy decision-makers. Although Mr. Lyon admitted that Canada was a middle power and not a major one, he failed to justify the reason why the United States would

(7) Lyon, Peyton, "Canada and Nuclear Weapons," Globe and Mail, May 1, 1961.

accept or even listen to advice proffered to the by Canadian government officials.

There was an article in the Canadian Commentator magazine by Mr. Iyon in which he placed great importance on Canada maintaining confidence with its allies. This can only be done by honouring our commitments. He said that although Mr. Pearson had long declared himself an opponent of a nuclear armed Canada, he (Mr. Pearson) could not maintain this position indefinitely. The article went on to say,

"Pearson...learned...that Canada would have to keep her commitments concerning warheads or lose heavily in the confidence and good-will of her allies. Both of these are necessary if we are to influence their policies; and if we can't influence their policies, we can do almost nothing to promote disarmament and a sensible approach to East-West problems. We can have no direct influence on the Russians, and the eight neutrals in Geneva, while serving a moderately useful function, can hardly be decisive. Therefore, paradoxical as it might seem, Canada must honour her obligations with respect to nuclear arms if she is to make the contribution she should be making in the promotion of disarmament." 8

David Crane, the associate editor of Canada Month magazine, wrote an article in January 1963 in which he said that Canada should pull its own weight in the NATO alliance and not survive parasitically on the efforts of its allies. He added that,

"Canada's hesitation over the nuclear question has lasted far too long. The result has been a loss of confidence among its allies and friends abroad, and a corresponding lack of confidence in the government at home. The West has too much at stake for Canada to treat defense as a game. The time has come for Canada to stop playing." 9

(8) Iyon, Peyton, "Foreign Policy is Crucial," Canadian Commentator, April, 1963, vol.7, no.4, Baxter Publishing Company, Toronto, page 17.

(9) Crane, David, "Nuclear Defense: Canada Must Have It," Canada Month, January 1963, Canada Week Ltd., Montreal, page 25.

Mr. Crane said the weapons are useless without their nuclear warheads and we must acquire these warheads as part of our responsibility in belonging to NORAD and NATO.

B. Important individuals opposed to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons

Just as there were prominent individuals who advocated acceptance of nuclear weapons for Canadian military forces, so were there prominent individuals who adopted a contrasting viewpoint.

Fred Alexander, a professor of modern history at the University of Western Australia, made a brief visit to Canada in 1960. He then wrote a book entitled, Canadians and Foreign Policy, in which he did a non-statistical survey of Canadian opinion on foreign and domestic affairs. Mr. Alexander explained in one part of his book, the opposition expressed by senior Canadian military officers to the prospect of Canada accepting nuclear weapons. Mr. Alexander said that at an informal gathering of senior journalists in Ontario, it was pointed out,

"that there was considerable dissatisfaction among serving officers, some of whom maintained silence for reasons of self-advancement while others did everything possible to avoid NORAD postings which would place them under the command of United States officers." 10

As early as 1956, Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, who was Adjutant-General of the Canadian Army from 1949 to 1956, was opposed to Canada spending money on the network of radar lines which were being constructed across the breadth of this nation. In an article in Maclean's magazine of February 18, 1956, Major-General Macklin stated in an article entitled,

(10) Alexander, Fred, Canadians and Foreign Policy, University of Toronto Press, 1960, page 41.

"The Costly Folly of Our Defense Policy," that,

"no defense will ever be perfect no matter how strong and formidable it is; there is too much of the fallible human element in its operation.

Are we not then justified in asking our government and its advisers, pointedly and searchingly, what real protection they expect to get for the enormous investment they are making in static air defenses? How, in other words, can the architects of these defenses assure us that even when the system is complete, and perfected, it will be able to prevent our ruin by a large-scale thermonuclear offensive? I, for one, wouldn't believe them if they did." 11

In 1963, in an article entitled, "A Defence Policy for Canada," which was published in the Canadian Saturday Night magazine, Major-General Macklin said that, when President Kennedy had been elected to office, the doctrine of massive retaliation was prevalent in NORAD and NATO. President Kennedy attempted to increase the weak conventional forces in NATO, and he recalled General Maxwell Taylor from retirement and made him chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to look into this problem.

Major-General Macklin felt that it was to this end, that Canada's defence policy should be directed. He said that Canada should divorce itself from the Bomarcs and Voodoos and some of the useless radar stations in the NORAD system. He also stated that the United States is five times more powerful in nuclear striking capability than the Soviet Union, and the Russians knew it, therefore, "the idea that a few more nuclear warheads and rockets on a few obsolete Bomarcs and Voodoos could increase its effect or credibility is a figment."¹² The Major-General was of the opinion that

(11) Maclean's Magazine, "The Costly Folly of Our Defense Policy," Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, Maclean-Hunter Publishing Company Limited, February 18, 1956, vol.69, no.4, Montreal, page 54.

(12) Macklin, W.H.S., "A Defence Policy for Canada," The Canadian Saturday Night, vol.78, no.4, whole no.3430 Parkman Publications Limited, Toronto, April 1963, page 26.

the Canadian army's contribution to NATO, should be one of tactical mobility. It was the opinion of the Major-General that "this would leave the government free to press for disarmament in international councils, without having nuclear bombs festooned around its neck at the council board."¹³

Another influential Canadian military officer, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds also opposed the idea of Canada accepting nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles. In an article entitled, "Bomarc, Just foot-in-door for U.S. nuclear bases—Simonds," which appeared in the Toronto Star on February 20, 1963, the Lieutenant-General said that the Bomarc did not increase Canadian security in any way. He said that,

"our poor little Bomarc bases couldn't knock out any more than .0001 per cent of an attacking force, they will not defend Canada, they will not defend America, they do not make the slightest bit of difference in the present world balance of power.

Whether or not Canada accepts nuclear weapons now or ever will not have the slightest influence on the defensive capacity of America." ¹⁴

The Lieutenant-General repeated his opinions to the Special Committee on Defence which was held in the autumn of 1963. He said on October 17,

"we should not be in the nuclear field at all. The most useful contribution we can make to any coalition or alliance of which we become a partner is in the field of being able to make a contribution to preventing a situation developing which would lead to a thermo-nuclear exchange." ¹⁵

(13) Ibid, page 27.

(14) Simonds, Lt. Gen. Guy, "Bomarc, Just foot-in-door for U.S. nuclear bases—Simonds," Toronto Star, February 20, 1963.

(15) Special Committee on Defence, Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1963, page 442.

Andrew Brewin, a member of the New Democratic Party who had been elected to the House of Commons, wrote a book called, Stand on Guard. Mr. Brewin was of the opinion that the days of a threat of a bomber attack against this continent had long since passed. He said that Canada should urge that its present air defence role be scrapped because the Bomarc missile sites act as a target for Soviet I.C.B.M.s. He was also of the opinion that the Bomarc "may well inhibit Canada from joining with other countries in political initiatives for the maintenance of nuclear free zones."¹⁶ Mr. Brewin advocated that Canada should withdraw from its "active" role in NORAD and should concentrate on its warning system and it should also concentrate on highly mobile forces of a conventional nature. With regard to NATO, Mr. Brewin felt that Canada should abandon its contribution of air strike forces and a forward brigade in NATO. He did not favour the idea of totally withdrawing Canadian forces from the NATO alliance, but rather to withdraw our forces into a reserve force. It was (and still is) Mr. Brewin's opinion that,

"the maintenance of a tactical nuclear role by Canada makes any initiative and influence by Canada far less effective to limit the dissemination of the control of nuclear weapons and to press for the development of nuclear-free zones." ¹⁷

He said that Canada's withdrawal of its nuclear role in NATO would be a step towards avoiding the proliferation and escalation of nuclear weapons. He also said that the policy of massive retaliation was outmoded, as was the policy of

(16) Brewin, Andrew, Stand on Guard, The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy, McClelland and Stewart Limited, Toronto/Montreal, 1965, page 61.

(17) Ibid, page 124.

limited nuclear war because of the possibility of retaliation. It was for these reasons that Mr. Brewin advocated that Canada should not contribute to NATO's nuclear defence but should contribute to a NATO conventional mobile force.

The March, 1963 issue of the Canadian Commentator, which has a circulation of 8,200 readers, featured an article by David Gauthier. Mr. Gauthier, a journalist, said that Canada should supplement the American nuclear deterrent by offering mobile conventionally armed forces to the Western alliance. He wanted the United States to maintain the sole nuclear deterrent force in NATO. Canada should assist the U.S. force by contributing its CF-104 strike interceptor aircraft and the Honest John rockets to the deterrent force, and it should oppose the creation of further nuclear forces within the organization. For this reason he said,

"Canada must not accept nuclear warheads for her NATO forces. Indeed, she must make her active military participation in NATO conditional on an agreement to abandon the dissemination of nuclear weapons within the alliance, and to create, instead, an adequate, purely conventional force." 18

James Eayrs presented another argument as to why Canada should not accept nuclear weapons. Mr. Eayrs, who has been a member of the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto since 1951, wrote a prize winning essay in the 1960 Journal Essay Contest entitled, "Canada, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons." Mr. Eayrs said that Canada had a world image of being a Western nation that was free from the taint of being a colonial or imperialist power. However, he said, that,

(18) Gauthier, David, "A Way Out of Our Nuclear Impasse," Canadian Commentator, vol. 7, no. 3, Barter Publishing Company, Toronto, March 1963, page 7.

"the acquisition by Canada of nuclear weapons cannot rationally be justified by considerations of prestige, any more than its justification may be sought in the need to prepare a distinctive deterrent to nuclear blackmail and aggression." 19

Mr. Bayrs was of the opinion that Canada could and should contribute to the American deterrent by allowing missile sites to be built in northern Canada, granting access to our territorial waters to U.S. atomic submarines armed with Polaris missiles, and establishing airfields for U.S. anti-missile defences and interceptor aircraft. Mr. Bayrs did not object to having nuclear armed missiles placed on Canadian soil as long as the missiles were to remain under American control.

In 1962, Mr. Paul Simon, an economist and a student of Canadian defence, wrote an article in Maclean's magazine in which he advocated that both the Bomarc and Voodocs should be armed with conventional warheads. Mr. Simon was one of the few people who did not believe that a conventional warhead had not previously been manufactured for the Bomarc missile. He referred to the Bomarc as a rifle and the warheads as being the bullets. He said that,

"it is not true, though often stated, that no conventional warhead exists for the Bomarc B.

...The designs and specifications for the bullets are there, and Canada could make them herself." 20

(19) Bayrs, James, "Canada, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons," R.C.A.F. Staff College Journal, R.C.A.F. Staff College, Armour Heights, Toronto, 1960, page 89.

(20) Simon, Paul, "We're Arming Against Ourselves if We Take A-arms for the Bomarc," Maclean's, July 14, 1962, Maclean-Hunter Publishing Company Limited, Toronto, page 47.

He said that if a bomber would be destroyed by a nuclear armed Bomarc at an altitude of 40,000 feet, the bomb within the airplane would explode. If this was a hundred megaton bomb, and if the explosion took place over Three Rivers, Mr. Simon says that the resulting fireball would envelop Quebec City and Montreal. Mr. Simon made two suggestions. The first one was that the Bomarc should be armed with conventional warheads so that when it destroyed an enemy bomber, the bomb would bury itself harmlessly in the ground. This was contrary to the idea of "weapon kill." The Bomarc, however, was not sufficiently accurate to ensure a direct hit on an enemy aircraft with each attempt.

"But as early as 1955 an expert pointed out that all it takes to achieve this is to fit a conventionally armed Falcon rocket to the Bomarc's nose. The Falcon,...guides itself with pin-point accuracy to its target by an infrared heat-seeking system." 21

Thus the Bomarc could be guided towards the aircraft's engines once the Falcon rocket was within five miles of the enemy bomber. Secondly, Mr. Simon proposed that the Bomarc bases should be moved farther north so as to lessen the risk of a Canadian city being damaged by enemy bombs.

James Minifie, who is a news correspondent for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was one of the few prominent Canadians who advocated that Canada should adopt a neutralist policy in matters of defence and foreign policy. Mr. Minifie stated in his book, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, that Canada's defence policies were largely determined by foreign military officers in the Pentagon and at Colorado Springs. He said that by belonging to NORAD, Canada's effectiveness at the United Nations was limited because a nation whose forces were under foreign command, was regarded as having lost its independence.

(21) loc. cit.

Canada was regarded as being a satellite of the United States, according to Mr. Minifie. He felt that Canada could regain its independence and its influence in world affairs by declaring itself a neutral nation. This would not be a negative withdrawal from world affairs, but rather a positive attitude towards solving world problems. In Mr. Minifie's view, it would enable Canada to play a more active role in the Commonwealth, and in the United Nations. He said that,

"Canada could not begin to fulfil its potential role as long as its initiatives were frustrated by policy directives laid down in Washington—as for example in the question of recognizing China where Canada dare not express the one view supported by every political party at home." 22

Mr. Minifie said that a policy of neutralism for Canada, "would imply the resumption of a universal role which has been blurred and blunted by over-close association in regional military alliances."²³ Mr. Minifie favoured Canada maintaining its own anti-bomber force which would be based in the Canadian northland. He repeated his belief in neutralism for Canada in his book entitled, Open at the Top. He said that Canada's future role

"inside NATO, inside continental defence and certainly inside the United Nations will not require any enlargement, but would require a diminution of any kind of nuclear arms and equipment." 24

(22) Minifie, James M., Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, McClelland & Stewart Limited, Toronto/Montreal, September 1965, page 72.

(23) loc. cit.

(24) Minifie, James M., Open at the Top, McClelland and Stewart Limited, Toronto/Montreal, 1964, page 107.

C. General Canadian misgivings about close cooperation with the U.S.A.

The author has presented the arguments put forth by influential Canadian and American writers who attempted to influence the Canadian public to adopt and support one or the other of the two sides to the nuclear arms debate. The author would now like to examine briefly the general misgivings that Canadians had in regard to close cooperation with the United States in the field of joint defence.

Donald C. Masters, who is a professor of history at Bishop's University, showed in his book, Canada in World Affairs, 1953 to 1955, that Canadian uneasiness over our close association with United States military policies, began in the early 1950's when the three radar lines were being constructed across Canada. He pointed out that the Montreal Star, which reflected the people's increasing uneasiness at the time, disliked the increased integration of the military forces of Canada and the United States under an American commander to the point where "Canadians would be fighting under a commander whose primary concern was the defence not of Canada, but of the United States."²⁵ At the same time, Maclean's magazine objected to the fact that visits by its editor, Mr. Ralph Allen, to the DEW line bases had to be cleared in advance with United States officials in the United States.

James Mays, in his book entitled, Canada in World Affairs, October 1955 to June 1957, mentioned some of the Canadian criticisms which were being expressed against close

(25) Masters, Donald C., Canada in World Affairs, 1953 to 1955, Oxford University Press, published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1965, page 64.

Canadian-U.S. military cooperation. Mr. Mayrs said that Canadians not only feared a loss of national sovereignty but resented the amount of money Canada was spending to construct the radar stations which, it was believed, would soon become obsolete due to the rapid strides being made in Soviet technology in the field of rockets and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Mr. Mayrs suggested that to regain Canadian sovereignty, Canadians should either take over the responsibility of manning the DM line, or this function should be done by all NATO countries on a rotation basis; however due to the possibility of security violations and the undesirability of increasing NATO's functions unduly, Mr. Mayrs preferred the former solution. He also pointed out that Canadians were criticizing the soundness of the strategy of joint defence with the United States and he noted that Major-General Macklin had accused the Canadian government of allowing its policies to be dictated by American concepts of what the defence of North America should entail.

Mr. Conant, although an American, was not immune to Canadian sensitivities aroused by the joint defence of this continent. He said that because the United States had assumed the main burden of defending the West against the Soviet menace, Canadians found themselves increasingly bound up with American policies and actions. He recognized the fact that Canada had lost much of its freedom of action in not establishing its own defence policies. He was also aware that Canadians felt,

"the purpose of much of Canada's military policy and its defense effort has been to assist in protecting the U.S. Strategic Air Command. Yet many Canadians feel their nation has not had and does not have any control or even any voice over the deployment or use of SAC in time of peace, war, or crisis. Thus they are deeply concerned that the strategic force may be used on an American initiative alone, but through an action that would involve Canada directly and fully in all its consequences." 26

However this did not change Mr. Conant's conviction that close cooperation between Canadian and United States air defence forces was both necessary and desirable.

(26) Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1962, page 73.

11. Newspapers and periodicals.

Many of the points put forward by newspapers are similar to those which have already been mentioned in the first section of this chapter. However, the author thought it necessary to include this section as newspapers attempted to influence Canadian public opinion. The success of the newspapers in accomplishing this feat is referred to in the last chapter.

The author has examined seventeen Canadian newspapers. The newspapers that have been chosen were selected for reasons of geographical representation as well as the size of their circulation. The author has examined thirteen of the fifteen most widely read newspapers. Several small newspapers were also surveyed for geographical purposes.

The 1967 Ayer Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals classified all of the newspapers which are mentioned in this chapter, as being independent, with the exception of the Liberal Vancouver Sun, the Independent Liberal Winnipeg Free Press, the Liberal Toronto Daily Star, and the Communist newspaper, The Tribune.¹

This section is divided into the pro and anti-nuclear arguments, with the viewpoints in favour of these weapons being examined first. Of the seventeen newspapers that the author examined, nine of them favoured Canada acquiring nuclear weapons for the Bomarcas and eight were opposed. Neither of these sentiments was confined to one particular area of the nation. Thus, for example, pro and anti-nuclear arms sentiment were expressed throughout the prairies and the

(1) The circulation figures and classification of the newspapers and periodicals being independent or otherwise was taken from the 1967 Ayer Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals, N.W. Ayer & Son Inc, Philadelphia, 1967.

Maritimes, and even the two principal newspapers in Toronto could not agree on the issue.

The differences of opinion expressed by the various newspapers in this country on matters of defence became more pronounced with the announcement that the Avro Arrow was to be scrapped. Many newspapers supported this decision of the Conservative Government. The Calgary Herald, which has a circulation of 87,140, deemed it an act of political courage and defended the government against the charges laid against it that the government rushed into its decision and did not consider the welfare of the displaced workers. The paper said on February 25, 1959,

"no government is going to throw Canadian workers out of work willingly...it was done with fair warning.

The government made efforts to cushion any shock to disposed workers. It was not the government that let them out on a few hours notice." 2

The implication was that the company, A.V.Roe of Canada, Ltd., was responsible for the dismissal of the 14,000 workers who were unemployed after the Avro Arrow project was abandoned. This point was also discussed by the Hamilton Spectator which is the tenth largest newspaper in Canada with a circulation of 118,487. The paper said that the scrapping of the Arrow was inevitable after the United States had decided not to purchase the aircraft. But the paper stated that the A.V.Roe Company must share a large amount of the blame for not assisting the jobless workers in helping them find new jobs, and in not systematically releasing the men from their jobs. The paper wanted to know why the decision on the Arrow was taken so suddenly and also, why the company reacted to the decision so abruptly.

The Winnipeg Tribune, the smaller of the two main Winnipeg newspapers, having a circulation of 74,549, said,

(2) Editorial, The Calgary Herald, February 25, 1959.

"the Diefenbaker government's decision to scrap the Arrow is praiseworthy."³ This newspaper strongly supported the government's decision. The editorial of February 21, 1959, said that Mr. Diefenbaker did not have to announce this decision until March 31, the end of the fiscal year, but he chose to make his decision at this time to prevent prolonging the agony of spreading the tax payer's money on an out-dated aircraft. It did criticize the government for not helping the workers of A.V.Roe Company, to find other employment. Other newspapers which supported the government were the Globe and Mail, the Montreal Star, and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald. The latter two supported it on the grounds that Canada would no longer be wasting money on this project. The Globe and Mail took a different approach. It said,

"this newspaper has not taken sides as between the government and Avro; nor has it the slightest desire to do so. We have accepted, without quibbling or quarreling, the Government's decision to terminate the Arrow and Iriquois program." 4

(The Iriquois was a Canadian designed flame thrower). Thus it can be said, that one of the main arguments for supporting the Conservative Government's decision to scrap the Arrow was its production costs. However, by supporting the Conservative decision, the newspapers were not rejecting Canadian acquisition of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. They were merely expressing their opposition to Canada manufacturing such aircraft because of the enormous cost involved in such a project.

A. Newspapers in support of nuclear weapons.

The issue of whether or not Canada should accept

(3) Editorial, Winnipeg Tribune, February 21, 1959.

(4) Editorial, Globe and Mail, February 25, 1959.

nuclear weapons saw the Canadian Government, the Canadian people, and the nation's newspapers, deeply divided in their opinions. However, on this issue, the newspapers which advocated Canada accepting these weapons had more than only one argument upon which they could base their beliefs.

Like the Conservatives, those papers that supported the idea of Canada acquiring nuclear weapons, often found themselves on the defensive side of the debate. One exception was the attitude taken by the Calgary Herald in May 1961. Mr. T.C. Douglas, who was then the Premier of Saskatchewan had said that if Canada were to accept nuclear weapons, this may provoke the Soviet Union into arming the socialist European nations with similar weapons. The attitude of the Calgary Herald was that this might already be the case. It then said,

"if Premier Douglas expects Canadian troops to defend this country, then even he and his 'new party' should see the sense of arming these troops with the best weapons available, and this means nuclear weapons." 5

With regard to NATO, the arguments put forth in the newspapers, both for and against Canada accepting nuclear weapons for its NATO forces, were essentially the same as those already mentioned with regard to the Bomarc issue. The Hamilton Spectator said on January 14, that by accepting nuclear weapons, Canada would not engender a nuclear war, but rather it would end the farce of not arming the Starfighter aircraft with the weapons it was designed to carry. The Ottawa Citizen said that Canada should not opt out of NATO, rather it should accept the nuclear weapons which have been advocated by the NATO Council. The paper favoured a buildup of NATO's conventional forces, and said Canada should attempt to impress this idea upon its allies while remaining a member

(5) Editorial, Calgary Herald, May 10, 1961.

of the alliance. In 1961, the Citizen said,

"extension of use of nuclear weapons to forces of any country within the alliance would indeed be a retrograde step. But if NATO did more in this direction Canada would be in a much better position to exert a countering influence if it was within the alliance, rather than outside of it." 6

B. Newspapers opposed to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons.

Differences of opinion which were expressed by the newspapers were not confined solely to the Bomarc issue. In 1955, there was some concern over increasing American control over our defence policies due to their financing and operating some of the radar lines then being built across Canada. The Winnipeg Free Press, which is the ninth largest newspaper in this country, having a following of 123,852 readers, echoed the sentiments of those that feared too close a relationship with the United States. The paper favoured the control of the radar lines passing into the hands of a NATO Northern Command. Such an arrangement would,

"have a special advantage for this country. Canada would no longer have to deal in defence matters bilaterally with the American giant. If we could deal multilaterally in a truly NATO command there would probably be less concern than at present over questions of sovereignty." 7

The Montreal Star took a different view of the situation. The paper said the agreement signed between Canada and the United States allowed Canada to replace American personnel with Canadians at any time it chose to do so. However, the Star did express a note of caution with regard to Canada safeguarding its sovereignty. The editorial of May 24, 1955

(6) Editorial, Ottawa Citizen, May 10, 1961.

