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


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**The Significance of ἔργος**

**in**

**Thucydides' Portrayal of Athenian Imperialism**

**by**

**© Catherine-Élisabeth Côté**

This Thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Classical Studies at the University of Ottawa.

Thesis advisor: Professor Edmund F. Bloedow

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## Abstract

Thucydides' text reveals nine instances of ἔρως and closely related words. The lack of evidence to support the assumption that a sexual context must necessarily form the primary meaning of ἔρως in the fifth century B.C. invites a closer examination. The first three instances in the *History* appear in conjunction with three Athenian leaders, who represent three very distinct stages in Athenian imperialism, namely Pericles, Cleon and Alcibiades. Throughout his treatments of these individuals, Thucydides highlights their interaction with the *demos* and underlines the process by which ἔρως ultimately subordinates reason: his portrayal of Pericles demonstrates the opposition between the rational γνώμη and the irrational ὄργη, that of Cleon illustrates the process by which the Athenians turn from γνώμη to ὄργη, and his treatment of Alcibiades underlines the dangers of such impulsive resolution. What was once τόλμα is rendered ἀλόγιστος τόλμα.

Many thanks to Professor David Welsh, who instilled in me a passion for reading ancient Greek, and *shenoragalem* to Boghos, without whose constant encouragement and support I would have despaired.

## Table of Contents

Introduction .....	1
Chapter 1	
Pericles and the γνώμη ideal .....	8
Chapter 2	
Cleon and the Athenian ὀργή .....	28
Chapter 3	
Alcibiades, the ἔρως incarnate .....	57
Chapter 4	
Harmodius and Aristogeiton: a story told .....	98
Conclusion .....	115
Appendix	
The use of ἔρως in Thucydides' contemporaries .....	124
Bibliography .....	132

## Introduction

There has been much debate amongst modern scholars on the question of Thucydides' presentation of Athenian imperialism. Critics have been most divided in particular over the development of Athenian imperialism in the *History*; some have argued that the historian highlights a distinct development, while others have been equally vigorous in denying it.<sup>1</sup> Already de Romilly observed that interpretations of Thucydides' outlook in this regard had been most diverse: "les uns ont fait de lui un partisan zélé de l'impérialisme, d'autres son adversaire."<sup>2</sup>

Since de Romilly's landmark study on the subject, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme Athénien*, modern research has taken the examination of Athenian imperialism to a new level. In his recent article, *Thukydides und die Perikleische Machtpolitik*, Nicolai traces the emerging trends in Thucydidean scholarship since the 1950's,<sup>3</sup> observing that scholars have generally avoided calling attention to the striking contrast Thucydides emphasizes between Pericles and his successors. The two new major schools of interpretation give precedence to Thucydides the historian rather than Thucydides the politician: "sie dem Historiker Thukydides den Vorrang

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<sup>1</sup>In a recent survey of the subject, Rengakos, for instance, argues for the development theory. At the same time, he provides a good overview of the research on the problem. Beginning with Schwartz, he recognizes the contributions of Pohlenz, Wassermann, Regenbogen, Jaeger, Dietzfelbinger, Bender, de Romilly, Schmid, Topitsch, Bayer, Herter and Plenio, along with the 'revivalists,' Raubitschek, Volkmann-Schluck, Landmann, Gaiser and Kohl; those arguing against the development of Athenian *Machtdenken*, include Vogt, Cloché, Stier, Berve, Ehrengberg and Strasburger (Rengakos 1984, 13-22, cited in Bloedow, in press, 1-2). Cf. Rhodes (1989, 219-220). Nicolai adds Erbse to the former, and primarily Hornblower and Meier to the latter (Nicolai 1996, 266-267). It must be noted that the full-text of Rengakos' thesis did not reach me until well after the completion of this Thesis.

<sup>2</sup>de Romilly (1951, 15).

<sup>3</sup>He attributes the 'new' developments in modern research to the reactions to Nazi imperialism and, more recently, to the American intervention in Vietnam (Nicolai 1996, 264).

einräumen vor dem Politiker."<sup>4</sup> Scholars such as Luschkat and Lendle deny Thucydides any real political judgement, while Strasburger, Méautis, Flashar, Heath, Connor and Forde appear to acknowledge the 'political' commentator, but reject the notion that Thucydides criticizes imperialism, much less Periclean imperialism.<sup>5</sup>

Nicolai, however, follows Meier in recognizing that the difficulties posed by Thucydides' praise of Periclean imperialism stem, for the most part, from a modern political context. Citing Raaflaub, he contends that the expansion, organization and exploitation of a power basis, whereby some ten thousand men determined the fate of hundreds of other cities, understandably governed the thoughts and actions of the Athenian *demos*. If we accept that the rise of Athens was an understandable phenomenon, then our general rejection of an oppressive imperialism does not justify the doubts of modern scholars regarding Thucydides' positive judgements on Periclean policy.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Nicolai emphasizes the need to resolve Thucydides' approval of Pericles' uncompromising power politics when these essentially culminated in the total collapse of Athens. In so doing, he questions whether it is truly possible to juxtapose Thucydides the historian with Thucydides the politician. According to him, the politician blames the Sicilian disaster on Pericles' successors, while the historian analyses how the appetite for power and profit led the Athenian *demos* into catastrophe.<sup>7</sup> And truly, it stands to reason that only when contemplating the two together can modern scholars fully understand Thucydides' perspective.<sup>8</sup>

The study of the *ἔργω* theme in Thucydides lends itself appropriately to the latest discussion on Athenian imperialism; it illustrates how Thucydides'

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<sup>4</sup>Nicolai (1996, 270).

<sup>5</sup>Nicolai (1996, 268-269).

<sup>6</sup>Nicolai (1996, 272-273) and see above n. 3.

<sup>7</sup>Nicolai (1996, 273).

<sup>8</sup>Cf. Nicolai (1996, 273-281) and Bloedow, who finds Nicolai's case most compelling (Bloedow, in press, 3).

political comment and historical analysis are intertwined throughout his work to provide a comprehensive view of Athens and her imperialism. Through the ἔργω theme, and the contrasts it helps provide, Thucydides carefully traces the changes in Athenian character throughout the Peloponnesian War, highlighting them through the interaction between *demos* and leader.

There is, at present, no complete examination of the role that ἔργω plays in Thucydides. Cornford, Connor and Forde appear to be the only critics who have directly emphasized the presence and importance of the theme in the *History*. Although their examinations are by no means exhaustive, each has made a significant contribution to the study at hand. Cornford, in his *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, draws on Plato's *Republic* to associate ἔργω with tyranny, and proceeds to examine Thucydides' references to Athens as the tyrant city.<sup>9</sup> Ostensibly he interprets the theme of ἔργω to fit his theory of literary manipulation, taking it in a 'mythic' sense,<sup>10</sup> but he touches on many of the crucial aspects nonetheless. Most importantly, he recognizes that Athens, in the *History*, "has a character of her own and a psychological history, passing through well-marked phases, which are determined partly by this character, and partly by the intervention of external or internal forces."<sup>11</sup> Moreover, he suggests that Thucydides presents the protagonists of his *History*, most notably Cleon and Alcibiades, so as to embody these forces which possessed and destroyed Athens.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Cornford (1965, 201-220; citing Plato, *Rep.* 573). Cf. Jaeger 1957, 346-347.

<sup>10</sup>Cornford's aim, as Bury remarked, was "to establish that the historian read Aeschylean conceptions into the events of the war and mounted it, like a tragedy, with the dark figures of Tyche, Hybris, Peitho, and Eros, moving in the background and prompting the human actors" (Bury 1909, 124).

<sup>11</sup>Cornford (1965, 153).

<sup>12</sup>Cf. Wallace: "as Cornford is probably wrong in his chief argument ... it is usual to shrug off or to ignore his attack. And yet ... one can hardly deny that in some sense Cleon and Alcibiades embody the arrogant delusion of their city" (Wallace 1964, 256).

Radford had earlier recognized the bold personification of the abstract passions in Thucydides: "the speeches plunge us into a world of abstractions, and we perceive that, regarding the passions as the mainspring of human action, Thucydides has introduced them

Connor clearly disagrees with Cornford's 'theological' approach to the *History*. Though he does not discount the allusion to Aeschylean tragedy at 6.24.3 (cf. Aes., Ag. 341-347), he calls attention to the emphatic use of ἔρως in Diodotus' speech (3.45.5), and the "specific and highly analytical treatment of Athenian reactions" which accompanies Thucydides' pronouncement on the enthusiasm for the Sicilian expedition (6.24).<sup>13</sup> Preferring to rest on a more objective approach to Thucydides,<sup>14</sup> Connor is the first to examine the association between ἔρως and τόλμα. Focusing primarily on the Harmodius and Aristogeiton digression, in which there are more instances of ἔρως and its derivatives than in the remainder of the *History*, Connor maintains that Thucydides' purpose is to invite comparison with the Athenians of 415 B.C.: "the Athenians, like Harmodius and Aristogeiton, are under the influence of *eros* and engaged in an act of unwarranted boldness."<sup>15</sup>

Forde follows Connor in recognizing an association between ἔρως and τόλμα, but it is he who brings the study of ἔρως directly within the context of Athenian imperialism. Building on Grene's earlier study, *Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato*, he contemplates the role of both ἔρως and τόλμα in the dynamics of Athenian imperialism, and concludes that "for Thucydides, Athenian imperialism grows out of a volatile combination of erotic passion and daring, two unusual qualities woven into the fabric of the regime."<sup>16</sup> At the very least, Forde's beliefs invite interest; unfortunately, they quickly lose ground as his arguments serve to promote his view of Alcibiades. As Kirkwood rightly observes, he shows himself to be

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also as actors in his history and assigned to them a great part in the production of events" (Radford 1901, 31).

<sup>13</sup>Connor (1984, 167-168 with n. 22).

<sup>14</sup>Cf. Connor (1984, 7-8).

<sup>15</sup>Connor (1984, 179).

<sup>16</sup>Forde (1989, 33). Though Grene, in his attempt to reconstruct the political philosophy of Thucydides, does not actually delineate the Athenian ἔρως and τόλμα, these concepts are often implicit in his discussions, such as when he establishes that the Athenians had, by the time of the Peloponnesian War, liberated themselves from the restraints of piety (Grene 1965, 86-92).

an "unabashed admirer" of the Athenian, "finding in his boundless ambition a dedication to 'honor' and, in his readiness to change sides in the conflict, a supra-nationalist 'universalism.'"<sup>17</sup> It will become evident that Forde, diverted by his own bias, confuses Alcibiades, the embodiment of Athens' 'erotic passion,' with the ἔρως theme itself, and accordingly his examinations of ἔρως and τόλμα encourage only the most positive association.<sup>18</sup>

Liddell and Scott define ἔρως to be, primarily, "love, mostly of the sexual passion."<sup>19</sup> It would seem, however, that such a definition, apart from the etymological trace in the English language (i.e., 'erotic'), leads to an apparently 'unexpungeable' preconception that has distracted modern scholars to date. Forde maintains that "the Greek notion of *eros* is of course broader than ours, embracing potentially all objects of desire, but it still differs from other kinds of desire, both in its intensity and in its unexpungeable sexual reference."<sup>20</sup> Yet an overview of Thucydides' near contemporaries suggests that it is the intensity, not the sexual reference, which is truly 'unexpungeable' in the use of ἔρως in the fifth century B.C. ἔρως and its derivatives were not always used in a sexual context; throughout Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Herodotus, Lysias, Aristophanes, Andocides and Isocrates there are, in fact, slightly more non-sexual instances than there are sexual.<sup>21</sup> The objects of ἔρως range from sanctuary to bloodshed, from glory to

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<sup>17</sup>Kirkwood (1990, 71).

<sup>18</sup>In Forde's view, Thucydides' theme essentially points to the "liberation of human eros in the city" (Forde 1989, 39).

<sup>19</sup>LSJ (s.v. ἔρως i).

<sup>20</sup>Forde (1986, 439).

<sup>21</sup>Discounting immediate repetitions, adjectives and those passages where there are textual difficulties, there are a total of 190 instances of ἔρως or one of its derivatives, of which 100 are clearly non-sexual in nature. See Appendix.

Examination into the Presocratic philosophers of this period was not particularly revealing; they essentially adopt Hesiod's concept of a cosmological Ἔρως (Jaeger 1957, 183). Cf. below n. 23. With regard to Empedocles and his study on 'Love and Strife,' the term ἔρως does not appear in the extant fragments. As Guthrie observes, "he calls the force modern editors refer to as 'Love,' Aphrodite, Cypris and φιλότης" (Guthrie 1965 ii, 182). There is only one

treason, even from eating Apaturian sausages to killing one's brother. Sexual inferences in respect of gastronomy may not be foreign to humankind, but it is unlikely that Polyneices has a sexual urge to kill his brother Eteocles in Euripides' *Phoenissae*.<sup>22</sup> In light of this, there is no evidence to support the assumption that a sexual context would necessarily form the primary meaning of ἔρως in the fifth century B.C. On the contrary, it would appear that ἔρως denotes primarily a psychological passion, rather than a physical desire. No doubt the sexual metaphor, the most violent of physical desires, may serve to reinforce the violence of the psychological passion, but it is truly necessary to distinguish between cause and effect.<sup>23</sup>

There are nine instances of ἔρως and closely related words in Thucydides' *History*, all of which are clearly used in connection with the Athenians. As Forde remarks, "each appearance is at a crucial juncture, and each plays a significant role in Thucydides' treatment of Athenian imperialism and the political psychology of Athens."<sup>24</sup> The first three instances occur in the speeches of Pericles (ἐραστάς, 2.43.1), Diodotus (ἔρως, 3.45.5) and Nicias (δυσέρωτας, 6.13.1), all of whom represent three very distinct stages in the psychological disposition of the Athenians; the fourth instance is an explicit

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passage of note, namely, that attributed to Democritus: δίκαιος ἔρως ἀνυβρίστως ἐφίεσθαι τῶν καλῶν, DK 73 (cited in Guthrie 1965 ii, 490).

<sup>22</sup>Eur. *Ph.* 621-622.

<sup>23</sup>Cf. de Romilly, who observes that ἔρως is part of a 'most specialized affective vocabulary' employed to bring to light the nature of ὕβρις (de Romilly 1951, 272). That Ἔρως is a primary force in Hesiod's *Theogony* would certainly support this line of reasoning. Ἔρως is fourth in the order of creation, following Chaos, Gaia and Tartarus, and so appears long before Aphrodite (205f.): ἡδ' Ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, λυσιμελής, πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν (120-123). West remarks that "Hesiod thinks of Aphrodite's activity solely in terms of human life, and not as something extending throughout the animal world" (West 1966, 225).

Equally revealing is Aristotle, who in the *Metaphysics*, credits Hesiod and Parmenides for being the first to consider ἔρως or ἐπιθυμία a primary force (ὑποπτεύσειε δ' ἂν τις Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, κἂν εἰ τις ἄλλος ἔρωτα ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἐν τοῖς οὖσι ἐθήκεν ὡς ἀρχὴν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν — πρῶτιστον μὲν (φησὶν) ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων, *Metaph.* 984b). The intimate relationship between the concepts of ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία will be carefully examined throughout Chapter 3.

<sup>24</sup>Forde (1989, 31).

judgement on the part of Thucydides (ἔρωσ, 6.24.3), and the final five appearances can be found in the famous Harmodius and Aristogeiton digression with which the historian retrospectively validates his own judgement (ἐρωτικὸν, ἐραστής, ἐρωτικῶς, ἐρωτικῆς and ἐρωτικὸν, 6.54.1-6.59.1).

This thesis will amplify the contributions of Cornford, Connor and Forde. Special emphasis will be placed on tracing the development of the Athenians' psychological character in an effort to understand better Thucydides' analysis on the influence of ἔρωσ and the process by which ἔρωσ ultimately subdues or subordinates reason. In order to establish the whole psychological context much time will be spent examining those elements which move in progression with ἔρωσ, namely ζύνεσις, γνώμη and ὄργη, in addition to such accompanying functions as πλεονεξία and ἐπιθυμία. Only then will it be possible to comprehend fully Thucydides' commentary on the Athenian τόλμα. The focus will be strictly literary and, for this reason, judgements and criticisms of the *History* will be left for others to make. Answers will be sought within Thucydides' work, and modern expectations placed on the 'historian' will not be considered. If we are to understand the *History*, it is essential to read and analyse Thucydides' work for what it is -- as opposed to what it 'should have been.'<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Cf. Rhodes: "it is perhaps dangerous that Thucydides is not so obviously different from modern historians" (Rhodes 1994, 161).

## Chapter 1

### Pericles and the γνώμη ideal

Thucydides' treatment of Pericles helps to determine the psychological character of the Athenians at a time when, because of Pericles, they were not entirely controlled by emotional impulse. The historian goes to great lengths to emphasize the interaction between the leader and his people; he seduces his reader into accepting not only his portrayal of Pericles, but also his assessment of Athenian character. Both treatments are determined largely by the contrast Thucydides strikes between them. The conflict of opinion he presents is "one between a majority of the Athenians, who were governed by emotion, and Pericles, who was governed by reason."<sup>1</sup>

Thucydides generally develops his portrayals in such a way that his readers should readily, sometimes unknowingly, adopt the historian's own judgement or opinion. So it is here. Before proceeding to contrast Pericles' stability with the instability of the *demos*, Thucydides ensures that his readers have a strong perception of the statesman. To this end, he shrewdly avoids drawing immediate attention to the wavering relationship between the Athenians and their leader, focusing instead upon the Spartans' apprehensions. His introduction of Pericles reveals the extent to which he manipulates the reader. Although he had opportunity to introduce him in many parts of the *Pentecontaetia*, he deliberately postpones any formal introduction until he appears as a leading figure in the Spartan negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Westlake (1968, 32).

<sup>2</sup>The greater part of the statesman's life was over, and he enters Thucydides' narrative only a few years before his death. Cf. Bury (1909, 120), de Romilly (1951, 99-100) and Kagan (1991, xii). The references to Pericles in the *Pentecontaetia* are without introduction and only with regard to military operations: the expedition to the Corinthian Gulf (1.111.2-3), the campaigns in Euboia (1.114.1-3) and the suppression of the Samian revolt (1.115.2-117.3).

Does the phrase δέκατος αὐτός at 116.1 (and 2.13.1) suggest that Pericles possessed superior authority over his colleagues or does it serve to remind the reader that he did not?

The contrast is striking, as he allots the statesman, not one, but two formal introductions, making Pericles "completely dominate the narrative and enjoy almost a monopoly of the speeches from this point to the crisis resulting in his dismissal from office in the second summer of the War."<sup>3</sup>

That Thucydides wants his readers to perceive Pericles as a dominant force is all the more evident in the narrative prior to his first formal introduction at 1.127.3. The Spartans have demanded that the Athenians drive out 'the curse of the goddess,' a demand for which Thucydides clearly attributes a motive. Not only do the Spartans anticipate a pretext for going to war should their demands be refused (1.126.1), they hope to be rid of or, at the very least, to discredit Pericles, who is associated with the curse through his mother (1.127.1-2):

τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον ἐλαύνειν δῆθεν τοῖς θεοῖς  
πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον

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Although opinion may be divided over its implication, the expression does not constitute an explicit judgement on the part of the historian. If, as Dover argues, the expression is restrictive, reminding the reader that Pericles was *only one of ten generals*, it seems unlikely that Thucydides' intent was to curb any inclination to exaggerate Pericles' role (Dover 1960, 76). If merely a numerical reference, it would be more reasonable to conclude that the expression was intended for non-Athenians, much like the historian's reference to Acharnae, the largest of the *so-called* demes of Athens: ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ἀχαρνάς, χωρίον μέγιστον τῆς Ἀττικῆς τῶν δήμων καλουμένων (2.19.2). Fornara agrees with Dover that δέκατος αὐτός need not refer to any superior authority, but insists that the expression cannot have a restrictive force. Stating that "it must be conceded that this type of expression, whatever the ordinal number, has, if not for its purpose, certainly as its effect, the emphasis of, and concentration of attention upon, the person so designated" (Fornara 1971, 33), Fornara suggests that Thucydides is emphasizing that "*even* Pericles, since he was one of the ten generals (but not one who normally took part in warfare), himself took part in the war" (*ibid.*, 34). Though Bloedow also considers the phrase δέκατος αὐτός to be "anything but restrictive" (Bloedow 1987, 22), he remarks that Pericles occupies a similar position in the revolts of Euboea and Megara, yet Thucydides does not "underline the gravity of the situation - as the translation of '*even*' would suggest in connection with Samos" (*ibid.*, 23). Regarding similar formulae in the same qualitative light (τρίτος and πέμπτος αὐτός each appear three times in connection with *strategoí*), Bloedow considers the natural force of the formula "to indicate Pericles' formalised unique position in the state" (*ibid.*, 24 with n. 3). If indeed the phrase δέκατος αὐτός suggests pre-eminence, Thucydides foreshadows his portrayal of the statesman, implanting in the minds of his readers a notion consistent with his picture of an individual "who has the authority to lead out, or not lead out, to convene, or not convene, either a regular meeting, or even an emergency meeting, of the Athenian people" (*ibid.*, 27). Cf. Westlake (1968, 24 with n. 3).

<sup>3</sup>Westlake (1968, 26).

αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα καὶ νομίζοντες ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ ῥᾶον ἄν>σφίσι προχωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἤλπιζον παθεῖν ἄν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὡς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου συμφορὰν τὸ μέρος ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος. ὦν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν ἤναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἶα ὑπέικειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὄρμα τοῦς Ἀθηναίους (1.127.1-3).

There is nothing in the text to suggest that Thucydides is affirming the sincerity of Spartan piety, as Connor and Orwin propose.<sup>4</sup> Nor does the historian delay his introduction only to paint Pericles "as a figure tainted by an ancient impiety."<sup>5</sup> The key to this passage lies with *δηθεν* at 1.127.1. Resembling *δή* in function, this particle, as Denniston observes, carries with it the "nuance of pretence or unreality."<sup>6</sup> Through his word order, Thucydides implies that the foremost motive of the Spartans is specious at best: *δηθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ....*<sup>7</sup> *πρῶτον* enhances the irony conveyed and the (*εἰδότες*) *δὲ* that follows confirms the true motive behind the Spartan demand.<sup>8</sup> With the formula *οὐ τοσοῦτον ... ὅσον* Thucydides sets aside the more widely accepted explanation, namely that the Spartans hoped to bring about Pericles' banishment, and suggests that what they really expected was that the Athenians would hold Pericles partly accountable for the rapidly approaching war.<sup>9</sup> In so doing, Thucydides manipulates his readers' perception of the statesman before he is properly introduced: he is a force

<sup>4</sup>Connor (1984, 48); Orwin (1994, 60).

<sup>5</sup>Orwin (1994, 60 n. 60). Orwin himself notes that Plutarch (*Per.* 33.1) records these accusations as having increased Pericles' reputation among the Athenians (*ibid.*, 60 n. 59).

<sup>6</sup>Denniston (1954, 264).

<sup>7</sup>Cf. Marchant (1964, 253). There has been, however, some debate regarding the position of *δηθεν* and the implications it raises. Denniston observes that *δηθεν*, like most particles of nuance, normally "follows the word it qualifies," but cites a number of passages that appear to be exceptions to this rule (Denniston 1954, 266). Jebb would argue that in those instances where *δηθεν* precedes what it qualifies, the irony of the particle affects the entire sentence (Jebb on *Soph. Tr.* 382).

<sup>8</sup>Cf. Morris (*ad loc.*) and Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*) regarding the force of (*εἰδότες*) *δὲ*.

<sup>9</sup>A suggestion confirmed by Thucydides' narrative at 2.21.3 and 2.59.2. Interestingly, the Spartans are indirectly credited with foresight. For a full discussion of Thucydides' use of the formula *οὐ τοσοῦτον ... ὅσον*, see Westlake (1969b).

to be reckoned with, a force which the Spartans try their best to avoid and/or eliminate.

When Thucydides finally refers to Pericles directly (1.127.3), he integrates his introduction into a narrative that explains the motives behind the Spartan demand at 1.126.2. Confirming Spartan fears (γὰρ), he introduces Pericles with a resounding epithet (ὦν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν), made all the more emphatic with further elaborations on the Spartan motive (ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν ἠναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἶα ὑπέικειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὄρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους). Clearly, the Spartan action and the motives behind it are not Thucydides' ultimate interest. The occasion serves as a pretext whereby a formidable portrait of Pericles is to emerge.<sup>10</sup> Through the element of drama, Thucydides creates a sense of objectivity and avoids being bound to any judgements; those inferred belong strictly to the Spartans or to the reader. Thucydides thus plants in his reader an indelible impression of Pericles, one which he will then corroborate through his own explicit remarks at 1.139.4.<sup>11</sup>

Thucydides' second introductory remark helps confirm this view of the historian's purpose. Following the exchanges and demands over the various curses, the Athenians hold an assembly to decide whether they should go to war:

καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς

<sup>10</sup>That the entire digression is an excuse for an underlying objective has not gone unnoticed. Cf. Westlake (1968, 26; 1969a, 51) and Rawlings (1981, 94).

<sup>11</sup>Westlake argues, rightly, in my opinion, that *δυνατώτατος* at 1.127.3 refers to Pericles' ability (Westlake 1968, 7-8) and, as he himself remarks, Thucydides is able to implant judgement by indirect means (*ibid.*, 5). This seems to be a case in point. Griffith and Westlake recognize the importance of this first passage when interpreting the second at 1.139.4, yet both seem to make little of this first remark: Griffith goes no further than to state that "Thucydides puts in the remark to explain the Spartan action in raking up the ancient ἄγος" (Griffith 1961, 28-29). Westlake maintains that "because the reader has not yet been informed of his [Pericles'] importance, a brief definition of his position and policy is added" (Westlake 1968, 26). The Spartan motive is undoubtedly the wider context. But it cannot escape notice that the formidable portrait of Pericles which emerges leaves a far greater impression upon the reader than any insights into Spartan character.

γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρῆ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἔμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, παρῆνει τοιάδε (1.139.4).

It is first necessary to examine, once again, the context in which Thucydides chooses to reintroduce Pericles. Huart points out that "ce n'est pas par hasard que le portrait de Thémistocle précède presque immédiatement l'apparition sur la scène de Périclès."<sup>12</sup> This raises a much debated question. To what end has Thucydides inserted the stories of Cylon, Pausanias and Themistocles? At first glance, Thucydides' first introductory remark appears nestled within a wandering digression, which many consider uncharacteristic of the historian.<sup>13</sup> It could be argued, however, that Thucydides' treatment of Pericles is, in fact, "at root the occasion for the whole excursus."<sup>14</sup> The story of Cylon acts as a bridge to the biographical sketches on Pausanias and Themistocles, which, in turn, Thucydides envelops with his double introduction of Athens' most able statesman (1.127.3; 1.139.4). In doing so, Thucydides resumes his introduction of Pericles against a large historical

<sup>12</sup>Huart (1968, 312).

<sup>13</sup>Thucydides' digression has puzzled many scholars, most notably Gomme, who states: "the whole excursus on Themistokles is irrelevant to the narrative, and so is the greater part of those on Kylon and Pausanias. Thucydides, besides being impelled, probably, to narrate episodes which he thought had been inadequately or inaccurately dealt with by others - as in the case of the tyrants at Athens - betrays a strong biographical interest, that interest which he so sternly represses, to our great loss, and to the detriment of a fuller understanding of the events, in his main narrative" (Gomme, *HCT* i, 446-447). Despite the difficulties, many attribute to Thucydides the motive of correcting previous accounts, claiming, in addition, that the stories of Cylon and Pausanias are necessary and/or relevant to the narrative. Cf. Grundy (1948 i, 449-451), de Romilly (1951, 107), Syme (1962, 41-42), Huart (1968, 312-313), Pouncey (1980, 70-72) and Hornblower (1991, 202-203; 211-212).

Others examine the digression from a very different position. Following Schwartz' and Münch's lead, Finley (1942, 139), Westlake (1969a, 51-55) and Rawlings (1981, 90-95) recognize in Thucydides' text two digressions on Pausanias and Themistokles: the first (89-96), dealing only with political aspects, and the second (128-138), with personal matters. The second digression thus amplifies the comparison of the two leaders begun at the beginning of the *Pentecontaetia*, a comparison through which Thucydides illustrates the characteristics of Athens and Sparta. Although this is clearly outside the scope of this Thesis, it is appropriate to note that the two positions are not mutually exclusive.

<sup>14</sup>Pouncey (1980, 71).

backdrop, the statesman's status further established "by the company he keeps."<sup>15</sup>

Only after encouraging his readers to conclude that Pericles' greatness was such that he is worthy of comparison with Pausanias and Themistocles does Thucydides allow himself to make explicit judgements. He carefully plants these personal remarks so as to reinforce the impressions left by the first passage. He makes the most of his earlier comparison and begins by stressing Pericles' status among his contemporaries. The phrase *δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτόν* at 1.127.3 is, in the second introductory passage, reinforced by the more elaborate remark that Pericles was *ἀνὴρ κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων*. Moreover, of those who spoke in the Athenian assembly (*καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς γνώμας*), Pericles is the only one named and the only one whose arguments are put forward by the historian. According to Westlake, Thucydides' "silence could be, and indeed has been [Gomme (*HCT* i, 464)], interpreted as evidence that the opposition to Pericles was at this time almost negligible."<sup>16</sup> It is legitimate to argue that this is precisely the perception Thucydides wants his readers to have.<sup>17</sup> His remarks

<sup>15</sup>Pouncey (1980, 72). Some scholars appear to overlook Thucydides' treatment of Pericles and reckon that the historian invites comparison between Pausanias, Themistocles and Alcibiades. Cf. Bury (1909, 127-128), Rawlings (1981, 96-100), Connor (1984, 48-49; 165 n. 18) and Forde (1989, 69). It cannot be considered coincidence that the only four character sketches offered by the historian include Pausanias, Themistocles, Pericles and Alcibiades (Bloedow 1990, 1-2 with nn. 3-4). Thucydides leads his readers first to a direct comparison between the past leaders (Pausanias and Themistocles) and Pericles, and only then to an indirect comparison with Alcibiades through the more direct comparison of the two protagonists of the Peloponnesian War. See Bloedow (1990; 1991b, 199) for observations on this last comparison. Cf. de Romilly (1951, 107), Grundy (1948 i, 449), Huart (1968, 312-313), Podlecki (1975, 74) and Hornblower (1991, 202-203).

<sup>16</sup>Westlake (1968, 27). Cf. Hornblower (1991, 225). It is important to recall that the remarks in this passage are personal to the historian, belonging neither to the Athenians nor to the Spartans, as they did in the earlier passage. Not surprisingly, Thucydides avoids putting the spotlight on the Athenians, whose instability he will emphasize through their interaction with Pericles.

From another perspective, Palmer notes that "Thucydides pays Pericles the unique compliment of never pairing a Periclean speech with another speech" (Palmer 1982b, 825). Cf. Ehrenberg (1968, 360).

<sup>17</sup>Or more simply, perhaps the phrase *ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ* contributes to the impression that many spoke, but none so great as Pericles. Another oversight which conveniently allows a

on Pericles' abilities would seem to encourage this argument. Again Thucydides expands his earlier passage, this time qualifying the superlative *δυνατώτατος* with the epexegetic infinitives *λέγειν* and *πράσσειν*.<sup>18</sup> Surely such praise can only be bestowed upon one who is unchallenged among his peers. The historian's explicit judgements corroborate the impressions left by the first passage, and thus Thucydides appears to confirm the reader's own opinions.

Thucydides' double introduction provides a strong foundation for his portrayal of Pericles as well as that of the Athenians. Putting aside any personal remarks until his eulogy (2.65), Thucydides relies further on the dramatic element and makes Pericles reveal his own character through his actions and his speeches.<sup>19</sup> Not surprisingly, the leader's actions will invite reactions from his people. Thucydides emphasizes this interaction throughout Pericles' leadership, portraying both the statesman and the *demos* only in relation to each other. The reader is continually treated to a sharp

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favourable portrait of Pericles to emerge is, of course, Thucydides' downplaying of the Megarian decree as a chief cause of the war, thus shielding the statesman, who was responsible for the policy. Cf. Cornford (1965, 25-38), Bury (1909, 95-101), Gomme (*HCT* i, 227, 447-450, 465-467) de Romilly (1951, 22-23), de Ste-Croix (1972, 1-2; 257-258), Chambers (1979, 165; 171) and Pouncey (1980, 73-74).

See also Bloedow, who notes the implications raised by the fact that, other than Pericles, we hear of no other Athenian individual or general personally "convening, or refusing to convene, a meeting of the *Ekklesia* or a *ξύλλογος*" (Bloedow, 1987, 12), and that no other general (or individual) is described as *δέκατος αὐτός* (*ibid.*, 19). Cf. above n. 2 and below n. 32.

<sup>18</sup>Hornblower (1991, 225-226) observes Homeric precedents for this description of a leader. In Homer (*Il* 9.443) "a great chief was expected to be a speaker of words as well as a doer of deeds" Lloyd-Jones (1983, 181 with n. 50). Cf. Connor (1984, 50 with n. 62).

Both Westlake and Griffith consider this second passage to reinforce and expand the meaning of *δυνατώτατος* at 1.127.3, and rightly so (Westlake, 1968, 8; Griffith 1961, 28-29). But there may already be an indirect reference to Pericles' ability in action and speech in the first introductory remark. A reader might infer Pericles' success in action when hearing of his constant opposition to the Spartans: *ἤναντιωτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις*. Were he not so successful, why would the Spartans wish to be rid of him? In turn, Pericles' success in speech seems reflected in his dealings with the Athenians: *οὐκ εἶα ὑπέικειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὤρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους*. The choice of verbs may be significant: *εἶω*, often used of oaths and laws, implies a certain power on the part of its subject, and *ὀρμάω* seems to denote success in its own right. Perhaps Thucydides is again leading his reader to make certain assumptions.

<sup>19</sup>For a good discussion of Thucydides' method see Bury (1909, 108; 116-123).

contrast between a rational Pericles and the irrational Athenians. The nature of their relationship is immediately evident in the prooemium of Pericles' first speech:

Τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἶκειν Πελοποννησίοις, καίπερ εἰδῶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους. ὄρω δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια συμβουλευτέα μοι ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαίῳ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἦν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι (1.140.1).

It is here that Thucydides introduces the ὀργή-γνώμη antithesis which will dominate his characterizations of Pericles and the Athenians.<sup>20</sup> Pericles is and has always been steadfast in his γνώμη (τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι). Once he has decided upon a policy, he does not allow himself to be moved by any ὀργή (καίπερ εἰδῶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους...). The Athenians, on the other hand, do not share the same resolve. Pericles must again advise them much as he had done in the past (ὄρω δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια συμβουλευτέα μοι ὄντα).<sup>21</sup> The necessity expressed by the use of the verbal adjective (συμβουλευτέα) supports the implication that Pericles' general reference to mankind is most applicable to the Athenians: they change their γνώμαι (τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους) according to events (πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς), moved by whatever ὀργή possesses them at the moment.

To understand this contrast between ὀργή and γνώμη better, it is necessary to explore the terms as Thucydides employs them. Huart recognizes that the historian replaces the traditional faculties νοῦς, φρῆν, θυμός and ψυχή with ὀργή, γνώμη (and ξύνεσις), accentuating the degrees to which these influence

<sup>20</sup>Others also recognize the contrast. Cf. de Romilly (1951, 272; *Budé* ii, xx-xxii), Huart (1968, 56-57), Edmunds (1975b, 8-14), Rawlings (1981, 131-132), Connor (1984, 57-60) and Farrar (1988, 164).

<sup>21</sup>As he will do again in the future (2.13.2): παρήνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἄπερ καὶ πρότερον. Cf. 2.21.3.

the reactions of men in the face of their realities.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, Thucydides' use of these terms reveals the depth of their meaning: γνώμη can signify as much a disposition, a frame of mind, as it can reflection and judgement, and, by extension, an opinion or motion, retaining at all times the notion of thought offered by its corresponding verb γιγνώσκειν.<sup>23</sup> ὄργη reunites the significance of the two verbs ὀργᾶν and ὀργίζεσθαι to denote anger and, more generally, a passionate disposition.<sup>24</sup> Of this latter sense, Huart explains, "le mot [ὄργη] peut signifier les *passions* des hommes et indique les réactions impulsives, en quelque sorte instinctives, auxquelles ils se laissent aller, quand ils n'ont pas la volonté, ou la possibilité, de les contrôler par la raison."<sup>25</sup> Thucydides makes the most of this opposition between the rational γνώμη and the irrational ὄργη, emphasizing the consequence of each. He will continue to stress the resolve Pericles holds in terms of his γνώμη, while accentuating the Athenians' tendency to let themselves be driven by their emotional reactions. To return to Pericles' prooemium, the statesman's own γνώμη clearly stands for a rational judgement, a practical resolution upon an examination of Athens' political situation.<sup>26</sup> In contrast, the Athenians

<sup>22</sup>Huart (1968, 48-57; 501-502).

<sup>23</sup>Parry concludes that "the word that expresses *intellect* is *gnome*, corresponding to the verb *gignoskein*, to come to know and it is even more common in Pericles' speeches than *logos*" (Parry 1970, 20). For a complete study on the use of γνώμη by Thucydides and his contemporaries, see Huart (1973). Cf. Snell (1924, 20-39). Both Snell and Huart have explored the relationship between γνώμη and ξύνεσις: Snell remarks that "γνώμη ist der erkennende, ordnende Geist, σύνεσις der sinnvolle, vernünftige Geist" (*ibid.*, 55). Huart suggests "γνώμη connaît le réel, σύνεσις juge et raisonne" (Huart 1968, 282). Marchant, for his part, finds ξύνεσις to stand very close to γνώμη, but "only in the intellectual sense of clear insight and circumspection" (Marchant 1961, 205). Lastly, Edmunds, as Bloedow demonstrates, bases his conclusion that ξύνεσις "may be the expression of *gnome*" and "relies on *gnome*" on a misinterpretation of Snell (Edmunds, 1975b, 9; Bloedow, 1991b, 194 n. 24). The phrase γνώμηξ συνέσεως (1.75.1) and the expression γνώμη ... μὴ ἀξύνετος (2.34.6), where the litotes accentuates the importance of ξύνεσις in γνώμη, attest the association of the two terms. Cf. Shorey (1893, 76).

<sup>24</sup>Huart (1968, 156-157).

<sup>25</sup>Huart (1968, 502). Cf.: "ὄργη c'est ce qui est en l'homme irrationnel, s'opposant à ce qui est rationnel γνώμη" (*ibid.*, 51). Zahn suggests that ὄργη, by its opposition to γνώμη, denotes all irrational motivations of an act (Zahn 1934, cited by de Romilly 1951, 272 n. 4).

<sup>26</sup>The fact that γνώμη, in the sense of rational judgement, marks the application of ξύνεσις

are unable to control their instinctive reactions through reason. When they are thus seized by ὄργη, their γνώμαι change accordingly.

Thucydides further emphasizes the Athenians' irresolution in the prooemium through his use of ἀναπείθειν.<sup>27</sup> Huart indicates that the prefix ἀνα- can bring to the simple verb the sense of changing of mind.<sup>28</sup> Regarding the first instance of ἀναπειθομένων, Gomme notes that we should expect the simple verb.<sup>29</sup> It seems significant, however, that in placing ὄργη and ἀναπειθομένων so closely together (εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὄργῃ ἀναπειθομένων τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας), Thucydides further emphasizes that the Athenians change their minds impulsively.<sup>30</sup> There is no doubt that the second occurrence of this verb in Pericles' direct address to the Athenians (τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαίῳ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν ... βοηθεῖν) is far more appropriate, as Gomme indicates. But the repetition of the verb, in exactly the same form, reinforces the impression made by the first instance, namely that of the Athenians' instability.

Having firmly established the ὄργη-γνώμη antithesis through a leader's perception of his people, Thucydides continually emphasizes the contrast between Pericles and the Athenians through what they themselves saw, felt, thought or realized. Both are made to speak and act, though often indirectly, in a manner which corresponds to the portrayals which emerge from Pericles'

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(see above n. 23), would suggest that Pericles is, by implication, ξυνετός. Cf. Bloedow "Thucydides also designates Pericles as intelligent in a comprehensive manner by the phrase γνώμη τε δοκῆ μὴ ἀξύνετος (II.34.6)" (Bloedow, 1991b, 200 n. 37). Syme had earlier remarked on Thucydides' exclusion of Pericles from among those individuals he would directly refer to as ξυνετός: "for Thucydides it was idle and superfluous thus to specify that paramount talent. However, Pericles comes in by direct allusion, in the class of those whom the city would normally select to hold an oration over the fallen war (ii.34.6)" (Syme 1962, 55).

<sup>27</sup>Of the 15 instances of the compound ἀναπείθειν in Thucydides, seven apply to the Athenians. The verb appears twice in the prooemium of Pericles' first speech, twice more throughout the interaction between Pericles and the Athenians (2.14.1, 2.65.2).

<sup>28</sup>Huart (1968, 34, n. 7).

<sup>29</sup>Gomme (*HCT* i, 43).

<sup>30</sup>The phrasing implies that it is precisely because they are not of the same ὄργη as they had been when they had come to their original resolution, that they change their minds.

prooemium. The historian advances the *ὀργή-γνώμη* opposition dramatically on at least three occasions: although the Athenians had considered the statesman's advice the best following his first speech (1.145.1), the threat of invasion is enough for their resolve to waver and Pericles must repeat his advice (*παρήνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον*, 2.13.2) for the Athenians to return to their previous resolution (*οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἀνεπαύθησαν*, 2.14.1); when threat becomes reality, and the sight of their land being ravaged strikes a chord the Athenians cannot endure,<sup>31</sup> they wish to go out to battle despite the fact that Pericles' strategy called upon them to refrain from engaging in battle on land (2.21.2-3). Pericles prevents the Athenians from coming together precisely to stop them from erring on account of an overpowering *ὀργή* (*τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν*, 2.22.1);<sup>32</sup> again, with the burden of the plague and a second Spartan invasion, the Athenians change with respect to their *γνώμη* (*ἠλλοίωσαν τὰς γνώμας*, 2.59.1).<sup>33</sup> They want no longer to deal with war, but once more Pericles succeeds in persuading them to return to their original resolution (*οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπαύθησαν*, 2.65.1).

