


LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS SCIENCE OF ALL
POSSIBLE SCIENCES

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SUMMARY

The following dissertation presents the facticity of language as a difficulty for the successful development of phenomenology into a science of all possible sciences.

One version of the theory of linguistic relativity interprets languages as contingent, empirical objects limited by duration in time and geographical extension. Some linguistic relativists also maintain that language and thought are coterminous. Thus, if thought is dependent on language, and if language is contingent, then the range of possible thought is governed by more or less arbitrary conventions.

Even if the linguistic relativists were to retreat to the position that only objectifiable ("shareable") thought and language are coterminous, it would strongly support logical psychologism. Logical laws would depend on linguistic convention.

Phenomenology has as one of its main aims the overcoming of psychologism. However, phenomenology's dependence on language is found to render the accomplishment of this major aim suspect.

INTRODUCTION

The objectifiability of a thought is conditional upon ontological commitment* to the means of objectification. The following essay attempts to explore the relationship between such ontological commitments and the practicability of Husserl's phenomenology as science of all possible sciences.

The principal means of objectifying thought is language. Thus, the present study is concerned with presenting the epistemological implications of ontological commitment to the existence of language for the possibility of a science of all possible sciences. The discussion exhibits conflict between the aims of phenomenology and the epistemological implications of ontological commitment regarding language. The conflict is described as a facet of the struggle between early phenomenology and psychologism.

There are three parts to the discussion. The first two parts basically correspond to the two sides of the conflict.

The first part attempts to draw out the consequences of linguistic ontological commitment for the nature of thought. This is largely done by presenting linguistic ontological commitment as a fundamental tenet of at least one version of the theory of linguistic relativity. This section will be aimed at answering the following questions: 1. What are ontological and metaphysical assumptions regarding language? 2. Why are such assumptions an important topic

* See Appendix I

for philosophical discussion? 3. Is linguistic relativity a necessary consequence of these assumptions? 4. On what basis does linguistic relativity offer a critique of rationalistic philosophy?

Owing to the interrelationships between these questions, a separate discussion of each question did not seem advisable. A separate treatment of each question would have involved excessive repetition and circumlocution. Thus, the above questions serve merely as a guide to my intentions and not as a guide to divisions in the text of the essay.

Near the end of this first part, Wittgenstein's argument against Cartesian privacy is presented as a paradigm of the conflict between ontological commitment regarding language and the aims of rationalistic philosophy. It is suggested that Wittgenstein's arguments are consistent with at least one version of linguistic relativity. In being consistent with linguistic relativity Wittgenstein's argument amounts to a criticism of rationalism from the point of view of psychologism.

Wittgenstein's position serves as a transition to the second part of this essay in which I characterize the establishment of phenomenology in Logical Investigations¹ as an attempt to undermine psychologism as based on ontological commitment regarding language.

If the first part of this essay succeeds in explaining the nature and consequences of ontological commitment regarding language, the second part aims at presenting such ontological commitment as a problem for the use and understanding of the language of science and especially for the language of phenomenology as science of all possible sciences. It is found that subjective presuppositions inherent in language prevent the objectivity in thought and communication necessary

for the attainment of absolute, universal knowledge. Since language is necessary for thought and communication, the ontological and metaphysical presuppositions inherent in it may cause a problem for the self-applicability of a theory of absolute, universal knowledge. This problem is seen as one motive for establishing phenomenology as science of all possible sciences.

In confronting the language problem with regard to the ideal of science, Husserl is facing the problem of the language of phenomenology. I suggest that Husserl's method of handling this problem in Logical Investigations consists of the application of phenomenological and eidetic reductions to language. By these means Husserl hopes to show that ontological and metaphysical commitment are non-essential to language. Further, the exclusion of ontological commitment from language leads to the intelligibility of the methods of phenomenological psychology in their character as phenomenological discoveries. The point of Husserl's efforts is to show that scientific investigations, and especially phenomenological investigations, need not deteriorate into psychological investigations.

The third and final major portion of this essay consists of an explication and evaluation of Husserl's effort to eliminate ontological commitment from language in the first of the Logical Investigations. Husserl attempts to accomplish his aim through a series of distinctions which lead to the separation of the sign as indicator and the expression. These distinctions are shown to follow the procedure of phenomenological and eidetic reduction as described in Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica² article of 1927.

By means of reductive procedures Husserl finds that the expression belongs essentially to solitary mental life while the sign is found to be essentially a physical percept. Thus, the ideality of the expression will consist for Husserl in the ideal possibility of the indefinite repetition of the expression as phenomenon in contrast to the impossibility of the exact repetition of the sign as physical percept.

However, I shall argue that the distinction between the sign and the expression cannot be maintained. This argument shall consist of a criticism of Husserl's description of solitary mental life and of the use of the expression in soliloquy. The criticism of Husserl's concept of solitary mental life leads to the impracticability and the unintelligibility of phenomenological reduction as a scientific method and as a phenomenological discovery.

This critique is extended to Husserl's ideal conception of meaning. I shall argue that the distinction which Husserl draws between the subjective meaning intention, or meaning conferring act and the meaning itself does not necessarily lead to the ideality of meaning. For indefinite repetition could only occur in so far as the meaning could be intended or conferred identically an infinite number of times. Such repetition is not a real possibility.

It should be stated at the outset that the Logical Investigations, where the idea of phenomenology as science of all possible sciences is introduced, are carried out at the level of phenomenological psychology. The investigations do not proceed beyond the phenomenological and eidetic reductions to the later-to-be-developed transcendental reduction, which is said to open up the realm of

transcendental subjectivity. Whether it is in fact possible to distinguish between a transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology is itself debatable. Husserl himself seems to have had doubts about the validity of the distinction.³ In any case, I wish to state that the present study brings the epistemological difficulty of ontological commitments involving language to bear only on the practicality of the phenomenological and eidetic reductions and thus on the practicability of what is usually called phenomenological psychology. Whether such ontological commitment creates similar difficulties for a transcendental phenomenology is a subject for further study.

Thus the area of research is limited on the one hand to the primary writings of Husserl which I deemed most important to the subject of the relationship between the inception of the idea of phenomenology and the exclusion of ontological commitment to existence, especially with regard to the existence of language. The main works cited have been Logical Investigations and Husserl's 1927 article, "Phenomenology" in the Encyclopedia Britannica as newly translated by Richard Palmer in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. Other writings by Husserl have been cited or referred to where I thought it necessary.

On the other hand, I have also referred to works exclusively on the subject of the epistemological problem of the relationship between thought and language. These works have consisted preponderantly of primary works on linguistic relativity. However, Wittgenstein's last major work, On Certainty, has also been considered, since it is directly concerned with the epistemological problem of the necessity of ontological commitment in the objectification of thought.

While linguistic relativity may be considered as an anthropological and linguistic theory, I think that its interest for the philosophical issues at hand justifies an exclusively philosophical treatment. The theory of linguistic relativity originates in the philosophical interest of the late eighteenth century philosopher, Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the relationship between language and thought. Further, the inability of linguists and anthropologists to provide conclusive empirical tests for the validity of the theory indicates that linguistic relativity is, at bottom, a philosophical and not an empirical thesis.

Those secondary sources have been incorporated which seemed to me to be especially interesting and relevant.

Thus, the following essay is not an exhaustive historical study either of Husserl's theory of reduction or of Husserl's philosophy of language. It is rather the presentation and explication of a philosophical problem which stands in a peculiar and singular relationship to a key Husserlian text. The problem, as previously stated, is that ontological commitment to the existence of language may have epistemological implications which conflict with the establishment of an absolute foundation for science in terms of a pure logic or a phenomenology. The Logical Investigations (especially the introduction to volume II and the "First Investigation") address this problem specifically by attempting to show that no support can be found for psychologism in the nature of language. The present essay tries to show that Husserl's method leads to the alleged discovery of the essence of the expression. This essence itself and Husserl's method of discovering it seem to me to bear a close resemblance to the phenomenological and

eidetic reductions. I have used the Britannica article as a way of exhibiting by comparison this similarity not simply to limit the scope of research but in an effort to let what I and others take to be Husserl's most representative account of his method stand as a basis for comparison. The Britannica article was to be a concise authoritative statement by Husserl at the mid point in his career to the English speaking world of the nature, aims, and method of phenomenology. It went through at least four drafts. Husserl even used the article as an opportunity to unite the phenomenological movement by trying (unsuccessfully) to collaborate with Heidegger on it. Hence the choice of this article was by no means arbitrary, it was determined by Britannica text's suitability to serve as authority. And the authoritativeness of the Britannica text seemed to be the best means of avoiding the endless and inconclusive disputes on the nature of reduction which did not seem to be of any particular relevance to my task since the interest of the problematic was only in the most general features and aims of the phenomenological and eidetic reductions.

Hence, the present study explicates a conflict between what I shall present as the anthropological version of linguistic relativity (best exemplified by Benjamin Lee Whorf) and Husserl's analysis of the expression as foundational to phenomenology as science of all possible sciences. I find that the linguistic relativist gets the better of the conflict.

I think that the main accomplishments of the thesis were: Firstly, to provide a new understanding of the theory of linguistic relativity which does away with the paradoxes of the so-called

strong-weak hypothesis interpretation by showing that the strong and weak hypothesis are compatible where the influence exerted by a particular language is distinguished from the control exerted by language as the set of natural languages or by language as an abstract entity. I distinguish an anthropological version of linguistic relativity to which a definition of language as the set of natural languages is appropriate and a metaphysical hypothesis to which an understanding of language as an abstract entity is appropriate. This interpretation is, as far as I know, original.

Secondly, I think that I have shown that part of the concern of the Logical Investigations is to overcome the epistemological limitations which would govern all thought and thus logic according to such an hypothesis as the anthropological version of linguistic relativity, that the attempt to work out a method and foundation for a science of all possible sciences was partially determined by consideration of a possible linguistic predicament which has relativistic epistemological consequences. If I have shown this, then perhaps I have also succeeded in suggesting in what way the Investigations are significant for contemporary philosophical and linguistic interests.

I have tried to argue in a sustained and coherent fashion that the theory of expressions being worked out in the Investigations and further explicated only in the later development of Husserl's philosophy cannot overcome the problem of its "self-applicability" that the anthropological theory of linguistic relativity would pose for any self-consistent idealistic theory of language.

However, I have noted that the discovery of intentionality^{*}, although not sufficient for the self-applicability of a phenomenological theory of expressions, explains how the meaningfulness of expressions may be constituted from within on the basis of what has been learned by empirical experience.

I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Peter McCormick for his helpful and appropriate criticisms and suggestions, and for his very kind attention and concern.

* See Appendix II

PART I: Ontological Commitment, Language, and the
Psychologism of Linguistic Relativity

Section 1. Introduction: the importance of a discussion
of linguistic relativity for a contemporary
consideration of Husserl's phenomenology

The importance of linguistic relativity for phenomenology is the development in certain versions of linguistic relativity of the psychologistic or anthropologicistic implications of ontological commitment with regard to language. At least one version of linguistic relativity contends that thought, perception, and behaviour are conditioned by presuppositions inherent in existing languages.

Linguistic relativity is an obscure, intractable, but nevertheless tempting thesis.¹ Its proponents claim, with varying degrees of conviction, that thought, perception, and behaviour are in some way relative to language. Depending on the particular advocate of linguistic relativity, language may be considered as one kind of abstract entity or as nothing more than existing natural languages or as both. All major linguistic relativists--von Humboldt, Sapir, and Whorf--seem to agree that at least individual natural languages contain implicit ontological and, or, metaphysical presuppositions within their syntactical structures and lexical resources. These presuppositions vary from language to language and exert some degree of control over the possibilities of thought and perception in the speakers of the various languages. One instance of the relativity of thought to language out of the many which Whorf describes concerns the hypostatization of entities to fill the place of the subject on

the part of speakers of just those languages which require that all verbs have substantives. Such languages may constrain their speakers to think of actions as always being performed by subjects, whereas the action itself may be all that inheres in reality. According to Whorf: "We have to say 'It flashed,' or 'A light flashed,' setting up an actor 'it' or 'light' to perform what we call an action, 'to flash,' yet the flashing and the light are one and the same."²

It is extremely difficult to determine to what precise degree linguistic relativists think that language controls thought, perception and behaviour. It is evident that they do not agree with each other on this matter. There is also evidence which suggests that each proponent's version of the thesis may not be internally consistent.

The suggestion that linguistic relativists are not consistent with each other and perhaps not even consistent with themselves is of some importance. Such a suggestion indicates that the importance of linguistic relativity for phenomenology may not be a simple matter of a theory of the epistemological significance of language which runs contrary to the one which is propounded by Husserl.

Obviously, linguistic relativity, by its very title, purports to be a form of relativism. Relativism may take the form of scepticism concerning the epistemological grounding of science. If, for instance, logical laws are taken to be psychological facts, then it follows that their validity is relative to those facts. Further, scientific knowledge based upon logic would then depend on contingent factual circumstances. Thus the relativity of logic to factual

circumstances lends credence to sceptical doubts about scientific knowledge. In fact, in the "Prolegomena" to Logical Investigations, Husserl equates what he calls individual relativism with scepticism. He says, "Individual relativism is such a bare-faced and (one might almost say) 'cheeky' scepticism, that it has certainly not been held in modern times."³ He also connects relativism in general to scepticism concerning the epistemological status of logical laws: "Our two forms of relativism are special cases of relativism in the widest sense of the word, as a doctrine which somehow derives the pure principles of logic from facts. Facts are contingent: they might very well not have been the case. . . ."⁴ Further, Husserl links psychologism (understood here as holding the 'truths' of philosophy, including logic, to be psychological truths) to relativism. The title of subsection thirty-eight of the "Prolegomena" reads "Psychologism in all its forms is a relativism."⁵ Thus the question that presents itself is: "Is there an internally consistent form of linguistic relativity which lends support to psychological relativism and thus also to sceptical doubts concerning the epistemological foundations of science?"

Husserl's phenomenology strives to be a science of all possible sciences.⁶ Accordingly, Husserl's phenomenology must be concerned with eliminating all relativism from the foundations of science. If the laws of logic, as the ground of scientific truth, were proved to be mere empirical generalizations of thought processes relative to a given culture, then any epistemological justification of scientific method or of the priority of scientific truths would, in the last analysis, be rendered nugatory. As science of all possible sciences

then, Husserl's phenomenology is called upon to explain and justify the epistemological priority of science in general by giving ultimate grounds for belief in knowledge. This would involve the overcoming of scepticism. In the "Prolegomena" to Logical Investigations, Husserl says: "The essence of science therefore involves unity in the whole system of grounded validation: not only isolated pieces of knowledge, but their grounded validations themselves."⁷

Thus, the most crucial problem that linguistic relativity as a self-consistent support of epistemological scepticism could pose for science would be to call into question the results and, or, the possibility of phenomenology as science of all possible sciences. Phenomenology as providing grounds for the sciences must be free from ontological and metaphysical presuppositions which would relativize its method. Sapir, in fact, has directed linguistic relativity against the claims of philosophy. He suggests, in an essay entitled "The Grammarian and His Language," that the philosopher may be the "dupe of speech forms," that "the mold of his thought, which is typically a linguistic mold, is apt to be projected into his conception of the world."⁸

The disagreement among proponents of linguistic relativity about the degree of control that language exerts on thought, perception, and behaviour is then germane to the possibility of a science of all possible sciences. Is linguistic relativity a warning to philosophers to take great care in their use of language, or does linguistic relativity claim that philosophers are inextricably bound by ontological commitments inherent in the structure of language(s)?

This is the question to which the present essay will be addressed. Ultimately, this question opens up the issue of whether or not philosophy as a science, and thus the ultimate grounding of science by philosophy, is possible.

With regard to this question, I wish to make three basic points.

