

**The Evidence on Police Contributions to Crime Reduction:
What do we know and what does the Ottawa Police Service do about it?**

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ABSTRACT

There are two main objectives of this thesis. First, to review the social science evidence on the extent to which different police practices have been proven to reduce crime, or not reduce crime, as well as those cases where the evidence is not clear. This thesis synthesizes crime reduction strategies to short-list those practices that are proven to reduce crime. Second, it uses the evidence collected to facilitate an exploratory case study with three key informants from the Ottawa Police Service (OPS). The case study examines the current use and perceived future role of the police in evidence-based crime prevention efforts. Overall, the research study seeks to answer the following four research questions:

1. What sources of literature provide well-researched and reliable data on effectiveness of policing in crime reduction?
2. In this literature, what policing strategies/practices are shown to reduce crime, not reduce crime or are promising in reducing crime?
3. To what extent is the OPS using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices?
4. To what extent is the OPS open to using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices in the future?

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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

Over the last few decades, citizens have continued to express support for public police, and, in response, politicians have increased their resources. However, based on evidence, it is unclear if a growth in police resources reduces crime and victimization among the public.

In Ontario, the police are expected to be not only enforcers of the law but also to contribute to crime prevention. “Adequate and effective police services must include ... Crime prevention...” (Police Services Act, 1990, Part I, 4(2)).

The public police are considered so fundamental to peace and good order in society that they are mandated as an essential service. They get high approval ratings from the public (OPS, 2010c). Furthermore, the public largely supports the hiring of more police officers.

Police budgets across Canada have doubled from 6.8 billion dollars in 2000 to 12.8 billion dollars in 2010 (StatsCan, 2011). During this time, the number of police officers in Canada has increased by about ten percent; so much of this increase is associated with improved salaries and overtime (StatsCan, 2011). Canadian police personnel salaries increased 34 percent between 2000 and 2010 (RCMP, 2010). The average Canadian family income increased only 16 percent over the same period (StatsCan, 2012a). Salaries, wages, and benefits represent over 80 percent of police operating budgets (OPS, 2011). The increased income of police officers has been linked by some to the policing labeling themselves as ‘professionals’.

The majority of the costs, 60 percent, of the police are incurred by municipalities, who are forced to increase taxes or take funding from other necessary services provided to local taxpayers (FCM, 2012). The Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Service, also known as the 'Drummond Report', drew particular attention to this problem at the provincial level and the "risk that this poses to the provision of police services in the future" (Drummond, 2012; p. 356). It called for improved use of evidence-based data, a review of the core responsibilities of police and the exploration of alternative models of police service delivery.

Though the police receive positive ratings in public opinion polls, victims of crime have been going to them less to report crimes. For instance, the General Social Survey (GSS) gathers data on social trends in order to monitor the wellbeing of Canadians over time. The GSS is undertaken by Statistics Canada focusing on victimization about every five years. It reaches a random sample of adults from about 20,000 households to ask them about their crime victimization. The sample is representative of Canada, except for some of the territories. The GSS revealed in 2009:

- The percentage of crime reported by victims to the police hit an all time low with only 31 percent of all crimes being reported to police, down from 34 percent in 2004 (Statistics Canada, 2010; 2011) which was down from 37 percent in 1999 (Linden, 2012; StatsCan, 2010).
- Violent victimization, including sexual and, physical assault, and robbery has remained essentially unchanged from 1999 to 2004 to 2009 according to the GSS (Linden, 2012).

The rate of crime recorded by the police has been steadily declining (StatsCan, 2012b). Part of this decline may be due to this phenomenon of victims of crime not reporting their victimization to the police.

Information from the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) shows that policing and public safety costs are the fastest growing for municipalities, exceeding 20 percent of municipal budgets (FCM, 2012). While FCM refer also to costs related to federal policing, the majority of these costs are for municipal law enforcement. This creates pressure to control costs of policing, perhaps by finding more efficient ways of policing or more effective ways of reducing crimes that require police response.

In contrast to the drops in police recorded crime, the last three GSSs (1999, 2004, and 2009) show small increases in sexual assault, robbery, and physical assault (Linden, 2012-Waller, p.219). Various types of property offences have seen minor increases or decreases depending on the specific offence, but overall the statistics have remained steady (Linden, 2012 -Waller, p.219).

It is troubling to note in the last few decades that the quality of life in Canada as indicated by victimization survey rates of crime has not improved, while almost every other indicator has improved, including life expectancy, access to better technology and education (StatsCan, 2012; Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2002). In most areas of the public service, an increase in financial resources and development results in a reduction of the issue. In the field of policing a drastic increase in spending has not resulted in a significant impact on victimization rates measured by the GSS (StatsCan, 2010).

Table 1: Self-reported victimization, 1999, 2004 and 2009

Year	Total Violent Victimization (Number in Thousands/Rate)	Total Household Victimization (Number in Thousands/Rate)	Theft of Personal Property (Number in Thousands/Rate)
1999	2691 / 111	2656 / 218	1831 / 75
2004	2751 / 106	3206 / 248	2408 / 93
2009	3267 / 118	3184 / 237	2981 / 108

(StatsCan, 2010)

When spending such large amounts of taxpayer money, it is essential that public servants ensure projects being funded are based on evidence proving effectiveness, to maximize return on investment for residents. There has been a vast wealth of knowledge created in the area of crime prevention over the past several decades. Significant sources such as the National Crime Prevention Centre (2011)- Canada, Crime Solutions (2012)- United States Department of Justice, World Health Organization (Krug et al., 2002) and Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (2011)- United States, all have assembled impressive banks of knowledge from scientific and empirical research on the effectiveness of policing. Each organization has well researched solutions for the police to effectively reduce crime rates.

Numerous crime reduction studies have shown significant return on investment. Crime prevention through social development, crime prevention through environmental design (WSIPP, 2012; ICPC, 2012) and strategies that combine innovative policing strategies and prevention, such as the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS), that was able to cause a sustained reduction in Winnipeg's auto theft rate (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009) are all examples of successful strategies.

In the last 20 years, the media discourse on policing has focused on innovations such as 'Broken Windows's' policing, CompStat policing, community policing and problem-oriented policing, zero tolerance policing, hot spot policing and so on.

Depending on who was using the term, they were used to describe vastly different strategies, which were often not consistent with the original concepts.

“The National Research Council (NRC) undertook a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of policing in 2004. The NRC was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government.” (Skogan & Frydl, 2004, p. iii). This prestigious organization is a private, non-profit institution with the aim of using research and evidence to improve government policy in the United States. In the United States, a 1994 mandate from Congress to evaluate what works in crime reduction, resulted in a wealth of knowledge being compiled on what reduces crime, including the NRC Report, the World Health Organization and recently the US Department of Justice. The combination of this wealth of crime reduction science available to police services in addition to the significant resources allocated to policing means that it is crucial to understand the current evidence based crime prevention initiatives being utilized in Canada, as well as the potential for greater use of this knowledge in future policing initiatives.

One striking finding – whatever the public discourse - police resources are allocated primarily to reactionary measures. For instance, two thirds of police resources go to responding to 911 calls and another 20 percent goes to the detective function (Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Bayley, 1994). Few resources are allocated to proactive strategies, evidence based or not.

Knowledge in the area of the police role in evidence-based crime prevention does exist, however, not in a comprehensive document specific to enable police executives to

easily identify successful police efforts in crime prevention or what is increasingly called smart policing.

1.1 The Research Problem for the Thesis

Given the above-mentioned points, I have decided to explore the practices of a Canadian police organization in relation to this accumulation of evidence-based knowledge about what reduces crime. I also want to understand the views of high ranking and experienced personnel of a police service on the role of the police as a key stakeholder in evidence-based crime reduction. Understanding the views of these members of a police service will help support the results of the broader research study.

The purpose of this thesis raises some specific research questions, which are explored through two primary sources in this research. The first is to identify within the literature, effective measures the police can utilize that are based on evidence to reduce crime. The second is to begin to explore the current and potential use of this knowledge by the Ottawa Police Service (OPS).

In order to fulfill these objectives, I identified the following research questions:

- 1) What sources of literature provide well-researched and reliable data on effectiveness of policing strategies in crime reduction?
- 2) In this literature, what policing strategies/practices are shown to reduce crime, not reduce crime or are promising in reducing crime?
- 3) To what extent is the OPS using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices?
- 4) To what extent is the OPS open to using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices in the future?

Policing in this paper is not viewed as a law enforcement agency, which enforces laws for the sake of enforcement regardless if it is the best course of action in any given situation. Police activity is rather seen as a means to serve the public in a way that has an overall objective of reducing the number of victims of crime.

1.2 Outline and Procedure

Chapter two discusses a number of concepts that are central to understanding the current research and describes them in the context of policing and crime prevention. Chapter three describes the choice of research method, the methodological framework, strengths, limitations of the research and ethical considerations. The limitations discussed focus on the generalizability of the literature review and limits of the interview component, as it is a case study of only three key informants with one police service in Ontario, Canada.

The literature review is divided into two chapters. The first, chapter four, examines the standard approach to policing, which has been the dominant approach in Canada, the Western world and indeed most if not all countries. An evaluation based on a review of the literature is then discussed and criticisms of the approach are identified.

Chapter five identifies, discusses and evaluates three innovative policing approaches that have been developed over the last three decades: innovative policing alone; policing with the public; and policing within multiagency partnerships. The approaches are then examined to determine which ones are successful in reducing crime, the keys to success and real world model examples.

Chapter six provides an analysis and description of the data collected through interviews and secondary sources, outlining findings. The chapter reviews the core

programs that the OPS label as crime prevention. Then, initiatives are analyzed where the OPS has organized actions that are designed to reduce crime.

Chapter seven examines the perceptions of the three key OPS members regarding the future direction of the role of OPS in preventing and reducing crime. It discusses their willingness to shift toward a more evidence-based approach to crime reduction and prevention and organizational philosophy.

The final chapter provides a summary of the conclusions. The findings of the current research are organized to provide responses to the primary research questions. Three recommendations are made for an increased role for evidence-based crime reduction initiatives within OPS and possibly other Canadian police services.

CHAPTER 2- CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to review literature relating the to current research, focusing on five concepts that include, crime, crime prevention/reduction, police, role of police, and evidence-based.

2.1 Crime

The current research conceptualizes ‘crime’ using the legal definition as a foundation because police activity is primarily focused on violations of the Criminal Code of Canada (CCC). For the purpose of the current research, crime refers to any property or violent offence, including all forms of assault and theft as found in the criminal code and also in crime reported by the police to Statistics Canada. In addition, crimes surrounding illicit drug use and firearms are also included. Crime does not refer to corporate crime or other violations of the CCC, including fraud, which involve their own area of expertise and are different in nature from crimes that were most commonly targeted in the research on effective crime reduction and crime prevention strategies. Driving offences are not a focus of the current study, with the exception of impaired driving offences.

The two most common ways of determining crime levels in Canada are using data from the GSS Victimization Surveys and police reported data, which is taken by way of Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) (Landau, 2006). The most commonly used but least reliable of the two is UCRs, for several reasons. The most significant reason is that the vast majority of crimes that occur are not reported to police. In Ontario, in recent years the number of crimes unreported to the police has decreased to the area of 70 percent

(StatsCan, 2010). For this reason, the main sources of crime data when measuring the effectiveness of crime prevention initiatives should come from the GSS Victimization Surveys.

2.2 Crime Prevention/Reduction

The terms ‘crime reduction’, and ‘crime prevention’ will be used interchangeably, as they have similar meanings for the purposes of the current research.

For the purposes of this research, crime prevention includes any action, initiative or policy that reduces or eliminates offending, victimization and reoffending (Government of Alberta, 2011).

Current police practices keep crime rates within a range that is accepted as normal by the public. Crime prevention is the implementation of strategies and practices by the police and community stakeholders to proactively address crime issues, which result in the decline of victimization rates.

In the current research, crime reduction practices will be divided into four categories based on their effectiveness in reducing/preventing crime (Sherman et al., 1998; Crimesolutions.gov, 2012). Crime prevention practices that have been proven to reduce crime based on scientific evidence are classified under the heading of ‘What works’. ‘Promising’ crime prevention practices have some scientific evidence indicating that further research could support a conclusion that indicated the program is effective in reducing crime. ‘What doesn’t work’ are practices the researcher is reasonably certain, fail to prevent crime based on available scientific evidence. ‘Inconclusive/Conflicting Evidence’ practices are those that do not fit into any of the previous categories because there is either not enough evidence available, or there are multiple reliable studies that have different conclusions on the effectiveness of a practice.

Crime prevention strategies will include two main streams, situational crime prevention and crime prevention through social development. Situational crime prevention is a strategy that attempts to reduce the opportunity for crime by increasing the risk and decreasing the rewards of committing a crime (Linden, 2007). Clarke (1997), an expert in the field of situational crime prevention, notes that it is radically different than most areas of criminology. Rather than focusing on the offender, it manipulates environmental settings in a discreet way to reduce the opportunity for crime to take place in a specific location, which is commonly referred to as crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). Therefore, the field does not attempt to eliminate criminal activity through improvement in society or institutions, but merely takes measures to make criminal actions less appealing to offenders (Clarke, 1997). The situational approach is founded on the basis of rational choice theory, which claims crime is the result of deliberate choices made by offenders based on their calculation of the risk and rewards of these choices (Linden, 2007).

Crime prevention through social development (CPSD) is based on the theory that criminal activity is determined by negative and positive life experiences often associated with particular behavioural and attitudinal patterns that have been learned through an individual's development (IPC, 2011). The focus of CPSD is to promote the well-being of people through social, economic, health and educational means, focusing on youth and risk factors associated with crime and victimization (IPC, 2011).

Social developmental crime prevention also targets risk factors that have been shown to contribute to a greater chance that a youth will become a persistent offender,

such as poverty, uncaring parenting, behavioural problems identified in primary school and abandonment of secondary school (Waller, 2008).

The field of crime prevention is often separated into three levels of prevention that involve both CPSD and CPTED, building on established concepts in public health (Brantingham and Faust, 1976). The first is primary prevention, defined by the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (2011) as “Policies that tackle risk factors in the general population believed to be associated with crime trends, such as youth unemployment or economic opportunities for women.” Secondary prevention is more specific, using policy to target situations where individuals are at an increased risk of becoming involved in a deviant lifestyle. Risk factors, including dropping out of school, inconsistent parenting, abusive parents, and alcohol and substance use/abuse have been scientifically been proven to predict which individuals in society are most likely to become involved in a criminal lifestyle (IPC, 2011). Science has also proven these risk factors can be addressed through means such as helping youth at risk to avoid dropping out of school or providing extra public health nurses for teenage mothers in low socioeconomic communities. The final prevention level is known as tertiary prevention, referring to strategies that prevent recidivism by intervening in the life of the offender, such as assisting in the social reintegration of offenders or the more traditional approach of incapacitation (IPC, 2011).

2.3 Police

The term ‘police’ in Canadian society has the ability to cover multiple agencies in both the private and public sector, with some overlap between the two sectors. The scope of this research defines ‘police’ with the same definition as the Police Services Act

(Ontario), which “means the Ontario Provincial Police or a municipal police force” (Police Services Act, 1990).

The current research more specifically conceptualizes the term ‘police’ to be a service rather than force, such as the OPS. The term ‘service’ is used because it suggests the police exist to assist and serve the public relating to matters of safety. ‘Force’ implies that the police are simply a law enforcement agency that enforces the laws of the state. The study is limited to public police services that have authority to apply the Canadian Criminal Code. It excludes other by-law enforcement officers or agents of the government who have authority as peace officers, although do not have Canadian Criminal Code authority.

2.4 Role of Police

The way ‘role of police’ is conceptualized within the current research is based both in the origins of policing, as well as contemporary legislation that dictates police conduct and responsibilities.

Sir Robert Peel, referred to as the ‘Father of Modern Policing’, set forth nine principles that his force, the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, were to abide by. As listed in Whitelaw, Parent and Griffiths (2006) the fundamental principles set forth by Peel most relevant to the current research include the following:

- The basic mission of the police is to prevent crime and disorder.
- The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of the police dealing with them.

Many or all of the principles set forth by Peel nearly two centuries ago are still discussed today. However, much of modern policing is dominated by emergency response and law enforcement.

Peel's Principles, are reflected in the current day Police Services Act (1990). The core services that are mandatory for police services in Ontario to provide adequately and effectively, at minimum are:

1. Crime Prevention
2. Law Enforcement
3. Assistance to Victims of Crime
4. Public Order Maintenance
5. Emergency Response

Of these core services, crime prevention is listed alongside law enforcement and emergency response; two areas that consume vast resources. The current research recognizes law enforcement as tool of policing services in order to prevent crime, not as the primary function.

2.5 Evidence Based

Ideally, the spread of all government crime prevention policy and related initiatives would be based on interventions that have been evaluated and demonstrated to be effective in reducing crime (Welsh & Farrington, 2005). Unfortunately evidence based programs remain underutilized. This results in the implementation of many programs and strategies claiming to reduce crime, but once evaluated, if at all, evidence has proven them to have little or no effect on crime rates (Welsh & Farrington, 2005). An emphasis on evidence based knowledge proving effectiveness is therefore essential to the current research.

Crime prevention policy and practice based on rigorous evaluations, such as Random Control Trials, that demonstrate effectiveness in preventing/reducing crime- using what works (Welsh & Farrington, 2005). For example, the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment, a Random Control Trial. The current research also makes use evidence that is the result of qualitative research.

Two of the most common methods used in the field of crime reduction to provide evidence of a program or strategies effectiveness are Random Control Trials (RCTs) and longitudinal studies (Waller, 2008). The first method will be heavily relied upon when accepting or rejecting crime reduction efforts.

Supported by Sherman et al. (1998), RCTs are field experiments where subjects of innovative interventions are selected at random from pools of individuals who are eligible so that researchers can determine whether the intervention was the only experience responsible for a change in an outcome (Waller, 2008).