The contrast between the statesman and the *demos* remains as striking as

<sup>31</sup>This is, of course, foreseen in Archidamus' second speech, (*πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκῳ ὄραν πάσχοντάς τι ἀηθὲς ὀργῇ προσπίπτει καὶ οἱ λογισμῶ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται*, 2.11.7). Rusten observes that "Thucydidean speakers note elsewhere that rage (*ὀργή*) is greatest at the instant a wrong is suffered" (3.38.1, cf. 2.65.4; 5.63.2; 6.89.3), but that Archidamus "adds that being an inactive *watcher* of sufferings makes rational deliberation even more difficult" (Rusten 1989, 112). Cf. Gomme (*HCT* ii, 75-77).

<sup>32</sup>Both in this passage and later, when Pericles is reported to have called a meeting, the expression Thucydides uses is (*οὐκ*) *ποιεῖν ξύλλογον* (2.22.1; 2.59.3). How Pericles could have prevented a meeting of an *ἐκκλησία* and/or *ξύλλογος* has been subject to much debate. Compare Hignett (1952, 246-247), Gomme (*HCT* ii, 76; 167), Dover (1960, 74-75), Brunt (1965, 265 n. 37), Westlake (1968, 33), Kagan (1974, 55-56), Hornblower (1983, 120-121), Connor (1984, 162 n. 13), Bloedow (1987, 9-19), Christensen and Hansen (1989, 195-209, with addenda 210-211) and Hornblower (1991, 275-276; 331).

<sup>33</sup>Connor raises an interesting possibility: "the verb [*ἠλλοίωω*] has a striking medical parallel in the Hippocratic *Praecepta* 9. Thucydides used it, I believe, to suggest some affliction of their [the Athenians'] judgement, an extension as it were, of the psychological effects of the plague described in chapter 53. The metaphor is then continued, though in less technical language, at the end of the chapter in *ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης* [2.59.3]" (Connor 1984, 58 n. 19).

it was in the prooemium to Pericles' first speech. Yet it becomes all the more clear that it is not an impartial comparison of dispositions. The Athenians' character is consistently set against that of their leader. As a result, much as the historian compels his reader to view Pericles in a most positive light, he encourages him to regard the Athenians most negatively. Pericles' rationality only highlights the Athenians' irrationality, and *vice-versa*.

Again, Thucydides' use of the verb ἀναπέιθειν helps us to understand his purpose. The force of the prefix ἀνα- indicates more than a changing of mind as indicated above.<sup>34</sup> Signalling a return to a previous state of mind, the prefix underlines the power of what was said; the Athenians change their minds and return to their previous resolution because they are won over by Pericles' words. The emphasis, therefore, is not only upon the Athenians' tendency to be distracted by their latest circumstance,<sup>35</sup> but more importantly upon Pericles' ability to guide them back to rational judgement.

This is reflected most in the second instance highlighted above (2.21.2-2.22.1), where Thucydides states the ὄργη-γνώμη antithesis directly.<sup>36</sup> Pericles

<sup>34</sup>Thucydides employs other verbs to state a general change of γνώμη. Cf. τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους (1.140.1) and ἠλλοίωοντο τὰς γνώμας (2.59.1). Regarding the latter, see above n. 33.

<sup>35</sup>Thucydides does not hesitate to emphasize this inclination when underlining Pericles' understanding of the Athenian instinct: ὄρων αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας (2.22.1); ὄρων αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας (2.59.3). This is further supported in Pericles' own words, when he himself explains his choice to call an assembly: καὶ ἐκκλησίαν τοῦτου ἔνεκα ξυνήγαγον, ὅπως ὑπομνήσω καὶ μέμψωμαι εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνετε ἢ ταῖς συμφοραῖς εἴκετε (2.60.1).

<sup>36</sup>Cf. Huart: "cette opposition entre les deux termes n'est exprimée formellement qu'une seule fois, en II,22,1" (Huart 1968, 307). The same opposition, however, is clearly articulated by the historian at 2.59.3 (ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης). It is most interesting that it is within these same two passages that we find also the only two instances whereby Thucydides attributes to Pericles the action of convening or not convening a meeting. Gomme states: "it is characteristic of Perikles and of Athens, that when he found his fellow countrymen unduly excited and confident, and critical of his *strategy*, he refused to call a special meeting; when he found them in despair and ready to find fault with his whole policy, when his own position was in danger, he called one" (Gomme *HCT ii*, 167). This somehow seems too simplistic a portrait to attribute to Thucydides. Edmunds, for his part, finds the antithesis between ὄργη and γνώμη repeated in Thucydides' summary of Pericles' last speech (Edmunds 1975b, 13-14): τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπεφάτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὐτὸν ὄργης παραλύειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην (2.65.1). While this passage may

does not even attempt to remind the Athenians of their resolutions, but prevents them from coming together precisely because they would be doing so under the influence of *ὄργη* more than that of *γνώμη*: τοῦ μὴ ὄργῃ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμη ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν (2.22.1).<sup>37</sup> The genitive articular infinitive of purpose delivers the necessary effect upon the reader; the rational statesman keeps the irrational *demos* from gravely erring on account of *ὄργη*.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the historian seems to clarify Pericles' earlier statement (μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας, 1.144.1), namely that the error to fear is that which is made under the influence of *ὄργη*.<sup>39</sup>

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recall the antithesis with the phrase ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων ... ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην, it cannot be considered a true repetition. This instance of *ὄργη* refers directly to the anger the Athenians held towards the statesman and cannot be confused with the sense of 'passionate disposition.'

<sup>37</sup>Huart observes the same expression in Antiphon's speech on the murder of Herodes (Huart 1973, 47 and 86). The Hellenotamiae face death when a judgement is rendered by *ὄργη* more than it is by *γνώμη*: ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἅπαντες ἀπέθανον ὄργῃ μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμη (Ant. 5.69).

<sup>38</sup>The force of the preposition in the compound ἐξαμαρτεῖν intensifies the meaning of the principal verb. Thucydides employs this compound only twice, the other instance being used of the Mytilenaeans in Diodotus' speech at 3.46.2. Of note, however, is the historian's choice of the compound ξυνεξαμαρτεῖν earlier in the same speech. The speaker complains of the Athenian tendency to blame all but themselves: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὄργην ἤντινα τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλέντες τὴν τοῦ πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζημιούτε καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλαὶ οὔσαι ξυνεξημαρτον (3.43.5).

<sup>39</sup>Perhaps it also sheds some light on Thucydides' judgement at 2.65.11: ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἢ πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγινώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. This would seem supported by Bloedow who, in his attempt to clarify the age-old problem between the historian's judgement and his narrative in books 6 and 7, concentrates upon the manner in which the expedition might have been a mistake. Examining, therefore, the manner in which the decision was reached, Bloedow concludes that "the decision to embark on the enterprise at that particular time was completely irrational" (Bloedow 1992, 148). No doubt the formula οὐ τοσοῦτον ... ὅσον can lead the modern reader to confusion. It is important to recall, however, that while the second explanation is generally "claimed to be more cogent than the first, ... the validity of the first is not expressly denied" (Westlake 1969b, 165-166). For a range of views, compare Gomme (*HCT* ii, 195; v, 423-427), Brunt (1952, 59-65), Dover (1987, 81), Westlake (1969b, 161-173), de Romilly (1965, 78), Thompson (1971, 141-151), Van de Maele (1971, 21-37), Rawlings (1981, 151 n. 39; 152 n.40), Hornblower, (1991, 348), Bloedow (1991b, 205-209; 1992, 144-149) and Connor (1984, 158 n. 2).

There are four other instances of *γνώμη* used in combination with *ἁμαρτάνω*, all of which appear outside of Thucydides' immediate treatment of the Athenians: *γνώμης ἁμαρτάνει* (1.33.3), *ξυγγνώμην ἁμαρτεῖν* (3.40.1), *γνώμη ἁμαρτοὶ* (6.78.3), and *οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι οἴμαι γνώμης* (6.92.1). It should be noted that not all instances need refer to the same manner of error.

Thucydides consistently portrays Pericles trying to steer the Athenians away from such errors. As Wilson rightly observes, "Pericles is a paragon of emotional stability, always remaining the same and not changing according to circumstance."<sup>40</sup> Throughout their interaction, the statesman, who is always of the same γνώμη,<sup>41</sup> gives the Athenians the same advice time after time.<sup>42</sup> When later the historian attributes to Pericles a motive for calling a ξύλλογος, he reinforces both Pericles' strength of leadership and the Athenians' shortcomings. The statesman tries to rid the Athenian γνώμη of ὄργη (ἐβούλετο ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἡπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστήσαι, 2.59.3). Huart remarks: "Il est bien évident que τὸ ὀργιζόμενον, qualifiant τῆς γνώμης, marque un *emportement* qui n'a plus grand'chose [sic] de commun avec un examen raisonnable de la situation; et le terme s'oppose à ἡπιώτερον, suggérant, lui le *calme* d'un esprit qui ne se laisse pas entraîner par les mouvements de la passion."<sup>43</sup> Clearly unchanged by ὄργη, Pericles incites the Athenians to hold to their resolutions (τὸ γὰρ βραχὺ τι τοῦτο πάσαν ὑμῶν ἔχει τὴν βεβαίωσιν καὶ πείραν τῆς γνώμης, 1.140.5) and alludes to γνώμη almost as an "arme de guerre" (τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμη καὶ χρημάτων περιουσία

<sup>40</sup>Wilson (1990, 52).

<sup>41</sup>Cf. 2.55.2 (Περικλῆς ... τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην εἶχεν) and 2.61.2 (ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι). Regarding the latter, Edmunds recognizes a verbal similarity to Theognis (319-322), and gathers that "Pericles attributes to himself that constancy which the aristocrat, Theognis, says belongs to the agathos, the aristocrat, and which the *kakos*, the man of the people, can never possess" (Edmunds 1975b, 11).

<sup>42</sup>This is also stressed outside the interaction to which the reader is witness. Cf. the prooemium to Pericles' first speech: ὄρω δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια συμβουλευτέα μοι ὄντα (1.140.1). Westlake finds Pericles' opening words (τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ᾧ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, 1.140.1) also to suggest that "Pericles had advocated the same policy in earlier speeches" (Westlake 1968, 29 n. 3). With respect to Pericles' last speech (καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι ὑμεῖς δὲ μεταβάλλετε, 2.61.2), de Romilly notes: "la permanence de cette γνώμη [de Périclès] se reflète, dans le discours, par toutes les formules évoquant un jugement droit et rationnel (60.2: ἡγοῦμαι; 5: γινώμαι; 6: γνούς, etc...)" (de Romilly *Budé* ii, xxi). Compare 2.22.1 (ὀρθῶς γινώσκω) and 1.141.2 (γνώτε), where Pericles has just exhorted the Athenians to make up their minds (διανοήθητε, 1.141.1). Rusten also observes that Pericles' constancy is clearly reflected in his speeches: apart from the funeral oration, they "consist of three successive attempts to elucidate and justify a single strategy to his people" (Rusten 1989, 114).

<sup>43</sup>Huart (1973, 28 with n. 2).

κρατεῖσθαι, 2.13.2).<sup>44</sup> To reinforce further the impression left on the reader, the historian corroborates, in his narrative, what the reader has witnessed in this interaction. On each occasion when the Athenians changed with regard to their γνώμαι, their consequent actions demonstrated their neglect of Pericles' advice. To this, Thucydides makes direct reference both in his narrative (καὶ ὧν παρήνεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδέεν, 2.21.3) and in his estimate of Pericles (οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τὸναντίον ἔπραξαν, 2.65.7). The reader is left to judge that, should the Athenians err, it would, in the end, be their own undoing.

To emphasize further the Athenians' irrationality, to illustrate that they are constantly at the mercy of ὀργή, Thucydides underlines the rage they hold toward their leader, both in his narrative and through the mouth of Pericles: Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον (2.21.3), προσδεχομένω μοι τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑμῶν ἔς με γεγένηται (2.60.1), καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε (2.60.5), ὑμεῖς δε ... μήτε ἐμὲ δι' ὀργῆς ἔχετε (2.64.1), τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειῶτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν (2.65.1), οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν (2.65.3)<sup>45</sup> Although, in these instances, Thucydides employs ὀργή in the more particular sense of 'anger', the frequent repetition of the term likely creates, in itself, a powerful verbal suggestion. Furthermore, the historian qualifies the Athenian feelings. He invites his readers to interpret them as irrational, by demonstrating that the Athenian disposition was being dictated only by the fact of their immediate realities:<sup>46</sup> when the Athenians could no longer bear

<sup>44</sup>Huart (1968, 307). Cf. 2.62.5: καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας τύχης ἢ ζύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἥσσον πιστεύει, ἥς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἢ ἰσχύς, γνώμη δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἥς βεβαιότερα ἢ πρόνοια.

<sup>45</sup>We also find at 2.60.1: ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνετε. Huart, citing 5.63.2 and 8.92.9, notes that the verb χαλεπαίνειν "traduit plutôt des sentiments violents que la résolution bien arrêtée de les transformer en actes" (Huart 1968, 95). Thucydides employs this verb eight times in the *History*, once with regard to Pericles, twice more with regard to the Athenians' current situation (2.22.1 and 2.59.3). Noting the distinctions between χαλεπαίνειν and ὀργίζεσθαι, Huart states: "χαλεπαίνειν reste dans le domaine de l'abstrait, ὀργίζεσθαι marque l'irritation qui se manifeste au dehors" (*ibid.*).

<sup>46</sup>Only to be corroborated by the calm and rational Pericles, who not only recognizes the force of the Athenians' irrationality, but also comes to expect it in the *demos*: Περικλῆς δὲ ὀρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονούνοντας... (2.22.1); ὁ δὲ ὀρῶν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιούντας ἄπερ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζε... (2.59.3).

the sight of their land being ravaged, Athens was παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέβιστο (2.21.3); when they were hit with both the war and the plague, they were πανταχόθεν τε τῇ γνώμῃ ἄποροι καθεστηκότες (2.59.2). In addition, they become so angry that they blame their statesman for all their misfortunes: αἰτιὸν τε σφίσι ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον (2.21.3), καὶ τὸν μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς ... δι' ἐκείνον ταῖς συμφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότες (2.59.2), καὶ ἐμέ ... δι' αἰτίας ἔχετε (2.60.4), οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως νῦν τοῦ γε ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν φεροίμην (2.60.7). By means of the strong impression of Pericles already emerging from the ὀργή-γνώμη opposition, Thucydides makes clear to the reader that the Athenians, swayed by their personal sufferings, would hold Pericles responsible regardless of his abilities.<sup>47</sup> With the irrational ὀργή prodding them, the Athenians, unable to think clearly,<sup>48</sup> abuse and attack their statesman when he does not yield to their irresolution: ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὧν οὐκ ἐπέξαγοι (2.21.3), ἐνέκειντο τῷ Περικλεῖ (2.59.2).

That the Athenians would blame their statesman on account of their own misfortunes is reinforced in Thucydides' valedictory to Pericles (2.65). Vexed by their own misfortunes (τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐλυποῦντο, 2.65.2), they are angry with the statesman (οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ζύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν..., 2.65.3) and exhibit their fickleness yet again, this time with direct regard to Pericles - he is fined, deposed, and welcomed back as general (2.65.3-4).<sup>49</sup> Truly the reader can only nod in agreement as Thucydides makes

<sup>47</sup>Marchant makes a similar remark regarding Thucydides' use of τοιούτῳ at 2.60.5: καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε (Marchant 1961, 201).

<sup>48</sup>Cf. 2.22.1 (οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονούντας), 2.60.1 (μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνετε ἢ ταῖς συμφοραῖς εἴκετε) and 2.61.2 (καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἀσθενεῖ τῆς γνώμης μὴ ὀρθὸν φαίνεσθαι).

<sup>49</sup>Ironically, as Westlake observes, the fickleness for which Pericles censured the Athenians benefits him now (2.65.3-4): οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ζύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν. ὕστερον δ' αὖθις οὐ πολλῶ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὄμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν (Westlake 1968, 39). Thucydides mentions only that the Athenians fined Pericles, but it is generally understood that the statesman's deposition is implied. See Gomme (*HCT* ii, 183) and Hornblower (1991, 341). There is some debate, however, as to whether the Athenians reinstated Pericles in 430/29 or re-elected him for 429/28. Compare Miltner (1938, 787), Gomme (*HCT* ii, 183), Fornara (1971, 55), Kagan (1974, 93 with n. 69), Develin (1989, 119; 121) and Rusten (1989, 209).

explicit what has already emerged from the interaction between the statesman and his *demos*. With his eulogy, the historian not only brings to a close his forceful treatment of the statesman, but ultimately shapes his readers' impression of the Athenians, an impression upon which the remainder of the *History* will depend.<sup>50</sup>

Before proceeding to offer his own explicit judgement of Pericles, Thucydides puts forward the public reaction to their leader and, in so doing, strengthens his hold upon the reader. He alludes to the *ὀργή-γνώμη* antithesis, again drawing attention to Pericles' abilities by underlining the Athenians' inabilities. Moreover, the historian's own explicit judgements will have been easily justified before they have even been offered: when the Athenians finally recognize their statesman for the true leader he is, they follow his advice with somewhat more conviction (*ὧν μὲν περὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἕκαστος ἤλγει ἀμβλύτεροι ἤδη ὄντες*), and finding Pericles most worthy with regard to the needs of the city (*ὧν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασσα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστου ἄξιον νομίζοντες εἶναι*), they entrust him with all their affairs (*πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν*, 2.65.4).<sup>51</sup> If the Athenians themselves recognized Pericles' eminence, then why should the reader doubt Thucydides' portrayal of either Pericles or the Athenians?

When the historian finally turns to his own explicit judgement of the statesman, it is in total agreement with Pericles' actions and words.<sup>52</sup> Having

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<sup>50</sup>Cf. Rusten: "This [Thucydides' estimate of Pericles] is perhaps the most complex and important chapter of T.'s history" (Rusten 1989, 207). Also, Westlake observes that Thucydides' primary aim "is not to assess his [Pericles'] ability but to establish that the Athenians could have been victorious if they had continued to follow his advice... [He] is concerned almost as much with their folly as with his wisdom" (Westlake, 1968, 40).

<sup>51</sup>Gomme suggests that "Thucydides here probably means no more than that the Athenians 'entrusted him with everything', as before, in the sense of being prepared always to follow his advice" (Gomme *HCT* ii, 183). The Athenians' perpetual change of *γνώμη* would point to the contrary. As is demonstrated later in the passage in question, Thucydides establishes that, ultimately, Pericles did not succeed in permanently shielding the Athenians from their own irrationality.

<sup>52</sup>Cf. Westlake: "the qualities here [2.65.5-13] attributed to him could for the most part

continued to allow Pericles' 'actions' to speak for themselves through his emphasis upon the Athenians' eventual appreciation of the statesman's advice, Thucydides defers any direct reference to Pericles' ability to guide and lead the *demos*. He first offers what appears to be a general assessment of Pericles' leadership, summarizing, nevertheless, those qualities which, as demonstrated through the ὀργή-γνώμη opposition, were abounding in Pericles and clearly lacking in the Athenians, namely constancy and moderation (2.65.5).<sup>53</sup> It cannot be more evident that the reader is prompted to judge the Athenians' behaviour by that of their leader. To highlight further Pericles' leadership, Thucydides points to the Athenians' inability to follow his lead upon his death. Although the Athenians recognized still more Pericles' understanding of Athens' needs with regard to the war (καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπὶ πλείον ἔτι ἐγνώσθη ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, 2.65.6), the historian demonstrates that they were unable to hold to their γνώμαι and regressed to their irresolute ways (2.65.7). Exploiting the opportunity to its fullest, Thucydides begins by expounding that which the Athenians recognized with regard to Pericles' πρόνοια (ὁ μὲν γὰρ... ἔφη...), only to accentuate the Athenians' ultimate disregard of it, both with respect to the war and on other matters (οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τούναντίον ἔπραξαν...). In so doing, Thucydides insinuates that Pericles alone had been responsible for shielding the Athenians from their own irrationality. The impression is secured when Thucydides finally extols the statesman's qualities of leadership at 2.65.8-9:

ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὦν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε

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have been inferred by a discerning reader from the record of what he did and said..." (Westlake, 1968, 41). This is most evident with regard to Pericles' last speech 2.60-64, where he defends himself against the Athenians' anger. See Rusten: "the twofold object of 60.4 (καὶ ἐμέ τε τὸν παραινέσαντα πολεμεῖν καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἱ ξυνέγνωτε ἴδι' αἰτίας ἔχετε) leads Pericles to remind them first of his own talents, then of their own inconstancy" (Rusten 1989, 198).

<sup>53</sup>2.65.5: ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ' ἐκείνου μεγίστη, ἐπειδὴ τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοῦς τὴν δύναμιν. The sense of constancy is evoked from the outset with the temporal clause ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον.

διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὄργην τι ἀντειπεῖν. ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθαιτό τι αὐτοῦς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσε ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν (2.65.8-9).

He wastes no time in alluding to Pericles' own γνώμη and the reasons for his ability to uphold that of the Athenians.<sup>54</sup> As de Romilly affirms, "Périclès agit comme le modérateur: il rapelle la crainte là où on l'oublie, la confiance là où elle manque: ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι — ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. Cet équilibre, cette position rigoureuse qui est celle du fléau de la balance, c'est le contrôle exercé par Périclès au nom du λόγος."<sup>55</sup>

In retrospect, Thucydides clearly outlined the Athenians' decreasing ability for realistic interpretation in the parallel passages at 2.21-2.22.1 and 2.59-2.60.1. In the former, Thucydides goes to great lengths to describe the Athenian reaction to the sight of the Peloponnesian invasion. He paints a most unflattering picture:

κατὰ ξυστάσεις τε γιγνόμενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν κελεύοντες ἐπεξιέναι, οἱ δέ τινες οὐκ ἐῶντες. χρησμολόγοι τε ἡδον χρησμούς παντοίους, ὧν ἀκροᾶσθαι ὡς ἕκαστος ὠρμητο (2.21.3).

Rusten observes the historian's technique: he "emphasises the build up of unrest by using the same connective for each new sentence...; then the leader

<sup>54</sup>I am in complete agreement with de Romilly, who suggests that πρὸς accompanies ἀντειπεῖν rather than ὄργην, as most would interpret. Citing Arist. *Nu.* 888, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.17, Dem. 27.15 and three other instances in Thucydides (3.61.1, 4.22.1, 8.74.3), de Romilly states: "étant donné l'importance que prend dans le livre II, la lutte entre la γνώμη de Périclès et les ὄργαι du peuple, nous avons cru devoir conserver cette interprétation...: Périclès répond à la colère, aux passions des gens; autrement dit, il leur oppose sa clairvoyance" (de Romilly *Budé* ii, 101). Connor observes that Thucydides "sharply contrasts Pericles' ability πρὸς ὄργην τι ἀντειπεῖν, to the tendency of others πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν" (Connor 1984, 60 n. 25).

<sup>55</sup>de Romilly (1965, 567). Edmunds notes that Pericles achieves one of the goals of sophistic rhetoric, namely "the ability to sway the passions of the mob from one state to its opposite" (Edmunds 1975b, 14). Cf. North (1966, 114). This is particularly true of Pericles' final speech.

takes control (Περικλῆς δὲ ... [2.22.1])."<sup>56</sup> When Thucydides remarks that the city was in a state of unrest (παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις), it is by no means an understatement, yet there is still hope. The Athenians impetuously consider a change of course (ἔδόκει ... ἐπεξιέναι καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν, 2.21.2; οἳ τε Ἀχαρνῆς ... ἐνῆγον τὴν ἔξοδον μάλιστα, 2.21.3), but are never shown to act upon it.<sup>57</sup> Later, however, it is a different case altogether. When the Athenians are enduring the plague in addition to the war, they do not merely consider acting in opposition to their resolutions, but are eager and quick to do so (πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὥρμητο συγχωρεῖν· καὶ πρέσβεις τινὰς πέμψαντες ὡς αὐτοὺς ἄπρακτοι ἐγένοντο, 2.59.2). They are now altogether without γνώμη (πανταχόθεν τε τῇ γνώμῃ ἄποροι καθεστηκότες, 2.59.2);<sup>58</sup> Pericles can only restore the Athenian resolve with a lengthy speech, in which he repeats his rules of action. He defends his policy (2.60-61), reminding the Athenians that the needs of the state outweigh those of the individual, and incites them, by extolling the virtues of their empire (2.62-64).<sup>59</sup> Ultimately, Pericles acted as the γνώμη of the *polis* in tempering and channeling the ὄργη of the Athenians.<sup>60</sup>

ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.

(Thuc., 2.65.9)

<sup>56</sup>Rusten (1989, 128). Rusten reads ὥρητο rather than ὥρητο at 2.21.3. The strong parallels between 2.21-2.22.1 and 2.59-2.60.1 (also noted by Connor [1984, 59 n. 20]) coupled with Thucydides' use of ὀρμᾶσθαι at 2.59.2, leads me to accept ὥρητο. Cf. Chapter 3 n. 131.

<sup>57</sup>Moreover, in reporting that Pericles prevents a meeting of the ἐκκλησία or ξύλλογος (2.22.1), the historian is implying that their lack of judgement was not a total one.

<sup>58</sup>Perhaps shedding some light upon Thucydides' statement at 2.51.4: πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀνέλπιστον εὐθύς τραπόμενοι τῇ γνώμῃ πολλῶ μᾶλλον προίεντο σφας αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀντείχον.

<sup>59</sup>To this end, de Romilly notes that Thucydides employs the words ἀρχή and ἄρχειν repeatedly (de Romilly 1951, 109-11).

<sup>60</sup>This is Farrar's characterization (Farrar 1988, 165).

## Chapter 2

### Cleon and the Athenian *δῆμος*

Toward the end of his eulogy of Pericles, Thucydides further highlights the statesman's greatness with an emphasis upon his successors' weaknesses. Unlike their predecessor, who clearly led the *demos* rather than be led by it (οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, 2.65.8), the future leaders begin instead to surrender to the whims of the people:

οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι (2.65.10).

Cleon is the first of these successors to be given any prominence in the *History*.<sup>1</sup> The historian's treatment of the demagogue not only clarifies the above statement, but sheds as much light upon the Athenian disposition following Pericles' leadership. The Mytilenaeen debate, in particular, helps the reader better to understand the degree to which emotional impulses have come to play a role in Athenian politics. The *demos* is further characterized as irresolute; yet, in this instance, Thucydides illustrates thoroughly the process by which the Athenians change with respect to their *γνώμη*. Thereupon he begins to address what it is that now prompts the Athenians to their irrationality, namely *ἔρως*.

There is little debate regarding the bias Thucydides holds toward Cleon. As Woodhead points out, scholars have divided themselves into pro-Cleon and anti-Cleon camps, the latter with Thucydides as their captain.<sup>2</sup> I do not wish to enter this particular debate, but rather prefer to examine the text of

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<sup>1</sup>It may seem, upon a preliminary reading, that Thucydides' charge at 2.65.10 is not made against Cleon (Lewis *CAH* v, 404), but, ultimately, the portrait of the demagogue embodies "the irresponsible, self-serving ambition by which Thucydides characterizes Pericles' successors" (Pouncey 1980, 20).

<sup>2</sup>Woodhead (1960, 290).

the historian.<sup>3</sup> As the tone of his statement at 2.65.10 would indicate, he does not necessarily disapprove of Cleon's policies, but objects to his motives and his methods.<sup>4</sup> He wastes no time and immediately passes judgement upon the demagogue when he first introduces him in the affair of Mytilene and, again, in the first debate on Pylos:

καταστάσης δ' εὐθύς ἐκκλησίας ἄλλαι τε γινώμαι ἀφ' ἐκάστων ἐλέγοντο καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνενηκῆκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὧν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαίωτατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, παρελθὼν αὐθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε (3.36.6).

μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνήγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὧν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος (4.21.3).

The brevity of both remarks and the superlatives point to the historian's intentional emphasis.<sup>5</sup> Thucydides' narrative underlines Cleon's manner and the extent to which it influences his policy.<sup>6</sup>

Thucydides' choice of superlatives is significant in itself. Cleon is βιαίωτατος and πιθανώτατος, both of which words are scarce in the *History*. The first of these two superlatives is nowhere else used;<sup>7</sup> βίαιος and its forms occur seventeen times in the entire work, but are only used of a person or

<sup>3</sup>Due to the wider context of this Thesis, and, seeing that the strength of Thucydides' treatment hinges, for the most part, on his direct judgements, this discussion will be restricted to illustrating their impact.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Gomme (*HCT* ii, 194-195).

<sup>5</sup>There is nothing unusual in the length of these statements. Griffith remarks that any "introductory remarks descriptive of persons or personages in the *History* ... are nearly always very brief; sometimes indeed so brief as to be not there at all" (Griffith 1961, 25). Cf. Westlake (1968, 5). Griffith may be right to stress the brevity of such remarks, but their nature requires equal attention. When a remark serves to define the ability or character of an individual, the forcefulness of the passage may well be provided by its brevity. In this case, the use of superlatives provides an intensity that would surely have been lost if Thucydides had allowed himself more room in the narrative.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Connor: "[Thucydides] stresses Cleon's style rather than his actions," introducing him "as 'most violent ... and most persuasive,' not 'most radical and severest in his policies toward the empire'" (Connor 1971, 132).

<sup>7</sup>Neither the comparative nor the superlative of βίαιος is to be found in Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus or Aristophanes. Forms of βίαιος occur 44 times in all of Euripides (23), Sophocles (1), Aeschylus (18) and Aristophanes (2).

persons in two other instances.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, Huart remarks that "βίαιος, en général, traduit comme βιάζειν simplement les effets de la violence," but points to two instances, 3.36.6 and 3.82.2, where it highlights, more particularly, "la naissance des sentiments d'hostilité dans l'esprit."<sup>9</sup> Clearly, it is not unreasonable to consider βιαιότατος a particularly strong superlative.

The same can be said for πιθανώτατος. Not only is πιθανός uncommon in Thucydides, but the superlative is the only form in which it actually appears. It is used twice of Cleon; the third and last usage is significantly employed of another demagogue, Athenagoras, "a man whom he regards as of the same stamp."<sup>10</sup> Like βιαιότατος, πιθανώτατος signals by no means an admirable quality. Woodhead, noting that Demosthenes couples the word with πονηρός, demonstrates that πιθανώτατος is clearly used in a derogatory sense: "[πιθανός] implies the carrying of conviction against what really is or ought to be so."<sup>11</sup> In his characterisation of Cleon, Thucydides further strengthens the superlative force, both through the use of various intensifiers (παρὰ πολὺ at 3.36.6 and καὶ at 4.21.3), and through his placement of πιθανώτατος at the end of each clause.<sup>12</sup> Is it Thucydides' intention to emphasize deliberately Cleon's style? A general examination of regular superlatives<sup>13</sup> in the *History* reveals

<sup>8</sup>It is used of the Corcyreans at 1.40.1, and of Pausanias at 1.95.1.

<sup>9</sup>3.82.2: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ... βίαιος διδάσκαλος. Huart (1968, 103 with n. 4).

<sup>10</sup>Woodhead (1960, 298). 6.35.2: παρελθὼν δ' αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιαῦτα. Apart from Thucydides, there are only 13 cases of πιθανός or any of its forms in all of Euripides (4), Sophocles (0), Aeschylus (6) and Aristophanes (3). It should be noted that one of the Aristophanic instances is also with regard to Cleon (*Knights*, 628-9): ξυνωμότας λέγων πιθανώτατα.

<sup>11</sup>Dem. 37.48: καὶ Στρατοκλεῖ τῷ πιθανωτάτῳ πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πονηροτάτῳ. Woodhead (1960, 298).

<sup>12</sup>It seems hasty to conclude that the historian's treatment of Athenagoras is "no gentler than his treatment of Cleon" (Westlake 1968, 61). In the case of Athenagoras, πιθανώτατος is neither strengthened nor seems in any way emphasized by word order (6.35): ὃς δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς. As for βιαιότατος, it is not unreasonable to consider the superlative an intensification in itself, on the grounds that βίαιος is not frequently attributed to persons, nor found in the strongest comparison.

<sup>13</sup>Those superlatives intensified to stress a degree of possibility - eg., 'he was most x as possible' - do not fall under the same category.

a selective use of strengthened comparison. For instance, in his treatment of Pericles, the statesman *par excellence*, the historian reinforces only one superlative, stressing that Pericles was most resistant to bribes.<sup>14</sup> Evidently, the superlative remains an extreme qualitative term throughout the *History* and, accordingly, is rarely intensified. Thucydides extends what is already extreme only when seeking to make a particular emphasis more forceful.<sup>15</sup>

Thucydides' double introduction of Cleon is no less calculated than that of his predecessor. Not unlike that of Pericles, Cleon's time of entry into the *History* does not reflect his standing in Athenian politics. Gomme, citing 2.21.3 and 3.19.1, notes that Thucydides had at least one earlier opportunity to introduce the demagogue, if not two.<sup>16</sup> In effect, the historian encompasses the Mytilenaeon Debate with his own explicit judgements, pretending to allow the reader to witness Cleon's manner for himself.<sup>17</sup> Yet the similarity of the two introductory passages has posed a number of difficulties for scholars. Unlike Pericles' and Alcibiades' double introductions, the two remarks concerning the demagogue are repetitive, with the second adding nothing new to the first.<sup>18</sup> Gomme concludes that "most probably, he

<sup>14</sup>2.65.8: χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος.

<sup>15</sup>It seems harsh to call βιαιώτατος and πῦθανώτατος "smear words" (Woodhead 1960, 298), if only on the grounds that modern scholars cannot know that the statements are untrue. I do, however, find de Wet's objections to Woodhead's argument questionable. Given the above evidence, it seems somewhat rash to imply that the superlatives employed reflect "a common custom in Thucydides" (de Wet 1962, 67).

<sup>16</sup>Gomme (*HCT* ii, 75-76; 278-279; 298). Cf. Kagan (1974, 156; 1975, 82) and Hornblower (1991, 419). Woodhead, for his part, does not even recognize a double introduction in the historian's treatment of Pericles, referring to 4.21.3 as an "unprecedented step of a 'second introduction'" (Woodhead 1960, 311).

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Weil and de Romilly: "le personnage de Cléon paraît présenté d'une façon non seulement vraisemblable, mais objective" (*Budé* iii, xxx).

<sup>18</sup>Although, at first glance, there is repetition in the passages devoted to Pericles, the second passage (1.139.4) definitely adds to the first (1.127.3). Gomme, in my opinion, oversimplifies Thucydides' purpose, when he states that this repetition is simply a "resumption of the narrative, on the same occasion" (Gomme *HCT* iii, 461). As for Alcibiades, the two remarks are fully complementary (5.43.2; 6.15.2f.). de Romilly notes that, in the cases of Pericles and Alcibiades, "la première présentation correspond à une nécessité et vise à la clarté, la seconde souligne et éclaire l'intervention décisive du personnage" (de Romilly 1951,

[Thucydides] had not decided, at the time of his death, which of the two introductions to delete."<sup>19</sup> Griffith argues that Thucydides surely "meant twice what he said twice," but questions the order the passages were meant to follow.<sup>20</sup> There is no doubt that, in the case of Pericles, the second passage is "the longer and stronger remark," emphatically reinforcing the first;<sup>21</sup> the first direct judgement on the statesman consists of only one superlative, the second of two (1.127.3; 1.139.4). In the case of Cleon, Griffith considers the reversal of order troublesome: "If he [Thucydides] *means* to write again something very like what he has written before, he is almost sure this time to make it a little stronger than before, and he is very unlikely to make it a little weaker."<sup>22</sup> The difference of impression, however, calls for the reverse. The negative portrayal of the demagogue is strongest when Thucydides' text is read as it stands.

There is a third direct judgement made on Cleon's character which may shed some light upon the historian's purpose.<sup>23</sup> Thucydides may not offer his judgement as explicitly as in his double introduction, but he exploits the opportunity to concentrate, once again, upon the demagogue's manner:

ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ἦσσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐγεγένητο καὶ ἔτεθνήκει Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, τότε δὴ ... (5.16.1).

Westlake, who recognizes only two distinct judgements (3.36.6 and 4.21.3), himself remarks that "if one wishes to discover what he [Thucydides] feels about the ability or character of any individual ... it is necessary to examine

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150 n. 2). Cf. Griffith (1961, 29-30).

<sup>19</sup>Gomme (*HCT* iv, 347). Cf. Murray (1966, 200).

<sup>20</sup>Griffith (1961, 28).

<sup>21</sup>Griffith (1961, 29).

<sup>22</sup>Griffith (1961, 28).

<sup>23</sup>Grote (vi, 26) and Andrewes (1962, 79), also recognize 5.16.1 to be an explicit judgement.

thoroughly all the relevant narrative and speeches."<sup>24</sup> Why not apply this here? The contrast between the two opposing leaders, in itself, encourages the reader to view Cleon in a most negative light. As Usher remarks, Thucydides treats Brasidas "much more sympathetically..., though a Spartan."<sup>25</sup> Although both are clearly motivated by private gain, the motives attributed to the Spartan seem somehow negligible when set against those of his counterpart, an effect undoubtedly left by the way in which they are presented. Thucydides does not merely offer his partial comparison through the *ὁ μὲν...*, *ὁ δὲ...* construction: he describes Brasidas' purpose in a rather detached manner, through the *διὰ* of motive and the articular infinitives (*διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν*); when he turns to Cleon, he leads the reader directly into the demagogue's state of mind, leaving a most vivid impression by his use of present participles. *νομίζων* alerts the reader to Cleon's motives, while *κακουργῶν* and (*ἀπιστότερος*) *διαβάλλων* highlight his methods. The demagogue's manner may be "thoroughly discreditable," it may even have been inferred from a "subjective assessment of his character,"<sup>26</sup> nonetheless, the attribution of motives in this case results in a characterization, and thereby constitutes a direct judgement.

Woodhead observes that Thucydides "conditions us by his very selection of words not to think our way, but to think his."<sup>27</sup> This is by all means true of the individual judgements, but equally important is the attention the historian pays to the structure of his treatments. When viewed in their context, the progression of passages (3.36.6, 4.21.3 and 5.16.1) seems most natural. These three explicit judgements effectively define the historian's portrayal and, accordingly, they help confirm an understanding of any indirect judgements made upon Cleon's character. If we were to remove one

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<sup>24</sup>Westlake (1968, 5-6).

<sup>25</sup>Usher (1969, 59). Cf. Adcock (1963, 63-64).

<sup>26</sup>Westlake (1968, 82).

<sup>27</sup>Woodhead (1960, 295).

of the two introductory passages, or even interchange them, the framework would weaken considerably. The treatment is carefully crafted, and the progression of passages carefully arranged, to leave a definitively negative impression upon the reader.

Due to the fact that Thucydides is judging Cleon by his manner alone, it is not surprising that the historian chooses to make his first direct judgement, at 3.36.6, his most severe. By first introducing the demagogue in the preamble to the Mytilenaeen debate,<sup>28</sup> Thucydides is "anticipating the evidence."<sup>29</sup> The speeches he reports are in *oratio recta*; Cleon's speech is made to match his description, and that of Diodotus only reinforces the historian's primary characterization. By contrast, Thucydides' second introductory passage, at 4.21.3, appears in the postscript following the first debate on Pylos, where Cleon's advice to the Athenians is merely reported in summary.<sup>30</sup> This second judgement has a function of its own, despite being briefer and weaker than the first.<sup>31</sup> The very repetitiveness reminds the reader of Cleon's character, as it is illustrated in the debate on the fate of Mytilene, and thus underscores the intensity of the first direct judgement at 3.36.6. Had Thucydides begun with a shorter judgement, expanding it into a second, as he had for Pericles, he would have been unable to exploit to the same extent the dramatic possibilities afforded him by the debate. If he had also chosen to report, in *oratio recta*, the speeches in the first debate on Pylos<sup>32</sup> to project

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<sup>28</sup>This preamble is contrary to Thucydides' usual practice. Cf. Westlake: Thucydides does not "normally choose to exploit the dramatic possibilities of the situations before or after each debate was held. Most preambles supply only such information as is necessary to explain why the debate took place" (Westlake 1973, 91).

<sup>29</sup>Gomme (1962, 113).

<sup>30</sup>Throughout the indirect discourse, the historian generally refrains from defining Cleon's manner, with only a slight exception, at 4.22.2: κλέων δὲ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολὺς ἐνέκειτο.

<sup>31</sup>This is also reflected in the historian's repeated intensification of πρῶτος. παρὰ πολὺ, at 3.36.6, intensifies the superlative more strongly than does καί at 4.21.3. Cf. Chapter 2 n. 97.

<sup>32</sup>Cf. Westlake, who notes a striking abnormality in the absence of speech in *oratio recta*, "though he [Cleon] evidently spoke twice (4.21.3; 4.22.2) and is seen to have exerted a decisive

Cleon's character further, his distaste for the demagogue might have been overpowering and his judgements less credible.<sup>33</sup> The same holds true with regard to the second debate on Pylos. As it stands, the historian exploits the dramatic possibilities as far as can be allowed without raising too much suspicion. His narrative on the Sphacteria episode continues to illuminate the demagogue's manner,<sup>34</sup> implicitly corroborating the portrait of Cleon which emerged from the Mytilenaeon debate. His third explicit judgement at 5.16.1<sup>35</sup> then rounds out an intensely negative impression, "a fitting conclusion to the damning portrait he had already painted."<sup>36</sup> The historian's last word on Cleon, διαβάλλων, emphasized by its placement at the end of the clause, brings the portrayal to a full close; he who was βιαίωτατος was most violent with his tongue.<sup>37</sup>

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influence upon the course of negotiations" (Westlake 1973, 98).

