

**NEW WAYS OF WORKING?
CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY WITHIN
OTTAWA'S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK**

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ABSTRACT

Over the past few decades, there has been a shift in crime control discourses, from an almost exclusive focus on traditional criminal justice objectives and practices, to attention to ‘community’ and a range of strategies that seek to prevent crime and increase safety. Overall, evaluations of the community mobilization approach to crime prevention and safety conclude that these initiatives have generally demonstrated limited long-term impacts on ‘crime’ and safety at the local level. Through the ‘what works’ lens, the limits of the approach have typically been attributed to implementation challenges related to outreach and mobilization, and inadequate resourcing. Through a more critical lens, using studies on *governmentality* as a starting point, this study examines the mechanisms through which crime prevention and community safety became thinkable as sites of governance in Canada, and more specifically within the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa (ON). To this end, I conducted an *ethnography* using a triangulation of data collection methods, including extensive fieldwork and direct participant observation within the CDF. The findings of this ethnography describe in detail how the CDF emerged and unfolded (from 2008 to 2010) from a variety of perspectives. These findings show that the CDF encountered a number of common challenges associated with program implementation and community-based evaluation. However, the lack of progress made towards adhering to CDF principles and reaching CDF goals cannot be reduced to these failures alone. The CDF highlights the importance of locating the community approach to crime prevention within its wider socio-political context, and of paying attention to its numerous ‘messy actualities’. These include the dynamics and repercussions of: governing at a distance and of the dispersal of social control; the neoliberal creation and responsabilization of choice-makers; relations of power, knowledge and the nature of expertise; the messiness of the notion of ‘community’; bureaucratic imperatives and professional interests; the words versus deeds of community policing; and processes relevant to resistance within current arrangements.

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INTRODUCTION

New Times with a New Terrain: Community Governance of Crime and Safety

Over the past few decades, there has been a shift in crime control discourses, from an almost exclusive focus on the criminal justice goals of catching, prosecuting and sanctioning offenders, to attention to a range of strategies that seek to prevent crime, reduce crime, and/or increase safety (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 2009; Garland, 2001; Hughes, 2007). The terms ‘crime prevention’, ‘crime reduction’ and ‘community safety’ are all used within this shift, though the similarities and differences between these three approaches are not always well described or understood¹ (see Ellsworth, 2011). As Hastings and Jamieson (2001: 28) point out, the term crime prevention today is often used loosely to refer to “the reduction of crime and victimization and the improvement in individual and community safety and security”.² Regardless of the specific term(s) used, one of the most salient features of this shift in crime control discourses is the appeal being made to ‘community’.

Building on Cohen’s (1985: 116) analysis of the dominance of ‘community’ within western crime control discourses in the mid-1980s, Hughes (2007: 7) argues:

In contemporary Anglophone societies, it is almost impossible to avoid hearing the word ‘community’ being used in policy and political debates and discourses regarding questions of what is to be done about problems of crime and disorder and concomitant preventive and safety-focussed solutions... It is no exaggeration to observe at the start of the twenty-first century that the influence and pervasiveness of appeals to community in the increasingly

¹ In general, the terms ‘crime prevention’ and ‘crime reduction’ are used to refer to any anticipatory, reactive, and/or remedial strategy, by an individual or group, public or private, which attempts to diminish the number of criminal events and the consequences of crime. ‘Community safety’, on the other hand, tends to refer more broadly to the absence of harms, and focuses on strategies aimed at improving order and feelings and perceptions of safety (Clancy, 2006; Ellsworth, 2011).

² In this work, the phrase ‘crime control and safety’ and ‘crime prevention and community safety’ are used to refer to the discourses on these broad notions as an ensemble.

inter-meshed domains of crime control and safety/security discourses internationally has developed at a staggering pace.

However, the meaning of the word *community* in contemporary crime control and safety discourses is not always well defined (Jamieson, 2008; Skogan, 1988; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002: 165), and there is little consensus as to what this term actually connotes³ (Shaw, 2001).

Nonetheless, there are generally two perspectives on the role of community within crime control and safety. With roots in the Chicago School studies of the early 20th Century (e.g., Anderson, 1928; Shaw & McKay, 1942), the first perspective sees community as both a cause of, and solution to, issues of crime and safety. It conceives of community as a powerful symbol, an aspiration, or *ideal condition* we should foster or create in order to defend ourselves against crime and restore order (Brint, 2001; Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1999; Rose, 1996; Sampson, 2002). At the heart of this conception lies a set of relationships and specific types of social relations. It often refers to a ‘sense of community’ and more specifically to notions of a sense of belonging, sense of ownership, community cohesion, community organization/disorganization, and informal social control (see Hirschfield & Bowers, 1997; Jamieson, 2008; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997; Wedlock, 2006). The second perspective sees community as an *essential means* through which to govern crime, a powerful site of intervention and/or a key delivery agent of intervention and control (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997; Rose, 1996). It can refer to a specific geographical area (i.e., a school, a neighbourhood), a specific group of agencies/organizations (i.e., the youth services sector; private sector), and/or a specific group of people (i.e., women; religious groups; New Canadians).

³ In this work, when not otherwise specified, the word ‘community’ on its own is used to denote that which lies outside of the realm of the police, courts and corrections, also jointly referred to as the criminal justice system.

These two uses of ‘community’ within crime control and safety discourses are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they can often be intertwined in complex ways. This is indeed the case in what is referred to as the *community approach to crime prevention and safety*, which focuses on addressing community-level ‘risk factors’ (i.e., community disorganization, lack of community cohesion, low sense of ownership, lack of community involvement with or trust in local institutions) and on building relationships among residents (i.e., neighbours), and between residents and service providers, including police. The goal of the community approach is to develop local capacity and mobilize community members for action and change (Hastings and Jamieson, 2001; Jamieson, 2008). This approach is the main focus of study for this research. In Chapter 1, I describe the community approach to crime prevention and safety in more detail and situate it within larger discourses on crime prevention.

Overall, evaluations of the community approach to crime prevention and safety, both in Canada and elsewhere, conclude that these initiatives have generally fallen short of their expected outcomes. They have demonstrated limited impacts on delinquency, crime and victimization at the local level, and negligible long-term impacts on fear of crime and feelings of safety (see Cherney & Sutton, 2007; Crawford, 2009; Jamieson, 2008; Rosenbaum, 1988; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002). The limited ability of the community approach to crime prevention and safety to demonstrate lasting impacts at the local level has generally been attributed to implementation problems related to a lack of human, technical and/or financial resources, and to a lack of time to demonstrate results (see Rosenbaum, 1988; Schneider, 2007; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002).

Crime Control and Safety within the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa

The *Community Development Framework (CDF)* initiative launched by the City of Ottawa in the spring of 2008 is an interesting illustration of the trends described above. The CDF is presented as a “new way of working”, a place-based community development initiative intentionally designed to support both neighbourhood capacity building and system-level organizational change in order to address neighbourhood issues more effectively (Kanellakos, 2008). Its guiding principles are collaboration, coordination, the active participation of the community, and the leveraging of resources (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Introduction”). It seeks a common approach across the city to addressing local needs through community engagement, needs assessment, prioritization, planning, implementation, and community-based evaluation (Kanellakos, 2008). The five goals of the CDF are (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Introduction”):

1. Increase neighbourhood capacity to enact positive change.
2. Improve planning and service delivery to achieve neighbourhood-defined goals.
3. Improve health of individual residents and their neighbourhood.
4. ***Increase neighbourhood safety and perceptions of safety.***
(emphasis added)
5. Promote sustainability of positive change at the neighbourhood and system levels.

The CDF began implementation in four pilot neighbourhoods in Ottawa the early spring of 2009.

CDF activities occur at two levels:

- at the *neighbourhood level*, with Local Steering Tables and community developers engaging and coordinating the efforts of local service providers and neighbourhood residents; and

- at the *system (organizational) level*, with City of Ottawa staff and a CDF Coordinator engaging and coordinating the efforts of various key organizations in the City (e.g., various departments of the City of Ottawa, the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa, Ottawa Community Housing, Ottawa Police Service, Crime Prevention Ottawa, United Way Ottawa, Community Foundation of Ottawa, local university professors, etc.).

It is clear that a lot of activity is taking place in Ottawa in the name of the Community Development Framework (CDF) initiative (see Kanellakos, 2008). What is less clear is exactly *how* the CDF is working, both at the neighbourhood level in the four pilot areas, and at the system (organizational) level.

An Ethnography of Crime Prevention and Safety within the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa

The objective of this study is to move beyond looking at the community approach to crime prevention and safety strictly through the lens of ‘what works’ and of implementation success or failure, by conducting an in-depth and critically informed ethnography of the CDF in Ottawa. To this end, I begin by situating the community approach to crime prevention and safety within the current discourses on crime prevention and community initiatives, presented in Chapter 1.

In Chapter 2, using Foucault (1978; 1989) and others’ work on governmentality (e.g., Burchill, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 2000; Rose & Miller, 1992) as a starting point, I develop a more critical lens that allows us to examine the mechanisms through which the community approach to crime prevention and safety became thinkable as a site of

governance in Canada. This allows us to shift our focus from simply investigating whether current approaches ‘work’, to also examining the context surrounding their emergence and implementation – understanding how and why they have evolved as they have. As we also see in Chapter 2, the community approach to crime prevention and safety is far more than a “mentality of rule”; it also involves a certain set of social relations. To this end, chapter 2 also raises the importance of exploring the “messy actualities” (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1993; O’Malley, Weir and Shearing, 1997) of the community approach to crime prevention and safety, including through the use of the concepts of translation (Latour, 1986) and resistance (Fletcher, 2007; Foucault, 1978; Scott, 1985 and 1990).

In Chapter 3, I delve deeper into the field of study for this research, namely the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa, Ontario. This involves a description of how the CDF was initially conceptualized and envisioned by its main creators – the City of Ottawa – at its launching in 2008. This allows me to then present the major research questions for this study, which centre around these broad themes:

1. How has ‘community’ been used to mobilize and legitimize different ‘solutions’ for the prevention of crime and the promotion of safety within the CDF?
2. How does this approach shape interests and actions? How does this play out at the level of implementation (on the ground), and why? How do relations of power, and differences in influence and/or interests affect the approach? Where and why does resistance emerge?
3. Is the community approach to crime prevention and safety accompanied by a shift in control and resources *to* ‘community’?

The final sections of Chapter 3 describe how ethnography was used to explore these questions, using a triangulation of the following data collection methods: (1) a review of CDF-related documentation, (2) extensive immersion fieldwork / participant observation, and (3) a series of in-depth interviews with key informants. This triangulation of data collection methods resulted in a rich and significant corpus of data, analyzed using an adaptive theory approach and a two-cycle process of coding and analysis, described in detail in Chapter 3.

In Chapter 4, I begin describing the findings of this research, focusing first on introducing the key institutional players involved in the CDF in Ottawa, with a particular focus on the organizations involved in the crime and safety components of the initiative. This chapter provides the context that is essential to understanding the findings described in subsequent chapters.

In Chapter 5, I provide a detailed account of how the CDF emerged within the City of Ottawa, how four geographic areas were selected for pilot implementation of the CDF, how the five overarching goals of the CDF were decided upon, and how an evaluation framework for the CDF was initially developed. I conclude this chapter by highlighting the reactions ‘on the ground’ to the launch of the CDF, and to the processes involved in it up to that point.

In Chapter 6, I continue to describe the unfolding of the CDF in Ottawa, focusing here on a detailed descriptive overview of the first three phases of the CDF problem-solving process, namely (1) organizing Local Steering Tables, (2) assessing neighbourhood assets and needs, and (3) developing a neighbourhood action plan. Chapter 7 then focuses on the last two phases of the CDF process: phase (4) implementing ‘solutions’ at the neighbourhood level and the system

level, and phase (5) reflecting on the CDF's process and progress. These two chapters highlight the assumptions, rationales, structures, processes and strategies involved in these phases, and some of the main methods and patterns of association among the various organizations and participants involved. The focus of these chapters is on describing how things unfolded from a variety of perspectives.

In our final chapter (Chapter 8), I pick up on some of the key themes raised within the previous descriptive chapters to further analyse and critically engage with the key tensions found within the crime and safety components of the Community Development Framework in Ottawa. This includes key findings regarding 'governing at a distance' and the 'dispersal of government' (Cohen, 1879; Foucault, 1975, 1978 and 1982; Rose, 1996 and 2000; Rose & Miller, 1992), illustrations of the dynamics of power, knowledge, and the nature of expertise (Foucault, 1972, 1978 and 1982; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 2001; Rose & Miller, 1992), neoliberal responsabilization strategies (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997; O'Malley, 1992 and 1996; Rose, 1996), translation (Latour, 1986), including the role of bureaucratic imperatives and professional interests (Cohen, 1985), and resistance (Fletcher, 2007; Scott, 1985 and 1990).

I conclude this work with an overview of the main findings of the research, as well as suggestions for future examinations in this area.

Contributions to Criminology and to the Field of Crime Prevention and Community Safety

From an academic standpoint, both the theoretical framework and the methodology involved in this research project (ethnography) are quite original in the field of crime prevention and community safety in Canada. Most of the existing literature on the community approach to crime

prevention and safety in Canada is in line with the ‘what works’ or ‘good practices’ discourses, often criticized for their ultra-practical and anti-theoretical nature, and for being de-politicized and insensitive to social contexts (for such critiques, see Hirschi, 1993; Walters, 2006; Young, 1988). Most of these studies have been conducted within the tradition of process and/or impact evaluation, performance monitoring, and uncovering ‘lessons learned’, and with very little examination of the assumptions, theoretical underpinnings, methods of association, and processes underlying the approach. By mapping some of the messy actualities of the community approach to crime prevention and safety within the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa through a theoretically-informed ethnography, this research hopes to shed light on some of the complexities involved in the workings of the community approach to crime prevention and safety within the current Canadian context, and within the context of a locally-initiated comprehensive community development initiative. This research also develops, documents, and reflects on ethnography, a methodology that is increasingly absent from the social sciences research arsenal, and that has not often been used in the field of crime prevention and safety in Canada. Furthermore, this research offers a rare and unique ethnographic account of some of the tensions, conflicts and pitfalls involved in doing community-based research.

Benefit to Participants

Work related to the Community Development Framework (CDF) has officially been underway in Ottawa since January of 2008. A few years of recruiting organizational and community partners, building new structures and relationships at both the system and neighbourhood levels, developing various processes and undertaking a number of neighbourhood-based activities have passed. However, very little of the CDF’s workings have been documented or communicated; exactly what has been going on within this complex framework is not well known, even among

those directly involved in or subject to this approach. Most seem to know only a very small part of the much larger puzzle. Piecing together the 'story' of the CDF in Ottawa and creating space for the voices of those who are arguably most affected by the adoption of this approach - either because of their place of work and/or their place of residence - were central objectives, and major contributions, of this project. The hope is that this will help increase the transparency of the processes and activities taking place within the CDF, in particular as they relate to issues of crime and safety. It is also hoped that this research will help increase the level of accountability of the CDF to all its members and partners, and especially to the community workers and residents involved in, and affected by, the initiative in their own place of work and/or residence. I promised each interview participant and others with whom I had frequent contact with through fieldwork that I would report back to them on the findings of this research. Once this research has been successfully defended, I plan on producing a plain language, user-friendly 5-page summary of my research findings and disseminating it to those who contributed to this research.

Finally, as Hastings and Jamieson (2001) argue, we often start with particular solutions in mind – solutions that protect our vested interests - then work backwards to legitimize them. Our reliance on the community stream of crime prevention may therefore lie in the fact that they are safe, tangible responses. What we end up with, however, is what organizations and communities are willing and able to do within their constrained resources, rather than what needs to be done (Hastings & Jamieson, 2001). In this sense, our current 'community' responses to crime and safety may remain largely politically expressive and focused on managing public perceptions and expectations, rather than on responding adequately to the complexities of the issue at hand (Cohen, 1985). A true shift to a more comprehensive, equitable and long-term solution requires a greater awareness and understanding of the complexities surrounding issues of community,

crime and safety, and the political will to tackle these issues head on. It is hoped that by identifying and discussing the ‘messy actualities’ of this type of approach, we can begin to make sense of their complexities and be in a better position to develop program and research policies and practices *with, by* and *for* the community (see Lee, 2008) rather than simply *through* community.

CHAPTER 1 - BEYOND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 'COMMUNITY' AS A FOCAL POINT OF CRIME PREVENTION AND LOCAL SAFETY

The objective of this chapter is to provide a brief summary of the literature on crime prevention and community safety in order to introduce the reader to some of the key reasonings, concepts, approaches and strategies found within contemporary Western crime prevention discourses. This is not intended to be a comprehensive overview or inventory of existing crime prevention policies, programs and practices (for such reviews, see: ICPC, 2008 and 2010; Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina & Fraser, 2008; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Krug et al., 2002; Waller, 2006). The focus here is on introducing the concepts and themes that are most relevant to the emergence and unfolding of the Community Development Framework in Ottawa, namely the broad goals and types of crime prevention, features of crime prevention implementation, the rise in local place-based approaches to crime and safety, and the role of crime prevention and safety within Comprehensive Community Initiatives. Finally, the focus on 'what works' in crime prevention discourses is raised, which leads us to conclude that there is a need for a more in-depth and critically informed examination of the community approach to crime prevention and safety in Canada. This more critical engagement begins in Chapter 2, which also includes more examples of the application of crime prevention in Canada.

The Preventive Turn in Crime Control and the Shift to Community

As suggested in the Introduction, there has been a shift in the discourses on crime control and safety in recent times, from an almost exclusive focus on criminal justice through police, courts and corrections, to the inclusion of attention to prevention and to the role of 'community' (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998, 2009; Garland, 2001; Hastings, 2008; Hughes, 2007). Based on explanations of criminal justice system failures, system overload, cost-efficiency and risk

management, the ‘community’ is being called upon as a key player in new forms of cooperative preventive action (Beck, 1992; Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998, 2009; Garland, 2001; Rose, 1996). The arguments used to advocate for increased policy focus and program expenditure on crime prevention and community safety typically highlight the economic, health, and social costs of crime, fear and violence, and the benefits of balancing rising expenditures on police, courts and corrections with prevention (see Institute for the Prevention of Crime, 2009; National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007; Waller, 2006; Waller, Sansfaçon & Welsh, 1999). In line with a broader shift to ‘community’ within a variety of policy realms, discourses on crime prevention and community have become increasingly intertwined (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998; 1999; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Rosenbaum, 1988). There has been a shift from “the relatively narrow focus on crime prevention to the broader issue of *community safety and security* as a public good” (Shaw, 2001: iii; italics in original). The shift that has taken place in the area of crime control over the past few decades has resulted in widespread messaging that crime is ‘everyone’s problem’ and ‘everyone’s responsibility’. Groups and individuals have been made responsible for the prevention of the various hazards and insecurities that accompany modern life, for providing for their own safety by managing ‘risk’ (Beck, 1992).

When it comes to crime control in Canada, the new ideology is not only to command and control, but also to ensure that a variety of other actors, the ‘community’, play their part in preventing crime⁴ (see Alberta Crime Reduction and Safe Communities Task Force, 2007; Alberta Justice, 2008; Canadian Forum for Crime Prevention, 2003; Denat, 2002; Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2008; Institute for the Prevention of Crime, 2009). Attention to

⁴ It is important to note that the newly elected Conservative Majority Federal Government in Canada is placing increasing focus on the traditional functions of the criminal justice system (police, courts and corrections). That said, there still exists widespread discourses on crime prevention and community safety at the federal, provincial/territorial, regional, and municipal orders in Canada (see the references noted in this section).

prevention is by no means an entirely new development in the history of crime control – a number of classical liberal theories of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries advocated different forms of prevention, including policing and prevention through tactics based on rational choice, which is not all that different from the reasoning behind some contemporary forms of crime prevention (Crawford, 2009). What *is* new within this “preventive turn” in crime control (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 2009; Garland, 2001; Hughes, 2007) is the “reconfiguration within and between policy domains and among relations between the state, market and citizenry” (Crawford, 2009: 3).

The Goals and Types of Crime Prevention

Three major overarching goals can be found within the literature on crime prevention: (1) to reduce the number of ‘offenders’, (2) to reduce the number of ‘victims’, and/or (3) to reduce feelings of fear and insecurity (Crawford, 2009; Garland, 2001; Hastings, 2008). Borrowing language from the public health sector, crime prevention strategies are often referred to as primary, secondary or tertiary depending on their site of intervention. *Primary crime prevention* is described as policies that tackle ‘risk factors’ in the general population known to be associated with crime trends, such as child poverty, youth unemployment or economic opportunities for women. *Secondary crime prevention* is described as policies that target situations where people or neighbourhoods are assessed as being particularly ‘at risk’, such as helping disadvantaged youth to avoid dropping out of school or providing extra public health nurses for poor teenage mothers in ‘vulnerable’ communities. *Tertiary crime prevention* is described as strategies that prevent recidivism by addressing the needs of ‘offenders’ and assisting them with their social reintegration (Gilling, 1997; Hastings, 1996; National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007; UN ECOSOC, 1995 and 2002; Krug et al., 2002).

The following typology by Hastings (1996; Figure 1 below) depicts the categories of crime prevention strategies and interventions possible when you combine the three broad stated goals of crime prevention (as listed above) with these three broad levels of intervention (primary, secondary and tertiary).

Figure 1. A Crime Prevention Typology by Hastings (1996: Table 1).

Levels of Intervention:			
Primary	7	8	9
Secondary	4	5	6
Tertiary	1	2	3
	Offender	Situation	Victim
	Elements of Crime Event		

This typology resonates with the work of the World Health Organization on violence prevention, which promotes an ecological model for understanding ‘risk factors’ for crime and delinquency. This model purports that individuals are affected not only by their personal characteristics and histories, but are also affected by those in their immediate sphere, such as family members, neighbours and peers, and by the wider community and society at large (Krug et al., 2002).

The specific types of interventions used under the guise of crime prevention generally fall under three broad approaches, described below⁵.

(1) Policing and Enforcement (Reactive Approach)

The Policing and Enforcement or Reactive Approach involves the strategies and practices of the criminal justice system (police, courts, corrections) aimed at deterring crime and catching, prosecuting, and sanctioning offenders. It also encompasses more recent trends in policing and justice practices that reflect an increased focus on the role of ‘community’, such as Problem-Oriented Policing (see Goldstein, 1990), or Youth Diversion (see Hornick et al., 1996).

(2) Situational Crime Prevention

Situational crime prevention (SCP) involves strategies that focus on reducing the opportunities for crime within the built (physical) environment, influencing a person’s decision and/or ability to commit a crime at a particular time and place, and minimizing the benefits of the ‘offence’ (Clarke & Cornish, 1986; Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998; Linden, 2007). SCP is largely based in notions borrowed from rational choice theory, the routine activities approach, and environmental criminology (see Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995; Clarke, 1995; Linden, 2007). SCP approaches rely heavily on the two concepts of ‘target hardening’ and ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1972; Clark, 1995; Linden, 2007). Target hardening focuses on lighting in public spaces, entrances to businesses and private property, deadbolt locks and peep holes on doors, and alarm systems. This is largely based on theories of ‘rational choice’ where it is believed that ‘offenders’ commit crimes and select ‘targets’ based on their perception of risk and reward (Clarke & Cornish, 1986; Linden, 2007; Waller and Okihiro 1978). The idea of ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1972) has its roots in the American urban planning debates of the early 1960s

⁵ Note that these approaches are described using the normative language found within crime prevention discourses.

that highlighted the notion of “having eyes on the street” (Jacobs, 1961); ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1962) focuses on the use of space and on ‘natural surveillance’ (Linden, 2007).

Among the most popular types of situational crime prevention is an approach called CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, pronounced sep-ted). It is commonly used by planners, builders, property managers and police services to design and make use of the physical environment in a way that reduces opportunities for crime (Linden, 2007; Schneider & Pearcy, 1996).

(3) Crime Prevention Through Social Development

Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPSD) focuses on the factors that place people at ‘risk’, and enhancing the factors that can provide some ‘protection’ or resiliency to individuals, families and communities (Hastings, 1998; Waller & Weiler, 1984). There are three main variants of CPSD, as identified by Hastings (1998):

- a) The ***developmental approach***: this is a micro level approach that focuses on reducing the ‘risk factors’ associated with ‘offending’, such as inconsistent and ineffective parenting, school dropout, unemployment, substance use, and mental health issues, and increasing the ‘protective factors’ which are associated with ‘prosocial’ behaviour. Interventions are focused on individuals and families (see Department of Justice Canada, 2003; National Crime Prevention Strategy, 2003; Spratt, Jenkins, & Doob, 2000; Waller & Weiler, 1984; Waller et al., 1999).
- b) The ***community approach***: focuses on community-level ‘risk factors’, which include community disorganization, lack of community cohesion, low sense of ownership, and a lack of community involvement with or trust in local institutions. The focus here is on building relationships among community residents and between community residents and service

providers, including police. The goal of this approach is to develop community capacity and mobilize community members for action and change (Hastings and Jamieson, 2001; Jamieson, 2008; Schneider, 2007). It often makes reference to the many notions that make up the discourses on community development and change, such as community engagement, asset building, empowerment, vitality and resiliency (Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Jamieson, 2008; Torjman, 2007). Another common concept employed by this approach is collective efficacy, defined as “mutual trust among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997: 918; see also Sampson, 2004). This concept illustrates how the two perspectives on the role of community within crime prevention (see p. 2) are not mutually exclusive. Here, community is referred to as a condition (mutual trust among neighbours), a means of intervention and control (neighbours’ willingness to intervene), and a site (‘neighbours’ implies a focus on a specific geographic neighbourhood).

- c) The ***social approach***: this is a macro level approach that focuses primarily on the impact of inequality and relative deprivation on the distribution of ‘risk’ or ‘protective’ factors in the general population. The goal here is to reduce inequality by paying attention to social arrangements based on income/class, gender, sexual orientation or race (see McMurtry & Curling, 2008; Krug et al., 2002).

Though these typologies are useful to help us frame our discussions, it is important to note that many initiatives conducted in the name of crime prevention and community safety make use of a variety of different strategies, sometimes blurring and blending these approaches together.

The Features of Crime Prevention Implementation

The literature on ‘evidence-based crime prevention’ consistently recommends key features or ‘salient ingredients’ for the implementation of crime prevention initiatives (see Hastings, 2009; Homel, 2009; IPC, 2009; Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Krug et al., 2002; National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007; UN ECOSOC, 1995 and 2002). Together, these features are often referred to as the “governance” of crime prevention⁶.

These features include:

- a stable ‘centre of responsibility’ to lead and coordinate the process;
- local collaboration and partnerships involving various sectors and agencies (both public and private);
- a problem-solving or strategic planning process based on (1) an assessment of challenges, needs and assets, (2) priority setting and action planning, (3) implementation, including decisions on *what* to do, *who* will do the work and *how* it will get done, and (4) monitoring and evaluation;
- the use of evidence-based or evidence-informed policies and practices (i.e., using ‘what works’);
- adequate support, including technical assistance and physical, financial and human resources; and
- the involvement and engagement of the public as clients, participants, and active contributors to the process.

⁶ Note that the word “governance” in crime prevention discourses is used to denote the management processes and systems through which to govern, the physical exercise of management power and policy. This is in contrast to the meaning of “to govern” and “governance” within the literature on *governmentality*, as discussed on pages 31-32.

Strategies encompassing these features have indeed emerged at the local, municipal, regional, and provincial orders in Canada. This includes strategies aimed at a particular issue, such as the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS; see City of Winnipeg, 2011) and the Fourth R, a school-based program aimed at reducing violence that is being implemented in schools across Canada (see Crooks et al., 2008). Regional and municipal ‘responsibility centres’ implementing a range of crime prevention and community safety initiatives have also emerged, such as the Waterloo Region Crime Prevention Council, Toronto’s Community Safety Secretariat, Crime Prevention Ottawa, and Safedmonton (for more examples of municipal initiatives and full descriptions, see Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). Finally, the provinces of Québec (see Ministère de sécurité publique, 2002), and more recently Nova Scotia (see Government of Nova Scotia, 2008) and Alberta (see Alberta Justice, 2008) have adopted and are implementing ministerial - and in the case of Alberta, inter-ministerial - crime prevention policies and action plans, using a range of strategies from the three broad approaches described beginning on p. 16.

Place-Based Approaches to Crime and Safety

The focus on community within crime prevention and safety discourses has increasingly been accompanied by a re-emphasis on place-based approaches to crime and safety, such as safety in schools, around and on public transit or in parks (see Bradford, 2005; Eck & Weisburd, 1995; Maurice et al., 2008; McMurtry & Curling, 2008). This trend includes a strong focus on neighbourhoods as sites, objects and agents of governance (Hughes, 2007; Maurice et al., 2008; McMurtry & Curling, 2008; Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2006). These approaches typically involve identifying neighbourhoods that are considered the most disadvantaged, vulnerable, distressed or ‘at-risk’, and focusing on them as priorities for service delivery and intervention. This

assessment is usually based on characteristics like high rates of crime and violence reported to the police, elevated disorder and/or fear of crime, and other factors that are thought to contribute to crime such as poverty, unemployment, poor housing, high mobility, poor access to education, challenges to early childhood development, social exclusion, and poor access to health, social or recreational services (see Bradford, 2005; Janhevich et al., 2008; Makhoul, 2009; McMurtry & Curling, 2008; United Way of Greater Toronto, 2005).

The focus on neighbourhoods as sites, objects and agents of governance is usually accompanied by an increased focus on the role of the local government, which is where key interdependent local institutions operate (see Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 1999; Shaw, 2001; Sherman et al., 1997). Though the United States, certain Australian States and some European countries have been delivering centrally developed, locally implemented neighbourhood approaches to crime and safety since the 1970s (see Homel, 2006 and 2009; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Solomon, 2009), these local place-based approaches are still relatively recent and fairly underdeveloped in Canada (Allard & Sadeler, 2009; Bradford, 2005; see also Janhevich et al., 2008; McMurtry & Curling, 2008). Federal, Provincial/Territorial and Municipal governments in Canada still typically use an approach that is based on central control over defining problems, identifying solutions, and delivering services, with very little collaboration between different orders of government and with other groups and sectors (Leviton-Reid, 2006; McMurtry & Curling, 2008: 142). Where place-based approaches to crime and safety do exist in Canada, they are largely initiated and implemented by local organizations and partnerships, and receive only limited support from central orders of government (see Allard & Sadeler, 2009; Janhevich et al., 2008; McMurtry & Curling, 2008). Nonetheless, these local place-based and neighbourhood-based crime prevention programs and strategies are becoming more and more popular in

Canadian cities (see Community Safety Secretariat, 2004; Janhevich et al., 2008; Makhoul, 2009; National Crime Prevention Strategy, 2004), and they are being put forth as the key to ‘targeting’ crime prevention resources and activities to where they are perceived as being most acutely needed (see IPC, 2009; Maurice et al., 2008; McMurtry & Curling, 2008).

The Role of Crime Prevention and Safety within Comprehensive Community Initiatives

The increasing focus on community and especially on ‘place’ is not exclusive to the crime prevention and safety arena; over the past few decades, many other areas of social and public policy have turned to the community as a focal point (Bradford, 2005; Torjman, 2007). As noted by Leviten-Reid (2006: 4), “the growing attention to ‘place-based development’ and ‘place-based public policy’ reflects a growing appreciation of the unique significance of local settings: localities are where diverse factors come together to generate either positive or negative effects”. Place-based initiatives focusing on cross-cutting issues of community wellbeing have emerged and some of these have focused on crime and safety among a variety of goals related to quality of life and to the social and physical health of residents (ICPC, 2003). These are commonly referred to as Comprehensive Community Initiatives (CCIs), and are defined as “neighbourhood-based efforts that seek improved outcomes for individuals and families as well as improvements in neighbourhood conditions by working comprehensively across social and economic sectors” (Kubisch et al., 1997: 1.2). As noted by Schorr (1997: 319):

the new synthesis rejects addressing poverty, welfare, employment, education, child development, housing and crime one at a time. It endorses the idea that the multiple and interrelated problems of poor neighbourhoods require multiple and interrelated solutions.

The objective of CCIs is to supplement universal policies and programs with enhanced responses that are more targeted and tailored to the particular strengths, assets and needs of specific

neighbourhoods (ICPC, 2003; Kubisch et al., 1997 and 2002; Torjman & Leviten-Reid, 2003).

More specifically, Comprehensive Community Initiatives strive to:

... foster a fundamental transformation of poor neighborhoods and to catalyze a process of sustained improvement in the circumstances and opportunities of individuals and families in those neighborhoods. They seek, furthermore, to change the nature of the relationship between the neighbourhood and the systems outside its boundaries by ensuring that change is locally grounded but also draws upon external sources of knowledge and resources. Thus, CCIs set out to promote change at three levels: the individual or family, the neighborhood and the broader, or system-level, context. (Kubisch et al., 1997: 1.2)

The U.S. began experimenting with the CCI approach in the 1990s with funds supplied in large part by private foundations (see Kubisch et al., 2002). In the United Kingdom, the Department for Communities and Local Government launched the *New Deal for Communities Programme* in 1998 (see Batty et al., 2010) and the England-wide *National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal* in 2001 (see AMION Consulting, 2010).

Once again, Canada has lagged behind other countries in developing and implementing Comprehensive Community Initiatives (Bradford, 2005; Torjman, 2007). However, a number of recent pan-Canadian projects, such as *Action for Neighbourhood Change* and *Vibrant Communities*, indicate a growing interest in CCIs. *Action for Neighbourhood Change* (ANC) was led by the United Way of Canada and was delivered in five Canadian communities from 2005-2007. Its goals were to address issues of personal safety, substance abuse, health, and housing stability through mobilization and partnerships (see United Way Canada, 2007). The more recent *Vibrant Communities* initiative is focused on poverty-reduction and on enhancing quality of life, including reducing crime and fear of crime in specific neighbourhoods in 12 cities across Canada. It is supported by a private Foundation, the Caledon Institute of Social Policy, Human

Resources and Social Development Canada, and Tamarack – An Institute for Community Engagement (see Born, 2008). More locally-driven initiatives consistent with the CCI approach have also emerged over the past decade, such as the *Strong Neighbourhoods* initiative in Toronto (a joint project of the United Way of Greater Toronto and the City of Toronto) and the City of Edmonton’s *Great Neighbourhoods Initiative* (see United Way of Greater Toronto, 2005; City of Edmonton, 2011). The City of Ottawa’s *Community Development Framework* - the field of study for this research – is another recent example.

The theory and assumptions underlying the CCI approach have also crept into crime prevention scholarship more specifically. One recent Canadian example is Schneider’s (2007) articulation of Crime Prevention through Community Development, an attempt to reconceptualize and refocus the community approach to crime prevention and safety into a longer-term developmental approach that takes into account the social, political and economic underpinnings of crime and that focuses on the longer-term goals of civic engagement and empowerment of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Schneider’s (2007) articulation of Crime Prevention through Community Development arose out of an ethnographic study of the obstacles and challenges to community mobilization faced by efforts in high-crime neighbourhood of Mount Pleasant in Vancouver (BC). In some ways, this research project presents a case study of Schneider’s (2007) articulation of Crime Prevention through Community Development.

The Focus on ‘What Works’ within the Literature on the Community Approach to Crime Prevention and Safety

The focus within the literature on the community approach to crime prevention and safety has by far been on ‘what works’. Even so, evaluations of the community approach to crime prevention

and safety have been fairly limited, both in quantity and quality (see Janhevich et al., 2008; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007; Rosenbaum, 1988; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002). Nonetheless, this existing body of work points to some initial successes in community mobilization, capacity building, and short-term reductions in fear, crime and victimization in some cases in Canadian communities and abroad (see Janhevich et al., 2008; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Makhoul, 2009; Rosenbaum, 1988; Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2006; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002). However, despite ‘good intentions’, these strategies have generally failed to sustain the participation of community members, and have demonstrated limited long-term impacts on crime and feelings of safety at the local level (Homel, 2006; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Rosenbaum, 1988; Schneider, 2007; Skogan, 1988; Sutton & Cherney, 2002; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002).

The limited success of the community approach to crime prevention and safety is typically attributed to local implementation challenges such as ineffectual communication and outreach (especially to marginalized individuals), a lack of adequate leadership, a lack of human and financial resources, the lack of skilled and trained staff, a lack of appropriate tools and practical ‘on-the-ground’ support and technical guidance, a lack of time to demonstrate results, and low levels of participation by community members, especially in higher-crime areas (see Homel, 2006 and 2009; NWGCP, 2007; Rosenbaum, 1988; Schneider, 2000; Sutton & Cherney, 2002; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002).

A number of other challenges to the community approach to crime prevention and safety and partnership working have been identified, mostly through examinations of programs in the United States and in Europe, especially the United Kingdom; many are inherent to partnership

working in general (Crawford, 1999; Hastings, 2004; Homel, 2006 and 2009; Kubisch et al., 1997 and 2002; NWGCP, 2007; Skogan, 1988; Solomon, 2009). These include:

- Hierarchical, cultural, political, and financial issues within organizations themselves which may limit their willingness and/or ability to participate openly and responsively in a partnership;
- Challenges related to the need to do *both* long-term strategic planning *and* to take short-term action;
- Tensions around paying due attention to process versus focussing on conducting activities and producing products; and
- A lack of flexibility in acknowledging and responding to external and local pressures and demands (e.g., political and bureaucratic imperatives).

As for Comprehensive Community Initiatives (CCIs), Torjman and Leviten-Reid (2003) point to a number of challenges emerging for the CCI approach in Canada, as evidenced by tensions found within the *Vibrant Communities* and *Action for Neighbourhood Change* projects. These include:

- The need to agree on the meaning of ‘comprehensive’, of ‘community’ and of ‘being inclusive’;
- The lack of an articulated, focused and coherent theory of change that outlines the links between the strategies proposed and the outcomes sought;
- Sufficient sources of sustained support;
- The need to sustain leadership in order to build and maintain momentum;
- Monitoring and evaluating progress and outcomes; and

- Understanding the limitations of community, and understanding and addressing structures outside and beyond communities.

CCIs are fairly new in Canada, however, and their various processes, impacts, successes and challenges are only beginning to be documented and understood (see Jamieson, 2008; Leviten-Reid, 2009). As Torjman and Leviten-Reid (2003: 3) put it:

Here at home, we are learning about these initiatives from both the American experience and our own work ‘on the ground’ in communities across Canada. We are only beginning to understand the various dimensions of this approach to community work. One of the most important lessons to date is that there is still so much to learn.

The Need for a More In-Depth, Critically-Informed Look at the Community Approach to Crime Prevention and Safety in Canada

The previous sections show how discourses on crime prevention and community have become increasingly intertwined over the past few decades, and how research on the community approach to crime prevention and safety has focused largely on ‘what works’, as regards the more instrumental and technical aspects of the approach. Some have argued that this overwhelming focus on ‘what works’ misses the point completely. As stated by Cherney and Sutton (2007, 66-67):

... ensuring that policy-makers confine themselves strictly to the ‘what works’ model has proven far more difficult than most advocates anticipated... the interests, values and assumptions of local organisations rarely sit comfortably with the priorities of central funding agencies... attempts to bypass such debates simply by maintaining that practitioners implement ‘what works’ are both unhelpful and disingenuous.

In light of these critiques, some have more recently begun to talk about a ‘what’s to be done’ approach, one that helps highlight for policy-makers and practitioners what to do in areas of crime prevention and *how* to do it. These authors (see Hastings, 2009; IPC, 2009; Shaw, 2008; Tilley, 2006; Cherney & Sutton, 2007) emphasize the importance of flexible problem-solving, a dialogue approach to governance, articulating a clear vision and specific governance arrangements, and understanding the strengths and needs of key local drivers. However, decisions about ‘what’s to be done’ involve important assumptions about capacity, along with judgements about what is valued in society, and the social control approaches preferred - which cannot be separated from how one might define or prioritize crime prevention activities (Cherney & Sutton, 2007: 77). To this day, these value judgements, the assumptions underlying the community approach to crime prevention and safety and the processes involved have largely gone unexamined.

Conclusions

There has been a shift in the discourses on crime control and safety in recent decades, from an almost exclusive focus on criminal justice through police, courts and corrections, to the inclusion of attention to prevention. One of the salient features of this shift are the appeals being made to ‘community’, both as an *ideal condition* to be fostered to defend against crime and restore order, and as an *essential means* through which to govern crime, as a site and/or agent of intervention and control. These two uses of ‘community’ within crime control and safety discourses are not mutually exclusive; the *community approach to crime prevention and safety*, which forms the field or study for this research, combines both.

Three major goals can be found within the literature on crime prevention and community safety: (1) to reduce the number of ‘offenders’, (2) to reduce the number of ‘victims’, and/or (3) to reduce feelings of fear and insecurity. The specific types of interventions used under the guise of crime prevention can be described under five types of approaches, namely (1) Policing and Enforcement, (2) Situational Crime Prevention, (3) the Developmental Approach, (4) the Community Approach, and (5) the Social Approach. The literature on ‘evidence-based crime prevention’ also emphasizes other key features in the implementation of crime prevention initiatives, including the call for ‘centres of responsibility’, for local collaboration and multi-sector partnerships, a problem-solving process, adequate technical and financial support, and the involvement and engagement of the public.

The focus on community within crime prevention and safety discourses has increasingly led to a re-emphasis on ‘place’, whereby neighbourhoods are seen as important sites, objects and agents of governance. In line with the fact that many other areas of social and public policy have turned to the ‘community’ as a focal point, place-based initiatives focusing on cross-cutting issues of community wellbeing have emerged, where crime and safety feature among a variety of goals related to quality of life. These strategies are commonly referred to as Comprehensive Community Initiatives (CCIs), which are only beginning to be examined in Canada. Research on the community approach to crime prevention and safety has been conducted mainly in the tradition of uncovering ‘what works’, with very little attention to the socio-political contexts and underlying assumptions of the approach. This points to a clear need for a more in-depth and critically informed examination of the community approach to crime prevention and safety in Canada.

CHAPTER 2 - THE 'MESSY ACTUALITIES' OF THE COMMUNITY APPROACH TO CRIME PREVENTION AND SAFETY: GOVERNMENTALITY AND BEYOND

Chapter 1 situated the community approach to crime prevention and safety within current discourses on crime prevention, and highlighted the need for a more in-depth and critically-informed examination of the approach. In this chapter, I use the work of Foucault (1978 and 1989) and others on *governmentality* (e.g., Burchill, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 2000; Rose & Miller, 1992) to develop a more critical lens that allows us to examine the mechanisms through which the community approach to crime prevention and safety became thinkable as a site of governance in Canada. This allows us to examine the socio-political context surrounding the emergence and implementation of the community approach to crime prevention and safety, and to understand how and why it has evolved as it has. I then describe the importance of 'grounding' governmentality by exploring the *messy actualities* (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1993; O'Malley, Weir and Shearing, 1997) of the community approach to crime prevention and safety, including through the use of the concepts of translation (Latour, 1986) and resistance (Fletcher, 2007; Foucault, 1978; Scott, 1985 and 1990). This results in a theoretically comprehensive framework that renders visible how the community approach to crime prevention and safety relates to broader rationalities of government, without ignoring how the approach unfolds in time and place and through the actions of the chain of agents involved.

Governmentality and the Role of Community

In the previous chapter, we have seen how the increased focus on community within crime prevention can be linked to a growing emphasis on the local dynamics of crime and safety issues, on the role and responsibility of municipalities, and on a push to 'mobilize' and 'empower'

communities to help solve ‘their own problems’. However, the focus on the community approach to crime prevention and safety in Canada begs an important question: What are the conditions under which the community approach to crime prevention and safety became thinkable as a site of governance in Canada?

The work of Foucault (1978 and 1989) and others (e.g., Burchill, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001) on governmentality is useful in rendering visible some of these conditions. Governmentality can be seen as a theoretical lens that aims to shed light on the general mechanisms through which we are governed (Burchill, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999). The governmentality lens sheds light on the rationalities (ways of thinking), technologies (ways of acting) and forms of subjectivity associated with the emergence of the community approach to crime prevention and safety, and on the implications these have for the responsabilization of the community, and its consequences. It allows us to look at community in a way that goes beyond more traditional sociological attempts at explaining the concept, and provides us with an interesting way of looking at crime prevention without getting caught in an attempt to provide the theoretical underpinnings of the various types of crime prevention approaches such as Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), or Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPSD).

Governmentality: A History of the Present

Foucault’s work on governmentality represents a relatively new project that emerged near the end of his life (see Foucault, 1978, 1982, 1989; Lemke, 2001). Though little of his writings focused on governmentality, it has proven to be a useful framework for exploring the emergence of various phenomena in a number of areas of social life (Gordon, 1991). To Foucault (1978),

the term 'government' meant not the political or administrative structures of the State, but rather all those mechanisms that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups (Dean, 1999:12). In this view, the state is only the most readily apparent and visible articulation of the larger processes of government.

The word 'govern' is used by Foucault (1978) to describe "... 'the conduct of conduct': that is to say, a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons" (Gordon, 1991: 2). Governmentality studies therefore strive to render visible (1) ways of thinking, that is the reasoning or *rationalities* underlying the way people govern others and themselves; and (2) ways of acting, the practices that coincide with these rationalities, termed *technologies* by Foucault (1978). The goal is to explore the ways through which individuals are constituted as subjects of both governance and self-governance (Foucault, 1978; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 2001).

As Rose (1996: 328) puts it, studies on governmentality seek to understand the "...deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices employed by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to ensure good and avert ill". The goal is to trace a genealogy of the reasonings and practices that we have witnessed throughout a particular point in time and to render visible what can appear to be the 'natural' emergence of a phenomenon (Foucault, 1978; Garland, 1997). This is significantly different from more traditional historical or sociological approaches that seek to reconstruct chronologies and events as they 'actually happened' or to simply expose the state's underlying interests in pursuing a particular agenda (O'Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997).

The following sections explore in more detail the notions of rationalities and technologies and their related concepts of power, knowledge, expertise and subjectification. A brief account of Foucault's (1978) analysis of the main rationalities and technologies that are present in contemporary society, and of what he called the governmentalization of the state, is then provided.

Rationalities and technologies of government: Power, knowledge and subjects

Both the “art of government” and “rationalities of government” are used by Foucault to describe the ways of thinking that enable individuals to be governed and to self-govern (Foucault, 1978; Gordon, 1991). They refer to the narratives and discourses that are used as a frame of reference for shaping the ways through which to govern (Rose & Miller, 1992). These rationalities are evidenced through both productive and repressive practices and techniques. They include the various technologies that are used to govern others, to shape their conduct in ways that are aligned with the interests of families, workplaces, communities, and the authorities of the State. They also include the numerous technologies that we use to exercise control over ourselves; these are the practices we use to manage our own passions, impulses and behaviours in a way that serves our interests (Foucault, 1978; Rose & Miller, 1992).

Governance is further reliant upon, and facilitated through, the generation of specific types of knowledge and “expertise” (Foucault, 1978; Gordon, 1991; Rose & Miller, 1992). The development of the social sciences (i.e., psychology, sociology, criminology, etc.) and of the types of knowledge and specialists they create are good examples. The types of knowledge and expertise that are generated and used in turn have important implications for the way subjects get

constituted, that is for the way we expect individuals and groups to be implicated in relations of power, or to be governed (Foucault, 1978; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 2001; Rose & Miller, 1992). These notions will become clearer as I explore three principle modes of governing identified by Foucault (1978): sovereignty, discipline and government.

Modes of governing

Foucault's work on governmentality follows his usual method of inquiry, namely a combination of archaeology and genealogy. It starts with a look at the functions and operations of the State in the 1500s, and then traces the shifts in the modes of governing that have taken place since that time. Foucault (1978) identified three principle modes of governing contemporary society, each with their corresponding technologies, expertise and subjects. He termed these sovereignty, discipline and government.

Foucault (1978) argued that *sovereignty*, which dominated in the period of the Renaissance, was characterized by a belief in the divine right of Kings. The main goal of governing was to retain control over the territory and its inhabitants and this was accomplished largely through mechanisms to ensure obedience. In relation to crime, the subject of sovereign command was the legal subject who is obliged to obey or be punished. Today, the main form of knowledge that supports this type of power is law, which in turn is supported by the expertise of law enforcement actors, such as police officers, lawyers and judges (Garland, 1997).

Discipline, on the other hand, emerged within the context of the overthrow of Kings and the establishment of the democratic State (Foucault, 1975; 1978). The central focus became how to organize and distribute wealth more efficiently and advantageously; this mode of governing is clearly linked to the economy and the importance of 'disciplined' and 'productive' labour. Who

to manage and how to manage them therefore became imperative questions. This brought with it the need to fully understand the bodies and souls of the citizens in order to be able to then regulate them most effectively (Foucault, 1975; 1978). Here the notions of normality and deviance emerged, where a variety of ‘disciplines’ examining these ideas flourished (e.g., medicine, psychiatry, criminology). In the field of crime control, the main subject became the criminal delinquent in need of discipline and especially correction (Foucault, 1975). This mode of governing gave rise to, and is fueled by, the social sciences and the flourishing of the analytical tools and expertise of criminologists, psychologists, probation officers, and social workers among others (Foucault, 1975; Garland, 1997).

Discipline in some ways laid the foundation for the third rationality identified by Foucault (1978), that of *government*. The enormous amount of information being gathered on individuals led to the realization that there is a logic of population, that there are patterns in births, deaths, homicides, crimes, etc. It became important to understand not only the characteristics of individuals but also the dynamics of their natural interactions - of the population. Rather than exercising power through the practices of discipline, the focus shifted to *exercising power by influencing the choices and decisions of active subjects*. This allowed the population to be governed through the manipulation of their interests and the promotion of self-regulation (Foucault, 1978; Garland, 1997; Rose and Miller, 1992).

Foucault (1978) stressed that since the 16th Century there has been a significant shift towards the governmentalization of the state: “...authorities have increasingly understood their task as a matter of governing individuals and populations, civil society and economic life, in such a way as to increase well-being, security and prosperity” (Garland, 1997: 178). Foucault saw these

three modes of governing, namely sovereignty, discipline and government, as an ever shifting configuration – a triangle of three forms of power that do not necessarily displace one another but that may gain more influence or dominance at a certain point in time or within a certain domain (Foucault, 1978 and 1989; Gordon, 1991).

Foucault's work on governmentality provided other theorists with a lens through which to explore some of the more recent shifts in forms of government that have taken place across western democracies (Gordon, 1991). This includes Rose and Miller's (1992) subsequent analyses of the shift from welfarism as a social form of government to neo-liberal political rationalities, where Foucault's attention to the exercise of power beyond the State becomes very important:

...political forces can only seek to operationalize *their* programmes of government by influencing, allying with or co-opting resources that they do not directly control – banks, financial institutions, enterprises, trade unions, professions, bureaucracies, families, individuals. (Rose & Miller, 1992: 189)

In this sense Rose and Miller (1992), like many others, stress that contemporary western democracies are becoming increasingly neo-liberal, as witnessed in part by power being exercised largely through “government at a distance”.

The Community Approach to Crime Prevention and Safety as Advanced Liberalism

The following sections look at the emergence of ‘community’ as a new realm of government in the prevention of crime within the current neo-liberal context. This includes a description of how community has been linked to crime prevention, policing and the promotion of safety in Canada in recent times. The forms of subjectivity and the responsabilization strategies that are involved

in this shift are then discussed, along with a brief account of the changing role of expertise in the field of crime prevention.

Community as a Realm of Government

The preventive turn in crime control has been characterized by an increasing interconnecting between discourses on crime prevention and safety, and community (Crawford, 2009; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Hughes, 2007). However, what is meant by ‘community’ is never really clear (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1999; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Sampson, 2002). Stemming from Toennies’ classic conceptualizations of *Gesellschaft* (society) and *Gemeinschaft* (community), traditional sociological explorations have offered ‘community’ as a solution to concerns surrounding the alienation of modern society, typically painting community as a type of “...social order rooted in human solidarity and mutual support” (Schofield, 2002: 664). More recent sociological explorations of community have tried to render the concept more tangible and empirically useful by elaborating its various properties and identifying its many possible subtypes. Brint (2001), for example, identified eight major structural subtypes of ‘community’ by looking at factors such as the primary reason for social interaction, frequency of interaction, location of members, etc. Yet the term community remains vague and largely undefined by its users.

The popularity of community within public and state discourses is thought to be grounded in both its enduring elusive nature and its ability to elicit a variety of positive notions and feelings (Cohen, 1985; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001). As noted by Brint (2001: 1-2):

The term suggests many appealing features of human social relationships – a sense of familiarity and safety, mutual concern and support, continuous loyalties, even the possibility of being

appreciated for one's full personality and contribution to group life rather than for narrower aspects of rank and achievement.

As we have seen, crime prevention discourses appeal to community as both an essential means through which to govern crime (a delivery mechanism), and as an end condition in and of itself (a 'sense of community') that will help defend against crime and ensure safety (Crawford, 1998, 1999; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001). These perspectives are based on a number of assumptions about the nature of crime, of community, and of the links between them. These assumptions in turn legitimize a wide range of discourses (i.e., rationalities of government), practices (i.e., technologies of power) and types of expertise that make up the community approach to crime prevention in Canada. Some of the characteristics of this approach are described below. The intention is not to be exhaustive in identifying all the components of the community approach to crime prevention and safety in Canada, but rather to give a feel for some of the rationalities, technologies and expertise that have emerged in this field in recent years.

The State 'can't do it alone': The call for community empowerment

Various explanations have been offered for the recent focus on the community as the preferred realm of government for the prevention of crime. Some have emphasized the importance of the broader socio-politico-economic context surrounding the trend. For example, in an attempt to examine the (re)emergence of community, Rose (1996) first points to the welfare state of the 20th century where governance operated within the broader framework of society through initiatives aimed at social justice, social protection, social rights or social solidarity. Many argued that certain conditions created an ideal climate for an emphasis to be placed on the role and responsibilities of the community in public policy in the late 20th century (see Rose, 1996; see also Garland, 2001, Hughes, 2007). These include:

- the advent of globalization and its effects on national economies;
- the critique from the right of the welfare system as being ineffective;
- the critique from the left of the welfare system as being counterproductive given its ability to create dependency; and
- the critique of experts and bureaucrats.

Recent appeals to community represent a response to what were perceived as system failures (i.e., the lack of coordination and responsiveness of criminal justice agencies) and a loss of legitimacy of the State's claim to dealing with the crime problem (Crawford, 1999). Along similar lines, appeals to community have also been examined as a response to state overload, where the police and other criminal justice agencies claimed to be overwhelmed by increasing demand, insufficient resources, and unrealistic public expectations, due in large part to the culture of dependency created by the welfare state and the fiscal crises of the 1970s and 1980s (Crawford, 1998 and 1999).

This rejection of the welfare state saw the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant rationality, a mode of city governance and a driver of urban change (Hackworth, 2007). Brenner and Theodore (2002) explain this as a two-fold process occurring during the 1990s, an important period of transition marked by:

- 1) neoliberal destruction: the removal or roll-back of welfare policies and institutions such as social housing, public space, and redistributive welfare; and
- 2) neoliberal creation: the establishment and roll-out of new (or the co-opting of existing) institutions and practices, such as public-private agreements and workfare policies.

Combined with a selective return to some ideas of classical liberalism, such as the non-interventionist state, localities were put in a position where they had to choose between financing or supplementing these areas (housing, local infrastructure, unemployment programs) themselves, or abandoning them altogether (Hackworth, 2007). Swyngedouw (1997) refers to this process as the glocalization of governance, the push of former nation-state regulatory power both upward to the global economy and its institutions (i.e., the World Bank), and downward to local authorities and governance structures.

