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Unholy Coercion: The Complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Use of Rape as a War Tactic

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Unholy Coercion:
The Complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Use of Rape as a War Tactic

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Abstract

This project investigates the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of sexual violence as a war tactic and means of ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian War. The thesis explores this in three ways: examining religiously imbued incidents of rape by Serbian belligerents, analysing the relationship between Serbian Orthodox authorities to Serbian politics and war criminals, and deconstructing specific Serbian Orthodox theological discourses. A project of this nature relies on two foundational pillars: first, an in-depth exploration of rape (especially in conflict) and second, the interlocking and socially constructed nature of identities, particularly ethnicity, enemies and gender. The analysis relies on United Nations reports, transcripts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, media reports and secondary sources, all of which illustrate the often subtle and discursive relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the systematic rape of Bosniak women.

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Figures

Introduction: Setting the Stage to Investigate Serbian Orthodox Complicity

The international recognition of rape as a war crime, after the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, marks a major progression in international law and in our understanding of the roles of gender, power and violence in wartime. Looking specifically at the religiously informed Serbian-Bosnian Conflict in 1993, we see how Serbian Orthodox forces used the systematic sexual assault of Bosnian Muslim women and girls as a military strategy and an act of genocide.

After the Bosnian War, the United Nations began to understand the use of rape in conflict as both a war crime and a systematic and tactical tool of war. So systematic was the use of rape as a tool of war in the Serbian-Bosnian conflict that the UN began to distinguish rape in this conflict according to five categories. This categorization was determined based on factors such as motivation, location and involvement, making explicit the systematic nature of sexual violence in this war; one of these five categories included the use of rape with intent to impregnate Bosniak women. This in particular identifies rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing.[1] During this conflict, between 20,000 and 50,000 Bosnian women were survivors or victims of systematic and strategic sexual violence.[2]

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[1] Todd A Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia," *Human Rights Quarterly* 20, no 2 (May 1998) 351-359

[2] The statistics around the Bosnian war are greatly varied, generally estimated between 20,000 and 50,000 women were raped United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Conflict
A Framework for Prevention and Response," *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs A Framework for Prevention and Response*, http·//ochaonline un org/News/InFocus/SexualandGenderBasedViolence/AFrameworkforPreventionandResponse/tabid/4751/language/en-US/Default aspx, The International Action Center estimates are as high as 100,000, demonstrating the potential magnitude of this tragedy "The rape charge / Control through division in Bosnia," NGO, *International Action Center*, 2010, http //www iacenter org/bosnia/rape htm; Todd Salzman uses the statistic 50,000 to 70,000 He also adds that the Bosnian government estimates approximately 35, 000 Muslims and Croat women became pregnant via rape Using the statistical likelyhood of getting getting pregnant from a

I believe that understanding the role of religion is key to understanding sexual violence in the Bosnian War both in general and specifically within the context of ethnic cleansing. Religion and religious affiliation were central to identity in the Bosnian War, and the distinction between the War's protagonists by major nationalities and their associated religion enables us to label the Bosnian War as religiously informed. I am not saying that Orthodox Christians, Catholic Christians and Muslims (the three groups involved in the conflict) differ in multiple ways, one of which is religion. Rather, I am claiming that the major difference among these three similar groups is religion, and that religious affiliation thus determines ethnic identity: Orthodox Christians are seen as Serbs, Catholic Christians are seen as Croats, and Muslims are seen as Bosnians. Since ethnic cleansing is about evacuating specific identities from a territory, and since religious affiliation is central to defining and naming ethnic identities in the Bosnian War, the role of religion needs to be investigated when analysing the Bosnian War.

Because the Bosnian War is a recent event, it has been well documented; the literature dealing with different aspects of the war is fairly expansive and accessible. In fact, much has already been written about the Bosnian War, notably on the sexual violence involved and the clash of religious and political alignments, although very little has been done to link these three aspects of the conflict. (It should be mentioned that links are often

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rape, Salzman argues that this could mean as many as 3,500,000 incidents of rape.Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing."

made between at least two of the aspects, however.)[3] I believe the connection between sexual assault, the political atmosphere in Bosnia, and religion is crucial, as we will see later.

A Brief History of Conflict in the Balkans

No conflict happens in a vacuum; therefore, a brief history of conflict in the Balkans will help to contextualise the Bosnian War. Slavic tribes invaded and settled in the Balkans starting in the sixth century of the Common Era. While the Slavic culture dominated, the other major influence in the Balkans belonged to the Vlachs: a pre-Slavic tribe that survived the invasions and helped retain some of the language roots. The first identifiably Serb populations settled in tribes in Sandžak, Montenegro, Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia. Largely, under Bulgarian and Byzantine powers, Christianity began to seep into the Balkans via Orthodox missionaries from Byzantium and Bulgaria between the 9th and the 11th centuries.[4]

The Serbian tribes developed into kingdoms, beginning to appear throughout the 11th century, and they soon fell under Byzantine rule. In 1036, the leader "Stefan Vojislav renounced his allegiance to the emperor of Constantinople and pronounced himself for Rome and began to bring the neighbouring Serbian tribes under his control."[5] This change of allegiance put his territory under the authority of Rome and tied the land to Catholicism.[6] Flipping allegiances between Rome and Byzantium was a way for rivals to garner political

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[3] For example, Dubravka Zarkov explores the connection between gender and ethnicity in the Bosnian War Dubravka Zarkov, *The Body of War: Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007).
[4] Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 6-9.
[5] Ibid., 9.
[6] Ibid.

support in order to wrest power from the current ruler. The back and forth of allegiances lasted until the death of King Constantin Bodin, around 1160. After Bodin's death, Stefan Nejamanja, succeeded him and began a dynasty that would expand for 200 years, becoming increasingly powerful. The Nejamanjic Empire collapsed with the death of King Dušan in 1355, at which time the Turkish invasions began. After Dušan's death, Serbia was kept divided by bickering among feudal lords, and was soon defeated by the Turks.[7] By 1389, the Serbs and Turks fought the Battle of Kosovo, leaving Turkey as the dominating power with the death of Prince Lazar. Lazar's death was a key event in Serbian history that will be explored further in Chapter 2. The Serbs were a conquered people, expected to pay tribute to the sultans until 1459, when the Turks put thousands of Serbs into slavery and resettled many of them to Constantinople. Between Turks, famines and plagues, much of the population also migrated further west.[8]

Serbian national identity is strongly linked to the Nejamanjic dynasty -- first, because Stefan Nejamanja unified the Serbian tribes under himself, and second, because his younger brother Sava (later venerated as a saint in Serbia) halted the political and religiously backed fighting between his older brothers, settled the religious differences in Serbian politics and gained the autonomy for a national Serbian Orthodox Church (a patriarchate).[9] The level of religious tolerance under the Ottomans was hardly consistent, being very open at times and strongly oppressive at others. Sometimes there were restrictions placed on non-Muslims,

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[7] Ibid., 17.
[8] Ibid., 9-10.
[9] Ibid., 19-20.

such as the wearing of weapons or bright colours.[10] At the best of times, Christians and Jews had to pay additional taxes and were considered second-class citizens with the option to upgrade upon conversion to Islam; at the nadir of the treatment of Christians by the Turks, the Serbian Patriarchate was officially repressed.[11]

Feudalism and vassal states continued under Turkish domination. A key element of Orthodox historical memory were the Janissaries, who will be further explored in Chapter 3. In short, the Janissaries were an elite class of Turkish warriors. While in later years, they wielded a significant amount of authority and political power, they started out as a fighting force composed of Orthodox men, reputedly taken as children, raised as Muslims in the sultan's army.[12] Whether these children were kidnapped, part of a taxation system, or enthusiastically given unto Turkish care by their parents (or any combination thereof) depends largely on the time period and the historian.

Present day Bosnia/Serbia remained under Turkish power until 1878, when it came under Austro-Hungarian domination.[13] This continued until the end of World War I, which started when a Serb nationalist assassinated the future Austro-Hungarian leader, Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914.[14] At the end of World War I, in 1918, after Europe's major powers met in Versailles, most of the Balkan countries were conglomerated, into one larger country: Yugoslavia.[15] After the Second World War, Yugoslavia became a communist state under

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[10] Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia From Myth to Genocide* (New York and London New York University Press, 1999), 34
[11] Judah, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 44-45
[12] Judah, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 45.
[13] Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts A Journey Through History* (New York Random House Inc , 1994), 26
[14] Judah, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 64
[15] Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, D C The Brookings Institutions, 1995), 22-23

Tito, lasting past his death in 1980.[16] After Tito's death and the end of the Cold War, Croatia and Slovenia became independent states, sparking violent resistance from Serbia. This was the prelude to the conflict in Bosnia.[17] In 1991, Bosnia also declared independence, setting off the violence in the Bosnian War.[18]

While Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia are presently three separate countries, there are different ethnonational groups within the country. Bosnia has a diverse distribution of "Serbs," "Croats," and "Bosniaks," (and others) as identified and aligned by their religious leanings (Serbian Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims). As we will see in Chapter 2, this makes for a complex understanding of identity. This leaves us with "Serbs" in Serbia, "Croats" in Croatia and three groups – "Bosniaks," "Bosnian Serbs" and "Bosnian Croats" – within Bosnia.

This extremely violent Bosnian War and genocide began around 1992 and finished officially on December 15, 1995 with the Dayton Accord. The Dayton Accord was and continues to be enforced by the United Nations Protection Force.[19] In 1993, the United Nations set up the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), meant to try war criminals responsible for war crimes.[20]

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[16] Ibid , 21
[17] Ibid , 1-2
[18] Ibid , 181,193.
[19] Roland Paris, *At War's End Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97-100
[20] "About the ICTY," *United Nations Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,* http //www icty org/sections/AbouttheICTY

Argument

My project consists of examining the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of rape as a tool of war during the Bosnian War. I argue that the Serbian Orthodox Church[21] both contributed to and encouraged (intentionally or unintentionally) the use of sexual violence as a means to ethnic cleansing, during the Bosnian War, and that the Church did so in three ways. In particular, it is my contention that the Serbian Orthodox Church is partly responsible (1) for the war crimes done by Serbian soldiers, who identify as Orthodox and raped Muslim women as both a war tactic and also a means of ethnic cleansing; (2) for the political power exerted by ultra nationalist clergy in promoting hatred; and (3) for the use of theology to buttress, even if unintentionally, the use of sexual violence and genocide.

I intend to support my argument in three ways: through an examination of (a) those survivor accounts detailing that victims were given reasons, threats or statements that included religious language or arguments, (b) Serbian politicians and their attachment to the Church, as well as Serbian Orthodox clergy and their relationship to Serbian politicians and politics, and (c) specific Serbian Orthodox theological discourses from that period.

These three pieces of information will be drawn together and analyzed in terms of four key concepts: a) rape and genocide, b) nationalism and phyletism, c) the construction of enemy and d) conceptions of gender and gender roles. A thorough examination of rape and its usefulness in performing ethnic cleansing is vital for understanding the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in enabling the practice of conflict rape and ethnic cleansing. It is essential to understand what rape is and what rape means in order to begin uncovering why rape happens. Nationalism is also a critical consideration because this gendered crime was

[21] I will define what I mean by "Serbian Orthodox Church" further on.

targeted along lines defined by perceptions of ethnicity. (Phyletism is a heresy in Orthodox theology that is condemned for tying Church identity too closely with national or ethnic identity.) The discussion of the construction of enemies will address how it was possible to encourage rape and ethnic cleansing, and how extreme nationalism could flourish contrary to religious precepts. Finally, an examination of gender and gender roles is also essential, given the gendered nature of rape, for understanding how rape came to be used as a particular form of ethnic cleansing. These concepts provide the foundation necessary for supporting my argument, and they will serve as the lens that will make visible the connections between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the use of sexual assault against Bosniak women as an instrument of war.

Defining the Church

In order to complete my project, I must be diligent in defining what and whom I mean by the "Serbian Orthodox Church." Because I am accusing a particular group of going against their own tradition and of committing or encouraging war crimes and the use of mass rapes as a means of ethnically cleansing certain territories, it is essential to acknowledge that no definition of "Church" will be perfect – and in particular that many Serbian Orthodox did not participate in the tragedy and even stood against it. While these elements of the Serbian Orthodox Church are less relevant to my thesis, I do not deny that they are equally part of the Church. This is entirely crucial because the term "Church," unless it is defined, will be ambiguous in its meaning, will not speak to those I wish to confront and risks being misinterpreted by those I do not mean to involve. When I speak of the involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church, I refer to some of its members, including some of its clergy, and

some of its theological teachings at the time of the Bosnian War. It is crucial to recognise that I am discussing a trend, a degree of complicity that by no means encompasses the entire Serbian Orthodox Church, nor does it disallow or deny simultaneous trends and individuals that might have stood against the violence. Since my argument relies on discourse, and the more subtle and unquestioned pathways through which violence becomes perpetuated, I acknowledge that people can be unconsciously or unintentionally complicit. However, the unintentional, unconscious or indirect enabling of violence however, does not erase one's complicity.

Defining Responsibility and Complicity

In 2001, the United Nations International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released a report entitled "The Responsibility to Protect," outlining state, community and international responsibility to protect citizens. The document outlines three key responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. Though this document is focused on the role of states and the international community, there it is recognised that the "Prevention of deadly conflict and other forms of man-made catastrophe is, as with all other aspects of the responsibility to protect, first and foremost the responsibility of sovereign states, *and the communities and institutions within them*(emphasis added)."[22]

[22] Government of Canada Foreign Affairs Canada, "ICISS Report : International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty," December 2001, 19, http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.

The responsibility to prevent means "to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk."[23] The responsibility to react is an imperative "to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures "[24] The document states that some of these measures might need to be coercive, such as political pressure. The report defines the responsibility to rebuild as a duty to "provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert "[25]

Since the details that follow these definitions deal specifically with nation states, the details are of limited relevance to addressing the responsibility and complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of war crimes and violence in the Bosnian War The general principles, however, can easily be applied to a structure that holds any kind of power This places responsibilities on individuals, such as Serbian Orthodox faithful (who are autonomous beings with power over their own actions) and institutions like the Serbian Orthodox Church (which wields various types of power and authority over people and politics alike). If we can understand the Serbian Orthodox Church as responsible, then it is arguable that they are complicit if these responsibilities were not met. I will argue that the Serbian Orthodox did little to prevent conflict, but rather encouraged violence or generated conditions that were permissive of violence I will also argue that the Church did not do enough to react, in the way it encouraged or supported political leaders even as they were instigating war crimes. Lastly, the Serbian Orthodox Church failed to rebuild, especially in

[23] Ibid , XI
[24] Ibid
[25] Ibid

terms of "reconciliation" or "addressing the causes of the harm." This is continuously demonstrated by the use of nationalist rhetoric and the continued support of many of Serbia's convicted war criminals.

Method

In order to make visible the link between the Serbian Orthodox Church and its promotion of sexual violence and genocide in the Bosnian War, I will look at three groups of people: belligerents, politicians and clergy, and theologians. In considering belligerents, I plan to use transcripts from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of survivors who indicate that their experience of sexual assault was religiously coloured, encouraged or oriented. The close link between clerics and politicians will be identified through media reports and secondary sources. The examination of specific Serbian Orthodox theologies will focus primarily on gender: first, a Christmas homily given in 1993 by Patriarch Pavle, and second, an examination of religiously constructed gender and gender roles as they relate to sexual violence. Patriarch Pavle's homily included a call for Serbian women to bear more children in order to create more soldiers. The homily is a valuable resource because it is consistent with what we know of sexual violence and genocide in the Bosniaan War; one reason for the rapes was the explicit intention of Serbian forces to impregnate Bosniak women with "Serbian babies," in order to create soldiers who would grow up to kill Muslims.

Outline

I will divide the presentation of my research into three chapters. My first chapter will examine concepts of rape. The second chapter will explore the connections (and their importance) between ethnicity, enemies and gender. The third chapter will examine the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of rape as a means of ethnic cleansing. Each of these chapters elaborates elements of my argument that the Serbian Orthodox Church both contributed to and encouraged specifically the use of sexual violence as an act of genocide.

My argument that the Serbian Orthodox Church contributed to and encouraged the use of rape in the Bosnian War relies on two foundational pillars. The first is a detailed understanding of rape, particularlyof rape in the context of war and genocide. In the first chapter, I will examine the first pillar; that is, I will define and expand on the phenomenon of rape and the implications of sexual violence in war. This foundation will allow me to explore the connection between religion and sexual violence later on in my thesis. I will use Ann Cahill's theory of rape as an embodied experience as the basis of my analysis, but it is Andrea Smith who will allow me to expand Cahill's theory into the scope of sexual violence as genocide and a tool of war.

The second supporting pillar of my argument rests in a thorough examination of gender, ethnicity and enemies, which I will argue are all imagined and socially constructed identities that are interlocking; that is, they support and enable each other's existence. Chapter Two will dissect and study the creation of ethnicity, enemies, gender and the Other. I will argue not only that these concepts are socially constructed, but also that they are interlocking, depending on one another and strengthening each other as systems. It is in this chapter that I will rely on the writings of Benedict Anderson, John Jillions and Dubravka

Zarkov. These elements are key to my argument because understanding nationalism, enemies and gender in the case of the former Yugoslavia provides the background allowing for the contextualisation of rape, religion and the Bosnian War.

Though integral to my project, neither of these two pillars actually demonstrates the way the Serbian Orthodox Church retains some responsibility and complicity for the use of sexual violence as a means to ethnic cleansing. Thus, in the third chapter, I intend to demonstrate the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in creating some of the permissive conditions for the use of sexual assault as a war tactic and as a means of ethnic cleansing. This is the crux of my argument where, relying on the foundations I have laid, I will argue that the Serbian Orthodox Church condoned and at times encouraged the use of sexual violence in order to ethnically cleanse certain populations. To demonstrate this, I will use survivor testimonies, examine the connections between political and religious hierarchies, and scrutinize Church theology. This will illustrate that the Serbian Orthodox Church bears at least partial responsibility for the actions of its lay people, the official hierarchy and the theology of the time.

The evidence demonstrated in Chapter 3 will allow me to draw specific conclusions about the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church and sexual violence. In the final instance, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the Serbian Orthodox Church not only condoned the use of rape as a means of ethnic cleansing, it often encouraged the act.

Chapter 1: Theorising Rape in the Context of War and Genocide

In the Bosnian War, between 20,000 and 50,000 women were systematically raped.[1] Victims and survivors were predominantly Bosniak women and the perpetrators were overwhelmingly Serbian men. Despite this, it should be noted that all sides (Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian) have populations of survivors, victims and perpetrators. While sexual violence is not unusual as a means of ethnic cleansing, the Bosnian War is unique in that Serbian men attempted to impregnate, via rape, Bosniak women. Though this was by no means the only type of – or motive for – rape that occurred, it was an important factor. In addressing rape in a way that appreciates its complexity in the context of the Bosnian War, theories that address rape in war, conflict, ethnic cleansing and pregnancy are vital.