1. There are two linguistic relativity hypotheses--not a strong hypothesis and a weak hypothesis, as is currently believed, but a metaphysical and an anthropological hypothesis.

The most definitive treatment of the subject of linguistic relativity from a philosophical point of view seems to me to be Julia M. Penn's Linguistic Relativity versus Innate Ideas.⁹ Penn claims that all linguistic relativists offer two hypotheses--one hypothesis which states that language merely influences thought, and another which states that language determines and is coterminous with thought.

I will argue against Penn's interpretation. I shall try to show that there is a metaphysical version of linguistic relativity advanced by von Humboldt which is not antithetical to innate, necessary ideas, and I will try to show also that the development of von Humboldt's theory upon anthropological lines by Whorf is that version of linguistic relativity which stands most opposed to the possibility of innate, necessary categories of thought.

2. The anthropological linguistic relativity hypothesis is a form of psychological relativism which occasions scepticism. Further, as will be shown, this version of the hypothesis is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to overcome.

The distinction between the anthropological and metaphysical versions of the linguistic relativity hypothesis is meant, in part, to call attention to different senses of the term "language." To begin with, Saussure distinguishes between language, "langue" and speech, "parole." He points out that language forms only an essential part of speech. For although language is necessary for speech, the act of speaking involves such things as the exercise of vocal chords, flexion of the tongue, and the production of sound(s). Language on the other hand may be isolated from such physiological functions as is shown by the written word. According to Saussure, "linguistic signs are tangible; it is possible to reduce them to conventional written symbols, whereas it would be impossible to provide detailed photographs of acts of speaking, 'actes de parole;' the pronunciation of even the smallest word represents an infinite number of muscular movements that could be identified and put into graphic form only with great difficulty."¹⁰

Saussure calls attention to the fact that language is a societal phenomenon whereas speech is a product of the individual. According to Saussure, in distinguishing between language and speech we are distinguishing "what is social from what is individual." "Language," he goes on, "is not a function of the speaker; it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual. It never requires premeditation."¹¹ Saussure speaks figuratively of language as being formed by means of a contract signed by the members of a community. It represents a system of convention. The individual is the executor of the contract or convention. And whereas the contract is a social fact, "execution is always individual."¹²

In this study, language shall always be understood as distinguished from speech. However, I do not accept Saussure's definition of "language" as: "a well defined object in the heterogeneous mass of speech facts," which "can be localized in a limited segment of the speaking-circuit where an auditory image becomes associated with a concept."¹³ Saussure's definition seems to presuppose that we can have concepts apart from what he calls "auditory images." But as we shall see it is very difficult to produce evidence of concepts without "auditory images" either in speech or in the visual form of writing.

Two other senses of the term "language" need to be discussed and enumerated. Firstly, language may be understood as denoting nothing more nor less than the collection of the various historically given natural languages. Greek, English, Hebrew, French, Latin, etc., are examples of historically given languages, i.e., they are examples of particular languages which have been or still are commonly in use. The term "language" may denote the set of languages similarly to the way in which the term "animal" denotes the set of animals. This is the sense of the term "language" which is appropriate to what I call the anthropological version of linguistic relativity. That is, anthropological linguistic relativity may be characterized in part as a theory of cognition which states that language and thought are coterminous where "language" is understood as denoting the set of historically given natural languages. The reasons for calling such a thesis the "anthropological" version of linguistic relativity will be discussed momentarily.

The second sense of "language" is exhibited where language is understood as an entity over and apart from the collection of historically given natural languages. That is, language may be considered as a general abstract entity like "substance" or "matter." As such, it may have characteristics which a particular, historically given, natural language may not display and it may not display characteristics which particular natural languages do display. For example, one might want to say that language contains implicitly all possible thought and perceptions whereas neither English nor German, nor French, nor any of the other particular languages taken separately or collectively does. Further, one can say correctly that Biblical Hebrew is archaic, but one could not say correctly that language as such is archaic. The anthropological linguistic relativist would look amiss at all such generalizations.

This second sense of the term language is appropriate to what I call the metaphysical version of linguistic relativity. The reason for the appellation "metaphysical" is that metaphysical linguistic relativity posits the existence of an abstract, ideal entity, language, which contains all the possibilities of thought and perception. Anthropological linguistic relativity, on the other hand, would argue against the existence of such an entity. Anthropological linguistic relativity is a theory about the relationship between a set of empirical objects, languages, and the nature of human thought. It states that language is an empirical limit to human thought and perception. As such, it implies that human thought is an object for anthropological research where anthropology is broadly conceived of as a branch of the positive science of zoology which has man as its object.¹⁴

In the light of the two different senses of "language," which have just been discussed, one can distinguish ontological commitment to the existence of a language from metaphysical presuppositions inherent within the logical structure of language. Both versions of linguistic relativity agree that language contains metaphysical predispositions. That is, the syntactical structure and lexical resources of a language will, according to linguistic relativity, influence a given speaker's concept of the world. Speakers of English would, according to Whorf, be prone to think of actions as always being performed by a subject whereas a speaker of a language which did not lay such heavy grammatical stress on the role of nouns would not. However, the thesis that there are metaphysical predispositions in language is not bound to any particular sense of the term "language." It would be perfectly consistent to adhere to this thesis and maintain that language is a general abstract entity. In this case metaphysical predispositions in language might amount to a priori categories of thought and judgement. That is, the possibilities of thought would not be restricted by empirical limits but by ideal limits.

On the other hand, if language is taken to be the set of natural languages and if one adheres to the view that language and thought are coterminous, then it follows that one thinks that there are empirical limits to thought. That is, any given thinker is ontologically committed to the factual, empirical, existence of a language.) Further, the metaphysical presuppositions inherent in any given language would be as contingent and accidental as the existences of the languages themselves. Thus, the anthropological version of

linguistic relativity implies a psychologistic epistemology. It states that language, as an empirical limit to thought, restricts the amount and kind of knowledge which man can obtain. According to anthropological linguistic relativity, ontological commitment to empirical existence is necessary for thought.

In order to overcome the anthropological theory of linguistic relativity, it would have to be shown that either language is ideal in character or that objectifiable thought is not coterminous with language as the set of historically given natural languages.

One might wish to object that in order to overcome anthropological linguistic relativism it is merely necessary to show that all extant or dead languages share common grammatical or semantic features. Such findings would prove that there are universal, innately necessary modes of thought. However, the weakness of this objection is that even if it were possible to show that all individual languages contain common grammatical features it would not thereby be proven that language is not subjective and empirical or that thought is not restricted to or influenced by language.

Thus, anthropological linguistic relativism strikes at the very heart of phenomenology. It casts doubt upon the availability of language as a tool for phenomenological research by ruling out the possibility of gaining absolute knowledge. For, according to anthropological linguistic relativism, all thought and thought processes would be contingent in their dependency on the empirical being of language. If the anthropological linguistic relativist is correct, there is no hope for an absolute foundation for formal logic. The laws of formal logic would be dependent on the factual circumstances of language.

3. Wittgenstein directly criticizes the rationalistic undertaking on grounds of the ontological presupposition of the existence of language when he criticizes Cartesian doubt in On Certainty.¹⁵

According to On Certainty, Wittgenstein accuses the Cartesian sceptic of neglecting to doubt the meanings of his own words. That is, Wittgenstein contends that Cartesian doubt is a function of what may be called a language game. Language games are empirical facts. A word having this or that meaning is an empirical circumstance. Therefore, there is no necessity in the Cartesian sceptic's arriving at the "cogito ergo sum." It is rather a case of "sum ergo cogito." The Cartesian sceptic is the "dupe" of his language.

I turn now to develop each of these three points in successive sections.

Section 2. Linguistic relativity may take two forms: one supports innate, necessary ideas, and the other is perhaps the strongest position against them

Julia M. Penn, along with A. H. Basson, D. J. O'Connor and John B. Carroll,¹⁶ has suggested that there are two linguistic relativity hypotheses. Penn distinguishes a strong and a weak, or modified hypothesis. The strong hypothesis contends that language determines, is the condition of, thought. The strong hypothesis is generally attributed to Wilhelm von Humboldt and Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf has said: "Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown by the study of language. This study shows that the forms of a person's thought are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language."¹⁷ What makes this passage evidence of the strong hypothesis is that the control of language over thought is by "inexorable laws of pattern." Whorf thus implies that the control is absolute.

Von Humboldt has said: "For language is related to everything contained in it, to the totality and to the individual. No part of it is or remains foreign to itself. It does not just passively receive impressions, but it selects from among the possible intellectual directions a single definite one and modifies internally every outside influence exerted upon it."¹⁸ The strong hypothesis comes out in this

quote in that language "modifies internally every outside influence exerted upon it." There is not a single way in which thought or perception can proceed unmodified by the characteristics of language.

A consequence of the absolute control of thought by language is that language precedes thought, is the condition of thought. Thinking is identified with language. Whorf has implied this identification by stating that the form of thought is bound to the patterns of language by inexorable laws. Von Humboldt has stated that language is "an indispensable factor for the development of human intellectual powers."¹⁹ Further, Penn asserts that the strong hypothesis entails that language had to come from an extra-human, presumably divine source. This is true in the case of von Humboldt's theory and perhaps in the case of Sapir's as well. However, Penn's assertion as will be shown is mistaken in the case of the Whorf hypothesis.

The weak hypothesis is usually associated with Edward Sapir. Linguistic relativity is watered down in that language does not determine thought; it merely influences thought. The weak hypothesis does not, it is said, lead to the conclusion that language precedes thinking. Sapir has said: "Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. . . . The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group."²⁰ Penn points out that in this statement the control of language over thinking is qualified by modifiers like "very much" and "to a large

extent" which suggest that the control is not absolute.

These two differing hypotheses have divergent implications for the nature of thinking. The strong hypothesis says that thinking is language, or, in the words of Anatol Rappaport, that "our language does our thinking for us."²¹ The weak says that language merely influences thought. The weak hypothesis seems to be a warning which points out that thinking must overcome the traps that language may set for it.

However, as Penn points out, it can be shown that Sapir propounded a strong hypothesis and that Whorf and von Humboldt at times propounded what look like weak hypotheses. Witness this statement by von Humboldt: "It can probably be assumed that the power to create speech does not reside in man . . . until he has produced whatever satisfies most completely the necessary requirement (my emphasis)."²² This passage seems to imply that there is some thinking on the part of man prior to and necessary for the formulation of language. Further, it comes in the same paragraph in which von Humboldt says that language is necessary for the development of human intellectual powers. This is indeed a curious ambivalence.

Whorf, in a monograph entitled "Language, Mind and Reality," calls language a veil of Maya.²³ He thereby implies that there is a level of possible mental activity other than the linguistic level. Whorf's analogy also implies that the presuppositions in language can and must be overcome. Whorf is very much aware, in this article, of the fact that there are capacities for thought and perception that a given individual language may not develop. This fact is a consequence of there being different ways of thinking developed by different

languages. Thus, even Whorf does not think that thought or perception is coterminous with any single language. He rather maintains that the language that we speak influences the kind of thinking that we do most of the time and that some things are more readily articulated in some languages than in others.

There is even an ambivalence in Sapir. Sapir at one point states: "The writer, for one, is strongly of the opinion that the feeling entertained by so many that they can think or even reason without language is an illusion."²⁴ This statement seems to accord with a strong hypothesis.

So it seems that each linguistic relativist has given at one time or another both versions of the hypothesis as described by Penn. When one considers that the implications of the two hypotheses are divergent, one is driven to search for an explanation. Why is it that each advocate of linguistic relativity propounds both versions of the theory if the two versions of it are really different?

Penn's explanation does not seem plausible to me for two reasons. Penn suggests that, on the one hand, all three proponents of linguistic relativity were inclined towards the strong hypothesis. They saw the strong hypothesis as an effective critique of the rationalist doctrine of innate a priori categories of thought.²⁵ However, it is possible to show that von Humboldt and Sapir were not opposed to the rationalist scheme and further that they saw in language proof of a priori categories of thought. On the other hand, Penn asserts that all three men were driven to a more modified hypothesis because they could not accept, as a conclusion of the strong hypothesis, that language came from a divine source.²⁶ However, I do not think

that the extreme hypothesis necessarily involves an extra-mundane source of language. Thus I would suggest that Penn's presentation is vitiated by the implausibility of her explanation of the strong-weak hypotheses ambivalence.

This calls for a re-examination of the theory as given by each proponent.

Luce Fontaine De Visscher points out that there are two levels of concern in von Humboldt's theory of language. She says: "La pensée du langage, chez W. von Humboldt, est bien cette contraction entre l'idée de forme vivant, d'organisme, et l'idée de totalité. . . . Extérieurement, il s'intéresse surtout aux facteurs historiques de la culture des peuples, mais néanmoins sa préoccupation reste foncièrement métaphysique. Comme pour Herder, la question du langage est pour lui d'ordre ontologique . . . langage n'existe qu'avec l'homme, mais il le précède."²⁷

According to De Visscher's view, von Humboldt's philosophy attempts to take into account both living languages and the totality of language as a general entity. I would suggest that it is this double concern which explains von Humboldt's seemingly different statements of linguistic relativity and not the unacceptability of the consequences of the extreme view. That is, I am contending that von Humboldt did not advance a strong and a weak hypothesis but general and particular versions of the same hypothesis which complement each other.

Von Humboldt's general hypothesis states that language is coterminous with thought. Von Humboldt posits the being of an entity, "language-in-general" otherwise known as the "inner form" of language,

to which thought is restricted. This inner form or language-in-general is distinguished from the various individual languages any one of which does not completely express all the possibilities of thought and perception. Witness these two statements by von Humboldt:

". . . languages are not always successful in developing their latent directions completely, no matter how distinctly the presence of these directions is indicated (my emphasis)." "Language is one of the forms of expression of the universal human intellectual power, and it is continuously dynamic. Differently expressed, we see in language man's striving to wrest reality from the idea of linguistic perfection (my emphasis)."²⁸ In the light of this distinction it is easily seen how the so-called strong and weak hypotheses are not two different hypotheses at all, but two mutually explanatory parts of one overall theory. The general, hypostatized entity, language contains all the possibilities of thought and perception. Von Humboldt says that "Language is one of the forms of expression of the universal human intellectual power." Yet none of the "empirical," historically given incarnations of this entity is able to express all the a priori possibilities of thought. "Languages," says von Humboldt, "are not always successful in developing their latent directions completely." Thus it is evident that within one theory languages may merely influence thought while language may control thought absolutely.

The positing of the entity, language in general, or the inner form of language, keeps von Humboldt's linguistic philosophy from opposing innately necessary categories of thought or judgement. According to von Humboldt, language is innate and controls the development of the intellect. De Visscher points out the similarities

between von Humboldt's "inner form" of language and Kant's categories of judgement: "L'individu utilise librement le langage, mais il est dans le langage. La "forme intérieure" du langage est sa capacité créatrice et en même temps l'a priori qui le rend possible. De même chez Kant: le schématisme transcendantal est en deçà de l'activité et de la passivité, le schème est à la fois intellectuel et sensible, le temps est auto-affection. C'est pourquoi l'individu crée le langage, mais dans un a priori objectivité."²⁹ I would suggest that the individual creates a language and that the a priori objectivity is contained in language in general or the inner form of language. Von Humboldt does imply that language is not the creation of peoples or of individuals. "Language," says von Humboldt, "wells from a depth of human existence which prohibits regarding it generally as a labor and a creation of peoples."³⁰ This quote seems to indicate that language came from a divine source and is innate in man. And further, since man may not develop completely his innate powers, his vision of the world may be limited by the extent and range of the development of his innate capacities. Von Humboldt goes on to say that, "For no matter how innate language is in its entirety, it still possesses an external existence, exerting a power against man himself."³¹

I think that enough evidence has now been given to strongly suggest that von Humboldt was not opposed to the rationalist notion of innate, necessary modes of cognition. For von Humboldt, the full development of the innate capacities of man was an ideal to be sought after "through the idea of linguistic perfection." Thus, Penn's explanation of the Humboldtian hypothesis is not acceptable. The fact that, for von Humboldt, language determines thought is no

argument against innate ideas.

