

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI[®]



Université d'Ottawa • University of Ottawa

On the Nature and Function of Scepticism in Speculative Philosophy:
A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's *Logic*
and A. N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality*

By **ADAM CHRISTIAN SCARFE**
1641192

Doctoral Thesis Dissertation
Department of Philosophy
University of Ottawa

Thesis Committee Members:

Dr. D. Schlitt (Saint Paul University) - Supervisor
Dr. T. F. Geraets (University of Ottawa)
Dr. D. Raynor (University of Ottawa)
Dr. D. Moggach (University of Ottawa)
Dr. L. S. Ford (Old Dominion University)

Defense Date: Friday, October 26, 2001



**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-67222-0

Canada

ABSTRACT:
On the Nature and Function of Scepticism in Speculative Philosophy:
A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's *Logic* and A. N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality*

By Adam Christian Scarfe

The following doctoral dissertation constitutes a conjoint analysis of the workings of scepticism as contained within Hegel's and Whitehead's respective and contrasting philosophies of 'process'. In it, I hypothesize that for these speculative thinkers, scepticism may be described as the 'mover' of philosophical, religious, and scientific endeavour.

Part One of the thesis focuses on Hegel's 'initially-idealistic' standpoint of Absolute Idealism as contained in the *Logic*. I find that for him, scepticism is to be defined as the recognition and negation of finitude. Drawing from Hegel's general distinction of Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism, I argue that scepticism is representative of the moment of 'cancellation' implicit within the dialectical progression of the logical Concept (*Begriff*). Subsequently, I trace the role of scepticism as the recognition of finitude with respect to the unfolding of Hegel's criterion of truth characteristic of Absolute Idealism, namely, within the process by which the dialectical opposition of 'idealism' and 'realism' is worked out.

Part Two concerns Whitehead's 'provisionally-realistic' philosophy of Organism as advanced in *Process and Reality*. I elucidate the fact that for him, scepticism is the main contributor to the problem of the radical 'bifurcation' of actualities. Following from an elucidation of the interplay between his ontological principle and the principle of relativity, as well as an analysis of his three modes of perception, I propose that Whitehead's notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify the workings of scepticism. In carrying out this interpretation, I show that 'negative prehensions' constitute the means by which the extensive continuum is divided by the organism, and are the efficient element in the creativity of organisms. And, I trace both the 'realistic' and 'idealistic' activities of 'negative prehensions' with respect to his descriptions of the unfolding of the creative processes of organisms.

Part Three of the dissertation focuses directly on the ramifications of accepting my initial hypothesis that, in speculative philosophy, scepticism is described as the 'mover' of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. I advance an overall synopsis of the nature and function of scepticism in, and in light of, my study of speculative philosophy. Lastly, I offer a critical response to the radical 'instrumental' scepticism predominant in our era, from both Hegelian and Whiteheadian perspectives.

ABSTRACT OF CONTENTS

The following doctoral dissertation constitutes a conjoint analysis of the workings of scepticism as contained within Hegel's and Whitehead's respective and contrasting philosophies of 'process'. In it, I hypothesize that for these speculative thinkers, scepticism may be described as the 'mover' of philosophical, religious, and scientific endeavour.

Part One of the thesis focuses on Hegel's 'initially-idealistic' standpoint of Absolute Idealism as contained in the *Logic*. I find that for him, scepticism is to be defined as the recognition and negation of finitude. Drawing from Hegel's general distinction of Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism, I argue that scepticism is representative of the moment of 'cancellation' implicit within the dialectical progression of the logical Concept (*Begriff*). Subsequently, I trace the role of scepticism as the recognition of finitude with respect to the unfolding of Hegel's criterion of truth characteristic of Absolute Idealism, namely, within the process by which the dialectical opposition of 'idealism' and 'realism' is worked out.

Part Two concerns Whitehead's 'provisionally-realistic' philosophy of Organism as advanced in *Process and Reality*. I elucidate the fact that for him, scepticism is the main contributor to the problem of the radical 'bifurcation' of actualities. Following from an elucidation of the interplay between his ontological principle and the principle of relativity, as well as an analysis of his three modes of perception, I propose that Whitehead's notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify the workings of scepticism. In carrying out this interpretation, I show that 'negative prehensions' constitute the means by which the extensive continuum is divided by the organism, and are the efficient element in the creativity of organisms. And, I trace both the 'realistic' and 'idealistic' activities of 'negative prehensions' with respect to his descriptions of the unfolding of the creative processes of organisms.

Part Three of the dissertation focuses directly on the ramifications of accepting my initial hypothesis that, in speculative philosophy, scepticism is described as the 'mover' of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. I advance an overall synopsis of the nature and function of scepticism in, and in light of, my study of speculative philosophy. Lastly, I offer a critical response to the radical 'instrumental' scepticism predominant in our era, from both Hegelian and Whiteheadian perspectives.

CONTENTS

Preface	4
Acknowledgments	5
List of Abbreviations of Works by G. W. F. Hegel	6
List of Abbreviations of Works by A. N. Whitehead	7
INTRODUCTION: <u>The Conjoint Study of G. W. F. Hegel and A. N. Whitehead</u>	8
I. Historical Overview: Hegel, the Anglo-American Idealists, and their Critics	8
II. Whitehead's Professional Philosophical Career (1924-1947) and its Relation to Hegel	13
III. 'Process' and Scepticism in Hegelian and Whiteheadian Speculative Philosophy	16
IV. The Question of Hegel's Absolute Idealism via Whitehead	19

PART ONE:

The Nature and Function of Scepticism in Hegel's *Logic*

CHAPTER ONE: <u>The Nature of Hegel's Absolute Idealism</u>	27
I. Perspectives on Idealism and Realism in Hegel's Introduction(s) to the <i>Logic</i>	29
II. Hegel's Criterion of Truth from: 'Positions of Thought with Regards to Objectivity' (<i>Encyclopedia Logic</i> , pp. 65-125)	36
III. The Presupposition of Scepticism Inherent to Both Idealism and Realism	42
IV. The Standpoint of Hegel's Absolute Idealism in the <i>Logic</i>	46
CHAPTER TWO: <u>Ancient and Modern Scepticism in Hegel's <i>Logic</i></u>	50
I. Scepticism as 'Contained in' Hegel's Logical Idea	53
II. Hegel's General Distinction of Ancient and Modern Forms of Scepticism	55
III. Ancient Scepticism as 'Contained in' Hegel's Logical Concept	59
IV. Modern Scepticism in Relation to Hegel's Absolute Idealism	67
V. Hegel's Treatment of the Finite (<i>das Endliche</i>) in the <i>Logic</i>	70
VI. Preliminary Conception of the Nature of Scepticism in Hegel's <i>Logic</i>	73
CHAPTER THREE: <u>The Role of Scepticism in Hegel's 'Doctrine of the Concept'</u>	75
I. On the Result and Meaning of the Dialectic for Hegel	77
II. Hegel's Division of the 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Concepts	82
III. Scepticism and the 'Idea': Hegel's Criterion of Truth in the <i>Logic</i>	93
IV. Final Conception of the Nature and Function of Scepticism in Hegel's <i>Logic</i>	98

PART TWO:

The Nature and Function of Scepticism in Whitehead's *Process and Reality*

CHAPTER FOUR: <u>Whitehead's Synthesis of Realism and Idealism</u>	104
I. The 'Provisional Priority' of Realism in Whitehead's Speculative Philosophy	108
II. The Role of Speculative Philosophy in Relation to the Natural Sciences	113
III. The Philosophy of Organism as Explanatory Scheme for the Natural Sciences	117
IV. Actual Entities and Whitehead's Synthesis of Realism and Idealism	125
V. Realism and Idealism in Whitehead's Speculative Philosophy	127

CHAPTER FIVE: <u>Humean Scepticism and Whitehead's Account of Experience</u>	129
I. The Principle of Relativity and 'Presentational Immediacy'	132
II. Whitehead's Amendment to Hume's Theory of Perception: 'Causal Efficacy'	138
III. Whitehead's Third Mode of Perception: 'Symbolic Reference'	146
IV. 'Division' in Whitehead's Theory of Extension	150
V. Preliminary Account of the Nature of Scepticism in Whitehead's <i>Process and Reality</i>	152
CHAPTER SIX: <u>Scepticism and Creative Process in <i>Process and Reality</i></u>	155
I. Negative Prehensions and Prehensive Appropriation: 'Reality' to 'Ideality'	159
II. Negative Prehensions and Self-Realization: 'Ideality' to 'Reality'	166
III. Scepticism, Consciousness, and Contrast: The Higher Levels of Experience	172
IV. Scepticism and Whitehead's Ideal Opposites: 'God' and the 'World'	179
V. Final Conception of the Nature and Function of Scepticism in <i>Process and Reality</i>	181
 PART THREE: <u>Reflections on Scepticism in Speculative Philosophy</u>	
CHAPTER SEVEN: <u>'Instrumental' Scepticism and Aspects of Finitude</u>	184
I. The Nature and Function of Scepticism in Light of Speculative Philosophy	184
II. Hegelian Reflections on Radical Instrumental Scepticism	188
III. A Rejoinder Concerning Scepticism in Whitehead's System	192
IV. Whiteheadian Reflections on Radical Instrumental Scepticism	200
V. 'Instrumental' Scepticism, Creativity, and Aspects of Finitude	205
APPENDICES: <u>Hegel's Dialectical Logic and Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts</u>	211
I. Appendix #1: 'One-Term Asymmetrical' Interpretation of the Dialectical Movement of Hegel's Logical Concept	212
II. Appendix #2: 'Two-Term' Interpretation of the Dialectical Movement of Hegel's Logical Concept and Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts: The 'Infinite Symmetry of Opposites'	213
III. Appendix #3: 'Half-Term' Interpretation of the Dialectical Movement of Hegel's Logical Concept and Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts: 'Asymmetry in Symmetry'	215
BIBLIOGRAPHY: <u>Sources Consulted and Cited in this Project</u>	216
I. Hegel Primary Sources	217
II. Hegel Secondary Sources	218
III. Whitehead Primary Sources	221
IV. Whitehead Secondary Sources	222
V. Conjoint Hegel and Whitehead Secondary Sources	224
VI. Tertiary Sources	225

PREFACE

The following University of Ottawa doctoral dissertation is an investigation of the nature and function of scepticism in speculative philosophy. It advances a conjoint analysis of G. W. F. Hegel's *Logic* and A. N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality*. In the process of completing the requirements for the degree and of acquainting myself with these two philosophers, I have come to a mature comprehension of some of the limitations of philosophical scholarship, which, in my view, are to be embraced. Specifically, I have come to the understanding that no matter how 'correct' conclusions regarding those we study might seem to the scholar, they never do full justice to those persons. By 'doing justice' here, I mean it in the sense of *consuming in a manner showing due appreciation*. Although a philosopher or a commentator may seem to defend a certain claim, even where it seems to be stated outright, we cannot allow ourselves to feel that we can have the exact final word on what they actually think or thought. The pretension to have the final word with regards to those we study, whether subversive or otherwise, reduces our work to a narrow dogmatism, limits the scope of the thinker to a set of rigid claims, and misrepresents the very individuality of those persons in themselves. But, to obtain a 'good' grasp of any of the great minds of Philosophy, one must realize that both our investigation as well as the thought we are considering, are in some sense, *in process*. Furthermore, one must not only consider a philosopher's 'main' claims that are privileged by the store-houses of Philosophy, but also to investigate where their 'lesser' claims are made. It is here that one may observe the thinker in the process of examining alternatives to previous conclusions which might even be said to provide material for their critics. As Alfred North Whitehead writes,

The ideas which (the great philosophers have) introduced into the philosophic tradition must be construed with limitations, adaptations, and inversions, either unknown to them, or even explicitly repudiated by them. A new idea introduces a new alternative; and we are not the less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded.¹

In any event, let the thought of these great men and women we are studying always keep us creatively speculating...

¹ A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition, Edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, pp. 10-11.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe much thanks to the following people: first and foremost to my supervisor, Dr. D. Schlitt, for standing-up for this project at the outset, as well as for his time, faith, and patience towards the completion of this manuscript even while I was away from campus; to Dr. T. Geraets from whom I have learned much about Hegel, especially during his course on the *Logic* in the Winter of 1998, and for his critical meticulousness in consideration of this thesis; to Dr. D. Raynor, Dr. D. Moggach, and Dr. L. S. Ford for their helpful commentary on the thesis as well as their participation as members of the defense committee; to Dr. J. Mayer, Dr. W.-C. Chan, and Dr. R. Singh of Brock University, and Dr. P. McCormick of the University of Ottawa for their deep contributions to my philosophical development; to Dr. R. Burch of the University of Alberta for his letting me audit PHIL 546 in the spring of 2000; to Dr. Reid and Dr. Feist of the University of Ottawa for allowing me to give a lecture in their respective courses on Hegel and Whitehead; to David Farr, colleague and personal friend, Doctoral Candidate at McMaster University whose interest in the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead has been quite contagious; to Anoop Gupta, Doctoral Candidate at the University of Ottawa, for our particular discussion on scepticism in the spring of 1999; and finally, to my friends and family 'out west' for their unwavering support.

List of Abbreviations of Works by G. W. F. Hegel

- EL** **The Encyclopedia Logic** (1830),
Translated and edited by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris,
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991.
(R=Remark, Z=Addition)
- ENK** **Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse** (1830),
Vol. 20 of *Gesammelte Werke*,
Edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas,
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969.
- SL** **Science of Logic** (1812, 1816, 1831),
Translated by A. V. Miller and edited by H. D. Lewis,
New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969.
- WSL** **Wissenschaft der Logik** (1812-13, 1816, 1831),
*GW*11, 12, 21 Vols. 11, 12, and 21 of *Gesammelte Werke*,
Edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke,
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978, 1981, 1985.
- LHP** **Lectures on the History of Philosophy** (1840),
Vols. 1-3, Translated by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson,
New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1983.
- VGP** **Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie** (1840),
*SW*18, 19 Vols. 18 and 19 of *Sämtliche Werke*,
Edited by H. Glockner and C. Michelet,
Stuttgart: Fromman, 1928.
- PS** **Phenomenology of Spirit** (1807),
Translated by A. V. Miller, analysis by J. N. Findlay,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- PG** **Phänomenologie des Geistes** (1807),
Vol. 9 of *Gesammelte Werke*,
Edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede,
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980.
- JKS** **Jenaer Kritische Schriften** (1801),
Vol. 4 of *Gesammelte Werke*,
Edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler,
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968.

List of Abbreviations of Works by A. N. Whitehead

- PR** **Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition**
 Edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne,
 New York: The Free Press, 1978.
- SMW** **Science and the Modern World (1925)**,
 New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- SB** **Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1927)**,
 New York: Fordham University Press, 1985.
- AI** **Adventures of Ideas (1933)**,
 New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- ESP** **Essays in Science and Philosophy (1941)**,
 New York: Philosophical Library, 1948.
- MT** **Modes of Thought (1938)**,
 New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- RM** **Religion in the Making (1926)**,
 New York: Macmillan Co., 1960,
 Introduction, Glossary, and Index by Fordham University Press, 1996.
- CN** **The Concept of Nature (1919)**,
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.
- PNK** **An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919)**
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955.
- ANW** **Alfred North Whitehead: An Anthology (Compiled)**
 Edited by F. S. C. Northrop and M. W. Gross
 New York: MacMillan Co. 1961.
- IM** **Introduction to Mathematics (1910)**,
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Introduction: The Conjoint Study of G. W. F. Hegel and A. N. Whitehead

I. Historical Overview: Hegel, the Anglo-American Idealists, and their Critics

The junctions where the German and British intellectual traditions have met in the history of modern philosophy have proved to be valuable chapters of the ongoing expression of truth, meaning, and the good in European culture. One such occasion involved the profound influence of G. W. F. Hegel's (1770-1831) philosophical writings in Britain in the latter portion of the nineteenth century. While British philosophy at that time was well-known for its tradition of empiricism, Hegel's ideas played a large role in spurring to life the intellectual movement known as Anglo-American idealism. Later, at the turn of the century, the British reaction against the so-called 'neo-Hegelian' paradigm proved equally progressive as it represented the beginnings of analytic philosophy. However, a full-fledged English response to Hegel's metaphysics and speculative philosophy, taking on both the neo-Hegelians of the British sphere, as well as the critical reaction against them, was not made until the mid-1920s, after A. N. Whitehead's (1861-1947) professional philosophical career had begun. In order to provide a solid context for the conjoint study of Hegel and Whitehead, here, I take up the relevant historical sequence of intellectual thought between them.

Over the course of his philosophical career which spanned thirty-five years, Hegel's thought became progressively refined through his prolific writings and lectures. He both wrote and lectured on logic, metaphysics, religion, art, nature, law, politics, and history. Hegel taught at Jena from 1801 to 1808, at Nürnberg from 1808 to 1816, at Heidelberg from 1816 to 1818, and in Berlin from 1818 until his death in 1831. Because of his wide lecturing, the expression of his thought is valuably preserved in course transcripts and student notes. To some extent, Hegel's brilliant career may have owed itself to the developments of the period in which he lived. He was subject to one of the most revolutionary periods in European political and intellectual history. It is widely known that Hegel wrote his famous *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) amidst some of the volatile events of the French Revolution; "on the eve of Napoleon's destruction of the Holy Roman Empire and at the beginning of the German 'Wars of Liberation'."¹ Also, it is reported that the *Phenomenology* was completed the very same day that the French armies had overtaken Jena. Furthermore, Hegel's contemporaries included great figures such as Kant (1724-1804), Fichte (1762-1814), and Schelling (1775-1854); the long line of thinkers traditionally known as the German Idealists. In essence, Hegel's writings and lectures constitute a final culmination

¹ R. C. Solomon in commentary on the jacket of Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Translated by A. V. Miller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

of the ideas of these thinkers. Inspired by them, he constructed a philosophical system of identity or, alternatively, a system of speculative philosophy which spoke of the eternal dialectical movement of three intermediated domains: namely, Logic (*Logik*), Nature (*Natur*), and Spirit (*Geist*).² These three domains

2 See Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* (1816), edited by E. Behler, translated by S. A. Taubeneck and A. V. Miller, New York: Continuum, 1990, pp. 262-264, sections 472-477, or see Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), Vol. 20 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969, pp. 554-571, sections 572-577. Regarding the characterization of Hegel's philosophy as a 'system of identity', Hegel writes, "the name *Identity-System*, or *Philosophy of Identity*, has already become the established one for speculative philosophy." (Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, translated and edited by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, p. 7, see also the additions pp. 164, p. 184) As Hegel remarks in the preface to the previous edition of the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1927), Vol. 19 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1989, "Für speculative Philosophie is daher der Name Identität-System, Identitäts-Philosophie bereits zu einem recipierten Namen geworden." (p. 8) However, it is also equally accurate to say that Hegel's system is a 'system of identity'.

The word 'domains' to describe Logic, Nature, and Spirit in Hegel's system may be misleading. As Hegel remarks, "Nature is not just something fixed and complete on its own account, which could therefore subsist even without spirit; rather, it is only in spirit that nature attains to its goal and its truth. Similarly, spirit, for its part, is not just an abstract world beyond nature; on the contrary, it only genuinely *is*, and proves to be spirit, insofar as it contains nature sublated within itself." (EL, p. 153, section 96Z) However, Hegel does use the term 'members' to describe Nature, Spirit, and Logic in the 'absolute syllogism' which is the framework for his system. He states, "the objective sense of the figures of the syllogism is generally that everything rational shows itself to be a threefold syllogism, and it does that in such a way that each of its members occupies the position both of an extreme and of the mediating middle. This is the case especially with the three 'members' of philosophical science, i.e., the logical Idea, Nature, and Spirit. Here, it is first Nature that stands in the middle as the member that concludes the others. As the immediate totality, Nature unfolds itself in the two extremes of logical Idea and Spirit. Spirit, however, is Spirit by being mediated through Nature. In the second place, Spirit which we know as what is individual and actuating is the middle, and Nature and the logical Idea are the extremes. It is Spirit that knows the logical Idea in Nature, and elevates it to its essence. Equally, in the third place, the logical Idea itself is the middle; it is the absolute substance of Spirit and of Nature, that which is universal and all-pervading. These are the members of the absolute syllogism." (EL, p. 263, section 187Z)

According to the translators (Geraets, Suchting, and Harris) of the EL, for Hegel, "*Geist* is the word, the notion, and the concept that constitutes the highest definition of the Absolute. As finite or human, spirit is distinct from nature, but in the fullness of its meaning, spirit overgrasps nature. This does not mean that only thought or mind (in the ordinary sense) exists, but rather that Hegel conceives the Absolute as being essentially what we might call 'the universe of meaning'. 'Spirit' expresses this universe as self-articulating, as in that sense 'subjective'. 'Subjectivity' here transcends its correlativity with regard to 'objectivity'. It overgrasps objectivity; it is not relative, but it remains (inwardly) relational.

"'Spirit' refers primarily to the interlocutive and interpersonal relation that underlies and activates all community. It names the concrete subject of the production of meaning, a production in which we all participate, but which none of us can claim for oneself. Ultimately, however, the process of the articulation of meaning has no other subject but meaning itself. In that sense 'spirit' is nothing but the Idea 'as being-for-itself and coming to be in and for itself' (section 18R).

"*Bewusstsein* or 'consciousness' is how spirit appears: as initially a thinking subject facing a world of objects. It is spirit only in-itself or implicitly. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the science of the experience of consciousness through which it becomes spirit conscious of itself as spirit. Self-consciousness is spirit for itself. But the result of the experience of consciousness is not just consciousness of the individual self, or of the communal self, but in and through both it is the knowledge of spirit as the ultimate Self, as the Idea itself" (EL, p. 350n)

Furthermore, in the assessment of Hegel's standpoint in the *Logic*, the translators of the EL state regarding

formed the basis of Hegel's complete speculative system of Absolute Idealism advanced in his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817, 1827, 1830). Because of its centrality with regards to his philosophical writings, he continuously refined the content of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* throughout his professional life. Within it, *The Science of Logic*, *The Philosophy of Nature*, and *The Philosophy of Spirit* constitute a 'triad' which expresses the full development of his philosophical system. In these three sections, Hegel set forth a mature understanding of the ongoing dialectical interplay of Logic, Nature, and Spirit which was said to constitute the foundation of speculative reason in general. In so doing, the purpose of his system was to provide a framework for rational self-understanding, specifically, for *thinking* in a manner "liberat(ed) from the opposition of consciousness" as well as for the realization of the unconditioned, namely the Absolute Idea.³

Thirty-five years after his death, Hegel's writings on metaphysics became extremely influential on the British intellectual scene, so much as to help repay the alleged 'debt' Kant had previously owed to the Scottish philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776), for stirring his philosophical awakening. As Kant himself noted, Hume's empiricism had "interrupted (his) dogmatic slumber and (had given him) a completely new direction to (his) researches in the field of speculative philosophy," an event which had arguably ushered in a new era of German thought.⁴ At any rate, Hegel's thought became popular in Britain largely due to figures such as T. H. Green (1836-1882) and E. Caird (1835-1908) who were among the first major philosophers in Britain who attempted to grasp German Idealism in critical fashion. To a large extent, both Green's and Caird's interpretations of Hegel motivated them to take issue with the orthodox views most often associated with the British tradition. Although idealism was not new to Britain, Green and Caird criticized the empiricist tradition which had arguably constituted the 'backbone'

the terms, '*Logik, das Logische*', "we write 'the Logic' wherever Hegel refers to his speculative logic, which is identical with metaphysics. Speculative logic is the metaphysics of the *logos* or of 'reason'. The first part of the *Encyclopedia (of the Philosophical Sciences)* is 'the Logic', as distinct from the *Realphilosophie* contained in 'The Philosophy of Nature' and 'The Philosophy of Spirit'. Sometimes *die Logik* refers to 'logic' in the traditional sense, and we translate accordingly. *Das Logische* sometimes stands for the subject matter of Hegel's *Logic*, just as *die Natur* is the subject matter of the Philosophy of Nature. But it has also a more explicit and dynamic meaning, best expressed by 'logical thinking', which we use together with 'the logical'." (p. 351n, my addition)

3 Hegel, *Science of Logic* (1812, 1816, 1831), translated by A. V. Miller and edited by H. D. Lewis, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 51. / "Aber die Befreyung von dem Gegensatze des Bewusstseyns." (Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Vol. 11 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978, p. 22)

4 Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, edited and translated by G. Hatfield, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 10.

of British philosophy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as can be seen from the writings of Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753), and Hume. Furthermore, Green and Caird made use of Hegel's writings towards the construction of original idealist positions, constituting the first step towards the onset of the movement known to intellectual historians as 'Anglo-American idealism' in the latter portion of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.

The Anglo-American idealists flourished particularly from 1865 to 1925, an historical period most often defined by the expansion of British imperialism, the genesis of Marxism, as well as the onset of German nationalism. Most notably, the philosophical writings of thinkers such as Bosanquet (1848-1923), Royce (1855-1916), Bradley (1846-1924), and McTaggart (1866-1925) drew much insight from Hegel's original works, as did many European movements during this period.⁵ Many of these thinkers made use of the often misconceived notion of 'Absolute Idealism'. For them, the term 'Absolute Idealism' designated their philosophical standpoint, provided a general heading for their account of truth, meaning, and the good, as well as described the ultimate goal of reason and religion, specifically, the attainment of the unconditioned.⁶ Hence, in Britain, the term 'Absolute Idealism' was popularized by the British idealists as well as by commentators and critics. The slogan eventually went on to describe that paradigm of metaphysics in opposition to empiricism.⁷

Of the alleged Anglo-American idealists of the period, it was widely recognized that F. H. Bradley, whose philosophical career started in 1870 and spanned half a century, was "regarded by many as the leading British Hegelian."⁸ This label was given to him by the many commentators of his main treatises such as *The Principles of Logic* (1883) and *Appearance and Reality* (1893 and 1897). In fact, during the 1890s, Bradley's work was taken very seriously and he was "perhaps the most prominent

5 See W. J. Mander (ed.), *et al. Anglo-American Idealism: 1865-1927*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000, pp. 1-9.

6 However, it was Schelling who originally used the term 'Absolute Idealism' in order to describe a philosophical system of identity in which transcendental idealism and *Naturphilosophie* were synthesized. According to Schelling, the term 'Absolute' designated the unity of thought and being. See Schelling, "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" (1801) in *Schriften von 1801-1804*, edited by J. G. Cotta, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968, pp. 1-108.

7 Furthermore, it is within this context that Whitehead employs the term 'Absolute Idealism'. He uses it in speaking of this group of thinkers, and as a particular paradigm of thought current to his time.

8 J. W. Allard and G. Stock (eds.), *F. H. Bradley: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. ix.

philosopher in Britain.”⁹ On the one hand, Bradley admitted that his debt was quite high. On the other hand, Bradley’s work was very original, and he was sceptical of a good number of Hegel’s presuppositions.¹⁰ Indeed, Bradley modestly stated of Hegel,

I think him a great philosopher; but I never could have called myself a Hegelian, partly because I can not say that I have mastered his system, and partly because I could not accept what seems his main principle, or at least part of that principle. I have no wish to conceal how much I owe to his writings; but I will leave it to those who can judge better than myself, to fix the limits within which I have followed him. As for the ‘Hegelian School’ which exists in our reviews, I know no one who has met with it anywhere else.”¹¹

While Bradley was greatly acquainted with and respected German rationalist philosophy and metaphysics, he also remained grounded in the traditional philosophical style of British empiricism and utilitarianism. Bradley held that “it is error where, and in so far as, our ideas are not the same as reality,” and his aim was to “reconcile sceptical epistemology and constructive metaphysics.”¹² In this sense, the source of Bradley’s idealism was the empirical, a fact habitually overlooked by his critics. Furthermore, in his own words, his philosophy made “a claim to reconcile extremes. Whether it is to be called Realism or Idealism, I do not know (...). It neither puts ideas and thoughts first, nor again does it permit us to assert that anything else by itself is more real.”¹³ However, even so, Bradley’s own system was vigorously attacked by a group of thinkers designated by intellectual historians as the ‘New British realists’ at the turn of the century.

9 P. Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 44.

10 For example, according to W. J. Mander in An Introduction to Bradley’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, Bradley’s scepticism of Hegel “consists primarily in the fact that he is unable to accept the basic Hegelian identity between thought and reality.” However, he explains, “like Hegel, Bradley thinks that thought and reality are not separate things, but, unlike Hegel, he thinks that reality is more than just thought.” (p. 14) In Mander’s view, “while Bradley’s position is (...) significantly different from Hegel’s in a number of key respects, it is the basic Hegelian model which provides the explanation and justification of the link between truth and (his concept of) satisfaction.” (p. 10)

11 F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, p. x, from W. J. Mander, An Introduction to Bradley’s Metaphysics, p. 164, and J. W. Allard and G. Stock (eds.), *et al.* F. H. Bradley: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, p. x, p. 3. In this latter text, in the section entitled, ‘Degrees of Truth and Reality’, Bradley mentions his appreciation of Hegel. (p. 183)

12 J. W. Allard and G. Stock (eds.), F. H. Bradley: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, p. 206; W. J. Mander, An Introduction to Bradley’s Metaphysics, p. 163. Mander also states that for Bradley, the contents of the Absolute “are nothing but sentient experience” where, “sentient experience is reality, and what is not this is not real.” (p. 124)

13 J. W. Allard and G. Stock (eds.), F. H. Bradley: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, p. 205.

B. Russell (1872-1970) and G. E. Moore (1873-1958) are largely considered the chief representatives of the New British realists who allegedly spearheaded the sceptical assault on Anglo-American idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century. While coming under the influence of Bradley and McTaggart during his formative years at Cambridge, Russell eventually adopted an extreme realist position alongside Moore's *The Refutation of Idealism* (1903). From 1894 to 1898, Russell considered himself "a full-fledged Hegelian, and (at that time) aimed at constructing a complete dialectic of the sciences."¹⁴ However, later, in *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), Russell believed himself to have discovered the basis for the refutation of all forms of idealism. In it, he argued for logicism, which generally is defined as the view that all concepts of mathematics can be deduced from logical principles. Russell's position proved to be against the

general idealist claim as to the inadequacy of our ordinary (non-metaphysical) thought. *Principles (of Mathematics)* set out to show that mathematics is true - not true as one stage in the dialectic, or more or less true, but absolutely true; not true if put in a wider context, or seen as part of a larger whole, but true just as it stands; not - to revert to the Kantian idiom - true only from the empirical standpoint and not from the transcendental standpoint, but flat-out true, with no distinctions of standpoints accepted. Mathematics thus functions as a counter-example to a claim which is a necessary part of any form of idealism.¹⁵

Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* paved the way towards his ten-year collaboration with the mathematician, A. N. Whitehead, for the ground-breaking *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13), which arguably set symbolic logic in modern form into operation. Russell and Whitehead were colleagues and had become friends at Trinity College in Cambridge in the 1890s, but because their interests in mathematics had overlapped, the *Principia Mathematica* was born.

II. Whitehead's Professional Philosophical Career (1924-1947) and its Relation to Hegel

To a large extent, Whitehead shared both Russell's and Moore's scepticism of neo-Hegelian British idealism, and he owed allegiance to the New realists of the period.¹⁶ However, in 1917, the

¹⁴ Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, p. 42, from P. Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of the Analytic Tradition, p. 72.

¹⁵ P. Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy, pp. 180-181. (my addition)

¹⁶ V. Lowe records in A. N. Whitehead: The Man and His Work (Vol. 2), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990, that Whitehead's "anti-Idealist views were in much accord with the dominant neo-Realists, who rejected Idealism as an adequate foundation for the special sciences." (p. 100) Also, according to Lowe, "he became associated with the New Realism which dominated British philosophical thought at the onset of the twentieth century, much of which set out to overthrow the neo-Hegelianism of the nineteenth century." (p. 109)

collaboration between Russell and Whitehead ended with historical finality. As recorded in Russell's autobiography, Whitehead became upset with Russell for having borrowed and appropriated some of his notes. Russell used these notes towards his own *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), a work which largely took issue with Bradley and the idealists.¹⁷ Because of this, Russell and Whitehead ceased to collaborate on original works. But, as much of the intellectual history of the period in Britain was written around the philosophical confrontation between realists and idealists, Whitehead's position in intellectual history eventually placed him at a privileged vantage point from which he had surveyed the 'battle movements' of the two opposing sides. And, Whitehead never really took on the radical scepticism of the New Realists. Rather, Whitehead was also profoundly influenced by contemporaries who sought to maintain a 'middle ground' between idealism and realism, such as G. Santayana (1863-1952), S. Alexander (1859-1938), W. James (1842-1910), as well as H. Bergson (1859-1941).¹⁸ And,

T. Pinkard writes in *Hegel: A Biography*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, "It is hardly a secret that there are large numbers of Anglo-American philosophers who refuse to read Hegel, who seem to have completely absorbed Bertrand Russell's criticisms of Hegel without ever having paused at Hegel himself. Among them, the suspicion remains, first fostered by Russell and the other great analytic critics of German Idealism at the beginning of the century, that the clarity and argumentative rigor that count as one of the great achievements of modern analytic philosophy can only be attained and sustained by a thorough refusal and avoidance of the dark prose and dense continental thought of Hegel. For these people in contemporary philosophy, Hegel stands not as one of the great thinkers of the modern era, someone with whom one simply must come to terms, but as somebody to be avoided virtually at all cost, who has nothing of importance to say, and whose thought is at best only a wicked temptation from which pliable young minds especially must be protected." (p. xii)

17 See Whitehead's letter to Russell in *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, Toronto: George Allan and Unwin Ltd., 1968, p. 78, in which this is explained. Also, see the Preface to Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1929, for the latter's alleged 'undervalued acknowledgment' of Whitehead. (pp. vii-ix) In this work, Russell takes issue with Bradley's theory of relations in *Appearance and Reality*, in that it "examines and condemns almost all that makes up our everyday world: things and qualities, relations, space and time, change, causation, activity, the self. All these, though in some sense facts which qualify reality, are not as real as they appear. What is real is one single, indivisible, timeless whole, called the Absolute, which is in some sense spiritual, but does not consist of souls, or of thought and will as we know them. And all this is established by abstract logical reasoning professing to find self-contradictions in the categories condemned as mere appearance, and to leave no tenable alternative to the kind of Absolute which is finally affirmed to be real." (pp. 6-7)

18 As noted by J. Fitzgerald in *Alfred North Whitehead's Early Philosophy of Space and Time*, Washington: University Press of America, 1979, "According to Victor Lowe, the early Whitehead accepted the characteristic starting point of British empiricism - that the immediate objects of our mind are the contents of our perceptions. Actually, during his natural philosophy period, Whitehead's empiricism is very similar to the narrow logical empiricism of the positivists mainly because of Whitehead's positivistic desire to keep all metaphysical questions independent from science. For Whitehead the world was a construct - the first unconscious act of speculative thought. The similarity between this idea of 'inferential construction' and Hume's notion of the connected world as a product of the habits of imagination is striking. So we see that Whitehead did indeed possess some of the traits of the British empiricists, logical positivists, and Humeans. Yet, at the same time, to complicate the matter, Whitehead exhibits traits which are distinctly un-Russellian, un-positivistic, and un-Humean. In the three transitional

armed with this philosophical knowledge, Whitehead entered into his professional philosophical career.

Whitehead's intellectual life may be divided into three important periods: he was, first, a mathematician, second, an educator, and third, a philosopher. Whitehead was originally a mathematician at Cambridge, but later his interests turned to education (1914-1924) while he was a professor in London at the Imperial College of Science and Technology. Although he had begun his philosophical writings before the first World War, his professional philosophical career did not actually begin until he was sixty-three years old, in 1924, when he moved to Harvard. However, his great contributions helped launch what is known today as 'process philosophy'. With regards to the deep philosophical divisions between the British idealists and the New realists, it is evident that Whitehead was originally concerned with the incompatibility of idealism with the empiricism of the natural sciences. Particularly, among his first lectures at Harvard on *Science and the Modern World* (1925), he stated that

in developing a criticism of the scientific scheme of the eighteenth century, I must first give my main reason for ignoring nineteenth century idealism - I am speaking of the philosophic idealism which finds the ultimate meaning of reality in mentality that is fully cognitive. This idealistic school, as hitherto developed, has been too much divorced from the scientific outlook. It has swallowed the scientific scheme in its entirety as being the only rendering of the facts of nature, and has then explained it as being an idea in the ultimate mentality. In the case of absolute idealism, the world of nature is just one of the ideas, somehow differentiating the unity of the Absolute: in the case of pluralistic idealism involving monadic mentalities, this world is the greatest common measure of the various ideas which differentiate the various mental unities of the various monads. But, however you take it, these idealistic schools have conspicuously failed to connect, in any organic fashion, the fact of nature with their idealistic philosophies. So far as concerns what will be said in these lectures, your ultimate outlook may be realistic or idealistic. My point is that a further stage of *provisional realism* is required in which the scientific scheme is recast, and founded upon the ultimate conception of *organism*.¹⁹

essays of 1915-1917 there is a total absence of any scepticism (of the kind like G. E. Moore or B. Russell); radical scepticism never interested the common-sensed Whitehead (as an undertaking)." (p. 50, my additions)

In R. W. Winks (ed.) *et al. A History of Civilization* (Vol. 2 - 1648 to the Present), Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1992, p. 592, it is noted that W. James (1842-1910) "summed up this antithesis of idealism and realism by arguing that people are either 'tender-minded' or 'tough-minded'. The tough-minded are convinced that the world of sense experience is the real world; the tender minded are convinced that the world of sense-experience is somehow an illusion, or at any rate a flawed copy of the real world, which exists perfectly in God's mind."

19 Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (1925), New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 63-64. (my emphasis) Whitehead further elucidates his point in that "the distinction between realism and idealism does not coincide with that between objectivism and subjectivism. Both realists and idealists can start from an objective standpoint. They may both agree that the world is disclosed in sense-perception is a common world, transcending the individual recipient. But the objective idealist, when he comes to analyse what the reality of this world involves, finds that cognitive mentality is in some way inextricably concerned in every detail. This position the realist denies. Accordingly, these two classes of objectivists do not part company till they have arrived at the ultimate problem of metaphysics. There is a great deal which they share in common. This is why, in my last lecture, I said that I adopted

The concerns set forth in this quotation provide a miniature prolegomenon to Whitehead's *magnum opus* entitled, *Process and Reality* (1929), in which Whitehead unveiled a speculative cosmology called the philosophy of Organism. In it, Whitehead attempted to "frame a scheme of ideas, (...) and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme."²⁰ One of the main aims of his cosmology was not to refute idealism outright, but rather to show that it needed to do justice to empirical reality, if it was to be considered part of a viable blueprint of experience in the scientific age. However, it is my contention that Whitehead's *Process and Reality* provided not only a response to the opposition between the idealists and realists of his day, but also an English response, within the sphere of speculative philosophy, to Hegel's Absolute Idealism, a century after the great German thinker's own philosophical career.²¹ Particularly, while interpretations of Hegel's system of Absolute Idealism usually emphasize his metaphysical outline of the process by which the content of subjective ideas becomes objective, Whitehead's philosophy of Organism is habitually understood to describe the reverse, namely, the process by which the content of empirically objective actual occasions become subjective eternal objects. Therefore, Whitehead's cosmology offers a response to Hegel's metaphysics, one which is steeped in the tradition of British empiricism. However, over the course of this dissertation, the almost universally held notion that 'Absolute Idealism' in any of its usages is not to be associated with empiricism and scepticism, will be overstepped.

III. 'Process' and Scepticism in Hegelian and Whiteheadian Speculative Philosophy

Speculative philosophy is a general heading describing that species of reflective, systematic philosophizing which emphasizes the endeavour to provide a 'panoramic' vision of the nature of humanity, God, and the cosmos. The word 'speculative' is derived from the Latin *specere*, meaning 'to

a position of provisional realism." (pp. 90-91)

20 Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (1929): *Corrected Edition*, edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, p. xiv.

21 Regarding his relation to Hegel, Whitehead was all too hastily described as a 'Neo-Hegelian' by Karl Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Vol. 2), London: Routledge, 1962, pp. 247-249. Popper states that Whitehead "is one of the few Neo-Hegelians who know how much they owe to Hegel. (...) He owes it to Hegel that he has the courage, in spite of Kant's burning protest, to build up grandiose metaphysical systems with a royal contempt for argument." However, Popper admits the possibility that he may have misunderstood Whitehead and that readers should "not form an opinion (on this matter) without reading *Process and Reality*." (p. 249, my addition) Also see J. G. Pilon's article, "On Popper's Understanding of Whitehead" in *Process Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Fall 1978. For a further reference on this subject, see C. Hartshorne's essay, "Karl Popper on Whitehead" in *Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers*. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1983, pp. 306-322.

look'. Both Hegel and Whitehead are generally regarded as masters of speculative thought, and it has been noted by many recent scholars that there are many points of coincidence between their respective philosophical visions.²² Strikingly, both Hegel and Whitehead place the notion of 'process' at the forefront of their respective reflections. On the one hand, for Hegel, 'process' is originally entrenched in the dialectical nature of thinking in general. The notion of 'process' proves to be a description of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept (*Begriff*), a movement generally synonymous with the ongoing intermediation of Spirit, Nature, and Logic.²³ It is also important to Hegel as he emphasizes that "the Idea is essentially *process*, because its identity is only the absolute and free identity of the Concept, because this identity is the absolute negativity and hence dialectical."²⁴ On the other hand, Whitehead's philosophy of Organism is alternatively described under the heading of 'process' philosophy. For him, 'creative process' is the central notion in his description of the life of the organism. Furthermore, he even goes so far as to say, "existence (in any of its senses) cannot be abstracted from 'process'; (i.e.) the notions of process and existence presuppose each other."²⁵ Hence, it is accurate to describe both Hegel

22 See D. E. Christensen, The Search for Concreteness: Reflections on Hegel and Whitehead, New Jersey: Susquehanna University Press, 1986, and Hegelian / Whiteheadian Perspectives, New York: University Press of America, 1989. Also see G. R. Lucas (ed.), *et al.* Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986. In this text, K. Hartman outlines some areas of coincidence between the two philosophers in "Types of Explanation in Hegel and Whitehead." He writes, "both philosophers are concerned with *organic wholes* (...); they both consider *process* crucial (...); they both defend a teleological scheme ordering levels of items in the universe (...); both philosophers object to the substance / accident schema (...); both philosophers effect a return from the characteristic epistemological focus on the cognizing subject in late modern thought, to a broader focus upon the nature of 'objectivity' in general." (p. 61)

23 According to the translation committee of the EL, "*Begriff* means the logical subject itself, logical thinking as it develops through its entire movement of self-comprehension. The word 'concept' is used because of its etymological link with 'comprehend' - *begreifen*. Far from being the static, neatly circumscribed thought-content which we call a 'definition', the Concept is the movement of comprehension itself. Where it is used in the absolute, and singularised, we write 'the Concept'; where we have the plural or a particular instance, we do not use the initial capital." (EL, p. 348n5)

24 EL, p. 290, section 215. / "Die Idee ist wesentlich Process, weil ihre Identität nur in sofern die absolute und freie des Begriffs ist, in sofern sie die absolute Negativität und daher dialektisch ist." (ENK, p. 218, section 215) In this section, Hegel goes on to explain, "the Idea is the course in which the Concept (as the universality that is singularity) determines itself both to objectivity and to the antithesis against it, and in which this externality, which the Concept has with regard to its substance, leads itself back again, through its immanent dialectic, into *subjectivity*." Hegel is also quoted as saying, "as a process, the Idea runs through three stages in its development. The first form of the Idea is life, i.e. the Idea in the form of immediacy. The second form is that of mediation or difference, and this is the Idea as cognition, which appears in the dual shape of the theoretical and the practical Idea. The result of the process of cognition is the reestablishing of unity enriched by distinction; and this gives the third form of the (herewith) absolute Idea. This last stage of the logical process proves at the same time to be what is genuinely first and what is only through itself." (EL, p. 291, section 215Z)

25 Whitehead, Modes of Thought (1938), New York: The Free Press, 1968, p. 96.

and Whitehead respectively as 'philosophers of process'.

Within their respective elaborations of 'process', both Hegel and Whitehead place a strong emphasis on the role of negativity and scepticism. The word 'scepticism' is derived from the Greek, *skeptesthai*, meaning, 'to look', and is usually defined as an attitude of doubt and negativity toward philosophical, religious, and scientific truth claims. And, while both Hegel and Whitehead challenge some of the various limitations posed on philosophical knowledge by scepticism in its Ancient and Modern forms, they also highlight its positive significance.²⁶ Thus, both Hegel and Whitehead treat scepticism as an important aspect of their respective philosophizing. On the one hand, for Hegel, scepticism is integral to the "labour of the negative" which both nullifies the dogmatic determinations of the understanding, and is intrinsic to the process by which consciousness comes to recognize and comprehend itself.²⁷ For him, scepticism belongs intrinsically to the dialectical unrest of cognition in general, as well as participates in the unfolding of the determinate identity (*Identität*) of particulars.²⁸ On the other hand, Whitehead is concerned with the fallacies of dogmatism and he also incorporates many elements of Hume's scepticism into his overall cosmological scheme. He endeavours to show how scepticism, as represented by his notion of 'negative prehensions', plays an important role in the organism's creative development. In these many ways, Hegel's and Whitehead's respective standpoints are both distinguished from scepticism, as well as incorporate it within their speculative endeavours. Specifically, scepticism is an essential component within their respective elucidations of 'process'. It is for this reason that the following dissertation will examine scepticism *in* Hegel's and Whitehead's speculative philosophies. In so doing, particular emphasis will be placed on scepticism 'within' or as 'contained in' Hegel's logical Concept and Absolute Idealism as well as *in* Whitehead's elucidation of perception and theory of prehensions. Specifically, I will attempt to answer the following question: What is the nature and function of scepticism *in* the speculative philosophies of Hegel and Whitehead, respectively?

26 In responding to scepticism in the *LHP* and in the *Logic*, Hegel argues against the infinite application of the dialectical method by the Ancient sceptics and takes issue with Modern scepticism, particularly that of Hume. On a similar note, in *SMW* and *PR*, Whitehead is largely concerned with the problems raised by Hume regarding causality, and takes issue with the 'bifurcation' of actuality resulting from one-sided sceptical standpoints.

27 *PS*, p. 10.

28 *PS*, p. 124.

In responding to this question, I aim at providing a contemporary perspective in relation to predominant works terming themselves 'speculative philosophy', and in particular those which can be interpreted as being 'philosophies of process'. In this task, since I attempt, here, to study Hegel and Whitehead in a conjoint manner, and not in a comparative way, I do not limit my investigations to one speculative, 'process' thinker alone. Furthermore, as both Hegel and Whitehead advance speculative metaphysical systems, an attempt is made to avoid, as much as possible, reading and interpreting one thinker through the other. My preliminary hypothesis which I intend to broaden over the course of this dissertation is that, for them, scepticism functions as the 'mover' of the processes by which identity, truth, meaning, consciousness, creativity, and ontology in general become and develop. Most poignantly, I aim to show that, in both Hegel's and Whitehead's systems which respectively synthesize idealism and realism, scepticism plays a vital role within the process by which truth by the correspondence of 'ideality' and 'reality' is attained. For both authors, it is only through the satisfaction of the respective scepticisms inherent to one-sided idealist and realist positions that philosophical, scientific, and religious truth is reached. Therefore, according to speculative philosophy, it is the nature and function of scepticism to be the 'mover' of the progression of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavours. Because of the generality of this hypothesis, if this study is to be successful, my considerations must include a comprehension of the full scope of both Hegel's and Whitehead's speculative philosophical systems. However, in light of this study, I am convinced that it will help serve as a basis to respond to a contemporary form of scepticism, in particular, radical 'instrumental' scepticism, which I consider to be inappropriate to the sound functioning of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavours.

IV. The Question of Hegel's Absolute Idealism via Whitehead

In spite of the apparent coincidences regarding their emphasis on the notion of 'process' and the incorporation of scepticism into their speculative philosophies, there are many difficulties in studying Hegel and Whitehead in a conjoint way.²⁹ Particularly, one stumbling block for scholarship in this area is that Hegel is rarely mentioned in Whitehead's writings. The reason for this, Whitehead has admitted,

29 Pointing to some further similarities and differences between Hegel and Whitehead, K. Hartmann in "Types of Explanation in Hegel and Whitehead," in G. R. Lucas (ed.), *et al. Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy*, p. 61, asserts that "an assimilation of their respective positions will not be meaningful unless the types of explanation adopted by each prove compatible." Regarding the possibility of comparing the two thinkers, Hartmann writes, "Whitehead devises a *metaphysical analogue* to Hegel's categorical position. It is an analogue, though, which commits us to a conflation of categorical (structurally-dialectical) and metaphysical inspirations which cannot be rationally defended." (p. 113)

is that he had never been able to read Hegel first-hand, although Whitehead himself acknowledged that Hegel's thought had played an important role in his own thinking. Whitehead had only a limited knowledge of Hegel's own system of Absolute Idealism. Rather, Whitehead's understanding of 'Absolute Idealism' stems from the Anglo-American idealists, most notably from F. H. Bradley, as well as from his interactions with McTaggart, Haldane, and their critics, such as Russell.³⁰ In fact, Whitehead was himself originally a critic of idealism. Hence, given that the term 'Absolute Idealism' was popularized in order to describe a particular paradigm in Britain, it is clear that Whitehead had only an indirect knowledge of Hegel's own system. This must be kept in mind when interpreting Whitehead's commentary on 'Absolute Idealism'. One such remark, owing to his allegiance to the New realists of his time, is his assertion in the early stages of *Process and Reality*, that "if this cosmology be deemed successful, it becomes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought involved be not a

30 See Whitehead's *Essays on Science and Philosophy* (1941), New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, p. 88, where he writes, "I said very little in my book *Process and Reality* about Hegel for a very good reason. You remember that the greater part of my professional life was passed as a mathematician, lecturing and teaching mathematics, and a great deal of the rest has been devoted to the elaboration of symbolic logic. So you will not be surprised when I confess to you that the amount of philosophy I have not read passes all telling, and that as a matter of fact I have never read a page of Hegel. That is not true. I remember when I was staying with Haldane at Cloan I read one page of Hegel. But it is true that I was influenced by Hegel. I was an intimate friend of McTaggart almost from the very first day he came to the University, and I had many a chat with Lord Haldane about his Hegelian point of view, and I have read books about Hegel." Also, in the autobiographical note in D. W. Schilpp (ed.), *et al. The Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (Vol. 3), New York: Tudor Publishing Company, p. 7, Whitehead indicates that "I have never been able to read Hegel: I initiated my attempt by studying some remarks of his on mathematics which struck me as complete nonsense. It was foolish of me, but I am not writing to explain my good sense."

In C. Hartshorne's paper, "Karl Popper on Whitehead" in *Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers*, p. 309, it is written, "I do recall (Whitehead) saying, with a peculiar smile, 'I don't pretend to rival Hegel. I thought he was being somewhat sarcastic.'" Hartshorne also indicates that in his view of Whitehead, "neither the arguments nor the ways of conceiving God are particularly reminiscent of Hegel." In regards to Whitehead's concepts of 'actual entities', 'prehensions', and 'nexus', Hartshorne states, "it would, if possible, be (hard) to find Hegelian matches for these essential and highly original ideas." (p. 311) According to Hartshorne, "it is hard to imagine Whitehead having much communication with Hegel. He is not a Hegelian, even a radically revised one." (p. 313) For Hartshorne, "Hegel had indeed written of truth as the 'unity of opposites'; but when one asks in terms of which pole the unity is to be construed, one finds the usual systematic ambiguity of Hegel's method. I know with some definiteness how Whitehead unifies the contraries (in modal logic)." (p. 316) In Hartshorne's view, "in spite of Popper's contrary implication, Whitehead is an original metaphysician if there have been any such in modern times. Before Whitehead, no one had explicitly elucidated creativity as the act of freely synthesizing antecedent actualities. (...) Hegel could be said, possibly, to have had the idea of universal creativity, but in what unambiguous sense is it free? Is it synthesis, not of ideas as in the Hegelian *Logik*, but of concrete particulars, which become but do not change?" (p. 318)

transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis.”³¹

This ambiguous statement is definitely in need of contextual clarification if we are to continue in our investigations of these thinkers. First, the distinction must be made that Whitehead was directly speaking of F. H. Bradley’s ‘Absolute Idealism’.³² Therefore, it is clear that Whitehead’s comment only takes Hegel’s Absolute Idealism into consideration inasmuch as Hegel was a source for Bradley. Second, in the quotation, Whitehead is speculating as to how his philosophical position would be perceived by his readers. He surmises that *Process and Reality* would be considered to have many affinities with some

31 **PR**, p. xiii. Later in **PR**, Whitehead writes, “it is now evident that the final analogy to philosophies of the Hegelian school, noted in the Preface, is not accidental. The universe is at once the multiplicity of *res verae* and the solidarity of *res verae*. The solidarity is itself the efficiency of the macroscopic *res vera*, embodying the principle of unbounded permanence acquiring novelty through flux. The multiplicity is composed of microscopic *res verae*, each embodying the principle of bounded flux acquiring ‘everlasting’ permanence. On one side, the one becomes many; and on the other side, the many become one. But what becomes is always a *res vera*, and the concrescence of a *res vera* is the development of a subjective aim. This development is nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea.” (p. 167) This comment points to the notion that if Hegel’s Absolute Idealism is interpreted to describe, one-sidedly, the process of a subjective Idea becoming objective, Whitehead’s philosophy of Organism is to be understood to describe the process of an empirically objective event becoming a subjective Idea. Another contrast that Whitehead makes between his cosmology and Hegel’s is that “in the place of the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought, the philosophy of organism finds a hierarchy of categories of feeling.” (**PR**, p. 166)

32 **PR**, p. xiii. Whitehead writes “though throughout the main body of this work I am in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature (viii) of experience, which appears in his *Essays on Truth and Reality*. His insistence on ‘feeling’ is very consonant with my own conclusions. (...) The fifth part (of **PR**) is concerned with the final interpretation of the ultimate way in which the cosmological problem is to be conceived. It answers the question, What does it all come to? In this part, the approximation to Bradley is evident.” (pp. xii-xiii, my addition)

In **ESP**, pp. 88-89, Whitehead explains that “I admit a very close affiliation with Bradley, except that I differ from Bradley where Bradley agrees with almost all the philosophers of his school and with Plato, insofar as Plato was a Hegelian. I differ from them where they all agree in their feeling of the illusiveness and relative unreality of the temporal world. Bergson takes the opposite point of view; he holds that the intellect necessarily falsifies the notion of process. There are these two prevalent alternative doctrines respecting the process apparent in the external world: one, which is Bergson’s view, is that the intellect in order to report upon experienced intuition must necessarily introduce an apparatus of concepts which falsify the intuition; the other is that process is a somewhat superficial, illusory element in our experience of the eternally real, the essentially permanent. The latter is Bradley’s standpoint, if I read him correctly. I think that it is at times Plato’s view also. It is exactly on these points that I differ from Bergson on the one side, and from Bradley on the other.” Whitehead further states that “almost all of *Process and Reality* can be read as an attempt to analyse perishing on the same level as Aristotle’s analysis of becoming. The notion of prehension of the past means that the past is an element which perishes and thereby remains an element in the state beyond, and thus is objectified. That is the whole notion. If you get a general notion of what is meant by perishing, you will have accomplished an apprehension of what you mean by memory and causality, what you mean when you feel that what we are is of finite importance, because as we perish we are immortal. That is the one key thought around which the whole development of *Process and Reality* is woven, and in many ways I find that I am in complete agreement with Bradley. (...) I think Bradley gets into a great muddle because he accepts the language which is developed from another point of view to express a doctrine based upon entirely alien concepts.”

of the main tenets of the British 'Absolute Idealists' of his day, but which would differ from them in that empirical realism would hold priority. In this light, Whitehead's comment raises the question whether Absolute Idealism is, to a certain degree, a one-sided form of idealism. That Absolute Idealism is a one-sided idealistic standpoint is certainly a common interpretation of Hegel and Bradley, both in Whitehead's day and in contemporary scholarship.³³ Third, Whitehead's statement suggests that his view of the British idealists was neither decidedly positive nor negative. On the one hand, his comment affirms Absolute Idealism as being in line with the end-point of his thinking. On the other hand, he speculates

33 K. Popper's thesis is that Hegel's Absolute Idealism is representative of a one-sided idealism. In The Open Society and Its Enemies (Vol. 2), Popper holds the view that Hegel's idealism and metaphysics is of the type "of whose stagnation Kant complained." (p. 250) Popper writes that "it is one of the gravest mistakes if a philosophy ever offers self-evidence as an argument in favour of the truth of a sentence; yet this is done by practically all idealist philosophies. It shows that idealist philosophies are often systems of apologetics for some dogmatic beliefs." (p. 291) In Popper's reading, "Hegel contended that his 'Idea' was something existing 'absolutely', i.e. independently of anybody's thought" and that "for Hegel, the 'thought process' (which he even presents in disguise under the name 'Idea' as an independent agent or subject) is the creator of the real." (p. 325) Popper further suggests that "Spinoza, who attempted to combine Cartesian intellectualism with mystical tendencies, rediscovered the theory of a mystical intellectual intuitionism, which, in spite of Kant's strong opposition, led to the post-Kantian rise of 'Idealism', to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel." (p. 353)

R. B. Pippin's Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, emphasizes Hegel's idealistic standpoint. Pippin seeks "to understand Hegel's speculative philosophy as an 'idealism'." He states, "clearly, Hegel is an idealist (he called himself an 'absolute idealist')." What else could his claims about the reality of the Absolute Idea, that all objects are 'in truth' the Notion, that the traditional dualism of subject and object had been overcome, that Substance had been thought as 'Subject,' and so forth, mean? Moreover, to the extent that treating Hegel as an idealist does not just restate all the obscurities of his position, it gets us nowhere, since Hegel uses the term 'idealism' so loosely that he characterizes *all* philosophy worthy of the name of idealism." (p. 6)

T. Rockmore in "Realism, Idealism, and Philosophy" in G. R. Lucas (ed.) *et al.* Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy, states, "While Hegel himself never employs the term 'absolute idealism', as the result of his stress (after the break with Schelling) on a structured form of the absolute. This term is further employed to link Hegel's position and British idealism." (p. 31) However, on this note, in the additions to the EL, Hegel himself is recorded as saying that "the naïve consciousness has rightly taken exception to (...) subjective idealism, according to which the content of our consciousness is something that is *only* ours, something posited only through *us*. In fact, the true situation is that the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, not only *for us*, but also *in-themselves*, and that the proper determination of these things, which are in this sense 'finite', consist in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This interpretation must be called idealism, but, as distinct from the subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy, it is absolute idealism. Although it transcends the ordinary realistic consciousness, still, this absolute idealism can hardly be regarded as the private property of philosophy in actual fact, because, on the contrary, it forms the basis of all religious consciousness. This is because religion, too, regards the sum total of everything that is there, in short, the world before us, as created and governed by God." (EL, p. 88-89, section 45Z, my emphasis)

T. Wartenburg in "Hegel's Idealism: The Logic of Conceptuality," in F. C. Beiser, *et al.* The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, presents "an interpretation of Hegel's idealism that is metaphysical. It is an interpretation that diverges both from the spirit monism (associated with C. Taylor) and non-metaphysical interpretations (associated with J. N. Findlay). In developing this interpretation, I have not claimed that this form of idealism is valid, only that it marks an important development of the modern European tradition of philosophy. (...) (It) makes Hegel's idealism an interesting and creative solution to issues in metaphysics that were raised by his predecessors." (p. 126, my additions)

whether or not his work will be seen by its readers as a metamorphosis of some of the main tenets of Absolute Idealism into a realist position, specifically, one that would be oriented toward the natural sciences.³⁴ Fourth, regarding Whitehead's statement, it is clear that one of his own intentions in *Process and Reality* was to provide a synthesis between the conflicting realistic and idealistic doctrines of his day.³⁵ Fifth, in light of these points, one would do well to treat Whitehead's specific comments on Hegel as the type of general impressions of a philosophy on the periphery of his horizon of knowledge.

34 According to K. Hartmann in "Types of Explanation in Hegel and Whitehead" in G. R. Lucas (ed.), *et al. Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy*, "it certainly makes good sense to see in Whitehead's cosmology a realistic, indeed atomistic, reductionist, and representational version of Hegel's philosophy, at least to the extent that this deals thematically with topics like organism, subjectivity, process and teleology, and so offers morphological blueprints." (p. 113)

35 In his paper, "The Contemporary Significance of Hegel and Whitehead," in G. R. Lucas (ed.) *et al. Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy*, E. E. Harris explains, "when Whitehead wrote, the current philosophical opposition was between Idealism and Realism: the first was represented in Britain by the Oxford school of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley, and in America by thinkers such as Royce and Hocking; the second was represented by writers like Bertrand Russell and the American Critical Realists. Whitehead was anxious to retain an 'objectivist' position, while doing justice to the insights of the idealists. (...) In some respects, therefore, he leaned strongly in the realist direction, insisting on the indispensability of 'physical data' for knowledge and the 'conformal phase' of feeling, while at the same time repudiating what he called 'vacuous actuality' (that is, actuality devoid of subjectivity or mind), and emphasizing the formative role in concrescence of the mental pole. Nature, he declared in an early work, is closed to mind. (see Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (1919), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 4) But then almost immediately he protests against and rejects any tendency to bifurcate Nature into what is purely physical and what is mind-dependent. In his mature thought, (...) Nature is the process of concrescence throughout which principles of definiteness, the objects of conceptual prehensions, which are the germ of mind, are everywhere immanent, so that no actuality is 'vacuous'; and this mentality develops until it emerges as consciousness, which attains its ultimate and complete realization in the consequent nature of God. So Whitehead's philosophy reconciles the Realism and the Idealism of his day. (...) Hegel, at that time, was misunderstood by his own idealistic followers equally with his materialistic Marxist critics as wishing to reduce the world to pure subjectivity; whereas in truth, as contemporary scholars have come to realize, Hegel is emphatically realist in his conception of Nature, out of which, he teaches, spirit is dialectically generated, so that in the self-consciousness of spirit, Nature becomes aware of itself (*an und für sich*), and because what anything truly *is* is what it dialectically becomes, Spirit is the truth of Nature. But this is not to overlook the concomitant fact that 'the external world is the truth implicitly (*an sich*), for the truth is actual and must exist.' (from *EL*, p. 78, section 38Z) Hegel, also, therefore, reconciles Idealism and Realism with an insight which was not again recovered before Whitehead." (pp. 26-27, my additions and emphasis)

T. Rockmore suggests in "Realism, Idealism and Philosophy" in G. R. Lucas (ed.), *et al. Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy*, p. 31, that "when Whitehead refers to 'absolute idealism' in the first instance he has in mind Bradley's view, but beyond it he refers as well to the idealist approach to knowledge in general as distinguished from realism." Furthermore, "an examination of the views of Kant and Hegel reveal, however, that idealism and realism are not exclusive alternatives, that in any case idealism does not substitute apparent objectivity for objectivity, and that the problems of solipsism and skepticism present in pre-idealistic thought do *not* persist in German idealism." (p. 33) According to Rockmore, for Whitehead, "the concern is *precisely* to *synthesize* realist and idealist perspectives." (p. 34) Also, "Whitehead suggests that idealism results in skepticism, which can only be remedied through a return to realism. Kant on the contrary holds that realism must lead to skepticism." (p. 35) Finally, "Hegel neither denies the reality of objectivity, nor does he deny the real in favor of the ideal." (p. 36)

My effort to clarify Whitehead's statement regarding the possible relation of his philosophy to Absolute Idealism has demonstrated that there are some very important contextual difficulties in view of our wanting to study the two philosophers together, in so far as Hegel's system is definitely located in Whitehead's 'blind spot'.³⁶ Therefore, this dissertation will proceed with a conjoint study of these two authors, rather than a comparative analysis. Furthermore, for the sake of the main theme of this dissertation which is the nature and function of scepticism, I will have to neglect the project of defining Hegel's influence on Bradley. At any rate, my examination of Whitehead's comment offers to me the initial consideration that the 'idealism' in Hegel's Absolute Idealism needs to be clarified.

Part One of this dissertation will examine the nature and function of scepticism in Hegel's *Logic*. In Chapter One, I shall investigate further what Hegel means by 'Absolute Idealism', through a brief analysis of the introductory sections of the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Science of Logic*.³⁷ It will be shown that the standpoint of Absolute Idealism is a reply to the presupposition of scepticism inherent to both one-sided idealistic and realistic philosophy, and is representative of the working out of the dialectical opposition between these opposed terms. In Chapter Two, Hegel's interpretation of the main tenets of Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism shall be highlighted from the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. It will be demonstrated how scepticism comprises the

36 Whitehead also makes other interesting references to Absolute Idealism in *Religion in the Making* (1926), New York: Macmillan Co., 1960, pp. 141-142. He states that "the absolute idealism, so influential in Europe and America during the last third of the nineteenth century, and still powerful notwithstanding the reaction from it, was undoubtedly a reaction towards Buddhistic metaphysics on the part of the Western mentality. The multiplicity of finite enduring individuals were relegated to a world of appearances, and the ultimate reality was centered in an Absolute." While on first glance, it may seem out of the question to associate Absolute Idealism with Buddhistic philosophy as Whitehead has done in this quotation, I believe that there are some intrinsic logical similarities. For instance, according to C. Luk in *The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra*, Berkeley: Shambala, 1972, p. 141, "in Indian religion the Trimūrti or Trinity of Brahmā and Śiva, is considered as an inseparable unity of three principles of creation, preservation, and destruction." Also, my 'Two-Term Symmetrical' interpretation of the dialectical progression of Hegel's logical Concept in Appendix #2 corresponds closely to the 'tetralemma' dialectic involved in Nāgārjuna's Buddhist Logic in the 2nd or 3rd century, A. D. See D. J. Kalupahana (trans. and ed.), *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way*, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986, which offers a translation and interpretation of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. See also L. Jamsal's (trans.), *Nāgārjuna's Letter to King Gautamīputra*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

37 Over the course of this dissertation, I will sometimes refer to the *EL* and the *SL* as the *Logic*. While these texts are distinct, they equally comprise Hegel's division of *Logic* in his system, and complement one another. My 'policy' regarding quoting Hegel is to provide the German counterpart from the editions listed on page 6 of this dissertation. Quotations appearing in the main body which are not 'additions' will be given in their German counterpart in footnotes. In a few instances, the German is lengthier in than the English. The reason for this is to keep the German sentence structure in order, and to make sure that the German is linear with the English references which are integrated into the main body of this dissertation.

'dialectical moment' of the logical Concept which may be defined as the recognition and negation of finitude. In Chapter Three, I shall elucidate the role of scepticism as it pertains to the working out of the opposition of idealism and realism in virtue of the logical Concept, the movement characteristic of Absolute Idealism with reference to the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Science of Logic*.

Part Two will provide a synopsis of the nature and function of scepticism in Whitehead's *Process and Reality*. With reference to Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*, in Chapter Four, I shall demonstrate that his philosophy of Organism advances a process metaphysical synthesis of realism and idealism, in order to undercut the resulting bifurcations of actuality brought about by their 'mutual scepticism'. In Chapter Five, I will provide a synopsis of the nature of scepticism as it pertains to Whitehead's three modes of perception and theory of extension. Following from Whitehead's principle of relativity, I shall propose that the notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify scepticism. However, in his theory of prehensions, Whitehead's notion of 'negative prehensions' represents the means by which the organism 'divides' and 'decides' the extensive continuum. Therefore, in Chapter Six, I shall investigate the role of scepticism via the notion of 'negative prehensions' within his outline of the creative processes of organisms.

In Part Three, and Chapter Seven of this dissertation, I will present a final synopsis of the nature and function of scepticism in, and in light of, my study of speculative philosophy. Also, I shall make a critical response to a contemporary form of scepticism which I call, 'instrumental' scepticism from both Hegelian and Whiteheadian perspectives. In Appendices #1, #2, and #3, I chart 'One-Term Asymmetrical', 'Two-Term Symmetrical', and 'Half-Term: Asymmetry in Symmetry' interpretations of the dialectical movement of Hegel's logical Concept and Whitehead's logic of contrasts.

