

THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM AS A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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INTRODUCTION

The Arab refugees are the victims of a clash between the forces of Arab Nationalism and Zionism which emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century and to-day are one of the major causes of unrest in the Middle East.

Both movements were stimulated, though not created, by repression: the former by the policy of Ottoman Turks, and the latter by the Russian pogroms. The adherents of both believed that they had been promised Palestine by the British: the Arabs by the McMahon letters, the Jews by the Balfour Declaration. For this and deeper reasons which will be shown both regarded themselves as possessing rights over Palestine.

Following World War I, Britain undertook the dual obligation to facilitate the "close settlement by Jews on the land" (in Palestine) and at the same time to safeguard "the rights and position of other sections of the population¹".

Jewish aim was to make Palestine as Jewish "as England is English²". This required large scale Jewish immigration and land purchases, as the Jews represented in 1914,

1 Article 6 of the Mandate for Palestine - See Appendix 14.

2 Dr. Chaim Weizmann, representing the Zionists at the Peace Conference in 1919.

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only a small fraction of the population, no more than 55,000; their land holdings were negligible--no more than 160,000 acres. British policy fluctuated in accordance with the interpretations of the Balfour Declaration, influenced by the pressures exerted by the forces of Arab Nationalism and Zionism.

The Jewish community grew in size, wealth and strength. Arab opposition grew more and more violent--but less in strength. By 1947, there were 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews in Palestine. The Jews claimed the creation of a sovereign Jewish State--the Arabs expressed themselves determined to resist the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. Their claims were irreconcilable--the Mandate unworkable. Britain submitted the problem to the United Nations for judgement.

The United Nations General Assembly, on November 29, 1947, by a vote of thirty-three (including the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) to thirteen, with ten abstentions (including the United Kingdom), recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish State and the placing of Jerusalem under a special, international regime. The two states were to be independent but bound by an economic union. The Jews accepted the partition resolution of the United Nations. The Arabs were resolved to oppose by force if necessary, any proposal which did not guarantee the independence of the whole of

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Palestine as an Arab state.

The United Nations Palestine Commission, set up to supervise the execution of the General Assembly's plan failed. Armed assistance alone could have effected the partition resolution, and Britain's co-operation was indispensable. However, Britain would not co-operate in any scheme which was not acceptable to both parties. Moreover, armed assistance was not provided by the United Nations Security Council.

Lawlessness and terrorism became rampant in Palestine. On May 14th, 1948, the Mandate came to an end. The State of Israel was proclaimed (and recognized immediately by the United States and by the U.S.S.R. three days later) and the disturbances in Palestine developed into open warfare, which in reality was no more in intensity than what had prevailed in the preceding months.

The Arab-Israeli war was short lived. Armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states were signed-- but no peace. In the wake of the Arab-Israeli hostilities, upwards of eighty per cent of the Arab population of Palestine became homeless and destitute.

Though the Arab refugees were received with hospitality by the neighbouring Arab states, there were too many. They were saved from starvation by the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations

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Relief for Palestine Refugees with the assistance of the Red Cross Societies and the American Society of Friends.

These refugees want to return to Palestine, to their homes, lands, shops and in many cases to their families. The Arab states support the refugees in their claim to repatriation. In fact, so does the United Nations by Resolution No. 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. The United Nations performs its humanitarian task through UNRWA, without prejudice to this resolution. Israel will not take them back. An influx of Jewish immigrants has already taken the possessions left behind by the Arabs.

Both the Jews and the Arabs have strong attachments to Palestine. The world community voted overwhelmingly in what they considered to be the best solution, endeavouring to satisfy the aspirations of both Arab Nationalism and Zionism by partitioning Palestine into an Arab State and a Jewish State. But little or no thought was given to the future of the Arab inhabitants in Palestine. Unfortunately, the voting was not an indication of the unmistakable sentiment of the United Nations.

On the question of refugees, the Jews assume no responsibility for the mass exodus. They place the onus on the Arabs themselves. The Arabs blame their exodus on eviction, evacuation and panic, allegedly caused by Jewish terrorism and massacres. Both the Jews and the Arab states, for

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political, psychological and economic reasons, are responsible for keeping the refugee problem alive. However, underlying these factors are the well founded fears, and distrust for one another.

It is a tragic problem and the international community is primarily concerned with the humanitarian aspects, at the same time it cannot ignore the international implications of an inflamed Middle East. A solution is urgent. Several avenues are open for a possible solution but the good-will of both the Jews and the Arabs is necessary. Compromise is essential.

A solution might be achieved first by an international guarantee of the security and territorial integrity of both Israel and the Arab states; this guarantee to be underwritten by the U.S.A. Secondly, the internationalization of Jerusalem might lead to a better understanding and would have the blessings of the world community. Thirdly, the possibility of an exchange of Gaza to Israel for a land corridor in the Negev to Egypt has its merits. Finally, the advisability of a buffer state between Egypt and Israel is also recommended. Positive steps towards the direct solution of the Arab refugee problem might be considered on the following basis: limited repatriation, integration, resettlement and emigration.

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A solution to the problem is possible provided the
Jews and the Arabs face the future with realism.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.- Emergence of Arab Nationalism vs Ottoman Empire.

In the seventh century A.D., the Bedouins of Arabia conquered the greatest empire the world had known, stretching from Spain across North Africa, through the Middle East and Central Asia, to the borders of China. Gradually, however, this Arab Empire crumbled from within, and by the beginning of the sixteenth century was replaced by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Turks were descendants of the Kayii Tribe of the Oghuz family, who emigrated from the northern part of the Altay Mountains in Central Asia, into Anatolia which was under the rule of the Seljuks, another branch of Turks. The defeat of the Seljuks, marked the beginning of the Ottoman Empire. Under Osman I (1290-1326), founder of the Ottoman dynasty, and through Osman's successors, the Turks enlarged their territories at the expense of the Byzantine Empire. Selim I, conquered Persia in 1515, Iraq and Syria in 1516 and Egypt in 1517. Seliman the Magnificent, successor to Selim I, the subjection of Arab countries to Ottoman rule was extended without a break from Algeria to the Persian Gulf and from Aleppo to the Indian Ocean. Its authority was generally loose and insecure, but

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it maintained itself within those frontiers until the close of the 18th century.

Under Turkish rule Arab Nationalism declined and became a spent force. Attempts at incorporating the European idea of patriotism into Egyptian and ultimately into Arabic thought failed.

Napoleon, in 1798, after invading Egypt, tried to cast himself in the role of liberator. He wrote, in the newspaper he founded with a captured Vatican Arabic press, of "the Egyptian Nation", saying that "all men are equal ...in future all Egyptians will be eligible for all (government) posts..." When Napoleon tried to organize a native government as a facade for French rule, he was told that Egyptians practiced other professions--government was the profession of the Turks¹.

In 1839, during the second Syrian War, there was a possibility for Mohammed Ali, to replace the Sultan of Turkey, and revive the Arab Empire. He failed, not only because he was opposed by some European powers, Britain in particular, the staunchest defender of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, but because

¹ William R. Polk, David M. Stamler, and Edmund Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy, The Struggle for Palestine, Boston, Beacon Press, Beacon Hill, 1957, p. 255.

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the Arabs of Palestine and Syria possessed no unified Arab consciousness on which Mohammed Ali could build².

However, Mohammed Ali's seizure of Palestine and Syria in 1832 did play a role in the rebirth of Arab Nationalism. His son Ibrahim abolished the laws of exception and other discrimination in force against the Christians, thus allowing American Protestants and French Roman Catholics to establish missionary schools. The chief contribution of these schools was the fact that they taught in Arabic. The Americans set up the first printing press in Beirut which further facilitated teaching, by providing training manuals and literature in the Arabic language. It is in this sense that the foremost Arab student of Arab nationalism, George Antonius, could say that "the story of the Arab national movement opens in Syria in 1847, with the foundation in Beirut of a modest literary society under American patronage³."

In 1857, the Syrian Scientific Society succeeded the Society of Arts and Sciences which had been founded in Beirut in 1847. Though the latter included American and British members, the former consisted of Arabs only.

2 Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, London: Hamish, Hamilton, 1938, pp. 30-31.

3 ibid., p. 13.

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However, following the sectarian massacres among Christians, Druzes, and Moslems in 1860, which proved to the members of the society as well as to other Arabs, that the Arabs must subordinate their religious differences if they were not to be fragmented into weak and warring sects, they joined together, in a single society, for the purpose of fostering and developing their common heritage. In 1868, the society obtained official recognition from the Turks and consequently its membership extended to include Arabs in Cairo, Constantinople and elsewhere.

In the years that followed, placards denouncing the Turks and exhorting the Arabs to rise in revolt made appearances in Beirut, Damascus, Tripoli, and other centers. Later propaganda outlined a specific revolutionary program, to be carried out by force if necessary:

- 1° the grant of independence to Syria in union with the Lebanon;
- 2° the recognition of Arabic as an official language in the country;
- 3° the removal of the censorship and other restrictions on the freedom of expression and the diffusion of knowledge;
- 4° the employment of locally-recruited units on local military service only⁴.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 84.

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The revolt never materialized and from 1880 to World War I, Arab national movements on the surface appeared inactive. Several factors were responsible for this, namely, the terrorism, repression, and censorship imposed by the Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), and to a lesser extent, the influence of the Western missionary schools which contributed to Arab sectarian rivalries, by teaching in foreign languages rather than in Arabic.

The revolt of the Young Turks, a group of pseudo, liberal minded young leaders, against Sultan Abdul Hamid II, in July 24, 1908, led to a semblance of cooperation between Arabs and Turks, during which time many Arab leaders pledged loyalty to Constantinople, provided that the Arabs be given an equal voice in the conduct of the Ottoman Empire. As a result of this co-operation, Hussein Ibn Ali, a scion of the House of Bani Hashem, the noblest of Arab families, was appointed Grand Sharif of Mecca in Western Arabia, giving him custody of the holy places of Islam and supervision of the annual Moslem pilgrimage to Mecca.

On April 13, 1909, another revolution broke out. Abdul-Hamid tried to overthrow the Young Turks, but failed. As a result the Young Turks deposed the sultan, replacing him with his brother Mehemed V, who abolished all non-Turkish societies and imposed a new tyranny on the Arabs. The Arabs reacted vigorously. A number of nationalist

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societies, some secret and some open, were founded: Al-Muntaba al-Adabi (i.e. the Literary Club), founded in Constantinople, in 1909, by a group of officials and men of letters; the Ottoman Decentralisation Party (Hizb al-Lamarkaziya al-Idariya al-'Uthmani), founded in Cairo towards the end of 1912; al-Qahtaniya (named after Qahtan, one of the legendary ancestors of the Arab race) was a secret society, established towards the end of 1909, with the object of turning the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy. This group was led by 'Aziz 'Ali al-Masri, an officer of the Turkish army, of whom we shall hear more hereafter.

Outstanding among these societies were the al-Fatat, (i.e. The Young Arab Society), founded in Paris in 1911, and the al-'Ahd, (i.e. the Covenant), founded in 1914 by 'Aziz 'Ali al-Masri, at this time, the Inspector-General of the Egyptian Army, consisting of Arab army officers. By and large these societies demanded, not independence, but political autonomy for the predominantly Arab districts and Arab representation in the imperial government at Istanbul on a basis of full equality with the Ottoman Turks. This emphasis is manifest in the resolution⁵, adopted by an Arab-Syrian Congress at Paris (18-24 June 1913), attended by twenty-four

5 Full text in Appendix 1.

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official delegates, who with the exception of three from the United States and two from Mesopotamia, came from the districts of Lebanon and Syria:

2. It is important to guarantee the Ottoman Arabs the exercise of their political rights by making effective their participation in the central administration of the Empire.
3. It is important to establish in each of the Syrian and Arab vilayets a decentralized regime suitable to their needs and aptitudes.
5. The Arabic language must be recognized in the Ottoman Parliament and considered as an official language in Syrian and Arab countries⁶.

The Committee of Union and Progress (the formal organization of the Young Turks) announced compliance with a number of the Arab demands. In practice, however, the Arabs soon learned that the Turkish concessions were negligible. The Arabs, in bitterness and despair made no secret of their desire to break from the Ottoman Empire.

When World War I brought Turkey on the side of Germany, both Britain and Turkey pressed for Sharif Hussein's support; meanwhile, Hussein was busy contacting the Arab leaders of the Arabian peninsula and Syria to determine their views, as he felt the time ripe to realize his dreams of Arab independence.

⁶ Hurewitz, J.C., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record, 1535-1914*, Princeton, New Jersey, Nostrand,

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At the same time, however, another force was growing, that would soon enter in competition with Arab Nationalism.

2.- Emergence of Zionism

Zionism -- the idea that there ought to be a national home for the Jews in Palestine is both a very old and a rather new concept. The aspiration for the restoration of the Jewish state in Palestine was sustained throughout the long centuries of exile by Jewish liturgy and ritual, by sacred literature and popular lore.

Ever since the destruction of the Second Temple and the leveling of Jerusalem by Titus in the First Century A.D., religious Jews yearned for the Messiah who would lead the dispersed nation back to its home. For almost 2,000 years the talisman greeting remained, "Next year in Jerusalem⁷!" Yet it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that the idea of literally "going to Zion⁸" was conceived as an escape from the persecutions of the Jews which took place time to time in various countries.

This idea was prompted by Dr. Theodore Herzl, a Viennese Journalist of Hungarian Jewish extraction, who covered the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. Herzle was

7 Life, November 18, 1957, p. 156.

8 ibid., p. 156.

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present when Dreyfus was officially disgraced in 1895. He heard the Parisian mobs shouting for Jewish blood, and realized that anti-semitism was deeply rooted even in a highly civilized country. He then wrote a pamphlet, "The Jewish State" in which he suggested that the Jews of the world should leave their unhappy exile and build for themselves a free Jewish state. He pleaded for territory: "Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation and the rest we shall arrange ourselves⁹." For the first time in more than 1800 years a Jewish leader emerged with a definite political programme aimed at the establishment of a Jewish State, for the Jewish nation.

In 1897 Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress at Basle Switzerland, where under his leadership, the World Zionist Organization was created. Their aim was to found for the Jewish people a home in Palestine. To attain this end, the Congress contemplated the following means:

- 1^o The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
- 2^o The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

9 Polk, p. 149.

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3° The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

4° Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism¹⁰.

From the very beginning it was realized that a goal of this magnitude and complexity could only be achieved with international support and that considerable and sustained diplomatic efforts with the rulers and statesmen of Europe would be needed to secure such international endorsement.

Herzl's first belief was that the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire might agree to the formation of an autonomous Jewish community in Palestine. He wrote to Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, urging that by supporting his efforts with the Sultan he would be doing good service to British interests in the East.

When it was clear that nothing would be accomplished by Herzl's negotiations with the Sultan, Lord Lansdowne, then British Minister for Foreign Affairs, offered to grant the Jews a large area of land in what is now known as Kenya for Jewish settlement under a Jewish official and with extensive

¹⁰ The (Basle) Program of the World Zionist Organization, 29 August 1897.

(N. Sokolow, History of Zionism (London, 1919), Vol. 1, pp. 268-69) as quoted in

Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1535-1914, Vol. 1, p. 209, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey.

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powers of self-government. Herzl persuaded one Zionist Congress to accept the offer by a narrow majority, but there was persistent opposition, especially from the Russian Jews, for whose principal benefit the scheme was devised. East Africa was not Zion, and the Zionist Congress in 1905 reversed its former decision and dropped the plan.

All Jewish history, all the traditions and teaching that have been handed down from generation to generation, all pointed to the Biblical Land of Palestine as the fount and source of their life. There they had been in the past, thither they had always longed to return. It was there that they had hammered out a religious and moral code for the Western world. Jerusalem might be a holy city for the Arabs, but only one of several, and not the holiest. For the Zionist there was nothing but Jerusalem.

3.- World War I - Crisis - Opportunity and Breaches of Promise.

In August, 1914 Turkey entered into the war on the side of Germany. The sultan of the Ottoman Empire, in his capacity as caliph, issued a call to a Jihad, (i.e. holy war against the Christians). The Turks wanted the Sharif Hussein of Mecca to approve the Jihad, in order that it would become more effective. On the other hand, the British feared that if Hussein approved the Jihad, the Suez Canal would be

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endangered. There was also a possibility of a Moslem uprising in Britain's colonial possessions such as Egypt and India. The Arabs hated the Turks but distrusted the British; however, they decided to negotiate an alliance with the British. Arab conditions were incorporated into the Damascus Protocol¹¹ they amounted to a request for a promise of full independence. British acceptance was contained in an exchange of letters¹² between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, then British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan.

Sir Henry McMahon, acting on instructions of the British Government, pledged England to support "the independence of the Arabs" but he excluded from his pledge the whole coastal belt of Syria "lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Hama, and Aleppo." In addition to the basic recognition of the Arab Nationalist claims, Britain guaranteed the holy places against external aggression and promised advice and assistance in the establishment of new Arab governments. On the strength of this agreement Hussein, on June 5, 1916 declared war against Turkey, an act which has since become known as the Arab Revolt.

11 See Appendix 2.

12 See Appendix 3.

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On June 5, 1916, the Arab Revolt began, with its initial object to seize the cities of the Hejaz from Turkish troops. By January 25, 1917, all Turkish strong points in the Hejaz, with the exception of Medina had fallen to Arab forces. (...) One Turkish division in Asia and two in Yemen had been cut off from their home bases. (...) Arab forces controlled the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, securing these two waterways for the Allies. (...) The Arabs under Feisal then struck northward toward Syria, capturing Aqaba on July 6, 1917. (...) Arab forces acted as the right wing for Sir Edmund Allenby's British troops moving up through Palestine¹³.

During the 19th Century up to World War I, the Ottoman Empire had maintained its essential integrity largely owing to the jealousies amongst the Powers. However, as the War proceeded, the Entente Powers became desirous of disrupting the Ottoman Empire. Russia wanted Constantinople and the Straits; France claimed Syria; Great Britain was beginning to feel the need of an overland route to the East and whatever else might be necessary to neutralize France's and Russia's gains. In the course of carving up the Sultan's dominions, Great Britain found herself driven to contract certain fresh obligations, some of which conflicted with, while others confirmed the pledges she had given in 1915 through Sir Henry McMahon to the Arabs. The first of those commitments was

¹³ Ellis, Harry B., Israel and the Middle East, New York, Ronald Press, 1957, pp. 88-9.

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the secret Sykes¹⁴-Picot¹⁵ Agreement¹⁶ with France, under which France was to enjoy hegemony over the districts of Lebanon and Syria after the war. Russia, also a party to the compact, was to receive Constantinople with some miles of hinterland on both sides of the Bosphorus, plus a large section of eastern Anatolia. France was to have the bulk of the district of Syria, together with part of southern Anatolia and the Mosul district in Iraq. Britain was to be entrusted with a belt of territory running west to east from the southern extremity of Syria to Iraq, where it broadened to include Baghdad and Basra and the entire area between the Persian Gulf and the land assigned to France. In addition Britain was to control the Mediterranean ports of Haifa and Acre with a narrow strip of hinterland. A special international regime was foreseen for much of Palestine. This latter proposal resulted from the refusal of any of the three powers concerned to permit any of the others to have sole control of Palestine.

¹⁴ Picot, F. George, Consul-General in Bairut before World War I.

¹⁵ Sykes, Mark, Secretary of the War Cabinet on Middle Eastern Affairs.

¹⁶ Sykes-Picot Agreement, see Appendix 4.

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Antonius, a foremost scholar of Arab Nationalism, describes the Sykes-Picot Agreement as "greed at its worse" and "a startling piece of double-dealing¹⁷". The agreement had been negotiated and concluded without the knowledge of Sharif Hussein; it contained provisions which were in direct conflict with the terms of Sir Henry McMahon's compact with him; and was entered into by Great Britain with France and Russia in the spring of 1916, six months after Sir Henry McMahon had concluded his bargain with the Arab leader Sharif Hussein. A gross breach of faith indeed.