My argument that the Serbian Orthodox Church contributed to and encouraged the use of rape in the Bosnian War relies on two foundational pillars: the first is a comprehensive understanding of rape and especially of rape in the context of war and genocide. In this first chapter, I will examine this first pillar; that is, I will define and expand on the phenomenon of rape and the implications of sexual violence in war. Many kinds of rape exist, but the use of rape as a tactic in war or genocide sets it apart from rape in other situations. For the purposes of this thesis, these "other" forms of rape (marital rape, date rape, etc.), will be referred to as "peacetime rape." In general, peacetime rape is different from rape as it is used in war and genocide because the former comes from within the community rather than from without – though the boundaries that define community in the context of rape can be extremely fluid and one does not always exclude the other. This foundation will allow me to

[1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Conflict:
A Framework for Prevention and Response."

explore the connection between religion and sexual violence later on in my thesis. As I have discussed previously, I will use Ann Cahill's theory of rape as an embodied experience as the basis of my analysis, but it is Andrea Smith who will allow me to expand Cahill's theory into the scope of sexual violence as genocide and a tool of war. Following this, I will consider the implications of these joint theories, broadly, for understanding rape in conflict and as a means to genocide, leading to a discussion focused specifically on the usefulness of "embodiment" for understanding sexual violence in the case of the Bosnian War.

Ann Cahill and Rape as Embodiment

A. Foundational Theories of Rape: Rape as a Violent Act vs. Rape as a Sexual Act

In Cahill's book *Rethinking Rape*, she begins developing her theory by expanding on two main feminist writers and their theories of rape: Susan Brownmiller, who holds that rape is a violent experience, and Catharine MacKinnon, who argues that rape is a sexual experience. For Brownmiller, rape is never about sex, but rather about violence and control. Critiquing the historical notion that rape derives from biological urges that must be sated, she maintains that rape is a political action meant to enforce domination through degradation and power. Rape is a systematic and conscious way to control all women through fear and to induce the need to be "protected" by men.[2] In order to prove her point about rape as power, Brownmiller even mentions the use of rape in war: "Here women are used as political pawns, as symbols of the potency of the men to whom they belong."[3] In war, the act of raping a woman is not meant as a slight against the woman as a person (for this would require that she

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[2] Ann Cahill, *Rethinking Rape* (London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 16-17.
[3] Ibid., 18.

be seen as a person in the first place), but rather against the men to whom she "belongs."[4] Brownmiller supports her theory of rape as violence by appealing to biology. Men are physiologically constructed as rapists and women are designed to be rapable.[5]

Brownmiller's argument remains vital to rape theory for four reasons. First, taking sexuality out of the way we think about rape accounts for the varied ages and physical appearances of women who are raped.[6] Addressing rape as only a sexual act neglects the reality that many victims and survivors of rape do not correspond to popular images of the sexually attractive woman. Second, seeing rape primarily as violence questions the idea that rape is merely an incidental "crime of passion" rather than a systematic and societal issue.[7] Third, seeing rape as primarily sexual can often disguise and hide the violent realities that accompany rape.[8] Finally, focusing on violence in rape, rather than sexuality, removes the possibility that a woman could be guilty of being raped.[9] However, Cahill finds Brownmiller's theory of rape limiting in three main areas. First, her understanding of rape as politically motivated limits our understanding of rape to a particular time, space and type of politics. Maintaining such a limited understanding is unhelpful in the context of other cultures or times where rape, gender and sex have neither the same meanings nor consequences as they do in the North American context that Brownmiller discusses. For example, in the village of Gerai in Indonesia, rape is not something the community understands or fears the way that North Americans do. The socially constructed meanings of sex, gender and intercourse are very different, which is reflected in the community's

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[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 21.
[6] Ibid., 19.
[7] Ibid., 24.
[8] Ibid., 20.
[9] Ibid., 25.

understanding of rape.[10] In an entirely different culture, with little or no shared, historical context, sex can have very different meanings (and so can sexual assault). Second, because her theory is dependent on a particular context, Brownmiller's understanding is also incapable of explaining how rape came to be a generalized phenomenon.[11] For Cahill, Brownmiller's appeal to biology is also unfortunate. The identification of men as inherently rapists and women as inherently rapeable renders the struggle to eradicate rape a moot cause. There is no point in resisting rape as a society if it is an integral part of our human wiring.[12] Finally, Brownmiller gambles with women's agency, which is a position Cahill cannot accept. That is, Brownmiller only portrays women as those who are acted on, never actors themselves. If women have no agency, then there is no space or tools with which to either resist the current context or create real change.[13]

The second major trend in feminist thought is to see rape as a sexual experience, rather than as violent. Radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon develop theories about rape as primarily sexual. For MacKinnon, rape is a part of normal heterosexual interactions. Her argument for this is mainly that heterosexual encounters are always portrayed and policed as normative, with consequences for leaving this boundary, defined in terms of non-heterosexual encounters. Under these conditions, women are not truly at liberty to "consent" to heterosexual sex; when one is forced to be heterosexual, one cannot choose heterosexuality because there are no alternative options from which to choose.[14] This argument recognises that because consent is not integral to heterosexual interactions, women

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[10] Christine Helliwell, "It's Only a Penis: Rape, Feminism and Difference," *Signs* 25, no. 3 (2000): 789-816.
[11] Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will Men, Women and Rape* (New York Ballantine Books, 1975), 21.
[12] Cahill, *Rethinking Rape*, 24.
[13] Ibid , 25.
[14] Ibid , 37-38.

have little space in which to consent. Alternately, domination and coercion are quite common.[15] For feminists such as MacKinnon, rape is only different from normative heterosexual sex in that rape is a more obvious and visible form of coercion; besides this, she sees the two as of the same basic substance.[16] MacKinnon's emphasis on the sexual aspect of rape calls into question how women's desires and sexuality are shaped and whether they are shaped by societal factors. We cannot presume that one part of a woman's life is disconnected from the rest.[17]

MacKinnon's radical feminist view of rape as primarily sexual fails in a number of key areas. First, the emphasis that all heterosexual relationships are a form of rape ignores the uniquely violent aspect of certain forms of sexual encounter. Rape becomes assimilated into everyday experience. Second, this perspective (like Brownmiller's, but for different reasons) takes away women's agency and ability to resist rape. If everything a woman wants in terms of sexual desire is really rape, then she has no space to be able to resist. In addition, just as we cannot assume that human beings are not shaped by their social surroundings, so we also cannot assume that humans are dominated by them. The lack of agency makes the fight against sexual assault and rape impossible.[18]

Cahill argues that rape must be understood as both a sexual experience and a violent experience, together. Both theories are too simple on their own, and each misses one essential component that would distinguish rape from other forms of violence or sex: embodiment. Both Brownmiller's and MacKinnon's theories leave out questions of how the

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[15] Ibid., 39.
[16] Ibid., 40.
[17] Ibid., 42.
[18] Ibid., 43.

body is socially constructed and the manner in which the body both experiences and is configured by rape.[19] In order to expand further on the body's key role in the reality of rape, Cahill lays her foundation by first considering the subjectivity of the body (the ability to see women's bodies as subjects) and then analysing the body as a subject. Following this foundation, she lays out her case for a theory of rape that includes embodied experience.

B. Subjectivity of the Body and the Body as Subject

Historically, the Western emphasis on subjectivity[20] and reason has also allowed women's bodies to be associated with women's perceived inferiority. Depending on modern dualistic thinking, that which was connected with the mind was superior and what was associated with the body was the opposite.[21] This understanding of superiority developed because "reason could provide a host of goods that the body could not hope to provide."[22] For example, the body was viewed as fragile and disposable, unlike the laws that reason determined could govern the universe. Women were considered to have more "direct ties" to the body due to menstruation, reproduction and their role in mothering and therefore limited or lesser subjectivity. This sense of difference allowed for a divide that defined one group as superior. Men became perceived as different from women in terms of reason precisely so that there could exist a group of people who used reason. Difference was invented so that the dominant category itself could exist. Not only did the prestige of reason and of subjectivity

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[19] Ibid , 48
[20] Her use of the term "subjectivity" does not mean the same as "subjective" with respect to "objectivity " Instead, it refers to being able to be subjects in the world
[21] Cahill, *Rethinking Rape*, 52
[22] Ibid , 51

in the modern period place women and their bodies in an inferior position, but the prestige was also dependent on women's inferior position.[23]

Cahill also demonstrates that early feminists critiqued these notions of reason and subjectivity and attempted to gain membership as subjects. She quotes Mary Wollstonecraft, who, though she did not question many of the assumptions of her societal context, still proposed challenges to women's placement outside the realm of being subjects. Wollstonecraft argued that if women were weak and unreasonable, it was because they were socialised to be this way. Unfortunately, she did not question the overarching dualism that pitted reason in opposition to the body.[24]

Cahill also considers the discussion in contemporary feminism concerning the difference between sex and gender, and she critiques the emphasis on this distinction. The distinction between sex and gender has been incredibly useful in distinguishing gender biases and the socially constructed exclusion of women. While this has been an extremely helpful tool on an intellectual level, it too does not address the body and the world that is constructed for certain bodies; in fact, the distinction between sex and gender depends on women's disembodiment.[25] While one's self identification is extremely important, in matters of rape, bodies are often interpreted by the rapist, rather than what might actually be the self-identified gender. This fact is key because it makes visible the rapes of gay, lesbian and trans bodies that are often made invisible in discussions about the Bosnian War, which is important in a theory that needs to take the bodily and psychological experiences into account. Acknowledging the limitations of the sex/gender distinction recognises the

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[23] Ibid., 51-54.
[24] Ibid., 56-57.
[25] Ibid., 59-65.

potential violence done by projecting and assuming gender and gendered traits. Contrary to what one might expect, setting aside the sex/gender divide is precisely what makes these bodies and these realities visible again.

Cahill also mentions postmodernist theories that have been brilliant in terms of challenging assumptions and dismantling dualistic categories. Cahill sees as problematic the idea of the postmodern body being the stage on which discourses and psychosexual drives play out. For her, this takes away from the importance of the physicality of the body: taking away from the "body" of the body.[26] In these theories, which are essentially about women and men's equality with one another (and to which bodies should be deeply connected), women try to fit into male categories, or the category of women magically disappears. Unfortunately, this does not erase that bodies and bodily differences exist. In addition, both have an impact on and are impacted by lived experiences.[27]

Because these contemporary trends in feminist theories about subjectivity do not adequately deal with the body and embodiment as a subject, Cahill explores feminist theories of the body. Here, Cahill draws on authors and some specific pieces such as Rosi Braidotti's "Nomadic Subject,"[28] Elizabeth Grosz's "Volatile Bodies,"[29] Judith Butler's concept of gender as performance,[30] Moira Gatens' "Imaginary Bodies"[31] and Luce Irigaray's[32] theory of thinking from the feminine body, in order to compile a theory of embodiment with which

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[26] Ibid., 68.
[27] Ibid., 69-70.
[28] Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, 0th ed. (New York. Columbia University Press, 1994).
[29] Elizabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994)
[30] Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 1990)
[31] Moira Gatens, *Imaginary Bodies Ethics, Power and Corporeality* (London. Routledge, 1995).
[32] Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, 3rd ed. (New York. Cornell University Press, 1985), Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), Luce Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1993), Luce Irigaray, *I Love to You Sketch for a Felicity within History* (New York. Routledge, 1996).

to address rape. Using these theories, Cahill provides a framework for analyzing rape. This framework includes embodiment, intersubjectivity, sexual difference and discontinuity.[33] I will discuss these four concepts in turn:

Embodiment:

It is extremely important to Cahill that a feminist subject be always seen as embodied. An embodied subject is always part of the body; she or he cannot be separated from the body. Cahill acknowledges that bodies are shaped by political, social, historical and physical powers, which are always trying to control bodies. However, she also stresses that these forces do not always succeed, and she argues that we need to see our bodies as "moving targets" that can refuse or accept some of these shapings—resistance is possible. Rather than being controlled by discourse, our bodies are marked by it.[34]

Intersubjectivity:

Subjectivity is often tightly linked with individualism, an individualism that can be entirely unhelpful to feminist work. For Cahill, modern individualism relies on the illusion that people are entirely independent from one another, not taking into consideration the relationships, especially power relationships, necessary for the individual to operate in society. It is important to see that while human beings are individual subjects, each is connected and in relationship with others in a society. Our subjectivity comes out of these

[33] Cahill, *Rethinking Rape*, 71-108.
[34] Ibid., 101-103.

relationships and out of our context within a social context.[35] This is crucial to Cahill's understanding of rape because it disrupts a "model of sexuality whereby one person is 'acting' and the other person is 'acted upon.'"[36]

Sexual Difference:

While gender neutrality is useful in theory and in much feminist discourse, it can be quite unhelpful in conversations about rape. The distinction between sex and gender often takes the body out of the equation. In saying that one's body does not determine who one is, that a person's gender is separate from their body, the body and difference is often unaddressed and left behind. In a conversation about embodiment and ethical issues that impact gendered bodies, these theories are not helpful. There is a need to analyse sexed subjects because survivors of rape are identified as sexed subjects (regardless of gender self-identification) and because rape is a physical act against the body. Cahill does not want to rely on biology as a way to distinguish sex or create any fixed idea about what sexual difference *looks* like; her aim is rather to unearth those realities that are excluded from consideration when the body is forgotten altogether.[37]

Discontinuity:

Cahill emphasises that bodies and subjects are dynamic; they are always changing and developing. Our bodily experiences are also part of this dynamic, changing and

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[35] Ibid., 103-104.
[36] Ibid., 104.
[37] Ibid., 104-106.

developing context. Everything we are is constantly unfinished and never static.[38] This means that our ethics can and must include the importance of "material and bodily changes and transformations. Bodily experiences no longer happen to a persistent immutable self; instead, they are part of the ongoing construction of the self and are in fact central to the development of particular modes of subjectivity."[39]

These categories allow us to recognise "an embodied, fluid, intersubjective being whose materiality is the basic condition of possibility for existence."[40] Because starting with bodies means beginning with difference, this particular framework is especially appropriate for considering an interlocking analysis that includes any kind of difference, such as race, class and sexual orientation.[41] This approach enables us to ask what rape is in terms of black bodies, poor bodies, disabled bodies and any other bodies that carry any other form (or combination of forms) of identity. The openness of this theory to recognising an interlocking analysis is especially useful in the Bosnian War, where bodies were labelled by ethnicity, religion, gender and enemy status.

C. Rape as Embodiment

With this framework, Cahill lays out her theory of rape as an embodied experience. Rape does need to be categorised broadly in order not to exclude people. Yet, it is still vital that any theory of rape be able to consider context, lest the theory lose what makes it

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[38] Ibid., 107-108.
[39] Ibid., 108.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

useful.[42] Context allows for experience, difference and the agency of the survivor to address the particulars of her experience. The exclusion of context would make unhelpful assumptions and projections onto the survivor. For the purposes of this theory, Cahill is specifically interested in the rape of women. She argues that while gender neutrality can be useful, in rape theory it is only deceptively broad as it "allows some of the sexually specific aspects of rape to be ignored."[43] This is not meant to deny the existence of rape against men, but rather to recognise a gendered difference, where sexual violence against men deserves its own research, rather than merely being tacked on to violence against women. In the Bosnian War, for example, men who were raped were more likely to be killed than women were.[44] I hold a strong interest in sexual violence against men, but am not able to address it satisfactorily within this space. By focusing specifically on violence against women and those who are identified as women, we are able to observe some shared experiences and motivations against, female victims and survivors that would not be shared among men. Of particular interest to me is the use of rape to impregnate women as a means to genocide, a tactic not used against men.

It is necessary that the embodied and lived experiences of rape victims be taken seriously; to do otherwise is to deny some of the outcomes of rape. Unfortunately, because the retelling of victims' experiences can cause harm, these stories need to be highly respected. Rape as a bodily experience allows for difference—infinite difference—and breaks down the idea that rape can be a universal experience. In this way, victims can hold

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[42] Ibid., 109
[43] Ibid., 110
[44] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 166

on to experiences they may share in common, without losing their voice to one dominant discourse or story about rape.[45]

Because rape happens to bodies, the body is crucial to understanding rape. As we have already said, this focus on the body also implies difference. With difference as our starting point, Cahill's theory can adequately address race and raced meanings as integral. It allows for an interlocking analysis of all the factors of difference that could have specific meaning within the context of rape.[46]

It is impossible to remove sexuality from rape theory without causing harm or hiding certain experiences. The real benefit to taking the sexual aspects out of rape is that one is able to talk about it comfortably without losing social respectability. This is hardly in the interests of either the theory or the victims. While rape can happen to anyone, the majority of sexual assault occurs to women. This uneven assault against particular sexed bodies means that rape must have a recognised sexual component. We know that in a North American context, women overwhelmingly are the victims and survivors of rape.[47] Another important aspect of the sexuality of rape is that, while rape is not sex, rape does not have to be sex in order for rape to retain sexual traits. Moreover, to see rape as sexual does not necessarily imply bodily parts and does not restrict rape to the use of genitalia.[48]

Cahill's stress on intersubjectivity comes into her theory of rape because it demonstrates the effect of rape on personhood and sense of being: it is an attack on these very things. She argues that intersubjectivity "encourages us to perceive such physically

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[45] Cahill, *Rethinking Rape*, 113-114.
[46] Ibid., 116.
[47] Ibid., 119-121.
[48] Ibid., 139-140.

traumatic experiences as rape as potentially radically transformative occurrences." This trait also denies that people can be separated from their experiences, acknowledging the impact of experience on the self. People cannot be disassembled into easily identified compartments.[49] This intersubjectivity is key to allowing us to see rape as something transformative and having consequences: "to know oneself as not only rapable, but as raped, is to become a different self."[50]

Finally, rape is an embodied experience, directed against embodied subjects. Seeing rape as embodied allows us to acknowledge the victimhood of the survivor, without removing all agency and ability to act for herself. This is important because, since rape is an embodied experience, "the acts of the rapist will necessarily be integrated into a new bodily being, but they do not exhaust the victim's possibilities of being."[51] To see rape as embodied is to acknowledge the interdependence of bodies on other bodies and to acknowledge human frailty, without that dependence or that fragility needing to be a negative reality.[52]

Building on Cahill's theoretical understanding of rape, we now move to a discussion of how this can be applied in a context of conflict rape and its use as a form of ethnic cleansing. While Cahill's theory lends itself to this project, she does not specifically address it. For this, I will rely on Andrea Smith's application of Cahill's theory of embodiment in order to see the theory stretched to include conflict and ethnic cleansing specifically.

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[49] Ibid., 131-133.
[50] Ibid., 133.
[51] Ibid., 138.
[52] Ibid., 142.

Andrea Smith and Rape in Genocide

Andrea Smith, in her book *Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide*, analyses rape as a tactic of war and genocide as it has been used against aboriginal peoples in Canada, the United States and Mexico. Out of her case study of war rape against aboriginal peoples, we can draw out the theoretical framework she uses and see how mass rape has been employed as a form of genocide. Her theoretical framework of rape in war is similar to Cahill's, but Smith's understanding also goes beyond Cahill's in that Smith adapts it in a way that is applicable for understanding this tragedy better both generally (rape in war or genocide) and in other specific contexts (rape in war and genocide of Native Americans or any other group).

