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A WIDER ROAD:
A CASE STUDY OF A CHIEF EDUCATION OFFICER

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Abstract

A Wider Road: A Case Study of a Chief Education Officer

Chief Education Officers must understand and work within and beyond the complexities of their school systems. They must balance public policy functions with the administration of system business with the advancement of educational programs. They have responsibilities for forging and communicating shared values, goals, and meanings. CEOs work in dynamic, interactive contexts. The purpose of this study was to explore, through the investigation of a CEO in action, political and cultural aspects of leadership, their interconnections, and the personal lens through which a CEO filtered these aspects.

The study undertook the investigation of two critical incidents. One explored the development, among four school districts, of the shared delivery of special education services. A second examined the establishment of an alternate, church-affiliated school within a public education system. CEO leadership in these incidents revealed interrelated themes of practice. One was the development of shared vision, out of the CEO's personal vision in one case and out of a CEO group vision in the other. Also important was the CEO's knowledge of the contexts in which he worked, that is, groups, events, and relationships among groups and events, and his use of this contextual knowledge. In both incidents, the CEO used similar interpersonal processes to bring about satisfactory resolutions. Interwoven through these themes was the CEO's attention to political and cultural aspects of leadership.

Findings suggested that CEO leadership occurred within interactive contexts of internal and external forces which, at any given point, operated in supportive or constraintive ways. The study concluded that the concept of a personal aspect of leadership underlies a CEO's choices and ways in which political and cultural aspects were processed. The study supported the importance of context as part of what enabled the CEO to exercise leadership in the way he did during the incidents of the study.

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I especially want to thank my family, friends and colleagues for their endearing patience and understanding in anticipation of accomplishing this consuming project. They have celebrated with me the milestones along the way and shared in the joy of the project's completion.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to
my mother
Katherina (Tena) Fedrau Ens (1914-1992).

She taught me that I could.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Within the broad field of education, one leadership position in particular, that of the Chief Education Officer (CEO), is hierarchially placed to be prominent in directing the operation of the school system while simultaneously interfacing with public audiences on behalf of the school system. It is a position important to the internal workings and the external presentation of the school system. It is also a position that, within educational literature, has received limited attention (Boich, Farquhar, & Leithwood, 1989; Crowson, 1987; Crowson & Glass, 1991; Leithwood & Musella, 1991).

CEO Leadership as Interactive

The CEO is a "prime point of contact" (Firestone, 1989) between school system personnel and trustees, between the school system and other educational agencies, and between school system personnel and the community. As such, the majority of these contacts involve the CEO in interactions with others. The nature of these interactions is wide-ranging. On any given day, the CEO may interact with community groups during formal meetings for the purpose of providing or receiving information. The CEO may meet with a special interest group and engage in mutual attempts to persuade each other of the values of a particular point of view. The CEO may meet trustees or staff in office hallways and exchange social pleasantries or hear hints of dissatisfaction. CEO interactions with others are a continual part of the CEO's work life. As well as the face-to-face encounters, interactions involving the CEO can take the form of written communications with outside agencies seeking to negotiate a change to an agreement or telephone conversations with parents seeking to resolve a conflict between their child and administrators of the child's school. Interactions occur when media personnel arrange an interview with the CEO to question the progress of a school system initiative. Interactions, while not an end in themselves,

are a primary way through which the work of the school system is accomplished (Fullan, Park, & Williams, 1987).

This interactive nature of leadership opens the CEO to a variety of internal and external influences related to the direction of education. Within the school system, the CEO influences and is subject to influences from administrators, teachers, consultants, caretakers, and paraprofessionals. Each group has a keen, and different, interest in the education of students and the operation of the school system. At times, the work and advice of these groups complement each other; at other times, they seem at odds. Matters as diverse as curriculum development, facility maintenance, and technological innovation compete for the attention of, and the resources available to, the system. While the responsibility and accountability for deciding the direction of the system and the allocation of resources is shared among staff, it is the CEO who bears final responsibility.

One group that regularly interacts with the CEO and is a major source of influence on the CEO is the elected Board of Trustees, particularly the Board Chairperson (Allison, Allison, & McHenry, 1995). Board members, elected as representatives of the public to oversee the operation of school systems, exercise a legal responsibility for the direction of public school education. In concert with the CEO, trustees formulate policy and share accountability for the activities of the school system. There is a mutually-influencing process between the CEO and trustees. Trustees represent, and are subject to, the interests of community groups. They also receive information on system programs and activities through the CEO. The CEO and trustees are in direct and continual contact. The CEO must be responsive to the views of trustees just as each must be to the views of system educational staff. It is left to the CEO to represent each group to the other while maintaining the integrity of each.

The Contexts of CEO Leadership

The interactive nature of CEO leadership also reflects the contexts within which the CEO works. CEOs operate and are influenced by internal and external

environmental factors that they take into account in planning strategies and making decisions in response to a variety of uncertainties (Scheele, 1994; Wills & Peterson, 1992). Every aspect of the direction and operation of the system falls ultimately within the responsibility of the CEO. Although the work of the school system may be largely delegated to others, the CEO is involved in setting major directions and representing the system to others. The CEO must be concerned with the setting of, and adherence to, policies that guide and regulate the functioning of the system within provincial law. The CEO is responsible for the design and implementation of educational programs appropriate to the needs of all students. The CEO is accountable for the management of system finances, the provision and maintenance of facilities to support the delivery of education within the system, and the recruitment, professional development and supervision of staff. Within the school system setting, the CEO holds a pivotal position in terms of educational visibility and influence. Ultimately, the CEO is professionally responsible for the overall effectiveness and operation of the school system (Allison & Wells, 1989).

Beyond the immediate school system context of the CEO are other agencies that constitute a wider educational community to which the CEO is also connected. Here, too, are policies and practices that affect and are affected by the efforts of the CEO. There are professional peer organizations, other school systems, provincial departments of education, faculties of education, and parents', teachers' and trustees' associations organized beyond the local level. Each of these organizations has or seeks to have involvement in the educational processes of any particular school system. Their activities both constrain and support the work of the CEO within a single system. These organizations extend the context of CEO work to arenas beyond the jurisdiction of the school system itself.

There is also a wider community context to which the CEO must remain necessarily sensitive. There are many constituents interested in the decisions taken by the school system and the CEO is always in the public eye. The network of interactions, influences and effects of what happens in a school system spreads out into the wider community. Constituents as diverse as municipal governments,

businesses, churches, service clubs, non-profit organizations, and a host of individuals seek to gain access to and influence what happens in schools. Their purposes are stated as educational ones. Businesses wish to ensure that students are prepared for the realities of the work force. Churches are concerned about the ethics of school practices and the values taught in schools. Service clubs and non-profit organizations want to ensure that students develop broad social responsibilities. The CEO is often the person through whom these influences are filtered; the CEO is seen as a gate-keeper to the school system. Influences on the CEO from external sources such as these demand to be recognized for their legal, fiscal or social rights.

The Political Aspect of CEO Leadership

The attention that the CEO must pay to external pressures, the diverse concerns of multiple shareholders in education and the public nature of school system decisions and actions indicate the political nature of the leadership role in a school system (Boich et al., 1989; Konnert & Augenstein, 1990; Leithwood, 1995; Mintzberg, 1973). The CEO position in a public institution where governance is shared between the CEO and an elected board inevitably involves political activity. The political aspect is part of an "increasingly intricate and involved administrative environment" (Allison & Wells, 1989) that makes up the work world of the CEO. In the literature on school system CEOs, the political aspect is inherent in descriptions of the processes in which the CEO is engaged (Leithwood, 1995). The CEO negotiates among different interest groups, builds consensus among varied stakeholders, facilitates problem solving and decision making, establishes coalitions for support, seeks ways to reconcile competing views and strives to reach agreements on allocations of resources (Cuban, 1976; Musella, 1992).

The Cultural Aspect of CEO Leadership

The political aspect is inextricably part of the primary focus of the CEO's job, that of directing and ensuring the quality of education for a school system. However, the politics of guiding decision making and negotiating among differing interests is not

the only factor in the leadership of a school system. Another contributor to the complexity of CEOs' work contexts has to do with the cultural nature of the constituencies with which CEOs and school systems are involved (Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). Each group with which CEOs and school systems interact brings its own cultural values and beliefs, its own "ways of doing things" that reflect its norms of behavior. It is the task of the CEO to negotiate not only the political aspect of working with other groups, but also the cultural aspect of other groups' belief systems. The political processes of working in and among various groups is intertwined with the cultural nature of these groups to create a rich, complex environment in which the CEO seeks to accomplish the educational goals of the school system.

Within the school system, the CEO, as its designated leader, is often pivotal in guiding the processes and interpreting the meanings of issues that are significant to the system (Boich et al., 1989; Musella, 1995; Pitner & Ogawa, 1981; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). CEO leadership is concerned with the values and vision that can inspire, provide meaning and instill a sense of purpose for members of the school system. The interpretation and communication of a common vision and direction is an ongoing task of CEO leadership (Butt, 1993). Part of what holds a system together and keeps it working toward common aims is members' shared understandings of events that create a sense of community (Sergiovanni & Corbally, 1984). Shared understandings among a community of educators is one thread in the encompassing fabric that is the socially constructed culture of a school system.

The CEO is also a primary communicator of the school system's culture to groups outside the system. In any situation or event, the culture of the school system, the values, vision, and direction that is shared among members of the system, may or may not align with the culture of other groups and organizations with which it is in contact. It is the task of CEO leadership to work through the differences in cultures so that the purposes of the school system can be accomplished. What is not well understood is how leaders work with and within the cultural context of their work worlds (Schein, 1985). In the case of CEO leadership, this cultural aspect, that of contributing to, interpreting, and communicating shared values, vision and direction

within and outside of the school system, is little studied and poorly understood (Musella, 1995; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988).

The Personal Aspect of CEO Leadership

CEO leadership includes attention to political and cultural aspects. The political strategies employed in a particular situation and the cultural values emphasized at a specific time are the responsibility of the person involved in choosing the strategies and attending to the values. The choices the CEO makes are influenced by the person the CEO is (Blumberg, 1985). They must come from within the CEO (Kussy, 1995). This aspect of leadership, rooted in the person within the position, is suggested, but not explored, in studies of CEOs that highlight a political aspect (Blumberg, 1985; Townsend, 1991) or a cultural aspect (Kussy, 1995; Roberts, 1985; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). The attention to political and cultural aspects as enacted through the person of the CEO contributes to the complex, interactive world within which CEOs work.

Need for the Study

The work world of the CEO is a dynamic and public one, one that consists primarily of interactions with others as an important way to accomplish the work of the school system (Fullan, Park & Williams, 1987). Yet, in terms of educational leadership, the work of the CEO is surprisingly understudied. In the conclusion to a review of research into the position of the school system CEO in the United States, Crowson (1987) noted that research was "not deep" and that the position was "strangely awash in contradictions and anomalies ... a distinct puzzle to those who seek to make a bit of conceptual sense out of this intriguing job" (pp. 49-50). Although research into the work lives of CEOs in the United States is changing (Crowson & Glass, 1991), the work of the CEO remains "the least thoroughly researched role in American public education" (p.14). Renewed interest in educational leadership and the social and political contexts of educational leadership have not improved the understanding of the connections among these for American CEOs (Crowson & Glass, 1991). The situation in Canada is similar. The position of CEO

is "an enigma, ... largely ... invisible to most" and scholarly attention to it, until recently, has been "somewhat dismaying" (Leithwood & Musella, 1991, p.viii). Calls for research into educational leadership, generally, (e.g., Immegart, 1988; McCall & Lombardo, 1978) and the CEO position, particularly, (Boich et al., 1989; Crowson, 1987; Crowson & Glass, 1991; Leithwood & Musella, 1991) stress the need to investigate leaders in their working contexts with attention to the dynamics and variations that exist both within and outside of those contexts.

Research into CEO leadership (e.g., studies from Leithwood, 1995) reveals an increasing attention to the political demands of the job (Leithwood, 1995; Musella, 1992) The political aspect is usually associated with conflict (Blumberg, 1985; Cuban, 1976), but not exclusively so (Genge, 1991). Investigations of the political aspect of CEO leadership acknowledge that while the political may be a dominating aspect of CEO work, it is not the only aspect important in the exercise of leadership.

While studying CEOs' responses to external pressures during turbulent events, Cuban (1976) noted personal, social and ideological aspects that also figured in CEO leadership. The interacting contexts of social/professional, personal and environmental factors were beyond the scope of the study, but Cuban believed them important enough to acknowledge the part they played in CEO leadership and to recommend investigation into the nature and interconnections of these aspects. In a study of CEOs that identified conflict as the central organizing feature of CEO work, Blumberg (1985) noted another aspect of CEO leadership worthy of investigation. He suggested that there was a "sense of self" within the person of the CEO that played an important part in CEO leadership. How this personal aspect was enacted in the work of CEOs was unclear, but its presence seemed influential to CEO leadership.

Research has also identified a cultural aspect to CEO leadership (Butt, 1993; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988; Coleman & LaRocque, 1990; Roberts, 1985; Pitner & Ogawa, 1981). The cultural aspect is the development and articulation of beliefs, values, meaning and direction shared among organizational members. As an aspect of CEO leadership, it is an important part of what drives a school system (Butt, 1993; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). The CEO who leads the system is an important contributor, in

interaction with others, in developing the cultural context that gives purpose, direction, and meaning to the organization (Musella, 1995). System beliefs and understandings are built among the influential constituents within and beyond the school system, but as those meanings develop, the CEO articulates and reinforces them through behaviors, language and sustained attention (Butt, 1993; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). It is an ongoing, intrinsically political, process.

In these studies, too, researchers acknowledge other aspects of leadership that play important roles. Roberts (1985) notes the political nature of the environment in which the CEO in her study functioned. Pitner and Ogawa (1981) mention the political aspect of leadership as exhibited by the CEOs in their studies. Again, studies into one aspect of CEO leadership reported the influence of one or more other aspects left uninvestigated.

Studies focusing on one aspect of CEO leadership, be it political or cultural, present a particular view of leadership that maps a part of the terrain. These studies do not account for CEO leadership from a more comprehensive perspective. Studies point to the importance of more than one aspect of leadership in determining how leadership is exercised, but do not pursue how aspects might be related. Few studies have set out specifically to investigate dual or multiple aspects of leadership, although those that do (e.g., Bolman & Deal, 1992a, 1992b) report promising findings. This study addresses the need to investigate aspects of CEO leadership that have been identified as important, but whose connections have not been explored.

There is a need to expand investigations of single aspects of leadership to include considerations of more than one aspect and considerations of how one aspect relates to another. The aspects of CEO leadership previously discussed, the interactive, the contextual, the political, and the cultural, drawn from across research of CEOs, are among these.

Investigations are being conducted that relate these general directives to leadership positions in education (e.g., Bolman & Deal, 1992a, 1992b; Duignan & Macpherson, 1992; Leithwood, 1995). Approaches to understanding leadership based on multiple (Bolman & Deal, 1991) or integrated (Duignan & Macpherson,

1992) perspectives include attention to cultural and political aspects of leadership as domains necessary to consider. According to Bolman and Deal (1992a, 1992b), of the four perspectives they identify (structural, human, political, symbolic), the cultural and political aspects of CEO leadership in particular require further exploration. They are the least studied and least understood aspects of the multiperspective view of leadership they propose. Likewise, Duignan and Macpherson (1992) propose a theory of leadership that incorporates cultural and political aspects in one of the three interconnected domains to which leaders must attend. Investigation into the cultural and political aspects of leadership would address a need to view them as interconnected, inherent, and important in the daily work of CEOs as educational leaders (Blumberg, 1985; Crowson, 1987; Crowson & Glass, 1991; Cuban, 1976; Leithwood & Musella, 1991). Knowledge from this kind of study would add to, and help to clarify, the nature of CEO leadership as it is presently understood.

In concert with the need to more fully understand CEO leadership within its complex environment is a suggestion of the need to more fully understand the person within the position (Blumberg, 1985; Bolman & Deal, 1994; Boyan, 1988; Kussy, 1995). It is the CEO who is the hierarchical head of the school system world, a world that might appear to be "randomized, irrational, and uncontrollable" at times (Blumberg, 1985). It is the CEO who must in some way make sense of the work world, put the daily disorderliness into manageable patterns with which to deal and try to maintain the balances. In some investigations researchers are noting a personal aspect in CEO leadership. It is referred to as a "sense of self" (Blumberg, 1985), or as "leaders' hearts" (Bolman & Deal, 1994), or as "internal processes" (Leithwood & Musella, 1991). The framework for understanding CEO leadership that Leithwood and Musella (1991) propose includes attention to the internal processes of CEOs. Initially defined as cognitive processes, Leithwood (1995) expands the definition to encompass "attitudes, values, beliefs, problem-solving processes and domain-specific knowledge . . . (traits and dispositions might also be included)" (p. 324). His own work focuses on the problem-solving processes of educational leaders. The personal aspect is a loosely-defined concept, but one that appears to be of importance as an

aspect of leadership. The understanding of CEO leadership would be enhanced if research sought to explore what is meant by the personal aspect and how it might relate to CEO leadership. Part of what is missing in the understanding of leadership within the wider environmental context, is attention to the interactive nature of the personal and the situational (Boyan, 1988).

CEOs continue to face the challenges of changing social realities (Boich et al., 1989; Patterson, Purkey & Parker, 1986). Within this context, it is important to gain a clearer understanding of how leaders function in complex environments. Focused inquiry of a CEO in her/his work situation provides the vivid, concrete, contextual data that are the "complex specificness" (Wolcott, 1988, p. 219) from which "a specific instance [can] illuminate a general problem" (Merriam, 1988, p. 13).

Purpose of the Study

The work world of the CEO is inevitably political and inherently cultural (Bolman & Deal, 1994; Duignan & Macpherson, 1992). This is the context of the CEO's actions. Ideas on vision, beliefs, and meaning are associated with a cultural aspect of leadership that is played out in a political environment.

Also associated with cultural ideas of leadership are ideas focused on leadership as moral (Sergiovanni, 1992a), spiritual (Bolman & Deal, 1993), or passionate (Vaill, 1989). These are inherently personal aspects seen as indicative of the essence of effective leadership. Writers attribute to effective leadership a source that is moral or values-based. Identifying leadership as moral or spiritual or passionate is not to treat each conception as a characteristic of the leader, but rather to try to define what drives the leader to do what she/he does. These conceptions, associated with a cultural aspect, are looking for the inner core of the leader that provides an explanation for the leader's actions. The attempt is to answer the question: What is at the center of the leader that shapes the leader's views and actions? The idea of leadership as stemming from a moral purpose is popular in conceptions of leadership (Badaracco & Ellsworth, 1989; Sergiovanni, 1992; Vaill, 1989), but has not been investigated in research on leadership (Bolman & Heller, 1995). If the essence of leadership is tied to a moral or

spiritual center (as conceptions claim), then this aspect should reveal itself in a close study of the cultural aspect of leadership. What strategies the CEO uses and how the CEO functions in the political and cultural context of the work world should provide insight into what is at the core of the CEO's choices and actions.

The purpose of this study is to explore political and cultural aspects of leadership and their interconnections through the investigation of a CEO in action. In doing so, the opportunity is also there to explore suggestions that a personal aspect is at the core of the leader's filtering of political and cultural aspects. Research suggests that the person remains important in attempts to understand leadership behavior (Boyan, 1988; Blumberg, 1985; Butt, 1993; Cuban, 1976; Kussy, 1995; Scheele, 1994; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). The purpose of this study is to take up the challenge to "redefine leadership" (Bolman & Deal, 1994) with attention to the interconnected areas of the political, the cultural, and the "deeper human qualities [that] effective leadership requires" (p. 78).

Research Questions

The research questions for the study are drawn from the literature on leadership and CEOs that attends to the understanding of the dynamics of CEO leadership. The research questions focus on extending the understanding of CEO leadership in areas that are recognized as important, but which require further investigation. Leadership is concerned with working through various interests (a political aspect) in order to advance and give meaning to the vision and direction of the organization (a cultural aspect). This study investigates these aspects by asking:

What is the nature of the political aspect of CEO leadership in an interactive context?

What is the nature of the cultural aspect of CEO leadership in an interactive context?

What is the nature of the interconnections of the political and cultural aspects of CEO leadership in an interactive context?

In addition, researchers suggest that another aspect of leadership, related to the person of the leader, may be important in the execution of leadership. It may be what is at the core of a leader's choices and actions. It may be what distinguishes leaders' orientations toward one or more leadership perspectives. This study intends to explore the suggestions of this aspect of leadership to develop an understanding of its meaning and connectedness with other aspects of CEO leadership. To this end, the study asks:

Does CEO leadership in an interactive context reveal a personal aspect of leadership?

If so, what is the nature of the personal aspect of CEO leadership in an interactive context?

Definitions

Chief Education Officer

The Chief Education Officer (CEO) is the designated, hierarchial, executive head of a school system. The terms 'superintendent', 'director of education', and 'chief education officer' are used interchangeably in some of the research on appointed leaders of school systems. Superintendent, Chief Superintendent, Chief Executive Officer, and Director of Education are the terms used in the prairie provinces of Canada, where this study took place. For consistency in this study, Chief Education Officer (CEO) will be the term used throughout.

Critical Incidents

Critical incidents are those issues or events identified by the CEO and others knowledgeable about the CEO and the school system as particularly important to the operation and direction of the school system.

Cultural Aspect

The cultural aspect of CEO leadership relates to the CEO's contribution to, articulation and communication of "a vision and values that give purpose, direction and meaning to an organization" (Bolman & Deal, 1994, p. 85).

Influencing Others

"Influencing others" are those people identified by the CEO and/or others as major participants or key players in determining the course and outcome of the critical incidents.

Interactions

The work of a CEO involves other people. This work is primarily in the form of interactions with others. Interaction with others is not an end in itself, but a means through which the tasks of the school system are accomplished. Interactions may be formal or informal, personal or written, individual or group, for purposes such as persuasion, information, negotiation, or conflict resolution, with influentials such as trustees, professional or support staff, community members, or ministry officials (Fullan, Park & Williams, 1987, p. 93).

Personal Aspect

The personal aspect of CEO leadership is a suggested concept that relates to the person within the CEO position. Writers use various terms to describe the concept. Among these are "sense of self" (Blumberg, 1985), inner core (Duignan & Macpherson, 1992), "internal processes" (Leithwood & Musella, 1991), "leaders' hearts" (Bolman & Deal, 1994). The personal aspect may be the internal, individually-held core of the underlying rationale for the choices and decisions the CEO makes (Blumberg, 1985; Duignan & Macpherson, 1992).

Political Aspect

The political aspect of CEO leadership relates to those processes, such as negotiation or bargaining, that a CEO engages in with individuals and/or groups interested in the work of the system. Individuals and/or groups can represent various positions in relation to the work of the system. The CEO takes into account the various positions and uses political processes to work between and among them to advance the work of the school system (Blumberg, 1985).

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter 1 provided an orientation to the area of and literature on CEO leadership in education. It outlined the need to investigate political and cultural aspects of CEO leadership and to explore the suggestions of a personal aspect of CEO leadership as carried out in the context of the CEO's work world.

Chapter 2 provides a review of literature on CEO leadership that seeks to capture aspects of leadership in the context in which they occurred. Particular attention is paid to studies relating to the context of CEO leadership, political, cultural, and personal aspects of CEO leadership, and the interrelatedness of these aspects.

Chapter 3 outlines the design and methodology for the study.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the cases and an introduction to the CEO.

Chapter 5 presents the findings through themes in CEO leadership.

Chapter 6 outlines the interpretive framework of CEO leadership. Interrelationships among the themes and political, cultural, and personal aspects of CEO leadership are presented.

Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and implications. Conclusions are drawn from the findings and implications of the study are given for CEOs, students of educational leadership, and researchers.

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Exploring Leadership

There is a long history of investigation into the concept of leadership (Bass, 1981; Stogdill, 1974). In the later part of the twentieth century alone, extensive research has been undertaken in attempts to understand the intricacies of leaders who influence the course of events, change the nature of organizations, and move people to perform actions that, without the leader, would have remained undone (e.g., Burns, 1978). Various studies have examined the circumstances or characteristics or combination of circumstances and characteristics that result in leadership (e.g., Fiedler, 1967: Hersey & Blanchard, 1982: Schein, 1985). Each conceptualization of leadership presents a piece of the picture, but the whole picture of leadership remains elusive (Hoy, 1994; Sheive & Schoenheit, 1987).

In education, the literature on leadership parallels the directions taken in the literature on leadership more generally. Attempts have been made, through conferences (Bolman & Deal, 1994; McCall & Lombardo, 1978), collected articles (Sheive & Schoenheit, 1987) and commissioned writings (Slater, Bolman, Crow, Goldring & Thurston, 1994), to capture the state of knowledge about leadership in education and provide indications of future directions. These periodic collections of ideas and research reveal the progress and similarities of thinkings on leadership over time.

A 1975 conference on leadership reported by McCall and Lombardo (1978) brought consensus to two main themes: the necessity of investigating leadership in its complexity and its context; and, the desirability of investigating the variety in leadership. Conference participants spoke of the need to find ways to get at the "deep structure" or meaning of leadership. Deep structures included those nuances, intuitions, ways of processing information, and fragile relationships with others that are not easily observed and cannot be measured (Pondy, 1978; Weick, 1978). The challenge for researchers was to focus attention on the neglected areas of leadership,

including the symbolic functions and politics of leadership, so that the "reality of the whole" (McCall & Lombardo, 1978, p. 8) of leadership could be better understood.

A 1994 conference reported by Bolman and Deal (1994) also reached consensus on a number of themes. Conference participants agreed that leadership was inevitably political, inherently symbolic, and required intangible human qualities. For leadership in education to become more effective, approaches need to be found that utilize these aspects of leadership in positive and new ways. Leadership as a political activity is often associated with conflict, but conference participants viewed effective political leadership as creating "supportive coalitions and alliances that make desired things happen" (Bolman & Deal, 1994, p. 83). The symbolic nature of leadership, with its attention to culture, values, and vision, is also of critical importance to leadership. Leadership "is always exercised in a cultural context" (p. 85). Leaders' need to understand the cultures within which they are embedded if they are to give direction and meaning to their work. Conference participants also called for attention to the 'hearts' of leaders, the "spiritual, moral, and expressive qualities" (p. 86) that are important to effective leadership, but are not tangible, rational skills. The challenge for researchers is to "redefine" leadership in ways consistent with the consensual themes of the conference.

A collection of writings on leadership edited by Sheive and Schoenheit (1987) also points to a shift in thinking about leadership. Sergiovanni (1987) sums it up:

> The old view of leadership, which emphasized style and behavior and the development of highly structured management systems, remains important. But now what leaders stand for and believe in, and their ability to communicate these values and ideals in a way that provides both meaning and significance to others, is more important than how they behave. (p. 117)

He calls this "cultural leadership" because of its attention to values, beliefs, and expectations for others. Leaders are to be the shapers and guardians of the values that define the cultures within which leaders work. More recently, this view continues to be proffered as symbolic leadership (Bolman & Deal, 1991), moral leadership (Sergiovanni, 1992a), or leadership as transformative (Foster, 1989).

Perspectives on Leadership

These views on leadership are part of a range of perspectives within more general orientations to the study of leadership. One recent overview of this range is summarized by Hoy (1994) from the commissioned writings of the University Council for Educational Administration. Four broad perspectives are delineated that encompass traditional and emerging views on leadership in educational administration: structural-functionalist; political-conflict; constructivist; and, critical-humanist.

The structural-functionalist perspective holds that leaders are the primary problem-solvers in organizations. Through behaviors that show concern for task and/or people and that attend to the situation at hand, leaders motivate followers to do the work of organizations. The political-conflict perspective holds that leaders are in positions of power in relation to followers. Although this situation can produce conflict, it can also produce efficient functioning as long as leaders' authority is seen as legitimate. The constructivist perspective concentrates on leadership as making meaning for organizational members. Leaders lead through what they represent and their ability to make sense of events for followers. Finally, the critical-humanist perspective holds that it is a function of leadership to move followers, through the creation of effective symbols, beyond the existing social order to a transformed democratic society (Hoy, 1994, pp.184-186).

Each orientation encompasses its own range of views and views can be situated in more than one orientation. For instance, feminist views of leadership are part of the political-conflict orientation, but also fall within constructivist and critical-humanist perspectives. A feminist view of leadership fits within the political-conflict orientation because of its focus on power relationships and social change. It takes issue with the tradition of research, largely conducted with male leaders (Shakeshaft, 1987), that tends to concentrate on themes of hierarchy, rationality, individualism, power, and competition (Blackmore, 1989). Feminist views of leadership have focused on themes of relationality, communalism, and intuition (Blackmore, 1989; Reynolds & Young, 1995), conceptualizations of leadership that are in keeping with constructivist

and critical-humanist perspectives. Feminist views, as part of a range of developing perspectives, indicate that what is missing in the understanding of educational leadership are more comprehensive views that include attention to perspectives other than the structural-functionalist which has dominated the study of leadership (Reynolds, 1995; Slater et al., 1994).

These perspectives, when applied to the considerations of leadership introduced earlier, indicate that the calls for directions in leadership study are calls for movement away from the structural-functionalist perspective predominantly to the political-conflict, constructivist, and critical-humanist perspectives. In essence, this is also at the nub of Hoy's summary. The perspectives provide a useful framework for thinking about educational administrative leadership. Each portrays a different meaning for leadership. No single perspective reflects a comprehensive view. Rather, the perspectives set out the current scope of the field in which work in educational administration occurs. The perspectives draw attention to the necessity to look beyond any one view when attempting to more fully understand the complexities of leadership in an educational context. The structural-functionalist perspective underlines the importance of leadership as an interactive endeavor; the political-conflict perspective recognizes the political, and often conflictual, context in which leadership must operate; the constructivist and the critical-humanist perspectives emphasize cultural and symbolic leadership as creating meanings shared and acted upon among participants.

These perspectives of leadership, the interactive, the contextual, the political, and the cultural, taken from the broad sweep of considerations in educational administration point to promising directions for more particular inquiry. Within the field of education, one leadership position specifically, that of the Chief Education Officer (CEO) is hierarchially placed to operate prominently in an interactive, contextual, political and cultural work world. Indeed, work is being done that attempts to draw together these perspectives and apply them to positions in educational leadership, including that of the CEO (Bolman & Deal, 1991; Duignan & Macpherson, 1992).

A Multiperspective View of Leadership

Bolman and Deal (1991) present conceptions of leadership in terms of the leader's ability to view leadership practices through a multiple-perspective lens. The four perspectives, or frames, they identify are similar to the orientations summarized by Hoy (1994). Bolman and Deal outline structural and human resource frames that reflect the structural-functionalist orientation, the political frame that reflects the political-conflict orientation, and the symbolic frame that reflects the constructivist and critical-humanist orientations.

The structural frame highlights coordination and control; roles and expectations are clearly outlined. Leadership practices related to the structural frame include activities such as planning and implementing policies and procedures. The human resource frame focuses on the needs, feelings, and morale of participating members of the organizational community. Leadership practices related to the human resource frame involve processes of participation and empowerment. The political frame stresses the conflictual nature of various groups that share an interest in resources, but compete for ways to allocate them. Leadership practices related to the political frame are those that involve bargaining, negotiating, compromising, building coalitions and establishing consensus. The symbolic frame emphasizes the ambiguous or uncertain nature of organizational life. Meaning and predictability are socially constructed and leaders seek to resolve confusion and provide direction through use of symbols. Events and processes may be more important for what they express than for what they produce. Leadership practices related to the symbolic frame are those that create ceremonies or rituals, develop an image or vision for the organization, or influence the work culture (Bolman & Deal, 1991, 1992a).

The Bolman and Deal (1991) perspectives parallel perspectives identified earlier by Sergiovanni and Corbally (1984): efficiency; person; political, and cultural. Of the four perspectives presented, the latter two have received less attention in the literature on leadership and organizations than the first two. Political and symbolic processes are, in some ways, less tangible than structural and human considerations. The

political perspective presents a consideration of educational organizations that is a dynamic interplay of the organization and its environment. The symbolic or cultural perspective is the newest and least developed of the four. Underlying the cultural perspective is the concept of community and the importance of shared meanings and values (Sergiovanni & Corbally, 1984). Bolman and Deal's thesis is that leaders need to be willing and able to use these multiple lenses to view organizations and their problems. They underscore not only the desirability, but the necessity of leaders' abilities to consider issues from multiple perspectives.

Leadership, with a frame perspective, would attend to propositions of context, relationship, and participatory approach. Context in leadership influences what leaders must attend to and places constraints on what leaders are able to do. Relationship in leadership is interactive and mutually influencing. A participatory approach requires cooperative, collective action among leaders and the led. This view of leadership supposes attention to political and cultural aspects; leadership is "a subtle process of mutual influence that fuses thought, feeling, and action to produce collective effort in the service of the purposes and values of both the leader and the led" (Bolman & Deal, 1991, p. 410).

Bolman and Deal (1992a) applied these ideas in a study that explored how educational leaders (school principals) used frames in their work and with what results. Leaders wrote accounts of "critical incidents . . . challenging leadership incidents in which they had been involved" (p. 316). The accounts of these critical incidents were analyzed for the presence or absence of frames in the issues leaders saw as important. While the analysis was more general than specific, the writers claim it did allow them to "make reliable judgements" about which frames are embedded in the incidents to which leaders attend. Most often, leaders framed the critical incidents in terms of human resource themes, followed in order of frequency by structural, political and symbolic themes. Leaders tended to use multiple frames in identifying critical incidents, with a dual perspective being the most frequent and the use of all four frames being rare. The context in which the frames were used appeared to be significant. For instance, leaders' attention to issues within their jurisdiction or

beyond it played a part in the frequency of use of the political frame. Symbolic issues, the writers suggested, often "lurked in the background without being made explicit" (p. 318) by the leader writing the account. In a related study (Bolman & Deal, 1992b) with a different sector of educational leaders (CEOs of college and school systems), results on the use of frames were similar for the human resource and structural frames, but study participants clustered together the political and symbolic frames. Studies related to leaders' use of frames have been minimal (Bensimon, 1989, applied a frame analysis to CEOs in college settings; Wimpelberg, 1987, applied a frame analysis to school principals). Results indicate less attention has been paid in leaders' backgrounds to symbolic and political skills than to human resource and structural skills; yet, these studies also indicate that symbolic and political skills are crucial for effective leadership. The Bolman and Deal studies invite further inquiry into leaders' use of political and symbolic frames in the contexts of working with incidents critical to their educational situations.

An Integrated View of Leadership

A similar view of leadership is suggested by Duignan and Macpherson (1992) in their report on a research project involving theorists and exemplary practitioners that was designed to articulate a practical theory of leadership in educational settings. The leadership theory they propose incorporates cultural and political aspects in one of three interconnected realms: ideas, people, and things, that constitute educative leadership.

At the heart of educational leadership is the realm of ideas stimulated by leaders' personal experience and reflection on "what is right and what is significant" for those involved in education. Educational leaders engage in activities of consideration and planning at the abstract level, taking into account what is in the long-term interests of students, teachers, and leaders. It also requires the "linking of core values to what is achievable in a context of material and social contingencies" (Duignan & Macpherson, 1995, p. 175). This realm incorporates the individual way of knowing of the leader.

From here, the abstraction of ideas is given form through the realm of culture.

This realm involves both cultural and political activities. Ideals, beliefs, and shared meanings associated with past practices and policies are diplomatically questioned by leaders seeking to alter what has been taken for granted previously and accepted. A new cultural reality is proffered and supported through leaders' attention to the core values that align to the altered concepts of "right and significant" coming out of the realm of ideas. Duignan and Macpherson suggest that the process of cultural realignment is "an intrinsically political" one.

The third realm is that of things, the area in which material resources make tangible the ideas and activities arising from the areas of ideas and culture. All three realms are interconnected and Duignan and Macpherson conclude that educative leaders must maintain the linkages by giving "balanced and integrated attention to the imperatives of all three realms. Educative leaders must provide a holistic view" (p. 183).

The realms are considered in an order that places the realm of ideas at the centre of educative leadership with culture and things building out from the core of ideas. In this proposal, aspects of the personal, cultural and political are central to the overall theory. Considerations such as this one heighten the need to explore, in context, the cultural and political aspects of leadership while attending to the personal aspect as it arises.

Conceptions of a Personal Aspect of Leadership

The personal aspect of leadership seems related to ideas explored by writers who consider the nature of leadership outside of traditional views, such as those of the structural-functionalist orientation. It may also relate to ideas primarily explored to date through feminist literature. Writers attempt to examine leadership beneath the surface of actions and words. They consider it on a deeper, meaning level where motivations and sources of behaviors are integral to understanding leadership.
The main themes of this area of exploration of leadership can be illustrated with a few examples. For instance, leaders are followed because of their compelling ideas (Sergiovanni, 1992a, 1992b, 1994) and the connections they are able to make with the

values and beliefs of others (Bennis, 1989).