This rationality is reflected in the work of the federal *National Crime Prevention Strategy* (NCPS) of Canada which was put in place in 1998 following the formative work of the National Crime Prevention Council (see NCPC, 1997). In 2000, the NCPS emphasized that:

...there has been a shift from a relatively narrow focus on crime prevention to the broader issue of community safety and security as a public good... from seeing the primary responsibility as that of the police, to recognizing that governments, communities and partnerships at all levels need to be actively engaged. (NCPS, 2000: 1)

In this context, community mobilization and multi-sectoral partnerships become attractive and seemingly legitimate means by which to govern crime and safety (Cohen, 1985). Community mobilization has been defined as “the process of preparing a community for action and change” (Hastings & Jamieson, 2001: 30). In the early years of the NCPS, its main funding streams, namely the *Community Mobilization Program*, the *Crime Prevention Partnership Program*, the *Business Action Program on Crime Prevention* (meant to foster private sector involvement in crime prevention) and the *Crime Prevention Investment Fund* (meant to financially support crime prevention activities in ‘local communities’) reflected this orientation, as their names suggest (Léonard et al., 2005). These funding programs were designed to promote and support

partnerships among governmental and non-governmental agencies as well as help communities mobilize their resources for change.

Given their direct contact with citizens and the community, this meant that an increasing amount of pressure was being placed on municipal governments to respond to challenges of crime and safety in their neighbourhoods. Municipalities across Canada were pressured by agencies within the State (i.e., other orders of government and the police), outside the State (i.e., non-profit groups, schools) and by multi-sector partnerships to assume their role in mobilizing and coordinating crime prevention and safety initiatives at the community level (see FCM, 1999; Shaw, 2001). Today, most of Canada's larger municipalities, as well as some smaller ones, have some sort of crime prevention or community safety Council or Secretariat charged with the mobilization and coordination of crime prevention partnerships and activities in their city (see Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina & Fraser, 2008).

At the non-governmental level, the *Action for Neighbourhood Change* (ANC) program, led by the United Way of Canada and involving a number of national partners, is a good example of this type of activity (see United Way of Canada, 2007). ANC is currently being delivered in 5 Canadian communities. Its main goals are to build the capacity of individuals, families and neighbourhoods for change, and to build local partnerships that will strengthen the responsiveness and coordination of various strategies (within and outside government) that address issues of personal safety, substance abuse, health, and housing stability (United Way of Canada, 2007).

The call for community involvement plays a central role in these discourses on the community approach to crime prevention and safety. In 1996, for example, the Department of Justice Canada pledged its commitment to:

...a strategy of preventing crime before it takes place. The key to this strategy is community involvement. Because the sources of crime and other social problems lie in the community, only communities can solve these problems. (Department of Justice Canada, 1996: 1)

The push for public or community involvement in crime prevention has taken two forms. The first is an emphasis on the *community's responsibility to participate* in prevention programs and services (Hastings, 1998; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001). This is exemplified in Canada through popular police-led programs such as Neighbourhood Watch and Crime Stoppers, which rely entirely on the active participation and cooperation of the public (Hastings & Jamieson, 2001). Another type of crime prevention technology requiring this type of community involvement is the local safety audit. It has become a popular tool to mobilize residents in Canada to identify the physical (i.e., visibility, lighting), social and institutional (i.e., recreational opportunities, women's access to community life) factors related to fear and safety in their area. These activities have largely been led by non-governmental organizations and have been accomplished through surveys, community consultations and resident walkabouts (see Cowichan Women against Violence Society, 2002; METRAC, 2001).

The second form of community involvement is a focus on *the community's right in having more say in and control over activities* relating to public safety and the administration of justice (Hastings & Jamieson, 2001). The discussion around what communities can and must do is commonly framed around a problem-solving approach, where the community is encouraged to

identify its problems and challenges, set goals and priorities through an action plan, design and implement solutions, and evaluate results (FCM, 1999; Hastings, 1998; IPC, 2009; NCPC, 1997; Waller, Sansfaçon & Welsh, 1999).

The (re)emergence of the principles of community policing first set out by Sir Robert Peel in 1829 is another example of this trend in Canada (see Griffiths, Parent & Whitelaw, 2001). The community policing model has three main components: prevention; problem solving; and partnership with the community (Griffiths, Parent & Whitelaw, 2001). Local residents are seen as important sources of information, and they are encouraged to assume their *responsibility* in helping authorities gain a better understanding of local crime problems and apply various preventative solutions (Crawford, 1998; McKenna, 2000; Rosenbaum, 2007; Stenson, 1993). Community consultations are held on a relatively regular basis to gain the residents' input on perceived local crime problems and to elicit their help and support in carrying out crime prevention activities in their neighbourhoods (Griffiths, Parent & Whitelaw, 2001; Rosenbaum, 2007; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Every major local police department in Canada claims to have adopted at least some aspects of a 'community policing' approach, with varying degrees of intensity (Griffiths, Parent & Whitelaw, 2001; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; McKenna, 2000).

In Vancouver (BC), this approach has gone one step further. Community Policing Centres throughout the city are staffed by one Community Policing Officer from the Vancouver Police Department, but they are non-profit agencies run by a full-time civilian coordinator. All programs and services are designed and coordinated by residents and rely almost exclusively on the involvement of local volunteers (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). These programs include foot patrols, bike patrols, and a variety of education and awareness activities related to safety, like the

Senior Safe Tea Program where seniors are offered a variety of safety tips over afternoon tea (Collingwood Community Policing Centre, 2007).

Managing ‘at-risk’ groups and situations

The recent focus on community in the prevention of crime has also been linked to a shift from identifying and normalizing the pathological individual offender to identifying and managing ‘at-risk’ groups (both potential victims and offenders) and ‘high-risk’ or ‘criminogenic’ situations (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998; 1999; Garland, 1997; O’Malley, 1992, 1996; Rose, 1999). In this sense, the community approach to crime prevention and safety has developed alongside the rise of ‘risk’ as an overarching governmental narrative (see Beck, 1992; Castel, 1991; Haggerty, 2003; O’Malley, 1992, 1998), and in step with the change from an inclusive to an exclusive society (Young, 1999). In this context, the broad public appeal of community may indeed reflect the fact that the locale “remains an essential part of how ordinary people make sense of the world” in increasingly global economies and social systems (Crawford 1999: 203). Community “has a profound emotional legitimacy, in that it holds out the ideal of genuine human identity, connectedness, and reciprocity precisely at a time in which they appear most absent” (Crawford, 1999: 273). Community is seen not as a set of geographical boundaries, but as a set of shared attitudes and identity - a sense of community - that can be measured and must be mobilized or implanted into a local area or group of people in order to defend against crime and ensure safety (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1999; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; McMillan & Chavis, 1986). This approach emphasizes the benefits of community cohesiveness and organization in the fight against crime and the discourse focuses on the need to bring communities together, and on the voluntary collective action of the community (Crawford, 1999; McMillan & Chavis, 1986; also see Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Department of Justice Canada, 1996).

Rose (1996; 1999) suggests that this has defined two main populations to regulate according to the degree and type of 'risk' they pose to their community and to themselves: the *included* and the *abjected*. The *included* are those who are responsive to, and aligned with, the interests of neo-liberalism - they have demonstrated their ability to manage risks through self-regulation, consumption and through 'appropriate' life choices (Rose, 1999). These are typically the groups of people who are least likely to come into contact with the criminal justice system, and most likely to become involved in official crime prevention activities, partnerships and mobilization efforts in their community (Jamieson, 2008; Schneider, 2007).

The *abjected*, on the other hand, are those perceived as incapable of making 'responsible' choices and managing both the risks they face and the risks they pose to their community. The *abjected* can further be split into two groups: the *unsalvageable* and the *responsibilizable*. The *unsalvageable* are deemed unteachable – they cannot be brought to conformity through intervention; their behaviours become criminalized, defined as dangerous in some cases, thereby legitimizing more overt criminal justice intervention (Rose, 1999). The *responsibilizable*, in contrast, are amenable to intervention - they can be targeted and successfully 'taught' to self-regulate in order to reduce the risk they are understood to pose to themselves and their community (Rose, 1999). This type of analysis is reminiscent of Spitzer's (1975) earlier and more Marxian analysis of the creation and control of deviance within capitalist societies, where he refers to these two groups as *social dynamite* and *social junk*, respectively. It also resonates with more recent theorizations of a *criminology of the alien* (Garland, 1996) and of *othering* (Young, 1999 and 2007), which emphasize the tendency within late modernity to bifurcate the law-abiding citizens from the 'criminals' along largely socio-demographic lines such as class and race.

Within crime prevention work, the responsabilizable (Rose, 1999) or social junk, as Spitzer (1975) would say, are typically subjected to forms of control that seek to regulate and contain the risk they pose to themselves and others through the remaining agencies and programs of the welfare state (Rose, 1999; Spitzer, 1975). They are therefore prime candidates for community or ‘pre-crime’ prevention measures, as illustrated by the underpinnings of the approach known as Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPSD). First articulated in Canada by the Canadian Council on Social Development (see Waller & Weiler, 1984: 2), the CPSD model stresses the role that social interventions can play in “tackling the risk and protective factors linked to crime and delinquency”. These interventions are focused on the social development of children, youth, families and geographical communities, and can be delivered by both governmental and non-governmental agencies and at times by partnerships between the two (see Department of Justice Canada, 1996). Examples of CPSD in Canada include programs such as early childhood education (see Public Health Agency of Canada, 2007), parent training and child social skill development (see Tremblay et al., 1995), school-based anti-bullying and drug prevention programs (see Wolfe et al., 2005), and improving social conditions in ‘at-risk’ neighbourhoods through free summer day camps for kids and jobs for youth (see National Crime Prevention Strategy, 2004).

CPSD is further supported by relatively new forms of knowledge and expertise that aim to identify ‘at-risk’ groups and neighbourhoods through statistically-derived ratings rather than through clinical expertise (Garland, 1997). One example is Canada’s *National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth*, which has been used to track the life-course trajectories of youth displaying aggressive and delinquent behaviours in order to identify the most common risk

factors found in their life experiences and their relation to socio-economic status, family, education, health, and friends (Department of Justice Canada, 2003).

As Castel (1991: 288) notes:

What the new preventive policies primarily address is no longer individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements. They deconstruct the concrete subject of intervention, and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk... to be suspected, it is no longer necessary to manifest symptoms of... abnormality, it is enough to display whatever characteristics the specialists responsible for the definitions of preventive policy have constituted as risk factors.

Another example of this is the geo-coding exercises conducted on a number of urban centres in Canada (Winnipeg, Regina, Montréal, Thunder Bay, Halifax and Edmonton), supported by police and various government departments (for example, see Fitzgerald, Wisener & Savoie, 2004; Savoie, Bédard & Collins, 2006). Geo-coding is a mapping process that examines how police-reported crimes are distributed across city neighbourhoods; it explores whether rates of crime are associated with various socio-demographic indicators specific to that neighbourhood as measured through census data and other measures (Fitzgerald, Wisener & Savoie, 2004). Here we have the intersection of technologies aimed at identifying and managing both 'at-risk' groups and 'high-risk' areas.

The management of risk at the community level has also resulted in an increase in focus on what Garland (1997) calls the 'criminogenic situation' and its three main components, namely the physical environment, the victim and the offender. Based in theories of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP; see p. 16), situations perceived as posing risks are governed by manipulating the physical environment and/or the decisions and behaviours of potential victims and offenders.

Popular SCP techniques include educating potential victims on how to avoid ‘risky’ behaviours and situations, target hardening (i.e., better locks) to increase the effort required to commit a crime, strengthening surveillance to increase the risk of getting caught, and reducing the rewards of an offense by rendering an item unusable if stolen (see Brantingham, Brantingham, & Taylor, 2005; Linden, 2007).

There are a number of examples of the application of SCP in Canada. The largest municipal governments in Canada use SCP and CPTED principles in the planning and designing of public spaces (see Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina & Fraser, 2008). Most police services in Canada offer citizens and businesses some sort of security inspection program to suggest ways of making homes and businesses ‘safer’ through better locks, lights and alarm systems (for e.g., see Ottawa Police Service, 2010). Partnerships have also been formed between the police, rental property owners and residents of ‘high-risk’ condensed housing across Canada to undertake programs such as Crime-Free Multi-Housing (CFMH). CFMH programs train property managers in how to properly screen and select potential renters and in using SCP and CPTED tactics to ‘defend’ the rental community against problems of property crime and disorder (see Mandarino, 2005). The rapid and inventive development of, and demand for, public and private security devices is also a testimony to the popularity of SCP approaches (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997). The use of technology-based surveillance devices – such as Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) - is now widespread in the United Kingdom, for example, and is also making its way into Canadian communities (see Hier, 2010).

The well-known *Broken Windows* theory, first articulated by Wilson and Kelling in 1982, has also inspired a number of SCP-based initiatives. Here the goal is to restore community order by

revamping and cleaning up the physical environment to eliminate the appearance of disorganization, decay or neglect, which is thought to invite larger problems of crime and disorder (Crawford, 1999; Kelling & Coles, 1996; Rosenbaum, 1997; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). These methods are popular in Canadian communities as evidenced by initiatives such as graffiti removal programs, revitalization projects, and community garbage clean-up events (see City of Edmonton, 2011; Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina & Fraser, 2008; Makhoul, 2009).

Shifting responsibility: The constitution of new subjects

The agencies of the criminal justice system (i.e., police, courts and corrections) have traditionally been responsible for ensuring safety through enforcement (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997; Rose, 1996). As we have seen, there has been a more recent shift in focus to the community as a new realm of government within the discourse on crime and its prevention in Canada. As noted, the term community is used frequently and rather loosely in the discourses on crime prevention and safety - its exact meaning is usually not very clear. What is certain, however, is that community is used to denote a realm that lies outside of the police, courts and corrections. Appeals made to community have therefore typically come to represent appeals made to the public, active citizens, community groups, the private sector, local institutions (i.e., schools) and to inter-agency partnerships (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001).

In this sense, the discourses on the community approach to crime prevention and safety can be seen as a type of responsabilization strategy (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997):

Politically, 'community' has been appropriated to fill the vacuum left by the redrawing of government responsibility for areas of crime control. It has been deployed as the central motif around which the public are to be mobilized to participate in crime

prevention and to take on a greater share of responsibility for personal security and public safety. (Crawford, 1999: 296)

The shift to community has thereby created a number of new subjects of government, new governors and guardians that operate in the space between the State and the offender (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997; Rose, 1996). Within the welfare state, the citizen was in large part seen as a client, the recipient of a service (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997; Rose, 1996). With the emergence of neo-liberal rationalities and the focus on community, citizens rather became responsible for actively seeking personal fulfillment and for successfully managing the various factors (including the 'risks') that threatened their safety or the safety of others (Rose & Miller, 1992). The descriptions of community approaches to crime prevention in Canada presented earlier in this paper illustrate how potential victims, community members and residents concerned for their safety, the voluntary and non-profit sector, and multi-sector partnerships have all been called on to take responsibility for, and an active role in, assuring their safety (Crawford, 1999; O'Malley 1992 and 1996; Rose, 1996 and 1999). It therefore appears clear that:

The state's new strategy is not to command and control but rather to persuade and align, to organize, to ensure that other actors play their part. Property owners, residents, retailers, manufacturers, town planners, school authorities, transport managers, employers, parents, individual citizens... the list is endless... must all be made to recognize that they have a responsibility... to exert their informal powers of social control, and if necessary, to modify their usual practices, in order to help reduce criminal opportunities and enhance crime control. (Garland, 1997: 126)

The central role given to the community and to partnerships may well be the result of an attempt on the part of State agencies to be more responsive and effective in their approach to crime and safety, and to manage costs (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1997). It can, however, also be interpreted as a way to lower the expectations of citizens as to the quantity and quality of

services they should be receiving from the State (Crawford, 1998 and 1999; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001).

Appeals made to community and to partnerships can be conceived as "...formal criminal justice agencies, such as the police, educating the public about their responsibilities and legitimate expectations" (Crawford, 1998: 136). At the same time, appeals to community involvement in matters of local safety become an important way for authorities to maintain police-community relations and attempt to enhance trust between residents and authorities at a time when the State may appear to be doing less. Finally, by sharing the responsibility and costs for crime prevention and safety with the community, the State not only transfers the burden of crime control but also redistributes the weight of the blame in case of failure (Crawford, 1998; Garland, 1997 and 2001; Rose, 1996).

The changing nature of expertise: The community knows best

The notions of expertise and knowledge play an important part in the process of responsabilization and subjectification described above (Foucault, 1978; Garland, 2001; Rose, 1996). Within the welfare state, individuals were governed through 'the social' based on the knowledge and expertise of an array of disciplines within the social sciences. Experts, professionals and specialists were therefore a central part of the practices of crime control and criminal justice. Criminologists and empirical knowledge were considered valid and reliable sources of information on which to base decisions about both policy and practice (Crawford, 1999; Garland 1997 and 2001; Rose 1996). A number of experts on delinquency, for example probation officers, social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and guidance counsellors, were given almost absolute discretionary power in making what were considered technical decisions

regarding individuals and criminal justice. An immense amount of trust was put in to what was considered their objective and apolitical expertise. Individuals and families were expected to be willing to bring their conduct into line with the prescriptions of experts for their own interests and those of society (Garland, 2001).

With the advance of neo-liberalism and the adoption of community as the focal point of discourses on safety, expertise did not disappear, but the professional hierarchy of credibility and the role of experts in matters of crime control and safety were significantly altered (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 2001; Rose 1996). In place of the professional expertise of criminologists and criminal justice agents, a culture of information sharing emerged, emphasizing the importance of incorporating the diverse knowledge and experience of various organizations, partners and the public (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 2001). The partnership, in this sense, has become the new model of professionalism (Crawford, 1999).

This emphasis on community, along with a focus on individual autonomy (i.e., personal choice, responsibility and self-government) that is also characteristic of advanced liberalism, align into a form of what Rose (2000: 329) describes as *governing through community*:

New modes of neighbourhood participation, local empowerment and engagement of residents in decisions over their own lives will, it is thought, reactivate self-motivation, self-responsibility and self-reliance in the form of active citizenship within a self-governing community.... Government of security here operates through the activation of individual commitments, energies and choices, through personal morality within a community setting. Community is not simply the territory within which crime is to be controlled, it is itself a *means* of government: its detailed knowledge about itself and the activities of its inhabitants are to be utilized, its ties, bonds, forces and affiliations are to be celebrated, its centres of authority... are to be encouraged, nurtured, shaped and instrumentalized to enhance the security of each and of all.

Here we see how Rose's (2000) articulation of "governing through community" is consistent with Foucault's (1978) attention to the exercise of power beyond the State, to the dispersal of 'government' to all levels and sites, including the self-government of individuals.

Grounding Governmentality: Towards Integrating Theory

Though governmentality may provide us with a lens through which to examine the rationalities, technologies and subjectifications that have helped to shape the community approach to crime prevention and safety in Canada, it is less helpful in shedding light on "the messy actualities of what actually happens" (O'Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997: 509), in other words how community approaches to crime prevention and safety play out 'on the ground' in the 'real world'. Are governmental rationalities effective in their efforts to shape and manipulate interests and actions, to what degree, and why?

Inspired by the Symbolic Interactionist perspective, some critics of the governmentality literature stress that it is important to scratch at the surface of broad rationalities to look at the diversity of voices that may exist within both ruling and non-ruling discourses, based in differences of perceived power and influence, of perspective, opinion, experience, values and interests

(Castellani, 1999; Latour, 1986; O'Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997; Rose, 1996 and 1999). As

Castellani (1999: 260) puts it:

Foucault was ultimately concerned with practice as an interaction and not with the impact people in inter-action have on practice... while he wonderfully illustrated over and over again how practice, as an interaction, structures the rules of formation involved in the construction of subjectivity, Foucault refused to acknowledge the important role interacting individuals have on this process, and was therefore unable to fully appreciate the importance of agency.

In the sections that follow, I describe how the concepts of *translation* and *resistance* were used to help construct a theoretically comprehensive framework that can account for more micro-levels of action and interaction, as well as for how these practices relate to broader rationalities of government (see Carrabine, 2000; Castellani, 1999). This allows for an account and analysis of the community approach to crime prevention and safety as an example of the neo-liberal rationalities and technologies of government at a distance (Rose & Miller, 1992) and of governing through community (Rose, 2000), without ignoring how the community approach to crime prevention and safety unfolds in time and place and through the actions of the chain of agents involved.

Translation

One of the major critiques of governmentality studies is their lack of attention to issues of translation - how rationalities are converted into policy and practice and the transformations and discrepancies that can occur along the way (Carrabine, 2000; Latour, 1986; O'Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997). The goal here is to avoid seeing rationalities of government as 'perfect knowledges' (Castellani, 1999; O'Malley, Weir and Shearing, 1997). It is important to examine how abstracted rationalities actually function in practice and in different contexts; how their technologies come to fruition; and how they are influenced by various interests, pressures, and the depth of understanding of their philosophical bases (Garland, 1997; O'Malley, Weir and Shearing, 1997).

To this end, Latour's (1986) distinction between a *diffusion model of power* and a *translation model of power* is useful in rendering visible the ways in which power is not something that can be hoarded or possessed, but that the exercise of power is an effect, a consequence of collective

action. In other words, if a claim or command (i.e., a policy) is successfully exerted and executed, it is the result of the actions of a chain of agents, each of whom has likely shaped, modified, added or subtracted to it (translated it) according to his or her own objectives and interests, and in a way that makes sense to them (Latour, 1986: 264). This translation model of power is in direct contrast to a diffusion model of power, where a claim or command is thought to move in the same direction (as initially intended) as long as there is no clear obstacle along the way. In the diffusion model, the focus is on the force or strength of the initial claim or command, and on explaining any obstacles it encounters (Latour, 1986). In other words, it uses analytical approaches that see the policy process as one of rational planning and linear implementation. By contrast, the translation model of power seeks to explain methods of association - the displacement of a claim or command through time and space, with particular attention to the ways in which individuals and groups shape and change the force as it moves along, and the ways in which people or groups are associated to one another (Latour, 1986). This approach is consistent with Foucault's emphasis on *relations of power*, on the various and varying reciprocal relationships of power between individuals as free subjects (Foucault, 1976, 1978 and 1982).

As we can see from the previous chapter, the literature on the community approach to crime prevention and safety has typically taken an approach that is in line with the *diffusion model of power*. The focus within discourses on the community approach to crime prevention and safety has largely been on identifying and promoting its 'key ingredients' or 'salient features', and on identifying and explaining the challenges impeding its 'success', which are often reduced to technical deficiencies and operational inefficiencies alone. The concept of translation, as articulated above, allows us to make a different kind of sense of these common challenges in the community approach to crime prevention and safety. For example, it allows us to explore the

complexities surrounding the notion of community and the impacts of its many underlying assumptions, especially as they relate to crime and neighbourhoods. It also encourages us to explore the methods and patterns of association among the various agents involved in the approach, including conflicts created by tensions between institutional (central) claims, expectations and plans, the organic processes of community, and their varying definitions of 'success'.

This theme leads us to another issue within the literature on governmentality and on the community approach to crime prevention and safety: the lack of attention to horizontal methods and powers of association – those relations found among and between individuals or groups who belong to the 'same' community (Crawford, 1998). Internal relations of power can have significant implications for the level of representation, participation and influence of certain people, groups or organizations within community activities and partnerships – some members of a spatial community may not be afforded a voice or a space at the table. These dynamics have largely been ignored by the community approach to crime prevention and safety activities and partnerships. The reality is that most communities, whether they are based on geography, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and/or interest, are not homogenous (Brint, 2001; Crawford, 1999; Rose, 1996 and 1999). They are typically characterized by either formal or informal hierarchies and can often experience internal conflicts and a lack of consensus on what constitutes a problem or a priority, including around issues of crime and safety (Crawford, 1999; Rose, 1999). The result can often be that only the most dominant perspectives get heard, which can lead to a reproduction of current relations of power, influence, inclusion and exclusion (Crawford, 1998; 1999; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Rose, 2000). This is also true of various forms of collaboration and partnership; there can be varying degrees of sharing of information,

of control over decision-making and resources, and of accountability among partners (Hastings, 2004; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001).

Resistance

O'Malley, Weir and Shearing (1997) point to another important gap in governmentality studies: the lack of attention given to the resistance or contestation that rationalities and technologies of government may face, and to the constitutive role this resistance may play in shaping or altering policy and practice. As Crawford (1999: 211) puts it, are the governed simply “cultural dupes” who accept subjectifications without question, or are there important points of resistance? If there are points of resistance, what and where are they, and what are their symbolic and ideological underpinnings (Fletcher, 2007; Scott, 1985)?

As noted by Rose (1996, 1999), the rise of community and its overshadowing of the concept of ‘the social’ has located individuals according to their unique set of community networks and associations rather than to more traditionally ascribed or achieved social statuses based on family, class, and/or race. The focus on the internal dynamics of local communities (e.g., neighbourhoods) has often overshadowed how neighbourhood resident life is shaped by both formal and informal networks of association with external actors, institutions and agencies outside of neighbourhoods (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Rose, 2000). This has allowed the relations of power that underlie broader social factors such as poverty, discrimination and class to take second stage.

Within the discourses on the community approach to crime prevention and safety, both the relatively ‘advantaged’ and ‘disadvantaged’ are to take responsibility as active agents for their own safety and the well-being of their community, since issues of structure are rendered

invisible. Attention is placed mainly on risk factors within individuals, groups, situations and neighbourhoods and it is most often taken away from the broader socio-political and economic relations that play a significant role in challenges related to crime and safety (i.e., poverty, lack of affordable housing, access to education, the labour market and employment). The reality is that individuals and groups differ greatly in their access to resources and to legitimate means of aligning their interests with those of the State (Crawford, 1999; Rose, 2000; Schneider, 2007). By bringing back into the discussion the wider social contexts, relations and arrangements in which crime and delinquency are defined and located, we can begin to examine the dynamics that surround the making up of 'free subjects', and the varying levels of inclusion in and affiliation to society, rather than simply each person's ability to self-regulate and manage 'risk' (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Cohen, 1985; Young, 1998 and 1999). This includes taking into account the effects that the processes of glocalization (Swyngedouw, 1997) have had on the spatial economic and social segregation of certain groups within our metropolitan areas.

To help us expand on these themes, the concept of resistance is quite useful. Resistance studies flourished from the 1950s onward, focusing at first on Marxist ideas of class-based revolution and large-scale, mobilized acts of open defiance towards the State, or the lack thereof (explained largely through the notion of hegemony) (Fletcher, 2007). By the 1970s and 1980s, a new perspective on resistance was emerging, with contributions from different fields. Two of the most influential contributions, those of Foucault (1972; 1976; 1978) in French social philosophy and of Scott (1985; 1990) in agrarian studies, challenged the earlier Marxist definition of resistance.

In Foucault's (1972; 1976; 1978) conception of power, he rejected the structural Marxist notion of power as an inherently negative (oppressive) form of domination by 'elites', and resistance as a struggle by 'subalterns' for liberation. Foucault (1972 and 1976) focused on marginal subjectivities instead - on marginalization based on non-class characteristics (e.g., race, gender, sexuality) - and emphasized the inseparable reciprocity and constant flipping back between a certain action by a certain group and a counter-offensive by another group. In this sense, Foucault ultimately saw all individuals as free subjects, with various and varying *relations of power* existing between them (Foucault, 1976, 1978 and 1982; Revel, 2008). Although Foucault (1978) focused on the importance of "serious" statements of resistance, others like Scott (1985 and 1990) stressed the need to pay more attention to "hidden transcripts", the more ordinary, subtle, every day and often covert acts of contestation, since they often represent less formal but equally important points of contestation.

In general terms, resistance is broadly defined as "a genuine challenge to a thing to which one stands opposed" (Fletcher, 2007: x). It is a useful analytic "to identify the *specific* 'in/equalities' against which, but also in *pursuit* of which, acts of resistance are directed (Fletcher, 2007: xx). It also allows us to explore how and why some appear to *not* resist, including in instances where certain individuals or groups (e.g., the poor and/or working class) support political ideologies and causes (e.g., 'tough of crime' policies) that would seem to go against what Marxists would perceive as their "true class interests" (see Crawford, 2007).

This research project will pay special attention to both overt, public points of resistance (open, public interaction between all agents) and more hidden or covert points of resistance (critique of and push-back towards other agents off-stage, behind closed doors) (see Scott, 1990). As some

have argued, it is likely that most forms of resistance occur somewhere in the middle between serious and everyday statements (see O'Malley, Weir and Shearing, 1997; Scott, 1985), which is consistent with the view that a broader range of voices must be accepted as legitimate sources that help shape political ideology. Within this attention to a broader and more diversified range of voices, particular attention will be paid to the more marginalized and excluded voices as important sources of resistance (see Scott, 1985 and 1990).

In sum, for the purposes of this research, resistance is defined as *an act of contestation (i.e., challenging, opposing, defying, disputing, fighting) that is either overt or more covert, and that arises out of a desire to challenge something to which one stands opposed, including as a result of a feeling of subordination or marginalization where one person or group feels they have been placed in a lower order or position than another*. Examples include resistance to an imposed identity, to an imposed condition, or resistance to a process, exercise or activity that was not requested, initiated, or desired.

Conclusions

This chapter shed light on the rationalities (ways of thinking), technologies (ways of acting) and forms of subjectivity associated with the emergence of the community approach to crime prevention and safety, and on the implications these have for the responsabilization of the 'community'. Through this lens, we see how the rejection of the welfare state led to the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant rationality, characterized in the 1990s by a two-fold process of neoliberal destruction (i.e., the removal or roll-back of welfare policies) and neoliberal creation (i.e., the roll-out of new practices like public-private agreements). Combined with a return to the ideal of the non-interventionist state, this led to the 'glocalization' of governance, the push of

former nation-state regulatory power upward to the global economy, and downward to local authorities. Given their direct contact with citizens and the ‘community’, municipal governments were experiencing increasing amounts of pressure to respond to challenges of crime and safety in their neighbourhoods. In this context, community mobilization and multi-sectoral partnerships become attractive and seemingly legitimate means by which to govern crime and safety. This shift has created a number of new subjects of government, new governors and guardians that operate in the space between the State and the offender.

However, these rationalities and forms of subjectifications are not ‘perfect knowledges’ – we must pay attention to the role of translation and resistance in shaping and altering policy and practice. Power is not something that can be hoarded or possessed. The exercise of power is an effect, the result of the actions of a chain of agents, each of whom has likely shaped, modified, added or subtracted to it according to his or her own objectives and interests. This also means that rationalities and technologies of government may face forms of resistance (an act of contestation that arises out of a desire to challenge something to which one stands opposed), which must also be taken into account when examining how rationalities of government play out ‘on the ground’.

CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY

The objective of this chapter is to describe in more detail the field of study for this research, the *Community Development Framework (CDF)* in Ottawa, as well as the methodology used to conduct the research, namely ethnography. In the first section, I describe how the CDF was originally conceptualized and envisioned upon its creation in 2008, including its underlying principles, key structures and processes. In other words, this section summarizes what the CDF is, and how it was *expected* to unfold.⁷ How I became involved in the CDF in March of 2008 through the Knowledge Transfer Table is then explained. In the second section, I turn to the research questions that guided this work. I then explain the methodology used to explore these questions - ethnography – along with the three data collection methods used, including extensive fieldwork in the tradition of ‘complete participant’, with intense immersion in the field of study. The two-cycle process used to code and analyse the data is then presented. Reflections on ‘doing ethnography’ are also provided, as well as an assessment of this work based on criteria for evaluating the quality of qualitative research.

Research Focus: Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa, Ontario

In June of 2008, Ottawa City Council officially endorsed the Community Development Framework (CDF) proposed by the Community and Protective Services (CPS) Department of the City of Ottawa. At that time (2008), the CPS Department had a Net Operating Budget of \$417.381 million (with gross expenditures of \$869.416 million and recoveries of \$452.035 million) and was responsible for 11 branches (City of Ottawa, 2008a):

- Fire Services

⁷ Exploring the reasoning behind the emergence of the CDF within the City of Ottawa, as well as how it unfolded in practice from 2008-2010, were key objectives of this research. The findings are described in detail in subsequent chapters of this work.

- Paramedic Services
- By-law Services
- Housing
- Child Care
- Public Health
- Employment and Financial Assistance
- Cultural Services and Community Funding
- Long-Term Care
- Parks and Recreation
- Office of Emergency Management

Representatives of the Community and Protective Services Department of the City of Ottawa view the CDF as a new *approach* to the way the CPS Department engages in community development, not a new ‘program’ or ‘project’ (Kanellakos, 2008). Through the CDF, the City of Ottawa was seeking a “standardized approach to community engagement, assessment, prioritization, planning, implementation, and evaluation” across the city (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Introduction”). The CDF is presented as:

a new way of coordinating municipal and community services. It brings together funders, community organizations, residents, researchers and city services to share information and leverage resources and community strengths in order to address needs in neighbourhoods. (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Introduction”)

Though the Deputy City Manager’s Office (of the Community and Protective Services Department) had a small amount of money available on a quarterly basis to “support” some CDF activities (i.e., tool development, translation, evaluation development), the CDF was *not* accompanied by its own operating budget (Kanellakos, 2008). The intention of the CDF was to maximize the impact of the money that the City of Ottawa was already spending on community development (especially through the “Community Funding” branch) and “leverage” the existing financial and other resources available from various institutions and groups across the city


(Kanellakos, 2008). In other words, the CPS Department expected to implement the CDF within its existing budget; through their participation in the CDF, various sectors - including municipal departments, police services, non-governmental agencies (public housing authorities, school boards, social services), funding organizations, private corporations and businesses, academia, community groups and residents – were expected to contribute some of their existing time, energy, and funds towards achieving CDF goals.

The CDF is centred on the following five goals (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Introduction”):

1. Increase neighbourhood capacity to enact positive change.
2. Improve planning and service delivery to achieve neighbourhood-defined goals.
3. Improve health of individual residents and their neighbourhood.
4. ***Increase neighbourhood safety and perceptions of safety.*** (emphasis added)
5. Promote sustainability of positive change at the neighbourhood and system levels.

Under the CDF approach, work happens simultaneously at two different levels: the *neighbourhood level* and the *system (organizations) level*. At the neighbourhood level, the process was inspired by and is largely based on the *No Community Left Behind (NCLB)* approach which was first developed and implemented by the South East Ottawa Community Health Centre in 2005. The components and processes involved in NCLB (see Figure 2 below) were based on an in-depth review of the literature on best practices in community development and crime prevention, conducted by the Community Developer of the South East Ottawa Community Health Centre at the time.

Figure 2. No Community Left Behind (NCLB) Problem-Solving Process (South East Ottawa Community Health Centre, 2006a).



In the spirit of NCLB, a Community Developer from each CDF area’s Community Health and Resource Centre is responsible for facilitating the development of a CDF *Local Steering Table*. This Table brings together a representative from various service providers in the catchment area in question (including a police officer), representatives from neighbourhood associations, organized groups, and businesses, along with residents. Once the Local Steering Table is formed,

it is responsible for implementing a problem-solving process in relation to the needs of a specific local neighbourhood. This involves analyzing neighbourhood assets and identifying issues of concern, creating an action plan, implementing proposed solutions, and monitoring progress and impacts. True to the original NCLB initiative, community mobilization and resident engagement are at the heart of this process.

Community Developers are largely responsible for implementing and coordinating this work on the ground, and the expectation was that they integrate existing local community development activities, services and programs into the CDF structure and processes. Similarly, other organizations within the city that are active in areas related to the work of the CDF, and that have been conducting initiatives and delivering programs in these neighbourhoods, were expected to come on board as collaborators and partners in the CDF process.

At the system level, a *Community Table* serves as a bridge among all the Local Steering Tables, and between the Local Steering Tables and the other System Level Tables (described below). The Community Table is led by the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) of Ottawa and was designed to be “the hub that unites the neighbourhoods participating in the CDF in an effort to facilitate the sharing of approaches and good practices across neighbourhoods, as well as to look for opportunities to share and leverage strengths and resources” (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Community Table”).

A number of other system level tables were proposed to provide various types of support to the work happening at the neighbourhood level. These include (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Structure”):

- The *Municipal Table*, which brings together senior staff from across the municipal services of the City of Ottawa to work collaboratively and to breakdown organizational barriers in order to help address neighbourhood-defined priorities and goals;
- The *Resource Table*, which brings together agencies and organizations with specific funding mandates to work together to identify various funding and resource opportunities to help support the work of the CDF;
- The *Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT)*, which is comprised of academics and community researchers, and is responsible for sharing and providing knowledge and support in the areas of community development theory and practice, as well as for developing community-based research and evaluation procedures and learning tools for use at the neighbourhood and system levels;
- The *Community Development Roundtable*, which works as a community leadership and accountability team to promote, guide and facilitate the implementation of the Community Development Framework within the city of Ottawa. Representation includes top City officials (City Councillor, Deputy City Manager, CEO of Ottawa Community Housing, Chief of Police, School Board executive), and the Chair of each other system level Table.


The structure of the Community Development Framework (CDF) as it was originally designed is presented in Figure 3 (p. 69). A small group of City of Ottawa staff from within the Community and Protective Services department was responsible for launching and facilitating the development of these various CDF components. Both the *Ottawa Police Service* and *Crime*

Prevention Ottawa are partners in the CDF - their representatives were invited to sit on the *Local Steering Tables*, the *Community Table*, the *Resource Table*, the *Knowledge Transfer Table* as well as the *Community Development Roundtable*.

The City of Ottawa's intentions were to pilot the CDF in selected neighbourhoods, then gradually roll it out to the rest of the city. A handful of geographical areas in Ottawa were to be identified as priorities for pilot CDF implementation, based largely on information provided by the *Ottawa Neighbourhood Study* (Kristjansson et al., 2008), police-recorded crime data provided by the Ottawa Police Service, and consultations with Community Health and Resource Centres regarding their interest in and capacity to carry out the elements of the CDF⁸. Once these areas were selected, it was left up to the Community Health and Resource Centres in question to decide on which specific neighbourhood (smaller geographical area within the larger catchment territory) they wanted to prioritize for CDF pilot implementation. The idea was to start with a small and manageable subset of residences and people in each catchment area in order to maximize community mobilization potential (Kanellakos, 2008).

⁸ The process used to prioritize and select areas for CDF pilot implementation is described in detail in the findings of this research.

Figure 3. Structure of the Community Development Framework (CDF) (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008).



In early March of 2008, as a PhD Candidate in Criminology and a Research Associate for the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (IPC) at the University of Ottawa, I was invited to attend a presentation at the City of Ottawa regarding this proposed Community Development Framework and the potential role of researchers in supporting this work. At that meeting, City officials within the CPS Department introduced the CDF and invited researchers in attendance to participate on its Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) as volunteer partners in the initiative. Given my interest in the areas of crime prevention and community-based research, I accepted the invitation and have regularly attended KTT meetings since then as an unpaid volunteer.

My idea and motivation for this research project emerged out of my participation on the CDF Knowledge Transfer Table. The focus of this ethnographic research project is on the emergence and unfolding of the CDF since its launch in January of 2008, when the City of Ottawa reached out to various partners to begin forming all the CDF Tables. When appropriate, it also took into account events that provide context for the emergence of the CDF within the city, dating back to the amalgamation of the current City of Ottawa in 2001 and the restructuring of City departments and services in 2004 (which included the creation of the Community and Protective Services (CPS) Department). Note that while I was indeed a part of the community-based research activities related to the CDF (through my participation on the KTT), this research endeavour was not in itself a community-based research project. This study offers a critical ethnographic account of the CDF in Ottawa, including of its community-based research components and activities.

Though CDF-related work in the four designated neighbourhoods is supposed to continue on an annual, cyclical basis, and the City of Ottawa plans on gradually and eventually rolling-out this

Framework to the rest of the city, the data collection timeframe for this research ended on December 31, 2010. At that point, each Local Steering Table had gone through their first assessment, prioritizing/planning, and implementation phase, and methods to monitor and evaluate progress and impacts were under development. Three of the four Local Steering Tables were also beginning to discuss the expansion of the CDF into another neighbourhood in their catchment area. At the system level, each Table had been in existence (at least on paper) for at least two years. Given the various data collection methods involved in this project, this provided ample data to explore the research questions outlined below.

Research Questions

Through the CDF, the city of Ottawa made a commitment to a more strategic “new way of working”, one that emphasizes place-based joint problem-solving through multi-agency collaboration and resident participation. What is less clear is *how* it is working.

The research questions for this study therefore include:

1. How have notions surrounding the concept of ‘community’ been used to mobilize and legitimize different ‘solutions’ for the prevention of crime and the promotion of safety within the CDF?
2. How does this approach shape interests and actions?
 - a. How do relations of power, and differences in influence and/or interests affect the approach?
 - b. How have different actors within the CDF, including individual citizens, understood the problem of ‘crime’ and their role in preventing it?

- c. What decisions are being made at each stage of the CDF problem-solving process at both the neighbourhood and system levels? By whom are these decisions being made, and for what reasons? How does this play out at the level of implementation (on the ground), and why?
 - d. What kinds of dynamics emerge when you ask vertical bureaucracies (municipal service departments, housing, police, health and social services, NGOs, funding agencies, universities, etc.) to work together in collaborative problem-solving, and with direct citizen/resident involvement?
 - e. How does the CDF goal to “increase neighbourhood safety and perceptions of safety” relate to and interact with the other goals of the CDF, and how does it fair against other competing interests and outcomes?
 - f. Where and why does resistance emerge?
3. Is the community approach to crime prevention and safety accompanied by a shift in control and resources *to* ‘community’?

In other words, the focus of this research is on the “messy actualities” (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1993; O’Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997) of the community approach to crime prevention and safety within a place-based community development initiative that aims to actualize the principles of collaboration, coordination, inclusiveness, and the active participation of the community. What do these messy actualities look like at each stage of the partnership and problem-solving process? What do they tell us about the interests of the various organizations and players involved?

Ethnography as Methodology

The methodology for this research was ethnography, broadly defined as the study of groups and people as they go about their everyday lives in a particular setting of interest (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). One of the main objectives of ethnography is to grasp and understand the meanings that actions and events have for those studied; to learn about the social world of a group of people as this world is subjectively experienced by them (Emerson, 1987; Goffman, 1961; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). This ethnography was in the interpretative tradition, in which “social phenomena is described, and its meanings and functions are further elaborated through the balanced commentary and philosophical descriptions of the researcher” (Madison, 2005: 6).

Ethnography is distinguishable from other methodologies by its reliance on *fieldwork* or *participant observation* as the key data collection method (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).

There are various types of participant observation, ranging along a continuum from (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983):

- *Complete observer*, where the researcher does not interact with people in the setting or participate in any of the activities, but is there strictly to observe;
- *Observer as participant*, where the researcher is there primarily to observe, but will participate in activities or interact with people only when necessary, and in a minimal capacity;
- *Participant as observer*, where the researcher seeks out participation in the setting specifically for the purposes of the study, interacts with others and participates fully in activities, and uses that participation as observation; and

- *Complete participant*, where the researcher is an existing, active member of the setting, interacts with others and participates fully in activities, and also uses that participation as observational data.

The type of fieldwork used in this research was the *complete participant* type with intense immersion in the field of study. This participant observation was supplemented by two other data collection methods: a review of documentation, and in-depth interviews with key informants. The specific processes, ethical considerations and limitations associated with each individual data collection method are discussed in detail below. Later in this chapter, I turn to some reflections on ‘doing’ ethnography, with a particular focus on subjectivity, positionality and reflexivity. At the end of this chapter, I provide a broader assessment of this research in light of evaluative criteria for ethnographic work.

Please note that the *Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board* of the University of Ottawa approved the data collection for this research on April 8, 2010 for a period of one year. The certification of ethics approval for this research (ethics file #02-10-19) is presented in Appendix 1.

Data Collection Methods

The following sections describe the processes involved in each data collection method used in this study, along with their respective ethical considerations and limitations.

Review of Documentation

Various types of documentation (paper, web-based, video) were gathered and used to provide a chronology and description of events and decisions as they were captured on paper and through

electronic media, both at the system and neighbourhood levels. This documentation provided a timeline and further context for other forms of data collected (i.e., through participant observation and in-depth interviews).

Below is a description of the documentation included in this research. As Chair of the CDF Knowledge Transfer Table, I had easy access to most of this documentation. Documents that were not readily available but that were deemed pertinent to this research were obtained from City of Ottawa staff, from the Chairs of various CDF Tables, and from individuals involved in the CDF upon request. In all cases, these were public documents, meaning that anyone could request to see them. The advantage I had by being involved in the CDF was knowing what types of documents existed and who to ask for them.

CDF Background documentation:

- All the background paper and web-based documentation that describes the CDF, its history, goals, guiding principles, structure, processes, and related activities, most of which is made public through the CDF website at www.cdfottawa.ca.
- Relevant paper and web-based documentation on the *No Community Left Behind (NCLB)* initiative in South East Ottawa neighbourhoods, on which the community engagement and problem-solving processes of the CDF are based (available at www.nocommunityleftbehind.ca).

CDF Neighbourhood Level documentation:

- Minutes from relevant meetings of the local Steering Tables and supporting planning and resource documents, including the Action Plan of each CDF neighbourhood.

- Results from the Neighbourhood Survey conducted in each CDF neighbourhood. The objective of the Neighbourhood Survey is to help identify each CDF neighbourhood's challenges and needs so that the local Steering Tables can move forward with the planning and prioritizing phase of the CDF process. The Survey tool was developed by the Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) and was disseminated in CDF neighbourhoods in the spring of 2009 with the help of Community Developers and resident volunteers. The Neighbourhood Survey is comprised of both quantitative and qualitative questions concerning satisfaction with City and community services, perceptions of and participation in neighbourhood life, and experiences of victimization and perceptions of crime and safety. Full reports on each neighbourhood's Survey results were prepared by the Carleton University Survey Centre and shared with local Steering Tables to help inform their Neighbourhood Action Plans.
- Videos of events in CDF neighbourhoods (e.g., CDF launches, clean-ups, playground building).
- Summary reports of meetings and activities with residents (e.g., report on two Community Talks sessions organized and sponsored by the CDF Community Table).

CDF System Level documentation:

Internal documentation from the system (organizations) level of the CDF was also used. This includes:

- City of Ottawa staff resource documents (background papers, timelines, etc.), position papers for briefing meetings with Ottawa City Council, and other supporting planning and evaluation documentation;

- the Terms of Reference and work plans of each CDF system Table (Municipal Services Table, Resource Table, and Knowledge Transfer Table);
- Minutes from the meetings of system Tables, where important decisions were made;
- A report on the processes involved in the first round of the Neighbourhood Survey (including major challenges). This report was requested by the Knowledge Transfer Table and conducted by a placement student from Carleton University (based on key stakeholder interviews).

Though in-depth documentary analysis (e.g., Discourse Analysis) was beyond the scope of this project, my review of this documentation was not confined just to the content of the documents themselves. It is important to recognize that documents are not necessarily transparent representations of organizational routines, activities and processes (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). Therefore, I also took into consideration how different documents were prepared and circulated, to whom, and for what purposes (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). These observations were recorded in analytic memos and carried forward to the qualitative data analysis process, where I reviewed them to see whether they could help shed light on or corroborate emerging themes or patterns in the qualitative data.

Participant Observation

The primary data collection method for this research was participant observation. The participant observation component of this research project is in the tradition of total immersion and complete participation in the field of study (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995). As previously noted, I became involved in the CDF as a volunteer member of the Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) in March of 2008. At a meeting on October 21, 2008, I was elected first Chair of the KTT for a

two-year period through a nomination and voting process. The role of Chair involves chairing KTT meetings, representing the KTT at various events and meetings with CDF partners, and participating on the Community Development Roundtable to report on KTT activities. The frequency of KTT meetings has typically been dependent on immediate needs at the neighbourhood level. For example, during the design of a Neighbourhood Survey and the preparation of the survey dissemination strategy for the four neighbourhoods involved in the CDF, the KTT met on average once a week. During the preparation of a proposal for a Community University Research Alliance grant, a subgroup of the KTT met on a weekly basis and communicated frequently. During slower periods, the KTT meets once every 5-6 weeks on average or as the need arises, dealing with smaller issues through telephone and email conversations. My involvement on the KTT was on a voluntary (unpaid) basis throughout.

Participation in activities related to the KTT gave me frequent, direct access to and interaction with City of Ottawa Councillors and Executives, City of Ottawa staff, the CDF Manager and the CDF Coordinator, Community Health and Resource Centre Executives, Community Developers, Ottawa Community Housing representatives, representatives from Ottawa Public Health and the Ottawa Police Service, community leaders and CDF neighbourhood residents, and academics and consultants from a variety of disciplines. As Chair of the KTT, I also participate on the Community Development Roundtable to report on KTT activities and be accountable to the other Tables. The Community Development Roundtable meets every 3 months, on average.

Community Development Roundtable meetings give me direct access to and interaction with the Deputy City Manager responsible for the CDF, a City of Ottawa Councillor and Board Member of Crime Prevention Ottawa, the Chief Executive Officer of Ottawa Community Housing

Corporation, the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service, a Superintendent of Instruction of the Ottawa Carleton District School Board, the President & CEO of the Community Foundation of Ottawa, and the President & CEO of United Way/Centraide of Ottawa.

In October of 2010, near the very end of my data collection timeframe, the City of Ottawa hired four consultants to conduct a Process Evaluation of the CDF using a SWOB analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Barriers) approach. This process evaluation involved a review of CDF-related documentation, a focus group with every existing CDF Table (at both the local and system level), as well as a full-day working session on November 26, 2010 with the Chairs of each of the CDF Tables (or a designate) and other key players. The purpose of that meeting was to present to the Chairs and others the findings from the SWOB analysis and to work towards developing a Theory of Change model that describes how the different parts of the CDF can work most effectively together to achieve the goals of the initiative. As a member and the Chair of the KTT, I participated in both a focus group with other KTT members, as well as the full-day session on November 26.

Finally, in addition to these “complete participant” observations, I also made a point of visiting each neighbourhood implementing the CDF (i.e., walking through, observing, and speaking to people I encountered as appropriate). I also attended various other CDF-related events, and events related to crime and safety in Ottawa neighbourhoods, mainly as an “observer as participant”. These included:

- at least one meeting of every CDF Local Steering Table (I attended a total of 8 Local Steering Table meetings);

- two meetings of the Ottawa Community Housing (OCH) *Community Safety Steering Committee*. The OCH-led Community Safety Steering Committee is a partnership of agencies with a mandate of working together to improve safety in OCH communities. It includes representatives from Ottawa Community Housing, Ottawa Police Service, City of Ottawa By-law Department, Crime Prevention Ottawa, Ottawa Fire Services, OC Transpo, City of Ottawa CDF team representative, OCH Tenant(s);
- a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Safety Audit in one CDF neighbourhood;
- a *CDF Resident Safety Dialogue* session organized by the CDF Community Table;
- a sharing and visioning session for an emerging initiative between the Ottawa Police Service Community Police Officers and the CHRC Community Developers to begin formalizing their relationship in a way that promotes greater cooperation and coordination of neighbourhood-based efforts and activities. Based on my involvement in the CDF and on this research endeavour, I was invited by a representative of the Ottawa Police Service to participate as an observer in this visioning session.

These events, among many others (see Appendix 2), provided me with a unique opportunity to observe the interaction between various people, organizations and groups. It also allowed me to hear their thoughts on crime and safety issues and activities in Ottawa neighbourhoods, and on the CDF, in public presentations, group discussions, and more private conversations with me on the side (i.e., outside of the formal unfolding of the event in question). In all, I completed a total of **261 hours** of fieldwork (direct participation and observation) over the period from April 8, 2010 to December 7, 2010 inclusive (8 months). This *does not include* the countless hours spent

writing fieldnotes and working on other data collection methods. A complete list of all of my fieldwork activities and observation hours is provided in Appendix 2.

Contemporaneous Fieldnote Taking Approach with In-Process Analytic Reflections

During my fieldwork activities, I jotted down key pieces of information and retreated as soon as possible after the activity to prepare a more complete fieldnote. Using the *contemporaneous fieldnote taking* approach described in Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995: 13), I prepared highly descriptive notes of what I had seen and heard. My fieldnotes focused mainly on the events taking place, the topics and ideas being discussed, the decisions being made, by whom, and the logic and/or criteria used for making those decisions. I also documented the thoughts people shared (using word-for-word quotes when useful and possible), their actions, reactions, and interactions in relation to these events and decisions, taking into account body language when appropriate.

Though I attempted to capture everything as it unfolded, fieldnotes inevitably involve a process of selecting what to include and how to present it (Clifford, 1983; Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I therefore supplemented my descriptive fieldnotes with *in-process analytic reflections* by writing *asides* (brief personal or theoretical reflective bits), *commentaries* (longer, more elaborate reflections or initial links within data) and *memos* (to raise or address methodological questions, help direct future attention, probe analytical reflection) in the right hand margin of my fieldnotes (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995: 100-105). Appendix 3 presents the template I used for this fieldnote taking process. This *contemporaneous fieldnote taking* approach with *in-process analytic reflections* allowed me to document in detail a description of what I had observed and heard, while noting my own personal perceptions,

actions, understandings and emotional reactions to these events, helping me to remain as reflexive as possible during the fieldnote taking process (a full discussion of reflexivity is provided in the next major section of this chapter).

Finally, it is important to note that City of Ottawa staff members, members of the CDF Knowledge Transfer Table and other Tables, members of the Ottawa Police Service, as well as practitioners and stakeholders from the CDF neighbourhoods were all aware of my intentions to carry out this research project. As was approved by the Ethics Board, it was not possible to obtain written consent from every single individual present at the meetings and events held within the natural setting in the field of study. Given the large number of people present at these events, it would have been unrealistic and highly disruptive of me to attempt to obtain written consent. Furthermore, given that my fieldnotes focused on events, ideas, issues and decisions, and that they did not contain specific personal identifiers (I generally recorded the person's relationship to the CDF and demographic information when useful), the potential risk to the individuals present was negligible. At meetings and events where a smaller number of individuals were present and where it was possible and/or appropriate for me to do so, I explained the objectives of my research and the fieldwork involved, and made sure attendees were aware of my project. I gave individuals the opportunity to inform me face-to-face or in writing (either on the spot or in private following the meeting or event) if they did not wish to have their views or their contributions reflected in my fieldnotes. This approach was approved by the University of Ottawa's Ethics Board.

People generally had one of two reactions to my intentions to carry out this project: some were indifferent and offered no reaction, while others were positive and supportive. In a context where

everyone has been ‘doing’ a lot in relation to the CDF without much opportunity to document what has been going on, share perspectives or take a step back, people said they liked the idea of a study that described what had happened and that identified and reflected on some of the key issues that have arisen to date. People were supportive of my goal to ‘tell the story’ of the challenges and complexities of this approach from various perspectives, and understood and appreciated that the intention was not to point fingers of accusation and/or blame at particular groups or individuals. The situation never arose where I had to remove someone’s participation from my fieldnotes.

In-Depth Interviews

One-on-one interviews were conducted with a variety of key informants using a semi-structured, in-depth approach (see Fontana & Frey, 2005; Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). Key informants were recruited in-person in the field of study or through email as appropriate. The information and script that I used to recruit key informants can be found in Appendix 4. Participants were asked two broad introductory questions (see Appendix 5 for the In-Depth Interview Guide). Informants then lead in developing the initial direction of the interview. Participants were then queried more specifically on their experiences, perceptions and understandings of the crime and safety aspects of the CDF, in accordance with their role. Throughout each interview, I privileged techniques such as asking for clarification and content development, as well as the rephrasing and reformulation of their contributions; partial probes on specific topics of interest were used as necessary. This allowed for more in-depth interviews and gave space for participants’ ‘truths’ to emerge (Personal Narratives Group, 1989).

A purposive and maximum variation sampling method was used (see Maykut and Morehouse, 1994), with the ultimate goal of gaining an increased understanding of a broad range of perspectives and experiences relating to the CDF. A total of eight (8) interviews were conducted with participants representing groups involved in, or touched by, the CDF. This included key but somewhat more ‘silent’ or ‘divergent’ front-line service providers and organizational executives (e.g., a Community House worker, Community Developers working in non-CDF neighbourhoods, representatives of community policing with the Ottawa Police Service). Given that the other two methods of data collection provided a very large amount of data, and in particular data related to the ‘goings on’ of the CDF and the perspectives of its various stakeholders, my intention with the in-depth interviews was to focus specifically on accessing the perspectives of those I felt were not well represented within these two methods.