(7) "On NATO's Northern Rim," Winnipeg Free Press, December 10, 1955.

said,

"there are also clauses in the agreement which safeguard Canadian sovereignty, establish Canadian law, and give important functions to the Department of Northern Affairs. The net effect of the arrangement is, however, one which leaves a faintly uncomfortable mood in Canadian minds. One recalls the old adage about 'who pays the piper calls the tune.' There is no doubt so far as the DEW line is concerned, about who is paying the piper." 8

The main opposition to Canada accepting nuclear weapons was that this was just another instance of the United States increasing its control and authority over Canadian defence policy. This was the attitude taken by the Vancouver Sun just one week after Mr. Diefenbaker's speech of February 20, 1959, in which he announced the scrapping of the Arrow program and the government's intention to accept the Bomarc missile. This paper, which has the third highest circulation figure in Canada (240,388), is a Liberal newspaper. On February 27, 1959, the paper said,

"...Canada is giving defence bases to the United States, buying U.S. military hardware, importing U.S.-owned nuclear warheads and even allowing the U.S. to dictate how and when Canadians may use them. Perhaps all of this makes military sense for a relatively small nation which is the inevitable ally of a much larger one. But it also makes a mockery of the pretence that each of the allies shall be expected—even required—to make the best of its own defence facilities." 9

This sentiment was also expressed by the Winnipeg Tribune, which was skeptical about the Bomarc still being a useful weapon, and by the Toronto Daily Star. The Toronto Daily Star is an Independent-Liberal newspaper, and is the most widely read English language daily paper in Canada, (349,250). The Star favoured Canada playing its pre-1957 role of warning the

(8) Editorial, The Montreal Star, May 24, 1955.

(9) Editorial, Vancouver Sun, February 27, 1959.

Strategic Air Command of any approaching hostile planes from northern Canada, but it did not favour our acquiring weapons which do not give Canada any added security but involve large expenditures of the tax payer's money. The Star said that this was not a plea for neutralism, but rather a desire to safeguard our sovereignty in matters of defence. "Geography, culture and economics dictate close ties with the United States. They do not dictate subservience in defence and foreign policy."¹⁰

The Winnipeg Tribune admired Mr. Green, the Minister for External Affairs, and his attempts to convince the Conservative Cabinet as well as international conferences, of the need to put an end to the arms race. The Tribune, like the Vancouver Sun, favoured Canada spending its defence dollars in purchasing conventional weapons for its military forces. In 1961, it gave the following reasons for its decision to which it adhered throughout the nuclear debate.

"We think that Canada would lose whatever moral leadership it has toward disarmament if it adopted nuclear weapons. We think that if Canada had a nuclear arsenal it would be even more difficult to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent an accidental holocaust." ¹¹

C. Periodicals.

The author found very few articles in Canadian periodicals dated in the mid-1950's which dealt with the issue of Canada accepting nuclear weapons. The author could not find any article which appeared in any Canadian periodical which supported Canadian acceptance of nuclear arms. However, one cannot assume that all Canadian periodicals were opposed to

(10) Editorial, Toronto Daily Star, February 23, 1959.

(11) Editorial, Winnipeg Tribune, May 3, 1961.

Canada acquiring nuclear weapons. The Canadian periodicals which were opposed to Canada becoming involved in a nuclear role, gave several reasons for their stand. The author has chosen to examine the arguments put forth by Maclean's magazine for several reasons. First, it is the most widely read Canadian magazine, having a circulation of 564,466 readers. Secondly, it is fairly representative of the arguments put forth by other Canadian periodicals which expressed their opposition to Canadian forces being equipped with nuclear weapons. Finally, it, more than any other periodical, consistently produced articles based on the nuclear arms issue and the problems produced by Canada's close association with the United States in the field of defence. In 1956, Maclean's magazine was concerned about the loss of Canadian sovereignty due to the agreements that had been made concerning the construction of the radar lines in Canada.

"In return for the luxury of not spending money on the Dewline we Canadians have surrendered something that for the last generation we have regarded as our greatest necessity: our independence. For a sum of money that during the approximate construction period of Dewline-roughly 1954 to 1957-will be somewhat more than equalled by the taxes we will pay on tobacco, we have delegated the effective working control of at least ten percent of our land area to the United States Air Force. " 12

Mr. Ralph Allen, the editor of the magazine who wrote this article said that under the original agreement, Canada had the right to take over the operation of the Dewline on reasonable notice. He said that the cost involved in having Canadian forces operate the Dewline was well worth our

(12) Allen, Ralph, "Will Dewline Cost Canada its Northland?" Maclean's, May 26, 1956, vol.69, no.11, Maclean-Hunter Publishing Company Limited, Montreal, page 69.

regaining the sovereignty which was lost to the U.S.A.F.

Mr. Allen then described a trip that he took with several Canadian and American military officers as well as some other journalists, from New York to a Dewline base. They stopped at Probisher Bay on Baffin Island where a press conference was held by the wing commander, who was a Canadian commanding the base.

"On many questions, some of which concerned the base he commands, he had no idea what to say. He would turn to the senior U.S. security colonel...

'Should I answer that?'

Sometimes the USAF colonel said it was all right to answer. Sometimes he did not. I asked a question about the defence of our radar sites, Canadian sites and American sites and joint sites.

'Can I answer?' the Canadian wing commander asked.

'No,' the American colonel said.

There was no answer." 13

While the rank of colonel is above that of a wing commander, the fact that a Canadian wing commander who was commanding a Canadian base was prohibited by an American colonel from answering a question, angered not only Mr. Allen, but many other Canadians.

It was partly because of this loss of Canadian command over bases which were situated on Canadian soil, that Maclean's magazine opposed Canada's close cooperation with the United States in matters of continental defence.

In an editorial in March 1959, the magazine said that the world is divided into two groups of nations, the Powers and non-Powers. Canada was a non-Power nation as it possessed and controlled no nuclear weapons or long-range missiles. It was of the opinion that Canada's status in the world would

(13) Ibid, page 70.

not change even "if we owned a thousand Arrows and were about to own ten thousand Bomars."¹⁴

(14) Editorial, Maclean's, March 28, 1959, vol.72, no.7, Maclean-Hunter Publishing Company Limited, Montreal, page 4.

111. Public opinion.

The author has examined Canadian defence policies from 1945 to 1963, and the reaction to these policies are expressed by prominent individuals in the fields of politics and defence. The reactions of Canadian newspapers and periodicals have also been examined. This section will concentrate on the attitudes of the Canadian people to the problem of national defence, and in particular, to the Bomarc issue.

Some of the polls which are presented in this chapter have been taken from a book entitled, In Your Opinion. These polls were compiled between November 1962, and February 1963. The book was written by two men, John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, who questioned people from various backgrounds. There were six categories of people who were questioned. The national sample (N) consisted of Canadian citizens and British subjects who were over 21 years of age. These people lived in various parts of Canada, except the difficult areas to reach, such as the Northwest Territories and northern Newfoundland. The teenage sample (T), consisted of 150 boys and girls whose ages ranged from 16 to 21. The teenage sample was taken from towns and cities having a population of over 1,000, and from seventy-two rural sampling areas, in the same areas of the country as referred to for the national sample. The 190 people who contributed financially to the Canadian Peace Research Institute (on whose behalf this survey was done), constituted a random geographical sample drawn from 25,000 people who contributed money to the Institute. The answers of the contributors have been designated as (C) on the polls. The 48 businessmen (B) who were randomly selected, represented companies whose assets exceeded one million dollars. The 48 union leaders (L) were also randomly selected and they were either leaders of a

union exceeding ten thousand members, or senior officers in a national trade union federation. Finally, the 48 political leaders (P) were chosen in proportion to their party's representation in the House of Commons. Thus the political representation was made up of 19 Conservatives, 18 Liberals, 6 Social Credit M.P.s, and 5 N.D.P. representatives.

It will be remembered that several prominent individuals cited in section one of this chapter, made reference to the possibility of Canada becoming a neutral state. All of them rejected this idea outright with the exception of Mr. James Minifie. In July 1960, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion asked Canadians what they thought of the idea of having Canada join the neutral bloc.

TABLE NUMBER ONE¹

Some people think that because of Canada's geographic position and problems of defence in the event of a nuclear war that we should become a neutral nation like Switzerland. Others think that this would not be the right thing to do. What is your opinion?

Neutral	161	22
Should Not	422	57.7
Qualified	31	4.3
No Opinion	<u>117</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	731	100.0%

The author was unable to discover if this was a national or regional poll. However, it can be safely stated, that by and large, Canadians rejected the theory that their nation should leave the Western military alliances and declare itself to be a neutral state.

The second table is designed to show the attitudes of various groups of people polled with respect to Canada playing

(1) Canadian Institute of Public Opinion poll, July 1960.

a role in the United Nations peacekeeping force. It will be noted that a greater percentage of the labour people favoured our support of a U.N. force than did the businessmen. (The figures from all of the tables cited from the book, In Your Opinion, are percentages).

TABLE NUMBER TWO²

Now here are two opposing ideas. Will you tell me which of the two comes closest to the way you yourself feel?

	N	T	C	B	L	P
a.) I think that a strong permanent U.N. Army would be a real danger to our national freedom.	11	12	11	23	4	17
b.) I think that a strong, permanent U.N. Army would protect, rather than endanger, our national freedom.	78	83	84	58	88	83
Don't know	11	5	5	19	8	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

It should also be noted from the above table that the business group placed less confidence in the effectiveness and the possibility of the U.N. Army to defend our national freedom than any other group questioned. The businessmen also expressed the largest percent of uncertainty about the capability of such a force as to whether it could be considered a danger, or protector to our national freedom.

(2) Paul, John, and Laulicht, Jerome, In Your Opinion, Canadian Peace Research Institute, volume I, Clarkson, Ontario, 1963, page 42.

TABLE NUMBER THREE³

Do you think we should or should not arm Canadian forces with atomic weapons now?

	N	T	C	B	L	P
Our armed forces both in Canada and Europe should have atomic weapons, only in Canada, or only in Europe	41	50	26	56	31	33
None of our forces, either in Europe or Canada, should have atomic weapons.	17	17	42	6	54	38
Emergency now—get them now	20	16	4	17	0	0
Not an emergency now, so don't get them	14	12	21	6	9	29
Don't know	8	5	7	15	6	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table number three is a result of a question posed by Messrs. Paul and Laulicht concerning the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces. Once again, the discrepancy between the answers given by the businessmen and labour leaders should be noted, especially with regard to the second and third statements. One surprising aspect may be the answers given by the teenagers. It is generally thought that the teenagers are against nuclear weapons of any kind and are more eager to support disarmament proposals than are people in other groups of society. However, when tables two and three are examined, it can be seen that the teenager's response corresponds closely to the opinions of the national sample. The teenagers were more favourable to the idea that Canada spend at least five percent of its defence budget on the U.N. Army, than were the Canadian adults. Although 54% of

(3) Ibid., page 84.

the teenagers, as compared to 41% of the adults, thought that Canada's defence forces should be increased, 67% of the teenagers thought that "if more countries get atomic weapons, the danger of atomic war (would) greatly increase,"⁴ as compared to 57% of the adult sample.

It should be noted in table number three, that both the teenage and business samples closely reflected the national sample in thinking that an emergency did exist in international relations, thus making it imperative that Canada accept nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. These figures should be compared not only to the labour respondents, but also to the responses of the politicians, who doubted that an emergency did exist. Furthermore, an examination of these groups should be made after combining their answers to the first and third choices in table number three. Here again, one can see the teenage and business groups closely resembling the national sample. Sixty-one percent of the national sample was in favour of Canadian forces being armed with nuclear weapons while 66% of the teenage sample and 73% of the business sample held the same opinion. These figures should be compared to those of the labour and politician's samples. Thirty-one percent of the labour group and 33% of the politicians favoured nuclear weapons being supplied to Canada's armed forces.

In September 1961, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion asked Canadians whether they thought Canadian armed forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons. The following response to that question was part of that CIPPO poll.

(4) Paul, John, and Leulight, Jerome, op. cit., page 42.

TABLE NUMBER FOUR⁵

5(a) Have you heard about Canada acquiring nuclear weapons?

	Number Interviewed
Yes	410
No	266
Total	676

5(b) Just from what you know or have heard, in your opinion should Canada's armed forces be equipped with nuclear weapons, or not?

	Number Interviewed	%
Yes	252	60.1
No	125	30.4
No Opinion	33	9.5
Total	410	100.0%

5(c)

<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>	
Our Own Protection	121	Should be neutral	20
Rest are doing it	75	It will agitate war	16
May avert war	17	Not leading power	19
Armed forces keep up		Do no good	9
to date	24		
We'll be in front line		Too dangerous	15
of war	7	US will defend us	5
Should not rely on US		Can't afford them	5
to defend us	4	No need, won't be a	
		war	6
No Opinion	1	Fewer countries have	
		them, the better	15
		No Opinion	13
Other	4	Other	4
Total	253*	Total	127*

* some gave more than one answer

(5) Canadian Institute of Public Opinion poll, September 1961.

(The author was unable to determine if the poll represented a national or local sample of Canadians).

(Those people who answered either "yes" or "no" in question 5(b) were then asked to explain their answer by means of question 5(c). It is no surprise that most of those in favour of Canada acquiring nuclear weapons, (48%), gave as their reason, that they are necessary for our own protection, however a large percentage of them, (29.7%), said that we should acquire these weapons because the rest of the countries of the world are acquiring nuclear weapons. This was not the case. It should also be noted that those who were opposed to Canada arming itself with nuclear weapons, gave as their reasons, those that have been stated by prominent individuals, newspapers, and magazines in the earlier parts of this chapter. The most prominent of them being; a desire for Canadian neutrality, the fact that Canada was not a leading power and therefore could not alter the international balance of power by acquiring these weapons, and the idea that these weapons are dangerous and their proliferation to more and more countries would intensify the possibility of a nuclear war, either intentionally or accidentally. While most of them thought that Canada should become neutral, they still represented a minority view. It should also be noted that many people who said they opposed Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons, gave no reason for their opinion.

Reference will be made in the concluding chapter of the thesis, that in December 1962, the percentage of those people who favoured nuclear weapons for Canadian military forces, had declined by 6.1% to a level of 54%. The fact that the decision to accept nuclear weapons by the Liberal Party in January 1963, at a time when those people who favoured such a policy were now abandoning their conviction, showed that the Liberal Party decision was not taken with the opinion of the Canadian people being considered. (In June 1963, the percentage of Canadians who were polled by the CIPQ who expressed their desire that Canada's armed forces be equipped with nuclear weapons, had declined another five percent to a

level of 49%). Similarly, the fact that in 1961, over 60% of Canadians favoured Canada acquiring nuclear weapons, leaves little to commend the Conservative Party and the Conservative Government's indecision for so many months as being due to the fact that the Canadian people did not indicate what policy they wanted the government to adopt.

In February 1964, the Bomarc missiles at North Bay and La Macaza were armed with nuclear warheads. In that same month, the CIPO conducted a survey for the purpose of determining the attitude of Canadians as to what military role Canada should adopt.

TABLE NUMBER FIVE⁶

Canada's defence policies are being argued about a good deal. Which of these statements comes closest to what you think Canada should do:

	Number in Sample	%
US should take responsibility for defending Canada	19	2.7
Canada should maintain her own defence	119	17.1
Defence should be a joint effort between Canada and US	464	66.8
Canada should disarm and become a neutral nation	74	10.6
Can't say	18	2.6
Total	<u>694</u>	<u>99.9%</u>

The above poll indicated that Canadians wanted the help of the United States in defending the country against a possible Soviet attack. However, as the word "nuclear" was omitted from the question posed to those who answered the CIPO representative, it should not be construed that Canadians approved of Canada's accepting nuclear weapons as part of the Canadian-United States joint defence of the North American

(6) Canadian Institute of Public Opinion poll, February 1964.

continent. The poll also showed that neutrality was still not a popular idea in the minds of the Canadian people. The significance of the public opinion polls cited in this chapter in relation to the policies adopted by the main political parties in Canada, will be examined in the concluding chapter.

IV. Interest groups.

It has often been said in the past that Canadians, in general, are apathetic to vital issues which are confronting their own nation. As this thesis is an attempt to analyze the opinion of Canadians in all walks of life, with respect to the nuclear arms issue, the author attempted to study the positions taken by various interest groups at the time of the nuclear arms crisis. It was discovered that Canadians, indeed, tend to shy away from taking definite stands on important issues.

A. Those in favour of nuclear weapons.

In a letter dated February 7, 1967, written by the Public Education Secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Mr. Brian Donaldson stated,

"we took no position on that question (Bomarc issue) because the CIIA by its constitution is not allowed to take partisan positions. 'The Institute is complete^{ly} non-official and non-political. To assure the maintenance of its objective and non-partisan character, the Institute as such is precluded by its charter from the formal expression of opinions on international questions...' 1

However, at the 1959 Annual Conference of the C.I.I.A., which was held in Saskatoon, the consensus of opinion was that it was necessary for the West to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to prevent an attack by the Soviet Union. The Conference felt that this deterrent in North America was to be found in the Strategic Air Command and it was Canada's responsibility to defend and warn SAC bases of an imminent

(1) Letter from Brian Donaldson, Public Education Secretary, C.I.I.A., February 7, 1967.

Soviet attack. It was felt that Canada's participation in NORAD, its scrapping of the Avro Arrow and the construction of Bomarc-SAGE defence installations in Canada all point to the fact that Canada cannot play this defensive role by herself, it needs the cooperation and joint undertaking of the United States. Canada's role in NORAD and NATO were defended and upheld. The Conference was also of the opinion that an integrated defence force with an integrated defence production program, was the most efficient way of achieving optimum results. Due to Canada's small population and its geographic position next to a colossus, the Saskatoon convention believed that,

"our defence policy should in some respects be less concerned with a futile effort to guarantee Canada's security from attack than it is to contribute to Canada's security in a broader sense." 2

As the C.I.I.A. never opposed this stand, nor made any derogatory reference to it in any way, the author has assumed that the Institute, despite its claim to being non-political, does support the idea of Canadian forces being equipped with nuclear weapons.

In correspondence with the Montreal Board of Trade and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the author was informed that "the Board has never taken an individual stand respecting this subject,"³ (Bomarc issue), and also that "the Canadian Chamber of Commerce did not take any position re, nuclear weapons or the acquisition of BOMARC missiles."⁴

(2) Ritchie, Ronald S., "Problems of a Defence Policy for Canada," International Journal, Summer 1959, vol. XIV, no. 3, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1959, page 212.

(3) Letter from Alex Harper, Secretary, Economic Policy and Information Committee, Montreal Board of Trade, February 1, 1967.

(4) Letter from Doug Henderson, Executive Assistant, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, February 2, 1967.

However, in the 1966-67 Statement of Policy which was adopted by the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in October, 1966, there were four recommendations which were made in the field of national defence. The first recommendation required, that,

"existing military forces be armed with the weapons which will enable them to provide maximum effectiveness in their agreed role in both NATO and NORAD. This means tactical weapons at least as effective as those likely to be available to a potential enemy." 5

This last sentence would imply tactical nuclear weapons. Remembering the attitudes adopted by businessmen in the Canadian public opinion polls presented in the third section of this chapter, there is no reason to believe that the Canadian Chamber of Commerce did not hold this same view in 1963.

B. Those who opposed nuclear weapons.

Mr. Andrew Clarke, the Executive Director of the World Federalists of Canada wrote to the author on November 24, 1966, saying that "the World Federalists of Canada did not take a firm position on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada."⁶ However, in the January-February 1963 issue of the Canadian World Federalist, Mr. John McDonald, a former vice-president of the World Federalists of Canada, wrote an article entitled, "Neutrals for Peace, an Approach to a New Canadian Foreign Policy." He advocated that a group of neutral nations should attempt to settle the nuclear

(5) 1966-67 Statement of Policy, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, page 69.

(6) Letter from Andrew Clarke, Executive Director, World Federalists of Canada, November 24, 1966.

impasse which existed, and still exists, between the United States and the Soviet Union. He also advocated that Canada would have to adopt a new foreign policy. This would involve Canada's withdrawal from NORAD and NATO when these treaties come up for renewal.

"Furthermore, we must make public our decision not to have Canadian forces equipped with nuclear weapons or have nuclear weapons based on Canadian soil." 7

The author is of the opinion that as this article was printed in the bimonthly publication of the World Federalists of Canada, and as the organization believes in world peace through world law, that the opinions expressed by Mr. McDonald received the support of the World Federalists of Canada, especially in view of the fact that the organization made no official statement to the contrary.

The Canadian Friends Service Committee, sometimes referred to as the Quakers, were opposed to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons. On March 15, 1963, the Committee issued a statement in Toronto which was signed by ninety-six clergymen representing many religious denominations. The statement said in part,

"We the undersigned ministers, rabbis, and priests, unite in opposition to nuclear weapons on Canadian soil or for possession by Canadian troops abroad.

We believe that without nuclear arms Canada can maintain and develop its special role as a peacemaker within the United Nations." 8

(7) McDonald, John C., "Neutrals for Peace," Canadian World Federalist, World Federalists of Canada, Ottawa, January-February, 1963, page 12.

(8) Copy of statement and signatures sent to the author by Murray Thomson, Peace Education Secretary, Canadian Friends Service Committee.

As well as issuing the above statement the Quakers were active in protesting against Canadian armed forces being armed with nuclear weapons.

In the field of labour, the United Steelworkers of America were opposed to arming Canadian forces with nuclear weapons. At the 1959 Canadian Policy Conference, the labour union was of the opinion that,

"for Canada to enter the nuclear arms race by the purchase of missiles for use with nuclear warheads from Canadian bases is rendering us less and less capable of making independent decisions in international affairs and is plainly an economic burden on our people which makes it less possible for us to render aid to nations in need to the extent that our people wish." 9

At the 1963 Canadian Policy Conference, the union passed the following resolution, "Be it resolved that the policy of the Canadian Labour Congress, that is, no nuclear arms for Canada or NATO, be endorsed."¹⁰

Another organization that opposed nuclear arms for Canadian military forces, was the Voice of Women. In a letter presented to Prime Minister Diefenbaker on November 1, 1962, the Voice of Women expressed their belief that,

"nous sommes convaincues toutefois que c'est seulement en tant que pays non-nucléaire que le Canada peut jouer un rôle positif et constructif dans les affaires mondiales. Si nous acquérons des ogives nucléaires,... nous perdons toute possibilité de jouer le rôle d'arbitre pacificateur dans les querelles internationales, en choisissant de devenir une puissance nucléaire mineure."¹¹

(9) Photostats of resolution passed at 1959 Canadian Policy Conference attached to a letter written to the author by Murray Cotterhill, Public Relations Director (Canada), United Steelworkers of America, March 28, 1967.

(10) Ibid, 1963 Canadian Policy Conference.

(11) Letter to Prime Minister Diefenbaker from Thérèse F. Casgrain, Présidente, La Voix des Femmes du Canada.

In an open letter to Mr. Diefenbaker during the missile crisis, the Voice of Women thought that the extension of nuclear weapons to nations which did not then have them, increased the possibility of war by providing the Soviet Union with a strong motive for sharing her nuclear weapons with other socialist states and the People's Republic of China. The possibility of an accidental war would also be increased due to the dissemination of nuclear arms. The Voice of Women was, and still is, convinced that a Canadian refusal to accept these weapons would encourage other nations to follow suit and would enhance our position in the United Nations.

Shortly before the 1963 federal election the organization issued a list of some points and suggestions which should be examined before the April election. The list of points was entitled, "Why Does Voice of Women Oppose Nuclear Weapons for Canada?" The ninth point on the list was a repetition of the ideas put forth by John McDonald in his article in the World Federalist. The Voice of Women felt that

"a non-nuclear Canada can make a real and positive contribution towards lessening world tension and building mutual trust....There is a desperate need for imaginative leadership from the smaller powers. Canada can fill this role only if she speaks as a non-nuclear nation. No one otherwise will listen to her." 12

It should be noted that among the interest groups that expressed their opinion, the findings of the public opinion polls were borne out in one respect. The Canadian

(12) Voice of Women, Why Does Voice of Women Oppose Nuclear for Canada? No date was printed on the list of points.