Sergiovanni (1987, 1992a, 1994) talks about leaders' "mindscapes," that is constructed personal realities, that are the basis for leadership actions. Mindscapes and a personal aspect in leadership seem related in their emphasis on leadership that links actions with meaning that has been individually designed out of ideas and beliefs about what is right and what is good. In leadership that is "ideas-based" (1992b) or "moral" (1992a), leaders draw on their mindscapes to formulate actions from "shared values, ideals, purposes and commitments" (1992b, p. 311). Leaders assume that what is right and what is good are as important considerations as what works and what is effective. The practical and the pragmatic are not sacrificed to what is meaningful, but are the visible, tangible manifestations of underlying, supporting bases of beliefs. Leadership based on mindscapes can be true to the foundational vision while able to make use of the various routes and opportunities that present themselves in the working contexts of leaders.

Bennis (1989) drew attention to a similar conception of leadership that he identified as one of the competencies of the CEOs he interviewed. He speaks of a "management of meaning" wherein leaders communicate a vision to followers and, at the same time, align others to the vision. Communication and alignment work together; this is the creation of meaning that comes to be shared and brings others to places they have not been to before nor necessarily knew they could reach. There is, in this conception, a likeness to Burns' (1978) idea of transformational leadership.

Ideas about leadership put forward by Greenleaf (1991/1977) as "servant leadership" also tie in with transformational leadership and what is referred to in this study as a personal aspect of leadership. Leaders work from an orientation to others. They have in mind the "grand purpose" or a "visionary concept" that they clearly articulate for others and that others find worthwhile and work to achieve. At the core of transformational leadership may be a personal aspect of leadership. The transformational leader acts out of personal values in ways that bring the entire group along.

Stated slightly differently, leadership depends on integrity (Badaracco &

Ellsworth, 1989). When people agree with a person's belief patterns, they are willing to follow them and to be influenced by them. Integrity provides the influence of leadership. De Pree (1992) explored leadership for how it connects "voice," the expression of leaders' beliefs, and "touch," the demonstration of these beliefs.

From the viewpoint of followers, the foundation of leadership is credibility (Kouzes & Posner, 1993). Leadership involves a relationship with followers that hinges on shared values, commitment to a common cause, and the development of mutual trust and understanding. Credible leaders inspire confidence and demonstrate a personal commitment to shared values and vision. Their leadership is seen as authentic (Terry, 1993).

A relational, communitarian aspect to leadership is also a theme of a feminist perspective on educational leadership (Blackmore, 1989; Glazer, 1991). Past considerations of leadership were informed by theories which focused on hierarchy, authority, individualism, and claims of rationality. Leadership involved dominance over followers in clearly demarcated ways. A feminist perspective proposes a different view of leadership and leader-follower relationships, one that directs interests and service towards others rather than self and offers a more egalitarian view of community participation. If new perspectives into leadership, male or female, are to be gained, it would seem necessary to direct attention to those individual behaviors which are most obvious in female behavior, but also exist in men to varying degrees (Blackmore, 1989). Among these are "qualities of emotionality, sociality, and caring values" (p. 101), a focus on collective activities and values, and a relational view of morality that emphasizes attachments and responsibilities to others.

In summary, conceptions of a personal aspect of leadership focus on leadership as a combination of vision, human qualities, and actions consistent with vision and qualities. Leadership stems from underlying, personally-held beliefs that inform and shape leaders' words and actions. Leadership is relational and involves the enabling of others to accept and act on a shared vision that is leader-articulated. The literature uses a variety of terms in attempting to capture the elusive essence of leadership that connects meaning with action. These ideas link with the personal aspect of leadership

that is integral to the individual leader.

Directions for Investigating Leadership

Leadership research has, by and large, neglected a multiple perspective view (Bolman & Deal, 1991; Hunt, 1991; Lundberg, 1978; Mouzelis, 1967; Sergiovanni & Corbally, 1984). It has been slow to investigate certain conceptions of leadership (Bolman & Heller, 1995). Yukl (1989) in a wide-ranging review of research into managerial leadership concluded with the trends he saw in leadership research indicative of "some real progress ... [in] ... unravelling the mysteries" of leadership (p. 279). One of these trends was to increase the scope of inquiry and the variety of methodologies used in leadership research. The call was for new theories "to describe interactive leadership processes that unfold over time in social systems" (p. 279). He concluded with a statement that reiterates the inclusion of political and cultural perspectives in research aimed at extending the understanding of leadership and organizational functioning:

> If anything is new [in leadership research], it is perhaps the awareness of political processes in organizations, the recognition that symbolic processes and management of meaning are as important as management of things, and the awareness that leadership processes are embedded in the culture of the organizations, shaping it and being shaped by it. (p. 279)

Inquiry designed to investigate leadership in its context with specific attention to cultural and political perspectives, while being sensitive to the revelation of a personal aspect, would contribute to the conceptual considerations and tentative theory outlined in this section.

Studies of CEO Leadership

The review of literature now moves to consideration of research on CEOs. The studies included here incorporate some combination of interviews, observations, and/or written records in attempts to capture the dynamics of CEO leadership as it is practiced. Only research specific to CEOs in education is included. Caution was

exercised in drawing from studies of leadership in other areas and applying them directly to CEOs in education (Bolman & Heller, 1994; Scheele, 1994; Smith, 1994).

This part of the review is presented in sections dealing with the context of CEO leadership and political and cultural aspects of CEO leadership. References to a personal aspect of leadership are incorporated within the sections on political and cultural aspects. The sections are separated here for convenience of presentation. In reality they occur together. The work world of CEOs is complex and comprehensive, a place where events and processes do not occur in isolation one from another.

Context of CEO Leadership

A recurring theme in the research on CEOs is the importance of context in understanding the work of these leaders (Allison, 1991; Berg, 1993; Blumberg, 1985; Cuban, 1976; Wills & Peterson, 1992). The CEO leadership role is not like other leadership roles in the school system (Blumberg, 1985; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988), nor is it like other CEO leadership roles in public and private organizations (Mintzberg, 1973; Leithwood, 1995). The differences lie in the role itself and in the context in which it occurs. The CEO has responsibilities within the system and beyond. The external pressures and boundary-spanning activities of the CEO in relation to the school system and the wider community fashion the CEO position as a powerful and delicate one (Crowson & Morris, 1992; Wills & Peterson, 1992).

Coming out of a series of studies on Canadian and American CEOs, Leithwood (1995) and Leithwood & Musella (1991) offer a general contextual framework for understanding CEO leadership. The framework includes components of external influences, internal processes, leadership practices, and elements in the school district. The CEO leads from a set of internal processes identified as "attitudes, values, beliefs, problem-solving processes . . . traits and dispositions" (Leithwood, 1995, p. 324). These inform the CEO's practices as she or he works within and beyond the school system. The system, composed of such elements as goals, tasks, structures, policies, and decision making processes, operates within its own culture and is embedded in the cultures of the external environment. The CEO's internal processes, the work of

the school system and the external environment are constantly engaged in mutual influencing and shaping processes between and among each other. The framework acknowledges the interrelatedness of the CEO's internal processes with the CEO's external environment, the CEO's external environment with the culture and components of the educational system, and the influence of the culture and components of the system on the CEO's internal processes. However, the framework is a general one and it is left to researchers to investigate the complexities of how and when certain components relate to certain other ones. The studies that follow contribute specific information about the leadership of CEOs that attempt to flesh out the generalities of a broad contextual framework.

Main Contexts of CEOs' Work

The work world of a CEO is not an easy one to map. The CEO may be hired or assigned to a particular geographical area that includes schools, central office and maintenance buildings, but the nature of a CEO's work transcends physical sites and boundaries. In any situation, the context of CEO leadership includes others who, along with the CEO, are influential in the process, direction, and outcomes of education.

Allison (1991), in a re-analysis of data from a study of supervisory officers in Ontario, identified the main work contexts of CEOs as board, system, and community. Within each sector, the CEO works with individuals or groups in particular ways depending on the CEO's orientation to the job and the size and complexity of the school system. The board sector includes the chairperson, with whom the CEO is likely to have extensive contact (Allison, Allison & McHenry, 1995), and board members. Allison (1991) found that CEOs tended to try to keep board and system contexts separate. CEOs saw their role as one of helping board members develop good policy and avoid making policy that they believed was not in the best interest of education in the system.

The system context includes central office and school-based personnel. These are the primary groups with whom the CEO is likely to work in order to carry out

educational functions. All CEOs spent considerable time in consultation with immediate subordinates and three-quarters of the CEOs had direct dealings with principals (Allison, 1991, pp. 32-33). In smaller school systems, CEOs participated directly in the operations of the system. In larger systems, CEOs' connections with the system context were in more coordinating and supervisory ways, accomplished through meetings with immediate subordinates and, in some cases, principals.

The community context includes all other groups, be they parents, special interest lobbies, or Ministry of Education officials. The CEOs in the Allison (1991) study further identified subsectors in this context as public relations, interagency liaison, parents, and professional community. All CEOs were active in the community context although the nature and extent of their involvement seemed related to size and complexity of the school system. CEOs in large school systems seemed most active in the area of public relations, while CEOs in very large systems focused on their role as representing the board to the community in symbolic ways at ceremonial events.

While not delineating the work contexts of CEOs as specifically as does Allison (1991), a study by Crowson and Morris (1992) confirms the importance, to CEOs, of their relationships with community, board and schools. In lengthy interviews with 10 experienced CEOs in Illinois, Crowson and Morris found that CEOs displayed a community consciousness that indicated the pride and attention they gave to the community context in which they worked. These CEOs enjoyed mainly cooperative relationships with their boards. Crowson and Morris characterize this relationship as a "carefully choreographed negotiated system" (p. 33), a description that intimates control and bargained exchange as much as it does cooperation. The CEOs also spoke about "the schools." CEOs expressed interest in schools and talked about their involvement in school-related issues, but also acknowledged their "administrative distancing" from the actual teaching and learning activities of schools. These CEOs spoke of a central office-school site distancing that indicates a system context of two parts, CEO-central office and principal-school site. This may be a variation to the system context as identified by Allison (1991).

CEOs' Consideration of Contexts

Research into the links between CEO leadership and district reforms reveal that system context is an important one. What CEOs attend to seems dependent on a variety of factors and configuration of factors within and beyond the school system that are specific to the CEO and the site (Hord et al., 1992; Scheele, 1994; Wills & Peterson, 1992).

Scheele (1994) studied three CEOs and their efforts at planned educational change within their districts. She found patterns in the organizational and personal characteristics of the CEOs affecting district change, but no patterns emerged in the contextual variables to which the CEOs attended. The contextual factors varied across the districts and while it was important to the successful implementation of change for CEOs to address factors in the context, the number and nature of the contextual factors were particular to each district. Similar findings have emerged in other studies of CEOs and school or district improvement (Hord, Jolly, & Mendez-Morse, 1992; Murphy, 1995). CEOs' leadership behaviors vary across the districts they head according to the specifics of the situations within each district. Context influences CEO leadership, but what the influences are, are site dependent.

In a study of 30 CEOs and their assistants in Maine, Wills and Peterson (1992) investigated CEOs' responses to state-initiated educational reforms. They found that CEOs' responses took into account their preceptions of six areas of uncertainty that ranged from internal considerations, such as their own career paths, to considerations of the external environment, such as economic and social conditions in the community. The state-initiated reform was the same for all CEOs, yet no single pattern appeared in CEO responses to the reform. The variety of responses depended on a combination of CEOs' preceptions of uncertainty factors in immediate and broader contexts and conditions unique to their situations. What was common to CEOs' responses were their attempts to synchronize their actions to the unpredictable nature of their working contexts.

Mitchell and Beach (1993) found that CEOs considered contexts of self and system in determining whether and how to pursue school restructuring. If CEOs were

new to the job or location of the job, it was more likely that they would initiate restructuring activities. If events in the school system were deemed unsettled or turbulent, CEOs were unlikely to initiate restructuring activities. CEOs, while focused on school systems as the primary location of their work, use considerations of happenings both within and beyond the system context in determining their actions.

Although Allison (1991) found differences in the ways CEOs related to the board, system, and community contexts of their work that seemed connected to size and complexity of school systems, he also found similarities in how CEOs oriented themselves to their job. As a whole, CEOs, more than other groups of employees in school systems, were "dominantly system-oriented" rather than school-oriented, "strongly reflective" rather than reactive, and "overwhelmingly generalist" rather than specialist (p. 38). It seems that CEO leadership incorporates a style that allows and necessitates that CEOs have a general understanding of all three contexts that enables them to integrate and relate happenings in one sector to events in another. It falls to CEOs alone to "use their unique knowledge to balance, arbitrate and when possible harmonize many diverse and often inherently conflictual expectations and demands" (p. 38) within and among the contexts of their work.

Features of Contexts

Certain features of the contexts of CEOs' work are mentioned repeatedly in the research on CEOs as important in understanding their leadership behavior. One feature that is common to CEOs' work in any context is the reliance on interactions as a way of accomplishing system business (Fullan, Park & Williams, 1987). Interactions dominate the work of CEOs (Hickcox, 1992) and can be written as well as verbal, but multiple, verbal interactions are more consistent with the CEO's orientation to working with people from across a variety of groups (Pitner & Ogawa, 1981; Townsend, 1991). Interaction implies the involvement of at least two people, but, although research reports CEOs as having a diversity of contacts and complexity of interactions, it has tended to focus on the CEO, not on the CEO and others as they interact.

A study by Townsend (1991) illustrates this point. Townsend sought to determine how the rhetoric of one CEO influenced the development of policy among different audiences. He shadowed a single CEO for most of a year as the CEO interacted with trustees, principals, teachers, secretaries, custodians and community members. He found the work world of the CEO to be highly interactive, filled with much talk on the part of the CEO as well as others. The focus of the Townsend study was on the CEO's arguments with others in the development of system policy. It was not designed to determine how the CEO's arguments were influenced by others' responses to them. What Townsend reported was the rhetoric of a CEO in policy development. What is missing are the influences that shaped the CEO's thinking as he negotiated and developed the shared understandings that were eventually articulated in policy. Attention to the interplay among the CEO and those with whom he interacted would provide a fuller understanding of the influential, dynamic nature of the CEO's work.

Another feature of the contexts within which CEOs work is the problem-solving orientation that CEOs must adopt (Leithwood & Steinbach, 1991; Leithwood, Steinbach & Raun, 1993). An expectation of CEO leadership is that CEOs will provide direction in solving the problems confronted by the system, problems that are less predictable as the contexts of school system functioning become more turbulent. What Leithwood and his associates are finding as they study the problem-solving strategies of CEOs is that CEOs are increasingly relying on a group or team approach to solve problems. Within the group approach, CEOs identified as expert problem-solvers tend to consider immediate problems within the broader context. Effective CEOs, it would seem, keep a dual focus on the interplay of immediate and wider-ranging contexts.

Summary of Discussion of Contexts

Common to these studies is CEOs' attention to a variety of contexts, internal and external, when deciding what course(s) of action to follow in providing leadership to their systems. Factors in these contexts can enable CEOs to begin or continue reform

strategies already in place, as Wills & Peterson (1992) found with some of the CEOs in their study, or contexts can limit the options open to CEOs (Scheele, 1994). Whatever the particulars of the contexts, they have a "substantial effect" on CEOs' behaviors (Genge, 1991).

The literature on CEOs consistently presents a picture of a complex role carried out in complex circumstances (Crowson, 1987; Leithwood, 1995; Leithwood & Musella, 1991; Maass, 1994). The contextual framework of Leithwood (1995) and Leithwood and Musella (1991) identifies the main components in the work context of CEOs and suggests some possible relationships. Within the components and relationships of the CEO's context, there are aspects of leadership that have received less research attention than others. In order to more fully understand the complexities of CEO leadership in its context, there is a need to more fully understand certain aspects of leadership and their interrelationships.

The review of literature now moves to consider aspects of CEO leadership, political, cultural and personal, that function in whatever context the CEO works. The political aspect has been more fully developed in the literature and is presented first. The cultural aspect of CEO leadership follows. The personal aspect of CEO leadership is suggested as it arises during discussions of the political and cultural aspects.

Political Aspect of CEO Leadership

An acceptance of the political nature of CEOs' work and work environments permeates the literature on CEOs. Whether or not writers highlight the political theme in study designs, the political is consistently referred to as part of the complexity of CEOs' roles (Allan, 1985; Blumberg, 1985; Fullan et al., 1987; Genge, 1991; Leithwood & Musella, 1991; Townsend, 1991; Wirt, 1990).

The CEOs in the Fullan et al. (1987) study identified the politicizing of education as one of the ways their job had most changed over the years. For CEOs the necessity of being involved in a political environment was a main dissatisfier in their job. For board members and principals, CEOs' political involvement was an expectation of the

job. A later survey of Canadian CEOs (Musella, 1992) confirmed an increase in political involvement for CEOs. The CEOs noted a greater active interest in education by trustees, community groups and special interest groups. Within these groups, people possessed an increased level of sophistication and knowledge about educational issues. These increases reduced the level of influence of the CEO and increased the degree of complexity of the CEO role. The Fullan et al. (1987) and Musella (1992) studies described, but did not investigate, the political aspect of CEO leadership.

Dealing with Differences

The nature of a CEO's position brings the CEO into contact with individuals and groups who hold a variety of views about education. Some views are compatible with those of educators, whereas others are divergent. CEOs are seen and see themselves as occupying a key leadership and liaison role between the public (via trustees) and the organization (via central office staff and principals) (Fullan et al., 1987). It is the CEO's responsibility to forge a path among differing perspectives that keeps the educational purposes of the school system in the forefront. Being political means being involved with the "ongoing process of bargaining and negotiating among the major interest groups" (Bolman & Deal, 1991, p. 203) concerned with the work of the leader's organization. In this sense, the political aspect of CEO leadership assumes that CEOs deal with differences through working with involved stakeholders in ways aimed at reaching some kind of resolution among the groups involved. The possibility of conflict is accepted as part of a political environment.

The differences CEOs face cover the range of individuals and groups with whom they interact. For the 25 CEOs interviewed by Blumberg (1985), dealing with differences was a major characteristic of their job. They regularly dealt with board members, teachers' unions and media personnel about matters such as school budgets, staffing issues and interpretations of events for the public. They had differences of views with principals about administrator transfers; they worked through issues of teacher incompetence; they were involved in situations of extremely

disruptive student behavior. There was virtually no area of board, system or community relations that could not, at some point, involve CEOs in attending to differences of viewpoints and interests.

CEOs accept that there is a political aspect to their work. Establishing and maintaining information networks across board, system and community contexts is a necessary function of their position. Hord et al. (1992) used participant observation techniques to study five CEOs in rural American school systems to determine their involvement in school improvement projects. Three of the CEOs visibly incorporated a political aspect to their work. For one CEO it meant considering the political past of the school system when deciding the focus he would initially give to his tenure in the system. Two other CEOs actively developed political networks with people within and outside the school system to support their views and secure resources for the system. These CEOs expected to attend to a political aspect in their leadership.

Conflictual and Non-conflictual Nature of the Political

Dealing with differences -- of views, purposes, interests -- can also mean dealing with conflict. Certain situations, such as teacher contract negotiations (Wirt, 1990) or groups expressing curricular concerns (Benedict, 1982), seem to invite conflicting views. Being political and dealing with conflict are often mentioned together (Blumberg, 1985; Cuban, 1976; Wirt, 1990) as if the conflictual were an inherent part of the political.

Blumberg's (1985) study confirmed the notion of a CEO work world as conflictual, political and interactive. It also highlighted the political aspect of CEO leadership, but from the personal perspective of CEOs. Blumberg was interested in the meaning of the role and the meaning of the work for the CEO as a person. He began his study with the idea (planted by a CEO) that conflict was at the centre of a CEO's work life. The notion of 'living with conflict' was confirmed through the CEOs' descriptions of their work lives as a central, appropriate framework for understanding the character of the role. Other themes, such as the effect of the CEO role on self and family, emerged as well. Blumberg concluded that the "focal

dilemma" for CEOs as leaders was how each CEO dealt with the often conflicting demands of self, Board, system, community, and wider environment.

The Blumberg study also raised the possibility of an aspect of leadership that was undefined and personal, but left it unexplored. The nature of the study, with its questions related to the meaning of the CEO role, open-ended responses, and categories of ideas evolving from the conversations with CEOs, allowed the researcher to be sensitive to possibilities. Blumberg's reference to a "sense of self" that is important in CEO leadership is speculative and derived from the data. Without predetermined categories, the research can be open to themes that are unexpected or subtle.

Blumberg identified a variety of skills required of the CEO to function in the role:

> Conceptual, human and technical skills are all important of course. But it seems . . . that they assume secondary importance to the need for the [CEO] to sort out what he is all about as a person responsible for the educational enterprise of a community. (p. 44)

It would seem that the CEO's own sense of self shapes how the CEO sees and works in the role. There is a need to address the question of how the CEO's sense of self influences how the CEO interacts with others. By focusing on a CEO, in interaction with others as they work through incidents critical to the school system, research could be open to exploring a personal aspect of CEO leadership as it interrelates with other aspects of CEO leadership.

Some studies into CEO leadership have investigated the specifics of the conflicting demands Blumberg identified (Benedict, 1982; Cuban, 1976; Wirt, 1990). Benedict (1982) investigated four CEOs' responses to demands by protest groups for changes in the instructional programs in schools. Here were situations where the views of the CEO, school officials and the majority of the community came into conflict with the views of minority special interest groups. At issue were the instructional programs in schools, CEOs' responsibility, and the amount of influence protest groups might have on these programs. CEOs found themselves in

circumstances where they needed to resolve issues of an educational nature in ways that would satisfy everyone involved.

CEOs can also find themselves embroiled in issues that pit teachers against board. The CEOs in Wirt's (1990) study were involved in teacher contract negotiations. The delicacy of a CEO's position is accentuated when circumstances place educational professionals, whom the CEO is responsible for supervising, in conflict with board members, who supervise the CEO. The conflict expressed in the Wirt study was more than a difference in positions between bargaining groups. For the CEOs it was a matter of their representing board views while expressing an understanding of teachers' circumstances and being cognizant of where community members stood on the issue.

Cuban's (1976) study demonstrated the conflictual nature of CEOs' work in the context of internal and external influencing pressures. It was essentially a political study of professional ideologies in conflict with changing environments. Cuban investigated three CEOs during a time when each came under intense pressure from forces outside the school system to make changes within the system. The basis of the study was to inquire into CEOs' responses to external pressures; the critical incidents chosen for study were those that seemed to capture the essence of conflict between the CEOs and external groups. For each CEO, one of the critical incidents investigated was of a broad social nature, something the CEO considered a noneducational issue. Still, it impacted directly on the CEO's leadership in the system.

These studies illustrate the pervasiveness of conflict as part of CEO leadership and leave the impression that the political aspect of CEO leadership is tied primarily to dealing with conflict. If groups with various interests take positions that involve differences that result in struggle, opposition that can be antagonistic, interference that is direct, or an incompatibility of views that cannot be reconciled, then CEO leadership involves conflict. However, if groups with various interests are open to processes of negotiation and compromise, of seeking commonalities on which to build, then CEO leadership involves aspects that will be political, but not necessarily conflictual.

Conflict can also be noted for its relative absence in studies that acknowledge the political (Crowson & Morris, 1992; Genge, 1991). In the Crowson and Morris (1992) study, CEO-Board relations were characterized as cooperative more often than conflictual. In the Genge (1991) study, the political environment of the CEOs seemed less turbulent than that characterized in other studies of CEOs. Studies investigating CEOs and some aspect of system functioning (Hord et al., 1992; Huff & Pondy, 1983; Murphy, 1995; Wills & Peterson, 1992) include references to differing points of view, but consider these a natural part of CEO leadership. The political aspect of CEO leadership involves work with individuals and groups expressing various interests and positions. It does not inevitably involve conflict, although conflict can be part of a political process.

CEOs' Responses to Dealing with Differences

The ways in which CEOs respond to the differences that constitute their work depends on a combination of factors. Studies of CEO leadership in times of crisis or in times of calm, reveal no single pattern of response that is followed by all CEOs. CEOs take into account a variety of factors, ranging from consideration of self (Mitchell & Beach, 1993) to the stance of the board (Wirt, 1990) to broad socioeconomic conditions (Cuban, 1976; Wills & Peterson, 1992). What is common to the responses of CEOs is the consideration of factors and events within and beyond their school systems. CEOs do not operate in isolation of their contexts and what they deem important to consider in their contexts varies with the participants, the issues, or other immediate circumstances.

The CEOs in Benedict's (1982) study handled issues raised by protest groups differently in each case. CEOs for whom there were a number of uncertainties, in the issue or materials, with the professionals involved, or about the protestors' motives, tended to recommend changes in favor of protestors' demands. Uncertainties for CEOs meant satisfaction for protest groups. Another consideration for CEOs was the extent of public involvement about the issue. The greater the number of community meetings held about the issue, the less likely CEOs were to recommend

changes in favor of protestors' demands. Public involvement seemed to allow for support to develop for CEOs' positions and against the views of special interest groups. Finally, CEOs considered the time and effort expended in resolving the issue. In general, the more time and effort spent on the process of protest and response the more likely were the CEOs to recommend changes in favor of the protestors' demands. It would appear that CEOs' responses to issues raised by protest groups were more a function of considerations of uncertainties and public visibility than considerations of the educational merits of the groups' demands.

The consideration of uncertainties was primary to how CEOs responded to state-initiated educational reforms in a study of CEOs by Wills and Peterson (1992). The state mandate for reform was identical for all CEOs involved in the study, yet their responses about how to proceed with the reform varied. CEOs considered such factors as their own career path, organizational structures, decision-making processes, economic and social conditions in their communities, and the intent of the reform. CEOs personally sought out information from external sources, made decisions incrementally and adjusted their behaviors according to the reactions they received. CEOs tended to make reform changes in line with practices already in existence in their systems or in visible areas such as personnel or facilities. They viewed their influence on the process of the reform as greater than on the outcome of the reform. The ways in which these CEOs responded to a mandate for reform were dependent on their ongoing assessments of uncertainties they saw as important in their contexts. They used processes intended to broaden their information base and promote dialogue among those groups affected by the reform. They made decisions incrementally and responded in areas they thought were open to influence. These CEOs were not functioning in crisis; the reform in question was a technical one. Yet, even in these calm and similar circumstances, CEOs' responses varied according to a variety of factors in the internal and external contexts of their work.

CEOs also find themselves in the midst of differences not of their making and where their responses are constrained by board and community expectations. Such was the case in Wirt's (1990) study of CEOs involved in teacher contract negotiations.

CEOs' responses were expected to be aligned with boards', and usually communities', positions in these disputes, yet CEOs were also connected with teachers who carry out the educational mandates of boards in schools. Wirt reports on three CEOs who displayed different responses to this situation with different results. One CEO adopted the board's stance and responded in direct opposition to teachers. He effectively refused to negotiate with teachers and acted through commands rather than discussions. The other two CEOs adopted the stance of mediator and attempted to reach compromises between the board and teachers. One CEO responded by working for both sides and was supported by neither. His compromising efforts were greeted with anger by both sides. The other CEO responded in ways that were collaborative with the board, understanding of teachers' needs, and open with the community. He kept a low public profile, but did answer questions asked of him. This CEO was the most successful in managing the contract differences. He seemed able to avoid confrontations with any of the involved groups (board, teachers, community) while remaining sensitive to the views of each group. CEOs' responses, while different, were linked to the positions of the board and CEOs' own preferences for the most appropriate stance to adopt. In this study successful CEO leadership, in conflictual circumstances, was the result of the CEO's deliberately mediating, compromising approach.

The conflict that CEOs find themselves involved with can extend far beyond the confines of boards and teacher unions. Pressures external to school systems can also command CEOs' attention. In a study of three CEOs during times of crisis, Cuban (1976) found that CEO responses, while a result of complex interacting contexts, were generally similar.

In terms of the noneducational issue, CEOs responded by attempting to avoid involvement with it, mainly because they saw it as noneducational and outside the parameters of how school systems should function. Their personal and professional beliefs supported their deliberate avoidance of attention to noneducational issues within their systems; it would be undemocratic and detrimental to other aspects of their systems if they became actively involved in this nonschool issue. In terms of the

educational issue, CEOs responded by redefining and controlling the progress of the issue in ways that would allow professional staff rather than nonprofessional groups to deal with it. They co-opted parts of the groups' issues, delayed implementation of ideas they disagreed with, and used lack of funds or other pressing concerns as reasons to ignore or reshape groups' concerns.

The responses of the three CEOs in Cuban's (1976) study to external pressures were the result of three interacting contexts: the beliefs and practices associated with CEOs' leadership role; the socialization of CEOs within educational institutions; and the conflicting organizational demands, both internal and external, on CEOs. The balance and integration of expectations and constraints on the CEOs included contributing factors from across the contexts of CEO work. Also important were the larger environment (i.e. socioeconomic trends, intellectual climate, and political movements) within which each system operated and the complex links between the beliefs and behaviors common to the CEO leadership role and the beliefs and behaviors of each CEO personally. The Cuban study identified varied contexts and suggested the interrelatedness of personal, professional and political dimensions, but the exploration of these mutually influencing contexts and networks of relationships among CEOs and others was beyond the scope of the study.

Processes for Solving Problems

Studies by Leithwood and Steinbach (1991) and Leithwood, Steinbach and Raun (1995) on CEOs' problem-solving processes are specific examinations of how CEOs go about dealing with the political, and potentially conflictual, issues they face. In the 1991 study, eight Canadian CEOs were given simulated problems to solve. While the problems reflected the kinds of issues CEOs typically face, CEOs went through the process of solving them in hypothetical terms. The 1995 study extended the investigation into actual group problem-solving situations of seven "reputationally effective" CEOs and their immediate subordinates. In both studies, Leithwood and his associates found that CEOs tended to interpret problems with an eye to the larger school system and the political environment in which they worked, a finding

congruent with other studies noted earlier (Benedict, 1982; Blumberg, 1985; Wills & Peterson, 1992). CEOs did not confine their understanding of the problem to the specific context in which it originated.

CEOs were also more concerned with the process of solving the problem than the outcome, especially if the problem was an unclear one. This concern for process more than outcome was expressed by CEOs in the Wills and Peterson (1992) study. It seems as if the solution to the problem will be considered satisfactory whatever it might be as long as the process is satisfactory. CEOs in the Leithwood et al. (1995) study also saw the group process of problem-solving as a form of staff development and a way to enable others to do the work of the system. Solutions generated by group process ensured broader ownership for carrying out the actions agreed to by the group.

CEOs accepted constraints as inevitable aspects of problem-solving and generated ways of dealing with constraints at the same time as identifying them. Two constraints they noted were working with a lack of information and working with opposition from other people. While not using the term 'constraint,' other studies confirm CEOs' desire to collect all the information they can when dealing with uncertainty (Cuban, 1976; Huff & Pondy, 1983; Wills & Peterson, 1992).

The processes CEOs employed in working towards solutions to problems revealed commonalities with processes used by other CEOs in other reported studies. CEOs consulted with individuals and groups with interests in the problem (Benedict, 1982; Wills & Peterson, 1992) and collected information pertinent to the problem (Cuban, 1976; Hord et al., 1992; Wills & Peterson, 1992). They adopted a flexible approach, making connections and exploiting possibilities as they presented themselves. They seemed not to have a clearly formulated plan in mind, but knew the general directions in which they wished to head and adjusted their immediate actions to make use of opportunities (Wills & Peterson, 1992). Leithwood and Steinbach (1991) suggest that CEOs seem to have clear long-term aims in mind that allow them to remain open to issues as the solution process moves along. CEOs may understand the futility of preplanning and rely, instead, on their understanding of changing

environments to develop a satisfactory process as they proceed.

The process is important for CEOs because it helps to reduce the uncertainties involved in dealing with differences (Benedict, 1982; Crowson & Morris, 1992; Wills & Peterson, 1992). If CEOs can develop a process that includes the groups with various viewpoints, more of the unknowns surrounding the issues under discussion will become known. A process that allows CEOs to make incremental decisions (Wills & Peterson, 1992) or rehearse possible solutions will also make it more likely for CEOs to avoid surprises (Huff & Pondy, 1983).

In all of these studies CEOs who successfully dealt with differences used processes such as negotiating and reaching compromises to achieve workable agreements among the groups. CEOs attempted to resolve the differences among the groups and promote or maintain the educational purposes of the system. The political processes used in this aspect of leadership include those that bring together individuals or groups with different points of view, different causes to advance. They include: reaching compromise, bargaining, negotiating, working to consensus, building alliances, and networking or communicating with representatives of different groups to exchange positions and solicit support (Cuban, 1976; Hord et al., 1992; Musella, 1992). Increasingly, CEOs rely on group problem-solving (Leithwood et al., 1995) rather than using an individual style to solve problems.

Investigations of CEO leadership in times of sharp differences between CEOs and groups are useful for what they reveal about CEOs' responses in very particular circumstances. Incidents of crisis can highlight CEO leadership. However, it seems that, in situations where CEOs are considered successful, CEOs' responses to differences that occur under crisis situations bear some similarities to the responses CEOs make when situations are not critical. CEOs manage uncertainty by considering a variety of factors internal and external to their systems and they respond in ways designed to reduce uncertainties and resolve the differences they face. CEOs do not make extensive long term plans for dealing with differences, perhaps due to the unpredictable nature of the contexts in which they work, but some CEOs do seem to have long term goals or fundamental beliefs that direct their more immediate actions.

CEOs take into account their changing circumstances and adjust their behaviors accordingly.

Summary of Discussion of Political Aspect

These studies support the recognition of the political aspect of CEO leadership. Crowson (1987) called specifically for studies into the politics of CEO leadership. He claimed that recognition of the political aspect of the context is not enough. Studies should include attention to the political constraints of the CEO position; the CEO holds the "point of contact" position between the board (public) and the bureaucracy (system organization) (p. 65). "Being 'political,' then involves ... the ability to take a broad and (curiously) an almost disinterested view of the kaleidoscope of interacting forces that impinge on school system[s]" (Blumberg, 1985, p. 56).

The political context is a fact of life for CEOs (Blumberg, 1985; Genge, 1991; Wills & Peterson, 1992; Wirt, 1990). If research into CEO leadership is to reflect the political realities of CEOs' changing organizational contexts (Musella, 1992), it would seem necessary to incorporate the political aspect in such investigations. The political aspect, as outlined here, includes notions of CEO leadership as dealing with differences, involving processes with various aims, and often, but not always, involving conflict. The inclusion of the political aspect in the study of CEO leadership would contribute to a clearer understanding of how the political aspect relates to other aspects of CEO leadership.

Cultural Aspect of CEO Leadership

The cultural aspect of leadership refers to what the leader attends to in a situation that is cultural, that is beliefs, values, meanings, direction, and how the leader goes about attending to what is cultural, that is what the leader chooses to attend to and the processes through which that attention is manifested. The leader must be able to identify and take into consideration both the cultural aspect of the group being worked with and the group being represented. In terms of the organization the leader heads, the cultural aspect of leadership refers to the leader's ability to recognize the beliefs

and values of the members of the organization (i.e. its culture), distill, articulate, give shape to and communicate back to the members the image of that culture which they collectively hold, and then guide the processes of acting upon those beliefs and values to move the organization in a direction that is consistent with its culture (Schein, 1985).

The cultural aspect has several facets to it: it is collectively shared among organizational members; it consists of beliefs, values, meanings (or understandings), and vision (or direction or mission or purpose); it is interactional and participatory in process; it is fostered through the deliberate attention of the leader. Culture is not individually held, but the personal ideology of each member must be such that it is compatible with the culture the person finds her- or himself in or productive membership will be difficult. The leader's personal ideology is rooted in the cultural aspect of his or her leadership and there is a compatibility between the ideology of the leader and the culture of the organization she or he leads.

Transformational Leadership

The cultural aspect has much in common with the idea of transformational leadership as identified by Burns (1978). According to Burns, transformational leadership is in evidence when leaders "engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality ... their purposes (which may have started out as separate) become fused" (p. 20). When such leadership is involved, significant change can occur in organizations; it occurs because the leadership is collective, dissentual, causative and morally purposeful. Transformational leadership is concerned with generating an awareness and acceptance of vision and direction of the group and stirring participants beyond self-interest. However, the cultural aspect, as explored here, goes beyond the general delineation of leadership that transforms and draws together themes relating to how leaders go about accomplishing that transformation. Transformational leadership captures the general sense of leadership capable of assisting followers to realize goals mutually held and valued. The cultural aspect of leadership is both a more specific

delineation of the transformational and an aspect of leadership that subsumes the transformational.

The themes Burns (1978) identified with transformational leadership, that it is relational, collective, purposeful and related to values and vision, are among those identified with the cultural aspect of leadership. Discussions of leadership that are cultural in nature draw attention to a process orientation of the leader used to support and advance what is cultural. The cultural aspect of leadership is recognized for its capacity to produce social change on a world level (Burns, 1978). Its capacity to impact on the educational world is no less significant (Slater, 1994; Smyth, 1989).

