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
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THE CAUSES OF PREJUDICE:
A CORRELATION OF ITS CAUSALITY AS DESCRIBED
BY SOCIOLOGY AND BY PHILOSOPHY

by Richard T. Mc Sorley, S.J.

Thesis presented to the Faculty of
Philosophy of the University of
Ottawa in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy



Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1960

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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INTRODUCTION

A four year assignment as pastor of a parish of mixed colors gave the writer first hand experience with prejudice. The parish was one-third Negro; two-thirds white. Color-segregation was practiced in church both in seating and reception of Holy Communion.

The parish was located in an area of the United States, Southern Maryland, where the public practice of compulsory color-segregation was as deeply entrenched as anywhere in the deep south.

The office of pastor gave the writer an opportunity to see the harm that the practice of compulsory color-segregation was doing to the spiritual lives of the people, more especially the white people. When he attempted to inform himself on what to do to remedy the situation he found himself facing the number one social problem of the United States.

Further experience in the parish began to make the writer wonder if the practice of compulsory color-segregation was not merely one facet of a deeper, more universal problem, the problem of group charity, or of group pride. There was no doubt that many of the people who practiced color-segregation were sincere, good people. They sincerely thought that their practice was good and right. Evidence to the contrary did not move them. They could not see that their exclusion of the colored man was a sin against justice and charity. Why

couldn't they see? How did they get that way? When they were asked these questions, their answers were unbelievably weak.

This introduction to the workings of prejudice helped the writer to see that prejudice manifests itself also in labor-management relations, national and international relations, in religion, and in fact, in all human relations.

To know the causes of prejudice would be a necessary first step towards providing a suitable remedy for it. It is for that reason that this thesis investigates the causes of prejudice.

Because color prejudice affords an unusually clear focus on the workings of prejudice, and because the experience of the writer has familiarized him with this aspect of prejudice, his illustrations have been drawn mostly from this source.

Since both sociology and philosophy have something to say on the causality of prejudice, both are used and correlated.

CHAPTER I

SOCIOLOGICAL DEFINITION

The word "prejudice" has a meaning today that was developed slowly from its Latin source, the noun, "praejudicium". Three stages in the process of the development are indicated in the meanings of the word given in A New English Dictionary.¹ They are: 1) A damage done to another by some previous decision, a precedent, 2) A hasty judgment made prior to the evidence, 3) A judgment previous to the evidence that carries with it emotional flavor.

The first stage meaning is used almost exclusively in the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas.²

Originally the term meant nothing emotional or unfavorable yet both those notes are attached to its use in modern times.³⁻⁴

One brief and easy definition of prejudice is "rash judgment". This definition is discussed by John LaFarge, S.J.

¹ Sir James A. H. MURRAY, Editor, A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909, Vol. VII, Part II, p. 1275.

² Roy J. DEFERRARI and Sister M. Inviolata BARRY, A Complete Index of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Washington, D.C., Catholic University Press, 1956, p. 271.

³ Gordon W. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 6.

⁴ Eric John DINWALL, Racial Pride and Prejudice, London, Watts, 1946, p. 210.

SOCIOLOGICAL DEFINITION

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the acknowledged dean of writers on color-prejudice in America. He says that¹¹ he has never been able to find a clear characterization of prejudice, racial or otherwise, in terms of Catholic ethics or moral theology.⁵

"Rash judgment is defined by moralists as "thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant." Arregui calls it "Firmus mentis assensus de peccato aut vitio proximi sine sufficienti motivo."⁶ //

Jone defines rash judgment as "firm mental assenting, without sufficient reason, to the existence of some moral defect in another."⁷

Rash judgment, inasmuch as it is made without sufficient evidence is certainly a pre-judgment. It deals with the internal estimate we make on the life and morals of our neighbor. Our state of mind can be judgment, opinion, suspicion or doubt. A firm assent can apply to all four acts. So these various acts are distinguished according to the thing towards which the assent is directed. In judgment, assent falls on the malice of another as certain. In

⁵John LA FARGE, S.J., The Race Question And The Negro. N.Y., Longmans, 1943, p. 174.

⁶Antonio M. ARREGUI, S.J., Summarium Theologiae Moralis Ad Codicem Juris Canonici Accomodatum, Bilbao, El Mensajero Del Corazon De Jesus, 1948, p. 259.

⁷Heribert JONE, O.F.M., Moral Theology, Westminster, Md., Newman, 1948, p. 268.

opinion assent falls on the malice of another as probable and in suspicion, assent falls on the complex predicate "It may be so."

Genicot and Salsmans⁸ say that acts are rash when there is not a proportionate motive for the assent, as for example, when you judge a person to be a thief because of evidence, which to a prudent man, would merely warrant suspicion. They note that it seems impossible that this assent is given by the influence of the intellect only, since the intellect distinctly understands that it lacks sufficient reason for the assent. Therefore, rash judgment takes place only when the intellect realizes the insufficiency of its reasons, at least confusedly, but is impelled to assent by the act of the will.

Moralists differ in explaining these acts of assent. They find there is nothing surprising in that because the explanations touch on the rather obscure theory of the nature of erroneous judgment.

This way of defining "prejudice" contains the two essentials found in most definitions of prejudice, emotional tone and faulty judgment. "Whenever a negative attitude

⁸ Ed. GENICOT, S.J. et Jos. SALESMANS, S.J., Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, quae in collegio Iovaniensi societatis Jesu tradebant, 16th Edition Bruxellis, L'Edition Universelle, S.A., 1940, Vol. 1, p. 350.

towards persons is sustained by a spurious overgeneralization we encounter the syndrome of prejudice."⁹ It is, however, unsatisfactory on the following points. It does not allow for favorable prejudice. It fails to stress the point of emotional tone. It does not point out the overgeneralization included in the falsity, nor the idea that the unfavorable judgment is often directed towards a group. A word on each of these is in order.

Prejudice can be both favorable and unfavorable. Men make prejudgments in favor of relatives, friends and countrymen merely on the basis that they are such. These favorable judgments come under an accepted wide definition of the word prejudice.¹⁰

Despite the fact that prejudice can be favorable, the word generally indicates a negative attitude when used absolutely¹¹ or when used to describe an attitude towards an ethnic group.

A group of students was asked to describe their attitudes toward ethnic groups. No suggestion was made that might lead them toward negative reports. Even so, they reported eight times as many antagonistic attitudes as favorable attitudes.¹²

⁹Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁰Sir James A. H. MURRAY, (Ibid.), p. 1275.

¹¹Sir James A. H. MURRAY, Ibid., p. 1275.

¹²Gordon W. ALLPORT, (Ibid.), p. 6, 7.

It is in that negative sense that the word will be used throughout this report.

Emotional tone is so essential an ingredient of prejudice that the definition should stress the point instead of merely suggest it as does the definition of rash judgment. In the case of the white man's prejudices against the Negro, the emotional tone is so intense that it has been seriously compared with insanity. "The insane support their delusions by the same mechanism of rationalization that normal people employ to support beliefs having a non-rational origin."¹³ Ordinarily the emotional tone appears openly in expressions like, "I can't stand Negroes" and "Would you like a Negro to marry your sister?"

Emotional tone is important in the definition because it distinguishes prejudiced judgments from mere falsehoods or errors. When confronted with evidence of a falsehood or error, the ordinary person can usually accept the evidence without being emotionally disturbed. For example, a man claims that the fire department ambulance made exactly 500 runs in the past year. Along comes the fire chief and says the ambulance made 600 runs. Usually such a contradiction is accepted without emotional difficulty. Such a judgment was not a prejudiced judgment, though it may have been a falsehood

¹³E. Franklin FRAZIER, "The Pathology of Race Prejudice" in The Forum, Vol. 77, No. 6, issue of June, 1927, p. 858.

or an error.

It is quite different with the judgment, "Negroes are inferior to whites", as maintained by some white people. They are not open to contrary, new evidence on the matter. Any effort to insist on the cogency of contrary evidence tends to arouse them emotionally.

This emotional hold then, is a test to distinguish prejudice from error and falsehood. "Is the person making the judgment open to new evidence?" If so, the judgment is not prejudiced because it is not held in the inflexible emotional vise, which is an essential part of prejudice.

Why is it that some judgments are held to emotionally? The reason may be that the emotional attitude begins before the conceptualization that develops from it, takes place. A sociological study on antipathy and prejudice by Alexander suggests the reason why. Alexander says that man begins life with singular negative feelings against things of environment.

They antipathies enter into the sensory experiences of nearly every person, and ... many of them remain in the semi-conscious state ... They usually function in an area that is marginal to attention ... are singular, negative feelings which are based on primary sensitivities, ...¹⁴

¹⁴ Chester S. ALEXANDER, Antipathy and Prejudice: A Study of the Distinctions Between These Two Phenomena, unpublished Ph.D. thesis presented to the department of Sociology of the University of Chicago, Chicago, 1942, pp. 69 and 71.

Fichter also mentions this priority of emotion to conceptualization.¹⁵

Overgeneralization and negative attitude towards a person or group are two elements of prejudice that overlap. Ordinarily, prejudice is directed towards a person, not as an individual, but because he is a member of a group. Certain negative characteristics ascribed to the group are then predicated of the individual because he is of that group. In other words, categories or generalizations are a part of prejudice. The judgment reaches to the individual person not directly, but through the medium of some false category. For example, the judgment, "I do not like John Smith" is not prejudiced because it involves no generalization. But the judgment, "I do not like John Smith because he is a Negro" does involve a generalization and is an example of a prejudiced judgment.

"Prejudice", as commonly used, and as it is used in this paper, is directed towards persons, not things. This means that prejudice is an interpersonal relationship, not merely a negative attitude of a person towards other objects. Alexander points out the basic reasons for this distinction. He says that things do not respond in a retaliatory way. Things do not appear to the imagination as potential enemies.

¹⁵Joseph FICHTER, Sociology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 185.

They do not inspire a sustained emotion.¹⁶

A definition which takes all these points into consideration and which will, therefore, be used in this report, is the following:

Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization [...] felt or expressed [...] directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group.¹⁷

This definition puts clearly the two elements of emotional tone and faulty generalization that are commonly found in sociological definitions of prejudice. It is a definition that is representative of modern sociological thought on prejudice. Sources of such thought are: the United Nations memorandum on Discrimination,¹⁸ a systematic organization of the studies and agreements of experts in the field; the encyclopedic works of Myrdal,¹⁹ Frazier,²⁰ texts like Sutherland and

¹⁶Chester S. ALEXANDER, Ibid., p. 80. Also see pp. 187 to 191.

¹⁷Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination, N.Y., U.N. Publications, 1949, p. 13.

¹⁹Gunnar MYRDAL, An American Dilemma, N.Y., Harper, 1944, p. 52 footnote, and p. 1136.

²⁰E. Franklin FRAZIER, The Negro in the United States, N.Y., Macmillan, 1951, p. 166.

Woodward,²¹ Rose,²² and Fichter.²³

As it is important to make this definition quite clear, here are two examples to illustrate it. "I can't stand Negroes. They smell badly." and, "Negroes should not be in the same schools with whites. Both races are happier that way." These examples clearly show the emotional element and the overgeneralization.

DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE

They also illustrate the difference between "prejudice" and "discrimination" as that word is commonly used in modern sociology. These judgments, except for the fact that they are expressed, are internal acts. "Discrimination" generally means any overt, external act. It is "harmful behaviour externally manifested [...] towards persons belonging to a particular category for the sole reason that they belong to that category."²⁴ When prejudices become the basis of laws forbidding interracial marriage or integration in attendance at school, they are no longer internal, but overt acts. They are examples of discrimination.

²¹ Robert L. SUTHERLAND and Julian L. WOODWARD, Introductory Sociology, N.Y., Lippincott, 1940, p. 396.

²² Arnold M. ROSE, Sociology, The Study of Human Relations, N.Y., Knopf, 1956, p. 565.

²³ Joseph FICHTER, Ibid., p. 185.

²⁴ UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Ibid., p. 10.

In practise, prejudice and discrimination are found together. Discrimination flows from prejudice and acts of discrimination help engender prejudice. They are reciprocally related.²⁵ The study of one includes a study of the other to some extent.

REALISTIC CONFLICT

There is one final type of judgment that needs to be clearly distinguished from the prejudiced judgment.²⁶ That is the emotionally held general judgment that is based on reality. Thus the antagonism felt towards Negroes or Jews, criminal elements in society like gangsters, or even an enemy nation may be either the result of prejudice or due to a realistic conflict of interests. Take, for example, the attitude of some white supremacists in the United States towards the Negro. They maintain that the Negroes merit segregated treatment because of certain traits which they possess. If investigation shows that they actually do possess these traits and that these traits merit segregated treatment, then the practise of segregation would not be prejudice but a practise based on true judgments.

²⁵UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Ibid., p. 11.

²⁶Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 87, 88, calls attention to this distinction.

At times there is a combination of these two components, one rational, the other, irrational. A war, for example, may start with a real conflict of interests, but as it proceeds, rumors, atrocity stories and exaggerations wind an outer structure of falsehood around the underlying core of truth.

ETHNIC PREJUDICE

The word "ethnic" is included as an accidental part of the definition of prejudice used in this report. It could be omitted and the definition could remain essentially unchanged. It is retained for these two reasons: 1) All prejudice is essentially the same, so a knowledge of the causes of one type of prejudice gives a general knowledge of all types. 2) Ethnic prejudice, especially when concerned with black-white color difference, is the easiest kind of prejudice to study. The "visibility" of and the surface nature of color difference bring the operation of prejudice into clearer focus than is possible when dealing with other areas of prejudice, like religion and politics. Besides, color prejudice is an aspect of race prejudice and it has all variations of intensity and motivation found in all other types of prejudice.²⁷

²⁷UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Ibid., p. 19.

This, then, is what sociology generally agrees is the thing called prejudice. What are its causes? Sociology gives its answers to that question. The summary of the causes generally agreed on by sociologists that follows prepares the way for a correlation of causes noted by sociology with the causality pointed out by philosophy.

CHAPTER II

SOCIOLOGY ON CAUSES

Although sociology has something to say on the causes of prejudice, it recognizes very well that it does not have the final answers. Professor Arnold M. Rose of the University of Minnesota says: "There is still relatively little understanding of the causes or even of the effects of prejudice, except on the superficial, obvious level. [...] It has not even been studied by scientists sufficiently to make them certain of its causes, although there have been some startling discoveries and stimulating suggestions."¹

Professor Gordon W. Allport of Harvard University discusses six theories of prejudice and then remarks: "There seems to be some value in all the six main approaches, and some truth in virtually all the resulting theories. It is not possible at the present time to reduce them to a single theory of human action."²

A sample of the scarcity of the available literature dealing with the theoretical issues in the analysis of prejudice is the digest of recent research made by Melvin M. Tumin

¹UNESCO, The Race Question In Modern Science, N.Y., Whiteside Inc., 1956, p. 215-216.

²Gordon W. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 208.

titled Segregation and Desegregation.³ In order to get an overall view of the available literature he canvassed the International Index to Periodicals, the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, the Sociological Abstracts and the Psychological Index for the period from January 1, 1951 to July 1, 1956. From these sources, plus a few others, he publishes a list of 115 research studies on segregation and desegregation. Of this entire list only seven studies deal with the causes of prejudice. This proportionately small number of studies on the theoretical issues underlying prejudice indicates that, even from the point of view of sociology, the examination of the causes of prejudice is by no means a well-worked field.

The causes of prejudice can be listed under the following three headings: first, irrational and emotional reactions; second, personal advantage; third, cultural conflict. Finally, a condition for the working of all these causes is "ignorance".

There is a certain overlapping between these headings. That is because they deal with motives, and these are seldom single. For example: an act of prejudice may be done for personal advantage. Yet that same act may be due to an irrational and emotional reaction. The cause of this reaction is

³Melvin M. TUMIN, Segregation and Desegregation, A Digest of Recent Research, N.Y., Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1957, 112 p.

likely to be rooted in the cultural background of the individual and conditioned by his ignorance. In such an example all three causes are at work.

Despite this overlapping, dividing the causes and listing them does help to expose the complexity of the problem of prejudice. By looking singly at the elements which go into it and considering each of them separately, a better understanding of prejudice is gained.

IRRATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL REACTIONS

The difference in color serves as a point around which prejudice is sometimes built. The young child has an attraction for some colors more than others. Notice the color of the toys given to children. Seldom or never are they painted black. Color is also one of the first means of distinguishing one thing from another. Visible differences imply real differences.⁴ When this natural aversion for black or this real difference of color is coupled with the common interpretation of the word "black" as meaning "evil" the foundation is laid for a prejudice that may last a lifetime. The emotional aversion for black is further increased by associating white with virtue, goodness, and other favorable qualities. In this way man develops sensory explanations of negative attitudes.

⁴Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 131-132.

The process seems natural enough because all men have instinctive sense-aversions of one kind or another. Many dislike the smell of cancer, the sight of blood, the sound of chalk squeaking, the smell of bad breath, and similar experiences. A study made on such sense-antipathies showed that the average person had about twenty-one such sensory dislikes and that about two-thirds of them refer to qualities of other human beings.⁵

An interesting example of a prejudice built from an emotional reaction to sense experience is the aversion against Negroes because they smell worse than white people. Most people have an aversion to the odor of sweat. Then they hear that Negroes or other groups have a peculiar odor. They connect this information with their sensory aversion and they soon think that they can't stand Negroes because of their odor. But it is by no means clear that Negroes in America do have a distinctive body-odor. An experiment on the identification of body odor by G. K. Morland showed that a group of fifty judges who experimented in distinguishing the differences of smell between white and colored people found themselves unable to make any distinction.⁶

⁵Chester ALEXANDER, "Antipathy and Social Behavior", in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 4, issue of Jan. 1946, p. 289.

⁶G. K. MORLAND, "An Experiment On The Identification Of Body Odor", in the Journal of Genetic Psychology, Vol. 77, issue of Sept., 1950, p. 257-265.

Overgeneralization. - Among the irrational reactions is overgeneralization. Man has a tendency to see things in terms of classes, or categories. His experience with a few Negroes of his acquaintance is that they are lazy, careless of their appearance, and he generalizes to think of all Negroes as lazy and careless of their appearance. This tendency to generalize is a part of man's effort to understand the manifold reality in the world around him. In order to deal with it at all, he has to classify things into groups because as individuals, things are too numerous and too meaningless to be used.⁷

Once formed, categories are the basis for normal pre-judgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process because ordinary living depends on it.⁸ These categories form the guiding principles for our daily judgments. When the sun shines brightly we judge that it will be a fair day, and we go out without a raincoat. A man smiles at us on the street; we judge him to be a friend. We walk into a classroom and we expect the professor to behave in a certain way towards us. Sometimes we are wrong; yet our behavior was rational. It was the best we could do. Our experience in life forms itself into categories. We may call on the right one, or the wrong one; but there is no other way we can handle the million

⁷Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 20.

⁸Robert PARK, "The Basis of Race Prejudice" in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 140, No. 229, p. 12.

events that befall us every day.

These categories tend to take all new evidence into their forms and to assimilate it. This helps us to solve problems easily by giving us a means of prejudging the solution. The bearing of this tendency on prejudice is clear. It costs less and is easier to lump all eighteen million Negroes into the category of "stupid, dirty and inferior" than to get to know them and distinguish one from the other. I simplify my life by avoiding them all.

Once a category is formed, a very slight sense cue is enough to reactivate it. A fleeting glimpse of a swaying car brings up the category "drunken driver." The appearance of a black face activates the category "Negro." In this way categories help us to quickly identify and classify the objects in the world around us and in that way adjust ourselves to it. They help make the adjustment speedy, smooth, and consistent.⁹

Most categories also carry with them some sort of emotional flavor or tone; that is, we either like or dislike what we know.¹⁰ This is especially true of ethnic categories. We not only know what the word "Negro", "Jew", or "Mexican" means, but we have a feeling about them. Categories can be rational or irrational; that is, drawn from reality, or not.

⁹Louis WIRTH, "Race and Public Policy" in The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 68, No. 4, issue of Apr. 1944, p. 303.

¹⁰Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 21.

To be rational, a category must be built around the essential attributes of all objects that can be correctly included in the category. Thus, all roofs are structures in some way related to the protection from the sun and rain. Each roof will also have some non-essential attributes like color, type of material, decorative work, and others. Likewise, to be a Negro a person must possess certain essential attributes. It is quite difficult to tell just what these attributes are. Certainly color, laziness, inferiority are not essential attributes, since there are some Negroes who are none of the three. It is through categories that the world takes on meaning. Though they are modified by experience, they tend to resist new evidence as that is the path of least resistance. Instead they admit exceptions, and hold on to the original structure. An ethnic prejudice is a category concerning a group of people which is not based on essential attributes but includes various surface attributes and leads to disparagement of the group as a whole.

PERSONAL ADVANTAGE, A CAUSE

Probably the most obvious cause of prejudice is that it gives an advantage and material benefits to the one who is prejudiced.¹¹ It can be and is the weapon for economic exploitation or political domination of the group that is rated

¹¹UNESCO, Ibid., p. 216.

as inferior. In fact this economic advantage is so strong a motive and so obvious that it has been sometimes insisted on as the key to the problem. Prejudice can enable a man to justify for himself acts that would ordinarily be repugnant to him. It can afford opportunities for taking sexual advantage of a minority group,¹² and can give people at the bottom of the social ladder some "status" or social standing.¹³ Thus the fact that individuals can and do find gains for themselves through prejudice is one of its causes.

The doctrine of "racism" is a good example of how prejudice was used for the personal advantage of the white man. "Racism" is a fairly modern doctrine,¹⁴ though men recognized differences between each other and even kept other men as slaves in ancient times. But in ancient times the claim was never seriously made that some groups of men were naturally inferior to others. As the slave trade of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries began to be attacked as immoral and a violation of the liberty of the individual, the natural historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth century used a pseudo-biology to classify men into five races, one inferior

¹²Gunnar MYRDAL, An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, N.Y., Harper, 1944, p. 589-591.

¹³Gunnar MYRDAL, Ibid., p. 582.

¹⁴UNESCO, Ibid., p. 222.

to the other. Scientific biologists soon corrected the error,¹⁵ but the concept of races was seized upon and elaborated into a whole new basis of inferiority.¹⁶⁻¹⁷ According to this theory, for example, Negroes are, on the average, not as intelligent as whites. This is due to heredity and can no more be changed than can the color of their skin. And of course intermarriage with people of different races would be mongrelization, which would result in children more degenerate than either of the parents.¹⁸ Racist beliefs became so widespread that some sociologists considered race prejudice to be the really important kind of prejudice.

Despite the fact that there is no scientific justification for linking the physical characteristics that distinguish the major groups of mankind with intellectual or moral virtues or defects, this linkage constitutes the very heart of race prejudice.¹⁹

Imperialism, especially when practiced by white people against colored, often carried with it much practice of prejudice even where that prejudice had no legal basis for

¹⁵UNESCO, Ibid., p. 276.

¹⁶M. F. ASHLEY MONTAGU, Man's Most Dangerous Myth; The Fallacy of Race, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1945, p. 27-36.

¹⁷Yves R. SIMON, Community of the Free, N.Y., Holt, 1947, p. 36. 95
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¹⁸Racial mixture, far from being harmful is biologically beneficial. See M. F. ASHLEY MONTAGU, Ibid., p. 100-133, also UNESCO, Ibid., p. 370-372.

¹⁹Louis WIRTH, Ibid., p. 306.

systematic establishment in the homeland. Government administrators, merchants and miners found that an assumed attitude of racial superiority, together with a callousness towards the needs of the subject people often was a means of increasing their wealth, if they used it in the right way, if they did not push it too far.

Techniques similar to imperialism are sometimes practiced within the nation: for example, prices and rents of houses can be kept high by obliging people to live in a restricted area. Lower wages can be paid to a segregated group like the Negro if he is blocked from getting a better type job and restricted to one classification.²⁰

Where personal advantage is in danger of being lost either because the means to it are taken away or from competition, prejudice may result.²¹ Consciousness of the conflict of interest or the fear of competition brings an attitude of hostility which is a sign of insecurity. This insecurity, economic or social, is sometimes given as the foundation of prejudice.²²

²⁰ Yves SIMON, Ibid., p. 40-45.

²¹ Yves SIMON, Ibid., p. 56-52.

²² Louis WIRTH, Ibid., p. 304.

It has been repeatedly found by students of Negro-white relations in the South that the so-called white aristocracy shows less racial prejudice than do the "poor-whites" whose own position is relatively insecure and who must compete with Negroes for jobs, for property, for social position, and for power.²³

When this insecurity increases at times of unemployment or depression or crisis, the hostility intensifies. A good example of the deprivation of advantage was the emancipation of the slaves in America in 1863: the advantage of free labor was removed and the means to live a life without working was taken away from the South. Then, when the colored man began to appear as a competitor in the labor market, the fear of his competition helped build up a hostility toward him which had not existed during slave days.

Propaganda intentionally used as a means of stirring up prejudice may be motivated by desire of personal or group advantage. Hitler used the technique of stirring up hatred against the Jews for his own personal political advantage. Some senators in the southern United States and other political figures use the prejudice against the Negro to further their own political domination. Usually such propaganda combines all the factors which contribute to arouse racial prejudice, and it sometimes succeeds in influencing masses of people who otherwise would not have had racial prejudice.

²³ Louis WIRTH, Ibid., p. 304.

Some final personal advantages resulting from prejudice are that it serves as a mechanism by which damaged self-esteem may be repaired,²⁴ inferiority complex may be forgotten or cured, resentment may be satisfied, insecurity and weakness may be ignored. The blame for all these troubles may be placed on the inferior group without their being able to do anything about it. This tendency to vent one's hostility on another group is called "scapegoating".²⁵⁻²⁶⁻²⁷ For many years now it has provided the white man in the South with a regular channel for his hostile impulses, and oversimplified solution to his problems and frustrations.

CULTURAL CONFLICT

The human child is dependent on its parents longer than any other animal. During this time in which it is naturally insecure, it builds up security by recognizing itself and identifying itself as a member of a group, a member of a family, a member of a certain age, sex group, a resident of a certain neighborhood, of a certain city, and state,

²⁴ Gunnar MYRDAL, Ibid., p. 532.

²⁵ UNESCO, Ibid., p. 234.

²⁶ H. F. ASHLEY MONTAGU, Ibid., p. 90-93.

²⁷ Peter T. FOMPILLE, The Relationship Between Projection and Prejudice With A Factor Analysis of Anti-Semitic and Anti-Negro Attitudes, Washington, D.C., Catholic University Press, 1957, 43 p.

and nation, racial stock, and religion. All these identifications are necessary for the development of the child, and they are passed on by the parents. When this group consciousness develops into a type of group superiority, the groundwork for prejudice is laid. Children tend to take over the attitudes of those in control of them at home, and in school, and as this attitude is largely the attitude of the group, the children often take on prejudices.²⁸⁻²⁹

Many studies of the effect of home environment on children shows that prejudice is not inherited but developed by the influences around children, sometimes even before the child can talk.³⁰⁻³¹

Race prejudice is not an instinct nor an innate tendency, but an attitude which has to be acquired, a mode of behavior which has to be learned.³² Young children are generally free from it.

The point of white children having no prejudice in their first days is clearly illustrated by the emotional dependence of the white child upon her black nurse or mammy in the South before the war. There was no repulsion felt for the

²⁸Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 297.

²⁹Louis WIRTH, Ibid., p. 302-303.

³⁰Robert E. PARK, Ibid., p. 16.

³¹Robert L. DUFFUS, "Where Do We Get Our Prejudices?" in Harper's Magazine, Vol. 53, issue of Sept. 1926, p. 507.