<sup>33</sup>The historian already runs the risk of alienating his readers, on the ground that his judgements bear "no relationship to the facts of the war" (Woodhead 1960, 304).

<sup>34</sup>Cf. Marshall: "the scene ... is characterized by alternating shiftiness or embarrassment and boldness on Cleon's part" (Marshall 1984, 20). Cleon is portrayed as a deceitful and slanderous man in pursuit of his own interests (4.27.4). He is but a swaggerer (4.27.5, 4.28.4), who makes idiotic claims only to become frightened when taken seriously (4.28.2). The dramatic tension of the narrative is reinforced as the demagogue makes an unsuccessful attempt to get out of his dilemma, and his true colours are vividly exposed (4.28.3). Not surprisingly, Thucydides maintains the slant of his portrayal by providing the Athenians' reaction, slyly incorporating his own judgement at the same time (τῆ κουφολογία αὐτοῦ): τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μὲν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῆ κουφολογία αὐτοῦ, ἀσμένοις δ' ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζόμενοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγῆσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπίζον, ἢ σφαιλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι (4.28.5). The emphasis on the Athenians' motives for humouring Cleon – he would either succeed or they would be rid of him – is most unflattering. Cf. Murray (1966, 200). When ultimately the demagogue makes good on his claim (4.39.3), the historian downplays his success, stressing, instead, the madness of it all: καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καίπερ μανιώδης οὕσα ἢ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσιν ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη. The scene is equally revealing of the Athenians' disposition.

<sup>35</sup>Thucydides prepares his readers for this last judgement by portraying Cleon as an arrogant coward throughout the Amphipolitan battle, and validating this portrayal by the malevolence of the Athenian soldiers toward their commander at 5.7.2. Cf. Gomme (*HCT* iii, 637-8 and 1962, 112-121), Woodhead (1960, 309), Andrewes (1962, 79) and Kagan (1974, 328).

<sup>36</sup>Kagan (1974, 331). Cf. Woodhead: "Thucydides makes sure that the taste left in our mouths is ineradicably unpleasant" (Woodhead 1960, 304).

<sup>37</sup>McGregor maintains that, in Thucydides, διαβολή and διαβάλλω "consistently imply that the charge is false, based on prejudice" (McGregor 1965, 34 n. 19; cf. Huart 1968, 115 n. 1). διαβάλλειν recurs twice in association with Cleon in the *History* (3.42.2 and 4.27.4) and is, as

In view of the direct judgements discussed above, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Thucydides' focus, throughout his treatment, is on the demagogue's style. But to what end? It is with the Mytilenaeon debate that the historian establishes the importance of his treatment to the *History*.<sup>38</sup> Westlake argued that the historian's motive for inserting the debate was "to draw attention to the affinity between the policies of Pericles and Cleon rather than the contrast between their personalities."<sup>39</sup> The narrative at 2.65.10, however, implies the reverse. Thucydides may well underline the similarities of their policies, but he does so precisely to strike a contrast between their individual methods and the reasons thereof.<sup>40</sup> Farrar rightly observes that the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus dramatically illustrate "the deterioration in the character of Athenian leadership -- that is, the character of the interaction between leaders and people."<sup>41</sup> Ultimately, this deterioration brings to light the historian's continuing examination of the Athenian character. The demagogue's speech is, as Wassermann states, "an integral part of Thucydides' picture of the inseparably intertwined strong and weak sides of the Athenian people and of Athenian democracy; a picture which underlies the major theme of the *History*."<sup>42</sup>

It is in the preamble to the debate that Thucydides fully prepares his readers for the level of comparison he will strike between the two leaders of

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Gomme observes, "constantly recurring in [Aristophanes's] *The Knights*" (Gomme *HCT* iii, 661).

<sup>38</sup>This is in disagreement with Andrewes who, on the ground that neither Cleon nor Diodotus treats the Athenian feelings at 3.36.4 as admissible, argues that "it is not entirely just to treat these chapters [3.36-49] as Thucydides' analysis of the hardening of Athens' spirit under the stress of war" (Andrewes 1962, 71-72).

<sup>39</sup>Westlake (1968, 65).

<sup>40</sup>Cf. Pouncey: "he [Thucydides] is confident that the readers will perceive that Pericles and Cleon are totally opposite types in their character and priorities [differences that are established at least in part by the speeches themselves]" (Pouncey 1980, 180 n. 5). Similarly, Marshall states: "that he [Cleon] is an impudent imitator of his betters enables Thucydides, despite the similarity in his policy, still to regard him as entirely opposite to Pericles" (Marshall 1984, 27).

<sup>41</sup>Farrar (1988, 168).

<sup>42</sup>Wassermann (1956, 32).

the *demos*. Westlake notes that it is "unusually detailed" and "considerably fuller than most."<sup>43</sup> The reasons for this are twofold. In order to ensure that his first mention of Cleon will provide the desired effect, Thucydides begins, in his preceding narrative, to condition his readers into accepting his judgements as though they were their own. At the same time, he illustrates the degree to which the Athenians react on the basis of *ὄργη*. The demagogue's methods will then invite the historian's scrutiny, but, in turn, will also reflect the Athenians' general disposition.

Remarking that the first Athenian decision (to put to death all the Mytilenaeans) had been taken under the influence of *ὄργη* (*ὑπὸ ὄργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς*, 3.36.2), Thucydides encourages the reader to place the responsibility for the irrational resolution squarely upon Cleon's shoulders. Before making the charge directly (*ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνεκλήκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι*, 3.36.6), he makes one acutely aware of the Athenians' own reaction toward their original state of mind:

καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθύς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὡμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνώσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους (3.36.4).

The regret the Athenians hold toward their former decision reinforces the historian's perspective. The degree of the Athenians' *μετάνοια* is clearly enforced through Thucydides' choice and structure of words: the adjectives used, *ὡμός* and *μέγας*, "have a powerful emotional content,"<sup>44</sup> and the formula *μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ* emphasizes the Athenians' reasons for rejecting their previous verdict.<sup>45</sup> It is not so much an impulse toward mercy<sup>46</sup> that

<sup>43</sup>Westlake (1973, 97).

<sup>44</sup>Winnington-Ingram (1965, 70). Cf. 3.49.4, where the ship to Mytilene is in no haste due to the nature of the expedition: *ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον*. Weil and de Romilly note that *ἀλλόκοτον* is a particularly expressive litotes: although those already *en route* to Mytilene are not among those who reflect upon the original resolution at 3.36.4, they share the same sentiments nonetheless (*Budé* iii, 88). See also Andrewes (1962, 72).

<sup>45</sup>LSJ (s.v. *μάλα* ii. 6) note that *μᾶλλον ἢ* is followed by *οὐ* in comparisons "where preference implies rejection or denial." Cf. Spratt (1905, 157) on the so-called pleonastic

Thucydides is stressing, for the Athenians are not against punishing those who are οἱ αἴτιοι, but rather the degree of their irrationality. The *demos* revoked Cleon's motion, only when its passion had had time to cool, thereby permitting rational judgement to emerge.<sup>47</sup> The Athenian βούλευμα was ὤμος and μέγα because the resolution was influenced by ὄργη.

ὤμος, as Connor points out, is unusual in the *History*, occurring only in one other instance.<sup>48</sup> Undoubtedly a very harsh word, it is interesting that this second and last instance occurs in the famous *stasis* passage, in which also occurs a significant use of βίαιος and of ὄργη:<sup>49</sup>

ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος  
καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ (3.82.2).

As Farrar points out, Thucydides establishes that "the stress of war and want tend to undermine man's judgement (gnome) and strengthen his passions (orge)."<sup>50</sup> If ὁ πόλεμος is a βίαιος διδάσκαλος,<sup>51</sup> then what is one to make of

negative.

<sup>46</sup>Cf. Winnington-Ingram (1965, 70).

<sup>47</sup>Winnington-Ingram (1965, 71) sees in ἀναλογισμός a reflection of the Athenians' cooling emotion. Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*) and Saar: "das nüchterne Nachrechnen (ἀναλογισμός) bildet in der Darstellung des Thukydides einen deutlichen Gegensatz zu der Erregung der ersten Versammlung" (Saar 1953, 14).

<sup>48</sup>3.82.1: οὕτως ὤμῃ ἤ> στάσις προυχώρησε. Connor (1984, 82 n.5). Neither is ὤμος particularly common in the playwrights. Including the relative compounds ὤμοτης and ὤμόφρων, it occurs a total of 26 times: Euripides (10), Sophocles (8), Aeschylus (7) and Aristophanes (1). Hornblower, observing that there are 113 Hippocratic instances of ὤμος and 12 more of προχωρέω, states that "the flavour of this phrase [3.82.1] is undoubtedly medical" (Hornblower 1991, 480), despite the fact that Thucydides does not use either in his account of the plague (2.47-54).

<sup>49</sup>There is, in classical Greek, only one other instance of ὄργη, ὤμος and βίαιος used together in context, but ὄργη, in this instance, is used in the more particular sense of 'anger': In Diod. 9.23.1, Astyages, when defeated, vents his anger upon his soldiers: he is described as ὤμος and, as a result, is βίαιος in his manner. Otherwise, ὤμος and ὄργη appear together in Aes. *Supp.* 187, Diod. 4.54.7 and Plut. *Sert.* 18.6; ὤμος is coupled with βίαιος in Dem. 24.24, Diod. 12.55.8 (Cleon is ὤμος ... τὸν τρόπον καὶ βίαιος), 12.67.4 and 17.5.3.

Interestingly, the adverb ὤμως occurs with ὄργη in chapter 84 of the *History*, a chapter widely considered inauthentic: ἀπὸ ἴσου δὲ μάλιστα ἐπίοντες ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ὄργῆς πλεῖστον ἐκφερόμενοι ὤμως καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν (3.84.1).

<sup>50</sup>Farrar (1988, 135).

<sup>51</sup>The phrase ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ... βίαιος διδάσκαλος (3.82.2) seems to pose some difficulty. Some scholars interpret βίαιος as a simple attributive adjective modifying διδάσκαλος (Weil

βιαιότατος with regard to Cleon? Gomme, who also recognizes a connection between the *stasis* passage and Thucydides' treatment of Cleon, states that "men's passions in war and in time of stress not only deteriorate, but tend to dominate their minds. This is what Cleon and men like him wanted."<sup>52</sup> The contrast with Pericles is especially striking. Rather than hold the reins of the Athenians' irrationality, to "challenge the demos to a sense of responsibility,"<sup>53</sup> Cleon appeals instead to their irrational fears. The Athenians, who are already prone to act on the basis of *ὄργη*, as is illustrated throughout Thucydides' treatment of Pericles, will be further encouraged to do so by the demagogue. βιαιότατος reflects the nature of Cleon's character, most notably his extreme tendency toward impetuous action, πιθανώτατος marks his ability to incite the Athenians to become βιαιότατοι themselves. The demagogue, like warfare, prompts the Athenians' *ὄργη* to match their condition, but he does so only because he himself is "a typical product of the war."<sup>54</sup> As much as Pericles represented "that aspect of intelligence [*γνώμη*], which will not yield to the pressures of external reality,"<sup>55</sup> Cleon embodies the *ὄργη* which so often influences the Athenians and their *γνώμη*.<sup>56</sup>

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and de Romilly 1967, 57; Huart 1968, 103 n. 4; Macleod 1979, 53; Pouncey 1980, 93 with n. 5; Hornblower 1991, 482; Orwin 1994, 176 and Rhodes 1994, 236), whereas others prefer to read βία διαδύσκει (LSJ, s.v. βίαιος i. 1; Classen-Steup, *ad loc.*; Finley 1942, 160; Gomme *HCT* ii, 373; Fuks 1971, 51 and Connor 1984, 80). There does not appear to be any other instance of βίαιος acting, in the neuter plural, as an adverb alongside a noun which reflects the action of its corresponding verb. Cf. *TLG* as well as LSJ (s.v. βίαιος). Weil and de Romilly address the problem as follows: "sans doute Thucydide veut-il bien dire, dans tout ce passage, que les hommes apprennent, dans de telles circonstances, toutes les formes du crime; mais c'est parce qu'elle est violente, βίαιος, que la guerre enseigne cela" (Weil and de Romilly 1967, 91). Cf. Huart, who observes rightly, in my opinion, "ne pourrait-on alors comprendre que la guerre est le rude maître en ce sens qu'elle interdit aux hommes toute échappatoire, et les contraint à se voir tels qu'ils sont?" (Huart 1968, 103 n. 4).

<sup>52</sup>Gomme (*HCT* ii, 374 and also 302, where he correlates 3.38.1 and 3.82.2). Cf. Finley (1942, 186-187) and Edmunds on 3.82.5: "it is not mob violence that Thucydides has in mind, but the violence of the individual, no doubt expressed in slandering the opposition, i.e., in διαβάλλειν.... The harshness and violence of political life described ... were already beginning in Athens with the ascendancy of Cleon" (Edmunds 1975a, 82).

<sup>53</sup>Lang (1972, 164).

<sup>54</sup>Gomme (*HCT* ii, 298).

<sup>55</sup>Parry (1972, 60).

<sup>56</sup>Others also recognize the contrast. Cf. Thibaudet: "Cléon s'oppose à Périclès comme le θυμός au νοῦς" (Thibaudet 1922, 203). Also Connor, who, on the similarities between Cleon's

The historian projects the comparison between Pericles' γνώμη and Cleon's ὄργη throughout the famous Periclean echoes. With his reader already wary of Cleon's character, he effectively illustrates the degree to which the demagogue is both βίαιος and πῠανός.<sup>57</sup> But it is in demonstrating the latter, in particular, that Thucydides succeeds in invoking the ὄργη-γνώμη antithesis, which so prominently illustrated the Athenian disposition throughout his treatment of Pericles. Cleon shows himself as untrustworthy as the superlative πῠανώτατος would imply. As Jebb rightly observes, "Cleon echoes the words of the statesman as whose successor he poses, at the very moment when he is contradicting his principles."<sup>58</sup> He advocates acting under the influence of ὄργη, the very behaviour which Pericles opposed, yet to convince the Athenians to stand-by his motion, he exploits his predecessor's leadership of the *demos*.<sup>59</sup> The demagogue capitalizes on the superficial similarities of their situations,<sup>60</sup> and exhorts the Athenians to hold to their prior resolution with blatant plagiarism:<sup>61</sup> he emphasizes, as did Pericles, that he is and has always been steadfast in his γνώμη (πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων, 3.37.1; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῆ γνώμη, 3.38.1; ἐγὼ

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first introductory passage (3.36.6) and Pericles' second (1.139.4), states that "the immediate effect is surely to establish a contrast between Cleon's superficial resemblance to Pericles and his advocacy of a policy whose *orge* contrasts sharply with the *gnome* of Pericles" (Connor 1984, 79 n. 1).

<sup>57</sup>Cf. Andrewes: "his energy stands out all through: he violently discredits his opponents in advance, working on the plain man's distrust of the clever and his readiness to suspect bribery: he appeals to unregulated emotion to carry his violent proposal" (Andrewes 1962, 76).

<sup>58</sup>Jebb (1898, 262).

<sup>59</sup>Gomme would argue that Cleon was a conscious follower "without understanding the statesman" (Gomme 1951, 78). Cf. Parry: "Cleon is represented as deliberately destroying the Periclean balance of λόγος and ἔργον" (Parry, 1981, 189).

<sup>60</sup>Both Pericles and Cleon try to convince the *demos* to maintain an original resolution. In the case of Pericles, it was always the influence of ὄργη which prompted the Athenians to change their minds. With Cleon, it is clearly the reverse. The original decision is being revoked due to the emergence of reason (ἀναλογισμός, 3.36.4). Cf., on the echoes' general purpose, Pouncey (1980, 79); Cogan (1981b, 54) and Farrar (1988, 170).

<sup>61</sup>Cf. J.R. Ellis: "Kleon but parodies Pericles" (Ellis 1979, 63 n. 20) and Pouncey (1980, 79 with n. 5).

μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι, 3.40.2), pointing, all the while, to the Athenians' inability to be resolute (εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξη πέρι, 3.37.3).<sup>62</sup>

It is ironic that the demagogue, who "stresses and embodies [the] irresponsibility of the *demos*,"<sup>63</sup> would, in his speech, recall the concept of *γνώμη* as it is defined in Thucydides' treatment of Pericles. That this is merely a tactic on the part of the demagogue is easily betrayed by his arrogance.<sup>64</sup> Cleon pretends that, like Pericles, he is merely attempting to deter the Athenians from their unhealthy behaviour (ὧν ἐγὼ πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν ὑμᾶς, 3.39.1). Had not the Athenians recognized, after all, that Pericles had been right to persuade them back to their original resolution on each occasion they had been irresolute? The demagogue assumes an honest front, professing to embody the *γνώμη* for which the statesman stood, though his own resolution is far from reflecting any rational judgement.<sup>65</sup> He considers impulsive action, resolutions based on *ὄργη*, totally justified (ὁ γὰρ παθῶν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὄργῃ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ὃν μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνει, 3.38.1).<sup>66</sup> The contrast between the two leaders is sharpened as Thucydides portrays the demagogue encouraging the *demos* to allow the influence of *ὄργη* upon its *γνώμη* (γενόμενοι δ' ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ πασχεῖν, 3.40.7). Nothing could be more

<sup>62</sup>Cf. in particular 1.140.1 (τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι) and 2.61.2 (καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι). Also 2.13.2, 2.21.3 and 2.55.2. Thucydides' Cleon, as Wassermann describes, presents himself, "as a paragon of steadiness, self-assurance, honesty and patriotic righteousness: he proudly asserts in the master's words while making the people feel, at the same time, their own lack of character and, in consequence, their need for leadership -- his, of course" (Wassermann 1956, 33).

<sup>63</sup>Pouncey (1980, 192; cf. *ibid.* 14-15).

<sup>64</sup>The frequent repetition of the personal pronoun ἐγὼ marks, as Gomme observes, Cleon's egoism (Gomme *HCT* ii, 302). Cf. Rhodes (1994, 205).

<sup>65</sup>See 3.36.2, where the first resolution is defined as one made ὑπὸ ὄργῆς, in addition to 3.42.1 and 3.44.4, where it is precisely such decisions to which Diodotus objects.

<sup>66</sup>Cf. Gomme on 3.38.1: "a direct, but not quite open, claim that in such circumstance at least ὄργη and not λογισμός should guide our actions" (Gomme *HCT* ii, 302).

opposite to his predecessor. Pericles had been continually arguing in favour of rational judgement precisely to rid the Athenian γνώμη of such volatile emotion (ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης, 2.59.3). Cleon may have been consistent in his resolution, but in being so he was most persistent in his rejection of reason.<sup>67</sup>

If there is any doubt that Thucydides' Cleon opposes the γνώμη for which his predecessor stood, it is easily dismissed by the anti-intellectual line that dominates at least a third of the demagogue's speech (3.37.3 - 3.38.7). In effect, it is through his blatant rejection of reason that Cleon validates his own method. When at 3.39.1 he claims that he seeks only to deter the Athenians from their unhealthy behaviour, the behaviour he speaks of is that influenced by γνώμη, not by ὀργή. Accordingly, his battle against eloquence is essentially one against ξύνεσις,<sup>68</sup> and, in consequence, one against Pericles.<sup>69</sup> Thucydides had portrayed the statesman as clearly promoting the concept not only in action, by his opposition to ὀργή, but also in word: Pericles, in his final speech, states that ξύνεσις renders daring (τόλμα) more secure, and trusts less in hope (ἐλπίς) than it does in γνώμη:<sup>70</sup>

καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας τύχης ἢ ξύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἥσσον πιστεύει, ἥς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἢ ἰσχύς, γνώμη δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἥς βεβαιοτέρα ἢ πρόνοια (2.62.5).

Cleon, on the other hand, champions the φαυλότεροι over the ξυνητωτέροι,<sup>71</sup> and later accuses those who are ξυνητός of advising the *demos* however they

<sup>67</sup>Cf. Rusten (1989, 198-199). For his part, Macleod argues that Thucydides, in inserting the 'steadfast' echo (ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι), is contrasting "[Cleon's] pig-headedness with Pericles' firmness" (Macleod 1983c, 93 n. 20).

<sup>68</sup>Parry (1981, 189) and Hornblower (1991, 424).

<sup>69</sup>Cf. Chapter 1 n. 23, for the association of ξύνεσις and γνώμη, and *ibid.* n. 26, for the implication that Pericles is himself ξυνητός.

<sup>70</sup>Cf. 1.140.1, where Pericles insists that the Athenians uphold their resolutions or lay no claim to ξύνεσις (μηδὲ κατορθούντας τῆς ξυνήσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι).

<sup>71</sup>3.37.3: οἳ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνητωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις.

might demonstrate their *ξύνεσις* best:

ὡς οὖν χρῆ καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιούντας μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγωνι  
ἐπαυρομένους παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει παραινεῖν (3.37.5).

As Bloedow explains, Cleon's arguments present *ξύνεσις* as "a sort of idle, frivolous, indeed dangerous mental capability or aptitude, which, when used, is employed exclusively in one's own interests."<sup>72</sup> But the historian does not permit Cleon to repudiate the concept of *ξύνεσις* entirely. It has, in the *History*, positive connotations and, for this reason, it would be unrealistic if the demagogue were made to disregard completely a term generally denoting praise.<sup>73</sup> Nowhere does he expressly deny that simpler folk, including himself, possess the virtue in question. Turning a possible contradiction to his favour, Cleon contrasts the arrogance of the *ξυνετώτεροι* with the modesty of the *φαυλότεροι*, claiming that the latter merely tend to distrust their own innate *ξύνεσις* (οἱ δ' ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ξυνέσει, 3.37.4). Thucydides then reinforces Cleon's contempt<sup>74</sup> through Diodotus' speech. The speaker, who represents the rational aspect within the debate,<sup>75</sup> retaliates, stressing that whoever believes rhetoric unnecessary may well be *ἀξύνητος* himself.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup>Bloedow (1991b, 197). There is also some irony in Cleon's words. Huart, citing 3.38.2 and 1.120.3, recognizes the implications of the verb *ἐπαίρεσθαι*: "il marque plutôt l'excitation à faire quelque chose, qui résulte précisément des désirs ou des passions" (Huart 1968, 390 n. 4). Cf. de Romilly (1951, 272).

<sup>73</sup>Cf. Huart: "L'historien, en effet, ne lui [*ξύνεσις*] attribue nullement ce rôle dissolvant et négatif que lui prête Cléon" (Huart 1968, 284). Bloedow, who points to the three senses of the term in the *History*, one positive and two negative, observes that the ambiguous use of the term reflects the historian's observations on the degeneration of Athens' *ξύνεσις* (Bloedow 1991b, 195-198). Cf. Syme (1962, 55-56), Edmunds (1975b, 9-10), Macleod (1979, 56), Hornblower (1991, 424) and Rhodes (1994, 206).

<sup>74</sup>Cleon's contempt is ironic in itself, if one takes into consideration Pericles' claim that contempt can only belong to him who trusts, by reason of his *γνώμη*, that he will be ahead of his opponents: *καταφρόνησις δὲ ὅς ἂν καὶ γνώμη πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων προύχειν* (2.62.4).

<sup>75</sup>Cf. Macleod, who regards Diodotus as Pericles' true heir within the context of the Mytilenaeen debate (Macleod 1979, 56).

<sup>76</sup>3.42.2: *τούς τε λόγους ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξύνητός ἐστιν ἢ ἰδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει*. See also 3.42.3. Hornblower (1991, 433). The implication that Cleon is *ἀξύνητος* amplifies the degree of contrast struck between the

That the historian is comparing Cleon to his predecessor in terms of method is all the more evident in the two remaining Periclean echoes.<sup>77</sup> Both originate from the same source, yet they are, in the demagogue's speech, introduced separately. At 2.63.2, Pericles, in an attempt to restore the Athenian resolve, incites the *demos* to uphold the great empire it had inherited:

ἥς οὐδ' ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιῶς ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἢν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφείναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον (2.63.2).

The statesman declares the impossibility of surrendering the empire, defining his statement with an explanatory γάρ: the empire the Athenians hold is much like a tyranny. It is the latter remark, ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, that Cleon is first made to repeat (3.37.2): τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν. Their definitions of the empire may be similar, but the difference in tone immediately sets the demagogue and the statesman apart. Pericles offers a comparison, likening the empire to a tyranny (ὡς τυραννίδα), whereas Cleon boldly states that Athens is a τυραννίς.<sup>78</sup> The word ὡς clearly demonstrates that, in Pericles' time, the concept of τύραννος was not fully established in respect of the Athenians' own definition of their empire.<sup>79</sup>

The wider contexts are equally revealing. Cleon shows himself to be βιαιότατος toward the Mytilenaeans, but, more importantly, his invectives

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demagogue and his counterpart, Brasidas, at 5.16.1. The Spartan is, as Bloedow remarks, one of only five individuals, in the context of the Peloponnesian War, elevated to Thucydides' "inner circle of the 'intelligent'" (Bloedow 1991b, 198): ἡ τότε Βρασίδου ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις (4.81.2).

<sup>77</sup>Most scholars recognize the importance of these echoes. Cf. Gomme (*HCT* ii, 177; 1951, 78), Andrewes (1962, 75), Hooker (1974, 166), Pouncey (1980, 79 with n. 5), Macleod (1983c, 93 with n. 20) and Connor (1984, 79 with n. 1). de Romilly and Westlake deny the Periclean echoes any real significance (de Romilly 1951, 143-146; Westlake 1968, 65 with n. 4): "[Thucydide] ne prend aucun soin pour montrer l'opposition entre Périclès et Cléon; il la marque si peu qu'il laisse un lecteur non averti confondre les idées de l'un avec celle de l'autre" (de Romilly 1951, 149).

<sup>78</sup>Cf. Cornford (1965, 209), Gomme (*HCT* ii, 175), de Wet (1963, 118-119), Connor (1984, 89), Rusten (1989, 204), Hornblower (1991, 337) and Rhodes (1994, 205).

<sup>79</sup>Cf. Bloedow (in press, 11-12) with de Romilly (1951, 112-113).

upon the Athenians demonstrate that it is not merely a question of policy.<sup>80</sup> Pericles speaks to the Athenians in the spirit of exhortation: he seeks to revive the Athenian resolve by reminding the *demos* of Athens' glories. And so it is at 2.63.2, when he addresses those who might not be in favour of upholding the necessary behaviour for an empire to rule. Pericles attempts to persuade the wary through rational judgement, phrasing his argument so as to emphasize the impossibility of surrender rather than highlight the weaknesses of those who might support such an action; when he refers to his opponents, he even employs, as Rusten observes, two expressions normally used for praise (ἀπραγμοσύνη and ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός).<sup>81</sup> In contrast, Cleon does everything but praise any member of his audience. His aim is to 'resuscitate' the Athenians' anger,<sup>82</sup> and, to this end, he exaggerates, as far as is possible, the weaknesses of his opponents. Rational judgement is out of the question; it is precisely what had interfered with the execution of his previous motion. Unable to draw out the initial ὄργη that had influenced the Athenians in the first debate, the demagogue turns to insult, and strives to provoke the emotions of his audience through taunt and ridicule. His opening words effectively illustrate the sting of his insults. Cleon attacks the *demos* at its very core. He "impugns the *arete* of Athens," with his assertion that she is incapable of governing others: ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἑτέρων ἄρχειν (3.37.1).<sup>83</sup> It is in this vein that Cleon introduces his definition of an empire. Where his predecessor would have reassured and encouraged the *demos*, the demagogue rebukes the Athenians for their incompetence: they allow themselves to be μαλακοί<sup>84</sup> because they don't think (οὐκ ... ἠγεῖσθε) that

<sup>80</sup>Cf. Gomme: "the only part of Kleon's policy which was un-Periclean, certainly, but even so by implication rather than explicitly, was its cruelty and brutality" (Gomme 1951, 78).

<sup>81</sup>Rusten (1989, 204). Cf. Gomme (*HCT* ii, 1750).

<sup>82</sup>The expression belongs to Winnington-Ingram (1965, 71).

<sup>83</sup>Adkins (1972, 135). Cf. Winnington-Ingram (1965, 71).

<sup>84</sup>Winnington-Ingram points to the insult carried through the vocabulary: "nobody - least of all a Greek - likes to be called soft" (Winnington-Ingram 1965, 71).

in doing so they will endanger themselves, they don't consider (οὐ σκοποῦντες) that their empire is a tyranny that must rule over unwilling subjects (3.37.2).

The second echo at 3.40.4 is not only consistent with "the bold assertion of the tyranny," but continues to illustrate the demagogue's treatment of the Athenians. Cleon again avails himself of Pericles' argument in a manner which would contradict his predecessor's method. He, too, is opposed to inactivity, but, unlike Pericles, who showed confidence in the *demos*, he berates the Athenians into action: the Athenians must punish the Mytilenaeans or else give up their empire.<sup>85</sup> Essentially, "in Cleon the emotional appeal of extreme suggestions replaces the cold analysis of the unavoidable consequences of domination."<sup>86</sup>

Woodhead, in his charges against Thucydides, states: "it seems, then, intolerable from all points of view to adopt a position which supposes that the *demos* and its system, once freed from Pericles' control, went immediately to the bad -- that having previously clung to Pericles the people should, changing character overnight, now be a prey to any unprincipled demagogue with a smooth or impressive tongue."<sup>87</sup> It stands to reason that such a hypothesis would have been equally intolerable to Thucydides. The Athenians depicted in the *History* are far from 'changing character overnight.' The historian picks up his assessment of the Athenian character not far from where he left it at the end of his treatment of Pericles. The Athenians were prone, long before Cleon, to change their γνώμαι according to

<sup>85</sup>3.40.4: εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οὐ προσήκον ὅμως ἀξιοῦτε τοῦτο δρᾶν, παρὰ τὸ εἰκός τοι καὶ τούσδε ξυμφόρως δεῖ κολάζεσθαι, ἢ παύεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι. Ironically, Cleon speaks in a manner reminiscent of Pericles' notice to the Athenians at 1.140.1. See above n. 70. Gomme, citing Denniston, observes that that the particle τοι is rare in Thucydides and here "appears to give a vigorous and colloquial colour" to the passage (Gomme *HCT* ii, 311; Denniston 1954, 537). Cf. Spratt (1905, 171).

<sup>86</sup>Wassermann (1956, 29).

<sup>87</sup>Woodhead (1960, 295). In a similar vein, Cornford states: "we must stop speaking of 'the Athenians,' as Thucydides does; not every Athenian was a Pericles in miniature" (Cornford 1965, 15).

the *ὄργή* of the moment. As Woodhead himself remarks, under the leadership of Pericles, the *demos* was very much under the statesman's 'control.'

Thucydides makes it clear, through his treatment of Cleon, that the Athenians were increasingly unable to abide by Pericles' advice when he was no longer present to hold their *ὄργή* in check. In the Mytilenaeen debate, it is precisely this *ὄργή* that guides the Athenians in their original resolution.<sup>88</sup> Yet the Athenian fickleness reveals that the *demos* is still divided in its appreciation for actions influenced by *γνώμη* and those based on *ὄργή*. The historian clearly delineates the two approaches through the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus; they represent the extremes within the Athenian disposition, as the postscript to the debate intimates:<sup>89</sup> ῥηθεισῶν δὲ τῶν γνωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας (3.49.1). Diodotus replaces the statesman in the advocacy of rational judgement, but, as Macleod remarks, he is no Pericles.<sup>90</sup> Like Cleon, he cannot help but be a product of his time, influenced by the toll of both the war and the plague. His speech is far from being a 'cold analysis,' such as the reader had come to expect from Pericles, if only because he repeatedly justifies the validity of his position.<sup>91</sup> Such justifications only contribute to the impression that the Athenians were on the verge of abandoning Pericles' concept of *γνώμη*. All that remains is for Thucydides to substantiate this impression, and he does indirectly through Diodotus, whom

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<sup>88</sup>It is important to recognize that, under Pericles' leadership, *ὄργή* did not influence the Athenians' original resolutions; it moved them to change with respect to their *γνώμαι*.

<sup>89</sup>Cf. Andrewes (1962, 71).

<sup>90</sup>Macleod (1983c, 93).

<sup>91</sup>That Diodotus' speech is greatly dependent on that of Cleon has not gone unnoticed. Diodotus, in order to justify his own position, discredits the demagogue and, in doing so, is "slipping in value-judgements irrelevant to his main position" (Winnington-Ingram 1965, 78, citing 3.42.2 and 3.43.2). Cf. Andrewes (1962, 72), Kagan (1975, 91), Macleod (1983c, 97-98) and Orwin (1984, 488). Wassermann argues that Diodotus' speech reflects a "cold impersonality" (Wassermann 1956, 29). Diodotus is clearly not as passionate as his adversary, but, on the other hand, he is certainly not as rational as Pericles.

he has made associate ὄργη with a shallowness of γνώμη,<sup>92</sup> and later, more directly, through his own narrative. In the postscript, Diodotus is barely able to call the Athenians back to reason; his motion is passed only by a narrow margin:<sup>93</sup> οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον μὲν ἐς ἀγῶνα ὅμως τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου (3.49.1).

As much as the Mytilenaeen debate invites the reader to observe the development in Athenian character from Pericles to Cleon, the predicament of Scione bears testimony to the changes thereafter. Cleon may represent an extreme at the time of the great debate, but Thucydides makes a brief, yet powerful, point of establishing that this is no longer the case toward the end of his leadership.<sup>94</sup> In the case of Scione, the Athenians are again influenced by their ὄργη (ὄργην ποιοῦμενοι, 4.122.5), when, at Cleon's urging, they resolve to execute all its inhabitants (4.122.6). It is here that the similarities end. In this instance, the extreme sentence is not carried out until two years later (5.32.1), when, as Gomme rightly observes, "their passion had had time to cool."<sup>95</sup> The *demos* is now resolute, but it is not by reason of γνώμη. Indulging the ὄργη which provokes them, the Athenians have now turned their backs upon the γνώμη principle, which Pericles had so firmly endorsed.

That Athens' conduct toward Mytilene and Scione outlines an important development in her character has not gone unnoticed. Many maintain that

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<sup>92</sup>3.42.1: νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλία εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὄργην, ὧν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης. Gomme would have preferred to invert the relation, considering ἀπαιδευσία and βραχύτητος γνώμης to go better with τάχος than it does with ὄργη (Gomme *HCT* ii, 313). There is no need for the inversion. The word order emphasizes βραχύτητος γνώμης and by relation ὄργη, and this fits the context of the debate rather well. Cf. Spratt, who notes the false balance of the μὲν..., δέ... construction (Spratt 1905, 173); Marchant (1952, 156) and Winnington-Ingram (1965, 78).

On another note, Saar and Rhodes remark that Diodotus' association of τάχος and ὄργη is consistent with Thucydides' description of the original resolution: the decision had been taken ὑπὸ ὄργης [3.36.2], and the Athenians had sent off a trireme κατὰ τάχος [3.36.3] (Saar 1953, 61; Rhodes 1994, 210). Cf. 3.48.2.

<sup>93</sup>Cf. Wassermann (1956, 28) and Andrewes (1962, 77).

<sup>94</sup>de Romilly notes that even in the first debate on Pylos, Cleon merely urges the *demos* in a direction it had already chosen [ἐνήγε, 4.21.3] (de Romilly 1951, 277).

<sup>95</sup>Gomme (*HCT*ii, 325).

Thucydides is underlining the Athenians' increasing ability to exhibit violent behaviour.<sup>96</sup> Gomme notes that "what is at first felt to be an atrocity men become used to, and it becomes an established custom of war."<sup>97</sup> But more important to the historian is the source of Athens' decreasing temperance. Her violent behaviour is merely a symptom of a much graver change in disposition. The *demos* is no longer fickle, having finally achieved a state of resolve, which, superficially, would have made Pericles proud. Ironically, the Athenians' prior irresolution sheds some light upon this fresh determination. Seeing that ὄργη influenced the original resolution on the fate of Mytilene, it stands to reason that the grounds for the Athenians' fickleness under Cleon must have differed from those under Pericles. When the statesman led the *demos*, it was a fear for private interests that influenced the Athenians to yield to ὄργη, which, in turn, induced them to change with respect to their γνῶμαι. Under the leadership of Cleon, self-interest is still a factor, though it is no longer a defensive fear,<sup>98</sup> but an offensive imperialism that is at play.

Thucydides foreshadows, through his treatment of the demagogue, a major shift in the Athenian disposition, which he corroborates in the forceful *stasis* passage at 3.82-3.83.<sup>99</sup> Thucydides' Cleon reveals the extent to which

<sup>96</sup>With the exception of Cogan, who maintains that the Athenians display "a consistent level of violence" (Cogan 1981a, 5), and thus Diodotus' speech represents "a distinct change in Athenian policy" (*ibid.*, 7 with n. 13). It is appropriate to note that Diodotus argues more from a rational standpoint and Athenian interest than he does from one of justice and from compassion. Cf. White (1984, 74).

<sup>97</sup>Gomme (*HCT* ii, 325). de Wet puts forth an interesting suggestion, namely that Thucydides drops the epithet βιαιότατος in his second introduction of Cleon because he no longer represents the extreme tendency to cruelty (de Wet 1963, 124).

<sup>98</sup>Thucydides even has Cleon indirectly attributing the Athenian indecisiveness to a lack of fear: διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεῆς (3.37.2).

<sup>99</sup>Cf. Finley: "underlying the portrait of Cleon, it [the concept of Athens' political weakness] is brilliantly analyzed in relation to the more general effects of war in the description of στάσις" (Finley 1967b, 162). That the decline in moral standards is valid for cities and individuals alike is generally accepted (cf. 1.144.3, 2.64.6, 3.45.6 and 3.82.2). See Grene (1965, 31-32), de Romilly (1951, 269 with n. 3 and 274), Wallace (1964, 252-253 with n. 2), Dover (1973, 39), Farrar (1988, 156) and Hornblower (1991, 478).

warfare distorts human nature, and, in Athenian terms, this culminates in a total breakdown of the Periclean γνώμη. The historian first points the finger to warfare (3.82.2), but his analysis is far more profound. Irrational daring (τόλμα ἀλόγιστος, 3.82.4) has become commonplace due to an inversion of the ξύνεσις concept (τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν [ἐνομίσθη] ἐπὶ πάν ἀργόν, 3.82.4), which calls to mind the demagogue's anti-intellectual line at 3.37.3-3.38.7.<sup>100</sup> The association is unmistakable in the historian's final depiction of the prevailing discord (τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν, 3.83.1):

καὶ οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλείω περιεγίγνοντο· τῷ γὰρ δεδιέναι τό τε αὐτῶν ἐνδεῆς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνετόν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἥσους ὦσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπιβουλεύμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν (3.83.3).

The reader who was, in the Mytilenaeen debate, invited to see through the demagogue himself, can only nod in agreement when the historian brings to light Cleon's perversion of what is ξύνεσις.<sup>101</sup> The demagogue, to justify his own behaviour, had championed the φαυλότεροι over the ξυνετώτεροι (3.37.3),<sup>102</sup> claiming that the former had appropriately mistrusted their own innate virtue (3.37.4). Thucydides, in the στάσις narrative, exposes the true motivation for the φαυλότεροι, including Cleon, to refrain from debate; they fear the rightful ξύνεσις and the power it lends to those who are truly ξυνετός.<sup>103</sup> But the historian's purpose is far more comprehensive. Thucydides emphasizes the crippling effect of warfare by accentuating the

<sup>100</sup>See above pp. 42-43.

<sup>101</sup>οἱ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις (3.37.3); οἱ δ' ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν ξυνέσει (3.37.4). It is significant that out of 26 instances of ξύνεσις and ξυνετός (13 each), 8 should appear in Thucydides' treatment of Pericles (2), that of Cleon (2) and the *stasis* passage (4).

<sup>102</sup>He himself does not carry the day in the second Mytilenaeen debate, but he does so in the debate on Pylos and in the first one on the fate of Scione.

<sup>103</sup>Macleod observes that it is this fear, which, paradoxically, makes them bolder [τῷ γὰρ δεδιέναι ... τολμηρῶς ... ἐχώρουν, 3.93.3] (Macleod 1979, 59). Cf. Immerwahr, who explains Cleon's adoption of an anti-intellectual position as one "merely for the convenience of the moment," serving "to shut off further discussion of the decision" (Immerwahr 1973, 28).

degree of distortion that has taken place: Cleon's inverted concept of *ξύνεσις* transforms into a positive virtue at 3.82.5: *ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχῶν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος*.<sup>104</sup> As Bloedow remarks, "this forms the ultimate contrast to Thucydides' primary sense of *ξύνεσις*, and a marked extension of the negative meaning to which it has now degenerated."<sup>105</sup> The corruption and deceit manifest in Cleon at the time of the Mytilenaeen debate is now widespread, as those aspiring to the 'corrupt' *ξύνεσις*, exhibit unscrupulous behaviour even in their aspirations: *ἀπάτη περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν* (3.82.7).<sup>106</sup>

It is in Diodotus' speech that Thucydides first hints at his examination of the role that *ἔρως* plays in the erosion of human nature. The speaker essentially anticipates the historian's direct commentary in the *στάσις* passage, while corroborating the 'physical' evidence offered through the portrait of Cleon. Arguing against the passionate temper of the Athenian resolutions,<sup>107</sup> Diodotus takes the argument against *ὄργη* to a new level:

ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὑβρεῖ τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὄργῃ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἐκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ' ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους (3.45.4).