Cultural Leadership in Education

Above all else, leadership in schools and school systems should relate to meaning (Hoyle & McMahon,1986). Societal ideals, to be fostered, experienced and sustained through generations, must be lived and nurtured within its major associations, of which the school is an important one (Slater, 1994). The development and transmission of cultural themes, values and dreams common to a democratic society is what educational leaders are about when they engage in symbolic educational leadership. Leaders are responsible for the symbolic function of providing the vision for the school system, a vision informed by the society in which the system operates (Slater, 1994) and the "realities of the educational world: forces in the situation, subordinates, the environment, as well as forces within the leader" (Hoyle & McMahon, 1986, p. 22). Fashioning the meanings for the system is a shared activity articulated and communicated by the CEO, who carries ultimate responsibility for it (Schlechty, 1990), but which comes out of influences within and outside of the system. The cultural aspect, as it emerges from literature on CEO leadership specifically and educational leadership generally, supports and expands on these notions of vision, shared meaning, interactiveness, and leader contribution to the processes through which community and collective action are developed.

In the literature reviewed here, CEO leadership is variously characterized as "intentional" (Wissler & Ortiz, 1988), "symbolic" (McLaughlin & Pfeifer, 1988),

"transformational" (Coleman & LaRocque, 1990), "charismatic" (Roberts, 1985), "cultural" (Ortiz & Hendrick, 1987) or "pragmatic visionary" (Butt, 1993). The use of these particular terms is intended to capture the essence of an aspect of leadership that develops a sense of community among the leader and the led. The cultural aspect evolves from these descriptions of leadership to include, with varying emphases, notions of vision, participation and collective action. Vision emerges as a key notion. Participation and collective action are processes used to develop the cultural aspect.

Vision. Studies of CEO leadership that attend to a cultural aspect place vision as a central component (Butt, 1993; Kussy, 1995; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). Some studies suggest that vision originates with the leader who then articulates it and kindles its development in followers who then take the vision on as their own (Champlin, 1987; Kussy, 1995; Pitner & Ogawa, 1989; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). In this view, it is the CEO who has a personal vision and who then consciously develops it so that it becomes a shared vision among followers and leader.

Champlin (1987) and Kussy (1995) write from the perspective of being CEOs themselves. They emphasize the importance of the CEO's carefully conceived vision as the beginning point to change in the school district. The CEO is the giver and protector of the vision, who then focuses on the development of beliefs supportive of the vision and directed towards the change the CEO sees. Kussy (1995) takes the vision of the CEO one step further when she suggests a personal aspect to it. "For the [CEO], this means that educational reforms must begin from within - by re-examining the beliefs that guide leadership practice and are demonstrated to others" (p. 104).

CEOs offer followers a vision of future possibilities and then support and sustain the vision through their actions (Pitner & Ogawa, 1981; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). Wissler and Ortiz stated at the beginning of their study of a CEO that the sustained reform process of decentralization in a school district depended on a cultural change only possible through the "intentional leadership" style of the CEO. By intentional leadership they meant the deliberate choices of the CEO to influence and change patterns in the school system through attention to language and information

that communicated to staff and community the beliefs and vision of the CEO for education.

CEOs in Pitner and Ogawa's (1981) studies attended to the "socio-cultural context" within which they worked. In this area, CEOs considered themselves responsible for sensing the values and opinions of school system professionals and those of community members beyond the system. CEOs carried out their work according to the balances they could strike among the values and preferences of these groups and their own educational philosophies.

Other studies suggest that vision originates in the group's beliefs and values (Coleman & LaRocque, 1990; Roberts, 1985). The CEO recognizes the vision of the group, articulates it for and back to the group, thus developing among the group its own vision. In this view, it is the group who had the vision and the CEO who recognized it and gave it a voice. Vision is developed as the shared vision of the group, recognized, articulated and developed by the CEO.

As part of a larger study of nine effective school systems in British Columbia, Coleman and LaRocque (1990) looked at relationships between leadership of CEOs and district ethos. 'Ethos' was defined as members' "shared understandings, norms and values" (p. 112). They maintained that leadership is concerned, partly, with creating a common vision and a common set of norms that influence the behavior of organizational members. This type of leadership was considered transformational in nature. Transformational leadership was also reported by Roberts (1985) in her study of a single CEO during a time of crisis. The CEO's leadership offered a vision of future possibilities and gave a sense of purpose and meaning to those who shared the vision.

Coleman and LaRocque (1991) also refer to a connection between CEO activities and vision. They used the idea of "congruence" as the link between vision and range. CEOs had a "mental map" that was the basis for their selection of activities to accomplish desired goals. CEOs had "a kind of personal frame of reference" (p. 111) that allowed them to keep different activities on the go without losing track of the direction they desired for their school systems. This personal frame of reference that

seemed to link vision with action may connect with what is referred to in this study as a personal aspect of leadership.

Still other studies speak to the importance of vision to CEO leadership (Butt, 1993; Genge, 1991; Johnson, 1992; Maass, 1994) without addressing the origins of the vision. In these views, the presence of vision is important, as is the CEO's attention to it. CEOs acknowledge and focus on vision, but whether CEOs bring the vision with them to the school district or intend to develop a shared vision among district constituents later is not addressed in the studies.

Butt (1993) studied 5 CEOs identified as "pragmatic visionaries." She began with the premise that vision is at the centre of CEO leadership. The presence of vision is important and necessary to the effective functioning of a CEO and a school system. The purpose of the study was to investigate how these CEOs turned vision into action, not to consider whether the vision originated with the CEO or with others.

Genge (1991) interviewed 13 CEOs, all of whom reported that they had clear visions for their systems. These CEOs were oriented to the future and able to translate vision into priorities and goals that would help to develop and achieve the vision. The nature of Genge's questions did not probe for where the CEOs' visions originated or how CEOs went about developing visions shared among their constituents. Genge concluded that CEOs "must also possess the skills to entice others to buy into and become a part of that vision" (p. 276).

Similarly, Johnson (1992) reported that the CEOs in her study, all recently appointed, had a vision and considered vision very important. However, their ideas about what constituted vision and where it originated differed, as did their views on how they would develop a vision in their new school systems. Some indicated they brought a vision to the system; others hoped to develop it collaboratively within the system after their arrival.

Maass (1994) studied one CEO in interaction with others during a strategic planning project. At one level, the CEO was seen and acted as a facilitator and visionary. He "actively pursued his vision" after articulating it. At another level, the CEO was seen as a manager who brought people together to work through an effort

with which they felt little connection and had little understanding. The CEO understood the importance of vision, articulating it, developing a shared understanding of it and using it as a foundation for change. However, for a variety of reasons the CEO was less than successful in developing the mutuality of vision and purpose necessary for collective action. The Maass study reiterates the importance, for CEOs, of the congruency of beliefs and behaviors and the "development of a collective vision that is inclusive and reflects what is in the common good" (p. 225).

Other writers support the idea of the importance of the CEO's contribution to the development and articulation of commonly shared meanings for organizational events and processes. McLaughlin and Pfeifer (1988) studied teacher evaluation programs in four American school systems. They concluded that CEO leadership was of critical importance in any organizational change. It was important for the CEO to articulate the vision for a program or initiative and then to communicate and actively attend to supporting it. What the CEO signals as important to the system will become important throughout the administrator and teacher ranks.

McLaughlin and Pfeifer's research was a study of teacher evaluation programs in school systems, not of CEO leadership per se, yet the discussion of CEO leadership arises in this study because of its striking importance to system directions. McLaughlin and Pfeifer claim that "nothing of significance will happen" in programs focused on the system without CEOs, the "key actors" who "marshal resources" and "serve an important symbolic function" (pp. 20-21) in system activities.

What is common to the studies reviewed here is the importance of a shared vision that translates into collective action and the prominence of CEO leadership in developing that shared vision and guiding and supporting that collective action. Regardless of where the vision originates, the effectiveness of the districts in implementing change or weathering crisis is dependent on the CEO's leadership in articulating and sustaining a vision that is shared among the group.

Participative and collective processes to develop the cultural aspect. Studies of CEO leadership that attend to a cultural aspect reveal similarities in the processes used

to develop a sense of community among leaders and followers. Some studies also suggest the interrelatedness of processes associated with a political aspect and those associated with a cultural aspect. Among these are participatory approaches, shared decision making, open communication, modeling and visibility, and attention to collegiality.

Butt (1993) focused her study of CEOs on the behaviors and attributes used by the CEOs to turn vision into action. She concluded that CEOs actively set the environment for vision and then created, articulated, inspired, implemented, and renewed the vision. Among the processes employed by CEOs were: use of clear, concise and frequent communications related to the vision; encouraging and supporting participation of involved constituents; modeling the behaviors and attributes CEOs valued; being flexible and responsive to the changing needs of their clientele: and, engaging in meaningful interactions with others.

The CEO in the Wissler and Ortiz (1988) study established a participatory approach to the reform effort that extended across ranks and hierarchy to systematically include board members, central office staff, principals, teachers and parents. The process began with the CEO's vision for the system and extended over a period of years through shared decision making, discussion and support of innovative ideas, and direct communication among the CEO and others. The entire reform process was initiated and sustained by the CEO out of his educational vision for the system and not in reaction to specific crises. The investigation of CEO leadership in this study occurred under circumstances of incremental change over 15 years, always supported by staff and community.

Ortiz and Hendrick (1987) used information from the Wissler and Ortiz study and two other studies of CEOs' reform efforts to draw links between culture and leadership. Ortiz and Hendrick made strong claims that the CEOs in these studies used cultural leadership strategies, such as shared decision making, articulated vision for the system, and intense communication, to influence the course of changes, planned and unforseen, in the school systems they headed. The strategies, although different in each system, exhibited some commonalities. The CEOs used strategies

that attended to the "quality participation for organizational members as the organization went through its cultural change" (p. 150).

Another study that links a participatory approach, collective action, and a process orientation to leaders is Roberts' (1985) study on transformational leadership. The study centers on one issue crucial to the school system and the CEO's handling of it from the time the issue first emerged until the CEO negotiated an acceptable resolution. The CEO's leadership generated the collective action of people in the educational system. Roberts also noted political dimensions to the crisis situation and the CEO's actions, but did not develop these. In the final analysis, Roberts concluded that the transformational process was due more to the CEO's creating and managing of energy and enthusiasm than to her shaping culture or managing meaning. The CEO came to be considered charismatic as a result of her successful resolution of the crisis. Roberts suggested that the charismatic feature was isolated to this incident and was possibly related to structural and contextual factors rather than the CEO's personal qualities.

The study raises questions about a CEO's use of cultural and political aspects of leadership during a transformative process that resolved a crisis situation. The study links the cultural aspect, through the concentration on transformational leadership, to the effective handling of a crisis in the school system. However, it leaves the political aspect undeveloped and does not attempt to show how the cultural and political aspects are related.

The Coleman and LaRocque (1990) study affirmed that effective CEOs exhibited elements of transformational leadership in an ongoing process of developing, through negotiation and mutual influence, a positive district ethos. The CEOs valued service to their educational clients and mutual respect within the educational community and among educational professionals. The study found that effective CEOs influenced the culture of their districts in ways consistent with the values they held and that CEOs were themselves influenced by others with whom they actively sought to share leadership, most often principals. It would seem that CEOs, in interactive, mutually influencing ways, practice a cultural aspect of leadership. The term 'negotiation,' as

used in this study, refers to cultural, not political, processes, but the description of the processes blends the distinctions between negotiation that is cultural and negotiation that could be political. The study speaks to the interactiveness of CEO leadership and to CEO attention to cultural aspects of leadership.

Pitner and Ogawa (1981) combined the results of three studies they conducted of CEOs that explored the context and meaning of CEO work. The studies established that central to CEO leadership was the notion of "mediation - the management of the process by which shared meanings are constructed among participants in the governance and operation of school systems" (p. 59). CEOs were sensitive to a broad range of individuals and groups who had interests in and exerted influence on schools. They utilized strategies such as persuasion, timing, and diversion in their efforts to guide school systems in directions they believed appropriate.

The CEOs in McLaughlin and Pfeifer's (1988) study paid highly visible and continuous attention to activities they believed were crucial to quality education in their systems. They provided an important symbolic function to organizational members by signaling and demonstrating their commitment to what they considered important system issues. They modeled the desired changes in system norms and expectations. The CEOs' leadership style was open and communicative, a style critical for developing a culture supportive of change (pp. 20-26). The study highlighted the importance of CEO attention to the cultural aspect of a system direction.

Summary of Discussion of Cultural Aspect

The literature reviewed here indicates that a cultural aspect, one that focuses on shared vision and a sense of community, is an important part of what drives a school system. The CEO, who leads the system, is important in developing the cultural aspect in interaction with others. Shared vision leading to collective action is developed through CEO leadership that emphasizes processes of participation, collegiality, shared decision making, open communication, and visibility. It is an ongoing process.

Studies of the CEO are just beginning to focus specific attention on this aspect of

CEO leadership (Leithwood & Musella, 1991). It is an area that is recognized as largely uncharted territory. Crowson (1987) reinforced the need for research in this area in his suggestions for study on school system CEOs. He called for understanding the CEO role within its organizational context, a less understood part of which are forces in the context such as "the disparate ideologies, values, and belief systems of organizational members" (p. 66). Inquiry aimed at gaining greater understanding of the cultural aspect of CEO leadership within the CEO's working context would fulfil the need for research to which Crowson drew attention.

Summary of Review of Literature

The literature reviewed here considers broad explorations of leadership theory and particular studies of CEO leadership. Leadership can be viewed through a range of perspectives, each contributing particular knowledge to the concept, but none capturing the concept in its entirety. Increasingly, leadership is considered through multiple or integrated perspectives that accommodate the variations and complexities of leadership in action. Ideas on leadership suggest leadership is a function of what leaders stand for and how they transform what is internal and intangible into external realities that followers can see and understand. These ideas suggest the importance of investigating what is at the essence of leadership, what is the nature of the personal aspect of leadership that connects meaning with action.

Research on CEO leadership considers CEOs in their contexts. Studies tend to focus primarily on the cultural or political aspect and may acknowledge the other. The political aspect is an inherent part of CEO leadership. The cultural aspect, as associated with CEO leadership, is beginning to receive attention as a specific area in need of study. The personal aspect, through which the two are mediated, is suggested as influential in studies of CEOs. The literature on CEOs referred to here along with other literature on educational leadership more generally presents CEOs as working in complex, interactive environments. Some literature focuses more on the political aspect of CEO leadership, some more on the cultural; however, increasingly the two are discussed in the same studies as necessary components of the CEO leadership

role. What is not discussed is the relationship of a personal aspect of leadership to cultural or political aspects. The personal aspect is developed in conceptions of leadership based on theorists' accumulation of knowledge; it is not developed in specific studies of CEO leadership. Studies occasionally hinted at it as an aspect of leadership in need of exploration.

CHAPTER THREE
DESIGN OF THE STUDY

This chapter outlines the design of the study. It provides information about the study's emergent design and the case study approach used within the design, the selection of the CEO, the critical incidents that formed the basis of the study, and the "influencing others" or key players involved in the critical incidents. The chapter traces the collection of data and processes used for data analysis. It addresses issues of trustworthiness as they were attended to during the course of the study.

Emergent Design Using a Case Study Approach

CEO leadership is a complex activity carried out in a complex environment. At any given time, over any given issue, a variety of internal and external influences interact with and impinge on what the CEO does and how it is done. The aim of the study was to investigate the dynamics of CEO leadership in relation to incidents identified as critical to the school system. Specific attention was focused on political, cultural, and personal aspects of leadership as the CEO, in interaction with others, worked through the critical incidents.

The study sought to explore a complex phenomenon in the context in which it occurred. As such, the study was designed to take advantage of the multiple realities and relationships that could present themselves during the investigation. Rather than impose a preordinate framework on the study of certain aspects of leadership about which there is a lack of studied knowledge, an emergent design was used (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). No single conceptual framework for the investigation was specified in advance. This allowed for the analysis and interpretation of findings, and eventually a conceptual framework, to develop from the data and not be constrained by other constructions of what might emerge.

Consistent with this emergent design, one appropriate research choice is the case study (Merriam, 1988; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1989). Using a case study approach allows me, as the researcher, to explore "the processes and dynamics of practice" (Merriam,

1988, p. xi). It allows for investigation that "retain[s] the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events" (Yin, 1989, p. 14) while adding to the clearer understanding of them. It draws attention to what particularly can be learned from a specific case (Stake, 1994). The use of case study for the research reported here is based on the choice to investigate a single case. The strategies employed, those of conducting interviews and using written records, are not exclusive to case research, but are applicable to a variety of qualitative investigations (Stake, 1994; Wolcott, 1992). Whether case study is considered a research method (Merriam, 1988; Yin, 1989) or a reporting format (Wolcott, 1992), the study of a particular case presents a unique description and interpretation from which researchers and readers can draw commonalities or comparisons with other particular cases (Stake, 1994). In the study reported here, the research questions are concerned with investigating the processes of a complex situation, that of a CEO in interaction with others, as he strove towards accomplishing the work of a school system. The end product is description and interpretation that provides greater understanding of how the CEO, in the interactive context that is inherently part of his work world, uses political and cultural aspects of leadership acted through the personal aspect, in working through incidents critical to the school system. Such an investigation of a 'how' or 'why' question about a set of events over which the researcher has little or no control (Yin, 1989, p. 20) is best facilitated through an emergent design using a case study approach.

Smith (as cited in Stake, 1994) calls case study the study of "a bounded system." Merriam (1988) elaborates on a qualitative case study through its identifying characteristics. It is particularistic, descriptive, heuristic, and inductive (pp. 11-13). The study reported here is of this nature. It is bounded by the incidents involving the CEO and those involved in influencing the course and outcome of those incidents. Its focus is specific. Extensive and intensive interviews yielded rich, 'thick' description that not only described the processes and events, but allowed me to draw interpretations from and about them. Findings were documented through the events, quotations from participants, and samples from written records. In keeping with

Yin's (1989, p. 23) definition of a case study, this study is an intensive investigation of a complex phenomenon in its real-life context with unclear boundaries between phenomenon and context and multiple sources of evidence being used.

Selection of the CEO

The study was conducted in one of the prairie provinces in Canada where the CEO of a school system is variously titled a Superintendent, Chief Superintendent, Director of Education, or Chief Executive Officer. To maintain confidentiality for the participants in the study, the term Chief Education Officer (CEO) was used to denote this position. A pseudonym was used for the CEO who was the subject of this study. Pseudonyms were also used for names of organizations and projects. Some alterations to the descriptions of participants and situations were made in keeping with the protection of confidentiality. The substantive course of events and participants' records of them were unaltered.

This study used a reputational-case format for the selection of the CEO to be studied (Lecompte & Preissle, 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988). To select a CEO, I contacted the senior executives in the major organizations in the province's public education system and asked them to select and submit the names of three CEOs who, in the educational and professional opinion of people in the organization, were 'reputationally effective' CEOs (Leithwood, Steinbach, & Raun, 1993). The seven organizations contacted were the provincial department of education, the departments of educational administration at the province's universities, the provincial teachers' association, trustees' association, professional association for central office administrators, and provincial educational leadership unit.

I made the initial contact by telephone. This allowed me to provide background information about myself and the study and to outline the request for nominations. Initial questions from the executives could be answered immediately. This initial contact was followed up with a letter and abstract of the study proposal. The written confirmation of the study and nomination request provided the executives with a two-three week period to consider the request and to consult with other senior officials, if

they so chose, to develop a list of three nominees. Within three weeks of the mailing of the requests, I had received three written responses and four telephone responses with lists of nominations.

In total, 13 different names appeared as the top three nominees recommended through this process. One CEO was named in the top three by four of the seven organizations, twice as the first nomination and twice as the second. His name also appeared twice in the lists from four organizations who voluntarily extended the list of nominees beyond the number requested. Thus, one CEO was listed by six of the seven organizations from which recommendations were requested. The next most frequently named CEO was nominated four times in the top three, twice as the first nomination, once as the second, and once as the third. His name was not included on any of the extended lists.

Based on an analysis of the submissions, I asked Hal, the most frequently named CEO, to participate in the study. I telephoned him in order to introduce the study and to request his involvement. The purpose of the first contact was to provide general background information to the request and to arrange a meeting to further discuss the study and his possible participation in it. The telephone conversation was followed immediately with a letter and copy of the abstract of the study. Three weeks after the initial contact, Hal and I met in his office to discuss the study at greater length. The conversation ranged from issues related to the design and procedures of the study to a description of the nature of the Fox Willow School District and suggestions by Hal of issues in the district that might be considered critical. I left a copy of the study proposal for him to read and we agreed that I would call him within a few days for his response about participation in the study. A week later, Hal agreed to become the CEO subject in the study.

The selection of this particular CEO, made on a reputational basis, was a fortunate selection for me as the researcher. Hal and I traced a sporadic professional acquaintance back to 1973 when he offered me a teaching position in what became the Fox Willow School District. Over the years, we had worked together on a provincial advisory committee, served on a university panel at the same time, and had contacts

during my term as a provincial educational consultant. At one point in my teaching career, I taught Hal's children. Although the working relationship was not extensive, it assisted me in gaining access to the site and in developing rapport with the CEO.

As well, the Fox Willow School District is the area in which I was born and in which I attended elementary school. Family and friends of mine have always lived in the area. I share a common religious background with the majority of the area population. My connections with the area have been, and remain, strong. My knowledge of the area comes from living in and nearby it for most of my life. This set of circumstances proved advantageous in gaining access to, and talking with, some of the people interviewed for this study.

The Critical Incident in CEO Leadership

The use of critical incidents serves to intensify the focus on CEO leadership during times of importance to the school system. Critical incidents are those issues or events identified by people, knowledgeable about the school system, that are considered to be particularly significant to the operation and direction of the school system. Cuban (1976) used this approach in conducting case studies of three CEOs and their responses to external system pressures. Critical incidents "seemed to capture the essence" (p. xiii) of the CEOs in political interaction with outside pressure groups. How leaders and others deal with critical incidents can also reveal cultural aspects of the groups involved (Schein, 1985). Beliefs, norms, and working procedures can continue unexamined and unquestioned until something critical happens to focus attention on them. Exploring critical incidents can highlight the CEO's beliefs and practices that reveal a deeper level of culture or are the beginnings of developing new beliefs, values, meanings and directions for the system. Participants' recollections and written records of events preceived as crucial will tend to be more extensive than for events to which less significance is attached. The use of critical incidents in research into CEO leadership offers an additional way to focus specifically on the CEO and CEO leadership.

In a study of CEOs in three American school systems, Huff (1985) set out to investigate the implications, for CEOs, of a working context taken to be multifacited and complicated. In order to capture CEO leadership in a transitory, complex environment, Huff bounded the investigation by focusing on CEO leadership related to several "key issues" identified by the CEOs. For the purposes of the study, key issues were defined as those issues the CEOs "felt would affect the long-run life of their district and that currently demanded their time" (p. 161). The key issues were preceived as important to the school system, important enough to demand continual CEO attention in the interests of the effective functioning of the system. Key issues provided the researchers with a way to focus on CEO leadership in an intensive, selective manner. It narrowed the possibilities of phenomena to be explored to a manageable range that would capture CEO leadership in situations of significance.

A limitation of the Huff study was that the CEOs identified the key issues for investigation. No other references were sought to confirm the importance of the issues to the school systems. This raises the possibility that the issues selected were those with a reasonable chance of favorable and/or easy resolution. It also remains unclear as to whether other people with knowledge of the CEO and the school system would preceive the same issues as key. What is important to the CEO may not be of the same consequence to those with whom the CEO works. This limitation in the selection of critical incidents could be overcome if others familiar with the CEO and the school system verified the incidents to be investigated as critical, not only to the CEO, but to knowledgeable others as well.

The use of critical incidents as the focus for investigating the CEO's leadership of a school system provided me with a way to explore, in depth, certain events and issues considered key to the system. Critical incidents are the "information-rich cases . . . from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research" (Patton, 1990, p. 169). The issues of central importance in this study were Hal's use of political and cultural aspects of leadership as he, together with others involved in the incidents, worked through the events and issues. Critical incidents are part of the "purposeful sampling" (Patton, 1990) that provided a picture

of the Hal's leadership in situations of heightened importance to the system. Because they are identified as key among the educational happenings of the school system, these incidents carry with them an intensity of involvement that sharpens people's recollections of them.

Selection of Critical Incidents

The selection of critical incidents in this study was developed from those identified by Hal and others knowledgeable about him as the CEO and the school system in which he worked. Incidents were solicited on this reputational-case basis (Lecompte & Preissle, 1993; Merriam, 1988). The selection of incidents was made by considering the frequency of recommendations and attempting to gain a variation within a sample size reasonable for me to investigate indepth.

Once Hal agreed to participate in the study, the discussion between us, as researcher and CEO, became issue-focussed (Sackman, 1991). I asked Hal to identify incidents he considered critical to the Fox Willow School District during his tenure. For incidents to be considered for investigation, they had to have occurred in the past and be considered closed. The criteria helped to bound the study. It also assisted me in investigating the incidents by identifying a beginning and end to each incident. I asked Hal to identify between five and seven such incidents.

Within a few days, Hal had compiled a list of seven critical incidents. The list included specific items such as the development of a particular program as well as more general items such as long term planning at a system level. We discussed the backgrounds to each incident and he indicated why he considered each one critical to the system.

We then discussed the process by which the critical incidents would be verified. Together, we generated a list of fifteen names of people who knew Hal and his work as a CEO well enough to identify their own lists of critical incidents. The original list of fifteen names included three current CEOs, eight elementary or secondary administrators, no teachers, and no Board members. Upon reflection of the groups represented on the list and with Hal's knowledge, I approached two of the

administrators named on the list for the names of teachers and Board members who could identify critical incidents involving Hal as CEO. From the twenty names eventually generated, I chose nine people to contact who represented different groups which have contact with the CEO. Those contacted were: a retired CEO from a school system adjacent to Fox Willow who knew Hal from the time of his appointment as a CEO; a present CEO from a different system adjacent to Fox Willow who knew Hal in more recent years; a regional CEO; two principals: one from an elementary school and the other from a secondary school; two Fox Willow Central Office people, a consultant and secretary-treasurer of the Board; a teacher; and, a parent who had also been a Board member.

I contacted each person by telephone and introduced the study and the task I was asking of her or him. I asked each person to list between five and seven critical incidents that she or he would associate with Hal's leadership in Fox Willow. The initial contact provided me with the opportunity to answer any questions the person might have. Four people asked for a specific explanation of the term "critical incident:" one person used the word "crisis" as synonymous with "critical." In each case, I expanded on what was intended as a "critical incident;" it was to be a key issue or event, something that stood out in this person's remembrance as being highly important in Hal's leadership of the school system. I used terms and explanations that allowed the people compiling the lists to include critical incidents that could be interpreted as either positive or negative experiences for the CEO. I did not provide examples of what might be a critical incident for the CEO, although asked specifically by two people to do so. The task seemed a difficult one for these two people, one of whom expressed frustration at perhaps not being as useful to the study as she could be, and the other by calling me back the next day with additional incidents he had thought of that fit the explanation of "critical incident." The telephone contact was followed with a letter which again briefly outlined the study and the request for a list of five to seven critical incidents. A week to ten days later, I telephoned each person and received from her or him the list of critical incidents. The direct contact facilitated further clarification of the request, if necessary, and resulted in my obtaining a

complete list of five to seven items from each person. Eight of the nine people indicated that the incidents were given without any ordering of priority; one person indicated that the list was in "semi-order of importance." No one knew what incidents were on others' lists before giving her or his own.

In total, Hal and the nine people I contacted listed 59 incidents they considered critical. I grouped the incidents in the following way: 1) incidents that were repeated on two or more lists; 2) incidents that were similar in focus, for example, incidents related to program or facilities or staff, and 3) incidents that were singularly mentioned. The incidents covered a broad range of issues and events, both specific and general. For instance, incidents as specific as the relocation of the central office from one community to another and the development of a formula for supervision time, were listed. Incidents as general as financial management and dedication to the job were also listed. Incidents ranged from the development of curricular programs to the management of busing.

From the lists of incidents, I identified four themes: the development of instructional programs within the district: system growth and facility expansion; professional development and support of staff and communities; and the cross-divisional development and implementation of special education services. In addition, one incident not directly related to the themes was listed repeatedly. This incident was the establishment of Willow Christian Academy. In making the selection of incidents to investigate, I considered frequently named incidents and incidents that represented sufficient breadth of situation to allow for the emergence of common and/or diverse patterns in the CEO's leadership.

I selected two incidents for the study: one came from one of the themes and the other was a specific incident identified independently of the themes. The two incidents were the establishment of a joint special education project, the Claremont Shared Services Centre (CSSC), and the creation of Willow Christian Academy (WCA). Hal and six of the nine respondents named the CSSC or one of its components as a critical incident. Hal and seven of the nine people listed the WCA as a critical incident. No other single incident or group of incidents was as frequently named as were these two.

These incidents also met the criteria of being completed in the sense that each dealt with the establishment of services or a school that had a specific beginning and could be considered closed once the facility or services were in operation. Both incidents affected the delivery of educational services throughout the school district; they represented key departures from previous practices within the district; and they were of critical importance to the nature of education in the Fox Willow School District.

Taken together, the two incidents provide a view of CEO leadership in varying situations and at varying times during his tenure with the district. The CSSC incident occurred early in Hal's career as CEO of Fox Willow. It involved four school districts, a university department and the provincial education department. It was initiated cooperatively by the four CEOs out of a common educational focus. Hal, as CEO of Fox Willow, was one of a collaborative group who planned and implemented the joint special education project. The WCA incident occurred when Hal had been CEO of Fox Willow for about twelve years. The incident was internal to the school system. It was initiated by a specific parent group expressing a particular concern about the public school system. The incident began out of a conflict of interests and required prolonged discussion and negotiation to resolve. Hal was central in bringing together the affected groups to reach an acceptable agreement.

The incidents provided me with the opportunity to study Hal's leadership under two different circumstances. Neither incident is so unusual as to be considered atypical of a CEO's work context; yet, the incidents are different enough to provide a broad view of a CEO's work. By investigating two incidents, I was able to provide detailed descriptions of each incident, useful in documenting the distinctiveness of each one, and still discern any commonalities that might occur across the incidents, and thereby gain significance as shared patterns occurring in different circumstances. Limiting the study to the investigation of one incident could result in inadvertently studying an extreme or unique incident when this was not the purpose of the study. Investigating two incidents offset this possibility while providing for the emergence of shared patterns. Investigating three or more incidents would have compromised the

depth with which I could have studied any one of the incidents. Two incidents was the optimum number to provide both reasonable depth and breadth to the study of aspects of a CEO's leadership in interaction with others.

Collection of Data

Data for case studies of the kind reported here come from three broad sources: observations, interviews, and written records (Merriam, 1988; Stake, 1988; Wolcott, 1992; Yin, 1989). This study used interviews and written records as primary sources for data collection since the incidents investigated occurred in the past. The CSSC incident occurred in the early-mid 1970's. The WCA incident occurred in the mid-1980's. Data collection for the study occurred between 1992 and 1994.

For each incident I investigated, information was gathered from different participants and from available written records. Data collected from multiple sources (Yin, 1989) not only generate 'richer data' and 'thicker description,' but also provide for triangulation and validation. These serve to support the credibility and trustworthiness of the study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988; Patton, 1990; Wolcott, 1988; Yin, 1989).

Interviews

The primary method of data collection for this study was the interview. For case studies investigating human affairs, as this one does, interviews are an essential means of eliciting information (Yin, 1989). Conducting interviews with different people about a single event is a way of tapping the multiple sources of evidence needed to ensure the completeness and authenticity of the study's findings. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend the use of information elicited from interviews to construct and reconstruct phenomena, to contribute to the triangulation of data and to provide for member checks of information. At the initial interview, I provided each person with a research permission form (see Appendix A). We went over its content together and signed it.

Claremont Shared Services Centre (CSSC)

Data collection on the CSSC incident began with a two hour interview with the CEO. Hal gave the early history of the CSSC project, a history that covered a ten year period from the initial cooperative venture of the CEOs of the four neighboring school districts to the implementation by the Department of Education of a provincial model of shared services centres. During that ten year period the CSSC group established a joint facility, the Claremont Shared Services Centre, began a second joint project called the Behavior Management Model, and became involved with the production of a video series as part of the Shared Services In-Service Project.

After the initial interview, I reviewed Hal's comments on the CSSC project and read the written information on the early history of the project that Hal provided. Following these deliberations, I decided to focus on the beginnings of the CSSC. The initial three years of the project, 1973-1976, marked the first time these four school systems worked together on a collaborative project. It was during this time that the foundational planning was done for what became a long term joint working arrangement. I decided to concentrate on the initial phase of the project, the time when the four distinct school districts joined together to meet a common educational purpose.

The next interview with the CEO focused on the initial creation of the CSSC. Hal answered questions about:

- how the project was initiated;
- how it developed;
- what the issues were and how they were resolved;
- his involvement in the project;
- the significance of the project to him and his school system;
- who the "influencing others" or key players were in this phase of the development of the CSSC.

Hal named eight people in three groups as the "influencing others." These included: officials in the other three cooperating school districts; university personnel; officials in the provincial education department. These names were the basis for

succeeding interviews about the CSSC and Hal's involvement in the project. This network selection (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Merriam, 1988) of "influencing others" continued until no new names were mentioned by the people interviewed.

Hal also described two department officials whom he felt were influential at the time, but for whom he could not recall complete names. I attempted to identify and locate the two department officials whom Hal described. One had left the department and moved out of the province. I was unsuccessful in locating this person. The other person had retired and, again, I was unable to locate him.

All eight people named as key players by the CEO were interviewed. Each of these people named between five and twelve others. The majority of these names repeated each other. What emerged was a core list of twelve names, including Hal's. Seven names were identified only once as influential in the development of the CSSC. I located and requested an interview with every person who was named at least twice as a key player. Eleven of these people were interviewed; one person declined to be interviewed.

Interviews were semistructured (Merriam, 1988). I prepared a general list of questions for each incident. Appendix B provides the interview questions for the CSSC incidents. Questions dealt with the description of the incident, its development, its importance to various people, the names of others involved in the process, and the outcome of the incident. The semistructured format allowed people to voice similarities and differences in perspectives to questions asked of everyone. It also allowed people to present individual perspectives which I could then probe more fully (Merriam, 1988; Patton, 1990).

All of the people interviewed were educators; the majority of interviews took place in people's offices. Interviews were an average of an hour in length. All interviews were tape recorded, with participant consent, and transcribed for later review and analysis.

At some point during every interview, the tone moved from that of an interview to that of a conversation (Spradley, 1979). I had worked professionally with five of the eleven people named as influential in the CSSC incident. There were connections

in the present or past work relationships between me and all of the people interviewed. This circumstance assisted me in gaining access for interviews and in creating an open, relaxed atmosphere during the interviews. I did not detect any assumptions made by the people interviewed about the level of knowledge or possible personal bias I might have about the CSSC incident. The incident had occurred twenty years ago and was viewed positively by all the people interviewed. I detected no hesitations in people's responses that might have been attributable to dissenting views or negative opinions. Hesitations occurred because of the length of time between the incident and the people's recollections of it. At the time of the interviews, four people were still actively involved in the same or similar educational positions as those they had held during the CSSC incident. Five people indicated that they had gone back through personal files and copies of reports to refresh their memories in preparation for the interviews.

No subsequent interviews were held with the people named as "influencing others" in the CSSC incident. By the end of each interview, people indicated that their recollections of the incident had been exhausted. I held two subsequent interviews with Hal about the CSSC incident. Each of these was an hour in length. As I became more familiar with the CSSC project, I required additional information about specific aspects of the project. These interviews focused on collecting that information.

Towards the end of the investigation of the CSSC project, I also interviewed Hal about the internal system happenings in special education that corresponded to the cross-district planning and implementation of the CSSC. This extended the information about the CEO and the incident to provide a more comprehensive view that incorporated internal and external school system events. The interview with Hal led to an additional four interviews with people involved with special education services within Fox Willow. These people were an elementary school principal with a special education facility in the school, a parent of special needs children, a special education teacher, and the district consultant in special education. Two of these interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Two of these people agreed to be interviewed, but declined to have the interviews tape recorded.

Willow Christian Academy (WCA)

Data collection on the WCA incident began with Hal and me meeting on two consecutive days for two hours each time. Hal began by providing general background to the incident and the nature of the people involved. He went on to speak specifically and extensively about:

- the Kirklanders' concern with public schools and the reasons behind it;
- the kind of education the Kirklanders wanted for their children;
- the issues raised by the Kirklanders;
- his response to the Kirklander position;
- the initial positions of the Board members and Department officials to the Kirklanders' intent;
- the options available to the District in response to the Kirklanders' intent;
- reactions of staff and communities to the situation;
- changes in people's positions as the incident unfolded;
- the process of meetings and discussions that resulted in a resolution to the incident;
- the significance of the incident to him, the District, and the Kirklanders;
- those people he considered as influencing others in the WCA incident.