³²Louis WIRTH, Ibid., p. 304-305.

black skin. Nor do white children who play with Negro children feel any repulsion towards their black skins. One white child in Atlanta, Georgia, thought that the mother of the Negro child had accidentally poured too much iodine on the Negro child.³³

The parents and those around the child are so identified with the child that there are no barriers between them. Children do not so much absorb culture as take it with celerity because they love or fear those who transmit it.³⁴

As the child grows, his attitude is molded by many cultural factors in the environment. In the South the white child learns that the Negro is a different kind of person, a person, for example, not to be invited as a playmate to a party. This helps him at an early age to get what is considered a proper attitude towards the Negro. As the white child sees the Negro excluded from church and school, entering the doctors' and dentists' offices from different doors, using different restaurants and recreational institutions, attitudes concerning the Negro's place in society are drilled into him. In larger cities in the north of the United States where Negroes and whites live together they very often grow

³³E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro In The United States, N.Y., Macmillan, 1951, p. 668.

³⁴Gardner MURPHY, Lois Barclay MURPHY, and Theodore M. NEWCOMB, Experimental Social Psychology, An Interpretation of Research Upon the Socialization of the Individual, N.Y. Harper, 1937, footnote on p. 238.

up as though they were in different worlds.

About this cultural influence Frazier says,

One might say that the entire culture of the American people has until World War II and the years following stamped the Negro as an inferior human being unfit for assimilation into American life.³⁵

There have been improvements since that time, but the epithets used about the Negro, the refusal of newspapers in the South to carry pictures of the Negro unless he had committed a crime, the portrayal of the Negro in literature and entertainment as a fool or a servant - all these influences tend to instill racial prejudices in the young and confirm the stereotypes against the Negro in the minds of adults. These cultural influences produce habits of thinking and acting, and these habits play a prominent place in fostering prejudice.³⁶

History. - Among the cultural influences is the history of the country in which a man lives.³⁷ The fact that historical influences do have a place in prejudice is clear from the fact that there seems to have been no color prejudice of the scope and style that we have in the world today before the practice of Negro slavery in the fifteenth and sixteenth

³⁵E. Franklin FRAZIER, Ibid., p. 669.

³⁶Eric John DINGWALL, Racial Pride and Prejudice, London, Watts, 1946, p. 211.

³⁷UNITED NATIONS, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General), N.Y., United Nations, 1949, p. 20.

century. Although there were slaves before in ancient times there was always the possibility of freedom and amalgamation into the master group. When slavery became identified with colored people, that kind of termination of it became more difficult.

The fact that the colored man in America today is a descendant of a group that were enslaved and is so identified by his color, helps keep alive that concept that he is different.

A good example of the cultural effect of history on prejudice may be obtained by a comparison of the racial attitudes in Brazil, in Hawaii, and the southern United States.³⁸ In both the former locations where there was no slavery and there was amalgamation of the white group into the native group there is no race prejudice similar to that in the southern United States.

IGNORANCE, A CONDITION FOR PREJUDICE

Some sociologists list ignorance as a cause of prejudice. Whether it actually is a cause or not depends on just what is meant by the word, "cause". If "cause" is used to mean "that which positively influences the being of another", it is difficult to see how it could ever be a "cause". Ignorance is something negative, an absence of due knowledge rather

³⁸UNESCO, Ibid., p. 124.

than something real in itself. At least it is in that sense that "ignorance" is used in this study. Considered in that sense, it cannot be a direct positive influence. But it may be and is a "condition", namely, a prerequisite for the operation of a cause.

In this negative way, as a condition, ignorance is a prerequisite for prejudice. In the section above on irrational reactions or generalizations as a cause of prejudice, the part that false generalizations have in prejudice was indicated. Now the point about ignorance is that even sincere men, who have no desire to form false generalizations often lack the information necessary to avoid the false and to obtain true categories.

Ignorance easily develops between groups where there is social isolation.³⁹ People can live next door to each other - even work in another's home or shop - but they may not know one another as human beings. In this way both physical and social segregation are conditions for prejudice: they promote ignorance, and ignorance is a prerequisite for prejudice.

In the United States in the South very often the white man knows only the stereotype, the generalizations about the Negro, or he knows the Negro through the medium of these false generalizations. Thus he may believe that the Negro is inferior to the white man by nature, that the Negro prefers to be

³⁹UNESCO, Ibid., p. 220.

segregated from the white man, or that the economical or cultural development of the South depends upon keeping up the practices of segregation. Even white men who are interested in knowing the truth about the colored people find these views so prevalent and the absence of contrary information so complete that they come to accept these stereotypes.

A good example of the relation of ignorance to prejudice is the general ignorance that prejudiced people have about the harm that prejudice does to its possessor. They look on prejudice in the terms of a good for themselves, but they do not see the price they pay for it.⁴⁰

Some of the price is direct economic waste. This happens when an employer refuses to use the man-power that is needed because of prejudice against a group, or when an area constantly refuses to hire or employ people on the basis of ability. These practices cannot help affecting the industrial output. This is illustrated by low productivity in the Southern States of the United States.

Where prejudice requires separate facilities in schools, hospitals, government bureaus, an enormous extra expense that is fairly obvious must be paid to continue such prejudices.

⁴⁰Gunnar MYRDAL, Ibid., p. 644.

What is not so obvious is the expense born by the government and private agencies to remedy the defects of the segregated system. Defects like poor health of the segregated group make control of epidemics more difficult. Defects of bad education make the control of crime more expensive and difficult. Defects in human relations require the establishment of agencies to get people together after they have been separated.

One of the greatest costs of prejudice is the wasting of time and money in trying to establish good relations with other countries, and then seeing those relations broken down to a great extent by the practise of prejudice at home. Few people will approve acts of violence and discrimination against members of their own race or nationality in another country. They will wonder if an ally that practises discrimination against minority groups is to be trusted.

Two-thirds or more of the world today belong to groups against whom prejudice has been manifested.⁴¹ It is these peoples especially who regard the practise of prejudice in any country as a part of its foreign policy. Thus much of the expensive diplomatic efforts at friendship are offset by prejudice and discrimination at home.

⁴¹ UNESCO, Ibid., p. 228.

There is also a great deal of ignorance about the psychological waste and damage that is caused by prejudice. People infected with prejudice have barriers to communication with others. They are deprived of sources of knowledge. They bring on themselves a rigidity of mind which helps block out anything new and lessens their ability to reciprocate fully any human relation.⁴² This rigidity makes them less capable of using well the knowledge they do have. It provides an outlet for frustration over unsolved problems which will continue to be problems till they are solved. It brings fear and anxiety which is exaggerated. Often it prepares the way for their own insecurity when the pattern of prejudice shifts so that it affects them.

Finally, one of the heaviest costs of prejudice is the disrespect for law that it engenders in the prejudiced group - with all the expense of law suits and rebellions that follow upon it.⁴³

Misinformation or no information on the costs of prejudice are certainly a necessary condition for the continuance of prejudices. In a way even false information is a result of ignorance for often enough one of the conditions for the acceptance of the false is that no other information is available.

⁴²Gunnar MYRDAL, Ibid., p. 657.

⁴³Gunnar MYRDAL, Ibid., p. 532.

In summary, then, these are the causes and the conditions of prejudice from the point of view of sociology: irrational and emotional reactions, personal conflict, cultural conflict and ignorance. Under these headings all the causes commonly assigned as causes of prejudice by sociologists and psychologists can be conveniently grouped.

The six general theories on the causes of prejudice, which were mentioned on page one of this chapter, are a sample group of causes that conveniently fit under the above classifications of causes. All six theories or approaches, Allport finds helpful towards explaining the causes of prejudice. In the chart marked, Figure 1,⁴⁴ he illustrates the relations of all six theories to prejudice and to the other theories.

⁴⁴ See next page.




Figure 1. Theoretical and methodical approaches to the study of the causes of prejudice. (From Gordon W. ALLPORT The Nature of Prejudice, p. 207.)

Figure 1 gives a visual summary of the causes of prejudice as proposed by modern sociology and psychology. The classifications necessarily overlap because prejudice is the effect of a multiple causality. This figure helps to emphasize that point and to present the various causes at work in the generation of prejudice.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF ERROR, THOMISTIC

From the definition of prejudice already given it is clear that prejudice is basically a process which produces judgments. It follows that any analysis of the meaning of prejudice from the philosophic point of view will basically consist in analyzing the process by which man makes judgments. Though it is true that the special type of prejudice selected for study in this thesis, unfavorable prejudice, produces judgments that are emotionally held, false and directed against an individual or group, they are merely a special type of judgment. Their explanation will be found in the same basic process which explains judgment in general.

Any effort to explain, from a philosophic point of view, the emotional hold of prejudice or its falsity immediately involves the presentation of some theory of cognition, some theory of judgment. This observation is made here because, although this chapter is devoted to a study of the falsity of judgments, it does so within the framework of the Thomistic theory of cognition. A later chapter will present an explanation of the emotional hold of prejudice in reference to the same theory.¹

If men had an intellect which immediately grasped things exactly as they are and if external factors never

¹See Chapter 6 of this thesis.

blocked the operation of such an intellect, then prejudice would be impossible. But man's intellect does not grasp things immediately, directly, immediately and just as they are.² About man's intellect, Rousselot says that in the hierarchy of intellects man's comes lowest and last. He says that before the splendors which nature unfolds, man is blind like the bat in the presence of the noon day sun.³ Man knows only indirectly and with the help of the senses. As a consequence, what is one in reality is known by pieces. Furthermore, he is influenced by many extrinsic factors which enter in to lead him on to error and prejudice.

It should be clear then that in order to investigate the nature of prejudice philosophically, the nature of error must be examined. It should be clear, also, that to understand the nature of error, something has to be said about the cognitive process within the framework of which error is explained.

Here it may be asked why the Thomistic theory on the nature of error is presented rather than some other theory. The answer is that the Thomistic theory is more complete and more satisfactory than other theories. It is a more satisfactory explanation of the nature of error than can be found

²J. PECHAIRE, C.S.Sp., Intellectus Et Ratio Selon S. Thomas D'Aquin, Paris, Vrin, 1936, p. 289.

³Pierre ROUSSELOT, S.J., L'Intellectualisme De Saint Thomas, 2nd edition, Paris, Beauchesne, 1924, p. 53.

in other theories. However, other theories are not entirely omitted. They will be grouped together in a later chapter which will aim to present both what they contribute to the knowledge of error and how they fail to completely explain it.⁴

This chapter will also try to show that what Saint Thomas had to say about error needs completion. Such completion affects Thomistic philosophy's relation to prejudice. So it is methodically necessary to present the Thomistic theory on error to show this point.

SAINT THOMAS AND ERROR

The key to understanding Saint Thomas' doctrine on error is to understand that he considers knowledge a type of being. This is one of the reasons why he has no formal treatment of error, but considers it in regard to knowledge and truth as an integral part of his metaphysics.⁵⁻⁶

⁴See Chapter 4 of this thesis.

⁵Leo W. KEELER, S.J., The Problem Of Error From Plato to Kant, Romae, Universitas Gregoriana, 1934, p. 83. The main points on Saint Thomas' theory of error given in this chapter are in agreement with the general outline of Keeler. []

⁶J. B. LOTZ, Metaphysica Operationis Humanae, Methodo Transcendentali Explicata, Romae, Apud aedes Universitatis Gregoriana, 1958, p. 6. Also see Joseph MARECHAL, S.J., Le Point De Départ De La Métaphysique, Deuxième Edition, Paris, Desclée, 1949, Conier 5, p. 118-125.

Knowledge is the taking in of forms. In this activity man shows himself to be essentially immaterial, for he is able to possess all forms. Man's intellect stands in relation to those forms it takes in in an analagous position to prime matter which unites with forms of various kinds.

This theory presupposes a kind of a double life for every known reality: its physical existence, and its known, or intentional existence in the mind of the knower. The basis for this possibility is the form impressed on all things by the Creator, which is a participation of His intelligible form. It is this intelligible form which the mind takes in and with which it has a basic affinity.⁷

This neat inclusion of the theory of knowledge into the general metaphysics of potency and act poses a special problem about the possibility of error for Saint Thomas.⁸ If knowledge is the taking in of the form of something, as he

⁷A. D. SERTILLANGES, The Foundations Of Thomistic Philosophy, St. Louis, Herder, 1931, p. 42-44. Also, Etienne GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, N.Y., Random House, 1956, p. 224-225.

⁸M.-D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, L'erreur, in Mélanges thomistes, Belgium, published by Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 1923, p. 253-274. This is a very helpful study of the Thomistic theory of error. Other helpful authors on this point are: P. M. TYRRELL, "The Nature and Function of Judgment", in New Scholasticism, Vol. 26, issue of Oct. 1952, p. 393-423; L. W. REGIS, O.P., Epistemology, transl. by Imelda Choquette BYRNE, N.Y., Macmillan, 1959; Jean Hervé NICOLAS, O.P., "Le problème de l'erreur", in Revue Thomiste, Tome 52, No. 1, issue of 1952, p. 328-357. The second part of this article appears in the same review, Tome 52, No. 3, issue of 1952, p. 528-566.

says, "Quaelibet cognitio perficitur per hoc quod similitudo rei cognitae est in cognoscente",⁹ then how can knowledge be false ever? If the form is the source of knowledge, and the form is possessed, then there is knowledge. If the form is not possessed, there is no knowledge, not even false knowledge.

Saint Thomas recognizes this difficulty and proposes an answer. The mind itself is infallible with regard to its proper object, namely, the essence of material things.¹⁰ But the essence that the mind apprehends when it first comes in contact with reality is certainly not the specific essence representing all that is to be known about that thing. The mind gets its knowledge indirectly through the senses. The senses are not error-proof. They do not seize anything but the external accidents of objects, and these only incompletely.¹¹ From data reached by the senses, and with its help, the mind begins with vague and confused concepts which it laboriously perfects in successive syntheses. These syntheses which are a part of judgments, may be false. From this it is easy to understand Saint Thomas' answer to the proposed difficulty, namely that infallibility in apprehending mere essences does

⁹S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Editio retractatur, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. SPIAZZI, O.P., Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1950, Liber 6, Lectio 4, #1234.

¹⁰S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q.17, a.3.

¹¹S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q.14, a.6.

not make judgment errorless.

Only through concepts does man have knowledge, but concepts alone do not constitute knowledge. Man knows when he passes judgment on a complex synthesis of concepts. In such acts, namely, judgments, truth and error are formally found. Only in such acts can there be error.¹²

Saint Thomas defines falsity as a disagreement between the mind and its object. "Sicut veritas consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus, ita falsitas consistit in eorum inaequalitate."¹³ Error is had in judgment when the false is approved as true.

Error autem est approbare falsa pro veris: unde addit actum quendam super ignorantiam: potest enim esse ignorantia sine hoc quod aliquis de ignotis sententiam ferat; et tunc ignorans est, et non errans; sed quando iam falsam sententiam fert, de his quae nescit, tunc proprie dicitur errare.¹⁴

From this it is clear that error is not merely a want of knowledge, nor is it reducible to this. Yet this want of knowledge is presupposed in all error. Error is the act by which the intellect approves of the false as true.

¹² S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Quaestiones Disputatae, Vol. 1, De Veritate, cura et studio P. Fr. Baymundi SPIAZZI, C.P., ed. revisa, Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1949, q. 1, a. 3.

¹³ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 10.

¹⁴ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Quaestiones Disputatae, Vol. 2, De Malo, cura et studio P. BAZZI, M. CALCATELLA et al., ed. revisa, Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1949, q. 3, a. 7.

Saint Thomas never doubted that men make errors; but neither did he doubt that men get to the truth, so there could be no essential defect in the two channels by which man reaches the truth, both the senses and the intellect. At least some aspects of the operations of these faculties must be infallible, if it is to be maintained that man has any certain judgments. For both are involved in every judgment. Yet, some sort of defective operation within both must in some way be allowed for.

Saint Thomas maintained that there could be no error in the essential act of the intellect, which is understanding, but that error could arise in the act of judgment. Where that does happen, he maintained that it is accompanied by and prepared for by some defect in the sense processes.

ERROR IN THE SENSES

Saint Thomas looked upon the senses as mediators between the intellect and things, "*Sic sensus inveniatur quodammodo medius inter intellectum et res.*"¹⁵ Senses have, on a lower plane, all the main characteristics of the intellect. They know, they judge. But their knowledge is particular, its judgment limited to material composition and division. Nevertheless, because of this operation of judging they can be said to be true or false in two respects. The first is the

¹⁵S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 11.

relation of sense to intellect and the second the relation of sense to things. In its relation to the intellect, sense can be called true or false inasmuch as it causes a true or false judgment of the intellect. In relation to things, sense can be true or false inasmuch as it judges materially of things.¹⁶

The senses considered as reporters of themselves to the intellect never err. They report themselves just as they are. They can report to the mind only how they are affected.

When they report on things, they may be the cause of intellectual error inasmuch as they represent a thing to the intellect other than it actually is. Thus the sense can cause false judgments, but not necessarily, since the intellect judges on what is presented by sense, just as it judges about things.¹⁷ From this it is clear that sense always produces a true judgment in the intellect with respect to its own condition, but not always with respect to the condition of things.

This capacity for misleading the intellect arises from the fact that the senses themselves are deceived with regard to the object. When the object with which the senses deal is the proper formal object of the sense, as, for example, color is the proper formal object for the eye, then only rarely and accidentally can the sense report something that

¹⁶S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 11.

¹⁷S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 11.

is not.¹⁸ When such error does occur it is due to the complexity of the sense organ or of the medium. For example, eyes that are overtired may see elephants instead of autos. Eyes looking through blue sunglasses will see white objects as blue.¹⁹ Error would be entirely excluded only where there was a simple faculty taking in a simple object without any external medium.

It is a different story when the sense organ takes in qualities common to itself and other senses, like shape, motion, extension. Here mistakes are possible even under normal conditions²⁰ because such objects are taken in by the senses accidentally, that is, as a consequence of sense being directed to its proper object.

Saint Thomas makes little or no effort to determine the reliability of the internal senses. He talks of the central sense as taking in all that the external sense refers to it in such a way that there is little room left for error.²¹ With regard to memory, Saint Thomas assumes that it is generally trustworthy. Following Aristotle he denounces

¹⁸ ARISTOTLE, On The Soul, Book 3, Chapter 3, p. 428^b, transl. by J. A. SMITH (Great Books Of The Western World, Robert Maynard HUTCHINS, Editor, vol. 8, p. 661.)

¹⁹ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 11.

²⁰ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 17, a. 2.

²¹ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2^{um}.

imagination as the great deceiver.

Sed imaginatio apprehendit ut plurimum rem ut non est, quia apprehendit eam ut praesentem, cum sit absens; et ideo dicit Philosophus in IV Metaph. quod sensus non est dominus falsitatis, sed phantasia.²²

The most important of the sense powers is the estimative-discursive or the cogitative sense. It owes its excellence to a certain proximity to reason which in a way overflows into it.²³ It is in this sense power that all the past experiences of sensation are coordinated and brought to bear on the present sensation or situation. Obviously a great deal of this activity of the human estimative power requires the use of memory and imagination. Also, since it is a sense power, a great deal of its activity goes on unconsciously or subconsciously, and without the direct intervention of reason. From this, it is clear that this human estimative power is in a position to affect associations and combinations of past experiences, to which nothing in the real world actually corresponds. Thus, Saint Thomas has placed at the very doorway to reason two powers, the imagination and the human estimative power, through which error may find an entrance into man's judgment.

²² S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 11.

²³ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 79, a. 4, ad 5.

SIMPLE APPREHENSION

Saint Thomas made it very clear that, although truth and falsity were in the mind, they did not belong to the operation by which the intellect merely apprehends the essence of things.

Verum autem et falsum, etiam sint in mente, non tamen sunt circa illam operationem mentis, qua intellectus format simplices conceptiones, et quod quid est rerum.²⁴

In the previous section on error in the senses it has already been shown how the sense might lead the intellect into error. Something more can be said about it here from the viewpoint of apprehension.

The starting point of the act of apprehension is the phantasm.²⁵ In treating of the act of forming a concept, Saint Thomas generally supposes that that object from which it is abstracted is a real thing present in sensation, and that the sense processes proceed under normal conditions. This is something of an oversimplification, because it doesn't always happen that way. There is much room for error in forming the phantasm and its object may not be a present thing. But

²⁴S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Liber 6, Lectio 4, #1233.

²⁵This point is clearly illustrated by the doctrine that a return to the phantasm is required for the intellect to know the material singular object. See George F. KLUBERTANZ, "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular", in The New Scholasticism, Vol. 26, No. 2, issue of Apr. 1952, p. 133-166.

apprehension does not begin until the intellect begins to abstract form from the phantasm. What Saint Thomas means is that the intellect does not err in abstracting forms from phantasms.

He speaks of a sick man who apprehends honey as something bitter.²⁶ In this case Saint Thomas would maintain that in abstracting the form from the phantasm the intellect makes no error. The phantasm formed by the unhealthy sense organ is actually "bitter". Error would come in only when the intellect attributed "bitter" to the honey. Such a complex act is not an act of apprehension.

" A second example is the case of a man who imagines an object that he labels as "sub-human person". What he means by the label he would probably describe as a being midway between being a man and a brute. "

The fact that the notes in this concept cannot really be united shows that it is not even a unified concept, but rather a confused mental complex. Even this, apart from any judgment about its representing an existing thing, would not be false. Neither would it be a simple, but a very complex apprehension.

These two examples make clear why it is that in all the places where Saint Thomas treats of the infallibility of

²⁶S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 17, a. 2.

simple apprehension, he draws attention to the accidental falsity that may accompany it.²⁷

A second point should be noted with regard to Saint Thomas' teaching that the mind does not err in acts of simple apprehensions of the essences of things.²⁸ It is this. He well knew that the human mind cannot directly intuit the essences or even the substantial differences of material objects, "Rerum essentiae sunt nobis ignotae [...] substantiales rerum differentiae sunt nobis ignotae."²⁹ This seems to be opposed to his statement that the intellect does not err with regard to the essences of things. "Circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur."³⁰

The two statements can be taken in conjunction and shown not to oppose each other. The reconciling of these texts further illustrates what Saint Thomas means when he maintains that the intellect does not err in simple apprehensions.

The reconciliation can be made like this. Where Saint Thomas speaks of "essences" as unknown to us, he was

²⁷S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 17, a. 2: De Veritate, q. 1, a. 12.

²⁸S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Liber 6, Lectio 4, #1233.

²⁹S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 10, a. 2 corpus, et ad 6.

³⁰S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 17, a. 2.

speaking of the individual essences of material singular things. Where he says that the intellect is not deceived with regard to "essences" or to "what a thing is", he was speaking of simple apprehensions of simple objects. This is clear from his teaching that the mind proceeds little by little from the apprehension of the basic form or essence of things to a complex, specific and distinct apprehension.³¹ Man advances from the state of potency to distinct and determinate knowledge by a slow process. He first acquires imperfect knowledge, very universal concepts. Things are known first indistinctly and confusedly.

Intellectus noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, partingit prius ad cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens.³²

The first idea formed is "being", the most general of all. Slowly and with experience this concept is refined and more distinct universals are formed. It is this first universal, or something close to it that Saint Thomas means when he claims that in simple apprehending the intellect is not deceived about what a thing is. Only the basic, primary concepts are simple. As the concepts are refined, they become complex.

³¹ S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 85, a. 3.

³² S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 14, a. 6.

JUDGMENT

The point about judgment in which Saint Thomas was most interested was, "Why does it contain truth?" This was one of the aspects of judgment which distinguished it from simple apprehension.³³

His answer to this question is that the judgment contains truth because in the act of judgment, the mind knows that the synthesis that it makes is really so. This is not the same as saying that there is a correspondence between the concept in the mind and things connected in the real order outside the mind. Judgment includes a knowledge of this correspondence between what is thought to be and what is really so.

Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest: sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum.³⁴

Saint Thomas bases his theory of judgment on the general structure of the universe contained in his metaphysics. According to this all material things are made up of matter and form. These things have one basic matter, prime matter, and an orderly hierarchy of forms which attach to it. One of

³³S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 3.

³⁴S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 16, a. 2.

these forms is substantial, the others are accidental. These material things form the proper object of the intellect of man. When man judges, he identifies various forms as belonging to some underlying subject. In this way judgment follows the orderly arrangement set up in Thomistic metaphysics. For example, the form black is predicated of a rather generalized underlying reality designated as "this being". This being is already a substance which acts as a kind of second material into which forms are received. Because of this, in the judgment, the subject is always taken materially and the predicate formally.³⁵

In general, when speaking of judgment, Saint Thomas refers to it merely as perceiving, knowing or understanding. In so doing, he is following the lead of Aristotle.

Hæc enim duo (sapere et intelligere) intellectivæ cognitioni attribuuntur; intellectus enim habet judicare, et hoc dicitur sapere et apprehendere, et hoc dicitur intelligere.³⁶

In judgment, two concepts, subject and predicate, are apprehended as united, as belonging to each other. Thus judgment is presented as an "apprehensive" act.

³⁵S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 13, a. 12.

³⁶S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, In Libros De Anima Expositio, Liber 3, lectio 4, #629, (S. Thomae Opera Omnia, vol. 20, Parma, Fiacadori, 1852-1873. Photographic reproduction by Muzurgia Publishers, N.Y., 1948-1949.)

This view of judgment as the apprehension of a synthesis is confirmed by Saint Thomas' insistence that the intellect's power of judging is evidenced by perfect reflection. Through and in the act of perfect reflection the intellect sees itself in action and sees that its nature is to conform itself to the real.³⁷ This perfect reflection distinguishes the acts of man from those of brutes. Reflection is proposed either as the judgment itself, or an essential of judgment.

If judgment did consist in a mere apprehension of syntheses, or in an act of perfect reflection in which man saw his act conformed to the real, then it seems that there would be no room at all for false judgment. The apprehension of forms as agreeing with each other could not take place unless the forms were there to be grasped. They would not be there in the case of false judgment. Neither could false reflection allow for false judgments because, if judgment is the act of reflecting on a concept in which one sees both that it belongs to an object and that one sees rightly, then the only kind of judgment allowed seems to be true judgment. Reflection that showed a judgment to be false would manifest its error and reverse it.

If the entirety of the act of judgment was merely the apprehension of a synthesis, then the only explanation of

³⁷S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 9: Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 16, a. 2.

false judgment available would be to say that false judgment is not a real judgment. There is no evidence that this is the Thomistic opinion. The opinion is rather that false judgments are just as real and put with just as much conviction as true judgments.

When speaking of existential judgment, Saint Thomas saw that something more was needed to explain it than mere apprehension of a synthesis.³⁸ He was not satisfied with Aristotle's opinion that judgment is a putting together or taking apart of concepts already stored up in the mind. In addition to the synthesis, what was needed to explain this kind of judgment was an objectivizing of that synthesis, a projection of it into the things from which it was drawn, or to which it will apply. A false judgment will then, consist in projecting the understood mental synthesis into things outside when that connection in things does not exist. The act of objectivizing which misses its mark is clearly not an act of perceiving, or understanding or apprehending. It is rather the act of "assent".³⁹

³⁸ S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, Summa Contra Gentem, Editio Leonina Manualis, Romae, Desclée-Hardier, 1934, Lib. 1, Caput 59.

³⁹ S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Liber 6, lect. 4, #1237.