In December, 1917, the Bolsheviks, who had overthrown the government in Russia, published the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Hussein demanded an explanation from the British. The reply he received on February 8, 1918, known as the Bassett Letter¹⁸ not only evaded the issue, namely whether or not it was true that the Allied Powers had concluded secret agreements affecting the future disposal of the Arab countries, but it clothed the evasion in language which implied that no such agreements had been concluded. The reply concludes with an emphatic assurance that Great Britain in accordance with her pledge, would stand by the Arabs in their struggle for liberation.

17 Antonius, p. 248.

18 See Appendix 5.

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The Sykes-Picot Treaty and the facts of war led Great Britain to conclude further obligations which conflicted with previous pledges; namely, the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917¹⁹.

In accordance with the Sykes-Picot Treaty, France was claiming Syria as her preserve and had given her allies unmistakably to understand that Palestine was included in her claim. Consequently, it became imperative for Great Britain, from the point of view of safety to interpose a buffer between her position on the Suez Canal and the future French position in Syria. Zionist leaders gave Sykes a formal assurance that they were irrevocably opposed to any internationalization of the Holy Land, even under an Anglo-French condominium, and that provided Great Britain would support them in their national aspirations, they would henceforth work for the establishment of a British protectorate in Palestine. However, more important than this factor was the desirability to give those Jews who had been so active in overthrowing the Czarist regime an incentive to keep Russia in the war. There was also a desire to bring over the United States to the Allied side and the fear that Germany would forestall this by declaring in favour of Zionism, as news had reached the British Foreign Office that Baron Rosen, the

¹⁹ See Appendix 6.

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German Ambassador at The Hague had been in conference with leading Dutch Jews in this respect.

The promise of the Balfour Declaration was bold and alluring, the kind of trumpet call that statesmen issue in critical hours to kindly peoples to further sacrifices. Lloyd George, in a speech made in the Commons in June 1937, stated in regard to the Balfour Declaration:

It was one of the darkest periods of the war when Mr. Balfour prepared his Declaration. Let me recall the circumstances to the House. At the time the French Army had mutinied, the Italian Army was on the eve of collapse, and America had hardly started preparing in earnest. There was nothing left but Britain confronting the most powerful military combination the world has ever seen. It was important for us to seek every legitimate help we could get. We came to the conclusion from information we received from every part of the world, that it was vital we should have the sympathies of the Jewish community. I can assure the Committee that we did not come to that conclusion from any predilections or prejudices. Certainly, we had no prejudices against the Arabs, because at the moment we had hundreds and thousands of troops fighting for Arab emancipation from the Turk. In these circumstances and on the advice which we received, we decided that it was desirable to secure the sympathy and cooperation of that most remarkable community, the Jews throughout the world ...²⁰

However, to the Arabs the Balfour Declaration was an indication of a second breach of faith, as it was taken to imply a denial of Arab political freedom in Palestine.

20 O.R. 2nd Session, G.A., Suppl. 11, U.N.S.C.O.P., Report to the G.A. Vol. 11, Doc. A/364 Add. 1, 9 Sept., 1947.

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Arab fears were again alleviated by further assurances. The Hogarth Message of January 1918 stated that "Jewish settlements in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the "political and economic freedom of the Arab population²¹".

On June 16, 1918, the Declaration to the Seven²², confirmed England's previous pledges to the Arabs in plainer language than in any former public utterance, and, more valuable still, provided an authoritative enunciation of the principles on which these pledges rested. Britain pledged herself to ensure that no regime would be set up in any of the Arab territories that was not acceptable to their populations. These assurances were further supplemented by the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918²³, which announced the identity of French and British war-aims in the East, which it defined as the complete and final liberation of the populations living under the Turkish yoke, and the

21 Antonius, p. 268.

"Commander Hogarth, one of the greatest authorities on Arabian history, one of the heads of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, interviewed King Husain and gave the message orally. Husain wrote it down in Arabic. The quotation is a translation of the note by Antonius."

22 See Appendix 8.

23 See Appendix 9.

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setting up of national governments chosen by the people themselves in the free exercise of the popular will.

Unfortunately history did not bear the British out, partly because France declared that, since she had not been made privy to the British correspondence with Hussein, she was under no compulsion to alter the Sykes-Picot Agreement to benefit the Arabs. The result of the long drawn-out negotiations was the assignment, in April, 1920, of a League of Nations mandate to France for Lebanon and Syria, and to Britain a similar mandate over Palestine and Iraq. In Palestine she was required to impliment the Balfour Declaration. Arab Nationalism and Zionism, both very suspicious of one another were about to collide.

4.- Arab Nationalism vs Zionism.

Zionism emerged at approximately the same time as Arab Nationalism. Both movements were stimulated by repression. To both, World War I was the time of crisis and opportunity. The adherents of both believed that they had been promised Palestine by Great Britain, the Arabs by the McMahon Letters, the Jews by the Balfour Declaration. After 1918 the two movements, each in a dynamic stage, and each believing itself to be right, found themselves facing one another in a single land with the attention of both focused

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on their interpretation of the Balfour Declaration.

Zionist endeavours were concentrated on making Palestine as Jewish as "England is English"²⁴. This required immigration and land purchases for the Jewish population in Palestine at the time was no more than 55,000 and land holdings were negligible -- no more than 160,000 acres.

Even before Britain assumed the Mandate for Palestine, that is, during the tenure of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (EOTA), Zionists demanded that they should participate in the military administration and that they should select, and supplement the pay of Jewish candidates for the police and that they should be allowed their own military defence force. During the tenure of the OETA, upward 5,000 Jewish immigrants were allowed to enter the country, Hebrew was adopted as one of the official languages, and a Zionist delegation began to tour the country to survey the development possibilities. A clash between the Arabs and the Jews was inevitable. Mark Sykes, who revisited Palestine in 1919, was, in spite of his earlier enthusiasm, "shocked by the intense bitterness provoked there"²⁵. The King-Crane commission, which toured the country on the instructions of President Wilson, (U.S.A.) to test the

²⁴ Polk et al, p. 73.

²⁵ Antonius, p. 291.

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reaction of the population to the proposed mandatory arrangement, recommended serious modification of the extreme Zionist program of unlimited immigration. The commission thought that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate the program of immigration. True to prediction, at Easter in 1920, there occurred the first of many communal riots.

In July 1920, the Lloyd George government of Britain, abolished the military administration and replaced it by a civil one with the mandate as its charter. Britain immediately took the first steps which appeared to be in the implementation of the Balfour Declaration: the Land Transfer Ordinance was issued and the first immigration ordinance was enacted. The former meant the reopening of the registry so that lands could be bought and sold. The first major purchase by the Jewish National Fund, established for this purpose by the Zionist Congress of 1919, dispossessed seven Arab villages with their 8,000 peasants.

One of the basic principles of the J.N.F. prohibited the use of hired labour. The first settlements in the nineteenth century by Jews did employ Arabs but the ideals of Zionism was "close settlement of Jews on the land²⁶", so that even those Jews who had at one time hired Arabs were compelled to boycott Arab help. More than eighty per cent

26 Article 6 of the mandate for Palestine.

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of Jewish land purchases in Palestine during the mandate period were from large land owners, many of whom were absentees. These land owners, for the most part, had acquired de jure title to the lands through the ignorance of the peasants, who had registered the title to the land, in the name of influential people, for protective reasons under a corrupt Ottoman administration.

The greatest cause of Arab unrest was Jewish immigration to Palestine. Following the first immigration ordinance of September 1920, under British Administration, 5,514 Jewish immigrants were given entry into Palestine between September and December, despite Arab protests, which broke into violence against the Jews and Jewish settlements. The Haycraft Commission, the first of the many inquiry commissions which visited Palestine, declared that the Zionist Organization had desired to ignore the Arabs as a factor to be taken into serious consideration, and had been a contributory cause of the disturbances. Immigration was suspended

but in spite of the findings of the British investigating commission that Arab unrest was due to fear of Zionism, immigration was again reopened the following month with fewer restrictions than prior to the outbreak²⁷.

27 Polk, et al, p. 77.

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These series of events, namely, land purchases, immigration, riots and fluctuations of British Policy set a pattern which continued throughout the history of the Mandate period. The Jewish community grew in size. Between 1920 and 1929, 99,806 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine. Between 1930 and 1937, 182,839 and between 1938 to 1946, 122,796²⁸. As the number of immigrants increased year by year, Arabs' fear of losing their country were increasing and Arab protests and riots were proportionately growing in intensity. In 1938 alone, there were 5,708 incidences of violence. Although these riots were relentlessly curbed by the British they could not be suppressed until 1939, when Britain issued the White Paper, which intended to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases.

The government of Palestine was aware of the implications of the land purchases and immigration as noted in the report of the Woodhead Commission, in 1939:

The gulf between the Arabs and the Jews has widened year by year. The Arabs look upon the Jews as foreigners invading their country, who are able and ready to spend money regardless of values if only they can acquire land occupied by Arabs on which to settle Jews²⁹.

28 Immigration to Palestine, see Appendix 10.

29 *ibid.*, p. 239, on quoting the Woodhead Commission report of 1938, from Cmd 5854, p. 84.

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Massive immigration of Jews is at the root of the present-day problem of Arab refugees. Somebody had to leave!

At this point in the Mandate period, Arab strength had weakened while the Jews had become a very strong force, a "state within a state"³⁰ in Palestine. Though Arab violence mounted in intensity over the years of the Mandate period, it was relentlessly curbed by the British. By 1939, thousands of Arabs had been arrested and their leaders deported. On the other hand, Arab violence led the Jews to form local defence units, to protect their rural settlements. The Haganah (defense) was organized about 1920 and expanded particularly after the Jews had been attacked by the Arabs in 1920 and 1921. By 1936, almost every Jewish man belonged to the Haganah. The organization acquired military skill in several ways. As a result of the Arab Rebellion (1936-1939), Orde Wingate, a young, pro-Zionist British officer, was assigned to train Jewish guerrilla forces to combat Arab terrorists.

Twenty-seven thousand Jews were enlisted to serve the British during World War II. When the Germans, under Rommel were advancing across North Africa, the British Army trained Palmach (shock troops of Jews) to act as guerrillas should the Germans capture Palestine. Thus when the Arabs

³⁰ Koestler, Arthur, Promise and Fulfilment, Palestine 1917-1949, London, MacMillan, 1949, p. 12.

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and the Jews collided head on in 1948, the Jews were able to draw on the Haganah, many veterans of service with the British, Windgate's commandes and the Palmach:

While nine out of ten people in England including the people who made British policy, believed that the British forces were protecting the Jews against the Arabs, they were in fact potentially fulfilling the opposite function³¹.

The Jews knew that in the absence of the British troops they would be capable of defeating the Arabs.

Jewish persecutions in Europe during World War II made the need for emigration to Palestine most urgent. The White Paper issued by the Chamberlain Government in May, 1939, laid down its Palestine Policy: Jewish immigration was to be restricted to a total of 75,000 over the next five years. After that there were to be no more unless the Arabs agreed to admitting them. Zionist impatience with Arab nationalism and the horror of Nazi persecution culminated in the 1942 Biltmore Program of world Zionism, which demanded the establishment of a Jewish State embracing all of Palestine, the creation of a Jewish army, the scrapping of the White Paper of 1939, and unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine, to be supervised by the Jewish Agency rather than by Britain.

31 ibid., p. 74-75.

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By 1944 Jewish terrorism, which had struck Palestine reached a crescendo with a series of well-organized attacks on British police and military outposts and on the country's communications systems. Lord Moyne, British Minister of State in the Middle East was assassinated in Cairo by Jewish terrorists, known as the Stern Gang. The Jews gained American support and President Truman of the U.S.A. appealed to the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee for immediate admission of 100,000. This led to an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which produced a unanimous report published in April 20, 1946. Among other things, 100,000 immigration permits were to be immediately granted to displaced Jews who had been the victims of Nazi persecution. The Arab position remained as it had: Palestine should become an independent state ruled by its majority with due protection for the rights of the minority. The Zionist position: Palestine should be a Jewish commonwealth, open to Jewish immigration as controlled by the Jewish Agency. To implement the committee's report, in all probability would have required "at least another division of troops to the already huge military establishment in Palestine³²." The United States was rather vague about American co-operation.

32 Polk, et al, p. 112.

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Under these circumstances Britain decided to turn the problem over to the United Nations.

5.- Palestine Becomes a United Nations Problem.

The United Kingdom, finding the mandate of Palestine unworkable, submitted the problem to the United Nations on April 2, 1947, suggesting that the General Assembly make recommendations concerning the future government of Palestine. On the 15th of May, the United Nations General Assembly appointed an 11-Power Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which reported on August 31. UNSCOP consisted of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia, with Justice Emil Sundstrom of Sweden as chairman. Soviet Russia proposed to seat the Big Five on the UNSCOP but the suggestion was rejected. The United States contended that the presence of the largest powers on the initial committee of inquiry would raise an obstacle to a fair and impartial report.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations, by a vote of 33 (including the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) to 13, with 10 abstentions (including the U.K.), adopted the Majority Report prepared by UNSCOP, namely, the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State. The two States would be independent but bound together by an economic union. Jerusalem, with its Moslem, Christian and

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Jewish shrines was to be internationalized.

In accordance with the partition proposed the population of the states would have been as follows: the Arab state -- 10,000 Jews and 725,000 Arabs; the Jewish state -- 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs; Jerusalem -- 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs and others. Sixty per cent of the land area of Palestine was to go to the Jewish State. Of the irrigated, cultivable areas, 84% would have been in the Jewish State and 16% in the Arab State. The entire Negev was to be given to the Jews yet only 1% of it was owned by Jews.

Many Zionist groups wanted still more territory than the plan proposed. However, most Zionist leaders acquiesced in the plan because it gave them the long-sought opportunity of founding a state in the area.

The Arabs regarded the establishment of Israel as a threat to the territorial integrity of land that had been inhabited predominantly by Arabs for over a thousand years. Therefore, the Arab Foreign Ministers who met at Beirut on the 21st of September 1947, announced that all Arab countries were resolved to oppose by force the partition proposals and any others which did not guarantee the independence of the whole of Palestine as an Arab State³³.

³³ Doc. R3649, Background to the Middle East Situation 1958, London, Central Office of Information, Reference Division.

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Immediately following the partition resolution of the United Nations, on November 29, 1947, chaos broke loose in Palestine. Great Britain not only refused to co-operate in any way with the committee appointed to supervise the U.N. Resolution but even prevented the United Nation's Commission from carrying out its task. This meant large scale ruin and death for Arabs and Jews. Meanwhile the wretched remnants of Europe's Jewry, in their pathetic ships were being rounded up by British war vessels and shipped to detention camps, in the face of United Nations decision to open a port for their admission. The reason given for Britain's refusal to co-operate with the U.N., was that the United Kingdom wished to retain complete sovereignty until May 15, 1948 without any interference or supervision from outside.

On the 14th May, 1948, the Mandate came to an end, the State of Israel was proclaimed and recognized immediately by the United States and three days later by the U.S.S.R. At the same time, the disturbances in Palestine developed into open warfare between the Jewish community and the Arab states. The British withdrawal was followed by an Arab League-organized invasion by the armies of the surrounding Arab states, comprising Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, proclaiming intervention in Palestine with the objective of establishing security and order in place of chaos and disorder.

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On the same day, May 14, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to appoint a United Nations Mediator.

On June 11th, 1948, a one-month truce was concluded under United Nations pressure. On its expiry the Arabs refused to extend the truce and resumed the attack. After ten days of battle, the truce was renewed. There was more fighting during the autumn and winter in Galilee and in the Negev, caused by Arab breaches of the truce. Meanwhile, Count Bernadotte, who was appointed to fill the function of U.N. mediator on 20th May, 1948, was assassinated by Jewish terrorists on 17th September 1948. His successor, Dr. Ralph Bunche, succeeded in January 1949 in bringing about armistice negotiations at Rhodes, and armistice agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt on 24th February 1949; Lebanon, on the 23rd of March; Jordan, on the 3rd of April, and Syria on 20th July. Iraq, whose forces were also involved, did not sign an armistice agreement, but provision for the withdrawal of their forces was made in the agreement with Jordan.

6.- Mass Exodus from Palestine.

The Arab-Israeli hostilities, though a small-scale affair in comparison to European Wars, was one of the most disruptive in modern times. More than 80 per cent of the Arab population of Palestine was turned into homeless

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refugees; and more than 100,000 villagers who retained their homes, lost the farmlands which had sustained them. From February 1948 to the termination of the Mandate in May 15, 1948, 360,000 had become refugees; from May 15, 1948 to the signing of the truce agreements between Israel and the neighbouring states, 380,000; and the number of those who fled Israel after the cease fire agreements, 100,000. In all a total of approximately 940,000³⁴.

The cause of the mass flight was not single or simple. A potent factor was the announcements made over the air by the Arab Higher Executive advising the civil population to leave their homes during the fighting and return later with the victorious Arab Liberation Army. It was intimated that those Arabs who remained and accepted Jewish protection would be regarded as renegades. A second factor was the terrorist action of Jewish extremists. Deir Yassin, for example, was one of the few Arab villages whose inhabitants had refused permission for foreign Arab volunteers to use their village as a base for operations against the Jewish life-line into Jerusalem; in fact the inhabitants had on occasions collaborated with the Jewish Agency. All but

34 League of Arab States, The Secretariat-General, Palestine Department, The Palestine Refugees, Information and Statistics, (New York), Costa Tsoumas, 1957, p. 14-16.

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forty were slaughtered and the remaining captives were paraded through the streets of Jerusalem. The village itself was razed to the ground. This produced "a mass fear psychosis, grasping the whole Arab community³⁵".

A third reason was Jewish military action during the war-- Arabs were evicted from those villages near the frontiers, for fear that the inhabitants might form a fifth column. There were also evacuations of Arab population by the British authorities³⁶. There were also tactical reasons for the Arab exodus. Arab leaders did advise evacuation of groups living in dangerous areas and also called for a mass evacuation to clear the way for the Arab armies.

Although there is truth in all these explanations, there were deeper social causes of upheaval within the Palestine Arab community. The Jewish community had been organized into a quasi-government for many years before the end of the mandate. This became an essential factor in preventing widespread panic and communal disintegration. In the Arab community there was no quasi-government and little experience or training in self-rule. Nearly all

³⁵ Peretz, Don, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, Richmond, Virginia, William Byrd Press, Inc., 1956, p. 6.

³⁶ Kimche, John, Seven Fallen Pillars, The Middle East, 1915-1950, London, Secker and Warburg, 1950, p. 292.

Also op. cit., p. 14.

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functions of government in Arab areas were under the direct control and administration of British mandatory officials. Early in the hostilities Arab leaders of national sentiment left the country; consequently, when the British administration departed there was no organized Arab body to manage the services of government essential for communal organization. With the breakdown of all functions of government necessary to maintain law, order and well-being, Arab morale collapsed and the community became easy prey to rumour and atrocity stories. With most Arab leaders outside the country, British officials no longer in evidence, there were no authoritative voice to inspire confidence among the Arab masses to check their flight. The flight gathered momentum until it carried away nearly the whole of the Palestine Arab community.

CHAPTER II

THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

1.- The Arab Refugees.

1) Who They Are

They are persons who, as a result of the hostilities in Palestine during 1947 and 1948, lost their homes in the territory that is now Israel and took refuge in neighbouring areas. They are mostly Arabs, but there are among them small numbers of Armenians, Greeks and others who were in practice assimilated to the rest of the non-Jewish population of Palestine under the British mandate. Also amongst them there are more than 100,000 Bedouins whose traditional grazing grounds now lie in Israel. Most of the refugees lived a settled life in towns and villages. The majority were small farmers, agricultural and town labourers, artisans, government employees, police, civil servants, etc., while a small minority were large property owners, business and professional men, doctors, lawyers, etc. About nine tenths of the refugees are Moslems, the remainder Christians.