Chamber of Commerce, which represents business interests was in favour of nuclear weapons, while the United Steelworkers of America, which represent the interests of labour groups, was opposed to such a policy.

One group was deeply divided on the issue. A booklet entitled, "Lord of the Worlds," represented the report of the United Church's Committee on International Affairs which was presented to the 1962 General Council. The General Council was unable to agree on a single opinion and it adopted what was called, two positions. In a letter written to the author by Reverend Ray Hord, on June 5, 1967, the Reverend said,

"I must say that there was considerable disagreement with this stand at the time and considerable feeling that General Council should have pressed for a majority view which is customary in democracy." 13

Those members of the General Council who favoured nuclear weapons for Canadian forces said that due to Canada's geographic position,

"we...recommend that the General Council continue its support of NATO including its policy of 'credible deterrence.' This policy includes the availability of the most powerful nuclear weapons." 14

Those who took the opposite view stated,

"we believe, without denying the sincerity of those who take an opposite view, that it is not permissible for Christians to sanction the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances." 15

(13) Letter from Rev. Ray Hord, Secretary of the United Church of Canada, June 5, 1967.

(14) Lord of the Worlds, Ninth Report of the Committee on the Church and International Affairs to the Twentieth General Council of the United Church of Canada, London, Ontario, Sept. 1962, Board of Evangelism and Social Service, the United Church of Canada, Toronto, 1962, page 19.

(15) Ibid, page 17.

After debating the issue at some length, the General Council passed several resolutions on the issue. One such resolution stated that the General Council favoured a continuation of achieving an acceptable formula of arms control. The Council also expressed their desire that the "opposition to the extension of nuclear weapons threats must be maintained."¹⁶

Another resolution which was adopted, affirmed the Church's conviction that, "the use of any weapons for mass destruction including weapons of megaton proportions is contrary to the will of God."¹⁷

C. Those who took no stand on the issue

There were several interest groups which refused to take a stand on the nuclear weapons issue. Both the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Zionist Organization of Canada made no statements and issued no pamphlets on the subject of nuclear arms for Canadian military forces. In a letter from D.P.Keogh, the manager of the Public Relations Department of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the author was informed that the subject of nuclear weapons,

"is completely outside our field which is to provide service concerning manufacturing problems to our members and to represent them in submissions to the three levels of government." ¹⁸

Consequently, the Association issued no statement on the matter. Finally, the author was notified in a letter from

(16) Ibid., page 75.

(17) Ibid., page 77.

(18) Letter from Mr. D.P.Keogh, manager of Public Relations Department of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, February 1, 1967.

Mrs. Jacqueline E. Scott, the Secretary of the Montreal Municipal Chapter of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire, that the I.O.D.E. is a non-political organization. Consequently it too, refused to take a stand on the nuclear arms issue.¹⁹

Thus it can be seen that the opinions of the interest groups were as divided and uncertain about what policy should be adopted, as were the newspapers, periodicals and the Canadian public at the time of the election.

(19) Letter from Mrs. Jacqueline Scott, Secretary, Municipal Chapter of Montreal I.O.D.E., February 21, 1967.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MINOR PARTIES

1. The C.C.F.-N.D.P.

A. The C.C.F.-N.D.P. and NORAD

The C.C.F.-N.D.P. has opposed the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces since the issue first arose, and it has been fairly consistent in its opinions, as this chapter will attempt to show. The party's views on a nuclear force for continental defence will be examined, followed by its views on Canadian forces under NATO command becoming nuclear armed.

The views expressed by the representatives of the C.C.F. concerning the creation of NORAD closely paralleled those of the Liberal Party. They criticized the government for not allowing an adequate, meaningful debate on the question of establishing NORAD. They also criticized the government for not clarifying exactly what the terms of the NORAD agreement were in respect to the command structure. On December 5, 1957, Mr. M.J. Coldwell, the C.C.F. Party leader, opposed the fact that a segment of Canada's armed forces were placed under the command of an American military officer and summarized the situation by saying, "we have lost the power to defend ourselves."¹

Mr. Hertridge was the main spokesman for the C.C.F. Party's opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons for continental defence. He attacked the Conservative Government for surrendering our sovereign rights to control the actions of our own troops, to an American commander. In the House of

(1) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11, 1957-58, page 1910.

Commons he said,

"it is one thing to surrender sovereign rights under a multilateral organization such as NATO or to such a body as the United Nations, but in our opinion it is an entirely different matter to surrender sovereign rights to a single country under a bilateral agreement which is what will be accomplished, in our view, in the case of Canada's position under the NORAD agreement." 2

Mr. Herridge was of the opinion that having a Canadian act as a deputy-commander did not alter this view in any way. He regretted that this close alliance with the American economy in order to obtain defence production contracts would lead to an increase in the American economic and political control over Canada's policy-makers. He attacked the contention of the Conservative Party that NORAD was purely a defensive military organization. On June 10, 1958, he said in the House of Commons,

"NORAD has been represented to the Canadian public as a purely defensive arrangement, an integration of Canadian and United States service units for the purpose of defending this continent against assault on the polar regions. United States military authorities, however, have never tried to hide the fact that NORAD is an integral part of a larger military organization which includes offensive as well as defensive arrangements." 3

This was in response to Mr. Diefenbaker's statements in various speeches in the House of Commons⁴ in which he referred to NORAD's role within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was also a rebuke to the Prime Minister's remarks of June 10, 1958 in which he attempted to make NORAD independent of SAC while at the same time admitting

(2) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.1, 1958. page 1020.

(3) Ibid, page 1018.

(4) Canada, House of Commons Debates, Dec.5,1957,p.1897, March 3,1959, p.1550, June 10,1958, p.992.

that a close working cooperation between the two forces did in fact exist. Mr. Merridge said that it was because NORAD was not a part of NATO, that the C.C.F. Party had misgivings about the organization. He stated that his party's defence policy consisted in the belief of the value of collective security such as that practiced by NATO or in the United Nations. However, NORAD was and is a bilateral military agreement with the added danger that the SAC forces which are in close cooperation with NORAD, are under the control of the American President.

Other reasons for the C.C.F. opposition to the creation of NORAD were mentioned in the House of Commons on the following day, June 11, 1958. Mr. Harold Winch pointed out a contradiction between the Prime Minister's speech of June 10th, and those of his Defence Minister. The latter had denied the existence of overflights of SAC planes armed with nuclear weapons while the Prime Minister admitted that such flights had been taking place during the past seven years. Mr. Briart Regier took issue with Mr. Diefenbaker's statements which were made when Mr. Diefenbaker introduced the bill to Parliament on June 10, asking for Parliament's approval for an exchange of notes between the Canadian and American Governments, setting up NORAD. The Prime Minister said that NORAD was a part of NATO as it constituted a subsidiary regional command with that alliance. Mr. Regier pondered the importance of NORAD and doubted that it did operate within the framework of NATO. He referred to Mr. Diefenbaker's statement and said,

"we would like him to explain to us how this agreement hastens the day when we will have an international police force; we would like him to explain how it strengthens NATO; we would like him to tell us what satisfaction our European allies will receive from the existence of the NORAD agreement." 5

He stated that Europe was disturbed now that the United States was focusing more attention to the defence of the North American continent rather than to European defence.

During the next three years, the policies put forth by the C.C.F. Party and its elected representatives in the House of Commons repeated their sentiments expressed in 1958. It is quite possible that the opposition to nuclear arms, as was being expressed by the Liberal and C.C.F. parties, enabled Howard Green to more effectively influence the Conservative Cabinet than would otherwise have been the case. However, despite the views expressed by Mr. Green, as well as the opposition parties in the House of Commons, the Conservative Party and the Conservative Government refused to issue a statement either endorsing or condemning nuclear weapons for Canada's armed forces. The next major contribution to the nuclear arms debate was made by the New Democratic Party, the successor to the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation.

The founding convention of the N.D.P. took place from July 31 to August 4, 1961, in Ottawa. One of the policies adopted at this convention stated,

"it is questionable whether NORAD ever made any significant contribution to the defence of Canada and in any case it has outlived its usefulness. Furthermore, there is every danger that the Bomarcas will be equipped with nuclear warheads. The NORAD agreements should therefore be terminated." 6

The N.D.P. favoured an appraisal of the money being spent on defence, and favoured an increased contribution of conventional troops and civilian personnel to United Nations peacekeeping

(6) The Federal Program of the New Democratic Party, adopted by its Founding Convention, Ottawa, July 31-August 4, 1961, and by its Second Federal Convention, Regina, August 6-9, 1963, New Democratic Party, Ottawa, 1965, page 51.

duties. In these respects, the N.D.P.'s policy was very similar, if not identical to that of the C.C.F.

In September, the N.D.P. put forward its policies in the House of Commons for the first time since the party's founding convention. Mr. Pitman said that Canada did not have any role to play as a nation armed with nuclear weapons. Another viewpoint expressed by an N.D.P. parliamentarian was similar to that expressed by Mr. Martin of the Liberal Party in his speech to the House of Commons on September 14, 1961. Mr. Howard said,

"I believe Canada has had a certain degree of respect among the other nations of the world for a number of years. However, we are gradually losing that admiration and that degree of respect which previously existed because we are becoming more and more closely allied and, to a large degree, subservient to the United States military machine. This fact is becoming recognized throughout other countries of the world." 7

Mr. Howard was of the opinion that it was not NATO, but rather NORAD, which had been the cause of this sentiment being directed towards Canada from other nations. On September 15, 1961, Mr. Howard continued his verbal attack on the government, saying that it had made Canada a member of the nuclear club by having this country participate in two military organizations which favoured the idea of arming its forces with tactical nuclear weapons. He said that the people of Canada should know this and he once again stated his party's opposition to the policy of equipping Canadian forces with nuclear weapons.

The New Democratic Party favoured a policy which would have Canada abandon NORAD and establish a mobile force which would be used in U.N. peacekeeping operations in order to deter a limited war. The party also favoured Canada increasing its foreign aid to the newly independent and other

(7) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. VIII, 1960-61, page 8341.

poorly developed nations and he referred to the Bomarc missile as being a good example of wasting money which could otherwise be used in foreign aid projects in poor countries. This was the stand that the party took in 1961, and it adhered to it consistently throughout 1962 but neither the party as a whole, nor any of its elected representatives made any newsworthy statements on this issue during this time. It was only when the Conservative Government was faced with this issue for the last time, that the views of the N.D.P. were once again prominently mentioned in the newspapers. These opinions and views will be examined in Chapter seven.

B. The N.D.P. and NATO.

The New Democratic Party policy concerning the Canadian role in a nuclear armed NATO, was similar to that of its policy concerning nuclear arms for Canada's continental defence forces. In outlining the policy of his party in the House of Commons, Mr. Horridge, on September 13, 1961, referred to the founding convention of the New Democratic Party. He said that,

"the convention approved a policy that support should be continued to NATO on the condition that nuclear weapons were not extended to any other country than those that have them at the present time. That is the position of the party." 8

He was of the opinion that the policies adopted by the Western countries should not perpetuate NATO, but should bring about policies which would make NATO obsolete.⁹ However, Mr. Horridge said that this was not possible as the military officials in NATO, rather than the political representatives of the member nations, were responsible for formulating NATO's foreign policy.

(8) Ibid., page 503.

(9) Two such policies would be that of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and the mutual disarmament of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

11. The Social Credit Party.

The Social Credit Party has not been very outspoken on the issue of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. It should be remembered, that for the most important years of the nuclear arms issue, from 1958, to 1962, there was no representative of the Social Credit Party sitting in the House of Commons. However, during the Supply Debate of the Department of National Defence in December 1957, Mr. Solon Low, the leader of the party, supported the idea of a NORAD agreement. He said in parliament that Canada did not have sufficient manpower or resources to defend itself. He added,

"we must never allow Canada to become a no man's land between an attacking country and the United States. We insist, therefore, that the defence of Canada must start in the far north. That being the case, we have to join with the United States, it seems to me, in providing the strongest type of warning lines in the north and keep them up to date." 10

He said that both countries should establish a working agreement on the joint defence of North America. Thus, six months before the Conservatives had asked for Parliament's approval of an exchange of notes between the Canadian and United States Governments officially setting up NORAD, Mr. Solon Low had already pledged his party's support to this idea.

As previously stated, the Social Credit Party was absent from the House of Commons from 1958 to 1962. Consequently there is a lack of views by this party with regard to Canada accepting nuclear weapons for the Starfighter aircraft and the Honest John and Lacrosse missiles which made up part of the arsenal of Canada's NATO forces.

(10) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11, 1957-58, page 1915.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE LIBERAL PARTY

1. Liberal Government policy after World War Two.

The Liberal Party represented the Government of Canada when discussions were held between Canadian and United States military officers for the purpose of creating the North American Air Defence Command. However, throughout the Bomarc crisis, the Liberals were the major opposition party in the House of Commons. This chapter will examine the attitudes and policies of the Liberal Government and Liberal Party when they sat on each side of the Commons chamber.

The first twelve years after the Second World War saw the Liberal Party, representing the Canadian Government, being elected to that office in 1945, 1949, and 1953. During its reign of power, Canada first based its foreign policy on the aims and goals of the United Nations Charter, but with the rise of the "cold war," the Liberal Government looked for some other means by which it could build up Canada's political and military security. One method was joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Close cooperation with its NATO allies became the cornerstone of the Liberal Government's foreign policy right up until the time they were voted out of office in the 1957 federal general election. Another method of achieving security was cooperating more closely with the United States in the joint defence of this continent. Collective defence became the basis of Canada's defence policy. In the 1957 election, the booklet published by the Liberal Party explaining its electoral programme, described the three radar lines that had been, or were in the process of being constructed across Canada. The article on national defence went on to state,

"in these dangerous times the defence of the free world is essentially a matter of team work, and if that team work is to be effective, no country can afford to permit narrow nationalistic pride to undermine its security or that of its allies." 1

It would appear that the Liberals were trying to break the news gently to the Canadian people that in the near futuro, there would be a merger of Canadian and American air defence forces under an American commander-in-chief, and the Liberals knew that such news would not be well received by the Canadian people. It can be surmised that to a certain extent, the Liberals were thankful that they did not win the 1957 election for it meant that they would not be the ones who would have to break the news of the creation of the NORAD alliance to the Canadian people. At a Liberal Party Convention held early in 1958, one of the resolutions that was adopted was that Canada should,

"consider the defence of the North American continent as a principal objective of Canadian defence policy and relate air defence arrangements between Canada and the United States to the command structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such arrangements...must assure the independence of Canada in its own air space and in the Arctic where Canadian authority must at all times be asserted." 2

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- (1) Liberal Action for a Greater Canada, Federal General Election 1957, National Liberal Federation of Canada, Ottawa, 1957, page 174.
 - (2) New Statements of Liberal Policy, Resolutions Adopted by the Fourth National Liberal Convention held in Ottawa, January 14, 15, 16-1958, National Liberal Federation of Canada, Ottawa, 1958, page 13.

This resolution was important for a number of reasons. First, as it came before the Conservatives asked for Parliament's approval to the establishing of the NORAD alliance, it could be considered as an indication of what the Liberals had hoped to see in the bill put forward by the Conservatives four months later. Second, it was a shift, not a radical one, but a shift nevertheless, away from stressing our participation in NATO toward stressing more intensively the defence of North America as being a prime target. Third, the resolution showed the Liberal's desire that NORAD should come under the NATO command structure. Its failure to do so was an important point on which the Liberals criticized the Conservative Government. Fourth, the desire to maintain Canadian sovereignty and authority proved to be another point on which the Liberals based their future attack against the Tories. Other resolutions pertaining to Canadian defence that were passed at the Convention mentioned Canada's need to develop not only an anti-bomber defence, but a system of protection against long-range missiles as well.

11. Criticism of Conservative bill asking for approval of NORAD

The introduction of the Government bill asking for approval by the House of Commons to the NORAD agreement was met with criticism by Liberal M.P.s, partly on the manner in which the bill was presented to the House. They objected to the fact that the Conservatives did not introduce the bill into Parliament in a proper manner. This would have entailed introducing the proposed legislation after its contents had been discussed by a Cabinet Defence Committee. This would be followed by an agreement between the Canadian and United States Governments on the principles of the agreement and this would be followed by tabling the agreement in the House for discussion. Instead of adopting this procedure, NORAD was presented to Parliament after only one Cabinet discussion. Mr. Diefenbaker replied by saying that it was not necessary

for his government to introduce the bill at all, but it did so because it was customary practice that important treaties would receive Parliamentary and not just Cabinet approval.

But of course, the Liberal opposition to the bill was not confined to the procedure of its presentation, but extended to the contents of the bill as well, specifically on the aspects pertaining to NORAD's independence of NATO. They said that the document introduced into the Commons,

"states that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be kept informed of these arrangements. This is not the important part of the connection between the command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it is in the sense of responsibility to and authority from NATO headquarters that NORAD has no organic connection with NATO at all. The commander and the deputy commander were not appointed by any NATO agency; they have no authority under NATO and they are not responsible to NATO, and in that sense to attempt to assimilate their positions with those of the commanders of NATO commands is wrong and that attempt, of course, must break down." 3

Mr. Pearson went on to attack the Diefenbaker administration for attempting to separate NORAD and SAC into two independent entities, saying that to do so was impossible and illogical. He also suggested that the government examine the possibility of bringing NORAD under NATO command, especially since Paul Henri Spaak, the Secretary-General of NATO at that time, had stated that NORAD was not a part of NATO in any sense of the word. This facet of Mr. Pearson's speech was later expanded upon in a speech to the House by Mr. Alexis Caron who said that NORAD was distinct from NATO,

"because the Secretary General of NATO, who was in Ottawa recently, admitted that NORAD is not part of NATO, that he had not heard of it, that it had not been discussed beforehand and that it was an experiment being looked at with interest by NATO. However, there was no statement from this international authority to indicate that it is indeed part and parcel of NATO." 4

(3) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.1, 1958. pp.1003-1004.

(4) Ibid., page 1055.

Furthermore, Mr. Caron added that there was no reference to NATO in the preamble of the NORAD agreement.

However, the Liberal Party itself, was being criticized both inside and outside of Parliament. Many people felt that the Liberal criticism of the Conservative Government's decision agreeing officially to the creation of NORAD was unwarranted,

"by the fact that they were aware that common control of North American air defence forces is a logical even if not an inevitable consequence of the Liberal Government's active cooperation in the establishment and working of the triple chain of warning stations thrown across Canada southwards from the Arctic DMW-line." 5

Mr. Pearson replied to a similar statement made by Mr. Diefenbaker by saying in the House of Commons,

"Mr. Speaker...notwithstanding everything that the Prime Minister has said that government (the previous government) never gave consideration to NORAD or to the concept behind NORAD. If we had, we would have spent more than 20 or 30 minutes in one cabinet meeting on it, and given prior consideration by the defence committee of the cabinet, before we gave agreement." 6

(As stated previously, it is difficult to believe that this was the case in view of the statements and support made in regard to North American air defence cooperation expressed in resolutions adopted at Liberal Party conventions, and also in view of General Boulkes' testimony before the Special Committee on Defence in 1963).

Mr. Martin adopted another point on which the Liberals constantly badgered the Diefenbaker Government. General Partridge, the commander-in-chief of NORAD, had inferred that he could press the fatal button without consulting the President of the United States, but Mr. Pearkes, the Canadian Minister of Defence, indicated that the General would first have to

(5) Alexander, Fred, Canadians and Foreign Policy, University of Toronto Press, 1960, page 40.

(6) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.1, 1958, page 1015.

consult with the United States Government and then the Canadian Government before pushing the button. Mr. Martin was curious to know which man had made the correct statement. If the General was correct in saying that he did not have to seek the permission of the U.S. President, how could Mr. Pearkes argue that the NORAD commander is expected to consult with officials in Ottawa? Mr. Martin also wanted to know whether Air Marshal Slemon, the Canadian deputy commander, had the same powers as those of General Artridge. The Conservative reply was to the effect that General Artridge was wrong, that he had to consult and receive the approval of both governments, and that in the General's absence, the Canadian deputy commander had the same authority.

Mr. Pearson, in response to the Prime Minister's important speech of February 20, 1959, agreed with the Prime Minister, that Canada should not manufacture nuclear weapons and said that the Bomarc should be acquired if it was beneficial to the defence of North America. He added,

"I think our defence policy--and I mention it on the broadest ground of principle--should be based on the kind of deterrence which the Prime Minister said is now essential. At this time we may require weapons for defence purposes while also seeking disarmament, a search in which we must not falter no matter how frustrating and disappointing it may seem to be." 7

If, when using the word "weapons," Mr. Pearson referred to nuclear weapons which seems evident from the first sentence, then the last part of the second sentence would appear to be inconsistent, for if we are to seek disarmament through all forms of trials and tribulations, why hinder the cause by accepting the sort of weapons that we were hoping would soon be illegal to manufacture or acquire? This question was asked of Mr. Pearson and the Liberal Party, especially during the

(7) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11,1959, page 1225.

1963 federal election campaign after the Liberals had decided to campaign on a platform of accepting nuclear weapons if they would be elected into power, but no satisfactory answer to the question was ever given.

Mr. Pearson strongly favoured a system of collective defence and collective control over the decision to fire nuclear weapons, rather than having this authority concentrated in the hands of one government. While Mr. Pearson said in February 26, 1959, that the Bomarc might be necessary, he opposed their acquisition when it became known under what conditions these weapons could be used.

"Our objection to the Bomarc is not only that we do not think it is an effective weapon...our objection is to the kind of defence strategy it represents and which we do not think will be effective however effective the weapon may be....After all, this kind of defence is primarily a United States responsibility. It is the defence of the deterrent. We know how important that is; but it is a deterrent which is under the sole control of the United States of America." 8

He said that our role in continental defence should be one of recognition and identification of enemy aircraft with modern planes capable of destroying the attacking aircraft. He further advocated reversing the present trend towards closer cooperation with the United States in matters of defence and advocated on behalf of his party that the government ensure that cooperation with the Pentagon does not mean absorption by it.

This policy was maintained by the Liberals for quite some time. Exactly one year and one week after Mr. Pearson made the speech cited in part above, Mr. Hellyer outlined the Liberal policy in the House of Commons when he said in the supply debate for the Department of National Defence,

(8) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. VII, 1960, page 7606.

"our position in this respect is the same as we announced last year. We still feel that atomic weapons in Canada are unnecessary at this time. We feel they are redundant. We do not think they add anything to the security of Canada, and we think they provide no security for the strategic air command." 9

Mr. Hellyer said that the possibility of a bomber threat has now been replaced by the threat of a missile attack on North American cities and SAC bases, and as the Bomarc cannot defend Canada against missiles, they are equally useless in the defence of SAC bases. They are also useless against airplanes carrying "stand-off" bombs (bombs with "dead-man" fuzes), which will be mentioned in the next chapter. He referred to President Kennedy's address to the United States Congress on March 28, 1961 in which the President outlined the need for strengthening the conventional forces of NATO. Mr. Hellyer agreed with this policy and criticized the Canadian Government for arming Canadian forces with second-rate weapons. He said,

"it is interesting to note that in the long list of priority items presented by President Kennedy to Congress on March 28 last there did not appear one of the major items on which the Canadian government is relying. Not one American penny for the Voodoo, the F-104, the Bomarc or the Honest John. The Canadian defence department has become a pawnshop for second hand American hardware." 10

He said the F-104 Starfighters had been withdrawn from NORAD because of a high accident rate and added that the United States was now putting its faith in the Little John rather than the Honest John missile because of better results achieved during its testing period. He then stated the Liberal Party's policy as supporting an increase in the conventional strength of NATO, and that the Liberal Party would accept nuclear defensive weapons for Canadian NATO troops provided that these weapons would come under NATO collective control.

(9) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. VIII, 1960-61. page 8230.

(10) loc. cit.