Originally, my intentions were to also interview what could be considered more marginalized voices, such as those of the residents living in neighbourhoods where the CDF is being implemented. Once in the field, these intentions ran into a few challenges, as it became more difficult and at times inappropriate for me to interview neighbourhood residents. Through my fieldwork, I came into contact with most of the residents involved in CDF activities in an informal way in the natural field of study. My first true meaningful point of contact with the residents involved in CDF activities occurred at a workshop held with CDF stakeholders in preparation for a research grant application to evaluate the CDF (held on June 24, 2010). At that workshop, residents talked about the many highs and lows of their experiences with the CDF so far. They openly expressed that their key concerns and frustrations with ‘research’ in particular were its highly formalized nature, and how that formality re-emphasizes for them the power differential between the researcher and the researched. I also participated as an observer in

another half-day CDF event called a Resident Dialogue on Crime and Safety (held on November 10, 2010), where residents were able to share their views of the crime and safety challenges in their neighbourhoods and their experiences with crime prevention efforts so far, in the spirit of sharing stories with, and lending support to, one another.

Given the level of interaction between myself and some residents of CDF neighbourhoods and the quality of the sharing and discussions on those days, I felt that requesting to interview them in a more formal (i.e., tape-recorded, semi-structured) way would have felt staged and contrived to both of us; I also felt that it would have ignored and gone against the feelings they shared with me regarding research practices. I therefore chose to rely on my extensive fieldnotes of the views they shared both in group settings and during more private conversations with me, and to forgo using more formal one-on-one interviews.

Furthermore, I was not able to interview residents who are not involved in the CDF but who live in a neighbourhood where the CDF is being implemented. I originally had the impression that the CDF would become a highly visible and well-known initiative in the neighbourhoods in which it was being implemented. In reality, this was not the case. When I attempted to recruit interview participants (on-site and in-person), I found out that aside from the Neighbourhood Survey distribution in the spring of 2009 and a CDF launch event held in some neighbourhoods (e.g., in most cases a barbecue held in concert with Neighbourhood Survey dissemination), residents had no idea what the Community Development Framework (CDF) was. Some were aware of a new, particular program or activity going on in their community (e.g., talk of forming a new Neighbourhood Watch program, a new playground structure), but they had no idea of the links of these activities to the broader CDF picture (this is discussed further in the findings of this

research). It was therefore impossible to explore the thoughts of these residents on the CDF approach *as such*, which also significantly circumvented my ability to examine resistance to the CDF *per se*. That said, the feelings and perspectives of some residents (not necessarily involved in the CDF) on the crime and safety issues and the crime prevention activities going on in their neighbourhoods were (to a degree) captured in some of the documentation reviewed (e.g., the Neighbourhood Surveys, the Community Talks sessions report) and in fieldnotes taken during my participation in neighbourhood events.

These dynamics, coupled with the high volume of fieldwork I conducted, the truly immersive nature of my participant observation, and my position in this research (as a formal member of the initiative), meant that I reached the saturation point fairly quickly in the interview process. The saturation point is the point at which newly collected data is redundant and the returns from further data collection efforts are negligible (see Maykut & Morehouse, 1994: 62). This, combined with a need to balance the idea of saturation with the other realities of research (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994) - in this case, the large amount of work and time associated with the collection and analysis of data from all three collection methods – led to the decision that an adequate amount of data had been obtained, and that further interviews were unlikely to generate any significant new information. Given the circumstances noted above and the reality of my position in this research, further investigation into resident perspectives as the CDF and its various activities develop may be warranted in the future.

Written consent was obtained from interview participants and each one was assured of the confidentiality of the information discussed during the interview (see Consent Forms in Appendix 6). I emphasized that I would not share things discussed during the interview with

others and that their individual identity would not be discernable in the results. Interviews were audio recorded (with consent) and transcribed verbatim. Attention was also paid to noting different forms of non-verbal communication, such as the pacing and pitch of speech, pauses, hesitations, and laughter. These can be just as telling as language itself (Fontana & Frey, 2005) and can become important during the analysis phase in order to fully access interviewees' descriptions and sharing of their experiences. I prepared a hand-written list of alpha-numerical codes linking in-depth interview participants to their names, which only I had access to. This list was securely stored in a locked drawer of my filing cabinet in my locked office on the University of Ottawa campus, which is protected by the University's alarm system. All hard copies of data were stored there as well. All electronic data (on both my personal laptop and a USB key) was password protected.

Gaining the interest and trust of interview participants, and developing a rapport with them, is critical in attempting to access how they make sense of their worlds (Fontana & Frey, 2005). I was therefore attentive to a number of factors that could lead to interviewer effects (Seidman, 1991), such as my choice of dress, demeanour and language (see Adams, 2000), and the effects that race, class, gender and age can have on the dynamics of the interview (Seidman, 1991; Singer, Frankel & Glassman, 1983). In this respect, the choice of location for the interview was very important (Fontana & Frey, 2005), as was my appearance and demeanour. All interviews were conducted in a location of the interviewee's choosing, mostly on-site at their place of work or in a neutral and informal setting that was comfortable for them (e.g., a coffee shop). I took care to dress and act as formally or informally as the situation called for, according to whether I was interviewing a participant in a public housing Community House or in a more formal office work environment.

Perhaps most importantly, I was faced with balancing the image – positive and negative – related to my status as a PhD candidate and researcher, and perhaps most of all, my involvement in the CDF as Chair of the Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT). In all cases, I located interview participants through networks of relations or by coming into direct contact with them in the field of study. My involvement in the CDF was a key facilitator for my access to interview participants. This meant that for many participants, my identity as a researcher was initially tied to my participation in the CDF's Knowledge Transfer Table. At first, I found this often created some question – perhaps even scepticism – as to my position, objectives and intentions in undertaking this research (e.g., what exactly were my ties to the City of Ottawa and its staff?). I therefore took great care to clearly explain my identity as a Doctoral Candidate, and the independence that comes along with that role (i.e., not 'working for' or reporting to any one specific person, group or organization). I also clearly explained the objectives of this research, reiterated the confidential and anonymous way in which data was being collected and reported, and answered any questions participants had on my relationship to the CDF and its various stakeholders. I feel that speaking openly about my personal engagement in the CDF to date and my subjective location as a researcher helped participants better understand my role, position and objectives in this research (Moffat, George, Lee & McGrath, 2005: 93).

Furthermore, at some points during the interview process, I chose to proceed with a more dialogical form of interaction, rather than strict interviewing. As noted by Moffat, George, Lee & McGrath (2005: 97): "... the dialogical 'to and fro' is not meant to come to some understanding of sameness between the researcher and the participant. Rather, the process is a form of clarification between both participants about their own social experiences". In a few cases, this

involved *experiential affinity*, “the acknowledgement that the researcher and research participant may be linked through similar experience” (Moffat, George, Lee & McGrath, 2005: 94). This method was used only in the case of broad, common themes in either past or current experience. For example, at times (when appropriate) I shared with Community Developers, Community House Workers and Police Officers my own past experience as a front-line service provider for more marginalized groups, as a Detoxification Centre Program Worker in Northern Ontario and a Residential Addictions Counsellor for criminalized women in Ottawa, for instance. With residents, they were sometimes interested in and quizzical about my own personal history, and I was forthcoming with them, for example about my rural, working-class roots. At other times, I acknowledged my own experiences within the CDF, for example in instances of poor communication between CDF Tables. This use of experiential affinity served to foster and increase trust, understanding and communication between myself and the interviewee, and contributed to the dialogical process mentioned above (Moffat, George, Lee & McGrath, 2005).

Doing Ethnography: Subjectivity, Positionality, and Reflexivity

The advantages of doing ethnography include the ability to delve into a diversity of experiences, to take into account a variety of perspectives, and to discover unanticipated aspects (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Ethnography is considered particularly useful for the in-depth exploration of how policies and practices are actually implemented ‘on the ground’ (Emerson, 1987; Hammersley, 1992; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Huberman & Miles, 2002), which was indeed one of the major objectives of this research. Given my complete immersion in the field of study, ethnography was a responsive methodology as it allowed for some flexibility and permitted me to capture and adjust to situations and changes in the environment (Hammersley, 1992; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

Like all methodologies, ethnography also has its limitations and disadvantages. Given that ethnography focuses on a particular setting of interest, it has been criticized for its limited ability to generalize to other settings (Hammersley, 1992). However, though it is necessary to exercise caution in generalizing findings to other circumstances, ethnography has widely been accepted as a useful and particularly effective way of delving into a setting of interest, thereby providing a rich, in-depth account and illustration of its main functions, complexities and tensions. This is often not possible through the use of other methodologies (Hammersley, 1992; Silverman, 2004).

One of the main challenges of doing ethnography is the danger of *appropriating* others rather than *creating a space for* others, which reflects the inherent complexities associated with generating ‘knowledge’ (Campbell, 2003; Clifford, 1983; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). With regards to this critique, this ethnography did not adopt the positivist goal of uncovering ‘the truth’ through objective (empirical) methods, nor did it conform to more traditional historical or sociological approaches that seek to reconstruct chronologies and events as they ‘actually happened’ (O’Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997). Rather, my task as an ethnographer is to reveal the multiple truths that are apparent in others' lived experience of the Community Development Framework in Ottawa, and more specifically of its crime and safety aspects. Great importance was placed on the meanings that social actors attributed to their actions and on understanding the particular social context within which these meanings and actions emerged. In this sense, this research took an “active subject, socially oriented” view of social phenomena (Bottoms, 2000).

As further explained by Bottoms (2000: 31):

‘By being witness to the day-to-day reasoning of their research subjects, by engaging in their life world, by participating in their decision-making’ (Pawson & Tilley, 1997: 21), as well as by careful interviewing of the research subjects about their understandings of

the world, a detailed picture of actors' lived experience can be assembled.

I did not adopt an activist stance where the ethnographer clearly sides with and advocates on behalf of a particular (often marginalized) group (Madison, 2005). However, I did take a critical approach that “takes us beneath surface appearances, disrupts the status quo, and unsettles both neutrality and taken-for-granted assumptions by bringing to light underlying and obscure operations of power and control” (Madison, 2005: 5).

Every research study involves a certain level of subjectivity. As Madison (2005) puts it:

...even with all the good intentions, excellent craftsmanship, and the reliability and eloquence of a particular story, representing Others is always going to be a complicated and contentious undertaking (p.3)... Doing fieldwork is a personal experience. Our intuitions, senses, and emotions are powerfully woven into and inseparable from the process (p.8).

Given my level of involvement with the Community Development Framework as volunteer member and Chair of the Knowledge Transfer Table, there is no question that I was *actively involved* as a participant in this research, and not just as an *interviewer* or *observer*. I developed relationships (both of a professional nature and of a more personal friendship nature at times) with others working within the CDF, at both the neighbourhood and the system level. I also participated in decisions made at the Knowledge Transfer Table and to some extent, the Community Development Roundtable. Like other participants in the initiative, I had moments of frustration, learning, excitement, and disappointment. Through my contributions, I may have influenced some of the directions of the CDF. Though it is important to acknowledge the reactivity and other effects this level of involvement may have had on this research, as noted by Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995: 4), this highly participatory role and consequential presence should not be seen as having a strictly contaminating effect. It also provided “special

opportunities to get close to, participate in, and experience life in previously unknown settings” (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995: 4).

I accept that my active role as a participant in the CDF and my engagement in this research as an ethnographer created a dual role (Grbich, 2004; see also Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). In fact, at times it felt more like a quadruple self:

- My membership on the KTT made me an “insider” with the other members at that Table (including both the academics and City of Ottawa representatives), but had the potential of making me an “outsider” to all others.
- My role as an ethnographer interested in exploring tensions and creating space for multiple voices made me an “insider” with those who felt their voices were not necessarily being heard within the more formal workings of the initiative, but had the potential of making me an “outsider” with those heavily involved in its official structures and processes.

Given this, it was of great importance that I remain as transparent as possible throughout the entire research process. To this end, I made the decision at the very beginning of this project to speak openly about my *personal engagement* in the CDF and my *subjective location as a researcher*, which I feel helped participants better understand my dual role, my position and my objectives (Moffat, George, Lee & McGrath, 2005: 93; Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). I consciously made these decisions based on the belief that a subjective and reflexive posture is both an honest and productive approach to doing research in the community. I feel that exposing my subjective engagement during specific moments in the research process allowed the focus to be on the web of relations and processes that both the participant and I are a part of, rather than on dissecting

the specific actions of participants (Moffat, George, Lee & McGrath, 2005). By making my personal engagement and subjective location explicit, I feel participants were able to make more informed judgements about my position as a researcher, which I believe ultimately contributed to gaining their trust, and to their candidness and the quality of information gathered throughout this research.

Finally, I remained reflexive about the relational issues and personal processes involved in this fieldwork by noting the sensitivities, meanings, and understandings that I had amassed from being close to and from participating in these interactions and events (Emerson, 1983; Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995). 'Reflexivity' involves remaining conscious and aware of one's contribution to the construction of meanings throughout the research process (Bourdieu, 1992). It urges us "to explore the ways in which a researcher's involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such research" (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999:228). It involves reflecting upon how our own values, experiences, interests, and beliefs shape the research, and how the research may have in turn affected us. Finally, reflexivity encourages us to reflect upon the assumptions we may have made throughout the research process, and to think about the implications of those assumptions for the research and its findings (Bourdieu, 1992; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

I purposely documented my own personal and emotional reactions throughout this research as well as my role in creating knowledge and in relations of power within the work of the CDF through *in-process analytic reflection and writing* which is an approach described by Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995). This allowed me to be aware of and attentive to my own activities, circumstances, judgements (based on values, beliefs, etc.), positions, and emotional responses to

events and situations as they unfolded. These memos and asides were written in a Reflexive Diary and within individual fieldnotes (as appropriate) throughout the data collection process, and they were carried forward to the data analysis and reporting process when applicable. This allowed me to reflect on, capture and discuss openly the choices made during the research process and the basis for these decisions, as they are described herein.

Data Coding, Analysis and Reporting

The qualitative data collected through participant observation and in-depth interviews was compiled, organized and coded with the use of NVivo software version 9 by QSR International. The data was analysed with two overarching objectives in mind. The first was to provide a descriptive analysis of how the CDF unfolded, highlighting some different points of view along the way. In Wolcott's (1994: 55) words, "to assist the reader to see what you saw and to hear what you heard". The second objective was to conduct a thematic analysis of the key issues and tensions found within the data.

To reach these objectives, I undertook a *polyvocal analysis*, an approach "that acknowledges and analyzes the multiple and sometimes contradictory perspectives of participants, giving voice to all" (Saldana, 2009: 207). More specifically, I undertook a *two-cycle coding process* (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Saldana, 2009; Van Maanen, 2002). *First cycle coding* (open coding) was done to label first order concepts, which are the descriptions and interpretations emanating directly from the data – how people make sense of their world in both written and oral form (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Saldana, 2009). A range of specific coding techniques were used simultaneously during first cycle coding, described in the sections below.

Second cycle coding (focused coding) was done to gather and explore subsets of data, ask questions, find patterns and determine second order themes, the notions I used to explain and interpret relationships emerging from first order concepts. Some “interpretations of interpretations” (Van Maanen, 2002: 104) were originally derived from the themes emanating from the literature review and theoretical framework elaborated in previous chapters, and room was left for themes emerging directly from the data. Second cycle coding techniques included various types of Queries available in NVivo, along with pattern matching as described by Trochim (1985, 1989).

The process involved in each method is described in more detail in the following sections.

First Cycle Coding and Analysis Methods

In the first cycle of coding, I used an “open” inductive and deductive approach (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Saldana, 2009). To begin, careful reading of the data was done to highlight and name segments of the data according to key ideas (codes, also called nodes in NVivo), without worrying too much about how many codes were being generated or how they may eventually fit together. Some of the codes reflected concepts I was interested in exploring from the start, some codes elaborated on or specified a prior concept in a new or unanticipated way, and other codes identified ideas that were completely unexpected at the outset. The specific first cycle coding methods used are described below. Note that these methods overlap at times and were used in concert with one another throughout the open coding process (versus a step-by-step approach).

Attribute Coding

Attribute Coding provided essential information on the participants represented within the data and the site and context in which the data was collected (Gibbs, 2002; Saldana, 2009). A key to

good qualitative data management, attribute coding is a way of documenting descriptive qualifiers. The focus was on:

- whether the individual is involved in the formal workings of the CDF and in what general capacity (e.g., resident, community developer, police officer, municipal staff);
- participant demographics (e.g., gender, age range, visible minority);
- location, place or site of data collection, date and time; and
- the general type of activity underway (e.g., resident meeting or forum, Local Steering Table meeting, CDF event or activity, research interview).

This allowed me to link attribute codes to data segments in order to then query and compare data in tables and matrices by variables such as participant type (e.g., all data depicting resident perspectives), or general activity (e.g., all data related to Local Steering Table meetings).

Topic or Descriptive Coding

Topic Coding was used to summarize in a word or short phrase the basic topic of a particular data segment, in other words what was being talked about or observed (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2009). This descriptive coding led to a general index of the data's contents, which was essential to help paint a picture of what I saw and heard, and to form the basis for further analytic work (Saldana, 2009). There were no minimum or maximum length restrictions for a Descriptive Code; some codes were linked to one data line, others to an entire paragraph.

Descriptive codes (parent codes) were assigned more specific subcodes (children codes) when needed. For example, the parent code 'police' was further specified into the children subcodes of 'police - trust', 'police - visibility', 'police - communication', 'police - consistency', 'police - continuity', 'police - youth relations', 'police - race relations', and 'police - harassment'.

Provisional Coding

Provisional Coding involves constructing a preliminary list of codes that represent anticipated categories or types of actions and responses based on the research questions and conceptual framework in question (Saldana, 2009: 120). The analytical dimensions used for provisional coding emerged out of the literature review and theoretical framework constructed in Chapter 2 as well as out of my previous knowledge of and experience in the field of study. A synthesis or adaptive theory approach (Leyder, 1998) was used to draft this list of provisional codes. This involved the adoption of concepts and elements stemming from a range of general social theories (GSTs) that were useful in illuminating the phenomenon being studied (Bottoms, 2000). In general terms, GSTs are broad explanatory frameworks concerned with the processes involved in the development of societies, general aspects of social reality, and the relationships between macro and micro influences on social reality (Bottoms, 2000).

Adopting an adaptive theory approach resulted in an initial analytical framework that was relatively durable, but that could be altered reflexively to accommodate new information and themes that emerged from the data (Bottoms, 2000). This implied the use of induction and deduction, where both were equally important and operated in a dialectic relationship to one another, allowing space for their mutual influence on each other and their dual influence on theory construction (Bottoms, 2000; Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Leyder, 1998). As qualitative data was collected, coded and analysed, these provisional codes were expanded, revised and modified to include new codes or to alter existing ones (Saldana, 2009).

Part of the provisional analytical lens for this research came from the literature on *governmentality*, with a particular focus on the role of ‘community’ and the responsabilization of

community within neoliberal forms of governance. This was particularly helpful in shedding light on some of the messy actualities involved in the CDF as a “new way of working”. For example, it allowed me to explore participants’ experiences and perceptions as to whether they were witnessing a *shift in power* from the State to the community, and whether they felt the community had *control over decision-making* in relation to crime and safety. It also allowed me to look at participants’ experiences and perceptions as to whether there had been a *shift in resources* from the State to the community, whether the community felt it had the *knowledge, skills* and *resources (financial, material, human)* it needs to address crime and safety challenges in a sustainable manner. Finally, the governmentality lens helped turn our attention to participants’ experiences and perceptions as to whether there had been a *shift in accountability* for issues of crime and safety, which can also at times mean a *shift in blame*. These themes were supplemented by the notions of *translation* and *resistance* that form the basis of the literature on the messy actualities (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1993; O’Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997) of governmental rationalities, as defined in chapter 3.

These broad notions were supplemented with more specific provisional codes based on the methods of association and known tensions found in community development work and in the politics of crime and community. These themes included:

- tensions related to *partnership* working, including *networking, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration* (see Wolff, 2010; see also Crawford, 1999; Hastings, 2004);
- Challenges inherent to *innovation, organizational development* and *organizational change* (see Battle, 1994 and 1998; Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998 and 1999; Hastings, 2009; Homel, 2009; Hughes, 2007; Kubisch et al., 1997; Latour, 1986; Morgan, 2000;

O'Malley, 1992; O'Malley, Weir & Shearing, 1997; Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2006; Torjman, 2007).

Versus Coding

Versus Coding was also used to identify in more binary terms the individuals, groups, perspectives and concepts that were in direct conflict with one another (Saldana, 2009: 94).

Versus coding helped identify differing and opposing points of view and perspectives, the stakeholders primarily associated with those views, and the central matters or issues of conflict.

Versus codes represented binaries that were provisionally generated from this project's analytical framework, as well as codes that were not predetermined and that emerged directly from the data. Predetermined versus codes focused on the following themes:

- *Central versus Local*: differences in central government (e.g., municipal) ambitions, intentions and implementation, and local level (e.g., Community Centres, neighbourhood associations and residents) ambitions, intentions and implementation (Crawford, 2009; Kubisch et al., 1997; Rosenbaum, 1988; Torjman & Leviten-Reid, 2003);
- *Insider versus Outsider*: differences in the views, values, interests, actions, positions and power of those 'in and of' the neighbourhood (e.g., residents, Community House workers), versus those 'in but not of' the neighbourhood (e.g., Community Developers, front-line service providers), and those 'outside' the neighbourhood (e.g., municipal staff and officials, housing staff and executives, police officers and executives, funders, researchers) (Kubisch et al., 1997; Wolff, 2010);
- *Geography versus Interest*: differences in the views, values, interests, actions, positions and power of geographic communities versus communities of interest (Brint, 2001; Crawford, 1999);

- *Long-Term versus Short-Term*: the desire for a long-term and sustainable approach and impacts versus the need for short-term concrete action and progress (Kubisch et al., 1997; National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007; Westley, Zimmerman, Patton, 2006; Wolff, 2010);
- *Need and Demand versus Capacity*: the gap between what should and/or want to be done versus what can be done right now within current capacity (Hastings, 2009; Homel, 2009; Kubisch et al., 1997);
- *Words versus Deeds*: difference between what is said and what is done (Cohen, 1985).

Versus codes that were not predetermined and that emerged directly from the data include:

- *Front-line versus leadership*: differences in the views, values, interests, actions, positions and power of front-line service providers versus organizational leaders;
- *Police versus community*: differences in the views, values, interests, actions, positions and power of representatives of the Ottawa Police Service versus community members (including service providers and residents).
- *Rural versus urban*: differences in the views, values, interests, actions, positions and power of rural residents and service providers versus urban residents and service providers.
- *Community Health Centres versus Community Resource Centres and Community Service Centres*: differences in the views, values, interests, actions, positions and power of CHCs versus CRCs and CSCs.

In Vivo Coding

In Vivo coding involves using a word or short phrase from the actual language found in the data as a code, in other words using “the terms used by [participants] themselves” (Strauss, 1987: 33). These participant-generated “indigenous” terms can often illustrate an individual participant’s views and give some sense of their origin; a recurrent indigenous term can often point to a group’s particular subcultural categories (Saldana, 2009: 74). In Vivo coding was used in this study to explore these cultural categories and to honour the participants’ voice, rather than using terms derived strictly from my academic discipline and lens (Saldana, 2009). Codes that were participant-generated rather than researcher-generated were always put in quotation marks, to identify them as In Vivo codes.

Co-occurrence Coding

Co-occurrence coding is the application of two or more different codes to the same data segment, or the overlapping of two or more codes for the same data passage (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2009: 62). Since “social interaction does not occur in neat, isolated units” (Glesne, 2006: 150), co-occurrence coding was used to identify various elements of interest within the same data segment (Saldana, 2009).

All first cycle methods of coding and analysis are summarized in Table 1 beginning on the following page.

Table 1. First Cycle Methods of Coding and Analysis.

<u>FIRST CYCLE CODING AND ANALYSIS</u>		
<u>METHOD</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>EXAMPLES</u>
Attribute Coding	Assigns descriptive qualifiers to participants represented within the data and the site and context in which the data was collected.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resident, Community Developer, City staff, police officer, etc. ▪ Demographics: gender, age, visible minority, etc. ▪ Location, time, place ▪ Type of activity underway: meeting, forum, interview, etc.
Topic Coding	Summarizes in a word or short phrase the basic topic of a data segment. Includes both Parent codes and Children codes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parent code: Police ▪ Children codes: police – trust; police – visibility; police – communication; police – consistency; police – continuity; police – youth relations; police – race relations; police – harassment
Provisional Coding	Assigns a predetermined code to a data segment that represents a theme found within the analytical framework.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Role of community ▪ Responsibilization of community ▪ Partnership working ▪ Control over decision-making ▪ Shift in resources ▪ Organizational change ▪ Translation ▪ Resistance
Versus Coding	Identifies in binary terms the individuals, groups, perspectives, concepts, etc. that are in direct conflict with one another.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Central vs. Local ▪ Insider vs. Outsider ▪ Geography vs. Interest ▪ Long-term vs. Short-term

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Need and demand vs. Capacity ▪ Words vs. Deeds
In Vivo Coding	Codes a data segment using the exact language found within the data (i.e., indigenous terms). Codes are participant-generated rather than researcher-generated. They were put in quotation marks to denote their origin.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “top down” ▪ “bottom up” ▪ “community empowerment” ▪ “grassroots” ▪ “dope pushers” ▪ “crackheads”
Co-occurrence Coding	Applies two or more different codes to the same data segment (overlapping codes).	<p>In the data segment:</p> <p>“In the rural even more than elsewhere, coming in with something that wasn’t developed by or with them, I know won’t be received particularly well. We struggle every day to build relationships because we’re seen as outsiders. I think the reaction to this whole CDF thing will be really umm... harsh.”</p> <p>Codes included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘central vs. local’, ‘rural vs. urban’, ‘insider vs. outsider’ (Versus codes) ▪ ‘building relationships’, ‘reaction to CDF’ (Topic codes) ▪ ‘Resistance’ (Provisional code)

Second Cycle Coding and Analysis Methods

Once the first cycle of open coding was completed, a second cycle of focused coding (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Saldana, 2009) was done to pull everything together. This involved reviewing, reorganizing and reconfiguring first cycle codes (and their associated data) and performing a fine-grained, integrative analysis of a smaller set of categories in order to come up

with major themes identifiable in both first-person accounts and in second order reflections (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2009).

The methods used to explore subsets of data and to develop and consolidate descriptive and analytic propositions included Text Search, Word Frequency, Content Coding, Matrix Coding, and Group Coding. These techniques were facilitated by the Queries function within NVivo 9 software; they are described in further detail in Table 2 below. The key techniques used for interpretation were explanation building and pattern matching (Campbell, 1966; Trochim, 1985 and 1989). Explanation building involves organizing and making sense of the facts and ideas within the data (Campbell, 1966). Pattern matching involves the inferential task of linking the facts and ideas within the data to a concept or construct within the theoretical framework (Trochim, 1985 and 1989). All of the methods involved in second cycle coding and analysis are summarized in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Second Cycle Methods of Coding and Analysis.

<u>SECOND CYCLE CODING AND ANALYSIS</u>		
<u>METHOD</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>EXAMPLES</u>
Text Search	Finds all occurrences of a word, phrase, or concept.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Find all occurrences of the word <i>police</i>. ▪ Find all references to <i>police</i>, and find similar words such as <i>cops</i>, <i>officers</i>, <i>Chief</i> and <i>OPS</i>. ▪ Find content where the terms <i>police</i> and <i>trust</i> occur within the same paragraph.
Word Frequency	Finds the most frequently occurring words or concepts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Find the most frequently occurring words in a set of interviews. ▪ Find the most frequently occurring words in a set of fieldnotes.

Content Coding	Finds all content coded at selected nodes, a combination of nodes, or a combination of nodes and attributes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Show where content coded as <i>resistance</i> is near content coded as <i>police</i>. ▪ Show content that is coded as both <i>role of community</i> and <i>control over decision-making</i>.
Matrix Coding	Finds a combination of items (usually nodes and attributes) and displays the results in a table.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Compare what <i>City staff, Community Developers, Police</i> and <i>Residents</i> say about <i>role of community</i>.
Group Coding	Finds items that are associated in a particular way with other items. The items could be associated by coding, attribute value, or relationships.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Show all data with the attribute value <i>residents</i>.
Explanation Building	Organizes and makes sense of the facts and ideas within the data.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Creating a timeline. ▪ Describing the perspective of a certain group over time. ▪ Comparing the perspective of one group to that of another.
Pattern Matching	Links facts and ideas within the data to theoretical concepts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Describing ways in which individuals are made subjects, justifying the argument. ▪ Describing and justifying a finding as an example of <i>resistance</i>.

As is the case with most qualitative data analysis, this second phase of analysis was cyclical, going back and forth to the data as key themes and major patterns emerged. In line with the adaptive approach to theory previously discussed, this interpretive process balanced inductive and deductive analysis, refining and finalizing themes as needed to remain as responsive to and representative of the data as possible. Reflective analytic memo writing was done throughout this process to allow me to reflect on and determine the reasoning behind my coding processes and decisions (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Saldana, 2009).

Evaluative Criteria for Ethnographic Research

Based on the contents of this chapter, I think it is fair to say that this research meets all four criteria articulated by Lincoln and Guba (1985) for assessing the quality of qualitative research.

These are:

1. Credibility, provided by my prolonged engagement in the field of study, my persistent observation within various realms of the initiative, the triangulation of three data collection methods, the inclusion of a wide variety of sources, and the use of multiple theoretical perspectives to examine the data.
2. Transferability (or external validity), fostered through my thick description, in other words the rich and detailed account of the field of study, allowing others to assess the extent to which my findings may be transferable to other settings and situations.
3. Dependability, provided by the “audit trail” herein, that is to say the clear description of my research design, data collection methods and decisions, and the steps taken to manage, analyze and report my data.
4. Confirmability, provided through the audit trail mentioned above, as well as the reflexive account of this research process.

Conclusions

This research focused on the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa, Ontario.

The CDF was designed as a place-based community development initiative built on the principles of collaboration, coordination, inclusiveness, and the active participation of the community. One of its central objectives is to improve safety and perceptions of safety in Ottawa neighbourhoods. The goal of this research is to analyze how the CDF ideal and model operates in practice, and to describe how it is perceived and what it means to people in organizations and

neighbourhoods in Ottawa. The research questions for this study centre on the *messy actualities* of the governance and workings of the community approach to crime prevention and safety within the CDF.

This research consists of a multi-modal ethnography and uses a triangulation of the following data collection methods: (1) a review of documentation, (2) participant observation, and (3) in-depth interviews with key informants. All qualitative data collected through participant observation and in-depth interviews was coded and analyzed using a two-cycle, adaptive theory approach. This resulted in an initial analytical framework that was relatively durable, but that could be adapted to accommodate new information and themes that emerged from the data or that challenged the basic tenants of the initial framework. In keeping with the tradition of ethnographic study, the findings of this research are reported as a rich, descriptive narrative of the approach to crime prevention and community safety within the Community Development Framework in Ottawa, and of the messy actualities involved in this type of work. While it is impossible to avoid the influence of the ethnographer as the subjective collector and interpreter of data, I remained as reflexive as possible throughout data collection and analysis, and focused on conducting and presenting my analysis in a way that represents as faithfully as possible the story of those involved in this research. This story is told in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 4 – INTRODUCING THE KEY PLAYERS: CDF PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS IN CONTEXT

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the key partner organizations involved in the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa. This information is essential to understand the practices involved in community development and in the community approach to crime prevention and safety in Ottawa, and provides key context for the findings revealed in later chapters.

The City of Ottawa

In 2001, the new City of Ottawa was created through the amalgamation of the former Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (formed in 1969); the new City includes the former cities of Ottawa, Nepean, Kanata, Gloucester, Vanier and Cumberland, the former townships of West Carleton, Goulburn, Rideau, and Osgoode, and the former village of Rockcliffe Park. The *City of Ottawa Act 1999*, an act of the legislature of Ontario first passed in 1999, provided for the 2001 amalgamation. Figure 4 below presents the geographical area of the current City of Ottawa. The City of Ottawa is governed by a 24-member City Council comprised of an elected Mayor (representing the whole City) and of 23 Councillors, each representing one of the city's individual wards. The Mayor and City Councillors typically serve four-year terms. The administrative structure of the municipal government – the City of Ottawa – as it was at the time of the launch of the CDF (2008) is presented in Figure 5⁹.

⁹ Note that the City of Ottawa has gone through more re-structuring since 2008. Despite some changes to its major Branches, the Community and Protective Services Department remains largely the same.

Figure 4. Map of the amalgamated City of Ottawa, 2001.




Source: City of Ottawa (2010) at http://www.ottawa.ca/city_hall/

Figure 5. City of Ottawa Administrative Structure in 2008 when the CDF was launched (City of Ottawa, 2008a, p.xvii).

Schedule 1

City of Ottawa Organizational Structure



The following two sections provide a very brief overview of the context around two of the key components of interest within the Community Development Framework (CDF): community development and community policing in Ottawa. These are not comprehensive histories of the two approaches nor do they delve into their many activities and complexities. The purpose here is to introduce the reader to the organizations, structures, actors and terms referred to often throughout the rest of this Chapter.

Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) of Ottawa

Formalized community development work in Ottawa dates back to at least the early 1960s with the enactment of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966 and the existence of the Ottawa Welfare Council (later renamed the Social Planning Council). These and other local factors were the impetus for the eventual creation of two local Community Service Centres, administered by the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton as of 1972 (see Tanner, 1999 for a detailed history).

The purpose of these Community Service Centres was:

- (1) To provide for the residents of a designated area comprehensive neighbourhood-based facilities and services to help achieve and maintain a state of physical, mental and social well-being, and
- (2) to promote the development of active constituencies within neighbourhoods to which Centres can become primarily responsible for services delivered and for identification and establishment of needed community programs. (Tanner, 1999: 18)

In 1975, one of these Community Service Centres hired a nurse practitioner, a nurse and later physicians, with the Social Planning Council and the Regional Municipality securing funding from the Ontario Ministry of Health for the physicians' salaries. From then on, that Centre offered primary health care services (including a Health Clinic) to the residents of their neighbourhood (Tanner, 1999). These two Centres provided a blueprint for other such Centres to

emerge across the city; these were created through the work of the Regional Municipality and/or emerged out of the actions of local residents and community leaders and organizers (Tanner, 1999).

Today, the amalgamated City of Ottawa is served by a network of fourteen (14) Centres in total, together referred to as the *Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs)* of Ottawa. This includes six *Community Health Centres (CHCs)*¹⁰, two *Community Service Centres (CSCs)*¹¹, and six *Community Resource Centres (CRCs)*¹².

Community Health Centres (CHCs) offer health education and promotion, and primary health care delivered by physicians, nurse practitioners, nurses, dietitians, chiropractors, physiotherapists, etc. CHCs also employ social workers who facilitate, coordinate and deliver a range of public health, social and community development programs and initiatives; positions funded by the Ministry of Health are referred to as *Health Promoters*, while positions paid for through other funds (from City of Ottawa, United Way, Community Foundation of Ottawa, etc.) are referred to as *Community Developers* (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010 and July 6, 2010).

Community Service Centres (CSCs) and *Community Resource Centres (CRCs)* do not offer primary health care, but offer a range of social services (e.g., counselling, parenting, youth recreation), public health promotion (e.g., Healthy Babies, Healthy Children program), housing support (e.g., help with affordable housing, evictions, discrimination) and community development programs (e.g., Good Food Box, Community Store, Community Gardens, Crime

¹⁰ Carlington Community and Health Services; Centretown Community Health Centre; Pinecrest-Queensway Health and Community Services; Sandy Hill Community Health Centre; Somerset West Community Health Centre; South-East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community.


¹¹ Hunt Club/Riverside Community Services Centre; Vanier Community Services Centre.

¹² Orléans-Cumberland Community Resource Centre; Eastern Ottawa (Gloucester) Resource Centre; Lowertown Community Resource Centre; Nepean, Rideau and Osgoode Community Resource Centre; Overbrook-Forbes Community Resource Centre; Western Ottawa Community Resource Centre.

Prevention and Safety initiatives). These services are typically facilitated, coordinated and/or delivered by *Community Developers* (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010 and July 6, 2010).

Each Centre is responsible for its own geographical catchment area, with all 14 catchment areas depicted in Figure 6 below. As you can see from Figure 6, some catchment areas are smaller, concentrated urban areas, while others are geographically larger and comprise mostly urban, suburban or rural areas, or in some cases a mix of all three. Each Centre is governed by a Board of Directors and run by an Executive Director and management staff.

Figure 6. Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) of Ottawa Catchment Areas.



Data Source: City of Ottawa

Source: City of Ottawa (2005) at http://www.ottawa.ca/city_hall/social_priorities/appendix_d_en.pdf

CHRCs are generally devoted to what could be referred to as traditional and asset-based community development principles, such as relationship- and trust-building, focusing on facilitating grass-roots initiatives (i.e., “starting where the people are”), keeping projects simple, involving as many local people as possible in all activities from the start, and encouraging interdependent relationships as opposed to dependent or totally independent relationships

(Fieldnotes, June 17, June 24 and July 12, 2010; Interviews #5, #6, and #7; see also Tanner, 1999). Many CHRC representatives refer to the social determinants of health as an overarching framework for their work (Fieldnotes, June 17, June 24 and July 12, 2010; Interviews #5, #6, and #7). The social determinants of health are a population health framework that purports that there is a set of key factors that seem to determine the health status of individuals (see Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008; Raphael, 2004). The following categories are typically found among these key determinants:

1. Income and Social Status
2. Social Support Networks
3. Education and Literacy
4. Employment/Working Conditions
5. Social Environments (which typically includes some notion of safety)
6. Physical Environments
7. Personal Health Practices and Coping Skills
8. Healthy Child Development
9. Biology and Genetic Endowment
10. Health Services
11. Gender-based norms
12. Culture

Intervention strategies based on the social determinants of health framework generally focus on social equity in these factors, on improving these conditions in the general population (Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008; Raphael, 2004). This framework emerged a number of times as a guiding form of knowledge within the CDF; these instances are described later on.

Each Centre receives some core funding and program grants from the City of Ottawa, though the amount varies across Centres (Fieldnotes, June 17, June 24 and July 12, 2010; Interviews #5, #6, and #7). CHRCs rely heavily on their capacity to secure program and project funding from both provincial and federal government initiatives, as well as from foundations and private and

corporate donors (Fieldnotes, June 17, June 24 and July 12, 2010; Interviews #5, #6, and #7). Finally, there is a *Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa*, which gathers the Executive Director from each of the 14 Centres to meet regularly throughout the year. This Coalition serves as the hub for CHRC networking and information sharing, as well as for city-wide planning and advocacy. There is also a *Coalition of Community Developers of Ottawa*, which serves as a similar network for CHRC front-line service providers, namely Health Promoters and Community Developers (Fieldnotes, June 17, June 24 and July 12, 2010; Interviews #5, #6, and #7).

Ottawa Community Housing and the Coalition of Community Houses of Ottawa

The Ottawa Community Housing (OCH) Corporation is the largest provider of social housing in Ottawa that manages over 14,780 homes for about 32,000 tenants, including seniors, parents, children, singles and persons with special needs. OCH runs low rise and high rise buildings, as well as town houses, row houses, detached houses and some rooming houses. Over 50% of tenants have employment or pension income and the remainder receive payments from Ontario Disability Support Program, Ontario Works, Employment Insurance, student loans or other income. In 2009, 34% of tenant households were families with children under the age of 18 and 31% were seniors (OCH, 2010).

The City of Ottawa is the sole shareholder of Ottawa Community Housing. OCH operates at arm's length from the City and has its own Board of Directors of eleven members, including the Mayor (as Ex-Officio), four City Councillors, five community representatives and a tenant Board member. OCH employs about 310 staff including District Managers, Tenant Services staff, Property Managers, Tenant Workers, and Community Safety Officers (more commonly referred

to as security officers) who patrol the OCH areas and respond to calls from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. daily (OCH, 2010). Most of the larger and/or densest OCH communities across the city benefit from an onsite Community House, typically one unit (e.g., a townhouse) dedicated to social, recreational, and skills building opportunities for the diverse individuals, children, youth and families living in the community (Ottawa Coalition of Community Houses, 2010). Most Community Houses offer a variety of services, everything from the use of a computer (and the internet), to evening socials, English as a Second Language courses, childcare, summer day camps for kids, homework clubs, a food bank and healthy food cupboard. The City of Ottawa provides sustained funding to each Community House to cover the salary costs of a Community House Coordinator or Director. Community Houses are responsible for seeking and obtaining funds from City programs and other sources for project and program funding. Since 1998, Community Houses across the city form the *Ottawa Coalition of Community Houses*, which serves as a network for information sharing and mutual support and advocacy. There are currently fifteen (15) Community Houses in Ottawa (Ottawa Coalition of Community Houses, 2010).

In May of 2008, Ottawa Community Housing launched a *Healthy Communities Initiative (HCI)* to create a formalized structure that organizes the various community development activities occurring in OCH communities and provides for more strategic planning moving forward. OCH has defined a “healthy community” as having the following four characteristics (OCH, 2008):

1. *A positive social environment*: an environment that promotes engagement, connectedness and inclusion of tenants.

2. *A safe place to live*: an environment that promotes physical and personal safety and feelings of safety.
3. *Pride of place*: an environment that allows tenants to feel proud of their homes and that promote a sense of satisfaction and self-respect.
4. *Engagement with the broader community*: opportunities to access and participate in various services and resources.

There are five key steps involved in the implementation of HCI in an OCH community: (1) creating a Local Community Team of tenants and service providers, (2) identifying the current conditions in the community, (3) identifying and implementing opportunities for action and change, (4) monitoring and informing the community about actions and changes, (5) evaluating progress and results (OCH, 2008: 2). Ottawa Community Housing began implementing the HCI in two pilot OCH communities in May 2008 (Fieldnotes, May 18, 2010). Note that the process used by the OCH Healthy Communities Initiative is essentially the same as the process involved in the City of Ottawa's Community Development Framework (CDF), also launched in 2008. The implications of this are discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters of this work.

Ottawa Police Service

The Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service (OCRPS) was formed in 1995 by the amalgamation of the Ottawa Police, Gloucester Police and Nepean Police Services. At that time, the OCRPS also assumed responsibility for outlying areas (formerly under Ontario Provincial Police jurisdiction). In 2001, to coincide with the amalgamation of the new City of Ottawa, the service changed its name (but not its operations) to the Ottawa Police Service (OPS). The OPS employs over 1,300 officers and 575 civilians, with a current patrol territory that members often

refer to as roughly the same size as the Province of Prince Edward Island (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interview #).

On its website, directly following its vision, mission and values, the OPS cites community policing as its core philosophy. This involves three simple bullets, which read (OPS, 2010, “About the OPS – Our Community Policing Philosophy”):

- To move in the direction of implementing a problem-oriented policing organization.
- To move as rapidly as possible to include the community as an active partner in problem-solving and prevention.
- To re-assess the current community-based activities of the Ottawa Police, and to retain only those which advance progress in the achievement of the above priorities.

There are six separate policing districts in the City of Ottawa: Rural West District, West District, Central West District, Central East District, East District and Rural East District. Each District is run by a Staff Sergeant who oversees a team of Investigators, Traffic Enforcement Officers, Neighbourhood Officers, as well as a number of Community Policing Centres (see Appendix 7 for the Ottawa Police Organizational Structure). There are 15 Community Police Centres (CPC) distributed across the city. Each CPC is run by one CPC Officer at the Constable level, typically assigned to the position for a 3-year period. All CPCs rely heavily on volunteers to help with administrative duties, outreach, and some service delivery. Note that the 15 Community Police Centres *do not* share the same geographical boundaries as the 14 Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interviews #2, #3, #5, and #7).

The role of each CPC Officer is to promote, support and/or administer the OPS’ eight “Core Crime Prevention Programs”. These are described by the OPS (2010) as (note that the wording used here is taken directly from the OPS):

1. ***Child Print***: This program encourages parents or guardians to visit a Community Police Centre to create a “record” of their child that includes their fingerprints, a recent photograph and descriptive details. It also provides parents/guardians and children with a pamphlet of “street proofing tips”.
2. ***Community Safety Letters***: The OPS states that this program aims to educate “Johns” on the negative impact they have on communities; reduce unwanted traffic; and improve the quality of life of communities impacted by the sex trade. An impact letter, tailored to the community in which the incident occurred, is sent to a driver who is caught picking up a sex trade worker, found in the company of a sex trade worker, found continually driving around the area frequented by sex trade workers, or continually stopping and talking to sex trade workers. OPS states the program is meant to act as a deterrent and raise awareness about the sex trade and its impact on communities.
3. ***Crime Free Multi Housing***: Described as a police/landlord/resident partnership, this program involves a three-phase certification process for landlords (owners and managers) “to keep illegal and nuisance activity out of rental communities”. It relies heavily on the use of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) practices and on tenant selection and responsibility.
4. ***Crime Stoppers***: This popular call-in program relies on anonymity and cash rewards as incentives for citizens to report crimes or contribute information on criminal activity. The OPS participates in this program as a partner with the Canadian Crime Stoppers Association.
5. ***Home Security Inspection***: This program allows people to request that police representatives visit their home to perform a safety audit, and provide any tips and strategies to help defend the home against criminal activity.
6. ***Neighbourhood Watch***: This program aims to “help neighbours to watch out for neighbours”. This program relies heavily on resident coordination and participation, where the Officer serves mainly as a resource.
7. ***Operation Identification***: Meant to deter theft, this program allows residents to borrow an electric engraver from the CPC, free of charge, so they can mark their personal property with a unique identifier, which is supposed to make them easier to track and harder to sell.
8. ***Safety and Prevention Tips***: This program disseminates pamphlets, videos, presentations, and other media on personal safety (i.e., women’s safety, seniors’ safety, safety for children on Halloween), road safety (i.e., distracted driving, car seat inspections) and recreational safety (i.e., in parks and on bike paths).

In general terms, the Ottawa Police Service considers its CPC Officers to be “the face of the Police” in neighbourhoods across the city, implementing these programs and making the necessary links between residents and the rest of the force when necessary (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; OPS, 2010). Some CPC Officers engage in other community programs and strategies, but this largely depends on the preferences of the individual Officer and on their interpretation of their role. Some stick strictly to the Core Programs listed above, while others initiate or participate in other initiatives that are designed to improve communication and the relationship between police and the community and address a community’s specific needs (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interview #2).

The Ottawa Police Service also has a Community Development and Corporate Communications branch which houses a number of civilian members that form a Community Development group, a Diversity and Race Relations component (currently comprised of one Race Relations officer), as well as Corporate Communications and Media Relations (see Appendix 7). The Community Development group is responsible for managing the OPS’s community outreach, Community Committees, and partnership opportunities such as events and activities sponsored jointly by the OPS and non-profit organizations, community groups or businesses. It also provides support to Community Police Centres and School Resource Officers (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interview #3).

During the data collection period, the Ottawa Police Service was in the midst of finalizing a report that recommends the creation of a new Crime Prevention Office within the OPS. Though the contents of the report are not yet public and still under tight internal control, OPS representatives shared that the new Crime Prevention Office would be responsible for researching and promoting the use of evidence-based crime prevention within the OPS, with a

focus on “good practices” and innovation. The anticipated relationship and degree of integration between the OPS Community Policing Centres, the Community Development team, and the new Crime Prevention Office is not yet clear (Interview #3).

There is one last note of context worth mentioning regarding the Ottawa Police Service, as it relates to some of the findings in later chapters. In November 2010, towards the end of the data collection period involved in this research project, the Ottawa Police Service was coming under heavy fire from the local media, community groups and residents for a series of incidents in its central holding cells involving questionable officer conduct and allegations of abuse and maltreatment. Four separate incidents of Officers or Special Constables kicking, kneeling and/or forcefully disrobing citizens being temporarily detained were caught on video and/or reported through the local media. The initial incident dated back to 2008 and arguably got most of the attention. It involved a 27-year-old Black woman with no criminal history named Stacey Bonds¹³, who had been taken to the OPS central holding block for public intoxication (Dyer, 2010). She had been walking home from the city’s most popular entertainment district when she was stopped by Police and asked for her identification. She complied with their request, but an argument broke out (the circumstances are not clear) and she was brought to the central holding block by the Officers in question. Once there, cellblock video showed one female Special Constable kneeling an apparently compliant Ms. Bonds in the side, and a male Officer cutting off her shirt and bra from the back as others stood watching. She was then left for hours in the cellblock without anything to cover the top half of her body. Charges against her were later stayed, with the Judge calling the case a “travesty” and referring to the “appalling behaviours” of Police Officers as seen in the videotape, which the Judge later released (Dyer, 2010).

¹³ All three other cases involved men, one a homeless Aboriginal and the others White males suspected of drug use.

This particular video put the issue of racial profiling by the Ottawa Police Service front and centre, with many others coming forward in the media with allegations of unjust targeting and Police harassment. Various ethnic community groups were demanding accountability and change. Others, such as the group POWER (Prostitutes of Ottawa Work Education Resist) were broadening the discussion to social profiling more generally (profiling based on social status), calling on the Ontario Human Rights Commission to conduct a public inquiry into the Ottawa Police Services' systemic discrimination against sex workers in Ottawa (Dyer, 2010).

As this was unfolding, the Ottawa Police Service was in the midst of revising its Race Relations Strategy. Coincidentally, a Police Services Board meeting on racial profiling had long been planned by the OPS for the very same week the Stacey Bonds story broke in the media. At that public consultation meeting on November 30, 2010, the Chief of Police and other OPS representatives were met by a diverse crowd of about 250 angry and upset residents demanding an explanation and repercussions for the Officers involved in racial profiling, not only in the mediatised cases but throughout the force in general (Fieldnotes, November 30, 2010). OPS responded by launching a series of internal investigations into the mediatised cases, and the Ontario Special Investigations Unit (a civilian agency with the power to investigate and charge police officers with a criminal offence) also begun investigating (Fieldnotes, November 30, 2010; Dyer, 2010). The Chief of Police was standing behind his Officers, pleading with the public to not let "a few bad apples" tarnish the reputation of the whole force (Fieldnotes, November 30, 2010). The damage appeared to be done, however, and the Ottawa Police Service continued to face criticism in the media, on social networking sites and in other public forums throughout the month of December (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010).

No Community Left Behind – A ‘Best Practice’ of the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community

No Community Left Behind (NCLB) is a community-based crime prevention initiative developed by the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community in January of 2005. The model brings together practices of community development and community policing and was initially developed to address gang violence and intimidation in a public-housing community known as Banff-Ledbury (Interview #4). Upon receiving a grant to do leadership training in the neighbourhood¹⁴, community organizers responsible for the program report they ran into some major barriers. Residents appeared isolated, fearful, distrustful of “outsiders” and service providers, and they were complaining about open drug dealing, prostitution, and fighting at all times of the day. Some parents reported that their young children were being intimidated and coerced into taking drugs and participating in other troubling activities: “parents were telling us that recruiting their kids into gangs had turned into a competitive sport for older youth” (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; Interview #4). Acts of retaliation and intimidation by gang members had appeared to cripple most residents’ willingness and ability to report the issues or seek assistance (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; Interview #).

From the perspective of local service providers, local media coverage of the gang violence in Banff-Ledbury had only exacerbated the problem (Interview #4). They felt the fact that the Ottawa Police had publicly named the gang (the “Banff-Ledbury Crips”) and was repeatedly talking about it on the local news had attracted more “wannabees” to the neighbourhood (Interview #4). Residents reported that the police and media attention had heightened their fears and made them feel even more judged by and isolated from the rest of the city (Fieldnotes, June

¹⁴ Under the “Taking Back Neighbourhoods” project of the United Way Ottawa.

24, 2010). For the most part, residents would shut their blinds, lock their doors, and keep their children in the house under close supervision (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; Interview #4).

Faced with this troubling situation, a Community Developer from the South East Centre for a Healthy Community conducted extensive research and consultations on good practice in community development and community-based crime prevention. The NCLB model is a reflection of the Community Developer's literature review, consultations with key agencies, and past experiences with community development in Ottawa (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). NCLB is built on the fundamental principles of collaboration, coordination, community participation and leveraging existing resources. It aims to intervene in the social environment, physical environment, human services and economic realm (NCLB guide, 2008).


The NCLB approach involves 5 Phases (NCLB guide, 2008):

- Phase 1: Organizing and convening a Local Steering Table of key service providers and resident representatives;
- Phase 2: Conducting a participatory community needs assessment of the designated neighbourhood;
- Phase 3: Developing a Neighbourhood Action Plan with priorities and strategies;
- Phase 4: Implementing solutions; and
- Phase 5: Evaluating progress.

These 5 Phases are illustrated in Figure 2. NCLB relies on a community mobilization approach to secure resident commitment and involvement, build community networks, create resident-led leadership structures, leverage internal and external resources, and create new and positive communication vehicles among residents and between residents and local organizations (NCLB guide, 2008). NCLB projects and strategies focus on four key areas of intervention: (1) Law

Enforcement, (2) Community Policing, (3) Prevention, Intervention and Treatment, and (4) Neighbourhood Restoration (NCLB guide, 2008). Figure 7 below is the first articulation of the NCLB approach developed by the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community in 2004-2005. It reflects its main components and shows the grassroots nature of the initiative.

Figure 7. The First Articulation of the *No Community Left Behind (NCLB)* Approach.



Source: <http://www.nocommunityleftbehind.ca/evolution/evolution.html>

The South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community received 1-year project funding from the *National Crime Prevention Centre/Strategy* to conduct the NCLB initiative in the Banff-Ledbury neighbourhood. Activity began in Banff-Ledbury in July 2005 with the implementation phase (of events, projects and strategies) occurring as of November 2005. Within its first year of implementation (summer 2005-summer 2006), service providers and residents involved in the NCLB approach reported significant successes in resident engagement and mobilization, and improved feelings of safety (South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community, 2006a).

Due to its perceived success, the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community secured program funding for NCLB to continue in Banff-Ledbury beyond its pilot phase, as well as to expand into three other neighbourhoods within the South East Ottawa catchment area. This included funding from the City of Ottawa and from United Way Ottawa's Strong Neighbourhoods initiative (Interview #4). NCLB activity continued in Banff-Ledbury and began in the neighbourhoods of Confederation Court, Heatherington, and Russell Heights in August 2006 (South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community, 2006b).

Results from the NCLB annual Neighbourhood Surveys from 2005 to 2007 showed that (NCLB newsletter, 2007):

- In Banff-Ledbury, feelings of safety went up from 51% in 2005 to 84% in 2007.
- In Confederation Court, feelings of safety went up from 29% in 2006 to 59% in 2007.
- In Heatherington, feelings of safety went up from 39% in 2006 to 60% in 2007.
- In Russell Heights, feelings of safety went up from 54% in 2006 to 71% in 2007.

The South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community continues to lead the implementation of NCLB in these four neighbourhoods. In 2010, a 20-minute documentary film called *A Shared Responsibility: The Story of No Community Left Behind* was released describing the work of NCLB in South East Ottawa from 2005-2009¹⁵. The film highlights the approach and presents a number of interviews with residents, service providers, and organizational leaders describing the keys to its success. The key factors mentioned repeatedly include:

- inspirational leadership by the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community and especially its NCLB Community Developer;
- an ability to gain resident trust and engage a large number of them in a variety of events and activities;
- a commitment from the City Councillor to participate in NCLB processes and activities and follow up with institutional partners on behalf of the community (e.g., to get CPTED audit recommendations implemented by various departments);
- a consistent presence by Ottawa Police Service *Neighbourhood Officers* in NCLB planning and implementation, and their work in building relationships with neighbourhood residents.

It is interesting to note that through the NCLB approach, a Neighbourhood Watch program was initiated in the Banff Ledbury community in September 2007. However, even though residents were engaged and interested in participating in neighbourhood change, they were still highly reluctant to engage in a program they felt put them at risk for retaliation. For a while, the Community House Director had offered to be a link between residents and the police for reporting incidents, but that had its challenges as well. For one, it often put the Community

¹⁵ The film was funded through a Knowledge Transfer Grant from the Social Development Partnerships Program of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC).

