

**Ethics and Arms Sales:
A Discourse Analysis of Canadian Foreign Policy**

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Legend	iv
Abstract	v
Chapter One - The Provocation	1
- The Question	3
- Research Design	6
o An Approach to Discourse Analysis	8
o Methodology	9
Chapter Two - Literature Review	
o Hypocrisy – Theoretical and Conceptual Understandings	13
o Hypocrisy and Foreign Policy Analysis	18
o Hypocrisy and Ethical Foreign Policy	22
o Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy	27
o Assessing Hypocrisy within Canadian Foreign Policy	30
Chapter Three - The Case	
- Canada – Saudi Relations and the LAV Deal	32
- Canada – Saudi LAV Deal Contextualization	35
o The Initial Statement	36
o Reactions	39
o The Final Report	42
o Reactions	46
- Foreign Policy Contextualization	49
o 2016 – 2017	50
o 2017 – 2018	51
o Feminist International Assistance Plan	52
o 2018 – 2019	52
o 2019 – 2020	54
o 2020 – 2021	54
Chapter Four – Analysis	
- The Institutionalization of Hypocrisy	57
- The Limits of Ethical Foreign Policy	65
Conclusion	72
Work Cited	76

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Legend

ATT – Arms Trade Treaty
CR – Core Responsibility
CSO – Civil Society Organization
DP – Departmental Plan
FIAP – Feminist International Assistance Plan
FPA – Foreign Policy Analysis
GAC – Global Affairs Canada
IHL – International Humanitarian Law
IHRL – International Human Rights Law
KSA – Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LAV – Light Armoured Vehicle
RPP – Report on Plans and Priorities
SO – Strategic Outcome
WPS – Women, Peace and Security

Abstract

Since 2015, the Canadian government has made recurrent assertions that Canada has a feminist foreign policy. A policy, according to certain critics, that is hypocritical because of the government's continuation of arms exports to countries deemed unsavory from a human rights standpoint. This context makes for a fertile exploration of the nexus between ethical foreign policy aspirations and the realities of foreign relations policy implementation and impact. By assessing these circumstances, I attempt to understand how hypocrisy functions within Canadian foreign policy. Through a method of discourse analysis, I evaluate the official discourses from the government and responses by civil society in relation to the Liberal Government's handling of the Canada – Saudi Light Armoured Vehicle contract. In addition, by analysing Canadian foreign policy, via departmental reports, I highlight how the government attempts to infuse Canada's foreign policy with ethical considerations. By tracing the rise of ethical considerations in Canada's foreign policy, I argue that hypocrisy is intertwined with ethical considerations, thus systematically embedding hypocrisy within established Canadian institutions. Moreover, I show that Canada is committed to the concept of risk transfer, the doctrine of double effect and need for 'proof grounded in evidence' when assessing arms exports. These concepts shift the risks associated with hypocritical action away from the government and onto the people it purports to aid.

Keywords: Ethics, Hypocrisy, Foreign Policy, Ethical Foreign Policy, Global Affairs Canada

Chapter One

The Provocation

In September 2019, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appeared on *Patriot Act*, an American Netflix television show hosted by left-wing comedian, Hasan Minhaj. That episode, titled “The Two Sides of Canada”, identified a multitude of instances where, under the leadership of Trudeau, Canada had championed a progressive agenda while not reflecting that agenda in its actual operational behaviour. Minhaj pointed to inconsistencies between talk and action on numerous issues, including forwarding gender parity in the federal cabinet while dealing paternalistically with Jodi Wilson-Raybold during the 2019 SNC – Lavalin affair, Trudeau’s condemnation of Bill 21 in Quebec while continuing the Canada – Saudi LAV deal, and Trudeau’s promises about protecting the environment while simultaneously purchasing the Trans Mountain Pipeline (“The Two Sides of Canada” 2019). These inconsistencies, Minhaj points out, are leading examples of Canada’s duplicitousness, showcasing the disconnect between espoused policy and political pragmatism.

Accusations of hypocrisy, whether valid or not, have followed Trudeau’s government since coming to power in 2015. The practical impacts of these accusations can be difficult to ascertain, but traditional media, civil discourse on social media platforms and members of the opposition have fixated on the various examples of Trudeau’s purported hypocrisy. These hypocrisy accusations attempt to insinuate a failure in Trudeau’s ability to lead domestically, resulting in a loss of Canada’s stature in the international realm.

One issue, mentioned by Minhaj, that exemplifies these accusations of hypocrisy is the infamous ‘Canada – Saudi LAV deal’. Since 2015, the Liberal government has, at various times, promoted ethical and feminist considerations ‘inherent’ to its foreign policy, an allegation that I

contend stems from the infusion of gendered language within government discourses exemplified by the introduction of policies like the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), and Women, Peace and Security Agenda and creation of an ambassador for Women, Peace and Security (GAC 2017). These policies and resulting discourses, I allege, are attempts by the government to situate itself as a feminist authority on the global stage which enables Canada, and its leaders, to ‘take a stand’ against global injustices in the name of feminist values. Concurrently, the government has preserved a contract (signed by the previous Conservative government) for the sale of Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia, a state notorious for human rights abuses. The LAV contract has been maintained through a variety of critiques from civil society and governmental reviews, which, in turn, provides further legitimacy to accusations of hypocrisy. The LAV contract, is thus emblematic for exploring ethical commitments through a seeming paradox between commitments to gender equity and the Saudi LAV deal. A paradox encapsulated by Canada’s assertion, and maintenance, of a feminist label and values, in the face of evidence to the contrary. For these reasons, I analyze the Canada – Saudi LAV deal by reviewing official discourses from the government, pertaining to both foreign policy and export review, and responses from civil society to these discourses.

Government hypocrisy is certainly not a new concept nor is it uncommon. Minhaj draws attention to some current examples but a plethora of examples remain, such as Canada’s actions in supporting the 2004 American led *coup d’état* and overthrow of the democratically elected Haitian president, or initial support and eventual condemnation of the South African apartheid regime. Government hypocrisy is certainly not solely a Canadian issue either. The British government led by the Labour party in 1997 advocated for a foreign policy containing ethical considerations, but due to its record on the arms trade and support for the American led ‘War on

Terror' among others, the ethical considerations became increasingly tenuous until discarded altogether from its foreign policy (Gaskarth 2006, p. 46). Democratic governments continuously show themselves to be potentially vulnerable due to accusations of hypocrisy resulting from their own policy incoherence.

It is interesting to note however, that it seems that these accusations of hypocrisy have had a negligible effect on Canadians perception of Canada. A study conducted by Abacus Data Inc. found that when asked, "How is Canada perceived around the world?", 93% of Canadians believed Canada was viewed as more tolerant than intolerant, and 88% saw Canada as ethical over unethical (Anderson and Coletto 2018). Thus, Canadians appear to value Canada's projected image as an ethical/constructive international actor, demonstrated by Canada's actual international contributions and political rhetoric which influences discourse surrounding Canada's image in both domestic and international realms. Additionally, other than the Canadian electorate, there is no 'higher authority' in global politics to which the Canadian government must answer. As a result, the government is able to weather accusations of hypocrisy as the price of conduct on the global stage. Therefore the 'disconnect' between policy and action, that Minhaj references, must be either a tool wielded by government actors and policy creators, a constitutive part of government policy, or both.

The Question

Although there may be few actual consequences to political hypocrisy, accusations or revelations of hypocrisy are a critical aspect of democracies because they shine a light on the duplicity of an elected government. Recognizing and understanding how hypocrisy functions and is used within governmental policy is essential for creating a more politically literate electorate and holding elected officials accountable. Furthermore, this understanding and recognition is

underscored by the influence of the disarray created by the infusion of ethics into governmental policy. The demarcations between ethics and governmental policy are potentially clarified through an exploration of hypocrisy within governmental policy discourses. As well, the ‘function’ of hypocrisy is highlighted by the coherence, or lack thereof, between political action and government discourse. In endeavoring to understand how hypocrisy functions within Canadian governmental policy, it is necessary to first assess under what circumstances hypocrisy arises. The circumstances surrounding an accusation or revelation of hypocrisy may impact the response from government. The gravity of hypocrisy’s impact may potentially be dependent on who has made the accusation as there are vast differences between accusations from opposition parties compared with accusations from another state or civil society groups. One area that is consistently a magnet for accusations, and revelations, of hypocrisy is the creation and implementation of foreign policy.

Canada’s insertion of gendered and feminist language within Canada’s foreign policy has elicited accusations of hypocrisy, while also signaling the values and ethics of the Government of Canada when interacting with the international community. For the Government, its foreign policy intends to embrace and promote human rights protections and support programs aimed at empowering women and girls in order to achieve its goals of eradicating poverty, and build a more peaceful, inclusive and prosperous world (Government of Canada 2019). Introducing feminist values within foreign policy breaks the mold for Canadian foreign policy as it has traditionally (with exceptions) pursued interests, rather than a policy based on principles. In doing so, the focus of an ethical foreign policy for Canada has evolved from being strictly focused on human security to one that encompasses gender and feminist concepts too. However, by blurring the lines between ethics focused on human security and ethics focused on gender

equity in foreign policy, accusations of hypocrisy highlight the policy incoherence between the Government and its institutions. Therefore, understanding how the government is able to justify arms sales and maintain feminist values within its foreign policy is not only important from a human rights perspective, but also critical for the maintenance of democracy in Canada and ensuring that the government remains accountable to the electorate. Thus, an exploration of the governments justifications of the Canada – Saudi LAV deal is a prime opportunity to decipher the paradox of, and understand the intersections between, hypocrisy, government policy, political legitimacy and the impact on Canadian institutions.

To begin, hypocrisy must be examined in the context of ethical foreign policy. An ethical examination results in further questions that have the potential to impact how Canadian foreign policy and the field of international relations (IR) is understood. The following questions form the basis of my examination of hypocrisy and stem from the overarching research question: *How does hypocrisy function in Canadian foreign policy discourses?*

- How is hypocrisy a choice of government actors or institutions, or does it express a logic or process in the contemporary world system?
- What are the forms through which hypocrisy operates and how does it impact the structure/creation of foreign policy?
- What, if any, are the limits to the influence of hypocrisy on foreign policy?

The proposed study explores the constitutive function of hypocrisy and how hypocritical actions become justified in Canadian foreign policy discourses. I argue that ethical values, exemplified by the addition of feminist values in Canada's foreign policy, serve to institutionalize hypocrisy within government norms and institutions, and by doing so, transfers the risk, intrinsic to hypocritical action, away from the government.

I have structured my argument beginning with an explanation of my research design and methodology used to examine the case study. This is followed by a literature review surrounding hypocrisy; its' myriad intersections in theoretical and practical foreign policy discourses; the evolution of Canadian foreign policy; and how hypocrisy can be assessed in Canadian foreign policy. By doing so, the theoretical concepts underpinning my exploration inform my analysis of hypocrisy and Canadian foreign policy. I then describe the case study and subsequent documents used to frame my analysis. Finally, my analysis of the case study highlights how hypocrisy becomes embedded within government norms and institutions, resulting in risk being transferred away from the government.

Research Design

To create a research design for a concept as amorphous as hypocrisy, I use an epistemology and method that accentuates a multi-faceted understanding of hypocrisy. This design views hypocrisy through a socio-historical context that highlights repercussions on Canadian social reality and power. By doing so, I am able to differentiate acceptable from unacceptable forms of hypocrisy and behaviour which aids in understanding how hypocrisy limits or expands a government's ability to govern. A discourse analysis is an effective method for this undertaking. It provides an understanding of how hypocrisy functions within Canadian foreign policy discourses and its potential impact on foreign policy creation and conduct. By tracing the concept of hypocrisy through foreign policy discourses, I can assess how hypocrisy functions and impacts Canadian foreign policy.

The Canada – Saudi Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) deal is explored through this type of discourse analysis. However, it is important to acknowledge that this analysis has been influenced by Smith and Ajadi (2020), Gutterman and Lane (2017) and Vucetic (2017). This is

done to highlight their contributions and convey the key differences from this analysis. Smith and Ajadi (2020), identify five similarities and five critiques between the Feminist foreign policy championed by Justin Trudeau and the human security agenda promoted by Lloyd Axworthy during the 1990's. Gutterman and Lane (2017) use the example of the Canada – Saudi LAV deal to pinpoint the underlying problem of Canada's arms control regime, which is Canada's defence industry and military sales. Vucetic (2017) underscores the similarities between the arms export records of Canadian Conservative and Liberal governments since the 1980's, and those of Sweden and the Netherlands, as they have similar defence industries and approaches to foreign policy. The analysis of these authors has added significant value to an evaluation of Canadian foreign policy and the field of International Relations. These studies discuss the common critique of hypocrisy levelled at the Canadian government, but do not delve fully into its potential institutional impacts. Through the example of the Canada – Saudi LAV deal, hypocritical words and actions by the Canadian government from when the Liberal government came to power in 2015 to 2020 will be analysed. By further exploring the Canada – Saudi LAV deal, this study highlights hypocrisy's effect on foreign policy and serves to inform how hypocrisy functions within Canadian foreign policy discourses.

First, an explanation and reasoning for the use of discourse analysis must be explored. This exploration describes the methodology of a discourse analysis approach, impact of 'historical embeddedness' and capacity to assess how hypocrisy functions in foreign policy discourses. Moreover, it explains why the chosen case study is applicable to an evaluation of hypocrisy within Canadian foreign policy discourses.

An Approach to Discourse Analysis

A discourse analysis approach is not a unique methodology for conducting research within the field of International Relations. Lene Hansen's (2013) seminal book on discourse analysis and the Bosnian War, *Security as Practice*, provides a precise outline for how and why discourse analysis is an invaluable approach to conducting analysis in the field of International Relations. In particular, the foreign policy of states is identified as a fertile area for understanding, "how foreign policy representations and representations articulated by oppositional political forces, the media, academe, and popular culture reinforce or contest each other." (Hansen 2013, p. 7). Considering the focus is on Canada's articulation of an ethical identity in the international realm, a discourse analysis approach is an invaluable tool to identifying how Canada links its identity to certain concepts (feminism, human rights) and attempts to disassociate from others (human rights abuse, hypocrisy). This is supported by Hansen, who argues that the process of linking and differentiation is of critical use within discourse analysis because both enable understandings of identity construction and are enacted simultaneously (Hansen 2013, p. 18). The process of linking is associated with concepts of positive, and differentiation with processes of negative identity creation (Hansen 2013, p. 18).