Andrea Smith begins with a brief explanation of rape and its particular context in aboriginal communities. Sexual assault includes both men and women but affects them differently. Like Cahill, Smith focuses primarily on women but does not assume that rape does not affect men. Because rape in aboriginal communities is raced, like all forms of genocide, differences between white women and Native women are also key to her work. Because sexual violence is used as a tactic against aboriginal peoples, the consequences (rape, racism, erasure) are calculated, systematic and intentional, not mere unplanned effects. She argues that Native women's bodies have been socially constructed as rapable, with the intent of "thingification," self-hatred and self-destruction. In some cases, Native women are even invisible as targets. The demonization and abuse of Native women is also used to control white women, in that white men have literally abused Native women as a symbolic abuse of white women. The treatment of Native women is thus intended, additionally, as a threat to white women of what may occur if they do not side with or conform to the

patriarchal status quo [53] While her work focuses on Native American genocide, these ideas are key to understanding conflict rape in general and can be used to address the specific context of the Bosnian Conflict (i e , the construction of certain bodies as rapable, the demonization of Bosniak women and the control of Serbian women via the rape of Bosniak women) Smith provides us with a language and a context for discussing conflict rape, we can draw parallels and discover or name difference

The genocide of Native American peoples through sexual assault has been played out through the history of colonialism and, as Smith demonstrates, persists today Colonial ability to rule depended on the maintenance of power and structures of domination The use of hierarchy and its imposition, Smith argues, is a learned trait, something that does not occur naturally European patriarchal structures were radically different from the structures found within aboriginal communities In order to impose this system of hierarchy, colonial powers needed to assimilate aboriginal peoples partially, without ever completing the assimilation Partial assimilation (through language, residential schools etc) allowed new structures to come into place without Europeans' ever losing the higher authority or right to govern that they asserted In the past and today, the imposed legal system, contrary to its purposes, works against the interests of aboriginal communities and is often a perpetrator of sexual violence [54] Colonialism, imported hierarchies and the partial assimilation of Native peoples depended on the use of sexual violence To illustrate this, Smith quotes a Cheyenne saying "a nation is not conquered until the hearts of the women are on the ground "[55] The history of

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[53] Andrea Smith, *Conquest Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide* (Cambridge, MA South End Press, 2005), 8-21
[54] Ibid , 26-33
[55] Ibid , 33

the Balkans is likewise complicated and important in the creation of rape policies, ideas about gender and gender roles, disproportionate applications of power and enemy divisions (whether drawn across ethnic, religious or political lines). Any nuanced and useful study of rape should include recognition of a particular history, responsible in part for shaping the world of victims, survivors and perpetrators alike.

Unlike Cahill, Smith expands her understanding of rape to include the rape, not only of women's bodies, but also of a people's land and spiritual practices; this can include both the rape of the land and these spiritual practices, but can also mean the inclusion of land or spirituality in the raping of human bodies. While Cahill does not discuss these aspects of rape, I believe that her theory can be adapted to include land and spiritual practices because these too can be physical and part of embodied experience. Including these experiences is important because the definition of rape is not overly defined or limited to a particular aspect of sex or sexuality (e.g., having rape limited to penile penetration). Rape becomes understood in terms of experienced consequences, rather than specific actions. I find the inclusion of spirituality especially important in the context of the Bosnian War, which was drawn across religious lines. An example of where this inclusion impacts our understanding would be when Bosniak women are deemed rapable because they are Muslim, or that they are being impregnated in order to produce Christian soldiers. The question of spirituality also includes assumptions about certain bodies and what they look like, based on the identification of one's body as belonging to a particular religion. An example of this involves a woman who, while being assaulted by soldiers, was told she could not be a Muslim because her pubic hair was unshaven. They then tried to make her deny that she was a Muslim; when she refused to state otherwise, they incorporated shaving her into her assault

in order to make her a "real Muslim."[56] Not only is this an assumption about what certain religious bodies look like, but it incorporated both the enforcing of this assumption and specifically oriented the assault to be about her religious identity. Broadening the understanding of rape in this way is useful because acknowledging the manner in which both land and spiritual practices are violated can shed some light on the reality of raped bodies. This tactic is especially important in considering the subject of rape in a way that addresses specific contexts. The analysis and inclusion of context is vital when addressing both peacetime rape and conflict rape.

Smith points to a parallel between the social construction of Native women and that of Native peoples' land: both are considered violable. Implicit in the imported hierarchical structures is the idea that if Native people do not subdue the land, just as if they do not subdue women's bodies, they lose their rights to them. All parallels aside, Native women's bodies are violated alongside the destruction of the land. This association between the land and the violable female body is intriguing when we take into considerations such metaphors as the "chastity border belt." This was a metaphor used for borders that imagined them as a "chaste, but not very trustworthy maiden, in need of proper protection, control and defense."[57] Male soldiers must defend the maiden (the land bordering other countries) from penetration by other soldiers. In the context of the Balkans, there are similar references to

[56] Maria Olujic, "Embodiment of Terror: Gendered Violence in Peacetime and Wartime in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1998): 42.
[57] Zarkov, *The Body of War: Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 1.

the territory of Mother Serbia.[58] This already colonised land and territory takes on gender and gendered imagery that corresponds to gendered humans.

The violation of women's bodies, in the context of Native American genocide, includes a fear of Native women's reproductive abilities and the desire to control them. In the United States, Smith argues, this has become a matter of national security.[59] The need to control women's reproductive capabilities is described in her chapter called "Better Dead Than Pregnant." This attitude is manifested though phenomena such as sterilization abuse, the perception of Native women as substance abusers to remove control from Native communities and bodies, and the general removal of choice.[60] Smith goes through each of these categories and several others, and she provides both historical context and recent examples of a continued genocide of Native American peoples in North America. For example, a rhetoric of "overpopulation" – a combination of racism and a (supposed) concern for the environment – advocates policies that Smith terms "green hate." In short, such rhetoric claims that there is a crisis of overpopulation and that when there are too many people on the planet, the environment suffers. Because non-white people (and in North America this includes Native peoples) are having too many children, they are hurting the land and should control their birthrates. This racist propaganda has led to the forced sterilization of women of colour.[61] The possibility that white people might also be contributing to this "overpopulation" remains unvoiced, and the impact of colonialism and capitalism on childbearing are likewise ignored. This rhetoric of overpopulation and

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[58] Wendy Bracewell, "Mothers of the Nation," *WarReport Bulletin for the Institute of War and Peace*, October 9, 1995
[59] Smith, *Conquest Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide*, 79.
[60] Ibid., 80-88
[61] Ibid., 71-73

strategic implementation of tactics to decrease the birthrate of minority populations is reflected in Serbia, whose government has put forth reports and implemented programs to decrease the "beyond rational" birthrates of ethnic Albanians, Muslims and Roma populations living in Serbia.[62] Third, toxic waste sites, similar to nuclear explosions, are usually on or near Native lands, which has a direct effect on women's bodies.[63]

These examples do not differentiate Smith's theory from Cahill's, but rather serendipitously adapt and demonstrate a way in which Cahill's theory can be applied to a larger context. An integration of the theories of Cahill and Smith is potentially useful, not only for understanding individual accounts of rape, but also for examining the entire notion of rape in war and genocide in general and for investigating war/genocidal rape in a specific conflict. For Smith, when considering rape as a tactic of war or genocide, any response must not only recognise rape as an assault against the victim's identities (gender and colour), but must also be prepared to work with context, histories and the dynamics of the present. Rape needs to be understood as fundamentally complex.[64] Cahill's work alone does not provide the tools necessary to address rape in conflict or genocide, but Smith's work not only demonstrates Cahill's theory in context, but also expands on Cahill's work by specifically including conflict and genocide, and by considering the unique contexts that conflict provides.

As an example of the unique context of war, Maria Olujic identifies a change in meanings and language before the Bosnian War and after it. She demonstrates that sexual

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[62] Zarana Papic, "How to Become a 'Real' Serbian Woman?," *WarReport Bulletin for the Institute of War and Peace*, no. 36 (September 1995) 41.
[63] Smith, *Conquest Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide*, 55-78
[64] Ibid., 151

poetry originally used language which represented a certain level of intimacy, but in the aftermath of the war, these words have taken on additional connotations of blood, rape and death.[65] Another example of the unique context with which conflict rape provides us refers to those who commit rapes. Miranda Alison demonstrates how gang rapes serve to create and preserve group loyalty by insuring all group members are complicit. This causes some of the rapists, to a certain degree, to become victims themselves. She also mentions that there is evidence that some soldiers felt guilty and used drugs and alcohol as a coping mechanism in order to perform in the rape camps in Bosnia.[66] While this potential coercion does not absolve soldiers of their crimes, it does demonstrate that the complex relationship between the rapists and the rape includes aspects not present in peacetime rapes.

The Theory of Embodiment as Applicable to Genocide and War Rape

Both Cahill's and Smith's analyses are extremely important in their recognition of rape as (a) both sexual and violent and (b) an embodied experience; the former elaborates on the theory and the latter is able to apply it to a specific context in a way that can be used for examining other conflicts, especially in war and genocide. The application of Cahill's theory as a way to analyse rape in war is extremely useful; her concept of embodiment is so relevant to genocide and war precisely because genocide and war are all about bodies—specifically gendered bodies. Smith, meanwhile, provides a way for understanding the physical repercussions of rape.

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[65] Olujic, "Embodiment of Terror Gendered Violence in Peacetime and Wartime in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina," 34-35

[66] Miranda Alison, "Wartime Sexual Violence Women's Human Rights and Questions of Masculinities," *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007) 77

Using Andrea Smith's arguments about land and spirituality, and their deep connection to women's bodies, we can bring Ann Cahill's theory of rape forward in a way that better fits an understanding of rape as used in war and genocide. Cahill fails to address the connections among land, spirituality and the sexual assault of women, but that is because this particular need is specifically within the context of Native American genocide. A theory of rape that deals with its use in war and genocide must be open to considering factors beyond the traditional western understanding of peacetime rape. War and genocide complicate the issue and bring in new factors, to which an adequate rape theory must be capable of responding. Fortunately, while Cahill does not address these factors herself, the fact that her theory focuses on embodiment makes it flexible enough to incorporate these factors. This flexibility comes about largely due to the inclusivity and space for self-determination of her embodiment theory.

Cahill does not address why rape occurs, which means that her theory is not locked into one understanding of the cause of rape. Both fortunately and unfortunately, because she does not explore these issues, the theory leaves her readers to address why rape happens. This prevents there being one dominant understanding of the origins of rape and yet negates the chance for theories of origin to build upon one another. Understanding the reasons why rape occurs is vital, because as Cahill and Smith demonstrate with their understanding of embodiment, rape is more than a single static event. It is a transformation and something that lives within the body – often including ongoing consequences such as continuous trauma and the reliving of experiences. We also should not assume that the consequences are immediate and static. Because consequences are not immediate or static, differences in

purpose and intent in different situations of rape can drastically change a survivor's understanding of their experiences and of themselves.

The fact that Cahill's argument includes both power and sexual aspects of rape is extremely important when considering war crimes. Often, the sexual aspect of rape is ignored, leaving theorists unable to address specific aspects of rape in conflict that are expressly sexual or where sexual pleasure is key; examples include female child soldiers as gifts, wives or sexual rewards for male child soldiers[67] and the use of systematic "rape camps" (as in Bosnia) available to soldiers.[68]

Theories of Embodiment, Religion and Rape in the Bosnian War

My own research examines the use of rape as a tactic of war and genocide in the Bosnian Conflict. During the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, the systematic and widespread rape of women was an instrument in the process of genocide. In this particular conflict, soldiers and other members of the Serbian Orthodox Church were responsible for brutal sexual crimes against many Muslim women.[69] It is the connections between sexual assault and religion in particular, that drives my research. Cahill's use of rape as embodiment will allow me to look at not only gendered and raced bodies, but also religious bodies. Together, Ann Cahill and Andrea Smith provide me with the tools required to complete my project with their unique contributions to rape theory.

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[67] *Women, Peace and Security Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)* (United Nations, 2002), 130

[68] *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)* (United Nations, May 27, 1994), 58-59

[69] "Bosnia and Herzegovina - Amnesty International Report 2008 Human Rights | Reports, News Articles & Campaigns | Amnesty International," *Amnesty International*, 2008, http //www amnesty org/en/region/bosnia-herzegovina/report-2008

Rape in the Bosnian War was used as a form of power and control, in order to instil fear; Serbs used rape not only to make Bosniak victims fearful of Serbs, but also to make Serbs fearful of Bosnian Muslims. Salzman comments on the use of propaganda and how the fear of rape was used to stir up nationalism and hatred. For example, he describes the use of television to broadcast footage, supposedly of Orthodox women being raped by "the Other" (though in actuality these were images of Bosniak women being raped by Serbs). The fear of rape was used as a political tool to change public opinion, in order to increase the power of the nationalistic regime responsible for the genocide.[70]

The United Nations Commission of Experts investigated the rapes of women in the aftermath of the Bosnian War and clearly identified five patterns in their *Final Report.* First, rape was used during the looting and stealing in conflict areas. In this category, women often knew their rapists as part of the community.[71] Here the boundary between "peacetime rape" and "conflict rape" begins to break down. Embodiment is helpful in addressing the rape by familiar faces (both in war and peacetime), especially when we consider Cahill's "moving target." The moving target as metaphor for how we are affected by social pressures and surroundings recognises the importance of context in the shaping of ourselves. As Cahill demonstrates, survivors of rape are shaped by and embody their rape. Rape by someone we know, therefore, can be differently embodied from rape by a stranger. Embodiment recognises the unique difficulties and trauma of continuing to be in relationship (not necessarily sexual) with our rapists.

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[70] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 353-354.
[71] *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)*, 58.

Second, Serbian forces used rape as a systematic tool with the intent to demoralise and cripple resistance while attacking villages and towns [72] Written evidence demonstrates the use of rape as a policy, this evidence shows the premeditated "research, planning and coordination of rape camps" by Serbian forces Using rape against women and children was thought, based on Serbian perceptions of Bosnian Muslim culture, to be an effective way to destabilize the enemy [73] The second category also resulted in the death of many of its victims [74] Here, embodiment recognises the assumptions about certain bodies that are sexed, ethnicised and identified by religion Since these identifications are written on, or at least interpreted from the body, embodiment is key

Though religion and spiritual practices cannot be easily recognised as physical traits, they can certainly be embodied experiences, especially, in this context, for Muslims and Orthodox Christians Their religious experiences are embodied in their rituals, their prayers, their fasting and other ascetical practices, their theologies, their symbols and their understandings of the physical world Orthodox Christianity, in particular, focuses on the idea of embodiment and embodied experience in the Incarnation of Christ The very existence of a "Serbian" Orthodox Church, implying an ethnic component, also demonstrates the importance of embodiment Cahill's theory of rape as embodiment is also essential to my research because rape has been done by and to bodies of religious believers As Andrea Smith was able to use embodiment to analyse similar factors in the context of Native American genocide, these and other factors in the context of the Bosniak genocide can be likewise explored

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[72] Ibid
[73] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 356
[74] Ibid , 361

The third category of rape documented by the United Nations includes detention centers where Bosnian men were separated from the women and were then sent to different camps or killed. In the women's detention camps, "soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries and civilians" sexually assaulted prisoners.[75] These acts were done either away from the group or as a public performance in front of other prisoners. Occasionally, women were coerced into sexually assaulting their fellow detainees.[76] We can see the progression of different stages of systematic sexual violence. Here, we see how rape is acted out on particular bodies with the intention of controlling a particular group. We also see bodies explicitly losing their status as human beings as they begin to be used as sexual slaves, not just for soldiers but also for civilians.

The fourth pattern was the use of rape camps. In these camps, women were detained in any variety of buildings and repetitively raped over long periods.[77] Women in this situation were often told that soldiers were attempting to impregnate them and that their children would serve as Serbian nationalists. When women were found to be pregnant, they were kept under closer supervision and suddenly given certain privileges, in order to maintain the health of the mother. When the period of gestation neared its end, they were sent to Serbia to give birth.[78]

While Cahill's concept of embodiment is helpful and necessary to deal with these varieties of rape adequately, the concept of impregnation, in particular, demands an understanding that includes embodiment. We have established that rape is an embodied

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[75] *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)*, 58-59.
[76] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 358-359.
[77] *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)*, 59.
[78] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 359.

phenomenon that affects and remains with the survivor and transforms them, but the inclusion of pregnancy, especially forced pregnancy in war by the enemy, drags embodiment into another dimension. These pregnancies raise a number of questions about rape that general theories do not always ask. What does it means to live with a visible sign of rape that everyone can see? That everyone can interpret? What does it mean for one's experience of rape not only to become a part of one's body, but to become a body in itself? What does this mean for survivors who desire and cannot have an abortion? What does this mean for survivors who would normally never want an abortion and yet who were impregnated for the purpose of raising enemy soldiers? What is the meaning of abortion in this context? What does it mean when one believes that the embodied consequence of one's rape (the child) is still innocent? What does it mean to give birth to that child and leave it to die? To give birth to that child and give it to another family to raise? To give birth and choose to keep that child? What does it mean to watch the embodied consequence of one's rape, which now has its own body, grow and become his or her own person? Many (though not all) of these questions are possibly unique to the context of conflict rape, not because pregnancy is unique to conflict rape, but because pregnancy can take on some new and different meanings in the context of war and ethnic cleansing. The only way to grapple with them is to include embodiment in the analysis of these events. While these questions are tangential to my overall argument, that the Serbian Orthodox Church shares complicity for the sexual violence used against Muslim women in the Bosnian War, these questions are important to voice and keep in mind as we address the rest of the argument.

The fifth use of rape in the Bosnian conflict was to provide sexual services to Serbian soldiers as they returned from the front lines. Over time, women who were used for sexual

services were either exchanged for new women or murdered.[79] Embodiment is extremely useful in acknowledging the unique difficulties of women who caught sexually transmitted infections (STIs) via their rape. This consequence is also applicable to the other four trends of rape. These infections are certainly embodied, and depending on the STI, permanently so. Death is another permanent consequence of this category (and many of the others) and certainly an embodied experience with a permanent result.

Conclusion

Rape has always been a consequence of war, but after the atrocities that occurred in Yugoslavia, the recognition that rape was used as a war crime has given us a space in which to analyse and theorise about these atrocities. Ann Cahill's theory, important to rape theory in general, has proven itself as a necessary component in the challenge to address adequately the use of rape in conflict. Her theory, in conjunction with Andrea Smith's theory on rape, which is able to consider particular instances of genocidal and war rape, is invaluable to my research and my attempt to discern the complicity of Serbian Orthodox Christianity within the reality of rape in the Bosnian War.