House Director in awkward and challenging positions, given her mandate to provide support to *all* residents. It eventually became apparent to service providers that a Neighbourhood Watch program was neither feasible nor effective in this neighbourhood.

What residents and service providers involved in NCLB felt really made a difference was the eventual approach to community policing taken by the Ottawa Police Neighbourhood Officers involved in the initiative (Interview #4 and #8; Fieldnotes, July 6, 2010). The officers had been given permission by their superiors to focus their time and energy on that particular neighbourhood, to interact face-to-face with residents in good situations (i.e., community events) and in more delicate situations (i.e., during drug sweeps) to allow for two-way communication between residents, service providers and the police. For residents, this meant they got to know and trust their Neighbourhood Officers, and felt reassured that the neighbours that were causing them problems and fear were being monitored (Interview #4 and #8; Fieldnotes, July 6, 2010).

Crime Prevention Ottawa

In 2004, a City Councillor led the creation of a Panel for Community Crime Prevention, which produced a report focused on the ‘what works’ arguments for crime prevention, and made the social and economic case for creating a comprehensive crime prevention and safety strategy for the City of Ottawa (Panel for Community Crime Prevention, 2004). The report was presented to City Council and a permanent responsibility centre for crime prevention was created in the 2005 budget process; it was called Crime Prevention Ottawa (Motion no. 27/66). This included an annual investment of \$400,000 (which increased gradually to \$500,000 by 2009) and the secondment of two full-time staff positions from the Department of Community and Protective Services of the City of Ottawa.

Crime Prevention Ottawa's (CPO) mission is "to contribute to crime reduction and enhanced community safety in Ottawa through collaborative, evidence-based crime prevention" (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2006: 1). CPO's goals are (CPO, 2006: 2):

- To implement specific targeted crime prevention programs and to support programs through appropriate community agencies and associations.
- To assist and support community groups and the City in acquiring, developing or enhancing the tools needed to operate programs to increase safety.
- To seek the funds and create partnerships essential for sustaining long-term crime prevention programs.
- To promote policy solutions to issues of crime and disorder.
- To monitor and evaluate on an ongoing basis the progress and impacts of plans and implementation.

Crime Prevention Ottawa is considered a "quasi-independent" entity from the City of Ottawa. It is governed by a Board of Directors responsible for the strategic direction and financial management of the organization. An Executive Director reports to a personnel committee and to the Chair of the Board. The Board of Directors is currently made up of representatives from the City of Ottawa (including two City Councillors, and the Deputy City Manager responsible for the CDF), the Ottawa Police Service, Ottawa Community Housing, the United Way/Centraide Ottawa, the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa, Ottawa's school boards, the Ottawa Youth Justice Services Network, Immigrant Women's Services Ottawa, the private sector, a Full Professor in Criminology, and others. Crime Prevention Ottawa is also accountable to an advisory group called the Community Forum made up of a broad representation of the community and of institutions which contribute to safety. Early on, the CPO Board of Directors agreed to focus on three particular areas of interest through a strategic planning process. These are: (1) reducing

violence against women, (2) reducing crime in high-risk neighbourhoods, and (3) working with youth in high risk environments (CPO, 2006).

In 2006, Crime Prevention Ottawa began a community development project in Ottawa's downtown neighbourhood of Vanier. Inspired largely by the momentum and successes of the No Community Left Behind (NCLB) initiative in South East Ottawa, and impressed that it was based in research and practice evidence, Crime Prevention Ottawa began supporting similar work through an initiative called *Together for Vanier-Ensemble pour Vanier* (Interview #8). Since then, Crime Prevention Ottawa has funded two other similar, place-based crime prevention through community development initiatives, namely *United Neighbours* in the Pinecrest-Queensway catchment area and *Lowertown Our Home-Basseville, notre chez nous* in the Lowertown catchment area. These initiatives are coordinated by a Community Developer from each Community Health or Resource Centre and are implemented through thematic Working Groups that bring together local service providers and resident leaders. These Working Groups focus on issues that include beautification, street disorder, drugs, addictions and prostitution, or mental health (Interview #8).

In 2007, Crime Prevention Ottawa initiated the Ottawa Youth Gang Prevention Initiative (OYGPI), co-chaired by Crime Prevention Ottawa and the Youth Services Bureau (YSB) of Ottawa. Its vision is to support youth and families to prevent youth from becoming involved in gang activity and to reduce and prevent the harmful effects of youth gangs in Ottawa through a collaborative, holistic, evidence-based strategy of prevention and intervention. The initiative's four component strategy involves (Hastings, 2010):

- (1) *Healthy Neighbourhood Cohesion*: Building positive relationships in gang affected neighbourhoods to reduce fear and strengthen the community fabric.
- (2) *Prevention*: Activities, programs and supports which seek to positively engage young people with their families, their schools and their community *before* they are attracted to gang life.
- (3) *Intervention*: Programming that engages with youth who are involved or beginning to be involved in youth gang activity.
- (4) *Suppression*: Targeted enforcement aimed at criminal gang activity.

The OYGPI has four Working Groups that focus on Data acquisition and analysis, Funding and policy development, Education and awareness, and Membership and partnership. An Executive Committee oversees and coordinates the activities of the four Working Groups. A Stakeholders Consultation Group composed of over 70 individuals representing approximately 35 agencies and organizations oversees and approves the overall work of the OYGPI (Hastings, 2010).

Following the release of the OYGPI-sponsored report titled *Now is the Time to Act: Youth Gang Prevention in Ottawa* (Chettleburgh, 2008), the OYGPI identified 6 priority geographical areas of the city to focus its efforts on¹⁶ (see Kelly, 2009). Since then, the OYGPI has organized some public forums, training sessions and workshops for service providers and for parents, and has supported research pieces such as a youth outreach and needs assessment in two priority areas and a Life Course History and Youth Gang Involvement research project expected to be completed in early 2011 (Interview #8).

¹⁶ Note that the geographical areas that later became the focus of CDF implementation are comprised within these 6 larger geographical areas that are the focus of the OYGPI.

In early 2010, Crime Prevention Ottawa faced a major challenge to its existence when the Mayor proposed to cut its funding from the City of Ottawa operating budget. After successful lobbying by the CPO Board and the support of many residents who attended public budget meetings in defense of Crime Prevention Ottawa, City Councillors voted to restore CPO's budget on January 28, 2010. In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, CPO continues to support other activities, such as their Paint it up! public art mural program for youth, the dating violence prevention program The Fourth R, and public education tools and campaigns (Interview #8).


CHAPTER 5: THE LAUNCH OF THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (CDF) IN OTTAWA AS A “NEW WAY OF WORKING” (2008), AND REACTIONS ON THE GROUND

Building on the context presented in the previous chapter, this chapter describes in detail the emergence of the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa as a “new way of working”. The following sections describe how the Community Development Framework emerged within the City of Ottawa, how the five CDF goals were decided upon, how neighbourhoods were selected for CDF pilot implementation, and how an evaluation framework was drafted. The story told reflects what I read, heard and observed over the course of the data collection process. A variety of perspectives are shared, highlighting both the formal (i.e., public) and more informal (i.e., behind the scenes) unfolding of the initial stages of the CDF, including a final section on perspectives, reactions and contestation ‘on the ground’. This ‘piecing together of the story’ represents a significant contribution to what is known about the unfolding of the CDF in Ottawa. The focus of this chapter is on describing how things unfolded from a variety of perspectives - a more in-depth analysis and critical engagement with these themes appears in Chapter 8.

To help orient the reader, some of the major events and milestones of the Community Development Framework (CDF) and of this ethnography are summarized in the timelines presented on the next page (Figure 8). These timelines highlight selected events only (all of which are addressed in this work) and do not represent a full list of CDF activities.

Figure 8. Timeline of the Community Development Framework (top) and of this Ethnographic Research (bottom).

Timeline: Community Development Framework (field of study)



Timeline: Ethnography (my involvement in and research on the CDF)



How It All Began: The Rationale and Roots of the CDF within the City of Ottawa

In 2003, the newly amalgamated City of Ottawa developed its main vision, articulated in *Window on Ottawa 20/20: Ottawa's Growth Management Strategy* (City of Ottawa, 2003). The plan has 7 guiding principles:

1. A Caring and Inclusive City
2. A Creative City Rich in Heritage, Unique in Identity
3. A Green and Environmentally-Sensitive City
4. A City of Distinct, Liveable Communities
5. An Innovative City Where Prosperity is Shared Among All
6. A Responsible and Responsive City
7. A Healthy and Active City

Shortly after, in early 2004, the City of Ottawa went through a major organizational restructuring, changing its four main Departments into the three Departments shown in Figure 5. This restructuring resulted in the creation of the Community and Protective Services Department (City Operations Portfolio) headed by a newly appointed Deputy City Manager. The new Community and Protective Services Department brought together all major service areas that provide direct services to residents. By 2005, the Community and Protective Services Department of the City of Ottawa was engaged in several of what they called “strategic projects” that focused on some of the priorities in the City’s 20/20 Plan (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). The Department was becoming increasingly interested in principles of community development and problem-solving, with a focus on “promot[ing] positive outcomes in the community by working collaboratively with community partners and citizens in the planning and delivery of

inclusive and responsive services (CPS community development problem-solving initiative, internal document, 2005). The Department committed to striving for a more holistic service delivery approach (dubbed “How can we help?”) that aimed to (CPS community development problem-solving initiative, internal document, 2005):

1. Improve services
2. Improve communication with communities
3. Empower communities
4. Connect talents of the front-line staff and give them tools to provide quality services
5. Increase community capacity

The idea of place-based planning was also of interest, with Community and Protective Services staff conducting extensive research on the topic (Filednotes, November 26, 2010).

One of the projects to emerge from this strategic direction was the Neighbourhood Planning Initiative (NPI). The NPI is a place-based approach with two goals: “to create active engagement with citizens in the planning of their neighbourhoods and develop strategies and processes to better coordinate all planning and related City services in a geographic area” (Kanellakos, 2008: 4). The focus of NPI was on joining up the planning for land use, infrastructure and human services within small geographic areas (Kanellakos, 2008). The planning for NPI began in 2005, with the neighbourhoods of Hintonburg/ Mechanicsville (a well-established urban neighbourhood that had two major infrastructure projects planned) and Vars (a rural neighbourhood 25km east of downtown) eventually chosen as pilot sites. NPI involved public meetings, education sessions and information sharing with residents, businesses, property

owners, community groups and other stakeholders to assess each neighbourhood's strengths and weaknesses, and to identify priorities for future physical, social, economic, and cultural development (City of Ottawa, 2010)¹⁷.

City of Ottawa staff reported that their work on the Neighbourhood Planning Initiative (NPI) and other strategic projects (e.g., the Arts Investment Strategy; City for All Women Initiative; Integrated Drugs and Addictions Strategy; Homelessness and Safe Streets Act Task Force) made it clear to them that the most successful initiatives were ones that engaged the public in identifying priorities and setting goals (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). As one senior City of Ottawa staff stated, "We can't do it alone. We benefit as a municipality in terms of resources, transparency and community building, but the community needs to be front and centre in these kinds of initiatives" (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). In 2006, as the City of Ottawa contemplated the second phase of many of these projects and initiatives, City Councillors were asking themselves and City staff the following questions: "As a municipality, what is our approach to community development? How do we bring all these disparate strategies and projects together to create an overarching approach that people can understand and contribute to?" (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

That prompted the Community and Protective Services Department to ramp up its research on good practice in community development across the country and around the world. City staff conducted a number of literature reviews as well as telephone and in-person consultations on community development within other major municipalities in Canada and abroad. With a desire to also respect what was already happening locally, City staff began an environmental scan of

¹⁷ Both neighbourhood plans were received by City Council at the beginning of 2010 and are now in the implementation phase (City of Ottawa, 2010).

community development practices within Ottawa. They found many examples of community development initiatives that appeared to be working well, but one in particular stood out for them: the *No Community Left Behind (NCLB)* initiative developed and implemented by the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008; Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

City of Ottawa consultations with the No Community Left Behind team and other Community Health and Resource Centres across the city revealed that there were many great existing community development initiatives in Ottawa, but they were operating in isolation from one another. In addition, service providers and Community Developers felt there was a constant struggle to break through bureaucratic channels in order to “make things happen” in and for neighbourhoods (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). They needed more direct access to and consistent support from the key system level players in the city: municipal government departments, public-housing authorities, police, local funders. Community groups and partnerships felt they were doing great work on-the-ground, but they were constantly running into barriers when it came time to get the main local organizations involved in their change process. They were frustrated by how long and complicated a process it was to get everything from an outdoor light bulb changed to gaining access to the local gym for youth programming (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010). The high rate of turnover in staff positions within local bureaucracies made it difficult for them to build lasting and impactful relationships with key service providers. This was especially true of the Ottawa Police Service Community Police Officers, who typically entered their position with very little to no knowledge of the neighbourhoods in question, and left their position after 1 or 2 years at most despite their 3-year assignment (Fieldnotes, June 17, July

6, November 3, and November 26, 2010). Finally, most initiatives were relying on 1-year project-based funding with very little stability or longer-term security, making it difficult to ensure follow-through and sustainability (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24, July 6 and November 26, 2010).

Armed with this knowledge, City of Ottawa senior staff said they felt their approach shouldn't attempt to reinvent community development on the ground (they felt it was happening well), but should rather focus on devising an approach to bring in system support for community development across the city (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010). City staff therefore began an extensive consultation process with organizational stakeholders within the city they perceived to be key players and essential partners in this type of approach. This group included the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) of Ottawa, Ottawa Community Housing, Ottawa Police Services, school boards, Crime Prevention Ottawa, Leadership Ottawa, the Ottawa-Carleton Immigrant Services Organization, the Trillium Foundation, Community Foundation of Ottawa, United Way Ottawa, university professors, and others. In these meetings, they raised questions about the possibility of working collaboratively on a shared vision for healthy neighbourhoods, on shared goals, on leveraging resources, on a commitment to "real" resident engagement, and on "working together to ensure that systems are responsive" (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010). The reaction City of Ottawa staff felt they received was "a resounding yes" (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). What City of Ottawa representatives took away from those conversations was that organizations recognized that they could be providing more or better support to local initiatives, and that people wanted to come together to create change (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

City of Ottawa staff therefore came up with a governance structure and a process that they felt would bring people together and encourage representatives from different organizations to work together towards change (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008; Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). They called it the *Community Development Framework (CDF)*. Where the existing Neighbourhood Planning Initiative (NPI) had a broader approach focused on both short and longer-term planning for all elements of a neighbourhood, with a particular focus on zoning and physical infrastructure, this new initiative would focus on the social, economic and general health issues in the present and short-term (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; Kanellakos, 2008). It was seen as a deliberate attempt to bring various social service and community partners together “to put their money where their mouth was, both financially and organizationally, to work differently to the benefit of neighbourhoods”, says a City of Ottawa CDF team member (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). City staff emphasized that this wasn’t about one organization coming in to fund something new, but that it was about how to collectively leverage resources (financial and otherwise) to make things happen in neighbourhoods (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010; Kanellakos, 2008).

Based on all their research and consultations, and inspired largely by the *Hamilton Roundtable for Poverty Reduction*¹⁸ (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008), City of Ottawa staff put together the *Community Development Framework (CDF)*, as illustrated in Figure 3.

This included bringing organizational leaders together through the *Community Development*

¹⁸ The Hamilton Roundtable for Poverty Reduction was formed in 2005 to work towards investments in poverty reduction strategies and policy and “systems-level” change to tackle the City of Hamilton’s levels of poverty. The Roundtable includes members from the business and non-profit sectors, government, education and faith groups, and residents who experience poverty daily. See www.hamiltonpoverty.ca for more information.

Roundtable, bringing local funders together through the *Resource Table*, creating “real-time access to municipal staff and services” through the *Municipal Services Table*, and infusing knowledge on good practice and evaluation into the approach through the *Knowledge Transfer Table* (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010). The decision to create these Tables was largely based on the feeling that those respective organizations had never sat together or collaborated strategically before. City of Ottawa staff saw the CDF as an innovation among Canadian municipalities, in that it was a deliberate and purposeful attempt at bringing key local system players together to focus on place-based planning and change (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). They saw the CDF as an initiative “that will move the city from fragmented approaches of addressing community needs in neighbourhoods to an approach that supports a focused, coordinated and strategic effort to align services and resources” (Kanellakos, 2008: 1).

Despite the fact that City of Ottawa staff said many times that the CDF was *not* trying to reinvent community development in Ottawa (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 22, June 24 and November 26, 2010; Interviews #5 and #6), the Community Development Framework did prescribe a process through which community mobilization and development was to be undertaken at the neighbourhood level (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008). The City of Ottawa was “interested in facilitating a city-wide community development framework, requiring a sound community problem-solving model” (Knowledge Transfer Table minutes of March 17, 2008, p.1). City of Ottawa senior representatives were impressed by the successes of the *No Community Left Behind (NCLB)* initiative in South East Ottawa (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010). An early internal CDF planning document (“CDF at a Glance”, 2008:1) puts it this

way: “CDF does not intend on minimizing approaches currently in place, but works to compliment the community work being done by tailoring the NCLB strategy to address each neighbourhood’s needs”.

The City of Ottawa eventually adopted the NCLB problem-solving process illustrated in Figure 2 as *the* approach to community mobilization and development within the Community Development Framework (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008). It was expected that stakeholders in each CDF neighbourhood would - with the help and leadership of a Community Developer from the local CHC or CRC – follow the 5 phases of (1) creating a CDF *Local Steering Table*, (2) conducting a neighbourhood assessment of assets and needs, (2) developing a neighbourhood action plan with priorities and recommendations, (3) implementing proposed solutions, and (4) monitoring progress. This work was to be supported by action planning and the provision of resources at the ‘system’ level (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008).

In April of 2008, the City of Ottawa obtained a commitment from the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa to play a leadership role in the implementation of the CDF. A number of meetings were held between the City of Ottawa CDF team and the Coalition of CHRC Executive Directors prior to and following this commitment (in September 2007, April 2008 and October 2008) to establish the role of CHRCs in the CDF and identify exactly what would be expected of the CHRCs (Fieldnotes, July 6, 2010). To help bridge the gap between what was happening in the CDF neighbourhoods and within the system, a CDF Coordinator position was created, funded jointly by the City of Ottawa and the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa. The Community Developer who had led the development and implementation of No Community Left Behind (NCLB) in South East Ottawa

was hired as the first CDF Coordinator. He was to work under the leadership of the Executive Director of the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community, who was also co-chair of the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4, 2008; Fieldnotes, July 6, 2010).

The City of Ottawa CDF team had held consultations with the institutional players they saw as key partners for this approach to proceed, and felt they had secured a commitment from them. They had also held meetings with City Councillors to garner support for the proposed model (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). On June 25, 2008, City Council officially endorsed the Community Development Framework (CDF) as a city-wide initiative of the Community and Protective Services Department (Memo to Council, May 15, 2009). By that time, the City of Ottawa team had already commissioned three preparatory projects, and these were underway at the recently formed Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT). Since March of 2008, the KTT was working on: (1) identifying a sound methodology for the selection of three neighbourhoods as pilot sites for CDF implementation, and carrying out the analysis to provide recommendations for pilot neighbourhoods based on empirical data, (2) developing a comprehensive CDF process and outcome evaluation framework, and (3) developing a Neighbourhood Survey for neighbourhood needs assessments (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 17, 2008).

The Process of Selecting Areas for CDF Pilot Implementation

When designing the Community Development Framework (CDF), the City of Ottawa's intention was that it be a citywide initiative that would eventually be operational in all parts of the city. Feeling that the CDF couldn't be everything to everyone all at once, the City of Ottawa team decided it would begin CDF work in three pilot areas that were assessed as being most 'at-risk', 'disadvantaged' or 'vulnerable'. There was a desire to begin the work in parts of the city that

were seen as needing it the most (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4 and March 17, 2008). In order to test CDF implementation in different types of contexts and situations, the City of Ottawa CDF team also expressed a desire to choose three pilot sites with differing levels of CHRC capacity. The rationale was that there was a lot to be learned about how this new model would unfold within different CHRCs and different neighbourhoods, based on their different levels of engagement with residents, relative internal staff capacity, existing programming, and external partnerships and support (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 4 and March 17, 2008).

In March of 2008, the City of Ottawa enlisted the help of the newly formed Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT), and asked them to use existing data sources to provide recommendations on areas of the city that were most “disadvantaged” or “at-risk” (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 17, 2008)). City of Ottawa staff saw this as a legitimate way to go about selecting pilot neighbourhoods, and especially as an effective way to “depoliticize” the selection process (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 17, 2008; Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). There was a fear on the part of senior City staff that if it were left up to City Councillors to decide, the discussion of where to start would be highly contentious, and decisions would not necessarily reflect where the work was “needed the most” (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

First, members of the KTT warned City staff that using words such as “at-risk”, “disadvantaged” or “vulnerable” could lead to stigmatization and create resentment on the part of residents and organizations that the City was labeling them a certain way. They cited many examples of such situations in the past, both in Ottawa and in other municipalities. After this discussion at the Knowledge Transfer Table, it was decided that the phrase to be used was: “neighbourhoods that could most benefit from community development” (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March

17, 2008). That phrase did not catch on, however, as it was deemed too cumbersome (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). Neighbourhoods chosen for CDF implementation were more commonly referred to as “CDF pilot neighbourhoods”, and eventually widely referred to as “CDF neighbourhoods” (Fieldnotes).

To identify these pilot neighbourhoods, the Knowledge Transfer Table decided to rely on four main criteria: socio-economic status, individual health, early childhood development, and crime. These four criteria were decided on by the KTT after long deliberations as to which factors may be the most useful indicators of a need for support. The KTT used three main sources of data: (1) the *Ottawa Neighbourhood Study (ONS)*, (2) crime data from the Ottawa Police Service, and (3) a short survey of Community Health and Resource Centres (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, July 23, 2008 and September 16, 2008).

The Ottawa Neighbourhood Study (ONS) is a longitudinal research project led by Dr. Elizabeth Kristjansson at the University of Ottawa (see Kristjansson et al., 2008), who is also a member of the KTT. The Ottawa Neighbourhood Study is a multi-disciplinary study housed within the *Institute of Population Health* at the University of Ottawa, and is funded by the *Canadian Institutes of Health Research*. In its first phase, the ONS focused on defining specific neighbourhoods in Ottawa using physical boundaries, real estate maps, community team member knowledge, and city planning department knowledge. It also conducted a number of consultations with residents and groups throughout the city to determine their perceptions of neighbourhood boundaries. The project was designed to better define Ottawa neighbourhoods and measure and map neighbourhood social determinants of health amenable to policy interventions (Kristjansson et al., 2008).

A total of 94 neighbourhoods were identified in Ottawa, with 89 of them considered inhabited (Kristjansson et al., 2008). It is important to note that the Ottawa Neighbourhood Study deals with ‘neighbourhoods’, while each Community Health Centre, Community Service Centre or Community Resource Centre (together referred to as the *Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa*, or CHRCs for short – see p. 111) operates within a particular ‘catchment area’. The ONS neighbourhoods and the CHRC catchment areas do not share the same geographical boundaries. The ONS neighbourhoods are much smaller geographically, with a total of 89 inhabited neighbourhoods for the City of Ottawa versus the 14 larger CHRC catchment areas in the City of Ottawa.

Once neighbourhood delineation was complete, the ONS team prepared a Neighbourhood Profile for each of these 89 areas using contextual and compositional socio-demographic data and data related to the social determinants of health, obtained from the Canadian Census, the City of Ottawa, Ottawa Public Health, the National Capital Commission, Success By Six, and other organizations (Kristjansson et al., 2008). These profiles are available on the ONS website at www.neighbourhoodstudy.ca. Data within the ONS goes back to 2006 and each profile includes:

- a map of the neighbourhood;
- a brief history and description of the neighbourhood;
- a breakdown of the demographic structure;
- a breakdown of home ownership versus rental units;
- civic engagement (percent exercising their municipal vote, community groups and associations);
- the food environment (access to grocery stores, specialty stores);
- the greenspace, parks and recreation environment;
- education and culture;

- financial services;
- health services;
- neighbourhood health outcomes; and
- child school readiness.

In its early stages, ONS researchers were not successful in obtaining crime data from the Ottawa Police Service to include in the neighbourhood profiles (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008). The ONS team received Ottawa Police data for the first time in 2010, long after their original request and two years after the time of selecting neighbourhoods for CDF implementation (Fieldnotes, August 19, 2010). At the time of writing, ONS researchers were beginning to update each neighbourhood profile to include rates of police-recorded property crime and crimes against the person (Fieldnotes, August 19, 2010).

Using data within the ONS at the time (March 2008), the KTT came up with a statistically-derived score for each neighbourhood in Ottawa using Principal Components Analysis in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Each neighbourhood's score was based on the following indicators (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008; Fieldnotes, April 15, 2010):

- *Low Socio Economic Status*, which included % of households below the Low Income Cut Off and % of households unemployed;
- *Poor Health*, which included high rates of hospitalization for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (conditions for which hospitalization is thought to be avoidable with the application of Public Health interventions and early disease management), low Self-Rated Health, and high rates of Low Birth Weight;

- *Low Early Development Index Scores / Child School Readiness*, which included % of children that score below the 10th percentile in one or more of the five key domains of: physical health and well-being, social competence, emotional maturity, language and cognitive development, communication skills and general knowledge.

Each neighbourhood's score based on these indicators was not shared outside of the KTT nor published. All members of the KTT felt that these scores were only relevant within the context of the selection process and did not want to create opportunities for the information to be misrepresented or used out of context. More specifically, researchers, service providers and City staff alike wanted to avoid the potential for further stigmatization of any neighbourhood and neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood comparisons being made in the media (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008; Fieldnotes, April 20, 2010).

The KTT had always intended on using crime as a selection criterion, but as previously mentioned, the Ottawa Police Service had not yet granted the ONS access to their crime statistics. With some pressure from City of Ottawa senior staff, the Ottawa Police Service provided the Knowledge Transfer Table with some crime data, but it was not the information they had requested and it had significant limitations (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008). First, what the Ottawa Police provided were number rankings, in other words a score representing how each neighbourhood fairs in comparison to others within the city on both police-recorded property crime and violent crime. Second, these rankings were based on the total number of offenses reported (i.e., counts), not presented on a per capita basis (i.e., rates), even though the geographical locations involved varied greatly in size and concentration. For these reasons, the information provided by the Ottawa Police was given secondary and limited consideration only. The Knowledge Transfer Table wanted to avoid giving too much

weight to these types of rankings, and also felt hesitant about using information based only on crimes reported to police, given known low reporting trends in certain areas of the city (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008; Fieldnotes, May 4, 2010). Furthermore, the rankings provided by the Ottawa Police were organized according to their geographical boundaries, not the ONS boundaries. Nonetheless, keeping these limitations in mind, areas that ranked the highest on crimes reported to police did contain the most ‘vulnerable’ neighbourhoods as determined by the socio-economic, health, and early childhood scores derived from the ONS. The KTT saw this as an indication that they were on the right track to identifying areas of the city that were dealing with multiple and inter-related issues (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008).

Based on a recommendation from the KTT, a decision was made by the City of Ottawa CDF team to conduct a separate piece of research to assess each Community Health Centre (CHC), Community Service Centre (CSC) and Community Resource Centre’s (CRC) interest in participating in the CDF, along with their perceived capacity to carry out the pilot implementation (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, July 23, 2008). A short survey prepared by the City of Ottawa and revised and finalized by the KTT was circulated to the Executive Director of each Centre. This process was facilitated by the CHC Executive Director who sat on the KTT as a representative of the CHRC Coalition. The survey asked the following questions related to current levels of resident mobilisation within their respective catchment area (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008):

1. Is there an active community association? (y/n)
2. If yes, is the community association representative of the neighbourhood residents?

3. Is there a common community hub actively used by residents?
(y/n)
4. Are there regular neighbourhood events frequented by a diversity of residents? (y/n)
5. How mobilized would you rate the residents to take on changes?
(High, Medium, Low)

In addition to these questions, CHRCs were asked to comment on their capacity to undertake community development initiatives under the proposed CDF. They were asked open-ended questions about: (1) internal resources (staff, time, space, volunteers, etc.), (2) external resources (community engagement, partnerships, access to space, in-kind support), (3) their interest in participating in the CDF, and (4) their willingness to participate in the CDF *within their current and existing capacity and resources*. The goal was to gain a better understanding of which CHRCs would rate themselves as having high, medium or low organizational capacity and willingness to carry out CDF pilot implementation (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, July 23, 2008 and September 16, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 3, 2010).

Two members of the KTT reviewed the results of each survey separately, and rated each CHRC on each of the four criteria above. They came together to compare their ratings. Their individual ratings were exactly the same in all but three cases, where the ratings were very similar – the KTT saw this as evidence of a high inter-rater reliability regarding the survey findings (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008; Fieldnotes, May 21, 2010). In summary, all CHRCs reported similar degrees of interest in the CDF (medium to high interest in principle), with varying levels of both internal and external resources. A few expressed concerns regarding their capacity to carry out the CDF within tight internal resources (especially staff and staff time), and one CHRC made it clear that they *were not* willing to participate in the CDF pilot without additional resources (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008;

Fieldnotes, May 21, 2010). Despite this process, the KTT deliberated over the reliability and validity of the results of this brief survey, given that it was not an in-depth analysis on readiness and capacity. The KTT argued that the survey could only be considered a starting point, and were adamant that further consultation with a variety of CHRC staff would be beneficial to the selection process (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008).

Based on the results of the above data collection methods, the KTT outlined the results of their various analyses and created a top ten list of the neighbourhoods of the City (based on ONS boundaries) that could most benefit from strategic community development. In addition to the criteria noted above, the list also included a snapshot of the demographics of each neighbourhood, including the percentage of “visible minority residents” (including consideration for distribution of Aboriginal Peoples), the percentage of recent immigrants, and the percentage of residents speaking neither English nor French (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008). A decision was made during a KTT discussion to remove both North Vanier and South Vanier from the KTT’s short-list, since a process much like NCLB was already underway there, supported by Crime Prevention Ottawa as previously mentioned (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 16, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 16, 2010). The KTT’s final top eight list of neighbourhoods that could most benefit from strategic community development was presented to the Community Development Roundtable in September of 2008.

The Four Neighbourhoods and Catchment Areas Selected for CDF Pilot Implementation

Although the City of Ottawa had initially decided that three neighbourhoods would be identified as CDF pilot sites, the KTT’s ratings were very close between two neighbourhoods. After a joint discussion on existing resources and deployment of staff, consensus was reached at the

Community Development Roundtable to increase the focus from three to four pilot neighbourhoods (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, September 22, 2008).

On September 22, 2008, the Community Development Roundtable decided on the final four pilot neighbourhoods for CDF implementation. This decision was based on: (1) the short-list of eight neighbourhoods prepared by the KTT, (2) a desire to conduct the pilot in CHRC catchment areas with different levels of current capacity (for purposes of learning and comparison), and (3) a desire to spread the CDF implementation out across the City (i.e., not conducting pilot implementation in adjacent neighbourhoods). The City of Ottawa stressed that all eight neighbourhoods short-listed by the KTT were considered priorities for the CDF, and that a plan would be developed to phase the CDF into *all* neighbourhoods of the City over time. The City promised that in the interim, neighbourhoods not participating in the CDF pilot phase would be supported with access to the same tools developed for and used by the four selected neighbourhoods (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, September 22, 2008).

The four neighbourhoods (according to ONS boundaries) selected for CDF pilot implementation were 1) Overbrook West – McArthur, 2) West Centretown, 3) Carlington, and 4) Bayshore (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, September 22, 2008). Table 3 below provides a brief overview of some of the socio-demographic context of each neighbourhood, provided by the Ottawa Neighbourhood Study (Kristjansson et al., 2008). Note that the CDF was eventually piloted in smaller sub-sections of these neighbourhoods, as explained in the next chapter. Also note that as previously explained, the crime rates provided in Table 3 were available from the Ottawa Police Service at time of writing, but they were not available to the KTT and other CDF stakeholders at time of CDF neighbourhood selection.

Table 3. Socio-demographic Context of Neighbourhoods Selected for Pilot Implementation of the CDF (Kristjansson et al., 2008; ONS, 2010).

	<u>ONS Neighbourhood Selected for Pilot CDF Implementation</u>			
	<u>Overbrook – McArthur</u>	<u>West Centretown</u>	<u>Carlington</u>	<u>Bayshore</u>
Population (2006 Census)	11,464	11,953	10,107	7,877
Can neither speak nor understand English nor French	0.9%	5.4%	1.9%	5%
Report belonging to a “visible minority” group (Ottawa average = 20%)	25%	38%	31%	54%
Average household income (Ottawa average = \$86, 848)	\$51,900	\$46,177	\$47,007	\$56,700
Residents living below the Low-Income Cut-Off (LICO) (Ottawa average = 14.1%)	29%	39%	30%	30%
Unemployment rate (Ottawa average = 5.9%)	8.2%	10%	8.6%	9%
Renters (versus home owners)	59%	77%	64%	79%
ONS socio-economic index¹⁹	5 th quintile	5 th quintile	5 th quintile	5 th quintile
Property crime rate (crimes per thousand people; Ottawa average = 42.7)	111.2	87	64.3	72
Rate of crimes against person (crimes per thousand people; Ottawa average = 6.5)	21.1	17.2	16	6.5

¹⁹ The neighbourhood socio-economic index is based on average income, percent below the LICO, the unemployment rate, the percent of people with less than a high school education, and the percent of families that are lone parent. Based on this index, Ottawa neighbourhoods were divided into quintiles, with 1 representing most advantage and 5 representing the least advantage (Kristjansson et al., 2008).

The Community Development Roundtable's final recommendation at this stage was that a consultation process be undertaken with internal and external partners in an effort to solicit more feedback regarding the CDF model and raise any additional considerations around the selection of neighbourhoods (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, September 22, 2008). The City of Ottawa CDF team took on this consultation process throughout October-November of 2008, and reported speaking to representatives from the following organizations or sectors (Kanellakos, 2008: 13):

- Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres
- Community Developers and CHRC Managers of Selected Neighbourhoods
- Mayor's office
- City Councillors of Selected Neighbourhoods
- Senior's Agenda Steering Committee (City of Ottawa)
- Health and Social Services Advisory Committee (City of Ottawa)
- Rural Affairs Office (City of Ottawa)
- Economic & Environmental Sustainability Branch (City of Ottawa)
- South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community
- Crime Prevention Ottawa
- Ottawa Police Service, Community Development Branch
- Ottawa Community Housing Corporation
- Ottawa Carleton District School Board
- United Way/Centraide Ottawa
- Community Foundation of Ottawa
- University of Ottawa
- Carleton University

Following these consultations, the City of Ottawa CDF team reported (Kanellakos, 2008: 12-13):

overall enthusiasm and support for the Framework with some constructive feedback for consideration when moving forward in the implementation of the CDF. Many of the individuals consulted expressed a keen interest for direct involvement or at the very least

periodic updates. The following lists the themes that emerged from the consultations:

- 1) Flexibility required in definitions of ‘neighbourhood’
- 2) Consideration of rural communities
- 3) Community Economic Development/Economic Development as key

An effort will be made to address the above areas and continue dialogue with community partners as the CDF proceeds with implementation.

In late November and early December of 2008, the City of Ottawa announced to the Coalition of CHRCs which Ottawa Neighbourhood Study neighbourhoods had been selected for CDF implementation (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, December 11, 2008). The Community Health, Community Resource or Community Service Centre responsible for each of those neighbourhoods was now charged with beginning CDF work. These four Centres are:

1. the *Overbrook-Forbes Community Resource Centre* (for Overbrook West – McArthur);
2. the *Somerset West Community Health Centre* (for West Centretown);
3. *Carlington Community and Health Services* (for Carlington); and
4. *Pinecrest-Queensway Health and Community Services* (for Bayshore).

To this day, the City of Ottawa CDF team reports feeling good about the fact that in their view, the neighbourhood selection process was never challenged (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

A decision was made that each CDF project should “start small”; the idea was to begin the CDF pilot work in a smaller, high-need sub-section of each larger ONS neighbourhood. This decision

was largely influenced by the CDF Coordinator, who, based on his experience with NCLB in South East Ottawa, felt that “starting small” would make the CDF process more manageable for Community Developers in terms of both workload and resident mobilization, thereby increasing the likelihood of success (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, July 23, 2008). The decision about where to start was largely left up to the CHRCs in question. The CDF Coordinator began talking to the Community Developers in those areas about their new role as CDF implementers, giving them information on setting up a Local Steering Table and talking about the Neighbourhood Survey they would soon be responsible for implementing as part of the CDF process (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, December 11, 2008).

Deciding on CDF Goals

Now that the pilot neighbourhoods were chosen and the wheels were in motion in neighbourhoods, the City of Ottawa was looking to finalize the overarching goals of the CDF. These would inform both actions on the ground and the development a comprehensive Evaluation Framework to capture short and longer-term changes at both the neighbourhood and system levels. The City of Ottawa CDF team had a set of seven draft CDF goals and once again requested the help of the KTT in order to finalize them. In late October of 2008, after a few discussions, the KTT condensed the previous seven goals into a set of five goals. This was accomplished by grouping what they perceived to be similar or related constructs in the original goals (i.e., social cohesion and collective efficacy) into one main new theme (i.e., neighbourhood capacity) (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, October 21 and 27, 2008).

The final five interrelated CDF goals are presented earlier on p. 64. There was agreement around the KTT that crime, safety and perceptions of safety can theoretically fall under the construct of neighbourhood health (under goal 3), but a decision was made to highlight crime and safety as a

separate issue and goal (number 4). This decision was based on a consensus that crime and safety would surely arise as a key issue in the neighbourhoods of interest, and that it should be dealt with as a distinct and important theme (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, October 27, 2008).

The City of Ottawa CDF team complemented this list of goals with an overall summary of the CDF approach, which they often used when discussing the CDF with others. The key elements involved the following (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, Community Development Framework – Approach):

- Focus on neighbourhoods with an identified need;
- Support a common community engagement process on the ground;
- Ensure partners from various sectors have an opportunity to contribute to solution building;
- Evaluate impact and progress;
- Celebrate successes and share information;
- Keep going.

Developing an Evaluation Framework

Behind the scenes, the City of Ottawa CDF team hired one member of the KTT to lead the development of an Evaluation Framework that would allow them to track whether the CDF was achieving its goals. The rest of the Knowledge Transfer Table members were asked to help refine and finalize the Evaluation Framework, which would go to the Community Development Roundtable for approval (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 5, 2008; Fieldnotes, June 21, 2010). Within the Evaluation Framework, the City of Ottawa was looking for a set of tools that would accomplish two goals: (1) they would serve as tools for Community Developers and others to conduct needs assessments in neighbourhoods, and (2) they would also serve as reliable, valid and longitudinal tools that would provide the data necessary for an ongoing

outcome evaluation of the CDF. For political and bureaucratic purposes, the City of Ottawa would have to “show results” (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 5, 2008).

In the fall of 2008, the KTT reacted to drafts of an Evaluation Framework prepared by the hired KTT member and a graduate student researcher. The drafts were based on a literature review of past community change initiatives and indicators, and some known data available from local sources. The draft Evaluation Framework borrowed indicators and measures from a variety of existing sources and tools, including the *New Deal for Communities* Evaluation (Lawless, 2005), Wolff’s (2003) work on the *Community Toolbox* and on evaluating community collaborations, *Action for Neighbourhood Change* (United Way Canada, 2007), and the *Portland Performance Measurement System* (Office of Neighborhood Involvement, 2008). The Evaluation Framework for the CDF that was eventually approved by the Community Development Roundtable had five key components (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 5, 2008):

1. A draft *Evaluation Matrix* that presented preliminary ideas on a subset of outcomes related to each CDF goal, possible measures and indicators, proposed data collection tools and timing.
2. A set of *Neighbourhood Level Tools* to help with a needs assessment in each neighbourhood (based primarily on a survey and focus groups), the tracking of CDF-related activities, outputs and experiences, and action planning.
3. A set of *System Level Tools* to measure coordination, collaboration and progress within each CDF system level Table and between City of Ottawa departments and staff.
4. Various *sources of existing quantitative data* to be used to measure and track longitudinal outcomes in neighbourhoods.

5. *Learning and celebration events* to help maintain momentum, showcase successes and promote the exchange of knowledge between CDF partners and neighbourhoods.

These evaluation components are further described in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Components of the Initial Evaluation Framework for the CDF, January 2009.

<u>Initial Evaluation Framework for the CDF (January 2009)</u>	
<u>Component</u>	<u>Description</u>
Evaluation Matrix	Summarizes each CDF goal, a subset of related outcomes, indicators/measures, tools and data collection timing.
<u>Neighbourhood Level Tools</u>	
Annual Neighbourhood Survey	A questionnaire designed to elicit the views of people who live in the neighbourhood, with both qualitative (open-ended) and quantitative (scale) questions that cover basic demographics, satisfaction with services, and measures the social determinants of health, including a section on victimization and feelings of safety.
Focus Groups	To supplement the Neighbourhood Survey and attempt to reach the voices of the most marginalised groups through targeted outreach with women, youth, seniors, etc.
Community Developer Tracking Tool	Allows Community Developers to document the activities, intervention, successes and challenges of the CDF in their catchment area.

<p>Other existing Community Developer tools</p>	<p>Community developers use a variety of tools to engage with and mobilise residents. These can be supplemented by tools developed for No Community Left Behind (NCLB) which guide community developers in the development, implementation and evaluation of a neighbourhood planning process. These include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asset Resource Inventory • Neighbourhood Action Plans • Annual assessments of the Neighbourhood • Action Plans
<p><u>System Level Tools</u></p>	
<p>Annual System Survey</p>	<p>All CDF system Tables and each Local Steering Table will be surveyed on an annual basis in order to get participants' views on how CDF implementation is going, and what needs to be improved.</p>
<p>Internal City of Ottawa staff survey</p>	<p>To measure coordination and collaboration between City of Ottawa departments and staff at all levels. Individual interviews with key stakeholders to enable the CDF team to gather important qualitative information.</p>
<p><u>Additional Outcome Measurements</u></p>	
<p>Ottawa Neighbourhood Study (ONS)</p>	<p>This study was used to help identify initial CDF neighbourhoods, and will be used to assess the effectiveness of the Community Development Framework in having an impact on key indicators of socio-economic conditions, health and wellbeing. New data will be added to the ONS and all neighbourhood profiles updated every 5 years to coincide with Statistics Canada Census data releases.</p>
<p>Other sources for outcome measurements</p>	<p>Data from the Ottawa Police Service, United Way, Success by Six, City of Ottawa records, School Boards data, the Annual Citizen Satisfaction survey, Ottawa Public Health, Ottawa Community Housing, the City of Ottawa's Neighbourhood Planning Initiative, private sector partner sources and other relevant sources.</p>
<p><u>Learning and Celebration</u></p>	
<p>Annual reflection sessions at each CDF table (neighbourhood and system level)</p>	<p>To allow all CDF stakeholders to reflect on the progress of their work and examine their strengths and weaknesses as a group, as well as revisit the overall CDF goals and vision.</p>

<p>City-led Celebration and Reporting Forums</p>	<p>Held every two years to provide all CDF stakeholders an opportunity to come together, share their success stories and get to know one another. It will showcase efforts by CDF neighbourhoods as well as their respective Community Health or Resource Centres. Celebrating success is a key pillar for maintaining momentum in collaborative efforts. Data collected up to that point can be presented orally by residents, Community Developers, City of Ottawa staff and others.</p>
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Members of the Knowledge Transfer Table stressed that there was a need to develop a Theory of Change that clearly articulated the vision, principles, goals, components, underlying assumptions and intended outcomes and impacts of the CDF to strengthen and inform its implementation and evaluation. Their view was that the draft evaluation framework was just a starting point – much work still had to be done and the plan should be presented to community partners for a “reality check” (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 5, 2008). That exercise would have to wait, though. The KTT was being asked to develop the neighbourhood level tool that would be needed soon: the Annual Neighbourhood Survey to begin the neighbourhood needs assessment and action planning (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 5, 2008 and December 11, 2008).

On the Ground Reactions to the CDF Launch and to the Selection of Neighbourhoods

There appears to be general consensus among different stakeholders in Ottawa that the Community Development Framework (CDF) is, in principle, a good idea. Representatives I spoke to from many different agencies and front-line service providers throughout the city lauded the existing community development culture and practices across the city; most appeared particularly supportive of and excited by the idea that the CDF could bring in more system support for local community development initiatives (Interviews #1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; Fieldnotes, May 15, June 24, September 13, September 14, October 7, November 3, 2010). Appreciation

was expressed for the City of Ottawa's interest in gaining a better understanding of what local community development is, and for the municipal government's willingness to engage with actors at the neighbourhood level (Interviews #1, 4, 6, 7; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010). Stakeholders felt the CDF was based on the "right" principles (i.e., collaboration, coordination, the active participation of the community) and on a problem-solving process that is well supported in the literature (Interviews #1, 5, 8; Fieldnotes, May 16, May 25, June 17, November 3, 2010).

In my experience during this research project, executives and senior staff from the various system organizations involved largely stuck to the institutional script (Goffman, 1959), both in public and in more private conversations. They all sang the praises of the efficiencies to be gained in the partnership model, and placed a lot of emphasis on the role of residents in taking responsibility for, and ownership of, change in their communities (Fieldnotes, May 4, July 12, September 30, November 3, November 26, December 7, 2010). Nonetheless, some stakeholders had questions and concerns about how the CDF related to other umbrella initiatives underway across the city. There were particular concerns around the relationship between the CDF and the Ottawa Community Housing *Healthy Communities Initiative* (see p. 117). The two initiatives appeared to follow the same principles and approach, and more importantly, it looked highly probable that these initiatives would end up being implemented in some of the same areas of the City. Some wondered what this type of duplication would mean for local partner and resident interest, availability, and engagement, and for the distribution of resources across the city (Interviews #5 and 6; Fieldnotes, May 18, July 6, October 22, and November 29, 2010).

Representatives from Community Health and Resource Centres appeared to hold the same regard for partnership working and resident ownership, but their views of the CDF were much more

diverse, and some expressed serious concerns. From their recollection, most Community Developers first heard about the CDF in the spring of 2008, and many at a meeting at the South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community (Interviews #1, 5, 6; Fieldnotes, June 17, October 22, November 8, 2010). Representatives from the City of Ottawa presented the Framework to them and described some of its elements, including: the rationale behind it, the use of NCLB as the “model” community development strategy, and the System Tables of support. The general reaction appears to have been a mix of feelings, concerns and scepticism.

Defining ‘Community’

Most stakeholders seemed to agree that a place-based approach held some merit as an interesting and effective way to do community development work (Interviews #1, 4, 7, 8; Fieldnotes, April 15, June 17, November 12, November 26, 2010). There were, however, various concerns around how ‘community’ was defined within the CDF. First and foremost, there were concerns around how to define and delineate a geographic ‘neighbourhood’. Front-line service providers expressed that in their experience, neighbours living across the street from one another or even next-door to each other didn’t always name their neighbourhood or describe its geographical boundaries in the same way (Interview #1, 6, 7; Fieldnotes, April 20, October 12, October 22, 2010). From my observations, this was especially the case in areas with a concentration of public housing. Often times, residents living across the street or in the same vicinity as a public housing community reported that they did not consider it a part of their neighbourhood. They saw the public housing area as a separate entity with its own structures, people and dynamics (Fieldnotes, June 7, July 3, September 22, October 12, 2010). In contrast, some residents living in public housing units resisted the label of the public housing community’s name. They felt the name came with a certain pejorative connotation and didn’t want the reputation of the neighbourhood

to reflect poorly on them (Fieldnotes, October 6, October 12, November 9, November 10, 2010). From a service provider's perspective, these situations create a myriad of challenges, including: communicating to all residents what the neighbourhood-based initiative is all about, getting residents to identify with the place-based initiative, and most importantly, motivating residents to get involved (Interview #1, 5, 6, 7; Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010).

Furthermore, several stakeholders mentioned the importance and benefits of working with both geographic communities and social communities of interest in a way that maximizes the assets of both. Since its focus was on small, geographically-defined neighbourhoods, the CDF allowed for very little of this - communities of interest tend to be spread out geographically. For example, in some catchment areas, faith-based groups were very strong and active, though their members did not necessarily all live in the same geographic space. Service providers often relied on their assistance with outreach, facilitation and community organizing, especially in cases where there were cultural or language barriers. How to involve these essential groups in an initiative that defines residents according primarily to where they live was not clear (Interview #3, 5 and 6; Fieldnotes, May 4, 2010).

Local Contexts and Transferability

All the Community Developers I encountered throughout this research said they admired and respected the work that had been accomplished through the No Community Left Behind (NCLB) initiative in South East Ottawa. However, many had serious concerns of how appropriate an approach it was for *all* community development work in Ottawa. Many Community Developers felt that promoting NCLB as 'the' approach to community development was doing community development in Ottawa a disservice. They emphasized that NCLB may very well be an effective approach in *some* neighbourhoods and for *some* issues, but from their experience, it wouldn't be

in all. For starters, neighbourhoods vary greatly in size and concentration. The NCLB initiative was developed for, and implemented in, relatively small and compact public housing communities comprised of a few hundred households at most. Other neighbourhoods, including some public housing communities, involved a much larger geographical footprint and had thousands of households within their boundaries. There were also other neighbourhood-specific factors to consider, such as resident readiness, local partner readiness, resident mobility, cultural context, and existing partnerships, processes and initiatives (Interview #1, 5, 6; Fieldnotes, May 25, June 17, June 24, October 22, November 8, 2010).

There was general resentment that other existing approaches to community development across the city were not being recognized, and that their experiences and local expertise were being discounted (Interviews #1, 5, 6; Fieldnotes, May 25, June 17, October 22, November 8, 2010).

Just because one Community Developer devoted years to developing something that worked for their area, how can you make assumptions about it working in all areas? So there was a lot of ummm, fear, anger, and an immediate distrust of the City that we were being told now how we were supposed to do our work. They're not there day in and day out, talking to residents and working on the engagement piece. Most of them probably couldn't even point to that neighbourhood on a map. The feeling towards the City was very much 'who are you to come in and tell us how to do our jobs?!' (Interview #6)

A few Community Developers further expressed the feeling that by promoting a "cookie cutter" approach to community development and by accepting a new position as the CDF Coordinator – thereby working closely with (for) the City of Ottawa - their former colleague was "selling out" (Interviews #5 and 6; Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010).

When Community Developers first heard about the CDF, they kept those feelings largely to themselves. The feeling that they were the last to know in itself was a major point of contention:

One major issue was that the City's consultations had involved only the CHRC Executive Directors, and Community Developers were never consulted... That was a major upset because unfortunately, the CHRCs do jump when the City says jump, and our EDs want to keep a positive relationship with the City as our main funder so when the City does ask us to do something, rarely does our leadership ever say no, even if they disagree or they know it's not the right thing to do, because our core funding is directly attached... especially for Resource Centres. Community Health Centres at least get some Ministry of Health funding too, but CRCs don't. They rely almost exclusively on City funding. (Interview #6)

Add to that the fact that most other key funders in the city appeared to be on board with the CDF model, and Community Developers felt they had no choice but to "toe the line". As one Community Developer offered:

When you only have so many funding bodies in the city, and they're all talking to each other under the guise of this Framework, there's a real fear that if the City comes and says 'you're a selected community' and if you say 'this isn't going to work for my community', what's that going to mean for your funding? Given your experience in and with that community, you know that they're not interested, or aren't there yet... and even if you could work with them to get to a point where they're ready to undertake this kind of process, will that match the City's timeline? With funding strings attached, there's a lot of pressure on Community Developers and managers too to give in even if they don't think it's what's best for the community in question. (Interview #5)

There were particular concerns around the complexities of attempting such an approach in rural settings, where in some cases the idea of a 'neighbourhood' just does not ring true. Community Developers who work in rural settings were having a difficult time imagining how the NCLB approach would play out in a large geographical area where homes were very dispersed and where they felt the idea of 'neighbourhood capacity' was largely inapplicable (Fieldnotes, June 17, June 24, November 8, 2010). As explained by one Community Developer:

In rural areas, it's very different. Most venues are inaccessible to most, people have to drive far to come to meetings, so the neighbourhood, umm, if you can even call it that, can be kilometers and kilometers wide. The high concentration of residents facing a particular issue is what characterized NCLB. That process does not translate well to rural spaces. (Interview #6)

Furthermore, perhaps even more than in urban settings, the insider/outsider dichotomy in rural settings is very much felt, and managing it is a constant work in progress for Community

Developers:

In the rural even more than elsewhere, coming in with something that wasn't developed by or with them, I know won't be received particularly well. We struggle every day to build relationships because we're seen as outsiders. I think the reaction to this whole CDF thing will be really umm... harsh. (Interview #6)

Community Developers also knew from their previous outreach attempts that some rural residents were still resentful of the amalgamation of 2001, had a poor opinion of the City of Ottawa and its programs and services, and would resist any initiative they saw as a City of Ottawa project (Fieldnotes, June 17, June 22, 2010; Interviews #5 and 6). Even more than that:

Some of the issues in the rural areas are concerned with basic infrastructure, like umm basic needs like potable water they feel the City isn't doing anything about. Or to maintain their rural lifestyle and not have big developers come in and build enormous developments around them. They feel like they're against development and large companies coming into their space, so for them, they mostly want assistance in resisting those trends... and they see it mostly as resisting the City of Ottawa. (Interview #6)

A Different Kind of Work, or More Work?

Community Developers also consistently noted that the amount of resources and energy invested by their colleague into NCLB in South East Ottawa was impressive and commendable, but it

went far beyond what could reasonably be expected of other community developers across the City on an ongoing basis. They already worked many evenings and weekends, and had family obligations and lives outside of work that they weren't willing to jeopardize any more than they already do under demanding work circumstances. Given the level of coordination and work involved in the multi-phase NCLB process, they had a hard time imagining how it wouldn't result in a heavier workload²⁰ (Interviews #5, 6, 7; Fieldnotes, June 22, June 24, July 12, 2010). They felt the idea of integrating all existing efforts and initiatives into this 'new way of working' may have made sense "on paper", but it was definitely easier said than done. Those individual projects still needed to be managed and supported, and not all of them had a clear fit into this new model (Interviews #1, 5, 7; Fieldnotes, June 7, 2010). There was also a fear among many Community Developers that given the strain the CDF would put on their workload, it would inevitably create a competing demand for their time and energy within their own catchment area. Since the CDF process would only be applied to a small sub-section of their catchment area, Community Developers felt they were going to be faced with choosing between issues of priority for the CDF neighbourhood and the rest of their catchment area, for which they were still held responsible and accountable (Interviews #1, 5, 7; Fieldnotes, May 25, June 7, 2010).

For service providers from other agencies, there was a sense of optimism that working closely in partnership within a Local Steering Table would help "get things done" (Fieldnotes, November 18, 2010). Most admitted that they were not very clear going in what their exact role would be within this new model, but they were interested in the idea of working on concrete, tangible issues affecting a particular neighbourhood in need (Fieldnotes, June 24, August 28, September 22, November 18, 2010). That said, many of them expressed they were not clear on the exact

²⁰ This concern would in fact materialize; at the end of the data collection period, CHRCs were estimating the costs of CDF coordination and implementation in their catchment areas to be between \$59,000 and \$98,000 (see p. 247).

level and depth of institutional buy-in from their managers and superiors. Some had doubts about what they would encounter internally within their individual organizations when it came time to make requests or try to do something differently. There was a sense of the unknown as to what they could commit to and what the repercussions would be for changing or bypassing the usual bureaucratic channels (Fieldnotes, June 24, September 30, November 18, 2010). Some more senior staff expressed similar concerns. As one district manager who sits on a Local Steering Table put it:

I was told to come to these meetings and represent our organization. It's taking up an incredible amount of my time, and most of the time I have no idea what I can offer to do and how much... And it's not just the big things, it's the little things too. If I offer to make some photocopies for the distribution of posters, what budget code number do I punch in at the photocopier? The simplest offer can sometimes create some bureaucratic headaches for me once I'm back at the office. It's just not worth my time. (Fieldnotes, November 18, 2010)

In addition to the implications of the CDF on participants' workload, this quote illustrates how there were also a number of bureaucratic challenges associated with this type of work. This is a theme that re-emerges in subsequent chapters and that is analysed in more detail in Chapter 8.