Discourse analysis methods have been used to great effect within many fields of study, International Relations included. For instance, Knight and Morgan (1991) use discourse analysis to develop an understanding of how the emergence of strategic management discourses impacted post-War recovery in the United States before spreading globally. In Price's (1995) analysis of the chemical weapons taboo, he emphasizes the role of discourse analysis to investigate whether the ban against the use of chemical weapons differs from past restraints on other weapons. Preston (2014) applies discourse analysis techniques to focus on the emergence of national

security as a foreign policy doctrine in the United States, highlighting how the concept has broadly defined the safety of the United States geographically and ideologically. These studies rely on discourse analysis methods to focus on the subsequent impacts which result from the articulation of certain concepts or identities through various discourses.

While each of these studies employed discourse analysis methods, they also highlighted the impact of the sociohistorical context on processes and discussions during the periods under examination. These sociohistorical contexts invariably impact the creation of government policy (i.e., foreign policy texts) as well. Hansen (2013) explains that “Texts are simultaneously unique and united: each makes its own particular construction of identity, weaves a series of differentiations and juxtapositions, and couples them to a spatially, temporally, and ethically situated foreign policy.” (p. 49). Eero and Lamberg (2015) use the term ‘historical embeddedness’ to explain, “the ways in which strategic processes and practices and our conceptions of them are embedded in and defined by sociohistorical environments.” (Eero and Lamberg 2015, p. 634). Historical embeddedness is used to further an understanding into how and why a particular identity is constructed through foreign policy discourses.

By coupling Hansen’s method for discourse analysis with the concept of historical embeddedness, deciphering how hypocrisy shapes and/or destabilizes foreign policy is possible. Additionally, an understanding of the processes and institutional factors influencing foreign policy creation and action can be understood, and the role of hypocrisy in those creations and actions revealed.

Methodology

Hansen (2013) outlines multiple models of discourse analysis. For the purposes of my research, the second model is ideal because it situates Canadian foreign policy and hypocrisy at

the center with direct focus on the Government of Canada. The second model broadens the analytical scope of her first model, which, “is directly based in official foreign policy discourse and centers on political leaders with official authority to sanction the foreign policies pursued as well as those with central roles in executing these policies.” (Hansen 2013, p. 53). Model two uses official discourses identified in model one, but also moves beyond, “official discourse and intertextual links to consider the major actors and arenas within a wider foreign policy debate.” (Hansen 2013, p. 54). The wider foreign policy debate includes political oppositional parties, the media, corporate institutions, prominent public academics and civil society organizations (CSOs) (Hansen 2013, p. 54). By including the wider foreign policy debate, and cases where the official discourse has not responded to potentially critical reports from the media in particular, Hansen (2013) asserts that the assessment of “official discourse hegemony” and relationship between politics and the media in general is strengthened. Therefore, the discourse analysis method will trace the construction of an identity within official discourses to “facilitate an analysis of the discursive and political hegemony a government position enjoys and thereby of its room to maneuver.” (Hansen 2013, p. 54) These discourses, in concert with intertextual discourse from entities identified previously in the model two description, informs my evaluation of how hypocrisy functions within Canadian foreign policy.

As the focus is on the authenticity of Canada’s ethical identity, it is important to reinforce the notion that, “identities are produced, and reproduced, through foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign policy.” (Hansen 2013, p. 22). Tracing the construction of Canada’s ethical identity begins by first contextualizing the case study, highlighting consequential events and circumstances relevant to the study of hypocrisy and ethical discourses. This contextualization primes the case for an assessment by providing a

summary of events that may have impacted the Canadian government's foreign policy during the period under study. A chronology of events is gathered from a combination of government and traditional news sources and understood as part of the 'historical embeddedness' which may impact foreign policy conduct and creation. Various government documents, which themselves are a part of, and highlight, potential hypocrisy on behalf of the Canadian government, contextualize the case study.¹ That section begins with a summary of the Government's justification of an action and followed by critical reactions from media sources (*The Globe and Mail*, *National Post*, *The Guardian* etc.), as well as from members of civil society (academics and NGO's). It should be noted that these reactions are representative of some of the critiques levelled at the Government and are not the sole reactions from the media but serve to identify the dominant discourses surrounding Canadian foreign policy and hypocrisy. Therefore, the critiques from media sources and civil society organizations were chosen on the basis of the time period of the case study (2015 – 2020) and interchange with the government's official discourse in general. Critiques of, and justification for, the Government's actions are an important factor in understanding how risk is transferred away from the government and are my attempt to situate the foreign policy context within a historical discourse which becomes a lens of interpretation rather than an objective, historical truth.

Finally, in an effort to chronicle Canadian foreign policy since the introduction of feminist values and gendered language, a detailed description of the government's vision, values and programming in regard to foreign policy is necessary. To understand the rise of ethical considerations within Canada's foreign policy, this description starts at the beginning of their 2015 mandate and juxtaposes it with subsequent alterations to foreign policy ending in 2020. All

¹ Links to copies of all official and intertextual discourse documents can be found in the works cited list.

information pertaining to Canadian foreign policy has been gleaned from the Departmental Plans (DPs) and/or Report on Plans and Priorities (RPPs) produced annually by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the department entrusted with conducting Canadian foreign policy. GAC was formerly known as the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) from 2013 - 2015 (GAC 2018, “History of Global Affairs Canada”). It is important to note that trade, aid, and diplomacy, are often viewed as separate areas of foreign policy, and separate missions of GAC. However, by not viewing these areas as silos separate from one another, the institutional impact of hypocrisy on government norms and institutions can be better evaluated. For this reason, a summary of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) is also included to further detail the official discourses released by GAC in regard to Canada’s promotion of a feminist foreign policy. The DPs and RPPs outline GAC’s objectives and offer justifications for the chosen objectives. They also outline the methods used in the pursuit and estimate of the cost for program implementation for the year. By offering this justification and financial assessment of Canadian foreign policy, these departmental plans are essential tools for the Government as a means of maintaining ‘transparent honest governance’ (GAC 2020) and highlight any change in messaging and programming by GAC in implementing Canadian foreign policy each year. Moreover, these documents highlight the ability and/or attempt of the government to incorporate ethical considerations into its institutional framework, and thereby present a foreign policy that is legitimate, enforceable and bolsters its ‘ethical’ identity.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

Understanding how hypocrisy is embedded within government norms and discourses is revealed by differentiating between ‘acceptable/unacceptable’ political action and then, analysing whether the action is justified on the basis of stated convictions. In addition, the concept of an explicitly ‘ethical foreign policy’ is a rather new phenomenon in International Relations and so, the resulting juxtaposition between hypocrisy and ethics requires evaluation. Therefore, a thorough review of hypocrisy’s theoretical and conceptual considerations is required to recognize the myriad fields impacted by it. This literature review begins with a dissection of the theoretical and conceptual understandings of hypocrisy to discern a framework definition of political hypocrisy. Moreover, it details how political hypocrisy is understood in the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA). Subsequently, the historical ascent of ethical considerations within foreign policy is summarized to aid in understanding the influence of ethics on foreign policy and highlight the disparities between hypocrisy, ethics, and foreign policy. Finally, an exploration of the intertextual relationship between hypocrisy and ethical foreign policy, and overview of the evolution of Canadian foreign policy, is conducted in order to assess how hypocrisy can be analysed within Canadian foreign policy.

Hypocrisy – Theoretical and Conceptual Understandings

Ideas and understandings of hypocrisy have been explored since the conception of political thought. Prominent political philosophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Machiavelli have made significant contributions to understanding hypocrisy within political discourse. These political philosophers provide a foundation for understanding traditional conceptions of hypocrisy, thus assisting our understanding of how hypocrisy has evolved in the modern era.

Beginning with an exploration of these prominent foundational ideas about political hypocrisy, I will then explore whether hypocrisy has infiltrated and now permeates certain political structures.

Hypocrisy, as highlighted previously, is a misalignment between espoused political policy and actual political action. Still, exactly what kind of problem hypocrisy poses in the political realm is not clear. Broadly defined, hypocrisy involves some form of deception; a lie (Runciman 2009, p. 7-9). However, it is important to clarify that while the various forms of hypocrisy reveal what appears to be a lie, not all lies are hypocritical. In his book, *Political Hypocrisy*, author David Runciman (2009) makes a distinction between harmful and harmless forms of hypocrisy in order to determine which ‘kind’ of hypocrite people should elect to positions of political power. In essence, Runciman elaborates on the idea that there is a spectrum consisting of acceptable and unacceptable forms of hypocrisy. In Runciman’s analysis, there is a large degree of variance on the spectrum of hypocrisy. This spectrum ranges from the unflinching, authentic anti-hypocrite/principled idealist championed by Rousseau to the devious hypocrite embodied by the Prince, as described by Machiavelli, who uses hypocrisy as a foundational tool in their political arsenal to accomplish political ends (Runciman 2009, p. 4). While this may be a simplistic evaluation of Machiavelli and Rousseau’s elaborations on political hypocrisy, it serves to define two ends to the spectrum of political hypocrisy. Both the honest idealist and hypocritical realist are concerned with questions of what principles ought, or whether it is even possible for a set of principles, to govern political practice (Grant 1997, p. 3). In the book, *Hypocrisy and Integrity*, Ruth W. Grant (1997) discerns between legitimate and destructive forms of hypocrisy. Grant (1997) argues that a distinction must be made between a legitimate compromise and a ‘sellout’, between statesmanship and demagoguery. This distinction

holds unique significance for exploring the concept of hypocrisy and its impact within contemporary foreign policy (Grant 1997, p. 3). Therefore hypocrisy, or more specifically hypocritical actions, can be viewed as a tool to be used and employed in the political realm with significant care (or sometimes, lack thereof). From this evaluation of hypocrisy as existing on a spectrum it can be surmised that hypocritical action is an intrinsic element, whether consciously or unconsciously, in the discursive maneuvering of political actors. Thus, hypocrisy is a constitutive part of politics. However, it remains to be seen whether hypocrisy becomes a constitutive part of government policy or is solely relegated to political actors.

Clearly, exploring the spectrum of hypocrisy is more than characterizing the gap between the unflinching moralist and duplicitous hypocrite; the 'gap' needs to be fully defined as there is often a narrow distinction between statecraft and demagoguery. Therefore, understanding how hypocrisy impacts political discourse can help distinguish authentic and legitimate discourse from the inverse. Hypocrisy often poses a problem for authenticity within politics because of the most common form of hypocrisy, when actors make public statements of principle that they do not adhere to privately, known colloquially as not 'practicing what you preach' (Runciman 2009, p. 9). Other forms of hypocrisy described by Runciman include claims to knowledge that one lacks, consistency that cannot be sustained, loyalty that one does not possess, and an identity that one does not hold (Runciman 2009, p. 8). All of these examples are part of hypocrisy's ontology, as they are broadly defined forms of deception or creations of false impressions or personas. Each form of hypocrisy demonstrates why a politician's authenticity may be challenged when confronted with the accusation of hypocrisy. An actor's ability to be, or identity as, authentic or sincere can be susceptible to questioning as a consequence of a perceived hypocritical action

resulting in the potential for their legitimacy and capability as a political actor being compromised.

However, within contemporary politics it must be acknowledged that, similar to the spectrum created by Rousseau's idealist and Hobbes' realist, authenticity must exist on a similar spectrum. The notion that someone is wholly authentic or totally insincere is unrealistic. While authenticity automatically becomes a characteristic associated with the idealist and insincerity with the hypocrite both of these characteristics must be evaluated by their ethical, or perhaps more critically political, value and ramifications. Identifying the ethical limits of authenticity and sincerity can potentially give insight into how political actors use hypocrisy as a tool for political ends. This realization further exemplifies how hypocrisy is a constitutive part of political discourses and actions, regardless of the 'level' (local, national or international) of politics where hypocrisy is utilized. Consequently, hypocrisy is a constitutive element of all democratic politics because democracy encompasses some measure of mutual dependence and will always arise among relations between conflicting interests where actors cannot be depended upon to strictly observe a moral framework (Grant 1997, p. 29). However, hypocrisy and hypocritical actions must not be ignored and accepted as simply, the price of politics. Grant (1997) asserts that hypocrisy must be acknowledged as existing on a spectrum and on that spectrum is a threshold of acceptable hypocritical action. Careful consideration of potentially hypocritical actions is therefore critical for attempting to distinguish the 'threshold' between justifiable and unjustifiable 'hypocritical' actions. As hypocrisy has been acknowledged to be an intrinsic part in political relations, it is not a stretch to imagine that actors weigh the benefit of utilizing hypocritical tactics. In the article, "Authenticity in Political Discourse", Ben Jones (2016) argues that a concern for authenticity in representative democratic political discourse is a virtue and not

a drawback as proposed by others, including Runciman. Jones (2016) views authenticity as a virtue and hypocrisy as a vice and believes utilizing authenticity and hypocrisy as political tools is further influenced by the 'role(s)' political actors play within politics (e.g., Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, Member of Parliament etc.). Hypocrisy is thus composed of multiple characteristics existing on a spectrum including authenticity and inauthenticity as well as conceptions of identity, identity creation and public perception. It is when a political actor's hypocritical actions are deemed untenable that they may face consequences, as will be exemplified by the British Labour government's abrupt reversal from the inclusion of an 'ethical dimension' when introducing its foreign policy in 2000. To determine the consequences of hypocritical actions, a deeper exploration of the impact of hypocrisy on political institutions is needed as the difference between the hypocritical actions of a political actor and political institution is not apparent.

Much of the focus for analyzing hypocrisy in a political context has relied upon historical accounts and literary figures with an understandable focus on the actions of a single political actor. However, in order to understand hypocrisy within a Canadian context, and specifically within Canadian foreign policy, hypocrisy needs to be scrutinized more broadly to understand its organizational quality and the ways in which a political actor's role is influenced by hypocrisy. Therefore, by detailing the historical ascension of ethical considerations within foreign policy, insight into why hypocrisy impacts foreign policy can be gained. Moreover, by highlighting the impact of hypocrisy and ethics on political institutions and foreign policy conceptually, we can begin to understand the sizeable power wielded by governments to shape international relations in the name of ethics.