Throughout the interviews Hal provided his perspectives on the issues and events and his understanding of the positions of others involved in the incident. He described his actions and the reasons behind them.

Hal named eleven people as "influencing others" in the WCA incident. These people represented four groups: the parent group, who were members of the Kirkland Church; Board members; staff in the Fox Willow office; officials in the Department of Education. I contacted all eleven people; ten were willing to be interviewed.

Each of the ten people interviewed named between three and ten others. The majority of these names repeated each other. The emergent list consisted of twenty names, including Hal's. Thirteen names were identified only once as influential to the course of the WCA incident. These names tended to appear within a particular group.

For instance, the Kirklanders provided lists of people from within their own group, but were unable to name people from the Department of Education whom they considered influential. Department officials provided lists of people from within the Department, but could name few others from the Kirkland group. I accounted for every person named at least twice as an "influencing other." I interviewed eighteen people, one person was deceased, and one declined to be interviewed.

I attempted to follow a semistructured format (Merriam, 1988) for these interviews. Appendix C provides the interview questions for the WCA incident. However, the majority of interviews with the Kirklanders and Board members resembled informal conversations (Patton, 1990) more than semistructured interviews. The interviews took place in people's homes which set a hospitable atmosphere; most interviews were accompanied with coffee and food. One person, whose memory was beginning to fail him, invited his wife to be part of the interview to assist in his recollection of events. These people appeared pleased to discuss what had been an important time in their lives and, given the opportunity and an interested listener, they spoke openly and informally about the WCA incident. The interviews averaged between one and one-and-a-half hours. Often, additional time was spent in friendly talk about my connection to the area or commonly remembered events or people. I noted that my affiliations with the area eased the entry into the discussion of the WCA. Assumptions were made about my level of knowledge about the Kirklanders, but not about my stance toward the WCA incident. The WCA incident occurred after I had moved out of the immediate region.

Fourteen interviews were tape recorded, with participant consent, for later transcription and analysis. Four people agreed to be interviewed, but declined to have the interviews recorded. In these cases, I took notes during the interview and added details to them immediately following the interview. No subsequent interviews were held with any of the people named as key players.

During twenty months between my initial contact with Hal and the completion of data collection, I made a minimum of 25 contacts with Hal. The majority of these were direct meetings and telephone conversations. The content of the conversations

was evenly distributed among discussions about the CSSC, the WCA, and general topics relating to Hal and/or the school district. Not every phone conversation was noted.

Written Records

The use of written resources in the form of personal and official records and documents as additional sources of information, where appropriate, is recommended (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Wolcott, 1988). Documents and "written resources" (Wolcott, 1988) constituted the bulk of the artifacts considered in this study. This source of data assisted in triangulation and corroboration. Written records relating to the incidents mutually identified by Hal and others included newspaper accounts, magazine articles, school board minutes of regular and special meetings, memos, correspondence, policy statements, memorandums of agreement, reports, background papers, notes of meetings, and working drafts of documents. Written records were supplied by Hal and a few of those named as "influencing others." The majority of people interviewed no longer had in their possession, or no longer had access to, written records pertaining to the two incidents. As many of the written records as possible were gathered; however, some records, such as minutes of meetings from the 1970's, had been lost or destroyed since the time of the incident.

For the CSSC incident, I had access to minutes of the project from the late 1970's to the present, but not from the early 1970's when the project originated. These had been destroyed or misplaced when Fox Willow moved its central office from one community to another in the early 1980's. Written records for this incident included such items as:

- the final report of the CSSC written and published by the university personnel at the time the pilot phase of the project ended;
- the Chronicle, a quarterly newsletter for the participants in the project;
- the formal (legal) agreement signed by the participating school districts when the joint facility opened;
- the policy manual for the joint facility;

- reports on the joint service model written for participating groups;
- sporadic minutes, memorandums, and letters from the mid-late 1970's.

For the WCA incident, I had access to written records such as:

- minutes of eight special meetings held to discuss the Kirklander Christian School Project, April 1, 1984 to January 27, 1986;
- minutes of regular Board meetings from 1983 to 1986;
- notes of meetings made by participants;
- correspondence between and among Hal, the Kirklanders, Department officials, District personnel, legal counsel for the teachers' association, and a Christian publishing firm;
- newspaper articles from the area tracing the progress of the WCA discussions;
- legal opinions from the trustees' and teachers' associations;
- an excerpt from a legislative debate which mentions the WCA incident;
- informal background papers written by Hal and a representative of the Kirklander group;
- position papers written by Hal;
- memos from Hal;
- lists of families intending to withdraw students from Fox Willow schools;
- government documents relating to education legislation and regulations;
- drafts of the agreement eventually signed by Fox Willow and the Kirklanders.

Gathering information through interviews and written records was the formal information-seeking phase of the study. Although data collection and data analysis appear here as separate activities, in practice they were not discrete (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). They occurred more or less simultaneously, with one activity 'informing' the other. I moved between data collection and analysis in a continuing effort to clarify both.

Hal provided me with written records pertaining to both incidents at our initial interviews. In the case of the CSSC incident, the written records helped to clarify and narrow the focus of the incident. In the case of the WCA incident, the written records provided information helpful in understanding the outline of events so that interview

time could focus on perspectives and understandings rather than a chronology of events. Interviews were conducted and written records gathered throughout the data collection period. Tapes from interviews were transcribed on an ongoing basis and I moved back and forth between conducting interviews, reading written records and transcripts, and analyzing the material collected.

Analysis of Data

I analyzed data from the interviews and written records in various ways and in successive phases. Written records supplied confirmation and support for spoken ideas. A reliance on interviews rather than written records in the writing of the study reflected Hal's and others' tendency to credit actions over written words (Butt, 1993: Smith, 1994).

Strategies for analysis were drawn from a variety of sources, such as Miles and Huberman (1994) and Strauss and Corbin (1990), without being confined by the techniques in any single source. I coded interview transcripts, reviewed written records, developed charts and maps, and wrote comments that moved between the collection of data and the analysis of data in an iterative way. Each successive review of material and written reflection moved the analysis along to a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of the incidents and the CEO's leadership as part of them.

Data analysis for the two incidents followed a similar process. They are discussed together here for ease of description. In actuality, the analyses rarely proceeded at the same pace or at the same time.

After each interview, I wrote up fieldnotes to capture my own reactions and observations about the interview. These notes were added to the transcripts of the interview and became part of the data for the study. The discussion of the analysis of data that follows concentrates on material from the interviews. A process similar to that described was used in coding the written records. Information from written records was incorporated into the charts, maps, matrices, and case records. Journal writings and memos were based on all of the data collected.

Transcripts of recorded interviews were initially coded in segments for the main elements of the incident. The elements related to the interview questions and focused on the chronology of the incident, events, issues, and the CEO's involvement. The size of the coded segments was determined by the topic; segments ranged from one paragraph to several pages in length. This first-level coding created categories of a descriptive nature (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In the CSSC incident, the main events included the initial formation of the working group, the year of special education inservice for professional staff, and the planning for the joint Centre. The main issues included obtaining funding support and the development of teacher support for the delivery of special education services. Events and issues overlapped on occasion, such as the issue of funding support which some people regarded as an important issue and others considered a straightforward event. I noted instances of differing viewpoints and coded the segments accordingly. References to Hal's involvement were frequently interspersed with references to the involvement of the other CEOs as a group.

In the WCA incident, the main events included the initial awareness by the Board of the Kirklanders' concerns with practices in the public schools, the series of meetings between the Board and the Kirklanders, the proposal for an alternate school arrangement for the Kirklanders, and the signing of the agreement establishing WCA. The main issues included views on public education, parental involvement in determining the nature of their children's education, WCA as setting a precedent for other groups, and the selection of teachers for the alternate school. Certain issues were of different importance to different groups. For instance, the issue of setting a precedent was viewed with apprehension by Board members, with interest as a possible model by Department officials, and with excitement by the Kirklanders. In this incident, references to the CEO's involvement were clearly focused on Hal as a single individual, rather than on Hal as part of a group as in the CSSC incident.

As coding progressed, I wrote comments along the margins of the transcripts. At first, these noted insights or summarized long sections of remarks. In the coding of successive transcripts, they also marked places of repeated phrases or differing

views. The marginal remarks (Miles & Huberman, 1994), used in these ways, came to alert me to recurring patterns or disconfirming comments that aided in the next level of coding. Marginal remarks were refined and added to the transcripts in later readings as well.

Once all the transcripts had been individually coded, I looked for common themes. Some initial themes in the CSSC incident were: working cooperatively; concern for the development of teachers; building support for this mode of delivery of special education services, and the commitment of the CEOs to the project. In the WCA incident, initial themes were: concern for the quality of education for Kirklander students; growing understanding of each group's position by the other; importance of control over teacher selection, and recognition of Hal's ability to keep the groups talking with each other. These themes were pulled out and used as another way of looking at the transcript data.

A second-level coding, of an interpretive nature (Miles & Huberman, 1994) was done. Charts and maps were drawn that brought the data together in different ways. Appendix D provides examples of these. Chronologies were created and key events and issues highlighted. Maps were developed for each group involved in each incident. Each map visually presented the perspectives of each group on the issues and events. A composite map for each incident was developed that displayed the perspectives of all the groups and the CEO. These showed places of agreement and disagreement among the views of the groups and offered clues about possibly related events and understandings. The amount of information displayed on the composite maps also revealed much that was interesting, but not necessarily relevant to the purpose of the study. This sent me back to the literature and the purpose of the study to discern what data related to the research questions and what did not. Additional rounds of selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) ensued in which I continued to gather, develop, display, consider, select, and refine the data.

Throughout the study, I kept a journal for notes and reflective remarks (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Recorded comments and questions became the basis for gathering additional information or for returning to the data to reread and reflect on information

already collected. Journal entries provided a place to try out ideas, make tentative interpretations, and record puzzling findings.

Journal writings led to another phase of analysis, that of memoing (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). I began to write longer pieces of thinking about the data based on comments in the journal. Memos evolved into discourses about a variety of aspects of the study such as relationships among groups and ideas in the incidents or arguments for the use of one term rather than another. Some of the memos were incorporated into the body of the study as the writing of it took shape; some memos were replaced by other considerations as analysis progressed; some memos were discarded as narrow or limited in light of later thinking. The value of memoing was in the concrete recording of abstract ideas. It forced me to explicitly and clearly set out ideas, a function that aided in bringing to focus the salient ideas in the study (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

I wrote a series of case records (Merriam, 1988) for the incidents. The case records pulled together the information about the incidents into more comprehensive narratives. Initially, a case record was written for each of the groups involved in each incident, presenting the incident from the viewpoint of that group. In the case of the CSSC, this resulted in records that were repetitive. The records of the three groups, the CEOs, the university, and the Department, were integrated into a single case record that included perspectives of all the groups as well as a chronology of events and an outline of the main issues. This comprehensive case record is presented in Appendix E. In the case of the WCA, the case records remained individual records of the Fox Willow Board, the Kirklanders, the Department of Education, and the CEO. The case record of Hal included background to the school system and himself as well as an overview of the chronology of events and the main issues. Appendix F contains the compilation of the case records of the WCA incident. The case records were originally intended to be descriptive accounts of the incidents; in fact, they became accounts that combined description with interpretation.

As I became familiar with the incidents, their events, development, significance, and the positions and views of each group, another level of analysis took shape.

Matrices (Miles & Huberman, 1994) were developed to assist in the explorations of the data. In the CSSC incident, a "significance" matrix was created from people's comments about the significance of the CSSC to them and their group. The matrix helped me to understand the value each person in each group attached to the establishment of joint special education services. It allowed me to discern the perceptions and values that were common within and across groups and those that were different within and across groups. In the WCA incident, a time-ordered matrix of events and activities of each group was plotted. It allowed me to simultaneously track each group during the course of the incident. The matrix helped to explore key points and points of interaction among the groups.

Data and previous analyses were reread and reconsidered for indications of Hal's use of political, cultural, and personal aspects during the course of the critical incidents. This reconsideration was guided by the data themselves, previous analyses, discussions with an educational colleague, and the literature on leadership that speaks to the political and cultural aspects of leadership. Events, activities, and the language used to discuss the incidents, were studied again according to the literature descriptions of political, cultural, and personal aspects.

As data analysis proceeded, I distributed the case records to people in each group for their reading and verification of the accuracy of the records. This provided for local verification of the credibility and trustworthiness of the study, and the accuracy of the information and perceptions supplied by the key players and recorded by the researcher. This helped "to obtain confirmation that the report has captured the data as constructed by the informants, [and] to correct, amend, or extend it, that is, to establish the credibility of the case" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 236). These "member checks" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) occurred after analysis had progressed to the stage of the writing of the case records. The member checks consisted of member approvals regarding the authenticity of the individual contributions to the research and not to my research interpretations.

Trustworthiness

A trustworthy study exemplifies disciplined inquiry, and ensures and confirms its status as a worthy endeavor. Establishing trustworthiness confers legitimation on the study (Owens, 1982). Lincoln and Guba (1985) view trustworthiness from a holistic perspective where validity, reliability, and credibility make sense in a combined rather than discrete sense.

A variety of techniques have been employed by naturalistic researchers to enhance the trustworthiness of their studies. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend strategies such as prolonged data collection, triangulation, member checks, developing thick description, peer debriefing, and audit trail. This study relied on strategies from this list as they were incorporated into the design and implementation of the study. I collected data until the network of those involved in the course of identified critical incidents was exhausted. Information gathering was prolonged until as many sources as possible of available evidence, written and verbal, had been accounted for. Data from the people interviewed and from the written records reflected a variety of viewpoints about each incident investigated. This range of perspectives provided multiple views on the incidents and interactions studied. The use of multiple perspectives helped to clarify meanings and verify interpretations. This provided the basis for triangulating the data (Stake, 1994). Member checks with the CEO were ongoing. Member checks with others took place to verify the accuracy of the case record accounts. The volume of information gathered allowed for the development of thick description. Contacts were made with two educational peers outside the boundary of the study to act as peer debriefers. These people acted as neutral readers and/or listeners as the study took shape. One of the debriefers was associated with a university. We met on an as-needed basis to discuss the progress of the study. Methodological, substantive, and ethical issues were discussed. The other debriefer was an educational colleague of mine who met with me on a regular basis to listen to, read drafts of, and question the progress of the study. This debriefer also read the transcripts of the interviews and discussed the case records with me. Records were kept of successive analyses as data collection and interpretation proceeded.

Limitations of the Study

The results of the study have limited generalizability to other CEOs. This study focused on Hal, the CEO selected through reputational nomination, and the critical incidents he and others knowledgeable of him identified. As such, the findings were particular to the incidents investigated.

This study was also limited by the nature and availability of data collection. Participants' views on the critical incidents were retrospective and subject to individual selection and recollections. This was particularly problematic for the CSSC incident which took place twenty years ago. At times, Hal's and others' views differed among themselves in the interpretations of the incidents and, occasionally, people's views differed with data from written records.

Summary

This study used a case study approach within an emergent design to explore political, cultural, and personal aspects of leadership of a Chief Education Officer of a prairie school system. The CEO was selected through a reputational-case format.

Critical incidents involving Hal, the CEO, in interaction with "influencing others" were used as the focus for investigating aspects of the CEO's leadership. Two incidents were identified for indepth study. One incident involved the development and implementation of a broad, cross-district arrangement for sharing special education services. The other incident involved the establishment of a new school, with a particular emphasis, within the school district.

Interviews and written records were the main sources of data collected for the study. A network process, beginning with the CEO, was used to identify people to be interviewed about the critical incidents. Written records were gathered from people and organizations pertinent to the incidents.

The analysis of data proceeded along with data collection. Transcriptions of tape recorded interviews and written records were analyzed for common themes and disconfirming comments or events. Case records were developed for each incident

and for participant groups within each incident. As noted earlier in the chapter, Appendices E and F provide the compilations of the case records for the CSSC and WCA incidents, respectively.

As data collection and analysis proceeded, techniques were employed to ensure the trustworthiness of the study. These included triangulation of data, member checks, and development of thick description.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE DISTRICT, CRITICAL INCIDENTS, AND CEO

In a study with an emergent design, case records describe the incidents from which themes are drawn and analyzed. This chapter presents an overview of the case records for the two critical incidents of this study. It introduces the school district, the incidents, and the CEO. It provides a transition between the full case records (Appendices E, F) and the themes which emerged from the cases and are analyzed in subsequent chapters.

The Fox Willow School District

The Fox Willow School District is nestled in the river valley region between the east and west branches of the Prairie River. The history of the area can be traced back 6 000 years through archeological sites preserved at the edge of the district's boundaries. The river valley included aboriginal hunting and gathering places with practical and ceremonial significance. Today, the Indian and Metis presence in the region remains strong, with a population concentrated in the northern section of the school district.

The late 1800's witnessed a wave of European immigration to the prairies and to the river valley region specifically. These immigrants, mainly farmers with various Anabaptist roots, came primarily from eastern Europe/western Ukraine regions. They came to the prairies as much for the religious freedom that was offered them as for the land settlement offers. With European settlement, the Fox Willow area became, and remains, basically an agrarian region.

In geographic terms, the Fox Willow School District is one of the smallest districts in the province, yet, in terms of student population, it is the province's largest rural school district. The assessment base of the area is low and the district's per student spending is one of the lowest in the province. Hal claims that "Fox Willow has always been short on funding." At the time of the study, the district served 5 200

students in 20 schools in 10 communities. In addition, it included 5 schools that operated under either church or Band arrangements.

During the time of the two incidents of this study (1972-1986), the Fox Willow School District was in a period of steady growth. Student population increased from 3 000 in 1972 to 5 200 in 1986, and the need for schools in which to house the increased enrollment resulted in a series of capital building projects. Six schools were built during this time in five locations. As well, the school district underwent a name change, a governance change, and a relocation of central office facilities.

Overview of the Critical Incidents

One of the incidents selected for the study occurred early in Hal's tenure as CEO of the Fox Willow School District. He had just been appointed CEO when the need arose to address the delivery of special education services in the district. The CSSC (Claremont Shared Services Centre) was a cross-district project geared to sharing and coordinating special education services among four neighbouring school systems. The CEOs from the participating school systems coordinated the CSSC project. They established a joint facility in the city of Claremont and staffed it with personnel who served the needs of a particular segment of special education students from throughout the four school districts. CSSC began as a pilot project, called the Claremont Region Special Services Project (CRSSP), in the early 1970's. The original partners were Fox Willow and three neighbouring school districts, and a university special education department. The provincial Department of Education provided pilot funding for the first three years. For the purpose of this study, the CSSC critical incident corresponds to the beginning of the CRSSP. It begins with the initiation of the joint project proposal among the CEOs and ends with the opening of the joint facility and the establishment of concomittant services within Fox Willow. At present, the CSSC continues to operate among the four original partners, without the involvement of the university and with regular special education funding from the province.

The other criticial incident selected for the study occurred when Hal had been CEO of Fox Willow for twelve years. This incident was the establishment of the

WCA (Willow Christian Academy). WCA was an independent alternate school organized in the mid-1980's in response to a group of parents from a particular religious denomination, Kirkland Church, who wanted to withdraw their children from Fox Willow schools and create their own school. Hal is credited as being instrumental in working out a way for a "publically funded private school" (as one respondent called it) to be established under the organizational umbrella of the Fox Willow School District. The process of establishing WCA was, at times, conflictual and involved a number of groups with differing views on the desirability of pursuing options that might accommodate the Kirklander request. The agreement to establish WCA required twenty months of discussion and negotiation to complete. It is this initial time period, from the first formal expression of concern by the Kirklanders to the Board to the signing of the agreement to establish WCA, that constitutes the critical incident for the study. By the time WCA was in operation, it was, and still is, considered a model for an alternate school operating successfully within provincial guidelines in a regularly-organized school district.

The Fox Willow District Office

The present office of the Fox Willow School District is a relatively new building. Less than ten years old, it sits on the outskirts of a small town across the street from the local high school and just down the street from the district's maintenance shop. The building is single story, reddish brown brick and warm brown wood. The CEO's office is immediately beside the front entrance. A framed poster of an eagle in flight hangs on the wall beside the door to the office. It reads: "LEADERS Leaders are like eagles. They don't flock. You find them one at a time." Other pictures on the walls in the reception area are of students' art works, framed and acknowledged with students' names, schools, and grade levels. The area has chairs and a coffee table with reading materials. These range from information pamphlets about the district to copies of the newspaper of the provincial teachers' association to collections of students' writings from schools in the district.

The CEO's office is a rectangular room with two walls of windows and two walls of bookshelves and file cabinets. Only one item hangs on the walls, a poster of a forest scene with a path meandering through it. The text on the poster are lines from "The Road Not Taken" by Robert Frost. The CEO's desk sits at one end and, when sitting behind it, Hal has views of the front entrance, the high school and the town in one direction, and an outdoor rink and the fields on the edge of town in the other. Soft chairs, a couch and a coffee table complete the furnishings. Coasters and coffee cups display the district's logo, a sheaf of wheat against a green background, and motto, "Caring - Learning - Excellence." The proximity of the district office to a school and a maintenance building is indicative of Hal's closeness to the various aspects of the operation of the district. He is as involved with administrative matters as he is with educational ones. They are both part of what he does and he considers them equally worthy of careful attention.

The CEO

In the 24 years that Hal has been the CEO of Fox Willow School District, he has overseen many changes. Facilities, programs, enrollments - all are remarkably different now than in 1972 when he became the CEO of what was then called the Wauring School Unit. The district was "ready for change," he acknowledges, when he arrived. The district had been one of the last in the province to become a larger school unit, long after most regions had taken advantage of provincial legislation encouraging the formation of larger school units. When Hal arrived in 1972, he found a school unit with "a lot of catching up to do with other larger units in the province. . . it had lots of scope for growth." This situation made his job "a lot easier" than if he had come into "a progressive, leading-edge" district where it might have been difficult "just to keep up" with past practices.

Initial descriptions of Hal as a CEO were volunteered to me by his peers during the selection of a CEO for this study and later by others during the selection of critical incidents for the study. None of the descriptors that follow came from people who were interviewed for the study. Hal was seen by a university official as

"demonstrably effective . . . he has seen baptism by fire." He is "open to innovations" according to a teacher organization executive. A teacher in a Fox Willow school sees him as dedicated to his job "beyond the call of duty . . . the CEO position is his life . . . I don't see him as separate from his job the way I see other people apart from their work." A parent in the district appreciates the way he "gets things done . . . he's on top of things." A CEO colleague comments that "He's one of our prizes."

Now, as he nears retirement, Hal is as actively involved in considering new ideas and facilitating change as he was when he first came to Fox Willow as CEO. During one of the last interviews for this study, Hal mused about what he sees as the coming changes in education provincially, such things as school district amalgamations, the revisitation of the Catholic 'public' system, and the development of joint district working arrangements, particularly among the Fox Willow, Mearel, and Lark school districts.

CHAPTER FIVE
THEMES IN CEO LEADERSHIP

This chapter presents the findings in terms of the main themes common to the CEO's leadership in the two incidents. These themes are the personal vision of the CEO, the belief systems of the groups with whom the CEO worked, the CEO's knowledge of the contexts of his work, and the CEO's focus on problem solving. Embedded in these themes are the interrelated strands of political, cultural, and personal aspects of the CEO's leadership.

Vision

Central to Hal's leadership was his personal vision for education. He believed that the parameters of public education, as traditionally practised, were narrower than necessary. Public education could, and should, broaden its scope to include options presently outside of a public education domain. In one instance, he described this vision in terms of an open field. On one side of the field:

> you have the public schools and separate schools which are provincially funded and they are supported by legislation and everything else. On the other side, you've got your independent schools. Somewhere inbetween . . . is the ground that is very fertile and somebody better look at it. And this is where [WCA] is. It is in this inbetween territory. And there is a lot more ground here than there is in this [public] end or this [independent] end as far as I'm concerned. And it's territory that can be used and should be used and people have to seriously consider the best way to use it. . . . If you're going to be in charge of a geographical region, certainly independent schools or associate schools or home schooling or public schooling or separate schools, they're all legal entities as far as the law is concerned. Then if you're going to be in charge of education, then why should you sort of hang your hat and say 'I'm a public school and that's all I am?' Then who's for the rest of the kids that are in these other kinds of schools? And many of them are into it, not by their own

> choice necessarily, but there could be any number of other reasons. Like who's going to be their spokesman? Who's going to act on their behalf? Isn't it your role [as CEO]?

At another time, Hal described his vision for education in terms of a "wider road."

> As a matter of fact, I think, you know, if you wanted to open up both eyes and look ahead, you know on a clear bright day you see tomorrow. If you want to do that, I think that there are going to be more and more alternatives to public education as we know it. . . . There is no question . . . that the road to getting an education has to be a lot wider than the one we are travelling . . . like the road that we have out there is in fact designed to protect the school systems that are out there, the institutions that are out there. And I think that's not right. And they will not survive, per se [although] this may take some time.

This vision of education was not shared by Hal's colleagues or constituents. It is uncertain if, and with whom, he articulated this personal vision. It seemed to be his alone. He spoke about it specifically in discussions of the WCA incident. Yet in both incidents he pursued alternate approaches to the inclusion of all students within the public education system that expanded the parameters of public education as they existed at the time. In the CSSC incident, the alternate approach was the delivery of special education services for students. In the WCA incident, the alternate approach was the arrangement under which a private school could be included in a public system. Both alternatives were firsts in the province. They established precedents.

In the CSSC incident, Hal understood, early in his tenure with Fox Willow, that there was a need for special education services in the Fox Willow district. In the area of special education:

> the people that we did have and the programs that we did have, there were a lot of students whose needs were not being met. We simply had students there that we knew could do better. We knew there was something wrong, but we didn't know what we could do to help them.

Rural school districts, generally, had small student populations requiring special

education services, few programs in place, and a lack of teachers with special education training. Hal recognized these difficulties in his own, and other, districts:

> When we began to look at the options available to us around the delivery of special services to students, the thing that became so obvious is that the legislation was there, the money for it was not necessarily there and the expertise wasn't around.

Facing these main difficulties, Hal set out to find a viable solution to the dilemma of providing an effective delivery mechanism for special education services within the Fox Willow district. He did so from a stance of collectiveness:

> It certainly behooves that you begin to look at what are some options that might help you do what you know you need to do for kids. And clearly if there is any kind of underlying principle or underlying law, when you get together with more people, there is a tendency for you to be able to do more than if you have to try and do it alone.

In this situation Hal was not alone in recognizing the needs of school districts in the area of special education services. He and CEOs from neighboring districts held a series of meetings to explore their options. According to Hal, the CEO group realized that:

> in looking at the kinds of services that the [urban] public school board could have in place as a result of the size of their population, we felt that we needed a base like that to work from . . . We looked at what were the options then and considered some of the possibilities that would go with those options.

Hal was instrumental in the formation of the joint CEO group. From this beginning, the CEOs collectively developed a vision for the kinds of special education services they desired for the students and staff in their districts. Although the more expedient and straightforward option for the CEOs would have been to purchase special education services from other jurisdictions or to develop services within each system's budgetary means, they decided to take a different route. Hal and the other CEOs realized that joint services would better meet the needs of students and staff than would the kinds of services that could be provided as individual school systems. Hal

saw sharing services as a way to realize the inclusion of all students (including those with special needs) within classrooms and community schools in his own school system.

Although a personal vision is not seen here overtly, what is evident is Hal's pursuit of the best educational path for students and staff in Fox Willow. The shared vision developed among Hal and the CEO group is in keeping with the personal vision later articulated by Hal as CEO of Fox Willow. The functioning of the CEO group in the CSSC incident raises questions about CEO group vision and leadership. Hal's personal vision and leadership are seen more fully in his development of the vision in Fox Willow district specifically than in his part as one of the CEO group.

In the WCA incident, the personal vision of education was the driving force for Hal. It was in connection with this incident that he spoke most directly about his vision of education. Expressions of the vision were included in some of his writings for board members during the negotiations with the Kirklanders and in comments about the future necessity of rethinking a separate, publicly funded, parallel Catholic school system:

> Whether we agree with the fact that minority groups can break away or withdraw their children from a public [education] system is not relevant. What is important is that such a right exists, and is being exercised - not just in Ontario, B.C., U.S.A., but right in our own turf. We need time as a district, as a province, and as a nation to react to this new thrust. While the Charter [of Rights] did intend to guarantee rights, I do not believe that the Charter intended to destroy our institutions. There needs to be some middle ground where there is some room for compromise so that the unique and specific needs of minorities are addressed, but not at the expense of separation. If the school goes private, there will be no provincial funding for these children. Yet these children deserve the same options and services as do all other students. Currently we [the public education system] are the mechanism through which funding can be made available.

Hal's personal vision was behind his quick proposal to the Kirklanders. The

proposal was his vision made practical and possible. He saw the opportunity to pursue a new arrangement with the Kirkland group that might keep them within the public system and, at the same time, expand the parameters of the public system. The alternate school arrangement may not have been immediately clear to Hal, but he knew a proposal to attract the attention of the Kirklanders had to be offered quickly. He knew the Kirklanders were capable of leaving the system if something different were not offered to them soon and he knew he did not want the creation of another private school without guidelines for program or teaching staff. His proposal was a political move, but its source was his personal vision for education. He saw, in the Kirklanders' initial expression of understanding of the limits of a public education system to respond to special interest pressures, an opportunity to pursue his vision for an expanded public system. So while his proposal can be viewed as a political move, it was motivated by a personal vision.

Hal's personal vision was also seen in the extent to which he was willing to go to include parent involvement in determining the direction of children's education. In terms of the WCA, Kirklander involvement included a voice in curriculum adaptation, in the selection of teachers, in designing and building the school facility, and in stocking the library. Providing for this level of parental involvement could also be seen as an astute political aspect of CEO leadership, offered to the Kirklanders as a way of reaching a suitable compromise. In Hal's view, however, parental involvement of this nature was an expression of his belief in parents' rights to be involved and did not compromise the integrity of his belief in providing quality education for students in ways that extended the boundaries of public education while remaining within the principles of public education. In the WCA incident, Hal's leadership helped the groups to create something new to achieve a vision of education that he saw and recognized could come to be shared among the Kirklanders and the Fox Willow Board members as well. There was no provincial model for the WCA. Through Hal's leadership, the groups created the WCA in cooperative, negotiative, and participatory ways out of a shared vision.

Hal's vision was congruent with the educational values of professional staff,

peers, and community. He did not explicitly articulate his vision to Board or staff in terms of a "wider road" for public education. He talked about education for all students, meeting needs of students, rights of parents to have a say in how children are educated, and/or supporting teachers in teaching all students. These beliefs were also attributed to the CEO by others who talked about what he believed in, but only Hal talked about a central vision of a "wider road." It was this personal vision that Hal kept in front of him as the "preferred future" (Block, 1987) to strive for, but he kept its specific articulation to himself. In developing a shared vision among himself and those with whom he worked, he concentrated on the broad strokes of common understandings as what are necessary to bring and keep groups together. Hal's more encompassing vision, while the driving force for his leadership, is subsumed by the main points of what is shared between him and the larger groups. It was the commonalities of shared beliefs that Hal emphasized, not the differences.

Belief Systems

Hal held fundamental beliefs about education that were the basis of his personal vision for education. His beliefs were mainly consistent with the belief systems of the cultural and professional groups involved in the incidents of the study. Important to his leadership was the recognition and understanding of the belief systems held by the groups with which he worked, including their areas of congruity and incongruity.

Belief System of the CEO

Hal's fundamental beliefs about education were ones that would be expected to be espoused by educational leaders, but for the CEO in this study these beliefs were more than professional dogma. They formed the basis for his personal vision of education and they were reflected consistently in his leadership in the two incidents. The beliefs held by Hal were:

- providing a quality education for all students;
- the rights of parents to be involved in, and help to determine, the kind of education provided for their children;

- the importance of supports for teachers in delivering education to students;
- working cooperatively with others produces better solutions than working alone;
- treating people with dignity and respect, listening to other views, involving concerned parties in problem solving, being open and honest.

Hal's beliefs about education were clear to the Board members of Fox Willow. They had no doubt about where he stood. One Board member recognized that "he's first and foremost concerned about the children, the education of children. If you can work around that, keep that as your focal point, then he's of the opinion that the other things can be worked out." In the opinion of the Board Chair, "He's there to promote education and to promote good education. So I think he really kept that in perspective."

Hal believed that education within his jurisdiction was for all children, that parents had a right to help determine the kind of education their children received and that public education, in general, must broaden its scope to include options other than the traditional view of public schools and public education.

Belief Systems in the CSSC Incident

The CSSC incident illustrated the coming together of various compatible groups for a common overriding purpose. The main participating groups were educational; they consisted of CEOs, university faculty of education, and department of education. Their belief systems about education were aligned with each other from the beginning and throughout the course of the incident. The congruity of the belief systems provided for complementary involvement of the groups as they supported the development of educational services that would best address the needs of special education students. Hal recognized and built on the shared beliefs among the groups in leading his Board to acceptance of the value of a shared services model.

The CEOs who formed the nucleus of the CSSC group came to the group with similar beliefs in valuing the best education services possible for all students, working cooperatively, and supporting and developing teachers. What initially brought the

CEOs together was a common need to provide services for special needs students; what kept them together were shared beliefs and a shared vision. The shared vision developed by the CEOs during the first year of the project became the foundation for the CSSC project; it supported the organization and operation of the project.

In retrospect, one member of the CEO group attributed the project's success to the "partnership" approach they adopted at the beginning and maintained throughout the life of the project. An assistant CEO claims that the CEOs "maintained a child-focused atmosphere . . . We always came back to kids and secondly, to support for the teachers. There were no extraneous political driving forces on this. This was an educationally driven idea."

The CEOs held in common certain beliefs about the nature and delivery of education to students. The CEOs shared a belief in the desirability of providing education services to all students in their jurisdictions, including special needs students. One of the CEOs observed that they "shared a common philosophy, probably unstated, common philosophy" of education. Said another CEO, "We brought with us the same kinds of values in terms of kids and needs." An assistant CEO who regularly attended the planning meetings said the CEOs:

> believed in the same kinds of things. Those things have now come to be called the inclusive schools movement, really. . . . They each held the belief that we didn't look at sending kids anywhere. We felt that we had a responsibility to deal with our own kids.

This basis of shared beliefs, in providing services for all students, in providing support for teachers, and in working cooperatively, was the underpinning for what Hal called the "natural alliance" of the four CEOs. It was also the basis for shared or group leadership, a distinctive feature of the CSSC project.

At the CSSC project level, CEO leadership was through the collective group. The CEOs formed a working relationship that resulted in leadership that was truly shared. One of the CEOs remembers it this way: "I think what happened as we met, we began to work cooperatively, not only focusing on the [CSSC], but other kinds of things. . . . Each person was an integral part of the group."

Another CEO adds:

> Our commitment was there, I would like to think. We had a mission that we wanted to accomplish and in a general sense, we knew where we wanted to go. What we grappled with was how best to get there. And how we can ensure that this thing doesn't stumble a year or two down the road, because that was very critical.

The group leadership that included Hal as CEO of Fox Willow as part of the CSSC group was a distinctive feature of the CSSC incident. In the literature on CEO leadership, the position of CEO is considered unique in the school system in that CEOs do not have others within the organization at the same hierarchical level. This means that ultimately, the CEO is positionally alone as accountable for all that happens within the school system. While this was still the case for the CEO in this study as far as Fox Willow School District was concerned, the leadership of the CSSC project was of the CEOs together, not any one alone. The CSSC project was led by the CEO group in concert. It included the working relationship with the university, the inservice of teachers in special education, and the establishment of a joint facility in a central location with shared personnel who served students in all the districts of the CEOs. At this level the CEOs practised group leadership. At the Fox Willow level, Hal practised the individual leadership more typical of a CEO. He took the directions of the CSSC project and continued and complemented them in supportive ways. He secured funding at the district level that was beyond the minimum agreed to by the CEO group. He established the position of special education consultant for Fox Willow and he ensured that each school had a special education resource teacher on staff. The distinction here is between Hal as one of the CEO group who led the CSSC project together and Hal as the CEO of Fox Willow who led the specific implementation of the CSSC project in his district.

Shared vision and group leadership went hand in hand. The CEO group spent a year planning the project before any definite steps were taken. An assistant CEO observed that the meetings and discussions allowed the group "to come to a shared vision of what kind of services we all wanted." The group met regularly to discuss

every aspect of the project and all decisions were made collectively. The group shared duties, such as each member taking his turn at chairing the meetings, and the work was distributed equally.

The congruent belief systems of the educational groups involved in the CSSC incident provided a supportive, cooperative base upon which the CEOs developed a shared vision and exercised group leadership.