<sup>104</sup>Cf. 3.37.2, where Cleon insists that a lack of plots (*ἀνεπιβούλευτον*) is contributing to the Athenians' weakness. In the two *ξύνεσις* references within the *στάσις* passage (3.82.4 and 3.82.5), Macleod identifies two significant word-plays (*ξυνετόν ... ξυνετός* and *ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ... ἐπιβουλεύσας ... προβουλεύσας*) which "serve to contrast a proper and a corrupt form of political intelligence" (Macleod 1979, 62). On the latter passage, Bloedow calls attention to the use of *δεινότερος*, remarking that "with its double connotation, [it] serves to drive home the point with particular emphasis" (Bloedow 1991b, 198). Cf. 3.82.7: *ῥῆγον δ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιῶι κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλονται*.

<sup>105</sup>Bloedow (1991b, 198).

<sup>106</sup>Huart recognizes an implication that this 'intelligence' is one many would be capable of if they were not held back by scruples, and so this would ensure the success of those without scruples to begin with (Huart 1968, 285 n. 3).

<sup>107</sup>Not surprisingly, the notion of *ἀμαρτημα* is also subtly introduced: *νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὄργην ἦντινα τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλέντες τὴν τοῦ πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζημιούτε καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλὰ οὐσαί ξυνεξήμαρτον* (3.43.5). Cf. 1.144.1, 2.22.1, 2.65.11 and Chapter 1 p. 20.

πενία and ἐξουσία, when combined with the internal passions, ἀνάγκη and ὕβρις, bring about an entirely new set of circumstances, τόλμα and πλεονεξία.<sup>108</sup> What was noble daring (τόλμα)<sup>109</sup> becomes brazen ambition (πλεονεξία).<sup>110</sup> Diodotus then underlines fully the climate ὄργη promotes; the speaker's theory on the nature of ὕβρις understands the ignoble quality as one 'characterized by the triumph of passions over reason.'<sup>111</sup>

ἢ τε ἐλπίς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἠγούμενος, ἢ δ' ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλήν ἐκφροντίζων, ἢ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα, πλείστα βλάβουσι, καὶ ὄντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὀρωμένων δεινῶν. καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ζυμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν· ἀδοκῆτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, καὶ οὐχ ἦσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλεόν τι αὐτὸν ἐδόξασεν (3.45.5-6).

ἐλπίς, ἔρως and τύχη form a deadly triangle from which human nature cannot escape.<sup>112</sup> It is through these elements that ὄργη will forever remain in

<sup>108</sup>Cf. Gomme (*HCT* ii, 319) and Saar: "Diodotos beschreibt ihr [ξυντυχίαι] Wirken mit den zunächst schwer zu verstehenden Worten, dass sie durch die leidenschaftliche Erregung (ὄργη) verleitet, so wie eine jede von unheilbaren Stärkeren beherrscht wird" (Saar 1953, 80).

One wonders why Thucydides has chosen Diodotus, a virtual unknown, to represent Cleon's opposition. Perhaps the historian does so, so as not to detract from his dramatic characterization of the demagogue. Had it been a familiar individual, the reader might have viewed the contrasts strictly as those between two speakers, rather than a reflection of the those within the evolving Athenian disposition.

<sup>109</sup>Cf. 2.40.3, where the Periclean γνώμη is described as one that can strengthen τόλμα.

<sup>110</sup>Huart understands the concept of πλεονεξία-πλεονεκτεῖν to signify, in the *History*, mostly negative connotations, "le désir d'avoir plus" (Huart 1968, 388). Cf. de Romilly who suggests πλεονεξία to be a fault brought on by ὕβρις that could be avoided with the application of γνώμη (de Romilly 1951, 280-281).

On a similar note, Huart refers to φιλοτιμία as a more noble form of ambition (Huart 1968, 389). de Romilly suggests that θράσος and θρασύτης replace τόλμα (de Romilly 1951, 272). Cf. 2.61.4.

<sup>111</sup>de Romilly (1951, 272). Cf.: "la tentation qui pousse l'homme à vouloir plus, au mépris de toute raison, est celle de la démesure, de l'hybris" (*ibid.*, 268). Fisher would argue that ὕβρις, in Diodotus' speech, refers to a "contempt for others" (Fisher 1992, 125 and 393), yet he recognizes that πλεονεξία may involve "acts of full-blown *hybris*" (*ibid.*, 396).

<sup>112</sup>I find it unnecessary to invert, as does Forde, ἐλπίς and ἔρως: "it seems to me that the only fair reading is to give to eros the fundamental or leading role, both because of the way Diodotus makes his argument and because of the character of the things he is describing" (Forde 1989, 41 n. 36). Not only is ἔρως given the leading role through the inverted μὲν..., δέ... clauses,

opposition to γνώμη,<sup>113</sup> causing one to be ἀλόγιστος.<sup>114</sup> What is more, ἐλπίς, when sponsored by ὀργή, represents a negative concept,<sup>115</sup> and thus paves the way for the destructive ἔρωσ.<sup>116</sup> Since Cleon, as illustrated through the ὀργή-γνώμη antithesis, is in direct opposition to Pericles, it is legitimate to argue that the demagogue will be most vulnerable. Thucydides emphasizes, throughout the Sphacteria and Amphipolitan episodes,<sup>117</sup> that the demagogue's γνώμαι are consistently without ζύνεσις (and therefore unable to control the prevailing ὀργαί), but defined by ἐλπίς and τύχη.<sup>118</sup> Cleon is very much what his predecessor stood against, namely one who brazenly covets (τὸν θρασύτητι ὀρεγόμενον, 2.61.4) what is not his.<sup>119</sup>

Since Cleon embodies ὀργή, it is no surprise that his behaviour inevitably

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its influence is underlined through the word order itself (ἢ τε ἐλπίς καὶ ὁ ἔρωσ ἐπὶ παντί). Cf. *S. Ant.*, where the two concepts are presented in similar order: ἀ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλπίς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνασις ἀνδρῶν/πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων, 616-617.

<sup>113</sup>Cf. Saar: "die ὀργή ist bei Thuk. immer der vernünftigen Überlegung entgegengesetzt" (Saar 1953, 80 n. 2).

<sup>114</sup>The tendency to exaggerate one's strength is vividly illustrated in the Sphacteria episode. Cf. 2.62.4: ἀύχημα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐτυχοῦς καὶ δειλῶ τινι ἐγγίγνεται, καταφρόνησις δὲ ὅς ἂν καὶ γνώμη πιστεῦη τῶν ἐναντίων προύχειν, ὃ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει.

Again, what applies to individuals may also be applied to cities and states. Cf. de Romilly: "il semble que ce texte s'applique comme à dessein à l'attitude athénienne" (de Romilly 1951, 274; citing 3.45.6) and Forde: "Diodotus ... treads a fine line between playing on the Athenians' understanding of their own motives and bringing their own case too much to the fore" (Forde 1989, 45); also, Fisher (1992, 393) and above n. 99.

<sup>115</sup>de Romilly, regarding ἐλπίς, states: "[elle] figure dans tous les cas où Athènes, ou une autre cité, se laisse entraîner de façon déraisonnable" (de Romilly 1951, 272). Cf. the irony in Cleon's words at 3.39.2-3: after claiming that revolt is for those who suffer something βίαιως, the demagogue states that, in the case of Mytilene, the inhabitants had become θράσεις and were conceiving hopes (ἐλπίσαντες) that were beyond their reach. See above n. 110, for the possible implications of θράσυς and ἐλπίς.

<sup>116</sup>Cf. Forde: "Diodotus establishes a direct link between human eros and empire; empire according to him is a natural goal of erotic passion simply because it is the greatest of accomplishments" (Forde 1989, 42).

<sup>117</sup>Edmunds remarks that the demagogue even brings about his own death, and with it the destruction of an Athenian army, through his misunderstanding of his success at Pylos (Edmunds 1975b, 197): "Thucydides does not regard chance events as "befalling" men, as coming from outside, but as originating in men's passions" (*ibid.*, 198). Cf. Cornford (1965, 147).

<sup>118</sup>Cf. 2.62.5. In consequence the demagogue, as Marshall observes, constantly exhibits "vacillation and impulsiveness" (Marshall 1984, 26).

<sup>119</sup>Cf. Marshall who recognizes in Pericles' words a reference specific to Cleon (Marshall, 1984, 27).

reflects *πλεονεξία*.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, the *demos* is never far behind. Thucydides essentially introduces, through the Mytilenaeen debate, new vocabulary to reflect the transformations that are taking place within the Athenian character.<sup>121</sup> Under Cleon's leadership, the *demos* eventually succumbs to *ὄργη* entirely, whereby, as Hunter observes, its *πλεονεξία* is unleashed.<sup>122</sup> The *demos* loses all control over emotional impulse. To reflect this development, the historian consistently describes the Athenians as grasping after more: at 4.21.2 (τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὠρέγοντο), with the urging of Cleon, the Athenian disposition is responsible for refusing peace, and at 4.41.4 (μειζόνων ... ὠρέγοντο) for failing negotiations.<sup>123</sup> The parallels in the *στάσις* passage strengthen the impression still further, and, like Diodotus' words, they are equally applicable to the Athenians.<sup>124</sup> Huart observes that, at 3.82.6, *πλεονεξία* is characterized as being contrary to the established laws (παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας), and held in opposition to *ὠφελία*, which, in contrast, conforms to the existing laws (μετὰ τῶν κεμένων νόμων).<sup>125</sup> Applied to the Athenians, the implication is that the overbearing influence of *ὄργη* has led them to be far

<sup>120</sup>Hunter follows Cornford in finding Cleon to represent *πλεονεξία*, rather than *ὄργη* (Hunter 1973, 180-181). Cf. Cornford (1965, 65 and 172). Of note, Huart points to 1.40.1, where the Corinthians in an attempt to turn the Athenians against the Corcyraeans, complain that the latter are βίαιοι and πλεόνεκται (Huart 1968, 389).

<sup>121</sup>Hunter also recognizes that the notion of *πλεονεξία*, with regard to the Athenians, only appears in the latter part of the *History* (Hunter 1973, 81). In addition to *ὀρέγεσθαι*, Thucydides also employs the verb *ἐφίεσθαι* to denote the psychological greed, but apart from one instance in the Pausanias excursus at 1.128.3, he does not do so with regard to the Athenians until well into Book 4. Cf. de Romilly (1951, 71-72 with n. 3) and Huart (1968, 389-390).

<sup>122</sup>Hunter (1973, 82). Cf. North (1966, 107).

<sup>123</sup>There are also the indirect allegations at 4.17.4 (τοῦ πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὀρέγονται), where *ἐλπίς* (with *τύχη*), is directly associated with the notion of covetousness, 4.62.3 (ἐλπίσαντες ἕτεροι δυνάμει τινὶ πλεονεκτήσειν), and 4.92.2 (τοῦ πλέονος ὀρεγόμενος). Cf. Huart (1968, 391). Van de Maele notes: "cette formule qui revient sous des formes semblables indique la démesure qui, selon Thucydide, s'est emparée des Athéniens sous l'instigation de Cléon" (Van de Maele 1980, 121 n. 5). Cf. Wilson (1990, 54-55). It is noteworthy, perhaps, that *πλεονεξία*, the corresponding noun appears only 4 times, and only in passages known for their moral content: once in Diodotus' speech, and the remaining instances in the *στάσις* passage (the last in the disputed chapter, 3.84).

<sup>124</sup>Cf. above n. 99.

<sup>125</sup>Huart (1968, 389). Cf. Spratt (1905a, 248).

bolder than the traditional code of behaviour allowed. πλεονεξία and φιλοτιμία are now more readily identified as the major motives behind human action (πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, 3.82.8).<sup>126</sup> It is these two elements that produce φιλονικία,<sup>127</sup> and as Huart remarks, this term is a pejorative one, evoking "l'esprit de rivalité qui ne s'embarasse d'aucun scrupule, pour parvenir à ses fins."<sup>128</sup> Thucydides is signalling, through his vocabulary, the beginning of Athens' decline and fall.<sup>129</sup> Verbal echoes encourage the reader to recall Thucydides' eulogy of Pericles, and amplify the failures of the statesman's successors, particularly Cleon.<sup>130</sup> Athens, as Cornford says, "is adventurous, restless, quick, ambitious; if she fails in one attempt, she immediately conceives a new ambition (ἐλπίς) to take its place; so rapidly does the act follow the decision, that hoping and having are to her the same."<sup>131</sup>

The ultimate paradox in Thucydides' treatment of Cleon lies within the demagogue's leadership of the *demos*. Lewis doubts whether Thucydides includes the demagogue among those successors "inclined to give the *demos* what it wanted," in his narrative at 2.65.10.<sup>132</sup> Similarly, Gomme argues that

<sup>126</sup>Cf. Macleod (1979, 57).

<sup>127</sup>3.82.8: φιλονικεῖν ... φιλονικία (de Romilly 1977, 54). Orwin also pays attention to Thucydides' use of this term, noting, in a discussion on 7.28.3, that the historian employs it, a term that does not particularly inspire a positive connotation, in place of τόλμα, the favorite term of Athenian self-description (Orwin 1994, 134).

<sup>128</sup>Huart (1968, 397). Cf. the first and only instance of the term prior to the *stasis* passage, in the speech of the Corinthians at 1.41.3, where they admit to their own questionable behaviour.

<sup>129</sup>As Wilson observes, "pleonexia, tyche and eros are precisely the factors that are prominent in the Sphacteria affair and its sequel in Sicily" (Wilson 1990, 53). Cf. de Romilly, who notes that this new Athenian covetousness essentially defines the evolution of Athens' imperialism (de Romilly 1951, 269). Similarly, Ehrenberg notes that "to Thucydides, Athenian imperialism, based on irrational optimism and a restless spirit of adventure, is a fundamental fact - actually ἡ ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις of the war" (Ehrenberg 1947, 51).

<sup>130</sup>2.65.7: κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας; 2.65.9: ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας; 2.65.10: οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ... ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι.

<sup>131</sup>Cornford (1965, 167). Cf. 1.70.1.

<sup>132</sup>Lewis (CAH v, 404).

Cleon "borrows his [Pericles'] mantle, and was as forceful a speaker, knowing how to tell the truth (on occasion) to his fellow-countrymen and equally ready to lead rather than be led by them."<sup>133</sup> But these views are not consistent with Thucydides' treatment. At best, the demagogue leads the *demos* in the sense that he represents the forefront of their developing character.<sup>134</sup> As it stands, Thucydides' Cleon embodies that which lies at the heart of the Athenians' weakness; he surrenders to ὄργη entirely and, as a result, devotes himself to covetousness.<sup>135</sup> He is a willing slave to his passions and, accordingly, to those of the *demos*.<sup>136</sup> This is far from the mark of leadership which Thucydides associated with Pericles. The demagogue, as Strauss observes, essentially "betrays the soul of Athens."<sup>137</sup> Perhaps Aristophanes would have better understood the historian's perspective; according to the comedian, Cleon was an ἐραστής of the *demos*:<sup>138</sup>

ΠΑ. Ὅτιν' ἀφιλῶ σ', ὡς Δῆμ', ἐραστής τ' εἰμὶ σός.

(Arist. Eq., 732)

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<sup>133</sup>Gomme (1951, 78).

<sup>134</sup>Cf. de Romilly: "Cléon ne fait qu'entraîner celui-ci [le peuple] dans la direction qu' il s'est choisie" (de Romilly 1951, 277). Accordingly, as Lang notes: "Cleon was an innovator in that he led the people not constructively but destructively" (Lang 1972, 162).

<sup>135</sup>Cf. Cornford (1965, 126).

<sup>136</sup>Cleon, as Yunis observes, is shown "seeking to inflame passions and otherwise encouraging the assemblies he addresses to act like a mob" (Yunis 1991, 194; citing 3.38.1, 3.40.7 and 4.22).

<sup>137</sup>Strauss (1964, 213).

<sup>138</sup>Cf. Connor: "the discourse moves, almost imperceptibly, from comic fantasy to political reality" (Connor 1971, 97). As Sommerstein observes, Aristophanes' *Knights* is "a violent attack on Cleon, but also on the whole style of leadership of which he was the foremost representative" (Sommerstein 1981, 2).

### Chapter 3

#### Alcibiades, the ἔρωσ incarnate

It has been established that Thucydides invites his readers to view Pericles as a representative of the rational, γνώμη, and Cleon as the embodiment of the passionate, ὄργη. To complete the framework supportive to his *History*, the historian introduces Alcibiades. His treatment of the Athenian elucidates further his own judgements upon post-Periclean Athens (2.65.7; 2.65.10-13), and confirms, beyond a doubt, Diodotus' predictions regarding the counteractive influence of ὄργη upon human nature (3.45.4-7).

Cornford discounts such peculiarities in the historian's narrative<sup>1</sup> as being mere "psychological accidents."<sup>2</sup> Many would argue, however, that this is a great understatement. That the Pericles-Cleon-Alcibiades triad is crucial to the historian's work has been recognized by a number of scholars. de Romilly considers the three leaders of the *demos* illustrations of the successive aspects of Athenian imperialism.<sup>3</sup> Gomme identifies the Thucydidean Cleon and Alcibiades "as the principal heirs to Perikles' policy, and in their different ways the destroyers of their inheritance."<sup>4</sup> On a more general note, Pouncey recognizes that individuals in the *History* are "shaped into archetypes, their personal qualities concentrated into the function they play within the state -- a function that is seen as typical in the development of history."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Namely, that "the disinterested ideal of Athens' glory is impersonated in Pericles; her restless covetousness (πλεονεξία) in Cleon; her ambition of conquest in Alcibiades" (Cornford 1965, 65).

<sup>2</sup>Cornford (1965, 65).

<sup>3</sup>de Romilly (1951, 97-98).

<sup>4</sup>Gomme (1951, 79). Cf. *ibid.* (HCT ii, 177).

<sup>5</sup>Pouncey (1980, 19). Cf. Bury: "in order to understand the meaning of historical facts, he [the historian] has to measure the characters and penetrate the motives of the actors, as well as to realise the conditions in which they acted" (Bury 1909, 107).

There is certainly evidence to support these views. Gomme observes that the historian comments on the deaths of only three Athenians: "of Perikles, because it was so disastrous; of Cleon, because it removed an obstacle to peace; and of Nicias, for personal reasons, because he was an honest man."<sup>6</sup> Yet each death also coincides with a pivotal development in the evolving Athenian disposition: the death of Pericles leads to an eventual surrender of γνώμη to ὄργη with the encouragement of Cleon; and the exit of Nicias, who makes an unsuccessful attempt to restore the rational γνώμη to the Athenian process of resolution, will remove any doubt that the changes within the Athenian character might be at all reversible. Moreover, these developments within the Athenian disposition are equally represented by the only three Athenian applications of the concept τύραννος: Pericles suggests that Athens is like a τύραννις (ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, 2.63.2); Cleon boldly asserts that she is a τύραννις (τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν, 3.37.2); and the implicit nature of the comparison in the speech of Euphemus,<sup>7</sup> who, with the departure of Alcibiades, will come to represent those developments under his leadership, implies that the equation has become a natural one to make (ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννω ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, 6.85.1).<sup>8</sup>

The similarities between Thucydides' introductions of the three historical leaders are particularly striking. As Griffith states, Pericles, Cleon and Alcibiades are the only individuals whom the historian ever introduces twice.<sup>9</sup> Thucydides introduces Alcibiades at a time and in a manner that suits

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<sup>6</sup>Gomme (*HCT* ii, 190).

<sup>7</sup>Bruell remarks that Euphemus is, like Diodotus, essentially an unknown: "he appears once to play his amazing part and then is gone" (Bruell 1974, 16). Cf. Gomme (*HCT* ii, 313).

<sup>8</sup>de Romilly observes: "ils [Cleon and Euphemus] glissent le mot, l'idée, comme une chose toute naturelle, comme un lieu commun" (de Romilly 1951, 113). Cf. 6.15.4, where the surrender of γνώμη to ὄργη is manifest in Alcibiades' reported ambition (τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι). Murray establishes a similar triad, but considers it to revolve around the definition of democracy rather than of empire. In doing so, he associates Pericles and Cleon directly with Alcibiades (Murray 1965, 53-54, citing Thuc. 2.63.1-2, 3.37.1-2 and 6.89.6).

<sup>9</sup>Griffith (1961, 28). Cf. Wassermann, who remarks that Pericles, Cleon and Alcibiades are the only Thucydidean speakers "so intensely dramatized" (Wassermann 1956, 33).

his purpose, much as he did Pericles and Cleon. He tells his readers nothing of Alcibiades' earlier career prior to his entrance,<sup>10</sup> and then employs the element of drama within his double introduction to secure his hold upon the reader's impression.<sup>11</sup> Not surprisingly, the historian's introductory passages, and the judgements therein, again serve to define the tone of his entire portrayal.<sup>12</sup>

Alcibiades first appears in connection with the near collapse of the Peace, and the emerging Argive alliance. Westlake maintains that Thucydides' first formal introduction (5.43.2) "strikes an exceptionally personal note, but does not include any assessment of his character or ability."<sup>13</sup> Indeed, there is not a single explicit judgement; the historian provokes the desired impression through a manipulation of his narrative.<sup>14</sup> He immediately brings Alcibiades' nature to the fore, and allows him to dominate the stage the moment he enters the political arena:

ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, ἀνὴρ ἡλικία μὲν ἔτι τότε

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Conversely, Woodhead and Gomme have expressed doubts regarding Thucydides' double introductions of Alcibiades' predecessors (see Chapter 2 nn. 16 and 18, respectively).

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Cornford (1965, 198), de Romilly (1951, 169) and Delebecque (1965, 197).

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Strauss who, stressing the importance of the Cylon-Pausanias-Themistocles digression to the historian's double introduction of Pericles, states: "the account in the center indicates the reason for Pericles' outstanding qualities; the center illuminates what precedes it and what follows it" (Strauss 1964, 216 n. 77). In the case of Cleon, the dramatic element is secured directly through the Mytilenaeen debate, and with regard to Alcibiades, it is provided indirectly through Thucydides' report of the negotiations preceding the alliance between Athens and Argos, and then more directly through the debate over the Sicilian expedition.

<sup>12</sup>Seeing that Athenian ἔρωσ will culminate in the launching of the Sicilian expedition, the historian's treatment of Alcibiades will be examined only insofar as concerns the theme at hand. Cf. Hunter: "what the *History* records is a transformation on the part of the *demos* from *sophrosyne* to *pleonexia* (encouraged by Kleon..., but only reaching its full force with the Sicilian expedition)" (Hunter 1973, 134 n. 13). Much earlier, de Romilly had already observed that "avec l'intervention d'Alcibiade, la politique impérialiste d'Athènes s'affirme sous sa forme la plus pure, dans l'expédition de Sicile" (de Romilly 1951, 168).

<sup>13</sup>Westlake (1968, 10). Cf. Kagan (1981, 72).

<sup>14</sup>As Bury remarks, the historian tends to remain in the background, seldom emerging to commit himself to explicitly personal judgements (Bury 1909, 108). When he does so, it is only after having conditioned his readers to such a extent that he appears to corroborate those impressions which the readers assume to be their own. Cf. de Romilly: "[Thucydide] va droit au fond du caractère du personnage" (de Romilly 1995, 59).

ὧν νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος· ᾧ ἔδοκει μὲν καὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους μᾶλλον χωρεῖν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Δάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδάς, ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τε τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὔσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἦν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπέων διενοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι (5.43.2).

No sooner is Alcibiades introduced than Thucydides leads his readers to suspect his motives.<sup>15</sup> With only a brief statement of the Athenian's position (ᾧ ἔδοκει μὲν καὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους μᾶλλον χωρεῖν),<sup>16</sup> the historian is quick to expose his true priorities (οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο). de Romilly observes the impact of Thucydides' frequent use of particles: "autant de particules, autant de façons de souligner que l'intérêt d'Athènes n'est point en cause."<sup>17</sup> Truly, the particular combination οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ makes the historian's statement all the more emphatic:<sup>18</sup> Alcibiades thought it better to go over to the Argives, and though he would probably have had other reasons to give, the real reason for his opposition to Sparta was that he was φρονήματι φιλονικῶν.<sup>19</sup> The thrust of Diodotus' speech

<sup>15</sup>According to Finley, Thucydides will never mention Alcibiades' policies without noting the "mixed motives behind them" (Finley 1967b, 158). Cf. de Romilly (1951, 193). It should be noted also that the extent to which Thucydides' reports Alcibiades' motives has led some scholars, most notably Brunt, to suggest that Alcibiades was Thucydides' source (Brunt 1952, 65-69 and 95). Cf. Andrewes (1961, 11 n. 26), Delebecque (1965, 199-200), Westlake (1968, 214 with n. 2) and Bloedow (1990, 2-3).

<sup>16</sup>Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*) note that the historian puts Alcibiades' ambitions immediately into motion with the expression ᾧ ἔδοκει μὲν. Others consider that the impression implies that Alcibiades was 'genuinely convinced' that an alliance with Argos would be of more benefit to Athens. Cf. Brunt (1952, 66), Andrewes (1961, 10) and Bloedow (1991a, 52).

<sup>17</sup>de Romilly (1951, 169). Westlake does not appear to recognize the imbalance within Thucydides' narrative, when he states that "the reasons attributed to him [Alcibiades] for advocating this policy are both public and private" (Westlake 1989, 209).

<sup>18</sup>Cf. LSJ (s.v. ἀλλά ii. 5) and Denniston (1954, 31; 306 and 399). Alternatively, Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*), citing 1.3.3, suggest that οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ corresponds to οὐ μὴν οὐδέ. This would negate the explanation that follows (ὅτι...), leaving the entire passage unresolved. It seems legitimate to argue that Thucydides would not have allowed the aspect of motive so much room in his narrative, had he not the intention of giving at least one reason for Alcibiades' opposition.

<sup>19</sup>The motivational sequence is clearly reflected in the word order (φρονήματι φιλονικῶν

and the *stasis* passage is immediately evoked. φρόνημα had been paired with ὕβρις in the Mytilenaeen debate to illustrate how the passions together could alter circumstances, turning ἐξουσία into πλεονεξία (3.45.4),<sup>20</sup> and the historian later took Diodotus' theory further, identifying πλεονεξία to be responsible, along with φιλοτιμία, for the emergence of φιλονικία (3.82.8).<sup>21</sup> If we examine the above text in this light, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Thucydides is deliberately defining Alcibiades' behaviour; it reflects φιλονικία and, in consequence, πλεονεξία.

Thucydides is clearly not intent on assessing the merit of Alcibiades' policy, but the motivation behind it. To this end, his references to Alcibiades' age and ancestry (ἀνὴρ ἡλικία μὲν ἔτι τότε ὦν νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος) subtly encourage the reader to suspect the grounds for Alcibiades' opposition to the Peace, and contribute to the impression that Alcibiades' πλεονεξία was of a most personal nature.<sup>22</sup> Pouncey proposes that the historian wishes to distinguish Alcibiades from the demagoguery.<sup>23</sup> Others maintain that Thucydides is underlining the importance of wealth in Athenian politics.<sup>24</sup> No doubt these are legitimate considerations, but they downplay Alcibiades' exceptional qualities, and do not explain the full force

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ἠναντιοῦτο), lending the most emphasis to φιλονικῶν. Cf. de Romilly, who also recognizes the importance of φιλονικία to the historian's introduction of Alcibiades (de Romilly 1995, 59).

<sup>20</sup>Cf. Huart: "pour φρόνημα (9 ex.), Thucydide ne lui donne pas le sens général de *pensée*, attesté en grec. Il lui attribue la valeur de *fierté, orgueil*, avec l'acception péjorative de *présomption* en III 45, 5 (joint à ὕβρις), également en V,40,3, et peut-être aussi, à propos d'Alcibiade, en V, 43, 2" (Huart 1968, 469 n. 1).

<sup>21</sup>φιλονικία, as has been noted above (Chapter 2 p. 55), is not a favourable term in the *History*. Cf. Ehrenberg: "[Thucydides] regards the greed for wealth and the lust for power (πλεονεξία καὶ φιλοτιμία) as the deepest causes of the perturbed and immoral conditions of his age" (Ehrenberg 1947, 49). See also Hermocrates' speech at 4.64.1: ἀξιώ ... μηδὲ μωρία φιλονικῶν ἠγεῖσθαι τῆς τε οἰκείας γνώμης ὁμοίως αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἥς οὐκ ἄρχω τύχης. Gomme recognizes the tragic tone of μωρία (Gomme *HCT* iii, 520).

<sup>22</sup>Cf. Finley and Macleod, who observe that Euripides also identifies the self-interest of the younger politicians (Finley 1967a, 37-38 and Macleod 1983d, 149, citing Eur., *Suppl.* 232-237). de Romilly discourages any assumptions that Euripides is alluding to Alcibiades (de Romilly 1951, 171 n. 2).

<sup>23</sup>Pouncey (1980, 107).

<sup>24</sup>Grote (vi, 302) and Kagan (1981, 62-63).

behind the historian's remark about Alcibiades' years.<sup>25</sup> What is more, it seems an unlikely coincidence that both Alcibiades' age and his ancestry figure prominently in those reasons for which Alcibiades was reportedly φρονήματι φιλονικῶν: the Spartans, when the Peace was being negotiated, had overlooked him on the basis of his youth, and not showed him the respect due him in accordance with the ancient προξενία rooted in his ancestry.<sup>26</sup>

Thucydides' narrative invites the reader to call Alcibiades' qualities into question at every turn. The Athenian, upon his introduction, is not merely described as being among those who most opposed the Peace, he is clearly also portrayed as "at the head of the pro-war faction" (ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ).<sup>27</sup> How did one so young get so far? One could argue, as does Kagan, that the historian clarifies this with his mention of Alcibiades' eminent family (ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος).<sup>28</sup> But why, then, the restrictive ὡς clause (ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει)?<sup>29</sup> As Classen-Steup note, Thucydides is leading the reader to understand that, in Athens, younger men were allowed to gain political influence despite their age.<sup>30</sup> If Athens differed from the standards customary in Greece, it seems reasonable that the reader ask how it would have been truly outrageous that the Spartans had overlooked Alcibiades on the basis of his youth (ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τε τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες). To what extent is Alcibiades manipulating a political situation in his favour? The 'supposed' insult

<sup>25</sup>Westlake notes that "it is very seldom that Thucydides supplies information about the age of individuals" (Westlake 1968, 212), and, for this reason alone, his reference here should not be taken lightly. Cf. Delebecque: "au lieu de dire son âge [Alcibiades], il [Thucydides] en souligne sa jeunesse" (Delebecque 1965, 198).

<sup>26</sup>It is noteworthy that Alcibiades' youth and ancestry will also figure prominently in the debate over the Sicilian expedition.

<sup>27</sup>Bloedow (1991a, 51).

<sup>28</sup>Kagan states: "as Thucydides points out, it was the fame of his ancestors which enabled Alcibiades to reach a position of eminence in Athens so rapidly" (Kagan 1981, 63).

<sup>29</sup>Cf. Smyth (1956, 344 n. 1495a; 670 n. 2993).

<sup>30</sup>Classen-Steup: "ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, nach dem anderswo üblichen Maßstabe, mit der Andeutung, daß in Athen auch jüngere Leute zu politischem Einfluß gelangen könnten" (Classen-Steup, *ad loc.*) Cf. Hignett, for the legal age assumed by scholars for membership of the *strategia* (Hignett 1952, 224).

involving the ancient προξενία begs a similar question. There is nothing in the text to indicate that Alcibiades had officially renewed his family's Spartan προξενία.<sup>31</sup> On the contrary, Thucydides refers only to an intention (διενοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι), underlined more particularly through the imperfect tense, which Alcibiades would have demonstrated through his attention toward the Spartan prisoners from Sphacteria (αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων).<sup>32</sup> Since, in the narrative, Alcibiades' grandfather is held accountable for severing the traditional relationship (ἦν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος),<sup>33</sup> it would appear that Thucydides is encouraging his readers to view the insult as one convenient for Alcibiades to act upon at this time.<sup>34</sup>

The wider context appears to strengthen the impression. The historian's account of the negotiations which pave the way to the Argive alliance highlights Alcibiades' most devious nature through an unusual recording of an incident largely insignificant to the history of the war.<sup>35</sup> Thucydides lends

<sup>31</sup>Cf. de Romilly (*Budé* iv, 133 n. 1).

<sup>32</sup>Whether or not this was truly the case does not alter the impact of Thucydides' narrative.

<sup>33</sup>It stands to reason that the party responsible for severing a relationship should also be the one responsible for renewing it. Thucydides subtly attributes to Alcibiades a recognition of this responsibility through the verb ἀνανεώσασθαι.

<sup>34</sup>Bloedow also considers that the historian demonstrates "from the very outset ... a fundamental contradiction in his [Alcibiades'] conduct" (Bloedow 1991a, 52): Alcibiades is said to have opposed the Peace from the first (5.43.3), and yet he is acting *de facto* as Spartan *proxenos*; the Athenian is passed over by the Spartans because of his youth, yet they appear to negotiate with him about a year later (*ibid.*, 1991a 52-53). Cf. Pouncey (1980, 108). Kagan, for his part, appears to have interpreted Thucydides' text without considering the extended context within the historian's narrative. He maintains that Alcibiades reversed his position due to the supposed insult: "Alcibiades had only been recently currying favor with the Spartans and had not yet turned against the peace (5.43.2; 6.89.2)" (Kagan 1981, 31 n. 35). Much relies on one's understanding of the temporal formula τό τε πρῶτον ... καὶ τότε (5.43.3). Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*) and Graves (1949, 155).

<sup>35</sup>Brunt "a minor diplomatic incident..., which was quite devoid of any significant consequences" (Brunt 1952, 68). Cf. Bloedow (1973, 5 n. 22).

Most scholars maintain that Thucydides' account is far from adequate. Important for the purposes of this Thesis is not the historical veracity of Thucydides' account, but the impact of his existing narrative upon the reader. For this reason, it will suffice to enumerate the difficulties which have been raised to date: Hatzfeld questioned why the Spartans would deal with Alcibiades, when they had previously overlooked him and dealt with Nicias; why Endius, after having been betrayed, would not have shown any resentment towards Alcibiades

an excessive prominence to the nasty trick the Athenian played on the Spartans,<sup>36</sup> though the influence it may have afforded Alcibiades over the assembly had ultimately no bearing on the Athenians' immediate motion -- the assembly was adjourned due to an earthquake (5.45.4), and, when it resumed its deliberations, it was Nicias, not Alcibiades, who succeeded in carrying the day (ἔπεισε..., 5.46.2). This seemingly unimportant narrative is crucial to Thucydides' treatment of Alcibiades. Through the dramatic element, the historian further defines his introductory remarks, effectively removing any benefit of doubt the reader may have held with respect to Alcibiades' character; the episode bears testimony to Alcibiades' exceptional abilities, only to emphasize their corruption by his self-centered disposition.<sup>37</sup> de Romilly rightly states: "l'entrée d'Alcibiade en politique est ... audacieuse et résolue. Elle semble devoir être un succès."<sup>38</sup> The prominence Thucydides lends to Alcibiades' scheme underlines his near success, and this in itself implies that Alcibiades would have prevailed had there not been an

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in their dealings six years later; and what the Spartans would have hoped to gain by lying in accordance with Alcibiades' plan (Hatzfeld 1951, 89-90). Brunt finds it unclear "why the fact that the Spartan ambassadors had full powers should have made it likely that agreement would be reached" (Brunt 1952, 67), Kagan, for his part, asks "why did the Spartans not reveal that Alcibiades had tricked them?" (Kagan 1981, 68), and, more recently, Bloedow questions how the Spartans thought they might prevent Athens from entering an alliance with Argos (Bloedow 1991a, 54-55). For fuller discussions, cf. Hatzfeld (1951, 89-93), Brunt (1952, 67-69 and 95), McGregor (1965, 29-30), Andrewes (*HCT* iv, 51-53), Ellis (1979, 60), Kagan (1981, 67-70), Ellis (1989, 38-40), Westlake (1989, 209), Bloedow (1991a, 54-59; 1991c, 20-22) and de Romilly (1995, 69-72).

Whatever difficulties arise from Thucydides' narrative, clearly the role and character of Alcibiades are magnified beyond the demands of the immediate context. Kagan notes that "the trick that deceived the Spartans was probably not necessary to defeat their mission. It was needed, however, to propel Alcibiades into the limelight as the man to see through the perfidy" (Kagan 1981, 69 n. 38). Cf. Bloedow: "given the many questions which Thucydides' treatment poses, the abbreviated version which he gives sounds very Alcibiadean in tone, tailored to suit his own purposes" (Bloedow 1991a, 59; cf. Westlake 1968, 218 and Ellis 1979, 60).

<sup>36</sup>Cf. Cornford: "Thucydides has made it [Alcibiades' trick] specially prominent, partly by treating it at considerable length, and partly by telling us nothing of any other incident in Alcibiades' early career" (Cornford 1965, 198).

<sup>37</sup>Cf. Liebeschuetz, who notes that Alcibiades exhibits an "extraordinary combination of self-centered character and exceptional ability" (Liebeschuetz 1968b, 303 n. 110).

<sup>38</sup>de Romilly (1995, 67).

earthquake to interrupt the proceedings.<sup>39</sup> Had Thucydides not stressed the element of motive beforehand, perhaps the emphasis might have lingered on the positive. As it stands, Thucydides prejudiced his readers against Alcibiades before any action could speak for itself, and he reinforces this bias directly at 5.45.3, where he calls attention to the extent to which Alcibiades would go to fulfill his *πλεονεξία* - namely, unscrupulous slander.<sup>40</sup> Thucydides' Alcibiades imposes himself upon the international scene;<sup>41</sup> he appears as an opportunist who would and (almost) could do whatever was necessary to manipulate a political situation to his favour.<sup>42</sup> His behaviour essentially reflects the same hubristic arrogance which Thucydides reported Pericles as having sought to restrain in the *demos*: ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι (2.65.9).<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup>de Romilly suggests: "il arriva même parfois que l'on alléguât un tremblement de terre douteux pour faire suspendre une assemblée" (de Romilly 1995, 68) cf. *ibid.* (*Budé* iv, 135 n. 2), Seager (1976, 261) and Kagan (1981, 67). Gomme makes a similar remark with respect to the conference at Corinth (Gomme, *HCT* iv, 67 on 5.50.5).

<sup>40</sup>5.45.3: βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστήσαι ταῦτα ἔπρασσε καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῶ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταῦτά, τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ Ἥλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ. Moreover, when Nicias fears an empty-handed return will result in *διαβολή* (ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ πάντα ἀτελῆ ἔχων ἀπέλθῃ καὶ διαβληθῆ, 5.46.4), there is nothing in the text to discourage the assumption that, in his perception, Alcibiades would have played a major role. For the use of *διαβολή* and *διαβάλλειν* in the *History*, see Chapter 2 n. 37.

<sup>41</sup>This impression is encouraged by the ordering of Thucydides' narrative. Alcibiades is nowhere mentioned prior to his initial introduction, and has, in sharp contrast to the first introductory passage, a rather diminished presence up until his second formal introduction within the context of the Sicilian expedition. Cf. J.R. Ellis, who remarks: "episodes consistent with this [Alcibiades to lead] are given prominence and fleshed out with detail; the inconsistent are understated or ignored" (Ellis 1979, 43). Truly, this contrast has generated much discussion among scholars, leading even to the suggestion that Book 5 was never completely revised, but see Gomme: "the playing-down of Alcibiades may be deliberate, may (that is) be the result of deliberate judgement, not of his never having 'written up' book v" (Gomme *HCT* iv, 71). For a range of views, cf. de Romilly (1951, 168-172; 1995, 69-72), Brunt (1952, 69-70), Liebeschuetz (1968b, 305 n. 125), Westlake (1968, 215-219; 1971, 316-318), Gomme (*HCT* iv, 70-71), Bloedow (1973, 5 n. 22; 1991a, 61) and Hornblower (1987, 138-143).

<sup>42</sup>Cf. Forde: "the occasion of Alcibiades' first appearance in Thucydides, his orchestration of events before the assembly so as to predispose the Athenians to the Argive league, presents most vividly the extent to which Alcibiades' "persuasion" approaches manipulation" (Forde 1989, 93). As Cornford earlier observed, "the story of the episode is treated in considerable detail, so as to fix the impression" (Cornford 1965, 191).

<sup>43</sup>See above (p. 61 with n. 20) for the pairing of *φρόνημα* and *ὑβρις* in Diodotus' speech and

The impact of such a dramatic entry has not been underestimated. Westlake boldly suggests that Thucydides made prominent the minor negotiations throughout the period of the 'uneasy' peace, because he wished "to focus attention upon the utter bankruptcy of Greek statesmanship at this time."<sup>44</sup> Those recorded here are certainly no exception. But Thucydides also exploits the opportunity to illustrate further the deterioration of political leadership within Athens.<sup>45</sup> His initial treatment of Alcibiades is consistent with his famous judgement on Pericles' successors (2.65.10), and even more so than his treatment of Cleon.<sup>46</sup> At no time does Thucydides discourage his readers from assuming that the unscrupulous behaviour which Alcibiades displayed toward the Spartans would differ from that which he would have exhibited in his obviously rapid ascendancy on the national stage.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, why should Alcibiades' dealings with Nicias, his chief rival, have been any different? Alcibiades' motives, as they are first recorded in the *History*, were, as Bloedow remarks, "as devious and corrupt as those of which

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the relevance of this to the first introductory remark on Alcibiades at 5.43.2. Cf. Huart on ὕβρις: "[il] se lit 6 fois chez Thucydide [apart from an instance in the suspect chapter 3.84], mais les exemples restent peu caractéristique. En IV, 98, 5, il s'agit d'un *outrage* aux dieux (cf. VI, 28,1), ailleurs, d'un esprit d'*insolence* (I, 38, 6), ou de *démésure* (III, 39, 4), considéré par Diodote comme naturel aux hommes (III, 45, 5). L'exemple peut-être le plus intéressant est celui de II, 65, 9, où Thucydide nous dit que Périclès savait ramener à plus de modération les Athéniens, quand il les voyait se livrer à une «confiance insolente» ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας" (Huart 1968, 473 n. 5).

<sup>44</sup>Westlake (1971, 323).