Another viewpoint was expressed by Mr. Matheson when he said,

"if we have conventional weapons and have the courage to put our gallant people in a place where they can preserve the peace, I put it to you that the moral effect of this is going to be so overpowering that many of these uncommitted people who know our background and many of the people behind the iron curtain who wish they were on our side, will take a stand with us." 11

This sentiment was echoed by Mr. Martin who felt that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada would not enhance our position at the United Nations.

It should be noted that while it is often easier to criticize than defend a certain policy, the Liberals did not escape criticism themselves. One such criticism was mentioned by Mr. Diufenbaker who reminded the Liberals that while they were now busily tearing the NORAD alliance asunder, it was those same Liberals who voted with his government on the question of Canada signing the NORAD agreement thereby giving the Alliance official approval of the Canadian Government.

Mr. Pearson's defence of this criticism was quite remarkable because he said,

"incidentally I would like to correct what the previous speaker said, namely that the Liberal Party approved NORAD in this house. That is not the case...The NORAD agreement was entered into by the present government and we criticized it at the time as being inadequate and ineffective, and as not providing, as they should have provided, for NORAD being part of NATO." 12

While it is true that the Liberals did not vote for the NORAD agreement without criticizing it, it is also true that it nevertheless voted for the government bill, but no reason was given at that time or at any other time as to why the Liberals did not oppose the bill as the C.C.F. Party had done.

Once again Mr. Pearson said the government should consider revising its policy regarding the type of weapons

(11) Ibid., page 8250.

(12) Ibid., page 8346.

it was acquiring for continental defence. He advocated reverting to the type of continental defence that existed before NORAD. The best defence is one of retaliation. This retaliatory force was in American hands. Canada's role should be to warn these retaliatory forces of an impending attack and to have the R.C.A.F. shoot down any isolated enemy aircraft that may intrude upon Canadian air space, but to do so with conventional weapons. He said, that as the advent of a missile attack draws nearer, Canada's role in continental defence decreases.

Still another point of Liberal criticism was directed at the efficiency of the Bomarc B. Mr. McMillan stated in the House of Commons

"I read one article concerning tests made in the United States. These tests would lead one to believe the Bomarc interceptor missile was of very dubious value. This article stated at that time that in 12 tests the missile got off the ground on only four occasions and only hit a slow moving target on one of the four occasions." 13

A quick reply by Mr. Harkness was made to the effect that these tests referred to the time when the Bomarc was in its infancy. He said the Bomarc was now perfected and was a highly successful weapon.

This was the scene in Parliament in September, 1961. The Conservatives were being attacked for their lack of decision-making in matters of defence over the past three and a half years, and they were almost always defending their past policies by making some vague statements which, very often, did not answer any of the questions asked by the parliamentary opposition or by the Canadian public. The Liberals used this period constantly to attack, ridicule and criticize the government's defence policy, or rather lack of

(13) Ibid. pages 8399-8400.

one, on such points as; the usefulness of the Bomarc, the need for such a weapon, its effectiveness, the effect of nuclear weapons would have on the Canadian foreign political policies at the U.N. and at the disarmament negotiations. The Liberals were also concerned about the status of Canadian sovereignty in NORAD, the authority delegated to Air Marshal Slemon, as well as the necessity for the NORAD commander-in-chief to consult with Canadian Government officials before ordering the nuclear missiles to be fired. Six months later, in March 1962, the Liberals were still asking the Conservative Government to issue a clear statement of its defence policy and to state in definite terms whether or not it is essential under the NORAD agreement for the Canadian Prime Minister to be notified before or after the NORAD commander has made his decision, or does the Prime Minister, along with the American President, in consultation with the NORAD commander, formulate the decision? No clear answer was given by the Conservative Government.

111. 1962 election policies.

During the general federal election campaign of 1962, the Liberal Party issued a pamphlet outlining its policies in all fields of government concern. In matters of defence, the pamphlet stated that the Liberals considered the United States retaliatory forces to be the best defence for North America and Canada's role should be to cooperate with the Strategic Air Command by continuing to man the radar stations that had been built across Canada. The pamphlet also stated that the Liberals considered the Bomarc to be useless without nuclear warheads and questioned their usefulness should they ever be equipped with nuclear tips. In addition, the Liberals believed, less than nine months before their total rejection of all their past policies concerning the Bomarc, that,

"the threat to peace will be greatly multiplied if more and more nations have nuclear weapons under their control. The spread of such weapons, in Canada or elsewhere, would not in any way increase...the ultimate power of retaliation which is the only real safeguard against aggression. On the basis of present information, therefore, the defence policy of a new Liberal government will not require Canada to become a nuclear power by the manufacture, acquisition or use of nuclear weapons under Canadian or American control. A new Liberal government will, however, reserve the right to examine each new development in the light of its overriding responsibility for the security of the Canadian people." 14

1V. The Liberal Party and NATO.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the Liberal Government looked to NATO as one of the means of increasing Canadian security against the spread of communism during the rise of the "cold war," Canada's membership in this alliance became a focal point of the government's foreign policy. The government's view was that,

"the Liberal Party favours the association of Canada with the United Kingdom, the United States, and the free countries of Europe in a North Atlantic security arrangement under the Charter of the United Nations." 15

As previously mentioned this was the cornerstone of the Liberal's foreign policy as late as the 1957 federal election. In the party's electoral pamphlet, it was stated that, "NATO remains the foundation of Canada's policy of collective security and Atlantic cooperation."¹⁶ During the Conservative

(14) The Liberal Programme, General Election-1962, National Liberal Federation of Canada, Ottawa, 1962, page 25.

(15) Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention, August 5th, 6th, 7th, 1948, National Liberal Federation of Canada, Ottawa, 1948, page 148.

(16) Liberal Action for a Greater Canada, Federal General Election 1957, op. cit., page 81.

Government's tenure in office, the emphasis of our defence policy shifted towards North American security against a possible Soviet bomber (and later a missile) attack which would come from the direction of the North Pole.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, after Mr. Diefenbaker's speech of February 20, 1959 the Liberals expressed their opposition to having Canada acquire nuclear Bomarc B weapons which were not under collective control. They were also against the idea of Canada accepting nuclear weapons for its European R.C.A.F. squadrons which could be used at the discretion of the United States, rather than by a decision from a NATO authority. In September 1960, Mr. Pearson stated that he agreed with Mr. Minifie that Canada should re-examine its defence policies and its defence relations with the United States, but he said that he did not go as far as Mr. Minifie in thinking that neutralism would be the answer. He repeated his preference for collective security and his dislike for the control and authority to launch nuclear weapons being at the discretion of one nation. This was his major reason for his opposition to Canada accepting nuclear weapons. However, there was some confusion created by Mr. Pearson's statements. On the one hand he was opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada, and on the other hand, he appeared to give his endorsement to equipping the R.C.A.F. squadrons in Europe with nuclear weapons provided that there would be collective control over the firing of these weapons. The leader of the main opposition party showed that both he and his party were reluctant to accept nuclear weapons partly due to the effect such a decision would have on Canadian political affairs internationally, partly on moral grounds, and partly on the fear of having such destructive weapons as part of the arsenal of its armed forces. However, he and the Liberal Party were prepared to arm the Canadian forces stationed in Europe with nuclear weapons provided that they came under NATO control. He then said,

"But if we are being asked in NATO to accept nuclear weapons for our air division and for our infantry brigade under other than that kind of control, under national control, or under joint control which gives the United States an overpowering authority to use or not to use them, then I do not think we should accept them in Europe." 17

On September 14, Mr. Pearson, eager to differentiate his NORAD non-nuclear policy from his NATO nuclear policy, explained to the House of Commons exactly what his party would and would not support. He said that the NATO nuclear forces must be under NATO control, not national control, otherwise chances of an accidental firing of a nuclear weapon would be greatly increased. He stated that he realized the difficulties involved in establishing an effective multi-national control, but nevertheless, it appeared to be the most desirable means of controlling these weapons. Mr. Pearson emphasized that the nuclear deterrent should not be used except when it is absolutely clear that a massive assault had been launched. The delay in using nuclear weapons would necessitate the use of conventional forces to repel the attack until the nuclear deterrent had been unleashed. Therefore the Liberal Party favoured the policy of increasing the strength of NATO's conventional forces, thus relegating the nuclear defence into the position of being a second line of defence.

This policy was maintained by the Liberal Party until Mr. Pearson's "Scarborough speech" on January 12, 1963. It will be seen that the policies of the Liberal Party changed radically at that time.

(17) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. VIII, 1960-61. page 8353.

CHAPTER SIX

THE GOVERNMENT

This chapter will examine the opinions and policies of the Conservative Party and the Conservative Government as put forth by various Conservative M.P.s, including the Prime Minister. The main emphasis of this chapter will be on the Bomarc issue and NORAD with a brief reference or two to the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canada's NATO forces.

1. Problems faced by Conservatives after 1957 election victory

Almost from the moment that the Conservative Party¹ came into power in 1957, it was placed in a defensive position. In June 1957, it was elected as a minority government, receiving one hundred and twelve seats out of a possible two hundred and sixty-five. The creation of NORAD was announced less than two months later and the Conservative Government was surprised to find that the agreement had practically been adopted by the outgoing Liberals, thus leaving the Conservatives in a position where it would have been difficult for them to refuse to grant their acceptance. However, this hasty agreement to take part in a military alliance, when they were not fully acquainted with all the obligations it entailed, proved to be a grave error for the duration of their tenure of office. In the end it was the basis for their being defeated on a vote of non-confidence in 1963.

(1) Although the Party has been known as the Progressive Conservative Party since 1942, it will be referred to as the Conservative Party for reasons of brevity.

NORAD was designed to defend the continent against a bomber attack. However, the Soviets had not been building bombers in the quantity anticipated but had been concentrating in establishing a powerful missile attack force. The American military intelligence corps had not anticipated this type of attack. Thus the three radar lines which were built in Canada during the 1950's, were almost completely useless.

One of the main criticisms of the NORAD alliance that the Conservatives had to defend themselves against was that there had been a loss of Canadian sovereignty and control over her own forces since NORAD was signed. The Conservatives tried to impress upon the people the idea of joint control of the Bomarc 3 missiles, requiring Canadian consent before they could be launched. This proved to be false when General Laurence Kuter, the commander-in-chief of NORAD, said in a 1959 speech to NATO's Parliamentary Conference in Washington,

"I have direct operational control over all air defence elements of the U.S. Army, the US Navy, the US Air Force and the Air Defence Command of the Royal Canadian Air Force." 2

He went on to say, "this authority...is not dependent on any consultations." 3

On December 5, 1957, during the supply debate for the Department of National Defence in the House of Commons, the Defence Minister, the Honourable George Pearkes attempted to justify Canada involving itself in NORAD. He said that the safety of the Western world depends upon its retaliatory forces, the ability to inflict heavy damage upon an enemy after we have been attacked and,

(2) Minifie, James M., Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, McClelland & Stewart Limited, Toronto/Montreal, September 1965, pages 28-29.

(3) Ibid., page 29.

"In Canada, our main contribution to this deterrent is to provide protection both for these retaliatory forces and for the industrial power of the North American continent. To this end we have established the early warning lines and air defence command." 4

The Defence Minister implied that there was a NORAD-NATO link, that they were not separate, independent alliances but that NORAD operated within the framework of NATO under the office of the North American Regional Command. This idea was stressed during the next few months to counter Liberal accusations that NATO had no control over NORAD and that Canadian sovereignty had been sacrificed by aligning ourselves with the United States in a bilateral military alliance. The Conservatives had hoped that by adopting the policy that NORAD was a subordinate command within NATO, NORAD would become more widely accepted by Canadians, keeping in mind the Canadian whole hearted acceptance of NATO and its popularity in 1949.

Mr. Pearkes also said that control of air defence in Canada depends upon all airplanes registering a flight plan with air defence authorities. Furthermore, the Canadian commanding officer at the St. Hubert air force base is in control of all air operations in Canada. This became a focal point of debate and justification to the Conservatives that NORAD did not involve any loss of sovereignty by Canada over its air space. The Canadian commander may authorize the interception of aircraft for identification purposes and if it proves to be an enemy plane, he can order the R.C.A.F. to engage it or force it to land. Refusal to deny these aircraft passage over Canadian territory is a Canadian responsibility. Mr. Pearkes emphasized this point when he said,

(4) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11, 1957-58, page 1897.

"every precaution has been taken and will continue to be taken to ensure that the Canadian government is consulted before any act is undertaken which would commit this country to war." 5

On June 10, 1958, the Conservative Government presented a bill before Parliament asking that Parliament approve an exchange of notes between the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the organization and operation of NORAD. The Prime Minister emphasized the need for continental defence against a possible enemy attack and stressed the fact quite strongly that NORAD was a defensive alliance and not an offensive one. When opposition was raised concerning the fact that airplanes of the Strategic Air Command were being refuelled in Canada, Mr. Diefenbaker said that the refuelling facilities were set up in Canada so as to contribute to the increased effectiveness of the SAC force. It became obvious, however, that SAC operations were a part of the continental air defence system,

"yet the United States never contemplated sharing control of SAC operations with any nation; its command, peacetime operations, the selection of target systems and forces participation in continental defence...might plunge Canada into war." 6

Mr. Diefenbaker's answer to this charge was to show, once again, that Canada was not losing any sovereignty in its close military alliance with the United States. He stated that although American nuclear armed airplanes had been flying over Canada for a period of seven years, each flight had to be sanctioned by the Canadian Government. The accuracy of this

(5) Ibid, page 1900.

(6) Conant, Melvin, "Canada and Continental Defence: an American View," International Journal, Summer 1960, vol. XV, no.3, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1960, page 223.

was doubted by many people due to Canada's authority vis-a-vis that of the United States in continental defence. Mr. Diefenbaker also attempted to separate NORAD and SAC into two independent and distinct military organizations, thereby purifying NORAD of any strike role, and recreating the image of a purely defensive alliance. In this, Mr. Diefenbaker was not successful, nor was the Conservative Party as a whole.

There was a lot of confusion both inside and outside of Parliament concerning the role of NORAD, its authority, and the authority of NORAD's Canadian deputy commander-in-chief. Questions on these subjects were posed by the Liberal Alan Macnaughton, and on June 11, the Minister for External Affairs, the Honourable Sidney Smith replied to the first subject by referring to the standing group in NATO and said,

"if they [the coordination plans of NORAD] are studied in the standing group and they do not seem to fit into the general over-all defence plans and defensive plans, retaliatory plans of NATO, then there will be discussion of them with the members of the Canada-United States regional planning group. It is in this context therefore that NORAD's role in the general framework of the over-all defence of the North Atlantic treaty area can be justified." 7

Thus, six months after the Defence Minister had attempted to impress upon Parliament the close working alliance, indeed, the subordinate position of NORAD within the NATO alliance, the External Affairs Minister was still trying to get the opposition members of the House, as well as the Canadian public in general, to believe the same story. He went on to say, in reply to Mr. Macnaughton's question that,

(7) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11, 1958, page 1049.

"I have consulted with my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, and he confirms the information that I am about to give,...in the absence of the commander in chief the deputy commander will assume his powers and his responsibilities...and there are no reservations in this very positive and categorical statement." 8

The Conservatives had hoped that this reply would quell the apprehension felt by many Canadians, that the Canadian deputy commander, Air Marshal Slemon, was given a titular position with very little or no power of authority. The above reply did satisfy some Canadians but by no means the majority of those that opposed NORAD.

(On June 19, 1958, the motion of the Conservative Government to recognize Canada's acceptance and participation in NORAD was carried by a vote of 200 to 8, the Liberals voting with the Government against the opposition of the C.C.F. Party).

11. Statement of February 20, 1959, and attitudes from 1959 to 1961.

On February 20, 1959, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced the government's decision to abandon the CF-105 Avro Arrow project because an alternative means of defending the continent had been developed in the form of Bomarc B missiles for air defence and Lacrosse missiles for the Army. The Prime Minister said that,

"the full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO's defence tasks are also being studied." 9

(8) Ibid, page 1050.

(9) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 11, 1959, page 1223.

He also stated that the decision to acquire these weapons was made on the best advice available and on Canada's determination to continue to make "an effective contribution to the NATO shield."¹⁰ He added that Canada had no desire to manufacture its own nuclear weapons and that she would still strive to achieve a disarmament agreement at Geneva. Mr. Diefenbaker also said that the ownership and custody of these weapons would remain in American hands as a further means to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to more and more countries.

The February 20th speech is significant for five reasons. First, it marked the start of the nuclear arms debate in Canada. Second, and most important, it put the Conservatives "on record" as saying that the Bomarc and Lacrosse missiles had to be armed with nuclear warheads in order to have these weapons achieve their full potential, a statement that they later came to regret. Third, this speech was often referred to by Conservatives in future parliamentary debates when they wished to give very vague answers to questions posed to them by opposition M.P.s because they would not, or could not, do otherwise. Fourth, it showed that the Conservatives did not regard nuclear weapons being introduced into Canada as constituting the dissemination of these weapons by one nation to another as long as the United States retained custody of the missiles. Lastly, it once again tried to show that the strengthening of Canadian forces in order to defend this continent was part of Canada's contribution to the NATO defence scheme. This was mentioned by Mr. Diefenbaker two weeks later in the House of Commons when he said,

(10) loc. cit.

"as far as NATO and our continental defenses are concerned, we take the stand—we have no reason to take other—that our actions within the continental context of North America are all within the contemplation of NATO. All of them have the approval of the NATO organization." 11

At the risk of being repititious, this constant referral by the Conservatives to NORAD being a part of NATO, showed that its attempts to convince the Canadian public to accept this as being a true state of affairs, had not met with success. It should be pointed out that this was by no means the last time that this argument was put forward by the Conservatives.

On May 25, it appeared that the Conservative Government was about to announce the acquisition of nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missile when Mr. Diefenbaker announced in the Commons that,

"provision is being made for the transfer to Canada under mutually agreeable conditions, of such non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving restricted data as are jointly determined to be necessary to improve the state of training of Canada's armed forces and the operational readiness of these forces." 12

It was believed that after receiving training in the use of detecting and using nuclear weapons the Canadian forces would then be equipped with such weapons but this did not turn out to be the case. Both opposition leaders did not comment on the Prime Minister's speech, saying they preferred to study the announcement further before making any comment on their own. However, with the passage of time and no statement forthcoming from the Conservatives with respect to the definite acquisition of nuclear weapons, the government thought it wise, in view of persistent opposition charges of Conservative indecisiveness and lack of a clear defence policy, to issue a statement outlining its defence policy.

(11) Ibid, page 1550.

(12) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.1V, 1959, page 3966.

Early in 1960, the Prime Minister said in the debate on the Speech from the Throne,

"eventually Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective. For example, the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile to be effective would require nuclear warheads." 13

He went on to reaffirm Canada's desire not to manufacture these weapons and that Canada was not giving up any of its decision-making powers in the field of defence by saying,

"I want to make it abundantly clear that nuclear weapons will not be used by the Canadian forces except as the Canadian government decides and in the manner approved by the Canadian government. Canada retains its full freedom of choice and decision." 14

In effect, the Prime Minister was saying that arrangements were being made with the United States authorities to provide us with the necessary weapons if and when they are required. It appeared that by stressing Canada's retention of decision-making power regarding the firing of these nuclear missiles, that difficulties had arisen in attempting to have American military officials recognize and accept Canada's possible veto over the decision to launch a nuclear equipped Bomarc in some future crisis. The Liberals, as was seen in the last chapter, attacked the Conservatives over the acquisition of these weapons "if and when required." They, and many other people, wanted to know how, in times of a sudden crisis, enough time will be available in order for Ottawa to notify Washington to send the nuclear weapons into Canada, mount them on the Bomarcs and be prepared to launch the missiles, before either the crisis had worsened, or an attack by enemy aircraft had already commenced.

(13) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.1, 1960, page 73.

(14) loc. cit.

111. Confusion in 1961 over Canadian defence policy

This situation of confusion within the country and within the Government showed no signs of being clarified. On March 6, 1961, when Mr. Chevrier asked the government when or if the nuclear warheads were going to be placed on the Bomarc missiles, the Associate Minister of National Defence, Mr. Sevigny, stated that the answer had already been given in one of Mr. Diefenbaker's previous speeches. This showed, that the Conservative Cabinet as well as the rest of the party, was not about to make a final definite decision on the matter.

The Conservatives not only had to defend their stand with regard to nuclear weapons, but they also had to defend some of their other defence policies. The Liberals blamed the government of gross negligence in the spending of the Canadian tax payer's money, especially in regard to the Avro Arrow project and the Bomarc, whose usefulness was now doubted due to the fact that the main threat to North America lay in Soviet long-range missiles, and not in a bomber force. These charges were answered in the House of Commons on September 12, 1961, by Conservative M.P. Mr. Bigg who stated in regard to the CF-105,

"the previous government took the decision to produce the Arrow without having any idea what the cost was going to be and without having any idea whether any other nation would buy any of these aircraft...they spent a large amount of money...and when we came into power we found that this program was there. A lot of money had been spent on it, and we made the greatest possible efforts to try and interest other countries in buying this airplane." 15

(15) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. VIII, 1960-61, page 8269.

Mr. Bigg defended the Bomarc by saying that if we didn't have a defence against the bomber, Russia would attack us with a cheaper and more readily available weapon than would otherwise be the case. This was a poor argument to put up in the defence of the Bomarc for it did not consider the fact that the arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. made it imperative for the Soviet Union to produce more sophisticated weapons and that the bomber threat was to give way to the missile threat not solely on the basis of the Bomarc, but on the entire "cold war" arms race. Thus, even if there were no Bomarc, the U.S.S.R. could not contemplate attacking us with a cheaper weapon than a bomber as it was forced to manufacture more modern weapons of attack. Mr. Bigg went so far as to say that if security meant a closer link with the United States and a loss of Canadian sovereignty, he would be prepared to accept that. He emphasized this when he launched a verbal attack against those people who suggested that Canada should get out of NORAD. He added,

"as a Canadian I put freedom ahead of the pride of Canadians and say that if our great neighbour the U.S.A., has the armed strength to deter nuclear war and the conventional strength to fight a conventional war, then I am going to be morally strong enough to stand beside them and for a short time share sovereignty with people who have never waged an aggressive war." 16

While not all Conservatives felt this strongly about close cooperation with the United States authorities, a majority of them favoured our continued partnership in NORAD although they were uncertain, both as a party and as the government, whether or not we should be a nuclear armed or non-nuclear armed partner.

The Conservatives had to defend their defence policy on still another issue. In mid-September 1961, Mr. Hellyer,

(16) Ibid., pages 8264-65.

the Liberal defence critic, accused the Conservatives of arming the Canadian forces with second rate weapons. He referred to Canada's acquiring the Honest John surface-to-surface missile at a time when the United States was arming itself with the Little John, a smaller, lighter, and more portable weapon. He attacked the Conservatives for acquiring the American Voodoo aircraft to replace the Avro Arrow which was faster and better than the Voodoo and said that the Bomarc was useless as the Soviet Union had manned bombers which could launch a ballistic missile known as a "stand-off" bomb towards a Canadian target without getting closer than one thousand miles beyond the range of our anti-bomber missiles. Mr. Mackness, the Minister of National Defence, challenged Mr. Hellyer's knowledge of such weapons as the Little John which he said had a range half that of the Honest John and defended the Bomarc's usefulness by saying that the military officers still believed there was a strong possibility of an enemy bomber attack. He defended the Bomarcs and CF-104 aircraft by saying that by arming them with conventional weapons they were not entirely useless, only less effective than if they carried nuclear warheads, but again he refused to say if or when such a transition in weapons would come about. His statement concerning the possibility of arming the Bomarcs with conventional weapons was not a valid one,

"because no warhead for the Bomarc B Model had ever been designed or manufactured. In the development stages of the Bomarc 'A' Model, a high-explosive warhead had been used, but it was scrapped when the miniaturized nuclear warhead became practical." 17

It is somewhat unusual for a government to openly admit on several occasions that the full effectiveness of these weapons

(17) Newman, Peter C., op. cit., page 349.

lay in their being nuclear armed, and yet allow them to be conventionally armed without either giving the public a reason for this nor telling them whether or not they would be nuclear armed in the foreseeable future.