Hypocrisy and Foreign Policy Analysis

The field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) is uniquely situated, due to its focus on the intentions and values of a state, for interpreting and understanding how hypocrisy functions as part of a state's foreign policy. There is considerable overlap between traditional conceptions of hypocrisy as detailed previously, and FPA scholars, with one minor exception potentially being a matter of scale. Political hypocrisy is explored by Catherine Weaver (2008) and Stephen Krasner (1999) respectively, in their books, *Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform* and *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. These two scholars analyse political hypocrisy at an organizational level as they evaluate the repercussions for states and international organizations (IOs) that act hypocritically.

Weaver (2008) and Krasner (1999) discuss and provide examples of how states or IO's that do not adhere to their own policies, and are therefore accused of hypocrisy, may suffer perceived or actual de-legitimization of their mandate and actions which creates potential barriers to legitimate actions in the future. The authors also use the term "organized hypocrisy" to define the "disconnects between formal policy and espoused agendas, on the one hand, and actual operational behaviour on the other." (Weaver 2008, p. 177). The term, organized hypocrisy, differs from political hypocrisy because it is, in Weaver and Krasner's interpretation, contained within the actions and policies of organizations or states as a whole and does not pertain to individual actors. Weaver asserts that there are two distinct types of organizational hypocrisy. The first type, which Weaver also characterizes as the most blatant, is the "outright violation of organizational mandates and policies." (Weaver 2008, p. 20). The second type of organizational hypocrisy detailed by Weaver (2008) is labelled 'mainstreaming gaps', which are exemplified by a government or an IO that commits to certain actions or policies (e.g., climate

change, sustainable development, gender equality etc.), “but does not commit the human and financial resources or enforce the rules necessary to integrate these values into organizational practices.” (p. 20). Weaver (2008) explains that mainstreaming gaps result in a separation or contradiction between proclaimed priorities/goals and the reality of their activities. Moreover, priorities and goals of a state often correspond with the intentions and values of a state, which is an important consideration for FPA. With this in mind, the degree to which the priorities and values of a state become intertwined, either formally or informally, explicitly articulated or embedded in culture, may impact the institutions of a state tasked with conducting foreign policy. Organized hypocrisy therefore expresses a certain logic or process which enables the link between hypocrisy and ethics to be conceptualized, and government institutions become critical sites of foreign policy development and implementation. The logic or process of hypocrisy of organizations within the contemporary world system is exemplified by Krasner’s (1999) concepts of the logic of expected consequences and appropriateness. The logic of expected consequences views political action, outcomes and institutions as “the product of rational calculating behaviour designed to maximize a given set of unexplained preferences” (Krasner 1999, p. 5). The logic of appropriateness is expressed differently and understands political action “as a product of rules, roles and identities that stipulate appropriate behaviour in given situations” (Krasner 1999, p. 5). These two ‘logics’ are not mutually incompatible and vary depending on context. The aforementioned concepts, organized hypocrisy and Krasner’s logics, underscore the impact of hypocrisy and ethics on foreign policy development and implementation.

As policies or actions become embedded within government institutions, so too does the potential for systemic problems connected to hypocrisy and ethics to develop which may

impinge on the legitimacy and authenticity of an organization or state. Krasner (1999) explains that institutions are characterized along two dimensions: institutionalization, and persistence and/or durability. Institutionalization, according to Krasner (1999), is the extent to which “behaviour conforms with institutional structures, that is with some set of principles, norms, and rules” whereas persistence and/or durability is the extent to which “a particular set of principles, norms, and rules persists over time in the face of changing conditions.” (p. 56). Krasner’s conception of institutions becomes critical when evaluating the extent to which ethical considerations and values become constituted within a state’s foreign policy. Dan Bulley (2014) asserts that the field of FPA is never ‘value free’. “Rather,” he argues, “it necessitates certain concerns, methodologies, judgements and outcomes which are ethically and politically questionable” (p. 6). Therefore, while it may be that hypocrisy and hypocritical action, often, is self-evident, FPA requires precise definitions to structure theoretical frameworks and thereby substantiate and evaluate foreign policy decisions and outcomes. These evaluations must be predicated on an ethical dimension in order to understand how hypocrisy functions within an ethical foreign policy. To begin an evaluation, an understanding of key historical moments pertaining to ethical foreign policy is required to better recognise the circumstances that have enabled ethical considerations in foreign policy to endure.

The rise of ethics within foreign policy has been largely attributed to the British New Labour Party following its election to office in 1997 (Williams 2002, p.53). Then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, advocated for the inclusion of an “ethical dimension” to British foreign policy where human rights would be at the center alongside the traditional concerns of security, prosperity and quality life (Williams 2002, p. 54)(Gaskarth 2006, p. 45). Similar to the Trudeau government in 2015, New Labour endeavoured to differentiate its approach to foreign policy

from its conservative predecessor. Thus, the “ethical dimension” was introduced and was viewed as “a radical departure from the previous administration” (Williams 2002, p. 55). Paul Williams (2002) asserts in the article, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Ethical Dimension’”, that Foreign Secretary Cook’s statement was broadly interpreted, primarily by the British media, as New Labour having an ‘ethical foreign policy’. Williams (2002) argues that as a result of this mischaracterization by the media, a false dichotomy was created “that implied New Labour were introducing ethics to a sphere of government that was previously devoid of ethical commitments” (p. 57). This characterization was embraced by the party at first, but was ultimately deemed untenable, and omitted from the next iteration of its foreign policy in September 2000 (Williams 2002, p. 59). New Labour found that a stated ethical dimension became increasingly difficult to defend when contrasted with their support, “for the war on terrorism and its ‘guilt by association’ over alleged human rights abuses in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan.” (Gaskarth 2006, p. 46). New Labour’s departure, though not complete desertion, from the language of human rights and ethical considerations in their platform during the next general election, demonstrates how foreign policy is more intricate than the discourses of a political actor or document and “must be acknowledged as being the sum of all the actions of the government departments” whose responsibility lie outside the domestic sphere (Gaskarth 2006, p. 48). Moreover, New Labour’s foray into ethics and foreign policy indicates a potential shift in the way foreign policy can be conceptualized in the international and domestic sphere.

In the article, “Rhetoric without responsibility: the attraction of the ‘ethical’ foreign policy”, David Chandler (2003) demonstrates how ethical or moral stances in foreign policy, which underscore the government’s moral authority, “led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy areas.” (p. 302).

This assertion highlights the trend of governments seeking a foreign policy that is conceptualized as “good” rather than wholly ethical. A trend that is illustrated by the rise of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine, “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoid-able catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.” (ICISS 2001, p. VIII). Chandler (2003) recognizes the accountability flaw that arises from “Internationalising responsibility for international ethical norms, such as the promotion of human rights... (because)... although we may all share responsibility, there is no political institution that is actually accountable.” (p. 306). Moreover, Chandler (2003) argues that “the question of accountability is central to understanding the domestic drive behind ethical foreign policy” (p. 306). Thus, the historical ascent of ethical considerations within foreign policy informs an appreciation of the influence of ethics on foreign policy and highlights the disparities between ethics, hypocrisy, and foreign policy. From this, the prominent conceptions of ethical foreign policy, and their convergence with hypocrisy, can be better evaluated.

Hypocrisy and Ethical Foreign Policy

Much foreign policy analysis suggests that states’ actions can be explained by mapping the prevailing material interests at stake. In a realist, liberal and some constructivist’s approach, this is done by identifying particular norms to which the state is committed. Postmodernists, feminists, and some constructivists explain states’ actions by linking them to the structural parameters in which the state operates. The intertextual concern for identity and norm creation, identification, and implementation permeates these theories and, in my view, are prescriptive. Prescriptive theories focus on what a state ought to do to achieve specific outcomes. This thesis examines Canadian foreign policy and how it is implemented in the context of norms and

structures pointing in different, and even conflicting, directions. In doing so, a descriptive theory, rather than prescriptive, is more appropriate as it focusses on what a state is doing to achieve specific outcomes. In attempting to normalize and institutionalize an ethical dimension with a gendered focus in Canadian foreign policy and structures, Canada is confronted by a paradox created by its concern for establishing human rights norms and adhering to a rules-based international structure. Two concepts that highlight the precarious position of Canada as a global leader in human rights, its ability to act in the international realm and domestic confidence in the Canadian government. Moreover, government institutions tasked with conducting an ethical foreign policy risk their own legitimacy as they must attempt to structure their processes and policy around this paradox.

As previously discussed, Krasner (1999) and Weaver (2008) apply an organizational conception of hypocrisy to study international organizations. By examining hypocrisy and Canadian foreign policy through an ethics as politics approach, hypocrisy's strategical usefulness and impact on foreign policy discourse can be better evaluated and described. I assert that the moral nature of hypocrisy arises after an accusation of hypocrisy is made. An ethics as politics framework, a set of principles intended to guide and govern political practice centered on questions of morality, also endeavours to understand what 'kind' of ethics is created as a result. In this way, ethics as politics understands that states and organizations may commit to actions with undesirable outcomes and is therefore ideal for evaluating hypocrisy in this context. However, there is need for further clarification between the 'ethical' principles intended to guide political practice and the prioritization of certain ethics over others, as the resulting actions will determine which ethics are actually produced.

Bulley (2014) asserts that foreign policy analysis is never 'value free', emphasizing the need to assess foreign policy with a theoretical framework capable of distinguishing between the ethical and moral dilemmas which inevitably result from foreign policy. An ethical foreign policy becomes of greater interest to the field of FPA when connected to ideas about hypocrisy because of the propagation of certain values, ethical or not, as a result of the policy. For example, an ethical foreign policy, when employed by a state, utilizes certain linguistic terms to indicate the values supported by the government. As a by-product, the state situates itself as an authority and legitimate entity who will defend said values (Chandler and Heins 2006, p.12). These values may be subject to change depending on which state is employing them. According to Gaskarth (2013), ethical foreign policy is a matter of interpretation as ethical considerations "are the subject of contestation over meaning and imply that competing beliefs exist among foreign policy actors about what it is to be ethical." (p. 193). Ideally, instituting a foreign policy containing ethical considerations, or ethical foreign policy, considers the moral ramifications of an action. However, as indicated previously, there are different conceptions of an ethical foreign policy. These differences become important when analysing the ethical discrepancies in the conduct of a state when, for example, they are deciding to join international agreements or reviewing arms exports. Moreover, accusations of hypocrisy serve to highlight these ethical discrepancies and may also subtly indicate a degree of policy incoherence between the Government and its institutions.

This notion is supported by David Welch (2000) in the article, "Ethics and Foreign Policy". Welch (2000) highlights that foreign policy, in particular, is an inherently moral activity and states are essentially never truly ethical in their foreign policy (p. 79-81). Welch (2000) asserts that ethics are meant to guide the practice of making systematic moral decisions such as

in the case of foreign policy creation and conduct (p. 81). If an ethical foreign policy is favouring certain types of ethics over others, it is likely that the foreign policy is being used to forward a certain goal by the state. The New Labour Party's introduction of ethical considerations supports this notion but also shows the potential impact on policy and authenticity of the government should the state be accused of hypocritical actions. The justification for an accusation of hypocrisy against the government is strengthened when a hypocritical action also violates the stated principles of the government. In doing so, the paradox created by an ethical foreign policy is revealed as actions on behalf of the government that contradict its stated commitments and is understood institutionally as policy incoherence. This understanding highlights the efficacy of an ethics as politics framework when analyzing the spectrum on which the hypocrisy lies, because it is not focussed on whether an action was right or wrong or where an action falls on the spectrum. Rather, it is concerned with what ethics are produced as a result.

It is important to further acknowledge that the impacts of these hypocritical actions are not isolated but may have a holistic impact on a state's capability and perception, a notion best explored through the concept of liberal militarism. Anna Stavrianakis (2016) analyses the reasons for a state to join an international agreement in the article, "Legitimising Liberal Militarism: Politics, Law and war in the Arms Trade Treaty". Stavrianakis (2016) argues that at the core of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is an effort to use criteria and risk-based assessments of arms transfers which can be understood as a form of legitimizing contemporary liberal forms of militarism (exercised by major Western states). This is due to Stavrianakis' (2016) assertion that the ATT has a naturalising effect for liberal states practices which allows them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and create leadership in a liberal international order that is reliant on coercion and violence (p. 841). Stavrianakis situates the ATT

as being based on human security norms and offers the concept of ‘liberal militarism’ as an alternative for understanding the theoretical base of the ATT. In effect, liberal militarism “moves beyond arguments based on hypocrisy and instrumental or functional pursuit of material interests, in order to explain key effects of the treaty in ways other approaches cannot.” (Stavrianakis 2016, p. 845). However, it remains important in the context of this thesis, to not ignore the hypocritical act(s) altogether, as there is a potential danger in separating the realities of hypocritical actions from theoretical considerations.

This assertion is exemplified in the book, *War and the Politics of Ethics*, as author Maya Zehfuss (2018) discusses the evolution of theories of war and the turn from ‘Just War’ to ‘Ethical War thinking’. In doing so, Zehfuss (2018) acknowledges that “Ethics is seductive” (Ch. 1 p. 10). Zehfuss (2018) asserts that “In order to think through what actions are permissible in war, just war thinking often constructs ethical dilemmas that, although derived from real situations, are treated as thought experiments around which to test and flesh out ethical arguments” (Ch. 2.2 p. 10). This separates the realities of war from theoretical considerations regarding conduct in war, which may enhance the ‘seductiveness’ of ethics. This issue is further highlighted by the notion of an ‘ethical war’. While discussing the paradox of whether war can ever be considered ‘ethical’, Zehfuss (2018) describes how ‘ethical’ war kills and destroys like any other war, including those it seeks to protect (Ch. 6, p. 2). In effect, ethical war enables its user to have and portray a ‘fantasy of control’ where violence is somehow controlled and is incidental to war (Zehfuss 2018, Ch. 6 p. 7). In this way, a state may be able to justify their actions in the name of ethics, yet, because “ethics creates and aggravates the problem it purports to address”, it is not the substantive content of ethical thinking that is the problem, but rather “its structural positioning in our wider imaginary” (Zehfuss 2018, Ch. 6.2, p. 20).