A Climate of Competition

Community Developers reported that when the City of Ottawa initially announced its intentions with regards to the CDF, some CHRC managers were under the impression that the CDF would result in a lot of additional resources flowing into the Centres chosen for the initiative – if not financial resources, then at least human resources and increased institutional access and support (Fieldnotes, June 24, July 12, October 22, and November 8, 2010). In this context, some Community Developers felt that evaluating the existing capacity of Community Health and Resources Centres to implement the CDF as part of the selection process (see p. 151) had created

a climate of competition among Centres (Interviews #1, 5, 6; Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010). Staff at these Centres said they were put under a lot of pressure to put forth an impressive and compelling “bid” to become a CDF catchment area. In this context, other Centres were seen as their competition, not their allies in the larger process (Interview #6; Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010).

There was also a perception among some Community Developers that while the CDF was presented as a way of addressing both the lack of consistency in funding and issues related to funding fragmentation, the creation of the Framework and the selection of those particular catchment areas had resulted in well-funded centres having even more access to a variety of enhanced resources, while other organizations with less capacity were feeling left behind once again (Fieldnotes, June 17, November 8, 2010). As one Community Developer offered:

It’s all this effort to address the lack of consistency in funding, the lack of core funding, issues around funding fragmentation, so they created a structure that has turned out to be nepotistic. Well-funded centres are continuing to be well-funded while newer organizations aren’t feeling heard, as usual. (Interview #5)

Political Vulnerability and Longevity

Senior and front-line staff from a variety of CDF partner agencies also noted that, given their past experiences with City of Ottawa initiatives, and especially the political nature of decisions made regarding these initiatives, they were fairly sceptical about the durability of the CDF. What happens when the Mayor and City Council changes? Will the CDF still exist in 1 year from now? In 2 years, 5 years? Many felt it would be difficult to invest the amount of time, energy - and in some cases, to run the risk – involved in this ‘new way of working’ without any assurances of its ability to stand the test of time (Interview #5; Fieldnotes, June 24, July 6, and November 8, 2010). This was felt particularly acutely by representatives from Community

Health and Resource Centres. In anticipation of the CDF reaching their catchment area, and given the climate of competition it had elicited for some Community Health or Resource Centres (for getting “picked” for CDF implementation), some CHRCs were adopting CDF-like processes without being designated a CDF area. Front-line staff were putting a lot of their time and energy into these activities (e.g., conducting a Neighbourhood Survey, described later on) and they were worried it may all lead to nothing, given the uncertainty of the expansion and/or sustainability of the CDF (Interviews # 1, 5, 6; Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010).

Resident Reactions

The reactions of residents who became aware of the CDF in its early stages seemed to revolve around three key issues: (1) the process and boundaries used to define their ‘neighbourhood’, (2) the reasons they were chosen as a target for CDF implementation, and (3) what this new City-led initiative would mean for the initiatives and programs that were already underway. It became clear throughout this research that not all residents who knew about the Ottawa Neighbourhood Study (ONS) were in agreement with the way neighbourhoods were defined. For many, the geographical boundaries set by the study did not resonate with what they perceived to be their neighbourhood. Most of the time, it was a case of the ONS boundaries encompassing a larger geographical area than what they identified with (Interview #1 and 7; Fieldnotes, June 24, September 22, October 12, 2010).

The second and more pervasive issue focused on the reasons why their neighbourhood had been selected for CDF implementation. It was obvious to me throughout this research project that the process used to identify areas for CDF implementation had not been well communicated to Community Developers or to residents themselves, leaving them with many unanswered questions about the neighbourhood selections (Interview #1 and 7; Fieldnotes, June 24,

September 22, October 12, 2010). Even more than two years after the launch of the CDF, I was asked questions about the selection process and selection decisions by a few neighbourhood residents who had been involved in the CDF action planning process in their neighbourhoods, but whom I was meeting for the first time. When probed, they shared that they did not perceive the selection of their neighbourhood as negative, they were simply curious, not necessarily angry nor concerned (Fieldnotes, September 22, October 12, 2010). Though this may in fact have been their perspective, this is one example of how my position within this research may have created some limitations around accessing residents' perspectives. Given their knowledge of my involvement in the Knowledge Transfer Table, they may have felt reluctant to share certain views.

It was interesting to note that when asked the same questions by residents, at least two of the Community Developers involved in the CDF tended to focus on the Early Childhood Development indicators used for neighbourhood selection, minimizing the use of other indicators such as low income, poor health or crime. When probed about it, they both explained that they felt it was the least hurtful or stigmatizing way of framing it for the residents, and that everyone could get behind wanting to improve conditions for children and youth (Fieldnotes, October 12, November 10, 2010). There was indeed a general preoccupation, especially on the part of Community Developers, but also expressed by other stakeholders such as a City Councillor, City of Ottawa staff, funders and researchers, of the risk of labelling or stigmatizing individuals and neighbourhoods through the CDF process (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, July 23, 2008; Interviews #1, 7, 8; Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24, November 8, 2010).

Finally, in newly designated CDF areas where residents were already mobilized and organized around various Committees and issues, Community Developers were also dealing with a myriad

of concerns and reactions from the residents they work with every day (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). As one CHRC staff working on a crime and safety initiative remembers:

... the Community Development Framework was introduced to our Steering Committee by a Community Developer just to say, 'this is just to give you a heads-up, this is what the City is rolling out now'... There were residents that were very confused, I remember them being confused, I remember them being upset, pissed off. Like 'what is this new thing, AGAIN', because, you know, it's the nature of community development, it's not always sustainable projects, you start one thing, it's going well, then the funder pulls out and decides it wants to try something else... From a resident's point of view, your lay person who's living in the community, they go to these meetings, voluntarily help to steer this thing, work hard in this working group, and umm... then you have people coming in and saying 'Now we're going to start this project, and it's a community engagement initiative'... Well that's already what we were doing. So when it [CDF] was introduced to them at the Steering Committee meeting, I remember them being upset, insulted and just generally pissed off about what this new thing was. And, umm... people's impressions from the CDF materials that were presented were that it was very top-down. They felt it showed a complete disrespect for the work they'd been doing so far, that the City is rolling this thing out, whether we like it or not, they're gonna do it, and whether we see faults in it or we feel we're already on the right track, they're gonna do it anyway. It was umm... really hard for me to get them to calm down and to just carry on with the work until we knew more about how it would all go down. (Interview #1)

Some Community Developers were also dealing with what they felt was a monumental task: gaining the interest and engagement of residents who are infamously harder-to-reach, a challenge they felt was exacerbated by how broad and complex the CDF can appear to be, with goals that are hard to pin down let alone explain in a clear and inviting way (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 26, 2010). How to communicate to residents what the CDF is was proving to be a big challenge for Community Developers. Without clear messaging to help communicate to residents what the CDF is all about, Community Developers and other community workers very rarely

used the name *Community Development Framework* when speaking to residents. Instead, they focused on engaging and interesting residents based on each specific and individual CDF-related issue of interest, activity or event. There was a sense that it was not necessarily imperative for residents to know what the CDF was and all the structures and processes that it entailed.

According to community workers, their primary focus was on finding ways of interesting and involving residents, and the name *Community Development Framework* was not helpful in doing that (Interview #7; Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24, July 1, August 28, November 26, 2010).

Conclusions

Shortly after its re-structuring in 2004, the Community and Protective Services (CPS) Department of the City of Ottawa became increasingly interested in place-based planning that involved the ‘community’ – local agencies, groups, businesses, and the public – in problem identification and priority setting. By 2006, the Department was leading a number of place-based initiatives and making financial contributions to various community development agencies and projects across the city. City Councillors and City of Ottawa officials were raising questions about the municipality’s overall vision for its approach to community development work, and for how all of its different ‘community’ strategies and projects ‘fit’ together into an overarching framework. After a number of research initiatives and consultations on community development work in Canada and abroad, an environmental scan of community development practices within Ottawa, and consultations with representatives from the city’s major institutions, the CPS Department created the *Community Development Framework (CDF)* as a deliberate attempt to bring these various social service and community partners together to work towards addressing needs in neighbourhoods. The City of Ottawa adopted the No Community Left Behind (NCLB)

problem-solving approach first developed and implemented in South East Ottawa as *the* approach to community mobilization and development within the CDF.

In 2008, the City of Ottawa obtained a commitment from the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa to play a leadership role in the implementation of the CDF in Ottawa neighbourhoods. The Community Developer who led the development and implementation of No Community Left Behind (NCLB) in South East Ottawa was hired as the first CDF Coordinator, and representatives from the CPS Department (the CDF team) began creating the system level tables involved in the CDF in early 2008, recruiting a number of representatives from key organizations within the city. In March of 2008, the City of Ottawa CDF team enlisted the help of the newly formed CDF Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) to select pilot neighbourhoods for CDF implementation. The KTT used three main sources of data to assess the level of 'need' in neighbourhoods: (1) the *Ottawa Neighbourhood Study (ONS)*, (2) crime data from the Ottawa Police Service, and (3) a short survey of Community Health and Resource Centres. Based on the results of the above data collection methods, the KTT created a top ten list of the neighbourhoods of the city (based on ONS boundaries) that could most benefit from strategic community development. On September 22, 2008, the CDF Roundtable decided on the final four pilot ONS neighbourhoods for CDF implementation. Now that the pilot neighbourhoods were selected and CHRCs were beginning their work 'on the ground', the City of Ottawa CDF team enlisted the help of the Knowledge Transfer Table to finalize the CDF goals and develop an evaluation framework for the initiative. Both the final CDF goals and a draft evaluation plan were approved by the CDF Roundtable in January of 2009. The KTT turned its attention to developing a CDF Neighbourhood Survey to help in the assessment phase of the CDF in neighbourhoods.

Overall, there appears to be general consensus among different stakeholders in Ottawa that the Community Development Framework (CDF) is, in principle, a good idea. Most appeared particularly supportive of, and excited by, the idea of ‘system change’, and of bringing in more system support for local community development initiatives. That said, representatives from a variety of sectors, and representatives of Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) in particular, voiced a number of concerns regarding the CDF. These concerns centered on issues related to defining ‘community’, and to the specificity of local contexts and the transferability of a particular community development process. Many felt that promoting NCLB as ‘the’ approach to community development was doing community development in Ottawa a disservice - there was widespread resentment that other existing approaches to community development across the city were not being recognized and that other types of local processes and expertise were being discounted. There was a sense that the CDF was creating a climate of competition among CHRC executives for the City of Ottawa’s attention and for the extra resources that were presumed to be associated with the CDF. Front-line community workers, on the other hand, were concerned that the CDF was going to be associated with more work rather than a different kind of work. Many, regardless of their feelings towards the CDF, were fairly sceptical about the longevity of the CDF given its political vulnerability as a City of Ottawa initiative. Finally, front-line service providers were faced with the reactions of residents to the CDF. Some appeared to have serious questions and concerns regarding the process and boundaries used to define their ‘neighbourhood’, the reasons they were chosen as a site for CDF implementation, and what this new City of Ottawa initiative would mean for the existing initiatives and programs in their area. These initial concerns appeared to dissipate, however, as the CDF per se became less and less visible in the neighbourhoods in question. Since community workers felt that their primary focus

was on garnering the participation of residents, and that the name *Community Development Framework* was not helpful in doing that, they resorted to gaining the interest of residents on an event-by-event or step-by-step basis, rather than explaining what the CDF was and all the structures and processes it entailed.

CHAPTER 6 - A DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST THREE PHASES OF THE CDF IN OTTAWA: ORGANIZING, ASSESSING AND PLANNING (2008-2009)

The goal of this chapter is to describe in detail the unfolding of the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa according to the first three phases of the CDF problem-solving process, namely: (1) organizing a Local Steering Table, (2) assessing neighbourhood assets and needs, and (3) developing a neighbourhood action plan. This chapter highlights the assumptions, rationales, structures, processes and strategies involved in these three phases of the CDF, and some of the main methods and patterns of association among the various organizations and participants involved. This includes examples of *resistance* to the CDF – opposing or contesting either overtly or covertly CDF ideas, processes or strategies – along with many examples of *translation* – the ways in which individuals and groups shaped and changed the direction of the CDF as it moved along the way. The focus of this chapter is on piecing together and describing how things unfolded from a variety of perspectives - a more in-depth analysis and critical engagement with these themes appears in Chapter 8.

Phase 1: Organizing Local Steering Tables and Deciding on Where to Start the Work (Late 2008 - Early 2009)

In late 2008 and early 2009, while the Knowledge Transfer Table was working on the development of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey, a Community Developer from each CHC or CRC now involved in the CDF began Phase 1 of the CDF process. This involved connecting and meeting with local stakeholders - including community leaders and service providers - to seek their involvement and commitment, and create a core group that would provide leadership and decision-making through a Local Steering Table (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008;

Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, December 11, 2008). The idea was that each CHRC in question would have its own Local Steering Table, responsible for the entire CHRC catchment area. It would focus on one specific geographical area (small neighbourhood) to start, and would eventually expand its focus to multiple geographic neighbourhoods within the larger catchment (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, December 11, 2008). From the City of Ottawa CDF team's perspective, the intention with the Local Steering Tables was to increase the informal responsibility of members to participate and produce results due to the increased personal and professional accountability that comes with the new structure (Fieldnotes, July 12, 2010).

Community Developers sent out a series of letters and made many phone calls to local groups and service providers to explain what the CDF was and to gauge their interest in participating in the partnership. They also relied heavily on the CHRCs' existing networks and partners to garner support and engagement (Fieldnotes, May 25, June 7 and June 22, 2010). The City of Ottawa CDF team also recruited and sent a number of City staff from various departments (e.g., public health, parks and recreation, by-law) to attend Local Steering Table meetings in all four locations. The participation of others, such as Ottawa Community Housing staff and the Ottawa Police Service was managed more internally. Requests were made by the City's CDF team to senior officials within both organizations, who then trickled down the request or appointed staff as they saw fit (Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24, July 12 and August 31, 2010).

In the catchment areas of Carlington and Pinecrest-Queensway, there were already planning structures (a Steering or Resource Committee) in place where local stakeholders came together to discuss key areas of community wellbeing. In Carlington, this Committee had served more of an information-sharing purpose and had not delved into the more strategic planning exercise prescribed by the CDF. The Committee was expanded and reconfigured to correspond more to

who and what would be needed for the purposes of CDF implementation (Fieldnotes, September 22, 2010). In Pincrest-Queensway, the CHC consciously decided to alter the prescribed CDF process by keeping the existing Committee of service providers as a Resource Committee and focusing instead on creating a new Committee composed mainly of residents, who would meet with whomever the organizations involved (the City of Ottawa, Ottawa Community Housing, Ottawa Police) sent to participate on the Local Steering Table (Fieldnotes, October 12, 2010; Interview #1). The Pincrest-Queensway CHC felt it had a long way to go in building relationships with residents in its most transient and diverse neighbourhood – they had proven to be especially hard-to-reach and involve in local initiatives. Doing outreach work with residents and building relationships with them is what they wanted to focus on the most (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010). The Overbrook-Forbes CRC and Somerset West CHC were starting from scratch to build their Local Steering Table. They contacted key local service providers to recruit representatives and engaged existing CHRC partners, recruiting members from groups such as the CHRC Board of Directors and reaching out to known community leaders and resident activists (Fieldnotes, June 7, June 22, June 24, and July 3, 2010).

At the end of this process, each Local Steering Table had around 12-15 members from a variety of public and service sectors, with each Table looking a bit different in terms of composition (Minutes, Local Steering Tables). Representatives from the Ottawa Police Service differed by catchment area – one had an Investigator sitting at the Local Steering Table while the other three had a Community Police Officer (Minutes, Local Steering Tables). These decisions were made internally “by feel” depending on the situation and existing police-community relationship within each catchment area (Fieldnotes, June 17, July 12 and November 3, 2010). The same can be said for other service providers, where the level of decision-making power of representatives

and/or the type of hands-on assistance they could provide differed across catchment areas (Minutes, Local Steering Tables). For example, in some catchment areas, the Ottawa Community Housing (OCH) District Manager sat on the Local Steering Table, whereas in other areas it was an OCH Tenant Worker (Minutes, Local Steering Tables). The City Councillor for each catchment area was also involved in the Local Steering Table to some extent, some mostly sending representatives to meetings, others attending the meetings themselves (Minutes, Local Steering Tables).

Each Local Steering Table also differed in the level of resident representation and involvement. In three cases, there were only 2 or 3 residents on the Table, typically catchment area residents who sat on the CHRC Board of Directors or another CHRC Committee, the President of a local Tenant's Association, and/or a youth from an existing CHRC Youth Advisory Committee (Minutes, Local Steering Tables; Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24, July 3, September 22, 2010). Over the course of CDF implementation, a variety of stakeholders often raised the issue that the residents involved at these Tables were not necessarily representative of the specific neighbourhood in question, especially from an ethno-cultural perspective (Fieldnotes, May 25, June 24, July 6, September 30, and November 8, 2010). The exception was in Pinecrest-Queensway, where the CHC made a deliberate effort to create a new Table composed of a large number of diverse residents. There, the Local Steering Table included at least 6 to 8 local residents on a regular basis representing the diversity of the community in question (Minutes, Local Steering Table; Fieldnotes, October 12, 2010). This decision was made based on the fact that the Pinecrest-Queensway CHC already had an existing Local Resource Committee that gathered many local service providers to share information and address issues of common concern (Interview #1; Fieldnotes, October 12, 2010). It also reflected the fact that the

Community Developer charged with the CDF in that catchment area was adamant about building relationships with local residents and ensuring strong resident input into CDF activities, given a concern that the CDF was too “top-down” (Fieldnotes, June 24, October 12, and November 26, 2010).

All four new CDF Local Steering Tables held their first meeting in either late December of 2008 or January of 2009 (Minutes, Local Steering Tables). Neighbourhood selection (boundary delineation) for CDF implementation was the first main task of the newly formed Local Steering Table in each catchment area. Though the CDF Roundtable had selected neighbourhoods based on the Ottawa Neighbourhood Study, these geographical areas were considered too large to undertake resident mobilization efforts on the ground (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, December 11, 2008). Local Steering Tables used existing data when available and relied heavily on their knowledge of the catchment area to pinpoint a high-need and manageable geographical space in which to begin CDF work. They divided their Ottawa Neighbourhood Study area into several smaller pockets based on their knowledge of how neighbourhoods were commonly known and used in the area. Once these smaller pockets were identified, member of the Local Steering Tables brought statistical data and information based on their respective agency’s experience to the Table. Some residents, representatives of Community Associations and Tenants Associations were also included in this discussion (Minutes, Local Steering Tables; Fieldnotes, June 7, 2010).

In all four catchment areas, the specific neighbourhood selected for CDF implementation ended up being composed largely of public-housing households managed by Ottawa Community Housing (OCH):

- **Neighbourhood A** is a high-rise OCH building in the Overbrook-Forbes catchment area. It is comprised of 138 households (Fieldnotes, July 3, 2010).
- **Neighbourhood B** is an OCH community of row houses that cover approximately 2 square city blocks in the Somerset West catchment area. It is comprised of 102 households (Fieldnotes, June 7 and August 28, 2010).
- **Neighbourhood C** is made up of a mix of two OCH high-rise buildings and row houses, and a neighbouring low-rise not operated by OCH in the Carlington catchment area. It is comprised of 700 households (Fieldnotes, July 1 and September 22, 2010).
- **Neighbourhood D** is made up of a dense mix of OCH row houses and neighbouring high-rise buildings operated by a private corporate landlord in the Pinecrest-Queensway catchment area. It is by far the largest neighbourhood implementing the CDF with a total of 2465 households (Fieldnotes, October 12, 2010).

Community Developers had announced the impending CDF to some residents and to community and agency partners as early as December of 2008. Some were met with concern, mainly from residents (as described earlier). Others felt that through their hard work, they had sparked an interest in and some momentum around the idea of the changes that could come about as a result of the CDF. In the case of Neighbourhood A, the Community Developer felt he had even created a bit of “hype” around the changes to come. This Community Developer was getting very anxious to begin the needs assessment and problem-solving work, to capitalize on the momentum he had created through initial outreach efforts (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, January 15 and March 31, 2009). All were waiting on the City of Ottawa and the Knowledge

Transfer Table to give them the tools they needed to begin the work, namely the Neighbourhood Survey (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, January 5, February 24, and May 6, 2009).

Phase 2: Assessing Assets and Needs in Neighbourhoods (Spring and Summer 2009)

Phase 2 of the CDF process involved the neighbourhood assessment, which was presented to Community Developers (by the CDF Coordinator) as a 4-step process of (Fieldnotes, November 8, 2010):

- Step 1: Developing an overall plan for and specific approach to neighbourhood assessment.
- Step 2: Identifying tools to use and sources and types of information already available. Identifying community activists/groups/associations that can contribute to the process.
- Step 3: Developing an asset/resource inventory of the neighbourhood.
- Step 4: Conducting the Neighbourhood Survey, focus groups and individual meetings as necessary.

Community Developers were initially told by the CDF Coordinator that they had about 1 month to complete this phase (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010). They undertook the needs assessment work with the help of OCH Community House staff, youth and community workers from partner organizations, resident volunteers, and under the guidance of their Local Steering Table and the CDF Coordinator (Minutes, Local Steering Tables; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010).

Most of the needs assessment tools and methods used were based on what Community Developers and Community House workers were already familiar with, and on the particular dynamics of each community. They were all trying to reach as many residents as possible and get the most comprehensive picture possible of what residents felt was most important to them,

both in terms of what they did and did not like about their neighbourhood. They conducted Focus Groups with different socio-demographic groups, consulted with existing community groups and talked to participants attending various community programs (Minutes, Local Steering Tables; Fieldnotes, June 29, 2010). The one consistent piece was the dissemination and use of the Neighbourhood Survey, developed by the Knowledge Transfer Table especially for the purposes of the CDF (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010).

The Neighbourhood Survey

The Neighbourhood Survey initially developed for the No Community Left Behind (NCLB) initiative was judged to be insufficient for the work of the Community Development Framework. NCLB in South East Ottawa had been much more focused, with an emphasis on issues of crime, safety, and fear of crime, which was reflected in the short NCLB survey questionnaire (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 5, 2008). What the CDF team at the City of Ottawa was requesting of the Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) was a survey tool that would serve as a key source of information for action planning in neighbourhoods, touching on all facets of community life and on the social determinants of health. At the same time, City staff wanted a survey that was “scientifically sound” and that had a rigorous dissemination plan so it could be used as a valid and reliable longitudinal tool to track progress on key indicators (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 5 and December 11, 2008, and January 5, January 15, February 24, March 31, and May 27, 2009).

The KTT proceeded with these instructions in mind. The initial draft of the survey, a compilation of questions that various KTT members or partner organizations felt should be in the survey, was almost 12 pages long with a myriad of quantitative and qualitative questions (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, December 11, 2008). The KTT decided to form a Survey Working

Group and invited Community Developers to participate in the process, since they were going to be implementing the tool (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, December 11, 2009). The goal was to eliminate any and all duplication of themes, and questions were assessed for their usefulness in both the short term (for planning) and longer term (for ongoing evaluation). There were also intense discussions on the ethical nature of certain questions versus their potential to provide information that is not available anywhere else, such as residents' sexual identity/orientation and experiences of victimization (the results of these discussions are presented in more detail later on) (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, January 5, January 15, February 24, March 31, and May 6, 2009). Making use of resources within the City of Ottawa, the City of Ottawa CDF team had the Survey checked for readability (at a grade 6 level) and translated into 7 languages (French, English, Arabic, Cambodian, Chinese, Somali, Vietnamese) for the paper version, and in French and English for the online version (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, May 27, 2009). The City of Ottawa also covered the cost of printing the surveys, as well as of posting the Survey online (Fieldnotes, July 20, 2010).

Once the survey was finalized, the KTT developed survey testing guidelines for Community Developers to conduct pilot testing of the new survey in 5 CHRCs not implementing the CDF during February and March of 2009 (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, January 15, 2009). Surveys were filled out voluntarily by community members during regularly scheduled community meetings and events. Community Developers held short feedback sessions with these respondents to get a sense of their impressions of, and experiences with, the survey. The KTT Survey Working Group revised the survey based on the feedback received, struggling to balance community members' feedback (mostly that the survey was too long) with the instructions it had been given by the City of Ottawa (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 31 and May 6,

2009). After numerous meetings and discussions that occurred over a 6 month period, the CDF Neighbourhood Survey was finalized in April of 2009. The survey was 6 pages long with a cover letter; there were 6 questions pertaining to crime, safety and victimization in the home and in the neighbourhood (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, March 31 and May 6, 2009). The CDF Neighbourhood Survey can be found in Appendix 8.

The KTT came up with a survey dissemination plan and recommendations that attempted to balance the reality of the population in question (seen as “harder-to-reach”) and the request for scientific rigour and reaching desirable response rates. The survey dissemination plan was as follows (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, May 27, 2009):

- Volunteer survey disseminators should be given a training session on how to approach households and request a survey completion.
- Only one adult over the age of 16 in each household was eligible to complete a survey. The birthday selection method should be used to select one individual in the household when more than one adult is present (the adult with a birthdate closest to the day of contact was the eligible adult).
- Surveys should be left in the mailbox if no one is home. Refusals should be noted on the master list so duplicate visits do not occur.
- Respondents should be given information on the location of the drop off locations for the surveys and given the option of completing the survey online.
- Respondents have the option of entering their name for a prize for completing the survey. Different prizes are being donated to each community by CDF partners.
- As surveys are returned, the respondent’s address should be checked off the master list to avoid duplication.

- Households where residents are not home are to be returned to on four separate occasions at different times of the day to maximize response rates.

The Neighbourhood Survey was ready for dissemination in various languages in all CDF neighbourhoods in May of 2009, and Community Developers lead the dissemination of the survey in their respective catchment areas, with the help of resident volunteers (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 10, 2009). The City of Ottawa agreed to spend around \$10,000 on Survey data collection, input and analysis, and enlisted the help of the Carleton University Survey Centre to help with data input and write up the results for each neighbourhood. The Survey Centre completed some of the work on a pro bono basis.

Community volunteers and students with the Carleton University Survey Centre were used in each community to enter the completed surveys. The surveys were entered into a web-based secure database on the City of Ottawa website. The volunteers were given a training session to ensure that the accuracy and integrity of the data was maintained (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 10, 2009; Fieldnotes, July 12, 2010).

Neighbourhood Survey data collection ended in all four neighbourhoods in July of 2009 (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 10, 2009). One of the Community Developers was frustrated by how long the Neighbourhood Survey development process had taken, and was pressuring the City of Ottawa for the survey results in order to begin the action planning phase (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 10, 2009; Fieldnotes, July 12, 2010). Other Community Developers later reported that they had experienced challenges in engaging and interesting residents in completing the survey. Residents were not interested in the survey, said they felt the survey was too long, were facing language barriers, and/or reported having recently

filled out a different survey (Fieldnotes, November 8, 2010). In Neighbourhood D, the Community Developer felt that a major disadvantage was that they had very little to no relationship with the majority of the numerous residents of that community at the outset (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). In addition, the private landlord of the largest high-rise apartment building in the area was not fully onboard as a CDF partner despite numerous attempts on the part of the City of Ottawa CDF team and Ottawa Community Housing to enlist their cooperation (Fieldnotes, June 24, July 12, September 1, and November 3, 2010). The private landlord had denied the Community Developer access to the building to circulate the CDF Neighbourhood Survey, and continued to refuse to let the Community Developer or others post any information on initiatives related to the CDF inside or near the building (Fieldnotes, June 24 and October 12, 2010). The corporation conducted its own annual survey of its tenants, and representatives reported that they felt very little need to comply with the CDF given there was no benefit in it for them (Fieldnotes, June 24 and October 12, 2010). This glaring example of the dynamics of power and knowledge, and implications regarding the notion of resistance discussed earlier, are explored further in Chapter 8.

The Community Developers facing these various difficulties in survey dissemination wished they had been given more time to engage residents and complete the Survey process (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010).

Neighbourhood Survey Results with a Focus on Crime and Safety

Each neighbourhood implementing the CDF was provided with its own survey results report prepared by the Carleton University Survey Centre (2009a, 2009b, 2009c and 2009d). The Neighbourhood Survey reports were handed over to the City of Ottawa in August of 2009 and were given to Local Steering Tables almost immediately (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table,

September 10, 2009). Table 5 on the following page presents some of the key findings of the Neighbourhood Survey across sites – note that this summary is focused particularly on questions pertaining to crime, fear of crime and victimization in each neighbourhood implementing the CDF (see Appendix 8 for a full list of all the questions included in the CDF Neighbourhood Survey).

Table 5. CDF Neighbourhood Survey Results on Crime and Safety by Neighbourhood (taken from Carleton University Survey Centre 2009a, 2009b, 2009c and 2009d).

Neighbourhood	A	B	C	D
Response Rate	34% (out of 138 units)	31% (out of 102 units)	17% (out of 700 units)	5.4% (out of 2465 units)
Respondents' Gender	50% male	70% female	60% female	70% female
Cultural Background	50% White 17% Black	28% Black 22% White	42% White 14% Black	27% White 17% Arab/West Asian 12% South Asian 12% Chinese
Age	56% aged 41-65	54% aged 21-40	51% aged 41-65	47% aged 21-40
Number of People in Household	87% single person household	58% households with 3-4 people	49% single-parent households	67% of households with 2-4 people
Age of Children in Household		of households with kids, 41% with kids aged 7-12	wide age distribution of kids	of households with kids, 47% with kids aged 0-6
% Afraid of Crime or Violence in Neighbourhood	66%	72%	66%	56%
% Victims of Crime (in past year while living in neighbourhood)	28%	27%	26.2%	12%
% Reported Crime to Police	44%	50%	47.5%	28.6%
Top 3 Concerns Overall	1. Drugs 2. Safety 3. Destruction of property	1. Drugs 2. Lack of grocery store 3. Poor housing maintenance	1. Drugs 2. Gangs 3. Prostitution	1. Crime and safety 2. Lack of grocery store 3. Garbage

As you can see from Table 5 above, the survey response rate varied significantly across sites, from 34% in neighbourhood A to 5.4% in neighbourhood D. From a scientific perspective, these response rates are low, and the Knowledge Transfer Table cautioned that the results represented a small/select number of residents only, and should therefore not be used as a valid and reliable picture of residents' experiences and perceptions (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, September 10, 2009). Community Developers agreed, and argued that they only ever saw the survey as a "jumping off point", a tool to engage residents and get the conversation started (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010).

In Neighbourhood D, for example, the response rate was very low at 5.4%, representing 133 out of 2465 household units (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009d). However, the Community Developer and CHC saw this as a success, given their lack of a rapport with residents and the significant challenges they encountered in communicating with residents living in the most densely populated high-rise building in the neighbourhood, owned and operated by a private (corporate) landlord (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). In light of these hurdles, the CHC, Community Developer and other service providers in neighbourhood D considered it a big accomplishment to have reached and convinced those 133 households in the area to participate in the Neighbourhood Survey (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010 and October 12, 2010).

Response rates aside, the results of the Neighbourhood Survey became an interesting part of the conversation within the CDF about residents' experiences and needs (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). The demographics of survey respondents implied that though the samples may not have been totally representative of the communities in question, they generally fit with the profile of each

community, and there had been some success in reaching a diversity of residents where applicable (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010).

In neighbourhoods A, B, and C, 26.2% to 28% of respondents reported being the victim of crime during the past year, a number that resembles the Canadian national average of 27% (Brennan & Perreault, 2009). The lower rate of 12% in neighbourhood D is interesting – in fact, given that all four neighbourhoods rank among the highest in crime reported to the Ottawa Police Service, it is somewhat surprising that rates of self-reported victimization among survey respondents were not higher. Of course, this could mean that those most willing to complete the survey were not among those most likely to be victims of crime in their neighbourhood. Aside from the rate of 28% in neighbourhood D, the rates of incidents reported to police were actually higher than the national average of 31% (with a national range of 29% for violent crime to 36% of household incidents; Brennan & Perreault, 2009). Keeping the low response rates in mind, this is nonetheless an interesting finding given the focus that was later placed on the responsabilization of residents to report crimes to police, discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.

As for the fear of crime and violence, 56% of respondents from neighbourhood D reported being afraid of crime or violence in their neighbourhood, 66% in neighbourhoods A and C, and 72% in neighbourhood B. When asked whether they felt safe in their neighbourhood after dark, 42.5% of respondents in neighbourhood D, 51.2% of respondents in neighbourhood A, 54.6% of respondents in neighbourhood C, and 60% of respondents in neighbourhood B reported feeling unsafe or very unsafe after dark in their neighbourhood. In comparison, the most recent General Social Survey showed that only 10% of Canadians who walk alone after dark felt unsafe doing

so²¹, and 17% of Canadians who are home alone in the evening or at night felt somewhat worried (16%) or very worried (1%) (Brennan & Perreault, 2009). We cannot draw absolute conclusions from these comparisons since the survey questions were not the exact same, and response rates were indeed low. Nonetheless, on the surface, it appears as though respondents of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey felt less safe in their neighbourhoods at night than the national average.

Finally, when asked about their top three concerns in terms of their quality of life in their neighbourhood, respondents in three neighbourhoods listed drugs-related issues as their top concern (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c and 2009d). This included drug dealing in public, drug trafficking from private residences and the common issues that surround it (frequent ins and outs, noise disturbances, high traffic), open drug use, and unpleasant encounters with drug users. In neighbourhood A, this was accompanied by a second most popular general concern with safety, most often attributed to groups or “suspicious” individuals “hanging around”, or violent incidents attributed to drug use. In neighbourhood C, the concern with drugs was followed closely by a second concern with gang activity and third concern with prostitution in the neighbourhood.

As for neighbourhood D, respondents also listed “crime” and/or “safety” as their top concern, but for them it had more to do with poor lighting, groups or individuals hanging around, traffic, and in some cases, poorly supervised dogs. Many residents of neighbourhood D referred to the negative reputation of their neighbourhood in both the media and among the general public, and spoke of the impact it had on their own feelings of safety. Though this was most common among

²¹ There appears to be potential for a selection bias here in the General Social Survey, since those who choose not to walk around at night may in fact do so out of fear of crime.

survey respondents from neighbourhood D, it also appeared in surveys from neighbourhoods A, B and C.

In addition to these concerns, in neighbourhoods B and D, respondents reported the lack of a grocery store as their second largest concern overall (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009b and 2009d). Respondents felt they had too far to travel to obtain affordable groceries and fresh food, with many facing limited transportation options and/or issues of physical mobility. In neighbourhood B, respondents reported poor housing maintenance as their third largest concern overall (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009b). This included problems with mice, rats, and roaches, lack of hot water in the winter, dangerous play structures, and overflowing dumpsters and poor lighting (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009b). In neighbourhood D, garbage was respondents' third largest concern overall (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009d). This included widespread litter, garbage being left out at all times (versus on garbage pick-up day), and pests spreading garbage around the neighbourhood.

Given the low response rates and the concerns about the representativeness of survey samples, these results were used very cautiously by Community Developers in drawing conclusions about resident experiences and perceptions. They saw the survey results as a starting point only, and relied heavily on the various other assessment methods used: targeted focus groups (with women, youth, seniors), meetings with existing community groups where applicable, informal individual conversations, and innovative resident submissions, such as a 10-minute video prepared by a group of youth from neighbourhood B showing viewers what they did and did not like about their neighbourhood (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010). The results of these assessments were documented by Community Developers on flip charts and in their notes. The

general findings they reported to their Local Steering Tables and the main conclusions of the overall assessments were fairly similar to the results found in the Neighbourhood Surveys (Minutes, Local Steering Tables; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010).

The Experience of the Neighbourhood Survey

The Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) received the Survey reports in late September 2009, long after they had been distributed to the Local Steering Tables for use in planning (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009). KTT members had some serious concerns with what they saw; the reports had significant errors in them. For example, there were many discrepancies in numbers represented in a table versus what was summarized in the text. The authors had also taken more liberties in the Conclusions section than deemed acceptable, for example recommending a particular program or strategy to address one of the issues emerging from the survey responses. The KTT spent some time revising and correcting the survey reports (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, February 10, 2010; Fieldnotes, July 14, 2010). It was too late, however, for the KTT to rectify the situation completely, since the Local Steering Tables were already using the Survey reports. As expected, some Community Developers and other Local Steering Table members later commented on the lack of attention to detail and professionalism found in some of the Survey reports (Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24 and November 8, 2010). As far as they knew, the Neighbourhood Survey was a KTT project and the poor quality of the reports reflected poorly on the KTT and its members (Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24 and November 8, 2010).

The experience with the development of the Evaluation Framework and the Neighbourhood Survey appeared to leave many people involved in the CDF feeling a bit dismayed. First, the idea

of a diverse group of academics contributing their time and expertise to a Knowledge Transfer Table on a voluntary basis was not going as initially intended and was coming up against important points of resistance. In addition to some conflicts of personality between KTT members (Fieldnotes, June 24 and July 12, 2010), there was some resentment that the time and expertise of one academic KTT member was being remunerated, while other academics were expected to spend their time and energy contributing as volunteers (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). Other KTT members simply could not see themselves sustaining this level of voluntary commitment and involvement over time (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). Over the course of the initial Neighbourhood Survey development period – which took months - the Survey Working Group (a critical mass of the initial academics involved) met at least once a week for about three hours and spent a lot of time corresponding and advancing the project through email. Some academics noted that since they work in an environment that values and rewards teaching and publications, they felt involvement in a community research initiative on a voluntary basis would go highly unnoticed by their superiors (Fieldnotes, August 30, 2010). Some of the academics felt they weren't getting a reasonable return on their time investment (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). After the experience with the Evaluation Framework and Neighbourhood Survey development, attrition at the KTT became a problem, with only about 4 academics attending meetings semi-regularly, and 2 of them doing all the hands-on work required, including myself (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table; Fieldnotes, July 14, September 28, November 8, and November 19, 2010).

The development of the Neighbourhood Survey also disheartened some Community Developers. There was a perception that the City of Ottawa and the KTT did not understand “community work”, that they were designing a survey to meet their particular research agendas and to feed

their zest for data (Interviews #1, 6, 7, 8; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010). There was a lack of communication with Community Developers about the fact that the KTT had been asked to design a tool that was to serve for much more than neighbourhood level engagement and planning, namely for longitudinal evaluation against a very specific set of outcomes (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010). To Community Developers, the survey was overly complicated, long, and not user-friendly enough (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010). They were resistant to the idea of target response rates – they did not want to be held accountable for the many dynamics involved in local survey dissemination and completion that were out of their influence and control – but they felt they had to comply based on their Centre’s funding arrangements with the City of Ottawa (Interviews #1 and 6; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010 and November 8, 2010). They saw target survey response rates as yet another illustration of the City of Ottawa and the KTT’s lack of understanding of local contexts (Fieldnotes, November 8, 2010). For others, though they liked the Survey tool itself, the time it had taken the KTT to develop and finalize it seemed unreasonable. Some Community Developers were waiting on the Neighbourhood Survey to begin CDF work in their catchment area, and felt they were losing momentum by waiting so long for the tool to arrive (Fieldnotes, November 8, 2010).

Finally, some of the Community Developers who participated in survey development meetings felt their concerns had been “swept under the rug” (Interview #6). The section of the Survey that dealt with issues of crime and victimization is a perfect illustration of some of the tensions that arose. Some Community Developers were very resistant to the idea of including a mini-victimization survey into the Neighbourhood Survey. They feared this would be perceived by community residents as an invasion of their privacy and would feed their feelings of distrust towards local institutions. They also worried about the ethics of “what to do” with the

information and a moral and/or professional obligation to provide assistance in particular types of situations, such as disclosures of violence against women and children (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, January 15 and February 24, 2009). The KTT was perceived as having the final decision-making power (in light of the mandate they were given by the City of Ottawa), and they essentially won the argument. They felt that safeguards related to confidentiality and anonymity of survey respondents addressed the concerns being raised. Furthermore, they felt questions on victimization were key to assessing the “real needs” of neighbourhood residents when it comes to personal safety, and to differentiating between issues of fear (perceptions of safety) and actual victimization (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, January 15 and February 24, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). The CDF Neighbourhood Survey includes 6 questions that pertain to crime, safety and victimization in the home and in the neighbourhood (out of a total of 22 questions; see Appendix 8, questions 9 through 14 for the Crime and Safety section of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey).

These types of decisions were beginning to fuel a sense among those on the ground that the CDF was turning out to be a very “top-down” kind of initiative, with very little respect for the delicate processes and timelines involved in community development work (Interview #1, 5 and 6; Fieldnotes, November 8, 2010). As one Community Developer put it: “In theory, this is all a great idea. How I’m seeing it play out, it seems to be the antithesis of what community development is supposed to be: from the ground up. It’s not necessarily rolling out that way” (Interview #5). These dynamics are not unique to the experience of the development of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey and are common when doing research in the community (Lee, 2008). They point to some of the inherent challenges in doing community-based research, a theme I address more comprehensively in Chapters 7 and 8.

Phase 3: Prioritizing Issues and Developing Neighbourhood Action Plans (Summer and Fall 2009)

Once the neighbourhood assessments were completed, Phase 3 of the CDF process involved creating a Neighbourhood Action Plan for each community. The Action Plan of each Local Steering Table ended up looking a bit different, but all of them were presented in a grid that listed Prioritized Issues, Solutions, Actions, Roles and Responsibilities (who, what), and the anticipated Timeframe (when); two also listed the Resources Required (human, funds, in-kind) (Neighbourhood Action Plans, 2009). In the summer and fall of 2009, the Community Developer in each area identified and synthesized local issues and concerns using the results of the Neighbourhood Survey as a starting point and supplementing those findings with all of the information gathered through other methods (focus groups, individual informal interviews, etc.). These main needs and concerns were articulated as critical priorities and then presented to Local Steering Tables for suggestions as to possible actions and responses. These ideas for solutions were a mix of what was heard directly from residents themselves and what members of the Local Steering Table offered as options (Interview #7; Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24, September 22, and October 12, 2010).

Neighbourhood Action Plans: Crime and Safety as a Prioritized Issue with Suggested Solutions

In neighbourhoods A, B and C, the category “Crime and Safety” was placed as the highest priority within their respective Neighbourhood Action Plans (Neighbourhood Action Plans, 2009). In neighbourhood D, a “Crime and Safety” category appeared as the number two priority in the Neighbourhood Action Plan, second to the lack of a grocery store (Neighbourhood Action Plan, 2009). Under the **Crime and Safety** category, a variety of specific dimensions were listed

across neighbourhoods, including (NB: the wording below is directly from Neighbourhood Action Plans, 2009):

- Perceptions of crime and safety
- Relationship between youth and the Police
- Alcohol abuse and drug addiction (drug users)
- Drug dealing
- Gangs and violence
- Prostitution
- Mental illness
- Reporting to Police and other authorities
- Antisocial behavior and disturbances, including: noise, racial slurs, intimidation, harassment, rowdiness, damage to property
- Traffic and pedestrian safety

While this may seem like a long list of separate concerns, from my fieldwork observations, there was a lot of overlap and interplay among key themes. One of the major issues to arise consistently was police-community relations, including youth-police relations, issues around trust, transparency and communication, and reporting (Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24, July 1, July 3, September 22, October 12, and November 10, 2010). Another overarching theme was fear of crime and feelings of insecurity. In many cases, these were closely related to crime in public spaces. This included dimensions of drug use/addiction, drug dealing, prostitution, and gangs and violence, which residents also related to some of the disorder and disturbances such as noise, rowdiness, intimidation, and harassment (Fieldnotes, June 7, June 24, July 1, July 3, September 22, October 12, and November 10, 2010). Some residents saw mental health issues and alcohol

or drug use as closely related (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). A final, less popular concern dealt with traffic and pedestrian safety (Fieldnotes, October 12). Here we see how in some cases – such as with dimensions of drug use, addiction, prostitution, and mental illness - the tendency of crime prevention and safety discourses to appropriate other social problems becomes evident. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 8.

The suggested **Solutions and Actions** related to issues of crime and safety across all sites were (NB: the wording below is directly from Neighbourhood Action Plans, 2009):

1. Increase reporting to Ottawa Police and housing Security / Promote safe ways of reporting. (neighbourhood A, B, C, D)
2. Conduct a CPTED Safety Audit, and/or follow up on the recommendations found within an existing Safety Audit conducted recently and prior to CDF implementation. (neighbourhood A, B, C, D)
3. Arrange face-to-face meetings between residents, the Ottawa Police and housing Security Officers. (neighbourhood A, C, D)
4. Set up a Neighbourhood Watch program. (neighbourhood A, B)
5. Increase Police patrols including on foot. (neighbourhood B, C)
6. Increase community cohesion through social events and activities, such as BBQs, multicultural dinners, movie nights, bingo nights, or dart tournaments. (neighbourhood A)
7. Install camera monitoring in the lobby of a high-rise building and enable residents to watch on their TV the person buzzing them for entry. (neighbourhood A)
8. Reduce duration for which the entrance door remains unlocked once a visitor is 'buzzed in' to reduce unwanted entries. (neighbourhood A)
9. Fix existing surveillance cameras throughout the building and install more as needed. (neighbourhood A)
10. Staff the onsite Security Office in the building for a short time to resolve acute issues through deterrence and intervention. (neighbourhood A)

11. Keep a running inventory of incidents occurring at “problem addresses”. (neighbourhood A)
12. Conduct background checks to screen tenants for criminal history and drug involvement. (neighbourhood A)
13. Create a Tenants Association to increase resident ownership. (neighbourhood A)
14. Record incidents on Community House bulletin board to raise awareness of community safety issues. (neighbourhood B)
15. Conduct needle clean-up sweeps and explore possibility of Needle Drop Box on site. (neighbourhood C)
16. Monitor news articles that refer to the neighbourhood by name and undertake advocacy with the media when necessary about the use of the name and to encourage more balanced news reporting. (neighbourhood D)
17. Circulate good news stories about the neighbourhood. (neighbourhood D)
18. Conduct a Let’s Chat/Crime Free Multi-Housing event for residents. (neighbourhood D)
19. Link into an existing Addictions Committee in the area. (neighbourhood D)
20. Conduct a safety blitz co-organized by the existing Youth Council and the Ottawa Police. (neighbourhood D)
21. Research and adopt speed reduction strategies such as speed traps and speed signs in front of schools. (neighbourhood D)

Using the five broad approaches to crime prevention described in Chapter 1, each of these suggested solutions and actions can be classified as an example of either (1) *Policing and Enforcement* (reactive approach), (2) *Situational Crime Prevention*, or *Crime Prevention Through Social Development* which includes (3) the *Developmental Approach*, (4) the *Community Approach*, or (5) the *Social Approach*. Table 6 below summarizes these findings, including the total number of suggested solutions and actions by neighbourhood. Please note that this is a summary of what was *suggested* in the Neighbourhood Action Plans, and does not

necessarily represent what was actually *implemented* in each neighbourhood (the implementation phase is described in the next chapter).

Table 6. Suggested Solutions and Actions to Address Issues of Crime and Safety within Neighbourhoods Implementing the CDF and the Type of Crime Prevention Approach They Represent.

<u>Suggested Solution and Action</u>	<u>Type of Approach to Crime Prevention</u>	<u>Neighbourhood</u>			
		<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>
1. Increase reporting to Police and Security	Policing / Enforcement	√	√	√	√
2. Conduct and/or follow up on existing CPTED Safety Audit	Situational	√	√	√	√
3. Arrange face-to-face meetings between residents and Police / Security to build trust and increase communication	Community	√		√	√
4. Set up a Neighbourhood Watch program	Community	√	√		
5. Increase Police patrols including on foot	Policing / Enforcement		√	√	
6. Increase community cohesion through social events	Community	√			
7. Install camera monitoring in the lobby of a high-rise building and enable residents to watch on their TV the person buzzing them for entry	Situational	√			
8. Reduce duration for which the entrance door remains unlocked once a visitor is ‘buzzed in’	Situational	√			
9. Fix existing surveillance cameras throughout building and install more as needed	Situational	√			
10. Staff the onsite Security Office in the building for a short time to resolve acute issues through deterrence and intervention	Policing / Enforcement	√			
11. Keep a running inventory of incidents occurring at “problem addresses”	Policing / Enforcement	√			
12. Conduct background checks to screen tenants for criminal history and drug involvement	Policing / Enforcement	√			
13. Create a Tenants Association	Community	√			
14. Record incidents on Community House bulletin board	Community		√		

15. Conduct needle clean-up sweeps and explore possibility of Needle Drop Box on site	Situational			√	
16. Monitor news articles that refer to the neighbourhood by name and undertake advocacy with the media when necessary about the use of the name and to encourage more balanced news reporting	Community				√
17. Circulate good news stories about the neighbourhood	Community				√
18. Conduct a Let's Chat/Crime Free Multi-Housing event	Community				√
19. Link into an existing Addictions Committee in the area	Developmental				√
20. Conduct a safety blitz co-organized by the existing Youth Council and the Ottawa Police	Policing / Enforcement				√
21. Research and adopt speed reduction strategies	Policing / Enforcement				√
Total Suggested Solutions and Actions in Each Neighbourhood		12	5	5	9

The following Table presents the number of suggested solutions and actions to address issues of crime and safety in each neighbourhood according to the type of crime prevention approach they represent.

Table 7. Number of Suggested Solutions and Actions to Address Issues of Crime and Safety in Each Neighbourhood According to the Type of Crime Prevention Approach They Represent.

<u>Approach to Crime Prevention</u>	<u>Neighbourhood</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	
Policing and Enforcement (Reactive)	4	2	2	3	11
Situational Crime Prevention	4	1	2	1	8
Developmental Approach	0	0	0	1	1
Community Approach	4	2	1	4	11
Social Approach	0	0	0	0	0
	12	5	5	9	

As Tables 6 and 7 show, Neighbourhood A had the highest number of proposed solutions and actions related to crime and safety, with an equal amount of strategies related to Policing and Enforcement, Situational Crime Prevention and the Community Approach (N=4 each).

Neighbourhood D had the second highest number of proposed solutions and actions, with a mix of strategies under the Community Approach (N=4), Policing and Enforcement (N=3),

Situational Crime Prevention (N=1) and the Developmental Approach (N=1). Neighbourhoods B

and C each had 5 proposed solutions and actions representing a mix of Policing and Enforcement, Situational Crime Prevention, and the Community Approach. Taken together, strategies under the Policing and Enforcement approach (N=11) were as popular as strategies that fall within the Community Approach (N=11). Situational Crime Prevention strategies were also often proposed as a solution (N=8). Only one proposed solution made reference to the Developmental Approach, while there were no suggestions made that would fall under the Social Approach to crime prevention. Here, we see how the discussion around solutions to dimensions of “Crime and Safety” within the CDF rested heavily on tactics of policing, enforcement, and monitoring, and on the responsabilization of residents to contribute through community engagement and mobilization efforts. These significant findings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

Other Prioritized Issues and Suggested Solutions

Other than Crime and Safety, issues and actions that were prioritized across all sites included (Neighbourhood Action Plans, 2009):

- **Food:** Improve food security, including access to a grocery store and the availability of fresh produce.
- **Housing Maintenance and Service:** Address issues such as bug and pest control, backwash in bathrooms, insufficient heating, lack of hot water, air quality. Increase transparency and accountability regarding maintenance standards and progress on complaints and requests.
- **Physical Condition of Neighbourhood:** Address issues related to garbage and litter, lighting, play structures, basketball courts, fields, beautification.

- **Recreation:** Increased opportunities for children and youth, increase recreation programs for adults, improve access to existing programs and provide a better variety of opportunities, consider cultural/religious needs and barriers to recreational programs, assure better access to local space by local residents.

- **Community engagement:** Address the need for an active Tenants Association, support social activities and celebrations, increase the use of the Community House and Community Centre, encourage more frequent and positive multicultural interaction.

On rare occasions, dimensions of crime and safety came up in conversations around some of these other priorities, and vice versa. More specifically, around improvements to the physical environment (e.g., garbage clean ups, condition of public space), access to recreational opportunities for youth and young adults, and positive social events and interactions among diverse residents (Fieldnotes, June 24, August 28, November 9 and November 10, 2010). Though these suggested solutions and actions could be considered crime prevention strategies under the *Situational*, *Developmental*, and *Social Approaches* to crime prevention, they were kept separate from issues in the “Crime and Safety” category in the Neighbourhood Action Plans and throughout most of the CDF discussions at the system level (Minutes, CDF Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, May 4, May 18, and July 12, 2010; Interview #8). The implications of these findings around the notion of *governing through crime* (Simon, 2007) are discussed in detail in Chapter 8.

Conclusions

In late 2008 and early 2009, a Community Developer from each CHC or CRC now involved in the CDF began Phase 1 of the CDF process. They created a core group of local service providers

and others that would provide leadership and decision-making through a Local Steering Table. Each Local Steering Table had around 12-15 members from a variety of public and service sectors, with each Table differing in its level of resident representation and involvement. In three cases, there were only 2 or 3 residents on the Local Steering Table, and a variety of stakeholders often raised the issue that these residents were not necessarily ethno-culturally representative of the specific neighbourhood in question. The exception was in the Pinecrest-Queensway CHC area, where the CHC made a deliberate effort to create a new Table composed of a large number of diverse residents. The first task of each Local Steering Table was to decide on a specific area, a smaller set of residences to begin the CDF implementation. In all four catchment areas, the specific neighbourhood selected for CDF implementation ended up being composed largely (but not all exclusively) of public-housing households managed by Ottawa Community Housing.

Phase 2 of the CDF process involved the neighbourhood assessment of assets and needs. The Community Developer in each neighbourhood was responsible for identifying tools to use and sources and types of information already available in the neighbourhood, including through information gathering from local agencies, groups and associations, focus groups and individual meetings as they deemed necessary. The CDF Neighbourhood Survey, on the other hand, was a mandatory part of Phase 2 in all neighbourhoods implementing the CDF. The City of Ottawa CDF team asked the Knowledge Transfer Table to design the survey keeping in mind that it was meant to be a tool for action planning in neighbourhoods, and also a scientifically sound tool to track longitudinal progress on key indicators touching on all facets of community life and on the social determinants of health. After a lengthy and labourious process, the Neighbourhood Survey was ready for dissemination in various languages in all CDF neighbourhoods in May of 2009. Community Developers lead the dissemination of the survey with the help of resident volunteers.

The results of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey and the broader needs assessment process identified the following issues as areas of priority within neighbourhoods implementing the CDF: drugs, crime, safety, lack of grocery stores, gangs, destruction of property, poor housing maintenance, prostitution, and garbage.

The experience with the development and dissemination of the Neighbourhood Survey was beginning to highlight some of the tensions within the CDF, especially as they relate to the dynamics of power, knowledge, and the nature of expertise. There was a growing perception among community workers that the City of Ottawa and the Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) did not understand community work, that they were designing a survey to meet their own particular interests. They felt the survey was overly complicated, long, and not user-friendly, and they were resistant to the idea of target response rates. The processes used to develop the CDF Neighbourhood Survey and the types of decisions being made were fuelling a growing sense among those on the ground that the CDF was turning out to be a very “top-down” initiative. At the same time, the KTT was also beginning to face a number of challenges internally, including personality clashes, resentment among members and towards the City of Ottawa, and high member attrition.

