

*Moving with the Tide? A Content Analysis of the Relative Prominence of Left and Right-Wing
Populism in Recent Canadian Federal Electoral Manifestos*

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Abstract:

In recent years, an explosion of populist movements has led some scholars to conceptualise them as part of a larger global “populist wave”. This phenomenon of populist upsurges has spread throughout much of the Europe and North America, manifesting as movements and parties that share similar styles of language and rhetoric but diverge greatly across the left/right political spectrum. Despite large scale populist victories in other states, Canadian politics has displayed a distinct absence of any powerful national populist parties or movements. However, some researchers note nascent populist elements in Canada’s current political sphere both regionally and nationally. This thesis attempts to answer the question to what extent populist influence may have already penetrated the politics of Canada’s major parties and to whether left- or right-wing variations of populism have been employed to a greater degree. This research employs a mixed method content analysis of each of Canada’s major parties’ electoral manifestos from the last three federal elections. It measures the frequency and intensity of the use of both left and right populist language and rhetoric in each of the nine examined manifestos. The study findings suggest that, while the manifestos of all three parties demonstrate an overall increase in total usage of populist language and rhetoric between 2011 and 2019, only the NDP displays a consistent increase across all three electoral years. Furthermore, the use of left vs right populist rhetoric and language generally falls along party lines reflecting the parties’ relative positions on the political spectrum. This paper ultimately concludes that while populism has seen increased use in the manifestos of Canada’s mainstream parties, the rhetoric and language used operates within a firm ideological framework for all three parties.

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The early twenty-first century featured a variety of socioeconomic and sociopolitical upheavals as a result of the changing geopolitical landscape of the preceding decades. As the world becomes more economically and socially interconnected and neoliberal global economic policies increasingly take hold in many states, a growing number of political movements and figures have emerged, in part, in opposition to these phenomena (Runje, 2018; Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Van Kessel, 2015). As a result, many researchers have begun to refocus their attention on the long-standing, if not fully defined, political concept of populism. While there is not yet a consensus on an exact definition, there are many movements, parties, and political figures — both national and international — that are both defined and studied as “populist” by political scientists. Examples of these include European populist parties such as SYRIZIA, The Five Star Movement, or UKIP, as well as non-western populist actors such as Rodrigo Duterte's PDP–Laban Party, the League of Social Democrats in Hong Kong, and Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro. Most researchers agree that an essential element running through many of these otherwise politically distinct movements and groups is a messaging that constructs a divide between a monolithic “people” and a corrupt and self-serving “elite.” (Kaltwasser et al., 2019; Zaslove, 2008; Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Fernández-Garcia and Luengo, 2018). Many political scientists have been cognizant of the growing global popularity of populist parties and leaders since the early 21st century (Akkerman, 2003; Laycock, 2005). However, outside the political science sphere, this phenomenon did not truly enter the popular zeitgeist until the mid-2010s, particularly in the West. During this period several populist leaders, parties, and movements gained serious traction, notably the 2016 election of President Donald Trump in the United States and the success of the Brexit referendum in the U.K that same year. As these movements and candidates continued to gain popularity and power in multiple states, some researchers began

to conceptualize this as part of a global “populist wave” that is reshaping the face of politics in many states, particularly in the North America and Europe (Charalambous and Ioannou, 2020; Hameleers et al., 2017; Moffit, 2016). Some within this field of research emphasize it as a growing threat to the stability of international politics with a dangerous and xenophobic right-wing bent (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Schwarz, 2020; Oliver and Rahn, 2016).

The effect of this populist wave on Canadian politics has been relatively underexamined by researchers and especially the international media despite its long history of regional and national populist uprisings (Blanchet and Medeiros, 2019; Neubauer, and Gunster, 2019; Page, 1994; Silver and Figueroa, 2019). Some academic and journalistic works consider the possibility that Canada could produce a populist leader such as Trump or UKIP’s Nigel Farage, others have viewed Canada as at least partially resistant to this “populist wave”, often citing failed populist efforts in primaries and elections (Budd, 2021; Hameed, 2018; Moscrop, 2019; Warnica, 2019). The latter perspective is largely based on Canada's lack of a strong foundationally populist party nationally as well as the popular self-identification among Canadians as a welcoming, multicultural, and relatively politically left-wing people (Corbett, 2017; Sawyer and Laycock, 2009; Ives, 2015). However, many of these writers note regional successes of populist actors and movements in Canada, even warning of the potential for future populist upsurges based on these trends (Adams, 2017).

This notion of “Canadian exceptionalism” as providing protection against dangerous populist waves can be partially explained by a tendency of some political writers to focus on right-wing populist movements and to pay less attention to the left-wing elements that can be equally pervasive (Thomas and Tufts, 2016; Snow and Moffit, 2012; Sawyer and Laycock, 2009). It may also reflect a tendency to focus more on populist movements than on populist discourses.

As the influx of populist actors in Western politics has become increasingly difficult for political scholars to ignore, many researchers have begun to analyze not only political parties, movements, and leaders that can be considered explicitly populist but also populist discourses and rhetoric themselves. This includes potential shifts in methods of messaging, policy enactment, and leadership employed by the states' dominant political parties (Snow and Moffit, 2012; Sawyer and Laycock, 2009; Thomas and Tufts, 2016). By conceiving populism as a “political style,” these researchers have begun to quantify and measure populism based on a varied set of criteria and are thus able to compare the relative prevalence of populist rhetoric and language between texts, parties, and time periods. Drawing on this perspective, I explore in this thesis the use of populist rhetoric in Canada over the past decade. More precisely, the research questions guiding this thesis are the following: Did Canada experience a rise in populist rhetoric since the 2011 federal election? Are there important differences between the three main federal political parties, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party, in terms of their use of populist rhetoric? I attempt to answer these questions by exploring the electoral manifestos of all three major federal parties, comparing both the prevalence of populism between parties and electoral years and its primary rhetorical targets.

This study will attempt to contribute to the previous and current field of research surrounding Canadian populism from a contemporary federal perspective. Considerable research has focused on Canadian populism from a historical perspective exploring populist movements of the 20th twentieth century. Other studies have taken a regional view, examining phenomena such as the Wild Rose party in Alberta and the election of Mayor Rob Ford in Toronto (Brym, 1978; Neubauer and Gunster, 2019; Silver and Figueroa, 2019). Considerably less academic focus has been afforded to more recent trends in federal Canadian populism. What research has

been conducted on the subject primarily focuses on populism from a right-wing perspective and has not firmly considered Canada's rich history of left-wing federal populism. One notable example being the populist leader Tommy Douglas, who founded one of Canada's current major federal parties (Papillon and Jenson, 1998; Macgregor, 2018). I hope to contribute to filling this research gap and highlight the potential influence of foreign left-wing populist movements and leaders, an example being the campaign of Bernie Sanders in the 2016 and 2020 U.S presidential elections, on the style of left-wing political discourse in Canada.

In the reminder of this chapter, I will provide an overview of the literature related to the general study of populism over the decades as well as that focused on the evolution of Canadian populism throughout its' political history. In chapter two, I will lay out the theoretical foundation for my study, including the definition of both left- and right-wing populism, which I will employ, as well as the various elements that comprise populist rhetoric. I will also present the methodological framework that was used to respond to my research questions. In chapters three, four, and five, I will present and explore my results, respectively regarding the manifestos of each of the three major parties. Finally, in chapter six, I will provide an overall discussion of my findings as well as their broader implications, contributions to the field, and conclusion.

1.1 Historical development and definition of populism within political study

The earliest recorded use of the term “populist” was a form of self-identification in the late nineteenth century (Canovan, 1982; Allcock, 1971; Berlin, 1968). This most notably included the left-wing agrarian Peoples Party in the United States, who were sometimes referred to as simply “the populists”. The obvious association of the term with the word populace carried over into other political groups and ideologies based on the idea of a focus on the common people. This included the anti-tsarist Narodniki movement which shared a similar name when

translated and advocated for democratic organization of government against autocracy. The name slowly began to enter the political lexicon of other states including France, where the term “populism” was used during the 1920s in relation to a group of writers who expressed sympathy for ordinary people (Eatwell, 2017). Around this time, the concept of the “plain people” who were deserving of greater self-determinism began to come into use by political figures (Canovan, 1982; Shils, 1954).

Populism was largely studied in a historical context until it was integrated into the social sciences in the mid twentieth century. Edward Shils was among the first researchers to do this. He framed populism as an ideological phenomenon which he described as “the belief that the people are not only equal to their rulers, but that they are actually better than their rulers” (Shils, 1954: 5). Here we begin to see the foundation of what is often considered to be the central message of most populists, the divide between “the people” and “the elite”. Subsequent publications, including the earliest political science works on the topic, ran with this idea and began to associate populism with mass political movements across various states, such as the multiple anticolonial political independence movements of the early- to mid-twentieth century (Canovan, 1982; Allcock, 1971; Eatwell, 2017). The term populism began to be used in reference to a variety of political phenomena including movements, figures, and political ideologies such as socialism, syndicalism, and fascism. This diversity became the foundation for the concept of right- and left-wing populism as scholars began to question the validity of the concept and the lack of agreement on the central ideas of populism, the agenda behind them, and even whether populism was a product of the people themselves or the intelligentsia advocating on their behalf (Canovan, 1981; Allcock, 1971; Brubaker, 2017; Knight, 1998; Nárdiz, 2018; Ivaldi et al., 2017; Bond, 1990). Many sub-elements of allegedly populist political messaging

were further identified, including majoritarianism, protectionism, and anti-institutionalism, with a further lack of consistency as to whether they were necessary components for a rhetoric to qualify as “populist.” (Brubaker, 2017; Mudde, 2015; Kaltwasser et al., 2017: 28). In response to this, beginning in the late twentieth century, the idea began to develop of defining populism as a “thin” or “chameleonic” ideology that could attach itself to pre-existing political causes, ideologies, and parties in order to frame them as “the voice of the people”. As a result, populism could be identified outside of a clearly defined “populist entity” and be observed and even quantified based on a set of criteria that was identified by the researcher (Aslanidis, 2018; Alvares and Dahlgren, 2016; Rooduijn, 2014). There currently exists no standardized set of these criteria. Largely, the two universal elements of populist content used in these studies are the concept of “people centrism” wherein a “true” or common people are portrayed as virtuous and/or politically united, and “anti elitism” wherein a state’s governance problems are blamed on an out of touch, self-serving, or outright corrupt “elite” population with a disproportionate amount of power or influence in the political “status-quo”.

1.2 Theoretical definition of left and right-wing populism in a modern context

Despite these advancements in the study of populism, throughout the twenty-first century there continued to be disagreements on the definition of a “populist actor” as well as what distinguishes “populist rhetoric” utilized by a political actor from any other form of political rhetorical strategy. Some researchers have associated the role of a populist political figure with that of a demagogue and suggested that such people gain mass support through voters attracted by their projected personalities, attitudes, backgrounds, or even prejudices. (Eatwell, 2017; Akkerman, 2003; Allcock, 1971). This style of populism frequently employs the strategy of communicating with the public on perceived ‘even terms’, often making direct references to

specific issues and needs of local populations and using simplistic language in order to appear more connected to the “common people” (Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Blühdorn and Butzlaff, 2019; Moffit, 2016). This approach has gained popularity in recent years, particularly with the successful campaigns of such left- and right-wing extremist movements and candidates as the Brexit party, led by Nigel Farage, and the PDP Labin Party led by President Rodrigo Duterte (Schwarz, 2020; Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Moghaddam, 2018). Some works have noted the xenophobic and extreme “us vs them attitude” of many of these campaigns and raised normative concerns surrounding the spread of their ideologies across their own populations as well as the politics of their contemporary states (Nardiz, 2018; Brubaker, 2017; Adams, 2017).

One of the most notable examples of these so-called populist demagogues is, of course, the former United States president Donald Trump. His abrasive, adversarial, and often crude style of political communication led many researchers to perceive him as the quintessential demagogic populist (Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Schwarz, 2020; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). An example of Trump's effects on the study of populism's Western spread is the book *Could It Happen Here? Canada in the Age of Trump and Brexit* by Micheal Addams (2017), which reflects on the possibility of a Canadian leader being elected with a similar attitude and policy platform to Trump. This perspective concerning populism tends to pathologize the phenomenon and is therefore prone to a very normative style of study.

While the aforementioned style of populism is examined by researchers from a “top down” perspective wherein the impetus towards political action is created by a leading figure, other scholars examine it from the “bottom up” (Bond, 1990; Canovan, 1982; Akkerman, 2003). This perspective instead understands populist movements and candidates as the inevitable result of a phenomenon known as “system discontent.” This effect is generally attributed to an ongoing

political reality that concerns an entire population, and most recently the ongoing process of neoliberal globalization. In response to a general dissatisfaction with the societal status quo, popular support will begin to emerge for “something new” in the form of a populist party, movement, or candidate who represents a fundamental systemic change — authentically or otherwise (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Bartlett, 2012). This popular dissatisfaction can often occur as the result of a “failure of the system,” such as the Great Recession of the early twenty-first century that is largely credited with the proliferation of various populist parties in Western states, such as UKIP in the United Kingdom and SYRIZIA in Greece. Additionally, the large-scale refugee crisis that emerged in the wake of the Arab spring is often credited with the emergence of the strong anti-immigrant populist push of recent years (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Altman, 2009). Many populist leaders who are viewed through this lens tend to either deemphasize their significance to the movement in order to uplift the role of their supporters or to emphasize their outsider status or appearance as representing the “everyman.” This approach is often favored by left-wing movements in order to more directly empathize with the middle or working class over the wealthier ruling or owner class (Moghaddam, 2018; Gerbaudo, 2017; Venizelos and Stavrakakis, 2020).

The academic concept of left- and right-wing styles of populism has evolved gradually in response to the application of populism to a wider variety of often philosophically opposed political ideologies and movements such as Marxism, Maoism, fascism, agrarian radicalism, and nativism (Allcock, 1971; Jessop, 1984; Canovan, 1981; Richards, 1981). This has given birth to the idea of academically defined subcategories of populist ideology, including party populism, market populism, and nationalist populism. Due to the already nebulously defined nature of the

concept, the subcategories were quite varied and by no means standardized, often with only the core idea of the people/elite divide being shared between scholarly interpretations or categories within the same one. Thusly conceptualized, populism was understood as having no exact locus on the political spectrum (Roebuck et al., 2013; Snow and Moffit, 2012; Canovan, 1982). Certain populist political movements such as Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism were deemed left populist based on the pre-existing position of their core policy ideals and favored populations. Likewise, strongly nationalist or pro-free market populist movements and parties such as Boulangisme and the Austrian Freedom Party were labelled as right populist (Jessop, 1984; Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Kaltwasser et al., 2019). In more recent years, this understanding has evolved to include not only the central policy proposals of a political actor but also the targets of their rhetoric in regard to the component elements of populist discourses, such as the central people/elite dichotomy. Left-wing populism is often characterized in this regard by its definitions of the “people” as the working and middle class and the “elites” as the wealthy and powerful who have “tipped the scales” of governance in their favor. Right-wing populism instead tends to define the people as either a national identity or as those who hold a universal national set of values and define the elites as the intelligentsia, the political class, or specific “special interest groups.” (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015; Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Ivaldi et al., 2017; Kaltwasser et al., 2019; Richards, 1981). However, even early on, the categorization of a political party or movement as simply left or right populist was demonstrated by some scholars to be insufficient as many of the examined parties had platforms that contained both left and right-wing ideals and goals (Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Aytaç and Öniş, 2014). This issue continues into the twenty-first century with a variety of the emergent populist parties in Europe displaying similarly mixed platforms, a

notable example being The Five Star Movement's simultaneously anti-immigration and anti-austerity redistributionist platform (Mosca and Tronconi, 2019).

Many researchers have also used the "thin ideology" angle to study populism across multiple states, describing a "spillover effect" wherein elements from the "host ideology" not only become integrated into the populist messaging frame but also spread across states as similar sentiments and attitudes are shared between populations and therefore begin to adopt a similar populist frame (Snow and Moffit, 2012; Reungoat, 2010; Rooduijn, 2014). A common example of this is resentment towards large supranational organizations, such as NATO or the European Union, who are perceived as out of touch professional bureaucrats without concern for the states that constitute or support them (Alvares and Dahlgren, 2016; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). In line with this concept of spillover and proliferation of populist ideals, language, and rhetoric, researchers have begun to look more closely at the integration of both left- and right-wing populism into the mainstream political sphere of the affected states, particularly in Europe (Webley, 2018; Stavrakakis et al, 2014; Rooduijn, 2014; Reungoat, 2010). This integration can include the often temporary "commandeering" of a pre-existing party by a popular political figure who uses populist language and rhetoric to gain influence and even leadership within the organization, such as Jeremy Corbyn and Boris Johnson in the UK, or the increased use of populist elements in the campaigning rhetoric of establishment parties and candidates (Rooduijn, 2014; Sawyer and Laycock, 2009; Snow and Moffit, 2012). Populist influence such as this can be particularly prevalent after a strong victory by a populist actor, such as the nationalist victory of The Brexit Party. It is this approach to the study of populism that will be used in this dissertation, an approach, as seen next, that has more rarely been explored in the study of Canadian populism.

1.3 Historical instances of populism in Canada

The literature on Canadian populism is considerably rich. Many studies exist on Canada's history of regional populism, such as provincial agrarian based radical populism, which goes back several decades (Brym, 1978; Richards, 1981; Macgregor, 2018). This trend has continued in recent years with multiple publications describing recent regional populist insurgencies. These include the First nations, Albertan, and Québécois nationalist movements that have risen and fallen in popularity throughout Canada's history (Blanchet and Medeiros, 2019; Neubauer and Gunster, 2019; Brym, 1978). One of the earliest noted emergences of populist movements in Canada is the labor movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in response to the spread of industrial capitalism in British North America. Various pro-union organizations across English Canada formed a foundation of Canadian resistance to big business interests (Friesen, 2021; Fuidge, 2010; Laycock, 2019).

While many of these movements experienced firm setbacks during this period, the economic calamities that occurred in the 1930s galvanized these efforts into full scale political parties who often incorporated key members of these movements into their ranks. The largest and most influential of these parties included the Non-Partisan League, The United Farmers of Alberta, and most notably, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. These parties, sometimes termed "prairie populist" by researchers, were primarily concentrated in Western Canada and advocated for greater enfranchisement of the more rural and less populated Western provinces in opposition to the federal government, which was viewed as more laissez-faire and strongly aligned with the more urbanized eastern provinces (Laycock, 2019; Jenson and Papillon, 1998; Brym, 1978). This era additionally produced right-wing populist movements with parties such as the Social Credit Party in Alberta emerging in response to the Great Depression and the

acknowledgement of the interdependency between urban and rural populations. These parties were, in general, more business friendly, more antagonistic towards the federal government, and more socially conservative than their left-wing counterparts (Brym, 1978; Rotstein, 1976; Laycock, 2019). Populist parties and candidates began to gain traction in subsequent decades with several major electoral victories. Some of the most successful of these included the victories of the now openly socially democratic CCF under leader Tommy Douglas, and the right-wing Albertan Social Credit Party after the emergence of party leader Ernest Manning (Froese, 2017; Macgregor, 2018; Jenson and Papillon, 1998).

Québécois populism, despite emerging around the same time, is largely viewed by scholars as politically distinct from other regional populist movements due to its basis in francophone nationalism and resistance to the anglophone dominance in Canadian federal policy. Like many of Canada's populist parties, the earliest of these movements formed partially as a response to the great depression, such as the Union Nationale in 1935. These parties tended to be economically and socially right-wing and heavily emphasized greater autonomy for the province, such as exemption from being conscripted. Many of these sentiments survived throughout the twentieth century and some were responsible for some of the earliest populist parties to operate in federal politics, such as the Social Credit Party of Canada (Blanchet and Medeiros, 2019; Corbett, 1965; Friesen, 2021; Breton, 1988). While both left- and right-wing regional anglophone parties endured well into the second half of the twentieth century, the two forms of populism diverged in their political trajectories. The overtly democratic socialist party of the NDP incorporated several left populist policy ideals and figures, most notably with the first party leader being the former head of the CCF Tommy Douglas (Jenson and Papillon, 1998; Macgregor, 2018; Penner, 1993). The first major right populist party to run nationally and gain

over 50 house seats was the Reform Party of Canada, which was founded in 1987 and formed from Albertan regional prairie populist movements. (Harrison, 1995). Researchers generally define the party as right populist due to its ideological commitment to socially conservative policies and its rejection of multiculturalism as a core Canadian value (Cody, 1998). Right populism's federal scope allowed for more ambitious proposals than some of its predecessors, such as an end to federal involvement in provincial energy resources and social services jurisdictions as well as strong senatorial reforms. Party leader Preston Manning was notably one of the first political figures to use the term Triple E senate (elected, effective, equal representation per province) to describe what he believed was necessary to remake the senate into a truly representative organization (Harrison, 1995). What can be noted as a pattern in the literature is the largest distinction between left and right populism in Canada. In left-wing Canadian populism, the people and the elites are divided primarily along socioeconomic lines with the rich and well-connected business class being considered a universal "elite." In right-wing populism, the people/elite divide is drawn more along geographical lines where powerful provinces, cultures, or communities are cast as the elite in contrast to a favored and allegedly oppressed population, such as westerners or French Canadians (Harrison, 1995; Farney, 2013: 43-58; Cody, 1998). The effects of both left- and right-wing populist ideas on the greater Canadian political zeitgeist of the time was also beginning to be examined by scholars, particularly in regard to foreign policy. These include the post-Cold War shift in foreign policy towards "Canada First" style isolationism, as well as the efforts in the 1980s to conduct intensive reviews of popular sentiment surrounding international policy in order to shape government action accordingly (Page, 1994; Rioux and Hay, 1999).

Past the merging of the Reform Party with the Progressive Conservatives in the late 1990s and the public acceptance of the NDP as a mainstream national party, comparatively fewer works were published on populism at the federal level in Canada until the early 2010s, likely due to the absence of an official national populist party. Some of the earliest works on populism written in this time period focus on the 2011 federal election. Scholars first began to take note of the increased role that social media was playing in the popularity of electoral candidates as part of the more general “mediatization” of politics that was occurring in many states at the time (Reilly, 2011; Gruzd, 2011; Saurette and Gunster, 2011; Roebuck and Beange, 2013). However, even before this, the influence of both foreign populists and historical homegrown populists on the future of Canadian politics was already being examined. Some researchers were attempting to determine the new form the right-wing of Canada would take now that a more radical element, The Reform Party, had been introduced. Others began using comparative analysis between Canada and other states with similar sociopolitical landscapes, such as the United States and Australia, and started to observe similar developments in the use of right-wing strategies such as “market populism” wherein the free market is envisioned as representing the popular will in the purest form (Sawyer and Laycock, 2009; Farney, 2005; Snow and Moffit, 2012).

1.4 Modern Canadian study of populism

This emphasis on the emergence of right-wing populism continued for the remainder of the decade with subsequent works focusing primarily on regional right-wing populist movements such as the phenomenon of the “Ford Nation,” a strongly right epistemologically populist ideology in local politics spearheaded by Toronto Mayor Rob Ford, who expressed an opposition to “Downtown Elites” who benefited from a “gravy train”, in both Toronto and Ontario. This brand of populism was noted as a distinctive populist ideology by some scholars,

particularly Silver and Figueroa (2019), and is especially relevant to the exploration of left versus right Canadian populism. While the political style is certainly slanted right with its fiscally and somewhat socially conservative policy proposals, it contains both left- and right-wing sub-elements. While the rhetoric employed frames the “elites” as union leaders and government officials as “fat cats” benefiting from the “gravy train”, the people are understood from a more socioeconomic standpoint with suburban, working class, and even new immigrant populations being contrasted with the “downtown elites” (Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Kipfer and Parastou, 2014; Zambito, 2018). These movements demonstrate not only an instance of non-uniform application of populist strategies in Canada, but also its capability to be used outside of strictly partisan campaigns as they do not necessarily represent a political party and target neighborhoods and social classes rather than ethnocultural groups as outsiders. The research trend of right-wing focus also applied nationally in this era. A growing number of academics began to analyze the effects of populist movements and successes on Canadian politics. Studies were conducted surrounding the integration into the Conservative Party of foreign electoral strategies that contained populist elements. However, few works utilize a longitudinal dimension in order to compare the significance of populism in each election (Thomas and Tufts, 2016; Snow and Moffit, 2012; Farney, 2013). Including this dimension, however, has useful applications for tracking populist progression over time. The political events of 2016, that of strong populist victories in two of Canada's contemporary states, lead to a greater emphasis on comparative analysis, including the possibility of whether Canada could experience a similar political event (Adams, 2017; Graves and Smith, 2020; Speer, 2018). The prospect of foreign right-populist influence on Canada has at this point taken firm hold in the zeitgeist of Canadian political science. Many of these speculative works contain a normative dimension and portray

the right-populist influence as a threat to the Canadian political sphere. Some researchers appear to express a concern that Canadian politics may become increasingly xenophobic and socially intolerant as well as hostile to the welfare state. This influence appeared to be exemplified in 2019 by the emergence of a strongly right-wing populist anti refugee federal movement in the form of Maxime Bernier's People's Party of Canada (Graves and Smith, 2020; Hameed, 2018; Freissen, 2021; Beer-Beauchamp, 2020).