Ultimately, the function of hypocrisy is informed by connecting Zehfuss' and Stavrianakis' ideas with the concept of 'risk-transfer militarism'. The concept of 'risk-transfer militarism' is described by Martin Shaw (2002) in the article, "Risk-transfer militarism, small massacres and the historic legitimacy of war". Risk-transfer militarism is used to explain the comprehensive transfer of risks away from the western military, as a way of managing the news media and public opinion (Shaw 2002, p. 349). It is designed to maintain the legitimacy of war in western societies (Shaw 2002, p. 5). Within Shaw's (2002) analysis of risk-transfer in the realm of (western) military actions and engagements, five elements which encompass this 'new' militarism are described. For the purpose of transposing Shaw's (2002) concept onto an ethical foreign policy context, two of Shaw's five elements are particularly consequential, those being, media management and indirect civilian casualties. In regard to indirect civilian casualties and the media as elements of the 'new' militarism, Shaw (2002) states that "indirect and less visible casualties are more acceptable than direct casualties, and less decisive efforts may be made to minimise these." (p. 348). 'Ethical' war and policies with ethical considerations become difficult to justify in the name of ethics when confronted with irrefutable proof of hypocrisy, thus it is critical to craft the image of 'ethics' within international relations between states.

By tying ethical considerations to foreign policy, a state is able to better legitimize and justify their actions, whether authentic or not. Therefore, an ethics as politics framework to analyze how hypocrisy functions within an ethical foreign policy serves to enable an understanding of why a state may risk ethical commitments because of the focus on what ethics are being produced as a result of conduct derived from an ethical foreign policy. Before this analysis can begin, it is important to explain why I characterize Canada's foreign policy, since the introduction of feminist values and a gendered focus, as both feminist and ethical.

Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy

Since the end of World War Two, Canada has strived to play an integral role as an influential member of international society. During a speech to the House of Commons on June 6th, 2017, Chrystia Freeland, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, recounted specific moments of national pride where Canada has demonstrated leadership and support for a rules-based international order (Global Affairs Canada (GAC) 2017). As examples, Minister Freeland mentioned the role of John Humphrey in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1948, Lester B. Pearson who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership during the 1956 Suez Crisis, and the creation of modern peacekeeping (GAC 2017). Other historical examples, not mentioned by Minister Freeland, include Canada's leadership role in helping to create the International Criminal Court (ICC) and establishment of the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a body that subsequently wrote the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (Wylie 2009)(ICISS 2001). Altogether, these examples showcase Canada's documented commitment to purported liberal values through historical engagements with international society.

Through this speech, Freeland reinforced Canada's commitment to strengthening multilateralism, international law, global governance, trade agreements, immigration protocols, regional security, and cultural arrangements. With these commitments, Canada is signalling to other countries its pledge to support a rules-based global order. More subtly, it emphasizes, both internationally and domestically, Canada's identity as a 'good' international citizen. Historically, these commitments by the Liberal government are not new to the Canadian political lexicon, as Canada has long desired prestige and recognition as a moral authority on the global stage. Lana

Wylie (2009) in the article, “Valuing Reputation and Prestige: Canadian Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court”, examines the relevance of reputation and prestige in Canadian foreign policy and stresses that the, “Canadian self-image as an international good citizen is reinforced by this desire to become recognized as a moral authority.” (p. 114). Wylie’s assertion highlights the potential ambiguity in Canada’s transition to an ethical foreign policy, as moral dimensions have been a part of past Canadian foreign policy, but not an inherent component.

In “Ethical Values and Canadian Foreign Policy”, Cranford Pratt (2001) asserts pre-2001 Canadian foreign policy literature was divided between dominant and statist class theorists. Dominant class theorists accentuate the role of the dominant ideology in Canadian decision-making circles, whereas statist theorists, “identify the interests that act as a sieve in less ideological and more narrowly bureaucratic terms.” (Pratt 2001, p. 38). To transcribe Pratt’s assertion to the current context, his focus on ideology and interests, in lieu of discourse, needs clarification. Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt (1993) distinguish between ideology and discourse in “Discourse, ideology, discourse ideology, discourse, ideology...”. Ideology, according to Purvis and Hunt (1993), “implies the existence of some link between ‘interests’ and ‘forms of consciousness’”, whereas discourse “focuses attention on the terms of engagement within social relations by insisting that all social relations are lived and comprehended by their participants in terms of specific linguistic or semiotic vehicles that organize their thinking, understanding and experience” (p. 476). This translates, within the current foreign policy context, to a middle ground approach where the dominant ideology, based on feminist values and principles, is woven into official discourses which, in turn, reinforces Canada’s stature as a feminist and moral authority in the international realm. Doing so, provides legitimacy (whether real or perceived) to programs and initiatives, and distinguishes the current government from past governments.

However, Canada does not yet have a policy document outlining its feminist foreign policy principles, approach and commitments (Amnesty International Canada 2020). But the gender focused policies, affirmations from officials, and discourse within the Canadian media all reinforce the notion that Canada has a feminist foreign policy, though the exact principles, approach and commitments are open to interpretation. The example of the British Labour government having an ethical foreign policy, though it only advocated for ethical considerations, also supports the assumption that Canada has a feminist foreign policy. Moreover, the Government of Canada plans to officially launch its feminist foreign policy sometime in 2021 (Amnesty International Canada 2020). Therefore, due to the affirmation of feminist values, Canada is, or at the very least attempting to be, a feminist and ethical actor. This assertion strengthens the framework for analysing how hypocrisy functions within an ethical foreign policy due to the differences between ethics and interests within the context of foreign policy.

Assessing Hypocrisy within Canadian Foreign Policy

In attempting to assess hypocrisy within Canadian foreign policy discourses, realism and liberalism are both inadequate because of their disregard for the concept of hypocrisy based on the emphasis of state/individual interests and primacy. Realism and Liberalism not only find the use of hypocrisy acceptable but would likely promote its use in advancing state interests, albeit in different ways. They do not allow for analysis of the subtle influence or impact on government (whether real or perceived) on their authenticity or sincerity. Constructivist and Feminist lenses are not inadequate but rather viewed as the foundation of my ethics as politics approach. Constructivism and feminism understand, to differing degrees, that normative structures shape the identities and interests of actors. My ethics as politics approach accepts these fundamental assertions and moves beyond them by analysing what ethics are produced as a result of a

particular identity influencing norms and institutions of a state. Doing so, focusses the discussion to understand why a state makes ethical commitments that ultimately have undesirable outcomes.

Finally, the foundational issue arising from governmental hypocrisy is one of trust. Can citizens trust that their elected officials and government will follow through on promises, or are they simply paying 'lip service' as a way to placate the general public? Ensuring the government remains accountable to the electorate relies on the ability of invigilators of democracy, such as the press, civil society organizations, and citizens, to perceive and illuminate government duplicity. By examining how hypocrisy functions within foreign policy and strategy, important analysis of the history of Canadian foreign policy can be gained. Moreover, an analysis of the function(s) of hypocrisy may add to understanding how other states use hypocrisy to further their own interests via foreign policy.

To evaluate how hypocrisy functions within the context of Canada implementing a feminist foreign policy while continuing to sell arms to a repressive regime, two overriding concepts which are incipient for understanding this paradox are examined. First, Krasner's concept of institutionalization is used to consider how hypocrisy becomes incorporated within Canadian government and its institutions. Second, an examination, using the concept of risk transfer, is undertaken in order to understand why a state would risk making ethical commitments that cannot always be achieved. Using these concepts to form the basis of an evaluation of how hypocrisy functions within foreign policy discourses, it becomes evident that ethical values serve to institutionalize hypocrisy within government norms and institutions which, in turn, transfers risk for hypocritical actions away from the government.

Chapter Three

The Case

In an effort to trace the evolution of the practice and concept of hypocrisy, this study examines accusations of hypocrisy as they pertain to the Liberal government's handling of the 2015 Canada – Saudi Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) arms deal. The Canada – Saudi LAV deal presents a stark contrast between purported foreign policy and operational behaviour, which makes it ideal for exploring how the Canadian government works to project its image to the world and Canadian electorate. As well, utilizing a discourse analysis method showcases the rise of ethical considerations within foreign policy creation and action, and highlights the morphic nature of hypocrisy within politics. The focus is on foreign policy actions in the contentious realm of moral ambiguity and does so, by attending to Canadian foreign policy action within the domain of human rights and international laws or norms.

Canada – Saudi Relations and the LAV Deal

The 2020 World Report, produced by Human Rights Watch (HRW), details the horrific situation which continues to unfold as a result of the civil war in Yemen (HRW 2020). It claims that there has been a 63% increase in violence against women and a surge in child marriage since the conflict began in 2014 (HRW 2019). Further corroboration comes from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (2020), the CFR explains that the civil war in Yemen has resulted in 91,600 deaths, the displacement of 2 million people, and a humanitarian crisis affecting 22.2 million people. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues unabated, exacerbated by outside influences, including from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in particular. The KSA has been accused of indiscriminate and unlawful airstrikes which have hit schools, hospitals, markets and homes in Yemen (HRW 2018). Moreover, the KSA has found itself in international headlines in

2018 and 2019 for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, its abysmal record on human rights protections for religious minorities, women and girls, and for its role in exacerbating the conflict in Yemen (HRW 2019). Amidst these events, Canada has continued to supply the KSA with exports of military goods and technology that have drawn accusations, from the media and a variety of non-governmental organizations, of hypocrisy and potential complicity in war crimes and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen (HRW 2019). In order to fully comprehend the accusations leveled at Canada, the sequence of events that has led Canada to a crossroads between being seen as an ‘ethical actor’ or ‘war criminal’ is described, for to be both is a paradox.

In 2014, as violent conflict erupted in Yemen, the Canadian government, under former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, helped to secure a \$10 billion-dollar contract with the KSA to sell armoured vehicles (Cudmore 2014).² The deal has since been updated and now encompasses \$15 billion-dollars over a 15-year period. The contract with the KSA is the largest advanced manufacturing export contract in Canadian history (CCC N.d.) and described as “akin to the holy grail for anyone in the armoured-vehicle industry” by the Canadian media (Webster 2016). While undoubtedly lucrative for Canada, this deal has also been scrutinized and criticized by government opposition, members of civil society, and international actors. Following the 2015 defeat of Stephen Harper and the Progressive Conservative Party, the Liberals, headed by Justin Trudeau, made the decision to honour the armoured vehicle contract with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This decision was followed by a number of events and decisions, on behalf of the Liberal government, that have enabled legitimate criticism towards Canada.

² For the purposes of my analysis, I submit that critiques of individual companies (i.e., General Dynamic Land Systems Canada) is largely futile – it is the Government of Canada that remains ultimately culpable for the decision to sell weapons because Canada is a monopsony in the arms trade (i.e., the sale would not continue without the approval of the federal government).

On June 6th, 2017, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, announced Canada's intention to pursue a feminist foreign policy. Freeland identified the feminist foreign policy as having the potential to reverberate within and influence international society (GAC 2017). In May 2018, Minister Freeland made a statement during question period in the House of Commons condemning the KSA's arrest of activists (Marcoux and Barghout 2018). While this statement went virtually unnoticed in the international community, Minister Freeland once again criticized the KSA in August 2018 for arresting women's rights activists, and this time, did so using the social media platform Twitter (Marcoux and Barghout 2018). The KSA's response to Minister Freeland's (2018) tweet of "Very alarmed to learn that Samar Badawi, Raif Badawi's sister, has been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. Canada stands together with the Badawi family in this difficult time, and we continue to strongly call for the release of both Raif and Samar Badawi.", was harsh and fast. It responded immediately, announcing it was expelling Canada's ambassador, selling Canadian assets, ceasing flights to Canada, suspending student exchange programs, and that it would stop buying Canadian wheat and barley (Marcoux and Barghout, 2018). Before the rift between the two countries could mend, Minister Freeland announced in November 2018 that Canada would not be issuing any new export permits to the KSA until at least December 2019, pending a review of all existing export permits to the KSA under the *Export and Import Permits Act* (EIPA). This review was spurred by the murder of U.S.-based Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi (GAC 2020, p. 4). Jamal Khashoggi was murdered inside a KSA consulate in Turkey, as ordered by the highest levels of the KSA government (BBC 2020). Notably, while the existing permits were being reviewed, the existing LAV permits were not impacted by the moratorium and LAVs were still being manufactured and exported to the KSA (Cecco 2020).

Lastly, Canada officially acceded to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on September 17th, 2019, by passing Bill C-47 which amended the *Exports and Imports Permit Act* (EIPA). Canada's accession required the incorporation of new assessment criteria along with other amendments to further strengthen Canada's export controls and bring Canada in line with other states that are parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. Despite this accession, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) continues to approve exports of military goods to the KSA and the justification for approving them is provided in the Final Report released in 2020.

While conducting trade based on Canada's interests is not wholly negative from an economic standpoint, it is at odds with a foreign policy purportedly aimed at supporting women and girls, as exemplified within official discourses, who are likely to be affected by arms sold to an oppressive regime. As a result, the values attributed to Canada's feminist foreign policy (e.g., human rights, gender equality and inclusion) are not the same as those expressed by Canada through its actions. Canada is caught within a paradox of its own making and Canada's actions in regard to its relationship with the KSA represent an invaluable case study for evaluating how hypocrisy functions within an ethical foreign policy framework.

Canada – Saudi LAV Deal Contextualization

Canada continues to acknowledge the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as a leader and key player in ensuring security and stability in the Middle East (GAC 2020. "Canada-Saudi Arabia Relations"). Since 2015, the two countries have been at odds for a variety of reasons previously mentioned, Khashoggi murder, KSA's role in Yemen and human rights concerns among others, which has led some critics in Canada to question the practicality of this bilateral relationship. Despite these considerations and a 2019 moratorium on new exports to the KSA, Canada sold more than double the amount of military equipment in 2019 to the KSA than the

previous year, amounting to nearly \$2.2 billion USD (Cecco 2020). At the same time, Canada has broadly adopted a feminist foreign policy, acceded to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and is committed to upholding Canadian values, based on human rights, gender equality, and inclusion, as described in official discourses. The trade deal for Light-Armoured Vehicles (LAVs), previously agreed to by the Conservative Party, has therefore been a focal point for many, inside and outside the government, to question Canada's commitment to its new feminist policies and espoused values.

In order to contextualize and understand the current relationship between Canada and the KSA, I summarize the initial "Statement by the Hon. Stéphane Dion, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Sale of Light Armoured Vehicles to Saudi Arabia." (2016) and the, "Final Report: Review of Export Permits to Saudi Arabia" (2020) released by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), as well as reactions from the media and civil society organizations (CSOs). The summary is my effort to highlight the disparity between government rhetoric and concern over human rights, and actions as it pertains to the bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, including specific events, language and evidence used to justify the continuation of LAV exports to the KSA.