PART ONE:

The Nature and Function of Scepticism in Hegel's *Logic*

CHAPTER I

The Nature of Hegel's Absolute Idealism

This first chapter offers a response to many of the traditional interpretations of Hegel's system that were mentioned in the Introduction, as well as to the particular question raised in relation to Whitehead's commentary with respect to the paradigm of 'Absolute Idealism' prevalent in his day. In particular, I will attempt to answer the following question: is Hegel's system of Absolute Idealism a one-sided form of idealism or realism? The answer to this question is the first step in obtaining and understanding of the nature of scepticism in Hegel's speculative philosophy. Also, it has large significance if we are to grasp how both Ancient and Modern types of scepticism are contained in his philosophy. Moreover, this question is important to current scholarship, as there is still much controversy with regards to defining Hegel's standpoint of Absolute Idealism.¹ Here, I intend to demonstrate that for Hegel, Absolute Idealism is not meant as any sort of one-sided idealism nor realism.² These two

1 Recently, in "The Very Idea of the Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel is not an Idealist" in S. Houlgate (ed.), *et al. Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature*. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1998, pp. 1-27, W. Maker, according to Houlgate's synopsis, "offers a vigorous defense of Hegel's (...) Philosophy of Nature against the familiar charge that it is metaphysically idealistic. Maker argues that, contrary to popular belief, Hegel does not deny the existence of an independently given nature (nor) conceive(s) of nature as a mere product of thought, but proceeds rather from the conviction that thought and nature are radically *non-identical*. Furthermore, Maker contends that Hegel is led to this conviction by the philosophical requirement of systematicity. Hegel's *Logic* sets out the process of thought's systematic and autonomous self-determination; and, according to Maker, if such self-determining thought is to become fully determinate, it must *limit* itself. But it can only limit itself, we are told, by conceiving of itself as bounded by what constitutes *nature*. Systematic philosophy must conceive of nature as other than thought, therefore, in order to conceive of thought itself as a distinctive and complete domain of logical self-determination. Maker goes on to show that precisely because it recognizes nature to be genuinely other than systematic thought, Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* has to acknowledge that specific contingent features of nature lie beyond the reach of *a priori* philosophy and can only be discovered by empirical observation. Far from seeking to supplant empirical science, therefore, Hegel's systematic philosophy of nature necessarily accords an indispensable and independent role to such science." (pp. xvi-xvii) Subsequently, in the article, Maker quotes M. Rosen in *Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism*, p. 174, to the effect that "idealism's characteristic difficulty (is), namely, the need to give an account of the relationship between empirical and transcendental realms. The problem is resolved by Hegel's Absolute Idealism because the transcendental subject is, in fact, an absolute one, which itself generates the empirical. Transcendental and empirical, mind and nature, are not heterogeneous but emerge as 'moments' in a unified process; the problem of how one realm is 'constituted on' another is left behind when we operate in the element of Thought." Maker further cites C. Taylor's *Hegel*, p. 110, asserting that "Taylor identifies Hegel as an absolute idealist and asserts that nothing exists which is not a manifestation of the Idea, that is, of rational necessity." Also, Maker makes reference to R. G. Collingwood's thesis from *The Idea of Nature*, p. 7, namely, that Hegel has the "idealistic view of nature" which asserts "that mind makes nature: nature is, so to speak, a by-product of the autonomous and self-existing activity of mind." (p. 21)

2 According to K. R. Westphal in *Hegel's Epistemological Realism*, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, "Hegel's brand of idealism is, and is intended to be, fully compatible with epistemological realism. (...) Hegel's 'idealism' is (...) not any sort of Berkeleyan or Kantian idealism, nor is it a phenomenalism. Hegel's idealism is an expression of what any non-skeptical view must hold: our conceptions can capture the way the world itself is." (p.

philosophical positions of thought are to be regarded as important finite moments of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept, of which it is the purpose of the *Logic* to comprehend in a mature way. As such, I am arguing that Hegel's Absolute Idealism can be interpreted to be a standpoint in which the dialectical opposition of idealism and realism has been worked out in virtue of the logical Concept. In fact, as demonstrated in the *Logic*, the working out of the dialectical opposition between idealism and realism is constitutive of Hegel's criterion of truth. In his philosophical system, there is no rigid conflict between idealism and realism nor does he place strict priority in what is said to be 'ideal' to the detriment of what is putatively 'real'. While the *Logic* does place a certain emphasis on the transition of thought by which the 'ideal' makes its passage over into the 'real', the 'doctrines' of Hegel's Absolute Idealism, as Whitehead might say, should also be said to encompass empirical realism. In this manner, it is due to Hegel's understanding of scepticism as a common presupposition of the attitudes of both idealism and realism that the term 'Absolute Idealism' is meant to assert the primacy of the logical Concept over the question of idealism and realism. In order to demonstrate that the mediation of the logical Concept over idealism and realism is an important aspect of any definition of Hegel's Absolute Idealism, it will be necessary to examine some of his commentaries concerning 'idealistic' and 'realistic' philosophy as contained in the *Logic*. In particular, I will draw mainly from three sections: 1.) the introductions of the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Science of Logic*, 2.) the section, 'Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, and 3.) chapters one and two of the *Science of Logic*, on 'Being' and 'Determinate Being', respectively. Hence, in the course of this elaboration, I follow loosely Hegel's own divisions in the *Logic*.³

140) Furthermore, Westphal states, "Hegel's brand of idealism is a kind of ontological holism according to which all parts of the world are fundamentally interrelated, where these interrelations are fundamentally conceptual relations." (p. 142) Taking Westphal's theses seriously, I am arguing that the standpoint of Absolute Idealism is where the opposition between idealism and realism is sublated in the logical Concept.

3 It is in order to respond to the question of scepticism in relation to Hegel's *Logic* that a full systematic analysis of Hegel's logical transitions in their particularity is to a certain extent neglected. As will be shown, scepticism is universally contained in the progression of Hegel's logical Concept (*Begriff*). It is for this reason that I reflect upon the transitions in the *Logic* in a more general way pertaining to the universality of the Concept. My interpretation will draw mainly from the *Encyclopedia Logic* (1830), translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, an edition which includes Hegel's own remarks as well as additions from student notes. This particular text is a relatively new, and valuable contribution to English-language Hegel scholarship. Its counterpart: the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), Vol. 20 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969, will back up this source. The standard A. V. Miller translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1812, 1816, 1832), New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969, as well as its counterpart, the *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1812, 1816, 1832), Vols. 11, 12, and 21 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978, 1981, 1985, will also be main references in this undertaking.

I. Perspectives on Idealism and Realism in Hegel's Introduction(s) to the *Logic*

It is my interpretation that Hegel's *Logic* expresses a standpoint which regards idealism and realism as finite, determinate philosophical positions in relation to the nature of cognition (*Erkenntnis*) and experience (*Erfahrung*) in general.⁴ The demonstration of the unity of what is ideal (*ideell*) and what is real (*reell*) in and for cognition is the subject matter of the *Logic*, in its comprehension of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept (*Begriff*).⁵ However, in order to proceed to this standpoint, it is necessary to come to some understanding of Hegel's outline of the structures of intentionality, particularly with regard to the logical relations of immediacy and mediation, subject and object, as well as being and nothing. Specifically, concerning the development of the logical Concept, Hegel shows that the thought of each of these terms has its identity (*Identität*) in virtue of the negation of its opposite, and the negation of that negation. This process by which the identity of particulars is determined constitutes the ongoing expression of the logical Concept, of which it is the purpose of the *Logic* to comprehend in a mature way. For Hegel, the process of identity "starts from one of the determinations and advances to the other, even though the latter returns to the first; it is a movement which at the same time may not be arbitrary or assertoric."⁶ The movement of this progression will become explicit over the course of this chapter.

For Hegel, the unity of the analytical duality of 'immediacy' and 'mediation' is already presupposed from the beginning of the *Logic* in that "the principle of *experience* (itself) contains the

4 The ambiguity of the English word 'experience' is such that it does not make the distinction between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis* in the German. *Erfahrung* usually entails a strong impression of something which allows one to gain a conceptualization of that thing, while *Erlebnis* is associated with something which is immediately known.

5 According to Geraets, *et al.* (trans.), "*Idee* is Hegel's term for the Absolute inasmuch as it is the total process of the self-articulation of meaning and of what is meaningful. We translate it as 'the Idea'. Where it is used in the plural or as particularised ('the idea of ...'), we drop the initial capital. But everywhere the *Idee* is the *Begriff* as realised, or as being realised. See the *Science of Logic*, Miller, 755ff. What is recognised as a moment in the *Idee* is called *ideell*; and *Idealität* belongs to what is *ideell*. 'Ideality' is the truth of what is finite, of reality; and the recognition of this ideality is 'Idealism' in Hegel's sense. See 95R." (EL, p. 350n29) Also, according to Geraets, *et al.* (trans.), "although Hegel himself says that *das Reelle* and *das Reale* are practically synonymous, and that no interest is served by distinguishing different shades of meaning here (see the *Science of Logic*, Miller, 149), we (in translating EL) have included the German term in a footnote wherever 'real' stands for *real*." (EL, p. 351n36, my addition) In translating the SL, Miller states that '*Das Ideale*' has a more precise meaning (of the beautiful and its associations) than '*das Ideelle*.'" (p. 149)

6 SL, p. 78. / "Das Aussprechen und die Darstellung eines solchen aber ist eine vermittelnde Bewegung, die von einer der Bestimmungen anfängt, und zu der andern fortgeht, wenn diese auch zur ersten zurückgeht; - es ist eine Bewegung, die zugleich nicht willkürlich oder assertorisch seyn darf" (WSL, *GW11*, p. 40)

infinitely important determination that, for a content to be accepted and held to be true, man must (...) find any such content to be at one and in unity with *the certainty of his own self*.⁷ In demonstrating this unity of objective content and subjective agency within the process of cognition, he begins with an analysis of the most immediately apparent structures of experience. The most immediate form of experience is the unmediated apprehension of an object, which is given to sensuous consciousness. In this consideration, Hegel finds that even in our most immediate experience there is always a subject in relation to an object given in experience. Specifically, he demonstrates that the objective contents of cognition cannot be divorced from the subjective acts of cognition itself. However, as Hegel explains, the difficulty with this starting point is that it is only verifiable through the mediation of thought, namely, through the reflective thought typically associated with philosophy in general. Therefore, on the one hand, Hegel suggests that the only 'measure' of immediate experience is reflective thought represented as a subjective positing of the thought and its object. That is to say, we have an understanding of the immediate experience of a sensuous given only through the reflective mediation of thought: i.e. through thought thinking itself. In this sense, we can infer that Hegel holds the view that 'subject' and 'object' is a distinction which is itself the product of the interplay of analytic and reflective thought. But, he recognizes that these intentional structures cannot in themselves actually be torn apart and that both are inseparably and necessarily bound together in the constitution of cognition.⁸ Hence, Hegel finds that the

7 EL, p. 31, section 7R, my addition and emphasis. / "Das Princip der Erfahrung enthält die unendlich wichtige Bestimmung, dass für das Annehmen und Fürwahrhalten eines Inhalts der Mensch selbst dabei seyn müsse, bestimmter dass er solchen Inhalt mit der Gewissheit seiner selbst in Einigkeit und vereinigt finde." (ENK, p. 46, section 7)

8 Hegel explains that "the difficulty of making a beginning arises immediately because a beginning (being something immediate) does make a presupposition or, rather, it is itself just that." (EL, p. 24, section 1); "to begin with, philosophy can be determined in general terms as a *thinking consideration* of objects. But if it is correct (as indeed it is), that the *human being* distinguishes itself from the *animals* by thinking, then everything human is human because it is brought about by thinking, and for that reason alone. (EL, pp. 24-25, section 2); "whatever kind it may be, the *content* that fills our consciousness is what makes up the 'determinacy' of our feelings, intuitions, images, and representations, of our purposes, duties, etc., and of our thoughts and concepts. (...) In any one of these forms (...), the content is *object* of our consciousness." (EL, p. 26, section 3); "philosophy has (...) taken its *content* from its *own* intuiting and perceiving of the outward and the inward, from the *presence* of nature as much as from the *presence* of spirit." (EL, p. 31, section 7) In the SL, Hegel states, "if earlier abstract thought was interested in the principle only as content, but in the course of philosophical development has been impelled to pay attention to the other side, to the behaviour of the cognitive process, this implies that the *subjective* act has also been grasped as an *essential* moment of objective truth." (p. 67) Regarding the relationship of immediacy and mediation within consciousness, Hegel similarly writes, "whilst each of these moments does also *appear* as distinct, *neither of them* can be *wanting*, and they are *inseparably* bound together" (EL, p. 36, section 12R) He explains that "when we are comparing the various forms of cognition with one another, it can easily appear that the first one, that of immediate knowledge, is the most adequate, the finest, and the highest. (...) Reflective cognition and then philosophical cognition, step out of that immediate natural unity." (EL, p. 61, section 24Z3)

only 'test' of the accuracy of mediating thought is, conversely, the immediate experience of an object. In this sense, immediacy and mediation are logical moments which cannot be divorced from one another in the constitution of cognition. Rather, Hegel's presupposition is that they mutually contain each other, and each provides the ground for the thought of the other. It is for this reason that "what philosophy begins with must be either *mediated* or *immediate*, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted."⁹ Similarly, he finds that "there is nothing in heaven or in nature or mind or anywhere else which does not contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be *unseparated* and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity."¹⁰

In conjunction with the question of immediacy and mediation, the beginning (*Anfang*) of Hegel's *Logic* also presents to us the logical dichotomy of 'being' and 'nothing' as one of the most primordial definitions of the absolute. This dichotomy provides us with one of the most original demonstrations of the 'process' of the dialectical movements of the logical Concept. According to Hegel, "It would not be difficult to demonstrate (the) unity of 'being' and 'nothing' (...) in *every* actual thing or thought."¹¹ Hence, while the beginning of the *Logic* presupposes the unity of 'being' and 'nothing', it commences with the thought of 'pure being'.¹² 'Pure being' determines itself in its passing over into 'pure nothing'

9 SL, p. 67. / "Der Anfang der Philosophie muss entweder ein Vermitteltes oder Unmittelbares seyn, und es ist leicht zu zeigen, dass es weder das Eine noch das Andre seyn könne; somit findet die eine oder die andre Weise des Anfangens ihre Widerlegung." (WSL, *GW11*, p. 53)

10 SL, p. 68. / "Hier mag daraus nur diss angeführt werden, dass es Nichts gibt, nichts im Himmel oder in der Natur oder im Geiste oder wo es sey, was nicht ebenso die Unmittelbarkeit enthält, als die Vermittlung, so dass sich diese beyden Bestimmungen als ungetrennt und untrennbar und jener Gegensatz sich als ein Nichtiges zeigt." (WSL, *GW11*, p. 54)

11 SL, p. 84. / "Es wäre nicht schwer, diese Einheit von Seyn und Nichts, in jedem Beyspiele, in jedem Wirklichen oder Gedanken aufzuzeigen." (WSL, *GW11*, pp. 45-46)

12 Regarding his beginning with 'pure being', "the enunciation and exposition of such concrete beginning is a process of mediation which starts from *one* of the determinations and advances to the other, even though the latter returns to the first; it is a movement which at the same time may not be arbitrary or assertoric. Consequently, it is not the concrete something itself with which that exposition begins but only the simple immediacy from which the movement starts. And further, if something concrete is taken as the beginning, the conjunction of the determinations contained in it demand proof, and this is lacking.

"If therefore, in the expression of the absolute, or eternal, or God (and *God* has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with him) - if in the intuition or thought of these there is *implied more* than pure being - then this *more* must make its appearance in our knowing only as something *thought*, not as something imagined or figuratively conceived; let what is present in intuition or figurate conception be as rich as it may, the determination which *first* emerges in knowing is simple, for only in what is simple is there nothing more than the pure

which is representative of the ground of the logical science. In explanation of this movement which necessarily starts with 'pure being', he states that

the beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning, therefore, contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is the same time non-being.¹³

beginning; only the immediate is simple, for only in the immediate has no advance yet been made from a *one* to an *other*. Consequently, whatever is intended to be expressed or implied beyond *being*, in the richer forms of representing the absolute or God, this is in the beginning only an empty word and only being; this simple determination which has no other meaning of any kind, this emptiness, is therefore simply as such the beginning of philosophy." (SL, p. 78)

My standpoint here is purely hermeneutic in investigating the logical standpoint contained in the text, and it should not be insinuated here that I am attempting to argue along a Buddhistic slant that the *Logic* could somehow start with 'pure nothing', although this is an interesting metaphysical hypothesis. In this dissertation, I am primarily investigating scepticism as contained in the movement of the logical Concept. What I am emphasizing, however, is that in Hegel's view, while one should not disregard the particularity of the determinations in question in virtue of the analysis of the Concept, one must first 'enter the water' before coming to a mature understanding of the logical Concept. As Hegel states, "what logic is cannot be started beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first to emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition." (SL, p. 43)

Regarding the starting point of either 'being' or 'nothing', Hegel states, "*ex nihilo nihil fit* - is one of those propositions to which great importance was ascribed in metaphysics. In it is to be seen either only the empty tautology: nothing is nothing; or if becoming is supposed to possess an actual meaning in it, then, since from *nothing* only *nothing* becomes, the proposition does not in fact contain *becoming*, for in it nothing remains nothing. Becoming implies that nothing does not remain nothing but passes into its other, into being. Later, especially Christian, metaphysics whilst rejecting the proposition that out of nothing comes nothing, asserted a transition from nothing into being; although it understood this proposition synthetically or merely imaginatively, yet even in the most imperfect union there is contained a point in which being and nothing coincide and their distinguishedness vanishes. The proposition: out of nothing comes nothing, nothing is just nothing, owes its particular importance to its opposition to *becoming* generally, and consequently also to its opposition to the creation of the world from nothing. Those who maintain the proposition: nothing is just nothing, and even grow heated in its defence, are unaware that in so doing they are subscribing to the abstract pantheism of the Eleatics, and also in principle to that of Spinoza. The philosophical view for which 'being is only being, nothing is only nothing', is a valid principle, merits the name of 'system of identity'; this abstract identity is the essence of pantheism." (SL, p. 84)

Later, Hegel writes, "self-consciousness, however, as consciousness, enters into the difference of *itself* and of an *other* - or of its *ideality*, in which it produces conceptions, and of its *reality*, inasmuch as its conception has a determinate content which still has the side of being known as the unsublated negative, as a real, determinate being. However, to call thought, spirit, God, *only* an ideal being, presupposes the standpoint from which finite being counts as the real, and the ideal being or being-for-one has only a one-sided meaning." (SL, p. 160)

13 SL, p. 73. / "Der Anfang ist nicht das reine Nichts, sondern ein Nichts, von dem etwas ausgehen soll; es ist zugleich das Seyn schon in ihm enthalten. Der Anfang enthält also beydes, Seyn und Nichts; ist die Einheit von Seyn und Nichts; - oder ist Nichtseyn, das zugleich Seyn, und Seyn, das zugleich Nichtseyn ist." (WSL, GW11, p. 36) Hegel further explains, "the analysis of the beginning would thus yield the notion of the unity of being and nothing - or, in a more reflected form, the unity of differentiatedness and non-differentiatedness, or the identity of identity and non-identity. This concept could be regarded as the first, purest, that is, most abstract definition of the absolute - as it would in fact be if we were at all concerned with the form of definitions and with the name of the absolute. In this sense, that abstract concept would be the first definition of this absolute and all further determinations and developments only more specific and richer determinations of it. But let those who are dissatisfied with *being* as a beginning because it passes over into nothing and so gives rise to the unity of being and

In commencing with 'pure being' in its passage over into 'pure nothing', the movement of the logical Concept, while fluent, starts with one term: 'being'. While 'being' is for Hegel, representative of pure indeterminate thought, its opposite, 'nothing', proves to provide the determinacy necessary to move to a third term. 'Being' is only thought in virtue of the thought of 'nothing', and the negation of the latter thought. Conversely, 'nothing' is only thought in virtue of the thought of 'being', and the negation of the latter thought. Furthermore, this dichotomy is shown to be resolved through a third term, 'becoming', or more accurately, 'determinate being', which is the unity of 'being' and 'nothing'. Accordingly,

as their unity, becoming is the true expression of the result of being and nothing; it is not just the unity of being and nothing, but it is inward unrest - a unity which in its self-relation is not simply motionless, but which, in virtue of the diversity of being and nothing which it contains, is inwardly turned against itself.¹⁴

Thus, as Hegel's overall metaphysical starting point, recognized once the initial thought determinations have been made explicit, the demonstration of the convergence towards equipollence of the dichotomies of 'immediacy' and 'mediation' as well as 'being' and 'nothing' by way of the progression of the logical Concept, is an important aspect in relation to the question of the unity of what is ideal and what is real in the *Logic*.¹⁵

From the introduction of the *Encyclopedia Logic*, there is much evidence to support the fact that the concepts of 'ideality' and 'reality' also converge towards logical equipollence, in virtue of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept. From this point of view, each provides the mutual ground for the other. Through the positing of a series of dialectical oppositions, Hegel makes it clear that each

nothing, let them see whether they find this beginning which begins with the general idea of a *beginning* and with its analysis (which though of course correct, likewise leads to the unity of being and nothing), more satisfactory that the beginning with being." (SL, p. 74) An interesting question here pointing to the legitimacy of Hegel's making a beginning is if in order to posit the opposition between being and nothing do we not presuppose that there is a further nothing between being and nothing?

14 EL, p. 143, section 88R / "Werden ist der wahre Ausdruck des Resultats von Seyn und Nichts, als die Einheit derselben; es ist nicht nur die Einheit des Seyn und Nichts, sondern ist die Unruhe in sich, - die Einheit, die nicht bloß als Beziehung-auf-sich bewegungslos, sondern durch die Verschiedenheit des Seyns und Nichts, die in ihm ist, in sich gegen sich selbst ist." (ENK, p. 128)

15 The term 'equipollence' (*isostheneia*) is used by the Ancient sceptics in order to designate a 'balance' between dialectically opposed terms and arguments, where neither takes precedence over the other. Here, I am using it to designate the relation between terms of equal weight, which, in their dialectical process of coming to be (as Hegel describes in the *Logic*) can be said to be in a 'biconditional' or 'symmetrical' relationship to one another. For further reference on the term 'equipollence', see M. Forster's *Hegel and Scepticism*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, and R. J. Hankinson's *The Sceptics*, New York: Routledge, 1995.

side is the condition for the possibility of the other. First, he states that “what is rational, is actual, and what is actual, is rational.”¹⁶ On the one hand, Hegel explains that

the notion that ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and that philosophy is a system of pure phantasms, sets itself at once against the actuality of what is rational; but conversely, the notion that ideas and ideals are far too excellent to have actuality, or equally something too impotent to achieve actuality (is equally contrary to the viewpoint set forth by the *Logic*).¹⁷

In the former case taken up in this passage, Hegel is emphasizing a realist’s scepticism with regards to the possibility of the empirical verification of philosophical ideas. In the realist’s point of view external reality is radically separated from the abstract. In the latter case, Hegel elucidates an idealist’s doubt with regards to the possibility that we can derive philosophical meaning from what is actual. Therefore, since scepticism and ‘doubt’ towards the other is inherent to both attitudes, the inevitable implication of this dialectical proposition is that of the equipollence of idealism and realism.

A second instance where Hegel elucidates the opposition and synthesis of ‘ideality’ and ‘reality’ is as he takes up the old saying (falsely) attributed to Aristotle, “Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu (there is nothing in the intellect that has not been in sense-experience).” This statement highlights the realist standpoint that any thought whatsoever contained in the intellect, has a prior empirical correlate as its ground. Conversely, Hegel states that “philosophy will equally affirm: Nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu (there is nothing in sense-experience that has not been in the intellect.)”¹⁸

In a third instance in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel examines the dialectical relationship of idealism and realism. He finds that the opposition between them consists in that each is sceptical as to the validity

16 **EL**, p. 29, section 6R. / “was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich, und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.” (**ENK**, p. 44)

17 **EL**, p. 30, section 6R, my additions. / “Der Wirklichkeit des Vernünftigen stellt sich schon die Vorstellung entgegen, sowohl dass die Ideen, Ideale, weiter nichts als Chimären und die Philosophie ein System von solchen Hirngespinnsten sey, als umgekehrt dass die Ideen und Ideale etwas viel zu Vortreffliches seyen, um Wirklichkeit zu haben, oder ebenso etwas zu Ohnmätiges, um sich solche zu verschaffen.” (**ENK**, p. 45)

18 **EL**, p. 32, section 8R, my additions. / “Es ist ein alter Satz, der dem Aristoteles fälschlicherweise so zugeschrieben zu werden pflegt, als ob damit der Standpunkt seiner Philosophie ausgedrückt seyn sollt; nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu; - es ist nichts im Denken, was nicht im Sinne, in der Erfahrung gewesen. Es ist nur für einen Misverstand zu achten, wenn die speculative Philosophie diesen Satz nicht zugeben wollte. Aber umgekehrt wird sie ebenso behaupten: nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu, - in dem ganz allgemeinen Sinne, dass der Nus und in tieferer Bestimmung der Geist, die Ursache der Welt ist, und in dem nähern (...)” (**ENK**, p. 48, section 8R)

of the other, in so far as scepticism is to be defined as a negative attitude towards a particular standpoint, a negation of a form of knowing or an aspect of cognition that is putatively not constitutive of the truth. For the idealist, the "knowledge of all that is *supersensible* in general, essentially involves an elevation above sensible feeling or intuition, hence, it involves a negative attitude towards the latter as first and in that sense it involves *mediation*."¹⁹ Furthermore, the idealist is only an idealist, in so far as she is not a realist. However, it is also equally implied in the introduction to the *Encyclopedia Logic* that there occurs a sceptical attitude towards philosophical ideas on the part of the realist. Similarly, the realist is a realist in so far as she is not an idealist. Hence, it is clear that each side determines itself through the negation of its opposite. But, concerning the truth of what is, it is against the one-sided presupposition of scepticism contained within these two opposed views that Hegel writes,

Reality may seem to be a word of various meanings because it is used of different, indeed of opposed determinations. In philosophy, one may perhaps speak of a *merely empirical* reality as of a worthless existence. But when it is said that thoughts, concepts, theories *have no reality*, this means that they do not possess *actuality*; *in itself* or in its notion, the idea of a Platonic Republic, for example, may well be true. Here the worth of the idea is not denied and it is left its place *alongside* the reality. But as against *mere* ideas, *mere* notions, the real alone counts as true. The sense in which, on the one hand, outer existence is made the criterion of the truth of a content is no less one-sided that when the idea, essential being, or even inner feeling is represented as indifferent to outer existence and is even held to be the more excellent the more remote it is from reality.²⁰

Therefore, the equal recognition of what is empirical and what is supersensible in and for cognition is an essential component of the Speculative Science. In this light, neither idealism nor realism would be demonstrative of attitudes representative of the sole criterion of the truth or falsity of experience.²¹

19 **EL**, p. 36, section 12R. / "So enthält das Wissen von Gott wir von allem Uebersinnlichen überhaupt, wesentlich eine Erhebung über die sinnliche Empfindung oder Anschauung; es enthält demit ein negatives Verhalten gegen diss Erste, darin aber die Vermittlung." (**ENK**, p. 53, section 12R)

20 **SL**, pp. 111-112. / "Realität kann ein vieldeutiges Wort zu seyn scheinen, weil es von verschiedenen, ja entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen gebraucht wird. Im philosophischen Sinne wird etwa von bloss empirischer Realität als einem werthlosen Daseyn gesprochen. Wenn aber von Gedanken, Begriffen, Theorien gesagt wird, sie haben keine Realität, so heisst diss, dass ihnen keine Wirklichkeit zukomme; ansich oder im Begriffe könne die Idee einer platonischen Republik z.B. wohl wahr seyn. Der Idee wird hier ihr Werth nicht abgesprochen, und sie neben der Realität auch belassen. Aber gegen sogenannte blosse Ideen, gegen blosse Begriffe gilt das Reelle als das allein Wahrhafte. - Der Sinn, in welchem das einemal dem äusserlichen Daseyn die Entscheidung über die Wahrheit eines Inhalts zugeschrieben wird, ist ebenso einseitig, als wenn die Idee, das Wesen oder auch die innere Empfindung als gleichgültig gegen das äusserliche Daseyn vorgestellt und gar für um so vortrefflicher gehalten wird, je mehr es von der Realität entfernt sey." (**WSL**, *GW11*, p. 99)

21 Hegel further states in the introduction to the **SL**, "one must discard the prejudice that truth must be something tangible. Such tangibility is, for example, imported even into the Platonic Ideas which are in God's thinking, as if they are, as it were, existing things but in another world or region; while the world of actuality exists

Furthermore, for Hegel, the resolution of the opposition of idealism and realism (based in their mutual scepticism) will be itself an important moment on the way towards the position of speculative thinking. This is the case, since, in coming to a mature comprehension of the Concept, Hegel's *Logic* will involve the 'overgrasping' of the respective one-sidednesses of idealism and realism.

II. Hegel's Criterion of Truth from: 'Positions of Thought with Regards to Objectivity' (Encyclopedia Logic, pp. 65-124)

In coming to a mature understanding of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept by way of the *Logic*, Hegel considers three positions of thought with regards to objectivity: 1.) the 'Metaphysics of the Understanding', 2.) 'Empiricism and Critical Philosophy', and 3.) 'Immediate Knowing'. In this analysis, he further elucidates his standpoint in relation to the 'conflicting' viewpoints of idealism and realism as well as to the logical dichotomy of 'immediacy' and 'mediation'. Therefore, this section is essential to clarifying what he means by Absolute Idealism.

The first thought-moment with respect to objectivity is that of the one-sided 'Metaphysics of the Understanding', which, in its isolation, is not representative of the mature standpoint which comprises the *Logic*. For Hegel, the 'Metaphysics of the Understanding' is characterized by the simple fact of coming to a subjective conclusion about a particular objective given. In this position of thought, the understanding elevates itself over objectivity. Thought "reproduces the content of sense-experience and intuition out of itself as a content of thought, and is satisfied with this as the truth."²² In his synopsis, thinking, here, posits one-sided, finite determinations regarding the nature of the objective, which are then taken as the final truth of the object. Thus, the understanding doubts the actuality of the object to the extent that it deprives the object of its actuality. It believes itself to supercede the object and to have acquired a comprehension of the truth of the object simply through the mediation of thought. In this way,

outside that region and has a substantial existence distinct from those Ideas and only through this distinction is a substantial reality. The Platonic Idea is the universal, or more definitely the Notion of an object; only in its Notion does something possess actuality and to the extent that it is distinct from its Notion it ceases to be actual and is a non-entity; the side of tangibility and sensuous self-externality belongs to this null aspect. But on the other side, one can appeal to the conceptions of ordinary logic itself, for it is assumed, for example, that the determinations contained in definitions do not belong only to the knower, but are determinations of the object, constituting its innermost essence and its very own nature." (p. 50)

²² EL, p. 65, section 26. / "reproducirt den Inhalt der Empfindungen und Anschauungen aus sich zu einem Inhalte des Gedankens und ist in solchem als der Wahrheit befriedigt." (ENK, pp. 69-70, section 26)

Hegel demonstrates that the 'Metaphysics of the Understanding' is an inherently dogmatic standpoint, in so far as its determinations consist in one-sidedness. The problem is that the understanding posits isolated propositions in an *either / or* fashion. That is to say, with regards to two opposed determinations of the same kind and of equal weight, the understanding concludes that "one must be *true*, and the other *false*."²³ However, for Hegel, a one-sided assertion is not yet fully representative of the truth, since a second, opposing proposition is inevitably set up against the first. In this manner, the dogmatic assertions of the understanding do not recognize their dialectical opposites, and are therefore, finite. Hegel clarifies the standpoint of the 'Metaphysics of the Understanding' in relation to Ancient scepticism and genuine speculative philosophy, stating,

dogmatism had its first antithesis in *scepticism*. The ancient Sceptics gave the general name of 'dogmatism' to any philosophy that sets up definite theses. In this wider sense scepticism also counted properly speculative philosophy as dogmatic. But in the narrower sense dogmatism consists in adhering to one-sided determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their opposites. This is just the strict 'either-or,' according to which (for instance) the world is *either* finite *or* infinite, but *not both*. On the contrary, what is genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have any such one-sided determination in it, and is therefore not exhausted by it; on the contrary, being a totality, it contains the determinations that dogmatism holds to be fixed and true in a state of separation from one another united with itself.²⁴

Therefore, for Hegel, the truth is to be found in the totality of the moments and in resolving dialectical opposition. As such, while the 'Metaphysics of the Understanding' is an important moment, it is not fully representative of a mature understanding of the logical Concept. As he states, "the understanding is, of course, one moment of speculative philosophy, but it is a moment at which we should not stop."²⁵

According to Hegel, the second position of thought with respect to objectivity is also not fully

23 EL, p. 69, section 32. / "Diese Metaphysik wurde Dogmatismus, weil sie nach der Natur der endlichen Bestimmungen annehmen musste, dass von zwei entgegengesetzten Behauptungen, dergleichen jene Sätze waren, die eine wahr, die andere aber falsch seyn müsse." (ENK, p. 72, section 32)

24 EL, pp. 69-70, section 32Z. Hegel continues, "It often happens in philosophy that a one-sided view sets itself up beside the totality, claiming to be something particular and fixed vis-à-vis the latter. But, in fact, what is one-sided is not fixed and does not subsist on its own account; instead, it is contained within the whole as sublated. The dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding consists in its adherence to the one-sided thought-determinations in their isolation, whereas the idealism of speculative philosophy involves the principle of totality and shows itself able to overgrasp the one-sidedness of the abstract determinations of the understanding. Thus, idealism will say, 'The soul is neither *just* finite nor *just* infinite, but is essentially *both* the one *and* the other, and hence neither the one nor the other.' In other words, these determinations are not valid when they are isolated from one another but only when sublated. (...) The struggle of reason consists precisely in overcoming what the understanding has made rigid."

25 EL, p. 76, section 36Z.

representative of the fully mature comprehension of the logical Concept of speculative philosophy. This position of thought is taken up by Hegel in two divisions. The first division is that of 'Empiricism' which seeks to draw the truth of objectivity from the immediate experience of the concretely real. Whereas the 'Metaphysics of the Understanding' believed itself to stand above objectivity, 'Empiricism' asserts the principle that "what is true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception."²⁶ Therefore, in order for something to be verified as true, it must be able to be immediately experienced through the senses. However, according to Hegel, the defect of this position of thought is that "inasmuch as, so far as content is concerned, 'Empiricism' restricts itself to what is finite, the *consistent* carrying through of its programme denies the supersensible altogether or at least its cognition and determinacy, and it leaves thinking with abstraction only, (i.e.,) with formal universality and identity."²⁷ In 'Empiricism', it would seem that objectivity stands over subjective agency in experience. In Hegel's reading, what is given immediately in sense-perception is the sole criterion of truth which overrides the understanding and what is 'ideal'. From this perspective, 'Empiricism', taken in its isolation, is a one-sided standpoint which privileges what is immediately given in sense-experience as the truth of what is. But, as Hegel charges, practically-speaking, even in its denial of the supersensible, scientific empiricism uses the metaphysical categories of the understanding in its investigations of the natural world, which would seem to be a contradiction. On the contrary, the result of taking 'Empiricism' to its extreme limit denies natural science of its metaphysical categories. To be sure, Hume defended the position that sense-perception must be taken as the primary element in the constitution of experience. One resulting problem for natural science was that we do not empirically observe causality, and therefore, Hume emphasized the notion that any hypothetical principle of 'causal connection' has no empirical grounding in perception. For Hume, the 'necessary connection' implied in the scientific notions of 'cause' and 'effect' is a habit whose origin lies beyond the immediacy of the senses.²⁸ In responding to the unmitigated Humean standpoint, Hegel's

26 **EL**, p. 77, section 38R. / "Es liegt im Empirismus diss grosse Princip, dass was wahr ist, in der Wirklichkeit seyn und für die Wahrnehmung da seyn muss." (**ENK**, p. 76, section 38R)

27 **EL**, p. 77, section 38R. / "Die consequente Durchführung, des Empirismus, in sofern er dem Inhalte nach sich auf Endliches beschränkt, läugnet aber das Uebersinnliche überhaupt oder wenigstens die Erkenntniss und Bestimmtheit desselben, und lässt dem Denken nur die Abstraction und formelle Allgemeinheit und Identität zu." (**ENK**, p. 76, section 38R)

28 A further lacuna posed by Hume's empiricism regarding the concept of causality was that it demonstrated that there was no necessary ground for conditional logic. That is to say, for Hume, there could be no empirical justification why a perceived state of affairs, 'Q', is necessarily connected to a previously perceived state of affairs, 'P', in the proposition: 'If P, then Q'. And, according to some neo-Humeans, it is for this reason that we should reassess our conceptual standpoint regarding causality and conditionality in virtue of the term 'accompaniment', such that 'Q accompanies P' rather than 'P causes Q', or 'P conditions Q'.

interpretation is that “in Humean scepticism, the *truth* of the empirical, the truth of feeling and intuition is taken as basic; and, on that basis, he attacks all universal determinations and laws, precisely because they have no justification by way of sense-perception.”²⁹ In this way, strict ‘Empiricism’ declares that the ‘supersensible’ is illusory. And, from Hegel’s perspective, while Hume’s brand of scepticism is to be viewed as an essential moment of the logical Concept, it is not fully representative of the mature comprehension of it, which is comprised by the *Logic*.

The second division of the second position of thought with regards to objectivity is that of ‘Critical Philosophy’, which includes Kantian subjective idealism. For Hegel, ‘Critical Philosophy’ shares its basis presupposition with ‘Empiricism’ in that the immediate experience of the concretely real is to be taken as the foundation for knowledge claims and truth in general. In fact, in Hegel’s perspective, ‘Critical Philosophy’ participates alongside ‘Empiricism’ in doubting the dogmatic ‘Metaphysics of the Understanding’. But, in its attempt to provide objective knowledge about the external world, namely, knowledge which is universally and necessarily true, ‘Critical Philosophy’ differs from ‘Empiricism’ in that it does not allow cognition to attain truth. That is to say, in that cognition is characterized as inherently subjective and is always mediating what is ‘real’, the ‘Critical Philosophy’ affirms that the knowledge human beings have about the external world must be limited to a knowledge of appearances, i.e., limited to a knowledge of what external objects are for us, rather than what they are in-themselves. For Hegel, “the Critical Philosophy extends the antithesis (of subjectivity and objectivity) in such a way that experience *in its entirety* falls within *subjectivity* except the *thing-in-itself*.”³⁰ Thus, the problem for ‘Critical Philosophy’ is that, on the one hand, the primary criterion of truth must be the immediate experience of a sensuous given. On the other hand, cognition is doubted to the extent that it is said to be unable to provide us with a pure form of immediacy, in which what is perceived is indeed representative of the actuality of the object. In this sense, human knowing about the objective world is said to be finite and restricted. Reason cannot penetrate to what actually is, and our knowledge of the object is to be considered a mere possibility of what is. Therefore, according to Hegel’s reading of Kant, “thoughts, although they are universal and necessary determinations, are still *only our* thoughts, and are cut off from

29 EL, p. 80, section 39R. / “Der Humesche legt die Wahrheit des Empirischen, des Gefühls, der Anschauung zu Grunde, und bestreitet die allgemeinen Bestimmungen und Gesetze von da aus, aus dem Grunde, weil sie nicht eine Berechtigung durch die sinnliche Wahrnehmung haben.” (ENK, p. 77, section 39R)

30 EL, p. 81, section 41, my emphasis. / “Aber die kritische Philosophie erweitert den Gegensatz so, dass in die Subjectivität das Gesammte der Erfahrung d. h. jene beide Elemente zusammen fällt, und derselben nichts gegenüber bleibt, als das Ding-an-sich.” (ENK, p. 79, section 41)

what the thing is *in-itself* by an impassable gulf.”³¹ In this way, one can assume that ‘Critical Philosophy’ entirely divorces objectivity from subjectivity. While the objective content of cognition is always a by-product of subjectivity and mediation, the object as it is in itself remains inaccessible to cognition. But, on the contrary, in Hegel’s view, “The true objectivity of thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts, but at the same time the In-itself of things and of whatever else is ob-jective.”³² Thus, for him, while the ‘Critical Philosophy’ is an essential moment of the development of the logical Concept, the standpoint of the *Logic* will comprise an overgrasping of the subject-object dichotomy, which differs from Kantian idealism.

The third position of thought with respect to objectivity that is taken up by Hegel is that of ‘Immediate Knowing’, which is the dialectical flip-side of ‘Empiricism’ and ‘Critical Philosophy’. Where ‘Empiricism’ asserts that the criterion of truth should be limited to what is immediately objective, and while ‘Critical Philosophy’ limits us to a knowledge of appearances, the standpoint of ‘Immediate Knowing’ asserts *faith* in reason to give us true knowledge of the external world. In Hegel’s view, the main tenet of this position of thought is that there is no experience of an object which is the product of mediation. That is to say, the fact of a content being cognized is representative of its truth. Thus, the mere fact of cognition is its criterion of truth. In Hegel’s synopsis, “What this immediate knowing knows is that the Infinite, the Eternal or God, that is (present) in our *representation* also is - that within our consciousness the certainty of its *being* is immediately and inseparably combined with our *representation* of it.”³³ Furthermore, it “makes immediacy - i.e., the way that a content is found within consciousness,

31 EL, p. 83, section 41Z.

32 EL, p. 83, section 41Z2. In clarifying his position, Hegel states that according to Kantian idealism, “the content of our consciousness is something that is *only* ours, something posited only through *us*. In fact, the true situation is that the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, not only *for us*, but also *in-themselves*, and that the proper determination of these things, which are in this sense ‘finite’, consists in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This interpretation must also be called idealism, but, as distinct from the subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy, it is *absolute idealism*. Although it transcends the ordinary realistic consciousness, still, this absolute idealism can hardly be regarded as the private property of philosophy in actual fact, because, on the contrary, it forms the basis of all religious consciousness. This is because religion, too, regards the sum total of everything that is there, in short, the world before us, as created and governed by God.” (EL, p. 89, section 45Z)

33 EL, p. 112, section 64. / “Das, was dieses unmittelbare Wissen weiss, ist, dass das Unendlich, Ewige, Gott, das in unserer Vorstellung ist, auch ist, - dass im Bewusstseyn mit dieser Vorstellung unmittelbar und unzertrennlich die Gewissheit ihres Seyns verbunden ist.” (ENK, p. 104, section 64)

and is a fact in it - into (its) principle.”³⁴ In this way, ‘Immediate Knowing’ holds to a faith in the unmediated unity of thought and being. For this position of thought, mediation is inadequate to the truth, and is thereby repudiated. It asserts that “since mediated knowledge is supposed to be restricted to a finite content, it follows that reason is *immediate knowing*.”³⁵ However, Hegel states outright that this viewpoint is held to the detriment of mediation, and thus superstition and illusion, for example, can be ‘faithfully’ declared true. Consequently, ‘Immediate Knowing’ involves a relapse to the position of the one-sided determinations of the ‘Metaphysics of the Understanding’, and is further characterized by Hegel as “an *elevation above* the sensible and the finite (which) passes over into faith in God and in the divine, (ending) there.”³⁶ While this is admirable to Hegel, he argues that mediation is essential to the criterion of truth in the *Logic* and that ‘Immediate Knowing’ is not fully representative of a mature comprehension of the logical Concept. He states,

For what is asserted from this standpoint is that neither the *Idea*, as a merely *subjective* thought, nor a mere *being* on its own account, is what is true; for being on its own account, any being that is not that of the *Idea*, is the sensible, finite being of the world. But what is immediately asserted by this is that the *Idea* is *what is true only as mediated* by being, and conversely, that being is *what is true only as mediated* by the *Idea*.³⁷

From this discussion of the section of the ‘Positions of Thought with Regards to Objectivity’ in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, it is clear that for Hegel, the ‘Metaphysics of the Understanding’, ‘Empiricism and Critical Philosophy’, and ‘Immediate Knowing’ are important moments of the whole truth which is the logical Concept. While none of these positions of thought, in their isolation, are representative of the criterion of truth in the *Logic*, together they comprise an important step towards that standpoint. In outlining these positions of thought, Hegel makes the case that cognition neither proceeds in one-sided immediacy nor in one-sided mediation. Furthermore, from this discussion, it is evident that the criterion

34 **EL**, p. 112, section 63R. / “Alle diese Formen machen auf die gleiche Weise die Unmittelbarkeit, wie sich ein Inhalt im Bewusstsein findet, eine Thatsache in diesem ist, zum Princip.” (**ENK**, p. 104, section 63R)

35 **EL**, p. 110, section 63. / “Weil aber das vermittelte Wissen nur auf endlichen Inhalt eingeschränkt seyn soll, so ist die Vernunft unmittelbares Wissen, Glaube.” (**ENK**, p. 102, section 63)

36 **EL**, p. 117, section 68, my addition. / “ein Erheben über das Sinnliche, Endliche, (...) welches in den Glauben an Gott und Göttliches übergeht und in demselben edigt.” (**ENK**, p. 109, section 68)

37 **EL**, pp. 117-118, section 70. / “Die Behauptung dieses Standpunktes is nämlich, dass weder die Idee als ein bloß subjectiver Gedanke, noch bloß ein Seyn für sich das Wahre ist; - das Seyn nur für sich, ein Seyn nicht der Idee, ist das sinnliche endliche Seyn der Welt. Damit wird also unmittelbar behauptet, dass die Idee nur vermittelt des Seyns, und umgekehrt das Seyn nur vermittelt der Idee, das Wahre ist.” (**ENK**, p. 110, section 70)

of truth in the *Logic* involves the working out of the dialectical opposition between what is 'ideal' and what is 'real', where each side has truth only through its mediation with the other. Specifically, the truth of what is 'ideal' or 'supersensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'real' or 'sensible' and *conversely*, the truth of what is 'real' or 'sensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'ideal' or 'supersensible'. This proposition represents the truth of what is *if and only if* the content of both sides, which are dialectically 'held apart', correspond in some fundamental and certain manner. In this formulation, neither what is 'ideal' can be reduced to what is 'real', nor what is 'real' can be reduced to what is 'ideal'. From this perspective, the term Absolute Idealism, used to describe the standpoint of the *Logic*, could neither be logically considered a one-sided idealism, nor realism. Rather, it is the working out of the dialectical opposition of idealism and realism, in virtue of the logical Concept. In this light, Absolute Idealism can be said at once to affirm and to overcome the respective one-sidednesses inherent to the doctrines of the 'Metaphysics of the Understanding', 'Empiricism and Critical Philosophy', and 'Immediate Knowing', as characterized by Hegel.

III. The Presupposition of Scepticism Inherent to Both Idealism and Realism

In his presentation of 'Determinate Being' in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel discusses the question of 'idealism' and 'realism' in relation to what is finite or perishable and what is infinite or not perishable. In his synopsis, the concept of 'determinate being' is explicated as what comes-to-be and what ceases-to-be, namely, what is finite. In fact, the philosophical standpoints of idealism and realism are to be defined in relation to their particular recognition of what is finite, constituting the basis for their respective scepticisms. In recognizing what is finite and perishable, scepticism goes on to negate and to pronounce the untruth, nullity, and insubstantiality of that particular content, knowledge claim, or thing. Hegel accounts for scepticism as a common element inherent in one-sided idealisms and realisms in that

the proposition that the finite is ideal (*ideell*) constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of religion: for religion does not recognize finitude as a veritable being, as something ultimate and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, eternal. Consequently, the opposition of idealism and realistic

philosophy has no significance.³⁸

In this passage, Hegel holds to the claim that philosophical idealism and realism have the same basic presupposition: they both are determinately aimed at recognizing what is finite, which is therefore to be considered untrue and insubstantial. The only question is how this is carried out by idealism and realism. To be sure, on the one hand, the sceptical attitude of 'idealistic' philosophy holds the view that "external being is present only as sublated, it is *for me*, it is *ideally* in me (and this form of the content) is declared to be the only true exclusive form in opposition to the form of objectivity or reality, of the (finite) external external existence of that content."³⁹ In this manner, idealism declares that the finite content which is 'dependent' on the 'ideal', is to be found in whatever is perceived by the senses, specifically in the 'real'. In other words, for idealism, the real is considered an illusion and the criterion of the truth of what is will be found only in the supersensible world. On the other hand, the sceptical attitude of realism holds the view that the 'dependent', finite content is to be found in the imagination, in fancies, in ideals, namely in "conceptions which are not only distinct from the real world, but are supposed to be *not* real" or, alternatively, where "the content is not present as a so-called *real existence*."⁴⁰ That is to say, for 'realistic' philosophy, the criterion of truth of what is will be in concrete empirical reality rather than in the finite, 'supersensible' world, which is illusory. Therefore, for Hegel, a basic presupposition of both 'idealistic' and 'realistic' philosophy consists in scepticism, and it is this scepticism which in turn bestows to them their respective determinacies. While a finite idealism emphasizes the finitude and the untruth with regards to what is real, and declares that the ground of the finite, 'real' content belongs to the 'ideal',

38 SL, p. 154. / "Der Satz, dass das Endliche ideell ist, macht den Idealismus aus. Der Idealismus der Philosophie besteht in nichts anderem, als darin, das Endliche nicht als ein wahrhaft Seyendes anzuerkennen. Jede Philosophie ist wesentlich Idealismus, oder hat denselben wenigstens zu ihrem Princip, und die Frage ist dann nur, inwiefern dasselbe wirklich durchgeführt ist. Die Philosophie ist es sosehr als die Religion; denn die Religion anerkennt die Endlichkeit ebenso wenig als ein wahrhaftes Seyn, als ein Letztes, Absolutes, oder als ein Nicht-gesetztes, Unerschaffenes, Ewiges. Der Gegensatz von idealistischer und realistischer Philosophie ist daher ohne Bedeutung." (WSL, *GW11*, p. 142)

39 SL, pp. 155-156, my additions. / "in der Einfachheit des Ich ist solches äusserliches Seyn nur aufgehoben, es ist für mich, es ist ideell in mir. Dieser subjective Idealismus, er sey als der bewusstlose Idealismus des Bewusstseyns überhaupt oder bewusst als Princip aufgehoben, es ist für mich, es ist ideell in mir. Dieser subjective Idealismus, er sey als der bewusstlose Idealismus des Bewusstseyns überhaupt oder bewusst als Princip ausgesprochen und aufgestellt, geht nur auf die Form der Vorstellung, nach der ein Inhalt der Meinige ist; diese Form wird im systematischen Idealismus der Subjectivität als die einzig wahrhafte, die ausschliessende gegen die Form der Objectivität oder Realität, des äusserlichen Daseyns jenes Inhalts behauptet." (WSL, *GW11*, p. 143)

40 SL, p. 155. / "Bey dem Ideellen wird vornehmlich die Form der Vorstellung gemeint, und das was in meiner Vorstellung überhaupt, oder im Begriffe, in der Idee, in der Einbildung u.s.f. ist, ideell genannt, so dass Ideelles überhaupt auch für Einbildungen gilt, - Vorstellungen, die nicht nur vom Reellen unterschieden, sondern wesentlich nicht reell seyn sollen." (WSL, *GW11*, p. 143)

a finite realism pronounces the insubstantiality of what is 'ideal', and considers that the ground of the finite 'ideal' content is the concretely 'real'. The identity of both terms is determined by the positing of its opposite, and the negation of that opposite, i.e., realism is determinately not idealism, and idealism is determinately not realism.⁴¹ However, the standpoint of the *Logic* is that of the sublation of the two sides, where the criterion of truth is to be found in a synthesis of idealism and realism.⁴²

As can be seen from the section, 'Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity' in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, as well as from the section on 'Determinate Being' in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel conducts his analysis in terms of one-sided moments in relation to the whole. For him, the term 'moment' is used to signify "something reflected" or a determination which has been or is in the process of being 'sublated' (*Aufheben*), i.e., "enter(ing) into unity with its opposite" or its limit. Thus, even Hegel's analysis proceeds, in a certain sense, in terms of recognizing finitude as what comes-to-be and what ceases-to-be. And, it might be said that Absolute Idealism is the same as a finite idealism or a finite realism in that it recognizes what is finite. However, the standpoint of Hegel's Absolute Idealism is distinct from these positions in that the finite is maintained as a part, or an aspect of the whole. His philosophical attitude in the *Logic* is not aimed at an utter rejection of what is finite, nor at dismantling

41 As an elaboration of realism and idealism in regards to the principle of identity, Hegel writes, "the negation to which (the category of reality) is opposed as the affirmative is here negation of the negation; as such it is itself opposed to that reality which finite determinate being is. The negation is thus determined as ideality; ideal being (*das Ideelle*) is the finite as it is in the true infinite - as a determination, a content, which is distinct but is not an independent, self-subsistent being, but only a *moment*. Ideality has this more concrete signification which is not fully expressed by the negation of finite determinate being. With reference to reality and ideality, however, the opposition of the finite and infinite is grasped in such a manner that the finite ranks as the real but the infinite as the 'ideal' (*das Ideelle*); in the same way that further on in the Notion, too, is regarded as an 'ideal', that is, as a *mere* 'ideal', in contrast to determinate being as such which is regarded as the real." (*SL*, pp. 149-150) Also see *WSL*, *GW21*, pp. 137.

42 K. R. Westphal, in *Hegel's Epistemological Realism* explains that "according to the sense of 'reality' Hegel adopts from the metaphysical tradition, something is 'real' only if it is self-sufficient, that is, ontologically independent. In contrast to this, Hegel holds that something is 'ideal' if (and only if) it is ontologically dependent on something else." (p. 142) Furthermore, he states that for Hegel, "the following logical (extensional) equivalences hold: (...)

(A) Self-relation = self-contained ground = ontological self-sufficiency = ontological independence = infinite = real = reality
 (B) Relation to an other = ground in an other = not ontologically self-sufficient = ontologically dependent = finite = ideal = appearance." (pp. 142-143)

However, I am interpreting Hegel to take the above formulations as seeming to pertain only to the realist. In my own view of what Hegel is getting at, the idealist will hold exactly the converse view, i.e., all the terms in 'A' up to 'infinite' pertain to the 'ideal' and 'ideality' and all the terms up to 'finite' pertain to the 'real' and 'reality'. As such, it is my contention that the sublation of the two sides in virtue of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept is an essential component of what is meant by 'Absolute Idealism'.

what is in opposition to any particular philosophical position. That is to say, in the *Logic*, Hegel does not endeavour to declare the untruth and nullity of the finite. Rather, the standpoint of the *Logic* is that of a mature comprehension of the dialectical development of the logical Concept, rooted in the notion that each determination is to be positively considered a 'moment', a part or segment of the logical and actual account of the truth of cognition. Hence, the term 'Absolute Idealism' should not be interpreted as either representing a one-sided idealism or realism.

The dialectical progression of the logical Concept is the main focus of the *Logic*. Particularly, each determination of the understanding, position of thought, aspect of cognition, or philosophical standpoint (such as idealism and realism) comes-to-be and ceases-to-be as a manifestation of the Concept. From this perspective, each finite content can be thought of as *something* over and above its other, as well as comes-to-be and ceases-to-be in virtue of its *other*. For Hegel, what is finite *is*, only in virtue of its other, and the viewpoint that the finite is what 'perishes' in its other, yet is 'lifted up', as well as is 'maintained', is what constitutes the dialectical progression of the logical Concept. Alternatively, the finite is defined by Hegel as that which is in the process of being 'sublated' (*Aufhebung*).⁴³ As Hegel explains,

At this point we should remember the double meaning of the German expression '*aufheben*'. On the one hand, we understand it to mean 'clear away' or 'cancel', and in that sense we say that a law or regulation is cancelled (*aufgehoben*). But the word also means 'to preserve', and we say in this sense that something is well taken care of (*wohl aufgehoben*). This ambiguity in linguistic usage, through which the same word has a negative and positive meaning, cannot be regarded as an accident nor yet as a reason to reproach language as if it were a source of confusion. We ought rather to recognize here the speculative spirit of our language, which transcends the 'either-or' of mere understanding.⁴⁴

Therefore, it is the standpoint of the *Logic*, that is, the standpoint of the Concept, that what is finite is not simply logically null if it is cancelled in its other, as is the case in the viewpoint of a one-sided scepticism,

43 In explicating the meaning of 'to sublate', Hegel writes that it "has the twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated. The two definitions of 'to sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary *meanings* of the word. (...) (The) affirmative determination (of the Latin *tollere*) signifies only a lifting up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a *moment*." (SL, p. 107) Also see WSL, *GW11*, pp. 94-95, Chapter Two of this dissertation, as well as the Geraets, Harris, and Suchting commentary in the EL, pp. xxvi-xxvii, xxxv-xxxvi.

44 EL, p. 154, section 96Z.

of the sort presupposed by idealism and realism. Rather, the finite is equally 'preserved' in Hegel's system. Hence, while scepticism's recognition of the finite is an important moment 'contained in' the ongoing process constitutive of cognition, scepticism itself is not fully representative of the dialectical movement of the logical Concept. It is for this reason that Hegel writes,

Being a negative science that has gone through all forms of cognition, *scepticism* might offer itself as an introduction in which the nullity of (...) (finite) presuppositions would be exposed. But it would not only be a sad way, but also a redundant one, because, as we shall soon see, the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science.⁴⁵

At any rate, the *Logic* itself is in fact representative of a mature comprehension of the activity of the logical Concept. And, the working out of the opposition of idealism and realism in virtue of the logical Concept is a fundamental aspect of any definition of Hegel's Absolute Idealism.

IV. The Standpoint of Hegel's Absolute Idealism in the *Logic*

So far, I have set forth the interpretation that from the standpoint of the *Logic*, Hegel's system of Absolute Idealism is not any form of one-sided idealism nor realism, as has been intimated from Whitehead's understanding of the paradigm of 'Absolute Idealism' stemming from the Preface to *Process and Reality*. Rather, from an analysis of the introductory sections of the *Logic*, I have suggested that for Hegel, the dialectical progression of the logical Concept takes priority over these two 'conflicting' philosophical positions, which each consist in scepticism. Each recognize finitude in the other, and pronounce the other's untruth. On the one hand, from an Hegelian perspective, idealism has its nature in refuting the 'real' as part of its criterion of truth, and on the other hand, realism has its essence in refuting the 'ideal' as part of its criterion of truth. However, in this chapter, I demonstrated that for Hegel, the truth of what is 'ideal' or 'supersensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'real' or 'sensible' and conversely, the truth of what is 'real' or 'sensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'ideal' or 'supersensible'. I believe that this proposition implying the processional working out of the dialectical opposition of idealism and realism represents the criterion of truth in the *Logic*. Thus, I have argued that the defining moment of Absolute Idealism in the *Logic* is that of the sublation of the opposition of 'ideality' and 'reality'.

⁴⁵ EL, p. 124, section 78R (my addition). / "Der Skepticismus, als eine durch alle Formen des Erkennens durchgeführte, negative Wissenschaft, würde sich als eine Einleitung darbieten, worin die Nichtigkeit solcher Voraussetzungen dargethan würde. Aber er würde nicht nur ein unerfreulicher, sondern auch darum ein überflüssiger Weg seyn, weil das Dialektische selbst ein wesentliches Moment der affirmativen Wissenschaft ist wie so gleich bemerkt werden wird." (ENK, pp. 117-118, section 78)

Similarly, it is for this reason regarding the totality of Hegel's system, and as outlined in the *Logic*, that Logic is the mediator between Spirit and Nature.⁴⁶

In view of this criterion of truth, it may be anticipated in keeping with the traditional interpretation of Hegel as an 'idealist', that, logically-speaking, the first moment in the process of cognition is 'idealistic' in nature; the second moment is 'realistic' in nature; and the third moment is the accomplished and true Idea. But, it is perhaps more accurate to say that what is logically first in Hegel's analysis, is an 'ideal' content in its passage over into 'empirical reality'; second, an 'empirically real' content in its passage over into 'ideality'; and third, the infinite unity and *correspondence* of the distinct contents in ideality and in reality. In any event, while neither the 'ideal' nor the 'real' should be said to occupy a strict position of priority over the other with respect to his criterion of truth, it should be affirmed that within the process of cognition, 'ideality' and 'reality' also remain distinct.

In Appendices #1, #2, and #3 at the end of this dissertation, I have attempted to provide creative 'One-Term Asymmetrical', 'Two-Term Symmetrical' and 'Half-Term: Asymmetry in Symmetry' interpretations of the dialectical movement of Hegel's logical Concept. I believe them to be accurate in terms of the logical structure of the dialectical progression of the Concept. However, it must be stated at the outset that these interpretations have many limitations. First, the Concept cannot be reduced to formal logic, nor is Hegel's *Logic* to be seen as a treatise on formal logic. Regarding them, we must take Hegel's comments seriously regarding the logical 'schematization' of the Concept, as well as the fact that

46 Of course, from various perspectives we could also say that Spirit is the mediator between Logic and Nature, and that Nature is equally the mediator between Logic and Spirit. In his additions, Hegel states, "being-for-itself has to be interpreted generally as *ideality*, just as, in contrast, being-there was earlier designated as *reality*. *Reality* and *ideality* are frequently considered as a pair of determinations that confront one another with equal independence, and therefore people say that apart from reality, there is 'also' an ideality. But ideality is not something that is given outside of and apart from reality. On the contrary, the concept of ideality expressly consists in its being the *truth* of reality, or in other words, reality posited as what it is in-itself proves itself to be ideality. So we must not believe that we have given to ideality all the honour that is due to it, if we simply allow that reality is not all, but that we have to recognise an ideality outside it as well. An ideality of this kind, set beside or even above reality, would in fact be only an empty name. Ideality has a content only because it is the ideality of something: and this 'something' is not merely an indeterminate this or that - on the contrary, it is being-there characterised as 'reality' - to which, when it is maintained on its own, no truth pertains. (...) The distinction between nature and spirit has been interpreted quite correctly as meaning that we must trace nature back to 'reality' as its basic determination, and spirit to 'ideality.' But nature is not just something fixed and complete on its own account, which could therefore subsist even without spirit; rather, it is only in spirit that nature attains to its goal and its truth. Similarly, spirit, for its part, is not just an abstract world beyond nature; on the contrary, it only genuinely is, and proves to be spirit insofar as it contains nature sublated within itself" (EL, p. 153, section 96Z)

the determinations are exhibited here as empty symbols.⁴⁷ Second, focusing on Appendix #2, we must note the dangerous tendency to radicalize the logical Concept in such a way as to disregard the distinctness of the determinations in their particularity and opposition. It may be said that Appendix #2 overemphasizes the sublation of the opposition of determinations 'A' and 'B' within the development of the Concept over and above their dialectical opposition.⁴⁸ That is to say, it might be said to privilege the identity of the terms instead of their non-identity. In response to these concerns, Hegel himself attempts to maintain a balance against this possibly 'one-sided' view of the speculative moment, in that, "if, for example, we say that 'The Absolute is the unity of the subjective and the objective,' that is certainly correct; but it is still one-sided, in that it expresses only the aspects of unity and puts the emphasis on that, whereas in fact, of course, the subjective and the objective are not only identical but also distinct."⁴⁹

In light of the analysis carried out in the present chapter which has argued that Hegel's Absolute Idealism is not a one-sided form of idealism nor realism, it will be useful to interpret Whitehead's comment regarding his own system's "transformation of the main tenets of 'Absolute Idealism' onto a realistic basis," as the expression of his own attempt to synthesize conflicting philosophical standpoints of idealism and realism, in his cosmology.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Whitehead's comment should be seen to point out how we are to interpret his own system, specifically, as 'provisionally-realistic' in nature. These issues will be dealt with further in Part Two of this dissertation. At any rate, in Chapter Two of this dissertation, I will attempt to elucidate Hegel's treatment of the finite and to answer two questions: first, how is the general position of Ancient Greek scepticism 'contained in' the dialectical development of the Concept? And, second, how, more explicitly, are the main concerns of Modern scepticism entrenched in Hegel's Absolute Idealism? Subsequently, in Chapter Three, I will focus on the nature and function

47 See the Preface and Introduction to the SL, where Hegel questions the 'life-less' content of formal logic. (pp. 52-53 or WSL, *GW11*, pp. 36-37)

48 And, if this overemphasis of logical synthesis as an overabundance of *neither/nor* is applied as a principle to ethical propositions, for example, the result may be nihilism. Rather, it is the case that with regards to ethical propositions in general, one attempts to 'hold' to a position without having that position overturning into its opposite. In this way, one 'takes a stand'. Perhaps this is why in *The Revelation to John* it is written to the church of Laodicea: "I know your works; you are neither cold nor hot. I wish that you were either cold or hot. So, because you are lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I am about to spit you out of my mouth." (Revelation 3.15)

49 EL, p. 132, section 82Z.

50 Whitehead, Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition, edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, p. xiii.

of scepticism as it pertains to Hegel's 'Doctrine of the Concept' in the *Logic*.

CHAPTER II

Ancient and Modern Scepticism in Hegel's *Logic*

Recent commentators have claimed that G. W. F. Hegel's system of Absolute Idealism endeavours to be representative of a 'non-' or 'anti-' sceptical standpoint.¹ Indeed, the argument might easily be made that Hegel's position is hostile to "the operations of Scepticism (which) are undoubtedly directed against the finite," an understanding set forth in his account of Ancient Greek scepticism in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*.² Hegel further charges that if we must have a characterization of Ancient Greek scepticism, then in itself it "belongs to the decay both of Philosophy and of the world" in its ongoing demonstration of the finitude and nullity of philosophizing in general.³ Similarly, Hegel responds to Modern scepticism stating that "the Scepticism of Hume (...) (has) been given a more important place in history than it deserves from its intrinsic nature; its historic importance is due to the fact that Kant really derives the starting point of his philosophy from Hume."⁴ Furthermore, in an early Jena essay entitled, "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy" (1801-1802), Hegel remarks that E. Schulze's (1761-1833) scepticism must have come into being "by pondering on the fate which has befallen every speculative involvement with the ultimate grounds of our cognition of the existence of things."⁵ From Hegel's perspective, Schulze attempted to "take hold of theoretical philosophy in general,

1 See K. Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemological Realism*, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, p. 140, where Hegel's system is described as 'non-sceptical'. Also see M. Forster's *Hegel and Scepticism*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. Particularly, see chapters seven and eight of Forster's text which attempt to advance an epistemological defense for Hegel's system against scepticism in its Ancient form. In this text, Forster also seeks to "distinguish three aspects of Hegel's relation to the sceptical tradition: his critical interpretation of views within the tradition, his pursuit within his own philosophy of history of themes arising from this critical interpretation of scepticism, and his effort to construct a philosophical position capable of withstanding the assaults of the sceptics." (p. 1)

2 Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Vol. 2), translated and edited by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1983, p. 367. / "Auf solche Weise findet der Skepticismus allerdings gegen das Endliche seine Anwendung." (Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 18 of *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by H. Glockner and C. Michelet, Stuttgart: Fromman, 1928, p. 579)

3 *LHP* (Vol. 2), p. 372. / "Dieser Skepticismus gehört dem Zerfall der Philosophie und der Welt an." (*VGP, SW18*, p. 581)

4 *LHP* (Vol. 3), p. 369. / "Es ist hier der hume'sche Skepticismus anzufügen, der mehr sich historisch merkwürdig gemacht hat, als er an sich ist; seine historische Merkwürdigkeit besteht darin, dass Kant eigentlich den Anfangspunkt seiner Philosophie von ihm nimmt." (*VGP, SW19*, p. 493)

5 Hegel, "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy," in *Between Kant and Hegel*, translated and annotated by G. di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1985, p. 314. / "ganz vorzüglich durch die Erwägung des Schicksals unterdrückt, welches alle speculative Beschäftigung mit den letzten Gründen unserer Erkenntniss des Daseyns der Dinge betroffen hat." (Hegel, *Jenaer kritische Schriften* (1801), Vol. 4 of *Gesammelte*

in order to set it on fire by means of his scepticism and burn it all to the ground.”⁶ Hence, given his incredulous reactions to both Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism, it may initially seem to be the case that Hegel’s Absolute Idealism is representative of a ‘non-’ or ‘anti-’ sceptical standpoint.

In Chapter One of this dissertation it was demonstrated pertaining to the dialectical opposition of idealism and realism, that, for Hegel, scepticism is the recognition of and negation of finitude. To be sure, scepticism, is defined elsewhere as “the art of dissolving all that is determinate, and showing it in its nullity,” and as “the demonstration that all that is determinate and finite is unstable (...) (and of the demonstration of) the finitude of all conceptions of truth.”⁷ Similarly, it was shown that his position is distinguished from scepticism in general, at least in the opening chapters of the *Logic*. For Hegel, what is finite is not regarded as simply null. Particularly, in Hegel’s analysis of the ‘Positions of Thought with Regards to Objectivity’, the standpoints of the ‘Metaphysics of the Understanding’, ‘Empiricism and Critical Philosophy’, and ‘Immediate Knowing’ are not refuted as utterly untrue. Rather, they are affirmed as finite, but essential manifestations of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept. It is in this sense that the truth is to be seen as the ‘whole’, in which these positions operate in conjunctive process. This totality of moments comprising the logical Concept is outlined as he states,

with regards to its form, the logical has three sides: (α) the side of abstraction or of the understanding, (β) the dialectical or negatively rational side, (and) (γ) the speculative or positively rational one. (...) These three sides do not constitute the three parts of the *Logic*, but are moments of everything logically real; i.e., of every concept or everything true in general.⁸

Werke, edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1977, p. 198)

6 “The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy,” in *Between Kant and Hegel*, p. 313. At the start of his essay, “Verhältniss des Skepticismus zur Philosophie,” Hegel writes in response to Schulze, “Acht Jahre, nachdem Hr. Schulz gegen die Kantische Philosophie, vorzüglich in der Form, welche sie in der Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens gewonnen hatte, mit Aufsehen aufgetreten war, umfasst er nunmehr die theoretische Philosophie überhaupt, um sie durch seinen Skepticismus in Flammen zu stecken, und bis aufs Fundament auszubrennen.” (*JKS*, p. 197)

7 *LHP* (Vol. 2), pp. 329, 330. / “Der Skepticismus hat zu allen Zeiten, und noch jeht, für den furchtbaren Gegner der Philosophie gegolten und für unbezwinglich, indem er die Kunst seh, alles Bestimmte aufzulösen, es in seiner Nichtigkeit zu zeigen.” (*VGP, SW18*, p. 538) “Ein Anderes ist aber der denkende Skepticismus welcher dieses ist, vom allem Bestimmten und Endlichen aufzuzeigen, dass es ein Wankendes ist. (...)” (*VGP, SW18*, p. 539)

8 *EL*, p. 125, section 79 and 79R, my addition. / “Das Logische hat der Form nach drei Seiten α) die abstract oder verständige, β) die dialektische oder negativ-vernünftige, γ) die speculative oder positiv-vernünftige. (...) Diese drei Seiten machen nicht drei Theile der Logik aus, sondern sind Momente jedes Logisch-Reellen, das ist jedes Begriffes oder jedes Wahren überhaupt.” (*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), Vol. 20 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969, p. 118, section 79 and 79R)

And, according to Hegel, scepticism is represented as moment (β) the dialectical moment within the logical Concept.⁹ In this light, the purpose of the present chapter of this dissertation is to come to an understanding of how both Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism can be said to be 'contained' in the general position of Hegel's *Logic*.

Here, I am arguing that scepticism is an integral aspect embedded within Hegel's system. In the *Logic* and elsewhere, scepticism is characterized by Hegel as the 'dialectical' moment which is 'contained in' the logical Concept.¹⁰ However, this characterization would seem to pertain only to Ancient scepticism. Therefore, in order to grasp more explicitly what the status of scepticism is in his system, it is necessary to proceed with respect to Hegel's distinction between its Ancient and Modern forms. From a Hegelian perspective, the distinction between Ancient Greek scepticism and Modern scepticism is parallel to the abstract distinction one could make between the logical Concept and Absolute Idealism. With this in mind, I will be able to enter into three important discussions over the course of this chapter. First, I shall consider that, for Hegel, Ancient scepticism is constitutive of the universal 'negative' or 'dialectical' moment in the progression of the logical Concept, necessary for the distinction (*Unterschied*) of finite determinations with respect to their opposites. Second, I shall elucidate that, for him, the main tenets of Modern scepticism are particularly to be associated with realism in its dialectical opposition with

9 In Hegel's view, it might be said that scepticism 'supercedes' philosophy, as in the *LHP*, he is alleged to have said that scepticism "has been held to be the most formidable, and, indeed, the invincible opponent of Philosophy. (...) Scepticism, (...) properly speaking, (...) cannot be refuted" and that "positive philosophy allows Scepticism to exist beside it; Scepticism, on the other hand, encroaches upon the domain of positive philosophy, for Scepticism has power to overcome the other, while positive philosophy cannot do the same." (*LHP* (Vol. 2), p. 329) Here, it is evident that there are two senses of the use of 'positive' philosophy. The first is that of ordinary, dogmatic, and 'finite' philosophy, which may be refuted by scepticism. The second sense is that of a description of Hegel's own philosophy, within which, scepticism is incorporated. To be more precise, from the standpoint of the logical Concept in Hegel's philosophy, each successive position of thought is 'sublated'. In this way, conceptions previously established as true are replaced by new conceptions, yet the older conceptions are 'preserved'. As such, scepticism is said to accompany the general standpoint of the *Logic*.