Above all, we should take from these theories that rape is fundamentally complex and needs to be dealt with as such. Second, context greatly impacts rape, as well as our meanings and our definitions of rape. To talk about sexual violence in war is to take seriously the differences between peacetime rape and conflict rape, such as different meanings that wartime produces about rape and sex, the open and public nature of rape camps (where

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[79] *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)*, 59.

peacetime rapes are usually hidden or frowned upon by society), the differences in access to resources, and the potential differences in intention and method. It also means to take seriously the unique circumstances of rape. Recognising both the complex nature of rape and the need to consider context allows us to examine sexual violence as more than a static act in time between victims and perpetrators. Third, looking at rape as embodied allows us to consider ongoing consequences and key social factors or discourses, and broadens our definitions of what sexual assault means. It is only in recognising these three key ideas that we will be able to address the complex relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the use of rape and ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian War. This will be explored more explicitly in Chapter 3.

This is only the first foundational pillar that is necessary to build my argument. The second is an analysis of the social construction of ethnicity, enemies and gender and the ways they are connected. This analysis will be required for making explicit many of the factors and foundations necessary for the systematic use of conflict rape in the Bosnian context that have thus far only been hinted at. An analysis illustrating how ethnicity, enemies and gender are constructed will allow us to understand the context of rape in the Bosnian War and give us a solid foundation with which to address the subtle but existing relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the use of sexual violence in this conflict.

Chapter 2: Interlocking Identities and the Social Construction of Ethnicity, Enemies and Gender

In order to adequately address the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church with regards to the use of rape in the Bosnian War, it is necessary to build a second pillar to my argument, laying a theoretical understanding of ethnicity, enemies and gender. In the Bosnian War, ethnicity, enemies and gender became three key markers of identity central to the discussions throughout the war and its aftermath. Ethnicity is key because the boundaries of the conflict were drawn across national lines: Serbian, Bosniak and Croatian. The identity of enemies is central to addressing any conflict where one group of people is in opposition to another. Gender is integral to our discussion about sexual violence in war because, as we have already see in chapter 1, rape is a gendered phenomenon, primarily a violation of women by men. I will argue not only that the concepts of ethnicity, enemies and gender are socially fabricated, but also that they interlock, depending on one another and strengthening each other as systems.

For the purposes of my research, Benedict Anderson's theory of imagined communities will be coupled with two other authors. Using Tim Judah and Branimir Anzulovic, Anderson's theory of imagined communities can be expanded to consider the grand narrative and myth of the "Heavenly Serbia." I will argue that this idea of the "Heavenly Serbia" is central to the creation of Serbian identity.

I will also use John Jillions' work on enemy language to show how enemies are created, especially within a theological or ecclesiastical setting. This will consider the intermingling of tradition (scripture, commentaries, liturgy, practice) with the contemporary world in the context of creating enemies.

Dubravka Zarkov demonstrates the construction of gender in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. She makes an argument that the creation of ethnicity is dependent on cultural ideas about gender and gender roles. She also argues that the creation of both gender norms and ethnicity were necessary for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the tragedies that ensued.

Finally, it is important to specify that when I say "Serbian," I am not implying that all Serbs believe or accept these social constructions. When I name these social constructions, I mean to distinguish a set of dominant ideological trends and narratives that create pressure within Serbian society. In addition, acknowledging these narratives and trends in no way excludes the possibility for resistance or difference.

Addressing the social constructions of ethnicity, enemies and gender in the former Yugoslavia provides a theoretical structure that recognises the complexity of human identity. My work in chapter 1 recognised both the complex nature of rape and the need to incorporate context in a study that examines rape in war. Identity is important for two reasons: first, identity is a key component of the context we need to recognise when addressing sexual violence, and second, the Bosnian War is particularly dependent on discourses that help construct identity.

The Construction of Ethnicity: Benedict Anderson

Understanding nationalism and ethnic identity is fundamental to understanding the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War because the conflict was divided along ethnic lines. Benedict Anderson, in his book *Imagined Communities*, theorises about nationalism and national identity as "imagined communities." He explores the socially constructed and created nature of national identity and its formulation, and contributes three constructive

ideas to my work. First, a nation is imagined to have three central components: imagined limitedness, imagined sovereignty and imagined community.[1] To be imagined as limited means the nation has "finite if elastic boundaries."[2] This creates both an inside group and, by definition, outsider groups. Imagined sovereignty is a desire for independence and freedom from others and outsiders. He argues that while this is derived from Enlightenment constructions of the individual and a shedding of religion, this does not necessarily exclude God completely. He specifies that if God is involved, as I would argue is the case in the Serbia of the 1990s, the nation would be seen as only barely below the Divine.[3] This is important because we will later see the close connection between God and Serbian identity in discourses of ethnicity. Imagined community refers to a constructed idea of brotherhood or familial ties with others belonging to the nation. These ties hold firm despite two key barriers: a) actual systemic inequality within the group, and b) the impossibility of being in relationship with each person in a nation.[4] While these bonds are not founded on actual relationships, imagining them to exist still has real implications in the way real life is performed and lived.

The second important idea Anderson contributes to my work is that national identity or ethnicity becomes normalised and naturalised. According to Anderson, national identity becomes identified as inherent, unchosen and integral to who we are as we are born—natural. People come to believe that they cannot opt out of their national identity any more than they can change their skin colour. In effect, national identity becomes embodied. This

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[1] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections in the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Norfolk: The Thetford Press Ltd., 1983), 15-16.
[2] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition* (London: Verso, 1983), 7.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., 6-7.

connection between the "natural" is made explicit when we consider the familial language used to describe countries, such as "motherland".[5] In the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, this connection with inherent ethnicity is made visible in the attempts by Serbian men to impregnate Bosniak women in order to create Serbian children.[6] The father's ethnicity is passed on to the child fully without the mother's background, socialisation or choice becoming a factor. In Bosnia, parts of the population identify, or are identified, as being Serbian, despite being born in Bosnia, outside the geographical boundaries of the state.[7] This connects Serbian ethnicity to blood and lineage, or social heritage, rather than to geographic birth locations. This familial history, passed down via genetics, exemplifies the inherent, natural, almost "destiny" quality of ethnicity. Wendy Bracewell also discusses the maternal language and imagery associated with the state ("Mother Serbia") and names its purpose as legitimizing and creating the nation as "natural."[8]

Third, Anderson states, "nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies."[9] When he says this, he is arguing for its distinction from racism, but I think this is nevertheless a key concept for understanding the creation of ethnicity during the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. For Serbia, this historical identity is the myth of "Heavenly Serbia."

In short, "Heavenly Serbia" is a historically steeped meta-narrative, of mythic proportions, which is used to define who Serbs are (much like the way Canadians might all be understood to be peaceful, hockey-loving and pro-multicultural). This is based on legends

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[5] Ibid., 143-144.
[6] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 359.

[7] Judah, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 62.
[8] Bracewell, "Mothers of the Nation."
[9] Anderson, *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition*, 149.

of saints and kings who defined their nation, starting with King Dûsan in the Glory Age of the Serbian Empire (1355)[10] and leading to the death of Prince Lazar while resisting medieval Turkish invasions. The history of Lazar is less important to the creation of the Heavenly Serbia than the folktales and stories that are told about him. In 1389, Lazar fought the last significant battle of resistance between the Serbs and the invading Turkish armies. In actuality, the Turks did not win this battle. Both Lazar and the Turkish leader were killed in battle, but after this, the Serbs were no longer capable of resisting militarily. After they recovered, the Turks took over.[11]

Regardless of the actual history, Serbian legend and folktales that are repeated again and again identify Lazar as a martyr for his people, who chose the "Heavenly Kingdom" rather than the "Earthly Kingdom." This places religion, and specifically Serbian Orthodoxy, in the center of the Heavenly Serbia myth. There are popular images in poetry and folktales that use imagery from the Last Supper and construct a sacrificial hero and a "moral victory."[12] Since Lazar lost his life, not only is he a martyr of the nation (and exalted as such in the Serbian Orthodox Church), but the narrative becomes one of constant vigilance and defence against outside forces and of fear of assimilation or extinction. This is illustrated in Figure 1. This is an icon representing Heavenly Serbia through the martyrdom of Serbs in World War II. The icon represents Dachau concentration camp (top right), martyrs "killed by Atheists," including Croat Nazis in World War II (left) and Christian soldiers (below right). The discourse provided by this narrative of historical destiny helps

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[10] Judah, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 80.
[11] Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia From Myth to Genocide*, 39.

[12] Ibid., 11-12.

produce the nation and the ethnic identity of Serbs This narrative might not be reflective of how all Serbs identify themselves any more than Canadian narratives about politeness and the passionate throes of hockey love are representative of all Canadians. This discourse also reflects Anderson's ideas about inherent ethnicity; this is a history that people are born into, supposedly by blood and lineage. We also see the components of Anderson's nation· insıders versus outsiders, the struggle for ındependence and imagined fraternal community via shared history.

Figure 1. Heavenly Serbia

Source "Момо Капор- међу великанима Небеске Србије," *Посматрач Србски*, March 5, 2010, http //www posmatrac com/2010/03/blog-post_05 html

The Construction of Enemies: John Jillions

The status of "enemy" is just as constructed and subjective as one's ethnic status. One's status as enemy is not something that is self-identified in the way gender and ethnicity might be, but ıt ıs nevertheless purely socially constructed; it is an identity marker that is key

to understanding any conflict, where so much hinges on identity in the first place. Enemy status is very much like the construction of ethnicity and gender in the way that these identities and their meanings can also be constructed or imposed. The Bosnian War is no exception. Anderson's discussion inherently implies the existence of enemies or outsiders when he defines insiders. Rather than repeating his arguments, I would like to introduce two key ideas from the Rev. John Jillions' work on the construction of enemies within Orthodox Christianity. His work will also help situate our understanding of enemies in the context of Orthodox theology and praxis.

First, he argues that the Orthodox Church has a complicated and inconsistent relationship with its "enemies." The Tradition ("big T," including scripture, liturgy, Patristics and theology) expresses a range of views from hatred of enemies to proclamations advocating the love of our enemies. For example, in the New Testament, Jesus says, "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy,' but I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you."[13] Later New Testament writers such as Paul sometimes advocate that "enemies" should be avoided and excluded from the group, e.g., "I urge you, brothers, to watch out for those who create dissensions and obstacles, in opposition to the teaching that you learned; avoid them."[14] This multitude of often opposing views can be seen in other parts of scripture, liturgical rites, theological writings, and practices, as well. All of this leaves the question of enemies open and the fate of our enemies undecided and subjective. While there is no consensus about how Orthodox Christians are called to interact with their enemies, there is no dispute that they exist. A lack

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[13] *The New American Bible* (Kansas: Catholic Bible Publishers, 1988), Matt 5:43-44.
[14] Ibid., Romans 16:17.

of consensus often means that the faithful can treat enemies poorly and feel justified in their hatred.

Jillions' second idea that would be useful here is that there is no consensus as to who "the enemies" are. Interpretations of enemies vary from "spiritual enemies" such as the devil, to historical figures, scriptural persons and tangible figures within a particular space and time; for example, Ukrainian Orthodox who lived under Russian rule might say "communists" are the enemies.[15] Interpreting a particular group in a historical context as enemies is especially relevant where national Churches or political strife is evident; Serbia in the early 1990s had both. As we have already briefly discussed, religion (Christian Orthodoxy) is central to the idea of Heavenly Serbia and Serbian identity. The designation of ethnicity in the Balkans is actually drawn along religious lines: Serbian Orthodox, Croatian Catholic and Bosnian Muslims.[16] When ethnic and religious identities are bound together, religious enemies are more easily reflected in the state's enemies. Branimir Anzulovic specifically notes key Serbian Orthodox theologians and bishops who identify as enemies Jews, Catholics, Mohandas Gandhi and Josip Tito in addresses, letters and media statements.[17]

This theological fluidity and trend to not define the rules and the Tradition exhaustively is a common theme in Orthodox thought. This aversion stops the Tradition, and all it contains, from being made stagnant and dying, because the Tradition is continuously alive and applicable to new contexts. As soon as something becomes completely codified and rigid, it risks death and irrelevance, as the world continues to change without the

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[15] John Jillions, "The Language of Enemies," *Logos* 40, no. 3-4 (2009): 330-332.
[16] Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*, 43.
[17] Ibid., 118-123.

Tradition. It is important to demonstrate the usefulness of the trend in Orthodox Christianity to avoid definitions and why it exists, because I will argue that this slippery aversion to definition also insures that certain subjects and ideas remain unquestioned, because the exact nature of the discussion can never be pinned down. This flexibility has the potential to be useful for Orthodox Christians, in that it provides room for change, but the reality is that dominant ideas often remain unquestioned and resist attempts at deeper investigation.

This Orthodox aversion to rigid definitions is key to understanding the construction of enemies because it demonstrates how state enemies can become religious enemies. Within Orthodox theology, an overemphasis on national identity is termed "phyletism." Phyletism was condemned by the synod of Constantinople in 1872 as a heresy.[18] Despite the status of heresy, some national churches or communities within them persist in emphasizing nationalist politics in the context of religious practices. The national aspect of a particular church emphasizes the importance of culture, historicity and contextual spirituality, but an extreme dependence on national identity within a church leads to the exclusion of others. In the case of Serbia in the 1990s, I implicate phyletistic tendencies (and its connection to the creation of ethnicity and enemies) as partially responsible for the ethnic conflict and Serbian attempts at ethnic cleansing.

The designation of religious enemies can bear a lot of weight within a political group, like Serbia's governing politicians, that incorporates religious ideas or believers into its practices. This is exemplified by Radovan Karadžić, currently on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for war crimes, who claims, "not a single

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[18] "Eastern Orthodoxy," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2010, http://search.eb.com.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/eb/article-60470.

important decision [regarding the carrying out of the Bosnian War] was made without the Church."[19] Religious enemies are easily open to definition by the state for political or nationalist agendas, especially when religious figures share these politics, bringing us back to the potential dangers of phyletism. For example, clergy, such as Bishop Filaret (Micevic), continue to be members in good standing of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Bishop Filaret was a vocal supporter of nationalism and the political violence of the Bosnian War. Reportedly, "In the early nineties, Filaret was something of a media star pushing his extreme Serbian nationalist views. On one occasion he appeared on television holding a skull in his hands, which he claimed belonged to the Serbian child killed by Croats. He also liked to pose for photographers in his priestly attire, but sporting a rifle."[20] He was a fervent supporter of accused war criminals such as Slobodan Milošević[21] and Vojislav Šešelj[22]. Bishop Filaret has also been black-listed and refused entry to EU countries for his public expressions of support for war criminals; this became quite controversial when he attempted to meet with Šešelj at the Hague.[23] Bishop Filaret's use of national rhetoric and his actions are more than just personal opinions. Even if he does not intend to speak on behalf of the Church, his position as a cleric gives him authority that is meaningful to Serbian Orthodox faithful. We also see that he intentionally used his role and authority as a priest to influence

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[19] Mitja Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Texas Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 268

[20] Vlado Mares, "Rift In The Serbian Orthodox Church," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, December 10, 1999, http //www iwpr net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=245732&apc_state=henibcr199912

[21] "Milošević dismisses lawyers," *BBC*, July 2, 2001, sec Europe, http //news.bbc co uk/2/hi/europe/1417460 stm

[22] "Transcript of 29 October 2003 for the Pre-Trial Status Conference of Vojislav Seselj," *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, October 29, 2003, http //www un org/icty/transe67/031029SE.htm

[23] Ibid , 158-161

political ideas, exemplified by his posing for photographers in clerical robes. Moreover, it is meaningful to note that during the war he was a priest, only being ordained as a bishop in 1999. Given the authority and responsibility that comes with becoming bishop, this seems like a reward. If it is not a reward, then at the very least it demonstrates a tacit support by the Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy for his incredibly political actions. His ordination was "attended by Patriarch Pavle and, very unusually, by high-ranking state officials."[24] This, once again, demonstrates the close ties between politics, political figures (and therefore political ideas) and Church hierarchy. We see in these examples that even if Orthodoxy, the Orthodox Church and its officials do not formally label who the enemies are (although some of them have done so), religious ideas about enemies were key to the productive power of creating enemy identities in Serbia at this time and had real consequences and effects. These incidents reflect the importance of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Heavenly Serbia's idea of the Serbian nation and brotherhood.

While an analysis of how enemies are constructed is crucial in addressing both sexual violence and conflict, considering the construction of gender is also key. Given the gendered nature of rape, the construction of gender in Serbia will be a lens that makes visible insights that would otherwise go unnoticed.

The Construction of Gender: Dubravka Zarkov

Dubravka Zarkov examines bodies, especially of women, in the fall of the former Yugoslavia. Using media sources from Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, she demonstrates that all bodies are perceived as gendered and that all gendered bodies are also ethnicised by the way

[24] Mares, "Rift In The Serbian Orthodox Church."

gender or gender roles are defined. She names and uses three different kinds of bodies as a lens through which she examines the productive connection between gender and ethnicity. First, she examines the maternal body, exploring who gets to be (or has to be) recognised as a mother (often in opposition to the categories of militant woman or whore). This deconstruction comes primarily from an analysis of media coverage of women protestors just before the collapse of Yugoslavia. The language surrounding "mothers" and "whores" was used in different conflicts by multiple media sources with various allegiances in order to report and interpret the political activism of women. In some cases, women marched in protest of the use of rape against their population; their slogan was "We are not whores, we are mothers," and variations of such.[25] This dichotomy is crucial to Zarkov because it highlights not only the role of women and what makes a good woman but also the opposite role of men. The particular use of the concept of "mother" in opposition to the word "whore" provides a binary that creates a moral hierarchy between different kinds of women.[26]

Zarkov is also not alone in exploring the discourse around mothers in Serbia (see, for example, scholars such as Wendy Bracewell[27]) but Zarkov's inclusion of victim and soldier identities contributes something new to the discussion. The ready connection made by protestors and media between "bad women" and the "enemy" demonstrates an explicit link between enemies and gender but also a profound implicit link between constructions of gender and constructions of ethnicity: Good, Serbian women are mothers and fulfill that role

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[25] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 27
[26] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 37, See also Deborah Stienstra, "Madonna/Whore, Pimp/Protector. International Law and Organization Related to Prostitution," *Studies in Political Economy* 51 (1996)
[27] Bracewell, "Mothers of the Nation."

on behalf of the nation. Bad women are "whores", traitors to the nation, and woman who transgress boundaries unofficially lose their ethnicity when they are called "Ustashis" (a word referring to Croatian fascists).[28] This connection between gender and gender roles also comes with parameters and policing of sexuality and with a heteronormative orientation.[29] The creation of ethnicity in Serbia therefore has consequences for those who refuse to conform to limited categories of identity, including homosexual, trans and childfree populations. These populations in particular are rendered invisible by the discourse of gender and motherhood in the way they are used to produce identity. This invisibility is an example of the consequences of constructing ethnicity, enemies and gender in particular ways, symptomatic of the same constructions that shape sexual violence in the context of the Bosnian War.