ASSENT

In his discussion of the judgment in general, Saint Thomas does not explicitly use the term "assent". He does use it when he treats of "belief". In commenting on Saint Augustine's definition of belief, "credere est cum assentione cogitare",⁴⁰ he shows in detail how assent is a part of judgment. He says that Augustine has given a satisfactory description of belief because he has by his definition set forth the nature of belief, and distinguished it from all other acts of understanding.⁴¹ It is distinguished from the first act of the understanding because it involves "truth" and "falsity". But "truth" and "falsity" are found only in that act of the understanding which joins and divides concepts by affirmation and denial, namely, judgment. So "belief" clearly pertains to the second act of the mind and not to the act of apprehension.⁴²

In this second act of the mind the intellect is determined to one or other side of a proposition.⁴³ Saint Thomas says that only two things move the possible intellect,

⁴⁰S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁴¹S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁴²S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁴³F. M. TYRRELL, "The Nature and Function of Judgment", in New Scholasticism, Vol. 26, issue of Oct. 1952, p. 21-23. Also by the same author The Role of Assent in Judgment, Washington, Catholic U. Press, 1948, p. 184.

its proper object, which is an intelligible form, and the will.⁴⁴ Here is a point valuable in understanding error and prejudice.

When the possible intellect is determined by the intelligible form, which is its proper object, this occurs either immediately, or mediately. Immediate determination by the intelligible form occurs when the truth of the proposition is overwhelmingly manifest. This happens in the case of one who understands the first principles. These are known as soon as the terms are known.⁴⁵ Mediate determination of the intellect occurs in scientific knowledge. Here through the mediation of the first principles, the intellect comes to some conclusion.

When the will moves the understanding to assent, it does so because of something which is enough to move the will, but not enough to move the understanding.

*Determinatur autem per voluntatem quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise proper aliquid, quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum intellectum, utpote quod videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire.*⁴⁶

⁴⁴ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁴⁵ ARISTOTLE, Posterior Analytics, (Analytica Posteriora), Book 1, Chapter 2, #72^a, transl. by G. R. G. MURE, (Great Books Of The Western World, Vol. 8, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952, p. 98-99.)

⁴⁶ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

It is clear from this discussion that assent is not to be found in the act of apprehension, for there is not truth or falsity there. And one does not assent unless he holds something as true.

In all three cases of determination above there is a very clear acceptance of one member of contradictory propositions. That acceptance is "assent". For example, one who understands first principles, most definitely assents to one side of contradictories. One also assents who has scientific knowledge, for by the very act of relating the principles to the conclusions, he assents to the conclusions by reducing them to the principles. There the movement of the one who is thinking is halted and brought to rest.⁴⁷

In the third case, where the will intervenes, the assent is not caused by the thought but by the will. Such is the case with "belief". Since in such an act the understanding does not have its action terminated by the one thing that is its proper term, namely, the intelligible object, it is not brought to rest. It still inquires discursively about the things which it believes, even though its assent to them is unwavering.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁴⁸ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

This analysis of the role of assent in judgment makes no mention of false judgment, but it does suggest that "assent" will be a more prominent element in false judgment than it is in true judgment. The reason for this is that error is a type of belief. It comes under the influence of the will as does "belief". This is implied in what Saint Thomas says.⁴⁹ Yet he never explicitly says that every mistake is due to some influence of the will. He does quote with approval the definition of error as unqualified assent to that which is false, "praecisus assensus ad id quod est falsum".⁵⁰

Since error, or false judgment, occurs in that type of judgment in which the will intervenes, it requires an assent that is placed, not due to some evidence presented by the intellect, but through the influence of the will. To explain error, then, something should be said about the nature of "assent".

NATURE OF ASSENT

The first point to note about "assent" is that it is, in itself and directly, an act of the intellect. This is most

⁴⁹S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Malo, q. 16, a. 6, (Quaestiones Disputatae, Vol. 2, cura et studio P. BAZZANI - M. CALCATERRA et al., editio 8 revisa, Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1949.) This discusses the fall of the angels in relation to their will. De Malo, q. 3, a. 7 relates error to sin, and therefore to the will.

⁵⁰S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 18, a. 6.

clearly evidenced from its presence in "assent" to first principles. This assent is the basic act of the intellect. In it the intellect is intrinsically determined by its own proper object.⁵¹ Such assent is clearly an act of the intellect.

Even where there is intervention of the will, Saint Thomas considers "assent" to be an act placed by the intellect. He says that in the act of believing, where the intellect is determined, not by reason, but by the will, the act should be considered as an act of the intellect.

Intellectus credentis determinatur ad unum non per rationem, sed per voluntatem. Et ideo assensus hic accipitur pro actu intellectus secundum quod a voluntate determinatur ad unum.⁵²

Clearly, in such an act, "assent" is not an act of the intellect only. The will plays its part. Yet Saint Thomas terms it an act of the intellect.

The second point to be noted about "assent" is that it is a distinguishing mark of all judgments. It is a mark, a note, that distinguishes judgment from simple apprehension. That it is a part of all judgment is evidenced by the fact of the inclusion of "assent" as an essential element even in the primary judgments and judgments of belief where the evidence

⁵¹S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁵²S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3.

is overwhelming.⁵³

That "assent" distinguishes judgment from the act of simple apprehension Saint Thomas makes clear in two ways. The first is by his relation of "assent" to belief. The second is by an analysis of the difference between the two. A word about each of these.

He could omit explicit mention of assent in treating of intrinsically evident judgments. There his emphasis is on the apprehensive acts contained in judgments. When he treats of belief, he cannot ignore the role of "assent".⁵⁴ Belief differs from the first act of the mind, simple apprehension, because the object of belief is the true and the false. A belief is always a judgment. The very fact that Saint Thomas links his treatment of "assent" to his analysis of "belief" is in itself, evidence that he considers "assent" a distinguishing mark which separates apprehensive acts from judgments.

In his analysis of the question, "Utrum actus rationis imperetur?"⁵⁵ Saint Thomas again makes clear that "assent" distinguishes judgments from the first act of the mind. This distinction is clearest where the intervention of the will

⁵³S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 5, a. 2. De Veritate, q. 14, a. 9, ad 4.

⁵⁴S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1. Summa Theologiae, 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 2, a. 1.

⁵⁵S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 17, a. 6.

moves the intellect to assent. But it can be observed even in those judgments in which the intellect is determined by its own proper object. Even in regard to these judgments, the exercise of the act of judgment is always in man's power. He can give or not give his attention to the evidence. This dependence on freedom of exercise, which involves an act of assent, distinguishes even such judgments from apprehensive acts.

Saint Thomas says that the act of reason can be considered in two ways.⁵⁶ First with regard to the exercise of the act. Considered thus, the act of reason can always be commanded as when one is told to use one's reason. Secondly, with regard to its object: in this respect two acts included in reason have to be noticed. One is the act of apprehending the truth about something. This act is not in man's power since it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. So in this respect the act of reason is not in man's power and cannot be commanded. The other act of reason is the act of assent. If that which is apprehended is such that man naturally assents, for example the first principles, it is not in man's power to assent or dissent. Assent follows naturally, and strictly speaking, is not subject to man's command. But some things which are apprehended do not convince the

⁵⁶S. THOMAS AQUINAPIS, Summa Theologiae, 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 9, a. 1.

intellect to such an extent as to force assent or dissent. In such cases, assent or dissent is in man's power and subject to his command.

The argument here clearly distinguishes assent from any sort of apprehension. Assent is in some way, at least with regard to exercise, in man's power while apprehension is not. There would be no point at all to Saint Thomas' argument if he was here merely trying to distinguish assent from the mere formation of concepts. No one is likely to confuse these. He was distinguishing between assent and the intellectual synthesis of concepts which occurs in the act of judging.

ASSENT AND ACTIVITY

That assent is an activity may be seen from the definition of it as an adhering to an alternative.⁵⁷ Assent is thus something dynamic and accords with Saint Thomas' remark that the soul, inasmuch as it judges about things, is not so much acted on by things as active, itself, "sed magis quodammodo agit".⁵⁸

This activity seems to be the affirming or rejecting that the relationship seen by the mind is, here and now,

⁵⁷S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁵⁸S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 10.

present in extra mental things.⁵⁹ Assent has to do with a mental conception "cui intellectus assentit dum iudicat eam esse veram."⁶⁰ Assent, then, is the positing of the real identity or diversity existing in things. Such identity or diversity is perceived in the mental synthesis which represents those things. The apprehension of the connection between the terms is not identical with the act by which the apprehended synthesis is projected into reality by affirmation or negation.

From the above distinction flows the possibility of making a projection of a synthesis when it does not correspond to the apprehension. In this way a theory of error, which would apply to both true and false judgments, can be had without making judgments become acts of the will.

ASSENT IS RELATED TO THE WILL

In the writings of Saint Thomas, the question of assent appears almost exclusively in the sections which deal with the will.⁶¹ Although "assent" is classified as an act of

⁵⁹S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Commentarium In De Interpretatione, Bk. 1, lec. 3, (S. Thomas Opera Omnia, Parma, Vol.18)

⁶⁰S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 14. Note that Saint Thomas distinguishes "consent" from "assent" classifying "consent" as an act of the appetitive power. Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^ae, q. 15, a. 1.

⁶¹S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^ae, q. 17. 2^a, 2^ae, q. 2, a. 1. De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

the intellect, it has a relationship to and dependence on the will. Saint Thomas speaks of "assent" as being something similar to appetite, inasmuch as it quiets the motion of the mind.⁶² He says that the will is operative in all assent, "Potest etiam dici quod intellectus assentit, inquantum a voluntate movetur."⁶³

Saint Thomas shows the relationship of assent to the will in a parallel he makes between the action of assent in deciding speculative judgments with the act of choice in deciding practical judgments. He says that just as in practical matters the free choice, which is an act of the will, is required to place the judgment, so in certain speculative matters the assent is influential in selection of alternatives. He sees in the act of assent a sort of choice in the speculative field in which the mind freely assents to this rather than to that.⁶⁴

This parallel can be better understood when one remembers that according to Saint Thomas, choice is an act of the will, although its freedom is due to being subject to the deliberation of reason. Because reason apprehends the good either imperfectly, or apprehends a particular good, it is not

⁶²S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

⁶³S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3.

⁶⁴S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 13, a. 4, ad 2.

necessitated, but free.

It is in his discussion of the freedom of choice that Saint Thomas develops his doctrine of the mutual priority of the intellect and will, and their inter-relation to each other and mutual causality. Basic elements of this doctrine are that both intellect and will are part of the human unity and do not act alone but are correlative accidental powers of man. Also basic is the fact that the true, which is the object of the intellect, is a particular good, and the good, which is apprehended by the will, is a particular or limited true. The formula for their mutual inter-action is that the intellect moves the will by proposing an object for it and controlling that object, and the will moves the intellect by desiring its operation as a good for itself.⁶⁵

NATURE OF FALSE JUDGMENT

How Saint Thomas' doctrine on falsity may be applied to false judgments has to be inferred from his general teaching on true judgment, since he does not formally apply it to false judgment himself. The main points are the following. In a judgment where the reasons are not manifest enough to compel assent, the intellect does not perceive that the

⁶⁵S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Scriptum Super Sententias, Magistri Petri Lombardi, editio a R. P. Maria Fabianus MOOS, O.P., Paris, Lethielloux, 1933, vol. 3, lib. 3, distinctio 23, q. 1, a. 2. ad 3.

subject belongs to the predicate by its very nature. Since the intellect is not forced in such a case by its proper object, manifest truth, it can doubt or form opinion. But in order to assent, it requires the intervention of the will. When the will intervenes, it desires this assent as a good and moves the intellect to the act of assent.

In this way the assent is placed through the influx of the will, which acts on account of something sufficient to move the will, but not the intellect.⁶⁶

From this analysis it appears that false assent and free assent have much in common, and it is clear that free choice is an element in false assent. Yet assent is an act of the intellect. And in false assent, clearly what the mind apprehends, differs from its assent. Furthermore, assent occurs only in the act of the judgment, the second act of the mind.

Would the following be a satisfactory "description of false judgment?" First the mind apprehends two concepts as joined, even though they do not belong together. Then the will posits these concepts as representing really existing things? No. This would not be a sufficient description of false judgment, for assent would then become an act of the will and the intellect would merely supply concepts, which would not be an act of judgment.

⁶⁶ S. THOMAS AQUINAS, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1.

If this were true, the will would be responsible for judgments. But the will cannot make judgments or propositions. It can only solicit or impel the intellect to make them either by supplying motives or drawing attention to some evidence. The will cannot act except the intellect is in some way already in action through its own object, truth. The will can play a part in error by giving impetus to the movement already begun, or by diverting attention from it.

From this it clearly follows that even in false assent there must be some underlying truth, something which the apprehensive power grasps. Saint Thomas says that assent pertains to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power.⁶⁷ In practise this means that a false assent is never put except with some foundation of truth. In other words, every falsity is founded on some truth.⁶⁸

What this means is that what is known points to something which we do not know. With regard to what is not known, a man can have a suspicion or an opinion, but the intervention of the will must arise before there can be consent in such a

⁶⁷S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3.

⁶⁸S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 17, a. 2; See Commentarium In Boethius De Trinitate, q. 3, a. 1, ad 4, "Ad quartum dicendum quod quandocumque acceptis aliquomodo assentitur, oportet esse aliquid quod inclinatur ad assensum [...] et aliquae verisimilitudines in hoc quod assentimus his quae opinatur."

case. This intervention of the will may arise from many motives which are suited to the will. But the action of the intellect was started by something that was true. For example, a man has a few experiences with Negroes and makes the judgment, "Negroes are inferior." In the cases of his experience it may be true that this or that Negro was inferior in some particular way. This truth may lead him to suspect that all Negroes are inferior; but he does not know this as he has not the evidence. He can suspect it or give an uncertain opinion. In this condition the will may intervene and in many subtle ways propose it as a good to make the intellect assent to the judgment, "All Negroes are inferior."

This is the nature of error, as presented in the thought of Saint Thomas. His theory of error is derived mostly from his theory of truth, because he never formally treated error in the judgment.⁶⁹ In the many contexts in which he deals with truth and falsity, he explains in what way truth resides in the intellect and in the judgment. But with regard to falsity, he merely asks whether or not it is in the intellect and never explicitly treats of how it arises in judgment.⁷⁰ Even when he deals with falsity in the intellect, his purpose is not to show that judgment can or does go wrong but

⁶⁹Leo KERLER, S.J., Ibid., p. 88.

⁷⁰S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 1; Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 16, 17 and 85.

that simple apprehension cannot go wrong.

His main explanation of error lies in the distinction between knowing and assenting and the influence of the will in assent. 82

Probably the main reason why he did not present any formal theory of error in judgment was the fact that the problem of false judgment was not featured in the philosophers preceding him. Aristotle, on whom he commented, was silent about it. And the nature of the problem of error is such that it camouflages itself from the searchings of a philosopher quite easily unless attention is drawn to it by controversies of the time. The explanations which Saint Thomas gives generally appear because he was dealing with phases of the problem brought to his attention by Saint Augustine. 89

The following elements of a theory of error coherent with Saint Thomas' theory of truth are found in his writings. They are: 1) A limited power of knowing that reaches the world with the help of the senses. 2) Knowledge through judgment which not only intellectually apprehends a synthesis between a subject and an object, but also includes a distinct act of assent by which the apprehended synthesis is affirmed or denied. 3) The influence of free will on assent when a proposition to which assent is given is not endowed with overwhelmingly clear evidence. 90

INCOMPLETENESS OF THOMISTIC THEORY

Inasmuch as the theory of error of Saint Thomas presented above was not formally presented by him but garnered from various places in his writings, even the above theory might count as a completion of the Thomistic view on the nature of error. But there is a further incompleteness in Saint Thomas' explanation of error which comes to this. He fails to explain the influences which underly assent. What explanations he does give are almost entirely from the side of the object. Very little is said about the dispositions of the subject. So although the dispositions of the subject are indicated by Saint Thomas as needed, at least in moral judgments,⁷¹ little or nothing is said on what causes these dispositions. Since such dispositions are needed for assent, and assent is needed for judgment, especially for false judgment, and prejudice, then this matter of the influences leading to assent, needs further explanation. That explanation may be found in the writings of John Henry Newman.

NEWMAN ON ASSENT

Newman had watched different individuals arrive at opposite conclusions from the same external evidence. He had seen men convinced where there was little evidence or none at

⁷¹See Chapter 6 of this thesis.

all while others remained skeptical after a full exposition of the proof. He himself had become a Catholic but the same evidence which was sufficient for his assent was not enough to convince his sincere and intelligent friends.⁷²

Newman was thus brought, by his own experience, face to face with the problem of why evidence differed in its effect upon different individuals. This problem was deepened and extended by Newman's correspondence with his friend, William Froude, who denied the validity of moral certitude and the force of converging probabilities. Froude considered faith as the theologians explained it, "to be another word for 'prejudice'." - i.e., as the formation of a judgment, irrespective of, or out of proportion to the evidence on which it rests.⁷³

Newman's answer to these problems is contained in his Oxford University Sermons and his Grammar of Assent. In these sermons⁷⁴ he explores the nature of faith and its relation to reason in order to show the grounds on which the untrained believer justifiably holds his belief. This, he maintains, is

⁷²Philip FLANAGAN, Newman, Faith and the Believer, Westminster, Md., Newman, 1946, p. 10.

⁷³Gordon Huntington HARPER, Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S., A Correspondence, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1933, p. 122.

⁷⁴John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford Between AD 1826 and 1843, London, Longmans, 1898, xxiii - 351 p.

done by a process of unconscious reasoning against the background of a right state of heart.

Newman's aim in the Grammar of Assent is much the same as in University Sermons. The Grammar is a defense of moral certitude, the certitude arising from a convergence of many probabilities.⁷⁵ In the Grammar he maintains that

In any problem that does not lend itself to bald mathematical demonstration, the manner in which we reach our conclusions cannot be decided by rigid, unchangeable rule, but is something proper to each individual and varying according to circumstances.⁷⁶

In the Grammar of Assent, Newman analyzes the difference between assent and inference. He finds that they differ radically. Assent is always unconditional, an unconditional acceptance of a proposition independent of the premises.⁷⁷ Inference, on the other hand, is the conditional acceptance of a proposition. It is never independent of the premises but stands or falls with them.⁷⁸

Newman continues his investigation by dividing assents into real assents and notional assents. Real assents are related to real apprehensions which deal with singular concrete

⁷⁵ Philip FLANAGAN, Ibid., p. 15.

⁷⁶ Philip FLANAGAN, Ibid., p. 10.

⁷⁷ John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, N.Y., Longmans, 1947, p. 10.

⁷⁸ John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, Ibid., p. 10.

things of experience.⁷⁹ Such real assents are stronger than mere notional assents because they are personal, they appeal to the emotion, imagination and the appetite as well as the intellect. Notional assents which are based on notional apprehensions reach to things beyond our experience. They deal with classes, abstractions and generalities.⁸⁰ They are impersonal and speculative.⁸¹

It is in his development of the difference between notional assent and real assent and his investigations of the influences underlying real assent that Newman develops his central theme and his main answer to the question "What influences underly assent?" His answer is that assent is arrived at not primarily by logic or demonstration, but by "the whole man". His feelings, his imagination, his memories, his associations, all his life and background contribute to the assent.⁸²

The effect of "antecedent considerations" on man's judgment is Newman's explanation of how men come to differ on points in which men have some personal interest but very different opinions. Newman maintained that we judge according to

⁷⁹John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, N.Y., Longmans, 1947, p. 19.

⁸⁰John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, Ibid., p. 19.

⁸¹John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, Ibid., p. 36-38.

⁸²John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, Ibid., p. xi. See also p. 236-237.

our previous prejudices, or prejudgments.

I do not say that our decisions can always be foreseen in our prejudices, but our prejudices do always have some effect on our conclusions, even though it be only subconscious. The term "prejudice" has become one of opprobrium; but there are good and bad, true and false prejudices. We may and should take steps to avoid being wrongly prejudiced, but, unless we have so lost our memory as to be cut off entirely from the past, we cannot and need not hope to be entirely free from prejudices.⁸³

This was Newman's view of the influence of man's past on his judgment and assent. Man weighs evidence, but different minds read different meanings into the same objective facts. When man turns his attention to a piece of evidence, he does not suddenly forget all that he already holds as established. So it happens that in nearly all religious, historical and political discussions, men are to some extent prejudiced. It is useless for them to try to confine themselves to the evidence that has immediate reference to the point in debate. Flanagan says, summarizing Newman,

Whether we will it or not, our earlier decisions and convictions come back on us demanding to be either discarded or given a hearing. We see the connection of our existing beliefs with the question of the moment and we know that either our answer must be made to fit in with these beliefs or the beliefs must be modified to suit the answer. It is for that reason that our previous knowledge and convictions play an important part in all our decisions.⁸⁴

⁸³ Philip FLANAGAN, Ibid., p. 73-74.

⁸⁴ Philip FLANAGAN, Ibid., p. 107.

Man's mental processes are not divorced from the rest of his life. His previous knowledge and conduct have a momentous influence on his gradual progress towards assent. This previous knowledge and conduct is a direct cause of what Newman calls "antecedent considerations".

When he speaks of these, he means everything that is consciously or subconsciously in the mind when the inquiry begins. He includes, therefore, not only desires and hopes but also whatever the mind already knows and what it can deduce from that knowledge.⁸⁵

Newman thus makes clear that man's differing from man in his appreciation of argument will be due to the difference in personal background, difference of knowledge, difference of experiences of all kinds. Newman says that appreciation of arguments depends on the personal activity and background of experience of the individual accepting it. He says,

What is an argument for? [...] Is there any royal road by which we may indolently be carried along into the acceptance of it? Does not the author rightly number it among his "aids" for our "reflection", not instruments for our compulsion? It is plain that, if the passage is worth anything, we must secure that worth for our own use by the personal action of our own mind, or else we shall be only professing and asserting its doctrine, without having any ground or right to assert it. And our preparation for understanding and making use of it will be the general state of our own mental discipline and cultivation, our own experiences, our appreciation of religious ideas, the perspicacity or steadiness of our intellectual vision.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Philip FLANAGAN, *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁸⁶ John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, N.Y., Longmans, 1947, p. 232.

Although Newman mentions religious ideas in this text, his theory on the importance of "antecedent considerations" in arriving at assent is by no means limited to religious questions. The Grammar of Assent proposes a theory of how assent is reached in general on all questions. It is through appeal to "personal" or "antecedent considerations" that Newman explains how it is that assent can go beyond the premises, can be stronger than the premises and be independent of them.

The power which enables man to place the act of assent, Newman calls the "illative sense". This is what others call "intellect" or "reason". About it Newman says,

It is the faculty or power of reasoning correctly, of being able to see how much the evidence contains, and of judging correctly the point at which it becomes sufficient to justify certitude.⁸⁷

The judgment of the illative sense is analagous to the process by which man recognizes objects with which he is familiar. He sees a figure or a face as a whole. Though a view of each part of it would be insufficient to make him absolutely sure of its identity, the view of all or several of the parts together make him quite certain.⁸⁸

According to Newman, the criterion of the accuracy of man's judgment is committed to the personal action of the illative sense. When is man justified in assenting with an

⁸⁷John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, N.Y., Longmans, 1947, p.262.

⁸⁸Philip FLANAGAN, Ibid., p. 105.

assurance that excludes all hesitation? Newman answers that it is not merely when argument is presented. It is not merely the argument but the whole man, the mind and its entire background that brings man to make judgments without hesitation. He says that man arrives at conclusions "not ex opere operato, by a scientific necessity independent of ourselves,-- but by the action of our own minds, by our own individual perception of the truth in question."⁸⁹ And this "action of our own mind" was the operation of the illative sense through which man knows when converging probabilities are sufficient to allow him to be certain.

The Grammar of Assent in defending moral certitude, not only proposed a coherent theory on the influences leading to assent, but, like Saint Thomas, it clearly recognized the place of will and freedom in arriving at assent.⁹⁰ On this point Newman added nothing to Saint Thomas' theory on the need of free choice to explain false judgment but he does clearly confirm and agree with Saint Thomas' opinion.

It is not very satisfactory to a mind looking for a neat list of causes of prejudice to find prominent among them the "antecedent considerations" of Newman. These are all embracing. But to a mind looking for the truth, whether it can

⁸⁹ John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, N.Y., Longmans, 1947, p. 10.

⁹⁰ John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, Ibid., p. 163. See also Philip FLANAGAN, Ibid., p. 383-385.

be neatly tagged or not, Newman's theory offers much in the way of an answer to the puzzles and problems underlying the nature of assent. To the mind looking for the roots of prejudice, Newman's theory is of basic importance. It is a definite addition to the theory of error proposed by Saint Thomas.

CHAPTER IV

NON-THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHIES ON PREJUDICE

No philosophic understanding of prejudice can be had independently of some theory of error. At least no understanding of "unfavorable prejudice" is possible without such a theory. Since it is "unfavorable prejudice" of which this thesis treats, some theory of error will form a basic part of it.

Due to the need of a theory of error in order to understand the causes of prejudice, this chapter will say more about theories of error in general. A comparison of some of the outstanding non-Thomistic philosophies on error with the Thomistic theory presented in the previous chapter has several advantages. The first advantage is by way of confirming the Thomistic theory where they agree with it, or of adding illustrations which clarify it. Another advantage is that the very incompleteness of other theories will demonstrate by comparison, the importance of the Thomistic theory. Such a survey will give a perspective, a setting, a background which will make it easier to understand why it is that no philosophers or philosophies have formally treated of "unfavorable prejudice."

No complete survey of non-Thomistic philosophies will be attempted here. Nor would such a survey add much to the knowledge of the causes of error that can be obtained by examining a few of the best of them. The reason for this is that

the theory of error is not a point on which philosophy shows any consistent development or unity.¹ Rather it is an example of the incompleteness of man's knowledge of error and the difficulty of giving a rational account of this irrational power of man.

The theories of three great thinkers, Plato, Saint Augustine and Descartes, will be briefly presented in this chapter. These three great thinkers are collected because for each of them the fact of error raised an important philosophical problem. As a result, they gave more attention to an understanding of error than did most other thinkers.² When it appears that the theories of these men who represent the best of the non-Thomistic writers on error, are defective and incomplete, then by inference, some idea of the inadequacy of the writings of other philosophers on error may be supposed.

Some general definition of the meaning of error and the problem of error is needed both for understanding these philosophers and seeing the relationship of error to prejudice. The Dictionary of Philosophy gives the following definition of error:

¹Leo W. KEELER, S.J., The Problem of Error From Plato to Kant, Rome, Universitas Gregoriana, 1934, p. 277-278.

²Leo W. KEELER, S.J., Ibid., p. [140].

distorted or non-veridical apprehension, for example, the illusory perception and memory [...] the term, although sometimes used as a synonym for falsity, is properly applied to acts of apprehension like perception and memory and not to propositions and judgments.³

Lalande defines error differently. He calls it "au sens actif, acte d'un esprit qui juge vrai ce qui est faux, ou inversement."⁴ These definitions do not tell very much because they contain within themselves synonyms for the word itself. They illustrate the point that there is a difference of opinion on the meaning of error. They further illustrate the point that though men disagree on the meaning of error, they do agree on the point that there is error and that error can be recognized and is different from truth.

The particular problem of error which is most related to prejudice is this "How can man think and be fully convinced that something is so when it is not so?" This is what happens in every case of unfavorable prejudice. Other implications of the problem of error also have a relation to prejudice, namely, the relation of error to evil and the extent of error. These subsidiary points will be mentioned later.⁵

³Dagelbert D. RUNES, Editor, The Dictionary of Philosophy, N.Y., Philosophical Library (no date) p. 343.