10 Regarding the perspective that determinations are 'contained in' the Concept, Hegel remarks, "it is clear, moreover, that what is at issue in all these transitions is more than just showing the inseparability of the Concept (or of thinking) from being. It has often been noted that *being* is nothing more than the simple relation to itself, and that this poor determination is indubitably contained in the Concept (or in thinking). The sense of these transitions is not to take up determinations simply as *contained* (in the Concept) (in the way this happens in the ontological argument for God's being-there, by means of the proposition that being is *one of the realities*). (The task here) is rather to take the Concept, the way it initially *ought* to be determined on its own account as Concept (with which this remote abstraction of being or even of objectivity has still nothing to do); and then, in its determinacy as determinacy of the *Concept* alone, to see whether, and (indeed) that this determinacy passes over into a form that is diverse from determinacy as it belongs to the Concept and appears *in it*. (*Encyclopedia Logic* (1830), translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, pp. 269-270, section 193R)

idealism, whose 'working out' is constitutive of Absolute Idealism. Third, I will demonstrate how Hegel's own position is distinct from scepticism in general in his treatment of the finite. In order to provide a preliminary conception of the nature and function of both Ancient and Modern scepticism in Hegel's speculative philosophy, it will first be necessary to examine the section, 'More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic' in the *Encyclopedia Logic*. Second, it is imperative to consider more precisely his distinction of Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism in the *Logic* and elsewhere. Third, I will elucidate Hegel's characterization of the main tenets of Ancient scepticism in relation to the dialectical progression of the logical Concept. Fourth, I shall briefly analyze the relation between Modern scepticism and his notion of Absolute Idealism. Fifth, I will distinguish Hegel's standpoint from that of scepticism, pertaining to his treatment of the finite. In the course of this analysis, the *Encyclopedia Logic*, in particular, the section, 'More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic', the sections on both Ancient and Modern scepticism in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, as well as Hegel's early essay, "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy," will be main sources.¹¹

I. Scepticism as 'Contained In' Hegel's Logical Idea

Hegel's notion of 'sublation' (*Aufhebung*) is demonstrative of the dialectical progression of cognition in which finite determinations pass over into their opposites and reconcile themselves in a positive unity: a movement which is constitutive of the logical Concept (*Begriff*). In the section, 'More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic', Hegel sets forth the interpretation of what constitutes the logical Idea in general. Drawing from the previous section on the 'Positions of Thought with Regards to Objectivity', he isolates the three moments which comprise the logically real. To recapitulate, the first moment is that of the 'understanding' which posits one sided and finite determinations regarding the objective.¹² But, for Hegel, the 'understanding' is responsible for both dogmatism and the 'oppositions of consciousness', since it proceeds in an 'either / or' fashion. Thus, the "abstract thinking of the

11 While different editors and commentators have published the Haldane and Simson translation of the LHP, it is the only full available English version of Hegel's writings and lectures on the history of philosophy. In this edition, student notes, additions, etc..., have been added to the main body of Hegel's text.

12 Hegel further explains that "the activity of the understanding consists generally in the bestowing of the form of universality on its content; and the universal posited by the understanding is, of course, an abstract one, which is held onto in firm opposition to the particular. But as a result, it is itself determined also as a particular again. Since the understanding behaves toward its ob-jects in a way that separates and abstracts them, it is thereby the opposite of immediate intuition and feeling (*Empfindung*), which, as such, deal entirely with the concrete and stick to that." (EL, p. 126, section 80Z)

understanding is so far from being something firm and ultimate that it proves itself, on the contrary, to be a constant 'sublation' of itself and an overturning into its opposite."¹³ The second moment is the 'dialectical' or 'negative' moment which is the "self-sublation of (the) finite determinations (of the understanding) on their own part, and their passing into their opposites."¹⁴ Interestingly enough, Hegel defines the second moment as a 'self-sublation (...) on their own part' rather than 'sublation' by another. This theme will be returned to later in our assessment of Hegel's treatment of the finite. At any rate, in the logical Idea, scepticism has its place as the dialectical moment in recognizing the finitude of the one-sided determinations of the 'understanding', and in refuting them. Thus, "the dialectical, taken separately on its own by the understanding, constitutes scepticism (...). Scepticism contains the mere negation that results from the dialectic."¹⁵ In this way, for Hegel, scepticism is representative of the negativity of the dialectical moment, although recognizing this is part of the third or 'speculative' moment of the logical Idea. Particularly, the third moment is the 'speculative' moment which "apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and in their transition."¹⁶ This third moment is that of 'speculative' or, alternatively, 'positive' philosophy and has the "consciousness that it has the negation of scepticism in itself; thus it does not oppose it, nor is outside of it, for scepticism is a moment in it. But this is true in such a way that this philosophy comprehends in itself the negative of its truth, as it is not present in Scepticism."¹⁷ Therefore, in Hegel's perspective, scepticism is to be seen as 'contained in' the logical Idea of speculative philosophy, rather than pursued as an end-in-itself declaring the absolute nullity of everything finite. To be sure, he writes that scepticism

is often regarded as an irresistible foe of any positive knowledge, and hence of philosophy too, so far as the latter deals with positive cognition. In response to this it needs to be remarked that in fact it is only the finite and abstract thinking of the understanding that has anything to fear from

13 EL, p. 133, section 82Z.

14 EL, p. 128, section 81. / "Das dialektische Moment ist das eigene Sich-Aufheben solcher endlichen Bestimmungen und ihr Uebergehen in ihre entgegengesetzte." (ENK, p. 119, section 81)

15 EL, p. 128, section 81R. / "Das dialektische vom Verstande für sich abgesondert genommen, macht insbesondere in wissenschaftlichen Begriffen aufgezeigt den Skepticismus aus; er enthält die blosse Negation als Resultat des Dialektischen." (ENK, p. 119, section 81R)

16 EL, p. 131, section 82. / "Das Speculative oder Positiv-Vernünftige fasst die Einheit der Bestimmungen in ihrer Entgegensetzung auf, das Affirmative, das in ihrer Auflösung und ihrem Uebergehen enthalten ist." (ENK, p. 120, section 82)

17 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 330. / "Die positive Philosophie kann über ihn dies Bewusstseyn haben: Sie hat das Negative des Skepticismus in ihr selbst, er ist nicht ihr entgegengesetzt, nicht ausser ihr, sondern ein Moment derselben, aber das Negative in seiner Wahrheit, wie es der Skepticismus nicht hat." (VGP, *SW18*, p. 539)

scepticism, and that cannot resist it; (...) (Speculative) philosophy, on the other hand, contains the sceptical as a moment within itself - specifically as the dialectical moment.¹⁸

As a whole, the three moments of the 'understanding', the 'dialectical', and the 'speculative', operating conjunctively in process, comprise the logical Idea as well as form the ground of the criterion of truth offered by the *Logic*. As alluded to in Chapter One of this dissertation, for Hegel, the truth of what is 'ideal' or 'supersensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'real' or 'sensible' *and conversely*, the truth of what is 'real' or 'sensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as what is 'ideal' or 'supersensible'. Similarly, both sides of this proposition are affirmed by Hegel as moments of the criterion of truth of the *Logic*, which is worked out in virtue of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept. Also, the working out of these two sides is synonymous with the dialectical progression of 'Being' and of 'Essence' in the development of the Concept. As he writes, "only the Concept is what is true, and, more precisely, it is the truth of Being and Essence. So each of these, if they are clung to in their isolation, or by themselves, must be considered at the same time as untrue - *Being* because it is still only what is *immediate*, and *Essence* because it is still only what is *mediated*."¹⁹ Consequently, Hegel's elaboration of 'Being', 'Essence', and the 'Concept' constitute the three main divisions of the *Encyclopedia Logic*. For this reason, later, I shall discuss more explicitly how scepticism is 'contained in' the criterion of truth involving the dialectical progression of the logical Concept. However, in order to come to a full grasp of the nature of scepticism within the standpoint of the *Logic*, I shall have to come to a comprehension of Hegel's general distinction of Ancient and Modern scepticism.

II. Hegel's General Distinction of Ancient and Modern Forms of Scepticism

In the section, 'More Precise Conception and Division of the *Logic*', Hegel makes a general distinction between the Ancient Greek Scepticism of Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrho, and the Modern Scepticism of Hume and Schulze, although he admits that there are many common elements between these two branches of scepticism. In Hegel's view, scepticism

is completely certain about its central point (*Sache*), i.e., the nullity of everything finite. (...) (For this reason) Scepticism proper, (...) is complete despair about everything that the understanding

18 **EL**, p. 131, section 81Z2.

19 **EL**, p. 134, section 83Z.

holds to be firm, and the disposition that results is imperturbability and inward repose. This is the high ancient scepticism, as we find it presented specifically in Sextus Empiricus, and as it was developed in the later Roman period as a complement to the dogmatic systems of the Stoics and the Epicureans. This ancient high scepticism must not be confused with the modern one, (...) which partly preceded the Critical Philosophy and partly grew out of it. This consists simply in denying that anything true and certain can be said about the supersensible, and in designating, on the contrary, the sensible and what is present in immediate sense-experience as what we have to hold onto."²⁰

Therefore, for Hegel, while Ancient Greek scepticism focuses on the dialectic in general, in universally refuting the one-sided determinations of the 'understanding', Modern scepticism is concerned with a particular denial of the 'supersensible' in representing the truth of what is. This distinction is echoed in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, where he adds, "The older Scepticism must further be distinguished from the modern, and it is only with the former that we have to do, for it alone is of a true, profound nature: the modern more resembles Epicureanism."²¹ Thus, Ancient Greek scepticism has a deeper significance, for him, than does Modern scepticism. Particularly, on the one hand, "modern Scepticism is only directed against thought, against the Concept and the Idea, and thus against what is in a higher sense philosophic; it consequently leaves the reality of things quite unquestioned, and merely asserts that from it nothing can be argued as regards thought."²² Modern sceptics "make it fundamental that we must consider sensuous Being, what is given to us by sensuous consciousness, to be true; all else must be doubted."²³ On the other hand, Ancient scepticism "was really far from holding things of immediate certainty to be true; thus it actually stands in contrast to modern scepticism, in which it is believed that what is in our immediate consciousness, or indeed, all that is sensuous, is a truth."²⁴ Therefore, in Hegel's synopsis, Ancient scepticism could be said to be more significant than Modern scepticism. In distinction from Modern scepticism, Ancient scepticism could oppose any finite

20 EL, pp. 130-131, section 81Z2.

21 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 331. / "Es muss alter Skepticismus vom neuen unterschieden werden, wir haben es nur mit jenem zu thun; er ist wahrhafter, tiefer Natur. Der neue Skepticismus ist eher Epikureismus." (VGP, *SW18*, p. 540)

22 LHP (Vol. 2), pp. 331-332. / "Der neuere Skepticismus ist nur gegen Gedanken, Begriff und Idee gerichtet, also gegen das höhere Philosophische; er lässt also die Realität der Dinge ganz unbezweifelt dastehen, und behauptet nur, dass sich daraus nichts für den Gedanken schiefen lässt." (VGP, *SW18*, p. 557)

23 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 331. Hegel's comment here is specifically aimed towards the scepticism of "Schulze and others." / "In diesem modernen Skepticismus wird angenommen, dass das, was in unserem unmittelbaren Bewusstseyn ist, alles Sinnliches ein Wahres sey." (VGP, *SW18*, p. 557)

24 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 347. This quotation appears in Haldane's translation.

determination regardless of whether it would speak of the truth of the 'ideal' or the 'empirically real'. From his analysis, if it was to the benefit of the sceptic, she could recognize the finitude of both in her argumentation. That is to say, the Ancient sceptics, in contrast to the Modern sceptics, are able to "proceed directly against empiricism. (If) something is by immediate certainty given out as being true, the opposite of this last is from some other point of view demonstrated to be equally true," by the Ancient sceptics.²⁵ In this way, for Hegel, contrary to Modern scepticism, Ancient scepticism could set "what is felt, and what is thought, in opposition, whether it be the sensuous to the sensuous, and what is thought to what is thought, or what is sensuous to what is thought, or what is thought to what is sensuous, i.e., showing that any one of these has as much force and weight as its opposite, and is hence equivalent."²⁶

From these passages, it is clear that Ancient Greek scepticism is considered to be more profound than Modern scepticism. As one commentator has suggested, for Hegel, Ancient scepticism is 'superior' to Modern scepticism.²⁷ However, in my opinion, the word 'superior' is misleading here. Rather,

25 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 356. / "verfahren, - unmittelbar gegen das Empirische. Es wird von der unmittelbaren Gewissheit Etwas al wahr ausgegeben; von diesem wird sein Gegentheil als ebenso gewiss nur aufgezeigt, also sein Anderseyn als geltend, - in irgend einem Gesichtspunkte wird auch das Richtgelten aufgewiesen." (VGP, SW18, pp. 566-567)

26 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 343, from *Pyrrh. Hyp. I c. 4*, sections 8-10. / "es seh, das Sinnliche dem Sinnlichen und das Gedachte dem Gedachten oder das Sinnliche dem Gedachten oder das Gedachte dem Sinnlichen entgegenzuheben, - d. h. einen Widerspruch derselben gegen einander aufzuzeigen" (VGP, SW18, pp. 553-554)

27 According to M. Forster in Hegel and Scepticism, p. 2, Hegel "draws a sharp distinction between the characters of ancient and modern scepticism, and holds that while ancient scepticism is of great philosophical importance, modern scepticism has little or no philosophical merit. Hegel's account of the difference between ancient and modern scepticism and his argument for the superiority of the former over the latter emerge as both original and, by and large, convincing. (...) The modern reader of Hegel is likely to have a conception of scepticism based on acquaintance with its modern rather than its ancient forms. For this reason, it is essential to understand the Hegelian views on the nature and comparative value of ancient and modern scepticism just alluded to in order to preserve the role that scepticism plays within the broader framework of his own philosophy." Also, in Forster's view, pp. 11-12, Hegel "holds (...) that modern scepticism has in general lost sight of the method of equipollence, and, as a consequence, has had recourse to procedures for calling the belief or set of beliefs into question which essentially rely on the presupposition of some other belief or set of beliefs. This makes modern varieties of scepticism essentially *dogmatic* in the sense of being founded on beliefs themselves vulnerable to sceptical attack, and hence restricted in scope, in a way that ancient forms of scepticism were enabled not to be by virtue of their possession of the equipollence method. Hence the sorry tale which Hegel tells in *The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy* of the gradual degeneration into dogmatism of the sceptical tradition through history. The tradition began with 'the old and genuine scepticism' of the ten tropes of Aenesidemus but already in the five tropes of Agrippa entered a decline into dogmatism, which proceeded 'until (scepticism) finally in the most recent times sinks so far with dogmatism that now for both the facts of consciousness possess undeniable certainty and for both truth lies in the temporal sphere.'" In this way, Forster argues that because of the inherent dogmatism in the Modern sceptical standpoint, Hegel is lead to claim "that modern scepticism is inferior to ancient scepticism." (p. 35)

pertaining to his own system, his distinction of the two forms of scepticism is parallel to the abstract distinction one could make between the logical Concept on the one hand, and the standpoint of Absolute Idealism on the other. Thus, it could be loosely said that Ancient scepticism has 'universal' application, while Modern scepticism is concerned with a 'particular' set of claims regarding the empirically real as the truth of what is. This interpretation is fair since, while the former is 'universally' focused on demonstrating the nullity of all finite determinations, the latter applies itself 'particularly' to the repudiation of the 'supersensible' as an element of any conception of truth. In a parallel manner, while the dialectical progression of Hegel's logical Concept is representative of the "general principle of all motion, of all life, and of all activation in the actual world," and moreover, is defined as the infinite and universal truth of all determinations, Absolute Idealism, i.e., the particular working out of the Concept in terms of the opposition of 'idealism' and 'realism', can be said to be a particular instance or manifestation of the Concept's ongoing development.²⁸ Thus, while the Concept could be said to designate the ongoing movement of the totality of moments, Absolute Idealism is characteristic of a specific movement with infinite significance. From this perspective, while Ancient scepticism pertains generally to a discussion of the logical Concept, Modern scepticism pertains particularly to a discussion of that movement of thought characteristic of the notion of Absolute Idealism. Following from this distinction, on the one hand, the main tenets of Ancient Greek scepticism can be said to be 'contained in' the logical Concept since, according to Sextus Empiricus, its "main principle (or method), (...) is that of opposing to every proposition / argument (*logos*) an equal proposition / argument (*logos*); for we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize."²⁹ In this way, Ancient scepticism is primarily constitutive of the demonstration of the 'equipollence' (*isostheneia*) of all propositions and arguments in general. The main doctrine of Ancient Greek scepticism is that for every argument there is an opposing argument of equal force, and the sceptic is concerned with setting up the opposition in order to bring about a suspension of belief (*epochē*) and quietude. On the other hand, Modern scepticism's empiricist concerns can be said to be 'contained in' the movement particular to Absolute Idealism. With this distinction in mind, in order to come to a more explicit understanding of the nature and function of scepticism within Hegel's system, it will be necessary to examine Ancient scepticism in relation to the movement of the logical Concept, and Modern scepticism in relation to the specific movement constitutive of Absolute Idealism.

28 EL, pp. 128-129, section 81Z1.

29 Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, in *Sextus Empiricus I*, translated by R. G. Bury, London: Loeb Classical Library, 1976, bk. I, ch. 6, from M. Forster, *Hegel and Scepticism*, p. 10, (my additions)

III. Ancient Scepticism as 'Contained In' Hegel's Logical Concept

In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel isolates the main purposes of Ancient Greek scepticism in its setting up of oppositions to all finite determinations in general, in order to 'balance out' the force of dogmatic assertions. He describes that the Ancient sceptics were masters of the dialectic, and they used their talent in order to carry out a specific purpose. Particularly, Hegel is alleged to have quoted Sextus Empiricus in pronouncing that

the effective principle of Scepticism (...) is the hope of attaining to security. Men of distinguished excellence, disquieted through the instability of things, and dubious as to which should in preference be given assent to, began the investigation of what is the truth and what is false in things, as if they could reach imperturbability through the decision of such matters. But while engaged in this investigation, man attains the knowledge that opposite determinations (...) 'have equal power' (...) (and) in this way he cannot decide between them, he really only then attains to imperturbability when he withholds his judgment.³⁰

Therefore, in his synopsis, one of the main tenets of Ancient scepticism was to show that all determinations have an equal and opposite determination which at once contradicts and balances out the former. This ongoing demonstration of the equipollence of all determinations was advanced in order to attain a state of mind marked by unperturbedness (*ataraxia*), passiveness, and calm, as well as to temper the force of powerful, dogmatic ideas. In setting up these oppositions, the Ancient sceptics could then suspend their judgment (*epochē*), and thus, "withhold (both their) assent and dissent."³¹ But, conversely, in this demonstration, a significant idea's lack of effectiveness was equally to be avoided. Hence, the Ancient sceptics "wanted tranquillity, not paralysis; a peaceful life, not an imitation of death."³²

As Hegel notes, the Ancient sceptics proceeded in their ongoing demonstration of the equipollence of finite determinations by way of the 'tropes' (*tropoi*), consisting in particular 'modes' or 'strategies' used to oppose and to undercut the force of dogmatic claims, leading to their *epochē*. The dialectical content of the tropes ranged from 'the differences in human beings' and 'the different

30 LHP (Vol. 2), pp. 341-342, from Pyrrh. Hyp. I c. 6, section 12, and c. 12, sections 25-30. This quotation is part of Haldane's translation. See VGP, *SW18*, pp. 551-552.

31 S. G. Etheridge (trans.) and P. P. Hallie (ed.), Sextus Empiricus: Selections from the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man, and God, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985, p. 14, my addition.

32 S. G. Etheridge (trans.) and P. P. Hallie (ed.), Sextus Empiricus: Selections from the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man, and God, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985, p. 7.

structures of the organs of sense', to 'circumstantial conditions' and 'the facts of relativity'.³³ In strategically setting up an opposition to any claim, Hegel notes that the Ancient sceptics strictly considered that all conceptions were alike in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. Therefore, in Hegel's view, Ancient scepticism would not tend to privilege any judgment or determination over its opposite, including those pertaining to the opposition of 'immediate consciousness' and 'thinking consciousness', and of what is 'real' and what is 'ideal'. Most importantly for him, Ancient scepticism, in contrast to Modern scepticism, could hold "an attitude of negativity in relation to both, (...) only recogniz(ing) them as true in their abrogation."³⁴ Hegel highlights the fact that while many of the earlier tropes were aimed at the negation of the truth of what is in objective immediacy, many of the later tropes were aimed at the negation of the truth of what is in reflection. In his analysis, the earlier ten tropes

are directed against (...) a consciousness which has sensuous existence immediately before it. (...) (They) proceed against the common belief in the immediate truth of things (...) but the five (later tropes) proceed against reflection (...) against thought-forms, scientific categories, (...) and the determination of the same through Notions.³⁵

Therefore, for Ancient scepticism, both idealism and realism could be negated and their opposition would be declared a nullity, like all other pairs of opposed viewpoints.³⁶ However, Hegel surmises that while

33 See R. J. Hankinson, The Sceptics, New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 155-181, and J. L. Saunders (ed.), Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle, New York: The Free Press, 1966, pp. 152-182.

34 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 344. More fully, Hegel is alleged to have stated that, "immediate consciousness and thinking consciousness, comprehend everything which is in any way to be set in opposition. In as far as Scepticism limits itself to this, it is a moment in Philosophy itself, which last, having an attitude of negativity in relation to both, only recognizes them as true in their abrogation. But Scepticism thinks that it reaches further; it sets up a pretension of venturing against the Speculative Idea and conquering it; Philosophy, however, since Scepticism itself is present in it as a moment, rather overcomes it." (pp. 343-344) / "Insofern der Skepticismus sich hierauf beschränkt, so ist er ein Moment der Philosophie selbst, die, ebenso negativ gegen Beides gerichtet, es nur als ein Aufgehobenes als wahr erkennt. Allein der Skepticismus meint, er reich noch weiter; er hat sich die Präntension, sich an die Idee zu wagen und die Spekulative Idee zu überwinden. Allein diese hat den Skepticismus selbst als Moment in ihr, und ist wieder über ihn hinaus." (VGP, *SW*18, p. 553)

35 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 346, my additions. / "Es wird aus ihren Angaben erhellen, dass jene älteren gegen das gemeine Bewusstseyn überhaupt gerichtet sind, und einem wenig gebildeten Denken angehören, - einem Bewusstseyn, welches zunächst das sinnlich Seyende vor sich hat. Sie gehen gegen das, was wir den gemeinen Glauben an die Wahrheit der Dinge nennen, und widerlegen sie auf ebenso unmittelbare Weise, nicht durch den Begriff, sondern das entgegengesetzte Seyn. Sie haben auch in ihrer Aufzählung diese Begriffslosigkeit. Die fünf späteren aber haben mehr Interesse. Sie gehen die Reflexion auf ein Bewusstseyn, welches sich auf den ausgebildeten Verstand bezieht, gegen wissenschaftlich Kategorien, - gegen das Gedachtseyn des Sinnlichen, gegen die Bestimmung desselben durch Begriff." (VGP, *SW*18, p. 556)

36 It is in this way that Ancient scepticism can be said to encompass the scepticism inherent in both idealist and realist positions. While this is similar to Hegel's own standpoint, his own point of view is that Ancient scepticism erred in that it did not come to an understanding of the logical Concept. This point will be further

"Ancient Scepticism did not (actually) spare itself the pains of demonstrating this contradiction or antinomy in every notion which confronted it," that was indeed its intent.³⁷ To be sure, Hegel writes, "Because the sceptical conscience demonstrates that in all that is immediately accepted there is nothing secure and absolute, the Sceptics have taken in hand all particular determinations (...) and have shown that they are not fixed."³⁸ As such, Hegel's interest in the strategies of Ancient scepticism pertain to the negative workings against all that is finite, which were intended to be carried out as an end-in-itself, *ad infinitum*. In his view, Ancient scepticism participates as the 'dialectical' moment within the logical Concept, regardless of the particularity of the determinations in question. Furthermore, the main principle of Ancient scepticism is, at once, the antithesis to all positive philosophy, as well as proves to be its ground, a standpoint which Hegel had acquired long before writing the *Logic*.

Hegel's early essay, "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy" was written in Jena five years before the completion of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and eleven years before the *Science of Logic* (1812). However, in it, Hegel criticizes G. E. Schulze's analysis of Ancient scepticism in *Aenesidemus*, thus setting the groundwork for his position regarding scepticism in his later writings. Here, Hegel closes in on how the main tenets of Ancient scepticism are said to be 'contained in' speculative philosophizing. In the early essay on scepticism, Hegel isolates the main principle of Ancient scepticism pertaining to the equipollence of finite determinations in their passing over into their opposites. It is summarized as: "panti logōi logos isos antikeitai," meaning that 'against every argument there is an equal one on the other side'.³⁹ And, according to Hegel, the Ancient sceptics used this method in attempting to balance out the force of all finite determinations *ad infinitum*. Hegel further explains that it is within "the tropes of Sextus Empiricus (that) the universal essence of (Ancient) scepticism is very truly preserved for us, so that every further development of scepticism could not be anything but the

developed in Chapter Three of this dissertation where I show how Ancient scepticism, idealism, and realism can be said to participate in the unfolding of Hegel's criterion of truth.

37 SL, p. 191. This quotation does not appear in the WSL, *GW11*, p. 114, but it is part of A. V. Miller's translation of the Lasson edition (1923) of the *Science of Logic*.

38 LHP (Vol. 2), p. 365. / "Diess ist nun der Skepticismus überhaupt, das skeptische Bewusstseyn; das Verfahren ist von der höchsten Wichtigkeit, in allem unmittelbar Angenommen aufzuzeigen, dass es nichts Festes, nichts an und für sich ist. Und die Skeptiker haben so alle besonderen Bestimmungen der einzelnen Wissenschaften vorgenommen, und gezeigt, das sie nichts Festes sind." (VGP, *SW18*, p. 577)

39 "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy," in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 325. / "so tritt das Princip des Skepticismus: παντι λογῳ λογος ισος αντικειται, in seiner ganzen Stärke auf." (JKS, p. 208)

continual repetition in active use of one and the same universal method.”⁴⁰ Similarly, in emphasizing the monotony, yet invincibility, of the endless negation of determinations, Hegel describes the main principle of Ancient scepticism as

the eternal repetition of that antithesis which leads to organic breakdown and the nihil negativum is on its negative side a perpetual pouring of water into a sieve, and from its positive side, it is the continual and mechanical application of one and the same rule of understanding (...); this application of the rule is like the labor of a woodcutter who ever strikes the same blow.⁴¹

However, although it could be said that Hegel’s logical Concept is itself representative of this eternal negativity, in his essay, Hegel defends the view that it is not the purpose of speculative philosophy to carry out the infinite negation of the finite. Rather, scepticism is itself an essential moment within the ongoing process that constitutes genuine philosophical articulation, but is not to be taken as an end-in-itself. It is for this reason that he writes that

without the determination of the true relationship of scepticism to philosophy, and without the insight that scepticism itself is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy, and hence there is a philosophy which is neither a scepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once, without this, all the histories, and reports, and new editions of scepticism lead to a dead end. The *sine qua non* for the cognition of scepticism, this relationship of scepticism to philosophy, not to some dogmatism or other, this recognition of a philosophy that is not a dogmatism, in fine, therefore, the concept of a philosophy as such, (has been overlooked by Schulze and others).⁴²

Therefore, even in this early essay, Ancient scepticism is characterized by Hegel as the negative side of positive or speculative philosophy in general, and in some ways, may be said to be in unity with it. And,

40 “The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy,” in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 322, my additions. / “theils dass in den Tropen des Sextus Empiricus uns das allegemeine Wesen dieses Skepticismus sehr treu aufbewahrt ist, so dass jede sonstige Ausführung des Skepticismus nichts seyn könnte, als die in der Anwendung vorkommende Wiederholung einer und eben derselben allgemeinen Weisen.” (JKS, p. 206)

41 “The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy,” in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 341. / “die ewige Wiederholung jenes Gegensatzes aber, der auf Desorganisation und das nihil negativum ausgeht, ist von seiner negativen Seite ein ewiges Giessen des Wassers in ein Sieb, von seiner positiven Seite aber, die beständige und mechanische Anwendung einer und eben derselben verständigen Regel, daraus nie neue Form aus Form hervorkommt, sondern immer dasselbe mechanische Werk gethan wird; diese Anwendung gleicht der Arbeit eines Holzhackers, der immer denselben Streich führt, oder eines Schneiders, der für eine Armee Uniformen zuschneidet.” (JKS, p. 206)

42 “The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy,” in Between Kant and Hegel, pp. 322-323, my additions. / “Ohne die Bestimmung des wahren Verhältnisses des Skepticismus selbst aufs innigste Eins ist, und dass es also eine Philosophie gibt, die weder Skepticismus noch Dogmatismus, und also beydes zugleich ist, können alle die Geschichten und Erzählungen und neue Auflagen des Skepticismus zu nichts führen. Das Wesentlich zur Erkenntniss des Skepticismus, dieses Verhältniss desselben zur Philosophie, nicht zu einem Dogmatismus, die Anerkennung einer Philosophie, die nicht ein Dogmatismus ist, überhaupt also der Begriff einer Philosophie selbst, ist es, was Hrn. Sch. Entgangen ist.” (JKS, p. 206)

"Every genuine philosophy has this negative side, or always sublates the principles of contradiction."⁴³ Moreover, Hegel acknowledges that the Platonic form of dialectical thinking was demonstrative of a philosophy which could be said to be wedded to scepticism. Specifically, the Platonic form of scepticism is, for him, "itself the negative side of the cognition of the Absolute, and directly presupposes Reason as its positive side."⁴⁴

From Hegel's early scepticism essay, it is clear that the main principle of Ancient scepticism is quite intimately linked with his own standpoint. However, the distinction must be made that

philosophy does not stop at the merely negative result of the dialectic, as is the case with scepticism. The latter mistakes its result, in so far as it holds fast to it as mere, i.e., abstract, negation. When the dialectic has the negative as the result, then, precisely as a result, this negative is at the same time the positive, for it contains what it resulted from sublated within itself, and it cannot be without it.⁴⁵

Therefore, speculative philosophy posits the negated determinations as 'maintained' within the Concept.

43 "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy," in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 325. / "Da jede ächte Philosophie diese negative Seite hat, oder den Satz des Widerspruchs ewig aufhebt." (JKS, p. 209)

44 "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy," in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 323. / "Dieser Skepticismus macht nicht ein besonderes Ding von einem System aus, sondern er ist selbst die negative Seite der Erkenntnis des Absoluten, und setzt unmittelbar die Vernunft als die positive Seite voraus." (JKS, p. 207)

This 'unity' of scepticism and philosophy is also alluded to as Hegel further asks, "Does not the transcendental lie precisely in (the main principle of Ancient scepticism), that there is neither things nor a character of things? (...) What more perfect and self-sustaining document and system of genuine scepticism could we find than the *Parmenides* in the Platonic philosophy? It embraces the whole domain of (...) knowledge through concepts of understanding, and destroys it." (p. 323)

In this vein of affirming scepticism in Plato, in the introduction to Plato: Complete Works, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co., 1997, J. M. Cooper (ed.) writes, "in Plato's own Academy, beginning only a couple of generations after Aristotle's death, the dialogues were read differently. They were taken to express a sceptical philosophy, one that raises questions about everything, examining the reasons pro and con on each issue, but always holds back from asserting anything as definitely established, as known to be the case. This reading works best, of course, for the Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates makes much of the fact that he does not actually know anything himself and can only examine and criticize the well-groundedness of other people's opinions who think that they do. But Arcesilaus (third century B. C.), one of Plato's successors as head of the Academy, who first adopted such a sceptical mode of philosophizing and defended it as genuinely Platonic, is reported to have owned a complete set of Plato's writings - apparently that was an unusual thing in those days - so apparently he studied them all. And indeed, even the last of Plato's works can sustain the sceptical reading if one takes account of the fact that, formally at least, as I have emphasized myself, Plato never speaks in his own person when any of his characters does: even a main character like the Athenian in *Laws* or the visitor from Elea, who does not hesitate to speak dogmatically himself, as if he had full possession of the truth on the matters he discourses upon, can still be read as putting something forward that Plato the author is presenting merely for examination and criticism. This 'sceptical' Platonism held the field in the Academy for the best part of two centuries, until Antiochus of Ascalon early in the first century B. C. refused any longer to accept the skeptical interpretation of Plato's own dialogues." (pp. xciii-xxiv)

45 EL, p. 131, section 81Z2.

And, for him, scepticism, with its ongoing demonstration of the nullity of all finite determinations is to be taken as the 'dialectical' moment together with the moments of the 'understanding' and of 'speculative' philosophy, which comprise the logical Idea. Specifically, the main principle of Ancient scepticism as the 'dialectical' moment within the logical Concept, is characterized by, but not limited to, a negation of the finite determinations of the 'understanding', which, in turn, yields the resulting 'speculative' moment, where the truth is said to be the whole movement just outlined.

In Hegel's system taken as a philosophy of identity, the main principle of Ancient scepticism participates intrinsically to the overall dialectical progression of the logical Concept. Particularly, the fundamental principle of Ancient scepticism coincides with the negative moment of the process by which the identity of determinations is achieved, as elucidated in the *Logic*. While Ancient scepticism sets up the non-identity of two opposed yet equal determinations posited by the understanding, speculative philosophy posits the identity-in-difference of the two determinations. In the section, 'The Doctrine of Essence' in the *Logic*, Hegel asserts that "it is of great importance to reach an adequate understanding of the true significance of identity, and this means above all that it must not be interpreted as abstract identity, i.e., as identity that excludes distinction."⁴⁶ Rather, according to him, "there is no identity without distinction," and conversely, it must be stated equally that 'there is no distinction without identity'.⁴⁷ While the 'understanding' is recognized as positing finite determinations, the main principle of Ancient scepticism is the demonstration of their contradiction. In Hegel's view, this moment is essential to the distinction (*Unterschied*) of two finite determinations of the 'understanding', and the dialectical moment yields the identity (*Identität*) of those determinations as opposed to each other. However, in virtue of the 'dialectical' moment, the unity of those determinations is posited in the 'speculative' moment.⁴⁸ To make this explicit, there are three moments that, when taken together, are

46 EL, p. 181, section 115Z.

47 EL, p. 195, section 125Z.

48 According to the translators of the EL, "*Unterschied* belongs properly to the doctrine of essence and has to be distinguished from the otherness of *Daseyn*. It is not the distinction of reflection; in absolute distinction (A and non-A) the terms are distinct in virtue of 'the simple not'. Hegel stresses the importance of grasping absolute distinction as simple, i.e., as relating to itself, as self-distinction. 'But what is distinct from the distinction is the identity. It (distinction) is therefore itself (i.e., distinction) and identity.' Both distinction and identity are at the same time the whole and one of its moments. Although distinction develops into 'diversity' which implies comparison by a third and is a moment that 'repeats' the otherness of *Daseyn*, and further into the 'antithesis' and 'opposition' of what is positive and what is negative, it must always be understood in its essential opposition to (or distinction from) identity. *Identität* and *Unterschied* are opposed in virtue of the *Scheidung*, or separation, that negates the unseparatedness of identity. In making our terminological choice we should, as is often the case, take our cue from

constitutive of the logical Concept. The first moment is that of the 'understanding' which is representative of the positing of a particular finite determination. For Hegel, "Thinking as understanding stops short at the fixed determinations vis-à-vis other determinacies; such a restricted abstraction counts for the understanding as one that subsists on its own account, and (simply) is."⁴⁹ The second moment is the 'dialectical' or 'sceptical' moment where a particular determination *passes over into its opposite*, bringing the first into contradiction with a second. Hence, this 'dialectical' moment consists in the negation of the first determination. Thinking establishes the first determination's distinctness with respect to its opposite, and thus its identity with respect to that opposite. For Hegel, "the dialectical moment is

the verb: *unterscheiden* means 'to distinguish'. We must not forget, however, that Hegel frequently speaks of *sich unterscheiden* ('to distinguish itself'). Indeed, the logical distinctions are not just our work; they are produced by the logical 'subject', i.e., the Concept, itself. *Unterschied* is more akin to the *distinctio realis* than to the *distinctio rationis tantum* of traditional metaphysics. It is in no way due to a purely subjective act. 'Reason' in the Hegelian sense does, of course, produce (and overcome) distinction, but then, for Hegel, logic is metaphysics; *distinctio rationis* is *distinctio realis*.

"Although we recognise that *Unterschied* can mean 'difference', this happens because 'distinction' itself can and must sometimes be understood in this way. But *Unterschied* does not always, or even principally, mean 'difference'. The more fundamental meaning is 'distinction'. And since there is great advantage in using only one English word to translate a logical term of such capital importance and its cognates, we have chosen to translate *Unterschied* always by 'distinction'. This terminological choice gives us the additional bonus of feeling 'difference' for the translation of *Differenz*.

"For Hegel, *Differenz* characterises the second moment that follows the first simple and undeveloped unity of determination, and that precedes the third moment of 'return from *Differenz* into simple self-relation' (Section 85). This intermediate position gives the term a double meaning. On the one hand, what is different is more developed than what remains in its simple, initial unity. On the other hand, what is different is more developed than what remains in its simple, initial unity. *Different* thus means 'differentiated' (...) and *Differenz* 'differentiation'. (...) These terms are akin to 'particular' and 'particularisation' (*Besonderung*). On the other hand, what is different can resist the return to self-relation. Under this aspect, *Differenz* does not mean a finitude awaiting to be transcended, but a dualism that attempts to prevent its assumption into a new articulated unity and tries to absolutise itself. We then have something quite close to the radical difference (or difference) of the postmodernists.

"The most apt translation for *Differenz* is simply 'difference', a term to be interpreted, like the German term itself, in a more positive, developmental, or a more rigid or even absolute way, according to the context in which it occurs." (pp. xxiii-xxiv)

According to the minority translator, "It is crucial to note that Hegel uses *Differenz* in two senses. (...) (a) *Differenz* is used to designate the stage at which the initial apparent simplicity, unity, immediacy of a category is ruptured, when its implicit complexity becomes explicit and it shows itself to be mediated. The newly 'posited' moments attain apparent independence. It is the stage of 'particularity'. (It is followed by a third stage, where the various moments of the category, thus revealed in the stage of *Differenz*, exhibit themselves as aspects of a unified whole.) (...) (b) *Differenz* is also used in a way best approached through the adjective *different*. (In 1942) *different* is introduced through its negative, indifferent. Hegel writes that something is indifferent if it 'contains difference' (*Unterschied*), but the diverse items behave indifferently (*gleichgültig*) towards one another, and their combination is only external to them.' Conversely, items are *different* if they "are what they are only through their relation to one another." (p. xlv)

49 EL, p. 125, section 80. / "Das Denken als Verstand bleibt bei der festen Bestimmtheit und der Unterschiedenheit derselben gegen an dere stehen; ein solches beschränktes Abstractes gilt ihm als für sich bestehend und seyend." (ENK, p. 118, section 80)

the self-sublation of these finite determinations on their own part, and their passing into their opposites.”⁵⁰ Third, the ‘speculative’ moment is demonstrative of the identity-in-difference of two finite determinations, through the negation of the dialectical moment. Thus, “the speculative or positively rational apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and in their transition.”⁵¹

Hegel’s notion of ‘sublation’ (*Aufhebung*) points directly to dialectical movement of the logical Concept, as alluded to above.⁵² *Aufheben* has a three-fold meaning within itself. In the German

50 *EL*, p. 128, section 81. / “Das dialektische Moment ist das eigene Sich-Aufheben solcher endlichen Bestimmungen und ihr Uebergehen in ihre entgegengesetzte.” (*ENK*, p. 119, section 81)

51 *EL*, p. 131, section 82. / “Das Speculative oder Positiv-Vernünftige fasst die Einheit der Bestimmungen in ihrer Entgegensetzung auf, das Affirmative, das in ihrer Auflösung und ihrem Uebergehen enthalten ist.” (*ENK*, p. 120, section 82) In terms of the transitions into the sphere of Essence, in the speculative moment, thought apprehends the unity of the distinct determinations, as *shining into one another* (Schein).

52 While A. V. Miller translates ‘Aufheben’ as ‘to sublate’, the translators of the *EL* have a mixed opinion. In the view of T. F. Geraets and H. S. Harris, “with *aufheben*, there is no problem about the meaning, because Hegel explains the term (in its systematically ambiguous use) as clearly as it can be explained. But there has always been the controversy about how it should be rendered. One tradition allows the translator to decide whether the ‘cancelling’ or the ‘preserving’ moment is dominant, and to use a battery of words to render different supposed shades of meaning. But the perfect determinacy of Hegel’s logical Concept forbids us to take this route (which being the road of subjective arbitrariness, is a thoroughly bad one in any event). So, for this fundamental name of the logical movement of the Concept, we have had to decide between ‘sublation’, an artificial logical word that comes closest to being systematically ambiguous in the right way. *Aufheben* is a very ordinary word in German; the English ‘put by’ has most of the same ambiguity, though without the element of ‘raising up’. But ‘put by’ would be as alien in logical discourse as ‘sublate’ is in vernacular speech (and about as empty of all obvious meaning). In the end, our majority has decided that even ‘suspend’ is out of place in pure logic. So only ‘sublate’ will be found in our translation.

“Hegel uses *übergreifen* to express the positive aspect of the process of *Aufhebung*. The concept that results from speculative ‘comprehension’ (*begreifen*) reaches back and ‘overgrasps’ the opposition of the moment produced by thought in its dialectical stage.” (*EL*, p. xcvi)

However, according to W. A. Suchting’s minority view on the translation, the Concept would take on a more ‘sceptical’ or dialectical character, as he states, “*Aufheben* (...) is an ordinary German word, which (as Hegel explains in section 96A) has the double meaning of ‘do away with’ and ‘preserve’. He uses the word in both nontechnical and technical senses. As to the former, the first of the two meanings just listed (...) is the usual one. As to the latter, he makes use of both meanings to mark his conception of the way in which one logical category successively does away with and also includes an immediately preceding one.

“The present translation does not clearly recognise the distinction between Hegel’s nontechnical and technical uses, rendering *aufheben* as if he always uses it in the second way. If the distinction were to be respected, there would be no difficulty at all about the first, for there are many English words (‘cancel’, ‘abolish’, and so on) that would do the job quite satisfactorily. It is the second, technical use that gives trouble. Since the publication of J. H. Stirling’s *The Secret of Hegel* (1865), the standard English rendering has been ‘sublate’. Now (...) the term appears first in English about the mid-sixteenth century, with the meaning ‘remove’, including removing by destroying. It appears again in nineteenth-century logic books (as early as 1838), where it means ‘deny’, ‘contradict’. Stirling simply imposed on it the extra semantic dimension of ‘include’, ‘preserve’, for the sole purpose

language, it simultaneously stands for 'preservation' (*conservare*), 'cancellation' (*tollere*), and 'to lift up' (*elevare*), which, in turn, characterize the three moments of the logical Concept. In my own view, as will be further elucidated in Chapter Seven of this dissertation, we should treat these three meanings as equal moments in what we mean by 'sublation' and in our interpretation of what Hegel means by the logical Concept. Furthermore, I am claiming that the meaning of the 'cancellation' of a finite determination is representative of the 'sceptical' moment embedded within the logical Concept, in distinction from the 'preservation' and the 'lifting up' of the finite content. More generally, the term *Aufhebung* has been translated to mean: 'to surpass while maintaining', and also, 'suspension'. In any case, I have now elucidated how the main principle of Ancient scepticism is indeed an integral aspect of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept, but it must be reiterated that Ancient scepticism is not limited to a negation of the determinations of the 'understanding'. For it may further attempt to demonstrate the absolute nullity of 'ideality' and 'reality' in general.

IV. Modern Scepticism in Relation to Hegel's Absolute Idealism

In Hegel's general distinction of scepticism in its Ancient and Modern forms as set forth in the *Logic* and elsewhere, it is affirmed that while the main tenet of Ancient scepticism attempts to balance out the force of all one-sided finite determinations and showing them in their nullity, Modern scepticism focuses on the particular opposition to what is 'supersensible' in general with respect to the truth of what is. Hegel's brief examination of Humean scepticism in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* as well as his early essay responding to Schulzean scepticism supplements the *Logic* with respect to the place of

of having an English word with a meaning to match the dual meaning of *aufheben*. So it is clear that this involves the rendering of an ordinary German word by a quite extraordinary English one that by the nineteenth century lived on only in manuals of logic and that as a translation of *aufheben* was completely factitious.

"Is there an English word which is both ordinary and has the dual sense of something's being put out of action whilst continuing to exist. In addition, it has strong etymological similarities to *aufheben*: *sus-* is a form of *sub-*, which can signify 'from below' and consequently 'on', and *pend* is the stem of the verb *pendere*, 'hang', whilst *aufheben* is formed from *auf*, meaning 'on', and *heben*, 'lift'. These etymologies reflect the logical features of the operation of *aufheben*. A category that is *aufgehoben* 'hangs' from the next higher one in the sense of being dependent upon it, having been 'lifted' into that position by the dialectical process. The only objection I have heard against this suggestion is that 'suspend' has an overtone of temporariness, which *aufheben*, at least in Hegel's technical use of it, does not. But, on the one hand, there is nothing incoherent in the idea of something's being suspended indefinitely, and, on the other hand, a category that is *aufgehoben* in Hegel's logic is once more in play when it is abstracted from the larger context in which it has been shown to be a mere 'moment', as it regularly is by the 'understanding'. Even if the objection were judged to be sound, still, taking everything into account, a very good case can be made that 'suspend' comes incomparably closer to *aufheben* than 'sublate' does, and therefore should be employed in the absence of a better rendering." (pp. xxxv-xxxvi)

Modern scepticism in relation to the working out of the dialectical opposition of 'ideality' and 'reality', characteristic of the standpoint of Absolute Idealism.

In a short section in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel takes Hume's empiricism as the main tenet of Modern scepticism. Here, Hegel contrasts Hume's perspective with that of the Ancient sceptics. He suggests that the "distinction (that) marks it off from the older scepticism, (is constitutive of the notion) that now the certainty of reality is made the starting point."⁵³ In Hegel's synopsis, Hume consistently adheres to what is empirically and immediately given to perception as the criterion of truth of what is, to the extent that it leads Hume to a denial of determinations of universality and necessity. That is to say, in Hegel's reading of Hume, the determinations of universality and necessity are not contained in, nor are they given to us in experience. Rather, they are only subjectively existent. As Hegel states,

Hume starts directly from the philosophic standpoint of Locke and Bacon, which derives our conceptions from experience, and his scepticism has the idealism of Berkeley as its object. The sequence of thought is this: Berkeley allows all ideas to hold good as they are; in Hume the antithesis of the sensuous and the universal has cleared and more sharply defined itself, sense being pronounced by him to be devoid of universality.⁵⁴

In Hegel's analysis, he advances the notion that Hume took Locke's realism to its radical conclusion. Consequently, Hegel charges that for Hume "experience is (...) the principle of whatever one knows, (...) perception itself contains everything that happens, but nevertheless the determinations of universality and necessity are not (...) given to us by experience."⁵⁵ One example Hume pointed to was the fact that we do not immediately perceive the necessary connection that is implied in causality. Thus, for Hume, the concept of causality is not legitimate in the face of concrete experience. On the contrary, as Hegel notes, the relations of causality arise "by reason of the principle of custom or habit of conjoining different

53 **LHP** (Vol. 3), p. 363, my additions. / "Diese Form hat es im Skepticismus, aber mit dem Unterschied, dass hier die Gewissheit der Realität zu Grunde liegt." (**VGP**, *SW19*, p. 487)

54 **LHP** (Vol. 3), p. 370. / "Die Hauptsache ist kurz zu erwähnen. Er geht aus von dem locke - baconischen Standpunkt der Philosophie, Erfahrungs-Philosophie. (...) Der hume'sche Skepticismus hat unmittelbar die lockesche Philosophie zu seinem Gegenstande, wie den berkeley'schen Idealismus. Die Fortbildung in Anfehlung des Gedankens ist die: Berkeley lässt alle Begriffe stehen; in Hume hat sich der Gegenhab des Sinnlichen und Allgemeinen gereinigt und schärfer ausgesprochen, - das Sinnliche ist als leer an Allgemeinheit bestimmt." (**VGP**, *SW19*, pp. 494-495)

55 **LHP** (Vol. 3), p. 371. / "Hume vollendete den Lockeanismus, indem er konsequent darauf aufmerken gemacht hat, dass wenn man sich auf diesen Standpunkt hält, die Erfahrung zwar die Grundlage ist von dem, was man weiss, die Wahrnehmung selbst Alles enthält, was geschieht, dass aber in der Erfahrung nicht enthalten find, uns nicht gegeben würden die Bestimmungen von Allgemeinheit und Nothwendigkeit." (**VGP** (Vol. 3), *SW19*, p. 495)

manifestations, i.e., by reason of the principle of the association of ideas. Hence, there is no knowledge and no metaphysic beyond experience.”⁵⁶ And, he further criticizes Hume for one-sidedly unseating the objectivity of thought-determinations in the constitution of experience. In this way, it would seem that Hegel marks Hume’s position off as a one-sided, and therefore, finite, form of realism.

Elsewhere, in regards to Modern scepticism, Hegel repeats the same criticism. In his early essay on scepticism, he accentuates the fact that Schulzean scepticism also defends empiricism to the detriment of the ‘supersensible’ in respect to the truth of what is. Hegel summarizes that Schulzean scepticism “holds fast to the given, the fact, the finite (whether this finite is called ‘appearance’ or ‘concept’), and sticks to it as certain, secure, as eternal.”⁵⁷ Hegel asks, “What then is left of scepticism in this latest version, which places its truth and certainty in the most blatant limitedness both of empirical intuition, and of empirical knowledge (...)?”⁵⁸ Similarly, in critical response to Schulze’s view, he surmises that when the Modern sceptic “weighs up (...) the *capacity of the human mind* to arrive at a real and secure cognition, he finds himself disposed not to be able to see how a cognition of the supersensible could ever come to pass (...) as long as the *equipment of the human cognitive faculty does not change*.”⁵⁹

56 LHP (Vol. 3), p. 371, from Hume, *Essays and Treatises*, Vol. III, section 4, Pt. I, pp. 43-45. / “Die Kenntniss dieser Kausal-verbinding entsteht nicht aus Schlüssen a priori, sondern lediglich aus Erfahrung; und wir schliessen, indem wir ähnliche Folgen von ähnlichen Ursachen erwarten, aus dem Princip der Gewohnheit der Verknüpfung verschiedener Erscheinungen oder Association der Vorstellungen. Es giebt daher keine Erkenntnis ausser der Erfahrung, keine Metaphysik.” (VGP, *SW*19, p. 496)

57 “The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy,” in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 339. / “Dieser Skepticismus ist demnach gegen die Philosophie gar nicht, und auf eine eben nicht philosophische, sondern populäre Weise gegen den gemein Menschenverstand oder das gemeine Bewusstseyn gewendet, welches das Gegebene, die Thatsache, das Endliche, (diess endliche heisse Erscheinung, oder Begriff) festhält, und an ihm als einem Gewissen, Sichern, Ewigen klebt.” (JKS, p. 215)

58 “The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy,” in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 332. / “Was bleibt denn nun für diesen neuesten Skepticismus, der in der grellsten Beschränktheit sowohl der empirischen Anschauung, als des empirischen Wissens, das die empirische Anschauung in Reflexion verwandelt, und sie nur zu analysiren, nichts aber zu ihr hinzuzusetzen vermeynt, - seine Wahrheit und Gewissheit setzt, vom Skeptizismus übrig?” (JKS, pp. 222-223)

59 “The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy,” in Between Kant and Hegel, p. 346. / “Aus diesen Gründen, sagt Hr. Sch. (...), sehe sich der Skeptiker bewogen, wenn er den eigentlich Zweck der Philosophie, und seine Bedingungen, und zugleich die Fähigkeit des menschlichen Gemüths, zu einer realen und sichern Erkenntnis zu gelangen, in Erwägung zieht, nicht einsehen zu können, wie jemahls ein Erkenntnis des Uebersinnlichen zu Stande kommen solle, wenn anders sich die Einrichtung des menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögens nicht ändert, wie wohl kein Vernünftiger erwartet, und worauf hin eine Hoffnung zu nähren thöricht seyn würde.” (JKS, p. 229)

In these ways, Hegel considers that the main tenet of Modern scepticism is to be found in its defense of empiricism. While he emphasizes that Modern scepticism may offset dogmatic metaphysical claims, he also considers it to be a finite perspective on the way to the cognizance of the Absolute. As I have already stated, the notion of 'Absolute Idealism' is to be defined as the working out of the dialectical opposition of 'idealism' and 'realism' in virtue of the logical Concept. In Hegel's assessment, the Modern sceptic gives little weight to the 'supersensible' in terms of the truth of what is, and recognizes it as finite. Hence, for him, the negativity of the Modern sceptic, is one-sidedly directed against finite 'ideality'. As such, it is clear that, in Hegel's view, the empirical realist concerns of Modern scepticism, as opposed to idealism, pertain directly to the transition of finite idealism into Absolute Idealism.

V. Hegel's Treatment of the Finite (*das Endliche*) in the *Logic*

In the *Logic*, Hegel's discussion of the finite pertains to his notion of 'sublation'. For him, the self-relating determinations of the understanding as well as all entities in general are finite, i.e., are null, or, are in the process of becoming null. In the same manner as the Ancient sceptics, he holds that all determinations contain the dialectic within themselves. The dialectic, thus, may be said to 'accompany' all determinations. That is to say, they all 'perish' or *pass over* into their limit. In relation to this movement,

the dialectic is the genuine nature that properly belongs to the determinations of the understanding, to things, and to the finite in general. Reflection is initially the transcending of the isolated determinacy and a relating of it, whereby it is posited in the relationship but is nevertheless maintained in its isolated validity. The dialectic, on the contrary, is the *immanent* transcending, in which the one-sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of the understanding displays itself as what it is, i.e., as their negation. That is what everything finite is: its own sublation. Hence, the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression, and it is the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science, just as all genuine, non-external elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ EL, p. 128, section 81R. / "In ihrer eigenthümlichen Bestimmtheit ist die Dialektik vielmehr die eigene, wahrhafte Natur der Verstandesbestimmungen, der Ding und des Endlichen überhaupt. Die Reflexion ist zunächst das Hinausgehen über die isolirte Bestimmtheit und ein Beziehen derselben, wodurch dies in Verhältniss gesetzt, übrigens in ihrem isolirten Gelten erhalten wird. Die Dialektik dagegen ist diss immanent Hinausgehen, worin die Einseitigkeit und Beschränktheit der Verstandesbestimmungen sich, als das was sie ist, nämlich als ihre Negation, darstellt. Alles Endliche ist diss, sich selbst aufzuheben. Das Dialektische macht daher die bewegende Seele des wissenschaftlichen Fortgehens aus, und is das Princip, wodurch allein immanenter Zusammenhang und Nothwendigkeit in den Inhalt der Wissenschaft kommt, so wie in ihm überhaupt die wahrhafte nicht äusserliche Erhebung über das Endliche liegt." (ENK, p. 119, section 81R)

In this way, the finite, including determinations and things in general, is to be defined as that which sublates itself, and what overturns into its opposite. For Hegel, the dialectic itself is that which constitutes the movement of the logical Concept. And, for him,

everything around us can be regarded an example of dialectic. For we know that, instead of being fixed and ultimate, everything finite is alterable or perishable, and this is nothing but the dialectic of the finite, through which the latter, being implicitly the other of itself, is driven beyond what it immediately is and overturns into its opposite.⁶¹

However, in recognizing what is finite, Hegel's position in the *Logic* is not to determinately show it in its nullity, *ad infinitum*, as is the case of Ancient scepticism. In his view, the sublation of the finite occurs of its own accord. The finite "is not restricted merely from the outside; rather, it sublates itself by virtue of its own nature, and passes over, of itself, into its opposite."⁶² Furthermore, the endless negation of the finite as in the case of the Ancient sceptics, is, for him, demonstrative of the 'spurious infinity'. In regards to the 'spurious infinity', Hegel states that

this infinity is spurious or negative infinity, since it is nothing but the negation of the finite, but the finite arises again in the same way, so that it is no more sublated than not. In other words, this (negative) infinity expresses only the requirement that the finite *ought* to be sublated. This progress *ad infinitum* does not go beyond the expression of the contradiction, which the finite contains, (i.e.,) that it is just as much something as its other, and (this progress) is the perpetual continuation of the alternation between these determinations, each bringing in the other one.⁶³

For Hegel, there is little necessity for an ongoing demonstration of the nullity of everything finite as in the case of the Ancient sceptics, since the finite is what perishes of its own accord and without external influence by another. It is for this reason that Hegel holds that scepticism in general is only representative of the 'dialectical' moment of the logical Concept, and fails to acknowledge that the finite is equally 'preserved' as it is null. This notion of 'preservation' (in ideality) of the finite distinguishes Hegel's thought from that of scepticism. That is to say, what is finite is not only what is in the process of being

61 EL, p. 130, section 81Z1.

62 EL, p. 129, section 81Z1.

63 EL, p. 149, section 94, my addition. / "Diese Unendlichkeit ist die schlechte oder negative Unendlichkeit, indem sie nichts ist, als die Negation des Endlichen, welches aber ebenso wieder entsteht, somit eben so sehr nicht aufgehoben ist, - oder diese Unendlichkeit drückt nur das Sollen des Aufhebens des Endlichen aus. Der Progress ins Unendliche bleibt bei dem Aussprechen des Widerspruchs stehen, den das Endliche enthält, dass es sowohl Etwas ist als sein Anderes, und ist das perennirende Fortsetzen des Wechels dieser einander herbeiführenden Bestimmungen." (ENK, p. 131, section 94)

Perhaps more clearly, Hegel states that the 'infinite progression is not the genuine Infinite, which consists rather in remaining at home with itself in its other, or (when it is expressed as a process) in coming to itself in its other. It is of great importance to grasp that the concept of true Infinity in an adequate way, and not just stop at the spurious infinity of the infinite progress." (EL, p. 149, section 94Z)

nullified. Rather, the finite is seen by Hegel as the positive limit of the infinite, for the perishing of the finite is how the infinite manifests itself. The finite is therefore 'preserved' in the infinite and is 'elevated' in the logical Concept. To be sure, he writes that the finite,

"in its passing into another, (...) only comes together with itself; and this relation to itself in the passing and in the other is *genuine Infinity*. Or, if we look at it negatively: what is changed is the *other*, it becomes the *other* of the *other*. In this way being is reestablished, but as negation of negation. It is now being-for-itself (ideal)."⁶⁴

Thus, the very accomplished fact of the identity or 'being' of the finite, in virtue of its other, is representative of its genuine infinite 'preservation' of the finite (in ideality). It is remarked,

in *being-for-self* the determination of *ideality* has entered. *Being-there*, taken at first only according to its being or its affirmation, has *reality*; and hence finitude, too, is under the determination of reality at first. But the truth of the (empirical) finite is rather its *ideality*. In the same way the infinite of the understanding, which is put *beside* the finite, is itself also only one of two finites, something-untrue, something-ideal. This ideality of the finite is the most important proposition of philosophy, and for that reason every genuine philosophy is *Idealism*. Everything depends on not mistaking for the Infinite that which is at once reduced in its determination to what is particular and finite. - That is why we have here drawn attention to this distinction at some length; the basic concept of philosophy, the genuine Infinite, depends on it.

In this way, for Hegel, the accomplished truth of the finite is the genuine infinite, i.e., the finite as 'preserved' (in ideality), and conversely, that the genuine infinite (i.e., the Concept) is the truth of the finite. The genuine infinite in the *Logic* is also not a dogmatic infinite. Rather, it is the unity of itself and the finite.⁶⁵

It is clear that the dialectical moment of negation, demonstrating the absolute nullity of everything finite, as in scepticism, is not representative of Hegel's standpoint in the *Logic*. But, the dialectical opposition of finite determinations, tempered with the 'speculative' moment of their unity, (where neither the 'dialectical', nor the 'speculative' have strict priority) is representative of the basic

64 **EL**, p. 151, section 95, my addition. / "Etwas ist im Verhältniss zu einem Anderen, selbst schon ein Anderes gegen dasselbe; somit da das, in welches es übergeht, ganz dasselbe ist, welches übergeht, - beide haben keine weitere als eine und dieselbe Bestimmung, ein Anderes zu seyn, - so geht hiemit Etwas in seinem Uebergehen in Anderes nur mit sich selbst ist die wahrhafte Unendlichkeit." (**ENK**, p. 131, section 95)

65 Also see the elaboration of the dialectic between finitude and infinitude in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (Vol. 1), translated and edited by M. J. Petry, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1978, pp. 71-77, section 386, R, and Z.

perspective of the *Logic*.⁶⁶ Similarly, in the movement of the logical Concept, the finite is 'cancelled' but is also equally 'elevated' and 'preserved'. Moreover, for Hegel, the *Aufhebung* may be said to accompany scepticism. Thus, for him, the 'end result' of the dialectic is not the empty nullity of the finite.⁶⁷ In this respect, his point of view in the *Logic* is distinct from the main tenets of both Ancient and Modern scepticisms in their ongoing recognition and negation of the finite. A further consideration is that, on the one hand, for Hegel, the 'dialectical' or 'sceptical' moment enables the finite to make itself distinct and to become determinate. To support this view, Hegel quotes Spinoza in stating positively that "the basis of all determinacy is negation (*omnis determinatio est negatio*)."⁶⁸ And, on the other hand, alluding to the process by which the identity of determinations is posited, the converse assertion may be equally affirmed: that the basis of all 'sceptical' negation is determinacy, pointing to the fact that "something only is what it is *within* its limit and by *virtue* of its limit (*Grenze*)."⁶⁹

VI. Preliminary Conception of the Nature of Scepticism in Hegel's *Logic*

Thus far, I have shown that scepticism is an integral part of the standpoint of the *Logic*. In so doing, I discussed how scepticism is 'contained in' the logical Concept as the dialectical moment of 'cancellation', and I elucidated Hegel's general distinction between Ancient and Modern scepticism. On the one hand, the main principle of Ancient scepticism is the recognition of the finitude and nullity of all determinations whatsoever, and is characterized by Hegel as the 'dialectical' moment of the logical Concept. On the other hand, the main tenet of Modern scepticism is taken by Hegel as the recognition of the finitude of ideality with regards to the truth of what is, and belongs to the working out of the

66 Later on, in the 'Doctrine of the Concept' of the *SL*, the 'dialectical' viewpoint will be affirmed as 'analytic', and the 'speculative' vantage point will become the 'synthetic'.

67 Regarding the endless sceptical refutation of philosophies in general, Hegel states, "when people talk about a philosophy's being refuted, they usually take this first in a merely abstract, negative sense - in other words, as meaning that the refuted philosophy is simply no longer valid at all, that it is set aside and done with. (...) But, although it must certainly be conceded that all philosophies have been refuted, it must also equally be affirmed that no philosophy has ever been refuted, nor can it be. This is the case in two ways. First, every philosophy worthy of the name always has the Idea as its content, and second, every philosophical system should be regarded as the presentation of a particular moment, or a particular stage, in the process of development of the Idea. So, the 'refuting' of a philosophy means only that its restricting boundary has been overstepped and its determinate principle has been reduced to an ideal moment." (*EL*, p. 138, section 86Z2)

68 *EL*, p. 147, section 91Z.

69 *EL*, p. 148, section 92Z.

dialectical opposition of idealism and realism in virtue of the logical Concept, a movement characteristic of Absolute Idealism. Therefore, my preliminary conception of scepticism is that it is the recognition and negation of finitude. Subsequently, it has been demonstrated that Hegel's position in the *Logic* and elsewhere, is that in its demonstration of the nullity of the finite, *ad infinitum*, does not acknowledge that the accomplished finite is the infinite. That is to say, that in the 'cancellation' of the finite, it is just as equally 'lifted up' and 'preserved' as it is null. Therefore, it is to be surmised that the other moments contained in the meaning of 'sublation' (*Aufhebung*) accompany scepticism. In this way, the distinctness of the general position of the *Logic* from both Ancient and Modern scepticism, as understood by Hegel, has become evident.

In the present analysis, I have not sought to ask whether Hegel's reading of the sceptical traditions is generous, or justified. Rather, here, I have attempted to elucidate Hegel's own understanding of scepticism as it participates within his own system. In the next chapter, I will continue to investigate the nature and function of scepticism in Hegel's speculative philosophy, focusing on 'The Doctrine of the Concept' in both the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia Logic*.

CHAPTER III

The Role of Scepticism in Hegel's 'Doctrine of the Concept'

The focus of the present chapter is Volume Two of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, entitled, 'The Doctrine of the Concept' (1816) and its corresponding section in the *Encyclopedia Logic*. In these sections, Hegel articulates more precisely, the relation of the different forms of scepticism to his philosophical standpoint of Absolute Idealism. Furthermore, it is in 'The Doctrine of the Concept' that he seeks ultimately to 'sublate' "the fundamental principle common to the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte (namely) (...) the absoluteness of finitude and, resulting from it, the absolute antitheses of finitude and infinity, reality and ideality, the sensuous and the supersensuous, and the beyondness of what is truly real and absolute."¹ Hence, in 'The Doctrine of the Concept', Hegel further develops his criterion of truth in relation to the working out of the opposition between 'ideality' and 'reality', as I alluded to in Chapter One and Chapter Two above.² The following discussion will be focused on the role of scepticism with regard to the 'Idea' as a standard of truth and meaning.

Thus far, in this dissertation I have analyzed Hegel's characterization of the workings of three different forms of scepticism in relation to the overall standpoint of the *Logic*: in particular, 1.) the scepticism inherent to idealism in its recognition (and negation) of the finitude of what is 'empirically real', 2.) the Modern scepticism defending empiricism in its recognition (and negation) of the finitude of

1 Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge* (1803), translated and edited by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1977, p. 62. / In characterizing the standpoints of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte, he writes, "Innerhalb dieses gemeinschaftlichen Grundprinzips, der Absolutheit der Endlichkeit und des daraus sich ergebenden absoluten Gegensatzes von Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit, Realität und Idealität, Sinnlichen und Uebersinnlichen, und des Jenseitsseyns des wahrhaft Reellen und Absoluten bilden diese Philosophien wieder Gegensätze unter sich, und zwar die Totalität der für das Princip möglichen Formen." (From *Glauben und Wissen* in *Jenae kritische Schriften*, Vol. 4 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968, p. 321)

2 In 'The Doctrine of the Concept', Hegel asks, "What is truth? (...) the aim of attaining truth is, as everyone knows, something given up and long since set aside, and that the unattainableness of truth is recognized even among professional philosophers and logicians." (Hegel, *Science of Logic* (1812, 1816, 1832), translated by A. V. Miller, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969, p. 575) In this section, Hegel seeks to answer the question which Kant raises: "in what relation do the *Concept* and the *science of the Concept* stand to truth itself (?)" (p. 590) In pointing to the limitations of Kant's philosophy in attaining truth, Hegel states that "when Kant, (...) comes to discuss the old and famous question: *what is truth?* he first of all *presents* to the reader as a triviality the explanation of the term as the agreement of cognition with its object - a definition of great, indeed of supreme, value. If we remember this definition in connection with the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism, that reason as cognitive is incapable of apprehending things-in-themselves, that *reality* lies *absolutely* outside the Concept, then it is at once evident that a *reason* such as this which is unable to put itself in agreement with its object, the things-in-themselves, and *things-in-themselves* that are not in agreement with the Concept of reason, the Concept that is not in agreement with reality, and a reality that does not agree with the Concept, are *untrue* conceptions." (p. 593)

what is 'ideal', and 3.) Ancient scepticism which recognizes the absolute finitude and nullity of all determinations whatsoever, including those pertaining to 'ideality' and 'reality' as to the truth of what is.³ It will be the aim of the present chapter to elucidate the role of these forms of scepticism in relation to the Concept's working out of the opposition between idealism and realism, yielding the standpoint of Absolute Idealism.

To recapitulate, the sequence of analysis in Part One of this dissertation has been as follows: in Chapter One, I argued that an important aspect of any definition of Hegel's standpoint of Absolute Idealism was the working out of the opposition between idealism and realism in virtue of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept.⁴ In Chapter Two, I demonstrated that, for Hegel, scepticism consists in the recognition (and negation) of finitude, comprising the 'dialectical' moment of the logical Concept. Here, in Chapter Three, in order to grasp fully the nature and function of scepticism in Hegel's speculative philosophy, it will be necessary to outline the role of scepticism in its recognition (and negation) of finitude as it pertains to the working of the dialectical opposition of idealism and realism in virtue of the ongoing development of the logical Concept. I shall undertake this task by presenting an examination of Hegel's 'Doctrine of the Concept' in relation to the question of scepticism, focusing primarily on the subsection, 'the Idea'. I demonstrate that scepticism, in its various forms, is the motivating element in the satisfaction of the criterion of truth representative of Absolute Idealism,

3 Regarding the respective scepticisms of idealism and realism, Hegel writes, "*Illusory being* is the phenomenon of (Modern) scepticism, and the Appearance of idealism, too, is such an *immediacy*, which is not a something or a thing, in general, not an indifferent being that would still be, apart from its determinateness and connexion with the subject. (Modern) Scepticism did not permit it to say 'It is'; modern idealism did not permit itself to regard knowledge as a knowing of the thing-in-itself; the illusory being of (Modern) scepticism was supposed to lack any foundation of being, and in idealism the thing-in-itself was not supposed to enter into knowledge. But at the same time (Modern) scepticism admitted a multitude of determinations of its illusory being, or rather its illusory being had for content the entire wealth of the world. In idealism, too, Appearance embraces within itself the range of these manifold determinatenesses. This illusory being and this Appearance are *immediately* thus manifoldly determined. This content, therefore, may well have no being, no thing or thing-in-itself at its base; it remains on its account as it is; the content has only been transferred from being into an illusory being, so that the latter has within itself those manifold determinatenesses, which are immediate, simply affirmative (*seiende*), and mutually related as others. Illusory being is, therefore, itself *immediately* determinate. It can have this or that content; whatever content it has, illusory being does not posit this itself but has it immediately. The various forms of idealism, Leibnizian, Kantian, Fichtean, and others, have not advanced beyond being as determinateness, have not advanced beyond this immediacy, any more than (Modern) scepticism did. (Modern) scepticism permits the content of its illusory being to be given to it; whatever content it is supposed to have, for (Modern) Scepticism it is *immediate*." (SL, p. 396, my additions)

4 Hegel attributes the dialectical movement of the logical Concept not only to the determinations of the understanding but equally to 'actuality'. This point distinguishes Hegel's Absolute Idealism from the Kantian subjective idealism.

namely, in the correspondence and 'infinite unity' of 'ideal' and 'real' contents, constitutive of the 'Idea'.⁵ Furthermore, in Hegel's overall system, it will be shown how scepticism participates in Logic's mediation of Spirit and Nature.