2) How Many There Are

Statistics as to the exact number of Arab Refugees are unreliable. The illegitimate addition of thousands of destitute Arabs from the neighbouring countries and the fact

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that deaths, concealed wherever possible have contributed to the discrepancies.

The United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, in its report of December 28, 1949, concluded that there could be no more than 726,000 refugees of whom 99,000 are not destitute. The Government of Israel prefers to quote the First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, published on November 1949, stating that the total number of Palestine refugees did not exceed 774,000, which included 48,000 residents in Israel, of whom 17,000 were Palestine Jews driven from their homes by the war, and of this number, 147,000 were self-supporting, therefore leaving 610,000 dependent on United Nations relief. The League of the Arab States quotes a grand total of 940,000 Arab Refugees.

However, in the reports of the United Nations agencies dealing with the problem, the estimates accepted are computed on the basis of the number drawing rations, which in 1950, puts the number of refugees at 960,021. In the Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period of July 1, 1957 to June 1958, the number of refugees is shown to have increased to 963,958¹.

¹ See Annual Distribution of Arab Refugees according to country, from June 1950 to June 1958, see Table II.

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3) Where They Went

About 70,000 crossed the Jordan River to the East, in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. About 97,000 fled into Lebanon, just north of Galilee. Some 75,000 clustered near the south and western boundaries of Syria, and in and around Damascus and other towns. About 200,000 crowded into a tiny coastal desert area called the Gaza strip, presently held by Egypt. About 4,000 crossed the desert to Baghdad in Iraq. In addition, 31,000 Arabs and 17,000 Jews, classed as refugees by the international relief agencies were in Israel².

4) How They Live

Almost a million Arabs forced into exile lived as best they could in unorganized and insanitary camps, or under trees in makeshift shelters, in mosques, convents, under bridges, in caves or, sometimes, just holes they dug in the ground. Although they were well received with hospitality by the neighbouring Arab Governments, there were so many refugees, that without the intervention of the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees with the assistance of the Red Cross Societies and the American Society of Friends,

² Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, Part I, December 28, 1949, U.N.O.R., doc. A/AC/6, p. 18.

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many would have starved. In spite of improved housing, the overall minimum needs have not yet been met. Some of them are still living in caves in the hills of Palestine and there are still concentrations of refugees in camps for which the United Nations Relief and Works Agency can assume no responsibility. Around many camps there are still so-called squatters for whom UNRWA shelter cannot be provided.

- Camp Life -

In 1950 there were 267,598 Arab Refugees living in camps, representing 29.3% of the total. In 1958, the Annual Report of the Director of the U.N.R.W.A. for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period July 1957 to June 1958, reported 380,527 Arab Refugees living in camps, or 39.4% of the total Arab Refugee population³.

"See one and you see them all⁴", UNRWA officials say of their refugee camps. They are not pleasant but they are better than nothing. A camp is usually made of old army tents, each one housing an average family of five, or of dis-used barracks divided by sacking into small cubicles, one to

³ See Annual Distribution of Arab Refugees in Camps According to Country, Appendix 12.

⁴ "Camp Life" is a summary of an account given by: Worthington, Peter, Telegram Staff Reporter, in a series of articles appearing in the Toronto Telegram, January 27-30, 1958.

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a family, with little or no privacy and just enough floor space for sleeping.

Jabalia is the second largest of eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. More than 21,000 people are wedged into one-room quarters. They do no work; each day their main activity is to line up for rations which they sell or trade or eat. The "inmates"⁵ exist rather than live. To a few refugees UNRWA is a bonanza of plenty, where before there was nothing; but to most the dole system is degrading and insufferable, yet, as Peter Worthington, a Telegram Staff Reporter, who describes camp life in Jabalia states, they can't fight it. "Malish" is their philosophy which means "never mind" and they live by that fatalistic outlook: there is no other hope unless revolt is hope. At dawn--4 to 5 a.m., thousands start lining up for food, for rations of flour, oil, beans, sugar--no meat. Sometimes the rations run out before everyone is served but it is a daily ordeal to which the UNRWA workers become hardened. As each day progresses a crowd collects outside the ration distribution building.

⁵ "In Gaza the refugee camps are located in a strip of land 25 miles long and 3 to 7 miles wide between Israel on one side and the Mediterranean sea on the other. The refugees are virtually prisoners. They cannot return to their original homes in Israel. Egypt, who occupies Gaza, will not allow them to leave."

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They set up small scales and barter their food. One trades oil for flour, and haggles over the amount for hours. There is nothing else to do and they take all day to do it.

Jabalia camp averages five to eight births a day. The mother comes into the clinic, has her child, rests for three days, then leaves. The living quarters are crowded-- five people live in a room barely nine feet square. Midwives do the delivering. In an emergency a nurse helps out. Only in critical cases is the doctor consulted. Births outnumber deaths by almost five to one, and the infant mortality rate in the clinic is low.

A typical meal, served in a flat tin plate, is a spoonful of grey-yellowish boiled wheat onto which is dumped a ladle of boiled, watery spinach. Into this a cod liver oil pill is tossed and over the whole a small ladle of hot oil is poured. The Arab refugees cluster at tables, bolt their food and leave to make room for the next wave of eaters. When a table is empty a "sweeper" comes and collects all the bits and spillings into a pan. This is put into the pot again and thus nothing is ever wasted.

One of the greatest problems is rations. Expectant Arab Refugee mothers draw extra food, but her baby, when it is born, doesn't qualify for a ration until it is a year old. However, if the baby dies about \$7.00 is given the mother to provide a shroud and pay for a burial. Adults are valued at

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\$10 for burial. Consequently, the mortality rate for babies under one year is abnormally high. UNRWA officials admit baby-killing goes on because the money is needed and the child doesn't draw rations. By the same token the adult death rate is abnormally low. Refugees conceal deaths and continue drawing rations of the dead person. As a result guards are put on cemeteries to stop secret burials.

5) Who Provides Relief

The plight of the Arab refugees as an obstacle to peace in Palestine prompted the United Nations General Assembly, in November 1948, to appeal to the nations of the world for funds to provide food, clothing and shelter for the refugees. Thirty-three Governments, made voluntary contributions amounting to \$32 million and the United Nations established an emergency Organization, the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees. The UNRPR purchased and scheduled materials and supplies, and through contracts with the International Red Cross Committee, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee, supplied the refugees with food, shelter and other services. Many other charitable, religious and social agencies assisted in substantial ways. It may be stated that out of the \$32 million provided by contributions to the UNRPR, \$6 million is credited to the Arab States.

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Governments contributed in the hope that conciliation would produce peace and lay the basis for a permanent solution for the refugees. There was no way of telling in 1948 that the problem would still exist ten years later and that more would be called for than the provision of relief.

On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (Resolution 194 (III)),

(...) that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date, and that compensations should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principle of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible⁶."

This resolution formed a Conciliation Commission for Palestine to negotiate a settlement of outstanding differences between Israel and the Arab States. Accordingly the Commission set up the Economic Survey Mission to examine the economic situation in the countries affected by the Arab-Israeli hostilities and to make recommendations to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation.

The Economic Survey Mission recommended a plan for relief and works programs under which direct relief was gradually to be replaced by works projects furnishing employment

⁶ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), of 11th December, 1948.

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to the refugees. In line with this new approach UNRPR, on December 8, 1949, at the fourth session of the General Assembly established UNRWA, to carry out relief and works projects in collaboration with the local governments. The same resolution also created a Commission to advise and assist the Director of the Agency. The Commission was composed of representatives of France, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S.A. On May 1, 1950 the assets and liabilities of UNRPR were transferred to UNRWA which officially assumed responsibility and established its headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon.

UNRWA has had its mandate extended twice, during which time it sought to set up development projects that could absorb refugees. When the last extension of UNRWA's mandate was under consideration in 1954, the United Nations agreed that UNRWA should continue to function until June 30, 1960, in recognition of the fact that large projects then being planned for resettlement of refugees in the Jordan Valley and the Sinai would require time to complete.

While UNRWA has been able efficiently and inexpensively to provide the necessary relief to the refugee population, it has not been successful in integrating refugees into the economy of the area, a failure due primarily to the attitude of the governments concerned and of the refugees themselves. The works projects program did not succeed and neither has the program for development projects. A limited

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number of very useful self-help projects arising from the vocational training and individual grants programs have resulted in making some refugees self-supporting. However, the numbers have not been sufficient to counterbalance the natural growth in the refugee population.

Over the past ten years the world has given some \$300 million to help the refugees, the United States having contributed two-thirds of this amount and the United Kingdom about one-fifth.

The Director of UNRWA has drawn attention to the need for a decision on the future handling of the refugee problem in view of the fact that UNRWA's mandate is due to expire on June 30, 1960. The Director has pointed out that there will be a continuing need after 1960 for the services UNRWA now renders to the refugees. If there is to be a change, a decision must be made not later than 1959, so that necessary arrangements can be made without a break in the flow of services and supplies.

- Prospects for the Future -

What are the prospects for relief beyond the present mandate which will expire after June 30, 1960?

The Arab refugees, will definitely require aid beyond the expiration date of UNRWA. They have already shown some signs of a desire for self-support and rehabilitation according to the Director of UNRWA. Huts are willingly accepted

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in place of tents. Applications for vocational training exceed the capacity of the agency's centres. All these are encouraging signs at the present moment.

However, the governments contributing to UNWRA for the purpose of sustaining the refugees are becoming "increasingly critical of the dole that they are called upon to perpetuate⁷." In the view of the United States the continuation of UNWRA beyond its present mandate is not the proper way to handle the refugee problem. It is generally felt there that aid should be made contingent on Arab willingness to conciliate. This makes the need for some solution most urgent.

6) Their Dilemma

The Arab Refugees want to return to their homes in Palestine. They were encouraged in this belief by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 III of December 11, 1948, which stated that "(...) refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date (...) ⁸." Even though the Arab refugees have been in exile for more

⁷ State Department Bulletin, U.S.A., June 26, 1959, Vol. XL, No. 1022, p. 139.

⁸ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), of 11th December, 1948.

than ten years, they still cling tenaciously to their right to repatriation. If the Jews desired to return to Palestine after 2,000 years, it is illogical to expect the Arabs who left in recent years to give up the idea.

Israel cannot, however, afford to jeopardize her sovereignty by permitting an influx of potential enemies within her frontiers. She suggests that the Arabs be resettled in Arab countries as a just solution to the Arab refugee problem. On the other hand the Arab states support their kin--the Arab refugees, in their demand to return to Palestine. In the opinion of the Jews, this stand emanates from Arab desire to annihilate Israel rather than to help the Arab refugees.

Both the Jews and the Arabs deserve much sympathy; both have strong claims to Palestine as will be discussed in Part 2 of this chapter; to both, the Arab refugees pose political, psychological and economic problems, as will be shown in Part 3. Meanwhile, the refugees is both a symptom and a cause of political and economic instability in the Middle East.

2.- Claims to Palestine.

The Arab Refugee problem is the result of the clash between two opposing forces, namely Zionism and Arab Nationalism. The former is determined to have the whole of

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Palestine as a Jewish State, or to have a Jewish State in a fairly large portion of Palestine; the latter is bent on not only preventing the establishment of a Jewish State but also aspires to achieve Arab independence in Palestine. The seeds of the struggle were nurtured by the irreconcilable promises made to the Jews and Arabs by Great Britain in an effort to win support of the two peoples during the First World War, and at the peace conference immediately following it. The struggle, apparent from the outset, moves crescendo to open hostilities immediately following the United Nations resolution to partition Palestine; thence it turns from terrorism to open warfare, culminating in an establishment of a state for Zionism, facilitated by the mass exodus of Arabs from Palestine, a mass quickly replaced by an influx of Jewish displaced persons. In its wake, almost a million Arabs found themselves homeless and destitute.

1) Jewish Claims

Jewish claims to the State in Palestine, which is now called Israel are based on the following:

- a) The historical association of the Jews with Palestine.
- b) The religious significance which they attach to Palestine.
- c) The promises contained in the Balfour Declaration subsequently incorporated in the Mandate, and endorsed by a large number of nations.

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- d) The improvements effected by the Jews at considerable cost, and the resulting increase in Palestine's economic prosperity.
- e) Jewish Homelessness.
- f) Humanitarian Reasons.

The initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, is that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on occupation 2,000 years ago. Ever since the Jewish people were forcibly deprived of sovereignty in Palestine, they have never ceased to claim its restoration, and the talisman greeting remained, "Next year in Jerusalem⁹." In the oral evidence presented at a public meeting by Rabbi Fishman, he explained that from the days of Daniel during the Babylonian Exile to the present day, that is a period of 2300 years, every Jew saying his prayer has turned his face towards Jerusalem and that throughout the ages Jews have made efforts to reach the land of Israel:

⁹ Life, Nov. 18, 1957, p. 156.

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In our view it is the duty of every Jew to come and live in Palestine; and any regulation restricting the fulfillment of this commandment is not only devoid of legal authority, but positively sinful. This land once ours and by the grace of Heaven it will be ours again and a new Jewish Commonwealth will arise in it. No power in the world can stop us from returning to this our land. (...) Since the dawn of political Zionism, which was created by Herzle, many leading rabbis, have lent their support to the new movement¹⁰.

The mystic attachment of the Jews to Palestine was transformed into a legal claim by the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate. The Balfour Declaration, issued from the British Foreign Office on the 2nd of November 1917, stated:

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country¹¹.

The establishment of the League of Nations offered an appropriate international medium for putting into effect the Balfour Declaration, and the Palestine Mandate of July 1922, in Article 2 of the Mandate made the mandatory responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and

¹⁰ U.N. G.A. O.R., 2nd Session, Suppl. 11, U.N.S.C.O.P., Report to the G.A., Vol. 3, Annex A, Doc. A/364, Add 2, 1947, p. 23-25.

¹¹ The Balfour Declaration, See Appendix 6.

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economic conditions as would assure:

- a) the establishment of a Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble and
- b) the development of self-governing institutions¹².

According to article 6 of the Mandate, the mandatory power was obligated to assure the establishment of a Jewish National Home by facilitating immigration and encouraging close settlement on the land.

Economically the Jewish claim is based on the economic achievements of Jews extending over a period of thirty years from 1918 to 1948. It is based in their view, both materially and morally, on the sacrifices and achievements of the Jewish pioneers. Most of the land they acquired with hard cash was waste land which the pioneers reclaimed with the work of their hands, paying heavy toll to tropical diseases and hostile raiders. Unlike previous colonizers, they did not exploit cheap native labour, but took their pride in becoming "hewers of wood and drawers of water"¹³, and improved the standard of living of Palestine Arabs as well as Jews. In this achievement the Jews claim that they have not displaced the Arabs but rather developed the areas which otherwise would have remained undeveloped. Without their achievement of transforming desert, swamp and dune into the material basis

¹² G.A.O.R., Suppl. No. 11, Vol. 1, Doc. A/364, 3 Sept. 1947, p. 30.

¹³ Koestler, Arthur, Promise and Fulfilment, Palestine 1917--1949, London, MacMillan, 1949, p. 41.

of the National Home, they would have had no moral claim to its possession. In view of what they have built in Palestine, on the basis of faith in the international pledges made to the Jewish people, they could not halt in midstream¹⁴.

Since the loss of their state 2,000 years ago, the Jews have been persecuted. The uncertainty of their position has compelled them to strive for security which in effect exposed them to envy and hatred. During the 1870s and 1880s, Russia passed severe anti-Jewish laws and encouraged bloody pogroms in which thousands were massacred. Hitler's advent to power meant the extermination of millions of Jews, as well as the displacement of hundreds of thousands. Their homelessness could only be remedied by the disappearance of either the people or their homelessness. However as humans they too are entitled to existence, based on the natural right of every people. International law recognized the Jewish people in the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate.

2) Arab Claims

Arab claims to Palestine are primarily based on the following:

- a) Their continuous occupation of Palestine as an Arab majority.

¹⁴ Op. cit., p. 30.

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- b) Legal rights, emanating from the general promises and pledges officially made to the Arab people in the course of the First World War.

The Arabs postulate the "natural" right of the Arab majority to remain in undisputed possession of the country, since they have been for many centuries in possession of the land. This claim of a "natural" right is based on the contention that the Arab connection with Palestine has continued uninterruptedly from early historical times, since the term "Arab", they say, is to be interpreted as connecting not only the invaders from the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh Century, but also the indigenous population which inter-married with the invaders and acquired their speech, customs and modes of thought in becoming permanently arabized¹⁵.

The Arabs also claim "acquired" legal rights, based on the general promises and pledges officially made to the Arab people in the course of World War I, including, in particular, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-1916 and the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918. The "Hogarth Message", the Basset Letter, and the "Declaration to the Seven" are regarded as further support for the Arab claim to an independent Palestine. In the Arab view, these undertakings, taken collectively provide a firm recognition,

¹⁵ O.R. of the 2nd Session of the General Assembly Suppl. 11, U.N.S.C.O.P., Report to the General Assembly, Vol. 1, Doc. A/AC.13/82, p. 33.

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by the Nineteenth Century law making big powers, of Arab rights which they contend should be fulfilled. They further maintain that these promises and pledges of Arab freedom and independence were among the main factors inspiring the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire and to ally themselves with Great Britain and the other allies during the first World War. Moreover, the Allies declared that their armies were to liberate and not to give away the Arab lands.

Although the Arabs claim a "natural" right to Palestine, they have never been in possession of it as a sovereign nation. However, from the point of view of patrimony, the Arabs owned more than eighty-five per cent of the land. Moreover, in an Arab state, they were quite willing to recognize the right of Jews to continue in possession of land legally acquired by the Jews during the Mandate. This is said in order to show how more conciliatory their thesis is than the Jewish one.

3) Counter Claims

The Arabs vehemently opposed the Jewish claims to Palestine. They argued that a spiritual connection does not entitle the Jews to return to Palestine for Palestine is holy to Christians, Moslems and Jews alike. "There are more than five hundred million Christians in the world and some three hundred million Moslems, all of whom are as much spiritually

interested in Palestine as are Jews¹⁶".

To the Zionist claim that they have gone to Palestine to help them materially and raise the Arab standard of living, Mr. Fadel Bey Jamali, representing the government of Iraq, stated that "Arabs do not want a rise in standard of living which leads to the loss of their own country and to the inflow of foreign elements who have come to dominate it ...¹⁷.

Ben Gurion, representing the Jewish Agency at the United Nations lamented that the Arabs possess vast lands whereas the Jews did not. Against this, Jamali argued that the United States, Canada, Australia and other countries possess vast areas of land that need development, but no one speaks of imposing any immigration which has an alien political domination as its aim.

To the Jews boasting of their achievement in Palestine--transforming sandy deserts into modern farms, Jamali stated: "given an unlimited source of dollars from the Zionists in the United States and Western science and technique, any amount of construction and development could be

16 U.N. O.R. to the 2nd Session of the General Assembly, Suppl. 11, U.N.S.C.O.P. Report to the G.A., Vol. IV, Annex B, Oral Evidence presented at Private Meetings (June 16-July 23, 1947) p. 52.

17 ibid., p. 52.

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done by anyone¹⁸." The second point is that "Zionist economy in Palestine is not self-supplied. It is running on a deficit of something like forty per cent paid from donations¹⁹." From these two observations the Arabs conclude that the Zionists have gone to Palestine which is mainly barren, rocky and sandy, merely to use it as a "stepping-stone to the economic exploitation of the whole Middle East²⁰." Arab fear that Israel might dominate the Middle East, has been one of the main obstacles thwarting the solution of the Arab refugee problem.

On the problem of Jewish homelessness the Arabs ask: Why should the Zionists assume that the Jews are homeless? Jamali argued that the home of every Jew is the country in which he is a citizen. The home of the Iraq Jew is Iraq, and of the English Jew it is England.