⁴André LALANDE, Vocabulaire Technique Et Critique De La Philosophie, Paris, Presses Universitaires De France, 1951, p. 297.

⁵See Chapter 9 of this thesis on the moral aspect of prejudices.

Here, the aspect of the problem of error which is most related to prejudice will be considered.

PLATO

Plato's theory of forms⁶ is the backdrop against which his theory of error takes shape. For Plato, all genuine reality is relegated to the real world of eternal ideas, and knowledge consists in a direct intuition of those ideas, an intuition which the study of sense objects can never give, since the real world of sense does not possess the ideas. The ideas come as the revival or reminiscence of a direct vision enjoyed by the soul before birth.

Plato's theory of form rules out error in the mind's grasp of intelligible forms. Either the mind grasps a certain form or it does not. Thus, the theory of forms is not a very helpful foundation on which to build a theory of error. Nor is it clear how any set of sense objects could excite the recollection of the wrong form. Obviously, to make room for error, and Plato clearly saw that room must be made for it, some sort of combination of knowing and ignorance, of being

⁶PLATO, The Republic, Books 5 to 7, transl. by Benjamin JOWETT, in Great Books of the Western World, Robert Maynard HUTCHINS, Editor, Vol. 7, p. 356-401. The argument in these books of The Republic, Book 5, Chapters 478-479, p. 372-373 centers on the theory of forms.

and non-being must be found.⁷

Plato's doctrine on the mutual participation of the forms within the "real world" of spiritual entities becomes part of his answer to this problem. Not only do the forms participate in some manner in the perfection of the form of the good, the absolute beauty, the supreme idea "which is above being or essence",⁸ but there is a mutual blending of the essential forms among themselves. The whole intelligible "real world" of forms has a varying participation in the one, all-pervading form of "being".⁹ In this type of participation just as in the participation of the concrete sensible singulars in the absolute perfection of their eternal specific form, there is found within the subjects in which the participated perfection is multiplied, a blend of being and non-being. In sensible reality, the image of the form is blended with the non-being of Platonic corporeal "matter". In the "real" intelligible world, each form is a blend of being and that intelligible non-being which is the form of the other. This blending of forms makes it possible to formulate meaningful judgments whose predicates are not identical with their

⁷ PLATO, Ibid., p. 372-373. Here "opinion" is proposed as a middle between ignorance and knowledge. It is a state which is halfway between pure being and pure non-being.

⁸ PLATO, Ibid., Book 6, Chapter 509, p. 386-387.

⁹ PLATO, The Sophist, transl. by Benjamin JOWETT, Chapter 249, in Great Books of the Western World, Robert Maynard HUTCHINS, Editor, Vol. 7, p. 568-569.

subjects. Plato thus explains the logical possibility of propositions which express more than identity.¹⁰

Plato sees that judgment is something different from apprehension. But he does not show how one can come to believe internally in a logically significant but false proposition. He does not make clear the possibility of erroneous judgments.

One obstacle to Plato's arriving at a sound theory of error was that he identified knowledge with virtue in the sense that all wickedness is involuntary and reducible to the want of right knowledge.¹¹ It is for this reason that he suggests in The Republic that philosophers should be kings.¹²

In the Theatetus, Plato made a psychological analysis of judgment that was taken over almost bodily into the Sophists. Although the Theatetus proposed a thorough going solution to the problem of error, it never accomplished that. In it Plato proposed five different solutions to the problem, only to reject them all.

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Neither in the Theatetus nor in the Sophist did Plato even state the real problem of error as it affects prejudice,

¹⁰ PLATO, The Sophist, Chapters 254-258, (Great Books of the Western World,) Vol. 7, p. 571-573.

¹¹ PLATO, Laws, Chapter 860, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 7, p. 746.

¹² PLATO, The Republic, Book 5, Chapter 473, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 7, p. 369.

"How can anyone in all seriousness assent to what is not true?" Much less did Plato solve this problem.

Plato's failure to solve the problem of error was no doubt rooted in his refusal to admit the existence of any genuine reality except in the order of ideas. This failure points out the need of admitting knowledge which begins with things of sense as a basic part of a consistent theory of error. As was already shown in the previous chapter, the Thomistic theory meets this requirement. This look at Plato's theory indicates that a philosophy which fails to meet this requirement will not be able to explain satisfactorily either error or prejudice.

Plato's most important contribution towards explaining error and prejudice was to point out that falsity exists only in judgment.

SAINT AUGUSTINE ON ERROR

Augustine was vitally concerned with the problem of error. At the age of thirty-three he put aside as error much of what he had considered truth. This experience made the presence of error a great reality to him.¹³

From his own experience of religious error he judged that it involved sinning against the light. It is not

¹³SAINT AUGUSTINE, The Confessions, transl. by Edward Bouverie PUSEY, Book 4, Chapter 15, Section 26, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 18, p. 25.

surprising then to find that his view of error will be colored by his experience.

What is surprising is that, considering his interest in the question, he never wrote a treatise on error, nor formally discussed it as a theory. This is probably due to his general practise of not treating any theme of philosophy except in the context of its relation to his entire philosophy. So, to understand his ideas on error or present them apart from the rest of his philosophy is difficult. The difficulty is increased by the fact that his treatment of it falls into the zone where sense and intellect meet. It is the obscurest part of his philosophy.

Saint Augustine defines error as "accepting the false for the true" (*falsi pro vero approbatio*).¹⁴ The definition makes it clear that some sort of approval or assent is an essential of falsehood. The word "approbatio" implies some activity dependent on the will of the subject. So it is clearly something different from ignorance. What he means by

¹⁴ SAINT AUGUSTINE, Answer To Skeptics, (Contra Academicos) transl. by Denis J. KAVANACH, O.S.A., Book 1, Chapter 4, in The Fathers Of The Church, A New Translation, edited by Ludwig SCHOPP, The Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1, p. 118, N.Y., Cima, 1948; Enchiridion Ad Laurentium, Sive De Fide, Spe, Et Charitate, Caput 17, Sectio 5, p. 239, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Latinae, Tomus 40, Parisiis, Garnier Fratres et J.-P. Migne, 1887.

"verum" and "falsum" is explained in the Soliloquies.¹⁵

Everything is true inasmuch as it is a participation of an eternal prototype. Things are false inasmuch as they fall short of their exemplars, or have no being.

In explaining these points Augustine makes it clear that: 1) There are no really false things. 2) Sensations in themselves are always true. 3) Imagination becomes false only through confusion with something different from itself. As a result, error requires a further act. It occurs only where there is "assent".

But "assent", the key to understanding just what Augustine means, is not clearly defined. Perhaps this is due to the fact that he has no separate theory of error of his own. He merely took over the term and the doctrine on error from his contemporaries. The men who had given it currency were the Skeptics, Stoics and Epicureans. These men had a sensistic psychology. To them "assent" meant acceptance of a sense image as a guarantee of the presence of a real thing. This is the meaning Augustine gives it in discussing the nature of error. He maintains that error consists in accepting a sense image, present or past, and attributing to it more

¹⁵ SAINT AUGUSTINE, Soliloquies, (Soliloquia) transl. by Thomas P. GILLIGAN, O.S.A., Book 2, Chapter 5, p. 391; Book 2, Chapter 9, p. 400 in The Fathers of The Church, A New Translation, The Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1.

than it is worth.¹⁶ The elements of error are a deceptive image, plus assent to it as a real thing. He seems to think that all errors can somehow come under this classification.

Like the sensists before him, Augustine speaks as though the only cognitive factor in assent was the sense image. The intellect, itself, never errs.¹⁷

It does not follow, as it might seem to, that "assent" is entirely an act of the will.¹⁸ The words he uses in his variants of his definition of error clearly refer to the intellect, but it is difficult to find place for the intellect's act in his psychology.

His psychology has the intellect sitting as a kind of higher court supervising the work of the senses.¹⁹ The senses themselves do not err. Error appears first when there is an interpretation of the data of the senses.²⁰ It would seem to

¹⁶ SAINT AUGUSTINE, On The Trinity, (De Trinitate), transl. by M. DODS and G. WILSON, (Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, edited by Whitney J. OATES, N.Y., Random House, 1948, Vol. 2, Book 9, Chapter 11, p. 800-801.)

¹⁷ SANCTI AURELII AUGUSTINI, Opera Omnia, Tomus 3, De Genesi ad Litteram, Liber 12, Caput 14, p. 466, (Patrologiae, Cursus Completus, Latinae, Tomus 34.)

¹⁸ SAINT AUGUSTINE, Confessions, Book 7, Chapter 15, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 18, p. 50.

¹⁹ SAINT AUGUSTINE, Confessions, Ibid., Book 7, Chapter 17, p. 50.

²⁰ SANCTI AURELII AUGUSTINI, Opera Omnia, Tomus 3, De Vera Religione, Liber 1, Caput 33, Sectio 62, p. 150, (Patrologiae, Cursus Completus, Latinae, Tomus 34.): Answer To Skeptics, Ibid., Book 3, Chapter 11, p. 195-199.

follow then that error is in the judgment. But Augustine does not say this. "Judging" for him has the scriptural meaning of "supervising" or "sitting in judgment".²¹ The intellect judges according to eternal norms, forms, truths or laws. It sees these because it is illuminated by a ray of God's intelligible light. This light could fail. But it cannot err because there are no false things²² about which to judge. Secondly, it cannot err because the intellect is more excellent than the senses, and they do not err.

This doctrine on the intellect's relation to the senses makes it difficult to understand just what "approbatio" means.

Did not Saint Augustine allow for some sort of "inferior reason" which went beyond mere sense and which did not involve the "intelligible light"? Might not this be the source of error? Augustine did suppose such a distinction.²³ But he does not explain it or develop it. In fact Augustine did not make any serious, systematic study of judgment in

²¹SANCTI AURELII AUGUSTINI, Ibid., Liber 1, Caput 31, Sectio 58, p. 147.

²²SAINT AUGUSTINE, Confessions, Ibid., Book 7, Chapter 15, p. 50.

²³SANCTI AURELII AUGUSTINI, Opera Omnia, Tomus 8, De Trinitate, Liber 12, Capita 2-3, p. 999, (Patrologiae, Cursus Completus, Series Latina, Tomus 42, Edit. J.-P. Migne, Parisiis, Gardiner Fratres et. J.-P. Migne, 1886.) Augustine says he is making a distinction between two functions of the same power of reason. See also De Genesi Ad Litteram, Ibid., Liber 12, Caput 14, p. 466.

general, nor of false judgment with regard to the intellect. For him the problem of judgment is the problem of true judgment. His solution to the problems of true judgment so stresses the infallibility of reason that he leaves apparently only sense and "will" factors with which to explain error. As a result, he finds difficulty in proposing a psychology of error.

This difficulty does indicate the requirement of a theory of judgment which allows for the complicity of intellect in the production of error as necessary for a consistent explanation of error and prejudice. This difficulty is met in the Thomistic theory on error.

Saint Augustine's important contributions to the theory of error are the need of an act of assent to explain false judgment and, secondly, the influence of free will.²⁴ Augustine notes the causes of error both from the side of the thing known and from the side of the knower. On the side of the object known he puts the throng of sense and

²⁴ SANCTI AURELII AUGUSTINI, Opera Omnia, Tomus 6, Enchiridion ad Laurentium, Sive De Fide, Spe, Et Charitate, Liber 1, Caput 19, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Latinae, Tomus 40, Parisiis, Garnier Fratres et J.-P. Migne, 1886, p. 242. Also see The Advantage of Believing (De Utilitate Credendi), transl. by Luanne HEAGHER, O.S.B., Chapter 11, p. 423-426 in The Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 2, in The Fathers of the Church, A New Translation. Also see De Trinitate, Ibid., Liber 11, Caput 11, p. 998.

imagination's images.²⁵ On the side of the knower he puts the enfleshed condition of the mind, the influence of passions, and above all, pride.²⁶ These are important contributions to the understanding of error and of prejudice. They confirm the Thomistic theory on error.

DESCARTES ON ERROR

For Descartes, as for Plato and Saint Augustine, error posed a problem for his philosophy which he could not avoid. Once Descartes had made God the link between what men think and what really is in the outside world, he was faced with the question of God as the cause of error. This made him consider the problem seriously.

His solution of turning to the will as the cause of error was almost forced on him by his neglect of judgment. In the Rules For The Direction Of The Mind, he had reduced knowing to intuition and deduction.²⁷ Judgment is suppressed.²⁸

²⁵ SAINT AUGUSTINE, Soliloquies, (Soliloquia), Ibid., Chapter 14, p. 375.

²⁶ SAINT AUGUSTINE, On The Trinity, (De Trinitate), Ibid., Book 8, Chapter 2, p. 774-775.

²⁷ Rene DESCARTES, Rules For The Direction Of The Mind, transl. by Elizabeth S. HALDANE and G. E. T. ROSS, Rules 2-3, and 10, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 31, p. 2-4, 15-16.

²⁸ Rene DESCARTES, Ibid., Rule 12, p. 24-25: Also see Leo W. KEELER, S.J., Ibid., p. 145.

Since things have to exist to be intuited, there was not much room for explaining error. Thought consists in intuiting certain natures and the links that join them. This is the doctrine on judgment taught throughout the rules. He mentions "judgment" only to try to explain false judgments.²⁹

To explain the nature of false judgment, he turns to the Augustinian theory of "belief". He makes judgment an assent by which the will extends itself beyond the evidence of clear and distinct ideas. Judgment is an act of the will.³⁰ p. 162

Descartes' weakness is that he proposes a theory of judgment which will explain only false judgment and does not consistently explain true judgment. This weakness emphasizes the need of incorporating the intellectual synthesis involved in all judgments into a coherent theory, if error and prejudice are to be explained. This need is met in the Thomistic system.

Descartes' meditations do emphasize the importance of will and assent on error and prejudice. He also suggests that a great deal of man's prejudices are due to precipitation and

²⁹ Rene DESCARTES, Rules For the Direction of the Mind, Ibid., Rule 8, p. 14: Rule 12, p. 21-22.

³⁰ Rene DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Mind and Body are Demonstrated, Meditation 3 and Meditation 4, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 31, p. 83-84, and p. 91.

the uncritical acceptance of ready-made ideas.³¹ These preconceived opinions he sometimes called "prejudices".³² The most stubborn and unmanageable of these he thinks are inherited from man's infancy. These are blind convictions that spring either from man's prerational experience or are instilled into him by the example, conversation and teaching of those around him.

Together with the acceptance of ready-made ideas, Descartes blames memory for sins of prejudice. In fact, the utility of his general doubt is that it delivers the mind from every kind of prejudice and sets forth a simple method in which the mind may detach itself from the senses.³³

Descartes' use of the word "prejudice" is quite different in meaning from the word as it is used in this thesis. Descartes' meaning does not include the "emotional tone" which is an essential part of prejudice as discussed in this thesis. But Descartes' searching for the causes of error did lead him to examine prejudgment and even to use the word "prejudice". In this way he shows very clearly the kinship between error

³¹Rene DESCARTES, Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, Part 2, in Great Books of the Western World, Robert Maynard HUTCHINS, Editor, Vol. 31, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, 1952, p. 46.

³²Rene DESCARTES, Ibid., p. 47.

³³Rene DESCARTES, Meditation on the First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Mind and Body are Demonstrated, Meditation 1, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 31, p. 77.

and prejudice. Because he made this connection between error and prejudice, he came closer than any other philosopher to a formal treatment of the nature of prejudice.

INGREDIENTS IN PREJUDICE

It is not surprising that no philosopher formerly wrote on prejudice as it is sociologically defined in this thesis. It is not surprising because sociology is a relatively new subject.³⁴ And "prejudice" in its broad ethnic definition has become a world problem, much thought about, only with the advent of industrial revolution and its effects on society.³⁵

The word was used by some philosophers in their writings, as just indicated in Descartes, but the meaning was quite different. Pascal in his Pensées and Newman in his writings did treat of the effect of emotion on knowledge. But neither of these incorporated their thoughts into a system of philosophy or a theory of error.

What can be found in philosophic writings are the ingredients which go to make up prejudice. They are basically error and emotional tone. Something of the scarcity and

³⁴Sociology came into its own only about 1900. See Nicholas S. TIMASHEFF, The Sociological Theory, Its Nature and Growth, N.Y., Doubleday, 1955, p. 72.

³⁵UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science, N.Y., Whiteside Inc., 1956, p. 25/.

incompleteness of philosophic writings on theories of error has already been given in this chapter. The scarcity of philosophers writing on the effect of emotion on knowledge is even greater. Scattered remarks on the point can be found in writers like Thomas Hobbes³⁶, William James³⁷ and others.³⁸

But the writers on this point are not many nor are their writings abundant. The scarcity of their writing shows that from a philosophical point of view the study of prejudice is not a well-worked field, but one in which the ingredients are treated in a disconnected way by various philosophers. This shows why a philosophic explanation of the causes of prejudice will lean heavily on what philosophy has to say about error. It also illustrates again the advantage of using the Thomistic system of philosophy which integrates

³⁶Thomas HOBBS, Leviathan, Or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, Part 1, Chapter 13, The English Philosophers From Bacon to Mill, Edwin A. BURT, Editor, N.Y., Modern Library, p. 160. Hobbes might be said to propose here a theory that prejudice is rooted in the instinct or drive of man for power.

³⁷William JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience A Study in Human Nature, N.Y., Modern Library, 1902, p. 422-429. James maintains that feelings precede philosophic principles as a source of religion. He maintains that arguments prove nothing rigorously. They only corroborate man's pre-existent partialities.

³⁸Emil FAQUET, Les Préjugés Necessaires, Paris, Oudin Et Cie., 1911, 374 p. This entire book is on prejudice but it considers prejudice to be merely a social instinct. He maintains that if man could get away from society entirely he might get away from his prejudices. But since he can't get away from society, he will never get away from his prejudices.

into its theory of error a theory of the relationship between error, appetite and judgment.

CHAPTER V

SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL JUDGMENT

In chapter three the examination of the nature of error from the Thomistic point of view showed that it is to be found in judgments. In general, it was also seen that judgments have a relation, through assent, to the will.

Even in this general analysis of the nature of error, it was found helpful to consider the differences between primary judgments, scientific and other secondary judgments. This suggests that more light on the nature of error may be gained by a consideration of other types of judgment and how these types are related to truth, falsity and to appetite. To present some of these considerations will be the work of this chapter.

The classification of judgments into "speculative" and "practical" is one of the more common distinctions between judgments.¹ For its import on the workings of error and prejudice, it is also one of the most important classifications.

Some of man's intellectual acts aim at knowledge. Others are directed to action. This is another way of saying that man's intellect has the double purpose of both knowing truth and aiding man in directing his actions.

¹Jean PÉTRIN, o.m.i., Connaissance Spéculative et Connaissance Pratique, Fondements de leur distinction, Ottawa, Editions de l'Université, 1948, p. 9/.

The speculative intellect contemplates truth. The practical intellect directs to operation.² They are not powers, but two functions of the same faculty.

Man's speculative intellect longs to see, and only to see, the truth. This is its only goal and its life.³

The aim of the practical intellect is quite different.

From the very start its object is not Being to be grasped, but human activity to be guided and human tasks to be achieved. It is immersed in creativity. To mould intellectually that which will be brought into being, to judge about ends and means, and to direct or even command our powers of execution - these are its very life.⁴

This distinction does not deal with accidental circumstances, but with the very object towards which the intellect reaches. It is an essential distinction. It is basically different for the intellect to have as its object knowledge rather than action.

How basic this difference is may be better understood by considering the different relationships of the intellect to truth and falsity and affectivity in speculative as opposed to practical judgments.

The speculative judgment is true or false if the identity or separation which it expresses is really found in

a. 1. ²S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 79.

³Jacques MARITAIN, Creative Intuition In Art And Poetry, N.Y., Pantheon Books, 1953, p. 46.

⁴Jacques MARITAIN, Ibid., p. 46.

things.

Sic igitur bonum virtutis intellectualis speculativae consistit in quodam medio, per conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; in quo ratio veri consistit.⁵

This makes it clear that the norm of truth for the speculative intellect is things. If, for example, I make the judgment, "Negroes are inferior to whites", the judgment will be true or false if the reality of Negro inferiority exists or does not exist.

The relation of the practical intellect to truth is quite different. Here the reality by which the truth or falsity of the judgment is to be measured often does not exist until after the judgment is made. How can it exist when the practical judgment deals with an action to be done! There is no previously existing thing with which the intellect can agree.

It is not with being, it is with the straight dynamism of the human subject with regard to this thing not yet existing, but to be created, that the intellect must make itself consonant. In other words, truth, in practical knowledge, is the adequation or conformity of the intellect with the straight appetite, with the appetite as straightly tending to the ends with respect to which the thing that man is about to create will exist.⁶

⁵ S. THOMAS AQUINATIC, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 64, a. 3.

⁶ Jacques MARITAIN, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Ibid., p. 47.

The judgments of the practical intellect, then, will be true or false in the moral sphere, when they direct man towards his destiny. Saint Thomas notes this when he says that in the case of practical virtue, truth consists in the conformity of the judgment with right appetite. "Sed haec mens, sive, ratio, quae sic concordat appetitui recto, et veritas eius, est practica."⁷

With regard to the appetite these judgments differ // basically. The appetite, the will, not considered as a power of decision, but as an energizing force, affects the speculative judgment only by setting it at work or not. For example, a biologist or anthropologist continues on with his work of studying speculatively the question, "Are Negroes inferior to whites?", without any further intervention from the appetitive power.

It is quite different with the judgments of the practical intellect. In this the appetite plays an essential part in the working of the knowledge, not merely in setting it in motion. For the intellect as such aims at being, not at action. And it is only when transformed and influenced by the will that it can aim at action to be brought about, instead of being. For example, when I make the judgment, "A Negro should

⁷ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Ad Nicomachum Expositio, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. SPIAZZI, O.P., Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1949, Liber 6, Lectio 2, #1129: See also Jean PETRIN, o.m.i., Ibid., p. 81. ✓

be in a segregated school.", the truth or falsity of this judgment is not to be measured merely by things as they exist outside the mind. It will be measured by things, inasmuch as they have become a good for the appetite, which is directed correctly, straightly, or not so directed towards its proper end.⁸

It should be clear, then, that the norms of truth and error will not as easily be applied to judgments of the practical intellect as they are to judgments of the speculative intellect. To discover whether the judgment of the speculative intellect, "Negroes are inferior" is true or false, one needs but to examine the realities expressed in the definitions "Negroes" and "inferior". If the examination shows there is no identity between these two realities, then the judgment asserting that identity is false.

The norm of truth for the practical judgment will be the correctness of appetite. To discover whether the practical judgment, "This Negro should be admitted now to this school" is true or false, I must compare it with a will or appetite correctly tending to its end. If the judgment corresponds to such a correctly directed will, then the judgment is true. If it does not correspond to such a will, it is false.

The judgment of the practical intellect, "This Negro should be admitted now to this school" affirms no identity or

⁸Jean PETHIN, o.m.i., Ibid., p. 81-82.

separation between two existing realities, but rather transfers the question from the realm of being to the realm of good.⁹ This judgment asserts by the use of the word "should" that, "To make the judgment 'This Negro should be admitted now to this school' is a good."

This re-wording of the judgment of the practical intellect is merely a putting it into logical form. It now appears that the judgment asserts an identity not between two realities but between a judgment and a reality. This assertion may be true at the same time that the judgment which constitutes part of its subject is false. So this type of judgment, because of its complexity, because of the process preceding it in which the appetitive power plays a large part, is much more open to error than the judgment of the speculative intellect.

It is worth noting that in the judgments of the practical intellect, the intellect, through the influence of the will, moves towards singular concrete reality, or it moves towards things to be done. Only singular things can be done. The notion of segregation may be considered abstractly. But when one considers putting it into operation, one must look at where, on whom, and under what circumstances the operation will take place. All these are the singular concrete

⁹Jacques MARITAIN, Existence and the Existent, English version by Lewis GALANTIERE and Gerald B. PHELAN, N.Y., Pantheon Books, 1948, p. 49-50.

conditions attendant on action. This is in accord with the nature of the appetite which tends towards the thing as it is.¹⁰ And all existing things are singular. *9* *Explain*

The difference in meaning between practical judgment and theoretic judgment may also be illustrated by the difference in theory and in practice in real life. In practice, a man may be most kind and friendly to individual Negroes whom he meets. This will not prevent him from holding a false theory about Negroes in general. Or on the contrary, a man may be very clear on the point that, in theory, "Negroes are equal to whites." Perhaps religion or study or general mental ability have led him to see this proposition clearly as true. This will not prevent him from acting in practical matters just as though he knew no theory at all. Theory deals with the speculative intellect and practice with the practical intellect. They are related for they are merely acts of intellect which have different aims. But they are also basically distinct. Keeping them related to each other in real life is a problem not merely for the intellect but also for the appetite.

MORAL JUDGMENT

Judgment, even when it is the ultimate practical judgment, retains its intellectual character inasmuch as

¹⁰S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 8, a. 1, Also see 1^a, q. 82, a. 4.

practical philosophy still requires natures to be known. But in the field of ethics, the will assumes a major role because the practical judgment is dependent on the actual movement of the appetite towards the ends of the subject.¹¹ In moral matters the rectitude of the intellect is dependent upon the rectitude of the will. This is because the truth of the practical judgment is judged by its conformity to right appetite. The end of the practical judgment is not to know that which exists, but to cause to exist that which is not yet.¹²

This "causing to exist" is done by a personal choice which is individualized both by the singularity of the person in whom it originates, and by the surrounding circumstances in which it takes place.¹³ Such a judgment can actually be right only if, here and now, the tendency of willing is right and is directed towards the real good of human life. This is why prudence is a virtue which is both moral and intellectual.¹⁴

¹¹Jacques MARITAIN, Existence and the Existent, Ibid., p. 47-48. S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 9, a. 1.

¹²Jacques MARITAIN, Ibid., p. 50. Jacques MARITAIN, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Ibid., p. 47.

¹³Philip FLANAGAN, Newman, Faith And The Believer, Westminster, Md., Newman, 1946, p. 107. Newman insisted on the personal nature of the illative sense and of certitude.

¹⁴S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 57, a. 4. Here Saint Thomas defines prudence and shows it is dependent on rectitude of appetite. He says, "Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines: quod quidem est per appetitum rectum."

Like conscience, it does not operate in the merely speculative sphere. So no theory of moral science can give either the judgment of conscience or the virtue of prudence. In a way, the same moral case never occurs twice. Maritain puts it this way.

Each time, I find myself in a situation requiring me to do a new thing, to bring into existence an act that is unique in the world, an act which must be in conformity with the moral law in a manner and under conditions belonging strictly to me alone and which have never arisen before. Useless to thumb through the dictionary of cases of conscience. Moral treatises will of course tell me the universal rule or rules I am bound to apply; they will not tell me how I, the unique I, am to apply them in the unique context in which I am involved.¹⁵

Moral treatises can never bring in all the circumstances of time and place and person which must be weighed in order to make a practical judgment. It is for this reason that not even a perfect knowledge of moral science can substitute for, or exempt a person from the act of conscience¹⁶ by which knowledge of moral principles is applied to an individual case.

In the practical syllogism, the major premise which gives the universal principle may be known only by the intellect. But the minor and the conclusion are in a different

¹⁵ Jacques MARITAIN, Existence and the Existent, Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁶ S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 79, a. 13. Conscience is not a distinct faculty, nor a habit but an act.

plane.¹⁷ They are put forward by the entire individual whose intellect is carried along towards the end to which his appetitive powers tend.¹⁸ Saint Thomas indicates this when he says that apprehension can never be out of harmony with appetite.