IV. Government's 1962 position as stated by Mr. Sevigny.

It is also unfortunate that exactly three years to the day of Mr. Diefenbaker's speech announcing the death of the Arrow and the Government's acceptance of the Bomarc, Mr. Sevigny, in replying to a question put to him in the House of Commons by Mr. Hellyer, could add very little to what the Prime Minister had said in 1959, due to three years of government indecision, and the inability of the Conservative Party to formulate a definite policy on this issue at the party's national conventions. In replying to the question he said,

"...may I say that facilities for the maintenance and storage of the Bomarc missile have been constructed at North Bay and are being constructed at La Macaza. These facilities will be available if and when nuclear warheads are obtained.

Mr. Hellyer: Can the minister say when that will be?

Mr. Sevigny: No comment."¹⁸

The Canadian people, did not approve of their government's indecision in this and other matters and although the Conservatives were once again elected to power in 1962, they were now in the position of being a minority government with 116 seats, having lost 92 seats since their last election in 1958. Despite this setback, the Conservatives were unable to rectify their past behaviour by formulating a precise defence policy. The state of affairs that existed on February 20, 1962, which was described above, persisted throughout the

(18) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.11, 1962, pages 1040-41.

remaining ten months of that year, with the Conservatives giving vague answers to questions posed by Liberal and New Democratic Party M.P.s, the favourite Conservative answer being merely a referral to the speech made by Mr. Diefenbaker on February 20, 1959 as being the clear, obvious answer to all of the opposition's queries.

V. Government's position in the Cuban Crisis.

Mr. Diefenbaker's policy of having Canada acquire nuclear weapons if and when they were needed, was put to the test in the autumn of 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis. Mr. Peter Newman, in Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, said that,

"the Cuban episode shattered this comfortable compromise. It clearly demonstrated that a period of international tension was the very worst time to adopt the weapons, because it would be interpreted by the communists as an aggressive act." 19

The question also reactivated the problem of the Prime Minister's authority vis-a-vis that of the United States President. Mr. Pearson wanted to know if the Bomarcas could be used solely on the authorization of the President of the United States. Mr. Diefenbaker replied that it was the authorization of the President, coupled with the fact that their use must receive the approval of the Canadian Government, that constituted joint defence of this continent. The next round of heated debate in the House of Commons turned out to be the last one for the Conservative Party on the Government side of the House.

(19) Newman, Peter C., op. cit., page 342.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CRISIS

1. The Liberals.

A. Speeches by General Norstad and Mr. Pearson.

Between 1959 and the end of 1962, in any controversy that arose over the problem of accepting nuclear warheads for Canadian military forces, the controversy would quickly die down. However, after the Cuban crisis, before the issue could die down as it had in the past, fuel was added to the fire in the form of a statement made by the retired NATO commander-in-chief, General Lauris Norstad. On January 3, 1963, he said at a press conference in Ottawa, that Canada had committed itself to the arming of the Starfighter aircraft which were stationed in Europe, with tactical nuclear weapons. Nine days later, on January 12, 1963, Mr. Pearson, in a speech made at the luncheon meeting of the York-Scarborough Liberal Association, "announced his party's conversion to a nuclear strategy."¹ This was tantamount to a complete reversal of policy for he and his party now advocated the acquisition of tactical defensive nuclear warheads in order to make Canada's defensive system fully effective. Mr. Pearson said that defence policies designed to prevent nuclear war must be based on nuclear retaliation, impressing upon the potential enemy the high price he will pay in human and material losses should he start a nuclear war, no matter how limited in scope. The deterrent forces of the West lie in NATO. He added,

(1) Special Studies prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, supplement 1964-65, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1965, page 16.

"as a member of the NATO coalition, we accept the nuclear deterrent in the hands of the United States as essential for defence; and we supply much of the uranium that goes into American bombs." 2

In his speech he described the forces that Canada has contributed to NATO in the past due to the obligations which have fallen upon Canada by being a member of this military alliance. He said that by being a member of NATO and NORAD, Canada had automatically taken upon itself certain obligations (accepting nuclear weapons) which it had failed to honour. After stating in the House of Commons on several occasions that our NATO forces should not be equipped with nuclear weapons until such weapons came under the collective control of that organization rather than being under the collective control of the U.S. or joint control between the U.S. and one of its allies, Mr. Pearson now abandoned that line of thinking. Speaking only one week after the NATO commander had spoken in Canada urging Canadian officials to accept nuclear arms, Mr. Pearson advocated that the Canadian Government,

"should end at once its evasion of responsibility, by discharging the commitments it has already accepted for Canada. It can only do this by accepting nuclear warheads, for those defensive tactical weapons which cannot effectively be used without them, but which we have agreed to use." 3

In making this speech, Mr. Pearson disregarded the statements printed in the 1962 party platform about the Bomarcas being useless with or without nuclear weapons. Forgotten too were the statements made by Mr. Hellyer when he described in

(2) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. VI11, 1960-61, page 8353.

(3) Text of an address by the Honourable Lester B. Pearson, P.C., M.P., Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, Delivered at a Luncheon meeting of York-Scarborough Liberal Association, Toronto, Ontario, January 12, 1963, page 6.

Parliament how Canada was a dumping ground for American out-dated weapons, referring to the Honest John and Bomarc missiles as well as other weapons. The leader of the "Grits" now attempted to impress upon the Canadian people the importance of respecting obligations incurred by Canada due to past agreements. He added that Canada should oppose any additional independent nuclear forces being established by any country in the world and added that the Canadian Government should support the strengthening of NATO's conventional forces. He said that Canada should also support a genuine collective control of all NATO tactical nuclear weapons. No longer was it a prerequisite to our acquiring nuclear weapons for our NATO forces that the control of these weapons be taken away from the United States and placed in the collective hands of NATO, Now this became a goal to strive for and hopefully, or rather, ideally, to achieve. Needless to say, this abrupt and radical reversal of policy caught the entire nation by surprise, and while Mr. Pearson was praised for having the temerity to come out boldly and declare himself on one side of the pro or anti-nuclear arms debate, he did not receive the whole-hearted support of his countrymen as has been previously stated.

B. Liberal policy as stated in the Commons, January 25, 1963.

The ensuing parliamentary crisis saw the Liberal Party taking a pro-nuclear stand, berating the government for reneging on its commitments while the Conservatives steadfastly denied signing any such agreement creating these alleged obligations and tried to defend their past policies. On January 25, Mr. Pearson explained his stand in the House of Commons. He said that it takes years for major changes in defence policy to come about, and since the Bomarc had already been introduced into Canada, it is not a simple task to alter our policy or our commitments with respect to these missiles,

but he never explained why this was the case. He then outlined what our defence policy should be. Canada's defence policies should not hinder our effectiveness at the United Nations, it must be geared to the nation's industrial resources, we should take all necessary steps to protect our territory and live up to our obligations. We should also cooperate with the United States and our NATO allies, take part in United Nations peacekeeping forces, and finally, Canada should not contribute to the strategic nuclear deterrent which differs from the tactical nuclear deterrent. He was (and still is) hopeful that one day there will be a complete abolition of these weapons and Canada should strive to bring about a settlement in the disarmament negotiations, but until that joyous day comes, Canada must acquire nuclear weapons. It is a case of Mr. Pearson believing that our word, given in an agreement, even if it brings about a wrong policy as he had previously maintained that the Bomarc policy was wrong, is nevertheless more important than the ramifications of acquiring nuclear weapons. He attacked the Government once again for not fulfilling its obligations, citing several speeches by Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Harkness in which they stated that the full effectiveness of the Bomarc necessitated it being armed with a nuclear warhead. He also mentioned the fact that no government official denied any of the statements made by General Lauris Norstad in his recent speech in which he stated that Canada was obligated to accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarc and Starfighters. What the Liberal leader did not mention was the hypocritical stand he was taking in view of the fact that Canada was selling uranium to the U.S.A. and sitting on the Geneva disarmament panel at one and the same time.

On January 31, Mr. Pearson referred to the communiqué issued by the U.S. State Department which stated in part,

"so far as NORAD is concerned, Canada has been negotiating with the United States for the past two or three months in order that nuclear warheads will be made available for our two squadrons of Bomarcas and our F-101 interceptors." 4

This, Mr. Pearson pointed out, differed from what the "Minister of National Defence said recently about Canada honouring its commitments. In Mr. Pearson's view, it was obvious from this press release that the Canadian minister was telling something less than the truth. Mr. Martin said the negotiations being held with a view to acquiring nuclear arms was not in accord with one of the Prime Minister's speeches in which he said that the Canadian and United States Governments were negotiating on the issue of making these weapons available to Canada when and if they would be required.

On February 4, 1963, the Liberals introduced a motion in the House of Commons alleging a lack of leadership in the government and also alleging that the government did not enjoy the support of the people of Canada. During the rest of that day and the next day, the Liberals (as well as other opposition parties) berated the government on its past indecision, its lack of leadership and the failure to honour its defence agreements as well as creating a deplorable situation vis-a-vis Canadian-U.S. relations. The Conservative Government found itself being attacked in all matters of its policy and was defeated on the fifth day of February.

C. Liberals elected as Government of Canada.

Although the Liberal Party was voted into office as the new Canadian Government in April, it was a minority government, receiving forty percent of the votes cast, and 131 seats out of a possible 265 in the House of Commons.

(4) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.111, 1962, page 3305.

Nevertheless it proceeded to sign an agreement with the United States providing for the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

Mr. Hellyer, who became Minister of National Defence in the new government, stated before a Special Committee on Defence in the House of Commons, the reasons why his party had decided to accept nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

"At this moment the active air defence is limited to the anti-bomber field, and a considerable effort is expended in this direction. If members of the committee recall statements I made when in opposition, you may wonder why I now support the use of some of our resources for this purpose. The opinions I expressed during the last few years were based on knowledge of the threat made available to us at that time—1959. The estimates have subsequently turned out to be incorrect. The rate of Soviet missile production anticipated at that time has not materialized. In consequence, the bomber threat remains at this date a very much larger proportion of the total threat than was expected." 5

(Mr. Hellyer never stated or admitted this lack of knowledge when he confidently criticized the Conservative Government for adopting the wrong policy in 1959 when the Bomarc announcement was made, nor did he admit this lack of knowledge in subsequent years of Conservative rule). This seemed to be at variance with American military policy which was outlined by U.S. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara prior to the April 1963 election when he stated that the bomber threat had almost been totally replaced by a possible missile attack, thus making the Bomarc all but obsolete. Mr. Hellyer also referred to General Kuter's speech which was delivered at a banquet of the Canadian International Air Show on September 1, 1961. Mr. Hellyer supported the General's statements on the necessity of destroying the enemy weapon as well as the weapon's carrier and this could only be done by a nuclear armed weapon.

(5) Special Committee on Defence, op. cit., pages 16-17.

By the end of the year, statements emanating from Ottawa clearly showed that Canada was prepared to defend Western Europe and this continent by accepting nuclear arms for its military forces. On December 20, an Interim Report of the Special Committee on Defence was issued recommending that we maintain our policies of support for United Nations peacekeeping operations, that we not produce nuclear weapons, and that we remain committed to NORAD as long as this continent was threatened with a possible bomber attack. The 75th point of the Report states,

"the advisability of providing the Bomarcas and the Voodoos with nuclear warheads would add to the effectiveness of the Voodoo and would give the Bomarcas a capability as a defensive weapon against bombers. They are of no use against a general range of ballistic missiles." 6

The nuclear warheads for the Bomarcas and Voodoos began entering Canada on New Year's Eve, December 31, 1963 and had all been installed and stored by the end of February 1964.

11. The N.D.P.

A. The N.D.P.'s position on nuclear arms in Canada, January 24, 1963.

Two weeks after the Liberal Party had decided to adopt nuclear warheads for the weapons which had already been acquired by Canadian defence forces, the New Democratic Party remained steadfastly rooted to its position of opposing nuclear weapons in the arsenal of Canadian defence forces. On January 24, 1963, Mr. Tommy Douglas, the national leader of the N.D.P. said in Parliament,

(6) Interim Report of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, Presented by Mr. Maurice Sauvé-Chairman, December 20, 1963, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1963, page 20.

"we maintain that Canada's best contribution to the peace of the world consists in refusing to acquire nuclear weapons for Canada's forces either at home or abroad. For Canada to become a nuclear power, no matter under what pretext, is to invite the growth of the world's nuclear club." 7

Mr. Douglas expressed the fear that if Canada should accept nuclear warheads from the United States, the Soviet Union may arm the forces of the neighbouring socialist states in a similar manner. This would lead to a situation of unchecked dissemination of nuclear weapons, thereby significantly endangering world peace. He said that the Liberal policy was illogical and he explained his position and that of his party to the House of Commons. He said that,

"acceptance of nuclear weapons by Canada is not a condition of our membership in NATO, as is evidenced by the fact that Denmark and Norway and some other countries have not accepted nuclear weapons...Canada's contribution...to the West's deterrent would be insignificant militarily, but it would do tremendous harm in proliferating the acquisition of nuclear arms and would therefore far offset any military value which might accrue." 8

Mr. Douglas favoured a strong Canadian contribution to disarmament rather than a contribution to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. After stating his party's position on the issue, he then asked the government for a clarification on the question of Canada making commitments in 1959 to accept weapons which they knew would be almost useless without the nuclear warheads. He also asked the government to explain the reason why it was spending a considerable amount of money on the CP-104 aircraft if it did not intend to acquire the nuclear weapons for these planes.

(7) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.111, 1962, page 3096.

(8) Ibid, page 3098.

Mr. Douglas did not confine his criticisms to the Conservative Party. He directed his wrath at the Liberal Party as well. In his parliamentary speech on January 24, 1963, he said,

"the leader of the Liberal Party has now committed his party to the acquiring of nuclear arms, and did so in a speech on January 12 at York-Scarborough Liberal convention. The talk of negotiating out afterwards was, in my opinion, just a sedative for the more disturbed members of the party who were protesting." 9

He said that this reversal of policy on the part of the Liberal Party did not make very much sense, especially when Mr. Pearson intimated that Canada would try to negotiate out of its commitments after fulfilling them. Mr. Douglas wanted Canada to cancel these commitments by means of negotiation before accepting the nuclear warheads.

B. Canada's NORAD role.

Mr. Douglas said that the threat of a bomber attack on North America had been replaced by the threat of a missile attack. He said there was no defence against this kind of an attack except the threat of a massive deterrent, and this was provided by the United States forces. Canada's role in NORAD should be one of contributing to the radar warning system of this continent as long as this system has some value.

On January 31, Mr. Douglas voiced his opposition to the statements made by the U.S. State Department. He said that Canadians should make their own defence policy, it should not be made by the U.S. State Department, and he resented the

(9) Ibid, page 3097. Mr. Pearson gave the impression that the Liberal Party disliked nuclear weapons being introduced into Canada, but was prepared to accept these weapons because of past commitments. After acquiring them and fulfilling our obligations, he suggested that Canada's defence policy should be examined and perhaps altered to a more realistic role for Canada, that of conventional forces. (Scarborough Speech, page 7)

United States meddling in Canada's internal affairs as it had done in Guatemala in 1954 and in Cuba in 1961. He deplored the fact that not only did the State Department criticize our Prime Minister but it also sought to pressure the Canadian people to urge the Diefenbaker Government to adopt a certain policy. After criticizing the U.S. State Department he then wanted to know the accuracy of the American statements. He asked the government to clarify for Parliament and for the people of Canada what obligations had been imposed upon Canada in past agreements.

On February 4, 1963, the N.D.P. announced that it would vote against the government in the non-confidence motion. Mr. David Lewis said that the country's commitments entailed Canada becoming a member of the nuclear club and this increased the danger of nuclear escalation. Also, Canada's commitments were out-dated and constituted a waste of the tax payer's money. On the day before the government was defeated, it was Mr. Lewis who outlined his party's policy which was later repeated during the election campaign. He said,

"these are the reasons why we oppose nuclear weapons in the hands of Canadian forces; it makes no material improvement in the defence position of the west. It does not, in effect, strengthen the western deterrent, but it does increase the nuclear club, increases the danger of nuclear war and increases the danger of escalation to total nuclear war if tactical nuclear weapons were used in Europe." 10

On February 5, 1963, Mr. Douglas addressed the government in a conciliatory mood. He said that the N.D.P. members of the House were not anxious to vote the Government out of office. Indeed, the N.D.P. would support the Government if it would introduce sensible and necessary legislation while

(10) Ibid., page 3418.

exercising proper leadership. As this was not the case, and as Parliament had been reduced to such impotence as to warrant the introduction of a motion of non-confidence, the N.D.P. was of the opinion that this was the time for the people of Canada to express their views at the polls. However, Mr. Douglas was eager to make it known that by voting for the motion of non-confidence against the Conservatives, it should not be construed that they were in any way giving the Liberal Party a vote of confidence.

C. N.D.P.'s 1963 election policies.

The pamphlet that was published by the N.D.P. during the 1963 election expressed the same views on Canadian defence policy as those expressed by the N.D.P. members in Parliament. The pamphlet stressed the party's policy of giving full support to the United Nations politically and militarily as well as in the form of allocating a permanent police force which would be at the disposal of the U.N. Secretariat. On the issue of nuclear weapons, the booklet stated that the N.D.P. was opposed to the idea of creating a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. With regard to nuclear weapons for continental defence, the pamphlet stated,

"the New Democratic Party believes that nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and in the hands of Canadian forces abroad add nothing to the security of Canada or of the Western World. They serve only to reduce the effectiveness of Canada's role in disarmament and to encourage the spread of nuclear weapons. The New Democratic Party, therefore, reiterates its position to nuclear weapons on our soil or for our forces anywhere and calls for the cancellation of the Government's plans to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead, Canada should immediately join with Norway, Sweden and other smaller countries to establish a non-nuclear club within the U.N. consisting of nations which undertake not to produce, stockpile, or permit on their soil nuclear weapons of any sort." 11

(11) The Federal Program of the New Democratic Party, op. cit., page 24.

Prior to the election in April 1963, the Canadian Saturday Night magazine asked the leaders of the four main political parties, what they would do first upon forming a Government. Mr. Douglas replied,

"my first act as a Prime Minister would be to investigate and make public the so-called nuclear commitments that the Diefenbaker government is reported to have made for Canada." 12

He said that an N.D.P. government would immediately negotiate out of any and all nuclear commitments. His reasons were; (1) both U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, and the Deputy Defence Secretary, Mr. Gilpatric, confirmed that the Bomarc missile does not serve as a means of defence or deterrence, (2) it was his belief that the spreading of nuclear weapons to nations which do not already have them, increases the likelihood of nuclear war. It was also his belief that Canada could make a more effective contribution to the defence of the Western world by contributing a highly mobile conventional force to NATO and the United Nations. (Even in the 1965 federal election, the policies of the N.D.P. remained the same. In the election programme issued by the party prior to the election, the fifth point in the section of International Affairs stated, "Canada will be opposed to the use of any kind of nuclear weapons, either by her own forces or on her own soil."¹³)

D. The N.D.P. and NATO.

The attitude of the N.D.P. towards Canadian forces in NATO acquiring nuclear warheads for the Honest John and Lacrosse missiles as well as for the CF-104 Starfighter

(12) Douglas, T.C., "What I Will Do When I Form a Government," Canadian Saturday Night, vol. 78, no. 4, Parkan Publications Limited, Toronto, April 1963, page 12.

(13) The Way Ahead for Canada, The New Democratic Party, Ottawa, 1965, page 15.

aircraft, closely paralleled its attitudes to Canada obtaining nuclear warheads for the Bomarcas and Voodoos. The N.D.P. did not differentiate between NATO and NORAD. This single policy on the acquisition of nuclear warheads was maintained throughout the nuclear arms crisis in Canada. One of the main reasons for the party's opposition to Canada acquiring nuclear warheads, was fear of the dissemination of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union to its allies. On January 24, 1963, in his speech during the supply debate for the Department of External Affairs, Mr. Douglas said,

"the two great dangers of tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO forces is summed up in the two terms now used in the military, namely escalation and proliferation." 14

Later on in his speech he said,

"we in the New Democratic Party believe that any proliferation, whether to independent nations or to NATO as a multinational nuclear power, would add immeasurably to the danger of nuclear war and should be resisted." 15

He once again stated that membership in NATO is not conditional upon accepting nuclear weapons, and he was of the opinion that Canada could adopt a conventional role in NATO as some other nations had done.

Mr. Brewin, in his book entitled, Stand on Guard, said that,

"the acquisition and use of nuclear arms by Canadian forces could only be justifiable if it were shown to make an effective contribution to the security of Canada and her allies in the Western Alliance and the peace of the world." 16

(14) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.111, 1962, page 3098.

(15) Ibid, page 3099.

(16) Brewin, Andrew, op. cit., page 126.

In Mr. Brown's opinion, the acquisition of nuclear warheads at that time would not contribute to world stability, nor would they serve any useful purpose. He expanded on these views in a speech in the House of Commons on January 25, 1963. In outlining his party's views as well as his own, he said,

"we say that for Canada to choose a nuclear role would be a foolish and a fatal step. In our view such a decision would be militarily useless, politically disastrous and morally unjustifiable." 17

He then explained what he meant by "morally unjustifiable."

"The reason I say that the adoption of nuclear weapons would be morally unjustifiable is that if, as I have argued, it is militarily unnecessary and politically disastrous, it would be morally wrong to pursue a course that adds to the danger of proliferation and spread of nuclear capacity and the dangers of its ultimate use." 18

Thus it can be seen that the N.D.P. policy towards Canada acquiring nuclear warheads for its NATO and NORAD roles, was one of firm opposition. In his speech criticizing the U.S. State Department for interfering in Canada's internal affairs, Mr. Douglas said that Canada should negotiate itself out of any nuclear commitments that have been made in NATO and NORAD. During the 1963 federal election campaign, the pamphlet describing the N.D.P.'s policies had as its ninth point on policy concerning international affairs, "Canada should oppose the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic alliance." 19 This still remains the policy followed by the New Democratic Party today.

(17) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 111, 1962, page 3141.

(18) Ibid, page 3143.

(19) The Way Ahead for Canada, op. cit., page 15.

111. The Social Credit Party.

A. The Social Credit Party and nuclear weapons.

On January 24, 1963, Mr. Robert Thompson, who was then the leader of the party having succeeded Solon Low, explained the party's position more emphatically than did Mr. Low. He said that Canada could adopt one of three policies. It could join the Eastern bloc of nations, it could become neutral, or it could join the Western bloc of nations. The first alternative was totally unreasonable. Neutrality, in his opinion, had no value, and he said that even Mr. Nehru, who had long supported a policy of neutrality in world affairs, had now seen the error of his ways. Our only choice was to join forces with the Western nations to counteract the immoral wars of liberation that were being perpetrated by the Communists. Mr. Thompson said that in order to fight against communism, Canada needs the best weapons available, whether they are nuclear or non-nuclear. But he distinguished between offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

In his speech in the House of Commons on that date, Mr. Thompson said,

"on behalf of my party I pledge that Social Credit will never adopt or support a defence policy whereby Canada adopts or makes use of offensive weapons of indiscriminate or uncontrollable mass destruction. Canada should indeed use its best efforts to promote the complete abandonment of this type of armament throughout the world, through effectively supervised multilateral international agreement." 20

Thus, Mr. Thompson, also expressed the desire for nuclear disarmament and he favoured the creation of modern, mobile, conventionally armed forces for Canada. He also believed in close military cooperation with the United States as did his predecessor. Furthermore, he favoured Canada assisting the United States in maintaining a strong deterrent against a

possible Soviet attack, including the participation in an anti-submarine force in cooperation with American forces.