In Phase 3, each Local Steering Table started developing a Neighbourhood Action Plan, with prioritized issues and suggested solutions. The ideas for ‘solutions’ were a mix of what was heard directly from residents themselves, and what members of the Local Steering Table offered as options. In neighbourhoods A, B and C, the category “Crime and Safety” was placed as the highest priority issue within their respective Neighbourhood Action Plans. In neighbourhood D, a “Crime and Safety” category appeared as the number two priority in the Neighbourhood Action

Plan (second to the lack of a grocery store). Under the Crime and Safety category, a variety of specific dimensions were listed across neighbourhoods, including: perceptions of crime and safety; the relationship between youth and the Police; alcohol abuse and drug addiction (drug users); drug dealing; gangs and violence; prostitution; mental illness; reporting to Police and other authorities; antisocial behavior and disturbances, including noise, racial slurs, intimidation, harassment, rowdiness, and damage to property; and traffic and pedestrian safety.

Here we see the tendency within crime prevention and safety discourses to appropriate other social problems, such as drug addiction, prostitution and mental illness. Using the five broad approaches to crime prevention described in Chapter 1, we also see that eleven (11) of the solutions suggested under the category Crime and Safety fall under the *Policing and Enforcement Approach*, eleven (11) fall under the *Community Approach*, eight (8) fall under the *Situational Crime Prevention Approach*, one (1) under the *Developmental Approach*, and zero (0) under the *Social Approach*. These findings highlight the tendency within the community approach to crime prevention to revert back to tactics of policing, enforcement and monitoring, and to the responsabilization of residents to contribute to these and other ‘mobilization’ efforts. The implications of these findings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER 7 - A DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LAST TWO PHASES OF THE CDF IN OTTAWA: IMPLEMENTING 'SOLUTIONS' AND REFLECTING ON PROCESS AND PROGRESS (2009-2010)

The goal of this chapter is to describe in detail the unfolding of the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa according to the last two phases of the CDF problem-solving process, namely implementing 'solutions' and reflecting on the CDF's process and progress. I begin by describing the implementation of the CDF at the 'neighbourhood level', treating each neighbourhood separately at first, and focusing specifically on the implementation of 'solutions' to issues of crime and safety as they were presented in Chapter 6. I then reflect briefly on some of the common themes in implementation across all four neighbourhoods. I then turn to the implementation of the CDF at the 'system level', noting important developments at each system Table. Finally, I review what transpired during the process evaluation phase of the CDF in late 2010. Like in the previous chapter, I focus here on piecing together a rich description, reserving more in-depth analysis and critical engagement for the final Chapter.

Phase 4: Implementing 'Solutions' to Issues of Crime and Safety (Fall 2009-December 2010)

Implementation at the Neighbourhood Level

The following sections provide an overview of what took place in each neighbourhood in relation to the CDF from the beginning of the implementation of Neighbourhood Action Plans in the fall of 2009 until the end of data collection in December 2010. This overview represents the progress in implementation in the CDF to that point (December 2010) with a particular focus on issues of crime and safety. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the events and activities that took place in neighbourhoods implementing the CDF, but it does cover the main efforts to date

in relation to crime and safety. It also explores what was actually done in relation to the suggested solutions and actions to issues of crime and safety described in the previous chapter.

Neighbourhood A

In neighbourhood A, after the first few months of implementation, it became apparent to the Community Developer and to residents that some of their top requests in the Action Plan were not going to be possible (Fieldnotes, July 3, September 30, November 8 and November 10, 2010; Neighbourhood Action Plan, 2010). For example, Ottawa Community Housing (OCH) said they did not have the ability to install a camera in the lobby that would allow residents to see who was ringing their doorbell, and they were told that local cable service providers no longer offered that service either (Fieldnotes, November 8 and November 10, 2010; Neighbourhood Action Plan, 2010). After much discussion, Ottawa Community Housing also said it was not feasible for them to assign Security Officers to a specific location (i.e., the Security Office in the lobby) even for a limited period of time (Neighbourhood Action Plan, 2010). Each OCH Security Officer is responsible for more than one building on any given shift and is typically mobile (i.e., drives around in an OCH Security vehicle) so as to respond to calls. OCH therefore felt they did not have the resources to accommodate the request (Fieldnotes, May 4, 2010). OCH also informed the Local Steering Table that they cannot, under provincial law, “screen” tenants. In addition, as the largest provider of public housing in Ottawa, OCH felt there were other social and welfare issues related to the screening of tenants (i.e., they are the “last resort” in housing). They told the Local Steering Table that for the most part, their hands were tied in relation to issues of screening and of eviction (Fieldnotes, November 8 and November 10, 2010; Interview #8). Furthermore, OCH reported that they are “legally not mandated to track problem addresses”, but

that they would gladly accept as much information as residents can provide and work with the Police to “get a better handle on them” (Fieldnotes, May 18 and November 3, 2010).

On the other hand, the Community Developer and OCH Tenant Worker were successful in facilitating the formation of a functional Tenants Association (TA) for the building in question. The TA held its first elections in the spring of 2010 (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). The Tenants Association was seen as “a key facilitator to enable residents to take ownership of and responsibility for the rest of the work to be done” (Neighbourhood Action Plan, 2010). Some of the focus turned to supporting the Tenants Association, such as helping them recruit members, organize fundraisers, and lobby OCH for a reliable internet connection for the TA President. The TA was also provided with resource materials and key pieces of information which they were charged with communicating to other residents. This included *Make the Right Call* information, a long list of over 12 telephone numbers to call for different types of incidents, such as a crime in progress (i.e., 911), drug activities, housing security issues, graffiti, property maintenance, or emergency maintenance (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010).

Ottawa Community Housing did repair existing and dysfunctional surveillance cameras in and around the building in neighbourhood A, and reduced the duration for which the front entrance door remains unlocked. The Local Steering Table also facilitated face-to-face meetings between residents and the Ottawa Police and OCH Security staff on a quarterly basis to discuss emerging issues and monitor progress on the situation (Neighbourhood Action Plan, 2010). Some residents felt this was a “good start”, but that representatives of the Ottawa Police remained largely incapable or unwilling to be transparent and open in their communication with residents on issues affecting their neighbourhood and resident requests (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). A CPTED Safety Audit of Neighbourhood A was arranged by the Ottawa Police, but much to the

Tenants Association and residents' disappointment, they were not invited to participate in the Audit; the CPTED Audit report prepared by a Police Officer was handed to the Local Steering Table for consideration. This appeared to fuel a perception that the Ottawa Police was resisting true engagement with the residents of that neighbourhood (Fieldnotes, November 29, 2010).

By the end of the data collection period, and a year after the implementation of the CDF Action Plan began in neighbourhood A, there was a feeling among many that things were reaching a bit of a crisis point in relation to the concerns of residents about crime and safety (Fieldnotes, November 8, November 10, November 26, and November 29, 2010). Though the formation of the Tenants Association and the increased communication between residents, the Ottawa Police and OCH were seen as accomplishments, there was increasing frustration on the part of residents and the Community Developer that issues of open drug dealing and drug use, prostitution, noise disturbances and violent incidents – for example, a stabbing in a hallway of the building – were not getting better. Residents reported being tired of going to meeting after meeting, only to still be woken up at all hours of the night by noise disturbances or to still have to clean blood off the walls in the morning (Fieldnotes, November 8, November 10, November 18, November 26, and November 29, 2010). Those involved in the new Tenants Association were reporting feeling overwhelmed, over-burdened and discouraged (Fieldnotes, November 29, 2010).

On a few occasions, residents were told by members of the Local Steering Table that the goals of the CDF were less to deal with immanent crises and more about long-term, sustainable community development initiatives. Some residents were “fed up” with the reality of their everyday situation, however, and their patience for discussing broader issues was wearing thin - they wanted and needed to start seeing “real changes” (Fieldnotes, November 10 and November 29, 2010). Their sense was that the Ottawa Police and other partners (especially OCH) had a long

way to go in making changes that would have a real impact on their current quality of life. It is not that these residents were not interested in broader, longer-term initiatives – for example, some of them were quite vocal about the need to address the “root causes” of the issues at hand, such as mental health, homelessness and the exploitation of young women (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). However, as one resident said:

... all I'm gonna ask for right now is a good night's sleep, to be able to go in and out without worrying about who's following or not following me, or who's gonna be hanging out in the lobby or not. It's kinda impossible for me to care about other things when I can't even come and go to the grocery store or umm whatever when I need to. (Fieldnotes, July 3, 2010)

The situation and experiences in Neighbourhood A were highlighting the tension between addressing the immediate day-to-day needs of residents versus the CDF's intention to focus on longer-term improvements to service delivery and local policy. It was also beginning to point to the limits of community mobilization, to what engaged residents (i.e., the Tenants Association) are realistically able to accomplish without greater system responsiveness and support. These important themes are developed further in Chapter 8.

Neighbourhood B

In neighbourhood B, a lot of energy was put into improving the physical condition of the neighbourhood and increasing the range and availability of social and recreational opportunities for residents. The Local Steering Table organized a large scale community clean-up event, other social activities (e.g., a Family Fun Night BBQ), and successfully applied for increased recreational opportunities for youth, through a school board grant and free swimming passes to the local pool (Fieldnotes, October 4 and November 18, 2010). Perhaps the most significant

project in neighbourhood B was the successful resident mobilization and fundraising efforts to build two new play structures in the heart of the neighbourhood. By partnering with an organization called *Let Them Be Kids*, residents, the Community Developer and Community House workers, CDF partners and local businesses raised \$100,000 for the new playgrounds (the community raised \$50,000 which was matched by the organization). The experience was considered a big success, especially the fact that residents had “owned” the process and that around 200 volunteers (residents and CDF partners) participated in the build day (Fieldnotes, August 28, October 4, and November 18, 2010).

As for issues of crime and safety, the Local Steering Table focused on increasing Ottawa Police foot patrols in the neighbourhood and putting up a bulletin board in the Community House to record incidents and raise awareness of safety issues (Fieldnotes, October 4, 2010). A CPTED Safety Audit was also arranged by the Ottawa Police. Like in neighbourhood A, residents, the Property Manager and others were not invited to participate in the Audit. A brief, one-page audit report prepared by a Police Officer was presented to the Local Steering Table for consideration. City staff and housing representatives reported that the lighting and fencing recommendations made were “already on their radar”. The Local Steering Table requested that a more participatory survey be undertaken to also take into account residents’ perceptions and use of the space; this was added to the Action Plan (Fieldnotes, June 7 and October 4, 2010).

Finally, there was also a lot of focus placed on increasing reporting to Ottawa Police and OCH Security and on setting up a Neighbourhood Watch program (Fieldnotes, June 7 and October 4, 2010). Information on *Make the Right Call* was distributed to residents and those interested in issues of safety were encouraged to participate in evening meetings with the Community Police Officer, organized by the Community House. The Local Steering Table hoped these informal

meetings would eventually turn into a new Neighbourhood Watch program. However, only 3 to 5 residents showed up to those meetings and it was clear in speaking to many neighbourhood residents that most of them were reluctant to participate in Neighbourhood Watch program. Some said they did not feel they had the time to participate, and others said they had childcare and other responsibilities that made evening meetings impossible. Many others feared the repercussions of participating in this type of initiative. There had been a recent incident of a neighbourhood resident calling the Police to report a crime in progress in the neighbourhood, and the Police showed up at her door shortly thereafter to speak with her. That woman was harassed and intimidated by the perpetrators for months after the incident, which was witnessed by other residents and a well-known fact in the neighbourhood. At a Local Steering Table meeting, the City Councillor insisted that the Police needed to be more aware of the repercussions of their actions in situations like this one. There were no Police representatives present at that meeting, and the recommendation appeared to go nowhere (Fieldnotes, June 7, October 4 and November 18, 2010).

In addition, many new Canadians living in the neighbourhood had a very poor view of the Police based on their past (and in some cases current) experiences and perceptions of Police corruption, abuse of power, harassment and impunity. Many Black youth and young adults in particular (and especially males) spoke to me of their experiences of being followed, stopped or questioned by Police in situations where they felt there was very little legitimate reason to do so (Fieldnotes, August 28 and November 18, 2010). Some felt they were being targeted because they were hanging out in groups, others because of the colour of their skin, and still others thought it was both (Fieldnotes, August 28, and November 18, 2010).

Given the difficulties they were having in attracting residents to talk openly about crime and participate in a Neighbourhood Watch, members of the Local Steering Table agreed that residents needed support in having a ‘safe’ place to report crime. A decision was made to work on building the trust of residents in Police by encouraging Police Officers to attend neighbourhood events and start building relationships with residents. Police Officers were thereafter often represented at neighbourhood events, like the playground building day, but it was not always the same Police Officers who were present (Fieldnotes, August 28, October 4 and November 18, 2010), which seems to largely defeated the original intent of personal relationship-building. Meanwhile, the three to five residents who did attend the evening ‘safety meetings’ were slowly being prepared by the Community House Coordinator and a Police Officer to form an eventual Neighbourhood Watch program (Fieldnotes, November 18, 2010), despite the apparent reluctance on the part of the majority of the residents to participate in such a program (Fieldnotes, August 28 and November 18, 2010).

The situation and experiences with CDF implementation in neighbourhood B are great examples of the challenges that come with seeing the Police as a significant part of the solution – and in allowing them to be in a position to make decisions about neighbourhood needs and ‘solutions’ - when they are evidently a central part of the problem. This theme is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 8.

Neighbourhood C

In neighbourhood C, there was a lot of focus on providing residents with information on a variety of their concerns, including those related to safety. A brochure was created that described existing programs and services available, which was “expected to increase community awareness and, in turn, increase access to opportunities for residents across the neighbourhood”

(CDF Update, Summer/Fall 2010: 1). The brochure included information on the importance of reporting incidents to the Police and to OCH and on *Make the Right Call* (an extensive list of emergency numbers), on what to do when a used needle is found, on procedures to follow when making a complaint with OCH maintenance or security (Fieldnotes, September 22, 2010). The Local Steering Table also organized a number of information sessions for Community Leaders and other interested parties, including one by the Elizabeth Fry Society of Ottawa on the services they offer to women involved in the sex trade (Fieldnotes, September 22, 2010). Partners at the Local Steering Table were also approached to offer a number of enhanced services, such as regular needle sweeps of the area by Ottawa Public Health and increased foot patrols by both the Ottawa Police and OCH Security. The hope was that an increase in visibility in the neighbourhood and developing relationships and trust with residents would eventually improve safety and feelings of safety (Fieldnotes, September 22 and November 9, 2010).

A CPTED Safety Audit was also organized by the Ottawa Police, and an OCH Tenant Worker recruited the Property Manager, three residents from the existing Tenants Association and a few members of the Local Steering Table to participate. The focus of the Audit was largely on issues related to lighting - both the Property Manager and residents stressed that many improvements to lighting had been made in the recent past as a result of an Audit conducted in the neighbourhood in 2009 by the organization *Women's Initiatives for Safe Environments (WISE)* (Fieldnotes, November 9, 2010). The Property Manager acknowledged that the lighting issues that were identified were already well known to him and that they were in the process of addressing them gradually, based on the OCH budget and funding allocations (Fieldnotes, November 9, 2010).

At the same time, the Local Steering Table for neighbourhood C was putting a lot of effort into increasing the number and variety of activities available to youth and adults (Fieldnotes,

November 10, 2010). New programs were offered in partnership with the CHC, Tenants Association and other CDF partners, such as Gym Nights, parent training, CPR training, computer training, a Glee Club for adults, and a job fair for youth. Fundraising activities were underway for a new play structure to replace a toddler playground that had been dismantled due to safety concerns. Residents involved in the Tenants Association reported that these activities were generally well attended and successful in their view. However, there were some tensions between two main community hubs – one small centre supported by the local Chaplaincy (where most of the Tenants Association members “hang out” and from where they run their programs) and the local Family Centre, a not-for-profit corporation and charity that runs a variety of courses and drop-in programs to local residents (and that is a member of the Coalition of Community Houses). Residents reported that those who attended one centre typically did not attend the other. This separation was not drawn along ethno-cultural or religious lines, but simply a matter of preference and of “where friends hang out” (Fieldnotes, November 9, 2010). The separation did not end with the clients, however. Residents involved in the Tenants Association and in CDF activities reported difficulties in working in partnership with the Family Centre, with the Family Centre refusing to post and help promote their new programs, events and initiatives. There was a sense among those residents that the underlying issue was a sense of competition for both resident attendance in their programming and for funding (Fieldnotes, November 9, 2010), which can often be interrelated.

Towards the end of the data collection period, the Local Steering Table, with some help from the City of Ottawa CDF team and other system supports, was turning special attention to access to space issues in the neighbourhood. In addition to the two community hubs already mentioned, there was a City of Ottawa run Recreation Centre nearby, and there was a desire to increase the

availability and accessibility of that space for use by local residents from neighbourhood C (Fieldnotes, November 3 and November 9, 2010).

Neighbourhood D

In the more densely populated neighbourhood D, a number of community groups, associations and Committees already existed, including a newly resurrected Community Association. Work involving these groups and the local City Councillor was already underway on a number of local issues, such as a proposal for consideration within the City budget for revitalizing the local Field House, and a working group on food security advocating for a new grocery store (Fieldnotes, June 24 and October 12, 2010). Residents attending the newly formed CDF Steering Table meetings were apprised of these ongoing projects and linked into them when necessary and appropriate. The new CDF group focused on greater outreach and engagement with diverse residents and on increasing information on, and access to, community and employment resources. They organized a local job fair as well as a large community event that offered food, games, activities, information on a variety of social services and free dental screening for children by Ottawa Public Health. Though they were hoping for 250 residents, the event attracted over 400 (Fieldnotes, October 12, 2010).

Unlike in the other three neighbourhoods, issues of crime and safety were not considered a big priority for the Local Steering Committee in neighbourhood D. There was a sense from the neighbourhood assessment that issues of crime and safety were not as prominent as others (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). In addition, there already existed a comprehensive crime prevention initiative that included (but was not limited to) the geographical area in question, sponsored by Crime Prevention Ottawa (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). In speaking to residents and front-line service providers involved in that initiative, they reported not being very familiar with or linked

into what was happening with the CDF in the area. They said their understanding of the CDF was that it was supposed to incorporate and consolidate existing programs and initiatives, but they had not yet witnessed that merging (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010, October 22 and November 12, 2010; Interview #1). Furthermore, there was some indication that a few service providers who were initially involved in that particular crime and safety initiative had since stopped attending meetings. They reported that since they sat on the catchment area's Resource Committee, and that that Resource Committee was now supposed to be responding to issues arising from the CDF Local Steering Table (which was supposedly incorporating all other local initiatives), they felt their representation on one Committee was enough (Fieldnotes, November 12, 2010; Interview #1).

The one safety issue taken on by a resident of the CDF Local Steering Table in neighbourhood D was a concern with traffic and pedestrian safety. Though the action plan made reference to enforcement type strategies such as speed traps and more speed signs (Neighbourhood Action Plan, 2009), that resident placed his focus on launching a PACE CAR program, an increasingly popular program he discovered in conversations with some Police Officers (Fieldnotes, October 12, 2010). The PACE CAR program involves getting local residents and those using local streets to sign an agreement committing to obey the posted speed limit, attach a PACE CAR decal on their vehicle, and act as a "mobile speed bump" that drives the speed limit to set the pace for local traffic. The resident provided key leadership and a lot of volunteer time for the program, which became a popular local initiative garnering some positive attention from other local groups and the local media (Fieldnotes, October 12 and November 3, 2010).

Common Themes: Neighbourhood Contexts and Impacts on CDF Implementation

Despite some of the differences across neighbourhoods in the types of ‘solutions’ implemented under the CDF, there are a number of common themes in how the implementation of the CDF unfolded at the neighbourhood level. First, in the highly heterogeneous neighbourhoods where the CDF is being implemented, there are significant socio-economic, cultural, and linguistic factors that posed serious challenges to community organizing (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 20, and November 26, 2010). These factors and differences among neighbours made the ideal of a common ‘community identity’ very elusive. Many residents living in neighbourhoods implementing the CDF reported facing competing demands on their time and energy. Some are single parents holding down more than one job, others are caring for a number of dependents such as children, elders, and in some cases, both. Some are involved in other social or faith-based interest groups or activities that take up much of their free time (Fieldnotes, June 24, August 26, and November 10, 2010).

Many other residents are dealing with personal challenges that may limit their willingness or capacity to get involved; a staggering 37% to 59% of CDF Neighbourhood Survey respondents²² reported facing an impediment to their hearing, seeing, speech, mobility, agility, learning, memory, psychological and/or developmental abilities (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d). Though there are significant methodological limitations related to these surveys, these numbers raise important questions about what can fairly and realistically be expected of residents experiencing these challenges in terms of ‘mobilization’. They also raise important questions about the appropriateness of some of the ‘solutions’ being proposed and

²² These figures were obtained by subtracting from 100 the percentage of respondents who chose “prefer not to answer” and “have no disability” to the multiple response question regarding disability. Respondents could select whether they faced impediments to their hearing, seeing, speech, mobility, agility, learning, memory, psychological and/or developmental abilities.

implemented under the CDF: Is ‘crime prevention’ through greater policing, enforcement and monitoring really the answer to these important challenges faced by residents?

The findings of this research also point to the possibility that ethno-racial tensions and intolerance within some of the neighbourhoods in question may be a significant barrier to community organizing and mobilization. Though very few residents talked about this openly during CDF consultations or in more private conversations, 19% of survey respondents in Neighbourhoods A and C reported being the victim of a hate crime²³ in their neighbourhood in the past year (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009a, 2009c). Rates of hate crime victimization were 12.5% in Neighbourhood B and 7.6% in Neighbourhood D (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009b, 2009d). Though there are methodological limitations related to these surveys, some of these rates seem to warrant further questioning. When asked specifically about this issue, residents and Community Developers typically said that racial tensions in the neighbourhood were restricted to isolated incidents and attributable to a few individuals or groups (Fieldnotes, June 24, August 28 and November 10, 2010). In other words, that it was not seen as a widespread or pervasive issue. However, Community Developers and other workers (e.g., Community House Coordinators) often referred to the need for neighbourhood events that promote greater positive multicultural interaction (Fieldnotes, June 17, June 24, September 30, and November 10, 2010; Neighbourhood Action Plans). Given all this, I believe this is an issue that would merit more investigation in the future.

²³ “Hate crime” was described in the survey as “a crime motivated by hate towards certain people because of their culture, race, religion, sexual orientation or gender identity”. Unfortunately, there are no comparable victimization questions or statistics in Canada to use as a comparator. The General Social Survey of 2004 revealed that 3% of victimization incidents were considered by the victim to be motivated by hate (Dauvergne, Scrim & Brennan, 2008). For a discussion of hate crime in Canada, see Janhevich, Bania & Hastings, 2008.

This research also found that language barriers can be a significant deterrent to participation, but that the “format” in which participation is sought and expected can be even more of a roadblock (Fieldnotes, June 24, September 30 and November 10, 2010). It became clear during the course of this research that many residents living in the neighbourhoods implementing the CDF felt intimidated by the formality of a chaired meeting, the mode of gathering most used within the CDF (Fieldnotes, June 24, September 30, November 10 and November 26, 2010). Many residents from diverse backgrounds felt they did not know what to expect and feared they would not have the skills to get through a formal meeting. “In my culture, a meeting like that, it’s not natural”, one woman offered (Fieldnotes, August 28, 2010). Another resident put it this way: “... it makes me feel stupid when I can’t understand the words or what’s going on. Why would I go to something that makes me feel bad about myself?” (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). As another resident offered: “Come meet me for coffee at my Tim Hortons and maybe then we can talk. Those big meetings with all those official people and those workers make me feel too nervous” (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). Here we see how the residents experience and react to the relations of power and knowledge that exist within a framework like the CDF, where in many instances the number and power of the ‘workers’ outweigh the number and power of the residents (see Chapter 8 for more analysis on this topic).

When it came to smaller community groups and meetings within their neighbourhood, such as a Tenants Association, some residents who were long-time tenants of the OCH community in question found comfort in their participation (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 10, 2010). However, they were also feeling tired and overworked. One woman participating on the revived Tenants Association in Neighbourhood C offered:

I grew up here, my daughter grew up here, and now my grandbabies are growing up here, ya know. I want it to be a safe place for them, ya know, so I have no choice but to do something. Doing something makes me feel like I know more of what's going on. It makes me feel better about it. [...] ... but it's hard. It's always the same four or five of us doin' the work. It's exhausting. (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010)

By contrast, other residents focused on moving out of the neighbourhood rather than on participating in activities that would make it possible for others outside their area to identify which neighbourhood they currently live in. As one resident put it:

If I meet someone new, like even on the bus home or something, and they ask me where I live or where I'm going, I'll never say that I live in *[name of public housing community]*. I'll say that I live just off of *[name of major street]* and leave it at that. It's too embarrassing, you know... People think we're all thugs, crackheads and trouble-makers or something like that. [...] My friend's done some stuff with the Tenants Association, you know, but not me. I don't want to get involved in anything that means I have to go around advertizing to other people that I live here. It's not something I'm proud about. And I don't want anyone to take it out on my daughter neither. We keep to ourselves and I hope we get outta here soon, that's all. (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010)

Here we see how stigmatization based one's address or neighbourhood name – an indicator of social class – can hinder a resident's willingness to 'engage' and become active in neighbourhood-based mobilization efforts for fear of revealing one's social status. The shame experienced by residents who are subject to this stigmatization is also evident.

Implementation at the System Level

The following sections describe the implementation of the CDF at the system level Tables.

The Community Development Roundtable and CDF Partners' Roles in Issues of Crime and Safety

The Community Development Roundtable met for the first time on May 21, 2008 (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, May 21, 2008). The table is composed of executives and senior managers from many of Ottawa's key institutions, including one City Councillor, the Deputy City Manager of the Community and Protective Services Department, the CEO of Ottawa Community Housing, the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service, a School Board executive, a Co-Chair of the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa, the CEO of the United Way of Ottawa, and the Chair of each other CDF system level Table. The Roundtable met twice a year in 2008 and 2009, and three times in 2010. Their role in the decisions made in the earlier phases of the CDF was described in the previous Chapter.

For a meeting of the Roundtable in February of 2010, the City of Ottawa CDF team prepared a summary of the key issues and priorities listed in the Neighbourhood Action Plans of all four CDF neighbourhoods. These eight key areas were listed by them (in no particular order) as (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010):

1. Access to Space / Community Programming
2. Crime and Safety
3. Food Security / Grocery Stores
4. Social / Multicultural Cohesion
5. Condition of Neighbourhood / Garbage
6. Housing Conditions
7. Traffic and Pedestrian Safety
8. Childcare

There were columns that listed, for each issue, proposed solutions and opportunities at the neighbourhood level and at the system level. This last column listed some of the needs and actions that the Local Steering Tables had put forth to the system level for consideration as a result of their needs assessment and action planning. These were needs that the residents and members of Local Steering Tables felt they could not address on their own due to a lack of knowledge, skills, resources, or decision-making power. They needed more support at a “higher level” within and between organizations (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, July 12, 2010).

At that meeting, members of the Roundtable studied the summary table, and went through each key area one by one, discussing what they felt needed to be done (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010). It was made clear by the Chair of the meeting at the outset that given members’ time constraints, the meeting was to last only one hour. For some, the pace of that meeting felt quite rushed, given the amount and complexity of the issues under consideration (Fieldnotes, May 25 and July 6, 2010; Interview #8).

In the crime and safety column, what was listed as resident concerns looked much like the list provided earlier (see p. 200). In the second column, Local Steering Tables had voiced a desire and need to “develop a comprehensive crime prevention strategy for each neighbourhood” (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010). Some Community Developers and Local Steering Table members felt that the solutions being proposed and implemented in neighbourhoods to date were only scratching the surface. One Community Developer referred to the actions proposed at the Local Steering Table as “band aid solutions” (Fieldnotes, June 7, 2010). They were looking for some leadership and guidance on the part of key institutions to come up with a plan that would result in more meaningful and longer-term

changes. Some of them spoke of “the root causes” of crime issues and wanted to see discussions on crime and safety broadened beyond talk of security, police programs and enforcement (Fieldnotes, May 25, June 24, 2010). The key question at that meeting in February of 2010 was: “who is going to do it?” (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, May 4, 2010).

At that meeting, a representative of the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRC) put the Chief of Police on the spot (Fieldnotes, July 6, 2010). She reminded him and the other members of the table that the successes of the *No Community Left Behind (NCLB)* initiative - which served as the inspiration for the work of the CDF on the ground - were due in large part to the willingness of the Ottawa Police Service to fully embrace community policing principles and practices in those neighbourhoods: Neighbourhood Officers were given the time and resources they needed to engage meaningfully with the community and residents, attend community events and activities, reach out and build relationships and trust, and engage in joint problem-solving with clear and consistent two-way communication. In order to see the same successes and changes in other neighbourhoods, the Ottawa Police Service was going to have to make the same kind of commitment, the CHRC representative pressed (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, May 4 and July 6, 2010).

The Chief of Police’s response was a clear ‘no’ (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, July 6, 2010). His position was that the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) did not have the resources required to provide that type of intensive, consistent and constant service to multiple sites at a time, let alone across the entire City. The OPS had entered the No Community Left Behind initiative in South East Ottawa with the impression that it was a “project”, not a “program”, and the OPS was still looking for an “exit strategy” for that initiative.

He saw the changes they had made to community policing in those areas as temporary, and had neither the interest nor the resources available to make it standard operational procedure. The Chief's position was that if the OPS adopts that type of strategy for one community, they have to adopt it for every community; OPS was committed to providing "equal treatment" and was not in a position to "play favourites", he said. When it was raised by the CHRC representative that community development and the CDF was about "equitable treatment" not necessarily "equal treatment", in other words providing resources where they are needed the most and in a way that was responsive to community needs, the Chief would not budge. The tone of his response made it clear to those in the room that the issue was no longer up for discussion (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, May 25, June 24 and July 6, 2010).

In light of this, the Ottawa Community Housing (OCH) representative spoke of a relatively new Safety Steering Committee coordinated by OCH that included senior representatives from OCH, Ottawa Police, Ottawa Fire Department, By-law Services, and Crime Prevention Ottawa. The new group had only met a few times and had just completed draft Terms of Reference. It was not really clear yet whether what the Local Steering Tables were looking for could be addressed by this Committee, but the idea was put forth to explore it as a possibility. The decision was made to move forward with that idea, and the Ottawa Community Housing (OCH) representative offered to take the lead on it (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, May 4, May 18, June 24 and July 6, 2010).

Some of the stakeholders involved in the CDF who were aware of that particular Roundtable meeting in February 2010 shared that they were confused or baffled by some of the things that transpired at that meeting. Many wondered why the Roundtable had been presented with this information and allowed to make key decisions, when the Community Table had not been

afforded the same opportunity (Fieldnotes, May 25, June 22, June 24, July 6, 2010; Interview #8). The process appeared to go against their understanding of the structure of the Framework, in other words that it would be a bottom-up approach where systemic issues arising from neighbourhood consultations and planning would be raised with system players, but largely via the work and advocacy of the Community Table. This was clearly not the process chosen by the City of Ottawa CDF Team, which fuelled a perception that the City of Ottawa was largely “controlling the direction” of the initiative, and more preoccupied with managing “strategic and bureaucratic considerations” than abiding by the principles of the CDF model (Fieldnotes, May 25, June 22 and June 24, 2010).

In relation to issues of crime and safety, many felt that Crime Prevention Ottawa was the most natural fit for the task of developing a comprehensive crime prevention strategy for and with each neighbourhood. This included City of Ottawa staff, representatives from Community Health and Resource Centres, and members of the Knowledge Transfer Table (Fieldnotes, June 22 and June 24, 2010). Three Roundtable members who were present at that meeting also sit on the Board of Directors for Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO), and not one of them spoke of the potential role Crime Prevention Ottawa could play in leading the crime and safety piece (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, July 6, 2010). Given CPO’s mandate and strategic priorities, it seemed obvious to some that Crime Prevention Ottawa could be a key resource. In light of recent vulnerabilities that Crime Prevention Ottawa had faced regarding its City of Ottawa funding (see p. 134), others even saw this as a key opportunity for Crime Prevention Ottawa to cement its role within the Community and Protective Services Department of the City of Ottawa (Fieldnotes, May 4, June 22 and June 24, 2010). Given that none of the CPO Board members had spoken up, and more importantly that

one of the CPO Board members (the OCH representative) had offered an alternative solution, there was a feeling that there was no other choice but to go along with what was decided at the Roundtable meeting (Fieldnotes, May 25, June 22 and July 6, 2010; Interview #8).

Nine months later (in November of 2010), after a series of meetings between Ottawa Community Housing representatives in charge of their new Safety Steering Committee and the City of Ottawa CDF team, and following the participation of the City of Ottawa CDF team at one meeting of the OCH Safety Steering Committee, it was decided that the Committee was *not* going to be a good fit for the needs of the CDF Local Steering Tables (Fieldnotes, May 4, May 18 and November 3, 2010). The Committee was focused heavily on information sharing between the partners involved on emerging trends and needs, as well as on their respective policies and protocols. Though better communication between partners and an understanding of their different roles and responsibilities was clearly needed, it would not provide the Local Steering Tables with the kind of comprehensive planning they were looking for. The Committee was therefore added to the list of ‘resources’ for the CDF, and the Crime Prevention Ottawa representative who sat on both this Committee and the CDF Community Table was asked to serve as the key communication link between the two (Fieldnotes, November 3, 2010).

In early November of 2010, members of the City of Ottawa CDF team had conversations with OCH senior representatives and then with the Executive Director of Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO) to suggest that CPO be the one to take the lead on the ‘system’ part of the crime and safety issues raised in neighbourhoods (Fieldnotes, November 3, 2010). Crime Prevention Ottawa agreed, and at the end of the data collection period, the CPO Executive Director was recruiting members to sit on a new CDF Safety Committee (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010).

Based on the discussions between members of the City of Ottawa CDF team and CPO

representatives, the purpose of the new Committee was described as: “to identify systemic or consistent crime and safety concerns in and across CDF neighbourhoods and seek solutions” (Draft Terms of Reference, CDF Safety Committee, “Purpose”, December 2010). The Committee’s objectives would include setting priorities for action among the systemic issues identified by neighbourhoods, attempting to resolve systemic barriers to the resolution of these crime and safety issues, and providing assistance in developing crime prevention strategies applicable across neighbourhoods when possible in response to the issues (Draft Terms of Reference, CDF Safety Committee, “Purpose”, December 2010). The Committee was tentatively composed of a Deputy Chief from the Ottawa Police Service, representatives from Ottawa Community Housing (including a Senior Manager of Operations and the Manager of the OCH Community Development group), members of the City of Ottawa CDF team, a representative from the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa, the Executive Director and Business Analyst of Crime Prevention Ottawa, and myself; it was scheduled to meet for the first time in January of 2011 (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010), almost a full year after the initial request from the Local Steering Tables came to the attention of the CDF Roundtable. From my observations, this lengthy process was a result of bureaucratic desires to control the safety component of the CDF, and was fuelled in part by personality clashes between members of the City of Ottawa’s CDF Team and a member of Crime Prevention Ottawa (Fieldnotes, May 4 and June 24, 2010; Interview #8). The theme of bureaucratic imperatives is revisited in Chapter 8.

Meanwhile, as an unrelated initiative, members of the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) Community Development Branch and of the Coalition of Community Developers of Ottawa had been working together to increase the communication and cooperation between OPS Community Police Officers and Community Developers across the city (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010). There

was an acknowledgment on both sides that there was a great deal of inconsistency across catchment areas in how these two groups interacted. Some Community Police Officers and Community Developers serving the same area of the city knew each other well and worked together on a regular basis, while others had never met before. The Community Development Branch of the OPS organized two working sessions for these two groups, one in June 2009 and another a year later in June 2010. Note that these meetings were initiated completely outside of the workings of the CDF (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interview #3). In fact, though a suggestion was made by one of the organizers to include a representative from the City of Ottawa CDF Team in the second session, other organizers – a few Community Developers in particular – were resistant to the idea. The CDF was still a contentious initiative within the Coalition of Community Developers of Ottawa, and Community Developers did not want to give the CDF any more space or “air time” than it already consumed within their overall workload (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interviews #3 and #6).

All Community Police Officers and their supervisors, as well as all Community Developers and their managers from across the city were invited to both sessions, which were well attended by all groups (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010). The two sessions focused on networking, information sharing and showcasing ‘best practices’ of existing cooperation between Community Developers and Community Police Officers. They were described as being designed to strengthen connections between these two service providers and inspire more cooperation between Police Officers and Community Developers in community initiatives across the city (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010). However, one of the main (and less publicly cited) objectives of the sessions was to increase the appreciation among Ottawa Police supervisors and executives for the importance of

the OPS's relationship to Community Health and Resource Centres and to their Community Developers, which was lacking (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interviews #2 and #3).

In more private settings, many Community Police Officers shared the frustrations that come along with their role and the many internal roadblocks they face. Community Police Officers spoke of the lack of respect, appreciation and recognition for their work among most of their colleagues and their superiors alike. They talked about the lack of understanding within the OPS of what community policing is, and of having no voice within their paramilitary organization (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interviews #2 and #3). One Community Police Officer expressed it this way:

Why is it so hard for the Executive branch to understand that community partners don't always want to see the uniform, that it can work against what we're trying to accomplish? It's hard to understand because when you're a police person in a policing world, everything you have revolves around the uniform, around the symbol that gives you authority. And without it, they feel naked, they're like "how will the community respect me"? Well, you don't get it then. If you think the symbol of power is the only way to gain respect, you're not getting it. But I mean this whole philosophy of community policing is very new, it hasn't been bought by everybody yet... So now the community is kinda like our big brother trying to instil wisdom and say "Now, as a police service, this is what you'll represent, this is what we want and expect" and then the little brother goes, "Oh, okay, I'll work towards that". Well, I'm sorry... shouldn't we be the big brother? Shouldn't we be role models in the community, not the other way around? And it really is backwards... the community gives us our mission and values and we strive to be good people. I read our mission and values and I go okay, well this is what a good person should want to be like. So really?! It had to be written down for us? Well it had to be written down for us because we're not meeting it... (Interview #2)

Community Police Officers also spoke of the immense difficulties they face in gaining the respect and trust of residents, especially those in neighbourhoods with a diversity of residents. In

their view, poor public perceptions of the Ottawa Police Service have a lot to do with it

(Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interviews #2 and #3). As one Community Police Officer offered:

If you go on the OPS website, there's a lot of very impressive, you know, slogans and catch phrases... it says: "To work in partnership with the community and reflect its values and makeup". Um, I would argue that the OPS is *not* reflective of the community's values and makeup. Let's look at the makeup. It doesn't send a good message to me, when I look at who's controlling the organization, the leaders of the OPS, the gold badge-wearing inspectors, superintendents, deputy chiefs and the Chief, right. The top tier of people who are responsible for the OPS, um... All white males, zero visible minorities, and two females total. Um... I don't know the exact numbers, I'm gonna guess 30, there's 30 superintendents, deputy chiefs and the Chief. So, if you do that ratio, 2 females out of 30, that is not representative of the community; zero visible minorities out of 30, that's not representative of our community. [...] Society has simply changed faster than the police services can keep up with, that's what it comes down to. The police service can't change on a daily basis. We can't even fire people. When was the last time a police officer was fired? I think he had to sell a couple guns and drugs to some bad people and then spent 4-5 years in court before he was fired. So the changing of police service and officers takes forever, the changing of society happens overnight. So that's where the hope comes in that the demographics will eventually help move things along whether the rest of the force is ready for it or not... But during this growing period, there's a lot of discrimination, there's a lot of harassment accepted, both internally and with the public. It's still the old white boys club, and the community sees and feels that on the street every day. We Community Officers have the impossible task of trying to change that perception. (Interview #2)

These findings raise important points about power relations within the Ottawa Police Service and between the Ottawa Police and members of the public. They also lead to serious questions about the role of Community Police Officers in Ottawa, and their role within a community development initiative more specifically. These themes are treated at length in Chapter 8.

The Community Table as a “Hub” and a “Bridge”?

The CDF Community Table met for the first time in April 2009 once neighbourhood selection was finalized and things were underway at the neighbourhood level (CDF Newsletter, Summer 2009). The table is led by the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) and membership includes front-line practitioners and mid-management representatives from a wide array of organizations in Ottawa. CDF materials describe the Community Table as (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, Community Development Framework, “Community Table”):

the hub that unites the neighbourhoods participating in the CDF in an effort to facilitate the sharing of approaches and good practices across neighbourhoods, as well as to look for opportunities to share and leverage strengths and resources. It assists neighbourhoods in resolving identified issues and action items and will assist neighbourhoods in identifying issues and action items that require system level supports.

Stakeholders involved at the Community Table admit that the group struggles to find its role and usefulness within the CDF initiative (Fieldnotes, July 6 and September 20, 2010). At the outset, members of the group were under the impression that they would act in a mainly reactive capacity to work on central themes and common issues arising in neighbourhoods that needed a more strategic response from a systems change perspective. From the outset, there was a key tension between members as to just how reactive or proactive the group should be. Some members wanted the Community Table to remain a loose, flexible body that focused less on a set work plan and more on being responsive to immediate needs, while others were in favour of setting up sub working groups related to specific and on-going issues (Fieldnotes, June 22, July 6 and September 30, 2010). In fact at one time, there were 4 Community Table Working Groups: (1) a Capacity Building and Civic Engagement subgroup, (2) a Health and Wellbeing subgroup,

(3) a Crime and Safety subgroup, and (4) a Communications subgroup. Discussions went back and forth on the purpose and possible work plan of the Health and Wellbeing subgroup and the Crime and Safety subgroup, and without any sense of consensus, they floundered (Fieldnotes, June 22, July 6 and September 30, 2010). Service providers from a few agencies were having a harder time identifying their exact role and usefulness, and stopped attending meetings (Fieldnotes, September 30, 2010).

The only subgroup to really take off was the one pertaining to *Capacity Building and Civic Engagement* (Fieldnotes, June 22 and September 30, 2010). With support from the United Way Ottawa, the Capacity Building and Civic Engagement subgroup of the CDF Community Table organized two events called *Community Talks: Share, Learn, Grow!* in mid-August of 2010. The rationale for the events was as follows (Hoffman, 2010: 1):

Support for community leaders was identified as an important issue in each of the neighbourhoods participating in the CDF. The decision was made to organize an event to bring together community leaders from across the City to discuss and identify the issues and challenges that were important to them in that role. This information will be used to help identify a strategy to help support community leaders in a more coordinated way.

For the purposes of these events, Community Leaders were defined as anyone who found themselves in a leadership position such as on a school council, a Tenants Association, a Community Association, in an ethno-cultural group, a sports group, and so on (Hoffman, 2010). Community members from across the city were invited (not just from CDF neighbourhoods) and these individuals were contacted through outreach by community developers and the City of Ottawa (Hoffman, 2010). As might be expected, among the main themes to arise were issues of crime and safety. With a few exceptions, the concerns and challenges raised were similar to what

can be found in the Neighbourhood Surveys and in the Neighbourhood Action Plans (Fieldnotes, September 30, 2010; Hoffman, 2010). These community leaders also put more emphasis on the lack of meaningful opportunities and activities for youth between the ages of 13-17. They spoke of what they perceived as an overwhelming apathy on the part of most of their neighbours to get involved and of the significant challenges created by language barriers. They shared their frustrations with a perceived lack of attention to community needs and to the resolution of community requests, resulting in “community fatigue”. They were asking for support in getting Ottawa Community Housing and other landlords to heed their complaints. They were also pushing for better collaboration between Ottawa Community Housing and the Ottawa Police to take the load off of them having to deal with both on the same issue. Finally, they were requesting more accountability and transparency on the part of the Ottawa Police, and greater continuity and consistency in efforts of Community Police Officers (Hoffman, 2010; Fieldnotes, September 28 and September 30, 2010). A report outlining these and other issues discussed at the *Community Talks* events was circulated to most Tables of the CDF in October 2010. It was not clear what the intentions or next steps were with regards to the report (Fieldnotes, September 28, September 30, 2010, November 26, 2010).

At a meeting in late September 2010, Community Table members made the decision not to go forward with the other proposed subgroups, and to undertake work “more organically” as key issues came to their attention (Fieldnotes, September 30, 2010). When the crime and safety concerns of residents came up in the conversation, it was suggested that resident leaders from the CDF neighbourhoods might benefit from the opportunity to come together and share experiences and frustrations around issues of crime and safety, and share ideas on solutions. There was a sentiment that more needed to be done to provide residents with support in relation to their

concerns (Fieldnotes, September 30, 2010). After all, at that time, the Roundtable still had not come to any conclusion or action with regards to developing comprehensive neighbourhood crime prevention strategies, as requested by the Local Steering Tables over 8 months ago, and there was a perception that the 'crime and safety' component of the CDF was not moving forward (Fieldnotes, September 30, 2010).

In early November of 2010, members of the Community Table organized a *CDF Resident Dialogue on Crime and Safety*, and Community Developers were responsible for reaching out to residents to invite them to the session (Fieldnotes, September 30, 2010). At that meeting, there were a total of only four residents present (though many more had been invited), one from neighbourhood A's new Tenant Association and three from neighbourhood C's Tenant Association. A representative from Crime Prevention Ottawa was also present, along with three Community Developers, one Community House Director, the CDF Coordinator, and myself as an observer (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). The things discussed at that meeting were much of what could be found in the Neighbourhood Surveys, Neighbourhood Action Plans and the more recent *Community Talks* report. The only exception was an in-depth conversation on Crime Stoppers led by Crime Prevention Ottawa, which residents, Community Developers and the Community House Director showed great interest in (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). Most were not aware of the process involved in Crime Stoppers, and felt the guarantee of anonymity would be a great tool for the residents of their neighbourhoods, given the lack of trust in the Police and fear of retaliation by neighbours. Residents from neighbourhood C invited a Crime Prevention Ottawa representative to give a presentation on Crime Stoppers at an upcoming community event. Crime Prevention Ottawa shared that it was partnering with Ottawa Community Housing and Crime Stoppers to develop various communication tools for Ottawa

residents and local service providers on the details of the Crime Stoppers program, expected in the spring of 2011 (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). Once again, the discussion on possible ‘solutions’ to resident concerns regarding safety focused largely on a reactive response aimed at responsabilizing residents and deploying policing and criminal justice measures.

Finally, there is one other major issue that deserves mention here: it was never really clear, for at least the first two years of the CDF, where the four NCLB neighbourhoods of South East Ottawa stood in relation to the work of the CDF. The commonly-used terminology among City of Ottawa staff was “the four CDF neighbourhoods”, which to many appeared to leave the four original NCLB neighbourhoods on the outside looking in (Fieldnotes, June 22, June 24 and October 6, 2010; Interview #4). The South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community was the host of the CDF Community Table, its Executive Director its Chair, and yet the relationship between the NCLB neighbourhoods in South East Ottawa - which had served as an inspiration for the new CDF process on the ground - and the areas designated as CDF neighbourhoods, was unclear. Furthermore, the relationship between the four NCLB neighbourhoods and the new System Tables was also unclear (Fieldnotes, June 22, June 24 and October 6, 2010; Interview #4). This caused frustration for some members of the NCLB coordination team and confusion at some of the System Tables, especially since the City of Ottawa CDF team did not appear to have any clear answers (Fieldnotes, June 22, June 24, July 6 and October 6, 2010; Interview #4).

By the end of the data collection period, many members of the Community Table were wondering what the “value added” of the current structure and process was, if any (Fieldnotes, November 26, November 29, December 7, 2010). The group as a whole was still unclear as to whether it was supposed to be making decisions, or just providing a forum for discussion (Fieldnotes, September 30, November 26 and November 29, 2010). There was a sense among

some that the Community Table should focus on becoming a stronger bridge between CDF neighbourhoods and between the neighbourhoods and the system tables, but the path and process to follow for doing so were not clear in the current context (Fieldnotes, November 26 and November 29, 2010).

The Municipal Services Table

The Municipal Services Table of the CDF was designed to bring together senior staff from across the municipal services of the City of Ottawa to work collaboratively and to breakdown organizational barriers in order to help address neighbourhood-defined priorities and goals. It was expected that City of Ottawa staff participating on this Table would (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, Community Development Framework, “Municipal Services Table”):

- work across organizational boundaries to help communities solve problems;
- collaborate, coordinate and facilitate resolution of neighbourhood issues using the extensive network of City services already in existence in communities;
- share learning and knowledge transfer across service areas to within the City of Ottawa;
- identify other partners in the community in the resolution of community issues;
- document results of successful community collaborations/lessons learned;
- advocate for structural, policy or other organizational changes necessary to affect positive neighbourhood outcomes.

The Municipal Services Table was the last of the proposed CDF structures to take root. It met for the first time in August of 2009, and has only had two other meetings since (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). By the end of the data collection period (December 2010), the Table was

working on finalizing its Terms of Reference and members were trying to figure out their exact role. The Table was composed mostly of mid-management and other staff, not senior staff as initially intended. The City of Ottawa CDF team describes the objective of this Table as “creating a network of change agents within the City”, but they admit that there is a lot of fear among City staff around that role. There is a sense of reluctance and scepticism among City staff around how “change agents” will be received by senior management, and no one seems to be volunteering to give it a first try (Fieldnotes, November 3, 2010). The City of Ottawa CDF team was conducting meetings with senior management in December of 2010 to “try to move the agenda forward” (Fieldnotes, November 26 and December 7, 2010).

A few participants involved in the CDF raised how ironic it seems to them that the least active and productive structure within the CDF to date is the one meant to create change within the City of Ottawa (Fieldnotes, November 18 and November 26, 2010; Interview #5 and #8). As one CDF participant put it, “they [representatives of the City of Ottawa] aren’t exactly leading by example” (Fieldnotes, November 18, 2010).

The Resource Table

The Resource Table was created to bring together various agencies and organizations with funding mandates relevant to the CDF to work together to identify various funding and resource opportunities to help support the work of the CDF. The intentions of the City of Ottawa CDF team were that Resource Table members would work towards (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, Community Development Framework, “Resource Table”):

- Identifying strategies to align funding processes, mechanisms, personnel and other resources to achieve and sustain the desired impact in identified neighbourhoods;

- Ensuring there is a shared understanding of how all the funding streams (short-term vs. long-term funding) for community investments interact;
- Sharing information about funding levels, current investments and opportunities to leverage other required resources between communities;
- Addressing duplication and gaps and develop and mobilize mechanisms to address these issues; and
- Effective monitoring/evaluation of the impacts on overall investment and implement corrective actions to facilitate and ensure sustainability.

Once the CDF was underway in neighbourhoods, the requests coming from Local Steering Tables were clear and consistent. First and foremost, they wanted to address issues related to short-term, one-off project funding, including a lack of funding certainty and continuity. Local Steering Tables were asking for stable and adequate funding that they could use to conduct long-term initiatives in order to deliver on long-term CDF goals. They were requesting that funders with a commitment to the CDF consider contributing to a “common pot” of money that would be accessible to CDF neighbourhoods for various agreed-upon initiatives. They were also requesting a common application form that CDF neighbourhoods would only have to fill out once. It would be left up to the Resource Table to decide whether they could provide support, and which organization was going to do so (Fieldnotes, May 25, June 24, July 6 and July 12, 2010).

During its initial meetings, members of the Resource Table worked together to create a spreadsheet of each organization’s mandate, structures, funding streams, processes and timelines. The scan was to serve as a communication tools among them, and between them and Local Steering Tables. As requested, they also had many discussions exploring the possibility of a “common pot” of money and of a common application form (Minutes, Resource Table). After

some deliberation, the Chair of the Resource Table announced that “it may seem so simple, but it’s extremely complex” (Fieldnotes, November 3, 2010). The Resource Table was facing a number of challenges. Some of the members on the Table had less authority within their own organization than others, creating a real challenge in making decisions and driving system level change among funders. In addition, many if not all of the funding bodies involved report to a Board of Directors, which in some cases must receive and approve funding requests (Fieldnotes, November 3, 2010).

The Resource Table decided it was not going to be able to fulfill the requests of the Local Steering Tables, and that they were going to have to work within the existing climate and funding structures (Fieldnotes, July 12 and August 31, 2010). In other words, Local Steering Tables, community groups and associations would have to go through the existing channels and apply to get project-based funding from whichever organization it saw as the most appropriate. The Resource Table decided it no longer needed a regular meeting schedule, but members agreed to share information informally on the kinds of projects they were being asked to fund in relation to the CDF to discuss options and possibilities (Fieldnotes, November 3, 2010).

By the end of the data collection period, representatives of the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) were requesting support from the Resource Table in another way. After two years of experience in implementing the CDF in neighbourhoods, it was clear to them that the CDF was not just a ‘different kind of work’ but that it was indeed a lot *more* work (Fieldnotes, November 26 and November 29, 2010). The Community Developers involved had taken duties and activities related to the CDF on as additional work and CHRCs were going to need supplemental resources in order to sustain the level of coordination, planning and

implementation involved in the CDF. CHRCs were no longer willing to stretch their Community Developers this thin; given their experience, they felt each catchment area needed its own full-time CDF Coordinator (Fieldnotes, November 26 and December 7, 2010). To this end, the Resource Table invited representatives of the CHRCs involved, via the Community Table, to present them with a list of what they required in terms of ongoing funding to cover the costs of coordinating and implementing the CDF. The total amount requested by each CHRC varied from approximately \$52,000 to \$78,000 annually for ongoing CDF coordination²⁴, with an additional \$7,000 to \$20,000 requested for planning materials, supplies, and resident honorariums to cover needs like childcare, pay them for their time, and cover costs of specific training (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010). The Community Foundation of Ottawa and the Community and Protective Services Department of the City of Ottawa (both members of the Resource Table) came to an agreement to split the costs (50%/50%) of 5-year sustained funding for the local coordination of the CDF in these catchment areas beginning in 2011, as per their request (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010).

The Knowledge Transfer Table

As described earlier, the Knowledge Transfer Table (KTT) was very busy at the launch of the CDF, providing significant pieces of work in relation to the selection of CDF neighbourhoods and to the development of a Neighbourhood Survey. Once those tasks were completed, members of the KTT were grappling with how to continue with their work plan with increasingly limited resources. They all knew that the Evaluation Plan needed some work, especially in relation to a Theory of Change or Logic Model, key indicators, sources of information, and participatory research methods (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009). The consensus was

²⁴ Just like each CHRC receives different levels of core funding, Community Developer positions also vary in salary.

that the CDF needed a Theory of Change and/or Logic Model on which decisions around process and the evaluation plan could rest. In other words, the KTT wanted a clear articulation of the CDF's short, medium, and longer-term intended activities and objectives and how those related back to the five ultimate goals of the CDF (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009 and February 10, 2010). Members of the KTT felt there was a need to think through intermediate outcomes and reach some degree of consensus on what 'success' meant for the CDF (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009 and February 10, 2010).

By late 2009, members of the Knowledge Transfer Table felt they were dealing with a number of important challenges that were going to prevent them from continuing any meaningful work within the CDF. First, due to a lack of interaction with other Tables and players within the CDF – and especially the Local Steering Tables, including Community Developers and residents – they felt they lacked a good understanding of their needs. What are their key questions around what the CDF is trying to accomplish? What do they feel needs to be measured, and how? What kinds of supports and tools do they need to do their work and to contribute to the learning and evaluation? Members of the KTT also felt that the distance between them and the Local Steering Tables prevented them from contributing to the conversations about proposed solutions, where they could offer a variety of expertise and knowledge on good practices (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). Local Steering Tables reported being interested in hearing about innovative solutions and good practices, but in the absence of such information, they were relying on what they knew and on what was being offered by Local Steering Table members (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010).

Most importantly, it had become clear to members that the KTT was not going to be able to fulfill its work plan without the dedicated people, time and resources to do so. Their experience

with the development and implementation of the Neighbourhood Survey had made these challenges very clear. It was felt that the current arrangement of relying on volunteer time and of doing CDF-related work “off the corner of their desks” was just not going to work (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). Members of the KTT had raised the idea of approaching the Resource Table about the possibility of having local funders contribute some financial resources to the CDF evaluation and learning process. They were told by representatives of the City of Ottawa that local funders were not in a position to fund research and evaluation, that their corporate and private donors were interested in contributing to “action”, not research (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). Besides, funding the CDF evaluation would not be good for “optics” with the community groups who were themselves fighting for local funding for programs and projects in CDF neighbourhoods (Fieldnotes, July 12, 2010).