If there can be any doubt von Humboldt did not oppose the rationalist undertaking, I would call the reader's attention to the fourth of the Logical Investigations. In a note appended to the end of that investigation, Husserl notes the similarity between his own project of laying the basis for a "pure logical grammar," an ideal grammar of meaning, and certain aspects of von Humboldt's philosophy. Husserl says: "I refer especially to his (Steinthal's) beautifully precise statement of the notion of W. v. Humboldt . . . from which it would seem that the views stated here are in some points close to those of the great thinker, whom Steinthal also respects. Steinthal himself sides against us and raises many objections to our views (my emphasis)." ³²

The explanation of the two different statements of linguistic relativity which hold the so-called strong statement to describe the relativity of thought to language in general and the so-called weak hypothesis to describe the relativity of thought to particular languages is relevant to Sapir and Whorf as well as to von Humboldt, with one very important qualification. Whorf does not posit the existence of a language in general or anything else that resembles a universally innate, a priori "inner form" of language. Thus I refer to von Humboldt's hypothesis as the metaphysical hypothesis, because von Humboldt posits the existence of an ideal entity, language-in-general, or the inner form of language. I refer to the Whorf hypothesis as the anthropological hypothesis. Whorf's theory confines itself to the empirical facticity of language.

By not positing a language-in-general, or an ideal inner form of language, Whorf indeed opposes his view to innate necessary modes of cognition. In other words, Whorf thinks that thought is confined to language as nothing more nor less than the various historically given natural languages. In the Whorf hypothesis, each language may influence thought differently, and it would be possible to mitigate the influence of one language by learning the syntactical structure of one or many other languages. However, it would not be possible for thought to proceed beyond all presuppositions, for it is bound to the facticity of language. It would merely be possible to trade in one set of presuppositions for the sake of another. Whorf makes the following highly suggestive statement in "Languages and Logic:"

"It may even be in the cards that there is no such thing as 'Language' (with a capital L) at all. The statement 'Thinking is a matter of language' is an incorrect generalization of the more nearly correct idea that 'Thinking is a matter of different tongues.'"³³

Sapir, to my knowledge makes no such explicit statement about the meaning of linguistic relativity. However, after examining various instances of talk about linguistic relativity in his writings, one observes that Sapir definitely believes that particular languages influence both thought and perception. Note that in Sapir's statement of the so-called weak hypothesis (quoted p. 14), he is careful to note that humans are "at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression of their society." But one searches in vain for statements by Sapir to the effect that there is no language-in-general.

In fact, Penn points out that Sapir, like von Humboldt, "speaks of language as a fully formed functional system within man's psychic or spiritual constitution."³⁴ Penn quotes the following statement by Sapir in support of her assertion: "If human language can be said to be 'localized' in the brain, it is only in the general and rather useless sense in which all aspects of consciousness, all human interest and activity may be said to be 'in the brain.' Hence, we have no recourse but to accept language as a fully formed functional system within man's 'psychic' or 'spiritual' constitution. We cannot define it as an entity in psychophysical terms alone, however much the psychophysical basis is essential to its functioning in the individual."³⁵ In this statement Sapir seems to imply something very much like von Humboldt's innate inner form of language which comes from an extraphysical source. Sapir thus seems to advance a metaphysical linguistic relativity hypothesis.

This contention is supported by the fact that Sapir did not stand opposed to rationalism. He felt that linguistic relativity was a warning to philosophers and scientists to overcome the unnoticed presuppositions of their respective languages. He says, "as our scientific experience grows we must learn to fight the implications of language."³⁶ Sapir's criticism of philosophy on the basis of linguistic relativity, which was mentioned earlier, is also in the spirit of a warning, for Sapir feels that language study "may be of the most curious and unexpected helpfulness to philosophy."³⁷

Further, as is well known, Sapir was an advocate of an international language. This recalls the Humboldtian ideal of the full realization of the innate, universal, inner form of language.

About this international language Sapir says: "It must, ideally, be as superior to any accepted language as the mathematical method of expressing quantities and relations between quantities is to the more lumbering methods of expressing these quantities and relations in verbal form."³⁸ Sapir's idealized international language would reflect reality as precisely as mathematics. Thus, Sapir seems to envision an ideal, non-relative language as free as possible from subjective ontological and metaphysical assumptions, a formal language.

Thus, in accord with evidence as given above, I am contending that there are a metaphysical and an anthropological hypothesis within which the so-called weak and strong hypotheses are complementary parts. The metaphysical hypothesis was advocated by von Humboldt and Sapir. This theory opposes ontological commitment in the thought process to the facticity of languages. The metaphysical version of linguistic relativity confines thought to language as an ideal innate entity. At the same time, this theory suggests that thought and perception are influenced by particular languages which only approximate to the ideal innate language or inner form of language.

The anthropological hypothesis is advanced by Whorf. Whorf posits no such metaphysical entity as language-in-general. He rather points out the commitment of thought to the existence of the various historically given languages. The fact that each language varies the opportunities for thought and perception speaks against the existence of any universal innately necessary modes of cognition. Thought, for Whorf, is committed to the facticity of languages, and languages, as empirical facts may vary. Therefore, there is nothing innately necessary in any mode of thought or perception.

Section 3. The Whorf hypothesis as psychologism

I want now to suggest that the Whorf hypothesis, as an anthropological theory, is a form of psychologism.

Under the heading of "psychologism" one may enumerate logical psychologism, mathematical psychologism, historicism, psychophysicalism and anthropologism, to name some of the possibilities. However, as various as these titles may appear, they all refer to an epistemological relativism based on the empirical limits of man's mental activity as occasioned by his finite, subjective standpoint. Thus, logical psychologism is the position which confers a relative as opposed to an absolute, status on the laws of logic. Thus, the laws of logic are considered laws of psychology, norms of human thought. Their validity does not extend beyond the sphere of human existence.

J. S. Mill connected what is often considered a psychologistic interpretation of logic to the subjectivity of language. Mill thought that introspection, or subjective reflection (subjective here means subjective to man), was the ground of all mathematics and logic. In recognition of the fact that language is the medium of expression of human thought, Mill called for linguistic discussions as a propaedeutic to the "art" of logic. The call was made with a view towards stimulating uniformity in logic in order to streamline the technological efficacy of logic as an index to scientific thought.

For Mill, the specification of grammatical conventions and word meanings was a matter of stipulation. The point of such stipulation was to encourage common understanding and agreement upon a model of correct thinking. Thus, Mill saw logic as dependent to some degree upon the contingent fact of language. He offered differences in language as the basis for differences in thinking.

However, although Mill saw that the subjectivity of language was a cause of variations in thinking, he did not offer a full blown theory of linguistic relativity. Even though he may have been influenced by von Humboldt,³⁹ Mill hesitated to equate thought with language. He rather thought that language was one of the "principal instruments or helps of thought."⁴⁰ He implied that language and thought were not strictly coterminous and the basis of psychologism was not the empirical fact of language but the psychophysical nature of the human mind.

Whorf's position seems to me to be much stronger than Mill's. One can make a strong case against psychophysicalism as essential to the character of the mind. Husserl does so through his conception of intentionality. If all consciousness is consciousness of something, then psychic phenomena may include such non-physical beings as golden mountains, unicorns, fictional characters, etc. It seems impossible to adequately describe consciousness of such entities in physical terms alone. However, it would be much more difficult to show that thinking did not presuppose the facticity of language.

This becomes immediately evident when one considers the question, "What means are available for producing for inspection evidence of thinking which does not involve language in the thinking

itself or in the presentation of the evidence?" However, a second course remains open, and this would be to prove that language is essentially ideal in character. This would be to oppose, as fact, that we encounter language as this or that historically given language. Husserl attempts such a proof. The explication and evaluation of Husserl's arguments will make up the third major part of this essay.

It may seem plausible that Whorf's hypothesis, as a theory about the relativity of thought, perception, and behaviour, to empirically given languages is open to empirical confirmation. However, all that can be tested is whether or not languages influence thought by means of certain identifiable internal dispositions. It cannot be found out empirically whether or not thought is coterminous with language as a historical fact. Any empirical test would presuppose the fact of language. Further, the origins of language are not open to inspection.

Nevertheless, attempts have been made to test the influence of language over perception and thought. However, the conflicting nature of the results of such tests seems to indicate that they are of little value. The Berlin and Kay experiments which claimed to offer evidence against relativity have been criticized by George Collier. Although Collier is critical of linguistic relativity and thinks it can be disproved, he claims that the results of the Berlin and Kay study were an artifact of their experimental procedures.⁴¹ The Brown and Lenneberg study, as described by Penn, seems to offer limited support of the Whorf hypothesis.⁴²

However, I wish to reiterate the point that no empirical test can be devised which could possibly show that the facticity of

language was not a presupposition of thinking. Further, this fact alone shows that language is necessary for the objectification of scientific thought. Thus, even though the Whorf hypothesis is an anthropological theory, a theory about man as he exists in the world, it is such a general theory, so fundamental in its implications, that to test it one would have to isolate oneself from one's mode of existence as a man. The possibility of such a test would presuppose that anthropological linguistic relativity was not the case. Otherwise the test could not reclaim participation in the objective world.

Thus, the Whorfian theory is a strong version of psychologism. Whorf identifies thought with the facticity of language. The possibilities of thought are finite in character in terms of the duration of the mental process and in terms of its subjectivity. Whorf has strongly affirmed the basic tenet of psychologism, the empirical limits of thought, by equating thought with the facticity of language.

In the light of the Whorfian hypothesis, it would seem that in order for a phenomenology to veridically achieve its aim of becoming a science of all possible sciences it must somehow overcome commitment to the facticity of language. If commitment to the factual nature of language is not overcome then neither is psychologism. However, how can it be argued that ontological commitment to the existence of a natural language is not necessary for thought without presupposing that the language in which the argument is made is epistemologically unhampered by such commitment? If such an argument were relative to ontological commitment to a natural language, then even if it were valid it would be ineffectual.

Section 4. Wittgenstein's criticism of Cartesian doubt illustrates the consequences of the facticity of language for rationalism as a whole and for Husserl's rationalism especially

Most of those who have had occasion to write about what I am calling the anthropological version of linguistic relativity have noted that it is unfavourable to the rationalist project of philosophy as a science and the universal or philosophical grammar. However, criticism of a rationalist philosophy on the basis of the existence of language is rare. Wittgenstein's criticism of Cartesian doubt is one such instance. It would be useful to examine Wittgenstein's position in order to clarify the way in which the facticity of language speaks against rationalism and in order to suggest what may be the weakness of the Husserlian project because of its Cartesian character.

However, prior to examining Wittgenstein's criticism of Cartesian doubt, it would be useful to note that Noam Chomsky calls these theories of language which cluster around the idea of a universal or philosophical grammar "Cartesian Linguistics." The conception of a universal grammar is quite arguably Cartesian in origin. Chomsky points out that for Descartes and Cordemoy the ability to use language furnished the only indubitable criterion for distinguishing other minds. Chomsky quotes a letter from Descartes to Henry More: "The word is the sole sign and the only certain mark of the presence of thought hidden and wrapped up in the body."¹¹⁴ And that characteristic of language use which gives evidence of mind is creativity. Chomsky quotes Cordemoy as saying,

". . . les nouvelles pensées, qui nous viennent par l'entretien que nous avons avec les hommes, sont un assuré témoignage à chacun de nous qu'ils ont un esprit comme le nostre."⁴⁵ Part of what is meant by the creative aspect of language use is that language use is free from stimulus control and "does not serve a merely communicative function but is rather an instrument for the free expression of thought and for appropriate response to new situations."⁴⁶

Part of the Cartesian position, as Chomsky presents it, seems to be that the essence of language can be isolated from the communicative function. Chomsky claims that von Humboldt can be placed within the Cartesian framework "in so far as he regards language primarily as a means of thought and self expression rather than as an animal-like functional communication system."⁴⁷ A "functional communication system" could, like other "animal" functions be explained mechanistically and so would not provide evidence of mind.⁴⁸ This is of course a characteristically Cartesian claim since Descartes arrives at the certainty of the fact that he is a thinking thing by isolating himself from his knowledge of his own body, his animality which he claims is doubtful. In the Cartesian scheme language is identified as such not by its ability to fulfill the purely practical and mechanical function of communication but by its ability to express thought. Cartesian linguistic seems to view language in terms of the Cartesian dualism. In so far as language is on the mind side of that dualism, it is what von Humboldt calls "one of the forms of expression of the universal human intellectual power."⁴⁹ Language is an "Arbeit des Geistes."⁵⁰ And indeed a dualistic view of language is a prerequisite for a universal grammar. In order for a grammar to be necessary or

binding it would have to be dissociated from the empirical or contingent world. Although Chomsky intends the term "Cartesian linguistics" as a historical term which characterizes linguistic philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, I think that Husserl's language philosophy can be said to fall within the Cartesian sphere in so far as Husserl finds a Cartesian-like dualism operative in language and in so far as he is a partisan of a universal grammar.

However, the Cartesian dualism is a result of Descartes' method of hyperbolic or universal doubt. Descartes began his rationalistic undertaking by attempting to take nothing for granted. He wished to doubt everything that he possibly could. But, as Wittgenstein points out, the Cartesian sceptic neglects to doubt the meaningfulness of his own language. Thus it seems that the Cartesian sceptic is involved in a paradox: his project can only be pursued by taking the ability of language to express necessary truth for granted. In a sense then, the Cartesian dualism can only be effected by presupposing that such a dualism is already inherent in language.

In On Certainty Wittgenstein discusses the importance of language for the epistemological problem of certainty. Basically, Wittgenstein's criticism of the Cartesian sceptic's attempt to find certainty is that the attempt excludes a consideration of the importance of language to such a search. If the Cartesian sceptic had tried to make language the subject of his doubt, he would have brought the senselessness of his project to light.

Anthony Kenny points out that according to Wittgenstein, "Doubt presupposes mastery of a language game."⁵¹ This means that, for Wittgenstein, language is the primary condition for the possibility

of doubt. Wittgenstein says: "If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the word hand has any meaning? So that is something I seem to know after all."⁵² In this passage Wittgenstein seems to claim that doubt about whether or not this is my hand involves doubt about the meaning of the word hand. He thereby implies as the basis for his claim that doubt about whether or not this is my hand and doubt about the meaning of the word hand are of the same kind. If I doubt whether or not this is my hand, I doubt the validity of what my senses tell me. I doubt my knowledge of the empirical world. Thus, to doubt the meaning of the word "hand" is also to doubt my knowledge of the empirical world. As Wittgenstein points out, it is an empirical fact that a word has the meaning that it does have. He says: "And the fact that a word means such and such, is used in such and such a way, is in turn an empirical fact, like the fact that what you see over there is a book."⁵³ Hence the Cartesian dualism is established by taking empirical knowledge of the meaning of words and grammatical conventions for granted. The project thus belies itself.

Wittgenstein's criticism of the Cartesian sceptic seems to follow the Whorf hypothesis. For Wittgenstein, language is the primary condition for the possibility of doubt. Within the Cartesian project, this implies that language is necessary for all thought. For Descartes, the fact that he was doubting was proof that he was thinking. Also, Wittgenstein contends that language is an empirical fact.

Thus, since language is the primary condition for doubt and since it is an empirical fact, the existence of language is a

presupposition which necessarily conditions the Cartesian project. The Cartesian project is self-defeating.