However, significantly fewer works have been written on the potential of left-wing foreign influence effecting the Canadian political landscape in a similar way or an otherwise general rise in left wing populist impact. This disparity is surprising, as the conditions for strong left-wing populist influence on Canadian politics appear to be firmly present. This is evidenced by the similar left-wing populist presence in the same contemporary states that provide right-wing populist influence, such as Corbynism in the United Kingdom and the strong grassroots support for left populist presidential candidate Bernie Sanders in the United States (Ives, 2018; Watts and Bale, 2019; Venizelos and Stavrakakis, 2020; Judis, 2016). It is also worth noting that corporate influence over Canadian politics was a heavy feature in the 2019 elections as many voters were affected in their choices by corporate scandals such as SNC Lavalin (Bezanson, 2019; Nanos, 2020). Due to the increasing relevance of left- and right-wing populism in both the global and Canadian political sphere, it is important to determine the extent to which they have influenced electoral politics in recent years. As such, this study will attempt to measure their relative use in the last three federal elections. To do so, I present in the next chapter the theoretical framework as well as the methodology that was mobilized to explore populist discourses in Canada in the 2010s.

Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology

Based on the previously examined literature, I will begin this study by formulating an operationalizable model for populism both in a general sense and in relation to the Canadian political sphere. In this chapter, I will first outline a theoretical framework of my chosen definition of populism and its component rhetorical elements. The section will identify what the study considers to be an important populist element as well as what differentiates their use in either a left-or -right-wing populist context. I will subsequently detail the sociopolitical factors offered by the literature to be most responsible for the recent “populist wave”. Based on both these factors and my own analysis of the Canadian political sphere, I will offer two hypotheses highlighting the possible and expected results of the study. These predictions will concern both the overall impact of the populist wave on populism’s use in Canadian politics and the comparative impacts of left- and right-wing populist influences. In order to test these hypotheses, this framework will further include a codex of terms related to Canadian populism as well as a set of criteria with which to measure populist language and rhetoric within documents. I will then outline the methodology to be used in order to gain insight on the relative prevalence of left- and right-wing populist language and rhetoric in the Canadian context. The final section will deal with case selection and will outline my objects of analysis, chosen cases, and the methods of observation and analysis that was employed for measurement.

2.1 Conceptual Framework

This section will propose a model for the concept of populism based on its existing interpretations as a rhetorical style in the literature. This will include discussions on the features of populist discourse and the pre-existing proposed definitions of populism. Drawing on case studies of populism, I will further distinguish left- and right-wing variants of populism in the

Canadian context as well as other contemporary states. I will also offer a description and justification for my two major hypotheses. As outlined in the previous chapter, I will conceptually approach populism by “treating it as a discursive and stylistic repertoire” (Brubaker, 2017) that can be employed by any political actor. This method will allow for a discussion of populism in terms of political actors who are explicitly populist and frame themselves as opponents of the status quo (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014). Furthermore, it will allow me to address those who are not specifically populist and only utilize populist elements in political discourse (Rooduijn, 2014). I will begin with the core definition of populism as proposed by political researchers Thomas and Tufts. Their work describes populist rhetoric as “an approach to politics that includes broad appeals to the interests of ‘the people’ as articulated against the interests of ‘elites,’ particularly those with an institutional basis” (2016).

2.1.1 Definition of Left Right Populism and its subcategories.

The academic concept of left- and right-wing styles of populism emerged largely in the latter part of the twentieth century in response to the application of populism to a wider variety of (often philosophically opposed) political ideologies and movements such as Marxism, Maoism, fascism, agrarian radicalism, and nativism (Allcock, 1971; Jessop, 1984; Canovan, 1981; Richards, 1981). This gave birth to the idea of academically defined subcategories of populist ideology. Due to the already nebulously defined nature of the concept, the subcategories were quite varied and by no means standardized. Often, only the core idea of the people/elite divide is shared between interpretations or enumerated categories. These subcategories of populism are often directly linked to a preexisting political ideology and demographic categories and represent the people/elite divide being used within the “host ideology’s” political framework. Specific examples of this include laissez faire market populism, agrarian populism,

reactionary populism, and progressive populism (Canovan, 1982; Snow and Moffit, 2012; Urbinati, 2013; Thomas and Tufts, 2016).

Many of these categories are given the additional attribution of “left or right populist”. Similar to the definition of populism itself, the division between left- and right-wing populism tends to vary between authors. The designations are generally based on whether the populist framing of the subcategory aligns more closely with a right- or left-wing political worldview. Populist talking points are typically described simply as left or right in accordance with the interpreted political alignment of the populist actor in question or policy they advocate for (Kaltwasser et al., 2019; Otjes and Louwerse, 2015; March, 2017). However, other works have instead utilized a distinct framework to identify left or right populist language and rhetoric based on its rhetorical audience and targets. This framework is based primarily on the idea of populist rhetoric having both a “vertical” and “horizontal” aspect. The vertical component generally refers to the identity of the “elites” as well as the nature of their victimisation of the “people” (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Ivaldi et al., 2017; Bubaker, 2017; Ostiguy and Casullo, 2017). The distinction here between left- and right-wing populism concerns whether the elites are primarily defined from a sociopolitical or socioeconomic perspective. In left populism, the elites will frequently be described from a socioeconomic perspective, with the wealthy and well connected being labelled elite, particularly the business class who allegedly “rig the system” in their political favor. In right-wing populism, the elites are more likely to be described socio-politically with specifically the governing class and the intelligentsia being labelled as out of touch and corrupt “downtown elites” or “fat cats” or powerful minority “special interest groups” (Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Thomas and Tufts, 2016; Aytaç and Öniş, 2014). These groups are generally

described as corrupting the state's cultural and political identity and values as well as consolidating political capital for themselves.

The horizontal aspect of a populist movement is usually distinguished as left-or right-wing by determining the identity of both the insider "people" and sociocultural outsiders in the rhetoric of a populist actor. The other in left-wing populism is typically the wealthy elites themselves or outsider financial interests such as foreign business interests, global banks, and foreign absentee landlords. In right-wing populism, the others are often more directly other states and their governments as well as the immigrants that hail from them. Furthermore, they will include populations that are considered "undesirables" by the state's mainstream culture, such as criminals and the homeless. The distinction of "the other" often includes the existence or nonexistence of a racial component (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). In right-wing populism, opposing races are frequently ethnic minorities within the state and dominant races from opposing states. While a racial element is comparatively rare in left-wing populism, it is sometimes used, particularly in the politics of former colonial states, to identify the outgroup as the allegedly dominant, but numerically inferior, racial group, most commonly Caucasians (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Ostuguy and Cassullo, 2017).

Researchers have also identified sub-elements of populist rhetoric and language that exist in tandem with each other to form "populist discourse" (Brubaker, 2017; Thomas and Tufts, 2016; Oliver and Rahn, 2016). These elements can also be labelled left- or right-wing based on their subjects and rhetorical targets. Using an aggregation of commonly outlined sub-elements in the literature, the framework employed in this study is based on a list of seven rhetorical elements which I believe most comprehensively represent populist language and rhetoric. The

following section outlines both the elements themselves and their left- and right-wing based variants

2.1.2 Model of Populist Sub-elements

Many researchers measure overall populist language and rhetoric in a text through the separate measurement of what are frequently termed “rhetorical sub-elements”. These are, otherwise, separate styles of political communication that are deemed important in the formation of a populist message (Aslanidis, 2018; Brubaker, 2017). As with much of the study of populism, no singular set of sub-elements have been agreed on by researchers to be essential to measure while analyzing a text. These sub-elements are largely based on both the “people/elite divide” of the populist political framework, as well as its frequently employed “us vs them” rhetorical mentality. This includes elements based on the typically antagonistic language of populist messaging towards both the state’s internal elites as well as sociocultural outsiders. Other sub-elements are based around claims to embody the singular “will of the people”, which includes both the extolling of the virtue and value of the people and the championing of the alleged will of the majority (Brubaker, 2017; Oliver and Rahn, 2016). Some works also include the necessity of normative rhetoric such as “moralism” where populist actors describe policies that they view as morally correct or following a higher principle of governance (Fernández-Garcia and Luengo, 2018; Reungoat, 2010). The nature of the direct appeals to the people are also considered by some researchers, particularly those that look at “epistemological populism” where the populist actor attempts to communicate with voters “on their level” and laud the expertise and intelligence of the “average Joe and Jane” voter, in order to further distinguish themselves from out of touch and elite politicians (Saurette and Gunster, 2011; Farney, 2013). I will now provide a list of sub-elements that I feel best represent the full range of populist rhetoric based on an

aggregation of those most commonly identified in the literature, as well as their left and right variants.

1. People-Centric Appeals: Primarily, this includes the usage of ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric. In order to qualify as populist and people centric, ‘the people,’ or a synonym thereof, must be used to describe an in-group in opposition to an ‘elite’ or foreign out-group (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014). Additionally, the in-group in question must be characterized in a morally superior light to the other (Thomas and Tufts, 2016; Brubaker, 2017; Kaltwasser et al., 2018). While both left- and right-wing populists frequently use this strategy, right-wing populism often frames outsiders in a more direct way, with the ‘others’ being immigrants or cultural minorities who are undermining the culture of the state (Ostuguy and Cassullo, 2017; Hogan and Haltinner, 2015). In contrast, left-wing populism tends to identify the foreign ‘other’ in terms of foreign and international business organizations who threaten the economic sovereignty of the state and its workers. Both left and right populists often demonize international organizations, with left-wing populists largely targeting trade organizations and right-wingers mostly targeting N.G.O.s such as Greenpeace (Ivaldi et al 201; Charalambous and Ioannou, 2020; Mavrozacharakis et al., 2017). A further example of people-centric appeals is the presentation of the people as monolithic. This can include an asserted singular political agenda (Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Schwarz, 2020; Nardiz, 2018) or a suggestion of universal common knowledge, where the common citizen does not need to be educated by the state beyond what they have learned themselves (Mair, 2002; Saurette and Gunster, 2011). A final element of people centric appeals is the assertion of greater popular sovereignty, where a call is made for more direct popular involvement in governance (Page,

1994), or greater decision-making capabilities by the state in international affairs (Aslanidis, 2018). Left-wing populism often frames this in terms of direct voting on issues and greater civic involvement of citizens, while right-wing populism often extols non-interference at both the intranational and international level by state or interstate actors (Aytac and Onis, 2014; La Torre, 2019; March, 2017).

2. Anti-elitism: The term ‘elite’ is an often poorly defined concept, with the only universal trait being the suggestion of a small but powerful population (Snow and Moffit, 2012). Anti-elitism rhetoric consists mostly of advocacy for the regulation, reduction in influence, or even persecution of a minority group deemed to be an elite by the political actor (Brubaker, 2017; Aslanidis, 2018; Ivaldi et al., 2017). The most common targets of this rhetoric can include wealthy economic classes, governmental actors or affiliates, special interest groups, or cultural minorities that are protected by the state (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Moghaddam, 2018). I will use the left/right dichotomy as identified by Ostuguy and Cassullo where “in left-wing populism, the social other is the rich, the oligarchy, the 1%, financial capital, the cuicos or pitucos, the rich white folks, all of whom, moreover and importantly, are always foreignizing and globalizing” and “In right-wing populisms, the government, the political establishment protects these ‘obviously nefarious’ social others (and their interests), instead of ‘the people of this place’” (Ostuguy and Cassullo, 2017: 2). In essence, the elites in left-wing populism are described as the wealthy business class while right-wing populists characterize them more with governmental and “special interest” actors. According to both perspectives, these elites benefit from their close relations with government.

3. Majoritarianism : This term is most commonly defined as “the assertion of the interests, rights, and will of the majority against those of minorities” (Brubaker, 2017). In left-wing populism, this can include the championing of the will of the majority over that of the rich and powerful (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) or the challenging of the electoral process on the grounds of it not reflecting the will of the majority (LeDuc, 2011). In right-wing populism, it can include the rejection of policy protections and benefits for minority populations (Nardiz, 2018). This can further include advocacy for greater cultural homogenization and the rejection of multiculturalism on the grounds that these policies are symbolically and sometimes substantively threatening the cultural practices of the majority (Brubaker, 2017; Schwarz, 2020; Mudde, 2015).

4. Antagonistic re-politicization: This concept is outlined by Brubaker as “the claim to reassert democratic political control over domains of life that are seen, plausibly enough, as having been depoliticized and de-democratized, that is, removed from the realm of democratic decision-making” (2017). This can include elements of the political process that are considered “baked into it”, such as judicial supremacy and influence of lobbyists (Moffitt, 2016; Mair, 2002). Additionally, it can challenge the core ideological basis of a state’s policy creation, such as neoliberal economics (Brubaker, 2017; Charalambous and Ioannou, 2020). In essence, alternative policy strategies are offered to areas of governance believed to be incontestable by the public. While this particular sub-element is often neutral in terms of the left/right political spectrum, there is still some variation in how it is primarily used for left- vs right-wing political goals. In left-wing populism, it often takes the form of criticizing the way financial resources and political capital is defined and distributed, such as the ability for monied interests to contribute to the campaigns of political actors. This can also include

criticizing even more fundamental aspects of a state's governance, such as proposing limitations on wealth or property ownership for individuals (Charalambous and Ioannou, 2020; Jenson and Papillion, 1998; Moghaddam, 2018). In right-wing populism, antagonistic re-politicization more often takes the form of criticizing long running governmental practices, largely on the grounds of being a waste of resources and time. Policy proposals based on this criticism include ending the practices altogether or streamlining or delegating them to the private sector (Snow and Moffit, 2012; Sawyer and Laycock, 2009; Thomas and Tufts, 2016).

5. Anti-institutionalism : This is broadly defined as a critique of the fundamentals of a state's political institutions and party system (Brubaker, 2017 ; Thomas and Tufts, 2016 ; Snow and Moffit, 2012). This includes the challenging of the legitimacy of the current party system (Harrison, 1995; Mair, 2002) or the legitimacy and alleged corruption of entire branches of government, such as the court system, the regulation of the media, or the senate (Alvares, and Dahlgren, 2016; Webley, 2018; Mudde, 2004). This can even extend to calls for the abolishing of entire governmental departments on the grounds of unnecessary bureaucracy (Penner, 2012). Frequently this is asserted based on claims of unnecessary and costly processes, in the case of right populism, and on the grounds of insufficient services or favoritism in terms of who benefits from them with left populism.
6. Protectionism: This element is defined from both an economic and sociological perspective. Broadly speaking, protectionism is most frequently described as claims of protecting 'the people' against existential threats from within and outside the state, regardless of whether the described threats actually exist' (Brubaker, 2017). Economic protectionism includes the protection of domestic goods producers through resistance to the importation of cheap

foreign goods on the one hand and the influence of foreign creditors and investors on the other. Furthermore, it often includes protection for employment against being supplanted by foreign laborers or the outsourcing of labor altogether (Moffit, 2016; Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018). Sociological protectionism applies primarily to direct foreign military and diplomatic threats, however right-wing populists often include immigration and foreign cultural influence as well. This can include advocacy for restrictions on immigration and social initiatives to preserve domestic culture (Nardiz, 2018; Hogan and Haltinner, 2015). The largest distinctions between left- and right-wing protectionism are the culprits behind the proposed threat. Left-wing populism tends to frame them as international and foreign business interests seeking to exploit the people as well as corrupt international trade organizations. In contrast, right-wing populism tends to view them as immigrants and foreign low-wage workers who seek to supplant local workers (Ostuguy and Cassullo, 2017; Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; March, 2017; Moghaddam, 2018).

7. Simplicity: The final major element of populism as a political style is the perceived simplicity of the process of both campaigning and governance. This first includes simplicity of language (Pollok, 2015; Silver and Figueroa, 2019), where a populist actor will utilize unpolished and ‘off-the-cuff’ language in order to converse with voters “on their level.” The second deals with projected simplicity of governance and appeals to common sense, where simplistic and straight forward solutions are offered to major political issues in order to portray the current political establishment as self-serving and corrupt for not yet having implemented such methods (Harrison, 1995; Kaltwasser et al., 2019).

2.2 Hypotheses

Based on the research question of whether left- or right-wing populism has gained greater significance in recent elections, I will be offering two basic hypotheses for the study. The first concerns whether or not populism itself has been utilized by the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP to a greater extent in the three most recent federal elections. The second will be based on the relative prominence of left- vs right-wing populism both overall and within each party. I will begin this section with a discussion of the theoretical bases for my hypotheses.

2.2.1 *The evolution of populism*

As stated in the literature and the previous chapter, large scale populist movements generally develop as a response to some form of geopolitical upheaval or a growing resentment towards an allegedly oppressive status quo. Examples of this include the early Canadian populist movements that emerged during both the labor movement and the great depression (Laycock, 2019; Jenson and Papillon, 1998; Canovan, 1982). What is generally regarded by researchers to be the most recent “populist wave” is the sharp uptick in the use of populist rhetoric by western political actors (Runje, 2018; Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Van Kessel, 2015). The inception of many populist movements and parties, such as SYRIZIA, The Five Star Movement or UKIP, appears mostly to have occurred in the late 20th or early 21st century. However, significant victories for populist parties or increases in popular support for populist causes are generally credited to the early to mid-2010s (Bartlett, 2014, 122; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Moffit, 2016; Rooduijn, 2014). These victories include the success of Brexit, the election of President Donald Trump in the United States, and the surge in political popularity of anti-immigration populist parties, such as the French National Front. Many scholars have identified a common popular sentiment throughout Western states, particularly in Europe, of disillusionment with neoliberal

globalisation, sometimes known as “system discontent”, and a mass demand for greater sovereignty in response to globalisation (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Bartlett, 2012). Contributing factors to this sentiment have been noted to include the 2008 global financial crash and the large-scale refugee crisis that emerged in the wake of the Arab spring (Haltinner and Hogan, 2015; Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Altman, 2009). Both of these factors play into both left- and right-wing populist narratives surrounding the state of geopolitics. The left-wing perspective would suggest that the financial crash is proof of the failures of neoliberal capitalism on both a local and global scale while the right-wing narrative instead suggests that a states reliance on the global community and its intertwining with foreign organizations and business interests has negatively impacted its financial wellbeing (Helleiner, 2011; Atabey and Burcu, 2020). Furthermore, the Arab spring and its resultant refugee crises has been interpreted from both a left and right-wing perspective. Right-wing populists frequently identify refugees as “invaders” who represent a significant threat to the sociocultural integrity of a state, while left-wing actors are typically more compassionate to the refugees themselves while blaming the global neoliberal status quo for creating the conditions that prompted the crises (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). While the spread of populist ideals and policies in Western states is generally consistent with political diffusion theory (Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2018), it has further been noted that the modern media advancements, particularly the increasing usage of social media by both citizens and political actors, has had a quickening effect on this diffusion (Rooduijn, 2014; Pollock et al., 2015). This has been supported by survey research suggesting that “beyond having a tabloidized and entertainment-based media diet, populist voters self-select media content that actively

articulates the divide between the “innocent” people and “culprit” others (Hameleers, et al., 2017).

While Canada has yet to have a notable populist party or movement gain significant electoral ground nationally, there is already evidence to suggest that the conditions that enable it are already present. Several studies have already demonstrated that, since at least 2011, a “mediatisation” of politics has occurred (Reilly, 2011; Saurette and Gunster, 2011; Boily, 2015), with an increased importance of social media and independent news in Canadian political discourse, particularly around elections. Furthermore, as predicted, the diffusion of populist ideals worldwide has seemingly penetrated the Canadian political sphere. Some surveys have been shown populist ideals gaining popularity with Canadian citizens in recent years, such as greater regulation of immigration and the replacing of Canada’s first-past-the-post electoral system. (Farney, 2013). Additionally, many scholars have identified the increased borrowing of populist elements by both regional and national actors (Laycock, 2005; Sawyer and Laycock, 2009; Thomas and Tufts, 2016), particularly the national Conservative Party. These ideals include the greater prominence of “market populism” that emphasises routine market deregulation and the expansion of business opportunities for all Canadians, as well as a stronger rhetorical emphasis on less direct geopolitical intervention and specific “Canada first” policy. In light of this literature, I propose the following hypothesis:

H1: There has been an increase in the populist rhetoric of major Canadian political parties since 2011.

2.2.2 Left- and Right-Wing Populism in Canada

Canada's three major parties are generally considered to represent three separate points on the state's political spectrum. The NDP generally embodies Canada's left-wing, the Conservatives its right, and the Liberals its center. Due to this paradigm, we can hypothesise that populist elements in the platform of the Conservative Party and the NDP should reflect respectively a right-and left-wing style of populism. The Liberal Party, which is generally believed to campaign to the left but generally govern as centrists (Clarkson, 2005: 252), and to frequently adjust its position on the political spectrum based on public sentiment (Corbett, 2017), will likely skew to the left but fluctuate in its use of populism between elections. The historical populist background of Canada would also appear to support this idea. As the NDP was born out of regional left populist movements in Western Canada, it is likely to maintain some degree of populist elements and rhetorical style in its platform (Jenson and Papillion, 1998; Brym, 1978; Macgregor, 2018). It is furthermore an "outsider party" that has yet to obtain federal office and can therefore distinguish itself from the successive Liberal and Conservative governments that embody the "status quo". Likewise, this paradigm could also be observed with right populism in the Conservatives, as the modern incarnation of the party is the result of the merging of the mainstream Progressive Conservative Party and the more explicitly populist Reform Party. (Rotstein, 1976; Bell, 1990; Stingle, 2001). While the Liberal Party lacks either of these features in its origins, its more progressive running style should likely contain left populist elements similar to the NDP, particularly to distinguish themselves from the Conservatives. I therefore offer the following hypothesis:

H2: Right-wing populism will have a greater overall prominence in the Conservative Party with each progressing election while left-wing populism will have greater prominence in the Liberal Party and NDP.

2.3 Methodology

The methodology I utilized consists of a series of mixed method content analyses. These analyses were conducted on the party manifestos of the three major Canadian political parties. They will aim to compare the populist elements within the manifestos between parties and across the previous three elections.

2.3.1 Case selection

This study focuses on the three largest Canadian national parties: the Liberal Party of Canada, the Conservative Party of Canada, and the New Democratic Party. These parties can be considered the most important in the Canadian political zeitgeist for two major reasons. The first is their proportion of seats and votes, having emerged from the last three federal elections with no fewer than 90 percent in total seats won. The second is their prominence in traditional, online, and social media coverage over all other parties (Small, 2008). This factor is particularly relevant as the diffusion of populist ideals across Western states has been demonstrated to occur largely through the internet and social media. This is further demonstrated to bolster the overall political influence of large parties over smaller ones (Small, 2008; Alvares and Dahlgren, 2016; Rooduijn, 2014). The Bloc Québécois is the only other party to hold significant seat numbers in recent elections, and it is not suitable for this analysis as it runs only in Quebec and is an explicitly regional party (Azem, 2011). While none of these mainstream parties feature explicitly populist platforms, in the sense that they do not fully place themselves outside the political “status quo” or suggest that the state’s political system is inherently corrupt and self-serving. (Brubaker, 2017), many published works on populism have noted their adoption of some populist elements within their platforms in recent elections (Farney, 2013; Snow and Moffit, 2012; Thomas and

Tufts, 2016). This supposed gradual adaptation of populist political elements makes these major parties ideal for analysis of populism's increasing relevance in Western political practice.

The choice to explore the rise of populism rhetoric, focusing on the three selected parties and their manifestos, was partly motivated by previous studies that have attempted to quantitatively analyze populism within texts (Aslanidis, 2018). A large portion of these analyses have utilized party manifestos because an election manifesto can be seen as an authoritative document that gives a clear overview of the ideas of a party at a certain point in time (Rooduijn, 2014). Not only do manifestos provide a solid demonstration of a party's image and projected method of campaigning and governance, but they also offer a unified singular message that covers the party's entire political outlook. Furthermore, the largely consistent format of manifestos across parties and even states allows for a simpler comparison between the communications to voters of the three Canadian parties (Reungoat, 2010). This simplicity, in turn, allows for a more mixed method approach to analysis, allowing for qualitative content analysis in conjunction with a computerized text analysis. This was used by previous studies to streamline the process of measuring populist words and phrases in a text (Oliver and Rahn, 2016).

This study will focus on party manifestos released during the three most recent Canadian federal elections: 2011, 2015, and 2019. These election years were selected to align with the timeline of the recent western populist surge, as outlined in the previous conceptual analysis section. The preceding 2008 election occurred roughly before, or simultaneously with, the foundation of many of the populist parties in Europe, who therefore would have less time to have their political ideas diffuse internationally (Ivaldi et al., 2017). It also slightly preceded the Canadian economic recession the same year (Pasma, 2010: 5). The global Great Recession is

largely considered by academics to be one of the major influencing factors behind the rise of western populism (Luis and Gomez, 2017). As a result, the global “populist wave” is less likely to be relevant to this electoral year. Additionally, the 2011 election, as outlined by several scholars, was the beginning of a concerted use of social media and the internet by voters and political actors (Reilly, 2011; Hameleers et al., 2017). The 2011 election can be considered an ideal starting point for analysis as many of the factors of populism’s international proliferation are present (Snow and Moffit, 2012) while others, such as the electoral success of populist campaigns in the United States and Europe, are absent. The largest of these successes, the American 2016 election and the Brexit referendum, will further act as an influencing factor between the 2015 and 2019 Canadian elections. This will help determine whether the success of populist parties and movements internationally resulted in an increase in populist rhetoric by the main Canadian federal political parties.