Zarkov also dissects the moral implications surrounding motherhood and people who are or are not mothers. This includes the Serbian obsession with the "White Plague" (the fear of death of the Serbian nation or population via low fertility rates). This fear led to criticism of both Serbian professional women and women who chose to have abortions.[30] They were instead encouraged to "come to their senses, give up paid jobs, and raise children for the nation."[31]

After examining the maternal body, the second type of body Zarkov visits is the victimized body. This group raises questions about the determination of who gets to be or must be a victim and the implications of this determination for gender and ethnicity. In the

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[28] Stasa Zajovic, "The Guardians of 'National Values' and Biological Reproduction," *WarReport Bulletin for the Institute of War and Peace*, no 36 (September 1995)
[29] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 11
[30] Ibid., 4.
[31] Ibid

Bosnian War, 20,000 to 50,000 women were raped during the conflict. In one particularly poignant example, Zarkov demonstrates that the Croatian media's emphasis on the raped Bosniak women victims by Serbs served to a) differentiate and remove agency from Bosniak women, b) make invisible the rapes of Croatian women, c) invalidate the rapes of Serbian women and d) hide sexual violence against men. Bosniak women were consistently reported as both the victims of rape and too ashamed to confess their realities. Croatian media made the rapes of Croatian women invisible by only reporting the rapes of Bosniak "victims." This also helped to construct the Bosniak population as "other." Finally, the rapes of Serbian women were invalidated because Serbs (implying men) were consistently reported as rapists and Serbian women (when mentioned) were at times reported as helpers or perpetrators of violence themselves.[32] This example shows clearly how ethnicity becomes stitched to certain ideas and tropes, such as "victim," "normative" and "rapist." These projections impact the way information is interpreted and gives specific meanings to certain ideas. Such projections also remove agency and make assumptions about the experiences of others. As we saw in Chapter 1, self-determination, agency and context are crucial to understanding rape.

Zarkov also demonstrates how gendered violence creates ideas about men and men's identities. Here, we see that good women are constructed as victims of rape and good men are shown to be starved but unviolated sexually (especially within international media coverage).[33] The reporting of sexual violence against men, while limited, differs according to the ethnicity of both the reporters and the victims. Again, we see only certain kinds of

[32] Ibid., 129-135.
[33] Ibid., 156.

men (Bosnian Muslims) portrayed as victims of sexual assault while Croatian men (while still helpless) are reportedly untouched by sexual abuse. Likewise, Serbian men are consistently portrayed as the perpetrators of violence.[34] While these examples are taken from Croatian media, their relevance to my work in Serbia is affirmed in the trend that hints that ethnicity can be assumed and implied by knowing traits: good/bad/victim, man/woman. These traits become affixed to certain bodies via their relationship to victimhood.

When she considers the third kind of body, the armed body, Zarkov demonstrates the way militarised women were welcomed but only insofar as they contributed to the reinforcement of certain gender roles and therefore (again) ethnicity. "Good" allied women soldiers are consistently portrayed as girlish, sisterly and mothering, with emphasis placed on their feminine features. One example given is Jadranka, a Serbian woman who followed her brother to war. In the Serbian media, her primary role was designated as sisterly protector. While her skill is sufficient and she is accepted into her unit, she is never seen as a warrior in her own right. Rather, the emphasis is on her connection and desire to be alongside her brother.[35] Alternatively, "bad" enemy or fallen soldier women are shown to be transgressing their gender boundaries into areas where they do not belong. Zarkov discusses two articles, a year apart, about a woman named Mara who defends her village. The first article written about her applauds her bravery but reinforces gender stereotypes by way of physical descriptions ("tiny posture") mannerisms ("childish embarrassment") and reactions (wanting to be simple and unknown or divert attention from herself). She is allowed to be a fighting hero insofar as it can be portrayed as unusual and for as long as she continues to claim it was

[34] Ibid., 156-159.
[35] Ibid., 205-206.

a matter of happenstance and that she only desires to be feminine. The second article, a year later, depicts her as a fallen heroine due to her transgression across gender boundaries, describing her mixed up masculine and feminine habits. She has been labelled by her community as "trigger happy," resulting in the loss of her job on the police force. While the journalist depicts this as unfair, her masculine traits are described as habits or acting, rather than her own traits. She also fell from grace when she stopped resisting the praise for her masculine gesture of protecting her village and continued to "be masculine" by joining the police force and leaving her farm life.[36] This regulation of armed bodies constructs good productive women and differentiates them from bad women. Women who transgress gender boundaries are permissible so long as they retain their inherent femininity. This reflects Zarkov's naming the assumption that "men are natural soldiers, while women are there only conditionally."[37] This demonstrates how gender and gender norms are policed and enforced, reflecting Cahill's "moving target," which demonstrated that while women and men have agency, pressures to conform make resistance difficult.[38]

The coverage about armed bodies also includes epic language and references to old legends and myths. Zarkov compares it to describing conflict in Northern Ireland using the language of Shakespeare.[39] There is distinct use of Serbian epic poetry, mythology and associated tropes.[40] Both of the examples given include examples of common tropes in

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[36] Ibid , 208-210.
[37] Ibid , 211
[38] See also Claire Turenne Sjolander and Kathryn Trevenen, "One of the Boys? Gender Disorder in a Time of Crisis," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 12, no 2 (June 2010) 158-176
[39] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 204
[40] Ibid

Serbian poetry (the love between brother and sister[41] or Mara's innocence and betrayal[42]). All of these ways of speaking about soldiers are only mentioned when women are being explored in the media, rather than their male counterparts. It is here that we encounter again Heavenly Serbia and historical identities. Heavenly Serbia is often reinforced by epic folk tales and poetry that defines Serbian ethnicity and what it means to belong to the group. Tim Judah demonstrates the effect of poetry, legends and myths on the shaping of Serbian historical consciousness using an epic song about the dinner held by Lazar before his last battle. This contains a passage about a character, Vuk Brankovic, who is named as a traitor within the verses and the reason for Lazar losing the battle. This betrayal is an important part of the Heavenly Serbia myth even though it only became part of the story approximately 200 years after the historical event and has no historical basis.[43]

While this list is hardly exhaustive, Zarkov firmly demonstrates the social construction of gender, and its connection to defining ethnicity and other discourse-mediated social constructions. While she includes enemies implicitly, I would like to take a more explicit approach that addresses the extent of the relationship between ethnicity, enemies and gender in order to demonstrate the relevance of this relationship to the use of sexual violence in the Bosnian War.

Interlocking Identities

My intention in this section is to show the connectedness of these three socially constructed markers of identity: ethnicity, enemies and gender. Zarkov explicitly links

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[41] Ibid., 206-207.
[42] Ibid., 208-210.
[43] Judah, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 34-37.

gender and ethnicity and demonstrates beautifully the way gender and gender roles buttress ethnicity and national identity I want to extend that connection to include the construction of enemies More than that, I want to show how the relationship is reciprocated amongst all three I will apply Sherene Razack's interlocking analysis, usually used to dissect systems of power and oppression, to analyse systems of creating identity

First, an interlocking analysis demonstrates the co-dependent nature of different forms of oppression (i e , racism, sexism, heterosexism) and makes visible the ways in which these systems strengthen and reinforce one another [44] Razack's interlocking analysis provides a new lens with which to analyse productive discourses of identity, which help create ethnicity, enemies and gender in particular times and spaces First, I want to apply this understanding of interconnectedness to the construction and production of social identities, namely ethnicity, enemies and gender I understand these structures as supporting one another in their creation and constantly affirming and strengthening the existence of the others, especially in the context of Serbia in the 1990s These are not the only identities that we might find to be interlocking, but, because of the ethnicised, gendered nature of conflict rape that depends on the existence and therefore the construction of enemies, I would place these as central to analysing roles and complicity in the use of sexual violence within this particular conflict

A second key aspect to interlocking oppressions is that someone can be both oppressed and complicit in the oppression of others [45] I understand this to have two important corollaries a) we assume multiple identities at once and b) those different

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[44] Sherene Razack, *Looking White People In the Eye* (Toronto University of Toronto Incorporated, 2001), 13
[45] Ibid , 14

identities have different meanings in relation to each other with different people at any given time. If we apply this notion to social constructions of identity, we understand that individuals have an ethnic identity, a gender identity and an enemy (or non-enemy) identity. What this means or looks like changes, depending on a person's combination of identities, and the identity mixture of others in relationship to him or her. This is vital to understanding social constructions of identity because it both acknowledges the complex diversity we see and provides a lens through which we can better observe the multifaceted relationships among the three. Being able to analyse socially constructed identities will also shed light on the interconnected relationships of other identities not explored in my research.

Interlocking Identities in Context

The interlocking nature of creating ethnicity, enemies and gender becomes visible within a historical context. This connection, stability and co-buttressing of social constructions is evident in Serbia during the fall of the former Yugoslavia. In terms of constructing national identity, Anderson argues that the nation is defined, in part, through boundaries around a cohesive group of insiders.[46] The discourse of inclusion within the nation produces outsiders, or enemies, by definition. Likewise, the way enemies are defined also indirectly produces definitions, ideas and assumptions about the inside group, or the nation. While the identification of enemies can be different from ethnicity and gender, which have arguably visible traits, it is crucial to understand that the meanings of these visible traits are socially constructed. An interlocking analysis also reveals the ways that enemy identity can become read across the body via its interlocking construction with

[46] Anderson, *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition*, 7.

ethnicity or gender. Anderson argues that there could be no nation without other outside nations. Nations cannot and do not want to include everyone and therefore depend on the existence of an outside group. Some Serbian people, politicians and policies define Serbian ethnicity in opposition to surrounding peoples. For example, in 1992, Serbia implemented principles to encourage the birthrate in Serbian (Orthodox) areas of the countries and decrease the birthrate in areas populated by ethnic Albanians, Roma and Muslims.[47] Such policies demonstrates how Serbian identity and policies designed by the Serbian government are defined in opposition to "others." It matters little that Albanians, Roma and Muslims live (perhaps have always lived) in Serbia, they are not "Serbs." Instead, the definition of Serbianhood is constructed and enforced in opposition to "non-Serbs," and policies reflect who is included in the nation and those who are excluded. This is also reflected in the Heavenly Serbia narrative, where Serbs are imagined as perpetually on guard against destruction and assimilation by outside groups. Anzulovic names this while explaining that Serbian historical allegiances are based on this fear.[48] The existence of these outside groups becomes necessary to how Serbs define themselves. Tim Judah argues that the conflict in the collapse of Yugoslavia would not have happened the way it did without the existence of these histories and narratives.[49]

Likewise, the discourse about the Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian languages also demonstrates the productive power of language as it defines ethnicity and other. Though there is much disagreement, Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian are very similar linguistically. During the 1990s there was much debate as to whether Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian count

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[47] Papic, "How to Become a 'Real' Serbian Woman?."
[48] Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia From Myth to Genocide*, 42
[49] Judah, *The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, xi-xiii

as their own unique languages, or are merely mutually-intelligible dialects of a single language. Language is used to distinguish both ethnicity and outsiders.[50] Again, we see the distinction between who is included and who is outside the nation and therefore suspect, this time through the discourse around language.[51]

The interlocking nature of ethnicity, enemies and gender is made visible when we return to the example of sexual assault in war. In the conflict surrounding Yugoslavia's disintegration, the use of rape was a harsh reality of war, recognised by international bodies such as the United Nations. The United Nations put together a report which distinguished between and recognised different types of conflict rape. This list includes rape for the purposes of impregnation. Some Bosniak women were told they were being raped in order to produce Chetnik (a term for certain Serbian para-military groups) babies.[52] Such incidents clearly rely on shared assumptions and constructions about ethnicity, enemies and gender. Here, ethnicity is clearly linked to who is an enemy and who is not. Those who are ethnically the same are not enemies. Enemies are those who are ethnically different. These assumptions imply that the identities of ethnicity and enemies are determined by blood. Ethnicity is so important in producing one's status as enemy or non-enemy, that socialisation and the circumstances of birth are utterly irrelevant. The children of these women are determined to be non-enemies, despite the violent nature of their conception and any loyalty the children may have to their non-Serbian mothers. Assumptions about gender are also made in this scenario. Using Bosniak women to make Serbian children assumes that ethnic

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[50] Dawa Norbu, "The Serbian Hegemony, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Yugoslav Break-Up," *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 34, no. No. 14 (April 3, 1999): 837.
[51] Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 43.
[52] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 359.

identity is passed on by men and that women do not contribute to the ethnicity of their children. This makes gender and ethnicity central to the construction of one another.

Ethnicity and gender continue to be tied when the nation is imagined as a woman's body. Anderson discusses the familial language used to describe the nation, but Zarkov names its gendered nature. In her analysis on gender and ethnicity, she discusses how a Serbian paper released an article, discussing the concept of a "chastity border belt" and how the Yugoslav borders were like "a chaste, but not very trustworthy maiden, in need of proper protection, control and defense," (mentioned in Chapter 1).[53] This also brings us back to Smith's gendered construction of land as discussed in Chapter 1. The structuring of the nation into a female body both produces and relies on specific meanings of what men and women represent. We have also already discussed the feminising and maternal images given to the nation, such as "Mother Serbia."[54]

Like the nation, Zarkov demonstrates that within Serbian media, all bodies have a gender; gender and gender roles are symbolically reflective (and therefore dependent) of the ethnicity of a body. She gives the examples of female protestors. When the media calls them mothers, they are good" and therefore of a particular ethnicity (in my research, Serbian). This status of "good" also points to a status of non-enemy. Likewise, media descriptions of "militant" women were of an opposing ethnicity and, I would argue, enemies.[55]

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[53] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 1
[54] Bracewell, "Mothers of the Nation "
[55] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 208-211

Radovan Karadžić, charged with numerous war crimes[56], was commended by the Greek Orthodox Church as "one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ working for peace."[57] The Greek Orthodox Church also honoured Karadžić naming him a Knight (First Rank) in the Order of Saint Dionysius of Xanthe.[58] Calling Karadžić, who is currently undergoing a trial for multiple war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, an example of peace reveals his status within Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox Church and other Orthodox communities as a non-enemy. His status as "good" and the rewards for his behaviour demonstrate that his actions are looked on favourably. Being rewarded for his actions while simultaneously being tried for war crimes sends a clear message about the priorities of the state and the belief that reinforces ethnic (and Zarkov would include gender) constructions.

The discourse around soldiers, especially enemy soldiers, reveals the tentative boundaries between stretching gender roles and subverting them. Enemy soldiers are either male or female and have assumed traits about them. These enemy soldiers and their associated gender stereotypes serve to produce previously non-existent (or alternatively, ancient) symbols and gender roles. This applies, in terms of women, to both the feminine "good" soldier and the transgressive, suspect "bad" soldier.[59]

Phyletism strongly ties religion to both ethnicity and enemies. The religious attachment to particular ethnicities is productive in the creation of who becomes the enemy. The reflection of national enemies as religious enemies is more than just coincidence.

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[56] The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "Karadžić and Mladić - Initial Indictment," *The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, July 1995, http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e htm.
[57] Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 265.
[58] Ibid
[59] Zarkov, *The Body of War Media Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia*, 204-211.

Finally, the Serbian preoccupation with the "white plague" visibly connects gender and gender roles with ethnicity. Traditional gender ideals produced an obsession with the production of ethnic offspring. This, in a very cyclical manner, reinforces or produces gender roles that women have an obligation to leave areas of paid labour and commit to their roles as mothers. They also have an obligation to the nation to produce citizens, and depending on the discourse, soldiers for the nation.[60] The attempt to control and make demands on women's bodies and sexual practices is symptomatic of the same structures that allow rape to happen and reflect the patterns of domination, entitlement and power relationships discussed by both Cahill and Smith in Chapter 1.

Conclusion

The construction and existence of ethnicity, enemies and, gender, as structures of social identity, are dependent on one another. These structures need one another to exist as we know them. They also strengthen and consistently aid in the reproduction of each other. This concept of interlocking social identities is incredibly applicable when we look specifically at ethnicity, enemies and gender in Serbia throughout the fall of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. This particular conflict visibly demonstrates the mutual reliance and strong buttressing that these identities, and the discourses surrounding them, are able to produce. The application of Razack's interlocking analysis reveals the complicated and sticky nature of these social identities, especially their ability to sustain and maintain one another.

What this analysis also does is to point to a number of populations within Serbia that are rendered invisible or ascribed unhelpful stereotypes. The discourse of social

[60] Bracewell, "Mothers of the Nation."

construction, via the use of categories, creates and defines boundaries into which to squeeze people. Those who do not fit easily into categories become left outside the system or are pressured to conform. For example, the discourse surrounding ethnicity, enemies and gender has troubling consequences for Serbia's homosexual or trans communities and also for other minority populations within the 1990s. The discourse about the social construction of gender and gender roles is extremely heteronormative. There are roles for men and roles for women and those roles include sexual desire for the opposite gender. Strict gender roles and ways of being also leave out trans populations who do not always fit easily or traditionally into categories of male and female. Because gender is so closely tied to ethnicity and enemies, when these populations are made visible, they might be abhorred, belittled or emasculated. Homosexuality is something that is perceived as an enemy trait and therefore as an ethnic (and sometimes Orientalist) conceptions are attached to it.

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia, the ensuing conflict and the peace agreements that followed were based upon the existence of particular groups. Certain populations were ignored and made invisible, despite their existence as residents in the Balkans. For example, despite the conflict's massive attention from the media and the United Nations, Roma and Jewish populations are made invisible by the predominant construction of enemies and ethnicity. By not defining the ethnicity of Jews and Roma in relation to other ethnicities and enemies, the populations disappear, and as a result, statistics, laws and language disputes do not include them. This is coming to light now as Jews and Roma are presently not allowed certain positions in government because their populations were ignored when peace

agreements divided Bosnia into a Serb-majority territory and a Bosnian/Croat-majority territory.[61]

This analysis of identity constructions is relevant to my own research, which focuses on the rape of Bosniak women by Serbian men in the Bosnian War, and particularly on the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of these methods. As I have shown, in order to understand conflict rape, it is necessary to look at gender, because rape is a gendered phenomenon. Similarly, because this conflict took place along ethnic division and definitions, ethnicity became a topic of interest as well. Lastly, understanding conflict rape implies boundaries where some women are targets for sexual violence, which makes understanding enemies, and how specific people become identified as enemies incredibly significant to my work. Whenever I tried to understand one of these social constructions in isolation, in the context of the Bosnian War, I consistently found that, at least one, if not both, of the others was inextricably joined to the social construction in question. This intersecting nature is more than parallel existence or crossings; rather, these structures of identity and the discourses surrounding them interlock and support each other as systems.

The analysis of these three constructions of identity and especially the acknowledgement of the interlocking relationships between them is essential to my argument. Understanding identity and the lives we live as fundamentally complex and made up of many different pieces stops us from limiting our examination of complicity and sexual violence in war. The theoretical framework I have outlined here provides us with a lens with which to interpret the actions of individuals, revealing two insights fundamental to

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[61] "European Court Condemns Bosnia Over Jews, Roma," *Radio Free Europe* (Strasbourg, December 22, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/European_Court_Condemns_Bosnia_Over_Jews_Roma/1910584.html.

understanding the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of sexual violence in the Bosnian War. First, this framework enables us to see patterns. Seeing patterns allows us to recognise purpose, consistency and intent. Second, it allows us to look beyond the initial instance of rape to see the discourses that shape the possibility of rape, the consequences that continue today and the indirect but existing connections of complicity that involve more than the victim and the individual perpetrator.