Ultimately, as stated by Petrosino, “An evidence-based approach requires that the results of rigorous evaluation be rationally integrated into decisions about interventions by policymakers and practitioners alike” (Petrosino, 2000; p. 635). Furthermore, in the field of policing there are consistent themes of accountability, legitimacy, innovation, evidence and the role of science emerging among leading researchers (Neyroud, 2011).

2.6 Conclusion

In the current chapter, an overview has been given of concepts important to the research study. ‘Crime’ is used to refer to violent or property offences of the Criminal Code of Canada, but also includes impaired driving and offences related to illicit drug use. ‘Crime prevention/reduction’ was broken down into the theories of CPTED and

CPSD, which compliment one another to reduce crime. 'Police' are the municipal police with power of arrest, viewed as a public service, to protect individuals from victimization. The 'role of the police' in the context of this research is focused on keeping the public safe through the prevention of crime. Finally, 'evidence-based' means the reliance on programs that have been scientifically evaluated and shown to reduce crime.

CHAPTER 3- METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the methodology is explained in four sections. The first section discusses the selected literature reviewed, which primarily consists of prestigious commissions involving academics and public interest groups. The second section discusses the process of collecting data through interviews with key members of the OPS and documents. The next section identifies the methodological framework selected to analyze the data collected from interviews and documents. The final section of the methodology chapter discusses limitations, strengths and ethical considerations of the study.

3.1 Review of Literature

The review of selected literature primarily focuses on prestigious commissions that have reviewed the scientific literature with the support of significant public funds, public interest organizations, and academic subject matter experts.

One source is the report from the ‘Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices’ (2000-2003). The US NRC established this committee, composed of 23 distinguished experts in the field of criminology from universities across the United States, including names well known to those working on police effectiveness, such as Wesley Skogan, David Weisburd, John Eck, and David Bayley to name a few. Combining these academics with significant government funding to research and collaborate on a specific area of interest results in the development of literature of an exceptional reliability and quality. Scientific evaluation methods were developed and

utilized to ensure only the most reliable research was analyzed by the subject matter experts.

The primary source of interest for the current research is their chapter entitled ‘The Effectiveness of Police Activities in Reducing Crime, Disorder and Fear’. The committee relied on thorough evaluations in addition to a general consensus among the experts to evaluate the validity and reliability of studies used to influence their findings (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

The researchers’ evaluation gave the highest regard to successfully implemented and sustained randomized experiments, followed by quasi-experimental design studies. Non-experimental research designs were given the least weight, and only used in exceptional circumstances (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

A second source is the group of distinguished criminologists from the Universities of Cambridge, Maryland and Pennsylvanian (Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, & Bushway, 1998). In 1996, due to a new Federal law, the U.S. Congress required the National Institute of Justice to review state and local crime prevention programs (Sherman, et. al, 1998). Lawrence Sherman became the lead investigator and the University of Maryland was responsible for creating a report to the U.S. Congress on preventing crime. ‘Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising’ was the final report submitted with the purpose of making policy-makers aware of the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of crime prevention programs.

The group developed the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods, a rigorous evaluation process, to determine the internal validity of program evaluations. The study ultimately evaluated the research to determine the effectiveness of programs in reducing

crime and identified them to work, not work or be promising (Sherman et al., 1998). It is not always clear the extent to which the Maryland Scale was used in the chapters relating to policing but the methodology meets the highest scientific standards according to experts involved. This work was revised and published as a book on Evidence Based Crime Prevention (Sherman et al., 2002). The authors include Farrington, the winner of the Stockholm prize for 2013 for evidence based crime prevention as well as Brandon Welsh, David Farrington, and Doris MacKenzie among the world's leading evaluators of crime prevention strategies (Sherman et al., 2002).

The most recent successor to these studies is a web-based resource in the United States Office of Justice program 'Crimesolutions.gov'. Similar to the report prepared for the U.S. Congress, initiatives are divided into one of three categories: effective, promising, or no effect. Crimesolutions.gov (2012) relies on several dozen experts in the field of criminology and criminal justices from numerous academic and public institutions to research, review, and evaluate programs. The experts took into consideration the quality, strength, and the extent of evidence to determine if a program effectively reaches its goals. The Maryland Scale of Scientific Method used relied heavily on evidence showing the replication of studies.

Campbell Collaboration Systematic Reviews were utilized, which by nature require transparent and systematic searches and analysis of numerous research studies. The review process seeks to sum up the best available research on a specific question, by first completing a search through numerous databases for both published and unpublished reports. The reports are then systematically coded and analyzed to determine the most

relevant and reliable studies. Studies that are screened in based on predetermined criteria are then combined and analyzed (The Campbell Collaboration, 2010).

Resources pertaining to more recent police crime prevention efforts were also utilized, such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), Police Foundation, Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (POP Center), and Community Oriented Policing Service. POP Center makes available some of the most practical applications based on the work of experts held in high regard, such as Goldstein, Clark, Cohen, and Felson. The non-profit organization strives to advance the concept and practice of problem-oriented policing by making information readily accessible to services seeking to more effectively address specific crime problems (Center for Problem Oriented Policing, 2010). The Police Foundation was a driving factor for change, which did much of the independent research that led to the questioning of the effectiveness of the standard policing model (Police Foundation, n.d.).

Peer-reviewed articles were used, often to support or gain a better understanding of issues that were conflicting or inconclusive in other sources. Peer-reviewed articles were not the primary sources for this research because the commissions had already reviewed and analyzed the vast amount of peer-review articles in this field. These articles were searched using online academic databases that identified peer-reviewed articles. The review and compilation of literature identified was instrumental in the development of interview questions and documents selected for review.

Reliability

The main argument that can be made concerning the reliability of the literature sources is that they focus on the US, and not Canada. Almost all of the studies were done

in the USA, as little empirical research on effectiveness of policing has been undertaken in Canada. Although US sources do not always reflect the realities of Canada, the nature of policing in the two countries remains very similar, being based on reacting to 911 calls for service, and performing follow-up investigations. Furthermore, police services from both countries often complete training courses together, adopting similar practices. Finally, the recent announcement of the ‘Canada-US Shiprider’ program that has police from both countries working together and gives them the authority to arrest on both sides of the border in certain circumstances, which reflects the similar policing practices across North America (RCMP, 2012). The main professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police and CALEA started as joint organizations between police leadership in the two countries. Canadian police leadership is active in both bodies.

3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews

The other source of data for analysis is three semi-structured interviews that focus not only on the practices of the Ottawa Police Service, but also perceptions of key informants who have significant influence on the direction of the organization. The interviews averaged about one hour each, in a setting of the participants choosing.

During interviews the researcher followed an interview guide (Appendix B) to ensure the interviews remained consistent. The interview guide contained predetermined questions developed from the initial literature review. To avoid misinterpreting information based around key terms being discussed, known as ‘tactic assumptions’, the researcher provided the participant with a list of terms described as they are conceptualized for the current research (Barriball & White, 1994).

The researcher also showed a key informant a chart (Appendix C) listing what the initial review of the literature identified as to what works, what does not and what is promising for police services in the field of crime prevention. This was used as a tool for the key informant to recognize which programs they currently engage in, as well as initiatives that they are currently engaged in which are not listed.

Key Informant Interviews

Key informants were recruited following the standards of the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board who granted full ethical approval once the OPS confirmed its interest in participating. From this recruitment, three individuals volunteered to participate in face-to-face semi-structured interviews with the primary researcher. The anonymity and confidentiality of all key informants was promised, however two key informants, Chief Bordeleau and Sergeant Frank D'Aoust dismissed the option of anonymity. When appropriate, key informants are referred to using a pseudonym such as 'Representative of the OPS'.

A limitation to the study is the fact that only three interview key informants were recruited. This raises the issue of validity concerning the information provided by the key informants. It is possible that their views are not consistent with other members of the organization and more broadly, other police services within Canada. Despite the limited number of key informants, the study is strengthened by who the members are. Chief Bordeleau leads the organization, and therefore has significant knowledge and influence over the current and future practices of the OPS. At the time of the interview, Bordeleau held the position of Deputy Chief and has since been promoted to Chief.

Sergeant D'Aoust recently conducted a review of the OPS to determine if there is a need for a Crime Prevention Section to be created within the organization.

Reports

A number of public reports and reports provided to the researcher by OPS were used to supplement information not discussed during the interviews. The publicly available reports analyzed included the OPS 2007-2009 and 2010 to 2012 Business Plans, OPS 'Year in Review 2010', 2011 Corporate Budget, and the 'Crime Prevention' section on the OPS's website. This sample of public reports is valuable because the documents within it reflect the priorities and goals that the organization seeks to achieve in both the near and distant future. The 'OPS- Crime Prevention Section Proposed Business Case' was the internal document provided by the OPS to be used for the current research. This document is beneficial to the research because it provides a significant amount of information regarding state of OPS crime prevention programs and practices.

3.3 Methodological Framework

The study took a qualitative case study approach and involved the use of content analysis to a limited extent.

Berg (2007, p. 303-304) describes content analysis as "a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, theme, biases and meanings." Content analysis is a flexible analytic approach ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analysis to systematic, of several forms of communication, primarily text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

Of the numerous types of content analysis, thematic content analysis has been identified as the most suitable for the current research, because the aim is to explore and

describe the perceptions within policing management of the police role in crime prevention. The coding scheme (Appendix D) was used to categorize themes that emerged from the reports and interviews.

3.4 Limitations & Ethical Considerations

Validity

External validity is focused on determining the generalizability of a research study, which single case studies are often criticized for having a poor basis for (Yin, 2003). The OPS was selected for the current research not simply because of its geographic location, but because the challenges facing the city are reflective of other Canadian cities with similar populations. Ottawa has a population spread out over a geographic area that is comparable to significant amount of medium to large Canadian cities. Despite being comparable to cities across Canada, it must be noted that each city faces its own unique challenges. For this reason, research in the future should tests the findings of the current research (Yin, 2003). This is known as ‘replication logic’, which increases external validity (Yin, 2003).

Reliability

Defined in simple terms, “Reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, yields the same result each time.” (Babbie, 2008, p.157). The concept of ‘reliability’ is concerned with minimizing errors and biases in a study, focusing on repeatability and the consistency of responses (Yin, 2003). A threat to the reliability of this study is the limited number of interview informants. Having only three key respondents from the OPS limits the amount of viewpoints and perceptions that

were used in the data set. When analyzing the data, set categories are used in a standardized way so that another researcher would categorize in the same way.

Ethical Considerations

The primary researcher received approval from the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board to conduct the semi-structured interviews with the OPS. Despite being deemed a study involving only minimal risk, which is considered to pose minimal risk to the subjects' rights and welfare, a number of ethical safeguards were put into place (University of Ottawa, 2011). All participant consent forms (See Appendix E) were signed by both the researcher and participant prior to each semi-structured interview, which outlined the purpose of the study, participant procedures, risk, benefits of the research and confidentiality.

3.5 Conclusion

The current chapter described the methodology used in this thesis. The first component will focus on reviews by public interest groups such as the US National Research Council, the Maryland-Cambridge-Pennsylvania group, the Campbell Collaborative and the Situational Crime Prevention group at POPCenter.org. These reviews focus on experiments carried out in the US using random control trials and other established ways of reliably determining whether the police strategy impacted on crime. The reviews meet the essential standards for scientific proof. The studies were done in the US, but are likely relevant to Canada where much of the policing strategies are similar to the US.

The second component consists of discussing the conclusions from the scientific literature with three key informants with the OPS. The informants are in key positions

with the OPS, including the new Chief of the OPS. The interviews were guided by a questionnaire developed from a review of the scientific evidence regarding police practices that reduce crime. The interviews are considered exploratory. While OPS is similar to other police services in Canada, this study generates some hypotheses about how police services rely on evidence rather than any conclusions.

CHAPTER 4- STANDARD POLICING APPROACH: REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE

In this chapter, I will identify the standard approach to policing. I will then use the literature to determine whether there is evidence that it reduces crime. The evolution and development of knowledge that has the ability to inform and guide the work of police organizations based on evidence is discussed.

4.1 Standard Policing Approach to Crime

Despite claims of advanced policing practices and strategies, policing agencies in Canada continue to default back to the “standard model” of policing. In completing a comprehensive international study, Bayley (1994) examined the resource allocation of police services in Canada and the US. The study found patrolling is by far the biggest assignment of the police, with 64 percent of officers in Canada designated for this purpose and 65 percent in the US (Bayley, 1994). In both Canadian and US cities, over 90 percent of this patrol work is generated by 911 dispatch (Bayley, 1994).

The next largest role of the police in Canada and the US was criminal investigation. This accounted for 14 percent of police personnel in Canada, 15 percent in the US. Administrative personnel take up approximately ten percent of human resources in Canada, but only seven percent in the US (Bayley, 1994). Six percent of the remaining human resources are designated to traffic enforcement in both Canada and the US (Bayley, 1994).

Police personnel in Canada tasked with giving explicit attention to anticipating and preventing crime account for a mere one percent (Bayley, 1994). There are negligible resources designated to proactive crime reduction measures, of which it is to be determined if the programs in place are even effective at reducing crime. Although more recent data was not found, it is likely that these statistics are close to the allocation of police resources today, due to no notable shift in policing work in the past two decades.

According to the NRC review, the dominant and standard approach of policing is focused on patrol practices premised on rapid response to 911 calls and reactive investigation (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Although there were numerous influences in the creation of the standard approach, advancements in technology, primarily the two-way radio, patrol vehicle, and widespread use of 911, were instrumental in shaping the police into the reactionary service they currently provide (Bennett & Hess, 2007).

Once the patrol car and two-way radio were in use, 911 created a shift from police officers walking a beat, interacting with the public, to being isolated in their patrol cars, responding to public requests received through 911 (Bennett & Hess, 2007; Bayley, 1994). The police not only accepted calls, but also encouraged the public to call them to resolve a wide range of problems.

The model is based on several key principles, including the idea that crime control is the sole responsibility of police officers, whose objective is to control crime through the use of rapid response to catch offenders (Whitelaw et al., 2006). The logic of rapid response is largely focused on apprehending offenders as a way to protect the public.

Prior to the 1980s, the standard approach that dominated policing was focused on patrol practices premised on random patrol, rapid response to 911 calls and reactive investigation (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). This remained the standard until empirical studies began to show the limitations of this model to reduce crime.

4.2 Evolution of Evidence-based Knowledge in Policing

In the 1970s two police resource organizations were founded with funding from the United States government and the Ford Foundation (Police Foundation, n.d.). Although change was not immediate or major, the formation of The Police Foundation led to the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment and many other scientific experiments. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) also led groundbreaking studies and innovations on community and problem-oriented policing, and police effectiveness that has impacted policing practices over the last several decades in the USA but also in other countries such as Canada and the UK. In addition, the field of policing has also had the benefit of numerous reviews of the results of the research and innovation, such as those identified in the previous chapter.

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was the first significant random control trial in policing and is a seminal study. It was the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment in 1974 that revealed that random patrol by officers had no impact on crime rates (Kelling et al., 1974). The police service increased preventive patrol in five beat areas in the city, reduced it in five areas and left patrol standard levels unchanged in five other areas (Kelling et al., 1974). Through examining crime rate data determined independently by crime victimization surveys of residents, researchers were able to

determine that police patrol had no impact on crime levels (Kelling et al., 1974; Waller, 2008).

The idea that rapid response by the police increases the likelihood of apprehending the offender(s) and therefore serves as a deterrent was also questioned by this study. Research by the Police Executive Research Forum revealed through a ten-month study that recorded the police response times to 'calls in progress' found that the speed at which police arrived on scene after being dispatched was irrelevant because victims of crimes that had direct contact with the offender took 41 minutes on average to phone 911 (Kansas City, 1977).

This research was replicated again in the 1980s that confirmed police response time was negligible in apprehending the offender. Rather it relied most on the time it took the victim to call 911, resulting in a limited deterrent effect (Spelman & Brown, 1981).

4.3 Evaluation of Standard Policing Approach Effectiveness in Reducing Crime

Evaluations of a number of standard policing model practices examined by Skogan and Frydl (2004), demonstrate a lack of effectiveness in reducing crime rates.

The first strategy examined addressed increases in size of police agencies, a move popular among politicians who seek to respond to public demand for more police and maybe reduce police response times to 911.

This literature provides two different results with respect to the size of a police organization on the presence of crime. In studies from cases where police have suddenly left duty, such as police strikes, there is evidence that their absence is likely to lead to an immediate increase in bank robberies and riots, which was seen in Montreal in 1969

(Sherman et al., 1998; Canada: City Without Cops, 1969). From the research in this area, one can logically conclude that there is ‘absolute benefit’ or ‘public value’ to the existence of police agencies or introduction of police to areas where none were previously present (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

When examining if increasing the relative number of police officers in a service by a small or even medium percentage reduces crime there are conflicting results. A few scholars suggest a reduction in crime will occur while most suggest no difference (Eck & Maguire, 2000). For example, the NRC examined numerous studies and found no effect (Skogan & Frydl, 2004, 225). However, one econometric study found a positive relationship between increases in policing and reduction in crime. It is worth noting that this specific study took place at election time, changing leadership and often policing strategies (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). The NRC dismissed the results due to the variable that with new police leadership there are changes in policing styles and direction of the service.

A recent study entitled *Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell Us About Investing in Police* by RAND (Heaton, 2010), showed no relation between the number of police serving an area and the crime rates. The study then looked at correlations between the costs of harm to crimes victims and the number of police. It found a correlation between the number of police and a reduction in the cost of homicides to victims (Heaton, 2010). The study did not explain how an increase in police officers reduces homicides.

The U.S. NRC report (2004) states that the standard model relies on a ‘one size fits all’ implementation of reactive strategies in an attempt to reduce crime (Skogan &

Frydl, 2004). This is problematic due to the fact that no two communities face identical situations and therefore need to customize each response based on the unique issues facing both their jurisdiction as a whole and smaller communities within that jurisdiction.