Belief Systems in the WCA Incident

In the WCA incident, Hal's beliefs had points in common with those of the Kirklanders and Board members who represented the district. Hal's leadership was one of recognizing and using common points to bring groups together . He kept them focused on what they had in common while working out compromises in areas of difference. His leadership was grounded in belief systems and personal vision as ends for which to strive. Although Board members and Kirklanders expressed conflicting views throughout the incident, both groups trusted Hal and saw him as working for the interests of students.

Hal was able to achieve the resolutions that he did, which was the establishment of an alternate school within a public system, in large part because of the commonalities in the belief systems of the main groups involved. Shared belief systems among the groups and Hal provided the framework for each group's actions. Shared belief systems provided the basis for the negotiations, the compromises, and the agreements. Shared belief systems provided the trust and "good faith" among the groups that sustained the negotiations and supported the resolutions. A shared vision was key to the resolution of the WCA incident. Hal was key to forging and articulating the shared vision between the Kirklanders and the Board.

Beliefs of the Fox Willow Board

One of the places to look for the beliefs of a school system is in the system's written mission statement or goals of education. The Fox Willow District had a system document entitled Goals of Education. Thirty goals were grouped in three

broad areas of academic, social, and personal development goals. Together, the goals articulated the district's official position on the purposes of education and presented a belief system that valued the "whole child" and acknowledged that the "growth and development of a wholesome, informed, proud and happy citizenry is one task the school participates in and shares with other agencies" (Goals of Education for the [Fox Willow] School District).

When the WCA incident began these goals of education had not been revised for at least ten years. Nonetheless, they served the purpose of articulating a stance towards education in a public school system agreed with by Board members and the communities they represented. Board members believed in the importance of education for all students; they believed in the rights of parents to help to determine the direction of education for their children; they believed that education for students and involvement of parents were best served through a public education system. The vision Board members shared about education was a general one. The district was relatively homogenous in racial, ethnic and religious composition. Although Board members represented communities more hetergeneous than that of the Kirkland Church, Board members and Kirklanders were neighbours and, in most cases, religiously affiliated with each other. They shared similar values of service and caring for others. Board members' beliefs about education were general and encompassed those attributed to supporters of a public education system.

Beliefs of the Kirklanders

Members of the Kirkland Church held fundamental beliefs about education and its role in their lives. They believed that education was part of the religious nurturance of their children. As such, they had a responsibility as church members and as parents to ensure that the education of their youth was consistent with their world view. The Kirklanders came from a tradition where schools were an important part of the community. Schools were the place where children received a basic academic education, where they learned the language of the community, and where they were oriented in the religious faith of the community. Viewed in this way, schools were

integral in the life of the community, a way of initiating children into the life and faith of their families. Control of their schools was as important to the Kirklanders as control of their churches.

What the Kirklanders wanted for their children, according to a member of the Kirkland group that negotiated with Hal and the Board was a "Christian education . . . not education with a Christian emphasis." The distinction was an important one for the Kirklanders. The church and God's teachings as interpreted by the church came ahead of everything else. The Kirklanders who were instrumental in developing the WCA lived, breathed and intertwined God throughout their telling of WCA's creation. The group's main spokesperson maintained that when:

> we came to the point when we didn't know what to plan anymore . . . we decided the Lord would direct us. And it all worked out that way too. . . . We had a lot of prayer meetings. . . .The Lord moved us and gave us the answers. So I give Him all of the credit for that school. To Him be the Glory. That's for sure.

In the same way, the Kirklanders wanted their children to see and feel the presence of God through the teachers and the teaching at WCA, a school they considered "a mission of the church." The spokesperson for the Kirklanders declared that teachers should be "Christian . . . a non-Christian we can't have." When they felt that the public education system was no longer providing an education compatible with their beliefs, they discussed their alternatives.

The central desire of the Kirklanders, according to their spokesperson, was to have "God in the school . . . We wanted every class to get to know God, the Lord Himself. And we felt doing it through these lessons, through the classes, then [students] would get to know Him." A church historian explained a "good" education as one that would allow Kirklander children to function in the world, but keep them from becoming of the world. Within months of first meeting with the Fox Willow Board, the Kirklanders had requested and received information from an American source about setting up a Christian school and using a Christian-based curriculum within it. It was the first time they had seen the materials. They studied them and

shared them with Hal and his staff. It quickly became apparent that this curriculum was unsuitable to both the Kirklanders and the CEO. The spokesperson for the Kirklanders put it this way:

> If our children go under a curriculum from another land, another country, what do they know about the province? That was a question that really bothered all of us. . . . It was way out from what we thought our children should learn. But you don't know that until you see it.

Bringing the Belief Systems Together

It took the WCA incident, and Hal's guidance of the discussions between Board members and the Kirklanders, for Board members to review their own, and through them the district's, educational beliefs for students in Fox Willow. For Board members, the discussions at meetings and with community members caused them considerable inner struggle as they tried to clarify their vision for education for the district. A Board member recalls their attempts to answer such questions as: "Why are [the Kirklanders] going? What's wrong with our system? What can we do to make [the Kirklanders] change their minds?"

The same was true for the Kirklanders. Their spokesperson expressed doubts about the Fox Willow Board being willing or able to make concessions to them:

> But in our case, as far as God's plan, we found we had a lot less say than those that look at it from the other side. They don't care about God in the school. They seem to have a lot more say.
>
> [And] this private school business. [The Fox Willow Board] were not for that at all. Private School. And they found out very soon that that was not what we wanted. We didn't want a private school. But we found it kind of hard to explain that we wanted a Christian school.

The Kirklanders' intent to withdraw their children from Fox Willow schools caused Board members to consider questions beyond the usual realm of agenda items. Where minutes of Board meetings recorded decisions about items such as staffing, transportation, or facilities, the WCA incident brought into question the fundamental

meaning of public education. How responsive can public education be to a particular group's beliefs and desire to be involved in the education of their children? How can one group's beliefs about education be balanced with a public education mandate to accommodate the beliefs of all groups? For Board members, the consideration of these questions required time and thought. For Hal who, in his own mind, knew where he stood in answer to these questions, the length of the negotiations was advantageous for Board members and Kirklanders alike. Both groups needed time to consider questions of meaning, from their own stances and from that of the other's.

Part of their considerations were of the district's Goals of Education. The Kirklander group wrote their own goals of education for the school they envisioned as desirable for their children. The groups exchanged documents and each considered the other's goals. Board members read and discussed the goal statements of the Kirklanders, but offered no revisions. The Kirklanders read and suggested changes to 26 of the 30 goals in the district's goal statement. Most changes were of the addition of a word or phrase that included a reference to 'spiritual,' 'Bible,' or 'God.' Following discussions within each group, Hal and the Board met with representatives of the Kirkland Church to come to some agreement on a single set of goals for education for the district. Hal proposed the addition of a fourth goal section, spiritual development, with five specific goals in it and minor revisions to a few of the other goals. The Kirkland representatives agreed to this. The result was a revised Goals of Education in [Fox Willow] School District that reflected the common beliefs of the Board members and the Kirklanders about education in Fox Willow. The focus of the discussions was on beliefs while the process of the discussions was problem solving and negotiative.

One meeting in particular between Board members and Kirklanders seemed critical in bringing the groups together. A Fox Willow Board member recalls that:

> the Kirklanders must have had 250 people out and they invited the Department and Hal. There was quite good discussion on it and Hal, I think, made the breaking point. He really convinced them we had something to offer. . . the differences that we have . . . the words won't come to me now, but Hal

> stressed the fact that the greatest educator that ever lived was the Lord Jesus and He was tall enough to look over the fence and see both sides. The way Hal did it, it just caught the attention of everyone that was there and they thought, "See, we can work with this group of people." From there on things went quite well.

It was Hal who recognized and focused attention on the commonalities of the Kirklanders' and Board members' beliefs about education. Board members, by function of their positions, were interested in the education of children in the Fox Willow district. Hal recognized that the Kirklanders, too, were genuinely interested in the education of their children. Their motivations were based on educational intentions, not personal or political ones. In Hal's view:

> you could bring back a lot of the issues that divided, back to the basic concern and that is: How will students be best looked after in a situation like this? When the students graduate, are they going to have something that's going to provide them an opportunity to go ahead or is it going to be just a piece of paper that gives them nothing? So that was one issue, that overriding concern on both sides to ensure that students are being properly looked after.

In the end, the establishment of the WCA represented the point at which the belief systems of the Board members and Kirklanders and the personal vision of Hal came together. The agreement that established the WCA was achieved through negotiative processes, but the foundation was the commonalities of the beliefs and vision for education among Hal, Board members and Kirklanders.

Summary of Discussion of Belief Systems

Common to all the groups involved in the CSSC and WCA incidents were certain beliefs about education as they related to students, teachers, and parents. All groups shared the belief that education should have at its centre the best interests of students. All groups shared the belief that teachers were important to the delivery of education and that parents, too, had an important role to play in the kind of education their children received. Beyond these basic tenets, groups distinguished themselves in

the emphasis they placed on particular beliefs and in how these beliefs were best translated into actions.

Hal's leadership attended to the consistencies and inconsistencies in the belief systems of the various groups. He recognized, understood and mediated among groups, emphasizing the commonalities among the groups' beliefs and the approaches that incorporated the commonalities. Belief systems are at the essence of what is cultural in groups (Schein, 1985) and in this respect, CEO leadership in this study revealed a cultural aspect sensitive to and interwoven with the broader context in which the CEO and the groups worked.

Knowledge of Contexts

Hal had a knowledge of the contexts within which he worked. He used this knowledge to guide and support the directions he took during the course of the CSSC and WCA incidents. He used this knowledge to guide his responses and interactions with others who favored other directions for the course of the CSSC and WCA incidents.

Contexts Common to the Incidents

Contexts of the Province

Both incidents occurred in a province where the context was one of cooperation. The province enjoyed a history of provincial teachers' groups, trustees' groups, education department, and universities working together on provincial education initiatives. This created a culture of cooperation that the CSSC group used in securing approval and funding for their shared services project and that Hal used in soliciting support from the department to pursue an alternate school arrangement. In both incidents, it was expected and accepted that the major groups involved in education, the school districts, trustees, department of education and/or universities, would be part of the consultation and decision-making process of any change in the delivery of educational programs.

Hal understood the primacy of the Department of Education in areas of

governance, policy, and funding. He knew the department needed to be informed of the directions being taken in the course of the two incidents. Changes in program delivery or school designation required department approval. Changes would also likely affect funding arrangements and here, again, the department would have the final say. Department officials practiced a restrained involvement in the incidents. Theirs was an approach that required them to be fiscally and philosophically accountable to a broad electorate. In considering the proposals from the CSSC group or from Hal regarding the WCA, the department's view was on the proposal itself, its legal ramifications and funding implications, and how arrangements worked out in these cases might affect situations in other parts of the province. While they were supportive of both proposals, they were also cautious about their level of involvement. Ministry officials commented that theirs was an overseer stance. Officials reacted to proposals rather than becoming directly involved in shaping the proposals or implementing them.

In the CSSC proposal, department officials knew that the legislation on special education services would require the department to "put together some implementation policy to try and make this [legislation] work and particularly to think through some procedural formula or format that would operationalize it. . . . We came up with an approach to funding that was essentially student based." The CSSC proposal for funding a shared services arrangement fit with department thinking. The discussion between the CSSC group and the department concerned the level and length of funding that would be contributed by the department, not the level or arrangements for the delivery of special education services.

The education department had a history of acceptance of the idea of supporting private and special religious schools with public funds. At the time of the WCA incident, there were a number of church-affiliated schools in the province that formed a particular category of schools receiving some public funds. The schools, all established in the early 1900s, met department requirements in areas such as curriculum, evaluation of students, and qualifications of teachers (Minister's Advisory Board on Independent Schools, 1990). While the number of private schools eligible

for public funds was small, there was a precedence for publicly-funded church-operated schools. This situation supported Hal's efforts with the Kirklanders and Board members in working out an arrangement for a special status school within the public education system.

Hal knew that officials in the Department of Education had their own interest in seeing what happened with the WCA proposal. If the proposal resulted in a successful agreement, it might give the department a model to use with other church groups. Still, department officials kept a distance. They constituted a third party involvement and kept their focus objectively on funding and teacher and program information. They declined to be a signator on the agreement. If the WCA did not work out, the department would not be directly involved.

An important context for Hal at the provincial level was that of his educational peers. He was a charter member and the first president of a province-wide professional Association of Central Office Administrators. He was appointed as CEO of Fox Willow within the same 2-3 year time frame as were the CEOs of Lark, Kindall, and Mearel. These four CEOs shared similar personal and professional backgrounds, all were born in the province and had accumulated all their educational training and experience in the province. They were rookie CEOs together and, given the geographic proximity and demographic similarity of their districts, they had much in common professionally.

The combination of similar backgrounds, outlooks, experiences and working situations encouraged discussions and communications among them about issues any one of them was encountering in his district. When the legislation pretaining to the education of special needs students was passed, it was logical for these CEOs to recognize they had a common need to meet the requirements of the legislation and that they could realize a common benefit if they worked together. They became natural partners in the CSSC project, and, in the view of one of their assistants "I think they were just good friends too."

While the collegiality and support of his CEO peers was a natural fit for the CSSC project, it did not influence the direction Hal took in the WCA incident. Here,

his personal vision of a more inclusive public education system overrode the comfortability of peer agreement and support. The same CEOs who were part of the CSSC project with Hal remained neutral on the issue of alternate school status for a private school in a public system. They were sympathetic to the dilemma he faced and offered personal support during the months of negotiation, but they did not take a public stand on the issue. The Association of Central Office Administrators did. They officially opposed the proposal of extending public school system status to what, in their view, was essentially a private school. Hal was aware of the position of his peer organization, but that did not deter him from pursuing the arrangement nonetheless.

Contexts of the Fox Willow School District

The composition of the Fox Willow district was such that elements in it both supported and constrained the course of the incidents. The religious orientation of the district supported an emphasis on cooperative and non-conflictual approaches to resolving problems. It also represented an attitude of caring and service towards others within its communities who were less fortunate. A Board member tried to explain it this way:

> It's very difficult to put a finger on it exactly, but I think the fact that maybe we are a small district. We are the smallest rural of the province geographically . . . By numbers we're the largest. So we're kind of stuck inbetween the two rivers here and basically the people, . . . maybe because we are so close, may be more ready to cooperate and see another point of view. It is, I think, probably more religious-oriented than some other districts are because we are small and there are a lot of different churches within the district, but they all seem to get along. I think maybe that is one of the reasons.

The district's orientation to caring and service supported the CSSC project directly by providing a context in which it was assumed that communities looked after those among them who were less able to do so for themselves. Up to the time of the provincial legislation about the education of special needs students, communities in the Fox Willow district had provided services for special needs children on their own.

There was no lobby for the school district to provide services for special needs children. Parents, supported by family, neighbours and churches, cared for special needs children at home, sent them to school and were grateful for whatever accommodation school staffs could make for them, or established and operated their own care centre for special needs children. For the Fox Willow district, the CSSC project was a natural extension of what communities saw as their responsibility for their own members.

In the WCA incident, the religious composition of the area, with acceptance and cooperation among its churches, supported the existence of a number of independent schools. This religious tolerance also placed constraints on the options available to Hal and the Board.

Hal understood that the Kirklanders, while viewing schools as part of the church and as part of their world view, also operated out of a "peace principle." It was important for them to get along with their neighbours and not to actively disagree with them. But, once having explained their position, the Kirklanders believed it acceptable and necessary to separate themselves from the disagreeing party. The Kirklanders held principles of faith above all else. Fox Willow Board members were neighbours and religious affiliates of the Kirklanders so they, too, were part of the district culture of tolerance and acceptance. Board members also appreciated the links of education with religious faith. They understood the Kirklanders and, to some extent, shared what they stood for. The cultural connections in the context acted as both supports and constraints for the course of the WCA incident. They were supportive of negotiation, reaching compromise, and a focus on what was best for students; they were constraining in how far each group could go in offering or accepting a proposal. Both groups knew the Kirklanders could leave and survive. That precedent already existed in the district.

In the CSSC incident, the Fox Willow Board was supportive of Hal's direction in pursuing educational services for special needs students that would be shared among neighbouring school systems. Hal kept Board members informed of the progress of the project. In essence the CSSC project was an extension of the beliefs

and practices concerning special needs students that already existed on a private level in the district. When the time came for a formal commitment to the project, the Board was ready to enter into a legal agreement.

The Board context in the WCA incident played a prominent role. Fox Willow Board members shared amongst themselves an acceptance of the various schools within the district that were independent or partially funded through provincial education grants. The Board Chair acknowledged the district as "strong" and "good in accommodating differences." To some extent, Board members accepted the right of parents or religious groups to determine the kind of education they desired for their children. At the time of the WCA incident, the district had four private, church-sponsored schools in operation, one of which was receiving some public funds. The Board-Kirklander negotiations represented the possibility of a fifth church-sponsored school. A sixth school outside the traditional bounds of the public education system, a Band-operated school, was set to open at the beginning of the next school year. The district population was supportive, or at least tolerant, of the existence of these schools. When the Kirklanders approached the Board with plans to leave the public system, it was possible for Board members to entertain considerations for yet another alternate school arrangement.

Hal cultivated a system of communication that kept him in touch with all sectors of his staff throughout the district. He was visible and accessible. He solicited and listened to the views of principals and teachers. He understood their needs and attended to them.

In both incidents, Hal knew that staff needed to understand and accept the ideas behind the proposals for change. He did not involve staff directly in formulating the proposals; he did give them opportunities to review and discuss the proposals and make suggestions at that point. Staff would ultimately be charged with the responsibility of putting the proposals into practice and if this was going to happen effectively, Hal knew he needed to gain staffs' understanding and support for the principles of the proposals.

In the CSSC incident, Hal's knowledge of the staff context was vital to the

successful implementation of the shared services system. Hal recognized teachers' frustrations and needs in dealing with special needs students. It was this understanding that was one of the motivators for him in seeking a long term solution to the problems associated with special education. He knew it was important to address teachers' needs and he believed that the most effective way to do this was with increased knowledge of, and services in, special education.

He knew that any professional development initiative, to be effective, would have to be designed to elicit genuine participation on the part of teachers and administrators. The CEO of Mearel described the process:

> We didn't want [others] to see this as something imposed from the top. You have to be very, very careful when you're dealing with professionals, with anybody. The whole concept was of bringing the principals and the staff onside from the standpoint of "Here's a service that can be very helpful to what you are doing as professionals in your school." What the professionals saw was that we were part of the process, we were part of the solution, we were with them as a team, and they saw us as a team working with them for the benefit of the children they were serving.

This understanding led Hal to an implementation plan that kept administrators and teachers fully informed and fully participating as the project unfolded. He understood that staff was willing to commit time and energy to a project that they could see would benefit students and their ability to address the needs of students. He capitalized on this by displaying his belief in and commitment to the CSSC project at every opportunity. He provided information updates, attended inservice sessions, provided resource teachers for schools. He visibly demonstrated that he understood the needs staff were facing and that he was doing his part to help them satisfactorily address those needs.

In the WCA incident, Hal used his knowledge of district staff in different ways. He understood staff unease about the possible inclusion in the district of a special status school. He knew he needed to "bring staff along" in accepting the idea of a WCA school while reassuring them that such a school need not negatively impact on

them personally or on their teaching situations. He kept staff informed of the state of Board negotiations with the Kirklanders through communication channels such as regular meetings with principals, special meetings with school staffs, and presentations at teachers' conventions. He invited staff to review and critique the goals documents of the district and the Kirklanders. He sent out "a calming of the waters" letter to each principal and staff when he sensed that the anxiety level of staff warranted it. He listened to concerns and reiterated his position on the rights of parents to help determine the nature of their children's education.

The final decisions around the proposals in the CSSC and WCA incidents would not be made by staff, but Hal knew that he needed staff understanding and at least tacit support of the proposals if the changes the proposals would effect had any chance of successful implementation. He used his knowledge of this educational context to help staff develop an understanding and acceptance of the principles and practice in the proposals. He did this through providing information and engaging in discussions.

Context Specifics of the CSSC Incident

When the CEOs of Fox Willow, Lark, Kindall, and Mearel entered into discussions about developing joint special education services, they realized that such a venture would require a change in teacher knowledge of students with special needs. The proximity of the university to their districts and their knowledge of the university's recent change in a teacher training model in special education made it logical for them to approach university personnel about the possible involvement of the university in what the CEOs had in mind. The CEOs found the university to be a willing partner. The groups were complementary in focus (teacher training and teacher practice) and complementary in needs (having knowledge in special education and lacking knowledge in special education). They shared a common set of beliefs about education. They both needed the expertise of the other and had expertise of their own to offer. They quickly determined that joining forces could result in complementary benefits.

The educational contexts of the CEOs and the university were a good fit in

political and cultural terms. They shared the broad tenets of beliefs in education and they brought complementary strengths and needs to the CSSC project. This was a union forged from common political and cultural bases.

The nature and timing of the CSSC project was in keeping with other events on the provincial scene. There was an understanding among government officials that in order to meet the requirements of the 1972 legislation on special education services, these services would have to be delivered differently than presently was the case. One of the provincial concerns was the cost of delivering special education services at the school system level. On an individual basis, urban school systems were better able to deliver services than were rural systems. Urban systems had a student base sufficient to make the creation and delivery of special education services viable on their own. They had professional staff with special education training and some programs in place to serve special needs students. The rural school systems, however, had fewer numbers of special education students, often insufficient numbers to make the creation of programs feasible for each system on its own, and fewer teachers with training in special education. To meet the legislative requirements in special education, rural systems would need provincial assistance with funding or would need to combine with other systems to jointly provide services for special education students.

Government officials were aware of cooperative projects in the United States among jurisdictions jointly offering services for students. These officials were encouraging of the concept of sharing services and were involved in some cooperative efforts among agencies in other parts of the province. The CSSC project, then, was in line with Department thinking about one of the ways in which rural school systems might deliver special education services to students.

Context Specifics of the WCA Incident

CEO-Board Relationship

Although Hal acknowledged his "bias . . . there's no question" toward the establishment of an alternative school that would accommodate the Kirklanders' request, he was careful to lead discussions of Board members in such a way as to

allow trustees to talk through the issues among themselves. On more than one occasion, Hal laid out in objective terms the advantages and disadvantages for the district of the alternate school arrangement. Hal claimed he was always prepared to accept and carry out whatever the decisions of the Board might be. His approach appeared to be nondirective, but he also continued with preparations in anticipation of the Board's and the Kirklanders' support for proceeding with the establishment of an alternate school. Hal was careful not to put Board members into a position of having to proceed with important decisions, such as this one, without full consideration and discussion of the issues involved. His leadership was one of seeking common ground among differing views and using commonalities as the basis for negotiation and resolution.

A particular relationship of Hal and the Board had to do with Hal's personal background in comparison with that of the majority of the district's population. Hal, in the twelve years he had been CEO of Fox Willow, had come to know the cultural and religious composition of the groups within the district, although he had grown up in a different part of the province. For one of the Fox Willow Board members, this made him "a complete outsider." The Board Chair characterized the WCA incident as "close to my heart. . . . I knew the inner rules on this whole thing, and maybe Hal didn't as much . . . he doesn't know the dynamics . . . he wasn't born into it." Still, the Chair considered the Board fortunate, perhaps, that Hal didn't "know this total, deep background. . . . He's more objective . . . He would look at it as an overall thing . . . sometimes we local people get hung up with certain concerns maybe that an outsider can't see. An outsider can keep us in focus a little better." Hal understood that he was viewed as being apart from the main cultural composition of the district. He observed that the Kirklanders and Board members were:

> farmers and they associate with one another. They are all in the milking business. You know, they are sharing cows and bulls. There are so many linkages there that you can't ignore that they are an extremely critical part of their associations. So really, from another level altogether, [the WCA incident] is a group of neighbours that want to do something different than the other

> neighbours are doing. And they are coming here to try to get this group to agree to allow them to do that. Well, maybe that is too simplistic, but it's not necessarily untrue. They are dealing with their own people.

Hal, although not one of either group's "own people," had gained the respect of his constituents in his position as CEO and this was crucial in developing the trust that allowed the Kirklanders and the Fox Willow Board members to come to an agreement for an alternate school. Hal considered any other view of him as being an 'outsider' as quietly amusing and understandable given the history and close ties among the people in the district.

On the question of the Kirklanders' request for an alternative school arrangement within the district, Hal and the chairperson of the Board held opposite views. Hal favoured alternative school status, the Board chairperson opposed it. Each person respected the other's view and understood both the role and the position each held. The Board Chair considered himself a "strong Central Office supporter" and even when he disagreed with Hal, he did not do so in public. When Hal first made the proposal to the Kirklanders, the Chair and another Board member were surprised by it. They had no recollection of having heard it before, although other Board members do recall being introduced to the proposal before Hal formally presented it to the Kirklanders. Still, no one took issue with Hal or the proposal. A Fox Willow administrator commented that the Board Chair was seen as "very, very concilliatory . . . if [the Board Chair] had anything to do with it, there was concilliation." The working relationship of Hal and Board Chair was one of mutual respect and understanding.

Throughout the course of the Board-Kirklander negotiations, Hal and the Board Chair fulfilled their responsibilities. Hal carried out the directions of the Board and the chairperson conducted the meetings and acted as spokesperson for the Board's position. At the same time, they allowed Board members to work through the possible responses to the Kirklanders' request. The Chair continued to oppose the establishment of the alternate school, but eventually deferred to the Board majority opinion and publicly supported the establishment of the WCA. Although the views of

Hal and the Board chair were conflictual, their public relationship did not show it and their discussions of it in retrospect did not reveal any lingering animosity between the two.

The Kirklanders

The Kirklanders are one group among a number of church groups that, while distinct, was part of a broader Protestant tradition prevalent in the Fox Willow district. Hal had made it a point to learn about the history of these groups in Fox Willow and he understood their fundamental beliefs and past experiences with state mandates. More than one church group had established its own school or left the country for places believed to offer greater freedom of religious practice (Doell, 1987). When Hal heard rumours of a Kirklander dissatisfaction with public system schools, he could put it into the perspective of similar past experiences of similar groups. Hal's official knowledge of the Kirklanders' concerns began with the Kirklanders' presentation to the Board of their intentions to withdraw their children from the district's schools and establish their own schools. The meeting, although potentially negative and conflictual, ended on an amicable note. In a written summary of the meeting, Hal recorded that the Kirklanders expressed an "understanding that the public system as it was structured could not as an institution meet their expectations and individuals working in the public system were limited to what they could do even if they wanted to comply with some wishes" for their children. This expression of understanding was enough of an opening for Hal to immediately begin discussions with education department officials, Kirklander representatives, and Board members about options for retaining the Kirklanders within the school district.

As negotiations between Hal and the Board, and the Kirklanders began, Hal's initial recognition of the Kirklanders' willingness to talk about education with the Board proved to be accurate. Hal and the Board began to realize a change from tradition in the Kirklanders' attitude toward education. Hal recalled that:

> We weren't aware of too many of the Kirklanders who were graduates in education. Because for the most part the approach that they had to higher

> education was you finished your schooling by grade 8. So there was, again, a glimmer that there was a desire to change that attitude. And that encouraged me a lot, that they wanted to . . . and were talking seriously about the need for their children to get a high school education and to graduate with grade 12. Which I thought really provided a strong opening [to continuing the negotiations].

The Board Chair acknowledged that "I guess, I particularly, read them wrong on that. I didn't think that strong education was very high on the Kirklanders' minds, because their background is not education." Another Board member confirmed that "WCA could very easily not have been a success story, but the fact the Kirklanders wanted a good education for their children was a plus."

Hal recognized that the Kirklanders, steeped in the traditions of their faith and their history, were now attempting to adapt to different circumstances. He encouraged them to think of the WCA as developing a model arrangement for themselves and for others:

> On numerous occasions both the Department people and ourselves, we pointed out that we were breaking new ground. There was no paralleling of this in the province, and I'm not sure whether elsewhere, but I assume there are [examples of alternate arrangements] elsewhere. But when you get the notion over to a group of people that they are somehow breaking new ground, there was a new kind of excitement that started to set in on them, because they felt now that they were going to provide an example, and they reiterated this many times. That they would provide an example for many other Church groups. You know, instead of them breaking away and trying to go it on their own, that there may be ways for them to work together with the existing institutions. You know, work out some kind of a compromise. . . . They got caught up in that and they were quite excited about it. Because they were part of the group that were breaking new ground, and . . . historically, they are not noted . . . for being on the cutting edge. So that was an exciting side to it.

Summary of Discussion of Contexts

Hal knew the groups in his work contexts. He knew them culturally, in that he understood their belief systems, and he knew them politically, in that he understood their ways of working. He knew the relationships among the groups and his relationship with them. He was aware of events in educational and public domains that influenced or could influence his work as CEO of Fox Willow. Hal used this knowledge of contexts in mainly political ways, through negotiating, bargaining, and seeking compromise, but the knowledge itself was based on his understanding of the cultural tenets of the groups and their ways of working within themselves and with others. Hal used his knowledge of the contexts in which he worked to promote his personal vision of education. Hal himself, his beliefs about education, his personal vision of education, and his way of working with others, were all congruent with the contexts in which he worked. There was a compatible fit between him and his working context.

Problem Solving Approach

Hal did not go searching for problems to add excitement to his work life:

> You don't sort of say, "Oh goody, goody, we have a problem. Now I'll draw out a strategy and we'll work through this." Basically what you do is you recognize that you have an issue or problem to deal with and you begin to try to look at the kinds of strategies and moves that you want to make.

He approached problems as difficulties between the present situation and a possible future state of affairs. He was consistent in his methods of working through problems and in working with others to solve problems. Hal likened his approach to working with others to a 'barn bee':

> It certainly behooves that you begin to look at what are some options that might help you do what you know you need to do for kids. And clearly if there is any kind of underlying principle or underlying law, when you get together with more people there is a tendency for you to be able to do more than if you have to try and do it alone. It's like a barn bee or something. You know,

you've got more people and they lend their expertise and their help.

Hal's approach to solving problems was to identify the problem(s) and gather and use information as the basis for discussions. He used processes of consultation and negotiation to move towards resolution of problems. He was aware of the importance of timing in bringing problems to resolutions.

Problem Identification

Hal and CEO group, in each incident, identified the main problem and then broke it down into more manageable, focused component problems. They kept the groups' attentions on the main problem while solving the component problems one at a time. In each incident, there were some component problems that lent themselves to more straightforward resolution than others. These tended to be issues of structure or legal requirements, such as establishing a joint facility in the CSSC incident. Issues that were more contentious, such as the teacher selection issue in the WCA incident, would surface as well, but Hal, in this case, was content to discuss, consult, and come back to this type of issue again and again, each time edging each group towards greater understanding of the other's position.

In the WCA incident, for example, Hal knew that the main problem was finding a way to address the Kirklanders' dissatisfaction with public schools. During the eighteen months of Board meetings that dealt with the Kirklander request, Hal periodically wrote position papers outlining background information on the Kirklanders' request or presenting the advantages and disadvantages to the Board and the district if the Board were to grant or deny the Kirklanders' request. These writings prompted discussions among Hal and Board members that kept the Board's focus on possible outcomes. As Hal repeatedly:

> pointed out to the Board, the decision was made that the Kirklanders weren't going to stay in the existing [public education structure], so we couldn't even begin negotiating sort of to stay in the existing [structure]. That was out of the question.

This was the point Hal continued to bring Board members back to throughout the

negotiations with the Kirklanders. If the Kirklanders were going to be retained in the public system, Board members had to move to the consideration of options beyond the present structure of the public school system.

Information

Hal sought information, provided information, and used information as the basis for discussions. In each case, he kept the immediate parties fully informed as the incident progressed. The CEO of Mearel described the process:

> Hal would make a real effort of keeping Board members informed, of not simply saying "It's out there so let's talk about it a year from now." He would, on an ongoing basis report to his Board who was there, how they're getting there, what the cost is, and what the results seem to be. And he was very open with them. So it would be a matter of his administrative style and his forthrightness, his honesty, his sincerity, his commitment that they will have seen in him and then they saw reason to support him and the ventures that he would encourage.

The Board structure of the Fox Willow School District was such that each member of the district school Board was also a member of a smaller, local board. This meant that Hal could disseminate information through Board members to the various communities in the district. Board members explained and supported the Board's position at local board meetings, thereby garnering local support, in the CSSC incident, or defusing the potential build-up of opposition, in the WCA incident, through frequent and direct communications. Hal also made himself available to attend local board meetings to provide updates and answer questions. He recalled this happening more frequently during the WCA incident than at other times during his time with the Fox Willow district.

Although Hal had regular direct communications with principals, he was more removed from teachers. He addressed the distance between himself and teachers by using occasions such as teachers' conventions to talk about main system happenings such as special education or the WCA situation. He also made himself available to

attend staff meetings to discuss issues directly with teachers. In the CSSC incident, he made it a point to attend every inservice (55-60 sessions in the first year of the project's implementation) along with teachers.

In the WCA incident, Hal used these strategies of information dissemination and deliberate visibility to heighten awareness among staff of the issues in the Kirklanders' request and to build consensus for a position of understanding and tolerance. He realized that, in general, there was a "fair degree of resistance" from staffs to the idea of a special status school for the Kirklanders, although many staffs were also "neutral." He took every opportunity to "sell" the idea of the Kirklander school as a school like any other in some ways, but with a special emphasis. In fact, what staffs saw was the creation of a separate institution for a group of people who were unhappy with the ethical and moral practices of the general population. In his discussions with staff, Hal referred to legislation such as the Charter of Rights, Human Rights and the Education Act to point out that parents have the right to decide on the kind of education they want for their children. "We need to work around the rules and regulations [i.e. in establishing an alternate school within the district] if we're going to maintain a meaningful educational relationship with this group of parents and students."

Building consensus among teachers of Fox Willow was complicated for Hal by the position taken by the teachers' provincial association. It was clearly opposed to any consideration of an alternate school arrangement between a particular group and a school district. In a letter from the association's lawyer to the association, the concern was that Fox Willow was entering into an agreement that was "so imprecise and inadequate that it serves only to raise potential problems." This view was echoed within the Fox Willow District by at least one teacher active in the provincial association and teaching in an area that would be specifically affected by an alternate school to accommodate the Kirklander request. He reported to Hal that he was "categorically opposed" to the alternative school idea. No one was going to tell him how he could live his life outside of school. Hal, in response to this opposition, continued with the information and visibility strategies intended to create an informed understanding of the situation among staff of the district.

Information, for Hal, was a way to focus on the problem at hand. He used the gathering and dissemination of information to promote consultation and negotiation among the groups with an interest in the resolution of the problem.

Consultation and Negotiation

Hal, individually in the WCA incident and as part of the CEO group in the CSSC incident, used processes of consultation and negotiation to advance the course of the incidents. Hal and the CEO group used these processes in tandem to develop understandings among the groups of the groups' positions and to advance the groups towards reaching consensus and agreement. Hal and the CEO group consulted with groups to seek advice from them, to make and consider plans with them, and to confer with them as events took place. Hal and the CEO group negotiated with groups to bargain with them, to reach compromises with them, and to bring about agreements among them. The main focus of negotiations was on tangible matters such as programs, resources and services. Through these discussions Hal and the CEO group and other groups could also discuss less tangible matters such as the nature of special education services or ideas on goals of education.

Consultation and Negotiation in the CSSC Incident

The consultative and negotiative processes among the CEO group began and continued to be cooperative throughout the life of the project. The CEOs formed a supportive alliance that, collectively, represented a positive, creative force for change in the delivery of special education services in all of their districts. One of the CEO assistants characterized it as "a very collaborative effort. . . . There was no one person who was the catalyst . . . or the driving force. It was everybody." Said one of the CEOs, "Each person was an integral part of the group. It was a group and still is." The CEOs maintained a regular meeting schedule that allowed for directions of the project to be discussed and decided at the CEO level. Decisions were collaboratively made, work was equitably done, and responsibilities, such as chairing the meetings, were evenly distributed among the CEOs. Of Hal in particular, two of the group's

members recall that he was "one of the key players [with] a very, very significant role."

> When Hal believes in something, he pushes very hard. So while I was the chairperson, he was no less instrumental in ensuring that this project would come to fruition. So I would say that while his role may not necessarily have been greater than any of the other three people involved, if Hal would have backed out somewhere along the way, the thing might have collapsed.

The establishment of the larger CSSC group which included the CEOs and university personnel, was also born out of cooperation and mutual benefit. University personnel viewed the partnership with the CEO group as a "made-to-order opportunity" to field test a particular model of teacher training in special education. A university official admitted they had a "vested interest" in finding out how teachers trained in this model would manage in school situations.

The CEO group saw the university as a source of expertise necessary for their purposes of teacher education and inservice in special education. Each group had something to offer and something to gain in establishing a larger group and working together. The interests of each group, while different, came together in a common "purpose of developing, implementing and evaluating a system of special educational service delivery" (McLeod, 1979, p.5) for students and teachers. It was a political alliance formed in the interest of achieving a larger educational goal. The addition of the university to the CEO group was accomplished through congenial negotiations that focussed on the logistics of the project.