On January 31, 1963, Mr. Thompson criticized the Government for not making a clear statement concerning its policy on nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. He was the only leader of a political party in the House of Commons that did not take strong exception to the communiqué issued by the U.S. State Department. While he didn't agree with the manner in which it was done, he didn't belabour the issue except to say that they had been obliged to clarify for us what our commitments were at the time.

On February 4, Mr. Thompson stated that his party was opposed to having an election at that crucial time. The resignation of the Defence Minister had added to the confusion, and Mr. Thompson thought it more important that the defence policy should be clarified and settled by a parliamentary committee rather than going to the people during this time of confusion and chaos. He quoted the editorial of the Toronto Globe and Mail of that day. It said,

"The government should make an honest statement on defence policy, from which we could move into reasonable negotiations with the United States..."

We ask the Prime Minister to forget politics and an election, and give us leadership." 21

Mr. Thompson added, "this is where we stand in the House of Commons at the present time."²²

However, on January 25, Mr. Caouette spoke in the House of Commons and his speech contradicted the statements made by Mr. Thompson. Mr. Caouette stated that his party was

(21) Ibid., page 3411.

(22) loc. cit.

(23) The differences of opinion between the two men were not confined to the issue of nuclear weapons. In the 1965 federal election, the party had split into the Social Credit Party led by Mr. Thompson, and the Ralliement des Creditistes, led by Mr. Caouette.

opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. He also said,

"instead of having launching pads for Bomarc missiles in the North Bay and La Macaza regions, why not have cold storage plants and grain elevators where we could store commodities to feed mankind and let the world enjoy them, unconditionally, in order to respect the freedom of the peoples as well as that of the families and the individuals, in our country and throughout the world." 24

While this speech may sound like one that would be made by a "left-wing pacifist," it was made by a member of Mr. Thompson's Social Credit Party, the same Mr. Thompson who had advocated that Canada acquire the most modern weapons available, be they nuclear or conventional. Mr. Caouette went on to say,

"we of the Social Credit are officially against nuclear arms, whether in Canada or outside the country. We are in favour of bread and butter, we are in favour of the hungry people in the world." 25

On February 5, Mr. Gilles Gregoire criticized the Liberal Party for its contradictory defence policy. He said that the Liberals opposed the spread of nuclear weapons but supported the acquisition of nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles. He added,

"the leader of the Liberal Party says: We are against atomic weapons, but we have given our word. Let us honour our commitments, let us accept atomic weapons and, afterwards, we shall do everything we can to get rid of them. That is the situation...Did you ever hear a more ridiculous argument coming from a statesman?" 26

Mr Gregoire, like Mr. Caouette, was opposed to Canada spending the tax payer's money to acquire these obsolete weapons. He was also opposed to their being acquired by Canadian forces for continental defence because the United States was to retain control over these weapons thereby allowing the United States to order the launching of a nuclear armed Bomarc missile from a Canadian site which was manned by Canadian military officers.

(24) Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol.111,1962, page 3140.

(25) loc. cit.

(26) Ibid, page 3455.

officers.

D. The Social Credit Party and NATO.

In regard to nuclear weapons being made available to Canadian troops serving with NATO, the Social Credit Party did not make any policy statements specifically relating to NATO. Most of its policy statements were concerned with the acquisition of nuclear weapons in general, or as they related to Canada's commitments to the North American defence. The party's platform published during the 1963 election campaign referred to nuclear weapons in a general way. The fifth point of the policy platform which was published in a one-page pamphlet stated that,

"a Social Credit Government would approve the adoption of defensive nuclear weapons found to be necessary for the defence of Canada and in conjunction with her allies in the defence of the western world." 27

At the same time the pamphlet, which resembled a one-page circular, stated that the party was opposed to Canada acquiring offensive weapons of mass destruction and that Canada must intensify its efforts in disarmament negotiations to ensure world peace. The party was in favour of arming Canadian forces with highly mobile and efficiently coordinated conventional defensive equipment. The party was also in favour of Canada contributing to world peace through the United Nations as were all Canadian political parties. Thus the policy put forward as being the official policy of the Social Credit Party was the policies enunciated by Robert Thompson and not those of R  al Caouette or Gilles G  goire. The party was, therefore, supporting the Liberal Party's position on the issue as it voted against the Government in the motion of non-confidence.

(27) The Time Has Come to Insure Canada's Future with a National Social Credit Policy, Social Credit Association of Canada, Ottawa, 1963.

IV. The Canadian Communist Party.

The Communist Party exerts little or no influence on Canadian defence policies, and although it gained less than one percent of the votes cast in the 1963 election, the author thought it best to include the views expressed by the party in the thesis. This was done because the aim of the thesis is to examine the varied opinions of Canadians towards the issue of nuclear weapons being placed in Canada, be they representative of the left, center or right position on the political spectrum.

On January 31, 1963, the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party issued a statement which criticized Mr. Pearson's reversal of policy. It criticized his policy for endangering the spread of nuclear weapons to many countries that did not then have them. The statement went on to say,

"Mr. Pearson's advocacy of nuclear arms now is a gross betrayal of the solemn commitment he made to the Canadian people during the course of the last federal election.

At that time he said on the basis of information available now the defense policy of a Liberal government would not require Canada to become a nuclear power by the manufacture, acquisition or use of nuclear weapons under Canadian or U.S. control....

The interests of Canada demand the rejection of nuclear arms. They must be kept out of the hands of NATO and NORAD generals. Canadians must not allow themselves to be duped by Liberal demagoguery about 'honouring our commitments.' This is nothing but a blind to cover up the conspiracy to put nuclear weapons on our soil." 28

During the election campaign, the Communist Party appealed to the N.D.P. to speak out vigorously against Canada

(28) The Canadian Tribune, published by the Canadian Tribune Publishing Association, Toronto, January 21, 1963.

acquiring nuclear weapons. A statement by the National Executive Committee of the party said,

"For our part we will redouble our work to arouse the people of Canada to assert their independence, to keep nuclear weapons out of Canada, to get out of the dangerous military alliance with the U A, to get out of NATO and NORAD, to fight in the United Nations for disarmament, peaceful coexistence and genuine world trade." 29

Such was the position taken by the Communist Party of Canada during the extreme crisis period in the nuclear weapons issue.

V. The Conservative Party, Government, and Cabinet revolt.

After the Cuban crisis and General Forster's speech on January 3, 1963, the Conservative Party once again found itself lacking a clear statement of policy and defending its past statements and actions (or lack of action) in parliament, against persistent Liberal Party accusations. The party was also troubled with internal dissension which resulted in the resignation of several Cabinet ministers. (The resignations of Douglas Harkness, George Hees, Pierre Sevigny, Davie Fulton, Donald Fleming and Ernest Halpinay, was an important factor in the Conservatives' inability to gain the confidence of the Canadian electorate. A government that cannot maintain the support of six Cabinet ministers could hardly be expected to gain the support of the people). Two weeks after Mr. Pearson's Scarborough speech, Parliament reconvened. Mr. Pearson promptly asked the government for a clear statement of its defence policy. Mr. Diefenbaker, in replying, praised his own party for maintaining a constant, unwavering policy in the

(29) Ibid., February 11, 1963.

field of defence, and he accused the Liberal Party of doing an about-face in its policy. But nearly four years after his February 20, 1959, speech, he still did not tell Canadians the two things they wanted to know. He did not say whether the Conservative Government was going to accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarcas. Nor did he explain how the problem of being assured there will be sufficient time to transport the warheads to Canada and make them operational, was to be solved, should Canada accept the weapons only if and when a crisis arose. Mr. Diefenbaker did state that the Canadian and United States Governments had been involved in negotiations for the preceding two or three months concerning a renegotiation of Bomarc defence plans, and in a speech he made at Brockville, the Prime Minister said that Canada did not intend to allow nuclear weapons to be spread to countries which did not then have them. This angered the United States Department of State to the point where they issued the Press Statement referred to earlier in the thesis. The Statement noted the role Canada was expected to play in the NORAD alliance. This role involved the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the Bomarcas and Voodocs and the Government's procrastination implied that our refusal to accept these warheads was an example of Canada reneging on its obligations. While most Canadians resented this American intrusion into Canadian domestic affairs, it nevertheless had the desired effect of making Canadians aware of tension existing between the Canadian and United States Governments and Mr. Diefenbaker's responsibilities for this situation. (This tension was later increased when Mr. Diefenbaker produced a letter which he alleged was signed by the American Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Dalton Butterworth. The letter contained a promise of American support both political and financial to the Liberal Party in the nuclear arms crisis and in the 1963 federal election. This letter was later regarded as having been a forgery). The existence of this tension provided the Liberals with another point in their arguments against lack of confidence in the

Conservative Government. (The Liberals have generally promoted close cooperation with the United States).

In the last hours of his Government, Mr. Diefenbaker naturally defended the past performance of his party and his own actions, saying that Canada had not refused to fulfil any obligations which had been imposed upon her and saying that his recent denunciation of the action of the U.S. State Department did not make him anti-American but rather, pro-Canadian. Nevertheless the die was cast and at 8:15 p.m. on February 5, 1963, the Conservative Government was defeated on a non-confidence motion by a vote of 142 to 111. (All of the Conservatives except Douglas Harkness, Art Smith and Edmund Morris voted with the government. The Conservatives did receive the support of two N.D.P. members, Colin Cameron and H.W. Herridge. The rest of the N.D.P. representatives, all of the Liberals and all Social Credit members voted against the government).

VI. Reaction of the Canadian public.

During the period of the nuclear arms crisis, the percentage of Canadians who were in favour of accepting nuclear weapons for Canadian forces constantly declined from 60.1% in November 1962 to 49% in June, 1963. However, the Canadian voters did not turn away from the Liberal Party and give their support to the Conservatives because of dissention within the Conservative Party, and due to the indecision of the Conservative Government on the nuclear arms issue. In a public opinion poll held on January 5, 1963, in which the people were asked to express their opinions of Mr. Diefenbaker, most of those who did not like him gave as their reason, his hesitancy to take a stand on many important issues. Thus, the Canadian public was caught in the dilemma of supporting a party whose leader procrastinated in making vital decisions, or supporting another party, whose leader boldly took a pro-nuclear stand, a stand now receiving less support from the

Canadian voters. In the end, the people denied giving a majority mandate to either party in the 1963 federal election.

VII. The press.

A. Reaction of the Canadian press, those in favour of nuclear weapons.

In 1963, the Calgary Herald did not agree with the argument put forth by some people, that by acquiring nuclear weapons, Canada would no longer have an effective voice when attempting to ease world tensions. The Herald was of the opinion that we must protect ourselves against the danger of an enemy attack. The paper solidly supported the Liberal Party in the 1963 election, saying,

"we hope Hon. Lester Pearson will reassert the Liberal party's new stand to be one of speedily honouring Canada's defence commitments, not after this country's defence policies have undergone long assessment and possible alteration, but before any such re-examination might be undertaken. The nation is entitled to the best security it can get-now." 30

It adopted Mr. Pearson's view that we must honour our obligations, one of these being, accepting tactical nuclear weapons. The paper was hopeful that the Liberals would form the next government for another reason. "Only a Liberal administration can hope to repair the vast damage Mr. Diefenbaker has done and is continuing to do to Canadian-US relations."³¹ There were other reasons why various newspapers supported the Liberal viewpoint.

The Globe and Mail was the only newspaper examined by the author that reversed its position on the nuclear arms issue. Although it is classified as an independent newspaper with a daily circulation of 241,472, (the second highest in Canada), it nevertheless does tend to support the Conservative

(30) Editorial, Calgary Herald, January 23, 1963.

(31) Ibid, March 27, 1963.

party.³² It was opposed to the acquisition of such weapons by this country in 1961. It felt that Canada should be concerned with building up its conventional forces to take part in any limited war that may erupt. On May 22, 1961, the paper clearly stated its position on the nuclear arms issue.

"In the view of this newspaper, the Government would be wise to abandon all thoughts of acquiring nuclear weapons. Their value for the defence of Canada in a nuclear war would be problematical, to say the least, and they would do Canada great damage in the eyes of the smaller and uncommitted nations of the world.

By joining the nuclear club, we should appear to many nations to have become a military satellite of the U.S., and our influence would be greatly diminished." 33

However, in 1963, the newspaper had switched its position to the other side of the nuclear debate. The paper now said that it was wrong to say that Mr. McNamara had written off the Bomarc as being useless. The editorial of March 30, 1963, stated that it was equally wrong for Canada to get rid of the Bomarc because they act as targets for enemy missiles.

"In the interests of Canadian safety, indeed, a good case could be made, on Mr. McNamara's evidence, for moving U.S. Bomarc bases away from the heavily populated areas of the U.S. side of the border and into the Canadian north land." 34

Thus, rather than advocating the disengagement of the Bomarc sites, as could be expected from its stand taken in 1961, the Globe and Mail was now advocating a more intensive participation on Canada's part in continental defence, even to the point of accepting nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles.

In Montreal, the major English language newspaper, the Montreal Star, is the fifth most widely read newspaper in Canada having a circulation of 183,169. It supported Canada's

(32) Ayer, J.W., op. cit., page 1216.

(33) Editorial, Globe and Mail, May 22, 1961.

(34) Ibid, March 30, 1963.

close cooperation with the United States even though our contribution to the joint defence of North America, was a small one.

"It is true that, if the attack takes place, the Canadian contribution, nuclear weapons included, will be small. Canada cannot, in any real sense, defend itself in such a war. But we should ask ourselves whether it is more desirable to play even some small role, or none at all." 35

The Star was of the opinion that the United States has the ominous task of defending the "free" world against communist aggression. The United States, therefore, has a right to expect its allies to honour the commitments which they made in order to help the U.S. in its task. It is Canada's duty to honour its commitment to accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles. Among the French language newspapers, the main Montreal newspapers, La Presse and Le Devoir, were opposed to Canada's acquiring nuclear weapons. The Montréal Matin, the two Quebec newspapers and La Voix de L'Est of Grandby as well as Le Droit, in Ottawa, all of which have a much smaller circulation than the Montreal French papers, all favoured nuclear weapons being placed in the hands of Canadian soldiers and airmen. Their reasons varied from the necessity of being armed with modern weapons in the event of an attack to the necessity of honouring our commitments. Le Soleil, one of the Quebec City newspapers, favoured Mr. Pearson's choice of sharing nuclear weapons rather than having Canada manufacture them. The Montréal Matin expressed another reason for Canada acquiring nuclear warheads. The paper said,

"we might as well decide on them right away, unless our country chooses to declare itself officially neutral, which is unthinkable in today's circumstances." 36

(35) Editorial, The Montreal Star, January 25, 1963.

(36) ~~Canada~~ translation in the Montreal Star, January 14, 1963.

From Canada's Eastern provinces, the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, which is widely distributed throughout the Maritimes, having a daily circulation of almost 70,000 readers, lent its support to the policies advocated by Mr. Pearson and the Liberal Party. The Herald said that it approved Mr. Pearson's policies not only because the paper thought they were correct but also because the Canadian voter now had a clear choice of what party to vote for, now that the two main political parties had taken opposite sides of the debate. The editorial of January 15, 1963 stated in part, "as far as the correctness of this policy now offered by the Liberals in this regard, there can be no doubt."³⁷ The Herald said the present Government policy had weakened Canada's defence posture and involved this nation in wasteful expenditures. The paper deplored our failure to honour our commitments and it emphasized the fact that the nuclear weapons were defensive. Therefore, the Herald felt that we projected no threat to any nation, we were only protecting ourselves against a possible attack. The paper did not think that the acquisition of these weapons constituted a radical shift in our defence policy. "Indeed, by acquiring the warheads for these weapons, we would only make plain overtly what we are, in fact, more or less covertly."³⁸ Thus, the paper dismissed the moral aspect of this issue as not being involved or harmed in any way as we had been selling uranium to the United States for many years in order that they could manufacture nuclear weapons.

The newspaper L'Evenement, which is Quebec City's morning newspaper which is read by 5,000 more people than is the evening paper, Le Soleil, put forth its idea as to why

(37) Editorial, Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 15, 1963.

(38) Ibid, January 18, 1963.

Canada's NATO forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons. A few days after Mr. Pearson's Scarborough speech, the paper said,

"by choosing to join the Atlantic Alliance we almost implicitly committed ourselves to go along with the evolution under way in the field of armament." 39

These were the arguments put forth by some of the Canadian newspapers which supported Canada acquiring nuclear weapons. Their reasons given were; the necessity of honouring our commitments, the need to maintain a close working alliance with the United States defence forces, and the necessity of having the most modern weapons for our forces if they are to effectively contribute to the defence of North America. The reasons given by those who opposed the introduction of nuclear weapons into Canada will now be examined.

B. Newspapers that opposed nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

In 1963 the Vancouver Sun said that conventionally armed Canadian forces could still fulfil its military commitments as a responsible ally, while its people will not feel burdened by the presence of nuclear weapons on its soil or in the hands of its defence forces. The paper said that should disarmament negotiations fail, this would not constitute a valid reason for Canada to accept nuclear weapons. The Sun wanted proof of the necessity and usefulness of these weapons before it would agree that Canada should acquire them. On January 23, 1963, the paper said,

"the Sun has maintained that the advantages of acquiring these terrible weapons, in a world already overstocked with them, require proof. We have not yet seen the proof." 40

(39) The Montreal Star, January 14, 1963. The Star quoted and translated excerpts from various French Canadian papers.

(40) Editorial, Vancouver Sun, January 23, 1963.

The Toronto Star opposed the acquisition of nuclear weapons into Canada, during the 1963 federal election, for several reasons. First, it questioned the usefulness of the Bomarcas and the Voodoos. The paper said that these weapons were practically obsolete in 1959, and their usefulness had declined even more through the passing years. Canada should be increasing the strength of its conventional forces in NATO as was being advocated by the United States. Secondly, it doubted Mr. Pearson's statements about Canada having made formal commitments to accept nuclear weapons. But the Star said, should this be the case, it did not view Mr. Pearson's idea of accepting them now and getting rid of them later as being a logical solution. The paper felt that if Canada did make a commitment, it should renegotiate our contractual obligations without first accepting the weapons. Thirdly, the Star felt that the additional firepower of nuclear armed Bomarcas and Voodoos in the continental defence forces, would be minute in comparison with American firepower. Its editorial of February 20, 1963, stated in part,

"To sum up, Canada's 'going nuclear' would promise no appreciable military gain either in North America or in Europe. It would accentuate a trend which threatens to make any European war a nuclear war." 41

The Canadian Tribune, which is the newspaper of the Canadian Communist Party, also opposed the idea of a nuclear armed Canada. The paper said that Mr. Pearson's policy of accepting nuclear weapons now, so that we may honour our commitments, and, in the near future, negotiate out of having nuclear weapons on our soil, was an impossible task to achieve. The Tribune was of the opinion that once we joined the nuclear club, the possibility of resigning from it was practically nil. In an article written by Nelson Clarke, the

(41) Editorial, Toronto Star, February 20, 1963.

national organizer of the Canadian Communist Party, he said,

"Canada must reject nuclear weapons for the sake of world peace.

The danger of war increases in direct proportion to the extent to which nuclear arms are spread about the world." 42

Two weeks later, an editorial of the Tribune urged the people of Canada to vote for the Communist, or New Democratic parties, the only parties who were determined to save Canada from taking this country down the path of nuclear suicide. It dismissed the Conservative and Social Credit parties as being unable to offer a definite policy to the Canadian people. The paper also stated that they serve the same interests as the Liberal Party. The Liberals came under the strongest attack. The paper accused the Liberals of being puppets of the American military policy makers.

"The Liberal Party has come out openly as the spokesman for Washington and the Pentagon, hoping no doubt that their well-oiled election machine (aided by the floodtide of cold war propaganda from the regular sources, especially from south of the border) will confuse the people enough to put them in power." 43

Not all newspapers which opposed the Liberal Party's policy of accepting nuclear weapons were as vehement in their criticisms of the Liberals as was the Canadian Tribune. The Ottawa Citizen was aware that Canada had committed itself to accepting nuclear weapons but it felt that these weapons no longer made any meaningful contribution to the defence of the continent. (This paper was chosen because it is the larger of the two English newspapers of Canada's capital city, having a circulation of 76,467 readers). The paper was hesitant to take

(42) Clarke, Nelson, "For Sake of World Peace, National Independence, We Must Reject Nuclear Arms," The Canadian Tribune, January 21, 1963.

(43) Editorial, Canadian Tribune, February 4, 1963.

a precise stand but it did give a hint as to its opinion, when it stated,

"...this newspaper is not yet convinced that Canada's best contribution to NATO and NORAD can be made through the acquisition of nuclear weapons rather than through a greater concentration of Canada's relatively limited resources on the strengthening of the country's conventional forces." 44

However, the views expressed by the French-Canadian papers were more vehement. While La Presse was glad that one of the major parties had now adopted a clear policy on the issue, it was not in accord with that policy. La Presse is the most widely read French language newspaper in the province of Quebec, having a circulation of 196,592. It wanted to know,

"comment notre pays, qui s'opposait l'an dernier encore à la dissémination des armes nucléaires, pourra-t-il exhorter d'autres pays à refuser ces armes, une fois qu'il les possèdera lui-même, en Europe et sur son propre territoire?

Non, Mr. Pearson, nous ne sommes pas d'accord. Et pourtant, nous nous étions réjouis de votre prix Nobel de la paix." 45

Le Devoir, which has a daily circulation of a little more than 41,000 copies, was of the opinion that the Bomarcos did not contribute any added security to the North American continent and it analyzed the policies put forth by the major parties, saying that only the V.D.P. had a clear stable policy on the issue. The paper criticized Mr. Pearson's policy of contracting out of our obligations after we honour them. This criticism continued long after the 1963 election. In December 1963 the newspaper once again stated,

(44) Editorial, Ottawa Citizen, January 14, 1963.

(45) Editorial, La Presse, January 15, 1963.

"L'armement nucléaire des forces canadiennes et les fusées installées sur notre territoire ne peuvent donner avoir qu'une influence bien marginal dans cette situation, et ne sauraient justifier un geste aussi redoutable de la part d'un pays qui jusqu'ici n'avait jamais accepté ces armes." 46

Even as late as April 1964, Le Devoir was reminding Prime Minister Pearson of what he had said during the 1963 federal election campaign concerning nuclear warheads for the Bomarc.

"Le premier ministre avait déjà exprimé son intention de libérer le Canada des armes nucléaires; il prétendait avoir été contraint de les accepter à cause d'un engagement de M. Diefenbaker que ce dernier niait. Mais tout cela est resté bien vague et enveloppé de contradictions; car, pourquoi accepter des armes nucléaires qu'on n'a pas encore si l'on veut s'en débarrasser?" 47

Finally, from the Maritimes, comes a note of opposition from the Guardian, in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. This paper ranks as the twenty-third most widely read newspaper in Canada, having a following of 16,012 readers. The Guardian was also concerned about limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which did not then have them. It, like the Toronto Star, did not see the necessity of honouring outmoded commitments. In its editorial of January 28, 1963, the newspaper said,

"we go along with those who believe that Canada can contribute to the cause of peace by NOT becoming a member of the nuclear club, and by helping to limit the spread of these weapons....To commit us to any other course at this time, under any pretext of honouring 'commitments' which, if ever made, are outmoded by the grim facts of the situation, would be criminal irresponsibility." 48

To list briefly the reasons given by various newspapers for their opposition to Canada acquiring nuclear

(46) Editorial, Le Devoir, December 18, 1963.