The NRC also examined the strategy of performing random or 'preventative' patrols across all parts of the community. The report primarily cited the findings of the Kansas City Patrol Experiment, concluding that 'preventative' patrol does not reduce crime, disorder or fear of crime (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

Rapid response to emergency calls for service has not been shown to affect crime rates or even lead to increased chances of arrest in most situations (Skogan & Frydl, 2004, p. 226). The majority of crimes are discovered long after they were committed. Despite significant resources designated to generally applied, follow-up investigations, most property crimes and violent crimes go unsolved (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

In 2010, the clearance rate for reported property crimes in Canada was a mere 24 percent (Brennan, 2012). In the same year, police cleared only 40 percent of reported robberies, by charge or other means (Brennan, 2012). Furthermore, clearance rates among police departments vary greatly depending on the type of crime (StatsCan, 2010). This means the low reporting and clearance rates suggests that there is a low deterrent effect. Like response times however, there are no studies that directly link investigation efforts to a reduction in crime. It is also noted that there is little evidence showing whether advancements in investigation technology have improved the effectiveness of policing services (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). This may change as the increased use of video technology, DNA, GPS and so on may make it easier to identify offenders.

Although the limited amount of research covering a variety of crimes makes it difficult to reach conclusions about the practice of investigations on police effectiveness, it has a practical use by providing peace of mind for victims that some effort is being made to assist them in their attempt to reach closure. The recent work of the IACP suggests that there is room for significant improvement in enhancing the response of police to crime victims (Waller, 2010).

There is emphasis based on the logic that investigations to improve the clearance rate will deter the occurrence of future crimes (Eck, 1983). Using this logic however, the police are failing by their own measure, as they are unable to 'clear' crimes that go unreported, which account for nearly 70 percent of crimes in Canada with the current trend likely to see this figure increase (StatsCan, 2009). Statistics Canada (2009) most recently published that less than one in four property crimes are reported to police and violent crime is at a report rate of only 29 percent.

Arresting youth for minor offences has been found to be ineffective in reducing the crime rates. A warning or alternative to formal charges by police has been identified as a better solution (Farrington, 1977). In the National Institute of Justice report, Sherman states that introducing individuals to the criminal justice system at a young age results in more delinquency in the future (Sherman et al., 1998).

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have identified the standard approach to policing used by Canadian police services for the past several decades. The standard policing approach is characterized by reactive measures, where as much as 65 percent of police resources are reacting to 911 calls and another 20 percent are reacting by investigating the offense. In

situations of total withdrawal of policing, certain crimes increase. Despite a few studies that experts dismiss, the overwhelming evidence is that large variations that fall short of eliminating the police do not increase or reduce crime. Table 2

Table 2: Standard Policing Approach

What's Inconclusive	• Generally applied follow-up investigations • Increasing/Higher numbers of police officers
What Doesn't	• Random patrol across all parts of the community • Rapid response to calls for service • Arrests for Juveniles for minor offences

CHAPTER 5- INNOVATIVE POLICING APPROACHES: REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE

This chapter will discuss generally the innovations arising from problem oriented policing. It will identify, discuss and evaluate three approaches to this type of preventive rather than reactive policing that have been developed as alternatives to the standard policing approach. Despite continuing to view the police as the sole means of crime reduction ‘Innovative Policing Alone’ includes a number of innovative practices that uses police intelligence to target and use police resources more effectively and efficiently. ‘Policing with the Public’ involves the frequently discussed concept of ‘community policing’, which represents a shift toward the use of community engagement to address issues of crime. Finally the ‘Policing Within Multiagency Partnerships’ is a comprehensive approach to policing that utilizes key stakeholders to identify and address crime issues through both CPSD and CPTED.

The analysis on the effectiveness of the strategies within the three groupings will be done using the literature identified in chapter three. The evidence will be used to identify which strategies within the three approaches have reduced crime or not.

5.1 Problem-Oriented Policing

In 1979 Goldstein published ‘Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach’ which has become seminal, claiming that police had become so focused on issues such as staffing and management that they had begun to ignore the problems that they were responsible for solving (Goldstein, 1979).

Goldstein is now a retired professor from the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School, and credited as the founder of the problem-oriented policing model.

Goldstein is one of the most frequently cited authors in the field of policing, as his work on problem-oriented policing, police accountability, and police function has been instrumental in shifting the focus of policing from managing the services, to using police resources effectively to reduce crime.

His problem-oriented policing approach had a primary emphasis on substantive social problems within the police mandate, with police/community collaborations used to determine problems that must be addressed and prioritized (Bennett & Hess, 2007). Ultimately, responses to issues that are addressed by the police are facilitated by an emphasis on intellectual and analytical problem solving, with a strong preference to utilizing alternatives to the traditional criminal justice system.

The implementation of problem-oriented policing in North America has been enhanced through a model created by Eck and Spelman (1987), who shifted Goldstein's original multiagency approach that had a balance of both crime prevention through social development (CPSD) and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), to the use of the SARA model focusing on CPTED. Evidence has shown that strategically manipulating a physical environment to be less appealing to potential offenders can reduce crime, however this is most effective when used as part of a comprehensive approach that includes CPSD (Guerette, 2009, p. 4). SARA is a four-step approach that assists in developing best practices for each unique community it is applied.

- Scan: identify and prioritizes issues in the target community.
- Analysis: use of multiple data sources to develop an effective response to the issues at hand.
- Response: implementation of developed response

- Assessment: evaluation to determine the effectiveness of the implemented response. (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2011)

An important aspect is that the SARA model is a continuous cycle, so that when priorities shift or responses are ineffective, there is opportunity to alter the response accordingly (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2011).

The NRC concluded that there is a growing research base supporting problem-oriented policing as an effective approach in reducing crime and disorder. The NRC found a number of research studies that completed quasi-experimental designs, as early as the 1980s consistently demonstrating the effectiveness of problem-oriented policing approaches reducing violent crime (Eck & Spelman, 1987), firearm related youth homicide (Kennedy et al., 2001; US Department of Justice, 2001), fear of crime (Cordner, 1986), and various forms of disorder (Eck & Spelman, 1987). Further research reviewed by the NRC revealed that experimental evaluations concluded crime reductions due to the application of problem-oriented policing methods, such as hot spots (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

A recent in-depth Campbell Collaboration Systematic Review involving the collection and analysis of several scholarly peer-reviewed articles concluded that the reviewed research indicated an overwhelmingly positive impact from problem-oriented policing in reducing crime and disorder (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010).

5.2 Innovative Policing Alone

One of the first major shifts in policing continued to rely on the police as the primary and sole stakeholder responsible for controlling crime. The most prevalent and popular ‘innovative policing alone’ strategy due to its perceived massive success when

implemented in New York City is known as ‘Broken Windows’ or zero tolerance policing (Waller, 2008).

The broken windows policing model was developed based on the ideas of a largely speculative article entitled *Broken Windows*, authored by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. In this article, Wilson and Kelling (1982) assert what they believe to be a certain sequence of events that can be expected in deteriorating neighbourhoods, starting with general evidence of decay, such as accumulated trash, broken windows and deteriorated buildings being neglected for an unreasonably long period of time. A lack of social cohesion and shared expectation for action provides an environment for outsiders to commit crime (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

The most influential aspect of the article toward the police role in the ‘Broken Windows’ theory is how Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue crime can be reduced and order restored. Wilson and Kelling articulate that by making a neighbourhood aesthetically pleasing, through the quick replacement of broken windows, removal or abandoned vehicles, cleaning up dumped items and miscellaneous debris, it will improve the perception of collective efficacy in the neighborhood, causing criminals to feel vulnerable if they were to commit a crime in that area.

The media often confuse zero tolerance policing with the ‘Broken Windows’ model of policing. Zero tolerance law enforcement measures, involving charging individuals for petty offenses such as jumping turnstiles without paying public transit fares, jaywalking, littering and public urination (Waller, 2008). These practices result in a spike in the number of arrests for minor offences. The research examined by the NRC on the effectiveness of generally applied intensive enforcement arrests found that the

literature is divided. Due to the use of the strategy in different instances, the NRC was only able to conclude that the approach provides varying levels of effectiveness depending on the situation it is applied to (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

Many leading criminologists who have studied the strategy argue that the logic of arresting an individual for public urination, can reduce homicide rate is flawed (Waller, 2008). Accepting the logic that arresting individuals for misdemeanor offences would be naïve correlation. The reduction in homicide is instead a result of police services from stopping people for carrying handguns, shutting down hotspot drug areas and tackling other established risk factors will reduce crime (Sherman et. al, 2002).

An ideal case study of using generally applied intensive enforcement and arrests are the events in New York City during the 1990s. The New York Police Department (NYPD) adopted a zero tolerance style of policing, implemented by the Commissioner of the NYPD William Bratton and Mayor Giuliani (Waller, 2008, Karmen, 2000). The New York style approach to policing became popular in the media, recognized as one of the most important innovations in policing in recent history and was praised for being associated with a large reduction in crime during the time it was implemented (Waller, 2008). It was largely based on the zero tolerance model of policing, used in conjunction with what is known as CompStat. CompStat is comprised of a four step process, which became the mantra of the NYPD: 1) accurate timely information, 2) rapid, focused deployment, 3) effective tactics, 4) relentless follow-up and assessment (Bratton, 1998a). Two times each week, CompStat meetings took place, requiring precinct commanders to be ready to review their up-to-date computer-generated crime statistics and relate what they were going to be doing to achieve a reduction in crime (Bratton, 1998a).

Despite the widespread hype of the crime reduction miracle in New York which was originally suggested to have caused the 60 percent decline, when looking at the evidence, there was no data available to the NRC that proved generalized intensive enforcement on crime on its own was effective in reducing crime (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Rather, as contended by many scholars, the crime reduction in New York was largely due to crime rates significantly dropping across the entire United States and social factors unrelated to police efforts. An evaluation by well respected sociologist, Dr. Andrew Karmen (2000) suggested that explanations for the crime drop could be grouped into six categories: improved policing by the NYPD; a tougher criminal justice system; the dwindling drug scene; a strong local economy; materialization of favourable demographic trends; and changing values of teenagers and young adults.

Through his own assessment which took into account external factors such as a national decline in crime, Kelling and Sousa came to the conclusion that the use of zero tolerance policing and CompStat resulted in a reduction of 60, 000 crimes, which equates to a five percent reduction (Waller, 2008; Kelling & Sousa, 2001). This statistic is much less impressive than the 60 percent reduction that was initially suggested.

In addition, taking into consideration the cost of policing, incarceration and processing through the justice system the cost to benefit ratio lessens the appeal of the zero tolerance and CompStat approaches even further (Waller, 2008).

Braga and Weisburd (2007) completed a rigorous evaluation of New York City and three other cities claiming a reduction in crime rates due to CompStat, however all cities involved had been observing a reduction in crime rates prior to the implementation of CompStat (Eck and Maguire, 2000; Weisburd et al., 2003; Weisburd et al., 2006).

CompStat has yet to be proven as an effective crime control strategy in cities that have adopted the approach (Braga & Weisburd, 2010).

A principal practice of innovative policing alone is hot spots policing. The practice involves focusing significant resources where there is a concentrated amount of crime, or 'hot spot'. A number of researchers argue that police can reduce the overall crime rate by concentrating on these hot spots.

First examined in the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment, hot spot policing drew upon empirical evidence that crime most frequently occurred in isolated areas (Braga & Weisburd, 2010). Hot spots policing is not a change in organizational strategy, rather it is a response requiring police services to use crime analysis technology to identify where crime is clustered and focusing resources in that area (Braga & Weisburd, 2010).

A recently released Campbell Collaboration Systematic Review took a comprehensive look at not only the effects of hot spots policing on the target community, but also attempted to measure if the efforts diffused or displaced crime to other neighborhoods. The authors to concluded that hot spots policing is an effective crime prevention strategy. The authors also found that the strategy does not lead to the displacement of crime, but rather diffusion, in that neighboring areas to the hot spots policing activity saw a reduction in crime. This conclusion was made with less certainty as the authors of the review acknowledged it is more difficult to measure the effects of displacement and diffusion outside the main area where hot spots is implemented.

The use of a prolific offenders unit by police services is also an evidence-based means of crime reduction and example of an innovative policing alone practice. Through the use of these units, police services are able to limit the time on the street of known

high-risk repeat offenders by monitoring them and returning them to prison more quickly (Sherman et al., 1998).

Increasing arrests or raids in known drug markets is a policing practice that is deemed not to be effective because at most it reduces crime and disorder in the area for a few days (Sherman et al., 1998). This differs from hot spots policing because this practice is limited to occasional raids, rather than a continuous and focused effort by police based on crime data.

Police completing stops and interrogations of suspicious persons has been shown to reduce crime in some studies (Sherman et al., 1998). Proactive arrests of individuals carrying concealed weapons are also considered to be a promising way for police to reduce crime (Waller, 2008; Sherman et al., 1998). Sherman et al. (1998) also identified two studies that show when police show greater respect for offenders it may lead to reduced recidivism and a more respect for the law.

The Minneapolis Domestic Violence experiment employed three different approaches (arrest the suspect, attempt to council both parties, or send the suspect away from the home for several hours) domestic violence cases. The study found that the practice of arresting employed domestic assault suspects on-scene was found to reduce recidivism rates (Sherman, 1992; Pate & Hamilton, 1992). The evidence was produced using a random selection of how each suspected domestic assault case would be processed to hold constant all other possible effects on results. In the same research however, on-scene arrests of unemployed domestic assault suspects increases recidivism over the long term, compared to non-arrest alternatives (Sherman, 1992; Pate & Hamilton, 1992).

Finally, proactive drunk driving arrests were shown to reduce impaired driving fatalities in an Australian study (Homel, 1990), which is consistent with multiple North American studies, although they have weaker evidence (Sherman et al., 1998).

Table 3: Innovative Policing Alone

What Works	• Targeted police patrol in high-crime hotspots/Hotspot Policing • Prolific offender units
What's Promising	• Police showing greater 'respect' to arrested offenders • Police field interrogations of suspicious persons • Proactive drunk driving arrests with breath testing • Proactive arrests for carrying concealed weapons
What's Inconclusive	• CompStat policing
What Doesn't	• Increased arrests or raids on drug markets • Police counseling visits to homes of couples days after domestic violence incidents • Arrest of unemployed domestic assault suspects

5.3 Policing with the Public

Despite resistance from multiple stakeholders in the field of policing that believe crime control is the duty of the police, the concept of shifting a portion of the crime control responsibility onto the public has gained significant attention over the past four decades. The NRC (Skogan, 2006), claims that community policing is the most important development in the past quarter century. Part of community policing is characterized by police organizations viewing themselves as a service rather than force, whose authority and power come from a combination of community support, law and professionalism (Bennett & Hess, 2007).

However, providing a concrete definition of community policing is difficult, mainly because the term is used and misused to such a degree that both the police and

public are confused by it. A leading source of the community-policing concept in North America is the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), a division of the United States Department of Justice. COPS defines community policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (COPS, 2012).

In 1990, Normandeau and Leighton created an in-depth definition of community policing in the Canadian context containing twelve elements as part of a report for the Solicitor General of Canada, entitled *A Vision of the Future of Policing in Canada: Police-Challenge 2000*. Reviewing the twelve stated elements, and comparing it with other prominent literature on the topic, it is difficult to synthesize the term into a succinct sentence. However, three core strategic components frequently emerge: decentralization, community partnerships/citizen involvement and problem solving (Normandeau & Leighton, 1990; Skogan, 2006; COPS, 2012). Overall, community policing demonstrates police are able to draw from a much broader array of resources than are utilized in the standard model (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

Evaluation of Policing With the Public Practices

Sherman’s report on what works concluded police organized Neighbourhood Watch, storefront offices and community newsletters pertaining to crime are not effective in reducing crime (Sherman et al., 1998). In the report completed by the NRC a number of community policing programs were reviewed, such as Neighbourhood Watch, general

foot patrol, storefront offices and general community meetings. These were not found to reduce crime (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

Despite current Neighbourhood Watch programs being identified as ineffective at reducing crime, there are examples of effective community based break and enter crime reduction programs.

The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project (KBPP) was able to reduce rates of break and enter by 45 to 60 percent (Forrester, Chatteron & Pease, 1988). The KBPP was based on a four-step process that included a safety diagnosis, action plan, implementation and evaluation (Forrester, Chatteron & Pease, 1988). It involved a collaborative approach, with many key stakeholders becoming involved, rather than the majority of responsibility being placed on the police. The police role in the KBPP was focused primarily on their responsibility of interviewing victims of crime, to better understand the nature of each break and enter. The police were also expected to promptly respond to suspicious activity reported by residents, in an effort to prevent break and enters (Forrester, Chatteron & Pease, 1988).

Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program (SCCPP) was also successful in reducing crime rates during the mid 1970s, with reductions of 48 to 65 percent among participating residences (Cirel, Evans, McGillis & Whitcomb, 1977). Similar to the KBPP, the SCCPP was based on the same four-step process, with the municipality taking a leadership role and acting as a central hub to manage funding. The police department partnered with the municipality to develop a law enforcement strategy. The primary police role was limited to identify and aggressively pursue offenders. The police also developed tactics to increase their knowledge of the issue, such as expanding the

detective investigational section, and streamlining the fingerprinting process under one system (Cirel, et al., 1977). Police involvement also legitimized the program in the eyes of the public. During the evaluation stage, a random control trial was completed to measure accurately the impact the program had on the rate of break and enters (Cirel, et al., 1977).

Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) is a well-intentioned community engagement education program delivered by the police in schools, but has been proven to yield no positive results. Evaluations of D.A.R.E. show that youth who are participants in the program do not engage in illicit drug use at lower rates, and in fact some cases show they are more likely to smoke tobacco, drink alcohol and use illicit drugs than non participants (Rosenbaum & Gordon, 1998; Sherman et al., 1998).

Police agencies also attempt to engage the community and reduce firearm offences by offering gun 'buyback' programs where residents are rewarded for turning their firearms into police. Studies of two gun buyback programs in North American cities without geographic limitations on the eligibility of people providing guns for money, found it was not effective in reducing firearm offences (Rosenfeld, 1995; Callahan et al., 1995).