Chapter 3: Serbian Orthodox Complicity

We have now established both of our foundational theoretical pillars: first, thinking about rape in war and genocide and second, considering social constructions of ethnicity, enemies and gender. With these pillars established, we can make visible the threads that tie the Serbian Orthodox Church to the use of rape as a tactic in the Bosnian War and as a means to genocide.

This particular chapter requires an attentive and nuanced approach because it often brushes close to and across what is considered sacred. My purpose in writing this is not to smear what others find sacred and holy, but rather to deal with this dark tragedy in a way that is respectful and leaves open the possibility of reflecting on and acting against these past offences, without at all pushing for the denial or the destruction of Serbian Orthodox identity. Acknowledging the sins against Bosnian Muslim women and families by Serbian Orthodox soldiers and the Church is necessary for this process. The denial of their crimes and a refusal to see the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church is a constant disruption in, and contrary to, who the Serbian Orthodox faithful are called to be.

I would like to emphasize six key points, before I move further into my analysis. First, the purpose of my analysis is to demonstrate a trend within the Serbian Orthodox Church that promoted and made the Serbian Orthodox Church partially complicit in the rape of Muslim women in the Bosnian War. This trend is only one among many; it absolutely *does not* erase the good done by Serbian Orthodox soldiers, laity and clergy throughout the war.

Second, as Iris Chang points out in her book *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, criticism of a people's behaviour in a particular time and place

within history (in this case, during the Bosnian War) is not a criticism of the entire group at all times.[1] The Rape of Nanking refers to the invasion of Japanese troops into the city of Nanking in World War II. Upon surrendering, the Japanese troops began a full-scale slaughter of thousands of Chinese civilians and prisoners of war, as well as the widespread, systematic use of sexual violence (frequently coupled together). The defining patterns of sexual violence and a continued history of denial and cover-up make for a useful comparison between the Rape of Nanking and the Bosnian War. My criticisms of the Serbian Orthodox Church, while recognising the systematic nature of sexual violence in the Bosnian War, the acts of some followers, authorities and theologies (and their systematic nature) within a particular context, do not tar all aspects of the Serbian Orthodox Church even now, especially given that there are new generations of Serbian Orthodox faithful who had nothing to do with the atrocities committed at the time. The refusal to acknowledge these crimes, however, is a continuation of the sexual violence against women.

Third, Iris Chang indicates that recognising the past is important and healthy. She emphasizes that countries and institutions are made better when they are not allowed to forget their past.[2] Her examples includes Germany after World War II and the American South after slavery. Chang argues that a perpetrating institution (in her case, Japan) "will not move forward until it too admits not only to the world but to itself how improper were its actions."[3] This can be said likewise for Serbia and the Serbian Orthodox Church, especially

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[1] Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 13.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 14.

when peacebuilding is part of the stakes of "moving forward." Otherwise, we continue to justify, deny or ignore (and therefore repeat) cycles of violence, destruction and hatred.

The fourth preliminary point I would like to make is that acknowledging guilt does not negate the pain suffered by Serbs in the Bosnian War. Instead, as Yasmin Jiwani demonstrates, discourses of denial often cloud our ability to recognise those interlocking factors that contribute to violence.[4] This discourse of denial leaves us unable to examine critically the key contributors to sexual assault and violence against women in war. By extension, this includes violence against Serbian women. By continuously denying guilt or complicity and refusing to acknowledge the violence against Bosniak women, Serbian leaders are hurting and making invisible the lived realities of their own people.

Fifth, Chang also points out that denying and forgetting these crimes is a crime in itself. She quotes Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel, who says, "to forget a holocaust is to kill twice".[5] Chang names the final part of her book, which demonstrates the cover-up of the Rape of Nanking "The Forgotten Holocaust: A Second Rape," which I feel reflects the nature of this amnesic crime.[6]

Sixth, Orthodox theology has a great deal to teach about humility and human error. Orthodox liturgical services often include asking God to forgive sins, even if the participant cannot remember committing any particular sins; there is a distinct recognition of the unconscious or unintentional capacity to sin. This is made explicit in two sections of the

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[4] Yasmin Jiwani, *Discourses of Denial Mediations of Race, Gender, and Violence* (Vancouver. UBC Press, 2006), 202-203.
[5] Chang, *The Rape of Nanking The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, 15-16
[6] Ibid., 199.

Divine Liturgy of Saint John Chrysostom, the Eucharistic service most commonly used in the Orthodox Church. First, in the prayer before the Trisagion Hymn, the priest says:

> You give wisdom and understanding to the supplicant and do not overlook the sinner but have established repentance as the way of salvation. You have enabled us, Your lowly and unworthy servants, to stand at this hour before the glory of Your holy altar and to offer to You due worship and praise. Master, accept the thrice holy hymn also from the lips of us sinners and visit us in Your goodness. Forgive our voluntary and involuntary transgressions...[7]

A similar sentiment is repeated by the people before Communion: "Therefore, I pray to You, have mercy upon me, and forgive my transgressions, voluntary and involuntary, in word and deed, known and unknown." Out of humility, guilt is presumed by the follower, and so is the appreciation that wrongdoing can happen in many forms, including unintentionally. In light of the denials and the refusal to acknowledge or respond to the war crimes against Bosniak women, and rather than consistently defending the innocence of Serbian Orthodox Church from the beginning, I propose that it would be more in line with the Orthodox Tradition and more productive to presume the *possibility* of guilt and to respond accordingly. These six points are important to keep in mind as we explore the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the use of sexual violence in the Bosnian War because it frames our way of thinking about war crimes and reminds us why considering the complicity of something others hold sacred is important, though complex.

In recognising both the encouragement and the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of rape as a tactic of war and a strategy for genocide, I will be considering a variety of crimes. Again, I am defining the Serbian Orthodox Church, for the purpose of

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[7] "The Divine Liturgy of Saint John Chrysostom" (Holy Cross Press), http://www goarch.org/chapel/liturgical_texts/liturgy_hchc.

this thesis, as being made up of self-identified members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, clergy and hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the theology and traditions belonging to or claimed by members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Since I am identifying a particular trend in the Serbian Orthodox Church, my argument will rely on evidence as it pertains to some of the members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, some of its clergy, and some of its theology. It is vital to recognise the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the sexual violence used in the Bosnian War as a trend. This allows for a space that recognises parts of the Church that stood against the violence and the war. This nuanced approach both recognises the complexity of human relationships, especially where the sacred is involved, and creates a space for productive conversations and peacebuilding efforts (such as accountability, healing or influencing current events). Neither denial nor wanton blame is a particularly helpful approach if we desire real change and real healing.

If a soldier who identifies as Serbian Orthodox commits an atrocity, does this count as the Serbian Orthodox Church? Can we really hold the Church accountable as complicit? What of an army of people who identify with this particular Church? We could say that they do not represent the Church because they do not speak for or act on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church. What if priests are implicated? Or perhaps a bishop? How many bishops? Or what if perhaps the Patriarch himself bore some responsibility. Does this count as the Church? What of the traditions and theology of the Church? What of theologians? What about poorly done theology? If someone with authority does theology in a problematic way, it becomes part of the repertoire of the Church's theology, as do any responses condemning that theology. What counts as teaching? One element of the Orthodox Tradition defines a theologian as "one who prays." This puts responsibility for and

representation of the Church on all three levels: faithful, authorities and theology. Rather than have the purpose of this project thwarted by arguing about whether I can say that any particular group or example truly represents the Serbian Orthodox Church, I will provide examples at all three levels and demonstrate the systemic nature of rape and the Church's complicity. If there are instances or groups where any of the three tiers participated, condoned or were silent, then the question of complicity can be raised.

Rape in the Bosnian War

The United Nations Commission of Experts investigated the rapes of women in the aftermath of the Bosnian War and clearly identified five patterns in their *Final Report.* This report is compiled from government information, cooperation with multiple organizations, and 32 investigative missions over two years.[8] This report identifies that each of these patterns was applicable within the context of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian populations. The first pattern involves rape used by small groups during the looting, vandalism and forced entry into the homes of the targeted ethnic group. Rape was a form of intimidation and performed by members of the community, rather than soldiers, before major violence and fighting broke out. The report identifies these instances with a gang mentality where perpetrators encouraged, pressured or forced one another to commit acts of sexual assault, thus implicating and including the entire group.[9]

The second pattern identified by the *Final Report* was rape that took place during the fighting and rounding up of prisoners. Prisoners would be divided by gender and age, and

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[8] *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)*, 7-12

[9] Ibid., 58.

evacuated to camps. Women were often raped in their homes or in front of other prisoners, depending on whether the soldiers were in the process of or had finished securing the area.[10]

This is followed by the third trend in rape, where prisoners, divided by gender, were sent to detention centers and camps and were raped by their captors. The report indicates that the perpetrators of these rapes included soldiers, paramilitaries, camp officials and civilians. These rapists were able to "enter the camp, pick out women, take them away, rape them and either kill them or return them to the site."[11] These sexual assaults may or may not have included torture, may or may not have been gang rapes, and may or may not have taken place in public. The *Final Report* also indicates that some prisoners were forced to sexually assault other prisoners. This particular context also includes repeated rapes and the sexual assault of men, and the *Final Report* specifically includes women soldiers as perpetrators of sexual violence.[12]

The fourth pattern is the use of rape as a means to ethnic cleansing. Particularly unique among the others four patterns is the trend in intentional impregnation. One survivor was repetitively raped and told that "she would give birth to a chetnik [*sic*] boy who would kill muslims [*sic*] when he grew up. They repeatedly said their President had ordered them to do this."[13] Pregnant women would be detained until it was too late to obtain an abortion, forcing them to give birth.[14]

The fifth pattern identified in the *Final Report* was the rape of women by soldiers in hotels and similar establishments. These women were detained in these places, raped and

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[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., 58-59.
[13] Ibid., 59.
[14] Ibid.

often murdered, more so than in other four categories of rape. Also unlike the other camps, rape was used for the gratification of the soldier, sometimes on rotation from the front lines, rather than for the destruction of the victim.[15]

In order to address the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church, I have divided my analysis into three sections. I will first consider the role of soldiers as laypersons and self-identified participants and members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Second, I will consider the role of clergy in the Bosnian War and their political influence. Finally, I will consider the theology and teaching of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Orthodox Followers as Belligerents and Rapists

The Serbian and Bosnian Serb forces, like all military forces and institutions, are made up of groups of people. These people are more than just soldiers; their identities are much more complex. These are parents, children, brothers and sisters, with families, talents, hobbies, genders, histories, dreams, fears, great losses, defining loves, relationships, secrets and religious leanings. Every person's identity is made up of more than just their occupation, just as they are more then their ethnicity or gender or enemy status. Most members of the Serbian forces and of the Bosnian Serb forces saw themselves ethnically as Serbs and religiously as Serbian Orthodox, as we saw in Chapter 2. In addition to religious conviction, we have already discussed the link between Serbian identity and Serbian Orthodoxy, exemplified in the discourse of Heavenly Serbia. To reiterate, Heavenly Serbia is a mythically influenced narrative of Serbian history and identity, emphasizing religion, nation and the constant struggle against outsiders. While mentioning soldiers is important,

[15] Ibid.

the identity of perpetrators is far more complex. The act of raping Bosniak women was carried out not only by official government soldiers, but also by paramilitaries and even by civilians. This act of raping in war identifies all three groups – soldiers, paramilitaries and civilians – who participate, as belligerents.

Using documents from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, this chapter explores survivor testimonies in those instances where religion is identified as part of the motivation for sexual assault. Many victims experienced religiously embedded threats, explanations and justifications for their situation by the perpetrators. Other victims had religious symbols and acts incorporated into their rape. Such religious references suggest the extent to which religion was a motivating factor for sexual assault in the understandings of many of the soldiers involved, even if not for all. Furthermore, my research will show that this is not the case of a few soldiers acting on their own, but rather a systematic and intended tactic in war, which benefits from those spaces where religious ideas intersect with political desires.

The complicity of the Orthodox Church at the level of its lay participants will take place in three sections, which are really subsets of each other. First, I will begin by discussing Orthodox perpetrators. Second, a focus on the religious identity of the victims and survivors will be important. Finally, I will focus on the impact of religion on some of the consequences of the rapes that took place. These three sections will allow us to conclude that sexual violence in the Bosnian War was a systemic problem in which the Serbian Orthodox Church is complicit.

Orthodox Belligerents Who Committed Rape

Early Christians were not permitted to be soldiers. One was not permitted to be baptised and then to take a life. In practice, this meant that many soldiers were not baptised until they had retired from their military duties, but eventually (with the growing popularity of Christianity in the Roman Empire) the rules about military service and baptism changed and this marked a significant alteration in Christian identity. Since then, most Christian traditions have permitted their faithful to participate in war.

Significant to addressing the rape of women by Orthodox soldiers is the systematic nature of the crime. When I say systematic, I mean this on two levels. First, in Chapter 1, we determined that: a) rape is fundamentally complex and needs to be dealt with as such, b) context greatly impacts rape, as well as our meanings and our definitions of rape and c) looking at rape as an embodied phenomenon allows us to consider ongoing consequences and key social factors or discourses and broadens our definitions of what sexual assault means. Rape is dependent on the way we structure masculinity and femininity, the way we teach people to interact, the hierarchy of values and even the way we lay out our cities. Second, conflict rape often ascends to a whole new level of systematicness: it becomes a strategy. In the Bosnian War, Serbian strategists and politicians used rape as a battle plan. Rape is useful because of its effects in demoralising civilian populations.[16] Rape was a useful strategy of ethnically cleansing a geographic zone because a survivor and her family would be less likely to want to return to the scene of her rape, whether because of trauma or social stigma. Christine Cleiren, a member of the Commission of Experts, specifically

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[16] Cindy Syder et al., "On the Battleground of Women's Bodies: Mass Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Affilia* 21, no. 2 (2006): 190.

connects this with military intention when she states that, "Some factors indicate a link between military action and rape and, in particular, military action designed to displace populations."[17] Rape became a tool to reward and relax soldiers recently returned or near the front lines of battle.[18] Rape was a visible and acknowledged part of the military strategic plan.

We have already seen that between 20,000 and 50,000 women were raped during the Bosnian War. We have also seen that there were many different patterns and types of rape perpetrated by many individuals, be they soldiers, paramilitaries or civilians. As we have just discussed, rape was a strategy and tactic used in war; it was part of the plan. We have shown evidence that there were many different motivations, locations and complexities where rape was involved in the Bosnian War.

The complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church can be visualised as an iceberg; what is explicitly visible (the Serbian Orthodox Church's involvement in the act of raping) seems small, but underneath the water, not easily visible from the surface, lies something pervasive. Saying that the Orthodox Church shares complicity for the rape of Bosniak women because the perpetrators happen to be Orthodox is not enough to implicate the Serbian Orthodox church, in the sense that Orthodox teachings do not counsel rape, but this is where we must begin. This argument cannot stand alone (because it could be coincidence that Orthodox followers are also rapists) but it is still important that so many rapists during the conflict were Orthodox. We understand the Serbian and Bosnian Serb populations and militias to be

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[17] "Transcript: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-18-R61" (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 2, 1996), 387-388, http.//secnet069 un org/x/cases/Mladić/trans/en/960702it.htm

[18] *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)*, 59.

(self-)identified as Orthodox because this is one of the key markers for Serbian identity, but this in no way attaches religious identity to rape. The connection nevertheless remains important as it makes clear the context of religion in the Bosnian War and creates a foundation for addressing complicity.

The Serbian Orthodox identity becomes more relevant when we change the question from "why did these Orthodox people commit rape?" to "why did the Orthodox identity of these people not prevent the use of rape?" Generally speaking, rape and murder are prohibited by Orthodox teachings; knowing this leaves us with some unanswered questions.

The Rape of Non-Orthodox Bodies

Another key reality that more directly implicates the Serbian Orthodox Church is the choice of victims. The usefulness of rape as a war tactic depended on the targeting of specific bodies. These bodies belonged to specific religious alignments. The rape of Bosniak women's bodies can be understood as an assault against Muslim bodies, or we can turn the question around to understand that soldiers were raping women who were not Orthodox. The victim's status as non-Orthodox, rather than their Muslim status is important to the Orthodox Church in terms of the construction of enemies, especially when we are speaking of complicity. This relies on the definition of the self, rather than the definition of the other and places Orthodoxy at the center of our questions.

Benedict Anderson's understanding of the nation as defining a group of insiders is reflected in this. Because the nation is defined along religious lines, one's status as Orthodox or non-Orthodox becomes key to analysing sexual violence against Bosniak women. In Chapter 2, John Jillions demonstrates the way enemies can be constructed and how Orthodox

might encounter non-Orthodox Because there are mixed responses, Orthodox flexibility and theological possibilities can be used by the political establishment to both name the "enemies" and indicate the relationship that Serbian Orthodox are to have with them This is illustrated when Karadžić describes the Bosnian War as a "holy war "[19] Identifying enemies as "non-Orthodox" is more realistic because, after all, this was not a war against Muslim women, Croats were also subject to sexual assault and ethnic cleansing practices Though statistically the majority of women sexually assaulted by Serbian or Bosnian Serb populations were Muslim,[20] understanding the identification markers as non-Orthodox is more accurate and better addresses the role that the Serbian Orthodox Church, intentionally or unintentionally, played The centrality of Serbian Orthodox identity to one's status as Serbian or enemy is significant here, because it maintains our focus on Serbian and Orthodox actions, responses and constructions

This attack on non-Orthodox bodies is illustrated by one witness who "recounted being raped again on the same night in a workshop attached to the house, by an old Montenegrin soldier who wielded a knife and threatened to draw a cross on her back and to baptise her "[21] The non-Orthodox identity of the woman is demonstrated in her attacker's desire to carve religious symbols into her body and telling her that he was going to make her become Christian (by baptising her) The assault against non-Orthodox bodies is especially clear when we take assaults on Croats into account One document, for example, describes the assault of one Croat man "They cursed Mr Dimač, and said, 'Let the Catholic Jesus help

[19] David Charter and The Hague, "Radovan Karadžic defends 'just and holy' war against Muslims," *The Times (UK)*, March 2, 2010, http //www timesonline co uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7045059 ece
[20] Syder et al , "On the Battleground of Women's Bodies Mass Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 189-190
[21] "PROSECUTOR v DRAGOLJUB KUNARAC, RADOMIR KOVAC AND ZORAN VUKOVIC JUDGEMENT" (United Nations, February 22, 2001), 91, http //secnet069 un org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e pdf

him now.' They made Mr. Dimač pray according to Catholic ritual and made fun of him. They hit him with a Bible and made him take his clothes off down to his underwear."[22] These examples illustrate the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rape of non-Orthodox in three ways: a) attempts to use non-Orthodox status against victims, b) the use of Orthodox symbolism and practice as a way of torture and c) attempts to rectify a victim's non-Orthodox status.