I do not wish to claim that Wittgenstein was a Whorfian. This would be an oversimplification. However, I do wish to claim that in On Certainty Wittgenstein takes the Cartesian sceptic to task on grounds which follow, very closely, Whorf's anthropological linguistic relativity hypothesis.

This is important because the linguistic relativity hypothesis as given by Whorf is shown by Wittgenstein to militate against universal doubt. In Logical Investigations and in the latter development of phenomenology Husserl attempts not to doubt the existence of language or the existence of the world, but to suspend belief, provisionally, in the facticity of language and of the world. He did this largely to avoid having his statements about language and about the world from being construed psychologically. Wittgenstein's criticism of the Cartesian sceptic casts doubt on the practicability of Husserl's aim and his method. Wittgenstein's critique is an argument against the practice of universal epoché, based on the anthropological version of linguistic relativity. It implies that the epoché could not be extended to language.

PART II: The Problem of Self-Applicability for the Language
of Phenomenology as Science of All Possible
Sciences.

Section 5. The generation of phenomenology from Husserl's effort to resolve the relativism which follows upon ontological commitment to language

In Part I ontological commitment to language was presented as an occasion for epistemological relativism. The dependency of thought upon language, in the light of the factual, historical existence of individual languages, served to indicate that thinking could only proceed within subjective presuppositions. The fundamental presupposition would be ontological commitment to the existence of language. If such ontological commitment were shown to be a necessary prerequisite of thought, then thought would be limited to the finitude of extant language(s). Thus, to paraphrase Bonomi,¹ the question that arises with regard to the possibility of absolute, universal knowledge is, "How is it that a finite set of vocabulary resources and grammatical rules can contain the possibility of producing an infinite range and number of statements?" Without the confirmed possibility of an infinite range of possible statements and thus thoughts, no propositions or statements could be claimed to be universally necessary or self-evident, because their cogency could be said to depend on the limited, subjective standpoint following upon the facticity of language.

It seems to me that any argument purporting to show that an epistemological theory is immune from sceptical doubts which stem from the relativity of the theory in question to the existence of a language would incur a problem of self-applicability. That is, we would expect

that a theory about theories would itself fulfill the conditions it lays down for being a good theory. W. D. Hart has said, "It would seem that a theory T of theories should apply to T itself and that an account A of our use of words should apply to our use of words in giving account A."² That there are such theories or accounts which meet these conditions is obvious: e.g., "words in English are not written with the Hebrew alphabet." Here is a written account in English of how words may not be written in English which follows its own dictates. Thus there may be legitimate or 'good' cases of self-reference or self-applicability. However there may also be such cases of self-reference as, "This statement is false." If it is false then it is true and if it is true it is false. "This statement is false" is a paradoxical or 'bad' instance of self-reference.

However, one may argue that self-reference is not itself a logical problem. Since there are legitimate uses of self-reference, then it would seem that there ought to be ways to account for paradoxes in self-referential statements other than attributing paradox to self-reference. Further self-application seems to be a desirable attribute of some theories. Tarski's theory of meta-languages is the result of such a view of self-reference. Tarski might argue that the contradictions in some self-referential statements can be disposed of by means of logical constructs. Tarski might say for instance that "false" is not a predicate of the English language. Thus the example "This statement is false" is paradoxical not because of self-reference but because it seems to be within the rules and vocabulary of English but actually is not. "False" would belong to a "meta-language" in which rules for obtaining

the truth value of statements in the "object language" (here English) were given.

However, I would argue that the desirability of self-application may itself constitute an epistemological problem for the ideal of absolute knowledge. It would seem that good theories of knowledge would have to be capable of self-application. Otherwise, they would point to their own weakness as legitimate pieces of knowledge. A problem would arise where theories of epistemological importance could not fulfill their own criteria. However, the necessity of self-applicability in an epistemological theory may lead to the problem of how a theory of knowledge can serve as its own justification. If epistemology is to ground knowledge, one may ask what then is to ground epistemology? The problem of self-application with regard to the rationalist ideal of absolute knowledge seems to be that on the one hand self-application must obtain in a theory of absolute knowledge. On the other hand, the self-application of epistemological theories would seem to involve circularity in the justification of epistemological theories. The epistemological theory in question would have to serve as the only ground for its justification. Further, an attempt to overcome this circularity could only generate an infinite regress of epistemological theories which ground other epistemological theories.

Anthropological linguistic relativity has as one of its major tenets that there is no ideal, abstract entity language. There are rather many natural languages. From this it follows that languages are contingent and relative--not absolute. In equating thought with language, anthropological linguistic relativity seems to be claiming

that no statement of absolute knowledge is possible. No thought can be known to be universally binding. Anthropological linguistic relativity seems to support psychological relativism.

In order to overcome such psychological relativism it would be necessary to show that absolutely universally binding statements could be made. An account of how such statements could be made would involve presenting favorable evidence for the possibility of universal grammar. Minimally, it would have to be shown that a Cartesian dualism can be applied to language and that the physical side of the Cartesian dualism could be excluded from the essence of language. In trying to overcome psychological relativism phenomenology would have to present a theory of language use or thought such that thought and language were shown to be ideal. However, as Wade has said, a theory of language use should apply to the use that is made of language in giving that theory. Thus the question that comes up for any theory purporting to establish the ideality of language is, "How is it possible for the elaboration of the theory itself to do without "factual natural language?" In other words, how could such a theory fulfill the criterion of self-applicability? Could the factual nature of the language in which the theory is elaborated be counted as non-essential to the elaboration of that theory? Further, meeting the criterion of self-applicability would involve explaining how the theory of language in question was free from ontological commitment to a given language and then explaining how that explanation was free from ontological commitment and so on.

I now wish to describe the struggle of Husserl's phenomenology with psychologism as an effort to resolve this problem of

self-applicability for the ideal of absolute knowledge. I hope that this discussion will reveal that one way to come to an understanding of Husserl's early phenomenology is through an examination of Husserl's efforts to neutralize the epistemological implications of the facticity of language for his ideal of scientific knowledge.

It is among the goals of this part of the essay to situate the conflict between Husserl's ideal of knowledge and the implications of the existence of language by placing it against a background of various stages of conflict between science and language. These stages of conflict will be seen to be distinguished by differences in the degree to which they immediately concern the foundations of science. Thus there will be shown to be a telescoping of the struggle between science and language from science as directly concerned with the world to science as concerned with science itself, or epistemology.

The conflict between the scientific goal of absolute knowledge about the universe and the limitations of language will be seen to stem from a conflict between logic, as the language of science, and the facticity of language. Husserl regards that standpoint which acknowledges the primacy of ontological commitment with regard to language as psychologism. As science of all possible sciences, phenomenology's first task, first in a very special sense, is the elimination of psychologism. The conflict between science and language is extrapolated by phenomenology into the conflict between suspending ontological assumptions and psychologism.

It will be suggested that Husserl attempts to cope with the self-applicability problem engendered by the existence of language through the method of epoché and eidetic reduction. The problem of

the relativity of thought to the existence of language was the occasion for the first formulation and application of Husserl's phenomenological method. By employing the phenomenological method in the investigation of the nature of language, Husserl hopes to forestall the question of the applicability of the phenomenological theory of language to the phenomenologist's use of language, and thus to solve the problem of being linguistically bound in the natural attitude.

Section 6. The conflict between suspending ontological judgement and ontological commitment with regard to language derives from a conflict between an empirical conception of meaning in language and an antipsychologistic view of logic

The problem which I wish to present and examine is that of the relationship between language and ontological commitment. In other words, I wish to open up the question of whether such commitment is necessary for language. The nature of the relationship between language and ontological commitment can be seen to be of consequence for the possibility of what is usually understood as Husserl's later method of phenomenological reduction. If there are ontological assumptions inherent in language, then difficulties ensue for the understanding of speech which issues from the phenomenological or reduced standpoint. If thought is committed to the existence of language, then the reduced standpoint would seem to be unattainable. Further, no communication could be carried on from that standpoint.

Thus, there seems to be a conflict between the possibility of a phenomenological standpoint and ontological commitment to the existence of language. However, from the most general perspective, the conflict here in question can be understood as a species of a genera of conflicts between science and language.

In the development of any science a point may eventually be reached at which the rate of progress outstrips the capacity of language to keep up with it. For instance, before the advent of

Einstein's special theory of relativity, Mach had also challenged the Newtonian concepts of absolute time and space. Ronald Clark, in his book on Einstein, quotes the following statement by Mach: "No one is competent to predicate things about absolute space and absolute motion; they are pure things of thought, pure mental constructs that cannot be produced in experience."³ Einstein himself regarded Mach as a forerunner of the theory of relativity.⁴ However, it may well have been Mach's very unwillingness to accept, as meaningful, terms which could not be defined by way of observable quantities or processes, terms such as "absolute space" and "absolute motion," which prevented him from offering a theory of relativity. The theory of relativity was, to use Einstein's own words, a "free conceptual construction,"⁵ into which the facts were fit. Thus Mach's well known positivism at once offered a basis for criticism of Newton and a block to progress beyond Newton. Mach's ideal of the language of physics as containing only those terms which could be defined quantitatively or observationally constituted a prejudice which blocked his way. Einstein has written that, "the antipathy of these scholars [Ostwald and Mach], towards atomistic theory as a statement of fact rather than as a convenient hypothesis can indubitably be traced back to their positivistic philosophical attitude. This is an interesting example of the fact that even scholars of audacious spirit and fine instinct can be obstructed in the interpretation of facts by philosophical prejudices. The prejudice--which has by no means died out in the meantime--consists in the faith that facts by themselves can and should yield scientific knowledge without free conceptual construction."⁶

I would like to suggest that Mach's prejudice can be understood as ontological commitment in the language of science. That is, for Mach, expressions which could not be defined in terms of the observable, the extant, were not meaningful. Thus, hypotheses in which such terms were included could yield no knowledge. Meaning, for Mach, could occur only in reference to the existence of that which is meant.

The case of Mach illustrates the development of science to the limits of metaphysical presuppositions in a language. The special theory of relativity illustrates what lay beyond those limits.

I would like to call the development of scientific theory to the limit of presuppositions in language the point of language crisis. If the crisis is perceived and overcome, progress is again possible. Thus Einstein could be said to have perceived the language crisis of Mach's physics. If the crisis is perceived and not overcome, progress is blocked. But the most pernicious danger is that the language crisis may go unperceived in which case the progress of the science in question becomes specious. I recognize this as the most pernicious danger because the scientist in question must realize that his thinking or his discovery has reached the limits of his language in order to recognize the crisis. This realization might be prevented by habits of thought inculcated through the use of language. Thus, in order to perceive a language crisis, a scientist would need enough perspective to be aware of the control language may exert on scientific intellection. It is doubtful that Mach ever achieved this perspective on his own scientific language, for he died repudiating relativity as anything more than a convenient hypothesis.⁷ This stage of language

crisis involves difficulty in gaining perspective on a localized language, namely that of physics.

Logic is one of the exact sciences most susceptible to language difficulties. If logic is understood as the foundation of science, as a pure, formal discipline concerned with the form of knowledge rather than the content of knowledge, one may readily observe how the truths of logic may be misunderstood through ambiguities in the nature of word meaning and syntax. The viability of such a conception of logic would depend on the possibility of the meaningfulness of expressions in isolation from reference or existential content. Further, the formal conception of logic demands that logic's laws should not depend on the contingency of the existence, and historical development of language.

Most philosophers who have considered the importance and nature of logic have called attention to various problems that language may present for logic. Often, difficulties with language have evoked a call for greater precision in the employment of language. This call for greater precision in the use of language may arise from a conception of logic as technology. That is, the idea of logic as that which shows one how to think or judge correctly demands that its terms and laws be uniformly understood so as to guarantee the correct application of its laws. Husserl calls attention to the problems of the language of logic as technology as pointed out by J. S. Mill: "The necessity that we should begin logic with linguistic discussion has often been acknowledged from the standpoint of logical technology." 'Language,' we read in Mill, "is evidently one of the principal instruments or helps of thought; and any imperfection in the instrument,

or in the mode of employing it, is confessedly liable, still more than in almost any other art, to confuse and impede the process, and destroy all ground of confidence in the result."⁸

So it might first appear that a language crisis in logic is too obvious to go unnoticed. But once logic becomes more than a technology of judgement, more than an "art," logic's language crisis can be seen to go deeper than mere ambiguities in the meanings of words or syntax. That is, once logic is understood to have as its object the form of knowledge and not that of judgement, the language crisis of logic concerns the ambiguity, the fundamental unclarity of the ontological status of meaning itself. If language is essentially a temporal physical existent and if thought is confined to language, then no expression of ideal truth, no prescription for the form of knowledge can take place. Husserl warns us that: "A misinterpretation based on equivocation may distort the sense of propositions of pure logic (perhaps turning them into empirical psychological propositions), and may tempt us to abandon previously experienced self-evidence and the unique significance of all that belongs to pure logic."⁹

Thus Husserl points out the nature of the language difficulties encountered by a pure, as opposed to a practical, logic. What is more, these difficulties cannot be assuaged by mere precision in the use of language.

Husserl tells us that a solution to the language crisis of pure logic must go deeper than the arbitrary specification of words and grammar. Such a solution would involve the clarification of the necessity of concepts or intuitions prior to any historically given language from which the ability of historically given languages to

express meaning must be seen to derive. Such linguistic researches would be necessary as a foundation for pure logic. Without such a foundation logic would revert to a practical discipline, a technology of judgement, a branch of psychology conceived as a positive science. Husserl says: "We can absolutely not rest content with 'mere words,' i.e., with a merely symbolic understanding of words such as we first have when we reflect on the sense of the laws for 'concepts,' 'judgements,' 'truths,' etc. (together with their manifold specifications) which are set up in pure logic. Meanings inspired only by remote, confused, unauthentic intuitions--if by any intuitions at all--are not enough: we must go back to the 'things themselves.'"¹⁰

The linguistic discussion to which Husserl is introducing us is a linguistic discussion of a very special order. It is not simply a discussion of words or of any historically given natural language but an attempt to expose those "things themselves" upon which meaning in language is based. The object of the discussion is to detach the experience of knowing from the empirical content of language, to give a philosophical rather than a psychological foundation for knowledge.

The gamut of this linguistic discussion has therefore developed from the clarification of ambiguities in language, which was called for by Mill, within a psychological interpretation of logic, to a phenomenological investigation into the a priori foundations of meaning, located in the necessary nature of the experience of thinking itself, called for by Husserl's antipsychologistic position. Husserl describes this progression in the range of the discussion as follows: "Linguistic discussions are certainly among the philosophically indispensable preparations for the building of pure logic: only by

their aid can the true objects of logical research . . . be refined to a clarity that excludes misunderstanding. We are not here concerned with grammatical discussions, empirically conceived and related to some historically given language: we are concerned with discussions of a most general sort which cover the wider sphere of an objective theory of knowledge, and closely linked with the last, the pure phenomenology of the theory of the experiences of thinking and knowing."¹¹

Phenomenology, then, can be said to come into conflict with ontological commitment to language at the point in Logical Investigations at which Husserl introduces the necessity of language discussions for the "epistemological criticism and clarification of pure logic." Husserl's logicism has as its goal the founding of logic upon intuitions which are necessary inside historically given language. The discovery of such intuitions would be beyond psychology understood as a positive science, but quite within the grasp of a pure ideal science of phenomenology.

At this level of language crisis ontological commitment to language itself, not metaphysical assumptions within any localized areas of language or any specific language, precipitates the crisis.