Sicut appetitus naturalis consequitur formam naturalem, ita et appetitus sensitivus, vel rationalis, sive intellectivus sequitur formam apprehensam: non enim est nisi boni apprehensi per sensum vel intellectum. Non ergo potest malum in appetitu accidere ex hoc quod discordet ab apprehensione quam sequitur;¹⁹

He notes this again when he affirms an indestructible concord between the practical judgment and action. "Sed iudicium de hoc particulari operabili, ut nunc, nunquam potest esse contrarium appetitui."²⁰

In texts like the above, Saint Thomas seems to subordinate intellect to liberty. More accurately his doctrine is that there is a mutual and reciprocal causality of will and

¹⁷ Knowledge of the material singular thing by the intellect is indirect by conversion to the phantasm. See George P. KLUBERTANZ, "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular", in The New Scholasticism, Vol. 26, No. 2, issue of Apr. 1952, p. 133-166.

¹⁸ Pierre ROUSSELOT, S.J., The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, translated by Father James E. O'MAHONEY, N.Y., Sheed and Ward, 1935, p. 77.

¹⁹ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Malo, q. 16, a. 2, in Quaestiones Disputatae, Vol. 2, cura et studio P. BAZZI, M. CALCATERRA, et al., Editio 8 revisa, Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1949.

²⁰ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 24, a. 2. See also Pierre ROUSSELOT, S.J., The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, Ibid., p. 201.

intellect in two different orders.²¹ The will is the efficient cause and the idea or intellect is the quasi material and dispositive cause.²² Saint Thomas makes the act of election by which deliberation comes to an end an act which is formally in the will and materially in the intellect.²³

Liberty arises from the gap between the will and its object. Joined with an intellect open to being in general, the will tends to the good in general. But it finds itself in the presence of particular good, not the general good, so it remains free.²⁴

Because human actions always have to deal with the particular, the singular, they deal with freedom. This is the realm of liberty, the realm of the variable and the uncertain.²⁵ This is why it is that knowledge of what ought to be done is inevitably filled with uncertainty.

The practical judgment is the decisive influence for action. Abstract moral knowledge may be a condition for

²¹ S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, De Veritate, q. 28, a. 7.

²² Pierre ROUSSELOT, S.J., The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, Ibid., p. 202.

²³ Etienne GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, transl. by L. W. SHOOK, C.S.B., N.Y., Random House, 1946, p. 255.

²⁴ S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 10, a. 2.

²⁵ Etienne GILSON, Ibid., p. 253.

virtue, but it is not the cause of virtue.²⁶ It has its part as a force in union with the appetitive powers.²⁷ All our acts and our elections are in reference to particular things. It is for this reason that the sensitive appetite which has to do with the particular, has great influence in disposing men so that something seems to him this way or that in a particular case. It is in this way that the sense faculties color the intellect and that tendencies of the sense order succeed in moving the will.²⁸ This point is underlined by a consideration of the Thomistic notion of virtue or habit.

VIRTUES

The theory of virtues as adopted in Saint Thomas puts a very clear light on the importance of the distinction between the speculative and the practical intellect. The virtue is looked on as an exclusively personal and practical thing. It regards one's own acts, it deals with particular things and happenings.²⁹

²⁶ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 77, a. 2.

²⁷ Jacques MARITAIN, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Ibid., p. 47.

²⁸ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 9, a. 2.

²⁹ Ibid., 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 47, a. 2, 3, 7.

Saint Thomas defines virtue as "a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions."³⁰ If the virtue is of a kind that perfects man's appetite, then it is called moral virtue.³¹ So a moral virtue is a right disposition of the appetitive power. If virtue is such that it rightly disposes the reason, then it is called an intellectual virtue. Moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite. It is a kind of habit.³² In the Thomistic view, virtue and habit mean the same thing when they are applied to the practical intellect.

In general, Saint Thomas defines habit as "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill and this either in regard to itself or in regard to another; thus health is a habit."³³ If the habit perfects the practical intellect about things to be done or made, then this habit is called virtue. If the habit perfects the speculative intellect, then it is merely called habit, for example, the habit of the science of metaphysics. This makes it clear

³⁰S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 58, a. 2. "Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum."

³¹Ibid., 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 58, a. 3.

³²Ibid., 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 59, a. 1.

³³Ibid., 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 49, a. 1. "Habitudo dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est."

that habit and virtue with regard to the practical intellect mean the same thing. It is a disposition of the soul that perfects the intellect with regard to singular things to be done. In other words, habit is a more general term than virtue and virtue is one particular kind of habit.

Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to the good as defined by reason.³⁴ When man has moral virtue, he has a right disposition of appetitive powers, and this includes even some of his sense powers.³⁵ This means that the sensitive and emotional part of man must be influenced before man can be said to have prudence.

Habits are dispositions or potencies and they are moved to act only by something outside of themselves.³⁶ Those habits which are also virtues exist either in the will or some power inasmuch as it is moved by the will because the will moves all other powers to their acts in some way. So if a man does a good act it is because basically he has a good will. The power which makes the man do the good act and not merely have the potentiality to do it is therefore either the will or some power moved by the will. It appears, then, that a certain amount of development of good will is necessary

³⁴ S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 59, a. 4.

³⁵ Ibid., 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 56, a. 4.

³⁶ Ibid., 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 51, a. 3.

before a man is in a position to do a good act. Maritain indicates this when he says that a habit adds something to a man. It "raises the human subject and his natural powers to a higher degree of vital formation of energy - or that makes him possessed of a particular strength of his own."³⁷ With this development of his powers man is capable of doing things which he would not be able to do without this development.

In his explanation of prejudice, Allport recognizes the importance of habit. He says "Memberships constitute a web of habits."³⁸ He says that man is born into memberships which he finds lock-stitched into the very fabric of his existence.³⁹ Although he sees the relationship of habits like this that are forced on man to prejudice, he does not seem to consider man's formative power in constructing his own habits.

With the distinction between the abstract ideal which affects the intellect and the practical idea or practical judgment which is alone a force for action, Thomism avoids a morality which is merely subjective. But even abstract ideas or speculative judgments, once they are repeated enough to

³⁷Jacques MARITAIN, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Ibid., p. 48.

³⁸Gordon W. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley, Inc., 1954, p. 46.

³⁹Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 30.

develop within a man a disposition to make them well, will hasten the coming of the virtue of prudence. For there is no prudence worthy of the name without some degree of developed virtue and very little moral sensitivity where virtue has not spread from the will to the other appetites of the body. Morality, then, is not just in the spirit but in the body also.¹¹ In fact, the whole moral system of Saint Thomas is reducible to the conquest of the body by the spirit and the penetration of opaque matter by the light of the mind.⁴⁰ It is the practical judgment acting as both moving force and as object to be obtained which binds together thought and action. In accordance with what kind of a man he is, so does the end appear to him. It is the practical judgment which brings into a unity thought and appetite.

APPETITE

Since appetite plays so important a part in false judgment and also constitutes an essential element of the judgment of the practical intellect, it is a very important element in the explanation of prejudice. For this reason it is important to say just what appetite is and what is its relationship to man's mind.

⁴⁰ Pierre ROUSSELOT, S.J., L'Intellectualisme De Saint Thomas, Paris, Beauchesne, 1924, p. 202.

In man appetite is a conscious inclination towards a known good which is suitable to man in some way or other. Appetite and knowledge are distinct powers. Even though what is apprehended and what is desired is the same object, yet it is that same object reached under a different aspect. The apprehensive power takes in something as sensible or intelligible but the appetite takes in the object as suitable or good.⁴¹ Another way of putting this is to say that the mind apprehends things as universals while the appetite tends to the things themselves whose being is restricted to the particular.⁴² This shows both the relationship of the appetite to the mind in the process of judgment and also indicates the advantage which the appetite has. The appetite reaches immediately to the thing as it is in its particular concrete reality. The intellect reaches first to the universal and only by an indirect and circuitous route comes to know the particular concrete reality. In this way the appetite precedes the act of reason when there is a question of reaching an end by choice of various means.⁴³ In this way the appetite can sometimes block the end from being known by the intellect. For example, the proposition, "Colored and White

⁴¹ THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, q. 80, a. 1, ad 2^{um}.

⁴² Ibid., 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 66, a. 4.

⁴³ Ibid., 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 66, a. 4.

children should be treated equally in the schools", is approached in a different way by the intellect and by the appetite. The intellect considers the purpose of this proposition and various other general aspects of it before it gets around to considering means to accomplish it. The appetite does not approach the proposition in that way. It directs itself to singulars and considers immediately the means and the concrete singular realities concerned. In this way it can contribute very much towards the making of false judgments and to the blocking of the possibility of true judgment. The following chapter illustrates how this occurs in various types of false judgments.

CHAPTER VI

AFFECTIVITY AND JUDGMENT

The first type of false judgment to consider is that made by the man who has difficulty with his practical judgment. Such a man makes a false practical judgment in applying principles to a concrete case. His principles are true but he merely fails to apply them. An example of this is the man who clearly admits that justice to the Negro is the right thing but at the same time he cannot see how that principle applies to this particular Negro going to this particular public school. This is an example of the simplest and most obvious type of difficulty which leads to false judgment. At least it is simplest from the viewpoint of the metaphysics of knowledge in which prejudice helps produce falsity by blocking the truth. In this case the universal idea and the principle developed from it are known, but prejudice blocks the intellect from passing on to the singular conclusion, namely, that this act of excluding the colored children from this school is an act of injustice.

Defective judgments about general principles are much more complicated. Yet these judgments are very important because they provide the major premise for the syllogism which concludes with a judgment of the practical intellect. Here is an example: major- Compulsory color segregation should not be practiced; minor- This act is an act of compulsory color segregation; conclusion- This act should not be practiced.

The major states a general principle. It appeals more to the intellect. The minor and the conclusion are on a different plane.¹ The condition of the appetitive powers of a man will very clearly influence the truth or falsity of his minor and conclusion. But can defects also be introduced into the judgment of the speculative intellect so that they are also made false?

One way in which such defects are introduced to the judgments of the speculative intellect is through the making of false practical judgments over a long period of time. Such a practice influences even the judgments of the speculative intellect. For example, living all one's life in a promiscuous town does not generate respect for matrimony. It does just the opposite. Daily life, and the practice of certain practical judgments develop in the mind a certain connaturality in the intellect towards unchastity. This connaturality interferes with the speculative intellect's effort to make true judgments.

More simply put, this means that practice affects theory. If I constantly refuse to have anything to do with the Negro, refuse him the ordinary marks of courtesy and

¹Jacques MARITAIN, Existence And The Existent, N.Y., Pantheon Books, Inc., 1948, pp. 51, 52.

respect, my theory will soon be affected by my practice.²

Are the principles of the speculative intellect, then, obtained from practice? Not entirely. The principles of the speculative intellect can be purely speculative when they deal with first principles. These are the principles which follow on the understanding of being. They are the principles of identity, of contradiction, and of sufficient reason. The speculative intellect gives an immediate grasp of these as soon as it understands them in its first sense experience. With regard to these principles, error and prejudice are excluded.

The first principles in moral matters are known by the practical intellect in an immediate grasp of them as soon as their meaning is understood.³ About these also, error and prejudice are impossible.

The more remote principles of the speculative intellect and of moral science are open to error. The scientific judgments of ethics, inasmuch as they are scientific, are concerned with universals. In this kind of judgment there is no knowledge of the singular. These judgments are arrived at in many ways. They require reflection on the nature of man and

²UNESCO, The Race Question In Modern Science, N.Y., United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956, p. 231.

³S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Quaestiones Disputatae, Vol. 1, De Veritate, cura et studio T. Raymundi SPIAZZI, O.P., Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1949, q. 16, a. 1.

the nature of society.

To form further developed principles of the moral law, more inference is required. When the principle is one such as "Segregation is wrong", a very refined process of inference must be gone through to arrive at it. A universal proposition of this kind presupposes induction, an analysis of human nature, a refining of judgments from more universal to less universal and a whole series of comparisons. All these processes are involved in the attaining of the universal concepts which are used in definitions. These definitions are not derived from reasoning or demonstration. They are discovered by a process which varies according to the kind of concept in question.

" The effort to obtain a definition sometimes begins with a confused concept. For example, a concept of a circle begins with a confused perception of circular form. It is not really fully known until one gets to learn the origin of the circle as a result of the rotation of a curved line around a point.⁴ //

" Far from being the summit of knowledge, the essence or concept is merely an inferior classification¹¹ of a thing which reasoning uses. It needs to be further defined by discursive knowledge. Essences are universals which are obtained by a

⁴J. M. LE BLOND, Logique Et Méthode Chez Aristote, Étude Sur La Recherche Des Principes Dans La Physique Aristotélicienne, Paris, J. Vrin, 1939, p. 437.

pre-scientific process, a condensation of images, a process which is more or less penetrated by an intellectual intuition. This condensation of images takes place by induction, deduction and analysis. All these processes in turn, are likely to be influenced by connaturality of various kinds, by natural gifts and by developed habits.⁵

Analysis is the ordinary reasoning process used to develop a concept. In the preamble to his physics, Aristotle points this out. He represents the man seeking knowledge as faced with a confused chaos of immediate experience.⁶ The process of understanding will consist of distinguishing the parts in this confusion, then in turn, forming the confusion into an ordered unity by means of the distinction of parts. A name, for example, "round" means a sort of figure. This definition analyzes it into its particular meanings.

This process is a rational analysis, not an experimental analysis. The divisions introduced in the definitions are not proofs. They are supported by sensible experience, even prolonged sensible experience. One does not prove, for example, that there are such things as substance and accident, matter and form, white and black. Neither are these concepts

⁵J. M. LE BLOND, *Ibid.*, p. 437-438.

⁶ARISTOTLE, *Physica* (*Physics*), translated by E. P. HARDIE and E. K. JAYE, book 1, chapter I, 184^a, in *Great Books of the Western World*, Robert Maynard HUTCHINS, Editor, Vol. 8, p. 259.

given in initial experience, but they are elaborations of experiences, rational interpretations of that which is contained in the data presented by the senses.

This is not a physical analysis done by sense-perception but a metaphysical analysis in which the mind goes beyond sensible perception.⁷

Definitions, then, are not merely the passive receptions of the forms or representations of things. They are a knowledge of a necessity included in the thing. One would not have intelligence of the meaning of the concept "eclipse" without distinguishing in it its cause, the coming of the earth between the viewer and the moon. This is not merely a passive act but it includes the experience and the constructive activity of the receiver.⁸ It is in this way that experience plays a part in the organization of the data of sense experience and in the building up of classifications for analysis. The divisions, the distinctions made are inspired by familiar experience. It is from these that the justification of a rational explanation comes. The distinctions used in the organization of concepts certainly have to be in the mind before they are imposed on objects. But they appear in the mind as a result of prolonged experience. In this experience the

⁷J. K. LE BLOND, *Ibid.*, p. 438, 439.

⁸S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, *Summa Theologiae*, 1^a, 2.79, a. 3, ad 1^{um}: q. 85, a. 1, ad 3^{um}.

groupings of things in daily life, in language, in custom, in business, make their impression on the mind. The divisions made in the analysis of concepts are affected by this experience.⁹ During all this process of the development of concepts and the inferences derived from them, there is much room for the influence of connaturality and of affectivity on developing the judgment. Because they are important sources of error in judgment, and therefore of prejudice, it is important to say something about each of them.

CONNATURALITY

Connaturality, in general, means connected with a thing by nature. Although it is clear that man's intellect and senses are connected by nature with his knowing, it is not quite so clear that the appetitive faculties also play a cognitive role. Yet if man is a unity and pursues or knows truth with his entire being, then feelings, desires and tendencies which make up part of man's consciousness, are indispensable elements of his judgment. Man not only needs a moral

⁹J. N. LE BLOND, Ibid., p. 442.

preparation for the perception of certain truths,¹⁰⁻¹¹ but in order to understand some truths he needs to develop within his soul a certain connaturality. Saint Thomas says,

Now rectitude of judgments is two-fold: first, on account of the perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus about matters of chastity a man who has learned moral science judges rightly; but a man who has the habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.¹²

The fact that Saint Thomas distinguishes "connatural" knowledge from the knowledge gained by reason clearly marks it as a different way of knowing from reasoning. In an earlier text

¹⁰ Philip FLANAGAN, Newman, Faith And The Believer, Westminster, Md., Newman Bookshop, 1946, p. 107. "The previous state of the mind has an influence on the giving of assent, not only because our moral character may affect our ability to recognise truth, but also because, when we give our attention to a piece of evidence, we do not suddenly forget all that we already hold as established."

¹¹ Dietrich VON HILDEBRAND, Fundamental Moral Attitudes, transl. by Alice M. JOURDAIN, N.Y., Longmans, Green, 1950, p. 14, 15.

¹² S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 45, a. 2. "Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo, secundum perfectum usum rationis; alio modo, propter connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus iam est iudicandum. Sicut de his quae ad castitem pertinent per rationis inquisitionem recte iudicat ille qui didicit scientiam moralem: sed per quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa recti iudicat de eis ille qui habet habitum castitatis."

he had pointed out this same distinction:

Just as a man gives his assent to first principles, by the natural light of the intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue.¹³

The explanation of the theory of connaturality seems to go like this. Acquisition of virtue implies that a course of action has been followed until the operation of it becomes something like a "second nature". When that happens, a virtuous action is raised to the level of spontaneity so there is no longer any need to refer back to first principles on each occasion. A man of such habits has merely to glance at his own tendencies to see how they react. Such a man can judge about a specific object of a virtue by noticing the greater or less facility entailed in the exercise of its corresponding actions.¹⁴ Rousselot illustrates this with two familiar examples. He says,

C'est ainsi qu'un Londonien, incapable d'établir un classement logique des cas où l'on dit shall ou will, vous répondra juste et sans hésitation sur des exemples concrets, - à moins qu'il ne s'empêtre d'une réflexion, au lieu d'écouter marcher ses organes. Tel enfant, encore inhabile à appliquer les notes droit et gauche, pour faire la distinction, esquisse machinalement un signe de croix.¹⁴

¹³S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3^{um}. "Sicut homo per naturale lumen intellectus assentit principiis, ita homo virtuosus per habitum virtutis habet rectum iudicium de his quae conveniunt virtuti illi." ad 2^{am}

¹⁴Pierre ROUSSELOT, S.J., L'intellectualisme De Saint Thomas, Paris, Beauchesne, 1924, p. 71.

Between the action of the child in making the sign of the cross and the judgment about which hand is right, an inference is slipped in with lightning like rapidity. This inference is based on a known relation between the action and its habitual object.

Habit is related to connaturality. Habit is a sort of nature, "qualibet natura". It has an essence as an accident has. This consists of a certain intentionality, a "leaning towards" a definite act. Through this "leaning towards" the definite act, for example, chastity, it establishes a relationship of connaturality to the act of chastity.

Habit and connaturality develop as man repeats his judging well or badly of singulars. Practical judgments about singulars, men, situations and things are acts of virtue, or vice.¹⁵ Their repetition brings habit, an inclination, a feeling, a hunch - like the farmer who "feels rain coming".

With the habit comes connaturality, an intentionality, a disposition in the intellect which is like the action that has been repeated. Connaturality is the setting up or establishing that "likeness to" or intentionality towards the act. Judgments can then be made according to the habits of virtue or vice. For example, the practical judgments of the saint who cannot give the theology behind his acts. The reflections of such a man go back only to habit, or previous practice, not

¹⁵See Chapter 5 of this thesis.

to a speculative justification.

Since virtue deals with singulars, the role of affectivity, the role of sensuality as it affects sense appetite and will, is tremendous in the practice of virtue. Here a clear overcoming of sense is needed for action. A man cannot live the life of a tom-cat for twenty years, read one book, and be converted overnight. He could not even see the meaning of such a book.

Yet, if for twenty years man so acts, his practical judgments will look for justification in the speculative intellect.

This doctrine of connaturality is Thomistic, but it justifies Plato's idea that man must pull away from his sense desires before he will get to the truths of science and philosophy. You can't even reason with a man whose sense pull is great and unrestrained. Saint Thomas' clearest text on the matter is as follows:

For it sometimes happens that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion; thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action, so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz., the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright about the end. This is done by moral virtue; for the virtuous man judges

aright of the end of virtue, because such as a man is, such does the end seem to him.¹⁶

A man must first see that individual things, like eating with a colored man, are not bad before he will be capable of seeing speculative truth. He needs to develop some connaturality. He needs to be prepared, rightly disposed before he will assent to such judgments.

For the sake of understanding the workings of connaturality better, it may be conveniently divided into "cognitive connaturality" and "affective connaturality". "Cognitive connaturality" refers to a metaphysical property or quality by which a faculty is proportioned to its object either in virtue of what it is itself or by virtue of an acquired disposition.¹⁷ In this case the intellect is specified by acquired dispositions. "Cognitive" connaturality refers to

¹⁶S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 58, a. 5. "Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrumpitur in particulare, per aliquam passionem: sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilia, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem: virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."

¹⁷Jacques CHATEAU, o.m.i., "Humani Generis" et L'Existentialisme, in Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa, Section speciale, Vol. 22, issue of 1952, p. 161*.

the object in reference to its likeness or similitude to the intelligence or to the sense. But it refers to the objective intelligibility of the object. The luminosity of the object itself is the "means by which" such knowledge is now possessed. Although such knowledge is "connatural", the object is reached according to its own objective notes.

"Affective" connaturality is more complex. It relates the object to the knower through the agreement of the subjective states of the knower to the object. Love for another person, for example, unveils in that person the reasons for love which are conformed to the dispositions of the lover. The "means by which" such knowledge is possessed is no longer drawn from the object but from the subject.¹⁸

The classical example of such affective connaturality is the example of the chaste man. The moral philosopher sets out from pre-existing moral ideas and then makes deductions; the chaste man experiences within himself sympathy for or repugnance to an action which is in accord or in discord with his own love for the virtue of chastity.

In order to make clearer the influence that affectivity has on knowledge, it will be helpful to analyze the workings of this kind of knowledge.

Although affective knowledge results from a blending of the powers of knowledge and appetite, such a blending does

¹⁸ Jacques GROPEAU, o.m.i., Ibid., p. 161^a.

not always result in the knowledge which is strictly affective. The operation of the will for example, is always necessary to put intelligence into act, even though that act is not affective. The will is necessary inasmuch as it moves all the powers to their ends.

Affective knowledge begins at that point at which I am no longer neutral with regard to the object of my inquiry. When the object of my knowledge is also the object of my affection and is colored by my affective state, then I have strictly affective knowledge. An example would be the knowledge I have of my mother. My affection towards her becomes an active principle. It reveals in her similarities between traits which are discoverable in her and my own affective condition.

As an active principle, then, in the process of knowledge, what is it precisely that affection or emotion does? In general, it does three things. First, it performs a classification of selection and rejection. It selects those notes which are in agreement with its tendencies and rejects those that are opposed to it. This selection may be such as to magnify or belittle the object. Saint Thomas seems to say this in the text when he says "Love is said to discern inasmuch as it moves the reason to discern."¹⁹ The meaning of

¹⁹S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 28, a. 2. "Dicitur amor discernere, in quantum movet rationem ad discernendum."

this discerning power of love is more fully expressed in the following text which distinguishes the intimate apprehension of the lover from the superficial apprehension of a neutral person.

The lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension inasmuch as a lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul.²⁰

The above text suggests that through affectivity the knower does more than merely select and classify notes of the object known. It suggests a second thing that affectivity does, namely, it adds a modality in the order of specification. This means, as John of Saint-Thomas says, "Affectivity transposes itself into a modality of the object known." As the affections of the knower blend with the object known, and because of that blending, the object is found to be more agreeable to the subject and more united with the subject. Then because of that agreeableness, the intellect is drawn to the object as something which is already a part of the knower. The text from John of Saint-Thomas is as follows:

Amor et affectus potest duplicem considerationem habere. Primo, ut applicat se et alias potentias ad operandum et sic solum se habet effective et executive in ordine ad illas operationes, scilicet per

²⁰ S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 28, a. 2. "Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae amatum pertinent intrinsicis disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur."

modum applicantis ad agendum: secundo ut applicat sibi objectum, et illud unit et inviscerat sibi per quandam fruitionem et quasi connaturalitatem et proportionem cum tali objecto et quasi experitur illud experientia affectiva juxta illud Psalm XXXIII: Gustate et videte. Et sic affectus transit in conditionem objecti, quatenus ex tali experientia affectiva redditur objectum magis conforme et proportionatum et unitum personae eiique magis conveniens, et sic fertur in intellectus in illud ut expertum et contactum sibi; et hoc modo se habet amor ut praecise movens in genere causae obiectivae, quatenus per tale experimentum diversimode proportionatur et conveniens redditur objectum.²¹

Affection unites the lover with the object by accomplishing that the lover see the object as in agreement with his own subjective conditions. His intelligence reaches to the thing as something already related to him, something which agrees with him, something of which he has already had experience that is favorable. Affection thus becomes a new modality of the thing known because the thing is known as being in agreement with the knower.

But this new modality added by affectivity is not a modality in the line of intelligible determinations. Affectivity does not add new notes to the object but it presents the same old notes under the new modality of being related to and in agreement with the knower. In other words, the object is known as an object which is at the same time producing a very acceptable adaptation in the appetitive faculty of the knower. Thus the object is seen as though it were endowed

²¹JOANNES a SANCTO-THOMA, *Cursus Theologicus*, in 1^{am}, 2^{ae}, q. 70, disp. 18, a. 4, n. 9, quoted by Jacques GROTEAU, o.m.i., *Op. cit.*, p. 163*.

with the affective coloring of the subject. This means that the object, because it has been touched by affectivity, contains more in its representative form or idea than before it was so touched. In this way the content of the idea is transposed into the affectivity of the knower.

With this operation the knower gets an appreciative, an interior or an estimative value of the object known. Such knowledge underlies what Newman would call the difference between a real assent and a notional assent.²²

The third effect which affectivity accomplishes in the knower is that it carries him towards the concrete singular object. As the apprehensive power of man tends to bring the object in to him, so does the appetitive or affective modification of the appetitive power carry the man towards the object as it is in itself. In this way it happens that through affectivity a thing can be more perfectly loved than it is known.

|| This point may be illustrated from the example of chastity. The moral philosopher may have an abstract notion of the value and meaning of chastity. || The chaste man experiences a feeling of sympathy or revulsion within himself which guides him. This sympathy or feeling is in the affective order. Of the two, which has the better grasp of reality?

Russell

²² John Cardinal Henry NEWMAN, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, N.Y., Longmans, 1947, p. 19.

If it is recalled that chastity in itself is not a thing but a chaste man is an existing thing, then it appears that the moralist possesses a generalized abstraction while the chaste man has an experience of a reality that is present to him. One has a transferrable, communicable idea. The chaste man has a real intuition. He is enriched by a higher form of knowledge than merely conceptual knowledge. It is a knowledge that is intuitive and personal in character.²³ It is a knowledge which can be so blended with the appetite and affectivity of the knower that he may love a thing more perfectly than he knows it. Beyond that which is known of the thing, the strength of his love may carry him towards that about the thing which remains unknown. It may be loved as it is without being known as it is. Thus it happens that as a man's affective experience about a thing increases, so does his desire increase to pierce through the mystery which surrounds the thing.

// In summary then, these are the three steps which are discernible in affectivity's work as it influences connatural knowledge.²⁴ Affectivity increases the power of discernment because it makes for deeper attention in selecting the notes of the object loved. It enriches the knowledge of the object by adding to it the experience of the subjective state of the

²³Pierre ROUSSELOT, S.J., Ibid., p. 72.