Crime Stoppers is a popular program throughout North America that is advertised by police as a crime prevention tool, encouraging citizens to report crimes to the police with the potential of a cash reward. The effectiveness of the program is limited, which has been noted in studies that date back to the 1980s (Rosenbaum, Lurigio, & Lavrakas, 1986). It has been concluded that Crime Stoppers is helpful to police in 'clearing' crimes that had previously gone unsolved through traditional means. These crimes however

represent a small fraction of the total crimes committed. The evaluation completed by Rosenbaum, Lurigio, and Lavrakas (1986), concluded “there is little reason to believe that Crime Stoppers programs will immediately or sustainably reduce the overall crime rate in most communities”.

Encouraging the flow of information between the police and public is a primary focus of community policing, which is an aspect that was also researched by Skogan & Frydl (2004). Providing newsletters, storefront offices, and holding community meetings, are not deemed to reduce crime according to the research. They are however, useful in lowering the community’s level of fear of crime (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). The failure of the communication aspect of policing can be linked to a number of factors causing resistance from both the police and public. Often in urban areas, the public avoids the police due to fear of retaliation from offenders, suppressive effects of poverty on civic life, and distrust and anger toward the police that stems from the professional model. The police too are hesitant to increase the flow of information, ranging from a lack of incentive for community engagement to organizational resistance to sharing information with outsiders (Rosenbaum, 2007).

Community policing is seen as a more promising approach when used in conjunction with problem-oriented policing. One of the most widely recognized and successful implementations of community policing that utilized a problem-oriented policing strategy was in Chicago. (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). During the 1990s Chicago shifted their model of policing toward community policing, which was labeled the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (Waller, 2008). The police department publicized that the initiative would bring police, citizens, and community agencies together to

prevent crime rather than continue the status quo of reacting to it (Waller, 2008). The police department was able to drastically shift the organizational structure and mandate to that indicative of community policing. Strategies were adopted with the goal of bringing the police and public closer, with hopes of information sharing, so that police could appropriately respond to crime and its causes, a method of problem oriented policing. The results of the community based strategy showed a 50 percent reduction in gang and drug related crime, however the homicide rate remained relatively unchanged (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Table four summarizes the findings of what has been discussed in this chapter.

Table 4: Policing With the Public

What Works	• Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project • Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program
What's Promising	• Community policing with meetings to set priorities that involve Problem-Oriented Policing (Chicago)
What's Inconclusive	
What Doesn't	• General foot patrol by police officers • Neighborhood watch programs founded on Break and Enters organized with police • Storefront police offices • D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education)* • Gun buyback programs in North America • Police newsletters with local crime information • Crime stoppers

* Evidence shows in some cases D.A.R.E. increases crime rates among those who take the program.

5.4 Policing within Multiagency Partnerships

The evolution of policing has recently seen a number of police organizations further problem-oriented policing as part of collaborative/multiagency partnerships. There are numerous examples of the success of comprehensive approaches to crime

reduction involving the police toward a wide range of crimes including both violent and property, one of the most inspiring occurring in Canada.

The comprehensive/multiagency approach contains many of the same basic principles as the SARA model used by progressive police services that often aim to reduce crime alone. Linden and Chaturvedi (2005) argue the following five steps are necessary for a crime prevention program to effectively reduce crime:

- 1) Analyze the crime problem in their community context.
- 2) Involve a broad group of people and organizations.
- 3) Consider a diverse range of prevention strategies.
- 4) Carefully implement the best programs.
- 5) Assess the result.

Although it shares a very close framework to the SARA model, the key difference is the inclusion of a wide array of stakeholders who are able to contribute so that crime is effectively dealt with in a comprehensive manner.

Furthering the comprehensive approach to crime reduction, Waller asserts police can be most effective in reducing crime as part of a permanent crime prevention planning office (Waller, 2008; IPC, 2009). This ensures that police services still have a large responsibility in reducing crime. The onus however, is not solely placed upon them, a task that they are unable to manage on their own no matter how large their budget becomes. The permanent office or 'Responsibility/Leadership Centre', a term that is becoming common among governments implementing this approach, is to include a wide variety of community stakeholders responsible for the continuous diagnosis, plan development, implementation and evaluation of crime reduction programs that address issues of crime from all angles. These strategies must unite educational institutions,

housing services, social services, law enforcement and any other relevant community stakeholders that can contribute to the solution. Figure 1 illustrates this process.

Figure 1- Governance & Administration of Comprehensive Initiatives Logic Model



Adapted from Waller (2006) and Waller, Sansfaçon & Welsh (1999).

(Institute for the Prevention of Crime, 2009)

The above-mentioned models by influential academics have been built from, and proven their success in reducing crime.

There are two excellent examples in North America that serve as evidence to prove the success of the comprehensive crime reduction model. Labeled ‘Operation Ceasefire’ Boston’s gun project was a coordinated comprehensive/multiagency initiative created to reduce serious, large-scale crimes, specifically, homicide victimization among youth (Waller, 2008). A 230 percent increase in homicides of individuals under 24 between the late 1980s and early 1990s was a clear indication that a new approach was required as to how youth homicide was handled (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). A broad coalition that included partnerships with federal, state, and local governmental

agencies, non-profit community service organizations, businesses, religious leaders, parents and resident stakeholders was formed to develop multiple programs to address identified issues contributing to the rising number of juvenile homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001).

The response developed by the multiple stakeholders, including the Boston Police Department (BPD) and its partners was a three-pronged approach, the first being heavily law enforcement based (Waller, 2008). The BPD, its state and federal law enforcement partners expanded their focus of firearm trafficking to include both intrastate and interstate trafficking. There was additional focus placed on traffickers that supplied commonly used firearm types by gangs, specifically traffickers that supplied the most violent gangs (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001).

The second aspect of the approach was the 'pulling levers' strategy. It involved deterring violent behaviour by chronic gang offenders by reaching out directly to gangs with the message that violence would no longer be tolerated (Waller, 2008). This message was supported by the action of 'pulling every lever' legally available when violence occurred.

Simultaneously, the united pressure of the Ceasefire partnership of community stakeholders such as street workers, probation and parole officers, and eventually religious groups such as the Ten Point Coalition delivered the message as a promise to stop gang violence, not an appeal (Waller, 2008). If gangs failed to comprehend the message and continued to cause harm to individuals, all partners in the Ceasefire agencies addressed the violent group or gang involved, drawing from all possible legal levers, ranging from trespassing to full DEA investigations. This final component included

street social workers outreaching to youth in gangs, to mediate disputes and assist the youth and their family's access social services (Waller, 2008). Evidence based crime reduction measures were implemented such as programs to mentor and reduce school dropouts. Private sector partnerships also assisted in the reduction of youth violence, through corporations such as John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance investing in a summer work program, giving youth a greater chance of being successful in high school and continuing on to college (Waller, 2008).

Operation Ceasefire was an overwhelming success in achieving its goal of reducing serious and violent crime among juveniles, mainly homicides. To ensure that Operation Ceasefire was responsible for the decline in violent crime, a rigorous evaluation of the intervention's effects on youth violence in the city was developed. The evaluation determined Operation Ceasefire was associated with a 63 percent decrease in youth homicides per month, a 32 percent decrease in gun assaults per month, and a 44 percent decrease in the number of youth gun assaults per month in the highest risk district (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). Furthermore, youth homicide dropped from an average rate of 44 per year during the span of 1991 to 1995, to 15 in 1998 (Waller, 2008). Boston's Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire is evidence that when coordinated into a comprehensive effort, partnerships with a vast range of public and private sector stakeholders can greatly enhance the ability of the police to be effective in reducing crime.

Further evidence emerged from the example of Boston's Operation Ceasefire that demonstrates the importance of a holistic approach when tackling crime issues with a permanent responsibility centre. In 2008, the National Institute of Justice cited the

success in Boston as a basis for its new initiative Project Safe Neighborhoods to reduce gun violence (Waller, 2011). However, when Project Safe Neighborhoods was implemented, only the law enforcement aspects of the Boston strategy were put into practice. The outreach and social development aspects were not used, which no doubt significantly affected the success of the program (Waller, 2011). Ultimately there were reductions in a few cities; however, with an investment of three billion dollars over ten years, the program should have seen a more significant, lasting success (Waller, 2011).

The second and more recent large-scale successful collaborative crime reduction initiative took place in a large Canadian city. The Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS) relied heavily on the partnership of a number of community stakeholders including the Winnipeg Police Service, Manitoba Public Insurance and Manitoba Justice-Youth Correctional Services and Prosecutions (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009). The knowledge and organization support provided by distinguished academic Rick Linden cannot be understated in the implementation of WATSS, which received the Herman Goldstein Award For Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing 2009 (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009). The strategy used the five-step model outlined by Linden and Chaturvedi (2005) throughout the entire initiative, beginning with identifying the unique situation in Winnipeg of extremely high auto theft rates. The situation that faced the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy was that Winnipeg has North America's highest rates of vehicle theft from 2003 to 2007, with a number of tactics since 2001 having marginal and temporary success and theft rates continuing to climb (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009; Linden, 2012).

Crime analysis was one of the keys to success, identifying patterns, causes and consequences of vehicle theft in Winnipeg, through such data sources as police statistics, insurance company statistics, police files and interviews with police, justice officials and young offenders (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009). The stakeholders involved then used the knowledge to effectively respond to the situation, developing a comprehensive strategy consisting of three components. First, a tiered approach was instituted for at-risk youth that included intensive community supervision of high-risk youth. Next, a program was developed that required immobilizers for vehicles at the highest risk of being targeted by offenders, and finally, the implementation of youth programming to address the root causes of vehicle theft. The final step of assessment, demonstrated its significant value due to the fact that after the implementation of WATSS in September of 2005, vehicle theft rates dropped by 16 percent, but soon rose by 26 percent in the early months of 2006 (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009). Continual assessment of the strategy ensured that shortcomings were addressed. The result of the use of a problem-oriented policing strategy to address the issue was a drop in auto theft of 76 percent between 2004 and 2009 (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009). Ultimately WATSS emphasized the value of addressing a community specific issue, through the use of comprehensive crime reduction planning. The return on investment for WATSS was significant. The 40 million dollar total invested in WATSS has resulted in 30 million dollars being saved each year from a reduction in auto theft (Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, 2009).

In North America, the province of Alberta has taken great strides toward becoming a model for other governments to follow in order to reduce crime in the

province by utilizing a comprehensive approach. In 2007 the Government of Alberta created the Safe Communities Secretariat (SafeCom) to examine crime reduction, community safety and public attitudes toward these issues (Waller, 2011). This resulted in the Government of Alberta implementing a three-pronged strategy consisting of prevention, enforcement and treatment, supporting a long term, comprehensive strategy with \$500 million of funding over three years. The provincial strategy also included a safety secretariat that included senior officials from nine ministries, which include housing, social services, youth, and health forming partnerships with law enforcement, justice and municipal affairs (Waller, 2011). The best example of a comprehensive crime reduction strategy in Canada, if not North America, academics assert Alberta's short-term actions will see successful and sustainable reductions in crime over the long-term (Waller, 2011). Alberta's strategy and commitment is a best practice for the role of police services in reducing crime. It exemplifies that police cannot and should not bear the responsibility of reducing crime on their own. As seen with Alberta, the police do not necessarily need to be the leaders of crime reduction, but rather must be willing to work with other stakeholders toward a common goal determined by diagnosis.

Glasgow, Scotland has gained international attention in recent years for its ability to address the issue of violent crime that has existed in the city for decades. In 2005, the Strathclyde Police established the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) with the aim of developing a strategy that would achieve sustainable reductions in violence (Violence Reduction Unit, n.d.). Through a diagnosis, the VRU's main priority became a reduction of knife and weapon crime among young males (Violence Reduction Unit, n.d.). Rather than focus specifically on enforcement, the police broadened their efforts and adopted the

public health approach to violence, set out by the World Health Organization (WHO) in their 2002 World Report on Violence and Health. The VRU's mission became "to reduce violent crime and behaviour by working with partner agencies to achieve long-term societal and attitudinal change, and, by focusing on enforcement, to contain and manage individuals who carry weapons or who are involved in violent behaviour" (Violence Reduction Unit, n.d.). Partner agencies included public health, police, education, and other public sector institutions. A year after it was established, the VRU became the Violence Reduction Team (VRT), a nationwide initiative supported by the Scottish Government to reduce crime throughout the country.

The VRT works with its partners using a five point strategy that includes enforcement, targeting gangs with the promise of punitive action; health, to gather reliable data on the nature of violent crimes and address the root causes; education, through helping parents with infants and young children avoid social circumstances that increase the risk of growing into a violent adult; community partnerships, involving police, health, education, and other public sector organizations to collectively address issues of violence from multiple angles; and, community groups, using the people who know violence all too well, to help develop solutions (Violence Reduction Unit, n.d.).

Despite being a relatively new program, initiative sponsored by the VRT has caused notable reductions in violence in the country (Violence Reduction Unit, n.d.). The program's success has inspired Chief Dale McFee, President of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP), has been working with the VRT in hopes of replicating the program in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan.

Within this approach, the only practice to be identified as being ineffective in reducing crime is stationing police officers in school, also known as School Resource Officers. Some scholars contend in the literature that when SROs are permanently assigned to a school, the number of violence and disciplinary problems reduce dramatically (Johnson, 1999). Others, such as a study completed in Manitoba, discussed the programs ability to forge positive relationships between police, ultimately serving as a means of crime prevention (North End Community Renewal Corporation, 2005). However, the most recent study available completed by the Justice Policy Institute in the United States identifies SRO programs as not only ineffective, but causes ‘lasting harm’ to youth by introducing them to arrests and the criminal justice system rather than school disciplinary measures (Petteruti, 2011).

Forming and making use of partnerships with battered women’s shelters has been found to be a promising practice, as they were shown to reduce the short-term rate of victimization by women who seek help (Sherman et al., 1998). The utilization of multiagency partnerships community workers, probation and police officers is also a promising exercise as it has been shown to reduce gang violence in some circumstance (Sherman et al., 1998).

Table 5: Policing Within Multiagency Partnerships

What Works	• Boston Operation Ceasefire • Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy • Violence Reduction Unit (Glasgow)
What’s Promising	• Collaborative partnerships with key community stakeholders • Following a Diagnosis, plan, implementation and evaluation cycle developed by a Joint Planning Board and Secretariat • Problem-solving’ analysis unique to the crime situation at each location • Gang offender monitoring by community workers, probation and police officers • Battered women’s shelters

What Doesn't	• School Resource Officers
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5.5 Conclusion

The police response in Canada to reducing and controlling crime has gone through a number of transformations over the past several decades, some more successful than others. While police services hold onto their traditional practices, there is no doubt that the climate in which policing operates is shifting towards a more effective means of addressing and reducing crime.

Table 6 is a summary of the findings from the current chapter pertaining to evidence-based crime prevention with police involvement.

Table 6: What Works

Standard Approach	
Innovative Policing Alone	• Targeted police patrol in high-crime hotspots/Hotspot Policing • Crime Analysis • Prolific offender units • On scene arrests for employed domestic assault suspects
Policing With the Public	• Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project • Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program
Policing Within Multiagency Partnerships	• Following a Diagnosis, plan, implementation and evaluation cycle developed by a Joint Planning Board and Secretariat • Collaborative partnerships with key community stakeholders • Utilize technology for crime analysis and for accountability • Boston Operation Ceasefire • Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy • Violence Reduction Unit (Glasgow)

Labeled as 'innovative policing alone' strategies based on problem-oriented policing such as hot spots policing and targeting repeat offenders are effective way of reducing crime based on the empirical evidence reviewed.

Policing with the community has been the most popular concept of the past two decades in Canada, among academics, policing leaders and politicians. Community policing is deemed to be successful in its objective of building stronger relationships with the community, however there are only certain strategies that have proven effective. The successful strategies are based on the collection of detailed information to diagnose the nature of the problem. This information is then used to develop an action plan with key partners that also involve educating the public of their role in addressing the crime issue. These strategies also have in common the use of scientific evaluation to determine if the action plan is effectively addressing the intended issue.

Policing within multiagency partnerships is recognized as an effective way to reduce crime, based on evidence from multiple initiatives that proved to significantly reduce crime. Employing a problem-oriented method of identifying and resolving crime issues, the policing within multiagency partnerships approach are seen as a progressive approach that should see continued implementation, growth and success in the future.

CHAPTER 6- PRACTICAL APPLICATION: CURRENT OPS APPROACH TO CRIME REDUCTION

The current chapter will provide an overview of the OPS, analysis of several OPS reports, and analysis of interviews with three key OPS officials regarding activities that might reduce crime. The purpose of this chapter is to answer research question three “To what extent is the OPS using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing practices?”

The chapter begins by providing an overview of the OPS organization and the crime challenges it is responsible for responding to. Specific programs labeled by OPS as crime prevention are then described and analyzed against the evidence. The chapter then describes and analyses OPS initiatives that may reduce crime against the evidence.

6.1 Overview

The OPS is tasked with policing the capital city of Canada. Ottawa is the fourth largest city in Canada, with a population of approximately 900 000 living within the city limits (City of Ottawa, 2012). More than 25 percent of residents were born outside of Canada (City of Ottawa, 2012).

Geographically, Ottawa has several different types of communities, from the urban in the downtown core where police recorded crime is more concentrated, to rural farming communities with lower reported crime rates (OPS, 2012a). Eighty-six percent of Ottawa residents are satisfied with the quality of policing services (OPS, 2010c).

The current Chief of the OPS, Charles Bordeleau, is responsible for leading the organization comprised of over 1300 sworn officers and 575 civilian employees, which handle on average, 365 000 calls for service each year (OPS, 2012a). Approximately 23 percent of OPS officers are female, which is three percent above the national average. (OPS, 2012a).