The Initial Statement

Following the 2015 election, the newly formed Liberal government faced continual questions and criticism regarding the sale of LAVs to the KSA. On April 13th, 2016, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stéphane Dion, released a statement informing Canadians that the Government of Canada had decided to honour the previous government's LAV agreement with the KSA (GAC 2016). This statement provided the public with the Government of Canada's initial assessment and justification for continuing to honour the contract with the KSA. The

statement highlighted various reasons for continuing the sale and as asserted by the Minister, the reasons were mutually reinforcing and altogether, provide a comprehensive basis for the decision to honour the sale (GAC 2016). The statement offers five justifications for continuing the sale under the headings, “Credibility matters”, “Choosing the Right lever to improve human rights in Saudi Arabia”, “Continual rigorous oversight of human rights”, “Security matters” and “The economy matters” (GAC 2016). Broadly, the five justifications fall into two paradigms, one concerning human rights and the other, the economy. The statement also offered a conclusion and briefly addressed Canada’s commitment to accede to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty. The following is a summary of the five justifications.

In the statement, Minister Dion first asserts that the Government of Canada does not want to “weaken the credibility of the signature of the Government of Canada” (GAC 2016). Therefore, the government highlights the need to ‘Choose the right lever to improve human rights in Saudi Arabia’, and submits that this is accomplished as a result of Canada’s commitment to advancing human rights and assures that Canada does not miss an opportunity to raise awareness on issues or promote positive engagement with Saudi counterparts (GAC 2016). Moreover, Minister Dion drew attention to the over 16,000 Saudi Arabian students studying in Canadian universities which, “will likely help to promote the liberalization of Saudi Arabian society.” (GAC 2016). Therefore, Minister Dion reasons that should the sale be cancelled, any positive efforts, in terms of liberalizing Saudi society, will be for naught.

As well, he suggests that if the sale is cancelled, the contract (for LAVs) will likely go to a different, non-Canadian, potentially more ambivalent contractor (GAC 2016). Therefore, in order to avoid cancelling the sale, Minister Dion emphasizes Canada’s ‘Continual rigorous oversight of human rights’ as further justification that the KSA would not use the weapons to

violate human rights. Minister Dion submitted that it was his decision and responsibility as the Minister of Foreign Affairs to determine the propriety of authorizing the LAV export permits, which were ultimately granted (GAC 2016). Minister Dion points to Canada's stringent export approval process which has been in place since 1986, a prime condition being that the export in question would not be used to violate human rights nor be contrary to the interests of Canada and its allies (GAC 2016). These considerations are followed with the broader justification of 'Security matters', which affirms and cites the KSA as a strategic partner in combatting ISIL, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups active in the region, while also preventing lawlessness and chaos in the Middle East as a whole (GAC 2016).

Finally, Minister Dion focusses on the potential impact on the Canadian economy should the contract be cancelled. Minister Dion asserts that it will be the Canadian taxpayer who is 'on the hook' for any financial penalties, potentially 2000 jobs becoming at-risk, and possible repercussions on the weapons manufacturing industry in Canada, an industry that supports approximately 70,000 Canadians jobs (GAC 2016). Before offering considerations regarding Canada's plan to accede to the ATT, the statement includes instructions to Minister Dion, from the Prime Minister, to provide 'transparency and rigor' in two areas: Canada's export permit process and reports, produced by the Government of Canada, concerning the situation of human rights in some countries (GAC 2016). Minister Dion asserts that the decision to honour the contract, because of the above reasoning, is an expression of 'responsible conviction' (GAC 2016). Concerning the ATT, Minister Dion submits that Canada will accede to the pact at the earliest opportunity, as one component of the broader effort to restore Canada as a constructive actor globally, contribute to global security and stability, and increase Canada's rigour and transparency (GAC 2016).

Reactions

Following the release of the statement by GAC and Minister Dion, traditional media and civil society organizations (CSOs) began to criticize the justification by highlighting certain contradictory elements. The following is a brief summation of reactions and critiques from traditional news media and CSOs levied at the government in the wake of the decision to continue the Canada – Saudi LAV sale.³

Some media critiques highlighted the seeming ‘political genius’ and hypocrisy of the claim that continuing the sale is an expression of ‘responsible conviction’. Five days before the initial statement release, Andrew Potter, in the *Montreal Gazette* (April 7, 2016), pointed out the duality and ingenuity of the term ‘responsible conviction’ because, “If someone accuses you of ignoring consequences, you tell them that you are guided by your convictions. If someone accuses you of being too focused on results at the expense of principles, you insist that you are behaving responsibly”. Potter further questioned how the sale of LAVs to the KSA ‘squares’ with the ethics of responsible conviction (Potter, 2016).

Following the release of the statement, Konrad Yakabuski (2016), writing for *The Globe and Mail*, examined the doctrine of ‘responsible conviction’ and stated that the “negative consequences of cancelling the contract - in financial penalties and lost jobs and votes in Southern Ontario manufacturing communities - outweigh its potential costs in civilian lives and the escalation of a Middle East arms race.”.

In an effort to show united disapproval for the continuation of the sale, The Group of 78, a civil society organization that promotes Canadian and global action for peace and disarmament

³ The sources amassed are meant to serve as an overview of responses from media and civil society critiquing the governments justification and are not to be considered a comprehensive list of all sources concerning/critiquing the LAV contract. Links to all articles can be found in the work cited list.

and global governance, along with other distinguished CSOs (Project Ploughshares, Rideau Institute, Amnesty International Canada among others), penned an open letter to Prime Minister Trudeau. They asked him to “consider seriously whether our (Canada’s) export controls have served their intended purpose with the authorization of this (LAV) deal.” (Group of 78 to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, April 25, 2016). In the letter, The Group of 78, asserts that the Government of Canada’s decision to continue the sale of LAVs to KSA is ‘immoral and unethical’, and the contract represents “precisely the type of deal that Canada’s export controls are intended to prevent.” (Group of 78 to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, April 25, 2016). The open letter indicates that Canada’s export controls are intended to assess an exports potential as a ‘reasonable risk’ and thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs justification, that Canada has no evidence of Canadian goods being misused is contrary to the threshold established, as neither ‘evidence’ nor ‘certainty’ is required to halt an export (Group of 78 to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, April 25, 2016). The letter concludes by warning that, “the decision to proceed with the arms deal undermines not only the public’s trust in our export control system, but also the core values that define Canada’s character as a nation.” (Group of 78 to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, April 25, 2016).

Other critiques of the government’s decision to continue the deal consisted of current and historical comparisons. Tasha Kheiriddin (2016), in an article in the *National Post*, juxtaposed Canada’s actions in regard to the LAV deal to former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s denouncement of apartheid in South Africa. Kheiriddin (2016) argues that the economic importance of South Africa in the 1980’s was similar to the importance granted to the KSA in 2016, and moreover, half the population was not represented and actively discriminated against by the South African government, similar to the KSA’s treatment of women and girls.

Alternatively, Steven Chase (2016), in an article in *The Globe and Mail*, argues that there is a consensus among Canadian human rights, development and arms control groups that the Canadian arms-control system failed in the case of the Canada – Saudi LAV deal, citing the open letter previously mentioned. Furthermore, Chase (2016) argues that the Trudeau government actively rejected further oversight of arms exports and makes the case that acceding to the UN’s Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will not be sufficient in stopping human rights abuses. Chase (2016) points to Sweden, a state that will not make deals with non-democratic countries, as an example for Canada to follow.

The general consensus from the media and other sources has been against the arms deal. However, some, like the government, believed the deal to be an unfortunate necessity. Scott Gilmore (2016), writing for *Maclean’s* magazine, labels the ‘responsible conviction’ approach to foreign policy, ‘a mess’, but then says “Successful foreign policy is always a mess”. Gilmore (2016) argues that each state is required to make “subjective choices to balance international commitments, economic realities, departmental capabilities, security objectives, domestic politics, (and) public perceptions”, and each decision must be defended on its own merits.

Moreover, the KSA ambassador to Canada, Naif Bin Bandar al-Sudairi when discussing the contract with journalists from *The Globe and Mail*, highlighted that the contract was a chance to improve the relations between Canada and the KSA and must be viewed from the perspective of co-operation (Chase and Fife 2016).

These reactions highlight the dominant justifications for continuing the sale by the government, and help to contextualize the perceived impact in Canada, the KSA and duality of Canada’s policies and actions. Moreover, the reactions serve to underscore the language used by

the government to frame its decision, which is critical in discourse analysis, and establish the government narrative for reviewing exports in the future.

The Final Report

In 2020, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) released the 29-page, “Final Report: Review of Export Permits to Saudi Arabia”, and offered a general conclusion that there is a ‘substantial risk’ that certain types of Canadian exports would be used to commit or facilitate violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). However, other military items, including Light-Armoured Vehicles (LAVs), were determined to not breach the threshold for constituting a ‘substantial risk’ (GAC 2020, p. 5). After offering a general conclusion, the report details the legislative framework used to assess export permits (the *EIPA*) which encompasses certain mandatory assessment criteria, mitigating measures, limits to ministerial authority as well as a definition of ‘Substantial Risk’ (GAC 2020, p. 4-7).⁴ ‘Substantial’, thus becomes the operative word. To reach this determination, a risk does not need to be highly likely, rather, it is required to be grounded in evidence and more than a mere possibility, theory, or speculation (GAC 2020, p. 8). The ‘substantial risk’ of any individual export permit is evaluated by six criteria, each beginning with the phrase, “Is there a substantial risk that Canadian exports of military goods and technology to KSA would...” and ending with the following considerations: undermine peace and security; be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL); be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of International Human Rights Law (IHRL); be used to commit or facilitate acts of terrorism or transnational organized crime; be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence, or serious

⁴ ‘Substantial risk’ is not defined in Canadian legislation but is an amalgamation of ideas and practices of other States party to the ATT as well as other relevant jurisprudence (GAC 2020, p. 6).

acts of violence against women and children (GAC 2020, p. 2).⁵ The overriding focus is whether an export poses a substantial risk to the KSA domestically and in areas where the KSA engages (i.e. Yemen).⁶ The following summarizes the governments assessment of each criterion under review.

Under ‘Criterion One’ regarding the substantial risk of exports undermining peace and security, GAC determined that the exports posed no risk to Canada’s national and regional security and moreover, the exports were determined to contribute to regional peace and security (GAC 2020, p. 8). The report asserts that the exports are more likely to help ensure stability in, “a key region for the global economy”, and even if LAVs were used in Yemen, GAC concluded that such an action would not violate the general prohibition on the threat or use of force (GAC 2020, p. 11 – 12). Finally, GAC views the continued sale of military goods and technology to KSA as a direct consequence of the West’s involvement in the first Gulf War (1990 – 1991) and ultimately, to be in Canada’s strategic interests as the KSA hinders Iranian aggression (GAC 2020, p. 12).

Under ‘Criterion Two’ regarding the possibility of military and technology exports posing a substantial risk to IHL, GAC justified its response based on intelligence reports and assessments from numerous sources, including United Nations fact-finding missions from the Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen (GEEY) and the Panel of Experts on Yemen (PEY). GAC concluded that there was a substantial risk of certain types of military goods and technology (e.g., air-to-surface missiles, bomber aircraft) being used in violation of IHL however, LAVs are

⁵ It should be noted that each criterion ends with the government’s assessment of the export item; the government’s assessment concerning violations of IHRL was redacted (GAC 2020, 21 - 22).

⁶ Each criterion has been assessed by GAC based on information collected from intelligence reports from Canadian institutions and allies (e.g., Privy Council Office, Security and Intelligence unit; Department of National Defence (DND); on-going Canadian missions in the region; Five Eyes (FVEY) partners’; as well as international organizations and social and traditional media sources) (GAC 2020, 8).

not within this classification (GAC 2020, p. 13). GAC based its determination on two reports, one from the PEY investigation of five coalition airstrikes that affected civilians and civilian objects, and the other from the GEEY, who investigated a number of ‘emblematic’ coalition airstrikes from June 2018 to June 2019 (GAC 2020, p. 14). The two reports warned of a persistent lack of accountability on both sides of the Yemen conflict, and the GEEY report further questioned the legality of arms transfers to the KSA from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, however, Canadian arm transfers were not mentioned (GAC 2020, p. 18).

‘Criterion Three’ determined that there was no substantial risk of current Canadian military and technology exports being used in violation of IHRL, including internal suppression within the KSA. Criterion three details an overview of the domestic human rights situation in the KSA and surmised that the KSA continues to perpetrate human rights violations; shows an outright disregard for human rights as showcased by the murder and attempted cover-up of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi; and the KSA legal system does not meet minimum international standards (GAC 2020, p. 19-20). However, the Final Report does acknowledge some improvements in regard to human rights in the KSA in recent years, citing women now being able to drive and an end to the guardian system⁷. Moreover, the Final Report mentions that exports of Canadian LAVs or similar technology to the KSA, directly or indirectly via the U.S., has occurred for over 25 years, and though it is possible, there has been no credible evidence of the KSA committing or facilitating serious IHRL violations, including internal repression (GAC 2020, p. 21).

Criterion four and five are assessed in concert as they pertain to Canadian exports being used to commit or facilitate acts of terrorism or transnational organized crime. GAC determined

⁷ Guardian system as defined in the Final Report, “a set of ministerial policies and practices which require women to have permission of a male guardian before undertaking daily activities” (GAC 2020, 20).

that there was no substantial risk of Canadian exports being used in terrorism or transnational organized crime and moreover, neither Canada nor the U.S. has listed the KSA as a state supporter of terrorism (GAC 2020, p. 23).

Criterion six addresses whether there is a substantial risk Canadian exports would be used to facilitate or commit serious acts of gender-based violence. Criterion six is evaluated in the context of the situation in Yemen; the circumstances of children in Yemen; and the KSA domestically. GAC cites a 2018 review from a committee, under direction of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), expressing concern about potential military operations in Yemen and the continued violations of the rights of women and girls (GAC 2020, p. 25). In the KSA domestically, GAC cites some recent progress (as stated previously) but overall, women continue to face significant discrimination within Saudi society and under the law (GAC 2020, p. 26). Despite these concerns, GAC asserts that there is no credible evidence linking Canadian military exports to gender-based violence nor is the KSA government directly involved in the recruitment and use of child soldiers or armed groups in Yemen who may try to recruit child soldiers (GAC 2020, p. 26).