I. On the Result and Meaning of the Dialectic for Hegel

Throughout his presentation of 'The Doctrine of the Concept', in both the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel contrasts his position with various other philosophical perspectives regarding the result and the meaning of the dialectic in general. Particularly, in these sections, Hegel discusses how the standpoint of the *Logic* overgrasps Kant's basic standpoint in which it is maintained that "reason as cognitive is incapable of apprehending *things-in-themselves*, that *reality* lies absolutely outside the Concept."⁶ Indeed, one of Hegel's main purposes in 'The Doctrine of the Concept' is to demonstrate the agreement of Concept and reality, as part of his standard of truth. In respect to Kant's position, he states,

The Concept has been declared to be the *objective* element of knowledge, and as such, the truth. But on the other hand, the Concept is taken as something *merely subjective* from which we cannot *extract reality*, by which is to be understood objectivity, since reality is contrasted with

5 In particular, in Chapter One, I showed that for Hegel, the truth of what is 'ideal' or 'supersensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'real' or 'sensible' and *conversely*, the truth of what is 'real' or 'sensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'ideal' or 'supersensible'. The question here is what is scepticism's function in relation to this criterion of truth. At the start of 'The Doctrine of the Concept', Hegel alludes to the role of scepticism in his comments on the 'refutation' of philosophical systems in general. Specifically, he shows how scepticism's recognition (and negation) of finitude and / or refutation of the false is part of the whole process of approaching truth. He writes, "with respect to the refutation of a philosophical system I have elsewhere also made the general observation that one must get rid of the erroneous idea of regarding the system as out and out *false*, as if the *true* system by contrast were only *opposed* to the false. (...) The *true* system cannot have the relation to it of being merely *opposed* to it; for if this were so, the system, as this opposite, would itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true system as the higher, must contain the subordinate system within itself." (SL, p. 580) Similarly, Hegel states that "the nerve (...) of the external refutation (of a philosophical system by scepticism) consists solely in clinging stubbornly to the antithesis of these assumptions, for example, to the absolute self-subsistence of the thinking individual as against the form of thought posited in absolute substance as identical with extension. (...) The only possible ('refutation' of a philosophical system) (...) must therefore consist, in the first place, in recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic." (SL, p. 581, my additions)

6 SL, p. 593. / "Wenn man sich derselben bey der Grundbehauptung des transcendentalen Idealismus erinnert, dass die Vernunftkenntnis die Ding an sich zu erfassen nicht vermögend sey, dass die Realität schlechthin ausser dem Begriffe liege, so zeigt sich sogleich, dass eine solche Vernunft, die sich mit ihrem Gegenstande, den Dinge an sich, die nicht mit dem Vernunftbegriffe, der Begriff, der nicht mit der Realität, eine Realität, die nicht mit dem Begriffe in Uebereinstimmung ist, unwahre Vorstellungen sind." (Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Vol. 12 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981, p. 26)

subjectivity; and, in general, the Concept and the logical element are declared to be something merely *formal* which, since it abstracts from the content, does not contain truth.⁷

Therefore, in Hegel's view, Kant's interpretation attributed the logical movement of the Concept (as known to Kant) solely to subjectivity, specifically to the subjective understanding, and not to objective reality. In contrast, Hegel suggests that "the Concept is to be regarded (...) not (only) as the subjective understanding, but as the Concept in its own absolute character which constitutes a stage of *nature* as well as of *spirit*."⁸ In this way, he takes issue with Kant's limiting of the Concept to the finite determinations of the understanding, which are said to not apply to actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). Hegel states,

The Kantian philosophy has not got beyond the psychological reflex of the Concept and has reverted at once more to the assertion that the Concept is permanently conditioned by a manifold of intuition. It has declared intellectual cognition and experience to be a *phenomenal* content, not because the categories themselves are only finite but, on the ground of a psychological idealism, because they are *merely* determinations originating in self-consciousness.⁹

In this way, for Hegel, as it did not demonstrate the link between the Concept and actuality, the Kantian philosophy was not able to attain to the criterion of truth and meaning of the *Logic*. Instead, Kant pronounced that reason was incapable of accessing things as they are in-themselves. Thus, in Hegel's assessment, the objective world remained a world of appearances and Kant's philosophy "stopped short at (...) the assertion that the Concept is and remains utterly separate from (sensuous) reality."¹⁰ However, in contrast, the *Logic* describes the movement in which, "through its own immanent dialectic (the

7 SL, pp. 585-586. / "Zweytens ist der Begriff als das Objectiv der Erkenntniss angegeben worden, somit als die Wahrheit. Aber auf der andern Seite wird derselbe als etwas bloss subjectives genommen, aus dem sich die Realität, unter welcher, da sie der Subjectivität gegenübergestellt wird, die Objectivität zu verstehen ist, nicht herauskauben lasse; und überhaupt wird der Begriff und das Logische für etwas nur formelles erklärt, das, weil es von dem Inhalt abstrahire, die Wahrheit nicht enthalte." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 19)

8 SL, p. 586, my addition. / "Eben so ist hier auch der Begriff, nicht als Actus des selbstbewussten Verstandes, nicht der subjective Verstand zu betrachten, sondern der Begriff an un für sich, welcher ebensowohl eine Stufe der Natur, als des Geistes ausmacht." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 20)

9 SL, p. 589. / "Alsdenn ist die Kantische Philosophie nur bey dem psychologischen Reflexe des Begriffs stehen geblieben, und ist wider zur Behauptung der bleibenden Bedingtheit des Begriffes durch ein Mannichfaltiges der Anschauung zurück gegangen. Sie hat die Verstandeserkenntnisse und die Erfahrung nicht darum als einen erscheinenden Inhalt ausgesprochen, weil die Categorien selbst nur endliche sind, sondern aus dem Grunde eines psychologischen Idealismus, weil sie nur Bestimmungen seyen, die vom Selbstbewusstseyn herkommen." (WSL, *GW12*, pp. 22-23)

10 SL, p. 592, my addition. / "wie die Kantische Philosophie, dasjenige Verhältniss des Denkens zum sinnlichen Daseyn, bey dem sie stehen blieb, für ein nur relatives Verhältniss und bey der Behauptung stehen geblieben ist, dass der Begriff schlechthin von der Realität." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 25)

'Subjective' Concept) passes over into reality."¹¹ As such, from Hegel's perspective, Kant's philosophy was limited to, the contradictoriness, and finitude of the subjective determinations of the 'understanding'. That is to say, the Kantian philosophy "did not consider the categories in and for themselves but declared them to be finite determinations incapable of containing truth, on the wrong ground that they are subjective forms of self-consciousness."¹²

Following from these limitations, another lacuna Hegel identifies in Kant's system is that it retained the same prejudice held by antecedent forms of scepticism in attributing only a negative outcome to the dialectical oppositions of the determinations of the 'understanding' in general. Specifically, the determinations and categories of the 'understanding' remained contradictory and null in Kant's view. On the contrary, from the perspective of the *Logic*, while "it is an easy task for the understanding to show that everything asserted about the Idea is self-contradictory," there is a positive aspect to the dialectic.¹³ But, Kant "define(d) the relation of reason to the categories as merely dialectical and, indeed, (took) the result of this dialectic to be the *infinite nothing*."¹⁴ Therefore, for Hegel, the Kantian antinomies present an 'unsublated' contradiction, which logically reduces each determination into 'nothing'. In Hegel's account, Kant held the view that the dialectic only demonstrated the negative or 'contradictory' relation between opposed terms, in a similar fashion as the Ancient sceptics and other systems of thought throughout the history of philosophy.¹⁵ To be sure, Hegel elaborates at length,

11 SL, p. 591, my addition. / "dass der Begriff in seiner formellen Abstraction sich als unvollendet zeigt, und durch die in ihm selbst gegründete Dialektik zur Realität so übergeht, dass er sie aus sich erzeugt, aber nicht, dass er zu einer fertigen, ihm gegenübergefundenen Realität wieder zurückfällt." (WSL, *GW12*, pp. 24-25)

12 SL, p. 595. / "So wie die Kantische Philosophie die Kategorieen nicht an und für sich betrachtete, sondern sie nur aus dem schiefen Grunde, weil sie subjective Formen des Selbstbewusstseyns seyen, für endliche Bestimmungen, die das Wahre zu enthalten unfähig seyen, erklärte, so hat sie noch weniger die Formen des Begriffs, welche der Inhalt der gewöhnlichen Logik sind, der Critik unterworfen." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 28)

13 Hegel, *Encyclopedia Logic* (1830), translated and edited by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, p. 288, section 214R. / "Der Verstand hat leichte Arbeit alles, was von der Idee gesagt wird, als in sich widersprechend aufzuzeigen." (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), Vol. 20 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969, p. 216, section 214R)

14 SL, p. 589. / "Dadurch dass Kant das Verhalten der Vernunft zu den Kategorien als nur dialektisch bestimmt, und zwar das Resultat dieser Dialektik schlechthin nur als das unendliche Nichts auffasst." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 23)

15 According to Hegel, "The high scepticism showed that every (form of cognition) contained a contradiction within itself. When this scepticism was applied to the forms of reason also, it (...) foisted (the) finite onto them." (EL, p. 61, section 61Z3, my additions)

Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences that have been most misunderstood in the metaphysics of the moderns, as well as by popular philosophy in general, ancient and modern alike. Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that, just as Thales was the founder of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy, so Plato was the founder of the third science pertaining to philosophy, namely, *dialectic* - a service which the ancient world esteemed his highest, but which often remains quite overlooked by those who have (the) most to say about him. Dialectic has often been regarded as an art, as though it rested on a subjective *talent* and did not belong to the objectivity of the Concept. The shape it takes and the result it reaches in Kantian philosophy have already been pointed out in the specific examples of the Kantian view of it. It must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is once more recognized as necessary to reason, although the result to be drawn from it must be the opposite of that arrived at by Kant. (...) The older Eleatic school directed its dialectic chiefly against motion, Plato frequently against the general ideas and notions of his time, especially those of the Sophists, but also against the pure categories and the determinations of reflection; the more cultivated scepticism of a later period extended it not only to the immediate so-called facts of consciousness and maxims of common life, but also to all the notions of science. Now the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the *contradiction* and *nullity* of the assertions made. But this conclusion can be drawn in either of two senses - either in the objective sense, that the *subject matter* which in such a manner contradicts itself cancels itself out and is null and void - this was, for example, the conclusion of the Eleatics, according to which *truth* was denied, for example, to the world, to motion, to the point; or in the subjective sense, that *cognition is defective*. One way of understanding the latter sense of the conclusion is that it is only this dialectic that imposes on us the trick of illusion. This is the common view of so-called sound common sense which takes its stand on the evidence of the senses and on *customary conceptions and judgements*. Sometimes it takes this dialectic lightly, as when Diogenes the cynic exposes the hollowness of the dialectic of motion by silently walking up and down; but often it flies into a passion, seeing it in perhaps a piece of sheer foolery, or, when morally important objects are concerned, an outrage that tries to unsettle what is essentially established and teaches how to supply wickedness with grounds. This is the view expressed in the Socratic dialectic against that of the Sophists, and this is the indignation which, turned in the opposite direction, cost Socrates his life. The vulgar refutation that opposes to thinking, as did Diogenes, *sensuous consciousness* and imagines that in the latter it possesses the truth, must be left to itself; but in so far as dialectic abrogates moral determinations, we must have confidence in reason that it will know how to restore them again, but restore them in their truth and in the consciousness of their right, though also of their limitations. Or again, the conclusion of subjective nullity may mean that it does not affect dialectic itself, but rather the cognition against which it is directed, and in the view of scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, *cognition in general*. (...) The fundamental prejudice in this matter is that dialectic has *only a negative result*.¹⁶

16 SL, pp. 831-832. / "Die Dialektik ist eine derjenigen alten Wissenschaften, welche in der Metaphysik der Modernen, und dann überhaupt durch die Popular-Philosophie sowohl der Alten als der Neuern, am meisten verkannt worden. Von Plato sagt Diogenes Laertius, dass wie Thales der Urheber der Naturphilosophie, Sokrates der Moralphilosophie, so sey Plato der Urheber der dritten zur Philosophie gehörigen Wissenschaft, der Dialektik gewesen; - ein Verdienst, das ihm vom Alterthum hiemit als das Höchste angerechnet worden, das aber von solchen oft gänzlich unbeachtet bleibt, die ihn am meisten im Munde führen. Man hat die Dialektik oft als ein Kunst betrachtet, als ob sie auf einem subjectiven Talente beruhe, und nicht der Objectivität des Begriffes angehöre. Welche Gestalt und welches Resultat sie in der Kantische Philosophie erhalten, ist an den bestimmten Beyspielen ihrer Ansicht schon gezeigt worden. Es ist als ein unendlich wichtiger Schritt anzusehen, dass die Dialektik wieder als der Vernunft nothwendig anerkannt worden, obgleich das entgegengesetzte Resultat gegen das, welches daraus

In contrast, the *Logic* holds that even through the negation of the finite determinations of the 'understanding', the determinations are equally 'preserved' in virtue of the logical Concept, and are not simply null. In Hegel's view, although they "have been overcome dialectically, i.e., through themselves; (...) it is precisely the Concept that contains all the earlier determinations of thinking sublated within itself."¹⁷ And, he goes on to suggest that the subjective determinations of the 'understanding' are themselves 'actual', as well as are to be "considered as a series of definitions of the Absolute."¹⁸ Therefore, for Hegel, they constitute the 'Subjective' form of the Concept and provide the condition for the possibility of the articulation of what is meaningful and true with respect to what is 'Objective'.¹⁹

hervorgegangen, gezogen werden muss. (...) Die ältere eleatische Schule hat vornemlich ihre Dialektik gegen die Bewegung angewendet, Plato häufig gegen die Vorstellungen und Begriffe seiner Zeit, insbesondere der Sophisten, aber auch gegen die reinen Kategorien und Reflexions-Bestimmungen; der gebildete spätere Skepticismus, hat sie nicht nur auf die unmittelbaren sogenannten Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns und Maximen des gemeinen Lebens, sondern auch auf alle wissenschaftlichen Begriffe ausgedehnt. Die Folgerung nun, die aus solcher Dialektik gezogen wird, ist überhaupt der Widerspruch und die Nichtigkeit der aufgestellten Behauptungen. Diss kann aber in doppeltem Sinne Statt haben, - entweder im objectiven Sinne, dass der Gegenstand, der solchermassen sich in sich selbst widerspreche, sich aufhebe und nichtung sey; - diss war z. B. die Folgerung der Eleaten, nach welcher z. B. der Welt, der Bewegung, dem Punkte die Wahrheit abgesprochen wurde; - oder aber im subjectiven Sinne, dass das Erkennen mangelhaft sey. Unter der letzern Folgerung wird nun entweder verstanden, dass es nure diese Dialektik sey, welche das Kunststück eines falschen Scheines vormache. Diss ist die gewöhnliche Ansicht des sogenannten gesunden Menschenverstandes, der sich an die sinnliche Evidenz und die gewohnten Vorstellungen und Aussprüche hält, - zuweilen ruhiger, wie Diogenes der Hund, die geräth, es sey bloss al über eine Narrheit, oder wenn es sittlich wichtige Gegenstände betrifft, als über einen Frevel, der das wesentlich Feste wankend zu machen suche, und dem Laster Gründe an die Hand zu geben lehre, - eine Ansicht, die in der sokratischen Dialektik gegen die sophistische vorkommt, und ein Zorn, der umgekehrt wieder selbst den Sokrates das Leben gekostet hat. Die pöbelhafte Widerlegung, die, wie Diogenes that, dem Denken das sinnliche Bewusstseyn entgegengesetzt, und in diesem die Wahrheit zu haben meynt, muss man sich selbst überlassen; insofern die Dialektik aber sittliche Bestimmungen aufhebt, zur Vernunft das Vertrauen haben, dass sie dieselben, aber in ihrer Wahrheit, und em Bewusstseyn ihre Rechts aber auch ihrer Schranke, wieder herzustellen wissen werde. - Oder aber das Resultat der subjectiven Nichtigkeit betrifft nicht die Dialektik selbst, sonder vielmehr das Erkennen, wogegen sie gerichtet ist; und im Sinne des Skepticismus, ingleichen der Kantischen Philosophie, das Erkennen überhaupt. (...) Das Grundvorurtheil hiebey ist, dass Dialektik nur ein negatives Resultat habe, was sogleich sein nähere Bestimmung erhalten wird." (WSL, GW12, pp. 242-243) In further explaining that the result of the dialectic is not always negative, Hegel states that the first term in the dialectical Concept is not simply negated yielding the empty negative. Rather, "the first is essentially *preserved* and *retained* even in the other." (SL, p. 834) And, "the *second* negative, the negative of the negative, (...) is the sublating of the contradiction." (SL, p. 835)

17 EL, p. 236, section 160Z.

18 EL, p. 237, section 160Z. He goes on to state, "The progression of the Concept is no longer either passing-over or shining into another, but *development*; for the (moments) that are distinguished are immediately posited at the same time as identical with one another and with the whole, and (each) determinacy is as a free being of the whole Concept." (EL, p. 237, section 161, my additions)

19 In fact, from the perspective of T. F. Geraets in unpublished papers entitled, 'Thinking, Dialectic, Logic: A Reading of Hegel', 'Thinking, Being and Idea', and 'The Idea: Logic, Nature, and Spirit', "For Hegel, 'thinking' is the articulation of meaning, making sense of whatever we see, hear, etc... (...) 'Thinking' is basically one ongoing

And, contrary to Kant's position in which an unbridgeable gap or 'nothingness' is posited between subjectivity and the object as it is in-itself, the correspondence between the 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Concepts is constitutive of Hegel's criterion of truth and meaning. However, Hegel's push to 'go further' than Kant should not be seen to diminish the importance of the latter's position. Particularly, Kant's vantage point constitutes a valuable moment in the overall dialectical process which approaches Hegel's criterion of truth and meaning.²⁰ But, the standpoint of the *Logic* is distinct from that of Kant in that the Concept dialectically passes from subjectivity over into objectivity, for only being mediated with the actual can the subjective be fully meaningful and have truth.

Stemming from this discussion, it is clear that in distinguishing his philosophy from that of Kant, Hegel makes the case that the result and the meaning of the dialectic is not simply to exhibit the contradictoriness, the nullity, and the emptiness of the determinations of the 'understanding'. While 'nothingness' may be a moment in the dialectic, it is certainly not its final result. Rather, in contrast to both the sceptics and systems of finitude, the dialectically developing progression of the logical Concept is foundational for the expression of truth and meaning. Furthermore, in distinction from Kant, for Hegel, the Concept does manifest itself in subjectivity, but it also pervades objectivity and actuality as well.

II. Hegel's Division of the 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Concepts

In the section, 'The Doctrine of the Concept', Hegel elucidates the dialectical movement by which the Absolute develops itself in terms of what is 'ideal', what is 'real', both and neither.²¹ Here, Hegel sets forth the process by which the Concept "cognizes (...) its objective world in its subjectivity

process of articulation of meaning," where "dialectic (is itself) the self-articulation of meaning." (my addition)

20 In Hegel's view, "It is an infinite merit of (Kant's investigations) (...) to have given the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic in the sense of the examination of the determinations *of thought in and for themselves*." (SL, p. 833, my addition)

21 The Concept was seen earlier in the *Logic* to be the unity of Being and Essence. And, the dialectical interplay between Being and Essence yielded the notion of 'substance'. Subsequently, here, Hegel traces the dialectical movement of the Concept in terms of the truth of our subjective conceptions as they pertain to objective states of affairs, as well as the truth of objective states of affairs as they agree or disagree with their subjective concept. As such, from the perspective of the logical Concept, neither subjectivity, nor objectivity has priority in terms of what is true, as in a correspondence theory of truth. In this interpretation, Hegel's 'Idea' is constitutive of 'truth' as applicable to philosophical, religious, and scientific endeavours.

and its subjectivity in its objective world.”²² Consequently, his ‘Doctrine of the Concept’ “subdivides into: (1) the doctrine of the subjective or *formal* Concept, (2) that of *objectivity* or of the Concept as determined to immediacy, (3) that of the *Idea*, or of the Subject-Object, the unity of the Concept and of objectivity, the absolute Truth.”²³ Here, I will sketch a brief synopsis of the relation of scepticism to some of the main tenets of the first two divisions: namely, the ‘Subjective’ and ‘Objective’ Concepts, respectively.

As demonstrated in Chapter Two of this dissertation, the *Logic* elucidates the process by which the finite determinations of the ‘understanding’ come to their identity, and are said to be ‘preserved’ in virtue of the Concept. Furthermore, scepticism was described as belonging to the ‘dialectical’ moment in which concepts achieved their identity in virtue of their own limit (*Grenze*). The ‘dialectical’ moment enabled what is finite to make itself determinate and distinct. Thus, the first division of ‘The Doctrine of the Concept’ is that of the ‘Subjective Concept’, which “appears as the determinate Concept, as the sphere of the mere *understanding*” and “constitutes *subjectivity*, or the *formal* Concept” in distinction from objectivity.²⁴ While, for Hegel, the ‘Subjective Concept’ is an important moment of the totality of the Concept, it is not fully representative of the mature standpoint of the *Logic*. It is clear that the ‘Subjective Concept’, in its first moment, is essentially the ‘Concept of concepts’ belonging to formal reason. Specifically, it constitutes the subjective logical process by which finite determinations, or alternatively, concepts come to be within the ‘understanding’. Hegel explains that what is “understood by ‘concepts’ are *determinations* of the *understanding*, or even just general notions; hence such ‘concepts’ are always *finite determinations*.”²⁵ However, even though the subjective concepts are recognized as ‘finite’ by Hegel, they are extremely important. As he remarks, concepts “being forms of

22 SL, p. 597. / “Die Vernunft, welche die Sphäre der Idee ist, ist die sich selbst enthüllte Wahrheit, worin der Begriff die schlechthin ihm angemessene Realisation hat, und insofern frey ist, als er diese seine objective Welt in seiner Subjectivität, und diese in jener erkennt.” (WSL, GW12, p. 30)

23 EL, p. 238, section 162. / “Die Lehre vom Begriffe theilt sich in die Lehre 1) von dem subjectiven oder formellen Begriffe, 2) von dem Begriffe als zure Unmittelbarkeit bestimmten, oder von der Objectivität, 3) von der Idee, dem Subject-Objecte, der Einheit des Begriffs und der Objectivität, der absoluten Wahrheit.” (ENK, p. 177, section 162)

24 SL, p. 597. / “Er erscheint als der bestimmte Begriff, als die Sphäre des blossen Verstandes. (...) Diese Stufe mach daher die Subjectivität oder den formellen Begriff aus.” (WSL, GW12, p. 30)

25 EL, p. 239, section 162R. / “Was gewöhnlich unter Begriffen verstanden wird, sind Verstandes-Bestimmungen, auch nur allegemeine Vorstellungen: daher überhaupt endliche Bestimmungen; vergl.” (ENK, p. 178, section 162R)

the Concept (...) are, on the contrary, *the living spirit of what is actual; and what is true of the actual is only true in virtue of these forms, through them and in them.*"²⁶ According to Hegel, the logical process of 1.) positing a concept in its simple self-relation, 2.) negating that concept, and 3.) negating that negation, yields three interconnected ontological aspects of concepts pertaining to their identity: namely, 1.) universality (*Allgemeinheit*), 2.) particularity (*Besonderheit*), and 3.) individuality (*Einzelheit*). These three ontological moments are interconnected in that each is itself to be regarded as the totality of the Concept, because in giving an account of one, there must be a reference to the others. In outlining the moments of the Concept 'as such', Hegel writes, "As negativity in general or in accordance with the first, immediate negation (of *universality*) contains determinateness generally as *particularity*; as the second negation, that is, as the negation of the negation, it is the *absolute determinateness* or *individuality* and *concreteness*."²⁷ As has been previously described in this dissertation, Hegel generally characterizes the 'dialectical' or 'sceptical' moment as the 'first negation' in which the concept passes over into its opposite and determines itself as particularity. Subsequently, from the result of this process of the development of the concepts of the 'understanding', Hegel traces the workings of the 'Subjective' Concept as it progresses from the logical form of 'concept' to 'judgement', and from 'judgement' to 'syllogism'.²⁸

The second moment of the 'Subjective Concept' is the 'judgement' (*Urteil*). In Hegel's synopsis, "The judgement is the relation of determinate concepts," and it is the logical form in which the

26 EL, p. 239, section 162R. / "In der That aber sind sie umgekehrt als Formen des Begriffs, der lebendige Geist des Wirklichen, und von dem Wirklichen ist wahr nur, was kraft dieser Formen, durch sie und in ihnen wahr ist." (ENK, p. 178, section 162R)

27 SL, p. 603, my addition. / "Als Negativität überhaupt, oder nach der ersten, unmittelbaren Negation hat es die Bestimmtheit überhaupt als Besonderheit an ihm; als zweytes als Negation der Negation ist es absolute Bestimmtheit, oder Einzelheit und Concretion." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 35) For Hegel, the 'interconnectedness' of universality, particularity, and individuality is to be seen in that "the universal is thus the totality of the Concept" (SL, pp. 603-604) and "The universal has proved itself to be not only the identical, but at the same time the different or contrary as against the particular and individual, and in addition also to be opposed to them or contradictory; in this opposition, however, it is identical with them and is their true ground in which they are sublated. The same holds good of particularity and individuality which are likewise the totality of the determinations of reflection." (SL, p. 616)

28 Hegel states, "Since thought seeks to form a concept of things, this concept (along with judgement and syllogism as its most immediate forms) cannot consist in determinations and relationships that are alien and external to the things. (...) To say that there is understanding, or reason, in the world is exactly what is contained in the expression 'objective thought'." (EL, p. 56, section 24R)

“immanent distinguishing and determining of the Concept is given.”²⁹ Hegel defines the judgement as “the Concept in its particularity, as the distinguishing relation of its moments, which are posited as being-for-themselves and at the same time as identical with themselves, and not with each other.”³⁰ Subsequently, in the ‘Subjective Concept’, he identifies four types of judgement: 1.) the Qualitative Judgement, 2.) the Judgement of Reflection, 3.) the Judgement of Necessity, and 4.) the Judgement of the Concept, in which the distinguishing relations of the moments are different. In general, the judgement consists in the ‘dialectical’ moment of the ‘Subjective Concept’ in which objects are particularized conceptually through the unity of their individuality and their universality. The judgement distinguishes the object from other objects by attaching a predicate to a subject. In this way, the individual acquires its ‘mark’ of particularity in virtue of the universal. But, Hegel observes that the act of attaching a predicate to a subject presupposes the recognition of the finitude of the subject (the object in question). In this way, scepticism plays an important role in the judgement’s determining of the object. He states, “The standpoint of the judgement is *finitude*, and from this point of view the finitude of things consist in their being a judgement.”³¹ In this manner, the judgement determining a predicate to a subject (the object in question) implies the finitude of its subject and thus, alone, the judgement is still one-sided.³² However, while for Hegel, the judgement is generally representative of the determination of particularity to an object, the Concept, at this stage, has not yet fully passed over into objectivity. Therefore, the content of the sphere of judgement is still to be considered to be finite, subjective, and not yet fully

29 SL, p. 616, and EL, p. 243, section 165R. / “Indem das Urtheil die Beziehung der Bestimmten Begriffe ist, so hat sich erst bey demselben das wahre Verhältniss zu ergeben.” (WSL, *GW12*, p. 46) and “Die immanente Unterscheidung und Bestimmen des Begriffes ist im Urtheile vorhanden, denn das Urtheilen ist das Bestimmen des Begriffs.” (ENK, p. 182, section 165R)

30 EL, p. 243, section 166. / “Das Urtheil ist der Begriff in seiner Besonderheit, als unterscheidende Bezielung seiner Momente, die als fürsichseyende und zugleich mit sich, nicht mit einander identische gesetzt sind.” (ENK, p. 182, section 166)

31 EL, p. 246, section 168. / “Der Standpunkt des Urtheils ist die Endlichkeit, und die Endlichkeit der Dinge besteht auf demselben darin, dass sie ein Urtheil sind, dass ihr Daseyn und ihre allgemeine Natur (ihr Leib und ihre Seele) zwar vereinigt sind; sonst wären die Dinge Nichts; aber dass diese ihre Momente sowohl bereits verschieden, als überhaupt trennbar sind.” (ENK, p. 184, section 168)

32 As the judgement is stated to be the ‘standpoint of finitude’ in general, the judgement may be initially seen to be a ‘harbour’ for dogmatism, standing over and above the object. However, it must be pointed out that the judgement is the condition for the possibility for the articulation of meaning in general, as from a Hegelian perspective, reason only proceeds in virtue of the judgement. Similarly, the judgement is to be seen as the fundamental ‘building block’ of the syllogism. Also, judgements, as mediated by objectivity, and objectivity as mediated by judgements is one aspect of the criterion of truth in the *Logic*.

representative of the truth.³³

The third moment of Hegel's 'Subjective Concept' is that of 'syllogism' which is defined as the "unity of the Concept and the judgement" and is representative of everything 'rational' having the moments of the Concept within itself. That is to say, the syllogism is the basis for rational argumentation in which the judgements of the 'understanding' form premises. From a relation of a multiplicity (usually three) of judgements, we can seek to know something more. The syllogism is a combination of judgements arrayed in logical sequence, each representing the moments of 'universality', 'particularity', and 'individuality' and each mediating the others. Subsequently, the various ways in which moments relate to each other yield different types of syllogism. In the *Logic*, Hegel identifies three forms of syllogism: 1.) the Qualitative Syllogism, 2.) the Syllogism of Reflection, and 3.) the Syllogism of Necessity. In general, the syllogism, pointing to its three moments, is to be considered as "that (thought-) determination in which the particular (judgement) is the middle that concludes the extremes of the universal (judgement) and the singular (or individual judgement)."³⁴ While subjectivity itself can determine whether the syllogism is logically valid, the truth of the premises must still be verified in actuality. Furthermore, like the judgement, the syllogism expresses only the finitude of its subjects (the objects in question). And, at this stage, while the syllogism is constitutive of the full development of the 'Subjective Concept', the syllogism itself is still finite since has not yet passed over into objectivity, in order to represent the truth of its subjects (the objects in question).

For Hegel, the 'Subjective Concept' as represented by its three moments of the 'Concept as such', the 'judgement', and the 'syllogism' is 'sceptical of itself' and must still determine itself to objectivity, in order to posit "itself as something *real*, something that *is*; this still abstract reality (must complete) itself in *objectivity*."³⁵ Hegel summarizes that through these moments,

33 Hegel writes, "The act of judgement involves reflection, whether this or that predicate which is in someone's *head* can and should be *attached* to the *object* which exists on its own account *outside*; the very act of judging consists in this, that only through it is a predicate *combined* with a subject, so that, if this combination did not take place, each on its own would still remain what it is, the latter an existent object, the former an idea in someone's head. The predicate which is attached to the subject should, however, also *belong* to it, that is, be in and for itself identical with it." (*SL*, pp. 625-626)

34 *EL*, p. 59, section 24Z2, my additions.

35 *SL*, pp. 705-706, my addition. / "Der Begriff ist als absolut mit sich identische Negativität, das sich selbst bestimmende; es ist bemerkt worden, dass er schon, indem er sich in der Einzelheit zum Urtheil entschliesst, sich als reales, seyendes setzt; diese noch abstracte Realität vollendet sich in der Objectivität." (*WSL*, *GW*12, p. 128)

we have come to the cognition of subjectivity, or the subjective Concept, which contains the Concept as such, the judgement, and the syllogism within it, as the dialectical result of the first two principle stages of the logical Idea, namely, being and essence. It is quite correct to say of the Concept that it is subjective and only subjective, because it is certainly subjectivity itself. And, both the judgement and the syllogism are as subjective as the Concept as such. These, together with the so-called laws of thought (the laws of identity, of distinction, and of sufficient reason), form the content of the so-called doctrine of elements in traditional logic. But now, this subjectivity, with the determinations which have been cited here (...) is not to be regarded as the empty framework that can only be filled up from outside, by objects that are present on their own account; on the contrary, it is subjectivity itself which, being dialectical, breaks through its own barrier, and opens itself up into objectivity by means of syllogism.³⁶

Thus, it is implied by Hegel that the 'Subjective Concept' passes over into objectivity, of itself, in order to relate itself to the object as something more than just illusory determinations. Moreover, the subjective content of the Concept must posit something that is "*a fact (eine Sache) that is in and for itself - objectivity,*" if it is to be meaningful and constitutive of truth.³⁷ In this sense, the initial content of the subjective determinations is to be recognized as finite if it is to pass-over genuinely into objectivity. According to Hegel, this 'passing over' (*Übergehen*) means that, while the 'Subjective Concept' must correspond to how its object actually is, i.e., how the thing is in-itself. In this movement, there is an immanent dialectic between the finitely 'ideal' content standing over against the reality of the objects. Thus, the object "sets itself up in its antithesis to what is subjective. But at this point, for subjectivity, the object, (...) is initially just immediate unaffected object."³⁸ And, for Hegel, rather than simply having an immediate knowledge of the object as it is in-itself, the subjective content must be mediated by objectivity. This position contrasts with the 'simple faith in subjectivity' of Jacobi's 'Immediate Knowing' in which the unity of the 'ideal' and the 'real' "is presupposed, it is assumed as in-itself only."³⁹ As such, in the process of attaining the criterion of truth offered by the *Logic*, the content posited in the 'Subjective Concept' must be sublated in objectivity. As Hegel states, the "Concept sublates itself

36 **EL**, pp. 267-268, section 192Z.

37 **SL**, p. 704. / "Diss Seyn ist daher eine Sache, die an und für sich ist, - die Objectivität." (**WSL**, *GW12*, p. 126)

38 **EL**, p. 268, section 193R. / "Dass das Object auch Gegenstand und einem Andern Ausseres ist, diss wird sich nachher bestimmen, in sofern es sich in den Gegensatz zum Subjectiven setzt; hier zunächst als das, worin der Begriff aus seiner Vermittlung übergegangen ist, ist es nur unmittelbares unbefangenes Object, so wie ebenso der Begriff erst in dem nachherigen Gegensatze als das Subjective bestimmt wird." (**ENK**, p. 200, section 193R)

39 **EL**, p. 271, section 193R. / "die als das Vollkommenste oder auch subjectiv als das wahre Wissen ausgesprochen wird, vorausgesetzt d. i. nur als an sich angenommen wird." (**ENK**, p. 203, section 193R)

in the object, the opposite one-sidedness.”⁴⁰ As the object has been determined in the ‘Subjective Concept’ as it is *for us*, the object must still be considered as it is in its own nature, as in the ‘Objective Concept’.

The second division of ‘The Doctrine of the Concept’ is the ‘Objective Concept’ which considers how the Concept “determines itself into objectivity.”⁴¹ The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the dialectically developing logical Concept permeates the objective world, namely, that “the Concept dwells within the things themselves.”⁴² With respect to the criterion of truth of the *Logic*, it is made clear that “the object is not rigid and without process; instead, its process consists in its proving itself to be that which is at the same time subjective, and this forms the advance to the *Idea*.”⁴³ In making the case that the objects themselves have the Concept as their ground, for Hegel it is not simply a matter of having ‘faith’ in subjectivity as in the case of ‘Immediate Knowing’. Rather, “the cognition of truth (must) be placed in cognizing the object as object, free from anything added by subjective reflection.”⁴⁴ As such, the position of the ‘Objective Concept’ is that in which the Concept has sublated the mediation of the object by subjectivity, and initially considers the object in its immediate and empirical existence. The thrust of this section is to answer how the object is in its own right, and further, to see whether the conceptions determined to the object by subjectivity actually correspond with the object itself. More precisely, Hegel seeks to demonstrate that the Concept is how the objects are in themselves.

40 EL, p. 270, section 193R. / “Jenes Ansich ist ein Abstractum und noch einseitiger als der Begriff selbst, dessen Einseitigkeit überhaupt sich darin aufhebt, dass er sich zum Objecte, der entgegengesetzten Einseitigkeit, aufhebt.” (ENK, p. 202, section 193R)

41 SL, p. 705. / “Den wesentlichen Gegenstand jenes Beweises, den Zusammenhang des Begriffes und des Daseyns, betrifft aber die eben geschlossene Betrachtung des Begriffes und des ganzen Verlaufs, durch den er sich zur Objectivität bestimmt.” (WSL, *GW12*, pp. 127-128) For Hegel, the process by which the criterion of truth in the *Logic* is satisfied applies both to scientific as well as religious domains. Hegel writes, “now though it might seem that the transition from the Concept into objectivity is not the same thing as the transition from the concept of God to his existence, it should be borne in mind on the one hand that the determinate *content*, God, makes no difference in the logical process, and the ontological proof is merely an application of this logical process to the said content.” (SL, p. 706)

42 EL, p. 245, section 166Z.

43 EL, p. 273, section 194Z1.

44 SL, p. 709. / “die Erkenntniss der Wahrheit wird darein gesetzt, das Object, wie es als Object frey von Zuthat subjectiver Reflexion.” (WSL, *GW12*, p. 131)

The first moment of the 'Objective Concept' is that of 'mechanism', in which the initially undifferentiated, immediate, sensuously given 'objects' become differentiated through the external processes which constitute their physical being.⁴⁵ Concerning mechanism, it is held that "in its immediacy, the object is only the Concept *in-itself*, initially it has the Concept *outside it*, and every determinacy is (present) as one that is posited externally."⁴⁶ Hence, for Hegel, mechanism is a logical category in which objects are distinguished from one another, and have their identity solely according to their external relations to other objects. For example, mechanism considers the physical action, reaction, mass, movement, acceleration, resistance, pressure exerted, of the object in relation to other objects. And, the mechanical object has the Concept as its ground since "*something-composite*; it is an aggregate, and its operation upon another remains an external relation."⁴⁷ However, the category of mechanism is limited in that "whatever relation obtains between the things combined, this relation is one extraneous

45 According to J. W. Burbidge in Real Process: How Logic and Chemistry Combine in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996, "when we think of the objective realm *mechanically*, we understand it to be made up of independent objects which, if they are altered at all, do not move themselves, but are acted upon. Since this realm is to be quite other than thought, any such movement must come from other objects. So we have a diversity of mechanical entities, each one moved only by the movement of others; each responds and in turn acts on the others. There is, then a reciprocity of action and reaction. When these movements balance each other, we have an equilibrium.

"We can now think of a balanced system of action and reaction as a single object, equally mechanical. But when we use this new concept of a mechanical object, we find that an important difference has emerged. In the first stage, each object was basically the same as every other. Therefore the action of one is just as strong as the reaction of the other and an equilibrium ensues. At this second stage, we can think of balanced systems as involving more or fewer first-order objects, so that any movement they impart would be stronger or weaker. Hence, a balance is not so easy to achieve. Were the differential between these objects too great, there would be no mechanical interaction at all; the weaker would simply give way. So a real mechanical relationship develops when the weaker resists the action of the stronger, while yet being influenced by it.

"The mechanical perspective of independent objects can be maintained as a permanent way of viewing the objective realm if the weaker objects revolve around the stronger object as their centre; at the same time, each of the weaker objects, as itself an equilibrium, becomes a secondary centre. A mechanical system of this sort has a persistent pattern, the principles of which can be conceptually identified, and understood as laws.

"The laws that emerge from mechanism spell out the way mechanical objects are related to each other. Each is no longer defined as strictly independent, simply responding to external forces, but rather as orientated towards an other. Such a way of conceiving the objective realm, however, is no longer strictly mechanical, for it presupposes an attraction between opposites. To view objects not as independent, but as orientated towards each other in this way, is to conceive them not mechanically but chemically. So at this point Hegel can leave the notion of mechanism and move on to that of chemism." (pp. 78-79)

46 EL, p. 274, section 195. / "Das Object 1) in seiner Unmittelbarkeit ist der Begriff nur an sich, hat denselben zunächst ausser ihm, und alle Bestimmtheit ist als eine äusserlich gesetzte." (ENK, p. 205, section 195)

47 EL, p. 274, section 195. / "Als Einheit Unterschiedener ist es daher ein Zusammengesetztes, ein Aggregat, und die Wirksamkeit auf Anderes bleibt eine äusserliche Beziehung. - formellen Mechanismus." (ENK, p. 205, section 195)

to them that does not concern their nature at all, and even if it is accompanied by a semblance of unity it remains nothing more than composition, mixture, aggregation and the like."⁴⁸ Thus, while the category of mechanism is an important moment, it is a finite one in the 'Objective Concept', for we must consider the ways in which "the object (...) (may be) posited as differentiated in its existence vis-à-vis its own other," as in the category of 'chemism'.⁴⁹

The second moment by which the Concept proves itself to be the ground of objectivity is that which considers the chemical processes of objects. In 'chemism', the focus is on the external identity of objects in virtue of their distinct chemical compositions, and their chemical reactions in relation to other objects of different and similar compositions.⁵⁰ For Hegel, "objects that are chemically differentiated are

48 SL, p. 711. / "Diss macht den Charakter des Mechanismus aus, dass welche Beziehung zwischen den Verbunden Statt findet, diese Beziehung ihnen eine fremde ist, welche ihre Natur nichts angeht, und wenn sie auch mit dem Schein Eins verknüpft ist, nichts weiter als Zusammensetzung, Vermischung, Hauffen, u.s.f. bleibt." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 133)

49 EL, p. 277, section 199, my addition. / "So ist das Object als in seiner Existenz gegen sein Anderes different zu setzen." (ENK, p. 207, section 199)

In Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, C. Taylor's analyzes the category of mechanism in Hegel's *Logic*. He states, "on this level of immediacy and externality, the thing is indifferent to its own characteristics, or put another way, its characteristics hang together in it without any internal necessity. It is because of this that we have to explain these characteristics by something else; the relations of causation which explain what it is are external, foreign to it (...). Hence mechanism recognizes only efficient causation, which is always causation between terms which are merely contingently linked and identified, as Hume showed. Even causation 'within' an object turns out on examination to be a causal relation between separable parts of this object.

"This yields the vision of determinism, in which the characteristics of one object are explained by another, and this in turn by another, and so on to the bad infinite.

"But this level of purely external, contingent relations cannot be the whole story. For we know that things are also internally related, by necessity. Hence this level cannot subsist alone but it requires others at which the relation is progressively interiorized. The object must become more of a centre. It must develop greater internal coherence, and demand according to its nature to be related in a certain way to others." (p. 320)

50 In *Real Processes: How Logic and Chemistry Combine in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, J. W. Burbidge states, "To get at what is distinctive about an object that is conceived to be chemical we compare it with the kind of movement just considered. A mechanical object is complete in itself and indifferent to whatever happens to it. Any movement or change intervenes from outside. In contrast, a chemical object is to be orientated towards another. Since this is essential to its nature, the kind of orientation it has makes a difference to the kind of thing it is.

"Chemical objects, then, are not all the same. They are differentiated from each other as particulars within a more comprehensive genus. But we need to be cautious. They are not simply diverse, each having a distinctive quality. Rather, one object is orientated towards another and vice-versa. What differentiates them is also what they share - a principle by which they are determined as direct complements. This determination is common to both and thus a universal.

"So it is not simply an act of understanding - a concept - that thinks of chemical objects as parts of a system, as was the case in the logic of mechanism. The object itself refers to something more general. What defines it as chemical is the mutual determination it shares with another object. The two together make up a complete picture.

"At the same time, each object exists as something singular - external to, and in some sense independent

explicitly what they are only in virtue of their difference. Hence, they are the absolute drive to integrate themselves through and into one another.”⁵¹ Chemism is the description of the natural processes by which chemical elements ‘react against’, and ‘come together’ in one another. For Hegel, “the chemical process has as its product the neutral (state) between its tensed extremes (which are *in-themselves* this neutral (state)). Through the difference of objects - their particularising - the Concept, as the concrete universal, con-cludes itself with the singularity, i.e., with the product.”⁵² Thus, first, Hegel describes the external processes of how the combining of distinct chemicals neutralizes them, and brings about a new product. However, second, he discusses the reverse process of “the separation of the different extremes out of the neutral product.”⁵³ From Hegel’s perspective, these two sides of the chemical process presuppose the finitude and contingency of the chemical objects in their external relations.⁵⁴ And, for him, the category of chemism does not take into account the nature of the object as it is in-itself. Therefore, in order to understand and explain the object in its own nature, we must consider it as it is *for itself*, in its own purposiveness.

The third moment of the ‘Objective Concept’ is ‘teleology’. In this section, internal

of, the other.

“In other words, the chemical object has within itself all the components of the whole notion of chemism. It exists as a singular object that can be referred to, but it is also tied with other chemical objects in a larger pattern.” (p. 80)

51 EL, p. 378, section 200Z.

52 EL, p. 278, section 201. / “Der chemische Process hat daher das Neutrale seiner gespannten Extreme, welches diese an sich sind, zum Producte; der Begriff, das concrete Allgemeine, schliesst sich durch die Differenz der Objecte, die Besonderung, mit der Einzelheit, dem Producte, und darin nur mit sich selbst zusammen.” (ENK, p. 208, section 201)

53 SL, p. 732. / “Eben so muss die Ausscheidung der differenten Extreme aus dem Neutralen, ingleichen ihre Zerlegung in ihre abstracten Elemente, von äusserlich hinzukommenden Bedingungen und Erregungen der Thätigkeit ausgehen.” (WSL, *GW12*, p. 153)

54 Hegel writes, “the *externality*, which lets these two processes (the reduction of what is differentiated to the neutral and the differentiating of the undifferentiated or the neutral) appear as independent vis-à-vis each other, also shows their finitude when they pass over into products in which they are sublated. And conversely, the process presents the presupposed immediacy of the undifferentiated objects as null and void. - Through this *negation* of the exteriority and immediacy in which the Concept *qua* object was immersed, it is set free and posited *for-itself against* that externality and immediacy. It is posited *as purpose*.” (EL, p. 279, section 203) Furthermore, he adds, “the passage from chemism to the teleological relationship is contained in the fact that the two forms of the chemical process sublate on another reciprocally. What results from this is that the Concept, which in chemism and in mechanism was still only present *in-itself*, becomes free, and the Concept that now exists for itself is *purpose*.” (EL, p. 279, section 203Z)

purposiveness is attributed to the object, and is determined through our perception of the object in its external state. The determination of the purpose of the object by reason is made in conjunction with the empirical observation of its 'mechanical' and 'chemical' processes, including, its finite, external relations. In Hegel's view, "Where purposiveness is discerned, an intelligence (*Verstand*) is assumed as its author, and for the end we therefore demand the Concept's own free Existence."⁵⁵ Hence, in the category of teleology, the object's own internal self-determination is considered in conjunction with its external relations.⁵⁶ As the categories of mechanism and chemism "do not go beyond the finite and lead only to finite causes in their explanation of phenomena," teleology answers the question: what is the reason

55 SL, p. 734. / "Wo Zweckmässigkeit wahrgenommen wird, wird ein Verstand als Urheber derselben angenommen, für den Zweck also die eigene, freye Existenz des Begriffes gefodert." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 154)

56 The question here is the question which plagued Kant, namely, can we know things as they are in-themselves? If we cannot, does this imply that reason must sacrifice itself on the altar of the thing-in-itself? Regarding this perspective of transcendental idealism, Hegel writes, "the inadequacy of the standpoint at which this philosophy stops short consists essentially in holding fast to the abstract *thing-in-itself* as an *ultimate* determination, and in opposing to the thing-in-itself reflection or the determinateness of the properties; whereas in fact the thing-in-itself essentially possesses this external reflection within itself and determines itself to be a thing with its *own* determinations, a thing endowed with properties, in this way demonstrating the abstraction of the thing as a pure thing-in-itself to be an untrue determination." (SL, p. 490) According to Hegel, we can come to an understanding of the thing-in-itself if we consider the object as it is for-itself, i.e., its own purposiveness or ideality. To the modern sceptic, it may seem like the most blatant abuse of metaphysics ascribing purpose to the objective world. However, for Kant in *The Critique of Judgment* and for Hegel here, the objective world itself demands that we see purpose in it. Furthermore, it is made explicit that if we do not recognize the purpose inherent to the objects by induction and we hold the view that the objects are just null and void, then our subjectivity has free reign to disrespect and do violence to the objective world. But, rather than merely ascribing purpose to the objective world in a dogmatic fashion, Hegel seeks to show that we can have knowledge of the objective world, in objective terms. As Hegel states, "When people speak of 'purpose' they usually have only external purposiveness in mind. From this point of view things are held not to bear their determination within themselves, but to count merely as means, which are use and used up in the realisation of a purpose that lies outside them. This is the general viewpoint of *utility*, which once played a great role, even in the sciences, but soon fell into deserved discredit, and was (re)cognised as a viewpoint that does not suffice for a genuine insight into the nature of things. Certainly finite things as such must be given their due by being regarded as not ultimate and as pointing beyond themselves. But this negativity of finite things is their own dialectic, and if we are to (re)cognise this, we must involve ourselves first of all in their positive content." (EL, p. 282, section 205Z) Therefore, the purpose of the object belongs to it alone, and initially confronts subjectivity as a 'supersensible beyond' but through objective investigation, we can come to some knowledge of the thing as it is in-itself. Similarly, Hegel acknowledges that sometimes there is error and finitude on both sides of our consideration of the object, i.e., our subjectivity can be wrong about, and misrepresent the content of the object's purpose and, conversely, the content of the object's purpose may not be found not to be adequate to our subjective determination. In this way, even though there is error and finitude, for Hegel, that does not mean that reason has absolutely no understanding of its object as it is in-itself. It is for these reasons that in my reading, I am emphasizing that Hegel's standpoint seeks to solidify the notion that neither subjectivity, nor objectivity, i.e., neither I nor the world, has strict priority in terms of what is true. In relation to pointing out the 'internal nature' of human beings, we can examine their relation to the objects surrounding them. Man's life is pervaded by objects, which are said to belong to him. Subsequently, we can hypothesize that his nature is to a certain extent defined by them, and hence we can ask whether man does not belong to his objects.

behind the mechanical and chemical relations of the object?⁵⁷ As such, in teleology, the external mechanical and chemical processes are said to be characteristic of the purpose of the object and are the means by which an end is accomplished. Furthermore, as Hegel points out, even as the purpose of the object comes to be actualized initially in a finite and external manner, it is still preserved 'ideally' in the object. And, as the end that is accomplished by the object is finite, it is still used as a means for subsequent purposes, and the process of self-determination of the object occurs in an ongoing manner. This is the case in that "the product of the purposive act is nothing but an object determined by an end external to it; *consequently it is the same thing as the means.*"⁵⁸ For Hegel, the 'cunning' of reason is to be able to deduce the purpose and nature of the object from its finite, objective, outward mechanical and chemical processes. He concludes that "by taking hold of the means, the *Concept* posits itself as the essence of the object."⁵⁹ Therefore, by this deduction, the internal purposiveness (the end) of the object from its mechanical and chemical processes (the means), the object is able to be determined as it truly is in itself.⁶⁰ Thus, through teleology, the object is found to be, implicitly, the Concept, leading to the standard of truth offered by the *Logic*, namely, the 'Idea'.

III. Scepticism and the 'Idea': Hegel's Criterion of Truth in the *Logic*

In his presentation of 'The Idea' in the *Logic*, Hegel goes on to substantiate his criterion of truth and meaning with regards to the unity of the 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Concepts, and the unity of the 'ideal' and the 'real'. For Hegel, the 'Idea' is synonymous with what is 'actual' (*das Wirkliche*), and is representative of his standard of truth in the *Logic*. Furthermore, the 'Idea' is constitutive of the recognition of the dialectical Concept in its three divisions of 'Life', 'Cognition', and the 'Absolute

57 SL, p. 735. / "Diese Principien bleiben daher innerhalb derselben Naturform der Endlichkeit stehen; ob sie aber gleich das Endliche nicht überschreiten wollen, und für die Erscheinungen nur zu endlichen Ursachen, die selbst das Weitergehen verlangen." (WSL, GW12, p. 155)

58 SL, p. 749. / "Es ist daher ganz gleichgültig, ein durch den äussern Zweck bestimmtes Object als ausgeführten Zweck, oder nur als Mittel zu betrachten; es ist diss eine relative, dem Objecte selbst äusserliche, nicht objective Bestimmung. Alle Objecte also, an welchen ein äusserer Zweck ausgeführt ist, sind ebensowohl nur Mittel des Zwecks." (WSL, GW12, pp. 168-169) The close proximity of *End* (end), *Endzweck* (final purpose), and *das Endliche* (the finite) in the German should here be noted.

59 EL, p. 285, section 212. / "In Ergreifung des Mittels setzt sich der Begriff als das sich seyende Wesen des Objects." (ENK, p. 214, section 212)

60 It is in this inference of the finitude of the purpose of the object that reason may be said to 'do violence' to the object. Nowhere in the *Logic* does Hegel conceal this fact.

Idea'.⁶¹ To be sure, Hegel asserts that "the Idea is the *adequate Concept*, that which is objectively true, or the *true as such*. When anything possesses truth, it possesses it through its Idea, or, *something possesses truth only insofar as it is Idea*."⁶² As described previously in this dissertation, in Hegel's perspective, the truth of what is 'ideal' or 'supersensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'real' or 'sensible', *and conversely*, the truth of what is cognized as 'real' or 'sensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'ideal' or 'supersensible'. Consequently, for Hegel, the 'Idea' is meant as "what is true in and for itself, the absolute unity of Concept and objectivity, (whose) (...) ideal content is nothing but the Concept in its determinations; (and) real content is only the presentation that the Concept in the form of external thereness."⁶³ In regard to Hegel's standard of truth, namely, in the 'Idea', it is as justified to say that the 'ideal' and the 'real' are held apart and are distinct, as that they mutually correspond. As such, the 'Idea'

61 The Concept's ongoing process of self-understanding culminates in the 'Idea'. Hegel's discussion of 'Life', 'Cognition', and the 'Absolute Idea' as aspects of the 'Idea' pertains to the recognition of the logical Concept within these divisions. First, "the Idea is *life*: the Concept that, distinguished from its objectivity, simple within itself, pervades its objectivity and, as its own end, possesses its means in the objectivity and posits the latter as its means, yet is immanent in this means and is therein the realized end that is identical with itself. This Idea, on account of its immediacy, has *individuality* for the form of its existence. But the reflection-into-self of its absolute process is the sublation of this immediate individuality; thereby the Concept which, as universality in this individuality, is the *inwardness* of the latter, converts the externality into universality, or posits its objectivity as being the same as itself."

"In (the) second stage, the Idea is the Idea of the *true* and the *good*, as *cognition* and *volition*. In the first instance, it is finite cognition and finite volition, in which the true and the good are still distinguished and each appears as yet only as a *goal*. The Concept has, in the first instance, liberated *itself* into itself and as yet given itself only an *abstract objectivity* for its reality. But the process of this finite cognition and action converts the initially abstract universality into a totality, whereby it becomes a *complete objectivity*. Or, to consider it from the other side, finite, that is subjective spirit, *makes* for itself the *presupposition* of an objective world, just as *life* has such a presupposition; but its activity consists in sublating this presupposition and converting it into a positedness. In this way its reality is for it the objective world, or conversely, the objective world is the ideality in which it cognizes itself.

"Thirdly, spirit cognizes the Idea as its *absolute truth*, as the truth that is in and for itself; the infinite Idea in which cognition and action are equalized, and which is the *absolute knowledge of itself*." (SL, p. 760)

The first division, 'Life', pertains to the recognition of the dialectically developing logical Concept through the Idea, within 1.) the living individual, 2.) the life-process, and 3.) the genus process. As such, Hegel makes clear the identity of the Concept and the organism's own teleological processes. The second moment, 'Cognition' pertains to 1.) the Idea of the True, and 2.) the Idea of the Good. In the present chapter of this dissertation, I am focusing primarily on the 'Idea' as a standard of truth. In the third instance, 'The Absolute Idea', the Concept has completed itself as 'fact', infinitely 'preserved' in 'ideality'.

62 SL, p. 755. / "Wenn irgend Etwas Wahrheit hat, hat es sie durch seine Idee, oder Etwas hat nur Wahrheit insofern es Idee ist." (WSL, GW12, p. 173)

63 EL, p. 286, section 213, my additions. / "Die Idee ist das Wahre and und für sich, die absolute Einheit des Begriffs und der Objectivität. Ihr ideeller Inhalt ist kein anderer als der Begriff in seinen Bestimmungen; ihr reeller Inhalt ist nur sein Darstellung, die er sich in der Form äusserlichen Daseyns gibt und diese Gestalt in seiner Idealität eingeschlossen, in seiner Macht, so sich in ihr erhält." (ENK, p. 215, section 213)

is not meant one-sidedly as either an 'ideal' or a 'real' content. Rather, it is the correspondence of the respective contents of what is 'ideal' and what is 'real' or, alternatively, it is the "*Subject-Object, (...) the unity of the ideal and the real, (and) of the finite and the infinite.*"⁶⁴ In this manner, the 'Idea' is not an 'idea' of a finite idealism. Hegel emphasizes that on the one hand,

we must (...) reject (...) that estimate of the Idea according to which it is not anything actual, and true thoughts are said to be *only ideas*. If thoughts are merely *subjective* and contingent, they certainly have no further value; but in this respect they are not inferior to temporal and contingent *actualities* which likewise have no further value than that of contingencies and phenomena. On the other hand, if, conversely, the Idea is not to have the value of truth, because in regard to phenomena it is *transcendent*, and no congruent object can be assigned to it in the world of sense, this is an odd misunderstanding that would deny objective validity to the Idea because it lacks that which constitutes Appearance, namely, the *untrue being* of the objective world.⁶⁵

Within the dialectical process by which Hegel's criterion of truth unfolds itself, scepticism plays a key role. First, scepticism recognizes (and negates) the finitude of the object, allowing determinations to be posited regarding the objective. Initially, the subjective determinations may be said to 'stand higher' than objectivity, as from this position, "the finite is the sort of objectivity which is (...) not adequate to its purpose, to its essence and concept, but diverse from it."⁶⁶ Second, scepticism recognizes (and negates) the finitude of the determinations of subjectivity as not having validity in the objective, as in empirical realism. In this moment, objectivity stands higher than subjectivity regarding the truth of what is. The finite that is to be negated here is "the sort of representation, the sort of subjective something, that does

64 EL, p. 288, section 214. / "Die Idee kann als die Vernunft, (diss ist die eigentliche philosophische Bedeutung für Vernunft), ferner als das Subject-Object, als die Einheit des Ideellen und Reellen, des Endlichen und Unendlichen." (ENK, p. 216, section 214)

65 SL, pp. 755-756. / "Indem nun der Ausdruck Idee für den objectiven oder realen Begriff zurückbehalten, und von dem Begriff selbst, noch mehr aber von der blossen Vorstellung unterschieden wird, so ist ferner noch mehr diejenige Schätzung der Idee zu verwerfen, nach welcher sie für etwas nur Unwirkliches genommen und von wahren Gedanken gesagt wird, es seyen nur Ideen. Wenn die Gedanken etwas bloss subjectives und zufälligen sind, so haben sie allerdings keinen weitem Werth, aber sie stehen den zeitlichen und zufälligen Wirklichkeiten darin nicht nach, welche ebenfalls keinen weitem Werth als den von Zufälligkeiten und Erscheinungen haben. Wenn dagegen umgekehrt die Idee darum den Werth der Wahrheit nicht haben soll, weil sie in Ansehung der Erscheinungen transcendent, weil ihr kein congruirender Gegenstand in der Sinnenwelt gegeben werden könne, so ist diss ein sonderbaren Missverstand, indem der Idee deswegen objective Gültigkeit abgesprochen wird, weil ihr dasjenige fehle, was die Erscheinung, das unwahre Seyn der objectiven Welt, ausmacht." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 174)

66 EL, p. 271, section 193R, my addition. / "denn, wie vorhin bemerkt, ist das Endliche eine solche Objectivität, die dem Zwecke, ihrem Wesen und Begriffe zugleich nicht angemessen, von ihm verschieden ist." (ENK, p. 203, section 193R) In this moment, from a certain vantage point, Hegel implicates the one-sidedness of the transcendental perspective. He states, "According to Kant, the notion of reason is supposed to be the notion of the *unconditioned*, but a notion *transcendent* in regard to phenomena, that is, no empirical use can be made of such notion that is *adequate to it.*" (SL, p. 755)

not involve existence.”⁶⁷ Third, scepticism may also declare the absolute non-correspondence, incongruence, and nullity of both the content of ‘ideality’ and ‘reality’, as is possible in the case of Ancient scepticism. In this moment, with respect to the “opposition between Concept and objectivity, one stops short at the untrue Concept and an equally untrue reality, as something ultimate.”⁶⁸ However, as was alluded to in Chapter Two of this dissertation, Hegel believes that the result of the dialectic is not absolute nothingness. That is to say, idealistic and realistic scepticisms do not just cancel one another out. Rather, the content of each is sublated in the other in the unfolding of truth. And, while scepticism is representative of the moment of ‘cancellation’, the contents of ‘ideality’ and ‘reality’ are equally ‘preserved’ and ‘raised up’. To be sure, regarding the first two moments of the Concept in the working out of the criterion of truth and meaning, Hegel states,

(to start with, there is the movement) to sublate the one-sidedness of the subjectivity of the Idea by means of the assumption of the world that (simply) is into oneself, into subjective representing and thinking; and to fill the abstract certainty of oneself with this objectivity (which thus counts as genuine) as its *content*. And, conversely, (there is the movement) to sublate the *one-sidedness* of the objective world, which therefore counts, on the contrary, only as a *semblance*, a collection of contingencies and of shapes which are in-themselves null and void - (the movement) to determine this world through the inwardness of the subjective, which here counts as what is truly objective, and to in-form it with subjectivity.⁶⁹

In this manner, in the unfolding of the criterion of truth of the *Logic*, on the one hand, there is the movement in which ‘idealistic’ scepticism sublates objectivity, and on the other hand, there is the movement in which ‘realistic’ scepticism sublates subjectivity. In particular, the ‘Idea’ as the unity of the ‘Subjective’ and ‘Objective’ Concepts occupies the position in which the content of the ‘ideal’ is ‘cancelled’, ‘preserved’, and ‘raised up’ into reality, *and conversely*, the content of the ‘real’ is

67 EL, p. 271, section 193R, continued from previous quote where the subject is the finite (*das Endliche*). / “- oder eine solche Vorstellung, solches Subjective, das die Existenz nicht involvirt.” (ENK, p. 203, section 193R)

68 SL, p. 707. / “dem Gegensatz des Begriffes gegen die Objectivität, bey dem unwahren Begriffe und einer eben so unwahren Realität, als einem letzten stehen geblieben wird.” (WSL, *GW12*, p. 129)

69 EL, p. 295, section 225. / “Dieser Process ist im Allgemeinen das Erkennen. An sich wird in ihm in Einer Thätigkeit der Gegensatz, die Einseitigkeit der Subjectivität mit der Einseitigkeit der Objectivität, aufgehoben. Aber diss Aufheben geschieht zunächst nur an sich; der Process als solcher ist daher unmittelbar selbst mit der Endlichkeit dieser Sphäre behaftet und zerfällt in die gedoppelte als verschieden gesetzte Bewegung des Triebs, - die Einseitigkeit der Subjectivität der Idee aufzuheben vermittelst der Aufnahme der seyendes Welt, in sich, in das subjective Vorstellen und Denken, und die abstracte Gewissheit seiner selbst mit dieser so als wahrhaft geltenden Objectivität als Inhalt zu erfüllen, - und umgekehrt die Einseitigkeit der objectiven Welt, die hiemit hier im Gegentheil nur als ein Schein, eine Sammlung von Zufälligkeiten und an sich nichtigen Gestalten, gilt, aufzuheben, sie durch das Innere des Subjectiven, das hier als das wahrhaft seyend Objective gilt, zu bestimmen und ihr dieses einzubilden.” (ENK, section 225, pp. 222-223)

'cancelled', 'preserved', and 'raised up' into ideality.⁷⁰ As such, the mutual sublation of 'ideality' and 'reality' yielding the 'Idea' is representative of the 'genuine' infinite and the standpoint of Absolute Idealism in general.

In the *Logic*, Hegel makes the general distinction between the 'Idea' and the 'Absolute Idea'. The 'Absolute Idea' is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, as in the 'Idea', but it is infinitely 'preserved' in ideality. Hence, while the 'Idea' is the 'subject-object', the 'Absolute Idea' is the 'subjective subject-object'. As such, Hegel's 'Absolute Idea' is representative of the non-regression of this unity as it is an instance of accomplished truth.⁷¹ That is to say, "there is no passing-over within (or overturning of) the Absolute Idea."⁷² In this manner, the 'Absolute Idea' is the recollected 'Idea', infinitely realized. Hegel also points out that the 'Absolute Idea' takes into account the full movement of the Concept leading up to the 'Idea', incorporating all the moments within itself. However, for him, the 'Absolute Idea' is not something dogmatic, as he states that

when the expression 'absolute Idea' is used, people may think that it is only here that we meet with what is right, that here everything must be given up. It is certainly possible to sing the hollow praises of the absolute Idea, far and wide; in the meantime, its true content is nothing but the entire

70 In elucidating the two-fold process by which the end or purpose of the Concept is realized, Hegel states, "At the present standpoint of our exposition objectivity signifies, in the first instance, the absolute being of the Concept, that is, the Concept that has sublated the mediation posited in its self-determination and converted it into immediate relation-to-self. Consequently this immediacy is itself immediately and wholly pervaded by the Concept, just as the Concept's totality is immediately identical with its being. But since, further, the Concept has equally to restore the free being-for-self of its subjectivity, there arises a relationship between the Concept as *end* and objectivity. In this relationship of the immediacy of the objectivity becomes the negative element over against the end, an element to be determined by the activity of the end; this immediacy thus acquires the other significance, that of being in and for itself null in so far as it stands opposed to the Concept. (...) Since the end is the Concept that is posited as in its own self relating itself to objectivity and as sublating by its own act its defect of being subjective, the purposiveness which is at first *external* becomes, through the realization of the end, *internal* and the *Idea*." (SL, p. 710) As such, it is evident that, by way of the Concept, the first moment is that of subjectivity standing over above objectivity, the second moment is that of objectivity standing over above subjectivity, and the third moment is the infinite unity of the contents of subjectivity and objectivity. Alternatively stated, subjectivity and objectivity must mutually sublate each other in the realization of the Idea. However, at this point, it is essential to understand that for Hegel, in 'The Doctrine of the Concept', as well as in his system, subjectivity and ideality seem to be logically 'first' and 'last'.

71 For Hegel, the attainment of 'Idea' and the 'Absolute Idea' is not simply "a goal to which we have to approximate but which itself always remains a kind of beyond; on the contrary, we must recognize that everything actual is only in so far as it possesses the Idea and expresses it." (SL, p. 756)

72 EL, p. 303, section 237, my addition. / "Für sich ist die absolute Idee, weil kein Uebergehen noch Voraussetzen und überhaupt keine Bestimmtheit, welche nicht flüssig und durchsichtig wäre, in ihr ist, die reine Form des Begriffs, die ihren Inhalt als sich selbst anschaut." (ENK, pp. 228-229, section 237)

system, the development of which we have been considering so far.⁷³

In this manner, the 'Absolute Idea' is representative of a mature understanding of the dialectical progression of the logical Concept in general.⁷⁴ It is the comprehension that although the Concept develops itself in the refinement of truth, and new truths develop themselves, no sublation or scepticism can alter the particular moment of truth characterized as the 'Idea'. For Hegel, the truth, as in the 'Absolute Idea', must be seen to involve the entire progression of finite moments.