2.3.2 Methods of Observation and Analysis

In recent years, researchers have employed a variety of methods and case studies to measure and compare populism between texts. Most works have interpreted the “political style” of populism to be a method of campaigning and direct voter communication. A variety of methods of analysis have been designed and employed depending on the length, detail, or number of the examined works. Some researchers have employed multiple interpreters to directly analyze these texts and define them as populist or non-populist based on a pre-written set of criteria. This can include a set of qualifying questions that gauge whether the text meets the minimum requirement to be considered truly populist or even how populist it is based on an ordinal scale. Other works employ a more quantitative or mixed method measuring system based on populist “key terms or phrases” (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Aslanidis, 2018; Roberts and

Popping, 2015). This style employs a dictionary of key terms and phrases that generally connote a populist sentiment regardless of context. The relative density of these key terms and phrases can then be quantitatively analyzed and compared between texts. This can even include the complexity of the language and number of words in order to gauge the “conversational level” at which the text is speaking to its audience. This is based around the principle of populism where political actors speak in a less technical and more casual style in order to better communicate on a voter’s level (Saurette and Gunster, 2011; Aslanidis, 2018; Rooduijn et al., 2011; Bonikowski and Gidron, 2016).

This content analysis employs elements from most of these methods. It utilized a mixed method strategy that will apply a set of questions individually to each of the three largest Canadian parties’ manifestos of all three selected electoral years. A pilot reading was conducted of all the manifestos in order to compile a list of key terms and phrases in them. The key terms were then categorized first by association with one of the seven populist sub-elements and then further subdivided as left, right, or neutral. Once the codex (available in appendix) was compiled, a set of questions was designed to analyze the overall populist intensity and style of each text. The units of analysis consist of ten policy subsections within each of the manifestos. As not all of the manifestos organize their policy chapters in the same way, some chapters were reorganized as necessary to include the areas from multiple sections dealing with the 10 policy topics outlined in the codex. For example, passages from multiple chapters dealing with Canada’s language and cultural policy are considered a single unit. The question set was divided into subsets for each of the sub-elements as well as general populism, which include some holistic questions concerning the entire text. The sets consist of both open- and closed-ended questions that aim to establish the full context of the populist language and rhetoric used in each text. This

includes yes or no questions to establish the presence or absence of a sub-element, as well as an ordinal question using a scale of one to three, in order to gauge the intensity of both overall populist sentiment and that of each sub-element. The open-ended questions identify the talking points and rhetorical targets of each passage as they pertain to the sub-element in question. Examples of this include questions such as what shared qualities the Canadian people are described as embodying and what groups are considered the “elites” by the passage. Finally, a question was asked as to determine whether the section contains left or right-wing key terms related to the sub-element in question, or neutral terms used in a left or right context, such as a neutral anti-elitist term targeting the 1 percent. In both cases, the result was categorized based on greater presence or stronger advancement. The results were then be analyzed in three different ways based around the four forms of questioning. The overall number of each ordinal scale result for each of a party’s electoral years were compared and analyzed for any apparent trends. The presence or absence of certain talking points established by the yes or no questions were also examined for trends based on how many of the texts contain these elements. The recorded results for each sub element for each party were organized into two sets of tables as seen in the next three chapters. The first set of tables display how many sections were considered 1, 2, or 3 on the ordinal scale, as well as the overall percentage of each category compared to the total number of sections for all three electoral years. The specific definition of each category varies between question sets for overall populism and each sub-element. However, across all of the ordinal questions, 1 represents little to no populist or sub-element presence, 2 represents a clear but moderate presence of the element and 3 represents a strong and central to presence of the element in the examined text. Designation of a category 2 scale result were generally favored, in terms of ambiguity of firm rhetorical presence, particularly if a document from one political

party represented a notable increase in a specific element from previous years' scale category of 1. This was done in order to account for subjectivity in terms of little populist presence as compared to moderate presence in a document. The second set of tables feature the number of yes answers to each of the yes/no questions as well as the overall percent of yes answers for the sections for all three years. The comparative prevalence of left and right populism was measured in two ways. Firstly, this was done by comparing the relative percentage of left vs right keywords for each of the three parties. Key terms in each policy section were analyzed separately by specific sub-element. Each of the key terms that appeared in a section were logged using NVivo. The question was then asked whether the section contained left- or right-wing people centrism key terms. The use of key terms in the passage was marked as leaning left, right, or neutral based on whether left or right people centrism key terms had a greater prominence within the section. If neither left nor right key terms were employed in the section or were used to an equal degree, the section was labelled neutral. This process was repeated for each of the remaining sub-elements. After this analysis was conducted, all the examined instances of each sub-element per manifesto were added together. As each of the ten sections were examined once for every sub-element, they totalled 70. The percentage of these instances considered left, right, or neutral were calculated for each electoral year and compared, to determine the proportion of left to right populist terminology for each electoral year used by a party. Secondly, left and right populism was analyzed by qualitatively measuring the responses to the open-ended questions based on the criteria for targets and topics established in the theoretical framework. The most commonly invoked topics and rhetorical targets for each of the parties' electoral years painted a clearer picture of how left- and right-wing populisms are employed for each party over the years.

Conclusions include how populist language and rhetoric progress in their use by each individual party as well as how each party uses populism in comparison to the others.

2.4 Conclusions

As outlined above, this study attempts to identify the possible effects that the most recent “populist wave” has had on the Canadian political sphere and whether left- or right-wing populism has had the greater impact. I have examined the literature on both the upsurge of populist movements, figures, and parties in recent decades, as well as the recent advent of greater populist discourse in Canadian politics. Through this process, I have identified a solid basis for the likelihood of the increased importance and use of populist language and rhetoric in the three most recent Canadian federal elections. The hypotheses that I have put forward suggest that, not only should populism and its various key elements be relatively prominent for all three political parties but should increase incrementally for all three parties between electoral years.

Furthermore, the greater prominence of left- or right-wing populism should fall largely across party lines with the Liberals and NDP having a greater left-wing populist tendency and the Conservatives having a greater right-wing prominence. The confirmation or refutation of these hypotheses was resolved through a content analysis of their manifestos in the last three elections. The results of the study demonstrate some interesting trends that divulge additional insight into both the current Canadian political landscape and its possible progression in future elections. The following three chapters will now outline the results and my analysis thereof.

Chapter 3: Results for the NDP 2011-2019

The results found in this study offer interesting insights into the use of populist language and rhetoric in the manifestos of all three major Canadian parties. This chapter, along with the subsequent two, will detail these results respectively for each of the three parties. This will include discoveries made about the frequency of use for populist language and rhetoric, as well as the specific targets, talking points, and key terms used in said populist language and rhetoric. This description will help to frame the overall relative prevalence of left- and right- wing populism used. In this chapter, I will detail the results found while examining the three selected party manifestos of the NDP. I will explore the overall prevalence of populist language and rhetoric in the texts as well as that of each of the aforementioned seven rhetorical sub-elements. Additionally, I will detail the relative prevalence of left- vs right-wing populist elements in each of the manifestos. In this first section, I will summarize the political context in which the NDP found itself in each of the electoral years in question, allowing for greater context to the topics of discussion in the manifestos. Subsequently, I will examine the overall prevalence of populist language and rhetoric across all of the policy sections for each electoral year and identify any patterns that emerge across the three years. Once this has been established, I will apply this analysis to the overall prevalence of each of the populist composite elements as well as detailing

the relative amounts of positive or negative answers to each of the questions that were used in the content analysis. These sections will also include a description of the predominant answers to the open-ended questions. Finally, I will detail the overall ration of left- to right-wing key terms used in the manifestos of each electoral year and provide a summative conclusion of the results.

3.1 Setting the stage

3.1.1 The 2011 election

The 2011 election was a pivotal opportunity for the NDP. While the party had gained some seats in the 2008 election, it was the subsequent events between 2008 and 2011 that had firmly placed the party in a strong electoral position. Following the 2008 federal election, the idea to oust the minority Conservative government began to be considered by the opposing parties, including the NDP. The idea finally came to fruition in December of that year when the party, along with the Liberal Party and the Bloc Québécois, proposed a vote of no confidence with the intention of approaching the governor general to replace the minority government with a coalition government. The failure of this measure also proved to be an electoral opportunity as the prorogation was viewed as undemocratic by many Canadians and sparked public protests (Wheeldon, 2014). The second prorogation of parliament occurred in 2009 due to Micheal Ignatieff withdrawing his support for Stephen Harper's government which further cast the Liberals in a negative and opportunistic light (Stewart, 2021). The major policy proposals put forward by the NDP included, the conservative reductions in corporate tax rates, rising healthcare costs, poverty relief and the need for governmental transparency. These put both the Liberals and the NDP in a prime position for populist messaging. The campaign slogans used were somewhat populist including, “working for families” and “you have a choice”. While the election did not result in the ousting of the Conservatives, and in fact allowed them to achieve a

majority government, the NDP did achieve strong electoral results, gaining over 60 seats and replacing the Liberals for the first time as the official opposition (Fournier, 2013).

3.1.2 The 2015 election

The 2015 election was the first ever for the NDP as the official opposition party. While this election was simply triggered by the time intervals set by the Canadian elections act, it was considered by both the NDP and the other opposition parties as an opportunity to oust the long-standing incumbent Conservative Party government under Stephen Harper. Harper had been Prime minister for almost a decade, resulting in what was sometimes referred to as “Harper fatigue” among voters (Ives, 2015). His decline in popularity was evidence in early polls placing the NDP in the lead. Stephen Harper's multiple dissolutions of Parliament and reputation for crushing dissent was beginning to work against him. This was evidenced in multiple polls that rated him high in intelligence and leadership but extremely low in trustworthiness and empathy (Loewen and Rubenson, 2015). The widespread desire for a change in leadership was represented in the simpler campaign slogan “Ready for Change”. Due to this decline in Conservative popularity, strategic voting quickly became an important factor in voter choice which, at first, favoured the NDP overall. This resulted in the party being perceived as front runners by both the electorate and the opposing parties. Leadership change was also an important factor in the election as both the NDP and Liberal Party had changed leadership. For the NDP this was the first time since 2003 and the new leader, Thomas Mulcair, attempted to frame himself as fresh faced but also experienced. The Party campaigned heavily on opposing the transpacific partnership, improving pharmacare, and promoting cultural tolerance, particularly surrounding Islamic immigrants and refugees. The polarizing nature of many of these issues resulted in voters splitting quite strongly across left/right lines so the largest question was which

left-wing party would earn the strategic vote. It is widely believed that Justin Trudeau's performance in several debates was largely responsible for the gaining of this support by the Liberals (Anderson and Macgregor, 2020). It is worth noting that many polls described Thomas Mulcair as competent but not particularly empathetic, a contrast with the charismatic and well-known Justin Trudeau, which is likely to have contributed to the parties crushing defeat at the hands of the Liberals.

3.1.3 The 2019 election

By the 2019 election, it appeared that the NDP had a chance to redeem themselves after the major defeat in 2015. Not only had Justin Trudeau himself been the subject of multiple scandals, most notably the SNC Lavalin scandal, he had also failed to achieve results on one of his most notably populist promises. That promise being that we are committed to ensuring that “2015 is the last election held under first-past-the-post”. After the failure of his appointed committee to produce a viable alternative to first past the post, he withdrew his support for the reform in 2017 (Zyglidopoulos, 2018). This, along with a variety of other broken promises, prompted an academic review that suggested that Trudeau's administration had kept a lower percentage of promises than that of his Conservative predecessors. This opened up some opportunities for the NDP to bill themselves as a more reliably left-wing alternative (Pétry, 2019). However, early on the party framed itself more in opposition to the Conservatives, most notably in Jagmheet Singh's pledge to work with the Liberal Party in a minority scenario but not with the Conservatives. The NDP had also experienced yet another leadership change after Mulcair was ousted as a result of his failure in the 2015 election. As a result, identity politics were brought more firmly into focus for the party, in particular in regard to Jagmeet Singh's turban worn as the result of his Sikh faith (McLean, 2021). Other major issues raised during the

election by the party included environmental policy, most notably in opposing the trans mountain pipeline, governmental ethics, particularly in regard to Justin Trudeau's conduct, poverty relief and the growing cost of living and Canada's response to the erratic actions of powerful states including the U.S, China, and Russia. While the NDP took a firm left-wing stance on all these issues, it appears that this approach did not achieve the desired results as the election resulted in a further loss of seats for the party with the Conservatives gaining some lost ground and reducing the Liberal government from a majority to a minority.

3.2 Progression of populist usage in the NDP manifestos 2011-2019

In Chapter 2, we presented two key hypotheses when it comes to the presence of populist elements in NDP party manifestos from 2011 to 2019. One surrounds the overall use of populism and its sub-elements during three federal elections, the other concerns the specific use of left or right-wing style populist talking points. Table 1 below is related to our first hypothesis, which stipulated that we should observed an increase in the populist rhetoric of major Canadian parties between 2011 and 2019. This table provides an overview of the numbers of each policy sections categorized at each level of the overall populism scale.

Table 1: Overall NDP Populist Prevalence

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	3	1	0	13.33%
2	5	4	4	43.33%
3	2	5	6	43.33%

Let's first consider the overall findings for all the election years together. As we see in Table 1, we see a strong overall use of categories of 2 (containing a 2 or higher in 4 or more of the sub elements/some significant use of populist tropes), and 3 (Very strong use of populist tropes (i.e.) populist tropes are some of most important rhetorical characteristics of the section/

representation of the people or opposition to elites central to the messaging of the section) on the scale sharing the frequency of 43.33%, and the result of 1 (nonexistent/ containing a 2 or higher in fewer than 4 of the sub elements) standing at only 13.33%. These initial results appear to indicate a strong use of populist tropes and language employed in the last three NDP electoral manifestos. The prominence of both category 2 and 3 on the scale, to the same degree, would additionally indicate a habitual use of some degree of populist talking points throughout all three federal elections. This concept appears consistent with the NDP's status as an “outsider party” who has a long history of populist policy proposals and resistance to Ottawa (Macgregor, 2018). This can allow for a consistency in populist messaging as they continue to portray themselves as a “people’s party” in opposition to the successive governments of the Liberals and Conservatives who represent the elite and the political “status quo”. The comparatively lower results of category 1 would, furthermore, initially indicate this consistency as policy sections with little to no populist messaging are 3 sections less frequent than sections that contain significant populist elements. Looking more specifically at the results by election year, they indicate a progression towards increased use of populist language and talking points from year to year. The most dramatic of these progressions occurs between the election years of 2011 and 2015 with 2 sections drop in the frequency of category 1 results as well as a 1 section decline in results of category 2. This amounts to a 3 sections increase in the frequency of category 3 results. The following transition is less significant with a further 1 section decline in category 1 results corresponding to a 1 section increase in category 3 results. This would indicate a positive relationship between the electoral year and the overall prominence of populist language. An initial impression of these numbers, in light of the conceptual framework of this study, suggests that a gradual increase in the use of populist talking points in response to the shifting geopolitical

landscape did in fact occur when it comes to the NDP. These numbers therefore indicate support for **Hypothesis 1** in regard to the NDP.

As we can observe in Table 1, the amount of populism employed in 2011 is distributed relatively equally among the three scale point results. However, the subsequent two electoral years indicate an increased overall usage of category 3 scale results and a decline in category 1 results, indicating a greater overall trend in the use of populism by the NDP. The greater increase in the overall use of populism between 2011 and 2015 compared to 2015 and 2019 suggests an alteration in the messaging style between in 2015 and an even more aggressive use of populism in 2019, possibly to capitalise on Justin Trudeau's alleged “broken promises”, which were in the political zeitgeist at the time (Birch, 2019). By contrast, the relative stability of category 2 results throughout all 3 electoral years supports the earlier conclusion of a consistent set of populist talking points and use of language throughout all three electoral years. The aggregation of these results suggests a general progression in the use of strong populist language to the exclusion of less populism-centric language while maintaining a consistent set of talking points surrounding many of the manifesto's policy subjects, as explored in the next sections.

3.3 NDP prevalence of people centrism

In our first section, we demonstrated an overall increase in populist rhetoric since 2011. In this section and the following ones, we explore also whether there has been an increase in sub-elements of Canadian as well as foreign populist discourses. We start this investigation by exploring people-centrism.

Table 2a: NDP People centrism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	6	4	1	36.67%
2	2	3	2	23.33%
3	2	3	7	40.00%

Looking at the results in Table 2a, we can observe an incremental increase in the prevalence of strong people centrism language over the three electoral years. The use of people centrism in the 2011 features a 6 sections prevalence in category 1 results compared to a shared 2 sections prevalence of the remaining two categories. The 2015 results are comparatively normally distributed with a 2 sections decrease in 1 scale results (Nonexistent people centrism/simple reference to Canadian/ sub community) and a corresponding increase of 1 section in the remaining two categories. A more dramatic shift is then seen between 2015 and 2019 with a 4 sections increase in category 3 scale results. These results correspond to the gradual increase in overall populism observed in Table 2a, exhibiting a positive relationship between electoral years and the prevalence of populist language and talking points, although with a sharper increase between 2015 and 2019. This shift can likely be attributed to significantly larger size of the 2015 and 2019 manifestos which allowed them to invoke the Canadian people and their shared qualities, needs, and political perspectives as a supplement to the policy details in each section. The dramatic further increase in the use of category 3 levels of rhetoric (Portrayal of the people in a conflict with a morally inferior outsider group) would initially indicate a possible adoption of the people-centric and nationalist language of foreign populists in the intervening years between elections.

Table 2b NDP People centrism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Group identity	10	9	10	96.67%
Homogeneous	0	5	9	46.67%
Virtuous	1	5	8	46.67%
Contrasted	6	5	7	60.00%

As we can observe in Table 2b, a similar trend exists in the majority of the people

centrism sub-elements. Invocation of the Canadian people as a whole (Group identity) exists almost universally across the policy sections in all 3 electoral years with a prevalence of 96.67% of the coded sections. This is overall unsurprising as the promotion of a shared Canadian identity despite internal cultural differences is a frequent feature in recent Canadian political discourse (Ives, 2015). Portrayal of the Canadian people as having a homogeneous political perspective, as well as having a general virtue, each follow the same general upward trend as the overall people-centrist use comprising the same 46.67 percentage of the overall use of people centrism in the policy sections and exhibiting a positive trend across the three electoral years. Due to the larger focus on Canadians people's needs and deserved services as opposed to qualities, very few shared qualities were described in 2011. Primarily, these few qualities were mutual compassion and generosity to those in need. In 2015, we see not only compassion being attributed to Canadians in the majority of answers, but also national pride, demands for greater representation, and commitment to saving the world from climate change. In 2019, we see the same qualities being referenced with an additional 2 sections including ingenuity. While ingenuity and national pride can be considered right-wing people centrism, the overall emphasis was placed on Canadians working together for mutual benefit

The contrasting of Canadians to an outsider group is featured in 60% of all sections with a 1 section decrease between 2011 and 2015 and only a 2 sections increase between 2015 and 2019. The contrast between these results and the high use of people centrism overall is likely explained by the frequent use of comparisons of Canadian politics to those of other states. As observed in Tables 2a and 2b, NDP manifestos frequently compare Canadians to other populations but do not as frequently portray them as directly in conflict with them or necessarily morally superior. In 2011, we see a right wing leaning to the choices of outsider groups, with

high-ranking politicians, foreign states (particularly the U.S), and “the well connected” comprising the majority of outsider groups. In 2015, we see a more even distribution, with outsiders including aggressive foreign states and investors, Ottawa as a whole, and the Canadian business class. Finally, in 2019 we see a greater anti-American sentiment with over half of the answers including American political leaders and business interests. References to insiders additionally contained references to their wealth.

3.4 NDP prevalence of anti elitism

As discussed in previous sections, the corollary to people centrism in Canadian and international populist discourse is often anti-elitism. We can first observe, in the 2011 results, a clear mode of the category 1 results (Nonexistent/passing reference to elites or wealthy) as shown in table 3a. In 2015, we see a 2 sections decrease in category 1 results as well as a 1 section decrease in category 2 results (Advocacy for enfranchising the people equal to or above the elite). These correspond with a 3 sections increase in category 3 results (Direct condemnation or call for the disenfranchisement of the elites). The subsequent increase in the use of anti-elitism between 2015 and 2019 is less significant, with a 2 sections increase in category 2 scale results and a corresponding decrease in category 1 results. This leads to a mode of category 2 scale results at 40.00% of the total results, with category 1 and 3 scale results sharing a 30.00% prevalence. The sharper increase between 2011 and 2015 can likely be attributed to the smaller and more policy concentrated nature of the 2011 manifesto with greater room in the subsequent texts to more comprehensively ascribe blame for the relevant political issues. The relatively stable numbers of category 2 scale results across all 3 electoral years and category 3 results between 2015 and 2019 would suggest a stable set of anti-elitist talking points from 2015 onward with varying degrees of harshness applied to the elites, depending on the electoral issues of the

day.

Table 3a: NDP Anti-elitism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	5	3	1	30.00%
2	4	3	5	40.00%
3	1	4	4	30.00%

As we can observe in Table 3b, the prevalence of each of the anti-elitist sub-elements progress in a steady direction. Notably, one of the least frequently used sub elements is the specific invocation of the elites, which holds across all three election years culminating in an only 43.33% overall prevalence. By contrast, elites being indirectly invoked amounts to an overall prevalence of 70%. This appears to demonstrate a willingness to critique the wealthy or well-connected while less frequently identifying them as being socio-politically distinct from “the people”. This is in line with the greater overall prevalence of scale 2 results as the populist language of the NDP is more likely to advocate for the “uplifting” of the people to the sociopolitical level of the elites rather than call for the direct disenfranchisement or bringing down of them, such as the several instances of advocating for the wealthy to pay their “fair share” in taxes (2019: 3).

The identification of a group with a superior virtue to the elites also has a consistent increase of 2 sections between each electoral year. This matches the similar increase in overall people centrism as demonstrated in Table 2a. The association of the elites with an opposing political party also takes a similarly sharp uptick of 5 sections between 2011 and 2015 with a less drastic increase of 3 sections in 2019. This suggests a trend towards a stronger critique of Canada's trend of successive Liberal and Conservative federal governments, such as their failures

to reform key government systems such as first past the post elections and the allegedly outdated public healthcare system (2019: 3).

The elites, as identified in 2011, include political insiders, large and multinational corporations as well as specific industries, such as defence contractors and pharmaceutical companies. The split between the elites being described as socioeconomic and sociopolitical elites favors socioeconomic by 4 times over sociopolitical. In 2015, the elites are similarly identified with an addition of urban Canadians and federal politicians.

The split between socioeconomic and sociopolitical identification favours socioeconomic by over two thirds in 2011 and 2015. In 2019, the ratio becomes 90:10 and elites now include wealthy Canadians in general and the Liberal Party of Canada. Additionally, there are fewer direct references made to the United States and foreign entities in favour of a general condemnation of large and wealthy institutions.

In 2011, groups who are extolled over the elites include working class Canadians, the middle class, voters and MPs, veterans, and small business owners. In 2015, these groups are maintained but include indigenous and rural communities which is also maintained in 2019. These results favor the interpretation of the NDP as a strong left populist party, with a general increase in the socioeconomic identification of the elites and the rhetorical favouring of some Canadians populations over others more frequently based on economic class.

Table 3b NDP Anti elitism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Specific mention	2	5	6	43.33%
Identified elites	5	7	9	70.00%
Superior group	4	6	8	60.00%
Association with opponents	0	5	8	43.33%

3.5 NDP prevalence of antagonistic re-politicization

As discussed earlier, antagonistic re-politicization is often an essential element to populist discourse as the populist actor positions themselves as outside of and in opposition to the “status quo”. Antagonistic re-politicization should therefore not only be prevalent across the three electoral years, due to the NDP's status as an exclusively opposition party but should also increase at a similar rate to the use of people centrism and anti elitism. Looking at the results by electoral years, we can observe a sharp increase almost exclusively in category 3 scale results across all three years. 2011 features a mode of category 1 scale results (Nonexistent/ reference to long running nature of a problematic policy). In 2015, we see a reduction in both category 1 and 2 scale results with a corresponding 4 sections increase in category 3 scale results. The trend continues in 2019 with a further 3 sections decrease in scale 2 results, corresponding to a 3 sections increase in category 3 results. This trend would indicate a strong adjustment in the messaging surrounding multiple policy issues between 2011 and 2015, with a much greater emphasis being placed on the failures of successive Liberal and NDP governments. The reduction in category 2 scale results between 2015 and 2019 suggest a consolidation of these themes with a more aggressively populist argument structure and a greater willingness to directly blame the elites and the opposing party for Canada's problems.