In sum, the Final Report issued by GAC served to justify the continued exportation of Canadian military goods and technology to the KSA and introduced the concept of ‘substantial risk’ as a key determinant within Canada’s export process. It also asserted that if an export’s potential for substantial risk is not able to be decreased through various mitigating measures, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is required to deny issuance of any permit in respect of ‘arms, ammunitions, implements or munitions of war’ (GAC 2020, p. 6). Canada continues to export LAVs to the KSA and sold nearly \$2.2 billion USD worth of military equipment to the KSA in 2019 (Cecco 2020).

Reactions

There have been numerous puzzled and dismayed reactions from the media and CSOs critiquing the government's actions and its justification of the LAV contract and continued relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In September 2018, shortly after the fallout between the KSA and Canada over Chrystia Freeland's tweet condemning the KSA, the Canadian CSO, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME), released a position paper highlighting the 'complex and contradictory relationship' between Canada and the KSA (2018). In the position paper, CJPME (2018) outlines and cites multiple examples of the KSA committing grievous human rights abuses and a continuing disregard for IHL and IHRL, including continuing to play a role in deepening the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, connection to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, and the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Following these examples, CJPME made three demands of the Canadian government. CJPME asked that the government continue to condemn Saudi human rights abuses, suspend both its short and long-term arms trade with the KSA, and that the government view the Canadian-Saudi dispute as an opportunity to rethink its relationship with the KSA (CJPME 2018). The paper cites numerous failings of the Canadian export process, which they believe serve to highlight the tenuous credibility of Canada's adherence to its own arms export controls. As the Canadian government was deciding how to handle the information regarding the KSA's direct role in the murder of Khashoggi, CJPME used the position paper to inform Canadians and urge government action.

Following the announcement and upon commencing the review of all existing export permits, the Canadian government delayed releasing further information regarding the export process. On March 4th, 2019, a group of CSOs, including many of the same organizations who

had signed the Group of 78's open letter in 2016, wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Trudeau once again imploring the government to consider the risk that LAVs sold to the KSA may be used by parties in the conflict in Yemen to commit serious violations of IHRL and IHL (Project Ploughshares 2019). In the letter, the CSOs call for all states to ban the sale or transfer of any weapons to any government when there is a risk for those weapons to be used in the conflict in Yemen. The letter emphasizes how "Canada is playing a role in alleviating this dire situation by providing humanitarian assistance, but is in the paradoxical position of doing so while simultaneously arming one of the parties to the conflict." (Project Ploughshares 2019). Five months later, on August 4th, 2019, this letter was followed by another open letter from the same group of CSOs, expressing their disappointment about the lack of response from the government to the first letter and further questioning the sincerity of the government's export review (Project Ploughshares 2019). The second open letter brings attention to three concerning developments which the writers believe underscore the need to end LAV exports. They point to Canada's accession to the ATT, the rapid pace of LAV development despite the government review and that the situation in Yemen has further deteriorated (Project Ploughshares 2019). The letter concludes by expressing the sentiment that Canadians are entitled to know the outcome of the review, and that the public also deserves to know the government's position concerning the export of LAVs from Canada to the KSA (Project Ploughshares 2019).

Before the Canadian government released its Final Report, two academics, Anthony Fenton and Jeremy Wildeman (2019) offered further condemnation of the Canadian government. In, *The Conversation*, an independent source of news and opinions for the public from the Canadian academic and research community, Fenton and Wildeman (2019) focussed on the deepening rift between Canada and the KSA following the murder of Khashoggi. While they

applaud Canada's past support for independent investigations into war crime allegations against the KSA in Yemen and the government's support for Saudi reforms and increasing aid to Yemen, they also argue that these actions do not exonerate Canada as these actions are outweighed by Canada's support for the KSA's role in Yemen via arms sales (Fenton and Wildeman 2019).

The release of the Final Report in 2020 was somewhat overshadowed in the media by the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent domestic and international fallout. However, after the Final Report's release, both CSOs and the media began to criticize its inherent inconsistencies. Writing for *The Globe and Mail*, parliamentary reporter Steven Chase (2020) elaborated on the open letter to Prime Minister Trudeau from the coalition of CSOs (detailed previously) and reiterated the coalitions statement that Canada was in breach of its own obligations to the ATT by continuing the LAV sale. Chase (2020) accentuates that in the analysis of the Final Report by the CSOs, the CSO's labelled the Final Report as 'weak' and that it was, in fact, in direct contradiction of a UN report on the situation in Yemen. The CSOs further criticized the "hypocrisy of the government for announcing a resumption of approvals for military exports to Saudi Arabia and then, days later, backing a UN call for a global ceasefire during the pandemic." (Chase 2020).

In an article in *The Guardian*, journalist Leyland Cecco (2020) calls attention to the fact that in 2019 Canada sold a record amount of military equipment to the KSA, in spite of its criticism of the human rights situation and the moratorium on any new exports to the KSA. Cecco (2020) quotes Mark Kersten, Deputy Director of the Wayamo Foundation (a non-profit organization focussed on enhancing the rule of law, justice promotion and fostering good governance), who questions the Canadian government's understanding of a 'moratorium' when

the ‘moratorium’ did not apply to existing permits. While acknowledging the government’s justification that there was no clear evidence of Canadian military goods being used for human rights violations in the KSA, Kersten declares that the Canadian government has made military exports a domestic economic issue rather than “about a courageous feminist foreign policy or the image of Canada itself.” (Cecco 2020).

Overall, it is clear that responses from the media, CSOs, and academia, to Canada’s export review announcement and Final Report, have been largely critical. These criticisms highlight Canada’s difficulty in following its own policies as well as Canada’s lack of commitment to the ATT in creating normative change to Canada’s export control process. Taken together, the reactions identify an underlying issue within the government’s official discourse surrounding the LAV sale, that being, the persistent problem of policy incoherence at Global Affairs Canada. The legitimacy of these reactions is bolstered by further contextualizing the official discourses, as described by GAC’s departmental plans, and serve to highlight the potential hypocrisy of the Canadian government.

Foreign Policy Contextualization

The election of the Liberal Party in 2015 and its subsequent introduction of a feminist foreign policy has further entrenched ethical considerations at the forefront of Canadian foreign policy. As evidenced by the critiques described previously, Canada’s ethical considerations have a seeming paltry ability to sway government decisions in regard to LAV exports. However, the government continues to portray and promote its gendered focus for handling international relations via the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) and foreign policy. Therefore, in an effort to understand the rise of ethical considerations in Canada’s foreign policy, changes to Canada’s foreign policy need to be catalogued to highlight any ethical considerations. As stated

previously, this is accomplished by summarizing the Report on Plans and Priorities (RPPs) and Departmental Plans (DPs) since 2015 as well as the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP).⁸ I assert that these documents are essential in creating the narrative that Canada has a feminist foreign policy and are representative of the historical discourse surrounding Canadian foreign policy.

2016 – 2017

The Liberal Government was elected in 2015 and the 2016/17 RPP was the first report released by GAC under their leadership. Stéphane Dion, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, Minister of International Trade and Minister of La Francophonie and International Development, Marie-Claude Bibeau, were the ministers responsible for directing and coordinating GACs programming for the 2016/17 year (GAC 2016, p. 3 – 4). The Ministers’ message assures Canadians that Canadian foreign policy is guided by Canadian values with a focus on results (GAC 2016, p. 3 – 4). These values are reflected in 4 Strategic Outcomes (SOs), which tie the organization’s mandate, vision and core functions to a long-term and enduring benefit for all Canadians (GAC 2016, p. 54). The SOs justify federal spending on programming and initiatives and further guide the creation of departmental priorities. In 2016/17, the SOs were focussed on the following: ensuring that the international agenda was shaped to advance Canadian security, prosperity, interests and values; Canadians were satisfied with commercial and consular services; poverty reduction and increased security and democratic capabilities for those living in countries where Canada engages; the department sustains a mission network of infrastructure and services to enable the Government of Canada to achieve its priorities (GAC 2016, p. 6). Each of the SOs are supported by 9 core programs and an assortment of sub-

⁸ Links to all of these documents can be found in the work cited list.

programs with the intention of a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. The 2016/17 RPP was the last RPP produced by GAC before transitioning to Departmental Plans and preceded the announcement of the FIAP. Thus, it contrasts subsequent DPs and draws attention to the institutional shift at GAC toward a feminist foreign policy.

2017 – 2018

The 2017/18 DP notably represented a change in the Ministerial structure leading GAC’s priorities and programming. The position of Minister of Foreign Affairs was occupied by Chrystia Freeland. The Minister of International Development and La Francophonie remained Marie-Claude Bibeau and the Minister of International Trade was François-Philippe Champagne. The 2017/2018 DP listed GAC’s 4 priorities, which are reflected in subsequent DPs, as: contributing to international peace, security and humanitarian assistance through renewed leadership and constructive engagement with partners; reinforcing Canada’s relationship with the United States and other key bi-lateral partners to advance Canadian interests; strengthening Canada’s contributions to a more just, inclusive and sustainable world; contributing to inclusive Canadian and global prosperity through increased and diversified trade and investment with various trading partners (GAC 2017, p. 3 - 4). The 2017/18 DP differs significantly from later DP’s, as in the fashion of RPPs, it offers GAC’s ‘Raison d’être’ as well as its mandate and role. Additionally, considerations for GAC’s ‘Operating Context’⁹ while implementing GAC programming is offered. This ‘Operating Context’ is critical for evaluating and understanding the impact of global, regional and local factors influencing Canadian foreign policy creation and conduct. The Operating Context described in the 2017/18 report, similar to the Operating Context in succeeding reports, cites numerous challenges for GAC including: the slow economic

⁹ The ‘operating context’ is explicitly stated in the 2017/18 and 2019/20 DPs, whereas the 2018/19 and 2020/21 DPs refer the reader to the Government of Canada’s website.

recovery and rising income inequality as factors in rising populism, social instability and extremism; the uneven distribution of power globally and a shift towards non-government actors (e.g. multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations); and increased nationalism and protectionist sentiments resulting from unceasing globalization (GAC 2017, p. 7).

Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP)

Following the release of the 2017/18 DP, the Government of Canada unveiled its Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) in accordance with its pursuit of a Feminist Foreign Policy (GAC 2017). The FIAP outlines Canada's feminist vision which, "seeks to eradicate poverty and build a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world. Canada firmly believes that promoting gender equality and empowering women and girls is the most effective approach to achieving this goal" (FIAP 2017, p. ii). This vision coincides with Canada's efforts to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and commitment to the Paris Agreement (FIAP 2017, p. vi). The FIAP highlights three issues Canada is focussed on which are addressed by 6 action areas. Integrated within each issue and action area is the core action belief, which is to promote and support gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (FIAP 2017). Other action areas that the FIAP aimed to address were human dignity, growth that works for everyone, environment and climate action, inclusive governance, and peace and security (FIAP 2017, p. iii). In releasing the FIAP, Canada announced that its new foreign aid commitments would be human-rights based and inclusive, strategic and focused, transformative and activist, as well as evidence-based and accountable.

2018 – 2019

The 2018/19 DP presented by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, Minister of International Trade and La Francophonie, Marie-Claude Bibeau, and Minister of International

Trade, François-Philippe Champagne, outlines how Canada will continue to work within the rules-based international order to promote peace and security. In the joint ministers' message at the beginning of the DP, the ministers highlight their 'signature' priority; that is to use the G7 presidency to advance Canadian domestic and international priorities (GAC 2018, p. 1 – 2). The Ministers mention other priorities including strengthening ties with the United States, intensifying and diversifying trade, and continued implementation of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) and National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (GAC 2018, p. 1 – 2). These priorities were supported by GAC through its own departmental priorities which were: to strengthen the rules-based international order through strategic leadership; to advance Canada's feminist foreign policy; to pursue a progressive trade agenda; and to maintain constructive relations with the United States (GAC 2018, p. 3 – 4). Additionally, the 2018/19 plan introduced the concept of 'core responsibilities', signifying "an enduring function or role performed by a department" and showcased the intentions of the department which "are reflected in one or more related departmental results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence" (GAC 2018, p. 49). The core responsibilities outlined in the 2018/19 DP have remained consistent in subsequent DP's until 2020/21 and serve to further guide program construction and resource allocation. The core responsibilities outlined in the 2018/19 DP were: international advocacy and diplomacy; trade and investment; development, peace and security programming; help for Canadians abroad; and support for Canada's presence abroad (GAC 2018). The international issues highlighted within the operating context of the 2018/19 DP include the rise of protectionism and isolationism as a result of the slow economic recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis, and decades of globalization directly or indirectly impacting political stability as well as the impact of climate change (GAC 2018).

2019 – 2020

The 2019/20 DP was presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland, Minister of International Trade Diversification James Carr, Minister of International Trade Development and Minister for Women and Gender Equality Maryam Monsef, and the Minister of Tourism, Official Languages and La Francophonie Mélanie Joly. The four departmental priorities guiding the implementation of GAC programming for 2019/20 were: the revitalization of the rules-based international order; the eradication of poverty; the pursuit of diversified, modern and inclusive trade; and the strengthening of Canada’s place in North America (GAC 2019, p. 3 – 4). These four priorities are accompanied by the same core responsibilities outlined previously in the 2018/19 Departmental Plan. The ‘operating context’ described within the 2019/20 DP describes multiple potential influences including “pressures related to the rise of protectionism, unilateralism, populism and authoritarianism, and the effects of violent extremism, social instability and poverty.” (GAC 2019, p. 4).

2020 - 2021

The 2020/21 DP was presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade Mary Ng and the Minister of International Development Karina Gould (GAC 2020, p. 1). The core priorities described in the 2020 – 2021 DP are to: contribute to a rules-based international system that advances Canadian interests; pursue diversified trade and supporting Canadian exporters; strengthen Canada’s bilateral relations; eradicate poverty (GAC 2020, p. 4 – 5). These four priorities form the foundation for program construction and are supported by the core responsibilities which have remained consistent since their introduction in the 2018/19 DP. Furthermore, the 2020/21 DP ensures that each priority contains some element or reference to

Canada's pursuit of feminist ideals, whether through the use of gendered language or a focus on issues impacting women and girls. The ministers assert at the outset of the 2020/21 DP that, "a gender lens is applied to all that we (GAC) do, because we know this is the only way to ensure an effective foreign policy." (GAC 2020, p. 1). The 'operating context' depicted in the 2020/21 DP includes "a variety of potential risks and challenges not present domestically, including the rise of protectionism and authoritarianism; competition or conflict among major and regional powers; crime and failures in governance; the growing influence of non-state actors as well as the effects of economic inequality, social instability and increasing disruptions from climate change." (GAC 2020). The DP's, as summarised above, underscore the institutional changes transpiring as a result of a "gender lens" being applied to all aspects of GAC's operations.