IV. Final Conception of the Nature and Function of Scepticism in Hegel's *Logic*

Thus far, I have traced the movement of the working out of the opposition of 'ideality' and 'reality' constitutive of Absolute Idealism and the criterion of truth offered by the *Logic*. In particular, the truth of what is 'ideal' or 'supersensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'real' or 'sensible' and conversely, the truth of what is cognized as 'real' or 'sensible' is to be found in its mediation with what is cognized in its immediacy as 'ideal' and 'supersensible'. Within the process of attaining to the 'Idea', the content of the distinct sides must logically correspond in some fundamental manner. Furthermore, it is the satisfaction of scepticism in its various forms that may be said to 'drive' the process by which the criterion of truth is attained. Particularly, scepticism is at once: 1.) the recognition (and negation of) finite 'reality' as not adequate to 'ideality' or, alternatively, the position that the truth of 'reality' is one-sidedly to be found in 'ideality', as in the general standpoint of finite idealism as characterized by Hegel; 2.) the recognition (and negation of) finite 'ideality' as not

73 EL, p. 304, section 237Z.

74 Hegel summarizes the dialectical movement of the Concept. He states that "a universal *first, considered in and for itself*, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first *immediate* now appears as *mediated, related* to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the *negative* of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the *first negative*. The immediate, from this negative side, has been *extinguished* in the other, but the other is essentially not the *empty negative*, the *nothing*, that is taken to be the usual result of the dialectic; rather is it the *other of the first*, the *negative of the immediate*; it is therefore determined as the *mediated - contains* in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially *preserved and retained* even in its other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition." (SL, pp. 833-834) Also see Appendices #1, #2, and #3 at the end of this dissertation. Furthermore, for Hegel, in the sphere of the 'Absolute Idea', the distinction between synthetic and analytic cognition comes to the fore. In the former case, the terms are posited in their unity, while in the latter the terms are posited in their distinction. In this manner, while synthetic cognition stems from the speculative moment of the Concept, analytic cognition stems from the dialectical or sceptical moment of the Concept.

adequate to 'reality', or, alternatively, the position that the truth of 'ideality' is one-sidedly to be found in 'reality', as in the general standpoint of Modern scepticism; 3.) the recognition (and negation) of both finite 'ideality' and finite 'reality', or, alternatively, the demonstration of the nullity, and absolute non-correspondence of both 'ideality' and 'reality', as in the possible standpoint of the Ancient sceptics. With respect to this third position of the Ancient sceptics, 'absolute nothingness' is considered to be the result of the dialectic. However, in this movement, from an Hegelian perspective, the mutually 'cancelled' contents of 'ideality' and 'reality' are equally 'preserved' and 'raised up' as they are 'void'. Therefore, for Hegel, the truth resides in the mutual sublation of 'ideality' and 'reality'. Consequently, Absolute Idealism occupies a fourth moment which 'contains' within itself the three before it. Specifically, the criterion of truth characteristic of Absolute Idealism is the standpoint of 4.) neither the recognition (and negation) of finite 'reality' as not adequate to 'ideality' nor the recognition (and negation) of finite 'ideality' as not adequate to 'reality'. This fourth moment is representative of the infinite unity and 'correspondence' of the respective contents of 'ideality' and 'reality', constituting the basis for the articulation of truth and meaning in general. But, this in no way implies that Hegel's position involves a regress to the standpoint of 'Immediate Knowing' which wrongly presupposes the unity of 'ideality' and 'reality' merely as *in-itself*. Rather, the standpoint of Absolute Idealism must 'contain' the first three moments within itself. That is to say, the dialectical process of the working out of the opposition between 'ideality' and 'reality' must include the three sceptical moments of idealism, realism, and Ancient scepticism if we are to attain the truth. Moreover, from Hegel's perspective, the logical Concept should also be seen to incorporate and contain all subsequent developments, refinements, and decompositions of itself, for example, a fifth moment: 5.) both 3.) and 4.) above, a sixth moment: 6.) neither 3.) nor 4.) above, a seventh moment: 7.) neither 5.) nor 6.) above, unto infinity. To be sure, Hegel states that "the advance rolls onward to infinity."⁷⁵

In these many ways, scepticism shows itself to 'drive' the process by which the criterion of truth is carried out in the *Logic*. Overall, scepticism shows itself to belong to Logic's ongoing mediation of Spirit and Nature within Hegel's system. Particularly, scepticism is representative of the moments of 'cancellation' within the mutual sublation of finite Spirit and Nature. However, viewed from the position of Hegel's Absolute Idealism, it might still be objected that the *Logic* begins with, and prioritizes the cognition of the 'ideal' to the detriment grasping the 'real' in a one-sided manner. Hegel himself

75 SL, p. 839. / "so dass der Fortgang sich eben so vorwärts in Unendliche fortwälzt." (WSL, *GW12*, p. 249) Also see Appendix #2.

responds to this objection by stating that

it might perhaps be objected to this procedure in the scientific sphere that, because intuition is easier than cognition, the object of intuition, that is, concrete actuality, should be made the beginning of science, and that this procedure is more *natural* than that which begins from the subject matter in its abstraction and from that proceeds in the opposite direction to its particularization and concrete individualization. But the fact that the aim is *to cognize*, implies that the question of a comparison with *intuition* is already settled and done with; there can be only a question of what is to be the first and what is to be the nature of the sequel *within the process of cognition*; it is no longer a natural method, but a method appropriate to cognition that is demanded. If it is merely a question of easiness, then it is self-evident besides, that it is easier for cognition to grasp the abstract simple thought determination than the concrete subject matter, which is a manifold connexion of such thought determinations and their relationships; and it is in this manner that we have now to apprehend the concrete, and not as it is in intuition.⁷⁶

Furthermore, it might still be stubbornly argued that Hegel's presentation of the 'Objective Concept' in the *Logic* is obscure, and provides a less-than-satisfactory balance between subjectivity and objectivity in relation to what is true. Definitely, it is to be admitted, in keeping with the traditional interpretation of Hegel's system, that it begins with what is 'ideal', namely, with *finite Spirit*.⁷⁷ However, elsewhere in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, he endeavours to demonstrate how *finite Spirit*, in turn, proceeds from Nature, pointing to the mutual sublation of Spirit and Nature. In an addition in the conclusion of *The Philosophy of Nature*, a series of lectures which strives to elucidate further how the Concept pervades the natural world, specifically, in relation to 'Inorganic Physics', 'Chemistry', as well as 'Organic life', Hegel summarizes that in

the transition from Nature to spirit; in the living being, Nature (...) is transformed into a higher

76 SL, p. 801. / "Gegen diesen Gang im Wissenschaftlichen kann etwa gemeint werden, weil das Anschauen leichter sey als das Erkennen, so sey auch das Anschaubare, also die concrete Wirklichkeit zum Anfang der Wissenschaft zu machen, und dieser Gang sey naturgemässer als der, welcher vom Gegenstand in seiner Abstraction beginnt, und von da umgekehrt zu dessen Besonderung und concreten Vereinzelung fortheht. - Indem aber erkannt werden soll, so ist die Vergleichung mit der Anschauung bereits entschieden und aufgegeben; und es kann nur die Frage seyn, was innerhalb des Erkennens das Erste und wie die Folge beschaffen seyn soll; es wird nicht mehr ein naturgemässer, sondern ein Erkenntnisgemässer Weg verlangt. - Wenn bloss nach der Leichtigkeit gefragt wird, so erhellt ohnehin von selbst, dass es dem Erkennen leichter ist, die abstracte einfache Gedankenbestimmung zu fassen, als das Concrete, welches eine vielfache Verknüpfung von solchen Gedankenbestimmungen und deren Verhältnissen ist; und in dieser Art, nicht mehr wie es in der Anschauung ist, soll es aufgefasst werden." (WSL, GW12, pp. 215-216) Also, Hegel explains, "the *universal* is in and for itself the first moment of the Concept because it is the *simple* moment, and the particular is only subsequent to it because it is the mediated moment; and conversely the *simple* is the more universal, and the concrete, as in itself differentiated and so mediated, is that which already presupposes the transition from a first. The remark applies not only to the order of procedure in the specific forms of definitions, divisions, and propositions, but also to the order of cognition as a whole and simply with respect to the difference of abstract and concrete in general." (pp. 801-802)

77 Here, the distinction between *finite Spirit* and *Absolute Spirit* must be made that while *finite Spirit* may be sublated, *Absolute Spirit* cannot.

existence. Spirit has thus proceeded from Nature. (...) Nature has become an other to itself in order to recognize itself again as Idea and to reconcile itself with itself. But it is one-sided to regard spirit in this way as having only *become* an actual existence after being merely a potentiality. True, Nature is the immediate - but even so, as the other of spirit, its existence is a relativity: and so, as the negative, its being is only posited, derivative. It is the power of free spirit which sublates this negativity; spirit is no less *before* than *after* Nature, it is not merely the metaphysical Idea of it. Spirit, just because it is the goal of Nature, is *prior* to it, Nature has proceeded from spirit: not empirically, however, but in such a manner that spirit is already from the very first implicitly present in Nature which is spirit's own presupposition. But spirit in its infinite freedom gives Nature a free existence and the Idea is active in Nature as an inner necessity; just as a free man of the world is sure that his action is the world's activity. Spirit, therefore, itself proceeding, *in the first instance*, from the immediate, but *then* abstractly apprehending itself, wills to achieve its own liberation by fashioning Nature out of itself; this action of spirit is philosophy.⁷⁸

In this quotation, Hegel admits that finite Spirit also proceeds from Nature. In this manner, scepticism is an essential aspect in the transitions of *finite* Spirit to Nature, and from *finite* Nature to Spirit. Moreover, in showing that Spirit and Nature mutually sublate one another, Hegel's speculative standpoint in the *Logic* may be interpreted as an attempt to eclipse both Kantian and Humean perspectives, namely, on the one hand, the

subjective idealism, which takes the activity of cognition in analysis to be merely a one-sided *positing*, beyond which the *thing-in-itself* remains concealed (...) (and on the other hand) the other view (which) belongs to so-called realism which apprehends the subjective Concept as an empty identity that receives the thought determinations into itself *from outside*.⁷⁹

However, within his own synthesis of 'ideality' and 'reality', it is clear that from the perspective of the *Logic*, Hegel still reserves a certain priority to *finite* Spirit over Nature. It is in this sense that it is now logical for us to investigate the nature and function of scepticism with respect to A. N. Whitehead's

78 Hegel, *The Philosophy of Nature*, translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, pp. 444, Section 376Z. This passage is also included in M. J. Petry's translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* (Vol. 3), New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1970, pp. 212-213. In Petry's translation, it is written, "Nature is certainly that which is immediate, but as that which is distinct from spirit, it is nevertheless merely a relativity. As the negative of spirit, it is therefore merely a posited being. It is the power of free spirit which sublates this negativity; spirit is nature's antecedent and to an equal extent its consequent, it is not merely the metaphysical Idea of it. It is precisely because spirit constitutes the end of nature, that it is *antecedent* to it."

According to Burbidge's synopsis in *Real Process: How Logic and Chemistry Combine in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, "unlike the *Science of Logic*, the *Philosophy of Nature* is a system, not because thought thinks through the implications of its own concepts, but because thought learns that it should look to nature in a certain way, then considers every experience relevant to that perspective, and finally discerns in the synthesis of all the resulting descriptions patterns that point forward to the next plateau." (p. 203)

79 *SL*, p. 788. / "Jene Vorstellung spricht bekanntlich der subjective Idealismus aus, der in der Analyse die Thätigkeit des Erkennens allein für ein einseitiges Setzen nimmt, jenseits dessen das Ding-an-sich verbogen bleibt; die andere Vorstellung gehört dem sogenannten Realismus an, der den subjectiven Begriff als eine leere Identität erfasst, welche die Gedankenbestimmungen von aussen in sich aufnehme." (*WSL*, *GW12*, p. 204)

philosophy of Organism, for whom 'realism' has 'provisional priority' over 'idealism'.⁸⁰

79 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (1925), New York: The Free Press, 1967.

PART TWO:

The Nature and Function of Scepticism in A. N. Whitehead's
Process and Reality

Chapter IV

Whitehead's Synthesis of Realism and Idealism

This fourth chapter begins Part Two of this dissertation and commences an investigation of the nature and function of scepticism within A. N. Whitehead's speculative system of 'process metaphysics' and philosophy of Organism. My discussion is not intended to overshadow a further elucidation of Hegel's rich and insightful *Philosophy of Nature*, which, in logical sequence comes immediately 'after' the *Logic* in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, and contains a thorough and valuable elaboration of the categories of Mathematics, Chemistry, Inorganic Physics, and Organic Physics in relation to the natural world. I shall have to dedicate a full investigation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* to a future work. However, it is the purpose of this dissertation to focus on the nature and role of scepticism in both Hegel's and Whitehead's speculative philosophies, respectively. In fact, my conjoint elaboration of these two thinkers aims at presenting a contemporary perspective on scepticism in relation to predominant works terming themselves 'speculative philosophy', and in particular, those which can be interpreted as 'process' philosophies. Also, by providing a conjoint analysis of both Hegel and Whitehead, this dissertation does not limit its investigations of scepticism in speculative philosophy to one thinker alone.

To refresh our considerations of Whitehead's speculative philosophy in relation to that of Hegel, as was discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation, while Whitehead was virtually ignorant of Hegel's philosophy, his own philosophy of Organism can be said to be an 'Anglo-American' response to Hegel within the domain of 'speculative' philosophy. And, it is one steeped in the British empirical tradition, but tempered with his acquaintance with the debates between the 'Absolute Idealists', such as Green, Caird, Bradley, and McTaggart and the 'Critical Realists', such as Moore and Russell in his day.¹ Similarly, in the Introduction of this dissertation, I attempted to clarify Whitehead's statement that his own philosophy might be interpreted as the project of "transforming some main doctrines of Absolute

¹ As W. E. Hocking reports in "Whitehead as I Knew Him" in G. L. Kline (ed.) *et al. Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1963, "After accusing me on one occasion of having spoken from a Hegelian standpoint, (Whitehead) added 'Don't be afraid of exposing my ignorance before the class - say anything you like - I speak in complete ignorance of Hegel.'" (p. 13) Also, as Hocking remembers, Whitehead stated, "I am conscious of having started with a decided antagonism to the Royce-Bradley tradition, and of having in the course of time approached to it... Its success lies in the wealth of intuitions expressed. But there is the great difficulty in verbalizing them, and making them consistent with one another. That is the task of this century." (p. 14)

Idealism onto a realistic basis.”² I demonstrated that Whitehead defends a position of “provisional

2 Whitehead, Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition, edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, p. xiii. In conjunction with my own understanding of this statement, in acknowledging the symmetrical aspect of relational terms in Hegel's logical Concept (see Appendix #2 below), G. Vlastos shows that there is a similar logical standpoint in Whitehead, and brings out some of these more ‘Hegelian’ tendencies of Whitehead. In “Organic Categories in Whitehead,” in G. L. Kline (ed.) *et al.* Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, Vlastos explains, “Two terms are organically, and internally, related whenever the essence of either requires a reference to the essence of the other. If *a* and *b* are organic parts, *a* can neither exist nor be conceived apart from *b*; *a* is not *a*, and could not exist as *a*, except in relation to *b*. Thus stated, this concept confronts a formidable objection. The internality of relations, it is said, is a self-contradictory notion. For if, by hypothesis, to know *a* I must know *b*, I cannot know *a* alone, nor *b* alone. If so, the relation breaks down. We no longer have two terms which can be related, for either term telescopes into its own nature the relation to the other. We are thus involved in a contradictory situation: *a* must be related to *b*, since without *b* it is not *a*; yet *a* cannot be related to *b*, for it cannot stand as a term in a relation.

“The classic solution to this difficulty is the Hegelian dialectic. In Hegel we begin with *a* (thesis). But *a* without *b* is not-*a*: it is incomplete, self-contradictory. We are, therefore, forced to take into account *b* (the antithesis), and state the full nature of both in this relation (synthesis). We have thus moved from the abstract to the concrete. The *a* of the synthesis is concrete; it has overcome the contradiction in *a* which arises out of its abstraction from *b*. The expression *aRb* states the transition from the first stage to the third stage. It is essentially dynamic. It could not be made at the first stage, for at that point we did not yet know *a*'s relation to *b*; and it need not be made at the third stage, for now, knowing the relation to *b*, we need not state it all over again in *aRb*. Neglect the dynamic relation which forces the progress from the thesis to the synthesis, and you will only see with Russell a plain self-contradiction in the doctrine of internal relations.

“Why is it, then, that Whitehead, building on the cornerstone of internal relatedness, should take no notice of the Hegelian dialectic? (...) The three terms of the Hegelian dialectic are ontologically homogenous. Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are all the nature of the Idea. The *Logic* begins with Being, which is described at once as ‘pure thought.’ The development of this initial term is ‘the movement of thought.’ No intrusion of any non-ideal factor is required to produce Nature as the ‘reflected image’ of the Idea.

“In Whitehead, on the other hand, we meet a *heterogenous* dialectic. Thesis is material (‘physical’) and antithesis ideal (‘conceptual’). Where such heterogeneity occurs, the second term of the triad cannot be generated from the first term by negation, nor the third from the second. First and second have independent origins. No internal contradiction will convert the thesis into the antithesis, and the antithesis into a synthesis. It follows that the dialectic can no longer be used as a heuristic principle. But it does not follow that it cannot be used at all. Insofar as Whitehead makes use of the concept of internal relatedness, he must conserve a certain part of it: the dynamic fusion of polar opposites, the process from the abstract to the concrete. This is best shown in his basic metaphysical unit, the actual entity. Without the dialectic the actual entity can only appear (like the notion of internal relatedness, which it embodies) self-contradictory.” (pp. 158-159)

“The actual entity seems - like the Hegelian *Begriff* - a metaphysical monster, which overrides established distinctions” (p. 161); “the homogenous dialectic of Hegel finds no difficulty in applying the two notions with complete symmetry to any phase of a given organic process” (p. 161); “Whitehead introduces a notion corresponding to the Hegelian Absolute, but constructed on the pattern of the heterogeneous dialectic” (p. 165); “Whitehead's permanent contribution to philosophy (is) his description of the genuinely organic parts of our experience. His doctrine of mind is a doctrine of the organic foundations of mind. He employs in this analysis a unique variant of the Hegelian dialectic, which interprets all process as an interplay of matter and idea in temporal actualities, and of idea and matter in a nontemporal actuality” (p. 166). While Vlastos here rightly presents the symmetrical aspect of relational terms, it is to be noted that the triad of ‘thesis’, ‘antithesis’, and ‘synthesis’ are almost never used by Hegel, but are to be attributed to Fichte. Also, we must remember Whitehead's stance which is contrary to Bradley, that “what are ordinarily termed ‘relations’ are abstractions from contrasts.” (PR, pp. 228, and see 229)

realism (...) in which the scientific scheme is recast, and founded on the (...) concept of *organism*.³ Therefore, here, I shall carry out a further elucidation on the relation of realism and idealism in Whitehead's philosophy, towards the aim of outlining Whitehead's views on the nature and function of scepticism in his speculative thought.

As a whole, Whitehead's three volumes, *Science and the Modern World* (1925), *Process and Reality* (1929), and *Adventures of Ideas* (1933) constitute the interconnected basis of Whitehead's speculative philosophical writings. As Whitehead presents his work:

The three books - *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality*, *Adventures of Ideas* - are an endeavour to express a way of understanding the nature of things, and to point out how that way of understanding is illustrated by a survey of the mutations of human experience. Each book can be read separately; but they supplement each other's omissions or compressions.⁴

Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World* consists of his Lowell Lectures delivered in 1925 is a prolegomenon to the later Gifford lectures of 1928. The Gifford lectures, including their expansion and revision, represent the basis of Whitehead's philosophy of Organism contained in his *magnum opus*, *Process and Reality*, which was published in 1929. The third volume in the series is *Adventures of Ideas*, and stems largely from Whitehead's Dartmouth College lectures in 1926. *Adventures of Ideas* both added to, and clarified the positions worked out in the previous volumes. At any rate, it is clear that one of the aims for Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World* was to 'plant the seeds' for some of his main notions which would later blossom in his later writings. One such 'seed' was the setting up of his position of 'provisional realism', which is more fully elucidated as a principle of experience in *Process and Reality*. Through this standpoint, Whitehead seeks to do justice to some of the main tenets of 'idealistic' doctrines by outlining the 'realistic' conditions for their possibility. And, in his analysis of experience in *Process and Reality*, idealism does have its place in Whitehead's scheme alongside his 'provisional realism'. In this way, Whitehead considers the 'bitter conflict' that he had witnessed in his day between realism and idealism not really as a conflict, but as a 'contrast' having its foundations within the 'process' nature of experience. It is my contention that while Whitehead's philosophy of Organism constituted a poignant response to Hegel, to the British 'Absolute Idealists' of his era, as well as to other forms of idealism in the history of philosophy, the end-product of Whitehead's speculative philosophy

3 Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (1925), New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 63-64, and see pp. 90-91.

4 Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), New York: The Free Press, 1967, p. vii.

offers to us a constructive synthesis of realism and idealism.⁵ It is clear that Whitehead's cosmology provides this synthesis to us in conjunction with his attempt to overcome the arbitrary 'bifurcation' of nature into strict dualities, such as 'matter' and 'mind'. He charges that these abstract separations were brought about by the historical opposition between 'idealistic' philosophy and 'realistic' natural science, characterized by their mutual scepticism. Therefore, it will be the task of the present chapter to investigate the ways in which Whitehead attempts to synthesize realism and idealism both in his writings on the relationship between philosophy and science as well as from within his philosophical system itself. In order to undertake this study, I shall first attempt to clarify Whitehead's attribution of a 'provisional priority' to 'realism' in his analysis of experience, stemming from his critique of idealism and in his commentary on the relationship of philosophy to science. Second, it will be necessary to elucidate Whitehead's defense of speculative philosophy. Third, I shall investigate Whitehead's critique of the modes of explanation advanced by the scientific materialist paradigm of his day, focusing on his commentary on the doctrine of 'simple location' in physics and the problem of induction. Fourth, with regards to the question of realism and idealism, I will introduce the fundamental ontological unit of Whitehead's system, namely, 'actual entities', or, alternatively, 'actual occasions'. Through the course of this study, I shall focus on both *Science and the Modern World* as well as the opening chapters of *Process and Reality*.

5 As was alluded to earlier, this thesis is defended by E. E. Harris' in his article, "The Contemporary Significance of Hegel and Whitehead," in G. R. Lucas (ed.), *et al. Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy*. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986, pp. 26-27, where he states, "Whitehead's philosophy reconciles the Realism and the Idealism of his day (and) (...) Hegel, also, (...) reconciles Idealism and Realism with an insight which was not again recovered before Whitehead." In *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, New York: University Press of America, 1983, p. 317, Harris also suggests, "Whiteheadian philosophy is far from contemplating a chaotic universe ordered only ideally by human thinking. It presumes a cosmic process of integrative activity directed by principles of order systematized in God's Primordial Nature, and it leads in part explicitly and in part by implication to the conception of a dialectical process generating conscious subjects, which (...) has much in common with Hegel's."

According to R. W. Sellars, in "Philosophy of Organism and Physical Realism," in Schilpp (ed.) *et al. The Library of Living Philosophers (Vol. 3): The Philosophy of Whitehead*, New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1941, Whitehead "seems to me to start from a neo-realist modification of idealism" (p. 411); "It is by means of his conception of togetherness as combined with a neorealistic idea of participation that he hopes to avoid traditional pitfalls. The accent is upon internal relations of a felt, or psychologistic, type. Hence his neorealism swings in the direction of idealism. Relations are internal and not external." (p. 413)

In *The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics 1925-1929*, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1984, L. Ford reports N. Lawrence's synopsis in *Whitehead's Philosophical Development*, that "most readers have found a vast difference between Whitehead's earlier works in the philosophy of nature, published 1919-1922, and his later metaphysical writings, starting with *Science and the Modern World* (1925). (...) Lawrence sees Whitehead's later philosophy as gradually emerging out of the tensions and conflicts already inherent in the 'idealist' and 'realist' strands of his epistemological reflections in the philosophy of nature, conflicts Whitehead was not able to resolve to his own satisfaction until *Process and Reality*." (p. 1)

I. The 'Provisional Priority' of Realism in Whitehead's Speculative Philosophy

Whitehead's initial critique of the model of experience set forth by 'idealistic' systems, in turn, provides the realist framework within which he grounds his own philosophy. In his early philosophical period, his allegiance to the Anglo-American realists of his time owes itself almost uniformly to his effort to advance the purposes of both mathematics and the natural sciences.⁶ In *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead provides a strong criticism of idealistic doctrines in the history of philosophy, in virtue of their anemic relationship to practical mathematics and to the natural sciences. He argues that the onset of idealism is largely responsible for the intellectual disunity of philosophy and the sciences, since, in his assessment, idealism believes itself to have transcended the need for the natural sciences. For him, idealism has "swallowed the scientific scheme its entirety as being the only rendering of the facts of nature," thereby thoroughly divorcing itself from all scientific investigations of nature.⁷ In Whitehead's synopsis, the previous historical paradigms such as "the romantic movement in literature, and the idealistic movement in philosophy were not the products of mathematical (and scientific) minds," pointing to an overall lack of familiarity with, and interest in the natural sciences on their parts.⁸ Similarly, he judges that the 'German idealistic schools' derived after Kant are not appealing as genuine sources of knowledge since they "have had but a slight effect on the mentality of the scientific world."⁹ These criticisms point to Whitehead's initial distrust of the 'idealistic schools' in the history of philosophy, and demonstrates that he is quite concerned with the one-sided standpoint of nineteenth-century epistemological viewpoints, which "claimed that nature was merely the chief example of the cogitations of minds" and referred to "the objective world as a theoretical construct from purely subjective experience."¹⁰ Therefore, Whitehead is convinced that 'idealistic' philosophies were wrong in the assumption that the very basis of nature was to be found only in the mind. And, for him, one-sided

6 In the Preface to *PR*, Whitehead writes that "among the contemporary schools of thought, my obligations to the English and American Realists are obvious." (p. xii) In *SMW*, Whitehead mounts a scathing attack on 'idealistic' philosophical positions in light of its lack of relationship with the natural sciences. This attack serves as the 'foundational critique' upon which 'a system is built', a move typical of many systematic philosophers.

7 *SMW*, p. 63.

8 *SMW*, p. 32.

9 *SMW*, p. 156.

10 *SMW*, p. 145, *PR*, p. xiii. In Hegel's defense, as was shown in Chapter Three of this dissertation, the world of nature is not just 'one of the ideas' as Whitehead charges. Rather, the 'Idea' is representative of 'a fact' in actuality.

idealisms of this sort lead to the problem of the 'bifurcation' of nature, namely, the arbitrary separation of nature into strict dualities such as 'matter', and 'mind'.¹¹ He charges that figures such as Berkeley "all too hastily have recourse to an idealism with its objectivity grounded in the mind of God."¹² The main problem for Whitehead is that "in monistic philosophies, Spinoza's or (that of) absolute idealism, (the) ultimate is God, who is equivalently termed 'The Absolute.' In such monistic schemes, the ultimate is illegitimately allowed a final, 'eminent' reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents."¹³ For Whitehead, these types of monistic interpretations in which mind simply transcends nature are largely incompatible with, and do not lend themselves at all to the natural science of the modern era. These idealisms fail "to connect, in any organic fashion, the fact of nature with their idealistic philosophies."¹⁴ For these reasons, in his discussion of the contacts of philosophy and science, Whitehead asserts that "the whole of the great German idealism will be ignored, as being out of effective touch with its contemporary science."¹⁵ In these ways, Whitehead's interprets that idealism has little to contribute to the natural sciences. And, he upholds the common criticism that the 'idealistic' world-view was a main source of error, wrongly attributing all sorts of metaphysical anomalies to empirical perception, thereby forcing science to disband philosophy, altogether. However, Whitehead himself does not disband philosophy in virtue of his initial dismissal of the 'idealistic' schools. Rather, he points out that "there is, (...) another possible line of thought, which enables us to adopt anyhow an attitude of provisional realism, and to widen the scientific scheme in a way which is useful for science itself."¹⁶ Through his position of 'provisional realism', which attempts to set out the experiential conditions for possibility of idealism,

11 In *The Concept of Nature* (1919), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, Whitehead writes, "natural philosophy should never ask, what is in the mind and what is in nature. (...) What I am essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in different senses. One reality would be the entities such as electrons which are the study of speculative physics. This would be the reality which there is for knowledge; although on this theory it is never known. For what is known is the other sort of reality, which is the byplay of the mind. Thus there would be two natures, one is the conjecture and the other is the dream." (p. 30)

12 *SMW*, pp. 67-68, my addition. For a synopsis of Whitehead's actual philosophical relationship to Berkeley, see E. Wolf-Gazo, "Whitehead and Berkeley: On the True Nature of Sense Perception," in F. Rapp and R. Wiehl (eds.), *et al. Whitehead's Metaphysics of Creativity*, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1990.

13 *PR*, p. 7, my additions.

14 *SMW*, p. 64.

15 *SMW*, p. 139.

16 *SMW*, p. 68.

Whitehead eventually does justice to idealism. Primarily, he acknowledges that natural science has also turned its back on metaphysics. As such, Whitehead's critique of idealism in *Science and the Modern World*, while representing the critical first step towards grounding his own speculative philosophy, is not as fatal as it may initially appear to be.

In setting out his position of 'provisional realism', Whitehead defends empiricism along Humean lines, as a first step to providing a coherent account of experience.¹⁷ He believes that it is necessary to recognize concrete experience which, Hume had rightly defended as the common-sense basis of all matters of fact. Whitehead states,

It is the blunt truth that we want. The final contentment of our aims requires nothing more than vulgar substitutes, or subtle evasions, however delicate. The indirections of truth can never satisfy us. Our purposes seek their main justifications in sheer matter-of-fact. All the rest is addition, however important, to this foundation.¹⁸

From Whitehead's point of view, Humean and neo-Humean standpoints insisting on empirical matter of fact, although critical towards many scientific assumptions, lend themselves positively to the standpoint of the natural sciences. Even though in many cases Hume tends to "deny the rationality of science," Whitehead believes that "some variant of Hume's philosophy has generally prevailed among men of science."¹⁹ And, he undoubtedly adopts many of the main tenets of his 'provisional realism' from

17 In coming to define his position, in the chapter, "The Romantic Reaction" in *SMW*, he states, subjectivism is the "belief that the nature of our immediate experience is the outcome of the perceptive peculiarities of the subject enjoying the experience." (p. 88) On the contrary, objectivism is the creed that "the actual elements perceived by our senses are in themselves the elements of a common world; and that this world is a complex of things, including indeed our acts of cognition, but transcending them. According to this point of view the things experienced are to be distinguished from our knowledge of them. So far as there is dependence, the *things* pave the way for the *cognition*, rather than vice-versa." (pp. 88-89) However, Whitehead concludes that "the distinction between realism and idealism does not coincide with that between objectivism and subjectivism. Both realists and idealists can start from an objective standpoint. They may both agree that the world disclosed in sense-perception is a common world, transcending the individual recipient. But the objective idealist, when he comes to analyze what the reality of the world involves, finds that cognitive mentality is in some way inextricably concerned in every detail. This position the realist denies. Accordingly these two classes of objectivists do not part company till they have arrived at the ultimate problem of metaphysics. There is a great deal which they share in common. This is why, in my last lecture, I said that I adopted a position of provisional realism." (pp. 90-91) The 'problem of metaphysics' that Whitehead describes is that of 'induction' which we shall investigate later in this chapter.

18 *AL*, p. 250.

19 *SMW*, p. 4. The scientific variant of Hume's philosophy to which Whitehead himself ascribed is summed up in the following passages: "It is the first rule of the scientific method, - Enunciate observed correlations of observed fact. This is the great Baconian doctrine, namely Observe and observe, until finally you detect a regularity of sequence" (*AL*, p. 117); "Apart from recurrence, knowledge would be impossible; for nothing could be referred to in our past experience" (*SMW*, p. 31); "The task of science is explained to be merely the formulation of observed

Hume's empiricism. In particular, at times, Whitehead quite forcefully defends the notion that the content of 'ideality' has without question originated from the immediate, empirical world of fact. He is convinced that "all knowledge is derived from, and verified by, direct intuitive observation."²⁰ Therefore, for Whitehead, the empirical has priority in, and is the 'starting point' of the unfolding of experience. And, "the elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification of thought; and the starting-point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience."²¹ Similarly, in pointing to the Humean standpoint embedded in his own perspective, Whitehead states of his analysis of experience that "we are here extending and rigidly applying Hume's principle that ideas of reflection are derived from actual facts."²² Hence, from his critique of the incompatibility of idealism with the natural sciences, it is clear that the aim of his philosophy of Organism is to set out, foremost, to describe the "object-to-subject structure of human experience," along a line of thought loosely comparable to that of Hume, in which, "'mind' is a process of concrescence arising from primary data."²³ Consequently, from the perspective of his overall cosmological scheme, Whitehead prioritizes an elucidation of the process by

identities of pattern persistent and recurrent in each stream of experience. (...) Hume adds that we expect the recurrence observed in the past, also to recur in the future. (But, will they come?) To this question Hume (...) returns no answer. But Positivistic science is solely concerned with observed fact, and must hazard no conjecture as to the future. If observed fact be all we know, then there is no other knowledge. Probability is relative to knowledge. There is no probability as to the future within the doctrine of Positivism. (...) Of course most men of science, and many philosophers, use the Positivistic doctrine to avoid the necessity of considering perplexing fundamental questions - in short, to avoid metaphysics -, and then save the importance of science by an implicit recurrence to their metaphysical persuasion that the past does in fact condition the future. (...) Indeed, as Hume pointed out, human life cannot be carried on without this persuasion. In this way the Positivistic doctrine of today bases life on some form of atomism, objective or subjective, and deduces that the sole conception of science is to elaborate simple descriptions of things observed. (...) Nature, even in the act of anticipation, often provides a surprise" (AL pp. 125-126); We do not trust any recasting of the scientific theory depending upon a single performance of an aberrant experiment, unrepeatable. The ultimate test is always widespread, recurrent experience; and the more general the rationalistic scheme, the more important is this final appeal." (PR, p. 17)

20 AL p. 177.

21 PR p. 4.

22 PR p. 40.

23 AL p. 188. PR p. 49, my addition. This quotation is not meant to assert that prehensions are to be simply equated with Humean perceptions of sense-data. Rather, it is meant to provide a general description of the overall vantage point of his system. Whitehead explains, "The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant's philosophy (...) (which) describes the process by which subjective data pass into appearance of an objective world. The philosophy of organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective data provides the intensity in the subjective satisfaction. For (German Idealism), the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world - a 'superject' rather than a 'subject.'" (PR, p. 88)

which objective events become subjective ideas in the life of the organism, where, “the objective content of the initial phases of reception is the real antecedent world, as given for that occasion (which) (...) is the ‘reality’ from which the creative advance starts.”²⁴ More explicitly, the epistemological position that Whitehead adopts is that what is empirically given comprises the first stage in the “complex process of *appropriating* (or ‘prehending’) into a unity of existence the many data presented as relevant by the physical process of nature.”²⁵ Consequently, like Hume, in Whitehead’s scheme, the ideas, or, alternatively, the ‘eternal objects’ in his terminology, which are in the mind, exist as a result of this process of ‘prehending’ the actual world. That is to say, for Whitehead, the ‘ideas’ in the mind are an end-point of the organism’s process of ‘seizing’ (*prehendere*) the events of the empirical world into its own internal constitution. It is further in this sense that for Whitehead “the understanding of actuality requires a reference to ideality,” and is the reason for his attempt to do justice to idealism.²⁶ Particularly, his philosophy may be seen to provide the ‘realistic basis’ for forms of idealism. I shall further clarify these notions later in this dissertation where it will become apparent that an idealist perspective does have full justification in his description of the ‘process of creative self-realization’ attributed to the organism, alongside his predominantly ‘realist’ enterprise.

In these ways, Whitehead provides an initial critique of idealism with the intention of grounding his philosophy in empiricism, a stance which aims at defending the purposes of the natural sciences as well as refuting dogmatic philosophical perspectives. However, while Whitehead brands himself a

24 AI p. 210.

25 Whitehead, Modes of Thought (1938), New York: The Free Press, 1968, p. 150, my emphasis, my addition.

26 SMW, p. 158. For Whitehead, the “term ‘idea’ has a subjective suggestion in Modern philosophy, which is very misleading for my present purposes; and in any sense it has been used in many senses and has become ambiguous. The term ‘essence,’ as used by the Critical Realists, also suggests their use of it, which diverges from what I intend. Accordingly by way of employing a term devoid of misleading suggestions, I use the phrase ‘eternal object’ for what (...) I have termed a ‘Platonic form.’ Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a *necessary* reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an ‘eternal object.’” (PR, p. 44, my emphasis)

Whitehead explains the concept of ‘prehensions’ in SMW, “I will use the word *prehension* for *uncognitive apprehension*: by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive.” (p. 69) Also see E. Kraus, The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Process and Reality, New York: Fordham University Press, 1998, p. 16, for the rendering of the term ‘prehension’ as a ‘seizing’ of datum. According to L. Ford in The Emergence of Whitehead’s Metaphysics, “Prehension was designed to incorporate process within his metaphysical system, but this is used in two ways: for prehensive unity and for prehensive unification. Prehensive unity, however, is coextensive with event; it is the event in its relatedness to all other events. Process is to be sought not in these events, but in that which brings them into being, the acts of prehensive unification: ‘A prehension is a process of unifying. Accordingly, nature is a process of expansive development, necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension.’” (pp. 43–44)

scientific Humean, he does not believe that the natural sciences could live up to the unmitigated Humean objection that metaphysics has no place in terms of what is empirically factual. Therefore, he acknowledges that it is wrong to assume “that science is the mere description of things observed, (...) (with no presuppositions of) an objective world, nor causation, nor induction, (...) nor metaphysics.”²⁷ In fact, Whitehead also argues to the contrary of his initial assertion, that the natural sciences are also to be blamed for the ‘bifurcation’ of nature into strict dualities, and are equally responsible for the divorce between metaphysics and science. As a man of science and mathematics, Whitehead considered one of his tasks to be that of modifying the general metaphysical standpoint of his time, so that it may be used positively to ‘move the yardsticks’ of scientific explanation in the twentieth century. For this reason, he seeks to remarry science with metaphysics, by defending speculative philosophy as a positive contributor to the aims of the natural sciences, as well as by introducing the novel concept of ‘organic mechanism’ as an amendment to the ‘scientific materialist’ paradigm of his day.

II. The Role of Speculative Philosophy in Relation to the Natural Sciences

Whitehead’s defense of speculative philosophy is one of the main subject matters in the early stages of *Process and Reality*. In fact, the first item appearing on his list of “prevalent habits of thought, which are (to be) repudiated (in his scheme),” as noted in the Preface, is the “distrust of speculative philosophy.”²⁸ His position in this matter coincides with his views concerning the importance of cosmology to the natural sciences. For Whitehead, one of the main tasks of philosophy is to construct cosmological schemes which aid in the scientific interpretation of the natural world. In fact, he even defines speculative philosophy as this

“endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted (...) (and that) the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme; All constructive thought, on the various special topics of scientific interest, is dominated by some such scheme, unacknowledged, but no less influential in guiding the imagination. The importance of philosophy lies in its sustained effort to make such schemes explicit, and thereby capable of criticism and improvement.”²⁹

27 Whitehead, The Function of Reason (1929), Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, p. 54.

28 PR, p. xiii, my additions.

29 PR, p. 3. In “The Goldilocks Syndrome,” in R. C. Neville and T. P. Kasulis (eds.), *et al. The Recovery of Philosophy in America: Essays in Honor of John Edwin Smith*, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1997, D. Sherburne summarizes that “Nathaniel Lawrence, in his last little book on Whitehead, makes some interesting comments about

However, at the same time, Whitehead's position is not meant to give philosophy a 'blank cheque' to blindly go forth in order to construct grandiose, dogmatic systems for the vanity of subjectivity. On the contrary, a speculative explanation should follow from particular scientific investigations, rather than precede them. Furthermore, Whitehead held the view that, "in philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly."³⁰ In fact, his 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' was aimed against dogmatism as well as scepticism. He writes,

The Universe is vast. Nothing is more curious than the self-satisfied dogmatism with which mankind at each period of its history cherishes the delusion of the finality of its existing modes of knowledge. Sceptics and believers are all alike. At this moment scientists and sceptics are the leading dogmatists. Advance in detail is admitted: fundamental novelty is barred. This dogmatic common sense is the death of philosophic adventure. The Universe is vast.³¹

In his explanation, the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' identifies

the chief error of philosophy, (...) (namely,) overstatement (...) (which) consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. (It also identifies) a false estimate of logical procedure in respect to certainty, and in respect to premises.³²

In Whitehead's view, one-sided views which are put forth dogmatically as philosophical truth commit the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'. Therefore, he argues that philosophy also operates as its own

the word *speculative* as it ought to be understood in the phrase 'speculative philosophy'. As he notes, in ordinary discourse the word *speculative* has a rather chancy ring to it. We say that one speculates in the stock market, meaning that one plays a hunch, one guesses, that the market will go up or down. But the word *speculative* in the phrase *speculative philosophy* has nothing to do with this, Lawrence asserts. He points out that the Latin root from which our word *speculative* derives is the word *specula*, which means literally a watchtower. A watchtower is a high place from which an army sentry, for example, can get a good view of the surrounding terrain, seeing more than can be seen from the ground and being able to put what is seen in proper perspective. Speculative philosophy is the business of building an intellectual watchtower firmly enough anchored so that it will support us, but high enough so that, from the vantage point of its platform, we can do such things as see over the walls that separate academic disciplines from one another. When we accuse someone of not being able to see the woods for the trees, we are suggesting that the person ought to get a perspective on the matter at hand which is a little more all-encompassing, which is to say that we are urging the person to mount a somewhat higher *specula* from which the outline of the forest will become apparent." (p. 168)

30 PR, p. xiv.

31 Whitehead in "John Dewey and his Influence," in Essays in Science and Philosophy, New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, pp. 91-92.

32 PR, pp. 7-8, my additions. In AI, Whitehead explains that "the Dogmatic Fallacy (is) the error (which) consists in the persuasion that we are capable of producing notions which are adequately defined in respect to the complexity of relationship required for their illustration in the real world." (p. 145) Later, as we shall see, Whitehead applies his 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' to the doctrine of simple location in the physical sciences.

'watchdog' or a sceptical "critic of cosmologies" ensuring that "speculative boldness (is) (...) balanced by complete humility before logic, and before fact."³³ Similarly, in articulating the tentative nature of his own project, he suggests that "if we consider any scheme of philosophic categories as one complex assertion, and apply it to the logician's alternative, true or false, the answer must be that the scheme is false."³⁴ But, here, Whitehead should not be interpreted to be affirming a type of automatic falsification of cosmologies, in which the truth of a theory consists solely in its falsification, as in certain contemporary perspectives. For, in his view, "even partial success has importance," and that even though the final outcome of the production of such schemes may be their abandonment, they do contribute positively to, and accompany the progress of the natural sciences.³⁵ Rather, for Whitehead, the measure of the success of a cosmology is progress. The speculative scheme is useful because it provides an approximation to the whole of the subject matter studied by science, or, alternatively, "a matrix from which true propositions applicable to particular circumstances can be derived."³⁶ It is for this reason that he concludes by stating that "philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaboration of categoreal schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recognized as its proper objective."³⁷

One of Whitehead's main interests in speculative philosophy is in the interpretive framework it provides to science, enabling it to explain its empirical data in a coherent and systematic way. While speculative philosophy has largely been dismissed on the grounds that it introduces foreign metaphysical principles into empirical observation, his own view is that

there are no brute, self-contained matters of fact, capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an element in a system. Whenever we attempt to express the matter of immediate

33 SMW, p. vii, PR, p. 17, my addition.

34 PR, p. 8.

35 PR, p. 9. See K. Popper's Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, as an example of a theory of falsification. Whitehead further suggests that "the outcome of the (speculative) procedure takes one of three forms: (i) the conclusion may agree with the observed facts; (ii) the conclusion may exhibit general agreement, with disagreement in detail; (iii) the conclusion may be in complete disagreement with the facts." (PR, p. 9) Furthermore, he believes that philosophical systems "are never refuted, only abandoned."

36 PR, p. 8.

37 PR, p. 8. Whitehead goes on to state that "it has been an objection to speculative philosophy that it is over-ambitious. Rationalism, it is admitted, is the method by which advance is made within the limits of particular schemes. It is, however, held that this limited success must not encourage attempts to frame ambitious schemes expressive of the general nature of things. (...) The proper test is not that of finality, but of progress." (PR, p. 14)

experience, we find that its understanding leads us beyond itself, to its contemporaries, to its past, to its future, and to the universals in terms of which its definiteness is exhibited. But such universals, by their very character of universality, embody the potentiality of other facts with variant types of definiteness. Thus the understanding of the immediate brute fact requires its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world with some systematic relation to it. Philosophy does not initiate interpretations. Its search for a rationalistic scheme is the search for more adequate criticism. Our habitual experience is a complex of failure and success in the enterprise of interpretation. If we desire a record of uninterpreted experience, we must ask a stone to record its autobiography. Every scientific memoir in its records of the 'facts' is shot through and through with interpretation.³⁸

Therefore, it is clear that speculative cosmology provides the interpretive ground, as well as instances of novel criticism, necessary for the advancement of the specific sciences. It also affords insight into the order of things, imperative for science in general. To be sure, Whitehead claims that "there can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an *Order of Things* and, in particular, an *Order of Nature*," to which speculative philosophy approximates.³⁹ Otherwise, in his view, science will have to retract its "bland indifferen(ce) to its refutation by Hume."⁴⁰

Whitehead's own speculative cosmology presents itself as such a framework for the scientific interpretation of the natural world. Writing in the mid-1920s, he believed that both philosophy and science were finally 'ripe' for his endeavour. Particularly, "the movement of historical, and philosophical, criticism of detached questions, which on the whole has dominated the last two centuries, has done its work, and requires to be supplemented by a more sustained effort of constructive thought."⁴¹ Therefore, Whitehead thought that the period of intellectual criticism had prepared the ground for his philosophy of Organism. Also, he cites, "the (recent) biological developments, the doctrine of evolution, the doctrine of energy, and the molecular theories (which had been) rapidly undermining the adequacy of the orthodox materialism," as reasons for his cosmology.⁴² "The field," he writes, "is now open for the introduction of some new doctrine of organism which may take the place of the materialism with

38 PR, pp. 14-15.

39 SMW, pp. 3-4.

40 SMW, p. 16, my addition.

41 PR, p. xiv.

42 SMW, p. 113, my additions.

which, since the seventeenth century, science has saddled philosophy."⁴³ These affirmations further point to the authenticity of Whitehead's construction of a cosmological system following from, and responding to the intellectual and scientific events of his time. Most particularly, his speculative metaphysical scheme can be said to be an attempt to come to grips with humanity's place in the cosmos, in light of the new scientific proclamations of his time, such as the theory of relativity.

III. The Philosophy of Organism as Explanatory Scheme for the Natural Sciences

Whitehead's critique of, and amendment to 'scientific materialism' is one of the main subject matters of *Science and the Modern World*, and demonstrates his commitment to a 'provisionally realistic' stance which does justice to idealism in terms of his analysis of experience. In contrast to his earlier incredulosity towards the idealistic schools, he notes that natural science is also responsible for the 'bifurcation' of nature, and the disjunction of philosophy from itself. Whitehead suggests that

the separation of philosophy and natural science is (also) due to the dominance of Newtonian materialism (and that this is) indicated by the division of science into 'moral science' and 'natural science'. (...) The notion is that philosophy is concerned with topics of the mind, and that natural science takes care of topics considering matter. The whole conception of philosophy as concerned with the discipline of the speculative Reason, to which nothing is alien, has vanished. Newton himself was one of the early scientists who most emphatically repudiated the intrusion of metaphysics into science."⁴⁴

And, particularly, in his view, 'scientific materialism' "leads to (the) bifurcation of nature."⁴⁵ It is for this reason that Whitehead advances his philosophy of Organism as a 'more adequate' description of the order of nature than that of the 'materialist' paradigm. The concept of 'organism' is, for him, a useful scientific tool aiding the interpretation, expression, and explanation of the natural world. In advancing his cosmology, Whitehead's main contention is that the notion of 'matter' should be replaced by the concept of 'organic mechanism' so as to make the explanation of nature possible, in light of the new scientific developments of his time.

In *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead argues for "a system of thought basing nature upon

43 SMW, p. 36.

44 ER, pp. 50-51, my additions.

45 This statement is included in a record of notes taken by W. E. Hocking from Whitehead's lecture (1924-25) given on January 10, 1925. It appears in Appendix #1 of L. Ford's The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics, p. 271, my addition.

the concept of organism, and not upon the concept of matter," precisely, to construct an "alternative scheme, (in which) the notion of material (...) (is) replaced by that of organic synthesis."⁴⁶ In this endeavour, Whitehead's claim against the predominant overstatement of scientific materialism is based in the fact that it

presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations. In itself such as material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its being. Also it is an assumption which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived. It is not wrong, if properly construed. If we confine ourselves to certain types of facts, abstracted from the complete circumstances in which they occur, the materialistic assumption expresses these facts to perfection. But when we pass beyond the abstraction either by more subtle employment of our senses, or by the request for meanings and for coherence of thoughts, the scheme breaks down at once.⁴⁷

Thus, in his assessment, the concept of 'matter' which is fundamental to modern physics only affords a partial explanation of phenomena, limited to the external relations of entities 'simply located' in space and time. According to Whitehead, the concepts of 'matter' and 'simple location' are synonymous, and do not represent the nature of concrete empirical experience. It is in his critique of the notion of 'simple location' that the philosophy of Organism is justified. In essence, the problem is that when modern physics considers an entity in space and time in the mode of 'simple location', it only does so in relation to 'material' that

can be said to be *here* in space and *here* in time, or *here* in space-time. Curiously enough, this character of simple location holds whether we look on a region of space-time as determined absolutely or relatively. For if a region is merely a way of indicating a certain set of relations to other entities, then this characteristic, which I call simple location, is that material can be said to have just these relations of position to other entities without requiring for its explanation any reference to other regions constituted by analogous relations of position to the same entities. In fact, as soon as you have settled, however you do settle, what you mean by a definite place in space-time, you can adequately state the relation of a particular material body to space-time by saying that it is just there, in that place; and, so far as simple location is concerned, there is nothing more to be said on the subject.⁴⁸

46 SMW, p. 75, p. 157, my additions.

47 SMW, p. 17.

48 SMW, p. 49. In SMW, Whitehead critiques the doctrine of 'simple location' of scientific materialism at length. Elsewhere, he explains, "To say that a bit of matter has simple location means that, in expressing its spatio-temporal relation, it is adequate to state that it is where it is, in a definite region of space, and throughout a definite finite duration of time, apart from any essential reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other regions of space and to other durations of time." (p. 58) Furthermore, Whitehead also points to the incompatibilities between induction and the doctrine of simple location. With induction, the entities may be given a life-history including a spatio-temporal past and a future. With the doctrine of simple location, the entities may not be given a life-history,

What Whitehead is pointing out here is that the 'materialist' standpoint provides an instance of the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness', and gives rise to the 'bifurcation' of actuality. Specifically, from the conceptual level of 'simple location', 'A' can be said to be here, without a simultaneous reference to the region that bit of matter 'B' occupies in relation to 'A'. In this sense, 'A' is independently separate from 'B', and requiring no reference to 'B'. However, in Whitehead's view, since there are no positions without reference to others, the concepts of 'matter' and 'simple location' are 'vacuous' in relation to space-time. As such, Whitehead argues that when one perceives the relation of the spatio-temporal coordinate of 'A' to 'B' and where 'B' is in relation to 'A', it is to be concluded that there is 'functionality' in space and time between 'A' and 'B', which gives birth to his 'organic' perspective.⁴⁹ But, in this way, Whitehead believes that without widening the scientific perspective to include the introduction of the notion of 'organism', scientific materialism is left with an inadequate mode of explanation of nature, namely, to a monitoring of natural occurrences involving only static, self-sufficient 'bits of matter'. He writes,

If scientific materialism be the last word, metaphysics must be useless for science. The ultimate truths about nature are then not capable of any explanatory interpretation. On this theory, all that there is to be known is that (vacuous) inexplicable bits of matter (with no internal values) are hurrying about with their motions correlated by inexplicable laws expressible in terms of their spatial relations to each other. If this is the final dogmatic truth, philosophy can have nothing to say to natural science.⁵⁰

On the contrary, for Whitehead, the novel philosophy of Organism in which "the order of nature is bound up with the concept of nature as the locus of organisms in process of development" more adequately represents what a concrete fact entails, than do the abstractions of scientific materialism.⁵¹ Instead of

and may be referred to only in present observation. He writes, "It is at once evident that the concept of simple location is going to make great difficulties for induction. For, if in the location of configurations of matter throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference to any other times, past or future, it immediately follows that nature within any period does not refer to nature at any other period." (SMW, p. 51) In pointing to the overhaul of the doctrine of 'simple location', Whitehead states, in relation to his notion of 'prehensive unification', "Note that the idea of *simple location* has gone. The things which are grasped into a realised unity, *here and now*, are not the castle, the cloud, and the planet simply in themselves; but they are the castle, the cloud, and the planet *from the standpoint*, in space and time, of the *prehensive unification*. In other words, it is the perspective of the castle over there from the standpoint of the *unification here*." (SMW, pp. 69-70)

49 Furthermore, as he argues that what is here and now requires a reference to other occasions, Whitehead's notion of a 'prehensive unification' involves the principle of the grasping together of entities only with reference to other entities, at other times and at other places.

50 FR, p. 50, my additions.

51 SMW, p. 73.

dealing with 'dead matter' yielding 'no reasons', as in his characterization of scientific materialism, science would be able to explicate the entities as they are 'alive' in space and time.⁵² In Whitehead's view, on their own, the concepts of scientific materialism cannot fully explain the workings of nature. But, when combined together with the notion of 'organism', they provide "a complete expression of the character of a real occurrence."⁵³ Thus, in *Science and the Modern World*, Whitehead terms his standpoint the theory of 'organic mechanism.'

It is clear that Whitehead's shift away from the 'materialistic' paradigm towards that of 'organic mechanism' also follows from his own scientific views regarding relativity theory in physics as well and the 'evolutionary' view of the organism in biology. Fundamentally, Whitehead believes that the functioning of the one entity, internal to the whole complex of nature influences the functioning of the whole and vice-versa. From this perspective, nature reveals herself as an unfolding complex of mutually participating organic entities.⁵⁴ A cosmological scheme surrounding the concept of 'organism' would thereby permit scientific explanation taking into account the internal purposiveness and function of the particular entity with respect to other entities, thus promoting those elements that are lacking in the 'materialist' paradigm. However, if Whitehead is to proceed with his standpoint, it is evident that he must address the Humean objection that his scheme presupposes induction, thereby introducing foreign metaphysical principles into immediate experience. In his own words,

It is at once evident that the concept of simple location is going to make great difficulties for induction. For, if in the location of configurations of matter throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference to any other times, past or future, it immediately follows that nature within any period does not refer to nature at any other period. Accordingly, induction is not based on anything which can be observed in nature. Thus we cannot look to nature for the justification of our belief in any law such as the law of gravitation. In other words, the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation of nature. For there is nothing in the present fact which inherently refers either to the past or to the future. It looks, therefore, as though memory, as well as induction, would fail to find any justification within nature itself.⁵⁵

52 See the two chapters entitled, "Nature Lifeless" and "Nature Alive" in *MT*, where the contrast between the strict materialist view of nature and the 'organic' view of nature is made.

53 *SMW*, p. 36.

54 With this view of nature in the back of our minds, we are able to refer, as we do today, to the earth as a living, breathing organism with interconnected ecosystems, functioning in relation to each other. For example, we speak of the Amazon rainforest as the 'lungs' of the earth, designating its function in relation to other ecosystems, and its place in relation to the whole.

55 *SMW*, p. 51.

To this, Whitehead concedes the point that it is a

very baffling task of applying reason to elicit the general characteristic of the immediate occasion, as set before us in direct cognition, (but it) is a necessary preliminary, if we are to justify induction; unless indeed we are content to base it upon our vague instinct that of course it is all right. Either there is something about the immediate occasion which affords knowledge of the past and the future, or we are reduced to utter scepticism as to memory and induction.⁵⁶

In thinking through this lacuna raised by simple location and Humean scepticism, Whitehead discusses the bodily organism. He believes that we can approach a limited defense of induction if we consider the implicit common-sense notion that our bodies are among the spatio-temporal datum perceivable in nature. For him, "in human experience (...) (a) fundamental fact of perception is the inclusion, in the datum, of the objectification of an antecedent part of the human body with such-and-such experiences."⁵⁷ As finite bodily organisms, we ourselves are in, and compositional of spatio-temporal extension, functionally relative to all other entities as in a causal nexus. Therefore, the "demarcation (of the body) from the rest of nature," Whitehead writes, "is vague in the extreme. (...) There is no definite boundary to determine where the body begins and external nature ends."⁵⁸ And, "the self-knowledge inherent in the bodily event is the knowledge of itself as a complex unity, (...) we know ourselves as a function of unification of a plurality of things which are other than ourselves."⁵⁹ Hence, using our bodily selves as evidence, the philosophy of Organism posits the notion that there is a spatio-temporal uniformity and functionality between organisms, within nature. In Whitehead's perspective, much of our complex emotional life is

56 SMW, p. 44. He continues, "it is impossible to over-emphasize the point that the key to the process of induction, as used either in science or in our ordinary life, is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. (...) We find ourselves amid insoluble difficulties when we substitute for this concrete occasion a mere abstract in which we only consider material objects in a flux of configurations in time and space. It is quite obvious that such objects can tell us only that they are where they are."

57 PR, p. 118, my addition. Furthermore, he states, "We perceive other things which are in the world in the same sense we are. Also our emotions are directed towards other things, including of course our bodily organs." (PR, p. 158)

58 MTL, p. 161, my addition. This discussion regarding the demarcation of the body sets the stage for Whitehead's elucidation of the togetherness of 'actual entities'. A human being is an 'actual entity' which prehends other 'actual entities' from its own perspective, and they in turn prehend the human being. Each actual entity is an empirical datum for other actual entities.

59 SMW, p. 150-151. For Whitehead, "We have to admit that the body is the organism whose states regulated our cognisance of the world. The unity of the perceptual field therefore must be a unity of bodily experience. In being aware of the bodily experience, we must thereby be aware of aspects of the whole spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life. (...) My theory involves the entire abandonment of the notion that simple location is the primary way in which things are involved in space-time. In a certain sense, everything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the world." (p. 91)

based upon such intuitions. But, even so, this argument would not seem to fully prove the validity of induction against the immanent critique of Humean scepticism. Consequently, Whitehead advances a realistic perspective regarding induction, and finds that a partial answer is

to be found in the right understanding of the immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. (...) We must observe the immediate occasion, and use reason to elicit a general description of its nature. Induction presupposes metaphysics. In other words, it rests upon an antecedent rationalism. You cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to; and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations. The difficulty is to make sense of either of these ideas. But unless you have done so, you have made nonsense of induction.⁶⁰

60 SMW, p. 44. Whitehead's essay, "Uniformity and Contingency" (1922-23) in Essays in Science and Philosophy (1941), New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, is an early, but clear account of his position regarding the Humean problems of induction and causality. He affirms, "I cannot hope in any essential way to remove (completely) the difficulties which encompass (the problems of induction and causality)." (p. 100, my addition) However, he attempts to approach a solution, stating, "According to the new relativity theory, space and time cannot be disjoined. Thus - if we follow the line of thought of the (Humean) objection - not only must perceived space, but also perceived time, be considered as mental and purely personal to each individual. But we have agreed that all our knowledge is based on experience. We are thus led to the conclusion that all our knowledge is the play of our own mind. Indeed, on this supposition, it is a mere silly trick which leads me to speak in the plural, and I cannot imagine how I acquired the habit. For I have no source of information to give me news of anything beyond myself. The space-time of science is thus absolutely swept away.

"My own position is that consciousness is a factor within fact and involves its knowledge. Thus apprehended nature is involved in our consciousness. But in its exhibition of this character our consciousness exhibits its significance of factors of fact beyond itself.

"I differ from the idealists, so far as they consider such an external significance as peculiar to consciousness and thence deduce that the things signified have a peculiar dependence on consciousness. I ascribe an analogous external significance to every factor of fact, such as the colour green or a bath-chair. Correlative to the significance of nature by consciousness, there is the patience of consciousness by nature. Nature exhibits the fact, that it is apprehensible by consciousness. (...) In other words, (consciousness) is both a fact of nature, and is also the way in which we apprehend nature. In separately abstracting consciousness and nature from their embeddedness in all embracing fact, each exhibits its patience of the other.

"The space-time continuum is not the sole basis of uniformity in nature. If it were so, induction would be impossible. It is here that we find the weakness in Hume's, and in some other, philosophies. Hume explains a ground for the origin of our instinctive trust in induction. But unfortunately his explanation does not disclose any rational explanation of this trust. (...) (Hume) writes:

'The sceptic, therefore, had better keep in his proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently conjoin'd together; that we have no arguments to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoin'd, will likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may be fallacious or deceitful.' (Essay XII, of the *Academic or Sceptical Philosophy*).

"Hume runs away from his own conclusion: he adds: - 'On the contrary, he (a Pyrrhonian) must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail.' (...) I do not conceive myself to have solved the difficulty which puzzled Hume. But I wish to

Therefore, Whitehead moves to accept induction into his system on a limited, naturalistic basis, as an inference of the uniformity and inter-functionality of empirical events and communities of occasions compositional of space-time, instead of applying it to a wider, more precarious generality. He states,

you will observe that I do not hold Induction to be in its essence the derivation of general laws. It is the divination of some characteristics of a particular future from the known characteristics of a particular past. The wider assumption of general laws holding for all cognisable occasions appears a very unsafe addendum to attach to this limited knowledge. All we can ask of the present occasion is that it shall determine a particular community of occasions, which are in some respects mutually qualified by reason of their inclusion within that same community. That community of occasions considered in physical science is the set of happenings which fit onto each other - as we say - in a common space-time, so that we can trace the transitions from one to the other. Accordingly, we refer to *the* common space-time indicated in our immediate occasion of knowledge. Inductive reasoning proceeds from the particular occasion to the particular community of occasions, and from the particular community to relations between particular occasions within that community.⁶¹

In this manner, Whitehead does not accept induction as a basis to arrive at scientific law. Rather, he accepts induction limited to the cognizable uniformity of past events to present ones, to the derivation of future occasions from the past and present, as well as to the interrelations of occasions in a common

point out the direction in which, as I believe, the complete solution will be found. In an extract, already quoted, he has stated the issue with his usual clearness: - 'But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendance, and to believe, that it will exist.'

"Hume's philosophy found nothing in any single instance to justify the mind's expectation. Accordingly he was reduced to explaining the origin of the mind's expectation otherwise than by its rational justification. It follows, that, if we are to get out of Hume's difficulty, we must find something in each single instance. When we have found that, we will have struck at the heart of Hume's argument.

"This overlooked character of the single instance must be its significance of something other than itself. This extra something will thus be known as relatedness, arising from the knowledge of the single instance by adjective." (pp. 106-109)

61 SMW, pp. 44-45. As E. Kraus points out in The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Process and Reality, "It is to be noted that Whitehead takes induction in its most limited sense, as the derivation of a particular future from a particular past, rather than as the extrapolation of the universal laws of nature from particular observations." (p. 15)

In Intensity: An Essay in Whiteheadian Ontology, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998, J. Jones states, "For Whitehead, induction is to be grounded not transcendently, but naturally, via the unpacking of the contents of experience treated as a natural occurrence." (p. 5)

In C. Hartshorne's view, in Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy of the Middle Way, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1987, "Metaphysics does not guarantee that induction will lead us to the exact truth, nor the approximate truth. We remain dependent upon the continuing exertions of scientists, some with genius and many with competence, to gradually bring us closer to a correct picture of the cosmos." (p. 10)

For a concise synopsis of the 'Whitehead versus Hume' debate with respect to induction, see J. W. Robson's "Whitehead's Answer to Hume," and M. W. Gross' "Whitehead's Answer to Hume: A Reply," in G. L. Kline (ed.), et al. Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy.

space-time. And, it is clear that Whitehead's acceptance of induction on this naturalistic basis prepares the way for his novel concept of organism, and is the means by which he is able to postulate the fundamental unit of his cosmological scheme, namely, the 'actual occasion', or, alternatively, the 'actual entity'. Thus, his speculative philosophical perspective both amends some existing presuppositions of 'scientific materialism', permitting a more accurate view of the order of nature, as well as admits some basic presuppositions making scientific explanation possible. With his vision of the order of nature based in the concept of 'organism', in his account, speculative philosophy can participate in progress of the natural sciences, as well as help resolve

the unrest which urges scientists beyond mere satisfaction with the simple description, beyond even the general description. It is the desire to obtain the explanatory descriptions which justifies the speculative extension of Laws, beyond actual, particular instances of observation. (...) This urge towards explanatory description provides the interplay between science and metaphysics. The doctrines of metaphysics are modified, so as to be capable of providing the explanation.⁶²

Whitehead's notion of 'actual entities' or, alternatively, 'actual occasions' forms the basis of Whitehead's speculative ontology as contained in *Process and Reality*.⁶³ 'Actual entities' represent the fundamental way in which his cosmology modifies traditional metaphysics in order to help provide the natural sciences with a novel and accurate terminology for explanation of natural occurrences. Furthermore, the notion of 'actual entities' constitutes the manner in which Whitehead attempts to overcome the problem of simple location, as well as the arbitrary 'bifurcation' of nature brought about by the mutual divorce of philosophy and the natural sciences. Pointing to the notion of 'actual entities' as the fundamental building-block of his speculative scheme, he writes, "In between (the fundamental duality, with material on the one hand, and on the other hand, mind) there lie(s) the concepts of life, organism, function, instantaneous reality, interaction, order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles heel of the whole system."⁶⁴ Moreover, it is by way of the concept of 'actual entities' that Whitehead is able to synthesize realism and idealism in his system.

62 AL pp. 128-129.

63 For Whitehead, "the term 'actual occasion' is used synonymously with 'actual entity'; but chiefly when its character of extensiveness has some direct relevance to the discussion, either extensiveness in the form of temporal extensiveness, that is to say 'duration,' or extensiveness in the form of spatial extension, or in the more complete signification of spatio-temporal extensiveness." (PR, p. 77)

64 SMW, p. 57.

IV. Actual Entities and Whitehead's Synthesis of Realism and Idealism

Whitehead's notion of 'actual entities' or, alternatively, 'actual occasions' are the basic ontological building-blocks in his speculative cosmology. Alluding to their centrality in the philosophy of Organism, he writes that the ontological principle of his scheme "can be summarized as: no actual entity, then no reason. (...) Actual entities are the only reasons, so that to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities. (...) Everything is positively somewhere in actuality, and in potency everywhere."⁶⁵ Hence, the ontological principle asserts that whatever may be said to 'exist' as an element of experience, is itself an actual entity. In the early stages of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead defines precisely what he means by an actual entity. For him, an actual entity, or, alternatively, an actual occasion is simply an organism or, synonymously, an event of experience; they are "the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. (...) Actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent."⁶⁶ The organic character of actual entities is constituted in the fact that they are themselves living creatures, 'in process', and functional, meaning "contributing determination" to the other entities within extensive nature.⁶⁷ In this way, actual entities are social creatures, existing in relative togetherness, and composing space-time. For Whitehead, in contrast to the position of simple location of scientific materialism, the universe itself is representative of the 'togetherness' of all actual entities, where the one society, namely, the universe, is composed of the many actual entities functionally relative to one another. Actual entities are organized and enduring, yet continually in the process of being reorganized within space-time. Thus, overall, Whitehead's notion of actual entities balances his adherence to a principle of relativity, with the strong maintenance of an ontological principle. That is to say, it permits reason in the face of the circumambient togetherness of the universe.

65 *PR*, p. 19, *PR*, p. 24. In explaining his ontological principle and that an actual entity is a *res vera* in the Cartesian sense, Whitehead borrows from Descartes' dictum that "when we perceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present" and "for every clear and distinct conception (*perceptio*) is without doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought." (*PR*, p. 40)

66 *PR*, p. 18. While actual entities are 'atomic', they are not 'atomic' in the sense that they are not divisible. In fact, "Each actual entity is analysable in an indefinite number of ways. In some modes of analysis the component elements are more abstract than in other modes of analysis. The analysis of an actual entity into 'prehensions' is that mode of analysis which exhibits the most concrete elements in the nature of actual entities. This mode of analysis will be termed the 'division' of the actual entity in question. Each actual entity is 'divisible' in an indefinite number of ways, and each way of 'division' yields its definite quota of prehensions." (*PR*, p. 19)

67 *PR*, p. 25.

It is clear that Whitehead's concept of an actual entity eclipses the traditional characterization of 'substance' as the basic 'unit' existing in the extensive world. While the notion of 'substance' designated a static entity, requiring nothing but itself to exist, actual entities are organisms, alive, and 'in process'. Whitehead's vision is based in the notion that if the best definition of the natural world involves terms such as 'becoming', and 'process', and actual entities compose that natural world, then actual entities also compose that 'process'. Actual entities are the "creatures which become, and they constitute a continuously extensive world."⁶⁸ Similarly, he states that "an actual entity is a process, and is not (fully) describable in terms of the morphology of a (neutral) stuff."⁶⁹ Thus, Whitehead's cosmology adheres to the principle that "'existence' (in any of its senses) cannot be abstracted from the 'process'. The notions of process and existence presuppose each other."⁷⁰ That is to say, the 'process' undergone by the actual entity corresponds to what the entity is. Hence, "*how an actual entity becomes* constitutes what that actual entity *is*."⁷¹ And, his speculative cosmology is aimed at describing the creative processes of organisms.

The notion of *creative process* in relation to the organism is the most central aspect of Whitehead's overall system, and is the subject matter of Part III of *Process and Reality*, entitled, 'The Theory of Prehensions'. Precisely, the actual entity is itself one complex creative process whose manifestations may be analyzed from realistic and idealistic standpoints. This is the case, since every actual entity is characterized as dipolar, which means that they have both a mental and a physical pole. As Whitehead states, the "synthesis of the ideal and the real is just what happens in each finite (actual) occasion."⁷² Also, each actual entity is an object perceivable in the empirical world and is a subject unto itself. As such, the creative process itself may be divided into two interconnected phases. The first is 'provisionally realistic' and macroscopic in nature, and is characterized by the process of the prehensive appropriation of the concretely 'real' by the organism into its own internal constitution. This first process

68 PR, p. 35.

69 PR, p. 41, my additions. However, Whitehead does carry out a morphological description of organisms in Part IV- 'The Theory of Extension' in *Process and Reality*.

70 ML, p. 96.

71 PR, p. 23.

72 AL, p. 277. For Whitehead, in each actual occasion "the conceptual entertainment of incompatibilities is possible, and so is their conceptual comparison. Also there is the synthesis of conceptual entertainment with physical realization. The idea conceptually entertained may be identical with the idea exemplified in the physical fact; or it may be different, compatible or incompatible."

concerns and analyzes “the givenness of the actual world, considered as the stubborn fact which at once limits and provides opportunity for the actual occasion.”⁷³ The second is ‘idealistic’ and ‘microscopic’ in nature, and is constitutive of the process of purposeful self-realization of the actual entity in the world. This second process concerns and analyzes “the formal constitution of an actual occasion, considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of experience.”⁷⁴ In characterizing each actual entity as dipolar, Whitehead attempts to synthesize realism and idealism in his system and to avoid the vicious problem of the ‘bifurcation’ or ‘division’ of nature into strict dualities, such as matter and mind, which was brought about by the mutually sceptical attitudes of philosophy and science. At any rate, later, in Chapter Six of this dissertation, I will more fully explicate the nature and function of scepticism within the creative processes of organisms, as described by Whitehead.