There should be no Jewish homelessness (...) Zionism (...) is trying to undermine their (Jewish) loyalty to the countries where they are and to make them feel they are not at home where they are. Once this principle is accepted, the Jews everywhere will be considered as strangers and hence anti-semitism will begin to operate (...) Palestine cannot meet the concept of homelessness, and the Arab world is no place for a Jewish political home. I hope, however, that democracy shall prevail all over the world in such a way as to make every Jew feel at home wherever he is²¹.

18 Op. cit., p. 54.

19 ibid., p. 54.

20 ibid., p. 54.

21 ibid., p. 53.

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It is of particular interest to note that Belgium was disturbed by the concept of Zionism and of Jewish homelessness:

The Palestinian question is particularly disturbing for the Belgians. They have to make an effort to understand Zionism. The national home of our Jewish patriots is in Belgium. No one has treated them in such a way as to make them want to find another home in Palestine²².

As will be shown in section 3 following, Belgium voted for the partitioning of Palestine.

On the question of displaced Jews as a humanitarian concern, the Arabs maintained that it should have been settled on an international level and that the United Nations had already created a special organization for that purpose.

"To assist Zionist political domination in Palestine with the pretext of displaced persons is to create trouble in the Arab World²³." The Arabs felt that further immigration to Palestine for humanitarian reasons by Jewish displaced persons was not only an injustice to the Arabs, but was also an anti-humanitarian act^{23a}.

4) U.N. Decision on These Claims

The problem of Palestine involved certain legal issues on which it was essential to decide authoritatively

22 U.N.G.A.O.R., 2nd Session Plenary Meetings, Nov. 13-Nov. 29, 1947, p. 1319.

23 Op. cit., p. 54.

23a See note by Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan, p. 60.

before any solution consistent with international law and justice could be made. It would have necessitated a proper interpretation of the claims of the Arabs and the Jews to Palestine. The Balfour Declaration laid the foundation for Jewish legal claim to Palestine, which was subsequently embodied in the Mandate for Palestine. The Balfour Declaration was attacked by the Arabs as being invalid on several grounds, inter alia, that it was made without their consent or knowledge, that it was contrary to the principles of national self-determination and democracy and that it was inconsistent with the pledges given to the Arabs before and after the date it was made.

Although the meaning of the term "Jewish National Home", the legality, validity and ethics of the Balfour Declaration was specifically raised by the Arab Higher Committee, the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) neither inquired into it nor expressed any opinion on it. In November 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine began voting and by a vote of 25 to 18, with 11 abstentions, the full committee rejected the proposal made by Subcommittee Two, that the validity of the Balfour Declaration and the question of the Mandate be submitted to the International Court of Justice²⁴.

²⁴ Lilienthal, Alfred M., What Price Israel, Chicago, Regnery, 1953, p. 56.

The basic promise underlying the partition proposal was that the claims to Palestine of the Jews and Arabs, both possessed validity and both were irreconcilable. Among all solutions advanced, partition seemed to provide the most realistic and practical settlement and the most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims and national aspirations of both parties. Although the United Nations decreed partition by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions and 1 absent²⁵ it was quite clear, as will be shown, that the majority in favour of partition did not express the unmistakable sentiment of the United Nations:

When partition prospects looked particularly grim, Bernard Baruch was prevailed upon to talk with the French who could not afford to lose Interim Marshall-Plan Aid. Other important Americans "talked" to other countries such as Haiti, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Paraguay, and Luxembourg, all dependent on the United States²⁶.

For example Haiti's representative, Antonie Vieux, who fiercely attacked the partition plan the day before the voting took place, and specifically mentioned that Haiti would vote in the negative, had a last minute change and voted in the affirmative. General Romulo, representative for the Philippines made an eloquent speech against partition.

²⁵ Alignment of U.N. members on the issue of partition, see Appendix 15.

²⁶ Lilienthal, p. 65.

However, Ambassador Elizalde and President Roxas agreed that the Philippines must not risk the antagonism of the United States when aid²⁷ could be gained so easily by a proper vote on Palestine. A joint telegraph from twenty-six pro-Zionist United States Senators, drafted by New York's Robert F. Wagner, was a particularly important factor in changing the Philippine vote²⁸.

Several months after the United Nations Resolution to partition Palestine on November 27, 1947, Dean Rusk, then Director of the State Department's Office of United Nations Affairs, admitted to a meeting of representatives of national organizations that, while the U.S. "never exerted pressure on countries of the U.N. in behalf of one side or another, certain unauthorized officials and private persons violated propriety and went beyond the law²⁹" to exert such pressure. As a result, Mr. Rusk pointed out, partition was "construed as an American Plan" in the eyes of certain countries, and the decision was robbed of whatever moral force it might otherwise have had³⁰.

27 "Seven bills for financial aid were pending in the U.S. Congress in which the Philippines had a stake."

28 Lilienthal, p. 66.

29 ibid., p. 67.

30 ibid., p. 67

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Canada, represented by the Rt. Hon. J.L. Ilsley, supported the partition plan "with heavy hearts and many misgivings³¹". He stated that the establishing of a well-rooted community of nearly 700,000 Jews in Palestine, the investment of \$600,000,000. and the devotion on the part of Jews all over the world to the idea of a Jewish national home in a country which, once at least, was a Jewish land "(...) made the Palestine problem sui generis and unique; and they constitute a vital flaw in the otherwise unanswerable Arab case³²." He further added that it would be folly to assume that there would be any less likelihood of disorders if any of the other alternatives were adopted.

New Zealand's Ambassador talked of the "grave inadequacies of the present proposal³³," while Belgium's Foreign Minister Van Langenhove, speaking on the partition plan stated:

31 U.N. G.A. O.R., 2nd Session, Plenary Meetings, November 13 - November 29, 1947, p. 1319. Text also quoted in Lilienthal, p. 58.

32 ibid., p. 1319.

33 ibid., p. 1357.

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We are not certain that it is completely just; we doubt whether it is practical; and we are afraid that it involves great risks (...) but what is the alternative? The solution proposed or no solution at all; that is to say, still more serious troubles, if not utter chaos. We do not want to assume the responsibility for that, either by a negative vote or even by an abstention. That is why we are resigned to voting with the majority.³⁴

The Representative of the United States, Herschel Johnson, tried to contend that this was not partition in reality, because of the provisions for economic union and for the internationalization of Jerusalem. He envisaged that the boundary between the two states "will be as friendly as the boundary which runs for three thousand miles between Canada and the United States³⁵."

Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, emphasized that the right of Palestine's 1,200,000 Arabs to choose the form of government under which they wished to live was guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations could effectively prescribe, Sir Mohammed pointed out, the conditions which would secure for the country's 625,000 Jews complete religious, linguistic, educational and social freedom within the independent state of Palestine. But the U.N. could hardly prescribe more.

³⁴ Op. cit., p. 1365.

³⁵ ibid., p. 1327.

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Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan advised the Western powers to "remember that you may need friends tomorrow, that you may need allies in the Middle East. I beg of you not to ruin and blast your credit in those lands³⁶." He questioned the viability of the proposed Jewish State and the sincerity of the U.S. and Western nations. They who gave lip service to humanitarian principles, he pointed out, were at the same time closing their doors to the "homeless Jew," and yet insisted on Arab Palestine providing not only "a shelter, a refuge but also a State so that he ('the homeless Jew') shall rule over the Arab³⁷."

Sardonically, Pakistan's Foreign Minister referred to the proposal that unrepatriated Displaced Persons be allocated to Member States in accordance with their capacity to receive such refugees:

Australia, an overpopulated small country with congested areas says no, no, no; Canada, equally congested and overpopulated, says no; the United States a great humanitarian country, a small area, with small resources, says no. This is their contribution to the humanitarian principle. But they state: let them go into Palestine, where there are vast areas, a large economy and no trouble; they can easily be taken there³⁸."

36 Op. cit., p. 1426.

37 ibid., p. 1426.

38 ibid., p. 1426.

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Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan had to leave New York just prior to the voting on the question of the partitioning of Palestine. However, he left a note behind which Mr. Ayub, representative of Pakistan read to the General Assembly:

A fateful decision has been taken. (...) We did succeed in persuading a sufficient number of our fellow representatives to see the right as we saw it, but they were not permitted to stand by the right as they saw it. (...) We much fear that the beneficence, if any, to which partition may lead will be small in comparison to the mischief which it might inaugurate. It totally lacks legal validity. We entertain no sense of grievance against those of our friends and fellow representatives who have been compelled, under heavy pressure, to change sides and to cast their votes in support of a proposal the justice and fairness of which do not commend themselves to them. Our feeling for them is one of sympathy that they should have been placed in a position of such embarrassment between their judgment and conscience, on the one side, and the pressure to which they and their Governments were being subjected, on the other³⁹.

It seems that Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan realized how the voting was to take place.

Mr. Jamali of Iraq stressed that great pressure and influence had worked itself through U.N.S.C.O.F., through the Ad Hoc Committee and through the General Assembly, to have effected the partition resolution of the General Assembly.

39 Op. cit., p. 1427.

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Mr. Amir Arslan, representative of Syria concluded that "My country will never recognize such a decision"⁴⁰.

He stated that even before the General Assembly made its decision, most of the delegations had suspected the outcome.

Partition to many of the nations was a sincere desire to facilitate a hopeful solution; to some, it was a question of submission to foreign pressures exerted upon them; to the Arab states, it was a negation of their desires; to the Jews it meant a state; but little or no thought was given to the future of the Arab inhabitants in that portion of territory allotted to the Jews.

The Arab states did not accept the partitioning of Palestine. They were determined to resist its implementation by force if necessary-- but they failed miserably. The Arab states gained a portion of Palestine and Israel annexed an additional thirty per cent to her territory⁴¹, as a result of the war. The Arab inhabitants of Palestine, lost, not only their possessions but even the part of the land that was assigned to them by the United Nations partition resolution of November 29, 1947.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., p. 1427.

⁴¹ See Maps, Appendix 16.

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3.- Political, Psychological and Economic Obstacles
to the Solution of the Arab Refugee Problem.

The Arab-Israeli war, though a small-scale affair, was one of the most disruptive in modern times. Upwards of 80 per cent of the Arab population of Palestine was turned into homeless refugees. An additional 125 to 150 thousand villagers who retained their houses, and so were not technically refugees, lost the farmlands which had sustained them. The prewar pattern of economic and social relations was completely disrupted. Rain cisterns were sometimes to be found on one side of the frontier and those who had used them on the other; shopkeepers in Jerusalem lost the shops and tools which had given them a living; a village of railway workers was left on the Arab side and the tracks they had tended, on the Israeli side. Some Arab refugees, can see their farmlands and homes across the armistice lines, but if they enter upon them, as many try to do, they do so at the peril of their lives. Yet they are not prepared to respect the invisible line or political decrees that are supposed to keep them from the lands they and their forbears have owned and cultivated for hundreds of years.

Why the Arab refugees do not return to their homes and solve their own problem!

That is what the great majority of them want. "The great mass of the refugees continues to believe that a grave

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injustice has been done to them and to express a desire to return to their homeland", stated Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, Director of U.N.R.W.A., in his annual report to the twelfth session of the United Nations General Assembly, covering the period of July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1957. In his 1958 report, Mr. Labouisse states that:

There have been no signs of any change from their collective hostility towards major development projects which, to the refugees, imply permanent resettlement away from their ancestral homes and the abandonment of their hopes of repatriation. Nor has there been any affirmative action by the Government of Israel to facilitate the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 1948, concerning repatriation and compensation. In the absence of a solution for this political problem, UNRWA's attempts to carry out its assigned task of effecting the "reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East either by repatriation or by resettlement" will continue to be hampered⁴².

The Arab refugees are determined to return to their homes and bitterly oppose anything which has even the semblance of permanent settlement elsewhere. Refugee children are indoctrinated with the same views as those held by their parents, even to being given maps of Palestine to colour, which show no Jewish state, but only an Arab Palestine.

The Arab states support the refugees in their demand. In fact, so adamantly opposed are they to settling the refugees permanently, that they have left virtually untouched

⁴² U.N.O.R. of the General Assembly, 13th Session, Supplement No. 14, Document A/3931, p. 1.

funds voted by the United Nations for the rehabilitation and settlement of the refugees in their host lands.

However, Israel's arguments against repatriation of Arab refugees are based on the following:

1. Need for security,
2. Density of population in Israel,
3. Psychological factors,
4. Economy.

Mr. Sharett, the former Israeli Foreign Minister, in two detailed kneset speeches, the first on June 15 and the second on August 1, 1949, stressed Israel's need for security. The return of any number of Arab refugees before peace with the Arab states has been effected would be national suicide. The Ambassador to the U.N., Abba Eban stated before the General Assembly of the United Nations that the return of the Arab refugees would be "tantamount... to the destruction of the State of Israel⁴³". Many statements by responsible Arab leaders confirm Israel's fear that the Arabs hope to annihilate the State of Israel. During the fifth General Assembly, Sharett pointed out that there was no longer a vacuum

⁴³ U.N.O.R. of the 4th Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 27 September - 7 December, 1949, New York, p. 322, par. 45.

Also quoted in Peretz, op. cit., p. 69.

in Palestine to be filled by Arabs. The movement of Palestinian Arabs to the surrounding areas was followed by an influx of Jewish immigrants into Israel. From Arab countries alone, Israel has absorbed more than 350,000 Jewish refugees. This in addition to immigration from other countries has turned Israel into one of the most densely populated areas in the Middle East.

The third Israeli argument against repatriation is a psychological one which is supported by various U.N. investigating commissions. With the overnight flight of the Arab masses, "life as it was before 1948 no longer exists and cannot be restored⁴⁴," states the Government of Israel in a publication entitled "The Arab Refugees". After explaining the impact of Jewish immigration on Israel this document continues:

An entirely new Arab social structure would have to be built up side by side with the Jewish economy (...) a proposition which clearly defies realization. Nor would they find the new conditions in the country congenial to their way of life. A former Palestinian fellah or townsman has little difficulty in adapting himself to the kindred religious, social and economic environment of the Arab countries of the Middle East. He will find himself a complete stranger in the New Israel⁴⁵.

⁴⁴ Government of Israel, The Arab Refugees, New York, Israel Office of Information, 1953, p. 30.

⁴⁵ ibid., p. 30-31.

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The publication then quotes from a report by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which was established to facilitate repatriation and compensation of the Arab refugees:

Having the interests of the refugees themselves in mind, attention should also be devoted (...) to the resettlement in the Arab countries of non-returning refugees. (...) The refugees should be afforded every opportunity to realize that the conditions which they would find on returning to their homes would differ greatly from those to which they were accustomed⁴⁶.

However, it must be pointed out that the Conciliation Commission goes further by specifically mentioning that the refugees who decide not to return to their homes should receive and be made aware of the fact that they will receive, just compensation for the loss of their property.

A final argument against repatriation is based on economy. Repatriation and resettlement of an individual in Israel would cost \$2500. approximately as compared with \$400. to absorb a person in the economy of Jordan⁴⁷.

Why the Arab Refugees do not go somewhere else!

The refugees do not take kindly to moving again, unless it be a return to their homes. The United Nations General Assembly's resolution No. 194 (III) of December 11,

⁴⁶ U.N.G.A.O.R., 5th Session, Suppl. No. 18, Doc. A/1367/Rev. 1, p. 31.

⁴⁷ United Nations Economic Survey Missions for the Middle East, Part 1, p. 46 - p.53.

1948, encourages this stand. Also, resettlement of the refugees outside of Palestine is a political issue placed against the issues of repatriation, compensation and a final territorial settlement. The Arab governments support the refugees in their demand, but for reasons other than humanitarian motives. A settlement of the refugees in the Arab countries, even if the refugees were willing would deprive the Arabs of a dramatic issue. Some of the reasons thwarting the solution of the Arab refugee problem from the Arab side are found in the following:

1. A psychological factor, that is, a refusal to admit defeat,
2. The lack of Arab unity,
3. Determination to destroy Israel,
4. Fear of an Israeli expansion,
5. Political and Economic weakness of the Arab States sheltering the refugees.

- Psychological -

To the non-Palestinian Arabs, the refugee is not merely a pitiful person--he is also a symbol of shame. The refugee is a constant reminder of Arab weakness and humiliation. The first task which confronted the Arab states as they really became states was the problem of Palestine. From a great show of bravado and a certainty of victory, the Arab states were forced to concede a humiliating defeat. They

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failed miserably to keep the Arab population in Palestine and indeed were partly responsible for its exodus. Individual shows of bravery and devotion were not lacking, but these were swamped by the overall lack of performance. The only Arab force which made a good show was the Arab Legion of Jordan. This exception was almost more humiliating than the lack of success in the other armies, for the Arab Legion was under the command of an Englishman, many of its officers were English, and it was paid for and supplied by England.

The Arabs accepted an armistice with Israel but would not convert it into a peace. The war of revenge has hung before them and has since become a fixed topic of Middle East politics.

Defeat in war also revealed a greed and lack of political unity. The figure of King Farouk became a symbol of corruption and degeneracy. King Abdullah was charged with making some sort of deal with Israel to enhance his own ambitions. Many Arabs still believe that he ordered his army to halt in its advance so that the Israelis could more effectively attack the Egyptians. The former Palestinian representative to the League of Arab States Musa Alami wrote: "In the face of the enemy the Arabs were not a state, but petty states; groups, not a nation; each fearing and anxiously watching the other and intriguing against it⁴⁸."

⁴⁸ Polk, et al., p. 301-2.

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A lost war and a national humiliation nearly always produces domestic upheaval. This is what has been happening ever since in the Arab countries, except Saudi Arabia. Revolution in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, assassinations in Jordan and Syria, have been influenced by the disastrous war with Israel. Arab public opinion wants governments which would eliminate Israel. Israel, as they see it, has no moral right to be in the Middle East as a sovereign state. They look upon Palestine as an Arab land which was stolen from them by the superior strength of the West and then given to the Jews. Israel itself is looked upon as the last stage of imperialism --the creation of a Western nation in the East. At the very base of this trend of thought is Arab nationalism which spread downward from the leadership circles, where it began, to the very base of Arab society. To every Arab Israel is the visible symbol of thwarted nationalism. Capitalizing on this feeling, some Arab leaders have used the Arab-Israeli animosity to divert attention of their peoples from the social evils at home. In fact, most Arabs have become convinced that the misery of their lot derives from the presence of Israel in the Middle East. The presence of hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arab refugees in their midst emphasizes this conviction. Although, the Arabs have never been politically united as history and current events demonstrate, they are in agreement that Israel must be ejected

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from the Middle East and that Arab rights cannot be redressed until Israel has been destroyed.

The first step taken by the Arabs towards the "destruction" of Israel is the economic boycott. Inaugurated by the Arab League the boycott is designed to bring about the eventual economic collapse of Israel by excluding her from her natural markets in the Middle East and by preventing the sale of Arab goods, to the Jewish state. A general boycott office has been established in Damascus, with branches in other Arab states. These offices enforce the boycott and punish smuggling.

In Palestine there are few resources and no established economy. Israel has been able to maintain herself financially only because millions of dollars in foreign capital pour into the country annually. Principal sources have been: Israel Bonds--largely subscribed to by United States citizens of Jewish faith; have recently amounted to some \$50 million a year. Private contributions-- mainly from American Jewry through the United Jewish Appeal and primarily for the settlement of immigrants have amounted to approximately \$60 million annually. In recent years there has been a substantial increase to this amount.

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The total subsidy rendered to Israel by the American tax-payer--through the three American channels of so-called "Philanthropic Agencies", Bond Drive, and direct Government aid-- has exceeded \$1,842,000,000 during the first nine years of Israel's existence (1948-1957)⁴⁹.

On a per capita basis, American financial assistance to Israel amounted to \$1,250 per person during the past nine years. United Nations--several million dollars have been used in Israel for technical assistance under the United Nations programs of its specialized agencies. Reparations--from the Federal Republic of Germany, who has agreed to pay the equivalent of about \$715 million in currencies and goods to Israel in restitution for damage to the Jewish people under the Nazi regime and an additional \$107 million to meet claims on behalf of world Jewry. Since April 1954 these reparations have been flowing into Israel at the rate of \$60 million per year.