Table 4a NDP antagonistic re-politicization results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	5	2	2	30.00%
2	4	3	0	23.33%
3	1	5	8	46.67%

Looking at the antagonistic re-politicization sub-elements, we can observe in Table 4b a steady increase in all relevant categories. The identification of a long-standing political practice

and the suggestion that it is costly, unnecessary, unfair, or otherwise harmful to the Canadian people increases by 1 between 2011 and 2015 and then doubles between 2015 and 2019. This sharper increase is in line with the greater emphasis in 2019 placed on the continuation of harmful practices across successive administrations, such as the continuation of subsidies to fossil fuel companies (2019: 53). The demands for an immediate reform to these practices follows a similar positive relationship with a 2 section and then a 3 sections overall increase. This likely indicates a greater consistency in proposing strong policy reforms on each political issue in order to further distinguish the NDP's proposed style of governance to that of the other two major parties. The suggestion of a political motivation by the opposing parties for the continuation of these harmful practices also follows the trend of a more drastic change between 2015 and 2019 than 2011 to 2015, with a 2 sections increase as opposed to 1. This is also consistent with the overall rise in the use of antagonistic re-politicization as the party becomes more and more willing to frame the current political practices as conscious choices made by successive governments, rather than simply an outdated practice or one that requires a certain amount of vision to practically abolish or replace. Finally, the amount of policy change proposals that would require a constitutional amendment or international political practice change increases from 1 section to 4 and then finally to 6 in 2019. This trend correlates with the party's gradually increasing boldness at which drastic political practice changes are proposed. The overall prevalence of each sub-element also follows a negative progression with each overall percentage being lower than the previously listed elements. This order matches the increases each year in the severity of the critique/proposed change to the identified practice. Therefore, it is consistent that the more dramatic the proposed change, the less frequently it will be advocated.

The harmful practices that were outlined in the 2011 manifesto included un-elected

leadership, the first-past-the-post system, bulk resource exports, Canada's participation in U.S initiated wars, the funding cap on Indian and Northern Affairs Canada transfers to aboriginal communities, and railway tariffs. In 2015, these practices or similar ones are consistently criticized with an additional critique of tax deductions for the wealthy and the gender imbalanced nature of many political offices. In 2019, the governmental critiques are less frequently used in favour of identifying large campaign donations as the source of Canada's "unrepresentative" electoral system. Additional criticisms now include the laissez-faire style of media regulation, the clawing back of veterans benefits, and sovereignty lawsuits against indigenous groups. One additional criticism of a practice used that is more right-wing and pro-business in orientation however is the opposition of gradual increasing of education fees and the G.S.T/H.S.T on building new properties, particularly for business owners. The political motivations described in 2011 for these practices include power consolidation, pork spending, and the generation of tax revenue at the expense of taxpayers. In 2015, this changes drastically to include power consolidation, class solidarity with the wealthy, politicians with business connections, and even outright racism. In 2019, we see similar described motivations that now include budget concerns, escaping accountability, and even quid pro quo business dealings. Both of these results represent an overall shift towards a left-wing economic focus placed on harmful practices and the decrying of austerity towards the poor.

Table 4b: NDP antagonistic re-politicization sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Harmful practice	6	7	9	73.33%
Immediate reform	4	6	9	63.33%
Political motivation	4	5	8	56.67%
Necessary amendment	1	4	6	36.67%

3.6 NDP prevalence of Majoritarianism

Majoritarianism is largely indirectly invoked within other elements of populist discourse, such as the people/elite divide. However, its more direct rhetorical use, the specific description of a minority population within the state and it being positioned in opposition to the majority, should likely be less prevalent than other elements within the manifestos. This is due to the fact that as, outlined in the literature, Canadian populist discourse is less likely to directly target minority demographics than other contemporary states.

Table 5a: NDP Majoritarianism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	9	6	4	63.33%
2	1	1	1	10.00%
3	0	3	5	26.67%

As we can observe in Table 5a, the use of majoritarianism follows a similar trend to the overall use of populism across the three electoral years as well as the overall prevalence of the previously examined elements of populist rhetoric. In 2011, there is a drastic dominance of category 1 scale results (Nonexistent/passing references to a populations small numbers) with the total results of numbers of sections. This falls in line with the observed shorter and more policy focused nature of the 2011 manifesto. While all three manifestos place an emphasis on serving “all Canadians” the greater length of the 2015 and 2019 manifestos allowed for a greater emphasis to be placed on which groups of Canadians deserved the help the most. In 2015, we see some change with a 3 sections increase in category 3 scale results (A call for the disenfranchisement or persecution of the population) with a corresponding 3 sections decrease in category 1 results. This trend continues in 2019 with a further 2 sections decrease in category 1 results and a corresponding 2 sections increase in category 3 results. Unusually, category 2 scale

results (Emphasis of a disproportionate amount of privilege/influence possessed by the population) remain constant at only 1 section across all 3 years. Correspondingly, the 2019 results have a more U-shaped distribution. This suggests a more utilitarian use of direct majoritarianism with the small percentage within the population of a group being largely invoked in order to advocate a specific disenfranchisement policy. This pattern demonstrates that the use of majoritarianism does increase across the three electoral years but to a lesser degree than many of the other populist elements.

Table 5b: NDP Majoritarianism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Minority	4	4	6	46.67%
Disproportionate	2	3	5	33.33%
Catered to	3	3	5	36.67%
Siding with majority	3	3	5	36.67%

Looking at the sub elements in Table 5b, we see a similar trend with no change in the invocation of a minority population in opposition to the majority between 2011 and 2015 and a 1 section increase in the emphasis being placed on them receiving a disproportionate amount of privilege or attention from the political class. Both then increase by 2 sections between 2015 and 2019, matching the overall increase in the use of majoritarian language and rhetoric observed in Table 5a. The portrayal of a minority being politically catered to by the current political establishment, as well as the explicit suggestion of siding with the majority over the minority, match each-other's progression exactly. This, once again, reflects the use of anti-minority rhetoric to push a specific policy advancement or privilege revocation as both sentiments are invoked to make the argument. The relative rarity of majoritarianism in the NDP manifestos is also reflected in the overall prevalence of each sub element with none of them surpassing 5 sections overall.

In 2011, these minority groups are identified as corporate administrators, federal politicians, and the investor class. In 2015, these groups are maintained with only 2 sections specifically mentioning the wealthiest 1 percent. In 2019, many of the direct references to political insiders are, once again, replaced with the wealthiest corporations and citizens who are capable of influencing politicians. However, some minority groups are included that are criticized from a right-populist perspective, that being criminals and foreign non-resident immigrants. Despite this, a clear dominance of left-wing rhetorical targets is born out in these results.

3.7 NDP prevalence of anti-institutionalism

As discussed earlier, anti-institutionalism is a frequent element in populist discourse due to the various governmental institutions being considered arms of the state that contribute to the status quo. Furthermore, the core function of the state's institutions is often framed as serving first and foremost the elites rather than the people. Therefore, according to **Hypothesis 1**, the use of anti-institutionalism by the NDP should increase over the course of the three election years. However, as previously established, Canadian populist movements have often focused around expanding institutions to greater serve the people rather than defunding or eliminating them. It is therefore most likely that the increase in anti-institutionalism should be less dramatic than the increase in many of the other elements.

Table 6a: NDP Anti-institutionalism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	5	7	5	56.67%
2	4	1	2	23.33%
3	1	2	3	20.00%

Looking at the results in Table 6a, we see a non-linear trend in the overall use of anti-

institutionalist rhetoric. In 2011 we see a 5 sections prevalence of results of category 1 scale results (Nonexistent/critique of an institutions function), and 4 sections of category 2 scale results (Demands for strong reform to the institution or its practices). These results appear to indicate some degree of a fundamental critique of Canada's institutions in its overall messaging. However, in 2015 we see a dramatic decline in the overall use of anti-institutionalism with category 2 scale results being largely redistributed to category 1 for a total of 7 sections. In 2019, we then see a reversal of this trend with a return to the same number of category 1 scale results as 2011 and a respective increase of 1 and 2 in category 2 and 3 scale results (Proposal to abolish the institution or replace it with a similar institution). While there is a marginal increase in the overall use of anti-institutionalism between 2011 and 2019, there is insufficient evidence of a positive relationship to conclusively determine the overall trend. The dramatic decrease in the use of anti-institutionalist rhetoric in 2015 and its subsequent increase in 2019 could possibly indicate a “safer” approach to policy proposal by Thomas Mulcair in 2015 due to the NDP's general platform of protecting social programs and institutions, followed by a bolder approach to critiquing the status quo surrounding them by Jagmeet Singh in 2019, once the NDP had achieved greater electoral success.

Table 6b: NDP Anti-institutionalism Sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Critique of institution	6	4	5	50.00%
Core reform	5	2	4	36.67%
Abolish	1	2	3	20.00%
Non beneficial	4	3	2	30.00%

The sub-elements of anti-institutionalism appear in a slightly different pattern then the overall use of anti-institutionalism would initially suggest, with a 2 sections decrease in the

overall critique of an institution's function between 2011 and 2015 followed by a 1 section increase in 2019. The criticized institutions in 2011 include the office of the Prime minister and the senate, the CRTC, the pharmaceutical bureaucracy, employment insurance programs, and regulatory industries surrounding international health aid. In 2015, a greater emphasis is placed on Canada's healthcare institutions with criticized institutions including healthcare distribution networks, the drug review process, and the investment review processes. In 2019, these criticisms are maintained with an additional criticism of the postal services, educational apparatuses, and housing approval boards.

The direct calls for a core reform to an institution actually decline in 2015 by 3 sections then increase by 2 in 2019. Calls for abolition or replacement of an institution instead exhibit a small 1 section increase each year. Institutions proposed to be abolished and replaced in 2011 include the senate in 2011, on the grounds that it does not represent the people. This criticism is maintained in 2015, with the additional proposal to consolidate multiple investment review institutions into one on the grounds of unnecessary bureaucracy. In 2019 both criticisms are also maintained with the addition of the consolidation of healthcare services due to them providing an insufficient service to Canadians

Unexpectedly, the suggestion that the institutions do not exist for the benefit of the people actually decreases by 1 section each year. In 2011, institutions that do not truly serve the people are instead described as serving the bureaucracy and the interests of the business class, with over twice as many references favouring the latter. This is maintained in 2015 at the same rate. In 2019, they are described as serving the incumbent administrations and the investor class at roughly the same rate. These results are generally inconclusive towards left- or right-wing orientation as there is no significant difference in right vs left wing rhetorical targets. The use of

each sub element across all 3 years displays an inverse relationship with the severity of the critique (critique, core reform, abolish), with the calls for abolition being extremely low compared to the other sub elements at only 16.67 %. Overall however, the lack of any consistency in the relationship between year and prevalence of populist elements suggests that the NDP's use of anti- institutionalism is not concurrent with its overall use of populism.

3.8 NDP prevalence of protectionism

While protectionism is not a strictly necessary element to populist discourse, it is a frequently used style of rhetoric by populist actors in order to better distinguish the monolithic “people” as an in group from foreign out groups who can often be associated with the “elites” through an implied favouritism or allegiance. As with the other elements, **Hypothesis 1** would suggest that the NDP would make increasing use of protectionism across the three electoral years.

Table 7a: NDP Protectionism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	5	6	5	53.33%
2	5	3	2	33.33%
3	0	1	3	13.33%

Looking at the results in Table 7a, we can see a minor progression towards a greater prevalence of protectionism across the three electoral years. In 2011, there is a notable absence of category 3 scale results (implication or statement of the oppositions softness towards on or even allegiance with threatening entity), with the remaining results being evenly split between categories 1 (Nonexistent/ reinforcement of existing security measures) and 2 (Strong emphasis of threat, promises of increase in resources to combat it).

There is, interestingly, a 2 section decline in category 2 scale results between 2011 and

2015, leading to a similar distribution. We can observe an upward trend in protectionism between 2015 and 2019 with a 2 sections increase category 3 scale results. This suggests an adoption in 2019 of a more aggressive style of protectionism that is more willing to directly blame the opposition for the sociopolitical threats to Canadians, such as their responses to foreign economic aggression from states such as the U.S and China (2019: 103). This is in line with previously observed findings indicating that the NDP placed greater emphasis in 2019 on the failures of successive Liberal and Conservative governments.

Table 7b: NDP Protectionism Sub-elements

Sub-element	2011	2015	2019	altogether
Foreign threat	5	5	5	50.00%
Conscious actor	3	3	5	36.67%

Looking at Table 7b we can observe a relatively stable set of results across all 3 electoral years, the description of a foreign threat remains completely the same at 5 across the entire table. The description of the threat as perpetuated by a conscious actor rather than an event, such as a natural disaster or economic downturn, also remains stable across the first two electoral years. The 2 sections increase in these results in 2019 is in line with the 2 sections increase in category 3 scale results observed in Table 7a. This would further suggest a more blame-centric approach to protectionism in 2019 with not only an increase in described threat actors but a greater willingness to direct blame at the opposition.

The threats described in 2011 include foreign investment and ownership of Canadian business assets, the global recession, global warming, and foreign terrorism. In 2015, there is a 5 sections increase in the threat of foreign business encroachment as well as the addition of foreign misogynistic cultural influence. In 2019, these threats are maintained with the addition of global warming and the threat of healthcare privatization. The actors described as behind these threats

include foreign investors and business interests in 2011, the same in 2015 with the addition of foreign terror states, and the same including competing G7 nations in 2019. Measures to combat these threats include the strengthening of economic regulations and the increasing of unemployment benefits in 2011. In 2015, they included greater transparency in international dealings, the funding of women's rights organizations increasing participation in peacekeeping operations and a more efficient economic regulation process. In 2019, they included similar measures to those in 2011 and 2015, along with the solidification of socialized medicine and the installation of a global military mandate. In 2011, the percentages of descriptions of the nature of the threat as social, economic, or military were evenly split between all 3 in 2011. In 2015, economic threats accounted for over half of the described threats. In 2019, the prevalence of each type of threat were most commonly economic followed by social and then military. This dominance of economic threats, combined with the actors most frequently being business interests, once again, suggests a strong left-wing protectionist orientation.

3.9 Prevalence of simplicity

The use of simplicity in populist discourse encapsulates a variety of populist strategies. These largely include the disregarding of mismanagement as a source of the state's political issues but rather corruption, class favouritism, and hypocrisy.

Table 8a: NDP Simplicity results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	7	0	3	33.33%
2	2	4	1	23.33%
3	1	6	6	43.33%

Looking at Table 8a, we see an unusual pattern with an overall dominance in category 1 scale results (Nonexistent /use of day one policy enactment language) in 2011. In 2015, we see a

drastic 70 section decline in these results with a corresponding 2 sections rise in category 2 scale results (Strong emphasis on the simplicity or easiness of enacting a policy/ claim made of hypocrisy towards opponents), and 5 sections rise in category 3 scale results (Implication or statement of opposition failing to enact policy due to corruption). This is once again, in line with the transition away from the shorter more directly policy focused manifesto style that was observed in 2011. Interestingly, in 2019, there is a small decline in the overall use of simplicity with 3 sections decrease in category 2 scale results and a corresponding increase in category 1 scale results. These results suggest a stable set of talking points surrounding the failures of corrupt successive governments for some policy areas with a slight rolling back of simplicity-based populist talking points due to the transition of government that took place in 2015.

Table 8b: NDP simplicity sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Common sense	9	9	10	93.33%
Hypocrisy	4	8	7	63.33%
Easiness	4	7	6	56.67%
Corruption	3	6	6	50.00%

As we can observe in Table 8b, the appeal to common sense exists almost universally across all 3 electoral years increasing to 10 in 2019. This is largely in line with the NDP's overall political stance of granting services to Canadians that are deserved and necessary. While claims of hypocrisy made against political opponents are relatively prevalent even in 2011, we do see the results doubling in 2015, which is in line with the drastic increase in overall simplicity between the 2 electoral years. In 2019, these results reduce by only 1 section indicating a relative stability of a set of talking points surrounding hypocrisy by both opposing parties. A similar trend can be observed in terms of the stressing of the easiness in enacting a proposed policy with an increase from the same result of 4 to 7 in 2015 and a 1 section decline in 2019. This suggests a

similar political strategy in regard to easiness with its use being slightly less relevant to the overall messaging. Finally, the accusations of outright corruption increase by 3 in 2015 and remain steady in 2019, suggesting an increased boldness, starting in 2015, in describing their opponents as self serving and corrupt.

In 2011, the topics of the majority of the appeals to common sense surround the need to reform democracy to better represent the people, the need to help vulnerable Canadians such as veterans, and the values of Canadian culture. In 2015, these criticisms were maintained with the addition of taxing the rich more, granting greater sovereignty to the indigenous population and diversifying Canada's export economy. In 2019, these were also maintained with the addition of valuing the military. Topics surrounding hypocrisy in 2011 primarily included the claims of valuing the working class and their representation while truly representing the wealthy and powerful. In 2015, these were maintained with the additional inclusion of broken promises surrounding protecting Canada cultural industries, healthcare reform, the creation of middle-class jobs and reconciliation with indigenous communities. In 2019, these were also maintained with the addition of incumbent governments giving lip-service to supporting Canada's social programs while quietly cutting their services. Sources of corruption in 2011 included self enrichment and political patronage. In 2015, they included a much greater emphasis on having quid pro quo connections with big businesses as well as the desire to avoid accountability for crimes and broken promises. In 2019, this prevalence was maintained but accusations of political patronage were brought back. Racism towards indigenous and immigrant populations was also invoked. These results demonstrate an overwhelming majority of the manifesto's sections focusing on the elites serving the wealthy rather than the working class and the less fortunate.

3.10 Overall use of left/right wing keywords

As described earlier, the overall usage of populist language containing left or right wing-centric key words and phrases should provide insight into the overall use of left- or right-wing populist rhetoric. According to **Hypothesis 2**, the overall usage of left-wing populist key phrases by the NDP should increase by electoral year, due to the parties positioning of themselves on the left side of the Canadian political spectrum. Left-wing populism should therefore display a statistically significant dominance over right-wing.

Table 9 NDP predominance of left- or right-wing key terms by year

Left/right	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Left	34.29%	37.14%	65.71%	45.24%
Right	18.57%	34.29%	8.57%	20.48%
Neutral	47.14%	28.57%	25.72%	34.28%

Observing Table 9, we can see a predominance of left-wing populist terms across all 3 electoral years with an increase between 2011 and 2015 of 2.85 % and a significantly larger increase right wing key term of 15.72%. In 2019, we see a drastic change in the ratio with a 28.57% increase in left wing key terms with a 25.72 % decrease in right wing key terms. This suggests an overall increase in populist talking points between 2011 and 2015 followed by an aggressive embrace of the NDP's left wing identity in 2019 as an attempt to “out left wing” the now incumbent Liberals. These results, as well as the over 2 to 1 ratio in overall left /right populist terms, strongly supports **Hypothesis 2** in that left wing populism has gained greater prominence in the manifestos of the NDP. The seemingly outlying increase in right-wing populism in 2015 can likely be explained by its more aggressive anti Conservative message which was intended as an anti-political status quo effort to oust a long running incumbency.

3.11 Conclusions

Overall, these results fell largely in line with both **Hypothesis 1** and **Hypothesis 2**. Not only did the NDP show consistent increases in both overall usage in populist language and rhetoric, but also in the majority of its sub-elements. The often-drastic increases in category 3 scale results for many of the elements as well as overall populism further suggests a greater trend in the embracing of strong and targeted populist sentiments. Interestingly, many of the sub-element progressions featured a significantly sharper increase in category 2 or 3 scale results in either 2015 or 2019 than the other year. This appeared to suggest a consistently populist if differently composed strategic message. Specifically, a more strongly anti Conservative message in 2015, billing them as the “status quo”, and a broader anti “establishment” message in 2019, featuring a broader criticism of “successive governments”. The consistent dominance of left over right-populism was also born out quite strongly in the results, both in regard to key terms and rhetorical targets as well as the comparative deficiency in the use of anti-institutionalism and majoritarianism. The one exception to this in 2015 is particularly interesting as it demonstrates a more right-wing strategy employed to take down the right wing “Status quo”.

Chapter 4: Results for the Liberal Party of Canada 2011- 2019

The Liberal Party of Canada is one of the oldest and best-established parties in the Canadian political sphere. As such, an analysis of the limits and scope of its populist language and rhetoric should offer some insight into its development. Similar to the preceding chapter, this section of the thesis will detail results found while examining the three selected party manifestos of the Liberals. I will explore the overall prevalence of populist language and rhetoric in the texts as well as that of each of the aforementioned seven rhetorical sub-elements. Additionally, I will detail the relative prevalence of left- vs right-wing populist elements in each of the manifestos. In this first section, I will summarize the political context in which the Liberal Party found itself in each of the electoral years in question, allowing for greater context to the topics of discussion in the manifestos. Subsequently, I will examine the overall prevalence of populist language and rhetoric across all of the policy sections for each electoral year and identify any patterns that emerge across the three years. Once this has been established, I will apply this analysis to the overall prevalence of each of the populist composite elements as well as detailing the relative amounts of positive or negative answers to each of the questions that were used in the content analysis. These sections will also include a description of the predominant answers to the open-ended questions. Finally, I will detail the overall ratio of left to right wing key terms used in the

manifestos of each electoral year and provide a summative conclusion of the results.

4.1. Setting the Stage

4.1.1 The 2011 election

Having lost a small number of seats in the previous 2008 election, the Liberal Party was hoping to gain some degree of forward momentum in 2011. After the prorogation of Parliament by Stephen Harper and the resultant mass protests, the Liberals, having led the no confidence and coalition effort, were poised to be the face of resistance against Stephen Harper's minority government (Wheeldon, 2014). After Stephan Dion's defeats both electorally in 2008 and in his efforts to form a coalition government, he was replaced as the party leader by Michael Ignatieff. Following the second prorogation, the Liberals and Ignatieff leaned heavily into criticizing Stephen Harper for his allegedly autocratic move and even proposed measures to curb a Prime minister's ability to dissolve Parliament, suggesting that such action was un-Canadian and an overstep of power. However, in 2009, attempts to bring down the Conservative minority government at all costs ultimately proved to be a political miscalculation. Ignatieff's attempt to trigger an election in 2009 by withdrawing Liberal support for the Conservative government was met with strong opposition in the polls. Many Canadians did not want an election so soon after the previous one and Ignatieff's moves were criticized by both the Conservatives and the NDP as trying to "force an election on the Canadian people" (Desserud, 2009). In 2011, the Liberal Party campaigned heavily on Stephen Harper being found in contempt of Parliament and attempting to sell themselves as strong instruments of change using the slogans "Rise Up Canada" & "Change we need, from a proven team". The Liberals campaigned on reigning in Stephen Harper's alleged abuses of power as well as a strong focus on poverty relief, fighting climate change, increasing corporate taxes, and reforming healthcare (Nanos, 2011). While polling continued to favour the

Conservatives across the entire election, Michael Ignatieff received promising results from rallies and debates. This, however, proved to be insufficient as the popularity of Jack Layton led to a significant NDP breakthrough and an historical defeat for the Liberals, as they finish in third place for the first time in their history.

4.1.2 The 2015 election

After the disastrous defeat in 2011, the Liberal Party needed a new strategy. The Liberal Party had, once again, changed its leader. Justin Trudeau offered both a charismatic face to the party as well as name recognition from his former Prime minister father (Lalancette and Cormack, 2020). This also contributed to associate the party with Canadian values, since important symbols of Canadian identity such as Multiculturalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, had been enacted when Pierre Elliott Trudeau was the Liberal Prime minister. The Liberals heavily leaned into the idea of “Canadian values” “that Stephen Harper had allegedly violated, including more left-wing economic strategies and Canada's status as a “kinder, gentler” and more welcoming nation (Ives, 2015: 3). This was exemplified by Justin Trudeau's strong support of religious tolerance in regard to immigrants being able to wear the Niqab in official citizenship photos (deClercy, 2015). The Party's campaign also focused firmly on electoral reform, most notably the proposal to adopt a new electoral system and a change to a more “merit based” system of senate appointment. The slogan used “Real Change (Now)” had something of a populist bent. This, combined with a sense of nostalgia for previous administrations, achieved strong success with the largest gaining of seats in Canadian electoral history.

4.1.3 The 2019 election:

The Liberal Party was in a precarious position in the 2019 election as Justin Trudeau had

been the subject of a variety of scandals, most notably the SNC Lavalin scandal (Zyglidopoulos, 2019). Furthermore, he had attracted a reputation of acting with impunity and very little input from both his own cabinet and others outside his party. This was exemplified by his dissolution of Parliament shortly before the election. Additionally, the study *Assessing Justin Trudeau's Liberal Government: 353 Promises and a Mandate for Change* further damaged the administration's reputation by concluding that the administration had kept significantly fewer of its campaign promises than recent previous administrations and suggested that “Trudeau's government's promises were transformative—ambitious pledges the Liberals took while they were the third-place party” (Pétry, 2019). This put the Liberals on the defensive for much of the election. The party's position was focused heavily on the strength of what they had accomplished in the last 4 years, including legalizing marijuana, boosting the number of refugees resettled in the country, renegotiating NAFTA, and finalizing trade deals with the EU and Pacific nations. The core policy promises were largely the same as the previous election with a heavy focus on environmentalism, pharma care, childcare and managing student loan debt. However, a notable issue with the budget proposal was the breaking of the promise to balance the books by 2019 (Romanow, 2018). The campaign slogan used emphasized continuity, that being “choose forward”. Overall, while the incumbency status of the party survived, it appears the fundamental setbacks of the campaign were not strongly overcome, resulting in a loss of 20 seats overall.

4.2. Progression of populist usage in the Liberal Party manifestos, 2011-2019

Like with the NDP, two major results were predicted by this study concerning the relevance of populist discourse and rhetoric to the messaging of the Liberal Party manifestos between 2011 and 2019. As established in previous sections, the Liberal Party of Canada often employs centrism in its political messaging while still billing themselves as distinctly to the left

of the Conservative Party. One major distinction that the Liberals have from the NDP is that they have held federal office more than any other party in Canadian history. As a result, it will likely be more difficult to frame themselves as outside of the “status quo”. With these factors in mind, it can be predicted that, while the Liberal Party will follow a similar rhetorical pattern to the NDP, it will do so with a smaller increase in overall populist rhetoric and language as well as its total use of left populism. The results concerning **Hypothesis 1**, can be found in Table 10 below.