²⁴Jacques CHOTEAU, O.M.I., Ibid., p. 165*.

knower. Finally, by carrying the knower towards the reality itself, even towards the elements in it that are unknown, it intensifies one's affective experience of the thing. //

How great the influence of affectivity is on man's knowledge may be judged from the fact that it is sometimes given as the reason why philosophers and metaphysicians differ so much among themselves.²⁵ Part of the reason for this is that the more seriously a philosopher advances in age and experience, the more likely he is to be impressed by the complexity of truth and the difficulty of solving philosophical problems. But the fact that effective dispositions play a part in helping reason to attain more assured knowledge in moral matters does not mean that man is incapable of discerning the truth with his reason. It does mean that in practical judgments, the free assent of the will²⁶ and affectivity play a big role.

When, then, is connatural knowledge true and when is it false? This is very difficult to say. There is a science of ethics, but no theory of the practical intellect's part in ethics. Yet in his practical judgments man deals with singulars as a doctor deals with a diagnosis.

²⁵Albert DONDEYNE, Contemporary European Thought And Christian Faith, Pittsburgh, Pa., Duquesne University Press, 1958, p. 74.

²⁶S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 17, a. 6.

Suppose two doctors make diagnoses. One is well informed, speculatively. He says, "No cancer." The other has a sub-conceptual knowledge of cancer from experience of many cases, from long practice and habit. He knows before he learns all the symptoms. He says, "Cancer." Which one is right? In cases like this the truth can be checked by the turn of events. In other cases, it may be checked by confirmation from other sources. In some cases, it cannot be checked. For example, the judgment reached by a music expert that a rendition of Beethoven's "Für Elise" is good may be confirmed by common agreement. It may not. When the experts differ on such a judgment, there may be no way of telling who is right. A few illustrations drawn from color prejudice in the United States may illustrate the roles of connaturality and affectivity better than further analysis.

AN INTRICATE PROBLEM FOR THE MAN OF GOOD WILL

The man of good will in the southern part of the United States has a difficult time in arriving at a clear and certain conclusion about the proposition, "Segregation is wrong." Just what is the meaning of segregation? Is it a pattern of action which applies to every aspect of man's personal life? Is it wrong, for example, to select my close friend on a basis of color? Or is segregation only wrong when it interferes with civil rights or the public activity of temporal society?

If a man of good will agrees that segregation is wrong when it is imposed as a pattern on temporal society, then he must decide for himself just what is temporal society in the context of life in the United States. The United States Government is not identifiable with temporal society, in fact, the Government's say so doesn't much affect temporal society.

Temporal society is the whole of society as a public organization. In the United States this is made up of Government, political parties, national associations, clubs, secular and religious institutions, and local forms of all of these.

Just what clubs or societies in the United States are public or private is not exactly clear. For example, a golf course owned by a state is clearly part of public society. But a golf course owned by an individual or a group of individuals and run as a club, becomes part of temporal society when it reaches a certain size and influence. How large a size? How much influence before it changes from private to public?

An example may illustrate this difficulty. On Wednesday, July 8th, 1959, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche made public the fact that he had been told by the Westside Tennis Club in Forest Hills, Queens, New York, that neither he nor his son could join because they were Negroes. Doctor Bunche, United Nations Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs, who won the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize, said that Wilfred Burglund,

president of the internationally known club, had made it clear to him that the club accepted neither Negroes nor Jews for membership.

Mr. Burglund said, according to Doctor Bunche, that the Westside Tennis Club was private, like a person's home, "where you invite whom you want to."²⁷

As a result of this disclosure the officials of the Westside Tennis Club were asked to appear before New York City Commission on Inter-group Relations for a hearing on its policy of barring Negroes and Jews. Doctor Alfred J. Marrow, chairman of the commission, said it was

unthinkable that major international athletic events for which the general public pays admission should be conducted in this city on the ground of an institution which discriminates in its membership policy.²⁸

The commission chairman said

that because the Westside Tennis Club held the public events like United States tennis championships and the Davis Cup matches, it ceases to have the privilege of private policy decisions which discriminate on the basis of race and religion.²⁹

This investigation helped stir up a debate between acting

²⁷Philip BENJAMIN, Color Line Bars Bunche And Son From Forest Hills Tennis Club, News Dispatch in The New York Times, Vol. 108, no. 37,056, City edition, issue of July 9th, 1959, p. 14, col. 1.

²⁸Philip BENJAMIN, City Investigates Tennis Club Bias, News Dispatch in The New York Times, Vol. 108, No. 37,057, City edition, issue of July 10th, 1959, p. 13, col. 4.

²⁹Philip BENJAMIN, Ibid., p. 13, col. 4.

mayor, Abe Stark, and the Department of Licenses. Acting License Commissioner, Thomas M. O'Neill, reported that the Westside Tennis Club was considered a private club and exempt from the licensing law.

Mr. Stark, replying to Mr. O'Neill's opinion that the club was exempt from the licensing law, said:

The administrative code declares that when public sports are held indoors or outdoors, licenses are required. So some one better apply for a license before any public exhibitions are held there.³⁰

The pressure of public opinion against the Westside Tennis Club action in refusing Doctor Bunche soon mounted to such a point that the club's restriction against Negroes was ended. That in itself might be another point to illustrate something of the public effects of this club on society around it. The point especially important in the incident is that, although ownership of the club remained private, this incident focused public attention on the fact that the national and international events played at this club properly designated it as being public inasmuch as it was clearly influencing society. In other instances it might not be so easy to see this distinction.

When the United States Government decides that schools must be integrated, as it has at Little Rock, temporal society

³⁰ Philip BENJAMIN, Stark Lets to Force Forest Hills to Drop Bias or Cup Matches, News Dispatch in The New York Times, Vol. 108, no. 37,058, City edition, issue of July 11th, 1959, p. 8, col. 1.

is not immediately much affected. The local feeling and much of the national feeling in practice is against integration. Because Governor Faubus has much sympathy in the north since the north has not basically accepted integration as part of its institutional life, he is able to defy the government with some success.

So, from a purely speculative point of view, the man of good will has a difficult time in arriving at the conclusion, "Segregation is wrong in this particular instance." He has a difficult time even in applying the concepts that make up his premises.

AFFECTIVITY AND THE MAN OF GOOD WILL

If from the purely cognitive or informational point of view the man of good will has difficulty with judgments of the speculative intellect, these difficulties are much increased when the influence of affectivity is considered. As the speculative judgment is combined with the practical judgment which leads to a parrotical conclusion, all the combined difficulties of finding the truth in both the speculative and practical judgment are added together. Throughout this process, affectivity, the attraction of appetites, both spiritual and sensual, play a dominant role.

Consider the influence of affectivity on a typical southerner as he tries sincerely to consider the argument, "Color segregation in public schools is un-American and should

be ended. Color segregation is practiced in my home-town school. Color segregation as practiced in my home-town school is un-American and should be ended."

This typical southerner lives in a small town in the southern part of the United States in which there is a fairly nice high school. This high school is attended only by white children. There is a rather poor colored school, attended only by the colored. There is a nice church in the town for whites only. The colored also have a small church.

As this typical southerner tries to consider this argument, he sees it opposed to many things that are dear to him, things that are good, things that have worked. The citizens of his town get along with the colored people pretty well. The white and colored people have a working agreement. As he sees it, the schools are doing a pretty good job of educating against great odds. Now, suddenly, he is told that this situation will be replaced by an invasion of colored children into the school. He sees the legal entrance of even a few Negro children into the white school as the beginning of the end of the education of the white children. Despite the ultimate advantages that the future may promise both for education and cooperation between the two groups, all that he can see is that, possibly, after two or three generations, with the best of effort, the general situation will be back to its present state of harmony. And this precarious gain will be made at the price of a very real present risk.

When he sees this change in prospect and finds that it is being pushed by agitators from outside his own home town, he is affected emotionally. This is his home, his town, and his school. It will never be the same again. He doesn't want any change.

If the razing and replacing of a family home in which a man has lived all his life causes the ordinary normal man an emotional upset, what must it be to a southerner of good will who sees his whole town about to be razed and rebuilt, and all this at the instigation of people who never did and never will live in that town.

With this emotional and affective pull upon him, he has to sit down and balance out for himself the truth of the statement "Color segregation is un-American and should be ended." As he sincerely tries to perform this task, he is aware that those who are asking him to decide in favor of it, would not do as much as he has done for these people. They would not make the decision they are asking him to make. As he sees it this is the same demand that was made by the abolitionists at the time of the Civil War. This is the demand that was made of his forefathers, a demand that caused all that bloodshed, horror and confusion.

As he weighs the proposition, he sees plenty of truth to support his prejudice, no matter what evidence may be urged against it. Here he has lived his whole life successfully. He has been praised by the community, by priests, by

public officials, and nothing was ever said against this practice of segregation. Now suddenly he is told that it is wrong and he should see the reasons for it being wrong.

He knows that in the times following the Civil War, and even long years after, many holy priests and many religious people felt that they had done well by the Negro in holding fast to the truths that they had souls and that they needed some sort of instruction, without making any fight against segregation. He believes that that was the most that they possibly could do, even if they had wanted to do more.

Even if he is able to settle on his major premise and see clearly that segregation is un-American and, in general, should be ended, he still has to apply this general principle to the particular case of his own nearby school. Despite much sincere effort, such a man is not likely to arrive at the practical conclusion. The pre-disposing influence of a negative type of affective connaturality is an influence that blocks him at every step of the long process of coming to the practical conclusion.

It is through this process that the social structure and cultural patterns help produce prejudice. Frazier says,

One might say that the entire culture of the American people has until World War II and the years following stamped the Negro as an inferior human being unfit for assimilation into American life.³¹

³¹ E. Franklin FRAZIER, The Negro in the United States, N.Y., Macmillan, 1949, p. 669.

This process of "stamping" the Negro as "an inferior human being" is the very process described above as the development of a negative affective connaturality in many white Americans.

Here is a point in which philosophy adds detail and completeness to modern sociology and psychology's description of the socio-cultural causes of prejudice. Such an explanation goes much deeper than merely describing and classifying the nouns "that cut alices".³²

Cultural background in practice makes certain words become like red flags to a bull. For example, the word "German" and "Nazi" to certain sections of France during the war brought with them much emotional tone. The words "Catholic", "Pope", "Negro" and "Jew" bring with them to many groups a train of associations and memories that block judgment. In all of this the development of affectivity plays a large part.

Affectivity, of course, has its maximum opportunity where both the judgments of the speculative and practical intellect need to be examined before being accepted. In such a case the highly elaborated process in which the speculative judgment is formed must be examined.³³ When such judgments concern prejudice they are usually made in the context of man

³²Gordon W. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 178.

³³See p. 116-120 of this chapter.

in society, because prejudiced judgments deal with persons. They are judgments which do not concern man alone but man as a member of a group, of a social group inside another social group. After the judgment about the group is made, then a value judgment concerned with some particular man as a member of this group must be made.

Basically the process requires an analysis of human nature, an analysis of the nature of society, of the family, the faith and temporal society. From such an analysis a decision must be made on what is suitable to man in such a society and what is not suitable; what actions are good and what are bad, to be done or not to be done because of man in such a society. To arrive at this conclusion a certain type of action like the exclusion of a man from a restaurant must be analyzed. What precisely is the nature of this action? How does this action suit this particular type of man at this particular stage of his existence? Is such an action just or unjust, an act of love or an act of hate to this man under these circumstances of society.

Very few of these points are reached by deduction. They involve an induction in which a whole series of circumstances are weighed, and weighed accurately. This is a kind of phenomenology, an effort to see what precisely is the nature of this act that must be judged.

By another series of inductions the nature and needs of this man at this stage of his development is reached.

Then a comparison is made between these two concepts and they are found to be either in agreement or disagreement, right or wrong. This process of weighing of essences is arrived at by much induction and careful analysis. Anywhere along the line of analysis and induction man's will, his appetite, his affectivity can upset the process. When this happens it is generally expressed in a judgment like "Well this type of action is not really bad! Exclusion from this restaurant really is not an injury to this man!"

EXAMPLES OF AFFECTIVITY BLOCKING THE EVIDENCE

Suppose a man was married and divorced before his conversion to the Catholic faith. Now he has children. Now to see the truth of the proposition "The Roman Catholic Church is the true church", includes with it his acceptance of the church's position on divorce. He knows that the church never allows divorce despite the fact that the Anglican Church or the Russian Orthodox Church or other churches do approve of it. To become a Catholic it is required that he accept this. To accept the Catholic position he must throw off a terrific weight of affective pull from his will. His will is face to face with the attraction of a great and present good which he desires. If he is strongly convinced ahead of time that the Catholic Church really is not the true church, he won't make the effort needed to offset the strong pull of his appetite. He needs the virtue of fortitude to go through this long

process. He needs some strong motivating force necessary to keep pushing him to complete the process. He might possibly find such a motivating force in his desire to please his wife.

If, instead of having a strong motive pushing him through the process, a man sees the conclusion towards which he is working as a threat to some real goods, some genuine and certain goods like 1) a way of life, 2) economic standing, 3) position and status in the community, 4) safety for himself and his family, 5) a home environment suitable for his family, he may never get to the conclusion. When he sees the conclusion as a threat to these goods, the emotion of fear upsets the balance of his intellect. He wants to maintain these goods and he wants to maintain them with peace of conscience, not with the conviction that in maintaining them he is going against his conscience and is a bum.

When the conclusion "You should let this Negro into this school" is incompatible with real present good, then the conclusion is seen as a real evil. This conclusion is not arrived at in one glance, as a man might look up at a crucifix, but it is arrived at by a long and indirect process. All during this process, because of the attachment of his will to these present goods, he gets a terrific push in the direction of finding some other conclusion or no conclusion at all. Sometimes, the push is so great that he remains in invincible ignorance with regard to that particular conclusion.

Clearly no direct attack on him is useful in forcing him to arrive at this conclusion. A whole way of life, a life full of actions and formed dispositions that affect his knowing powers are in question. To change he needs a conversion. A way of life and a way of knowing must be put aside. This can be done only indirectly as when, for example, a protestant accepts "the infallibility of the pope". He accepts not because he agrees with it, but because of other doctrines. He finds the totality of the church's teaching as generally acceptable. Because he sees these other doctrines as a good, he will take the infallibility of the pope along with them. Thus, indirectly, he may be converted. All the principles operative in conversion from one faith to another operate also in non-religious prejudice. In general, these come down to an appeal to the will of the individual.

The above example illustrates two points about which a few words should be said. The first is the ubiquitous influence of feelings on human actions. The second is the limitation of liberty by affectivity.

FEELINGS AFFECT ACTIONS

Clearly such states as fear, jealousy, suspicion, resentment, love and hatred affect conduct. They more or less strongly incline man toward things that are attractive and away from things that are repellent. They are the appetites which accompany all human knowledge. They reinforce

motivational tendencies and add the energy of their own dynamics to a motive already aroused.³⁴ In questions which really affect man's daily life, it is practically impossible to eliminate the emotional factor. "Even those who claim to be unbiased are generally inclined to one side or the other."³⁵

Saint Catherine of Siena taught that feelings affect all actions. She says that a man who loves himself is not ready to give his life. Far from it he cannot even bear the least unpleasantness, for he always fears to lose his life and its comforts. She continues:

Therefore everything that he does is done imperfectly and badly, because at heart his feelings are corrupt, and it is through feelings that one acts.³⁶

She does not deny that man acts with knowledge, but emphasizes that it is inseparable from emotion. It is an emphasis that is repeated by Wirth who says:

Academic men are inclined to ascribe an importance to knowledge all out of proportion to its actual role in human conduct [...]. Men do not wait until the latest findings of science are in before

³⁴ Etienne GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, transl. by L. K. SHOOK, N.Y., Random House, 1956, p. 272.

³⁵ Philip FLANAGAN, Newman, Faith And The Believer, p. 56.

³⁶ Johannes JOERGENSEN, Saint Catherine of Siena, transl. by Ingeborg LUND, N.Y., Longmans, 1938, p. 289.

they begin to feel, think, or act on matters that concerns race.³⁷

These opinions on the ubiquity of feeling's influence of human actions might also serve to partially explain how it is that prejudice lingers on even after the rationalizations by which they were first supported have disappeared.

FREEDOM AND AFFECTIVITY

Since affectivity powerfully pushes and pulls man, how much freedom of choice does man have to follow or not follow a prejudice? What is the extent of human freedom where there is a question of habitual judgment? Suppose a man has been judging for years that "the Negro is inferior". He has been allowing the pulls and pushes of affectivity to blind him for years and he is not even aware that his will is affected. How free is he? How culpable?

The answer is not easy to give. It would require an exact knowledge of the conditions surrounding and affecting the person about whom it was asked. This much can be said in general. It is clear that the will's freedom is diminished by the affectivity that builds up under habitual judgments. The frame of reference within which the will operates is contracted in a case where negative connaturality is developed.

³⁷ Louis WIRTH, "Race and Public Policy" in The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 58, no. 4, issue of Apr. 1944, p. 302.

In such a case the mind is like a window which blocks out more and more sunlight by getting more and more dirty. Saint John of the Cross puts it this way:

If the window is in any way stained or misty, the sun's rays will not be able to illuminate and transform it into its own light, totally, as it would if it were clean of all these things and pure.³⁸

Affectivity is like the dirt on the window that lessens the light in which the intellect sees its object. Thus it limits freedom by limiting knowledge.

Another way in which affectivity diminishes freedom is by transforming, changing the character of the one who makes judgments under the influence of affectivity. Man's actions not only follow after him. They change him.

De Montcheuil says,

Our acts change us. [..] The person who is judging after the act is not the same person who judged before it. He is entering into a rushing current and cannot say exactly where it will lead him.³⁹

In other words it is activities exercised on particular objects that make character. Suppose, for example, the case of a man voluntarily sick due to failure to obey his doctor's advice about continence. Previous to his sickness, he was free not to be sick. After it begins, he has thrown away his

³⁸ SAINT JOHN OF THE CROSS, The Complete Works of St. John of the Cross, transl. from the critical edition of P. Silverio de Santa Theresa, C.D. and edited by E. Allison PEERS, 3 Vols., Westminster, Md., Newman, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 82.

³⁹ Yves DE MONTCHEUIL, For Men of Action, Chicago, Fides Publishers, (no date), p. 78.

chance. Just as when a man has thrown a stone, it is too late to stop, but yet it once was in his power not to throw it.

Saint Thomas indicates all this and more when he says that passion can hinder man in three ways; first, by way of distraction; secondly, by way of opposition; and thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation as a result of which the "reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely."⁴⁰

Another indication that the will ultimately has a part in the determination of prejudice is that people are not born with it.⁴¹ Nor do they need to die with it. People can get rid of their prejudices. If this is true, then prejudice, no matter how deeply rooted, does not completely destroy man's freedom.

What might be pointed out to the man of good will is that error helps cause prejudice in two ways. First by inducing a negative connaturality, and secondly, it indirectly causes prejudice by the development of affectivity, the arousing of the appetites. What is more, prejudice once born, tends to perpetuate itself by a repetition of both of these processes.

The following chapter will present the causes of prejudice from the philosophic point of view.

⁴⁰S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, *Summa Theologiae*, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 77, a. 2. "Tertio, per quandam immutationem corporalem, ex qua ratio quodammodo ligatur, ne libere in actum exeat:"

⁴¹Gordon W. ALLPORT, *Ibid.*, p. 324.

CHAPTER VII

CORRELATION

The first two chapters of this thesis described prejudice and its causes from the viewpoint of sociology and of modern psychology. This might also be called a phenomenological viewpoint. From chapter three on up to this present chapter, what philosophies, especially Thomistic philosophy, have to say on prejudice, was treated. This chapter will endeavor to directly correlate what philosophy has to say about prejudice with the phenomenological description of it given by sociology and modern psychology.

It is this correlation which is the contribution of this thesis to new knowledge. This thesis is the application of the metaphysics of knowledge to the problem of prejudice. In it the principles of the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge are extended so that they apply to the question of prejudice. This application illustrates two points. First, that the causality of prejudice proposed by sociology is bulwarked by Thomistic metaphysics and therefore takes on a depth of meaning and of permanence which makes the sociological study of it worthy of the attention of philosophy. Secondly, this application illustrates the perennial fecundity of Thomistic philosophy which can extend itself and incorporate into itself new knowledge, new sciences. At the same time it adds strength and importance to that new science. Finally, by shedding new light on the nature of prejudice and its causes,

this thesis should prove valuable both in indicating how one should proceed towards the conquest of error and prejudice and why the attitude towards the prejudiced person should be the virtue of charity.

In Chapter 1 of this thesis the following definition of prejudice is given:

Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization [...] felt or expressed [...] directed towards a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group.¹

This was the definition settled on to be used in this thesis. The reasons why it was selected are given in Chapter 1.

In Chapter 2 the causes of prejudice so defined were grouped under the three following headings: First, irrational and emotional reactions; second, personal advantage; third, cultural conflict. A condition for the working of all these causes was given as "ignorance".²

Although there is a certain overlapping between these headings, as was noted in Chapter 2, they will be convenient headings under which to make the correlation between what sociology and philosophy have to say about prejudice. At the end of Chapter 2 of this thesis six general approaches to the study of prejudice are listed. In a sense each one of them is a partial explanation of the causality of prejudice. These

¹Chapter 1, p. 8.

²Chapter 2, p. 28.

causalities are as follows: 1) historical, 2) socio-cultural, 3) situational, 4) dynamics and structure of personality, 5) phenomenological, 6) stimulus object.

These six theories on the causality of prejudice are merely another division of the multiple causality of prejudice. They overlap almost entirely the three general divisions of causes already given. For that reason they will not be developed in detail. They will be developed just enough to show the way in which they overlap with the other divisions and where they are helpful by way of suggesting details of correlation that are not implied in the other divisions.

IRRATIONAL REACTIONS

What sociology and modern psychology describe as irrational reactions correlate very well with what Thomistic philosophy has to say about the theory of error. The predominance of prejudice³ the difficulty of really getting to know the truth about any given social situation, all this agrees well with what philosophy has to say about the nature of error.⁴ The fact that there are more prejudiced people in the United States than unprejudiced might be expected when the

³Gordon W. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 77-79. See Also: UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science, N.Y., Whiteside, Inc., 1956, p. (5).

⁴See Chapter 3 of this thesis.

theory of the process of error proposed by philosophers reveals the extensive limitations of man's mind in the search for truth. The very disunity of philosophers⁵ on the nature of error illustrates the difficult path man's mind must follow in order to reach truth.

The very fact, admitted by sociology and modern psychology, that prejudice is an irrational process shows clearly that an understanding of it will be deepened by as clear and complete as possible a theory of man's basically irrational process, namely, the process of making errors.

One cause of error clearly and generally noted by sociology⁶ is the tendency of man to think in categories. Even the relationship between categories and linguistic factors is described.⁷ Sociology recognizes the "stereotype" as related to the category. These are recognized as inter-related one with the other. But just what that relationship is, goes beyond the scope of sociology. When it ventures into a description of the relationship, its explanation becomes confused. Allport, for example, defines stereotype as "an exaggerated belief".⁸ In a paragraph further on he speaks of

⁵See Chapter 4 of this thesis.

⁶See Chapter 2, p. 17 of this thesis.

⁷Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 176-187. "This tendency to rely words underscores the close cohesion that exists between category and symbol."

⁸Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 191.

a stereotype as "the ideational content (the image) that is bound in with the category." Here the one and same author gives the impression that the stereotype is sometimes a judgment, sometimes an image and sometimes a mixture of both.

The above is not meant to be a criticism of the phenomenological description of prejudice but an illustration of the need that such an explanation has of a coherent theory of cognition in which these points can be correlated. The Thomistic theory of cognition offers just what is needed to synthesize and inter-relate these notions. The Thomistic theory of cognition shows how man's knowledge begins from sense objects and proceeds by a process of abstraction to the formation of universal or generalized ideas. In the process of abstraction and in the return of the intellect to the knowledge of the individual concrete sense object, the image or phantasm plays a central role. These universal concepts are expressed externally in words, but the words are by no means identified with the concepts.

In this way an easy correlation between the findings of sociology and philosophy may be made. Categories may be described as universal concepts. A stereotype would be the relationship of the universal concept to the image from which it was drawn. The process of forming categories would correlate with the sense experiences which go into making up the universal concepts.

This correlation shows the importance of the image as a kind of bridge between the concrete material object of sense and the universal ideas formed with the help of these objects.

Above all, the Thomistic theory of error would indicate the need of freedom, or free choice. And this is a point which is generally overlooked in the sociological explanation of the causes of prejudice. The Thomistic theory on the nature of error shows how "assent" is an essential element of all judgment. While it clearly marks "assent" as an act of intellect, it is just as clearly related to the will and to man's freedom.

When sociology or modern psychology find themselves unable to explain variations of opinion or prejudice among people who have had similar environmental influences from childhood, they are indicating their lack of some element in their explanation to account for this difference. They seem to have slipped into that great temptation noted by Dondeyne of treating the mystery of incarnate liberty or the interaction between different liberties according to a naturalistic and monistic causality.⁹

It is very true that in man's thoughts and actions, his prejudices, he owes much to his environment and education. But, as Dondeyne says, "it would be wrong to look upon

⁹Albert DONDEYNE, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, Pittsburgh, Pa., Duquesne University Press, 1956, p. 15.

this dependence as if it were the expression of an impersonal causal process."¹⁰ "Environment for the most part, forms man merely only in as far as he accepts it and allows it to have a formative influence on him." "This act of free acceptance, then, certainly, is a big element in the causality of prejudice."

Even Allport, one of the best writers on the nature of prejudice, seems to yield to this temptation. He notes that the basic need of "trying to build up a world picture that is orderly, manageable and reasonably simple",¹¹ has an important bearing upon group relations. He says,

[...] We tend to regard causation as something people are responsible for. Ultimately it is a Diety who created the world and tidied it up. It is a devil who brings evil and disorder. It is the President of a country who brings on a depression. The conflict in Korea was called "Truman's war". It is the Jew, said Hitler, who caused the war. This anthropomorphic tendency is exceedingly marked [...] thus we continually seek another explanation for our frustrations and ills, and are particularly prone to look for human agencies. This quirk, unless it is strenuously disciplined, predisposes us to prejudice. While in reality our frustrations and ills are frequently due to impersonal causes - to altered economic conditions, to the tides of social and historical change - unless we fully realize this fact we tend to slip into the habit of blaming our lot upon identifiable human agents (scapegoats).¹²

Notice that it is stated as a fact that economic conditions

¹⁰ Albert LOWEYNE, Ibid., p. 15.

¹¹ Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 170.

¹² Ibid., p. 170.

and the tides of social and historical change are frequently due to impersonal causes. The word "frequently" allows, at least sometimes, for the intervention of personal causes. But it would be very difficult to show any instances where a causation that was completely impersonal either altered economic conditions or brought about social and historical change. Furthermore, this view of causality does not allow for the universal and primary causality of a personal God. Yet in seeing this inclination in man to look towards personal causality, sociology and modern psychology bear testimony of the need of more elements in the explanation of prejudice than they are able to supply.

Further indications from sociology that it needs free will in its explanation of prejudice are not lacking. The top socio-psychological study on prejudice admits

While psychological principles help us to understand the process of prejudice, they cannot themselves fully explain why one group and not another should be selected as objects of hate.¹³

Introduction of the element of free will into the causality of prejudice might help this author, Gordon W. Allport, to see more of the answer to this problem. Further on he says that the maximum understanding of the problem of prejudice can be gained only by knowing the historical context of each single case. When he says,

¹³ Ibid., p. 259.