Foreign aid is a requisite for Israel's existence. The Arab Boycott involves prohibition of trade and exchange between the state of Israel and the Arab states. Consequently, the raw materials that the Arab countries could supply to Israel such as crude oil and foodstuffs, Israel must import them abroad at relatively higher prices mainly because of the transportation costs. It also prevents Israel

⁴⁹ "Arab News and Views", American Financial Assistance to Israel, New York, Arab Information Centre, 1958.

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from profiting from its naturally favourable position as a country of transit. Thus, oil pipelines that carried oil from Iraq to Haifa before 1948 could be an important source of revenue as are their correspondents in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.

It is estimated that the direct and indirect effects of the Arab economic boycott cost Israel about forty million of her two hundred and fifty million dollar yearly deficit⁵⁰. Adding to the annoyance of this boycott is the fact that the Arab League seeks to intimidate foreign nations and companies by threatening economic reprisals if trade with Israel is not stopped. The effect of this threat was indicated in a 1954 report of the Arab Regional Offices for the Boycott of Israel, which stated that fifty leading foreign companies had severed their trade connections with Israel at the time the report was written, preferring to maintain their business relations with the Arab states⁵¹. As long as the economic boycott of Israel remains it is not likely that Israel will take any measure towards the alleviation of the plight of the refugees. Meanwhile it is tantamount to an act of war and the Arabs intended it to be since they feel that Israel has no right to exist in Palestine.

50 Ellis, Harry B., Israel and the Middle East, New York, Ronald, 1957, p. 163.

51 ibid., p. 134.

Perhaps even more important than these considerations are the Arab fears of an Israeli expansion. Israel claims sovereign rights over the zones that were demilitarized without prejudice to ultimate territorial settlement. Israel refuses to talk of repatriation or territorial adjustments. Israel's constant call for immigration, the "in gathering"⁵² of all Jews means but one thing to the Arabs--eventual expansion, at the expense of the Arabs.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, more than 350,000 Jews from Arab and Moslem lands have settled in Israel. The absorption of a huge immigration from Europe and the Middle East has turned Israel into one of the most densely populated areas of the Middle East.

At the end of 1946 the mandatory government of Britain estimated there were 625,000 Jews in Palestine. By May 14, 1948, the day Israel became a state, this total had risen to 655,000. Since that time Jewish immigration to Palestine has been as follows:

⁵² The first Parliament, elected in January 1949, gave formal expression to the nation's chief reason for existing by promulgating the Law of Return, under which every Jew in the world was given the right to immigrate to Israel.

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1948	May 15, to December 31	101,819	
1949		239,076	
1950		169,405	
1951		173,901	
1952		23,375	
1953		10,347	
1954		17,471	
1955		36,303	
1956		55,000	53

By January 1957, Israel's population soared to approximately 1,700,000 Jews and 200,000 non-Jews. Of the non-Jews, 190,000 were Palestine Arabs who had not fled during the 1948 fighting and have become Israeli citizens.

Every male Israeli is conscripted at the age of eighteen for two and one half years of active military service. The soldier then passes into the reserves, where he remains until he is thirty-nine years old. As a reserve soldier, the Israeli is liable to one month of active service each year, plus one day per month. If a soldier commands a line unit, he is liable to an additional seven days active service per year. From thirty-nine to forty-nine years old, the soldier must serve two weeks a year, plus one day each month.

Unmarried women must spend two years in active service, in noncombatant classifications such as clerks and parachute folders. Should a woman marry while she is on

53 Op. cit., p. 173.

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active duty, she is transferred automatically to the reserves. There she remains until she is thirty-six years old, serving one month per year and one day each month on active duty. As soon as she has children, she is exempted from all military service. Orthodox religious girls may be excused from military service though the government will assign them to teaching or social work.

The army program is flexible, designed to obtain for the state the best service of the young people involved.

The Israeli Army has built a fighting machine which most probably is superior to the combined armies of the Arab world. At any one time Israel has about 50,000 men under arms. Within forty-eight hours this number can be swelled to 250,000 by calling up the reserves, who differ little in effectiveness from the soldiers who are on active duty.

An inescapable impression on the traveller in Israel is that the military takes precedence over everything. The youth groups; the professional soldier, sailor and airman, the vast military reserve standing fully equipped, highly trained, and cleverly concealed in the settlement systems bracing Israel's borders; the frontier patrolman; the police, all indicate that the nation places its greatest emphasis on the machinery and weapons of war⁵⁴."

As a measure of safety to Arab insecurity in the face of a militant Israeli state, the spirit of revenge amongst the

⁵⁴ Hutchison, E.H., Violent Truce, Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951-1955, New York, Devin-Adair, 1956, p. 141.

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Arab refugees has been kept alive. As long as the Arab refugees remain along the borders of Israel, the Arab states do not believe that Israel would attack them, as they feel that Israel would not care to absorb the three quarter million Arab refugees.

Why the Arab Refugees do not Settle in Those Countries Where they are now Located!

The influx of these destitute families into an already crowded area notably the Western part of Jordan and the Gaza strip has aggravated the already depressed standard of life in these countries. In Lebanon it is an economic and political problem, while in Syria it is simply a political implication.

GAZA--

Gaza has a population of over 300,000. Over 200,000 are refugees located in a small strip of land ranging in width from three to seven miles wide and about thirty miles in length. Not more than ten per cent of the total population is self supporting and between 59,000 and 71,000 of the people in Gaza have normally received public assistance from the Egyptian authorities. Egypt, responsible for the Arab refugees living in Gaza, has offered to assimilate up to 50,000 Palestinians in the Sinai Peninsula. But Sinai has no water, and a plan worked out by UNRWA engineers to siphon Nile water under the Suez Canal into Sinai has been pushed

into the background by Egypt's internal problems following on President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Within Egypt itself, already suffering from over-population, there is no room for refugees.

LEBANON--

The Lebanon refuses to accept permanently her 105,000 Arab refugees as they present both a political and economic problem. Lebanon is a very small country with a population of 1,250,000. The refugees constituting about ten per cent of the population of the country. Lebanon is already suffering from chronic unemployment and has very little additional land which could be brought under cultivation.

A further difficulty created by the presence of the refugees is the danger of upsetting the Christian-Moslem balance. Lebanon is governed under a constitution which guarantees proportional representation to the country's many religious sects. The population of Lebanon has been historically about 52 per cent Christian and 48 per cent Moslem. The refugees, although including many Christians, are predominantly Moslem. If they become full citizens and permanently residents the Christians will become a minority group and this they will resist⁵⁵.

⁵⁵ Ellis, op. cit., p. 130. Also found in the Smith-Prouty Report, The Arab Refugees and Other Problems in the Near East, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954, p. 17.

JORDAN--

Jordan's population, in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war found itself almost doubled. All the refugees in Jordan have become Jordanian citizens and many hold important positions in the country. However, Jordan is economically a poor country and the great majority of the refugees are unemployed, except for such seasonal and part-time work as they are able to find, for example, during the harvest.

The Arabs of Palestine have progressed much more than their kin in Transjordan. During the British mandatory regime they became aware of their political power, and they advanced economically, attaining a fairly high standard of living, with good prospects for further developments. Educationally too, they progressed, and they were actively engaged in a struggle for independence. Suddenly they felt that they were annexed to a people inferior to themselves politically and educationally, and to a country economically backward and without prospects for growth. The Palestinian Arabs in Jordan were also subjected to internal pressure from the old Palestinian Arab leaderships, especially the Hussein clan which has nursed hatred for Abdullah for many years; to pressures resulting from inter-Arab friction, from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq; and to pressure from the Soviet Union through local Communists and other agents. Add to all that, the political pressure of intransigence towards Israel,

and it becomes obvious that the annexation of Arab Palestine condemned Jordan at once to political instability and economic stagnation⁵⁶.

SYRIA--

In the case of Syria, there are approximately 100,000 Arab Refugees as compared to the total population of 3,300,000. Arab Refugees in Syria have all the rights of citizens except political rights. It would seem that Syria is quite capable of absorbing the Arab Refugees but for political reasons she will not resettle them, maintaining that thousands of Syrian citizens live in conditions worse than do the refugees, who at least receive a food dole from the United Nations. Basic to this refusal is the conviction that resettlement of the refugees would involve the admission that Israel is in the Middle East to stay.

⁵⁶ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 6-7, New York, Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July, 1957, p. 206.

CHAPTER III

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The Arab refugees and the Arab states, both represented by the Arab League, insist that restitution for wrongs suffered by the refugees must be the first item on any agenda for discussion with Israel. They reject on principle any solution other than the return of the refugees to their original place of residence. Their contention is that the Arabs were driven from their homes against their will and they have a right to go back. The United Nations has reaffirmed every year the right of the Arab refugees to repatriation and compensation first noted in its resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948.

Total repatriation to Palestine is not acceptable to Israel. This is based on the following which have already been discussed: need for security, density of population in Israel, psychological factors and on economy¹. Israel insists that serious thought should be given to resettling the Arab refugees in the neighbouring countries. Public opinion, like the government, regard resettlement and not repatriation to Israel as the only practicable solution to the problem. But

¹ See page 66-68.

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not all Israeli political leaders are in agreement with this principle.

In a communication to the United Nations Conciliation Commission, which was established for the purpose of implementing the United Nations Resolution 194(III), Israel recognized that the payment of compensation for abandoned Arab land could be an important contribution to Arab Refugee settlement. The Secretary of State of the United States, proposed that an international loan would be made available to enable Israel to discharge this obligation. But as Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Eban pointed out in the General Assembly in 1955:

payment of compensation would require the solution and clarification of related problems..... The Arab governments cannot attempt to stifle Israel financially by blockage and boycott, and at the same time expect Israel to assume heavy financial burdens for this and future generations of its citizens².

Israel will not consider compensation in disregard of a general peace settlement with the Arab states.

Dr. Elfan Rees, adviser on refugees to the World Council of Churches has stated very strongly that there is

2 U.N. G.A. O.R. Doc. No. A/3199, Annex A, P. 1-2 October 4, 1956, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Fifteenth Progress Report for the period from 1 January, 1955 to September, 1956.

Also quoted in Eytan, Walter, The First Ten Years, A Diplomatic History of Israel, London, Weidenfeld, 1958, p. 124.

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a three-fold debt owed to these refugees; one by the State of Israel, the second by the International community, and the third by the Arab States themselves.

As regards Israel, Dr. Rees states, that Israel owes the refugees adequate compensation for the losses they have suffered; that the recognition of the moral right to repatriation on grounds of compassion, most notably the reunion of families is also a debt that is due. He points out that though Israel has more than once made offers of compensation, Israel has not made enough emphasis on that point.

With regard to the debt owed by the international community, Dr. Rees feels that most of it is being paid, pointing out that out of 30 to 40 million refugees in the world, only the approximate 900,000 Arab Refugees are in receipt of international care and maintenance.

Dr. Rees emphasizes that there is also the debt owed to the refugees by the Arab States themselves.

The debt, that men of the same language, the same faith, the same social organization should at any time in history feel due from them to their fellows in distress, the debt which in simple terms would involve regarding these people as human beings and not as political footballs³.

³ Rees, Elfan, The Refugee Problem, Today and Tomorrow, Geneva, Palais des Nations, May 27-28, 1957, p. 3.

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The greatest obstacle to a solution of the Arab Refugee problem seems to be the mutual fear of Jews and Arabs. The Jews have every reason to believe that the Arab States are determined to eventually destroy Israel. This is confirmed by the Arab press reports and by official Arab statements to the effect that there is no moral or legal justification for the existence of the Israeli state. On the other hand Arab fears of an Israeli expansion are also well founded. The frequent statements made by some Israelis, who suggest that Israel's rightful borders lie beyond the present ones; Israel's law granting Israeli citizenship to any Jew who desires it; Israeli's retaliatory measures against refugee robbers which Time Magazine describes as "five eyes for an eye", and finally Israel's 1956 "Preventive War" on Egypt, have created a suspicion in the minds of the Arabs that Israel plans for the future.

Before any positive steps could be initiated with regard to the solution of the Arab Refugee problem, both the Jews and the Arabs should compromise to provide a basis for negotiation. Some manifestation of good will by both sides is necessary for a clearing of the tense atmosphere, prerequisite to any solution. That compromise on the principal question might be preceded by concessions on some of the following points:

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1. International border guarantees underwritten by the U.S.A.
2. Status of Jerusalem
3. Land corridor in Negev
4. International buffer state between Israel and Egypt.

(1) First of all, the Arab States must recognize the legitimate and permanent existence of the State of Israel. The Jews have a right to a national existence and have a right to know that this is not at stake. Unless Israel is released from this fear of destruction, efforts towards peace will be of no avail, and eventually fear might lead to desperate acts. It is, therefore, essential that Israel's existence be recognized and guaranteed as one of the first basis of negotiation towards the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This being achieved, the prospects for the solution of the Arab Refugee problem would improve considerably.

The Arabs are also entitled to assurances that Israel will not expand her frontiers at the expense of the Arab States. As long as there are fears of an Israeli aggression, or expansion, it is not likely that the Arabs will make any attempt to take positive steps towards a solution of the Arab refugee problem. The Arab States, particularly Jordan, feel that as long as the Arab Refugees are with them, (though Israel might be anxious to expand at their expense), it is not likely that Israel would care to assume the burden of

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the approximate million refugees, who are located along the borders of Israel⁴.

An international guarantee of present borders is essential to any future Arab-Israeli compromise. Who should give that guarantee? In the writer's view, this guarantee could be given by the United Nations but underwritten by the United States. The Arab States quite openly argue that the existence of Israel is only economically possible by the assistance given by the United States⁵. If the United States were to guarantee the Arab States against any possible Israeli aggression, it would possibly eliminate the fear that "Israel was created principally to make it an instrument that can be used whenever it becomes necessary to impose the will of some big powers against the rising nations of the Arab East⁶."

Why not the U.N. alone give the requisite guarantee? Many incidents have taken place between the Arabs and the Jews. For example, the U.N. Security Council in 1951 supported Israel in its contention that Egypt's interference

4 Winnett, Fred V., For the Sake of Argument, Why the West Should Stop Supporting Israel, article appearing in MacLean's Magazine, January 18, 1958, p. 47.

5 Infra, p.

6 Meir, Golda, A Good Neighbor Policy must be Universal, U.N., 13th Session, General Assembly, 1958, p. 1.

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with shipping through the Suez Canal destined for Israel, on the grounds of belligerent rights, was unwarranted but nothing was done to make Egypt change its practice. Israel's raid on the village of Qibiya was given strong censure by the Security Council, but Israel merely shrugged off the reprimand and resorted to the same measures again when it thought the situation required it. Both sides got the idea that they could flout the United Nations when they desired and that the world organization was of no particular use to them in maintaining their national interests. They used the U.N. as a forum for their propoganda but they were not seriously influenced by its authority or its prestige.

In the case of Israel, a State whose birth and continued existence the United Nations was so closely associated, this attitude was all the more manifest as an indication of the failure of the United Nations, and thus of those members who could have, but did not take the lead to act effectively through the United Nations, to face up to the dangerous situation that was developing⁷."

After Israel's attack on Egypt and occupied Gaza and other Egyptian territory, it was only the U.S.A. that effectively was able to demand Israel's withdrawal, Israel's

⁷ Israel and the United Nations, Report of a Study Group set up by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (New York; Manhattan Publishing Co., for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956), pp. 218-223, 292-294. see also

Campbell, John C., Defense of the Middle East, Problems of American Policy, published for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper 1958) p. 82-3.

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economy being wholly dependent on the goodwill and benevolence of the U.S.A. It is therefore essential that the international guarantee be underwritten by the U.S.A.

(2) Another step that could prepare the ground for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and which might lead to the solution of the Arab refugee problem would be Israel's willingness to negotiate the status of Jerusalem.

In the partition resolution of November 29, 1947, Jerusalem was to be an international regime. The General Assembly Resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948, reaffirmed that Jerusalem was to be accorded special treatment. These resolutions expressed the views of the world community. As a result of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, Jerusalem has been divided and is under de facto occupation by Israel in the New City and by Jordan in the Old City. Meanwhile, in defiance of the United Nations, that part of Jerusalem occupied by Israel has become the locality for the seat of the Israeli Government. The United Nations has not recognized the sovereignty of either Jordan nor Israel over those sections of Jerusalem occupied by these two countries, against the original understanding.

The City of Jerusalem, as a "corpus separatum" under a special international regime was to be administered by the United Nations. A Trusteeship Council was to be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering

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Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

Boundaries of the City of Jerusalem were to include the municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which is Abu Dis, the most southern, Bethlehem, the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa), and the most northern, Shu'fat.

A Governor of the City of Jerusalem was to be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and to be responsible to it. His selection was to be on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality, but he should not be a citizen of either State in Palestine. The Governor would represent the United Nations in the City and would exercise on its behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs.

With regard to security, the City of Jerusalem was to be demilitarized and its neutrality was to be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercise or activities were to be permitted within its confines.

For the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the City, the Governor was to organize a special police force of adequate strength, recruited outside of Palestine.

A Legislative council elected by adult residents of the City irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal

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and secret suffrage and proportional representation would have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measure was to conflict or interfere with the provisions which would be set forth in the statute of the City, nor should any law regulation, or official action prevail over them. The statute would grant to the governor a right of vetoing the unconstitutional bills. It would also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the council failed to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

Subject to considerations of security and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into and residence within the borders of the City was to be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into and residence within the borders of the City for nationals of other States was to be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States were to be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of the City.

As to the official language, both Arabic and Hebrew were to be official, but the adoption of one or more addition-

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al working languages, as might be required was not to be precluded^{7a}.

Internationalization of Jerusalem would not only have the blessing of the international community, but would enable the Jews and the Arabs free intercourse in the Holy City, which might be conducive to peaceful co-existence, if not complete peace with one another. Moreover, some Arab refugees might find their way to settling in Jerusalem. Finally, the United Nations, by effecting its resolutions regarding the internationalization of the Holy City, might regain some of its lost prestige, otherwise, as Lebanon pointed out "If in reality the United Nations was not in a position to impose its will upon a Member State (...) it should abandon all hope of ever imposing its will upon any State which defied its decisions^{7b}."

In a possible internationalization of Jerusalem, Lebanon expressed a willingness to pay twice its fair share of the expenses that would be incurred in the administration of the Holy City.

7a U.N. O.R. of the 2nd Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, 25 September - 25 November, 1947. p. 260-2.

7b U.N. O.R. of the 4th Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 27 September - 7 December, 1949. Lake Success, New York, p. 288.

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(3) A third possibility for consideration might be the exchange of Gaza for a land corridor in the Negev. This could form the basis of a compromise between Egypt and Israel which would not only alleviate the tension and fear between them, but would perhaps help solve the refugee problem to their mutual advantage and future peace.

The Government of Israel had offered to compromise in the repatriation of Arab refugees by incorporating the Gaza strip and its large Arab population into Israel. According to Mr. Eban, "removal of (...) that strategic danger (...) would largely offset the risk to Israel security which would result from the entry into Israel of a large number of refugees⁸."

Egypt has demanded a land corridor across the Negev to link Egypt with the rest of the Arab world. Though Israel has rejected this, Israel has been willing to consider transit rights for Egypt and Jordan across Israeli territory. However, it could be to their advantage if Gaza were yielded to Israel and a land corridor in the Negev be given to Egypt. At the same time it would solve the problem for more than 200,000 Arab refugees now located in the Gaza.

8 O.R. of the 4th Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 27 September - 7 December, 1949, p. 323. and also quoted in

Peretz, p. 69.