According to its mission statement, “The OPS is committed to professionally serving the City of Ottawa by improving the safety of people, security of property, and quality of life through policing and partnership” (OPS, 2012a). The OPS organizational structure has been in place since 1995 when the three main police municipal services of Ottawa, Gloucester and Nepean were amalgamated into the single police service known as Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service (OPS, 2012a). More recently, in 2001 the service became known as OPS, after a municipal amalgamation (OPS, 2012a).

OPS human resources are largely allocated to responding to 911 calls – similar to the standard model that was discussed in chapter three. In 2011, the OPS received 390 558 calls for service requiring a response. The OPS categorizes calls requiring a response as Priority 1, Priority 2, Priority 3, or Priority 4. Crimes in progress or life threatening situations are considered Priority 1. These represented 20 percent of the calls for service to the OPS in 2011 (OPS, 2012b). In 2011, the average OPS response time to Priority 1 calls was ten minutes (OPS, 2012b). Priority 2 calls are considered urgent but not life threatening, represent close to 60 percent of calls for service to OPS in 2011 (OPS, 2012b). In 2011, the average response time to Priority 2 calls by the OPS was 36 minutes (OPS, 2012b). Responding to calls for service is the single largest task of the OPS, which is the primary way of alerting them of when a crime has occurred.

In 2011, Ottawa ranked as having one of the lowest reported crime rates among major Canadian metropolitan areas, based on the StatsCan (Brennan, 2012) Crime Severity Index (CSI). The CSI is a measure of the seriousness of crime based on crime type and frequency of occurrence that was launched in 2009 as reported crime rates were coming off a long term high (Brennan, 2012).

The table below identifies the number of each type of CCC offences reported, and solvency rate, calculated by the number of crime ‘cleared by charge’ or ‘cleared otherwise’, and divided by the total number of crime reported. Toronto statistics are included to put Ottawa in perspective in comparison to another major Ontario city. This table also shows that there are only minor variations in the solvency rates between the two cities for crimes against the person and property. The only major difference between the two services is the solvency of Toronto’s reported CCC traffic offences, likely due to the method of reporting.

Table 8: Reported Criminal Code of Canada Offences: Ottawa and Toronto

	Crimes against the Person	Crimes against Property	Other CCC Offences	CCC Traffic Offences
Ottawa- Crimes Reported	5 245	27 151	4 226	2 497
Toronto- Crimes Reported	31 332	91 349	37 508	3 955
Ottawa Solvency Rate	62%	27%	89%	37%
Toronto Solvency Rate	68.2%	28%	80.9%	97.2%

In 2011 the projected net operating budget of the OPS was 236.9 million dollars on a gross operating budget of 258.0 million dollars (OPS, 2011). In 2001, the OPS net operating budget was 121.6 million dollars on a gross operating budget of 128.8 million dollars (City of Ottawa, 2002). In the 2011 budget, 206 000 dollars was designated for

the programs labeled as ‘core crime prevention programs’ (CCPP) by the OPS (OPS, 2012b).

6.2 OPS Programs Labeled as ‘Crime Prevention’- Descriptions

The purpose of this section is to identify and describe the OPS programs labeled as CCPPs the OPS offers to the public. The OPS website identifies the organization as having six CCPPs that it provides across its entire jurisdiction on an ongoing basis “...in partnership with the community to ensure that people's rights, lives and property are secure” (OPS, 2012a).

The primary difference between CCPPs and initiatives in the current research is that programs are permanent and applied generally across the city, while initiatives are in place in specific neighbourhoods/communities for a predetermined or uncertain amount of time. As described by Sergeant D’Aoust “Community police officers do offer the crime prevention programs, the ‘cookie cutter’ programs”.

Neighbourhood Watch

Neighbourhood Watch is one of the most common and well-known crime prevention programs in Canada and the USA that police services organize. OPS is no different, as Sgt. D’Aoust stated, “Neighbourhood Watch is our main crime prevention program, flagship program we call it ”. The program “ aims to get citizens involved in discouraging and preventing crime at the local level. The ultimate success of Neighbourhood Watch depends largely on a commitment to cooperate between area residents and the police - and more importantly, between residents themselves” (OPS, 2012a).

Crime Free Multi-Housing

The OPS has adopted Crime Free Multi-Housing (CFMH) as one of its CCPPs, which key informants identified as a program in which they had confidence. “Crime Free Multi-Housing is a program to prevent and reduce crimes in apartment complexes. Property owners work with police to train their staff, perform CPTED audits and conduct criminal records checks on tenants and potential tenants. The revenue from the criminal records checks generates from \$160 000 to \$206 000 gross revenue, per year for the organization” (D’Aoust, 2011). Ultimately the program is “Designed to help owners, managers, residents and police work together to keep illegal and nuisance activity out of rental communities” (OPS, 2012a).

Home Security Inspection

OPS manage a program known as Home Security Inspection involving police representatives visiting homes of residents that request a safety audit. OPS representatives go through a checklist, suggest improvements and educate the residents on how to make their home safer (OPS, 2012a). This program is promoted by the OPS (2012a) to “Allow community members to take an active role in making their homes less susceptible to criminal activity. Based on proven crime prevention principles, residents learn how to make their homes safer.” It is important to note that this program focuses only on reducing the risk of an external offender, not offences where the offender is a resident, such as domestic violence.

Child Print

Advertised as a way to prevent child abductions and help return children home in the event of child abduction, the program Child Print is offered by the OPS with a focus on educating children and adults. When listing the crime prevention programs OPS is

involved in, Chief Bordeleau mentioned, “Child Print is another core prevention program. We fingerprint kids and we get the parents to keep the fingerprints on file in case the children are abducted”. The program is available at community events within the city and also encourages interested individuals to visit their local Community Police Centre to participate and become educated about street safety and prevention tips.

Operation Identification

In an attempt to combat property crime, OPS offers the Operation Identification program. Advertising that marked stolen articles are difficult to sell and more easily traced, the OPS encourages community members to mark or identify valuables as a proactive measure against theft (OPS, 2012a). The organizations involvement in the program primarily consists of educating the public of this concept of deterrence and allows those willing to participate to borrow an electric engraver to mark their possessions.

Community Safety Letters

The final CCPP that OPS offers is Community Safety Letters directed at addressing the prevalence of the sex trade in area neighbourhoods. “The letter, tailored to each community where the incident occurs, is sent to the driver of any stopped vehicle visiting area neighbourhoods for solicitation” (OPS, 2012a). The purpose of the letter is not only to act as a deterrent, but also educate potential ‘John’s’ (men who purchase sex from street sex workers) about the risks of the sex trade and crack cocaine use in communities. This is one of three main ways OPS attempts to combat sex work in Ottawa communities, the other two being ‘John Sweeps’ and ‘John Schools’ (OPS, 2012a).

All Valuables Removed

Although it is not labeled as a CCPP, it is worth noting that the OPS has also recently started All Valuables Removed in response to recent public surveys, community feedback and crime analysis. The program is aimed at reducing the amount of thefts of vehicles and thefts from vehicles, in areas identified with higher rates of these crimes. The program is explained as, “Police officers or volunteers place the warning cards on the windshields of vehicles in a particular area that has a recent history of criminal activity or is at risk for it” (OPS, 2012a). The public education aspect also encourages victims of these types of crime to report all incidents, which assists in the overall effort to provide the police with more intelligence on the nature of the crime and ultimately how to prevent it. As Sgt. D’Aoust explained:

Normally a report is taken and not followed up. But this time all the reports were reported to detectives to follow up and call back the people. To find out in a certain area if there was a common factor, if it was glass breaks or just door checks. Anyone who was arrested was also interviewed. Usually they get charged and that’s it. Now they were interviewed, so they were able to have some individuals say, “Okay, I’ve done this one, this one, this one and this one.” So we we’re able to go down the list and write them off and find out who did them and find out where the property was going. Was it pawnshops, or just people on the street? So when it was looked at more, we were able to find out where the stuff was going, who was doing it, was it a handful or people or 30 different people?

6.3 OPS Programs Labeled as ‘Crime Prevention’- Analysis Based on Review of Literature

The CCPP the OPS currently provide to the community are primarily replications of programs used in other jurisdictions. It is important to note that performing a quick online search, the OPS offers much more information pertaining to crime prevention programs than many other police services in the province, such as Toronto Police Service, Durham Regional Police Service, and Cobourg Police Service. However,

awareness is simply not enough, as a crucial aspect significant to the success of any crime prevention effort creates a solution that is unique to the needs of the community it will be implemented in.

Neighbourhood Watch has been successful in advertising its existence to the public. According to the 2008 survey on policing services in Ottawa, it was the most identifiable crime prevention program among participants at 62 percent, however only 8 percent of residents surveyed reported participating in Neighborhood Watch (D'Aoust, 2011).

Academic literature on the program shows there is a general consensus that Neighbourhood Watch when run by police is not effective in reducing crime (Sherman et al., 1998). Despite continuing to fund the program, the OPS seem to be well aware of this evidence. Sgt. D'Aoust described the issue with the Neighbourhood Watch participation:

Often times Neighbourhood Watch is formed when there is a new community and everyone is fresh and happy to be together, will attend a few meetings and then after a few months when nothing is going on, they fall off program. Or when there is a series of break and enters, and one community is very excited, thinking 'we have to fight this, we have to find these guys' mobilize the community. After the person is caught or moves to another area then everyone leaves the program or doesn't participate.

The OPS is taking steps forward in their approach to this program, as they have identified the programs ineffectiveness. Chief Bordeleau made the comment, "We just went under a whole Neighbourhood Watch review and took a look at the effectiveness of that and how can we structure it differently to improve its efficiency".

The evaluation of the OPS Neighbourhood Watch program was completed by Evan Muller-Cheng, who also wrote a Master's Major Research Paper entitled 'Towards an effective Neighbourhood Watch (NW) program for Ottawa to reduce break and enter:

A review of exemplary breaking and entering programs effective in reducing crime and a survey of Neighbourhood Watch Coordinators and Members.’ Muller-Cheng (2010) had four primary recommendations:

- Strengthen key components of Neighbourhood Watch
- Fund and employ properly trained fulltime staff
- Conduct cost-effective safety diagnosis
- Share responsibility with partners

All members of the OPS that participated in the current research acknowledged the lack of effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch, however each of them stressed the importance it has in identifying residents who had the drive and ability to mobilize communities. Chief Bordeleau was quick to defend the program by stating its added value towards police/community relations:

Because of Neighbourhood Watch, how many break and enters have we been able to solve or prevent? Those are very difficult to measure. But a lot of the programs we have go towards communities feeling safer and building those relationships between the police service and the community. There’s a lot of merit that comes around Neighbourhood Watch.

Sergeant D’Aoust also identified Neighbourhood Watch as an asset when attempting to mobilize communities by stating, “It’s a tool to mobilize individuals and support a community to participate in to keep an eye out”. Despite these claims, in its current state when compared to evidence in the literature, Neighbourhood Watch is not effective at reducing crime and continues to be an unproductive use of taxpayer money.

The Child Print program offered by the OPS appears to remain funded due to the similar logic that it builds relationships with the community. No literature was discovered providing evidence that Child Print or similar programs had any effect on reducing crime. Sergeant D’Aoust explained the OPS could not provide any evidence either that proved the program reduced crime:

But, there are no evaluations, which is a huge part throughout the research. There is nothing saying that child print reduced a certain crime. There aren't even numbers of the people who participated in the program. We can't say we've found this many kids because of this program, but at least we can say we have talked to this many kids, which would be a basic evaluation.

Rather, when the topic of evidence-based programs came up, Chief Bordeleau stressed the importance of the program in building community relations by stating:

We fingerprint kids and we get the parents to keep the fingerprints on file in case the children are abducted. How many abductions have we had that we've been able to have the child's fingerprint on file and be able to find them? I'm not aware of any. However, what that program does is really helps build rapport between the police service and children. It exposes them to police in a different environment. It's a good program from that perspective, it helps us build that relationship at a young age and helps them identify that police officers are trusted and you can go to them. It does accomplish a lot from that perspective, is the sole purpose of Child Print to prevent abductions? I'm not aware of any as far as that.

Sergeant D'Aoust made a similar comment, "Child print, which is not really a program it's more community engagement with youth." Although the Chief's honesty about the program's lack of success in its intended purpose is appreciated, the fact remains that it is that there is no evidence showing it reduce crime.

Two 'core' prevention programs that the OPS offer, Operation Identification and CFMH, are based on CPTED principles. Based on a review of the literature, CFMH is an effective method, recommended by the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing when attempting to reduce crime in apartment complexes (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2010; IPC, 2009). Literature specific to programs following the models of CFMH and Operation Identification are limited, although scholars and evidence discussed in chapter four have shown that strategically manipulating a physical environment to be less appealing to potential offenders can reduce crime. CFMH was perceived by Sergeant D'Aoust, who recently completed a review of OPS crime

prevention efforts, to be one of the most successful programs that OPS provides. Sergeant D'Aoust stated:

It's a dual aspect; it's good for us because we're getting the message out. We're lowering calls for service in certain areas; we're getting money from record checks. Tenants have better buildings because they're neighbours in general are crime free and the landlords will have less problems. So that's one of the programs we should focus a little more on. It's been approved, it's working and we are showing less calls for service and we are getting money.

Sergeant D'Aoust also explained:

It makes about 200 000 dollars per year for OPS, and there are other buildings that want to participate in this program, but given there are only one and a half people doing background checks for that program they are too busy to keep up with the demand.

This partnership between the police and the private sector is a small model of how crime reduction efforts are strengthened when multiagency partnerships are used.

Although OPS does not measure the success of this program based on a reduction in crime rates, the program is likely having an impact of crime in the buildings it is implemented because it follows CPTED principles. This program is also unique in that it is the only crime prevention program that brings in revenue for the OPS. The reduced calls for service is also an important piece promoting the evidence-based nature of the study.

The OPS did not present any evidence that Operation Identification was effective in reducing crime, which is seen in this statement by Chief Bordeleau:

Is it helping educate our business in becoming more crime prevention savvy? I think it is. But can we make the direct link that we've been able to prevent robberies because we've had operation identification in place? I'm not aware of the research, locally here to support that.

It was suggested that its value added to the community is based on the ability to lessen the impact of victimization by being able to return items to their rightful owners. Sgt.

D'Aoust supported this view by saying, "Operation identification, is more crime reduction to get the property back." This is only true, however when the police do recover the stolen property.

The final 'core' crime prevention program, Community Safety Letters, is based on the crime prevention concept of deterrence. There was no evidence in the literature or provided by the OPS to suggest that this program was effective or not.

The new All Valuables Removed has not had any evaluations performed by the OPS, however this is due to the fact that it was only recently released. The OPS website suggests a promising step forward toward an evidence-based program by revealing:

Quantitative and qualitative efforts will be made to measure the effectiveness and cost of this program in Ottawa. This includes: monitoring media coverage, evaluating crime and web statistics, keeping track of the number of warning cards issued, conducting public surveys, and gathering feedback from drivers and community partners, as well as police staff and volunteers tasked with program delivery.

This type of rigorous evaluation is unfortunately not consistent with the rest of the OPSs crime prevention programs.

The All Valuables Removed program has potential to be successful as it encompasses three of the four elements involved in the logic model of problem-oriented policing that addresses specific crimes.

Conclusions: OPS Crime Prevention Programs

Overall, the crime prevention programs offered by the OPS are replications of widespread programs provided by police services across Canada; many of which have no evidence to prove their effectiveness in Ottawa or elsewhere. The lack of current

evidence-based programs is reflected in the following statement made by Chief

Bordeleau:

I think that's a common problem in all of policing, our difficulty in using evidence based programs. A lot of the things we do intuitively we think are having a good impact/success. But to say we are an evidence-based organization. We're not. I think a lot of the programs we have could use more evidence-based research to support the work that we are doing.

This statement also brings to attention that the lack of evidence-based crime prevention programs offered by police services is not limited to Ottawa, but is inherent across the field of policing in Canada based on.

One report concluded that, "Currently, the OPS's approach to crime prevention can be described as fragmented with limited sharing of information and best practices, training and evaluation of initiatives." (D'Aoust, 2011). This statement details the poor state of the OPS crime prevention efforts. The report went on to state:

- The OPS's approach to crime prevention programs is fragmented with the organization and across districts.
 - Officers lack training in implementing and delivering crime prevention programs.
 - Community Police Centre Officers are over-tasked and require a unit that creates, develops and organizes crime prevention programs, material and presentations.
- (D'Aoust, 2011)

Each of these factors may be responsible for the finding that "The Ottawa Police's 2009 Environmental scan indicated that OPS members ranked crime prevention the lowest in operational performance (48 percent)" (D'Aoust, 2011). Despite the current state of OPS crime prevention programs, the organization has identified it, "requires a unified and strategic focus regarding crime prevention" (D'Aoust, 2011), which is discussed in the next chapter.

Based on the interviews with key informants at OPS and review of OPS reports, there is nothing to suggest that the OPS is focusing on evidence based crime reduction. Rather, the OPS is focused on efforts that improve public relations, community engagement, and ensuring operational practices are well managed. Table nine summarizes conclusions reached based on a comparison to the evidence about OPS programs intended for crime prevention.

Table 9: Evaluation of Ottawa Police Service Programs

Program	Conclusion	Comments
Neighbourhood Watch	Does not reduce crime	- In its current state it is not effective in reducing crime. - Police like it due to ability to engage public. - Can reduce crime if it replicates the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program.
Crime Free Multi-Housing	Reduces Crime	- Based on CPTED theory, literature suggests it likely reduces crimes committed by outside trespassers. - OPS should complete in-depth RCT evaluation.
Home Security Inspection	Inconclusive	- Base on CPTED theory, there is potential for it to reduce victimization among those who actively seek assistance of police. - Primarily used for public relations/community engagement.
Child Print	Does not reduce crime	- No evidence supporting its ability to reduce crime. - Continues to be funded for public relations and community engagement purposes.
Operation Identification	Does not reduce crime	- No evidence indicates this program reduces crime. It can be helpful with returning stolen property to owner if recovered.
Community Safety Letters	Inconclusive	- Based on concept of deterrence. - Does not likely reduce crime.
All Valuables Removed	Inconclusive	- The program is too recent and does not have evaluation data. - OPS should complete in-depth evaluation to determine effectiveness.