<sup>45</sup>Westlake does not seem to take this into account: "his [Thucydides'] conviction that at Athens political leadership deteriorated disastrously after the death of Pericles has already been sufficiently established in his account of the Archidamian war" (Westlake 1971, 323).

<sup>46</sup>2.65.10: οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονᾶς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. Cf. Rawlings (1981, 136-137) and de Romilly (1995, 59-60). Regarding Cleon, see Chapter 2 p. 28 with n. 1.

<sup>47</sup>Perhaps this provides an answer to Hornblower's query as to whether it was necessary that Thucydides give Alcibiades' deception so much room in the narrative (Hornblower 1987, 139). Cf. Grote, who earlier remarked that the entire episode surrounding Alcibiades' initial entry to the *History* "illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alcibiades through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud" (Grote vi, 318). This contradicts W.M. Ellis' more favourable view of Alcibiades: "Alcibiades did, indeed, eclipse all his younger rivals and, with a master stratagem, catapulted himself into a position as the chief rival to Nicias" (Ellis 1989, 37; cf. Bloedow 1991c, 21).

he was to accuse the Spartan ambassadors."<sup>48</sup> And not only with regard to the Spartans. Thucydides draws his readers' attention directly to the fact that Alcibiades' scheme was plotted also against his political opponent: in underlining Alcibiades' motives, the historian first puts forth an explanation which brings to light his opposition to Nicias (βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοῦς Νικίου τε ἀποστήσαι ταῦτα ἔπρασσε, 5.45.3).<sup>49</sup> Thucydides' narrative clearly provokes the impression that Alcibiades' personal πλεονεξία is to play a crucial role in his emergence as the leading political figure in Athens,<sup>50</sup> and there is little in the text to prevent the reader from concluding that Alcibiades' opposition to Nicias was motivated by his φιλονικία, and so became the ground for his anti-Spartan policy.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>48</sup>Bloedow (1991a, 53 n. 13).

<sup>49</sup>Cf. 5.46.1: ὁ Νικίας, καίπερ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτῶν ἡπατημένων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξηπατημένος περὶ τοῦ μὴ αὐτοκράτορας ὁμολογήσαι ἤκειν. In retrospect, Thucydides also encourages an association between Alcibiades' opposition to Nicias and his anti-Spartan policy at 5.43.2; though indirectly, this opposition again figures first in an explanation of his anti-Spartan motives: φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἤναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Δάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδὰς. As for the motives attributed to the Spartans by Alcibiades at 5.43.3, Thucydides does not deny their existence (de Romilly 1951, 169 and McGregor 1965, 29-30; cf. Bloedow 1973, 3-4 and 1991a, 53), but again the impact of the wider context helps to define the readers' impression. It is unlikely that Thucydides' readers would consider Alcibiades trustworthy, when the historian goes at length to define Alcibiades' later accusations as slanderous (even doing so directly at 5.45.3: βουλόμενος ... ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοῦς...), and depicts the Spartans acting true to Alcibiades' words, because of the Athenian's own dishonourable action.

<sup>50</sup>Cf. Dover: "Alcibiades' ambition was to gain at least a Periclean status by establishing a claim on the gratitude and attention of the people superior to the claims of actual and possible rivals" (Dover *HCT* iv, 230).

<sup>51</sup>As Kagan remarks, Alcibiades "hoped to be the Athenian with whom the Spartans negotiated and who would receive credit for the resulting peace" (Kagan 1981, 65; cf. 70). When the Spartans turned to Nicias, Alcibiades had to seek other means to reach his goal. Accordingly, his opposition to the Spartans was triggered not by their disregard for him in the negotiations, but more precisely by his opposition to Nicias. There is nothing in the text to confirm that φρονήματι φιλονικῶν at 5.43.2 must be in reference to Alcibiades' attitude toward the Spartans. On the contrary, Thucydides' introductory account and his use of the term φιλονικία in the *stasis* passage (3.82.8) suggest that it is being used of internal politics. Cf. Westlake, on the introductory passage in general: "he [Thucydides] may have overstressed the personal rivalry between Alcibiades and Nicias" (Westlake 1968, 215 with n. 1). For a range of views on Thucydides' estimate of Alcibiades' policy, cf. Hatzfeld (1951, 86-93), de Romilly (1951, 169-172 and 193-194 with n. 5), Brunt (1965, 65-79), McGregor (1965, 28-31), Westlake (1968, 215-219; 1971, 321), Bloedow (1973, 3-8; 1991a, 61 and 1991b, 201-202 n. 39), Ellis (1989, 39 with n. 17 and 43) and Forde (1989, 98).

Thucydides' initial introduction sets the tone for a treatment wherein Alcibiades will, like Cleon, exemplify the "corrupt combination of intelligence and boldness" as it is described in the *stasis* passage (3.82.4-5).<sup>52</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that Alcibiades' trick is somewhat reminiscent of Cleon's own denunciation of the Spartans in the first debate on Pylos (4.22.2). Yet Thucydides' Alcibiades brings such corruption to an even higher level. Alcibiades was no less devoted to slander than Cleon, but he was shrewder in its application. Cleon had been at the mercy of his passions, and had never been truly able to harness his intellect to their service.<sup>53</sup> The speed and extent of Alcibiades' rise in the political ranks and the near success of his characteristic trick lead the reader to understand that the Athenian is most able in this regard: his scheme is greatly dependent on a keen understanding of the Athenian disposition. Essentially, Alcibiades is in the proper place at the proper time, after having purposely triggered a course of events which would inevitably lead to the circumstances necessary for him to emerge as champion of the people. Cleon surrendered to the whims of the people only because he himself embodied the nature of their passions.<sup>54</sup> In the case of Alcibiades, there is nothing in the text to discourage the assumption that he engineered his scheme so as to appear as though he was yielding to the Athenians' whims: it is he upon whom the Athenians call when they can no longer tolerate the Spartans' perfidy (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐσήκουον, 5.45.4); it is he who happens to be nearby, ready to bring in the Argives when the Athenians are δι' ὀργῆς εἶχον over the lack of accomplishments at Sparta (ἔτυχον γὰρ παρόντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παραγαγόντος Ἀλκιβιάδου, 5.46.5).<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Macleod (1979, 57).

<sup>53</sup>The demagogue, in his attempt to discredit Diodotus, even argued against ζύνεσις to avoid an honest debate of the issues at hand. Cf. Chapter 2 n. 103.

<sup>54</sup>Moreover, Thucydides' treatment of the demagogue leaves the impression that he was incapable of doing otherwise. Cf. de Romilly (1951, 277).

<sup>55</sup>Cf. Kagan: "Alcibiades took advantage of the Athenians' rage" Kagan (1981, 71).

But the effect of Thucydides' narrative is twofold. The near success of Alcibiades' trick also confirms the importance the passage plays in the historian's portrayal of the Athenians and their ever-evolving disposition. Thucydides' narrative testifies to Alcibiades' intellect,<sup>56</sup> but, at the same time, emphasizes the extent to which emotional impulse has come to play a role in Athenian politics. Whereas Cleon, in the Mytilenaeon debate, had sought to resuscitate the *ὄργή* which had first fueled the Athenians to pass his resolution, Alcibiades seeks to exaggerate the *ὄργή* of the moment so as to pass an initial motion.<sup>57</sup> Thus, the entire episode surrounding Alcibiades' scheme and the Argive alliance which he ultimately secures highlights the Athenians' continuous surrender to *ὄργή*, the earthquake offering Nicias only a temporary reprieve (*δι' ὄργης εἶχον*, 5.46.5). The scenario effectively reflects the culmination of those transformations which Thucydides had invited his readers to witness throughout his treatment of Cleon, and corroborates with remarkable accuracy the corruption outlined in the *stasis* passage:

καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεὶ, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποπτος.  
ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχῶν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος  
(3.82.5).

Alcibiades' success hinged on his own understanding of this corruption. The Athenian was *πιστός* in the eyes of the Athenians because he was *χαλεπός*. He was *ξυνετός* because he succeeded in the scheming of plots,<sup>58</sup> and, at the same time, *δεινότερος* due to his apparent ability to detect them.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup>The use of the English term 'intellect' in no way implies that Alcibiades was, in Thucydides' view, *ξυνετός* in the true positive sense. See below n. 59.

<sup>57</sup>de Romilly notes that Alcibiades is no more able than Cleon to hold the *demos'* *ὄργή* in check: "sujet lui-même aux tentations de la *πλεονεξία*, et soucieux de son intérêt plus que de celui du peuple, Alcibiade n'est pas plus désigné que Cléon pour retenir celui-ci sur la voie où le pousse sa passion" (de Romilly 1951, 277). It seems important, however, to stress that both Cleon and Alcibiades did exactly the opposite, with purpose. Cf. Farrar (1988, 175 n. 81).

<sup>58</sup>Thucydides discourages his readers from viewing Alcibiades' initial failure as one due to Alcibiades' own incapacities. On the contrary, his narrative emphasizes that Alcibiades' scheme would have been a success had it not been for external forces beyond his reach.

<sup>59</sup>Thucydides' use of *ξυνετός* at 3.82.5 marks the total inversion of the *ξύνεσις* concept. What had been regarded as highly negative transforms into a positive virtue (cf. Chapter 2 with pp. 50-51).

Alcibiades' motives are again at the forefront of Thucydides' portrayal in the historian's second formal introduction of the Athenian at 6.15. Alcibiades is re-introduced in connection with the Sicilian expedition, and, in a notoriously striking passage, Thucydides removes any remaining doubts that Alcibiades' motives were of a purely personal nature:

ἐνήγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὧν καὶ εἰς τὰλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. ὧν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρήτο εἰς τε τὰς ἵπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας· ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας εἰς τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ' ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσαν, ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν (6.15.2-4).

As Griffith observes, this second introductory passage complements the first.<sup>60</sup> Thucydides' explicit judgements direct his reader's attention to Alcibiades' character, and reinforce the suspicions raised by the first introductory episode. Strikingly little mention is made of Alcibiades' abilities;<sup>61</sup> the historian reminds the reader of Alcibiades' talents, as they were demonstrated in the first introductory passage, with a subtle reference to his political standing in the context of the Expedition: his major opponent Nicias must stoop to 'supposed' slander (ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, 6.15.2; cf. 6.12.2) in what he himself considers a defeatist attempt to sway the Athenian

<sup>60</sup>Griffith (1961, 28). Cf. Grundy (1948 i, 509 n. 1). Westlake argues that this second introduction throws more light upon the personality of Alcibiades than did the first (Westlake 1968, 220).

<sup>61</sup>This is contrary to Westlake, who maintains that this second introduction includes judgements "both on character and on ability" (Westlake 1968, 9).

decision (καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενῆς ἄν μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, 6.9.3).

Yet Thucydides, in this second introduction, goes beyond a mere suspicion of Alcibiades' motives. The historian continues his examination into Alcibiades' character, by emphasizing his manner much as he did for the demagogue Cleon.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, he does not merely condemn Alcibiades' behaviour; he alerts the reader to the root of Alcibiades' self-indulgence, by underlining the extent to which emotional impulse interferes with the his γνώμη.<sup>63</sup> From the outset, he emphasizes the passionate nature of Alcibiades' support of the Expedition (προθυμότητα, 6.15.2),<sup>64</sup> and proceeds in his narrative to offer little evidence of a rational γνώμη influencing his actions. As in the first introduction, Alcibiades' opposition to Nicias figures first in the historian's explanation of the his motives (βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι), reinforcing the implication that Alcibiades' rivalry with Nicias would influence the outcome of his decisions.<sup>65</sup> Thucydides barely refers to

<sup>62</sup>Cf. Bloedow, who remarks that Thucydides invites a comparison between Alcibiades' self-interest and Pericles' patriotism: "when Thucydides draws attention to Alcibiades' extravagant ambitions..., one is reminded of his words in connection with Pericles, namely his 'known integrity' (χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος) (II 65, 8)" (Bloedow 1990, 3; cf. 5 and *ibid.* 1991b, 199 with n. 36). See also below n. 149.

<sup>63</sup>The Thucydidean application of the term γνώμη retains at all times the notion of thought offered by its corresponding verb, γιγνώσκειν (cf. Chapter 1 n. 23). It is through its antitheses, namely ὀργή, ἐπιθυμία, and ultimately ἔρως, that Thucydides establishes the progression of corruption which attacks the rational thought process. Cf. North, who identifies a similar framework in her discussions on σωφροσύνη: "the scope of sophrosyne as he [Thucydides] understands it is demonstrated by its synonyms, which invariably have a political connotation -- words such as *euboulia*, *to eukosmon*, or *metriotês* -- and by its antitheses, which include not only the traditional *hybris*, *orgê*, and *epithymia* but the more specialized Thucydidean and Periclean words for the active principle -- *to drastêrion* and the like" (North 1966, 114).

<sup>64</sup>Cf. Huart: "τὸ πρόθυμον, en rapport d'ailleurs avec πλεονεξία et φιλοτιμία, suggère la violence des désirs" (Huart 1968, 414).

<sup>65</sup>Cf. Dover: "it is noteworthy that Thucydides puts 'desire to oppose Nicias' first among Alcibiades' motives in making so strong a plea for the expedition. He often represents political issues in terms of political rivalries, and this is sometimes taken as an indication that he failed to see the 'real' causes of political decisions" (Dover 1965, 22-23). See above p. 67 with nn. 49-50. For her part, de Romilly finds similarities in Alcibiades' successive interventions at 5.43.2, 6.15.2 and 8.47.1: "ainsi ses interventions successives à Athènes ou chez Tissapherne sont expliquées les trois fois par la juxtaposition d'un motif théorique et d'un motif plus important,

the differences of policy (ἐς τὰλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικά), yet he does not hesitate to advance Alcibiades' emotional response to Nicias' 'supposed' slander (ὄτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη).<sup>66</sup> The still more personal motives attributed to him in the following clause maintain the emotional tone of the historian's narrative:<sup>67</sup> Alcibiades desires (ἐπιθυμῶν) to gain the generalship and hopes (ἐλπίζων) to take Sicily and Carthage, thereby benefitting his personal interests (ἴδια) in terms of both wealth and reputation (6.15.2).

The vocabulary may have changed somewhat, but the major elements remain the same. In drawing attention to the resulting behaviour, Thucydides highlights the absence of the Periclean γνώμη in Alcibiades' disposition, and continues to emphasize the damage ὀργή can affect upon human nature. The word order (ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων) insists on the dangerous relationship between ἐπιθυμία and ἐλπίς, thereby attesting the negative connotations retained in the first of these two concepts.<sup>68</sup> Thucydides, through Diodotus, had carefully established the negative qualities of ἐλπίς when it was sponsored by ὀργή (3.45.5), and he later associated the two concepts of ἐπιθυμία and ἐλπίς in his commentary on the Athenian reaction to the fall of Amphipolis: εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗ μὲν

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d'intérêt personnel" (de Romilly 1951, 193; cf. *ibid.* 1995, 152).

<sup>66</sup>Thucydides presents the reasons for Alcibiades' rivalry through the καὶ ... καὶ construction (6.15.2). Though this construction may "emphasize each member separately" (Smyth 1956, 651 n. 2877), by going from the general to the specific, the historian places particular emphasis upon the latter. Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*).

As regards the use of διαβόλως at 6.15.2, it is significant that it is Alcibiades, not Thucydides, who is attributing διαβολή to his opponent. Cf. 6.16.1. The wider context clearly implies that Alcibiades is again manipulating the situation to his favour, and thus he himself could be characteristically indulging in slander. Cf. above with pp. 62-63, and n. 40. On a related note, Westlake remarks that while Nicias only refers to his opponent indirectly, "it is characteristic of Alcibiades that he has no hesitation in referring to his opponent by name [16.1; 17.1; 18.6]" (Westlake 1968, 220 n. 1).

<sup>67</sup>The word order (βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι ... καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσαι) has caused some difficulties. Spratt notes that "the position of τε would prepare us for a corresponding infinitive to ἐναντιοῦσθαι (Spratt 1905, 152). See Dover, who states: "the coordinating particle in the first clause is often placed later than we would logically expect" (Dover 1965, xv-xvi). Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*).

<sup>68</sup>Cf. Huart: "la liaison ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων implique aussi une condamnation des désirs d'Alcibiade, appuyés sur des espoirs chimériques" (Huart 1968, 401).

ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, 4.108.4.<sup>69</sup> Clearly ἐπιθυμία, in the *History*, represents a violent desire founded least of all on rational thought.

According to North and Hunter, the prevalence of the term ἐπιθυμία in this second introduction recommends that the concept be held in close association with Alcibiades.<sup>70</sup> Thucydides contemplates the general dangers of desire as they are reflected in Alcibiades' behaviour (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρήτο..., 6.15.3),<sup>71</sup> and reinforces his judgement with the charge that indulgence beyond one's actual means was a major cause of Athens' downfall (ὄπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα, 6.15.3).<sup>72</sup> A report of the *demos*' reaction to their leader lends more

<sup>69</sup>The two concepts are again associated in Hermocrates' speech to the Camarinaeans at 6.78.2. To return to 4.108.4, the application of ἀπερίσκεπτος to ἐλπίς is noteworthy in itself. Compare Demosthenes' words to his hoplites at 4.10.1: ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀνάγκῃ ξυνητὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἅπαν τὸ περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπερισκέπτως εὐελπίς ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἂν περιγενόμενος. Huart finds it odd that this term is used in connection with ἐλπίς on both occasions (4.10.1 and 4.108.4): "[ἐλπίς à 4.10.1] souligne les avantages de l'espoir, et d'un espoir qui refuse la réflexion, ἀπερισκέπτως εὐελπίς; il est curieux de constater que ἀπερίσκεπτος est également joint à ἐλπίς, en IV, 108, 4, mais, là, comme une condamnation des espoirs inconsidérés" (Huart 1968, 150). To account for the contradiction, Huart distinguishes between the scenarios, identifying the ἐλπίς at 4.108.4 as relating to distant possibilities, whereas that at 4.10.1 is used of imminent combat (*ibid.*). There is, however, an equally important distinction to be made; at 4.10.1, an Athenian general is exhorting his troops, whereas at 4.108.4 the historian is offering his own commentary. In light of the inversion of the ξύνεσις concept, which the historian goes at length to illustrate throughout his treatment of Cleon, and the importance of this inversion to his portrayal of the Athenian disposition, the context in which we find ἀπερισκέπτως εὐελπίς at 4.10.1 strongly suggests a relative inversion, namely that of ἐλπίς. Thucydides employs εὐελπίς only five times in the *History*. All four instances which refer to the Athenians, 1.70.3, 4.10.1, 4.62.4, and 6.24.3, appear to reflect this positive-negative inversion (the fifth instance, at 8.2.4, is applied to the Spartans, but it is used in its primary positive sense to oppose the Athenians' ἀνελπίς at 8.1.2 [cf. *ibid.*]). Cf. Chapter 2 pp. 52-53.

<sup>70</sup>North (1966, 110) and Hunter (1973, 139 n. 19 and 180). Cf. Bloedow (1991b, 215).

<sup>71</sup>de Romilly finds this phrase to contribute to the impression evoked earlier in Thucydides' narrative (namely through ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων at 6.15.2): "ces mots évoquent le climat de l'hybris, -- et la formule ne tarde pas à suivre [6.15.3]" (de Romilly 1951, 277).

<sup>72</sup>Cf. North (1966, 110 n. 79), Pouncey (1980, 106) and Kagan (1981, 180). The context in which we find the phrase ὦν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν (6.15.3) reduces the likelihood that Thucydides is highlighting Alcibiades' reputation. Rather, it calls to mind the φρόνημα and ὕβρις which so characterized the Athenian's behaviour according to Thucydides' first introduction. Cf. Farrar: "Pericles exploited his reputation to chastise and guide the people; Alcibiades, to indulge his desires beyond his means (6.15.3 with 2.65)" (Farrar 1988, 175).

credibility to the historian's statement, and, in turn, to those impressions which emerged from Thucydides' initial introductory passage.<sup>73</sup> It stands to reason that the reader is less likely to doubt the historian's suspicion of Alcibiades' motives when the Athenians themselves questioned the driving force behind his actions: Thucydides reports that the Athenians were alarmed at the degree of self-interest in each of Alcibiades' endeavours (φοβηθέντες ... [τὸ μέγεθος] τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ' ἕν ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσε, 6.15.4),<sup>74</sup> to the point of turning against him on the ground that he was τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι.

Dover remarks that the "allegation of tyrannical ambitions was still current coin in Athenian politics," but, even so, Thucydides' choice of the particular verb, ἐπιθυμεῖν, seems rather significant.<sup>75</sup> A closer examination into the Thucydidean concept of ἐπιθυμία helps us better understand how it figures in the historian's analysis of the corruption which contaminates the rational thought process, i.e. the Periclean γνώμη. Huart recognizes an ambiguity in the term, noting its similarity in meaning to ἐφίεσθαι and ὀρέγεσθαι.<sup>76</sup> It is precisely the varying implications of the different Thucydidean terms, most notably πλεονεξία and ἐπιθυμία, which must be dealt with here. Both concepts signal a lack of γνώμη; both mark a disposition

<sup>73</sup>Westlake considers Thucydides' discussion on the attitude of the Athenians "to cause some imbalance in its context" (Westlake 1973, 105). However, he does not seem to take into consideration that Thucydides employs a similar technique in his treatment of Pericles (cf. Chapter 1 p. 24), and, again, to give credence to his portrayal of Cleon (cf. Chapter 2 nn. 34-35).

<sup>74</sup>Dover, on this phrase, notes: "i.e. 'the ambition (διάνοια denotes not an *attitude*, which would be denoted by φρονεῖν and its derivatives, but systematic thinking) apparent in all his actions in everything with which he was concerned'" (Dover 1965, 24). Cf. Huart: "dans certains cas, le mot [διάνοια] signifie *pensée*, mais, généralement, ou bien il réunit les deux notions de *état d'esprit*, *pensée* et *intention*, ou, le plus souvent, indique purement et simplement *l'intention* elle-même" (Huart 1973, 146).

<sup>75</sup>Dover (1965, 24-25; citing Aris. *Vesp.* 488ff.).

<sup>76</sup>Huart states: "cette notion de *désir* est ambiguë. On peut *désirer* quelque chose et, dans ce cas, ἐπιθυμεῖν apparaîtra plutôt comme un équivalent de verbes déjà notés, comme ἐφίεσθαι, ὀρέγεσθαι. On peut aussi *désirer* faire quelque chose et, avec cette valeur, ἐπιθυμεῖν se rapprochera d'un verbe comme βούλεσθαι, exprimant, en un certain sens, la volonté" (Huart 1968, 400). The use of βούλεσθαι at 6.9.2 suggests that there is an important distinction between the two terms, namely with regard to the presence of a rational γνώμη or lack thereof.

influenced by ὄργη.

Within the twenty-two occurrences of ἐπιθυμία and ἐπιθυμεῖν,<sup>77</sup> Huart attempts to distinguish between those desires for a certain action, such as to be in command (6.15.2) or to embark upon an expedition (6.24.2), and those desires for the results of a particular action, such as the recovery of one's men (5.15.1) or friendship (5.36.1).<sup>78</sup> Such distinctions have led him to ascertain that Thucydides often insists less on the desire itself than on the drive it provokes: "l'accent est mis moins sur la définition du désir lui-même que sur le souhait, sinon la volonté, de le réaliser."<sup>79</sup> It seems legitimate to argue that this is exactly what distinguishes the Thucydidean ἐπιθυμεῖν from the other terms the historian employs to denote the function of desiring, such as ἐφίεσθαι, ὀρέγεσθαι, and πλεονεκτεῖν. The latter lend more emphasis to the act itself than they do to the psychological effect the act may bring over the actor. In contrast, the irrational element retained within the concept of ἐπιθυμία does not primarily reflect the nature of the desire, but is due in large measure to the hold the desire obtains over its subject.<sup>80</sup> The loss of logic, and

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<sup>77</sup>This discounts the instance in the spurious chapter 3.84. There are 4 instances with regard to Alcibiades, 13 with respect to the Athenians, and, in contrast, only 5 instances where ἐπιθυμεῖν-ἐπιθυμία is used of the Spartans.

<sup>78</sup>Huart (1968, 401-402).

<sup>79</sup>Huart (1968, 401; cf. 402). Interestingly, Huart hesitates to apply this argument to most of those instances employed in connection with the Sicilian Expedition, namely 6.13.1, 6.15.2, 6.15.3, 6.15.4, 6.24.2, 6.33.2 and 6.78.2 (of the 22 occurrences in the *History*, Thucydides employs ἐπιθυμεῖν-ἐπιθυμία 9 times in connection with the Expedition, the remaining two occurring at 6.10.1 and 6.24.4). Huart finds 6.15.2, 6.15.3, 6.15.4, 6.24.2, 6.92.4 and 7.77.7 to draw attention to the desire itself and cites 1.80.1, 1.124.2, 4.21.1, 4.81.2, 4.108.4, 4.117.1, 5.15.1, 5.36.1, 5.41.3, 6.10.1 and 6.78.2 as those instances where Thucydides emphasizes the will to realize the desire in question. Unfortunately, these distinctions have also added to the ambiguities, which Huart identifies among ἐφίεσθαι, ὀρέγεσθαι, and ἐπιθυμεῖν (cf. above n. 76). Moreover, it appears that Huart's predilection for the categorization of Thucydidean terms shapes his argument: 6.24.4, according to him, falls in each category; 2.52.2 and 7.84.2 are excluded because they denote a 'physical desire'; though he recognizes the impact of 6.13.1, Huart is at a loss to fit this instance into one of his categories; and 6.33.2 seems to be completely disregarded. See Huart (1968, 400-403).

<sup>80</sup>The concept of θυμός points to an impulse which is not in itself under control; left to itself, it is not subject to reason, it is not thought out. Cf. de Romilly: "[ἐπιθυμία] désigne le mobile" (de Romilly 1951, 272); North, who refers to ἐπιθυμία as an "uncontrolled greed"

consequently the inability to control, is inevitable when one's γνώμαι are determined by one's ἐπιθυμῖαι, if only on account of this determination.<sup>81</sup> A number of passages reveal this nuance most clearly. Thucydides employs ἐπιθυμία in describing the overwhelming thirst which drives those stricken with the plague (ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀπάσας ἡμιβνηήτες τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμία, 2.52.2),<sup>82</sup> and, in his narrative on the fall of Amphipolis, he brings to light the compelling force of ἐπιθυμία, maintaining that whatever men desire, whatever displeases them they tend to reject by arbitrary reasoning: (εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῶ ἀτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι, 4.108.4).<sup>83</sup>

#### The emergence of the ἐπιθυμία concept in the second introductory passage

(North 1966, 110); and Bloedow (1990, 4). Huart acknowledges that the desire need not be unreasonable in itself, when he maintains with regard to 4.81.2: "ce désir ne semble pas, en lui-même, absurde ou déraisonnable" (Huart 1968, 402).

<sup>81</sup>Cf. Huart: "il est à noter que les désirs sont souvent considérés comme un élément irrationnel et par là-même dangereux" (Huart 1968, 401). Moreover, the lack of control identified with ἐπιθυμεῖν above coincides with the point made in Hermocrates' speech at Camarina: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἅμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς τύχης τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοίως ταμίαν γενέσθαι, 6.78.2. The absurdity of the Syracusan's statement, reinforced by the two temporal adverbs (ἅμα and ὁμοίως) and the adjective pronoun (αὐτός), clearly underlines the impossibility of controlling ἐπιθυμία.

<sup>82</sup>Not suprisingly, the word order further emphasizes the desire. See Parry, who, on the language in Thucydides' description of the plague, states: "it is grammatical, but it stretches the limits of Greek grammar. It is dramatic and imaginative, controlled throughout by the writer's determination to show the awful and overwhelming power of the sickness" (Parry 1969, 114). The 'physical' desire to drink also figures, in similar word order, at 7.84.2, where Thucydides describes the Athenians in their haste to cross the river Assinarus: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠπέιγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμόν, ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς ἰππέων τε πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, οἴομενοι ῥᾶόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι, ἣν διαβῶσι τὸν ποταμόν, ἅμα δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πεινῆ ἐπιθυμία. Huart sets apart these two examples of ἐπιθυμία ("les valeurs du substantif correspondent à celles du verbe, sauf que deux exemples" [Huart 1968, 402]) on the grounds that they refer to a 'physical' desire, yet he recognizes, in my opinion, the very essence of the term, when he remarks: "dans ces deux cas, ce désir, incoercible, cause la perte de ceux qui ne peuvent y résister" (Huart 1968, 402 n. 2).

<sup>83</sup>Gomme sees irony in this passage. Preferring to follow the scholiast (τοῦτο μόνον λογισμῶ ἐξακριβοῦντες), he understands λογισμῶ ἀτοκράτορι to imply a total application of reasoning, and not 'arbitrary judgement' as most edd. do: "the irony consists in the statement that, after we have made up our minds that we do not like a thing, we use our godlike gift of reason to reject it" (Gomme *HCT* iii, 582-583). Spratt appears to sum up Gomme's argument with his earlier interpretation, "with masterful conclusiveness" (Spratt 1912, 381). Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*), Graves (1958, 274), de Romilly (*Budé* iv, 76) and Hunter (1973, 142).

marks a crucial development in Alcibiades' disposition, and with it Thucydides takes his analysis of the *ὄργη-γνώμη* antithesis yet another step further. Through his treatment of Cleon, he established the dangers of surrendering to the *ὄργη* of the moment, namely the resulting *πλεονεξία*,<sup>84</sup> and through that of Alcibiades, with whom he identifies the concept of *ἐπιθυμία*, Thucydides determines the consequences of such continuous surrender. In the first introductory episode, the reader is made witness to the extent of Alcibiades' *πλεονεξία* as he enters the political arena, but it is the nature of the desire and its influence upon Alcibiades' actions which Thucydides appears to emphasize. Alcibiades is still able to harness his intellect to serve his *πλεονεξία*, thus demonstrating that the rational *γνώμη* is still, to some extent, within his reach.<sup>85</sup> Only in his second introduction does the historian trigger the impression that Alcibiades is no longer merely influenced by his 'desires.' With the term *ἐπιθυμία*, Thucydides draws attention to the fact that the influence of *ὄργη* has accumulated to the point of dictating Alcibiades' *γνώμαι*, and this loss of control inevitably leads to increasingly irrational *ἐπιθυμιαί*.<sup>86</sup> The escalating nature of *ἐπιθυμία* is

<sup>84</sup>Cf. Chapter 2 pp. 53-55.

<sup>85</sup>The second introductory passage certainly confirms that Alcibiades was no less inspired by *ὄργη* than his predecessor. Alcibiades' lawlessness (*παρανομία*, 6.15.4), which is itself intensified merely by its inclusion in the historian's report of the Athenians' fears, calls to mind Thucydides' elaboration of the *πλεονεξία* concept in the *stasis* passage (3.82.6): the historian characterizes the 'psychological greed' as one which inevitably compels the subject to act contrary to the established customs, and he remarks that it is acts of *παρανομία* which come to solidify party ties (*τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστευς οὐ τῷ θεῖῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι*). Dover recognizes that "just as *νόμος* covers 'custom' as well as 'law,' so *παρανομία* is not always or necessarily 'illegality' but also unconventional behaviour or violation of accepted ideas of right and wrong" (Dover 1965, 24; cf. Huart 1968, 444 n. 2). Finley considers the term *παρανομία* to encompass Thucydides' entire impression of Alcibiades (Finley 1942, 223). Cf. 2.37.3, and 4.98.6 where Thucydides reports the Athenian reply to the Boeotian charge that they committed a transgression by entering a Boeotian temple upon taking Delium: *καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀκουσίῳν ἁμαρτημάτων καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς βωμούς, παρανομίαν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀνάγκη κακοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν τι τολμήσασιν. παρανομία* is again used of Alcibiades at 6.28.2, where it figures as the *τεκμήριον* upon which his opponents draw to implicate him in the mutilation of the Hermes.

<sup>86</sup>If *ἐπιθυμία* attests the psychological effect the act of desiring may bring over the actor, then it is legitimate to argue that the more one succumbs to *ὄργη*, the more one's behaviour will reflect *πλεονεξία*, and the constant indulgence of one's *πλεονεξία* will result in *ἐπιθυμία*. That a subject characterized by *ἐπιθυμία* would go to any lengths to see his desire satisfied, thereby

certainly brought to the fore by the Athenians' fear that Alcibiades was coveting a tyranny (τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι, 6.15.4), but it is equally illustrated in Thucydides' attribution of motives to Alcibiades at 6.15.2: βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι ... καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσαι τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. Though μάλιστα may lose a little of its superlative strength due to the placement of the first co-ordinating particle (τε),<sup>87</sup> the second set of reasons given for Alcibiades' support of the expedition remains the most emphasized. Alcibiades had clearly gained some ground over Nicias since his arrival on the political scene, and his ἐπιθυμῖαι have come to reflect more than a mere πλεονεξία to become the leading political figure in Athens. Perhaps Alcibiades' intoxication was leading him to covet even the honourable position of becoming the leading statesman of his time.<sup>88</sup>

True to the Thucydidean method, the context in which the reader is treated to a second introduction of Alcibiades strengthens the historian's

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signalling a shift of control from the subject to the desire, Thucydides corroborates, ironically, in Alcibiades' speech to the Spartans at 6.92.4; the exiled Athenian implies that a true patriot, wishing to gain back his homeland, would do anything by reason of his ἐπιθυμία: καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς ... ὅς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῆ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν. Again, Thucydides' word order (ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν) is remarkable, and all the more so seeing that τρόπος can also refer to a man's *character* or *temper* (cf. Nicias' words at 6.9.3). The historian underscores the essence of ἐπιθυμία by immediately following the prepositional clause with διὰ and the articular infinitive. Cf. Cochrane (1929, 56) and Huart (1968, 401 n. 1).

<sup>87</sup>Cf. above n. 67.

<sup>88</sup>There is certainly nothing in the text to discourage the reader from such an assumption. The suspicion that Alcibiades was seeking a tyranny (τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι, 6.15.4) belongs to the Athenians, and there is no reason why the historian might not have entertained a less subjective view. Moreover, in the preamble to Nicias' first speech, the historian credits the Athenian statesman with recognizing the true nature of the Expedition for which the Athenians previously voted (καὶ ὁ Νικίας ... νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλευσθαι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχεία καὶ εὐπρεπεῖ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπάσης, μεγάλου ἔργου, ἐφίεσθαι..., 6.8.4), and it is on this point that Nicias attempts to dissuade the Athenians from their prior resolution. Against this backdrop, Alcibiades' ἐπιθυμία is highlighted all the more when he adds to the ambition of conquering Sicily the overthrow of Carthage. As McGregor notes, "up to this time [the Sicilian Expedition], Alcibiades had initiated the events that were shaping his career" (McGregor 1965, 34), and there is little reason to discount this as a possibility here. Cf. Dover (*HCT* iv, 230; 1965, 23; *HCT* iv, 241), Bloedow (1990, 16; 1991b, 212 with n. 74) and de Romilly (1995, 88-89 and 98-99).

explicit judgements. Just as he did with respect to Cleon, Thucydides exploits the dramatic possibilities afforded him by the setting of the debate to promote further his treatment of Alcibiades, which, in turn, shapes his analysis of the Athenian disposition. Liebeschuetz observes that the debate has "the effect of persuading the reader that the decision to make the Sicilian expedition was a thoroughly bad one."<sup>89</sup> And this is far from being a coincidence. With remarkable precision, Thucydides coordinates the speeches, their preambles and the postscript to enforce his own views on Athenian imperialism.<sup>90</sup> Nicias replaces Diodotus in the advocacy of the Periclean γνώμη, as he, too, takes it upon himself to change the minds of the Athenians after an original motion has been passed.<sup>91</sup> Whereas Diodotus' role in the Mytilenaeon debate was to corroborate the 'physical' evidence presented in the speech before him, Nicias' speech anticipates the historian's judgements, after which Alcibiades' speech only confirms their verdict. Even the most reticent of readers cannot help but join the historian in his judgement of Alcibiades; the most passionate advocate of the expedition, the Athenian leader, exemplifies all that is negative regarding the Athenian decision.

Nicias' first speech plays a crucial role in securing the readers'

<sup>89</sup>Liebeschuetz (1968b, 299). This is much like the motion of the first Mytilenaeon debate.

<sup>90</sup>Westlake considers the debate on the Sicilian Expedition to be "outstanding in achieving effective co-ordination between speeches and their setting" (Westlake 1973, 105). Cf. Liebeschuetz (1968a, 76) and Chapter 2 n. 28.

<sup>91</sup>Nicias implies that this motion had been passed under the influence of ὄργη, when he intimates that the Athenian resolution was lacking in γνώμη (6.9.2-3; cf. 6.8.4). Moreover, the implication is reinforced with the statesman's continuing emphasis on the function of πρόνοια (6.9.2; 6.11.1, 6.13.1). Diodotus, at 3.42.1, maintained that the two greatest obstacles to εὐβουλία were τάχος and ὄργη, and while he associated the latter with a shallowness of γνώμη, he emphasized also the role ἄνοια plays in compelling one to act in haste. Yet Thucydides does not only reiterate the ὄργη-γνώμη antithesis through an implicit comparison with the Mytilenaeon debate; as Connor observes, Nicias' position is similar to that in which Pericles found himself when the Athenians were compelled by ὄργη to fight the invading Spartans (2.21.2-2.22.1; Connor 1984, 162 with n. 13). Such a comparison is further encouraged with a subtle reminder of Pericles' steadfast conduct. Nicias emphasizes that he is and has always been steadfast in his γνώμη (οὔτε ἐν τῷ πρότερον χρόνῳ ... οὔτε νῦν, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἂν γιγνώσκω βέλτιστα, ἐρῶ, 6.9.2), regardless of the personal outcome. Cf. 1.140.1, 2.13.2, 2.21.3, 2.55.2, 2.61.2, and Cleon's plagiarism at 3.37.1, 3.38.1 and 2.40.2.

understanding of Thucydides' Alcibiades. The Athenian statesman refers to his opposition on at least three occasions, albeit indirectly, and with each instance, Thucydides has Nicias amplify the extent of Alcibiades' self-interest all the more. In defence of his own position, and his motives thereof, Nicias affirms his advocacy of the Periclean γνώμη (καὶ μὴ οὕτως βραχεία βουλή περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων ... πόλεμον οὐ προσήκοντα ἄρασθαι, 6.9.1) and maintains that, though he himself would derive honour from such an expedition (καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, 6.9.2),<sup>92</sup> he is obliged to bring the gravity of the Athenians' situation to light. Such self-sacrifice will only sharpen the implied contrast with his nameless opponent.<sup>93</sup> Nicias offers his prior record as testimony that he would never speak παρὰ γνώμην for the sake of honour (ὅμως δὲ οὐτε ἐν τῷ πρότερον χρόνῳ διὰ τὸ προτιμᾶσθαι εἶπον παρὰ γνώμην οὐτε νῦν, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἂν γιγνώσκω βέλτιστα, ἐρῶ, 6.9.2), and with his statement comes the insinuation that his opponents would not do the same.<sup>94</sup>

The second reference takes the reader from the universal to the specific. Nicias' allusion to the treaty and the men who were responsible for its conclusion (καὶ οἴεσθε ἴσως τὰς γενομένας ὑμῖν σπονδὰς ἔχειν τι βέβαιον, αἱ ἡσυχάζοντων μὲν ὑμῶν ὀνόματι σπονδαὶ ἔσσονται [οὕτω γὰρ ἐνθένδε τε ἄνδρες ἔπραξαν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων]...6.10.2) calls to mind Alcibiades' characteristic manipulation of circumstance, as it was so carefully illustrated throughout Thucydides' first introductory episode.<sup>95</sup> But Nicias does not only point to Alcibiades' tendency to change his views according to the honour he might secure from his support of a particular initiative; with his criticism of the

<sup>92</sup>Spratt, on the use of καίτοι, observes: it "strikes a note of objection and of self-vindication" (Spratt 1905, 135). Cf. Denniston (1954, 556-557).

<sup>93</sup>Cf. Connor: "Nicias is introduced with language that emphasizes his reluctance to take on the command (a sharp contrast to Alcibiades' desire for advancement)" (Connor 1984, 162).

<sup>94</sup>Cf. Westlake: "here he implies that to Alcibiades self-advancement was paramount" (Westlake 1968, 172).

<sup>95</sup>Cf. Dover: "αὐτά refers not to the peace treaty itself but to the whole train of events of which the treaty was a part" (Dover 1965, 16).

treaty (6.10.2-3), he passes judgement on his opponent's prior conduct, emphasizing the extent to which Alcibiades would act in his own interest, regardless of whether it would benefit Athens. In doing so, Nicias hints at the major shift that has been taking place in Alcibiades' disposition, namely that from πλεονεξία to ἐπιθυμία.

The third reference reinforces Nicias' suggestion and confirms the identity of his opponent within the context of the debate. There is no question that it is Alcibiades to whom the statesman refers, though, yet again, he refrains from naming him:<sup>96</sup>

εἴ τέ τις ἄρχειν ἄσμενος αἰρεθεῖς παραινεῖ ὑμῖν ἐκπλεῖν, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν, ὅπως θαυμασθῆ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἵπποτροφίας, διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῆ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνῳ ἰδίᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι, νομίσατε δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀναλοῦν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἶον νεωτέρῳ βουλευσασθαί τε καὶ ὀξέως μεταχειρίσαι (6.12.2).

By allowing Nicias a character sketch of Alcibiades, rather than making a direct reference to him, Thucydides not only emphasizes the prominence to which Alcibiades has risen; through Nicias, he demonstrates that Alcibiades' πλεονεξία has become transformed into ἐπιθυμία. Having previously drawn on past evidence of Alcibiades' self-seeking conduct, Nicias turns to more contemporary testimony. The statesman draws attention to his opponent's tendency to care more for private concerns than he does public affairs (τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν; τῷ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνῳ), and he provides evidence to back up his charge (ὅπως θαυμασθῆ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἵπποτροφίας, διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῆ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς). The word order and the extra space devoted to the more trivial ἐπιθυμία makes Nicias' appeal (μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς

<sup>96</sup>Cf. Dover: "Nicias does not name Alcibiades, but makes his reference immediately clear by closer specification of Alcibiades' characteristics" (Dover *HCT* iv, 236). See above n. 66.