Section 7. Since the propositions of a phenomenology would depend upon a pure logic for their validity, phenomenology's effort to ground pure logic is circular

There is a crucial problem which stands in the way of Husserl's aim of showing logic to be an ideal science. What is to prevent Husserl's investigations, which must be carried out and communicated in language, from being interpreted as mere psychological investigations? In other words, a special sort of linguistic discussion has been declared a necessary prerequisite for the foundation of formal logic. This means that language must be approached from a certain standpoint. This standpoint, moreover, must be attainable and at the same time guarantee that the significance of observations made from it is not hampered by the epistemological limits which apply to empirical generalizations. But how is such a standpoint to be reached? Further, what criteria of recognition can be established for the identification of such a standpoint?

Husserl says that "psychologism can only be radically overcome by a pure phenomenology, a science infinitely removed from psychology as the empirical science of mental attributes and states of animal realities."¹² But how is it that phenomenology can claim to be "infinitely removed" from psychology understood as a positive science if it has not yet been shown whether or not logic itself, the ground of scientific reasoning, is no part of psychology? Is there any language obviously free from ontological commitment, free from the

possibility of being construed as psychological fact to which the phenomenologist can claim access? It seems that access to a language free from ontological commitment is at least one aspect of the overall aim of the Logical Investigations. In the introduction to the second volume of that work, Husserl says: "Clarifying researches are especially needed to explain our by no means chance inclination to slip unwittingly from an objective to a psychological attitude, and to mix up two bodies of data distinguishable in principle however much they may be essentially related and to be deceived by psychological misconstructions and misrepresentations of the objects of logic."¹³ Husserl is not only trying to establish logic as an ideal science through linguistic discussion, but through these very same linguistic discussions he is trying to clarify the objective, presumably phenomenological, attitude necessary for the overcoming of psychologism, and thus necessary for the success of those discussions themselves.

The attainment of the phenomenological attitude and the establishment of a foundation for pure logic are intimately tied together. The problem is that if the investigations which follow the introduction to the second volume of Logical Investigations are to be considered phenomenological, that is, made from the standpoint of an objective attitude, then they presuppose one of the aims of the investigations. Further, an objective attitude would only be possible in reference to an objective standard. A truly objective standard could only be furnished by pure logic as that science which has as its object the form of knowledge.

Thus, the phenomenological project encounters a problem in the fulfillment of the self-applicability criterion with regard to its starting point, its language. That is, the ability of language to express absolute truth must be taken for granted in order to initiate discussions which have as their object the clarification of the a priori foundations of meaning.

This begging of the question would seem to lend support to psychologism because it points to the inability of Husserlian phenomenology to found its own starting point.

Husserl seems to have been well aware of this problem. In section number three of the introduction to volume two of Logical Investigations, entitled "The difficulties of pure phenomenological analysis,"¹⁴ Husserl brings the language difficulty to bear on phenomenology as well as logic. First, Husserl describes phenomenology as requiring an unnatural redirecting of thought which involves the withholding of assent to the physical existence of the objects before consciousness. This withholding of ontological judgement is undertaken in order to encourage "reflection." The difficulties of pure phenomenological analysis pertain to the unnatural character of thought required for phenomenology. Husserl says: "The source of all such difficulties lies in the unnatural direction of intuition or thought which phenomenological analysis requires. Instead of becoming lost in the performance of acts built intrinsically on one another, and instead of (as it were) naively positing the existence of the objects intended in their sense and then going on to characterize them . . . we must rather practice 'reflection' . . . make these acts themselves our objects."¹⁵ In the same section Husserl calls attention to the problem

that ontological commitment in language poses for the expounding of "self-evident" truths. He says: "Completely self-evident truths of essence established by the most exact analysis must be expounded by way of expressions whose rich variety does not compensate for the fact that they fit only familiar natural objects."¹⁶ Husserl here implies that "self-evident truths of essence" are not "familiar natural objects." Therefore they would seem to be ideal objects. Further, the unsuitability of expressions for the expounding of self-evident truths must consist in their inability to embody the ideal character of "self-evident truths." This inability would be a logical result of the predication of the possibility of meaning on the existence of language. In other words, the suitability of expressions for the description of familiar natural objects derives from the fact that language is also a natural object. (One is here reminded of the dichotomy between the natural objects of logic as technology or, forms of judgement, and the ideal objects of pure logic, forms of knowledge.)

Husserl warns us that in order for the expression of self-evident truths to take place, expressions must undergo a change of sense. By virtue of such a change of sense the meaning of the expression would consist of the act by which an object may come before consciousness rather than the object itself. Such a change of sense would admit the expression to the language of phenomenology. Thus the meaning of the expression would be isolated from psychology, for the mental act here spoken of is not considered a physical object. Husserl asserts that in phenomenological discourse one forgets that the expressions used to describe objective truth have undergone this change of sense. He thereby implies that this change of sense actually takes place in

phenomenological discourse. However, the phenomenological investigations which follow the introduction are to explain the ability of language to express ideal meaning. Thus Husserl seems to wish language to miraculously express this change of sense before he has been able to introduce any changes from the psychological conception of language, before he has been able to show that the language which fits natural objects will also fit ideal objects. His investigations seem to presuppose at the outset the ideal character of meaning of which they are in search.

Section 8. The problem of the language of phenomenology
is the problem of the language of reduction

Ontological commitment with regard to language has so far been presented as leading to an epistemological problem for the self-applicability of the language of a science of all possible sciences. This problem was brought to light through the construct of "language crisis." On the level physics, understood as a branch of physical science, philosophically compelled commitment to the measurable physical existence of that which is meant was shown to restrict the construction of scientific hypotheses. Thus the range of possible statements or propositions about the world would have been limited by such ontological commitment to the sensible, the measurable.

On a more general level, the idea of a "language crisis" was applied to logic as that science which furnished norms for the formulation of scientific statements and arguments. On this level, a dependency of thought upon the existence of language itself, and not upon the existence of that which is meant in speech, would place in question the epistemological status of the laws of logic. The necessity, for the possibility of thought, of the existence of language would make the laws of logic relative to the existence of language and thus to the existence of speakers. The laws of logic would thus be laws of psychology, significant only for speakers of languages. The language crisis of logic pertains to the epistemological limits of its laws. Is logic a pure ideal science concerned with the

form of absolute a priori knowledge or is it a technology of judgement?

On a yet more radical plane I have tried to show that the language crisis of logic must also be the language crisis of phenomenology as science of all possible sciences. If logic dictates the form of scientific propositions and arguments then phenomenology must use those forms if it is to be considered a science. Thus, through its dependency on logic, phenomenology is found to be entangled in the language crisis it attempts to assuage.

It would seem then that in order to solve its own language crisis Husserl's phenomenology would have to identify a standpoint from which communicable thought could take place free from ontological commitment. But the question is how, prior to the attainment of a standpoint free from ontological commitment, establish criteria which will guarantee the absolute identification of such a standpoint?

The method by which latter Husserlian phenomenology is said to attain an ontologically neutral attitude is known as reduction. There is little talk of reduction in Logical Investigations, but there is nevertheless in Logical Investigations an attempt to gain, with positive assurance, an ontologically neutral point of view. Further, this neutral standpoint, like the reduction, has as its aim the avoidance of psychologistic errors. Thus the difficulties which pertain to the performance of reduction would seem to be among the problems that Husserl is trying to solve in Logical Investigations through linguistic discussions.

Maurice Natanson notes that there is a gap between the ability to explain reduction and the ability to understand it.¹⁷ Natanson

links the difficulty of grasping phenomenological method to the ancient philosophical problem of having to possess the truth before truth can be recognized as such. He says: "The distinctively philosophical character of the reduction may help to explain its obscurity and opaqueness.

Understanding Husserl means more than reformulating the propositions of his position: it means invading that position and seizing it from within. The performance of phenomenology may be described in the natural attitude but it cannot be grasped in that way."¹⁸ What Natanson seems to be saying is that performance of reduction is necessary for a true understanding of reduction. This difficulty bears an essential similarity to the difficulty (already mentioned in connection with the establishment of logic as an ideal science) of having to have attained a standpoint free from ontological commitment in order to properly delineate the criteria for the identification of such a standpoint. Further, Natanson points out that there is a conflict between the ontological neutrality of the phenomenologist and the use of language by the phenomenologist. "Having performed the reduction," says Natanson, "how can the phenomenologist communicate his results?"¹⁹ This difficulty of the language of the reduction is, of course, the same as that of the language of the phenomenological or objective attitude.

Natanson indirectly points out that the self-applicability problem occasioned by ontological commitment to language would make the possibility of a metaphysically neutral standpoint dubious indeed. He further implies that reduction is not a concept which can be defended or explained from outside itself, that phenomenological method would have to be a phenomenological discovery. Thus the question arises: "What is to be the starting point for phenomenology?"

Section 9. Husserl's examination of language as an effort to found a starting point for phenomenology by revealing intentionality as an essential characteristic of language

Husserl has said: "From the beginning, as at all later stages, its [phenomenology's] scientific statements involve not the slightest reference to real existence, no metaphysical, scientific, and above all, no psychological assertions can therefore occur among its premises."²⁰ (my emphasis) He has thus implied that in order for phenomenology to begin there must exist the confirmed possibility of the absence of ontological commitment regarding language. Thus linguistic investigations seem to be a prerequisite for phenomenology and, further, such investigations must be, in a sense, prephenomenological. Otherwise Husserl could not be said to have found the starting point for phenomenology. He would have merely begged the question. He would have adopted one circle of self-applicability (phenomenology) in order to make a futile effort of avoiding the self-reference occasioned by ontological commitment regarding language. He would be open, in a sense, to Wittgenstein's criticism of the Cartesian sceptic. That is, he would not have shown how language could be free from ontological commitment and yet be meaningful.

How, prior to phenomenology, construct a theory of language that is not a psychological theory? The answer is by constructing a theory of language which, from a natural standpoint, succeeds in depicting language as a product of mind as such. Such a theory would not be a

theory of language which pertains to language as the product of man as rational animal. What would guarantee that a theory of language pertained to mind as such and not to man as rational animal? For Husserl, the answer to this question will be the discovery of the intentionality of consciousness as revealing the ideal quality of language. The intentionality of consciousness, that all consciousness is consciousness of something, reveals for Husserl that the essence of mind is not physical or even psychophysical. Intentionality thus opens up the possibility of a theory of language which is not a psychological theory.

That which opens up the way to consciousness in its intentionality is reduction, or more precisely phenomenological reduction. Reduction makes consciousness of an object (physical or imaginary) the object of consciousness by directing concern away from the existence of the object in question. Phenomenological reduction incites reflection. The withholding of ontological commitment causes attention to shift from the object to the act whereby the object becomes known.

To show that intentionality is an essential characteristic of language, that language is constituted as a mental act and not as a physical object, would be to confirm the possibility of ontological neutrality with regard to language. In fact, to show that intentionality was essential to language would be to show that language is metaphysically neutral.

However, it would be a phenomenological reduction of language which would reveal intentionality as essential to the character of language. The question is: "When does phenomenology begin, after the reduction has been put into effect or in the actual attempt to cancel

out ontological commitment?" If phenomenology can only be said to begin once ontological commitment is excluded from language, then the investigation which excludes such ontological commitment from language may be viewed as prephenomenological. In this way the begging of the question of the starting point for phenomenology might be avoided. The discovery of the intentionality of language could then be said to be the proper starting point for phenomenology. However, as prephenomenological what special epistemological status can the discovery of the intentionality of consciousness, and of language, claim? That is, what would guarantee that the discovery of intentionality is not conditioned by the existence of language? The only possible answer to this question is that either intentionality, as Husserl describes it, cannot be shown to be the paramount, essential fact of consciousness or the nature of the discovery itself guarantees its epistemological priority. It would be "self-evident."

A successful reduction of language, a delineation of the "phenomenal" character of language would pave the way for a science of all possible sciences. In the words of Jacques Derrida, the reduction would discover itself at work in ordinary language use.²¹

There is some support for the view that in Logical Investigations a "reduction" of language takes place. J. N. Findlay, who has translated the second edition of Logical Investigations into English has said that, "Husserl, in the Investigations, of course practices reduction in the sense of eidetic abstraction so that meanings as objective data become separated from the psychological acts in which they are given."²² I think that Findlay is here referring to the distinction in the First Investigation (to be explicated in Part III),

between meaning itself and the subjective meaning intention or act of meaning conferral. Findlay would have it that the distinction between the meaning itself and the act of conferring a meaning on an expression is made by means of "reduction."

Derrida holds that the distinction in the First Investigation, between the two senses of the word sign, amounts to a phenomenological reduction.²³ Derrida feels that the reduction leads to the ideality of expressions of even ordinary language. However, even though Derrida seems to believe that this interpretation is correct, he feels, at the same time, that such an interpretation would contradict the expressed intention of Husserl. Husserl, according to Derrida, wishes to reveal a prelinguistic, pre-expressive level of meaning through reduction.

I think that there is no real contradiction between these two interpretations. The contradiction here in question makes its appearance through the vagueness of the term "prelinguistic." If "prelinguistic" is taken to mean literally, prior to language, in any sense whatsoever, then there is indeed a conflict between the desired disclosure of pre-expressive meaning and the actual disclosure of the ideality of ordinary language through reduction. However, if "prelinguistic" is understood as prior to historically given language, prior to individual languages, then the discovery of the ideal characteristics of even everyday speech merely reveals the "pre-expressive" background of such speech in the universal characteristics of languages which would form the philosophical grammar. I would suggest that in order to interpret Husserl as consistently as possible we should accept the latter meaning of the

term "prelinguistic." Husserl himself gives us reason to understand his use of the term "prelinguistic" in the sense of prior to historically given individual languages when he tells us that the concern of his investigations is not historically given language. His investigations attempt to isolate the essence of language from individual historicity.

Herman Parret offers an explanation of the relationship between reduction and "prelinguistic meaning" when he contrasts the linguistic philosophies of Husserl and the Humboldtians.

In Part I, the philosophy of von Humboldt was described as foreshadowing modern, anthropological linguistic relativity and at the same time as containing similarities to Husserl's "pure logical grammar." The "pure logical grammar" of Husserl and the "inner form" of von Humboldt are similar in that they are both ideal, both allied to the idea of universal grammar. However, von Humboldt's "inner form" consists of a set of metaphysical presuppositions which amount to a world view. Further, this "inner form" is realized historically. That is, as languages develop they progress further and further towards manifestation of the "inner form" which is a perfect, ideal, divinely given reflection of reality. Husserl's "pure logical grammar," on the other hand, is without material content. It says nothing about the structure of the universe. The possibility of what Husserl calls "pure logical grammar" testifies to the ability of man to express absolute a priori knowledge. Further, Husserl's "pure logical grammar" does not develop historically. It rather dictates the minimum conditions an expression must fulfill in order to be meaningful, in order to be an expression at all. Thus one could say that "pure logical

grammar" is not something which becomes manifest over the course of time but is rather the timeless foundation for the possibility of any expression of meaning whatsoever. One could say that von Humboldt's conception of language is dynamic, situated in the milieu of the unfolding of history, while Husserl's is static, enduring despite historical change.

Parret contends that it is reduction which leads Husserl to his static conception of language. He says: "For Husserl . . . the form of language is the pure form of meaning. The domain of meaning is 'a fixed system of forms' and pure logical grammar provides the a priori system of the formal structures which leave open all material specificity of meaning. This way towards the essence or pure form of meaning is a reductive operation characterized by irreversibility."²⁴

It is the reduction of the manifestation of meaning in language to the intentional character of the expression from which Husserl's theory gains its static character. Further, it is because Husserl's theory is static that it is "prelinguistic." For Husserl, there is no essential relationship between the ability of language to express meaning and its actual physical manifestation and development in speech. Parret says: "By 'form of meaning' the Logical Investigations mean the ideal meaning prior to all incarnated or expressed meaning."²⁵

The reduction is meant to eliminate the physical incarnation of language from the essence of thought. It would thus open the way towards the possibility of discourse about the world from an ontologically neutral standpoint. The successful reduction of language would ensure the possibility of phenomenology as ideal science.