6.4 OPS Initiatives Designed to Reduce Crime- Descriptions

Three examples of major crime prevention initiatives were mentioned in the interviews and the OPS reports. Additionally, OPS has a supportive role in the OYGPI. Crime prevention initiatives are identified in the current research as efforts put forth to reduce crime and are specifically tailored to a particular issue or community for a limited or undetermined period of time.

When asked to identify any crime prevention programs or initiatives he has been involved with as a part of the OPS, Chief Bordeleau was proud in saying:

I think if you look at it from a broad perspective there's a number of fairly significant initiatives that have happened in our community and with the OPS that I've been involved with. I'll go back a number of years when I was a superintendent in charge of our east division, there was an initiative called 'No Community Left Behind' which was initiated in Banff/Ledbury. The whole concept was around crime prevention through social development and working with the community and community leaders and service providers in order to help reduce crime and reduce the fear and perception of crime.

The initiative No Community Left Behind (NCLB) is one of the largest in which the OPS has been involved. Originally launched in 2005, the initiative was primarily focused on social development with the objective to prevent crime and address social issues that impacted the health of individuals in the community of Banff/Ledbury. NCLB was based on a collaborative approach and integration of services at the neighbourhood level (South-East Ottawa Community Health Centre, 2007). Ultimately the goal/vision of NCLB "is to keep people well; to enable them to live, work, and raise their families in a safe and prosperous environment." (South-East Ottawa Community Health Centre, 2007). The website goes on to explain:

The vision is achieved through: Developing a comprehensive community-based strategy for addressing social determinants of health, while working to address major risk factors that lead to fear, isolation and crime; Mobilizing community

members and service providers to assist each other in addressing the community identified and prioritized problems; Assisting concerned service agencies to respond to social/community/health service needs; Engaging and supporting community members to participate more fully in neighbourhood planning and decision making processes.

In addition to being one of the largest crime prevention initiatives that OPS has been involved with it has been one of the most successful as an evaluation was built into the model, which will be discussed in the analysis.

School Resource Officer

The School Resource Officer (SRO) initiative was also prominent in the interviews. The initiative is not formally recognized as a crime prevention initiative; rather it is advertised as a means of building positive relationships with youth. The Chief however, did identify it as a crime prevention initiative, stating:

Other initiatives are our School Resource Officers. They currently fall in my area of responsibility. That's an area around our approach to youth and is one of the key crime prevention strategies that we use in being involved with our youth at the earliest opportunity and identify potential issues at the onset and ensuring our youth in conflict with the law are connected to the right agencies to help them and to prevent them from becoming involved with criminal activities later on.

A representative of the OPS explained the initiative as “A joint effort between the school system and police. The school board identifies priority schools.” The representative went on to explain that the initiative is based on a five-pillar approach of early intervention, education, diversion, suppression and enforcement. The following from the OPS's web page on the SRO initiative describes the basic functions of the initiative:

Every school in the City of Ottawa is currently assigned a specific SRO as their personal police contact. The role of the School Resource Officer is to provide support to your school community as a whole, which includes students, parents, school staff, and administrators. SROs provide this support by answering calls for service regarding incidents occurring in schools during school hours. Additionally, SROs support schools by providing law and safety related lectures, as well as providing guidance on school issues.

Lowertown: Our Home Safety Project

The Lowertown Our Home Safety Project is an initiative the OPS is involved with, that “works to promote community awareness and participation in crime prevention as well as improve community cohesion and community-police relationships” (OPS, 2010a). The initiative received the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) 2010 Community Mobilization award, recognizing the efforts of residents in Lowertown East for “improving the safety and security of their community while addressing social development needs through a collaborative and active partnership with the OPS and 13 other community partners involved with the Lowertown Our Home Safety Project” (OPS, 2010a).

Ottawa Youth Gang Prevention Initiative


Despite not being a prominent point of discussion during interviews, an initiative taking place that the OPS is involved in the Ottawa Youth Gang Prevention Initiative. The OPS is not in a lead role; however they play an important role in a partnership with over 20 agencies with Crime Prevention Ottawa taking a lead role. “The OYGPI aims to support youth and families to prevent youth from becoming involved in gang activity and to reduce and prevent the harmful effects of youth gangs in Ottawa through a collaborative, holistic, evidence-based strategy of prevention and intervention.” (Boyd & Justinich, 2010). The initiative acts as the prevention component of an overall youth gang strategy that also includes healthy neighbourhood cohesion, intervention and suppression (Boyd & Justinich, 2010). It is one of the most relevant examples of how the OPS can participate in a crime prevention initiative without having a lead role.

6.5 OPS Initiatives Designed to Reduce Crime - Analysis

The crime prevention initiatives the OPS is involved in are better suited to address the concerns and needs of the communities than the CCPPs. Due to the diverse nature of crime prevention initiatives, there are few scholarly articles that discuss specific initiatives that the OPS participate in. The OPS has been involved in a number of initiatives that closely follow logic models identified in the literature as proven effective in reducing crime. The OPS has not performed in-depth evaluations of these programs, making it difficult to identify their impact on the community in Ottawa. Identified by an OPS participant, the organization does not often perform evaluations of initiatives, and often they lack sustainability and accountability, due to a lack of a responsibility centre. One OPS representative suggested the possibility of partnered organizations completing evaluations, rather than the police.

Discussed as one of the most successful crime prevention initiatives that the Ottawa Police has been involved in, NCLB was founded on an approach similar to the basic logic model discussed by Waller. The 'NCLB Key Components & Process' is illustrated in Figure 2, which includes the key elements of assessing the issue(s), prioritizing/planning, action/implementation, and concluded with an evaluation.

Figure 2- No Community Left Behind Approach



(South-East Ottawa Community Health Centre, 2007).

The major difference between Waller's logic model and NCLB is that community members are expected to mobilize and stay involved, without a sustained responsibility centre, to ensure all stakeholders are fulfilling their obligations.

NCLB demonstrates the importance of following a logic model that includes an evaluation component as it ensures the effect of the program on the community was measured and can be identified as an evidence-based initiative. The most positive measured result of the NCLB initiative was its impact on perceptions of safety. "The results of the NCLB strategy's community health and safety surveys indicate that between 2005 and 2007, perceptions of safety have increased in the neighbourhoods where the strategy was employed. For instance in 2005, 34 percent of residents reported feeling safe compared to 64 percent in 2007" (Freire, 2008).

Chief Bordeleau who was deeply involved in the NCLB initiative confirmed the outcome of the initiative when he said:

The whole concept was around crime prevention through social development and working with the community and community leaders and service providers in order to help reduce crime and reduce the fear and perception of crime. We didn't reduce crime because part of working with the community is to educate them on if they are victims of crime, to report it. We expected an increase in reported crime, which is good news from our (the police) perspective because you're getting a truer picture of what the crime level is. But where we saw the big reduction, was in the perception of fear and safety of the residents.

The ability to produce evidence and identify NCLB as a success due to the evaluation component, proved to be valuable as it showed politicians the worth of the initiative, which was subsequently used as the foundation to form the City of Ottawa's permanent Community Development Framework strategy.

The SRO initiative is based around a partnership between the OPS and schools throughout Ottawa. Although not specifically focused on reducing crime, the initiative works to resolve conflict in a constructive manner with the youth's best interest in mind. An OPS representative identified the SRO initiative with the OPS as a three-year pilot program. The same individual went on to explain that a mid-cycle evaluation would be performed by the OPS, with the intent of understanding successes and areas of improvement. The representative stated that this is unique, as often initiatives are only evaluated following its completion, if at all. The researcher was informed that it is a pilot program so the evaluation will not involve a random control trial. Furthermore, the researcher was not made aware of what the evaluation will measure.

The Lowertown: Our Home Safety Project is applicable to the current research, however beyond being able to identify it involves a multiagency partnership driven by community mobilization, it was determined by the researcher that there is not sufficient information available to understand its role and effectiveness.

The OYGPI is significant to the current research in that it is structured around the logic model with Crime Prevention Ottawa, identified as a key partner by several OPS representatives, Crime Prevention Ottawa acts as the responsibility centre. The initiative first identified if Ottawa had an issue with gangs and if so, what the nature of the problem was. They then researched best practices and created a plan unique to the gang issues Ottawa currently faces. A plan was then put into action focused primarily around social development among youth to prevent them from becoming involved in gang activity. Finally, a report was completed in September 2009 outlining the current state, successes, shortcomings and areas of improvement, which served as an evaluation. The report concluded that out of six identified priority areas, only two reported significant gang activity (Kelly, 2009). Despite the completion of a diagnosis, a lack of sustainability and accountability has resulted in no action being taken to date.

Table 10: Evaluation of OPS Initiatives

Initiative	Conclusion	Comments
NCLB	Promising	- Effective in increasing perception of safety. - Future initiatives similar to NCLB should include a more comprehensive evaluation (RCT).
School Resource Officer	Ineffective	- Literature identifies the program as ineffective. - Current OPS evaluation of SRO ongoing.
Lowertown: Our Home Safety Project	Inconclusive	- Follows fundamentals of multiagency partnership approach. - Not enough data available.
OYGPI	Inconclusive	- Follows fundamentals of multiagency partnership approach. - Initiative is in early stages and requires additional resources to be sustainable and effective.

Conclusions

The initiatives identified primarily represent the successful initiatives OPS has been engaged in, as it is natural for an organization to advertise its positive

accomplishments. Speaking with a representative of the OPS it became apparent there are currently three main barriers to the success of crime prevention initiatives led by the OPS or that the OPS has a supporting role in. Accountability and sustainability are closely linked because without public and private stakeholders fulfilling their commitments the initiative is doomed to fail. This was the theme of the following comments made by a representative of the OPS:

Exactly. And at the end, who is Clara Freire (Manager- Client Service Strategies- Community Development Framework) to say the police aren't doing their part? It's difficult because you want everyone to participate but it's hard to say you're not living up to your obligation. There are a lot of good meaning people involved. We developed our mini project in Carling over the summer but once that project is done, which was a four to five month program. But once the programs done, what do you do? We didn't clean up Carling, but there is still issues with prostitution and other types of crime, property crime. It was just a mini program.

These comments also identify another aspect that reduces the opportunity for initiatives to succeed that is also related to sustainability, which is evaluation. An OPS representative in the following remarks brought up the lack of effective evaluation:

There is no body dedicated to that (sustainability). Nobody looking over it. A lot of times before promotions there are certain individuals that will develop ideas, push it forward, get it through, then there is no evaluation. That's the big key. There is no sustainability. The program is done, it's on paper, I've developed this program. It was great, we had great feedback but that's it. It doesn't follow up... There's not central oversight within the organization which is a big problem.

The representative went on to discuss current issues with evaluation, in cases when it is completed. "It's just word of mouth. There are no numbers. Which are hard to get, but it would be nice to say we reduced this type of crime by 10 percent over five months."

The analysis of the initiatives identified in the data set proved to closely follow the logic models created by scholars in the field of crime prevention to establish a framework for successful crime prevention efforts. The initiatives promoted by the OPS

in publicly available documents are likely the most successful initiatives they have been involved in and do not reflect the overall state of OPS initiatives. There is a lack of rigorous evaluation apparent in both crime prevention programs and initiatives the OPS is involved in. In the following chapter, the willingness of the organization to evolve into a more evidence-based organization will be discussed.

6.6 Conclusions

The overarching objective of this chapter was to explore the evidence of the OPS's contributions to crime reduction, it is evident that the OPS uses practices that work, are promising, and do not work to prevent crime. Supported by interview data with key members of the OPS and by the secondary data set of reports, it was shown that only one of the programs, labeled by the OPS as 'crime prevention' is supported by evidence in a review of the literature. The remainder labeled as 'core crime prevention programs' were deemed to be ineffective at reducing crime in their current state. The interview key informants from the OPS agreed with their ineffectiveness in reducing crime, but defended the programs as valuable because of their ability to engage the public.

CHAPTER 7- FUTURE OPS APPROACH TO CRIME REDUCTION

In this chapter the future direction and actions the OPS expect to shift toward in an effort to reduce crime are identified and discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to answer the research questions “To what extent is the OPS open to using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices in the future?” This chapter starts with a presentation of the views of the OPS informants on what effective and ineffective strategies they are following. Then it discusses the Organizational Philosophy, Crime Prevention Programs, Crime Prevention Initiatives, and Future Direction with the purpose of exploring the capacity and will of the OPS to shift toward evidence based crime reduction practices.

7.1 OPS View of Actions Consistent with Evidence

A version of the What Works, What Doesn't and What's Promising chart created early in this research was provided to the OPS prior to the interviews. This was done so key informants would be able to identify which practices the organization participates in. The chart used during the interview is not identical to the chart(s) displayed in chapter three as additional studies were identified. OPS representatives identified the organization as being involved with the practices are bolded in the chart below.

Table 11: Interview Charts

Standard Approach

What Doesn't	• Random patrol across all parts of the community • Rapid response to calls for service • Arrests for Juveniles for minor offences (Yes, but alternative measures) • Arrest of unemployed domestic assault suspects
--------------	--

Innovative Policing Alone

What Works	• Targeted police patrol in high-crime hotspots/Hotspot Policing • Crime Analysis • Prolific offender units • On scene arrests for employed domestic assault suspects
What Doesn't	• Increased arrests or raids on drug markets • Police counseling visits to homes of couples days after domestic violence incidents
What's Promising	• Police showing greater 'respect' to arrested offenders • Police field interrogations of suspicious persons • Proactive drunk driving arrests with breath testing • Proactive arrests for carrying concealed weapons

Policing with the Public

What Doesn't	• General foot patrol • Neighborhood watch programs founded on Break and Enters organized with police • Storefront police offices • D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education)* • Gun buyback programs in North America • Police newsletters with local crime information
What's Promising	• Community policing with meetings to set priorities that involve Problem-Oriented Policing (Chicago)

Evidence shows in some cases D.A.R.E. increases crime rates among those who take the program.

Policing Within Multiagency Partnerships

What Works	• Utilize technology for crime analysis and for accountability • Collaborative partnerships with key community stakeholders • Boston Operation Ceasefire • Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy
What's Promising	• "Problem-solving" analysis unique to the crime situation at each location • Gang offender monitoring by community workers, probation and police officers • Battered women's shelters

Inconclusive/Conflicting Evidence

• Generally applied follow-up investigations • Increasing/Higher numbers of police officers • CompStat Policing
--

As displayed in Table 11, the OPS self identifies as participating in several strategies that are proven effective such as targeted police patrol in high crime areas, crime analysis, use of a prolific offender unit, on scene arrested of employed domestic assault suspects, and utilizing technology for crime analysis to ensure accountability of members who commit to multiagency approaches.

OPS also identified a number of practices they are engaged in that do not have an impact on the crime rate, including every practice categorized as part of the standard policing approach. OPS uses increased raids on drug markets and police counseling in cases of domestic assault, which are innovative policing practices, but ineffective in regards to crime reduction. OPS employs a number of policing with the public practices that are shown not to reduce the crime rate. It is worth noting that the OPS claims to adhere to all but one policing practice that is labeled as promising.

7.2 OPS Organizational Philosophy

In publicly available reports used for this research, the overall philosophy the OPS appears to subscribe to is 'Community Policing'. On the OPS website, the organization identifies its philosophy to be 'Community Policing'. The website goes on to articulate its own brand of what 'Community Policing' means to the organization which include:


- To move in the direction of implementing a problem oriented police organization.
- To move as rapidly as possible to include the community as an active partner in problem solving and prevention.
- To reassess the current community based activities of the Ottawa Police, and to retain only those, which advance progress in the achievement of the above priorities. (OPS, 2010b)

During the interview with Chief Bordeleau the dialogue relating to the OPS model was dominated by the concepts commonly associated with the community policing model, exemplified when he mentioned, "...being able to mobilize that community to take ownership, be proud and to bring the right people to the leadership table to identify issues and come up with strategies to reduce them and where we saw a big win was developing those relationships of trust between police and community." Furthermore the OPS has 15 'Community Police Centres'. When asked by the researcher to identify the OPSs organization strategy, Sgt. D'Aoust said, "It's a combination... Community policing is our model so that may be the biggest piece".

Most recently the OPS adopted 'Ontario's Mobilization & Engagement Model of Community Policing' illustrated in Figure 3/Appendix A, that they assisted in developing and was released in 2010 to replace the original 1996 Community Policing Model. The primary drivers for change were to include greater emphasis on community mobilization, crime prevention through social development, police/community joint problem solving and to create a model that translated the philosophy into a meaningful tool to frontline officers.

Chief Bordeleau echoed this sentiment when saying, "We all talk about community policing and philosophy. This really helps us translate that philosophy into concrete action items as far as what does that mean from a policing perspective and who do we need to bring to the table".

Figure 3: Ontario's Mobilization & Engagement Model of Community Policing



(OACP, 2010)

The deployment of resources was a significant topic of discussion with the Chief. He stated in relation to the deployment of resources, "The current model of the OPS is 70 percent reactive and 30 percent proactive." Chief Bordeleau has an alternative vision of how to effectively use resources. He used the OPSs newly adopted OACP model that guides their philosophy to illustrate the initial need for enforcement practices that are heavily reactionary based, with an eventual transition to crime prevention and community mobilization/engagement.

It's always fluid based on what is happening. And sometimes a community does require 90 percent of enforcement from our role perspective. But the goal is not always to be at 90 percent, the goal is always to shift people to community engagement. But we need to recognize that it is fluid because of different factors, whether it's the economic situation, whether its crime trends that are taking place within that community. That there will be a greater need for enforcement to deal with that specific issue. But again, the enforcement should be a short-term solution because you're always trying to address the root cause issues. So the goal is not always to have... there is no percentage it's not 'the goal is 50/50'.

If the OPS successfully implements and actively follows the OACP model, it would represent a shift toward the organization increasing evidence-based practices, and ultimately reduce victimization in Ottawa.