Since the implementation of Canada's FIAP, feminist language and ideals have been interwoven within GAC's Departmental Plans. Most prominently, this is apparent within the core responsibility statements concerning 'development, peace and security programming' which includes the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The WPS agenda endeavours to pursue a 'gender-responsive' and integrated response to global peace and security challenges (GAC 2020). However, it should be acknowledged that before and after the advent of Canada's FIAP, GAC/DFATD has remained fixated on "advancing Canadian values and interests internationally" (GAC 2016). Only after the introduction of the FIAP, and a feminist foreign policy broadly, has Feminism become incorporated as a 'Canadian value'. Additionally, before re-structuring GAC programming around 'departmental priorities' and 'core responsibilities', the DPs and RPPs were oriented around 'Strategic Outcomes' and the management of 'Corporate Risks' through programming aimed to diminish said risks. While the language within the DPs has subtly shifted

since the introduction of the feminist foreign policy, some form of the five core responsibilities have been reiterated within DPs and/or RPPs since at least 2015.

How GAC introduces, implements, analyses, and evaluates its role in conducting Canada's foreign policy has clearly changed since 2015. The RPP and DPs released since the Liberal government came to power represent the official, dominant, and historical discourse, of the government in the context of Canada's foreign policy. These documents exemplify the transition of GACs institutional focus from being based on interests to gender and feminist values. Moreover, they serve as evidence of the government embedding ethical considerations at an institutional level within the department tasked with executing Canada's foreign policy.

Chapter 4 - Analysis

The Institutionalization of Hypocrisy

Identifying whether hypocrisy is a choice, or if it expresses a logic or process in the contemporary world system, I allege, is critical for exposing the link between hypocrisy and ethical considerations in foreign policy. The concept of “organized hypocrisy”, as described by Krasner (1999) and Weaver (2008), is pertinent because this conception of hypocrisy is contained within the parameters of specific deviations from institutional norms and rules. While there is an argument for hypocrisy being a choice by rational political actors, it is more difficult to understand as being a choice when confined to the distinction of being ‘organized’ because it is not solely political actors but whole governmental departments/institutions that perpetuate potentially hypocritical policy and political agendas. Therefore, organized hypocrisy conceptualizes the link between hypocrisy and ethics, an assertion that is exemplified by applying Krasner’s logics of appropriateness and expected outcomes to Canada’s initial justification for continuing the sale of LAVs to the KSA, and articulation of its feminist approach to foreign policy.

As previously discussed, Canada actively cultivates and values its image as an international good citizen and global leader in defending human rights. This sentiment is encapsulated in Canada’s initial justification of the Canada – Saudi LAV deal. The initial statement in 2016, by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion, made use of the phrase ‘responsible conviction’, thus exemplifying the logic of expected consequences. The Canadian government wanted to continue the sale but needed to justify it without compromising its stated responsibilities to protecting human rights. In his condemnation of the LAV deal, Andrew Potter (2016) labeled responsible conviction as ‘political genius’ because it enabled the government to

justify the sale of LAVs as both a form of responsible governance, due to the economic benefit to Canada, and an example of Canada upholding its convictions, shown by Canada's stringent export measures combined with continual oversight of human rights. Thus, from the government's perspective, the initial statement justified the Canada – Saudi LAV deal from both an economic and moral standpoint. The logic of expected consequences is also exemplified, as the government was able to capitalize on the sale negotiated by their predecessor, maximizing the economic benefit while also remaining steadfast in its convictions.

The logic of appropriateness is apparent in the initial statement with Minister Dion's assertion that Saudi students in Canada will support the liberalization of KSA society, an assertion that is difficult to prove, yet, ostensibly easy to assume. Moreover, the concluding affirmation that Canada would accede to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) at the earliest opportunity is a product of the Canadian governments desire to be a moral and righteous actor even when they are selling weapons to a dictatorial regime. Thus, we see the first example of organized hypocrisy through the government's convictions and ethical commitments becoming intertwined.

As explained by Runciman (2009), one form of hypocrisy is a claim to an identity that one does not possess (p. 10). Therefore, by following accounts of the Canadian government claiming or asserting ethical commitments and identities which align with how they wish to be perceived, various examples of hypocrisy emerge. This assertion is underscored by the Weaver's concept of mainstreaming gaps, the second type of organizational hypocrisy, because the emergence of hypocrisy is evidence of the government's ineffective implementation of an ethical identity on an organizational level. While the government attempts to institutionalize ethical convictions, it is in fact, also institutionalizing hypocrisy. Thus, hypocrisy and ethics become

intertwined by the state attempting to employ ethical considerations within their foreign policy. While this realization furthers understandings of ethical commitments and organized hypocrisy, it does not explain how hypocrisy becomes incorporated institutionally within Canadian institutions.

Determining whether a concept or value has been ‘institutionalized’ is determined by the degree to which they are incorporated within an institution of a state. An institution, as defined by Krasner (1999), is “conceived of as a set of rules and norms often embodied in formal organizations” (p. 59), reflecting the policies of states. In Canada, the degree to which ethical commitments are institutionalized in regard to foreign policy is most apparent within Global Affairs Canada (GAC). By reviewing GAC’s implementation of feminist values and gendered language within its departmental plans and policy documents, ethics and hypocrisy are exposed as intertwined and gradually being incorporated within the institutional framework of GAC. Therefore, evaluating ethical considerations adherence to the two dimensions which Krasner (1999) identifies as characterizing institutions, persistence/durability and institutionalization, shows the degree to which ethics are incorporated in a government institution. I assess the extent to which Canada’s feminist principles have persisted within Canada’s foreign policy from its inception in 2017 until 2020 to understand the persistence/durability dimension of ethical considerations in government discourses. Then, the institutionalization dimension is uncovered by determining the extent the behaviour of the Canadian government, via GAC, conforms with the institutional structure depicted in Canada’s feminist foreign policy.

Then Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland announced Canada’s iteration of a feminist foreign policy on June 6th, 2017, and with the announcement, formally heralded Canada’s pursuit of incorporating feminist values into Canada’s foreign policy. The

incorporation of feminist values into Canada's foreign policy begins with the departmental plans (DPs) and release of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) by GAC. This shift in the government's messaging is highlighted when contrasting the 2017/18 DP with the previous years' Report on Plans and Priorities. While the change in title of GAC's annual guiding framework from RPP to DP may seem innocuous, viewing this change through a feminist lens suggests that this is an example of the government incorporating certain feminist principles into the institutional framework of GAC, whereby there is an emphasis on the language of care over results. This is exemplified by the change from 'Strategic Outcomes' (SOs) within the RPPs to simply, 'Priorities' of the department. In reviewing the differences between SOs in the 2016/17 RPP, and 'Priorities' in the 2017/18 DP, the language used to articulate the SOs clearly have an emphasis on achieving results and articulating benefits, whereas the 'Priorities' emphasize how Canada is either contributing, reinforcing, or strengthening Canada's efforts globally, albeit in a more nebulous manner. In addition, there appears to be an emphasis and implied understanding of the 'process', that is to say, Canada's foreign policy efforts cannot be viewed in the silo of a single year. Rather, GAC is acknowledging a commitment to a prolonged effort, exemplified by the continuation of priorities in subsequent departmental plans.

The DPs also differ from the RPPs by including considerations regarding the 'operating context' within the 2017/18 and later Departmental Plans. The operating context briefly describes global conditions in respect to considerations or hindrances to GAC operations and can be understood as representative of historical embeddedness. Conceptually, the operating context acknowledges that global events influence and define Canadian governmental processes and practices, and our conceptions of them. Through this acknowledgement of the 'operating

context', the DP demonstrates formally why GAC, and by association the Government, views foreign policy as an area of holistic concern that has far reaching impacts.

Clearly, with respect to articulating feminist values and language, GAC has prioritized incorporating feminist ethics into the Departmental Plans. Consider the 'core action area' that is incorporated into other 'action areas' of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (2017). The core action area for GAC is to "promote and support gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls" (FIAP 2017, p. iii). This 'action area' was not limited to the FIAP but was emphasized in subsequent DPs and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. As well, in the 2018/19 DP, implementing the FIAP and WPS agenda became one of the departmental priorities and introduced the concept of core responsibilities. A 'core responsibility' is meant to perform an 'enduring function or role' which shifts the intention of the department from implementing programs aimed at achieving the SOs to understanding that it is the responsibility of the department to continue building towards 'a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world'. The core responsibilities of GAC did not change in subsequent DPs, helping to demonstrate that GAC understands the underlying issues (e.g., poverty) affecting international society require persistent vigilance. The feminist aspects of Canada's foreign policy tend to focus on poverty alleviation and political participation as exemplified through the Feminist International Assistance Policy. This assertion is further supported by the article, "Which feminism(s)? For whom? Intersectionality in Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy" which states, "A close reading of Canada's FIAP and its Action Area Policies shows that, for the federal government, women's and girls' economic and political participation are viewed as the key means and ends to women's empowerment and gender equality more broadly." (Morton, Muchiri and Swiss 2020, p. 333). The 2020/21 DP does not specifically state a core priority

being the continued implementation of the feminist foreign policy, rather that policy is considered implemented. Finally, the inclusion of the ‘operating context’ considerations within the DPs demonstrate GAC’s acknowledgement of the volatile atmosphere and conditions globally, and again serve to demonstrate the persistence and durability of GAC in propagating Canada’s feminist vision. Thus, the persistence and durability of Canada’s ‘Feminism’ within GAC as exemplified by the successive DPs, FIAP and WPS agenda fulfills the dimension of persistence/durability in Krasner’s (1999) characterization of institutions.

When viewed through an ethics as politics lens, the extent to which the behaviour of the Canadian government, via GAC, conforms to the institutional structure depicted in Canada’s feminist foreign policy can be assessed. As such, it reveals that Canada’s behavior as a ‘feminist’ is not only institutionalized, but also hypocritical. As shown, ethics and hypocrisy are linked as a result of ethical commitments within a state’s foreign policy. By highlighting instances of GAC representatives acting ‘ethically’, the degree to which Canada’s behaviour conforms with the institutional structure of GAC validates the claim that ethics, and as a result hypocrisy, has become institutionalized within Canadian foreign policy. As Canada’s feminist foreign policy was not unveiled until 2017, the evidence used to substantiate the institutionalization of ethics and hypocrisy within institutional structures focusses on the relationship and rhetoric between Canada and the KSA.

Consider the damage to Canada – Saudi relations, as previously described, from Minister Freeland’s condemnation of the KSA during question period in 2018 and Canada’s response to evidence of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder by the KSA. These actions lead to a multitude of accusations from the media and CSOs of hypocrisy on the part of the Canadian government. Furthermore, the ethical stances from the Canadian government highlight the ‘organizational

hypocrisy' of GAC as identified by Weaver (2008). Claims of Canada committing outright violations of GACs organizational mandate and policies as they pertain to Canada's feminist values are, as Weaver (2008) identifies, the most blatant form of organizational hypocrisy, and may have merit. However, viewing these actions myopically does not allow for a recognition of the various factors impacting Canada's decision to continue exporting LAVs. Rather, the influences of the operating context (i.e., historical embeddedness) on Canada's decision-making process are necessary considerations when determining if Canada is truly culpable of violating its institutional structure.

Within the Final Report detailing the government's justification for once again continuing the exports of LAVs to the KSA, the legislative framework for reviewing the export permits acknowledges the need for 'mitigating measures' when determining whether an export can be issued. These measures are intended to decrease the risk an individual export may pose to violating International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The mitigating measures, as described within the Final Report, commit resources to 'training relevant actors in the application of IHL and IHRL' as well as other measures including requirement checks and increased sharing of information between Canada and the end user of an export (the KSA government) among others. Thus, in the government's opinion, GAC was able to, as elucidated by Minister Dion in 2016, demonstrate 'responsible conviction' and remain steadfast in its conviction to protecting human rights. However, the responses from the media and civil society argue that this is demonstrably false, and the government is, in actuality, 'moving the goalposts' to ensure policy affirms, rather than informs, its actions.

These examples provide behavioural evidence of GAC's adherence to its institutional principles, though that does not mean they are inherently feminist, and likely indicates that

Canada creates and showcases its own unique version of a feminist foreign policy. As a result, organised hypocrisy is embedded within the institutional structure of GAC. However, the actual impact of organized hypocrisy is not apparent until Canada's ethical commitments and its limits are assessed. Therefore, I assert that by identifying Canada's ethical commitments and its limits the function of hypocrisy within ethical foreign policy is to bolster Canada's version of feminist ethics and shifts the risks, for these commitments, away from the government.

The Limits of Ethical Foreign Policy

As ethics, and by association hypocrisy, has been demonstrated to be institutionalized within at least one Canadian governmental institution, Global Affairs Canada, the question of whether foreign policy can ever be truly ethical can be evaluated. This brings with it an additional question: if foreign policy is not ethical, what are the ethics of a state that employs what they purport to be an ethical foreign policy?

As highlighted by Gaskarth (2013), an ethical foreign policy can be interpreted in a multitude of ways due to competing beliefs regarding what it is to be ethical. Clearly the ‘ethicality’ of Canada’s feminist foreign policy, as evidenced by the multitude of critiques and accusations of hypocrisy from the media and civil society regarding Canada’s continued approval of LAV exports to the KSA, is a matter of subjectivity and debate. These responses and critiques demonstrate that Canada is willing to risk its ethical commitments however, it is not abruptly clear why, or what value is added to Canada’s feminist foreign policy as a result. To understand the ethics of a state with an ethical foreign policy, it is necessary to begin by investigating why a state would risk ethical commitments when they cannot always be achieved in the international realm.