Genocide Via Propagation

The *Final Report* given by the Commission of Experts specifically identifies ethnic cleansing as one of the key patterns for rape in the Bosnian War. One of the principal, if somewhat unique, ways to use rape as a form of ethnic cleansing was through forced pregnancy. Andrea Smith specifically names women's reproductive abilities as targets of genocidal policies toward Native Americans in North America, but this is the opposite of what happened in Bosnia. Smith points to repeated attempts to sabotage women's reproductive capacities, whereas Serbian soldiers were utilising them. Like some twisted algebraic formula, the rape of a non-Orthodox woman by an Orthodox man is understood to produce an Orthodox child. One witness describes the procedure: "[W]omen were taken out of the camp, were taken to another house or another building, soldiers ordered then to wash themselves, to clean themselves, then they came back in the room or wherever they were, then [the soldiers] said, 'I am going to rape you and I will make you a Chetnik or Serb

[22] United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Ivo Atlija," *United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia*, http://secnet069.un org/sid/190

baby.'"[23] According to witnesses and the *Final Report*, some women were told that they were being raped to make Orthodox babies, who would then grow up to kill Muslims. These women would be repetitively raped and when pregnant given better treatment and forced to carry the child to term.

Such attitudes and understandings, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, rely on shared notions of ethnicity, enemies and gender. These identities work together to create such an understanding of what men and women contribute to the process of bearing children, and how one's identity is obtained. For example, the ability of a Bosniak woman to give birth to a Serbian child relies on concepts and constructs of identity (such as gender) to determine how another form of identity (ethnicity) is passed on and developed.

This practice of ethnic cleansing is also reflective of Balkan history, notably the history of the Janissaries. Though sources differ, Orthodox writers describe the Janissaries as a section of the Turkish army made up of soldiers who were born Christian and stolen by the invading Turks. Raised as Muslims in the Turkish army, the soldiers would be set upon their own traditional homes, much to the horror of their families.[24] Historically, the Janissaries are not limited to this narrative, and were different, at times, from how they are remembered in Orthodox history.[25] However, even if the Orthodox narrative concerning the Janissaries is historically inaccurate, the Janissaries appear to have become mythology, and the discourse about them thus impacts and colours national history in the same way that Heavenly Serbia does. With this particular national history in mind, there is a startling

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[23] "THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER. Case No IT-95-18-R61, Case No IT-95-5-R61" (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 2, 1996), 419, http //secnet069 un org/x/cases/Mladić/trans/en/960702it htm

[24] Adrian Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church* (London Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 233-238

[25] "Janissary," in *Britannica Online Encyclopedia* (Encylopaedia Britannica, 2010), http //search eb.com.proxy bib uottawa ca/eb/article-9043340#cite

resemblance to the atrocities against Bosnian Muslims when they are told their children will grow up to kill Muslims. This is especially interesting in the light of Serbian propaganda that made use of the Janissary stories, claiming (before the conflict got started) that Muslim men were impregnating Serbian women and explicitly calling to mind the Janissary history.[26]

Looking at the actions of soldiers alone, even if we have rebutted the idea that the rape of Bosniak women was the work of a few cruel individuals, the difficulty remains in arguing that the Serbian Orthodox Church retains responsibility for what its followers do outside of the church building. Can we really hold the Church accountable for its followers' not obeying key ideas forbidding killing or sexual assault? Even if the actions of Serbian Orthodox belligerents do not condemn the Serbian Orthodox Church in questions of complicity, I am still left wondering why their Orthodox identity did not prevent the perpetrators from committing their rapes. I do not foresee an answer to this question that does not somehow implicate the Serbian Orthodox Church. While it could be supposed that some of the Serbian belligerents were not particularly faithful Orthodox followers, did that many soldiers, paramilitaries and civilians responsible for their actions simply fake their Orthodox faith? Approximately 31% of Bosnia identifies as Serbian Orthodox and 37.1% of the population are Serbs.[27] In Serbia, 82.9% of the population are Serbs and 85% of the population identifies as Serbian Orthodox.[28] While we cannot sufficiently judge the Serbian Orthodox Church as complicit in the rapes and ethnic cleansing tactics used during the Bosnian War by considering the soldiers and other lay followers alone, they do lay the

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[26] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 353.
[27] "Bosnia and Herzegovina," *CIA - The World Factbook*, June 24, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html.
[28] "Serbia," *CIA - The World Factbook*, June 24, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html.

foundation for examining the response of its followers, especially its clergy. Unfortunately, this response was overwhelmingly one of encouragement and justification, or at best, silence.

Clergy, Politicians and Politics

A discussion of the complicity of the clergy and hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church will require a three-tiered approach. First, I will examine the political power historically held by Serbian Orthodox clergy and their role in politics, so as to show the legitimised relationships of power and influence they retain within the state. Second, I will discuss the problematic actions of certain Orthodox clergy members, including the ethics of silence and the visible support for Serbia's war criminals. Third, I will discuss the continued hiding of war criminals and the ethics of refusing to speak against or recognise the atrocities perpetuated in the early 1990s.

Church and State

The second element of the Serbian Orthodox Church discussed here is the Church's hierarchy and authority. I identify authorities within the Serbian Orthodox Church as deacons, priests, theologians and bishops. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church is the Patriarch, who is elected by the bishops. During the war and until very recently (1990-2009), the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church was Patriarch Pavle. The complicity of Serbian Orthodox Church authorities manifests itself in three ways: the relationship that Church authorities and hierarchy had with political officials, the acts and statements of Church authorities during the war and finally, the continued actions of authorities in light of the war's aftermath. The boundaries among these three trends are blurry, and there is some

overlap between them, due to the intersecting and complex nature of sexual violence, religion and identity in war.

The relationship and boundaries between politicians and Church officials is fluid and dependent on the political and national culture. The Serbian Orthodox Church is the national church of Serbia and an ethnic church for those Serbs in the diaspora. This relationship to the state already places it in close proximity to politics. When considering the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of rape as a war strategy, we must remember two key points. First, rape was a systematic tool, used and implemented as a strategy and therefore intentional. Second, while soldiers carried out the sexual assaults, since rape was part of a systematic, well-known and widespread strategy, political authorities were likewise responsible for the acts of sexual violence and genocide committed against Muslims. These authorities have a "responsibility to react."[29] More than that, they have a responsibility not to organise military actions that are war crimes.[30] Therefore, if we are to connect the Serbian Orthodox Church with the use of rape in war, it is essential that we examine the Church's relationship to political powers. The importance of this connection becomes very clear when a key figure like Radovan Karadžić, previously on the run but captured and placed on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia earlier this year, claims that "not a single important decision [regarding the carrying out of the Bosnian War] was made without the Church."[31] It goes without saying that the intentional and strategic rape of thousands of enemy women cannot but fall under the category of "important." Karadžić's

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[29] Foreign Affairs Canada, "ICISS Report," XI

[30] Erna Paris, *The Sun Climbs Slow The International Criminal Court and the Struggle for Justice* (Toronto Random House of Canada, 2009), 109-110

[31] Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 268

statement gives the Serbian Orthodox Church a central role in the happenings of Bosnian Serb politics. This is also not the only instance where the former Bosnian Serb leader has described himself as aligned with and working with the Serbian Orthodox Church.[32] He has defended his actions and Bosnian Serb actions as "just and holy."[33]

Marcus Tanner of *The Guardian* reports:

> The Serbs of Karadžić's stamp were on a mission to change that urban landscape for good, and found in the Orthodox church an unswerving supporter. The hierarchy blew incense over every Serbian offensive, however bloody. When the paramilitary group know [*sic*] as the Tigers stormed the northeast town of Bijeljina in 1992 and butchered a good number of the local Muslims, "pour encourager les autres", (an assault memorably captured by a Time magazine photographer) their leader, nicknamed Arkan, sought – and received – the public blessing of one of the leading bishops.[34]

Lenard Cohen describes the Serbian Orthodox Church as split between the older generation of clergy, who were cautious about Milošević, at least later on, and a younger generation that promoted the nationalist rhetoric of Milošević's politics. Patriarch Pavle has been recognised both for criticising Milošević's politics and denouncing the violent measures and ethnic cleansings.[35] He is also known, however, for siding with nationalist tendencies and recycling nationalist rhetoric.[36] For example, while calling for Milošević to step down, he and other bishops continued to reiterate the need for Serbs all to be in one state – a "Greater Serbia."[37] Even here, where Patriarch Pavle is outspoken against Serb violence, he

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[32] Lenard J Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom the Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic* (Colorado Westview Press, 2002), 202
[33] Charter and Hague, "Radovan Karadžić defends 'just and holy' war against Muslims "
[34] Marcus Tanner, "Karadžić's 'holy war'," *The Guardian*, March 2, 2010, http //www guardian co uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/02/Karadžić-holy-war-bosnia
[35] Cohen, *Serpent in the bosom*, 200-201
[36] Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia From Myth to Genocide*, 123
[37] Ibid

continues to promote one of the key contributors to the violence. Patriarch Pavle is depicted in Figure 2 alongside Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (both indicted war criminals), Bosnia's political and military leaders in the Bosnian War. This public appearance shows a degree of support and cooperation. Despite consciously refuting violence, Patriarch Pavle retains complicity, unintentionally, because he openly supported some of the very things that contribute to sexual violence in war: nationalism and (as we will see later) problematic gender constructions. This understanding of complicity is reflected in the "responsibility to prevent" as argued in *The Responsibility to Protect.*[38]

Figure 2. Patriarch Pavle with Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić
Source: Suzana Šačić and Medina Delalić, "Mladićev dan (20)," *E-Novine Elekronske Novine*, January 12, 2010, http //www.e-novine.com/feljton/33927-Mladiev-dan.html

[38] Foreign Affairs Canada, "ICISS Report," XI.

Clergy During the Bosnian War

Having already explored a manifestation of the close relationship between politics and the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church, I will demonstrate the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of rape in the Bosnian War by pointing to specific actions taken by Serbian Orthodox clergy, either alone or collectively. This section will span the years during the conflict, and I will later address those actions that continue after the war. The following section, for the most part, deals not with rapists themselves, but with those indirectly involved in the use of rape and ethnic cleansing policies, either through policies, advocacy, political rhetoric or encouraging those tendencies (such as extreme nationalism, enemy rhetoric and specific ideas about gender and gender roles) which I have already defined as necessary for rape to function as it did in this specific conflict. Therefore, political opinions and how they are voiced and by whom, matter to our discussion of complicity and sexual violence.

Having already discussed the link between nationalism and sexual violence, I argue that the Serbian Orthodox Church maintains a degree of complicity and responsibility for the sexual assault of Bosniak women by encouraging and inciting ethnocentrism (which, as I have previously discussed, can be seen in Orthodox tradition as a heresy) and hatred. One such example is the case of Bishop Filaret (Micevic), briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 and whom I will continue to discuss in the following section. Bishop Filaret continues to be a bishop in good standing with the Serbian Orthodox Church. He was a vocal supporter of the political violence of the Bosnian War with his extreme nationalist views. During the war, he was a priest and was known for being outspoken about his views in the media, including one instance when he was reputed to have been on television with the skull he claimed belonged

to a Serbian child killed by a Croat. There are also photographs of Filaret posing with his clerical robes and a rifle (Figure 3). After the war, he continued to associate with nationalist politicians and to support them publically. Filaret was then ordained to the episcopate and continued to support a nationalist agenda and Slobodan Milošević.[39]

Perhaps, the Serbian Orthodox Church cannot be held accountable for the political leanings of one priest, even when he openly incites hatred, using the authority or symbolism of his office as a priest, on television. His consistent siding with war criminals can be taken as the act and opinion of one person. Even interpreting his actions as those of an individual, however, maintaining Filaret in good standing within the Serbian Orthodox Church, let alone promoting him and ordaining him as a bishop, seems like a reward, which places the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church in question. The opposite situation is seen in the case of Bishop Atanasije (Jeftic). Though he officially abdicated his office for medical reasons (apparently previously unheard of), he is believed to have been pressured to resign due to his criticism of Milošević's government.[40] The promotion of one bishop and the dismissal of another could be coincidental, but in this context, the disparity is striking and significant. Whether the Church hierarchy was intending to promote sexual violence or not, the consequences of their actions promotes, encourages and validates the actions of those who did rape during the war. This creates a culture of permissiveness, where sexual violence flourishes when people do not respond to it or ignore its existence.

[39] Mares, "Rift In The Serbian Orthodox Church."
[40] Mares, "Rift In The Serbian Orthodox Church."

Figure 3. Filaret and his Gun

Source "Filaret počeo štrajk glađu," *PCNEN - Prve crnogorske elektronske novine*, August 28, 2007, http //www pcnen com/detail php?module=15&news_id=251

The realities of sexual violence, religious symbolism, permissiveness and the complicity of Serbian Orthodox clergy all culminate and are illustrated in one particular example. A 16-year-old Bosnian Muslim girl was brought by Predrag Kujundzik (now a convicted war criminal) to a radio station and forced to read a document confessing that she was abandoning Islam and converting to Christianity, and that Muslims were responsible for the war and were bombing their own mosques. She was then brought to an isolated building, was raped by Kujundzik and was forced to perform oral sex until she bled from her genitals and face (eyes, ears and mouth). Later, Kujundzik gave her a military uniform and a large cross on a chain and ordered her not to remove the cross. He then had her name changed to a Serbian name and required that people address her with it. He subsequently brought her to a Church in Bjeljina where Bishop Vasilij (Kačavenda) – who was also known to bless soldiers and paramilitaries before their missions, as seen in Figure 4 – was waiting. Bishop Vasilij proceeded to rape her in the church and then to baptise her.[41] They had discussed this and joked that it would be a sin for Bishop Vasilij to rape her after she was baptised. She reports that she was raped multiple times by both Kujundzik and Bishop Vasilij and by many others as well.[42]

Here we see the incorporation of religion and religious identity into sexual assault as a form of torture. This entire process, from forcing her to speak on the radio to changing her name to baptising her, was about making her become "Orthodox." The participation of Bishop Vasilij and the way he joked about how raping her after baptising her would be a sin

[41] Bishop Vasilij has not been indicted for this assault; this information arose as part of the witness' testimony against Predrag Kujundzik.
[42] "VLADIKA SPC SILOVAO U BIH," *Sjenica Uzivo* (Bosnia, January 25, 2009), http://www.sjenica-info.com/news.php?readmore=844.

(even though he would later rape her anyway) continues the use of religious symbolism and teachings as torture. While Bishop Valisij's role as a rapist does not imply that all Serbian Orthodox clergy are rapists, it does point to the Orthodox Church's complicity. Not only does Bishop Vasilij remain in good standing, but he was also one of the top three candidates put forward for election to the Patriarchate earlier this year.[43] This level of tacit approval demonstrates the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of rape in the Bosnian War; the lack of response to sexual assault and the perversion of Orthodox practices into a form of torture is extremely damning.

Figure 4. Bishop Vasilij (Kačavenda) Blessing the "Liberators" of Srebrenica
Source: "Udbaš hoće da postavi atrijarha," PROTEST.ba, January 15, 2010, http://protest.ba/v2/udbas-hoce-da-postavi-patrijarha/.

The Serbian Orthodox Church also retains complicity for not doing enough to stop the conflict. The Church did not step up to prevent the violence (but instead allowed individuals to incite it), it did not react to the violence (instead allowing the denial of war

[43] Mirko Dordevic, "News and Analysis: A new Patriarch but no change in the Serbian Orthodox Church," interview by BH Dani, Bosnian Institute, March 1, 2010, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2684.

crimes and supporting war criminals) and it did not rebuild by working for reconciliation (rather, it continues to support war crimes and to incite conflict over similar scenarios, such as the separation of Kosovo).

After the War

Certain factions of the Serbian Orthodox Church continue actively and openly to support criminals tried or accused by the international community for war crimes. Journalist Sonja Biserko has reported that the Serbian Orthodox Church has a reputation for defending its war criminals and has even been accused by a United Nations Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, of hiding individuals accused of war crimes.[44] This support of criminals, at times even exaltating them as heroes, is damning as we consider Serbian Orthodox complicity in the use of sexual violence. Even if the actions of Serbian Orthodox soldiers could not be tied to the Serbian Orthodox Church – and perhaps the consequences of nationalist rhetoric and extremist politicians was unanticipated and a matter of poor judgement on behalf of some individual bishops – to continue to support these criminals is simply unacceptable.

We come again to Bishop Filaret (Micevic). Bishop Filaret is currently black-listed and refused entry to the European Union due to suspicions of hiding and aiding war criminals.[45] This became very controversial when he tried to meet with Vojislav Šešelj (on trial for war crimes) in The Hague.[46] He even feels honoured by the chance to be with these war criminals: "I am proud to go to the Hague, I can hardly wait to see honest Serbs, to kiss

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[44] Sonja Biserko, "Bosnian Institute News. Hague Coercion," *Bosnian Institute*, June 23, 3005, http.//www bosnia.org uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2067.
[45] Mares, "Rift In The Serbian Orthodox Church "
[46] "Transcript of 29 October 2003 for the Pre-Trial Status Conference of Vojislav Seselj."

the hands of men who fought for the Serbian people and their fatherland – Vojislav Šešelj and Momčilo Krajišnik."[47] This continued contact with and support for Serbian war criminals by a ranking Serbian Orthodox authority maintains the complicity and continues the active participation of the Church in the extended consequences of sexual assault and war.

Another key example of the continued support for war criminals includes another name previously mentioned. Radovan Karadžić, charged with numerous war crimes[48], was commended by Greek metropolitans and bishops as "one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ working for peace."[49] The Greek Orthodox Church also named Karadžić as a Knight (First Rank) in the Order of Saint Dionysius of Xanthe.[50] What is most interesting here is that this was done by Greek, not Serb, bishops. While this does not implicate the Serbian Orthodox Church specifically, it does point to the same kind of solidarity that exists between the Serbian Orthodox Church and its war criminals. Rather than treating politics and war crimes as matters that profoundly affect the lived experience, lives and deaths of many people, this solidarity demands a loyalty that values identity over values. There is support coming from solidarity and loyalty to identities (in this case Orthodox), but little consideration of real and deadly actions and consequences. It apparently does not matter to the Greek Orthodox Church that Karadžić stands accused of war crimes, including leading the massacre of 8000 men and boys; rather, because he is fighting on the side of the Orthodoxy (clearly identified by ethnicity and not contemplative

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[47] *Vreme* (Belgrade, November 13, 2003), No. 671 edition.
[48] The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "Karadžić and Mladić - Initial Indictment."
[49] Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 265.
[50] Ibid.

and meditative spiritual life), the Greek Church not only openly declares their support for him, but speaks Orwellian mistruths about being a peacemaker. This partisanship is significant because it demonstrates that even if the Serbian Orthodox Church is not complicit, Orthodox communities might not be looking at the matter (or their alliances) critically.