By subscribing to the OACP model, it is apparent that the OPS is making efforts to advance the organization strategically and philosophically in the direction of a progressive community policing approach. The philosophy has significantly distanced itself from the professional model of policing by identifying police services should not be evenly distributed, but rather that communities have different needs and in order for police to be effective they must respond with the appropriate service delivery.

Despite identifying ‘Ontario’s Mobilization & Engagement Model of Community Policing’ as the organizations philosophical model, it would be naive to accept this commitment as the current state of the OPS’s service delivery. As stated by Mastrofski (2006, p.54), “If we were to measure changes in organization goals by observing police departments’ mission statements and strategic plans, we would undoubtedly conclude that community policing has had a major transformative effect”. Chief Bordeleau brought up this issue when he explained:

We all talk about community policing and philosophy. This really helps us translate that philosophy into concrete action items as far as what does that mean from a policing perspective and who do we need to bring to the table. So that’s our philosophy and that’s our approach. Are we there as an organization? No. We have pockets of it where we’ve had success. I think that’s our strategy and that’s what were always trying to achieve, and educating our officers on the approach and how to do this.

In saying this, Chief Bordeleau expressed that philosophically the OPS is not reaching its target of becoming a police service that fully utilizes a community policing, however he went on to offer an explanation as to why:

Will we ever be able to say, ‘Yes, we’ve achieved it, we’re there’? I don’t think so. It’s always an evolving process as you hire new officers into the organization, as communities change, as the dynamics, whether it’s the economic situation... it’s very fluid. It’s always an evolving process.

Other OPS representatives echoed Chief Bordeleau’s sentiment about the value of the OACP model as well as the challenge of educating officers, both new and experienced, the importance of the overall philosophy of the OPS. Both officers that participated in interviews identified that an emphasis among frontline officers on the enforcement and suppression of crime as a challenge to the successful implementation of the OACP model. As Chief Bordeleau explained when asked about barriers to the implementation of the model:

Well because some of the community and some of our officers still have their heads around our enforcement role. So we need to continue educating our officers internally here around this model and the benefits of it. Yes we do have enforcement, but not everything is enforcement driven. You’ll have as much of an impact on sitting down around a table of leaders in the community and talking about what kind of other things we could be doing as a police service to improve that relationship of trust. Whether you’re sitting down at a community event and opening those doors and building those relationships. That has as much benefit from a long-term perspective than going out and arresting an individual for whatever, re-arresting them and re-arresting them. I think they both have value and we need to continue educating our officers, they understand the value of this, but I think we need to continue educating them as far as, there is also value in the soft policing from a long term perspective there are a lot of benefits. Policing is policing, it’s not hard or soft, it’s all about police and what our role in society is.

Chief Bordeleau further explained issues pertaining to specific aspects of the model by stating:

The red piece (Enforcement & Crime Suppression) mimics the use of force model, that is, where the officers like to work, mostly young officers, in Vanier and downtown. The mobilization piece, not too many people like to deal with community members who want oversight and want to know what’s going on. It’s hard to get officers interested in the community mobilization, presentations, Neighborhood Watch meetings, there aren’t too many police officers who like to do that. I don’t blame them because when you’re applying for a new position

they ask for how many stats did you do, how many street checks? They don't ask how community meetings did you do.

These comments identify that despite the organizations desire to shift away from enforcement and suppression, to community mobilization and community engagement, the internal organizational practices of the OPS need to be modified to promote the new strategy of policing rather than the standard model. What is missing from the comments however, is the lack of commitment to move away from the daily reactive nature of the police service.

7.3 Will Crime Prevention Section Get More Crime Reduction

It has been established in the current study that all but one of the programs OPS offers labeled 'Crime Prevention', are ineffective. Through the data collection and speaking with three representatives of the OPS, the consensus of this small sample is that there is a need to change the current status of OPS programs labeled as crime prevention.

OPS Crime Prevention Section

In June 2010 the OPS began to research the need to create a crime prevention section within the organization. Sgt. D'Aoust was tasked with researching and creating a report, and explained, "They were doing a strategic deployment plan and certain police officers in the SDP (District Strategic Deployment Planning), seeing that other police services had crime prevention sections that are more up to date and doing more up to date research on crime prevention".

Sgt. D'Aoust performed interviews with sworn and civilian members of the OPS, Crime Prevention Ottawa members, Community Development Framework group, Waterloo Crime Prevention Council and members of police services across Canada. A

literature review and surveys of Ottawa Police Officers were also conducted leading to the development of a report that made nine recommendations that include:

- OPS Executive approves the formation of the Crime Prevention Section.
- A Staff Sergeant, a Sergeant, one full-time civilian and one temporary civilian position staff the Crime Prevention Section.
- The Crime Prevention Section be based out of the Community Development and Corporate Communications Section reporting to the Director of that section.
- All current Crime Prevention Programs and future initiatives be the administrative responsibility of the Crime Prevention Section.
- The Crime Prevention Section be given the mandate to research new initiatives, assist with the training of officers on crime prevention and problem-oriented policing and serve as administrators of other crime prevention programs.
- A temporary civilian position be created to assist in the Crime Free Multi-Housing Program and the administrative duties of the section.
- That the Crime Prevention Staff Sergeant have full-time membership on the Community Police Centre Management Committee.
- The Auxiliary Unit Report to the Crime Prevention Staff Sergeant.
- That the Crime Prevention Section participates in a Community Development Framework working group as well as the Neighbourhood Planning Initiative. (D'Aoust, 2011)

The report goes on to state:

In order to be more effective, and to continue to comply with mandated requirements, the OPS must develop a Crime Prevention Section which has significant influence at both the administrative and operational levels, has the capacity to design, deliver and evaluated programs, has the ability to assemble and sustain key stakeholders and to play a public role in communicating the best evidence on crime prevention. Failure to implement a Crime Prevention Section will prolong the persistent fragmentation of crime prevention, mitigating the impact of crime prevention initiatives and will negatively impact the OPSs Board's strategic priority of preventing, reducing and investigating crime.

If all the proposed measures were to be adopted, it would be a significant move in the direction of becoming an evidence-based organization, a point that all officers and civilian staff interviewed for the current research agreed was important. The proposed section would provide evidence based programs and have a section that provides evidence-based information to the whole organization to enact effective policy changes.

Although the fate of the proposed section and recommendations are unknown, during the data collection stage of the current research Sgt. D'Aoust was cautiously optimistic saying:

I'm curious to find out what will happen with this section. That's a definite improvement. Which should be up and running and staffed in six months. It will depend on the communication piece that section will have and how that will influence the officers. It's a soft type of policing, but there is a lot there. Especially in Ottawa we have the Institute for the Prevention of Crime, Crime Prevention Ottawa, so many different avenues and things available to us. Only the people can fail it, everything is out there, we do have research, you just have to find it and you have to act on it. So I have a positive outlook. I'm hopeful.

As mentioned by Sgt. D'Aoust, getting personnel within the organization to 'buy-in' to the prevention aspect of policing will be the primary issue that will determine the ability of the crime prevention section and programs to be successful.

Evaluation

One officer was specifically interested in furthering community lead initiatives through educating community stakeholders to perform evaluations. "Teach them how to do evaluations, there is so much more we could do given that process." This is an interesting point, considering the lack of evaluation the organization completes on the initiatives it leads. However, this could be interpreted as a way for police to download the responsibility on other organizations.

Evaluation is an area that the OPS must improve upon to have effective crime prevention programs. The completion of evaluations is essential. Furthermore the OPS must act upon evaluations such as the review of Neighbourhood Watch that was recently completed (Muller-Cheng, 2010). The evaluation of Neighbourhood Watch could be used as a model of what evaluation of OPS programs should look like. Despite

completion of the evaluation, the police must also act on its recommendations, which they have yet to implement.

7.4 Interest in Multi-Agency Initiatives, such as CPO

Continuing to work with community stakeholders and organizations such as Crime Prevention Ottawa will be an important step forward for the success of future OPS initiatives with the goal of reducing crime. Despite a small operating budget, Crime Prevention Ottawa acts as an ad hoc responsibility centre, working within the context of Waller's logic model (Waller, 2008, p. 116).

Chief Bordeleau expressed the value and necessity of sustainable partnerships in order for initiatives to be successful.

Public safety is not solely a police responsibility and community safety is not just a police responsibility. We have a role to play but we need to work with our partners, whether it be by-law, fire services, paramedics, Crime Prevention Ottawa, all our stakeholders out there to make sure we achieve our goal of having a safe community. We don't do that alone, we can't. We know that if we do that alone it will fail.

Although no specific future plans for initiatives were discussed, the Chief's perceptions of the future role of the OPS in crime prevention initiatives were positive overall. A theme common in interviews with all officers, he reinforced the concept that crime prevention is not the sole responsibility of the police and therefore it is important for the police, community, and public and private stakeholders to recognize that the police cannot and should not always be the leaders in crime prevention initiatives.

I think we'll continue playing a pivotal role in supporting crime prevention initiatives in our community, some of them we'll play more of a leader role to get things going, but more in support, that we need to continue working with our partners to really emphasize the benefits of preventing crime. I think we are on a good track around working with our community partners and reinforcing the need for crime prevention.

7.5 Future Direction

As a public service, the OPS must be committed to providing the best return on investment to taxpayers. It is for these reasons that residents were consulted when constructing a future strategic direction, among other key community stakeholders. This input from Ottawa residents, police service members, community partners, school boards, businesses, local government and the OPSs Board resulted in four strategic priorities being developed in the 2010-2012 OPS Business Plan.

Most relevant to the current research is the first strategic priority listed is, Reducing, Investigating and Preventing Crime. This priority has been broken down into five goals:

- Preventing and reducing youth crime through early intervention and diversion activities.
 - Supporting and providing assistance to victims- reducing victimization and re-victimization.
 - Investing in technology and initiatives that support intelligence-led policing.
 - Review investigative functions to achieve optimum solvency of crimes.
 - Apprehend prolific offenders and target priority crime areas.
- (OPS, 2010b)

The goals of this priority are very similar to what the literature review chapter would recommend the police do to become more effective in reducing crime. This information shows that at least at a high level, the OPS understands the general principles of what must be made a priority to reduce victimization. One key aspect missing however, is the lack of emphasis on evaluation of outcomes.

Each goal is further broken down into a series of objectives measurable by predetermined actions and success indicators. Chief Bordeleau echoed the importance of crime prevention in the organizations strategic priorities moving forward by stating:

Crime prevention, we need to continue to make significant investments into ensuring that as a community not just a police service, that we are putting a lot of resources into preventing crime. And that's not an easy sell in the community because it's not sexy as far as build jails and put people in jail, which seems to solve the problem, but really it doesn't.

Included in the organizations strategic priorities involved in the future direction were also 'investing in our people', 'enhancing partnerships and interoperability', and 'expanding public education, community engagement and mobilization'. Of specific relevance to the current research, is the strategic priority of expanding public education, community engagement and mobilization. The business plan states:

Public education is essential for policing to be successful. If the community does not understand how and why we do the things we do, they are less likely to support our actions. Once communities are aware and have the information about a safer Ottawa, they can be engaged in meaningful and practical ways. Engagement comes in many different forms, some proactive and some reactive. Through engagement, communities will mobilize and contribute to the partnerships and actions that build a healthy and safe city. Mobilization is a practical aspect of policing in Canada. The police cannot be everywhere and available at all times. Good policing requires an engaged and mobilized community. We need a community that is prepared to act and work to help prevent and solve crime.

Again, it is clear that Chief Bordeleau has bought into both the strategic priorities and philosophy that are intended to shape the future direction of the organization, as he was asked about the organizations future role in crime prevention he explained:

I think if you look at the policing business it continues to be more and more accountable to the public and our actions are scrutinized on a daily basis, and we are faced with some significant challenges in our business and we recognize that for us to be successful we need to be transparent. And we need to work with our community partners. We need to work hard at sending that message.

This emphasis on partnerships and community mobilization was noted to be a significant component of the police role in effective crime reduction in the review literature. It is

therefore promising that the OPS has set this as a strategic priority with specific objectives whose success can ultimately be determined by preset actions and indicators.

The challenges of pursuing this active role of the OPS in reducing crime are similar to those of current day. Set goals and objectives with practical indicators to identify when each strategic priority has been successfully achieved, clearly outlining how the organization will embrace an evidence-based role in crime prevention. Therefore, similar to the implementation of the proposed Crime Prevention Section, as Sgt. D'Aoust stated "Only the people can fail it..."

The strategic priorities discussed in OPS reports and recognized in the interviews, fit within the organizations philosophy of 'Ontario's Mobilization & Engagement Model of Community Policing', which decision makers in the organization have expressed a significant and long-term commitment to. Identified in the previous chapter, the newly implemented philosophy that the OPS subscribe to has significant promise to direct the organization in an effective and evidence-based crime prevention direction moving forward.

The report "Crime Prevention in Ontario: A Framework for Action" developed by the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Corrections and OACP was released after the interviews were conducted. This first major provincial report on crime prevention advocates for a shift to an evidence-based multiagency partnership approach. Furthermore, the CACP Institute for Strategic International Studies (ISIS) recently completed a global study of police practices effective in reducing crime. Upon completion, the one-year study, which involved a team of experts travelling to several countries around the world reached conclusions similar to the current study. The ISIS

report states that in order to effectively reduce crime a ‘full circle community safety’ approach is required. The Ontario government, OACP, and ISIS each support the multiagency partnership approach that this thesis identifies as being most effective in reducing crime.

7.6 Conclusions

Based on a small number of interviews with key members of the OPS, there appears to be a consensus that the OPS should shift toward a more prevention-based approach to crime reduction. Beyond making statements to this effect, the OPS has taken actions consistent with proven crime reduction practices, but also some that are not. A consistent theme within the interviews and reviewed reports, was an emphasis on community engagement and creating a balance between proactive and reactionary approaches to crime.

The review initiated by the OPS of the need for a crime prevention section, which may influence the use of more informed crime prevention strategies. However, the OPS also completed a review of Neighborhood Watch, which it has yet to act upon. It is not clear the importance the OPS places on evidence-based strategies or evaluation. Based on the priorities set out by the OPS in their most recent Business Plan, the organization is aware at a high level what needs to be done to reduce crime.

The organizational reports and interview informants all expressed an openness to the multi-agency approach to crime. The multi-agency approach based on evidence, evaluation, and prevention are what the ISIS and Ontario Crime Prevention Framework advocate as the best way for police to reduce crime.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The two primary objectives of this research were to review the social science evidence on the extent to which different police practices have been proven to reduce crime or not, and then examine the current use and perceived future role of OPS in evidence-based crime prevention efforts.

Four research questions were developed for this research:

1. What sources of literature provide well-researched and reliable data on effectiveness of policing in crime reduction?
2. In this literature, what policing strategies/practices are shown to reduce crime, not reduce crime or are promising in reducing crime?
3. To what extent is the OPS using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices?
4. To what extent is the OPS open to using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices in the future?

8.1 Overview of Conclusions

1. *What sources of literature provide well-researched and reliable data on effectiveness of policing in crime reduction?*

Starting in the 1970s, police services in the US began cooperating in RCT's of policing innovations. Today, leading public interest groups engaging academics from the US and other developed countries have brought together the cumulative knowledge from these evaluations. Examples of these groups included the U.S. National Research Council, the report for the U.S. Congress on crime prevention entitled 'Preventing Crime:

What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising', the U.S. Office of Justice program 'Crimesolutions.gov', and the World Health Organization's Report on the Evidence on Violence Prevention. Other recent resources relating to police crime prevention and problem oriented policing were also utilized, such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), Police Foundation, Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, and the US Department of Justice's Community Oriented Policing Service. Peer reviewed articles were also drawn upon where they were mentioned in the literature, including Campbell Collaborative Systematic Reviews.

2. *In this literature, what policing strategies/practices are shown to reduce crime, not reduce crime or are promising in reducing crime?*

Policing practices were grouped into two categories. The first category was limited to the standard policing approach, which is common in Canada. The standard policing approach is primarily reactive and is characterized by two thirds or more of police resources being used to react 911 calls and approximately another 20 percent allocated to the detective function. (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). When large changes occur in levels of police on patrol such as in a police strike there are changes in crime levels, but changes as large as 20 percent have little impact. A few studies claimed some impact but were dismissed by the academic groups because of alternative explanations.

The second category of police practices were developed in the last few decades because of perceived limitations of the standard approach in achieving crime reductions. These practices focus on reducing crime around principles such as those of problem oriented policing. The strategies in this category have been grouped around three

headings of policing alone, police and the public, and police in multi-agency partnerships.

Labeled in this paper as ‘innovative policing alone’, the strategies include CompStat and Zero Tolerance policing. They are recognized in the effectiveness literature to cause reductions in crime when implemented, however the reductions are minor and expensive. The next innovative policing approach discussed was ‘Policing with the public’. This has been the most popular concept of the past two decades in Canada, among academics, policing leaders and politicians. In the effectiveness literature, many practices of this policing approach fail to reduce crime (but are thought to be successful in their objective of building stronger relationships with the community). However, when fully implemented, such as in Chicago in the 1990s, they were proven to reduce robbery and property crime.

‘Policing within multiagency partnerships’ was recognized as the most effective way to reduce crime in the literature. Employing a method of involving key sectors to identify crime issues, create an evidence-based action plan, implementing the action plan, followed by an evaluation was shown to be effective though by its nature these programs at a city or provincial level cannot be part of an RCT.

The conclusions are summarized in the following two tables, which show what was proven to work and what is promising.