Consider the inherent paradox of a state with a feminist foreign policy that is focussed on alleviating poverty, increasing women’s political participation and curbing gender-based violence while simultaneously selling weapons to a state that actively discriminates against women and girls. Zehfuss’ (2018) elaborations on whether war can ever be considered ethical is useful in this context. Similar to Zehfuss’ (2018) description that ethical war kills and destroys like any other war, including those it seeks to protect, I argue that Canada’s feminist foreign policy negatively impacts those it seeks to uplift. The comparison could be potentially difficult to

prove, yet a stark example is Canada's role (regardless of impact) in the continued war in Yemen. As exemplified previously, Canada has made repeated assertions of upholding its values (e.g., responsible conviction) irrespective of actual policy decisions or actions. By claiming a feminist identity that exercises responsible conviction Canada is able to portray, regardless of veracity, a 'fantasy of control', as previously described by Zehfuss (2018). For Zehfuss, this meant violence is somehow controlled and is incidental to war. For Canada, this means women's empowerment and political participation is somehow regulated through legislation and is connected to Canada's feminist identity. This is exemplified by the departmental plans, export review, and gender focussed policies, which are intended to empower women and girls, and bolster Canada's claim to a feminist identity and 'champion of women's rights', domestically and internationally. Yet rather than empowering women and girls, Canada's claim to a feminist identity empowers the government's actions which result in negative impacts on women and girls in Yemen. Thus, showcasing the seductive quality of ethics and moreover, that it is not ethical thinking that is problematic, but our perception of it.

These considerations provide insight into why Canada may risk its ethical commitments. By declaring its intention for creating and actively implementing a feminist foreign policy, Canada is situating itself as an authority and legitimate defender of feminist values. However, Canada's vision for a feminist foreign policy, in the context of the FIAP, which "seeks to eradicate poverty and build a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world." (FIAP 2017, p. ii) must be remembered. While certainly idyllic, this vision serves to propagate a certain type of feminism; one which "advances an individualistic liberal feminism that prioritizes economic and political participation." (Morton, Muchiri and Swiss 2020, p. 347). In effect, the assertion by Zehfuss (2018) that "ethics creates and aggravates the problem it purports to

address” (Ch. 6.2, p. 20) proves to be valid in this context due to the unrealized, or unacknowledged, impact of the government’s ‘feminist’ actions. Therefore, it can be surmised that when the government continually approves the export of LAVs to the KSA, the Canadian Government, at an institutional level, believes it is remaining responsible to its convictions and commitments. In the Government’s view, Canada is not ‘risking’ its feminist foreign policy because it is not applicable within this context, further revealing the government’s narrow interpretation of a feminist foreign policy.

These assertions are strengthened further when considered in unison with Stavrianakis’ (2016) analysis of how international agreements, exemplified by the ATT, legitimize liberal forms of militarism that condone certain actions over others. Similar to Zehfuss’ (2018) assertion of ‘ethical war’ granting a state the ‘fantasy of control’, Stavrianakis (2016) submits that because the ATT represents “the confluence of arms control, security, human rights, trade, armed violence, sovereignty, development, self-defence, technology...” (p. 843), it legitimizes and protects states that are party to the ATT and thus part of the ‘legitimate’ arms trade. Therefore, when states conduct risk assessments only to decide in favour of the transfer, peace and security justifications are deemed acceptable by other adherents and serve to further legitimize their ability to trade (Stavrianakis 2016, p. 849). A claim that is exemplified within criterion one of the Final Report, whereby it is resolved that continuing the sale is in Canada’s strategic interest because the KSA inhibits Iranian aggression. The ATT seemingly grants states a ‘fantasy of control’ over where and who can receive exports of military goods and technology. Therefore, implying that because Canada is party to the ATT GAC is able to control or limit violence. However, Canada becoming a party to the ATT has not silenced legitimate criticism or accusations of hypocrisy for there is a clear gap between commitment and compliance to the

Arms Trade Treaty. Stavrianakis' (2016) concept of liberal militarism further highlights the practical means of a state, such as Canada, to claim the mantle of morality and responsibility while simultaneously approving arms sales to authoritarian states. With Zehfuss' (2018) and Stavrianakis' (2016) considerations in mind, it is possible to understand the divide between a critics point of view and the Government's belief in how Canada's feminist foreign policy and its limits are conceptualized.

The stated overarching focus of Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, while also providing aid and bolstering peace and security, is to apply a gendered lens to the way it approaches issues in the global realm. The limits of this policy are clearly exposed when dealing with authoritarian or undemocratic states that are likely to infringe and discriminate against a portion of their population. However, it is evident that the government believes that this is a necessary concession when interacting with other states. This is exemplified by former Foreign Affairs Minister Dion's initial justification in continuing the Canada – Saudi LAV contract when he suggests that cancelling the LAV contract would only result in it going to a non-Canadian, possibly more ambivalent contractor. Minister Dion assumes then, that Canadians may be more supportive of the LAV deal because of Canada's ethical proclivities as affirmed by its responsible conviction. Again, showcasing the influence of the perception that ethical considerations only have positive impacts, regardless of validity. In effect, the government is attempting to separate the realities of hypocritical actions from theoretical considerations. Therefore, I assert that the limits of Canada's feminist foreign policy are exposed by accusations of hypocrisy from the media and wider civil society.

Due to the ambiguous nature of ethics and hypocrisy, it is unreasonable to expect a clear demarcation of Canada's ethical limits and thus, the limits of Canada's feminist foreign policy are revealed by critiques of government actions and accusations of hypocrisy. Moreover, new or renewed critiques and accusations towards the government then continue to highlight the limits and the morphic nature of an ethical foreign policy, as exemplified by the open letters critiquing the Government's initial justification and Final Report.

While critiques and accusations highlight the limits and seductive quality of an ethical foreign policy, it does not necessarily lead to substantive change in behaviour or policy. Therefore, it is imperative to analyse what ethics are produced, as a result of the discrepancy between stated commitments and actual behaviour, in order to demonstrate the genuine ethical commitments of a state with an ethical foreign policy.

To demonstrate the genuine ethical commitments of Canada in regard to its feminist foreign policy, the concept of risk-transfer, elucidated by Martin Shaw (2002), is useful. Shaw (2002) argues that western military practices are engaged in risk-transfer militarism which is described as the comprehensive transfer of risks away from western military personnel and appears to be a major aim of the 'new' way of war. The concept of risk-transfer can be applied to Canada's justification that LAVs do not represent a 'substantial risk' to IHL, IHRL and women and girls. Canada is not subtle in its efforts to tie ethical considerations to any action which serves to legitimize and justify said action (e.g., responsible conviction; if the Canada – Saudi LAV contract is cancelled it could simply go to a less discriminating contractor, acceding to the Arms Trade Treaty). Consider the two elements, media management and indirect civilian casualties, identified by Shaw (2002) that contribute to risk-transfer militarism in the Canadian context. The government's management strategy in this case has been to largely ignore

legitimate criticisms, as demonstrated by the lack of response to the open letters from civil society advocates. As well, while not formally stated in the Final Report by GAC, the government appears to grant greater legitimacy to certain reports over others. As verifying incidents within the KSA can be difficult, Canada relies on intelligence reports from Canadian institutions and allies. In doing so, GAC prioritizes certain reports over other information that is counter to its narrative, as exemplified by Chase's (2020) criticism of the Final Report. By favouring certain information over others, Canada exemplifies Shaw's (2002) assertion regarding the acceptability of indirect and less visible casualties.

As the KSA has cultivated a harsh environment for journalists and activists (e.g., the murder of Khashoggi; imprisoning women's rights activists), verifying information has proved to be difficult. Because, in the government's assessment, there is no credible evidence of the KSA violating IHL, IHRL or discriminating against women and girls, Canada is able to feign a degree of ignorance while maintaining its moral authority. In this way, Canada is shifting the onus onto others (the media) to find substantial proof of the KSA's misdeeds. Thus, showcasing a double standard of evidence, where much more evidence is required to change beliefs or policies than is required to establish them in the first place (Welch 2005, p. 26). The evidence and assessment criteria within the Final Report exculpates Canada of any association with potential violations of IHL, IHRL or discrimination against women and girls committed by the KSA domestically, or in Yemen. Additionally, Canada's 'substantial risk' assessment demonstrates that the doctrine of 'double effect', as described by Shaw (2002), enables Canada to justify arms exports to the KSA. This 'double effect' doctrine suggests that it is permitted to perform an act likely to have negative consequences, on the condition that a positive outcome compensates for said consequence (p. 353). Furthermore, Stavrianakis (2016) contends that the doctrine of double

effect “makes space for consequences that are not deliberately intended, merely foreseen.” (p. 852). Taken together, Canada has effectively transferred the burden of proof onto the media and civil society at large, to prove beyond doubt that the LAV exports specifically are used by the KSA to commit human rights violations and meet the threshold of substantial risk. A threshold that may be subject to change depending on the government’s intentions.

While the Government of Canada is using the feminist foreign policy as a foundational basis for policy creation and conduct, it is its behaviour, defined by hypocrisy, that dictates the actual framework of Canada’s ethical commitments. As to exactly what Canada’s genuine ethical commitments are, Canada, via GAC, appears to be committed to the concept of risk transfer, the doctrine of double effect, and need for ‘proof grounded in evidence’, though the ethical value imbibed within these concepts and considerations is undetermined. It is apparent that Canada’s feminist foreign policy serves to enable and legitimize Canadian actions that could be characterized as hypocritical. Zehfuss (2018) supports this analysis by asserting that the ‘politics of ethics’, which is meant to guide actions, is a problem because it “enables the claim that we ought to and therefore can—or, alternatively, that we can and therefore ought to—change the world.” (Ch. 6 p. 35). Canada’s feminist foreign policy endeavours to change how Canada approaches international issues. In reality, it serves to further institutionalize hypocrisy and shift any risk away from the Government and onto the people it intends to protect, women and girls in Yemen.

Conclusion

Since being elected in 2015, the Liberal government under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has endeavoured to glorify itself as a conscientious, responsible and feminist actor on the global stage. Whether through Trudeau's infamous "because it's 2015" explanation to questions regarding gender parity in his first cabinet or kneeling in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter protests in June 2020, Trudeau and the Liberal government have made concerted efforts to promote and project an image of liberal progress and concern for human rights and women and girls (Chartrand 2015)(Cecco 2020). Concurrently, the department tasked with conducting Canada's foreign policy, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), has made successive justifications regarding the export of military goods and technology, specifically Light-Armoured Vehicles (LAVs), to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Thus, Canada appears to be caught in a paradox between ethical commitments and arms sales, where Canada is both a defender of human rights and protector of women and girls, and, complicit in violating International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and a party to acts of violence and discrimination against women and children in the KSA and Yemen.

Much of the media's focus has been on Prime Minister Trudeau and his role in promulgating ethical considerations while not exercising them practically. Rather, I have focussed on, and demonstrated how, ethical considerations become embedded within the institution tasked with conducting foreign policy. Moreover, as result of GAC incorporating ethical considerations into policy creation, via GAC's reports on plans and priorities (RPPs), departmental plans (DPs) and the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), hypocrisy also becomes implanted. This clearly demonstrates how ethics becomes intertwined with hypocrisy in states who employ ethical convictions within their foreign policy. Further, it is clear

that ‘ethical’ states are then able to justify seemingly hypocritical actions on the basis of ethics or ethical justifications, as exemplified by the Arms Trade Treaty. Canada has been able to deny culpability and maintain its ethical claims through the process of risk-transfer, whereby Canada transfers the risk of Canadian military exports being used in violation of human rights away from Canada’s export control process. This results in a contingency where others have to prove that the risk of misuse is substantial, and that “it is beyond suspicion, but need not be as high as ‘highly probably’—it needs to be ‘reasonably foreseen’, based on credible evidence of current and past record” (Stavrianakis 2016, p. 848). In doing so, the burden of proving the risk is on others to provide credible evidence of Canadian exports being misused by the KSA, domestically or in Yemen, where direct evidence is difficult to find due to practical limitations caused by the on-going conflict. Additionally, the ‘doctrine of double effect’ is employed by the government to justify an action further by contending that the positive effects of the deal outweigh the negative consequences. As a result, the government succeeds in its attempts to legitimize certain actions over others.

The primary intention of this thesis was to understand how hypocrisy functions in Canadian foreign policy discourses. As exemplified by the case study of the Canada – Saudi LAV deal, it appears that hypocrisy ultimately serves to embed ethical considerations, which are tied to hypocritical concepts, into foreign policy discourses. These considerations, predominantly demonstrated by the incorporation of ethical language, enables states to legitimize certain actions over others and protect the state, its allies and interests, from culpability for the negative impacts of its actions. Showcasing further that the government’s desire to be perceived as an ethical actor does not translate to actual ethical behaviour, only the perception of one. Thus, while it is important to consider the benefits of ‘ethical’ actions and policies of states that employ ethical

considerations, it is more important to understand that these ethical policies enable paradoxes, which are certainly problematic when created by a governing authority, regardless of the type of government. They may even subtly shift the balance of power further away from voting citizens to concentrate power in governments and states deemed legitimate. Ensuring that a democratically elected government remains responsible to its citizens could become increasingly difficult when ethics is employed as justification for an action, due its seductive quality and ability to legitimize certain actions over others. Understanding how states, political actors, and government institutions, are involved in the production of ethics and hypocritical processes via ethics, adds valuable insight into both theoretical and practical Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and the field of International Relations. At best, these understandings can continue to broaden knowledge and enlighten the field of International Relations. At worst, democratic processes and responsibilities are endangered globally.

This investigation into how hypocrisy functions within Canadian foreign policy discourses is not limited to Canada's relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or its adherence to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In October 2020, Canada announced the suspension of arms sales to Turkey over allegations that the weapons were being diverted to the renewal of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Jaramillo 2020). After review, the federal government announced the cancellation of arms exports to Turkey based on 'credible evidence' that Canadian technology was being used in fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh (Sevunts 2021). This example gives credence to my assertion that the onus is on the media to find substantial proof of other states misdeeds, and that there is a disconnect within the Canadian government between policy and action, at least where arms sales are concerned. To add further legitimacy to my research, additional research could focus on the historical impacts of hypocrisy on foreign policy. By

coupling discourse analysis techniques with a genealogical lens, hypocrisy could be traced back to the inception of ethical considerations within Canadian foreign relations. Myriad instances of Canadian policy and rhetoric being counter to actions and behaviours are ripe for examination and study, including Canada's actions in supporting the 2004 American led *coup d'état* of the democratically elected Haitian president, as well as the turn from support to condemnation of the South African apartheid regime. Both examples take place during pivotal moments of recent history, the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and rise of the Cold War, enabling a more holistic evaluation of ethical considerations. In this way, further study could add depth to the discussion of how hypocrisy functions within ethical foreign policy and contrast the current Canadian Government's stated ethical foreign policy with past foreign policies with ethical considerations.

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