(47) Ibid., April 21, 1964.

(48) Editorial, The Guardian, January 28, 1963.

weapons, they are; that it would not make any appreciable difference for the security of the North American continent, that our accepting these weapons may lead to their dissemination in other nations of the world, that the Bomarc and Voodocs are obsolete, that we should be increasing our conventional strength, and finally, our relationship with other middle and non-aligned powers, as well as the smaller nations may be affected adversely.

C. Newspapers opposed to a Canadian NATO nuclear role.

The Winnipeg Tribune, advocated in January 1963, that the NATO alliance should prepare itself for a non-nuclear defensive role. It favoured a Canadian NATO role of providing a highly mobile conventional force. As in the VERAF debate, the paper repeated its belief that the acceptance of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces would increase the danger of their proliferation to other nations. "In our view Canada could make a contribution to adjusting the balance between nuclear and conventional arms in the Western alliance."⁴⁹

While the Toronto Star echoed the sentiments of the Ottawa Citizen, in that Canada should remain in NATO, it nevertheless did not favour our acquiring nuclear weapons. In May 1961, the newspaper supported the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards. The Committee circulated a petition entitled, "No nuclear weapons for Canada." This stand was maintained throughout the following turbulent two years. In January 1963, it advocated that Mr. Diefenbaker renegotiate our position in NATO so that we could play a non-nuclear role in the alliance. However, the Star still favoured our remaining in the alliance. Its position was,

(49) Editorial, Winnipeg Tribune, January 15, 1963.

"we believe Canada is--and must remain--an integral part of the Western alliance. Apart from our own self-interest, this nation's history and geographical position make this inescapable.

But we believe there is an honourable and substantial role for conventional Canadian forces without resorting to nuclear arms." 50

A little further on in the editorial the Star said, "surely the role for Canada is clear. It is to do everything we can to help deter nuclear war, to stop the spread of nuclear arms, to work for nuclear disarmament, while at the same time meeting our responsibilities as a member of the Western alliance.

This newspaper believes more strongly than ever, that we can pursue these objectives more effectively by refusing to accept nuclear arms." 51

Two weeks after the defeat of the Conservative Government, the Star took the same view of nuclear Honest John, Lacrosse and Conie missiles as it did with the nuclear armed Bomarc. The paper said that such weapons were superfluous because,

"the United States already has more than enough nuclear power to deter any Soviet nuclear invasion of Europe... and its Polaris submarines will soon be able to hit any part of the immense land area of the Communist bloc." 52

It can be seen, that the reasons expressed in the Bomarc debate were repeated when the newspapers discussed the problem of accepting nuclear warheads for Canada's defensive weapons. Very often, the views expressed by the newspapers with regard to the Bomarc missile, also reflected the paper's attitudes to the nuclear NATO dilemma, even though reference to Canada's NATO forces and weapons was mentioned only sparingly.

(50) Editorial, Toronto Star, January 10, 1963.

(51) loc. cit.

(52) Ibid., February 20, 1963.

D. Periodicals.

All eight Canadian periodicals which the author examined, (Maclean's, Canadian Dimension, Canadian Commentator, Canadian Forum, Canada Month, Saturday Night, Reader's Digest and Our Generation Against Nuclear War), were classified as being independent of any political leanings, by the 1967 Ayer Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals. However, the author would like to inform the reader that both the Canada Month and Canadian Commentator periodicals tend to be conservative in their outlook. Canadian Dimension, on the other hand, tends to support the socialist philosophy and is somewhat sympathetic to the New Democratic Party. Of the eight periodicals, only one, the Canada Month periodical, expressed a desire to have Canadian forces equipped with nuclear weapons. Another periodical contained articles which expressed both sides of the nuclear debate. One periodical did not issue any statements or take any stand on the nuclear arms crisis, and the five remaining periodicals were opposed to the Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons. In January 1963, Canada Month had an editorial which said,

"only nuclear warheads in North America's defense armament could destroy enemy nuclear warheads before they destroyed North America.

Canada must arm its defense weapons with nuclear warheads." 53

This was the only periodical that took a pro-nuclear stand on the issue.

In the March 9, 1963, edition of Maclean's magazine, an editorial written by Ken Lefolli, one of the magazine's

(53) "Why Nuclear Arms," Canada Month,
January 1963, vol.3, no.1, Canada Week Ltd., Montreal,
page 4.

associate editors, echoed the sentiments expressed by Mr. Simon in an article in Maclean's magazine, eight months before. (See chapter three, section one). He was in favour of arming the Bomarcas and Voodocs with conventional weapons and he said there was no reason why this could not be done with the CF-104 Starfighter aircraft. He said this should be done as a nuclear armed Voodoo would be useless in a conventional war. He also said that Canada could more easily renegotiate its commitments with regard to nuclear weapons, as the U.S. military authorities were then urging its allies to strengthen their conventional forces.

On November 8th, 9th, and 10th, 1962, the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, held a Proposals for Peace Lobby in Ottawa. The periodical, Our Generation Against Nuclear War, was (and still is), a strong supporter of these organizations. The magazine was of the opinion that Canada should constantly strive to ease world tensions and pursue constructive steps toward disarmament. In its Fall 1962 edition, it urged the Canadian Government to "reject categorically the possession, use or control of nuclear weapons, by Canadian forces at home or abroad."⁵⁴ The periodical, which acted as a spokesman for the above named pacifist groups also advocated that Canada should introduce a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly, which would make Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East, atom-free zones. It should be mentioned, that the periodical has little influence on Canadian political affairs, having a circulation

(54) Our Generation Against Nuclear War, Fall 1962, vol.2, no.1, "Proposals for the Lobby in Ottawa by the CCND, CUOND, Nov.8th, 9th and 10th, 1962," Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Montreal, page 6.

of only 1,500.

Saturday Night magazine is one of the more widely read Canadian periodicals, publishing more than 90,000 copies each month. It was opposed to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons because they added little to the over-all defence of this continent. In an article written by Mr. John Gellner, he stated,

"this magazine and this writer have always been opposed to the acquisition by Canada of nuclear weapons, because we believed, and believe, that whatever military advantages may be derived from having them (and we still cannot see what they are), they are far outweighed by the political disadvantages, domestic and international." 55

Mr. Gellner was concerned about our future relations with the smaller nations should we become more closely allied with the United States by accepting their nuclear missiles.

The editor of Canadian Dimension, Mr. C.W. Gonick, said in an editorial, that Canada could have renegotiated its commitments with respect to acquiring nuclear warheads for the Bomarcas and other missiles, before having accepted the warheads. He referred to Mr. Pearson's announcement on August 16, 1963 that Canada and the United States had signed an agreement on nuclear weapons, as being out of touch with reality. Mr. Gonick said,

"It is indeed ironical that Canada should assume a nuclear role in the western defence system only a few weeks after signing the partial test-ban treaty. Surely the Prime Minister, a Nobel Peace Prize Winner, must see that his policies are out of time with the possible turn towards peace which the recent treaty may augur.

Not only is the Pearson policy inconsistent with international developments, it adds nothing to the defence of the West, even assuming that deterrence provides a reliable defence against nuclear war." 56

(55) Gellner, John, "Filling in Parliament on the Future War," Saturday Night, August 1963, vol.78, no.7, Saturday Night Publications Ltd., Toronto, page 10.

(56) Gonick, C.W., "Nuclear Arms for Canada," Canadian Dimension, May 1964, vol.1, no.1 & 2, Canadian Dimension, Winnipeg, page 4.

The Canadian Forum is not a widely read periodical, publishing only 2,210 copies of its monthly edition. The attitude taken by this magazine on the nuclear arms issue was ambiguous. It made no statements of any value on the issue. If it is in total agreement with an article printed in its March 1963 edition, then its stand was very evasive and non-committal. Mr. Eugene Forsey, the Director of Research for the Canadian Labour Congress, said in the article that Canada should wait awhile before making any decision. Apparently Dr. Forsey was not disturbed by the fact that Canada had been avoiding making any decision on nuclear weapons for the past four years. He said,

"'Doing something' is not always wiser than waiting. No one in Canada wants to have anything to do with 'these horrible things' (as Mr. Nehru calls them) if we can avoid it. With new strategic ideas rapidly emerging which may very soon make our acceptance of nuclear weapons at least a waste of money, is it really so foolish to wait a little till the facts become clearer?" 57

The Reader's Digest informed the author that it did not issue any statements or pamphlets on what was a vital issue in Canadian politics.

The editorials and articles featured in the above named periodicals gave the same reasons as those given by the newspapers as to why Canada should or should not equip its military forces with nuclear weapons. Although the periodicals which opposed a Canadian nuclear role gave as the reasons for their stand; the uselessness of the weapons, the need to build up the strength of our conventional forces, and the political disadvantages of accepting nuclear weapons vis-a-vis our relations with the small and neutral nations of the world, they supported their stand with more facts and

(57) Forsey, Eugene, "The Political Crisis," The Canadian Forum, March 1963, vol. XLIII, no. 506, Canadian Forum Limited, Toronto, page 266.

detailed information than did the newspapers. Thus, for example, Mr. Simon explained how the Bomarc could be equipped with a conventional warhead and how their accuracy could be improved, when it was believed that no such warheads existed for the Bomarc B. Furthermore, while the principal newspapers of this country were almost equally divided on the nuclear arms debate, the Canadian periodicals were overwhelmingly opposed to Canada adopting a nuclear role.

The role of the press in a democratic society is one of adequately reporting facts as objectively as possible to its readers. In this way it helps to shape and guide public opinion, and its views, in turn, may also be shaped by the opinion of its readers. Thus there is the element of "feedback." The same situation should exist between the press and the government, each taking account of the other's opinions. In the Bomarc issue, it has been shown that the major newspapers in the nation were split almost evenly on the pro and anti-nuclear sides of the debate. The effect that the newspapers had on the Canadian political parties and the Canadian electorate will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

1. Political Analysis.

A. Canadian public opinion in the Bomarc crisis and the 1963 election.

This study has analyzed Canadian defence policies from 1945-1963, the positions adopted by the main political parties regarding the defence policies, and the attempts of newspapers, periodicals, and influential people to have the Canadian people support or reject a certain policy, notably the Bomarc policy. It would seem that by the time the government was defeated on February 5, 1963, the people of Canada were deeply divided on the problem of whether Canada should accept nuclear weapons. This can be shown by examining three public opinion polls conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion between September 1961 and June 1963. The Institute asked the following question and received the following answers.

TABLE NUMBER SIX¹

Just from what you know or have heard, in your opinion should Canada's armed forces be armed with nuclear weapons, or not?

	September 1961	December 1962	June 1963
Yes	60.1%	54%	49%
No	30.4	32	32
Qualified	1.5	6	4
No Opinion	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	100.0%	100%	100%

(1) Figures from CIPO polls of September 1961, December 1962, and June 1963.

B. Conservatives and public opinion.

The Conservatives appear to have ignored public opinion. This was prevalent all through the four years that the Conservatives were in power during the nuclear arms debate. Neither the Conservative Party, nor the Conservative Government, took a stand on the issue when, in September 1961, a CIPO poll indicated that 60% of the Canadian voters were in favour of Canada acquiring nuclear weapons. After disregarding this sentiment expressed by the Canadian people in public opinion polls, the Conservatives neglected to capitalize on the change of Canadian opinion only eighteen months later. Although the number of people who opposed Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons still represented a minority viewpoint (32%) those people who were in favour of nuclear weapons being placed in the hands of Canada's military forces were decreasing. More and more people had reservations on this important issue. In contrast to the Liberal Party, the Conservatives could not lead, nor could they respond to public opinion.

Although Mr. Diefenbaker was the leader of a government which enjoyed the largest Parliamentary majority in the history of the Canadian House of Commons, he was unable to enunciate decisions on many major issues. The loss of ninety-two seats in the 1962 federal election left him unsure of himself and his party's policies. He was reluctant to make decisions, more so than was the case during the previous four years. There are several reasons for this.

One reason was his relationship with Quebec. The Conservative Party has always done poorly in federal elections in the province of Quebec. It was only in 1958, when Premier Duplessis put the Union Nationale Party's organization to work for the Conservatives, that Diefenbaker received fifty representatives out of seventy-five from the province, more than any other former Conservative Prime Minister. Paul

Sauvé, Mr. Duplessis' successor, was eager to improve relations with Mr. Diefenbaker and improve relations between the two parties as well. This would not have hurt the Tories at the time, as both English and French Quebecers had a great admiration for Premier Sauvé. However Paul Sauvé died after only a little more than three months in office and an election was called in 1960 after Antonio Barrette succeeded Mr. Sauvé. The election was won by the Liberal Party and Jean Lesage became the Premier of Quebec.

"What Lesage set out to accomplish was nothing less than to create a situation in which the English—in fact and not just in theory—would accept the French-Canadian concept of Canada as a nation that is not a homogeneous entity but the political home of two quite separate though not necessarily incompatible societies." 2

This idea was in contrast to Diefenbaker's concept of "unhyphenated Canadianism." Relations between the Quebec and federal governments, as well as between English and French speaking Canadians began to deteriorate. The French-Canadians regarded Diefenbaker as a man not capable of comprehending the ideological upheaval taking place in Quebec, and they switched their votes to the Liberal and Social Credit Parties. In 1962, the Conservatives received 29.6% of the Quebec votes as compared to 49.6% in 1958.³

Mr. Diefenbaker was also disturbed by the fact that many newspapers which had supported him in the 1957 and 1958 election campaigns, now condemned him for mismanagement of governmental affairs, and for his inability to make clear decisions on important issues. There was a gradual breakdown

(2) Newman, Peter, op. cit., page 281.

(3) In 1962, the Conservatives obtained 29.6% of the vote but only 18.7% of the 75 seats; the Liberals, 39.2% of the vote and 46.6% of the seats; the N.D.P. 4.4% of the vote but no seats; and the Socreds, 26.0% of the vote and 34.7% of the seats. (In 1958 the Conservatives obtained 49.6% of the vote and 66.6% of the seats). Meisel, (ed), ... Papers on the 1962 election, page 273.

in the relationship between Diefenbaker and the press since the 1955 election. This was due to Diefenbaker's assertions from time to time, that any statement which had appeared in the press which embarrassed the government, was due to inaccurate reporting of the facts, or misquoting those people who made the disparaging comments. An example of this was Paul Henri-Spaak's statement that NORAL was not part of NATO. Diefenbaker said, "it is apparent that the interpretation given in the press is not in accordance with the statement made by Mr. Spaak."⁴ A similar instance occurred with the press using the text of a speech made by Mr. Lees at a meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council in Accra, Ghana, in the autumn of 1961. Mr. Lees urged that Great Britain not join the European Economic Community. When editorial opinion in Canada began to condemn Canada's stand, Diefenbaker blamed the press for allegedly reporting discussions which took place behind closed doors. By 1962, the Edmonton Journal, the Toronto Telegram and the Montreal Gazette were no longer supporting the government as they had done in the past.

"The Globe and Mail, which had been a voice of Canadian Conservatism for a generation, called Diefenbaker 'unfit to lead the Conservative Party...for the sake of the Party and the country, he should give up the leadership!'" ⁵

In the autumn of 1962, the Canadian people were made fully aware of the indecision that existed within the government and especially with the Prime Minister. The Cuban crisis of October 1962 made the Canadian people aware that the Conservative Government had made commitments in the field of defence, which it had not met.

(4) Newman, Peter, op. cit., page 233.

(5) Ibid., page 247.

"When this was revealed, some of his own ministers turned against him and staged a coup d'état to rid the Party of his (Diefenbaker's) leadership.

The revolt did not succeed, but it did split the Conservative Party, bringing about the resignation of some key ministers, and it ended the life of the 25th Parliament." 6

On January 25, 1963, Prime Minister Diefenbaker said in a speech in the House of Commons,

"More and more the nuclear deterrent is becoming of such a nature that more nuclear arms will add nothing material to our defence." 7

Mr. Harkness, the Canadian defence minister, interpreted the above statement as signifying Diefenbaker's pledge to have Canada accept nuclear weapons. When this did not prove to be the case, he threatened to resign if, in the next election campaign, the Conservative Party programme did not contain a pledge to accept nuclear weapons. He hoped that Canada would announce the acceptance of these weapons at the NATO ministerial meeting which was due to be held in Ottawa in May of that year. At a Cabinet meeting on February 1, it became clear that Diefenbaker had no intention of making any such announcement at the NATO conference. On February 3, at the Prime Minister's official residence, Harkness' patience ended and he attacked Diefenbaker for his indecision on such an important matter. He followed his verbal attack by announcing his resignation. On February 7, George Hees and Pierre Sevigny resigned from the Cabinet. During the election campaign, Dave Fulton, Donald Fleming, and Ernest Halpenny also resigned their positions. Although they gave various reasons for doing so, the real reasons were the refusal, or inability of John Diefenbaker to pronounce a clear statement of the Government's defence policies, and their unwillingness to take part in an

(6) Ibid., pages 333-334.

(7) Ibid., page 361.

election which was somewhat anti-American. (The anti-Americanism stemmed from the United States State Department's communiqué which criticized Canada for hesitating to act during the Cuban crisis.

"Diefenbaker claimed...that his hesitation had been based on the failure of the United States to consult Canada in advance about the proposed action—a procedure that is specified in the NORAD agreement.") 8

It should be noted here, that Diefenbaker's antagonism towards the United States Government did not originate with the State Department's communiqué. The personal relationship between Diefenbaker and Kennedy was most likely the stormiest relationship that ever existed between any Canadian Prime Minister and United States President. When Mr. Kennedy journeyed to Ottawa in 1961 (May 16-18), he placed a paper before Mr. Diefenbaker in which he asked for Diefenbaker's support on five subjects. Mr. Diefenbaker took a pen and wrote "No" beside each request. During the visit, the American President mislaid his personal working paper entitled, What We Want from the Ottawa Trip. The Americans were asking Canada to give more foreign aid to India, to join the Organization of American States, and to support the Alliance for Progress. In addition, they were also asking Canada to place stricter controls on the Communists in Laos and in South Vietnam. The memorandum came into Diefenbaker's possession, but instead of returning it, or copying it and returning it, he used the paper as a threat against the United States President. He accused President Kennedy of interfering in Canadian affairs and he threatened to use the document in the 1962 federal election. Although Livingston Merchant, the American ambassador to Canada, and Mr. Diefenbaker later agreed that the document would not be used

(8) Ibid, page 339.

in the election, it nevertheless did become public knowledge in an article written by Charles Lynch on March 27, 1963. President Kennedy's dislike for Prime Minister Diefenbaker, led him to agree that Lou Harris, a successful public opinion analyst, should work for the Liberal Party in the 1962 and 1963 elections in an effort to oust Diefenbaker from power.

C. Liberals and public opinion.

It can be seen from Table 6, that while there was no increase between 1962 and 1963 in the percentage of those who opposed nuclear weapons for Canadian forces, the percentage of those who were in favour of such a policy was constantly declining although still in the majority when Mr. Pearson and the Liberal Party decided to accept nuclear weapons. On January 12, 1963, Mr. Pearson said,

"as a Canadian, I am ashamed if we accept commitments and then refuse to discharge them. In acting thus, we deceive ourselves, we let our armed forces down, and betray our allies." 9

It would seem that,

"Pearson's personal aversion in the acquisition of nuclear warheads was outbalanced by his conviction that international commitments, once pledged, must be discharged." 10

The commitment to which Mr. Pearson referred, was the acceptance of nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missile to which the Conservative Government had agreed in 1959. Mr. Pearson implied that as he was a Canadian, and as he was ashamed of Canada's reluctance to accept its responsibilities, that he was expressing the feeling shared by most Canadians.

(9) Text of an address by the Honourable Lester B. Pearson, P.C., M.P., Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, Delivered at a Luncheon meeting of York-Scarborough Liberal Association, Toronto, Ontario, Jan. 12, 1963, p.5.

(10) Newman, Peter, op. cit., page 396.

The Liberal policy-makers, the small, elite body of individuals who are responsible for decision-making at the highest level of the party infra-structure, seemed to take the position of knowing all the wishes and desires of the Canadian people. It would appear that they were not too concerned about the declining number of Canadians who were in favour of adopting nuclear arms as this segment of the population still formed a majority opinion.

Another reason for Mr. Pearson's reversal of policy was his desire to ease the tension which had been created between Canada and the United States over the nuclear weapons issue. His desire to appease those Liberals who still opposed Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and his hope that Canada may one day free itself from its nuclear commitments, led him to introduce the "re-negotiation" clause as part of his acceptance of nuclear weapons. Because Canadians were dissatisfied with the lack of decision-making on the part of the Conservative Government, and due to the increasing tension between the Conservatives and the aspirations of the French Canadians over language and constitutional rights, the Liberals were of the opinion that their policies would attract a majority of the electorate in the next federal election. However, it would seem that one of the most important issues to Mr. Pearson and the Liberals, was the fulfillment of Canada's obligations to accept nuclear weapons. In their endeavour to get elected and have Canadian armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons the Liberal Party received unofficial help from the President of the United States.

There was no ill feeling between Mr. Pearson and Mr. Kennedy as there was between Messrs. Diefenbaker and Kennedy. When President Kennedy had invited the Nobel Prize winners of the western hemisphere to a dinner in Washington on April 29, 1962, a photograph which appeared in the press had shown the President and Mr. Pearson descending the White House steps together. This honour which had been paid to Mr. Pearson, showed the friendship that existed between the two men, while

at the same time, worsening the already ill-feelings that Diefenbaker had for Kennedy. Because of the personal relationship that existed between Kennedy and the two Canadian statesmen as well as the different policies espoused by Messrs. Diefenbaker and Pearson, the American President and other influential members of the United States Government were eager to see Mr. Pearson become Prime Minister of Canada.

"As his personal contribution towards the defeat of the Canadian politician, Diefenbaker, he gave his unofficial blessing to Lou Harris—the shrewd public opinion analyst who had tested the trends so effectively for him during the 1960 presidential campaign—to work for Canada's Liberal Party." 11

Mr. Harris spent a lot of time with the Liberal Party organization during the 1962 and 1963 election campaigns. His knowledge and assistance, "were considered key contributions to the Liberal victory of 1963." 12

The decision of the Liberal Party to accept nuclear weapons produced two important results. First, as the Liberal Party was prepared to make this policy an election issue, and as they were eager to get enough votes to allow them to be elected into office, they did not allow the fact that there was a declining majority of the electorate who were in favour of nuclear weapons, to change the Party's position on this issue. It would appear, therefore, that the switch in the Liberal Party's policy was due to outside pressure, most likely the United States military officials, especially in view of the fact that the Liberal's reversal of policy came only nine days after General Norstad's speech advocating that Canada accept nuclear weapons. Second, in view of the fact that the Liberals attempted to counter the trend in public opinion on nuclear arms by stressing the importance of Canada fulfilling its obligations (accepting nuclear weapons), albeit

(11) Ibid, page 267.

(12) loc. cit.

with the hope of possibly negotiating ourselves out of the nuclear arms commitment in the future, the Liberal Party was aware of the shift in Canadian opinion, and it was trying to bend Canadian opinion to its way of thinking. Tommy Douglas, was not far wrong when he said that the Liberal policy of accepting the weapons now, and negotiating out of our commitments later was a sedative to those Liberals who voiced their opposition to the policy. (see Chapter Seven, page 119).

D. The minor parties and public opinion.

Only the New Democratic Party maintained a consistent negative policy on the issue. Having very little chance of being voted into office, the N.D.P. could afford to adopt a stand that might not appeal to a majority of Canadian voters. It could be said that the N.D.P.'s opposition to nuclear weapons was one of principle. If this is so, it could also be said that the N.D.P. considered adherence to the principles (of socialism) as being more important than adhering to the desires of the people.