If we are right in asserting that a pattern of particular circumstances determines each object of prejudice, a long volume indeed would be needed to explain the plight of the American Negro, [...] and countless other instances of scapegoating in the world today. The task lies beyond our present reach. It is sufficient if we have illustrated the method of study that must be used.¹⁴

Here again freedom would help in the explanation. Without objecting to what the author says, freedom might be considered as one of the circumstances which determines each act of prejudice. When such a causality is admitted, the volume needed to explain the plight of the American Negro could be more briefly written.

Again, Allport seems to implicitly invoke free choice as the cause of prejudice in talking about the function of ethnic stereotypes. He says that if one accusation at a given time seems to explain or justify our dislike, we call upon it; if an opposite accusation at another time seems more appropriate, we invoke it.¹⁵ This act of ours by which we call on one stereotype or call on another seems to be a free choice of ours. We freely select one rather than the other.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 259.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 196.

Maritain puts freedom as one of the basic elements in the explanation of the "creativity" of poetry.¹⁶ Now, prejudice too, is partly a "creation" of the prejudiced man. He adds something to reality which was not there before. Just as the poet integrates into himself both his view of the external world and of himself, so does the prejudiced man integrate into himself a view of the external world and of himself. This integrated view is a free creation. What Maritain says about poetry can be accurately said about prejudice.

Maritain says,

Poetry is engaged in the free creativity of the spirit. And thus it implies an intellectual act which is not formed by things but is, by its own essence, formative and forming. Well, it is too clear that the poet is a poor god. He does not know himself. And his creative insight miserably depends on the external world, and on the infinite heaps of forms and beauties already made by men, and on the mass of things that generations have learned, and on the code of signs which is used by his fellow men and which he receives from a language he has not made. Yet, for all that he is condemned both to subdue to his own purpose all these extraneous elements and to manifest his own substance in his creation.¹⁷

The need of this "creative" or free act to explain the causality of prejudice may further be seen from the fact that prejudiced judgments generally rest on moral certitude. They

¹⁶Jacques MARITAIN, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Pantheon Books, 1953, p. 150. "For poetry means first of all an intellectual act which by its essence is creative and forms something into being instead of being formed by things."

¹⁷Jacques MARITAIN, Ibid., p. 113.

are not judgments which proceed from strict and necessitating evidence which compel judgment without the help of free will. It is a certitude that is based on moral evidence, usually the reliability of someone else's word or reliability of their example. Such a certitude is a voluntary, free certitude.¹⁸

EMOTIONAL REACTIONS

Emotional tone is given by sociology as a characteristic which marks off the judgment which is prejudiced from other false judgments.¹⁹ This emotional hold correlates well with the dominant role of appetite in the formulation of practical judgments.²⁰ Because of the involved process underlying the act of reasoning, the appetite is given the time and opportunity to influence the intellect, especially when it is making practical judgments. The build-up of affective connaturalities towards objects, the development of habit and virtue, all these might be seen as ways in which philosophy can add depth and completeness to the question, "What is the nature of this emotional hold of prejudice?"

Philosophy, at least Thomistic philosophy, clearly distinguishes between intellect and appetite. In this it

¹⁸ Philip FLANAGAN, Newman, Faith And The Believer, Westminster, Md., The Newman Book Shop, 1946, p. 134.

¹⁹ See Chapter 1, p. 5, of this thesis.

²⁰ See Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.

adds something of clarity to sociology's definition of prejudice. Though both are distinct, they are both conscious processes. Because of this one intimately affects the other. Appetite is not a power of knowing, but it is so closely linked with man's powers of knowing that it is greatly responsible for the irrationality of his reactions. Emotional reactions, inasmuch as they are activities of appetites, are by their very nature "irrational" in the sense that they are not operations by which knowledge is taken in. Unlike cognition, which has a direct objective reference, appetitive experience is a purely subjective experience or response, and exists simply as an "excoitement" or modification of the conscious life of man.

The fact that man is pushed and pulled and blocked by appetite of various kinds might be considered to be a certain disorder in man. This disorder of appetites independently seeking their objects without reference to man's total good must be considered a cause of prejudice. If this is so, where such disorder is corrected by the subordination of these appetites so that they contribute to the good of man, considered as an entirety or a unity, there would be found a remedy against prejudice. There would be a means of bringing man's emotional, appetitive life under the direction of reason. If this happened, man would have emotional reactions that were "rational" inasmuch as they were subordinated to reason.

In the sociological definition of prejudice used in this thesis only "unfavorable" prejudice is considered. Why "unfavorable" prejudice is more prevalent about groups than "favorable" prejudice appears clear from a look at the influence of appetite on the process underlying practical judgments. As was pointed out in chapter 6, it is easier to err in this process than to carry it through to a truthful judgment.

PERSONAL CONFLICT

Under this heading of personal conflict there are many subdivisions listed, all of them beginning with goods to be gained for the person who is prejudiced.²¹ Some of the advantages noted were economic gain, political domination, achievement of status, sexual advantage and the establishment of a convenient object on which to vent one's anger and blame one's frustrations. This causal process which contributes so much to prejudice correlates with the Thomistic metaphysics of cognition in the following way. These goods enumerated are the objects which attract man's appetite. It is the pull of these appetites, often simultaneously working, that make man's

²¹ See Chapter 2, p. 19 of this thesis. Also see UNITED NATIONS, Commission on Human Rights, sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination. (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General), N.Y., United Nations Publications, 1949, p. 17-25.

process in obtaining the truth a difficult one. As a result of the attractive power of these appetites, man is very likely to arrive at a false set of values. For example, he may want political power in order to dominate others. He will then seek the accomplishment of these values or goals and thus finds convenient pretexts for his actions. As he continues to yield to the pull of appetites rather than to the lead of his intellect, his will becomes weaker through habit. The natural priority of the sense object over the intellectual concept is intensified by practice. As this process goes on, the likelihood increases that personal advantage will become more and more man's motivation.

One of the processes which sociology considers a very important cause of prejudice is the "frustration - aggression" theory.²² In sociological language this is also called the "scapegoat" theory. By "scapegoating", man can project his frustrations, his troubles or anger onto someone else or onto some group. This is a very obvious personal advantage for the one doing it. It is a way of getting rid of his troubles. When this is done, it is usually accompanied by a process of "rationalization".²³ By "rationalization", reasons for the actions are advanced which misdescribe the real source of the

²² UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science, p. 234.

²³ Eric John DINGWALL, Racial Pride and Prejudice, London, Watts, 1946, p. 217.

action. Now these two elements "scapegoating" and "rationalizations" may be correlated very well with each other in this way. According to Thomistic philosophy's view of man, he is a substantial unity who is capable of simultaneous activity on many levels, due to a multiplicity of accidental powers. In simpler words, man is simultaneously attracted by the pull of many appetites. In this case he simultaneously is desirous of getting rid of his frustration or anger and at the same time retaining his esteem for himself. He can simultaneously enjoy the fulfillment of both desires only by some sort of "rationalization" which will give him an apparently good reason for doing an action which, without this rationalization, would destroy his own self esteem.

CULTURAL CONFLICT

Almost every social and cultural group develops its own sense of superiority and often tries to strengthen that sense of superiority by developing or maintaining prejudices.²⁴

Physical separation, physical differences plus man's defective way of knowing through categories or universals, set the stage for this process. The effort of any individual

²⁴See Chapter 2, p. 24 of this thesis. See also UNITED NATIONS, Commission on Human Rights and Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination, p. 15.

member of a group to untangle the web of custom, tradition and history in order to see the truth, is blunted or otherwise interfered with by appetite. The dominant role of appetite and its influence on man as he goes about making practical judgments is needed to complete sociology's view on the influence of cultural factors as a cause of prejudice. Sociology is very clear on the effect of the identification of the individual with the various groups around him. The effect is a group consciousness which easily develops into a type of group superiority. Sociology is also very clear on the point that ready-made ideas are transmitted from one generation to the other by parents, schools and the previous generation. On these points it brings much light that is helpful towards forming a philosophy of prejudice.

Philosophy adds to these cultural influences the explanation that as man goes on practicing error, accepting or listening to error, he develops an affective connaturality towards it. He develops habits which make it easier for him to accept error and more difficult for him to find the truth. Although philosophy would clearly admit, as sociology suggests, that the weight of man's past experiences weigh heavily on his present decisions even to the extent of diminishing his freedom,²⁵ it still insists on the point that man is free and that his free consent is a part of the explanation of his

²⁵See Chapter 6 of this thesis.

prejudice. It also offers freedom as a partial explanation of how and why some men overcome their prejudices and others do not.

Allport gives an interesting example of the working of cultural conflict on prejudice. It can be used to illustrate some of these points just mentioned. Allport says:

Janet, six years of age, was trying hard to integrate her obedience to her mother with her daily social contact. One day she came running home and asked, "Mother, what is the name of the children I am supposed to hate?" [...]²⁶ Janet is stumbling at the threshold of some abstraction. She wishes to form the right category. She intends to oblige her mother by hating the right people when she can find out who they are.²⁶

Janet's wistful question leads Allport to make a theoretical summary of the preceding stages in Janet's history. They are:

1. Identification with her mother
2. Probable experience of insecurity with outsiders
3. Curiosity about distinctions in ethnic groups; she knows some cues, not all
4. She has acquired the emotional meaning of a word but doesn't know to what objects she must refer the term

This process so far might be called pregeneralized learning, or the process of developing preliminary universals.²⁷

5. A total rejection of all who fit into the universal
6. Differentiation of concepts to allow for exceptions

It takes the child about six to eight years of his life to

²⁶Gordon W. ALLPORT, *Ibid.*, p. 307.

²⁷See Chapter 6, p. 118 of this thesis.

learn total rejection, and another six years or so to modify it. For example, up to about age eight the child learns to talk prejudices but acts democratically. At school he learns the norms of democracy and begins to accept it verbally, but his behavior is now quite prejudiced. By the time he is fifteen years old, prejudiced talk and democratic talk are used for appropriate occasions. He is friendly to the Negro in the kitchen, hostile to him in the parlor. His actual adult creed is complex indeed. While it allows and encourages ethnocentrism, it gives lip service to democracy and equality.

Here cultural influences are clearly traced as they proceed from pregeneralization to total rejection and then to differentiation of concepts. It illustrates clearly man's historical character; he is influenced by the world in which he lives. What it does not explain is how the world in which he lives got to be that way. Nor does it explain how man, so limited by his environment, would ever be able to put his own stamp on the world in which he lives. Here is where it becomes obvious that the causal influence of culture and prejudice should include man's use of his freedom.

When the three notions of 1) identification of self with a cultural group, 2) belief in the superiority of that group over other groups, and 3) free choice are brought together, they add up to the notion of human pride. With this in mind, it is clear that prejudice is cloaked by pride. Pride is taken here in the meaning of a false esteem of one's

own excellence or the excellence of the group to which one belongs. This theme of egoism, or craving for status, underlies many of the causes of prejudice. Perhaps Murphy is right in regarding it as the primary root of prejudice.²⁸ Viewed in this light, "white supremacy" is just one facet of the problem of human pride. It is merely another example of a false view of the universe which centers around one's self.

More than a century ago De Tocqueville discussed this feature of the culture of the southern portion of the United States. He reported that a cheaply won pride seemed characteristic of the dominant group:

In the South there are no families so poor as not to have slaves. The citizen of the Southern states becomes a sort of domestic dictator from infancy; the first notion he acquires in life is that he is born to command, and the first habit which he contracts is that of ruling without resistance. His education tends, then, to give him the character of a haughty and hasty man, irascible, violent, ardent in his desires, impatient of obstacles, but easily discouraged if he cannot succeed in the first attempt.²⁹

Writing on this same theme today, more than one hundred years later, Lillian Smith tells how child training in many southern families is still directed towards the theme of white supremacy. She says,

I do not remember how or when, but by the time I had learned that God is love, that Jesus is His Son

²⁸E. HARTLEY, Problems in Prejudice, N.Y., Kings Crown, 1946, p. viii, prefaced by G. MURPHY.

²⁹Alexis DE TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America, N.Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 1946, Vol. 1, p. 434.

and come to give us more abundant life, that all men are brothers with a common Father, I also knew that I was better than a Negro, that all black folks have their place and must be kept in it [..] that a terrifying disaster would befall the South if ever I treated a Negro as my social equal.³⁰

Here clearly is an example where cultural influence contributes to prejudice by contributing to pride. It may not be so clear, but it is nonetheless true, that besides being the effect of such a culture, pride and prejudice are also its partial cause. This becomes clear only if the element of freedom is introduced as a causal factor in prejudice.

IGNORANCE, A CONDITION

Ignorance, which is frequently given as an indirect cause or a condition of prejudice by sociology,³¹ tallies well with Thomistic philosophy's view of the limitation of man's intellect. In other words, it should be expected that due to the nature of man's way of knowing, his ignorance and the errors which follow from it would be extensive. Here, again, is a point on which Thomistic philosophy undergirds and strengthens the findings of sociology.

The limitation of man's intellect comes basically, in the Thomistic view of intellection, from the fact that he has no direct intellectual knowledge of the singular. Yet

³⁰ Lillian SMITH, Killers of the Dream, N.Y., W. Norton, 1949, p. 18.

³¹ See Chapter 2, p. 28 of this thesis.

everything that really exists is singular. Man knows singular objects intellectually only in a general, universal way. He knows them in universal concepts which leave out the singularity and individuality of those objects. Thus these concepts leave out much of the reality.³²

The bearing of this process of knowing on ignorance becomes clear when you reflect that there are a thousand universal aspects of any singular thing. Furthermore, man never knows them all. For example, a ball is round, it is colored, it is a thing, it is pleasant, it is bouncing; and many more aspects could be added to these. What a man knows of the ball is that aspect of the ball which is here and now causing a phantasm from which a certain universal aspect is extracted. That is what man knows when the ball is actually causing a pleasant sensation. When man remembers the ball, he merely knows an aspect of the ball which is represented by some re-activated phantasm. In other words, what man knows about the ball is only one small aspect of what the ball really is, and of what might be known about the ball. As a result, when man speaks about the ball as round, he omits a thousand aspects of it that are true even though he takes one that is also true. But the truth that he has is not the entire truth. As he goes on to talk about the ball as if he had the entire truth about it, as he is likely to do, then there will be more errors in

³²See Chapter 3, p. 37 of this thesis.

his judgment than truth because there is more unknown to him about the ball than there is known.

Because of his defective intellectual grasp of reality, man uses a discursive reasoning process which typifies his manner of knowing. By means of discursive reasoning he often masks his ignorance. Sometimes he even conceals that lack of knowledge from himself.

Besides the multiplicity which is implied in discursive reasoning man has many other powers, cognitive and appetitive, that operate simultaneously. This simultaneous operation of the multiplicity of powers weakens man's ability to work or know perfectly through any one of his powers. The result - man is unable to concentrate perfectly even on the one aspect of an object which he is considering. Maritain notes how this multiplicity contributes to man's ignorance, even of himself.

But the substance of man is obscure to himself. He knows not his soul, except in the fluid multiplicity of passing phenomena which emerge from it and are more or less clearly attained by reflective consciousness, but only increase the enigma, and leave him more ignorant of the essence of his Self. He knows not his own subjectivity. For, if he knows it, it is formlessly, by feeling it as a kind of propitious and enveloping night. Melville, I think, was aware of that when he observed that "no man can ever feel his own identity aright except his eyes be closed; as if darkness were indeed the proper element of our essences."³³

³³Jacques MARITAIN, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 114. The quote from Melville is from Moby Dick, N.Y. Random House, Modern Library, 1926, p. 53.

This notion of "darkness" as the proper element for man is a picturesque way of saying that man's ignorance is more extensive than his knowledge.

Bishop Charles H. Helmsing, Bishop of Springfield-Cape Girardeau, which borders on the diocese of Little Rock, Arkansas, cautions men not to underestimate the part ignorance plays in prejudice. He says,

We humans are liable to ignorance [...] it is one of the things we inherited with original sin. Even the greatest of minds have made serious mistakes. It is a teaching of the Catholic Church that man, apart from the grace of God, cannot even know the truths of natural law without fear of erring.

As a result of ignorance [...] many people are in great fear that their entire way of life may be destroyed by an influx of Negroes.

[...] Seemingly, we are living in an age of emotion rather than of reason.³⁴

This final remark of Bishop Helmsing that the world around us seems to be ruled more by emotions than reasons suggests the dominant role of appetite in practical judgments which was already mentioned.³⁵

One would expect then that there would be a correlation between ignorance and emotion in man. This in fact, does exist. When a person is prejudiced on any point, it is often noticed that when he is asked on what grounds he believes this

³⁴ Bishop Charles A. HELMSING, "Bishop Calls Upon Catholics to Help Ease Racial Tensions in South", in Social Action Notes for Priests, issue of Oct.-Nov., 1957, p. 6-7. No volume number is given.

³⁵ See Chapter 7 of this thesis.

or that, he is usually somewhat taken aback, annoyed or emotionally excited. The more annoyed or excited he is, the more likely it is that his belief is not founded upon evidence but upon emotions and desires, open or repressed, which it will be very painful for him to reveal. Dingwall says:

It is rarely the things about which we have knowledge that arouse emotional excitement. People do not get emotionally aroused when they are discussing such questions as the composition of some substance, or the faults which are likely to arise in radio apparatus.³⁶

Ignorance is so intimately connected with prejudice, that one of the writers on racial prejudice holds ignorance to be a worse social evil than the cruel emotional effects of prejudice. He says:

It is not so much the hatreds, the fears, the brutalities, which are the basic social evils of our country - it is the ignorance, and with it the acceptance of the evil.³⁷

Is not this the same as saying that there is no hope of removing prejudice as long as ignorance remains?

GENERAL CORRELATION

It is now possible, perhaps, to point out in general what it is that philosophy contributes to an understanding of the causality of prejudice and what in general is the contribution of sociology. A resume of the correlation just made

³⁶Eric John DINGWALL, Ibid., p. 218.

³⁷Trevor HUDDLESTON, Naught for Your Comfort, London, Collins, 1954, p. 47.

shows that philosophy indicates these causal factors which are not given by a sociological analysis. First, the existence of "will" in man. This is needed to explain the diversity of reaction among men to objects. It is needed to explain the possible basis for unification of man's appetites. Without "will" neither can there be any reasonable reference to "liberty" as a cause.

A second point which philosophy contributes in general is an immaterial power of knowing. This is needed to explain the categories. It is needed to explain why and how man's way of knowing differs from animal's. Animals do not have prejudice.

Philosophy also suggests, because it indicates the presence of an immaterial power of appetite and of knowing, that man's life should be directed to a goal which is suitable and proportionate to these powers. Such a goal alone could satisfy immaterial faculties and give man's life a purpose in the following of which he could unify his other powers under the control of his will and intellect. Philosophy clearly indicates the need of man's subordination of his powers one to another, if his life is to be unified. In any such plan of subordination, man's top powers of will and intellect should take precedence.

Finally, the relation of will to intellect is suggested by philosophy. Both are non-organic, immaterial powers. They work together. The only distinction between them is

that of nature and order. The will is in the intellect, that is, on the same order or level. It is the appetite corresponding to the intellect. It is not separated from the intellect, but is ordered to the intellect and the intellect is ordered to it. So the relations of intellect and will are purely qualitative relations of order and dependence. The intellect is the most universal knowing power of man. As knowing power it is on the side of form. The intellect presents an object and the will tends simply and directly to that object. In this relation the will depends on the intellect in the line of final causality.

But will is the most universal appetite in man, and all appetite is in the order of efficient cause. So the will is the ultimate, most universal moving power in man. And so, apart from initial dependence of will upon intellect, the will can move the intellect and all the other powers of man to the exercise of any one of their acts. In this relationship, the will is an efficient principal cause and the intellect is a patient-instrument.

These general points in the causality of prejudice, suggested by a philosophical analysis of the causality of prejudice, show something about the nature of philosophy itself. Inevitably, a philosophical view of anything at all will imply a metaphysics, that is a reflection by man upon the meaning of life and being in general. It will imply some view of what constitutes truth, or what is the true view of

being and life. Finally, it will give a philosophical anthropology or a view of the nature of man.³⁸ Philosophy says equivalently, that in order to understand the causation of prejudice something must be said about the meaning of being, of truth and of man.

Sociology, on the other hand, presents the causality of prejudice, insofar as that can be done, without these implications. The historical, socio-cultural and situational influences which surround man are emphasized. Even when the causality is explained in the terms of the dynamics of personality it is more the influences of other things in the universe with man that are emphasized, rather than the structure or nature of man, truth, and reality.

Sociology is strong in presenting man's place in history, the social and cultural forces that affect man and the descriptions of man's reactions to these forces. But, in general, it presents man as passively being influenced by forces outside of him. It is weak in presenting the formative activity of man as the maker of history and culture. From this it appears that the descriptions of the causality of prejudice given by sociology and philosophy are complimentary and correlative. Far from conflicting with each other, they complete each other.

The following chart may illustrate this point.

³⁸Albert BOVDEYNS, Ibid., p. 27.




Figure 2.- Chart on the philosophy of prejudice.

This chart should be compared with the chart illustrating the causality of prejudice from the sociological point of view to be found in Chapter 2.³⁹ Notice that the chart in Chapter 2 ends with the object of prejudice. This chart begins with the object of prejudice. This illustrates how sociology emphasizes man rather as a passive instrument than active. Of course, the chart is a simplification and only indicates the general features of difference between sociology and philosophy. Sociology's explanation of prejudice through the dynamics of personality does indicate some of man's activity. But even that is more a reaction to external stimuli rather than a formative activity on man's part.

What the chart does not show about philosophy's explanation of the causality of prejudice is the connaturality developed in man both in the line of emotions and of habits before he comes in contact with the object of prejudice. This is omitted from the chart in order to present the main point of contrast between the two explanations. The main point is that philosophy maintains that after man has come in contact with the stimulus object he performs within himself a complex integration of that stimulus into himself. Within himself, using the stimulus object as his instrument and model, he brings forth concepts. With the creatively free act of assent he identifies these concepts with each other to form

³⁹See Chapter 2, p. 34 of this thesis.

judgments. Maritain expresses something of this when he says about man,

All that he discerns and divines into things, he discerns and divines not as something other than himself, according to the law of speculative knowledge, but, on the contrary, as inseparable from himself and from his emotion, and in truth as identified with himself.⁴⁰

SUMMARY

Philosophy's answer to the question "what are the causes of prejudice" is this: The causes of prejudice are those positive influences which bring into existence the prejudiced judgments. Among those influences, error is basic. All the elements, then, that would cause error are also a cause of prejudice. These elements are the influence of appetite and of affective connaturality on man's limited intellect. Freedom is also needed to explain error.

Perhaps it may help to designate the causes of prejudice according to the Thomistic view of the four causes.

The material cause of prejudice is the existence of people that are different from each other, the existence of groups of people that are like each other in some general notes, the existence of man's sense and intellectual knowing powers.

⁴⁰ Jacques MARITAIN, Ibid., p. 115.

The formal cause of prejudice is sensio-intellectual knowledge as affected by historical, socio-cultural, and situational influences. Secondly, this knowledge as it is influenced by affective connaturality and habit.

The final cause is some good or goods which appeals to man's appetites in the light of the knowledge just described.

The efficient cause is the will as the principal efficient cause with emotions and other appetites as secondary causes.

This certainly correlates well with the conclusions of sociology⁴¹ that prejudice is due to a multiple causality. It is a complex effect so it should have been expected that its causality would likewise be complex.

⁴¹ See Chapter 2, p. 35 of this thesis.

CHAPTER VIII

MORAL ASPECT AND TYPES

Is an act of prejudice an immoral act? Keeping in mind that the definition of prejudice is that settled on in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the answer is that an act of prejudice, in itself, is immoral. It is immoral, basically, because it is an unreasonable act.

The analysis of the causality of prejudice already given shows that false judgments are an essential element in the causality of prejudice. The prejudiced judgment, itself, may be supported by a previous judgment that is true. But somewhere in the prejudiced judgment's genesis, there is a false judgment or series of false judgments that are freely consented to.

Note that the act of prejudice is said to be immoral in itself. This means that when the act is done by a person who recognizes it to be an act based on false judgments, it is morally wrong. From this it follows that when a person is invincibly ignorant of the nature of the act of prejudice at the time that he commits it, he does not sin or commit moral evil.

Invincible ignorance is a failure to know what one is not able to know.¹ Where ignorance of the nature of the act of prejudice is due to negligence or deliberate refusal to

¹ S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, q. 76, a. 2.

investigate evidence, the ignorance is culpable.² In the field of color-prejudice in the United States, it is difficult to see how any intelligent adult could for a long time remain invincibly ignorant of the fact that error is an essential part of color-prejudice. There is a sufficient amount of material written on the subject that is available to all.³ In addition all the major religious bodies in the United States have condemned it as immoral.⁴

²S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Ibid., q. 19, a.6.

³See the Selected Bibliograph on Discrimination and Related Subjects by UNITED NATIONS, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination, N.Y., United Nations, 1949, p. 58-88.

⁴BISHOPS OF THE UNITED STATES, Discrimination and the Christian Conscience. Statement of the Bishops of the United States, 1958, Washington, D.C., National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1958. See also pamphlet by Daniel M. CANTWELL, Catholics Speak on Race Relations, Chicago, Fides, 1952. This pamphlet is a 64 page summary of statements of Catholics, mostly Bishops. PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL BISHOPS, "Pastoral Letter from Protestant Episcopal Bishops, October 17, 1958, Meet, Know and Listen", in New South, Vol. 13, No. 12, issue of Dec. 1958, p. 4-8. This same issue also contains statements by The Methodist Council of Bishops made on Nov. 13, 1958, p. 3; by the Eighth Assembly of the United Church Women, p. 14; and by the National Council of Churches, p. 13. For the Jewish viewpoint, at least for Jews representing the reform movement, see CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS, Commission on Justice and Peace, A Pledge for Greatness of Soul. A Message for Race Relations Sabbath, 1958, and also The Challenge To America. A Message for Race Relations Sabbath, 1959, N.Y., Central Conference of American Rabbis, 40 W. 68th St., N.Y. For orthodox Jews see Resolutions of Social Action Significance Adopted by 44th General Assembly of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Toronto, Canada, Apr. 28- May 2, 1957.

Besides the point that an act of prejudice is immoral because it is an unreasonable act, it is also in general, immoral because it is a sin against justice and against charity.

Prejudice is a sin against justice because it takes away the right of another to his good reputation both within the mind of the one making the judgment and in the minds of others who learn of that judgment. This sin of thinking ill of another is worse when it affects the reputation of an entire group.

A prejudiced judgment helps deprive another person or a group of their reputation. When the deprivation of reputation of another or of a group appears as a good, then it becomes desirable to the prejudiced man to find such a judgment true. The prejudiced man wants the false, prejudiced judgment to be true. In this he sins against charity.

A TYPICAL CASE

Generally in the United States the act of color-prejudice will take on further immoral aspects due to the means used and the circumstances surrounding the act of prejudice. Take for example a typical case of racial discrimination.⁵ John White operates a public restaurant to support his family. He recognizes all human beings as essentially equal but

⁵John P. MARKEE, S.J., A Moral Appraisal of an Individual Act of Racial Discrimination, St. Louis, Mo., (no publisher given) 1951. This is a 4 page pamphlet.

one day refuses service to Jim Black, a Negro, on the grounds that to serve Black would harm his business which serves a White trade only. Here the act is immoral because of the means used and the circumstances.

The means used to support his family is to strike a blow on the wedge that tends to split the natural unity of the human race. Hence his act goes against the natural law of human unity.