πόλεως κινδύνῳ ἰδίᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι) all the more dramatic, particularly in view of the judgement emerging from the second reference alluded to above.<sup>97</sup> Thucydides does not only encourage his readers to conclude that Alcibiades would sacrifice the interests of the state to his own, but he also slips in the implication that Alcibiades would sacrifice Athens, no matter how little the ἐπιθυμία he could satisfy as a result.

The similarities of this last reference to Thucydides' own character sketch at 6.15.2-3 cannot be ignored. Thucydides essentially conditions his readers throughout Nicias' speech, and validates his own judgements merely by endorsing the statesman's accusations.<sup>98</sup> To ensure his readers' confidence in Nicias, the historian lends the statesman credibility by 'exempting him from that ignorance he has characterized by previously apprising himself of facts not known.'<sup>99</sup> The reader is quickly made to realize that Nicias is not ἄπειρος, as most of the Athenians are described at 6.1.1, from the moment he is introduced (νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχεία καὶ εὐπρεπεὶ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπάσης, μεγάλου ἔργου, ἐφίεσθαι, 6.8.4).<sup>100</sup> Thucydides thus

<sup>97</sup>Though Thucydides' own character sketch reaches beyond 'trivial' desires, such as the keeping of horses, it is reasonable that Nicias would choose to single out his opponent on a point so obvious that it could not be denied.

<sup>98</sup>Cf. Kagan (1981, 180).

<sup>99</sup>See Stahl (1973, 70-71). He stresses the importance of examining the so-called digression on the socio-geographical make-up of Sicily (6.2-5) within its context: with the explanatory γὰρ Thucydides introduces a justification of his most telling description of the Athenians [ἄπειροι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλήθους καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πολλῶ τινὶ ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον ἀνηροῦντο ἢ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους, 6.1.1] (Stahl 1973, 70). Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc*) and Spratt (1905, 110). de Romilly had earlier recognized that Thucydides at 6.1.1 "signale le caractère disproportionné de l'ambition athénienne," noting that the greatness of their regret at 7.55.1 (πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετᾶμελος) "souligne l'erreur commise" (de Romilly 1951, 174 with n. 2). Cf. Connor (1984, 159-160).

<sup>100</sup>Connor observes an echo of 6.6.1: ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι ... (Connor 1984, 162 n. 12). Furthermore, Nicias' speeches generally reflect arguments that will prove sounder than those of Alcibiades, who is clearly not exempt from Thucydides' description of the Athenians at 6.1.1. J.R. Ellis remarks that: "in fearing an enemy coalition Nicias was properly applying Athens' past experience to the present and future; in discounting it Alcibiades was ignorant or perverse" (Ellis 1979, 46). Cf., for a range of views, de Romilly (1951, 174-178; 206-207), Finley (1967b, 156-157), Westlake (1968, 221), Hunter (1973, 124-127; 136-139), Stahl (1973, 65-69), Ellis (1979, 45-47), Kagan

amplifies the opposition between Nicias and Alcibiades before the debate has even begun,<sup>101</sup> and when he offers his 'retrospective judgement,'<sup>102</sup> he never betrays the fact that he himself has shaped his readers' impressions; on the contrary, he appears to empower his readers, who join the historian in his agreement with Nicias.<sup>103</sup>

Unlike Cleon at the time of the Mytilenaeen debate, Alcibiades does not represent an extreme within the Athenian disposition. That being so, Nicias' first speech is as revealing of the Athenians as it is of Alcibiades. This is evident not only from the fact that the statesman "himself, before speaking against the general enthusiasm, feels the embarrassing compulsion to prove his own honesty first (6.9.2),"<sup>104</sup> but also from the very lack of response to Nicias' exhortations to reason. Thucydides' narrative suggests that the majority are still in favour of the expedition at 6.15.1, and though there is no passionate vocabulary directly applied to them, the excessively passionate vocabulary employed by the historian to describe the most zealous advocate of the Expedition (6.15.2-4) must, to some degree, also reflect the disposition of those in his company. What is more, it is clear immediately following Nicias' *prooemium* that the statesman's argument is essentially one against ἐπιθυμία. Nicias determines that the Athenian motion to assist the Egestaeans and restore Leontini is more an ἐπιθυμία than it is a resolution based on γνώμη,<sup>105</sup> and he urges the Athenians to acknowledge this by showing them

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(1981, 181-186), Macleod (1983b, 78-86), Connor (1984, 165-166) and Bloedow (1990, 7-8; 12-17 and 1992, 145-146).

<sup>101</sup>Cf. Stahl, according to whom, "the setting of the debate proves it: ignorance (combined with desire for conquest) is the keynote for understanding the following process of decision-making in Athens [chapter 8-24]" (Stahl 1973, 71).

<sup>102</sup>The expression belongs to J.R. Ellis (Ellis, 1979, 45). This 'retrospective judgement' ensures that, when Thucydides magnifies Nicias' implicit analysis of Alcibiades' conduct, the reader will nod voluntarily in agreement. Cf. Forde (1989, 76).

<sup>103</sup>Cf. Westlake's reaction to 6.15.2: "a statement by Thucydides himself shows that in his opinion these charges were well-founded" (Westlake 1968, 172).

<sup>104</sup>Stahl (1973, 71).

<sup>105</sup>This is reinforced, in Thucydides' narrative, with repeated allusions to the fact that the initial resolution had never properly defined the Expedition in the first place. Cf. 6.1.1,

the extent to which their desire to subdue Sicily is irrational: φημὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς πολεμίους πολλοὺς ἐνθάδε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ ἑτέρους ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐκεῖσε πλεύσαντας δεῦρο ἐπαγαγέσθαι, 6.10.1. Were they rational, surely the Athenians would see that it is not reasonable to reach for another empire when they have yet to stabilize their own: ἀρχῆς ἄλλῆς ὀρέγεσθαι πρὶν ἢν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσώμεθα, 6.10.5.<sup>106</sup> Such an enterprise could only be considered ἀνόητον (6.11.2). Thucydides himself then corroborates that the Athenian disposition has, like that of Alcibiades, shifted from πλεονεξία to ἐπιθυμία through a most revealing verbal echo in his postscript: the historian's description of the Athenians "as possessed of an ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν [6.24.4]"<sup>107</sup> calls to mind the repeated expression used to denote their active πλεονεξία under the leadership of Cleon, τοῦ πλεόνος ὠρέγοντο.<sup>108</sup>

Much like Diodotus and Pericles before him, Nicias attempts to clarify the forces which have corrupted the Athenian process of resolution. To this end, he emphasizes the degree to which ἐπιθυμία can stem from ἀπειρία, not only by underlining, through his characterization of Alcibiades, the vulnerability of youth,<sup>109</sup> but with his appeal to the ἐμπειρία of his contemporaries.<sup>110</sup> North

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6.6.1, 6.8.4. See also 4.60.1, 6.18.3, 6.20.2, and especially 6.33.2, where Hermocrates' urges the assembly at Syracuse to see the Athenian expedition for what it truly is: πρόφασιν μὲν Ἐγεσταιῶν ξυμμαχία καὶ Λεοντίνων κατοικίσει, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς Σικελίας ἐπιθυμία, 6.33.2.

<sup>106</sup>Spratt considers ὀρέγεσθαι to be "the word usually applied to the effort to gratify ἐπιθυμία" (Spratt 1905, 140). But the notion of πλεονεξία, to which it is related, reflects only the *influence* of ὀργή, whereas ἐπιθυμία signals a total control of ὀργή over γνώμη. In light of this, it seems more likely that the use of ὀρέγεσθαι reflects the application of γνώμη within Nicias' argument.

<sup>107</sup>Finley (1967b, 157). Cf. Eur. *Supp.*: οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρώσ' ἀεὶ, 238-239.

<sup>108</sup>Cf. Finley: "the words [at 6.24.4] come as a climax to all that has been said before of their dangerous instability and of the equally dangerous leadership to which it gave rise" (Finley 1967b, 160; cf. 157). See also Connor (1984, 168, n. 25) and Chapter 2 p. 54.

<sup>109</sup>Nicias' word order at 12.2 underlines the connection between Alcibiades' youth and his self-serving ambition: τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν. Hence, Thucydides' emphasis on Alcibiades' youth throughout his treatment was with purpose. Cf. de Romilly: "la critique de Nicias, comme celle de Diodote [envers Cléon], enveloppe Alcibiade dans une catégorie, qui permet de voir d'où vient le mal. Seulement cette catégorie d'hommes portés à l'hybris n'est plus composée par les ennemis de l'intelligence, mais,

and Hunter recognize a critical echo: when Archidamus exhorts the Spartans not to underestimate Athens in Book 1, he cautions them to base their resolutions on γνώμη, rather than ὄργη, stating that no one can have ἐπιθυμία for war unless it is due to ignorance or an error in judgement (καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὄρω, ὥστε μήτε ἀπειρία ἐπιθυμήσῃ τινὰ τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν, μήτε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς νομίσαντα, 1.80.1).<sup>111</sup> Like Archidamus (1.80.1-2), Nicias exhorts the Athenian elders to vote against war, because experience has taught them that προνοία is far more dependable than ἐπιθυμία: γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοία δὲ πλείστα, 6.13.1.<sup>112</sup>

Moreover, it is through Nicias that Thucydides first marks the connection between ἐπιθυμία and ἔρωσ. In his appeal to the πρεσβύτεροι the Athenian statesman asks that they not be shamed into action, lest they appear μαλακοί to those around them, and so [by their very shame] become δυσέρωτας themselves (μὴ καταισχυνοθῆναι, εἴ τῷ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δόξει, εἴαν μὴ ψηφίζηται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδ', ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, 6.13.1).<sup>113</sup> Through the word order (ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας

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ici, par la jeunesse" (de Romilly 1951, 277). Moreover, McGregor notes: "we may note that the irresponsibility and freedom from inhibition that characterised his [Alcibiades'] early years persisted into his maturity and are confirmed by Thucydides, not merely in the words of Nicias" (McGregor 1965, 28). In his postscript, Thucydides brings the theme to an appropriate close with his categorical explanations for the Athenian resolution. Note, in particular, the application of εὐελπίς to the νεώτεροι at 6.24.3 (cf. above n. 69). Cf. Cornford (1965, 205) and Forde (1989, 59, 149 n. 34).

<sup>110</sup>A number of scholars recognize the opposition between old and young. Cf. de Romilly (1951, 204-205, 277; 1995, 31), Stahl (1966, 73), Finley (1967a, 43), Westlake (1968, 221), Hunter (1973, 110, 126 and 142), Edmunds (1975b, 124), Macleod (1983b, 71) and de Romilly (1995, 31). It is interesting to note, as Connor does, that "the early books ... emphasize the experience (*empeiria*) of the Athenians and rarely associate the word *apeiros* or its cognates with them" (Connor 1984, 159 n. 5).

<sup>111</sup>North (1966, 110) and Hunter (1973, 128). Cf. Edmunds (1975b, 124).

<sup>112</sup>Cf. Hunter, who identifies the many parallels between the speeches of the two 'tragic warners' (Hunter 1973, 127-129). See also below n. 129.

<sup>113</sup>The μή ... μηδέ is crucial to the interpretation of this passage. Cf. Denniston, who, on οὐδέ, μηδέ, states: "by a process of inversion frequently found in the case of καί (see καί, Π.Β.Ι.iii), οὐδέ, especially in a clause or sentence giving a reason, sometimes represents a negative idea

εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων)<sup>114</sup> and, particularly, the choice of the verb πάσχω,<sup>115</sup> Thucydides' Nicias points to the emotional state of the νεώτεροι and contemplates what is responsible for the driving force behind ἐπιθυμία. Much as πλεονεξία was a symptom of ὄργη, so too ἐπιθυμία is a symptom of a larger element, namely ἔρως.<sup>116</sup> Nicias accentuates that the Athenians' ἐπιθυμία for the Expedition illustrates in itself the dangers of acting under the influence of ἔρως, not only by underscoring with the prefix δυσ- the measure of suffering the younger men experience,<sup>117</sup> but even more so with the contention that Athens, in her present state, was running by far the greatest risk indeed: ὡς μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπούσης, 6.13.1.<sup>118</sup> Thucydides himself

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which, logically speaking, is prior to another idea, as posterior to it" (Denniston 1954, 195).

<sup>114</sup>The word order has led some scholars to question to whom αὐτοῖ must refer. Cf. Richards (1914, 77). Considering the syntax at 1.80.1, of which the phrase at 6.13.1 is clearly an echo (ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν, 1.80.1; cf. Hunter 1973, 129), αὐτοῖ can only refer to the youth. Cornford, for his part, suggests that Thucydides' Nicias is quoting from Pindar's story of Coronis: ἀλλά τοι ἤρατο τῶν ἀπόντων· οἶα καὶ πολλοὶ πάθον (Cornford 1965, 206 with n. 1; citing Pind., *Pyth.* 3.20).

<sup>115</sup>Cf. de Romilly: "on le retrouve partout où il s'agit de désirs immodérés" (de Romilly 1951, 271; citing 1.40.1, 1.80.1, 4.17.4, 5.103.2, 6.34.7, 6.11.5, 6.13.1, 7.42.3). Huart, following his remark that the passive sense retained in πάσχω reflects the emotional state of the person(s) towards whom an action is taken, states: "du sens neutre originel du verbe, *subir en bien ou en mal*, on passe assez souvent au sens défavorable d'*éprouver un malheur*" (Huart 1968, 62). de Romilly had earlier remarked that πάσχω, in marking the presence of ὕβρις, signals "une exaltation qui vous prend mal à propos, pour vous duper," and alludes to "un accident que l'on subit, avant de désigner un sentiment que l'on éprouve" (de Romilly 1951, 271).

<sup>116</sup>Wilson does not distinguish between cause and effect when he states: "blending the theme of eros with that of pleonexia, Thucydides summarizes the emotions of the time" (Wilson 1990, 55).

<sup>117</sup>Cf. Dover: "these words [ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοῖ πάθοιεν] refer to δυσ-, and (as ἂν shows) are a warning not an imprecation" (Dover *HCT* iv, 238). LSJ (s.v. δυσ-) note that the prefix has the function of "destroying the good sense of a word, or increasing its bad sense: hence, joined even to words expressing negation." Interestingly, Plutarch also refers to the project of conquering Sicily as a δύσερως ἔρως: πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ Σικελίας ὁ δύσερως ἐκεῖνος ἤδη καὶ δύσποτος ἔρως εἶχεν, *Per.* 20.3. See also Huart: "Nicias définit par ce mot [δύσερως] à la fois la *passion* des Athéniens..., et ses dangers" (Huart 1968, 392). There appear to be only two other instances of δύσερως in fifth-century literature, one in Eur. (*Hipp.* 194-197), the other in Lysias (4.8).

<sup>118</sup>Cf. Spratt on the double intensification of the superlative: "δὴ emphasises μέγιστον, ὡς marking conviction or assurance" (Spratt 1912, 150). Both Graves and Spratt contend that ἀναρριπεῖν signals a gambling expression (Spratt 1912, 150; Graves 1958, 245; cf. Edmunds 1975b, 121 and Parry 1981, 197). If so, it accentuates the irresponsibility of behaviour that Nicias' is trying to expose. The notion that the influence of ὄργη leads to risk-taking is not one new to the *History*. Cf. Diodotus' speech, where the remarks on the inefficiency of the death-

substantiates Nicias' analysis in his postscript, claiming ἔρωσ to be responsible for Athens' total subordination of reason (καὶ ἔρωσ ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλευσαι, 6.24.3);<sup>119</sup> so intense was the Athenian ἐπιθυμία that anyone of a different mind kept silent lest he might appear unpatriotic: ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴ τῳ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιῶς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, 6.24.4. As Bloedow observes, "in view of Thucydides' use of γνώμη and σωφροσύνη and πρόνοια, nothing could constitute a greater indictment of the decision to embark on this enterprise than his use of the term ἔρωσ."<sup>120</sup> And Thucydides' choice of the verb ἐμπίπτω to describe the force with which ἔρωσ falls upon, or, perhaps more appropriately, takes residency in, the Athenians, heightens the dramatic element.<sup>121</sup> The text invites comparison with Clytemnestra's words to the chorus in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (ἔρωσ δὲ μή τις πρότερον ἐμπίπτῃ στρατῷ/πορθεῖν ἄ μὴ χρή, κέρδεσιν νικωμένους, 340-341);<sup>122</sup> and Achilles' description of the army's impatience

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penalty also underline the role ἐλπίς plays in the contaminated resolution (τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσιν, 3.45.1), and, ironically, the Athenians' warnings to the Melians on the dangers of ἐλπίς (τοῖς δὲ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτούσι, 5.103). The concept of risk is associated with ἔρωσ also in Isocrates (*Ep.* 7.7).

<sup>119</sup>Cf. Stahl (1973, 73), Rawlings (1981, 74), Forde (1989, 32) and Bloedow (1990, 16-17; 1991b, 204; 1992, 145-146). Moreover, as Bloedow demonstrates, Thucydides' presentation of the debate at Syracuse (6.32.3-6.41) confirms, in retrospect, the lack of γνώμη in the Athenian decision (Bloedow 1992, 146 n. 20).

<sup>120</sup>Bloedow (1991b, 204). Cf. Huart: "nous retrouvons le terme [ἔρωσ] dans le chapitre 24 du livre VI, pour qualifier «la fureur de s'embarquer» qui «s'abat (comme une épidémie) sur la ville entière»" (Huart 1968, 391).

<sup>121</sup>Fraënkell, in his commentary on Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, stresses the importance of the verb, noting that ἐμπίπτειν "expresses the overmastering force with which covetousness seizes upon men" (Fraënkell 1950 ii, 176; citing Aes. A. 1175, 1468 and S. *Ant.* 782 in addition to Thuc. 6.24.).

This is not the only instance in which Thucydides uses ἐμπίπτω of an external force. Cf. 2.48.2 ([ἡ νόσος] ἐξαπιναιῶς ἐνέπεσε), 2.53.4 (ἦν [τιμωρίαν θεῶν] πρὶν ἐμπεσεῖν), 2.61.2 (μεταβολῆς μεγάλης ... ἐμπεσοῦσης), 2.91.4 (φόβος ἐμπίπτει), 4.4.1 (ὄρμη ἐνέπεσε), 4.28.5 (ἐνέπεσε ... τι καὶ γέλωτος), 4.34.2 (ἐκπληξίς τε ἐνέπεσεν) and 7.80.3 (ἐμπίπτει ταραχή).

<sup>122</sup>Cf. Cornford: "must not Thucydides have intended this dark allusion which so terribly fits the sequel? -- 'Of the many who went few returned home again. Thus ended what happened concerning Sicily' [7.87.6]" (Cornford 1965, 214-215). Connor contends that "the echo of Aeschylus reminds the reader of the underlying mythic pattern and the traditional expectation of disaster for those who travel overseas after excessive violence" (Connor 1984,

with the delays prior to sailing for Troy in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis* (οὐτω δεινός ἐμπέπτωκ' ἔρωσ / τῆσδε στρατείας Ἑλλάδ' οὐκ ἄνευ θεῶν, 808-809).<sup>123</sup>

In Westlake's view, "from the point at which Thucydides begins his account of the Athenian Expedition to Sicily he gives much attention to the personality of Nicias, doubtless because of its influence upon the outcome."<sup>124</sup> The text, however, suggests otherwise. The historian's presentation of the debate contemplates the lack of influence Nicias holds over the *demos*, and, furthermore, highlights Athens' failure to refrain from her ἐπιθυμία far more than it does Nicias' inability to reapply γνώμη to the Athenian process of resolution.<sup>125</sup> Nicias' failure exposes in itself the extent to which emotional impulse has come to dictate the Athenian resolutions, through the implicit comparison the historian strikes between Diodotus and Nicias and the contrasting outcomes of their individual debates.<sup>126</sup> The former, a virtual 'unknown' in the *History*, succeeded in bringing the *demos* back to a point of rationality with a single speech, whereas Nicias, who had previously spent a number of years in the forefront of Athenian politics, fails on not one, but two counts. The fact that the Athenians had not, in this instance, come together for the purpose of reconsidering their resolution, as they had done in the case of the Mytilenaeen debate, sharpens the contrast further and underlines the extent to which ὄργη has come to control their

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168). This would be consistent with Macleod, who finds the language of battle and victory within Clytemnestra's altercation with Agamemnon (Aes. A. 940-3, 956; cf. 1236f) "comparable as a whole to the Melian Dialogue, in so far as there too a victory in words prefigures the victory of force" (Macleod 1983a, 57).

<sup>123</sup>Dover (*HCT* iv, 262) points to an equally important passage in Isocrates' tenth oration, where an ἔρωσ for the expedition to Troy has come over not only the Greeks and the barbarians, but even the gods: τοσοῦτος δ' ἔρωσ ἐνέπεσεν τῶν πόνων καὶ τῆς στρατείας ἐκείνης οὐ μόνον τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς..., 10.52. It is interesting to note that of all the verbs associated with ἔρωσ in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Herodotus and Aristophanes, ἐμπίπτειν and πίπτειν occur most often.

<sup>124</sup>Westlake (1968, 171).

<sup>125</sup>Cf. de Romilly (1951, 273); Stahl: "the reader quickly realizes that Thucydides himself favors the views of Nicias, whom the Athenians did *not* follow" (Stahl 1973, 65); and Forde: "the Athenians' approval of Alcibiades involves the rejection of Nicias' counsel in equal measure" (Forde 1989, 16).

<sup>126</sup>Cf. Connor (1984, 162 n. 11) and Ellis (1989, 55).

γνώμαι.<sup>127</sup>

Moreover, nowhere does Thucydides imply that the statesman "misjudged completely the temper of the assembly."<sup>128</sup> On the contrary, within the historian's presentation of the debate, Nicias, as Bloedow well observes, "represents the rational, whereas Alcibiades the irrational."<sup>129</sup> The historian reinforces the statesman's arguments against ἐπιθυμία and ἔρως with vivid references to the *demos*' disposition in his preambles and postscript. The lack of response to Nicias' first speech is in sharp contrast to the highly charged reaction following his opponent's only attempt:<sup>130</sup> Thucydides emphatically states that the Athenians, after hearing Alcibiades, were far more eager to make the expedition (πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὤρμηντο

<sup>127</sup>See 3.37.3, 6.8.3 and above n. 105. Cf. Connor: "Thucydides' selection of the second debate on the subject [of the Sicilian Expedition] brackets this scene with the reconsideration of the decision about Mytilene. There second thoughts prove better; here the renewed deliberation simply compounds the initial difficulties" (Connor 1984, 162 n. 11). Moreover, along with the Melian dialogue, the debate on the Sicilian expedition does not entail the issue of morality, as was the case in the Mytilenaeon debate.

<sup>128</sup>Westlake (1968, 172). The general tendency of the narrative throughout the presentation of the debate promotes a more positive impression of Nicias than Westlake seems prepared to recognize (Westlake 1973, 105-107; cf. Palmer 1982a, 119). Strauss, observing the unique introduction provided Nicias by the historian ("only after having shown us Nicias in such a large number of deeds of so great a variety does Thucydides let us hear a speech"), suggests that this is due to Nicias' unique importance to the *History*: "he is the representative *par excellence* of moderation in the city of daring" (Strauss 1964, 202 with n. 68; cf. Forde 1989, 16). While there is no question that Thucydides points to an element of self-interest (as a secondary motivation) regarding the statesman's second speech (cf. 6.19.2 and 6.24.1), the reader is compelled to appreciate the challenge even Nicias knew he had before him (καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενῆς ἄν μου ὁ λόγος, 6.9.3). As Connor observes, like Pericles he must urge inactivity on a people whose disposition is restless and active, and it was impossible for him to prevent a meeting of the Athenians, as Pericles had done in similar circumstances at 2.21.2-2.22.1 (Connor 1984, 162 with n. 13; cf. Chapter 1 pp. 18-20 and n. 55). Cf. Farrar (1988, 173), Bloedow (1990, 15 n. 38) and above n. 91.

<sup>129</sup>Bloedow (1991b, 215). Bloedow also points to Nicias' critical use of the phrase εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν at 6.11. The phrase appears in the speeches of three other individuals whose sensible role it is to champion γνώμη over ὀργή, namely Archidamus (1.80.2, 1.84.1, 1.84.3 and 1.86.2), Diodotus (3.44.1) and Hermocrates (4.60.1 and 4.61.1) (Bloedow 1990, 14-16). See also the Corinthians' speech at Athens (1.40.2). North's studies on σωφροσύνη have led her to note that "Thucydides regards sophrosyne as the control of the irrational" (North 1966, 114). Cf. Gomme (*HCT* i, 248) and Wilson (1990).

<sup>130</sup>Cf. Bloedow (1973, 9 with n. 36; citing Beloch *Die att. Politik* 1884, 58-59).

στρατεύειν, 6.19.1),<sup>131</sup> before reintroducing Nicias, whose attempts to deter them are equally underscored (καὶ ὁ Νικίας γνοὺς ὅτι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀποτρέψειε, παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, ξτὰχ' ἂν μεταστήσειέ αὐτούς, 6.19.2). And the same holds true following Nicias' second speech -- his failure to dissuade the *demos* from its resolution merely illuminates the Athenian disposition (οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦ οὐκ ἐξηρέθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀχλώδους τῆς παρασκευῆς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμητο, καὶ τούναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ, 6.24.2).<sup>132</sup> Accordingly, the reaction of the *demos* to Nicias' final attempt reveals the extent to which the Athenian indulgence of ὀργή has led to a total subordination of γνώμη. Thucydides' narrative suggests that, under the spell of ἔρωσ, the Athenians succeeded in distorting Nicias' words to suit their ἐπιθυμίας: εὖ τε γὰρ παραινέσαι ἔδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δὴ καὶ πολλὴ ἔσεσθαι, 6.24.2.<sup>133</sup> His aim had never been to advise them, only to deter

<sup>131</sup>The impression is strengthened further through Nicias' own perspective (ὄρω ὑμᾶς ... ὥρμημένους στρατεύειν, 6.20.1). Cf. 6.6.1, where Thucydides employs ὀρμᾶσθαι to describe the Athenians' mood prior to the debate (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ὥρμητο), and again the confirmation through Nicias at 6.9.3 (οὔτε ῥάδιά ἐστι κατασχεῖν ἐφ' ᾧ ὥρμησθε).

Huart observes that, in the *History*, ὀρμᾶσθαι in the perfect passive carries a psychological sense (Huart 1968, 415-416 n. 5, citing 3.92.4, 4.29.2, 5.1.1, 6.19.1, 6.20.1, 6.24.2 and 7.21.5). He also points to a significant use of ὀρμή in the preamble to the Mytilenaeen debate (καὶ προσξυνελάβοντο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὀρμῆς αἱ Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐς Ἴωνίαν ἐκείνοις βοηθοὶ τολμήσασαι παρακινδυνεύσαι, 3.36.2), regarding which he states: "il signifie *impulsion violente*, avec une valeur pas tellement différente de ὀργή au début du même paragraphe (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτείναι...)" (*ibid.*, 415-416 n. 5). Cf. Shorey: "Thucydides usually employs the weaker synonym of ὀρμή, reserving the tragic intensity of ἔρωσ for the fatal passion of Athens for the expedition against Sicily" (Shorey 1893, 71). This does not seem likely, as the historian clearly uses ὀρμᾶσθαι in the context of the Sicilian expedition. It would be more legitimate to argue that ὀρμᾶσθαι and its corresponding noun, ὀρμή place more emphasis on the pure emotional state than on the motivation for that state. Cf. Chapter 1 n. 56.

<sup>132</sup>Cf. Bloedow, who draws attention to the impression left by Thucydides' presentation of the debate: "not only does Nicias make two speeches, whereas Alcibiades makes only one, but Nicias also has the advantage of the last word. That is why the reaction to his second speech (VI 20.1-23.4) is so remarkable" (Bloedow 1992, 146). As Stahl earlier remarked: "[Thucydides] measures the Athenian failure by the bushel of Nicias' speech" (Stahl 1973, 75).

<sup>133</sup>Cf. 4.108.4, where the historian considers the distortion of reason a consequence of ἐπιθυμία. See above p. 76 and Hunter (1973, 142). Moreover, Thucydides' explanation concerning the motivation of the πρεσβύτεροι reveals their distortion of the πρόνοια concept; impassioned, they figured they would have nothing to lose ([ἔρωσ ἐνέπεσε] τοῖς μὲν γὰρ

them by highlighting the magnitude of the Expedition (6.19.2; 6.24.1).<sup>134</sup> What is more, in light of the *πρεσβύτεροι-νεώτεροι* opposition emphasized throughout the debate, and, more specifically, Nicias' call to his contemporaries to exercise the *σωφροσύνη* their experience could only recommend, the fact that all the Athenians, both young and old, were possessed with *ἔρως* (6.24.3) only highlights the degree to which the Athenian decision was irrational.<sup>135</sup>

Palmer insists that "Thucydides' presentation makes it clear that Alcibiades' presence in the city was not the cause of the Athenians' ambitions in Sicily."<sup>136</sup> True, he himself is not the cause, but the historian's treatment certainly calls attention to the part he plays in encouraging the expedition.<sup>137</sup> Alcibiades' speech not only confirms the previous characterizations of both Nicias and Thucydides; it ultimately confirms Diodotus' predictions on the threatening influence of *ὄργη*. Thucydides' Alcibiades appears a prime example of what the speaker had warned the Athenians against in the Mytilenaeon debate, when *ὄργη* subordinates *γνώμη* entirely: once a violent passion sets in, compelling one to undertake a particular endeavour, nothing can deter human nature from its resolution (*ἀπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἴεται τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὀρμωμένης προθύμως τι πράξαι*

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*πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἡ καταστρεψομένοις ἐφ' ᾧ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν, 6.24.3). Cf. Forde (1989, 149 n. 34).*

<sup>134</sup>See Bloedow: "Nicias' arguments in both his speeches should have prompted any sober-minded, rational individual to oppose the expedition" (Bloedow 1990, 16). Cf. *ibid.* (1991c 22 with n. 16; 1992, 146) and Orwin (1994, 120). Cf. above n. 129.

<sup>135</sup>Bloedow (1990, 16 n. 40). Cf. above n. 133.

<sup>136</sup>Palmer (1982a, 122). Cf. de Romilly, who, citing the parallel use of *ἐνῆγε* for Cleon (4.21.3) and Alcibiades (6.15.2), states: "comme c'était le cas, précédemment, pour Cléon, Alcibiade ne fait qu'entraîner le peuple dans le sens où le mène son désir" (de Romilly 1951, 174 with n. 3). Connor adds that these are the only instances in the *History* where this form of the verb occurs (Connor 1984, 164; cf. de Romilly 1977, 91 n. 11, where she cites 2.21.3, 4.24.1 and 7.18.1, as other instances where *ἐνάγειν* is used to signal irrational wish). See below with n. 160.

<sup>137</sup>Cf. Gomme (1951, 74), Brunt (1952, 65 and 96), Westlake (1968, 220), and Bloedow (1992, 147).

ἀποτροπήν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλω τῷ δεινῷ, 3.45.7). And indeed, Alcibiades follows Cleon in exercising the negative *ξύνεσις* to succeed in justifying his position.<sup>138</sup>

Through his treatment of Cleon, Thucydides effectively demonstrated the extent to which *ὀργή* could compel one to acts of *πλεονεξία*, through an opposition to what is *ξύνεσις*; his portrayal of Alcibiades takes his *ὀργή-γνώμη* antithesis further by illustrating how *ἔρως* drives the Athenian to *ἐπιθυμία* thanks to a relative inversion, namely that of *πρόνοια*. Rather than defend himself against Nicias' implicit charge that by indulging his *ἐπιθυμῖαι* he is clearly incapable of exercising *πρόνοια*,<sup>139</sup> Alcibiades boldly attacks the virtue itself. To justify his *παρανομία*, his indulgence of *ἐπιθυμία*,<sup>140</sup> Thucydides' Alcibiades essentially demonstrates his own irrationality, by going so far as to advocate lack of reason. He never denies that he is prone to acts of *ἄνοια*.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>138</sup>As he did in the earlier episode reported by Thucydides (cf. above p. 68). Alcibiades cannot be considered any more *ξυνητός* than was Cleon, if only on the ground that his powers of reasoning are determined by his *ἐπιθυμία*. Westlake would like to include Alcibiades among those the historian credits with *ξύνεσις* (Westlake 1971, 324 with n.2), but as Bloedow demonstrates, Alcibiades can only be considered in connection with the negative *ξύνεσις*. His inability to apply *γνώμη*, "the active expression of [the positive] *ξύνεσις*" (Bloedow 1991b, 214), to his process of resolution results in the indulgence of his *ἐπιθυμία*, which leads to the negative *ξύνεσις*, "which works against the needs and best interest of the *polis*" (*ibid.*, 203). For a more detailed discussion, see Bloedow (1991b; 1992).

<sup>139</sup>Both de Romilly and Bloedow recognize that Nicias' argument against *ἔρως* is implied, when he offsets the dangers of *ἐπιθυμία* against the virtues of *πρόνοια* (de Romilly 1951, 176 and 277; Bloedow 1991b, 203-204). Cf. Huart (1968, 351).

<sup>140</sup>Cf. Bloedow (1990, 5-6). The term *παρανομία*, in the *History*, though clearly encouraged by acts of *πλεονεξία* (3.82.6), appears to denote precisely that behaviour which results from the indulgence of one's *ἐπιθυμῖαι*. Cf. above n. 85.

<sup>141</sup>Dover follows Richards to take up a different position. Considering Nicias' use of the word *ἀνόητος* a "highly general reference about extension of empire," he does not see, in Nicias' speech, any accusation of 'folly' brought against Alcibiades, and states: "no doubt there was at times a slight discrepancy between what Thucydides had actually written and what he thought he had written" (Dover 1965, 26 and *HCT* iv 247; cf. Richards 1914, 77). It stands to reason, however, that if Nicias' characterization of Alcibiades serves to illustrate the statesman's point on the dangers of indulging one's *ἐπιθυμία* (and this would seem the case, given, in particular, the *νεώτεροι-ἀπειρία/πρεσβύτεροι-ἐμπειρία* opposition), then any arguments against *ἐπιθυμία* and *ἔρως* are as applicable to Alcibiades as they are to the general Athenian disposition. Moreover, outside of Alcibiades' positive use of the term *ἄνοια*, it figures only in its primary negative sense through the mouths of Pericles (2.61.1), Diodotus

On the contrary, he claims that his is no useless folly (οὐκ ἄχρηστος ἤδ' ἡ ἄνοια, 6.16.3); it had, along with his youth, clinched the successful negotiations with Sparta (ἡ ... ἄνοια παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι, 6.17.1).<sup>142</sup> As Macleod remarks, "what was originally presented as a polemical and sarcastic echo of Nicias' accusations, is now seriously represented as something to rely on."<sup>143</sup>

But Alcibiades does not stop at his distortion of πρόνοια. His ἄνοια leads him to distort those very dangers which Diodotus had cautioned the Athenians accompany ἔρωσ. Cleon's opponent had forewarned the Athenians that the influence of ὄργη would promote a climate conducive to ἐλπίς and ἔρωσ, which in turn would lead human nature to attempt control over τύχη;<sup>144</sup> only the application of γνώμη could help resist such temptation.<sup>145</sup>

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(3.42.1; 3.48.2) and the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue (5.111.4), all of whom act as the voice of reason. Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*), Spratt (1912, 158), Huart (1968, 238 n. 2), Macleod (1983b, 76-77; 84-85), Forde (1989, 86-87) and above n. 91.

On a related note, Bloedow establishes that Alcibiades was even lacking πρόνοια in the one episode where Thucydides suggests he finally did service to Athens (καὶ δοκεῖ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτον τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔλασσον τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι, 8.86.4) (Bloedow 1991b, 210-11; 216).

<sup>142</sup>The distortion of fact is evident in Alcibiades' words, due, for the most part, to the emphasis placed on Alcibiades' character throughout the initial introductory episode. The issue of youth had conveniently served Alcibiades' purpose when he opposed the Spartans. Cf. above pp. 61-62. Moreover, Dover notes: "ignoring the fact that Argos, the major power concerned, had not been an ally of Sparta, Alcibiades represents himself as negotiating successfully with 'the area controlled by Sparta and her allies [Πελοποννησίων]'" (Dover *HCT* iv, 249). See also 6.89.6, where Alcibiades refers to his ἄνοια as one confessed (ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας).

<sup>143</sup>Macleod (1983b, 76). Alcibiades' virtuous use of ὄργη in the same phrase (καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἐμὴ νεότης καὶ ἄνοια παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι ἐς τὴν Πελοποννησίων δύναμιν λόγοις τε πρέπουσιν ὠμίλησε καὶ ὄργη πίστιν παρασχομένη ἐπεισεν, 6.17.1) leaves no doubt that any sarcasm has turned into dramatic irony: Alcibiades' ἄνοια is seemingly παρὰ φύσιν only to those still capable of reason -- Nicias, Thucydides, and the reader. Cf. Forde (1989, 86 and 188). Dover, who it appears would disagree, interprets the phrase differently: "the arguments (λόγοις) were what the occasion required, but it was the sincerity underlying them (ὄργη) which achieved conviction" (Dover 1965, 27).

Macleod also suggests "τὸ πᾶν ἀκριβές [at 18.6] could be an attempt to discredit Nicias' πρόνοια; it would then carry the unfavourable connotation of 'pedantry' and would genuinely supply an opposite extreme to τὸ φαῦλον" (Macleod 1983b, 85).

<sup>144</sup>Cf. 3.45.1 (τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαϊρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσι) and Nicias' reproach at 6.11.6 (χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι). See Chapter 2 n. 72 on ἐπαίρεσθαι.

<sup>145</sup>Cf. Shorey: "when ὄρμη hath fallen upon or ἔρωσ taken possession of the soul, ἐλπίς enters in to heighten confidence and blind to the risk of failure" (Shorey 1893, 71). Human nature cannot hope to control τύχη, but it can intervene and prevent ἐλπίς and ἔρωσ from taking

Alcibiades, to incite the Athenians to follow through on their resolution, 'exploits their irrationality.'<sup>146</sup> He amplifies their hopes with his optimistic assessments of situations both domestic and abroad (6.17.2-8) and exaggerates their desires with future scenarios most certain to pass (6.18.4).<sup>147</sup> And he deals with the issue of *τύχη* as he did that of *πρόνοια*. Rather than address Nicias' charge that he is reaching for things unseen (*τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων*, 6.9.3; *τῶν ἀπόντων*, 6.13.1), Alcibiades inverts even the traditional concept of *τύχη*. Playing on his opponent's reputation, he suggests to the Athenians that they have everything they need, his own youthful *ἄνοια* and Nicias' good luck (*ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχῆς δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀποχρήσασθε τῇ ἑκατέρου ἡμῶν ὠφελίᾳ*, 6.17.1).<sup>148</sup> Stahl recognizes the ultimate inversion: "when the unfounded view, that of Alcibiades prevails, then the *unreal* becomes *real*, because people are going to act out their hopes and desires, and the *real*, like the facts Nicias tells his audience, becomes, at least for some time *unreal*, because it is simply overlooked."<sup>149</sup>

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control with the application of *γνώμη*.

<sup>146</sup>Cf. Bloedow: "Alcibiades not only became the chief architect of an enterprise that was fundamentally misconceived, but he also in particular exploited the *irrational* disposition of his fellow-Athenians at that time" (Bloedow 1992, 147).

<sup>147</sup>For an outline of Alcibiades' speech, see Bloedow (1990, 5-12). As Hunter observes, "sharing as he does in the general *ἀπειρία*, he increases their ardour with misinformation" (Hunter 1973, 144). Alcibiades is not exempt from Thucydides' explanation of the motives compelling the *νεώτεροι* at 6.34.2; he too was *εὐέλπις*. Cf. above nn. 68, 100 and 109.

<sup>148</sup>Dover has noted that "Alcibiades' argument only makes sense if *εὐτυχία* is treated as an abiding characteristic, and that is logically irreconcilable with its treatment as pure chance" (Dover *HCT* iv, 249), but see Macleod, who states: "Alcibiades is exploiting an ambiguity in Greek notions which comes out in the fourth-century debate: it belongs to a man casually and/or intrinsically. Dover's note is, I suspect, too rigorously logical to do justice to the rhetoric of our passage; for rhetoric is, to a great extent, playing on contradictions or tensions in the audience's thinking" (Macleod 1983b, 77). Cf. Pericles' words at 2.61.1 and 2.62.4.

Cf. Bloedow, who recognizes in the debate a contrast between *τύχη-ἐπιθυμία* and *γνώμη-πρόνοια* (Bloedow, 1991b, 203-4; cf. de Romilly 1951, 175-176). Alcibiades' irrationality leads him to believe that he can control an external element not even subject to control by *πρόνοια* – thus the irrational implication that *ἔρως* surpasses even *γνώμη*.