What Works

Innovative Policing Alone	• Targeted police patrol in high-crime hotspots/Hotspot Policing • Crime Analysis • Prolific offender units • On scene arrests for employed domestic assault suspects
Policing With the Public	• Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project • Seattle’s Community Crime Prevention Program

Policing Within Multiagency Partnerships	• Following a Diagnosis, plan, implementation and evaluation cycle developed by a Joint Planning Board and Secretariat • Collaborative partnerships with key community stakeholders • Utilize technology for crime analysis and for accountability • Boston Operation Ceasefire • Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy • Violence Reduction Unit (Glasgow)
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What's Promising

Innovative Policing Alone	• Police field interrogations of suspicious persons • Proactive arrests for carrying concealed weapons • Proactive drunk driving arrests with breath testing • Police showing greater 'respect' to arrested offenders
Policing With the Public	• Community policing with meetings to set priorities that involve Problem-Oriented Policing (Chicago)
Policing Within Multiagency Partnerships	• Collaborative partnerships with key community stakeholders • Following a Diagnosis, plan, implementation and evaluation cycle developed by a Joint Planning Board and Secretariat • Problem-solving' analysis unique to the crime situation at each location • Gang offender monitoring by community workers, probation and police officers • Battered women's shelters

3. *To what extent is the OPS using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices?*

Supported by interview data with three key members of the OPS and by a secondary data set of key public reports from OPS, it was possible to identify the main programs labeled crime prevention by OPS as well as other initiatives whose objective was to reduce or prevent crime.

When compared to the effectiveness literature, only one program labeled by the OPS as ‘crime prevention’ has been shown to reduce crime. Known as CFMH, this is considered to be promising in reducing crime, based on CPTED principles.

Neighbourhood Watch is another program that the OPS considers to be important in its programs labeled crime prevention. It is the only program that OPS has evaluated. They compared the key ingredients of the program with their analysis of the effectiveness literature, which concluded that it does not reduce break-ins. However their report recommends ways to make it more effective, consistent with the effectiveness literature in chapter five. At this time, the evaluation have not yet been acted on. The remainder of programs labeled as ‘core crime prevention programs’ were deemed to be ineffective at reducing crime.

The OPS interview informants agreed with the ineffectiveness of many of the programs in reducing crime, however defended the value of the programs, because of their ability to engage the public.

The OPS has been involved in a number of initiatives that closely follow SARA and problem oriented models, identified in the literature as effective means of reducing crime. The models are based on diagnosing a crime issue, creating an evidence-based plan, implementing the plan, and the completion of an evaluation. However, the OPS has not included any in-depth evaluation component, making it difficult to identify their impact on crime. As identified by an OPS participant, the organization does not often perform evaluations of initiatives or programs.

The OPS has shown initiative in working toward an organizational philosophy of ‘mobilization and community engagement’. No Community left behind and the OYGI

are examples of this. However, in the effectiveness literature, problem solving, particularly using multi-agency strategies needs sustainability and accountability made possible through a responsibility centre. A responsibility centre would ensure that all key stakeholders who committed to the initiative correctly carry out all steps of developed action plan. At this time, there are no examples of OPS using a responsibility centre.

4. *To what extent is the OPS open to using evidence-based knowledge to guide their policing strategy/practices in the future?*

Based on the priorities set out by the OPS in their most recent Business Plan, the organization is aware at a high level of what needs to be done to reduce victimization. Based on the interviews with key informants, there is a consensus that the OPS should shift to a more prevention and evidence-based approach to crime. Beyond making statements to this effect, the OPS has taken concrete action to review its efforts labeled as crime prevention, with the hopes of establishing a permanent crime prevention section within the service to inform and guide the work of the organization based on evidence.

The research informants openly discussed the need to establish and utilize partnerships with key stakeholders to ensure the effectiveness of initiatives directed at reducing crime. Despite discussion of investing more in a multi-agency approach, there were no concrete steps discussed as to how a shift will occur.

Ensuring proper evaluations, and at a more basic level documentation, of initiatives that involve the OPS was also a priority of OPS informants. One OPS representative suggested the possibility of partnered organizations completing evaluations, rather than the police.

OPS informants, specifically Chief Bordeleau, stressed that buy-in is needed from all members of the organization in order to shift from a reactive law enforcement organization, to one that is driven by proactive, evidence-based prevention practices.

8.2 Recommendations

1) Greater use of evidence-based crime prevention strategies, and less of ones that do not reduce crime.

If policing does not become more effective and efficient in reducing crime, which result in fewer calls for service, it may lead to increasing costs for policing services on municipal budgets and likely to increasing congestion in courts and overcrowding in prisons. Police services in Canada have already begun to look for solutions with some politicians, the FCM, CACP, CPA and associations of police boards interested in reducing the cost of policing. This pressure has come in the form of hiring freezes and very limited budget increases, as well as an upcoming 'National Summit on the Economics of Policing' recently announced by Public Safety Minister Vic Toews.

Internationally, police services in England and Wales and USA have been forced to significantly cut the number of police officers from their organizations. Some of these cuts have included expansion of the use of less expensive private police officers for duties currently carried out by public police officers.

Crime prevention is legislated as one of the five core functions of police services in Ontario. The Ontario Crime Prevention Framework co-authored by the OACP and the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services acknowledges the wealth of proven crime prevention strategies that have strong evidence supporting them – the effectiveness literature in chapters three and four. The Drummond Report

emphasized the need to shift to evidence-based practices in policing to avoid further escalating policing costs. Police services must make prevention a priority, rather than simply carrying on with the ‘business as usual’ approach of reacting to 911 calls, performing follow-up investigations and engaging in community relations.

So conditions are developing for OPS to implement more of the strategies that are proven to reduce crime and reduce the resources dedicated to practices that do not reduce crime.

2) Effective leadership and communication among police services, police service boards and government officials to shift focus toward prevention.

The OPS is aware this knowledge exists, however currently is not using it, except for a few minor instances. From this research there are several barriers that must be overcome to shift from the status quo of reacting to crime toward a more effective and efficient way of reducing crime.

The basic concept of ‘change’ is likely the largest barrier to implementing successful crime reduction practices, because it is something that the bureaucracies are slow or unwilling to do. Communication should be focused on providing training, resources and development of infrastructure to make a comprehensive approach to crime reduction a reality.

There are also a number of other ‘winning conditions’ that must be aligned in order to motivate the changes needed to proactively reduce the crime rate. One condition is public support for crime prevention in Canada has been steadily growing over the past few decades, with 63 percent of Canadians who prefer crime prevention instead of law enforcement (Makin, 2012).

Another condition comes from effective leadership (Waller, 2012). Both police and political leadership at all levels of government must work toward a common objective. There needs to be more communication on how to shift toward an evidence-based approach with police, police service boards, and city councilors.

3) Creation of a task force to develop an action plan that includes evaluation.

An important way to plan the successful implementing of evidence based crime reduction is an action plan developed by a task force (Waller, 2012). The task force would include key stakeholders from the police services board, the OPS, city council and so on. It would develop an action plan to allocate resources, infrastructure, and training in a way that shifts the role of police services from a reactionary to an evidence-based, prevention-oriented service. The Police Services Board of Peel Region has already started this process following a high profile seminar in February with politicians from all orders of government listening to evidence informed presentations by McFee, then President of the CACP, and Waller (SafeCityMiss, 2012). The Board is working on recommendations in time for the budget review in the fall of 2012.

The City of Surrey in British Columbia is a great example of how to mobilize local government to use resources, including police, more effectively to reduce crime rates. When newly elected in 2006, Mayor Dianne Watts spearheaded the development and implementation of Surrey's award winning Crime Reduction Strategy (City of Surrey, 2011). Founded in research completed by the Mayor's Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety, concrete objectives and actions were developed to establish the foundation of the crime reduction strategy (City of Surrey, 2011). The Mayor's leadership and city council support, combined with public support, mobilized relevant

stakeholders into implementing the collaborative strategy. Between 2006 and 2010, the sustained commitment to the strategy resulted in a 28 percent reduction in break and enters; 40 percent reduction in motor vehicle theft; 24 percent reduction in property crime; and a 9 percent reduction in violent crime (City of Surrey, 2012). Despite pressures of the economy, the City of Surrey has maintained its commitment to the strategy with continued public support.

8.3 Future Research

The findings of this exploratory study represent a starting point for not only the OPS, but also police services from across the country to capitalize on the growing trend of support for crime prevention with the ultimate goal of reducing victimization among Canadians while limiting the growth in policing costs and possible court and correctional costs.

Future research in this field could further explore the challenges and barriers faced in implementing evidence based crime prevention efforts within a police service.

The findings point to building on the current research by addressing the extent to which the OPS Crime Prevention Section is able to affect a shift toward evidence-based crime prevention in its programs but also across the organization. The literature discussed in chapter five suggests that this section is not high enough in the hierarchy to become a leadership centre that would transform the actions of the OPS but it may kick start the process.

Due to the fact that this study only examined the OPS, there are limits to the extent that the findings can be generalized to the broader field of policing. It would be particularly interesting to undertake similar studies that use the effectiveness literature in

this thesis to explore the attitudes of other police services in Canada to making a shift towards more effective and efficient policing. Therefore, an in-depth multiple-case study design, including several police services across Canada, could confirm or refine the findings of the current research.

The growing consensus on the importance of multi-sector prevention to reducing crime raises questions about whether the recent major policy innovations in Alberta and under consideration in Saskatchewan and Manitoba will force or encourage greater use of evidence-based prevention than in Ontario.

Is it an exciting time for reform of policing or will reactive standard policing resist change to the cost of the taxpayers and victims of crime?

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(Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, 2010)



APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE

- 1) To what extent have you been involved with crime reductions initiatives with OPS?
- 2) As an organization, what policing strategy does OPS follow?
 - Ex. Standard/Professional, community, problem-oriented, multiagency partnership
- a) Do the overall organizational structure and strategies of OPS complement the use of crime prevention measures?
- 3) What do you consider to be the police role in reducing crime?
 - a) What role does multiagency partnerships play in this?
- 4) What crime prevention initiatives is OPS currently engaged in?
 - a) Objective?
 - b) Success?
 - c) Any cancelled?
- 5) Are the crime prevention initiatives OPS is engaged in evidence based?
 - a. Based on what evidence?
- 6) What is the future direction of OPS in relation to evidence based crime prevention?
 - a) Do you see room for improvement short or long term?
- 7) Which of the programs in this chart are OPS involved in?

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW CHARTS

Standard Approach

What Works	On scene arrests for employed domestic assault suspects
What Doesn't	- Random patrol across all parts of the community - Rapid response to calls for service - Arrests for Juveniles for minor offences (Yes, but alternative measures) - Arrest of unemployed domestic assault suspects

Innovative Policing Alone

What Works	- Targeted police patrol in high-crime hotspots/Hotspot Policing - Crime Analysis - Prolific offender units
What Doesn't	- Increased arrests or raids on drug markets - Police counseling visits to homes of couples days after domestic violence incidents
What's Promising	- Police showing greater 'respect' to arrested offenders - Police field interrogations of suspicious persons - Proactive drunk driving arrests with breath testing - Proactive arrests for carrying concealed weapons

Policing with the Public

What Doesn't	- General foot patrol - Neighborhood watch programs founded on Break and Enters organized with police - Storefront police offices - D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education)* - Gun buyback programs in North America - Police newsletters with local crime
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	information
What's Promising	• Community policing with meetings to set priorities that involve Problem-Oriented Policing (Chicago)

Evidence shows in some cases D.A.R.E. increases crime rates among those who take the program.

Policing Within Multiagency Partnerships

What Works	• Utilize technology for crime analysis and for accountability • Collaborative partnerships with key community stakeholders • Boston Operation Ceasefire • Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy
What's Promising	• "Problem-solving" analysis unique to the crime situation at each location • Gang offender monitoring by community workers, probation and police officers • Battered women's shelters

Inconclusive/Conflicting Evidence

• Generally applied follow-up investigations • Increasing/Higher numbers of police officers • CompStat Policing

APPENDIX D: CODING SCHEME

Theme

1. Current Police Role in Evidence Based Crime Prevention

<i>Concept</i>	<i>Indicator(s)</i>
1. a. Police Role in Crime Prevention	The data set discusses and/or there are indications of:
i. Crime Prevention Programs	- Permanent functions of the OPS that aim is to prevent crime. - Identifies programs with the objective of preventing crime.
ii. Crime Prevention Initiatives	- Projects OPS engage in on a temporary or predetermined basis that proactively aim to reduce crime. - Are not considered core prevention programs.
iii. Philosophy	- Reducing crime through community mobilization and engagement. - Partnerships with community and key stakeholders
1. b. Evidence-based	The data set discusses and/or there are indications of:
i. Best Practice Research	- Research identifying superior methods of reducing a specific crime or generally.
ii. Assessment/Evaluation	- Reviewing crime prevention programs or initiatives, through qualitative or quantitative research to determine the effect on crime rates.
iii. Crime Analysis	- Identify crime trends and patterns to inform decision-making relating to crime prevention.
1. c. Challenges of Crime Prevention	The data set discusses and/or there are indications of:
i. Accountability	- Follow through on commitment to multiagency initiatives.
ii. Sustainability	- Interest after initial plan/implementation.

	- Pilot programs.
iii. Funding	- Economic uncertainty. - Cost of basic policing functions.
iv. Personnel	- Training and mentality of those implementing the programs/initiatives.
v. Political	- Working with or without support from various levels of government.

2. Future Police Role in Evidence Based Crime Prevention

<i>Concept</i>	<i>Indicator(s)</i>
2. a. Police Role in Crime Prevention	The interviewee expresses perceptions of; or there are indications in the text data of:
i. Crime Prevention Programs	- Crime prevention section. - Permanent functions of the OPS to reduce crime.
ii. Crime Prevention Initiatives	- Projects OPS engages in or will engage in on a temporary or undetermined basis that proactively aim to reduce crime. - Are not considered core prevention programs.
iii. Philosophy	- Reducing crime through community mobilization and engagement. - Partnerships with community and key stakeholders.
2. b. Evidence-based	
i. Scientific Evaluation	- Random control trials. - Longitudinal studies.
ii. Best Practice Research	- Research identifying superior methods of reducing a specific crime or generally.
iii. Crime Analysis	- Identify crime trends and patterns to inform decision-making relating to crime prevention.
2. c. Challenges of Crime Prevention	
i. Accountability	- Follow through on commitment to multiagency initiatives.
ii. Sustainability	- Interest after initial plan/implementation. - Pilot programs.

iii. Funding	- Economic uncertainty. - Cost of basic policing functions.
iv. Personnel	- Frontline officers buying in to the concept of crime prevention. - Focus on enforcement and suppression.
v. Leadership	- Change in leadership personnel at senior management level.
vi. Political	- Working with or without support from various levels of government. - Legislative changes.

APPENDIX E: ETHICAL CONSENT FORM

Title of Study

A Qualitative Analysis of the Role of Policing in Evidence Based Crime Reduction: A Case Study of Ottawa

Principal Researcher:

Adam Norton (MA Candidate)

Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa

Thesis Supervisor:

Dr. Irvin Waller

Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa

I am asked to participate in a research study conducted by Master of Criminology student, Adam Norton (supervised by Dr. Irvin Waller) from the Department of Criminology at the University of Ottawa. The results will contribute to the master's thesis of Adam Norton.

Purpose of this Study

The aim of this research is to fill a gap in the current literature surrounding the police role in reducing crime through evidence based initiatives and overall strategies. The primary focus will be placed on what initiatives police services in large Ontario city centres are currently engaged in, as well as their future strategic direction in relation to crime prevention.

Participation Procedures

As a participant, I will be asked to:

1. Participate in one face-to-face interview approximately 45- 60 minutes in duration. I will be asked for my knowledge, opinions, perceptions of, and experiences relating to crime prevention in Ottawa. The interview will be conducted at the time and place that is most convenient for me.
2. The data collected will be used only for the purposes of completion of the primary researcher's Master's Thesis and related publishing.
3. Participation in the research study is completely voluntary and I may choose to stop participating at any time. If I choose to participate, I can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions without suffering any negative consequences. If I choose to withdraw, all collected data until the point of withdrawal will be destroyed. I may also refuse to answer any questions and remain in the study.
4. My decision not to volunteer will not influence the nature of my relationship with the researchers, the University of Ottawa.
5. The research results will be available upon request at the completion of the study. To obtain the results, my request should be sent to: iwaller@uottawa.ca

Risk

6. There are no foreseeable risks due to the participation in this study. I should not expect any risks or discomfort (physical, psychological, emotional, financial and/or social).

Benefits of Research

7. Through participating in the current research, I will have assisted in creating knowledge for the fields of both academia and policing on how to improve crime prevention efforts.

Confidentiality

8. Any information I share with the principal researcher will remain strictly confidential. I acknowledge and understand that the researcher's supervisor will also have access to the data.
9. Unless I give consent to do, my name or identification will not appear in any report or publication of the research.
10. The primary researcher will not inform each Chief of Police who will be participating. The participants identity will be kept confidential, unless they consent to having their real identity used in the research study.
11. I understand that only the principal researcher will conduct interviews.
12. The principal researcher will ask me if the interview can be audio recorded for future transcription by the researcher, Adam Norton; I understand that I can refuse audio recording.

13. All data collected from the interview process will be kept in a securely locked filing cabinet in the residence of the primary researcher during the collection period. All written records and audio recordings will be stored in this securely locked filing cabinet. Electronic data will be stored on the primary researcher's computer protected by password. The primary researcher is the only individual with access to the filing cabinet where the collected data will be stored. Only the principal researcher and thesis supervisor will have access to the collected information.
14. During the conservation period the data obtained will be kept for five years in a secure locked cabinet in Dr. Waller's work office. When this time expires all data will be destroyed.

This study has received ethics approval from the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board. If I have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, the University of Ottawa Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research can be contacted.

If there is any aspect of this study I wish to discuss, I can contact either Adam Norton (principle researcher) or Dr. Irvin Waller (supervisor) by phone or email which are listed above. Either one will be happy to discuss any aspect of the research.

Consent

I _____, consent to participate in the research study being proposed by Adam Norton and Dr. Irvin Waller. I understand the nature of this research study and wish to participate. My signature below indicates my consent. There are two copies of this consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

I consent to the use of my real identity by the researcher in current study.

Yes (Real Name) _____ No (Pseudonym) _____

I consent to the audio recording of the interview between myself and the researcher.

Yes _____ No _____

Participant's Signature:

Date:

Researcher's Signature:

Date: