

The Kinship of Theory and Practice in Aristotle

Alexander Edwards

Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa
in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the
Doctorate in Philosophy in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts
University of Ottawa

© **Alexander Edwards, Ottawa, Canada, 2024**

Abstract

Short Form

The fragments of Aristotle's *Protreptic* are internally consistent under dialogical interpretation, if one accepts my thesis about the 'three-ring circus of ambiguity' in their usage of *sophia* and *phronêsis*. Thus interpreted, the content of the *Protr.* is compatible with the content of his 'mature' ethical and political treatises, particularly the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, though they differ in emphasis, due to their rhetorical context. Their compatibility is to be determined primarily in terms of their solution to the dilemma of 'quietist' and 'activist' accounts of *eudaimonia*. The primary division of his ethical and political works is analogous to and, moreover, rooted in that of his psychology. Both are analogous to and, moreover, 'serially' related to his account of the divine life in the twofold sense of "prime mover". Thus, his accounts of life, the good life, and the divine life are not only analogous but also systematically connected.

Long Form

This dissertation investigates the contrast and identification of theory and practice in Aristotle. It comprises three chapters. The first "reweaves" the lost *Protreptic* of Aristotle, demonstrating the internal consistency of the fragments under dialogical interpretation. If one accepts my thesis concerning the '3-ring circus of ambiguity' in the fragments as regards their usage of *sophia* and *phronêsis*, wherein each of the three characters ('Isocrates', 'Heraclides' and 'Aristotle') uses these terms in their own way in light of their ('quietist' or 'activist') account of *eudaimonia*, I contend, the fragments of the *Protreptic* are internally consistent and, moreover, consistent with the account of *eudaimonia* in 'mature' treatises such as the *NE* and *Pol.*: dialogically interpreted, the fragments of the *Protr.* are consistent with the *NE* and *Pol.* (contra Jaeger et al.). But that claim depends on my reading of these treatises in respect of the dilemma of 'quietism or activism?', which dramatically structured the *Protreptic* (as I show in Part 1). Hence, Part 2 articulates my reading of the relevant arguments in these treatises. I argue that they are consistent with, though differ in emphasis from, the fragments of the *Protr.* That difference in emphasis, I contend, is due to 'rhetorical context', not only in the sense that the work was addressed to an 'exoteric' (vs. 'esoteric') audience, but in the sense of the 'circus of ambiguity' at work in the fragments, which develops as the conversation progresses and culminates in the ultimate conclusion of 'Aristotle'. The conclusion of Part 2 considers (what I argue is) the physical and metaphysical analogue of the ethical and political dilemma: the activity of *sophoi* and *phronimoi* is akin to that of 'the God and the total cosmos' (motionless activity and changeless motion). Having shown that his accounts of the good life and of the divine life are analogous, I turn in chapter 3 to (what I argue) is their analogue in his psychology, the 'basic' division of *De Anima* between critical and kinetic functions of the soul, which I argue 'develops' or 'transforms' into that of theoretical and practical *nous* and thus of *sophia* and *phronêsis* in the ethical and political works. Thus, I connect his accounts of life, the good life, and the divine life not only analogically but 'serially', argue that the question of the systematicity of the corpus reduces to the question of its seriality, and conclude with my account of how these serial 'transformations' operate not only in his treatment of, e.g., soul and body, but also in the relationship between treatises or of the treatises to themselves, arguing for their 'serial' unity.

Table of Contents

Abstract
Acknowledgements

Part 1

I. Introduction	1
II. Theory and Practice in the <i>Protreptic</i>	14

Part 2

Introduction

III. Theory as Practice: Complete and Incomplete Action in Aristotle	81
2.1.1 <u>How <i>Sophia</i> and <i>Phronêsis</i> are Useful</u>	
2.1.2 <u>Activity and Motion as Sorts of Praxis in ‘The Passage’ of the <i>Metaphysics</i></u>	
2.1.3 <u>Degrees of Completeness</u>	
IV. Exclusive vs. Inclusive, Only vs. Especially, and Esoteric vs. Exoteric	105
2.2.1 <u>Exclusivist Readings of Aristotle</u>	
2.2.2 <u>Inclusivist Readings of Aristotle</u>	
2.2.3 <u>Incompatibilist Readings of Aristotle</u>	
V. Independence and Interdependence in the <i>Metaphysics</i> and <i>Politics</i> of Aristotle	128
2.3.1 <u>Divine Activity as the Metric of Political Activity</u>	
2.3.2 <u>Political Theory and the End of Political Philosophy</u>	
2.3.3 <u>The God and the Universe as Models of Virtuous Action</u>	

Conclusion

Part 3

VI. Theory and Practice in Aristotle’s Account of Life, Human Life, and Divine Life	144
3.1 <i>From Critical and Kinetic Soul to Theoretical and Practical Wisdom</i>	
3.2 <i>Divine Life as the Norm of Human Life</i>	
3.3 <i>Conclusions and Ramifications: Seriality and System</i>	
VII. Conclusion	199

Acknowledgements

Thanks first and foremost to my parents, Jeff Edwards and Allegra de Laurentiis, mainly for nudging me into philosophy but also for the economic support throughout, without which not.

I would also sincerely thank my teachers and colleagues at the University of Ottawa, the Dalhousie Classics Department, and the University of King's College. This dissertation is a product of my time at these institutions, from the Foundation Year Program at King's through the Classics curriculum at Dalhousie to the seminars I attended at the University of Ottawa.

Particularly, I would like to thank Dr. Francisco Gonzalez for guidance, patience, discerning the content of my argument from the problematic way in which I initially presented it, and helpful pushback on several problems with said content. My account of the *Protreptic* in Part 1 was partially inspired by your account of certain Platonic dialogues in *Dialectic and Dialogue*.

Finally, I wish to thank Thomas Slabon for in-depth knowledge and helpful conversation about the *Protreptic*. Regrettably, I have not had the time or occasion to register your questions about the authentications of D. S. Hutchinson and M. R. Johnson. But I am content to present my account of the evidence base as per their authentications first, and to save grappling with the issues you have raised for another occasion, unraveling my account thread by thread as the case may require, and reweaving it if need be. I have tried to streamline this unweaving and reweaving process for myself and other would-be Penelopes, by being as upfront and transparent as I can about the warp and weft of the conceptual loom on which I wove the web.

Perhaps that suffices to acknowledge the debt I owe to the reconstructions of Hutchinson and Johnson that form the basis of my interpretation in chapter 1, which forms the basis of the argument of the rest of the dissertation. Apparently, the research which led to them began in seminars at the University of Toronto, so I would also thank the participants of these seminars for providing the context in which their project was born and for participating in the heavy lifting that forms much of the backdrop of this dissertation and on which much of its argument depends.

De summo autem bono, quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod ἐξωτερικόν appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio.

Aristotle and Theophrastus seem to speak inconsistently about the highest good because there are two kinds of books: one popularly written, which they called exoteric, the other more refined, which they left in memoranda. But on the whole there is neither discrepancy within [the works of] those I named nor dissension between them.

Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum* V.12

... Prospero the prime duke, being so reputed
In dignity, and for the liberal arts
Without a parallel; those being all my study,
The government I cast upon my brother,
And to my state grew stranger, being transported
And rapt in secret studies...

Part 1

I. Introduction

The roots of the dilemma between ‘quietism’ and ‘activism’ (as I shall provisionally call them) in Greek literature emerge already at its inception in the poetry of Homer. The *Odyssey* is about Odysseus trying to live the kind of life that Achilles forgoes in the *Iliad*, a fateful choice the poet has him regret in the underworld. For Achilles, the choice is between returning home to live ‘quietly’ and re-entering the war to die for immortal glory. For Odysseus, who returns home after the war, the choice is between breaking and continuing the vicious cycle of retaliation (by *lex talionis*) generated and perpetuated by his vengeance against the suitors of Penelope upon his return. At the end of the poem, Athena intervenes to break the cycle of retributive warfare and blood feud, establishing peace by means of the thunderbolt, just as it is her function in *Theogony* to guarantee the rule of Zeus by breaking the fateful cycle of divine patricide in her very person.

She resolves the problem implicit at the end of the *Odyssey* (24.528-48) in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus:

I myself obey Zeus, it goes without saying,
And I alone of the Gods know the keys to the house
Wherein the thunderbolt is sealed.
But there is no need of it; let me persuade you instead...¹

What could only be resolved through force (albeit divine intervention) in the pre-polis setting of the *Odyssey* must now, in the context of the Athenian polis, be resolved through persuasion, not by forcing the Furies to subordinate their wills to that of Zeus, but by persuading them to transfigure into Eumenides. The retroactive continuity Aeschylus thus establishes between his trilogy and the Epic Cycle, however, finds authority or legitimacy in the initial speech of Zeus in *Odyssey* concerning the *tisis* ('payback' or retribution) of Orestes, which invites us—the audience—to interpret the various *tisis*-narratives constitutive of the *Odyssey* (on the whole, a meditation on and implicit critique of justice as vengeance) in terms of the Orestes myth as paradigm.² That is, the poet(s) of the *Odyssey* call on its audience to interpret it and especially its conclusion in light of the story of Orestes, a call Aeschylus responded to and a task he fulfilled.

That the contrast between 'active' and 'quiet' initially connoted war and peace is clear not only from its origins in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but also from the two dominant political slogans in Athens during and after the Peloponnesian War, namely *polupragmosunê* (lit. much-activity but normally in the sense of too-much-activity or too-many-activities) and *apragmosunê* (lit. inactivity or quietude). By the end of the 5th century, the Periclean polemic against *apragmones* in the sense of political 'pacifists' (proponents of peace or truce with Sparta) had

¹ *Eumenides* 826-9.

² Cf. Loney (2019).

turned into a polemic against political and apolitical theorists (political quietists).³ Already in the ‘great debate’ between Zethus and Amphion over the best way of life (*bios*) in the *Antiope* of Euripides, a *locus classicus* of the dispute since Plato (who casts the contest between Callicles and Socrates in terms of the Euripidean *agôn*),⁴ the ‘theoretical’ character of the *apragmôn* takes center stage. To his musical twin brother, who enters singing and apparently explaining the history of the lyre (how Hermes gave it to Apollo in compensation for the cattle he stole), Zethus presents a series of protreptic arguments aimed at converting him to an ‘active’ life of substance:

Zethus

You initiate evils, introducing music here:
it’s inactive (*argon*), dipsomaniacal, neglectful of useful affairs (*chrêmatôn atêmelê*).

It’s in this (I tell you) that each man shines forth
And for this that he surges on,
Spending the greatest part of his day on this,
Where he himself is actively at his best / What he himself is best at doing.

(You are neglectful of things you should care about.)
(For) though by nature allotted with trueborn soul,
You present yourself in woman-mimicking shape!
You wouldn’t propose a speech in deliberations about justice
Nor would you voice anything likely or persuasive...
... you’d neither keep close (bravely) to the hollow of a shield
Nor council (any) vigorous resolution on behalf of others.

And how is this wise (*sophon*), an art that
takes a well-natured man and makes him inferior?

³ Quietude (*hêsuchia*) in the sense of (political) peace had expanded to include (even apolitical) theory. The ‘quiet life’ envisioned negatively in *Iliad* and positively in *Odyssey* does not exclude political activity; Achilles and Odysseus would return home to rule in peace. Pindar opposes internal peace to faction (*stasis*) and external peace to war (cf. fr. 109 with *P.8*, which raises the specter of gigantomachy); cf. Wade-Gery (1932, app. D, 224-5), who contends that the referent of *apragmones* in Thucydides is not Socrates and his circle but Thucydides the son of Melesias, whose ostracism inaugurated the Periclean principate. If true, however, the general thesis of Nestle (1926) concerning this overall development still stands; moreover, his point is that Thucydides the historian ‘retcons’ Socrates as the referent in revision of his text. There was a parallel development in the usage of *theôria* from ‘visit’ to oracular centers, religious festivals, and strange lands (whether in civic or private capacity) to (supra-political) contemplation, on which cf. Nightingale (2004) and Rutherford (2013). On “war as action and peace as inaction” in antiquity cf. Raaflaub (2022).

⁴ *Gorgias* 484Eff.

A man who possesses a good livelihood (*bion*)
But neglects domestic matters and lets them slip,
And from pleasure in song and dance pursues this all the time,
Will become inactive (*argos*) at home and in the city,
And a nobody to his friends: for his nature is gone
When he is subdued by the sweetness of pleasure.

- (i) Ditch the lyre and use weapons!
- (ii) You play the cithara in vain (*matên*), it's of no benefit! Instead, go outdoors: live the soldier's life (*stratiôtikon bion*), be well-resourced, and rule (*turannêson*).

But let me persuade you.
Stop being idle / doing nothing (*matazôn*) and train yourself in the sweet music of hard
works / toils (*ponôn eumousian askei*)!
Sing this sort of song and you'll seem to be wise (*phronein*),
Digging, plowing the land, presiding over flocks,
Leaving these delicate arts (*kompsa sophismata*) to others,
From which you'll end up keeping house in empty rooms.

Chorus(?)

Someone could make a contest (*agôna*) of two arguments from any affair (*pragmatos*),
If in speaking he were clever (*sophos*).⁵

Amphion then responds with his own series of counterarguments:

Amphion

Whoever does many things (*prassei polla*) when he may do nothing (*mê prassein*),
Is a moron, when he may live pleasantly without being active (*apragmona*).

The quiet man (*hêsuchos*) is a safe friend for friends
And best for the city. Praise not
Risky ventures. For I love neither the sailor
Nor the leader of a country who is too daring.

Such is the life of distressed mortals:
One is neither altogether fortunate nor unfortunate.
(One is happy and in turn is unhappy.)
Why then, in prosperity uncertain and unstable,
Do we not live as pleasantly as we can, not grieving?

If someone who has good fortune and livelihood
Is going to pursue none of the beautiful things in his home,
I myself will never call him prosperous,

⁵ Fr. 183-9. The following are fr. 193-202, omitting 195 and 197.

But rather a happy guardian of assets (*chrêmatôn*).

You blamed the weakness and femininity of my body
Wrongly. For if I am possessed of good intelligence (*eu phronein echô*),
This is stronger than a strong arm.

Cities are well managed by the judgements of a man,
As is his household, and he/it is a great strength in war.
For one wise counsel (*sophon bouleuma*) defeats many hands [sc. votes],
And ignorance (*amathia*) with the mob is the greatest evil.

Look, those whose way of life is to train their body into good condition
Are bad citizens if their assets fail,
For a man accustomed to undisciplined habits of appetite
Inevitably stays in that condition.

So let me rather sing and say something
Wise (*sophon*), stirring up nothing that would get the city sick.

The question at issue in this contest, which Amphion appears to have won, is whether the ‘quiet’ or the ‘active’ life is the most conducive to happiness, and whether the quiet or the active man is better or ‘more useful’ for the city (contra Zethus, who claims that he neglects politics, Amphion argues that quiet men are more useful to and better able to govern the city and household).

Hence, the meaning of wisdom is in dispute: is the wise man the one versed in the political and martial as opposed to the musical arts (Zethus disputes that practitioners of the latter are *sophos*) or vice versa (Amphion disputes that practitioners of the former govern well)? Moreover, Amphion articulates the root of the dilemma in terms of the contrast between ‘doing too much’ or ‘being overly active’ and ‘doing nothing’ or ‘being inactive’. Inactivity or quietude is better than activity (in the sense of *excessive* activity), he argues, because the *hêsuchos* is actually able to enjoy the fruits of the “toils” that Zethus praises as if they were ends in themselves, free to use the goods that Zethuses merely hoard. Thus, Euripides casts the controversy not just in terms of war and peace, but also in terms of a debate over the best way of life and system of governance.

The contrast between ‘over-activity’ and ‘inactivity’ was dichotomous (though fluid) because they were pejorative, how the peace party framed the war party (overly active / meddlesome / ‘interfering in the self-determination of others’) and vice versa (inactive / useless / promoters of ‘appeasement’ and ‘safe slavery’, not true peace and freedom).⁶ No author captures this contest more vividly than Aristophanes, whose life and career spanned the whole length of the war and straddled the turn of the century. Most obviously, the ‘peace plays’⁷ dramatize the conflict and resolution in the form of the struggle and eventual victory of the ‘irenic’ protagonist against the ‘warmonger’ antagonist. But I would argue that it forms the central tension of Aristophanic drama in general, what each drama is ‘about’ and as such gets worked out and resolved through the action (especially through the contest). In lieu of detailed accounts of the plots of each of these plays, consider simply the comic hero versus comic villain in each case:

Acharnians: Dikaiopolis vs. Lamachus

Knights: Sausage Seller vs. Paphlagon (Kleon)

Clouds: Strepsiades (Better Argument?) vs. Socrates / Sophists (Worse Argument)

Wasps: Antikleon vs. Prokleon

Peace: Trygaeus vs. War

Birds: Peisetaerus vs. Zeus(?)

Lysistrata: Lysistrata vs. Magistrate

Women at Thesmophoria: Kinsman vs. Euripides

Frogs: Dionysus vs. Euripides

⁶ As Ehrenberg (1947) notes, “Πολυπραγμοσύνη and its opposite ἀπραγμοσύνη are typical abstract nouns of the fifth century, indicating human qualities, comparable to words like δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη. There is, however, one thing peculiar to our two words: they are opposite extremes, but there is nothing between them. There is no πραγμοσύνη” (46). But he explains the lack of a term for ‘activity’ in purely psychological terms. By contrast, I think the dichotomy is at least also, if not primarily, rooted in the fact that they were used pejoratively by political opponents of one another (either in-active or too-active; there was no reason or context in which it was useful for anyone to frame their opponents as ‘moderates’). For an account of ‘the socio-political overtones of these words’ and their usage in terms of oppositional framing see Adkins (1976) and Kleve (1964), respectively. Kleve notes exceptions to the pejorative usage that prove the rule: the only instance of someone calling their own policy inactive is in regret, and where someone calls their own policy overactive they are doubling down; the exceptions are ironic acceptations of the oppositional frame. The implication that ‘much-activity’ = ‘too-much-activity’ stems from its pejorative usage, from being framed in terms of the opposition, from being publicly accused of wrongdoing (*katêgoria* & *kakêgoria*). ‘Safe slavery’ & ‘interfering in the self-determination of others’ are from Pericles & JFK, respectively; “Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. ... we must... live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete” (“A Strategy of Peace”).

⁷ Already so called in the 3rd Hypothesis to *Peace* (30-3; cf. Aristophanes, 2008, 313).

Assemblywomen: Praxagora vs. (Selfish) Man
Wealth: Chremylus vs. Poverty (Zeus?)

Clearly in *Acharnians*, *Knights*, *Wasps*, *Peace*, *Lysistrata* and *Assemblywomen*, the protagonist somehow represents peace and the antagonist war (explicitly in *Peace*). Even in *Clouds*, *Birds*, *Women at Thesmophoria*, *Frogs* and *Wealth*, which are not obviously about war and peace, the villain is somehow ‘overly active’ while the hero presses for ‘quietude’ or ‘not being (overly) active’.⁸ Overall, the task of Aristophanic drama is to exhibit the victory of the *apragmôn* over the *polupragmôn* and thus, since the interest of the former is one with that of Athens as a whole, the ‘total victory’ of Athena.⁹

But the *apragmôn* in Aristophanes is not apolitical per se, just anti-war, or pro-peace, which is a political position (he ironically appropriates the term). Hence, he mocks Socrates not for being *apragmôn*, which would commend rather than condemn him, but for being functionless (*argon*) or useless to the city;¹⁰ his anti-*polupragmôn* stance does not entail his support of (what he but not Plato viewed as) sophistry. In the wake of Athenian defeat and the execution of Socrates, the internal strife or ‘civil war’ between ‘overactives’ and ‘inactives’ transformed from

⁸ The fragments of *Banqueters*, *Babylonians*, *Farmers*, *Merchant Ships*, *Clouds I*, *Peace II*, *Women at Thesmophoria II* and *Islands* suggest that they also treated this struggle in some form. Cf. Henderson (1998) on ‘sympathetic vs. unsympathetic’ characters: “Characters or choruses representing the demos as a whole are portrayed as initially sceptical or hostile to the sympathetic character(s), but in the end they are persuaded. Those who are responsible for the problem are exposed, then disgraced or expelled, and Athens is recalled to a sense of her true (traditional) ideals and thus renewed. ... *Clouds*, with its misguided and unsuccessful ‘hero’ Strepsiades, is the exception to this pattern, and that may well have contributed to its failure in competition” (27). *Clouds* then would be the exception that proves the rule; note how the ‘odd one out’ explicitly compares its antihero to the Better *Logos*.

⁹ I take the final lines of *Lysistrata* on the total (not partial) victory of Athena (*tan pammachon*) to reveal the *telos* of Aristophanic comedy in general, which is also formulable in terms of reconciliation (as Plato saw). *Diallagê* appears imaginatively already in *Acharnians* (986-99) but as a character in *Lysistrata*; in its list of titles *Prolegomena On Comedy XXX*^a (codd. M Rs Vat 918) refers to ‘*Lysistrata* or *Reconciliation*’. Reconciliation is the temporary solution of *Iliad* (Achilles vis-à-vis Priam and the funeral of Hector) and the permanent solution of *Odyssey* (fulfilled in *Oresteia*); cf. the temporary solution of *Lysistrata* with the permanent solution of *Assemblywomen*.

¹⁰ E.g. *Clouds* 205; 316-8; 331-4; 1476-85; *Frogs* 1482-99. For the inference from ‘inactive’ to ‘useless to the city’ cf. Pericles’ “not [only] *apragmona* but *achreion*” (Thuc., PW II.40.2). Aristophanes accuses Socrates of being *argon* but not *apragmôn* because he opposes the Periclean polemic. Pericles opposed the *apragmôn* to the *drastêrios*, not the *polupragmôn*. On *dran* as Dorian vs. *prattein* as Athenian for *to poiein* cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 3.

a conflict between ‘imperialism’ and ‘pacifism’ at the level of foreign policy (hawks vs. doves), and between ‘busybodies’ and those who studiously avoided activity in the assembly and courts at the level of domestic policy, into the dilemma of political activism vs. apolitical quietism. In the shift from the war to its aftermath, the meaning of ‘quietude’ shifted from peace to reclusion (cf. the ambiguity of ‘isolationism’). Instructive in this regard is the choice of Odysseus in the myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*:

By chance the soul of Odysseus went to make its choice after drawing the last of all the lots; it had found relief from its love of honor by memory of its previous labors (*ponôn*), and went around for a long time searching for the life of a man private and inactive (*bion andros idiôtou apragmonos*), and with some trouble it found one lying somewhere that had been neglected by the others. And it said when it saw it that it was glad to choose it, and would have done the same even if it had drawn the first lot.

The ‘quiet’ life Odysseus chooses in *Republic*, the quietude he seeks, is not just the peace at home and abroad envisioned at the end of the *Odyssey*. Already in Euripides the quietist is a man whose musical education (not just pacifism) sets him apart; in *Amphion* these are wedded; his pacifism is principled in a way that the broader sense of pacifism I invoked, which includes those who advocate peace not in principle but for other reasons (e.g. Nicias), is not, for it is grounded in rejection of the ‘right of the stronger’ or ‘might-makes-right’ principle of the imperialists.¹¹ This equation of the quiet life of the *apragmôn* with the theoretical life of the *sophos*, which Anaxagoras, Euripides and others already embodied, would come to institutional expression in the quiet grove of the Academy and the quiet activity Plato and his students cultivated there. In

¹¹ On diplomacy as (non-negotiable) principle cf. e.g. *Suppl.* 748-9: “Cities, you could overcome evils through speech, but you settle affairs (*ta pragmata*) by bloodshed (*phonô*), not speech (*logô*).” On the political value of theoretically inclined people cf. fr. 910, though it uses *mathêsin*. For Nicias as failed ‘moderate’ imperialist (à la Pericles) and Cleon and Alcibiades as ‘unrestrained’ imperialists cf. Ehrenberg (1947, 49). Much like Eisenhower, Pericles warned of overextension, which is one way to look at the negative outcome of *polupragmosunê* (‘butter scraped over too much bread’). Alcibiades infamously did not heed this warning.

the context of the *Republic*, however, a polis in which the contemplative and active lives are one, the vignette of Odysseus stresses not that such activity is apolitical, only that it is supra-political.

The *Republic* raises the prospect of unifying these lives in that of the philosopher-ruler(s). Books 6 and 7 contrast their activity with that of unphilosophic rulers, who rule well only through true belief or divine inspiration, and of ‘depraved’ or ‘decent but useless’ claimants to *sophia*. The latter ‘keeps quiet and does his own thing’ (*hêsuchian echôn kai ta hautou prattôn*) not because his activity is useless to the city but because all existent polities are prejudiced against philosophy by these two types of impostor (495A-497C). Neither “those who are uneducated and inexperienced with truth” nor “those who are allowed to spend their whole life in education” can rule well, “the former because they have no one aim in life (*skopon en tô biô*), at which they must aim in doing all that they do in private and in public, and the latter because they wouldn’t willingly act, believing they’ve come to dwell in the Isles of the Blessed while still alive” (519B-C). By overcoming the limitations of practice without theory and theory without practice, in contrast, the philosopher-rulers unify and reconcile the theoretical and practical lives.

Crucially, Plato relates the three walks of life in Kallipolis to the tripartite soul (580Dff.): the life of each citizen is ruled by one or another part of the soul, so that “there are three primary kinds of humans: wisdom-loving, victory-loving, and gain-loving” (581B-C). Hence, the three *bioi* appear to be mutually exclusive and in that sense incompatible; for the city to do well, for it to be just and thus reveal what justice is (or looks like), members of each class must do their own work and not usurp or interfere with the functions of the others: *to ta [erga] autou prattein kai mê polupragmonein dikaionê esti* (433A). As soon as the walks of life were related to parts of the soul, however, the ground was prepared for Aristotle to treat *theôria* and *praxis* as activities

of the human soul in general, i.e., of each and every human being.¹² The sense in which the quiet and active lives are compatible for Plato (as reconciled in the prospective activity of philosopher-rulers and arguably in the present activity of Socrates, on his interpretation), then, differs from the sense in which they are compatible for Aristotle, who appears to have argued early in his career that practitioners of *all* three ways of life appropriate for free people (not performed ‘for the sake of necessities’) should do philosophy, regardless of motive: wisdom, virtue, or pleasure.

Such was the conclusion of the *Protreptic*, by all lights an ‘exoteric’ work written, as Elias wrote, to benefit all men, or rather, we should qualify, all men who practiced the three ways of life he regarded as appropriate for free people, that is, to all men properly speaking, distinct from other animals in pursuit of ‘happy conduct’ beyond ‘the necessities’.¹³ With the necessities taken care of, free people are at leisure to pursue ‘goods properly speaking’, as he calls the ends of people who lead one of the free ways of life in the following passage:

But to seek for every science to generate some other thing and require that it be useful is the demand of someone altogether ignorant of how much separates from the beginning the goods and the necessities; they differ most. For of things without which living is impossible, one should say those that are cherished on account of another are necessities and co-causes, while those that are cherished on account of themselves, even if nothing results [from them], are goods properly (*kuriôs*); for this is not to be chosen on account of that, and that on account of another, nor does this get lost by going into infinity, but rather stops somewhere. So it is completely ridiculous, indeed, to seek from everything another service besides the thing itself, and to ask ‘So what benefit to us is it?’

¹² Cf. Lobkowitz (1967), ch. 2 “Contemplation and Politics: the Two Dimensions of Man” (esp. 25ff.), who focuses on their incompatibility in Plato vs. compatibility in Aristotle. But if theory and practice are one in the legislative activity of philosopher-rulers, the contemplative and active lives are one in Kallipolis. So the assumption that the contemplative, political (or active), and hedonist *bioi* in the *Ethics* are equivalent to the three *bioi* in *Republic* is questionable. The ‘victory-loving’ part is active in the sense that it executes the law, not in the sense that it legislates or directs it. For Aristotle vs. Plato on practical as directive (not just executive) cf. Bodéüs (1993, 65-6 & 171). On the “processo di codificazione che porta alla fissazione di una triade di *bioi*” see also Gastaldi (2003, 9-10).

¹³ *NE* 1.5 rejects the pleasure-focused life of moneymaking for being ‘slavish’ and ‘a compulsory sort of activity’ in contrast to the political and contemplative lives, on the grounds that their ends are ‘more (properly) ends’ than wealth. *EE* 1.4 clarifies that these of course are not the only ways of life, for there are various ways of life that focus on ‘necessaries’ as opposed to ‘happy conduct’. *Pol.* excludes these as ‘necessary for’ but not ‘part of’ the *polis* proper. *Meta.* A.1 draws the same contrast, despite most translations, more on which below. I translate *diagôgê* generally as ‘conduct’ to retain the ambiguity of whether ‘good conduct’ is the end or ‘conducive to’ it as means. So I qualify ‘all (free) men’ where economic independence and hence leisure is presumed; Elias *in Cat.* (114, 18).

and ‘How is it useful?’ For what we say is true: such a person doesn’t seem like one who knows the beautiful and good or discerns what is responsible and what is co-responsible.

One might see that what we say is all the more true if someone transported us in thought, as it were, to the Isles of the Blessed; for there would occur no need of anything nor any benefit from anything else, with only thinking and contemplating left, which even now we call a free way of life (*eleutheron bion*). If this is true, then how would any one of us not justly be ashamed if, having become empowered to dwell in the Blessed Isles, he would be unable on account of himself. So the payment of science to humans is not discreditable, nor is the good that comes from it small. For just as the sages of the poets say that in Hades are transported to us the gifts of justice, thus, it would seem, in the Blessed Isles are the gifts of intelligence (*phronêseôs*).

It isn’t terrible at all, then, if it doesn’t appear to be useful or beneficial; for we claim not that it’s beneficial but that it itself is good, and not for another but for itself is it appropriate to choose it. For just as we travel abroad to Olympia for the sake of the spectacle (*theas*) itself, even if there is going to be nothing more to get from it—for the observance (*theôria*) itself is superior to lots of money—and as we observe (*theôroumen*) the Dionysia not in order to take anything from the actors (rather, we even pay for it), and as there are many other spectacles we would choose instead of lots of money (*chrêmatôn*), so too the observance of the universe is to be honored before everything believed to be useful (*chrêsimôn*). For surely one shouldn’t journey with great effort for the sake of observing people mimicking girls and slaves, or fighting and running, and not think one should observe the nature of beings, i.e., the truth, without payment.

This argument links the defense of ‘goods proper’ as the ends of people whose way of life is free with theory and the theoretic life both in the old sense of religiopolitical observance or inspection of panhellenic rites (games, festivals, truces, contests) and in the new sense, modeled on the old, of philosophic ‘contemplation’ of the universe and the truth.¹⁴ The comparison of the three free *bioi* with the reasons people attend the Olympics or Dionysia—to make money, win victory in competition, and purely to witness, inspect, observe or spectate—goes back at least to Heraclides Ponticus, who attributed it to Pythagoras. The image encapsulates the audience of the *Protreptic*, which, as we shall see, was designed precisely so as to articulate, dramatize, and resolve the dilemma of ‘quietism or activism?’ in the form of a dialogue between three rival philosophers.

¹⁴ I use ‘observance’ rather than ‘observation’ to capture the religiopolitical quality as well as the rule-following dimension of traditional *theôriai* (cf. *nomizein*), which also mitigates confusion with the distinction between ‘theory’ (hypothesis) and (empirical) ‘observation’. Usages such as “*theôreisthai to katholou* e.g. of the *Iphigeneia*” (*Poet.* 1455b1), that is, contemplating the plot of a play (vs. watching it), mediate and so may have been the segue from the sense of (religiopolitical) ‘observance’ to that of (philosophic) ‘contemplation’.

In Part 1 of this dissertation I argue that the purpose of the *Protreptic* was to resolve this dilemma and that the solution it presents is consistent with and indeed fleshed out in the solution he stakes out in his ‘mature’ ethical and political treatises. By reading its fragments as the fragments of a dialogue in which ‘Aristotle’ mediates and reconciles the dramatically opposed answers of ‘Isocrates’ and ‘Heraclides’ to the question of why one should do philosophy, I show how the content of *Protr.* must be understood in light of its dramatic form, and conversely how its dramatic structure must be understood in light of the arguments that its fragments present, which are at crucial moments inconsistent (for its *dramatis personae* present them agonistically). My “reweaving” of the dialogue (à la ‘rhapsodic’ performance) demonstrates the internal consistency of the fragments under dialogical interpretation. If one accepts my thesis concerning the ‘three-ring circus of ambiguity’ in the fragments as regards their usage of *sophia* and *phronêsis* (each character uses them in his own way in light of his ‘quietist’ or ‘activist’ account of *eudaimonia*), I contend, the fragments of the *Protreptic* are self-consistent, and leave room for (though do not explicate) the account of *eudaimonia* in ‘mature’ treatises such as the *NE* and *Pol.*

Dialogically interpreted, that is, not only are the fragments of the *Protreptic* internally consistent, they are consistent with the *NE* and *Pol.* (contra Jaeger et al.). But the latter claim depends on my reading of these treatises as regards the dilemma of ‘quietism or activism?’ (which logically and dramatically structured the *Protr.*, as I show in Part 1). The same dilemma structures *Pol.* 7.1-3, e.g. Hence, Part 2 articulates my reading of the relevant arguments in these treatises, demonstrating that they are consistent with, though differ in emphasis from, those in the fragments of the *Protreptic* (dialogically interpreted). That difference in emphasis, I contend, is due not to ‘schizophrenia due to metanoia’ (as I phrase the Jaegerian hypothesis) but to ‘rhetorical context’, not only in the sense that the work was addressed to an ‘exoteric’ (vs.

‘esoteric’) audience but in the sense of the ‘3-ring circus of ambiguity’ at work in the fragments, which develops as the conversation progresses and culminates in the ultimate conclusion of ‘Aristotle’, which prepares the way for and indeed structures his account, e.g., in *NE* 10. The conclusion of Part 2 considers the physical and metaphysical analogue of the ethical and political dilemma: the activity of *sophoi* and *phronimoi* is akin to that of “the God and the total cosmos”.

Having shown that his accounts of the good life and divine life are analogous, I turn in Part 3 to what I argue is their analogue in his psychology, the ‘basic’ division of *De Anima* between ‘critical’ and ‘kinetic’ functions of the soul, which I argue ‘develops’ or ‘transforms’ (*metabainei*) into that of theoretical and practical *nous* and thus of *sophia* and *phronêsis* in the ethical and political works. In this way, I connect Aristotle’s accounts of life, the good life, and the divine life not just analogically but ‘serially’ or ‘sequentially’. The ‘rhapsodic’ background of Aristotle’s account of sequential unity brings us back to the Homeric and Athenian matrix from which we began, the sequential performance or ‘reweaving’ of Homer at the Panathenaia. In that spirit, let us begin the task of reweaving the *Protreptic*.

II. Theory and Practice in the *Protreptic*

Prelude

Jaeger (1923) grounded his account of the early Aristotle largely on his account of the *Protrepticus* as an exhortative monologue à la Isocrates wherein Aristotle developed a conception of philosophy that was ‘still Platonic’ in that it identified (or conflated) theoretical and practical wisdom, metaphysics and ethics, true knowledge and good conduct, being and value, or however else one might determine the opposition of theory and practice, the core question (I take it) being whether theory without practice can be true and, conversely, whether practice without theory can be good.¹⁵ That is, he took it to be Isocratic in form and Platonic in content.¹⁶ In what follows, I argue precisely the reverse, that the *Protrepticus* was a dialogue and in that regard Platonic in form¹⁷ but already ‘distinctively Aristotelian’ in content, i.e., compatible with the contents of his ‘mature’ works. Since he interpreted its fragments as the fragments of a monologue written in propria persona, Jaeger ascribes premises, arguments, and conclusions to its author that its author had ascribed to his *opponents* in the dialogue; misreading its form, he distorts its content. Hence, much of the evidence he presents *for* his account of the early Aristotle is evidence *against* it, especially if one assumes an early date of composition. Let me begin by outlining the overall structure of the dialogue in its basic contours. Then we can place its fragments in context and interpret them accordingly. Only thus can we compare its

¹⁵ Cf. Winfield (2013).

¹⁶ “An dieses klassische Muster platonischer Protreptik hat Aristoteles sogar ausdrücklich angeknüpft, aber ausschließlich in den Gedanken. In der Form folgte er diesmal nicht Platons Spuren, sondern dem Vorbild des Isokrates” (1923, 55).

¹⁷ Whether or not Plato invented the dialogue as literary genre (cf. the controversy over Alexamenos in Athenaeus & Diogenes Laertius vs. P.Oxy. XLV 3219), Diogenes notes that he ‘exactified’ it and in that regard ‘carries off the first prizes, as in beauty so also in discovery’; the form is Platonic in that Plato perfected it and hence ‘takes precedence’ in its development, a principle congenial enough to Aristotle (more on which below).

content with that of the ethical and political treatises. By weaving its fragments together on the warp of this skeleton, I hope to reveal the contours and contents of the lost dialogue at once.

Structure of the Dialogue and Location of Fragments

The reconstructions of Hutchinson & Johnson that form the basis of my interpretation here assume that the *Protrepticus* was a dialogue based on their argument in (2018b) that none other than the dialogue hypothesis can account for the fact (contra Düring) that it contained apotreptic arguments against theoretical or Academic philosophy, which cannot have been advanced in the person of Aristotle.¹⁸ Moreover, its status as a dialogue accords with ancient testimony, especially that of Cicero, who uses the expression *in Aristotelio more* in at least three ways: ‘in Aristotelian style’ means (1) an agonistic dialogue (*disputatione ac dialogo*) between named persons including living authors, (2) the author personates himself as a character in the dialogue and gives himself the principal role (*principatus*)—call it the eponymous format plus main character, (3) the author prefaces the dialogue with an proem written in *propria persona*, beginning with a dedication addressed to a known person (*prohoemiis... appellarem*).¹⁹ Since the monological form of the intro is one sense of *in Aristotelio more*, the intro to *Protrepticus* was likely written in *propria persona*. One might therefore call it a proem, rather than a *mise-en-scène* in the style of the *Euthydemus*, e.g. Technically, however, the whole work would need to

¹⁸ Esp. 144-54. That—the authentication of *DCMS* xxvi, 79.5-81.4—is their core reason, reinforced by Cicero’s own description of *Hortensius* in *De Finibus* plus the *disputatione ac dialogo* sense of *in Aristotelio more*. Generally, it included several types of apotreptic speeches and protreptic responses to them: (1) general apotreptic against doing philosophy at any time in any way whatsoever, (2) specific apotreptic against “majoring” in philosophy, (3) specific apotreptic against areas or sorts of philosophy, or ‘parts’ of philosophy that are contested (as to their being part of philosophy or not). Cicero presumes the distinction in *DF* I.2-3: the extreme apotreptic (*omnino*) is ‘almost more just’ or respectable than the moderate (*mediocritatem*). On all these grounds the dialogue hypothesis it is at least more likely than not: the burden is on its critics. That said, the ultimate test is whether its fragments cohere under dialogical interpretation (without omitting or fudging any to get them to fit the hypothesis), a task that has not been attempted until now. The following confirms their coherence under dialogical interpretation. The logical inconsistency of *H*₃ and *A*₃ as responses to *I*₂ (see below) is another core reason (independent of Cicero); to clarify: 1. Iamblichus preserves the order or sequence of fragments (*H* & *J*), 2. There are two rhetorical climaxes in defense of theoretical philosophy, and 3. These speeches differ in their premises and conclusions, as we shall see.

¹⁹ *Epistulae ad familiares* I.9.23, letter 20, *Epistulae ad Atticum* XIII.19.3-5 and IV.16.2, respectively.

be in monologue for it to count as a ‘proem’ for Aristotle (and Isocrates), who uses *prooimion* only for initial sections of monological prose works (*Rhet.* 3.14). So Aristotle would not have called it a proem, even if it transpired outside the dialogue proper, whereas the mise-en-scène can be in the dialogue (Plato) or in monologue preliminary to the dialogue proper (Aristotle). Therefore, the latter term is appropriate.²⁰ Refracted through the lens of Cicero, then, the text divides generally in two: introduction vs. dialogue proper. My subdivision of these parts runs:

1. Mise-en-scène

- i. Dedication
- ii. Setting & Dramatis Personae

2. Dialogue

- i. Pure Apotreptic against Philosophy
- ii. Pro-philosophy responses by ‘Isocrates’, ‘Heraclides’, and ‘Aristotle’²¹
 - a. Practical self-refutation argument
 - b. Proverb contest
 - c. I₁ / H₁ / A₁ / H₂ / I₂ / A₂ / H₃ / A₃

The dialogue proper began with the pure apotreptic (somehow). In response, three rival philosophers defend philosophy from different angles. Eventually ‘Isocrates’ delivers a limited apotreptic against (theoretical or Academic) philosophy, which sets the stage for ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Aristotle’ to defend theoretical philosophy on kindred but distinct grounds, and ultimately for ‘Aristotle’ to contrast his response to ‘Isocrates’ with that of ‘Heraclides’ in A₃ vs. H₃.

I₁, H₁, A₁ and H₂ respond to the general apotreptic; until I₂ the dispute is latent. I₂ then launches a specific apotreptic against (theoretical or Academic) philosophy, to which A₂, H₃ and A₃ then respond. I₂ sets the stage for ‘Aristotle’ to contrast his response to I₂ with that of

²⁰ I am grateful to D. Hutchinson for questioning my use of ‘proem’ to refer to the intro (despite Cicero).

²¹ The sequence of 2.ii.c (P.Oxy.666 / DCMS xxii / DCMS xxiii; xxiv; xxv; *Protr.* V / *Protr.* V / DCMS xxvi / *Protr.* VI; DCMS xxvi; xxvii; *Protr.* VII / *Protr.* VIII / *Protr.* IX; X; XI; XII) is from H & J (forthcoming). I number them for ease of comprehension. The main difference between (2018a) and (forthcoming) is that *Protr.* V comes right after I₁ in the former but right before I₂ in the latter. As I shall argue, my interpretation works on either assumption.

‘Heraclides’. The unqualified and qualified apotreptics bookend the first portion of the dialogue proper. The second portion then contrasts the responses of Aristotle and Heraclides to Isocrates.

L₂ is pivotal; minimally there was a shift from the defense of philosophy in general (vs. the pure apotreptic) to the defense of theoretical philosophy specifically or philosophy proper (vs. the limited apotreptic). Thus we glimpse the *rhêsis* of the *logos*, the address or to-whom of the argument. Long have the dialogues been identified as ‘exoteric’ texts, addressed to audiences outside or not limited to the Academy or Lyceum, and conversely the treatises with ‘esoteric’ texts, addressed to students studying or interested in studying with Aristotle.²² The Greek commentators generally contrast ‘acroamatic’ works written in *propria persona* for philosophically oriented people with ‘exoteric’ works written in dialogue form for a more general audience. The shift in *Protrepticus* from the general defense of philosophy to the specific defense of theoretical philosophy marks the presence in its audience not only of people who are not (yet) interested in philosophy but also of people who are at least interested in philosophy if not already convinced to pursue *sophia* as a way of life.²³ Hence, the second portion of the dialogue proper is a contest between rival philosophers; the meaning of *sophia* is in dispute or contested. If you are interested in philosophy, what school should you go to? The *Protrepticus* was also designed so as to answer that question. As we shall see, once its fragments are read as

²² Whether Aristotle wrote exoteric works (addressed to general audiences) that were not dialogues, and conversely acroamatic or esoteric works that were not monologues, perhaps cannot be answered certainly, though the former seems likelier than the latter. If all the dialogues were exoteric, were all the exoteric works dialogues? If all the treatises were esoteric (addressed to audiences at the school), were all the esoteric works treatises? At any rate, the intelligibility of the question speaks to the difference (though close relation) between kinds of audience and kinds of literature. As Jaeger notes (1923, 54, fn. 3), its presence in the lists under exoteric “womit aber über seine Form nichts gesagt ist, da exoterisch nicht notwendig nur die dialogischen Schriften zu sein brauchten. Zu dieser Gruppe zählt er auch dann, wenn er die Form einer Rede bezw. eines Sendbriefs hatte” (*pace* H & J, 2018b, 138). By the same token, however, he’s wrong in the next sentence to suggest that the change of title (to *Hortensius*) entails that *Protrepticus* wasn’t a dialogue (not all Aristotle’s dialogues were titled after characters, e.g. *On Good Birth*). In any case: even if all the dialogues were exoteric, it does not follow that all the exoteric works were dialogues.

²³ For how ‘advice’ can be addressed at once privately to a particular individual and publicly to general audiences cf. H & J (2018b, 120-1 on *Rhet.* 1.3, 1358b8-10).

the fragments of a dialogue, the dramatic structure of that dialogue shows that its contents are compatible with those of his ethical and political treatises. In the following account, I trace the development of the dilemma and its resolution in *Protrepticus*. Then I argue that his solution in *Protrepticus* is consistent with the solution he develops in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*.

Theory and Practice in the Protreptic

Following the structure of the dialogue proper, let me begin with the unconditional apotreptic against philosophy, for it sets the stage for the rival philosophers to present their cases for philosophy, which generates the contest or dispute that then gets worked out in and through the second portion of the dialogue. P.Oxy.3659 preserves part of a hostile challenge to philosophy tout court, “precisely the sort of challenge that suits the drama of the lost dialogue.”²⁴ Presumably, the defenses of philosophy in *Protrepticus* arose in response to such a challenge. The specific defense of theoretical philosophy is a further refinement that arose in response to the limited apotreptic against it delivered at some juncture in the person of ‘Isocrates’. Examples of the latter are Isocrates in *Antidosis*, to which *Protrepticus* was a response,²⁵ and Callicles in *Gorgias*: both concede that “mental gymnastics” might be useful for youth in preparation for (or as a propaedeutic to) adulthood (the School of Hard Knocks that is the life of political speech and action) but not for mature adults, who are men of action, not theory. By contrast, the apotreptic preserved in this fragment is of the unqualified sort. Whoever voiced it denies that philosophy is worthwhile at all. As far as we can tell from the present evidence base, the

²⁴ H & J (2018a, 68). It is because the fragment is apt to the function of pure apotreptic that it suits the beginning and hence could serve as the initial stimulus or springboard of the conversation. Only such a challenge seems necessary or likely, not necessarily this one, though H & J offer several reasons why this one might be genuine (and apparently have recently authenticated it). As they argue (2018b, 154), the practical self-refutation / performative contradiction argument (2.ii.a) can be valid only if *ad hominem*, i.e., in response to an actual interlocutor giving a general or pure apotreptic. In any case, all that matters for my purpose is that it fits the function of general aversion.

²⁵ Cf. H & J (2010) and the list of references in Hildebrandt (2020, 13, fn. 11).

dialogue proper began with such a confrontation, which is why the persona of I₁ (who responds to the pure apotreptic) can be the same as the persona of I₂ (who delivers the limited apotreptic).

I₁ is a defense of philosophy as good for the soul that any of the pro-philosophy speakers in the dialogue could (and in fact do) get behind. So it's hard to tell exactly who the speaker was. Without wisdom (*phronêsis*), he argues, none of the other things conventionally held to be good in themselves (like wealth, strength, and beauty) are such but rather are at least potentially harmful (as per the proverb 'no knife for a child'). "But all would agree", the fragment concludes, "that wisdom comes from learning or seeking, the capacities for which are comprehended in philosophy. Hence, one should do philosophy without reservation / excuse, and..."²⁶ Everyone in general would agree? Or all of us (philosophers)? At any rate, two aspects of the fragment echo Isocrates so loudly that it is at least plausible if not likely that it was spoken in his person: that happiness or worthiness consists not in mere possession (but in use or activity) and, hence, that it is as shameful and ridiculous for one's possessions to be worth more than oneself as it is for someone to be 'inferior to his own servants'.²⁷ Likely, but unnecessary, for any of the pro-philosophy speakers could have voiced it, because the dispute is still latent. The first pro-philosophy response thus counters the unqualified apotreptic with a series of arguments marshalled against the anti-philosophy stance of the person(s) who voiced it. The practical self-refutation argument (2.ii.a) was also likely marshalled *ad hominem* against this anti-philosopher.

²⁶ P.Oxy.666; col. I l. 51-55 + II.1-57 + III.1-56. I use '/' in translation where only codetermination gives the sense.

²⁷ Criticizing Academic pedagogy, though conceding that theoretical disciplines are worthwhile for youth, he denies that mature adults (men who are no longer boys) should still practice them, "For I see that some of those who are so thoroughly conversant / discerning in these studies (*mathêmasi*) as to teach others, are not [those] using the sciences which they have, while in the other businesses (*pragmateiais*) concerning life they are more unwise (*aphronesterous*) than their students (for I hesitate to say [more unwise] than their servants)" (*Panathenaicus* 28). For the Platonic conceit of masters being more enslaved than their slaves, cf. Boulnois (2017, esp. 38-41) on the transformation of freedom as 'social situation' into 'metaphysical property'.

The penultimate round of fragments (H₁, A₁, H₂), whatever their sequence, respond not only to the pure apotreptic but also to the terms set forth in I₁; the final round of fragments respond to the limited apotreptic set forth in I₂ and conclude in the contrast of A₃ to H₃. Consider first this claim from H₁, which could have been made either in the person of ‘Heraclides’ or ‘Aristotle’: “there are small glimmers of reason and intelligence (*phronêsis*) in [other animals] too, but these are absolutely without share of theoretic wisdom (*sophias theôrêtikês*), and this is shared only with the Gods, just as humans indeed lag behind many other animals in the precision and strength of their senses and drives.” Similarly ‘Aristotle’ claims that “those thought-processes that are to be chosen sheerly on account of the contemplating itself are more honorable and superior to those that are useful for other things; and it is on account of themselves that the observances (*theôriai*) are honorable, and the wisdom (*sophia*) in these [observances] of the intellect (*nou*) is a virtue, but those according to intelligence (*phronêsis*) are [honorable] on account of the actions (*praxeis*).” In whatever order they appeared, these arguments transpired before the limited apotreptic against Academic philosophy advanced in I₂, after which point ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Aristotle’ seem to have expressed their conclusions in terms of *phronêsis*, the word ‘Isocrates’ favors. Still, “every time he used the concept ‘intelligence’ thereafter, ‘Aristotle’ took care to couple ‘intelligence’ with another term suggesting theoretical wisdom.”²⁸ In the function-argument of *Protr.* IX, 51.7-54.5, ‘Aristotle’ reaches the conclusion that “some sort of *phronêsis* is by nature the end for us” and brackets the question in the present context “whether the object of this cognition is the cosmos or some other nature.” ‘Heraclides’ by contrast couches his conclusions simply in terms of *phronêsis*, without using *sophia* or *theôrêtikê* or any of the other locutions Aristotle uses to contrast wisdom and prudence or theoretical and

²⁸ H & J (forthcoming, 31-2 [xiv.]).

practical wisdom in *EE* 5 and *NE* 6; he just assumes that *phronêsis* means theoretical wisdom, in flat contradiction to ‘Isocrates’ who assumes the opposite. ‘Aristotle’ integrates their usages.

The first series of ‘Heraclides’ fragments (*H*₁) begins to develop a Pythagorean defense of philosophy in response both to the general aporetic and to the initial response of *I*₁. For they are concerned to show, besides the roots and potential reconstruction of “the really mathematical Pythagorean science,” not only that devoting oneself to its acquisition and exercise is intrinsically worthwhile but also that such knowledge is ‘useful’ for (ethicopolitical) action:

the most beautiful thing in it is actually what is high-minded and leads back to the primary causes, which both fashions its learnings (*mathêseis*) for the sake of deeds (*pragmatôn*) and also purely apprehends beings (*katharôs antilambomenon tôn ontôn*), and at times the mathematical theorems are even connected with the theological ones.

As H & J note, this “seems to prefigure the distinction between theoretical and practical activities (and instrumental and intrinsic value) that occupies much of the subsequent speeches of ‘Isocrates’ and ‘Aristotle’.”²⁹ But what ‘Heraclides’ means by the contrast becomes clear in the conclusion to this set of fragments, which speaks of ‘practical’ wisdom (*tôn pragmatôn heneka*) in terms of the ‘application’ of mathematics to ‘all departments of life’:

And in the soul [mathematics] contributes to purity of cognition and subtlety of thoughts, as well as to precision of reason and contact with their own nonbodily substances, as well as to symmetry and good temper and conversion to being; and in the human it provides order in his way of life, as well as quietude of the passions and beauty in character traits, as well as discoveries of the other things that are profitable to the human way of life. And they turned their hands to [philosophy] throughout the whole of their domestic life, weaving the benefit from it into their actions and habits of soul, as well as into the construction of their cities and into the management of their homes, as well as into artistic work / skilled manufacture and preparations for war and peace; and on the whole, they applied mathematical science in all the parts of their way of life (*peri panta ta mere tou biou tēn mathēmatikēn prosepheron*), properly in businesses (*pragmasi*), profitably for the users of it (*chrōmenois*), attunedly in both these ways, and in all other ways symmetrically / proportionately.

²⁹ (2018a, *ad loc.*, 15).

The conclusion of H₁ thus responds to the concern for practicality characteristic of Isocrates (and presumably the anonymous anti-philosopher) in a way that reduces practical knowledge to the application of theoretical knowledge. The contrast of ‘pure apprehension’ with practical (qua applied) mathematics develops here into the contrast of intellectual and ethical virtue, where the latter is conceived in terms of the application of mathematical science to all walks or aspects of human life. In the next set of fragments, ‘Aristotle’ responds not only to the concern for practicality but also to the way ‘Heraclides’ attempts to accommodate it by reducing practical knowledge to theoretical knowledge, and the latter to mathematics: he defends the utility of theoretical wisdom without simply identifying it with practical wisdom in defense of philosophy.

This set generally provides evidence of a dispute within the *Protreptic* over the value, significance or status of mathematics and Pythagoreanism; one speaker endorses and defends ‘mathematical philosophy’ whereas the other speaker, though sympathetic toward it, expresses reservations through raising alternative ways of viewing the status of mathematics in relation to philosophy. The first of these fragments begins by associating contemplation with free activity:

[Via mathematics] we partake for the first time of spectation / vision / observance (*theas*) both free and fitting for philosophers in their community; for proper is what is like in nature to each, and to the free man the dominant end of the activity according to his proper way of life (*to kurion telos tês kata ton oikeion bion energeias*) has reference to himself and to nothing else external. And this is present in the sciences mentioned, being theoretic... And if one ought to address also this person by the name proper to the passion (as with the desires proper to others, who are named by their love for some kind), the ‘philosopher’ seems to have aspiration for some science that is honored on account of itself and not on account of anything else resulting from it.

Those who promote (*proagein*) theoretical sciences on the grounds that they are useful, he continues, seem not “to apportion them the appropriate rank (*tên prepousan aponemein taxin*).” Already in this passage ‘Aristotle’ hints at the contrast between theoretical science in general and mathematics in particular (‘the sciences mentioned, being theoretic...’), as opposed to the

identification of theoretical and mathematical in H₁. Yet the anti-utilitarian argument of this fragment gives the impression that ‘Aristotle’ simply denies the utility of philosophy (though will argue that its ‘uselessness’ indicates its supreme value). The next fragment remedies this:

But **not only** for such assistance should anyone cherish their power, but **still more** for themselves and their own nature. For it’s agreed that some sciences are to be chosen for themselves and **not only** for what results from them; and this is possible **either only or especially** for the theoretical sciences, for their end is nothing else besides the theory... [I]t would seem to be out-of-place and in no way agreeable for those who claim the philosopher is kin of the truth to think it necessary for him to seek some other fruit from such spectacles (*theôrematôn*), which commune of the highest truth; and for the spectacle-lover (*philotheamona*) to deem it worthy to acquire such sciences for another [reason], which are about the most common things of nature and the most divine of the things perceptible to us...

I embolden the ‘not only but also’ clauses to emphasize the contrast with the previous fragment, which stresses the anti-utilitarian conception of worth or intrinsic value.³⁰ Though it returns to that point, this next fragment begins by stressing that theoretical sciences are not only instrumentally but also intrinsically valuable, i.e., that they *are* ‘useful’ but are *also* (and more importantly) ‘useless’ in the aristocratic sense of ‘leisurely’ (non-heteronomously determined). That seeking some ulterior motive for acquiring these sciences is ‘absurd and unacceptable’ suggests that ‘Isocrates’ had articulated the premise that uselessness = worthlessness previously in the dialogue, though it is not explicit in I₁ and comes to be explicit only in I₂. On the other hand, ‘Aristotle’ so far has not specified how theoretical science is instrumentally valuable, whether as ‘Heraclides’ conceives it—practical knowledge as applied theoretical knowledge—or in some other way. This will not come out clearly until the second and third series of ‘Aristotle’

³⁰ I equate ‘worth’ here with intrinsic as opposed to instrumental value, though I shall sometimes loosely use ‘worth’ and ‘value’ synonymously. Similarly (though not equivalently), Marx notes in *Kapital* vol. 1 that English writers of the 17th century tend to equate worth with use-value and value with exchange-value, “ganz im Geist einer Sprache, die es liebt, die unmittelbare Sache germanisch und die reflektierte Sache romanisch auszudrücken.”

fragments (A₂ & A₃), but the rest of A₁ stakes out an interpretation and evaluation of Pythagoreanism and mathematics that responds to and contrasts with the account of ‘Heraclides’.

The next fragment seeks to determine the “reasons the Pythagoreans honored the effort concerning mathematics and coordinated it toward *theôria* of the cosmos in variegated ways,” but addresses this account at least in part to

those who think that conduct in philosophy is intrinsically choiceworthy (*tên en tô philosophhein diagôgên kath autên aietên einai*), and that mathematical theory (*tên peri ta mathêmata theorian*) is akin to and cognate with (*oikeian kai sungenê*) philosophy.

Though explaining the reasons why one might be led to posit *ta mathêmata* before “the other spectacles (*theôremata*) of the cosmos as principles”, then, the speaker remains critically distant, suggesting that mathematics is akin (though not identical) to philosophy (proper, as he conceives it). The last three fragments of this portion of the dialogue (from I₁ until I₂) develop the contrast already marked between the responses of ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Heraclides’ to the question of why mathematics is central to Pythagorean philosophy. The first of these concludes by differentiating the concern for or love of the theorems themselves (*auta ta theôrêmata*) from “the discipline of converting them to apply to other things (*askoumena ta theôrêmata ep’ alla periêgagon*).” It is hard to tell whether the speaker who voiced this is ‘Heraclides’ or ‘Aristotle’ because both so far have been arguing that astronomy and other mathematical sciences are not only intrinsically but also instrumentally valuable or useful in application. The dispute between them remains latent (discernible but under the surface) until I₂, which responds by dividing the sciences into mathematical or ‘cognitive’ sciences on the one hand (qua useless) and non-mathematical or atheoretical ‘empirical’ sciences on the other (qua useful). As we shall see, this provides the context and opportunity for ‘Aristotle’ to concede several points to ‘Isocrates’ (contra ‘Heraclides’) without relinquishing the insistence of ‘Heraclides’ on the worth of theoretical

philosophy (contra ‘Isocrates’). The last two fragments, in brief, concern the division within Pythagoreanism between the *akousmatikoi* and *mathematikoi*, which ‘Aristotle’ interprets in terms of a generational difference between “the older ones who were unleisured because they were occupied in political business (*politikois pragmasi*)” and “the younger ones who were able both to labor and to learn,” and the “reasons they thought these [mathematical] things are causes of the beings and the principles of them.” This last fragment confirms the ‘critical distance’ of the speaker at this point in the dialogue with regard to the status of Pythagoras and mathematics; it is consistent with the qualified appreciation of mathematical theory as ‘akin to and cognate with’ philosophy (the backhanded compliment, as it were). For ‘Aristotle’, the mathematical sciences contribute to the natural sciences and thus indirectly to philosophy; for ‘Heraclides’, the mathematical sciences comprise philosophy and thus constitute the whole of theoretical science.

In response to these different accounts of the worth of theoretical science (particularly mathematics), ‘Isocrates’ now stages an intervention against what he regards as an overly theoretical, indeed Academic, conception of philosophy. It is worth quoting this lengthy passage in full, for it lays out the terms with which ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Heraclides’ will have to contend in the second portion of the dialogue proper, and ultimately contrast their conclusions in A₃ vs. H₃:

If their end (on account of which the **philosophers** claim it’s necessary to learn them) is useless, it’s necessarily much more futile (*mataion*) to put effort into them. And on the end, pretty much everyone reputable who has been most precise about it agrees. For some claim that it’s knowledge of the unjust and just and bad and good, similar to geometry and the other [sciences] of that sort, others that it’s *phronêsis* about nature and that sort of truth, such as those around Anaxagoras and Parmenides introduced.

So one who is going to examine these must not forget that everything good and beneficial for the human way of life is in the using and acting, and not in knowing only. For we are healthy not by familiarity with what is productive of health, but by applying it to our bodies, nor are we wealthy by acquaintance with wealth, but by having acquired much substance, nor, greatest of all, do we live well by acquaintance with certain beings, but by acting well; for this is what being happy truly is. Hence it’s appropriate that **philosophy** too, if indeed it’s beneficial, either be a practice of goods or else be useful for such practices. (...?)

So, that it itself isn't some production of things (*pragmatôn*), nor are any of the aforementioned sciences, is manifest to all. And that it isn't useful for actions either, one could learn from this. We have the greatest exemplar in the sciences similar to it and the beliefs underlying them, for we see the geometers being able to do (*praktikous*) none of the things they contemplate (*theôrêtikoi*) through demonstration; and yet to divide an estate, and all the other properties both of magnitudes and locations, the land-surveyors are able through experience (*empeirian*) [to do], whereas those who know about the mathematical and the arguments about them know how one ought to act, but cannot act.

It holds similarly with music and the other sciences in which the cognitive aspect (*tês gnôseôs*) is divided off from the empirical. For those who determine the demonstrations and syllogisms about harmony and the other such things are accustomed to inquiry, but partake in none of the functions (*ergôn*), just as those who do **philosophy**; but even if they happen to be able to handle something in them, when they learn the demonstrations, they straightaway perform these [functions] worse, as if on purpose, whereas those who do not know the arguments, if trained and believing rightly, are wholly superior for all uses (*pros tas chreias*). So too with the things in accord with astronomy, such as sun and moon and the other stars; those who have attended to the causes and the arguments know nothing of what is useful for humans, whereas those having so-called navigational sciences about them are able to predict storms and winds and many of these events for us. Hence such sciences will be entirely useless for actions; and if, of actions, they omit the right ones, **philomathy** omits the greatest of goods.

The transition between the second and third paragraphs of this fragment marks the shift in usage from philosophy in general (which 'Isocrates' qualifiedly defends in the last sentence of the second paragraph) to theoretical philosophy specifically (which 'Isocrates' attacks throughout but explicitly in the last paragraph), what 'Aristotle' and 'Heraclides' (for different reasons) but not 'Isocrates' mean by philosophy full stop or proper. The fact that 'Isocrates' shifts from using 'philosophy' in his sense to using it in their sense—mirroring their usage and turning it against them—signals the emergence of a dispute that so far has remained implicit or under the surface.³¹ As I shall argue in what follows, the switch from the pro-philosophy argument of I₁ to the anti-(theoretical)philosophy argument of I₂ sets the stage for the characters to begin to clarify

³¹ The transition from the second to third paragraphs is authenticated in the 2018 but not the 2017 edition, where H & J note that "since 'Isocrates' has just concluded that philosophy is beneficial and useful... it would seem odd for him to say that philosophy is neither productive nor useful in the very next sentence. If, however, this first sentence is indeed a remark of Iamblichus, then an indeterminate amount of argumentation has dropped out. Apparently not much has been skipped over, but there must be enough of a gap for the context to shift so that it is now clear that 'Isocrates' is specifically referring to theoretical philosophy and arguing that theoretical mathematics is neither useful nor productive" (19). Either way, that such a shift is *necessary* is why I interpret it as the pivotal juncture.

the three-ring circus of ambiguity that has governed the conversation so far, wherein each character uses *sophia* both as interchangeable with *and* as distinct from *phronêsis* in his own way. As I map these out, we shall begin to see how this dialogical give-and-take accounts—or at least can account—for all the shifts in usage of these terms throughout the fragments. But if one *can* account for the interchangeability of *sophia* and *phronêsis* in *Protrepticus* as a function of rhetorical context—not only with respect to the intended audience of the dialogue as a whole but with respect to the characters in the dialogue ‘mirroring’ each other’s usage *arguendo* (the latter being my original contribution)—then the developmental hypothesis as Jaeger figures it is otiose.

Before turning to the responses of ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Heraclides’ to I₂, however, a few words about the argument(s) of I₂ are in order. The first sentence states the assumption on which the rest of its arguments trade, the pragmatist or consequentialist assumption that X is valuable only insofar as it is useful, where ‘useful’ is interpreted as instrumentally valuable (in a formula: uselessness = worthlessness). In response to the earlier arguments of ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Aristotle’ to the effect that mathematics is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, ‘Isocrates’ now divides the sciences into ‘cognitive’ and ‘empirical’ sciences, or each science into its ‘cognitive’ and ‘empirical’ counterpart. To illustrate, he offers a pairwise comparison of six arts or sciences (indifferently, as in *Meta.* A.1-2 vs. *NE* 6):³² geometry & landsurvey, harmonics & musicianship, astronomy & navigation. In each case, he argues, the cognitive science is worthless because useless and even counterproductive, whereas the empirical science enables us to act (*prattein*) and thus to do well (*eu prattein*), i.e., thrive or be happy. So he contends that (1) theoretical knowledge is worth the time and energy it takes to acquire it only insofar as it is ‘useful’ and that (2) theoretical knowledge is useless. Conversely he calls the empirical counterparts sciences, as

³² Though cf. Nightingale (2004, 222-227) on how *Meta.* A.1-2 bridges the ‘handicraftsman’ and ‘theoretician’ or ‘pure scientist’ in the figure of the ‘architect’ as ‘intellectual laborer’; it does not *only* use them interchangeably.

Aristotle does at *Post. An.* 1.13, 78b34-79a16, “using a less technical mode of expression that connects well with the conventional way of referring to these sciences on the part of people like Isocrates” (vs. the contrast between so-called sciences and science proper at *NE* 6.3).³³ Thus, he provides the occasion for ‘Aristotle’ to concede the relative independence of practical science (not merely applied theoretical science), as he does in *Meta.* A.1-2 (981a), but also to critique the assumptions that lead him to deny the worth of theoretical philosophy, that is, philosophy as ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Heraclides’ use it, though they differ precisely in that the former can accommodate the critique advanced in the person of ‘Isocrates’ while the latter can (or does) not.

The next set of fragments (A₂) responds precisely to the assumptions at the root of this critique. Roughly, it divides into three phases: (1) after contrasting ‘proper use’ with abuse and ‘using’ with making or producing, ‘Aristotle’ argues contra I₂ that philosophy is possible, beneficial, and in a sense easy, (2) methodological and pedagogical remarks about theoretical philosophy as a whole and mathematics in particular, (3) the beginning of the function-argument, which will lead ‘Heraclides’ to intervene in H₃ and ‘Aristotle’ in turn to respond in A₃. As we witness the development of these arguments, we should note the complex ‘mirroring’ I described whereby each character accepts his interlocutors’ usage *arguendo* even as he insinuates his own.

A₂ begins by sketching the notion of use (*chrêsis*) that will reemerge in the *ergon*-argument. I quote this in full, for it lays out the terms and premises that argument will assume:

The things underlying our way of life, such as a body and its surroundings, support it in the way of certain tools, the use of which is risky, and more harm than good is elaborated by those who use them as one should not. Accordingly, one should desire both the possession and the appropriate use (*chrêsthai prosêkontôs*) of that knowledge

³³ (2018a, 30). Where Aristotle opposes ‘mathematical’ and ‘empirical’ he speaks loosely and thus interchangeably of theoretical and mathematical sciences, mirroring ‘Heraclides’, just as he speaks of empirical sciences as sciences, mirroring ‘Isocrates’, though elsewhere he speaks *sensu strictu* of mathematics as a species of theoretical science and of science proper as theoretical (cf. *Meta.* E.1 & *NE* 6.3). Here too, what appear to be disparate and even contradictory usages are explicable in terms of dialogical ‘mirroring’ in the sense I expound. The *Spiegelspiel* I propose relates to *speculatio* (*theôria*), from *speculum*, which both reflects and inverts (distorts?).

through which we shall position all these well. Therefore we should do philosophy, if we are going to do politics rightly (*orthôs politeuesthai*) and conduct our life beneficially.

Further, the sciences that make (*poiousai*) each thing that's advantageous in this way of life are other than those that use them, and those that serve are other than those that command; and in these [latter], as if more leaderly, is what is good properly speaking (*kuriôs*). If then only that [knowledge] which has rightness of judgement, and uses reason, and observes the whole good—that is, philosophy—is able to use everything and command according to nature, by all means one should do philosophy, as only philosophy includes this right judgement and this unerringly commanding *phronêsis*.

'Aristotle' then turns to attack I₂ directly by arguing that (theoretical) philosophy is not only possible but indeed beneficial and even easy despite being difficult from another point of view. The rest of the fragment focuses on the first of these protreptic commonplaces (*Rhet.* 1.6, 1363a19-24): "that we are able to acquire the sciences concerning the just and the advantageous, and also concerning nature and the other truth, it is easy to exhibit." The speaker proceeds to outline a sense in which knowing 'priors' is simpler and in that regard easier than knowing the 'posteriors' constituted of them, and to respond to arguments that we can independently confirm were advanced by the historical Isocrates, particularly the analogy between physical education for the body and philosophy for the soul (*Antidosis* 180-3) and the critique of physics or natural science and its archaeology or stoichiology (*Antidosis* 268-9), turning *phronêsis* against him by speaking of '*phronêsis* of the causes and elements' in contrast to '*phronêsis* of the subsequents'.

The next fragment focuses on the second protreptic motif. That philosophy is beneficial, he argues, follows from what "we all agree" about governance and law, viz. that *phronêsis* is the mark of the best ruler and legislator: "the most excellent" should rule and "the law rules and alone is authoritative; but this is a kind of *phronêsis* and discourse based on *phronêsis*." And just as the just, courageous and temperate choose to live according to their proper virtues, "it's clear that the *phronimos* will choose most of all to be wise (*phronein*), for this is the function of that capacity." Since, then, "*phronêsis* is the most superior of goods", "one should not flee

philosophy, if philosophy is, as we think, both possession and use of *sophia*, and *sophia* is one of the greatest goods.” *Prima facie*, this fragment thus appears to conflate wisdom and prudence. Understood in the context of the ongoing dialogue, however, it is equally if not more plausible that ‘Aristotle’ here appropriates the usage of ‘Isocrates’, just as he did in the previous fragment. Indeed, he already specifies ‘a kind of *phronêsis*’, implying that it is not the only one at play.³⁴

The next fragment focuses on the third protreptic motif. In general, the arguments it offers trade on the opposition of leisure (*scholazein*) and labor (*ponein*). The use of philosophy alluded to in the previous fragment is here glossed in terms of the exercise of a capacity during leisure as opposed to toil (and thus contrasted with the use of capacities for various sorts of production), which the fragment goes on to exhibit in terms of the ‘progress’ of arts from those that aim at securing necessities to those that aim at pleasure and ultimately wisdom. The construal of this and kindred passages in terms of “three stages according to three different kinds of goods (goods necessary for life, goods for leisure and pleasure, and goods for contemplation and philosophy)” is widespread.³⁵ Broadie e.g. interprets *Meta.* A.2, 982b23-4, as a contrast between arts that ‘meet needs and provide pleasant recreation’ on the one hand and arts that constitute wisdom on the other. Most translators construe *schedon gar pantôn huparchontôn tôn anangkaiôn kai pros rastônên kai diagôgên he toiautê phronêsis êrxato zêteisthai* ‘it was when almost all of the necessities and things relating to comfort and recreation were supplied that this sort of *phronêsis* began to be sought’. But if one construes the first *kai* with the independent clause, not the genitive absolute, the result is consistent with what he says in kindred passages: “For [it was] when nearly all of the necessities were supplied, [that] also relative to ease and

³⁴ Moreover, as Hildebrandt (2020, 21) argues, the definition “must be understood as a response to Isocrates’ objection that philosophy cannot be the possession and use of knowledge, because knowledge is useless for action.” As in *Meta.* A.1-2, ‘Aristotle’ shows that philosophy concerns the possession and use of *epistêmê*, not just *empeiria*.

³⁵ H & J (2018a, 84). The following example is Broadie (2012, 62-3).

conduct this sort of *phronêsis* began to be sought”,³⁶ which finds confirmation both in *EE* 1.4 (1215a25-36), which contrasts the three free ways of life as modes of ‘happy conduct’ with more servile *bioi* ‘pursued as if for the sake of necessities’, and in the previous chapter at 981b17-20:

as more arts were discovered, some [directed] toward the necessities [of life] and some toward conduct [of life] (*diagôgên*), the ones who discovered the latter were always supposed wiser, because their sciences were not [directed] toward utility. Hence with all such arts established, those of the sciences [directed] neither toward pleasure nor toward necessities were discovered, and first in those places where first they were at leisure.

In each case, the primary division is twofold: as a free *bios* or *diagôgê* in contrast to ways of life or modes of conduct devoted to taking care of the ‘basic needs’ of bare life, philosophy is on the side of ‘ease’ in the sense of leisure. Further confirmation appears at *DCMS* xxiii, 71.16-20, which contrasts the instrumental and intrinsic benefit of ‘philosophy about the mathematics’: for “the necessities for our way of life” and “for those things that in themselves are honorable, as soon as we are surplused (*ek periousias êdê*).” Likewise *EE* 1.4 specifies that the three free *bioi* are those “which those who happen to be in power (*ep’ exousias tunchanontes*) all choose to live”. It is because the criterion is freedom that Aristotle perfunctorily rules out the apolaustic life in the contest of the three *bioi* he conducts in the *Ethics* and *Politics*.³⁷ The place of pleasure in this contrast is ambiguous, but only because some are free while others are servile. So ‘ease’ is to be interpreted not in terms of relaxation from toil (cf. *NE* X.6),³⁸ not merely as rest from the

³⁶ Tredennick in the Loeb edition is the only translation I know of that construes it thus. As Cambiano (2012, 39-40) notes, it was this use of *phronêsis* that led Jaeger to regard *Protrepticus* as the model of *Meta*. A.1-2, though I cannot agree that “the notions of happiness, kinds of life, virtue and so on... are absent from A 1-2” (41) precisely because it calls the pursuit of wisdom a mode of conduct or way of life, as he does vis-à-vis the divine *diagôgê* in *Λ*.

³⁷ If Stobaeus is to be trusted, the *Protreptic* was addressed in a dedication (1.i.) to one Themison ‘king of the Cyprians’ who has not only wealth but also (*eti*) reputation. H & J (forthcoming, 28-9 [ix.]) point out that, though the *Protreptic* featured Anaxagoras and probably Sardanapalus as examples of the philosophic and hedonistic life, its fragments and testimonia give no representative of the political life (nor of contestation between philosophy and politics). Perhaps this is somehow due to the fact that it was (at least fictively) addressed to a (non-hedonist?) ruler.

³⁸ 1176b9-77a12, which explicitly contrasts *diagôgai* that are for the sake of ‘play’ in the sense of ‘relaxation’ (*anapausis*, from the verb to ‘rest-up’ [for]) or at worst ‘escapism’, which only seem eudaimonic or ‘conducive to happiness’ (cf. fn. 13), with ‘free’ *diagôgai* that are for the sake of virtuous activity. The difference for Aristotle between leisure and relaxation (vs. busyness) goes to the core of his metaphysics, which contrasts *energeia* proper with *kinêsis* as well as *stasis*. The connection is perhaps clearest at *Pol.* 8.3, 1337b29-34: “nature herself seeks, as

Sisyphean labor of spurious infinity, the proverbial rat race or hamster wheel, but in terms of freedom, i.e., liberation from the need to perform ‘necessary’ activities and hence leisure to perform ‘beautiful’ activities.³⁹ In the present fragment, then, ‘Aristotle’ notes the progress from arts concerned with the production of necessities to “arts that are for pleasure, like music and such; and it was when they had more than [enough of] the necessities that they undertook to do philosophy.” Despite the fact that “those who busy themselves (*pragmateuomenous*) with these [theoretical and specifically mathematical things] we not only do not exhort (*protrepomen*) but often even obstruct; still, nonetheless, they have progressed the most, because in their nature they are elder / president, for the subsequent in genesis takes the lead in substance and perfection.”

The next four fragments consist mostly of methodological remarks that again imply the critical distance of the speaker with respect to Pythagoreanism. The first combines pedagogical remarks about the function of the student relative to that of the mathematician, accepting “the manner of the proofs independently of how the truth holds,” and the method of “mathematical education.” The second contrasts the plausible reasoning acceptable from rhetors with the necessary demonstrations one should demand of mathematicians, the sorts of necessity and

has often been said, not only to be busy (*ascholein*) rightly but also to be able to be at leisure beautifully. For the same [sc. leisure] is the one principle of everything,” on which cf. Diamond (Unpublished): “the leisure all things seek is the full realization of their own intrinsic form—they seek to actively be what they are, after having busily worked to overcome their separation from this end on the way to becoming what they were only implicitly. So in the busy work of being engaged in a process towards some end not yet attained, one is only potentially in possession of one’s goal, end, or form, not actively. Leisure is the activity which has overcome this separation or potentiality for the goal and is completely exercising the end which it already possesses” (5-6 etc.). As Lobkowitz (1967, 24) observes, “That Aristotle had no difficulty in saying, on the one hand, that contemplation is an activity and, on the other hand, that it is completely leisured, may be due to the circumstance that the Greek language expresses ‘to be leisured’ as an activity: ‘[*scholên agein*].’” That is, leisure implies freedom-to (work), not just freedom-from (toil).³⁹ “And all life (*bios*) too is divided into business (*ascholian*) and leisure and into war and peace, and of actions some relate to the necessities and utilities and others to the beautiful things” (*Pol.* 7.14, 1333a30-31-4). Cf. Diamond (Unpublished, 15) on the Shield of Achilles: “We get a circle with two cities, one at war and one at peace, involved in all the busyness of the political and military sphere. Yet at the very centre of the shield, placed within the circle of these cities, is a lovely scene depicting youth and leisure—Homer makes sure we know that what is happening at the centre of this shield is the focus, Aristotle would say the *telos*, of the serious work of the political work of the city at war and in peace.” For the development see my account in the *Introduction*.

precision appropriate to the technical (productive) and theoretical sciences, and the principles and causes of things of radically distinct kinds and the modes of demonstration appropriate to them.⁴⁰ The third shifts from comparing rhetorical and mathematical demonstration to contrasting and ordering types of mathematical demonstration and research in terms of content and method. The fourth renders the critical distance explicit, not only negatively but positively: the younger Pythagoreans hypothesized only mathematical principles (*archai*),

But since we demonstrate, not only in the speeches previous to now but also in our subsequent remarks, that there are many other substances that are motionless and the same in themselves, not only the mathematical ones, and that the former are elder and more honorable than the latter, and we will demonstrate also that these mathematical [principles] are not the only principles, but there are also others, and the latter are elder and more potent than the former, and that the mathematical principles are not those of all the beings but [only] of some...

These ‘elder and more potent’ principles are to be understood in the context of his earlier remark that celestial *theôrêmata* “have the most honorable and divine rank of the things perceptible to us and naturally are cognized / familiar through the science of astronomy, which is as it happens one of the mathematical [sciences]” (*DCMS* xxiii, 72.16-20), which implies that the principles the present fragment has in mind are prior to those of astronomy, which in turn suggests an answer to the question I earlier referred to as ‘bracketed’ in *Protrepticus* of ‘whether the object of this cognition is the cosmos or some other nature’. Strikingly, ‘Aristotle’ here uses the very phrase Plato uses at *Rep.* 6, 509b9-10, for the respect in which the Good is *epekeina tês ousias*, in a context that also subordinates mathematics and astronomy to philosophy proper (dialectic).

⁴⁰ *Meta.* Δ.4-5 offers his definitive answer to the question implicitly raised here concerning the identity (and difference) of the principles and causes of being as such: he concludes that they are one by analogy, focality, and seriality (‘primary in entelechy’). As Crubellier (2000, 141) observes, these modes of unity correspond to the ontology, ousiology, and theology conceptions of first philosophy: analogical unity is cross-generic and cross-categorical (categories are the highest genera), focal unity is that of substance as the primary category or highest genus, divine substance is the primary substance in the series of substance(s). The fragment ends by stressing that the mode (*tropos*) is cognate (*sungenês*). The next fragment speaks of being able to tell the difference between ‘what is the same and other’ & ‘what is the same by analogy (*kat’ analogian*)’, foreshadowing *Meta.* Δ.6 (1016b31-17a3).

He even appears to appropriate it in his formula concerning the inverse correlation of being and becoming, that the ‘elder in substance and perfection’ is posterior in the order of coming-to-be.

The third and last phase of A₂ consists of two fragments, the first of which is the longest version of the *ergon*-argument anywhere in the corpus, the second of which appears to expatiate on its conclusion in an axiological register. The former begins by stressing the intrinsic *and* instrumental value of *to phronein kai to gignôskein*. Then it previews the final conclusion of A₃:

whether thriving (*to zên eudaimonôs*) consists in enjoyment, or in having virtue, or in wisdom (*phronêsei*), according to all these one should do philosophy; for these come about for us especially and purely through doing philosophy.

Dividing “us” into soul and body and the soul into rational and irrational parts, ‘Aristotle’ proceeds to identify the ‘ruling’ part with that which ‘uses’ the other as an instrument (*organon*), which supports or underlies (*hupokeitai*) the ruler or user. He then correlates usage or function with virtue, especially that of “the most authoritative and honorable” part of anything: “whatever the virtue of this part is, it’s necessarily the most choiceworthy of all simply, both for everything and for us; ... one might even posit that we ourselves are this portion, either only or especially.”

When it comes to the human soul, then, “the most authoritative end for this is *theôria*.” For

nothing is more choiceworthy than *phronêsis*, which we claim to be the capacity of the most authoritative [function] in us, to judge one condition (*hexin*) relative to another; for the cognitive (*gnôstikon*) part, both independently (*chôris*) and combined (*sunkeimenon*), is better than all [the rest] of the soul, and knowledge is its virtue.

The speaker at this point in the dialogue elides *theôria* and *phronêsis*: *phronêsis* is the virtue of that part of the soul which performs (*dra*) *theôria*, the peculiar or special function of the human soul. Penultimately, then, the fragment distinguishes theoretical and productive knowledge on the grounds that productive arts are not parts of their products whereas “*phronêsis* is part of virtue and of happiness, for we claim that happiness is either from it or is it.” Hence,

it is impossible for this to be productive science... one should say that this science is some theoretic [one], since it is impossible for production to be its end. Therefore, *to phronein kai to theôrein* is [the] function of the virtue, and this of all things is the most choiceworthy for humans, just as seeing is to the eyes, I guess, which one would choose to have even if nothing else were going to come to be through it besides the sight itself.

As the function of our highest virtue, the fragment concludes, *to phronein kai to theôrein* is the activity which fulfills our capacity to engage in distinctively human action (whether the *kai* is explicative is fruitfully and, I claim, deliberately ambiguous).⁴¹ Responding to the use of *phronêsis* in I₁ and I₂, ‘Aristotle’ realigns it to coincide with *theôria* as opposed to *poiêsis*; responding to its use in H₁ and H₂, he stresses the kind of wisdom he has in mind by glossing it as theoretical, implying or leaving open the possibility that these are not simply coextensive.

The latter fragment picks up the thread of the ‘seeing’ analogy at the end of the former, comparing the value of perception in general, sight in particular, true belief and *phronêsis*, and concludes that “all humans especially pursue *to phronein*.” After an indeterminate gap, H₃ begins. The first fragment of H₃ continues the line of thought developed in A₂ both with respect to the *sine qua non* status of *phronêsis* in the good life (without which “none of his other goods would be of any benefit”), the life worth living, and with respect to the ‘seeing’ analogy. As a response to I₂, however, it appears to be consistent with ‘Heraclides’. Aside from the reasons H & J offer in their reconstruction, I would note: the speaker holds that “everyone, inasmuch as they perceive *to phronein* and can taste it, think the other [goods] to be nothing” (in contrast to the previous fragment of ‘Aristotle’ which sketches a hierarchy of comparative value) and argues “that the many flee death shows the philomathy of the soul” and, hence, that people are

⁴¹ Earlier it claims “that which is naturally more ruling and more leading is better, as a human relative to the other animals; thus soul is better than body (for it is more ruling), as is the part of the soul that has reason and thought, for such is what prescribes and proscribes and says how one ought or ought not to act (*prattein*).” Earlier still, it casts the intrinsic value of wisdom and cognition in terms of its being “impossible to live as humans without these” and its utility in terms of being “useful in our way of life, for nothing good comes about for us unless completed by having been enacted (*energêsasin*) by reasoning and according to *phronêsis*.”

possessed of *philia* “*tou phronêsai ti kai idein*.”⁴² The philomathy discredited at the end of I₂ returns here with a vengeance, leading the speaker to claim, on the contrary, that (far from ‘omitting the greatest of goods’) it implies our orientation toward the greatest good, *phronêsis*, as the speaker interprets it. That is, he equates philomathy with philosophy. ‘Aristotle’ spoke earlier of the mathematical theorist as a *kind* of spectacle-lover (*philothēamôn*), and of mathematical theory as ‘akin to and cognate with’ philosophy; the theory-lover is inclusive of but not reducible to the math-lover. The philomath parallels the *philopragmôn* just as the polymath parallels the *polupragmôn*; each is pejorative—framed in terms of the opposition—yet reclaimable. In response to I₂ here, ‘Heraclides’ reclaims philomathy by eliding it with philosophy. ‘Aristotle’ thus prescinds from the antithesis: philomathy for him would be as it were a kind of philosophy (vs. ‘Isocrates’), not coextensive with it (vs. ‘Heraclides’). Yet ‘*tou phronêsai ti kai idein*’ hints that a broad sense of *phronêsis* is at play. This hint is confirmed in the second fragment of H₃.

This dense little paragraph is worth quoting in full:

Just as, with property (*ousias*), it is not the same possession that is for the sake of living and of living happily in humans, so too with *phronêsis* we are not in need of the same [*phronêsis*] for living only and for living beautifully. So there is much forgiveness for the many who do this (for they pray to be happy, but are content if they are able only to live), but whoever thinks it is necessary not to stay alive in every way / by all means, already thinks it’s derisible to not endure every toil and exert every effort so as to have acquired this *phronêsis* that will cognize the truth.

The speaker here explicitly contrasts two sorts of *phronêsis*. As it stands, it could have been voiced either by ‘Heraclides’ or by ‘Aristotle’, though it seems more continuous with the previous fragment than the *ergon*-argument. If ‘Heraclides’, we can now say that each character

⁴² The fragment concludes, “It is for the same reason that we both rejoice in things and people we’re accustomed to and call ‘friends’ (*philous*) our familiars.” This exhibition of the range of *philos* “may have been part of an effort to define ‘philosophy’” (H & J, 2018a, *ad loc.*, 48).

has conceded that there is a broad sense of *phronêsis* despite their preferred usage.⁴³ Earlier I spoke of the ‘three-ring circus of ambiguity’ wherein each character uses *phronêsis* both as interchangeable with *and* as distinct from *sophia* in his own way. What I meant was as follows:

1. ‘Isocrates’ is pro-philosophy in his sense but anti-philosophy in the sense of his opponents (theoretical or Academic). Hence, he uses *phronêsis* (in his sense) both interchangeably with *sophia* (in his sense) and in contrast to *sophia* (in their sense). I.e., he uses both terms in his sense interchangeably, but contrasts *phronêsis* in his sense (practical wisdom) to *sophia* in their sense (theoretical wisdom).
2. ‘Heraclides’ is pro-philosophy in his sense (mathematical or Pythagorean). Hence, he uses *phronêsis* (in his sense) both interchangeably with *sophia* (in his sense) and in contrast to *sophia* (practical vs. theoretical wisdom, a distinction ‘Isocrates’ accepts only in their sense of *sophia*). I.e., he uses both terms in his sense interchangeably (he identifies or conflates theoretical and practical wisdom, as ‘Aristotle’ does not), but contrasts *sophia* in his sense to *phronêsis* in the sense of ‘Isocrates’. The latter he identifies or conflates with survival-oriented as opposed to happiness-oriented wisdom.
3. ‘Aristotle’ is pro-philosophy in his sense but critical of the one-sided accounts of his interlocutors. Hence, his usage both mirrors and diverges from theirs.

To clarify:

1. explains the shift in usage from I₁ to I₂, and from the 1st to the 2nd half of I₂.
2. explains the conflation as well as distinction of *sophia* and *phronêsis* in H₁, H₂, & H₃.
3. explains their usage in the three sets of fragments spoken in the person of ‘Aristotle’.

The current fragment links the two sorts of *phronêsis* to the distinction, developed by each of the characters in the dialogue, between living and living well or surviving and thriving, or alternatively ‘degrees of vitality’,⁴⁴ which culminates, as we shall see, in A₃. Earlier ‘Aristotle’ had stressed that it is “servile to cling to living but not to living well” and spoken of the ‘liberated vision’ of the free man for whom “the dominant end of the activity according to his

⁴³ I₂: ‘*phronêsis* about nature and that sort of truth’; H₁: other animals have some share of *phronêsis* but none of *sophias theôrêtikês*, which we share only with the Gods; A₁: theoretical *sophia* vs. practical *phronêsis*. As we saw, the speaker of *sophias theôrêtikês* may have been ‘Aristotle’. Cf. fn. 80. If ‘Heraclides’, it could merely be intensive; but if he did draw some distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom, we should interpret it in the context of his account of practical wisdom as applied mathematics. In any case, the dispute or rivalry was still latent prior to I₂.

⁴⁴ I say ‘alternatively’ because, as we shall see, there is a curious ‘flip’ wherein ‘living well’ is seen as ‘truly living’ in contrast to ‘merely living’ seen as living to a lesser degree: the divine life is life itself as a *pros hen legomenon*.

proper way of life has reference to himself and to nothing else external.”⁴⁵ In the last fragment of A₂, moreover, as it were the addendum of the initial *ergon*-argument, he sketched an axiological hierarchy rising from lower to higher levels of psychic or cognitive activity indexed to the degree they contribute to a life worth living. It is against this account of degrees of vitality, sketched in the function-argument and its coda,⁴⁶ that the final fragment of H₃ demurs. In this passage, ‘Heraclides’ questions whether human life is worth it, and answers that it is *only* and *solely* insofar as we cultivate and exercise the divine or immortal part of ourselves *instead* of the human part. This misanthropic and pessimistic conclusion sets the stage and provides the springboard for ‘Aristotle’ to respond and wrap the conversation up in the ultimate conclusion of A₃.

To get the full force of the ultimate conclusion of ‘Heraclides’ (such as we have it), one must grasp the mood in which the argument is articulated, and for that, it is necessary, I think, to quote the passage in full, for no summary rehearsal on my part can do justice to its overall tone:

one will discover that all the things seeming great to humans are optical illusion (*skiagraphian*). Whence also it is right to say that the human is nothing and that nothing in human affairs is stable. For strength, size, and beauty are laughable and worth nothing (*oudenos axia*), and beauty seems to be such because they see nothing accurately. For if someone was able to gaze as keenly as they say Lynceus did, who saw through walls and trees, how could such a sight seem tolerable to him, seeing from what sort of evils (*kakôn*) he is constituted? And honors and reputations, objects of more zeal than the rest, are laden with indescribable nonsense; for to one beholding anything eternal it is vain to take those seriously. What is long-lasting in human affairs, what is longstanding? It’s rather on account of our weakness, I think, and the brevity of [our] lifespan, that these seem to be much of anything.

⁴⁵ Stobaeus folds the story about the original dedication to Themison (1.i) into a story about the Cynic Crates, who remarks that the shoemaker listening to him read *Protrepticus* aloud while sewing (*prosechein hama rhaptonta*) is in a freer position to do philosophy than the original addressee (heavy is the head that wears the crown), a Cynical spin on ‘being more servile than one’s servants’ (on which cf. fn. 27).

⁴⁶ E.g., in anticipation of the ultimate conclusion of A₃, ‘whether thriving consists in enjoyment, virtue, or wisdom, one should do philosophy, for these come about for us *especially and purely* through doing philosophy’; we are the rational part of our soul ‘either only or especially’; ‘the *most* authoritative end is *theôria*’. ‘Most’ or ‘especially’ in each case implies hierarchy; ‘only’ leaves open the question of exclusivity and what it consists in. He compares ‘being wise’ to ‘seeing’ in that ‘one would choose to have it even if nothing else were to come to be through it besides the [activity] itself’; it is typical of his strategy to argue that ‘even if (*arguendo*) it were not instrumentally valuable, it is intrinsically valuable. That said, it is ‘useful’ qua instrumentally valuable’ (more on which later). It is this aspect of the *ergon*-argument that implies degrees of vitality, which sets the stage for and leads H₃ to intervene.

So who would think himself happy and blessed, gazing at these things we've been constituted for by nature right from the first, as if for retribution—all—as they say the mysteries reveal? For the more archaic [rites] reveal this divinely, saying that the soul gives retribution and that we live for the discipline of certain great errors. For the syzygy of the soul to the body altogether resembles something of this sort. For as they say the Tyrrhenians often torture their captives by chaining corpses right up against their living bodies, face-to-face, fitting each part to each part, thus the soul seems to stretch itself through and glue itself to all the sensitive limbs of the body.

So nothing divine or blessed belongs to humans, save for the **only** thing worthy of seriousness, as much intellect and wisdom (*nou kai phronêseôs*) as is in us; for of what is ours, this **alone** seems to be immortal and this **alone** divine. And by being able to commune with such a capacity, although our way of life by nature is wretched and hard, even so it is so gracefully stewarded that, relative to the other animals, the human seems to be a God. For 'the intellect is the God in us' (whether Hermotimus or Anaxagoras said this) and 'the mortal phase has part of some God'. So one should **either** do philosophy **or** bid farewell to living and depart hence, as all else at least in a way seems to be lots of nonsense and trash / glitz / trumpery.

Not only is *nous kai phronêsis*, which he assumes means theoretic intellect and wisdom, the *most* valuable good, it is the *only* valuable good. Hence the exclusive force of 'or' in his conclusion.

The fragment begins by taking up the 'optics' theme in a way that casts doubt on the whole edifice of human value in comparison with the divine and eternal. Thus we see the import for 'Heraclides' of the premise that without *phronêsis* life is not worth living. He admits that according to ordinary acceptation, there is a sort of wisdom concerned with securing the needs of bare life, but it is not the sort of wisdom 'that will cognize the truth' and hence conduce to the only happiness feasible for us as human beings. Moreover, as we saw earlier, he spoke of what he now deems a 'lesser' sort of *phronêsis* merely in terms of the application of mathematical knowledge (*phronêsis* as applied mathematics) in contrast to 'Aristotle' who concedes the radical division of the sciences in I_2 without accepting its utilitarian or consequentialist valuation of them. Commenting on this passage, which he (mis)took for the conclusion of the *Protreptic* as a whole, Jaeger registers an important observation that is doubly intriguing once we appreciate it in its proper context by wresting it from the framework he intends it to reinforce and to justify:

Aristotle strikes the mortal place of his time where, in *Protrepticus*, he lays hands on her idol, the beautiful Alcibiades, in whose dazzlingly brilliant pose she smugly recognized herself. Who ‘with Lynceus-eyes’ could gaze into the interior of this pedestalized body would be presented with a picture of revulsion and hideousness. It is the Lynceus-vision (*Lynkeusblick*) of another life-feel that pierces through the material partition of the things that visibly surround us and behind this scene of appearance uncovers the new world of the hitherto invisible, the world of Plato.

Because he thought the argument was advanced in *propria persona* (being monological in form), he compares the ‘seeing-through’ at issue in the fragment with the Platonic (or Parmenidean) trope of piercing through the veil of appearance, interpreted in terms of illusion (*skiagraphian*), the shadow-theater of shadow puppets playing on the partition or wall of the Cave. Yet the latter sort of perspicacity is the *Lynkeusblick* of another *Lebensgefühl*. But why another? For Jaeger is *identifying* the lynx-eyed vision that sees through the beautiful appearance to reveal the ugly interior with that which sees through the material, visible or perceptible to reveal the immaterial, invisible or intelligible (in the person of ‘early Aristotle’). So he seems to recognize, as it were despite himself, that these versions or interpretations of Lynceus are not the same. Why then does he attribute both to the same person at the same time (despite “another”)? He tells us in a footnote to the final sentence of his treatment:

Cicero set this and similar thoughts, which he borrowed from the *Protrepticus*, at the end of the *Hortensius*, and [presumably] they would have stood at the end in the original too.

But this assumption, grounded in his monological reading of the text and revealed *ex machina* at the very end, is prejudicial. So it begs the question. For if it appeared in the context of dialogue, the fragment could just as well preserve the end of a speech of one of its characters, and since it is consistent with the speeches (that for independent reasons one can discern to have been those) of ‘Heraclides’ and only partially consistent with the speeches of ‘Aristotle’ (and not at all those of ‘Isocrates’), it is at least more plausible to frame it as the climax of a speech by ‘Heraclides’. This judgement will only be reinforced through A₃, which contrasts with H₃ as a response to I₂.

Jaeger rightly contrasts the lynx-vision of Alcibiades described in the fragment⁴⁷ with the lynx-vision of forms through their appearances (despite himself). Since the fragment preserves at least part of the conclusion not of ‘Aristotle’ but of ‘Heraclides’, however, it would appear that Aristotle here ascribes to ‘Heraclides’ an interpretation of ‘perspicacity’ that he doesn’t necessarily share, indeed, that he means to contrast with his own. Perspicacity in his sense is indeed *another* perspective, else he would be comparing ‘seeing the form through its appearance’ with seeing the ugly inside of a superficially beautiful body (superficially beautiful but essentially ugly), which is hardly the comparison Jaeger needs to substantiate his version of the early Aristotle. The whole situation reminds rather of the story about Cephisodorus, disciple of Isocrates, who ‘waged war’ against Aristotle for attacking his mentor on the assumption that ‘Aristotle was following Plato (*kata Platôna philosophhein*)’, and hence (according to the author and his source) against a strawman.⁴⁸ Like Cephisodorus (only in this respect), Jaeger thought Aristotle was ‘philosophizing according to Plato’. But whence that assumption? Jaeger thought the *Protrepticus* was Isocratic in form (prose monologue) but Platonic in content. The latter is what it means *kata Platôna philosophhein*. And his core argument for that—whence the assumption—is that its fragments do not distinguish between *sophia* and *phronêsis*.⁴⁹ In light of

⁴⁷ The example of Alcibiades is already in Boethius, though the assumption is not far-fetched. “Herakleides, der eifrigste Pythagoreer unter den Platonikern, ist sichtlich vom Protreptikos angeregt. Er verlegt die Unterscheidung der drei [*bioi*] in die ferne Vergangenheit zurück” (100). On the present account this was quite an understatement.

⁴⁸ Numenius apud Eusebius (*PE* 14.6.9-10). Jaeger (1934) discusses this episode at the end of his account of the ‘early works’ besides the *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: he rejects the assumption that it was a strawman and endorses Cephisodorus’ alleged interpretation of Aristotle (at that time). Further, he alleges that Cephisodorus knew Aristotle only through his dialogues, an intriguing claim in light of the *Protrepticus*-*Antidosis* connection. I am not aware of any attempt to pursue the suggestion that it was the treatment of Isocrates in *Protrepticus* that incited Cephisodorus.

⁴⁹ He recognizes that *phronêsis* was “Seit langem zerspalten in einen ökonomisch-praktischen und einen moralisch-religiösen Kernkomplex” (1923, 82) but claims that *phronêsis* in *Protrepticus* is “fast[!?] ausschließlich” equivalent to mathematical-philosophical knowledge (83) and therefore interprets ‘*phronêsis* about nature and that sort of truth’ (which, ironically, was ‘Isocrates’) as incompatible with the contrast of *sophoi* and *phronimoi* in the *NE* and thus as evidence that “Hinter diesem Wandel der Terminologie verbirgt sich der Wandel der metaphysischen und ethischen Grundanschauung des Aristoteles” (84). Ironically, the ‘old’ split was *in the dialogue*, both in content (two sorts of *phronêsis*) and, as I have tried to show, in its very form or dramatic structure, wherein ‘Aristotle’ mediates and reconciles the usages of his interlocutors, which casts the point that the *NE* ‘returns to ordinary usage’ in new light.

the foregoing rhapsodic performance of the text, we can see how that assumption was false. But even if it were true, verbal indistinction may imply but does not entail conceptual identification or confusion, as in various rhetorical contexts one may suppress technical distinctions one would draw in discourse among initiates (of whatever field). Even aside from the foregoing, however, the ultimate conclusion of *A*₃ tells against his interpretive premise. So let us let it unfold.

*A*₃ breaks into eight fragments. The first two preserve another version or aspect of the *ergon*-argument directed squarely at *I*₂, the next three concern the relation of theoretical to political and productive science, the sixth concerns the meaning of life, the seventh concerns pleasure, and the last is the ultimate conclusion of ‘Aristotle’ and of the dialogue (as we have it).

The first begins with a distinction, familiar to readers of *Phys.* 2 and *Meta. Z*, between natural, artificial, and chance genesis, dismisses the latter on the grounds that it is not for the sake of an end, and ranks natural higher than artificial genesis on the grounds that art imitates nature but not vice versa (asymmetrical *mimêsis*) and exists to ‘fill in’ what nature ‘leaves out’. It concludes by arguing that everything that ‘rightly’ comes to be (e.g. animals as a whole and each of their parts) does so for the sake of an end and not in vain (*charin* vs. *matên*). “Thus that for the sake of which something has come to be (*gegone*) and that for the sake of which it ought to have come to be (*dei gegonenai*), is the same.” Animals and especially humans exemplify natural generation; “hence it is clear that we’ve come to be both by nature and according to nature.” The second fragment picks up this teleological thread by asking and answering the question “So what is this [end]?”⁵⁰ Compare the beginning of *I*₂: “If the end of [the theoretical sciences] is useless, it’s necessarily much more futile (*mataion*) to put effort into them.” ‘Aristotle’ now takes aim

Hence my use of ‘schizo-phrenia’ and ‘schizo-phrenic’: the first component corresponds to Jaeger’s use of *zerspalten* (cf. Bleuler’s use of *Zerspaltung*), the second to the *phrên-phronêsis* connection (cf. *PA* 3.10, 672b31-2).

⁵⁰ Much as the *ergon*-argument of *NE* 1.7 answers the question of what happiness consists in, given that it is the highest good or ultimate end for human beings. Cf. *NE* 10.6-8, *EE* 1-2, *Pol.* 7.1-3, and *Rhet.* 1.5-7.

directly at I₂. When Pythagoras and Anaxagoras were asked, he says, they responded ‘to theorize the sky’ as a (freely chosen) way of life, “since everything else at any rate is worth nothing (*ôstôn allôn ge pantôn oudenos axiôn ontôn*).”⁵¹ Now the natural end, he continues, comes last in the order of generation, and this is the best of all (*beltiston pantôn*); so it is that the parts of the soul attain their perfection later than the parts of the body, and *phronêsis* is the final stage (*teleutaion*) of the soul, the last (*hustaton*) to come to be by nature in humans. “Therefore,” he concludes,

some sort of wisdom (*phronêsis tis*) is by nature the end for us, and ultimately (*eschaton*) we’ve come to be for the sake of being wise (*to phronein*). So if we’ve come to be, it’s clear that we also are for the sake of *tou phronêsai ti kai mathein*. Therefore Pythagoras, according to this argument at least (*ge*), was right to say that it is for cognizing (*gnônai*) and contemplating (*theôrêsai*) that every human has been constituted by the God.

Stressing the sort of wisdom he has in mind, *mathein* here picks out the theoretic aspect, perhaps noting qualified (*ti*) affinity with ‘Heraclides’. Pythagoras was right at least (*ge*) insofar as he posited *theôria* as the end, though “this argument” trades on the premise that it is the best of all, not that all else is worthless; if the end is the good, the ultimate (*eschaton*) end is the *beltiston pantôn*. In other words, contemplation is the highest good, not the only good.⁵² However we evaluate his treatment of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras here, it is noteworthy that Aristotle pairs them just as he begins to distinguish the responses of ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Aristotle’ to ‘Isocrates’. ‘Isocrates’ had paired Anaxagoras with Parmenides as proponents of ‘*phronêsis* about nature and that sort of truth’, accepting their usage *arguendo*. But now in A₃, even as he refutes I₂, ‘Aristotle’ begins to distance himself from ‘Heraclides’, contrasting the argument that all *else* is

⁵¹ Whether the last clause is part of the quote (of Anaxagoras) or reported as (*ôs*) his view by Aristotle, ‘Aristotle’ appears to question it in what follows. Cf. ‘*oudenos axia*’ and ‘*ôs ta alla ge panta...*’ in the last fragment of H₃.

⁵² Whether ‘since all else at any rate is worthless’ is part of the quote or reported as (*ôs*) his view or its implication by Aristotle, ‘Aristotle’ in the latter *ge* (at least) seems to deny the force of ‘at *any* rate’; perhaps according to them, but not ‘according to this argument’. He consciously appropriates the precept, showing *how* it was right (rather than anachronistically attributing his own view to Pythagoras, as Heraclides is alleged to have done).

worthless (exclusive) with the argument that *phronêsis* is the *most* final good of all (inclusive). Of course, ‘Heraclides’ distinguished between thriving-oriented and surviving-oriented sorts of *phronêsis*, accepting the broad usage at play *arguendo*. But as he employs it, it is a distinction without a difference, for he conceives of the latter simply in terms of the application of the former, which he conceives of in terms of mathematics (‘which both fashions its learnings for the sake of deeds and also purely apprehends beings’). Already in these first two fragments of A₃, then, which overtly take aim at I₂, we detect tension simmering just below the surface with H₃.

After raising the question ‘whether the object of this cognition is the cosmos or some other nature’, the rest of the fragment proceeds to undermine the utilitarian premise of I₂, which I quoted in full at the end of the *Introduction*. I shall not reproduce it here, but simply register several observations we were not then but are now in a position to make. First, with regard to the lack of discernment (*diagignôskonti*) he accuses his utilitarian interlocutor of, the (in)ability to tell the difference between goods proper and necessities (or causes and co-causes),⁵³ it is remarkable that ‘Aristotle’ includes *both* goods proper *and* necessities as types of ‘things without which living is impossible’ (*ôn aneu zên adunaton*), implying two senses of living: things without which bare life is impossible vs. things without which the good life is impossible (though the former *may* be included in the latter, the latter are not included in the former), which coincides with the two sorts of *phronêsis* and resurfaces in the sixth fragment of A₃ on the meaning of life. The diagnosis at issue here is the aristocratic discernment or ‘discrimination’ involved in positing the useless as the absolutely valuable rather than absolutely valueless. Hence

⁵³ Cf. *aitia* vs. *sunaitia* at *Tim.* 46d, *Statesman* 281Cff. & 287Bff. with the failure to distinguish cause and *sine qua non* at *Phaedo* 99b, and Socrates’ ‘intellectual autobiography’ as critique of Anaxagoras for failure to ‘use’ (98b) the Good and *Nous* in *Phaedo* with *Meta.* A.4, 985a14-24 (*chrêtai* = *aitiatai*) and *NE* 1.6, 1096a24 (*ho theos kai ho nous*). Roughly, Peripatetics take ‘and’ as explicative, Platonists take it as exclusive or inclusive conjunction (or ‘the Good or *Nous*’ as exclusive or inclusive disjunction). Cf. Menn (1992) & House (1996). Whether the One is *nous* or beyond *nous* in the *Parm.* is an analogous question. For ‘the God and the *Nous*’ as a hendiadys cf. Kosman (1968).

‘Aristotle’ proceeds to speak of the ‘free way of life’ enjoyed by contemplatives both here and hereafter. The whole problem of use-value will resurface in the third through sixth fragments of A₃ on political philosophy, vision, and the meaning of life. The fragment concludes: *even if* contemplation were not instrumentally valuable, it is nonetheless (and more importantly) intrinsically valuable: “It isn’t terrible at all, then, if it doesn’t *appear* to be useful or beneficial; for we claim not that it’s beneficial but that it itself is good, and not for another but for itself is it appropriate to choose it... the observance of the universe is to be honored before everything *believed* to be useful.” Without context, ‘Aristotle’ appears to be claiming that *theôria* is *not* instrumentally but *only* intrinsically valuable. In context, as a response to ‘Isocrates’, the sense is: ‘even if it weren’t useful or beneficial, that’s not what we’re claiming (strawman)...’, which leaves the door open for the utility-argument that ‘Aristotle’ will in fact go on to make in the subsequent fragments. Indeed, none of the other goods are useful or beneficial *without* wisdom (‘no knife for a child’); hence it is to be honored before all that is *believed* to be useful.

The next two fragments concern the relation of theoretical to practical and productive science. The first begins by comparing good legislators and statesmen to good doctors and athletic trainers insofar as they must be ‘experienced about nature’, the latter being public-workers (*dêmiourgoi*) of somatic virtue, the former of psychic virtue. As such, the speaker contends, the former especially are in need of philosophy,

For just as in the other craftsmanlike arts (*technais dêmiourgikais*) the best of their instruments (*organôn*) were discovered from nature (*apo tês phuseôs*), as in carpentry the framing square and standard ruler and string compass <***> for some are taken with water or with light and the beams of the rays [of the sun], and judging relative to these (*pros ha krinontes*) we test what according to perception is sufficiently straight and smooth; similarly the statesman ought to have limits (*horous*) from nature herself and the truth, relative to which he judges (*pros hous krinei*) what is just, good, and advantageous.

In contrast to the previous fragment, which stressed the intrinsic value of *theôria*, this fragment broaches the question of its instrumental value, concluding that the contemplation at the heart of philosophy is requisite for ‘expertise’ in the happiness and unhappiness (*eudaimonias kai kakodaimonias*) of the city.⁵⁴ Natural science here functions as the basis of practical and even productive science as they *should* be practiced. In contrast to what? The next fragment clarifies: non-philosophical practitioners of ‘the other arts’ take their ‘tools and most precise reasonings’ not from ‘the primaries’ or originals themselves, but from what is twice- or thrice- (etc.) removed, taking their reasons from experience (*ex empeirias*), whereas “for the philosopher alone is the imitation from the exact things themselves, for he is spectator (*theatês*) of the things themselves, not of imitations.” Just as the good housebuilder approximates his work to the archetype he has in mind rather than other existent buildings (copies), the good legislator and statesman ‘posits laws for cities or does his deeds’ not by ‘gazing off toward and mimicking other human actions or political systems’ but by imitating the ‘divine and stable in nature’.⁵⁵ Of the philosopher alone among craftsmen, the fragment concludes, are the laws reliable and the actions right and beautiful,

For he is the only [public-worker] who lives gazing toward nature and toward the divine, and just as if he were some good steersman who tethers the principles of his way of life to eternals and constants, he moors / anchors and lives according to himself.

The relation of theoretical to practical and productive science in these fragments is ambiguous.

Commenting on the pro-philosopher-ruler flavor of the text, Walker (2010) notes:

although Aristotle begins... by saying that *lawmakers* and *statesmen* will need philosophy, [he] is explicit... that *philosophers* derive these boundary markers of the human good and produce the best actions and laws. Consistent with the evident influence

⁵⁴ In ‘expertise’ I elide *technê* and *empeiria*, which are not rigorously contrasted here as they are in *Meta.* A.1-2. Cf. ‘those who are uneducated and inexperienced with truth’ in *Rep.* 7. Just as ‘mathematical’ can be used loosely or strictly, so can ‘empirical’. One might compare ‘the true empiricism’ as ‘intellectual auscultation’ in Bergson, e.g.

⁵⁵ Cf. H & J (2010, 19-22) for the implicit critique of Isocrates; ‘imitation of the imperfect’, I take it, is ‘servile’.

of Plato's *Republic* on this section... Aristotle seems to suggest that philosopher-lawmakers are a possibility, and that the best lawmakers will be philosophers of a sort.

This cautious framing does justice, I think, to the ambiguity or underdeterminacy of the text. For texts such as *NE* 6 do not rule out the *possibility* of philosophic legislators, nor even that the best legislators will be philosophers 'of a sort' (already ambiguous), only the *necessity* that wise legislators be philosophers and vice versa. In other words, these fragments leave the question open.⁵⁶ Its underdeterminacy could just as well be due to the fact that it was addressed to a broad audience, and moreover dedicated to a (real or fictive) statesman, as to its fragmentary state.⁵⁷

Yet the ambiguity Walker rightly articulates is not consistent with his exclusively theoretical interpretation of *phronêsis* in *Protrepticus*. What I hope to have shown so far is how simply placing the fragments in the context of ongoing dialogue and reading them accordingly discourages or at least problematizes such a view. But Walker's argument is subtle, so it is worth taking into account for the sake of clarity. In sum: the aristocratic and utilitarian arguments advanced in *Protrepticus* (that wisdom is useless and useful) are consistent if we distinguish two senses of utility in Aristotle, 'subservience' of lower-level activities to higher ends and 'support' of higher-level activities for subservient lower ends;⁵⁸ only in the latter sense is wisdom capable of satisfying both the intrinsic *and* non-instrumental conditions of being the highest good; wisdom is instrumentally valuable in the latter sense but not the former (resolving the

⁵⁶ Contra Jaeger (1923), e.g., who thinks they straightforwardly and unambiguously follow the *Republic*: "Nicht der Inhalt, sondern der Gesichtspunkt, unter den er gestellt ist, gibt die Entscheidung. Und gerade durch diesen Gesichtspunkt—die Betonung des theoretischen Charakters der normativen Politik—ordnet sich das Fragment dem Lobpreise der reinen [*theôria*] im *Protreptikos* ein" (78). Rather, the content is decisive as regards the 'viewpoint'.

⁵⁷ Flipping "Besonders geeignet für die Schrift an einen praktischen Politiker ist der Hinweis, daß die Politik nur auf wissenschaftlicher Grundlage betrieben und als normative Disziplin aufgefaßt aus ihrer gegenwärtigen Unfruchtbarkeit und Haltlosigkeit befreit werden könne" (*ibid.*, 78) on its head.

⁵⁸ 'Support' in his sense is the 'providential' inverse of hypothetical necessity (as in Proclus, Dionysius, Eriugena, etc. on teleology as providential love; cf. Corrigan, 2014). For "we need to account simultaneously for both the reciprocity and the hierarchy" (146); in the sense of 'support' we have asymmetric reciprocity. To ground the subservience/support distinction in *Protrepticus*, he appeals to Platonic psychology, but I would just appeal to the 'user's knowledge' theme throughout and the literal distinction between modes of 'use' in the sixth fragment of *A3*.

contradiction through disambiguation); but if it is useful in that sense of supportive, how? In that the philosopher can ‘derive boundary markers of the human good’ for legislation and action; but what does that derivation consist in or how is it supposed to work? Walker answers: by *indirect* provision of the norm that is ‘the God and the cosmos’ to practical reason, “which in turn supports virtuous patterns of reason-responsive desire” (148). Fleshing this out, he writes that

while seasoned craftsmen can often ‘eyeball’ proper measurements on the basis of experience, and while such inexact measurement may have its place outside the practice of craft, even good craftsmen still use plumb-lines, rulers, and compasses to make their measurements exact and to ensure fine works. Moreover, they do so as *part* of their craft-activity, and not as an alien, ‘rationalist’ imposition on it... Just as [bad craftsmen] rely on inexact measures, [bad agents] rely on inexact measures of *the human good* in making practical judgements.

The inexact measures such agents and legislators rely on are ‘other human actions or polities’; they do not ‘see for themselves’ via firsthand cognition the originals or archetypes of which these are imitations.⁵⁹ In other words, ‘monkey see, monkey do’ can work but is *unreliable* (like the game of telephone). Judging and acting in reference to (*pros*), in reverence of, nature and the divine, contemplators need not presuppose and reason from conventional or happenstance metrics and thus “most reliably achieve the intermediate in action and passion. On this basis, Aristotle identifies *the philosopher* as the agent possessing the most exact and reliable form of practical reasoning... the true *phronimos*” (143); the philosopher is not the *only* agent capable of being ethically virtuous, only the most reliable. Thus, wisdom is an intellectual virtue that is useful for ethical virtue. But what sort of wisdom (the core question of *NE* 6)? Walker (and Jaeger) is right that these fragments concern the use-value of *theoretical* wisdom. We shall return

⁵⁹ On *theôria* as ‘direct gaze’ or ‘autopsy’ cf. Nightingale: “the *theoros* journeyed to a sanctuary for the purpose of seeing something for himself rather than hearing it reported by others: the ‘autopsy’ or ‘eye-witnessing’ of the spectacles at festivals was a defining aspect of *theoria*” (2004, 46). Direct cognition of the original (vs. indirect cognition of it through its imitation or representation) is only ‘indirectly’ beneficial *because* theoretic knowledge is only mediately productive, sc., through the mediation of practical reason, which is thus presumed to be distinct.

to the arguments of *NE* 6 in due course, but here it is apt to note provisionally that while *NE* 6 countenances a sense in which *both* theoretical and practical wisdom are intrinsically *and* instrumentally valuable, these fragments sketch the sense in which theoretical wisdom is instrumentally valuable; these are not contradictory positions, they differ only in focus. And whence that difference in emphasis? Again, it is at least as plausible that it derives from rhetorical exigency (that these fragments are *responses* to *I*₂) as that it derives from different contradictory stages of Aristotle's intellectual maturation (the schizophrenic hypothesis, as it were). And in light of the foregoing treatment both of the dialogical form of the text and of its argumentative contents, it is indeed *more* plausible. By parsimony, then, one should reject the schizophrenic reading (not of Aristotle at any one stage but) of the corpus as otiose. To the extent that the fragments of *Protrepticus* are themselves, taken together, schizo-phrenic, it is because of the broad sense of *phronêsis* at play in the dialogue, which the interlocutors appropriate as they see fit. But let us return to what I called Walker's overly (exclusively) theoretical interpretation.

The subtlety I attributed to his argument is evident in formulations such as the following: "although contemplation is not productive, it offers a background perspective that promotes the best practical judgment" (140) and "Although philosophers do not produce when contemplating, the insights they obtain through contemplation guide their production, i.e., their sculpting of fine actions and laws, in their non-contemplative moments" (143). Thus the practical benefit theoretical philosophy offers is indirect, which is consistent with his claim in the previous fragment that it *seems* not to be useful, i.e., the benefit it provides is not obvious, because indirect (though the more you dwell in it, the clearer it becomes). So far so good. But when Walker interprets the content of wisdom or philosophical knowledge in the *Protreptic*, he restricts it to 'nature and the divine' where 'the divine' includes both 'celestial phenomena' and

‘the universe as ordered by divine intellect’ and hence, somehow, divine intellect itself.⁶⁰ But if these are the *only* objects proper to such knowledge in the *Protreptic*, how are we to account for the distinction ‘Aristotle’ drew between “the sciences concerning the just and the advantageous, and also concerning nature and the other truth” in response to the division of the sciences in I₂? One cannot. For as Hildebrandt (2020) has argued, this expression most plausibly implies not that these are two perspectives on the same knowledge (applied vs. pure versions of one knowledge) but that “philosophy includes two fields of knowledge which are distinct not just in regard to their ends but also in regard to their objects” (41); more specifically, “philosophy consists both of a theoretical and a productive or practical branch of knowledge that are differentiated by their ends and objects” (43). In conclusion (47), she suggests

[how] philosophy could be the possession and use of both practical and theoretical knowledge in the *Protrepticus*: philosophy is either exclusively or, at the very least, primarily the possession and use of the more universal practical and theoretical knowledge, such as knowledge of the human good (i.e. ethics) and knowledge of the fundamental causes and principles of reality (i.e. metaphysics and natural philosophy).

⁶⁰ Walker treats the range of ‘the divine’ as a problem (whether or not it includes celestial phenomena) but as we saw, ‘Aristotle’ already argued that theoretical sciences concern “the most common things of nature and the most divine of the things perceptible to us” (cf. “the *theôrêmata* in the sky have the most honorable and divine rank of the things perceptible to us and naturally are cognized through the science of astronomy, which is as it happens one of the mathematical [sciences]”). In light of his leaving it open “whether the object of this cognition is the cosmos or some other nature” (cf. *Meta.* A.10), it is clear that ‘the divine’ includes though is not reducible to celestial phenomena, the science of which is ‘mathematical’ and hence, in context, ‘akin to and cognate with’ philosophy (a kind of theoretical philosophy, though not the *primary* one). That “the statesman ought to have limits from nature herself and the truth, relative to which he judges what is just, good, and advantageous” and that “the philosopher is kin of the truth” go together here. Cf. “the nature of beings, i.e., the truth” and “the sciences concerning the just and the advantageous, and also concerning nature and the other truth”; H & J (2018a, 32) interpret ‘the truth’ as logic, translating *peri phuseôs te kai tês allês alêtheias* ‘about nature and the rest of truth’, connecting it with the division of propositions at *Top.* 105b20 into ethical, natural, and logical: “here we have ‘knowledge about the just and the advantageous’ (i.e. ethics) ‘about nature’ (i.e. physics) and ‘about the rest of truth’ (i.e. logic).” But Aristotle does not speak of the sciences in terms of the latter division (cf. Bodéüs, 1993, esp. 12-22). Hildebrandt (2020, 34) interprets ‘the rest of reality’ as the content of all theoretical science inclusive. One wonders to what extent the question of logic or metaphysics is misguided. I interpret ‘the other truth’ in ‘both nature and the other truth’ as the God both in itself and in relation to the cosmos, as in *Meta.* E.1 (where celestial phenomena are among *tôn theiôn*), the disclosure (*alêtheia*) of which is reserved, naturally (‘the nature of beings, i.e., the truth’), for *Meta.* A. Nature is a kind of truth in the sense that it is the disclosure of the absolute idea or divine intellect, on which cf. the final sentence of Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia Logic*: “The absolute *freedom* of the Idea, however, is that it does not merely *pass over* into life, nor that it lets life *shine* within itself as finite cognition, but that, in the absolute truth of itself, it *resolves to release out of itself* (*sich entschließt... zu entlassen*) into freedom the moment of its particularity or of the initial determining and otherness, [i.e.,] the *immediate Idea* as its reflexion, or itself as *Nature*” (trans. Geraets, Suchting, Harris). *Entschließen* here carries the same sense as *alêtheuein*, more on which in the 6th fragment of A₃.

In my view the strongest reason she offers for regarding these two kinds of knowledge as distinct not only in terms of their ends (contemplation vs. action) but also in terms of their objects takes the form of her reading of these very fragments on the utility of theoretical knowledge. In sum, she argues that the prescriptive aspect of the argument—that legislators and statesmen *should* base their craft, their knowledge of the just and the advantageous and the virtues of the soul (whether they have it or not), on, or at least supplement it with, experience about nature—presumes that these modes of knowledge are distinct.⁶¹ These fragments describe the utility of theoretical knowledge in such a way that they *presume* its distinction from practical knowledge, not as pure vs. applied theoretical knowledge, but as a distinct *kind* of knowledge. That is, knowledge of the just and the advantageous is not theoretical, but rather practical or productive.⁶² Assuming that the *NE* denies or at least deemphasizes the utility of theoretic knowledge for action and legislation, she writes (39-40),

But even if the *Protrepticus* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* should disagree on this point, this would not imply that there is a unity of the two branches of philosophy in the *Protrepticus*, i.e. a unity of knowledge of nature and the rest of reality, and knowledge of

⁶¹ The comparison implies that “both the doctor and the athletic trainer already have some knowledge in their field that they can teach, specifically, some productive knowledge concerning the excellences of the body. The claim in the *Protrepticus* is only that they profit from additional experience about nature. If their knowledge of medicine or athletics were already identical with knowledge of nature, then they surely would not be benefitted by experience of nature” (42). The force of ‘only’ here is akin to my point that Aristotle undermines not the possibility but only the necessity of turning rulers into philosophers or vice versa. She assumes that the legislator, according to this comparison, has the knowledge he professes to have (*prospoiumenoi*), but her argument works without this assumption, which we therefore need not attribute to ‘Aristotle’. Either they have it, but still need to supplement it with experience about nature, in which case these are distinct, or they don’t, but need experience with nature in order to acquire it, in which case experience about nature would be prerequisite and thus ‘useful’ for acquiring ‘sciences about the just and the advantageous’; in the latter case, experience about nature would be ‘sciences about nature and the other truth’ put to good use, which would thus be ‘applicable’ without being identical to the former sciences (the plural in my view contrasts both domains as a whole and the sciences that comprise them). In that case, “Perhaps the idea is that doctors, physical trainers and legislators need only some and not comprehensive knowledge in the domain of nature, i.e. they only need ‘some experience with’ such knowledge” (35), which is a viable alternative to the quasi-Bergsonian reading I suggest in fn. 54. Either way, my point is, they are distinct.

⁶² Depending on how we construe the latter. Hildebrandt (2020, 40-1) cites Johnson (2015, 173) on the sense in which ‘productive’ can include practical (whether the science is practical or productive ‘makes no difference’ when the issue is whether it “aims at some result other than knowledge”). But as Kosman (2013, 302) notes, there is also a sense in which *poiein* is a ‘special case’ of *prattein*. I shall sort this out in due course; on the inversion of *praktikê* and *poiêtikê*, the two ‘sorts of *praxis*’ in *Meta*. Θ.6, and the two ‘models of production’ in *NE* 6, see Part 2.

the just, the useful and the excellences of the soul. Aristotle might rather just have changed his mind regarding the usefulness of theoretical knowledge for practical concerns.

In light of the argument I preliminarily sketched to the effect that these texts differ not in content or doctrine but only in emphasis, however, to posit even this ‘change of mind’ is otiose. For as soon as we place these fragments in their dialogical context, it becomes clear how they are part of the ongoing back-and-forth between ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Heraclides’ in response to ‘Isocrates’.

Hildebrandt deliberately focuses only on those fragments which are agreed to have been advanced in the person of ‘Aristotle’, regardless of whether they were in dialogue or monologue (whether the arguments of his interlocutors appeared in direct or indirect speech). This method has the advantage of showing how the texts Jaeger uses to substantiate his reading do not entail and even positively discourage it. Yet it brackets the dramatic context in which these arguments are to be understood. Once we include all the fragments in our interpretation and read them dialogically, we can see, e.g., how the premises, which Jaeger attributes to the author of *Protrepticus*, that there is only one knowledge, that it is theoretical, and that ‘knowledge of the just and the advantageous’ is simply the applied (vs. pure) version of that knowledge, *were* articulated or espoused in the dialogue but *in the person of ‘Heraclides’*.⁶³ In a sense, then, we need not choose between these interpretations of the fragments; we need only contextualize them properly. Likewise, the broad (appropriable) sense of *phronêsis* at play in the dialogue explains its ambiguity throughout, for its usage is *contested*.⁶⁴ So although I agree that its usage in the text is somehow due to rhetorical context:

⁶³ Again, ‘Aristotle’ does not deny that theoretical knowledge is applicable, only that practical knowledge consists *simply* in the application of theoretical knowledge to human action and legislation.

⁶⁴ Justifying (what is probably) Iamblichus’ phrase ‘theoretical *phronêsis*’ with reference to ‘nothing is better than *phronêsis*... therefore... this science is some theoretic [one]’, she rightly claims that *phronêsis* here is *at least partly* theoretical. By the same token, it is not *only* theoretical (contra ‘Heraclides’). Similarly she claims (19) that the knowledge attacked in I₂ is philosophy *and not* mathematics; on my account we need not choose because the dispute

Since the *Protrepticus* is a published work intended for the exhortation of philosophical amateurs, it is likely that Aristotle did not wish to make exhaustive use of his set of technical vocabulary and instead chose to employ more common terms.

I think we can go further. Aristotle is not just suppressing technical distinctions for non-initiates but consciously playing with the meaning of *phronêsis* through the drama of the dialogue, showing how each of the interlocutors uses it in his own way, in view of his account of “what being happy truly is.” But this remains obscure as long as we bracket the question of form. By reading the fragments dialogically and dramatically, we can account for its usage in all of them.

So Walker cannot be right that philosophy in *Protrepticus* consists *only* in theology or metaphysics and cosmology or astronomy, even if it consists *primarily* in them; Hildebrandt is right that it is “either exclusively or, at the very least, primarily... knowledge of the human good (i.e. ethics) and knowledge of the fundamental causes and principles of reality (i.e. metaphysics and natural philosophy).”⁶⁵ But I still have not addressed the final aspect of his argument, his description of how ‘deriving *horoi* of the human good’ is supposed to work, which is worth taking into account before we turn to the final four fragments of A₃, for it shows *how* ‘Aristotle’ here conceives the utility of theoretic knowledge as distinct from practical and/or productive knowledge. Essentially: contemplation of the divine clarifies the upper limits of the human good, how we are not Gods; contemplation of our kinship with the divine, or in contemplation being akin to the divine, clarifies the lower limits of the human good, how we are like Gods. Citing NE 6.7 on the content of *sophia* (vs. *phronêsis*), Walker claims that the content of *phronêsis* in

between ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Heraclides’ *at this stage of the dialogue* is still latent; the attack is *indiscriminate*, as is the defense of ‘Heraclides’, which provides the opportunity for ‘Aristotle’ to offer a subtler response than ‘Heraclides’.

⁶⁵ By ‘possession and use of the more universal practical and theoretical knowledge, such as...’ Hildebrandt means *politikê* or political philosophy and metaphysics or first philosophy, respectively, the question being the referent of ‘unfailingly epictactic *phronêsis*’, on which cf. the ambiguity of *periechoi* at NE 1.2, 1094b6, and *to kuriôs on agathon* with Pol. 1.1, 1252a5-7 (“*malista tou kuriôtatou pantôn ê pasôn kuriôtatê kai pasas periechousa tas allas*”), Meta. A.2, 982b5-7 (“*archikôtatê... tinos heneken esti prakteon hekaston; touto d’ esti tagathon hekastou, holôs de to ariston en tê phusei pasê*”), and E.1, 1026a32 (“*katholou outôs hoti prôtê*”), more on which in Part 2.

Protrepticus must be ‘higher’ than the human good, so that the cognition one acquires of its “structure and boundaries” via philosophy is indirect, in which respect theory is useful.⁶⁶ But again the claim is otiose: one can retain the indirect (non-productive) condition if the *kind* of *phronêsis* at issue concerns the divine alone; *phronêsis* broadly speaking would *primarily* though not *exclusively* concern the divine.⁶⁷ Taking the conclusion of H₃ as that of Aristotle, Walker interprets Lynceus-vision of the ‘evils’ of which we are constituted figuratively: human beings and human goods are “relatively imperfect when compared against the standard of divinity” (150). Thus “to one beholding anything eternal it is vain to take those seriously” showcases a comparative mode of apprehension wherein the upper limits of human beings and goods are revealed.⁶⁸ But to interpret “evils” as ‘relative imperfections’ is to elide the contrast Aristotle suggests here between the theory of evil of ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Aristotle’, respectively. For the doctrine that ‘all else is worthless junk / trash / glitz / trumpery’ (deceptive illusion) flies in the face of the Aristotelian notion, suggested already at this stage of *Protrepticus* in the sketch of ‘degrees of vitality’ that prompted H₃ to intervene, that all else is a *relatively (un)successful*

⁶⁶ For ‘nothing prevents theoretic knowledge being incidentally useful to us for many of the necessities’ cf. *EE* 1.5, 1216b16-7, in the context of concession to Isocrates vis-à-vis ‘Socrates the elder’, though whether such knowledge is ‘incidentally useful’ for legislating and acting well is another question (*pace* Hildebrandt, 2020, 39).

⁶⁷ Walker takes issue with Bobonich (2007, 167), stressing that the utility of theoretical wisdom in *Protrepticus* is *not* equivalent to its being (identical with) practical wisdom: “(some of) the knowledge the philosopher uses in his political judgement *is* the highest sort of wisdom... Part of such wisdom’s special value... consists in its providing (in part) a *basis for* practically wise judgement” (citing Gerson). So Walker appears to recognize that there *is* another sort of wisdom at play in *Protrepticus*; it is just not relevant in these passages, which concern the utility of theoretical wisdom for practical reason. Less charitably, he does not recognize practical wisdom (as distinct from applied theoretical wisdom) in *Protrepticus*, in which case he and Bobonich are both partially right and wrong. One should keep the questions of ‘the utility of theoretical wisdom’ and ‘how it contrasts with practical wisdom’ distinct. Contrast also the formulation in Bobonich (2006, esp. 20-3): “only a philosopher performs actions that are right and fine”; “a life without philosophy is of little worth. This does not commit him to the idea that a life of virtuous action is worth little, since... the *Protrepticus* seems to hold that virtuous action requires philosophic understanding. But the claim that any life without philosophic understanding is of little value to its possessor is in deep tension with Aristotle’s views elsewhere.” Rather, the *Protrepticus* admits the contrast between theoretical and practical wisdom, but emphasizes the utility of theoretical wisdom, which are compatible answers to distinct questions.

⁶⁸ “In bringing to light our difference and separation from the divine, contemplation elucidates the way in which we, as all-too-mortal human beings, are akin to other animal life forms... We recognize the dependence of our biological self-maintenance upon both the ongoing satisfaction of basic nutritive-reproductive needs and the acquisition of external goods that promise to provide us with a measure of security” (150).

approximation of the divine. For ‘Heraclides’, all else is mere distraction; for ‘Aristotle’, even the lowest, grossest animals are wonderful and beautiful and worthy of study, divine sparks, imitations of eternity, mortal imitations of divine life.⁶⁹ Conversely, in contemplating the divine and cosmic intellect, we contemplate the paradigm of an activity of which we too are capable, albeit limitedly and imperfectly. Again citing the conclusion of H₃,⁷⁰ Walker writes that the philosopher “would be in a position to recognize not only his finitude in relation to the divine, but also his *relative kinship* with the divine” (151), revealing the lower limits of the human good. Thus appreciating our intermediate place between Gods and the other animals, we grasp how the human good is delimited from that of the other living beings in whose midst we find ourselves. And although this physical or metaphysical mean (grasped in theory) is not simply equivalent to the ethical mean (in action and passion), Walker continues, it proves useful for attaining it: theoretical activities are valuable for us in a way they are not for the other animals, mortal lifeforms whose activity is governed by perception and appetitive desire; conversely, appetitive desires are valuable for us in a way they are not for the Gods, whose activity is free of the need to satisfy such desires.⁷¹ Comparing this to Aristotle’s claim at the end of the *EE* that contemplation of the God can provide ‘the most beautiful limit’ for legislators and statesmen

⁶⁹ Cf. *PA* 1.5 (“*en pasi gar tois phusikois enesti ti thaumaston... ôs en apasin ontos tinos phusikou kai kalou... tèn tou kalou chôran eilêphen*”). On how *PA* 1 ‘retains and redeploys’ *Protrepticus* cf. H & J (forthcoming, 22-3; 2017, *ad loc.*; 2018a, *ad loc.*). On the ‘optimism’ (vs. pessimism) of Aristotle cf. Segev (2022). One should contrast the pessimism of H₃ with the optimism implicit in the ‘degrees of vitality’ theme, which forms the background “against which Heraclides’ dark and pessimistic speech makes for such a stark contrast... Against this, Aristotle will offer several lines of response, all of them relatively life affirming” (2018a, 49). What is it about the initial stage of the *ergon*-argument that implies the ‘degrees of vitality’ theme that leads H₃ to intervene? ‘Heraclides’ thinks that *phronêsis* is the *only* good that matters, because he conceives of it purely in terms of theoretic wisdom (and instrumentally in terms of applied theory). For ‘Aristotle’ by contrast it is the *supreme* good, the *best* of all.

⁷⁰ “So nothing divine or blessed belongs to humans, save for the only thing worthy of seriousness, as much *nou kai phronêseôs* as is in us; for of what is ours, this alone seems to be immortal and this alone divine. And by being able to commune with such a capacity... relative to the other animals, the human seems to be a God. For ‘the intellect is the God in us’... and ‘the mortal phase has part of some God.’” Since ‘Aristotle’ agrees with (at least a revised version of) this point, (mis)attributing it to him is not lethal.

⁷¹ Cf. the ‘know your limits’ vs. ‘become Godlike’ interpretations of the Delphic imperative in Socrates and Plato.

who seek to determine the right proportion of natural goods for citizens, which rules out excess in establishing an upper limit on the possession and use of such goods (which should not hinder contemplation) and deficiency or ‘need’ in establishing a lower limit on their possession and use (which, given the requirements of mortal beings, also frustrates contemplation),⁷² he concludes that by recognizing the kinship of our activity with that of the Gods, we will appropriately value our theoretical activity and harmonize our appetitive desires with it (attune them to it), forswearing vice in one direction, and appropriately value the satisfaction of our life-needs (*Lebensmittel*), forswearing vice in the other direction: “Benefitting from the utility of contemplation, ... such agents will be in a position most reliably to achieve the intermediate in action and passion and to create good laws” (152). Despite the problems I have raised and responded to, Walker’s account of the ‘derivation’ implicit in these fragments is correct. But I would stress: none of it, as I have construed it, contradicts the *NE* in principle (only in emphasis).

So when Walker claims that philosophic legislators in *Protrepticus* are a *possibility* and that the *best* legislators will be philosophers *of a sort* (emphases mine), he shows how even these fragments leave the question open, the question I call that of ‘reorienting’ quietists to politics and activists to philosophy, which I shall flesh out in due course. When ‘Aristotle’ concludes that those who profess expertise (*epaiein prospoioumenoi*) in the *eudaimonia* (and *kakodaimonia*) of the city are even more “in need of philosophy” (*prosdeontai*; ob-ligated, given the prescriptive force of the argument) than doctors and athletic trainers, then, it is ambiguous whether he means that they should become philosophers or enlist their help. And that is as it should be, for nothing

⁷² That these fragments are compatible with the end of the *EE* raises the question of their relation to the *NE* (esp. 6.13), where Aristotle seems both to identify *phronêsis* with ‘right reason’ and to ‘subordinate’ it to *sophia* (but in what sense?). I discuss these issues in the next chapters.

in these fragments *entails* an answer to this question in one way or another. Thus we have another reason to attribute the underdeterminacy of the text to logical and rhetorical exigency.

One last proleptic point before we turn to the final four fragments. One might object that the very thesis that there are two branches of philosophy in the *Protrepticus* (distinct in end as well as object) is incompatible with the *sophia/phronêsis* distinction, for practical wisdom in the sense of *NE* 6 is not equivalent to ‘political philosophy’ or the ‘philosophy of human affairs’; practical science is the intellectual disposition of someone who *acts* scientifically, not of someone who *studies* action scientifically.⁷³ True, but irrelevant, for *phronêsis* in the sense of ‘Aristotle’ (akin though not identical to that of ‘Heraclides’) coincides with *sophia*, not with the ‘lesser’ (survival-oriented) forms of *phronêsis*, though these too are recognized in the course of the dialogue. Conversely, ‘Aristotle’ does not simply identify practical wisdom—as distinct from theoretical wisdom—with these survival-oriented forms of wisdom concerning the ‘basic needs’ of ‘bare life’. Once we read the fragments dialogically (or rhapsodically), the objection resolves.

The fifth fragment of *A*₃ appears to develop the previous two fragments on the utility of contemplation:

For just as sight is productive and a craftsman (*poiêtikê kai dêmiourgos*) of nothing, for its only function is to discern and clarify each of the visibles, but provides us the [ability] to do something (*prattein ti*) through it and is of the greatest help to us for actions (*prostatas praxeis*), for being deprived of it we would be almost absolutely motionless, so it’s clear that, though the knowledge is theoretic, nonetheless we do myriad things according to it, taking some and fleeing others, and on the whole acquiring all the goods through it.

‘Aristotle’ expressly says that we can act ‘according to’ theoretical knowledge, but does that mean that we act only insofar as we theorize? Evidently not. The sister-passage is of course the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, which frames our love of the senses in terms of *both* their intrinsic *and* their instrumental value, though stresses the former:

⁷³ Cf. Bodéüs (1993, 21).

even independently (*chôris*) of the use they are cherished on account of themselves, and especially the one through the eyes; for not only in order that we might act but even when going to do nothing we choose seeing against all the others, so to speak.

Both texts presume that theoretic modes of awareness *are* instrumentally valuable, though the former emphasizes and the latter deemphasizes it. *Even if* they were not instrumentally valuable, as ‘Aristotle’ puts it at the end of the initial stage of the *ergon*-argument, they would still be *choiceworthy* (‘which one would choose to have *even if* nothing else were to come of it besides the activity’). For to act *kata* theoretical knowledge is *either* to act ‘restrictively’ or to act ‘directively’ according to it (inclusive);⁷⁴ it is valuable both intrinsically and instrumentally, ‘useless’ and ‘useful qua supportive’: it provides limits and ‘the most beautiful limit’ *both* to practical reason *and* through (the mediation of) practical reason to the reasonable side of the irrational soul as directives (epitactic *phronêsis*, which orders the non-rational soul *kata logon*). The pure function of theoretical cognition (*to krinein*) contrasts with its utility *pros tax praxeis* not *only* in the sense that it ‘directs’ practical reason but *also* in the sense that it ‘orders’ the soul.

The sixth fragment of A₃ draws all these questions about ‘usage’ together in its account of the meaning of life, concluding that philosophers in the act or use of contemplation are most truly alive:

The ‘living’ is meant doubly, one according to capacity (*dunamin*) and the other according to activity (*energeian*). For we say those animals are ‘seeing’ both which have sight and are naturally able to see (even if it happens to be closing its eyes) and who are using the capacity and casting their sight. And similarly also ‘understanding’ and ‘knowing’, we mean on the one hand using and theorizing, on the other hand having acquired [(possessing)] the capacity and having the understanding. Accordingly, if we discern the living from the not living by perceiving, and ‘perceiving’ is twofold—properly as using the senses but otherwise as being capable [of it] (wherefore we say even of those who are sleeping that they are perceptive, as it seems), clearly it shall follow that ‘living’ too is doubly meant; for the one who is awake should be said to live

⁷⁴ Walker (2011) contrasts ‘restrictive’ or exclusive and ‘directive’ or inclusive usages of *kata*: on the latter, activities that are *kata* e.g. ‘the best and most complete virtue’ need not (though can) be the exercise of that virtue, for they can be *kata* that virtue insofar as it directs them such that they are ultimately consistent with and promote it.

truly and properly (*alêthôs kai kuriôs*), but the one who is asleep through being able to change into the motion according to which we mean that someone is waking and sensing.

... And so, whenever one and the same [word] is meant of each of two things, and one is meant by [virtue of] the doing (*tô poiein*) and the other by [virtue of] the being done to (*tô paschein*), we shall render the term to belong more to this [former]; such as ‘understanding’ [belongs] more to the one using [it] than to the one having the understanding, and ‘seeing’ [belongs] more to the one casting his sight than to the one able to cast. For we mean ‘more’ not only according to excess of things for which there is one account, but also according to that which is prior and posterior; e.g., we say that health is more [of a] good than healthy things, and that what is to be chosen according to its own nature [is more of a good] than what is productive [of it]. And yet we see, at any rate, that it is not by the account of ‘good’ being predicated of both that it applies to each, both to the beneficials and to the virtue. Therefore, the one who is awake (*egrêgorota*) should be said to live / be alive more than the one who is asleep and the one who is active (*energounta*) in the soul [more] than the one only having [the capacity]; for it is on account of the former ‘living’ that we say the latter too [is ‘living’], because like the former he is such as [to be able] to suffer (*paschein*) and to do (*poiein*).

Accordingly, to use anything (*to chrêsthai panti*) at least is this: whenever the capacity is for **one** thing (*henos*), someone who does (*prattê*) this same thing [uses it], but if the number is more [than one], the one [uses it] who does the **best** of these, like with flutes, one uses it either **only** when one uses a flute or **especially**; for presumably the uses of the other capacities are for this too. Accordingly one should also say that he who uses [a capacity] rightly uses [it] more; for the natural for-which and how (*to eph’ ho kai hôs*) belong to the one using beautifully and precisely. Now of soul too the function is thinking and reasoning either **alone** or **most of all**. Therefore, it’s already simple and easy for all to syllogize that the one thinking rightly lives **more** / is **more** alive and **most of all** the one **most** disclosing-truth, and this is the one being wise and theorizing (*phronôn kai theôrôn*) according to the most precise understanding; and completely living (*teleôs zên*) at least is to be rendered then and to these: to those being wise, i.e., to the wise.

The distinction ‘Aristotle’ here introduces between living *kata dunamin* and living *kat’*

energeian follows the *ergon*-argument articulated in the first two fragments of A₃ and arguments concerning the (non)utility of theoretical wisdom in the next three fragments, which emerge naturally enough from the ‘aristocratic’ emphasis of the conclusion of the second (the questions about utility that it and the ‘even if...’ structure of the argument that leads to it, the hypothetical mood in which it is articulated, generate). Here it leads him to speak of living *kat’ energeian* as living truly and properly: the *ergon*-argument entails that ‘completely living’ belongs either only or most of all to *ho phronôn kai theôrôn*. Whether it belongs to philosophers only or especially is

a question that recurs in the penultimate and ultimate fragments, which suggests that ‘Aristotle’ here again leaves the question open, unlike ‘Heraclides’ who concluded that philosophers alone lead lives worth living, that philosophy is the only worthwhile way of life, which led to the exclusive disjunction of his conclusion that we should pursue (theoretical) wisdom or forsake our all-too-human lives (nasty, brutish, and short as they are). But even in the present fragment, as I have construed it, nothing entails an answer one way or the other. The last paragraph frames the question in terms of inclusive disjunctions and ends by stressing the superlative rather than the exclusive term. Even *ge in to ge teleôs zên tote kai toutois* stresses: minimally (or maximally), living in the true and authoritative sense belongs to those who exercise their theoretical wisdom. Moreover, even among those who ‘think and reason rightly’, the one who does so superlatively is the one who most discloses the truth (*ho malista alêtheuôn*), which implies levels or degrees of disclosure, that the speaker has in mind different kinds of reason or functions of the rational soul. Indeed the fragment enacts what it is about: the disclosure of what living ‘truly and properly’ is, in response not only to I₂ (‘we live well by acting well, for that’s what being happy truly is’) but also to H₃ (‘either do philosophy or take leave of life, because it’s the only life worth living’).

The penultimate fragment concerns the status of pleasure in the good life, concluding that philosophers enjoy true pleasure ‘either only or especially’:

... we render ‘living’ to the waking more than to the sleeping, and to one who is wise more than to the unwise; and the pleasure that is from life is that which comes from the use of the soul, we say, for this is being alive truly (*to zên alêthôs*). Accordingly, even if there are many uses of the soul, nonetheless most authoritative (*kuriôtatê*) of all is that of being wise (*tou phronein*) to one’s utmost. Accordingly, it’s clear that the pleasure which comes from being wise and theorizing (*phronein kai theôrein*) is also that which is from living **either only or especially**. Therefore, living pleasurably and true enjoyment (*to chairein hôs alêthôs*) belong **either only or especially** to the philosophers.

‘Aristotle’ here elaborates an account of pleasure that stems from the *ergon*-argument(s) sketched in previous fragments and especially from the last, which couches its account of

(peculiar or special) function in terms of usage (*chrêsis*). As in *all* these fragments, he frames the question of exclusion vs. inclusion (only vs. especially) in such a way as to leave it open (via inclusive disjunction), in contrast to ‘Heraclides’ who assumes and/or argues for an all-or-nothing interpretation of *eudaimonia* (via exclusive disjunction), viz. that only the best life is worth living, that there is only one virtue worth acquiring and exercising (whether ‘purely’ in itself or ‘usefully’ in application, i.e., in relation to the satisfaction of our all-too-human needs).⁷⁵ Whether it consists exclusively in the use of the soul, or if there are many such uses then in the most authoritative of all, i.e., *phronein kai theôrein* (contra both ‘Isocrates’ who decouples these and ‘Heraclides’ who assumes that *kai* here is explicative), *to zên alêthôs*⁷⁶ and the pleasure of being alive are the prerogative of philosophers, i.e., belong to them either only or especially (inclusive). The premises articulated entail only the inclusive disjunction, and that is the conclusion ‘Aristotle’ in fact derives. Why else would he stress the question continuously throughout, as we have seen him do? In absence of evidence to the contrary, then, we should surmise that ‘Aristotle’ in staking out his response to I₂ carefully demarcates it from that of H₃,

⁷⁵ Cf. ‘pure apprehension of beings vs. applied mathematics for the sake of deeds’ in H₁ with A₂ on how ‘whether thriving consists in enjoyment, virtue, or wisdom, one should do philosophy, for these come about for us *especially and purely* through doing philosophy’; for ‘Heraclides’ they do so *only* via philosophy.

⁷⁶ Cf. ‘*zên alêthôs kai kuriôs*’ & ‘*teleôs zên*’ in the previous fragment. Living ‘truly and properly’ and ‘completely’ turns out to = living well (cf. fn. 44). That living = living truly or completely is implicit in ordinary usage (e.g. ‘*dum vivimus, vivamus*’ or ‘*Vivamus, mea Lesbia...*’). On the *euêmeria* and ‘natural sweetness’ of *to zên auto monon* cf. *Pol.* 3.6, 1278b25-31 (and *euêmeria* at *EE* 1.4, 1215a27). For an ironic take on the pleasure of leisure (vis-à-vis Sappho and Cicero) cf. Catullus 51 ‘*otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est: / otio exsultas nimiumque gestis. / otium et reges prius et beatas / perdidit urbes.*’ On the sweetness of life and *la dolce vita* one might compare *odi et amo* with *glukupikron*. The contrast (cf. *NE* 9.9, 1170a17-b5) is between the pleasure that comes from living well and the pleasure that comes from sheerly living (it goes under the radar, but if you attend to it you’ll notice, like breathing; call it the giddiness of being), the pleasure that comes from achieving excellence vs. the pleasure that comes from simply being alive (which usually goes unnoticed until you have a near-death experience, e.g.). In the next and last fragment, completely living turns out to = completely living well. If we include Düring fr. B86 & B87 (cf. *NE* 10.4, 1175a11-21) as Chame (2023, esp. 15-24) does (H & J do not), we can link complete (*teleia*) living, happiness, and activity with unqualified (*haplôs*) via ‘absolutely’ (simple & complete are one as beginning & end), more on which in Part 2. I am currently in dialogue with D. Hutchinson on their authenticity. That being is *better* than not being and living than not living (at least *ceteris paribus*) is at *GA* 2, 731b30.

which interrupts. As we turn at last to the final fragment and ultimate conclusion of A₃, we shall witness the very same caution both in its premises and in the conclusion it derives from them.

The ultimate conclusion of the *Protreptic*, such as we have it, integrates all the preceding strands of argument into its call for all who are capable to do philosophy in the sense ‘Aristotle’ has sketched and indeed exhibited or enacted in competitive conversation with his interlocutors:

happiness is either *phronêsin* and *tina sophian*, or virtue/excellence, or especially enjoyment, or all these. Hence, [1] if it’s *phronêsis*, it’s manifest that living happily would belong to the philosophers **only**; and [2] if it’s virtue of soul or enjoyment, even so [it would belong] to them **only or most of all**; for virtue is the most authoritative of the [things] in us, and the most pleasurable of all is, comparing one to one (*ôs hen pros hen*), *phronêsis*; and similarly, [3] even if someone were to claim that all these same [at once or together] are happiness, it is to be defined by being wise (*tô phronein*). Hence [4] all who can should do philosophy; for surely [5] this either is completely living well (*to teleôs eu zên*) or is **most of all** anyway, as one so to speak to one,⁷⁷ responsible for it in their souls.

Whether happiness consists exclusively [1] or especially [2-3] in the exercise of *phronêsis*, philosophy is the most worthwhile way of life: *either way* or *regardless*, he concludes, you should do philosophy. The argument that philosophy is the *only* worthwhile way to live (H₃) is to be contrasted (logically and, I hope to have shown, dramatically) with the argument that philosophy is *at any rate* the *most* (*malista ge pantôn*) worthwhile way to live (A₃), which raises the prospect of an inclusive account of *eudaimonia* wherein philosophy, though it satisfies the conditions of *to zên eudaimonôs* most of all or to the greatest *degree*, is not the only worthwhile way to live. Once again, and at last, ‘Aristotle’ leaves the question whether the political life is ‘secondarily’ happy (as he puts it at *NE* 10.8) open. And again, that is as it should be, not only because none of the fragments present arguments that entail an answer one way or another, but because the *Protreptic* was addressed at least fictively to a reputable ruler and generally to a broad audience (all who can) including, if not entirely comprised of, potential legislators; it

⁷⁷ Translating *ôs hen eipein pros hen* vaguely (vs. ‘comparing one to another’) so as to keep the ‘focal’ reading live.

would not serve his rhetorical strategy to alienate (at least part of) his intended audience by stressing the inferiority of the life they currently led or sought to lead. Rather, he emphasizes the superiority of philosophy by arguing that the very metrics by which practitioners of the political and hedonistic lives judge their lives successful or unsuccessful, happy or unhappy, compel and obligate them to acknowledge the supreme value of *phronêsis* and hence philosophy as the way of life that prioritizes ‘what being happy truly is’.⁷⁸ Moreover, he introduces this argument by identifying *phronêsis* as a kind of *sophia* and/or distinguishing *phronêsis* from a kind of *sophia* (depending on the function of *kai*), which remains unclear precisely because it raises the question whether they are identical or distinct without resolving it. H & J translate *phronêsis* ‘intelligence’ throughout to keep the question of its relation to *sophia* live. I have kept to ‘wisdom’; both work where Aristotle doesn’t (or doesn’t need to) contrast them. But in contexts like this,⁷⁹ the verbal contrast is apt. For ‘Aristotle’ here introduces the upshot of his argument by alluding to the ambiguity I have argued is present throughout the dialogue, whereby each interlocutor uses *sophia* and *phronêsis* both interchangeably and contrastively vis-à-vis one another according to his own account of *eudaimonia*. Previously we saw how each appropriates the broad sense of *phronêsis* to suit his account. Here *sophia* too is used broadly (the sort of *sophia* is qualified).⁸⁰ Hence one cannot tell whether *kai* in this context is explicative or contrastive. And once again, that is as it should be, for the rhetorical context of exoteric discourse (oral or written) is not the forum to decide the question, which Aristotle raises only in texts addressed to students who have

⁷⁸ The contrast between deemphasizing the inferiority of other ways of life and emphasizing the superiority of philosophy may well seem hairsplitting, but only in logical terms divorced from rhetorical context, where alienating people who are not already purely reason-responsive presents a problem in view of the end (suasion or conversion). Similarly, the (negative) anti-apotreptic of *Pol.* 7.1-3 and (positive) protreptic of *NE* 10.6-8 differ in emphasis.

⁷⁹ Cf. fn. 43 for other instances of the contrast in *Protrepticus*.

⁸⁰ It is unclear whether *sophias theôrêtikês* in *Protr.* V, 35.14-36.24, is merely intensive or specifies the kind of *sophia* the speaker has in mind. In the latter case, *phronêsis* would contrast not with *sophia* in general but only with theoretical *sophia*. In the former, only the conclusion of A₃ would raise the question.

already chosen to do philosophy in the Lyceum, “perhaps because they were convinced by arguments in *Protrepticus* that it would be valuable for their political careers. They could benefit from a narrow protreptic to pure philosophy.”⁸¹ The conclusion of *Protrepticus* addresses people even outside the Academy or Lyceum, exhorting them by their own internal logic, the internal logic of their ultimate commitments, to pursue wisdom. Though the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a whole and book 10 in particular exhibits and elaborates the structure of its conclusion,⁸² the conclusion of the ‘pure protreptic’ at *NE* 10.6-8 is less inclusive in that it addresses those who have already chosen to pursue wisdom and study in the Lyceum;⁸³ yet this latter audience includes not only those who have chosen to do pure philosophy (to encourage them to keep at it) but also those who have chosen to pursue wisdom only to the extent that or solely because they (or their parents) were convinced that it would be useful or beneficial for their political vocation. By raising the question without answering it, Aristotle leaves it open for an appropriate forum.

With regard to the fact that book 10 of the *NE* is the only place in the corpus where Aristotle stresses the secondary happiness of the political life, which I have just argued the *Protrepticus* admits but deemphasizes, H & J point out that

the protreptics of X.7-8 may have served a recruiting purpose. But even those students who would never be attracted to the intellectual life should be cautioned that the political

⁸¹ H & J (2014), 401.

⁸² Cf. (*ibid.*, 386-7 & 390), and Bodéüs (1982): *NE* 10 “touche à trois problèmes nettement distincts, l’un relatif au plaisir (chap. 1-6), l’autre au bonheur contemplatif (chap. 7-9) et le troisième à l’éducation et la politique (chap. 10). Il est difficile de ne point constater le rapport entre le choix de telles matières et l’existence reconnue ailleurs de trois biens fondamentaux... [*hedonê, phronêsis, aretê*]... ou de trois genres de vie... [*apolaustikos, theôrêtikos, politikos*]” (n. 9 to ch. 2, sic). Roughly, then, the structure of *NE* 10 is a fractal or microcosm of that of *NE* as a whole; both are “essentially an expansion of the structure of argument that was the culmination of the *Protrepticus*” (H & J, *ibid.*). Cf. (forthcoming, 37-43) and (2005, 280).

⁸³ Though the distinction between *protrepis* and *parainesis* is fluid (Alieva, Kotzé, Van der Meeren, 2018), one might at least heuristically contrast the functions of ‘attaining’ and ‘maintaining’ conversion. On *muêsis* and *epopsis* as levels or stages of graduation in mystery cult (*mystai* and *epoptai* as the ‘blinded’ and the ‘viewers’) cf. e.g. Dimitrova (2008): “In Samothrace, as at Eleusis, the first-time initiates are called *mystai*, ‘blinded ones,’ as opposed to the *epoptai*, ‘viewers,’ initiates participating in the second stage of the rite... This gradation, attested first at Eleusis and elsewhere only at Samothrace, apparently originated at Eleusis, where *mystai*, first-stage initiates, could become *epoptai* at a second participation in the Mysteries” (78). Cf. the reversal in the Theban plays. On the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* as adaptations of Diotima’s Lesser and Greater Mysteries see Corrigan (2014, 93-4).

life comes with serious constraints and compromises, so it is opportune in this context for Aristotle to reveal his own authentic preference between the two eligible lives, with the political life being ranked lower.⁸⁴

Conversely, I would add, it serves to get potential rulers to appreciate philosophy, to put it in perspective, even if they don't ultimately do it, i.e., choose it as a way of life, and thus to turn the 'activist' to philosophy in a weaker sense than that of turning rulers into philosophers. Likewise, stressing the secondary (genuine though not primary) status of practical wisdom and the political life may lead 'quietists' to appreciate politics without necessarily turning them into rulers. Again, nothing in the fragments of *Protrepticus* entails that Aristotle decided between these weaker and stronger senses of 'conversion' in the text. Hence, I speak vaguely of 'reorienting' quietists to politics and activists to philosophy to capture both versions of conversion. Moreover, in light of the simultaneous presence in the text of arguments for the utility of theoretical wisdom *and* its distinction from practical wisdom, it is not so much that the fragments do not decide the question as that they entail that *both* those who are purely interested in wisdom and those who are not should do philosophy (either way). But even beyond logical entailment, or in concert with it, the dramatic structure of the dialogue shows how 'Aristotle' mediates the quietism of 'Heraclides' and the activism of 'Isocrates', who voice 'extreme' versions of the quietist and activist ideals (of happiness). The very drama of the dialogue suggests that its author sought to reconcile the quietism of one with the activism of the other. To what extent were these characters caricatures?

Isocrates historically occupied an ambiguous position between quietude and activity, identifying as an *apragmôn* who 'kept quiet' away from the assembly and courts, yet "whose

⁸⁴ (Forthcoming, 42). They read *deuterôs* as stressing inferiority; minimally, it stresses that there are degrees.

detachment from the world by no means implied indifference to it.”⁸⁵ Hence his peculiar account of (atheoretical) philosophy:

So I don’t think one should address as ‘philosophy’ what isn’t in the present of any benefit for speaking and acting; however, I call such time-spending (*diatribên*) ‘mental gymnastics’ (*gumnasian tês psuchês*) and ‘preparation for philosophy’, manlier than what boys are made to learn in school-lessons, but mostly in that neighborhood. For when they have thoroughly labored at grammar, music, and the rest of education, they are taking no progress as yet toward speaking better or deliberating about public affairs (*tôn pragmatôn*), but become better at learning relative to the greater and more serious of the studies (*mathêmatôn*). So I would council the young to spend some time on these disciplines / branches of education, yet to not let their [souls] get withered / ossified on them, nor stranded upon the discourses of the antique sophists, one of whom claimed that the number of beings is unlimited; Empedocles, that it’s four, strife and friendship among them; Ion, that it’s not more than three; Alcmaeon, only two; Parmenides and Melissus, one; and Gorgias, absolutely none. For I think such grandiloquences / overtalkativeness are like wondermakings, which are beneficial to no one but generate crowds of mindless bystanders, and that those wishing to do / produce something of service (*prourgou ti poiein*) must rid all their activities (*diatribôn*) of futile discourses and actions bearing nothing [relevant] to their way of life... On wisdom (*sophia*) and philosophy: it wouldn’t be fitting for those contending about any of the others [(cases?)] to speak on these names, for it’s alien to all the [other?] activities (*allotria pasais tais pragmateiais*); but since I am judged / tried on such [names?] and claim that what some call philosophy isn’t, it’s appropriate for me to limit and clarify it—justly regarded—for you... For since it isn’t in human nature to attain knowledge (*epistêmê*) having which we’d know (*eideimen*) that which is to be done or said, in the next resort I deem wise (*sophous*) those who by their beliefs (*doxais*) are able to attain the best for the most part and philosophers those who spend time in these [studies] from which they will most quickly acquire such wisdom (*toiautên phronêsin*).⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Ehrenberg (1947, 58), whose verdict on the ‘moderate and rather shallow aims’ of Isocrates should be balanced with e.g. Haskins (2004): “Yet, unlike other literary *apragmones* of his generation—especially Plato and other Socratics—Isocrates adopts the quietist stance in order to reinvent democratic rhetoric, not to disavow its legitimacy altogether” (91). I shall not litigate these charges here, but note them in passing.

⁸⁶ *Antidosis* 266-271. For more on the ‘studies’ he proposes cf. 184: “But when [paedotribes and philosophers] have made [their students] experienced and thoroughly conversant / discerning in these [lessons concerning somatic *schêmata* and psychic or logical *ideai*, respectively], again they exercise them and accustom them to labor, and compel them to string-together each one they have learned, in order that they hold these down more stably / reliably and that their beliefs (*doxais*) come to be closer to the occasions (*kairôn*). For it’s impossible to comprehend these by knowing (*tô eidenai perilabein*); for in all of the activities (*pragmatôn*) they thoroughly elude the sciences (*epistêmas*), but those who are especially attentive (*prosechontes ton noun*) and able to observe (*theôrein*) what results [from them] for the most part, most often meet (*tunchanousi*) these [occasions rightly].” *Meta*. A.1-2 responds (in effect if not intent) to these arguments both at the beginning (*eidenai... phusei*) and at the end (‘the nature of the *epistêmê* being sought and the *skopos ou dei* for the quest and the whole pursuit *tunchanein*’); perhaps he ironically appropriates the sense in Isocrates of it not being in human nature to ‘happen / chance upon *epistêmê*’.

Despite his quietism or apragmatic status, then, his stance was still fundamentally activist, for he cherished the activist ideal, as Aristotle shows in *I*₂. It is unclear whether he calls philosophy ‘other to all *pragmateiai*’ or the weird *pragmateia*, for he has just contrasted philosophy in his sense with the ‘mental gymnastics’ practiced by theoretical philosophers; theoretical philosophy is at best propaedeutic to practical philosophy (= philosophy proper), which is at least beneficial for all *pragmateiai* if not itself an activity or ‘employment’ unlike any other. The real philosophers are those who spend time in the disciplines that are most conducive to acquiring the sort of *phronêsis* that he identifies as *sophia*. It is such if not this very usage that Aristotle invokes in *Protrepticus*, and such if not this very equivocation over the status of philosophy as an activity or vocation. One function of protreptic dialogue is to show how the arguments or speeches of a character flow from their priorities or commitments as these are grounded in choices that reflect their character, and conversely how their character or ethical stance flows from the reasons they cite in thought or justification of speech and action, the account of themselves and their way of life they render under question.⁸⁷ In *Protrepticus*, the ‘pessimistic’ conclusion of ‘Heraclides’ follows from his premises, which reflect his priorities, which reflect his choice of a Pythagorean *bios*; likewise, the ‘pragmatism’ of ‘Isocrates’ follows from his premises, which reflect his priorities, which reflect the ‘choice of life’ he has resolved upon. One argues that the contemplative life is the *only* life worth living, the other that active *and not* contemplative lives are worthwhile (not wastes of time, worthless *diatribai*). That its fragments do not entail though pave the way for an answer to the ‘reference-question’ raised in *NE* 1.7

⁸⁷ Cf. Fink (2012, esp. 179-182) on the interrelation of ‘character, decision and purpose’ in Platonic dialogues, who argues that Aristotle’s dialogues did not focus on depicting these, despite drawing them from *Rhet.* 3.16 (1417a15-20). On the contrary, I am arguing that ‘characterization’ in his sense was crucial to *Protrepticus* (at least). Cf. Walker (2010): “like the [*theôria*] of excellent Olympic athletes and of dramatic performances at the Dionysia, philosophical [*theôria*] is a final good choiceworthy for its own sake... to hold goods such as wealth as higher than such [*theôria*] is to reveal mistaken priorities: instrumental goods are choiceworthy for the sake of *theôria*” (138).

(what is the referent of ‘the best and most complete virtue’ in its definition of happiness?) is consistent with the dramatic structure of the dialogue wherein they took place, the mediation and reconciliation of theoretical and practical wisdom, philosophy and politics, the Good itself and the good for us, Academics and pragmatists, quietism and activism. Despite the ambivalence of the historical Isocrates on the question—his wanting to have his cake (quietism) and eat it too (activism)—or perhaps because of it, there remains a gulf on his account, however bridgeable, between quietude and activity, theory and practice. Aristotle sought to honor and simultaneously to overcome this chasm already in the *Protreptic*. So although Aristotle does indeed caricature Isocrates to the extent he depicts his stance as simply an extreme form of activism—what some have called ‘hyperactivism’ and what I have called over-activism, i.e., *polupragmosunê*—it is a caricature that accentuates (at least what he regarded as) the genuine implication of his stance, that reveals rather than distorts his conception of wisdom in action and hence of philosophy as the propaedeutic to the ‘usage and action’ at the root of living well = acting well = being happy.

It is harder to sort out the relation of character to caricature in the case of ‘Heraclides’, for we possess only fragments of his works that rarely if ever supply reliable independent confirmation of the ‘over-quietism’ or *apragmosunê* Aristotle ascribed to him in *Protrepticus*.⁸⁸ Whatever we may conclude from these scintillae, Aristotle was careful to ascribe to him arguments not only for the intrinsic value of theoretical wisdom but also for its instrumental value in application to all facets of human life. The problem isn’t that he denies that living well = acting or doing well, but that he conceives of good conduct simply in terms of the putting-into-practice of mathematics (= theoretical science), practical wisdom as applied mathematics, which is thus subordinate and in the end pales in comparison to ‘pure apprehension of beings’ in the

⁸⁸ Perhaps fr. 48, 54A, 56, 81, 84, 85, 104, 111, 115A-B, 116B, 147, 149B (2008) are candidates for comparison.

rarified air of pure (theoretical) mathematics. By contrast, ‘Aristotle’ concedes to ‘Isocrates’ that practical wisdom is not simply the application of theoretical wisdom, though he argues that the latter is indeed useful and beneficial (contra ‘Isocrates’ and with qualified concession to ‘Heraclides’). Conversely, he floats though doesn’t necessarily endorse the view that (theoretical) philosophy is the only *bios* worthy of human beings and concludes that at any rate it’s the most worthwhile pursuit for us (contra both and with qualified concession to both). By integrating and overcoming and in that sense reconciling the quietist and activist ideals, priorities or commitments of his interlocutors, the stance of ‘Aristotle’ surpasses the dilemma of quietude and activity or inactivity and overactivity. His very argument that the human function is the end of philosophy, that *theôria* is the *ergon* at the heart of philosophy, overcomes the dilemma of contemplation and action in the concept of activity (*energeia*) and being active (vs. inactive *and* overactive). ‘Aristotle’ emphasizes the activist ideal not against the quietist ideal, but rather treats the quietist ideal as the quintessential case of the activist ideal.⁸⁹ There is a sense, then, in which Aristotle shares the Periclean polemic against *apragmones* insofar as he espouses the activist ideal of *eudaimonia*, but he denies that what post-Pericleans are calling quietude (whether for or against) is merely *stasis* or rest, for it is his contention that *theôria* is activity in the highest sense and degree, that contemplation is the *praxis* that the happiest prioritize. By the very logic his audience uses to justify their way of life, they should do philosophy, i.e., choose it as a way of life (in which regard the contemplative life is an action), or at least use it to benefit their way of life. He rejects the overly narrow sense of *praxis* and *praktikos* to which his (overly)

⁸⁹ Thus when Hadot contrasts *théorique* with *théorétique* to mark the difference between theoretical discourse as an aspect of philosophy and philosophy as a contemplative way of life, yet recognizes that “Aristotle himself uses only the word *theôrêtikos*, and he uses it to designate, on the one hand, the mode of knowledge whose end is knowledge for its own sake and not an end external to itself, and, on the other, the way of life which consists in consecrating one’s life to this mode of knowledge. In this latter sense, theoretical is not opposed to practical” (1995, 129), he registers the distinction as well as the identification (ambiguity) of theory and practice in Aristotle, which Aristotle himself explains in terms of distinct senses of *praktikos* (not *theôrêtikos*), more on which in Part 2.

active and quiet opponents are committed, both his supposedly activist opponent who denies the value of (theoretical) philosophy and his overly quietist opponent who denies that any other way of life is worth living. Instead, he articulates an account of *eudaimonia* wherein, though philosophy at any rate *most* of all satisfies the conditions of living well = doing well = happiness, i.e., satisfies them to the greatest *degree*, it is not necessarily the *only* worthwhile way to live.

Thus, we come to the problem presented yet left unresolved at the end of *Protrepticus*: whether philosophy exclusively or most of all is *to teleôs eu zên*. I have already argued that the text is intentionally underdetermined; hence my claim that Aristotle deliberately left it unresolved, despite suggesting his stance through the drama of the dialogue. Curious, then, that it is precisely the question that recurs in his ethical and political treatises in the form of the ‘reference’ (and ‘accordance’) question, which is at the root of the schism in recent literature between ‘exclusivist’ and ‘inclusivist’ readings of *eudaimonia* in these treatises. As my account of the *Protreptic* suggests, its author was already aware of and sought to overcome the split between quietism and activism (as ways of life and interpretations of happiness). In Part 2, we shall see how the contrast between exclusive and inclusive accounts of happiness is a function not of ‘schizophrenia due to metanoia’ but of rhetorical context, i.e., whether or to what degree the text is esoteric vs. exoteric: the protreptic to pure philosophy in *NE* 10 and the anti-apotreptic against theoretical philosophy in *Pol.* 7, e.g., both argue for the superiority of the contemplative life on the grounds that it is the *most* active of all *bioi*. The latter explicitly distinguishes senses of *praktikos* (based on sorts of *praxis*), degrees of *praxis* even in the ‘proper’ sense, and argues that *theôria* is the *praxis* that the happiest prioritize. These three premises are consistent with and develop the solution to the dilemma articulated in the fragments of *Protrepticus*. Part 2 begins by

investigating each of them in turn. As we shall see, they raise questions that lead ultimately to the heart of his metaphysics, i.e., his account of pure noetic activity and eternal celestial motion.

Outro

In conclusion, the supposed indistinction of *sophia* and *phronêsis* in *Protrepticus*—to the extent that it treats them interchangeably (I have shown the extent to which it does not)—is explicable at least as well in terms of rhetorical context as in terms of ‘schizophrenia due to metanoia’ (as I have phrased the Jaegerian thesis). Indeed, as I have argued, the fact that some of the fragments do contrast them (implicitly and even explicitly) entails that they are *more* explicable in terms of my thesis. But my thesis is not just that the indistinction is due to the ‘exoteric’ audience to whom the *Protreptic* was addressed, which has been argued before, but that it is due to what I have called the ‘3-ring circus of ambiguity’ wherein each of the characters in the dialogue ‘mirrors’ each other’s usage *arguendo* even as they appropriate it to fit their own. Only thus, I contend, can we account for their usage in *all* fragments of the *Protreptic* at once. As a corollary, I have argued that the *Protreptic* such as we have it entails no decision as to the question of whether rulers *must* become philosophers or vice versa, and of whether philosophers ‘only or especially’ lead happy lives, though what I have argued is the intentional underdeterminacy of the text suggests answers to both these questions while keeping them live and leaving them open for an appropriate forum; to capture the ambiguity I have spoken of stronger and weaker senses of ‘reorienting’ or ‘converting’ politicians or activists to philosophy and philosophers or quietists to politics. Thus construed, I claim, his account of *eudaimonia* in the ‘exoteric’ work is compatible with his account of *eudaimonia* in the ‘esoteric’ works, though I can only justify this claim through certain readings of the latter, which I reserve for Part 2. If the fragments of the lost work *can* be read consistently in the way I propose, then (by parsimony)

they *should*. Moreover, since my thesis preserves the (dia)logical consistency of the entire evidence base, we should assume the dialogue hypothesis not only parsimony but to account for all the evidence. That is the prescriptive force of my argument.

Let me end by anticipating what I regard as a reasonable *prima facie* objection to the whole enterprise undertaken here: it is nothing but a flight of fancy based on the random stitching-together of fragments on the framework of the skeleton devised at the outset. My response: to the extent it involves stitching, that stitching is not random. I have outlined the methodological assumptions that rivet the warp of the loom through which I have passed the thread (*oimê*) of the argument(s), sequencing the fragments together into one continuous essay, recreating the dialogue in the manner of rhaps-ody. H & J provide the materials and sequence. I have dialectically woven them together into a comprehensive and coherent web. Properly speaking, I have *sewn* (not stitched) the weave together. So my imaginary objector *misinterprets* the sort of weaving at work in the essay. Call it flight of fancy; in truth it is rhapsodic *mimêsis*.

As such I offer it as a peplos (back) to Athena, the Goddess who presides over such work. And thus we come full circle back to the beginning, the thread that runs through the whole,⁹⁰ which I trace from Homer and Hesiod through the dramatists and historians to Plato and Aristotle, whose *Protreptic* dramatized the dilemma of ‘quietism or activism?’ and its resolution.

Appendix on the Eudemus

Walker (2021) develops a “nondoctrinal” reading of the *Eudemus* that avoids attributing to Aristotle not only a “full-on double doctrine” (self-contradictory ‘public vs. private’ position) but also “an aim to defend any particular doctrine... Instead... Aristotle entertained arguments for unqualified immortality in the *Eudemus* but bracketed his own theoretical commitments for

⁹⁰ Nagy (2002, esp. ch. 3).

pedagogical purposes” (410). I deny that these—the ‘self-contradictory’ and ‘no positive doctrine’ (aporetic though propaedeutic) approaches—are the only alternatives. By propaedeutic Walker means aporetic—that Aristotle in (at least most of) his dialogues suppresses his own stance (even if he appears and speaks in *propria persona*) in favor of exhibiting the negative result of the dialectic, which sparks perplexity and hence the desire to understand. He contrasts this “nondoctrinal” approach with the view that the doctrine (content) of the exoteric and esoteric works is either consistent or inconsistent, irrespective of the difference in expression or style (form). For Walker, the ‘positive’ aspect of the *Protrepticus* is the exception that proves the rule (at least as regards the evidence base). On my account of the ‘middle path’, by contrast, the dialectic could be aporetic *for outsiders* (non-philosophers in general or more particularly those who do not attend school at the Academy or Lyceum) but already positive *for insiders*; the aporetic need not exclude the positively rational, and these positions need not be self-contradictory. In any case, we are agreed that the *Protrepticus* already contains positive doctrine. On my reading, it exhibits the positive result of the dialectic in its conclusion (such as we have it), which reconciles the dramatically opposed stances of his interlocutors. The positive ‘doctrine’ which thus emerges is therefore in the *form* just as it is in the *content* of the dialogue. By the same token that Walker’s “conservativism” or caution is apt in the case of the meager evidence base of the *Eudemus*, then, one cannot know that it and the other dialogues were *not* like the *Protrepticus* in containing ‘positive doctrine’ beneath the surface, as it were (assuming *Protr.* and *Eud.* were different works; cf. Bos, 1984). Granted, the conclusion of *Protrepticus* is on the surface for all to see. But it is the *resolution* of the *aporia* at the heart of the dialectic. Hence, the aporetic and doctrinal (or skeptical & dogmatic) elements are compatible in this case.

As I have shown, the absence of any *explicit* distinction between parts of the rational soul in *Protrepticus* does not preclude the *implicit* distinction, given the fact that the contrast between *sophia* and *phronêsis* is floated if not stressed. Assuming the *Eudemus* was a different work, the core question of its relation to works such as the *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia* is whether it too contrasted parts or powers of the rational soul (not just soul vs. body and rational vs. irrational soul). The ethical contrast between *sophia* and *phronêsis* implies the psychological contrast, which is worked out preeminently in *De Anima*. Was it “in” the *Eudemus* too? If it is *implicit* in *Protrepticus*, rather than precluded, such that ‘exoteric vs. esoteric’ in this case means ‘implicit vs. explicit’ (rather than contradiction due to change of mind etc.), it is reasonable to claim that *Eudemus* relates to *De Anima* as *Protrepticus* relates to the *Ethics* and *Politics*, at least as reasonable as assuming the contrary. For Walker, the ‘obscurantism’ of the dialogues is their aporetic function for pedagogical or propaedeutic purposes; on my account, it is that the contrast is *implicit* but *vivid* in the dramatic structure of the dialogue, at least in *Protrepticus*. By the same token that Walker is right to suggest that we lack sufficient evidence to determine that such drama took place in (even structured) the *Eudemus*, we lack sufficient evidence to determine that it did not. In any case, the doctrinal content of *Protrepticus* (summed up in its conclusion) is not properly appreciable in isolation from the dialogical context in and through which it emerges. Its propaedeutic function for outsiders need not exclude—does not preclude—its ‘doctrinal’ function for insiders; both approaches are consistent, at least as regards the *Protreptic*. That an exoteric *logos* is addressed *primarily* to outsiders does not entail that it is addressed *exclusively* to them; that esoteric *logoi* are primarily for insiders does not entail that they are only for them. So one can admit that there were ‘hidden teachings’ (for insiders) without lapsing into the assumption that they contradicted ‘surface teachings’ (for outsiders), or else that exoteric *logoi*

are in essence solely aporetic (and hence *merely* preparatory, even if addressed primarily to outsiders). For the contrast was implicit in at least one dialogue, as I recreate it in the main text.

If Bos (1984) is right, of course, the whole problem collapses. I assume the difference *arguendo*: even so, it is reasonable to suppose that the contrast was at least implicit in *Eudemus*, for it was implicit in *Protrepticus* not only in the content but in the very structure of the dialogue.

Part 2

Introduction

The overarching question of ‘quietism or activism?’ is the segue from *Protrepticus* into the ethical and political treatises. As H & J (forthcoming, 38-9 [iv.]) argue, the 3rd person plural ‘they declared’ (*apephênto*) in first sentence of the *NE* plausibly refers to the interlocutors in the dialogue, who each in his own way displayed the good as a *telos*. At any rate, it is no accident that the primary split in contemporary readings of *eudaimonia* in the treatises or monologues is analogous to the aporia and solution I articulated in Part 1. That split, in my view, is best understood in terms of distinct answers to the so-called reference-question of what the referent of ‘the best and most *teleios* virtue’ in his definition of happiness at *NE* 1.7 is, the split between ‘exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’ interpretations. On the former, it refers exclusively to wisdom (*sophia*) as distinct from prudence (*phronêsis*) and the ethical virtues. On the latter, it refers either to the complete set of intellectual and ethical virtues (‘total virtue’ as a higher-order ‘composite’) or else to the best kind or genus of virtue, the virtues of the rational soul in general or as a whole inclusive of *sophia* as well as *phronêsis* and the virtues of character.⁹¹ At the heart of the debate lies an impasse that is analogous, I submit, to the impasse of quietist vs. activist accounts of happiness that, as I argued in Part 1, provides the dramatic background of the *Protreptic*.

In the proem to *Pol.* 7 (1-3), after replaying arguments about the best life that were spoken ‘sufficiently’ in ‘the exoteric *logoi*’, a locution that refers at least primarily or especially to the *Protreptic*,⁹² Aristotle raises an aporia that in the rest of the proem he seeks to resolve, at

⁹¹ Walker (2011, 2018) outlines the contours of the dispute in like terms. Pilario (2005) adopts the tripartition ‘strong (dominant end) position’ vs. ‘moderate (inclusive end) position’ vs. ‘skeptical or incoherent position’.

⁹² H & J (forthcoming, 34-6).

least sketchily or in outline. The question at the root of that impasse, the stalemate between opposite factions of those who agree that the virtuous life is the most worthy of choice, is

whether the *politikos kai praktikos bios* is to be chosen, or rather / more (*mallon*) the one absolved of all the external [goods], such as some [sort of] contemplative [*bios*], which alone some claim is philosophic. For it is almost [only] these two ways of life that those among humans who are most ambitious (*philotimotatoi*) relative to virtue appear to choose, both previously and now—the two I call (*legô*) the political and the philosophic.

Again, among those who agree the virtuous life is best but differ as to the use (*chrêseôs*) of it,

it's necessary for us to say unto both of them—for some opine-away the political offices, deeming that the *bios* of the free man is something other than that of the political man and is of all [*bioi*] the most choiceworthy, but others deem that this [political life] is best, for one who does nothing cannot do well, and doing-well (*eupragian*) and happiness are the same—that both speak rightly and not rightly.⁹³

For the quietist, the best life is the contemplative as opposed to the political life. For the activist, the best life is at least also if not primarily or even exclusively the political as opposed to the contemplative life. The exclusivist reading of Aristotle resembles the quietist account of *eudaimonia* to the extent that it treats *theôria* as the *only* complete activity and *sophia* as the *only* complete virtue.⁹⁴ The inclusivist reading resembles the activist account to the extent that it takes the referent to include *phronêsis* and ethicopolitical *praxis*; but 'activism' also covers the positively anti-theoretical stance of the extreme 'hyperactivist ideal'.⁹⁵ Though the spectra defined by these pairs overlap, then, they are not identical: activism is broader than inclusivism in that it also covers anti-contemplative and anti-philosophy stances (whether indiscriminate or qualified, a contrast that structured the *Protreptic*, as we saw). To that extent, the ancient framework is more comprehensive. But for the same reason, (what I have argued is) the fact that

⁹³ 1324a24-33 & 1325a16-24.

⁹⁴ As Pilario (2005, 6) puts it, the 'dominant or exclusive end' reading "considers contemplation as the sole component of *eudaimonia*; and *praxis* is only valuable insofar as it promotes this contemplative ideal." In section 2 of this chapter I argue that this is not true for all versions of exclusivism (hence my qualification 'to the extent that').

⁹⁵ As O'Connor (1999) puts it. For reasons discussed above, 'overactive' is an apt translation of *polupragmôn*.

Aristotle sought to overcome the dilemma already in the *Protreptic*, both in the content of its argument(s) and the structure of its drama, suggests that the solution he develops applies not only to the traditional problem but also to the schism in recent literature. For against the over-quietist (*apragmôn*) for whom *praxis* at best is merely instrumental to *theôria* and the over-activist (*polupragmôn*) for whom *theôria* is a useless and therefore worthless state of inactivity, Aristotle contends that the theoretical life is the most active of all, that it surpasses the political life by the very metric(s) that the political life surpasses other ways of life, namely freedom.⁹⁶ The conclusions of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* both contain arguments to the effect that philosophy is the best way of life. As we shall see, the former implicitly and the latter explicitly argues that the contemplative life is best on the grounds that it is the most active. As I argued, the conclusion of *Protrepticus* leaves it open whether the *politikos kai praktikos bios* is ‘secondarily’ happy, i.e., whether philosophy alone or most of all is the best way of life (exclusive vs. inclusive). In what follows, I argue that the *NE* and *Pol.* stake out solutions to the dilemma that are in principle consistent with the solution of the *Protreptic* as I interpret it in Part 1. In the former, he claims that the theoretical life is the most practical of all, contra apolitical quietists and a(nti?)theoretical activists. The *NE* and *Pol.* speak to opposite sects of people who dichotomize theory and practice, as we saw Plato and Aristotle do in Part 1. ‘Aristotle’ in *Protr.* resolves the dilemma by arguing that the philosopher lives the best life on the grounds that *theôria* is the only activity that is simply or unconditionally its own end (*telos*).

⁹⁶ These are that *theôria* is the most dominant (*kratistê*) activity, the most continuous (*sunechestatê*), the most pleasurable (*hêdistê*), the most self-sufficient (*legomenê autarkeia... malist'... autarkestatos*), apparently the only activity cherished (simply) on account of itself, the most leisurely (*pantelôs*). He groups traits like self-sufficient, leisurely, non-tedious together as ‘attributes of blessedness’. I reduce these to freedom on the grounds that each expresses self-determination under some facet, and that they are those traits by which the Athenian *kaloï kagathoi* discerned themselves from even the banausic nouveau riche, on which cf. Nightingale (2004, esp. ch. 3 & 5) and Lobkowitz (1967, 22-4). The ‘blessings of liberty’ in the preamble to the US constitution are rights to thrive, not merely survive; bare life is a form of freedom, but freedom proper consists in living well; gratuitous as it may be, blessedness is not supererogatory. Comparably, the “rhetoric of freedom” lies behind the aristocratic discourse.

But this solution, which problematizes the opposition of *theôria* and *praxis* (figured in his opponents), relies on several premises that the fragments of *Protrepticus* do not clearly spell out or justify: (1) in what sense is *theôria* a kind of activity (*energeia*) or action (*praxis*)? (2) how is the philosophic life ‘more’ complete and self-sufficient than the political life? (3) what is the precise relation between *sophia* and *phronêsis*? His arguments in *NE* 10.6-9 and *Pol.* 7.1-3 to the effect that philosophy is the most active way of life rely on premises that respond to these questions: (1) there are two sorts of *praxis*, (2) there are degrees even of complete *praxis* (= *praxis* proper), (3) *theôria* is the best, i.e., most complete and self-sufficient *praxis*. This chapter aims to show that and how Aristotle advances these answers in the treatises. First, I show how he resolves the dilemma by way of his account of degrees of completeness. Second, we examine the debate in recent literature between exclusive and inclusive readings (of Aristotle’s account of happiness) in light of the solution developed in *Protrepticus* and the treatises as interpreted in Parts 1 and 2.1. Finally, I show how the *NE*, *Pol.*, *Phys.*, and *Meta.* coordinate their answers to what I argue are analogous questions.

Recall: in Part 1 I argued that *Protrepticus* left the question of exclusivism or inclusivism (only or especially) open. Crucially, I argued that the fragments which concern the use-value of theoretical wisdom are underdetermined as to whether it is necessary or just possible for philosophers to become rulers and vice versa, and thus leave it open what sort of wisdom is useful for governing. Further, I claimed that the sense in which theoretical wisdom is instrumentally valuable for ‘Aristotle’ is compatible with what Aristotle argues in *NE* 6, which, I postulated, countenances a sense in which *both* sorts of wisdom are intrinsically *and* instrumentally valuable, such that these texts differ only in emphasis, not content or doctrine. Moreover, I linked the change in emphasis to the rhetorical context of esoteric vs. exoteric

discourse, rather than ‘schizophrenia due to metanoia’. But I deferred the justification of these claims to the present chapter, where I promised to show how the treatises develop the solution Aristotle articulated and enacted in the *Protreptic*. Accordingly, the following sections offer readings of those passages of the corpus that develop his answer to the dilemma. Let me repeat the plan clearly. 2.1 examines the premises of his solution in *NE* 10 and *Pol.* 7: his claim that there are distinct and even opposite senses of *praxis*, his account of *energeia* as complete *praxis*, and his argument that even among complete actions, some are ‘more’ complete than others, and that theory is the most complete practice. 2.2 examines the impasse in recent literature (in light of the solution articulated in Parts 1 and 2.1), which I argue is based on the mistaken assumption that exclusive and inclusive readings are incompatible. 2.3 examines how these arguments figure in his account of the human and the city in relation to the God and the universe. Thus, I argue, we can account for the reinterpretation of ‘active’ at the heart of his solution to the dilemma, and see how his account in each case belongs to a coherent and sustained answer to the question of ‘exclusivism or inclusivism?’ that transcends the dichotomous interpretation of these stances, integrating their virtues and uprooting their vices just as he mediates the dispute in *Protrepticus*.

III. Theory as Practice: Complete and Incomplete Action in Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics 10.6-8 and *Politics* 7.1-3 develop the line of thought Aristotle articulated in *Protrepticus*. Both texts entertain the dichotomy of *theôrêtikos* and *praktikos* and conclude by rejecting or overcoming it. They differ principally in that the former is protreptic (positive) whereas the latter is anti-apotreptic (negative). Both develop the peculiar argument that philosophy and the contemplative life is active in the very respect(s) in which the political life is active, but somehow even ‘more’ so, the former implicitly and the latter explicitly.

NE 10.6 speaks generally of happiness in terms of the sort of activity (*energeia*) that is its own end, and of virtuous actions (*kat’ aretên praxeis*) as such activities, but 10.7-8 proceed to rank *sophia* and hence philosophy as a way of life above *phronêsis* and the political life in terms of theoretical *energeia* versus political *praxis*:

Contemplative activity is the most continuous, for we are able to contemplate (*theôrein*) continuously more than to act [continuously] in any way whatever (*prattein hotioun*).

Theôria seems to be the only activity loved on account of itself, for nothing comes from it besides (*para*) the contemplating. But from the practical [activities] we make some byproduct for ourselves (*peripoioumetha*) besides (*para*) the action either more or less.

The activity of the practical virtues is present in political and military affairs, and the actions concerning these seem to be un leisured, military action absolutely so... But the activity of the political [actor] is also un leisured, and besides itself political activity produces as byproduct (*peripoioumenê*) dynasties and honors and at any rate happiness for oneself and one’s fellow citizens other than political activity, and which we clearly seek as being other. So if, among actions according to the virtues, the political and military are preeminent in beauty and greatness, but are un leisured and aim at some [other] end and are not to be chosen for their own sake, while the activity of intellect seems to differ in seriousness, and to be contemplative and aim at no end besides itself...

For [virtuous] actions many [externals] are needed, and more of them inasmuch as they are greater and more beautiful. But for the one contemplating there is no need of such things, at least for the activity; rather, they so to speak get in the way of contemplation.

We suppose the Gods especially to be blessed and happy, but what sort of actions should we attribute to Them? ... [Everything] about actions is small and unworthy of the Gods.

But all suppose Them to be alive at any rate, and therefore active (*energein*)... But if acting is taken away from the living, and still more producing, what is left save *theôria*?⁹⁷

At the end of 10.8, however, Aristotle drops the dichotomous usage and recasts the relation of theory to practice and vice versa:

[Human beings require external prosperity, since nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation, but not in excess]; for neither self-sufficiency nor action consist in excess, and one can perform beautiful actions even without ruling land and sea. For one could act according to virtue from moderate means (and this is plain to see, since the private seem to perform fitting actions not less than the powerful but even more), and it is enough if so much is present, for the *bios* of the one who is active in accord with virtue will be happy.

And perhaps Solon beautifully revealed those who are happy, when he said they're those who've been supplied with externals in measure, performed the most beautiful deeds (as he supposed them), and lived temperately, for someone with moderate possessions is empowered to act as one should. And Anaxagoras too seems to suppose that the happy person is neither rich nor powerful, when he said it would be unsurprising if such a person were to seem out of place to many, for they judge by externals, perceiving these only. So the opinions of the wise seem in tune with these arguments...

But the one who is active according to intellect (*kata noun energôn*) and tends to this and is best disposed [to it] / keeps it best disposed also seems most dear to the Gods. For if some care for human things comes from the Gods, as it seems / is believed, it would also be reasonable that They both rejoice in that which is best and most akin [to Them] (and this would be the intellect) and make-good-in-return to those who cherish and honor this most, as these care for that which is dear to Them and act (*prattontas*) both rightly and beautifully. And it's not unclear that all these belong to the *sophos* most of all (*malisth*). Therefore he is *theophilestatos*. And it's likely that the same is also happiest (*eudaimonestaton*). So thus [too], the *sophos* is especially happy (*malist' eudaimôn*).

The conclusion of 10.8 that the *sophos* (vs. *phronimos*) lives the happiest *bios* echoes the beginning, which calls the *bios* “according to the other / rest of virtue (*tên allên aretên*)” secondarily happy. But as a whole, NE 10.7-8, the protreptic to pure (theoretical) philosophy, shifts from the contrastive usage of ‘theoretical *energeia* versus political *praxis*’ to speaking of theoretical activity as the action of those friendliest to the Gods.⁹⁸ In the context of 10.6-8, then, it returns to the broad sense of ‘virtuous actions’ (*kat' aretên praxeis*) invoked in 10.6.

⁹⁷ 1177a21-1178b21.

⁹⁸ O'Connor (1999, esp. 123-7) argues that NE 10.7-8 first “sets up a rigorously consistent distinction between theoretical activity as *energeia* and political action as *praxis* that is crucial for most of his points”, using *praxis* “in the restricted way that the real man of politics would use it when he claims that philosophy is not action-oriented

At the end of the proem to *Pol.* 7-8 (7.1-3), similarly, which explicitly addresses the dispute among the most ambitious for virtue (*hoi philotimotatoi pros aretên*), Aristotle rejects the common assumption of both factions—quietists and (over)activists—that the contemplative life is necessarily inactive:

But if... happiness is... doing-well (*eupragian*), the active life (*bios praktikos*) would be the best, both for all the city in common and for each [individual]. But the active (*ton praktikon*) need not be relative to others, as some hold, nor are active trains-of-thought only those which are for the sake of the results that come from acting, but far more [active] are the studies (*theôrias*) and trains-of-thought which are self-complete (*autoteleis*) and for their own sake. For doing-well (*eupraxia*) is the end (*telos*), so it too is some action. And we even say that those who by their thoughts are architectonic of external actions act especially and authoritatively. Nor, moreover, are cities situated off by themselves, which choose to live thus, necessarily inactive, for there can also be action among parts, since there are many ways for the parts of the city to be in community relative to one another; and this holds similarly of any one human whoever; else the God and the total cosmos, for whom there are no external actions besides their own, could scarcely be beautifully at leisure. Manifestly, then, the same way of life is necessarily the best both for each human and in common for cities and humans.⁹⁹

The *bios theôrêtikos* satisfies the conditions of *eupraxia* (completeness and self-sufficiency) even ‘more’ than the *bios politikos*, he argues, in terms of the degree to which its central activity is ‘autotelic’ and for-itself, even as the political life excels other ways of life in virtue of its

(*praktikos*). But then in the concluding paragraph, he makes the same move he made in the [proem to *Pol.* 7-8], dressing theoretical *energeia* in the garb of political *praxis*”; “Earlier in the discussion, Aristotle had contrasted action’s greater need for external goods to activity’s very modest needs (1178b1-4); now he says that ‘one can perform virtuous actions with a moderate supply.’ Earlier he said that no actions were worthy of the gods, so that they must be theorizers...; now he says that theorizing is the action that makes people friends of the gods.” On *kai orthôs te kai kalôs prattontas*, Bodéüs (2000, 260, n. 43) notes “first, that the god is here understood to love in return not only because of intellectual virtues but because of moral excellence... and, second, that in speaking of the wise person as the *best* beloved of the gods, Aristotle suggests that to lesser degrees persons other than the wise can also be loved by the gods.” Conversely, however, ‘acting both rightly and beautifully’ refers not only to moral or ethically virtuous action, but also to cultivating or *kata noun energôn kai touton therapeuôn kai diakeimenos arista*. So the *kai* in *ôs tôn philôn autois epimeloumenous kai... prattontas* can be contrastive or explicative; the ambiguity is intentional or at least due to the shift in usage (hence both readings, e.g. of O’Connor and Bodéüs, are possible). Further, even if the *kai* were simply contrastive, it would not follow that the expression concerns ethical rather than intellectual virtue, for *phronêsis* in *NE* 6 is precisely the intellectual virtue that is responsible for ethical virtue, more on which below. That is, the question is whether it concerns *phronêsis* rather than *sophia* (not ethical vs. intellectual virtue). But Aristotle immediately proceeds to grant “all these” (including right and beautiful action) to the *sophos*. Yet that need not exclude the *phronimos* from the referent, for the very reason Bodéüs notes second, that ‘most God-beloved’ and indeed all these superlative and comparative expressions imply the inclusion of *phronimoi* who are not also *sophoi* though ‘to a lesser degree’. On what this means for Aristotle, and whether it is even coherent, see below.
⁹⁹ 1325b14-32.

freedom, i.e., liberation from the need to perform ‘necessary’ actions and hence leisure to perform ‘beautiful’ actions.¹⁰⁰ Against the quietist for whom action at best is only instrumental to contemplation, and the (over)activist for whom *theôria* is a useless and therefore worthless state of inactivity, Aristotle contends that the theoretical life is the most practical of all, that it surpasses the political life just as the political life transcends the other *bioi*. The antithesis and reconciliation sketched here is essentially the same as the dialectic implicit in the dual reference to Anaxagoras and Solon at the end of *NE* 10.8, though the latter is less extreme.¹⁰¹

In both cases, Aristotle seeks to resolve the dilemma between what he regards as connaturally one-sided accounts of happiness or *eupraxia* by reinterpreting philosophy as the most active way of life.

The conclusion of *Pol.* 7.1-3 is supposed to resolve the dispute between those who think ‘the political and practical life’ is best and those who think the theoretical life is best and is the only life appropriate for philosophers. Both factions identify the philosophic and theoretical life on the one hand, and the political and practical life on the other. Aristotle, by contrast, decouples these pairs: ‘these are almost the only two that those who are most ambitious for virtue appear to

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *NE* 1.7 on the highest good as such being the most complete & self-sufficient and *Pol.* 7.14, 1333a9-b5, on beautiful vs. necessary actions in terms of the capacity to be at peace and leisure vs. war and unleisure, in the context of remarks about the *praxeis* of both theoretical and practical reason, though these pairs are not equivalent.

¹⁰¹ Solon and Pericles are not hostile to Thales and Anaxagoras in the way that Callicles and Thrasymachus are, e.g., even as practitioners of the *bios politikos*. Cf. O’Connor (1999, 126-7): “Aristotle’s move from *energeia* to *praxis*, then, has much the same point as the appropriation of *praxis* did in the *Politics*, but it is less dramatic, primarily because Solon structures the dialectic differently from Callicles. It is not as bold a move for Aristotle to claim a common ground in *praxis* with Solon as it was with Callicles.” O’Connor doubts the validity of his solution to the dilemma (124 & 127). I take my account of its premises in this chapter, especially in the context of the previous chapter, to clarify the arguments it rests on, and thus to contribute to the determination of their (in)validity. Finally, O’Connor (129, n. 12) notes that “A fuller account of Aristotle’s audience could point out how the retiring philosopher is also a part of Aristotle’s intended audience, though less prominently than the ambitious politician. Aristotle wants to energize the potential philosopher as much as he wants to moderate the potential ruler.” That ‘fuller account’ is precisely what I am offering in this and the previous chapter (‘two versions of conversion’).

choose... the two I call (*legô*) the political and the philosophic.’¹⁰² The former, for whom “the only *bios* of a man is the practical and political,” simply identify (or conflate) the political and active life; for them, the *kai* is explicative. The latter, who, reacting against politics as practiced by (at least some of) the political men, shun governance on the assumption that all forms of rule are despotic (which Aristotle denies), agree that the contemplative life is inactive or impractical, but endorse that inactivity (*apragmosunê*) on the assumption that activity = overactivity (*polupragmosunê*). To adjudicate, Aristotle endorses the activist account of *eudaimonia* (*eupraxia*), refusing to cede practicality to the (over)activist faction, but identifies theory as the most active practice and the *bios theôrêtikos* as even ‘more’ *praktikos* than the *bios politikos*, refusing the simple dichotomy. Those who identify the political and active lives admit two sorts of free *bioi*: active and inactive (how Pericles framed them). To men devoted solely to the political life, the philosophic life appears inactive in the sense of apolitical (political quietism). Hence philosophers get equated or conflated with quietists who do nothing, are useless, *argon*, etc. (Over)activists don’t necessarily deny that theory is a practice, but at least claim that it’s bad practice, that philosophy is impractical because it is the pursuit of an activity that is useless or worthless. But it is easy to slip from the claim that theory is impractical (qua useless) into the claim that theory is non-practical, not a *praxis*.¹⁰³ Still, it is not even sufficient to frame his stance simply in terms of the claim that contemplation is impractical qua useless, though he accepts it at several junctures *arguendo* (even if it were useless, it would be worthwhile; yet it is useful...). But in accommodation of Isocrates, who embodies the mature, respectable version of

¹⁰² “Speaking for himself, Aristotle distinguishes the political and the philosophic lives; he drops the equation of political and practical, philosophic and theoretical which characterized the conception of the original contenders” (Thompson, 1994, 117).

¹⁰³ As Thompson (1994, 118) puts it. Cf. “Because the objects of wisdom are things beyond the pale of common human concern, the pursuit of wisdom is taken not to belong to the realm of practice. The uselessness of wisdom is taken to entail not merely the impracticality, but the non-practicality of its pursuit” (116).

the ‘hyperactivist’ stance (vs. Callicles, e.g.),¹⁰⁴ Aristotle admits the relative autonomy of practical reason, despite the utility of *theôria*. Contrary to the political lifers, however, he argues that action or activity is not (over)busyness but *energeia* (the elusive *pragmosunê*), that the theoretical life is active in the very sense that the political life (vs. others) is active, and that it is somehow even more active than the life to which exclusively political actors devote themselves.

So the “some” who claim that the contemplative life alone is philosophic and are content to avoid (‘keep quiet from’) politics are the *apragmones* whereas those who reject theoretical philosophy as at best propaedeutic are the *polupragmones*. Aristotle situates himself between and beyond them, just as he dialectically mediates the mathematicians (‘Heraclides’) and pragmatists (‘Isocrates’) in the *Protreptic*. Despite the dichotomous usage of theory and practice that he entertains and employs in various texts, he deliberately points to the sense in which the opposition is overcome, implicitly in *NE* 10.6-8 and explicitly in *Pol.* 7.1-3. The latter explicitly contrasts action that is ‘self-complete and for its own sake’ with action that is ‘relative to others’ and ‘for the sake of the consequences that come from acting’.¹⁰⁵ Then it contrasts the sense in which those who act direct (the architect or lawgiver) with the sense in which those who act execute that directive (*praktikê* as *cheirotechnikê*),¹⁰⁶ and concludes by sketching the sense in which the non-imperialist city, individual human, and ‘the God and the total cosmos’ are active. Thus, he mediates the extreme versions of (over)quietism (*apragmosunê*) and (over)activism

¹⁰⁴ Again, overactive is pejorative; Isocrates might characterize Callicles, but would not characterize himself, thus.

¹⁰⁵ I tend to read the latter two as ‘ethicopolitical’ and ‘productive’ action, respectively. Reeve (2017, 361, n. 855) rightly compares *NE* 10.7, 1177a27-b1 on degrees of autarky & *EE* 1.7, 1217a37-40 on ends and means as *prakton*. Nightingale (2004, 235) elides them, but since *NE* 10 admits of *degrees* of ‘by-production’, such elision is viable.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Bodéüs (1993, 2.III.2, 63-66 & 170-1) on how Aristotle adopts the architect vs. manual laborer division of *Statesman* to contrast legislative and deliberative (executive) activity within politics. As he acknowledges, however, the conclusion of *Pol.* 7.3 implies that architectonic and legislative activity is practical par excellence in that it directs (vs. executes). So Aristotle does not simply accept the dichotomy of ‘knowers vs. doers’ even as he adopts it.

(*polupragmosunê*) by reinterpreting theory as the practice wherein humans are most Godlike, which was the conclusion of the protreptic to theoretical philosophy in the last book of the *NE*.

That ‘the God and the total cosmos’ is / are beautifully at leisure recurs at *Pol.* 8.3, 1337b29-34, where Aristotle claims that “nature herself seeks, as has often been said, not only to be busy rightly (*ascholein orthôs*) but also to be able to be at leisure beautifully (*scholazein dunasthai kalôs*). For the same [sc. leisure] is the one principle of everything (*archê pantôn mia*)”. *Energeia* is what one does once one is capable of being at leisure beautifully, once one has been busy rightly and thus has become capable of being at leisure beautifully, i.e., once one has become actively, *in actu*, or explicitly what one was only potentially, in *dunamis*, or implicitly. As Diamond argues,¹⁰⁷ *pantôn* here includes not only human beings working busily to be capable of being at leisure beautifully, but also non-human natural beings striving to realize themselves. In other words, leisure and busyness correspond to activity (*energeia*) or action (*praxis*) and motion (*kinêsis*) or production (*poiêsis*). Once one has become capable or has the capacity to perform the function, deed, or work (*ergon*) that one alone or best can do, one is no longer busy but at leisure, free as opposed to banausic, entelic as opposed to heteronomous. Having the *dunamis* ‘*scholazein kalôs*’ is part of anti-banausic aristocratic rhetoric—it is what even those *banausoi* who are nouveau riche lack.¹⁰⁸ But here Aristotle speaks of everything in these terms. At the end of *Pol.* 7.3, he even says that *ho theos kai pas ho kosmos* is at leisure beautifully (*scholê eiche kalôs*). *Energeia* or *praxis* in the sense that conclusion invokes, then, is not busyness in the sense of motion or production, nor is it therefore rest, quietude, or inactivity; rather, it is activity and action that is ‘autotelic and for its own sake’ (leisurely). As such, *theôria*

¹⁰⁷ Unpublished (see bibliography).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Nightingale (2004, 118-127, esp. 121 on *Pol.* 8.2) on having free time vs. knowing what to do with it. Leisure (*scholê*) is how people of culture spend their time (*diatribê*); culture is about turning freedom into meaning. Cf. the end of *Pol.* 7.14 on the responsibility of legislators for ensuring education in the capacity to be at leisure.

is *praxis*; moreover, as the anti-apotreptic conclusion suggests, the theoretical life is even ‘more’ active than the political life. By the very logic the political men use to justify their way of life, then, they should respect if not do theoretical philosophy. Conversely, the quietists or *apragmones* who claim that *only* the contemplative life is fit for philosophers and divorce philosophy from the political life are in error, for they cede *praxis* and politics to the anti-theoretical political men, acquiesce to politics as practiced by men who conflate political rule with despotic rule at home and/or abroad; ironically, Aristotle accuses them of being reactionary (they err in the conflation of political and despotic rule despite “shunning” it). Though the scene or audience has changed somewhat, then, his solution here is analogous to that of the *Protreptic*.

Though Aristotle denies the inference from impracticality to non-practicality, as Thompson puts it, i.e., from the claim that *theôria* is useless to the claim that it is not *praxis*, I caution against the assumption that the former claim exhausts his account.¹⁰⁹ For as I argued in Part 1 and promised to confirm in Part 2, Aristotle affirms the utility of *sophia* even as he contrasts it with the excellent use of practical reason characteristic of the *phronimos*. In Part 1 we saw how ‘Aristotle’ mediates ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Isocrates’ on whether and how philosophy is useful. The mathema-tician is literally the student, the professional student, who professes to study or observe rather than act or do, though ‘Heraclides’ conceives of virtuous action in terms of the application of mathematics to all facets of human life (practical wisdom as applied mathematics); hence he argues that the studious or contemplative life is the *only* life that is truly

¹⁰⁹ Contra Nightingale (2004, 230-1), Walker (2010, 137) stresses that uselessness is a necessary but insufficient condition of being the ultimate end. In the terms of *NE* 1.2, it is the non-instrumentality condition, for the highest good must be (1) intrinsically, (2) non-instrumentally, and (3) ultimately choiceworthy. One should disambiguate (1) and (2), for some goods can be / are both intrinsically and instrumentally choiceworthy. How it can be both instrumentally and non-instrumentally choiceworthy is the basic *prima facie* contradiction, which Walker resolves via ‘two senses of usefulness’, as we saw in Part 1. Nightingale admits that *theôria* in *Protr.* is / can be useful (196), but contrasts *Protr.* here with the treatises, more on which below. That said, I agree that these conditions ultimately measure freedom (235), which lies behind the aristocratic discourse of useless and leisurely activity.

happy and worthwhile. Philosophy is useful for ‘Heraclides’ in the sense that it is applicable in practice. ‘Isocrates’ on the contrary denies that theoretical disciplines are useful in practice, though he regards them as temporarily useful studies that are dangerous and lethal in the long run.¹¹⁰ Indeed, he affirms that philosophy in *his* sense is a useful study, as long as one knows its limits and treats it appropriately as propaedeutic (keeps it ‘quiet’ though on the verge of action).

In response, ‘Aristotle’ argues that there are two senses of use (*chrêsis*) and correspondingly two sorts or ways of interpreting use-value. The fragment that contrasts having capacities with using, exercising, or enacting them concludes, as we saw, by contrasting capacities for *only* one function with capacities for the *best* function of all: ‘using’ in the former case means doing or performing the one *ergon*, but in the latter case means doing the best of the *erga* that cooperate or synergize in one overall activity, i.e., the one *ergon* toward or in reference to which the other capacities operate, as the (proper) use of the flute is its *ergon* or *telos* ‘either only or especially’ and as ‘thinking and reasoning’ is the work or end of the soul ‘either only or especially’. These locutions recall the *ergon*-argument at the end of book 1 of the *Republic* (352Dff.), which treats the *ergon* of anything in terms of what one can do ‘alone or best’ with it (*ho an ê monô ekeinô poiê tis ê arista*) and *aretê* as the capacity of things that have a function in that sense to do (i.e., perform that function) well or excellently. *EE* 2 contrasts cases where the work is something else besides the use (product of the activity), “as of housebuilding the house, not housebuilding, [is the work] and of medicine health, not healing or doctoring, [is the work],” with cases where the work just is the use, “as of the eye seeing and of mathematical knowledge *theôria*.”¹¹¹ *NE* 1.1 similarly contrasts two sorts of *telos*: “some are activities (*energeiai*), others are works of some sort besides them (*par’ autas erga*)”, that is, “ends of some sort besides the

¹¹⁰ If practiced for their own sake or ‘prioritized’. E.g. *Antidosis* 262-3. For *achrêsta mathêmata* cf. *Rep.* 527D.

¹¹¹ 1219a13-7. On mathematical as theoretical cf. fn. 33.

actions (*para tas praxeis*), in which cases the works are naturally better than the activities.”

Though the contrast is overtly between two sorts of *telos*, it is implicitly also between two sorts of *energeia*:¹¹² activities that are their own ends vs. activities that are only intermediate ends or means to ends other and worthier than themselves. Further, since *para tas praxeis* is explicative of *par' autas* [*energeias*] here, the contrast is also implicitly between two sorts of *praxis*: action that is its own end vs. action that is not its own end (is productive of some end ‘besides’ the action). It is in this broad sense of action that “it makes no difference whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves or something else besides them,” as he says at the end of the chapter.¹¹³ Broadly speaking, then, Aristotle uses *ergon*, *praxis*, and *telos* interchangeably. That *chrêsis* too is ‘meant doubly’ emerges in *Pol.* 7.1 where, replaying arguments from the exoteric *logoi*, he writes that

external [goods] have a limit (*peras*), as any instrument, and every useful [thing] is for something, of which the excess necessarily either harms or is of no benefit to those who have it; but each of the goods concerning the soul, inasmuch it exceeds, is that much more useful, if one should call even these [goods] not only beautiful but also useful.¹¹⁴

The definitions of *eudaimonia* in the rest of *Pol.* 7 are expressed in terms of *energeia kai chrêsis*: ‘activity of virtue and some complete usage / activity and some complete usage of virtue / some complete activity and usage of virtue (*aretês energeia kai chrêsis tis teleios*)’; ‘activity and usage

¹¹² Pace Ebert (1976), who denies that *energeiai* vs. *erga tina* corresponds to *praxis* vs. *poiêsis* here on the grounds that it “ist eine Unterscheidung von Zielen, nicht von solchem, was auf Ziele gerichtet ist” (15). The point is not that Aristotle understands action (vs. production) “ausschließlich” (18) as entelic but rather *especially* as entelic. Further, *praxis* in “the Passage” of *Meta.* Θ.6 is not an “Oberbegriff” (19), more on which below. That said, his contention that the same action is interpretable as *praxis* and *poiêsis* (vs. mutually exclusive classes), such that *allo to genos* at *NE* 6.4-5 expresses intensional rather than extensional difference, is viable. Pilario (2005, 13-5) outlines three readings of the relation between *praxis* and *poiêsis*: (1) ‘mutually exclusive occurrences’, (2) not, (3) incoherent. On (1), they name distinct classes of actions; on (2) one and the same action can be internally the *energeia* of some *dunamis* but externally some motion or set of motions; on (3) Aristotle presents both conceptions without reconciling them. Pilario suspends judgement (15). Against the view that activities and motions are (1), Penner (1970) articulates (2) the “‘two-entity’ theory of most actions” to ensure that *energeia* and *kinêsis* are mutually exclusive classes (439-40). Below, I argue that *energeia* and *kinêsis* are not species of the genus *praxis*.

¹¹³ Cf. fn. 62 for an inverse but compatible reading and “the doable / practicable is meant doubly, for both what we act for the sake of and what we do for the sake of these [ends] partake of action” (*EE* 1.7, 1217a36-7).

¹¹⁴ 1323b7-13.

of complete virtue / complete activity and usage of virtue (*energeian kai chrêsin aretês teleian*), and this not conditionally (*ex hupotheseôs*) but unconditionally (*haplôs*). By conditionally I mean the necessities, by unconditionally I mean beautifully.’ The terms coalesce in *EE* 1.1: “doing well and living well are the same as being happy, each of which is usage and activity, i.e. life and action, for the acting art is the using art (*hê praktikê chrêstikê estin*), for the bronzeworker makes (*poiei*) the bridle but the horseman uses it.” The one who acts in this sense is the one who uses the product of subordinate arts or sciences; the one who acts well in this sense is the one who uses them rightly, puts them to proper use. That *hê praktikê chrêstikê estin* is the implicit premise of his claim at the end of *Pol.* 7.1-3 that the architectonic art(s) is that which acts in the authoritative or proper sense. That sense is crucially distinct from the sense in which *prattein* means to execute what the one who knows the end directs, in which ‘practical’ means useful in the sense of instrumentally valuable. So although Thompson is right that the impracticality or uselessness of *theôria* for Aristotle does not entail its non-practicality, it does not even do justice to him to frame his stance in terms of impracticality versus non-practicality. For Aristotle endorses the *bios praktikos*, not as opposed to but as inclusive of the theoretical life ‘primarily’ and the political life ‘secondarily’.

Nightingale contends that the treatises “retain the argument that *theoria* is non-productive (and non-practical), but... drop the idea that it can also be useful (and serve as the basis for ‘producing’ virtuous actions)” in contrast to the *Protrepticus* which “argues that theoretical knowledge is *both* separate from (and superior to) practical and productive activities, *and* useful as a basis for action and various kinds of production.”¹¹⁵ In Part 1, discussing the utility of

¹¹⁵ (2004, 197), which continues “In my view, Aristotle’s account of *theoria* in the *Protrepticus* is not fully consistent, since he still retained some key Platonic positions even as he began to articulate his own ideas. [Fn.:] Alternatively, however, one may claim that the text is not really inconsistent, since the fact that the theorist engages in *theoria* in a nonutilitarian fashion is compatible with the claim that theoretical knowledge can produce useful

theôria in *Protrepticus* vis-à-vis the ethical and political treatises, I claimed that the sense in which theoretical wisdom is useful qua instrumentally valuable in the former is compatible with the content of *NE* 6, which recognizes a sense in which *both* theoretical and practical wisdom are *both* intrinsically and instrumentally valuable; construed thus, their stances are consistent, though the emphasis differs, which I argued is due to rhetorical context (exoteric vs. esoteric discourse) rather than inconsistency due to metanoia. So let us turn to *NE* 6, where Aristotle explicitly raises and develops his response to the question, indeed *aporia*, of how *sophia* and *phronêsis* are useful.

2.1.1 How *Sophia* and *Phronêsis* are Useful

Having determined ‘what *phronêsis* and *sophia* are, their spheres of concern, and that each is the virtue of a distinct portion of the soul’, Aristotle turns in *NE* 6.12 to the problem of their use-value, i.e., the impasse of whether and how they are useful. His response is as follows:

First, then, let us say that it’s necessary for them to be choiceworthy in themselves, at least since each is the virtue of its respective portion, even if neither of them produce anything. Next, they do indeed produce (*poiouai*), not as the medical art produces health, but as health [produces health]; thus (*outôs*) *sophia* [produces] happiness, for, being part of the whole of virtue, it makes (*poiei*) [one] happy by having (*tô echesthai*) and enacting (*tô energein*) [it]. Further, the function is fulfilled according to *phronêsis* and ethical virtue, for virtue makes the target right (*ton skopon poiei orthon*) and *phronêsis* [makes] the things toward (*ta pros*) this [target right].¹¹⁶

Notice the ‘even if (*arguendo*) neither were productive...; that said, they are productive...’

structure of the argument, which I argued was central to the *modus operandi* of ‘Aristotle’ in the

results in other scientific and technical endeavors (as Tony Long has suggested to me).” I explain why this suggestion is correct in Part 1. But the uselessness and impracticality of theory is the core premise of her argument that Aristotle simply divorces theory and practice in contrast to Plato. Further, I deny that the treatises ‘drop the idea’ that it can also be useful (e.g. cf. *EE* 1.5 1216b4-26 on the ‘incidental’ utility of theoretical science). For the slip back into ‘simply useless’ cf. e.g. 203-5, 209 & 214, which explicitly claims that the theorist for Aristotle “does not (and, indeed, cannot) put his *theoria* to practical use...”; I accept ‘does not’ insofar as it means ‘need not’ but deny ‘cannot’. Criticizing the same passage in a review, Hutchinson writes, “Knowing the full text might help us see in it a consistent account of *theoria*, or it might not, if the text was a dialogue that contained speakers expressing different points view on the subject” (2007, 484-5). As I show in Part 1, these are not mutually exclusive: that it was a dialogue is compatible with its having presented a consistent account of *theôria* in the person of ‘Aristotle’.

¹¹⁶ 1144a1-9. Cf. *Pol.* 7.13, 1331b25-1332a5, on getting the ends and means right.

Protreptic. Since *poiouai* is plural, the claim is that *both* theoretical *and* practical wisdom ‘produce’ happiness as health ‘produces’ itself. So *phronêsis* is choiceworthy intrinsically, not *only* insofar as it is instrumental to *sophia*. Yet they *are* productive in a way, just not in the way that medical expertise is productive of health. It is in that way (*outôs*) that *sophia* produces *eudaimonia*: by being (identical to) the virtue whose activity or employment (*chrêsis*) somehow constitutes the happy life. The production at issue here is the enactment of the virtue, which Aristotle contrasts with the ‘technical’ sense in which production is activity whose end is *other* than or *not* identical to itself. *Phronêsis* is not *only* valuable as a means (instrumental) to *sophia* just as *sophia* is useful or ‘productive’ in its own way: both virtues are intrinsically choiceworthy *and* both are useful or productive in their own way.¹¹⁷ Thus, Aristotle positively argues both that *sophia* is useful and productive in a nonutilitarian sense (though he *also* ascribes ‘indirect’ utility or instrumental value to it, as I argued in Part 1) and that *phronêsis* is not *merely* useful qua instrumentally valuable, to which extent the life it governs is genuinely its own end or complete.

The distinction between two kinds or modes of production clarifies the ambiguity of locutions such as ‘activities / actions that produce nothing besides (*para*) themselves’. For on the one hand, such activities are productive of no end other than themselves, but on the other hand, they are self-productive or autopoietic in the sense that they begin and end at once; in contrast to motions, which finish in states of being at rest, activities proper are complete as soon as they begin, in which respect they do not take time. Even at the end of his argument against the claim that wisdom is productive in *Meta. A.2*, Aristotle writes that “we seek it on account of no other / further use (*chreian heteran*), but just as the human is free, we say, who is for the sake of himself and not of another, thus also [we seek] it as the only knowledge that is free, for it alone [of the

¹¹⁷ On the controversy over *poiouai* vis-à-vis *outôs* cf. Lear (2004, 116, fn. 55).

sciences] is for the sake of itself.” No *other* use, he claims, implying that he is speaking of extrinsic utility or instrumental value (as opposed to intrinsic use, function, action, or end).¹¹⁸

Compare the account of the difference between *praxis* and *poiêsis* in the *MM* (1197a3-13):¹¹⁹

That which makes what is made and that which does what is done are not the same. For of the productive [arts] there is some other end (*allo telos*) besides the production, e.g. besides the housebuilding, since it is productive of a house, a house [is] its end besides the production, and similarly with carpentry and the other productive [arts]; but with deeds (*tôn praktikôn*) there is no other end (*allo telos*) besides the action itself, e.g. besides kithara-playing there is no other end (*allo telos*), but this itself is the end, the activity and the action (*hê energeia kai hê praxis*). So *phronêsis* concerns the action and the things done, but *technê* concerns the production and the things produced; for artfulness is [manifest] in things produced more than in things done.

The author of this passage clarifies that there being no end ‘besides’ or ‘other than’ the *praxis* means that the *energeia* and *praxis* is itself the end.¹²⁰ That there is no other use, then, is compatible with the claim that it is itself the (intrinsic) use, (internal) *praxis*, *ergon* or *telos*. *NE*

¹¹⁸ Nightingale (2004, 227-30 ‘The Rejection of Utility: *Metaphysics* 1.2’ et ff.) seems to ignore the force of *heteran* because she is arguing that Aristotle simply rejects the utility of theoretical wisdom; on her account, he rejects the claim that it is useful but (aristocratically) endorses ‘useless knowledge’. As far as I can tell, her argument rests on the non-instrumentality condition of being the highest good (*NE* 1.2 & 1.7), that the most complete and self-sufficient good is that on account of which others are choiceworthy and which is *never* or *nohow* choiceworthy for the sake of another. Construed thus (-worthy), Aristotle denies that contemplation *should* ever be subordinate to other goods. But she frames his stance descriptively rather than prescriptively: that which *is* never chosen for the sake of another, as if his claim were that it *cannot* be abused so (216-22). But Aristotle *also* speaks of these conditions normatively or prescriptively (e.g. *NE* 1.7): one should prioritize leisurely activities, especially *theôria*, though one very well might not, which is after all the presupposition of the protreptic to theoretical philosophy in *NE* 10.6-9. *Theôria* is the best (most complete & self-sufficient) activity; as such, it is the activity that practitioners of the best life prioritize; hence, one should prioritize it if one wants to live the happiest life of which one is capable. She claims that *theôria* for Aristotle *cannot* be useful, which she counters by arguing that it is always possible to subordinate it to another end (as in sophistry). But that claim derives from the premise that Aristotle only advances such arguments descriptively, which is false. That it is “always to-be-chosen (*aireton*) per se and never on account of another” (vs. what is choiceworthy both per se and per aliud) means that it *should* not be subordinate; *ideally* it cannot, but it *can* be used (properly) and abused. On the normative dimension of such terms cf. e.g. Broadie on *prakteon* (2012, 59) contra Ross (1924, 121, *ad loc.* 982a16); Kraut (1995, esp. 140-4) contra Roche in the same volume, though his construal of ‘primarily vs. secondarily happy’ on p. 146 (‘ethical activity is not part of the ultimate end of the life that is happiest’) on my account is overly exclusionary; and Parellada (2005, esp. 9-12) contra Aubenque (1963). Thus Cooper (2004, 280) in my view gets it right: “it is always choiceworthy for itself, as ends must be, *and* in being choiceworthy it is never referred in any way to anything else—whether as a productive means to something further, or some sort of constituent in a larger whole, or in any other way owing any part of what is choiceworthy about it to any relationship it might bear to anything else” (emphasis on ‘-worthy’ mine).

¹¹⁹ Ebert (1976, 16-7) rightly cautions against using this passage as the *basis* for interpreting *NE* 1.1 and 6.4-5, but I reject his reading of the former (cf. fn. 112) and use it only to confirm my reading of the latter in light of *NE* 6.12.

¹²⁰ Cf. “doing-well (*eupraxia*) is the end (*telos*), so it too is some action” in the conclusion of *Pol.* 7.1-3 and *hê gar eupraxia telos* at *NE* 6.2, 1139b4.

6.4-5 also contrast *phronêsis* and *technê* in terms of *praxis* and *poiêsis* on the grounds that the end of production is external to the act of production, whereas the end of action just is *eupraxia*:

Of that which admits of being otherwise there is both the [thing] made and the [thing] done. But production and action differ (and we trust this about them even in the exoteric *logoi*), such that the active habitus with reason too is other than the productive habitus with reason. Wherefore neither is included under the other, for action is not production nor is production action... All art is about genesis, and to be artful is also to theorize how to generate something of things that admit of being and not being and of which the origin (*archê*) is in the one producing but not in the one being produced; for art is neither about things that by necessity are or come to be, nor things according to nature, for these have the origin in themselves. But since production and action differ, necessarily art is about production, not action... *phronêsis* would be neither *epistêmê* nor *technê*, *epistêmê* because the doable (*prakton*) admits of being otherwise, and *technê* because the genus of action is other than that of production (*allo to genos praxeôs kai poiêseôs*). What is left, therefore, is that it be true active habitus with reason about things good and bad for the human. For the end of production is other, but of action it couldn't be, for *eupraxia* is itself the end... the *archai* of actions are that for the sake of which the actions are...

The contrast between internal and external actions at the end of *Pol.* 7.1-3, then, expresses what locutions such as 'no other use' and 'works / ends besides the activities / actions' imply: some actions are entelic in that they are per se complete (and hence are to be done for their own sake). Entelic action, i.e., action that is its own end, is not productive in that it produces no end other than itself, which means it is self-productive in that the beginning and end of the action are one, in contrast to technical production, the *telos* of which is distinct from the *archê* in its producer. On the technical model of production, the end-product serves some use extrinsic to the act of production. On the non-technical model of production, the "product" or *ergon* just is the activity of the virtue, the use or exercise of that capacity, for *sophia* and *phronêsis* are productive, he claims, not as medical expertise produces health (as efficient cause distinct from final cause) but as health produces health, i.e., in the way that being healthy and living well are not finite ends that cease once one has performed the actions which are conducive to them but rather infinite

ends that manifest in and throughout such actions.¹²¹ Despite the radical, mutually exclusive contrast he draws in *NE* 6.4-5 between action and production (*allo to genos*), then, he nonetheless distinguishes two modes of production in response to the question of how *sophia* and *phronêsis* are useful. Both virtues are ‘useful’ not only in the sense of instrumentally valuable,¹²² but in the sense that their usage manifests the human function as entelic action or infinite end.

The contrast between finite and infinite actions or ends becomes explicit in “the Passage” of the *Metaphysics* (1048b18-35), where Aristotle gives his account of activity vis-à-vis motion. The next subsection argues that it is consistent with and hence confirms the foregoing account of *praxis* vis-à-vis *poiêsis* in the corpus as a whole, against readings that regard it as inconsistent. As we shall see, it reconceives of *kinêsis* and by extension *poiêsis* as a (deficient) kind of *praxis* just as *NE* 6.12 reconceives of *praxis* (proper) as a kind of *poiêsis* (opposed to technical *poiêsis*).

2.1.2 Activity and Motion as Sorts of Praxis in ‘The Passage’ of the *Metaphysics*

Metaphysics Θ.6 delivers on the promise Aristotle makes at the outset of book Θ to disclose the sense in which activity (*energeia*) is independent of motion (*kinêsis*). The crux of this argument emerges in “the Passage” at the end of the chapter (1048b18-35):

And since none of the actions (*praxeôn*) of which there is a limit (*peras*) is an end (*telos*), but is rather among things relative to an end (like shrinking or weight-loss, for the thing losing weight, when doing so, is thus in motion, though that-for-the-sake-of-which the motion is isn’t present), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (*ouk esti tauta praxis hê ou teleia ge*), for it is not an end. But that in which the end is present also is an action. For instance, one sees <and simultaneously has seen>, but also *phronei* <and *pephronêke*> and *noei* and *nenôên*, but not learns and has learned, heals and has healed; [but] one lives well and simultaneously has lived well, flourishes and has flourished. If not, it would be necessary for [the action] to cease at some time. Now this is not the case, but one lives and has lived. Of these some are to be called motions, others

¹²¹ On these two ‘models of production’ in Aristotle cf. Pickford (2017), who contrasts the classical model of technical or artistic production with the model (implicit in *poiouai*) on which *poiêsis* is the ‘manifestation’ of species-specific human excellences or virtues. In this regard, *praxis* proper is a (non-technical) kind of *poiêsis*, which suggests that *praxis* and *poiêsis* in their broadest senses are interchangeable, much as ‘doing’ and ‘making’ can be construed both in opposition to and as interchangeable with one another, more on which below.

¹²² *Phronêsis* in that its exercise is also instrumental to that of *sophia*, *sophia* in that it is possible to instrumentalize.

activities. For every motion is incomplete (*atelês*): shrinking, learning, walking, housebuilding. These are motions and indeed incomplete. For one is not simultaneously [in the condition of] walking and having walked, building a house and having built it, coming to be and having come to be, being moved and having been moved, but [these are] different, as are moving and having moved [i.e. caused motion]. But one has seen and is seeing the same thing at the same time, contemplating and has contemplated. So I call this sort [of *praxis*] activity, and that sort [of *praxis*] motion. What and of what sort being active is, then, let it be clear to us from these and these sorts [of examples].

The end of motion entails its cessation (*pausis*). Motion, then, is the limited, finite sort of action.

The end of being-active in the sense of being-in-motion is being-at-rest. Activities proper are limitless or infinite, by contrast, in that they *are* their own ends such that they need not in principle *come* to an end (rest). As soon as one sees (exercises the capacity to see), for example, one has already seen (exercised that capacity): the beginning and the end of the action are identical and simultaneous, for seeing is the sort of *praxis* that is its own *telos*, regardless of its usefulness or utility in relation to other ends (cf. “even independently of its use” in *Meta*. A.1). To see is immediately to have seen, but one cannot be (in the process of) sailing to Troy and simultaneously have sailed (completed the process of sailing) to Troy, unless one intends ‘have’ in the past tense instead of the perfect aspect at issue.¹²³ To be sure, motion is a sort of activity (*Phys.* 3.1, 201a10-1). But it is not activity *proper*, for it is essentially incomplete activity (*energeia atelês*). Activities proper are distinct from motions in that they are complete actions. Thus, he discloses the sense in which being-active is *synonymous* with being-complete (*teleia*).

Θ.6 invites us to grasp “what activity is and of what sort” by way of analogy. The analogy lets us comprehend the “equality of ratios” (*NE* 5.3, 1131a29-32) among examples of distinct senses of the activity-capacity relation. As motion is to mobility, so is substance to matter, division to divisibility, and seeing (e.g.) to visibility. In each of these senses the relation

¹²³ That is, one can have sailed to Troy in the past and simultaneously be sailing to Troy in the present, but one cannot have completed the present action while one is completing it; present and perfect are mutually exclusive.

of capacity to exercise is analogous. Only in the final sense, however, does the core meaning of being-complete reveal itself. For substances are activities *as the end of their material constituents*, and activities proper are infinite, not in the sense that dividing a line is infinite (never completable, always ongoing, the ongoing activity of what cannot in principle be completed), but in the sense that they are ‘autotelic’ actions, actions that are their own ends and hence are not ‘limited’ by external ends.¹²⁴ So the Passage answers the twofold question that occurs at the beginning and recurs at the end of the chapter:¹²⁵ *energeia* proper is the complete sort of *praxis*, in which sense activity (*energeia*) is synonymous with completeness (*entelecheia*).

That is not to say, however, that the Passage interprets *energeia* and *kinêsis* as species of a genus “for which Aristotle has no name, and for which he uses now the name of one species, now that of the other” (Ross *ad loc.*). But the mistake in such readings is not, *pace* Burnyeat, that the author of the Passage does name the genus in question—action (*praxis*)—which indicates an *exclusive* contrast between activity and motion to be found nowhere else in the extant corpus.¹²⁶ Rather, the mistake is the assumption that the Passage treats them as species of a common genus, that it predicates complete (*teleia*) and incomplete (*atelês*) as contradictory differentiae of the genus *praxis*. Every kind of animal, e.g., is fully animal, just because it is a species of animal. Motion by contrast is *not* action proper.¹²⁷ On the other hand, ‘incomplete activity’ denotes not

¹²⁴ True vs. spurious infinity, in Hegelian terms.

¹²⁵ ‘What is activity and of what sort is it?’ The Passage completes his answer to both questions.

¹²⁶ (2008, 264-5 *et pass.*). I.e., Burnyeat agrees that it treats *praxis* as a genus but disagrees that it “has no name”.

¹²⁷ Cf. Gonzalez (2019) and Chame (2023, 16). Chame cites “An ‘incomplete *energeia*’ is similarly not a species or kind of *energeia* but a defective *energeia*, one that is *not energeia* in the full or unqualified sense” (141), which continues “Furthermore, if it is not *energeia* in the full or unqualified sense, we can also say that, while it is like *energeia* and approximates it, it is *not energeia*, period. Thus... Aristotle assert[s] in the Passage not only that a motion is not a complete *praxis*, but also that it is simply not a *praxis*.” Hence, I take it, the argument that theory is the *only* activity and philosophy the *only* way of life that is *simply* its own end (not the only complete one but the only *simply* complete one) is compatible with the sense in which only the philosophic life is ‘completely happy’, which is why the Passage includes practically wise activity as well as noetic activity as examples of complete *praxis*. That only contemplatives enjoy complete happiness is compatible with their not being the only happy citizens, though the secondary happiness of the political life is not therefore incomplete, but rather only *relatively* complete.

simply inactivity or not-being *simpliciter*, but rather the activity (vs. capacity) of not yet being, being on the way toward being, as it were. In other words, becoming is a *mode* of being,¹²⁸ not simply non-being, and motion is precisely insofar as the capacity to move or be moved is active. To call activity and motion complete and incomplete *praxis*, then, is not to define them by genus and differentiae. Indeed, Aristotle explicitly denies that *energeia* can (at least needs to be) defined at the outset of the chapter.¹²⁹ Rather, we are to ‘comprehend the analogy’ (*to analogon*).

The examples of complete *praxis* exhibit “what activity is” more clearly than the examples of incomplete *praxis*, for they immediately disclose the property in virtue of which all activities are analogous and hence ‘comprehensible’: completeness. When the author of the Passage writes that ‘motion is not an action, or at least not a complete one,’ he assumes that it is not an action *proper*, which he then contrasts (through the limitative *ge*) with the attenuated sense in which it is an action. His argument, then, is not that activity and motion are species of action, but that activities *proper* are *complete* actions, in which regard they are synonymous.

Thus, not only is the Passage compatible with the distinction between two sorts of *praxis* we have observed elsewhere in the corpus, it justifies the presupposition of texts such as *NE* 1.1.

One reason for the confusion surrounding it, I suspect, is that the analogical procedure of Θ .6 obscures the fact that its task (in the context of Θ) is to determine the primary or core sense of *energeia* in contrast to its secondary or derivative senses. Analogical comprehension constitutively ignores relations of priority and posteriority to reveal the “equality of ratios” among analogues. Hence, its argument for the primacy of *energeia* in the sense of ‘complete action’ tends to get obscured. Even the examples of complete *praxis* are presented as analogues:

¹²⁸ “Becoming is for Aristotle the active exercise of something’s being able to be otherwise [qua able]. Becoming is therefore not an ontological category separate from being; the analysis that shows motion to be a mode of activity is aimed precisely at explaining the respect in which becoming is a mode of being” (Kosman, 2013, 70).

¹²⁹ 1048a37-b1 (necessary not to vs. not necessary to).

seeing, exercising *phronêsis* and *nous*, living and living well are equally complete actions. Whether these activities exhibit relations of priority and posteriority—are hierarchically ordered—in relation to one another is irrelevant; such relations do not enter into the analogy.¹³⁰

Yet the Passage treats analogically or ‘equally’ activities that Aristotle elsewhere ranks hierarchically in terms of the *degree* of completeness they exhibit. Seeing and knowing, practical and theoretical knowing, living and thriving, are equally instances of complete *praxis*. Each is genuinely complete (not incomplete), yet some are ‘more’ complete than others. But how can activities that are less complete than others not thereby be incomplete? Is the distinction of activity (proper) from motion compatible with the premise that some such activities are nonetheless more complete than others? How are we to understand the scale of completeness Aristotle draws our attention to in texts such as the *Metaphysics*? In the next subsection, I argue that more and less complete is to be understood in terms of absolute and relative completeness.

2.1.3 Degrees of Completeness

The conclusion of the proem to *Pol.* 7 (1-3) contrasts not only action proper with production but degrees even of action proper: the contemplative life is even *more* active than the political life, which is active relative to the (technically) productive ways of life. In *NE* 10.7, Aristotle speaks of the degree to which an activity produces something besides itself:¹³¹ though political activity is more its own end (‘leisurely’) than military activity, it is not *simply* its own end (= complete).¹³² Contemplative activity is the *most* self-sufficient (1177a27-b1), by contrast, in that it is *unconditionally* its own end, at least in principle. Likewise, *NE* 10 compares the

¹³⁰ I argued that Aristotle always distinguishes analogical from focal (*pros hen*) and serial unity in my MA thesis.

¹³¹ “*Theôria* seems to be the only activity loved on account of itself, for nothing comes from it besides (*para*) the contemplating. But from the practical [activities] we make some byproduct for ourselves (*peripoioumetha*) besides (*para*) the action either more or less” (1177b1-4). Cf. ‘besides the *praxis*’ in *NE* 1.1 and *Pol.* 7.3.

¹³² “But the activity of the political [actor] is also unleisurely, and besides itself political activity produces as byproduct (*peripoioumenê*) dynasties and honors and at any rate happiness for oneself and one’s fellow citizens other than political activity, and which we clearly seek as being other” (1177b12-5).

relative completeness and self-sufficiency of the *phronimos* (especially the wise legislator) to the absolute completeness and self-sufficiency of the *sophos* (especially the metaphysician). The ‘secondary happiness’ of the political life is somehow less than the ‘complete happiness’ of the theoretical life but nonetheless genuinely complete in comparison or relative to the other *bioi*.

The primary sense of *energeia* revealed in the Passage is the ‘most useful’ (1046a1) for Aristotle not only because it discloses that all activities are analogous by virtue of being complete or entelic, but because it is the only sense in which activity without capacity (*dunamis*) is comprehensible. Already at the end of the previous book (*Meta.* H.6), where he translates the contrast of form and material into that of active and potential being to resolve the aporia of definitional unity, Aristotle distinguishes the relative unity of natural substance(s) from the absolute unity of immaterial substance(s):

the ultimate material and the form are one and the same [being], the former in capacity, the latter in activity, such that seeking the cause of their being one is like seeking the cause of being one; for each is a one, and the being-in-capacity and being-in-activity are one in a way (*pôs*), such that nothing else is the cause, save if it is [such as] to move it from capacity into activity. But everything that has no matter is something unconditionally (*haplôs*) one.¹³³

The ‘distinction without a difference’ of form and material understood as activity and capacity here stresses *both* the immediate unity of natural substances and their ultimate materials, overcoming the ‘stoichiological’ language of composition discarded at the end of book Z, *and* their ‘lesser’ unity vis-à-vis the unqualified unity of immaterial substances.¹³⁴ In other words, the conclusion of book H contrasts the ‘relatively’ immediate unity of natural substances with the ‘absolutely’ immediate unity of immaterial substances. Hence the qualification that they are ‘somehow’ though not ‘simply’ one. They are one in that their form is *nothing but* the enactment

¹³³ 1045b19-24.

¹³⁴ Immediate here means not internally undifferentiated but non-combinatorial or non-synthetic, on which cf. fn. 222.

of the potential of their material constituents. They are not simply one, however, just because of the distinction. Hence, only a *purely* active, i.e., immaterial substance would be *unqualifiedly* one, and thus a substance properly speaking.¹³⁵ Since sensible (primarily natural) substances are not *simply* one, in other words, they cannot be substances in the fullest or most complete sense. And since the very distinction between active and potential being shows why such qualification is necessary, Aristotle turns in book Θ to examine the distinction comprehensively in order to disclose the sense in which there can be activity without capacity, substance(s) without material.

Seeing, for instance, requires the *dunamis* for it in the form of the eye, without which the natural capacity to see cannot be active. Hence it is analogous to the *energeia* of sensible substance(s) as a whole, which require bodily organisms. But if there are substances so complete that their being-active requires no correspondent capacity, they deserve to be called *absolutely* one and hence substances in the fullest, most complete sense of the term. Such substances would be ‘complete actions’ to the highest degree, the *most* complete actions (among complete actions).

Compare this argument to the argument in the *NE* about the secondary happiness of the political life. Relative to production, ethically virtuous action is its own end. Relative to theoretical activity, however, such activity is less complete in the sense that is not *absolutely* complete. *Meta.* Θ.6 speaks of motion whereas *NE* 1.1, 6.12 and 10.7 speak of production.¹³⁶ As an example of complete action, contemplation is analogous to all other activities in the proper or primary sense (limitless action). But insofar as *theôria* is the *most* complete *praxis* (which is

¹³⁵ Given the mutual convertibility of being and unity (1003b24-36).

¹³⁶ On *kinêsis* vis-à-vis *poiêsis* in Aristotle cf. Chame (2023, 17ff.). On the comparison of theoretical knowledge to sight in *Protrepticus* Hildebrandt (2020, 39) writes, “although the function or end of sight is not action but to distinguish visible things, sight helps us with acting and, more generally, moving successfully. Likewise, we can assume that the end of knowledge of nature is distinguishing what is knowable rather than production, but that it is still considered to be helpful for acting and moving successfully in the *Protrepticus*.” On the ambiguity of ‘production and in general motion’ vs. ‘acting and, more generally, moving’ Chame (*ibid.*, 22-3) writes, “Sometimes Aristotle emphasizes the motions necessary for carrying out a given action and on other occasions he underscores the intrinsic independence of that particular action from motion.”

irrelevant to the analogy), it sets the standard and provides the metric of completeness. And since the highest good for Aristotle is the most complete and self-sufficient, that is to say that immaterial substance(s), i.e., pure activity sets the standard and provides the metric of goodness.

The best life is such because it is the most substantial, for the best substance is pure activity.¹³⁷ The unqualified completeness of theoretical activity and the theoretical life is like the absolute unity of immaterial substance(s), just as the secondary completeness of ethically virtuous activity and the political life is like the relative unity of sensible substance(s). *Meta.* Θ.6 treats practically wise or ethically virtuous and theoretical activities as complete actions, but ignores whether such activities are themselves ordered in terms of the degree of completeness they exhibit relative to one another, the scale Aristotle uses in *NE* to rank ‘complete happiness’ above ‘secondary happiness’. To the extent that being-active is synonymous with being-complete, being *purely* active is synonymous with being *absolutely* complete. Theoretic activity is not the only activity that is its own end, but it is the only activity that is *simply* its own end, and is for that reason the *most* complete activity of all. Though all *energeiai* proper are complete, some nonetheless approximate ‘that which is primary in [the scale of] completeness’ more or less, better or worse, than others.¹³⁸ The primary entelechy is the only activity that is *absolutely* its own end, which is compatible with its being the activity that is its own end most of all. All

¹³⁷ On the ‘quasi-substantial’ unity of the happy life, polis and best polity cf. Halper (1995): “the happy life is the best life precisely because it is substantial” (8); “human happiness is directly proportional to the substantiality of human ethical life” (12-3); “a state is a substance insofar as it is an activity that unites a plurality” (20); “insofar as this [political] activity is or resembles an actuality, the polity is a quasi-substantial entity” (22); “The state and happiness are further realizations, that is, second actualities, of the nature of a human being” (22); “The best lives and the best states are such because they are most substantial” (23). I take it his resolution of “the so-called problem of Aristotle’s intellectualism” and the ‘inclusive vs. dominant’ dilemma on pp. 13-4 is compatible in spirit with that which I develop in this chapter, though it is more of a gesture toward the solution I am articulating here. As we shall see, e.g., I do not even accept the assumption that ‘dominant’ ends are exclusive rather than inclusive. Further, though best = most substantial, most substantial = most active, so the best lives and cities are such not just because they are the most substantial but because they are the most active (cf. 26, n. 19), vis-à-vis pure activity.

¹³⁸ On to *prôton entelecheia* (1071a37) cf. fn. 40.

other *energeiai* figure or approximate the absolute unity of divine substance(s), in which regard they ‘refer’ to it. Θ.6 argues that all activities proper are complete actions. According to Λ.4-5, however, analogy does not guarantee the unity of first philosophy. What guarantees its unity is the focal (*pros hen*) reference of all beings, substances, or activities to the Good itself (Λ.10).

So where Aristotle claims that the theoretic life is even more active than the political life, he means to contrast the absolute completeness of its central activity with the relative completeness of political activity. Ethically virtuous and political activity is complete relative to (technically) productive activity, which simply is not its own end, though is ‘more’ of an end than the inactive capacity to produce or in general move.¹³⁹ Relative to theoretic activity, however, it is less complete in the sense that it is not *simply* its own end. Yet theoretic activity is simply its own end in that it is in principle useless, not in that it cannot be (ab)used. But how *sophia* is useful or useless is distinct from the question of how *phronêsis* is useful or useless. Aristotle argues that both are intrinsically and instrumentally valuable: both produce *eudaimonia* in the way that health produces itself (as infinite end). Hence both are useless (qua non-instrumentally valuable). Yet both are also instrumentally useful, *phronêsis* in that its exercise serves to prescribe and to implement the conditions of the good or happy life, which is primarily the philosophic life though secondarily the political life, and *sophia* in that it is possible though unnecessary to instrumentalize it (as Thales, e.g., is said to have done).¹⁴⁰ His claims that (1) the political life is genuinely happy and that (2) it is less happy than philosophy, then, are consistent.

¹³⁹ *Meta.* Θ.8, 1050a23-b2.

¹⁴⁰ *Pol.* 1.11, 1259a. Another way to frame the utility of *phronêsis*: its exercise is instrumental to that of *nous*. The Passage speaks of *phronein* and *noei*; cf. “thinking, both theoretical and practical (*kai to noein kai to phronein*)” at *DA* 3.3, 427a18-22. *NE* 6.7 calls *sophia* “*nous kai epistêmê*” (1141a18-9). So I assume that *noei* and *phronein* refer to theoretical and practically wise or ethically virtuous activity. For *noein* in the focal sense of *theôrein* cf. *DA* 2.5. Cf. Bodéüs (1993, 35 & n. 61).

IV. *Exclusive vs. Inclusive, Only vs. Especially, and Esoteric vs. Exoteric*

The content of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is therefore compatible with the content of the *Protreptic* as I interpreted it in Part 1 of this dissertation. For just as the latter does not rule out the contrast of *sophia* and *phronêsis*, the former does not rule out the intrinsic or instrumental value of either virtue. Rule out, I say, because his contention is only that it's unnecessary that philosophers rule for ethically virtuous (just, courageous, temperate, etc.) action to be the norm.

NE 6 argues that *phronêsis* rather than *sophia* is the intellectual virtue that is responsible for ethical virtue,¹⁴¹ but admits that both are productive though not instrumentally, whereas *Protrepticus* argued that wisdom is both intrinsically and instrumentally worthwhile (as 'Aristotle' interprets these contra 'Isocrates' and 'Heraclides'); the texts differ in emphasis, but

¹⁴¹ Book 6 concludes that *phronêsis* is both an intellectual virtue in its own right and essential to or "involved in" (*meta* vs. *kata*) ethical virtue (1144b25-32). This ambivalence pervades his account and explains the apparent inconsistency of the 'two introductions' that constitute 6.1 (1138b18-34–1138b35-1139a17). On the one hand, as the wisdom that is 'involved in' acting virtuously, *phronêsis* is the active ingredient of ethical virtue (1st introduction). On the other, it is essential to happiness just because it is a virtue (2nd introduction): 'even if it were not active (*praktikê*), there would still be need of it because it is the virtue of a portion [of the soul]' (1145a3-4); again note the 'even if...' structure of the argument. To the extent that it is a virtue in its own right, it constitutes part of happiness, is valuable not only as a means to it but also intrinsically. To the extent that it is 'involved in' virtue of character, however, it is the 'right reason' (1144b27) by which practically wise agents determine the right end and the right means, e.g., what justice in this particular situation entails (what the just action is, say, paying reparations) and how best to do it. But even in the latter regard, *phronêsis* is valuable not simply as a means to ethical virtue, because its activity is *intrinsic* to such virtues, not externally imposed on them. In no sense, then, is it *merely* instrumentally valuable. Hence its activity and the life it governs is genuinely complete, though 'less' complete than its counterpart. For the way in which the exercise of practical wisdom in ethically virtuous action (primarily at the political level) is its own end, cf. Halper (1995): "To choose a mean properly, a person must exercise reason, and in so doing he engages in a fundamentally human activity. Because this activity defines our nature and because a nature is its own end, ... our rational activity is its own end... Nevertheless, insofar as the other faculties have been trained to follow reason, the choice of a mean would not be merely an exercise of reason but the attainment of the mean for these faculties and so the best use of them... The best use of these faculties is... that which is most in accord with our nature. Hence, it is that which promotes the exercise of reason... Such an application of practical reason fulfills my human nature and is, thus, its own end" (10); though its own end, it is also instrumentally useful for *theôria* (13); the form or function of the polis is its own end, the common action or activity definitive of the polis is for its own sake (15); the polis is its own end ("the activity of the citizens aims to preserve the continued common activity of the citizens") and fulfills human nature (16); "The state is... a common activity in accordance with reason undertaken by its citizens for the sake of itself both in the sense that this activity is intrinsically valuable and in the sense that it preserves the state" (16-7) vs. the mere instrumental use of reason to meet 'physical needs' (18); "acts that aim at the common good, aim to preserve the conditions in which acts such as themselves can occur and, so, are for their own sakes" (20). So the exercise of *phronêsis* is genuinely its own end, not just instrumental.

are not contradictory (such that one must account for the difference in terms of *metanoia*), for the reasons I spelled out in my account of the ‘indirect’ utility of *sophia* in Part 1.

NE 6 was written for quietists (‘inactivists’) who underestimate the value of *phronêsis* as distinct from *sophia* and unphilosophic legislators (‘overactivists’) who underestimate the value of *sophia* both in itself and in relation to the other virtues. *NE* 10 was written for atheoretical legislators who could convert to philosophy (either in the strong sense of choosing to do philosophy as a way of life or in the weak sense of coming to value it rightly and hence treat it appropriately) and apolitical philosophers who conceive of practical wisdom merely in terms of the application of theoretical wisdom. *Pol.* 7.1-3 was written to adjudicate the dispute between quietist and activist accounts of the best way of life and polity. So the dilemma that was central to the drama of the *Protreptic* remains central to the rhetorical context of the esoteric *logoi*.

In the latter, however, he explicitly ranks the philosophic life as best and the political life as second-best, which I interpret in terms of absolute and relative completeness. Aristotle stresses the contrast in the context of esoteric discourse because he aims to convert those who have chosen to study with him either, if overly pragmatic, to philosophy or, if overly quietistic, to politics. He suppresses it in the context of exoteric discourse for rhetorical reasons, but does not thereby contradict himself. The esoteric account seems ‘exclusive’ because it offers protreptic to pure (theoretical) philosophy whereas the exoteric account seems ‘inclusive’ because it exhorts any (free) person to do philosophy; conversely, however, the esoteric account seems ‘inclusive’ because it is not only for theoretical philosophers but also for active or prospective legislators, whereas the exoteric account seems ‘exclusive’ because it exhorts everyone including the politically active to do philosophy, though it keeps the question of ‘only vs. especially’ live (as I argued in Part 1). Whether philosophy alone or most of all is the best life

is the very question Aristotle answers in *NE* 10.7-8. Both chapters literally conclude by stressing that the philosophic life is the *most* happy. The *sophos* is *especially* happy (*malist' eudaimôn*) and lives the *best* life, not the only worthwhile life. In *Protr.*, 'Heraclides' concludes that the philosophic life is the only life worth living, 'Isocrates' argues that philosophy is at best propaedeutic to the only *bios* that is conducive to *eudaimonia*, and 'Aristotle' leaves the question open. The *NE* and *Pol.* both address and answer that question.

So the contrast between exclusive and inclusive accounts of *eudaimonia* tracks the contrast between esoteric and exoteric discourse (rather than metanoia etc.). I say 'tracks' because, as the previous paragraph shows, these pairs are coterminous but not identical, for esoteric and exoteric are each exclusive in one respect and inclusive in another, and the former pair foregrounds rhetoric while the latter foregrounds logic. It is the exoteric discourse, the *Protreptic*, that leaves the question of 'exclusive or inclusive?' open. The esoteric discourses answer that question ambiguously: as the *only* activity that is *absolutely* complete, *theôria* is the *praxis* that the happiest prioritize. In one sense, then, exclusive (only) and inclusive (especially) are compatible. Hence, exclusivists are right that *sophia* is the answer to the reference-question, the referent of 'the best and most complete virtue' in his definition of happiness, but wrong to the extent they assume that it therefore excludes *phronêsis* and the ethical virtues, which it includes on a directive reading of *kata*;¹⁴² conversely, inclusivists are right that the referent includes *phronêsis* and ethical virtue (somehow) but wrong to infer that, therefore, it is not *sophia*. On my account, the referent is *primarily* theoretical wisdom though *secondarily* practical wisdom and the virtues of character, as he frames it in the last book of the *NE*. As I have argued, his account

¹⁴² On directive vs. restrictive readings of *kata* cf. fn. 74. At any rate, then, the mere assumption is a non sequitur, as is the cognate assumption in the next sentence. Of course, inclusive readings take the referent to include *sophia* as part of the whole, but do not take it to *be* (identical to) *sophia*, for they interpret it as a genus, more on which below.

there and elsewhere is to be understood in terms of degrees of completeness. By comparing and contrasting the simple completeness of theoretical activity with the qualified completeness of political activity, Aristotle sought to reorient his quietist audience to politics and his activist audience to philosophy. He endorses the activist conception (as he does vis-à-vis ‘Isocrates’ in *Protr.*) but rejects the ‘overactive’ devaluation of *theôria*; he endorses the quietist elevation of *theôria* but rejects the ‘inactive’ devaluation of *praxis*. To the extent that the exclusivist reading (of Aristotle) is equivalent to the quietist interpretation (of happiness), one can devise his response to it. And since the inclusivist reading is a version of the activist interpretation, one can likewise devise his response. In the following subsections I articulate the debate and how one might devise his response to it in the context of his reconciliation in *Protr.* and the *NE* and *Pol.*

Since the literature is vast and burgeoning, I restrict my discussion to several texts that clarify the structure and parameters of the dispute, so as to clarify how my account of the solution in this chapter fits into or, more to the point, reconciles the readings at issue. I aim not to map the controversy out in its entirety but merely to show its contours and how they overlap.¹⁴³ To the extent that they overlap, I argue, these accounts are consistent with the solution I propose.

2.2.1 Exclusivist Readings of Aristotle

There seems to be consensus that Hardie (1965) initiated the recent dispute by arguing that Aristotle “confused or conflated” ‘dominant’ and ‘inclusive’ conceptions of the ultimate end, that his “considered view” or final word is the former, and that he should have opted for the latter instead, which would have resolved his “mistake and confusion” (279). Though he entertains the ‘incoherent’ reading, then, he ultimately endorses the exclusivist reading of Aristotle, though his own stance is (at least that Aristotle should have been) inclusivist. In

¹⁴³ For brief comprehensive overview in chronological order, the introduction of Purinton (1998) is still invaluable.

speaking of “[t]he confusion between an end which is final because it is inclusive and an end which is final because it is supreme or dominant” (281) or “the conception of the end as dominant and not inclusive” (283), Hardie assumes that the ‘dominant’ and ‘inclusive’ accounts are mutually exclusive. On my reading, ‘dominant’ means primary but *not* exclusive; *sophia* is the answer to the referent-question but in such a way as to include (not exclude) practically wise and ethically virtuous activity, a life of which is ‘secondarily’ happy. The formula of *Protrepticus* that “to the free man the dominant end of the activity according to his proper way of life (*to kurion telos tês kata ton oikeion bion energeias*) has reference to himself and to nothing else external” assumes, e.g., that the dominant or authoritative end is the one that is *in charge*: that it alone is in charge *implies* that its activity somehow includes that of *phronêsis* and the ethical virtues. Thus, ‘only’ and ‘especially’ are compatible. That it is the dominant end assumes that it is not the only end. So ‘dominant’ and ‘inclusive’ are compatible: the end is dominant in that it is inclusive qua primary. Hardie seems to admit their compatibility: “But to say that the final good is inclusive is not to deny that within it there are certain dominant ends corresponding to the major interests of developed human nature” (284); “some inclusive ends will include a dominant end” (287). But such construals get it backward: it is not that the inclusive end includes the dominant end(s), but that the dominant end qua primary includes the rest qua secondary, etc. Thus interpreted, the dominant and inclusive accounts are compatible.

Like Hardie, Kenny (1965-6) contrasts ‘dominant’ and ‘inclusive’ interpretations of happiness. Unlike Hardie, he contends that Aristotle does not even entertain the latter. Thus, his argument falls squarely into the ‘exclusivist’ camp. In support of the dominant rather than inclusive reading, he writes, “In the first book [of the *NE* Aristotle] lists the properties which men believe to be essential to happiness, and in the tenth book he seeks to show that

philosophical contemplation, and it alone, possesses to the full these essential qualities” (100). On my account, this dichotomy is incoherent: since ‘alone’ here means exclusively *rather than* primarily, either it alone possesses them, or it most of all (‘to the full’) possesses them. (To say that ‘it alone possesses them to the full’ is to say that it especially, not only, possesses them.) On the latter route, which I propose, the ‘dominance’ of *theôria* does not rule out that ‘lesser’ activities are genuinely complete: that it is the only *absolutely* complete activity does not preclude but on the contrary *entails* that it is the most complete.

That said, I agree with his suggestion that the prescriptive aspect of the argument for the ultimacy of *eudaimonia* is due to audience: “Aristotle, who considers happiness only in the dominant sense, does not make even the modest claim that everyone seeks happiness. He certainly says that all agree that happiness is the purpose of ethics, and that it is the highest of practical goods. But there is no reason why he should think that everybody practises ethics, or pursues the highest good. All he needs to presume, and all that he does presume, is that all of his lecture audiences are in search of happiness” (99). As I have argued, the ethical discourses were addressed to the overly quietist and overly activist, whom Aristotle sought to convert, respectively, to politics and philosophy. But it is that rhetorical exigency which explains the emphasis on the primacy of *sophia* in texts such as *NE* 10.7-8, which virtually discredits the interpretation of ‘alone’ as ‘only’ *rather than* ‘especially’ (‘exclusively’ vs. ‘primarily [and secondarily]’);¹⁴⁴ again, these are compatible under my interpretation. Though I agree that “The fact that [*EE* 1.2 contains] a recommendation shows that what is recommended is not something that is already the case in the behaviour of all men” (98), then, I reject his ascription to Aristotle of the inference from ‘happiness must include activity that humans only or especially perform’ to

¹⁴⁴ Save for the one apparent exception discussed below in the paragraph on ‘moderate intellectualism’ in Keyt.

‘it consists solely in that activity’ (100). For the dominant end, on my reading, includes the rest as the only one that is *simply* complete.

Cooper (2004) argues that *eudaimonia* for Aristotle consists primarily in virtuous theoretical activity but secondarily in activity according to the ethical virtues (doing justice etc.) in the sense that the former is *teleiotatos*, i.e., unqualifiedly final and hence self-sufficient (sufficient for being choiceworthy) whereas the latter is *airetôtatos* in “the way that some single subordinate good might be most choiceworthy in relation to other subordinate goods” (292). For Cooper, then, exclusive and inclusive readings of ‘best and *teleiotatos*’ are compatible. The self-sufficiency criterion on his account revises the sufficiency criterion in *Philebus*: “To meet Aristotle’s condition does not require making a life lacking in nothing, but only lacking in nothing needed for choiceworthiness” (286); “[*eudaimonia*] is *self*-sufficient, though not *sufficient*—if sufficiency is understood in Socrates’ way. [Aristotle limits] Socrates’ ‘lacking in nothing’ to what is lacking in nothing needed for choiceworthiness of life” (287). So Aristotle’s account of the philosophic and political lives as primarily and secondarily happy follows from his account of the highest good or ultimate end as such.

I agree that *sophia* is primarily, not exclusively, the answer to the reference-question. To that extent, as we shall see, his and my version of exclusivism (exclusivism in general being reducible to the proposition that *sophia* is the answer to the reference-question) is compatible with what Keyt (1978) under the banner of inclusivism calls ‘moderate (vs. strict) intellectualism’. As I have argued, Aristotle’s conception of degrees of completeness, understood in terms of absolute and relative entelechy, accounts for his peculiar claim that philosophy is the most practical way of life. Cooper contrasts the way in which *sophia* is the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with the way in which *phronêsis* and ethical virtue are most choiceworthy relative to other

subordinate goods, though themselves are subordinate goods (relative to *sophia*), which is compatible with my account of absolute and relative registers of evaluation in Aristotle.

Yet theoretical and practical reason in Aristotle are “internally related in such a way that the moral excellences, those of practical reasoning, could be seen as lesser instantiations of the very same values fully instantiated in, and only in, theoretical thought” (304-5). Now ‘fully instantiated in, and only in’ is ambiguous. If only is taken to mean exclusively *rather than* primarily, my account diverges. But if one takes it to imply ‘only *fully* instantiated in’, it converges with my account of *haplôs* (thus far and in the next section). Likewise, I deny that practically wise and ethically virtuous agents for Aristotle *must* ‘have vividly in mind, as they make their moral choices among the independent goods, that there is something better—indeed... categorially better—than the goods involved in morally good choosing and action: viz., the good of excellent contemplative activity’ (305-6). For on his account, as I have argued, one *need* not consciously prioritize *sophia* to live happily, though the ‘vague awareness’ of the value of *theôria* that Cooper attributes to people living the second-best life, “in the way someone who does not have actual experience of the thing they are missing might be aware” (306), is what I have argued Aristotle *recommends* or *prescribes* to practitioners of the second-best life. Thus contemplation *should* “always be in view... both in choosing morally virtuous actions themselves and in one’s selection, through moral virtue and its standards of evaluation, of independent goods to pursue and enjoy” (305), but needn’t.

That said, my account of degrees of completeness converges with his view that “moral virtue and contemplative virtue, and the goods that I have been calling independent, are related to each other so to speak each *en bloc*, as values of different orders or at different levels” (306). Indeed, the conclusion of the *Protreptic* entertains such a multilevel account: “[3] even if

someone were to claim that all these same [viz. wisdom, virtue, enjoyment] are happiness, it is to be defined by being wise”; even if one offers an account of *eudaimonia* that includes satisfaction of the ends that motivate practitioners of the three free *bioi*, in other words, together or at once rather than separately, that account relies on the premise that wisdom *especially* satisfies these desires (hence one should do philosophy regardless), even if it is not the *only* good that satisfies them. Though it raises the question ‘what sort of wisdom?’, however, it does not definitively answer it (intentionally, as I argued), which is the task of texts such as *NE* 6 & 10.

Finally, I agree with Cooper that the whole ‘*theôria*-addict’ problem (the unethical sage or philosopher who will do anything to maximize contemplation), as I shall call it, i.e., how *sophia* can be the best and *teleiotatos* virtue without undermining or compromising the integrity of ethical virtue, is misconceived. His formulation “Part of what it is to see constantly that there is something of higher value than the goods of social, political, and moral life would be an effort to reserve one’s time and energies so much as possible (given the requirements of morality) for the higher value of intellectually excellent work” (306) is compatible with Keyt’s formulation (*ibid.*) of what he calls the ‘superstructure’ view, as we shall see in the next subsection. To prioritize such activity “is not a way of organizing one’s choices that threatens to place contemplative activity in competition, as object of pursuit, with the other goods that are subordinate to it. Thus moral value is subordinated to contemplative activity *as a kind* of value, or in terms of the values that they are” (307, emphasis mine); to forego ethically virtuous action in order to maximize such activity is to betray “the misunderstanding of morality that allowing such ‘exceptions’ would imply” (308). As distinct from what Keyt calls the ‘absolute priority’ view, “on this view, the thing to do... is to meet all the legitimate requirements of morality first, including any that might take you away from contemplative thinking that without them you

would have engaged in, and then give yourself over to such work when and as circumstances—including in the first instance various moral relationships and commitments—permit” (308). To that extent, the exclusivism of Cooper and the inclusivism of Keyt are compatible, though their reading of *teleiotes* differs.

2.2.2 Inclusivist Readings of Aristotle

Keyt (1978) develops the case for an inclusive account of the ultimate end in *NE*, what he contrasts as ‘moderate intellectualism’ with ‘strict intellectualism’. The former proposes “that theoretical activity is the primary but not the sole component of the best life for a man, moral action being a secondary component” but comprises a range of stances that differ according to “the various ways of combining moral and intellectual activity while preserving the primacy of the latter” (4). For the strict intellectualist, ethical activity is merely a ‘subservient’ end in that it is only a means to (even if precondition for) happiness, whereas for the moderate intellectualist it is a ‘subordinate’ end that is a ‘component’ or ‘part’ of happiness, in contrast to the ‘ultimate’ end which is happiness, which includes theoretically as well as practically excellent activity as parts or subordinate ends, or rather the former primarily and the latter secondarily (somehow). Hence, exclusivism *in the sense of* ‘strict intellectualism’ is equivalent to what I have been calling quietism or inactivism. The inclusive or moderate reading on his account runs as follows.

Is virtuous *praxis* a component of (vs. precondition for) happiness? If not, then ‘strict intellectualism’. If so, is its value commensurable with that of theoretical activity or incommensurable? If commensurable, then ‘the trade-off view’ whose maxim is the maximization of *total* value regarded as distinct from and inclusive of that of theoretical and practical activity separately. If not, then either the ‘absolute priority’ view (whose maxim is

‘maximize *theôria* first; then maximize *praxis*) or the ‘superstructure’ view (whose maxim is ‘maximize *theôria* but only within the constraints of prudence and the ethical virtues’).

Keyt contends that the last is the only acceptable interpretation. I agree that the account of *eudaimonia* throughout the corpus (even in *Protrepticus*) is not exclusivist in the sense of quietist, that ‘activity according to prudence and the ethical virtues’ is not *merely* a subservient end, but *also* (I stress these) subordinate, even in *NE* 10. But I deny that theoretical activity for Aristotle is just one subordinate end among others, distinct from happiness as part from whole. For it is not just one such end among others, but the dominant, primary or ultimate end in light of which the subordinate (not merely subservient) end of ethicopolitical action is the most choiceworthy relative to other subordinate and subservient goods, the multilevel reading discussed in the previous subsection. So I question the dichotomy of ‘primary but not sole’ in his definition of moderate intellectualism. On my account, *NE* 6 & 10 emphasize that ethicopolitical activity is subordinate though not *merely* subservient (rather than it being subordinate in book 1 but merely subservient in book 10). So we agree that *NE* 10 presents an inclusive conception of *eudaimonia* to the extent that it does not treat such activity merely as subservient; but the contrast between primary and secondary, I have argued, is to be understood in terms of absolute and relative completeness, i.e., in light of the premise that *theôria* is the only *absolutely* complete *praxis*, and as such is that which the happiest prioritize.

Keyt appeals to the ‘implicit distinction’ in Aristotle between internal and external ends to show how the same action can be at once intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, and thus rescues the ‘subordinate rather than merely subservient’ view of ethicopolitical activity in *NE* 10, except for “*theôria* seems to be the only activity cherished on account of itself,” which he deems the only statement inconsistent with moderate intellectualism (15). Because he conceives of

theôria as a subordinate end, though primary (the primary component or constituent), the sense in which it alone seems to be cherished on its own account escapes his account. But if one supplies *haplôs* (as Aristotle does in *NE* 1.7), that it alone is the most in the sense of *simply* complete and self-sufficient does not preclude but rather *entails* that ‘lesser’ activities can be genuinely complete (subordinate but not merely subservient). The strict intellectualist is wrong that ethicopolitical activity is valuable *only* as a means in Aristotle, even in *NE* 10, but right that *sophia* is somehow (primarily though not ‘exclusively’) the referent of ‘the best and *teleiôtatos* virtue’,¹⁴⁵ that *theôria* is not one subordinate end (however primary) among others. Hence, on my account, the question of how to translate *teleia* in *hê teleia eudaimonia*—whether as complete (exclusivist qua strict intellectualist), perfect, or fully realized (inclusivist qua moderate intellectualist)—is superfluous (11ff.). For *theôria* is not one subordinate end among others, such that its being equivalent to or coextensive with ‘complete’ rather than ‘perfect’ happiness entails strict intellectualism. (Such dichotomies in my view depend on arbitrarily restrictive readings of English terms such as complete, as if ‘complete’ is not as ambiguous as *teleia*.) Both lives are genuinely complete, for their central activities are genuinely complete, though theoretical activity is primarily qua absolutely complete whereas ethicopolitical action is secondarily qua relatively complete (subordinate but not merely subservient).

Finally, then, although I agree that the injunction ‘to immortalize insofar as one admits of it’ expresses the superstructure version of moderate intellectualism insofar as *eph’ hoson endechetai* “includes moral restrictions as well as those of mind, body, and estate” (16),¹⁴⁶ such that “one should seek to immortalize oneself but only within the bounds of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue” (16), I deny that this is inconsistent with an exclusivist answer to the

¹⁴⁵ Where ‘exclusively’ means ‘in such a way as to exclude the other / rest of virtue’.

¹⁴⁶ Contra Adkins (1978).

reference-question, provided ‘primarily vs. secondarily’ is interpreted as I am interpreting it in this chapter, viz. as ‘absolutely vs. relatively’. That “the various aspects of a person’s total life—his life as a living thing, as an animal, as a man, and as a demigod—form a hierarchy with the higher aspects resting on and presupposing the lower” (16) is true from the perspective of hypothetical necessity, but that should not be taken to mean that all these preconditions for and even (constitutive) conditions of theoretical activity “*must* be satisfied before one is to engage in theoretical activity” (6, emphasis mine), as if Aristotle were proposing some version of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs *avant la lettre* (which, incidentally, is neither descriptive of how people act nor prescriptive of how they should; otherwise no one would or should ever have risked their life for justice or freedom, say, which on that theory of motivation is irrational). Rather, as Keyt appears to recognize, the superstructure view “does not demand that one should never shirk a duty, however trivial, for an opportunity to contemplate. Where the line is drawn will presumably be determined by the moral intuition of the practically wise man” (6). Insofar as satisfaction of higher-level ends does not entail though implies that of lower-level ends, then, his account of the inclusive or moderate thesis converges with the tempered version of exclusivism discussed in the previous subsection.

Roche (1988) argues against “intellectualism” that ethically virtuous activity for Aristotle is constituent part of the human function and end, i.e., against what Keyt qualifies as strict intellectualism (quietism or inactivism) and for its being ‘subordinate’ rather than ‘subservient’. I have argued that ethical and political activity for Aristotle is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable, both subordinate and subservient. Roche contends that the definition of the human good at the conclusion of the function-argument in *NE* 1 follows from its premises iff “the

human good is not confined to any special form of rational activity: It embraces the activity of human reason in its full range of application, i.e., theoretical *and* practical activity” (184).

Inclusivists typically interpret *eudaimonia* (the highest good or ultimate end) as a whole that includes theoretical and practical activity as parts, or as a genus of which these are species. In response to the question of what primarily vs. secondarily happy in *NE* 10 means, they argue that the primary part is included in the whole or genus as the best part of the best virtue (either total virtue or rational virtue) but that the whole or genus is not the primary part, which is a subordinate end distinct from the ultimate end that is the all-inclusive whole that is happiness. On my account, *sophia* is the best and most complete virtue qua primary, not qua comprehensive as distinct from primary; on the contrary it includes the other(s) qua primary, not is included though primary. I agree that Aristotle does not define the human good in terms of excellent theoretical activity alone, but interpret ‘primarily’ in *NE* 10 as especially and especially as absolutely in contrast to relatively. For the directive (vs. restrictive) reading of *kata* undermines the necessity for the one giving the exclusivist answer to the reference-question to interpret the scope of *teleiotatos* exclusively.¹⁴⁷ Hence *sophia* can be the focal (*pros hen*) referent, not the only referent (as if *kath’ hen*, which one assumes on the restrictive reading). That it alone is the most, i.e., especially or absolutely complete is compatible with the subordinate—genuinely though not absolutely complete—status of ‘the other virtue(s)’.

So the dichotomy of ‘combination of activities or one single activity?’ (186) is false, to the extent that it is unnecessary. *Sophia* is a particular virtue, but the way it includes the other (primarily vs. secondarily) differs from the way rational virtue as a whole or in general includes the rational virtues as parts or species. Roche concludes by pointing to the need for inclusivists to

¹⁴⁷ Cf. fn. 142 and 145.

explain how *NE* 10.7-8 fits into their interpretation, suggesting that refuting the (strict) intellectualist reading of these chapters requires refuting the premise that they identify the human with theoretic intellect alone. Keyt points out that the conclusion of 10.7 clarifies *malista*, whereas other texts leave the question of solely or especially open (13). As I have argued, that is consistent with my interpretation, on which *theôria* is the only activity that is simply its own end and as such is the most (not the only) complete activity. The conclusion of the *Protreptic* raises the question of whether philosophy alone or most of all is *to teleôs eu zên*. The conclusion of the *NE* answers: especially, though it is the only ‘completely’ happy way of life in the sense that *theôria* is the only *absolutely* complete *praxis*, just as the proem to *Pol.* 7-8 concludes that it is the *most* active (*praktikos*) way of life.

Roche (1989) clarifies or modifies (cf. n. 9) the reading staked out in (1988), interpreting the final clause of the definition in book 1 and *hê teleia eudaimonia* in book 10 as referring not to “the best *element* in *eudaimonia*, but the *best eudaimonia*, or the *best form* of *eudaimonia*” (114). The definition “suggests *both* that happiness may be understood, generally, as activity of human excellence *and* that happiness (in its highest form) is the activity of the *best kind of human excellence*[:] The essence of human good... is ‘activity of human excellence,’ and [so], if it is possible to distinguish and rank kinds of human excellence according to their value, the activity of the best excellence will count (especially) as an instance of *eudaimonia* (i.e., the best or *perfect eudaimonia*)” (115), which is “The happiness that is (or that is generated by) the activity of the most perfect virtue” (116).

I agree that *de* in the definition is copulative or continuative rather than adversative or exclusionary (integrative vs. contrastive), and hence that ‘rational virtue’ and ‘*sophia*’ readings of the referent are compatible rather than mutually exclusive alternatives. Moreover, Roche here

proposes the exclusivist answer to the referent-question, to the extent that he argues it is the primary or ultimate (though not only) answer, which is what I called the tempered version of exclusivism, which I argued converges with ‘moderate intellectualism’ insofar as prescription is concerned; “When Aristotle argues that the life of the intellect is the happiest life I take him to mean that the happiest person is one who correctly regards contemplative activity as the most valuable activity and succeeds in making such activity the primary focus of his life” (119). As the primary but not exclusive focus, it cannot justify commission of unjust (etc.) or omission of just (etc.) action. Again, the problem comes down to the interpretation of *NE* 10, which contains the protreptic to pure (theoretical) philosophy. Roche rejects the claim of Keyt that “*theôria* seems to be the only activity loved on account of itself since nothing comes from it besides the contemplating, whereas from the practical activities we make some byproduct for ourselves besides the action either more or less” is a non sequitur (the only claim Keyt found to be inconsistent with moderate intellectualism), on the grounds that it reports how it *appears* that *theôria* is the only intrinsically choiceworthy activity (n. 11).¹⁴⁸ Again I agree, though I would add that one can save the appearance by stressing that it is the only activity that is *simply* complete in the sense I articulate in this chapter. So, to the extent that he regards ‘the best and *teleiotatos* virtue’ not *only* as rational or human virtue in general but *also* and *primarily* as *sophia*, our accounts converge. Indeed, he intends his account to overcome the dominant vs. inclusive end dichotomy, (strict) intellectualism and inclusivism,¹⁴⁹ which is akin to the

¹⁴⁸ “If one agrees that excellent contemplative activity is a choiceworthy activity (as the arguments of [1177a19-b1] show), then it must be regarded as an *intrinsically* choiceworthy activity, and so a candidate for the title of (some form) of *eudaimonia* (cf. 1177a12-18). It *must* be regarded as *intrinsically* choiceworthy because there is nothing produced by such activity for the sake of which one might choose it. Indeed, this fact might even lead one to think—incorrectly—that it is the *only* intrinsically desirable excellent activity.”

¹⁴⁹ Which he associates with Hardie vs. Ackrill, Keyt and Cooper (who recanted his early reading as overly strict; the text I discuss above is later).

reconciliation I suggest in the context of the quietism vs. activism dilemma (for the reasons discussed at the beginning of this chapter).

Purinton (1998) reviews the debate over the referent-question and concludes that ‘*teleios* virtue’ in all cases including, he argues, ‘the best and *teleiotatos* virtue’ refers to the virtue of the rational soul in general as distinct from the virtues of the sensitive and nutritive soul *and not* one such virtue, namely *sophia*: by ‘if the virtues are more than one’ Aristotle means “‘if there are virtues of the non-rational faculty in addition to the virtue of the rational faculty’, and not ‘if there are many virtues of the rational faculty’” (295). To the extent that he denies that *sophia* is the answer to the referent-question, his account is inclusivist—he defends the reading of Ackrill against Hardie and the attempts of Cooper and Kraut to ‘rescue’ his thesis—though it differs from the ‘all-inclusive whole’ reading of Ackrill in that it answers the question in terms of the best kind of virtue, human or rational virtue as inclusive of the intellectual and ethical virtues, rather than in terms of a whole that may or may not include other intrinsically choiceworthy goods.¹⁵⁰ Purinton considers and rejects four arguments that have been thought sufficient to

¹⁵⁰ Cf. n. 13 on the inconsistency of Ackrill’s formulations. Purinton contrasts his as ‘virtue inclusivism’ with the ‘intrinsic good inclusivism’ of Ackrill. Walker (2018, 22-3) classifies it as narrow rather than broad inclusivism, which both divide as to whether the virtues or also other intrinsically choiceworthy goods are teleologically ordered, and both of which he contrasts with ‘exclusivism a.k.a. strict intellectualism’. Since I maintain that *sophia* is the only *simply* complete virtue, not the only complete virtue, I hesitate to restrict ‘exclusivism’ to strict intellectualism. That said, I basically agree with his approach in (2011). Minimally, one cannot answer the reference-question without at least implicitly answering the accordance-question, and since most of the debate assumes the restrictive reading, but the directive reading is possible if not plausible, counterarguments to interpreting *sophia* as the referent premised on the restrictive reading fail to address let alone refute the tempered version of the exclusivist answer discussed and tentatively proposed in this section, which I argued is consistent in terms of its prescriptive upshot with ‘moderate intellectualism’, though it maintains the focal reference to *sophia*. In section VII of his paper Ackrill speculates “that the reason why he does not speak of parts of a whole in [NE 1] is not that he now sees *eudaimonia* as other than inclusive, but that he now has a greater awareness of how difficult it is to say exactly how the notion of ‘inclusion’ is to be understood. It may have seemed less misleading to speak (rather vaguely) of ‘contributing to a final end’ than to use an expression like ‘parts of a whole’, which sounds entirely straightforward but is not really so” (195-6). Chronology aside, I think the suggestion that Aristotle suppresses the language of whole and part due to concerns about misunderstanding ‘inclusion’ is right. But that is precisely why speaking of complete virtue *merely* in terms of the all-inclusive whole or genus of virtue is insufficient. In NE 1.6, prior to the *ergon*-argument, he denies that ‘good’ is homonymous by chance and raises the question of whether it is focally, derivatively, or analogically predicated, which he defers to ‘another [sort of] philosophy’. NE 5.1 contrasts the sort of justice that is complete virtue with the justice that is part of virtue and calls it ‘not part of but whole virtue’, but immediately

refute the critique of Hardie in Ackrill (1974). Let me articulate his counterarguments and my response.

(1) The definition in *NE* 1.7 and particularly the rider ‘if the virtues are more than one, then according to the best and *teleiotatos*’ follows from the premises of the *ergon*-argument iff the virtue in question is rational virtue generally and not *sophia* specifically. Since Aristotle does not claim that there is more than one rational virtue until *NE* 1.13, Purinton takes *ei* to mean since; otherwise “what Aristotle says at 1098a16-18 leaves his readers in a position to state his view of happiness only hypothetically” (267). Thus, he argues, the definition rightfully assumes that the virtue in question is human (the assumption of ‘common parlance’), and then clarifies that if, on ‘philosophical consideration’, one assumes that there are virtues of the nonrational soul, these are to be excluded (270-1). The best and most *teleios* virtue, then, just reformulates ‘virtue’ more precisely, such that it follows from the premises of the *ergon*-argument. But the same advantage accrues to the account in Roche (1989) canvassed above, which also takes the *de* as continuative rather than adversative, but leaves room for the inference from rational virtue generally to *sophia* specifically or rather especially, primarily. Hence, though I agree that the definition follows if its first clause refers to rational virtue generally, I deny that its second clause (the conditional) follows if *and only if* it too refers *only* to rational virtue generically (*and not* to one such virtue, namely *sophia*, especially). On my account, then, the *ei* (which Purinton translates ‘since’ rather than ‘if’) is intentionally and fruitfully ambiguous.

(2) *NE* 10.7 begins by restating “happiness is activity according to virtue” as the antecedent of a conditional, the consequent of which is “it is reasonable / with good reason that it is according to the most dominant (*kratistên*); and this would be of the best [part].” Thus,

qualifies “this [sort of] justice is *teleia* virtue, though not *haplôs* but relative to another (*pros heteron*)” (1129b26-7). Thus, he contrasts absolutely and relatively *teleia* virtue, which suggests degree or hierarchy (*pace* Purinton, 284).

Purinton argues, 10.7 begins not by restating the conclusion of the *ergon*-argument, such that the reader may assume *kratistên* refers back to *aristên kai teleiotatên*, but rather by performing “a ‘reasonable’ inference from that conclusion (as stated in the antecedent) to a new conclusion *not* previously stated” (272). So the reader should not assume that *aristos* in book 1 and *kratistos* in book 10 are coextensive. I agree that they do not *necessarily* co-refer, but because my account of the definition leaves the inference to *sophia* open, I take it that the inference to ‘most dominant’ is implicit: not entailed, as Purinton says, yet implied. Thus it is not just *reasonable* but with *good* reason (*eulogon*) that Aristotle proceeds to draw that inference in book 10.

(3) The argument in *NE* 1.8 that the Delian epigram presents disjunctively attributes which ‘all belong to the best activities; and these, or the best one of these, we claim to be happiness’ (1099a29-31) entails not the (strict) intellectualist account but only that virtuous activities of the nonrational soul, which “are to be included among ‘the *best* activities’, because they are activities in accordance with the *virtues* of these faculties” (278), are to be excluded from the scope of ‘the best one of the best activities’, which is “activity in accordance with the *best* virtue, the virtue of the rational faculty” (279). I agree that the strict intellectualist account does not follow, but deny that it must therefore refer *only* to the activity of rational virtue in general *and not also* to activity of the best rational virtue specifically or, more to the point, *especially* or primarily, for the same reason I reject his attempt to block the inference to *sophia* in the definition of 1.7 (*de* implies though does not entail it). The interpretive dichotomy of ‘activity *kata* only one rational virtue’ vs. ‘activity *kata* all ethical and intellectual virtues taken together as a whole’ (280) is false if *kata* is understood *directively* rather than *restrictively*.

(4) What Aristotle says about the *teleiotatos* end earlier in 1.7 (1097a25-b6), that it is *haplôs teleios*, does not (and is not intended to) explain what he means by ‘the best and

teleiotatos virtue' in the definition. Purinton contends that the former passage argues not that *teleios* means 'always to be chosen per se and never on account of another' (which is none of the senses of *teleios* at *Meta.* Δ.16), but that happiness is the end which is *teleios* without qualification, "a statement which presupposes that the reader already knows what the term 'perfect' means" (289). Again: I agree, but since the definition on my construal is open to the tempered version of the exclusivist reading, it does not commit me to the assumption that the operative sense of *teleios* in 'the *teleiotatos* virtue' differs from that of *teleia* in '*teleia* virtue', as he argues (strict) intellectualists and all-inclusivists (Ackrill) are obliged to assume; in the final section of his paper he argues that Aristotle abbreviates 'the best and *teleiotatos* virtue' to '*teleios* virtue' in subsequent reformulations of the definition on the grounds that "there is virtually no difference between saying of some *x* that it fully satisfies the criteria for being an *x* and saying that it *most* fully satisfies them. For, in a fairly obvious sense, only that which *most* fully satisfies them can be said to satisfy them *fully* at all... [Hence] 'the *most* perfect' end... is the end which is 'perfect without qualification'... [and] 'the *most* perfect' virtue... is... 'perfect' virtue" (293). I deny that the equivalence of these expressions precludes the inference to *sophia*, however, because I reject his inference from 'it is the virtue which *most* fully satisfies the criteria' to 'it is the only virtue that satisfies them *fully* at all'. That rational virtue most satisfies the criteria for being a virtue *relative* to the virtues of the nonrational soul, I maintain, does not preclude the inference that one of the rational virtues satisfies them especially or most of all. That rational virtue generally is the most *teleios* kind of *animate* virtue, that is, neither entails nor precludes but *implies* that, if there is more than one such virtue, the *teleiotatos* of these is 'perfect virtue' in the sense Purinton elaborates, which is the inference Aristotle draws in the last book.

Purinton objects that such accounts are obliged to take ‘*teleiotatos* virtue’ and ‘*teleia* virtue’ in distinct senses, namely ‘most perfect’ vs. ‘complete’. Earlier I suggested that such restrictions (Cooper insists on ‘final’ as distinct from both, e.g.) arbitrarily limit English usage. Throughout I have used ‘complete’ not just in the sense of all-inclusive but in the very sense Purinton claims that only ‘perfect’ expresses, the sense in which the complete X (end, life, virtue) is that which *simply* satisfies the criteria for being X. Though I admit that ‘the *teleiotatos* virtue’ and ‘*teleios* virtue’ both *can* refer to rational virtue as a whole inclusive of the particular rational virtues as parts (or species of the genus), then, I reject his thesis that it must *only* refer to that whole *and not* to *sophia* especially. On my account, *sophia* is neither just a subordinate part of complete virtue nor just a species of complete virtue, but the especially or superlatively complete virtue, the primary or focal referent of complete virtue (not the only complete virtue). The ‘human virtue’ that Aristotle announces he is going to investigate at the end of the first book is as ambiguous as his identification of the human ‘only or especially’ with *nous* and his account of how ‘the complete happiness of man’ transcends strictly human activity in the last book.¹⁵¹

2.2.3 Incompatibilist Readings of Aristotle

I should have mentioned Ackrill (1974) at the beginning of the last subsection, but since I am not attempting to map out the entirety of the debate, but merely to clarify how my reading relates to and, I am arguing, integrates various exclusive and inclusive accounts that have been proposed (in something like the way Aristotle attempts to integrate the quietist and activist accounts), I mention it here to stress that any reading can entertain more than one interpretation, and thus that the account I offer in this section is schematic. Ackrill concludes (as some of his

¹⁵¹ Thus I hope to have responded to the most acute objections to my account that I am aware of, though I do not claim to have demonstratively refuted them. What I have argued is that they fail to refute the account I propose, which integrates ‘tempered’ exclusivism and the ‘moderate intellectualist’ version of inclusivism.

inclusivist allies do not) that the ‘compromise’ Aristotle effects in the *NE* between *theôria* and (ethicopolitical) *praxis* is not in the end happy, or at least is not satisfactory. Though he proposes the inclusivist reading (in his case of *eudaimonia* as the inclusive whole of all intrinsically worthwhile activities, etc., and ‘the best and *teleiotatê* virtue’ as “total virtue, the combination of all virtues” [194]), then, he also doubts the coherence of the Aristotelian solution, and thus entertains the ‘incoherent’ or ‘incompatible’ reading. So as not to belabor the point, I shall canvass only one other version of what, for lack of a better term, I therefore call incompatibilism.

Nussbaum (1986, 373-7) contends that *NE* 10.6-8 is out of place, citing “the most important reasons for judging that there is incompatibility here, not just difference of emphasis” (375) and “that the text of *EN* x seems to be oddly composed, giving rise to suspicion that Chapters 6-8 are not originally parts of the same whole” (376). Since the account of *eudaimonia* in the rest of the *NE* is inclusive *and not* exclusive, and since the account in these chapters is dominant in the sense of monolithic (‘strict intellectualist’), she argues, the dominant and inclusive accounts are incompatible.¹⁵² On the contrary, I have argued that (1) exclusive and inclusive properly interpreted are compatible, as are the esoteric and exoteric *logoi*, (2) *NE* 10 is carefully structured in light of the ‘three lives’ motif, developing the conclusion of the *Protreptic* for ‘esoteric’ audiences,¹⁵³ and (3) ‘the mixed view’ and ‘the other view’¹⁵⁴ are compatible: as the *only* activity that is *absolutely* complete and self-sufficient, *theôria* is the *most* complete and

¹⁵² Ackrill in section II of his paper rightly contrasts strong and weak senses of inclusive and dominant and moreover suggests that it is only in the strong sense of dominant (monolithic) that the exclusive thesis contradicts inclusivism in the weak sense, i.e., that the weak sense of dominant and the strong sense of inclusive are compatible. The strong version of inclusivism, I take it, is that which he proposes (at least for book 1; according to Roche, 1989, 104, Keyt first articulated the inclusivist reading also of book 10, though with one exception, as we saw).

¹⁵³ Cf. fn. 82. Keyt (1978, 10) shows how *NE* 10.6 rules out the apolaustic life and thus transitions from 1-5 to 7-8.

¹⁵⁴ “So he articulates the Platonist view, not attempting to harmonize it with the other view, but setting it side by side with that one... In a sense there is a decision for the mixed view; but the other view remains, not fully dismissed, exerting its claim as a possibility” (377); “Neither of these two lives... is the life defended up until this point in the *EN*, since that life will contain both contemplative and non-contemplative components” (375).

self-sufficient *praxis*, that which the happiest prioritize; as the only way of life that is *simply* its own end, philosophy is the *best*, i.e., *most* complete and self-sufficient way of life. The assumption that ‘dominant’ and ‘strict intellectualist’ accounts are identical is mistaken, for ‘dominant’ also expresses what I called the tempered version of the exclusivist stance, which I argued is compatible with the ‘moderate intellectualist’ stance (dominant [*kurios*] implies main or most, not only).¹⁵⁵

Thus, the exclusive and inclusive accounts are consistent, though incompatibilist accounts are right to stress their copresence in the text. Though my reading integrates all three sorts of account to some extent, then, it rejects them insofar as they maintain incompatibility.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. fn. 152 and Walker (2018, 22).

V. Independence and Interdependence in the *Metaphysics and Politics of Aristotle*

In *NE* 10, Aristotle speaks of the degree to which activities result in some product besides themselves:¹⁵⁶ though political activity is more leisurely (its own end) than military activity, it is not *simply* its own end (= complete).¹⁵⁷ Theoretic activity is the *most* self-sufficient (1177a27-b1), by contrast, in that it alone is *simply* its own end. Thus he compares the ‘primary’ happiness of the *sophos* (especially the metaphysician) with the ‘secondary’ happiness of the *phronimos* (especially the prudent legislator). Though the activity of the *phronimos* is not *simply* complete, it is ‘more’ complete than that of the artist (*technitês*) or producer (*poiêtês*), which is incomplete.

Having articulated my account of the *NE* in relation to the *Protreptic* as I rewove it in Part 1, let me shift focus from the *NE* to its sequel, the *Politics*. Just as the polis in book 1 emerges as the most complete and self-sufficient form of human community, the best polity in books 7 & 8 emerges as the most complete and self-sufficient form of government. As such, the polis in general and the best polity especially most closely approximate the absolute completeness and self-sufficiency of divine activity.¹⁵⁸ Yet the freedom (entelechy and autarky, autonomy and independence) of ‘the God and the total cosmos’ is absolute, whereas that of the polis and best polity is relative; even the best way of life and form of government is at best only an image or *agalma* of divine and cosmic freedom. In other words, he contrasts the relative independence or interdependence of political activity (even in the best polity) with the simple,

¹⁵⁶ “*Theôria* seems to be the only activity loved on account of itself, for nothing comes from it besides the contemplating. But from the practical [activities] we make some byproduct for ourselves (*peripoioumetha*) besides the action either more or less.” On the force of ‘besides’ (*para*) cf. subsection 2.1.1. On degrees of completeness as degrees of identity of an activity with its object in *NE* 10 and Aristotle generally cf. Gonzalez (1991, esp. 155-9).

¹⁵⁷ “But the activity of the political [actor] is also unleisurely, and besides itself political activity produces as byproduct (*peripoioumenê*) dynasties and honors and at any rate happiness for oneself and one’s fellow citizens other than political activity, and which we clearly seek as being other” (1177b12-5).

¹⁵⁸ “For even if [the human good] is the same for one [individual] and for the city, that of the city appears to be greater, at any rate, and more complete (*teleioteron*) both to attain and to preserve; for [to attain and preserve it] even for one [individual] alone is to be cherished, but [to attain and preserve it is] more beautiful (*kallion*) and more divine (*theioteron*) for a people and cities. So the pursuit aims at these, being some political [inquiry]” (1094b7-10).

absolute independence of divine activity.¹⁵⁹ Though the city enjoys a greater degree of freedom qua self-determination than the other forms of community, and the best polity enjoys a greater degree of freedom than the other forms of polity, just as the best life enjoys even more freedom than the second-best life, only ‘the God and the total cosmos’ enjoy absolute or unconditional freedom. Though he often speaks of freedom in terms of liberation from the need to procure ‘necessaries’ (economic independence) and hence leisure to perform ‘beautiful’ actions, Aristotle refers to *sophia* in general and first philosophy or metaphysics especially as ‘the freest science’ on the grounds that it is the only branch of knowledge that is its own end simply or without qualification (useless, not unusable). As the only activity that is absolutely complete and self-sufficient, i.e., free, *theôria* is the *praxis* that the happiest prioritize. For the freedom of the city is not its inactivity but rather its internal activity, its *energeia*, its relative lack of dependence on external conditions due to its relative self-determination or autonomy, second only to ‘the God and the total cosmos, for whom there are no external actions besides their own’. By comparing the relative freedom of political activity to the absolute freedom of theoretical activity and vice versa, Aristotle sought to reorient the activist toward philosophy and the quietist toward politics, whether in the strong sense of turning rulers into philosophers or vice versa, or in the weak sense of leading rulers to appreciate philosophy rightly and philosophers to appreciate politics rightly.

The following subsections examine three claims implicit in the previous paragraph: (1) each community and polity is to be understood in terms of its own form or function, yet is ultimately to be evaluated in terms of divinity as a metric, (2) compared to other forms of

¹⁵⁹ At the end of *Pol.* 7.1-3 Aristotle suggests that independent cities are not only not inactive but even more (properly) active than overactive (imperial) cities, “for there can also be action among parts, since there are many ways for the parts of the city to be in community relative to one another”, which he then compares to the ‘internal (inter)action’ of each human and moreover of the God and cosmic totality. As Newman (1902) notes, “when the parts of the State have relations with each other, inter-action results or co-operative action or both” (339). The freedom won through interaction and cooperation is what I call relative independence or complete interdependence.

community, the polis is the most complete and self-sufficient, yet remains ‘incompletely self-sufficient’ in that it only ever approaches or approximates an end it cannot absolutely attain,¹⁶⁰ and (3) divine and cosmic freedom model the best and second-best ways of life, respectively, and together model the life which the polis manifests more than other forms of community and the best polity more than other forms of government. Thus I hope to offer the reader a preliminary glimpse of the analogical structure of Aristotelian ‘first philosophy’ and ‘political philosophy’, before turning to its psychological counterpart and the implication of this triple analogy in Part 3.

2.3.1 Divine Activity as the Metric of Political Activity

At the outset of the *Politics* Aristotle articulates the program of the books that follow:

Since we see that every city is some community, and every community is constituted for the sake of some good (for everything everyone does is for the sake of the apparent good), it is clear that all [communities] aim at some good, and that the community which is the most sovereign (*kuriôtatê*) of all and contains all the others [aims] especially at the most sovereign of all [goods]. And this is the one called the city, the political community.

The program implies three discernible tasks: to understand (1) the forms of human association both in themselves and in relation to the most complete and authoritative form, the polis, (2) the forms of polity both in themselves and in relation to the best polity, and (3) ‘the most sovereign of all goods’ as the original motive and ultimate end of each form of community, especially of the political community, and especially of the best form of political community.¹⁶¹ Political philosophy thus ends in disclosure of the most sovereign good as the *archê* and *telos* of community in general, political community especially, and the best polity (whatever it is) most

¹⁶⁰ “[T]he city is a mortal being, and... even the most self-sufficient being within human life, the total political community, simply approaches an end it never quite attains” (Diamond, Unpublished, 8). As I shall argue, ‘incompletely self-sufficient’ means relatively but not absolutely self-sufficient. On the two modes of autarky in Aristotle cf. Brown (2014), esp. on autarky being ‘all or nothing’ vs. ‘a matter of degree’: “Only after Aristotle excludes the solitary kind of self-sufficiency from discussion does he characterize happiness as self-sufficient and most choiceworthy. This leaves open the possibility of ranking self-sufficient happinesses when the solitary kind of self-sufficiency is in play, and exactly that possibility is realized in X 6-8” (33). Instead of ‘solitary’ vs. ‘political’ self-sufficiency I call them independent and interdependent self-sufficiency, to avoid misunderstanding of ‘solitary’.

¹⁶¹ Adapting the division of Diamond (Unpublished, 10).

of all forms of political community. That good is the God, who appears in the *NE* and *Pol.* under the descriptions of leisure and self-sufficiency, for all natural mortal beings partake of divinity to the degree that they can¹⁶² and the city is the natural mortal being which most resembles the divine life of the primary unmoved mover and motion ('the God and the total cosmos'),¹⁶³ the divine life of self-thinking thought that is the principle of the human desire for theoretical knowledge, which is satisfied only or especially in *sophia* and in 'primary philosophy' most of all (*Meta.* A), and of the outermost celestial sphere, which contains all 'lower' motions beyond constraint, as the rational desire of the *phronimos* contains his 'lower' desires beyond restraint.¹⁶⁴ To understand the threefold program of *Pol.* 1.1, let us consider (I) how each form of community desires the God, (II) how the polis satisfies that desire more than other forms of community, and (III) how the best polity satisfies it more than the other forms of political community.

First, to understand how each form or stage of community as such desires the God, consider the following. In one respect, the city is the nature or telos of all human community (as *nous* is the nature of the soul), for household and village are not just distinct forms of community but parts of the complete and self-sufficient community that is the city, which contains or includes them. In another respect, however, Aristotle is careful to remind that even the city, though the most self-sufficient form of human community, is still 'incompletely self-sufficient':

The complete (*teleios*) community of more than one village is a city, already having [reached] the limit (*peras*) of the full (*pasês*) self-sufficiency, so to speak, coming to be for the sake of living but being for the sake of living well. Wherefore every city is by

¹⁶² *DA* 2.4, 415a26-b6: "for living beings that are complete and not mutilated nor have spontaneous generation, the most natural of the functions is to produce another such as itself, animal animal and plant plant, so as to partake of the eternal and the divine insofar as is possible [for them]; for all desire that, for the sake of that do whatever they do according to nature. That for the sake of which is twofold, the of-which [(aim)] and the for-which / by-which [(beneficiary / instrument)]. So since it is unable to commune of the eternal and the divine in continuity, because none of the perishables admits of persisting one and the same, insofar as each is able to partake, it communes thus, one more and another less; and it persists not as itself but as one such as itself, one not in number but in kind." For 'directive' and 'instrumental' readings of the genitive and dative, respectively, see Gelber (2018).

¹⁶³ Cf. fn. 158. I pursue the ambiguity of locutions like 'the God and the total cosmos' in the next chapter.

¹⁶⁴ Again, more on which in the next chapter; some of my claims in this section pend justification in Part 3.

nature, if indeed the first forms of community are too. For it is their end, and nature is end; for what each is once it has completed its genesis / is at the apex of its development, this we say is the nature of each, as of human, horse, house. Further, that for the sake of which and the end is the best, while self-sufficiency is both end and best.¹⁶⁵

Despite being self-sufficient *relative* to other forms of community, which it preserves and uplifts in itself, then, Aristotle is careful to acknowledge that the city is not *absolutely* self-sufficient: the city approaches the limit of and thus approximates absolute autarky without transgressing the threshold, as he clarifies the *qualification* he introduces ('having the limit' is vague and ambiguous, though presumably is to be distinguished from being the limit) with another (*ôs epos eipein*), emphasizing that even the most self-sufficient human community approximates an end it cannot 'fully' or without qualification attain, thus gesturing toward the absolute self-sufficiency that lies beyond the scope of political philosophy yet within it as the original motive and ultimate aspiration of all communal and especially political activity. Yet the pre-political or sub-political communities each in their own way, in seeking to express their natures, also aim at the divine self-sufficiency rather than at the self-sufficiency of the political community, which is why they remain distinct parts of the city albeit preserved and uplifted (sublated); the city is the completion not of their natures but of its own nature as inclusive of theirs (inclusive, not destructive, unless it is the sublative destruction of their no longer being the ultimate form of community). In joining together to form the household, e.g., family members do not desire to form little cities, just as members of the body politic do not desire to form one large household; rather, each in doing its own thing or performing its own function(s) desires that measure of self-sufficiency which befits its nature.¹⁶⁶ In other words, the desire of each is immediately for the

¹⁶⁵ 1252b29-53a2.

¹⁶⁶ Throughout *Pol.* 7 Aristotle structures the best polity in light of 'the most beautiful limit' of which he speaks at the end of the *EE* and which in *NE* 6 is 'according to right reason' qua *phronêsis*. I already quoted *ta ekstos echei peras* at 1323b7-13; on the proper quantity and quality of citizenry and territory cf. *Pol.* 7.4-7, where he transitions from speaking of the *horos* of the most beautiful city to the claim that "there is some measure (*metron*) of size for

God, though that desire is also mediated through the city precisely insofar as it is the complete community, as that which most fully satisfies the desire and hence most resembles the divinity.¹⁶⁷ As Kosman (1969) enunciates the principle, “Beings... imitate divinity in being, acting out, what they are; *imitatio dei* consists in striving not to be God, but to be one’s self, to emulate that being who is totally active, i.e., who totally is what he is” (60).¹⁶⁸ Or perhaps, in striving to ‘do the *erga* proper to oneself’ one strives to be the God or at least Godlike to the degree that one can. At any rate, the principle that to be oneself is to approximate the divine is the reason behind (I). Hence task (1) implies task (3): to understand the stages of community (ultimately via the polis) one must grasp the divine as the end and metric of each form even as it becomes part of the next.

Second, to understand how the polis satisfies the desire for divine self-sufficiency most of all forms of community, consider what I have just argued in light of my thesis that ‘more’ and ‘less’ complete is ultimately to be understood in terms of absolute and relative completeness.

cities, just as of all else too—animals, plants, instruments” and thence to speaking of it in terms of autarky (‘self-sufficient for living well according to the political community’), etc. Eventually 7.15 speaks of it in terms of leisure. Throughout he uses the verb ‘determine’ or ‘delimit’ in conclusion for having worked out the limit, e.g. *diôristai* at the end of 7.7. On ‘deriving the limits of the human good’ in *Protr.* cf. Part 1 (here we see that derivation in action). On measure as the union of quality and quantity cf. the third stage of Being in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* of Hegel.

¹⁶⁷ “As with leisure, we should not take the *telos* which is ultimately moving us into associations to be the best manifestations of these characteristics as they appear in mortal human life: it is not that the individuals coming together to form family households desire to be cities—to be more precise, they desire a principle of self-sufficiency which is most fully manifested in human associations with the emergence of the city... The city, not itself the moving *telos* of all impulse towards association, is the fullest mortal flowering of this universal impulse, and as mortal is itself motivated along with the household by this common desire or impulse towards self-sufficiency. And this motivating end is a *complete* self-sufficiency—this is the god” (Diamond, Unpublished, 9). Again, the double qualification ‘having the limit of the full self-sufficiency, so to speak’ is meant to contrast ‘political self-sufficiency’ (cf. fn. 160) as limited with the (superlative) autarky of theoretical activity, divine and human, as per *NE* 10.7-8.

¹⁶⁸ Which continues, “That the essence of God is actuality has other than metaphysical force for Aristotle. For we partake of divinity in our capacity for action which is actuality and which has no limit and no end outside itself.” One might also compare House (2007) on the speech of Aristophanes in *Symposium*: “The relation of the human to the divine, in his account, is to be at peace with the gods by limiting human ambition to what belongs to human nature and not exceeding it by aspiring to identity directly with divine nature. But it is precisely by recognizing the limit that the human being is understood as having his own end which is his own self-realization. Aristophanes asserts the side of human autonomy and independence while acknowledging its limits” (47 *et pass.*). Ironically, the ‘know your limits’ interpretation of the Delphic imperative (vs. ‘become Godlike’) asserts human autonomy.

Relative to sub-political communities, the political community is the most autarkic. Relative to the absolute self-sufficiency of the God, however, the political community remains incompletely autarkic. Hence, his claim that it is the most autarkic is compatible with his claim that it is not as autarkic as divine and cosmic self-sufficiency, just as I argued that the genuine completeness of the political life is compatible with its lesser degree of completeness relative to the theoretic life, and that the genuine unity of natural substance is compatible with its lesser unity vis-à-vis immaterial substance. Thus, his argument in the *Pol.* is akin to his argument in the *NE* and *Meta*.

Third, to understand how the best polity as such satisfies the desire for absolute self-sufficiency more than other forms of government and thus manifests the divine life of self-thinking thought as infinite end (*tou eidenai oregontai*) most of all forms of political community, consider the following passage at the beginning of *Pol.* 2.9:

About the Spartan polity and the Cretan, and just about all the other polities too, the considerations are two. One is whether anything is legislated beautifully or not relative to the best order, while the other is whether anything is implicitly contrary [lit. subcontrary] to the supposition and mode of the polity they have proposed for themselves. It is agreed that leisure from the necessities must / ought to be present in the [city] going to govern itself / be governed beautifully, but in what mode it is to be present is not easy to grasp...

Aristotle here expresses a principle that runs through his treatment of the forms of government in the *Politics* and that, properly understood, accounts for the ambiguity of his various evaluations of them throughout. Let us call these considerations the absolute vs. relative evaluation of polity. The former evaluates each polity relative to or against the measure of (how they measure up to) ‘the best order’; the latter evaluates each against its own supposition, i.e., the mode of polity their constitution upholds. In his account of the best polity in *Pol.* 7-8, Aristotle echoes the principle:

it is possible both for everyone to share in all [the parts or functions of the polis] and for not everyone to share in all but only some in some. For these [distributions] indeed are what makes the polities different; for in democracies everyone partakes of all, while in oligarchies the opposite. But since we happen to be examining the best polity, and this is that according to which the city would be the most happy (*malist’ eudaimôn*), and that it

is impossible for happiness to be present separately of virtue was said previously, it's manifest from these that in the city which is most beautifully governed and possesses just men simply and not relative to the supposition, the citizens must / ought to live neither a banausic nor a market-centered life (for such a life is lowborn and subcontrary to virtue), nor indeed should those who are going to be citizens be farmers (for leisure is necessary both for the genesis / development of virtue and for political actions).¹⁶⁹

Here Aristotle contrasts those who are 'simply' just with those who are just relative or according to whatever polity they happen to inhabit, whether it be democratic, oligarchic, etc. Justice without qualification is manifest only in the best polity, though is also manifest to lesser degrees in other forms of government *ex hypothesi*. Again, 'only' is compatible with 'especially' *qua* primarily. But if the best polity is that which is the most 'conducive to happiness' (i.e., not the only one that is such, but the only one that is *simply* such), what is it, according to Aristotle? Which of the polities is best? Remarkably, his answer even to this question is ambiguous. For in the *Politics* as a whole, Aristotle both entertains the idea that the best form of human government mirrors the divine rule of the cosmos (absolute monarchy of the most excellent individual) and rejects the premise that it is always best for human cities to mirror the divine and cosmic city in their polity, since the improbability of one human excelling others to the degree that the Gods excel mortals implies that the best polity for at least most (if not all) human communities is constitutional rule among equals in virtue—ruling and being ruled in turns—even if such government is second-best absolutely speaking (1332b). So 'the best polity' for Aristotle is already ambiguous—absolutely or relatively?¹⁷⁰ Hence task (2), to understand the forms of polity

¹⁶⁹ 1328b31-29a4. Cf. *Pol.* 4.1.

¹⁷⁰ Which is why I wrote that 'the best polity (whatever it is)' satisfies the desire for absolute freedom most of all forms of political community. In respect of political theology one might compare and contrast what Rousseau says of democracy at the end of *Social Contract* III.4: "S'il y avait un peuple de Dieux, il se gouvernerait démocratiquement. Un gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas à des hommes." As Halper (1995) notes, "Deciding absolutely between these two constitutions [viz. aristocracy and monarchy] is equivalent to asking whether a group is more one if several of its members perform a unifying activity or if the unifying function is performed by one person who far excels the other. Both can make legitimate claims to unity and, therefore, to substantiality" (21).

both in themselves and in relation to the best polity, implies task (3), to grasp ‘the most sovereign of all goods’ as the end and metric of all forms of government and especially the best.

2.3.2 Political Theory and the End of Political Philosophy

That is to say that political philosophy for Aristotle culminates in *theôria* of divinity as the (motive) principle and (final) cause of political activity, just as the *Phys.* culminates in his account of the unmoved mover as principle and cause of the first motion, the *DA* in his account of intellect as the principle and cause of soul or life, and the *Meta.* in his account of pure activity or self-thinking thought as the principle and cause of all beings (especially substances) as such, though only in the *Meta.* does investigation of the principle in itself (not only as principle) lie within rather than beyond the scope of the inquiry.¹⁷¹ Though these inquiries pass beyond themselves in their final conclusions (except the *Meta.*), reaching the threshold of first philosophy without crossing it, however, the ‘gesture’ in each case differs according to whether the principle is the paradigmatic instance of the subject under investigation or not: in the *Meta.*, *DA*, and *NE*, divinity is the prime instance of being or substance, life or cognition, and happiness or the good life, whereas in the *Phys.* and *Pol.*, the principle of motion is *not* itself in motion and that of human and especially political community (and especially of the best polity), communities of citizens who relate to one another rightly through ethically virtuous action, is apolitical in being without any of the insufficiency at the root of the *interdependent* self-sufficiency of human community, though political insofar as ‘*pas ho kosmos*’ paradigmatically instantiates the complete interdependence, i.e., relative independence, of political community.¹⁷² That is, Aristotle contrasts the *absolute* independence of the God with the *relative* independence

¹⁷¹ For my account of mind as the focal sense of life in *DA* see the next chapter.

¹⁷² Cf. *Meta.* A.10 on whether the Good is beyond or immanent.

(complete interdependence) of the city. Though ‘the God’ is completely independent, ‘the total cosmos’ is completely interdependent, and both together model the well-ordered soul and city.

That political philosophy culminates in theoretical insight, however, does not mean it ends there.¹⁷³ As Ward (2018) points out, the structure of *NE* 10 resembles that of a traditional *theôria*, wherein the argument ascends to the conclusion that the highest human activity is that of the Gods and descends in the last chapter to return to the point at which the *NE* began:

This conclusion [that the highest human activity is *theoria*], in turn, provides a foothold for the highest point of his conception: an argument showing *theoria* is the activity of the gods in *EN* X 8. Having reached a pinnacle in his reasoning about the highest activity, he descends, the final passage comprising a rhetorical return to the starting point of the *Ethics*... Taking the whole work as an architectural model, we can conceive a circular shape formed throughout the *Ethics* in the sense that his final lines about the practical sciences and the art of politics return to the idea offered in *EN* I 6: that we seek the practical and not the theoretical good. We might imagine a parallel to the path of a classical Greek travelling on a *theoria*—moving away from and back to one’s home city—for the sake of seeing things occasioning wonder and leading to understanding.

The ring-structure of the *NE* resembles traditional *theôriai* in the sense Nightingale evokes.¹⁷⁴ So although ‘political thinking and study’ (1324a21) for Aristotle ‘culminates’ in contemplative insight of the God as the principle and cause of political activity, in another sense it culminates in the return of the political thinker and theorist to action in the city. For the *phronimos* legislates so as to protect and promote leisure and self-sufficiency *regardless* of whether he recognizes these as belonging primarily or absolutely to the God(s). As Diamond suggests, it is not just that the human desire for the absolute freedom of ‘the God and the total cosmos’ *can* be unconscious for

¹⁷³ “If then what concerns [happiness] and the virtues, and further friendship and pleasure, has been discussed sufficiently in outline, should one assume that the choice [we made] has its end? Or, as has been said, is the end in the practical [sciences] not to contemplate and cognize each of them, but rather / more (*mallon*) to do them, so that neither is it sufficient to know about virtue, but one must try to have and to use it, unless we become good men somehow else?” (1179a33-b4). Thus he accommodates the ‘pragmatist’ critique of theory (vs. the ‘mathematician’ who does not).

¹⁷⁴ For which reason I cannot agree with her claim (2004, 71 & 187) that Aristotle ‘completely abandons the notion of the journey, focusing exclusively on the spectatorial activity of contemplation’ or “dispenses with the notion of a round-trip journey abroad.” He emphasizes the uselessness of ‘sacred spectating’ or ‘visitation’ (cf. 45) but also, as I have argued, its usefulness in several senses. The *NE* and its sequel structurally ‘return to the city’.

the *phronimos*, but that it *should* be.¹⁷⁵ For *whether or not* prudent legislators recognize the God as the model of the freedom they seek to realize in their city and polity, they seek nonetheless to enact or embody it through legislation to the degree that is possible in that city or polity; and that is as it should be, for the theoretical ‘culmination’ or moment of political philosophy is only mediately (not immediately) the content of practical wisdom, the practical truth that guides the deliberations of the practically wise and ethically virtuous agent. Such agents *need* not be political philosophers in order to act and legislate well, though they *can* be or at least benefit from such wisdom, which anchors their deliberations in such a way as to render them less fickle under the vicissitudes of fortune than their unphilosophic counterparts; again, as in the *Protreptic*, the philosopher is not the *only* agent capable of acting well, only the most reliable.¹⁷⁶

So political philosophy like physics and psychology for Aristotle is both relatively autonomous, to the extent that it need not appeal to or gesture toward theoretical philosophy, and not absolutely autonomous, to the extent that to investigate its ultimate principle (‘the most sovereign of all goods’) is to pass beyond political philosophy proper into first philosophy. For although the city is the best or most complete and self-sufficient community relative to other forms of community, it is nonetheless only relatively complete and self-sufficient in that it can only approximate the absolute completeness and self-sufficiency it constitutively cannot attain.

¹⁷⁵ “But what difference does it make whether we think of these as chiefly desirable attributes for communities or as the divine principle which perfectly possesses them? Would this alter in any way the target for which legislators and rulers should write their laws, educate their citizens and shape their constitutions? The answer, I think, is ‘no’. Either way they will be trying to create the conditions for leisure and educate the citizens so they know how to use this leisure excellently; they will be seeking to protect and promote the self-sufficiency of the community, but with this as the target, certain imperialistic excesses will not tempt them into constant foreign incursions, since it would add nothing to the self-sufficient city’s happiness. In fact, the *phronimos* should not look the divinity and try to apply this standard onto the moral complexity of human life—it is not just that our desire for the free and self-sufficient activity of the god *can* be unconscious, but it *should* be. To understand the divine first principle as the reason these targets are good, and to see the god as the principle of politics and human practical activity, just as it is the first principle of nature, this is a *theoretical* truth attained by practical philosophy, not a practical one to be used by legislators” (Unpublished, 13).

¹⁷⁶ Nichols (1992) approaches the value of ‘political theory’ from the angle of its place in the philosophic life: “Happiness does lie in a theoretical life, but the theoretical life must include political thought and theory” (135).

2.3.3 The God and the Universe as Models of Virtuous Action

Divine and cosmic freedom model the best and second-best ways of life, respectively, and together model the life which the polis manifests most of all forms of community and the best polity most of all forms of government. Just as the activity of the *sophos* is akin to that of the God, the rational self-motion of the *phronimos* is akin to the circular motion of the cosmos in toto. Actively contemplating the knowledge they have acquired, theoretical philosophers (especially metaphysicians) resemble the God, just as the action of the practically wise and ethically virtuous agent, whose rational and appetitive desire relate as convex and concave,¹⁷⁷ is virtuously ‘circular’ in that such action is its own end, in which respect its beginning and end coincide. Though he insists on the relative freedom or autonomy of practical reason and the political life, then, Aristotle nonetheless treats ‘the God and the total cosmos’ as paradigmatic, models, for ethics and political philosophy, much as Homer illustrates the union of center and circumference in the cosmopolitical Shield of Achilles, or Parmenides the ‘symbiotic union’ of center and circumference in his poem.¹⁷⁸ Thus, the basic tension in his ethics or political philosophy—the dilemma of quietism vs. activism—is akin to or ‘mirrors’ the tension in his metaphysics or first philosophy between divine and cosmic activity (pure activity vs. eternal motion) and in his physics or second philosophy between the unmoved mover and first motion.

Circular motion images divine activity in the twofold sense that its unmoved center images the God whereas the rotation of its circumference images the celestial spheres and

¹⁷⁷ More on which in the next chapter.

¹⁷⁸ In the felicitous expression of Kosman (1969, 60; cf. 2013, ch. 7). On leisurely activity as the focus of the Shield cf. Diamond (Unpublished, 15): “What is happening among humans in the human, mortal sphere, in these fleeting moments of leisurely activity pursued for the sake of itself and with no reference to further use, is perfectly embodied in the divine outer limit of the whole cosmos, which contains everything in the world, all of nature and all of human activity, within itself; in this way it is the ultimate principle of self-sufficiency and leisure, determined by nothing outside of itself.” Calling it cosmopolitical may be anachronistic (Cartledge, 2009, ch. 3), but is apt enough.

sublunary cycles.¹⁷⁹ Virtuous human activity images divine activity in the twofold sense that excellent theoretical activity and the best life image that of the God whereas excellent practical activity and the second-best life image that of the universe.¹⁸⁰ And just as Aristotle intends his account of the best human life to overcome the dichotomy of quietude and activity, leisure and busyness, he intends his account of the divine life to reconcile the still center and active circumference. For the ‘still’ point at the center is not static but active, yet not in motion, in that the (circular) motion of its circumference is but the expression, the moving image, of the activity at the center, which is active yet unmoved, energetic yet not kinetic. So he resolves the dichotomy of rest and motion in his account of divine activity in its twofold sense, just as he resolves the dilemma of quietude and activity in his account of the best way(s) of life and polity.

Despite his radical distinction between theoretical and political philosophy, then, and *sophia* and *phronêsis* as intellectual virtues, the dilemma he faces in both sets of treatises is analogous or parallel. In this section (2.3), I have argued that Aristotle compares the relative independence, i.e., complete interdependence of the political life and community to that of the universe, and the absolute independence of the theoretical life and community to that of the God(s), though the former in both cases only ever approximates the latter as well as it can. His solution of the ethical and political dilemma takes the form of his argument that *theôria* is the *praxis* that the happiest prioritize, as I have interpreted it in this chapter. His solution to the physical and metaphysical dilemma emerges at the structural culmination of the corpus, *Meta*. A.10, which argues that the Good is at once transcendent and immanent though ‘more’ (*mallon*) the former. In both cases, his account of degrees of completeness and self-sufficiency is crucial; properly appreciating his solution, I have argued, requires that we interpret that account as I have

¹⁷⁹ The two *kosmoi* Aristotle admits (Johnson, 2019, esp. 103-6).

¹⁸⁰ Cf. ‘using the God for witness’ in *Pol.* 7.1, 1323b24-7, e.g., more on which in the next chapter.

done. His account of the human and the city vis-à-vis the God and the total cosmos provides the basis for an account of his ‘political theology’. Even his answer to the question of which polity is best is ambiguous (*amphoterôs*), for he denies that it is always best for human polities to be of the same form as the divine polity, though he contrasts absolute and relative evaluation (*mallon*). The well-ordered political community on the Aristotelian account resembles the cosmic totality, just as the well-ordered human soul (who ranks *sophia* and *phronêsis* appropriately) resembles the God.

Conclusion

The central dilemma of the *Protreptic* (as I interpreted it in Part 1) is analogous to the ethical dilemma of whether happiness consists in quietude or activity and the political dilemma of inactive vs. overactive policy, which I have just argued is analogous to the question he answers in *Phys.* 8 and *Meta.* Λ.10. Section 2.1 shows how his solution to the problem in *NE* 10 and *Pol.* 7-8 is consistent: since he contrasts not only complete and incomplete *praxis* but degrees even of complete *praxis*, political activity can be both complete and yet ‘less’ complete than theoretic activity, such that the best and second-best ways of life are to be interpreted in terms of absolute and relative completeness. Section 2.2 shows how his distinction between ‘primarily’ and ‘secondarily’ happy, as interpreted in 2.1, overcomes or reconciles recent scholarship on the question of ‘exclusivism or inclusivism?’ in the treatises: as the *only* activity that is *absolutely* complete, *that is*, the *most* complete activity, *theôria* is the activity which the happiest prioritize. Thus the exclusive and inclusive readings are compatible, though the incompatibilist readings are right to insist on their copresence. Section 2.3 shows how the dilemma which we have seen work its way through the *Protr.* and *NE* recurs in the *Pol.* and *Meta.*: as the most complete and self-sufficient community, the city most of all aims at the most sovereign of all goods, and the best form of government (whichever it is) embodies it most of all; further, the activities of the *sophos* and *phronimos* image that of the God and the total cosmos, respectively, and though they are not necessarily the same person, Aristotle does not deny that they can be. Thus, I concluded by noting the theological dimension of his city-soul analogy. But what of the soul? In these sections I have focused on the relationship of his ethics and politics to his physics and metaphysics, taking his psychology or ‘biology’ mostly for granted. But his account of life figures crucially in his account of the good life. In the next and final chapter,

therefore, I turn to what I argue is the analogue and even basis in his psychology of the contrast between *sophia* and *phronêsis* in his ethical and political works. Ultimately, I argue that his accounts of life, the good life, and the divine life are analogous and, moreover, serially related.

Part 3

VI. Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Account of Life, Human Life, and Divine Life

Introduction

The division of theoretical and practical wisdom in *NE* stems from that of thinking soul (*hê noêtikê*) into theoretical and practical intellect (*nous*) in *DA*, for the former are the virtues of the latter, characteristic of those who think and deliberate *well*. For Aristotle as for Plato, excellence (*aretê*) is the capacity of *any* being to perform its function or do its work (*ergon*) well, though human *aretê* is a special case not least because what the human *ergon* is, and whether there even is one, is questionable and indeed hotly contested. To the extent that the eye, e.g., sees well, it is 'virtuous' in that it does its work excellently, i.e., excels other instances of its kind at doing the work that defines its essence, *to ti ên einai*. When it comes to the human function, of the noetic or rational soul, Aristotle distinguishes theoretical and practical functions of the intellect or reason. The function of 'practical' reason is to deliberate, choose and act (*prattein*), and those of us who do so well are characterized by prudence or practical wisdom (*phronêsis*). The function of 'theoretic' reason is to contemplate (*theôrein*) the content of the knowledge (*epistêmê*) one has acquired through learning (*mathêsis*), and those of us who are good or excellent at 'theorizing' are characterized by theoretical wisdom or wisdom proper (*sophia*). Thus, the distinction in his 'ethical discourses' and 'political philosophy' emerges from the distinction in his psychology, his account of soul as the principle of life. If the functions are distinct, so too are the virtues. But if the latter contrast depends on the former, whence the psychological division? What is the basis of the distinction that lies behind the contest between the philosophic and political lives in his ethical and political investigations and which, as I

argued in chapter 1, structured the *Protr.* at least as a presupposition (theoretical vs. practical reason, which the *Eud.* may have thematized)?

Having taken that presupposition for granted in the foregoing, the task of this third and final chapter is—in the interest of fuller disclosure—to investigate it, to show how the division in *DA* ‘develops’ into the division in *NE* and its sequel, and thus to expose the ‘developmental’ logic that, I argue, runs through his account of the soul, the city, and the God, who models the reconciliation of the divisions that emerge in the treatises on life and the good life, and thus acts as the norm and metric of the well-ordered soul and city. To see how the division and reconciliation of the philosophic and political lives in the best polity ‘develops’ the logic of division and (re)unification of the soul in *DA*, and thus to grasp the logical context of his resolution of the dilemma in *NE* and *Pol.*, it is necessary to suppose that *DA* articulates the logic of reconciliation in its account of the transition or transformation (*metabasis*) of soul through its own serial logic into its most developed form, thinking soul. Therefore, to convince my reader of that supposition, I begin with my summary account of *DA*.

Section 1 of this chapter investigates the emergence of theoretical and practical intellect in *De Anima* and argues that the division traces back to (what I argue is) the primary division of the treatise between ‘critical’ and ‘kinetic’ or ‘cognitive’ and ‘locomotive’ soul, soul as the cause of cognition and motion (ultimately self-cognition and self-motion). The twofold division comprehends the threefold structure (nutritive, sensitive, intellective) such that the latter ‘develops’ or ‘progresses’ in terms of the reconciliation of the former: (1) nutritive activity is precisely (pre- yet) proto-cognitive and proto-locomotive, such that these functions are as yet undifferentiated, (2) the differentiation of these functions emerges precisely at the level of animal life (in the contrast of perception [*aisthêsis*] and appetite [*epithumia*]), develops at the level of

human life (into the contrast of thought and perception on the one side and of rational and appetitive desire on the other), and (3) is reconciled at the level of the *well*-ordered soul and city. Ultimately, I argue, the fully articulated division is reconciled in the very activity of the theoretical intellect, which integrates the human desire to know, and in the virtuous form of human action, which integrates reason and appetite or rational and appetitive desire beyond restraint (vs. akratic and enkratic action). Thus, I contend, the primary division of *DA* is not only ‘analogous’ to but ‘develops’ or ‘transitions’ into the dilemma in terms of which Aristotle frames the protreptic and anti-apotreptic passages (of the *NE* and *Pol.*) discussed in the previous chapter.

Section 2 (re)turns to (what I can then justify calling) the political counterpart of the virtuous soul, the well-governed political community. Aristotle ‘models’ the life of citizens of the best polity on that of the God(s). The directive to become Godlike operates ‘biologically’ in the desire to immortalize insofar as one can via reproduction; at the ethical and political level, it ‘transforms’ into the prescription to mimic ‘the God and the total cosmos’ in and through virtuous action, which is what *eudaimonia* ‘consists’ in (activities that are ends in themselves and especially that which is absolutely or unconditionally its own end, if there is one such activity). We are to become or to do explicitly what we already were or were doing implicitly. Once we have become able to govern ourselves, it is up to us to live as (in the way that) the God does, and I contend that the crux of such ‘imitation’ is the ‘prioritization’ of *theôria* both in the (traditional) sense of religiopolitical ‘spectacle’ and in the sense of philosophic ‘contemplation’. Reconciling theoretical and practical life, the best polity mirrors the integrity of the virtuous soul.

In section 3, finally, I review the whole argument of my dissertation, threading the arguments together. Ultimately, I conclude that the question of the ‘systematicity’ of the Aristotelian corpus reduces to the question of its ‘seriality’ (whether his investigations are

‘serially’ or ‘sequentially’ related in the sense he articulates), arguing that the serial account he articulates in response to analogous problems in distinct though connected domains of investigation suggests that his account of the interrelation of these investigations is itself serial. The logic of serial unity is systematic in the very sense Aristotle uses the term ‘system’ (hylomorphic whole), and ‘systems’ on his account develop serially and thus form series. The ‘rhapsodic’ background of his account of serial unity (and thus, I argue, of systematicity), in turn, suggests the ‘rhapsodic’ unity of his corpus, returning us to the point from which we began.

3.1 From Critical and Kinetic Soul to Theoretical and Practical Wisdom

At the beginning of his inquiry about the soul (403b25-8) and throughout *De Anima*, Aristotle speaks of *psuchê* in terms of cognition (sensation and thought, appetitive and rational desire) and motion (the apparent capacity of animals to move themselves), though he criticizes his predecessors for failing to include the nutritive soul (unconscious and stationary life) in their accounts.¹⁸¹ Prior to his account of the threefold structure of life (nutritive, sensitive, intellective) in 2.4-3.6, Aristotle contrasts ‘cognitive’ and ‘locomotive’ functions of the soul, its role as the cause of cognition and self-motion. My contention in what follows is that the prior twofold

¹⁸¹ Near the end of book 1 Aristotle writes, “So it’s manifest from what’s been said that [1.] it’s not on account of being [composed] from the elements that cognizing (*to ginôskein*) belongs to the soul, and that [2.] neither beautifully nor truly is it said to move itself (*to kineisthai autên*). But since cognizing does belong to the soul, both sensing and believing, and further appetitively and rationally desiring and generally desires (*eti de to epithumein kai boulesthai kai holôs hai orexeis*), and locomotion in animals also is generated by the soul, and further growth and peak/maturity and decay, does each of these belong to the soul as a whole, and is it with all the soul that we think and sense each of the others, do and suffer, or do distinct [functions] belong to distinct parts? And is the ‘living’ in some one of these, or also in many or all, or is there also something else responsible? Some say it is partitioned / divided (*meristên*), thinking (*noein*) with one [part] and appetitively desiring (*epithumein*) with another. But in that case, whatever is it that holds the soul together (*sunechei tèn psuchên*), if naturally partitioned?” (411a25-b8 et ff.). The result of previous psychology, his critical adoption of the division at the end of book 1 is compatible with his critique of its failure to account for plants and stationary animals. Diamond (2015) argues, to my mind successfully, that the twofold division structures the subsequent account of nutritive, sensitive, intellective soul in 2.4-3.6 and locomotive soul in 3.9-11, the “conceptual halves” of the treatise. The serial account of soul Aristotle proposes at the end of 2.3 (to resolve the impasse of ‘common’ and ‘particular’ accounts) includes its locomotive and orectic power. The continuity (*sunecheia*) of the soul through the ‘succession’ is crucial to serial logic; Nagy (2002) translates *ephexês logos* in the context of rhapsodic performance as ‘continuous discourse’, more on which in the final section.

division determines and structures the development of the subsequent threefold division, such that his account of perception (*aisthêsis*) and thought (*noêsis*) in 2.5-3.6 precedes his account of appetite (*epithumia*) and wish (*boulêsis*) in 3.9-11; the former chapters concern the ‘critical’ side of psychic activity while the latter concern the locomotive (‘kinetic’) and desiderative (‘orectic’) side.¹⁸² Even nutritive activity in 2.4, distinctive of unconscious and stationary (plant) life, prefigures (1) the identification of subject and object in *aisthêsis* and *noêsis* and (2) the agent-patient structure of self-motion ([unmoved and moved] mover:instrument:moved::feeder:instrument:fed). That is, Aristotle understands nutritive soul precisely in terms of its being proto-cognitive and proto-locomotive. So the ‘prior’ division is precisely undifferentiated at the first level of the ‘subsequent’ division: nutritive activity is proto-cognitive and proto-locomotive. As I shall now argue, the ‘development’ of the second and third stages of the sequence consists precisely in the emergence, alienation, and reconciliation of the prior division. Further, though Aristotle tends to reserve ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ for intellectual or rational cognition (the division of ‘noetic soul’ into theoretical and practical intellect or reason), the ‘primary’ division of the treatise is itself formulable in terms of theoretical and practical cognition or awareness.¹⁸³

¹⁸² E.g. (3.4, 429b13-23): “... [*nous*] discerns (*krinei*) being-flesh and flesh either by another [capacity] or by [the same capacity] holding / related otherwise... So by the perceptive capacity it discerns the hot and the cold, and the things of which flesh is some ratio; but [it is] by another [capacity], either separate or as the bent line holds relative to itself when stretched out, [that] it discerns the being-flesh... Therefore [it is] by another [capacity] or by [the same] holding / related otherwise [that] it discerns [essence]. And generally, then, as the things are separate of their material, so too are the [capacities] concerning the intellect.” Cf. 424aff., 3.2-4, 7, 9 & 12. For *boulêsis* and *epithumia* as sorts of *orexis* cf. 411a27-b2, 414b3-7, & 3.9-11, esp. 433a21-6. *De Motu Animalium* 6, 700b18-25, summarizes the whole division: the causes of animal motion are *dianoia*, *phantasia*, *proairesis*, *boulêsis* and *epithumia*, which reduce to (*anagetai eis*) *nous* and *orexis*, “for *phantasia* and *aisthêsis* have the same territory as *nous*; for all are *kritika*, but differ according to the differences discussed elsewhere. And *boulêsis*, *thumos*, and *epithumia* are all [forms of] *orexis*, while *proairesis* is the community of *dianoia* and *orexis*; such that the primary cause of motion is the object of *orexis* and of *dianoia*, but not every object of *dianoia*, but the practicable end...”

¹⁸³ On which see esp. Diamond (2015), who argues that the initial twofold division determines the subsequent division in terms of theoretical and practical or ‘disinterested’ and ‘interested’ modes of cognition or awareness, rooted in the ‘proto-cognitive’ and ‘proto-locomotive’ activity of nutrition. Though 3.9-11 and already 3.7 speak of *praxis* in terms of the cooperation of practical intellect and desire, 3.3 contrasts the way human and non-human

The beginning of the *Meta.* and its sister-passage of the *Protr.*, e.g., contrast theoretical and practical modes not only of knowing but also of seeing; there are theoretical and practical modes not only of *nous* but also of *aisthêsis*. In fact, the word for cognition in the first sentence of *DA* (*eidêsis*), cognate with the *eidēnai* of *Meta.* A.1, covers thought and perception as well as theoretical and practical modes of awareness.¹⁸⁴ Insofar as their function is simply to know (*eidēnai*), to cognize the perceptible and intelligible object on its own terms or ‘disinterestedly’, thought and perception are ‘theoretical’ modes of cognition, ways of ‘spectating’ the object, knowing it simply or per se; but insofar as the end is not just to contemplate or know things but to act or do them (*NE* 10.9: it is insufficient simply to know about virtue [*peri aretês to eidēnai*] but one must try to possess and use / exercise it [*echēin kai chrêsthai*], accommodating the Isocratic critique), the cognition at issue is ‘practical’ in that it is of the object as good or bad, pleasant or painful, for oneself, the ‘interested’ subject or agent. Desire (*orexis*), whether *boulêsis* or mere *epithumia*, is the (rational or sensual-appetitive) awareness of some object as good or pleasant for oneself. Even mere appetite (*epithumia*) involves perception of the object as good or bad, pleasant or painful, for oneself (431a8-11).¹⁸⁵ In humans, reason or rational desire *ought* to govern appetitive desire, i.e., the action of *virtuous* agents proceeds from *right* desire.

animals act (*prattein*), employing *praxis* for animal motion generally. As Diamond (ch. 5, *passim*; cf. 301, n. 6) shows, framing the question in terms of how the soul moves the body allows Aristotle to include the whole range of desiderative cognitions and resultant behavior in his analysis while paving the way for his analysis of the relation between rational and appetitive desire (*boulêsis* and *epithumia*) in terms of continent, incontinent, and virtuous action (3.11). On the ‘biological’ usage of *praxis* vis-à-vis its ‘strictly anthropological’ usage see Lobkowitz (1967, 10-11).

¹⁸⁴ As a translation, ‘awareness’ serves to mitigate confusion regarding the use of ‘cognitive’ for one side of the opposition of theoretical and practical cognition (the discerning or ‘critical’ side vs. the desiring or ‘orectic’ side), though such usage is justified on the assumption that theoretical cognition is somehow cognition pure and simple; cf. *haplôs* vs. *tini*, absolute vs. relative, at 431b12: practical cognition (in terms of good and bad) is agent-relative.

¹⁸⁵ “And so perceiving is like simple saying and thinking (*phanai monon kai noein*); but whenever [the object is] pleasant or painful, it pursues or flees, like affirming or denying (*kataphasa ê apophasa*).” On the ‘implicitly predicative structure’ of perceiving something qua pleasant or painful (that it is such) cf. Diamond (2015, 227); see also Sorabji (1993, 19): though this passage might seem to dissociate perception and predication, “There is no suggestion here that sense perception has to *confine* itself to simple saying. On the contrary, it is stated that finding the thing pleasant or unpleasant is itself an exercise of the perceptual faculty (*energein tēi aisthêtikēi mesotētēi*).”

In the virtuous sort of human action (the emergence of which at the end of *DA* 3.11 we shall consider in due course), the reason or wish of the agent governs the appetite thoroughly, i.e., from beginning to end, such that the (right) desire of the temperate person, e.g., is consistent with (right) reason.¹⁸⁶ As *epithumia* is or involves practical or desiderative sensation (*aisthêsis*), *boulêsis* is or involves practical or desiderative intellect (*nous*), which is why the *Protr.* and *Meta. A* both dwell on the intrinsic *and* instrumental value of knowing *and* seeing, though the former emphasizes their utility while the latter deemphasizes it. The *Protr.* fragment calls the function of sight “discerning and clarifying (*to krinein kai dêloun*) each of the visibles” whereas *Meta. A* speaks of it being the sense which “most of all makes us cognize (*gnôrizein*) and reveals (*dêloi*) many differences.”¹⁸⁷ The former contrasts the intrinsic value of simply knowing and seeing with their instrumental value *pros tas praxeis*; the latter contrasts their intrinsic value with their utility *pros to prattein*—the empirics, he concedes, are more successful at acting than those who are cognizant or have *gnôsis* only of the (abstract) universal. In the *Protr.* ‘Isocrates’ introduces the distinction between ‘gnostic’ and ‘empirical’ science(s), theoretical and practical understanding, in response to their conflation, as he sees it, in the speech of ‘Heraclides’;

¹⁸⁶ The practice of right reason entails that of ethical virtue(s), however, so that is to say consistent with justice, etc. E.g., once it is determined that reparations are owed, the virtuous desire to fulfill that obligation, need not restrain their wrong desire to shirk that duty (enkratic), nor fail to restrain it (akratic), for it is already consonant with justice. On ‘ethical pleasure’ cf. Whiting (2023a, 140-1): “sight is altered by its association with intellect, so that sight itself—along with its possible objects and the pleasures of its exercise—is rendered more complex. Instead of seeing things as non-rational animals see them—simply, for example, as predators or prey and so as potential sources of pain or pleasure—rational animals, because of the ways in which their sight is informed by intellect, can see things as triangles, eclipses, and other objects of knowledge. Sight is thus associated in rational animals with distinctive sorts of contemplative pleasures and with correspondingly distinctive sorts of contemplative desires. ... [T]he emergence of *practical* intellect alters and informs sight in similar ways, yielding forms of perception complex enough to register what (for example) is noble or what justice requires here and now, forms of perception that go hand in hand with ethical forms of desire and the pleasures associated with their satisfaction [citing *NE* 1113a23-b2 and 1099a7-21]. This helps to explain why he seeks to elucidate φρόνησις in perceptual terms, and why he explicitly says that human beings have *perception* of what is *good and bad* and of what is *just and unjust*.” Desire is right when it is consistent with and, moreover, proceeds from right reason. For ‘true *logos* and right *orexis*’ cf. *NE* 6.2, 1139a21-7. For ‘reason or wish’ (and ‘reason or rational desire’ in the previous sentence) cf. fn. 208.

¹⁸⁷ “But since they define the soul by two things especially, by motion in respect of place and by thinking and discerning and perceiving, and thinking, both theoretical and practical (*kai to noein kai to phronein*), seems as if it is some sort of perceiving; for in both the soul discerns and cognizes (*gnôrizei*) some of the beings...” (427a18-22).

‘Aristotle’ preserves the contrast but reevaluates it. These sorts of knowledge are dispositional capacities of the rational soul.¹⁸⁸ ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Isocrates’ are partisan advocates, so to speak, of the one side and its respective virtue to the exclusion of the other; ‘Aristotle’ prioritizes one but not to the exclusion of the other. *DA*, I argue in the rest of this section, elaborates the basis of the division of rational soul in the basic division of critical and kinetic modes of psychic activity, culminating on the one side in its treatment of active contemplation and on the other in its treatment of the rational self-motion of virtuous agents. Mind or intellect is the nature of the soul in the sense of the end, apex, or final term of its development through its own serial logic, just as the city in *Pol.* emerges as the nature of the community (i.e., as its true nature, beyond its initial appearance in the form of the household) through the serial logic of community: the nature of the community is ‘the complete community’. And just the kinds of community are ultimately stages or levels of the most complete kind of community, the kinds of life are ultimately degrees of life, in its focal meaning: *nous*, theoretical and practical, is the nature of the soul, critical and kinetic.

The thesis of this section, then, is that Aristotle frames the basic division of his psychology in *terms* of the division and reconciliation of theoretical and practical intellect: the critical-kinetic division ‘transforms’ into the theoretical-practical division. To see how the initial division ‘develops’ into that of the noetic soul, it is instructive to consider the sense in which perceiving (*aisthêsis*) and thinking (*noêsis*) are ‘critical’ modes of cognition, and the sense in which appetite (*epithumia*) and wish (*boulêsis*), the sensual and rational modes of desire (*orexis*), are ‘kinetic’. On the ‘critical’ function of perception, Aristotle writes (*DA* 2.11, 424a1-16) that

perceiving is a way of being acted upon, so that the agent makes what is in capacity such as itself be of that sort in activity. Hence, we do not perceive the similarly hot and cold or

¹⁸⁸ Though cf. Bodéüs (1993, 21): practical science “is an habitual disposition to *act* scientifically, not to *study* action scientifically.” *NE* 6 distinguishes the scientific and calculative or deliberative (epistemic and logistical) parts but clarifies that the former is ‘scientific’ properly speaking (vs. ‘the likenesses’ at 1139b20). One of these likenesses, I take it, is the ‘epistemic moment’ of practical reason, more on which below.

hard and soft, but the excesses, as the sense is like some mean of the contraries in the perceptibles. And on account of this it discerns the perceptibles. For the mean has the discerning power (*to gar meson kritikon*), since it becomes other relative to each of the same extremes (*pros hekateron autôn thateron tôn akrôn*); and just as that which is going to perceive white and black must be neither in activity, but in capacity both (and so too in the other cases), also in the case of touch [it must be] neither hot nor cold. And further, just as sight was somehow of visible and invisible, and similarly the rest are also of opposites / objects (*tôn antikeimenôn*), so too touch is of the tangible and intangible; intangible is both what has the differentia of the tangibles to a very small degree, as air does, and those that have it to an excessive degree, as the things destructive [of them] do.

For there to be perception, the capacity for perception must be relatively indeterminate yet determinable. Each of the senses must be potentially both yet actively neither of the contraries that are or limit the spectrum of its proper objects. As the mean between contrary perceptible attributes, each sense is critical, i.e., capable of discerning the one from the other. Further, each sense is capable of discerning contradictories of the same kind—it is by touch that the animal discerns the tangible and intangible, etc. Moreover, the common sense, i.e., the active moment of awareness common to the senses at the center of the organism as distinct from the passive moment of reception of the proper sensibles through the sense-organs at its periphery, is capable of discerning and integrating opposite attributes of different kinds, such that one perceives the yellow sour (etc.) object as a lemon, e.g., the ‘incidental’ object of perception.¹⁸⁹ In these ways, the central function of perceptive soul is *krisis*: discernment or ‘judgement’ in the sense of *Urteil* (i.e., originary partition, diremption, split, discrimination or—as I tend to opt for—discernment).

¹⁸⁹ “What it is by which the soul adjudges (*epikrinei*) the difference between sweet and hot, was discussed before, but one must say also the following. It is something one, but thus, i.e., as boundary / limit (*horos*). And these [capacities], being one by analogy and in number, relate to each other as those [perceptibles] relate to one another. For what difference does it make, whether the impasse is how it discerns (*krinei*) the non-homogenous [attributes] or the contraries [of the same genus] like white and black?” (431a21-6). On the desiderative function of the integral common sense, Diamond (2015, 228) writes, “Just as this power unites contraries within a genus of qualities (white and black in the genus of colors), as well as qualities belonging to distinct senses (white and sweet), so does it unite the proper sensible qualities of an object with its perception of the goodness or badness for the perceiving subject, the awareness of which constitutes desire.” Cf. p. 161 on the serial structure of the three kinds of sensibles, and p. 146 on how the ability to ‘see’ darkness, e.g., responds to the question with which Aristotle concludes *DA* 2.

Intellectual *krisis* inverts the predicative order of perceptual *krisis*, restoring the proper relation of substance to attribute or subject to predicate that was lost or inverted in the transition from nutrition to perception, correcting the upside-down relation of the ‘incidental’ object of perception to the properly perceptible quality.¹⁹⁰ One perceives that this perceptible quality is Socrates, e.g.; the proper object of perception plays the role of subject. In thinking, the substance is the subject. That is, the incidental object of perception is the proper object of intellection; the object that in perception is predicate of the sensible quality becomes the subject of intellection. The substance (*ousia*) contains its constitutive divisions or moments just as the intellect does.¹⁹¹ On the ‘rectification’ of perception in thought, Aristotle writes (*DA* 3.4, 429b11-23),

since the magnitude is distinct from the being-magnitude and water from being-water (and so too in many other cases, but not in all, for in some cases it is the same), [*nous*] discerns (*krinei*) being-flesh and flesh either by distinct capacities or by [the same] one holding / related / disposed otherwise... So by the perceptive capacity it discerns the hot and the cold, and the things of which flesh is some ratio; but it discerns the being-flesh by another capacity, either separate or as the bent line holds relative / relates to itself when straightened... Therefore it discerns [essence] by another capacity or by the same one

¹⁹⁰ In nutrition, the subject identifies with the object on its own terms (unilateral assimilation of other to self); in perception, the subject has developed the capacity to let the object appear on *its* own terms, but only in terms of the dimensions the bodily organs of perception permit (assimilates itself to the sensible quality or form of the object without assimilating it and its matter to itself, though such ‘reverse’ assimilation still presupposes subjective conditions just as the previous presupposes objective conditions). The self-cognition at work in the nutritive and sensitive relation culminates in (the pure self-relation of) thinking. The reconciliation of self and other in noetic unity is beyond assimilation, though in humans presupposes the working of the nutritive and sensitive capacities. The development is from the subject-oriented term through the object-oriented term to the absolute-oriented term. As Diamond (2015, 119) writes, “the soul should be determined by the form of the object as it is in itself, while simultaneously retaining its own nature.” That is, thinking is the *norm* (“should”) of the previous activities, just as the divine life is the norm of derivative life forms, more on which below. On reconciliation vs. assimilation cf. also Russon (1996): “All the grades of knowing except νοῦς ποιητικός are overcomings of a pre-existent distance, that is, the division into the two terms which provide the extremes of the relation (self and other) are already fixed; the acts of such knowings overcome this distance by destroying the integrity of one contrary through making one extreme identical with the other, (nutrition transforming the object, and sensation the subject). Νοῦς, however, is the true unity from which duality is generated. ... [I]n the order of being, it is the original unity which splits itself, whereas the others unifications are imitations which attempt to regain unity over a pre-established distance” (798-9); “It is not the kind of appropriation one engages in in eating in which the other is forced to conform to a pre-existent self, nor is it a simply sensible appropriating in which one conforms oneself to a pre-existent other; rather, if the integrity of both subject and object is to be respected, it must be a noetic appropriation” (801).

¹⁹¹ Cf. Diamond (2015, 205-15): “Just as the proper object of sensation is the fundamental undivided building block for all the subsequently more complex and synthetic perceptive predications, the essence is the proper object of thinking, serving as the building block for the synthetic operations of mind in causal explanation... and definition. ... The object of thought contains within itself in potency its various divisions and distinctions... and consequently thought contains within itself the various powers of soul by which these distinctions and divisions are grasped.”

holding otherwise. And generally, then, in the way that the things are separate of their material, so too are the [corresponding] capacities of the intellect.

Again several modes of discernment are at issue. First is the perceptual discernment of this flesh, say, from any other perceptible. Second is the intellectual discernment of essence, what flesh is, say, from any other intelligible. Third is discernment of the intelligible essence from the perceptible instance and vice versa, telling the one from the other—the work either of two different capacities or of one and the same capacity in distinguishable relations or modes. In any case, the function of *nous* is ‘critical’ in that it, like *aisthêsis*, is or involves discernment (*krisis*).

These ‘spectative’ or ‘observant’ modes of cognition are ‘critical’ in that their function is to discern their object, and these ‘critical’ modes are ‘theoretical’ in that the concern of ‘critical’ cognition (perceptual and intellectual) is to know the object on its own terms or ‘simply’ (vs. in terms of or ‘relative’ to the good or interest of some agent), and thus to know itself, still only as ‘byproduct’ (*en parergô*) of the activity in perception (*aisthêsis*) but directly or explicitly, at last, in the activity of intellect (*nous*), to which self-cognition is no longer incidental or *para* the act.¹⁹² So even *aisthêsis* is spectative (vs. motive), though he tends to reserve *theôrein* for *noein* proper.

Aristotle returns to the initial twofold division of the soul at the outset of the chapters on its kinetic power or function (*DA* 3.9-11, though the question of desire emerges already in 3.7):

But since the soul is marked (*hôristai*) by two capacities of living things—by the critical, which is the work of thought and of perception (*dianoias ergon esti kai aisthêseôs*), and further by that which causes motion in respect of place (*eti tô kinein tēn kata topon kinesis*)—let so much be determined about perception and intellect (*aisthêseôs kai nou*). But about the one causing motion, one must examine whatever of the soul it is [that does

¹⁹² Cf. Russon (1996, 787-9) on the extent to which nutrition and sensation are forms of self-relation, how “the *noetic* relation is the most perfect fulfillment of that relation of which nutrition and sensation are inferior species.” Russon appeals to *en parergô* at *Meta.* Λ.9, 1074b35-6 for the notion of incidental self-cognizance; cf. my discussion of the ambiguity of locutions such as ‘no *ergon* besides (*para*) the activity’ in the previous chapter. The double sense of ‘theoretic’ I appeal to in the second half of this sentence derives from that of *theôria*, which is both (1) ‘disinterested’ spectating and (2) ‘participatory’ self-cognizance (hence the ‘speculum’ or mirror). Brogan (2002, esp. 146ff.) accounts for the unity of these paradoxical aspects in light of the account of friendship (*philia*) in *NE*.

so], whether some one portion (*morion*) of it that is separate either in magnitude or [only] in account, or all (*pasa*) the soul; and if some portion, whether some peculiar (*idion*) one besides the ones customarily spoken of and discussed, or some one of these.¹⁹³

The previous chapters on perception and intellect treat the ‘critical’ side of psychic activity in the sense just described. The following chapters treat the ‘kinetic’ or locomotive side, which turns out to be the orectic or desiderative side, though not without imagination (*phantasia*, whether *logistikê* or *aisthêtikê*; in human thinking, images ‘bridge’ perceptible and intelligible objects). Yet *orexis* or desire, rational or appetitive, is itself ‘practical’ cognition (of the object qua good or pleasurable for oneself, the ‘interested’ agent). But just as there are perceptual and intellectual modes of discernment or ‘theoretic’ cognition, there are rational and appetitive modes of desire:

What causes motion, then, is something one, the *orektikon*. For if the two, intellect (*nous*) and desire (*orexis*), were causing the motion, they would be doing so in virtue of some common form. But as it is, the intellect doesn’t appear to cause motion without desire (for *boulêsis* is desire, and whenever one is moved according to *logismos*, one is also moved according to *boulêsis*), while desire causes motion [even] besides [or contrary to] reasoning (for *epithumia* is some [sort of] desire). So all intellect is right, but desire and imagination [are / can be] both right and not right. Hence, what causes motion is always the desired [object], but this is either the good or the apparent good, and not all, but the practicable good. But the practicable is that which admits of being otherwise. And so it is manifest that this sort of capacity of the soul causes motion, the one that’s called desire.¹⁹⁴

Thus, he reasons, the locomotive (kinetic) power of the soul is the desiderative (orectic) power.

Having reached this conclusion, however, he immediately proceeds to contrast his own conception of desire—operative in this argument—with that of “those who divide the parts of the soul, whenever they divide [it] and separate [the parts] according to the capacities” (433b1-2).¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ 432a15-23.

¹⁹⁴ 433a21-31, accepting the emendation of *orekton* to *orektikon* (Whiting, 2023a, 133, fn. 55). My reading of the ‘reduction to some common form’ seems closer to that of Whiting (*ibid.*, 136) than that of Diamond (2015, 228, despite the citation) in that I take it to be *ad absurdum* (vs. “he explicitly reduces cognition and desire to their common form”). But since the point in any case is to ‘stress the cognitive-desiderative unity’, I take it that the reduction thus construed is compatible with the claim that both are irreducible to some *extra* or *additional* form.

¹⁹⁵ For this gloss on this remarkable expression see Whiting (2023a, 134 & 137): “we should not posit *separate* parts of soul, at least not separate parts for each of the capacities mentioned here and perhaps even no separate parts at all. This solution... is directed against those who propose to divide the soul according to its *capacities* and to posit

On his account, desire is not the irrational opposite of reason,¹⁹⁶ as it is in the divisions of those who bifurcate the soul into rational and non-rational powers (even when the latter is divided into spirited and appetitive or reason-responsive and reason-unresponsive powers). At the level of noetic soul, rational desire (without which *nous* “doesn’t appear to cause motion”) can contradict appetite to the extent that (practical) reason orders that one resist some appetite and vice versa, as in self-restraint (*enkrateia*) and unrestraint (*akrasia*), the two non-virtuous sorts of motion or action mentioned at 434a11-5.¹⁹⁷ But such conflict is between higher and lower forms of desire (not non-desiderative reason and non-rational desire), though these are the orectic or practical ‘counterparts’ (if not modes) of intellect and perception. The intellect alone, in its critical, ‘spectative’ or ‘theoretic’ mode, is unable or insufficient to cause locomotion, for *boulêsis*, the epistemic moment of practical reason (i.e., practical knowledge [*epistêmê*] as stage one of the practical syllogism, wherein practical mind ‘thinks [*noein*] the universal’), is rational *desire*, whereas *epithumia*, the lower sort of desire, can cause locomotion without, or contrary to, reason (the good as it appears through rational or deliberative *phantasia*). So although the mover of the animal is one in form (*eidei*), ‘the desiderative capacity qua desiderative,’¹⁹⁸ and first of all the

separate parts (presumably for each capacity). This suggests that Aristotle wants at the very least to allow that one and the same part of soul can have multiple capacities. And it leaves open the more extreme possibility that he would reject *any* division whatsoever of the soul into parts. ... [His] frequent references [*in propria persona*] to various ‘parts’ of soul render it implausible to suppose that he objects to *any* division whatsoever of the soul into parts: it is more plausible to suppose that his objection is... to dividing the soul into *separate* parts.”

¹⁹⁶ “But since desires (*orexeis*) [may] become contrary to each other, and this results whenever the reason (*logos*) and the appetite (*epithumia*) are contrary, and happens in those having perception of time (for the intellect calls one to resist [*anthelein*] on account of the future, but the appetite [calls one to resist] on account of the immediate [*êdê*]; for the immediately pleasant appears [*phainetai*] both simply pleasant and simply good, on account of not seeing / looking to the future)...” (433b6-11). Cf. fn. 208.

¹⁹⁷ “Hence *orexis* doesn’t entail the deliberative capacity. And sometimes this conquers and moves that, but sometimes that this, just as a sphere [does a sphere], [so does] the desire [conquer and move] the desire, whenever *akrasia* has come to be. But by nature the higher is always more ruling and moves [the lower]. So already there are three ways of being moved in place (*treis phoras êdê kineisthai*). But the epistemic capacity is not moved, but remains.” Having divided rational and appetitive *orexis* in 3.11, he proceeds to account for their relation in terms of enkritic, akratic, and virtuous action. That account is the conclusion of the chapters on locomotive soul (3.9-11); they conclude with his account of *praxis*. The best kind of mortal self-motion (virtuous) most clearly approximates spherical motion, I argue below, in that it manifests circularity to the greatest degree (possible for mortal beings).

¹⁹⁸ On the qualification *to orektikon hê orektikon* cf. Whiting (2023a, 138) and Diamond (2015, 233).

object of desire (for this causes motion without being moved by being thought or imagined), the movers are many in number'; the *orekton* or *prakton agathon* motivates the desire that, in turn, causes the animal to move itself toward (or away from) the object of desire, the doable good. The best sort of mortal self-motion (virtuous, where the higher desire 'rules and motivates' the lower) harmonizes the desire(s) of the agent such that the lower not only is consistent with but flows or proceeds from the higher: reason or rational desire measures appetitive desire such that the latter is consistent with and proceeds from right reason (is not only *kata* but *meta* right reason, as he puts it at the end of *NE* 6). In thinking animals, that is, reason or rational desire *should* 'govern and motivate' appetitive desire, "contain" it beyond resistance or restraint. The desirability of the object of appetite *should* flow from that of the object of the rational desire or wish; the appetite *should* figure in the second premise of the practical syllogism, as he formulates it at the end of 3.11 (prescriptively), beginning with the premise that such (virtuous, e.g., just) persons ought to perform such actions, which cannot generate motion without the further premise that this present action is such, and that I am such a person.¹⁹⁹ In the case of virtuous agents, the conclusion of the practical syllogism proceeds necessarily from the universal principle of practical knowledge through the particular motive of the agent, whose action proceeds from right desire (not against desire, as in the merely self-restrained or enkratic). The reason of such agents contains the whole motivational process from beginning to end, emancipated of the need to resist non-rational desire, the success or failure of which determines the character of the continent and incontinent.

¹⁹⁹ *NE* 6.5, 1140b11-21, calls *phronêsis* a sort of supposition (*tên toiautên hupolêpsin*), the grasp of practical truth about human goods, what is good for humans not just at some particular moment but in general or the long run. On the bilateral sense of 'practical truth' see Kosman (2014): "good and successful thinking is a form of virtuous praxis and... virtuous praxis is in turn thought in action" (297).

Aristotle stresses that such action is figuratively circular.²⁰⁰ I just quoted the ‘analogy of the sphere’ adumbrated at the end of *DA* 3.11, which concludes with the remark that it is the particular (second) premise of the practical syllogism that causes motion, “or both, but the universal rests more (*êremousa mallon*).” The universal premise of the (practically wise and ethically) virtuous agent is relatively unmoved, whereas the particular premise is both moved or motivated (by the former) and moves or motivates (the action). The suggestion that the action of the *phronimos* most closely approximates the motion of the outermost sphere of the universe, which contains in itself beyond restriction the various spheres and counteracting spheres that constitute the celestial and terrestrial system(s), recalls the end of 3.10, where he explicitly compares the motion of (all, not just human) animals to circular or rotatory locomotion.

Though the locomotive power of the soul is one in kind (the kinds of desire are kinds of *desire*), the moments of ensouled locomotion (self-motion) are three in number: the mover, the moved, and the instrument or organ through which the soul causes the body to move or change place. Further, though the animal body is moved (the passive moment of self-motion) just as the animate body is fed (the passive moment of nutrition), both the mover and the instrument in animal (especially human) life are twofold, more distinct than in plant life: the motionless mover, causing motion without being moved, is the practicable good, while the moved mover is the desiderative capacity when active, i.e., desire; likewise, the bodily instrument of the sort of motion that distinguishes animals (especially humans, as he then shows in 3.11) from stationary or plant life (and nutritive soul from inanimate nature), internalizing the difference between heat

²⁰⁰ On ‘figurative’ circularity as a compromise see Diamond (2015, 224ff.): “Aristotle rejects this too literal ‘physiology’ of the soul, while ultimately accepting it in a qualified way. He seeks to show how the soul’s movement of the body is in a nonliteral sense circular, and also that this applies not only to the soul’s thinking, but rather that all self-movement manifests some degree of this self-returning circular activity.” Bodéüs (2000) contains a good discussion of this point too, if memory serves.

inside and food outside the organism in nutrition (activity beyond process and moved mover), is located

wherever the same is origin and end, as in a hinge / ball-and-socket joint; for there the convex and concave / ball and socket are the end and the origin (wherefore the one rests while the other moves), being distinct in account but inseparable in magnitude. For all are moved by pushing and pulling. Wherefore it is necessary, as in a circle / wheel, for something to remain [still] and the motion to originate thence. So generally, as was said, insofar as the animal is capable of desire, to this extent it is capable of moving itself (*autou kinêtikon*); but it is capable of desire not without imagination, and all imagination is either rational or perceptual / sensual, and so of this even the other animals partake.²⁰¹

As the fulcrum of self-motion, the doable good is relatively motionless, while the desire it causes both is moved (by it) and moves (the animal). Since the object must *appear* desirable or practicable to the agent to cause motion or action in response, there is no desire without image, no non-cognitive desire; to desire *is* to cognize the object as good (or bad) for the soul. In any case (animal or human), since it is the (sensual or rational) image or appearance of the *orekton*, the internal *representation* of the object, the object *as cognized*, that functions as the unmoved socket, while desire, the object cognized *as attractive*, functions as the ball rotating in the hinge which, moved, pulls or pushes the agent toward or away from the object, the origin (*archê*) of the motion or action that desire causes is inside (not outside) the animal or human agent, i.e., the agent moves itself (lit. is ‘motive of itself’ or autokinetic). The object attracts only as cognized and must be cognized as attractive, i.e., desired: the object as cognized initiates the motion that the object as attained completes; at the level of deliberation, one reasons ‘back’ from the *orekton* to the immediately doable end, which leads through some series of intermediate actions ‘back’ to the beginning, the original end, the *orekton* as accomplished. Where rational desire has emerged as distinct from (though out of) appetitive desire, the relatively undifferentiated unity of unmoved cognition (perceptual image) and moved desire (appetite) differentiates such that the

²⁰¹ 433b22-31.

object of reason or wish *should* determine the object of appetite (the desirability of the present particular); the ‘higher’ *should* thoroughly govern and cause the ‘lower’. Not only do the *orekton* and *orexis* in each case of self-motion play the roles of unmoved and moved mover, respectively, in the case of rational self-motion the object of wish or the wish should ‘anchor’ the appetite.

Containing the motivational process from beginning to end, the desire at the heart of all animal self-motion, but especially that of virtuous humans (where the rational desire ‘rules and moves’ the appetite), mirrors the relation of surrounding and surrounded, and is thus nonliterally circular.

In the serial structure of life, pursuing the thread from the stationary yet proto-automotive life of plants through desiderative perception or perceptual desire in the life of animals to desiderative intellect or noetic desire in the life of humans, especially of the virtuous sort, Aristotle detects progressively autonomous degrees of self-motion, and in these degrees of self-motion progressively lucid approximations of the one absolute or unconditional self-motion, the changeless motion of the outermost celestial sphere,²⁰² which contains the whole system of celestial spheres (and counter-spheres) beyond opposition or constraint, just as in the virtuous sort of human action, reason or wish contains appetite beyond opposition or restraint (in the

²⁰² Though *Phys.* initially speaks of *kinêsis* and *metabolê* interchangeably, they turn out not to be synonymous (though coextensive), indeed, inverse correlates, such that the primary motion (circular locomotion) changes the least (only in place) and the radical continuity of motion contrasts with the radical discontinuity of change. Diamond (2015, 301, n. 5; cf. 111) shows how the sorts of ensouled change (nutrition, perception, self-movement) in *DA* correspond to or develop the sorts of motion or change in *Phys.* (growth, alteration, locomotion): “Quantitative change in growth and diminution is caused and controlled by nutritive soul as the λόγος or ratio of the body... while qualitative change in sensation is controlled by the sensitive soul as the λόγος or ratio of the sense organ. The correspondence between the hierarchy of emerging causal powers of the soul (nutrition, sensation, movement through space) and the hierarchy of quantitative change, qualitative change, and change of location articulated in [*Phys.*] V.1, VIII.7, and elsewhere suggests a deep systematic connection between the [*DA*] and his general theory of change.” Nutrition (growth, self-nourishment, reproduction), perception (proper sense [passive moment], common sense [active moment], imagination), and thought (learning, knowing, thinking or passive *nous*, active *nous*, divine *nous*) develop triadically, but only the third triad completely unifies the four causes, reconciles them: active thinking is the efficient, formal, and final cause of mind, which is its own material (since mind has become its object [essence] through learning [transition from 1st-level capacity to 2nd-level capacity / 1st-level entelechy], thinking it = thinking itself; once it has become identical with its object[s], emancipating itself through imagination, there is no longer any independently existent subject or substrate on which it depends to be active [as in nutrition, perception, and art, despite the analogy], such that its activation is in principle up to it ‘whenever it wants’). On how thinking (the 3rd triad) exhibits the 3-level structure most lucidly and articulately cf. Diamond (*ibid.*, 293, n. 27).

second moment of the practical syllogism as operative in cases of virtuous action). The reason or wish of the virtuous agent initiates the most circular sort of mortal self-motion, though all self-motion (the motion that distinguishes animals from plants and plants from inanimate natures) is circular insofar as the beginning and end of the motion or action are somehow identical (and its organ is located “wherever the same is beginning and end”). The conclusion of 3.11, then, is that the higher desire *should* relate to the lower as the convex to the concave, as the (containing) outside of the circle relates to its (contained) inside, or as unmoved center relates to moving periphery, as the hub relates to the shield in Homer, or to the wheels and gates in Parmenides,²⁰³ just as *nous* and *dianoia* relates to *aisthêsis* as the bent line relates to itself when straightened.²⁰⁴ The best kind of mortal self-motion (virtuous), beginning with practical thought of the universal, is the most independent of externality, the least heteronomous, though such autonomy is relative, not absolute. The only *simply* autonomous self-mover is the divinity whose body is incapable of

²⁰³ Cf. the gates of the paths of Night and Day in the poem with the inversion of moonlight & starlight and dusk & dawn in Sappho fr. 34 and 104A (Voigt); the ambiguity of whether the initiate and escorts go into light or darkness is probably another hinge (dialectic of revelation and concealment). As Kosman (2013) writes, “In one sense *energeia* is figured in the axis of [circular] motion, in the still point at the center of the most energetic activity. This image of ceaseless activity made serene by its unmoved center as a figure of the cosmos and its individual modes of activity alludes to earlier figures. Think of the *Republic*’s figure of a spinning top’s immovable peg, the unwobbling pivot that is a type of the calm and ordered soul at the center of the dialogue’s politically active hero [436D]. Or recall the shining, singing axles of the chariot that takes the Parmenidean neophyte to the place of his revelation, a revelation of ‘the unmoving heart of full-circling truth’... But it is equally the bounding and limiting circumferential motion itself that, in its establishment of limit and its steadiness of circuit, figures that reality” (206-7). Diamond (2015, 239-40) compares *NE* 1.13 (1102a30-3) on the unity of rational and non-rational soul or desire: “whether these are delimited / divided just as the portions of the body and everything partible / divisible, or is two in the account while being naturally inseparable just as the convex and the concave in the circumference (*periphereia*), makes no difference for the present [investigation].”

²⁰⁴ Appetite (*epithumia*) is cognition of the perceptual appearance or image (*phantasma*) as good or pleasant for me, as to be pursued; the *orekton* motivates the internal image or re-presentation that pulls (or pushes) the agent toward (or away from) the object. Wish (*boulêsis*) emerges through deliberation (*bouleusis*) between conflicting appetites as the measure against or *pros* which rational agents measure their present appetite(s). Rooted in the proto-critical and proto-kinetic functions of nutritive soul, the division of *aisthêsis* and *epithumia* as critical and orectic modes of awareness develops into that of *noêsis* and *boulêsis* as theoretical and practical modes of awareness. In the case of noetic soul, wish and appetite *ought* to relate as convex to concave just as thought and perception, if they are not separate, relate as the bent line straightened. On studious vs. ethical perception, so to speak, cf. fn. 186. On appetite as desiderative perception or perceptual desire and wish as desiderative thought or thoughtful desire cf. the next two fn.

generation and destruction (eternal) and whose soul(-analogue?) moves it without being moved. Mortal self-motion only ever approximates the ultimate self-motion, which is literally circular.

Each stage or level of the soul—nutrition (growth, self-nourishment, reproduction), perception (proper sense, common sense, imagination), thought (learning, knowing, thinking)—develops the division between critical and kinetic functions of the soul, though the clearer differentiation of these powers in noetic souls goes along with their deeper internalization (their exercise is less externally determined, especially in *sophoi* and *phronimoi*). But if the causes of animate locomotion trace back to *nous* and *orexis* (as he puts it in *DMA* 6, 700b18-25), whence the unity of these two sides of the soul? Tellingly, Aristotle calls choice (*proairesis*) desiderative thought *and* thoughtful desire (“orectic *nous* or dianoetic *orexis*”).²⁰⁵ *Boulêsis*, rational *orexis*, is orectic *nous*, just as *epithumia*, perceptual *orexis*, is orectic *aisthêsis*.²⁰⁶ Though the lower desire can conflict with and “knock out” the higher desire in akratic agents (motivational struggle), the conflict is between rational *desire* (for what the soul rationally judges good via deliberation) and appetitive *desire* (for what appears good to the soul through perceptual imagination). Yet, just as cognition is pivotal to all self-motion (image or appearance plays the role of unmoved socket while desire functions as moved mover), desire is integral to the function of intellect, not only practical but even theoretical. For the cause of the transition from having (acquired) knowledge

²⁰⁵ Cf. Diamond (2015, 304-5, n. 43) on ‘orectic perception & perceptual *orexis*’ with Whiting (2023a, 131, fn. 48 (to *aisthêtikôn hê orektikôn*) & 133, fn. 56 (“βούλησις, which is a form of νοῦς, is *also* a form of ὄρεξις”).

²⁰⁶ On the broad sense of *boulêsis* in *DA* (covering ‘all forms of rational desire’) joining with *proairesis* in *NE* cf. Moss (2009, fn. 50 & 137 on how rational desire follows rational judgement [“just as the temperate person is not subject to false evaluative appearances, neither is she subject to appetites that conflict with what her rational faculty commands”]) and Diamond (2015, 248 & n. 107 and 304, n. 42) on the critical (unmoved) and orectic (moved) aspect of *both* rational and appetitive desire in the practical syllogism. Moss contends that the ignorance and motivational-struggle accounts of *akrasia* in *NE* and *DA*, respectively, are compatible if(f) it can / should be interpreted as a kind of perceptual illusion: “In perceptual illusion the appearances in question are straightforward perceptual appearances such as the appearance of the sun as a foot wide; in *akrasia* and *enkrateia* they are appearances of things as *good*—more precisely, the appearance that the qualified pleasant is ‘without qualification pleasant and good without qualification’.” I.e., if desire (motivational-struggle) is ‘interested’ cognition (ignorance) in the sense Diamond articulates, the passages are compatible. On ‘conflicting desires’ see fn. 208.

(as a dispositional capacity) to exercising it in the act of contemplation (*noein* in the focal sense of *theôrein*; cf. *DA* 2.5), from (having learned and thus) knowing to thinking in the sense of contemplating, is none other than the desire or ‘will’ to know, to actively contemplate the content of knowledge; the human desire to know not only explains the love of *sophia*, *boulêsis* is integral to active contemplation (“able to contemplate when he wants (*boulêtheis*), so long as none of the externals prevent it”; “thinking is up to him, whenever he wants (*boulêtai*), but perceiving is not up to him; for the perceptible must be present”). The highest stage of human theoretical cognition integrates *orexis*, just as the highest stage of human practical cognition (the practical syllogism as operative in virtuous agents) integrates *nous*, foreshadowing the unity beyond constraint of the two sides of divine activity, eternal thinking and circular locomotion.

In perceptual desire or desiderative perception, perceptual image and appetite play the roles of unmoved mover and moved mover. As cognized, the *orekton* initiates the motivational process that results in the motion or action; as attained, it completes the motion or action and so the whole motivational process. The object attracts only as cognized and must be cognized as attractive (desired) to initiate motion or action.²⁰⁷ Though the beginning and the end of such motion differs—one moves from lacking to having the object of desire, and the (perceptual) image of the (perceptual) object that functions as the motionless anchor ultimately originates outside the agent (through memory of past perception)—it is one and the same object that initiates and completes one and the same motion (under different descriptions), in which regard the beginning and the end are figuratively the same, such that the motion is figuratively circular.

²⁰⁷ “Extending this image used to explain the *physical* cause of motion (i.e., the heart) to the unmoved and moving movers in the *soul*, the cognition can be understood as the unmoved, fixed point, while the desire which follows necessarily from this cognition is the mover which is itself in motion. The socket here would be the cognition of the object, which acts as an unmoved anchor. Insofar as the object is cognized as pleasant or good (or its opposites), the object exerts a pull or push on the organism, like the ball rotating in the hinge and directly swinging the door. These are simply two inseparable sides of one and the same event—the practical good is cognized as attractive and attracts as cognized” (Diamond, 2015, 229 & n. 46 & 48 [305] contra Furley and Labarrière, respectively).

In thoughtful desire or desiderative intellect, reason or rational desire *should* ‘govern, motivate, and measure’ appetite (the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ *should* relate as unmoved mover and moved mover), such that what appears good via perceptual imagination is the (true) good (as it appears through the rational or deliberative imagination of virtuous agents).²⁰⁸ The rational desire both is anchored in practical *nous* (grasp of the universal in stage one of the practical syllogism), and anchors the appetitive desire (for the particular object of *epithumia*) in virtuous agents; appetitive desire, itself anchored in perception, can motivate the animal independently of rational desire, but should depend on or proceed from it in the case of thinking animals, who, possessed of *nous* and *dianoia*, need not depend on perceptual appearance in order to move themselves, but can determine what perceptually appears good to them in light of what they rationally judge best (discern the good to be through deliberation between conflicting appetites, which allows one to discern the future good from the present good [object of appetite], which allows for the ‘supposition and proposition of the universal’ about what is good for human

²⁰⁸ On the ambiguity of ‘cognitive’ and ‘desiderative’ aspects of *boulêsis* and how it emerges through deliberation as the measure of conflicting appetitive desires see Diamond (2015, 229-33 with n. 58 & 86 and 241-2). Thus, I take it, *boulêsis* can ‘play the role of’ unmoved mover vis-à-vis *epithumia*, even if qua desire it is itself moved. For ‘qua desire’ cf. fn. 205 on *boulêsis* being a form of both, *nous* and *orexis*. This ambiguity is parallel to that of whether rational and appetitive desires are distinguishable but harmonious in virtuous action or whether the former is just *orexis* anchored in or sequent to *nous* while the latter is just *orexis* not thus anchored or sequent. As Aspasius puts it, “whenever someone deliberates and then chooses and the desire follows upon the reasoning / calculation, or reversely (*anapalin*) someone desires and deliberates and then chooses, such a thing is choice” (1889, 3, 25-7); desire can ‘follow’ deliberation and choice, but can also precede and ‘anchor’ them. Deciding between these readings (‘distinct but harmonious desires’ vs. ‘one desire in which reason and appetite harmonize’) is unnecessary for the argument of this section, for the point in any case is the unity or integrity of the soul in virtuous action, though I just suggested that there are reasons endogenous to Aristotle and his usage for ‘sliding’ between them. Crucially: “since desires (*orexeis*) [may] become contrary to each other, and this results whenever the reason (*logos*) and the appetite (*epithumia*) are contrary, and this happens in those having perception of time... in form the cause of motion would be one, the orectic qua orectic... though in number there would be more than one cause of motion” (433b6-13); desires (plural) oppose each other whenever reason and appetite do, yet the motive power is one in form: the desiderative capacity as such, “desire as comprehensive of the distinction of rational and appetitive” (Diamond, *ibid.*, 233; cf. 232-40 for an account of why the opposition of rational and non-rational powers is inadequate to or does not exhaust the ‘basic’ division of soul for Aristotle). For the ‘distinct desires’ interpretation see also Moss (2009, 129: “Instead [of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* being conflicts between desire and intellect], the agent is torn between two desires, each based on a different form of cognition”) and Whiting (2023a, 134, fn. 57: “This opposition [of *logos* and *epithumiai*] is said to involve—or at least to result in—ὁρέξεις themselves being opposed to one another, perhaps because [as I am claiming] the relevant states of λόγος are themselves ὁρέξεις”).

beings universally or in general, not just for this particular human being at this particular moment). Alternatively, desire for some object is rational when it follows or proceeds from practical thought, and non-rational or ‘merely’ appetitive when it is not thus anchored or sequent. At any rate, since there is no cognitive dissonance in the virtuous sort of self-motion (virtuous agents do not suffer such cognitive dissonance), there is no attendant motivational struggle (of conflicting desires, which attend the object of wish and appetite, rational and perceptual imagination).

Though both sorts of desire have unmoved (discerning) and moved (desiring) aspects, then, the virtuous sort of human action unites or harmonizes reason or wish and appetite as unmoved and moved aspects of the same self-motion. *Both* objects (of wish and appetite) are cognized and desired, ‘but rational *orexis* or orectic *nous*’ plays the ‘critical’ role while ‘appetitive *orexis* or orectic *aisthêsis*’ plays the ‘kinetic’ role;²⁰⁹ alternatively, reason plays the ‘critical’ role while rational desire plays the ‘kinetic’ role, where this is sufficient to get me moving. At any rate, the best form of mortal self-motion reunites the roles that were differentiated in the transition from plant life to animal life, the critical and kinetic functions, retrieving the initial union of cognition and desire in the simplest form of awareness (only touch) in the more comprehensive form of rational self-motion. Comprehending the whole series of unmoved movers and moved movers, the motion or action of virtuous agents resembles that of “the God and the total cosmos, for whom there are no external actions besides / contrary to their

²⁰⁹ Cf. the previous fn. and Diamond (2015, 248): “This distinction between unmoved and moved mover occurs within all self-movers, although in simpler animals such a distinction is not nearly so articulated. While in the practical syllogism, the unmoved and moved movers are two distinct desires (rational and appetitive), in simple appetitive desire the distinction simply lies between the cognitive and appetitive aspects of the same desiring cognition. Recall that in III.10, in the general account of how the soul moves the body (III.10.433b13-27), the moving cause of the body was twofold: the cognition of the practical good remains as an unmoved fixed point, while the desire for this good exerts a psychological push or pull on the agent—it is a moved mover. In the practical syllogism, both the rational and appetitive objects of desire are simultaneously cognized and desired, but the rational desire here plays the cognitive role, while the appetitive desire plays the attracting, desiderative role.”

own,” whereas (in)continent agents, (not)restraining themselves, acting despite themselves, are alienated from themselves in the action, external to themselves, not at home with themselves (no action external to *tas oikeas tas autôn*, those proper to themselves, in which they are at home). Though such motion remains mortal (finite), it anticipates the unity beyond constraint (limitation) of the limitless sort of action in terms of which he defines *energeia* proper (*Meta.* Θ).

So although *DA* does not explicitly reconcile the twofold division, the conclusion of the chapters on self-motion or locomotive soul (3.9-11) suggests that virtuous human or mortal self-motion reconciles the sides of the soul that are torn or externally related in akratic and enkratic action,²¹⁰ giving the motivational process figurative circularity akin to the literal circularity of the motion of the outermost sphere, just as the chapters on critical soul (perception and intellect) refer to the union of thought and desire in active human thinking and conclude with some reference to “deathless and eternal” intellect. Having developed from critical and kinetic soul into full-blown theoretical and practical reason, the virtuous activity of these capacities in (dia)noetic living beings is analogous to the ‘cognitive’ and ‘locomotive’ sides of divine activity, which emerge at the end of these chapters as integral to yet beyond the scope of the argument.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Again, practical *nous* is integral to rational *orexis* just as the latter is integral to theoretical *nous*. Cf. *NE* 6.2, 1139a17-8, on the three *kuria* of action and truth: *aisthêsis*, *nous*, and *orexis*; the three forms of human action (akratic, enkratic, virtuous) involve different permutations of these *kuria*.

²¹¹ On how the motionless can cause motion generally, and especially the eternal locomotion of ‘the primary sky’ (on the trifold sense of *ouranos* cf. Johnson, 2019, 78-9), Aristotle writes (*Meta.* Λ.7, 1072a26-b4), “the *orekton* and the *noêton* move thus: it causes motion without being moved. The primary [instances] of these [sc., objects of *orexis* and *nous*] are the same. For the *epithumêton* is the apparent (*phainomenon*) beautiful while the primary *boulêton* is the actual (*on*) beautiful / the *boulêton* is the primary actual beautiful. But we desire because it seems [good], more / rather than it seems [good] because we desire [it]. For the origin is the *noêsis*. But *nous* is moved by the intelligible, and one of the co-elements [in the list or series] is intelligible per se, and of this [series] the *ousia* is primary, and of this [series] the [ousia that is] simple and active [is primary]. (But the one is not the same as the simple, for the one signifies measure, while the simple [signifies] how it itself holds.) But surely the beautiful and the to-be-chosen-per-se is / are also in the same column; and the primary is always best or analogous [to it]. And that the for-the-sake-of is among the motionless [beings], the [following] division clarifies: for the for-the-sake-of is [both] for-whom and of-whom, of which the one is and the other is not [among the motionless]. Indeed it causes motion as being loved (*ôs erômenon*), while the others (*talla*) cause motion [as] being moved.” Diamond (2015, 310, n. 110) notes that the two sides of soul or conceptual halves of *DA* (culminating in their respective paradigm) are brought together in this reference to the object(s) of thought and desire. On the crucial *mallon ê* cf. Whiting (2023a, 133, fn. 52): “I prefer ‘more than’ to ‘rather than’ as a rendering... because it leaves open something I think Aristotle wants to allow—

But the suggestion that virtuous action reconciles the sides of the soul that are alienated or externally related in non-virtuous action, akin to circular (infinite) vs. rectilinear (finite) motion, implies that the reconciliation at issue in human action is intentional or deliberate and thus chosen, not just natural (except in cases of natural virtue). By choosing to imitate the God not just via sacrifice but in the structure of our lives or the way we live (sacrificing or consecrating our lives), practitioners of the philosophic and political lives, in the exercise of their corresponding virtues, resemble the two sides of divine activity. The choice of life at issue here is between the

three *bioi* which those happening / lucky enough to be surplused / economically independent all choose to live (*hoi ep' exousias tunchanontes proairountai zên apantes*): political, philosophic, apolaustic. For of these the philosopher rationally desires (*bouletai*) concerning wisdom (*phronêsin*) and the study (*theôrian*) concerning the truth, the politician [rationally desires] concerning beautiful actions (and these are those from the virtue), and the apolaustic one [rationally desires] concerning the somatic pleasures.

Each type of economically independent person rationally desires the good to which they choose to devote their lives: wisdom, virtue, pleasure. Their choice of *bios* is equivalent to or based on their *boulêsis* for the good they prioritize (the three ‘greatest goods for human beings’).

Emancipated from the compulsory need to secure the ‘(hypothetically) basic needs’ of bare life or brute survival, free people can discern ‘goods proper’ (from hypothetical necessities), the right

namely, that some subjects may think things good at least partly because they desire them... But even if we understand Aristotle to be saying ‘rather than,’ his claim is one about how things *should*—as a matter of teleological fact—be. There is nothing in principle that would prevent many people—perhaps even most people—departing from this norm.” Cf. *DA* 433b12. Corrigan (2014) interprets the ‘analogy’ at issue in the passage in terms of the transcendent and immanent good of Λ .10. Diamond concludes his book by gesturing toward “the underlying structural unity of Aristotle’s first philosophy, physics and practical philosophy” in terms of how ‘the two senses of *primum movens*’ “are analogous to the relation between body and soul in mortal living beings,” how in the God “what is only vaguely achieved at lower levels of living being is very closely approximated by the theoretical and practical sides of human rational activity, and then fully realized in the complete actuality of divinity”, and how the psychological distinction between “its cognitive (κρίτική) and locomotive (κινητική) power provides the biological basis for the primary distinction of the [*NE*] between theoretical and practical reason” (250). My argument in this section is that the twofold division emerges in the transition from nutrition to perception, develops into the division of theoretical and practical reason (comprehensive of the previous forms), and reconciles in virtuous human activity, which images the eternal union of the ‘cognitive’ and ‘locomotive’ sides of divine activity. That, in outline, is my account of how the *DA* “provides the biological basis for” the central distinction of the *NE*.

end for themselves through their *own* exercise of right reason, set for themselves the end or norm that they pursue in action (vs. the ‘servility’ of production—literal in the case of slaves, nonliteral in the case of wage-workers), which they thus direct or move themselves toward.²¹² In each of the three cases, what is (at least in some respect) an end or good proper *appears* good to the agent; the desire in each case is rational (whether it governs and motivates their appetite[s] is another question). When it comes to the question of which good one should prioritize and hence which *bios* is best, however, the underdeveloped conception of freedom implicit in the maxim of ‘doing whatever you rationally desire’ is silent (because unable to account for evaluation of the content of choice or wish). The extant conclusion of the *Protreptic*, we saw, argues that one should do philosophy *regardless* of their priorities, since philosophy somehow unites them. *NE* 10, after its discussion of pleasure, contrasts *sophia* with ‘the other virtue’ and ranks the philosophic and political lives as ‘happiest’ and ‘secondarily happy’. As I argued in the previous two chapters, both texts agree that philosophy is the *only* way of life that *most* satisfies the desire for pleasure, virtue and wisdom. Though it need not exclude and in some respects presupposes the political life, the philosophic life treats the exercise of ‘the other virtue’ not *merely* as its own

²¹² The inquiry at *Pol.* 7.13 begins by distinguishing ‘laying the target and the end of the actions rightly’ from ‘discovering the relative-to-the-telos-bearing actions’; *phronêsis* is not just being good at determining the best means to heteronomously given ends (cleverness), but wisdom about which end(s) is/are the best. As Walsh (1997) brings out, *eleutheria* for Aristotle “is not just the ability to move oneself towards whatever end one happens to desire, but the ability to order one’s life *towards the end apprehended by right reason*” (501; or “not just the capacity to move oneself towards whatever ends one wishes,” as she puts it on p. 504), in critique of the ‘democratic’ (and ‘sophistic’; cf. Boulnois, 2017) conception of freedom in terms of the ability to do whatever one wants, regardless of what one wants to do (“in such democracies each lives *ôs bouletai*”; 1310a32-3, vs. *pros tēn politeian*), to move oneself toward whatever end one wishes (rationally desires). Beyond “the bare ability to choose between alternatives” (Walsh, *ibid.*, fn. 3), the content of choice or rational desire (what you choose or rationally desire), for Aristotle, matters. As Diamond (2015, 310 n. 119) points out, Aristotle includes the apolaustic *bios*, “being most intimately connected to contact senses,” despite its slavishness, on the grounds that its end—the activity of sensual-appetitive pleasure—is an end in itself (‘good proper’); he rules out the ‘productive’ ways of life devoted to ‘necessities’ on the grounds that their ends are heteronomously given. Though the ability to do whatever one wishes steps beyond the compulsion or coercion of the necessary *bioi*, the conception of freedom it betrays remains purely subjective or arbitrary. Freedom for Aristotle is not merely the formal freedom of ‘freedom of choice’, which, though necessary, is inadequate. It is because such activity can seem but not be autonomous (deliberating and choosing among heteronomously determined options) that it is not properly free; the conception is underdeveloped.

end but *also* as means to the exercise of theoretical intellect and its virtue, which, as the only end that is unconditionally choiceworthy, appears so to those who prioritize it. Though wish grounds appetite in each of the three free *bioi*, then, some objects of wish (‘goods proper’ or ends in themselves) are better than others;²¹³ even ‘free’ people may not have their priorities straight. Though the political life is well-ordered relative to the apolaustic life (whose practitioners, though free of the servility characteristic of slaves and wage-workers, remain servile to ‘the somatic pleasures’), it is less well-ordered than the philosophic life to the extent that it treats the end that it should prioritize as means, conscripting theory into the service of practice instead of letting theory rule practice as its proper end or final cause, on the model of ‘the God’ whose intellect moves the outermost sphere of ‘the total cosmos’ without being moved or constrained (just as celestial matter, incapable of birth and death, need not strain against its natural motion).

Though the initial love of Gods for humans is beyond merit (Their role as efficient causes of life, nourishment and education), Their ultimate love for us, once we have developed the ability to deliberate, choose and act, is conditional upon merit (Their role as final causes, as models to be imitated).²¹⁴ Now that we (free citizens) have the power to choose for ourselves which way of life to lead, They withdraw from those who do not (choose not to) imitate Them

²¹³ NE 3.4, 1113a23-31: “simply and according to truth the good is [the] object of wish, but to each the apparent [good is the object of wish]; so to the serious person [the object of wish] is [good] according to truth / the truly good, but to the base person [the object of wish is] whatever happens [to seem good] (*to tuchon*)... For the serious person discerns each of these rightly (*krinei orthôs*) and in each case the true [good] appears to him.”

²¹⁴ Cf. Bodéüs (2000, 157ff.) on Their role as benefactors qua efficient causes of life, nourishment and education vis-à-vis Their role as final causes or ‘objects of imitation’. Bodéüs argues that Aristotle sincerely endorses certain propositions received from traditional belief about the Gods—crucially, “the divine beneficence that justifies piety” (180) or “the assumption, if not of divine providence, at least of divine beneficence (justifying the reciprocity of love in and through ritual)” (8)—and that his endorsement of these propositions is compatible with his account of divine substance(s) in *Meta. Λ*, because they concern the Gods of the city and the ‘theology’ of the ‘Olympians’ rather than (and not) the divine substance(s) of Λ. Again, Their beneficence is that They “give us unearned benefits, as our parents do, and that they take care to reward our personal merits” (196). For my purpose, the most obvious reference is *theophilestatos* at NE 10.8, 1179a30, more on which below. But Corrigan (2014) discusses the precedent for ‘providential love’ even in Λ. At any rate, I take it, his endorsement of divine beneficence is sincere. On conditional and unconditional love cf. Kosman (1976).

and the life They lead. The piety we owe Them as benefactors (efficient causes), therefore, may not suffice to give Them Their due as models (final causes). Thus, to merit Their love, it is up to us to get our priorities straight (individually and politically; cf. his critique of Sparta). That is, we must choose to order our life as the Gods order Theirs. Again, the conclusion of *DA* 3.9-11 suggests that humans *should* order their desires as the convex and concave sides of the circle (or, paradoxically, center and periphery), that the *best* sort of action is the most like that of the God, whose soul and body (in theological terms, which provide Aristotle the model for the object of metaphysics and celestial physics, respectively) relate to one another without compulsion or constraint. Because it is the best (most entelic & autarkic) activity, one ought to prioritize it; because it's the best, the Gods love it (not vice versa). That activity, *theôria*, is both 'contemplation' (in the case of persons in their 'private' capacity) and 'spectacle' (in the case of persons in their 'civic' capacity); hence his argument that it's the same for humans and cities, that both should prioritize it.²¹⁵

Thus, as Bodéüs writes, "when imitation of the gods is pushed to the point where 'resemblance' is possible (*NE* x 8.1178b26-27), it coincides with piety understood as the upper limit of homage to the gods."²¹⁶ Contemplative activity is the highest form of piety in that it fulfills the duty or obligation to perfect oneself that emerges once humans and cities have become able to choose their way of life.

On the virtuous sort of 'self-lover', who perfects himself in and through the exercise of virtue, Aristotle writes,

he apportions to himself (*aponemei heautô*) the things that are the most beautiful and especially good, and gratifies / favors / delights in the most sovereign [part] of himself, and all is obedient / subordinate (*peithetai*) to this. And just as a city also seems especially to be the most sovereign [part of it], and [so too] every other system (*pan allo*

²¹⁵ More on which in the next section; cf. fn. 14.

²¹⁶ (2000, 153).

sustêma), so too a human. Thus he is self-lover especially who cherishes this and gratifies / favors / delights in this.²¹⁷

The ‘part’ of any system or constitution that governs the whole is what that system ‘most of all’ seems to be, be it the government or constitution in the case of the city or the intellect in the case of the human. *Meta.* Λ.10 expresses the same view, comparing the universal situation to the situation of armies and households: ‘the good and the best’ is both (*amphoterôs*) the whole system and its constitutive principle, yet more (*mallon*) the latter. As the polity is to the polis, the most sovereign form of community (“the community which is the most sovereign [*kuriôtatê*] of all and contains [*periechousa*] all the others [aims] especially at the most sovereign of all [goods]”), so is the best polity to the forms of government.²¹⁸ Whether the most authoritative good is internal or external to political activity is analogous to the question at the beginning of Λ.10. The conclusion of *Pol.* 7.1-3 contrasts leisurely and non-leisurely action in terms of the end being internal or external to the action, complete and incomplete action (entelic and atelic), which is consistent with his account in *Meta.* Θ.6.²¹⁹ Choosing to prioritize *theôria*, humans and cities resemble, mirror, or model themselves on the Gods, who rule not by issuing orders but by being (at least modeling) that for the sake of which good ‘politicians’ (primarily lawgivers or legislators) rule, just as prudence issues orders not to (theoretical) wisdom but for its sake. Any system is both the total system, the system as a whole, and yet ‘especially’ or primarily the principle of the whole, the cause of its parts being one whole.²²⁰

²¹⁷ NE 9.8, 1168b29-34, which then compares how enkratic and akratic people (systems?) act in terms of whether *nous* dominates (*kratein*) or not. *Nomos* is from *nemein*; the notion is somehow of ‘dispensing’ the law to oneself, though it is the self-legislation of one whose subjective ‘order of preference’ mirrors his true conception of the good, his discernment of ‘goods / ends proper’ from ‘necessaries’. Colloquially, such agents have their priorities straight. Cf. fn. 213.

²¹⁸ Cf. section 3 of the previous chapter.

²¹⁹ Cf. section 1 of the previous chapter.

²²⁰ As even Bodéüs (2000, 128) concedes, “If Lambda actually equates the god to the pure separate act, it does so because here the word ‘god’ refers to the inclusive system of being, and this system can in fact be traced back to the principle that constitutes it essentially, eternal life.” Hence the ambiguity of ‘the nature of the whole’, more on

The same goes for any animal. As he writes at the end of the penultimate chapter of *DMA*,

one should suppose the animal to be constituted (*sunestanai*) just as a well-legislated (*eunomoumenên*) polis. For in the city, whenever once (*hotan hapax*) the order constitutes itself (*sustê*), there is no need of a separate monarch who must be present at each of the things that happen, but each himself does the [*erga*] of himself as ordered / he orders himself, and this [*ergon*] comes after that on account of the custom / habit (*ethos*). And in the animals this same [order] comes to be on account of the nature and [or i.e.] by each, thus constituted (*sustantôn*), naturally doing its own work (*to hautou ergon*); so there is no need for the soul to be in each [part], but, being in some origin (*archê*) of the body, the others [parts] live by grafting themselves [to it] (*tô prospephukenai*) and doing their own work on account of the nature.

The constitutive principle rules the system in each case as its final cause; acting as the very model or paradigm of goodness and perfection, the God is the principle of the system of systems, who relates to ‘the total cosmos’ as its *archê* and *telos*. The God provides Aristotle the model of the total system (hylomorphic whole), but since that system is primarily or especially its ‘most authoritative [aspect]’, the God primarily or especially models that ‘part’ of the total system of systems that governs it as its final cause.²²¹ Now arguably the part-whole relation is insufficient to account for the relation of constitutive principle to the system it governs.²²² In any case, the relation of ‘the God’ to ‘the total cosmos’ models the relation of principle to system: of the soul to the hylomorphic whole of body and soul in animals,²²³ and of the rational soul to the whole soul in virtuous humans, i.e., the relation that we *should* (is up to us to) uphold between reason

which in the next section. On the functional elision of ‘the totality’ and ‘the whole’ (and ‘the *ouranos*’) in Aristotle cf. Johnson (2019, 77, fn. 16). On whether the ‘constitutive principle’ is ‘part’ of the system it governs cf. fn. 222.

²²¹ Cf. “the *archikôtatê* of the sciences, and the more *archikê* than the subordinate, is that which is familiar with that for the sake of which each is to be done; and this is the good of each, and on the whole the best in *tê phusei pasê*” (*Meta.* A.2, 982b5-7).

²²² Cf. the contrast between principle and element at the end of *Meta.* Z (elements are primary *immanent* constituents; *Meta.* Δ.3) and Λ.4-5 (which critiques the ‘stoichiological’ conception of all principles as elements). Ultimately, beyond the stoichiological language of composition, Aristotle is concerned with how (and invites us) to conceive non-combinatorial unity, to think wholes that are not just composites: on *sunolos* vs. *sunthetos* cf. *DA* 1.5, 409b31ff., *Meta.* Z.11, 1037a30ff., and H.2, 1043a26ff. Hence, to avoid begging questions about ‘synthesis’, I resort to locutions like ‘hylomorphic whole’, though it still gives the impression of fusing distinct, pre-existent parts together instead of splitting the original unity in twain, the ‘originary partition’ (*Urteil*) of the originally whole.

²²³ *Phys.* 8.2, 252b25-9, speaks of the animal vis-à-vis ‘the all’ in terms of microcosm vis-à-vis macrocosm.

and appetite or rational and appetitive desire, and do uphold insofar as we fulfill the duty of self-perfection that obligates us once we have become capable of governing ourselves. Choosing to model themselves on the God, prioritizing the function of the ‘part’ of themselves (and its virtue) that naturally rules, virtuous humans and well-governed cities order their lives well (around *theôria*); their lives are ‘blessed’ insofar as they, directing themselves to fulfill the exhortation to immortalize insofar as one can, attain some likeness (*eph’ hoson homoiôma ti*) of Their activity.

3.2 Divine Life as the Norm of Human Life

Having concluded that the same way of life is best for cities and humans at the end of the ‘proem’ to *Pol.* 7.1-3 (on the model of the way in which ‘the God and the entire cosmos’ is / are ‘active’), Aristotle turns in *Pol.* 7.4 to the necessary preconditions (*hupotheseis*) for

the city going to be constituted (*sunestanaî*) according to prayer (*kat’ euchên*). For the best polity isn’t such as to come to be without commensurate equipment. Hence, it’s necessary to presuppose (*proupotetheisthai*) many [conditions] as being the way they are prayed for (*kathaper euchoumenous*), so long as none of these are impossible.²²⁴

As he turns from his account of these conditions to that of “the polity itself, from what and what sorts [of things] it’s necessary to constitute the city [that’s] going to be blessed (*makarian*) and governed beautifully” in 7.13, he contrasts (at the end of 7.12) the speech (*legein*) that is the work of prayer (*euchês*) with the outcome (*sumbênai*) that is the work of luck (*tuchês*).²²⁵ That blessedness involves being fortunate in the conditions that are not up to one to determine

²²⁴ 1325b35-40. Frank (2005, 57-69) offers helpful discussion of *chorêgia* as regards ‘the practice of proper use’.

²²⁵ “[A]long with parents and the lawgiver for whose weaknesses they compensate the gods who guide fortune are partly responsible for successful education. They could also be responsible in another way, since education does not use compulsion but reason or at least speech in order to direct the learner toward the good... Discourse makes it possible to evoke the gods not to stimulate fear as one might do with bad people, but to offer divine models of excellence for imitation. As a result, the gods evoked by the educator become allies of education. Incidentally, in his own philosophical discourses Aristotle often has the gods intervene in this way... Aristotle is certainly thinking of a phenomenon of the [‘enthusiastic’] type, although less spectacular, in connection with exhortatory discourse, perhaps not written discourse but speeches uttered by educators who are themselves seduced by their subject and communicate their enthusiasm... [T]he eagerness of the inspired educator... resembles the action of the gods themselves, especially if the educator’s discourse evokes the gods as models for imitation” (Bodéüs, 2000, 147-8).

(external) was emphasized in 7.1, where the first argument he draws from ‘the exoteric *logoi*’ is based on the consensus that those who are blessed enjoy external, somatic, and psychic goods. Though all would concede that one who is blessed must somehow enjoy all three, he writes, people differ in the amount and in the rankings of priority / relative superiority (*diapherontai d' en tô posô kai tais huperochais*) they assign or apportion to them. To determine which proportion is right, he registers a number of arguments, including the contrast (as regards ‘living happily, whether for humans it is in enjoyment, virtue, or both’) between “those who’ve set in order (*kekosmênois*) their character and thinking to the utmost and are measured about the acquisition of external goods” and “those who’ve acquired more of those [latter] than is useful [to them] but are deficient in these [former]”, the distinct senses in which external and psychic goods are useful, and that the best condition of each thing relative to that of another “follows according to the ranking of priority which one allots to the things of which we say they’re the conditions.”²²⁶ Thus, he concludes, “if the soul is more worthy of honor than the [external] possession and the body both simply and for us (*kai haplôs kai hêmin*),” the relation of their best dispositions is analogous or proportionate, “and, further, these are naturally to be chosen and / i.e. it’s necessary that all the wise (*eu phronountas*) choose them [(i.e., one *should* choose them)] for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of them.” Having appealed to facts (*erga*) and reason (*logos*) to determine the right order, he concludes that the happiness of each is proportionate to the degree of ‘virtue, *phronêsis*, and action according to these’ (*tosouton hoson*),

consulting the God for witness (*marturi tô theô chrômenois*), who is happy and blessed not on account of any of the exoteric goods but on account of himself [being] himself and by the nature being of a certain sort; since good luck (*eutuchian*) is necessarily other than happiness also on account of this—for chance and luck (*tautomaton kai hê tuchê*) are responsible for the goods external to the soul, but none are just or temperate from luck or

²²⁶ I highlight these three because (1) *kekosmênois* suggests the relation of microcosm to macrocosm, (2) the contrast between different senses of use-value was in the *Protreptic* (cf. Parts 1 and 2), and (3) so is the argument that the axiological hierarchy of the virtues ‘follows’ that of the things or functions (*hekastou pragmatos*).

on account of luck / fortune. And it's a corollary entailed by these arguments that the best city is happy and / i.e. does (*prattousan*) beautifully. But it's impossible for those who do no beautiful [deeds] to do beautifully, and there is no beautiful deed (*ergon*), neither of man nor of city, separate from virtue and *phronêsis*; and courage, justice, and *phronêsis* of the city have the same power and shape of which each of the humans called just, *phronimos* and temperate (*sôphrôn*) partakes. So let these [considerations] to this extent be prefaced (*pephroimiasmena*; lit. forethreaded) to the account.

Given the need for external conditions, blessed humans and cities depend on these being the way one would pray for if it were up to one to determine them, or rather, the way they are prayed for, i.e., how one would determine them if it were up to one; “we pray for the constitution (*sustasei*) of the city to be lucky (*katatuchein*) in things of which luck is master, for we posit it's the master of what's already present to begin with. But that the city is [of] serious [worth] is no longer the work of luck but of knowledge and of choice” (13.1332a29-30). Mostly, at least, determining them is not up to us; these conditions are *preconditions*, *presuppositions*, external to the agent. Being blessed is being fortunate (enjoying good luck) on top of being happy (acting according to virtue); cf. *NE* 1099a29-b8. To qualify as blessed, it is necessary (though insufficient) that humans or cities enjoy fortunate (external) circumstances, in contrast to the God, for whom there are no such circumstances, who is blessed on account of who and what sort of nature he is, and “for whom there are no external actions besides their own,” as he writes at the end of the proem.

But the appeal to divine blessedness and the claim that it is independent of externality (and hence luck) can support theses about human and civic blessedness only on the assumption that the God (and the cosmos as a whole; cf. the human vis-à-vis the city as a whole) functions as the norm or paradigm of human conduct (private and civic), that the divine life is somehow the model of human life. Thus Aristotle properly uses, consults, or invokes the God as model at the end of both phases of the proem to *Pol.* 7-8.²²⁷ As model and metric, the God rules out (at least

²²⁷ I quoted the initial reference to ‘forethreading’ near the end of 7.1; cf. *pephroimiastai* at the outset of 7.4. On the ‘assumption’ of divine normativity see also Bodéüs (2000, esp. 157).

discredits) inactive and overactive conduct and policy (how the polis conducts itself; private and civic conduct).²²⁸ In wise humans and ‘well-normed’ cities (who have their priorities straight), the divine (life as) model demotes the political life to ‘secondary’ status. But such subordination does not *simply* relegate the activity of (especially political) prudence to the order of means (vs. ends proper).²²⁹ Rather, such activity is both its own end and for the sake of another activity, which alone is *simply* its own end (to be done for its own sake, which is prescriptive though descriptive in the case of such agents). It is because he supposes that the Gods norm human conduct, because he treats Them as models, that the ambiguity of whether the God (in theology) is analogous to the whole (hylomorphic) system (of body and soul) or to the constitutive principle (soul) of that system (in physics and metaphysics) is like the ambiguity that pervades his account of the intellect-soul relation in *DA* and the city-community relation in *NE* and *Pol*. Hence, I take it, ‘the total cosmos’ is the model or paradigm of the best community and polity,

²²⁸ Cf. my discussion of the dilemma between quietism and activism in the previous chapters. Aristotle frames the dispute among *hoi philotimotatoi pros aretên* in terms of the consensus that the best polity is “that ordering (*taxin*) by which anyone whosoever might do the best [deeds] and live blessedly (*zôê makariôs*)”. As apt as the comparison of peace-loving (vs. war-prioritizing) cities and wisdom-loving (vs. domination-of-others-prioritizing) humans to the God in Bodéüs (2000, 168ff.) is—cf. “among some [peoples] this is the measure / boundary (*horos*) of the polity and of the laws, that they be masters / despotic of their neighbors. So while most of the statutes laid by most people are a random fusion (*chudên*; cf. *kechumenon* in the alleged Heraclitus fr. 124), so to speak, nonetheless if anywhere the laws look toward some one [end] (*ti pros hen blepousi*), all aim at being dominant (*kratein*), as in Sparta and Crete the education and the majority of the laws are pretty much coordinated for the wars” (he then calls “this sort of power” the power to be greedy or have more than one is due (*pleonektein*); “but ruling (*archein*) not only justly but also unjustly is not lawful, and it is possible to dominate (*kratein*) unjustly” (i.e. “to force [*biasasthai*]” instead of “to persuade (*peisai*)” the unwilling [*mê boulomenôn*]); “the coordination [*suntaxis*] of its polity will be neither *pros* war nor *pros* the domination of its enemies (*polemiôn*)”; “while all the concerns / disciplines (*epimeleias*) *pros* war are to be posited beautiful, they are not so as the highest end of all (*telos pantôn akrotaton*); rather, these are for the sake of / thanks to that”; “to deem (*nomizein*) every [sort of] rule (*archên*) to be despotic / despotism, however, isn’t right (*orthon*)”—I prefer to frame the comparison or metric in terms of precluding or discrediting inactive as well as overactive cities because of the overall argument of the proem, crystallized in its conclusion. Hence, for instance, the ‘inactivists’ critiqued in the last quote assume that the *bios* of the free man (*ho tou eleutherou bios*) is incompatible with rule (since they conflate all rule with despotism, all relations of rule and ruled with master-slave relations), the implication being that freedom does not *only* characterize those who renounce rule to live ‘quietly’; the overly quiet or apolitical are also under critique. Cf. my discussion of the shift of ‘inactivity’ from ‘peace’ to ‘reclusion’ in *Intro*.

²²⁹ Bodéüs (2000) tends to emphasize that ‘Aristotle generally refuses to subjugate wisdom to prudence’ (172), whereas I have been emphasizing that he *also* refuses to *simply* subordinate (call it subjugate) prudence to wisdom; as he writes elsewhere, “la promotion de la sagacité [chez Aristote] ne s’accomplit pas aux dépens de la sagesse” (2002, 179).

whereas ‘the God’ (as constitutive principle) is the model or paradigm of the best way of life, though both jointly model the relation of the best polity to the best life. Perhaps the *kai* distinguishing and uniting them is ambiguous (contrastive or explicative?) for the same reason.

As our most sovereign aspect, *nous* rules, and what it rules is the only aspect of ourselves that can usurp its sovereignty or at least rule: desire (*orexis*). As we learn at the end of the chapters on self-motion in *DA*, the *orexis* that can dominate *nous* is the appetitive sort of *orexis* (based on the perceptual image of the *orekton*), which dominates the rational sort of *orexis* (based on practical *nous*) in cases of akratic action (vs. enkratic action, wherein the roles are reversed). In virtuous *praxis*, the sovereign aspect rules; the authoritative aspect, which should rule, does rule (dominates though not through force). Now the sovereign aspect is constituted in two aspects: theoretical and practical *nous*. The practical *nous* of the prudent person (especially legislator) commands for the sake of *theôria*, the activity of theoretical *nous* and its virtue, which, without commanding (or ‘micromanaging’, as his critical remark about the omnipresent ‘separate monarch’ in *DMA* suggests), rules as final cause. The virtues of these functions of the rational soul relate to each other as political activity in the best polis relates to ‘theoretic’ activity (private and civic, i.e., philosophic contemplation and religious spectacle, private and civic worship).

Thus, at the end of the *EE*, Aristotle defines *kalokagathia*, the ‘complete virtue’ characteristic of the good-and-beautiful man, in terms of the norm that governs personal and political (especially architectonic/legislative) prudence as the target (*skopos*) or end of its activity: the God(s). The *horos kallistos*, the *horos* of the *kalokagathos*, is the very end that is normative for the prudent lawgiver or legislator. He asks what norm should guide action and the choice of natural but not praiseworthy goods, the amount of money or assets (*chrêmatôn*) and

‘the things having to do with good luck (*eutuchêmatôn*)’. His response is, first, that “one ought, as in other cases (*tois allois*), to live relative (*pros*) to the ruling [aspect], and relative to the *hexin kata tên energeian* of the ruling [aspect], as slave relative to master and each relative to the principle appropriate to each.” Humans too, he continues, are constituted (*sunestêken*) and ought to live thus. But their principle is double, in the way that the art of healing and health are principles: “the former is for the sake of the latter. Thus it holds according to the theoretical [aspect]. For the God is ruler not as commander (*epitaktikôs*) but as that for the sake of which prudence (*phronêsis*) commands (*epitattei*).” But the God is not the final cause in the sense of the beneficiary or user (instrumentally) of the prudent activity of the well-ordered legislator (who has his priorities straight), “since he at least is in need of (*deitai*) nothing” (no defect to remedy or instrument needed, in contrast to the doctor). And so it follows, he says, that

whichever choice and possession of natural goods—of body or money or friends or the other goods—will especially promote (*poiêsei*) the spectacle of the God (*tên tou theou theôrian*), this is best, and this limit is the most beautiful; but whichever through deficiency or excess hinders *ton theon therapeuein kai theôrein*, this is base.

The sudden reference to the God in the middle of an inference evidently intended to establish the sovereignty of theoretic reason (its supremacy via the superiority of reason, to use military lingo) seems intrusive or extraneous (*ex machina*) so long as one identifies the God in this context *only* with the one transcendent and/or immanent principle to which he refers the ‘coordination of all’ at the outset of *Meta*. A.10. If it refers to *any* God (as the deictic ‘the’ does in polytheistic discourse), however, then it is compatible with the reference to the Gods (of the city) at the end of *NE* 6, and the *horos tês kalokagathias* and the *skopos tôn haplôs agathôn* is the very end that rules the activity of the *phronimos*, who prioritizes (treats as principle) and aims to promote ‘worship and *theôria*’ of the God(s). But since the function of *kalokagathia* transcends the public-private division (involving choice of natural goods that one needs to act in public life),

and one can exercise *phronêsis* not only as a public person but also privately, perhaps it is better to interpret ‘*theôria* of the God’ *both* in the sense of philosophic contemplation *and* religious observance or worship. Or rather, both (completely virtuous people and political leaders in the best city) aim to promote *theôria* of the God, i.e., worshipful activity, in public and in private, i.e., the religious ‘spectacle’ of leisurely activities practiced as rites (acts of worship for no ulterior motive) and the ‘contemplation’ that renders philosophy the ultimate practice of piety.²³⁰

Accordingly, I take *tên tou theou theôrian* to refer to the (religious) spectacle and (philosophic) contemplation of the God, *both* in the sense that the God is somehow object *and* subject of the activity (*tou theou* is both objective and subjective genitive). Whether the God is the one being contemplated or the one contemplating, being ‘sacredly spectated’ or ‘sacredly spectating’, is analogous to the question of whether the *kai* in ‘the God and the intellect’ (as Aristotle uses the expression in *NE* 1.6) is contrastive or explicative, whether the God transcends (though is object) of the intellect or is the intellect who contemplates or spectates. As for the copresence of both (traditional and philosophic) acceptations, the mutuality or reciprocity of God-city-human interaction in Athenian ritual is attested,²³¹ and Aristotle himself speaks of ritual

²³⁰ I take *therapeuein kai theôrein* to emphasize the worshipful or reverential aspect of the *theôria* at issue. Bodéüs (2000, 172–4) argues against the tendency to restrict it to ‘contemplation’ and opts instead for ‘spectacle’ in roughly the sense I describe. I agree that it must refer (at least *also*) to communal acts of public worship. But, in light of Nightingale (2004), I read these passages as simultaneous references to traditional and philosophic *theôriai*, for the reason I just outlined: *kalokagathia* and *phronêsis* are *both* virtues that straddle public and private life. Bodéüs (173) also notes that *kalokagathia* is the precondition for magnanimity, which presumes public life. Cf. fn. 154, where I suggest that ‘the most beautiful limit’ is that which he uses in *Pol.* 7–8 to determine the end and structure of the best city, and that *Pol.* 7–8 exhibits the ‘derivation of *horoi*’ adumbrated in *Protr.*, “relative to which the *politikos* discerns (*krinei*) what the just, beautiful, and advantageous is”, just as, at the end of *EE*, “there is some mark for the healer, referring to which (*pros hon anapherôn*) he discerns (*krinei*) the healthy and unhealthy for body, and *pros* which he discerns how far/much each is to be done (if [done] well it is healthy, but if [done] less or more, no longer)”. On political, economic, and personal (concerning oneself as one person [*hê peri auton kai hena*]) *phronêsis* cf. *NE* 6.8 and Bodéüs (1993, 63–6).

²³¹ Kavoulaki (1999), e.g., writes that *theôria* implies and incorporates “all the possible vantage points: viewing the worshippers from the point of view of the divinity, viewing the divinity among the worshippers, viewing the worshipping community as divine or ‘other’ and recognizing the power of the divine” (312); “The procession is an invitation for the attention of the superhuman” (302). Thus, the God is both object and subject of the spectacle. Cf. her comments on the Homeric hymn to Apollo on p. 311 (“the god participates as pleased spectator and the human

attention not only in the context of describing the priestly function (*Pol.* 7.9, 1329a32) but also in the context of arguing that the *sophos*, who ‘tends to’ (prioritizes and cultivates) *nous*, is ‘most beloved of the God(s)’.²³² As for the ambiguity of object and subject, I just referenced how the God is both object and subject of the spectacle, and Aristotle himself argues that wisdom is divine science both in the sense that it is of or concerns divine things (*tôn theiôn*) and in the sense that it is the sort of knowledge that the God ‘only or especially’ would have or possess.²³³

So ‘the God and the intellect’ could be analogues: political activity is *pros* worshipful (religious and philosophic) activity in the best polity just as the activity of practical *nous* is *pros* that of theoretic *nous* in the best life. Thus the *kai* would be contrastive rather than explicative. On the other hand, if the *kai* is explicative, the question arises whether the God-intellect is the divine intellect as distinct from and transcendent of the human intellect or the God in the human,

participants strive to delight him with their spectacle... To a human spectator, the human celebrants would also seem to participate in divine nature in this panegyric context”) with the beginning and end of the *EE* together.

²³² Bodéüs (2000, 267, n. 111), in keeping with his thesis that *theôria* here is the spectacle *rather than* contemplation of the God, insists on “the fact that it has to do with worship” *despite* the end of *NE* 10.8 (“even if”). On my reading, the *Pol.* and *NE* passages evince complementary usages that indicate rather precisely the very ambiguity that I am arguing Aristotle is trading on (relying on his audience to discern) at the end of the *EE*. That is, to treat the usage at the end of *NE* 10.8 as anomalous is to beg the question. As the previous paragraph also suggests, I prefer to speak of civic *and* private worship rather than restrict worship to the ‘religious’ or priestly side, not least because of these very texts. Incidentally, ‘therapy’ gets at the *disanalogy* with the healer, whose art *produces* (as efficient cause) the health of the patient who *needs* it (beneficiary) or uses the instrument by means of which. Wisdom does not need prudence in the way that health needs the medical art and its instruments (to remedy some defect); if anything, the God needs ‘therapy’ even less. It is not a question of what the God *needs* in the sense of lacks, but of what the God *deserves* as our benefactor and model. On the ambiguity of the dative cf. fn. 162.

²³³ *Meta.* A.2, 983a6-1. Bodéüs (2000, 19-20, 41, 75, 155-6) interprets the God vis-à-vis *tôn theiôn* in terms of the God(s) vis-à-vis ‘those things *pros hois per theos ôn theios estin*’ (*Phaedrus*, 249c), which he interprets (as most translations do) in terms of the forms somehow causing the Godhood of the Gods (‘those things by proximity or being relative to which the God is divine’ or some such expression). But the reading this translation presumes is questionable. Butler (2011, esp. 79-80 & 82-3), e.g., argues that “The remark at 249 c, which might be taken to imply the subordination of the Gods to the ideas, says only that those things which collectively constitute real being are those things with which the God is engaged *qua* divine” on the grounds that *pros hois per* corresponds to neither of “the ways in which Plato expresses the causality of forms in the relationship of participation” (causal dative and *dia* + accusative). If this reading of the expression is correct, then it cannot support the interpretation of *tôn theiôn* in *Meta.* A.2 as things to which the God is somehow subordinate and on which They somehow depend for Their Godhood. The *theiôn* are not radically distinct from and superior to the Gods but attributes (paradigmatically) of the Gods Themselves, and of humans insofar as they imitate the God to whom they (prenatally) are cultically affiliated. Hence, they are as ‘objective’ to the God(s) as they are ‘subjective’: as their original bearers, in ‘theorizing’ them the Gods ‘theorize’ Themselves. Ironically, this reading of Plato brings him closer to Bodéüs’ reading of Aristotle.

i.e., the intellect. Now if ‘the God’ refers to the divine intellect and ‘the intellect’ refers to the human intellect, both readings of *kai* are compatible. *Sophia* is not just analogous to the divine mode of knowledge but is the mode of knowledge that properly belongs to the God: the God *has* the knowledge that humans naturally, constitutively desire.²³⁴ The human *sophos* lives blessedly, whereas the philosophic life is proper to humans. *EE* 1.3 (1215a10-1) contrasts human happiness with divine blessedness; 1.4 (1215b13-4) contrasts two conceptions of what he (in the person of Anaxagoras) qualifies as human (presumably in contrast to divine) blessedness, apparently divergent on the question of whether blessedness involves external goods; *NE* 10.8 (1178b7-31) argues from the premise that the Gods are especially (*malista*) blessed and happy, establishing along the way that the activity of the God, differing in blessedness (*makariotêti diapherousa*), would be theoretic, and that the way Their *bios* is blessed differs from the way ours is (ours is blessed to the degree that we attain some likeness of Their activity); and 10.8 (1178b32-1179a9) considers the need for external goods in the humanly blessed life.²³⁵ That blessedness is proper to the Gods, though characterizes humans insofar as they are Godlike, implies that the prohibition against aiming to be or live like Them (to the degree that we can) is as hubristic as the attempt to be or live the life of Gods, for it assumes the difference is superable. The philo-sophic life acknowledges and preserves the insuperable difference as well as the likeness or kinship of our lives and Theirs (contra the hubristic assumption that one could equal Them behind the faux-piety of the prohibition against aspiring to *Godlikeness*, as if our life could ever equal Theirs).²³⁶

If ‘the God and the intellect’ is contrastive, *theôria* ‘of the God’ is objective genitive; if explicative, it is subjective genitive. One need not opt for one instead of the other if one

²³⁴ The constitutive shortcomings of things are degrees of separation, so to speak; cf. *GC* 2.11, 336b27-31.

²³⁵ On the need to distinguish *eudaimôn* and *makarios* cf. Celano (1985, 209-10) on Priam and the qualification *makarious d’ hôs anthrôpous*.

²³⁶ Cf. Bodéüs (2000, 154-5).

interprets the expression in terms of divine and human intellect: ‘the God, i.e., the *nous*’ and ‘the God vs. the *nous*’ are compatible, since the *nous* is the God in the human, the *archê* of the human system as the God is the *archê* of the cosmic or universal system. That is, it would emphasize the analogy *and* disanalogy, closeness *and* distance, of God and human.²³⁷ That blessedness is not properly human but characterizes humans who are fortunate (enjoy good luck) on top of being happy (acting virtuously) emphasizes the radical difference between our blessedness and Theirs (ineradically relative vs. absolute); that we are capable of being blessed to the extent that we resemble Them, however, emphasizes the kinship and even friendship we can enjoy with Them if we respond to Their call in the form of the duty to perfect oneself that emerges once we have become capable of governing ourselves and which we fulfill by choosing to imitate Their way of life in the orientation and structure of our own. The God and the intellect are analogous (the God is to the universe as the intellect is to the human), but the activity of the God relates to that of the universe as the activity of theoretical intellect (and its virtue) relates to that of practical intellect (and its virtue). So the *kai* is contrastive (analogues) *and* explicative (divine vs. human intellect).

The (dis)analogy of God and human or divine and human intellect lies at the root of the general God-city-human (dis)analogy in Aristotle, for the relation of priestly to political activity in the best polity is that of the activity of theoretical to practical intellect in the virtuous human writ large. Roughly, the (dis)analogy runs: God:universe::religion:city::wisdom:prudence. The analogy is that the latter term in each case relates to the former as its final cause: the universe relates to the God as the best city relates to the ‘spectacle’ (of the God) as the activity of the *phronimos* relates to the ‘contemplation’ that is the end of the philosophic life. The disanalogy is

²³⁷ The double meaning of *theôria* (spectacle and contemplation) suggests that *both* divine and human self-cognition are at issue; on ‘self-cognition’ in Aristotle cf. Russon (1996), but Diamond (2015, ch. 4) in my view offers the more comprehensive account of the ‘two intellects’ problem and its solution.

that the God vis-à-vis the universe is more comprehensive than the spectacle vis-à-vis the city, which is more comprehensive than the contemplation that is the norm of the practical intellect in the virtuous human individual.²³⁸ Indeed, how the universe relates to the God is how the city *should* relate to the spectacle of the God and how the human *should* relate to the contemplation of the God. For ‘the God and the total cosmos’ *norm(s)* how cities and humans relate, i.e., model(s) how they should relate, to the *theôria tou theou* that is their proper end or final cause. So the God-city-human analogy in Aristotle is normative or prescriptive, not just descriptive. If prudence should relate to wisdom, and politics to religion, as the universe relates to the God, then the distorted order of valuation wherein theory to be deemed worthwhile must serve practice and religion politics should give way to the reverse situation, wherein religion as the homage of the city to the God(s) and philosophy as the homage of the human to the very same God(s) are valued as they ought to be.²³⁹ Against what he regards as the perverse order of priority or operation in many cities and humans or polities and ways of life, Aristotle counsels the reverse, and does so in light of his treatment of the God as model to be imitated or norm to be practiced.

But is the God in his treatment the model of any system as a (hylomorphic) whole, or just the paradigmatic instance of the principle of such (ultimately substantial) wholes? Is the living being the hylomorphic whole of soul and body or just the constitutive principle of the whole? As

²³⁸ “For even if [the end that is the human good] is the same for individual / one person (*heni*) and city, that of the city appears greater, at least, and more complete (*teleioteson* [‘the *telos* of this *periechoi* the ends of the others’]) both to attain and to maintain / grasp and preserve (*labein kai sôzein*); for that it be so for one [human] only is to be cherished, but for a people / nation and for cities it is more beautiful and more divine (*theioteson*)” (NE 1.2). Morrison (2001) argues that “The activity of statesmanship is more divine than the activity of securing one’s own happiness because its object is, not exactly immortal, but nonetheless *more immortal*. Just as we are motivated to have children... because this is a way of participating in immortality, or anyway partially escaping the strictures of our own mortality, so we are motivated to engage in politics for the same reason” (231) and distinguishes between “a political life” (“a life of *some* political participation”) and “the political life, i.e. the paradigmatic example of such a life” (“the one which aims to *maximize* the agent’s political activity”) (238). The first claim agrees with my account of ‘degrees of completeness’ in the previous chapter, to which I refer the reader for more precision about terms like *teleioteson*; the second corresponds roughly to how I have used the terms citizen and politician thus far.

²³⁹ Cf. Bodéüs (2000, 183).

he stresses at the outset of $\Lambda.10$, the ‘nature of the whole’ contains (*echei*) ‘the good and the best’ *both* as the order of the whole *and* as its principle (‘something separate and itself by itself’), yet *more* or primarily as the latter, since its presence as the order of the whole depends on its absence from (being constituent of) the whole, but not vice versa (asymmetrical dependence). That is, the universe as the union of substantial orders *includes* the principle as separate from that of which it is the principle.²⁴⁰ The God as hylomorphic system or whole²⁴¹ provides the model of the universe interpreted in terms of that union. Yet ‘the God and the total cosmos’ are not just analogues, for the God is analogous not just to the universe but to its constitutive (though not constituent) principle, the principle that orders the whole of the cosmic system; any system (hylomorphic whole) is ‘especially’ the principle of its constitution. So the God vis-à-vis the universe is also the model of the intellect vis-à-vis the human and of the polity vis-à-vis the city (and, further, of theoretical vis-à-vis practical intellect and of the best polity vis-à-vis the others). Again, the *kai* is both explicative and contrastive, depending on whether the God is the paradigm of the hylomorphic whole or of its principle. The analogy holds in both cases. The God as the paradigm hylomorphic whole is the background model of ‘the total cosmos’ or ‘the nature of the whole’, but any system is ‘especially’ its constitutive principle, so the God also relates to the universe as the intellect relates to the human, and as wisdom should relate to prudence, or as the activity of theoretical intellect should relate to the activity of practical intellect. The celestial motions relate to separate divine acts as the virtuous sort of mortal self-motion relates to *sophia*:

²⁴⁰ For ‘the nature of the whole’ as ‘the association of substantial orders’ cf. Bodéüs (2000, 126-7): “everything that is, in other words, the association of substantial orders, including the order of the first substance, distinct from the orders of which it is the principle. What we thus discover is an extremely inclusive vision of reality or a genuine ‘system’ of being.”

²⁴¹ Cf. *Meta.* $\Delta.26$ on the whole as “that which contains what is contained (*to periechon ta periechomena*) such that they are something one, and this is twofold, either as each being one or as being one from these” (1023b27-8).

as final cause, i.e., good. In the city constituted for the sake of leisure, the relation of political activity to *theôria* is analogous. In both roles (whole and principle), then, the God is normative.

Remember the context of the expression: the anti-apotreptic argument of *Pol.* 7.1-3, which appeals to the sense in which wisdom-loving humans and freedom-loving cities are active, in comparison and contrast to the absolutely internal action of the God and the universe.²⁴² The conception of activity Aristotle is trying to articulate in passages like this and *Meta.* Θ.6 mediates the quietist and activist accounts of *eudaimonia*, inactive and overactive policy, as the context we explored in the previous chapters shows. From the core dilemma of the *Protreptic* to the dispute in terms of which he frames his account of the best way of life and form of government in the *NE* and *Pol.*, Aristotle consistently models his account of the good life on his account of the divine life, of how humans and cities should act in terms of how the Gods do act. Though he draws on the traditional model of the God in first and second philosophy, he draws on the correct(ed) theoretical model in his ethical discourses and political philosophy, making prescriptions for practice on the basis of conclusions proper to theoretical science, and invokes the God in his account of the best life for humans and the best polity for cities (or rather, the best life for cities and humans, the life that is ‘active’ in the focal sense). Conclusions about the system, themselves informed by the model derived from traditional belief, are themselves employed as premises in conclusions about how one ought to act (how the virtuous act): the system and its principle can norm practice as its divine model because both are (at least analogous to) the God, who is the paradigm not only of any system as a whole but also (and even ‘more’) of the principle that rules any system as its proper end or final cause. Comprehending and coordinating the ends of all substance-beings in itself, ‘the God and the total cosmos’ models

²⁴² The active city at the end of the proem is ‘peaceful’ because free (not despite being unfree).

(norms) the relation of theoretical and practical intellect in humans and of ‘religion’ or the (contuitional) spectacle of public worship to political life in cities, that is, provides the end to which humans and cities should aspire and the metric in light of which to evaluate their actions.

3.3 *Conclusions and Ramifications: Seriality and System*

Just as *De Anima* traces the development of the soul, showing how its critical and kinetic (‘cognitive’ and locomotive or ‘theoretic’ and practical) powers differentiate and ultimately reconcile in the development from nutrition to perception to thought and appetite to wish, the *Politics* traces the development of the polis through the series of communities, showing how the best polity reconciles the virtues of theoretical and practical intellect and the ways of life devoted to their exercise. At each stage of the journey we are to follow the (dis)analogy between the previous and successive level of soul and community, how the higher corrects or remedies deficiencies of the lower. Similarly, the deficiencies of the lone human relative to the political community, and of the political community—even the best-constituted—relative to the God and the universe (and generally of mortal relative to immortal or generable and perishable to eternal life), suggest that his account of plant-animal-human life in *DA*, the good life in *NE* and *Pol.*, and the divine life in *Phys.* and *Meta.* are themselves to be read serially. One can also view the series in terms of animal (*DA*), human (*NE* & *Pol.*), and God (*Phys.* & *Meta.*), since the *DA* concludes its treatment of critical and kinetic soul with references to the relation between human and divine reason (in their ‘cognitive’ and ‘locomotive’ aspects), and the *NE* and *Pol.* conclude with references to the relation between the human and divine way of life and polity. On the latter construal the triad is formulable in terms of animal, human, and divine life.

The final book of the *NE* develops a serial solution to the dilemma posed in the contest between the free ways of life and in the form of the reference-question (as regards ‘the best and

most *teleios* virtue' in his definition of happiness): the political life is 'secondarily' (genuinely but derivatively) happy. Likewise, he seeks to overcome the political dilemma of 'inactive' and 'overactive' policy, foreign and domestic, and grades polities not only *ex hypothesi* (on their own terms) but also in terms of the best polity simply speaking. The counterpart in his theoretical philosophy is his attempt to articulate the sense in which activity (*energeia*) is beyond motion (*kinêsis*) and rest (*stasis*). The chief evidence of that attempt is "the Passage" of *Meta.* Θ.6, where Aristotle interprets *energeia* and *kinêsis* in terms of (infinite qua) entelic and atelic action (*praxis*),²⁴³ which figures crucially in his account of the primary unmoved mover and motion in *Meta.* Λ. DA shows how the critical and kinetic powers of the soul develop into full-blown theoretical and practical reason in human beings, as I argued in the first section of this chapter.²⁴⁴ The distinction of theory and practice, crucial in each case, is ultimately overcome in the activity of the completely virtuous agent, of the well-ordered city, and of 'the God and the total cosmos'.

These activities, I have suggested, are themselves to be viewed serially. As I discussed in the previous Part, the analogy between the various sorts of activity, and within 'entelic action' between various examples of entelic action, does not preclude that some complete actions are 'more' complete than others; so long as one interprets 'more' and 'less' complete in terms of absolute and relative completeness, the analogical account is consistent with the focal and serial accounts.²⁴⁵ As he explicitly wrote in the *Protreptic*, the contrast between more and less knowing or perceiving is not limited to the activity vs. capacity of each life function severally, but also goes for terms ordered in relations of priority and posteriority, i.e., focally and even serially:²⁴⁶

²⁴³ 'Infinite qua entelic *praxis*' is the 4th sense of *energeia* in 'the Passage' (vs. qua infinitely divisible, the 3rd sense).

²⁴⁴ How some sort of wisdom (*phronêsis*) is the final stage of the soul (*tês psuchês teleutaion*), as he puts it in *Protr.*

²⁴⁵ The focal account shows how various derivative terms depend on some primary term, e.g., how the categories depend on or are derivative of *ousia*. The serial account shows how the dependents themselves are ordered in relations of priority and posteriority with respect to one another. Analogy ignores such relations to reveal 'equality'.

²⁴⁶ "This distinction between being more or less knowing or perceiving is not restricted to the actuality and potentiality of a single specific living activity, but applies also to terms that are ordered in terms of their priority or

... whenever one and the same [word] is meant of each of two things, and one is meant by [virtue of] the doing (*tô poiein*) and the other by [virtue of] the being done to (*tô paschein*), we shall render the term to belong more to this [former]; such as ‘understanding’ [belongs] more to the one using [it] than to the one having the understanding, and ‘seeing’ [belongs] more to the one casting his sight than to the one able to cast. **For we mean ‘more’ not only according to excess of things for which there is one account, but also according to that which is prior and posterior;** e.g., we say that health is more [of a] good than healthy things, and that what is to be chosen according to its own nature [is more of a good] than what is productive [of it]. And yet we see, at any rate, that it is not by the account of ‘good’ being predicated of both that it applies to each, both to the beneficials and to the virtue. Therefore, the one who is awake (*egrêgorota*) should be said to live / be alive more than the one who is asleep and the one who is active (*energounta*) in the soul [more] than the one only having [the capacity]; for it is on account of the former ‘living’ that we say the latter too [is ‘living’], because like the former he is such as [to be able] to suffer (*paschein*) and to do (*poiein*).

Accordingly, to use anything (*to chrêsthai panti*) at least is this: whenever the capacity is for one thing (*henos*), someone who does (*prattê*) this same thing [uses it], but if the number is more [than one], the one [uses it] who does the best of these, like with flutes, one uses it either only when one uses a flute or especially; for presumably the uses of the other capacities are for this too. Accordingly one should also say that he who uses [a capacity] rightly uses [it] more; for the natural for-which and how (*to eph’ ho kai hôs*) belong to the one using beautifully and precisely. Now of soul too the function is thinking and reasoning either alone or most of all. Therefore, it’s already simple and easy for all to syllogize that the one thinking rightly lives more / is more alive and most of all the one most disclosing-truth, and this is the one being wise and theorizing (*phronôn kai theôrôn*) according to the most precise understanding, and it’s then and to these that completely living (*teleôs zên*) at least is to be rendered...²⁴⁷

Not only in respect of the priority of *energeia* to *dunamis* are those actively thinking or perceiving more alive than those only potentially so, but in case there are many functions, one who does ‘the best of these’ (“thinking and reasoning”) is even ‘more’ alive, ‘and most of all the one who most discloses truth’. Even if the activities differ in account, if they enter relations of priority and posteriority with respect to each other (where the derivative ones are for the sake of the primary one and the primary one for the sake of itself), then the prior (again) is even ‘more’

posteriority... Even when the activities do not have the same defining account (λόγος), if they fall in the order of prior and posterior with the posterior existing for the sake of the prior while the prior exists for the sake of itself, then one can say that prior terms offer the stricter sense of the term in question” (Diamond, 2015, 13).

²⁴⁷ From fr. 6 of A₃ (*Protr.* IX; X; XI; XII); cf. Part 1. I requote the 1st paragraph to stress the context of the (emboldened) expression, more on which below, and the 2nd to stress its relation to the *ergon*-argument conclusion.

alive, and the primary activity is life in the focal sense of the term. Nonetheless, for them to be comparable in terms of more and less, they must be homonymous not merely by chance, but must relate as prior and posterior, as stages or levels (moments) of one and the same activity.²⁴⁸

Such is the case for the serial logic of soul and community in the *DA* and *Pol.* It would also seem to be the case for being (*on*) and substance (*ousia*) in the *Meta.*²⁴⁹ All I am proposing, then, is that these series themselves constitute one series, which unfolds from the human through the city to the God (or from life through human life to divine life). Is there any evidence that Aristotle would agree?

To begin with, the *Protreptic* stressed that the development of rational soul involves the transition from the soul needing its object in order to survive to needing it in order to thrive, live well or be happy. Crucial to the fragment of the *ergon*-argument that concludes with the comparison of philosophic contemplation to religious spectacle (another indication that we are to understand both at once or in their interrelation), e.g., is the premise that “the natural end is that which is the last (*hustaton*) to be accomplished according to the genesis that has grown [lit. natured] when / once the genesis is passed through continuously”. Accordingly, to understand

²⁴⁸ Fraser argues and in my view demonstrates that the focal and serial structure of the categories “are really one and the same structure, understood in different stages of articulation or refinement. We first have the recognition of the ‘focal’ priority of substance relative to the non-substances collectively; and then the more elaborate recognition that the non-substances *themselves* fall into internal relations of priority and posteriority, exhibiting degrees of proximity to the underlying substrate” (2003, 132-3); cf. “While it is acceptable, within the broadest perspective, to speak of a single mode of non-substantial being, over and against the substantial, in truth the non-substances have distinct modes of ‘what-is-being’ (see [*Meta.* Z.4]), in virtue of their different relations to the underlying οὐσία. In general the mode of being of non-substances, following the *Categories*, is that of inherence in a substrate (being ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ), but for each category there is a different way of being ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. The determination of the πρὸς ἐν relations yields a different result for each category” (2002, 73); “This notion of serial unity (unity τὸ ἐφεξῆς) can be regarded as a more precise articulation of the πρὸς ἐν unity of the categories, since it recognizes that the non-substances *themselves* fall into structured relations of priority and posteriority, and exhibit degrees of proximity to the underlying οὐσία” (*ibid.*, 74); “Some caution is required here. I do not mean to say that every instance of focal connection can be articulated in terms of a serial structure. For instance, the various ways of being ‘healthy’ do not obviously admit of any such hierarchical ordering. However I *would* say, inversely, that every serial structure can be regarded as a species of πρὸς ἐν connection” (2003, 139). The structure of life, e.g., is both sequential and focal.

²⁴⁹ Cf. the beginning of the first and last chapters of *Meta.* Λ. The homonymy of being traces back to substance, and the homonymy of substance traces back to divine substance. But these relations are serial, not just focal; cf. Fraser (*ibid.*).

natural beings like us, one must look to the last stage of their development, which exhibits the nature of the being in question more than any other stage of its development, which, after all, are all for the sake of the last, which emerges last in the order of becoming (though is first in the order of being; the orders ‘invert’ one another such that ‘development’ consists in ‘reversion’). In the case of humans, ‘some sort of *phronêsis*’ is the ‘final stage of the soul’ and ‘is the natural end for us’. Its exercise is good simply rather than instrumentally; he contrasts ‘goods proper’ with ‘necessaries’ on the grounds that the former are crucial for the good life whereas the latter are crucial for bare life or brute survival.²⁵⁰ Thus one discerns, in the development of this virtue, the transition from goods needed for survival to goods needed to live well, from the natural necessity of bare life to the rational freedom of the good life, from animal life to human life.²⁵¹

That is, it stressed the development of life into human life, of soul into rational soul or human intellect,²⁵² which is just what the *De Anima* does at the end of its account of the critical and then kinetic side of psychic activity, where it likens human theoretical and practical activity to that of the God and the universe, respectively (and the best sort of practical activity to the changeless motion of the outermost sphere). The *DA* concludes with the distinction between the sense without which the animal would die (*apothnêskein*; mortality) and the senses which the animal has “as was said, not for the sake of being (*tou einai*) but of well-being (*tou eu*),” referring proximately to the previous chapter where he draws roughly the same distinction (with the qualification that taste is necessary though not vital, and that the ‘unnecessary’ senses are necessary in animals like those capable of traversing distance [‘poreutic’]), but possibly also to

²⁵⁰ On the ambiguity of ‘living’ (thriving and surviving) and its relation to ‘living well’ (vs. [just] living) cf. Part 1.

²⁵¹ In agreement with Diamond (2015, 16): “As a result, it can seem that the lower activities, like nutrition or touch, are more fundamental and inherently related to life, whereas seeing or thinking, being simply optional, are less essentially connected to living... Aristotle explicitly repudiates this view”.

²⁵² Bodéüs (2000, 264, n. 86) notes that Aristotle says *noun echein* of humans and *logon echein* of the human soul.

the passage of 2.8 concerning voice as ensouled sound, where he writes that ‘nature uses the inhaled air for two functions, just as it does the tongue for both taste and conversation (*dialekton*), of which taste is necessary (and hence it belongs to more) but interpretation (*hermêneia*) is for the sake of well-being; thus too [nature uses] the breath as necessary for the internal heat... and for the voice so that well-being be present.’²⁵³ Just as the chapters on critical and kinetic soul (mainly 2.5-3.6 & 3.9-11) conclude with their manifestation in rational soul (and the comparison of virtuous action to circular motion), the treatise concludes by discerning what is proper to the good life from what is necessary for bare life, goods proper from bare necessities: “hearing so that something be signified to it, and tongue so that it signify something to another.”

The ‘two functions of nature’ to which this network of passages alludes appears to be equivalent to his proposition in book 8 of the *Pol.* that “nature herself seeks, as has often been said, not only to be busy (*ascholein*) rightly but also to be able to be at leisure beautifully. For the same [sc. leisure] is the one principle of everything”. Indeed, ‘being at leisure beautifully’ is precisely how he characterized the God and the universe (and entelic action generally) at the end of the proem to *Pol.* 7-8. There are actions necessary for living, and actions that constitute living well. Virtuous action is the sort that constitutes the good life, in contrast to the ‘necessity’ or coercive quality of (in)continent action. So I take it the distinctions in *DA* and *Pol.* are consistent.

In Plato too, psychology is to politics as living is to living well, for living is the function of the soul such that living well is the function of its virtue, as the interlocutors of the *Republic* conclude already at the end of book 1. In Aristotle, the account of the good life takes up where the account of plant-animal-human life leaves off. As living is being for living things, so is

²⁵³ Cf. *Pol.* 1.2, 1253a10-9 & 3.6, 1278b16-30.

living-well their well-being.²⁵⁴ Thus, the account of (degrees of) the good life logically follows the account of (degrees of) life. But that sequence suggests that the accounts are serially related.

That the transition from inanimate to living nature in Aristotle is continuous, though a transition nonetheless, is clear from passages such as *Hist. Anim.* 588b4ff.:

Thus nature proceeds (*metabainei*) from the soulless [beings] into the animals little by little (*kata mikron*), such that, due to the continuity, the mid-mark (*to methorion*) of them and on which side of the middle it [(some intermediate form)] is (*to meson poterôn estin*) escapes notice. For after (*meta*) the genus of the soulless [beings] the first is the genus of the plants; and of these one differs relative to another in seeming to partake of life more (*mallon*), but the whole genus [of plants] relative to the other bodies appears pretty much as ensouled, while relative to the animals [it appears] soulless. But the transcension (*metabasis*) from them into the animals is continuous, as was said before... But always, by small difference, each after (*pro*) the other appears having more life and motion. And according to the actions (*praxeis*) of [their] way of life (*biou*) it holds the same way...²⁵⁵

One observes in the transition from inanimate to animate nature and from plant into animal life “a continuous scale of ascent... a graduated differentiation in amount of vitality and in capacity for motion.”²⁵⁶ The scale of life exhibits (*phainetai*) degrees of vitality and autokinetic capacity; as one ascends the scale of life, one discovers clearer and clearer (or more and more explicit) manifestations of life. The limit or last term of the series is life itself and pure (changeless) motion. The last term of the series does the job of the Platonic form, without falling prey to the ‘third man’ critique of the form as the abstract universal; life itself and motion itself is the primary instance of the term in question. Being itself, on his account, is not the genus of all beings but the last term of the series of beings, substance-being (*ousia*). Substance-being, in turn,

²⁵⁴ *DA* 2.4, 415b13. Diamond (2015, 256-7, n. 15) notes that Düring fr. B86 of the *Protr.* on this basis connects ‘degrees of aliveness’ to degrees of being, such that the more alive one is, the more one (qua alive) is. But cf. fn. 76.

²⁵⁵ I use transcension instead of transcendence (one could translate *metabainei* ‘transcends’) mainly to contrast ascension *through* the scale of nature with transcendence of the scale, which the former implies but does not beg the question of ‘separability’, more on which below. Transcension is ‘sublative’ progression. *Meta* implies next, through and beyond all at once; *ephexês* implies mediation; passing through, one passes beyond. On *hexis* and mediation cf. Russon (1996, 789-794).

²⁵⁶ In the translation of Diamond (2015, 17). The end of *DA* similarly connects perceiving that which is in food (nutriment) through (the lens of, so to speak) the pleasant and painful “*kai epithumê kai kinêtai*,” noting the unity of critical and kinetic soul in the case of animals, just before closing with the reference to rational or speaking animals.

is not (at least in the final analysis) the genus of all substances but the last term of the series of substance-beings, divine substance(s), which norm and measure subsequent or derivative substances in the way I described in the previous section. Likewise with the series of goods, then, which reflects the homonymy of being (*NE* 1.6) such that the primary term of the series is ‘the God and the intellect’ (or ‘that which is primary in [the order of] entelechy’), to be construed both as analogues (contrastive *kai*) and as a hendiadys (explicative *kai*), i.e., in terms of the relation of divine and human mind, his account of which culminates in the last book of the *NE*.

Not only do living beings become increasingly alive and autokinetic as one ascends the scale, the same holds for ‘the actions of their way of life’. Aristotle here speaks broadly of any *ergon* of the living being as such as *praxis* and of the *bios* of any living being.²⁵⁷ In *DC* (2.12, 292b1-19), he speaks not just of the transition from inanimate nature to plant and from plant to animal, but of the whole scale of life activities:

Hence one must deem the action of the stars to be of the same sort as that of the animals and plants. For here [on Earth] the greatest [number or variety] of actions are those of the human; for he is able to attain many goods / do many things well, so that his actions are many (*polla prattei*), and for the sake of other [ends], whereas for that which is in the best condition there is no need of action; for it is itself that for the sake which (*auto to hou heneka*), and action is always twofold (*en dusin*): whenever there is both that for the sake of which and that which is for the sake of this. But of the other animals [there is] less [action], and of the plants perhaps [just] some small and single / uniform action; for either [just] one [good] is attainable [for them], as also [for] the human, or, if also many, all on the way toward the best. So one has and partakes of the best, another attains / reaches it straightaway through few [steps], another through many, and another does not even attempt [to secure it] but is satisfied to come into the proximity of the ultimate (*eschatou*); e.g., if health is the end, then one is always healthy, another [gets it] by slimming, another by running and [thus] slimming, another by doing something else for the sake of the running [that leads to slimming], such that the motions (*kinêseis*) are more, while another is unable to attain to being healthy, but only to running or slimming, and for them one or the other of these is the end. For it’s best for all to attain that which is the end especially; but if not, it’s always better inasmuch as it’s closer to the best.

²⁵⁷ Lobkowitz (1967, 10-1) shows how life is *praxis* (vs. *poiêsis*) as *energeia* (vs. *kinêsis*) and thus how the ‘biological’ usage of *praxis* relates to the ‘anthropological’ usage in which it refers to ‘rational and purposeful human conduct’. He cites *Pol.* 1.2, 1254a7ff. (“life is action, not production”), though ‘life’ here is *bios*. I take it that the following passage gives a rather coherent, albeit cryptic, account of the actions of all (including nonhuman) *bioi*.

The sequence of actions here corresponds to the series of life activities that constitute the various kinds of living being. There is the God who has no need to act, then there are two kinds of living being for whom ‘the most divine principle’ (as he goes on to call it) is attainable, but only through motion, one through one action (circular locomotion), the other through several intermediary activities (eating, perceiving, thinking). Then there are the other animals, who do only two of these activities, and plants, who do only one; they are only able to perform the functions that in human beings are subordinate to and sublimated in the activity of thought.²⁵⁸ The action(s) peculiar to the kind of living being define(s) its way of life, and these ways of life constitute degrees of proximity to the best, i.e., are hierarchically ordered; the kinds of life are also degrees of life. But ‘more’ and ‘less’ in such cases implies prior and posterior, i.e., seriality.

So the continuous hierarchy of life extends through every kind of living being, from the life of plants to the life of Gods. But if the lower levels of the scale of life are ultimately for the sake of the higher (though capable of existing independently in the lower forms of life), such that the former are ‘at scale’ even as they are taken up and transformed in the latter, what prevents us from reading the whole development in terms of one comprehensive series (that includes and orders its constituent sub-series)? Nor does Aristotle simply dichotomize animate and inanimate nature. For plant life or nutritive soul on his account is rooted in and articulates the deep structure of inanimate nature, depending on it for the use of food (inanimate nature becomes instrumentally necessary as food for animate nature) and developing the structure of acting (*poiein*) and being affected (*paschein*) operative already at the level of inanimate nature, which prefigures the structure of nutrition and thus ultimately of cognition and self-motion (since

²⁵⁸ Cf. Diamond (2015, 18-9).

nutritive activity is precisely proto-critical and proto-kinetic).²⁵⁹ The fragment of the *Protr.* that explains the ‘more qua prior’ principle (of seriality) refers twice to doing and suffering, in the second instance coordinating them with *energeia* and *dunamis* such that doing and suffering require the capacity for it, that one be able (or has the *dunamis*) to act or be acted upon (even passivity requires capacity), discussing the structure at the level of living being or activity. That ‘Aristotle’ notes the principle of seriality (that potencies operating for the sake of activities are serially ‘subsequent’ or ‘secondary’ to them) as he is explaining how doing and suffering operate in the case of life activity, however, suggests that he may have the ontological significance of these categories in mind.²⁶⁰ In any case, the scale of nature is continuous even in the transition from inanimate to animate nature, wherein life distinguishes itself by the capacity of nutritive activity, which ultimately develops into the capacity for cognition and autokinesis or self-motion.