V. Realism and Idealism in Whitehead’s Speculative Philosophy

The present chapter has had its purpose in demonstrating that the fundamental aim of Whitehead’s cosmology was to provide a ‘provisionally realistic’ synthesis of idealism and realism in order to avoid the problem of the ‘bifurcation’ of nature into strict dualities, such as matter and mind. In his perspective, this problem was brought on by three factors: 1.) the one-sided idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century in its opposition to the natural sciences, 2.) the one-sided scientific materialism in opposition to philosophy, and 3.) the divorce within philosophy between its two streams of thought. Initially, as we saw, Whitehead is very critical of the ways in which idealism handled notions such as ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ in contrast to the empiricism of the natural sciences. However, later, he acknowledges and defends the importance of speculative philosophy to the progress of the sciences, as well as criticizes the neglect of scientific materialism to provide adequate modes of explanation of natural occurrences. Particularly, he believes that speculative metaphysics must accompany the progress of the natural sciences, so as to permit explanation. In this way, through his own cosmology, Whitehead attempts to modify the materialist perspective so that modern physics, in light of the new discoveries of his time, is well-equipped to explain empirical fact from the perspective of organic functionality. He also cites the separation of philosophy into the ‘idealistic’ and ‘realistic’ streams of thought as contributing to the ‘bifurcation’ of nature. For him, philosophy

73 **PR**, p. 129.

74 **PR**, p. 129.

divided itself into two streams of thought. One stream subordinated itself entirely to science, and has asserted its mission to be the discussion of the proper coordination of notions employed in current scientific practice. The other stream, which is that of absolute idealism, side-tracked science by proclaiming that science dealt with finite truths respecting a world of appearances; and that these appearances were not very real, and that these truths were not very true. It reserved for philosophy the determination of all that was to be known concerning the ultimate reality, and concerning our own participation in that final absolute fact.⁷⁵

Hence, Whitehead criticizes both 'idealistic' and 'realistic' attitudes for their mutual scepticism. Similarly, in his attempt to reconcile the two streams of philosophy with the natural sciences, Whitehead concludes that

the general principles of physics are exactly what we should expect as a specific exemplification of the metaphysics required by the philosophy of organism. It has been a defect in the modern philosophies that they throw no light whatsoever on any scientific principles. Science should investigate particular species, and metaphysics should investigate the generic notions under which those specific principles should fall. Yet modern realisms have had nothing to say about scientific principle; and modern idealisms have merely contributed the unhelpful suggestion that the phenomenal world is one of the inferior avocations of the Absolute.⁷⁶

Therefore, in order to avoid falling into the sceptical trap of the 'bifurcation' of nature, Whitehead's own stance includes: 1.) the maintenance of a strong defense of speculative philosophy, based in advancing the aims of the natural sciences, and 2.) a 'provisionally-realistic' synthesis of realism and idealism made largely in relation to the central building block in his cosmology, namely, the actual entity. For this reason, Whitehead's synopsis of his own position, in the Preface to *Process and Reality*, is that although "throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement with (Bradley's form of 'Absolute Idealism'), the final outcome is after all not so greatly different."⁷⁷

75 Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (1926), New York: Macmillan Co., 1960, Introduction, Glossary and Index by Fordham University Press, 1996, p. 142.

76 *PR*, p. 116.

77 *PR*, p. xiii.

Chapter V

Humean Scepticism and Whitehead's Account of Experience

Whitehead's philosophy of Organism can be interpreted, in some ways, as a revitalization of Hume's empiricist account of experience in light of the scientific revolution of the early twentieth century. In maintaining his own 'provisionally realistic', scientific Humean stance in *Process and Reality*, Whitehead makes the case that "direct experience is infallible" and that metaphysical abstractions with regards to what is true are fallible.¹ In fact, throughout his work, Whitehead pays tribute to Hume's philosophy, which provided him with many of the foundations of his own philosophy of Organism.²

1 Whitehead, Symbolism (1927), New York: Fordham University Press, 1985, p. 6. In Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition, edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, Whitehead states, "The explanatory purpose of philosophy is often misunderstood. Its business is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the more concrete things. It is a complete mistake to ask how concrete particular fact can be built out of universals. The answer is, 'In no way.'" (p. 20)

2 For example, Whitehead writes that the "conclusion that pure sense perception does not provide the data for its own interpretation was the great discovery embodied in Hume's philosophy. This discovery is the reason why Hume's *Treatise* will remain the irrefutable basis for all subsequent philosophical thought." (Modes of Thought (1938), New York: The Free Press, 1968, p. 133) Elsewhere, Whitehead remarks that, in contradistinction to his impression of some neo-Humeans, "we must reverence (Hume) as one of the greatest of philosophers" (SR, p. 52, my addition); "Hume is a writer of unrivaled clearness" (PR, p. 130); "(no) epistemology can survive a comparison of with the facts. This is the inescapable conclusion to be inferred from Hume's *Dialogues*." (PR, p. 94) In alluding to some of Hume's notions fundamental to his own philosophy, Whitehead affirms that "Hume's train of thought unwittingly emphasizes 'process.' (...) Hume's account of the process discoverable in 'the soul' is as follows: first, impressions of sensation, of unknown origin; then ideas of such impressions, 'derived from' the impressions; then, impressions of reflection 'derived from' the antecedent ideas; and then, ideas of impressions of reflection. Somewhere in this process, there is to be found repetition of impressions, and thence by 'habit' - by which we may suppose that a particular mode of 'derivation' is meant - by habit, a repetition of the correlate ideas; and thence expectancy of the repetition of the correlate impressions. This expectancy would be an 'impression or reflection.' It is difficult to understand why Hume exempts 'habit' from the same criticism as that applied to the notion of 'cause.' We have no 'impression' of 'habit,' just as we have no 'impression' of 'cause.' Cause, repetition, habit are all in the same boat.

"Somewhat inconsistently, Hume never allows impressions of sensation to be derived from the correlate ideas; though, as the difference between them only consists in 'force and vivacity,' the reason for this refusal cannot be found in his philosophy. The truth is that Hume retained an obstinate belief in an external world which forbade him to confess in his philosophical constructions. He reserved that belief for his daily life, and for his historical and sociological writings, and for his *Dialogues*."

The merit of Hume's account is that the process described is within 'the soul.' In the philosophy of organism 'the soul' as it appears in Hume, and 'the mind' as it appears in Locke and Hume, are replaced by the phrases 'the actual entity,' and 'the actual occasion,' these phrases being synonymous." (PR, pp. 140-141)

Whitehead also comments that the reasons for his "examination of Hume, including the prolonged quotations, are (i) that Hume states with great clearness important aspects of our experience; (ii) that the defects in his statements are eminently natural defects which emerge with great clearness, owing to the excellence of his presentation; and (iii) that Hume differs from the great majority of his followers chiefly by the way in which he faces up to the problems raised by his own philosophy." (PR, pp. 135-136) Furthermore, Whitehead writes, "from the point of view of the philosophy of organism, the credit must be given to Hume that he emphasized the 'process' inherent in the fact of being a mind" (PR, p. 151); "a more detailed discussion of Descartes, Locke, and Hume (...)

However, at the beginning of his philosophical writings, Whitehead demonstrates that his endeavour differs from the Great Empiricist in terms of rescuing relatedness from Hume. He opens his lecture on the relatedness of nature as follows:

In choosing the topic of a lecture which is to be the first of a series upon the philosophy of science, it seems suitable to explore the broadest possible aspect of the subject. Accordingly I propose to address to you upon Relatedness and, in particular, upon the Relatedness of Nature. I feel some natural diffidence in speaking upon this theme in the capital of British metaphysics, haunted by the shade of Hume. This great thinker made short work of the theory of the relatedness of nature as it existed in the current philosophy of his time. It is hardly too much to say that the course of subsequent philosophy, including even Hume's own later writings and the British Empirical School, but still more in the stream which descends through Kant, Hegel and Caird, has been an endeavour to restore some theory of relatedness to replace the one demolished by Hume's youthful scepticism. If you once conceive fundamental fact as a multiplicity of subjects qualified by predicates, you must fail to give a coherent account of experience. The disjunction of subjects is the presupposition from which you start, and you can only account for conjunctive relations by some fallacious sleight of hand, such as Leibniz's metaphor of his monads engaged in mirroring. The alternative philosophic position must commence with denouncing the whole idea of 'subject qualified by predicate' as a trap set for philosophers by the syntax of language. The conclusion which I shall wish to enforce is that we can discern in nature a ground of uniformity, of which the more far-reaching example is the uniformity of space-time and the more limited example is what is usually known under the title, the Uniformity of Nature.³

Subsequently, in the construction of his own cosmology based in the uniformity of nature, which emphasizes the notion of *feeling*, in contrast to consciousness, Whitehead takes issue with some of the main tenets of Hume's standpoint. But, he affirms many of Hume's own hypotheses regarding *feeling* that were discarded. Whitehead acknowledges that to associate Hume's theory of perception, which has its basis in 'conscious perception' or, alternatively, in his own terminology, 'presentational immediacy', with *primitive experience*, has had fatal consequences for both philosophy and science in general. As Whitehead fields a universal principle of 'uniformity' or 'relativity', his own position is that Hume's theory of perception provides only a limited description of the experience of organisms. Therefore, in *Symbolism and Process and Reality*, Whitehead proposes an amendment to Humean empiricism such as to include 'causal efficacy' as a primary form of perception alongside 'presentational immediacy'. In so doing, Whitehead sets up a three-branch model of perception including the modes of 1.) 'causal efficacy', 2.) 'presentational immediacy', and 3.) 'symbolic reference'. He explains that "I am here

may make plain how deeply the philosophy of organism is founded on seventeenth century thought and how at certain critical points diverges from that thought" (PR, p. 130)

3 Whitehead, "The Principle of Relativity," in F. S. C. Northrop and M. Gross (eds.), Alfred North Whitehead: An Anthology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953, p. 305.

controverting the most cherished tradition of modern philosophy, shared alike by the school of empiricists which derives from Hume, and the school of transcendental idealists which derives from Kant."⁴ It is in this discussion of Hume's account of experience, which sets the basis for Whitehead's 'Theory of Prehensions' in Part III of *Process and Reality*, that the nature and function of scepticism in his philosophy of Organism becomes clearer.

In this chapter, I show that scepticism is an element of experience playing an important role with respect to Whitehead's three modes of perception, as well as in his coordinate morphology. Specifically, I propose that, in Whitehead's speculative philosophy, the notions of 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify scepticism. Scepticism in the sense of 'division' and 'decision', is the formal element involved in the objectification of actual entities, and is implicit to perception in the modes of 'presentational immediacy' (i.e., 'conscious perception'), in 'symbolic reference', in one aspect of 'causal efficacy', and is fundamental to his theory of extension. In order to substantiate this thesis, it is first necessary to provide a synopsis of 'presentational immediacy' and his principle of relativity. Second, it is imperative to elaborate on Whitehead's modification of Hume's account of perception to include 'causal efficacy'. Third, I shall discuss the notion of the 'division' of the extensive continuum in view of Whitehead's third mode of perception: 'symbolic reference', as well as in relation to his theory of extension.

4 SB, p. 31. In contrast, Whitehead also admits that "the philosophy of organism can be best understood by conceiving it as accepting large portions of the expositions of Hume and Kant." (PR, p. 130) However, he does take issue with both Hume and Kant. He states, "Hume (...) fail(s) to provide experience with any objective content. Kant, for whom 'process' is mainly a process of thought, accepts Hume's doctrine as to the 'datum' and turns the 'apparent' objective content into the end of the construct. So far, Kant's 'apparent' objective content seems to take the place of the 'satisfaction' in the philosophy of organism. In this way there can be no real escape from the solipsistic difficulty. But Kant in his appeal to 'practical reason' admits also the 'satisfaction' in a sense analogous to that in the philosophy of organism; and by an analysis of its complex character he arrives at ultimate actualities which, according to his account, cannot be discovered by any analysis of 'mere appearance.' This is a very complex doctrine, which has been reproduced in all philosophies derivative from Kant. The doctrine gives each actual entity two worlds, one world of appearance, and the other world compact of ultimate substantial fact. On this point, as to the absence of 'objective content' in the datum for experience, Santayana seems to agree with Hume and Kant. But if his introduction of 'animal faith' is to be taken as a re-examination of the datum under the influence of the sceptical conclusion of Hume's doctrine, then he, as his second doctrine, is practically reasserting Locke's second doctrine. But if he is appealing to 'practice' away from the critical examination of our sources of information, he must be classed with Hume and Kant, although differing from them in every detail of procedure." (PR, pp. 152-153)

I. The Principle of Relativity and 'Presentational Immediacy'

The principle of universal relativity is one of the fundamental cosmological notions in *Process and Reality*. In fact, with some modifications, Whitehead aims at incorporating Einstein's principle of the "connexion between time and space" into his cosmology, which emerged from the great physicist's own "way of envisaging the general fact of relativity."⁵ One of the main assumptions of Whitehead's metaphysics is that our immediate empirical experience of actual entities originates out of the backdrop of the 'extensive continuum', i.e., the circumambient universe of space and time which we help compose. For Whitehead, the term 'extensive continuum' is the best definition of the spatio-temporal universe as a whole, as implied by the principle of relativity, in which the many actual entities, in cumulative 'solidarity', compose the one society. "This extensive continuum," Whitehead writes, "is one relational complex in which all potential objectifications find their niche. It underlies the whole world, past, present, and future (...) (and) involves both the property of indefinite divisibility and the property of unbounded extension."⁶ In this sense, it is clear that for Whitehead, our perception of the universe involves the process of contrasting the disjointed many actual entities implied by the 'indefinite divisibility' of the extensive continuum with the unified one actual entity implied by the 'indefinite

5 Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy (1941), New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, p. 241. As L. Ford reports in "Whitehead's Distinctive Features," in The Recovery of Philosophy in America: Essays in Honor of John Edwin Smith, New York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1997, p. 136, "This is the first comprehensive metaphysics built on relativity physics and evolution which seeks to make room for experience within nature. (A) first concern led Whitehead to find a suitable replacement for the customary elements of scientific materialism (space, time, and matter) in terms of objects and events, while (a) second concern seeks equal justice for matters such as value and novelty. One consequence of relativity physics is that contemporaries do not causally interact." However, for Whitehead, perception in the sense of 'prehension' itself is a causal act.

6 PR, p. 66, my addition. In Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986, p. xiv, J. L. Nobo writes that Whitehead's metaphysics "is the vision of universal solidarity: that the entire universe is somehow to be found within each of its ultimate concrete components or, equivalently, that the final real actualities of which the universe is composed are each all and all in each. (...) The solidarity of the universe is the fundamental thesis of Whitehead's metaphysical philosophy." Nobo explains, "The fundamental thesis of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism is that the final actualities of the universe cannot be abstracted from one another because each actuality, though individual and discrete, is internally related to all other actualities. This mutual involvement of discrete actualities is what Whitehead meant by the *solidarity* or *connectedness* of the universe." (p. 1)

It is necessary to note that the term 'universe' in description of the 'extensive continuum' is meant only in a generalized way. The term 'universe' suggests the already-objectified 'extensive continuum'. According to Whitehead, "possibilities of division constitute the external world a continuum. For a continuum is divisible, so far as the contemporary world is divided by actual entities, it is not a continuum, but is atomic. Thus the contemporary world is perceived with its potentiality for extensive division, and not its actual atomic division. (...) The contemporary world as perceived by the senses is the datum for contemporary actuality, and is therefore continuous - divisible but not divided. The contemporary world is in fact divided and atomic, being a multiplicity of definite actual entities." (p. 62) Also, "the extensive continuum is not a fact prior to the world; it is the first determination of order - that is, of real potentiality - arising out of the general character of the world." (p. 66)

connectibility' of the extensive continuum. That is to say, following from the principle of relativity, our perception of the actual entities in the universe is caught up with the contrast between the many actual entities as compositional of the one (which increases the many by one), and the one actual entity as comprising the many (which decreases the many by one, but maintains the one in objective immortality).⁷ In maintaining the principle of relativity, Whitehead's philosophy of Organism adheres to the notion that "no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe."⁸ It is from this

7 Following from the principle of relativity, for Whitehead, "the term 'many' presupposes the term 'one,' and the term 'one' presupposes the term 'many.' The term 'many' conveys the notion of 'disjunctive diversity'; this notion is an essential element in the concept of 'being.' There are many 'beings' in disjunctive diversity." (PR, p. 21) He explains that "in the philosophy of organism it is assumed that an actual entity is composite. 'Actuality' is the fundamental exemplification of composition; all other meanings of 'composition' are referent to this root meaning. But 'actuality' is a general term, which merely indicates this ultimate type of composite unity: there are many composite unities to which this general term applies. There is no general fact of composition, not expressible in terms of the composite constitutions of the individual occasions. Every proposition is entertained in the constitution of some one actual entity, or severally in the constitutions of many actual entities. This is only another rendering of the 'ontological principle.'" (PR, pp. 147-148) Whitehead's cosmology is based in the notion that "every item of the universe including all the other actual entities, is a constituent in the constitution of any one actual entity. This conclusion has already been employed under the title of the 'principle of relativity.' This principle of relativity is the axiom by which the ontological principle is rescued from issuing in an extreme monism. Hume adumbrates this principle in his notion of 'repetition.'" (PR, p. 148)

8 PR, p. 3. Whitehead's view of a universe which is 'indefinitely divisible', which stems from the principle of relativity, forces us to recollect Hume's synopsis of the 'infinite divisibility' of the universe. In "Book I: of the Understanding" in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by E. C. Mossner, New York: Penguin Books, 1969, he writes, "now 'tis certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? 'Tis likewise certain, that this idea as conceiv'd by the imagination, tho' divisible into parts or inferior ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infinite number of parts: For that exceeds the comprehension of our limited capacities. Here then is an idea of extension, which consists of parts or inferior ideas, that are perfectly indivisible: consequently 'tis possible for extension really to exist conformable to it: and consequently all the arguments employ'd against the possibility of mathematical points are mere scholastick quibbles, and unworthy of our attention. (...) These consequences we may carry one step farther, and conclude that all the pretended demonstrations for the infinite divisibility of extension are equally sophistical; since 'tis certain these demonstration cannot be just without proving the impossibility of mathematical points; which 'tis an evident absurdity to pretend to." (p. 81)

Later, in the *Treatise*, Hume states that "'tis natural for men, in their common and careless way of thinking to imagine they perceive a connexion betwixt such objects as they have constantly found united together; and because custom has render'd it difficult to separate the ideas, they are apt to fancy such a separation to be in itself impossible and absurd. But philosophers, who abstract from the effects of custom, and compare the ideas of objects, immediately perceive the falsehood of these vulgar sentiments, and discover that there is no known connexion among objects. Every different object appears to them entirely distinct and separate; and they perceive, that 'tis not from a view of the nature and qualities of objects we infer one from another, but only when in several instances we observe them to have been constantly conjoin'd. But these philosophers, instead of drawing a just inference from this observation, and concluding, that we have no idea of power or agency, separate from the mind, and belonging to causes; I say, instead of drawing the conclusion, they frequently search for the qualities, in which this agency consists, and are displeas'd with every system, which their reason suggests to them, in order to explain it. They have sufficient force of genius to free them from the vulgar error, that there is a natural and perceivable connexion betwixt the several sensible qualities and actions of matter, but not sufficient to keep them from ever seeking for this connexion in matter, or causes." (pp. 272-273)

cosmological standpoint that Whitehead disagrees, on some accounts, with modern philosophical assessments of 'conscious perception' or, alternatively, 'presentational immediacy', including that of Hume.

In basing his cosmology on the principle of relativity, Whitehead shows how 'presentational immediacy', which is supposed to involve the immediate perception of a given object, is really not that 'immediate'.⁹ Rather, for him, perception in the mode of 'presentational immediacy' is that which "by means of a *sensum*, rescues from vagueness a contemporary spatial region, in respect to its spatial shape and its spatial perspective from the percipient."¹⁰ Perception in this mode "illustrates the contemporary world in respect to its potentiality for extensive subdivision into atomic actualities and in respect to the scheme of perspective relationships which thereby eventuates. But it gives no information as to the actual (process of) atomization of this contemporary 'real potentiality.'"¹¹ For Whitehead, immediate perception presupposes the 'objectification' of an actual entity, implying the process by which one actual entity becomes "present in another entity."¹² Specifically, "objectification is an operation of mutually adjusted abstraction, or *elimination*, whereby the many occasions of the actual world become one complex datum."¹³ Thus, 'objectification' implies the prehension of an actual entity out from the backdrop of the extensive continuum, where "actual entities atomize the extensive continuum. This continuum is in itself merely the potentiality for division; an actual entity effects its division."¹⁴ And, according to Whitehead, the process by which an object becomes given in 'presentational immediacy'

9 In an early work Whitehead expresses his position that "we imagine that we have immediate experience of a world of perfectly defined objects implicated in perfectly defined events, which as known to us by the direct deliverance of our senses, happen at exact instances of time, in a space formed by exact points, without parts and without magnitude: the neat, trim, tidy exact world which is the goal of scientific thought. (...) My contention is, that this world is a world of ideas, and that its internal relations are relations between abstract concepts, and that the elucidation of the precise connection between this world and the feelings of actual experience is the fundamental question of scientific philosophy." (Whitehead in "Organisation of Thought," (1916-1917) in V. Lowe's A. N. Whitehead: The Man and His Work (Vol. 2), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990, p. 96)

10 PR, p. 121.

11 PR, p. 123, my addition.

12 PR, p. 50.

13 This is J. L. Nobo's quotation in Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity, p. 127, of the original version of *Process and Reality*, p. 321, my emphasis.

14 PR, p. 67.

is a neglected underlying assumption in modern realisms, including that of Hume. To be sure, Whitehead states, "it is the basis of any realistic philosophy, that in perception there is a disclosure of objectified data, which are known as having a community with the immediate experience for which they are data."¹⁵ However, both Whitehead's argument for perception in the mode of 'causal efficacy' and his theory of prehensions undercuts the assumption of the primitiveness of 'presentational immediacy'.

For Whitehead, perception in the mode of 'presentational immediacy' where there is consciousness of actual entities (and nexus), is really not that primitive since it implies the 'division' and the 'decision' of the essentially unbounded extensive continuum. And, in this chapter, I am proposing that the notions of 'division' and 'decision' signify scepticism in Whitehead's speculative scheme. For it is by way of 'division' and 'decision' that we perceptually and ontologically carve up the unbounded universe into the actual entities and nexus that we know as given in experience. In Whitehead's perspective, the actual entity is itself an initially indeterminate potentiality for division. But, the actual entity only becomes a determinate entity as it is 'divided' and 'decided' as an object only through the process of its 'objectification' or 'prehension'. It is for this reason that he states,

The notion of 'givenness' carries with it a reference beyond the mere data in question. It refers to a 'decision' whereby what is 'given' is separated off from what for that occasion is 'not given.' This element of 'givenness' in things implies some activity procuring limitation. The word 'decision' does not here imply conscious judgment, though in some 'decisions' consciousness will be a factor. The word is used in its root sense of a 'cutting off.' The ontological principle declares that every decision is referable to one or more actual entities, because in separation from actual entities there is nothing, merely nonentity - 'The rest is silence.'

The ontological principle asserts the relativity of decision; whereby every decision expresses the relation of the actual thing, *for which* a decision is made, to an actual thing *by which* that decision is made. It constitutes the very meaning of actuality. An actual entity arises from

15 PR, p. 79. In SB, Whitehead states that the "given-ness of the sense-data, as the basis of (perception in the mode of presentational immediacy), is the great doctrine common to Hume and Kant. But what is already given for experience can only be derived from that natural potentiality which shapes a particular experience in the guise of causal efficacy. Causal efficacy is the hand of the settled past in the formation of the present." (p. 50, my addition)

Following from his adherence to the principle of relativity, Whitehead believes that Hume "fails to distinguish sufficiently between (i) the 'manner' (or 'order') in which many simples constitute some one complex perception, i.e., impression or idea; and (ii) the efficacious fact by reason of which this complex perception arises; and (iii) the mere multiplicity of simples which constitute the complex perception in this definite manner" (p. 131); "Hume's philosophy is occupied with the double search, first, for manners of unity, whereby many simples become one complex impression; and secondly, for a standard of propriety by which to criticize the production of ideas" (p. 133) Demonstrating this 'search', Whitehead quotes Hume to the effect that "as to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and it will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arrive immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being." (PR, p. 139, from *Treatise*, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. V)

decisions *for* it, and by its very existence provides decisions *for* other actual entities which supercede it. Thus the ontological principle is the first stage in constituting a theory embracing the notions of 'actual entity,' 'givenness,' and 'process.' Just as 'potentiality for process' is the meaning of the more general term 'entity,' or 'thing'; so 'decision' is the additional meaning imported by the word 'actual' into the phrase 'actual entity.' 'Actuality' is the decision amid 'potentiality.' It represents stubborn fact which cannot be evaded.¹⁶

In this way, the delimited, given object cognized in 'presentational immediacy' only becomes 'objectified' in virtue of its distinction from the rest of the multifarious universe. To be sure, Whitehead writes, "where there is no decision involving *exclusion*, there is no givenness."¹⁷ Thus, the notions of 'division' and 'decision' are constitutive of the very conditions for the possibility of the cognition of actual entities out from the backdrop of the extensive continuum. But, at this point, it is wrong to ascribe 'division' and 'decision' solely to subjective activity because the object may also be said to 'donate' itself to such ways of perceiving it. And, it is equally to be affirmed that actual entities given in 'presentational immediacy' are also the result of a perceptual synthesis of their various objective elements within the process of prehending them. For Whitehead, the actual entity is 'objectified', positively prehended or, alternatively, felt by the subject only by an interplay of 'division' and 'connection'.¹⁸ Consequently, in response to Hume, Whitehead believes that it is a mistake to assume that 'presentational immediacy' is representative of the most primordial form of perception. Rather, an actual entity given in 'presentational immediacy' presupposes a 'sceptical' phase in the process of objectification involving the 'division of

16 PR, p. 43. As J. L. Nobo points out in Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity, "Insofar as Whitehead uses it as a technical term, 'decision' does not generally mean a 'conscious choice' or a 'conscious judgment', though in respect to some high-grade occasions it may mean that; instead, the term is taken in its 'root sense of a cutting off'. (...) What is 'cut off' is always some possibility or potentiality for the determinateness of an actual entity. Actual entities, God excepted, are finite things, and finitude involves exclusion; thus, 'decision' means a cutting off, or exclusion, of the potentiality for being 'that', in order to realize the potentiality for being 'this.' " (p. 153)

17 PR, p. 43, my emphasis.

18 In this manner, "an actual entity as felt is said to be 'objectified' for that subject." (PR, p. 41) Also, "the analysis of an actual entity into 'prehensions' is that mode of analysis which exhibits the most concrete elements in the nature of actual entities. This mode of analysis will be termed a 'division' of the actual entity in question. Each actual entity is 'divisible' in an indefinite number of ways, and each way of 'division' yields its definite quota of prehensions. A prehension reproduces in itself the general characteristics of an actual entity: it is referent to an external world, and in this sense will be said to have a 'vector character'; it involves emotion, and purpose, and valuation, and causation." (p. 19) Also, Whitehead writes, "actual entities involve each other by reason of their prehensions of each other. There are thus real individual facts of the togetherness of actual entities, which are real, individual, and particular, in the same sense in which actual entities and the prehensions are real, individual, and particular. Any such particular fact of togetherness among actual entities is called a 'nexus.' The ultimate facts of immediate actual experience are actual entities, prehensions, and nexus. All else is, for our experience, derivative abstraction." (p. 20)

and 'decision about' the extensive continuum. Therefore, in Whitehead's scheme, it is clear that the givenness of the object in immediate perception, is a "derivative abstraction, necessary indeed as an element in the description of the fundamental experiential feeling, but delusive as a metaphysical starting-point."¹⁹ That is to say, for him, "consciousness is the crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base."²⁰

In this way, following from the principle of relativity, Whitehead overturns a basic presupposition in modern philosophy, namely, the centrality of consciousness. In contrast, his metaphysics holds that consciousness is derivative from *feeling*. In the philosophy of Organism, consciousness, which involves the immediate perception of a given object, arises only in a late derivative phase of the process of prehension, and presupposes the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum. For Whitehead,

the general case of conscious perception is the negative perception, namely, 'perceiving this stone as not grey'. The 'grey' then has ingression in its full character of a conceptual novelty, illustrating an alternative. In the positive case, 'perceiving this stone as grey,' the grey has ingression in its character of a possible novelty, but in fact by its conformity emphasizing the dative grey, blindly felt. Consciousness is the feeling of negation: in the perception of 'the stone as grey,' such feeling is in barest germ; in the perception of 'the stone as not grey,' such feeling is in full development. Thus the negative perception is the triumph of consciousness.²¹

By way of the contrast of the propositions, 'the stone as grey' and 'the stone as not grey', Whitehead shows that a stone, as consciously perceived, involves the negation or 'cutting off' of those qualities it does not actually possess. For him, consciousness is described as *the feeling of negation*, in which the notions of 'division' and 'decision' are implicit. And, it is in virtue of this negation that in Whitehead's speculative philosophy, consciousness implies scepticism. In Chapter Six of this dissertation, consciousness will be further elucidated with respect to Whitehead's theory of prehensions, in which it is described as the 'affirmation-negation' contrast. In any event, it is through this insistence on the principle of relativity and the argument that consciousness is derivative from feeling that Whitehead attempts to modify Hume's account of perception, so as to include 'causal efficacy' as the primitive mode of perception.

19 **PR**, p. 160.

20 **PR**, p. 267.

21 **PR**, p. 161.

II. Whitehead's Amendment to Hume's Theory of Perception: 'Causal Efficacy'

Following from the principle of relativity, in *Symbolism and Process and Reality*, Whitehead proposes an amendment to that empirical standpoint which admits only immediate experience as the truth of what is. In this way, he wants to overcome that form of neo-Humean scepticism whose "general procedure (...) is to tie down opponents strictly to the front door of presentational immediacy as the sole source of information, while (his) own philosophy makes its escape by a back door veiled under the ordinary usages of language."²² In particular, Whitehead wants to include 'causal efficacy' not only as a legitimate mode of perception alongside 'presentational immediacy', but as the most primordial form of perception. In his assessment, "Hume's difficulty with 'cause and effect' is that the 'necessary connexion' lies 'beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses.' In other words, this *manner* of connection is not given in any impression."²³ Therefore, Hume argues that the 'necessary

22 PR, p. 174, my addition. Whitehead explains, "For both (Hume and Kant) presentational immediacy was the primary fact of perception, and any apprehension of causation was, somehow or other, to be elicited from this primary fact. (...) The modern critical movement in philosophy arose when Hume and Kant emphasized the fundamental, inescapable, importance which this doctrine possesses for any philosophy admitting its truth. The philosophy of organism does not admit its truth, and thus rejects the touchstone which is the neolithic weapon of 'critical' philosophy." (PR, p. 173) Whitehead also states, "For subsequent empiricists the pleasure of the dogma has overcome the metaphysical rule of evidence: that we must bow to those presumptions, which, in despite of criticism, we still employ for the regulation of our lives. Such presumptions are imperative in experience. Rationalism is the search for the coherence of such presumptions. Hume, in his series of ideas and impressions, derivates from impressions of sensation, implicitly allows that the building-up of experience is a process of addition to original data. It disagrees with Hume as to the proper characterization of the primary data. In Hume's philosophy the primary impressions are characterized in terms of universals." (PR, p. 151) In distinction from other philosophies, Whitehead believes that "the development of cosmology has been hampered by the stress laid upon one, or other, of three misconceptions: (i) the substance-quality doctrine of actuality; (...) (ii) the sensationalist doctrine of perception; (...) (iii) the Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a construct from subjective experience." As such, the philosophy of organism diverges from "the combined influence of these allied errors (which) has been to reduce philosophy to a negligible influence in the formation of contemporary thought. Hume himself introduces the ominous appeal to 'practice' - not in criticism of his premises, but in supplement to his conclusions. Bradley, who repudiates Hume, finds the objective world in which we live, and move, and have our being, 'inconsistent if taken as real.' Neither side conciliates philosophical conceptions of a real world with the world of daily experience." (PR, p. 156)

23 PR, p. 134. He continues, "Thus the whole basis of the idea, its propriety, is to be traced to the repetition of impressions. At this point of his argument, Hume seems to have overlooked the difficulty that 'repetition' stands with regard to 'impressions' in exactly the same position as does 'cause and effect.' Hume has confused a 'repetition of impressions' with an 'impression of repetition of impressions.'" Antecedently, Whitehead quotes Hume to the effect that "the only connection or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of 'cause and effect'; and that because it is the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another. The idea of cause and effect is derived from *experience*, which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoined with each other: and as an object similar to one of these is supposed to be immediately present in its impression, we thence *presume* on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant. According to this account of things, (...) probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance between those objects of which we have had experience, and those of which we have

connexion' implied between 'cause' and 'effect' is not empirically given in 'presentational immediacy'. As Whitehead summarizes,

Hume's polemic respecting causation is, in fact, one prolonged, convincing argument that pure presentational immediacy does not disclose any causal influence, either whereby one actual entity is constitutive of the percipient actual entity, or whereby one perceived actual entity is constitutive of another perceived actual entity. The conclusion is that, in so far as concerns their disclosure by presentational immediacy, actual entities in the contemporary universe are causally independent of each other.²⁴

On the contrary, in view of the principle of relativity, Whitehead thinks that we perceive more than Hume's theory would have us believe. In particular, he objects to the fact that if Hume's scepticism were to be taken to its radical conclusion, we would be unable to make reference to the relations between objects, nor the basic categories of thought we attribute to the external world. In this case, there would remain "only what Santayana calls 'Solipsism of the Present Moment'. Even memory goes."²⁵ The problem is that 'presentational immediacy', "gives only positive information about the immediate present as defined by itself."²⁶ Therefore, in holding to 'presentational immediacy' as the unmitigated Hume does, no reference can be made as to the past or the future for that presupposes induction and metaphysics. However, according to Whitehead, Hume's task of attempting to observe the necessary connection between cause and effect is problematic in that "consciousness only dimly illuminates the

had none; and, therefore, it is *impossible* this presumption can arise from *probability*." (from Bk. I, Part III, Sect. VI.) Elsewhere, in *SB*, Whitehead explains that "the followers of Hume and the followers of Kant have thus their diverse, but allied, objections to the notion of any direct perception of causal efficacy, in the sense in which direct perception is antecedent to thought about it. Both schools find 'causal efficacy' to be the importation, into the data, of a way of thinking or judging about those data. One school calls it a habit of thought; the other school calls it a category of thought. Also for them the mere data are the pure sense-data." (pp. 39-40)

24 *PR*, p. 123. However, according to Whitehead, "it is a great mistake to attribute to Hume any disbelief in the importance of the notion of 'cause' and 'effect.' Throughout the *Treatise* he steadily affirms its fundamental importance; and finally, when he cannot fit it into his metaphysics, he appeals beyond his metaphysics to an ultimate justification outside any rational systematization. This ultimate justification is 'practice.'" (*PR*, p. 133) Elsewhere, in *SB*, Whitehead surmises that "Hume's followers in developing his doctrine presuppose that presentational immediacy is primitive, and that causal efficacy is the sophisticated derivative. This is a complete inversion of the evidence. So far as Hume's own teaching is concerned, there is, of course, another alternative: it is that Hume's disciples have misinterpreted Hume's final position. On this hypothesis, his final appeal to 'practice' is an appeal against the inadequacy of the then current metaphysical categories as interpretive of obvious experience." (pp. 51-51)

25 *SB*, p. 33. This reference is to Santayana's *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. Whitehead quotes Hume in that according to him, "ought not to receive (...) any of the observations we may make concerning *identity* and relation of *time* and *place*; since in none of them can the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects." (*SB*, p. 32, from Hume's *Treatise*, Part III, Sect. II)

26 *PR*, p. 124.

prehensions in the mode of causal efficacy, because these prehensions are primitive elements in our experience."²⁷ As such, Whitehead makes the case that although

Hume's demand that causation be describable as an element in element in experience is (...) entirely justifiable (...) the point of the criticisms of Hume's procedure is that we have direct intuition of inheritance and memory: thus the only problem is, so to describe the general character of experience that these intuitions may be included.²⁸

In this way, Whitehead proceeds to make an amendment to Hume's account of experience so as to include the particular intuitions which we do have in practice, and which we may associate with perception in the mode of 'causal efficacy'. For Whitehead, 'causal efficacy' is equally as valid as 'presentational immediacy', and is in essence, more primordial. While Hume emphasizes that "pure presentational immediacy does not disclose any causal influence," and falsely holds the view that causality is "dependent upon presentational immediacy," Whitehead believes the reverse, namely, that 'causal efficacy' is intrinsic to ordinary perception and that 'presentational immediacy' is actually dependent upon 'causal efficacy'.²⁹ He writes, "Hume's doctrine inverts this relationship by making causal efficacy, as an experience, dependent upon presentational immediacy. This doctrine, whatever be its merits, is not based upon any appeal to experience."³⁰ On the contrary, Whitehead maintains that "presentational immediacy is an outgrowth from the complex datum implanted by causal efficacy," that "the sense-data, required for immediate sense-perception, enter into experience in virtue of the efficacy of the environment," and that 'presentational immediacy' belongs only to high-grade organisms.³¹ Furthermore, it is his contention that "the notion of causation arose because mankind lives amid experiences in the mode of causal efficacy," and from this perspective, he attributes 'feeling' as primitive,

27 PR, p. 162.

28 PR, p. 166-167.

29 PR, p. 124, PR, p. 176. In SB, Whitehead states, "Hume's argument first tacitly presupposes the two modes of perception, and then tacitly assumes that presentational immediacy is the only mode. Also Hume's followers in developing this doctrine presuppose that presentational immediacy is primitive, and that causal efficacy is the sophisticated derivative. This is a complete inversion of the evidence." (pp. 51-52) Whitehead also suggests that "one reason for the philosophical difficulties over causation is that Hume and subsequently Kant, conceived the causal nexus as, in its primary character, derived from the presupposed sequence of immediate presentations. But if we interrogate experience, the exact converse is the case; the perceptive mode of immediate presentation affords information about the percepts in the more aboriginal mode of causal efficacy." (PR, p. 178)

30 PR, p. 176.

31 PR, p. 172, SB, p. 52. In SB, Whitehead states that perception in the mode of 'presentational immediacy' "is mainly a characteristic of more advanced organisms; whereas all organisms have experience of causal efficacy whereby their functioning is conditioned by their environment." (p. 5)

rather than consciousness.³² Hence, in distinction from Hume, the perspective that consciousness arises from feeling is, for Whitehead, representative of a more accurate doctrine of 'empirical realism'.

In defending 'causal efficacy' as a more primordial mode of perception, Whitehead elaborates on three interconnected points. First, he uses the empirically verifiable example of the experience of the bodily organism in relation to its environment. He argues that "our bodily experience is primarily an experience of the dependence of presentational immediacy upon causal efficacy."³³ In Whitehead's view, the most primitive experience involves our bodily sense-organs which *feel* the environment. In Humean fashion, he alludes to the fact that we feel the 'causal efficacious' impress of the object in our hand and we see the object with our eyes, pointing to the real relationship between percipient and what is perceived. That is to say, "sense-data functioning in an act of experience demonstrate that they are given by the causal efficacy of actual bodily organs."³⁴ Thus, for Whitehead, 'causal efficacy' is a real mode of

32 PR, p. 175. Antecedently to this quotation, Whitehead takes issue with Hume's interpretation of experience as elucidated in his example of the 'non-empirical' nature of causality, of the man blinking after a flash. He writes, "The philosophy of organism accepts the man's statement, that the *flash* made him blink. But Hume intervenes with another explanation. He first points out that in the mode of presentational immediacy there is no percept of the flash *making* the man blink. In this mode there are merely the two percepts - the flash and the blink - combining the two latter of the three percepts under the one term 'blink.' Hume refuses to admit the man's protestation, that the compulsion to blink is just what he did feel. The refusal is based on the dogma that all percepts are in the mode of presentational immediacy - a dogma not to be upset by a mere appeal to direct experience. Besides, Hume has another interpretation of the man's experience: what the man really felt was his *habit* of blinking after flashes. The word 'association' explains it all, according to Hume. But how can a 'habit' be felt, when a 'cause' cannot be felt? Is there any presentational immediacy in the feeling of a 'habit'? Hume by a sleight of hand confuses a 'habit of feeling blinks after flashes' with a 'feeling of the habit of feeling blinks after flashes.'" (PR, p. 175)

To illustrate this point regarding feeling, Whitehead describes the primitive experience of the organism as 'causal efficacy'. He suggests, "It would seem therefore that inhibitions of *sensa*, given in presentational immediacy, should be accompanied by a corresponding absence of 'causal feeling'; for the explanation of how there is 'causal feeling' presupposes the well-marked familiar *sensa*, in presentational immediacy. Unfortunately the contrary is the case. An inhibition of familiar *sensa* is very apt to leave us prey to vague terrors respecting a circumambient world of causal operations. In the dark there are vague presences, doubtfully feared; in the silence, the irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses itself upon us; in the vagueness of the low hum of insects in an August woodland, the inflow into ourselves of feelings from enveloping nature overwhelms us; in the dim consciousness of half-sleep, the presentations of sense fade away, and we are left with the vague feeling of influences from vague things around us. It is quite untrue that the feeling of various types of influences are dependent upon the familiarity of well-marked *sensa* in immediate presentment." (PR, p. 176)

33 PR, p. 176.

34 SB, p. 51. Here, Whitehead takes up Hume's account of the role of the bodily organs in the acquisition of sense-data: "(Hume) writes: 'if it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a color.' Thus, in asserting the lack of perception of causality, he implicitly presupposes it. For what is the meaning of 'by' in 'by the eyes,' (...) His argument presupposes that sense-data, functioning in presentational immediacy, are 'given' by reason of the 'eyes,' (...) functioning in causal efficacy." Similarly, as V. Lowe, in A. N. Whitehead: The Man and His Work (Vol. 2),

perception denoting the feeling originating from a datum acting on the sensory organs of the body, and vice-versa. However, while admittedly Hume more than adequately considers the body in his own elaboration from a similar perspective, Whitehead cites the fact that in both Hume's and Descartes' respective accounts, the body is dropped out of the analysis. He writes,

both (Descartes and Hume) agree though Hume more explicitly - that sense-perception of the contemporary world is accompanied by perception of the 'withness' of the body. It is the 'withness' of the body that makes the body the starting point for our knowledge of the circumambient world. We find here our direct knowledge of 'causal efficacy'. Hume and Descartes in their theory of direct perceptive knowledge dropped out this withness of the body and thus confined perception to presentational immediacy. Santayana, in his doctrine of 'animal faith,' practically agrees with Hume and Descartes as to this withness of the actual world, including the body. Santayana also excludes our knowledge of it from givenness. Descartes calls it a certain kind of 'understanding'; Santayana calls it 'animal faith' provoked by 'shock'; and Hume calls it 'practice.' But we must - to avoid 'solipsism of the present moment' - include in direct perception something more than presentational immediacy. (...) Even presentational immediacy begins with sense-presentation of the contemporary body.³⁵

Therefore, in Whitehead's assessment, Hume's analysis points directly to 'causal efficacy' but maintains only 'presentational immediacy' as fundamental. While Whitehead believes, like Hume, that "all exact observation is made by perception in the mode of presentational immediacy," he also acknowledges that it "solely depends upon the 'withness' of the 'body,' and only exhibits the external contemporary world in respect to its systematic geometrical relationship to the 'body.'"³⁶ As such, in contrast to Hume, Whitehead attempts to carry out the full ramifications of this real interdependence between the bodily perspective and the environment, as an example of how 'causal efficacy' is the basic mode of perception. He states, "So far as concerns the causal efficacy of the world external to the human body, there is the most insistent perception of a circumambient world of beings."³⁷ And, what is perceived in

summarizes, "Whitehead attacks Hume's denial that there is any perception of causal efficacy by simply asking for the meaning of 'by' in his observation that if the idea of substance is perceived by the eyes it must be a color, if by the ears a sound, if by the palate a taste. Was Hume not assuming that what he called 'impressions' are given by the causal efficacy of eyes, ears, and palate? And his argument must begin again over the perception of those sense-organs." (p. 209)

35 PR, p. 81.

36 PR, p. 333.

37 SB, p. 55. Whitehead makes the case that "in the mode of presentational immediacy (the sense-data) are projected to exhibit the contemporary world in its spatial relations. In the mode of causal efficacy they exhibit the almost instantaneous precedent bodily organs as imposing their characters on the experience in question." (p. 50) Similarly, "Hume (...) states the fundamental point, that sense-data functioning in an act of experience demonstrate that they are given by the causal efficacy of the actual bodily organs. He refers to this causal efficacy as a component in direct perception." (p. 51)

'presentational immediacy' is limited in terms of what is originally perceived in 'causal efficacy', pointing to his thesis that feeling originates cognition. Whitehead argues, "Presentational immediacy comes into being by reason of an integration of a conceptual feeling drawn from bodily efficacy with a bare regional feeling which is also a component in a complex feeling of bodily efficacy," where 'bodily efficacy' is "a component presupposed by (...) presentational immediacy and leading up to it."³⁸ Later, he uses animal instinct as an example of the primitiveness of 'causal efficacy' as the mode of perception of other bodily organisms. For him, non-human animals have perception in 'causal efficacy' and not in 'presentational immediacy'. He argues that "all organisms have experience of causal efficacy whereby their functioning is conditioned by their environment," whereas cognition only belongs to a few 'high-grade' organisms.³⁹

Second, Whitehead makes the case that the circumambient relatedness and functionality between organisms and their environment is the basis for much of our emotional life. For him, this points directly to the primitiveness of 'causal efficacy'. As Whitehead suggests, "emotions are accompanied by the clearest recognition of other actual things reacting upon ourselves. (...) (For instance,) when we hate, it is a man that we hate and not a collection of sense-data - a causal, efficacious man."⁴⁰ And, emotions are by no means subordinate to clear and distinct objects, immediately presented. He argues that "for Hume, hating, loving, thinking, feeling, are nothing but perceptions derivate from (...) impressions. This is the *a priori* sensationalist dogma which bounds all Hume's discoveries in the realm of experience."⁴¹ Practically-speaking, organisms are finite creatures concerned for their existence and their survival. Socially-speaking, they are only one among many, and are thoroughly concerned with the ways in which they interrelate with their species. Hence, for Whitehead, organisms exhibit emotion due to their real perception of the 'causal efficacy' of the environment and others on them, and vice-versa. Furthermore, their emotions are transferred from past or other occasions into present or contemporary ones. In this light, "the primitive form of physical experience is emotional - blind emotion - received as felt elsewhere in another occasion and conformally appropriated as a subjective passion (...) The primitive element is

38 PR, p. 316, PR, p. 312.

39 SB, p. 5.

40 SB, p. 45, my addition.

41 PR, p. 146.

sympathy, that is, feeling the feeling in another and feeling conformally with another.”⁴² In these ways, Whitehead incorporates emotion as demonstrative of the primitiveness of perception in the mode of ‘causal efficacy’.

Third, contrary to the ‘solipsism of the present moment’ stemming from the unmitigated Humean perspective, Whitehead’s introduction of ‘causal efficacy’ as a primary mode of perception points to the possibility of reference to other occasions, not immediately experienced, as in memory. In this respect, Whitehead admits ‘non-sensuous’ perception, which has its basis in the continuity of nature, into his scheme. In turn, this represents a breach of the unmitigated Humean empiricism. But, as mentioned in Chapter Four, above, his position is to admit induction from a naturalist perspective, as well as memory, into his cosmology. In conjunction of his maintenance of the principle of relativity, he believes that the various occasions in the life of the organism may be said to conform to each other. In his view, the present is directly derived from, and conforms to the past. According to Whitehead, “we only finish a sentence because we have begun it,” and hence, ‘causal efficacy’ may also be said to be “the hand of the settled past in the formation of the present.”⁴³ In this way, Whitehead shows that time is not merely the

42 PR, p. 163. For Whitehead, it is also “evident that ‘perception in the mode of causal efficacy’ is not that sort of perception which has received chief attention in the philosophical tradition. Philosophers have disdained the information about the universe obtained through their visceral feelings, and have concentrated on visual feelings.” (PR, p. 121)

43 PR, p. 129, SB, p. 50. Whitehead is not convinced by Hume’s account of memory. He states, “This is Hume’s doctrine of memory (*Treatise*, Part III, Sect. V): ‘Since therefore the memory is known, neither by the order of its *complex* ideas, nor the nature of *simple* ones; it follows, that the difference between it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity.’ But, (in Part I, Sect. I) he writes: ‘By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these (i.e., impressions) in thinking and reasoning,’ and later on he expands ‘faint’ into ‘degree of force and vivacity.’ Thus, purely differing in ‘force and vivacity,’ we have the order: impressions, memories, ideas. (...) This doctrine is very unpalatable; and to speak bluntly, is in contradiction to plain fact. But, even worse, it omits the vital character of memory, namely that it is memory. In fact the whole notion of repetition is lost in the ‘force and vivacity’ doctrine. What Hume does explain is that with a number of different perceptions immediately concurrent, he sorts them out into three different classes according to force and vivacity. But the repetition character, which he ascribes to simple ideas, and which is the whole point of memory, finds no place in his explanation.” (PR, pp. 134-135)

Later, in *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), New York: The Free Press, 1967, p. 184, Whitehead argues, “Hume appeals to a doctrine of force and liveliness as an essential factor in an impression of sensation. This doctrine is nothing but a special case for the doctrine of subjective forms. (...) He holds that the force and liveliness of one occasion of experience enter into the character of succeeding occasions. The whole doctrine of ‘custom’ depends on this assumption. If the occasions be entirely separate, as Hume contends, this transition of character is without any basis in the nature of things. What Hume, in his appeal to memory, is really doing is to appeal to an observed immanence of the past in the future, involving a continuity of subjective form. (...) With this addition, every argument of Part III of Hume’s *Treatise* can be accepted. But the conclusion follows that there is an observed relation of causation between such occasions. The general character of this observed relation explains at once memory and personal identity.

pure succession of our acts of experience, independent and separate. Rather, it is in virtue of the cumulation of the occasions of the past that the present occasion is what it is, a notion which represents his denial of 'simple occurrence'. For Whitehead, it is common sense to suggest that "there is nothing which 'simply happens'," without a reference to the past."⁴⁴ "The causal efficacy *from* the past," Whitehead writes, "is at least one factor giving our presentational immediacy in the present. The how of our present experience must conform to the what of the past in us."⁴⁵ In Whitehead's view, the importance of the past is that it is the bearer of 'fact' and actuality. According to him,

events become and perish. In their becoming they are immediate and then vanish into the past. (...) When they perish, occasions pass from the immediacy of being into the not-being of immediacy. But that does not mean that they are nothing. They remain 'stubborn fact.' (...) The not-being of occasions is their 'objective immortality.'⁴⁶

44 SB, p. 38.

45 SB, p. 58. Whitehead argues against the Humean presupposition of "the individual independence of successive temporal occasions," (PR, p. 137) which stems from the following passage of the *Treatise*, "now as time is composed of parts that are not coexistent, an unchangeable object, since it produces none but coexistent impressions, produces none that can give us the idea of time; and, consequently, that idea must be derived from a succession of changeable objects, and time in its first appearance can never be severed from such a succession." (PR, p. 136, from Bk. I, Part II, Sect. III) However, Whitehead's position is that "Hume's impressions are self-contained, and he can find no temporal relationship other than mere serial order. This statement about Hume requires qualifying so far as concerns the connection between 'impressions' and 'ideas.' There is a relation of 'derivation' of 'ideas' from 'impressions' which he is always citing and never discussing. So far as it is to be taken seriously - for he never refers it to a correlate 'impression' - it constitutes an exception to the individual independence of successive 'perceptions.' This presupposition of individual independence is what I have elsewhere called, the 'fallacy of simple location.' The notion of 'simple location' is inconsistent with any admission of 'repetition'; Hume's difficulties arise from the fact that he starts with simple locations and ends with repetition. In the organic philosophy the notion of repetition is fundamental. The doctrine of objectification is an endeavour to express how what is settled in actuality is repeated under limitations, so as to be 'given' for immediacy. Later, in discussing 'time,' this doctrine will be termed the doctrine of 'objective immortality.'" (PR, p. 137)

In AI, Whitehead writes, "The present moment is constituted by the influx of the other into that self-identity which is the continued life of the immediate past within the immediacy of the present," (p. 181) and "The immediate past as surviving to be again lived through in the present is the palmary instance of non-sensuous perception." (p. 182) Also, Whitehead asserts "in so far as we apply notions of causality to the understanding of the events in nature, we must conceive these events under the general notions which apply to occasions of experience. For we can only understand causation in terms of our observation of these occasions. This appeal to Hume has the sole purpose of illustrating the common-sense obviousness of the present thesis." (p. 184)

For Whitehead, "If we hold with Hume, that the sole data originating reflective experience are impressions of sensation, and also if we also admit the obvious fact that no one impression by its own individual nature discloses any information as to another such impression, then on that hypothesis the direct experience for interconnectedness vanishes." (p. 220) However, "if we hold, as for example in *Process and Reality*, that all final individual actualities have the metaphysical character of occasions of experience, then on that hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connectedness of one's immediate present occasion with one's immediately past occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the connectedness of all occasions in nature." (p. 221) Later, this distinction serves as the basis for the chapters, "Nature Lifeless" and "Nature Alive," in MT.

46 AI, p. 237.

In this way, following from the principle of relativity, Whitehead argues for the interdependence of experienced facts and temporal occasions in the life of the organism. However, he also admits the possibility of the 'separation' of objectively immortal occasions by the higher organisms, which is the activity of memory. Specifically, the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum regarding past temporal occasions, is implicit to memory. To be sure, for Whitehead, "the separation of the potential extensive scheme into past and future lies with the mode of causal efficacy and not with that of presentational immediacy."⁴⁷

With regards to the 'higher grade organisms', Whitehead makes the case that perception in the modes of 'presentational immediacy' and 'causal efficacy' cannot be rigidly separated. Rather, both modes are intertwined within the experience of the organism. He writes that "the contrast (and interplay) between the comparative emptiness of Presentational Immediacy and the deep significance disclosed by Causal Efficacy is at the root of the pathos of the world."⁴⁸ And, it is from this discussion of the interplay of the two pure modes of perception, i.e., 'presentational immediacy' and 'causal efficacy', that Whitehead presents his third mode of perception, 'symbolic reference'.

III. Whitehead's Third Mode of Perception: 'Symbolic Reference'

Whitehead's philosophy of Organism sets forth two pure modes of perception. First, perception in the mode of 'causal efficacy' is the primitive perception of the organism in relation to the environment, including bodily feelings, emotions, and memory. Second, perception in the mode of 'presentational immediacy', which is accessible only to higher-grade organisms, involves cognition of 'actual entities' and 'nexus' that are fully objectified. However, in *Symbolism and Process and Reality*, Whitehead also presents a third mode of perception which is a synthesis of 'causal efficacy' and 'presentational immediacy'. For him, "the interplay between the (first) two modes will be termed 'symbolic reference'."⁴⁹ The 'interplay' representative of 'symbolic reference' "is chiefly to be thought of as the elucidation of percepta in the mode of causal efficacy by the fluctuating intervention of percepta in the

47 **PR**, p. 170.

48 **SB**, p. 47, my addition.

49 **PR**, p. 121, my addition.

mode of presentational immediacy,” and vice-versa.⁵⁰ For Whitehead, ‘symbolic reference’ is representative of the ‘ordinary’, everyday, ontological mode of human perception, since “complete ideal purity of perceptive experience, devoid of any symbolic reference, is in practice unobtainable for either perceptive mode.”⁵¹ ‘Symbolic reference’ arises from the ‘intersection’ of both ‘causal efficacy’ and ‘presentational immediacy’ and is the synthesis of the ongoing process of the feeling of, and the cognizing of the very same datum. More generally, ‘symbolic reference’ is defined by Whitehead as “the interpretative element in human experience.”⁵²

Perception in the mode of ‘symbolic reference’ involves the integration of emotions and bodily feelings with the immediately presented objects. Particularly, it involves the contrast-in-process of

the two distinct perceptive modes (the objectification of) (...) actual things under the guise of presentational immediacy, and (the perception of) (...) them under the guise of causal efficacy. The synthetic activity whereby these two modes are fused into one perception is what I have called ‘symbolic reference.’⁵³

In explanation of the third mode of perception, Whitehead states that while the “exact discrimination (of emotion from emotion), of thing from thing, and of position from position is vague (in ‘causal efficacy’) (...), the definite discrimination, which in fact we do make, arises almost wholly by reason of symbolic reference from presentational immediacy.”⁵⁴ Hence, in virtue of the interplay of ‘causal efficacy’ and ‘presentational immediacy’, there is a perceptual ‘division’ and ‘decision’ of the extensive continuum, fundamental to ‘symbolic reference’. Through the ‘division’ and ‘decision’ of the extensive continuum intrinsic to ‘symbolic reference’, occurring by way of the fluctuation of what “is directly and distinctly perceived in presentational immediacy and is indistinctly and indirectly perceived in causal efficacy,” what Whitehead calls the ‘presented locus’ issues forth.⁵⁵ The ‘presented locus’ is one ground for perception in the mode of ‘symbolic reference’, and constitutes the ‘logical subject(s)’ in a proposition. It is “directly illustrated by the sensa; while the causal past, the causal future, and the other contemporary

50 **PR**, p. 178.

51 **SB**, p. 54.

52 **PR**, p. 173.

53 **SB**, p. 18, my additions.

54 **SB**, p. 55, my addition.

55 **PR**, p. 169.

events, are only indirectly perceived by means of their extensive relations to the presented locus.”⁵⁶ The other ground for symbolic reference “is the connection between the two modes effected by the identity of an eternal object ingredient in both of them.”⁵⁷ An eternal object is loosely, an ‘idea’ developed by the cumulative perception and interplay of the two pure modes. In other words, past perceptions continuously inform ‘presentational immediacy’, giving rise to eternal objects. Furthermore, for Whitehead, since eternal objects are the basis for predication in general, they connect the two pure modes of perception. As such, the illustration of the ‘presented locus’ together with the development of eternal objects, ultimately yield propositions, which are what is mainly perceived or, alternatively, ‘conceptually analyzed’ in the mode of ‘symbolic reference’.

By way of the conceptual analysis of propositions, i.e., with ‘symbolic reference’ human beings can “define with some accuracy those distant features in the immediate world by which their future lives are to be determined.”⁵⁸ Specifically, they can readily make linguistic reference to fully objectified actual entities, which is the sense in which ‘symbolic reference’ belongs to the ordinary experience of human beings. However, while for Whitehead, “it is true that the general agreement of mankind as to experienced facts is best expressed in language,” he is very distrustful of “language as an adequate

56 PR, p. 169.

57 PR, p. 170. For Whitehead, “any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an ‘eternal object’.” (PR, p. 40) To clarify, while eternal objects may be considered as being ‘separate’ from the world, Whitehead’s standpoint is that, like Hume, eternal objects originate from our cumulative and ongoing perception of the external world. He explains that the relation of eternal objects to ‘symbolic reference’ is such that “the antithetical terms ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’ are the usual words employed to denote respectively entities which nearly, though not quite, correspond to the entities here termed ‘eternal objects,’ and ‘actual entities.’ These terms, ‘universals’ and ‘particulars,’ both in the suggestiveness of the two words and in their current philosophical use, are somewhat misleading. The ontological principle, and the wider doctrine of universal relativity, on which the present metaphysical discussion is founded, blur the sharp distinction between what is universal and what is particular. The notion of a universal is of that which can enter into the description of many particulars; whereas the notion of a particular is that it is described by universals, and does not itself enter into the description of any other particular. According to the doctrine of relativity which is the basis of (this) metaphysical system (...), both these notions involve a misconception. An actual entity cannot be described, even inadequately, by universals; because other actual entities do enter into the description of any one actual entity. Thus every so-called ‘universal’ is particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called ‘particular’ is universal in the sense of entering into the constitution of other actual entities. The contrary opinion led to the collapse of Descartes’ many substances into Spinoza’s one substance; to Leibniz’ windowless monads with their pre-established harmony; to the sceptical reduction of Hume’s philosophy - a reduction first effected by Hume himself, and reissued with the most beautiful exposition by Santayana.” (PR, p. 48)

58 SB, p. 59.

expression of propositions (of fact)."⁵⁹ Following from the principle of relativity, one fundamental problem is that

every proposition refers to a universe exhibiting some general systematic metaphysical character. Apart from this background, the separate entities which go to form the proposition, and the proposition as a whole, are without determinate character. Nothing has been defined, because every definite entity requires a systematic universe to supply its requisite status. Thus every proposition proposing a fact must, in its complete analysis, propose the general character of the universe required for that fact. There are no self-sustained facts, floating in non-entity.⁶⁰

In this way, Whitehead defends that one cause for error is that the determinate character of propositions always involves the 'division' and 'decision' of the essentially unbounded extensive continuum. On this note, Whitehead agrees, although from a different perspective, with one of Hume's dictums that "there is something in the world which cannot be expressed in analytic propositions."⁶¹ Thus, according to Whitehead, 'symbolic reference' is a later result of the ongoing process of the objectification of actual entities and is to be regarded an abstraction from our primitive experience of the world. 'Symbolic reference', being that mode of human perception which is the vehicle for linguistic propositions of fact, is subject to error. As he states, it "plays a dominant part in the way in which all higher organisms conduct their lives. It is the cause of progress, and the cause of error," and it is a "faculty (which) is not infallible."⁶² This is the case since a proposition does not always conform or correspond to the objective occasion. And, the non-correspondence of propositions to the objectified world is a basic premise of scepticism in the realist sense. But, according to Whitehead, "error is the mark of the higher organisms, and is the schoolmaster by whose agency there is upward evolution. For example, the evolutionary use of intelligence is that it enables the individual to profit by error without being slaughtered by it."⁶³ In any event, the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum is a definite presupposition of 'symbolic reference', as it is in 'presentational immediacy' and in the one aspect of 'causal efficacy', i.e., in memory.

59 PR, p. 11, PR, p. xiii.

60 PR, p. 11.

61 PR, p. 140. Regarding Hume's emphasis on separation and 'division', Whitehead adds, "Hume discovered that 'We murder to dissect'. (...) Hume discovered that an actual entity is at once a process, and is atomic; so that in no sense is it the sum of its parts. Hume proclaimed the bankruptcy of morphology."

62 SB, p. 59. Similarly, Whitehead writes, "The errors of mankind equally spring from (the abstractions of) symbolism. (...) An adequate account of human mentality requires an explanation of (i) how we can know truly, (ii) how we can err, and (iii) how we can critically distinguish the truth from error." (pp. 6-7)

63 PR, p. 168.

IV. 'Division' in Whitehead's Theory of Extension

The notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum is the main subject matter of Part IV of *Process and Reality*, entitled 'The Theory of Extension'. Following from his principle of relativity, Whitehead's vision is that of the solidarity and functional interrelatedness of all organisms compositional of the extensive continuum. In this way, nature is, for him, an "organic extensive community" in which the universe has the property of unbounded extension, but which is "indefinitely subdivisible."⁶⁴ Whitehead points out that it belongs to the high-level modes of perception, namely, the 'conscious perception' of the high-grade organisms, which executes the 'division' and 'decision' the extensive continuum. For the sake of his analysis, Whitehead asserts that there are two manners in which one may 'divide' an actual entity, namely, 'genetic division' and 'coordinate division'. While 'genetic division' is the division of the process of concrescence of an actual entity and is "concerned with an actual entity in its character of a concrescent immediacy," 'coordinate division' is the "division of the concrete" and is concerned with "an actual occasion in its character of a concrete object."⁶⁵ Furthermore,

64 PR, p. 289, PR, p. 285.

65 PR, p. 292, PR, p. 283, PR, p. 292. Whitehead explains, "In the 'genetic' mode, the prehensions are exhibited in their genetic relationship to each other. The actual entity is seen as a process; there is growth from phase to phase; there are processes of integration and of reintegration. At length a complex unity of objective datum is obtained, in the guise of a contrast of actual entities, eternal objects, and propositions, felt with corresponding complex unity of subjective form. This genetic passage from phase to phase is not in physical time. It can be put shortly by saying, that physical time expresses some features of the growth, but *not* the growth of the features." (PR, p. 283) In this way, it may be said that 'genetic division' places emphasis on the mental pole of actual entities. On the other hand, coordinate division places emphasis on the physical pole of the 'actual entity'. Whitehead writes, "in so far as the objectification of the actual world (...) is concerned, there is nothing to distinguish this coordinate division from an actual entity. But it is only the physical pole of the actual entity which is thus divisible. The mental pole is incurably one. (...) It is (...) an empirical question to decide (...) whether the distinction between a coordinate division and a true actual entity is, or is not, relevant." (PR, pp. 284-285)

For Whitehead, coordinate division presupposes the high levels of experience of the higher organisms. In this sense coordinate division presupposes the theory of prehensions, the subject matter of Part III of PR. As Whitehead states, "A coordinate division is thus to be classed as a generic contrast. The two components of the contrast are, (i) the parent actual entity, and (ii) the proposition which is the potentiality of that superject having arisen from the physical standpoint of the restricted sub-region. The proposition is thus the potentiality of eliminating from the physical pole of the parent entity all the objectified actual world, except those elements derivable from that standpoint; and yet retaining the relevant elements of the subjective form." (PR, p. 285)

In *The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead's Process and Reality*, New York: Fordham University Press, 1998, E. Kraus defines the nature of the contrast between 'genetic division' and 'coordinate division'. She states, "In genetic analysis, the self-creative process of the subject is traced as it grows from phase to phase. Coordinate analysis, focusing on the fully determinate satisfaction achieved in concrescence, takes as its object the spatio-temporal standpoint in the extensive continuum which the entity has actualized. The former mode divides an occasion into prehensions, underscoring its final causality; the latter mode yields space-time regions through which chains of efficient causality are propagated." (p. 107)

while 'genetic' division is "analytical of the process of which constitutes its own becoming," 'coordinate' division is "analytic of its potentiality for 'objectification' in the becoming of other actual entities."⁶⁶ Another distinction between the two ways of analysis of an actual entity is that the 'genetic' mode is conceived of as *out* of space-time and the 'coordinate' mode as *in* space-time. But, in fact, actual entities *compose* space-time. Thus, while for Whitehead, 'genetic' analysis divides up the one actual entity into its many 'prehensions', and 'coordinate' analysis divides up the one actual entity into its many composing actual entities, these modes of analysis are not to be radically distinguished, since, "*how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*."⁶⁷ But, here, for our present purposes, I am only concerned with 'division' in the 'coordinate' analysis of extension.

In conjunction with his notion of 'coordinate division' in his 'Theory of Extension', Whitehead also advances the opposite notion, namely, 'extensive connection' which is representative of the objective relativity, mutual inclusion, and joining of the many actual occasions into a common spatio-temporal region to form one nexus. The interplay of 'extensive connection' and 'coordinate division' comprises the morphological and geometrical processes by which the many actual entities cumulatively penetrate one another in order to comprise the one nexus or, conversely, the processes by which the one actual may be separated into its component parts. In Part IV, in the sections entitled, 'Flat Loci', 'Strains', and 'Measurement', Whitehead takes up the ways in which actual entities may be connected or divided. In these sections, a morphological (from the Greek, '*morphe*' - meaning 'form') analysis dealing with the component structure of actual entities and nexus is undertaken, providing a valuable contribution to both descriptive and projective geometries. For Whitehead, these forms of geometry are to be described primarily as "the investigation of the morphology of nexus."⁶⁸ Stemming from this analysis, the various abstract 'divisions' and 'connections' regarding the extensive continuum, which are executed in the higher modes of human perception, discloses space-time as 'atomized' by the many concrete actual entities or nexus. Each nexus, in the formal physical sense, may be itself subdivided into its many compositional actual entities, and conversely, each of the many actual entities may be themselves connected to form the one nexus. Pointing to this solidarity in the universe, Whitehead writes, "If you abolish the whole,

66 PR, p. 23.

67 PR, p. 23.

68 PR, p. 302. Also see both Whitehead's The Axioms of Projective Geometry, and The Axioms of Descriptive Geometry, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., Inc., 1960. As Whitehead explains, "The bonds of the objectified nexus only exhibit the definiteness of mathematical relations." (PR, p. 327.)

you abolish its parts; and if you abolish its parts, then *that* whole is abolished.”⁶⁹ In this light, the main tenet of ‘coordinate division’ involves the contrast between the particular actual entity perceived and “the potentiality of eliminating from the physical pole of (that) (...) actual entity all the objectified actual world.”⁷⁰ In other words, for Whitehead, consciousness of an actual entity is constitutive of the contrast between itself and the rest of the extensive continuum, a notion which also implies that the contrast of propositions is also presupposition of consciousness. In this manner, what an entity is formally, involves its ‘cutting off’ from what it is not. Specifically, as has been maintained throughout this chapter, the concrete actual entity is ‘divided’ and ‘decided’ by the prehending subject out from the backdrop of the extensive continuum. However, it must be remembered an actual entity is equally the connection of its component actual entities and that the one nexus is itself a society of actual entities. One subsequent problem involved with the execution of the ‘division’ and ‘decision’ of the extensive continuum by the prehending subject, which is characteristic of consciousness, is that “in dividing the region we (...) (may be) ignoring the subjective unity (of the actual entity in question) which is inconsistent with such division,” and that “the divisions of the region are not divisions which *are*; they are divisions which *might be*.”⁷¹ In this way, for Whitehead, the ‘division’ and ‘decision’ of the extensive continuum is an abstraction which may be said to disregard the subjective unity of the actual entity in question. Thus, Whitehead’s point is that our ‘divisions’ and ‘decisions’ of unbounded extension may potentially constitute instances of the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, which create “the separations of perceptual fact from emotional fact; and of causal fact from emotional fact, and from perceptual fact; and of perceptual fact, emotional fact, and causal fact, from purposive fact; (...) (which) have constituted a complex of bifurcations, fatal to satisfactory cosmology.”⁷² And in attempting to overcome such arbitrary ‘bifurcations’, Whitehead advances his theory of prehensions, emphasizing *feeling* in contrast to consciousness.