John White's act violates justice because: 1) He denies Jim Black the treatment due him as a human being.⁶ 2) He does not treat Jim Black on an equal footing with other members of the public. It deprives him of that generally good reputation to which he is entitled. 3) He denies Jim Black the respect and courtesy due to him as a human being.

John White's act violates charity because it humiliates, hurts and frustrates Jim Black. It degrades him.

The circumstances aggravate the immorality of the act because such individual acts of this kind, even when done without malice, but for business reasons only, support and perpetuate the social pattern known as "Jim Crow" or

⁶Gerald KELLY, S.J., "Current Theology", in Theological Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, issue of Mar. 1947, p. 112-114. Also see "Notes on Race Relations" by the same author in Review for Religious, Vol. 11, No. 6, issue of Nov. 1952, p. 296-300.

"segregation".⁷⁻⁸⁻⁹ Anent the immorality of the practice of segregation in America, one of the best known moral theologians in the country writes,

We must disapprove of the segregation policy, which is, in fact, a colossal violation of justice and charity. Such disapproval, incidentally, is not a counsel of perfection; it is a strict duty, and a serious one.¹⁰

Father Kelly clearly contends that the circumstances greatly contribute to the immorality of the individual act of segregation.

TYPES OF PREJUDICE

Prejudiced people may be conveniently classified according to whether their prejudice is practical, theoretical, or both.

The man who has only practical prejudice is rather common. He sees clearly the general principle, for example,

⁷John P. MAREKOE, S.J., "A Moral Appraisal of the Color Line" in The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Vol. 48, No. 11, issue of Aug. 1948, p. 828-836.

⁸Rev. Father George H. DUNNE, S.J., The Sin of Segregation. The Immorality of Racial Segregation, Syracuse, N.Y., Bishop Feery Foundation, (no date given, pamphlet 14 pages).

⁹SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE FAITH, Report on the Catholic Church and the Negro in the United States, Rome, Italy, Fides News Agency, March 1950, 16 p.

¹⁰Rev. Gerald KELLY, S.J., "How to Think and Act About Race Relations", in Review for Religious, Vol. 10, No. 6, issue of Nov. 1951, p. 319.

that Negroes are really human beings, that they are equal to whites as human beings and that therefore they should receive equal treatment by the law. His difficulty comes with practice when these theories are applied. When time, place and all the other circumstances are added, he finds himself unable or unwilling to apply the principles.

The second type is the man who has theoretical prejudice only. He may, in theory, hold that "Negroes are inferior, they are not equal to whites" but his practice goes against his theory. In practice he is fair and equal in his treatment of colored people. This may be due to his generally high level of culture, of education, or to a multitude of factors which make it connatural to him to be courteous and respectful to the individual despite his contrary theories.¹¹ Sometimes, through a sort of rationalization, he holds that his practice is right even though it goes against his theories. This sort of prejudiced practice has within it the seeds of its own cure. For constant practice will induce a connaturality in knowing which is likely to bring the theory in line with it.

The third type of prejudiced man is the most common, that is, the man who both in theory and in practice maintains that Negroes are inferior. He thinks they are. He says they are. And he treats them as inferiors.

¹¹See Chapter 6, p. 120 of this thesis.

SERENE AND DOUBTFUL

Another convenient division of types of prejudice is according to the state of mind of the person possessing prejudice, a state of serenity or of doubt.¹²

Serene prejudice is the state of the man who judges, "All Negroes are inferior." His judgment is untroubled. He does not doubt. He may have either a mild or a very strong emotion amounting to hate accompanying his judgment. If there is no emotion at all, he would not have prejudice but a mere error or false judgment.

The other type is the doubter. He may be a troubled man who is still doubting about his judgment or a man who has crushed his doubts and now holds them below the surface. The case of the troubled conscience is illustrated by a white, southern mother of ten children who, in the midst of a long public discussion of the church's attitude towards segregation, told us, "Our attitude towards the Negroes is one of the things that, deep down in our hearts, we have always wondered about. If our attitude is wrong, it is going to take a long time for us to change."

The man who has crushed his doubts soon comes to a position where he does not want to know. He finds it desirable not to know lest a good already possessed be put in

¹² This division correlates with the invincible and the culpable ignorance described on page 1 of this Chapter.

danger. He wants to be neutral, to live in peace. He looks at the social situation and sees that he will be going against his conscience if he yields to prejudice. He will have the neighborhood against him if he opposes its prejudice. He wants peace, so he wants to know nothing more about the condition of the Negro. He has taken a look at the consequences of giving up his doubt, the consequences of investigating it, and he has decided to hold onto the doubt.

THE EXPLOITER

The exploiter is a man who uses the prejudices of others for his own benefit. He may have no prejudice, himself, at all. He maliciously uses the social situation and the prejudice he finds in it for his own benefit. He is the agitator who stirs up emotion and prejudice for political and personal ends. He knows he is wrong. He does not deceive himself. He offends against many virtues but he does not care about truth or justice.

He is the real estate agent who causes neighborhood hysteria through his propaganda against the Negro invasion and then makes a killing by buying up property cheaply and selling it at twice that price to the incoming Negroes.

VARIATIONS

These classifications overlap and intermix in real life. These are cases which are more or less pure and

typical states that can be used to form these classifications. But in general these types will overlap. The malicious man, for example, may also be a doubter. He may clearly realize that what he is doing is wrong because he is acting in doubt and knows that such action is not approved by his conscience.

Despite the fact that these classifications overlap, they do help to point out the various types of prejudice and in that way, help to a better understanding of prejudice. They also suggest that for the variations of types there will be variations of remedies.

CHAPTER IX

REMEDIES

Among the advantages to be gained from a study of the causes of prejudice is the knowledge of how to remedy it. Just as a doctor is in a position to prescribe remedies for disease once he finds its causes, so must the one who would prescribe effective remedies for prejudice know its causes.

In view of the multiple causality of prejudice already described, the remedies, also, are multiple. The remedies may conveniently be divided as follows: 1) education, 2) control of appetites, 3) practice, 4) religion, 5) personal example.

EDUCATION

Education is put first among the remedies because it is, perhaps, the most easily accepted remedy, and therefore the easiest with which to begin. It is also, in a sense, an all-inclusive remedy since the other remedies will work only inasmuch as they educate or change the mind of the prejudiced person. As Trevor Huddleston says, "No advance can be made against prejudice and fear unless these things are seen as irrational and brought out into the fierce light of day."¹ This quote expresses the main aim of education as a remedy against prejudice. That aim is to show that prejudice is irrational.

¹Trevor HUDDLESTON, Naught For Your Comfort, London, Collins, 1954, p. 18.

This can be done by disseminating correct information which will counteract false beliefs and errors. It can be done by making known the damage done by prejudice and the advantages that result from the overcoming of prejudice.

This educational program should not be limited merely to schools but should aim at enlightenment both in and out of schools. Government, mass media of communication and parental instruction at home are powerful educational influences. Among the facts which should be stated and explained correctly, if color prejudice is used as an example, some facts are derived from anthropology and biology, some from psychology and some from ethics.

Among the facts from anthropology and biology the following might be presented: a) the essential equality of all human beings biologically;²⁻³ b) the fact that science has proved that there is no such thing as "race" applied to human types. All people are ethnically mixed. It is a fallacy to

² UNITED NATIONS, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination, N.Y., United Nations, 1949, p. 55.

³ UNESCO, The Race Question in Modern Science, N.Y., Whiteside Inc., 1956, pp. 245-284.

speak of races as pure and definite types;⁴⁻⁵⁻⁶ c) the fact that there is no correlation between racial types and intelligence, and no natural mental superiority of certain ethnic types over others.⁷

Facts concerned with psychology that need to be emphasized and taught as a remedy to prejudice are man's defective way of knowing and the influence of habit, appetite and con-naturality on his judgment.⁸ If man can be brought to see how easily appetite influences his judgment, he may begin to wonder about the certainty of some of his judgments and begin to suspect that they may be prejudiced.

Among the facts of ethics which need to be explained and taught are a) the essential dignity of the individual human being; b) man's freedom and its relation to responsibility for his actions; and c) the brotherhood of man which is based on man's common origin and destiny.

The educational program should also show something of the damage done by prejudice. This would include the harm it

⁴Gordon W. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice, Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 113.

⁵John LA FARCE, S.J., The Race Question and the Negro. A Study of the Catholic Doctrine on Interracial Justice, N.Y., Longmans, 1943, p. 11-23.

⁶UNITED NATIONS, Ibid., p. 55.

⁷UNESCO, Ibid., p. 319.

⁸See Chapters 3, 6 and 7 of this thesis.

does to the development of moral and psychological life of the individual, the manner in which it interferes with the development of community and of national life, and the harm it does to international friendship.⁹⁻¹⁰ Conversely, by remedying prejudice and doing away with some of these disadvantages, some estimate of the benefit to the individual, to the community, to the nation and to world peace could be given.

The above educational program is not exhaustive, but merely an example of the general direction and the principal content of a program of education directed against color prejudice which would work against error and ignorance on which prejudice thrives.

It should be noted in line with the simultaneous activity of both knowledge and appetite in man, that the educational program should comprise both rational and emotional appeal, closely connected. Part of the educational program should aim at developing adequate self control in the

⁹ John LA FAROE, S.J., No Postponement, United States Moral Leadership and the Problem of Racial Minorities, N.Y., Longmans, 1950, p. 212-239. Father La Faroe strongly presents the point that America will achieve the moral leadership to which it aspires only by a striking improvement of the status of the Negroes in the United States.

¹⁰ The course of prejudice does not run smoothly. It usually conflicts with deeply held convictions, religious, ethical, and national. The central theme of Gunnar Myrdal's monumental study of Negro-white relations in America is that it is impossible to integrate prejudice into the American Creed. See Gunnar MYRDAL, An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, Harper, 1944, lix, 1,483 p.

individuals before they become prejudiced.

CONTROL OF APPETITES

The pull and push and blocking power of appetite is one of the main causes of error and of prejudice. Obviously, then, one of the main remedies will be to control appetite. This remedy of self control will basically consist of two elements. The element of putting order into life by directing the appetites in subordination to each other to the achievement of a unified purpose in life, and secondly, the direct training of the appetites to follow this scheme. This training will consist in self denial or systematic control of appetite.

Without a purpose in life that is good enough to attract man's highest appetite, his will; and comprehensive enough to unify under it all his other appetites, man will seek in vain for order in his life. Without such a goal he will not know how to begin to put his thoughts or his appetites in order. Just as the learning of prejudice is not exclusively a product of external influence, merely a matter of propaganda, but a tendency to acquire ethnic attitudes to conform to whatever dominant frames of value the individual has,¹¹ so the remedy for prejudice will be not merely a product of external influence, of propaganda or of education, but

¹¹Gordon W. ALLPORT, *Ibid.*, p. 318.

it will be all these things inasmuch as their influence is subordinated to the child's growing philosophy of life. How this process works is indicated by Bihler when he says,

Order in thought is that condition of the human mind in thinking, in which the various faculties of man cooperate with intellect in its achievement of reality or truth. When the will is subservient to the intellectual goal of truth in a manner outlined above, when the senses provide grist for the mill of thought, when past experience re-instates relevant imagery and ideas in the mind, or is transferred to new situations, without deflecting the mind from its quest of the truth now sought, this order is prevalent and maintained.¹²

Order in life requires knowledge of such a goal, and the reverence for a goal to which man subordinates himself. As Von Hildebrand says, "The irreverent and impertinent man is a man incapable of any abandonment or subordination of self."¹³ This makes it clear that the presenting to man of the correct goal in life is an important element in the remedying of prejudice.

The point of man's subordination of himself to a goal is indicated in the following chart.

¹²H. BIHLER, "Order in Thought" in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. 17, issue of Dec. 1941, p. 93.

¹³Dietrich VON HILDEBRAND, Fundamental Moral Attitudes, N.Y., Longmans, 1950, p. 6.




Figure 3, The hypothetical lessening of prejudice as membership in wider groups develops.¹⁴

¹⁴This chart is suggested by the chart to be found in Gordon W. ALLPORT, Ibid., p. 43.

The seven solid concentric circles indicate widening groups to which man belongs as he develops and with which he identifies himself. They also illustrate what he may take as goals in life. The broken line circle, which is not given by Allport, illustrates the possibility of man identifying his own good with the service of God and of all humanity. The widening of the circles indicates the tendency of a lessening allegiance as the circles get bigger. There seems to be an inverse proportion between the size of the group and man's allegiance to it. On the other hand, there is more order and unity in his life as his allegiance, or appetite, is directed to more comprehensive goods.

This need for order is interfered with by insubordination of appetites within man and the overcoming of knowledge by passion. This was a point missed by Plato who held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge and every sin a kind of ignorance.¹⁵ For this reason a certain amount of asceticism for training of the appetites in self control is necessary.

Saint Catherine of Siena indicates all this when she says, "There is, then, no perfect performance of duty without perfect self denial."¹⁶ She makes the point that he who fears

¹⁵ D. THOMAS AQUINATIS, Summa Theologiae, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 77, a. 2.

¹⁶ Johannes JORGENSEN, Saint Catherine of Siena, transl. by Ingeborg LUND, N.Y., Longmans, 1938, p. 289.

the displeasure of others will always be inclined to reduce his demands or make a compromise.

This same point with a bit of a different twist to it is made by De Montcheuil. He maintains that man needs a certain amount of training in self-control in order to keep the pleasure which accompanies the attainment of his goal continually subordinate to that goal. He says,

Having been able to impose certain sacrifices on ourselves, we can be assured against the fundamental error which consists not in receiving a pleasure from an action which is in accord with our tendencies, but rather in acting for the pleasure itself.¹⁷

This restraint of appetite aims at the subordination of appetite to the rule of reason. This is almost the same as Saint Thomas says about prudence which he calls "right order about things to be done."¹⁸ Saint Thomas maintains that for prudence it is requisite that man be well disposed towards the ends that are aimed at. This will depend on the rectitude of his appetite. From this it is clear that development of self-control is a help to prudence.

PRACTICE

Just as practice and habit are powerful forces towards developing prejudice by inducing affective

¹⁷Yves DE MONTCHEUIL, *For Men of Action*, transl. by Charles E. PARNELL, Chicago, Fides Publishers, p. 101.

¹⁸S. THOMAS AQUINATIS, *Summa Theologiae*, 1^a, 2^{ae}, q. 57, a. 4. "Recta ratio agibilium."

connaturality, so is practice in the opposite direction a powerful remedy for prejudice. Ordinarily, in color prejudice in the United States, the remedy would be some sort of contact between the people of the two groups. It should be a contact in which one group shows respect for the other as for example, an exchange of courtesies or greetings.

Because practice is always more effective than theory, the first obvious measure to be taken in teaching wisdom and virtue is a systematic daily routine of practice. This develops the dispositions prerrequired for knowledge and for good acts. This is the method used by religious orders in training their members to a life of virtue. So a remedy for color prejudice in the United States would be to have the white child sit with the colored, play with the colored child, go to school with the colored child. Normally this would develop a connaturality, a disposition of mind that would block prejudice.

Even with grown-up people, contact with the individuals of the other group often breaks down prejudice. It does this by building up a disposition of affective connaturality. Without this kind of approach, the logical attack on prejudice cannot expect to succeed.

Note that the kind of contact which succeeds best in breaking down prejudice is equal status contact. A good example of this is in the field of sports where individual

skill more easily attains recognition.¹⁹

In line with remedying prejudice by inducing a connaturality opposed to it, legislation has an important role to play. It is true that legislation cannot directly do away with prejudice, especially that part of it which is an emotional attitude. But legislation can indirectly do such to end prejudice, even the emotional attitude, by forbidding those public acts of discrimination which flow from prejudice. By forbidding such acts, legislation can block the development of that negative connaturality which is a great support of prejudice.

In addition, legislation can add the strength of institutional support to the individual's effort to acquire a favorable connaturality towards those in the colored group. In fact, without the help of such legislation, it is probable that the voluntary effort to insure civil rights for colored citizens of the United States will fail of its objectives.²⁰

A good example of legislation helping to further prejudice is the body of laws in many states of the United States which prescribe segregated education for colored and white people. The Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, which interpreted such legislation to be contrary to the Constitution of the United States, is an example of how a public

¹⁹UNITED NATIONS, Ibid., p. 54.

²⁰John LA FARGE, S.J., No Postponement, p. 230.

institution can do much to lessen and prevent prejudice by adding its institutional support to a course of action which will produce a type of connaturality opposed to prejudice.

Legislation can be effective against prejudice just as it can be effective against any other kind of immorality. The state does not necessarily legislate morality when it promulgates laws against theft, murder and divorce. But it does, by such laws, legislate against immorality; it does indirectly promote morality. Similarly, by legislating against discriminatory practices which flow from prejudice, legislation can greatly aid in weakening prejudice. That such legislation is operable, is shown by the experience of the different states of the union where it has been put into effect. It meets with far fewer difficulties than its opponents would have us believe.²¹ A good example of such legislation is the fair employment practice laws in the United States which forbid discrimination in hiring on the basis of color, creed or national origin.

Practice is a particularly important remedy for those who already are speculatively free of prejudice. These are the people whose attitude is summed up in the phrase, "I am all for giving colored people a better break, but don't ask me to go near them." Lucile Hasley has a word of advice for just these people. She says,

²¹John LA FARGE, S.J., Ibid., p. 230.

Personal contact, on a friendly and social basis, is the best and quickest remedy on the market to wipe out that Colored skin aversion or even awareness. I particularly recommend it for just those souls who want to go all the way in their Christianity but just can't get their theology and their 'feelings' to kiss and make up.²²

Even for those whose prejudice colors even their theories, practice may become a helpful remedy. For if a man does a thing often enough, he begins to look for some theoretical justification of his actions.

RELIGION

If ordering one's life under a unified goal to which all man's appetites are subordinated is a remedy for prejudice, then religion is important as a remedy. For religion can add much to the firmness of man's conviction in the purpose of life and it can supply motivation for him to follow that conviction.

One of the main ways in which religion can act as a remedy to the spread of prejudice is as a guide to man for the proper use of his freedom. Prejudice is basically a moral problem.²³ It is a state which depends at many stages of its development on man's free assent, his free choice. Because of this involvement of freedom man is responsible for

²² Lucile HASLEY, "Load That Plate, Lift That Fork!", in Integrity, Vol. 5, No. 2, issue of Nov. 1950, p. 18.

²³ See Chapter 8 of this thesis.

his prejudice. When a man's religion points all this out to him and uses its authority to inform man that prejudice is, in itself, wrong and immoral, religion becomes a great aid to the elimination of prejudice.

Religion can also be very helpful in remedying prejudice by establishing a connaturality in man for goods of a higher order. When, for example, because of religion, a man has developed a connaturality towards love for God, for his neighbor, and an affection for all that his church teaches, he may be willing to put aside his prejudices when he finds that they conflict with these higher goods.

This same point may be put in this way. In order to get or accept a new idea a man must be convinced first that there is such an idea; secondly, that such an idea is bigger and more important than things he already has; and thirdly, that the idea is worth getting. Now religion is in a position to fulfill all these conditions. Seen in this light, religion appears to be a big aid in overcoming prejudice by way of predisposing for the reception of new ideas at the same time that it motivates the process necessary to receive them.

Particularly in the field of color prejudice, religion can be a remedy by helping man to replace pride with the virtue of humility. That inordinate love of one's own self which is at the root of color prejudice²⁴ may be replaced

²⁴See Chapter 7, p. 168, of this thesis.

with a properly ordered view of one's self in relation to God and to other men with the help of religion.²⁵

Part of the process of man's development in the virtue of humility will be to recognize the need of God's help. This need may be seen to extend to all man's actions, as expressed in the text of Saint John's Gospel "Without Me you can do nothing."²⁶ It will, then, very clearly apply to man's effort to unify and put order into his life. As a help to accomplish this difficult task, religion suggests man enlist God's help by prayer. Thus prayer, both as indicating man's admission of his need of God's help and as a means of uniting man with God's power, can be a powerful remedy against prejudice.

PERSONAL EXAMPLE

No method of combating prejudice is more effective than personal example. Perhaps this is because personal example presents theory and practice all in one unified act. Every man who goes out of his way to show that his attitude towards his fellow man is completely independent of color, becomes a focal point in his own person for the forces of light and truth. If his own personal example is the result, not of a love for the unusual or ostentatious, but the fruit of

²⁵H. F. STEWART, editor and translator, Pascal's Pensées, with an English translation, N.Y., Pantheon Books, 1950, p. 18.

²⁶SAINT JOHN, Chapter 15, verse 5.

genuine love of God and man, such an example is "infinitely far reaching. Its effects will be noticed long after he is dead and gone."²⁷

Personal example is a powerful remedy for prejudice because of its simultaneous appeal to all man's powers, to his senses, to his appetite, to his intellect. Because this appeal is made by one unit being on all these levels, it is the appeal most suited to man's complex nature.

This point about personal example combining in itself a multiple appeal to all man's powers was the underlying theme of Mahatma Ghandi's non-violent resistance. The principle underlying non-violent resistance is that things of fundamental importance to people are not secured by reason alone, but have to be purchased with suffering. And that suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for converting the opponent and opening his mind which is otherwise shut to the voice of reason. This principle is explained by Martin Luther King who was the first one to apply it on a large scale to the remedying of color prejudice. He says,

My study of Ghandi convinced me that pacifism is not nonresistance to evil, but nonviolent resistance to evil. Between the two positions there is a world of difference. Ghandi resisted evil with as much

²⁷ EDITORS OF INTERRACIAL REVIEW, "Can Prejudice Be Cured?", reprinted from The Interracial Review, issue of Aug. 1935, p. 5.

vigor and power as the violent resisted it, but he resisted with love instead of hate.²⁸

The main effectiveness of nonviolent resistance is that the personal example of other men speaks louder than their words. Their sufferings speak with voices that appeal simultaneously to all man's powers; to his emotions, to his intellect, to his moral sense of right and wrong.

Personal example as a remedy for prejudice is not really a separate remedy from education itself, any more than the teacher is separate from education. The ideal teacher is, himself, an example which illustrates both practice and theory all unified in one person. Perhaps that is one reason why, when God decided to teach men, He did so through a human person, Jesus Christ. At the same time He taught men difficult truths, He attracted them by His love to accept both Him and His teaching.

²⁸ Martin Luther KING, Stride Towards Freedom. The Montgomery Story, N.Y., Harper, 1958, p. 98.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem that this thesis set out to solve is the correlation of the findings of sociology and the philosophy on the causality of prejudice.

From sociology, both a definition of unfavorable prejudice and its causality as described by sociology are taken. These causes were found to be; 1) irrational and emotional reactions, 2) personal advantage, and 3) cultural conflict. Ignorance was noted as a condition for the operation of these causes.

Examination of this causality in the light of what philosophy, especially Thomistic philosophy, might have to say about the causality of unfavorable prejudice, led to the following conclusions: 1) A coherent theory of cognition and error is needed to explain prejudice. 2) Assent is an important element in such a theory. 3) A coherent theory of error needs to recognize man's freedom as one of its basic constituents. 4) Sociology's failure to recognize man's freedom as a cause leaves its description of causality incomplete. Philosophy's view of freedom as a part of error completes it. 5) "Emotional reaction" as a cause, correlates well with the dominant role of appetite in the making of practical judgments. 6) Philosophy's view of knowledge by affective and cognitive connaturality helps explain both the emotional grip of prejudice and the influence of culture and environment on

prejudice. 7) Philosophy's view of the limitation of man's mind, both in its process of knowing and its content, corroborates sociology's view of ignorance as conditioning prejudice. 8) Philosophy's view of man's multiple, accidental appetites and powers correlates well with the pull and push of goods that give personal advantage or promote cultural conflict. 9) The presence of multiple appetites shows the need of subordination to an ultimate goal if man's life is to be unified. Thus self denial is found to be a remedy for prejudice. 10) Religion is a remedy inasmuch as it proposes an ultimate goal and motivates man towards seeking it. 11) Practice is a remedy for prejudice inasmuch as it generates a favorable connaturality, and removes ignorance. 12) The other remedies of education and personal example weaken all the causal factors of prejudice.

The correlation of causality of prejudice as found in sociology and philosophy show that these two sciences do not conflict with each other but are mutually helpful.

From the analysis of prejudice as irrational yet rooted in freedom, it follows that every act of prejudice is, of itself, immoral. A typical case of compulsory-color-segregation in the United States illustrates this conclusion in detail.

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APPENDIX 1

ABSTRACT OF

The Causes of Prejudice: A Correlation of its Causality as Described by Sociology and by Philosophy¹

Four years of first hand experience with prejudice as pastor of a parish of mixed colors in southern United States gave the writer his interest in prejudice. What is it? What are its causes and remedies? This thesis attempts to answer those questions by correlating what can be found in sociology and philosophy.

From sociology a definition of unfavorable prejudice is drawn. Its causes are sociologically described as 1) Irrational and emotional reactions, 2) Personal advantage, 3) Cultural conflict. Ignorance appears as a necessary condition for the operation of these causes.

Philosophy appears weak in the formal treatment of prejudice, but strong in development of explanations of basic ingredients of prejudice such as error, assent and their relation to freedom. On these points Saint Thomas' philosophy is presented as completed by Newman.

Some important non-Thomistic philosophies are briefly viewed both to confirm Thomism and to illustrate why it

¹ Richard T. McGorley, S.J., doctoral thesis presented to Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, Feb., 1960, viii-222 p.

is preferred.

The correlation between philosophy and sociology shows in general a basic agreement between them. Sociology is stronger in development of causality on the phenomenological level, philosophy stronger on the deeper level of essence and nature. In particular, the correlation shows that the causes of prejudice are the three general causes given by sociology. In addition, philosophy shows the following causes: 1) Free will, needed to coherently explain the error involved in prejudice. 2) The pull and push of multiple and unsubordinated appetites that operate as man performs the intricate cognitive process of making practical judgments. 3) The development of negative affective connaturality through which history, environment and affective state dispose man towards error. 4) Man's abstractive, universal manner of knowing objects of sense.

In view of this combined causality, the remedies for prejudice appear as 1) Control of appetites 2) Practise which develops a positive affective connaturality 3) Religion as a unifying and motivating force 4) Personal example 5) Education.

A typical case of color-prejudice illustrates the point that the act of prejudice, because it is rooted in freedom and error, is, of itself, an immoral act.

Sociology on Causation

Causation { irrational + emotional reactions
personal advantage
cultural conflict

A condition for the working of all three: ignorance

p. 41 p. 18: "Only in such acts can there be error"
There is no error in the acts of senses. ???

p. 42 You say "St Thomas maintained that there would be no error in the essential act of the intellect, which is understanding" - act of judgment it would not be an essential act. - It has to be since for St Thomas truth is formally in judgment because judgment is the perfect act.

p. 47-48 = Error in the senses: very poor treatment
Is there error "per se" or "per accidens" in the senses?

p. 49 "The first idea formed is "being". You mention this in your chapter on apprehension. Do you mean to say that it is through apprehension that we grasp being?

p. 51 "In judgment, two concepts, subject and predicate are apprehended as united - - -" Is this an adequate description of judgment?

p. 63 "He says that the will is operative in all assent, 'Potest etiam deus quodcumque velit assensu, repugnante a voluntate movetur' S. T. I-II, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3

p. 63 "He sees in the act of assent a sort of choice in the speculative field in which the mind freely assents to this rather than to that" What do you mean by a sort of choice

(1)

Do you mean that in all cases of assent the will intervenes?

Are these judgments what compel assent? Where is
then choice in such a case and what is the role of the will

(7)

p. 71, p. 73: You always quote Newman from Planchon