His account of the polis fits into his account of the scale of natural systems (ultimately ‘the nature of the whole’) for at least three related reasons: (1) the city is the nature of the community (as the *nous* is the nature of the soul), (2) its constitution is analogous to that of any natural system (in the series of natural systems), (3) the human is the political animal, the polis being the natural end of the original desire behind human community (comprehensive of the end

²⁵⁹ Diamond (2015) shows how the structure of *GC* 1.7 recurs at each stage or level of the soul; “the primary psychological distinction between soul as the cause of cognition and soul as the cause of motion is the difference between its powers for being acted upon (*πάσχειν*) and acting (*ποιεῖν*) respectively” (288, n. 84). “Each of the principal distinctions is the whole substance, less and more explicit to itself. These distinctions reduce to two, which contain the rest: the soul seeks to know, to find itself in what is presented to itself as other, and to move, to initiate from itself its relations to another” (Doull apud Diamond, *ibid.*, 308, n. 79). See also Russon (1996, 784ff.).

²⁶⁰ For which reason I am not sure that the *Protr.* did not recognize the ‘deep structure’ behind animal and even plant life, as Diamond (2015, 256, n. 11) suggests (“he does not consider the nutritive activity of plants. Living is rather defined, as it is for Plato, by the presence of perception”), though presumably the *Protr.* “does not bring his analysis of the various kinds of life into the immersion in nature to the same extent,” which would be inappropriate for a work about living well (in *Protr.* but perhaps not in *Eud.*). On ‘action and passion’ as the human version of ‘acting and being acted upon / affected’ (or ‘doing and being done’) as ontological categories cf. Kosman (2014, ch. 4), who notes that relating the contrasts thus “is on the assumption that *πράττειν* is a special case of *ποιεῖν* and not, as Aristotle comes to understand it, vice versa. Compare his uses of *κίνησις* and *ἐνέργεια* for a similar reversal of the common understanding” (302, n. 3).

of each stage or level of community). In the best polity, politics stands to worship as prudence stands to wisdom in the completely virtuous human. The constitution of well-ordered cities and humans resembles that of the universe; we ought to constitute ourselves in the way that the God constitutes the universe. Spectacle and contemplation (should) norm human and political action in the way that the God already and always governs the universe, ruling without commanding as final cause. These natural systems are analogous; they are disanalogous, however, as regards the *degree* to which they (humans, cities, and Gods) are complete and self-sufficient. Lone humans are less complete and self-sufficient than cities, but even political communities are mortal, though ‘more’ immortal than their constituent citizens (institutions don’t die like people do, but are still perishable). The (dis)analogy of the terms suggests seriality, that the good of the city comprehends the individual goods of its citizens just as ‘the good and the best’ comprehends the goods of all natural beings (including humans and cities). The universe is the paradigmatically complete and self-sufficient community: the cosmic community, so to speak, is the most complete and self-sufficient, even ‘more’ than the political community, for which reason its constitution norms that of any ‘subsequent’ or ‘derivative’ natural system, including that of humans and cities (however special and in some ways exceptional the case of the city may be). That norm is to be understood in terms of the God both as perfect hylomorphic whole (whose body and soul are beyond antagonism) and as the constitutive principle that governs the whole.

Aristotle appeals to seriality to solve analogous problems in *DA*, *NE* & *Pol.*, and *Meta*. The *Protr.* leaves room for the serial solution to the problem of which is the best way of life, as I argued in Part 1. *DA* articulates the basis of that solution, for the priority of *sophia* and the philosophic life follows the natural priority of the power of the soul of which it is the function. The differentiation, development, and ultimate reconciliation of critical and kinetic soul in the

harmony of theoretical and practical intellect, intellect and desire, or rational and appetitive desire in virtuous human agents shows the basis of the division (though ultimate integrity) of theoretical and practical reason and hence of their respective virtues.²⁶¹ Analogously, the city governs the serial logic of community as its natural end, and the best polity reconciles the best ways of life. The best form of government, like the best way of life, is the most Godlike, since the God is the paradigm of the good life, the paradigm case of living well, whereas the God (as principle) and the universe (as system) jointly model the structure of the best polity, which reconciles the best ways of life.

The development in each case is toward the reconciliation of the original partition. Just as *DA* compares the integrity of the soul in virtuous human action to the action of the total cosmos, reconciling the sides of the soul in practice just as *nous* and *orexis* are reconciled in theory (via the desire or ‘will’ to contemplate that explains the transition from knowing or understanding to thinking or contemplating), *NE* (esp. 10) resolves the referent-question (of ‘the best and most *teleios* virtue’) and the corollary question of the best way of life serially, in terms of degree (more *qua prior*). His account of the best polity, similarly, is ambiguous: best simply vs. best *ex hypothesi*, and even his answer to the former is ambiguous: the case of the implausibly virtuous man who deserves to be absolute monarch vs. the case of people who are relatively equal in respect of virtue (and therefore desert, on his account), who would presumably do well to respect his ‘consultation’ of the God in delimiting the best polity at the end of the *Pol. Meta.* Λ investigates the homonymy of substance, showing how the series of substance(s) culminates in divine substance(s), substance in the focal sense. The chapters on divine substance(s) reveal the paradigm case of substance-being, eternally reconciling the sides (cognitive and locomotive or

²⁶¹ My basic response to the question of Diamond (2015, 310, n. 120).

theoretical and practical) that in humans and cities can fall out of sync. Once we have become able to choose our way of life, it is up to us to effect the integrity of soul and city that the God and the universe model(s). Thus we become as Godlike as mortals can be, rendering homage to the God(s) in the cultivation of our highest capacity and in the very (re)structuring of our lives.

VII. Conclusion

To conclude, let me take a step back to review the entire argument of my dissertation.

The first Part argues that the *Protreptic* was dialogical in form and that its content, dialogically interpreted, is consistent with the content of ‘mature’ treatises such as the *NE* and *Pol.*, though the latter claim depends on the reading of the latter texts that I work out in the second Part and develop in the third (especially through my reading of *NE* 10 and *Pol.* 7-8). After introducing the dilemma of ‘quietism’ and ‘activism’ in Greek literature up to the time of Aristotle generally, it begins with the dialogue hypothesis. Articulating several reasons that it is more plausible than not (such that the burden is on its detractors), I contend that the ultimate test of the hypothesis is whether its fragments cohere under dialogical interpretation, a task that to my knowledge had not been attempted until I wrote the chapter, wherein I ‘reweave’ the dialogue (rhapsodically). By their ‘coherence’ I intend primarily that their usage of *sophia* and *phronêsis* is consistent throughout, which is distinct from and prior to the question of whether its usage is consistent with that of the treatises. My argument for that thesis is the further thesis about the ‘three-ring circus of ambiguity’ wherein, as the conversation develops, each of the characters adopts his interlocutors’ usage (of *sophia* and *phronêsis*) *arguendo*, even as he turns it around on them to fit his own usage (e.g. of ‘philosophy’). More precisely, each character uses *sophia* and *phronêsis* interchangeably *and* contrastively, in light of his account of “what being happy truly is.” To recognize the internal coherence of the fragments (let alone their consistency with the treatises), I contend, one must accept my thesis about the ‘circus of ambiguity’ at work in the dialogue, which I sustained through my reading of the entire evidence base. At least, it is one interpretive hypothesis that succeeds in explaining the entire evidence base, which the

monologue hypothesis fails to do. Since their usage is coherent under dialogical interpretation, the ‘schizophrenic’ hypothesis (concerning its relation to that of the treatises) is otiose.

Rather, the extent to which the fragments use them interchangeably (some but not all) is explicable in terms of ‘rhetorical context’ not just in the sense that the work was addressed to an ‘exoteric’ audience (i.e., outside or not limited to the school) but in the sense of the internal audience of the dialogue, the contestants themselves vis-à-vis one another and the crowd of spectators, both internal to the dialogue and, as ‘exoteric’ suggests, ourselves. Moreover, to preserve consistency of usage among the fragments themselves (let alone how their usage relates to that of the treatises), they *must* be read dialogically, i.e., weaved into the context of the development of the conversation, which progresses along the lines of the structure I articulate at the outset of the chapter. Not only by parsimony, then, but to account for the evidence base,²⁶² one should assume the dialogue hypothesis. My dialogical reading of the fragments in chapter 2, I claim, confirms the hypothesis.

And since the solution of the *Protreptic* to the dilemma between overly quietist or exclusively theoretical and overly activist or exclusively practical accounts of the good life (embodied in the complementary one-sidedness of his interlocutors and expressed in the contrast of A₃ to H₃ as responses to I₂) is consistent with his solution to analogous dilemmas in *NE* and *Pol.* (though different in emphasis), I claim, one should reject (at least this crucial premise of) the ‘schizophrenic’ hypothesis (schizophrenia due to metanoia). To the extent that the fragments of the *Protr.* are themselves, taken together, schizo-phrenic, it is because of the broad sense of *phronêsis* at play in the dialogue, which the characters appropriate as they see fit, in light of their accounts of “what being happy truly is”; namely, quietist and activist accounts of *eudaimonia*,

²⁶² Objection: the inclusion of I₂ in the evidence base begs the question. Response: the inconsistency of H₃ and A₃ is another core reason (independent of Cicero).

philosophic and political ways of life. But the claim depends on readings of the treatises that I therefore proceed to develop in the next Part.

I split the second Part into three sections, the first devoted to elucidating the grounds of his solution to the dilemma in the *NE* and *Pol.*, the second to the ongoing debate in anglophone scholarly literature between ‘exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’ accounts of Aristotle on *eudaimonia*, the third to the counterpart or analogue in his theoretical philosophy of the dilemma in his practical or political philosophy. Ultimately I argued that his resolution of the dilemma in each case is precisely analogous, such that I formulated on his behalf the ‘human-city-God analogy’, which I associated with the series of discourses on life, human life, and divine life or soul, city, and God, mainly *DA*, *NE* and *Pol.*, *Phys.* and *Meta.*²⁶³

Situating the dilemma at the heart of the ethical and political treatises in the context of the *Protreptic* interpreted dialogically lets us see how the solution of Aristotle in the treatises grows out of the solution of ‘Aristotle’ in the dialogue. Formally, for example, it lets us see how the structure of the *NE* as a whole and book 10 in particular elaborates the argumentative structure that led to the ultimate conclusion of A₃. Content-wise, I contend that the way in which *sophia* is useful qua instrumentally valuable in the relevant fragments of *Protr.* is compatible with *NE* 6, which admits of a way in which *both* theoretical and practical wisdom are intrinsically *and* instrumentally valuable, though the *Protr.* fragments emphasize the (indirect) instrumental value of *sophia* whereas texts like the beginning of the *Meta.*, e.g., deemphasize it. These are not inconsistent accounts, though they differ in emphasis. Whence the shift in emphasis? I maintain that it is due to ‘rhetorical context’ in the double sense I spoke of (not ‘schizophrenia due to metanoia’). Crucially, I compare the aporia in *NE* 6.12 of how *sophia* and *phronêsis* are useful to

²⁶³ I mostly bracket the *EE*, save for my account of its conclusion in the previous chapter.

the intrinsic and instrumental justification of philosophy in *Protr.* (and the reinterpretation of *praxis* as a non-technical kind of *poiêsis* in 6.12 to the reinterpretation of *kinêsis*—and by extension *poiêsis*—as incomplete or deficient *praxis* in *Meta.* Θ.6). Further, I argue that the proem to *Pol.* 7-8 (7.1-3) develops the solution at the level of state policy, so to speak, resolving the tension between apolitical quietism and a(nti)theoretical activism in the constitution of the best city. The problem and solution in all three texts is analogous, though different in emphasis.

Having clarified the premises that figure in his solution to the problem in 2.1 (in my formulation, ‘*theôria* is the *only* activity that is *simply* complete and autarkic’, where ‘simply’ means ‘absolutely or unconditionally’ vs. ‘relatively or conditionally’), I proceed in 2.2 to situate the dispute in recent anglophone scholarship among exclusivist and inclusivist (and incompatibilist) readings of *eudaimonia* in Aristotle in the older framework of quietist vs. activist (or inactivist vs. overactivist) accounts of *eudaimonia*, in terms of which early Greek literature framed the question (as I tried to show in the *Intro*). There are different versions of each reading, however, and I argue that the ‘tempered’ and ‘moderate’ versions of exclusivism and inclusivism, respectively, are compatible, and that the serial solution Aristotle develops to the problem of the best life reconciles exclusivist and inclusivist answers to the referent-question, which is what I take the root of the controversy to be. As the *only* activity that is unconditionally its own end and autarkic, *theôria* is the *most* entelic and autarkic action; as such it is that which the happiest prioritize. As the only way of life that is *simply* its own end, without qualification (in principle), philosophy is the *best*, i.e., *most* entelic and autarkic way of life. Thus he does not exclude that the political life is secondarily happy, though he emphasizes it only in *NE* 10, which effectively ranks the free ways of life in order (degree) of goodness and Godlikeness. Further,

Pol. 7-8 structures the best city on the model of the God, model of the sort of life and action that well-constituted cities and humans strive to realize in their own; I turn to *Pol.* in the next section.

With this account of the *NE* solution in place, 2.3 compares it to the serial solution of *Pol.* to the problems that derive from its programmatic opening, which I associated with the following propositions: (1) each community and polity is to be understood in terms of its own form, function or end, yet is ultimately to be evaluated in terms of the divine life and polity as metric, (2) the polis is the most complete and self-sufficient community yet nonetheless ‘incompletely self-sufficient’ vis-à-vis the unconditional independence and interdependence of ‘the God and the total cosmos’, (3) the latter model the best and second-best ways of life, respectively, and together model the life that the city most of all forms of community and the best polity most of all forms of government strives to realize. Ultimately, I argue that *NE* and *Pol.* articulate serial solutions to analogous problems that are consistent with the solution of ‘Aristotle’ in the *Protr.*

But the logic of reconciliation at work in these solutions, I contend, grows out of the ‘basic’ twofold division of his psychology between ‘critical’ and ‘kinetic’ functions of the soul, which develops into that of theoretical and practical functions of the human soul or intellect. In the interest of fuller disclosure, then, to contextualize these ‘serial solutions’ in (what I ultimately argue is) the serial logic of the corpus as a whole, I proceed to offer my account of the *DA* insofar as it articulates the account of life that his ethical and political writings presuppose in their account of the good life. For one cannot fully account for the distinction and relationship between *sophia* and *phronêsis* without recognizing how virtue in general is just the (natural or developed) capacity to function well, and how they in particular are the capacities of the noetic soul to function well (living is what the soul does, so living well is what the virtuous soul does). To understand the psychological division, one must examine its roots in the proto-cognitive and

proto-locomotive structure of nutritive soul or plant life, and follow the division all the way to its reconciliation in the activity of theoretical intellect beyond externality and in that of the practical intellect of prudent and ethically virtuous agents, which is beyond externality in another respect. The ‘conceptual halves’ of the treatise (on critical and kinetic soul; mainly 2.5-3.6 & 3.9-11) culminate²⁶⁴ with references to the relation of human thinking and desiring to divine thinking and celestial motion, respectively, comparing the activity of mind once it has internalized its objects (such that in thinking them it thinks itself) with eternally active thinking and the self-motion of the virtuous agent with the changeless motion of the outermost sphere. Ultimately, I argue, the sides of the soul that are divided in the transition from nutritive to perceptive soul or plant to animal life (plant life is precisely unconscious and stationary yet proto-critical and proto-kinetic) are reconciled in the activity of theoretical *nous* and its virtue, which integrates rational *orexis*, and of practical *nous* and its virtue, which integrates the rational and appetitive desire(s) of virtuous agents, preserving the division in its (re)unification at the level of conduct and policy.

That reconciliation is “intentional” or ‘deliberate and thus chosen’ in the way I describe in the next section. Virtuous action reconciles the sides of the soul that get alienated in the split between critical and kinetic modes of cognition in rational agents (*aisthêsis*, *nous*, and *orexis*), and hence are alienated or externally related in akratic and enkratic agents and action. Containing appetite beyond restraint, reason or wish relates to it as the convex to the concave; such action or self-motion is the most akin to circular (infinite) vs. rectilinear (finite) motion, to the immortal rather than mortal or eternal rather than generable and perishable sort of motion. Just as on the critical side, thinking is to perceiving as the bent line relates to itself when rectified, on the kinetic side, the rational and appetitive desire of virtuous agents relate(s) as convex and concave

²⁶⁴ On ‘culminate’ cf. Part 2.3.2.

(or center and periphery). That is, these sides of the soul *should* relate that way (though needn't). Further, not any and every (object of) wish qualifies to be or appear in the first premise of the practically virtuous person (ultimately legislator), for the *phronimos* is free in the robust sense that the content of his choice is not heteronomously determined, such that he is not alienated from himself in the choice, to which Aristotle crucially contrasts the apolaustic individual, who, though “free” to choose to enslave himself, metaphorically speaking, is nonetheless unfree in the choice of life not properly his own. Rather, freedom requires that wish be reflected in the content of choice, either *tout court* in the case of externals being as prayed for (blessedness), or at least qua ‘having a say’ in determining the content of choice, the options among which one chooses. In the well-ordered human and city, practical *nous* or rational *orexis*²⁶⁵ plays the role of form while *orexis* or perceptual *orexis* (orectic *aisthêsis* or appetite) plays the role of matter; moreover, *sophia* relates to *phronêsis* and worship to politics as the God relates to the universe (‘the total cosmos’ or ‘the nature of the whole’). That is, these sides of the human soul and the city *should* relate to one another as divine activity and celestial motion, or as soul and body of the God. Once we are capable of governing ourselves, it is up to us to choose—in effect or intent—to model our way of life on that of the God(s), (re)constituting in the soul and city the union the God eternally enjoys.

That choice and action is the highest form of piety, for Aristotle, for it fulfills the obligation to perfect oneself that emerges once the system is capable of self-government.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ I have tried to remain as neutral as possible on the precise relation between these, whether they are equivalent (mutually reducible) or not, though I argue that practical thought of the universal grounds the rational desire of virtuous agents, that ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ desire figure in the 1st and 2nd premises of that syllogism, respectively, and that the highest level of noetic activity integrates *orexis* just as that of orectic activity integrates *nous*. Hence my suggestion that the unity of *nous* and *orexis*, the twofold division, is *accomplished*, for Aristotle, in virtuous activity.

²⁶⁶ “When all goes well, practical *nous* comes to be in stages not unlike those in which an animal’s essentially embodied capacities come to be. Just as Aristotle takes the emergence of the heart to mark an embryological turning point, whence the embryo’s own heart starts to guide its development, so too he may take the emergence of practical *nous* to mark an ethical turning point, whence the agent’s own practical *nous* starts to guide her development. But

Conforming to the best order, one conforms to the divine order; conforming to the divine order, one conforms to the best order. Imitating (even self-consciously modeling ourselves on) the God(s), we perfect ourselves; perfecting ourselves, we imitate the God(s). Our duty to self-perfect thus interchanges with our duty (and presumable ability) to become as Godlike as we can. Imitating the God(s) in the structure of their lives, virtuous examples of the philosophic and political lives resemble the two sides of divine activity in their union beyond division. It is up to us to reconcile what is already and always reconciled in the activity of the God and the universe.

The various locutions Aristotle uses to refer to divine activity can be confusing, I argued, because any system is both the whole system and yet ‘especially’ the principle of its constitution. Hence the expression ‘the God and the total cosmos’ at the end of *Pol.* 7.1-3 (which otherwise claims to consult simply the God) is ambiguous in the way that ‘the God and the intellect’ in *NE* 1.6 is ambiguous: they can be analogues, where the soul and body of the God are compared to the separate intellect(s) who govern(s) celestial matter and motion, such that the *kai* is read contrastively, or the God can relate to the universe as its constitutive principle qua final cause, as practical *nous* relates to *orexis* in the ethically virtuous agents (unmoved vis-à-vis moved mover) and as the activity of theoretical intellect relates to that of practical intellect in well-constituted humans and cities. Thus we come to the ‘human-city-God analogy’ that I finally argue is ultimately to be understood serially, in the way that *DA*, *NE* & *Pol.*, and *Meta.* severally suggest.

But only severally. For it belongs to his method to leave the systematizing up to us, to work out the connections not only of the arguments within each treatise but of the treatises themselves. All I propose here is that the treatises on life, the good life, and the divine life

we should not expect practical *nous* in its early stages to be anymore capable of doing everything it is the function of mature practical *nous* to do than we expect the heart of an embryo to do everything it is the function of a mature heart to do. Practical *nous* in an adolescent is at best incomplete, and Aristotle thinks that it remains incomplete in many (perhaps even most) adults” (Whiting, 2023b, 171).

(physical and metaphysical) are related in the way that which they treat is, in order of degree (where more = prior), i.e., serially. That one must infer the answer to such questions, I suggest, is due at least as much to his pedagogical method as to the incomplete preservation of his corpus.

In any case, what I hope to have demonstrated is the structural coherence of his inquiries in the *DA*, *NE*, *Pol.*, and *Meta.*, that their ultimate conclusions are analogous. The series in each case culminates in the focal term that comprehends its dependents as ‘derivative’ (however necessary they may be for the focal term to exist). Yet his account of life transitions into his account of the good life, which is integrally wedded to his account of the divine life; indeed, *NE* famously ends with a paean that doubles as an advertisement for those interested in studying at the Lyceum.

So, I propose that there is at least one sense in which the Aristotelian corpus is systematic (though it is not *as* systematic as the Hegelian corpus, e.g.): serial unity and logic *is* systematic for Aristotle in the rather precise sense that each level of the scale of nature and life relates to the next as material to form, such that it is hylomorphic ‘all the way up’, that is, culminates in the ultimate hylomorphic whole, ‘the God and the total cosmos’ or ‘the nature of the whole’; the ‘system’ on his account is the hylomorphic whole, of the plant, animal, human, city, universe. To the degree we are autonomous, it is up to us to integrate ourselves, make whole what was broken, make ourselves whole. The well-ordered human and city unify in one system theory and practice.

That is why, I submit, Aristotle both distinguishes and identifies theory and practice. That they can alienate one another in cities and humans suggests that theoretical and practical modes of cognition are radically distinct. Yet they *should* relate to one another, Aristotle prescribes, as hylomorphic whole. That whole is virtue, but virtue as a *pros hen legomenon*, not just as the generic whole that includes all particular virtues as parts, but the virtue whose exercise

comprehends that of all other virtues as final cause, *phronêsis* and ultimately *sophia* or *theôria*. Aristotle identifies theory as a kind of practice, indeed as practice in the proper sense of the term and moreover as the best (most complete and self-sufficient) practice, on the other hand, precisely in contexts where the overcoming or reconciliation of theoretical and practical life, say, is at issue.²⁶⁷ In his account of the soul, it is precisely at the culmination of the series that theoretical and practical cognition, *nous* and *orexis*, reconcile. Only ‘the God and the *nous*’ and ‘the God and the total cosmos’, however, absolutely reconcile cognitive and locomotive activity.

But Aristotle does not begin with that reconciliation and then proceed to show how mortal forms of life (plant, animal, human) imitate or ‘retrieve’ it each in their own way, even if these ways constitute degrees of retrieval. Rather, his account of life begins where his account of inanimate nature leaves off, at the point of emergence of the most rudimentary or immediate form of life, the (abstract) universal common denominator of mortal lives, nutritive activity.²⁶⁸ From there he ascends through ‘critical’ modes of animal and human cognition, on the one hand, and through ‘kinetic’ modes of animal and human cognition, on the other, to the most comprehensive form, which, as the last term of the series, is the most comprehensive instance (as the abstract universal cannot be). Even the most complete and self-sufficient form of human cognition (theoretical and practical), however, remains less complete and self-sufficient than the

²⁶⁷ Clarifying texts like *DC* 2.12, which rejects the *need* for that which already ‘has’ the good to act (*outhen dei praxeôs*), that some lack or defect *compels* or *necessitates* its action (external), then proceeds to contrast entelic and atelic *praxis*. *NE* 10.8, similarly, ascribes theoretical but not practical and productive activity to the Gods on the ground that the sort of action (*praxeis poias*) meant, ethically virtuous action, is unworthy of Them, since it presumes insufficiency or lack. *Pol.* 7.3 clarifies that the sort of action at issue in these passages is *external* action; cf. fn. 105.

²⁶⁸ On the qualification “this [nutritive capacity] is able to be separate(d) of/from the others, but the others are not able to be separate(d) of/from this in the mortals (*en tois thnêtois*) at *DA* 2.2, 413a31-2, cf. Bodéüs (2000, 130-1). ‘Picking up’ (*hupolambanein*) where the previous speech or speaker ‘leaves off’ (*lêgein*) is rhapsodic lingo; at the Panathenaia, “each competing rhapsode would be required to take up the Homeric narrative continuum where the previous rhapsode had left off. We may compare this rhapsodic imperative with the dramatic imperative of one actor’s picking up the dialogue where the previous actor had left off” (Nagy, 2002, 28).

only absolutely complete and self-sufficient activity, that of the God(s). The developmental or serial logic of soul thus *entails* (rather than presupposes) the divine life. It is crucial to the Aristotelian method or procedure that the God emerges in conclusion rather than presupposition.

So unsystematic readings of Aristotle are right to stress the genuinely ‘developmental’ and even empirical method to which he normally commits himself.²⁶⁹ He does not start with the divinity as metric and proceed to show whether and how mortal life forms measure up,²⁷⁰ but analyzes each according to its own immanent developmental logic until that very logic passes beyond itself, to so to speak, cries out for rectification at the next level, and so on up. But their insight into the ‘unsystematic’ aspect of the corpus is not incompatible with the quest of ancient and medieval commentators to discover the *skopos* or unifying thread of each treatise (and, perhaps, of the corpus as a whole) and, concurrently, the ‘theological’ reading or dimension of these arguments. Rather, the divine life is the focal (*pros hen*) referent of life that emerges at the end of the investigation of the series of life forms, the ultimate term of the series that explains why each of the ‘lower’ terms develops as it does. To pursue the logic of life, with Aristotle, one must study the basic analogical structure uniting all forms of life in terms of the scale of life (identification of subject and object) *and* the disanalogy (how that identification transpires) to grasp the (direction of) development or progression. To grasp the disanalogy, one must grasp the analogy; to grasp the analogy, it is helpful to witness the disanalogy.²⁷¹ The direction of the argument comes *through* witnessing how the analogous or analogical levels are unified in reference (diverse as that reference may be) to one, i.e., focally and ultimately serially (where the focal dependents relate to one another in order of priority and posteriority, primacy and

²⁶⁹ With a few pregnant exceptions, as in *DA* 2.4, which ‘previews’ the ultimate satisfaction of desire in the divinity.

²⁷⁰ Intending ‘life form’ here ambiguously, so as to include forms of *zôê* and *bios*.

²⁷¹ Hence my somewhat cryptic use of ‘(dis)analogy’ in the foregoing; their contuition, so to speak, is crucial.

derivativeness). That goes for any Aristotelian treatise. Perhaps it also goes for his *logoi* at once or together, at least insofar as the being they investigate determines the structure of his thinking.

Systematic readings, then, are right to stress the ‘unifying thread’ and ‘theological dimension’ of each investigation, but wrong or inadequate insofar they premise the conclusion of the investigation at each stage of the argument. The logic of serial unity captures the respect in which his procedure is systematic. As Diamond has shown, *DA* is “completely systematic” in the sense that the conceptual halves of the treatise correspond to the basic division of the soul, culminating in reference to the two sides of divine activity. I have argued that ‘completion’ here is (or is a function of) the *reconciliation* of the sides of the soul that got split or were alienated in the transition from the nutritive stage of life to perceptive and appetitive life. Further, I have argued that the reconciliation at issue is ‘systematic’ in the rather precise sense that the sides at the end of the development form one system or hylomorphic whole (system in the sense that Aristotle himself uses the term).²⁷² The relation of practical *nous* to *orexis* and of theoretical *nous* to practical *nous* in virtuous agents is that of form to matter; to become virtuous is to retrieve the original unity of the soul at the level of (dia)noetic soul, making whole what was broken and is up to us to integrate. Serial logic is systematic in the sense that each level of the series constitutes its own system that develops into, gets taken up and transformed in, the next, and so on up to the last term of the series, which is the complete system (though especially its constitutive principle).

Analogical, focal, and serial comprehension are thus integrally related on the Aristotelian account such that the ascent through (dis)analogy is one with the focal ‘reference’ of derivative

²⁷² See also Nagy (2002, ch. 3) on wholeness and order (*sustasis*) in the *Poet*. “From the standpoint of archaic poetic diction, ... the word *prooimion* refers exclusively to the beginning of a Homeric performance, whereas *humnos* can refer optionally to the whole performance—not only the *prooimion* but also the epic that extends from it” (86), i.e., it can refer both to the beginning and to the whole; cf. my discussion of systems and their constitutive principles in this Part. Further, cf. his account of *metabêsomai allon es humnon* with my remarks on *metabasis* and ‘reconciled otherness’ in what follows.

terms to a primary term, where the focal dependents may exhibit relations of priority and posteriority among themselves (with respect to the primary term) and thus enjoy serial relationship. The same terms may be analogues, focal dependents and members of series. The integral comprehension of beings in terms of all three modes of relation at once, so to speak, is the comprehension of development, ultimately of the term that itself comprehends the series. That development is the transcension (*metabasis*) that constitutes the scale of being, nature, life. As he writes of body as the third, last and complete term of the series of magnitude in *DC* 1 (as the city is the complete community in *Pol.* 1),

there is no *metabasis* into another kind (*genos*), as [there is] from length into surface and from surface into body. For otherwise body would no longer be the complete sort of magnitude. For it's necessary that there come to be excession / progression according to the deficiency (*tên ekbasin kata tēn elleipsin*); but the complete is not such as [to be able] to be deficient (*elleipein*), for it is [or extends] in every direction / all three directions.²⁷³

The transformation is complete in that the initial term through the intermediary term has become the final term. But just as there is no simple discontinuity between animate and inanimate nature, or mental and natural activity, on his account, his account of life shades into his account of the good life (rather as the *NE* shades into the *Pol.*). Even in the *Protr.*, we saw, living well is living in the full and proper sense. And as the (dis)analogy of embryological and ethical development (of the heart and the *nous*) suggests, the end of the development is self-government or autonomy, i.e., freedom. That freedom, paradoxically, is coextensive with likeness or similitude to the God. But the transformation in any case is toward the final term of the series.

The logic of serial unity is systematic, and systems form (ultimately one) series. Thus, the question of systematicity in Aristotle reduces to the question of seriality. Not all systematic

²⁷³ Cursory search of the *LSJ* for *metabasis* & *metabainô* reveals various intriguing usages, including political and poetic transformation. 'Procession' might work for *ekbasis*, but begs questions about the Aristotelian vs. Platonic and/or Neoplatonic beginning point, on which cf. Diamond (2015, 21-35).

accounts are serial in the doggedly ‘empirical’ manner I described, but the serial account Aristotle evidently endorses in various contexts is systematic in the sense I described. Serial logic unifies the univocal account of life, e.g., in terms of the most rudimentary activity present in all mortal life forms (synonymously, except that, as it turns out, the meaning of the lower transforms as it becomes subordinate to the higher) and the equivocal account in terms of the particular activity distinctive of each form of life (such that ‘life’ in each case, or each kind of case, is homonymous). Beyond the rigid univocity of the abstract universal and the disjointed equivocity of accidentally homonymous particulars, the serial account integrates unity and multiplicity such that derivative terms (many) relate to the primary term (one) in order of degree.

The steps leading to the fulfillment of the final term are necessary, but once one has completed the development, are they still necessary? Or are they no longer necessary, such that one can do away with the ladder once one has ascended? In retrospect, the steps were necessary. But are they still necessary, once one has become capable of self-governance? Aristotle offers complicated answers to these questions. Crucially, he recognizes multiple ways of being separable (senses of separability) or independent (senses of independence). The way in which the (serially) lower activities of living beings are separable from the higher activities (consider plants and sleeping animals), e.g., i.e., in the sense that they can exist apart from them (though not as what they were in cases where they were subordinate to the higher activity), is not equivalent to the way in which the higher activity attains independence or separability, i.e., in the sense that it is the most independent of externality,²⁷⁴ though they are somehow the inversion of one another.

²⁷⁴ An expression I used previously, paradoxical because ‘independence’ seems to presume externality (negative); I intend it to suggest a more positive conception of independence (self-determination; nothing other to heteronomously determine it). Cf. Diamond (2015, 261-2, n. 15 & 16; 269, n. 86; 169ff.), Whiting (2023a, 104ff.), and Russon (1996, 796): “whatever independence and separability the active *voûç* has, (namely, the separability from unreconciled otherness), it will have to be rooted in a comprehending of its conditions, rather than abstraction from them...” What I mean by ‘independent of externality’ is roughly what Russon means, I take it, by ‘separable

The degree to which the activity of the soul depends on another (alien factor) corresponds to its degree of independence in the latter, positive sense. Though nutritive soul can and does exist independently in plants, e.g., plants are the most externally or heteronomously determined form of life (though more inwardly determined than inanimate nature). As one ascends the scale of life, the forms become progressively autonomous, which is the positive side of their being more and more independent of the need to ‘get determined’ by an external object. The gradual emancipation from externality is the negative side of the development of freedom in the positive sense of autonomy or self-determination.

Cities are independent not in the sense that they can exist without humans but in the sense that citizens are more self-determining (as regards having a say in determining the content of choice, the options among which they choose) than lone humans (who, however ‘apolitical’ they may be, ultimately were born and thus depend on networks of communities, ultimately the city). Nonetheless, though more independent than lone humans, even the best-constituted cities are less independent than Gods, whose activity is independent without qualification. But perhaps They are independent not only qua beyond externality, but also in being able to exist apart from other life forms. The question concerning the immortality of the human soul or intellect is analogous, and I register it not in order to answer it but to suggest the bond these ‘directions’ of separability or independence enjoy in his thinking, marking as they do the ‘reversion’ wherein the stages that were hypothetically necessary get sublated and fulfilled in the emergence of that which, having emerged, no longer needs them in the way that it did while it had not yet emerged or was still emerging. Since the God is in no way deficient, already and always complete, etc., divine life may be the exception that proves the rule. In any case, the ‘human-city-God analogy’ gives way

from unreconciled otherness’, though cf. fn. 237 and the previous two chapters. Emancipated from alienation is another formulation.

to the logic of serial unity in the very way that his analogical account of activity gives way to his account of the reference of all sorts of activity to ‘complete action’ and all such action to *theôria*.

Reconstituting the original unity of the soul at the level of human life—in the form of the good life—is the ethical endeavor, just as (re)constituting the city on the model of the God (at least those attributes like leisure and self-sufficiency that are most properly predicable of the God) is the political endeavor; both are the prerogative of *phronimoi*, who ‘have their priorities straight’ in the way I defined.²⁷⁵ At the end of her account of the hylomorphic conception of virtue that Aristotle suggests or presumes at various junctures of the corpus (that practical *nous* in thinking animals *should* relate to desire as soul relates to body, i.e., as form to matter),

Whiting writes,

A fully virtuous agent, whose *orektikon* is so thoroughly actualized by practical *nous* that she never experiences any conflict between what appears good and what she wants to do, has attained a godlike state. But she has also become—indeed thereby become—like a non-rational animal, whose *aisthêtikon* is generally one with (though different in account from) its *orektikon*. In this sense akratic and enkratic agents are true anomalies in Aristotle’s great chain of being. So we should not generalize the lack of unity we find in them and assume that it must be present in virtuous agents any more than it is present either in other animals or in the gods whose lives the virtuous agent seeks to imitate.²⁷⁶

Virtuous agents reconstitute the unity of the sides of the soul that are one in the animal and even more undifferentiated in the plant. As I argued, the ‘return’ such agents thus effect is intentional or deliberate and thus chosen. But this return to the one includes, saves the whole intermediating development, the differentiation of critical and kinetic soul and of theoretical and practical intellect; the difference remains, just not the alienation. Again, one discerns in the structure of serial transformation the story of reconciliation. In the best polity, analogously, the constitution

²⁷⁵ The same goes for the completely virtuous (*kalokagathoi*); on the Gods as ‘the supreme *kaloi kagathoi*’ cf. Butler (2011, 79-82).

²⁷⁶ (2023b, 175); cf. pp. 170-5 for her outline of “how, in the virtuous agent, the sort of perception with which Aristotle seems to identify *phronêsis* might come to coincide with desire. We should not suppose that there are two parts of soul there all along, practical intellect on the one hand and desire on the other.”

reconciles *theôria* and *praxis* in the sense of worship (spectacle and contemplation) and politics. Well-constituted humans and cities reconcile theory and practice.

The higher unity accomplished through development is that of self-determination or freedom.²⁷⁷ Such freedom, freedom proper, is, negatively speaking, the absence of psychic or political ‘faction’, but only because, positively speaking, it is the presence of reconciliation. Imitating the God, we accomplish integration; accomplishing integration, we imitate the God. The unification we accomplish preserves or “saves” the distinction, integrating the sides into the higher unity of the well-constituted soul and city. Ultimately, the God as the paradigm case of the well-ordered whole provides the model of the well-constituted system, while the God as the divine intellect that governs such wholes provides the model of the principle of their constitution.

Observing how the union of critical and kinetic soul in animals transforms into that of intellect and desire in virtuous humans (and how the former develops from the proto-critical and proto-kinetic activity of plants), both on the side of theoretical *nous* and on the side of practical *nous*, shows how life develops toward freedom, how freedom is the end (*telos*) of the development. Life is a form of freedom. But “bare life” in the sense of its lowest common denominator, nutritive soul, which in animals and especially humans is bare survival, develops, or *should* develop, in terms of freedom. The best life for cities and humans is the most self-determining (complete and self-sufficient). The good life is the free life and the best life is the most free. The freedom of bare life develops into the free way of life, the good life. Just as his account of being in terms of functioning leads into his account of well-being in terms of

²⁷⁷ Cf. Whiting (2023b, 156ff.) on the complete vs. incomplete or total vs. partial ‘domination’ of matter; ‘complete’ domination is oxymoronic, for in that case there is no (longer any) heteronomous factor to be dominated. Likewise I have spoken somewhat paradoxically of ‘containing beyond constraint / restraint / restriction’ and thus in *another* sense of not ‘containing’ (where the containing and contained are externally related or alien, as in the [in]continent, rather than related as the convex and concave). The former sense, I take it, converges with his usage of *periechein*.

functioning-well, his account of living (as the function of soul) leads into his account of living-well (as the function of its virtue): living:thriving::function:virtue. And just as substance is the paradigm case of being, and living substance the paradigm case of substance, divine life is the paradigm case of living substance and thus of all substance and all being, and norms the lives not only of plants and the other animals (such that failure is possible) but especially of humans and cities who model their way of life on that of ‘the God and the total cosmos’ insofar as they can.

The reconciliation of soul (ultimately *nous* and *orexis* or theoretical and practical *nous*) in virtuous human action prefigures the reconciliation of theoretical and political activity in the best city, which in turn augurs the unity beyond constraint of the cognitive and locomotive sides of divine activity, the highest, most complete and self-sufficient form of unity.²⁷⁸ Microcosmic souls and cities, integrating the division that emerges in their development, offer themselves up to the God, consecrating their lives as the ultimate form of sacrifice, forming themselves into *agalmata*, imitating the pure giving (beyond merit) of the God such that the spectacle is ultimately of the God offering himself back to himself, as Athena receives the peplos she has woven for herself.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ Russon (1996) offers a rigorous account of ascension through progressively higher degrees of unification in the case of soul, “the principle of the act of unification with the object” (784), “to understand how it is that that degree of unification which is self-cognizing *voûς*, by being a unity which respects the integrity of both subject and object, is the real standard of knowledge compared to which the other unifications are called knowledge” (788). The *anagôgê* or *metabasis* toward the reconciliation of the higher unity, I am arguing, stretches through the whole of his thought, including his psychology; the ‘analogy of the sphere’ gives way to the focal and serial account(s). To capture the revelation of progressively higher, more differentiation-comprehensive forms of unity (vs. lower, simpler or undifferentiated forms of unity) in a word, I have used the terms ‘(re)union’ and ‘(re)unification’. The former gets at the ambiguity of ‘unity’, the ‘lower’ forms of which are less differentiated or articulate, the ‘higher’ forms of which are more differentiated or articulate. Indeed, Aristotle routinely begins his investigation with some undifferentiated unity, proceeds to differentiate it, and finally integrates or (re)unifies it (cf. *Phys.* 1 and *Pol.* 1, e.g.). That said, since the final stage of each sequence or series comprehends the ‘hypothetical’ stages of its development in itself, it is in another sense or from another perspective simpler: more unconditionally or absolutely one. The ‘gradual emancipation from presupposition’ is the negative version of the ‘development toward self-determination’.

²⁷⁹ Cf. 2.3.2 for my brief account of how this works in effect even if not intent, which seems at odds with my argument that these reconciliations or reconstitutions at the level of human and political life are intentional (not just natural), but only on the assumption that the God or the sacred figures explicitly in the premises and deliberations of the *phronimos*, which is false; it may but needn’t (even shouldn’t). Such arguments appear somewhat violent to the extent that they charge the well-constituted human and city with piety whether they like it or not, as it were; it is not

That the critical vs. kinetic divide cuts across the distinction between *nous* and *aisthêsis*, such that there are critical and kinetic, theoretical and practical (though Aristotle tends to reserve these for *nous*), modes of *both* forms of cognition (such that *boulêsis* and *epithumia* are or involve practical thought and perception, respectively), already suggests that the unity of the soul ultimately involves the reconciliation of the cognitive and locomotive or theoretical and practical sides of psychic activity. It is not just that the practical *nous* of human animals is or should be one and the same as the locomotive part (under another aspect),²⁸⁰ but that virtuous *praxis* reconciles *nous* and *orexis* just as human *theôria* does. So the more basic question is: whence the division of critical and kinetic soul, theoretical and practical reason, and whence the unity? It is precisely in the development or emergence of awareness and self-consciousness and self-motion in the *metabasis* or self-sublation of nature that cognitive differentiation emerges (in the transition from nutritive into sensitive soul, the simplicity or relatively undifferentiated unity of plant life into the cognitive and desiderative activity of animal and human life),²⁸¹ and it is precisely in the reconciliation of that differentiation (ultimately of theoretical and practical *nous*,

my purpose to adjudicate this, but perhaps it is worth noting that the inference (in Plato and Aristotle) from the desire to reproduce to the desire to be Godlike, e.g., operates on such grounds. On *agalmata* or sacred images (or incarnations) vs. shady *eidôla* cf. Nightingale (2004, ch. 4): “The *agalma*, in short, both is and is not divine—unlike an ordinary image, it is sacred and in some sense replete with divinity, yet it is not itself a god” (164). On the peplos cf. Nagy (2002, ch. 3): “I draw attention here to the expression *ephexês logos* ‘continuous discourse’, which applies in ‘Plato’ *Hipparkhos* 228b-c to the seamless web of Homeric poetry as performed by rhapsodes at the Panathenaia. Such metaphors of rhapsodes performing at the Panathenaia in Plato’s *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* bring us back... to the occasion of the Peplos, which is coextensive with the occasion of performing the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in their ultimately authorized setting. That merged occasion is the Great [= quadrennial] Panathenaia. Every four years, the identity of Athens becomes definitively reaffirmed with the official re-weaving of Athena’s web and with the official re-performance of the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey*... My own ongoing question remains this: was this re-performance of Homer equated, metaphorically, with the re-weaving of the Peplos?... We know, of course, that this mentality of re-weaving gives way, in the course of time, to a web no longer re-woven. Once the weaving stops, the web can become a text”; etc. On panhellenic events and ideology see Nightingale (*ibid.*, 309, s.v. ‘panhellenism’).

²⁸⁰ I take this to be the reading of Whiting (2023b, 170), with which I am otherwise in agreement: “If [Aristotle takes ‘the genesis of human action to presuppose a unity of the cognitive and the desiderative that is either the same in kind as or at least analogous to the unity involved in the genesis of non-human animal action’], then practical *nous* belongs to locomotive rather than to thinking soul...” (“rather than” [and not] is the inference I’m questioning). On Whiting see also Diamond (2015, ch. 5, esp. n. 5 [256], n. 30 [303-4]) & n. 61-2 [306]).

²⁸¹ On ‘the simplicity of plants’ and the ‘internal differentiation’ requisite for desire or desiderative cognition cf. Diamond (2015, 237-8 & 115-7). On the distinguishable senses of ‘cognitive’ in this sentence cf. fn. 184.

rational and appetitive *orexis*, and thus generally of *nous* and *orexis*) that the fully formed, differentiation-comprehensive unity emerges. The problem of the unity of the soul in Aristotelian psychology thus transitions into that of the practical norm for humans in his political philosophy.

The best polity on his account is that which most secures the (fragile) conditions of free life, political and contemplative. Since theoretical activity is the most free (entellic and autarkic, autonomous and independent), it is that which ranks first in the best city. The best constitution reconciles the free ways of life on the model of the God, the ultimate union of motionless activity and changeless motion. Thus, I submit, his answer to the question of the unity of the soul is ultimately to be glimpsed in his account of the best city and, hence, his account of the divine life.

References

Editions of Aristotle

Categories. 1938. Translated by H. P. Cook. Loeb Classical Library 325. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Eudemian Ethics. 1935. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 285. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Generation of Animals. 1943. Translated by A. L. Peck. Loeb Classical Library 366. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

History of Animals. 1965, 1970, 1991. Translated by A. L. Peck and D. M. Balme. Loeb Classical Library 437-439. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Magna Moralia. 1935. Translated by G. C. Armstrong. Loeb Classical Library 287. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. 1924. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross. Volumes I & II. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Metaphysics. 1956. Translated by H. Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library 271. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Movement of Animals. 1937. Translated by E. S. Forster. Loeb Classical Library 323. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nicomachean Ethics. 1926. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 73. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

On Coming-to-be and Passing-Away. 1922. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by H. H. Joachim. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

On the Heavens. 1939. Translated by W. K. C. Guthrie. Loeb Classical Library 338. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

On the Soul. 1964. Translated by W. S. Hett. Loeb Classical Library 288. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Parts of Animals. 1937. Translated by A. L. Peck. Loeb Classical Library 323. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Physics. 1950. Aristotelis *Physica* recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Poetics. 1965. Aristotelis *De Arte Poetica Liber* recognovit brevisque annotatione critica instruxit R. Kassel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Politics. 1957. Aristotelis *Politica* recognovit brevisque annotatione critica instruxit W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Posterior Analytics. 1960. Translated by H. Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library 391. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Aristotle: Protrepticus or Exhortation to Philosophy (citations, fragments, paraphrases, and other evidence). 2017 & 2018[a]. Hutchinson, D. S., and M. K. Johnson, eds.

Aristotle's Protrepticus: an Attempt at Reconstruction. 1961. Düring, I. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag.

Rhetoric. 1959. Aristotelis *Ars Rhetorica* recognovit brevisque annotatione critica instruxit W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Select Fragments. 1952. Translated under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Topics. 1960. Translated by E. S. Forster. Loeb Classical Library 391. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Other Ancient and Modern Primary Sources

Aeschylus. 2009. *Oresteia: Agamemnon. Libation-Bearers. Eumenides*. Edited and translated by A. H. Sommerstein. Loeb Classical Library 146. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Aristophanes. 1998, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2008. *Acharnians. Knights. Clouds. Wasps. Peace. Birds. Lysistrata. Women at the Thesmophoria. Frogs. Assemblywomen. Wealth. Fragments*. Edited and translated by J. Henderson. Loeb Classical Library 178, 488, 179, 180, 502. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Aspasius. 1889. *Aspasii in Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria*, Vol. XIX / Pars 1. Edited by G. Heylbut. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter.

Athenaeus. 2009. *The Learned Banqueters, Volume V*. Edited and translated by S. Douglas Olson. Loeb Classical Library 274. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Catullus. 1893. *Catullus*. Edited by E. T. Merrill. Boston: Ginn & Company.

Cicero. 1999. *Letters to Atticus, Volume I*. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library 7. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- 2001. *Letters to Friends, Volume I*. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library 205. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 - 1914. *On Ends (De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum)*. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Diogenes Laertius. 1925. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume III*. Translated by R. D. Hicks. Loeb Classical Library 184. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Elias. 1900. *Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria*, Vol. XVIII / Pars 1. Edited by A. Busse. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter Mouton.
- Euripides. 2008. *Antiope*. In *Fragments*, edited and translated by C. Collard & M. Cropp. Loeb Classical Library 504. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 2009. *Suppliants*. Edited and translated by A. H. Sommerstein. Loeb Classical Library 145. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Eusebius. 1867. *Eusebii Caesariensis Opera, Volume 1-2*. Edited by L. Dindorf. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Hegel. 1991. *The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusätze)*. Translated with Introduction and notes by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Heraclides. 2008. *Heraclides of Pontus: Texts and Translation*. Edited by E. Schütrumpf and translated by J. van Ophuijsen & S. Prince. Oxon / New York: Routledge.
- Homer. 1919. *Odyssey*, in two volumes. Translated by A. T. Murray. Revised by G. E. Dimock. Loeb Classical Library 104. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Iamblichus. 1975. *De communi mathematica scientia*. Iamblichi *De Communi Mathematica Scientia Liber* ad fidem codicis Florentini edidit Nicolaus Festa. Editionem addendis et corrigendis adiunctis curavit Udalricus Klein. Stuttgart: Teubner.
- *Protrepticus*. 1888. Iamblichi *Protrepticus* ad fidem codicis Florentini edidit Hermenegildus Pistelli. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Isocrates. 1929. *On the Peace. Areopagiticus. Against the Sophists. Antidosis. Panathenaicus*. Translated by G. Norlin. Loeb Classical Library 229. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Marx. 1975-. *Das Kapital, Volume I*. In *Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)*. Berlin.
- Oxyrhynchus Papyri. 1898-. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. Edited and translated by B. P. Grenfell & A. S. Hunt. London: Egypt Exploration Fund.
- Plato. 1900-1907. *Platonis Opera* recognovit brevisque adnotatione critica instruxit J. Burnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rousseau. 1964. *Du contrat sociale ou Principes du droit politique*. In *Oeuvres complètes*, Vol. 3. Paris: Éditions Gallimard.

Sappho. 1971. Voigt, E.-M. *Sappho et Alcaeus: Fragmenta*. Amsterdam: Athenaeum – Polak & van Gennep.

Thucydides. 1919. *History of the Peloponnesian War, Volume I: Books 1-2*. Translated by C. F. Smith. Loeb Classical Library 108. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Secondary Literature

Ackrill, J. L. 1997. "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*." In *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, 179-200. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. Previously published as "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*," in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* LX (1974): 339-359.

Adkins, A. W. H. October 1976. "*Polu pragmosune* and 'Minding One's Own Business': A Study in Greek Social and Political Values." *Classical Philology* 71, no. 4: 301-327.
- "Theoria versus Praxis in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Republic*." October 1978. *Classical Philology* 73, no. 4: 297-313.

Alieva, O., Kotzé, A., and Van der Meeren, S. 2018. *When Wisdom Calls: Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity*. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers.

Aubenque, P. 1963. *La prudence chez Aristote*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Boulnois, O. December 2017. "What is Freedom?" *Dionysius*, Vol. XXXV: 38-62.

Burnyeat, M. 2008. "Kinêsis vs. *Energeia*: A much-read passage in (but not of) Aristotle's *Metaphysics*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 34: 219-291.

Butler, E. P. 2011. "Plato's Gods and the Way of Ideas." *Diotima* 29: 73-87.

Bobonich, C. July 2007. "Why Should Philosophers Rule: Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 24, no. 2: 153-175.
- "Aristotle's Ethical Treatises." 2006. In *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by Richard Kraut, 12-36. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing.

Bodéüs, R. 2002. *Aristote: Une philosophie en quête de savoir*. Paris: Vrin.
- 2000. *Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals*. Translated by Jan Garrett. Albany: State University of New York Press. Originally published as *Aristote et la théologie des vivants immortels*. Saint-Laurent: Bellarmin, 1992.
- 1982. *Le Philosophe et la Cité: Recherches sur les Rapports entre Morale et Politique dans la Pensée d'Aristote*. Liège: Presses Universitaires de Liège.
- 1993. *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics*. Translated by Jan Edward Garrett. Albany: State University of New York Press.

- Bos, A. P. December 1984. "Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: Are They Really Two Different Works?" *Dionysius*, Vol. VIII: 19-51.
- Broadie, S. 2012. "A Science of First Principles (*Metaphysics* A 2)." In *Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium Aristotelicum*, edited by Carlos Steel with a new critical edition of the Greek Text by Oliver Primavesi, 43-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brogan, W. 2002. "Gadamer's Praise of Theory: Aristotle's Friend and the Reciprocity Between Theory and Practice." *Research in Phenomenology* 32, no. 1: 141-55.
- Brown, E. 2014. "Aristotle on the Choice of Lives: Two Concepts of Self-Sufficiency." In *Theoria: Studies on the Status and Meaning of Contemplation in Aristotle's Ethics*, edited by Pierre Destrée & Marco Zingano, 111-133. Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters Publishers.
- Cambiano, G. 2012. "The Desire to Know (*Metaphysics* A 1)." In *Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium Aristotelicum*, edited by Carlos Steel with a new critical edition of the Greek Text by Oliver Primavesi, 1-42. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cartledge, P. 2009. *Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Celano, A. J. 1985. "Aristotle on Beatitude." *Ancient Philosophy* 5, no. 2: 205-214.
- Chame, S. 2023. "The Non-kinetic Origins of Aristotle's Concept of 'Ενέργεια.'" *Apeiron* 56, no. 3: 469-494.
- Cooper, J. 2004. "Plato and Aristotle on 'Finality' and 'Sufficiency'." In *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 270-308.
- Corrigan, K. December 2014. "How did Aristotle's Unmoved Mover come to love everything by the end of the ancient pagan tradition?" *Dionysius*, Vol. XXXII: 82-115.
- Crubellier, M. 2000. "*Metaphysics* Λ 4." In *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum*, edited by Michael Frede & David Charles, 137-160. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Diamond, E. "The Divine Principle of Aristotelian Politics: Leisure and Self-Sufficiency as the Final Cause of Political Activity." Unpublished lecture.
https://www.academia.edu/14854541/The_Divine_Principle_of_Aristotelian_Politics_Leisure_and_Self_Sufficiency_as_the_Final_Cause_of_Political_Activity
 - 2015. *Mortal Imitations of Divine Life: The Nature of the Soul in Aristotle's De Anima*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Dimitrova, N. M. 2008. *Theoroi and Initiates in Samothrace: The Epigraphical Evidence*.

- Hesperia Supplement* 37. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
- Ebert, T. 1976. "Praxis und Poiesis. Zu einer handlungstheoretischen Unterscheidung des Aristoteles." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 30, H. 1: 12-30.
- Ehrenberg, Victor. 1947. "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 67: 46-67.
- Fink, J. L. 2012. "How Did Aristotle Read a Platonic Dialogue?" In *The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle*, edited by Jakob Leth Fink, 174-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frank, J. 2005. *A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fraser, K. Summer 2002. "Demonstrative Science and the Science of Being *qua* Being." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* XXII: 43-82.
- Winter 2003. "Seriality and Demonstration in Aristotle's Ontology." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* XXV: 131-158.
- Gastaldi, S. 2003. *Bios Hairetotos*. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
- Gelber, J. 2018. "Two Ways of Being for an End." *Phronesis* 63, no. 1: 64-86.
- Gonzalez, F. J. 1991. "Aristotle on Pleasure and Perfection." *Phronesis* 36, no. 2: 141-159.
- Summer 2019. "Being as Activity: A Defense of the Importance of *Metaphysics* 1048b18-35 for Aristotle's Ontology." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* LVI: 123-191.
- Hadot, P. 1995. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
- Halper, E. 1995. "The Substance of Aristotle's Ethics." In *The Crossroads of Norm and Nature*, edited by May Sim, 3-28. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hardie, W. F. R. October 1965. "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics." *Philosophy* 40, no. 154: 277-295.
- Haskins, E. 2004. "Logos and Power in Sophistical and Isocratean Rhetoric." In *Isocrates and Civic Education*, edited by Takis Poulakos & David Depew, 84-103. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Hildebrandt, R. 2020. "What Is Philosophy in the *Protrepticus*?" In *Revisiting Aristotle's Fragments: New Essays on the Fragments of Aristotle's Lost Works*, edited by António Pedro Mesquita, Simon Noriega-Olmos & Christopher Shields, 11-47. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter.

- House, D. K. December 1999. "Did Aristotle Understand Plato?" *Dionysius*, Vol. XVII: 7-25. Originally published as "Did Aristotle Understand Plato?" *Animus* 1 (1996): 38-53.
- 2007. "The Origin and Nature of Humankind in Plato's *Symposium*." In *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr Robert D. Crouse*, edited by Michael Treschow, Willemien Otten & Walter Hannam, 45-72. Leiden: Brill.
- Hutchinson, D. S. 2007. Review of *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context*, by Andrea Wilson Nightingale. *The Philosophical Review* 116, no. 3: 482-485.
- Hutchinson, D. S., and M. R. Johnson. "Aristotle's dialogue *Protrepticus*: retention and redeployment." Forthcoming.
- Winter 2005. "Authenticating Aristotle's *Protrepticus*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* XXIX: 193-294.
 - 2018[b]. "Protreptic and Apotreptic: Aristotle's dialogue *Protrepticus*." In *When Wisdom Calls: Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity*, edited by Olga Alieva, Annemaré Kotzé & Sophie Van der Meeren, 111-154. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers.
 - 2014. "Protreptic Aspects of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*." In *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by Ronald Polansky, 383-409. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 - 2010. "The Antidosis of Isocrates and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*." Unpublished manuscript. <http://www.protrepticus.info/antidosisprotrepticus.pdf>
- Johnson, M. R. 2019. "Aristotle on *Kosmos* and *Kosmoi*." In *Cosmos in the Ancient World*, edited by Phillip Sidney Horky, 74-107. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 2015. "Aristotle's Architectonic Sciences." In *Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science*, edited by David Ebrey, 163-186. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jaeger, W. 1923. *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.
- 1934. *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*. Translated with the Author's Corrections and Additions by Richard Robinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kavoulaki, A. 1999. "Processional Performance and the Democratic Polis." In *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, edited by Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne, 293-320. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kenny, A. 1965-66. "Happiness." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 66: 93-102.
- Keyt, D. 1978. "Intellectualism in Aristotle." *The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter* 87: 1-20. <https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/87>
- Kleve, K. 1964. "Ἀπραγμοσύνη and Πολυπραγμοσύνη: Two Slogans in Athenian Politics." *Symbolae Osloenses* 39, no. 1: 83-88.

- Kosman, A. L. 1969. "Aristotle's Definition of Motion." *Phronesis* 14, no. 1: 40-62.
- 2013. "Aristotle on the Virtues of Thought." In *Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, 280-297. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 - 2013. "Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's *Ethics*." In *Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, 62-76. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 - 1976. "Platonic Love." In *Facets of Plato's Philosophy*, edited by William Henry Werkmeister, 333-356. Assen: Van Gorcum.
 - 1968. "Predicating the Good." *Phronesis* 13, no. 2: 171-174.
 - 2013. *The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle's Ontology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kraut, R. 1989. *Aristotle on the Human Good*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 1995. "Reply to Professor Roche." In *The Crossroads of Norm and Nature*, edited by May Sim, 139-148. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lear, G. R. 2004. *Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lobkowitz, N. 1967. *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Loney, A. 2019. *The Ethics of Revenge and the Meanings of the Odyssey*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Menn, S. March 1992. "Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good." *Review of Metaphysics* 45, no. 3: 543-573.
- Morrison, D. Summer 2001. "Politics as a Vocation, According to Aristotle." *History of Political Thought* 22, no. 2: 221-241.
- Moss, J. 2009. "Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 91, no. 2: 119-156.
- Nagy, G. 2002. *Plato's Rhapsody and Homer's Music: The Poetics of the Panathenaic Festival in Classical Athens*. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies.
- Nestle, W. January 1926. "ΑΙΠΠΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗ." *Philologus* 81, no. 1-4: 129-140.
- Newman, W. L. 1902. *The Politics of Aristotle: With an Introduction, Two Prefatory Essays and Notes Critical and Explanatory*, Vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Nichols, M. P. 1992. *Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nightingale, A. W. 2004. *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its*

- Cultural Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. 1986. *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Revised Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Connor, D. K. 1999. "The Ambitions of Aristotle's Audience and the Activist Ideal of Happiness." In *Action and Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle*, edited by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins, 107-129. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Thompson, W. J. 1994. "Aristotle: Philosophy and Politics, Theory and Practice." *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 68: 109-124.
- Parellada, R. November 2005. "Aristotle's Theory of Practical Wisdom." *The Modern Schoolman* LXXXIII, no. 1: 1-18.
- Penner, T. 1970. "Verbs and the Identify of Actions—A Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation of Aristotle." In *Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, edited by Oscar P. Wood and George Pitcher, 393-460. New York: Macmillan Publishers.
- Pickford, H. W. 2017. "Poiêsis, Praxis, Aisthesis: Remarks on Aristotle and Marx." In *Aesthetic Marx*, edited by Samir Gandesha & Johan Hartle, 23-48. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Pilario, D. F. 2005. *Back to the Rough Grounds of Praxis: Exploring Theological Method with Pierre Bourdieu*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
- Purinton, J. S. 1998. "Aristotle's Definition of Happiness (NE 1.7, 1098a16-18)." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 16, no. 1: 259-297.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 2022. "Making and Experiencing Peace in the Ancient World." In *Making Peace in the Ancient World: Proceedings of the 7th Melammu Workshop, Padova, 5-7 November 2018*, edited by Giovanni B. Lanfranchi, Simonetta Ponchia & Robert Rollinger, 31- 61. Münster: Zaphon.
- Reeve, C. D. C. 2017. *Politics: A New Translation*, with Introduction and Notes. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Roche, T. D. April 1988. "Ergon and Eudaimonia in *Nicomachean Ethics* I: Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpretation." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 26, no. 2: 175-194.
- Spring 1989. "The Perfect Happiness." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27, S1: S103-S125.
 - 1995. "The Ultimate End of Action: A Critique of Richard Kraut's *Aristotle on the Human Good*." In *The Crossroads of Norm and Nature*, edited by May Sim, 115-138. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Russon, J. E. October 1996. "Self-Consciousness and the Tradition in Aristotle's Psychology." *Laval théologique et philosophique* 52, no. 3: 777-803.
- Rutherford, I. 2013. *State Pilgrims and Sacred Observers in Ancient Greece: A Study of Theôriâ and Theôroi*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Segev, M. 2022. *The Value of the World and of Oneself: Philosophical Optimism and Pessimism from Aristotle to Modernity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sorabji, R. 1993. "Perceptual Content Expanded." In *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*, 17-29. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Walker, M. D. 2011. "Aristotle on Activity 'According to the Best and Most Final' Virtue." *Apeiron* 44, no. 1: 91-109.
- 2018. *Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 - July 2021. "Aristotle's *Eudemus* and the Propaedeutic Use of the Dialogue Form." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 59, no. 3: 399-427.
<https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2021.0047>
 - Spring 2010. "The Utility of Contemplation in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*." *Ancient Philosophy* 30, no. 1: 135-153.
- Winfield, R. D. December 2013. "Truth, the Good, and the Unity of Theory and Practice." *The Review of Metaphysics* 67, no. 2: 405-422.
- Wade-Gery, H. T. 1932. "Thucydides the Son of Melesias: A Study of Periklean Policy." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 52, no. 2: 205-227.
- Walsh, M. M. October 1997. "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no. 4: 495-507.
- Ward, J. 2018. "Theoria as Practice and as Activity." In *Aristotele e le Sfide del suo Tempo*, edited by Roberto Radice & Marcello Zanatta with the collaboration of Pia De Simone, 235-250. Milan: Unicopli.
- Whiting, J. 2023a. "Locomotive Soul: The Parts of Soul in Aristotle's Scientific Works." In *Body and Soul: Essays on Aristotle's Hylomorphism*, 102-150. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 2023b. "Hylomorphic Virtue: Cosmology, Embryology, and Moral Development in Aristotle." In *Body and Soul: Essays on Aristotle's Hylomorphism*, 151-176. New York: Oxford University Press.