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(4) A fourth suggestion could be the creation of an international buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. The United Nations could negotiate the purchase of a strip of Egyptian territory running from Gaza to the Gulf of Aqaba and including the Gaza strip at the one end and the islands guarding the entrance to the gulf at the other. The internationalization of this zone could serve a variety of purposes. It would keep Egypt and Israel apart, stopping the constant raids by Arab peasants on Israeli territory, which in turn, have led Israel to retaliate with severe military measures. The creating of a buffer zone would enable Egypt and Israel to curtail their heavy military expenditures and devote more money for economic and social purposes. Pipelines through the buffer zone could be installed to take oil from the producing countries of the Middle East direct to the Mediterranean, where it could be taken by tanker without needing to pass through any of the non-producer states. Some of the oil producing countries might welcome direct access to a free port in the Mediterranean which could be established with the creation of the buffer state. This would make the oil producing countries less dependent on their neighbours. The buffer zone could provide work for refugees and other unemployed, in building and maintaining roads and railways, ports and airfields.

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All this work would require money, but the finance needed could take the form of sound business loans and not of charitable grants, for the zone could quickly become self-supporting if the users were to pay for transit and other facilities at the rates they are paying now for the same services in less favourable conditions. The purchase price for this territory would be most useful to Egypt who needs money for the building of the Aswan dam.

Undoubtedly, there are a lot of advantages in the creating of the buffer state. To Egypt, it would provide the money necessary for the construction of the Aswan dam, a requisite to her economy; to Egypt and Israel--it would lead to the alleviation of border tensions and reduce military budgets, expenditures they could ill-afford; to the Arab refugees--it would help to solve their problem by providing employment and a new life; to the international community--reduce if not eliminate the cold war; to the Western nations --Egypt might be brought and kept in closer ties with the West. The sum total could help to bring stability in the Middle East.

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This part is devoted to the analysis of the possibilities of solving the Arab refugee problem by the following considerations:

1. Limited Repatriation,
2. Integration,
3. Resettlement,
4. Emigration.

1) Limited Repatriation

First the desirability of re-admitting a limited number of Arab refugees to Israel will be discussed. Then the prospects of some being absorbed by these countries now sheltering them will be inspected; the resettlement possibilities in Syria and Iraq will be considered; and emigration as a solution to the problem will be mentioned; finally, conclusions will be drawn.

Granted that total repatriation of the Arab refugees is unrealistic at the present time, for reasons already expounded, it might be possible and desirable to repatriate a token number. Israel has accepted some on compassionate grounds but the total accepted in the past ten years has been about 8000 compared with the tens of thousands of applications submitted by the Arab refugees. A few Jewish and Arab Kneset members have suggested that families separated by the Arab-Israeli war could be completely reunited through the return to Israel of not more than 50,000 Arabs, and

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"re-establishing and concentrating their blood ties within Israel would strengthen the loyalty of the country's Arab minority and eliminate one fundamental cause of infiltration⁹." Infiltration by Arab bands into Israeli held territory has been quoted by that Government as a reason for not accepting Arab refugees, claiming that they might become a fifth column, and Israel cannot jeopardize what they now possess. It has been the pretext for Government sponsored retaliatory measures against Jordan in particular, which the Time Magazine has quoted as five eyes for an eye, and it has been the reason for keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict alive which in turn contributed to the political instability of Jordan.

After a visit to the Middle East in 1953, Secretary of State, Dulles of the U.S.A., reported to the American people that some of the Arab refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by Israel. In a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on August 26, 1955, Mr. Dulles touched on the problem of Arab refugee repatriation and resettlement.

To end the plight of the 900,000 refugees requires that these uprooted people should, through resettlement and, to such an extent as may be feasible, repatriation, be enabled to resume a life of dignity and self-respect¹⁰.

9 Peretz, p. 85.

10 Ibid, p. 83.

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Mr. Dulles also promised favorable consideration of American aid to help in the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees. He also promised assistance for Israel to facilitate its payment of compensation to the refugees.

When Israel seized the Gaza strip and the Sinai peninsula, soon after her attack on Egypt, beginning on October 29, 1956, the Israeli Government did announce its general intention to make a "contribution to a United Nations programme for settling the refugee population of the strip." Israel's contribution would "consist both in the payment of compensation and in the settlement of a part of the refugees¹¹."

It would seem that partial repatriation might be feasible and could play an important role in the security of that country. However, as long as Israel accepts the principle of "limited repatriation" on the one hand and then refuses to implement it; as long as Israel makes it almost impossible for those who would normally come under the category of "compassionate cases", to return to Israel, and as long as

¹¹ Peretz, p. 83-84, quoting "Statement by Ambassador Michael Comay before the U.N. Ad Hoc Political Committee, February 19, 1957.

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she discriminates¹² her present Arab minority, she will have good reasons to feel insecure.

To the Arabs, Israel's refusal to resettle the Arab refugees seem fraudulent and are suspicious of her intentions, especially since Israel continues to call for more and more Jewish immigrants. To hold to the principle that repatriation is desirable and then not to do anything about it stifles all attempts at a real solution.

2) Integration

The double movement of population which resulted from the 1948 Arab-Israeli struggle in Palestine took place in a poverty-stricken area where resources are meager and over-population is a permanent problem. The effects of the influx

¹² Under the Nationality Bill of Israel which went into effect on July 14, 1952 none of the 170,000 Arabs in Israel can become Israel citizens without first proving that he was a Palestinian citizen up to May 14, 1948, and that he had lived there continuously since the establishment of the State in Israel, or entered Israel legally after the establishment. To become a naturalized Israeli citizen the Arab must fulfill six requirements - such as giving proof that he has resided in Israel for three of the five years preceding the application, possess knowledge of the Hebrew language, and has renounced prior nationality. Only a small proportion of Israel's 170,000 Arabs can offer the proofs necessary for automatic citizenship, quoted in

Lienthal, op. cit., p. 205, and

Peretz, op. cit., p. 124-6.

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of the refugees upon the resources of the Arab States can be suggested by comparing the numbers of refugees to the total population of the areas where they are now chiefly concentrated¹³. The population of the Gaza strip before the Arab-Israeli hostilities was about 70,000; --refugees in 1958 numbered 225,575; Jordan's population was 460,000; --refugees in 1958, 539,519; Lebanon's population 1,500,000; --refugees in 1958, 102,291; Syria's population 3,810,000; --refugees 102,291 in 1958; Israel's population approximately 2,000,000 --refugees in 1958 nil.

For example, if the case of Gaza were applied to Canada, it would be the same as if Canada were suddenly confronted with an increase of population from its present 17 million to 72,000,000 people. One can well imagine the strain on the economy of the country.

The rehabilitation of the million Jewish immigrants¹⁴ and the creation of jobs in Israel was considerably facilitated by the utilization of farms and houses that belonged to the Arab refugees and by the expenditure of almost 2 billion dollars obtained from grants, transfers, and loans from abroad. The Arab refugees, on the other hand, are still

13 See appendix 11, Annual Distribution of Arab Refugees according to Country from June, 1950 to June, 1958.

14 See appendix 9, Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

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dependent, almost wholly, on relief given by UNRWA, which is largely supported by the United States. It is worth noting in this respect that the total relief expenditures on the approximate million Arab refugees amounts to about \$2 per head per month for food, shelter, and health services. A good proportion of Arab refugees are still living in army tents, caves and mud huts. They can find little work, and then only by competing with Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, or Gaza inhabitants for wages that, in themselves, are a mere pittance. It is generally beyond the physical and financial capacity of the host countries to absorb large numbers over and above the natural increase of population.

GAZA--

Egypt had offered to assimilate up to 50,000 Palestinians in the Sinai Peninsula. A detailed plan had been accurately worked out by technical advisers, whereby enough water from the Nile river in Egypt, could be siphoned under the Suez Canal into the Sinai, sufficient to integrate from 50,000 to 60,000 Arab refugees, in the Northern Sinai desert¹⁵. The Egyptian Government and UNRWA jointly certified the plan as feasible. However, the plan has not materialized as Egypt feels that water from the Nile cannot be spared

15 Ellis, p. 129-30.

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without the construction of the High Dam at Aswan in Egypt¹⁶.

Apart from this project of irrigating part of the Sinai desert, there are few rehabilitation opportunities in Egypt for the Gaza refugees. Egypt itself is one of the most densely populated and one of the poorest countries in the world. There is hardly any opportunity for integration of Arab refugees in Egypt, other than in individual cases. The only solution to the Arab Refugee problem in Gaza is a transfer to other countries with better prospects for re-settlement.

JORDAN--

Jordan has more than half a million Arab Refugees, representing more than half of her population. One third of the total population, about 350,000 live in the western part of the Jordan River which was annexed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan following the Arab-Israeli War. The most promising project in Jordan is the development of the Jordan River system which could lead to the irrigation of 125,000 acres of land in the Jordan valley, providing a direct livelihood for over 100,000 more people. Jordan power can also be used to establish a number of small industrial plants,

¹⁶ U.S.A. had pledged 400 million dollars towards the construction of the Aswan Dam; when Egypt purchased a quantity of Soviet arms in 1955, the U.S. withdrew her offer and the Aswan Dam was not built.

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thereby absorbing many more Arab refugees in light industries, and related trades.

The river and the streams which feed the Jordan river run through Lebanon, Syria, and Israel as well as Jordan. Any project contemplated would require an agreement among the four riparians. In 1953 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), interested in providing work projects and additional land for refugees, asked the American Tennessee Valley Authority to draw up a plan for the full development of the Jordan's resources. With the active support of the United States President Eisenhower, who sent Ambassador Eric Johnston into the area, this proposal became the basis for negotiations with the four countries involved.

What happened to the plan which became known as the Johnston Plan?

The story is told in "The Reporter" of 7 February, 1957, in an article by Mr. George Barnes, who accompanied Mr. Johnston as an Adviser on his trips to the Middle East, and subsequently quoted by Michael Comay, Israeli Ambassador to Canada:

In late September 1955, a special Committee of Arab Engineers reported to the Arab League that the Johnston Plan revised and refined through negotiation, was equitable, workable and compatible with Arab interests...On the night of 11 October 1955, in the Cairo office of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Johnston was handed a brief statement that had just been adopted by the Arab League. It requested 'more time' to consider the 'technical' details of the

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project...the negative vote that killed the project under the Arab League's unanimity rule was cast by Said el-Ghazzi, then Premier of Syria (...). Both Lebanon and Jordan, the other principal beneficiaries, were in favour of acceptance. On the following morning, an exceptionally well-informed Egyptian newspaperman told me that el-Ghazzi had acted under instructions from Nasser of Egypt, who had repeatedly assured Johnston that he would support the plan¹⁷.

A unified development of the Jordan is economically feasible. Total cost of the project is estimated at about \$120 million. The increased yields of the valley in Jordan alone may be worth as much as \$40 million a year. Once a plan is agreed upon, many of the Arab refugees can be put to work on Jordan development projects. The United Nations, which had already allocated an initial sum for development surveys, could provide additional funds for the construction as soon as a multilateral agreement could be reached. In less than three years after work commences the first families could move to their new land. Even without the signing of a formal peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, the problems of Jordan's water needs could be solved which would in turn help towards a solution of the Arab refugee problem.

¹⁷ Comay, Michael, "Resettling the Arab Refugees" Statement by Ambassador Michael Comay, Israel Ambassador to Canada, and member of the Israel Delegation to the tenth U.N.G.A., before the Special Political Committee, 19th February, 1947, Jerusalem, Government Printer, 1957. p. 9-10.

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Jordan has also possibilities in mining where a substantial number of Arab refugees could find employment and thus be integrated. Jordan has some of the best phosphate deposits, in Busseifa, El-Hasa, Ma'an and Ras-el-Nageb. Only one, Russeifa, is presently being worked. High transport costs is the barrier to their exploitation. The phosphate has to be conveyed by train to the port of Beirut, rendering prices uncompetitive. A railway connection with Aqaba and paved roads from the mines to the port of Aqaba would probably resolve the high transportation costs and at the same time absorb a great number of refugees.

According to the Research Group for European Migration Problems, over 100,000 refugees could be given work if the Yarmuk-Jordan Plan is carried out, and possibly another 50,000 could be placed in various occupations and in mining. However, the remaining 350,000 Arab refugees would have to be moved elsewhere¹⁸. The Government of Jordan has neither the means nor the bargaining power to create a solution of its own to the Arab refugee problem. Undoubtedly, international assistance and co-operation between Israel and Jordan would go a long way towards the solution of the Arab refugee question.

¹⁸ Research Group for European Migration Problems, R.E.M.P. Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 1, The Hague, January-March, 1957, p. 38

Plan drawn up by the American Tennessee Valley Authority - the Johnston Plan.

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LEBANON--

Though Lebanon refuses to accept permanently her 102,291 Arab refugees for political reasons, the Government considers the integration of the refugees an impossibility. Next to Egypt, Lebanon is the most densely populated of all Mideast countries. It has a population of one and one-half million people in an area of 6,327 square miles, which is equivalent to three times the area of Prince Edward Island in Canada. Owing to its mountainous character, one third of the country is not cultivable. Though agriculture is the main source of income, Lebanon is also a commercial and financial centre for several neighbouring countries.

The best way to alleviate the population pressure, resulting from the presence of Arab refugees, is the Litani Project--a scheme to use the waters of the Litani River in the Bekaa's area and on the coastal plain, both for hydroelectric developments and irrigation schemes¹⁹. However, this may not be even sufficient to meet the needs of Lebanon's rapid population growth. Therefore, Lebanon has very little to offer the refugees.

19 Cooke, Hedley V., *Challenge and Response in the Middle East, The Quest for Prosperity 1919-1951*, New York, Harper, 1952, p. 134-145.

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SYRIA--

In comparison with most Mideast countries, Syria is thinly populated. A large part of the country consists of deserts, but one third is tillable. There is suitable land lying fallow; but the limiting factor in Arab refugee resettlement here is the poor use of water. The country is fortunate in possessing a number of rivers, particularly the Euphrates and its tributary the Khabur which carry enormous quantities of mountain water. Apart from water and a fertile soil, Syria possesses few or no natural riches, but this assertion seems somewhat premature as the country is virtually unexplored geologically, except for oil²⁰.

Syria is predominantly an agricultural country. Between 65 and 75 per cent of the population live in villages and rural towns. Half the national income is derived from agricultural and pastoral sources. Only 30 to 40 per cent of produce is marketed the remainder is consumed directly. The peasant is generally poor.

The transport system in Syria is completely inadequate. It consists of an insufficient number of rather bad roads and three railway lines which were inherited from the Ottoman Sultanate and remain unadapted to Syria's frontiers. Even the width of the rails varies.

What could Syria do for the refugees?

20 R.E.M.P. p. 32, quoting Report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of Syria, Baltimore, 1955.

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Several development projects in Syria are under way and many more are in the designing stage. However, Syrian Government co-operates most reluctantly with rehabilitation projects for refugees. She has however, under UNRWA pressure consented to open up a few small agricultural projects in Dabaa, for example. These were financed by UNRWA until the first harvest made a self-supporting existence possible. The cost per settled refugee was very high but the families helped became self-supporting.

A second area, consisting of 160,000²¹ dunums of uninhabited land, near Ramahdan, situated about 25 miles East of Damascus was made available for refugee settlement. UNRWA started this project mainly so as not to decline the first concrete offer in Syria for the resettlement of large numbers of refugees, and also to acquire experience in marginal steppe country. Houses here were built of simple native materials. Each family was provided with 20 dunums of irrigated land, a house, a mule, 20 ewes, and some implements. The livestock fed in part on the surrounding steppelands. The sale of lambs, wool and meat expected to give an income of £S 1,200²² per year per family. The irrigated land is to be used mainly for the cultivation of maize, wheat, vegetables

21 1 Syrian Dunum is 0.1 ha or .247 acres.

22 1 £ Syrian= \$.45

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and fruit. This would make the families self-supporting, and leave a small surplus for sale to the city as well; 64 families were transferred to the village in 1955-56. However, the cost of this small project was extremely high, \$400,000 and UNRWA deemed it not only uneconomic but also impractical.²³

The North and the North East of Syria offer greater scope for the refugees. Going North both the soil and the climatic conditions improve, and here are found the great rivers. In the Central and Northern Plains, a strip from 50 to 100 km wide, the soil is mainly redbrown, getting deeper and darker, going North. There is considerable large scale extensive farming in the area with modern equipment. The produce is grain of various kinds. Farm units vary in size from a few hundred to hundreds of thousands of acres, many state owned. Though the best land is presently occupied, there is an enormous quantity of medium quality land not being cultivated²⁴. According to the R.E.M.P. Bulletin, it seems almost certain that with the co-operation of the Syrian Government a large number of refugee families could be settled in this area.

²³ UNRWA Report to the 9th Session. No. 17, doc. A/2717, 1954-5, p. 5, quoted in R.E.M.P., p. 33.

²⁴ R.E.M.P., p. 34, quoting Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development, UNRWA. No. 11, July, 1955.

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In the three most fertile zones in the Jezireh area, namely Qubur al-Bid, the district North East of Hasaka, and the area surrounding Tel Kucuk, the estimated absorptive capacity is from 100,000 to 245,000 additional people²⁵. All sorts of produce can be grown here, particularly cotton, grains, and oilseeds. The soil is excellent for horticulture, but the transport facilities must be improved.

The richest alluvial lands should be found in the valleys of the Euphrates and the Khabur. According to the IBDR report the cultivable area could be doubled by irrigation:

Hundreds of thousands of hectares on the somewhat higher land on both banks of the Euphrates and in the lower Khabus valley form a potential future reserve, though the capital outlay required to bring them under cultivation would probably have to be furnished by the Government²⁶.

The general development of the areas discussed is impossible without outside aid, technically, financially, and in manpower. The technical and financial aid could be available through UNRWA; through compensation by Israel for the Arab property the latter acquired; and through other international agencies. The manpower could be supplied by

25 Thicnesse, S.G. Arab Refugees, A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford, 1949, p. 47. quoted by R.E.M.P. p. 34, and by Comay. op. cit., p. 6.

26 The Economic Development of Syria, report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Baltimore, 1955, p. 298, quoted by R.E.M.P. op. cit., p. 34.

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the Arab refugees. It finally requires the good will of Syria, a compromising attitude with Israel and a humanitarian outlook towards the Arab refugees.

One of the major obstacles to integration of the Arab refugees is the extreme barrenness and poverty of the countries adjacent to Israel in which most of the refugees are located. These countries, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and to a lesser degree Syria are short of water, have large areas of desert and possess little or no oil. Each has a large proportion of its own population existing at a minimum subsistence level. The only way to provide for large numbers of refugees is to bring additional land under cultivation. This involves large-scale, high-cost irrigation projects of a complex nature because the sources of water are limited.

International aid, both financial and technical, has been offered for refugee resettlement, and should be accepted and used.

Many schemes have been proposed which if executed would provide much land under cultivation for the absorption of a great number of Arab refugees. However, with the exception of those in Syria, most of them would have to be resettled elsewhere. Syria itself is potentially capable of not only absorbing these refugees she now possesses but can with international aid, both financial and technical, resettle many of the refugees now located in Gaza, Lebanon and Jordan.

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3) Resettlement

IRAQ--

In the late autumn of 1956 a British newspaper correspondent was discussing Iraq's development plans with an Iraqi Cabinet Minister at Baghdad. The Minister lamented Iraq's shortage of manpower. "Why don't you bring over the Arab refugees from Palestine?" inquired the correspondent. "Oh, we couldn't do that," the Minister replied; "that would solve the refugee problem."²⁷

The official news commentator of Cairo radio, reacting to a statement by Mr. Ben Gurion in July 1957, made their attitude quite clear: "The fact that Israel is trying to solve the refugee problem proves that she has an interest in its solution. This alone is enough to damn any such attempt in Arab eyes."²⁸

About 5000 Arab refugees went to Iraq where they have been joined by perhaps 10,000 more recently. Here the Arab refugees have found work as Iraq not only has the potential to absorb all the refugees, but her economic development is seriously hampered by a lack of manpower.

²⁷ Eytan, Walter, The First Ten Years, A Diplomatic History of Israel, London, Weidenfeld, 1958, p. 111.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 111.