Another level of negotiation occurred in the CSSC group's discussions with the provincial department of education over funding. The proposal of the CSSC group to establish a central special education facility and share personnel among the districts required financial resources beyond the group's collective capacity. A department official referred to it as a "Cadillac delivery system." The CEOs and a university representative developed a funding proposal and together presented it to provincial officials. The districts, considered together, formed a substantive population and administrative base, one provincial department officials listened to.

Within the CSSC group, the participants exchanged knowledge that met the purposes of each person. However, the exchange of special education expertise for access to field sites was the surface part of the transaction. It solved the immediate problems of dissemination of information and field testing. The deeper motive for the alliance was to transform the approach to special education in the school districts. This change, if successful, would affirm the value of the university's teacher training model in special education and implement provincial legislation for the education of special needs students. All parties in the CSSC project wanted it to succeed. Conflict, in this situation, was confined to matters of logistics. The discussions between the CSSC group and the education department over funding, for instance, were in terms of level of funding, not possibility of funding.

The full participation of the CEOs in the direction and life of the CSSC project was characterized by cooperative negotiations and continuous development and refinement of consensus. A university member of the CSSC group remembers the CEOs for:

> how supportive each was of the other. If Hal had the idea, [the CEO of Mearel] would immediately say, "You know, that's wonderful. I think that's something I'd like to try in my school district." It was always that way. They were mutually supportive.

Hal tended to use a collaborative leadership approach that favored teamwork and responsiveness to students' and teachers' needs. He used the same approach with the CSSC group in achieving a joint delivery system for special education services.

Consultation and Negotiation in the WCA Incident

Hal was at the center of the discussions among the Board, Kirklanders and Department of Education. Although it was the Fox Willow Board that entered into discussions with the Kirklanders, it was Hal who guided the consultations and negotiations throughout the incident. He knew the historical and religious backgrounds of the Board members and the Kirklanders. During the course of the negotiations, he came to more fully understand and appreciate the groups' strong

beliefs in the value of education for their children. He used this knowledge to help each group recognize that its beliefs about education and those of the other group were similar. Hal noted that:

> There was an overriding concern on both sides to ensure that students are looked after. As the debate moved on, so to speak, the concern for the welfare of the students became more and more evident and also what became absolutely clear was that both sides have the same concern. So we had a common goal, so to speak, that was the students.

Hal, more clearly and immediately than Board members or Kirklanders, recognized the commonalities in the groups' beliefs. Over the course of the negotiations, he promoted a sense of 'we-ness' between the Board and the Kirklanders:

> Both sides began to share the problem. You know, that it wasn't just one side had a problem and they were coming to the other side to solve it. This "We are in this together" mentality tended to facilitate reaching an agreement, in my opinion. In other words, both sides were coming up with little suggestions that were facilitators to reaching a consensus as opposed to always saying, "Why are you doing this or that?"

The spokesperson for the Kirklanders described the process of negotiation this way:

> And we got to talking, and we got to know each other, and they got to know what we wanted. We got to know what they might do. And that's how it happened. And that's why we decided to have some meetings. We had some meetings in some of our buildings. We had some meetings in their [district] office, and we always came closer.

The problem of accommodating the Kirklander concerns within a public school system became a shared one with the Fox Willow Board. Both sides came to recognize that the resolution would come by solving the problem together. Hal nurtured this view by maintaining the focus of the negotiations on students and the quality of their education. In this way, he could work with both sides. Both groups

saw him as objective and as working in their best interests. He worked very closely with the Board, but retained the trust of both groups.

In the case of the Board members, Hal spent a lot of time discussing the Kirklanders' position and their (as a district) possible options in responding to it. He guided Board members' discussions by presenting information and clarifying the issues and options. He helped them to settle one issue at a time while continuing to discuss unresolved, often more contentious, issues. Bit by bit, Hal moved Board members along from their initial stances of bewilderment and defence of the status quo public system to considerations of options beyond what was familiar to them as a public system. He did this through consideration of the main issues of facilities, curriculum, funding, and teachers/teacher selection. Curriculum and teachers/teacher selection issues were the more contentious ones to resolve.

The curriculum issue. The opening discussions between the CEO-Board and the Kirklanders were about the kind of programs the Kirklanders wanted to see taught to their children and the kinds of adaptations that might be possible within the public system. Hal and the central office staff studied curricula supplied by the Kirklanders that the Kirklanders had secured as a possible teaching program for their children. However, Hal recognized that this curricula would not gain provincial approval:

> I was concerned that if they would move in that direction, then, really, I wondered, why would we want to be involved? . . . What would be our involvement? So at that particular time, I began discussion with them about the possibility about maintaining the provincial curriculum.

The Kirklanders agreed that they wanted their children to complete an education that would be recognized by other educational institutions and keep open the options for pursuing a post-secondary education. Hal capitalized on this expressed desire for a "good education" for the Kirklander children. He recalled them:

> talking seriously about the need for their children to get a high school education and to graduate with a grade 12. Which I thought really provided a strong opening for saying "Okay, . . . I think what you really need then is . . . a high

> school diploma that will permit you to do something. It has to be recognized by other institutions that go beyond the school." And I think that this provided a strong basis on which to begin discussing the notion that if we're going to provide a program, then maybe it should be the provincial one. I made that point with them and then I invited a number of people from the Curriculum Branch to begin to try to support that notion that the department, in fact, would stand behind me on that.

Hal had consulted with department of education officials immediately after the initial Board meeting with the Kirklanders. He informed them of the situation and his intentions to develop a proposal that might retain them within the public education system. He checked with them to ensure that the proposal was within legal parameters of provincial requirements. If he and the Fox Willow Board were "barking up the wrong tree . . . if we can't do this, tell us now and we'll end it." While it was necessary and important for him to know the department's position, Hal used his consultations with the department to strengthen his position in negotiating with the Kirklanders.

Hal found department officials supportive, for their own reasons, of his efforts with the Kirklanders. From the department's view, the exploration of alternate school arrangements with a religious group that might keep the group within the public education system was a positive one. If a satisfactory agreement could be worked out, perhaps the agreement could become a model for other religious groups and districts in similar circumstances. As the Fox Willow-Kirklander discussions continued, some department officials openly supported the direction Fox Willow district was taking and said as much to Board members. The Board Chair remembers officials calling it a "bold, new move" and congratulating Board members on their ability to "be accommodating." He and other "Board members were not enthralled . . . We weren't that worried about whether we were making some big, new movements."

In arranging a meeting between department officials and the Kirklanders, Hal wanted the Kirklanders to:

> clearly recognize that the Department was somehow Fox Willow and Fox

> Willow was the Department. . . .[Department officials] were part of that team that was working on this side of the fence or this side of the table if you like.

Any dealings the Kirklanders would have with the provincial education department would be conducted through Hal and the school district, not directly on their own.

The meeting with department officials also lent credibility to Hal's proposal to the Kirklanders. It displayed the willingness of the department to discuss curricular adaptations with the Kirklanders and not dismiss their concerns out of hand. In Hal's view, department officials:

> represented good faith in terms of, they didn't come in again sort of saying, "Well, you people can't do this or that. You people are doing the wrong thing." What they were saying was that if you're going to have the provincial curriculum, these would be some of the requirements we would have to work through together, and we are prepared to help you as much as we can.

This willingness on the part of officials from the provincial education department to work with the Fox Willow Board strengthened Hal's position in negotiating with the Kirklander group. It demonstrated to the Kirklanders the seriousness and support with which department officials viewed the Kirklander request and the school district's proposal in response to it. It assisted Hal in developing trust between himself and the Kirklanders so that negotiations could proceed. With the Kirklanders:

> having to come face-to-face, which of course rate payers out there never do, with the real people from the Department, [they] began to realize [the department officials] weren't some kind of villains and people that were always filling in more expenses than they should or something like that. They had in fact something to offer, you know. And this was a real revelation to them and I think it speaks highly of the people that came from the Department. ... I think what [the Kirklanders] fully expected was that they're going to come on our side with the sort of a power house group and then we are going to chastise them for doing the wrong things. Nobody even suggested that. All we said was that, "Okay, we can understand what your concerns are. How can we

> help you?" And when the Department more or less assumed the same posture through us, then it became an even more powerful kind of force . . . The provincial program in that respect became synonymous with our involvement.

Hal involved the department to successfully oversee the resolution of the issue of curricular modifications. More importantly, for Board members and Kirklanders, department involvement established a legal and supportive basis to continue discussions. What Hal was proposing was possible. There were no models on which to pattern the arrangements for a school operating within the public system under different circumstances, but it appeared that the government would recognize such a school. The department presence at the beginning of the CEO-Board and Kirklander discussions gave both groups the confidence and opportunity to proceed. The proposal was within government guidelines and was sanctioned by government. The rest of the shaping of the arrangements was up to the CEO-Board and Kirklanders.

The teachers/teacher selection issue. Hal knew that the alternate school was entitled to provincial education funding as long as provincially approved curricula was used and certified teachers were employed. Once the issue of curricula was settled, the issue of teachers and their selection could be tackled. It proved a more difficult issue to resolve. Hal and the Kirklanders agreed that teachers for the alternate (WCA) school should meet the same provincial qualifications as teachers employed in any of the district's schools. In Hal's written opinion, the Kirklanders, however, saw a "conflict in the Kirklander philosophy and the life style of some teachers" in Fox Willow schools. The Kirklanders argued strongly that, since teachers were key in providing the kind of religiously-based education they desired for their children, they must be actively involved in selecting those teachers. The Kirklanders maintained that they needed to ensure themselves that teachers for their children practised a particular religious philosophy. According to the Fox Willow Board Chair, the Kirklanders wanted "complete control" of the hiring process.

In considering the selection of teachers, Hal contacted the provincial Human Rights Commission as well as other agencies for their views on how far the school

district could go in advertising and selecting a certain kind of teacher for a certain kind of school. The Human Rights Commission responded that it was illegal to hire on the basis of religious affiliation. For Hal, though, the issue was less clear cut. "But for any school that you hire a teacher, you don't hire somebody that is out of sync . . . you hire people that are going to fit. . . . You hire people that are right for you in other schools as well as in that one."

Hal knew that there was enough religious homogeneity within the district that teachers hired for WCA could transfer to other schools and successfully fit in with existing staffs and communities. The reverse could also happen. The length of time over which discussions of teacher selection occurred again worked to Hal's advantage. It allowed him time to present information, hear concerns, and develop understanding and trust for his position that compromises with the Kirklanders around teacher selection would not result in discriminatory or restrictive conditions for other teachers in the district.

Eventually, Hal and the Kirklanders worked out an arrangement that provided the Kirkland Church with local board status similar to other local boards in the district that had input into the community schools. The initial screening of teachers would be handled at the district level as it was for all teachers hired for the district. The Kirklanders would have representation in the final interview stage as did local boards when teachers were hired for a particular, local school. It was a satisfactory resolution. Hal explained it this way: "So through your whole process of short listing and referencing on the people that you do hire, you know you pick the people that fit your mold."

Once the issues were resolved, a final point that demonstrated an act of good faith on the part of the Board towards the Kirklanders was, in Hal's view:

> the fact that we were prepared to sign an agreement for five years. I think [that] spoke a language of its own. In other words, we weren't just trying to buy one year of time. We said, "Okay. Let's give this thing a little time to work its way through. It may not be perfect. It has probably a lot of glitches, and we know that we may be trampling on the toes of human rights in some instances.

> We could be out of sync here, [with] you . . . acting as a Board, and yet you are not a Board."

The offer of a multi-year agreement was viewed positively by the Kirklanders, another example of the level of trust and understanding that had developed between the Fox Willow Board and the Kirklanders during the negotiations for WCA.

Timing

Hal recognized the importance of the use of timing to advance the course of the CSSC and WCA incidents. He knew that:

> there are certain things you have to do at certain times and if you don't do them then, you probably should forget about it all together. You know that timing is a very critical thing. Sometimes you have to move quickly and sometimes you go out and try to buy time, depending upon what the situation is.

In the CSSC incident, the year the CSSC group spent in planning and developing a shared vision of what joint services would look like was time necessary and valuable to the successful implementation of the project. In all, the CEOs used three years to do the initial work to "bring people along" with the ideas of a delivery of expanded and shared special education services.

In the WCA incident, Hal made use of timing in both ways. He knew that if some kind of options were not quickly forthcoming from the Fox Willow Board, the Kirklanders would proceed with their plans to leave the school district and his opportunity to retain them in the public school system would be lost. He knew Board members were struggling with the idea of an alternate school arrangement, but the proposal bought time for both the Board members and the Kirklanders to enter into negotiations where options and consequences could be considered. He called the proposal:

> the ace card that we had. We provided the Kirklanders with an alternate [arrangement] which was not the existing [public education structure]. And it was an alternate which denied them their arguments. So that, I think, is a strong point in terms of getting somewhere.

Once the Kirklanders entered into negotiations with the Board, the opposite use of time became an advantage to a successful resolution of the WCA incident. Hal noted that:

> as we proceeded in our meetings, there was a developing trust relationship that I felt was coming through. And it was good to have the meetings for a year and a half, or there about, before anything formally developed. The Kirklanders began to feel that we weren't just out to pull a fast one on them and conversely, our Board became convinced that they weren't out there just to, for a lark, or to gain money or something.

The length of the negotiations provided time for each side to develop an understanding of the other's views.

The timing of the events in the CSSC and WCA incidents coincided with the timing of events beyond the parameters of the two incidents and with the timing of Hal's tenure with the Fox Willow Board. In the CSSC incident, Hal was appointed to the Fox Willow District just as the government legislation relating to special education services was passed. The context of the Fox Willow district was such that he found immediate and unqualified support for the CSSC project, a project designed to address the needs of special education students. At the same time, the Department of Education was open to proposals from school districts for joint services and university personnel were ready to evaluate a new model for training special education teachers. Taken together, the events allowed Hal to begin his work in the Fox Willow District in a positive way.

When the WCA incident began, Hal had been with Fox Willow for twelve years, enough time to develop a history of cooperative working relations with the Board. Board members had sufficient trust in him to accept his assessment of the Kirkland situation and to go along with the proposal as he outlined it to them. The proposal bought Hal more time for discussions:

> to plan better. And eventually [the Board and the Kirklanders] did, which I think was to everybody's advantage, because if, on top of everything else,

[discussions] were preceived to be a rush job, it would have created additional problems.

The timing of the WCA incident corresponded to an increase in the establishment of church-sponsored schools across the province and across Canada. Department of Education officials looked favorably at options that might defuse and/or satisfy church groups considering their own schools. In both incidents, the timing of outside events and the timing in relation to Hal's tenure with the Fox Willow Board supported the directions and the personal and shared visions of Hal and the CEO group.

Summary of Discussion of Problem Solving Approach

In both incidents, Hal and the CEO group worked through issues from a collective problem-solving orientation. The resolutions they sought were not necessarily the easiest ones or the obvious ones, but ones based on what was in the best interests of students first, then teachers in the case of CSSC, and students first, then parents in the case of the WCA. Hal's and the CEO group's approach to problem solving began with the identification of the problem and its issues and ended with a resolution that was satisfactory to the main groups involved. The processes in between, while identifiable, were fluid and Hal and the CEO group moved back and forth among them throughout the course of the incidents. Once the main issue(s) in the problem had been identified, Hal and the CEO group gathered information and disseminated information among all the concerned groups. Periodically, Hal and the CEO group brought the focus of the groups back to the main problem(s) to be solved. They regularly kept everyone informed of events throughout the problem solving process. Hal and the CEO group used consultation and negotiation among the concerned groups to develop the understandings that would resolve the problem(s). They worked towards achieving consensus among the groups through developing shared understandings and common agreements on what was the best resolution for students.

Summary of Themes

The themes in CEO leadership were interconnected and interdependent. Hal's personal vision for education was more encompassing than, but congruent with, the belief systems of the groups with which he worked. His knowledge of the contexts and groups within these contexts included an understanding of what each group valued and believed in, that is, the belief systems, and how each group might act in particular situations. Hal's ways of working with others were reflected in his focus on collective problem solving and his orientation to working cooperatively with others rather than working alone. There was an interrelatedness among Hal's personal vision, the belief systems of the groups with whom he worked, his knowledge of the contexts within which he operated, and his collective problem-solving approach to working with people.

Revealed in the themes were aspects of CEO leadership that were political, cultural, and/or personal. Certain aspects were evident more clearly in certain themes than in others. For instance, the political aspect was evident in Hal's focus on problem solving, the cultural aspect was evident in Hal's understanding of the belief systems of the groups with whom he worked, and the personal aspect was evident in Hal's personal vision of education. Still, the aspects of CEO leadership were not seen exclusively in certain themes. As with the themes themselves, political, cultural, and personal aspects were interrelated and more than one were evident as themes were presented.

CHAPTER SIX
A WIDER ROAD

This chapter presents an interpretive framework of CEO leadership based on the integration of the findings of the study with the related literature. Hal's image of public education as needing to become "a wider road" is used as an introduction. CEO leadership depends on vision, knowledge of contexts, and interpersonal processes. Political, cultural, and personal aspects of leadership are interwoven among the leadership themes.

CEO leadership in this study stemmed from the vision of the leader(s) that was then transformed into words and actions. The personal vision is what kept Hal 'centered' throughout the events and pressures that he encountered. If education is a journey, the destination - an educated society - is generally similar for all travellers. The route(s) and mode of transportation by which to arrive at that destination vary, dependent upon the travellers. While this CEO was among a host of travellers for whom the destination of education is quality education for all students, he differed from other travellers in the nature of the route to be taken. The road to education, in his view, needed to be wider than the one presently travelled by public education supporters. Hal's personal vision of education, as more inclusive of groups and arrangements, is what sustained him through the myriad of detours and alternate routes that others would have him travel. In Hal's own mind, the destination and the reasons for travelling in that direction were clear. The level of articulation of his personal vision to others might be explicit or general depending on the audience he was addressing, but his affinity to a wider road for public education did not vary.

A Multiperspective View of CEO Leadership

CEO leadership, in this study, incorporated a number of the perspectives Slater et al. (1994) outline as representing present and emerging views on educational leadership. Throughout the course of the incidents, Hal approached his work from an orientation of problem solving. He demonstrated simultaneous concern for the tasks

at hand and for the people involved in those tasks. His leadership was consistently carried out in an interactive environment. Leadership of this nature seems to fall within the structural-functionalist perspective (Slater et al., 1994) or what Bolman and Deal (1991) call the structural and human resource frames. However, a discussion of CEO leadership within these frames, while arguably present in Hal's leadership, is beyond the scope of this study. What is prominent in this study is Hal's use of the political-conflict perspective (Slater et al., 1994) or political frame (Bolman & Deal, 1991) and the constructivist and critical-humanist perspectives (Slater et al., 1994) or the symbolic frame (Bolman & Deal, 1991).

Applying the political-conflict perspective to leadership in this study emphasizes the problem-solving features of the orientation and de-emphasizes conflict and disputes of power relationships. The interpersonal processes in which Hal engaged throughout the course of the incidents were general, long term activities that confirmed the inherent political nature of CEO leadership (Leithwood, 1995). Consultation and negotiation occurred together as attempts were made to reach compromises, build consensus, and understand positions among the involved groups. In the CSSC incident, the political aspect of CEO leadership resembled a political-cooperative orientation as envisioned by Bolman and Deal (1994). In the WCA incident, the political aspect of CEO leadership involved some conflict of interests, in keeping with predominant views of a political-conflict orientation (Slater et al., 1994). However, here too, the overriding political orientation was negotiative and cooperative rather than conflictual and divisive.

CEO leadership used interpersonal processes in positive, creative ways. The building of alliances and negotiative processes that Hal used are in keeping with the actions Bolman and Deal (1991) identify as typifying a political frame. However, the issues associated with the political frame, such as conflict, tensions, disputes over resources, games of power and self-interest, were absent in the CSSC incident and minimal in the WCA incident. Hal, along with the other key players in the incidents, was problem-oriented and cooperatively-disposed in his working relationships. In

this sense, the political aspect displayed the positive features of Bolman and Deal's (1991) political frame.

The incidents highlight the relational and interactive dimensions of leadership that are both transactional and transformational. The alliances built among the CEO group and university personnel in the CSSC incident brought together groups with different interests that were subsumed under a broader, collectively-held goal. Each group consisted of leaders in their own spheres who sought and agreed to join the larger group for reasons that would benefit each of the systems. Hal, the CEO of this study, like the other members of the CSSC group, had a particular problem to solve, but more than that, he, and likewise the others, wished to fundamentally change teachers' approaches to special education services for students. This common goal of the group became the focus of their working relationship. Their concerns were with facilitating transformational changes and not limited to achieving transactional gains (Burns, 1978).

Similarly, in the WCA incident, the common understandings built among the Board members and the Kirklanders brought together groups with different interests that became subsumed under a broader, collectively-held vision of education. Here as well, the CEO-Board and the Kirklanders each had a problem to solve. However, in this incident, it was Hal alone who wished to develop a resolution to the problem that would fundamentally alter the way education was structured in the school district. He focused the groups' attentions on developing the beliefs each group held for the education of students into a shared vision for education. A developing shared vision for education became the basis for their working relationship. The dual concern for Hal was in facilitating transformational change while achieving transactional gains (Burns, 1978).

What contributed to the cooperative, consultative dimension of leadership in this study was Hal's attention to the cultural aspect. He actively and continuously sought to help all groups understand the meanings behind the processes and actions that he and others took. He focused attention on the commonalties of groups' beliefs and visions for education. He modeled the values and created the symbols that developed

a shared sense of community among the groups involved in the incidents. In both incidents, Hal worked toward the establishment of educational models that would transform the fundamental ways in which education was configured within the school system. Hal's leadership displayed evidence of constructivist and critical-humanist orientations (Slater et al., 1994).

Leadership of the nature revealed in this study harkens to feminist views of leadership (Blackmore, 1989; Glazer, 1991; Kantor, 1989) with its themes of relationalty, empowerment, and "communitarian and collective activities and values" more than to traditional views of leadership that emphasize "individualism, hierarchial relationships, bureaucratic rationality and abstract moral principles" (Blackmore, 1989, p. 94). CEO leadership, in this study, used political and cultural processes for transformational purposes. Hal carried out his leadership through and among groups where collective interests and shared visions directed actions and relationships.

Hal led from an amalgamation of frames that considered the issues at hand from simultaneous considerations of vision and practicality. He knew what he ultimately wished to achieve, was aware of the people and contexts of the environment, and worked to accomplish practical results. His leadership resembled "educative leadership" as proposed by Duignan and Macpherson (1992). In both incidents, Hal, individually and as part of the CEO group, "designed out from shared values, ideals, purposes and commitment rather than down from objectives and work structures" (Sergiovanni, 1992b, p. 311). Hal used the cultural elements that groups held in common as his basis for bringing the groups together and helping them work towards compromise. His process was political; the focus was cultural. The direction originated and was sustained in the personal vision of Hal and the CEO group, the realm of ideas (Duignan & Macpherson, 1992) that comes from the personal beliefs of the CEO and is shaped through experience and reflection. Hal knew what he considered right and significant for students within his jurisdiction. He never waivered from a vision of quality education for all students. To achieve this end in both incidents, he undertook to negotiate and create a reality that was true to his ideas.

Vision

Central to CEO leadership in this study was vision, vision that was held and supported by Hal or the CEO group (Butt, 1993; Kussy, 1995; Maass, 1994; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). Vision provided the direction for Hal's leadership.

Vision can originate either with the leader (Kussy, 1995; Pitner & Ogawa, 1981; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988) or with the group (Coleman & LaRocque, 1990; Roberts, 1985). If it originates as a personal vision of the leader, the leader can then develop the vision among the group; if the vision originates with the group as commonly-held beliefs, the leader can look for and develop back among the group an articulation of the group's own vision.

Hal, the CEO in this study, utilized both approaches (Fullan, 1993) to the development of a shared vision among the major constituents in the incidents. It was Hal's personal vision that drove the WCA incident. It was the shared vision of the CEO group that drove the CSSC project. In both cases, vision of the leader(s) was the driving force behind the development of a shared vision among the broader groups involved in the incidents.

Shared vision is necessary for collective action to occur. The personal vision of the leader alone is not enough to mobilize followers to take action or make changes in practices and/or beliefs. The leader must take the personal vision and present it, shape it and develop it so it becomes shared among the group if the vision is to result in action or change (Butt, 1993; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). The CEO is in a position in the school system to develop, articulate, implement and support vision (Butt, 1993; Kussy, 1995; McLaughlin & Pfeifer, 1988; Scheele, 1994). The CEO is also in the position in the school system to recognize issues and trends that give rise to shared vision (Roberts, 1985; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). If personal vision is to be the driving force for CEO leadership, it must be developed into a shared vision of the group the CEO leads. There must be a congruency between the personal vision of the CEO and the shared vision the CEO works to develop.

In this study, CEO leadership was underpinned by Hal's personal vision in the WCA incident and by the shared vision of the CEO group who initiated the CSSC

project. The shared vision in the CSSC incident originated with each CEO recognizing needs in his own system and working together to address those needs. In both incidents, vision (personal in one and shared in the other) was the driving force to the development of shared vision among wider constituents that resulted in actions that advanced the educational enterprise and the original vision. The difference in the personal or shared vision underpinnings related to differences in the incidents. There were differences in the incidents themselves, one was begun and sustained collaboratively, the other began out of differences and developed cooperatively. There were differences in the contexts, one primarily involved educational groups and the other involved a special interest group and a board of trustees. And, there were differences in the CEO's relationship to the incidents and contexts, one developed among CEO peers across districts and the other developed with an individual CEO within the district.

The question of where the vision arises, may, in the end, be secondary to the importance of developing a shared vision among leader and followers. In this study, actions were grounded in a vision that was shared among the major participants in each incident. The vision originated with the leader or was recognized and developed by a leader group, but a shared vision was developed in followers and supported long enough to take hold among followers to become an "authentic shared vision" (Fullan, 1993). The actions resulted in meaningful, long term change. At the time of this study, the CEOs of the CSSC project were into their fifteenth year of sharing special education services among their school districts. Hal and the Board of Fox Willow were about to begin negotiations to renew their agreement with the Kirklanders for a third five-year term.

Hal's personal vision as revealed in the WCA incident seems to capture what is hinted at in other studies (e.g., Blumberg, 1985; Coleman & LaRocque, 1990; Walker, 1991) as something within the CEO that is important to the way the CEO exercises leadership. It may begin to get at, in a study, what conceptual writers refer to as the "heart" of leadership (Sergiovanni, 1992b) or "servant leadership" (Greenleaf, 1991/1977) or the "voice" of leadership (De Pree, 1992). Hal's personal

vision reveals itself in the CSSC incident through his leadership at the district level where he transformed the CEO group vision into changes in the delivery of special education services. The nature of CEO group leadership may have precluded the opportunity for Hal's personal vision to be distinguishable in the shared vision developed by the group.

The development of a shared vision is the cultural aspect of leadership at work. Leadership develops shared beliefs and understandings supportive of vision through processes of articulating and modeling the desired values and vision (Butt, 1993; Coleman & LaRocque, 1990; Pitner & Ogawa, 1981), open communication (Butt, 1993; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988) and concern for the participation of others (Butt, 1993; Ortiz & Hendrick, 1987). The cultural aspect of CEO leadership is seen through the development of a shared culture among group members and the recognition on the part of the CEO of working with and developing shared cultural elements among the different groups involved in each incident.

Knowledge of Contexts

Literature on CEO leadership acknowledges the importance of context to the exercise of leadership (Allison, 1991; Berg, 1993; Genge, 1991; Pitner & Ogawa, 1981; Wills & Peterson, 1992). It seems that context is important to consider in investigating leadership (Wills & Peterson, 1992), that context influences leadership (Scheele, 1994), but also that context, alone, does not determine leadership (Allison, 1991). Context contributes to the complexity of leadership in ways that appear to be specific to the situation (Hord et al., 1992). Context and leadership are bound together in complex ways that have yet to be unravelled (Greenfield, 1995).

CEO leadership in this study, with its focus on a single CEO in a single district, cannot confirm the findings of other research that indicates CEOs' considerations of factors are context specific (Hord et al., 1992; Scheele, 1994; Wills & Peterson, 1992). However, it does lend support to the idea that CEOs are cognizant of various "areas of uncertainty" (Wills & Peterson, 1992) in their contexts. Hal adjusted his leadership to account for uncertainties in immediate and wider-ranging contexts. He

worked towards achieving balances among competing interests. His approach was system-oriented, reflective and generalist (Allison, 1991). His main concern was for the happenings as they occurred in his school system; in this sense, he was site-specific even when the contexts moved beyond school district boundaries.

This study focused on Hal, a CEO, in interaction with others. What is seen is a CEO who attended to and adjusted his leadership in response to the words and actions of others in his contexts. This finding supports and extends the work of other investigations that have drawn attention to the interactive nature of CEO work (Fullan et al., 1987; Hickcox, 1992; Townsend, 1991) without exploring the influence of those interactions on subsequent CEO behavior.

CEO leadership, as revealed in this study, fits within, and adds specifics to, the contextual framework proposed by Leithwood (1995). Hal led from a personal core of "internal processes" that informed his leadership practices. His internal processes, the work of the school system, and factors in the context beyond the system were constantly engaged in mutual influencing and shaping processes between and among each other. Hal's leadership was an ongoing effort to attend to and balance these elements in the best interests of the school system and the students, staff, and communities within them.

Knowledge of contexts is one thing. It is important for CEOs to know and understand those groups and events around them that make up the intricate and often turbulent environments in which they work, but knowledge by itself is not enough. Knowledge of contexts is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for CEO leadership. Hal knew the contexts of his work and he also used that knowledge in ways that advanced the course of the CSSC and WCA incidents to successful resolutions.

In this study, Hal's knowledge of contexts was political and cultural. He used that knowledge in political and cultural ways, simultaneously, as he worked through the incidents under investigation. His leadership combined working with groups to reach consensus and working with groups to develop shared understandings. He accomplished both through similar interpersonal processes used in context-sensitive ways.

Interpersonal Processes

Hal had a preferred way of working with people and a preferred way of working through problems. He demonstrated a concern with the process of working with others that is in keeping with other investigations where process is an important part of how CEOs deal with the uncertainties inherent in their work (Benedict, 1982; Leithwood et al., 1995; Wills & Peterson, 1992). Attention to process involves particular strategies on the part of CEOs aimed at expanding their knowledge of the issues at hand and involving affected groups so that uncertainties are reduced and amicable resolutions become more likely to be achieved. Attention to process enables CEOs to move incrementally and this, too, enhances the CEOs' opportunities to successfully negotiate a response agreeable to all groups involved. The CEO in this study attended to interpersonal processes as outlined here, but he paid equal attention to the outcomes of the process. Where CEOs in other studies attend to process over outcome in seeking resolutions to problems or uncertainties (Leithwood et al., 1995; Wills & Peterson, 1992), Hal, in this study always kept the outcome (the vision) of the process in sight.

Hal used a variety of interpersonal processes, including sharing information, communicating, consulting, negotiating, and reaching consensus. Some processes, such as negotiating, are associated with a political view of leadership (Blumberg, 1985; Bolman & Deal, 1991; Leithwood, 1995). Since negotiations occur between groups trying to resolve differences, the process of negotiation is usually seen as a political activity. However, the process of negotiation has also been associated with a cultural view of leadership (Coleman & LaRocque, 1990; Pitner & Ogawa, 1981). Here, the leader negotiates among groups in the development of shared beliefs, values, norms.

In this study, Hal's leadership revealed the use of interpersonal processes for both political and cultural purposes. He provided information, communicated, consulted, negotiated, and worked toward consensus in order to reach agreement among the groups and to develop common understandings among the groups of the

beliefs that informed the agreement. Achieving agreement and developing shared understandings are political and cultural ends. A strength of Hal's leadership in this study was his attention to and integration of political and cultural strands as important aspects of his leadership.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter summarizes the intent and outline of the study, presents the conclusions of the study, draws implications for practice and research, and provides a final overview to the study. During the course of this study certain issues emerged through the research process and in connection with ideas found in the literature. These issues are presented and discussed in the implications section.

Summary of the Study's Structure

This study set out to investigate certain aspects of CEO leadership in the interactive context of critical incidents. The review of literature outlined at the beginning of the study suggested that aspects of leadership, political, cultural, and perhaps, personal, were important, interrelated, and insufficiently understood in the practice of CEO leadership. An emergent design, utilizing a case study approach, was employed to investigate the problem. Data gathered from interviews with the CEO and others involved in the critical incidents yielded a rich, comprehensive picture of Hal's leadership during the course of complex events.

As the researcher, I worked within the limitations and biases of the views of participants and their memories, and the availability of people and documents for research purposes. I made a conscious effort to maintain an awareness of the limitations and opportunities of the investigative approach of the study. Analysis and interpretation of data moved among consideration of literature, consideration of data, and searches for emerging patterns and themes while not discounting the puzzles and dilemmas that also presented themselves throughout the process.

This study reports on how Hal, as a CEO, functioned in the political and cultural realities of leadership in dynamic circumstances and how a personal aspect was involved. It presents a picture of CEO leadership in successful resolution of two different and commonly-faced incidents critical to the operation of a school system

Conclusions

The study began by posing research questions drawn from literature on CEOs and focused on extending the understanding of CEO leadership in areas where such extension seemed appropriate. The main conclusions of the study are now presented in relation to the research questions that guided the investigation.

Nature of the Political Aspect of CEO Leadership

The political aspect of Hal's leadership was evident in his knowledge of the context and groups of his work and in his use of processes to move the incidents along to satisfactory resolutions. At every opportunity he used processes that would bring together groups with various views in order to find common ground. Common agreements and understandings formed the basis for each succeeding step and, ultimately, for the conclusions reached that were acceptable to the main groups involved in each incident.

In the CSSC incident, Hal, as part of the CEO group, was instrumental in building alliances among groups with mutual needs so that mutual benefits could be realized. In the WCA incident, he used consultation and negotiation as the main political processes to bring together groups with different views. Out of a lengthy series of discussions that enabled each group to come to a better understanding of the other, Hal was able to negotiate an agreement acceptable to both groups based on certain educational values that the groups held in common. In both incidents, Hal used a knowledge of groups and contexts, and interpersonal and political processes as means to advance the cultural values and vision he had for education.

Nature of the Cultural Aspect of CEO Leadership

The cultural aspect of Hal's leadership was also evident in his knowledge of the context and groups of his work as well as in the values and vision for education that he shared with others and that gave the school district its direction and purpose. Hal envisioned an educational system that provided a quality education to all students. Teachers would be provided with supports necessary to enable them to deliver the

best education possible for all students; parents were recognized as having a legitimate part to play in determining the kind of education their children received. This educational system was achievable through having the involved groups work together. To different extents, this vision of education was shared among Hal and the individuals and groups with whom he worked.

In the CSSC incident, Hal and the CEO group, and university and education department officials all valued a quality education accessible to all students, provided by appropriately trained teachers, and supported with specialized resources as required. This delivery system was best achieved through the cooperative efforts of the districts, university and department of education. In the WCA incident, Hal, Board members and Kirklanders all valued a quality education for all students; all valued teachers as important in how educational experiences were shaped for students; all valued the rights of parents to be involved in directing their children's education; all valued the ability to work together in the interests of achieving these educational values for students. In both incidents, the cultural aspect of Hal's leadership focused on understanding and developing shared educational values as the ends to be achieved.

Interconnections of Political and Cultural Aspects

Political and cultural aspects of leadership as seen in this study were interconnected. Both aspects attended to the interplay of Hal and the school district with the influences of the contexts in which he worked (Bolman & Deal, 1991; Crowson & Morris, 1990; Patterson, Purkey & Parker, 1986). In the course of exercising leadership, Hal faced issues and dealt with events that incorporated combinations of cultural and political forces. Working with others to develop a shared vision was a cultural activity, yet it occurred through political processes of gathering and incorporating the views of people within the group that were, individually, variant. It was necessary to accommodate views from people outside the group as well. Issues that seemed primarily political, such as garnering support for the development of an innovation or maintaining productive working relations

between the board of trustees and a special interest group, still involved a cultural component. The successful resolution of the issues depended, in part, on the commonly shared values all participants came to hold in common. At the centre of how cultural and political forces were worked through in the incidents was the CEO. It was what Hal brought personally to bear on the incidents that was part of what determined the political processes used and the cultural values emphasized.