The Social Credit Party, like the N.L.P. had very little chance of being elected as the next government of Canada. Unlike the N.D.P., the party was split between the Thompson and the Caouette factions. Mr. Thompson and most, if not all of the Western Social Crediters were in favour of Canada acquiring defensive nuclear weapons, while Mr. Caouette and most of the French Canadian Social Crediters were opposed to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons of any kind. However, this split was not confined to the Bomarc issue alone, and it did not affect the party's chances of being elected into office. There is no evidence that the author could find to suggest that the Social Credit Party formulated its policies with regard to the Bomarc issue on the basis of the opinions expressed by the Canadian public.

11. Conclusion.

After World War One, Canada had obtained representation at the League of Nations which, for the first time, indicated Canada's independence of Great Britain in the field of foreign affairs. In subsequent years, Canadian Governments were eager to establish diplomatic offices in various countries throughout the world. By the late 1920's, legations had been established in Washington, Paris and Tokyo. After the Second World War, Canada embarked upon a policy of increasing its diplomatic missions and taking an active part in world affairs through the United Nations Organization. However, when it became evident that the U.N. was not capable of solving the world's problems as had been originally hoped, and with the threat of Soviet expansionism through military and subversive means, the Canadian Government looked for some other kind of organization which could maintain peace in the world. The thesis has examined Canada's participation in two military alliances, with special attention to the problem of Canada accepting nuclear weapons for its forces, as part of the obligations incurred by belonging to NATO and NORAD. The thesis has concentrated on the reaction of the major Canadian political parties, as well as newspaper, periodical and public opinion on the issue of Canada acquiring nuclear weapons. In concluding the thesis, the author would like to briefly review the actions of the major Canadian political parties on this important issue.

The Conservative Party represented the Government of Canada throughout the nuclear crisis. In August 1957, a short time after the Conservatives were elected into power, they were faced with the problem of whether Canada should or should not participate in the NORAD defence alliance. Most of the details of the alliance had been settled previously by the Chiefs of Staff of both nations. Thus, when the Conservatives came to power, they were urged to accept the idea of NORAD and

the plans that had been already established. In retrospect, it would seem that the Conservative Government agreed to have Canada participate in NORAD without adequate knowledge of the consequences of this decision. Throughout the Conservative's tenure of office, they were criticized by the opposition parties and by the press concerning NORAD's relationship with NATO, the powers of the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD vis-a-vis the American commander-in-chief, and the loss of Canadian sovereignty over the ability to make defence policy and the ability to control the movement of its air force. The Conservatives attempted to convince their critics that NORAD was a regional command of NATO, but to no avail. The denial of this statement by Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, the Secretary-General of NATO, did nothing to inspire the confidence of the Canadian people in the Conservative Government.

In 1959, due to the increasing cost of producing the CF-105 Avro Arrow jet interceptor aircraft, and also because of the diminishing threat of a Soviet bomber attack on this continent and its replacement of the possibility of a Soviet missile threat, the Conservative Government cancelled the production of the Avro Arrow. Prime Minister Diefenbaker said in a speech to the House of Commons on February 20, 1959, that the Canadian Government was going to scrap the Arrow programme in favour of acquiring American-made, unmanned, Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles which required nuclear warheads in order for them to be fully effective. He said at the time that this decision was taken in order to maintain Canada's commitment to contribute to the defence of the Western world, and that the Government was heeding the best military advice available. The abruptness in scrapping the Arrow programme, and the increased reliance on American military weapons, created resentment in the Canadian press towards the Conservatives. On May 25, 1959, Mr. Diefenbaker announced that non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons were being transferred to Canada. It was expected that an announcement of the transfer of nuclear warheads for these weapons would follow shortly.

However, for the next four years, the Conservative Government hesitated in accepting nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles and the Voodoo jet interceptors which were also acquired by the Conservative Government in the face of strong criticism by some of the major Canadian newspapers and the opposition parties.

From time to time, the government gave different reasons for its hesitation in accepting nuclear weapons. One reason was that should the Canadian Government accept nuclear warheads, the disarmament negotiations at Geneva may have been affected adversely. Another reason was a difference of opinion between Canadian and American officials as to whether or not the Canadian Government must give its approval before a nuclear armed Bomarc could be launched. Furthermore, the Conservative Government, and especially the Conservative Cabinet, was split over the issue of accepting nuclear weapons. The split closely paralleled the speeches given by President Kennedy and General Kuter in 1961. President Kennedy urged his NATO allies to concentrate on increasing its conventional forces in keeping with the new concept of a graduated scale of warfare. Conservative Cabinet Ministers who were opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons seized this speech by President Kennedy as the reason why Canada should reject the use of all nuclear weapons. However, a few months later, General Laurence S. Kuter, the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, denied that the threat of a Soviet bomber attack against this continent was a thing of the past, therefore justifying the necessity of arming the Bomarcs with nuclear warheads. This dilemma was never resolved by the Conservative Cabinet, and it proved to be one of the factors in the Conservative's loss of power in the 1963 federal election. A fourth reason for the Government's lack of decisive policy formation in matters of defence was the government's loss of ninety-two seats in the 1962 federal election. It would appear that after such a devastating blow, the Conservative Government, and especially Mr. Diefenbaker, were both unable

or unwilling to enunciate a definite defence policy lest it lose support among the party's stalwarts.

The Conservative Government was constantly being questioned about its acceptance of the Bomarc and Voodoos, but its refusal to accept the nuclear warheads for these weapons which Mr. Diefenbaker had admitted on February 20, 1959, were necessary in order that these weapons be made fully effective. Mr. Diefenbaker now stated that the Canadian Government would accept the nuclear warheads if and when they were needed. This concept of defence strategy was shattered due to the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962. The indecision and inaction of the Canadian Government to take the necessary measures during this crisis, resulted in an unfriendly relationship between the Canadian and United States Governments. This tension was increased after General Norstad's speech of January 3, 1963 in which he stated that Canada had definitely committed itself to accepting nuclear weapons, and that since that time, it had failed to meet its obligations. When Mr. Diefenbaker replied by saying that Canada was opposed to the spread of nuclear arms to nations which did not then have them, this angered the American officials to the point where the U.S. State Department issued a communiqué stating Canada's role in Western defence. This role included the acceptance of nuclear weapons. Relations between the Canadian and United States Governments were at a new low. They were lowered even further when Mr. Diefenbaker produced a letter which he alleged had been signed by Mr. Butterworth, the American ambassador to Canada. The letter contained a promise of American support to the Liberal Party during the 1963 election. This degeneration in diplomatic relations between the two countries, as well as Mr. Diefenbaker's anti-American remarks in his campaign speeches (which he declared were not anti-American but rather pro-Canadian) did much to alienate the Canadian voters.

It would seem that the Conservatives did not pay close attention to the opinions expressed by prominent individuals,

news media, or public opinion. In the early 1960's, public opinion gave the Conservative Government a clear mandate to accept nuclear weapons. Those newspapers and periodicals which opposed this policy were not as vociferous, nor did they have the support of the people to the extent that they did in 1963. Although the government stated that it was accepting the Bomarcas on the best military advice available, including the advice of General Charles Foulkes, the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff until 1960, the government was also aware of the necessity of accepting the nuclear warheads as well. However the Conservatives seemed to have dismissed this important advice from its military advisers, and it appeared to have ignored the sentiments of the people, that these warheads be accepted. The Conservatives repeatedly brushed aside the opposition's pleas and demands that they (the Conservatives) tell Parliament, and the people of Canada, exactly what our commitments are, and what defence policy Canada is to follow. This "credibility gap" between the Government and the people, was responsible for the people's distrust and unhappiness with the Conservative Government. The Canadian people, not having been told of our commitments and what our defensive role in the NORAD and NATO alliances were to be, were shocked to suddenly discover on January 3, 1963, that Canada, had indeed, obligated itself in the past to accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarcas and Voodocs. (Until then Canadians felt that Canada should accept such weapons as part of our contribution to the defence of the Western world. They were not fully aware that Canada had been obligated to do so and had failed to fulfil its commitments). This lack of decision, procrastination, hesitation, and in the end, open disagreement among Conservative Cabinet members, had lost the confidence of the people and of the press. It should be noted that since 1958, relations between Mr. Diefenbaker and the press had deteriorated due to the Prime Minister's repeated accusations and charges that articles which appeared in the press which were unfavourable to the Government, were either

devoid of factual content, or they were misinterpretations of statements made by Mr. Diefenbaker and other government ministers.

While Canadian newspapers and periodicals were voicing increasing opposition to Canada accepting nuclear weapons, it is difficult to analyze the effect that these news media had in contributing to the trend in Canadian opinion away from the former strong endorsement of accepting these weapons. It should be remembered that at the time 50% of the Canadian public favoured a Canadian nuclear policy, and when only 49% still strongly adhered to this stand, the division among the seventeen newspapers that the author examined remained fairly constant with one exception, the Globe and Mail. Of all the newspapers and periodicals that the author examined, the circulation of those papers and periodicals that opposed Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons was greater than those who favoured nuclear weapons. However, an important point to note, is that several influential newspapers such as the Montreal Gazette, the Ottawa Journal and the Globe and Mail, among others, who habitually had supported the Conservatives in the past, were now urging Mr. Diefenbaker to resign. The Globe and Mail stated that he was unfit to lead the party. When it became apparent that Mr. Diefenbaker was not going to resign, these newspapers urged the Canadian electorate to vote for the Liberal Party, not because they favoured the policies of the Liberals, but because the editors of these newspapers were of the opinion that Canada was in need of a strong, stable government, and they felt that only the Liberal Party was capable of providing Canada with effective leadership.

Thus it can be seen, that after six years of ineffective leadership, lack of decision making in matters of defence, and the inability to adhere to the public's wishes or to keep the public informed, led to a lack of confidence among the Canadian press, and more important, among the Canadian electorate. Although the Bomarc issue was not the only election

issue in the 1963 campaign, the inability or unwillingness of the Conservative Party and the Conservative Government to obey the dictates of the Canadian people, led to its downfall from power. In the 1963 campaign, the Conservatives were content to hold on to their power in Western and Eastern Canada, and to regain some support in Ontario. Due to deteriorating relations between the Federal and Quebec Governments, the Conservatives did not concentrate too intensively in attempting to woo the French Quebec electorate. They hoped that they would be able to form a majority government if they could increase their representation in Ontario, while maintaining their hold on the prairie and Maritime provinces. It is obvious that political parties are concerned with the mood and aspirations of the electorate, however, it would seem that the Conservatives due to their lack of policy and decision-making in matters of defence and nuclear weapons, were not giving serious attention to the electorate's loss of confidence in their administration. Their indecision and lack of policy did not represent the actions of a responsible political party acting as the government of the people, for the people and by the people. This fact was made known to them in the federal election of April, 1963.

The Liberal Party, while in opposition throughout the nuclear arms crisis, was in power when preliminary talks were taking place between Canadian and United States military officials, concerning the creation of NORAD. General Foulkes testified before the Special Committee on Defence in 1963, that at the time of the 1957 federal election, the only remaining stumbling block to the formal acceptance of NORAD by the Liberal Party, was the problem of financing its operation. The Liberal Government was prepared to examine that problem immediately after the federal election. Thus, it would seem that the Liberals were prepared to accept a defensive military alliance with the United States that would result in close military cooperation between the two nations. However, the final acceptance of the NORAD agreement was the

responsibility of the Conservative Government. For the next four and one-half years, the Liberals constantly berated the government for its lack of a defence policy, or accused it of not considering Canada's best interests in matters of defence.

The first criticism put forth by the Liberals concerned the manner in which the Conservative Government presented the bill asking for Parliament's approval of NORAD. The Liberals were displeased that Parliament was given very little opportunity to discuss the merits and demerits of the bill, and they were also displeased that the bill did not come before a Defence Committee which would be capable of discussing the proposed legislation. After the bill was passed, (the Liberals voted for the bill), the Liberals then concentrated their attacks on the contents of the bill. Specifically, they attempted to discover whether NORAD was a regional command of NATO, or whether it was a separate military alliance, entirely outside the command structure of NATO. The Liberals seemed to favour NORAD being part of NATO, but were never convinced that this was true, despite Conservative assurances that it is the case. The statement made by the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Paul Henri Spahn that NATO was definitely not a regional command of NATO, embarrassed the government and discomfited the Liberals by having their worst fears substantiated. The Liberals favoured collective control over nuclear weapons, rather than having the authority for using these weapons left to the leading decision-makers of one nation. The Liberal's refusal to accept nuclear armed Bombers and Voodocs was based largely on their policy of collective control of nuclear weapons, as well as their doubts about the usefulness of these weapons. Throughout the Conservative administration the Liberals were not satisfied with Canada's position and role in NORAD. This was probably due to the fact that the Liberals were not fully aware of the contents of the NORAD agreement with respect to its organizational and command structure. The Conservative replies to opposition demands of outlining the function and power of

the Canadian deputy commander vis-a-vis the American commander-in-chief of NORAD, did nothing to satisfy the opposition, and it did not provide them with the information which they desired to acquire. The Liberals were concerned with a loss of Canadian sovereignty in matters of defence, especially with regard to the fact that an American military officer could possibly order the launching of an anti-aircraft missile which was situated on Canadian soil. Closely akin to the problem of attempting to discover the role and powers of the Canadian deputy commander, the Liberals were also anxious to know the powers of the Canadian Prime Minister vis-a-vis the President of the United States and the American commander-in-chief of NORAD, with respect to the launching of the Bomarc missiles from a Canadian base. The Liberals, as well as the rest of the nation, did not have a clear concept of the powers of the Canadian Prime Minister. They wanted to know if the Canadian Prime Minister must consent to the launching of the Bomarc, before the "fire" button would be pressed. On several occasions Mr. Diefenbaker stated that the need for approval of both the Canadian and American Governments was what constituted one aspect of the joint defence of the North American continent. However, due to conflicting statements made by the NORAD commander-in-chief, General Partridge, the Liberals were not convinced that the Conservatives were fully knowledgeable about the actual powers of the Canadian Prime Minister with regard to NORAD during a crisis.

Until January 1963, the Liberals doubted the usefulness of nuclear armed Bomarc and Voodoos. The Liberal Party's defence critic, Mr. Hellyer, as well as Mr. Pearson, constantly questioned the value of nuclear weapons in the hands of Canadian military forces, and their contribution to the defence of the North American continent. They pointed out that the threat of a Soviet bomber attack was dwindling, and due to the introduction of the "stand off" bomb, Soviet bombers could fire these weapons at Canadian targets while remaining out of

range of the Bomarc missiles. The Liberals went so far as to disassociate Canada from taking part in a defence of the deterrent. In reply to Mr. Diefenbaker's speech of February 29, 1959, Mr. Pearson said that the role of deterrence is an American responsibility.

In 1961, President Kennedy urged the Western nations to increase its conventional forces. It was this role that the Liberals favoured for Canada and they urged the Conservative Government to accept a defence role similar to that which existed prior to 1957. This would involve the maintenance of a well-equipped, conventional armed military force in NATO, and a role of warning the United States of an impending Soviet attack on this continent from the direction of the North Pole. Mr. Hellyer accused the Conservative Government of accepting second-rate weapons from the United States. This accusation was made after Mr. Hellyer examined a list of military items in which the American Government was spending large sums of money. The Bomarc, Voodoos, F-104 fighters, and the latest John Birchall surface-to-surface rockets were not among the weapons which were mentioned on the list of priority weapons. The opposition to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons for its defence forces, and the desire that all nuclear weapons assigned to NATO forces come under the collective control of the UN Council, was the stand taken by the Liberal Party throughout 1951 and 1952.

On January 5, 1963, General Macdonald, the retired Chief Commander-in-Chief stated at a press conference in Ottawa that Canada had committed itself to accepting nuclear weapons and that it had failed to meet these commitments. Five days later, at a speech addressed to the York-Scarborough Liberal Association, Mr. Pearson announced that the Liberal Party would accept nuclear weapons for Canada, thereby fulfilling this nation's commitments. This was a complete reversal of the party's policy over the past five years. Mr. Pearson and the Liberal Party now abandoned the idea of collective security over nuclear weapons as a

prerequisite for Canada accepting them for its NATO forces. Mr. Pearson stated that by being a member of the NATO alliance, Canada had automatically committed itself to accepting nuclear weapons for its NATO military forces. The 1962 election platform in which the Bomarcas were regarded as useless weapons, was now radically altered to the opposite viewpoint. The party also intended to ignore Mr. Hellyer's speeches in the House of Commons that Canada was a dumping ground for second-rate American weapons. (Shortly after the 1963 election, Mr. Hellyer stated before the Special Committee on Defence that the opinions which he had expressed while a member of the opposition party, were based on inaccurate knowledge concerning the possibility of a Soviet bomber attack on the North American continent).

It would seem logical, and politically wise, for the Liberal Party to denounce the Conservative Government for failing to meet its commitments and at the same time, remain steadfast in its opposition to such weapons based on its past statements and criticisms of these weapons in the House of Commons and in the press. Instead, the Liberals shifted their position, and advocated Canada's acceptance of nuclear weapons, thus championing the cause put forth by General Norstad. It would seem that the Liberals may have changed their policy due to pressures from foreign sources. Mr. Pearson said that it was not a simple task for Canada to alter its policies or commitments because the weapons had already been transferred to Canada, but he never gave any reason for this statement. Instead, he and the Liberal Party attempted to convince the Canadian electorate during the 1963 federal election campaign, of the importance of Canada fulfilling its international commitments, and the necessity of having strong and stable leadership in Ottawa. The Liberal Party also announced that it would attempt to negotiate Canada out of its nuclear commitments as soon as possible. This policy was adopted for three reasons. First, it was adopted to placate the members of the Liberal Party who found the sudden reversal of policy

unacceptable to them, and in order to prevent open dissention and splits within the Liberal Party, this re-negotiation clause was inserted into the party's policies on the nuclear weapons issue. Secondly, a Liberal survey in the province of Quebec showed that in the twenty-six constituencies which had Social Credit representation in the last Parliament, the Social Credit support had declined. However, the Quebec wing of the Social Credit Party was opposed to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons and a lot of French-Canadians supported this policy. In an attempt to capture the support of discontented Social Credit supporters, and to appeal to their dislike of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, the Liberal Party promised to re-negotiate out of our commitments as soon as it was feasible to do so. The task of wooing former Social Credit supporters into the Liberal fold was given to Mr. Yvon Dupuis. Thirdly, there was a trend among Canadians that was resulting in a more cautious approval of nuclear weapons for Canada's military forces. Although a majority of Canadians still favoured Canada acquiring nuclear arms, the Canadian people did not endorse this policy as strongly in December 1962 as they did in September 1961. (The Liberal Government concluded an agreement with the United States Government by means of an exchange of notes on August 16, 1963, for the transfer of nuclear warheads to Canada. A public opinion poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion on June 5, 1963, showed that only 49% of the people questioned, strongly favoured Canada accepting nuclear weapons, although another 4% of the sample gave qualified answers. While there was no increase in the percentage of those who opposed nuclear weapons between December 1962 and June 1963, the percentage of those people who had no opinion increased by 7%).

Although the Liberals were elected into office, it cannot be said that this was proof that the Canadian people favoured the Liberal's nuclear policy. There are several reasons for this. First, the Liberal Party polled only 41.7% of the popular vote. Secondly, the lack of any clear policy

by the Conservative Party or the Conservative Government, to counteract the pro-nuclear policy of the Liberals, was also responsible for the demise of Mr. Diefenbaker and his government. However, the nuclear weapons issue, while one of the most important issues in the 1963 election, was not the sole issue.

Another issue in the 1963 election was the question of Quebec's powers and position in Canada vis-a-vis the powers of the federal government. Some concern was expressed concerning the future of Confederation and Quebec's place within Confederation during Canada's second century of existence as an independent nation. In Quebec, it was felt that the Liberals were more sympathetic to Quebec's aspirations, and offered greater hope that English and French-Canadians would continue to coexist side by side in harmony, than would otherwise be the case should the Conservatives be elected as the Government. The result of this was that the Conservatives received only eight out of seventy-five Quebec seats in the House of Commons, and the percentage of the party's proportion of the popular vote dropped from 29.6% to 19.5% between the 1962 and 1963 federal elections.

Of all the major political parties in Canada, the one which maintained the most consistent policy on the nuclear arms issue was the C.C.F.-N.D.P. The C.C.F. had opposed Canada's participation in NORAD, and the close military cooperation with the United States that resulted from this alliance. It favoured Canada playing a prominent role in the United Nations peacekeeping forces, and by maintaining a highly mobile conventional force in NATO. The N.D.P. maintained these policies after its founding convention, stating that by joining NORAD, Canada had become a military satellite of the United States, its Bomarc sites were useless and served only as a target for Soviet missiles, and that membership in NATO was not incumbent upon accepting nuclear weapons. While the party was eager to increase its representation in the House of Commons, it did not have much possibility of

being elected as the Government of Canada, and therefore could afford to have a policy which did not appeal to a majority of the Canadian people. However in 1963, the New Democratic Party stressed its opposition to nuclear weapons in Canada in the hope of bringing dissonant Liberals (and Conservatives) into the fold. In Quebec, the N.D.P. strongly stressed its opposition to nuclear weapons, and received some support from *La Presse* and *Le Devoir*. While it increased its support in Quebec, no N.D.P. members were elected from that province.

The Social Credit Party was not represented in the House of Commons for the critical years of the nuclear arms debate, 1958 to 1962. In the 1962 federal election, thirty Social Credit Party candidates were elected to the House of Commons. Most of the M.P.s came from Quebec. Messrs. Caouette and Grégoire repeatedly stated their opposition in the House of Commons, to Canada acquiring any nuclear weapons for its military forces. The other French-Canadian Social Credit M.P.s shared this view. However, Mr. Thompson, the leader of the party, and the other Social Credit M.P.s from Western Canada, were in favour of Canada accepting defensive nuclear weapons for its NORAD and NATO forces. The 1963 election campaign platform that was published by the Social Credit Party, endorsed Mr. Thompson's policies on the nuclear arms issue. While the Social Credit Party lost six seats in Quebec, it is the opinion of the author that this loss was due mainly to the disillusionment that the people felt towards the party's ability to influence governmental decisions, rather than its stand on nuclear weapons.

In summation, it can be seen that the Conservative Party and the Conservative Government had been unable to cope with the commitments which it accepted by agreeing to participate in NORAD in 1958. For the next five years, the Conservatives consistently were unable or unwilling to provide to the opposition parties, the Canadian press, and the Canadian people, a clear defence policy, and a definite

answer as to when the nuclear warheads for the Bomarcas would be accepted by the Canadian Government. The Conservatives, throughout their stay in office, lacked the temerity to clearly state their acceptance or rejection of nuclear weapons partly due to the inability of Prime Minister Diefenbaker to make up his mind on the issue, and partly due to the serious difference of opinion on this issue which existed in the Cabinet. Consequently, the Conservatives saw their support among the Canadian press and the Canadian people decline lower and lower and were unable to counter this lack of confidence that the people had in them.

The Liberals, on the other hand, could be said to have been more conscious of public opinion as they attempted to capitalize on the Canadian people's dislike for the Conservative Party and attempting to capture the votes of the disillusioned Social Credit Party supporters in Quebec. However it would seem that they were not intent on listening to public opinion in every case, but rather, in the nuclear weapons issue, they were opposing the trend in Canadian public opinion by adopting a pro-nuclear policy to serve the interests of the United States, at a time when support for such a policy was held by a decreasing majority of Canadians. By reversing its policy of the past four years only nine days after General Norstad's speech, and due to Mr. Pearson's personal relationship with Mr. Kennedy and the support that the Liberal Party received from American sources, it would seem that the Liberal Party's stand on the nuclear weapons issue was not taken with the aim of considering the interests of Canadian public opinion alone, but also to please the interests of the United States Government.

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