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Iraq has a population of 5,000,000 in an area of 273,213 sq. miles with 9,544,644 hectares cultivable and only partly used. A fairly narrow strip in the North has sufficient rainfall. The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers can supply the rest of the cultivable area with irrigation water. Much of the soil in Iraq is fertile, promising reasonable returns. Iraq's oil is not only a source of income in any desired currency, it also provides cheap energy, cheap raw material for industrial development, and cheap transport. Unfortunately, huge quantities of good but fallow land lays unexploited.

Irrigation water is wasted as a result of incompetent use and lack of reservoirs. In the Autumn there is a grave shortage of water, in the spring the rivers invariably break through their banks. The technical level of agriculture is among the most backward in the Middle East.

In 1950 a Development Board was founded, an independent body charged with the preparation and execution of development plans. Seventy per cent of Iraq's income estimated at 200 million dollars annually from the oil industry has been put at its disposal. The "National Development Board"^{28a} task of this is to find means of spending the increasing revenue in such a way as to ensure the maximum short-term and long-term benefits to the country.

28a Time, April 8, 1957, p. 33.

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Iraq is engaged on a six-year river control plan which is expected to result in more irrigated land and at the same time to put an end to flooding. In 1954, a few hundred foreign experts were employed in addition to 3,000 Iraqi workers and experts. However, there is a great need for skilled and semi-skilled labour. Among the Palestine refugees there are many tradesmen, such as fitters, carpenters, electricians, bricklayers and builder's labourers.

According to experts, the chief limiting factor in developing the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in Iraq, is the lack of population. In its Report to the President in March 1951, the United States International Development Advisory Board emphasized that the reclamation of the river basin could irrigate several millions of acres of potentially fertile land, on which perhaps two to three million persons could be settled²⁹. Therefore, these lands could possibly absorb the Arab refugees.

Moreover, resettlement possibilities in Iraq, particularly in urban occupations, have been greatly increased by the exodus to Israel in 1950-51 of 120,000 Iraqi Jews. This exodus created a vacuum which could be filled by qualified Arab refugees from Palestine, thirty-five per cent of whom are townspeople, such as shopkeepers, artisans and

29 Gemay, op. cit., p. 5

white-collar workers³⁰.

Undoubtedly Iraq holds the best key to the solution of the Arab refugee problem by resettlement. She possesses perhaps the best long range prospects for the development of agriculture than any other country in the Middle East. She is not short of land, water or resources, but she is short of people, skill and capital which are available for the solution of the Arab refugee problem.

CONCLUSION--

It may be concluded that Jordan and Egypt can permanently absorb a limited number of refugees, provided irrigation and cultivation plans are executed, but the bulk of the Arab refugees would have to be settled elsewhere. Lebanon has employment possibilities but they are required for her own increasing population. The Gaza strip holds no hope whatsoever for absorption of the refugees. Their position in Gaza is untenable and their only hope lies in resettlement, possibly Syria who has the potential capacity to absorb her own and others, or Iraq. However, it is not likely that Iraq and the other Arab states will take positive steps in resettling the Arab refugees, so long as Israel remains a "threat to their

30 Comay, op. cit., p. 6

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territorial integrity³¹" and so long as the Arab states remain politically divided³².

31 This is particularly true of Jordan and Egypt. The latter was attacked by Israel in October, 1956.

32 The Arabs are only united insofar as they are opposed in bloc to the existence of Israel.

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4) Emigration

A further step towards the solution of the Arab refugee problem could be through emigration. For some years, the UNRWA has furnished assistance to refugees who wish to emigrate from Lebanon and Jordan. In the Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period of July 1, 1957 to June 30, 1958, seventeen countries are reported to have taken 571 Arab refugees, namely:

Argentina	1	
Brazil	137	
Bolivia	11	
Canada	11	
Colombia	1	
Chile	9	
Egypt	16	
Honduras	8	
Iran	54	
Kuwait	34	
Oatar	24	
Sierra Leone	1	
Saudi Arabia	9	
United States of America	80	
Venezuela	170	
Germany (Federal Republic)	4	
Yemen	1	32a
	<u>571</u>	

32a U.N. G.A. O.R., 13th Session Suppl. No. 14,
Doc. A/3931, p. 22.

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Though the largest, and probably the most suitable area for resettlement of Arab refugees would seem to be the Middle East, the possibility of certain numbers being accepted elsewhere should not be entirely neglected. Since the Palestine war numbers of Palestine Arabs have been applying mainly for American, British, and French visas. If no wider possibilities for the resettlement of refugees outside the Middle East are contemplated, at least it might be possible for sympathetic consideration to be given to the applications of Arab homeless by immigration authorities of other countries, as was sometimes done in the case of Jewish refugees, though allowances would have to be made for linguistic barriers and racial prejudices.

Why is a Solution Urgent?

First of all it is a humanitarian problem. Conditions which existed when Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State, for the U.S.A., visited the area in 1953 have remained the same.

These people

(...) mostly exist in makeshift camps, with few facilities either for health, work, or recreation. Within these camps the inmates rot away, spiritually and physically. Even the Grim Reaper offers no solution, for as the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate³³.

³³ Background, Department of State Publication, Near and Middle Eastern Series, Washington, U.S. Printing Office, 1954, p. 3.

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The plight of the unfortunate refugees is a challenge to the international community.

Just as important as the humanitarian aspect is the need for stability in the Middle East which threatens the world community to war. It is a vicious circle whether we state that the Arab refugees are the cause of the instability in the Middle East or whether they are the effect. Russian influence in the Middle East has been helped by Israel's existence.

Henry A. Byroade, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, in the hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that one of the real impediments standing in the way of peace is that the Arab world doesn't know, the size of the state they are dealing with. They know that the only limitation on immigration into Israel is the total of all people of the Jewish faith anywhere in the world. If they had a peace treaty to-day, would it mean anything? Sometime in the future, Israel's call for increased immigration might be heeded and the country might burst its bounds at the expense of the Arab states.

Mr. Byroade pointed out that there are only two places in the world where there are millions of Jews--the United States;

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and I don't foresee many from American Jewry immigrating to Israel to take on a new citizenship. The other is the Soviet Union...We don't see the Kremlin opening its gates...unless the time comes when they feel a Middle East aflame would be more important to them than the disadvantage of the break in the curtain³⁴.

Russia gains by inflaming the quarrel between the Arabs and the Jews.

The revelation in the post-war years of the colossal size of the oil reserves in the Middle East has increased year by year the importance of the region in world politics --the entire European economy is dependent on Middle East oil. If Russia were in a position to deny the oil to Western Europe, it would have an invaluable instrument of blackmail. Therefore, Russia has been able with little risk and little cost to discomfort the West and at the same time it has increased the disorders. A solution to the Arab refugee problem is most urgent and necessary both for the refugees themselves and also as a precautionary measure towards the peace and security of the world community.

³⁴ Middle Eastern Affairs, August, 1954, p. 262-3.

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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The Arab refugee problem is the most tragic consequence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a struggle between two dynamic forces, Arab Nationalism and Zionism, whose aspirations from the outset were irreconcilable. In the wake of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, almost one million Arab inhabitants of Palestine lost their homes, lands and means of livelihood. They have been subsisting mainly on UNRWA charity, but this cannot go on forever. These refugees demand repatriation and restitution but Israel refuses to take them back. The Arab states support the refugees in their demands while the United Nations Resolution No. 194 (III) of December 11, 1948 has encouraged them. Underlying the political, psychological and economic factors thwarting a solution to the plight of the Arab refugees, are the deep-rooted fears.

The Jews fear annihilation. Press reports, public statements by responsible Arab leaders and the economic boycott of Israeli goods have been convincing. On the other hand Arab fears of an Israeli expansion are well founded. Of particular concern is Israel's constant call for more and more Jewish immigrants, while at the same time refusing to consider Arab repatriation. To the Arabs, Israel's attitude is not re-assuring.

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A solution to the Arab refugee problem is made contingent on a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and vice versa. It is a vicious circle, but a solution is possible provided both the Jews and the Arabs face the future with realism. To alleviate the Arab-Israeli tension the following suggestions have been offered: International border guarantees of the Arab States and Israel, but underwritten by the U.S.A; Internationalization of Jerusalem; the exchange of Gaza to Israel for a land corridor in the Negev to Egypt; and finally an international buffer state between Israel and Egypt. A direct approach to the solution of the Arab refugee problem could be made by a sincere study and consideration of the following: limited repatriation, integration, resettlement, and emigration.

Plain humanity demands a solution; it is urgent, but compromise and good will is necessary. As an inducement to negotiate, the Arabs would seem certainly within their rights to expect some show of cooperation on the part of Israel, and an indication of strength from the United Nations, that would guarantee Arab security. If Israel can be persuaded to take back at least

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a proportion of the refugees and help towards the financing of the resettlement of the rest, it would help to solve the problem.

Israel to-day is in a strong enough position to make concessions which might eventually lead to peace. Though Israel is wholly convinced of the moral and legal rights of her position, it would seem that this is not the time for insisting upon them. Some compromise is necessary. At present, Israel is more than a match for any single Arab state and could probably again defeat the "coalition" of the Arab states as they exist today. The success of her attack on Egypt in 1956 encouraged many Israelis to think and talk in martial terms. Withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza subsequent to her attack on Egypt were unpopular in Israel. However, Israel must realize that her only hope of peace and stability lies in her acceptance and integration into the Middle East. Economically, her natural outlets are not to the West, with whose industrial machines she can hardly hope to compete. It would thus seem that it would be most beneficial for Israel to make the first move towards conciliation with the Arabs. Moreover, no Arab government, under the shame of defeat is secure enough to be able to take the first steps to the peace-conference table.

The concessions Israel could afford to make are open to discussion and undoubtedly there are risks involved.

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However, there are greater risks involved in the absence of concessions, and it is rather doubtful if a nation such as Israel, with a population of approximately two million could survive for long in a hostile environment surrounded by 40,000,000 Arabs.

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APPENDIX 1

RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-SYRIAN CONGRESS
AT PARIS 21 JUNE 1913

1. Radical and urgent reforms are needed in the Ottoman Empire.
2. It is important to guarantee the Ottoman Arabs the exercise of their political rights by making effective their participation in the central administration of the Empire.
3. It is important to establish in each of the Syrian and Arab vilayets a decentralized regime suitable to their needs and aptitudes.
4. The vilayet of Bayrut, having formulated its claims in a special project adopted on 31 January 1913 by an ad hoc General Assembly and based on the double principle of the extension of the powers of the general council of the vilayet and the nomination of foreign councillors, the Congress requests the execution of the above project.
5. The Arabic language must be recognized in the Ottoman Parliament and considered as an official language in Syrian and Arab countries.
6. Military service shall be regional in Syrian and Arab vilayets, except in case of extreme necessity.
7. The Congress expresses the wish that the Ottoman Imperial Government will provide the mutasarriflik of Lebanon with the means of improving the financial situation.
8. The Congress affirms that it favours the reformist and decentralizing demands of the Armenian Ottomans.
9. The present resolution shall be communicated to the Ottoman Imperial Government.
10. These resolutions shall also be communicated to the powers friendly to the Ottoman Empire.
11. The Congress conveys its grateful thanks to the Government of the (French) Republic for its generous hospitality¹.

¹ Translated from the French text in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, Vol. 10 (ii), p. 826, quoted by Hurewitz, J.C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East Documentary Record: 1535-1914* Page 268.

APPENDIX 2

THE DAMASCUS PROTOCOL

"The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying within the following frontiers:

- North: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37°N. and thence along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn 'Umar)-Amadia to the Persian frontier;
- East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;
- South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be maintained);
- West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

"The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under the Capitulations.

The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the future independent Arab state.

The grant of economic preference to Great Britain."

(The text as given above is a translation of the Arabic version lent to Antonius by King Faisal)

1 Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, The Story of the Arab National Movement, p. 157-8.

APPENDIX 3

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIR HENRY MCMAHON,
HIS MAJESTY'S HIGH COMMISSIONER AT CAIRO AND
THE SHERIF HUSSEIN OF MECCA

DATES OF LETTERS

1. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 14th July, 1915
2. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, 30th August, 1915
3. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 9th September, 1915
4. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, 24th October, 1915
5. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 5th November, 1915
6. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, 14th December, 1915
7. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 1st January, 1916
8. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, 25th January, 1916
9. From Sherif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, 18th February, 1916
10. From Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein, 10th March, 1916¹

¹ Text of Letters appear in: Cmd 5957, London,
Printed and Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office,
1939.

APPENDIX 1

THE ANGLO-FRANCO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT
(April-May 1916)

Generally Known As

THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT

(The Sykes-Picot Agreement was concluded in the form of diplomatic notes exchanged between the Governments of the three Powers, in which the claims of each Power to portions of the Ottoman Empire after its dismemberment were recognised by the other two. Notes defining the Russian share were exchanged in Petrograd on April 26, 1916, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazeneff) and the French Ambassador (M. Paleologue), and in London a few weeks later between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the Russian Ambassador (Count Benckendorff). Notes defining the British and French shares were exchanged in London on May 9 and May 16, between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon).

The text reproduced below is only that of the Anglo-French section of the Agreement, since that section alone dealt with the future of Arab territories. It is my own translation of the French version published in A. Giannini, *Documenti per la Storia della Pace orientale*, Rome, 1933.)

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT

Concluded in London on May 16, 1916

1. France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas shown as (A) and (B) on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief. France in area (A) and Great Britain in area (B) shall have a right of priority in enterprises and local loans. France in area (A) and Great Britain in area (B) shall alone supply foreign advisers or officials on the request of the Arab State or the Confederation of Arab States.
2. France in the Blue area and Great Britain in the Red area shall be at liberty to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they may desire or as they may deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
3. In the Brown area there shall be established an international administration of which the form will be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and after subsequent agreement with the other Allies and the representatives of the Sharif of Mecca.

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THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT

4. There shall be accorded to Great Britain

- (a) The ports of Haifa and Acre;
- (b) Guarantee of a specific supply of water from the Tigris and the Euphrates in area (A) for area (B).

His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time initiate negotiations for the concession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

5. Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire and there shall be no differentiation in treatment with regard to port dues or the extension of special privileges affecting British shipping and commerce; there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and over railways through the Blue area, whether such goods are going to or coming from the Red area, area (A) or area (B); and there shall be no differentiation in treatment, direct or indirect, at the expense of British goods on any railway or of British goods and shipping in any port serving the areas in question.

Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her colonies and protectorates, and there shall be no differentiation in treatment or privilege with regard to port dues against French shipping and commerce. There shall be freedom of transit through Haifa and over British railways through the Brown area, whether such goods are coming from or going to the Blue area, area (A) or area (B), and there shall be no differentiation in treatment, direct or indirect, at the expense of French goods on any railway or of French goods and shipping in any port serving the areas in question.

6. In area (A), the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (B), it shall not be extended northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo along the basin of the Euphrates will have been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.

7. Great Britain shall have the right to build, administer and be the sole owner of the railway connecting Haifa with area (B). She shall have, in addition, the right in perpetuity and at all times of carrying troops on that line. It is understood by both Governments that this railway is intended to facilitate communication between Baghdad and Haifa, and it is further understood that, in the event of technical difficulties and expenditure incurred in the maintenance of this line in the Brown area rendering the execution of the project impracticable, the French Government will be prepared to consider plans for enabling the line in question to traverse the

THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT

polygon formed by Banias-Umm Qais-Salkhad-Tall 'Osda-Mismieh before reaching area (B).

8. For a period of twenty years, the Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the Blue and Red areas as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duties and no alteration of ad valorem duties into specific duties shall be made without the consent of the two Powers.

There shall be no internal customs barriers between any of the areas mentioned above. The customs duties to be levied on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the ports of entry and remitted to the Administration of the area of destination.

9. It is understood that the French Government will at no time initiate any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede their prospective rights in the Blue area to any third Power other than the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States, without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government who, on their part, give the French Government a similar undertaking in respect of the Red area.

10. The British and French Governments shall agree to abstain from acquiring and to withhold their consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula; nor shall they consent to the construction by a third Power of a naval base in the islands on the eastern seaboard of the Red Sea. This, however, will not prevent such rectification of the Aden boundary as might be found necessary in view of the recent Turkish attack.

11. The negotiations with the Arabs concerning the frontiers of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be pursued through the same channel as heretofore in the name of the two Powers.

12. It is understood, moreover, that measures for controlling the importation of arms into the Arab territory will be considered by the two Governments.

Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, The Story of The Arab National Movement, London, Hamilton, 1938, p.428-30.

APPENDIX 5

COMMUNICATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

TO THE KING OF THE HEJAZ

(February 8, 1918)

(The text of the original communication has often appeared in the Arabic Press in facsimile reproduction from a photostat copy supplied by the late King Husain. The original communication was in Arabic. The version given here is my own rendering from the Arabic text.)¹

(TRANSLATION)

THE ACTING BRITISH AGENT, JEDDA TO KING HUSAIN

Jedda, February 8, 1918.

Complimentary titles.

I am directed by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner¹ to forward to Your Majesty the text of a telegraphic message which His Excellency has had from the Foreign Office in London for transmission as a communication from His Britannic Majesty's Government to Your Majesty. The text is verbatim as follows:

Begins. The loyal motives which have prompted Your Majesty to forward to the High Commissioner the letters addressed by the Turkish commander-in-chief in Syria to His Highness the Amir Faisal and to Ja'far Pasha have caused His Majesty's Government the liveliest satisfaction. The steps taken by Your Majesty in this connexion are only a token of the friendship and mutual sincerity which have always inspired the relations between the Government of the Hejaz and His Majesty's Government. It would be superfluous to point out that the object aimed at by Turkey is to sow doubt and suspicion between the Allied Powers and those Arabs who, under Your Majesty's leadership and guidance, are striving nobly to recover their ancient freedom. The Turkish policy is to create dissension by luring the Arabs into believing that the Allied Powers have designs on the Arab countries, and by represent to the Allies that the Arabs might be made to renounce their aspirations. But such intrigues cannot succeed in sowing dissension among those whose minds are directed by a common purpose to a common end.

His Majesty's Government and their allies stand steadfastly by every cause aiming at the liberation of the oppressed nations, and they are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an Arab world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice, and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries artificially

APPENDIX 5

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

TO THE KING OF THE HEJAZ
(February 8, 1918)

(TRANSLATION)

THE ACTING BRITISH AGENT, JEDDA TO KING HUSAIN

Jedda, February 8, 1918.

provoked by the policy of Turkish officials. His Majesty's Government re-affirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples. His Majesty's Government have hitherto made it their policy to ensure that liberation, and it remains the policy they are determined unflinchingly to pursue by protecting such Arabs as are already liberated from all dangers and perils, and by assisting those who are still under the yoke of the tyrants to obtain their freedom. Ends.

Compliments.

J. R. Bassett,
Lt.-Col.
Acting British Agent,
Jedda.

1 Antonius, op. cit., p. 431-2.

APPENDIX 6

Text of the Balfour Declaration

Foreign Office

2 November 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with the Jewish Zionist aspirations which have been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Arthur James Balfour

APPENDIX 7

HOGARTH MESSAGE

Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the 'political and economic freedom of the Arab population'¹.

1 "The message was delivered orally by Commander Hogarth, one of the Heads of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, who arrived in Jeddah in the first week of January 1918. Hussein took the message down and the quotation just given is Antonius own rendering of the note made originally in Arabic"

Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, The Story of the Arab National Movement, p. 268.

APPENDIX 8

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION

TO THE SEVEN ARABS

(June 16, 1918)

(This Declaration was made in reply to a memorial submitted to the Foreign Office, through the Arab Bureau in Cairo by seven Arab leaders domiciled in Egypt.

The Declaration was read out by an officer of the Arab Bureau at a meeting of the seven Arab leaders, which had been specially convened for the purpose on June 16, 1918, in Cairo.

The text reproduced here is my own rendering of the Arabic text which is in the possession of one of the seven memorialists.^{1a}

In Arab circles this Declaration is usually known as the Declaration to the Seven.)