V. Preliminary Account of the Nature of Scepticism in Whitehead’s *Process and Reality*

The present chapter has had its purpose in demonstrating that, for Whitehead, the notions of the

69 **PR**, p. 288.

70 **PR**, p. 285.

71 **PR**, p. 284, my additions.

72 **PR**, p. 290.

'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum are main presuppositions of: 1.) perception in the mode of 'presentational immediacy', 2.) memory, which is attributed to perception in the mode of 'causal efficacy', 3.) perception in the mode of 'symbolic reference', as well as 4.) 'coordinate division'. Stemming from this analysis, the thesis I have proposed is that the notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify scepticism. In this interpretation, scepticism is the formal element in the 'objectification' of actual entities. My account follows from Hume's brand of scepticism which emphasizes that there is no empirical perception of any *necessary connection* in relation to putatively-stated cases of 'cause' and 'effect', nor with regards to conscious perceptions of distinct objects. To be sure, as stated in the *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume's scepticism has its basis in the notion that "*all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.*"⁷³ However, following from 1.) his naturalist standpoint on induction and causality, 2.) the principle of relativity, as well as 3.) his emphasis on feeling, Whitehead is affirming that in the mode of 'causal efficacy', there is neither a perception of a *necessary separation* of actual entities, nor a perception of a 'division' between putatively-stated 'causes' and 'effects'. Consequently, Whitehead writes that "the theory of 'prehensions' embodies a protest against the 'bifurcation' of nature. It embodies more than that: its protest is against the (radical) bifurcation of actualities."⁷⁴

One fundamental point of Whitehead's speculative cosmology is the conjunction of his ontological principle with his adherence to the principle of relativity. Stemming from this standpoint, it is to be affirmed that Whitehead seeks to maintain a balance of division and connection. For him, some 'division' and some 'connection' is a necessary precondition for ontology in general. While he shares many concerns of the modern sceptics regarding the errors of 'symbolic reference', it is clear that for him,

73 Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 678. However, preceding the above quotation, Hume states that "we only *feel* a connexion or determination of thought, to pass from one object to another." (p. 677) After the above quotation, Hume remarks, "Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding." (pp. 677-678)

74 PR, p. 289, my addition. In *Speaking From the Depths: A. N. Whitehead's Hermeneutical Metaphysics of Propositions, Experience, Symbolism, Language, and Religion*, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990, S. T. Franklin reports that Charles Malik, a doctoral student of Whitehead's, who went on to become the chairman of the commission which drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights examined the nature of the bifurcation of actuality in the practical sphere. According to Franklin, one important question Malik raised in "The Metaphysics of Time in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead and M. Heidegger," was "the bifurcations between the human world and the natural world have been standard in Western culture. (...) Do these bifurcations serve to protect our human integrity or do they destroy our human integrity by isolating us from the very world which provides us with our context?" (p. 77)

when the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum is excessively executed in such a manner as to break down the actual entity into its many components, *ad infinitum*, ontology is unjustifiably jeopardized. The oneness and the subjective unity of the actual entity is negated and we are only left with the *void* of division or, alternatively, a view of the actual entity, in question, as an absolute nothingness. To be sure, Whitehead may be seen to recite his ontological principle: "No actual entity, then no reason" with literal precision.⁷⁵ And, in response to this radical scepticism, in a later paper, Whitehead writes, "Complete scepticism involves an aroma of self-destruction. It seems as the negation of experience. It craves for an elegy on the passing of rational knowledge - the beautiful youth drowned in the *Sea of Vacuity*."⁷⁶

75 PR, p. 19.

76 Whitehead in "Harvard: The Future," (1936) in ESP, p. 156, my emphasis. Preceding and subsequent to this comment, Whitehead makes a few general remarks on scepticism. He writes, "the palmary instances of human certainty, Logic and Mathematics, have given way under the scrutiny of two thousand years. To-day we have less apparent ground for certainty than had Plato and Aristotle. The natural rebound from this conclusion is scepticism. Trust your reflexes, says the sceptic, and do not seek to understand. Your reflexes are the outcome of routine. Your emotions are the reception of the process. There is no understanding, because there is nothing to understand.

"(...) The large and practical effect of scepticism is gross acquiescence in what is immediate and obvious. Postponement, subtle interweaving, delicacies of adjustment, wide co-ordinations, moral restraint, the whole artistry of civilization, all presuppose understanding. And without understanding they are meaningless.

"Thus, in practice, scepticism always means some knowledge, but not too much. It is indeed evident that our knowledge is limited. But the traditional scepticism is a reaction against an imperfect view of human knowledge."

Chapter VI

Scepticism and Creative Process in *Process and Reality*

The concept of *creativity* is the 'mantle-piece' on which Whitehead founds his speculative cosmology in *Process and Reality*. According to Whitehead's philosophy of Organism, 'creativity' characterizes the process of becoming of all actual entities and is to be considered "the universals of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact."¹ He even goes so far as to define the universe itself as "the creative advance into novelty."² For Whitehead, the concept of 'creativity' is the ultimate factor involved in the *one* overall process constituting the life of the 'creatures' composing the universe. However, this *one* creative process may be seen to be divided into two aspects, one of *appropriation* and one of *self-realization*. While the former aspect of *appropriation* is representative of the 'prehensive' passage of what is 'empirically real' into 'ideality', (i.e., the passage of an objective given into subjectivity), the latter aspect of *self-realization* is the causal 'ingression' of what is 'ideal' into 'empirical reality', (i.e., the metamorphosis of a 'subjective' content into objectivity). In this sense, his speculative cosmology seeks to describe, first, the 'creative process' by which "What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and (second, that by which) the reality in heaven passes back into the world."³ In clarification of this abstract 'division' within the one 'creative process' of organisms, Whitehead writes of the contrast between the 'provisional realism' of his philosophy of Organism and schools stemming from the Kantian philosophy, which, for him, includes those philosophies branding themselves 'Absolute Idealism'. He states,

For Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external

1 Whitehead, Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition, edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, p. 21. For various discussions focusing on the central concept of 'creativity' in Whitehead's metaphysics, see F. Rapp and R. Wiehl (eds.), *et al.* Whitehead's Metaphysics of Creativity, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986.

2 PR, p. 222.

3 PR, p. 351. However, in Whitehead's philosophy, the dichotomy of *appropriation* and *self-realization* is false because it may be said that the *self-realization* of a subject implies the *appropriation* of an object, and conversely, that the *appropriation* of a subject also implies the attainment towards the *self-realization* of an object. In Whitehead's terminology, an actual entity's attainment of its 'subjective aim' implies its status as a 'superject'. What Whitehead means by the 'superject' nature of an actual entity is that status whereby the subject has fulfilled its 'subjective aim', thus attaining its 'objective immortality'. It then loses its subjectivity and becomes an object: 'food' to be appropriated by other actual entities in their own subjective make-up. In these ways, an actual entity has both subjective and objective cycles.

world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience.⁴

In contrast to the Kantian philosophy emphasizing *self-realization*, Whitehead's aim in *Process and Reality* as represented by his 'provisional realism' is to trace the 'genetic' process of *appropriation* by the organism "for the foundation of its own existence (i.e., its subjective aim), the various elements of the universe out of which it arises."⁵ In other words, Whitehead is primarily concerned with how the organism *seizes* an 'actual occasion', and makes it its own by transforming the actual occasion into an 'ideal' content. This appropriative metamorphosis is the 'creative process' described in Part III of *Process and Reality* - 'The Theory of Prehensions'. And, because the theory of prehensions is at the center of his speculative scheme, Whitehead's philosophy of Organism may be interpreted as a "transformation of (...) Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis."⁶ However, the aspect of causal *self-realization* predominant in the 'Kantian schools' (in Whitehead's reading) is not neglected in his own philosophy of Organism.⁷ Consequently, Whitehead wants to overcome the abstract separation of the 'movements' from 'reality' to 'ideality', and vice-versa, as described here. Rather, his emphasis is on the *one* 'creative process' representing the lives of organisms. As he states, the "reality of the actuality in question belongs to its process of concrescence and not to its 'satisfaction'" at either end of the spectrum of creativity.⁸ Thus, for Whitehead, the disjunctions of 'appropriation' and 'self-realization', 'reality' and 'ideality' are abstract 'bifurcations' of the process of concrescence of actual entities, and are

4 PR, p. 156. On Whitehead's list of "prevalent habits of thought (to be) (...) repudiated" by the philosophy of Organism is "the Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical construct from purely subjective experience." (p. xiii) It must be mentioned again that, due to the slimness of Whitehead's readings of the history of philosophy, he interprets 'absolute idealism' as derived from Kantian philosophy. Whitehead writes, "Kant, for whom 'process' is mainly a process of thought, accepts Hume's doctrine as to the 'datum' and turns the 'apparent' objective content into the end of the construct. So far, Kant's 'apparent' objective content seems to take the place of the 'satisfaction' in the philosophy of organism. In this way there can be no escape from the solipsist difficulty. But Kant in his appeal to 'practical reason' admits also the 'satisfaction' in a sense analogous to that in the philosophy of organism; and by an analysis of its complex character he arrives at ultimate actualities which, according to his account, cannot be discovered by any analysis of 'mere appearance.' This is a very complex doctrine, which has been reproduced in all philosophies derivative from Kant. The doctrine gives each actual entity two worlds, one world of mere appearance, and the other world compact of ultimate substantial fact." (p. 152)

5 PR, p. 219, my addition.

6 PR, p. xiii.

7 Whitehead states, "the entity, when considered 'formally,' is being described in respect to those forms of its constitution whereby it is that individual entity with its own measure of absolute self-realization. (PR, p. 51)

8 Whitehead, in D. W. Sherburne (ed.), A Key to Process and Reality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, pp. 14-15.

to be interpreted as *dynamic contrasts*, rather than strict dichotomies.

To reiterate the sequence of analysis in Part Two of this dissertation: in Chapter Four, it was shown that Whitehead's philosophy of Organism endeavours to provide a process metaphysical synthesis of realism and idealism, in order to undercut the 'mutual scepticism' of philosophy and the natural sciences. It was found that one of his central aims was to resolve the arbitrary 'bifurcations' of nature, such as 'matter' and 'mind', brought on by the mutual divorce of philosophy and the natural sciences. In Chapter Five, following from an examination of Whitehead's three modes of perception and theory of extension, it was demonstrated that the notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum are the formal element in the process of 'objectification' of actual entities as presupposed in the higher levels of experience of the higher organisms, such as consciousness. Subsequently, I proposed that his notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify scepticism. However, in this interpretation, scepticism is further to be associated with Whitehead's notion of 'negative prehensions' which are the means by which the organism executes the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum. As Whitehead writes, in conjunction with the notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum, "it is the mark of a high-grade organism to *eliminate*, by negative prehension, the irrelevant accidents in its environment, and to elicit massive attention to every variety of systematic order."⁹ And, it is largely in virtue of 'division', 'decision' and 'negative prehensions' that

9 PR, p. 317, my emphasis. In a similar vein to the interpretation set forth by this dissertation, E. Wolf-Gazo's paper entitled, "Negation and Contrast: The Origins of Self-Consciousness in Hegel and Whitehead," in G. R. Lucas (ed.), *et al. Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy*, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986, pp. 207-215, undertakes a detailed comparison of Hegel's and Whitehead's respective notions of 'negation'. He writes, "an essential notion for the interpretation of Hegel's System is the function of Negation (*Logik* I, 35-38; 100-102; II, 494-499). The act of negation is a self-conscious mental act exclusively in Hegel; whereas for Whitehead such self-conscious acts are included within the scope of the theory of prehension, but negative prehension is not limited exclusively to this class of acts. For Hegel, negation is a systematic treatment of the overcoming of contradictions in the world. For Whitehead, in contrast, negation is a manifestation of mental cogitation within the wider spectrum of man's mental activities. For Whitehead, conscious negation is one form of the possible 'higher phases of experience,' but not the exclusive case, since bare perceptive acts may themselves exhibit features of negative prehension.

"The nature of negation for Hegel involves dynamism in the forms of thought exclusively, while for Whitehead 'negation' may involve feelings in terms of awareness of contrasts. (...) It is negativity as a unity of the negative as well as the positive which addresses what Whitehead considered the essential problem of a natural philosophy - 'the bifurcation of nature'." (p. 213)

"In Whitehead there is no simple contrast possible, but always a contrast of contrasts. Likewise, in Hegel's worldview, there seems to be no simple or isolated act of negation possible, for there always follows another negation, a 'negation of negation.' It seems that the essence of the contradiction lies in the very interdependence of the relevant entities in question. It is, perhaps, the secret of Hegel and Whitehead that they discovered the nature of contradiction in the world, each in his own way: the one in terms of negation, the other in terms of contrast." (p. 214)

while “we can imagine beings who observe all phenomena in all space with an equal eye, unbiased in favour of any part (...), with us it is otherwise, a cat at our feet claims more attention than an earthquake at Cape Horn, or than the destruction of a world in the Milky Way.”¹⁰ Therefore, in Chapter Six, I will investigate the role of scepticism via the notion of ‘negative prehensions’ with respect to his description of the ‘creative processes’ of organisms.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that in *Process and Reality*, ‘negative prehensions’, which *eliminate* data from the process of concrescence may be said to ‘move’ creativity, since they constitute the efficient element involved in the creativity of organisms. In Whitehead’s ‘genetic’ analysis of actual entities, namely, with respect to the theory of prehensions, his notion of a ‘negative prehension’ represents the means by which the organism ‘divides’ and ‘decides’ the extensive continuum, leading to the novel contrasts characteristic of the higher phases of experience. By way of negative prehensions, Whitehead seeks to depict how “in the passage from our lower type animal experience to our higher type human experience, we have acquired a selective emphasis whereby the finite occasions of experience receive clear definition.”¹¹ These higher phases of experience include complex comparative feelings, which involve the dynamic contrast of ‘reality’ and ‘ideality’. While negative prehensions play a one-way eliminatory and ‘decisive’ role in the early phases of concrescence, they play a two-way eliminatory role in the later phases of concrescence, dissolving oppositions into contrasts. Consequently, from this interpretation, in Whitehead’s theory of prehensions, scepticism is ‘feeling-based’, but with respect to the particular occasion in question, the final satisfaction of the concrescing actual entities involves no further elimination. In order to carry out this investigation, in a first part, it will be necessary to examine the function of negative prehensions with regards to Whitehead’s synopsis of the initial phases of the process of concrescence marked by the appropriation of ‘reality’ and its transformation into an ‘ideal’ content. Second, I will elucidate the role of negative prehensions with respect to the later phases of the process of concrescence, characterized by self-realization, namely by the metamorphosis of an ‘ideal’ content back into ‘reality’. Third, it will be imperative to discuss the functioning of negative prehensions in relation to the dynamic contrasts characteristic to the higher phases of experience, including consciousness. Fourth, I shall examine the role of scepticism with regards to Whitehead’s contrast of the ‘Ideal Opposites’, namely ‘God and the World’, as contained in Part V of *Process and Reality*.

10 Whitehead, *An Introduction to Mathematics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 91.

11 Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, New York: Macmillan Co., 1966, p. 77.

I. Negative Prehensions and Prehensive Appropriation: 'Reality' to 'Ideality'

The 'first half' of Whitehead's elucidation of 'creativity' involves the organism in its process of appropriation or 'prehension' of the objective world, namely, the process by which an objective actual entity is transformed into an 'ideal' content by the prehending subject. Whitehead's theory of prehensions is the central in the philosophy of Organism, a fact which coincides with his belief that feeling is more primitive than consciousness with regards to the organism's experience of the world. It is clear that for Whitehead, a philosophy of feeling is representative of a more accurate form of realism than many of his predecessors. The theory of prehensions is primarily a 'genetic' analysis of the actualities composing the extensive continuum. In *Process and Reality*, Whitehead's description of this process of prehension runs through various phases, beginning with feeling and ending with consciousness. Generally-speaking, in his scheme, the order of the 'creative process' begins with the organism feeling its environment, then integrating those feelings into their own internal constitution, and lastly, with respect to the higher organisms, being conscious of their environment, as characterized by an awareness of contrasts. As such, for Whitehead, 'consciousness' occurs in the higher phases of experience of the higher organisms, and is not the necessary base of experience. Hence, his cosmology attempts to build the 'house of experience' from the 'bottom-up', starting with *simple physical feelings*.

In explanation of his standpoint, Whitehead defines "a feeling - i.e., a positive prehension - (as) (...) essentially a transition effecting a concrescence."¹² The 'concrescence', or 'growing together' of actual occasions denotes the process by which feelings (originating from an objective actual occasion, not yet fully 'objectified') become fully integrated into the internal constitution of the prehending subject. That is to say, the object and the subject 'grow together' and are unified. Furthermore, the process of 'concrescence' is constitutive of a formal definition of what the actual entity itself is. In other words, an actual entity is essentially a 'creature' composed of its creative process. According to Whitehead, "'Concrescence' is the name for the process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of the novel 'one'."¹³ While his 'stages' or 'phases' of concrescence are abstract 'divisions' of the process made solely for the purposes of his analysis, they help him describe the process by which the many objective

12 **PR**, p. 221, my addition.

13 Whitehead in D. W. Sherburne (ed.), *A Key to Process and Reality*, p. 7.

data are transformed into one objective datum by, and for the prehending subject towards its 'satisfaction'. For Whitehead, prehensions in fluctuating interplay with negative prehensions, drive the process of 'concrescence', and with respect to the 'genetic' analysis, they are the sub-components of actual entities in general. At the start of his analysis, Whitehead lists the five determinate factors involved in the various stages of concrescence. These determinate factors include: "(i) the 'subject' which feels, (ii) the 'initial data' which are to be felt, (iii) the 'elimination' in virtue of negative prehensions, (iv) the 'objective datum' which is felt, (and) (v) the 'subjective form' which is *how* that subject feels that objective datum."¹⁴ Each phase of concrescence involves different types of feelings whose sub-components, may be divided into these determinate factors. Thus, negative prehensions play a role in each stage of the process of concrescence. Essentially, the process of concrescence runs through three stages: 1.) a 'conformal' phase of 'simple physical feelings', 2.) a stage of 'conceptual feelings', and 3.) a phase of 'comparative feelings'. In this way, the process of concrescence starts with raw sensory data developing 'up' into consciousness and the higher levels of experience. Here, in my analysis of scepticism in Whitehead's theory of prehensions, I focus on the functioning of negative prehensions with respect to the phases of 'simple physical feelings' and 'conceptual feelings' belonging respectively to the physical and mental poles of the prehending subject.

Negative Prehensions and 'Simple Physical Feelings'

In outlining the initial phases of concrescence, Whitehead defines that "a feeling will be called 'physical' when its datum involves objectifications of other actual entities."¹⁵ In maintaining his 'provisionally-realistic' Humean standpoint, Whitehead starts his analysis on the realist assumption that all experience of the actual world originates from simple physical feelings, in abstraction from conceptual feelings.¹⁶ However, following from his response to the Humean theory of perception which, in

14 PR, p. 221.

15 PR, p. 245.

16 Although this principle, which is derived from Hume, maintains his 'provisional realism', Whitehead's notion of 'hybrid feelings' and his 'Category of Conceptual Reversion' place some modifiers on it. A 'hybrid feeling' may be divided into two species: 1.) feelings of the conceptual pole of another actual entity, and 2.) feelings of the conceptual feelings of God. In a 'hybrid feeling' of the first type, "the actual entity forming the datum is objectified by one of its conceptual feelings." (PR, p. 246.) That is to say, with respect to the first type, there is a sympathetic feeling and valuation of the conceptual pole of another actual entity, either a re-enacted past occurrence in the constitution of another actual entity or an eternal object, entering into the creative purposes of that actual entity, i.e., God in another actual entity. The second type leaves open the possibility of the conceptual feelings of God as the initial stage in the process of concrescence. At any rate, the notion of 'conceptual reversion' will be analyzed later with respect to 'conceptual feelings'.

Whitehead's assessment, has its basis in the mode of 'presentational immediacy', he makes the case that a prehension, that is, a 'simple physical feeling', is itself an instance of 'causality'. As he explains, "causation is the transfer of a feeling."¹⁷ Hence, in his analysis of a prehension, an objective 'actual occasion' (not yet fully objectified) 'causes' the multiplicity of feelings which are the 'effect' felt by the prehending subject.¹⁸ By way of the body's sensory organs, simple physical feelings are registered which are both seized from and 'caused' by an object (not yet fully 'objectified'). In his description, "an actual entity in the actual world of a subject must enter into the concrescence of that subject by some simple causal feeling, however vague, trivial, and submerged."¹⁹ In terms of a 'simple physical feeling', in feeling the feelings 'caused by' and 'seized from' another actual entity (not yet fully 'objectified') by way of the sensory organs, the prehending subject is introduced to the initial data which will possibly be integrated into its own constitution. On the one hand, a prehension of the 'positive' species with regards to this possibility is the "definite inclusion of that item into positive contribution to the subject's own real

17 PR, p. 238.

18 As L. S. Ford explains in "Whitehead's Distinctive Features," in R. C. Neville and T. P. Kasulis (eds.), *et al. The Recovery of Philosophy in America: Essays in Honor of John Edwin Smith*, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1997, "The concept of 'prehension' enables us to span the gap between science and phenomenology. Prehension is a generalization of perception as 'apprehension', where the 'ap-' has been removed to indicate that this relationship is not necessarily conscious. It is any 'taking account' of another. Thus if A causes B, then B prehends A. So both the causation of science and the perception of phenomenology can be linked together by this useful concept.

"We may state this basic schema another way: if (object) A causes B, then (subject) B prehends A. Or if (past) A causes B, then (present) B prehends A. The relation of subject and object, so problematic ever since Descartes treated *res cogitans* and *res extensa* as two different kinds of actuality, can be resolved by treating them as two different temporal aspects of the same actuality. The causal-prehensive relations between objects and subjects are asymmetrical, external to the object but internal to the subject." (p. 137)

Whitehead uses "the term 'prehension' for the general way in which the occasion of experience can include, as part of its own essence, any other entity, whether another occasion of experience or an entity of another type. This term is devoid of suggestion either of consciousness or of representative perception. Feelings are the positive type of prehensions. In positive prehensions the 'datum' is preserved as part of the final complex object which 'satisfies' the process of self-formation and thereby completes the occasion." (*Adventures of Ideas*, New York, The Free Press, 1967, p. 234) On the contrary, what Whitehead terms 'negative prehension' is a prehension which "is active via its contribution of its subjective form to the creative process, but it dismisses its 'object' from the possibility of entering into the datum of the final satisfaction." (*AI*, p. 232)

It is clear that the notion of a prehension overcomes the traditional bifurcation of 'subject' and 'object'. Rather, a prehension involves both: 1.) an act of 'appropriation' or 'seizing' of objective datum by the prehending subject, and 2.) a causal act on the prehending subject's sensory organs by objective actual occasions. Therefore, neither subject, nor object has priority in the process of concrescence or 'growing together' of actual occasions. What is occurring is that the prehending subject is 'appropriating' the object, and the object 'donates' itself. Also, here, it should be noted that there is a close proximity between the German notion of 'Concept' (*Begriff*), and Whitehead's notion of a 'prehension'. Particularly, *Begriff* is related to the verb: *greifen*, meaning to 'grasp' or to 'seize'.

19 PR, p. 239.

internal constitution,” while on the other hand, a prehension of the ‘negative’ species with regards to this possibility is the “definite exclusion of that item into positive contribution to the subject’s own real internal constitution.”²⁰ Thus, through alternating positive integrations and negative eliminations of the feelings which are, at once, ‘caused’ by the object (not yet fully ‘objectified’) and ‘seized’ by the prehending subject, the object becomes ‘objectified’ for the subject out from the backdrop of the extensive continuum. The object becomes one objective datum (i.e., a nexus), in the sense of a “realized pattern of the initial data,” thus ‘divided’ and ‘decided’ for the prehending subject, by way of the fluctuating interplay of positive and negative prehensions.²¹ To be sure, for Whitehead, negative prehensions “consist of exclusions from contribution to the concrescence (and) can be treated in their subordination to positive prehensions.”²² And, with respect to ‘simple physical feelings’, in determining the object that was the ‘cause’ of the feelings registered by the sensory organs, the exclusion from feeling is the delimitation of data constitutive of the one objective datum. In Whitehead’s perspective, the feeling of the objective datum involves the dismissal of those feelings extraneous to it, as well as the elimination of the incompatibility of feelings internal to the one objective nexus. In this sense, negative prehensions sever or ‘divide’ the irrelevant feelings from the more ‘causally’ relevant ones, leaving the former on the peripheries of perception, and letting the objective datum be felt as *one*. This development into ‘oneness’ of the many feelings registered is the ‘objectification’ of the datum for the prehending subject.

The ‘objectification’ of the datum involves the fluctuating contrast of positive and negative prehensions. As Whitehead writes, “if the actual entity be *this*, then by nature of the case it is not *that* or *that*.”²³ Subsequently, the subjective form of ‘simple physical feelings’ involves the feeling of the qualitative and quantitative intensity of the objective datum, i.e., *how* the subject feels that datum, perhaps emotionally. Also, according to Whitehead, with respect to the subjective form of positively prehended datum, there is a re-enaction of the objective datum by the subject, such that the objective datum is reproduced conceptually. While, for him, a “re-enaction is not perfect” in its reproduction of the objective datum, in the positive sense, it is the basis for the development of an eternal object.²⁴

20 Whitehead in D. W. Sherburne (ed.), A Key to *Process and Reality*, p. 9.

21 PR, p. 231.

22 PR, p. 220, my addition.

23 PR, p. 240.

24 PR, p. 237.

Furthermore, it is in virtue of this 're-enaction' that, for Whitehead, the conceptual experience of an occasion is always made up of past sensory data. At any rate, he makes it clear that it is by way of the involvement of negative prehensions intrinsic to 'simple physical feelings', that "the cause passes on its feelings to be reproduced by the subject."²⁵ In other words, it is by way of the *contrast-in-process* of positive and negative prehensions that 'simple physical feelings' are constitutive of the physical registration of "the deterministic efficient causation (or) inflow of the actual world in its own proper character of its own feelings, (each) with their own intensive strength, felt and re-enacted by the (...) concrescent subject."²⁶

Negative Prehensions and 'Conceptual Feelings'

In *Process and Reality*, the objective datum of 'conceptual feelings' is an eternal object, in abstraction from the objective datum of the 'simple physical feelings'. In keeping with Whitehead's maintenance of Hume's principle that all experience originates from physical experience, it must be reiterated that eternal objects are constitutive of a conceptual re-enaction of an objective datum which was originally transferred via 'simple physical feelings'. However, here, in respect to 'conceptual feelings', the objective datum is that 're-enaction' as an 'integrated datum'. As such, what is felt in a 'conceptual feeling' is only that 'integrated datum' or eternal object, "in the primary metaphysical sense of being an 'object'" and in abstraction from 'simple physical feelings'.²⁷ Hence, Whitehead defines conceptual feeling as "the feeling of an unqualified negation; that is to say, it is the feeling of a definite eternal object

25 PR, p. 237. Whitehead writes, "The novel actual entity, which is the effect, is the reproduction of the many actual entities of the past. But in this reproduction there is abstraction from their various totalities of feeling. This abstraction is required by the categoreal conditions for compatible synthesis in the novel unity. This abstractive 'objectification' is rendered possible by reason of the 'divisible' character of the satisfactions of actual entities. By reason of this 'divisible' character causation is the transfer of a feeling, and not of a total satisfaction. The other feelings are dismissed by negative prehensions, owing to their lack of compliance with categoreal demands.

"A simple physical feeling enjoys a characteristic which has been variously described as 're-enaction,' 'reproduction,' and 'conformation.' This characteristic can be more accurately explained in terms of the eternal objects involved. There are eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the objective datum which is the 'cause,' and eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the subjective form belonging to the 'effect.' When there is re-enaction there is one eternal object with two-way functioning, namely, as partial determinant of the objective datum, and as partial determinant of the subjective form. In this two-way rôle, the eternal object is functioning relationally between the initial data on the one hand and the concrescent subject on the other." (PR, p. 238)

26 PR, p. 245, my addition.

27 PR, p. 239.

with the definite extrusion of any particular realization."²⁸ Therefore, a 'conceptual feeling' is the feeling of an eternal object in separation from the actual world. For Whitehead, this abstraction is the work of negative prehensions *eliminating* the actual world from feeling.

For Whitehead, "conceptual prehensions, positive or negative, constitute the primary operations among those belonging to the mental pole of an actual entity."²⁹ In 'conceptual feelings', there is no necessary 'initial data' which needs to be synthesized into one 'objective datum', as in 'simple physical feelings'. That is to say, the role of negative prehensions in the feeling of eternal objects is effectively not the transition of many data into one datum. To be sure, Whitehead explains that the 'conceptual feeling' of an eternal object

does not involve elimination by negative prehensions; such eliminations of positive prehensions in the concrescent subject would *divide* that subject into many subjects, and would divide these many subjects from the superject. But, though there can be no elimination from the supervening phase (of 'conceptual feelings') as a whole, there may be elimination from some new integral feeling which is merely one component of that phase.³⁰

Therefore, it may be said that the prehending subject directly feels an integrated datum or an eternal object through its 'conceptual feelings'. However, negative prehensions do play a definite role in conjunction with the subjective form of the feelings. For Whitehead, the determination of the subjective form of a 'conceptual feeling' involves the 'valuation' or 'decision' of the importance and intensity of the particular integrated datum, as a possibility of the development of an eternal object, in the sense of being a novel potential for actualization. Some re-enactions, i.e., integrated datum, are kept as eternal objects introducing creative purpose, some are modified with component elements derived from other occasions (as in what he calls 'conceptual reversion'), and others are eliminated outright. As such, it is by means of negative 'conceptual prehensions' that the integrated datum is modified or dismissed. The

28 PR, p. 243. On this note, W. A. Christian in An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, pp. 214-215, writes, "The negation involved in conceptual feelings must not be confused with the (same type of) negation involved in negative prehensions (as in 'simple physical feelings'). A negative prehension 'holds its datum as inoperative' in the concrescence in which the prehension occurs. (...) The datum of a conceptual feeling (a positive conceptual prehension) is not 'withheld' but has a positive function in the concrescence. The negation involved in conceptual feelings is not a negation of the *function* of the datum in the experience. Negation enters into feeling as a property of the datum itself. The datum of a negative prehension is *not* 'felt' The datum of a conceptual feeling is positively felt as *not* physically realized. Mental experience is 'the experience of forms of definiteness in respect to their disconnection from any particular physical experience, but with abstract evaluation of what they can contribute to such experience.'" (my additions)

29 PR, p. 240.

30 PR, p. 240, my emphasis and addition.

valuation of eternal objects is determined in relation to the concrescent subject's other integrated data, and in virtue of the subjective aim of the actual entity in question. Thus, the subjective form of a 'conceptual feeling', "values up, or down (via negative prehensions), so as to determine the intensive importance accorded to the eternal object."³¹ The subjective form determines how the eternal object is to be used as a medium for creative purpose in the internal constitution of the subject, where negative 'conceptual prehensions' are involved in the selection or dismissal of an eternal object as a potential for future actualization.³² In other words, the subjective valuation via negative prehensions 'decides' which integrated datum or, alternatively, which eternal objects will enter positively into the prehending subject's internal constitution as a medium for creative purpose. In the case of 'conceptual reversion', the subjective form is enriched with respect to other 'conceptual feelings'. In 'conceptual reversion', the eternal object may be synthesized with other eternal objects such as to increase the intensity of the eternal object, subsequently, adding 'value' to the eternal object's possibility of entering into the prehending subject's internal constitution as a potentiality for future actualization or, alternatively, ingression in the actual world. In this way, the eternal object may be creatively modified with respect to any one of the subject's other feelings, including physical feelings, and it may take on some novel content. From this perspective, it is to be noted that Whitehead's 'conceptual reversion' is analogous to the mitigated Humean notion of the connection of ideas in the mind. In any case, it is clear that the role of negative prehensions in 'conceptual feelings' is valuation, namely, to provide the occasion for the modification of eternal objects, or to eliminate them altogether from positive inclusion of them as future potentialities for ingression.

In summary, for Whitehead, negative prehensions play an important role in the 'first half' or, alternatively, in the initial *appropriative* phases of the process of concrescence. On the one hand, 'simple

31 **PR**, p. 241, my addition. There are three characteristics involved in the 'valuation' of eternal objects belonging to the subjective form of conceptual feelings. Here, I have quoted the third characteristic. The first two are: "(i) According to the Category of Subjective Unity, and of Subjective Harmony, the valuation is dependent on the other feelings in its phase of origination. (...) (ii) The valuation determines in what status the eternal object has ingression into the integrated nexus physically felt." However, he states, "But though these three characteristic are included in a valuation, they are merely the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determining what it is itself integrally to be, in its own character of the superject of its own process."

32 As Whitehead states, "In any given concrescence, (an eternal object) may be included positively by means of a conceptual feeling; but it may be excluded by a negative prehension. The actualities have to be felt, while the pure potentials can be dismissed. So far as concerns their functioning as objects, this is the great distinction between an actual entity and an eternal object. The one is stubborn matter of fact; and the other never loses its 'accent' of potentiality." (**PR**, p. 239, my addition)

physical feelings' were described as the feelings derived from the 'causal inflow' of the objective world on the sensory organs, in abstraction from mentality. With respect to 'simple physical feelings', the fluctuating interplay of positive and negative prehensions is the ground of the 'division' and 'objectification' of actual occasions out from the backdrop of the extensive continuum. Negative prehensions cut off the irrelevant data from feeling, an elimination necessary for the transition of the many objective data into the one objective datum, and subsequently, for the integration of datum into the internal constitution of the prehending subject.³³ On the other hand, 'conceptual feelings' were defined in terms of the feeling of the integrated datum as well as eternal objects, in abstraction from the objective world. With respect to 'conceptual feelings', negative prehensions play an important function in the valuation and 'decision' of integrated datum or eternal objects to enter into the internal constitution of the prehending subject as potentialities for future actualization. Overall, these eliminations in terms of both 'simple physical feelings' and 'conceptual feelings' drive the process by which the 'empirically real' occasions of experience are 'objectified', and are *appropriatively* transformed into 'ideal' contents, by the organism, as potentialities for future actualization.

II. Negative Prehensions and Self-Realization: 'Ideality' to 'Reality'

The 'second half' of Whitehead's elucidation of 'creativity' has to do with the organism in its 'self-causal' process of *realizing* a 'subjective aim'. Particularly, it concerns the actualization of an 'ideal' content by the organism. However, L. S. Ford reports that the full conceptions of the 'subjective aim' and 'God' were late developments in Whitehead's thought, and were late insertions into the draft of *Process and Reality*. As such, the notion of 'subjective aim' contrasts with his original standpoint of 'provisional realism', but it remains an extremely important aspect of Whitehead's cosmology.³⁴

33 Whitehead's categories of 'Objective Identity' and 'Objective Diversity' maintain the 'societal' nature of actual entities, that the many compose the one and the one is compositional of the many. These categories respectively assert the "essential self-identity of any entity as regards its status in each individualization of the universe" and dismiss "the notion of diverse elements exercising an absolute identity of function." (PR, p. 225)

34 In his analysis of the genesis of PR from 1926-27, L. S. Ford, in The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1984, writes that "the Giffords draft has a theory of subjectivity cast in terms of final causation. As we saw above under the first distinctive feature, the original datum includes all the eternal objects, from which the occasion derives its 'ideal of itself.' 'Process is the growth and attainment of a final end. The progressive definition of the final end is the efficacious condition for its attainment.' (PR 150)

"Certain features of the concept of 'subjective aim' are already present here. There is an individualized final causation operative throughout concrescence, whose nature is partially determined by the occasion itself. Its derivation, however, is more closely associated with the past than with God. Most importantly, the 'ideal of itself' does not play nearly (such) (...) a central role in concrescence as the 'subjective aim' comes to play simply because

Particularly, it is through the notion of a 'subjective aim' that Whitehead retains the essential elements of 'idealistic' philosophy. For Whitehead, from his 'provisional realist' standpoint, the initial stages of concrescence constitute a description of the origination of an eternal object from the actual world as physically felt, i.e., its development as a novel potential for future actualization and 'self-realization' in the actual world. It is in this sense that he describes his philosophy of Organism as an inversion of Kant and Hegel, since it provides an understanding of the conditions for the possibility of the development of a 'subjective aim'. And, along a realistic line of thinking, the organism's development of an 'ideal of itself' derived from its feeling of the actual world would seem to constitute one 'end-point' of the process of concrescence. It is for this reason that in elucidating the relation between Absolute Idealism and his own philosophy, Whitehead states "It is now evident that the final analogy to philosophies of the Hegelian school, noted in the Preface, is not accidental. (...) The concrescence of a *res vera* is the development of a subjective aim. This development is nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea."³⁵ As was shown in the previous section, for Whitehead, the positive valuation of eternal objects (initially appropriated from objectivity) via negative prehensions is the pre-condition for self-realization, namely, the actualization of eternal objects, and the 'satisfaction' of the subject. Here, I sketch the functioning of negative prehensions with respect to the process of concrescence as it passes from 'ideality' to 'reality', namely as the subject "passes from a subjective aim in concrescence into a superject

it is not required in a process initiated by the original datum. Given the multiplicity of initial data, 'subjective aim' is needed in order to coordinate the activity of creative unification. The term 'subjective aim' and its special enlarged role only comes much later in the final revisions." (pp. 193-194)

In Transforming Process Theism, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2000, Ford describes his interpretive approach to the issue of God in *Science and the Modern World* and *PR*. He states, "the determination of Whitehead's own concepts of God depends upon the compositional analysis of the two books. In the case of *Science and the Modern World*, he devised temporal atomicity, which led to a more transcendent interpretation of eternal objects and to his first concept of God, only after he had given the lectures that comprise most of the book. With a few insertions, he determined to publish the lectures as presented. Thus, there are two strata reflecting different philosophical perspectives within the same book. The first perspective shows a nontheistic metaphysics for his earlier philosophy of nature, while the second gives a preview of what will be more fully developed in *Process and Reality*. Compositional analysis undertakes to separate and analyze these two strands." (p. xvi)

35 *PR*, p. 167. Whitehead's realism consists in that "the truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature. Such representations compose the 'consequent nature' of God, which evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without derogation to the eternal completion of its primordial conceptual nature. In this way the 'ontological principle' is maintained - since there can be no determinate truth, correlating impartially the partial experiences of the many actual entities, apart from one actual entity to which it can be referred. The reaction of the temporal world on the nature of God is considered subsequently in Part V (of *PR*): it is there termed 'the consequent nature of God.'" (*PR*, p. 13, my addition)

with objective immortality.”³⁶

In Whitehead’s philosophy of Organism, the development of a subjective aim signifies the positive conceptual prehension or valuation of an eternal object (initially derived from the feeling of the objective world), via the eliminations of negative prehensions and through ‘conceptual reversion’, as a potential for future actualization. The developed ‘subjective aim’ is constituted by “anticipatory feelings of the transcendent future in its relation to immediate fact (...) (involving) realization of the relevance of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God.”³⁷ In explicating the importance of the notion of ‘subjective aim’ with respect to ‘creativity’, Whitehead believes that an entity’s urge for *self-realization* is constitutive of the actuality of that entity. He writes, “self-realization is the ultimate fact of facts. An actuality is self-realizing, and whatever is self-realizing is an actuality.”³⁸ However, the developed ‘subjective aim’ represents the ‘mid-point’ of the whole process of concrescence, for the ‘ideal’ must pass once again into the actual world. For him, the ‘subjective aim’ of an actual entity is to be ascribed to the mental pole of the actual entity and to the primordial nature of God. For Whitehead, God is the “aboriginal condition” and “the principle of concretion” qualifying the creativity of actual entities, conceptually valuating and ‘deciding’ which eternal objects are to be potentials for realization in the objective world.³⁹ In this way, an actual entity is what it is in virtue of God’s conceptual decisions which are the final cause of the actual entity. Therefore, through his notion of the ‘subjective aim’, Whitehead is able to introduce the principle that “each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world,

36 *PR*, p. 245.

37 *PR*, p. 278.

38 *PR*, p. 222. This quotation concerns Whitehead’s category of Subjective Unity within his system. The category of Subjective Unity asserts the principle that as concerns the conceptual make-up of an entity, the entity strives for its own subjective unity as a final end. Furthermore, the Category of Subjective Unity emphasizes that the subject is at work in every feeling of the objective world, and seeks to maintain a unity of its various feelings of that objective world. According to Whitehead, the category of Subjective Unity involves the notion that “the inference of the subject in the process of its production requires that in the primary phase of the subjective process there be a conceptual feeling of subjective aim: the physical and other feelings originate as steps towards realizing this conceptual aim through their treatment of initial data.” (*PR*, p. 224)

39 *PR*, p. 225, *PR*, p. 244. The category of ‘Subjective Harmony’ asserts that “the valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined by their adaptation to be joint elements in a satisfaction aimed at by their subject.” (*PR*, p. 254-25)

yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions.”⁴⁰ In this way, the notion of a ‘subjective aim’ would seem to constitute a modification of the Humean principle that all experience originates from the actual entity’s physical feelings of the objective world, as well as represents an abandonment of his realistic stance. On the contrary, following from the ontological principle, it does not, since each entity in Whitehead’s system is already objectively immortal, or alternatively, an *actual* entity in virtue of its initial feelings of the objective world. As he states, “an actual entity is at once the subject of self-realization, and the superject which is self-realized.”⁴¹ Rather, Whitehead seeks to maintain that “God and the actual world *jointly* constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence.”⁴²

Negative Prehensions and ‘Transmuted Feelings’

Subsequent to his examination of the initial phases of concrescence as represented by ‘simple physical feelings’ and ‘conceptual feelings’, Whitehead takes up ‘transmuted feelings’ which bring about a further integration between ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual feelings’ and represent an important step on the road to consciousness. In ‘transmuted feelings’, the prehending subject “transmutes the datum of (a) conceptual feeling into a contrast with the nexus of those prehended actual entities.”⁴³ Whitehead calls such a transmuted feeling a ‘complex physical feeling’. In ‘transmutation’, the conceptual feelings of an eternal object are re-ascribed to the physical feelings of a nexus inclusive of all component actual entities within that nexus. Thus, the eternal object is felt as encompassing the actualities composing the nexus, without regard for the multiplicity in their detail or the discordance of the individual members within that nexus. Whitehead writes that

transmutation is the way in which the actual world is felt as a community, and is so felt in virtue of its prevalent order. For it arises by reason of the analogies between the various members of the

40 **PR**, p. 224.

41 **PR**, p. 222. It might be interpreted from **PR** that there are actually many subjective aims involved in the process of concrescence, where, the first one is the most important to the creature as it is the fundamental and initial subjective aim already attained by the entity in question but which holds for the mental pole of an actual entity throughout its existence. That is to say, it constitutes an original instance of actualization, objectively immortal, with which the organism may define itself. The subsequent subjective aims may hold merely for particular occasions, and do not essentially define what the organism is. But, for Whitehead, even though subjective aims originate from the primordial nature of God, there is always, conjointly, an objective derivation from the World. It is in this sense that it might be said that the actual entity is always already ‘objectively immortal’.

42 **PR**, p. 245, my emphasis.

43 **PR**, p. 251, my addition.

prehended nexus, and eliminates their differences. Apart from transmutation our feeble intellectual operations would fail to penetrate into the dominant characteristics of things. We can only understand by discarding.⁴⁴

In this way, in 'transmutation', the discordances of the individual actual entities within the nexus are massively eliminated by negative prehensions, so that the objectified nexus may be felt as 'one' through an eternal object. Furthermore, in 'transmuted feelings', the nexus becomes part of the conceptual valuation of that eternal object which now encompasses it. On the one hand, if the nexus is associated with an eternal object which in its conceptual feeling was valued upward with reference to the subjective aim, the result is *adversion* to that objective nexus on the part of the prehending subject. On the other hand, if the nexus is associated with an eternal object which in its conceptual feeling was valued downward with reference to the subjective aim, the result is *aversion* to that nexus on the part of the prehending subject. In this sense, negative prehensions also play a role in eliminating the objectified nexus from importance to the concrescing subject's creative drive to satisfy its 'subjective aim' in the world. Thus, because of either the positive or negative valuation of the eternal object which is 'transmuted' onto the nexus, the prehending subject either has *adversion* or *aversion* to that nexus. And, for Whitehead, "'adversion' and 'aversion' are types of decision" of the extensive continuum.⁴⁵ In other words, through 'transmuted feelings', by means of its contrast with an eternal object, an objectified nexus is valued via negative prehensions as being either relevant or irrelevant to the prehending subject's conceptually-'decided' process of *self-realization*.

Negative Prehensions and 'Propositional Feelings'

In outlining the remaining phases of concrescence leading up to consciousness and the higher levels of experience, Whitehead elaborates on the stage of 'propositional feelings', which is necessary for consciousness. In his theory, "a proposition enters into experience as the entity forming the datum of a complex feeling derived from the integration of a physical and a conceptual feeling," namely, the integration brought on by 'transmuted feelings'.⁴⁶ A proposition provides the link between the eternal object as felt and the objectified nexus as felt. In particular, for Whitehead, eternal objects conceptually felt in the primordial nature of God are themselves indeterminate. Eternal objects "tell no tales as to their

44 PR, p. 251.

45 PR, p. 254.

46 PR, p. 256.

ingressions (in the occasions of the actual world) (...) for no eternal object is ever (by itself) true or false.”⁴⁷ In other words, eternal objects “cannot demonstrate what they are except in some given fact.”⁴⁸ However, through ‘propositional feelings’ the prehending subject can determine the relevance of that eternal object to the objectified nexus. For Whitehead, a proposition is itself an entity determining how an eternal object has ingression into the empirical occasions of the actual world. In this sense, a proposition is initially a potential as to the meaning or relevance (with reference to the actual world) of the eternal object contained in the primordial nature of God. Thus, both propositions and eternal objects “are definite potentialities for actuality with undetermined realization in actuality (...) but they differ in that an eternal object refers to actuality with absolute generality, whereas a proposition refers to indicated logical subjects.”⁴⁹ As such, on the one hand, it is out of the eternal object that the ‘predicative pattern’ of a proposition arises. On the other hand, a proposition gives *reasons*: it makes definite reference to the objectified actual entities as logical subjects. And, by way of the contrast of the ‘predicative pattern’ and the logical subjects, the proposition “must be true or false.”⁵⁰ Specifically, “the proposition is the possibility of that predicate applying in that assigned way to *those* logical subjects.”⁵¹ Thus, in a propositional feeling, negative prehensions play a role in determining the relevance of the predicative pattern to the logical subjects of the objective world. The determination as to the truth or falsity of the proposition is based in the ‘valuation’ or ‘decision’ as to whether or not the predicative pattern is to be felt with adversion or aversion with reference to the logical subjects in question. Hence, the determination by way of the proposition of whether or not the predicative pattern applies to the logical subjects, is made by way of negative prehensions.

To sum up, in this section, I have traced the workings of negative prehensions as they pertain to

47 PR, p. 256, my additions.

48 PR, pp. 258-259.

49 PR, p. 258.

50 PR, p. 256.

51 PR, p. 258. In reference to this determination, Whitehead subdivides propositional feelings into two main categories. If, on the one hand, the logical subjects are positively prehended as being identical with the predicative pattern (i.e., the eternal object); that is to say, if the proposition is ‘true’, then there is what Whitehead calls ‘perceptive propositional feelings’. If, on the other hand, the logical subjects are prehended negatively, as being distinct from the predicative pattern; in other words, if the proposition is ‘false’, then there is what Whitehead calls, ‘imaginative propositional feelings’. Subsequently, he defines that a ‘true’ proposition must be ‘perceptive’, ‘authentic’, and ‘direct’. See PR, pp. 261-265.

the phases of *self-realization* of the process of concrescence involving the passage of an 'ideal' content or a 'subjective aim' into 'empirical reality'. First, in my analysis of 'transmuted feelings' in which eternal objects are ascribed to an objectified nexus, I have demonstrated that it is through negative prehensions that the prehending subject values or 'decides' an objectified nexus as being adequate or not adequate to its 'subjective aim'. Second, in my elucidation of 'propositional feelings', it is by way of negative prehensions that the prehending subject determines the truth or falsity of a proposition by way of the applicability of the predicate to the logical subjects in question. Overall, these eliminations in terms of both 'transmuted feelings' and 'propositional feelings' drive the process by which 'ideal' contents are transformed, by the organism, into 'empirically real' occasions of experience. Through this process, eternal objects have ingression into actual occasions and/or the organism may realize its 'subjective aim'.

III. Scepticism, Consciousness, and Contrast: The Higher Levels of Experience

In the last chapter of Part III - 'The Theory of Prehensions' in *Process and Reality*, Whitehead takes up the 'higher phases of experience', thus completing his description of the process of concrescence which started with 'simple physical feelings' and ends with consciousness. In it, he essentially completes his argument that "consciousness follows, and does not precede, the entry of the conceptual prehensions of the relevant universals."⁵² Furthermore, in this section, Whitehead elucidates what he calls 'comparative feelings' characterized by the complex feelings of *contrasts*. It is important to note that, for Whitehead, a *contrast* does not signify the incompatibility of actual entities nor does it mean the opposition of extremes. Rather, a *contrast* is representative of the realization by the prehending subject of the 'growing together' of actual entities, and in particular that "opposed elements stand to each other in their mutual requirement."⁵³ I use the term 'dynamic' to emphasize that a contrast denotes the *unity-in-*

52 PR, p. 273.

53 PR, p. 348. Other possible synonyms for Whitehead's use of the term 'contrast' are: the 'mutual inclusion', the 'co-dependence', or the 'interpenetration' of actual entities or of elements previously said to be 'in opposition'. According to J. Jones in *Intensity: An Essay in Whiteheadian Ontology*, Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 1998, "A 'contrast' is the positive relation of two or more discrete elements in the complex of feeling involved in concrescence, such that those elements are mutually compatible and enhancing rather than mutually inhibiting or indifferent. That is to say, prehensions involving a contrast of elements allow for more of the actual world to be positively and importantly involved in the concrescence of an entity. All prehensions are brought under some mode of contrast, either to the enhancement or diminishment of overall intensity of feeling. We should note at the outset

process of the concreting actual entities.⁵⁴ One such contrast is the unity of 'reality' and 'ideality' involved in comparative feelings, which may alternatively be described as the foundation for the correspondence theory of truth.⁵⁵ In *contrasts*, negative prehensions play a 'two-way' eliminatory role, in distinction from the earlier 'one-way' roles in the earlier phases of concreting. Here, I elucidate the function of negative prehensions in relation to 'comparative feelings', consciousness, and the 'higher levels of experience'.

Negative Prehensions and 'Comparative Feelings'

"Comparative feelings," Whitehead writes, "are the result of integrations not yet considered: their data are generic contrasts."⁵⁶ For him, there are two main types of comparative feelings: 1.) 'intellectual feelings', a class which is subdivided into 'conscious perceptions' and 'intuitive judgments', and 2.) 'physical purposes'.⁵⁷ While 'intellectual feelings' involve propositions, negation, and contrasts

that the concept of 'contrast' allows Whitehead to avoid the metaphysical difficulty of describing an entity as feeling every item in its world separately." (pp. 12-13)

54 See *PR*, pp. 106, 228, 266-267. Also see Appendices #1, #2, and #3 below. The term 'dynamic' should not be seen to be an amendment to Whitehead's notion of a 'generic' contrast, which implies the 'oneness' pertaining to the members of a contrast.

55 The philosophy of Organism fields a correspondence theory of truth in that "an account of an actual occasion in terms of its connection, with the realm of eternal objects," which is the basis for a correspondence theory of truth. For him, "the theory of judgment in the philosophy of organism can (...) be described as a 'correspondence' theory or as a 'coherence' theory. It is a correspondence theory, because it describes judgment as the subjective form of the integral prehension of the conformity, or of the non-conformity, of a proposition and an objectified nexus. The prehension in question arises from the synthesis of the two prehensions, one physical and the other mental. The physical prehension is the prehension of the nexus of objectified actual occasions. The mental prehension is the prehension of the proposition. (...) (Also, the) judgment is concerned with a conformity of two components within one experience. It is thus a 'coherence' theory. (...) In this sense there is a 'correspondence' theory. But, at this point of the argument, a distinction must be made. We shall say that a proposition can be true or false, and that a judgment can be correct, or incorrect, or suspended. With this distinction we see that there is a 'correspondence' theory of the truth and falsehood of propositions, and a 'coherence' theory of the correctness, incorrectness and suspension of judgments." (*PR*, pp. 190-191)

56 *PR*, p. 266.

57 Whitehead explains, on the one hand, "the distinction between ('conscious perceptions' and 'intuitive judgments') (...) is not absolute. (...) A conscious perception is a very simplified type of affirmative judgment; and a direct affirmative judgment is a very sophisticated case of conscious perception. The difference between the two has its origin in the fact that one involves a perceptive feeling, and the other involves an imaginative feeling." (*PR*, pp. 272-273, my addition) For Whitehead, while a "conscious perception is the feeling of what is relevant to immediate fact in contrast with its potential irrelevance." (*PR*, p. 268) In an intuitive judgment, "the datum is the generic contrast between an objectified nexus and a proposition whose logical subjects make up the nexus"; "an intuitive judgment may be a belief, or a disbelief, or a suspended judgment." (*PR*, p. 270, *PR*, p. 272) However,

which are the fundamental aspects of consciousness, the more primitive 'physical feelings' do not. On the one hand, with respect to 'intellectual feelings', eternal objects have ingression into actual occasions by way of a proposition. On the other hand, with respect to 'physical purposes', eternal objects have direct aesthetic ingression into actual occasions.

In Whitehead's synopsis, 'intellectual feelings' are the feelings which have consciousness as their subjective form. For him, propositions are a fundamental component of consciousness. As he writes, "there is no consciousness apart from propositions as one element in the objective datum."⁵⁸ 'Intellectual feelings' stem from the integration or contrast of propositional feelings with the feeling of what the proposition itself indicates, namely, a nexus of actual entities in the world. He defines 'intellectual feelings' as the feeling of the "contrast between a nexus of actual entities and a propositions with its logical subjects members of the nexus," namely, the feeling of the "contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality, which is the contrast between '*in fact*' and '*might be*', in respect to particular instances in *this* world."⁵⁹ For Whitehead, consciousness is to be defined as the way in which the prehending subject feels this "affirmation-negation contrast," involving decisions regarding what is actual and what is potential.⁶⁰ Therefore, negative prehensions play a two-way eliminatory role in 'intellectual feelings'. Particularly, the conscious affirmation of what is the case in actuality always involves the negative prehension of what is merely potential, *and conversely*, the conscious affirmation of what is the case in potentiality always involves the negative prehension of what is merely actual. To be sure, in elucidating the meaning of consciousness, Whitehead writes that

in awareness actuality, as a process in fact, is integrated with the potentialities which illustrate *either* what it is and might not be, *or* what it is not and might be. In other words, there is no consciousness without reference to definiteness, affirmation, and negation. Also affirmation involves its contrast with negation, and negation involves its contrast with affirmation. Further, affirmation and negation are alike meaningless apart from reference to the definiteness of particular actualities. Consciousness is how we feel the affirmation-negation contrast. Conceptual feeling is the feeling of an unqualified negation; that is to say, it is the feeling of a definite eternal object with the definite extrusion of any particular realization. Consciousness requires that the objective datum should involve (as one side of a contrast) a qualified negative determined to some definite

"'physical purposes' constitute a type of comparative feeling more primitive than the type of intellectual feelings." (PR, p. 275)

58 PR, p. 243.

59 PR, p. 266, PR, p. 267.

60 PR, p. 243 and 267.

situation.⁶¹

Thus, for him, consciousness involves the awareness of the contrasts of actuality and potentiality as well as affirmation and negation. In this manner, the fluctuating interplay of positive and negative prehensions in relation to the conformity of the proposition to the nexus in question is one of the main presuppositions of consciousness.

With respect to the class of intellectual feelings Whitehead calls 'conscious perceptions', "the comparative feeling arising from the integration of the (propositional) feeling with (its) original physical feeling."⁶² For Whitehead, 'conscious perceptions' integrate a proposition (which indicates its logical subjects and attributes its predicate to the nexus) with the physical feeling of the nexus. In this way, the contrast felt in conscious perceptions, "confronts the nexus as fact, with the potentiality derived from itself, limited to itself, and exemplified in itself. (...) The subjective form thus assumes its vivid immediate consciousness of what the nexus really *is* in the way of potentiality realized."⁶³ Thus, for him, 'conscious perceptions' "are the outcome of an originaive process which has its closest possible restriction to the fact, thus consciously perceived."⁶⁴ However, 'conscious perceptions' are not infallible. Rather, they are among the highest abstractions from primitive experience and belong only to the higher grade organisms. Accordingly, Whitehead states that "what is (mostly) in doubt (in conscious) perceptions is not the immediate perception of a nexus which is a fragment of the actual world. The dubitable element is the definition of the nexus by the observed predicate."⁶⁵ Similarly, in the sense that the fallacious element in conscious perceptions is the predicate, scepticism (i.e., 'negative prehensions') in the realist sense play an overriding role in determining whether the predicate may define the objectified nexus in question.

'Intuitive judgments' comprise the second class of 'intellectual feelings' which also involve

61 **PR**, p. 243.

62 **PR**, p. 268.

63 **PR**, p. 269.

64 **PR**, p. 272.

65 **PR**, p. 270, my addition. Whitehead writes that there are "two immediate guarantees of the correctness of a conscious perception: one is Hume's test of 'force and vivacity,' and the other is the illumination by consciousness of the various feelings involved in the process." (**PR**, p. 269)

consciousness as their subjective form. Whitehead defines 'intuitive judgments' as the feeling of the "contrast between an objectified nexus and a proposition whose logical subjects make up the nexus," but with emphasis on the truth or falsity of the proposition.⁶⁶ There are three possibilities with respect to 'intuitive judgments': 1.) that there is identity with respect to the predicate and the objectified nexus, which is an 'affirmative intuitive judgment', 2.) that there is incompatible diversity with respect to the predicate and the objectified nexus, which is an 'negative intuitive judgment', and 3.) that the predicate and the objectified nexus are neither compatible, nor incompatible, which is a 'suspended intuitive judgment'. As such, 'intuitive judgments' are involved in all determinations as to the compatibility or incompatibility, i.e., the truth or falsity of a proposition with respect to the objectified nexus. Thus, 'intuitive judgments' represent the basis of a 'correspondence' theory of truth. To be sure, Whitehead explains that

the theory of judgment in the philosophy of organism can equally well be described as a 'correspondence' theory or as a 'coherence' theory. It is a correspondence theory, because it describes judgment as the subjective form of the integral prehension of the conformity, or of the non-conformity, of a proposition and an objectified nexus.⁶⁷

Furthermore, he states, "'truth' is the absence of incompatibility (...) in the patterns of the nexus and of the proposition in their generic contrast."⁶⁸ Hence, it is clear that, for Whitehead, 'truth' in the sense of the 'absence of incompatibility' involves the satisfaction of scepticism (i.e., negative prehensions) in both its 'idealistic' and 'realistic' forms.

In general, the class of 'intellectual feelings' Whitehead calls 'intuitive judgments' which have consciousness as their subjective form, are comparative between an affirmative or negative valuation (or 'decision') of an objectified nexus as being relevant as logical subjects to a proposition (and/or to the 'subjective aim' of the organism) and an affirmative or negative valuation (or 'decision') of the truth of the proposition with respect to the objectified nexus. Therefore, scepticism, i.e., negative prehensions would seem to play a two-way eliminatory role in the development of 'intuitive judgments'. First, there

66 **PR**, p. 270.

67 **PR**, p. 190.

68 **PR**, p. 271. Whitehead also analyzes the case in which there is indifference to truth on the part of the prehending subject, which involves negative prehensions. He writes that the "indifference to truth is (...) to be expressed as readiness to eliminate the true objectifying pattern exemplified in the objective datum of the physical feeling in question; while the attention to truth is merely the refusal to eliminate this pattern." (**PR**, p. 275) Thus, for Whitehead, the prehending subject may simply enjoy its 'imaginative freedom'.

are negative prehensions by which the prehending subject 'decides' whether an objectified nexus is either relevant or irrelevant, as a logical subject to its proposition and/or to its 'subjective aim'. These negative prehensions can be said to constitute scepticism in the 'idealistic' sense. Second, there are negative prehensions by which the prehending subject 'decides' the truth or falsity of the proposition with respect to the objectified nexus in the actual world. These negative prehensions can be interpreted to constitute scepticism in the 'realistic' sense. Therefore, 'truth', in the sense of the incompatibility of proposition and objectified nexus, comes only by passing through the eliminations of both 'idealistic' and 'realistic' forms of scepticism. However, in Whitehead's perspective,

the triumph of consciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgment. In this case there is a conscious feeling of what might be, and is not. The feeling directly concerns the definite negative prehensions enjoyed by its subject. It is the feeling of absence, and it feels this absence as produced by the definite exclusiveness of what is really present. Thus, the explicitness of negation, which is the peculiar characteristic of consciousness, is here at its maximum.⁶⁹

In Whitehead's theory of prehensions, the second class of 'comparative feelings' are 'physical purposes' which are said to be more primitive than 'intellectual feelings'. Unlike 'intellectual feelings', 'physical purposes' do not involve propositions, nor consciousness. Rather, in the satisfaction of a 'physical purpose' there is a direct aesthetic ingression of eternal objects into actual occasions, without their mediation by propositions. For Whitehead, 'physical purposes' involve "the contrast of the conceptual datum with the reality of the objectified nexus (and the comparative feeling of the) (...) compatibility or incompatibility of the fact as felt with the eternal object as a datum in feeling."⁷⁰ The

69 *PR*, pp. 273-274.

70 *PR*, p. 276. Some commentators seem to downplay the importance of 'physical purposes' in *PR*. In my view, this should not be the case. For example, in D. W. Sherburne (ed.), *A Key to Process and Reality*, his section on 'physical purposes' (p. 55) is not placed in the order as it appears in *PR*. Rather, it is placed before the section on 'propositional feelings' under 'simple comparative feelings'. Also, he states that 'physical purposes' "characterize the primitive sorts of actual entities that are members of the kinds of societies we term inanimate objects." (p. 235) Furthermore, in E. Kraus' *The Metaphysics of Experience*, she writes, "less sophisticated comparative feelings characterize lower-grade organisms, actual entities lacking sufficient complexity in their actual worlds to elicit affirmation-negation contrasts." (p. 131) Whitehead himself makes two comments which seem to suggest that we should downplay 'physical purposes' in contrast to 'intellectual feelings'. First, he states, "in general, it seems as though intellectual feelings are negligible, so as only to obtain importance in exceptional actual entities." (*PR*, p. 275) Second, he writes, "in respect to physical purposes, the cosmological scheme which is here being developed requires us to hold that all entities include physical purposes." (*PR*, p. 276) However, in my reading, 'physical purposes' are quite important, and they should maintain their placement in *PR*, after 'intellectual feelings'. Whitehead's notion of 'physical purposes' is the affirmation of the universality of his system with respect to all actual entities and "explains the persistence of the order of nature, and in particular of 'enduring objects.'" (*PR*, p. 276) Also, intellectual functioning, including finding out the truth or falsity of propositions is by no means representative of the main drives of organisms, not even human beings. Rather, physical purposes are representative of the drives of

role of negative prehensions in 'physical purposes' may include the modification on the part of the prehending subject, of the integrated datum or the eternal object so as to add intensity (as in 'conceptual reversion'), and the 'decision' of the compatibility or incompatibility of eternal objects and objective occasions towards the satisfaction of the 'subjective aim'.⁷¹ But, due to the primitiveness of 'physical purposes', it is clear that negative prehensions play a more limited role than in 'intellectual feelings'. In any event, the realization of a 'physical purpose' is representative of the ingression of the eternal object into the actual world or, alternatively, actualization of a 'subjective aim'. And, in Whitehead's descriptions the realization of the 'subjective aim' is a 'novel consequent' implying the culmination and satisfaction of the whole creative process of the organism. For him, "an actual fact is a fact of aesthetic experience. All aesthetic experience is feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under identity."⁷² Subsequently, in Whitehead's terminology, in feeling the realized aesthetic contrasts between the 'subjective aim' and the actual world, the prehending subject becomes a superject, i.e., 'objectively immortal'. Furthermore, Whitehead's notion of 'physical purposes' is representative of the universality of his scheme in its applicability to all actual entities.

In summary, in Whitehead's view, the satisfaction of the higher organisms is constituted by the 'complex comparative feelings' and awareness of dynamic contrasts, and of "contrasts of contrasts."⁷³ In 'comparative feelings', it is through the 'double-edged sword' (i.e., the two-way elimination) of negative prehensions that incompatibilities between terms are dissolved and that contrasts are felt. Particularly, in 'comparative feelings' it is through the overcoming of the opposition between, and/or the 'bifurcation' of 'reality' and 'ideality' that the organism is satisfied. And, with the satisfaction of the actual entity, there is no more elimination by way of negative prehensions for that particular occasion of concrescence, which passes into 'objective immortality' and is conceptually 'registered' in the consequent

organisms to feel the aesthetic contrasts between eternal objects and objectified nexus, without propositions and judgment. As such, 'physical purposes' represent 'transcendent creativity' as in the private realization of subjective aims. Also, with Whitehead's insistence on feeling as opposed to consciousness is evidence enough to support that 'physical purposes' are extremely important in his scheme.

71 For Whitehead, the category of 'Subjective Intensity' is constituted by modifications to the eternal objects in a physical purpose, so as to add to the intensity of contrasts, and bring about what he calls 'balance'. In his view, 'balance' means "the adjustment of identity and diversities for the introduction of contrast with the avoidance of inhibitions by incompatibilities." (PR, p. 278, also see pp. 277-280)

72 PR, p. 280.

73 PR, p. 278.

nature of God. At any rate, I have now traced the workings of negative prehensions in the whole creative process as represented by organism's *appropriation* of, and *self-realization* in the actual world, as described by Whitehead. In the next section, I shall investigate the relation of scepticism to Whitehead's dynamic contrast of 'God' and the 'World' as contained in Part V of *Process and Reality*.

IV. Scepticism and Whitehead's Ideal Opposites: 'God' and the 'World'

In Part V of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead provides an additional synopsis of the *one* 'creative process' by which the organisms *appropriate*, and *realize themselves* in the actual world, in terms of the 'ideal opposites' of God and the World. To reiterate, he writes that the *one* creative process is that in which "what is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world."⁷⁴ First, the completed process of *prehensive appropriation* of the world is for Whitehead, the development of a 'subjective aim' or, alternatively, the positive conceptual valuation of an eternal object (via negative prehensions) in the primordial nature of God. That is to say, the primordial nature of God receives and 'decides' eternal objects out from the physical feelings of the objective world. Therefore, the primordial nature of God may be characterized as the realm of 'finite potentiality' of eternal objects in relation to their capacity for future ingression into the actual world. Second, the completed process of *self-realization* in the world is for Whitehead, the actualization of the eternal object (via negative prehensions) in the world, and involves the consequent nature of God. The consequent nature of God is the storehouse of the past actualized eternal objects in the objective world, which are to be considered 'fact', and 'objectively immortal'. In this way, the consequent nature of God may be characterized as the realm of 'infinite actuality' of eternal objects, and "devoid of all negative prehensions," i.e., without any further possibility of 'movement' by scepticism.⁷⁵ However, it must be remembered that, for Whitehead, both natures of God are mediated by the World. In this sense, for him, God is not a static, condescending Caesar nor an 'unmoved mover', radically separated from, and unaffected by the World. Rather, he argues, God is *with* the World, i.e., God is *in contrast* with the World. The primordial nature of God transforms the objective datum derived from the World into eternal objects while the consequent nature of God stores the objectively immortal eternal objects which have ingressed into the actual occasions of the World. Hence, in his speculative cosmology, Whitehead

74 PR, p. 351.

75 PR, p. 345.

presents a non-‘bifurcated’ view of the relationship between God and the World. For him, neither God nor the World has priority over the other. In other words, in Whitehead’s view, God and the World are not incompatible extremes. Rather, for him, the traditional ‘bifurcation’ of God and the World is bridged by his ultimate principle of ‘creative process’. As such, in his perspective, the relationship between God and the World should be characterized by ‘reciprocity’, ‘symmetry’, and *dynamic contrast*. In particular, it is an infinitely co-dependent or ‘biconditional’ relationship which can be construed in a similar manner to Spinoza’s ‘God *sive* World, and conversely, ‘World *sive* God’. In his presentation of the dynamic contrast of God and the World, Whitehead attempts to overcome the incompatibility which arose from the sceptical, ‘divisive’ view which holds that there is a “vicious separation of” actualities.⁷⁶ Rather, for Whitehead, following from the principle of relativity, which holds that “no two actualities can be torn apart: each is all in all,” God and the World are ‘interpenetrating’ actualities.⁷⁷ In this way, Whitehead warns us that we should

not make the mistake of assuming that the World and God are external to, separate from, each other. Remember the togetherness of all actual occasions. The ‘saving’ of the world is not something that goes on apart from the world of actual events. To conceive God ‘separate’ from the World would be to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.⁷⁸

Again, in his view, the arbitrary ‘dividing line’ between God and the World is bridged by ‘creative process’, and each shares in the components traditionally ascribed to the other. For example, in Whitehead’s cosmology, through the fact that both God and the World are caught “in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty,” both God and the World can be said to be finite and infinite.⁷⁹ Also, both God can be said to transcend the World, and the World can be said to transcend God. Furthermore, both the World can be said to be immanent in God, and God can be said to be immanent in the World. Finally, for Whitehead, both God can be said to create the World, and the World can be said to create God. Thus, in dissolving the ‘bifurcation’ of these actualities into contrasts, and into contrasts of contrasts, the components: ‘finitude’ or ‘infinite’, ‘transcendence’ or ‘immanence’ in one are “not separated by any decisive line from analogous components for which the assumption is

76 PR, p. 346.

77 PR, p. 348.

78 Whitehead in Jentz, A. Whitehead’s Philosophy, Lanham: University Press of America, p. 67.

79 PR, p. 349. Also see p. 348. Here, Whitehead does not use the terms ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’, rather ‘fluent’ and ‘permanent’.

not made" in the other.⁸⁰

V. Final Conception of the Nature and Function of Scepticism in *Process and Reality*

The present chapter has demonstrated that, for Whitehead, the arbitrary 'bifurcations' of 'reality' and 'ideality' and 'God' and the 'World' are to be bridged by the ultimate notion of 'creative process'. The sequence of analysis in Part Two of this dissertation has been as follows. In Chapter Four, I argued that one of the main tenets of Whitehead's philosophy of Organism was to provide a 'provisionally-realistic' synthesis of realism and idealism, in order to overcome the 'bifurcation' of nature which was brought on by the mutual scepticism of philosophy and the natural sciences. In Chapter Five of this dissertation I proposed that Whitehead's notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum which "dominate that creative process which we term our lives" signify scepticism.⁸¹ Here, in Chapter Six, I have shown that, with respect to Whitehead's 'genetic' analysis of the concrescence of actual entities (i.e., the theory of prehensions), the notion of a negative prehension is the efficient element in the organism's 'creative process', and is the means by which it executes its 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum. In this interpretation, scepticism is 'feeling-based', and caught up in the selectivity of organisms. By way of their one-way *eliminations* of irrelevant data from feeling in the lower phases of concrescence, and their two-way *eliminations* in the higher phases of concrescence dissolving oppositions into contrasts, negative prehensions drive the process of concrescence in which organisms *appropriate* and *actualize themselves* in the actual world. But, in the final satisfaction of the concrescing actual entities, no further elimination occurs for that particular occasion as it passes into 'objective immortality'. However, in pointing to their necessity and importance in the development and the process of concrescence of organisms, Whitehead writes that "the right coordination of negative prehensions is one secret of mental progress but unless some systematic scheme of relatedness characterizes the environment, there will be *nothing* left whereby to constitute vivid prehension of the world."⁸² As such, while negative prehension is intrinsic to our vivid experience of the world, he makes it clear that excessive negative prehension leads to the negation of experience. That is to say, excessive negative prehension leads to the view of the world as an absolute nothingness, eliminatory of actuality

80 **PR**, p. 347.