Nature of the Personal Aspect of CEO Leadership

Underlying political processes and cultural values was a personal aspect of Hal's leadership that informed both. Hal operated out of a personal vision for education that was not necessarily shared by others with whom he worked, although it was compatible with the broader cultural values he shared with others. Central to Hal's leadership was his belief that public education should be more encompassing in the views it included. Groups and individuals now established with separate, and sometimes parallel, systems of education, could and should be part of a broader public education system. Hal's vision of a "wider road" for education was at the heart of his actions and thinking. The cultural values he shared with others, such as quality education for all students and parental rights for involvement, were extentions of his belief in a broader inclusiveness for education. The political processes his favored, those of consultation and negotiation, were congruent with his belief that more and different views should be included within a public education system. The specific course of events in the incidents of this study occurred in the particular ways that they did because they sprang from and were filtered through Hal's personal vision of education. It was a vision that informed the political processes he used and the cultural values he emphasized.

Implications

This section outlines implications to be drawn from this study for the practice of CEO leadership and for research into CEO leadership.

Implications for Practice

The transferability of findings from this study to the working contexts of CEOs comes through the themes - vision, knowledge of contexts and interpersonal processes. The issues, interest groups and contexts of this study are particular to a time and place, but issues of program delivery, special interest groups concerned with public education, contexts of groups and events, and interpersonal processes related to problem solving are generalizable to other times and places. What is transferable from this study are the understandings derived from the themes of CEO leadership: that vision, the personal vision of a leader or the shared vision encompassed by constituents, is critical to maintaining the focus on educational ideals; that knowledge of contexts provides CEOs with the parameters within which they can work; that interpersonal processes are important to the successful achievement of resolutions to problems encountered by school districts.

This study suggests that a personal aspect of leadership does exist and that it interacts with other aspects, such as political and cultural, in integral ways. For the CEO in this study, a personal vision was an important, fundamental core in maintaining his educational focus while operating in the complex, dynamic environment of his work world. CEOs in the field would do well to note this finding and consider its implications for them individually.

CEO leadership in this study suggested the importance of congruency among the CEO's beliefs and personal vision, the shared vision the CEO worked to develop among others, and the interpersonal processes the CEO used in the development of shared vision and in helping groups work through the problems in which they found themselves involved. The successful resolution in the critical incidents of this study depended in no small part on CEO leadership congruity between CEO beliefs and CEO functioning with groups.

For CEOs in the field, this study points to the importance of developing a shared vision among the groups involved in working through the problems that face school districts. Whether the vision originates with the CEO or with the groups with whom the CEO works, this study illustrates the importance of CEO leadership in articulating

and developing a vision that groups take on as their own and to which they extend committed, collective action.

This study also indicates that CEOs would do well to understand their own place in the contexts and in relation to the groups and events of the contexts. It is important that CEOs understand the contexts within which they work and use that knowledge to further educational purposes. It is imperative that CEOs know their contexts even though they are complex and often turbulent and the specifics of what must be attended to are variable (Allison, 1991; Hord et al., 1992; Scheele, 1994; Wills & Peterson, 1992). Contexts include enabling and constraining forces that influence CEO leadership during the course of events. Contextual knowledge includes knowledge of groups, events, and relationships among groups and events that impinge upon the issues at hand. It involves political and cultural understandings of groups and events.

This study points to the importance of training and professional development which enhances CEO knowledge of a range of perspectives (Slater et al., 1994) or frames (Bolman & Deal, 1991) that can be incorporated in their leadership practice. The CEO in this study attended to matters of structure, task, people, politics, culture and symbolism during the course of the incidents under investigation. His leadership was not contained within a single perspective, but encompassed a variety of approaches. In preparing and renewing CEOs for their work, a familiarity with a range of perspectives would be useful.

Implications for Research

Certain implications for research emerged during the course of the study. Some issues were substantive, such as the relationship of personal vision to shared vision. Some issues were methodological, such as the identification of critical incidents. The implications are outlined here, not in an attempt to resolve the issues they raise, but to present them as issues worthy of note and consideration in future studies.

Substantive Issues

Expanding the view of leadership. This study continues to support the view that CEO leadership is a complex, demanding task (Cuban, 1976; Leithwood, 1995) carried out with attention to interacting forces that range from personal to professional and from internal to external. Research on a single aspect of leadership, or leadership viewed from a single perspective, provides a partial picture of leadership. This study supports the taking of a multiperspective (Bolman & Deal, 1991) or integrated (Duignan & Macpherson, 1992) approach in inquiry into CEO leadership.

CEO leadership, in this study, included attention to transformational leadership. The CEO was instrumental in developing a congruent vision that guided the course of the incidents. Constituents and other participants alike, formed common understandings and beliefs that helped to move the incidents to satisfactory resolutions. Transformational leadership in this sense is aligned with a cultural aspect of leadership (Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). However, CEO leadership also revealed attention to other aspects, such as political and personal. CEO leadership was more than transformational leadership; it encompassed a transformational approach within a broader multiperspective one. A multiperspective approach to the study of leadership is more embracing and more convincing than inquiry that focuses on a single perspective.

This study also supports the recognition of the need to look beyond traditional orientations to the study of leadership, such as structural-functionalist or political as necessarily conflictual, to include orientations of the constructivist or critical-humanist (Slater et al., 1994) views. For instance, CEO leadership in this study included notions of feminist perspectives of leadership. There were suggestions of a relational, communitarian approach to leadership. There was an absence of attention to issues of power and conflict. These connections with nontraditional orientations to leadership emerged as the study developed. Attention to the meanings behind the actions of leadership while accounting for the context within which it occurs will add to a fuller understanding of the nature of leadership.

This study suggests that an aspect of leadership, a personal one, deserves attention for the part it plays in understanding the entirety of CEO leadership. This aspect seems to be related to ideas of personal vision, personal qualities (Greenfield, 1995) or internal processes (Leithwood, 1995) noted in other leadership research.

Personal and shared vision. 'Vision' is a term commonly associated with educational leadership. This study uses the term extensively to describe the goals and ideals of the CEO that shaped his views and guided his actions. Still, the frequent use of the term begs the question of the possible limits to the utlity of the term. Findings from this study suggest that 'vision' is still a useful term to describe the foresight of leaders in anticipating and working towards a desired future.

Another issue raised in this study is the relationship between personal vision and shared vision. The question of where and when the vision originates, with the leader who develops it in followers, or with the followers in whom the leader then recognizes the vision and articulates it for and back to the group and, in doing so, develops a shared vision, remains unanswered. The findings of this study contribute to the discussion, but do not answer the question.

In the CSSC incident, Hal's personal vision was not as clearly evident as in the WCA incident. Why? Perhaps the vision was in its early development. The CSSC incident occurred at the beginning of Hal's career as a CEO and he may not have had the time, experience, or reflection to develop one fully. Perhaps his personal vision was congruent with the group vision developed by the CEOs who formed the nucleus of the CSSC group. In this case, Hal's personal vision may not be revealed separately from the group vision. Perhaps the development of the shared vision by the four CEOs constituted a personal vision and played the role of a personal vision. It was this vision, developed jointly among the CEOs as they initially planned the CSSC project, that each CEO took back to his own school district and developed as a shared vision among the staff, Board, and communities of that district. None of these possibilities was investigated. If the position is taken that Hal's personal vision was not singularly revealed in the CEO group that lead the CSSC project because it was

still developing, then the question becomes one of whether it is always necessary for the CEO to clearly articulate a personal vision at all. If the position is taken that the group-developed vision functions as a personal vision, then the question becomes one of whether what is known about personal (individual) vision can be applied to personal (group-developed) vision.

In the WCA incident, Hal's personal vision of a wider road for public education, was not the articulated vision he worked to develop as a shared vision among Board members, Kirklanders, and district staff. There was a congruency between the two visions. Both visions focused on providing the best education possible for all students. The personal vision of the CEO, that of a more inclusive public education system, encompassed the shared vision he articulated and developed, but he did not use his personal vision overtly to bring the groups together. Why? Perhaps Hal recognized the political volatility of introducing to the groups an idea they might not be willing to accept. In his vision for education, the wider road of public education extended to all students. The distinctions he saw around him, including public schools, private schools, publicly-funded church-operated schools, home schooling, and facilities for special needs students, all could and should be encompassed within a single public education system. However, throughout the discussions concerning the WCA, he maintained the groups' focus on the idea of the best education possible for students in this situation and refrained from broadening the argument to a wider venue. Perhaps, as Fullan (1993) claims, personal and shared visions take time to merge and Hal, in this incident, was providing the necessary time. He chose to develop a shared vision to which all groups could be committed rather than introduce his personal vision too soon. Perhaps he was content to develop among the groups a shared vision that was incorporated within his personal vision.

This study raises questions about personal vision and shared vision. Are there situations where it is necessary or desirable for a CEO to have an openly articulated personal vision? If so, what are they and why? Are there situations were it is unnecessary or undesirable for a CEO to have an openly articulated personal vision? If so, what are they and why? Is it necessary or desirable for the CEO to have a

personal vision more encompassing than the shared vision of followers? Is a CEO's personal vision a distinguishing feature between effective CEOs and less effective ones? Is a CEO's ability to recognize and develop a shared vision among followers a distinguishing feature between effective CEOs and less effective ones? What about the congruency between the personal vision of the CEO and the shared vision the CEO develops among followers? To what extent is congruency necessary or desirable?

This study, with its two incidents that seem to reveal different perspectives on the personal vision - shared vision dilemma within the same CEO's leadership, adds to the debate about the relationship between personal vision and shared vision without providing definitive answers.

CEO leadership is associated with vision (Butt, 1993). This study confirms the importance of vision to leadership and supports the importance of CEO leadership in developing a shared vision among the constituents with whom the leader works. This study lends support to the claim that a CEO must have a strong personal vision, in this case during a time of crisis, as the foundation for developing a shared vision among constituents. It also lends support to suggestions of the value of developing a shared vision, in this study during a time of planned educational change, where the personal vision of the CEO is less clearly visible. It raises the question of whether the development of CEO shared vision, in this case among a group of CEO peers exercising leadership together, can or does act like a CEO personal vision.

Individual and group leadership. Related to the questions about personal and shared visions is another issue raised in this study, that of the relationship between individual and group leadership. Just as it is sometimes difficult to sort out the personal vision of a leader from the shared vision the leader develops, this study raises the issue of trying to sort out the individual leadership of the CEO from the group leadership of the CEOs in the CSSC project.

CEOs rarely have the opportunity to exercise leadership as a group of peers. The literature on shared leadership refers to leadership among the CEO and others who

report to the CEO. For instance, in the Coleman and LaRocque (1990) study of CEOs and districts, 'shared leadership' referred to the CEO and principals within the school district who discussed and mutually influenced each other about district and/or school matters. In the Maass (1994) study of a CEO and an Administrative Council, the CEO shared leadership through shared decision making with senior administrators in the district. These senior administrators, however, were central office administrators and school principals, all of whom reported to the CEO. A similar situation existed in the Leithwood et al. (1995) study of CEOs in group problem solving situations. The CEO and a group of "senior administrative colleagues" solved problems together, but these colleagues were central office administrators who reported to the CEO. These studies illustrate situations of shared leadership or a group approach to leadership in which a single CEO works with senior staff in collaborative ways. However, in each example there is one CEO and the shared or group process occurs within the district the CEO heads. The literature is silent on shared or group leadership where a CEO works as part of a group of CEOs to exercise leadership as a group entity.

Hal, the CEO in this study, exercised leadership both as an individual leader, in the WCA incident, and as one of a group of CEO leaders, in the CSSC incident. The shared or group leadership of the CEOs in the CSSC incident represents shared leadership in a way not investigated or written about in the literature on CEO leadership. At times, Hal as an individual CEO was difficult to distinguish in the CEO group. This presented a difficulty in trying to differentiate a particular CEO's leadership or contribution(s) to the leadership of the group. What this points out is a limitation in the investigations and understanding of CEO leadership. In situations where a group of peers works as a leader, how is leadership to be understood or investigated? Is the group of leaders considered a single entity? If so, then can what is known about individual leadership be applied directly to group leadership? This approach assumes that a group of leaders acting in a single leadership capacity can be investigated and understood as a single leader. It questions the necessity of considering individual leader contributions to group leadership.

Another approach to thinking about group leadership is to consider the group of leaders a collection of individual leadership entities that is different from a single leadership entity. If this approach is taken, then researchers would attempt to distinguish each leader's contributions to the group and investigate group leadership as a collection of individual leaderships. The assumption here is that a group of leaders acting in a single leadership capacity still need to be investigated as single leaders each contributing to a single, collective leadership.

Finally, a third approach to the investigation of group leadership is to consider it a single entity different from single leadership and also different from a collection of individual leaderships. This approach assumes that group leadership is a different phenomenon from individual leadership and from a collection of individual leaderships exercised in a group situation. Group leadership, in this view, is leadership among a group of peers that exists as a separate entity that requires investigation in its own right.

This study invites inquiry into the concept and practice of group leadership. The work environment of educational CEOs has been and continues to be identified as complex and demanding (Boich et al., 1989; Konnert & Augenstein, 1990; Lombardo & McCall, 1978; Leithwood, 1995). Studies of CEO leadership suggest a trend towards greater consultation with affected groups as part of leadership practice (Crowson & Morris, 1990). As well, it appears that in some areas CEOs are increasingly working with groups of colleagues rather than by themselves in exercising leadership (Leithwood et al., 1995; Maass, 1994). The combination of complex environments and the necessity and/or desirability of consulting and working with various constituents may be leading to a greater incidence of situations of shared and/or group leadership. These are areas in need of inquiry. What is group leadership and how does it relate to existing knowledge of shared leadership? How does group leadership relate to existing knowledge of individual leadership? This study suggests that CEOs, as a group, can collectively practice leadership, a circumstance that may repeat itself in other situations, but about which little is known at present.

Methodological Issue

Identification of critical incidents. An issue that surfaced early in the study and lingered through most of the data analysis phase concerned the identification of the critical incidents. Selection of the two critical incidents was done by seeking nominations from a group of people familiar with Hal and his leadership. Hal's list of critical incidents and the lists gathered from the group of knowledgeable others were put together and the two most frequently listed incidents became the critical incidents investigated in the study. The selection of two such different critical incidents as the CSSC and the WCA raised questions about the method of critical incident identification. Had the request and instructions been clear? What was the understanding of the knowledgeable others about what constitutes a critical incident? What was the familiarity of the knowledgeable others about Hal and his leadership as CEO? Had it been appropriate to ask a broad spectrum of people, as well as Hal, for critical incident nominations? Perhaps the nine knowledgeable others, all with educational connections to the CEO, were too many people and/or from too many areas (CEO, central office, teacher, administrator, parent, local board) to develop a reliable consensus around two critical incidents.

As the analysis of data progressed and the picture of Hal's leadership across the two incidents developed, I felt a growing appreciation for the incidents named. Although the term 'critical incident' had engendered some questions from some of the knowledgeable others about what was meant or what might be included, each of the incidents was named by a clear majority of the group. The CSSC was listed by six people and the WCA by seven. In fact, eight people had independently named one or both (usually both) of the critical incidents eventually selected. Hal had named both incidents. The request and opportunity to ask for clarification seemed sufficient to result in unambiguous choices. However, the term 'critical incident' should be used with caution. It seemed to present difficulties in understanding related to the person's familiarity with educational terms in general. The CEOs, for instance, did not ask for clarification of the term. Among the teacher-administrator-consultant group, if

questions about the term were asked, an explanation of 'critical incident' as 'key issue or event' was sufficient for clarification. Among the parent-board-nonprofessional staff group, using 'key issue or event' along with 'critical incident' helped to clarify the understanding, but was not a sufficient explanation to clear up all the uncertainties with the term. This group confused 'crisis' for 'critical' and were more likely than the other two groups to ask for examples of critical incidents or for specific incidents that others had named. In future studies using a critical incident method, researchers would do well to be sensitive to terms tinged, in any way, as educational jargon. Terms used should convey an ordinarily understood meaning.

In the end, my experience with the identification of critical incidents by a group of knowledgeable others confirms its value as part of the research process. These people, from within and outside of the school district of which Hal was CEO, saw these incidents as the key issues or events they associated with his leadership. They identified the outcomes of Hal's leadership, not necessarily the process. I was looking for the process of leadership as well as the outcomes. During the analysis of data, it became clear to me that, what the knowledgeable others saw as successful outcomes, was accompanied by effective processes. The informants saw in the CEO's leadership what I came to see. The lesson for researchers is to trust the knowledgeable others and to trust the process. It is the researcher's responsibility to address the apparent dilemmas and dig deeply into the data for understanding. Questioning the identification process or how knowledgeable others are chosen can be worthwhile exercises for what can be learned about research methods; questioning the incidents named through the process can be enlightening for the research findings.

Reflection on Process

Use of a critical incident approach provided me, as the researcher, with two key, agreed-upon incidents to investigate and a variety of people to interview. What was intriguing to me from the beginning of the interview process was the lack of contentiousness in people's recollections of the incidents, particularly so in the CSSC incident. This may, in part, have been due to the time element, since twenty years had

passed between the events and people's recollections of them. However, there may be other factors involved here as well. In each of the incidents, the vision of the CEO or CEO group was accepted by others as the underpinning for the services to be developed and the alternate school arrangement to be established. Distance from the events, along with shared views and common recollections, may allow for a "myth-making" element to arise. The CEO's words and actions may, over time, have taken on a mythic quality that contributed to recollections of events that dwellt on the positives and the successes of discussions and actions, while down-playing the struggles of the process. Distance from the events also allows people to rethink the course of events and place them into a broader perspective of happenings before and after those being recalled. Upon reflection, the critical incident approach added scope to the study and provided a more robust view of CEO leadership.

CEO Leadership in an Interactive Context

CEO leadership in this study consisted of Hal "reading" the contexts of his work and acting on this knowledge in ways that were sensitive to the problems, groups, and contexts of the incidents. He did this with an inner road map or centering core (a personal aspect) that kept him focused on a desired ideal as he worked, with others, through the processes and practicalities of the incidents.

What Hal brought, personally, to his leadership in Fox Willow School District, was comprised of ideas, experiences, discussions, and reflections. Together, these components shaped his responses to events and situations that demanded attention. The choices he was able to make in the incidents varied according to factors within and beyond the school district. The choices will also vary from one CEO to another. Each CEO brings a personal blend of past experiences, ideas, beliefs, and reflections that form a personal aspect reflected in the choices the CEO considers and the decisions the CEO makes. Similar situations with similar parameters for action will result in different courses of action chosen by different CEOs. The differences in responses have to do with differences in the personal aspect of the CEO as well as

differences in the political and cultural dimensions of the situations.

The bases of Hal's leadership were similar in the two incidents that formed the data base for the study even though the incidents themselves were very different. The studies of CEO leadership that were reviewed as background to the study did not speak to this situation. Studies tended to be of CEO leadership and conflict management (e.g., Benedict, 1982; Cuban, 1976; Roberts, 1985; Wirt, 1990) or CEO leadership and educational reform (e.g., Corbett & Wilson, 1992; Hallinger & Edwards, 1992; Hord et al., 1992; Kussy, 1995; Wissler & Ortiz, 1988). Some studies looked at CEO leadership and a specific concept or area, such as power (Smith, 1994), meaning of the position to the person in it (Blumberg, 1985), rhetoric (Townsend, 1991), or effectiveness (Genge, 1991; Hickcox, 1992). No studies focused on the leadership of the same CEO in incidents of crisis and incidents of planned educational change. This study, then, presents a rare glimpse of CEO leadership in two common, but different, work situations. What is noteworthy is the similarity of the underpinnings of Hal's leadership in both incidents. He lead from a personal vision, a knowledge and use of knowledge of contexts, and interpersonal processes sensitive to the groups and contexts of his work.

Hal's leadership neither fully determined the course of the incidents nor was it determined by the course of the incidents. Leadership was a complex, dynamic mixture of political, cultural and personal aspects with contextual forces. The courses of the incidents are unique in the sense that no other CEO, or group of CEOs, would have approached the events and interactions exactly as this one did. The Minister of Education at the time commented that it was "appropriate" that it was Hal who was CEO of Fox Willow at the time of the WCA incident. He "wasn't into power" as were some other CEOs of the time. He was issue-focused, not power- or personality-focused. The Minister, and others, offered the assessment that WCA would very likely not have been established if any other CEO had been at Fox Willow at the time. A similar assessment was made by a Department of Education official about the creation of the CSSC project. Had it not been for the particular CEOs, of whom Hal, the CEO in this study, was one, who initiated and advocated for the project, the

project would not have come to fruition.

The interconnections between the political and cultural aspects of leadership and the mediation of the two through the personal aspect of leadership are consistent with indications in the literature of the complex and interactive nature of educational leadership (Bolman & Deal, 1991; Duignan & Macpherson, 1992).

This study provides a sense of the interconnections of the political and cultural aspects of leadership. It draws attention to the importance of context as influencing the practice of leadership. It suggests a personal aspect of leadership that informs the utilization of the political and cultural aspects. This study contributes to existing knowledge by exploring the idea of a personal aspect of CEO leadership and examining the nature of and relationships among political, cultural, and personal aspects of CEO leadership within the complex and interactive context of school system functioning.

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APPENDIX A
Research Permission Form

INFORMED CONSENT

A study by Carol S. Fedrau-Ens conducted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa.

Studies involving human participants require the written consent of those participants. It is understood that this does not imply that the project described below carries any risk or embarrassment; it is simply the respect to which the individuals involved are entitled that has prompted the University of Ottawa to make this type of agreement mandatory.

I therefore agree to take part in the study entitled:

A Case Study of a Chief Education Officer in Interaction with Others during the Course of Incidents Identified as Critical to a School System

under the direction of: Dr. Margaret McKinnon
Educational Studies
Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa
OTTAWA, Ontario
K1N 6N5 (w) (613) 564-3427 (h) (416) 522-0048

As such, I consent to answering questions from my experience relating to the researcher's study of a Saskatchewan Director of Education in interaction with others during the course of incidents identified as critical to the school system. The questions will be answered during recorded interviews, each of which will last no more than 2 hours. Interviews will be held at a time and place agreed to by the researcher and myself. I understand that I may indicate at any time during the interviews that I wish to stop the recording. The recorded material will help the researcher in her analysis and may be quoted by her.

I may reconsider this commitment and change it as I see fit. I may also withdraw from this study at any time. Furthermore, I can obtain additional information from the researcher involved and express my opinion to her.

Upon completion of the study a short summary of the study results will be available on request to all participants.

_____ _____ _____

Researcher Participant Date

A copy of this form will be provided for your records.

APPENDIX B

Interview with CSSC Participants

Interview with CSSC Participants

Explanation of purpose: For my research study, I am conducting a case study of a CEO in _____. I am investigating aspects of the CEO's leadership as he and influential others interacted during the course of incidents identified as critical to the school district. One of the critical incidents under investigation is the development of the _____Shared Services _____ among the school districts of _____, _____, _____, and _____. I am interested in your views on how the joint services project developed and what the CEO's involvement was in that development.

Sample Questions:

A. Involvement in Development

1. a. How did you become involved in the sharing of services among the school districts?
   b. Who initiated the idea of the school districts working together as a group? Who kept the idea going?
2. a. Why were you interested in becoming involved in this joint venture?
   b. What kept you interested/involved in sharing services?
3. a. What factors outside the district influenced the move to joint services?
   b. What factors inside the district influenced the move to joint services?
4. a. Why do you think _____[CEO of Fox Willow] was interested in becoming involved?
   b. What do you think kept _____[CEO of Fox Willow] interested/involved?

B. Important Events

1. What were the important events in creating the shared services project?
2. What was your part in the process?
3. What part did _____[CEO of Fox Willow] play in the process?

C. Issues and Resolutions

1. What were the main issues/problems you faced in establishing the joint services among the districts?
2. How did you resolve the issues/problems?

D. Reservations and Support

1. a. What persons/groups had reservations about the move to sharing services? e.g. department/university colleagues, Board members, administrators, teachers, central office personnel/consultants, parents/community
   b. What were the reservations? How were they dealt with?
2. What persons/groups supported the move to sharing services? How?

E. Impact

1. a. What difference has shared services made to your school district?
   b. What difference do you think it has made to _____[CEO and Fox Willow]?

F. Key Players

1. Who were the key players in the development of shared services among the school districts?
2. What part did each person play in the development of shared services?

G. CEO of _____

1. What stands out in your memory about _____ and the development of shared services?

APPENDIX C

Interview with WCA Participants

Interview with WCA Participants

Explanation of purpose: For my research study, I am conducting a case study of a CEO in _____. I am investigating aspects of the CEO's leadership as he and influential others interacted during the course of incidents identified as critical to the school district. One of the critical incidents under investigation is the establishment of _____[WCA]. I am interested in your views on how the Academy came into being and what part the CEO played in its establishment.

Sample Questions:

A. Involvement in Establishment

1. Tell me about the beginnings of the _____ [WCA].
   a. Who was involved initially?
   b. What precipitated the _____[Kirklander's] move towards establishing a Christian school?
   c. What was the _____[Kirklanders'] initial stance?
   d. What was the initial response of the CEO? the Board? communities? school staffs? the department of education?
2. How did you become involved in the establishment of _____[WCA]?

B. Important Events

1. What were the important events in creating the ____ [WCA]?
2. What was your part in the process?
3. What part did ____ [CEO] play in the process?

C. Issues and Resolutions

1. What were the main issues/problems that surfaced in the establishment of ___ [WCA]?
2. How was each one resolved?

D. Reservations and Support

1. a. What persons/groups had reservations about the establishment of ___ [WCA]? e.g. Kirklanders, CEO, Board members, school staffs, communities, department personnel

   b. What were the reservations? How were they dealt with?

2. What persons/groups supported the establishment of ____ [WCA]? How?

E. Impact

1. What has the establishment of ___ [WCA] meant to the Kirklanders? Board members? the CEO? school staffs? communities? the department of education?

F. Key Players

1. Who were the key players in the establishment of ____ [WCA]?
2. What part did each person play in the process?

G. CEO of _____

1. What stands out in your memory about ____ and the creation of ___ [WCA]?

APPENDIX D

Examples of Data Analysis

Kirklanders	Conflicts	Agreements
Within own group	• dress code • primary focus - academics or Biblical	• change in educ. necessary • vision of key players for quality ed/school with chr. emphasis • commitment of group to need/NBce of Christian educ.
With Fox Willow	• 'better than us . . . real Christians' • lack of Christian emphasis permeating school • LRC material • accommodation or leave • transportation	• use of prov'l curr as base • quality education for students • right of group/parents for input • hiring staff - B. input
With Department of Education		• right of group/Kirk. to kind of education they wanted for their children

• recog. of NBce of funding support/difficulties in going it alone

Strategies

- non-confrontational approach
- time for understanding/persuasion of group as whole
- key people - consultant; driving forces
- talk / meetings / discussions - then majority vote

Fox Willow Board	Conflicts	Agreements
Within own group	• prior knowledge/initial agreement with of Hal's 'umbrella' offer to Kirk. • to accommodate or to let K. go? • precedent-setting-would there be others? • effect on district of withdrawal of Kirk. students - Numbers; background of values	• avoidance of more small private schools • initial attempts/desire to have Kirk. remain in system • concern c. precedent-setting
With Kirklanders	• what's wrong with FW system? • extent of accommodation possible in public system • name/use of 'Kirklander' • transportation/busing • finances - profile; capital %s	• provincial curr. • credited teachers • value of education / 'good' education
With Dept. of Education	• 3-party signature on agreement	

Department of Education: Considerations

Kirklanders	Own Department	Fox Willow
• curr/prog with Christian emphasis NB • academic quality NB • say in hiring staff	• okay with full funding if: - provincial curr. - certified teachers - FW supervision • information role - direct to Kirk but work with Fox Willow • 3rd party involvement • conditions right for Dept of Ed to consider associate school possibility • possible model • trust in Hal	• all of background work • in FW's best interest • in students' best interest

- will give points of interaction / change in stance of group(s)
- what is CEO's role in each case?


Experiences
• Northwood and Prairie View
• MLC - Eagle's
• Christian Ethics in towns taught by nonstaff
• home schooling
• saw WCA as viable alternative right from start
Beliefs
• provide ed for all children in region - who/s looking after them?
• public ed road must be broader than one we're presently on - must meet needs of students beyond those attending traditional public system
• road to an educ. must be wider than one we're presently traveling (mentioned university entrance exams, GED) to meet their views (within reason)
• non-negotiable principles for alternative school 1) credited teachers 2) provincial curr.
Large setting
• concurrent happenings in Rock Pt / Claremont / Villa
• Ont (Shapiro) rep't
Relationship to Dept of Ed
• need to operate within leg. prog mod; funding/grants
• need support of Dept of Ed for ideas
• need to have Kirk work through FW to get to Dept of Ed
HAL
(Hal's view)
FW Board
• lots of local issues
• bring them to understanding of issues so can make informed decision
• future considerations
• local community concerns
• pull out of students
• what's wrong with our schools now? Better than us
Kirklander Group
• adamant in what they wanted
• openings for discussion/consideration
own pressures
• Forest Drive Alliance pull of Kirk. members - FDA complex
• consider NBce of educ (K-12) and opportunities for higher ed for Kirk. students
FW prof'd staff
• review committee
• pull out of students-affect on on other schools
• if staffs/princs agst WCA ideas princ would get message to district Bd - who would convey it to district bd rep who would bring it to full district bd meeting
• memo to staff - 'calming the waters' (WCA and Eagle's)
• met with principals to solicit feedback on drafts of agreement

CSSC: Hal - leadership - (processes - stances)

demonstrating commitment (focus)
- attending teacher inservices
- meetings of Management Committee throughout years of CSSC
- resource teachers in elementary schools
- hiring practices at begng of CSSC

vision
- do better things
- do things better for students
- working together
- empowering teachers - inservices - school supports (resource teachers)

coop/collaborative approach
- with other districts (LAC)
- with University (CSSC)
- Management Cmte - work sharing
- bring people along (not top down)
- promoting team approach at school and system levels
- promoting teacher networking

pragmatic
- asks questions eg. How is this going to work?
- more resources more accessable if work together
- information as base to work from
- research minded

understanding of audiences
- principals}
- teachers } mutual need
- University}

communication
- keeping Bd informed ongoing fully
- principal workshop at beginning of CSSC
- teacher inservices

concern for people
- prov s.s. personnel
- teachers
  - basic knowledge
  - inservices resources

understanding of: attention to: responsive to:
system needs:
- teachers re: special ed
  - inservices
    - information
    - networks
    - support
- students re: special ed
- information/system supports for:
  - inservices
  - resource teachers
  - system programs

inclusion involvement of others for effectiveness of project
- bringing others along how, not what, admin decisions made
- Bd
- teachers
- principals

CSSC: Sharing Services: Group Profiles

Fox Willow

- Divisions together looking for ways to provide services for special needs kids
- timing critical - divisions wanting service delivery model - U of S wanting to test teacher training model
  * SEECC and strong inservice component met both needs
- Divisions working relationship developed over time combination of common needs, geographic locations, personalities, results/successes

Hal

- strong student focus
- strong teacher focus

Mearel

- Director familiar with urban services
- invited others to discuss services if worked together
- trying to address particular need

Lark

- informal begng as talked c. kids with problems
- together could provide services couldn't alone

Kindall

- common need
- districts could better serve kids together than individually
- "host" Bd

- Always a good collegial and working relationship among these Divisions

- legislation
- SEECC model
  - teacher training
  - field-testing
- cooperative ventures (Department of Ed)
- changing approaches to Special ed
- school divisions:
  - common need-students
  - recognition of advantages of working together
- leadership similarities

U of C - Edex

- training teachers with special ed component
- SEECC model - wanted to field test - wanted to see how trained teachers were managing in the field
- LAC was 3rd stage of model

Institute

- SEECC model - traning teachers in it, wanted to see how they were doing in practice
- SEECC - teacher training not delivery of services not I.d. model

Dept. of Education

- aware of cooperative efforts in States
- involved in other cooperative efforts in province
- 1972 leg. for delivery of special ed services @ school div. level
- U of C - SEECC - research project
- policy framework funding
- LAC - represented commitment of CEOs in Claremont region to Special Ed

*** involvement was with funding

Regional

- 4 districts were large base to deal with
- contexts/coming together
- proximity of U of C
- legislation
- changing nations of I.d. and how to respond
- chemistry of 4 districts
- Department of Ed - joint projects

Minister of Ed

- Dept concern was financial cost
- recognition that things were going to have to be delivered differently, so encouragement of Dept. "to take a firmer role" in shared services

APPENDIX E

Case Record of the CSSC Incident

CLAREMONT SHARED SERVICES CENTRE: A CASE IN COLLABORATION

In 1972, a Department of Education official recalls that the provincial government passed "mandatory legislation for the education of the handicapped," the first jurisdiction in North America to do so. The department expected that educating the 'handicapped,' or special education as it quickly became referred to, would focus on "a very clearly identifiable handicapped population," that is children with mental and/or physical disabilities that precluded them from attending regular school. The department would work out a way of "tying a preferred grant to those kids so that school systems could then do whatever it was they would do to develop an appropriate program." Almost immediately, the task of delivering special education services for school districts became more complex as the notion of learning disabilities entered the discussion. Parent groups, special interest groups, and educators began to lobby for the inclusion of the learning disabled in services for the 'handicapped.' The definitional criteria for students requiring special education broadened and the need for appropriate programs and finances increased.

The legislation left school systems in the position of needing to identify the special education population within their jurisdictions and then to provide special education services themselves or to contract appropriate services from other jurisdictions or agencies. Larger, usually urban, school systems had special education experts within their ranks and could meet the provincial requirements with adjustments, but without great difficulties. However, smaller, often rural, school systems were faced with immediate problems in trying to meet the legislative requirements for special education services.

For the rural school districts the problems of providing special education services were ones of students, teachers, and funding. The first need for school districts was to identify the special education population, including the learning disabled, within their jurisdictions. Before the 1972 legislation, some special education students attended schools operated by outside agencies and some attended regular schools,

with or without the assistance of special education teachers. These students were relatively easy to identify. The learning disabled students were not. In the early 1970's, there was no clear way of determining who were the learning disabled. School districts faced the problem of identifying a broad range of special education students and then ensuring appropriate services for them.

School districts also faced the problem of providing adequately trained teachers. In 1972, districts did not have sufficient numbers of teachers trained to assess or work with special needs students. Special education programs were generally not in place or were limited in nature.

With small student populations requiring special education services, few programs in place and a lack of teachers with special education training, rural school districts found themselves in need of expertise and funds to address the legislative requirements for special education.

Hal, the CEO of Fox Willow School District, recognized these difficulties in his own, and other, districts:

> When we began to look at the options available to us around the delivery of special services to students, the thing that became so obvious is that the legislation was there, the money for it was not necessarily there and the expertise wasn't around.

Facing these main difficulties, Hal set out to find a viable solution to the dilemma of providing an effective delivery mechanism for special education services within the Fox Willow district.

Issues and Resolutions

Hal approached the special education dilemma from a stance of collectiveness:

> It certainly behooves that you begin to look at what are some options that might help you do what you know you need to do for kids. And clearly if there is any kind of underlying principle or underlying law, when you get together with more people, there is a tendency for you to be able to do more than if you have to try and do it alone. It's like a barn bee or something. You know,

you've got more people and they lend their expertise and their help.

Hal was not alone in recognizing the needs of school districts in meeting the new provincial legislation around special needs education. He and CEOs from the surrounding districts of Lark, Mearel and Kindall organized a meeting to discuss the situation:

> And so we started to meet, and when I talk about 'we,' it took in a much larger group initially. It involved the public board, it involved the Catholic board, it involved all the rural [boards] around and then we involved social services, and we involved the department of public health, and we involved education department people, whoever was available in the area . . . and, oh, university hospital, McTavish Clinic . . . and we tried to see what we could do.

These exploratory meetings resulted in four school districts, Fox Willow, Lark, Mearel, and Kindall, deciding to establish some form of joint special education services to meet the needs in their jurisdictions. According to Hal, the CEO group realized that:

> in looking at the kinds of services that the [urban] public school [district] could have in place as a result of the size of their population, we felt that we needed a base like that to work from . . . We looked at what were the options then and considered some of the possibilities that would go with those options.

Hal was instrumental in the formation of the joint group. In the view of one of the University personnel, the CEOs, from the beginning, "were thinking that if you work cooperatively, that they would be able to come up with a system that would be best for all" the districts. The CEOs "were the initiators. They were the collaborators. . . . I can't remember who initiated that initial meeting. It could well have been Hal. I kind of would have expected that out of him."

Expertise in Special Education

Hal understood that there was a need for special education services in the district. In the area of special education:

> the people that we did have and the programs that we did have, there were a lot

> of students whose needs were not being met. We simply had students there that we knew could do better. We knew there was something wrong, but we didn't know what we could do to help them.

Informally at first, the CEOs discussed ways they could address the delivery of special education services in their districts. They quickly formed a working group that maintained a professional working relationship for the next 15 years. There was, from the outset, a collegial working relationship among the CEOs. An assistant to one of the CEOs called it "a very collaborative effort . . . there was no one person who was the catalyst . . . or the driving force. It was everybody." The CEO of Kindall recalls that, "Each person was an integral part of the group. It was a group and still is." Of Hal in particular, two of the group members remember him as "one of the key players" with "a very, very, significant role."