Joint Application for a Community-University Research Alliance (CURA) Grant

Given the situation at hand, a decision was made by members of the KTT and the City of Ottawa CDF team to apply for a *Community-University Research Alliance (CURA)* funding grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, November 2, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). The federal CURA grant consists of 5-year program funding for up to \$200,000 per year. After submitting an initial CURA Letter of Intent to SSHRC in the fall of 2009, the KTT received an invitation and \$20,000 from SSHRC in February 2010 to put together an official, full-length CURA proposal, due mid-September 2010 (Minutes, Knowledge Transfer Table, February 10, 2010).

The KTT formed a small CURA working group to put together the application, comprised of two KTT members (including myself), a City of Ottawa CDF team representative, a

consultant/facilitator with experience in evaluation and in community development in Ottawa, and a Research Assistant (Fieldnotes, April 15, 2010). They attended a wide variety of CDF meetings over the course of the spring and summer of 2010 to gather input into the proposal. These included meetings of the five CDF Local Steering Tables, the CDF Community Table, the Knowledge Transfer Table, and meetings with senior staff from the City of Ottawa and from the Coalition of CHRCs (Fieldnotes, June 24, July 27, August 16 and September 16, 2010).

Furthermore, a workshop was held on June 24, 2010 where over 50 people including CDF neighbourhood residents (N=10), Community Developers, City of Ottawa staff, community service providers, and academics gathered to discuss the CURA proposal (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). This process allowed participants to share and explore their thoughts on (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010):

- Key research issues and questions that are most relevant as the CDF moves forward;
- How the research can best support community members and other CDF stakeholders in developing, implementing, and monitoring CDF initiatives (e.g., what types of information and tools could best support capacity building);
- The principles that should guide the partnership between community members, other CDF stakeholders, and academic researchers; and
- Governance in the CURA partnership.

Some of the key messages that emerged through that consultation process were (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010):

- Community residents are experts on their own community. Residents must be closely involved in the research, including when deciding on questions and methods. To facilitate their contributions, they should be compensated for their time as a reflection of a commitment to true partnership and equal status.
- The focus should be on participatory methods and making activities and results accessible and meaningful to all, including residents. This includes an effort to keep things informal, flexible and creative, and a commitment to *knowledge exchange* between university and community versus knowledge transfer *from* university to community.
- It is critical to engage and involve youth.
- It is critical to ensure due diligence and good process, with particular attention to effective communication, and responsibility and accountability of all partners (shared governance and responsibility between university, City, and community).

Thirteen academics from both the University of Ottawa and Carleton University signed on to the CURA as co-investigators or collaborators, each with a specific role and responsibilities in relation to the overall program (Fieldnotes, August 30, August 31 and September 16, 2010).

Given the lack of attendance by academics at KTT meetings over the past two years of the CDF, this appeared to be a clear indication that academics were willing to engage in research related to the CDF, but there had to be something in it for them professionally.

Six key CDF institutional partners also agreed to be part of the CURA:

- City of Ottawa
- Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) of Ottawa

- Ottawa Community Housing
- Ottawa Police Service
- University of Ottawa
- Carleton University

Every one of them committed a certain amount of time, cash and in-kind contributions to the CURA representing \$157,646 annually over 5 years (Fieldnotes, August 31 and September 16, 2010). This was by far the greatest contribution any of these organizations was willing to make to the CDF evaluation and learning component up until that point (Fieldnotes, September 28, 2010).

Taking into account the various discussions and consultations conducted, the academics and community partners involved in the CURA application came to an agreement on a set of 20 research questions to be explored through the CURA program (Fieldnotes, July 20, August 20, September 1, 2010). These research questions are presented in Table 8 along with the three overarching objectives of the proposed CURA program (Fieldnotes, September 16, 2010).

Table 8. Community-University Research Alliance (CURA) Proposal Objectives and Research Questions.

<u>CURA Objectives</u>	<u>CURA Research Questions</u>
<p>(1) To describe and measure the implementation and outcomes of the CDF in Ottawa.</p>	<p>Implementation Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the ways in which actors in the CDF are working to enhance community capacity? 2. What strategies are being put in place to improve planning and service delivery? What could be improved? 3. How are neighbourhood residents, community developers, the City, and other organizations collaborating to improve community determinants of well-being? To improve safety and perceptions of safety? What could be improved? 4. How are all actors in the CDF working to ensure sustainability of change? 5. Is the collaboration functioning well? 6. What factors (related to neighbourhood characteristics, community capacities, organizational practices) contribute to effective implementation of the CDF? <p>Outcome Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Is the CDF resulting in increased community capacity to enact positive change in neighbourhoods? 8. Are the City of Ottawa and other stakeholder organizations improving service delivery and coordination? Are they increasing their organizational capacity to respond to neighbourhood needs? 9. Are the social determinants of well-being improving in CDF neighbourhoods? 10. Are safety and perceptions of safety improving? 11. Is the CDF resulting in sustainable change? 12. What are the unique impacts of the CDF as opposed to changes in similar neighbourhoods where the CDF is not taking place?

<p>(2) To build capacity within the CDF for continued sharing, reflection, and learning among all CDF participants, and others.</p>	<p>Implementation Questions</p> <p>13. What are the key learning needs identified by residents, community developers, service providers, municipal staff, students, and others?</p> <p>14. How are these learning needs being supported within the CDF?</p> <p>15. What other supports and resources are communities seeking to enhance their capacities to improve their neighbourhood?</p> <p>Outcome Questions</p> <p>16. How does a Participatory approach affect:</p> <p>1) action at the community level? 2) residents' understanding of and confidence in the results? 3) collaboration dynamics and relationships?</p> <p>17. Has the learning organization approach resulted in changes to the way CDF participants are working?</p>
<p>(3) To disseminate the knowledge gained so that the tools and lessons learned can be applied to community practices and policy development within Ottawa and in other jurisdictions.</p>	<p>18. What are the most useful and effective ways of capturing, sharing, and mobilizing the learning at the community and the system levels?</p> <p>19. What types of knowledge and evidence are important to different partners (including residents)? How are these differences managed in keeping with a learning organization approach?</p> <p>20. As the CDF rolls out into other neighbourhoods, how can we best share tools and lessons learned from the neighbourhoods already involved in CDF implementation?</p>

To answer these questions, the CURA team proposed a number of research and learning strategies and activities to be implemented at both the neighbourhood and system levels of the CDF. These were similar to what had been proposed by the Knowledge Transfer Table in early 2009 (see Table 4). However, the partners involved in the CURA proposal committed to:

take a *Participatory Learning and Action* approach for research activities at the neighbourhood level. All strategies and activities will be planned and undertaken in a collaborative way, with input and active participation from all CDF participants: residents and community leaders, community developers, municipal staff, service providers, academics and students. All activities will have

the ultimate goal of leading to action and change. (CURA Proposal, September 16, 2010, “Detailed Description”: 4-5)

A new emphasis was placed on technical assistance through a component called *Researchers on Call for Communities*, to link the CDF Community Table with a variety of resource persons with subject matter expertise (CURA Proposal, September 16, 2010). Additional on-the-ground support and training opportunities for students were envisioned through *Community Service Learning* opportunities for students in the CDF and CURA activities (CURA Proposal, September 16, 2010). Funding was requested for (CURA Proposal, September 16, 2010):

- Resident honoraria and resident costs (transportation, childcare)
- Community Developer salary replacement for research activities
- Graduate students and Postdoctoral Fellow
- Equipment and supplies for neighbourhood projects
- Equipment and supplies for researchers
- Tool development, reproduction
- Printing posters, pictures etc.
- Food for events
- Travel for community members, researchers, and students to share experiences and results with others at conferences

In addition to the many questions around CDF implementation, outcomes and impacts presented in Table 8, there were two interrelated issues that community partners kept raising throughout the CURA consultations as their *key* questions about the CDF (Fieldnotes, June 24, July 6 and August 31, 2010):

- What are the added benefits of the CDF and its various structures, compared to the ‘usual’ community development practices already occurring in neighbourhoods in Ottawa?
- What are the unique impacts of the CDF as opposed to changes in similar neighbourhoods where the CDF is not taking place?

If successful in the application, the CURA project was to be coordinated and funds administered through the *Centre for Research on Educational and Community Services (CRECS)* at the University of Ottawa, to which the Principal Investigator was affiliated (CURA Proposal, September 16, 2010). From a governance and accountability standpoint, it was decided during discussions at the KTT that the CURA team would essentially become the research and knowledge exchange group of the CDF for the duration of the program. The CURA had its own proposed governance structure, with a *CURA Working Group* responsible for the day-to-day coordination, implementation and monitoring of CURA activities, and a *CURA Steering Committee* responsible for the overall direction of the CURA program, and for ensuring accountability and smooth collaboration among all partners. The academics who are listed as members of the KTT but who chose not to sign onto the CURA (mostly for lack of time) would remain on the KTT as extra resource people to be called upon for feedback and guidance if/when their expertise was needed (Fieldnotes, July 14 and September 28, 2010).

Some of the community partners involved, particularly representatives of Community Health and Resource Centres, were somewhat sceptical of just how much the ‘community’ would have control in this Community-University Research Alliance (Fieldnotes, July 6, September 30 and November 8, 2010). Some were raising the need to consider, at all stages of the research process

from the identification of specific research questions to the preparation of reports to the dissemination of research products, questions of control and ownership of participatory research. What processes or mechanisms, such as a review structure and/or working guidelines, need to be put in place? Who decides what a report should contain, what it should look like? Who decides if a research ‘product’ is ready for dissemination, either to CURA (SSHRC), to a research journal, to City of Ottawa staff, to the general public? (Fieldnotes, November 8, 2010).

These questions of participation, power and control in decision-making, and ‘expertise’ seem quite warranted. As the experience of the CDF reveals, the resources available to conduct this type of research are very limited, and those that do exist (such as SSHRC programs) come with significant institutional biases that favour ‘expert knowledge’ (of academics, government and other institutions) over other forms, namely the experiences and expertise of neighbourhood-based workers and residents directly affected by the ‘problem’ and program in question. One flagrant example of this is that the amount permissible for resident honorariums under CURA (SSHRC) regulations is well below what is allowable, and in fact expected, for honorariums for university student assistance (Fieldnotes, June 22, July 23 and September 10, 2010). The implications of these findings are examined further in Chapter 8.

At the time of writing (Spring 2011), those involved in the CURA application received news from SSHRC that their proposal was declined for funding. Given that the CURA was meant in large part to rectify the fact that the KTT was operating largely on volunteer time, it is not clear where the KTT is going to go from here. Though I was a participant in the KTT before this research project came into being, my continued and active participation in the CDF was of course eventually fuelled in part by my own professional interests (i.e., conducting this research).

It is questionable whether anyone without such an incentive would continue to invest the amount of time and level of energy I did in that work going forward. The fact that the KTT has generally suffered in productivity due to member attrition and the general absence of resources points to the conclusion that they would not.

Phase 5: Reflecting on CDF Process and Progress from 2008-2010 (Late 2010)

In October of 2010, the City of Ottawa hired a team of four consultants to conduct a process evaluation of the CDF (Fieldnotes, October 14, 2010). City of Ottawa staff had reached out to representatives from the four Community Health and Resource Centres involved in the CDF and were told that CDF teams were not ready for any type of impact evaluation, but that they did see merit in conducting a process evaluation at this point (Fieldnotes, August 16, 2010). For the process evaluation, the consultants held a focus group with each of the various Tables involved in the CDF (at both the neighbourhood and system levels) and individual interviews with some key stakeholders. They also conducted a review of the CDF documentation to date (Fieldnotes, August 16, October 14, November 3 and November 26, 2010).

The preliminary findings from the process evaluation consultations were presented to a Reference Group on November 26 of 2010, which I attended as Chair of the Knowledge Transfer Table. Others in attendance included the City of Ottawa CDF team, the past and present CDF Coordinators, the Chairs of each CDF Table at the neighbourhood and system levels, the four Community Developers implementing the CDF, and a few other service providers (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). The objective of the full-day meeting was to present to the group what the consultants had heard throughout their consultations and during focus groups, and gain feedback and further input from those present (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

Overall, the consultants reported hearing about a number of positive stories and perceived strengths of the CDF. They heard that some residents in the various neighbourhoods were mobilized and that structures to support resident participation (e.g., Tenants Associations) had been created or revived. Some felt there was a convergence of energy in neighbourhoods and that residents and service providers were finally focusing on ‘the right’ and the same issues. Most importantly, there appeared to be a tremendous amount of good will and good intentions on the part of engaged residents and service providers (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). A number of events and activities had taken place, and some of them were perceived as making a significant contribution to the neighbourhood in question (i.e., the playground built in Neighbourhood B, the high attendance at some neighbourhood service delivery events).

The consultants also reported on a number of common challenges and emerging issues. Most stakeholders felt there was a lack of a commonly shared vision for the CDF. There was a feeling that the initiative lacked a clear purpose and effective leadership. Most of the residents and stakeholders involved had very little to no understanding of “the whole of the CDF”. They did not know or understand what its various moving parts were or did (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). Various stakeholders also felt that they were spending a lot of time in meetings but lacked a clear understanding of their role and of how they could or should contribute (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). Furthermore, there was a feeling among Ottawa Community Housing front-line staff as well as managers and executives that OCH was bearing the brunt of the CDF process (Fieldnotes, November 18, November 26 and December 7, 2010). They felt that because the neighbourhoods chosen for CDF implementation were in fact OCH communities at their core, OCH was being “picked on” in terms of the changes that needed to happen (Fieldnotes, November 18, 2010). Resident leaders were also feeling overwhelmed by constant demands on

their time and energy, as were Community Developers. Many Community Developers were under pressure from their CHRC Board of Directors and local stakeholders (e.g., Better Business Associations) to work on other community projects not related to the CDF. Since these projects typically came with additional resources for the CHRC (in funds or in highly mobilized volunteers) - which the CDF did not – Community Developers in CDF catchment areas were feeling a real pull in all directions. Most CDF partners and stakeholders felt there had to be a serious reconsideration of the time and resources required to succeed in CDF efforts and objectives (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

From my observations, there were a number of other general tensions within the CDF. First, there was a strong and continuous tension between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ directions. The City of Ottawa and the System Tables were perceived by some stakeholders at the neighbourhood level as being unresponsive (Fieldnotes, November 8, November 26, November 29, 2010; Interviews #1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7). Many of the solutions and actions proposed within the Neighbourhood Action Plans had been dismissed by the authorities in question, and from the neighbourhood-level perspective, other requests appeared to be taking a very long time to move through the system (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 3, November 8, November 26, November 29, 2010). Finally, there was growing frustration among Community Developers and other front-line service providers (e.g., Community House workers, Youth workers) that community development principles did not always seem to prevail (Fieldnotes, July 6, September 30, November 8, November 26, 2010; Interviews #1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7). A good example was the experience with the Neighbourhood Survey. The Community Developers were asking the City of Ottawa and the Knowledge Transfer Table to provide more clarity around the exact purpose of the survey; was it for community engagement and needs assessment, system needs around

evaluation, or both? Regardless of the answer, they were asking for the development of a more flexible set of tools (a Neighbourhood Needs Assessment Toolkit) that they could pull from and use in a way that respected their local context. They were not necessarily opposed to conducting an annual Neighbourhood Survey, but given the experience the first time around, they refused to proceed without significant changes being made to the existing tool and processes involved (Fieldnotes, November 8 and November 26, 2010).

At the system level, stakeholders reported serious concerns that there was a disconnect between the issues that first guided the selection of neighbourhoods for CDF implementation (i.e., economic status, health, early childhood indicators) and subsequent actions undertaken at the neighbourhood level (Fieldnotes, November 3 and December 7, 2010). CDF goals were decided on at the system level by City staff and the KTT, and a draft outcome evaluation plan focused on indicators related to the social determinants of health. Then, neighbourhood residents were surveyed and consulted on their wants and needs; Local Steering Tables of service providers and some residents were tasked with deciding on priorities, devising strategies, implementing actions, and asking for system-level support if and when needed. As one member of the Resource Table offered: “How do these two processes add up?” (Fieldnotes, November 3, 2010). This led some system level stakeholders, including executives within the City of Ottawa, to raise questions about the appropriateness of the process undertaken and to worry about the value added of the CDF (Fieldnotes, November 3 and December 7, 2010).

There were also growing tensions within individual Tables themselves. For example, years after the development and initial dissemination of the Neighbourhood Survey, and with some changes in membership, the Knowledge Transfer Table was at times still torn. Some researchers were still highly preoccupied with traditional ideals of cause and effect, statistical significance, and

longitudinal reliability, while others were more preoccupied with ideals of Participatory Learning and Action Research on the ground (Fieldnotes, November 19, 2010). There remained a key tension between the KTT as a source of *support for and to* those implementing the CDF on the ground, and the KTT as a research body pursuing its own research interests and/or the bureaucratic and political needs of City of Ottawa and other system players. It is a tension that eventually led me, as Chair of the KTT, to raise the following question during various meetings related to the CDF process evaluation in November and December of 2010: “We are being pulled in a variety of competing directions - who does the Knowledge Transfer Table ultimately work for?” (Fieldnotes, November 19, November 26 and December 7, 2010). A City of Ottawa senior staff’s answer was “everyone” (Fieldnotes, November 19, 2010). It appeared as though the KTT was not getting any closer to clarity around its role, its work plan, or to whom it was ultimately accountable. Many key questions still remained: What was the CDF hoping to achieve, in concrete terms? What were CDF partners and participants looking to measure, and how? What did they see and agree upon as appropriate methods?

During the process evaluation, members of the City of Ottawa CDF team offered that they had “been naive in jumping in and expecting system players to be fully onboard” (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). They acknowledged that the City services piece (the Municipal Service Table) had moved along very slowly, and that it was more difficult than they had anticipated to convince other municipal departments and services to be open to change. Nonetheless, they emphasized that these types of exercises take time, are slow moving, and come with considerable challenges. They were asking that the challenges experienced by the CDF in its first two years of implementation and the frustrations felt by those involved be put into better balance with its many perceived successes. They wanted the roadblocks experienced to be reframed into what

can naturally be expected from this type of complex initiative. From their perspective, the findings of the Process Evaluation would help identify some of the key tensions they needed to address and learn to manage from here on out (Fieldnotes, November 3, November 26 and December 7, 2010). Many other stakeholders were hoping the findings and recommendations would lead to significant changes in some of the structures and processes of the CDF, which the City reported being open to making (Fieldnotes, November 19, November 26, November 29, December 7, 2010).

In the end, the City of Ottawa CDF team maintained editorial control over the final product, and it was clear that the CDF team was juggling many political and bureaucratic considerations (Fieldnotes, November 26, November 29 and December 7, 2010). The way the findings were presented could reflect either nicely or poorly on the quality of their work; it could also have a big impact on how the report was received by the City of Ottawa and its Councillors, and ultimately on the fate of the CDF.

In December 2010, the City of Ottawa was working with the South East Ottawa Community Health Centre to develop the dissemination plan for the process evaluation report, expected for the end of February 2011 (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010). The City of Ottawa CDF team appeared to have heard the message behind one of the main issues raised by the process evaluation: the focus of the dissemination plan was to be on ensuring that all the partners and various Tables involved in the CDF receive the process evaluation report at the same time, to avoid any sense of hierarchy (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010). The consultants responsible for the CDF Process Evaluation reported handing the report over to the City of Ottawa CDF team in

early March of 2011. The CDF Process Evaluation report had not yet been released by the City of Ottawa CDF team at the time of finalizing this manuscript (May 2011).

Conclusions

At the neighbourhood level, the Local Steering Tables of the CDF began the implementation of their respective Neighbourhood Action Plans in the fall of 2009. A variety of proposed solution and activities took place, including facilitating the creation of a group of concerned residents (i.e., through a Tenants Association), educating residents on their responsibility to report various incidents to authorities, organizing meetings between residents and local authorities (including Police representatives), and conducting a traffic and pedestrian safety awareness campaign. However, a number of proposed solutions were not implemented as initially intended by the Local Steering Table. For example, local safety audits were conducted in neighbourhoods A and C, but the Police conducted these surveys without the participation of local residents, as was recommended by the Local Steering Tables. Other proposed solutions were deemed not possible by the authority responsible for their implementation, such as the installation of security cameras, increasing surveillance through security staff, or screening tenants. In addition, findings show that in the highly heterogeneous neighbourhoods where the CDF is being implemented, significant socio-economic, cultural, and linguistic factors created important challenges to community organizing as it was intended in the CDF model. These factors include competing demands on the time and energy of residents, personal challenges faced by residents that impeded on their willingness and/or capacity to participate in neighbourhood activities, language barriers, discomfort with the formality of the gathering methods used by the CDF (i.e., formal chaired meetings), and a fear of stigmatization based on social class.

At the system level, the various Tables involved in the CDF were working towards establishing and making progress on their Terms of References and their Work Plans. At the leadership *Roundtable*, members were asked to react to some of the main priority issues and requests coming from the Local Steering Tables. In the area of crime and safety, Local Steering Tables were looking for some leadership on the part of key institutions to come up with a plan that would put the concerns of residents into context, and formulate longer-term, more comprehensive strategies to address crime issues in neighbourhoods. Nine months after this request came to the attention of the Roundtable, and after a series of meetings to explore who should take the lead on this component, the City of Ottawa CDF team asked Crime Prevention Ottawa to form a new system level CDF Safety Committee. The Ottawa Police Service was also put on the spot by members of the Table, and asked to seriously re-consider the way community policing is done in the city, by improving the relationship-building and problem-solving capabilities of its Community Police Officers. The Chief of Police declined the request, and the conversation on making changes within the Ottawa Police Service to accommodate ‘community’ needs essentially ended there. This finding, coupled with Community Police Officers’ own negative experiences of their role within the organization, highlights significant tensions related to the role of Community Police Officers in Ottawa.

The *Community Table*, which was meant to be the hub for on-the-ground CDF learning and development and the bridge from CDF neighbourhoods to systems, lacked clear direction. Though it organized a few civic engagement and resident dialogue events, the group as a whole as well as its individual members struggled to find and define their role. The *Municipal Services Table* was particularly slow to get off the ground, and only met three times in two years. City of Ottawa staff were reluctant to become “agents of change” within their individual departments

without clear buy-in from their managers. The feeling was that the role came with a lot of risk but very little reward. As for the *Resource Table*, it attempted to work together on devising more accessible, predictable and longer-term sustainable funds for successful community initiatives, as requested by community groups. However, it found the requests of the community too difficult to accommodate logistically and was therefore questioning the added value of their contribution as a CDF entity. At the end of the data collection period, the Resource Table was talking about dissolving completely. Individual donors were willing to remain engaged in CDF needs, however, and two members of the Resource Table were committing to 5-year sustained funding for the local coordination of the CDF in catchment areas currently implementing the CDF, beginning in 2011.

At the *Knowledge Transfer Table*, members were grappling with how to continue with their work plan with increasingly limited resources. A decision was made by members of the KTT and the City of Ottawa CDF team to apply for a *Community-University Research Alliance (CURA)* funding grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). Members of the KTT conducted a number of consultations with CDF participants, including neighbourhood residents, to develop the proposal. The proposal focused on a mix of neighbourhood-based participatory research projects, longitudinal tools and indicators, and training and learning activities. The proposal process highlighted some of the key dynamics of power, knowledge, participation and control in decision making within the CDF. At the time of writing (Spring 2011), those involved in the CURA application received news from SSHRC that their proposal was declined for funding. It was not clear where the KTT would go from here.

Finally, in October of 2010, the City of Ottawa hired a team of consultants to conduct a process evaluation of the CDF. Overall, the consultants reported some progress within the CDF, especially as it relates to specific activities and projects conducted in neighbourhoods. There were also a number of challenges. Most stakeholders felt there was a lack of a shared vision for the CDF. Various stakeholders felt that they were spending a lot of time in meetings but lacked a clear understanding of their role and expected contribution. Resident leaders and Community Developers were feeling overwhelmed by constant demands on their time and energy. There was a growing tension between “top-down” and “bottom-up” pressures and directions. There was growing frustration among Community Developers and other front-line service providers that community development principles were not the guiding force behind the initiative. At the system level, stakeholders were concerned about what they perceived as a disconnect between the issues that first guided the selection of neighbourhoods for CDF implementation (i.e., economic status, health, early childhood indicators), and subsequent actions undertaken at the neighbourhood level. There were also a number of growing challenges and tensions within individual Tables themselves.

The results of the process evaluation were expected to be released by the end of February 2011; the report had not yet been released by the City of Ottawa CDF team at the time of writing (May 2011).

CHAPTER 8 – GOVERNMENTALITY AND MESSY ACTUALITIES: FURTHER ANALYTICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE CDF IN OTTAWA

The previous chapters provide a detailed descriptive overview of how the CDF emerged in Ottawa and how it unfolded at the neighbourhood and system levels from a variety of perspectives, raising some key tensions along the way. In this chapter, I expand on those descriptions by delving deeper into the nature of the tensions they highlight, and by exploring the role these tensions played in whether the CDF accomplished the goals that were set out for it. In the spirit of Cohen (1985), I am exploring whether the *words* of the CDF were converted to *deeds*, and why or why not? This is by no means a systematic process or impact evaluation of the CDF. Rather, it is an in-depth look at some of the messy actualities of the governance and workings of crime prevention within a place-based community development initiative, and what they tell us about the roles and interests of the various organizations and players involved.

The previous chapters show that overall, there appears to be a lack of progress towards achieving CDF goals, especially those related to systemic change, measurable impacts on the health of individual residents and their neighbourhood, and safety. The key question then becomes: *why*? There is no doubt that the CDF was faced with a number of common program implementation challenges, including lack of broad community engagement and mobilization, sparse and inconsistent financial, human and technical resources, and insufficient communication among its many moving parts. However, this research shows that the lack of progress made towards achieving key CDF goals cannot be reduced to implementation failures alone. First, the ideas on which the CDF was built and the original intentions behind it need to be located and explored within the wider socio-political (neoliberal) context in which they emerged. Second, important tensions relating to Power, Knowledge, and the nature of expertise must be taken into

consideration. Finally, the ways in which the original goals and intentions of the CDF were transformed through the processes of both translation and resistance must be taken into account. Note that while this discussion is organized into the specific conceptual lenses introduced in Chapter 2, this creates a bit of a superficial separation – some of the major findings could be discussed through more than one of the lenses presented here (e.g., Power/Knowledge *and* Translation). We may come closer to a more complete picture of the messy actualities of this kind of work when these themes are taken together as a whole.

Governing at a Distance & the Dispersal of Government

As the previous chapters show, the CDF makes strong appeals to community as both an ideal condition to foster (i.e., through the concepts of social cohesion, collective efficacy, informal social control) and an ideal site of intervention. Through the CDF, the City of Ottawa chose to define various issues as neighbourhood-based, and sought to influence the actions and choices of residents and service providers in those neighbourhoods. It called for residents to “take ownership”, to spend their time and energy on addressing neighbourhood issues that are of interest and importance to local institutions, including making choices deemed healthier and safer than their past and/or current choices.

The previous chapters also show how the City of Ottawa sought to operationalize its program by influencing and co-opting resources (human, in-kind and financial) that it does not directly control. This includes influencing the aims and actions of other institutions of the State, such as the Ottawa Police Service and Crime Prevention Ottawa. It also includes exerting a greater influence on the programs and actions of other local bureaucracies operating outside the State and over which the City of Ottawa already had some, but limited, influence and control (e.g.,

through participation on the Board of Directors or a Committee, and/or through financial contributions). These institutions included the Ottawa Community Housing Corporation, Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa, and various local funders such as the United Way of Ottawa and the Community Foundation of Ottawa.

Finally, in a striking example of the dispersal of government and social control (Cohen, 1979; Foucault, 1975, 1978 and 1982; Rose, 1996 and 2000; Rose & Miller, 1992), *at least one* representative of the City of Ottawa Community and Protective Services Department sits on *every* CDF Table (Minutes, CDF Meetings, 2008-2010). A representative of the Ottawa Police Service sits on every CDF Local Steering Table, on the Knowledge Transfer Table and on the CDF Roundtable (Minutes, CDF Meetings, 2008-2010). One representative from Ottawa By-Law Services and one from Crime Prevention Ottawa attend the meetings of most of the Local Steering Tables, the Community Table and Municipal Services Table (Minutes, CDF Meetings, 2008-2010). Here, we witness how the social control mechanisms of those organizations are dispersed right down into the neighbourhood level, in the name of ‘community partnership’. By promoting this model (i.e., Local Steering Tables made up mostly of representatives from various local institutions), the CDF appears to be defeating what it claims to be a key priority, namely gaining the active participation of residents in decision-making and mobilization efforts. As one resident offered (see p. 229), people living in neighbourhoods where the CDF is being implemented are not likely to participate in a process where they feel their thoughts and actions are increasingly under surveillance and subject to record.

Power, Knowledge and the Nature of Expertise

The findings of the previous descriptive chapters show that the key tensions to emerge repeatedly throughout the CDF relate back to the dynamics of Power, Knowledge and the nature of expertise (Foucault, 1972, 1978 and 1982; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 2001; Rose & Miller, 1992).

As a model, the CDF is a good example of how the professional expertise of the welfare state is increasingly being replaced - at least in *words* – by a focus on the diverse knowledge of organizations and publics, where collaboration and the partnership have emerged as the new model of professionalism (see Sutton & Cherney, 2002; Crawford, 1999; Hughes, 2007).

However, as is also clearly illustrated by the CDF, it is important to examine the degree to which this collaboration exists in practice, and ask *who's* voice really gets heard within this 'new' model, and why.

Though the CDF promoted the community – especially CHRCs, community groups and individual residents - as equal partners in the initiative (City of Ottawa, 2008b; Kanellakos, 2008), it is clear that this sector of the 'community' had only limited control over CDF processes and decision-making. As previously described, from the very outset, many representatives of the Community Health and Resource Centres felt they had no choice but to fall in line with the City of Ottawa's plans for the CDF despite major concerns, given their reliance on it for core and program funding. This highlights one of the major pitfalls of having community organizations heavily dependent on government funding for their survival.

The very creation and name of the *Knowledge Transfer Table*, which implies the one-way flow of information only *from* 'experts' *to* community, and the use of the university-based *Ottawa Neighbourhood Study (ONS)* to select neighbourhoods for CDF implementation and monitor

outcomes, are further glaring examples of how expert ‘knowledge’ was used to legitimize and influence major decisions within the CDF. As previously described, senior representatives from the City of Ottawa felt that using the Knowledge Transfer Table and the ONS was a way to “depoliticize” the process of neighbourhood selection, in other words a way to avoid political (City Council) meddling in the decision. However, this decision not only limited the power and influence of politicians, but it also affected the power and influence of local service providers and residents, thereby negating local forms of knowledge and expertise. Community Health and Resource Centre representatives see the ONS as *one* (but not the only) ‘way of knowing’ Ottawa neighbourhoods and the residents within them, but other ‘ways of knowing’ were not given as much weight within the CDF (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010; Interview #6). The role of City of Ottawa officials and of the Knowledge Transfer Table in reviewing and finalizing CDF goals without broader input, and in leading the initial development of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey, were other examples of this.

Among the most glaring examples of the imbalances in the relations of power within the CDF is the lack of resident representation and participation in most of the decision-making processes of the CDF. With the exception of the Local Steering Table in Neighbourhood D, the number of City of Ottawa and other service provider representatives far outweighed the number of residents involved in decision-making at the neighbourhood-level. Furthermore, residents remained completely absent from the system tables, including the leadership Roundtable (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010). The need for a resident representative and a youth representative at the CDF Roundtable and at other CDF system Tables was raised as an issue at the very beginning of the CDF and re-emerged throughout, but it never materialized (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, March 4, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, November 8, November 26, 2010). Given

community agencies' continuous demand for more input from, and more system accountability to, residents, and residents' apparent apprehension with participating in the 'formal' settings of the CDF, City officials should have found methods to engage residents in ways that are comfortable for and meaningful to them. Though City of Ottawa staff acknowledged low resident engagement and accountability as a concern (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010), it was not acted upon. Furthermore, the fact that most residents were either completely unaware of the existence of the CDF, or had only very limited knowledge of its goals and structures, prevented them from initiating any involvement in its unfolding.

Developing the application to CURA in the summer/fall of 2010 was an interesting exercise in power-sharing within the CDF. For the first time in CDF practice, residents were paid for their time and contribution, through monetary honorarium compensation for attending the CURA consultation workshop (Fieldnotes, June 22 and June 24, 2010). Though this by no means addressed the many power inequalities within the CDF in relation to residents, it was seen by those residents and by community partners as a step in the right direction (Fieldnotes, June 22, June 24 and November 26, 2010). That said, the official and financial governance of the CURA rested in academia, and the amount of compensation allowable to residents under SSHRC guidelines was much less than the amount of compensation permissible (and highly encouraged) for University students. This shows just how institutionalized the Power/Knowledge dynamics are within the culture of government-funded academic research, even when it comes to programs that are supposed to promote community capacity building through 'community-university research alliances'. Finally, it is interesting to note that the Knowledge Transfer Table suggested their name be changed to the *Knowledge Exchange Table*, in an attempt to reframe their role within the CDF moving forward and assert their desire to have 'local knowledge' and

‘community expertise’ be given equal weight and influence in relation to academic knowledge and expertise within the CDF (Fieldnotes, September 28 and November 19, 2010). It was not clear at the time of writing whether this change would actually materialize.

At the end of the data collection period, the City of Ottawa’s message remained that “the community has to own it” (Fieldnotes, November 26 and December 7, 2010). However, the significant delay in the sharing and release of the results of the Process Evaluation was yet another contradiction to that mantra – it appeared as though the City of Ottawa was still clinging on to control over messaging and perceptions of outcomes in relation to the CDF. Given this and the many other tensions and struggles outlined above, it is difficult not to question the *symbolic* versus the *substantive* value (see Barnes & Prior, 2009; Crawford, 1998; Sutton & Cherney, 2002) given to community participation and engagement within the CDF.

Neoliberal creation of choice-makers and responsabilization

All major institutional partners involved in the CDF see Ottawa residents as responsible for acting – in their everyday, private and public activities – in a way that contributes to their productive social and economic life, and that of their neighbourhood (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 3, November 26, December 7, 2010). This neoliberal responsabilization of individuals is further accompanied by a neoconservative remoralization of some of Ottawa’s poorest residents (i.e., those dependent on social housing). When it comes to crime control and safety, this largely takes the shape of what Garland (1996: 446; 2000) refers to as the *new criminologies of everyday life*, where crime is seen as a common and expected ‘risk’ to be calculated by the ‘offender’ and ‘potential victim’ alike (see also Haggerty, 2003). This includes both a *criminology of the self*, whereby ‘offenders’ and ‘victims’ are seen as rational choice makers, and

a *criminology of the other*, whereby ‘offenders’ are perceived as threatening strangers (Garland, 1996). Both tendencies are present within the CDF, as evidenced by the types of solutions being proposed by residents and service providers alike at all CDF Local Steering Tables, including increasing surveillance measures (i.e., cameras and patrolling), encouraging residents to turn their vigilance into actions that are supportive of the mandates of state institutions (i.e., ‘educating’ residents on what to report and to whom), and creating Neighbourhood Watch programs (see Table 6).

Furthermore, the findings of this study illustrate a tendency within the CDF to *govern through crime* (Simon, 2007), where various dimensions of social life and social problems are redefined under the rubric of ‘crime’ and/or ‘safety’. Major social issues identified around mental health (disturbances, addictions), police-resident relations (police discrimination and distrust), drug demand (addictions), youth disaffiliation (graffiti, gang activity), and prostitution were appropriated by crime prevention and safety. Through this lens, there were two main resident populations to regulate according to the degree and type of ‘risk’ they were perceived to pose to their community and to themselves: the *included* and the *abjected* (Rose, 1996; 1999). The ‘included’ - those responsive to, and aligned with, the interests of the state (those deemed capable of managing risks through self-regulation and through ‘appropriate’ life choices) - were recruited to become involved in mobilization efforts in their neighbourhood. They were responsabilized to become ‘good’ or ‘better’ citizens by attending CDF assessment and planning meetings, CDF neighbourhood events, and participating in various crime prevention activities, including increasing their reporting to local authorities, becoming involved in a Tenants Association or a Neighbourhood Watch program. The ‘included’ of all ages represented a large

majority of the residents attending various CDF activities and programming (Fieldnotes, November 10 and November 26, 2010).

The 'abjected' were treated as either responsabilizable through intervention or as unsalvageable (Rose, 1996; 1999). For the abjected but responsabilizable (i.e., 'at-risk' or delinquent youth, young poor single mothers), efforts were made by Community Developers, Community House workers and other service providers to include them in a variety of neighbourhood initiatives, be it crime prevention activities, recreational or skills building programming (e.g., homework clubs, 'good parenting' groups), in the hope they could be successfully 'taught' to reduce the risk they appear to pose to themselves and their community. The extent to which these residents actually participated in CDF activities is not clear. However, front-line service providers in all neighbourhoods implementing the CDF agreed that: "We tend to see the same faces over and over again, and they tend to be the ones who need some but not the most help" (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). The 'unsalvageable', by contrast, were defined as dangerous, and it appeared as though efforts were underway to increase more overt enforcement and criminal justice intervention against them through the work of the new CDF Safety Committee, including through exploring the potential for evictions and arrests (Fieldnotes, December 7, 2010; Interview #8).

Though there was a tendency within the CDF to *govern through crime* (Simon, 2007), there were a few notable instances where this tendency was met with some resistance. One such example was in the development of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey, where Community Developers were reluctant to include questions on victimization, crime and safety, in part out of fear that it would take the focus away from other issues (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 8, 2010). Another

example can be found in Neighbourhood D, where issues of crime and safety did bubble up through the Neighbourhood Survey and other community consultations, but a conscious decision was made by the Community Developer and the CHRC to avoid placing too much emphasis on those dimensions of neighbourhood life. The Community Developer instead chose to frame social issues through lenses she considered less “divisive”, such as early childhood needs, understanding cultural differences, and mental health (Fieldnotes, October 12, 2010). Similarly, Community Developers in other neighbourhoods implementing the CDF expressed concerns that some of the ‘safety’ issues raised by residents (e.g., a group of youth “hanging around”) were actually “symptoms” of other social problems, such as youth disaffiliation, lack of opportunities for youth, racism and intolerance (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; Interviews #1 and 5). However, the inclusion of Police representatives at their Local Steering Tables tended to make the Police the default solution to residents’ concerns around safety, which tended to re-focus the conversation on the “symptoms” rather than on the underlying issues (Interview #7; Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010).

There were other more general displays of avoiding a tendency to govern through crime. For example, top City of Ottawa executives often went out of their way to reinforce the idea that the CDF was *not* a crime and safety initiative (e.g., CDF Memo to Council, May 15, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). In a few instances, it appeared as though City of Ottawa executives did not want to take attention away from the other social issues at hand, such as food security and youth integration (Fieldnotes, June 24 and July 12, 2010). In other instances, City of Ottawa representatives seemed more preoccupied with preventing the appearance that the CDF was putting too much of the onus on or “overstepping” the Police (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 3, 2010), or

replicating existing initiatives, such as those of Crime Prevention Ottawa (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, May 4, May 18, 2010).

Regardless of the 'lens' they chose, all major organizational players involved in the CDF spoke of the importance of making residents active contributors to the processes of policy making and service delivery and of the importance of promoting civic responsibility through participation and engagement in 'community' matters (Minutes, Community development Roundtable, May 21, 2008 and March 4, 2009; Fieldnotes, June 24, November 3 and December 7, 2010).

However, it is clear that only a certain *type* of participation and engagement is supported and tolerated within the CDF. Residents were constantly and consistently reminded of *their* responsibility as good citizens to get involved in local actions and *their* responsibility as good tenants to comply with the rules and procedures of the organizations in question (Neighbourhood Action Plans, 2009-2010). The focus was largely on educating individual residents about their responsibilities and on managing their expectations as to what they could and should expect from their local institutions. For example, residents in all neighbourhoods were repeatedly told by crime prevention practitioners and Police alike that the reason their neighbourhood does not get the Police response residents feel is needed is because *they* are not reporting those specific incidents to Police (Fieldnotes, May 18, June 7, September 22 and November 10, 2010; Interviews #4 and #8). Residents were told that since Police resources are allocated based on calls for service, they would not get the type of attention and response they want until they started reporting every single incident and the reporting reached a critical point (Fieldnotes, May 18, June 7, September 22 and November 10, 2010; Interviews #2 and #8). Though Police representatives reported being well aware of the distinct issues of each neighbourhood, and police calls for service were indeed generally quite high in these areas (as per information

provided to the Knowledge Transfer Table, see p. 150-151), there did not appear to be much of a desire, ability or willingness on the part of Police leaders to think outside of their current organizational processes and practices to deal with these issues in some other more productive way.

In all neighbourhoods, the discussion revolved largely around the responsibility of the ‘tenant’, ‘citizen’, ‘victim’ or ‘offender’. This type of responsabilization of individual residents took much of the focus away from the dynamics surrounding the relationship between residents and local authorities - especially the Police – and from the quality of the services they receive from local institutions. As one Community Developer put it: “There are things these organizations just don’t want to hear, or more importantly, they wouldn’t want others to hear... it makes them look bad. So they push it back down onto the residents, make it look like it’s only the residents who aren’t doing their part” (Interview #5).

‘Blaming the victim’ in this way also takes attention away from broader social relations (i.e., around class, status, race, gender) and structures (i.e., labour market policies, social security policies) that tend to construct, reproduce and exacerbate inequality and disadvantage (Ryan, 1976; Grover, 2008). Though community economic development was articulated as a chief concern of local stakeholders at the very outset of the CDF (see p. 157), there is very little attention being paid within the CDF to improving the economic wellbeing of residents, to relieving the conditions associated with poverty, and to breaking the social and economic divide between these ‘vulnerable’ neighbourhoods and their larger and ‘wealthier’ surrounding areas. Some events have been initiated to bring culturally diverse neighbourhood residents together in

one activity, but reaching the most disaffiliated residents remains a key struggle (Fieldnotes, November 26, 2010). That being said:

Even if participation could be guaranteed, there is still the problem of human capital. Effective organization is most severely needed in the geographic areas that have served as the “home of last resort” for those with the fewest personal and financial resources. Asking them to shoulder the burden of undoing the social effects of corporate and political practices is both unfair and unrealistic. (Buerger, 1994: 428)

This was indeed evident within the CDF. As previously mentioned, 37% to 59% of CDF Neighbourhood Survey respondents reported facing an impediment to their hearing, seeing, speech, mobility, agility, learning, memory, psychological and/or developmental abilities (Carleton University Survey Centre, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d). Though the surveys did have a low response rate and the samples were not necessarily representative of neighbourhood residents as a whole, it is important to consider the implications of these numbers, and it is a finding that merits further inquiry and examination.

Finally, even among the most ‘included’ and mobilized residents, the work involved in being a ‘good neighbour’ and ‘good citizen’ the way the CDF intended was turning out to be more than what some residents were willing and able to give – many reported feeling overwhelmed by their role and “burnt out” from the time and energy required (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). The CDF’s emphasis on “celebrating small successes” to maintain momentum (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; November 26, 2010) may further detract from the fact that it is highly unlikely that what is realistically achievable through the community actions being proposed will lead to desired larger-scale social changes. Even if these celebrations are effective in their short-term goals of sustaining and encouraging further community participation, the failure to produce any concrete

and longer-term changes to troubling living conditions can only serve to further fuel attrition, feelings of frustrations and resentment among community workers and residents alike (Buerger, 1994; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Grover, 2008).

Translation

The unfolding and inner workings of the CDF also raise serious questions about some of the underlying assumptions of the community approach to crime and safety, including those related to ‘community’, to partnership working, and to the role of the police.

Defining ‘community’ and the messiness of ‘neighbourhood’

The findings of this research on the implementation of the CDF at the neighbourhood level challenge some of the major assumptions underlying the CDF, namely:

- (A) that ‘community’ equals a shared geographic locality;
- (B) that ‘community’ equals a shared concern or ‘sense of community’;
- (C) that A creates (or should) B; and
- (D) that change through communal action will create or bring back B.

Keeping these assumptions in mind, it is important to note that each institutional partner involved in the CDF operates (or runs programs) under a different set of physical delineations and definitions of Ottawa areas and ‘neighbourhoods’. For example, there are:

- 89 inhabited neighbourhoods of the *Ottawa Neighbourhood Study* (University of Ottawa)
- 14 Community Health and Resource Centre catchment areas
- 15 Community Policing Centre areas (Ottawa Police Service)
- 15 *Community Houses* (in Ottawa Community Housing neighbourhoods)

- 2 pilot sites of the Ottawa Community Housing *Healthy Communities Initiative*
- 6 priority areas of the *Ottawa Youth Gang Prevention Initiative* (of Crime Prevention Ottawa & the Youth Services Bureau of Ottawa)

In some cases, there is considerable geographical overlap among these various delineations, while in other cases, there is not. It would be interesting to draw the physical boundaries related to each of these areas on a map, along with the neighbourhoods implementing the CDF. This would undoubtedly provide a great visual representation of the messiness of defining ‘community’ geographically, and of attempting collaborative work based on ‘place’.

Also, the findings described in Chapter 7 point to serious challenges to the assumption that residents living within a shared geographic locality (i.e., a neighbourhood) necessarily share common concerns and /or a common view of what ‘community’ means. These conditions render mobilization and communal action very challenging, while any successes in mobilization may actually undermine the appeal to ‘community’ by accentuating an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dynamic in neighbourhoods (see Young, 1999). This is particularly evident in the case of police presence/involvement and police-led initiatives, which I turn to in a later section on Community Policing in Ottawa.

Bureaucratic Imperatives and Professional Interests

The lack of a shared vision and the absence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities were among the most commonly cited struggles in relation to the CDF. As previously described, despite some reticence, institutional partners involved in the CDF came on board in the name of collaboration and partnership. However, there were clear tensions over ‘turf’ within the CDF, including ‘turf wars’ (Cohen & Gould, 2003) over processes, resources, time, participation and

recognition. Representatives from each organization involved in the CDF still had their own organizational mandate and intended policy and program outcomes, as well as their own professional interests (Cohen, 1985), as their prime responsibility and concern.

First, it is important to note that at the present time in Ottawa, there are three very similar neighbourhood-based strategies underway aimed (in general terms) at ‘community health’, each with an explicit safety component. These are (1) the City of Ottawa’s *CDF*, (2) the Ottawa Community Housing’s *Healthy Communities Initiative*, and (3) the United Way of Ottawa’s *Stronger Neighbourhoods Initiative*. In a few cases, these initiatives overlap within the same geographical area. Though there appears to be basic information-sharing between the City of Ottawa and Ottawa Community Housing about the goings-on of their respective initiatives (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; November 26, 2010), there is no apparent collaboration between these three very similar strategies, each led by a prominent CDF partner. Each initiative is developing and using its own set of tools (e.g., community/tenant surveys), structures (e.g., resident and service provider working groups), processes (community engagement and development), and interventions.

The three similar but separate initiatives are causing a great deal of confusion for workers on the ground, and there is a palpable climate of competition among the three organizations involved (Interviews #5, #6 and #8; Fieldnotes, October 22, November 12 and December 7, 2010). As one Community Developer offered: “Neighbourhood-based community development work is like the shiny red car of the moment in this city... it feels like everybody wants to own it but nobody knows how to drive it” (Fieldnotes, November 12, 2010). Here we see how the bureaucratic imperatives of each organization to grow and to maintain control over a particular type of approach is outweighing the principle of collaboration as set out by the CDF. This same

bureaucratic interest in survival and growth is what led to the initial climate of competition among representatives of Community Health and Resource Centres upon the launch of the CDF in 2008 (see p. 171).

Among the other struggles of the initiative were the competing interpretations within the CDF of what ‘community development’ could or should look like (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 8, November 26 and December 7, 2010). There was a definite sense among CHRC managers, Community Developers, and Community House Workers that the rest of the stakeholders involved in the CDF did not have an adequate understanding of, or appreciation for, the principles of Community Development as they understood and practiced them (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 8, November 26 and November 29, 2010; Interviews #1, #5, #6, and #7). From the outset, Community Developers were weary of the City of Ottawa’s aims of ‘standardizing’ community development through the processes, practices, tools and tracking mechanisms of the CDF. There was a strong feeling that standardization goes against the very core principles of Community Development, namely the promotion of grassroots efforts in response to context specificity, the use of ‘local knowledge’ rather than institutional assumptions, and an embracing of fluidity rather than a strive for structure (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 8, November 26 and November 29, 2010; Interviews #1, #5, #6, and #7). As one Community Developer insisted:

My understanding of my role as a community developer is to facilitate what’s already there. To help with the implementation of ideas that come from the residents and the community themselves. There are opportunities to contribute to and add to those ideas, but we shouldn’t be implanting or imposing them (Interview #6).

In the case of CHRCs, the CDF not only lacked a clearly articulated shared vision, but some felt it initially led to a climate of competition between the various Community Health Centres and

Community Resource Centres regarding recognition for their work, funding and access to system attention and resources. However, as it unfolded, it became clear that the CDF did not necessarily equal additional resources (technical and/or financial), that it required a lot of extra work on the part of front-line staff, and that it relied heavily on the good will of organizational staff and the volunteer time of researchers. Front-line service providers and low-level managers who sit on CDF Local Steering Tables have limited powers and authority within their own organizations. When they go back into their organization, they are faced with many bureaucratic roadblocks in attempting to push a CDF item forward. As the previous chapters show, this can range from something as simple as not being able to make photocopies of a CDF-related flyer without an appropriate budget code for the photocopier, to something as challenging as asking a Community Police Officer to engage differently with the community in which he/she works. Many front-line service providers reported they felt it was not in their best professional interest to create extra work or “ruffle feathers” internally (Fieldnotes, June 24 and November 18, 2010). Similarly, the CDF promotes “agents of change” within City of Ottawa staff from a variety of departments - findings show there is tremendous reluctance to be the “guinea pig” for this type of role without clear managerial and institutional support.

Though all stakeholders agreed on the importance of exploring and identifying CDF outcomes and impacts, another key tension lied in what constituted ‘success’ in the CDF, and in how to go about measuring it. The City of Ottawa CDF team felt acute political pressure to show the worth and success of the CDF in ‘measurable’ ways (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010; November 26, 2010; December 7, 2010), and favoured empirical forms of knowledge. These political and bureaucratic needs were seen by many on the ground as key impediments to community development principles and processes (Fieldnotes, November 8, 2010). Community Developers

were also very weary of having the impact of their work be assessed based upon broad social indicators that they feel they had limited influence on, including police-recorded crime (Fieldnotes, June 24, 2010). The tension between “celebrating small successes” at a very micro level - a staple practice in Community Development - versus measuring social change based on a list of broad, pre-set indicators was very much present (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 8, November 26, and December 7, 2010). Developing the CURA proposal was an interesting exercise in coming to a shared vision among the many CDF stakeholders of how to measure this kind of work. In the end, the CURA proposal made use of a mixed methods approach, combining experimental longitudinal data collection (on quality of life measures) with more participatory, community-driven and ‘real time’ forms of inquiry and learning.

Developing the CURA proposal also highlighted some of the dynamics and professional interests surrounding the Knowledge Transfer Table. The most often cited reason for the severe attrition within the Knowledge Transfer Table (from 2008 to 2010) was a lack of time on the part of academics (Fieldnotes, July 14, September 28 and November 19, 2010). However, as previously outlined, thirteen (13) academics from both the University of Ottawa and Carleton University signed on to the CURA proposal to SSHRC in the fall of 2010. The proposal listed each academic as either a Co-Investigator or a Collaborator, and clearly laid out a specific and time-limited role for each academic according to his or her area of expertise. The clear and specific contribution, along with the potential of adding a SSHRC grant to their curriculum vitae, made it easier to retain their interest (Fieldnotes, August 30, August 31 and September 16, 2010). Some academics reported that community involvement and research is not recognized by their Universities for advancement, which makes some researchers less willing to participate unless there is something in it for them and/or their career (Fieldnotes, Fieldnotes, August 30 and

September 28, 2010). Ultimately, the lack of success in obtaining a CURA grant brought the shared visioning process and its proposed activities to a halt. The group was back where it started, relying on volunteer time and very limited resources to work through small pieces of planning and evaluation as the need arose (i.e., re-vamping the Neighbourhood Survey to make it more participatory and responsive to community partner and resident needs).

The Words vs. Deeds of Community Policing in Ottawa

The findings of this research also show that the CDF was not successful in leading to system change within one of its key partners, namely the Ottawa Police Service. As described in the previous chapter, the Chief of Police of the Ottawa Police Service is happy to have Community Police Officers show up at community events and participate in short-term community projects, but he is not willing to invest in longer-term neighbourhood-based relationship building and problem-solving, as was done in the *No Community Left Behind (NCLB)* initiative, and intended in the plans of the CDF. In fact, as the Chief stated, the OPS hopes to come up with an “exit strategy” for its “resource-intensive” participation in NCLB in South East Ottawa neighbourhoods. These findings show that the Executive Branch of the OPS is not receptive to the requests of community partners for changes to the way the OPS views and does community policing in Ottawa. This includes requests for more positive, meaningful and impactful interactions between Police Officers and residents and community groups, ensuring that Community Police Officers have the adequate qualifications for their role (i.e., cultural sensitivity and understanding, conflict-resolution skills, proficiency in both Official Languages), and transition planning within Community Police Centres (Fieldnotes, June 17, October 22, November 3, November 12 and November 26, 2010). There is currently very little to no succession

planning on the part of OPS – some Community Developers and community workers are beginning to take the initiative to create a “Community Binder” with all the essential facts and statistics that relate to their particular catchment area of the City. It has been the Community Health and Resource Centres’ experience that Community Police Officers enter their position with very little to no knowledge of the neighbourhoods in question (Fieldnotes, June 17, October 22, November 12 and November 26, 2010).

In line with this finding, many Community Police Officers in Ottawa report that their role is not respected within the OPS Executive and among their patrol colleagues (Fieldnotes, May 15, June 17 and November 30, 2010; Interviews #2 and #3). Many Community Police Officers feel the primary concern of their superiors is with managing the OPS’ public image and creating an *appearance* of being community minded, rather than actually improving responsiveness to community concerns (Interviews #2 and #3; Fieldnotes, May 16 and June 17, 2010). As one Community Police Officer put it: “OPS is talking the community talk but not walking the walk... we get no voice, no recognition and no respect” (Interview #2).

Not surprisingly, community service providers and residents cite major issues around the capacity of Community Police Officers and other local Police to engage in neighbourhood problem-solving, based on roadblocks these Officers experience internally. As one Community Developer stated: “It’s not that [*name of the Community Police Officer*] doesn’t get what we’re trying to do, it’s just that he can’t actually contribute much, he’s just not allowed to, 99% of his superiors still don’t get it” (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). Many Community Police Officers and a few Community Developers also raised concerns with the inconsistency in community policing resources from one area of the city to another. For example, the West District has a Staff

Sergeant of Community Policing while other districts do not. In districts without a Staff Sergeant of Community Policing, Community Police Officers report to the same Staff Sergeant as Patrol Officers. Community Police Officers and front-line community workers alike feel the needs, requests and priorities of Community Police Officers in these districts are not heard (Fieldnotes, November 12, 2010; Interviews #2 and #3).

In addition, one Community Police Officer highlighted the lack of ethnic diversity within the Executive Branch of the OPS, as well as a lack of women in positions of power in the OPS, referring to the OPS as an “old white boys club” (Interview #2). Many Community Police Officers spoke of the challenges female officers face within the organization, citing ongoing issues with internal discrimination and sexual harassment (Fieldnotes, June 17 and November 30, 2010; Interview #2). Furthermore, the OPS has only one officer dedicated to Race Relations (a white woman) whereas most other forces in Canada have an entire Race Relations Team, often composed of ethnically diverse Officers (Fieldnotes, November 30, 2010; Interview #2). These findings raise questions about the internal dynamics of race and gender-based discrimination within the OPS, as well as the OPS’ lack of understanding or care for the importance of relationship building with ethnic groups in an increasingly diverse city.