The successful reduction of language involves locating the foundation of meaning "prelinguistically." That is, in thrusting the essence of language outside physical manifestation and temporal development, in finding the foundation of language to be a priori and static, Husserl's foundation of language is prelinguistic.

But this does not mean that Husserl thinks that the language of phenomenology is an "ideal" language. The reductive operation discloses the identity of even ordinary language. J. N. Mohanty has said: "The peculiarity of Husserl's thought lies not in distinguishing between an ideal language and empirical languages (this distinction he does not in reality draw), but in attributing ideality even to expressions in empirical languages."²⁶ And indeed Husserl must find a way of attributing ideality to expressions in "empirical languages" in order to found pure logic and phenomenology. Hence the irreversibility of the reduction consists in the fact that it discovers itself as a permanent and enduring characteristic language. Further, if absolute certainty about the form of knowledge is to be presented as an immediate practical possibility, then the ideality of the form of meaning cannot be something which is reclaimed through a process of historical development. It must be something which is shown to condition the existence of language and to be the controller of historical development. In other words, even though von Humboldt attempts to align presuppositions in language with Kant's categories of judgement, the dynamic character of his concept of language keeps the realization of that alignment from being anything but a future prospect. Thus von Humboldt's "inner form" does not offer an actual way for philosophy to escape psychologism.

Parret, however, feels that Husserl's "pure logical grammar" is too remote from the actual facts of language usage to offer insight into meaning in everyday language. The reductive operation leads the phenomenologist away from language itself. He writes: "The phenomenological project shows us that an essentialistic-logistic attitude is unable to recuperate the form of language, or rather the form of meaning in language."²⁷

It seems to me that Parret interprets Husserl's pure form of meaning as something like a Platonic form. His criticism of Husserl is that Husserl does not deal with the problem of the participation of the forms in the empirical world. In other words, how is it that meaning can be ideal and manifest at the same time without mediation? Do not the facts of the actual physical manifestation of language belie the ideality of language and thus of meaning? Can the phenomenologist claim legitimate use of language for his purposes? Parret here casts doubt upon the correlation between the intentionality and the ideality of the expression. He therefore calls for a re-examination of the nature of the intentionality of the expression. Such a re-examination shall constitute the subject of the next Part of this essay.

However, by way of conclusion, let it here be said that the problem of explaining and formulating phenomenological method is not confined to Husserl's middle and later periods. It may be said that the formulation and enactment of phenomenological method would be the occasion of the establishment of pure logic and phenomenology. For only once the possibility of ontological neutrality is successfully presented can pure logic and phenomenology begin. The aim of reduction

is the avoidance of psychologism. And indeed avoiding psychologism has consistently been the purpose of reduction. In fact, in the author's preface to the English edition of Ideas, which was written much later than Ideas itself, probably around 1930, Husserl issues the following statement: "In the eyes of those who set aside the phenomenological reduction as a philosophically irrelevant eccentricity (whereby, to be sure, they destroy the whole meaning of the work and of my phenomenology, and leave nothing remaining but an a priori psychology. . . ."28

I hope that it may now be strongly suggested that phenomenological method evolved in the attempt to separate the essence of language from ontological commitment.

PART III. The Failure of Husserl's Attempt to Correlate the
Intentionality of the Expression and the Ideality
of Language in the "First Investigation."

Section 10. Introduction to the presentation and evaluation
of Husserl's philosophy of language

In the first part of this essay I tried to show that linguistic relativity, as presented by Whorf and as implied by Wittgenstein's critique of the Cartesian sceptic, offers the facticity of language as an obstacle to the radicalizing aims of rationalistic philosophy. The anthropological version of linguistic relativity was presented as a particularly potent version of psychologism.

The strength of psychologism as based on anthropological linguistic relativity derives from the difficulty of refuting the relativist's two most basic tenets, the facticity of language and the equivalence between thought and language. Upon these two propositions rests the relativist's assertion that thought is incapable of reaching absolute knowledge because it is tied to the ontological presupposition of language.

It would be impossible to demonstrate conclusively the independence of thought from language. No one is able to justify the assertion that thought preceded language historically. The origins of language are not open to inspection. Further, an instance of "pre-linguistic" mental activity cannot be presented. A presentation of mental activity must involve language directly or indirectly. One might wish to assert, for example, that music is an example of pre-linguistic mental activity. However, it can be argued that music is intimately related to language in that it reflects the rhythm and

structure of speech. This is most evident when music is compared to poetry or when poetry is set to music. Further, it could be argued that music is itself a kind of language.

However, one may justly assert that pre-linguistic thought may take place even though it cannot be presented. This would be to claim that "pre-linguistic" mental activity is private. That is, one may define the limits of mental privacy such that there may occur knowledge of mental states which is entirely subjective. Then one could make the claim, without having to defend it, that one knows, absolutely, that one has mental experiences which are "pre-linguistic."

Mental privacy opens up the possibility of the ideality of consciousness. Private mental activity could not be measured, quantified, or described in terms of physical reality. Thus, self-evident knowledge of private "pre-linguistic" mental states would be ideal and absolute. The problem with such knowledge is that it could not retrieve objectivity. For in order to retrieve objectivity it would have to be objectified. The objectification of mental states is bound up with language, or at least with the ontological presupposition of the means of objectification.

Thus, in the light of the possibility of mental privacy, the linguistic relativist must qualify his position by stating that objectifiable thought and language are coterminous. However, since the objectification of thought is necessary for science, and since objectified thought cannot be divorced from language, the problem for the ideal of an absolute objective foundation for science becomes the establishment of the ideality of language. By establishing the ideality of language it would be shown that objectifiable thought

was not hampered by the necessity of ontological commitment.

As I tried to suggest in Part II, Husserl realized that the facticity of language presented a problem for the foundations of science. Like Wittgenstein, he knew that Descartes did not carry his radicalization far enough. In Formal and Transcendental Logic,¹ Husserl says: "The steadfast will, not to accept any cognition unless it is justified absolutely, is not sufficient to the deed But even a best possible conscience and a method of practical approximation to that idea are a theme for meditations far more extensive and difficult than Descartes supposed. Unnoticed prejudices directed his meditations, so that, viewed as a whole, they lacked the power to convince even his contemporaries."²

In view of the interdependence of thought and language, Husserl gave priority to linguistic discussions which would exclude ontological assumptions from the use of language as a first and most necessary step in the radicalization of philosophy and science. "Now," says Husserl, "human thinking is normally done in language and all the activities of reason are as good as entirely bound up with speech Our first concern, therefore, is not with bare acts of thinking and bare thoughts, but is above all with statements, stated thoughts."³

However, as was also suggested in Part II, the attempt to support the possibility of the exclusion of ontological commitment from the use of language incurs a problem of self-applicability. That is, the possibility of such a discussion presupposes the ability to overcome particular ontological commitments within the discussion itself. Thus, such a discussion might fail because of the inability of the philosopher to conclusively overcome his subjective standpoint.

Nevertheless, I have suggested that a reduction of language may begin without presupposing freedom from ontological commitment. That is, if it were possible to discover an essence of language resting outside the sphere of physical existence, the nature of such a discovery would of itself guarantee its own epistemological priority. Such a discovery could count as evidence for the possibility of expressing absolute truth in language. Such a discovery would be "self-evident."

I further suggested that the technique of reduction and the "science" of phenomenology evolved from Husserl's efforts, in Logical Investigations, to overcome the problem that language presents for the foundation of science. The technique of reduction attempts to discover itself at work in ordinary language use.

In this part, I propose to show how this reduction is carried out. This shall be done by comparing the analysis of signs in the "First Logical Investigation" to the description of the phenomenological and eidetic reductions in Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article of 1927. I shall concentrate on the Britannica text because Husserl seems to have always been in the process of searching for an adequate formulation of his method, and the Britannica text is, according to Spiegelberg,⁴ Palmer, and others, the definition of phenomenology and formulation of phenomenological method upon which Husserl devoted the most effort. The article went through at least four drafts. I think that it is important in discussing a philosophical matter as controversial as phenomenological method to refer to an authoritative text.

However, I shall argue that the reduced standpoint can, in actuality, neither be gained nor maintained as long as thought continues to be objectifiable. To put it more precisely, the function of communication, which depends on the empirical nature of language, is essential and could not be recuperated from the envisaged phenomenological or reduced standpoint. The possibility of the objectification of thought presupposes ontological commitment to the existence of language. The necessity of objectifying his thoughts will prevent the phenomenologist from either gaining or maintaining the reduced standpoint. Phenomenology (conceived as phenomenological psychology) will not, in my view, be able to serve as a science of all possible sciences. The problem of self-applicability occasioned by ontological commitment with regard to language will force Husserl into an insurmountable solipsism.

Although I think that Husserl's effort to establish phenomenology as science of all possible sciences fails, his description of meaning conferring acts, or meaning intentions, opens up the possibility of meaningful expressions which have no material referents. I am speaking of such terms as "unicorn," "round square," and "golden mountains." The meaningfulness of terms without material referents may present a strong argument against a positivistic approach to science. Thus, Husserl may have an important contribution to make to the language crisis of science at the level of science as directly concerned with the world. However, due to the problem of self-applicability, Husserl cannot move from the possibility of the exclusion of ontological presuppositions from that which is meant to the exclusion of ontological commitment to that which bears meaning,

the expression. Thus, the meaning intention can only be viewed as the occasion for a modification of positivistic psychology and not for the establishment of a pure phenomenology.

Section 11. The distinction between the "sign" and the "expression" as fundamental to Husserl's philosophy

The introduction to the second volume of Logical Investigations introduces the necessity of linguistic discussions for the epistemological clarification of logic. The discussions were to concern, at least in part, the implications of the facticity of language for the status of logical laws and propositions.

The "First Investigation" begins this discussion in earnest with the much noted distinction between the terms "sign" and "expression." The distinction is the first in a series of "Essential Distinctions" which may be seen to follow upon each other in a logical manner. As the first in a coherent series, the distinction between "sign" and "expression" deserves special attention, for this distinction sets the stage for the exclusion of ontological commitment from language, and thus for the possibility of a science of all possible sciences.

The heading of the first section of this investigation is revealing. It reads: "An ambiguity in the term sign." This ambiguity consists in the alleged fact that the term "sign" is used both in the sense of 'sign' and also in the sense of 'expression.' Husserl states that, "The terms 'expression' and 'sign' are often treated as synonymous."⁵ Thus, Husserl begins his philosophy of language by pointing out that an ambiguity may occur in the language of naïve language philosophy.

All signs indicate. Husserl writes that, "Every sign is a sign for something."⁶ But not all signs have a meaning or sense. One is therefore given to understand that being a sign for something, standing for something, is different in kind from meaning. A sign can be a sign without having a meaning. Expressions have meaning. Expressions may also be signs. But an expression cannot properly be an expression without a meaning. Thus not all signs are expressions. Therefore signs and expressions comprise two different classes of entities which intersect in the form of meaningful signs. Husserl says: "If, as one unwillingly does, one limits oneself to expressions employed in living discourse, the notion of an indication seems to apply more widely than that of an expression, but this does not mean that its content is the genus of which an expression is the species. To mean is not a particular way of being a sign in the sense of indicating something."⁷ Meaning, according to Husserl, may therefore be understood in isolation from indication. However, in communicative speech, an intersection of the classes 'sign' and 'expression,' meaning is attached to indication. But "in isolated mental life," the soliloquy of thought expressions may function meaningfully without indicating anything.

Thus, the alleged ambiguity which Husserl describes could, if Husserl is correct, perpetuate a confusion in language philosophy between that which means and that which indicates. But what is the basis of the distinction Husserl wishes to draw? From what sort of confusion does the ambiguity originate?

Section 12. Ontological commitment pertains to the sign as indicator

Husserl begins to lay down the grounds for his distinction through delineating "the essence of indication." For Husserl, an indication is an object or state of affairs the reality of which "motivates" belief in the reality of another object or state of affairs. Therefore, since I see the Canadian flag, I believe that I am in Canada. Since the days are getting longer, I believe that spring is approaching. However, in every case of indication, the belief which is motivated is in no sense a necessary consequence of the indication itself. In other words, a judgement motivated by indication is a surmise prompted by the presence of a sign. "If," says Husserl, "we wish to seize the pervasively common element here present [in indication] we must first refer back to such cases of 'live' functioning. In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other."⁸

Husserl distinguishes demonstration by proof and demonstration by indication. Husserl contends that demonstration by proof "in the strict logical sense" is informed by "insight." Whereas no insight is present in the case of indication. Husserl writes: "Here, [in the

case of indication] insight and (to put the matter objectively) knowledge regarding the ideal connections among contents of judgements concerned, is quite excluded. When one says that a state of affairs A indicates the state of affairs B, that the existence of one points to that of the other, one may be confidently expecting to find B true, but one's mode of speech implies no objectively necessary connections between A and B, nothing into which one could have insight."⁹

Husserl's concept of indication therefore applies not merely to signs in the sense of "marks" arbitrarily and artificially brought about to signal certain states of affairs, but also to empirical evidence in the sense that the lengthening of the days may indicate the coming of spring. In fact, Husserl links his conception of indication to Hume's doctrine of the association of ideas. He says: "The mental facts in which the notion of indication has its 'origin,' i.e. in which it can be abstractly apprehended, belong to the wider group of facts which fall under the historical rubric of the 'association of ideas.'"¹⁰

Demonstration by indication covers that area of the association of ideas designated by Hume as "cause and effect." According to Hume, arguments which derive the existence of one state of affairs from that of another are entirely based on experience and the belief that the future will conform to the past. The conclusions of such arguments are by no means logically necessary. Hume writes: "We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experiential conclusions proceed from the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past."¹¹

By describing indication in terms of a type of demonstration, Husserl relates indication in the sense of "standing for" in which a mark or sign is deliberately brought about as a sign for something else, and indication in the sense of demonstration where the observation of a fact or set of circumstances points to the existence of another fact or set of circumstances. The first sense of indication might be represented by the brand mark on a cow or steer which serves to indicate the identity or the owner. The second sense of indication may be represented by Husserl's statement that, "The Martian canals are signs of the existence of intelligent beings on Mars." Upon this second sort of indication depends the "unity of experience," all "empirical unity."

The basis for the relation between these two senses of indication is that in either case a fact or set of circumstances serves as evidence (by no means conclusive), for another fact or set of circumstances. The brand mark on the cow or steer serves as evidence of ownership. However, a cow or steer may be branded by a thief. So the evidence is not conclusive. The Martian canals serve as evidence of intelligent life on Mars. But, of course, the canals of Mars are not really canals at all.

The difference between the two sorts of indication is that indicative function of an artificially brought about mark or sign derives from convention of arbitrary agreement: while the indicative function of facts of nature present a certain resistance to control. It is not always within our power to alter empirical circumstances at will. The indications of facts of nature are learned by experience alone. They ask for no assent. However, indication in either sense

depends upon the physical existence of the indicators. Thus the function of indication is always contingent.

It is important to note that Wittgenstein's contention, that doubt about empirical facts involves doubt about the meanings of words, pertains to linguistic symbols functioning as indicators. Husserl's concept of indication applies to the empirical existence of language. Note that Husserl thinks that in "living discourse" the function of indication applies more widely than that of "expression." Thus, language functioning as a system of indications in communication is based on ontological commitment. Husserl links the concept of indication with knowledge of empirical facts by delineating the function of indication in demonstration. Wittgenstein's contention, as viewed in the light of Husserl's philosophy, supposes that indication is essential to language. Thus, the success of Husserl's project will depend on the exclusion of indication from the essence of language.