Table 10: Overall Liberal Populism

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	6	3	2	36.67%
2	3	6	5	46.67%
3	1	1	3	16.67%

Looking at the results in Table 10, we can see a positive relationship of overall use of populism and progressing electoral years. However, these patterns show a less drastic overall trend than with the NDP manifestos. In 2011, we see a clear dominance of category 1 results at 6 sections compared to only 1 in category 3 results. In 2015, we see a reversal of category 2 and 3 scale results allowing for a more bell curved distribution. This trend continues in 2019 with a decrease of one in both category 1 and 2 scale results with a 2 sections increase in category 3 results. These results support **Hypothesis 1** and suggest an adjustment in talking points toward a more populist-centric rhetoric in a variety of new policy sections. The increase in category 3 scale results further suggests an embrace of the stronger populist-centric dialogue that had been more commonly used by parties in contemporary states such as Great Britain and the United States after 2015. The overall percentages of each category for all three years, however, demonstrate a dominance of category 2 scale results at 46.67% and a distinctly smaller

percentage of category 3 scale results at only 16.67%.

There is also a notable difference in category 3 scale results between the Liberal and NDP manifestos in 2015 and 2019 with a difference of four sections in 2015 and a 3 sections difference in 2019. This is in line with the aforementioned predictions and suggests that, not only has the Liberal Party embraced populist language and rhetoric to a lesser degree than the NDP but is also significantly more reticent to make this rhetoric and language central to their messaging. A contributing factor could be the Liberals victory in the 2015 federal election. This supposition is based on the fact that it is more difficult to criticize the political establishment when you are in control of it to some degree. As a result, the stronger adjustment of category 1 scale results to category 2 scale results between the years of 2011 and 2015 are in line with what we would expect with a party that is attempting to oust a long-standing incumbency by the opposition. The Liberals were also no longer the official opposition in 2015, which suggests a potential for a more radical policy agenda. The subsequent shift of only 1 section away from category 1 scale results in 2019 suggests a stability in populist talking points with an increase in the intensity of some of the pre-existing talking points.

4.3 Liberal prevalence of people centrism

The results observed in regard to the prevalence of people centrism in the electoral manifestos of the NDP indicated that people-centrism was not only pervasive throughout their messaging but increased in accordance with the overall upwards progression of populist language and rhetoric over the three electoral campaigns. According to **Hypothesis 1**, this should apply also for the Liberal Party. Furthermore, as identified in the literature, people centrism has been a key dimension in the use of populism by Canadian political actors. Therefore, the upwards progression of people centrism should be to a greater degree than the overall use of

populism.

Table 11A: Liberal Party People Centrism Results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	3	4	2	33.33%
2	6	4	6	46.67.%
3	1	2	2	20.00%

Looking at the results in Table 11a, we see a very marginal progression in the overall use of people centrism by the Liberal Party. In the 2011 electoral year, we see a distribution results with a clear mode of category 2 scale results at 6 sections. There is also a notable minority of category 3 scale results at only 1. This is likely because of a heavy emphasis being placed on the equality of all Canadians, with less overall oppositional language. An example of this is the opening quote by Michael Ignatieff of “When each of us gets a chance to succeed, we all succeed together.” (2011:1). In 2015, we see a closer to equally distributed results with a 2 sections decrease in category 2 scale results and a corresponding increase in the remaining two categories. While the 2015 manifesto uses a similar rhetorical style with a strong emphasis on growing and protecting the middle class, the increase in category 3 results can likely be explained by a slightly more aggressive language style, such as the quote “We will repeal the anti-democratic elements in Stephen Harper’s Fair Elections Act, which make it harder for Canadians to vote and easier for election lawbreakers to evade punishment” (2015: 28). In 2019, we see a decrease of 2 sections in category 1 scale results and a corresponding increase in category 2 scale results. The overall trends in distribution of results can likely be explained by the incumbency status of the party with a strong emphasis being placed on services granted to Canadians and promises kept. The overall progression in the use of people centrism is ultimately negligible as there is only an observable 1 section positive change in the 3 categories. This is

further born out in the overall percentages of categories for all 3 years with a mode of category 2 scale results with category 3 results being the lowest at only 20.00%. These results suggest a relatively stable use of people centrist-based language and talking points throughout all 3 electoral years. However, the overall dominance of 66.67% to 33.33% of combined category 2 and 3 scale results over category 1 scale results suggest that people centrist has been a reliably used rhetorical style throughout recent elections.

Table 11b: Liberal People Centrist Sub-Elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Group identity	10	10	10	100.00%
Homogeneous	7	7	6	66.67%
Virtuous	6	5	6	56.67%
Contrasted	6	5	3	46.67%

Observing the results in Table 11b we see the pattern of relatively stable people centrist based talking points maintained. The invoking of the Canadian people as a whole holds across all 3 electoral years at 100% of total sections. This is in line with the similar results observed with the NDP manifestos. The description of the Canadian people as holding a homogeneous set of values, political views, or demands also follows the pattern in all 3 years with only a slight decrease of one section from 7 to 6 between 2015 and 2019. The same general trend is exhibited with shared virtues with 6 sections holding between 2011 and 2019 with a slight decline by 1 in 2015.

The shared qualities observed in 2011 are, in general, quite like those observed in the NDP manifestos including industriousness, desire for real change, and good stewardship both locally and internationally. The most prominent quality however, comprising over half of the results, was compassion. Compassion was included in reference to other Canadians, first nations,

and even citizens of foreign states. This virtuous portrayal of Canada in relation to foreigners is in line with the overall lack of category 3 scale results as Canadians are not frequently compared to morally inferior outsiders. In 2015, compassion was still a favoured quality, but greater emphasis was placed on industriousness and hard work. Additionally, the results included Canada's history of left-wing values. In 2019, an even greater emphasis was placed on Canadian ingenuity, industriousness, and hard work with compassion being less prominent in the overall results.

The contrasting of the Canadian people with an outsider group interestingly exhibits a negative relationship with the progressing electoral year, dropping by 1 section and then 2 the next electoral year. This relationship suggests a platform increasingly based on reconciling differences with other states across all 3 electoral years with less and less emphasis being placed on conflict with outsiders or Canadian exceptionalism. This is possibly an attempt to further distinguish themselves from the perceived slightly xenophobic governance of the Conservative Party, particularly in regard to foreign policy. The outsider groups described in 2011 have a distinctly right-wing bent with a clear emphasis being placed on foreign populations, including the United States, Israel, and many other G7 states. A frequently use context for these talking points is a comparison of Canada and its population in overall results, such as emission goals or export values to these states. This can take either the form of emphasizing the positive qualities of the Canadian people or to address a comparative deficiency to be resolved. In 2015, we see a move away from this in favour of a more antagonistic approach focusing on the business class both locally and abroad but still containing the aforementioned comparative references. In 2019, this trend is maintained, not only supporting **Hypothesis 2**, but the previously observed stability of messaging between the last 2 electoral years.

4.4 Liberal prevalence of anti elitism

As discussed in earlier sections, the use of anti-elitist rhetoric and talking points by the Liberal Party should share a similar progression to both the use of people centrism and overall populism. However, the Liberal Party's perspective on the alleged elites should differ from the NDP's in one major way. This difference is the incumbency status of the Liberal Party in 2019, which will likely make them more reticent to criticize "political insiders". As a result, the percentage of anti-elitist rhetoric used in that electoral year should increase to a lesser degree than between the first two, or even decrease overall.

Table 12a: Liberal Anti-elitist results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	4	6	4	46.67%
2	5	2	3	33.33%
3	1	2	3	16.67%

The results in Table 12a show interesting changes in results across all three years. The numbers are concentrated in the middle in 2011 with a dominance of category 2 scale results at 5 sections. In 2015, we instead see an overall negative shift with a 3 sections reduction in category 2 scale results with the greatest increase being a 2 section boost in category 1 scale results. This drop suggests a difference in strategy between political leaders as Justin Trudeau replaced Michael Ignatieff in 2015. His choice to make less use of anti-elitist rhetoric suggests a different approach with less emphasis on "bringing elites down" in favour of a simpler and safer advocacy for a fresh change in leadership. This is evidenced by the use of softened anti-wealthy rhetoric, such as "asking them to pay a bit more in taxes to help others" (2015: 5). In 2019, we actually see a slight overall increase in the use of anti-elitism resulting from an increasing use of category

2 and 3 scale results. This can be explained by a more focused anti-elitist rhetorical style, such as the suggestion in one chart that their tax plan helps the middle class as opposed to the wealthy who would benefit under the Conservatives' plan. The overall results still demonstrate a dominance of category 1 scale results at 46.67% over the three elections.

Table 12b: Liberal anti-elitist sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Specific mention	2	1	1	13.33%
Identified elites	6	7	7	66.67%
Superior group	5	5	6	53.33%
Association with opponents	3	4	3	33.33%

Looking at the results in Table 12b, we see an interesting diverging trend with some of the results in the previous table. While the use of direct and specific invocations of the elites remains low throughout all three electoral years, amounting to only 13.33% overall across all three years, the identification of an “elite population” actually exceeds the percentage of category 2 and 3 scale results in the years of 2015 and 2019 and increase by 1 section from 2011. This disparity supports not only **Hypothesis 1** in regard to the use of language but further supports the aforementioned speculation of the shift in leadership having a greater effect on the use of anti-elitist language and rhetoric. In essence, these results suggest an increase in “lip service” given to the issue of the elites holding too much power without a reciprocal description of substantive reforms to remedy this disparity.

The elites are described in 2011 at even numbers between sociopolitical and socioeconomic. In 2015, this changes to a greater ratio in favour of a sociopolitical perspective by 3 sections. This trend reverses itself with 4 additional sections describing them from a socioeconomic perspective. This trend is further observed in the identified elites in 2015, which

include both right-wing targets like the federal bureaucracy, the incumbent government and urban Canadians, as well as left-wing targets such as oil and gas companies, the wealthy, and even well-connected white Canadians. This messaging is maintained in 2015 with the left-wing addition of criticizing security officials. However, in 2019, we see an overall majority of left-wing targets which now include large and multinational corporations.

The results related to how frequently a groups interests were being favoured over those of the elites is also somewhat in line with this pattern with the number of them exceeding the overall use of category 2 and 3 scale results by 1 section in 2015 and 2019 with very few repeated populations, most simply being the subject of the relevant policy proposals, such as Canadian families. In 2019, the results were equally varied but included a greater emphasis on economic class, containing references to the middle class, working class, small business class, and rural working Canadians,

4.5 Liberal prevalence of antagonistic re-politicization

As with previous sections, antagonistic re-politicization is an important element in most populist discourse, particularly in regard to criticizing incumbent politicians and administrations. As such, according to **Hypothesis 1**, antagonistic re-politicization should be prevalent in 2011 and 2015 due to the party's reformist campaign strategy of those years. While it is possible that the use of this element will increase in 2019, the dropped reform proposals, such as abolishing FPP, by the Liberal Party in that electoral year will likely have a negative effect on the increase of its use.

Table 13a: Liberal Antagonistic re-politicization results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	5	2	4	36.67%
2	3	6	3	40.00%
3	2	2	3	23.33%

Looking at the results in Table 13a, we see that the overall use of antagonistic re-politicization roughly falls in line with the above predictions. Between 2011 and 2015, we see a 3 sections increase in the prevalence of category 2 scale results. This suggests a bolder approach to policy proposal in 2015. This could be attributed to a variety of factors, including the influence of bolder policy advocacy in contemporary states, the change in leadership of the party or a greater comfort in stronger policy proposal in response to the polls being against the Conservatives at the time. In 2019, we instead see a sharp decline in category 2 scale results with 1 of those transferring to category 3 results and the remaining 2 returning to category 1. This change culminates in a slight mean increase between the earliest and latest electoral years. This suggests an overall dependence on the idea of political “freshness” the party offered at the time as a source of antagonistic re-politicization talking points. It is particularly notable that, by 2015, the Conservatives had been in power for almost a decade, therefore allowing their incumbency to be conflated with the “status quo”. With the Liberals having dropped support for some of their proposed reforms in their four-year term in office, in 2019, antagonistic re-politicization correspondingly dropped.

Table 13b: Liberal Antagonistic re-politicization sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Harmful practice	6	8	6	66.67%
Immediate reform	6	8	6	66.67%
Political motivation	4	5	5	46.67%
Necessary amendment	2	2	3	23.33%

Looking at the prevalence of antagonistic re-politicization sub-elements in Table 13b,

we see strong support for the above conclusions. The first two sub-elements, both the identification of a long standing but harmful practice, and the advocacy of a strong reform thereto, both match each other in progression exactly. This pattern is in line with the overall increase in antagonistic re-politicization between 2011 and 2015 and the subsequent scaling back thereof in 2019. The return to the same results seen in 2011 further cement the idea of the Liberals attempting to emphasize what has been done as opposed to what has to be done. This is evidenced in the foreword sections quote “In the last four years, we’ve accomplished so much together” (2019: 1).

The practices addressed in 2011 include partisan court government, oil subsidies, isolationist foreign policy, and employer dependent pharma care, many of which are generally considered to be right-wing practices. In 2015, the criticized policies continue to have a left-wing bent and now include taxes on benefits, ministerial oversight on environmental review, and the transfer cap for first nations benefits. Following the reduction of overall criticized practices in 2019, many of the strongly left-wing criticisms were not included. However, the remainder continued to have a focus on climate change and aboriginal benefits and even included federal ownership of aboriginal artifacts and cultural institutions.

The ascribing of a political motivation to these practices is comparatively lower, increasing only by 1 between 2011 and 2015 with no additional change in 2019. This culminates in an overall difference from the first two categories by 2. These results suggest a less aggressive style of antagonistic re-politicization than the NDP, with less direct political blame placed on “the establishment” or opposing parties. Many of the policy sections that did not describe political motivations for the practices instead frame them as “unaddressed” or needing to be “modernized”. The political motivations that were described included power consolidation,

reduction of government workload, political grandstanding, and parliamentary business connections in 2011. This general balance between left- and right-wing motivations continues in 2015 to now include attempts to streamline some political processes, valuing re-election over results for the people and solidarity with upper class Canadians. In 2019, these results are generally maintained. These results largely demonstrate that the motivations are fairly consistent across all 3 electoral years.

Finally, the results surrounding the necessity of an amendment, or an international practice change demonstrate a significant drop from previous categories. With an additional lower overall prevalence of 2 sections, the relationship with electoral year is also negligible with only an increase of one section in 2019 which is in line with the increase of one section in category 3 scale results overall. These limited numbers of category 2 and 3 results suggest an overall limit to the boldness that the Liberal Party manifestos are willing to go in their policy proposal with comparatively few policy suggestions that would truly alter the way Canada is governed.

4.6 Liberal prevalence of majoritarianism

Majoritarianism was observed to be generally less prevalent across all three electoral years in regard to the NDP manifestos than some of the earlier described elements. Following the earlier trends observed in this section, majoritarianism will likely be similarly scarce. However, due to the fact that majoritarian rhetoric does not necessarily directly deal with a powerful “elite”, the previously observed factors associated with the Liberals having gained power in the 2015 election is less likely to feature in the progression of results.

Table 14a: Liberal Majoritarianism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	9	8	5	73.33%
2	0	1	3	13.33%
3	1	1	2	13.33%

Looking at the results in Table 14a, we see a consistently positive, if very gradual, progression. Looking first at the overall percentages of results for each year, category 1 scale results display a distinct dominance at 73.33%. By year, we see this to be the result of a gradual shift towards category 2 scale results. This includes an increase of only one section in category 2 results in 2015 and an additional 2 sections increase in category 2 scale results and an increase of one section in category 3 scale results in 2019. The obvious lack of majoritarian rhetoric in the first 2 manifestos is likely the result of the very communal language used in both years, such as the quote “Liberals believe it’s in everyone’s interests that new Canadians succeed in the workforce and can fully participate in the daily life of their communities” in 2011(61). These results, while supporting **Hypothesis 1** overall, may also suggest the continued relevance of the incumbency status of the party in the 2019 election. In essence, once the party could no longer directly target an opposing incumbent administration in its rhetoric, greater emphasis was placed on opposing elite minority populations in general, such as large corporations and the top 1 percent, which were observed to be more frequently directly invoked in 2019. Overall, however, it is clear that majoritarianism plays a significantly lesser role in the populist rhetoric employed in the Liberal Party’s manifestos than many of the previously described elements.

Table 14b: Liberal Majoritarian sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Minority	2	2	6	33.33%
Disproportionate benefit	1	2	4	23.33%
Catered to	1	1	4	20.00%
Siding with majority	1	2	5	26.67%

Looking at the sub elements of majoritarianism in Table 14b we see a general alignment with the results of the previous table. This is especially notable in the 2015 electoral year with the description of a minority group, as well as the suggestions of siding with the majority over the minority, being perfectly concurrent with the amount of category 2 and 3 scale results. The minority populations described in the manifestos in 2011 are more or less unanimously the richest 1% with the singular exception of francophone Canadians, albeit with francophone Canadians being favoured by the policy proposal. This is maintained in 2015 with the addition of aboriginal populations, also in the context of being favoured. In 2019, these groups are expanded to include the business class and the largest corporations in opposition to smaller Canadian business interests.

Similar to the NDP manifestos, the Liberals use of majoritarianism is more or less unanimously left-wing. The portrayal of a population being catered to by the political establishment matches the number of category 3 scale results. In 2019, we see a concurrent drastic increase in all 4 sub-element prevalence. It is also worth noting that, in this particular electoral year, the description of a minority group in opposition to the majority exceeds the overall prevalence of category 2 and 3 scale results by 1. This suggests a greater increase in the use of majoritarian language to a slightly greater degree than substantive majoritarian rhetoric.

Overall, however, the general scarcity of majoritarianism in the Liberal Party manifestos is clearly demonstrated across the 3 electoral years. This can be observed in the fact that, in overall percentage, the highest category, that of simply identifying a minority population, rests at only 33.33%. Despite this disparity, the results of this table still demonstrate a general increase in the overall use of populist rhetoric in regard to these sub elements.

4.7 Liberal progression of anti-institutionalism

As observed in both previous sections and the NDP manifesto results, anti-institutionalism appears to be a relatively minor element in regard to Canadian populist discourse, particularly in regard to the manifestos of Canada's left leaning parties. It can also be noted that anti-institutionalism is frequently conceptually related to antagonistic re-politicization, due to the fact of a state's institutions being integral to its style of governance. This was demonstrated in the NDP manifesto results with a positive correlation between the two. As such, due to the comparatively small numbers observed in section 4.5, we should likewise see a comparatively minor average and progression of results.

Table 15a: Liberal Anti-institutionalism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	9	8	6	76.67%
2	0	2	2	13.33%
3	1	0	2	10.00%

Looking at the results in Table 15a, we see a confirmation of the above prediction in regard to overall percentages. The percentages across all 3 electoral years display a clear mode of category 1 scale results at 76.67%. This, of course, suggests a reticence to criticize the core function of the states existing institutions and a preference to instead criticize their management by previous administrations. The results interestingly shift towards the centre between 2011 and

2015 with a 2 sections increase in category 2 scale results and a decrease of one section in category 3 scale results. While the change in 2019 is comparatively sharper at a further decrease of 2 sections in category 1 results, with a corresponding increase in category 3 scale results, it ultimately still results in a firm dominance of category 1 scale results. As predicted above however, this 3 sections reduction in category 1 scale results between 2015 and 2019 correlates exactly with the pattern observed in Table 13a, demonstrating a positive relationship between prevalence of anti-institutionalism and antagonistic re-politicization. This abrupt shift further suggests an attempt to preserve the populist messaging used in 2015. More specifically, a shift in the targeting of the status quo from Stephen Harper's management of the state's institutions to the function of the institutions themselves. An example of this is the promise to update the senate to fit its new “nonpartisan role”. Overall however, anti-institutionalism remains a relatively minor feature in the manifestos of the Liberal Party as was also observed in the manifestos of the NDP.

Table 15b: Liberal Anti-institutionalism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Critique of institution	2	3	6	36.67%
Core reform	1	2	5	26.67%
Abolish	1	0	2	10.00%
Non beneficial	1	1	2	13.33%

The results seen in Table 15b demonstrate some degree of lip-service to populist ideals over rhetoric with a critique of an institutions function rising every electoral year while exceeding the proposal for a core reform. Furthermore, in the same year, we see the number of core reforms being proposed exceeding the number of category 2 scale results. This suggests a greater concentration of anti-institutional rhetoric with multiple institutions being criticized in some policy sections. Proposals to abolish or replace an institution are demonstrated to be the

least utilized of all sub elements at only 10% overall. Finally, the suggestion that the institutions do not exist for the benefit of the people is similarly low at only 13.33%, which is in line with what has been observed in both the literature and previously observed results.

Overall, these results are consistent with both **Hypothesis 1** and other predictions based on the literature and previous sections. The criticized institutions in 2011 include the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and a more general inclusion of agricultural review boards, some of which are proposed for abolition on the grounds of inefficiency and unnecessary complexity. In 2015, these are replaced with the senate, Medicare institutions, and Canada's national security apparatus. Finally, in 2019, financial advisory institutions, employment insurance programs, and museums and archives are added, largely under the justification that they supply insufficient services to citizens. Proposals for abolition now include the Indian Act and some of the smaller financial advisory institutions, the justifications being respectively the inefficiency of service and the violation of indigenous sovereignty.

The identities of the alleged true beneficiaries of the criticized institutions include the bureaucracy in 2011, the state itself, and the incumbent federal government in 2015, and the same in 2019. Overall, these results do not concur with **Hypothesis 2**. While there is some emphasis on insufficient service given to both Canadian and aboriginal populations, the greater emphasis is placed on reducing overall governmental spending and bureaucratic influence.

4.8 Liberal progression of protectionism

While protectionism is a frequently used populist element, it is not necessarily tied into rhetoric surrounding the “status quo” or criticism of an incumbent administration. As such, according to **Hypothesis 1**, there should be a linear positive relationship between the electoral year and the prevalence of protectionist rhetoric and language. Results will likely be similar to

that of the NDP, due to the qualitative data observed in section 4.7 which suggested a gradual increase in the anti-United States rhetoric.

Table 16a: Liberal Protectionism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	6	5	4	50.00%
2	2	3	4	30.00%
3	2	2	2	20.00%

Looking at the results in Table 16a, we can observe a positive, if minor, relationship between the electoral year and prevalence of protectionist rhetoric and language. Category 3 scale results are consistent across all three electoral years at 2 sections. This appears to suggest a general consistency in the use of strong protectionist rhetoric, such as the emphasis placed in all three foreign policy sections on Canada's need to “take back” its place in the world. Other than the aforementioned trend, we can observe a consistent increase of one section in category 2 scale results at the expense of category 1 scale results. The overall percentages of each result for every year display a relative normal distribution and a 50/50 split between category 1 scale results and categories 2 and 3. This, along with the general lack of movement in the percentages between electoral years suggest a general consistency in the ways threats to the Canadian people are described in recent Liberal Party manifestos. This positive relationship, albeit one to a lesser degree than what was observed in the NDP manifestos, is likely the result of a gradually more ambitious preservationist platform, as evidenced in 2019 by the frequent use of talking points such as “undoing Stephen Harper's damage in 2015” and “There’s so much more to be done” in 2019.

Table 16b: Liberal Protectionism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Foreign threat	5	6	6	56.67%
Conscious actor	4	4	4	40.00%

Looking at the results in Table 16b, we can observe a similar pattern to that of Table 16a. In both 2011 and 2015, we can observe a 1 section exceeding of category 2 and 3 scale results by the prevalence of foreign threats being described. This suggests some degree of invocation of threats without seriously engaging with the idea. This ends in 2019, suggesting a slight tightening of the rhetoric surrounding foreign threats. We also can observe a consistent 4 section prevalence of the threat being described as a conscious actor, which suggests a predominance of threats being given a face in the rhetoric used by the Liberal manifestos. These threat actors include terrorists, foreign business interests, N.G.O.s, and the United States.

In terms of the threats themselves, we can observe in 2011 an emphasis on social threats with social threats amounting to the same number as economic and security threat mentions combined. These social threats include foreign cultural influence and misinformation through the internet. The remaining threats are composed of foreign business interests, oil companies, and terror states.

Proposals to combat these threats include tighter trade regulation, investment in Canadian cultural institutions and projects, and a less isolationist approach to foreign policy. In 2015, we see three quarters dominance of results by economic threats which now include international market pressure sand competition, cyber attacks on Canadians, and technological competition on green energy. Threat actors remain largely the same with an additional emphasis on China. Simpler solutions are offered to these threats including reallocation of industry subsidy funds away from oil companies towards agricultural and tech industries as well as better export

supply management. Education and tighter cyber security are proposed to combat social threats. Finally, in 2019 we see the same proportions of economic, social, and security threats, with the addition of a greater emphasis on climate change itself. Threat actors also largely remain the same with fewer invocations of specific foreign states. We can observe overall a general progression towards economic protectionism and the curtailing of unregulated business conduct.

4.9 Liberal progression of simplicity

As observed in previous sections, simplicity has been demonstrated to be an important factor in the composition of populist rhetoric and language. It should be noted that the simplicity of language and rhetoric could be considered the most likely element to have been adapted from other contemporary state's political actors and movements. This is because appeals to common sense, day one language, and insinuations of corruption towards opponents can be more readily used by political actors at any place on the political spectrum than many of the above populist elements. As such, there should be a significant increase in the overall use of simplicity across all 3 electoral years.