<sup>149</sup>Stahl (1973, 72). As Cochrane remarks, Thucydides emphasizes that the Athenians allowed themselves to be deceived (Cochrane 1929, 130; citing 6.8 and 6.46), confirming that human nature gets carried away by success (cf., for example 4.17.4, 4.65.4 and 6.11.5). That the influence of *ὄργη* has led to a total reversal of Periclean priorities, *γνώμη-πρόνοια* vs *ὄργη-ἄνοια*, is most evident if we recall Pericles' words at 2.62.5: *καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας*

Parry's contention that the "central problem of the history is, How, and when, can man impose his *gnome* on things outside himself?" is reinforced through the ironic implications emerging from the Melian dialogue<sup>150</sup> Wassermann sees the irony in Nicias' desperate recourse to *τύχη* as he later hopes for a miracle "wrought by the gods" (7.61.3; 7.77.2.),<sup>151</sup> but a more tragic irony emerges in the debate on the Sicilian expedition. Outside the issues of piety,<sup>152</sup> the irony is played out on the Athenians' own precepts as far as concerns their attitude toward the Expedition -- at which point Nicias is still the voice of reason. As Stahl observes, "Nicias very much uses the same language which the Athenians use in the Melian dialogue, when they warn the Melians, while Alcibiades' speech has much in common with the irrational desires and hopes of the Melians."<sup>153</sup> Compare, for example, Nicias' statement of case with the Athenians' final address to the Melians:

καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενῆς ἄν μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, εἰ τὰ τε ὑπάρχοντα σώζειν παραινοίην καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐτοίμοις περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων κινδυνεύειν· ὡς δὲ οὔτε ἐν καιρῷ σπεύδετε οὔτε ῥάδιά ἐστι κατασχεῖν ἐφ' ᾧ ὤρμησθε, ταῦτα διδάξω (6.9.3).

ἀλλ' οὖν μόνοι γε ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν βουλευμάτων, ὡς ἡμῖν δοκεῖτε, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα τῶν ὀρωμένων σαφέστερα κρίνετε, τὰ δὲ ἀφανῆ τῷ βούλεσθαι ὡς γιγνόμενα ἤδη θεᾶσθε, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τύχη καὶ ἐλπίσι πλεῖστον δὴ παραβεβλημένοι καὶ πιστεύσαντες πλεῖστον καὶ σφαλῆσεσθε (5.113).

Both parties essentially point out the dangers of ἔρως, ἐλπίς and *τύχη* in a

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*τύχης* ἢ ξύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἦσσαν πιστεύει, ἥς ἐν τῷ ἀπὸρῳ ἢ ἰσχύς, γνώμη δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἥς βεβαιότερα ἢ πρόνοια. Cf. below n. 161, for the παρανομία inversion.

<sup>150</sup>The importance of the Melian dialogue to the *History* has not gone unnoticed. Cf. Wassermann: "the independence of Melos represents the last survival of polis autonomy in the Aegean, the core of the Attic empire, and her conquest by Athens in a way symbolizes the zenith and the turning point of Athenian ascendancy" (Wassermann 1947, 21) Cf. Bloedow (1991b, 212).

<sup>151</sup>Wassermann (1947, 30).

<sup>152</sup>Wassermann shows well that the conflict between the Melians and Athenians is essentially reflected in their attitude towards *τύχη* (Wassermann 1947, 29-30).

<sup>153</sup>Stahl (1973, 72). Cf. Pearson (1957, 238) and Edmunds (1975b, 121).

manner most consistent with Diodotus' warnings.<sup>154</sup> That theirs is the voice of reason is confirmed when the Athenians, like Nicias, urge their opponents to exercise σωφροσύνη,<sup>155</sup> implying that their inability to do so would reflect ἄνοια (αἰσχύνην αἰσχίω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ τύχη προσλαβεῖν, 5.111.3). The juxtaposition of the two episodes clearly underlines the irony.<sup>156</sup> Throughout the debate on the Expedition, the Athenians themselves are unable to apply γνώμη in the attempt to prevent the dangers of ἔρωσ, ἐλπίς and τύχη, as they had so matter-of-factly directed the Melians in the preceding Dialogue.

According to Macleod "[Thucydides' speeches] come at moments of decision and illustrate vividly and in detail those factors which influence the decision.... The speeches embody ... [motives] in argument and so directly present them at work."<sup>157</sup> Clearly this is the case here. Bloedow concludes, "as the outcome of the struggle in 431 turned on the confrontation between ὀργή and γνώμη, so in 415 it turned on a confrontation between ἐπιθυμία-ἔρωσ and ξύνεσις-γνώμη."<sup>158</sup> Thucydides' presentation of the debate on the Sicilian Expedition draws attention to this opposition, making the reader witness to

<sup>154</sup>See too, Diodotus' predictions at 3.45.5 and also the Athenians' elaborations on ἐλπίς at 5.103. Edmunds maintains: "Nicias' repetition of the metaphor from dicing [6.13.1; 5.103] seems to underline the fact that he is addressing a city that is subject to the same psychological forces which led to the defeat, destruction, and enslavement of the Melians" (Edmunds 1975b, 121). Cf. n. 118.

<sup>155</sup>Cf. 5.111.2: πολλήν τε ἀλογίαν τῆς διανοίας παρέχετε, εἰ μὴ μετασησάμενοι ἔτι ἡμᾶς ἄλλο τι τῶνδε σωφρονέστερον γνώσεσθε. The irony is reinvoiced in Hermocrates' speech at Camarina (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς τύχης τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοίως ταμίαν γενέσθαι, 6.78.2): "man cannot regulate fortune so that only what he desires occurs" (Dover *HCT* iv, 352).

<sup>156</sup>And all the more so, bearing in mind that Thucydides attributes none of the responsibility for the destruction of Melos to Alcibiades. For a range of views on the association between the episodes, see Jebb (1898, 290 with n. 2), Wassermann (1947, 18-36), Cornford (1965, 185 and 202), Liebeschuetz (1968a, 75-76), de Romilly (1951, 168; and 245; *Budé* iv, 173 n.1), Andrewes (1960, 2-3), Strauss (1964, 192-209), Stahl (1966, 160), Dover (*HCT* iv, 190-191), Bruell (1974, 14), Edmunds (1975b, 121), Ellis (1979, 55), Parry (1981, 194-199), Macleod (1983a, 58; 62-63), Connor (1984, 158), Farrar (1988, 150-151) and Orwin (1994, 118 with n. 2).

<sup>157</sup>Macleod (1983a, 52). On a similar note, Connor observes: "the significance of Alcibiades' speech lies not in the force of its arguments for action against Sicily, but in its understanding and illumination of Athenian character" (Connor 1984, 166). Cf. Wassermann (1947, 19) and Ste. Croix (1972, 297).

<sup>158</sup>Bloedow (1991b, 215).

the outcome. Much as Cleon embodied the *ὄργη* which so crucially influenced the Athenians during the course of the Mytilenaeon debate, Alcibiades embodies the *ἔρως* which so completely intoxicates them with regard to the Expedition;<sup>159</sup> so as to satisfy his own *ἐπιθυμία*, he incites the Athenians to follow their own,<sup>160</sup> and, in doing so, he leads Athenian imperialism to *παρανομία*.<sup>161</sup> Thucydides subtly maintains the Athenians' suspicions that Alcibiades was *τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι* through the Athenian's very embodiment of that all-ruling passion. *ἔρως* is the ultimate tyrant over one's *γνώμη*, and as its embodiment, Alcibiades becomes *τύραννος* himself.<sup>162</sup> Plutarch's description of *ἔρως* on Alcibiades' custom-built shield certainly reinforces the suggestion:

ἀσπίδος τε διαχρύσου ποίησιν οὐδὲν ἐπίσημον τῶν πατρίων ἔχουσιν,  
ἀλλ' Ἔρωτα κεραυνοφόρον....

(Plut., *Alc.* 16.2)

<sup>159</sup>Cf. Macleod: "the desire which seizes them (6.24.3) is correlative to the *ἡδονή* of Alcibiades' proposals" (Macleod 1983b, 79) and Bloedow (1991b, 215). Hunter takes a slightly different position when she states: "as the type of *ἐπιθυμία* he [Alcibiades] symbolizes their [the Athenians'] major passions, *ἔρως* and *ἔλπις* [*sic*]" (Hunter 1973, 144; cf. 180).

<sup>160</sup>As Bloedow notes: "at the time of the most crucial decision in the entire course of the War Nicias' call to *γνώμη* and *σωφροσύνη* was not sufficient to control the *ἐπιθυμία* of the Athenians, not least because the arch-representative of *ἐπιθυμία* projected them headlong on their irrational course" (Bloedow 1991b, 215).

<sup>161</sup>Note the Thebans' retort to the Plataeans at 3.65.2: οἱ γὰρ ἄγοντες παρανομοῦσι μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπομένων (cf. 3.55.4); and compare Pericles' words on *παρανομία* at 2.37.3: ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν.

<sup>162</sup>Connor remarks that "the association between tyranny and *eros* is strong in fifth-century literature (Connor 1984, 178 n. 53; citing Her. 6.62 [?], Eur. fr. 850 Nauck *TGrF*<sup>2</sup>, Plut. *Alc.* 16). Cf. Cornford, in his chapter heading 'Eros Tyrannus,' cites, in particular, Plato *Rep.* 573 (Cornford 1965, 201-220). Cf. Eur. (*HF* 63-66; *Rh.* 166) and Hdt. (1.96.4-5; 3.53.16-17; 5.32.9-10).

## Chapter 4

### Harmodius and Aristogeiton: a story told

Neatly sandwiched between the arrival in Sicily and the recall of Alcibiades, Thucydides' digression on the so-called 'tyrannicides,' Harmodius and Aristogeiton, completes his treatment of Athenian character insofar as the function of ἔρως and its role in Athenian politics is concerned. In light of the ὄργη-γνώμη antithesis which carries the reader through Thucydides' treatments of Athens' major leaders, from Pericles to Alcibiades, the total absence of γνώμη in the resolutions of Harmodius and Aristogeiton is most significant. ἔρως is the subject of the digression, which, in its extended context, illustrates the extent to which γνώμη becomes subordinate to ὄργη within contemporary Athens.

According to Palmer, "far from being an account of how noble and public-spirited self-sacrifice brought down a very bad regime, the true story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton is an account of how a very good regime came to ruin, undone by the most private of concerns -- eros."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the digression is not a historical romance meant to point out the virtues of desire; it is a tragedy illustrating the dangers of emotional impulse.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, as Forde observes, the digression "draws our attention not only because it deals with the crucial aspects of Athenian character, but because its subject turns out to be Athenian daring and Athenian eros both; it contains more references to eros in particular than are found in the entire remainder of the work."<sup>3</sup> Thucydides essentially demonstrates how the influence of ἔρως, the

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<sup>1</sup>Palmer (1982a, 109). Cf. Connor: "they [Harmodius and Aristogeiton] are not political reformers or liberators, but lovers, threatened by the intervention of a member of the Pisistratid house into their erotic relationship" (Connor 1984, 179).

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Forde: "the digression illustrates the excess and irrationality of Harmodius and Aristogeiton" (Forde 1989, 95).

<sup>3</sup>Forde (1989, 33-34).

total subordination of γνώμη, leads to the inversion of priorities (public *versus* private), and in consequence, to an inversion of the noble τόλμα. That the two protagonists are lovers intensifies the analogy, making the ἔρως theme most accessible to the reader.

In Connor's view, "the influence of *eros* provides the motivation for Harmodius and Aristogeiton's conspiracy."<sup>4</sup> This is clearly underlined through Thucydides' choice of vocabulary. Among the five references to ἔρως, only one directly establishes the setting to reflect the romantic love shared by Harmodius and Aristogeiton (ἔραστῆς, 6.54.2). The remaining four instances contemplate the role ἔρως plays in the control of circumstance (ἔρωτικὴν, 6.54.1; ἔρωτικῶς, 6.54.3; ἔρωτικῆς, 6.57.3; ἔρωτικὴν, 6.59.1). This is most evident in Thucydides' opening statement, where the lovers' τόλμημα is reportedly undertaken in consequence of an ἔρωτικὴ ξυντυχία: τὸ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ Ἀρμοδίου τόλμημα δι' ἔρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν ἐπεχειρήθη, 6.54.1. There is nothing in the text, apart from the romantic setting yet to come (6.54.2), to suggest that ἔρωτικὴ ξυντυχία is but a superficial reference to a 'love affair.'<sup>5</sup> On the contrary, the preposition δία clearly points to the motive governing the action;<sup>6</sup> the ξυντυχία is determined by ἔρως.<sup>7</sup>

The final reference to ἔρως helps confirm this view of the historian's purpose. In concluding his digression, Thucydides calls attention to the

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<sup>4</sup>Connor (1984, 178-179).

<sup>5</sup>In Diodotus' speech, ξυντυχία is used in connection with ὄργη to denote the various states brought about by ὄργη: αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὄργη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ' ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους, 3.45.4. Cf. Cornford (1965, 220-221), Marchant (1952, 161), Saar (1953, 80) and Edmunds (1975b, 199).

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Smyth, who notes that δία with the genitive expresses *means*, while δία with the accusative points to *motive* (Smyth 1956, 371 n. 1679).

<sup>7</sup>Edmunds considers the digression to reveal "Thucydides' understanding of tyche as originating in the passions or as decisive mainly in its effect on the passions" (Edmunds 1975b, 194). Such an interpretation does not coincide with Diodotus' words at 3.45.6, where τύχη does not appear as a result of ἔρως, it accompanies ἐλπίς and ἔρως to form a triangle deadly to human nature: καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον συμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν. Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*), Spratt (1905, 181), Marchand (1952, 161) and Chapter 2 p. 52.

predominant role of ἔρωσ in the plot to overthrow the tyranny, and highlights the influence ἔρωσ holds over the protagonists' dispositions:

τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ δι' ἐρωτικὴν λύπην ἢ τε ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ἡ ἀλόγιστος τόλμα ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα περιδεοῦς Ἄρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἄριστογοίτονι ἐγένετο (6.59.1).

Thucydides again observes the role of ἔρωσ through the *διά* of motive (δι' ἐρωτικὴν λύπην), but, on this occasion, he amplifies the impression with his particular emphasis on the origin of the plot (ἢ τε ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, ἐγένετο). His implicit analysis calls to mind Diodotus' forecast of the dangers of ὄργη: the Athenian speaker clearly gave ἔρωσ the leading role (ὁ μὲν ἠγούμενος) over ἐλπίς and τύχη, holding it responsible for the careful devising of plots (ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλήν ἐκφροντίζων, 3.45.5).<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the far-reaching influence of ἔρωσ is initially implied through the verbal variation on δι' ἐρωτικὴν *ξυντυχίαν*, δι' ἐρωτικὴν *λύπην*,<sup>9</sup> and Thucydides highlights it further by drawing his readers' attention to the extent to which Harmodius and Aristogiton were moved by the momentary ὄργη which possessed them. Their act of daring had been born from an impulsive reaction (ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα περιδεοῦς),<sup>10</sup> and so what the two protagonists reportedly considered to be τόλμα (cf. 6.56.3) was truly ἀλόγιστος τόλμα, precisely because ὄργη had come to dominate γνώμη entirely.

<sup>8</sup>In my opinion, Thucydides' use of ἐπιβουλή in this chapter upholds the reading of ἐπιβουλήν at 3.45.5, opposed to the variant reading, ἐπιβολήν. Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*), in addition to Weil and de Romilly (*Budé* iii, 32).

<sup>9</sup>Huart notes that in the *History* λύπη-λυπεῖν express personal vexation, yet he considers this instance at 6.59.1 an exception to the rule: "le seul exemple où λύπη marque l'hostilité se lit en VI, 59, 1; Thucydide explique par une *blessure d'amour*, δι' ἐρωτικὴν λύπην, le complot d'Harmodios et Aristogiton" (Huart 1968, 100). It is far easier, however, to interpret λύπη in its customary sense, if we regard the personal vexation as one brought about by ἔρωσ. Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*).

<sup>10</sup>Huart observes that the addition of prefixes to δέιδειν and its derivatives renders the abstract speculation expressed affective: "ces préfixes [ἐκ-, κατα-, περι-, ὑπερ-], à cause du sens concret qu'ils gardent toujours quelque peu, auront pour effet de colorer d'une nuance affective une spéculation abstraite, qui perd alors, en tout ou en partie, sa valeur d'opération intellectuelle" (Huart 1968, 139). See below n. 12 on the influence of the prefix περι- in the compound περιαλαγεῖν.

The two remaining instances (6.54.3 and 6.57.3) illustrate the irrationality provoked by ἔρωσ with vivid expression. The pitch of emotion which takes place in Aristogeiton, once he has been informed of Hipparchus' attempts on Harmodius, is precisely what leads him to the excessive and impulsive resolution to overthrow the tyranny:

ὁ δὲ ἔρωτικῶς περιαληγῆσας καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὴν Ἰππάρχου δύναμιν μὴ βία  
προσαγάγηται αὐτόν, ἐπιβουλεύει εὐθύς ὥς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης  
ἀξιώσεως κατάλυσιν τῆ τυραννίδι (6.54.3).

There is no reason why the adverb ἔρωτικῶς must govern only περιαληγῆσας;<sup>11</sup> the adverb points directly to the motive behind both Aristogeiton's pain and his fear, which, in turn, perpetuate his irrational resolution.<sup>12</sup> The impulsive behaviour is reinforced through εὐθύς and the excessive nature of the plot brought to the fore with the expression ὥς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀξιώσεως. Ironically, the restrictive ὥς emphasizes at the same time that Aristogeiton, previously defined as a μέσος πολίτης (6.54.2), would go to any length within his reach to accomplish his resolution.

It is in our last instance that Thucydides fully underlines the extent to which emotional impulse governs Harmodius and Aristogeiton's dispositions. Their plans go awry when, upon seeing a fellow-conspirator conversing with Hippias, they jump to the conclusion that they are being betrayed:<sup>13</sup>

τὸν λυπήσαντα οὖν σφᾶς καὶ δι' ὄνπερ πάντα ἐκινδύνευον ἐβούλοντο  
πρότερον, εἰ δύναιτο, προτιμωρήσασθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ εἶχον ὥρμησαν ἔσω

<sup>11</sup>As some scholars appear to interpret the text. Cf. Spratt (1905, 246), Bodin and de Romilly (*Budé* v, 40), as well as Dover (1965, 62).

<sup>12</sup>Huart observes, "l'idée de superlatif contenue dans le préfixe περι- nous mène à la notion de quelque chose d'insupportable" (Huart 1968, 66).

<sup>13</sup>Thucydides emphasizes, at 6.57.2, that his protagonists had essentially 'jumped the gun' with an aside to the effect that Hippias was πᾶσιν εὐπρόσοδος. Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*) and Spratt (1905, 254), who remark on the rare personal use of the adjective εὐπρόσοδος. If indeed the expression were striking to the reader, then Thucydides' point would be highlighted all the more.

τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ περιέτυχον τῷ Ἰππάρχῳ παρὰ τὸ Λεωκόρειον  
καλούμενον, καὶ εὐθύς ἀπερισκέπτως προσπεσόντες καὶ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα  
δι' ὄργῆς ὁ μὲν ἐρωτικῆς, ὁ δὲ ὑβρισμένος, ἔτυπτον καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν  
αὐτόν (6.57.3).

Once more, the historian illustrates the excessive and impulsive nature which emerges when ὄργῆ prevails over γνώμη.<sup>14</sup> Overwhelmed by the ὄργῆ which possesses them at the moment, Aristogeiton (ὁ μὲν ἐρωτικῆς) and Harmodius (ὁ δὲ ὑβρισμένος) rush as they are (ὥσπερ εἶχον), and immediately (εὐθύς) fall upon Hipparchus.<sup>15</sup> Thucydides' use of the adverb ἀπερισκέπτως leaves no doubt that "the assassination is an act for which Thucydides has not the slightest admiration."<sup>16</sup> As Huart observes, "le terme s'applique aux conjurés qui, se croyant découverts, se jettent sur Hipparche, *sans réfléchir*, acte inconsidéré expliqué par l'ὄργῆ."<sup>17</sup> And indeed, the lovers' lack of γνώμη is highlighted in Thucydides' striking description of their attack on Hipparchus: they act as one would when most under the influence of ὄργῆ (ὡς ἂν μάλιστα δι' ὄργῆς), beating him repeatedly to the point of death (ἔτυπτον καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν αὐτόν). Dover explains that the historical present is "especially frequent with words denoting violence and death," in which case, Thucydides' deliberate use of the imperfect of repeated action reinforces his dramatic illustration.<sup>18</sup>

It has been previously observed that Thucydides' digression on Harmodius and Aristogeiton is reminiscent of Diodotus' forecast of the dangers of ὄργῆ. But it is not only with regard to ἔρωτος. Upon closer

<sup>14</sup>The connective οὖν effectively points to the sequence of thought (cf. Denniston 1954, 425-426).

<sup>15</sup>Cf. Classen-Steup: "wovon bei dem Arist. der Grund durch das Adj. ἐρωτικῆς, bei dem Harm. im Part. ὑβρισμένος ausgedrückt wird" (Classen-Steup, *ad loc.*) and Palmer (1982a, 108).

<sup>16</sup>Edmunds (1975a, 75).

<sup>17</sup>Huart (1968, 195; cf. 161). Cf 4.10.1 and 4.108.4, where ἀπερίσκεπτος is applied to ἐλπίς, with Chapter 3 n. 69.

<sup>18</sup>Dover (1965, 66). Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*), Spratt (1905, 255) in addition to Goodwin and Gulick (1930, 268 n. 1253).

examination, the lovers are also subject to the dangers said to accompany ἔρωσ by the speaker in the Mytilenaeon debate: Diodotus pointed to ἐλπίς and τύχη, claiming that the former, in following the lead of ἔρωσ (ἢ δ' ἐφεπομένη), would encourage the assumption of facility (ἢ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα, 3.45.5), while the latter induces men (ζυμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν) to take risks even with insufficient means (καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, 3.45.6). As Palmer remarks, the lovers' 'hope' (ἠλπίζον, 6.56.3) that others would rise up spontaneously with a view to their own freedom (ἐβελήσειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνελευθεροῦν) "does not appear to have been well-founded."<sup>19</sup> Indeed, Thucydides' text implies otherwise. Not only does the historian underline the folly of their hopes with an ironic emphasis on the few conspirators involved (εἶ καὶ ὀποσοιοῦν τολμήσειαν),<sup>20</sup> Harmodius and Aristogeiton essentially hope that the Athenians will respond in a frame of mind similar to their own (ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα; cf. 6.59.1).<sup>21</sup> In light of Thucydides' determined effort to establish the mild nature of the tyranny (6.54.5-7),<sup>22</sup> such an expectation would certainly defy logic. The element of risk is more directly emphasized when the lovers' vengeful passion is most manifest: though their attempt to overthrow the tyranny is aborted, Harmodius and Aristogeiton wish nonetheless to take vengeance upon Hipparchus, on account of whom they were risking everything (δι' ὄνπερ πάντα ἐκινδύνευον, 6.57.3).<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Palmer (1982a, 108).

<sup>20</sup>Cf. Classen-Steup (*ad loc.*), Spratt (1905, 253) and Denniston (1954, 422).

<sup>21</sup>Cf. Classen-Steup: "– ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα, ohne lange Überlegung und Vorbereitung" (Classen-Steup, *ad loc.*).

<sup>22</sup>A passage Rawlings refers to as a "digression within a digression" (Rawlings 1981, 106).

<sup>23</sup>Dover clearly does not recognize the emphasis Thucydides places upon the irrational effects of emotional impulse when he states: "whatever the reason for Aristogeiton's emotion, he and Harmodios did after all plan *the overthrow of the tyranny*, not mere personal revenge on Hipparchos" (Dover 1965, 58-59). Cf. a most significant passage in Lysias which effectively summarizes the degree of emotional impulse which accompanies ἔρωσ: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, ὅταν ἐρώσιν καὶ ἀποστερώνται ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ συγκοπῶσιν, ὀργιζόμενοι παραχρήμα τιμωρεῖσθαι ζητοῦσιν, 3.39.

Recent scholarship recognizes that Thucydides' digression on Harmodius and Aristogeiton is of central relevance to the theme of ἔρως in the *History*. Connor states that "the use of ring composition and the interpretation of the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton as an act of erotic boldness link the digression to the theme of *eros* so prominent in the work."<sup>24</sup> Previous scholarship, however, has not accorded the historian's digression as much significance.<sup>25</sup> Some scholars, such as Dover, argue that Thucydides "succumbed here to the temptation ... to correct historical error,"<sup>26</sup> while others maintain the digression is intended to rebuke the Athenian fears of tyranny.<sup>27</sup> At the very least, there appears to be some confusion regarding the digression's extended context.<sup>28</sup> Though most scholars agree that the digression illustrates how "private considerations shape public events,"<sup>29</sup> the parallels drawn between the events of 514 B.C. and those in 415 B.C. vary widely: the role of Alcibiades has been viewed alongside that of both Hippias and Hipparchus in addition to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton and both Alcibiades' opponents and the *demos* have at various times been compared to Aristogeiton.<sup>30</sup> Undoubtedly, these are all legitimate considerations, but

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<sup>24</sup>Connor (1984, 178; cf. Appendix 6). Forde maintains that Thucydides' account of the Athenian ἔρως "reaches a climax of sorts in the digression on the tyrannicides" (Forde 1989, 37). As Todd observes, Forde essentially suggests that "*erôs* is a Thucydidean metaphor for the *tolma* (daring aggression) associated with Athenian imperialism," and so, in his view, "this may help explain why Thucydides chooses to connect Alcibiades' recall from the Sicilian expedition with the love-affair of Harmodios and Aristogeiton" (Todd 1991, 243; cf. Forde 1989, 31-37). Cf. Orwin (1994, 162 n. 32).

<sup>25</sup>Some, such as Proctor, even follow Schwartz' suggestion that the digression may have been an earlier piece of work inserted by a posthumous editor (Proctor 1980, 16; cf. 195). Cf. Parry (1972, 50 n. 7).

<sup>26</sup>Dover (*HCT* iv, 329). Cf. Bury (1909, 89-90), Grundy (1948 i, 424-427), Lang (1955, 398), Liebeschuetz (1968b, 304), Stahl (1973, 70), Rawlings (1981, 103) and Farrar (1988, 146).

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Grene (1965, 69), Adcock (1963, 25), Hunter (1973, 173-174), Edmunds (1975b, 157), Palmer (1982a, 106-107), Kern (1989, 79) and Orwin (1994, 125).

<sup>28</sup>Stahl and Dover are convinced that Thucydides never even intended the digression to serve as a parallel to contemporary events (Stahl 1966, 7; Dover *HCT* iv, 328). Cf. Proctor, who regards the digression as irrelevant (Proctor 1981, 195; see above n. 25).

<sup>29</sup>Connor (1984, 179).

<sup>30</sup>For a range of views, cf. de Romilly (1951, 178; cf. 1995, 104), Lang (1955, 395-400), Strauss (1964, 196-197), Liebeschuetz (1968b, 304-305), Woodhead (1970, 79-80), Edmunds

they downplay the crucial role the digression plays in illustrating the extent to which γνώμη becomes subordinate to ὀργή within contemporary Athens.

The historian's portrayal of Alcibiades in the debate on the Sicilian Expedition dramatically illustrated the level of distortion encouraged by ἔρως.<sup>31</sup> The Athenians were not exempt from the historian's judgement then,<sup>32</sup> and there is certainly nothing in Thucydides' text to suggest that their irrational disposition evaporated as soon as they had reconfirmed their initial decision to sail. On the contrary, Thucydides continually reinforces the fact that the climate in Athens was determined by ἔρως throughout the elaborate episode dealing with the mutilation of the Hermae (6.27-30; 6.53-61), the very context in which the digression is introduced.<sup>33</sup> As Palmer notes "why Alcibiades should be suspected in an affair that could do nothing but raise doubts about an expedition he so strongly supported" is beyond reason.<sup>34</sup> Accordingly, Thucydides does not merely condemn Alcibiades' opponents for their motives and methods;<sup>35</sup> he clearly disapproves of the Athenians'

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(1975b, 194-195), Rawlings (1981, 98-117), Connor (1984, 176-180), Farrar (1988, 146-148), Forde (1989, 33-37 and 95), Palmer (1982a, 105-109) and Orwin (1994, 125-126).

<sup>31</sup>Cf. Chapter 3 pp. 91-94.

<sup>32</sup>Equally intoxicated (καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι, 6.24.3), the Athenians embraced Alcibiades' irrational inversions of πρόνοια, ἐλπίς and τύχη. As Alcibiades distorted the truth about Sicily, so the Athenians distorted Nicias' discouragements to suit their own ἐπιθυμῖαι. Cf. 6.24.2 and Chapter 3 n. 132.

<sup>33</sup>The significance given to this episode varies enormously. Grundy, for example, considers it merely "a mean story interpolated into the history of great events" (Grundy 1948 ii, 182), while Pearson equates this passage with 2.65, recognizing it as one of the few passages where "Thucydides is definite and blunt in his disapproval [of the Athenians]" (Pearson 1947, 50). Rawlings marks an important association between the passage on the mutilation of the Hermae and the digression, when he states that "the bitterness revealed in Thucydides' treatment of the Hermacopidae is matched by that which he betrays in his handling of the tyrannicide" (Rawlings 1981, 112). Cf. Westlake: "it is not his [Thucydides'] normal practice to dwell upon the internal history of Athens or of any other state, unless it influenced the course of the war" (Westlake 1968 221).

<sup>34</sup>Palmer (1982a, 112 n. 20).

<sup>35</sup>As de Romilly observes, Thucydides is clearly against Alcibiades' opponents, emphasizing both their jealousy (6.28.2) and deceit (6.29.3) (de Romilly 1951, 178 with n. 4). Similarly, Kern states: "Thucydides provides the utmost drama to this episode by describing it from the point of view of Alcibiades' most ardent supporters" (Kern 1989, 79). Cf. Westlake

impulsive reactions in investigating the affair.<sup>36</sup> Bloedow recognizes the extent of the hysteria in Athens when he remarks that Thucydides "makes it clear that Alcibiades was never formally charged with mutilation of the Hermae."<sup>37</sup> From the outset, the historian establishes that no one knew who was guilty (καὶ τοὺς δράσαντας ἤδει οὐδεὶς, 6.27.2),<sup>38</sup> and his own use of the term διάβολη in connection with Alcibiades' opponents at 6.29.3 (οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ ... βουλόμενοι ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς) strengthens the implication emerging from the indirect statements attributed to Alcibiades at 6.29.2. (καὶ ἐπεμαρτύρετο μὴ ἀπόντος περὶ αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι...), namely, that the charges against Alcibiades were false.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, the hysteria of the *demos* is further illuminated when, as Bloedow observes, "Alcibiades who had been able, virtually single-handed,...to launch Athens on the greatest adventure of her history, was, at a most crucial moment, incapable of persuading the

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(1968, 221-222) and Farrar (1988, 147-8).

<sup>36</sup>Cf. Kern: "although Thucydides has made it clear that Alcibiades was selfish and personally ambitious (6.15), he does not remind us of these flaws when he describes the recall. Instead he emphasizes the irrational hysteria behind the charges against Alcibiades" (Kern 1989, 79). The *demos* presumes Alcibiades guilty based on the testimony of non-Athenian citizens regarding, not the mutilation of the Hermae, but the mocking of the Mysteries (6.28.2); without investigating the informers and without the necessary evidence, the Athenians ultimately charge the χρηστοί based on the word of the πονηροί (6.53.2).

<sup>37</sup>Bloedow (1992, 149). Liebeschuetz argues that it was the "fear of tyranny which induced the Athenians to believe the slanders against Alcibiades" (Liebeschuetz 1968b, 304). It is important to distinguish, however, that this fear is provoked by ἔρωσ. Thucydides' Athenians were irrational before the mutilation of the Hermae, and so it is unlikely that the hysteria in Athens at the time of the scandals was "motivated by the *demos*' extreme fear of tyranny" (Palmer 1982a, 106; cf. Woodhead 1970, 79 and Stahl 1973, 70). That irrational fear is an offshoot of ἔρωσ is demonstrated not only through the digression on Harmodius and Aristogeiton (ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικῶς ... φοβηθεὶς..., 6.54.3; ὡς εἶδόν ... ἔδεισαν..., 6.57.2; ἡ ἀλόγιστος τόλμα ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα περιδεοῦς ... ἐγένετο, 6.59.1), but also in the debate on the Sicilian Expedition. Alcibiades, in his embodiment of ἔρωσ, convinced the Athenians to pass his motion by feeding their fear of inactivity (6.18.2-3).

<sup>38</sup>Thucydides' use of οἶδα, here in the second pluperfect, reinforces the notion of factual knowledge. That the Athenians did not know who was guilty is made clear through the large number of arrests and Thucydides' emphasis on the fake confession which followed (6.60.2-5). Seager and Palmer appropriately refer to the entire affair as a 'witch-hunt' (Seager 1967, 8; Palmer 1982a, 112).

<sup>39</sup>Cf. 6.61.6, where Alcibiades is reportedly afraid to return to face trial ἐπὶ διαβολῇ, and Chapter 2 n. 37.

Athenians to clear up the matter of the Mysteries and the Hermae before his departure."<sup>40</sup> Evidently Alcibiades was not alone in successfully exploiting the Athenians' irrational disposition;<sup>41</sup> his own opponents were able to manipulate the impressionable *demos* against him.<sup>42</sup>

No doubt Thucydides inserted his digression to account for Alcibiades' recall, but it is not so much to highlight the impact of the Athenian decision on the Expedition to Sicily as it is to expose the motive behind the Athenians' suspicions of Alcibiades.<sup>43</sup> Thucydides is determined to correct the many 'misconceptions' held by the Athenians regarding the tyranny of the Peisistratidae, and while much notice has been given to the historian's purpose, his need to correct is most significant in itself. In the preamble to his digression, Thucydides makes it clear that the Athenians knew full well that the tyranny had not fallen at their own hands (ἐπιστάμενος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἀκοῆ τὴν Πεισιστράτου καὶ τῶν παίδων τυραννίδα χαλεπὴν τελευτῶσαν γενομένην καὶ προσέτι οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ Ἄρμοδίου καταλυθεῖσαν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐφοβεῖτο αἰεὶ καὶ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἐλάμβανεν, 6.53.3).<sup>44</sup> This has led some scholars to consider that the historian is laying the emphasis on the fact that the Athenians were fearful of tyranny because they had been previously unable to bring it down

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<sup>40</sup>Bloedow (1973, 15-16).

<sup>41</sup>Cf. Chapter 3 n. 146.

<sup>42</sup>This may help to explain why Thucydides lays more stress on the ἴδιαι διαβολαί of Alcibiades' fellow-Athenians than he does on the δῆματα of Alcibiades' himself (cf. Bloedow 1973, 15-17). Cf. Forde: "within the context of Thucydides' retelling of the story, this conclusion [that the protagonists aimed at a private erotic freedom] implies first of all that although the Athenians' excessive suspicion of prominent men in the city presents itself, and understands itself, as a laudable and public-spirited defence of liberty in the city, it is in fact rooted in rather questionable private jealousy" (Forde 1989, 36). See also below n. 59.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. Forde (1989, 95), Kern (1989, 79) and above n. 36. As Bloedow remarks, "whether he [Alcibiades] was actually guilty of mutilating the Hermae or mocking the Mysteries is ultimately irrelevant" (Bloedow 1973, 15).

<sup>44</sup>That the Athenians were not ignorant on this point is underlined by the adverbial expression προσέτι οὐδέ, directly followed by ὑπὸ with the genitive of personal agent (ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν). Cf. Denniston, who attributes to the adverbial οὐδέ "a sense of climax" (Denniston 1954, 196) and Smyth (1956, 660 n. 2931).

without the aid of the Spartans.<sup>45</sup> But this raises some major questions: why the historian's emphasis on Harmodius and Aristogeiton? Why the need to clarify that Hippias, not Hipparchus, was the reigning tyrant? And, most importantly, for what reason would Thucydides go to such lengths to establish that the Peisistratidae were far from being impious, hostile and oppressive tyrants at the height of their rule (6.54.5-7)?<sup>46</sup> In light of Thucydides' statement of purpose, namely, to prove that the Athenians were saying nothing accurate (ἀκριβῆς οὐδὲν λέγοντας, 6.54.1) in connection with their own tyrants, nor even the incident involving Harmodius and Aristogeiton, it seems legitimate to argue that it is not so much historical ignorance that Thucydides wishes to bring to light, but rather the Athenians' distortion of tradition.<sup>47</sup> The historian leads his readers to recognize the extent to which irrational impulse has consumed the Athenian disposition by drawing constant attention to the Athenians' distortions of a familiar story. Harmodius' and Aristogeiton's 'great' τόλμημα never brought the tyranny to its end, as the Athenians were well aware (6.53.5). Not only had the 'heroes' never planned an attack on Hippias, the true tyrant, but their attack on Hipparchus provoked his brother's fears, bringing about an oppressive tyranny as a result.<sup>48</sup> As Farrar remarks, "Thucydides' careful analysis shows

<sup>45</sup>Cf., among others, Lang (1955, 396 and 398), Adcock (1963, 25), and Dover (1973 29-30).

<sup>46</sup>Connor suggests that Thucydides may have even downplayed any serious political opposition to the tyrants (Connor 1984, 179 n. 54). Cf. Strauss (1964, 197 with n. 63). Forde suggests that Thucydides may have drawn the readers' attention away from the fact that "Hipparchus did use the public power of tyranny to insult Harmodius' sister" (Forde 1989, 35).

<sup>47</sup>Edmunds maintains that "historical ignorance leads to ignorant suspicion. Ignorant suspicion leads in turn to ignorant action" (Edmunds 1975b, 157). He is not alone in this interpretation; cf. Hunter (1973, 174), Stahl (1973, 70) and Kern (1989, 79). But perhaps not enough weight has been given to 6.53.3. If Thucydides is drawing his readers' attention to the fact that the Athenians were distorting the facts, this could well explain the 'disturbing' contradiction scholars have identified between 6.53.3 and 6.54.1. Cf. Lang (1955, 398-399) and Dover (*HCT* iv, 325-328).

<sup>48</sup>That the harshness of tyranny was the effect and not the cause of the attempted 'tyrannicide' is commonplace. Cf. Rawlings (1981, 109-110), Palmer (1982a, 109 and 115), Farrar (1988, 146-7) and Orwin (1994, 126).

that the plot against the tyranny was undertaken for the sake of love, not liberty, to avenge a personal affront by the tyrant's brother, not a political offense by the tyrant himself."<sup>49</sup> Not only was Harmodius' and Aristogeiton's deed not born for public benefit,<sup>50</sup> their private and selfish motivations crippled the public interest. Prior to their attack, the tyranny portrayed by Thucydides had always been pious and virtuous, so much so that the historian credits the Peisistratidae with the most commendable of qualities, ἀρετή and ζύνεσις (καὶ ἐπετήδευσαν ἐπὶ πλείστον δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν καὶ ζύνεσιν, 6.54.5).<sup>51</sup> As Lang suggests, the Athenians had to distort their 'knowledge' regarding the events of 514 B.C. "to justify their comparison between the impious ones of 415 B.C. and the tyrants of the previous century."<sup>52</sup>

The sudden importance of piety is equally suspect in view of the Athenians' lack of pious concern throughout the *History*.<sup>53</sup> The Melian

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<sup>49</sup>Farrar (1988, 146).

<sup>50</sup>Cf. Forde: "Thucydides shows that their motivation was private, even selfish, and aimed at public benefit only incidentally if at all" (Forde 1989, 35).

<sup>51</sup>Cf. Palmer: "to insure that the import of Hipparchus' intending no violence be fully appreciated, Thucydides takes the time to pronounce on the character of the Pisistratid tyranny" (Palmer 1982a, 107-8). The application of the terms ἀρετή and ζύνεσις in connection with the tyrants is most impressive. Palmer observes that the only individuals credited with ἀρετή in the *History* are Brasidas (4.81.2), Nicias (7.86.5) and Antiphon (8.68.1), and the tyrants are alone among the rulers (Palmer 1982a, 107). Huart remarks: "l'ἀρετή des Pisistratides ... paraît avoir été surtout un acte de sagesse politique, cette vertu étant essentiellement une vertu politique" (Huart 1968, 450). As for ζύνεσις, Bloedow observes that "very few individuals are permitted entry ... into what we might call his [Thucydides'] 'inner circle' of the 'intelligent.' If we exclude Theseus and Peisistratus *alias*, the Peisistratidae, because they lie well outside the Peloponnesian War, we find only six individuals who are elevated to this select company" (Bloedow 1992, 140).

<sup>52</sup>Lang (1955, 396).

<sup>53</sup>Cf. Forde: "the Athenians react to this event with the most conspicuous outpouring of pious concern that we have witnessed in the city to this point" (Forde 1989, 58). Thucydides reports that the Athenians were treating μεζόνως the matter of the Hermae, and they link impiety with political conspiracy: καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μεζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι (6.27.3). It seems rather ironic in light of Pearson's observations that "when piety or superstition plays a part on the Athenian side, it is represented as affecting individuals not

Dialogue effectively juxtaposed with the narrative on the Sicilian Expedition brought to the fore the Athenians "unabashed denial ... of a divine law."<sup>54</sup> Bloedow rightly counters McGregor when the latter maintains that the affair of the Hermae was far from being a "heaven-sent opportunity for his enemies,"<sup>55</sup> "it had much less to do with Fortune and heaven than with Alcibiades and his political opponents."<sup>56</sup> Indeed, if piety was so great a concern, then why would the Athenians not delay the expedition until the matter had been resolved?<sup>57</sup> Presumably, the mutilation of the Hermae would have cast a most ominous shadow over the expedition,<sup>58</sup> and Thucydides' Alcibiades seems most willing to clear up the matter before his departure (6.29.1-2).<sup>59</sup> Truly, this would have been the most pious and most rational course of action, and in urging it Alcibiades is made to appear innocent of the charges assumed against him.<sup>60</sup> What is more, the charges against Alcibiades do not even stand to reason. As Forde observes, "when the Hermae are mutilated in the city, the Athenians fear a plot against the

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official policy" (Pearson 1947, 52). And even then, the lack of piety in Pericles' Funeral Oration has not gone unnoticed (cf. Bury 1909, 145-146; Grundy 1948 ii, 7-8; Grene 1965, 88-90; Strauss 1964, 161; Edmunds 1975b, 45-46 and Forde 1989, 27-28). Moreover, Forde points to yet another paradox: "the Athenian rediscovery of piety as a safeguard of the democracy appears especially naïve in this instance, since it seems that many of the Hermes statues in Athens were erected by the Peisistratid tyrants in the first place (Forde 1989, 185 n. 10; citing Plato, *Hipp.* 228-229). Cf. Cornford: "the disregard of omens is another constant motive in the legend of Hybris" (Cornford 1965, 216).