> When Hal believes in something, he pushes very hard. So while I was the chairperson, he was no less instrumental in ensuring that this project would come to fruition. So I would say that while his role may not necessarily have been greater than any of the other three people involved, if Hal would have backed out somewhere along the way, the thing might have collapsed.

In the early stages of discussion among the CEOs, the group recognized that they had needs beyond the immediate ones of identifying their special education population and providing services for these students. Hal considered a longer term:

> component that was very troublesome and that was that we have all of these teachers out there. They came out of training programs that didn't have the exceptional children background. So how are we going to deal with them? We had to do something that would provide all of these teachers with a background so they could deal with the problem. At least they would be well enough versed to be able to identify a problem when they had one. So saying, 'Okay this student, in my opinion, is experiencing this type of a problem and that's how we should be dealing with it.'
>
> So then we decided that we needed to launch into a very, very major aggressive kind of inservice program.

The CEOs looked, quite naturally, to the nearby University of Claremont. Officials in the special education department were in the early stages of working with a model that seemed to hold promise for the direction the CEOs wished to take. Hal explained:

> For example, the university was just starting up its programs [in special education] and they were really struggling to get a program into place and to generate graduates that could move into the schools and do something around special needs. . . . It was around this time that this publication was put out and it's Standards for Educators of Exceptional Children in Canada.
>
> One of the aspects of this [model] was that it provided a mechanism for delivering service to students, but it also provided a mechanism for training teachers to become better deliverers of service. And this became known as the SEECC Model. And basically the notion is that this is the top of the prism and over here you have specialization in the area of exceptionality and specialist teachers and down at the bottom is the regular classroom. This is a different way of looking at [providing special education services].
>
> Like if you look at it from here, Stage 1 - Basic Orientation for All Teachers, and that was one of the things that we were working on at that time. And then the second level, or Stage 2, were resource rooms. These would be the B.Ed. with the specialization in special education. The third one was the highly specialized people, like the psychologists or somebody that is very highly trained.
>
> So there was this three-stage model for preparation of teachers and then at the same time it provided for a model to deliver educational services to students. So it's sort of two-fold. We looked at it very carefully and we felt that this was a reasonable model and we wanted to go that way with our shared services approach.

It was at this time that the CEOs "latched onto the university." In Hal's opinion, officials at the university "were in fact looking for certain projects that they could do. They were looking for a place. I think the time was critical" for the CEOs and the

university to begin direct discussions with each other:

> So we began to work with the university very closely. We said, 'Look, we have a bit of a mutual need here. You people need to standardize and formalize some kind of a teacher training model that you can sell to the university and you can sell otherwise. At the same time, we have to standardize and formalize some kind of a delivery model that will work for us. So we have a mutual kind of need here.'

The university personnel welcomed the possibility of working on a project with the school districts. They had been using the SEECC model for teacher training in special education since 1969 and were ready to evaluate its effectiveness in the field.

Both groups, the CEOs and the university, found, in each other, a match in their needs and purposes. For the CEOs, working with the university offered them the access to information and expertise they needed to provide inservice for their teachers and a model that could help them in the delivery of special education services. For the university, the proximity of the districts to Claremont and the willingness of the CEOs to participate fully in a research project made the school districts a feasible field test site. A university official called it a "made-to-order opportunity" for the university, who had a "vested interest" in finding out how teachers trained in their special education model would manage in school situations.

As well, from the perspective of the university people, the CEOs were a compatible group with whom to work. The CEOs had already determined that they had a common need to support teachers and students in the area of special education. They had decided to work together as a unit to meet this need before they approached the University. As a group, they supported each other and used their working meetings as a "springboard for ideas" each could implement in his own school system. There was a "universal level of competence" among them. A research project involving this group had an excellent chance of being successfully completed.

Funding

Hal recognized that in order for the project to proceed, "there were a whole number of other things that had to happen. We needed money, for one thing. If we were going to make this thing work, if we were going to set up some kind of centre, as in this model, we needed to have some money."

Together, the CEOs and the university special education department pursued a joint research project under the title of the Claremont Shared Services Centre (CSSC). For a year and a half, the CEO group and the university personnel met regularly to plan the activities and sequence of the project. They also addressed the need for securing adequate funding for the project.

Hal recalls that "We began to write up a formalized proposal of what we wanted and why we wanted it, and then we went to various kinds of agencies that might have money to give us." It was to be a three year project with "the purpose of developing, implementing and evaluating a system of special educational service delivery . . ." (McLeod, 1979, p.5).

From the first contacts between the CSSC group and department of education officials, government considered the CSSC a worthwhile project. The four school districts, together, had a student population base that approximately equalled that of an urban system. It meant the school systems were a large base with which the Department could deal. The hesitations, on the part of department officials, had to do with the amount of support such a "Cadillac delivery system" would require. The CSSC idea was sound and the project represented the commitment of the CEOs in the Claremont region to special education, but department officials were unsure if they could afford to financially support the project to the extent of the CEOs' request, and, if the Department were to support it initially, how long that support could be maintained. The Department had to consider projects in light of the provincial scene and, as such, officials were cautious about providing funding to one project in the province and not to others.

The CSSC group tapped a number of sources for funding so that the project could remain as they were envisioning it. As Hal put it:

> The university had some money. They always seem to be able to squeeze a few thousand dollars. [The trustee association's] research centre provided us with some money and eventually the Department of Education provided us with some money. In fact, quite a bit of money. It's the first time I've ever experienced walking into a Deputy Minister's office and walking out with basically a cheque in hand. And it was for $50,000, which at that time was a fair bit of cash. In addition we were able to put this project on something they call a pilot and as long as it remained a pilot, it would get funding. So it remained a pilot for about three years. So we got pilot funding for a period of time so that we could in fact run through a number of students and test its validity, first as a teacher training model and then as a delivery of services model.

Implementation of the Project

To be successfully implemented, the CSSC project required major commitments of professional and financial support from the CEOs and their districts and the university. The CEOs provided the school system sites for the project and enthusiasticly supported the model. The University people provided the content and leaders for the inservice training of teachers. The groups, together, designed, carried out, and evaluated the project.

Eighteen months after the initial contact between the CEOs and the university, the CSSC group had its project plans in place and funding secured. The commitment of the CEOs to every aspect of the project showed itself in concrete, visible ways. The CEOs, and not their delegates, attended and chaired the meetings necessary to plan, deliver, and maintain support for the CSSC project. The Assistant CEO of Lark remembers the initial inservice implementation as being "planned collaboratively . . . and done cooperatively." At the end of the first year of meetings, school system officals, including the CEOs, and university personnel conducted a full day workshop to introduce the CSSC project to all elementary principals from all four districts.

During the next school year, Hal, along with the other members of the CEO

group implemented a "very, very major aggressive kind of inservice program" that the CEOs had envisioned early in their meetings. "And again, I think for the first time we were able to do something with the university . . . we set out a program that all of the teachers, [K-grade 6] teachers, had to go through."

Each teacher attended five workshop sessions about special education each month. Elementary principals and the CEOs also attended every special education workshop, 55-60 in the first school year of the project. Hal recalls that:

> the equivalency of that program was such that if teachers went through it and did a term paper or did some research and wrote an exam, they could get a [university course] credit. That was a hard one to wrestle out of the university because that's not the way they operate. It usually takes about three years for them to hear you. But this seemed to move very quickly, and I think the reason that it did was that we had the Special Ed Department at the university very much on side with us. . . .So they provided us with the inservice sessions. These would happen with early dismissals. These would happen with one day institutes. . . . a lot of them were in the 3-5 p.m. time frame. So there was a whole range of different kinds of inservice that was being delivered.

The inservice component, with its university involvement and credit option "provided a very, very strong impetus for this whole program, because it turned things around in terms of your own system, where instead of people just kind of talking about special ed . . . we tried to move the system [toward expertise in special education] as much as possible."

Also in the same school year, the CEOs ensured that each elementary school in each system had a resource teacher on staff. This provided each school with classroom teachers with some familiarity with special education and an in-school resource teacher with further expertise in special education. With these two things in place, the needs of most special education students could be met with school and system resources.

The final stage of the SEECC model was to provide services for those students

whose special education needs had not been met through classroom and school resources. During the year in which the inservice was being delivered, the CSSC group planned the establishment of the Learning Assistance Centre (LAC). The Centre was to be centrally located in a vacant school in Claremont. The participating districts and the department of education would share the costs of hiring personnel and equipping the school. Each district would be responsible for transporting students from that jurisdiction who would attend the school for services beyond what the district could provide. The CSSC group formalized this phase of the project through a legal agreement among the four school districts that set out the establishment and operating arrangements for the LAC. This final phase of the project brought with it the necessity of obtaining the direct support of each school district board. Whereas the initial phases of the project, teacher inservice and resource staff, were immediately visible and in keeping with implementation patterns of other programs, the establishment of the LAC was a new venture. According to Hal, the LAC:

> was the first major development that we had together . . . It involved, from my perspective, other than working with principals and teachers, it also involved convincing the Board that this was the direction that we ought to be moving. Boards tend to be very independent. They are anxious to be masters of their own house and once you start interlocking with some other jurisdictions, then you automatically give up some of those rights because for the whole, for the benefit of the whole, you have to sacrifice some of the [rights of] individual.

In the estimation of the CEO of Mearel, Hal kept the board members informed of the activities and progress connected with the CSSC project:

> Hal would make a real effort of keeping Board members informed, of not simply saying, 'It's out there so let's talk about it a year from now when we're reviewing our budget.' He would, on an ongoing basis, report to his Board who was there, how they're getting there, what the cost is, and what the results seem to be. And he was very open with them in saying, 'Look, this isn't cheap. This is an expensive program.' So it would be a matter of his administrative style and his forthrightness, his honesty, his sincerity, his

commitment that they will have seen in him and then they saw reason to support him and the ventures that he would encourage.

When the time came for the Fox Willow Board to formally become part of the LAC agreement, Board members did so without opposition. Board involvement was at arm's length from the practical operation of the CSSC project. Hal remembers that "We felt that the responsibility the trustees have, would be to certainly approve the budget, to ask questions and do whatever they need to do, but not to attend each one of those meetings. I think that's just a bit much."

Organizationally, the establishment of the LAC involved settling on a location for the facility and determining the number and nature of jointly hired staff with special education specialties. In the view of Hal:

> We looked at the design of the staff that was necessary. We looked at the components and we said, 'Well, we need a psychologist. We need somebody that's a psychomatrition. We need somebody that's got these kinds of skills and these kinds of skills and these kinds of skills in order to make a team.' And we decided on four people that would be part of the learning assistance team. We developed strategies that we thought would work and did a philosophical kind of orientation for the Learning Assistance Centre. We developed a policy manual and so on . . .
>
> What we were working with is a location where we had a place and where we were getting all kinds of materials and testing them out. We weren't moving the staff, other than initially, to arrange that they would go to visit the schools and the home with each of the students that they were working with.

The formal research part of the CSSC project continued for three years. At the end of that time, the university conducted an evaluation of the project and published a final report. With the completion of the report the university's official involvement with the project ended. The school districts, however, continued to operate the CSSC project as a shared services project for another fifteen years.

The participants in the CSSC project, that is, school district personnel, university personnel and provincial education officials, attributed its success to the "partnership"

approach they adopted and maintained throughout the life of the project. The CEOs ". . . maintained a child-focused atmosphere . . . we always came back to kids and secondly, to support for the teachers. There were no extraneous political driving forces on this. This was an educationally driven idea. [The CEOs shared a] common philosophy, probably unstated, common philosophy" of education. They ". . . brought with them the same kinds of values in terms of kids and needs." They "believed in the same kinds of things. Those things have now come to be called the inclusive schools movement, really." The year of planning meetings brought the CEOs to "a shared vision of what kinds of services we all wanted." The planning and delivery process was intensive and extensive; it was accomplished with support from teachers, parents, Board members, and central office staff and without conflict from any of these groups. Hal played a substantial, collegial role in developing a project where "working together as jurisdictions is the answer" to meeting a common need.

APPENDIX F

Case Record of the WCA Incident

WILLOW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY:
A CASE IN NEGOTIATION

The Willow Christian Academy incident began in the fall of 1983 with a group of parents, all belonging to the Kirkland Church, bringing a "collective concern" to a regular Board meeting of the Fox Willow School District. It continued over the next eighteen months as Hal, the CEO of Fox Willow, Board members and members of the Kirkland Church sought to find an acceptable resolution to the educational concerns of the Kirklanders for their children. Throughout the process, Hal was directly involved in all aspects and is credited by participants from every group with being instrumental in its successful outcome.

Issues and Resolutions

As the issues around the Kirklanders' concern with the public school system developed, Hal took the lead in guiding the negotiations to an acceptable conclusion. The issues were not new to him. Fox Willow included four church-operated schools, three of which were functioning outside of any provincial department of education connection. One of these schools had recently opened in an area with a strong Kirklander population. Hal had, in his own estimation, "grappled" with the issues of curriculum, teachers, and quality of education. Thus, when the Kirklanders came to the Fox Willow Board with their concerns, Hal had the advantage of having previously thought through many of the issues around the establishment of a private school. He knew its implications in terms of students, teachers, interest groups, community and Fox Willow as a whole. He saw, and acted upon, the more complete picture of a parent group concern within the public education system.

Before any issues could be considered, Hal's first task was to establish discussions between the two groups. He began this at the first meeting in November 1983 when the Kirklanders brought their concerns to the Fox Willow Board. He recognized that the Kirklanders were reluctant to leave the system abruptly. In a written summary of the meeting, he mused that the Kirklanders seemed:

understanding that the public system as it was structured could not as an institution meet their expectations and individuals working in the public school system were limited to what they could do even if they wanted to comply with some wishes.

He used this understanding on the Kirklanders' part of a public school system position to help set a tone for discussion and consideration. He listened to the Kirklanders' concerns and tried to narrow the scope of those concerns to a manageable level. He tried to buy some time for the Board to consider its options in response to the Kirklanders' concerns. The meeting ended positively with these things accomplished. Hal recalls that he "took the opening" the Kirklanders provided for he and the Board to consider what alternatives there might be within the public school structure to address the Kirklanders' concerns.

Curriculum

Immediately following the initial meeting between the Fox Willow Board and the Kirklanders, Hal began discussions with officials from the provincial education department. Their discussions focused on curriculum, teachers and funding. Hal explored the extent to which the provincial curriculum could be adapted to meet the Kirklanders' needs.

One of the Kirklanders' initial concerns about the kind of education their children were receiving in Fox Willow schools had to do with instruction. They were displeased with some of the activities and materials teachers used with students. A spokesperson for the Kirklanders explained that they wanted a "good" education for their children, but their view of what constituted a good education differed from what was being provided in public schools. In discussions among members of the church congregation, the Kirklanders were agreed that they wanted an education for their children that would strengthen the values and beliefs they taught in the home and through the church. They wanted a school education based on Christian principles as they interpreted them.

Early in the Kirklander-Fox Willow Board discussions, the Kirklanders gathered

education program materials published by Christian organizations. They actively pursued their options in establishing the kind of school they wanted. Hal became involved when he asked to look at one of the programs the Kirklanders were considering. His view, and that of the staff who also reviewed it, was that the program was inadequate as the main instructional program. It provided possibilities for supplementing a curriculum, but not for use as the main program of instruction. Hal recalls that:

> I was concerned that if they would move in that direction, then, really, I wondered, why would we want to be involved? ... What would be our involvement? So at that particular time, I began discussions with them about the possibility about maintaining the provincial curriculum.

The Kirklanders were open to discussions about the use of the provincial curriculum rather than one published by a Christian publishing house. The educational consultant in their group was strongly opposed to the use of anything other than the provincial curriculum. He had used this provincial curriculum when he taught in a private Christian school in Europe and knew that it could be infused with Biblically-based materials and approaches. He was also quick to point out to the Kirklanders that use of the provincial curriculum was required if the Kirklanders were to gain any grant support from the education department.

Hal was giving the Kirklanders a similar message about the inclusion of a "religious component" in the provincial curriculum. Within the scope of the provincial curriculum, there was ample opportunity for the Kirklanders to select and use materials of their choice that would fulfil the instructional function and satisfy the concerns they had about books and materials in public schools. "I made that point with them and then I invited a number of people from the Curriculum Branch to begin to try to support that notion that the department, in fact, would stand behind me on that."

As well as wanting a Christian education for their children, the Kirklanders wanted "a good education." Hal recalls them:

> talking seriously about the need for their children to get a high school education

> and to graduate with a grade 12. Which I thought really provided a strong opening for saying okay, . . . I think what you really need then is . . . a high school diploma that will permit you to do something. . . . It has to be recognized by other institutions that go beyond the school. And I think that this provided a strong basis on which to begin discussing the notion that if we're going to provide a program, then maybe it should be the provincial one.

The Fox Willow School District, at this time, had had three recent experiences with the establishment of small private schools. One in particular, Northwood School, was an example of what Board members did not want to see repeated with the Kirklanders. At one time, the church group operating the Northwood School had hired a teacher with a grade 8 education to teach students up to grade 8 or 9. The desks and textbooks were ones Fox Willow had been ready to discard. The provincial curriculum was not used. Board members were adamant that they did not want to see the establishment of another private school like this one in their district. They agreed that the provincial curriculum and qualified teachers were desirable in any kind of school arrangement they could work out with the Kirklanders.

These were not necessary requirements if the Kirklanders chose to establish their own school. Provincially, private schools had developed over time for a variety of reasons. Up to and including the early 1980's, the regulations, policies and procedures governing the establishment and operation of private schools were not clearly defined (Report. Minister's Advisory Board on Independent Schools, 1990). It was possible for groups to establish and operate schools "in a legal vacuum" (Report, 1990, p. 2). There were no legal requirements for registration of schools, attendance of students, or supervision of teachers or programs used in private schools.

Within this context, schools operated legally, but without provincial support in funding or curriculum. The education department's position on curriculum was clear. Use of the provincial curriculum was a requirement for grant support. Hal invited representatives of the department to a series of meetings with the Board and the Kirklanders to discuss curriculum. From Hal's perspective, it was advantageous to

have department officials provide program information directly to the Kirklanders. It showed the seriousness with which the district was treating the Kirklanders' request. At some point, if an agreement was to be worked out for an alternate school, department approval would be necessary, so department officials might as well be involved early and directly in the discussions with the Kirklanders. Hal knew it was possible to adapt the provincial curriculum, and again, preferred that information to come initially from department officials. He wanted the Kirklanders "clearly [to] recognize that the Department was somehow Fox Willow and Fox Willow was the Department." As the Kirklanders moved to acceptance of the provincial curriculum as the best program of instruction for their students, the tenor of the discussions about curriculum changed. Rather than discussion about what program to use, it became a discussion of how to enhance or adapt the provincial curriculum to meet the Kirklanders' desires for a Christian emphasis.

Teachers

Hal, Board members, and Kirklanders were agreed on the important role of teachers in the education of students. In selecting teachers for Fox Willow schools, Hal and the Board were interested in teachers' training, experience and abilities as they related to the positions available. Hal's view was that, in hiring teachers suitable for different school situations, it was possible to hire teachers for a Christian-focused school as well. Selections and transfers of teachers among schools in the district already required some sensitivity to local conditions and Hal considered the Kirklander situation to be another case where similar sensitivity to the school community would be necessary. The Kirklanders had made it clear in the first meeting with Hal and the Board that their interest in teachers went beyond an interest in training, experience, and abilities. In Hal's estimation the Kirklanders saw a "conflict in the Kirklander philosophy and the lifestyle of some teachers." For Hal, the issue of teachers was one of the most contentious and difficult to mediate.

Teachers were a vitally important component of the Kirklanders' vision for the education of their children. Teachers were the role models; they needed to be

Christian by the Kirklanders' standards; they were to practice a lifestyle in keeping with the Kirklanders' expectations. The indicators of such a lifestyle included a strong family unit and involvement in church activities. Christian principles as interpreted by the church guided people's lives. What was said, what was done, what was read, what was attended was based on the church's interpretation of what Jesus would have said and done and read and attended. Work that involved physical labour was valued over work that did not. There was respect for authority. There was no ostentatious show of wealth, no separation or divorce, no consumption of alcohol or use of tobacco, no use of vulgar or profane language.

In order to be sure that teachers working with their children met these expectations, the Kirklanders wanted involvement with the selection of teachers. In the view of the Fox Willow Board Chair, the Kirklanders wanted "complete control" of the hiring process.

Members of the Fox Willow Board also felt that teachers were important in whatever kind of school they might arrange with the Kirklanders. Board members' view was that teachers should be qualified and certified through the education department. The Board discussed teacher selection and teacher transfer possibilities among themselves and heard concerns from local boards and community members, but it was Hal who negotiated the final compromise with the Kirklanders.

The issue of teachers for an alternate Christian school generated a great deal of interest among teachers and principals in Fox Willow. In general, Hal judged there was a "fair degree of resistance" from staffs to the whole idea of a special status school for the Kirklanders, although many staffs were also "neutral." One teacher on the staff of a school that included a large number of Kirklander students was "categorically opposed" to the alternative school idea. No one was going to tell him how he could live his life outside of school. The view of the provincial teachers' association was also that Fox Willow was getting into dangerous territory in considering the establishment of a school with stringent rules about students and staff. In a letter from the association's lawyer to the association, the concern was that

Fox Willow was entering into an agreement that was " so imprecise and inadequate that it serves only to raise potential problems."

But where teachers and principals expressed most concerns was around the issue of hiring and transferring teachers. Concerns came to Hal from principals and from staffs via principals who were fielding questions from teachers. Hal attended more staff meetings during this time that he normally would in a year. Most staffs wanted assurances that they would not be transferred into the Christian school if they did not wish to go and they had questions about what would happen if staff from the Christian school wanted to transfer out into other Fox Willow schools.

Hal realized that it was a "thorny issue" for Catholic teachers in particular. Catholic and public school systems operated side by side provincially. Both systems adhered to provincial requirements regarding certification of teachers and use of approved curricula. Both systems received identical levels of funding. While it was possible for non-Catholic teachers to teach in the Catholic school system and Catholic teachers to teach in the public school system, the latter was the more likely arrangement to occur. One of the subdivisions in Fox Willow was primarily composed of First Nations people, French and Roman Catholic. Schools in this area were staffed with a number of Catholic teachers. If they applied for a teaching position in the alternative Protestant Christian school, they felt they would not be hired because they were Catholic. Their transferability within the district would be more limited than that of their Protestant teaching colleagues. While this would be the case, Hal, privately, was quick to point out that the same situation held true for Catholic schools and Protestant teachers. Hal, in his own view of education, commented that "as a nation, we may have to come back to rethink the legislation creating separate Catholic schools."

When talking with Fox Willow staff, Hal tried to "sell" the idea of the Christian school as being a school like any other in some ways, but with a special emphasis. In fact, what staffs saw was the creation of a separate institution for a group of people who were unhappy with the ethical and moral practices of the general population. Hal would refer to legislation such as the Charter of Rights, Human Rights and the

Education Act to point out that parents have the right to decide on the kind of education they want for their children. "We need to work around the rules and regulations [that is, establish an alternate school within the district] if we're going to maintain a meaningful educational relationship with this group of parents and students."

Hal used similar arguments with parents and local boards in his discussions with these groups during the time of the Board-Kirklander negotiations. He did not actively arrange any public meetings about the possible establishment of an alternate school. His view was that discussion among smaller groups of people or through committees offered a more "negotiable stance" than did public meetings. Nonetheless, when requested to do so, he attended local board meetings to provide information and answer questions. In Fox Willow, home and school associations were mainly inactive, "a dead issue" for most parents; instead, parents used the local board structure as the vehicle for involvement with their local school and for input into district matters.

Hal pursued the issue of the selection of teachers on a number of fronts. With the Kirklanders, he returned to their expressed desire for "a good education." A good education meant a grade 12 recognized by other institutions which meant use of the provincial curriculum. In turn, Hal suggested, the provincial curriculum was best taught by teachers trained and certified to teach it.

In considering the selection of teachers, Hal contacted the provincial Human Rights Commission as well as other agencies for their views on how far the school district could go in advertising and selecting a certain kind of teacher for a certain kind of school. The Human Rights Commission responded that it was illegal to hire on the basis of religious affiliation. For Hal, though, the issue was less clear cut. "But for any school that you hire a teacher, you don't hire somebody that is out of sync . . . you hire people that are going to fit. . . . You hire people that are right for you in other schools as well as in that one."

Eventually, the compromise on the selection of teachers that Hal helped the groups work out was similar to the district's involvement of local boards in the

staffing procedure. Hal advertised positions available in the district by naming the school which had the vacancy. He and his designates in the central office conducted the initial screening of applications and determined a short list of candidates for the position. The candidates were interviewed by a committee usually consisting of Hal or his designate, a member of the District Board, the chairperson of the local board, and the school principal. Any other member of the local board could sit in on the interviews, usually as observers, and participate in the committee's selection of the teacher(s) to be hired.

This, then, was the arrangement worked out with the Kirklanders. The Kirkland group would act as a local board and have representation on the interview committee through a Kirkland Church Committee member and the school principal. The rest of the staffing procedure would be identical to that used for other schools in the district. For Hal and most of the Board members, it was a satisfactory resolution. Hal considered that "through your whole process of short listing and referencing on the people that you do hire, you know you pick the people that fit your mold."

The education department's position on teachers was connected with use of the provincial curriculum and funding. If the provincial curriculum was taught by certified teachers and those teachers were under the supervision of district personnel, then the conditions were met for consideration of grant support. Discussions of this nature occurred between Hal and department officials early in the Board-Kirklander discussions. Hal kept the department informed of the state of the negotiations. The department's position was consistent throughout that funding was contingent on the basic requirements of provincial curriculum and certified and properly supervised teachers being met.

Funding

The funding issue was initially a concern of education department officials, Fox Willow Board members, and Hal. Immediately following the indication of the Kirklanders' dissatisfaction with Fox Willow schools in November 1983, Hal contacted the department of education. He knew that arrangements for schools that

deviated from standard practice would require departmental approval, so he wanted to involve department officials in the Board discussions with the Kirklanders right from the beginning. If Hal and the Fox Willow Board members were "barking up the wrong tree . . if we can't do this, tell us now and we'll end it."

Hal recalls that the department's position was that it would provide grant support for "high school students only and only after two years of successful operation without any funding support." This was the arrangement it had with nine church-operated high schools in the province that had been in existence for a long time and even with these schools, the grant support was partial. Any funding support at all was contingent on the school's use of the provincial curriculum and certified teachers.

Hal's position was that if the provincial curriculum were used and qualified teachers to teach it, then why not provide grant support from the beginning of the school's existence and for all students attending? Hal personally held the view that "the road to an education must be wider than the one we're now on." The Catholic School System receives full grant support for students attending its schools and it operates with a religiously-enhanced curriculum. He saw the Kirklanders' request for a Christian school as similar to the Catholic school situation. Hal questioned why there is support for students in the public and Catholic systems and only partial support, or no support at all, for students in private schools where the same curriculum and teachers with the same qualifications provide the education.

The Fox Willow Board recognized the funding support it would lose if 125 students were withdrawn from its schools. Although Board members and Hal agreed that financial considerations were "not the main thing" in their negotiations with the Kirklanders, they did acknowledge the loss of revenue that would result if the Kirklanders began their own school. The educational consultant for the Kirklanders speculated that the loss of grant support was more important to Hal and the Board than they were willing to admit.

In the early stages of the discussions between the Fox Willow Board and the Kirklanders, Hal "spent considerable time with the Department negotiating an arrangement for grant support." As Board-Kirklander negotiations continued and it

became apparent that the Kirklanders supported the use of the provincial curriculum and certified teachers in whatever school configuration might be arrived at, Hal's discussions with education department officials changed directions. The department's reluctance to provide grant support evaporated with the Kirklanders' willingness to adhere to provincial curriculum and teacher certification requirements. Discussions involving department officials then moved to a consideration of curriculum adaptation.

The Kirklanders' primary concern at the outset was securing a Christian-based education for their children. They knew it would require a heavy financial commitment on their part to build and operate a school, but their belief in the importance of a Christian education was strong enough to make the financial investment worthwhile. According to a Kirkland Church member, they considered the school "a mission of the church" and as such, they were ready to bear whatever the financial cost might be. Hal recognized both the determination of the Kirklanders in the church school matter and that they had the financial wherewithall to successfully build and operate such a school.

As Board-Kirklander discussions progressed, two things happened to make the Kirklanders take a keener interest in the issue of provincial funding support for education. One was that, as the Kirklanders got deeper into discussions about school operations, they more clearly understood the costs of education. By their own admission, they did not know the intracacies of establishing or operating a school. Some people in the Kirklander group ran successful businesses, but they were not, according to Hal, "academics." As they began to realize the costs of building, staffing, equipping and maintaining a school on a long term basis, the spokesperson for the Kirkland group remembers that they also began to ask themselves "why, as tax payers, shouldn't some of our tax dollars come back to us?"

The other factor that increased the Kirklander interest in the funding issue was the addition to the Kirklander group of a non-Kirklander educational consultant. Originally, one of the leaders in the Kirkland Church enlisted the support of the education consultant to help the Kirklanders deal with the Fox Willow Board in matters of program. However, once committed to the group, the consultant became a

fully participating member of the Kirkland Education Committee. He, too, recognized that the Kirklanders would continue to support a public school system that their students would not be using. He encouraged them to make the tax issue more prominent in their discussions with the Fox Willow Board.

Eventually the funding issue was resolved to the satisfaction of the Kirklanders, Department of Education officials, Hal, and most Fox Willow Board members. The Kirklanders agreed to use the provincial curriculum and certified teachers; department officials recognized all students attending WCA for grant purposes and included these numbers in the grant support calculated for the Fox Willow School District; Fox Willow provided the teachers for WCA. Two Board members maintained that the financial arrangements around WCA were detrimental to Fox Willow. For one, facility costs, which were the Kirklanders' responsibility, were far less than instructional costs, which were the district's responsibility. In the view of the Fox Willow Board chair, public school supporters were helping to pay for a private school.

Enrolment

Early in the discussion process, the Kirklanders developed a list of families ready to commit to sending their children to a Kirklander Christian school. The first such enrolment list had 126 student and parent names on it from schools in six different communities across the Fox Willow District and one community in an adjacent district. The Board could see that most areas of the school district would be affected by a withdrawal of Kirklander students. It was a serious concern to Board members and Hal that the district would lose this number of students all at once and at least this number on a long term basis.

The implications of this loss in enrolment would be felt across the school district. The district would experience a reduction in grant support from the department of education. If the reduction were drastic enough, the district would have to increase the mill rate to make up the shortfall or reduce services. Schools losing 20-30 students would experience a reduction in staff. A reduction in students and/or

staff would also affect programming. The selection of academic classes at a high school level could be curtailed; options classes could be reduced or eliminated; programs for exceptional students could be reduced if enrolment dropped. Some Board members feared that the viability of a smaller school would be in question.

For Hal, it was also a boundaries issue. The working agreement among districts sharing boundaries was that one district would not accept students into its schools from another district. If the school was a private school, then the attendance issue was out of the CEO's hands; if the school was a district school, as the Christian school would be if the Board and the Kirklanders came to an agreement, then Hal would need to arrange for the cross-district attendance of Kirklander students.

The enrolment issue was worked out through the agreement of certain guidelines. The Kirklanders kept the Board informed of families indicating an interest in enrolling their children in the Christian school. Hal kept principals informed of the names of potential students of the new school. Principals confirmed the student intentions directly with students and their families.

The discussion of students' leaving a public school for the Christian school caused some disruption among students, teachers and parents. A member of the Kirkland Church Committee commented on his daughter's negative experience with her teacher when the church school issue was discussed in her classroom. Hal contacted a neighbouring district to clear the attendance of students at WCA. By the time the agreement was signed, the number of students giving intention to attend the new school had risen from 126 to over 200.

Setting a Precedent

All the groups involved in negotiating the establishment of a Christian school within a public school system viewed it as precedent setting. The Fox Willow Board was concerned that if an agreement for a special emphasis school was struck with one religious group, others would ask for the same sort of agreement. Hal could not assure Board members that this would not happen, although he personally doubted it would. The Kirklanders were a well-organized and determined group. From the

beginning they were prepared to finance what they wanted and strike out on their own if necessary. They were open to negotiations in some areas if their basic principle of Christian education remained intact. They valued a Christian and quality education that would allow students access to post-secondary institutions. Hal doubted that this combination of will, resources, and attitude to education would repeat itself too often in other groups. Board members, nonetheless, felt that, if pressed, it would not be feasible to grant other groups the same arrangement they were discussing with the Kirklanders. Board members were also hearing concerns from people in their subdistricts about the direction they were taking with the Kirklanders. Hal was hearing similar concerns from professional staff in Fox Willow. The idea of a special status school did not generally sit well with staff or community. During the time of the Board-Kirklander discussions, Hal attended more than the usual number of staff and local board meetings to explain the situation and answer questions.

Officials from the department of education took an interested view in the possible precedent the Fox Willow Board and the Kirklanders might set. If a satisfactory arrangement between the two groups could be worked out, it might provide a model for the department to use with other church group requests. Some department officials were openly supportive of the direction Fox Willow was taking and said as much to Board members. The Board Chair remembers officials calling it a "bold, new move" and congratulating Board members on their ability to "be accommodating." The Chair and Board members were "not enthralled . . . We weren't that worried about whether we were making some big, new movements."

The Kirklanders, too, came to realize that the process of creating a Christian school within a public school system was a new one. Around them, in other locations across the province, church groups attempting to come to agreements with other school districts were meeting with rejection. The Kirklanders began to see that their arrangement with Fox Willow could be a model for other church groups to use in their pursuit of a Christian education for their children. An excitement at being a leader in this area took hold in the Kirklanders. They did not have a history for trying new things in consort with public organizations. In Hal's view, this positive view by the

Kirklanders of setting a precedent for other church groups was a facilitating factor in eventually reaching an agreement.

Quality of Education

Hal recognized from the outset that the Board and the Kirklanders were both interested in creating the best education for students. It was this desire for "a good education" that first brought the Kirklanders to express their concerns to the Board about activities and materials used in their children's schools. And it was this desire for a good education that eventually made it possible for Hal to help them reach an agreement with the Fox Willow Board of Education.

The Kirklanders recognized the need for their children to have access to education that exceeded the level most of them had attained. When discussions began with the Fox Willow Board, only one of the Kirklanders' group had graduated from grade 12. For the most part, the group was made up of farmers and business people. They were successful at what they did, but they saw that the future for their children depended on more than hard work and apprenticeships with their parents. They wanted their children to have the same opportunities as other people's children would have and they recognized that this meant a grade 12 education with the potential of going on to university or other post-secondary institutions. Education took on a new importance for them and, as with other aspects of their lives, this meant education needed to be considered within the Christian principles that guided their lives.

This attitude toward education was not a part of the Kirklanders' traditions. Hal recognized this:

> We weren't aware of too many of the Kirklanders that were graduates in education. Because for the most part the approach that they had to higher education was you finished your schooling by grade 8. So there was, again, a glimmer that there was a desire to change that attitude. And that encouraged me a lot. That they wanted to . . . and were talking seriously about the need for their children to get a high school education and to graduate with grade 12. Which I thought really provided a strong opening.

The Board Chair, someone who had a good understanding of the Kirklanders, admitted that he had misread the Kirklanders' intentions about the quality of education they wanted for their children. ". . . and I guess, I particularly, read them wrong on that. I didn't think that the strong education was very high on the Kirklanders' minds. Because their background is not education." Another Board member agreed that the establishment of WCA "could very easily not have been" a success story. "But the fact that the Kirklanders wanted a good education for their children was a plus."

Board members had no doubt about where Hal stood on the issue of quality education. One of them commented that, "He's first and foremost concerned about the children, the education of the children. If you can work around that, keep that as your focal point, then he's of the opinion that the other things can be worked out." The Board Chair said, "He's there to promote education and to promote good education. So I think he really kept that in perspective."

With the understanding that both the Kirklanders and the Board were working from the basis of what was best for students, Hal, from time to time, used this mutual intent to help the groups reach consensus on critical issues:

> There was an overriding concern on both sides to ensure that students are looked after. As the debate moved on, so to speak, the concern for the welfare of the students became more and more evident and also what became absolutely clear was that both sides have the same concern. So we had a common goal, so to speak, that was the students.

The establishment of Willow Christian Academy was the result of the concerted effort of two groups to meet and discuss and understand each other's views so that an educational compromise, satisfactory to both groups, might be reached. Key to the process was Hal, the CEO, who worked with both groups to facilitate the discussions and develop the understandings. In this case, it was Hal who held the larger view, saw the pathways through the issues and understood the participants. In the opinion of department officials, Kirkland Church members and Fox Willow Board members, without Hal's involvement, the Willow Christian Academy incident would have taken a different course and the WCA would not have been established.