(Translation)

DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN

His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the Seven with great care. They fully appreciate the reasons for the desire of its authors to retain their anonymity,¹ but the fact that the memorial is anonymous has in no way detracted from the value which His Majesty's Government assign to that document.

The territories mentioned in the memorial fall into four categories:--

- (i) Territories which were free and independent before the outbreak of the War;
- (ii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Arabs themselves;
- (iii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Allied armies;
- (iv) Territories still under Turkish rule.

1a Antonius, George, Translation op. cit., p433-4

1 The memorialists were Rafiq al-'Azm; Shaikh Kamel al-Qassab; Mukhtar al-Sulh; 'Abdul-Rahman Shahbandar; Khaled al-Hakim; Fauzi al-Bakri; Hasan Himadeh.

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DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN

With regard to the first two categories,¹ His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these territories, and support them in their struggle for freedom.

With regard to the territories occupied by the Allied armies,² His Majesty's Government invite the attention of the memorialists to the proclamations issued by the commander-in-chief on the occasions of the capture of Baghdad (March 19, 1917) and of the capture of Jerusalem (December 9, 1917). These proclamations define the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of these regions, which is that the future government of these territories should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed. This policy will always be that of His Majesty's Government.

With regard to the territories in the fourth category,³ it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples in these territories should obtain their freedom and independence. His Majesty's Government will continue to work for the achievement of that object. They are fully aware of the difficulties and perils which threaten those who are striving for the (liberation?)⁴ of the inhabitants of these territories.

In spite of these obstacles, however, His Majesty's Government believe that the difficulties can be overcome, and they are prepared to give every support to those who are striving to overcome them. They are ready to consider any scheme of co-operation which does not conflict with the military operations in hand or with the political principles proclaimed by His Majesty's Government and their allies.

1. i.e., the independent states of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Hejaz as far north as 'Aqaba.

2. In June 1918, when this statement was issued, these territories comprised the greater part of Iraq (inclusive of Basra and Baghdad) and the southern half of Palestine (inclusive of Jerusalem and Jaffa).

3. i.e., the hitherto unliberated portions of Iraq and Syria.

4. This word is obscure in the Arabic source.

APPENDIX 9

ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION

(November 7, 1918)

(This Declaration was issued in Palestine, Syria and Iraq, in the form of an official communique emanating from General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, dated November 7, 1918.

The text was given out to the Press, on the authority of the military censorship department, with instructions that it be given special prominence. Copies of it were posted on the public notice-boards in all towns and a great many villages in the Arab territories then occupied by the Allied forces, that is to say throughout the length and breadth of Palestine, Syria and Iraq.

The Declaration appears to have been originally drawn up in French. Official versions that have appeared in English are obvious translations, not excluding that which was circulated in answer to a question in the House of Commons on the 25th July 1921.

The version here given is my own (George Antonius) rendering of the authoritative French text as printed in one of the leaflets officially distributed at the time.)¹

(Translation)

ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION

November 7, 1918.

The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War set in train by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.

In pursuit of these intentions, France and Great Britain agree to further and assist in the setting up of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria¹ and Mesopotamia² which have already been liberated by the Allies, as well as in those territories which they are endeavouring to liberate, and to recognize them as soon as they are actually set up.

1 In official parlance, this name was still used to denote the whole of geographical Syria, from the Taurus range to the Egyptian frontier.

2. The term is used here to denote the region made up of the former Ottoman Vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, which has throughout this book been referred to (and is now universally known) as Iraq.

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ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION

(November 7, 1918)

Far from wishing to impose this or that system upon the populations of these regions, their (i.e., France's and Great Britain's) only concern is to offer such support and efficacious help as will ensure the smooth working of the governments and administrations which these populations will have elected of their own free will to have; to secure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by promoting and encouraging local initiative; to foster the spread of education; and to put an end to the dissensions which Turkish policy has for so long exploited. Such is the task which the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the liberated territories.

1 Antonius, op. cit., p. 435-6.

APPENDIX 10

Table I .- Annual Jewish Immigration to Palestine, from 1920 to 1946.^a

Year	Number
1920	5,514
1921	9,149
1922	7,844
1923	7,421
1924	12,856
1925	33,801
1926	13,081
1927	2,713
1928	2,178
1929	5,249
1930	4,944
1931	4,075
1932	9,553
1933	30,327
1934	42,359
1935	61,864
1936	29,727
1937	10,536
1938	12,868
1939	27,561
1940	10,445
1941	3,839
1942	3,581
1943	8,558
1944	14,491
1945	13,156
1946	17,761
TOTAL	<u>405,441</u>

^a Ellis, Harry B., Israel and the Middle East, New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1957, p. 99-102-111. Taken from "The Political History of Palestine Under British Administration, p. 8-17-32.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A

REFUGEE STATISTICS *u*

Table 1

NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND RATIONS DISTRIBUTED^a

Country	June 1950		June 1951		June 1952		June 1953		June 1954		June 1955		June 1956		June 1957		June 1958	
	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations	Refugees	Rations
Gaza	198,227	188,227	199,789	197,233	204,356	198,427	208,560	199,465	212,600	207,037	214,601	208,674	216,971	213,056	221,058	214,463	225,575	218,325
Jordan	506,200	503,423	465,741	444,403	469,576	438,775	475,620	431,012	486,631	443,464	499,606	441,371	512,706	437,855	517,388	433,511	539,519	432,750
Lebanon	127,600	129,041	106,896	106,068	104,901	99,903	102,095	97,324	101,636	100,056	103,600	101,272	102,625	101,056	102,586	101,352	102,291	101,205
Syria	82,194	82,824	82,861	80,499	84,224	80,674	85,473	76,819	86,191	83,233	88,179	84,611	89,977	85,810	92,524	87,451	96,573	90,213
Israel	45,800	45,800	24,380	23,434	19,616	17,176	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b	^b
TOTAL	960,021	949,315	879,667	851,637	882,673	834,955	871,748	807,620	887,058	833,790	905,986	835,928	922,279	837,777	933,556	836,777	963,958	842,493

^a The refugees enumerated are persons registered for rations, their babies under one year of age and children registered for all services except rations. In addition, some refugees registered with the Agency receive, because of their income, only certain services or no services. On 30 June 1958 this group numbered 89,390.

The number of rations has been corrected to the equivalent of full rations as some refugees (frontier villagers) receive half rations. Prior to the eighth session of the General Assembly, children under seven years old and certain Bedouins also received half rather than full rations.

^b No longer UNRWA responsibility.

^a
 U.N. G.A.
 O.R. : 13th
 Session
 Suppl No.
 14, Doc.
 (A13931)

Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES ACCORDING TO AGE AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE AS AT 30 JUNE 1958

Country	0-1 year	1-15 years	15 years and over	Number of families
Gaza	5,309	104,116	116,150	40,883
Jordan	9,826	223,804	305,889	103,411
Lebanon	654	42,504	59,133	23,505
Syria	3,378	39,442	53,753	22,461
TOTAL	19,167	409,866	534,925	190,260

Table 3

Table III.-NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN CAMPS ACCORDING TO COUNTRY ^a

Country	June 1950	June 1951	June 1952	June 1953	June 1954	June 1955	June 1956	June 1957	June 1958
Gaza	95,000	102,586	90,670	81,367	96,500	124,107	129,741	123,770	132,242
Jordan	110,655	115,867	134,588	145,962	153,967	153,250	167,364	171,579	180,970
Lebanon	28,799	34,363	36,881	37,236	37,333	38,670	42,494	45,143	46,740
Syria	33,144	23,478	18,989	17,698	17,830	19,725	19,082	20,106	20,575
TOTAL	267,598	276,294	281,128	282,263	305,630	335,752	358,681	360,598	380,527
Number in camps as a percentage of the refugees shown in table 1.....	29.3%	32.3%	32.6%	32.4%	34.4%	37.1%	38.9%	38.6%	39.4%

APPENDIX 14

TEXT OF THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

(U.N. Document A/292)

(Original Text: English-French)

MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8) it is provided that the degree of authority, control or

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administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Article 1

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

Article 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 3

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

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Article 5

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Powers.

Article 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Articles 7 to 10 Omitted

Article 11

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish Agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, insofar as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the administration.

Articles 12 to 16 Omitted

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Article 17

The Administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified have with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine ..."

28 articles in Mandate

Taken from UN. OR. of the 2nd session of the G.A. Suppl. 11, U.N.S.C.O.P., Report to the General Assembly Vol. 11, A/364, Add. 1, 9 Sept. 1947, p. 18-20.

APPENDIX 15

Alignment of U.N. Countries on the
Partition of Palestine

<u>Against Partition</u>	<u>In Favour of Partition</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
Afghanistan	Australia	Argentina
Cuba	Belgium	Chile
Egypt	Bolivia	China
Greece	Brazil	Colombia
India	Byelorussian Soviet	El Salvador
Iran	Socialist Republic	Ethiopia
Iraq	Canada	Honduras
Lebanon	Costa Rica	Mexico
Pakistan	Czechoslovakia	U.K.
Saudi Arabia	Denmark	Yugoslavia
Syria	Dominion Republic	
Turkey	Ecuador	
Yemen	France	
	Guatemala	
	Haiti	
	Iceland	
	Siberia	
	Luxembourg	
	Netherlands	
	New Zealand	
	Nicaragua	
	Norway	
	Panama	
	Paraguay	
	Peru	
	Phillippines	
	Poland	
	Sweden	
	Ukrainian Soviet	
	Socialist Republic	
	Union of South Africa	
	Union of Soviet Socialist	
	Republics	
	U.S.A.	
	Uruguay	
	Venezuela	





Table 5
PLEDGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS TO UNRWA
 For the six months ended 30 June 1958 ^a
 (Expressed in US dollars)

Name of contributor	Description	Pledges		Contributions received		Balance of unpaid pledges	
		Unpaid from prior years	For 1958	From prior years' pledges	From 1958 pledges	Prior years' pledges	1958 pledges
Australia	£44,643 Australian US dollars	—	100,000	—	100,000	—	—
Austria	US dollars	—	1,400	—	—	—	1,400
Belgium	1,000,000 Belgian francs	—	20,000	—	20,000	—	—
Brazil	US dollars	25,000	—	—	—	25,000	—
Canada	Canadian dollars 62,500 (balance of pledge)	63,750	—	63,750	—	—	—
Canada	Canadian dollars 500,000 and flour (Can.\$1,500,000)	—	2,075,000	—	2,031,425	—	43,575
Denmark	350,000 Danish crowns	—	43,440	—	43,440	—	—
Denmark	50,000 Danish crowns ^a	—	7,240	—	—	—	7,240
France	207 million French francs and scholarships ^a	492,857	5,142	492,857	5,142	—	—
France	93 million French francs	—	221,429	—	119,047	—	102,382
France	Rent of camp and warehouse sites	—	23,040	—	11,520	—	11,520
Greece	45 tons of raisins	16,500	—	16,500	—	—	—
Greece	130 tons of raisins	—	39,000	—	—	—	39,000
Gaza Authorities	Rent of clinics and land	—	14,000	—	7,000	—	7,000
Federal Republic of Germany	0.8 million German marks ^b	—	190,476	—	—	—	190,476
India	Medical services, supplies and equipment	13,532	—	231	—	13,301	—
Iran	200,000 rials	2,680	—	—	—	2,680	—
Iran	200,000 rials	—	2,680	—	—	—	2,680
Israel	Transport, wharfage and port services	36,821	—	—	—	36,821	—
Italy	25 million Italian lire	—	39,953	—	39,953	—	—
Jordan	Water and rents	—	97,000	—	48,521	—	48,479
Lebanon	Refund of port charges (1 Nov. 1949 to 30 June 1951)	107,820	—	—	—	107,820	—
Lebanon	Water and rent of camp sites	—	8,000	—	3,907	—	4,093
Liberia	US dollars	—	5,000	—	—	—	5,000
Libya	US dollars	—	14,000	—	—	—	14,000
Luxembourg	US dollars ^b	—	2,000	—	—	—	2,000
Monaco	1 million French francs	—	2,381	—	2,381	—	—
Morocco	2 million French francs	—	4,762	—	4,762	—	—
Netherlands	125,000 Dutch florins	—	32,895	—	32,895	—	—
New Zealand	Milk powder	28,000	—	28,000	—	—	—
Norway	300,000 Norwegian crowns	—	42,000	—	21,000	—	21,000
Norway	50,000 Norwegian crowns ^a	—	7,000	—	—	—	7,000
Pakistan	100,000 Pakistani rupees	—	20,964	—	20,964	—	—
Saudi Arabia	2,000 tons of fuel	112,459	—	64,636	—	47,823	—
Saudi Arabia	2,000 tons of fuel and 100,000 US dollars	—	212,420	—	100,000	—	112,420
Carried forward:		899,419	3,231,222	665,974	2,611,957	233,445	619,265

Table 5

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PLEDGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS TO UNRWA

For the six months ended 30 June 1958 ^a

(Expressed in US dollars)

Name of contributor	Description	Pledges		Contributions received		Balance of unpaid pledges	
		Unpaid from prior years	For 1958	From prior years' pledges	From 1958 pledges	Prior years' pledges	1958 pledges
	Brought forward	899,419	3,231,222	665,974	2,611,957	233,445	619,265
Spain	1 million pesetas	—	23,810	—	—	—	23,810
Sudan	1,500 Sudanese pounds	—	4,200	—	4,200	—	—
Sweden	300,000 Swedish crowns	—	57,915	—	28,958	—	28,957
Sweden	51,800 Swedish crowns ^a	—	10,000	—	—	—	10,000
Switzerland	Hospital equipment	7,423	—	—	—	7,423	—
Switzerland	300,000 Swiss francs	—	70,093	—	70,093	—	—
Tunisia	US dollars	—	2,000	—	—	—	2,000
Turkey	Turkish pounds or supplies	5,357	—	5,357	—	—	—
Turkey	Turkish pounds	—	5,000	—	—	—	5,000
United Arab Republic							
Egyptian Region . .	Transport rents, and port services	—	180,000	—	90,102	—	89,898
Syrian Region	Rents and transport	—	80,000	—	40,128	—	39,872
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . .	£378,571 sterling ^a	—	1,060,000	—	1,060,000	—	—
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . .	£657,143 sterling	—	1,840,000	—	1,840,000	—	—
United States of America	US dollars ^b	500,000	2,500,000	500,000	1,693,915	—	806,085
United States of America	US dollars	250,000	9,000,000	250,000	9,000,000	—	—
Uruguay	US dollars	5,000	—	—	—	5,000	—
Yugoslavia	Supplies ^c	40,000	—	—	—	40,000	—
Yugoslavia	Supplies ^c	—	40,000	—	—	—	40,000
		<u>1,707,199</u>	<u>18,104,240</u>	<u>1,421,331</u>	<u>16,439,353</u>	<u>285,868</u>	<u>1,664,887</u>

Special notes on table 5

^a Designated by the contributor for the rehabilitation programme

^b Subject to parliamentary approval

^c Yugoslavia notified that these supplies were despatched by 30 June 1958

General note on table 5

The foregoing table, taken from the Agency's financial report for the six months ended 30 June 1958, is reproduced in full in this annex so as to provide information with regard to income that is directly comparable with the figures for actual expenditure for the same period, the latest date for which such information is available. Data on contributions received through 31 August 1958 has since become available and is summarized in this note for information.

During the two months of July and August, 1958 the Agency received total contributions of \$4.1 million, of which \$2.7 million

represented a payment from the United Kingdom for the six months ending 31 December 1958, of which \$2.2 million was for relief and \$0.5 million for rehabilitation. The balance of approximately \$1,368,000 comprised a payment of \$802,154 from the United States for the rehabilitation programme plus a variety of smaller payments from several countries, including the continued rendering of services by the host countries valued at their monthly rates as well as services and/or supplies from France (\$3,570) and Yugoslavia (\$80,000), and payments in cash from France (\$104,960), Federal Republic of Germany (\$190,476), Japan (\$10,000), Norway (\$21,000) and Sweden (\$67,915).

With regard to pledges for relief still outstanding, the following may be noted: the payment of the balance of the Canadian pledge is expected before 31 December 1958, the raisins from Greece are expected shortly after the crop is gathered in the fall, the kerosene from Saudi Arabia is available and will be called upon for distribution during the coming winter, utilization of the Spanish pledge of one million pesetas is being studied

a U.N. G.A. O.R.: 13th Session Suppl No. 14, Doc (A13931)

DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINE REFUGEE CHILDREN RECEIVING EDUCATION AS AT MAY 1958 *u*

	Number of UNRWA/ UNESCO schools	Elementary			Secondary			Total number of assisted refugee pupils in elementary and secondary classes in		Total number of refugees receiving education
		Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Government schools	Private schools	
		Gaza	77	20,736	14,427	35,163	6,297	1,198	7,495	
Jordan	185	25,574	16,026	41,600	5,313	539	5,852	26,500	7,002	80,954
Lebanon	50	8,865	5,071	13,936	904	92	996	1,014	8,921	24,867
Syria	69	7,205	4,127	11,332	1,184	378	1,562	6,591	1,687	21,172
TOTAL	381	62,380	39,651	102,031	13,698	2,207	15,905	37,505	17,610	173,051

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a. U.N. G.A.
O.R.: 13th
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UNRWA/UNESCO SCHOOLS SHOWING NUMBER OF PUPILS PER CLASS AT THE END OF MAY 1958 *a*

Elementary classes

Area	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		Totals	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Gaza	2,929	2,896	2,816	2,802	2,816	2,675	3,845	2,526	4,398	2,183	3,932	1,345	20,736	14,427
Jordan	4,027	3,763	3,556	2,683	4,034	3,033	5,036	3,021	5,196	2,512	3,715	1,014	25,574	16,026
Lebanon	1,879	1,406	1,461	1,037	1,902	1,136	1,603	783	1,245	468	775	241	8,805	5,071
Syria	1,326	986	1,221	875	1,022	707	1,276	712	1,700	644	660	203	7,205	4,127
TOTAL	10,161	9,051	9,064	7,397	9,774	7,755	11,760	7,042	12,539	5,807	9,082	2,803	62,380	39,651
GRAND TOTAL	19,212		16,461		17,325		18,802		18,346		11,885		102,031	

Secondary classes

Area	I		II		III		IV		V		Totals	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Gaza	3,036	723	3,261	475	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,297	1,198
Jordan	2,367	360	1,682	179	769	—	352	—	143	—	5,313	539
Lebanon	543	65	361	27	—	—	—	—	—	—	904	92
Syria	538	140	295	131	351	107	—	—	—	—	1,184	378
TOTAL	6,184	1,288	5,599	812	1,120	107	352	—	143	—	13,698	2,207
GRAND TOTAL	7,772		6,411		1,227		352		143		15,905	

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Table VII.-5. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES CONTROL ⁽²⁾

27. A list of infectious diseases recorded among the refugee population during the period under review is given in the following table:

Table 4

	Lebanon	Syria	Jordan	Gaza	Total
Plague	0	0	0	0	0
Cholera	0	0	0	0	0
Yellow fever	0	0	0	0	0
Smallpox	0	0	0	0	0
Typhus (louse borne)	0	0	0	0	0
Typhus (endemic)	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever	0	0	8	0	8
Diphtheria	7	8	70	1	86
Measles	1,124	421	2,008	10,395	13,948
Whooping cough	1,100	606	1,835	33	3,574
Chickenpox	277	413	3,160	7,619	11,469
Mumps	409	373	1,021	1	1,804
Meningitis (cerebro-spinal)	7	5	8	5	25
Polomyelitis	7	6	43	0	56
Enteric Group fevers	152	144	157	150	603
Dysentery ^a	18,170	15,529	14,100	22,579	70,378
Malaria ^a	66	291	1,843	18	2,218
Bilharziasis	0	0	0	94	94
Ankylostomiasis	49	0	0	1,509	1,558
Trachoma ^a	7,146	1,217	82,143	15,948	106,454
Conjunctivitis ^a	21,437	10,795	102,352	18,727	153,311

^a The numbers shown on this table represent number of attendances not clinical cases