Table 17a: Liberal Simplicity results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	4	3	2	30.00%
2	5	5	6	53.33%
3	1	2	2	16.67%

Based on what we can observe in Table 17a, the results appear to conform to what has been previously observed surrounding **Hypothesis 1**. While the results do show the predicted positive relationship between the overall use of simplicity and the progressing electoral year, they are, once again, less dramatic than what has been observed in regard to the NDP manifestos. We see a mode of category 2 scale results in the 2011 manifesto with only one instance of

category 3 scale results. The results gain a more even distribution in 2015 as the result of a decrease of one section in category 1 scale results and a corresponding increase in category 3 results. This positive trend continues in 2019 with a distinct mode of category 2 scale results of 6 as the result of a further 1 section drop in category 1 scale results. The predominance of category 2 scale results and the generally small prevalence of category 3 scale results at only 16.67% suggest a further reluctance to portray political opponents as outright corrupt. Portrayals instead appear to favour opponents presented as hypocritical career politicians who are out of touch with the people. This can be observed in 2011 with the singular source of corruption being unethical desire for greater power by the Conservatives. In 2015, this is maintained with a critique of the Conservatives' method of power consolidation. In 2019, this is once again maintained with an additional reference to business connections of Conservative politicians. These results appear to show that there is a general balance between right- and left-wing simplicity based talking points.

Table 17b: Liberal Simplicity sub-elements.

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Common sense	7	7	7	70.00%
Hypocrisy	6	5	4	50.00%
Easiness	1	4	5	33.33%
Corruption	1	2	2	16.67%

The results observed in Table 17b have some interesting progressions. Appeals to common sense stay consistent at the high number of 7 sections across all 3 electoral years. In 2011, these appeals consist largely of parity of results and equality of opportunity between Canadian populations in regard to a variety of programs including education and community services. They additionally include the advancement of healthcare and the combating of global warming. In 2015, less emphasis is placed on parity of results but instead feature the need to reform the electoral system, the preservation of Canadian liberties, the need for greater help for

veterans and seniors, and the need to preserve Canada's cultural identity. In 2019, these concerns are maintained with an additional mention of reining in corporate tax shopping, indigenous sovereignty, and strengthening Canada's place in the world. This suggests a consistency in agenda and messaging across the 3 elections.

Interestingly, claims of hypocrisy actually decline by 1 each electoral year suggesting that the Liberal Party has not made claims of hypocrisy central to their populist message. The references that are made include lip service being given by the Conservatives to important healthcare and environmental policy, the failures of the recent Conservative budget and the lack of commitment to helping vulnerable populations such as aboriginal women, rural communities, and impoverished Canadians. In 2015, they include anti democratic features in the fair elections bill, neglect of the healthcare system, how much the Conservatives value Canada's place in the world, and the tax breaks given to wealthy corporations. In 2019, the cutting of social services remains included and is now the most prominent claim. Emphasis on the diminishing role of Canada on the world stage and the Conservative's violation of treaties with First Nations is also included. The frequency of stressing of how easy it would be to enact a policy abruptly increases between 2011 and 2015. This increase continues in 2019 but to a lesser degree at only 1 section. This is possibly explained by the change in leadership that occurred in 2015, with Justin Trudeau employing a more aggressive style of certain policy proposals. This would partially explain the smaller increase in addition to federal incumbency status of the Liberal Party in 2019.

Finally, regarding the use of accusations of corruption towards opponents, we can observe a general consistency with the overall prevalence of simplicity in Table 17a. This generally low result of only 16.67% suggests that accusations of outright corruption is only invoked in particular policy topics, such as in discussing Harper's alleged resistance to electoral

reform and is generally not central to the simplicity-based messaging used in the recent Liberal Party manifestos.

4.10 Overall use of left/right wing keywords

According to **Hypothesis 2**, the overall use of left-wing based populist key terms should increase incrementally across all 3 electoral years. In addition, the overall proportion of right-wing based populist key terms should be lower than that of left-wing ones. However, due to the more centrist position of the Liberal Party on the political spectrum, the ratios will likely be less drastic and there should be a greater overall prominence of right populist key phrases across the 3 electoral years.

Table 19 Liberal predominance of left or right-wing key terms by year

Left/right	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Left	32.86%	20.00%	35.71%	29.05%
Right	11.43%	18.67%	15.71%	13.80%
Neutral	55.71%	61.40%	48.58%	84.75%

Looking at the results in Table 19, we can see that the percentages across the three electoral years do not fully conform to **Hypothesis 2**. While left-wing key terms do indeed display a prominence over right-wing key terms across all three electoral years. The results not only feature a mere 1.43% difference in the 2015 manifesto between left and right key terms, but also represents an overall left key term decrease of 12.6% from the previous electoral year. While this trend does reverse in the 2019 manifesto, with a sharp increase of 15.71% in left populist key terms, it ultimately represents an increase of less than 5 percent from the 2011 manifesto. The increase in right wing populism across all 3 electoral years is even slightly higher at 4.28% as opposed to 2.85%. The outlying tightening of the ratio between left- and right-wing key terms in the 2015 manifesto is actually similar to the increase and subsequent decrease of right-wing

key terms seen in the NDP manifesto of the same electoral year. This would suggest an overall greater use of right-wing style populist language by both parties in an attempt to portray Stephen Harper's long running incumbent government as synonymous with the political “establishment” and “status quo”. The overall percentages of left vs right key terms, while demonstrating a similar ratio to that of the NDP manifesto results, are significantly lower than the previously observed results. This matches the overall smaller percentage of populist language and rhetoric of the Liberal Party as compared to the NDP. However, we can not conclusively determine that there has been a significant overall increase in the use of either style of populist language. Therefore, these results instead favour the Null hypothesis.

4.11 Conclusions

What is immediately evident in these results is the comparatively minor changes that occur in both the party's overall use of populist rhetoric and language. Unlike the almost exclusively positive relationship between electoral year and populist elements seen in the manifestos of the NDP, the overall progression of results for the Liberal varies greatly between years, elements, and policy sections. One pattern frequently observed between sub-element sections is a large increase between 2011 and 2015, followed by a smaller increase or even decrease in 2019. This appears to give strong credence to the suggestion made by Pétry that the Liberal Party made bold but ultimately empty promises at a time when they had nothing to lose (2019). The difference between left-and right-wing populist language and rhetoric ultimately falls in line with what was hypothesized with a substantive favouring of left-wing rhetoric but a greater willingness than the NDP to employ firm right-wing talking points. Overall, while the ultimate increase in the use of, primarily left-wing, populism suggests the Liberal Party has adopted some populist stylings from its contemporaries, the comparatively minor degree to

which it does so suggests it is unwilling to surrender its image as the embodiment of standard Canadian governance.

Chapter 5: Progression of populist usage in the Conservative Party 2011-2019

While the Liberals and the NDP varied with each other to some degree, particularly in regard to intensity of rhetoric, they still featured strong similarities in the style and framing of populist rhetoric. Being the furthest right-wing of the three examined parties, the Conservative manifestos have the potential to reveal a more unique and right-wing style of populism. This section will, of course, details the results of examining the three manifestos in question. I will be detailing the overall prevalence and style of populist language and rhetoric found within and offer some comparisons to both the results of the Liberal and NDP manifestos. In this first section, I will summarize the political context in which the Conservative Party found itself in each of the electoral years in question, allowing for greater context to the topics of discussion in the manifestos. Subsequently, I will examine the overall prevalence of populist language and rhetoric across all of the policy sections for each electoral year and identify any patterns that emerge across the three years. Once this has been established, I will apply this analysis to the overall prevalence of each of the populist composite elements as well as detailing the relative amounts of positive or negative answers to each of the questions that were used in the content analysis. These sections will also include a description of the predominant answers to the open-ended questions. Finally, I will detail the overall ration of left- to right-wing key terms used in the manifestos of each electoral year and provide a summative conclusion of the results

5.1. Setting the stage

5.1.1 The 2011 election

In the 2008 election, the Conservative Party had hoped to increase their number of seats to the point of changing their minority government into a majority. Not only had this attempt

failed but, subsequently, an attempt was made to oust them from power altogether through a coalition effort in later years. After successfully defeating this effort by suspending Parliament, the Conservative Party began to bill itself as the “serious” party, who's focus was not on politics and identity but instead on doing the necessary work of actually governing. The second prorogation of Parliament in 2009 supplied a strong support for this narrative as the polls demonstrated that the prospect of another election so soon was unpopular with the electorate as a whole (Wheeldon, 2014). Once the 2011 election was triggered, this strategy was heavily used in the campaign, billing the Conservative Party as a strong and stable force that had taken good care of the people as opposed to the “agents of chaos” of the other parties, including the Bloc Québécois, who were stalling the process of governance with “political games”. This stability angle was played up in the campaign and an added emphasis on the need for a stable majority in order to prevent the disruptions of the last few years was frequently used. In order to emphasize the “stable hand” aspect to the campaign, frequent references were used to the great recession and Canada's resilience to it, particularly in comparison to the United States (2011: 2). This stability angle was prevalent in their campaign slogan “Here For Canada”, as well as their major campaign promises which included greater economic stimulation, aid to small businesses, criminal justice reforms, and phasing out of taxpayer subsidies to federal political parties.

5.1.2 The 2015 election

Four years after their securing of a majority government, the party was faced with how to hold onto it. At this point, the government had held power for almost a decade and the party was no longer starting the election first in the polls. Now that the party had secured their majority government, their goal in the intervening years was to attempt to alter the political zeitgeist of Canada to a more neoliberal economic framework (Ives, 2015). As such, the case for stability

was made, this time from a more sociocultural perspective. Knowing that the left-wing-vote would be split between the two major opposing parties, Stephen Harper instead chose to focus on securing a strong alliance between economic and social Conservatives across the country. This resulted in somewhat of a traditionalist strategy employed by the Conservatives, using the slogans “Proven leadership for a strong Canada. “Safer Canada/Stronger Economy”, and “Protect our Economy”. A heavy emphasis was once again placed on the economy, particularly in regard to preserving Canada's resource economy and trading relationships with other nations such as the United States. One of the major sociocultural worries that was heavily leaned into in order to appeal to social Conservatives was a firm promise to disallow the wearing of the Niqab for the purposes of government photos, which was billed as a commitment to “Canadian values” (Anderson and McGregor, 2020). The campaign also had a strongly negative bent with a heavy use of attack ads against both opposing leaders. Thomas Mulcair was criticized for being dishonest and untrustworthy while Justin Trudeau was portrayed as being inexperienced and incompetent, with frequent use in ads of the phrase “He’s in way over his head”. Ultimately however, this strategy proved unsuccessful as the Conservatives suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Liberals which ultimately suggested a failure to supplant them as the embodiment of Canadian values.

5.1.3 The 2019 election

After their defeat in the previous election and the first shift in leadership in over a decade, the Conservative Party needed to adjust their image and strategy for the next election. This change resulted in a firmly “anti-Trudeau” strategy and branding in the subsequent campaign. As the Liberals focused their campaign on the concept of “promises made promises kept”, the Conservative messaging largely focused on challenging that notion and describing

Trudeau as “not as advertised” (2019: 1). Similar to the strategy of the NDP, emphasis was placed heavily on Justin Trudeau’s failures and controversies. One major failure being his revoking of his support for altering the first past the post electoral format. Andrew Scheer’s strategy was even described as “Trumpian” by some researchers and journalists with his use of the populist slogan “It’s time for you to get ahead” and a heavy emphasis being placed on the “pay to play” scandals such as SNC Lavalin (Nanos, 2020). Similar to Harper’s campaign strategies, the economy was front and centre in the messaging, especially in regard to Trudeau’s running of deficits and his failure to balance the budget by the promised year. Immigration and environmentalism also played a firm role in the political messaging, this time going for a stronger environmentalist angle, including criticizing the Liberals for their handling of the Trans Mountain pipeline and a more “fair and compassionate” stance on immigration as opposed to the more hard-line stance taken by Harper in 2015. This strategy appeared to be largely successful overall as it resulted in a strong gain of seats for the party and downgrading of the Liberal incumbency from a majority to a minority government. The NDP’s loss of seats further vindicated the anti Trudeau strategy as the party failed to provide a left-wing alternative to the Liberals.

5.2 Progression of populist usage for the Conservatives 2011-2019

As discussed in the results of the previously examined political party manifestos, **Hypothesis 1** predicts that there should be a notable increase in the usage of populist language and rhetoric in the electoral manifestos of all three political parties over the three examined electoral years. As such, **Hypothesis 1** would suggest that the usage of populist language and rhetoric in the Conservative Party manifestos should follow a similar pattern to those of the Liberal Party and the NDP. However, as the incumbency status of the Liberal Party in 2019 has

been demonstrated to have some degree of effect on its use of populist language and rhetoric, it can be predicted that the transition of the Conservative Party to the opposition bench might have contributed to a sharp increase in populist discourse. The 2019 year should be particularly relevant since the party had also experienced a change in party leadership. In terms of **Hypothesis 2**, a prediction was made that the Conservative Party should experience an overall greater increase in its use of right-wing populist language than that of left-wing populist language. The results concerning Hypothesis 1 can be found in Table 20 below.

Table 20 Overall Conservative Populism

Intensity	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	6	7	0	43.33%
2	3	1	6	33.33%
3	1	2	4	23.33%

Looking at the results in table 20, we can observe a drastic change across the three electoral years. In 2011, we see a very low average of results. This indicates some usage of populist rhetoric and language that year but with a clear mode of category 1 scale results at 6 sections, this style is demonstrated not to be particularly central to the political messaging. We see no major change in 2015 with only a 2 sections reduction in category 2 scale results with a concurrent 1 section increase in category 1 and 3 scale results. This shift makes no change to the overall mean of the results. The lack of a strong populist sentiment in both electoral years can likely be attributed to the aforementioned Conservative strategy of attempting to normalize their style of governance and frame their policies as more “standard” for Canada. In keeping with this, a variety of policy sections make references to “staying the course” and the “recklessness” of proposed policy ideas by political opponents. In 2019, we see a drastic positive shift from the previous electoral year. This represents the greatest shift of any category scale frequencies with a

7 sections decrease in category 1 scale results. This appears to suggest that the results of the 2015 election and the firm defeat by Justin Trudeau's Liberals had a particularly significant impact on the political messaging of the Conservative Party manifestos. Not only could the party portray itself as a political outsider for the first time in almost a decade, but also in opposition to an inexperienced Prime minister who allegedly got by on charisma and name recognition. It is also worth noting that, by the time the manifesto had been released, Justin Trudeau had been the subject of a variety of scandals, most notably the SNC Lavalin scandal. Unsurprisingly, the manifesto contains multiple references to Trudeau and these events. This is combined with the effect of having a leadership shift from Stephen Harper to Andrew Scheer between elections. While the use of populist rhetoric and language did in fact increase between the electoral years of 2011 and 2019, it is unclear whether this was the result of external influence or simply political opportunism.

5.3 *Conservative people centrism usage*

As established in the sections concerning its use in the Liberal and NDP manifestos, people centrism is shown to increase in relation to the overall increase in populist rhetoric and language. As people centrism is a heavy feature for both the NDP and Liberal Party manifestos across all three electoral years, it stands to reason that it should likewise correlate with the results of Table 20. Furthermore, as people centrism has been shown to be very present in the other party manifestos, it is likely that it will also be the same for the Conservative manifestos

Table 21a Conservative People Centrism Results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	3	2	3	26.67%
2	5	3	2	33.33%
3	2	5	5	40.00%

Looking at the results in Table 21a, we see an interesting distribution in the numbers of each category of results. While an overall positive relationship is demonstrated between electoral year and overall prevalence of people centrism, the greater, increase in the overall usage of people centrism actually occurs between 2011 and 2015. While the results in 2011 feature a mode of 5 sections in category 2 scale results, there is a sharp increase in category 3 scale result in 2015 which amounts to a 5-section overall prevalence. This change is accompanied by a 1 section decrease in category 1 scale results and a 2 sections decrease in category 2 scale results. However, this trend does not continue in 2019 with an actual decrease, albeit very limited, in the overall usage of people centrism.

These results suggest a sharp increase in emphasis being placed on the Canadian people and their plight in response to being in danger of losing the election. This is demonstrated in the 2015 manifesto with several references to Canada's ability to “weather the storm” of the various recent global crises, as well as references to “staying the course” in order to maintain the measures put in place to help the Canadian people. The relative stability of people centrism usage between 2015 and 2019 would suggest a favoring of this style of rhetoric, with similar talking points and language being useful for projecting the Conservative Party as the servants of the people as opposed to the self-interested opposing parties.

Table 21b Conservative People Centrism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Group identity	9	9	8	86.67%
Homogenous	5	8	7	66.67%
Virtuous	5	7	6	56.67%
Contrasted	7	7	7	70.00%

The results in Table 21b show a strong consistency in people centrist based talking points. As with the other political party manifestos, a firm emphasis is placed on invoking the Canadian people as a whole with each electoral year having 8 sections or higher usage of the talking point. The prevalence of portraying the Canadian people as having a homogeneous opinion or perspective and portraying them as having a shared virtue both follow a similar pattern. Both categories experience a strong increase between 2011 and 2015 followed by a 1 section decrease. The increases in 2015 suggests a stronger emphasis being placed on Canada's virtue and accomplishments after 2011 as well as the need to follow the will of the people which is allegedly expressed by the Conservative Party. This is demonstrated in the 2015 manifesto with several references to the endurance of Canadians through hard times in comparison to other western states as well as suggestions of the Conservatives siding with the people as opposed to "special interests" (2015: 15). The shared virtues and qualities described in 2011 are quite varied and include hard work, the desire for stability, ingenuity, and an ability to harmoniously work for the betterment of the nation. In 2015, we see an even greater right-wing emphasis with the inclusion of having an independent spirit, a sense of self determinism, frugality, the valuing of the arts, national pride, and family orientation. However, we also see a stronger inclusion of environmental stewardship and commitment to emission goals. In 2019, we see a trend towards more left-wing values with the addition of desire for change, community, compassion, and the ability to stand up for liberal values globally.

The results also demonstrate a consistency of contrasting the Canadian people to an outsider group which remains consistent across all 3 electoral years. This further suggests a stable set of states and interest groups that are invoked by the party more or less every election. Populations contrasted with the people in 2011 include foreign criminals, other developed

countries, the United States, terrorists, and the governing class. It is worth noting that the invocation of many of the other countries exist for the purpose of contrasting their socioeconomic results with Canada on a variety of topics. These more or less remain stable in 2015 with a great emphasis placed on Canada's superior results in matters of states to both the United States and other G7 states. In 2019, we see the results generally maintained with less emphasis placed on invoking contemporary states. They additionally now include rich insiders and foreign billionaires. Both of these results suggest a general predominance of right-wing targets with somewhat of an increase in left wing targets in 2019.

5.4 Conservative anti-elitism usage

Based on what was observed in the previous two sections, we can likely observe a general increase in the use of anti-elitist language and rhetoric across the three electoral years even in cases where the party in question held the incumbency. Following this trend, it is likely that anti-elitism's use will be relatively consistent between 2011 and 2015. However, it is can also be hypothesized that some increase should be seen in its overall usage in 2019. This is likely because, as of 2019, not only had the Conservatives lost the previous election, but a variety of scandals involving Justin Trudeau's links to powerful individuals and corporations had been released by the press. This, theoretically, should make him a prime target for anti-elitism rhetoric.

Table 22a Conservative anti-elitism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	4	7	2	43.33%
2	4	1	5	30.00%
3	2	2	3	23.33%

We can see in Table 22a, in 2011, shared numbers between category 1 and 2 scale results. This suggests some criticism of the elites in this electoral year but not often to a particularly strong degree. We see a drastic change to this pattern in 2015 with a 3 sections drop in category 2 scale results and a corresponding 3 sections increase in category 1 scale results, achieving a clear mode at 7 sections. This suggests a drastic alteration in the messaging style in the 2015 manifesto. It is likely the result of the heavy emphasis placed on stability that electoral year with several references to policies and governing strategies that were working and helping Canadians through tough times and that the opposition wanted to make “irresponsible moves”. As a result, the Conservative government appears to want fewer references to the idea of powerful “elites” other than themselves. Furthermore, it is worth noting that a recurring political motif in the 2011 manifesto was to reference the “unnecessary and opportunistic” nature of the current election. This framed the opposing parties as more concerned with their own political power than with the plight of the people. Therefore, without this talking point in 2015, the use of anti-elitism correspondingly dropped. The reversal of this trend in 2019 can likewise be explained by the opportunities put forward by the election of Justin Trudeau and his corresponding scandals. The manifesto references him almost to the preclusion of any other opposing politicians and is often used in contexts such as “We’ve seen who gets ahead with Justin Trudeau, the wealthy and well-connected who have the right friends in the right places. I think it’s time for you to get ahead” (2019: 1).

Table 22b Conservative Anti elitism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Specific mentions	0	2	5	23.33%
Identified elites	6	4	7	56.67%
Superior Group	5	2	7	46.67%
Association with opponents	6	2	5	43.33%

The results in Table 22b yield some interesting observations surrounding the composition of Conservative anti-elitist rhetoric over the last 3 electoral years. Specific mentions of the elites, while ultimately culminating in an overall low percentage, show a steady increase across all 3 electoral years. This suggest as gradual focusing of anti-elitist rhetoric culminating in the larger increase to 5 sections in 2019, with several references to “the rich and well connected” and “Justin Trudeau's powerful friends” (2019: 1). By contrast, the identification of the elites follows a similar pattern to Table 22a with a 2 sections dip in 2015 followed by a 3 sections increase the following electoral year. The 1 section exceeding of category 2 and 3 scale results by the sub element in 2015 can be attributed once again to the emphasis on stability with some passing references to opposing and foreign politicians irresponsibly spending taxpayer money. Groups identified as the elites in 2011 are portrayed exclusively as the political class. In 2015, this trend is less pronounced but now includes environmental special interest groups as well as large scale real estate investors. In 2019, we see rich corporations, the investor class, foreign business interests, and celebrities added to these results, demonstrating some degree of left-wing style anti-elitism.

Advocacy for certain groups over the elites, with 2 sections in 2015 being the lowest, matches the use of category 3 scale results seen in the previous table. This suggests that groups other than the general “people” are only invoked for more aggressively anti-elitist messages. Groups extolled over the elites consist of small communities, working Canadians, rural Canadians, small business owners, indigenous peoples and vulnerable populations. In 2015, the only remaining groups used are working Canadians and Canadian homeowners. In 2019, they now include the middle class, and Canadian artists, as well as the return of indigenous communities, small business owners, and a much higher prevalence of working-class Canadians.

Finally, the association of the elites with opponents is in line with what has been observed above, the high percentage in 2011 matches the frequent references to political opportunism in most sections. The corresponding drop in 2015 demonstrates the overall reticence to describe powerful outsiders and the subsequent increase in 2019 matches the heavy invocation of Justin Trudeau's name. More directly dealing with **Hypothesis 2**, socioeconomic/sociopolitical divide in terms of style of criticism is entirely sociopolitical in 2011, and 3 times more in 2015, and reversed in favor of socioeconomic in 2019, suggesting a drastic left-wing shift in the 2019 manifestos use of anti-elitism.

5.5 Conservative antagonistic re-politicization usage

Antagonistic re-politicization used by the Conservatives is likely to vary drastically between electoral years. Having an incumbency does not, by definition, detract from a party's ability to propose bold policy changes and question traditionally maintained policies or methods of governance. However, as we have observed in the previous results sections, the 2015 manifesto placed great emphasis on stability, as well as the importance of allowing the policies previously enacted by the administration to be maintained. As a result, antagonistic re-

politicization should likely remain similar between 2011 and 2015 or decline overall. In 2019, it is likely that we will observe some degree of increase from 2015 to 2019 due to the shift in leadership that occurred after the 2015 election as well as the general increase we have seen in the two previous results sections.

Table 23a Conservative antagonistic re-politicization results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	7	6	1	46.67%
2	3	3	5	36.67%
3	0	1	4	16.67%

Looking at the results in Table 23a, we actually observe a linear positive progression. We see results in 2011 that notably includes no category 3 scale results and a firm mode of category 1 results at 7 sections. This is likely the result of the core messaging found in the manifesto that the Conservatives were more interested in delivering on the budget and programs they had planned rather than going through another election. It is further noteworthy that, at this point in time, the Conservative Party held a minority government which would make passing strong governance reforms more difficult. Due to the aforementioned messaging style, very few mentions of reforms that would require a majority government are included in the manifestos. We see, in 2015, a small increase in the overall use of antagonistic re-politicization. This includes a 1 section drop in category 1 results with a 1 section increase of category 3 scale results. This is likely the result of the majority government now held by the party which allowed for some slightly more ambitious policy platforms. In 2019, we see a drastic increase with a 5 section decline in category 1 scale results and a corresponding increase in both remaining results most notably the 3 sections increase in category 3 scale results. This drastic change can be possibly attributed to both the new leadership and the shift in power with the Conservatives now

being the official opposition. In essence, it is easier to make criticisms of long running practices and conflate them with your political opponents when you are not in the immediate position to alter them. More specifically, the manifesto frequently challenges Justin Trudeau's identity as a “fresh face” in Canadian politics and frames him as another “typical” politician, thus framing the new Conservatives as the real bringers of change. One example of this is the assertion that “If Trudeau is given four more years, he will keep breaking his promises and his never-ending deficits will force him to raise taxes even more (2019: 5).

Table 23b Conservative Antagonistic re-politicization sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Harmful practice	3	4	7	46.67%
Immediate reform	3	4	7	46.67%
Political motivation	3	2	5	33.33%
Necessary amendment	1	2	3	20.00%

The results in Table 23b largely follow a similar trend to each other. The description of a harmful long running political practice, as well as the proposal for an immediate reform thereto, each match each-other exactly matching the more drastic increase in overall antagonistic re-politicization seen in the previous table. The attribution to a political motivation to the practices also follows this trend to a slightly lesser degree and once again fits with the more personally focused approach to criticism of the incumbent government seen in 2019. The need for an amendment or international practice change follows a 1 section increase each electoral year but ultimately only amounts to 2 sections overall, which is the lowest overall percentage of results. This demonstrates a reticence by most mainstream parties to propose particularly bold or controversial legislation while still maintaining a gradual increase in this boldness.

The practices themselves in 2011 are composed of party finance subsidies, the reductions in military spending and restrictions on gun ownership. In 2015, we see a shift in focus to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, lightness in treason sentencing, gradual increases in business regulation, and targeted tax relief. In 2019, we see a more mixed left- and right-wing taking points with the inclusion of rampant government spending, taxes on government benefits, unilateral government oversight on indigenous affairs, admission charges for museums, the use of single use plastics, cabinet confidence, sidelining of religious liberty, and foreign aid to richer countries.

Political motivations for the practices motivations include desire for greater election financing, governmental control over Canadian industry, and an isolationist foreign policy ideology. In 2015, they are comprised largely of political cowardice in enacting needed policies by political opponents. In 2019, there is the addition of political patronage by Trudeau, special interest allegiance and valuing of reelection over policy success. This overall demonstrates a rather consistent use of right-wing talking points.

5.6 Conservative majoritarianism prevalence

Majoritarianism has been observed in manifestos of the two previous parties to be both comparatively less frequently used than many of the other populist elements and to generally target socioeconomic minorities, such as the richest 1 percent. In the case of the Conservative Party manifestos, it is likely that the use of this sub- element in the manifestos rhetoric and language will be slightly higher than that of the other parties. This is due to the fact that, as the major party with the furthest right-wing position on the political spectrum, the criticized minority groups will likely also include groups such as illegal immigrants and criminal elements. This

should be particularly relevant in the first two electoral years due to Stephen Harper's firm “tough on crime” stance that defined his time as Prime minister.

Table 24a Conservative Majoritarianism Results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	7	8	6	70.00%
2	1	1	2	13.33%
3	2	1	2	16.67%

Looking at the results in Table 24a, we can observe that the Conservative use of majoritarianism does not show a significant difference overall from the manifestos of the other two political parties. The overall averages across all 3 years actually falls between that of the NDP and the Liberal Party in the overall average of category scale results at a mean of 33.33%. Looking at the results by electoral year, we can again see a generally small overall use of majoritarian language and rhetoric with a clear mode in 2011 of category 1 scale results at 7 sections. In 2015, we see a minor, if negative, shift in the overall results with a 1 section transfer from category 3 to category 1 scale results. This is likely, once again, the result of the 2015 emphasis on stability with the 1 section decrease being the result of references in the 2011 manifesto to federal politicians exerting too much control over smaller jurisdictions which are largely absent in the 2015 manifesto. In 2019, we see a stronger reversal of this trend with a 2 sections drop in category 1 scale results with a corresponding increase in the other 2. This can largely be attributed to the larger emphasis placed on reigning in the influence of large corporations and the richest 1 percent which was adopted with the shift in leadership.

Table 24b Conservative Majoritarianism sub-elements

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Minority	6	2	4	40.00%
Disproportionate benefit	1	2	3	20.00%
Catered to	4	2	4	33.33%
Siding with Majority	6	2	4	40.00%

Looking at the results in Table 24b, we can observe similar results cross all years with the exception of the 2011 manifesto. While in 2015 and 2019, we can see the description of an opposing minority group such as the 1 percent or immigrants, the disproportionate benefits they receive and the alleged catering thereto by the political establishment fits the number of category 2 and 3 scale results exactly, with the one exception being the 3 sections prevalence of disproportionate benefit in 2019. However, in 2011, we can observe the exceeding of category 2 and 3 scale results by as much as 3 sections. This appears to be the result of the writing style of the 2011 manifesto with the emphasis on being “here for Canadians”. With the central messaging revolving around being a strong hand for Canadians in time of need, the emphasis was frequently put on the opposing parties caring more about individual power for themselves or helping than helping “special interest groups”. Examples of this include references to the “rights of criminals”, “environmental special interests” or the assertion that the federal government held too much power over the political structures of indigenous populations. However, these references usually were briefly mentioned at the beginning or end of many of the passages and contained little policy detail. They, therefore, did not constitute substantive majoritarian rhetoric.

The groups themselves are described in 2011 as the federal political class, immigrants, and Canada's criminal population. In 2015, this changes to foreign business speculators and upper-class environmentalists. Finally, in 2019, we see a return to the federal political class

being prevalent with the new additions of billionaires, highlighted artists, and the one percent.

This demonstrates yet another heavily right-wing majoritarian focus with a slight leftwards shift in 2019.

5.7 *Conservative usage of anti-institutionalism*

Anti-institutionalism-based rhetoric and language is likely to be relatively rare in its use by the Conservatives, like it was in two other parties' manifestos. In particular, this would be due to the Conservatives' emphasis in both 2011 and 2015 on the persisting global issues and the resilience of Canada in light of them, as well as the need to maintain the course the party has set. The emphasis was overall placed on what has been done already and the need to "ride out the storm". Due to this, the idea of fundamentally altering existing institutions is less frequently used in the rhetoric. As a result, we should see in 2019 a drastic increase similar to what we have observed in previous sections.

Table 25a Conservative Anti-institutionalism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	7	7	4	60.00%
2	2	2	3	23.33%
3	1	1	3	16.67%

The results in Table 25a largely conform to the above prediction. We see identical results in 2011 and 2015, with the same 7 sections mode of category 1 scale results. This suggests an adherence to a set of talking points in both years surrounding institutional reforms. This is in line with the Conservative emphasis on strong services and protections that have been granted to the people over the years under the Conservative federal governance. The sections that do include strong anti-institutionalism are often framed from a singular perspective, that of cutting "red

tape” in order to streamline institutions not only to more efficiently provide services to Canadians, but also allow them greater autonomy, such as with the elimination of the long gun registry in 2011. In 2019, we see a strong increase in anti-institutional language with a 3 sections decrease in category 1 results and a sharp increase in category 3 results for the first time. This suggests a diversification of institutional critique, with a notable example being a proposal to reform the office of foreign aid on the grounds that it is too broad. The diversity is likely the result of the slightly more left-wing approach adopted by Andrew Sheer which allows for criticizing institutions for their lack of services provided or the social positions of those running them.

Table 25b Conservative Anti-institutionalism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Critique of institution	3	3	6	40.00%
Core reform	1	1	3	16.67%
Abolish	1	1	3	16.67%
Non beneficial	3	2	4	30.00%

The results in Table 25b support the pattern seen in the previous table. The critique of an institution’s function matches the numbers of category 2 and 3 scale results seen in Table 25a. The criticized institutions themselves include the long gun registry in 2011, on the grounds that it was inefficient and treated law-abiding citizens as criminals. In 2015, they included the senate on the grounds of its un-elected status. In 2019, we see a leftwards shift in rhetoric to include the Indian Act on the grounds that it violated indigenous sovereignty, federal carbon emission regulation on the grounds of inefficiency, and Trudeau's “office of everything” in regard to the regulation of Canada’s rural economy on the grounds of a need for specialization.

The groups identified as the true beneficiary of the criticized institutions stays largely consistent across all 3 electoral years suggesting that they serve a bloated bureaucracy with federal politicians gaining influence through pork spending and stronger control of the institutions themselves. This offers a distinct right-wing bent to the anti-institutionalism of the manifestos.

The results surrounding the proposal to abolish an institution also match the number of category 3 scale results. The description of the institutions as non-beneficial actually decreases in 2015 but increases by 2 sections in 2019. This is likely the result of the slightly less aggressive populist style used in 2015 and the subsequent return to form in 2019. One example of this is the notion that Canadian heritage should not be for sale and that putting fees on Canadian museums aids the governmental bottom line rather than the people. However, numbers of proposals of a core reform that would require an amendment or referendum is smaller than the number of category 2 scale results in both 2011 and 2015. This appears to be the result of there being several strong promises to deregulate industries and governmental institutions while being unspecific on which regulations would be cut and what measures would be taken to do so. This changed in 2019 with the addition of more concrete promises to introduce an amendment to cut at least 2 regulations for every one introduced.

5.8 Conservative usage of protectionism

In previous sections, we have observed a strong emphasis, in both the 2011 and 2015 manifestos, on Canada's resilience in the face of several global crises, such as the great recession. As a result, it is likely that protectionism should be a heavy feature in the manifestos of each electoral year. As we have observed a general increase between 2011 and 2019 in all the

previously examined populist elements, it stands to reason that the 2019 manifesto will likely exhibit similar results or a continued increase in the overall use of protectionism.

Table 26a Conservative Protectionism results

Intensity scale	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
1	5	4	4	43.33%
2	4	4	3	36.67%
3	1	2	3	20.00%

The results observed in Table 26a largely conform to the above prediction. In 2011, we can see an even split between category 1 scale results and category 2 and 3 scale results. The mean of 1.6 it is the second highest of all the previously examined elements in the 2011 results. The fact that it is secondary to people centrism is consistent with the overall tone of the manifesto, that of portraying the Conservative government in a close relationship with the people and keeping them safe through hard times. This is evident in the language used in the titles of each policy section. This included “here for x subgroup” and specifically “here to stand on guard for Canada” in regard to national security. This particular statement clearly exists to not only invoke strength and competence but also patriotism through allusion to the national anthem. The comparatively minor shift between 2011 and 2015 reflects their similarity in messaging. The shared small prevalence in category 3 results suggests an emphasis on having a “sturdy hand” that requires less emphasis on the severity of threats. The minor increase is largely attributed to the added inclusion of “homegrown terrorists”. It is worth noting that the terrorist attack on Parliament had happened between the two elections. The even smaller increase in 2019 suggests a maintenance of the core protectionist messages. This is evidenced by the general consistency in the targets but with the added flavor of stopping Trudeau’s “attacks” on industries or institutions (2019: 20).

Table 26b Conservative Protectionism sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	altogether
Foreign threat	5	8	4	56.67%
Conscious actor	2	4	2	26.67%

Looking at the results in Table 26b, we can see a clear dominance of the number of described foreign threats and conscious actors behind them in 2015. In this electoral year we see a 3 sections increase in the description of foreign threats and a 2 sections increase in the description of a conscious actor. This is likely the result of the slightly stronger emphasis on stability seen in the 2015 manifesto. Not only are more threats invoked in order to describe Canada's already existing resilience to them but the greater emphasis on direct attacks on Canada, such as homegrown terrorists allowed for a greater prevalence of conscious actors. The reversal of this trend in 2019 is likely the result of the electoral defeat in 2015. The description of threats now notably matches the number of category 2 and 3 scale results, suggesting that threats are not invoked other than to provide a substantive critique of the Liberal Party's handling of these threats. The similar reduction in described conscious actors further suggests that less emphasis has been placed on direct aggression towards Canada, allowing for a greater focus on the issues facing Canadians being based of the failures of the current administration.

The threats themselves in 2011 are composed of foreign criminals, illegal immigration, terrorism, global markets, and, most frequently, the global recession. In 2015, there is a much stronger emphasis on global markets as well as the addition of corporate data mining and foreign radical influence on Canadians. In 2019, cybercrime and climate disasters are added. Measures proposed to combat them include investment in green energy in collaboration with the United States, as well as the tightening of the borders and tax reduction for Canadian industries in 2011.

In 2015, they include the addition of standardized funding of government programs, review of the privacy act, categorizing of non-resident ownership and tariffs, harsher punishments and travel bans for criminals, and investment in agricultural transport infrastructure. Finally, in 2019, they primarily include budget balancing, frequent review of foreign economic ownership, and the retrofitting of energy and agricultural technology.

The actors behind these threats in 2011 include foreign criminals, terror states, and foreign agricultural business interests. In 2015, they additionally include foreign nonresidents and large, multinational corporations. Finally, in 2019, this stays consistent but with a smaller general prevalence. The nature of these threats is split the same way across all 3 electoral years. Economic threats comprise over half the results with the remaining sections being even split between security and social. This pattern is in line with the previously observed focuses.

5.9 Conservative usage of simplicity

The three examined Conservative Party manifestos all place a heavy emphasis on the duplicity of their opponents. As a result, there is often drastic language surrounding hypocrisy, political opportunism, and corruption. Based on the observation of these elements in previous sections we can surmise that the use of simplicity will also be a heavy feature in all or most of the Conservative manifestos. In addition, we can surmise that there will be an increase in its overall use similar to the previous sections due to the previously observed prevalence of criticizing Justin Trudeau as corrupt and “not as advertised”.

Table 27a Conservative simplicity results

Intensity Scale	2011	2015	2019	altogether
1	3	2	2	23.33%
2	2	7	5	46.67%
3	5	1	3	30.00%

The results found in Table 27a are somewhat anomalous with the previously observed statistics. In 2011 we see strongly positively leaning results with a clear mode of category 3 scale results. This prevalence can be easily accounted for with the recurrent use of the “unnecessary and opportunistic election” talking point. A firm majority of the policy section in the 2011 manifesto describe the rejection of the budget or policy plan the Conservatives had proposed by the Liberals and the NDP and the subsequent loss the people were receiving as a result of the holdup. This allowed for the frequent use of strong simplicity-based statements which stated that the other parties valued their own political power over the wellbeing of the people and that they were abandoning the people in their time of need. The subsequent 4 sections decline in category 3 results seen in 2015 is the result of an absence of this talking point, however the firm 5 sections increase in category 2 scale results suggest that the general message of the Conservative Party being “there for the people” was maintained. This is evidenced by the frequent references to the Conservative policies that were “working” and the frequent use of quotations from citizens describing how they were helped by the Conservative policies. This overall change also falls in line with the increase in people centrism seen in Table 21a of the same year. The 2 sections increase in category 3 scale results demonstrates the maintenance of this strategy as the manifesto continues to emphasize the failures of Justin Trudeau's government based on neglect and corruption.

Table 27b Conservative Simplicity sub-elements

Sub element	2011	2015	2019	altogether
Common sense	7	7	8	73.33%
Hypocrisy	9	5	6	66.67%
Easiness	5	6	5	53.33%
Corruption	5	1	3	30.00%

Looking at the results in Table 27b, we see a general consistency in many of the sub-elements across all three electoral years. Appeals to common sense remain at 7 sections across the first two electoral years with a slight increase in 2019. These appeals primarily surround the need for stability and the lack of a need for the snap election, they also notably surround military spending, aid to seniors, and helping job creation. In 2015, these are replaced with Canadian resource industry development, economic opportunism for indigenous people, standing up to foreign aggression, permanent funding of cultural intuitions, rural economy investment, and the need for innovation over regulation. In 2019, they include greater accountability for leaders, more budget discipline, updating of medical tech, parity in government services between communities, and the promotion of Canadian values internationally. This is consistent with the overall messaging of all three manifestos of the Conservatives being the only logical choice in light of the bad faith actions of their opponents.

We see a 9 sections prevalence in the use of claims made of hypocrisy against political opponent. There is a 4 sections decrease in 2015 followed by a subsequent 2 sections increase in 2019. This is consistent with the loss of the “opportunistic election” talking point in 2015 and the subsequent loss of federal office. The claims themselves in 2011 are comprised largely of noting the opposing parties stated concern for various Canadian populations while highlighting that they have interrupted their services with the snap election. They also notably include their positions on senate reform. In 2015, they are instead comprised of the feasibility of altering the electoral system, the Liberal's healthcare funding cuts, strength of support surrounding the promotion of Canadian liberal values, concern for overall stability, and allegiance to Canada's rural economy. In 2019, they are based around aid for the middle class, adaptation to changing art landscape,

claiming on helping the poor while raising their taxes, concern for rural Canadians, and Justin Trudeau's treatment of Canadian corporate interests.

The stressing of the easiness of enacting the proposed policy stays consistent at 5 sections with only a slight increase in 2015. This suggests a general consistency in the way policies are proposed with the greater variance occurring in the description of the opposing party's policy ideas.

Finally, assertions of corruption rise and fall in accordance with the prevalence of category 3 scale results. The nature of this corruption in 2011 is comprised largely of illegitimate power grabs as well as self-enrichment. In 2015, we see a reduction in claims of power grabs, with a general prominence of self-enrichment. In 2019, they are largely composed of accusations of quid pro quo dealings, self-enrichment and federal power consolidation.

5.10 Overall prominence of Conservative left/right key terms

According to **Hypothesis 2**, The conservative manifestos should consistently exhibit a greater prominence of right-wing style populism across all 3 electoral manifestos. As we have observed in previous sections, the overall use of key terms should be in line with this Hypothesis. However, due to the increase in left-wing targets such as large corporations or the wealthiest 1 percent that was observed in 2019, it is likely that we should see a slightly more even distribution of left- and right-wing keywords in the manifesto of that year.

Table 28 Conservative predominance of left- or right-wing key terms by year

Left/right	2011	2015	2019	Altogether
Left	5.71%	5.29%	20.00%	10.00%
Right	51.43%	54.30%	52.60%	52.86%
Neutral	42.86%	40.41%	23.40%	37.14%

Looking at the results in Table 28, we see a drastic ratio between right and left-wing populist key words and phrases most predominantly used in each policy section. In the manifestos for the first two electoral years, we see an approximate 10 to 1 ratio favoring right-wing key terms. This is, of course, in line with the overall right-wing orientation of the Conservative Party as well as what we have observed in the targets of populist rhetoric seen in the previous sections. The changes between the 2011 and 2015 manifestos show a slight increase in the ratio but are overall features only a 2.7% increase in right-wing key terms and a decrease of 0.42% in left-wing terms. This lack of change suggests a firm consistency in the language used between the two manifestos despite the drop off in the rhetorical intensity of many populist elements as observed in the previous sections. This trend reverses somewhat in the 2019 manifesto with a shrinking of the ratio, including a 1.44% drop in right-wing key terms and a 14.71% increase in the prevalence of left-wing terms. This abrupt change in contrast to the consistency of the last two manifestos is, of course, likely the result of the shift in leadership and incumbency status of the party, as well as the aforementioned emphasis on Justin Trudeau's corporate scandals. This is evidenced by the increased mentions of corporate tax cuts and the reigning in thereof that was needed. Furthermore, a greater emphasis is placed within the manifesto on helping people to “get ahead” with a stronger emphasis on poverty relief programs that were largely absent in the first two manifestos. It is also worth noting that many of the contemporary populists, such as those in the United States at the time, had begun to implement some degree of left-wing populism into their messaging. One notable example being the emphasis on reigning in outsourcing that was used heavily by presidential candidate Donald Trump. Overall, while right wing populism dominated the manifestos across all 3 years as predicted, ultimately, left-wing populism had the largest overall increase across all 3 years.

5.11. Conclusions

In contrast to the two previously examined parties' manifestos, the Conservative Party's use of populism and its sub-elements progressed in a very sporadic way. The first two electoral years featured comparatively lighter overall use of populist language and rhetoric with a heavy emphasis placed on the virtues of the long running Harper government and the need to maintain this stable leadership whose policy strategies were "working" to keep Canada secure and prosperous through hard times. Featured populist rhetoric frequently framed the political opposition as opportunistic and power hungry, with little regard for the people they were hoping to represent. This pattern manifested in a heavy use of people centrism and protectionism with a comparative deficiency in other sub-elements such as antagonistic re-politicization and anti-institutionalism. Drastic changes to this strategy occurred in 2019 with a high pickup in the overall use of populism and many of its sub elements, appearing to be the result of the change in leadership and new position as the official opposition. Justin Trudeau was placed firmly in the role of a power abusing self-interested leader and billed as the source of most of Canada's problems. This new strategy took advantage of many of Trudeau's failings and scandals and appeared to leak even into the ratio of left- vs right-wing populism used as 2019 saw a drastic increase in left-wing key terms and targets while still generally maintaining right-wing ones. In general, it appears as if the Conservative Party sought to fully rebrand itself as a more rebellious and compassionate opposition party once it found itself on the other side of the aisle.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions

The results summarised in the previous three chapters have provided a variety of insights into the relative prevalence, composition, and range of left- and right-wing style populism in each of the observed parties' manifestos over the last three elections. Many of the results, such as the relative prominence left and right populism for each of the parties, supported the two hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. Other results, particularly regarding the progression of the general use of some of the sub-elements, instead progressed in an entirely different direction from the predicted linear positive direction across the three examined electoral years. Overall, I believe the observations made in this study make contribute to the emerging field of research of populism within the context of both Canadian and global politics in the timeline between the beginning and end of the 2010s. In this chapter, I will be discussing these results by first examining the specifics of the populism's framework as used in all of the examined manifestos. This will include the ideological framework within which the populism of the manifestos operates as well as the most commonly invoked populist talking points by each party. I will then relate the results to the hypotheses formulated based on the pre-existing literature on the topic. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of the study as well as options and ideas for further research on this topic.

6.1 Framing populism within the context of electoral manifestos

6.1.1 Results pertaining to the overall description of "the status quo"

The results suggest a gradual increase in the use of populist rhetoric by all three parties. However, they differ in some ways from what has been observed in other cases. Based on my analysis of the content of each manifesto, the differing positions of each party on the political

spectrum had some effect on, not only the relative frequency of left- and right-wing populism in each parties' manifestos, but also the manner in which each style was utilised. However, all three parties largely exhibited similar restraints in their populist rhetoric and language in a broader sense. The first major restriction in this framework concerns the perceived legitimacy of the current political "status quo" by the three parties. As demonstrated in the literature, many populist political actors will question the legitimacy or functionality of the system by which the state is governed and therefore demand radical changes thereof, such as Bernie Sander and Donald trump questioning the efficacy of the American electoral system. (Mudde, 2017; Brubaker, 2017; Nardiz, 2018). These rhetorical elements are largely absent from the manifestos of all three examined parties, which feature a much bigger emphasis on intimating that the "status quo" is the result of the machinations of other political parties. The Liberal Party manifestos make several references to "making Ottawa work for everyone" and "making sure your vote matters" (2015: 23) but they regularly describe these concepts in the form of rectifying the damage done by the previous long running Conservative government. These suggestions include reversing their long-standing taxation or trade policies, or "modernising and updating" pre-existing electoral institutions such as the senate and the first-past-the-post voting system, which the Conservatives have "failed to do" or "abused" (2015: 30). Also seen in Chapter 4, the party dropped the latter reform proposal in 2019 and overall made lesser use of both antagonistic re-politicization and anti-institutionalism in the corresponding manifesto than those of the other parties that year. This might indicate that the party is not consistently moving towards strong core governance reforms, even when in power.

The Conservative Party largely advocated changes to the system with a similar framework to the Liberals. While the first two Conservative manifestos emphasised stability and

“maintaining the course” in the face of various global crises, many of the proposed governance reforms were the same as those proposed by the Liberals and NDP in their manifestos (2011: 1). This most notably included the assertion that “If the senate cannot be reformed it should be abolished” (2015: 153). One uniquely Conservative variation on the reform-based populist framework was the attempt to shift the economic status quo of Canada in a more neoliberal direction (Ives, 2015). This included the strong advocacy for the abolition of some regulatory institutions, such as the long gun registry, and advancing the idea of a need to universally cut “red tape” for business, such as the promise to cut two regulations for every new one implemented (2019: 19). Finally, the NDP manifestos, whose party could be considered the furthest from the “political status quo” due to it being a newer party that has yet to hold federal office, does not veer particularly far away from the framing of the other parties. Generally, their manifestos did most intensely advocate change to both the bureaucratic and electoral systems of Canada’s government. Examples of this include the consistent advocacy for policies such as universal pharma care and the unconditional abolition of the senate. However, the framing of these proposals remains similar to the other parties’ manifestos. The appeals frequently describe the “failures” of successive Liberal and Conservative governments (2019: 2) while making few references to a truly “rigged system” or a “corrupt bureaucracy”. These elements have been demonstrated to appear in more radically populist elements of Canadas political sphere, such as “Ford Nation” and the People’s Party of Canada (Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Brubaker, 2017; Adams, 2017). The similarity of the rhetorical framework for all three parties suggests that the manifestos of the major parties have a baseline of inhibition towards aggressive rhetoric targeting both their opponents and Canada’s governmental system, at least in regard to written manifestos.

6.1.2 Results pertaining to the rhetorical populist-sub elements.

Both the people centric virtuous depictions of the Canadian people and the described out-groups with whom they are contrasted also fell within a limited range across the manifestos of all three political parties. While the intensity of people centrism was quite prevalent for all three parties, the variety of virtues associated with the Canadian people were largely composed of simple general descriptors. These prominent qualities included hard work, community, diversity, and compassion. One anti-elitist talking point that was frequently employed when describing the Canadian people was the notion that the “elites” are taking advantage of both their hard work and generosity and denying them the fruit of their labor that they deserve. One phrase frequently used by all three parties suggested the elite’s benefit by exploiting the labour of “hard-working Canadians” (Conservative Party of Canada, 2019: 20), either through unfair taxation or exploitative wages and weak benefits. While the proportionate selection of left- or right-wing targets for these rhetorical attacks varied between parties, all three made extensive use of both (Liberal Party of Canada, 2015: 5; NDP, 2019: 26).

A similar pattern can be observed in the identification of out groups, which applied to both majoritarianism and protectionism. Unlike more aggressive forms of populism observed in the rhetoric of mainstream foreign parties, such as those in the US or France (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Ivaldi et al., 2017), hostility towards outgroups was rarely directed at foreigners. Comparisons of Canada and its population to other states were predominantly other G7 states with very little in the way of hostility towards them. In contrast to the more isolationist stance towards foreign states exhibited by other populist actors, such as those in the UK and Australia, (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Freedman, 2017), the rhetoric surrounding other states was rarely, if ever, oppositional. Both the Liberals and Conservatives

even frequently criticized each other for not having conducted sufficient trade diplomacy with states such as China and India (Liberal Party of Canada, 2015: 67). One partial exception to this trend was the rhetoric surrounding the United States. While the importance of good relations was still often stressed in many of the manifestos, all three parties displayed instances of promising to stay ahead of them in policy goals such as emission standards or interest rates over their southern neighbors (Liberal Party of Canada, 2011 :80). Terrorism and immigration were also challenged from a relatively noncombative perspective. While the Conservatives criticized Canada's immigration system to a significantly greater degree than the other two parties, there was little to no proposals to cut general immigration numbers. The manifestos instead proposed crackdowns on "crooked immigration" (2011: 34). Terrorism was also rarely given a specific national identity with few references to terror states or foreign sponsorship thereof. These trends suggest that the mainstream parties still continue to rhetorically invoke cultural values, such as multiculturalism and compassion to foreign states and populations in need, as tenants of Canadian culture (Ives, 2015). In general, the outgroups described antagonistically often took the forms of the elites themselves, particularly with the Conservative and NDP manifestos. The identity thereof was largely dominated by foreign and local big businesses and the opposing leader's "rich friends" (NDP, 2011: 1), as well as a power-hungry political class (Conservative Party of Canada, 2019: 1). While the NDP and Liberals generally favoured the latter and the Conservatives favoured the former, all three parties used both quite consistently. This could likely be attributed to Canada's more economically left-wing zeitgeist, as compared to some of its contemporary states such as the US, as well as a reaction to the increasing centralization of power in the hands of the Prime minister and cabinet as outlined in theories of Canada's "court government" political system (Savoie, 1999).

The comparative prevalence of some of the rhetorical populist sub-element also followed a similar pattern across all three parties' manifestos. The strong prevalence of people centrism across nearly all nine seemingly indicates that appeals to patriotism and the shared Canadian identity are a reliably used strategy in Canadian political manifestos. The least two prevalent sub-elements were, of course, anti-institutionalism and majoritarianism. Many instances of anti-institutionalism and antagonistic re-politicisation found in the manifestos criticized the function of the state's institutions on the grounds of inefficiency or even not sufficiently extending their services to some communities or populations (NDP, 2011: 5; Liberal Party of Canada, 2015: 8; Conservative Party of Canada, 2019: 13). While the Conservatives more frequently made calls to abolish entire institutions, even they rarely advocated for the abolition of an institution without offering some form of replacement (2019: 53). The only institutions that were consistently attacked by all three parties were the senate and first-past-the-post electoral system. Even then, these institutions were only consistently marked for abolition across all three electoral years by the NDP, with the Liberals criticizing them the least.

The comparative rarity of majoritarianism suggests that the major parties are still firmly embracing the Canadian value of multiculturalism. Criticisms of special rights or privileges are almost nonexistent regarding discussion of sociocultural minorities. Even the Conservatives advanced that minority groups such as First Nations and francophones have been insufficiently aided by the federal government (2019: 60). The most aggressively advanced anti-minority sentiment by any of the parties, outside of wealth-based minority groups, was the advocacy for curtailing the percentage of real estate owned by foreign absentee landlords and business interests. However, Harper's controversial niqab ban was also included albeit by mentioning his specific policy proposal of requiring the face to be visible for citizenship pictures without

directly addressing the garment (2015: 152). While protectionism was more prevalent than both previously examined sub-elements, it displayed a relative deficiency in category 3 scale results compared to many of the other elements in most of the manifestos. This idea reinforces these conclusions as it demonstrates a softer framing of foreign threats than is seen in other political contexts. In general, these results appear to indicate that the more radical populist elements observed in other state's political rhetoric such as outright xenophobia, as seen with the firmly anti-immigrant and multiculturalism ideals seen in movements such as Brexit, or the reimagining of a state's entire bureaucratic function have at least not yet entered the Canadian political sphere to the point of being used in the manifestos of mainstream parties. However, it is worth noting that at this level of political communication, it is difficult to ascertain the amount to which these elements may have been integrated into the general political sphere. The format of a policy manifesto requires general appeal and is therefore less likely to include rhetoric and language that is particularly radical or contains targeted appeal to specific groups than other forms of communication, such as campaign speeches and election debates. These formats often also make more extensive use of simplicity, which, while used in the manifestos, was often accompanied by more detailed policy outlines.

6.2 Results compared to the literature

6.2.1 Comparisons of literature as pertaining to the hypotheses

Two hypotheses were advanced at the beginning of this study. **Hypothesis 1** stated that the overall of populist language and rhetoric would increase in all three parties over the course of the three electoral years examined. The second hypothesis stated that the Conservative Party's manifestos would exhibit a greater proportion of right-wing populist rhetoric and language while those of the Liberals and the NDP would exhibit a greater proportion of left-wing populist

language and rhetoric. **Hypothesis 1** was based primarily on the literature surrounding the diffusion of populist sentiment and mobilisation throughout the western political world, including its effect on the Canadian political sphere (Brubaker, 2017; Snow and Moffit, 2012; Silver and Figueroa, 2019; Adams, 2017). Additionally, these populist sentiments were hypothesised to have been organically propelled by preceding political upheavals such as the 2008 global financial crisis (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Altman, 2009). Based on how these developments have already altered the political landscape for many of Canada's contemporary states, as well as select parts of Canadian political discourse, it follows that a greater significance of populism should be felt with each passing electoral year. While the results did demonstrate an overall increase in the use of populist rhetoric and language for all three parties from 2011 to 2019, they did not fully conform to this literature-based hypothesis. Specifically, only the NDP results displayed a linear positive relationship across all three electoral years with an overall increase in both 2015 and 2019. Furthermore, an increasingly important element in the rhetoric did include references to both the Liberals and Conservatives having failed to provide for the people in hard times, including the financial crash of previous years. However, as stated above, the Conservative Party manifestos exhibited comparatively low amounts of overall populism in both 2011 and 2015. The sharp uptick of populism's usage in 2019 does correlate with the previous success of populist efforts globally after 2015, such as the election of Donald Trump and the success of Brexit. However, as established earlier, other probable factors also may have contributed to this increase. These include the change in party's leadership and its new position as the opposition party. One relation to the literature that is in line with the results is the effect of the Great Recession on political discourse. The 2011 and 2015 Conservative manifestos consistently

invoked the event as both a populist and “anti populist” strategy. The texts both stress the need for stable and predictable leadership while heavily using people centric appeals such as Canadian resilience in facing it, as well as criticize the opposition as power hungry political opportunists (2011: 2). The Liberal Party appears to be the least effected by outside circumstances, having the smallest overall percentage of category 3 scale results and the smallest overall changes between electoral years. While the 2019 manifesto’s overall populism results are still higher than that of 2011, their results represent a decline from 2015. Their decrease in use of populist rhetoric, along with an increase in its use by both opposing parties, appears to demonstrate what was outlined in Birch’s study of Trudeau’s administration. In essence, their failure to keep some of their more ambitious promises lead to a decline in ambitious populist proposals while giving their opposition a greater opportunity for populist critique of their government (Birch, 2019).

Hypothesis 2 was more decisively confirmed by the results. The Conservative manifestos featured a strong dominance of right-wing over left-wing populism in all three years with the one anomaly being the sharp increase of left-wing style populism in 2019. The idea of “market populism” taking hold in the party as outline by Sawyer and Laycock was also largely supported by the results as many of the right-wing talking points, even in 2019, emphasised “cutting red tape” and “giving Canadian businesses freedom” (2009). As predicted, the NDP had a greater proportion of left- vs right-wing talking points with the Liberals at a distant second. The Liberals even had a very narrow proportion of left and right-wing populist rhetoric in 2015. This is possibly reflective of foreign style right-wing influence on both the Conservatives and the Liberals. Overall, however, the results more or less matched the political orientation of each party with the NDP furthest left, the Conservatives furthest right, and the Liberals in the middle.

6.2.2 Comparisons of results to historical populist literature

As demonstrated in the literature surrounding the historical development of populism in Canada, both the modern Conservative Party and the NDP were formed from pre-existing populist movements and parties (Jenson and Papillion, 1998; Brym, 1978; Macgregor, 2018). The NDP, having been founded directly as a federal version of a regional left populist party with a well-known populist leader, could be considered the closest of the three parties to being “fully” populist (Jenson and Papillion, 1998; Laycock, 2019; Macgregor, 2018). By contrast, the Conservative Party was formed by the merging of the right populist Reform party and the more mainstream Progressive Conservatives (Bélanger and Godbout, 2010). As a result, it could be hypothesised that some amount of “residual” populism should exist in their messaging and therefore a greater overall prevalence compared to the Liberals. As the NDP has the largest overall prevalence of populism in all three electoral years with a sharp increase in category 3 scale results from 2011 to 2019, the results appear to concur with this idea. The Conservatives, on the other hand, do not display an overall positive trend across the years in general populism compared to their Liberal counterparts. This is demonstrated by similar levels of populist rhetoric across all three electoral years. While their results in 2011 are identical in each of the three categories, they have drastically more category 1 scale results than the Liberals in 2015 with only a 1 section overall increase in category 3 scale results. The increase in both 2 and 3 scale results in 2019 would indicate that the messaging was changed based more on the change in leadership and party position than a natural forwards progressive development. These results, as well as the pattern of both the Liberals and the Conservatives using greater degrees of populism when not in office, appears to concur with the historical literatures description of Canadian populism. Specifically, this style might be considered an “anti Ottawa” approach to politics, where the central rule of the federal government is challenged (Laycock, 2019; Rotstein, 1976; Brym,

1978). In essence, it is easier to criticize Ottawa when you are not in power. These comparative results appear to indicate that, while foreign populist ideas may indeed strengthen the prevalence of populist rhetoric and language in the mainstream parties, the overall basis of Canadian populism by party has been relatively unchanged. This is demonstrated by the more regionalist, socially progressive and parliamentary style of populism of much of the populism found in the texts as opposed to a more isolationist, or socially regressive style that is observed in many foreign states.

6.3 Limitations and implications for further research

The primary aim of this study was to identify the elements of left-and right-wing populist rhetoric and language that had begun to be employed in the general Canadian political sphere in light of the growing international diffusion of populism. The results suggest that many left and right populist elements are indeed significantly present in the electoral manifestos of the three parties and have increased in their prevalence over time. However, many of them seem to have been the results of factors originating from Canada itself. Despite these results, the methodological framework of this study has several limitations in its ability to gauge populism's overall impact in Canada. Firstly, this study focused only on the three primary parties in Canada. While this allowed for easy comparison between texts, it also limited the scope by studying the three parties that were least likely to employ more radical or out of the box populist policy ideas. Furthermore, while the choice of using electoral manifestos for the content analysis was useful in that each text would be created in a similar political context and with a similar format by each party, it also limited the range of populist talking points and rhetorical arenas. Electoral manifestos are, by definition, meant to communicate a political message to the entire electorate. Therefore, greater use of populist sub-elements, such as majoritarianism or anti-elitism, are less

likely to be exhibited for fear of alienating certain demographics (Rooduijn et al., 2014).

Stronger populist language is also more likely to be employed in more targeted forms of political communication, such as campaign speeches and political ads, as the message can be more directly catered to a community or demographic (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Bernhard et al., 2015). Furthermore, manifestos are often written with the primary goal of detailing policy proposals and goals and are, therefore, more likely to be information focused rather than rhetorically focused.

Despite these limitations, this study may provide a foundation for further investigation into populism's importance to modern Canadian politics. The choice examined manifestos could be extended by both party and electoral year. This could include examining manifestos of more radical federal, or even regional, parties, such as the People's Party of Canada, in order to determine whether they employ a similar populist rhetorical framework as that employed by the major parties. Another possible avenue of research would be to extend the study to earlier or even future electoral years in order to gauge whether similar populist element were already present in previous elections or if 2011 itself marks a notable increase from previous years. Studying subsequent electoral manifestos could reveal whether the observed trends continue in an upwards direction, particularly regarding the Conservative manifestos in light of their most recent shift in leadership. A final possible direction would be to utilise a similar methodology in the same timeframe with the same parties while shifting the units of analysis to another form of political communication, such as speeches or political ads. This would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the overall amount and style of populist rhetoric and language during those elections. While this study may provide a steppingstone towards a better understanding of populism in Canada there remains a lot more to be done.

Appendix 1: Codex of Key Terms and Qualitative Questions

1.1 Examined policy sections:

Cultural/language policy

Agricultural/ resource economy

Taxation policy

Indigenous relations

Environmental policy

Governance Reform

Introduction

Foreign policy/National security

Healthcare policy

Poverty relief

1.2 Questions for qualitative portion

People centrism:

Does the article evoke the Canadian people as a whole, implicitly or explicitly? (variable true/false)

Are the people described in a monolithic fashion such as a shared opinion or understanding? (variable true/false)

Are the people portrayed in a positive and virtuous light, such as a described shared virtue or talent? (variable true /false)

If so, what are the shared qualities? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Are the people being contrasted with an outsider group, such as a different nationality or a socioeconomic minority? (variable true /false)

If so, who is the outsider group? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the passage contain right- or left-wing people centrism keywords? (variable left/right/neither)

What is the intensity of the people centrism within the article? (ordinal 1 -3)

Intensity scale:

- 1: Nonexistent people centrism/simple reference to Canadian/ sub community
- 2: Containing an emotional appeal towards a reference of a shared virtue/ deserved service
- 3: Portrayal of the people in a conflict with a morally inferior outsider group

Anti elitism:

Does the article specifically mention the elites or the well connected? (variable true /false)

Are a group of people otherwise described as disproportionately powerful or catered to by the political status quo? (variable true /false)

If so, who are portrayed as being the elites? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Are the elites described from a sociopolitical or socioeconomic perspective? (variable left/ right)

Does the article contain left- or right-wing anti-elitist keywords? (variable left /right/neither)

Is a group being specifically favoured over the elite in a described virtue or prioritization of policy by the sections rhetoric? (variable true /false)

If so, what group? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Are the elites described in association with an opposing political party or leader? (variable true/false)

What is the intensity of the anti-elitist message? (ordinal 1 -3)

Intensity scale:

- 1: Nonexistent/passing reference to elites or wealthy
- 2: Advocacy for enfranchising the people equal to or above the elite
- 3: Direct condemnation or call for the disenfranchisement of the elites

Antagonistic re-politicization:

Does the article describe a long-standing political practice and suggest that it is costly, unnecessary, unfair, or otherwise harmful to the Canadian people? (variable true/false)

If so, what practice? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article suggest an immediate reform or abolition of the practice? (variable true/false)

Is a political motivation by an opposing political faction or outsider group alleged for the perpetuation of the practice? (variable true/false)

If so, what is the motivation? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the proposed change require a constitutional or international practice change? (variable true/false)

Does the article contain Antagonistic re-politicization based left- or right-wing keywords? (variable left/right /neither)

What is the intensity of the antagonistic re-politicization in the article? (ordinal, 1-3)

Intensity scale:

- 1: Nonexistent/ reference to long running nature of a problematic policy
- 2: Direct reference to the sidelining of the issue or acceptance of a policy
- 3: Condemnation of the policy or issue based on corruption or foul play as its source

Majoritarianism:

Is a minority population described implicitly or explicitly in opposition or contrast to the majority? (variable true / false)

What is the minority population in question? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Is a disproportionate amount of privilege or attention based on the small percentage of the population suggested or emphasized in the article? (variable true/false)

Is the minority population described as unfairly catered to by the political establishment through economic or policy-based benefits? (variable true /false)

Does the article contain left- or right-wing majoritarian keywords? (variable left /right/neither)

Does the article explicitly suggest siding with the majority over the minority? (variable true/false)

What is the intensity of the majoritarian message? (ordinal, 1-3)

Intensity scale:

- 1: Nonexistent/passing references to a population's small numbers
- 2: Emphasis of a disproportionate amount of privilege/influence possessed by the population
- 3: A call for the disenfranchisement or persecution of the population

Anti-institutionalism:

Does the article criticize the usefulness or functionality of one of the state's institutions rather than the way they have been managed by opposing parties or previous administrations? (variable true/false)

If so, which institutions are being criticized? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article propose a core reform to the institutions that would require a referendum or

constitutional amendment? (variable, true/false)

Does the article call for an abolition or replacement of an electoral or governmental institution? (variable true/false)

If so, what institution? (open question, re-code as necessary)

If so, what are the grounds for its abolition or replacement? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article suggest implicitly or explicitly that the institutions in question do not exist for the peoples benefit? (variable, true/false)

If so, who are they described as serving? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article contain left or right wing anti institutional keywords? (variable left/right/neither)

What is the intensity of the anti institutional message? (ordinal, 1-3)

Intensity scale:

1: Nonexistent/critique of an institutions function

2: Demands for strong reform to the institution or its practices

3: Proposal to abolish the institution or replace it with a similar institution

Protectionism:

Does the article describe a foreign threat to Canadians in any capacity? (variable, true /false)

What is the described source of the threat? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Is the threat sociological, military, or economic in nature? (categorical: social, economic, military)

Is the source of the threat a conscious actor as opposed to an event such as a natural disaster or economic downturn? (variable, true /false)

If so, who is the described actor? (open question, re-code as necessary)

What measure is being proposed to combat the threat? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article contain left- or right-wing protectionist keywords? (variable left/right/neither)

What is the intensity of the protectionist message? (ordinal 1-3)

Intensity scale:

1: Nonexistent/ reinforcement of existing security measures

2: Strong emphasis of threat, promises of increase in resources to combat it

3: Implication or statement of the opposition's softness or even allegiance with threat

Simplicity:

Does the article contain an explicit or implicit appeal to common sense, such as the necessity to implement a popular policy immediately or the suggestion of only one solution being feasible to address a political issue? (variable, true /false)

If so, what is the policy subject or debate surrounding the appeal? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article make an implicit or explicit claim of hypocrisy by opposing political actors, such as an opposition to a policy while benefiting from its existence or criticizing a decision, opposing a practice while privately indulging in it, or critiquing a policy advanced by an opposing administration and later failing to alter it or implementing similar legislation? (variable true/false)

If so, what is the subject surrounding the hypocrisy? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article stress the easiness of its proposed policy such as a promise to enact it on day one? (variable true or false)

Does the article imply corruption, such as personal enrichment, quid pro quo dealings with outside actors, or the covering up of illegal or unethical actions, as the source of a policy delay or veto? (variable true/false)

If so, what is the nature of the opposing actor's corruption? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the article contain left- or right-wing simplicity-based populist keywords? (variable left/right/neither)

How prevalent is the use of simplicity in the article? (ordinal 1-3)

Intensity scale:

1: Nonexistent /use of day one language

2: Strong emphasis on the simplicity or easiness of enacting a policy / claims made of hypocrisy towards opponents

3: Implication or statement of opposition failing to enact policy due to corruption

Sample Holistic questions:

What is the central policy change or addition to the system of (relevant policy section)? (open question, re-code as necessary)

Does the section explicitly or explicitly suggest that the existing issues are intrinsic to Canada's political system? (variable, true/false)

Does the section use evocative or simplistic language such as destroying or whipping the system into place? (variable, true /false)

If so, which terms are used? (open question, re-code as necessary)

In light of the findings above, what is the overall populist intensity of this case? (ordinal,1-3)

Intensity scale:

1: Nonexistent

2: Some significant use of populist tropes

3: Very strong use of populist tropes (i.e.) populist tropes are some of most important rhetorical characteristics of the section

(Populist tropes include aforementioned 7 elements, conflation of opposing parties and the elite, claims of embodying the will of the people, and the value of the people's "common knowledge" and opinion over the "expertise" of the elite)

1.3 Key Terms

People centrism:

Allowing provinces (right)

Canadians agree (neutral)

Canadians cherish (neutral)

Canadians deserve (left)

Canadians first (right)

Canadians know/understand (neutral)

Every Canadian (neutral)

Everyday people (neutral)

Hard working families (neutral)

Input from Canadians (left)

Law-abiding Canadians (right)

Listen to Canadians (neutral)

Made in Canada (left)

Marginalized (left)

More of what they earn (right)

Net benefit to Canada (right)

No matter where you live (neutral)

Off /on the backs of hard-working Canadians (right)

One-size-fits-all (right)

Ordinary people (left)

Our country (neutral)
Our nation (right)
Own money (right)
Regardless of income (left)
Self determination (neutral)
Stand on guard (right)
The Canadian people (neutral)
The community (neutral)
This country is better than that (neutral)
Trusting Canadians (right)
Voluntary (neutral)
Vulnerable people (left)
Working people (left)

Anti Elitism:

Accountability (neutral)
Accountable to Canadians (neutral)
Autocratic /Autocrat(right)
Bay Street (left)
Big business (left)
Broken/hollow promises (neutral)
Broken system(neutral)
Conflict of interest (neutral)
Corporate giveaways (left)
Corporate interests (left)
Corporate tax cuts (left)
Corporate welfare(left)
Corruption (neutral)
Donors (left)
Healthy democracy (neutral)

Independent board (left)
Inequality (left)
Influencers (right)
Insiders (right)
Largest corporations (left)
Left behind /forgotten (left)
Most profitable corporations (left)
Neglect (left)
No consultation/ not consulting (left)
Not by accident (neutral)
Opportunistic election/ move (right)
Ottawa (down /centric etc.) (right)
Pad the bank accounts (neutral)
Partisan (Neutral)
Political games /scandals (neutral)
Political Insiders (right)
Politicians who let them get away with it (right)
Posing for pictures (neutral)
Quietly(neutral)
Raid (neutral)
Real job creators (Neutral)
Rich corporations (left)
Rich/wealthy friends (left)
Scandalous (neutral)
Speak for Canada (neutral)
Special deals (right)
Special interests (right)
Sweetheart deals (right)
The establishment (neutral)

The real criminals (left)

The richest (left)

The well connected (right)

Two-tier system (left)

Unaccountable (neutral)

Unfair influence (neutral)

Well connected friends (right)

Anti-institutionalism:

Abolish (right)

Central banks (left)

Community control(neutral)

Depoliticize (right)

Government paperwork (right)

Hiding behind (left)

Handouts (right)

Independent board (left)

Mega mergers (left)

Nonpartisan (neutral)

One stop shop (neutral)

Open government (neutral)

Patchwork (left)

Red tape (right)

Reduce politicization (neutral)

Redundant (right)

Reforming the (variable) system (variable)

Secretive (neutral)

Transparency (neutral)

Un-elected (neutral)

Unaccountable (neutral)

Undemocratic (neutral)

Wasteful (neutral)

(With) Taxpayer money (neutral)

Majoritarianism:

“Cultural sensitivity” (right)

Crooked immigration (right)

Disproportionate benefit (left)

Fortunate few (left)

Majority of Canadians/people (neutral)

Only x percent of Canadians (neutral)

Pick and choose (neutral)

Rights of criminals (right)

Special interests (right)

The richest one percent (left)

Will of the majority (neutral)

Antagonistic re-politicization:

Big money (left)

Canada was once ... (right)

Current system does not work (neutral)

Dragging their feet (left)

Far too long (neutral)

For decades(neutral)

For the longest time /forever (neutral)

For too long(neutral)

Get used to it (right)

Given up (neutral)

Old fashion hierarchy (left)

Successive governments (neutral)

The status quo (neutral)

Tinkered (neutral)

Your vote will count (neutral)

Protectionism:

Below /above the United States (right)

Buy local (left)

Canadian heritage (right)

Canadian sovereignty (neutral)

Canadian values (right)

Claw(ed)back (left)

Compete globally (left)

Competitive advantage (right)

Consumer rights (left)

Defend Canadian products (right)

Defend Canadians (neutral)

Foreign buyers/tax (left)

Foreign takeover (left)

Global average (neutral)

Global security threats (neutral)

Homegrown terrorists (right)

Outsourcing (left)

Protect Canadians (neutral)

Safeguard(neutral)

Soft on crime (right)

Taking advantage (right)

Temporary workers (right)

Traditions /traditional (right)

Unfair tariffs (right)

Vigilance (neutral)

Simplicity:

Get it done (neutral)
Actually (want, help, with etc.) (neutral)
Blocking necessary measures (neutral)
Common sense (neutral)
Day one (neutral)
Gut instinct (right)
Hypocrisy (neutral)
Immediate (neutral)
Not by accident (neutral)
On your side (neutral)
Real results (neutral)
Rigged (neutral)
Simple objective (neutral)
Simply put (neutral)
Working for you (neutral)
You can hold me to it (neutral)

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