As previously described, the Ottawa Police Service’s public and race relations crisis in 2010 (see p. 122) suggests that the OPS should have every reason to be concerned with its relationship with the public and with ethnically diverse residents in particular. Furthermore, many residents living in the neighbourhoods in which the CDF operates report distrust in (and in some cases disdain for) the Ottawa Police due to specific incidents of harassment and abuses of power that they have witnessed, experienced directly, or that someone they know experienced. Most of these

racialized Ottawa residents attribute the Ottawa Police's behaviour to racism and class discrimination. This is yet another example of the pervasiveness of a *criminology of the alien* (Garland, 1996) and of *othering* (Young, 1999 and 2007), the tendency within late modernity to bifurcate citizens as either law-abiding or 'criminal' based on their race and class.

The tagline used by the Ottawa Police Service is that Community Police Officers are "the face of the Police in our communities" (Fieldnotes, June 17, 2010; Interview #2). Though this may ring true in more homogeneous middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods, the findings of this study show that for many residents living in highly heterogeneous, racialized and poor neighbourhoods, "the face of the Police" is the Patrol Officers they experience as being disrespectful, confrontational and discriminatory, and the Drug Squad Officers who come charging into their highly condensed neighbourhoods shouting and with their weapons drawn, banging down doors (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010). As one single mother offered:

...when they [the Drug Squad] broke down the neighbour's door and started screaming and shooting and waving around their big guns, my 12 year old daughter and I thought we were gonna die. It was a helluva lot scarier than anything that drug dealer next door ever done to us. Then we were just left there terrified, not knowing what happened or what to do. We couldn't sleep for days. (Fieldnotes, November 10, 2010)

As one Community Police Officer (CPO) noted, CPOs are charged with the "impossible task" of trying to alter that image: "once they've had a bad experience, that's it, I'm done. They see me as no different, we're all the same asshole to them... changing that takes a lot more than showing up at a neighbourhood barbeque" (Interview #2).

In this context, it seems likely that it will remain virtually impossible for the CDF to attract the participation of more than a few residents in 'community' structures and processes where the

Police are present. Within the CDF, the issue of police-resident relations took a backseat in favour of further ‘educating’ and responsabilizing residents to report crime to the Police, and/or responsabilizing residents to participate in police-community initiatives, most of which were conducted on the Police’s terms rather than on the residents’ terms (i.e., through the promotion of Neighbourhood Watch type initiatives). The key question then becomes: If the Police are considered by many residents in these neighbourhoods to be a significant part of the problem, why should the Police be thought of as the solution? The findings of this research suggest that the Ottawa Police Service has adopted the words ‘community policing’ as a public relations tactic, with very little interest in being responsive to the expressed needs and direct requests of local community partners and residents. The OPS appears keen to focus resources to certain neighbourhoods of the city when it comes to patrol and enforcement, but not when it comes to community relationship-building and problem-solving (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, February 3, 2010; Fieldnotes, May 18 and November 3, 2010). Why, then, should the Ottawa Police play such a prominent role in an initiative that purports to be based on principles of Community Development? The track record of the Ottawa Police Service as a CDF partner at the ‘system’ level provides little argument in favour of their strong presence, as evidenced by their lack of cooperation in sharing pertinent and useable police data, and their complete absence at the Community Development Roundtable during the last 10 months of this research (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, November 3 and December 7, 2010; Fieldnotes, November 30, 2010).

Final Thoughts on Resistance

Though there was initial resistance from some residents when they first heard about the CDF (see p. 173), this resistance appeared to largely dissipate since the CDF was not very visible to

residents on the ground (Fieldnotes, June 24, November 10 and November 26, 2010). As previously described, CDF-related activities and events were generally promoted and implemented in neighbourhoods without being identified as a CDF initiative. This left residents largely unaware of the broader structures and processes at play in their very own place of residence, which also relates back to our earlier discussion of Power/Knowledge. Though the issue of “branding” the CDF and the idea of making it more visible to residents emerged a number of times, the City of Ottawa remained mostly quiet on the issue (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, March 4, 2009; Fieldnotes, November 3 and December 7, 2010). Some CDF promotional materials such as posters and bags were produced by the City of Ottawa (Minutes, Community Development Roundtable, March 4, 2009), but from my observations, they were not visible in neighbourhoods implementing the CDF (Fieldnotes, June 7, June 22, July 1, July 3, August 28, September 22, October 6, and October 12, 2010). Though the City of Ottawa CDF team remained very vague on their thoughts on the issue (Fieldnotes, July 12 and November 3, 2010), it may be that there was some safety for them and for the other organizations involved in having the CDF remain fairly unseen; it is hard for residents to question and to keep you accountable for an initiative they do not know exists.

Furthermore, by placing the focus on the responsabilization of residents as ‘good tenants’ and ‘good citizens’, and on educating residents about *their* role in adapting to systems (rather than the other way around), activities related to the CDF did not allow for the mobilization and release of community energy in opposition to the agenda and interests of local authorities including the City of Ottawa, Ottawa Community Housing, and the Ottawa Police Service. In addition, it appears as though current funding arrangements in Ottawa, where grassroots community development work is largely dependent on municipal funding, combined with

contemporary appeals to partnership working in crime control, where community organizations and groups are responsabilized as ‘good partners’, leave very little room for the more confrontational or coercive social change tactics reminiscent of mid-century community organizing (e.g., Alinsky, 1946). Since Community Developers’ and Community House workers’ salaries depend on City of Ottawa funding, and the CDF model emphasizes inter-sectoral cooperation and collaboration, it seems almost impossible for these community organizers to harness or support political organizing motivated by resident and/or community resistance to the policies and practices of CDF system partners. Both these tendencies within the CDF appear to go against the core principles of Community Development of ‘empowerment’ and of increasing space for citizen ‘voice’ by encouraging forms of participatory democracy (see Campfens, 1997).

Ironically (given the definition of resistance presented on p. 60), the group that arguably showed the most overt form of contestation to the CDF were representatives from a large North American corporate (private) builder and developer that owns and operates one of the most populated buildings encompassed within a neighbourhood implementing the CDF (neighbourhood D). As previously described, the private landlord refused representatives of the CDF access to the building and to the residents within it. Despite repeated attempts by City of Ottawa officials and the executives of Ottawa Community Housing to persuade representatives of the corporate landlord to become a partner in the CDF, they refused participation based on the fact that there was “nothing in it for them”. Given that the CDF assessment phase involves a large number of questions relating to quality of housing, neighbour interactions, and perceptions of neighbourhood safety, it was not necessarily in the private landlord’s best interest to participate in the CDF, keeping their reputation, public relations and therefore profits in mind.

Even though the social service providers involved in the CDF may have wanted to reach the residents living in that building, there was very little they could do. This is a good illustration of the effects of neoliberalism, and how it can protect the interests of large corporations to the detriment of the potential interests and needs of the 'community'.

Conclusions

The findings of this research show that the CDF encountered a number of common program implementation and evaluation challenges, including lack of resident engagement, inadequate financial, human and technical resources, and a lack of communication among its many structures. However, this research also shows that the lack of progress made towards achieving key CDF principles and goals cannot be reduced to implementation failures alone. There are numerous and important 'messy actualities' of the community approach to crime prevention. These messy actualities include the dynamics and repercussions of: governing at a distance and of the dispersal of social control; the neoliberal creation and responsabilization of choice-makers; relations of power and the nature of expertise; defining community and the messiness of the notion of 'neighbourhood'; bureaucratic imperatives and professional interests; the words versus deeds of community policing; and processes relevant to resistance and participatory democracy.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This final chapter provides an overview of the descriptive and analytical findings of this research, as well as some directions for future inquiries into the community approach to crime prevention and safety.

Conclusions

Over the past few decades, the ideals of ‘community’ and of ‘prevention’ have become pervasive in Western discourses of crime control and safety (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 2009; Garland, 2001; Hastings, 2008; Hughes, 2007). Though the exact meaning of the word ‘community’ in contemporary crime control discourses is not always well defined, they all focus on engaging and mobilizing individuals and groups outside of the criminal justice system, including members of the public and service providers from the public, non-governmental, volunteer and private sectors (Crawford, 1999; Cohen, 1985; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Homel, 2009; Hughes, 2007; Jamieson, 2008; National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007).

Despite all of its promise and good intentions, the community approach to crime prevention and safety has not been as successful in addressing issues of crime and safety as many had hoped. Shortfalls have typically been attributed to local implementation challenges like ineffectual communication and outreach to marginalized groups, a lack of human and financial resources, the lack of skilled and trained staff, a lack of time to demonstrate results, and low levels of participation by community members, especially in higher-crime areas (see Homel, 2006 and 2009; National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007; Rosenbaum, 1988; Schneider, 2000; Sutton & Cherney, 2002; Welsh & Hoshi, 2002). However, even the most well-funded and well-designed crime prevention schemes adopting some form of the community approach (see Homel,

2009; Solomon, 2009) have generally fallen short of their expected outcomes. This implies that the limits of the community approach to crime prevention and safety may very well go beyond simple implementation failures. Continuing to examine the community approach to crime prevention and safety through the lens of linear implementation and of ‘what works’ is no longer adequate. There are many assumptions underlying the thinking behind the community approach to crime prevention and safety and its practices that need further exploration (Cohen, 1985; Hastings, 2008; Sutton & Cherney, 2002).

To this end, this research project set out to look at the governance and workings of the community approach to crime prevention and safety within the *Community Development Framework (CDF)* in Ottawa, Ontario. Launched by the City of Ottawa in the spring of 2008, the CDF is presented as a “new way of working”, a place-based community development initiative focused on principles of collaboration, coordination, inclusiveness, and the active participation of the community (City of Ottawa and Partner Agencies, 2008, “Introduction”). The overarching goals of the CDF are to increase neighbourhood capacity, improve planning and service delivery to, improve the health of residents and their neighbourhood, improve neighbourhood safety and perceptions of safety, and promote sustainable change. The CDF involves a five phase approach to multi-sectoral problem-solving that requires active participation at: (1) the *neighbourhood level*, with Local Steering Tables and community developers engaging and coordinating the efforts of local service providers and neighbourhood residents, and (2) the *system (organizational) level*, with City of Ottawa staff and a CDF Coordinator engaging and coordinating the efforts of key organizations in the City (e.g., various departments of the City of Ottawa, the Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa, Ottawa

Community Housing, Ottawa Police Service, Crime Prevention Ottawa, United Way Ottawa, Community Foundation of Ottawa, local universities, etc.).

In the tradition of full immersion ethnography, a triangulation of data collection methods was used, combining a comprehensive review of documentation with key informant interviews and extensive fieldwork/direct observation in the tradition of “complete participant”. This ethnography presented a unique opportunity to observe Community Development Framework (CDF) events and interactions as they unfolded, and to ask key stakeholders involved their thoughts and perspectives on these events and interactions in real time (as they were happening), as well as later on and in light of new developments or further reflection. This ethnography represents the first and only attempt so far at documenting how the first two years of the CDF in Ottawa unfolded – including events, key decisions and tensions - from a variety of different perspectives. This includes both the official story told by CDF documentation, meetings and public events, and behind the scenes interactions and decision-making.

The results of this research show that the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa embodies both leading perspectives on the role of ‘community’ within crime prevention. The CDF makes appeals to ‘community’ as both an *ideal condition* to foster (a ‘sense of community’, ‘community capacity’), and an *essential means* through which to govern crime (through the ‘neighbourhood’ and partnership Tables). Using Foucault (1978; 1989) and others’ (e.g., Burchill, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 1999; 2000) work on *governmentality* as a theoretical starting point, we see how the CDF in Ottawa embodies the rationality of ‘governing at a distance’ and the neoliberal creation and responsabilization of ‘choice-makers’. Through the CDF, the City of Ottawa sought to operationalize its program by

exerting influence over the functions and resources of other institutions of the State (i.e., the Ottawa Police Service and Crime Prevention Ottawa), as well as various local bureaucracies operating outside the State. The City of Ottawa also sought to influence the actions and choices of residents by calling upon them as ‘good tenants’, ‘good neighbours’ and ‘good citizens’ to align their interests and activities with those of the institutions involved in the CDF.

There is no doubt that the Community Development Framework in Ottawa experienced a number of implementation challenges related to difficulties in community engagement, sparse and inconsistent financial and human resources, and insufficient communication among its many moving parts. However, this research shows that the difficulties associated with the community approach to crime prevention and safety within the CDF cannot be reduced to implementation failures alone. A certain set of systemic factors and social relations, including differences in actual and perceived power and influence, perspective, opinion, experience, individual and/or organizational values and interests, influenced the outcomes of the community approach to crime prevention and safety within the CDF.

Despite their concerns, and in the spirit of partnership working, key institutional partners across the city came onboard and participated in the implementation of the five phases of the CDF.

Community Health and Resource Centres (CHRCs) - the community partner responsible for most of the CDF implementation on the ground - generally felt the need to align with and support the City of Ottawa’s objectives based primarily on their funding relationship (CHRCs depend on the City for core and program funding). In *Phase 1*, a Local Steering Table was created in each of four pilot Community Health and Resource Centre catchment areas. These catchment areas were chosen based on criteria related to the socio-economic status, health, and early childhood

development of its residents, along with information on the levels of crime and the demographic make-up of the area. Each Local Steering Table chose a particular (smaller) neighbourhood within their catchment area to begin the pilot implementation of the CDF. All four neighbourhoods chosen were low income, demographically diverse and highly concentrated communities with at least some public housing units. In *Phase 2*, a needs assessment exercise was conducted in each of the four neighbourhoods implementing the CDF, which included a CDF Neighbourhood Survey developed by the City of Ottawa CDF team and the Knowledge Transfer Table.

These two Phases of the CDF were particularly good examples of the dynamics of power and knowledge within the CDF, of how the professional expertise of the welfare state is, mostly in words, increasingly being replaced by the notion that ‘the community knows best’. The findings of this study suggest that the CDF promoted various community agencies, groups and residents as equal partners in the initiative, but that the expertise of these community members was not attributed the same weight as that of government officials, ‘professional’ and academic ‘experts’. From the selection of neighbourhoods for CDF implementation, to the finalizing of CDF goals, to the process of developing the CDF Neighbourhood Survey, the ‘community’ had only very limited control over CDF decisions and processes. This raises important questions on the *symbolic* versus the *substantive* value attributed to community participation and resident engagement within the CDF.

The results of the CDF Neighbourhood Survey and other neighbourhood assessment tools show that dimensions of crime, safety, drugs, gangs, destruction of property, and garbage were among residents’ top three overall concerns. In *Phase 3*, issues of crime and safety were made the top priority for action in three of the four neighbourhoods implementing the CDF. A variety of

solutions and actions were proposed by residents and Local Steering Table members. These included policing and enforcement strategies (N=11), strategies within the community approach to crime prevention and safety (N=11), situational crime prevention strategies (N=8) and one reference to a developmental strategy.

Findings from *Phase 4*, the implementation phase of the CDF, support the findings of others that there are many obstacles to community mobilization in the current Canadian context, especially in highly concentrated, low-income, transient and demographically diverse neighbourhoods (see Jamieson, 2008; Schneider, 2000). This study shows that in these neighbourhoods, resistance to engagement and mobilization was especially strong around issues of crime and safety. Residents were often reluctant to get involved because of a lack of trust in local institutions (especially the Police) and because of a fear of retaliation by their neighbours. The many additional obstacles to community mobilization described in this study put into perspective one of the main underlying assumptions of the community approach to crime prevention and safety: that there is a wealth of (or at least enough) untapped assets in a community that just need to be uncovered and ignited, including a common set of values to rally around. Though certain common virtues or principles may indeed exist, the day-to-day reality in highly concentrated areas where individuals and families differ significantly in demographic background, health (physical and mental), ability and support, poses significant challenges to their emergence; the immediate needs typically overshadow the assets. In addition, what is seen as a desirable solution to some, such as an increase in Police and security presence and visibility, may in fact lead to the exacerbation of a problem for others. This includes increased fear and anxiety due to Police presence, or harassment and unfair treatment by Police, which was especially true of racialized youth. Here

we see how the conservative moral authoritarian appeal of community can be dangerously reactionary and exclusionary in its effects.

In Phase 4, we also see how most of the practices implemented under the guise of improving crime and safety in neighbourhoods (i.e., “Make the right call” campaigns, Neighbourhood Watch programs, police-led CPTED audits, surveillance and monitoring, enforcement) actually undermine ideas of ‘community’ through inclusion and informal social control. These approaches rely on state involvement and intervention and place the focus on exclusion, on a *criminology of the other* (Garland, 2000). Such approaches contradict and undermine the evocative model of ‘community’ to which the CDF continues to appeal. They also contradict the ideals of social equity on which the social determinants of health framework is based, a framework that typically informs the work of Community Health and Resource Centres and that guided the process of CDF neighbourhood selection. Without any substantial changes to some of the systems involved, it is hard to see how the stated goals of the CDF can ever be reached. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the control and enforcement functions of policing systems can do anything but expand under the current work of the CDF (Cohen, 1985). Despite its stated intention of ‘building community’ as a means to reduce state intervention in the long run, the CDF may have actually resulted in the greater control *of communities*. As Cohen (1985: 127) puts it: “the strength of the community ideology is the strength of all ideology: its persuasive ability to keep us believing that we are doing one thing while we might really be doing something else”.

Throughout implementation, the messaging of City of Ottawa representatives, Police representatives, Housing authorities and crime prevention practitioners all emphasized the need for resident ownership, responsibility, empowerment and mobilization. However, it often

appeared as though only a *certain type* of mobilization would be supported and tolerated.

Throughout the many consultations with residents conducted under the guise of the Community Development Framework, residents articulated clearly the situations and conditions that were of most concern to them, including issues related to open drug dealing and public drug use, gang intimidation and violence, prostitution and feelings of safety. Residents and community workers were asking for more continuity in the organizational representatives responsible for helping them address their concerns (e.g., Community Police Officers, Housing security), in an effort to build relationships and increase accountability. They were asking for more and better communication with and between the local authorities in question, especially the Ottawa Police, Ottawa Community Housing, and certain departments of the City of Ottawa (e.g., By-law). They were also asking for more transparency on the part of these local institutions as to the reasoning behind their decision-making, and more institutional accountability for tangible change.

By contrast, residents were constantly and consistently reminded of *their* responsibility as good citizens to get involved in local actions and *their* responsibility as good tenants to comply with the rules and procedures of the organizations in question. The collective concerns of residents were broken back down into the specific issues, situations or complaints of individual residents. They were told that they had to learn which numbers to call for different types of emergencies or situations (“Make the right call”), that they should start reporting every crime or incident of concern they witness or experience to Police or other appropriate authorities, and that they had to keep their incident or complaint reference number if they wished to follow-up on their report (“who to call, for what, when, and how”). The focus was on educating individual residents about their responsibilities and on managing their expectations as to what they could and should expect from their local institutions.

This neoliberal responsabilization *and* neoconservative remoralization of individual residents to become ‘compliant tenants’ and ‘good citizens’ took much of the focus away from the quality of the services they receive from local institutions such as the Police, Housing authorities or City By-law. Some attention was paid to improving the relationship between residents and front-line service providers such as Community Police Officers and Housing security officers. Very little focus was placed on resource distribution and on the quality of the services provided by these organizations. All CDF system level partners seemed to favour educating residents on how to better navigate their systems, rather than focusing on how they could change their organizational procedures and processes to better accommodate resident needs. This type of blaming the victim (Ryan, 1976) created an atmosphere with very little potential for what Marxists call “jumping scale” – for turning individual concerns into the motivation for larger-scale acts of collective resistance and mobilization based on feelings of dissatisfaction with or open defiance towards the institutions of the State (Fletcher, 2002).

The initial interest of most community organizations and groups in the CDF lied in its promise of affecting ‘system change’. The CDF has led to much movement and action on the ground (events and actions in neighbourhoods), with very little to no changes at the organizational/system level in Ottawa, particularly on behalf of the Ottawa Police Service. The creators of the initiative (City of Ottawa) got started on the work, but were largely unsuccessful in changing the way work is done at the system level in Ottawa, due in large part to the overwhelming influence of organizational and professional interests. First, there appeared to be different definitions on the part of different CDF players of the meaning and principles of ‘community development’ and of ‘crime prevention’. It was not always clear to community developers and workers how crime prevention strategies focused on enforcement and surveillance fit into a community development

approach, where they define community development as a set practices that are based on values of equality and mutual respect, with a focus on changing the relationships between ordinary people and people in positions of power so that everyone can take part in the issues that affect their lives. CDF stakeholders had not discussed or settled on set of common guiding principles for these broad but core practices; there was nothing to ‘check’ decisions against or hold groups accountable to in terms of practice orientation. In the absence of clear principles, the crime and safety concerns of residents were permitted to become a reporting and policing issue, automatically reverting back to enforcement and to the proliferation of control.

In the end, what most stakeholders wanted to know was “is the CDF working?”. The problem is, there had never been a discussion, at any Table other than the Knowledge Transfer Table, of what ‘working’ would look like, and which indicators would be most appropriate and useful. Senior managers within the City of Ottawa, system partners and some researchers pressed for a sense of progress on key socio-economic indicators, such as those used to select pilot neighbourhoods in the first place: levels of household unemployment and income, health, and early childhood development. Others were more concerned with ‘success’ from the residents’ point of view: how would residents know that things had changed in their neighbourhood, what would that look like for them? Most were in favour of doing both - exploring residents’ point of view through real time participatory methods *and* tracking longitudinal changes in key socio-economic indicators through quantitative database research – as was proposed in the CURA application. Some saw one level of change as directly impacting on the other: if the capacity of residents and the social capital of neighbourhoods were increasing, these changes would eventually be reflected in empirical indicators of social and economic wellbeing. That was a big ‘if’, however, as there was little evidence that the type of activities undertaken as part of the CDF

to date could or would have an impact on the individual human capital of residents or on the collective social capital of neighbourhoods.

These struggles within the CDF raise a key and often unacknowledged tension that lies at the heart of the community approach to crime prevention: Are the ultimate goals of crime prevention (as they are described on p. 14) best served by crime-specific strategies that have the deliberate intention of removing elements defined as criminal from neighbourhoods, or are they best served by strategies that focus on general socio-economic conditions in neighbourhoods that, if addressed, could presumably lessen the potential for criminalization and victimization? It is clear that the various participants involved in the CDF differ in their perspective on this issue, differences that appear to be based in personal convictions, professional interests and institutional imperatives alike.

Finally, by placing the focus on 'community' – on resident responsibility, on internal neighbourhood conditions, factors, and dynamics, and on the importance of building local multi-sector partnerships - the CDF fails to acknowledge the broader socio-political and economic factors that are beyond the jurisdiction and control of these local 'communities' but that play a significant role in challenges of crime and safety, such as a lack of adequate and affordable housing, poverty, poor labour market conditions, discrimination, and exclusion (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Hughes, 2007; Websdale, 2001). A reliance on the enforcement, situational and community streams of crime prevention within the CDF may very well lie in the fact that they are tangible and known responses. What we end up with, however, is what organizations and 'communities' are willing and able to do within their existing cultures and their constrained resources and abilities, rather than what needs to be done to address current structural arrangements (Hastings, 2008). In this sense, our current responses to crime and safety

may remain largely politically expressive and focused on managing public perceptions and expectations, rather than on responding adequately to the complexities of the issues at hand (Cohen, 1985; Garland, 2001; Hughes, 2007; Jones, 2003). The salience of appeals made to community in the contemporary governance of crime and safety may be an effective way of showing that an effort is being made to make a difference, without actually having to make any change.

Future Directions

This research project was an exploratory study of the messy actualities of a place-based, community approach to crime prevention and safety at the local level in Ottawa. Given the findings of this research, there is a clear need for further exploration of the relationship between issues of ‘crime’, insecurity, and inequality in Ottawa, and their particular effects on the city’s poorest and most racialized residents. Furthermore, the impacts that rationalities and technologies of government highlighted in this study have on Ottawa’s poorest residents and neighbourhoods should be examined more closely, along with the “everyday acts of resistance” that may accompany them. These findings also suggest that there are unequal power relations within the Ottawa Police Service because of its gendered and racialized culture (as indicated by one respondent, it remains an “old white boys club”), and that by and large, community policing narratives are currently used by the Ottawa Police Service for image and impression management rather than as an institutionalized and organized policing strategy and structure. Both these themes point to the need for future critical policing research that can tease out and further explore these important issues.

From a theory development perspective, this research integrates different traditions in order to build a framework that allows us to shift analytically between macro and micro levels of critical engagement. This offers an effective analytical starting point on which future studies can build.

Some of the theoretical considerations future inquiries may wish to explore include:

- The relationship between the conceptual lenses of translation (shaping) and resistance (contesting): When is it one to the exclusion of the other? Can one (i.e., resistance) lead to the other (i.e., translation), how and when?
- The potential contribution of the Symbolic Interactionist concept of Framing (Goffman, 1974) in relation to the conceptual lenses of translation and resistance.

Finally, it would also be useful to compare the CDF to other similar projects of this scale conducted in other countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Australia, to see what messy actualities they encountered in their early stages, and how the initiatives developed over time. This could also help render visible the rationalities, technologies, and inner workings of the community approach to crime prevention and safety across western capitalist democracies.

All in all, it is difficult to make any projections as to where the CDF will go from here. By the end of my data collection, one of the key questions to arise repeatedly is what the value added of the CDF is as it currently operates. Stakeholders are awaiting the release of the findings of the CDF Process Evaluation; there appears to be widespread anticipation that the recommendations within the report might pave a new path for the CDF moving forward, but the direction of that new path is still unknown. It would be interesting for future research to document and explore ‘what happened’ with the CDF in Ottawa beyond 2010, and why.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Ethics Approval Notice



Université d'Ottawa **University of Ottawa**
Service de subventions de recherche et déontologie Research Grants and Ethics Services

Ethics Approval Notice

Social Science and Humanities REB

Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)

<u>First Name</u>	<u>Last Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Role</u>
Ross	Hastings	Social Sciences / Criminology	Supervisor
Melanie	Bania	Social Sciences / Criminology	Student Researcher

File Number: 02-10-19

Type of Project: PhD Thesis

Title: New Ways of Working? The Governance of Crime Prevention and Safety within Ottawa's CDF

Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy)	Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy)	Approval Type
04/08/2010	04/07/2011	Ia

(Ia: Approval, Ib: Approval for initial stage only)

Special Conditions / Comments:
N/A

Appendix 2

List of Hours of Direct Participant Observation

<u>Date</u>	<u>Direct Participant Observation: Event / Activity</u>	<u>Hours of Observation</u>
15-Apr-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
20-Apr-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
4-May-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
4-May-10	CDF-OCH Community Safety Meeting	3
15-May-10	Meeting of Crime Prevention Committee of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP)	10
16-May-10	Meeting of Crime Prevention Committee of the CACP & National Crime Prevention Centre	4
18-May-10	OCH Community Safety Committee Meeting (with CDF reps)	3
21-May-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
21-May-10	Presentation by and Meeting with Tom Wolff (see Wolff, 2010) on behalf of the KTT	5
25-May-10	Coffee with new CDF Coordinator	3
3-Jun-10	Team work on CDF CURA proposal	5
7-Jun-10	West-Centretown Local Steering Table meeting	3
7-Jun-10	Visit to Somerset West Community Health Centre (Neighbourhood B)	1
9-Jun-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
15-Jun-10	Team work on CDF CURA proposal	5

16-Jun-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
17-Jun-10	Meeting between CHRC Community Developers and Community Policing Officers (Ottawa Police)	8
18-Jun-10	Meeting with the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences (Univ. of Ottawa) re: CDF CURA proposal	2
21-Jun-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
22-Jun-10	Email exchange with CDers about resident honorariums within CDF/CURA	1
22-Jun-10	CDF Community Table Meeting	3
22-Jun-10	Visit to South East Ottawa Centre for a Healthy Community (NCLB neighbourhoods)	1
24-Jun-10	Full Day CURA Workshop with representatives from CDF Tables and residents	10
29-Jun-10	CDF CURA meeting	2
1-Jul-10	Canada Day BBQ in Neighbourhood C	3
3-Jul-10	Walk around Neighbourhood A (early evening)	1
5-Jul-10	Discussion on CDF CURA Workshop, preparing report with CDF reps	8
6-Jul-10	Meeting with representative from the Coalition of CHRCs (Executive Director)	3
12-Jul-10	Coffee with a senior member of the City of Ottawa CDF Team	3
14-Jul-10	Knowledge Transfer Table meeting	3
20-Jul-10	CDF CURA meeting	3
23-Jul-11	Discussion with SSHRC representatives re: CDF CURA proposal	1

27-Jul-10	Team work on CDF CURA proposal	5
16-Aug-10	Discussion with City of Ottawa representatives of their plan for CDF Process Evaluation	3
16-Aug-10	Team work on CDF CURA proposal	6
19-Aug-10	Conference Call for CDF CURA proposal	2
20-Aug-10	Team work on CDF CURA proposal	6
28-Aug-10	Neighbourhood B Playground Build & Community Celebration Day	8
30-Aug-10	Meetings with University of Ottawa academics re: their interest/role in CDF CURA proposal	6
31-Aug-10	Email exchange among CDF system partners re: CDF CURA proposal	2
31-Aug-10	Email exchange among CDF academic partners re: CDF CURA proposal	3
1-Sep-10	Team work on CDF CURA proposal	3
10-Sep-10	Meeting with the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences (Univ. of Ottawa) and Faculty staff re: CDF CURA proposal	2
13-Sep-10	Meeting with Ottawa Police Representative and Leadership Ottawa representative re: CDF & Community Talks Events	2
14-Sep-10	Crime Prevention Ottawa Speaker Series event on Neighbourhoods and Crime	3
16-Sep-10	Team work on submitting CDF CURA proposal	10
22-Sep-10	Carlington Local Steering Table meeting	3
22-Sep-10	Visit to Carlington Community Health Centre (Neighbourhood C)	1
22-Sep-10	Walk through Neighbourhood C (daytime)	1

28-Sep-10	Knowledge Transfer Table Meeting	3
30-Sep-10	Community Table meeting	3
4-Oct-10	West-Centretown Local Steering Table meeting	3
4-Oct-10	Visit to Somerset West Community Health Centre (Neighbourhood B)	1
6-Oct-10	Walk through No Community Left Behind (NCLB) neighbourhoods	3
6-Oct-10	Visit to the Community House in the neighbourhood that first implemented NCLB	1
7-Oct-10	Mayoral Debate organized by the Coalition of Community Developers of Ottawa	3
12-Oct-10	Bayshore Local Steering Table meeting	3
12-Oct-10	Walk through Neighbourhood D (evening)	1
14-Oct-10	Coffee with Consultants conducting CDF process evaluation	3
22-Oct-10	Meeting with CDers implementing neighbourhood safety projects with CPO support	4
26-Oct-10	Crime Prevention Ottawa CPTED Conference	8
3-Nov-10	CDF Roundtable/Leadership Table meeting	3
8-Nov-10	KTT & CDF CDers meeting re: neighbourhood assessment	3
9-Nov-10	Safety Audit in Neighbourhood C	4
9-Nov-10	Walk through Neighbourhood C (night time)	1
10-Nov-10	CDF Resident Dialogue on Crime and Safety	4

12-Nov-10	Meeting re: crime prevention & safety indicators at neighbourhood level (CPO and CDers)	3
18-Nov-10	West-Centretown Local Steering Table focus group	3
18-Nov-10	Visit to Neighbourhood B Community House and walk through neighbourhood (daytime)	2
19-Nov-10	KTT Meeting and Process Evaluation session	4
26-Nov-10	CDF Process Evaluation Reference Group (Chairs) session	8
29-Nov-10	Coffee with CDF Coordinator	3
30-Nov-10	Ottawa Police Service Public Meeting on Race Relations	3
7-Dec-10	CDF Roundtable/Leadership Table meeting	3
TOTAL HOURS OF DIRECT OBSERVATION		261

Appendix 3

Contemporaneous Fieldnote Taking Approach with In-Process Analytic Reflections

(Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995: 100-105)

Appendix 4

Key Informant (Interview) Recruitment Scripts (English and French)

Key Informant Recruitment Script

English Version

Hi, my name is Melanie Bania, and I'm a PhD student in Criminology at the University of Ottawa. I'd like to invite you to participate in a research study I am conducting for my Doctoral Thesis. The purpose of the study is to find out exactly what has been going on within the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa when it comes to issues of crime and safety. I'm interested in finding out more about how things have developed, how decisions have been made, and what different people think about the initiative and about the way things have been going so far.

Your participation would consist of an interview with me that would last about one hour. During the interview, I would ask you to share your views of and experiences within the Community Development Framework (CDF). Your participation in this study would give you an opportunity to share your thoughts about and experiences within the CDF so far, in an anonymous and confidential way. My hope is that by capturing different people's perspectives and experiences, we can all begin to gain a better understanding of what the CDF is all about and how it actually works in practice. This is a chance for you to voice your opinions so that they can be taken into consideration as the CDF moves forward in your neighbourhood and in other neighbourhoods in Ottawa. Your experiences may also be of interest to other communities and municipalities who are considering adopting this type of approach. Your name or any other information that would allow you to be individually identified will never be used in the results of this study.

You are under no obligation to participate and if you choose to participate, you can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. Do you have any other questions about the study that we have not already talked about?

If you would like to participate, we can go ahead and book a time and a public place that is convenient for you to meet for the interview.

Key Informant Recruitment Script

French Version

Bonjour, mon nom est Mélanie Bania et je suis une étudiante au doctorat en criminologie à l'Université d'Ottawa. J'aimerais t'inviter à participer à une recherche que je mène dans le cadre de ma thèse de doctorat. Le but de l'étude est de faire le point sur ce qui se passe au juste au sein du Cadre de développement communautaire (CDC) en matière de prévention de la criminalité et de sécurité communautaire. Je m'intéresse à apprendre davantage ce qui s'est passé à date en fait de prévention de la criminalité, quelles décisions ont été prises et basées sur quels facteurs, et ce que les gens pensent de cette initiative et de son déroulement jusqu'à maintenant.

Ta participation consisterait à une entrevue avec moi qui durerait environ une heure. Au cours de cette entrevue, je te demanderais de partager tes opinions sur le CDC et de me décrire tes expériences au sein de cette initiative. Cette entrevue te donnerait l'occasion de partager tes opinions et tes expériences liées au CDC de façon confidentielle et anonyme. Ceci permettrait à ceux et celles qui sont impliqués dans le CDC et à d'autres d'approfondir leurs connaissances quant aux différents effets que cette initiative peut avoir sur différentes organisations et différentes personnes. Ce n'est qu'avec ta contribution qu'on arrivera à faire le point sur le CDC et sur son déroulement sur le terrain. Cette étude te donnerait l'occasion de faire connaître ton point de vue en espérant qu'il soit tenu en compte dans les efforts futurs du CDC dans ton quartier ainsi que dans d'autres quartiers d'Ottawa. Tes expériences seront aussi utiles pour les communautés et les municipalités à l'extérieur d'Ottawa qui envisagent entreprendre une telle initiative. Ton nom ou tout autre moyen de t'identifier ne seront jamais révélés dans les résultats de cette étude.

Ta participation à la recherche est volontaire et tu serais libre de te retirer en tout temps, et/ou de refuser de répondre à certaines questions, sans subir de conséquences négatives. As-tu d'autres questions par rapport à cette étude que nous n'avons pas encore eu la chance de discuter?

Si tu choisis de participer à cette étude, nous pouvons dès maintenant discuter d'un temps et d'un endroit public qui te conviennent pour l'entrevue.

Appendix 5

In-Depth Interview Guide

In-Depth Interview Guide

Hello, I'm Melanie Bania. Thank you so much for agreeing to meet with me today. I've asked to meet with you to get your views on the Community Development Framework (CDF) and your experiences within the initiative so far. I'm especially interested in how things have developed around issues of crime and safety.

If it is okay with you, I will be tape recording our conversation. The purpose of recording our interview is so that I can get all the details but at the same time be able to carry on an attentive conversation with you and not be distracted by taking notes. I'd like for you to read this Consent Form (*hand the participant the Consent Form*). If you agree to the terms of this interview including the audio tape recording, please sign the consent form on the bottom of page 2.

Consistent questions:

I'd like to start by having you briefly describe how you became aware of the CDF and what your involvement in it has been so far. (*Probe to gather information on areas of interest*)

What do you think of the CDF? (*Probe to get more detail on any issue of interest*)

Other sample questions:

What does the word "community" mean to you? (*Probe to get more detail*)

What do you think of the CDF's goal to improve safety and perceptions of safety? (*Probe to get more detail on any issue of interest*)

What are your impressions of how the many CDF Tables have been working?

What are your impressions of the decisions being made at the Tables?

What do you think the strongest points of the CDF have been up to this point? (*Probe: What makes you say this / how can you tell?*)

What types of concerns have you had regarding the CDF in your area?

Is there any other information about the CDF or other aspects of it that you think would be useful for me to know?

Appendix 6

Interview Consent Forms (English and French)

Consent Form

Title of the study: New Ways of Working? The Governance of Crime Prevention and Safety within Ottawa's Community Development Framework (CDF)

Doctoral Researcher

Melanie Bania

Department of Criminology & Institute for the Prevention of Crime

Telephone number

Email address

Supervisor

Prof. Ross Hastings

Department of Criminology & Institute for the Prevention of Crime

Telephone number

Email address

Invitation to Participate: I am invited to participate in the abovementioned research study conducted by Doctoral student Melanie Bania, supervised by Prof. Ross Hastings.

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the study is to find out exactly what has been going on within the Community Development Framework (CDF) in Ottawa when it comes to issues of crime and safety. The researcher is interested in finding out more about how things have developed, how decisions have been made, and what different people think about the initiative and about the way things have been going so far.

Participation: My participation will consist of an interview that will last around one hour and that will be tape recorded. During the interview, I will be asked to share my views of and experiences within the Community Development Framework (CDF).

Risks: The researcher has made it clear that I am here to share my opinions and experiences without having to divulge any very personal information or going into details that I am not comfortable sharing. There is a very small chance that my participation in this interview will lead me to talk about things that I find sad, frustrating or that make me angry. I have received assurance from the researcher that the risk of this happening will be minimized, and that if I do become upset during the interview, she will have a list of appropriate resources for me to reach out to in the event that I would like to speak to someone about these issues.

Benefits: My participation in this study will give me an opportunity to share my thoughts about and experiences within the CDF so far, in an anonymous and confidential way. Sharing my views means that everyone involved in the CDF and others can gain a better understanding of how it affects different organizations and different people in different ways. Telling my story and how I view and have experienced the CDF is central to helping others understand what the CDF is all about and how it actually works in practice. This is a chance for me to voice my views and experiences so that they can be taken into consideration as the CDF moves forward in my neighbourhood and in other neighbourhoods in Ottawa. My experiences may also be of interest to other communities and municipalities who are considering adopting this type of approach.

Confidentiality and anonymity: I have received assurance from the researcher that the information I will share will remain strictly confidential. I understand that the contents of my interview will be used only for the purposes of the researcher's Doctoral Thesis and that only the researcher and her supervisor will have access to what I have said. An alpha-numerical code will be used to link my name to my interview tape and transcript and only the researcher will know which interview belongs to which name. My name or any other information that would allow me to be individually identified will never be used in the results of this study.

Conservation of data: The tape recording of my interview, the researcher's notes on my interview, and my interview transcript (in both electronic form and hard copy) will be securely stored in a locked drawer of the researcher's locked and alarm-protected office. Only the researcher will have access to this drawer. All data will be stored securely for 5 years. At the end of 5 years, all audiotapes will be securely deleted and all notes and transcripts will be shredded.

Voluntary Participation: I am under no obligation to participate and if I choose to participate, I can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If I choose to withdraw, I can decide whether I want the data gathered up until the time of my withdrawal to be included in the study. If I withdraw abruptly and the researcher is not sure of my wishes, the data gathered up until my withdrawal will not be included in the study.

Acceptance: I, _____, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Melanie Bania of the Department of Criminology and Institute for the Prevention of Crime, supervised by Ross Hastings who is also of the Department of Criminology and Institute for the Prevention of Crime.

If I have any questions about the study, I may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

If I have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, I may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa (contact information).

There are two copies of this consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

*Participant's signature: _____ Date: _____

*Researcher's signature: _____ Date: _____

Formulaire de consentement

Titre du projet: Une nouvelle façon de faire? La gouvernance de la prévention de la criminalité et de la sécurité au sein du Cadre de développement communautaire (CDC) d'Ottawa

Chercheuse

Mélanie Bania

Département de criminologie & Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité

Numéro de téléphone

Adresse courriel

Superviseur

Prof. Ross Hastings

Département de criminologie & Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité

Numéro de téléphone

Adresse courriel

Invitation à participer: Je suis invité(e) à participer à la recherche nommée ci haut qui est menée par Mélanie Bania et supervisée par Ross Hastings.

But de l'étude: Le but de l'étude est de faire le point sur ce qui se passe au juste au sein du Cadre de développement communautaire (CDC) en matière de prévention de la criminalité et de sécurité communautaire. La chercheuse s'intéresse à apprendre davantage ce qui s'est passé à date en fait de prévention de la criminalité, quelles décisions ont été prises et basées sur quels facteurs, et ce que les gens pensent de cette initiative et de son déroulement jusqu'à maintenant.

Participation: Ma participation consistera essentiellement à une entrevue qui durera environ une heure et qui sera enregistrée sur bande magnétique. Au cours de cette entrevue, on me demandera de partager mes opinions sur le CDC et de décrire mes expériences au sein de cette initiative.

Risques: Je comprends qu'on me demandera de partager mes opinions et mes expériences sans nécessairement avoir à donner de l'information personnelle ou à discuter de choses qui me rendent inconfortable. Il y a tout de même une toute petite chance que je deviendrai triste, frustré(e) ou même fâché(e) au cours de cette conversation. J'ai reçu l'assurance de la chercheuse que tout se fait en vue de minimiser ces risques et qu'une liste de ressources sera disponible au cas où j'aimerais discuter de ces choses troublantes avec une personne compétente.

Bienfaits: Ma participation à cette recherche me donnera l'occasion de partager mes opinions et mes expériences liées au CDC de façon confidentielle et anonyme. Ceci permettra à ceux et celles qui sont impliqués dans le CDC et à d'autres d'approfondir leurs connaissances quant aux différents effets que cette initiative peut avoir sur différentes organisations et différentes personnes.

Ce n'est qu'avec ma contribution qu'on arrivera à faire le point sur le CDC et sur son déroulement sur le terrain. Cette étude me donnera l'occasion de faire connaître mon point de vue en espérant qu'il soit tenu en compte dans les efforts futurs du CDC dans mon quartier ainsi que dans d'autres quartiers d'Ottawa. Mes expériences seront aussi utiles pour les communautés et les municipalités à l'extérieur d'Ottawa qui envisagent entreprendre une telle initiative.

Confidentialité et anonymat: J'ai l'assurance de la chercheuse que l'information que je partagerai avec elle restera strictement confidentielle. Je m'attends à ce que le contenu ne soit utilisé que pour sa Thèse de doctorat et je comprends que le contenu de mon entrevue sera disponible à elle et à son superviseur seulement. **L'anonymat** est garanti de la façon suivante: un code alphanumérique sera attribué à mon nom et sera utilisé pour identifier la bande magnétique et la transcription de mon entrevue. Seule la chercheuse sera en mesure d'identifier quelle entrevue correspond à quel(le) participant(e). Mon nom ou tout autre moyen de m'identifier ne seront jamais révélés dans les résultats de cette étude.

Conservation des données: La bande magnétique de mon entrevue, les notes de la chercheuse lors de mon entrevue et la transcription de mon entrevue (sur papier et sur support électronique) seront conservées de façon sécuritaire dans un tiroir fermé à clé dans le bureau de la chercheuse qui est protégé par une alarme. Seule la chercheuse aura accès à ce tiroir. Les données recueillies seront conservées pour 5 ans. Au bout de 5 ans, toutes les bandes magnétiques seront effacées et toutes les notes et transcriptions seront déchiquetées.

Participation volontaire: Ma participation à la recherche est volontaire et je suis libre de me retirer en tout temps, et/ou refuser de répondre à certaines questions, sans subir de conséquences négatives. Si je choisis de me retirer de l'étude, les données recueillies jusqu'à ce moment seront utilisées avec ma permission seulement. Si je choisis de me retirer de l'étude et la chercheuse n'est pas certaine de mes souhaits, les données recueillies jusqu'à ce moment ne seront pas utilisées.

Acceptation: Je, _____, accepte de participer à cette recherche menée par Mélanie Bania du Département de criminologie et de l'Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité, laquelle recherche est supervisée par le professeur Ross Hastings.

Pour tout renseignement additionnel concernant cette étude, je peux communiquer avec la chercheuse ou son superviseur.

Pour tout renseignement sur les aspects éthiques de cette recherche, je peux m'adresser au Responsable de l'éthique en recherche, Université d'Ottawa (informations).


Il y a deux copies du formulaire de consentement, dont une copie que je peux garder.

Signature du participant: _____ Date: _____

Signature de la chercheuse: _____ Date: _____

Appendix 7

Ottawa Police Service (OPS) Organizational Structure Chart



Appendix 8

CDF Neighbourhood Survey (2009)

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey. We want to hear your ideas!



- You do not have to give your name.
- Everything that you say or write will be private (confidential). The people who collect the information will put everyone's answers together. No one will know what any one person said or wrote.
- Your ideas can help to make your neighbourhood a better place.
- Please put an **X** or a **✓** in the circle **O**.

1. How well do you think the statement below describes your neighbourhood?

	I strongly agree	I somewhat agree	I somewhat disagree	I strongly disagree	I don't know
a) People in this neighbourhood feel connected to each other.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
b) People are willing to help their neighbour.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
c) I feel welcome to participate in neighbourhood events.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
d) I like to think of myself as similar to the people who live in the neighbourhood.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
e) In this neighbourhood, when someone is not at home, their neighbours will watch over their property.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
f) There are trees, gardens and other green space along the streets in my neighbourhood.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
g) There are many interesting things to look at while walking in my neighbourhood.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
h) There are many places to go within easy walking distance of my home.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
i) There is so much traffic along the streets in my neighbourhood that it is not pleasant to walk.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
j) I see a lot of graffiti (spray painted writing or pictures) in my neighbourhood.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
k) There is a lot of vandalism in my neighbourhood.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
l) I see a lot of garbage on the streets in my neighbourhood.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
m) People leave junk on the streets in my neighbourhood.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉

2. Would you or your neighbours do something if there was a problem or conflict in your neighbourhood?

Examples:	Very likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very unlikely	I don't know
a) An older child is bullying a younger child.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
b) A local agency says it has to close because it has run out of money.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
c) A resident is harassing a couple who moved into the neighbourhood with their young children because they are different from him/her.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
d) Animals got into the garbage and spread it around the street.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
e) Someone's car got stuck in the snow on your street.	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉

3. Are there people or organizations in your neighbourhood you can count on to help solve community problems or conflicts?

Yes (please indicate who)

No

Don't know

If you said yes, please tell us who they are:

--

4. Do you feel comfortable getting involved in neighbourhood activities, associations and/or groups?

Very comfortable

Comfortable

Not comfortable

5. Do you or your family use the parks in the neighbourhood?

Yes

No (please indicate why not)

If no, why not? Check all that apply.

<input type="radio"/> There are not enough of them	<input type="radio"/> They are not well maintained
<input type="radio"/> Too far away	<input type="radio"/> They are too crowded
<input type="radio"/> Too many animals	<input type="radio"/> I feel unsafe there
<input type="radio"/> Other (please specify):	

6. Do you or your family use sports and exercise programs (i.e. skating or swimming lessons) in or near your neighbourhood?

Yes

No (please indicate why not)

If no, why not? (Please check all that apply)

<input type="radio"/> The ones that I'm interested in aren't available	<input type="radio"/> Too expensive
<input type="radio"/> Not accessible	<input type="radio"/> Language problems
<input type="radio"/> Don't have childcare	<input type="radio"/> Cultural reasons
<input type="radio"/> Too far away	<input type="radio"/> Not inclusive of different groups
<input type="radio"/> Don't feel welcomed	<input type="radio"/> Facility is not clean
<input type="radio"/> Equipment is in poor condition	<input type="radio"/> Difficult to register
<input type="radio"/> Bad experience	<input type="radio"/> Quality of program/service is poor
<input type="radio"/> Other (please specify):	

7. Do you or your family use other recreation programs (i.e. arts classes, cooking classes) in or near your neighbourhood?

Yes

No (please indicate why not)

If no, why not? (Please check all that apply)

<input type="radio"/> The ones that I'm interested in aren't available	<input type="radio"/> Too expensive
<input type="radio"/> Not accessible	<input type="radio"/> Language problems
<input type="radio"/> Don't have childcare	<input type="radio"/> Cultural reasons
<input type="radio"/> Too far away	<input type="radio"/> Not inclusive of different groups
<input type="radio"/> Don't feel welcomed	<input type="radio"/> Facility is not clean
<input type="radio"/> Equipment is in poor condition	<input type="radio"/> Difficult to register
<input type="radio"/> Bad experience	<input type="radio"/> Quality of program/service is poor
<input type="radio"/> Other (please specify):	

8. How satisfied are you with the quality of the services in your neighbourhood?

	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Not applicable	Don't know
a) Maintenance of roads?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
b) Snow plowing?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
c) Sidewalk maintenance?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
d) Walkway maintenance?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
e) Bike path maintenance?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
f) Lighting?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
g) Garbage pick-up?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
h) Recycling?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
i) Schools?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
j) Libraries?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
k) Bookmobile?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
l) Grocery stores?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
m) Affordable healthy food?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
n) Public transportation?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
o) Childcare?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
p) Sports and exercise programs?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
q) Other recreation programs? (i.e. arts, cultural activity)	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
r) Affordable housing?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
s) Condition of housing?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
t) Health services? (i.e. clinics, community health centres, family physicians)	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
u) Social services? (i.e. Employment and Financial Assistance, community resource centres, social programs)	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
v) Mental health services? (i.e. clinics, support groups)	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
w) Programs to help find a job?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
x) By-law services? (i.e. parking, dog/cat licences)	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
y) Fire services?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
z) Paramedic services?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
aa) Police services?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
bb) Other security services?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
cc) Other (please specify):						

9. How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood:

	Very unsafe	Unsafe	Safe	Very safe	Don't know
a) During the day?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉
b) After dark?	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₉₉

10. Are you afraid of violence or crime in your neighbourhood?

₁ Yes

₂ No

If yes, please indicate why: (Check all that apply.)

<input type="radio"/> ₁	Individuals hanging around	<input type="radio"/> ₆	I have witnessed crime or violence
<input type="radio"/> ₂	The reputation of my neighbourhood	<input type="radio"/> ₇	Media reports
<input type="radio"/> ₃	Factors such as graffiti, street lighting, or litter	<input type="radio"/> ₈	I feel socially isolated
<input type="radio"/> ₄	I am a previous victim of crime or violence.	<input type="radio"/> ₉	Groups hanging around
<input type="radio"/> ₅	A friend or family member has been the victim of crime or violence		
<input type="radio"/> ₁₀	Other (please specify):		

11. Over the last few years, do you think your neighbourhood has been getting:

- ₁ More safe
 ₂ About the same
 ₃ Less safe
 ₉₉ Don't know

Please explain why you think this.

12. Did any crime happen to you, in the past year, while you were living in this neighbourhood?

- ₁ Yes (please proceed to 13)
 ₂ No (please proceed to question 15)

13. Did any of the following crimes happen to you, in the past year, at home or in this neighbourhood? Please include any crimes committed by a partner or family member. Remember that your answer is private (confidential).

Put an X or ✓ beside all crimes that happened to you.	At Home	In Neighbourhood
Property damage (example – broken windows, graffiti)	<input type="radio"/> ₁	<input type="radio"/> ₁₁
Break-in or attempted break-in to your home, garage or business	<input type="radio"/> ₂	<input type="radio"/> ₁₂
Theft or attempted theft of property (without violence)	<input type="radio"/> ₃	<input type="radio"/> ₁₃
Theft or attempted theft of vehicle, vehicle parts, or contents of vehicle (hubcap, CDs, packages etc.)	<input type="radio"/> ₄	<input type="radio"/> ₁₄
Robbery or attempted robbery (face-to-face theft with violence or threat of violence)	<input type="radio"/> ₅	<input type="radio"/> ₁₅
Harassment (threatening or disturbing behaviour)	<input type="radio"/> ₆	<input type="radio"/> ₁₆
Stalking (obsessive following, observing or contacting)	<input type="radio"/> ₇	<input type="radio"/> ₁₇
Assault or attempted assault (deliberate hitting, hurting)	<input type="radio"/> ₈	<input type="radio"/> ₁₈
Sexual assault or attempted sexual assault (unwanted sexual touching, rape or attempted rape)	<input type="radio"/> ₉	<input type="radio"/> ₁₉
Hate crime (crime motivated by hate towards certain people because of culture/race, religion/faith, sexual orientation/gender identity)	<input type="radio"/> ₁₀	<input type="radio"/> ₂₀
Other crime (please give details):		

14. Did you report any of above-mentioned crimes to police? Remember that your answer is private (confidential).

- ₁ Yes
 ₂ No (please indicate why not)

If no, why not?

<input type="radio"/> ₁	There was nothing of real value that was stolen or damaged.	<input type="radio"/> ₆	It was dealt with another way.
<input type="radio"/> ₂	No one was seriously hurt.	<input type="radio"/> ₇	I did not want to get involved with the police.
<input type="radio"/> ₃	I did not believe the police could do anything.	<input type="radio"/> ₈	I did not want anyone to find out about the incident.
<input type="radio"/> ₄	I did not believe the police would help.	<input type="radio"/> ₉	I did not want any publicity or media coverage.
<input type="radio"/> ₅	I believed that my insurance costs would increase as a result.	<input type="radio"/> ₁₀	I was afraid of what the offender might do.
<input type="radio"/> ₁₁	Other (please specify):		

15. What do you think are the 3 best things about your neighbourhood?

1.

2.

3.

16. What are the 3 biggest concerns that you have about your neighbourhood?

1.

2.

3.

The questions in this part of the survey will help us learn more about the people who live in the neighbourhood. All of your answers are confidential (private). This information will not be used to identify you in any way. We need this information for statistical purposes and to help us understand the make-up of your neighbourhood. Please do not give us your name; we do not want to identify you in any way.

17. What is your postal code?

Or nearest major intersection (e.g. Kent St. and Slater St.)? _____

18. What is your gender?

- Male Female Trans Other (please specify): _____ I prefer not to answer

19. What is your age group?

- 16-20 years 21-40 years 41-65 years 66 and above

20. How long have you been living in this neighbourhood?

- Less than one year 1-3 years 4-6 years More than 6 years

21. How many people (adults and children) live in your home? _____ (Include yourself)

How many adults? _____

How many children? Age 0-6 _____ 7-12 _____ 13-18 _____

22. To which of these various diverse groups do you belong? Please check all that apply.

Disability Identify as:	
<input type="radio"/> 1	I prefer not to answer
<input type="radio"/> 2	I have no disability
<input type="radio"/> 3	Hearing
<input type="radio"/> 4	Seeing
<input type="radio"/> 5	Speech
<input type="radio"/> 6	Mobility
<input type="radio"/> 12	Other (please specify):

Sexual orientation Identify as:	
<input type="radio"/> 1	I prefer not to answer
<input type="radio"/> 2	Heterosexual/Straight
<input type="radio"/> 3	Gay
<input type="radio"/> 4	Lesbian
<input type="radio"/> 9	Other (please specify):

Cultural or racial background Identify as:	
<input type="radio"/> 1	I prefer not to answer
<input type="radio"/> 2	Chinese
<input type="radio"/> 3	South Asian (e.g. East Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi, Sri Lankan)
<input type="radio"/> 4	Black (e.g. African, Haitian, Jamaican, Somali)
<input type="radio"/> 5	Arab/West Asian (e.g. Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Moroccan)
<input type="radio"/> 6	Filipino
<input type="radio"/> 13	Other (please specify):