The act of doing nothing or not enough is another area where complicity can be argued. Anzulovic details how the Serbian Orthodox Church has put out statements against the Serbian genocide but has refused to acknowledge Serbian crimes, and in some instances, continues to justify Serbian atrocities and the Bosnian conflict.[51] "In April 1997, Patriarch Pavle blessed and signed a "Declaration against the Genocide of the Serbian People," which was sent to many international institutions"[52] and spoke about the hard history of the Serbs, such as their long history of self-defense, completely neglecting to consider Serbian crimes and rewriting, justifying or omitting history.[53] This is demonstrated when the Bishops authoring the document name the Serbian nation as "the last rampart in the self defense of Europe from the Turkish invasion and the penetration of Islam."[54] While arguing this, they do not take into account complex historical relations with the Turks (including alliances with them), and they ignore the genocide of Muslims in the Bosnian War, instead justifying their actions in the war as an attempt to "thwart expansionist trends whose root we can observe today in the shape of fundamentalism."[55]

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[51] Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia From Myth to Genocide*, 123-125.
[52] Ibid., 123-124.
[53] Ibid., 124
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

Theology and Discourse

Pointing to the traditions and theology of the Serbian Orthodox Church is not meant to be essentialising. Instead, I recognise that these ideas are general and do not apply to all believers at all times. However, it would be irresponsible to let theology and tradition remain unquestioned due to its subjective nature. It is, in fact, this subjective nature, in part, that makes theology and tradition all the more important to keep in mind. However, this discussion will require a more nuanced approached than the others.

In Chapter 1, we determined that rape is fundamentally complex. Part of this complexity is because rape is structured, created and defined by the way we think, speak and act about rape and those things that make up rape. Our interpretation of rape must also take in context and start from a position of embodiment. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that addressing rape in the context of the Bosnian War rested upon two key ideas: first, understanding the socially constructed nature of identities such as ethnicity, enemies and gender, and second, knowing that the construction of any identity (such as gender) is dependent upon and strengthened by the others (ethnicity, enemy status). Taken together, these chapters demonstrate that rape involves so much more than the violence of one person against another. The acknowledgement of complexity provides us with a lens through which to consider discourses and trends that might at first seem unrelated or unimportant, and provides us with the tools to see the connections. This is especially necessary when examining theology, which might at first glance seem removed from the actual rapes.

In this section, I will discuss two ways in which theology is a space where the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church can be evaluated. First, I will discuss a homily given by Patriarch Pavle and second, I will discuss gender and gender roles in theological

teaching. Both of these will illustrate the way in which theology and religious discourse produce, reaffirm and buttress socially constructed identities and interpretations of the world that can lend themselves to sexual assault.

Theology and the Discourse of the "White Plague"

Rape's usefulness as a tactic in war is dependent on shared ideas about ethnicity, enemies and gender. In Chapter 2, we discussed the use of rape as a tool for ethnic cleansing by means of impregnation. When Bosniak women were told they were being raped in order to produce Chetnik (Serbian) babies, we understand how this clearly relies on specific assumptions and constructions about ethnicity, enemies and gender. In Chapter 2, we also concluded that in order for this to be possible: a) enemies are defined as those who are ethnically different, and therefore b) socialisation and the circumstances of birth are treated as utterly irrelevant. If the children of these women are determined to be non-enemies, despite the violent nature of their conception and any loyalty they may have to their mothers, then we must assume that ethnic identity is passed on by men and that women do not contribute to the ethnicity of their children. Essentially, women become nothing more than incubators.

Wendy Bracewell identifies the discourse of women as primarily mothers, by looking at the Serbian preoccupation with the "white plague." The white plague is the name for the low birthrate in Serbia. Patriarch Pavle gave his Christmas homily in 1993 in part on the topic of women and the "white plague." In this homily, Patriarch Pavle called on women to have more children. Patriarch Pavle is not alone in voicing this, but it is important to show

that he is participating in the wider discourse (along with politicians, media and other religious leaders)[56] who are calling women into the home to be mothers.[57]

Todd Salzman discusses Patriarch Pavle's homily and problematises the childbearing discourse threaded into the homily. In doing so, he reveals possible linkages to political rhetoric about birth rates and Serbian identity. He does not single out Patriarch Pavle as directly instigating violence against women, but rather demonstrates how Patriarch Pavle unconsciously participates and incorporates a particular political mindset into his theologies. The Patriarch concludes that the call for children will provide more Serbs and especially, more Serb soldiers.[58] He also says Serbian women who do not have enough children are committing

> a threefold sin: against themselves, the Serbian nation, and God himself. The women sin against themselves because "many mothers who did not want more than one child, today bitterly cry and pull their hair in despair over the loss of the only son in the war...why did they not give birth to more children and have them as consolation." They sin against the Serbian nation because "in twenty years, the Serbs will, if such a birth-rate remains, become an ethnic minority in their own country." Finally, they sin against God because "when they come to meet God, those mothers who never allowed their children to be born will meet their children who will sadly ask: why did you kill me? Why did you not let me live?"[59]

Both Bracewell and Salzman point out the call for women to produce more soldiers for the Serbian Nation. If we consider this and remember that Bosniak women are being told they are being raped to make Serbian soldiers,[60] there is a connection to be made between what Serbian soldiers attempt when they rape Bosniak women and the call for Serbian

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[56] Papic, "How to Become a 'Real' Serbian Woman? "
[57] Bracewell, "Mothers of the Nation."
[58] Salzman, "Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing," 351-352
[59] Todd Salzman paraphrasing and quoting Patriarch Pavle's Christmas homily Ibid , 351.
[60] Ibid., 359.

women to produce more Serbian soldiers. Both Serbian women and Bosniak women are producing Serbian soldiers for the Serbian nation. This connection implies that Patriarch Pavle, who calls for the production of more Serbian babies and is outspoken against the genocide and violence during the war, remains unintentionally complicit. Anyone who participates in this discourse does so.

Learning Gender Via Theology

Like ethnicity and nationalism, we have already discussed how rape in the Bosnian War depended on certain shared ideas about gender and gender roles. What we know about gender and gender roles is socially constructed, learned early in life, and it is constantly refined as we age. This learning occurs in a number of settings. Religious institutions are important among these because religion serves to teach gender roles both directly and indirectly. For example, gender roles are taught in churches, through the Bible, the liturgy, canon law and other parts of the Tradition. They are also taught by parents and at school. Parents and the school curriculum (especially at a religiously oriented school) are influenced by the religion's teachings as well. Therefore, if I am Catholic, and raised by Catholic parents and attend Catholic school, the Catholic Church has both a direct and indirect influence on what I learn about gender and gender roles. The influence of Catholic teaching through parenting and Catholic schools is indirect because it is filtered by the experiences and choices of parents and teachers, but can still be very pervasive.

In Chapter 2, we discussed the construction of gender and its importance in understanding rape. Religion's teachings about gender and gender roles can have a lasting impact, while other sources might not have such a permanent effect, because religion claims

authority over what is "natural," the rules of a higher power and the potential threat of damnation. Theology and Church practice create a space for learning or buttressing those ideas about gender and gender roles that contribute to or are foundationally necessary for rape and the use of rape as a war tactic. In exploring theology and Church space, I am not implying that all Orthodox followers agree with some of these problematic ideas. Even if all Orthodox Christians were to agree with all of these ideas, not all of these ideas, while at times problematic, are entirely inappropriate or wrong. This project is not, in itself, a theological undertaking. Rather than sorting out which theological statements are truer to the Tradition, stronger, more reflective of Christianity's true meaning, or more culturally influenced, this project serves to open up a space to think critically about these ideas and the discursive power that these ideas hold. Systems of power retain their power by remaining unquestioned.[61]

Kyriaki Karidoyanes Fitzgerald, while demonstrating the dangers of sexism in an Orthodox context, describes four key ways that Orthodox traditional constructions of gender and gender roles have proven problematic. First is the projection of "pre-determined assumptions onto women."[62] These assumptions include socially constructed gendered expectations, roles and vocations in the home, society and church. Often policed through shaming and coercion, these projections are particularly problematic because they remove women's choice and agency through the removal or diminishment of discernment, women are expected and presumed to fill certain roles by nature of their gender, rather than through

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[61] *Tough Guise Media and the Crisis in Masculinity* (Massachusetts: Media Education Foundation, 1999)
[62] Kyriaki Karidoyanes FitzGerald, "Sexism as Sin: Essential Spiritual Considerations," in *Orthodox Women Speak Discerning the "Signs of the Times"* (Brookline, MA: World Council of Churches, 1999), 197.

discernment.[63] For some theologians, these roles and projections seem necessary, lest there be "gender confusion."[64] We have already demonstrated how certain ideas about gender and gender roles can implicitly justify or contribute to a culture permissive of rape. Fitzgerald, in demonstrating that gender roles are projected and policed through the church, illustrates the beginnings of how church theology can encourage rape as it was used in the Bosnian War.

Second, Fitzgerald points to the way sexism can be used to depersonalise women. She argues that this particular breakdown in the relationship between human beings is damaging to women and men.[65] We see this when Serbian women are defined solely or primarily by their capacity to be incubators (carrying children, but not passing anything religious or cultural onto the child). This identifier locates women by their reproductive capacities, rather than through any other human attributes.

Third, gender is constructed in images and icons that we see in the Church. The overwhelming difference in the ratio between men and women in sacred imagery is significant. In my own experience with Orthodox men and women, many stories and lives of women have been passed on to me, but I (and Fitzgerald also agrees) see relatively few of them painted in icons or in churches (with the exception of Mary, the mother of Jesus).[66] We see that women take up less sacred space, their stories and lives becoming inexplicitly less valuable in a gendered way. When we see that holy women are less important, in the implicit message is that women in general are also less important. The exception, as I have already said, is Mary. When only one image represents women, women's lives and women's

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[63] Ibid , 197-198
[64] John Breck, *The Sacred Gift of Life Orthodox Christianity and Bioethics* (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2000), 86
[65] Karidoyanes FitzGerald, "Sexism as Sin: Essential Spiritual Considerations," 198.
[66] Ibid

contributions, it is intrinsically suggested that there is only one way for women to be: an obedient virgin mother. This is especially problematic when the "one way" is an ideal impossible to achieve.[67] In taking up less space, women are seen as less important, less valuable and less threatening to men and men's roles.[68] Many of the stories that construct Orthodox ideas of women are even more explicitly problematic in the context of discussions of sexual assault. Some of these include "the anonymous sacrificial subject"[69] (it becomes the woman's place, or "natural," to suffer), the pressure for women to withstand hardship through patience and prayer[70] (implicitly encouraging women's silence about sexual abuse, especially within marriage) and ideas about women's modesty as a way to avert men's lust[71] (making women responsible in part for their own protection and for men's actions).

Drawing from Fitzgerald's fourth example points to the fact that when women are identified by only one specific role or idea, their contributions are limited and of finite potential. If women have only one representation and one role projected on them (such as being obedient child-bearers like Mary), then their potential for ministry and participation is limited to this role. Fitzgerald even expresses the view that the Orthodox have done Mary herself a disservice. She is known as the Theotokos (God-bearer), venerated as being the Mother of God, honoured for her piety, virginity and obedience, but her ministry ends there. There is comparatively little discussion or veneration about her ministry, her leadership or

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[67] As my professor for a theology course in feminist ethics once asked "Have you ever TRIED to be a virgin mother? It's very difficult."

[68] Jean Kilbourne, *Killing Us Softly 3 Advertising's image of Women* (Media Education Foundation, 2002)

[69] Christos Mylonas, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals The Quest for an Eternal Identity* (New York Central European University Share Company, 2003), 91

[70] Marie Assaad, "Defining Ourself as Orthodox Women," in *Orthodox Women Speak Discerning the "Signs of the Times"* (Brookline, MA World Council of Churches, 1999), 157

[71] Breck, *The Sacred Gift of Life Orthodox Christianity and Bioethics*, 86

her life.[72] The identification of Mary and her role as mother is a key concept that helps produce expectations for Serbian women too.[73]

Conclusion

Accounting for the complicity and the responsibility for sexual assault in war requires that we address more than just the perpetrators of rape; it requires that we look also at the governing structures and the discourses that teach us. When looking specifically at the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, this requires that we look at perpetrators, the hierarchy and authority of the Church, and the theology presented and used in the Church. This examination requires a nuanced understanding both of rape and identity in the Bosnian War.

The Serbian Orthodox Church is complicit when Serbian Orthodox belligerents rape and when religion and Orthodox identity become key markers in the patterns of rape. The Church also bears some complicity through the actions of those who claim authority in the Church: the use of nationalist rhetoric, the visible support for political leaders responsible for these crimes and the absence of speaking out against either the policies of rape or the policies that allow rape to happen. Moreover, the Serbian Orthodox Church is complicit by participating in rhetoric and identity constructions that make rape possible, not just in the personal lives of bishops, but also by incorporating and naming problematic ideas within theological space, such as through homilies or scripture.

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[72] Karidoyanes FitzGerald, "Sexism as Sin: Essential Spiritual Considerations," 198-199.
[73] Mylonas, *Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity*, 91.

Conclusion

The use of sexual violence as both a war tactic and a means to ethnic cleansing is a nightmare in which the Serbian Orthodox Church finds itself complicit. This argument derives from the actions of Serbian Orthodox followers and belligerents who sexually assaulted Bosniak women. Using a more nuanced approach, I argue, in addition, that the Serbian Orthodox Church is complicit through the actions of its clergy and the dangerous discourses that are supported by seemingly benign theology and theological trends. The Serbian Orthodox Church's complicity rests on the systematic nature of both the Serbian Orthodox Church's actions and the rapes that characterized the Bosnian War.

In order to examine this phenomenon, it was vital that we first consider the nature of rape and come to understand the differences between peacetime rape and conflict rape. Using theories about sexual assault from Ann Cahill, the thesis adopts the framework of rape as an embodied phenomena. Andrea Smith's work on sexual violence and the genocide of Native Americans enabled us to extend these insights into the context of conflict and ethnic cleansing.

Second, using Benedict Anderson, John Jillions and Dubravka Zarkov, it was necessary to develop a thorough understanding of how ethnicity, enemies and gender are constructed. It is crucial to note their interlocking nature, enabling and supporting each other as structures. Understanding the social construction of ethnicity is critical to understanding rape in war, where violence, especially sexual violence, was drawn across ethnic lines, depended on assumptions about particular ethnicised bodies and had intended consequences based on assumptions and constructions about ethnicity. An examination of how the identity of enemies becomes constructed is key in understanding sexual violence in conflict because

belligerents use this identity, and the projection of this identity in how they act. This use of ethnic identity is reflected in how political and religious leaders speak in a context where theology takes on new meanings or applications depending on one's enemy status. As an extraordinarily gendered form of violence, the construction of gender, gender roles and the meaning that gender takes on is crucial and highly impacts the use of sexual violence in war.

Finally, these theoretical pillars were used to interpret evidence showing the Serbian Orthodox Church as complicit. First, we examined the actions of Serbian Orthodox belligerents who committed rape, posing the question of why their Serbian Orthodox identity, if it did not encourage them to use sexual assault, did not stop such assaults. We have also highlighted the connection between Serbian Orthodox identity and conflict rape, as such identity was used to identify victims (the raping of specifically non-Orthodox persons) and to torture them (the carving of religious symbols into bodies and the threat of baptism if one did not comply with sexual assault). In addition, the Serbian Orthodox Church is implicated in the use of sexual assault as a means to genocide, as Serbian belligerents forcibly impregnated women and told them they would carry Serbian Orthodox children who would become Serbian soldiers to kill Muslims.

The clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church further demonstrated complicity through the active support of violence, nationalism and the use of their office and authority to condone these actions. The fact is that these are not merely clerics, who are human and have opinions; rather, when they use their office and authority to support war crimes and war criminals, the Serbian Orthodox Church is implicated in these actions and their systematic nature. It would have been harder to point to the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church if Bishop Filaret had spoken publicly about nationalism and posed with guns and children's

skulls without his clerical robes. It would have been harder to argue that the Serbian Orthodox Church was complicit in supporting war criminals if these bishops were holding opinions rather than "blessing" the war criminal's efforts or committing sexual assault in a church in the midst of a forced baptism.

We also looked at theologically informed discourses and constructions. When Serbian Orthodox Church authorities line national rhetoric with theological reasoning and language, the Tradition of the Church is arguably warped and is thus made complicit. When this national rhetoric begins to encroach upon and projects expectations and assumptions on women's bodies, we need to think critically. This critical thinking must extend to all facets of theology; it is vital to consider the real world implications of religiously inspired rhetoric and socially constructed identities. In the case of the Bosnian War, the consequences were devastating.

Despite the relatively new category of contemporary Eastern Christian ethics in academia, I am surprised, especially given the gravity and the enormity of these events, that there is little or no theological response to the crimes committed throughout this conflict. An Orthodox response might involve a statement authoring an apology and an acknowledgement of responsibility; it might use theology to advocate that the Serbian government acknowledge war crimes; or it might involve theological statements condemning genocide, violence and the use of sexual assault by Orthodox Christians. In claiming that there is a lack of theological work, I do not mean to erase the work and denunciations made by individuals, but my research suggests that little has been done by Orthodox theologians, synods or researchers. This leads one to suspect a connection between the Serbian government's consistent denial of most of the horrors of those years and the limited theological response of

the Serbian Orthodox Church. One cannot help but be struck by the Serbian Orthodox Church's continued vocal stance concerning injustices to Serbs, for example in the newer context of Kosovo's declaring independence. Even here, protestations by the Serbian Orthodox Church reflect Serbia's political agenda.[1]

While this project demonstrates the complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the use of rape as a war tactic and as a means to ethnic cleansing, it does not tell us what to do with this information. If we understand the Serbian Orthodox Church as complicit in war crimes, I would argue that we can more clearly discern the Serbian Orthodox Church's responsibility to work harder to prevent, react and rebuild. Acknowledging complicity and thus the guilt of the Serbian Orthodox Church might push for a greater role in peacebuilding and preventing further conflicts.

This project also leaves me with questions. What does the Serbian Orthodox Church's complicity in sexual violence mean theologically? What does it mean for its identity? Would acknowledging the Serbian Orthodox Church's complicity enable it to provide better pastoral care for both survivors and perpetrators? Can acknowledging complicity rather than outright support for war criminals be a more productive form of pastoral care and healing? How can and should the Church respond theologically?

An important term in Orthodox theology is *homoousios*, which is Greek for "of the same substance." Christ is of the same substance as God and also of the same substance as humankind. Humans are likewise *homoousios* with Christ. If we couple this understanding with a particular piece of scripture that says, "Amen, I say to you, whatever you did for one

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[1] "Patriarch wants apology from EU office," *B92*, June 25, 2010, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=06&dd=25&nav_id=68024.

of these least brothers of mine, you did for me,"[2] we are left with a profound question. In the context of the Bosnian War, the "least brothers" would include the most oppressed, including the women across whose bodies soldiers fought their war. For me, this demands a vital theological question. What does it mean for Christians to have systematically raped the body of Christ?

[2] *NAB*, Matthew 25:40.

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