Section 13. Expressions as signs

According to Husserl, then, the most essential characteristic of a sign is the fact that it indicates. Expressions, as signs, must also indicate. In communicative speech, or for that matter in any communicative use of language, the expression is a signal, to the listener, of the thoughts and the emotions of the speaker. The expression lets the hearer "know" that the speaker is having such and such a thought. As a sign, an expression is said by Husserl to "intimate." Intimation is the species of indication common to expressions as signs.

Intimation is perceived in the same sense in which the person who is intimating (speaking) is perceived. That is, words have sounds, or they may appear in writing. Thus, they are visible or auditory signs of a speaker's or writer's inner experiences. We perceive these inner states in so far as the speaker or writer manifests them in the act of utterance. We do not, of course, experience the speaker's inner state, let us say his anger, in the same way that the speaker experiences it. We rather "see" that he is angry. We experience his inner state in so far as he manifests it. However, on the basis of intimation, we can merely presume to know what the speaker's inner state actually is, for we experience a manifestation and not the inner state itself. Intimation is no more conclusive as evidence than other sorts of indication. Husserl says that:

"The hearer perceives the speaker as manifesting certain inner experiences, and to that extent he also perceives these inner states themselves. He does not, however, himself experience them, he has not an 'inner' but an 'outer' percept of them. Here we have the big difference between the real grasp of what is in adequate intuition and the putative grasp of what is on the basis of inadequate though intuitive, presentation. In the former case we have to do with an experience, in the latter case with a presumed being, to which no truth corresponds at all."¹²

Thus expressions, as signs, constitute a set of auditory and visual signals which point to the speaker or writer as one who is having whatever thoughts, emotions, or perceptions the words themselves suggest. The primary fact concerning expressions as signs is that they function communicatively. They are spoken or written. As signs, expressions are empirical facts.

Section 14. Husserl's attempt to locate the essence of the expression in mental privacy

Husserl describes expressions functioning as signs in order to contrast them with "expressions themselves." According to Husserl, "expressions themselves" do not function communicatively.

Husserl points out that expressions may also function in the soliloquy of thought. He then attempts to equate the soliloquy of thought with mental privacy.

In soliloquy expressions do not function communicatively. They do not intimate. They are not addressed to a listener or reader as evidence of the speaker's or writer's inner experiences. Thus, apart from serving as evidence, expressions may simply and purely bear meanings. Expressions articulate as well as communicate experience. And where no communication takes place, expressions must primarily articulate.

According to Husserl, the change in function from communication to mere articulation does not involve the subtraction of anything essential from the expression. An expression is an expression in either case. The fact that an expression does not indicate does not mean that it is not an expression. For Husserl, expressions bear meaning whether or not they indicate. Husserl will therefore claim that meaning and not indication is that which is essential to the expression.

Husserl argues that a word only becomes a word, is only understood as such, when one abstracts from the physical way in which it is given. That is, in order to apprehend the word as such one must abstract from the mere sound or the configuration of ink on a surface. In Husserl's words, "An expression's meaning, and whatever pertains to it essentially, cannot coincide with its feats of intimation."¹³

Husserl further contends that the relationship of the expression to meaning is not the same as that of sign to indication. Signs must function within the context of physical existence. That is, a sign must be perceived as inhering in physical reality. As so perceived it motivates belief in an object or state of affairs. Just so with expressions functioning in communication.

However, in solitary mental life the expression is not perceived as existent, nor does it motivate belief in any object or state of affairs. Thus, if I think to myself, "the days are getting shorter. Therefore spring is approaching." These words do not compel me to judge that someone is having such and such a mental experience, or that someone is making a judgement. The words rather articulate my own judgement. The words do not compel me to believe that spring is approaching either. That belief is something I already have. I experience the belief itself and my reason for holding that belief in my soliloquy, not a manifestation of belief from outside. The expression in soliloquy may indeed be said to point away from itself, but what it aims at is its sense, not an object or state of affairs.

In soliloquy there is no question, according to Husserl, of motivation or empirical evidence. "The word comes before us as intrinsically indifferent," says Husserl. There is no empirical

connection between the word "blackbird" and the thing, blackbird. Thus, there is an absence of "motivation" toward belief that the word "blackbird" means, blackbird. I do not make a surmise that a word means such and such. In the course of soliloquy I know what the word means. The words having its meaning are part of my inner experience.

Knowledge of the meaning of a word in soliloquy is therefore different in kind from knowledge of what a word indicates. Husserl has argued that the former case concerns one's knowledge of one's own mental life. The meaning of the word is the mental act which the word articulates. In communication, however, where the function of the expression is essentially determined by indication, the mental experience which the expression indicates is known to us only at second hand. There is a felt connection between the utterance of a word and the mental experience of the speaker. However, it is merely felt. Since the hearer himself does not experience the mental state of the speaker, he can only presume to know it.

Thus, Husserl is contending that in soliloquy, knowledge of a word's meaning (not that this or that word usually means such and such, but knowledge of the word's meaning as employed in the soliloquy) may be absolute. Such knowledge depends on no empirical evidence. The way a word is used in soliloquy is a fact of private mental life. Further, expressions are essentially ideal since the indicative function is not necessary to the expression as such. Husserl says: "In monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment [the moment of soliloquy]."14

However, I think that one may object at this point as to the legitimacy of turning to private or "solitary" mental life for the essence of the expression. Husserl himself admits that, "Expressions were originally framed to fulfill a communicative function."¹⁵ If this is the case, then it would seem that the framing of expressions is in fact directed toward the relationships between existing, finite persons. Husserl has not in fact shown that in soliloquy expressions are actually abstracted from such relationships.

I would argue that soliloquy is not an aspect of private or solitary mental life, for language is public. It may be true that in order to understand a word as a word it must be taken as something other than mere sound or ink, but that by which the word becomes significant is public convention, historical custom, not by private mental acts. To be sure, I may soliloquize, but the use of language in my soliloquy violates its privacy or solitude. The conventions and customs of language usage are not individually subjective; they are learned by experience. I learn by experience that the word "blackbird" always signifies blackbird. It is a custom or social habit. Thus my employment of the word "blackbird" even in soliloquy is not isolated from empirical circumstances. Husserl seems to be correct in noting that the use of expressions in soliloquy does not furnish evidence of an inward mental state. This does not mean, however, that such usage is not informed by the customs by which a mental state is indicated. I may know with "certainty" what I mean by this or that expression. But this certainty is individually subjective. It may have nothing to do with the customs and social habits of language usage. It cannot be shared. It cannot retrieve objectivity. The

objectification of such certitude would merely indicate certitude.

Thus, since the objectifiable articulation of inner experiences even in soliloquy is controlled by the customs and conventions of communication, such articulation may be said to depend upon knowledge of expressions as signs, an acknowledgement of the motivating function of the expression. The distinction between the expression as sign and the expression itself becomes suspect when one realizes that even in soliloquy mental experience may be invaded by empirical circumstances in the form of custom or convention.

In order to establish the ideality of the expression, Husserl would have had to establish its essence in private mental life. However, private mental life cannot be objectified without the loss of its essential character. Thus nothing of private mental life may survive in communication. The expression could not participate in the empirical world without losing its ideality, without losing its ability to express its meaning absolutely. Nothing of private mental life could be shown to survive in communication.

Nevertheless, the fact that Husserl discusses the function of expressions in soliloquy is, in itself, very important for the purposes of this essay. It was within this discussion that Husserl hoped to divorce the expression from the ontological assumption of physical existence. Thus the nature of soliloquy would seem to be very important for both the language of phenomenology and the field of phenomenological research. It was the discovery of the ideality of language which was to be the starting point for phenomenology. It was the ideality of language which was to confirm the possibility of the reduced standpoint. The nature of soliloquy would therefore seem to

be intimately related to that reduced standpoint. The location of the essence of the expression in soliloquy seems to have been Husserl's way of opposing the psychologism of linguistic relativity. Unfortunately Husserl did not seem to realize that true mental privacy would have to be quite literally "pre-linguistic." To illustrate the relationship between soliloquy and the reduced standpoint I would like to compare the distinctions Husserl makes in the "First Investigation" to his description of reduction in his Encyclopedia Britannica article of 1927.

Section 15. Soliloquy and reduction

The split between the meaningfulness of the expression and the physical existence of the sign seems to me to have been the product of phenomenological and eidetic reductions as applied to the "sign." The eidetic reduction of the sign led Husserl to the alleged discovery of a phenomenological reduction involved in ordinary use and understanding of expressions as given in communication. That is, the eidetic reduction of the sign leads to the participation of soliloquy even in communication. The problem which Husserl does not seem able to overcome is the maintenance of the privacy of soliloquy.

The relationship between soliloquy and the reduced standpoint will become clear if we compare the distinctions which begin the "First Investigation" to Husserl's description of the phenomenological and eidetic reductions in the Encyclopedia Britannica article on phenomenology.

The phenomenological and eidetic reductions are discussed in section I of the Britannica article. Section I has as its theme "pure psychology." Pure, phenomenological psychology is distinguished from empirical psychology in that it deals with the psychic as such in contrast to the psychic in relation to the physical or psycho-physical. Empirical psychology is a branch of what Husserl calls pure natural science. Pure natural science is concerned with physical reality. "Experience," according to Husserl, "presents the physical as merely a

stratum of human and animal being. Accordingly psychology is seen as a branch of the more concrete science of anthropology, or rather zoology. Animal realities are first of all, at the most basic stratum, physical realities. As such, they belong in the closed nexus of relationships in physical nature, in Nature meant in the highest and most pregnant sense as the universal theme of a pure natural science."¹⁶

The psychology of pure natural science is the psychology of psychologism. It is the psychology from which Husserl wishes to distinguish logic. Husserl thinks that the laws of logic as well as other objects of mental activity lie outside the limits of physical reality. Thus, they would not be correctly characterized by psychology as a pure natural science. A psychological conception of language is, of course, an objection to Husserl's point of view.

Husserl points out that in order to establish the purely psychic as a field of possible research it is necessary to distinguish the purely psychic from the psycho-physical. Experience of the purely psychic must take place as reflection. In normal mental activity attention is directed toward specific aspects of exterior reality. This sheet of paper, this desk, this pen, this room, are objects of normal mental activity. But reflection alters the direction of consciousness away from specific things to the psychic experiences in which these things are known as what they are. Reflection directs me not to the table but to my consciousness of the table. The direction of normal mental activity is reversed.

That which is experienced in reflection is the phenomenon, that is consciousness of an object and not the object itself. Thus the term, "phenomenological psychology."

The primary fact of the phenomenon, consciousness of something, is known as intentionality. All consciousness is directed toward, "intends" some object. That is, according to Husserl reflection reveals that consciousness is not merely receptive and passive. In the phenomenon there is a going out to meet the world; there is a directedness toward the world. Thus, the world is what it is for us because of the direction, the selectiveness of our consciousness. This means, for the phenomenologist, that the essential structure of the world is to be sought in consciousness and not in observations of physical reality. Intentionality would support Cartesian rationalism.

Natural science ignores the intentional character of consciousness. It refuses to examine the world as phenomenon. As a natural science empirical psychology tries to study consciousness the way that the other natural sciences study the world. The empirical psychologist does not employ reflection as a method. He tries to study consciousness as if it were an object. Husserl argues that the empirical psychologist misses the object of his research by not examining consciousness as consciousness of something, by not examining phenomena as instances of consciousness.

The intentional character of consciousness is that which calls for a science practised from a reduced standpoint. And it is the phenomenological reduction which gives access to the intention. The phenomenological reduction insures a closed off field of investigation for phenomenological psychology. The world as it physically exists is shut out. "Its place," says Husserl, "is taken by the world as given in consciousness."¹⁷ Of course, Husserl is not denying that

the world exists or that physical reality is not a legitimate object of science. The phenomenological reduction, or epoché, as Husserl also calls it, puts the existence of the world out of action for the moment in order to propitiate the directing of consciousness to the phenomena.

According to Husserl's description of the apprehension of the expression as such, there is a shifting of attention away from the physical existence of the sign to the consciousness of the expression which is strikingly similar to the enactment of phenomenological reduction. In fact, Husserl locates the essence of the expression in a mental act which he calls the "meaning intention" or meaning conferring act. This signifies that Husserl is locating the essence of language in intentionality the activity of private mental life. Thus, there is a participation of soliloquy even in communication.

Husserl distinguishes between the physical sign, i.e., the sounded or printed word and the mental acts by which the sign may function as an expression. The acts by which the sign functions as expression are the so-called meaning intentions or meaning conferring acts. By the meaning intention the expression achieves its sense, becomes more than the physical sign. By virtue of the meaning intention the expression also refers to its object whether the object is intuitively present or not.¹⁸ The name "John" refers to the person John whether we see him before us, recall his image or not. But the object to which the expression refers does not coincide with the meaning of an expression. The meaning is what is 'said.' The object referred to is what the meaning is said about.

However, there is also an act of meaning fulfillment which may confirm or illustrate the meaning intention. Thus, the actual presence of John may be said to reinforce the meaning intention of the name "John." However, there can be expressions valid as such which have no possibility of intuitive fulfillment, e.g., "round square." Thus, the expression is determined as such by the meaning intention and not the meaning fulfillment.

Husserl believes that when a word is understood as an expression our attention shifts from the mere physical presentation of the sound or of the print to the mental act which gives the word meaning. Thus, in the understanding of expression a reflection takes place similar to that induced by the phenomenological reduction. By virtue of this reflection soliloquy may slip into the process of communication. In other words, communication has its roots in soliloquy. Attention shifts from the presentation of the individual singular reality of the word to consciousness of the word--from physical percept to phenomenon. If someone says to me, "I have a pain," I do not have a direct, self-evident experience of his pain. His internal state has been intimated to me. However, I do have direct experience of the intimation. The reception of the intimation is my internal experience. Husserl says: "If this object [sign] again functions as a word, its presentation is wholly altered in character. The word (qua external singular) remains intuitively present, maintains its appearance, but we no longer intend it, it no longer properly is the object of our mental activity. Our interest, our intention, our thought--mere synonyms if taken in a sufficiently wide sense--point exclusively to the thing meant in the sense giving act."¹⁹

To quote Derrida again, "even before becoming a method the 'reduction' would already be at work in the most spontaneous act of spoken discourse."²⁰ Yet the difference between the actual method of phenomenological reduction and the understanding of the expression is precisely that in the understanding of the expression there is no deliberate philosophical method. The epoché of the expression is mixed with an unreflective consciousness in which the speaker and the other aspects of physical reality may be posited as there, as physically existent. However, the viability of reduction as a scientific philosophical method depends on the exclusively intentional character of language. A. T. Tymieniecka has said: "It is precisely the notion of the exclusively intentional character of all conscious acts that is instrumental in the theoretical establishment of the phenomenological method."²¹

However, the possibility of communication demands that there be states of consciousness which are passive and receptive. Otherwise there would be no objectification of ideas. The intentionality of language is at once necessary for phenomenology and that which would prevent all communication. For if intentionality means that consciousness is closed off from physical reality then nothing could enter and nothing could escape.²²

It was the problem of having to gain entrance to and exit the sphere of intentionality which led Husserl to try to establish the ideality of language. Unfortunately the establishment of the essentially ideal character of language cannot be firmly established for it would lead to the impossibility of communication. Thus, Husserl cannot escape the problem of the self-applicability of his

theory of language occasioned by ontological commitment to the existence of language.

It is true that Husserl acknowledges that the physical percept of the word may support the meaning intention. But could any meaning intention have taken place if I had not at some point in time posited the existence of the expression or passively perceived just in order to learn it?

The fact that the expression is given in time and space is essential. Thus, Husserl's distinction between the sign and the expression as such cannot be maintained. The method of reduction which this distinction supports refutes itself, because it must call the existence of its own language into question.