<sup>54</sup>Strauss (1964, 193). Cf. Cornford (1965, 217) and Wallace (1964, 255). It appears that Orwin would disagree: he refers to the affair of the Hermae as a "frenzied obsession with omens adverse to that success [of the expedition]" (Orwin 1994, 122).

<sup>55</sup>MacGregor (1965, 34).

<sup>56</sup>Bloedow (1973, 16 n. 87; cf. 52 n. 309).

<sup>57</sup>Cf. Kagan (1981, 194).

<sup>58</sup>Cf. Kagan: "Hermes was the god of travelers, and the mutilation of statues was plainly a warning against the imminent expedition to Sicily" (Kagan 1981, 194).

<sup>59</sup>Cf. Bloedow: "the impression given is that Alcibiades made a very determined effort to secure a trial, but that his opponents made an equally determined effort to foil him in this, and very decisively outmanoeuvred him" (Bloedow 1973, 16-17).

<sup>60</sup>Ironically, Thucydides even credits Alcibiades with urging the Athenians to apply σωφροσύνη: ἐπεμαρτύρετο ... ὅτι σωφρονέστερον εἶη μὴ μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, πρὶν διαγνώσθαι, πέμπειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτω στρατεύματι (6.29.2). Cf. Chapter 3 n. 129.

democracy, as if piety were the same as dedication to the democracy."<sup>61</sup> The length to which Thucydides demonstrates that the Peistratid tyranny was not impious prior to Harmodius' and Aristogeiton's attack on Hipparchus highlights the irrationality of the Athenians' fear.<sup>62</sup> In view of the piety practiced by the Peisistratidae,<sup>63</sup> how could one rationally suspect Alcibiades of tyranny based on his 'alleged' impieties?<sup>64</sup> As Palmer indicates, Alcibiades' political enemies "are not above making use of piety as a political weapon,"<sup>65</sup> and the fact that the Athenians postpone the trial so readily exposes the extent to which γνώμη has become subordinate to ὄργη.<sup>66</sup> The Athenians follow the lead of Alcibiades' political opponents without any consideration whatsoever,<sup>67</sup> both with regard to their suspicions and in allowing Alcibiades to sail prior to the trial. Equally rash is their purpose in recalling him; Thucydides' narrative encourages the assumption that the Athenians never had the intention of according Alcibiades a fair trial; their aim was to sentence him to death (βουλόμενοι αὐτὸν ἐς κρίσιν ἀγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι, 6.61.4).<sup>68</sup>

<sup>61</sup>Forde (1989, 185).

<sup>62</sup>See above n. 37 on the relationship between ἔρωσ and fear.

<sup>63</sup>Cf. Forde: "tyrants are in fact the most pious people in the *History*" (Forde 1989, 184 with n. 8). For a detailed discussion on 'the problem of tyranny and the question of piety,' see Palmer (1982a, 108; 118-124).

<sup>64</sup>Cf. Orwin (1994, 126).

<sup>65</sup>Palmer (1982a, 112-113).

<sup>66</sup>Indeed, Thucydides' narrative is so factual in this regard that the historian leaves the reader with the impression that Alcibiades' opponents' task is effortless. Cf. 6.29.3.

<sup>67</sup>Thucydides stresses that the Athenians are, like Harmodius and Aristogeiton (6.57.2-3), reacting under the influence of ὄργη (χαλεπός, 6.60.1; ὀργιζομένων, 6.60.2; χαλεπῶς, 6.61.1). See Chapter 1 n. 45 for the distinction between χαλεπαινεῖν and ὀργίζεσθαι. Cf. Farrar, who notes Thucydides' emphasis' on ὄργη and its influence on Athenian τόλμα (Farrar 1988, 146 n. 32). It should not come as a surprise, then, that the Athenians' charge against Alcibiades was based on suspicions resting "not upon any specifically political actions but upon the nature of his private life [his παρανομία, cf. 6.15.4 and 6.28.2]" (Seager 1967, 8). Bloedow rightly remarks: "his [Alcibiades'] private conduct thus became the Achilles' heel of his public career" (Bloedow 1973, 16). See also above pp. 105-106.

<sup>68</sup>Cf. Spratt: "ἐς κρίσιν ἀγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι, 'to bring him to trial before executing him,' i.e. not to take his life without some form of trial" (Spratt 1905, 266). Due to the context in which Thucydides' statement appears, it is important not to apply one's own logic to correct

According to Dover, the digression on Harmodius and Aristogeiton has but "a marginal relevance to the main narrative of Book VI.... Thucydides is so anxious to ensure that we understand the seed from which the conspiracy grew that he does nothing to make us understand the fact that it did grow."<sup>69</sup> Yet this 'seed' commands the historian's attention particularly with regard to the Athenian decision to embark on the Sicilian Expedition (καὶ ἔρωσ ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι, 6.24.3).<sup>70</sup> Thucydides does more than deny the validity of the Athenians' analogy in connection with Harmodius and Aristogeiton.<sup>71</sup> He overturns their own analogy to betray the Athenians' corrupt understanding of the proper qualities of man.<sup>72</sup> In so doing, Thucydides brings to light the parallels between the events of 415 B.C. and 514 B.C. with a comparison of the role ἔρωσ plays in the control of circumstance.

Forde contends that "the story as formulated by Thucydides ... corroborates the view that Athens is characterized by a kind of erotically charged daring."<sup>73</sup> This is most manifest in the Athenians' distortions of the past events. The digression comments on "an earlier internal breakdown in Athens,"<sup>74</sup> and, by exposing the Athenians' distorted explanations in 415 B.C., Thucydides demonstrates that the ὄργή-γνώμη opposition which Pericles had earlier fought to keep in proper balance has culminated in the total domination of ἔρωσ over ζύνεσις.<sup>75</sup> The Athenians' 'misconceptions' justified

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that which is lacking in the Athenians' resolution. Strictly speaking, the temporal participle could go both ways.

<sup>69</sup>Dover (1965, 58-59).

<sup>70</sup>Cf. Bloedow on 6.24.3: "unquestionably some of the most remarkable words in the whole of Thucydides' *History*" (Bloedow 1992, 146).

<sup>71</sup>Lang (1955, 398).

<sup>72</sup>Cf. Rawlings (1981, 116).

<sup>73</sup>Forde (1989, 35).

<sup>74</sup>Rawlings (1981, 76).

<sup>75</sup>This may account for the striking contrast which emerges between the tyrant and his would-be assassins. Both Rawlings and Palmer recognize that the panicked and desperate actions of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (6.57.3 and 6.59.1) are in sharp contrast to Hippias'

their appreciation for Harmodius and Aristogeiton's 'noble' daring (τόλμημα),<sup>76</sup> and this justification reflects their own disposition with regard to the Sicilian Expedition. As Connor concludes, "both the conspiracy against the Pisistratids and the invasion of Sicily ... are presented as acts of inappropriate or misdirected boldness, *tolma*."<sup>77</sup>

It is not surprising that such distortions validate Thucydides' forceful estimate in the *stasis* passage.<sup>78</sup> The historian observed that irrational daring came to be regarded as courage and loyalty to party (τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη), due in large part to an inversion of the ζύνεσις concept (τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ζυνετὸν [ἐνομίσθη] ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν, 3.82.4).<sup>79</sup> The 'noble' τόλμημα of Harmodius and Aristogeiton had to have been as dependent on a reversal of patriotism as was the decision to sail to Sicily. In his elaborate chapter on the Athenians' motivations with regard to their Expedition (6.24), Thucydides' last words create the lasting impression that the shift within the Athenian disposition is complete; if anyone was actually not satisfied, he kept quiet lest he might appear unpatriotic: εἴ τῳ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιῶς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, 6.24.4.<sup>80</sup> Nothing

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calm, cool and efficient reactions (6.58.1 and 6.59.2) (Rawlings 1981, 107; Palmer 1982a, 108).

Cf. Theognis 1271 and S. *Ant.* 791-800, where ἔρωσ expropriates reason. Burton would add to these S. *Ant.* 615-617, where, in association with ἐλπίς, ἔρωσ is used of general passion, arguing that "the logic of Sophocles' ode [596-645] requires us to relate its last stanza [particularly, λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς] closely to the whole" (Burton 1980, 109).

<sup>76</sup>Much as it did for the protagonists themselves. See above p. 100. Huart suggests another exception to a rule (cf. above n. 9). Observing that the two other instances of τόλμημα in the *History* (2.25.2 and 7.43.6) are most positive, he sets the use at 6.54.1 apart to allow a negative connotation (Huart 1968, 435 n.1). It stands to reason that τόλμημα at 6.54.1 holds a positive connotation as it is precisely that in the view of both the protagonists of the digression and the Athenians of 415 B.C.

<sup>77</sup>Connor (1984, 179). Cf. *ibid.*: "the Athenians, like Harmodius and Aristogeiton, are under the influence of *eros* and engaged in an act of unwarranted boldness."

<sup>78</sup>Cf. Grene: "the gist of the chapter on *stasis* is that the proper qualities of man in a state of normalcy -- courage, caution, decency, and intelligence -- become superseded by peculiar distortions in fact, such as insensate daring, ruthlessness, and universal suspicion, and that the use of moral terms also changes" (Grene 1965, 77).

<sup>79</sup>Chapter 2 pp. 49-51.

<sup>80</sup>Cf. Chapter 3 p. 80. As Hornblower notes with regard to 3.82.4: "the use which people

could take the Athenians further from the Periclean ideal. As Huart remarks, Thucydides' Pericles makes τόλμα depend upon ξύνεσις when he states, in his final speech that the latter renders daring more secure: καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας τύχης ἢ ξύνεσις ... ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, 2.62.5.<sup>81</sup> As much as ξύνεσις could embolden τόλμα, Thucydides' digression illustrates the extent to which ἔρωσ contaminates it with its own subordination of ξύνεσις, rendering the proper τόλμα ἀλόγιστος.<sup>82</sup> Athenagoras' words to the people of Syracuse resound with ironic truth when he states that he does not marvel at the Athenian τόλμα, but at their ἀξυνεσία (τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, 6.36.1).<sup>83</sup> And truly, as Liebeshuetz insists, "if the Athenians knew the truth they might see in the act of Harmodius and Aristogeiton a warning and not an example."<sup>84</sup>

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made of the available descriptions changed as their evaluation of the relevant actions changed" (Hornblower 1991, 483). See also Wilson (1982) and Worthington (1982).

<sup>81</sup>Huart (1968, 434).

<sup>82</sup>Cf. Podlecki, who observes τόλμα to be high on Thucydides' list of admirable qualities "an energetic will-to-action (for which "daring" is too weak a term), which, without a cool calculation of the risks involved, could easily turn into mere foolhardy bravado" (Podlecki 1975, 74).

<sup>83</sup>Classen-Steup note that Athenagoras also points to the reversal of patriotism: the reader is made to witness at 6.24.4: τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὅστις μὴ βούλεται οὕτω κακῶς φρονῆσαι καὶ ὑποχειρίουσ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας, ἢ δειλός ἐστιν ἢ τῆ πόλει οὐκ εὐνους, 6.36.1. "οὐκ εὐνους = κακόνους c. 24, 4: 'kein guter Patriot'" (Classen-Steup, *ad loc.*).

<sup>84</sup>Liebeshuetz (1968b, 305).

## Conclusion

Thucydides' treatments of Pericles, Cleon and Alcibiades clearly emphasize the motives and methods of the individual leaders. The strength of the historian's portrayals lies in the careful selection and arrangement of his material; he leads the reader to draw certain conclusions with implicit suggestion, and validates those impressions with his explicit judgements and digressions.<sup>1</sup> Pericles exemplifies the ideal γνώμη, Cleon embodies the implacable ὄργη, and Alcibiades emerges as the ἔρως incarnate.

But the historian's treatments of these three Athenians not only offset the changes in leadership, they also underline the disposition of the contemporary *demos*. Thucydides' portrayal of the rational Pericles highlights the Athenians' tendency to irrationality, and those of Cleon and Alcibiades confirm that the Athenian application of γνώμη had been due to the earlier statesman's constant guidance: when led by Cleon, the Athenians reverted to their customary reactions under the influence of emotional impulse (ὄργη); and by the time of Alcibiades, the *demos* is subject to its total control (ἔρως). That the loss of γνώμη within the Athenian process of resolution inevitably determines their attitude toward imperialism is most manifest in the Athenians' developing inclination toward πλεονεξία (under Cleon) and, ultimately, subjection to ἐπιθυμία (under Alcibiades). The Harmodius and Aristogeiton digression corroborates such an 'impression.' If Alcibiades was aiming for tyranny as the Athenians reportedly suspect

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<sup>1</sup>Palmer and Connor remark that the efforts of more modern scholars are anticipated by Hobbes and Meinecke, both of whom had previously emphasized the fundamental importance of implicit judgement within Thucydides' presentation of his 'history' (Palmer 1982a, 103; Connor 1984, 7-8). Cf. Rhodes (1994, 163-164).

(6.15.4), the *demos* is equally guilty. As Forde rightly observes, "the Athenians most dislike or mistrust in Alcibiades the very qualities that they most share with him."<sup>2</sup>

The historian's emphasis on the Athenian lack of *γνώμη* sheds some light on a most significant question. To what extent was the Sicilian Expedition a *γνώμης ἀμάρτημα* as Thucydides reports in his eulogy to Pericles? After stressing that the Athenians did not follow Pericles' advice after his death (2.65.7), he isolates the Sicilian Expedition, implying that it was their most crucial mistake:

ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπήσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν (2.65.11).

Many have noted a great discrepancy between the historian's judgement and the narrative on the Expedition throughout Books VI and VII.<sup>3</sup> In Bloedow's view, this is due largely to the fact that most modern scholars have paid more attention to the latter part of Thucydides' explanation (οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες) than the former (*γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπήσαν*).<sup>4</sup> Indeed, it would appear that many would agree with Westlake, who, upon determining that the second explanation (ὅσον) is more cogent than the first (οὐ τοσοῦτον), contends that Thucydides "did not consider the Athenian action in embarking on the Sicilian expedition to have been in itself an error of judgement."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Forde (1989, 58).

<sup>3</sup>Cf., among others, Gomme (*HCT* ii, 195-196; cf. 1951, 72), de Romilly (1965, 561-569), Thompson (1971, 148), Connor (1984, 158 n. 2), Dover (1987, 81), Farrar (1988, 167 n. 71), Rusten (1989, 212-213), Bloedow (1991b, 205-206) and Homblower (1991, 348).

<sup>4</sup>Bloedow (1992, 144-145).

<sup>5</sup>Westlake (1969b, 165-166).

Thucydides' statement that the Athenian decision was not so much a γνώμης ἀμάρτημα with regard to the force against which they were setting out in no way implies that the Expedition was not a γνώμης ἀμάρτημα at all.<sup>6</sup> To begin with, though "the construction with the relative is abandoned in the second clause,"<sup>7</sup> the phrase γνώμης ἀμάρτημα must still govern, to some extent, the historian's second explanation.<sup>8</sup> What is more, through his portrayals of Cleon and Alcibiades, Thucydides effectively demonstrates that risks and misjudgments do not necessarily lead to failure. And as de Romilly observes, the application of γνώμη and the accompanying πρόνοια do not necessarily guarantee success: "Périclès, malgré l'échec, avait bien prévu; et Cléon, lui, malgré son succès de Pylos, avait mal prévu."<sup>9</sup> Evidently, Thucydides is not one to judge an undertaking by its result, but rather from the manner in which the decisions regarding it were reached.<sup>10</sup>

Thucydides' tracing of the developments in the Athenian disposition clearly reaches its climax in the context of the Sicilian Expedition. According to Hunter, Athens' policy is, from the outset, one of γνώμης ἀμάρτημα if only because it is based on ἐπιθυμία.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, in exposing the total lack of γνώμη within the Athenian process of resolution, the historian does not merely drive his readers to the conclusion that the Athenians are simply without

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<sup>6</sup>Westlake himself notes, with regard to the formula οὐ τοσοῦτον ... ὅσον, that "the validity of the first [explanation] is not expressly denied: it is merely not discussed. It is a mistake to imagine that a true cause is contrasted with a false one" (Westlake 1969, 166).

<sup>7</sup>Rusten (1989, 213).

<sup>8</sup>Cf. de Romilly: "le verbe [ἀμαρτάνειν] est commenté par l'expression γνώμης ἀμάρτημα, ce qui ne laisse guère de doutes: il s'agit d'un manquement aux règles d'une bonne politique" (de Romilly 1965, 564), and Bloedow (1991b, 205). It would appear that Westlake goes against his own better judgement when he maintains that the phrase πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆσαν shows that the historian "is considering the decision of the Athenians from an exclusively military standpoint" (Westlake 1969, 162).

<sup>9</sup>de Romilly (1956, 46). Thus Thucydides' emphasis on the Athenian lack of γνώμη helps explain the historian's admiration for Pericles, and his disgust for Cleon.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Bloedow (1992, 145-147).

<sup>11</sup>Hunter (1973, 139).

ξύνεσις, but that they are truly incapable of ξύνεσις.<sup>12</sup> When viewed in this light, there seems to be little anomaly between judgement and narrative. The historian's emphasis is on the second debate, and this corroborates in itself the impression that the initial decision to sail was truly under the influence of ἔρωσ.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, Thucydides goes at length to illustrate that the influence of ἔρωσ did not come to an end once the original decision was reconfirmed. As Finley states, "precisely by considering the expedition as the supreme evidence and result of Athens' internal faults, does Thucydides bind the whole *History* as closely as he does."<sup>14</sup>

Before concluding, there is one last instance of ἔρωσ in the *History* that has yet to be addressed, namely, the very first instance in the famous Funeral Oration. Thucydides' Pericles exhorts the Athenians to become ἐρασταί of their city:<sup>15</sup>

καὶ οἶδε μὲν προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει τοιοῦδε ἐγένοντο· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς  
 χρῆ ἄσφαλεστέραν μὲν εὐχεσθαι, ἀτολμοτέραν δὲ μηδὲν ἀξιούν τὴν ἐς  
 τοὺς πολεμίους διάνοιαν ἔχειν, σκοποῦντας μὴ λόγῳ μόνῳ τὴν ὠφελίαν,  
 ἦν ἂν τις πρὸς οὐδὲν χειρὸν αὐτοῦς ὑμᾶς εἰδότας μηκύνει, λέγων ὅσα ἐν  
 τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀμύνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἔνεστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς

<sup>12</sup>Cf. Bloedow, who follows a similar argument with regard to Alcibiades (Bloedow 1992, 144-147).

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Bloedow: "modern critics seem to have taken little notice [of 6.24.3: καὶ ἔρωσ ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεύσαι].... It clearly signifies that, in Thucydides' view, the decision to embark on the Expedition was a fundamentally irrational one. It seems difficult for us to imagine that the Athenians, on a question of such fundamental importance, could have been guided purely by emotion" (Bloedow 1992, 146).

<sup>14</sup>Finley (1967b, 135).

<sup>15</sup>Hornblower raises an interesting possibility: "what does αὐτῆς in Th. refer to? There are two feminine nouns here, δύναμις and πόλις. If the Athenians were being urged to become lovers of the *power* of Athens that would be an even more striking and aggressive idea" (Hornblower 1991, 311). Cf. Kallet-Marx who also points to the ambiguity in the Greek: "the words ἔργῳ θεωμένους makes it clear that the *dunamis* is visible and tangible. The ἐραστής metaphor is extraordinary in this context and would even seem peculiar were it not for the fervor with which Pericles believed that the strength of the city lay in its men, money, and ships. The metaphor is especially striking if the αὐτῆς refers to δύναμις and not πόλις" (Kallet-Marx 1993, 112 n. 10). That αὐτῆς refers to δύναμις may well be indicated by the phrase αὐτὰ ἐκτίσαντο, with αὐτὰ pointing to that which makes up the δύναμις.

πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἔραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξα εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γινώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυρόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτίησαντο, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ πείρα του σφαλεῖεν, οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὴν πόλιν γε τῆς σφετέρας ἀρετῆς ἀξιοῦντες στερίσκειν, κάλλιστον δὲ ἔρανον αὐτῇ προῖέμενοι (2.43.1).

How to explain the contradiction within Thucydides' text? The statesman who so determinedly advocated γνώμη encourages the Athenians to act under the influence of ἔρως? Forde appears to disregard the contradiction entirely. He considers Pericles' recourse to 'erotic passion' as a most positive appeal to patriotism and this appears to serve as the foundation on which he bases his entire argument on the *eros* theme, thus 'supporting' his admiration for Alcibiades.<sup>16</sup>

Forde is not alone in his interpretation. Strauss had earlier suggested that "one could say that 'Athens in Sicily' is greater than Pericles' Athens according to Pericles himself.... The *eros* of the Athenian for Sicily is the peak of his *eros* for his city, and that *eros* is his full dedication to his city, the willingness to sacrifice, to forget everything private for the sake of the city."<sup>17</sup> Immerwahr later attempted to isolate the motive in more precise terms of Athenian imperialism, stating that "*dynamis* is first an attempt of the mind to control the environment, a control which is achieved by the rational *logos* which calculates resources, prepares military forces, and plans strategy and tactics in war. But power also works through the emotions, where it arouses a deep commitment, which Thucydides calls *erôs* and which we might call

<sup>16</sup>Forde (1989 31-37).

<sup>17</sup>Strauss (1964, 226). Parry goes so far as to state: "when he [Thucydides] has Pericles speak in this vein, can we doubt that he was, and as he writes is in [*sic*] retrospect, one of those who heard Pericles' words with willing ears?" (Parry 1972, 48). Cf. Weil (1965, 70), Murray (1966, 179), Pouncey (1980, 111) and Farrar (1988, 162).

patriotism."<sup>18</sup> Neither explanation, however, appears to take into account the most negative connotations the concept of ἔρως bears throughout the remainder of the *History*. Not only does Thucydides' concept of ἔρως in its very nature promote self-interest, thereby encouraging the alignment of public with private interests, ἔρως in itself contaminates the very λόγος on which the δύναμις was based.<sup>19</sup>

If the words of Thucydides' Pericles are to be equated with the modern conception of patriotism, then it is necessary to contemplate the implications. The statesman, in the *History*, had always stressed that the Athenians' weakness was due to their selfish fears, and he had always emphasized the importance of private interests moving in unison with those of the public.<sup>20</sup> In light of this, along with the statesman's apparent recognition of the dangers of ὄργη, either Thucydides' Pericles, in his eagerness to exploit the Funeral Oration as a political tool,<sup>21</sup> did not realize the implications of his words and so unintentionally urged the Athenians to the destruction of Athens, or he did not truly possess πρόνοια to the extent to which Thucydides credits him.<sup>22</sup>

Immerwahr resolves the contradiction by stating that ἔρως is

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<sup>18</sup>Immerwahr (1973, 20).

<sup>19</sup>Orwin alone detects a disparity, when he states: "the city as the object of eros does not jibe with the city as thrall of safety and profit." (Orwin 1994, 198).

<sup>20</sup>Cf. Farrar (1988, 166-168).

<sup>21</sup>The notion that the genre could be exploited as a political tool is not new. Cochrane suggests that an exhortation such as that of Pericles would have been necessary to replace the piety of religion: "in these burning words are recorded the principles to which men must always turn when religious sentiment is weak, or non-existent (Cochrane 1965, 55). Immerwahr contends that the didactic purpose of the Funeral Oration was "to achieve unity of state and individual" (Immerwahr 1973, 27 n. 20). Cf. Ziolkowski (1981a, 181-196) and Loraux (1986, 221-248).

<sup>22</sup>Bloedow, as will be seen below, makes the same observations with regard to 2.62.2-3 (Bloedow, in press, 6-7). It is important to note also that Thucydides' Pericles does not ultimately succeed in shielding the Athenians from their own irrationality. Cf. Chapter 1 n. 51.

"characteristic of tyrants," and he maintains that Pericles had pointed out, when calling the empire a tyranny which cannot be relinquished, that the emotional commitment to power, dangerous as it is, is unavoidable (ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον, 2.63.2).<sup>23</sup> Far more compelling, however, are Bloedow's bold observations on the very same passage. According to him, "if refusal to disband her empire in the Aegean is an acknowledged act of *tyrannis*, there is no essential difference between the Athenian empire of Pericles and the empire as expanded (or the attempted expansion) after his death."<sup>24</sup> Moreover, he contends that his interpretation corroborates a perplexing aspect of Pericles' *Machtdenken*. Recognizing a "*fundamentally new*" idea in the statesman's final speech (2.62.2-3), namely, that the "Athenian naval power opened up *unlimited horizons of imperialist expansion*," Bloedow briefly toys with the idea that Pericles may have unintentionally encouraged Athens to expand her empire; Thucydides' emphasis on Pericles' *πρόνοια*, however, leads him to question otherwise: "if he [Pericles] really did possess the *pronoia* with which Thucydides' credits him, he ought to have been able to foresee the real implications inherent in his statement."<sup>25</sup> Thus, Bloedow concludes that Thucydides essentially "presents us with *two* Pericleses -- without resolving the contradictions between them," one of whom may not have been so different from his successors, one of whom was clearly capable of tactical manoeuvres.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Immerwahr (1973, 27). The portrait of the Peisistratidae, which Thucydides goes at length to give, does not support Immerwahr's contention. Up until the attack of Harmodius and Aristogeiton on Hipparchus, the historian establishes that the tyrants had possessed both ἀρετή and ξυνέσις (6.54.5).

<sup>24</sup>Bloedow (in press, 11-12).

<sup>25</sup>Bloedow (in press, 6-7; cf. 31: "[Pericles] brandishes the notion of unlimited empire").

<sup>26</sup>Bloedow (in press, 16). Bloedow notes the importance of the attributive position of the demonstrative pronoun αὐτός at 6.76.3: τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐκεῖνά τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πειρῶνται (*ibid.*, 12).

Bloedow's observations certainly amplify the implications arising from Pericles' call to ἔρωσ in the Funeral Oration. If the character of the Athenians at the time of Sicilian expedition fits precisely with the portrait painted of them by the Corinthians in the conference at Sparta (οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες, 1.70.3),<sup>27</sup> the Pericles who delivers the Funeral Oration is clearly not exempt; he essentially exhorts the Athenians to act accordingly when he calls for them to be under the influence of ἔρωσ. Perhaps this explains why Thucydides never directly credits Pericles as being *ξυνετός*.<sup>28</sup>

According to Nicolai, Thucydides the politician blames Pericles' successors, while Thucydides the historian examines the Athenian appetite for power and the ensuing catastrophe.<sup>29</sup> Both are critical in formulating the readers' impression of the Athenian *demos*. No doubt the emphasis Thucydides places on the ἴδια φιλοτιμιαί, ἴδια κέρδη and ἴδια διαβολαί of Cleon and Alcibiades as they strive to be πρῶτος ἕκαστος is most consistent with the verdict in his eulogy of Pericles (2.65.7; 2.65.10-11). Their treatments, however, also underline the Athenians' growing tolerance of and eventual participation in such behaviour, both internally, as exemplified through their investigation of the mutilation of the Hermae, and externally in their quest to become the supreme power. Macleod rightly remarks on Alcibiades' speech in the debate on the Sicilian Expedition: "if such arguments can be offered to the Athenian people in their assembly, that shows not only Alcibiades' audacity and παρανομία, but equally how precarious the democracy and its

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Bury on the function of speeches: "in some cases the speech was only a dramatic disguise of a study of his own. Thus, the characters of the two protagonist cities, Athens and Sparta, are delineated in a speech of a third party, the Corinthians: the author of this famous comparison was unquestionably Thucydides himself" (Bury 1909, 116).

<sup>28</sup>Thucydides will only do so indirectly, referring to the statesman as being μὴ ἀξύνετος (γνώμη τε δοκῆ μὴ ἀξύνετος, 2.34.6).

<sup>29</sup>Nicolai (1996, 273).

ideals are."<sup>30</sup> According to Diodotus, the Athenians were erring when listening to Cleon (ὕμεις δὲ σκέψασθε ὅσον ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἀμαρτάνοιτε Κλέωνι πειθόμενοι, 3.47.1), and Hermocrates at Camarina makes a similar implication regarding their response to Alcibiades, stating that a γνώμης ἀμάρτημα would be inevitable, when trying to control fate to achieve one's ἐπιθυμία (οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἅμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τύχης τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοίως ταμίαν γενέσθαι. καὶ εἰ γνώμη ἀμάρτοι..., 6.78.2-3).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Macleod (1983b, 75).

<sup>31</sup>Cf. 6.80.2, where Hermocrates in the conclusion to his speech refers more directly to the Sicilian Expedition as an error: καίτοι κάλλιον τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις καὶ ἅμα συγγενέσι προσθεμένους τὴν τε κοινὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ Σικελίᾳ φυλάξαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φίλους δὴ ὄντας μὴ ἔᾶσαι ἀμαρτεῖν. Moreover, his opponent in the debate at Camarina effectively illustrates how far the Athenians have come: Euphemus' reference to Athens as a τυραννίς appears as though it were the most natural equation to make (ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι συμφέρον οὐδ' οἰκείον ὅτι μὴ πιστόν, 6.85.1). As was the case with Diodotus, perhaps Thucydides' choice of an 'unknown' speaker is to ensure his readers' attention on the general disposition of the Athenians, rather than that of a single man (cf. Chapter 2 n. 108).

**Appendix**  
**The use of ἔρωσ in Thucydides' contemporaries**

**AESCHYLUS**

PASSAGE	ἔρωσ / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρωσ
<i>Supp.</i> 520-521	ἔρωσ	sanctuary/safety
<i>Supp.</i> 1041-1042	ἐρώτων	love/sexual passion
<i>Pers.</i> 824-826	ἐρασθεῖς	wealth
<i>Th.</i> 391-395	ἐρών	battle
<i>Th.</i> 687-688	ἔρωτος	battle
<i>Pr.</i> 590-592	ἔρωτι	love/sexual passion
<i>Pr.</i> 891-893	ἐραστεύσαι	unions/marriages
<i>Pr.</i> 902-904	ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>A.</i> 341-342	ἔρωσ	plunder
<i>A.</i> 540	ἔρωσ	fatherland
<i>A.</i> 742-743	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>A.</i> 1478-1479	ἔρωσ	bloodshed
<i>Ch.</i> 596-598	ἔρωτας	love/sexual passion
<i>Ch.</i> 599-601	ἔρωσ/ἀπέρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Eu.</i> 851-852	ἐρασθήσεσθε	land
<i>Eu.</i> 864-865	ἔρωσ	glory

**SOPHOCLES**

PASSAGE	ἔρωσ / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρωσ
<i>Tr.</i> 354-355	ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Tr.</i> 431-433	ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Tr.</i> 441-442	ἔρωτι	love/sexual passion
<i>Tr.</i> 488-489	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Ant.</i> 90	ἐρός	impossibilities/ to bury P.

PASSAGE	ἔρωσ / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρωσ
<i>Ant.</i> 220	ἐρῆ	death
<i>Ant.</i> 615-617	ἐρώτων	(used of general passion)
<i>Ant.</i> 781-800	Ἔρωσ/Ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Ant.</i> 1336	ἐρώ	death
<i>Aj.</i> 684-686	ἐρῆ	death
<i>Aj.</i> 967-968	ἠράσθη	death
<i>OT</i> 601-602	ἐραστής	policy of treason
<i>El.</i> 197	ἔρος	bloodshed
<i>El.</i> 364-365	ἐρώ	to win honour
<i>Ph.</i> 651	ἐρῆς	to bring belongings
<i>Ph.</i> 659-660	ἐρώ/ἔρωθ'	to examine P's bow/arrows
<i>OC</i> 510-512	ἔραμαι	to hear of old evils

### EURIPIDES

PASSAGE	ἔρωσ / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρωσ
<i>Cyc.</i> 554-555	ἐράν	love/sexual passion
<i>Cyc.</i> 588	ἐραστήν	love/sexual passion
<i>Alc.</i> 715	ἐρώντα	long life
<i>Alc.</i> 865-867	ἔραμαι	the dead/state of death
<i>Alc.</i> 1079-1081	ἔρωσ	to mourn for a beloved
<i>Med.</i> 7-8	ἔρωτι	love/sexual passion
<i>Med.</i> 151-152	ἔρος	death
<i>Med.</i> 330	ἔρωτες	love/sexual passion
<i>Med.</i> 490-491	ἐρασθῆναι	love/sexual passion
<i>Med.</i> 529-531	Ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Med.</i> 627-630	ἔρωτες	love/sexual passion
<i>Med.</i> 688	ἐρῆς	whatever desired
<i>Med.</i> 697-698	ἐρασθεῖς/ἔρωτα	love/sexual passion
<i>Med.</i> 700	ἠράσθη	to gain an alliance

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
<i>Med.</i> 714-715	ἔρως	children
<i>Med.</i> 840-845	Ἔρωτας	love/sexual passion
<i>Med.</i> 974-975	ἐρῆ	that Jason's bride perish
<i>Hipp.</i> 27-28	ἔρωτι	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 29-32	ἐρώσ'/ἔρωτ'	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 38-41	ἔρωτος/ἔρωτα	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 174-176	ἔραται	to learn something
<i>Hipp.</i> 194-197	δυσέρωτες	life
<i>Hipp.</i> 219-225	ἔραμαι/ἔρασαι	the hunt
<i>Hipp.</i> 233-235	ἔρασαι	horses
<i>Hipp.</i> 337	ἠράσθης/ἔρον	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 346-350	ἐράν/ἐρῆς	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 358-361	ἐρώσι	evils/death
<i>Hipp.</i> 391-393	ἔρως	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 438-439	ἐρῆς	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 440-442	ἔρωτος/ἐρώσι	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 449-450	ἔρον	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 452-453	ἠράσθη	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 455-456	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 475-477	ἐρώσα	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 504-506	ἔρωτι	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 509-512	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 525-534	Ἔρωσ Ἔρωσ/ Ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 537-541	Ἔρωτα	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 727	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 766-768	ἐρώτων	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 775	ἔρωτα	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 1274-1275	Ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 1302-1303	ἠράσθη	love/sexual passion
<i>Hipp.</i> 1374-1376	ἔραμαι	double-edged spear/death
<i>Hipp.</i> 1428-1430	ἔρως	love/sexual passion
<i>Hec.</i> 357-358	ἐράν	death

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
<i>Hec.</i> 775	ἡράσθη	gold
<i>Hec.</i> 996	ἔρα	wealth
<i>Hec.</i> 1280	ἐρῆς	misery
<i>Supp.</i> 137	ἔρωτα	alliance
<i>Supp.</i> 176-179	ἔρως	possessions
<i>Supp.</i> 238-239	ἐρώσ'	more wealth
<i>Supp.</i> 899-900	ἐραστάς	love/sexual passion
<i>Supp.</i> 1039-40	ἐρώσα	to die with husband
<i>Supp.</i> 1087-1088	ἐραστής	children
<i>HF</i> 63-66	ἔρωτι	τύραννις
<i>HF</i> 316-318	ἐρᾶν	impossibilities/to save grandchildren
<i>Ion</i> 65-66	ἔρωτι	children
<i>Tr.</i> 255	ἔρως	love/sexual passion
<i>Tr.</i> 413-415	ἔρωτ'	love/sexual passion
<i>Tr.</i> 438-439	ἔρωτες	lotus
<i>Tr.</i> 732-734	ἐρᾶν	battle
<i>Tr.</i> 840-842	Ἔρως Ἔρως	love/sexual passion
<i>Tr.</i> 976-977	ἔρωτα	beauty
<i>Tr.</i> 1005-1006	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Tr.</i> 1051	ἐραστής	love/sexual passion
<i>El.</i> 297-298	ἔρον	to hear Electra's story
<i>IT</i> 530	ἐρῆς	answers
<i>IT</i> 1172	ἔρον	to learn of pollution
<i>Hel.</i> 666-668	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Hel.</i> 1102-1104	ἔρωτας	love/sexual passion
<i>Hel.</i> 1639	ἐρᾶν	death
<i>Ph.</i> 357-359	ἐρᾶν	fatherland
<i>Ph.</i> 621-622	ἔρως	to kill brother
<i>Ba.</i> 404-405	Ἔρωτες	love/sexual passion
<i>Ba.</i> 813	ἔρωτα	to see the Bacchae
<i>IA</i> 75-76	ἐρώων/ἐρώσαν	love/sexual passion

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
IA 508-509	ἔρωτα	love/sexual passion
IA 543-551	ἔρως	(used of raging passion)
IA 584-586	ἔρωτα/ἔρωτι	love/sexual passion
IA 807-809	ἔρως	expedition to Troy
Rh. 166	ἐρώμεν	the life of a τύραννος
Rh. 184	ἐρώντι/ἀντερᾶς	horses
Rh. 360-364	ἐρώτων	love/sexual passion
Rh. 837-840	ἐρασθεῖς	horses
Rh. 859-860	ἔρως	horses

### HERODOTUS

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
1.8.1-2	ἠράσθη/ἐρασθεῖς	love/sexual passion
1.96.4-5	ἐρασθεῖς	to be τύραννος
2.131.2-4	ἠράσθη	love/sexual passion
3.31.5-6	ἠράσθη	love/sexual passion
3.53.16-17	ἐρασταί	τύραννις
5.32.9-10	ἔρωτα	to be τύραννος
6.62.1-2	ἔρως	love/sexual passion
9.108.1-2	ἦρα	love/sexual passion
9.108.12-14	ἦρα	love/sexual passion
9.113.13-14	ἔρωτα	love/sexual passion

### LYSIAS

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
3.39	ἐρώσι	(used of general passion)
3.44	ἐρᾶν	(used of general passion)

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
4.8	δύσερως / ἐράσθαι	love/sexual passion
14.27	ἐραστής	love/sexual passion

### ARISTOPHANES

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
<i>Ach.</i> 28-36	ἐρῶν	peace
<i>Ach.</i> 142-144	ἐραστής	Athens/Athenians
<i>Ach.</i> 145-146	ἦρα	to eat sausages
<i>Ach.</i> 991-992	Ἔρως	peace
<i>Eq.</i> 732-740	ἐραστής/ἀντεραστής ἐρῶν/ἐρωμένοις	love/sexual passion with political overtones
<i>Eq.</i> 1162-1163	ἐραστῶν	love/sexual passion with political overtones
<i>Eq.</i> 1340-1342	ἐραστής	love/sexual passion with political overtones
<i>Nu.</i> 975-980	ἐρασταῖσιν / ἐραστήν	love/sexual passion
<i>Nu.</i> 1076	ἠράσθης	love/sexual passion
<i>Nu.</i> 1080-1081	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Nu.</i> 1303-1305	ἐρᾶν/ἐρασθεῖς	evil things
<i>Nu.</i> 1458-1459	ἐραστήν	evil things
<i>V.</i> 88-89	ἐρᾶ	judging
<i>V.</i> 473-474	ἐραστά	monarchy
<i>V.</i> 752-755	ἔραμαι	to be the last at the κημοῖς
<i>V.</i> 1025-1026	ἐραστής	love/sexual passion
<i>V.</i> 1364-1365	ἐρᾶν	love/sexual passion
<i>Pax</i> 190-191	ἐραστής	disputes
<i>Pax</i> 987-988	ἐρασταῖς	peace
<i>Pax</i> 1097-1098	ἔραται	civil war
<i>Av.</i> 75-77	ἐρᾶ	to eat sardines
<i>Av.</i> 135-136	ἐρᾶς/ἐρῶ	hardships

PASSAGE	ἔρωσ / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρωσ
<i>Av.</i> 143	ἐρᾶς	hardships
<i>Av.</i> 324	ἐραστά	society of birds
<i>Av.</i> 412-414	ἔρωσ	birds' way of life
<i>Av.</i> 592	ἐρώσι	wealth
<i>Av.</i> 694-706	ἔρωσ / ἔρωσ / ἔρωτος ἐρώσι / ἐρασταί	love/sexual passion
<i>Av.</i> 1278-1279	ἐραστάς	bird city
<i>Av.</i> 1316	ἔρωτες	bird city
<i>Av.</i> 1343b	ἐρώ	laws/customs of the birds
<i>Av.</i> 1635-1636	ἐρᾶς	peace
<i>Av.</i> 1737	ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Lys.</i> 551-554	ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Th.</i> 400-401	ἐράν	love/sexual passion
<i>Th.</i> 1117-1118	ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Ra.</i> 1022	ἠράσθη	battle
<i>Ra.</i> 1043-1044	ἐρώσαν	love/sexual passion
<i>Ra.</i> 1392	ἐρᾶ	gifts/offerings
<i>Ec.</i> 954-959	ἔρωσ / ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Ec.</i> 967-968	ἔρωσ	love/sexual passion
<i>Ec.</i> 994	ἐραστήν	love/sexual passion
<i>Pl.</i> 153-154	ἐραστῶν	love/sexual passion
<i>Pl.</i> 178-179	ἐρᾶ	love/sexual passion
<i>Pl.</i> 189-190	ἔρωτος	love/sexual passion
<i>Pl.</i> 253-254	ἐρασταί	labour
<i>Pl.</i> 992	ἐρώντ'	love/sexual passion
<i>Pl.</i> 1008-1009	ἐρών	to hear someone's voice

ANDOCIDES

PASSAGE	ἔρωσ / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρωσ
<i>Myst.</i> 127	ἀνηράσθη	love/sexual passion

ISOCRATES

PASSAGE	ἔρως / COGNATE	OBJECT OF ἔρως
8.103	ἐράων	whatever desired
8.113	ἐρώσι	evils
10.52	ἔρωσι	hardships of expedition
10.55	ἔρωσι	beautiful things
12.193	ἐρασθεισαν	love/sexual passion
12.318	ἐρασθησιναι	friendship and alliance
15.245	ἐρώσι	(used of general passion)
15.275	ἐρασθειεν	to persuade an audience
<i>Ep.</i> 7.7	ἐράς	money, power and danger

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





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