The epoché that Husserl finds in the expression is itself discovered by means of an eidetic reduction. In the process of eidetic reduction, "The theoretical eye directs itself to the necessarily enduring invariant in the variation."²³ Thus, the physical signs are the variations of the expression, while the occurrence of the expression in solitary mental life is the enduring invariant characteristic of the expression. Thus, the eidetic reduction grounds the shift in the object of the investigation from the expression-sign to the expression in soliloquy.

However, I have argued that the expression-sign is not a variation of the expression but rather is that which is essential. The objectifiability of thought is bound to ontological commitment to the existence of the expression. What led Husserl away from this fact? Husserl notes, in the Britannica article, that the eidetic reduction is itself grounded in the epoché.²⁴ And this would have

to be the case, because the determining of an invariant characteristic of the variation would depend on lifting it out of the flux of physical existence. Thus, the possibility of eidetic reduction Husserl wishes to make presupposes the possibility of epoché.

Husserl has warned us that his linguistic discussions are not directed to any historically given language. But how else are languages given? Husserl's goal of excluding ontological commitment from language in order to defeat psychologism has forced him to presuppose the possibility of epoché, the possibility of examining language outside of time and change in order to avoid the problem of the self-applicability occasioned by ontological commitment to language and to make the eidetic distinction between the expression and the sign.

The phenomenological reduction may be compared to a four dimensional geometrical figure. It is capable of only conceptual realization. It is a philosophical tesseract. It can be conceived of but not realized in actual fact. The barrier which phenomenology as science of all possible sciences cannot overcome is the participation of a reduced standpoint in the actual world concurrently with the maintenance of the integrity of that standpoint. The same problem would arise from the tesseract. Only three dimensions can be realized. The other dimension is merely conceptual.

CONCLUSION

This study began by trying to show that linguistic relativity presents a problem for the rationalist ideal of a science of all possible sciences of which the universal grammar is a part. In order to show this I distinguished two sorts of linguistic relativity, an anthropological and a metaphysical version. The metaphysical version addresses language as a general abstract entity. The anthropological version addresses language as the set of natural languages. Thus, anthropological linguistic relativity claims that the dualistic approach to language necessary for the universal grammar cannot be maintained. Any attempt to maintain such a dualism would founder on its inability to apply to itself. Any such attempt would presuppose a dualism already present in language.

Husserl's phenomenology was, at least in part, generated in an effort to overcome this problem. If a self-evident discovery could guarantee the dualism in language from which the universal grammar must begin, then phenomenology could proceed to locate those universal and necessary features of language. Husserl believed that the intentional character of the expression was such a discovery. The way to the intentionality of the expression is through a reductive operation. However, the possibility of the reductive operation which Husserl wishes to effect presupposes the absence of ontological commitment in language. Thus, the inability of a theory of the

ideality of language to apply to itself cannot be overcome through reduction.

The ideality of language would follow from its exclusively intentional character. But the passivity necessary for learning language and receiving communications indicates that language could not be exclusively intentional. Exclusive intentionality would demand that language could participate in mental privacy. As I have tried to show, however, since language functions by means of social customs and conventions, no mental act involving language is private.

The impossibility of proving the exclusively intentional character of the expression means that phenomenological psychology as science of all possible sciences is not a practical possibility. The psychologism of the anthropological version of linguistic relativity has not been overcome. Yet I hope that it has been sufficiently shown that the attempt to establish phenomenology as a science of all possible sciences was motivated at least in part by the desire to overcome the self-applicability problem a science of sciences would have as occasioned by the necessity of ontological commitment to language in scientific thought.

However, even though Husserl is not able to establish the hard and fast dichotomy between psychic and physical being necessary for a pure phenomenology, Husserl does show that it is not possible to dispense with any such distinction whatsoever. Intentionality may play a part in the constitution of objects without being exclusive. For example, the meaning intention helps to explain the intelligibility of expressions which can have no material referents. Thus, there may be conventions absorbed more or less passively for the usage of

such expressions as unicorn, ghost, or golden mountain. But what each individual understands by such an expression must in part be the creation of each individual. If I think of a unicorn, that which I have in mind could not totally be the product of passive perception for there are no unicorns. However, I may have passively learned the rules by which the term unicorn may be employed, and this may have helped me to create an object to which the expression refers.

The scientific usefulness of the intentionality of an expression may become clear if we return to the area of physics. The atom is not directly perceivable. Thus, there must be a going out to meet it "intentionally." Factual, perceivable circumstances such as Brownian motion warrant this intention. The atom is a construct which fits into facts. Thus, meaningfulness of the term "atom" is not just passively learned; it is rather constituted from within on the basis of what has been learned. Just so to greater or lesser degrees with all expressions. Strict positivism is no better a guide to language and science than is pure phenomenology.

A priori rules which govern the conferring of meaning may then be possible. However, these a priori rules which Husserl begins to formulate in the "Fourth Investigation" cannot be held to be ideal. They would be psychological and merely serve to delimit the power of man to objectify his thought.

Thus, the "act of meaning conferral," or "meaning intention" may solve the language crisis of science at the level of science as directly concerned with the physical world. But Husserl has been unable to show that it is possible for science to exclude circumstances which govern existence in the physical world from its researches.

The existence of language bars the entrance of science into a realm of the exclusively intentional. However, the existence of language would constitute no block to the self-applicability of a theory of the meaningfulness of expressions which referred non-existent entities.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹ Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. by J. N. Findlay, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970).

² Edmund Husserl, "'Phenomenology' Edmund Husserl's Article for the Encyclopedia Britannica (1927): New complete translation by Richard Palmer," JBSP, II (1971), pp. 77-90.

³ Iso Kern, "The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," trans. by Peter McCormick and F. Elliston, in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. Peter McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame: forthcoming).

PART I

¹ Roulon Wells, "What has Linguistics done for Philosophy," JP, 59 (1962), p. 698.

² Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language Thought and Reality, ed. John B. Carrol (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1956), p. 243.

³ Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. by J. N. Findlay, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 139.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 144.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 145.

⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 62, 248, 249. Note: In none of these places does Husserl actually make the claim that "phenomenology is the science of all possible sciences." However, he implies this claim in that phenomenology is to ground and clarify pure logic which in its turn gives coherence to the sciences as a whole. However, one place where he does make the claim that phenomenology is to serve as science of all possible sciences is in the essay, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" as translated by Quentin Lauer, in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 62.

⁸ Edward Sapir, Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language Culture and Personality, ed. David Mendelbaum (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933), p. 57.

⁹ Julia M. Penn, Linguistic Relativity versus Innate Ideas (The Hague: Mouton, 1972).

¹⁰ Ferdinand De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Wade Baskin (London: Peter Owen, 1959), p. 15.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 14.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 13.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁴ My use of the term "anthropology" is of course not consistent with an anthropologist's understanding of "anthropology." I am borrowing my sense of the term from Husserl. See Husserl's "'Phenomenology' New Complete Translation by Richard Palmer."

- ¹⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: J. and J. Harper Editions, 1969).
- ¹⁶ Penn, p. 15.
- ¹⁷ Whorf, p. 252.
- ¹⁸ Wilhelm von Humboldt, Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development, trans. by George C. Buck and Frithjof A. Raven (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 21.
- ¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 5.
- ²⁰ Edward Sapir, "The Statue of Linguistics as a Science," Language, 5 (1929), p. 209.
- ²¹ Anatol Rappaport, "General Semantics: Its Place in Science," Etc., 16 (1956), p. 89.
- ²² von Humboldt, p. 5.
- ²³ Whorf, p. 263.
- ²⁴ Edward Sapir, Language (New York: Harcourt Grace & Co., 1921), pp. 14-15.
- ²⁵ Penn, pp. 18-19.
- ²⁶ *ibid.*
- ²⁷ Luce Fontaine-De Visscher, "La pensée du langage comme forme: la "forme intérieure du langage" chez W. von Humboldt," Rev Phil Louvain, 68 (1970), pp. 451-52.

- 28 von Humboldt, p. 5.
- 29 De Visscher, p. 459.
- 30 von Humboldt, p. 2.
- 31 *ibid.*, p. 5.
- 32 Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 529.
- 33 Whorf, p. 239.
- 34 Penn, p. 25.
- 35 Sapir, Language, p. 9.
- 36 Sapir, Selected Writings, p. 10.
- 37 *ibid.*, p. 157.
- 38 *ibid.*, p.
- 39 Nicola Abbagnano, "Psychologism," trans. by Nino Zanguilli, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6 (1969), p. 520.
- 40 Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 249.
- 41 George H. Collier, "Review of Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution, by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay," Language, 1, Vol. 49 (1973), pp. 245-48.
- 42 Penn, pp. 36-37.
- 43 Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 75.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁹ von Humboldt, p. 5.

⁵⁰ Chomsky, p. 19.

⁵¹ Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1973), p. 206.

⁵² Wittgenstein, p. 48 e.

⁵³ Wittgenstein, p. 65 e.

PART II

¹ Andrea Bonomi, "The Problem of Language in Husserl," Telos, 6 (1970), p. 193.

² W. D. Hart, "On Self-Reference," Philosophical Review 79 (1970), p. 526.

³ Ronald W. Clark, Einstein: The Life and Times (New York: World Publishing Company, 1971), p. 76.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 63.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁸ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 249.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 251.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 252.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 249.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 253.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 254.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 255.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁷ Maurice Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 75.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 77.

²⁰ Husserl, p. 265.

²¹ Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. by D. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 31.

²² J. N. Findlay, Letter to the author, March 8, 1975. Quoted by permission.

²³ Derrida, p. 4.

²⁴ Herman Parret, "Husserl and the Neo-Humboldtians on Language," IPQ, 12 (1972), p. 531.

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁶ J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 63.

²⁷ Parret, p. 62.

²⁸ Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W. Boyce Gibson (London: Collier Macmillan, Ltd., 1969), p. 16.

PART III

¹ Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. by D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969).

² *ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴ Herbert Spiegelberg, "On the Misfortunes of Edmund Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica Article, 'Phenomenology,'" JBSP, II (1971), p. 74.

⁵ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 269.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 270.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 271-72.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 273.

¹¹ David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" (1748), in The Empiricists (Garden City: Dolphin Books, 1961), p. 330.

¹² Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 278.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 279.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 280.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 276.

¹⁶ Edmund Husserl, "'Phenomenology' Edmund Husserl's Article for the Encyclopedia Britannica (1927): New Complete Translation by Richard Palmer," JBSP, II (1971), p. 78.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁸ Ernest Tugendhat, in his article, "Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis" (trans. by P. McCormick and F. Elliston, in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston, Notre Dame: forthcoming), argues that Husserl's theory of expressions is adequate for names only, i.e., Husserl's theory of expressions cannot properly account for predicative sentences as expressions.

According to Tugendhat, Husserl is forced to "nominalize" predicates in order to explain their ability as expressions to refer to objects. Thus, in a predicative statement something is said to contain something else as a part. "A has a." The predicate stands for a "dependent moment of an object." However, the transformation of predicative sentences into statements about the relationships between parts and wholes leads to an infinite regress. That is, "A has a" is itself a predicative sentence. Since the form of a predicative sentence cannot be obviated, understanding a predicative sentence cannot consist in a synthesis of two objects by means of what Husserl calls a categorial act.

However, J. N. Mohanty, in "Husserl's Theory of Meaning" (Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals), contends that it would be inaccurate to say that Husserl treats predicates as if they were names. Mohanty believes that Husserl's theory takes full account of the syntactic difference between names and predicates. While it may be true that only the subject expression can be properly said to name this does not mean that predicates cannot refer. Naming may be viewed, as I think Mohanty views it, as merely a species of reference. According to Mohanty, "a" does not simply refer to that which "A" contains as a part. Mohanty would say that "a" refers rather to a range or extension of possible application. Thus, 'horse' would determine a range of possible propositions of the form "X is a horse," or "red" would determine a range of propositions of the form "A is red." Thus, a predicate refers to its extension or the number of its possible applications, which is not an object in the strict sense of that which can be named.

Although I think that Mohanty's interpretation is far more subtle and illuminating than Tugendadt's, Mohanty seems to push Husserl's theory of predicate reference very close to a theory of predicate meaning. That is, it seems according to Mohanty's interpretation as if predicates may be referring to their meanings. The range of possible application seems like a description of the way a predicate may be syntactically determined in relation to any given subject. Rules for correct usage may be interpreted as part of meaning. Thus, it may be that if Mohanty is right, Husserl can only separate meaning and reference with regard to names.

¹⁹ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 282.

²⁰ Derrida, p. 31.

²¹ A. T. Tymieniecha et al, For Roman Ingarden; Nine Essays in Phenomenology (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959), p. 3.

²² *ibid.*

²³ Husserl, "Phenomenology," p. 81.

²⁴ *ibid.*

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APPENDIX I: "Ontological Commitment to Language"

The term "ontological commitment to language" is used in the present essay to signify the dependency of articulate thought upon the empirical circumstances governing language usage. The term refers to the alleged fact that articulate thought is only possible because of certain empirical facts. Hence, the term stands for a state of affairs in which linguistic acts are conditioned by empirical circumstances and in which the nature of those acts is contingent upon those circumstances.

It may prove helpful to distinguish my use of the term "ontological commitment" from Quine's. Quine seems to think that belief in the truth of an assertion or theory involves belief in the existence of the entity that a particular assertion or theory is about. Hence, the acceptance of a theory about mammals would involve belief in the existence of mammals. Belief in the statement "the table is flat," would involve belief in the statement " $\exists x (Tx \ \& \ Fx)$," or "there exists some x such that x is a table and x is flat." In other words, Quine seems to believe that assertions or theories are logically translatable into statements which contain existential quantifiers.

My sense of the term is much more general and much more fundamental. Instead of signifying particular ontological commitments "built in" to the logical structure of assertion or belief in assertions, my sense of the term stands for ontological commitment as governing any linguistic act whatsoever. According to Quine's use of the term "ontological commitment" to language would only need to occur

in assertions, beliefs or theories about language. My sense of the term derives less from the logical structure of such assertions, beliefs and theories than from the empirical facts surrounding language usage like convention and custom. Quine's sense of the term as dependent on the logical structure of assertions, beliefs and theories is something I discuss (not exhaustively) as part of "metaphysical presuppositions inherent in language." That is, ontological commitments as part of the logical structure of belief, or assertions, would be a linguistic fact that might condition the world views of speakers of those languages in which statements of belief or assertion are logically translatable into statements which contain existential quantifiers.

Please note that my use of the word "ontology" in the term "ontological commitment" is not to be associated with Husserlian talk of "regional ontologies." Regional ontologies were to be part of the task of the newly founded pure logic or phenomenology in that as science of all possible sciences phenomenology was to set the bounds of the proper subject matter of each of the sciences.

Also note that I sometimes talk of ontological commitment to language and metaphysical presuppositions of language together and refer to them both as "ontological commitments regarding language or toward language." Context should help to make it clear whether I am talking of either or both.

APPENDIX II: Intentionality

Husserl's use of the concept of intentionality was heavily influenced by the rediscovery and reinterpretation of the scholastic theory of intentionality by Franz Brentano. According to Brentano's theory and Husserl's use of it, every act of consciousness is directed toward some object. The object of consciousness does not necessarily have to exist.

This thesis has great implications for world and meaning constitution. Husserl even speaks of "meaning intention" or "meaning conferral." Intentionality means not only that consciousness is selective, that it is directed to certain objects rather than others, but that the world and meaning are what they are for us because of this very directedness. Hence, if the thesis of intentionality is accepted, then the structure and "essence" of the world is to be sought in consciousness through reflection rather than in the physical existential world itself.

However, I argue that in order to maintain the ideality of the linguistic expression it would have to be exclusively intentional, that is, constituted solely from within consciousness. Linguistic convention and the social character of language preclude such exclusive intentionality since some passive assimilation would be needed for the existence of such customs and conventions.