81 **MT**, p. 75.

82 **PR**, p. 254, my emphasis.

and contrasts in general.

PART THREE:

Reflections on Scepticism in Light of Speculative Philosophy

Chapter VII

'Instrumental' Scepticism and Aspects of Finitude

I. The Nature and Function of Scepticism in and in Light of Speculative Philosophy

Parts One and Two of this dissertation have comprised an examination of the nature and function of scepticism in speculative philosophy, through a conjoint study of Hegel's *Logic* and Whitehead's *Process and Reality*. Within the sphere of speculative, 'process' metaphysics, I have emphasized the contrast between Hegel's Absolute Idealism and Whitehead's Organic Realism. On the one hand, as can be seen from the *Logic*, Hegel's Absolute Idealism can be said to accentuate the 'idealistic' starting point of finite Spirit in its transition into Nature, and its return into Absolute Spirit. Regarding this particular dialectical progression of the logical Concept, characteristic of Absolute Idealism, I proposed that for Hegel, scepticism, defined as the recognition (and negation) of finitude, participates as the moment of *cancellation* within the mutual sublations of 'ideality' and 'reality'. Furthermore, within this specific dialectical movement, I emphasized how Logic 'bridges the gap' between Spirit and Nature. On the other hand, with respect to *Process and Reality*, I demonstrated that Whitehead's descriptions of the organism's creative processes 'provisionally-prioritize' realism. In his speculative scheme, he initially accentuates and prioritizes the process of *prehensive appropriation*, by which the 'empirically real' is transformed into an 'ideal' content, over the process of *self-realization* of the organism, by which an 'ideal' content is actualized in 'reality'. In my analysis, I proposed that for Whitehead, the notions of the 'bifurcation' of actuality and the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum both imply and signify scepticism. It was shown that the organism executes its 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum by way of negative prehensions. Therefore, stemming from this interpretation of Whitehead's speculative cosmology, scepticism is 'feeling-based', and caught up in the selectivity of organisms.

Overall, this dissertation has demonstrated that both Hegel and Whitehead respectively present a *synthesis-in-process* of idealism and realism, by which a correspondence theory of truth is satisfied.¹ I showed that for both authors, it is only through the satisfaction of the respective scepticisms inherent to idealist and realist positions that philosophical, scientific, and religious truth is reached. Therefore, it is clear that in speculative philosophy, it is the nature and function of scepticism to be the 'mover' of

¹ It is to be understood that the notion of a 'correspondence theory of truth' is being used in a general sense regarding Hegel's position and is not to be overstated. Regarding 'correspondence' see the *Encyclopedia Logic*, translated and edited by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, pp. 286-288. Also see the *Science of Logic*, translated by A. V. Miller, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969, pp. 826.

the philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavours, an interpretation which is consistent with the initial hypothesis I made in the Introduction of this dissertation. Over the course of this study, I emphasized the contrast between Hegel's 'initial prioritizing' of idealism and Whitehead's 'provisional prioritizing' of realism within their respective elucidations. Stemming from my emphasis on this contrast, I have aimed to suggest that there is no strict priority nor posteriority between 'ideality' and 'reality' in the unfolding of experience, truth, and meaning.²

Here, in this Seventh (and final) Chapter, *in light* of this study of speculative philosophy, I am now in a position to make some final conclusions regarding the nature and function of scepticism. Resulting from Parts One and Two of this dissertation, my final synopsis is that *scepticism implies the positing of nothingness*. On the one hand, Hegel's description of scepticism as the recognition (and negation) of finitude within the ongoing dialectical progression of the logical Concept has pointed to this thesis.³ For Hegel, particularly Ancient scepticism is representative of the ongoing demonstration of the nullity of the finite. However, conversely, all determinacy is the result of such negation. Throughout the *Logic*, scepticism participates as the dialectical moment of the Concept, which incites the *Aufhebung*, and subsequently, scepticism accompanies every 'sublation'. On the other hand, Whitehead's elucidation of the 'bifurcation' of actuality, and the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum also points to the positing of nothingness. For Whitehead, the positing of nothingness will not only belong to the processes by which actual entities become 'objectified', but is the basic presupposition of perception in the modes of 'presentational immediacy' and 'symbolic reference' as well as in coordinate division. For him, the creative activity of the organism, including both the processes of *prehensive appropriation* and *self-realization* stem largely from the workings of 'division', 'decision', and 'negative prehensions'.

2 Thus, in light of this dissertation, S. Alexander's loose synopsis regarding idealism and realism might be adopted. In *Space, Time, and Deity*, New York: Macmillan Co. 1934, p. 8, Alexander states, "The real difference between idealism and realism lies in the starting-point or the spirit of their method. For the one, in some form or other, however much disguised, mind is the measure of things and the starting-point of inquiry. The sting of absolute idealism lies in its assertion that the parts of the world are not ultimately real or *true* but only the whole is true. For realism, mind has no privileged place except in its perfection. The real issue is between these two spirits of inquiry; and it is in this sense that (Alexander's own) (...) inquiry is realistic. But no sane philosophy has ever been exclusively the one or the other, and where the modern antithesis has hardly arisen as with Plato, it is extraordinarily difficult to say under which head the philosophy should be classed."

3 My conclusion that scepticism implies the positing of nothingness is also demonstrated in Hegel's section in chapter three - 'Being-for-self' in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 157-184. There, Hegel explicitly takes up the positing of nothingness in relation to the dialectic of 'The One and the Many' including the sub-sections: (a) *The One in its own self*, (b) *The One and the Void*, and (c) *Many Ones: Repulsion*. The interplay between the one and the many is also a main theme in Whitehead's elucidation of creativity in *Process and Reality*.

Thus, it will be the purpose of this chapter to further investigate and solidify the notion that for Hegel and Whitehead, scepticism implies the positing of nothingness. Scepticism, in this sense, will present itself throughout the whole web of logical and creative processes by which identity, determinacy, essence, truth, meaning, consciousness, and ontology in general become and develop. It is further to be hypothesized that the 'mover' of every one of these processes, as described by Hegel and Whitehead, will be sceptical negativity which posits nothingness.

As initial evidence, for these speculative thinkers, it is by way of scepticism that nothingness is posited which both mutually challenges, and separates, for example, what is determinately 'ideal' and what is determinately 'real' and vice-versa, thus 'driving' the overall process by which a correspondence theory of truth is attained. In essence, both Hegel and Whitehead will adhere to the ontological principle that what something fundamentally is, involves what it is not, and the negation of what it is not. As such, to posit somethingness, implies the positing of nothingness, and vice-versa, pointing to the inherence of scepticism in conscious experience. For Hegel, "*there is nothing which is not an intermediate state between being and nothing.*"⁴ For Whitehead, what is felt is felt only in virtue of what is eliminated from feeling. Subsequently, in his view, "every occasion (in conscious experience) is a synthesis of being and not-being," and "you cannot think of mere nothing; and the something which is an object of thought may be called an entity."⁵ Therefore, in distinction from some sceptical systems, for both Hegelian and Whiteheadian philosophies of 'process', the positing of nothingness only occurs in conjunction with the

4 SL, p. 105. / "das nicht ein Mittelzustand zwischen Seyn und Nichts ist." (WSL, GW21, p. 92)

5 Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, New York: The Free Press, 1967, p. 163-164, my addition; p. 144. For Whitehead, "*A*, conceived merely in respect to its relationships to other eternal objects, is '*A* conceived as *not-being*'; where '*not-being*' means 'abstracted from the determinate fact of inclusions in, and exclusions from, actual events.' Also '*A* as *not-being* in respect to a definite occasion *a*' means that *A* in all its determinate relationships is excluded from *a*. Again '*A* as *being* in respect to *a*' means that *A* in some of its determinate relationships is included in *a*. But there can be no occasion which includes *A* in all its determinate relationships; for some of these relationships are contraries. Thus, in regard to excluded relationships, *A* will be *not-being* in *a*, even when in regard to other relationships *A* will be *being* in *a*. Furthermore, though some eternal objects are synthesized in an occasion a merely qua *not-being*, each eternal object which is synthesized qua *being* is also synthesized qua *not-being*. '*Being*' here means 'individually effective in the aesthetic synthesis.' Also the 'aesthetic synthesis' is the 'experient synthesis' viewed as self-creative, under the limitations laid upon it by its internal relatedness to all other actual occasions. We thus conclude-what has already been stated above - that the general fact of the synthetic prehension of all eternal objects into every occasion wears the double aspect of the indeterminate relatedness of each eternal object to occasions generally, and of its determinate relatedness to each particular occasion."

As R. Demos points out in "The One and the Many in Plato," in *Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead*, New York: Russell and Russell, 1966, p. 52, "By virtue of the category of non-being, being divides into the many. By virtue of the category of participation, the many are integrated into wholes. Non-being re-enters the scene, functioning by way of limiting the membership of the wholes. Thus, every whole is bounded."

positing of being. In speculative philosophy, scepticism may be interpreted to have the contrasting role either of positing being within nothingness or of positing nothingness within being. According to the balanced perspective of these speculative philosophers, we may suggest that by positing nothingness in relation to being, scepticism is that 'organ' of reason which may be said to be the 'mover' of the progression of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. With this proposed conclusion in mind, I will now proceed to characterize and respond to that contemporary form of scepticism, which I call 'instrumental' scepticism, which may be seen to dominate the philosophical thought of the present era.

As stated in the Introduction, this dissertation aims at presenting a contemporary perspective on scepticism in light of my conjoint elaboration of Hegel's and Whitehead's respective speculative philosophies. Therefore, in the present chapter, I shall offer a response to the radical 'instrumental' scepticism predominant in our era. Radical 'instrumental' scepticism is a predominant method employed today, for example, in philosophical dialogue, by interpreters of texts, as well as by students and educators alike. It is a strategy in which, for example, an excessive recognition (and negation) of finitude instrumentally occasioning the positing of nothingness, is used as a means to satisfy various practical ends, such as to attain 'truth', to 'move' the interpretation of texts forward, or to disclose and appropriate another's legitimate ideas and beliefs, by way of constant challenging and demanding for justification. This attritional sceptical method is summed up well by Hume as he states, "It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative."⁶ As such, the main purpose of this scepticism is to control the

6 "On the Immortality of the Soul" in Hume, Selected Essays, edited by S. Copley and A. Edgar, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 331. It must be noted that this remark is not meant to label Hume as simply a radical 'instrumental' sceptic, although it does serve to help define the excessiveness of radical 'instrumental' scepticism. At any rate, in response to Hume, Kant also believes that the method of 'scepticism' is the 'mover' of philosophy. Kant states in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that scepticism discloses the 'dialectical battlefield' littered with antinomies, through its "method of watching, or rather provoking, a conflict of assertions, not for the purposes of deciding in favour of one or the other side, but of investigating whether the object of controversy is not perhaps a deceptive appearance which each vainly strives to grasp, and in regard to which, even if there were no opposition to be overcome, neither can arrive at any result, - this procedure, I say, may be entitled the sceptical method. It is altogether different from scepticism - a principle of technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, and strives in all possible ways to destroy its reliability and steadfastness. For the sceptical method aims at certainty. It seeks to discover the point of misunderstanding in the case of disputes which are sincerely and competently conducted by both sides." (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, edited and translated by N. K. Smith, New York: Macmillan & Co., 1965, p. 395) At any rate, when confronted with the imminent question whether Descartes' motivated doubt in the *Meditations* is to be regarded as 'instrumental' scepticism, it is my response that yes it is, but that it is definitely not as excessive and attritional as some contemporary forms, nor is it directed against another. In my view, in contemporary times it is not Descartes' assertion of '*cogito ergo sum*' that is important, rather, we wrongly worship his sceptically 'motivated doubt' as its causal source and its underlying ground. Thus, for the radical sceptic, the *cogito* is treated in its subordination to the motivated doubt, in that the *cogito* is posited only by and through bracketing out everything else. However, in my view, the doubt does not *stand*

creativity (in the Whiteheadian sense) of organisms, and particularly, for acquiring an advantage in the circle of *appropriation* and *self-realization*. From a Hegelian perspective, as scepticism is the 'mover' of the logical Concept, radical 'instrumental' scepticism seeks the control of the dialectical progression of the Concept in its various manifestations. Consequently, in our era, radical 'instrumental' scepticism has used its excessive method of occasioning the positing of nothingness in order to control the development of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. Furthermore, the predominance of this type of thinking, which has culminated in today's all-out attack on metaphysics in general, threatens to reduce genuine philosophizing into a subordinate and valueless resource supply.⁷ But, as will be elucidated here, it is my perspective that this form of scepticism is inappropriate to philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. In the course of responding to radical 'instrumental' scepticism, it will be necessary to further reflect on scepticism, first, from an Hegelian perspective, and, secondly, from a Whiteheadian standpoint. Third, I shall make some final comments on 'instrumental' scepticism in relation to finitude and creativity.

II. Hegelian Reflections on Radical Instrumental Scepticism

In Part One of this dissertation, I demonstrated that Hegel's speculative definition of scepticism is the recognition (and negation) of finitude or, alternatively, the declaration of the untruth of finitude. I elucidated the role of scepticism in terms of the process by which the criterion of truth is carried out in the *Logic*. From the perspective of Hegel's Absolute Idealism, scepticism is the 'common element' inherent to both one-sided idealisms and realisms. Furthermore, I described how scepticism belonged to the working out of the dialectical opposition between idealism and realism, yielding the 'Idea'. From this study, it is to be affirmed that Hegel consistently argued that scepticism was an important element

over the *cogito*. Therefore, it is to be admitted that it is a shortcoming of these interpretations of Descartes' philosophy to overemphasize the motivated doubt, which thereby radically separates subject and object.

7 My response to radical 'instrumental' scepticism is also offered in light of the later Heidegger's 1951 lecture, "The Question Concerning Technology" in *Basic Writings*, edited by D. Krell, New York: Harper San Francisco, 1977, pp. 283-317. In that lecture, Heidegger warns us of the 'danger' of instrumentality, residing in a way of thinking which he calls 'enframing' (*Ge-stell*), which is defined as the causing of beings to reveal themselves. In the human domain, Heidegger argues that such calculative thinking threatens to reduce human beings to a 'standing reserve' purely for technological ordering and purposes. Against the instrumental appropriation of beings, Heidegger argues that philosophy needs to pay more attention to the complex notion of the fact of beings as the ground of Beings. One question is if Whitehead's philosophy of Organism addresses some of these Heideggerian concerns. It is precisely this question which is being worked on by David Farr of McMaster University. Farr intends to ask whether Whitehead's metaphysical position would satisfy Heidegger's standpoint with regards to the fact of beings as the ground of Being. Namely, does Whitehead's metaphysics withstand a Heideggerian critique?

contained within the logical Concept, and that the 'end result' of the dialectic could be conceived as a 'determinate negation' of the finite. However, with regard to this assertion, one must guard against making the interpretation that Hegel is fielding an 'instrumental' form of scepticism in his system. In the introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he states,

The necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness will *by itself* bring to pass the completion of the series. To make this more intelligible, it may be remarked, in a preliminary way, that the exposition of the untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely *negative* procedure. The natural consciousness itself normally takes this one-sided view of it; and a knowledge which makes this one-sidedness its very essence is itself one of the patterns of incomplete consciousness which occurs on the road itself, and will manifest itself in due course. This is just the scepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that *from which it results*. For it is only when it is taken as the result of that which it emerges, that it is, in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a *content*. The scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, *but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss*. But when, on the other hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a *determinate negation*, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms *comes about of itself*.

But the *goal* is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where (Concept) corresponds to object and object to (Concept).⁸

In this paragraph, Hegel is preparing the reader for his presentation of the dialectical progression of the finite forms of consciousness, namely, for the long 'climb' towards the 'plateau' of the Absolute, which

8 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), translated by A. V. Miller and analysis by J. N. Findlay, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 50-51, my emphasis. / "Die Vollständigkeit der Formen des nicht realen Bewusstseins, wird sich durch die Notwendigkeit des Fortganges und Zusammenhanges selbst ergeben. Um diss begreiflich zu machen, kann im Allgemeinen zum voraus bemerkt werden, dass die Darstellung des nicht wahrhaften Bewusstseins in seiner Unwahrheit, nicht eine bloss *negative* Bewegung ist. Eine solche einseitige Ansicht hat das natürliche Bewusstseyn überhaupt von ihr; und ein Wissen, welches diese Einseitigkeit zu seinem Wesen macht, ist ein der Gestalten des unvollendeten Bewusstseyns, welche in den Verlauff des Weges selbst fällt, und darin sich darbieten wird. Sie ist nemlich der Skeptizismus, der in dem Resultate nur immer das reine Nichts sieht, und davon abstrahirt, dass diss Nichts bestimmt das Nichts *dessen* ist, *woraus es resultirt*. Das Nichts ist aber nur, genommen als das Nichts *dessen*, woraus es herkömmt, in der That das wahrhafte Resultat; es ist hiemit selbst ein *bestimmtes* und hat einen *Innhalt*. Der Skepiticismus, der mit der Abstraction des Nichts oder der Leerheit endigt, kann von dieser nicht weiter fortgehen, sondern muss es erwarten, ob, und was ihm etwa neues sich darbietet, um es in denselben leeren Abgrund zu werfen. Indem dagegen das Resultat, wie es in Wahrheit ist, aufgefasst wird, als *bestimmte* Negation, so ist damit unmittelbar eine neue Form entsprungen, und in der Negation der Uebergang gemacht, wodurch sich der Fortgang durch die vollständige Reihe der Gestalten von selbst ergibt.

"Das Ziel aber ist dem Wissen ebenso notwendig, als die Reihe des Fortganges gesteckt; es ist da, wo es nicht mehr über sich selbst hinaus zu gehen nötig hat, wo es sich selbst findet und der Begriff dem Gegenstande, der Gegenstand dem Begriffe entspricht." (*Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807), Vol. 9 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980, p. 56-57)

is the subject matter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Consequently, here, he is responding to the imminent conclusion of the sceptics that if the finite forms of consciousness continually overturn themselves (with the exception of Absolute Knowing), then pure nothingness must be the result of every dialectical opposition. But, his main response to the sceptics is that it is a one-sided and biased point of view to think that the only result of the dialectic is 'nothingness'.⁹ Following from his mature understanding of the dialectical movement of the logical Concept, Hegel explains that the identity of that nothingness must come to be only in virtue of the negation of the previous finite form of consciousness. As such, Hegel's hidden premise here is that the sceptical interpretation that 'nothingness' is the result of the dialectic always involves the negation of the previous form of consciousness or mode of knowledge. In this way, according to him, the sceptic must negate each finite form of consciousness as it comes along. Therefore, in Hegel's view, the result of the dialectic never has the content of pure nothingness, and thus, the positing of nothingness only occurs in conjunction with the positing of being. On the contrary, as Hegel points out, it may be truthfully said that the result is always a 'determinate negation' (*bestimmte Negation*) of a preceding finite form of consciousness that comes about *of itself*.¹⁰ This notion of 'determinate negation' is extremely important for Hegel. However, in distinction from the imminent sceptical interpretation that the notion of 'determinate negation' implies that the result of the dialectic is an 'empty nothingness' and that we should carry out the project of negating all finitude, Hegel's own position is that 'determinate negation' implies the natural movement and development of the logical Concept, which occurs *of itself*. In other words, 'determinate negation' is the source of 'becoming', 'life', 'motion', 'activity', and 'process', in which the finite (*qua finite*) overturns *of itself*, no less than it does from the negative 'hand' of scepticism. Furthermore, as was described in Chapter Three of this dissertation, while 'nothingness' may be considered a moment of the dialectic, from an Hegelian perspective, it is wrong to attribute to it the connotation of finality to this 'nothingness', as many types of scepticism (such as the Ancient form) do. As Hegel writes, "speculative philosophy must not

9 Later, in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel repeats his point against those sceptics who believe that the result of the dialectic has the content of nothingness. He states that "in every case the result of an untrue mode of knowledge must not be allowed to run away into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be grasped as the nothing of *that from which it results* - a result which contains what was true in the preceding knowledge." (PS, p. 56)

10 In German, the adjective: *bestimmte* means 'determinate', 'definite' (as in the 'negation' of the finite), or 'precise'. The verb: *bestimmen* means 'to decide on' ('decide' from the latin: *decidere* meaning 'to cut off'), 'to identify', or 'to define'.

be charged with making negation or nothing an ultimate.”¹¹ But, it is easy for one to misinterpret this ‘determinate negation’ that Hegel describes as a more ‘truthful conception’ of the result of the dialectic, and as a more radical mode of scepticism, particularly, one that is both *radical* and *instrumental* in its treatment of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour.

Here, I am characterizing radical ‘instrumental’ scepticism in conjunction with a particular understanding of the Concept, namely, one that uses the implicit sceptical element contained in the Concept for one’s own calculative purposes. In particular, the method of this form of scepticism can be construed as ‘determinately negating’ every succeeding philosophical novelty. In this way, radical ‘instrumental’ scepticism is to be characterized by an excessive and contrived privileging of the moment of ‘cancellation’ (*tollere*) within the Concept, as a calculative and appropriative means to definite ends. That is to say, it is representative of a determinate method of negating progressively ‘more truthful’ philosophical standpoints *ad infinitum*. On the contrary, for Hegel, as was elucidated in Chapter Two of this dissertation, this ongoing recognition of finitude and its negation *ad infinitum* is fielded with the problem of the ‘spurious infinity’. With regards to the ‘spurious infinity’, it may be suggested that determination is itself representative of finitude, and that ‘determinate negation’ must always carry with it the connotation of the ‘finitude of negation’. Thus, from this perspective, scepticism’s ongoing negation of finitude is always tempered with the converse notion of the ‘finitude of negation’. But, it may be conjectured that, in effect, radical ‘instrumental’ scepticism attempts to carry out its negation unto the ‘spurious infinity’. In any event, in my view, the excessive negation fielded by the radical ‘instrumental’ form of scepticism is the main source of the ‘exhaustion’ and ‘death’ of genuine philosophy which struggles to come up with new justifications and new instances of creative novelty, only to find once again that its claims are, as Hegel states above, ‘thrown into the same empty abyss’. Practically-speaking, one may interpret this movement in conjunction with the contemporary situation in which the proliferation of radical ‘instrumental’ scepticism has over-challenged, and consequently, over-hastened the development of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. In this manner, it may be stated that radical ‘instrumental’ scepticism does not seem to want to let finitude overturn of itself. Rather, it constantly wants to be the causal ‘hand’ of all intellectual development, by occasioning both the perpetual perishing of that which is finite, as well as all determination. Hence, by way of its excessiveness in occasioning the positing of nothingness, radical ‘instrumental’ scepticism has alienated genuine

¹¹ SL, p. 113. / “der speculativen Philosophie muss aber nicht Schuld gegeben werden, dass ihr die Negation oder das Nichts ein Letztes sey.” (WSL, *GW21*, p. 101)

philosophizing from its own labours, and has reduced it to a valueless and subordinate resource supply. However, while I am characterizing that radical 'instrumental' scepticism consists in the overemphasis of the moment of 'cancellation' within the Concept, for Hegel, the truth is the totality of the 'moments' of the Concept. In my interpretation, the 'moments' of the Concept are derived from the three meanings of '*Aufheben*', and every genuine articulation of truth and meaning naturally belong to the three 'moments' of 'preservation' (*preservare*), 'cancellation' (*tollere*), and 'raising up' (*elevare*). Hence, for Hegel, from this interpretation, all three 'moments' have equal importance in representing the Concept, which moves *of itself*. Subsequently, the other two 'moments' should also not be overemphasized, a point which is implied as he characterizes that in the absence of opposition and 'cancellation', there is a 'lack of movement'. To be sure, in the *Philosophy of Nature*, this 'lack of movement' is what Hegel calls "the repose of the dead."¹² In contrast, for Hegel, a genuine philosophical attitude or, alternatively, a "life of God and divine cognition" requires "the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the *labour of the negative*."¹³ From this perspective, in my view, it is imperative to treat each 'moment' of the Concept equally. Therefore, I would take a position against the privileging of any one of the 'moments' of the Concept above the others, as does radical 'instrumental' scepticism. For it is only in virtue of the Concept's ongoing development of itself in respect to the totality of its 'moments', that Life, Philosophy, Truth, Beauty, and the Good are able to flow naturally and harmoniously.

III. A Rejoinder Concerning Scepticism in Whitehead's System

In light of his attempt to construct a speculative scheme which seeks to describe many elements of experience which were left out by previous systems of metaphysics, Whitehead insists that radical scepticism implies negation and the positing of nothingness. His assertion that "complete scepticism (...) seems as the negation of experience," is no mere passing remark.¹⁴ Rather, this position regarding scepticism and the negation of experience, is implied throughout much of *Process and Reality* and elsewhere, to varying degrees. To be sure, in *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, in considering the unending dilemmas of the idealist-realist debate and prior to his development of the theory of

12 See Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature* (Vol. 3), translated by M. J. Petry, New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1970, section 375, pp. 209-210. Hegel writes, "(A living being) is a process which needs opposition. (...) The lack of opposition to which the organism progresses constitutes the stillness (and repose) of death." (my additions)

13 *PS*, p. 10, my emphasis.

14 Whitehead in "Harvard: The Future," (1936) in *Essays on Science and Philosophy*, p. 156.

prehensions, Whitehead writes of a "sceptical descent" where one is "left solitary in the character of a void of experience without significance."¹⁵ In conjunction with this stance, we may recollect that in

15 Whitehead, Principles of Natural Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955, p. 11. Whitehead's consideration of complete scepticism as the negation of experience is affirmed as he responds to the Berkeleyan idealist-realist dilemma whether perceptions are in or out of the mind. He does this in taking up Berkeley's Fourth Dialogue (section 10) between Alciphron and Euphranor which posits the difference between perceptions of objects (the specific examples being a castle, a planet and a cloud) at a succession of distances, and the objects themselves. As Whitehead's considerations oscillate between realist and idealist positions regarding the status of perception in Berkeley's dilemma, he asserts that one is led to a reduction in which one must inevitably negate the existence of space and time, a "sceptical descent" where one is "left solitary in the character of a void of experience without significance."

Whitehead states, "The difficulty to be faced is just this. We may not lightly abandon the castle, the planet, and the crimson cloud, and hope to retain the eye, its retina, and the brain. Such a philosophy is too simple-minded - or at least might be thought so, except for its wide diffusion."

"Suppose we make a clean sweep. Science then becomes a formula for calculating mental 'phenomena' or 'impressions.' But where is science? In books? But the castle and the planet took their libraries with them."

"No, science is in the minds of men. But men sleep and forget, and at their best in any one moment of insight entertain but scanty thoughts. Science therefore is nothing but a confident expectation that relevant thoughts will occasionally occur. But by the bye, what has happened to time and space? They must have gone after the other things. No, we must distinguish: space has gone, of course; but time remains as relating the succession of phenomena. Yet this won't do; for this succession is only known by recollection, and recollection is subject to the same criticism as that applied by Berkeley to the castle, the planet, and the cloud. So after all, time does evaporate without space, and in their departure 'you' also have accompanied them; and I am left solitary in the character of a void of experience without significance."

"At this point in the argument we may break off, having formed a short catalogue of the sort of considerations which lead from the Berkeleyan dilemma to a complete scepticism which was not in Berkeley's own thought."

"There are two types of answer to this sceptical descent. One is Dr. Johnston's. He stamped his foot on a paving-stone, and went on his way satisfied with its reality. A scrutiny of modern philosophy will, if I am not mistaken, show that more philosophers should own Dr. Johnson as their master than would be willing to acknowledge their indebtedness."

"The other answer was first given by Kant. We must distinguish between the general way he set about constructing his answer to Hume, and the details of his system which in many respects are highly disputable. *The essential point of his method is the assumption that 'significance' is an essential element in concrete experience.* The Berkeleyan dilemma starts with tacitly ignoring this aspect of experience, and thus with putting forward, as expressing experience, conceptions of it which have no relevance to fact. In the light of Kant's procedure, Johnson's answer falls into its place; it is the assertion that Berkeley has not correctly expounded what experience in fact is."

"Berkeley himself insists that experience is significant, indeed three-quarters of his writings are devoted to enforcing this position. But Kant's position is the converse of Berkeley's, namely that significance is experience. Berkeley first analyses experience, and then expounds his view of its significance, namely that God is conversing with us. For Berkeley the significance is detachable from the experience. It is here that Hume came in. He accepted Berkeley's assumption that experience is something given, an impression, without essential reference to significance, and exhibited it in its bare insignificance. Berkeley's conversation with God then became a fairy tale."

"What is 'significance'? Evidently this is a fundamental question for the philosophy of natural knowledge, which cannot move a step until it has made up its mind as to what is meant by this 'significance' which is experience."

"Significance' is the relatedness of things. To say that significance is experience, is to affirm that perceptual knowledge is nothing else than an apprehension of the relatedness of things, namely of things in their relations and as related. Certainly if we commence with a knowledge of things, and then look around for their relations we shall not find them. 'Causal connection' is merely one typical instance of the universal ruin of relatedness. But then we are quite mistaken in thinking that there is a possible knowledge of things as unrelated."

describing his reformed subjectivist principle, Whitehead asserts that “apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness.”¹⁶ In fact, one of the key claims Whitehead makes against both the arbitrary bifurcation of nature and the unmitigated Humean dismissal of causality is that they neglect significant factors of experience and important sources of knowledge about the world. For example, Whitehead maintains that causality is indeed a factor of experience. For him, “the notion of causation arose because mankind lives amid experiences in the mode of causal efficacy.”¹⁷ It is for this reason that Whitehead seeks to include and analyze the real elements of experience in his speculative scheme. In a parallel manner, in his description of the creative life-processes of organisms, Whitehead points out that the organism’s own dismissal of various elements of experience is tied up with the notions of the ‘division’ and ‘decision’ of the extensive continuum in virtue of his doctrine of objectification, not to mention with respect to the key role negative prehensions play in the process of concrescence. These notions may be said to designate the ‘partial’ scepticism of organic selectivity in contrast to the radical scepticism consisting in a complete negation of experience. It is to be presumed that according to Whitehead, a complete negation of experience would mean the extinction of universal relatedness, significance, meaning, and importance. However, in his view, it is only by way of the dismissal or the elimination of various elements of experience that the organism acquires its *perspective* necessary for creative advance.

Whitehead’s own view regarding scepticism stems explicitly from Santayana’s *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, which is representative of a doctrine of organic selectivity. In *Process and Reality*, Whitehead is enthusiastic regarding Santayana’s project, as he states, “Santayana irrefutably exposes the

It is thus out of the question to start with a knowledge of things antecedent to a knowledge of their relations. The so-called properties of things can always be expressed as their relatedness to other things unspecified, and natural knowledge is exclusively concerned with relatedness.” (pp. 10-12, my emphasis) Whitehead’s notion of ‘significance’ later develops into the notion of ‘importance’ in *Process and Reality* and in *Modes of Thought*.

Later, in *Science and the Modern World*, Berkeley’s dialogue is again quoted by Whitehead in order to define his notion of a ‘prehension’. He states, “(Berkeley) contends that what constitutes the realisation of natural entities is the being perceived within the unity of mind.

“We can substitute the concept, that the realisation is a gathering of things into the unity of a prehension; and that what is thereby realized is the prehension, and not the things. This unity of a prehension defines itself as a *here* and a *now*, and the things so gathered into the grasped unity have essential reference to other places and other times. For Berkeley’s *mind*, I substitute a process of prehensive unification.” (SMW, p. 69)

16 PR, p. 167.

17 PR, p. 175.

full extent to which (Hume's brand of) (...) scepticism must be carried."¹⁸ The link to Santayana is further acknowledged by Whitehead as he states, "the approximation of the philosophy of organism to Santayana's doctrine of 'animal faith' is effected by this doctrine of objectification by the mediation of 'feeling'."¹⁹ Santayana holds that is by way of the fluctuating interplay of scepticism and animal faith that objects are posited. According to Santayana, while "the ultimate position of the sceptic, (is) that nothing given exists," the positing of, and belief in objects is "a function of animal life."²⁰ For him, the reporting of an actual object is based in the organism's "compulsion to use things as materials, to drop them and forge ahead, or to eat and digest them."²¹ That is to say, the selection-in-virtue-of-the-dismissal of actual objects occurs by way of animal endeavour, based in animal intuition, desire, hunger, emotion, and instinct. As Santayana describes,

It is only things on the scale of the human senses and in the field of those instinctive reactions which sensation calls forth, that can be the primary objects of human knowledge: no other things can be discriminated at first by an animal mind, or can interest it, or can be meant and believed in by it. It is these instinctive reactions that select the objects of attention, designate their locus, and impose faith on their existence. But these reactions may be modified by experience, and the description the mind gives of the objects reacted upon can be revised, or the objects themselves discarded, and others discerned instead.²²

Correspondingly, Whitehead's doctrine of objectification involving the notions of 'division' and 'decision', as well as 'negative prehensions', derive themselves largely from Santayana. These notions are representative of scepticism pervading the organism's selection of its elements of experience in respect to its creative life-process, providing its 'perspective'. Thus, in a similar manner to Santayana, Whitehead holds that "the sense of importance (or interest in experience) is embedded in the very being

18 PR, p. 49.

19 PR, p. 142, also see pp. 47-52. Furthermore, Whitehead suggests that "if we allow the term 'animal faith' to describe a kind of perception which has been neglected by the philosophic tradition, then practically the whole of Santayana's discussion is in accord with the organic philosophy." (PR, p. 142) While agreeing with Santayana's notion of 'organic selectivity', Whitehead discusses where he differs from Santayana. He states "the exact point where Santayana differs from the organic philosophy is his implicit assumption that 'intuitions themselves' cannot be among the 'data of intuition,' that is to say, the data of other intuitions. This possibility is what Santayana denies and the organic philosophy asserts." (p. 142, also see pp. 142-143)

20 Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, New York: Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 49; p. 166.

21 Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, New York: Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 281. For Santayana, "complete scepticism is (...) not inconsistent with animal faith; the admission that nothing given exists is not incompatible with belief in things not given." (p. 105)

22 Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, New York: Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 175.

of animal experience. As it sinks in dominance, experience trivializes and verges towards nothingness."²³ However, as mentioned, in distinction from Santayana, in Whitehead's scheme, scepticism is 'feeling-based'.²⁴ Particularly, negative prehensions are an intrinsic element in the organism's self-development

23 MT, p. 9.

24 The fact that for Whitehead, scepticism is primarily 'feeling-based' may also be said to constitute a fundamental distinction between the role of scepticism and negation in Hegel's system. For Hegel, negation is primarily caught up with consciousness and thinking in general. According to Hegel, "Thinking is in fact the negation of something immediately given - just as we owe our eating to food because without it we could not eat. It is true that, in this context, eating is represented as ungrateful, since it is the digesting of that to which it is supposed to owe itself. In this sense, thinking is no less ungrateful." (EL, p. 36) However, Hegel also believes that feeling is not to be radically separated from thinking. He states, "one can hold that the need is there, in view of the prejudice of our day and age, which separates *feeling* and *thinking* from each other in such a way that they are supposedly opposed to each other, and are even so hostile that feeling - religious feeling in particular - is contaminated, perverted, or even totally destroyed by thinking, and that religion and religiosity essentially do not have their root and their place in thinking. Making a separation of this kind means forgetting that only man is capable of religion, and that the lower animals have no religion, any more than right and morality belong to them." (EL, p. 25)

On the differentiation between the roles of scepticism and negation in Whitehead's and Hegel's respective systems, see Wolf-Gazo, E. "Negation and Contrast: The Origins of Self-Consciousness in Hegel and Whitehead," in G. R. Lucas (ed.), Hegel and Whitehead, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, pp. 207-215. According to Wolf-Gazo, "Both Whitehead and Hegel seem to agree that consciousness is a form of human experience. The essential difference between the two philosophers at the outset is that Hegel considers consciousness as a necessary expression of Mind, while for Whitehead consciousness is merely a *possible* form of human experience." (p. 207)

"An essential notion for the interpretation of Hegel's System is the function of Negation. (...) The act of negation is a self-conscious mental act exclusively in Hegel; whereas for Whitehead such self-conscious acts are included within the scope of the theory of prehension, but negative prehension is not limited exclusively to this class of acts. For Hegel, negation is a systematic treatment of the overcoming of contradictions in the world. For Whitehead, in contrast, negation is a manifestation of mental cogitation within the wide spectrum of man's mental activities. For Whitehead, conscious negation is one form of the possible 'higher phases of experience,' but not the exclusive case, since bare perceptive acts may themselves exhibit features of negative prehension.

The background of the Hegelian notion of negation can help us more fully to appreciate its function not only in Hegel's system, but also in Whitehead's categorial scheme in terms of *Contrast*." (p. 208)

"I would like to propose that Hegel's notion of 'negation' seems to have an equivalent in Whitehead's last category of existence, namely *Contrast*." (p. 212)

"Clearly, if we read these Whiteheadian passages carefully we do find some striking analogies: specifically, structures woven into the whole fabric of the categorial scheme of Process and Reality which resemble the function and nature of Hegel's 'Negation.' Particularly, the 'affirmation-negation' contrast exhibits a form of Whiteheadian higher phases of experience resembling Hegel's process of 'double negation.' Both operations are logical in function but ontological in import. An Hegelian negation may appear in the form of a 'feeling of negation' (PR 244) eliciting consciousness in terms of a 'negative perception' such as suggested by Whitehead's example of 'perceiving this stone as *not* grey' (PR 245) For perceiving this stone as grey means (...) that there is an 'ingression' of one particular eternal object or form of definiteness taking place (to the deliberate exclusion of other possibilities) so as to formulate a determinate experience (or judgment of experience) in one of many possible worlds." (p. 213)

"The nature of negation for Hegel involves dynamism in the forms of thought exclusively, while for Whitehead 'negation' may involve feelings in terms of awareness of contrasts. In Hegel's worldview, thought becomes conceptual and thereby perpetuates the process of thinking. Negation is reality as actuality. Hegel impresses upon us that there is no such thing as 'pure positivity' as we might call it. For 'pure positivity' is a myth created by those who claim that the observer of the world is just a passive bystander in the world of ontological

in terms of creativity, and in the acquisition of its experiential perspective. To be sure, Whitehead suggests that "the right coordination of negative prehensions is one secret of mental progress but unless some systematic scheme of relatedness characterizes the environment, there will be *nothing* left whereby to constitute vivid prehension of the world."²⁵ As such, it is clear that he distinguishes between an excess of negative prehension displayed by a complete scepticism, which would lead to a complete elimination of experience, of perspective, of actuality, and of contrasts in general, and the negative prehensions representative of the scepticism intrinsic to organic selectivity. Moreover, his concern with degrees of negative prehension throughout our experience is repeated as he describes the fundamental role of negative prehensions in determining the principle of 'intensive relevance' with respect to experiencing any actual entities. Whitehead states that

The notion of intensive relevance is fundamental for the meaning of such concepts as 'alternative possibilities,' 'more or less', 'important or negligible.' The principle asserts that any item of the universe, however preposterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, in the constitution of any one actual entity: it might have had more relevance; and it might have had less relevance, *including the zero of relevance involved in the negative prehension*; but in fact it has just that relevance whereby it finds its status in the constitution of that actual entity.²⁶

Much of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme is a defense of actuality against excessive negative prehension, and sceptical reductions involving the positing of nothingness. The issue of 'nothingness' is a constant theme in *Process and Reality*, since his system is largely based on the premise that there is not two systems of reality, one true, the other false, as represented by the vicious bifurcation of nature. Rather, our experience of the world must be flexible, for example, to both the scientific explanations of

affairs." (p. 213)

"It is negativity as a unity of the negative as well as the positive which addresses what Whitehead considered the essential problem of a natural philosophy - 'the bifurcation of nature' (or, as Hegel called it 'Entzweiung und Zerissenheit.' Negativity posits, preserves, negates, and sublates the entities that constitute the world." (pp. 213-214)

"There is an essential difference between Hegel and Whitehead on this point (negation). For Hegel, self-conscious thinking has inherited exclusively the function of negation, while for Whitehead, negation is already present in simple perception, which takes place in the form of differentiation, configuration, contrasting, and mainly in the process of Gestalt." (p. 214.)

25 **PR**, p. 254, my emphasis.

26 **PR**, p. 148, my emphasis. This point regarding the 'zero' of relevance given to some actual entities is echoed as he states that "the actual entities enter into each other's constitutions under limitations imposed by incompatibilities of feelings. Such incompatibilities relegate various elements in the constitutions of felt objects to the intensive zero, which is termed 'irrelevance'." (p. 149)

our experience of reality as well as to everyday explanations of our experience of reality. Furthermore, his ontological principle, 'no actual entity, then no reason', expresses that while "actual entities are drops of experience," "in separation from actual entities there is nothing, merely nonentity - 'The rest is silence'."²⁷ That is to say, without the admittance of actual entities into the philosophical scheme, there is no basis for reason at all. One can also assume that Whitehead's own views regarding scepticism's positing of nothingness coincide with those of Bergson, from whom Whitehead drew much inspiration. Particularly, in *Creative Evolution*, Bergson argues that the assumption of nothingness is a falsity. He states,

The problem of knowledge is complicated, and possibly made insoluble, by the idea that order fills a void and that its actual presence is superposed on its virtual absence. We go from absence to presence, from the void to the full, in virtue of the fundamental illusion of our understanding. That is the error of which we noticed one consequence in our last chapter. As we then anticipated, we must come to close quarters with this error, and finally grapple with it. We must face it in itself, in the radically false conception which it implies of negation, of the void and of the nought.²⁸

27 PR, p. 18; p. 43. In *Process and Reality* and elsewhere, Whitehead is thoroughly concerned with issue of the positing of nothingness. He maintains the Aristotelian principle that "apart from things that are actual, there is nothing - nothing either in fact or in efficacy (and the Cartesian notion that) 'for every clear and distinct conception (*perceptio*) is without doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought...' This general principle will be termed the 'ontological principle.' It is the principle that everything is positively somewhere in actuality, and in potency everywhere." (p. 40); "It is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out of nonentity. Nonentity is nothingness." (p. 46); "Chaotic disorder means the lack of dominant definition of compatible contrasts in the satisfactions attained and consequent enfeeblement of intensity. It means the lapse towards slighter actuality. It is a natural figure of speech, to conceive a slighter actuality as being an approach towards non-entity. But you cannot approach nothing; for there is nothing to approach. It is an approach towards the futility of being a faint compromise between contrary reasons." (pp. 92-93); "In abstraction from actualization, truth and falsehood are meaningless: we are in the region of nonsense, a limbo where nothing has claim to existence." (p. 223); "to be an abstraction does not mean that the entity is nothing. It merely means that its existence is only one factor of a more concrete element of nature." (The Concept of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 71); "the universe is passing on to a triviality. All the effects to be derived from our existing type of order are passing away into trivialities. That does not mean that there are not some other types of order of which you and I have not the faintest notion, unless perchance they are to be found in our highest mentality and are unperceived by us in their true relevance to the future. The universe is laying a foundation of a new type, where our present theories of order will appear as trivial. If remembered, they would be remembered or discerned in the future as trivialities, gradually fading into nothingness. This is the only possible doctrine of a universe always driving on to novelty." (ESP, p. 90)

28 Bergson, H. Creative Evolution. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1998, pp. 274-275. The claim of the falsity of nothingness may be tied to Whitehead's arguments against the existence of mathematical objects in nature. According to W. W. Hammerschmidt in Whitehead's Philosophy of Time. New York: King's Crown Press, 1947, p. 34, "Whitehead's theory implies that there are no real separations of two contiguous regions. The boundary of two contiguous occasions has no extension and therefore can have no real fact within it and can directly express or illustrate no real character of fact. If A and B are contiguous, and A is red and B is green, *nothing* separates the red from the green." Similarly, Hammerschmidt records that "Whitehead's arguments against points and instants fall into three general classes: arguments asserting that no points are *perceived* in nature, arguments showing that it is *impossible* that they should be ultimate real elements of nature, and arguments showing

And, Bergson believes that by proclaiming the falsity of the idea of nothingness, the demands and excessive constraints placed on philosophy by scepticism are dismissed. Specifically, in *The Creative Mind*, he writes,

'Disorder' and 'nothingness' in reality designate therefore a presence - the presence of a thing or an order which does not interest us, which blunts our effort or our attention; it is our disappointment being expressed when we call this presence absence. Consequently, to speak of the absence of all order and all things, that is, to speak of absolute disorder and absolute nothingness, is to pronounce words void of meaning, *flatus vocis*, since a suppression is simply a substitution envisaged by a single one of its two sides, and since the abolition of all order and all things would be a substitution with but a single side - an idea which has exactly as much existence as a round square. When the philosopher speaks of chaos and nothingness he is only carrying over into the order of speculation - raised to the absolute and consequently emptied of all meaning, of all effective content - two ideas made for practical use and which were related to a particular kind of matter or order, but not to all order or all matter. That being so, what becomes of the two problems of the origin of order and the origin of being? They fade away since they only arise if one represents being and order as 'what turned up,' and consequently nothingness and disorder as possibles or at least as conceivables. But those are only words, mirages of ideas.

Let human thought but become impregnated with this conviction, let it be freed of this obsession: immediately it begins to breathe. It no longer worries over questions which retarded its progress. The difficulties raised for example by ancient skepticism and modern criticism in turn are seen to disappear.²⁹

But, however much we want to assume and accept Bergson's thesis about the falsity of the idea of the nothing and the dissolution of the challenges posed by ancient and modern scepticism, Bergson's psychologistic standpoint may be challenged, as Heidegger and Sartre did later in the twentieth century. Thus, it seems inconclusive whether or not nothingness as experienced, has a veritable reality or not. At any rate, the fact remains that scepticism, negation, and the positing of nothingness are dominant themes both in Whitehead's work, and in the works of those who inspired him. Similarly, Bergson did consider that the positing of nothingness is the 'mover' of philosophizing in general. Bergson writes that "Philosophers have paid little attention to the idea of the nought. And yet it is often the hidden spring, the invisible mover of philosophical thinking."³⁰ Pointing to the significance of scepticism as the 'mover' of creativity in his own system, for Whitehead, while there are many elements involved in the creativity of organisms, it is largely by way of negative prehensions that the organism acquires its experiential

the undesirability of a formal analysis of nature which treats them as ultimate elements. This last argument is not against mathematics taken as a closed system. It is against the current way in which mathematics is applied to nature." (p. 19)

29 Bergson, H. *The Creative Mind*. New Jersey: Replica Books, 1999, pp. 64-65.

30 Bergson, H. *Creative Evolution*. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1998, p. 275.

perspective: namely, that contrast of experienced finitude and experienced infinitude necessary for physical and conceptual appetition and realization.³¹ Thus, negative prehensions constitute the efficient element involved in creativity. Some other important elements involved in the creativity of organisms may include the positive prehensions in relation to the negative prehensions, as well as the subjective aims of organisms, which may be said to constitute the element of final causality ingredient in creativity.

IV. Whiteheadian Reflections on Radical Instrumental Scepticism

In Part Two of this dissertation, I proposed that in Whitehead's philosophy of Organism, the notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify scepticism. For Whitehead, the great importance of 'division' and 'decision' in the creative life-process of organisms is articulated as he asks,

What are the general principles of division which dominate that creative process which we term our lives? (In taking account of the notion of 'prehension') We can only appeal to our direct insight - to what Descartes termed, our *inspectio*. Our judgement, that is, our judicium to which Descartes also appealed, requires an inspection to provide the material from which decision arises. The question therefore is as to those fundamental modes dominating experience. Such modes are modes of division, each division involving differences with essential contrasts.³²

From a Whiteheadian point of view, by occasioning the positing of nothingness, it is to be suggested that radical 'instrumental' scepticism incites the radical 'bifurcation' of actualities and rigidly separates the notions of 'mind' and 'matter', 'real' and 'ideal', and 'God' and the 'World', and eliminates contrast. In contradistinction, following from his adherence to the principle of relativity, Whitehead emphasizes

31 According to Whitehead, "the process of feeling involves negative prehensions which effect elimination. Thus the data are felt under a 'perspective' which is the objective datum of the feeling. In virtue of this elimination the components of the complex objective datum have become 'objects' intervening in the constitution of the subject of the feeling." (PR, p. 231) Thus, "the objectification is the 'perspective' of the initial datum." (p. 231) Furthermore, regarding the notion of 'perspective', "immediacy of finite existence refuses to be deprived of that infinitude of extension which is its perspective." (Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, New York: Macmillan Co., 1966, p. 83, also see pp. 78-79)

32 MT, p. 75, my addition. One close definition of 'prehension' is found in Descartes' notion of 'intuition' (*inspectio*). Therefore, Whitehead quotes, "the perception of (the wax) is neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, and never was either of these, though it might formerly seem so, but is simply an *intuition* (*inspectio*) of the mind." Subsequently, Whitehead notes that "the Latin word 'inspectio' is associated in its classical use with the notion of theory as opposed to practice." (SMW, p. 146) The words: '*inspectio*', 'perspective', 'speculative', and 'scepticism' all have similar etymological roots. While the words: *inspectio*, perspective, and 'speculative' have the Latin root, '*specere*' meaning 'to look', the word: 'scepticism' has the Greek root, '*skeptesthai*' also meaning 'to look'. For Whitehead, "the speculative school (of philosophy) appeals to direct insight, and endeavours to indicate its meanings by further appeal to situations which promote such specific insights." (MT, p. 173)

throughout his philosophical writings that

Connectedness is of the essence of all things of all types. It is of the essence of types, that they be connected. Abstraction from connectedness involving the omission of an essential factor in the fact considered. No fact is merely itself. (...) It follows that in every consideration of a single fact there is the suppressed presupposition of the environmental coördination requisite for its existence. This environment, thus coördinated, is the whole universe in its perspective to the fact.³³

In this paragraph, Whitehead is emphasizing the importance of 'connectedness' in view of his ontological principle. However, Whitehead defends a position which maintains a balance between 'division' and 'connection' thus enabling the 'objectification' of actual entities. For him, some 'division' and some 'connection' of the extensive continuum is intrinsic to the workings of reason and ontology in general. This is the case since, on the one hand, an overemphasis of the 'division' of the extensive continuum, as in radical 'instrumental' scepticism, would seem to lead to a view of the universe as an absolute nothingness. On the other hand, the overstatement of 'connection' leads to a static monistic view of the universe, which is not what Whitehead has in mind. Therefore, Whitehead's process metaphysics is constituted by the dynamic interplay and logical contrast of the notions of 'division' and 'connection' of the extensive continuum, involving the creative metamorphoses of the one into the many, and the many into the one.³⁴ And, within this creative ontological process, scepticism may be said to participate in 'dividing' the extensive continuum or, alternatively, in positing nothingness as implicitly operational within being, and conversely, in positing being as implicitly operational within nothingness. In this way, Whitehead is able to balance his ontological principle with the principle of relativity, thus preserving the creative notion that the universe is indeed composed of individual organisms within societies, and individual organisms composed of societies. Furthermore, for him, it is only through a balance of 'division' and 'connection' that both the legitimate physical and mental poles of organisms can be preserved ontologically. That is to say, by adhering to this logical balance and contrast within the unfolding of experience and of ontology in general, Whitehead seeks to maintain that "no entity can be considered in abstraction from the universe, and no entity can be divested of its own individuality."³⁵

33 MT, p. 9.

34 As mentioned earlier in Chapter Five of this dissertation, the metamorphosis from one into many decreases the many by one, but the one is preserved in 'objective immortality'. The process from many into one increases the many by one.

35 Whitehead in "Mathematics and the Good," in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *et al.* The Library of Living Philosophers (Vol. 3): The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1941, p. 678. This paper directly focuses on the relationship between the 'division' of the extensive continuum and the promotion of the Good.

Whitehead's philosophy further highlights the notion of 'creativity' in relation to the life-processes of organisms. In Chapter Six, I demonstrated that negative prehensions are the efficient element implicit to the creative process by which organisms appropriate their environment and realize themselves in the actual world. Particularly, in Whitehead's perspective, negative prehensions, which are the means by which the organism 'divides' and 'decides' the extensive continuum, and has access to the 'higher levels' of experience, such as 'consciousness', 'rationality', 'truth', and 'reason' which are characterized by the feeling of novel and dynamic contrasts. Therefore, from a Whiteheadian standpoint, scepticism is intrinsic to the very workings of reason. In *The Function of Reason*, Whitehead writes that as "Reason is the organ of emphasis on novelty," the very "*function of reason is to promote the art of life*."³⁶ From a Whiteheadian standpoint, in conjunction with some of his main claims in *Process and Reality* and elsewhere, 'the promotion of the art of life' means, progressively, "to live well, to live better, and to have an increase in satisfaction" through: 1.) the "enjoyment of (novel) contrasts," 2.) "fathom(ing) the deeper depths of the many-sidedness of things," and 3.) "morality."³⁷ Furthermore, the 'promotion of the art of life' constitutes an essential definition of the Good. And, scepticism does participate as an 'organ' of reason towards the promotion of the Good. However, in my view, the radical 'instrumental' scepticism which excessively aims to occasion the positing of nothingness is detrimental to these means (listed above) of promoting the art of life.

First, with regards to the 'promotion of the art of life' through 'enjoyment of novel contrasts', it is to be implied, positively, that scepticism is itself an 'organ' of reason insisting on creative novelty. However, the occasioning of the positing of nothingness as in radical 'instrumental' scepticism, eliminates creative novelty by over-hastening its development. This form of scepticism is directed against

36 Whitehead, *The Function of Reason* (1929), Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, p. 20, p. 4. Whitehead follows this assertion with the further explanation, "in the interpretation of this definition, I must at once join issue with the evolutionist fallacy suggested by the phrase 'the survival of the fittest' The fallacy does not consist in believing that in the struggle for existence the fittest to survive *eliminate* the less fit. The fact is obvious and stares us in the face. The fallacy is the belief that fitness for survival is identical with the best exemplification of the Art of Life. (...) In fact life itself is comparatively deficient in survival value. The art of persistence is to be dead." (FR, p. 4, my emphasis) Later, Whitehead articulates the notion of the art of life comprises the engagement by organisms to "modify their environment" in order to "(i) to live, (ii) to live well, (iii) to live better. In fact the art of life is *first* to be alive, *secondly* to be alive in a satisfactory way, and *thirdly* to acquire an increase in satisfaction." (p. 8) While in FR, Whitehead states that the primary function of reason in its promotion of the art of life is the "direction of the attack on the environment," here I am not endorsing this view. (FR, p. 8) Rather, my own position regarding this assertion is that while it may be stated that 'instrumental' reason can be described in this manner, reason itself promotes the art of life by holding a balance between humanity and the surrounding environment.

37 See FR, p. 8, FR, p. 22 (my addition), PR, p. 342, PR, p. 13.

the creative capacity of organisms and leads to their feelings of 'Life-tedium', 'exhaustion', and 'fatigue'. To be sure, Whitehead states that "Life-tedium is fatigue derived from a thwarted urge toward novel contrast."³⁸ And, according to him, "'Fatigue' is the antithesis to Reason. The operations of Fatigue constitute the defeat of Reason. (...) Fatigue means the operation of excluding the impulse towards novelty."³⁹ Similarly, for Whitehead, the notion of 'fatigue' denotes the state of affairs where the organism has divested itself "of any factor involving the effort towards living well, and still less of any effort towards living better."⁴⁰ Therefore, along a Whiteheadian line of thought, scepticism does have its place as an 'organ' of reason. However, in my own view, if scepticism is to have a goal, then it should work together with reason in aiming at the *moderate* promotion of creativity and the art of life, including a balance between humanity and the surrounding environment, rather at the construction of the 'mill of death'.⁴¹ For Whitehead,

"Refutation has its legitimate place in philosophic discussion: (but) it should never form the final chapter. Human beliefs constitute the evidence as to human experience of the nature of things. Every belief is to be approached with respectful enquiry. The final chapter of philosophy consists in the search for the unexpressed presuppositions which underlie the beliefs of every finite human intellect. In this way philosophy makes its slow advance by the introduction of new ideas, widening vision and adjusting clashes."⁴²

Second, with respect to promotion of the art of life by 'fathoming the depths of the many-sidedness of things', scepticism also operates productively as reason's organ of selective capacity. By way of sceptical *elimination*, reason is able to select and decide what aspects and evidences are relevant to the objects of its enquiry. In fact, as has been maintained throughout Part Two of this dissertation, the 'objects' of enquiry are 'objectified', primarily by way of elimination and exclusion. That is to say, they are selected through the 'divisive' and 'decisive' workings of scepticism. However, Whitehead's cosmology has shown how 'division' is to be balanced with 'connection' as well as how exclusion is to be balanced with inclusion. For Whitehead, "the creative process is a process of exclusion to the same

38 FR, p. 20. The notion of 'fatigue' also appears in PR, pp. 16, 239, 339.

39 FR, p. 23.

40 FR, pp. 23-24.

41 It must be stated that while the word 'promotion' (from Latin, *promovēre*, meaning 'to move forward') has the connotation of 'to move', 'to further' or 'elevate', in relation to creativity and the art of life, I do not myself intend to advance Whitehead's notion of the 'promotion of the art of life' in the stronger connotation of 'to cause' in the sense of instrumentality and calculation.

42 ESP, p. 92.

extent as it is a process of inclusion."⁴³ Furthermore, regarding the notion of exclusion as the selective capacity of organisms, Whitehead reaffirms his 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' as he states, "the chief danger to philosophy is narrowness in the selection of evidence (...) (and) evil (is the) result from this distortion of evidence."⁴⁴ In this sense, error and evil in philosophy are fundamentally constituted by a neglect of the many-sidedness of things. I consider this neglect as characteristic of radical 'instrumental' scepticism which eliminates creative contrast, and radically 'bifurcates' actualities. To be sure, Whitehead further explains that "the nature of evil (involves the finality of statement) that the characters of things are mutually obstructive."⁴⁵

Third, in view of the promotion of the art of life through 'morality', scepticism operates as a fundamental aspect of the individual's rational capacity to 'control its own life-process'. According to Whitehead, "morality consists in the control of process so as to maximize importance," where 'importance' means the attribution of value to finite occasions in that "the infinite (has immanence) in the finite."⁴⁶ It is easy to see that scepticism is involved in what Whitehead means by the 'control of process'. In particular, scepticism enables individual human beings to eliminate those occasions or actions that are detrimental to their own health and welfare, as well as to select those occasions which are meaningful and important to them. However, radical 'instrumental' scepticism (*qua* 'instrumental') is definitely to be regarded as a 'control of process'. But, in being wielded in a manner such as to constantly challenge others, its end is to 'control' the creative processes of those others. Furthermore, in this sense, radical 'instrumental' scepticism involves the exact opposite of Whitehead's definition of morality. As an overemphasis in recognizing finitude and proclaiming the nullity of things, this form of scepticism involves the 'control of process so as to *minimize* importance'. Namely, it is the view-point that the infinite has no immanence in the finite. As such, from a Whiteheadian perspective, the radical 'instrumental' scepticism that I have characterized here is fundamentally immoral.

43 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, New York: Macmillan Co., 1960, p. 113.

44 Whitehead, Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition, edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, p. 337, my additions.

45 PR, p. 340.

46 PR, pp. 13-14, PR, p. 20, my addition.

V. 'Instrumental' Scepticism, Creativity, and Aspects of Finitude

It is no secret that the creative capacity of human beings as well as 'what is created' in the process, are altogether finite. For Whitehead, "all forms of realization express some aspect of finitude. Such a form expresses as being *this*, and not *that*. In other words it expresses exclusion; and exclusion means finitude."⁴⁷ Pointing to the indispensability of exclusion, finitude, and negation to creative process, one may hold that if the creative capacity of human beings was not finite, i.e., if it was infinite, for example, we could produce infinite numbers of art-works, works of philosophy, etc..., rendering art and philosophy entirely meaningless. As Whitehead defines, for instance, "The work of Art is a fragment of nature with the mark of a finite creative effort, an individual thing detailed from the vague infinity of its background."⁴⁸ Therefore, it may be said that it is always in virtue of the finitude of the creative capacity of its author that art-works are meaningful, and are created in the first place. The finitude of the creative capacity of the author also contributes to the meaningfulness or value of art-work. A painting, for example, is a finite art-work (*qua finite*) that is 'framed' or 'cut off' from the rest of unbounded extension. The frame erected around the painting itself represents a 'nothingness' which separates the finite, meaningful occasion from the rest of the extensive continuum. In the same way, it is the nature of reason and ontology to 'divide' entities. But, the frame, in part, is a misrepresentation of the entity in question. In the same way, scepticism in the Whitehead sense of 'division' and 'decision' is, in part, a misrepresentation of finite entities because, as much as the object seems to 'donate' itself to this boundedness, it is another subjectivity which posits that boundedness. But, in the case of the radical 'instrumental' form of scepticism, the object is reduced to a pure nothingness, devoid of its own individuality and subjective unity. Against this reduction, in maintaining the ontological principle while, at the same time, adhering to the principle of relativity, Whitehead rightly thought that "the crux of philosophy is to retain the balance between the individuality of existence and the relativity of existence."⁴⁹ And similarly, above all, he thought that "no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the

47 MT, p. 78. "The full solemnity of the world arises from the sense of positive achievement within the finite, combined with the sense of modes of infinitude stretching beyond each finite fact. This infinitude is required by each fact to express its necessary relevance beyond its own limitations. It expresses a perspective of the universe. (...) Importance arises from this fusion of the finite and the infinite."

48 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (1933), New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 270-271.

49 Whitehead, in "Mathematics and the Good," in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *et al.* The Library of Living Philosophers (Vol. 3): The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 680.

system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth.”⁵⁰

In his 1941 papers on “Immortality” and “Mathematics and the Good,” Whitehead defends a logical contrast and a balanced interplay between finitude and infinitude in our experience of the world, in our knowledge, and in ontology in general, against the extreme views of both dogmatism and radical scepticism. On the one hand, according to him,

The notion of the complete self-sufficiency of any item of finite knowledge is the fundamental error of dogmatism. Every such item derives its truth, and its very meaning, from its unanalyzed relevance to the background which is the unbounded Universe. Not even the simplest notion of arithmetic escapes this inescapable condition for existence. Every scrap of our knowledge derives its meaning from the fact that we are factors in the universe, and are dependent on the universe for every detail of our experience. The thorough sceptic is a dogmatist. He enjoys the delusion of complete futility. Wherever there is the sense of self-sufficient completion, there is the germ of vicious dogmatism. There is no entity which enjoys an isolated, self-sufficiency of existence. In other words, finitude is not self-supporting.⁵¹

Furthermore, on the other hand, Whitehead spoke the words: “There is finitude - unless this were true, infinity would have no meaning,” explaining that

all value is the gift of finitude which is the necessary condition for activity (and that) (...) infinitude in itself is meaningless and valueless. It acquires meaning and value by its embodiment of finite entities. Apart from the finite, the infinite is devoid of meaning and cannot be distinguished from nonentity. The notion of the essential relatedness of all things is the primary step in understanding how finite entities require the unbounded universe, and how the universe acquires meaning and value by reason of its embodiment of the activity of finitude.⁵²

In this manner, Whitehead consistently argued that finitude in its contrast with infinity is representative of what is meaningful and genuinely creative. To be sure, Whitehead believes that “there is no meaning to ‘creativity’ apart from its ‘creatures,’ and no meaning to ‘God’ apart from the ‘creativity’ and the

50 PR, p. 3.

51 Whitehead, in “Mathematics and the Good,” in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *et al.* The Library of Living Philosophers (Vol. 3): The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 670.

52 Whitehead, in “Mathematics and the Good,” in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *et al.* The Library of Living Philosophers (Vol. 3): The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 682, 674-675, my additions. Whitehead continues, “the contrast of finitude and infinity arises from the fundamental metaphysical truth that every entity involves an indefinite array of perspectives, each perspective expressing a finite characteristic of that entity. But any one finite perspective does not enable an entity to shake off its essential connection with totality. The infinite background always remains as the unanalysed reason why that finite perspective of that entity has the special character that it does have.” (p. 682)

'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the 'temporal creatures' apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'"⁵³ Hence, it is clear that scepticism's recognition of finitude, implying the positing of nothingness which challenges the finite being, can be construed as causally 'enabling' creativity. In this sense, creativity is primarily a response to a finitude entirely divorced from infinity. As I myself hold, where there is no Temporality, there is no Transcendence of the World, and conversely, where there is no Transcendence of the World, there is no Temporality.⁵⁴ Thus, the recognition of temporal finitude and the drive for infinite self-realization are co-dependent.⁵⁵ This is the sense in which radical 'instrumental' scepticism, on the one hand, seems to have the motive of being the causal source of creativity. The radical 'instrumental' sceptic knows that whatever is placed in bounds, (i.e., recognized as finite) will attempt to overcome them. On the other hand, the radical 'instrumental' scepticism also may have the motive of being directed against, and stifling legitimate creativity, either by purely destructive means or by over-hastening creative development.

In the late stages of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead writes that "the ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing.'"⁵⁶ And, as was alluded to earlier, radical 'instrumental' scepticism does not want to let finitude overturn of itself. Rather, its goal is to be that which occasions the perpetual perishing of the finite. Therefore, it is clear that, on the one hand, radical 'instrumental' scepticism which has the motive to destroy creativity may be described as the mimicry of the World, or of Nature, in its character of bringing about the

53 PR, p. 225, my addition.

54 I derived this statement from a reading of Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?" in *Pathmarks*, edited by W. McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. As he states, "Dasein means: being held out into the nothing. (...) Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. Such being beyond beings we call *transcendence*." (p. 91) Conversely, I hold that temporality means: the nothing held out into being. Also, where there is no immanence in the world, there is no spatiality, and vice-versa. My point is that as Heidegger states, "Only in the nothing of Dasein do beings as a whole, in accord with their most proper possibility - that is, in a finite way - come to themselves," we should not take this as affirming the freedom to use scepticism in a radical, 'instrumental' manner, in challenging beings by occasioning the positing of their nothingness, thus bringing Dasein to the nothingness, in which it may 'come to itself'. (*Pathmarks*, p. 95) A further thesis Heidegger holds is that "the nothing is the origin of negation, not vice-versa." (p. 92) These issues will be investigated in my upcoming paper entitled, "Heidegger with Whitehead on Technological Thinking."

55 Here it may be pointed out that the drive for self-realization does not necessarily imply the promotion of the Good. Perhaps more often than not, an excessive drive for self-realization is unethical. Therefore, occasioning the drive for self-realization, as in 'instrumental' scepticism, cannot be said to represent the promotion of the Good.

56 PR, p. 340.

perpetual perishing of human endeavour.⁵⁷ On the other hand, as I have previously pointed out, according to speculative philosophy, scepticism is the 'mover' of the processes by which, identity, truth, meaning, consciousness, and ontology in general become and develop. And, in the present chapter, I have shown how the recognition of finitude occasioning the positing of nothingness may, in practice be construed as a causal source of determination and of creativity. Therefore, in its excessiveness, radical 'instrumental' scepticism, with the motive to cause creativity, may conversely be described as the mimicry of God, as the 'unmoved mover' of these processes.⁵⁸ Here, philosophizing is reduced to the subordinate role of 'moved unmover'.

In my view, radical 'instrumental' scepticism's mimicry of God and the World, in these senses, constitutes *evil*. For Whitehead,

Evil is exhibited in physical suffering, mental suffering, and loss of the higher experience in favour of the lower experience. The common character of all evil is that its realization in fact involves that there is some concurrent realization of a purpose towards elimination. (...) Evil, triumphant in its enjoyment, is so far good in itself; but beyond itself it is evil in its character of a destructive agent among things greater than itself. In the summation of the more complete fact it has secured a descent towards nothingness, in contrast to the creativeness of what can without qualification be termed good. Evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative.⁵⁹

On the contrary, human beings are not God, nor are they Nature, nor are they both, nor neither, in the

57 Many 'post-modern' philosophies can be included in my characterization of radical 'instrumental' scepticism which mimics the temporal world in our characterization of it as representing the 'perpetual perishing' of human endeavour. In this way, whereas in Existentialism and Human Emotions, New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990, J.-P. Sartre characterizes man's "fundamental project" as the "desire to be God," (p. 63), in reaction, many philosophies following from Heidegger's *destruktion* (Zerstören, Zerstörung) of the history of ontology can be classified as the 'fundamental project' of the 'desire to be Nature'. See my paper, "Towards a Philosophical Cognition-Only." Many 'post-modern' philosophers advance their radical 'instrumental' scepticism as 'life-enhancing' or 'life-affirming' deceptions, and above all, the 'causal source' of creativity. However, in the philosophical culture of 'post-modernity', we have made the error of ceasing to affirm genuine philosophizing. Rather, now, we worship radical 'instrumental' scepticism as it is held to be this 'causal source' of creativity. But, in my view, the post-modern scepticism is *anti-creative*, and has no claim to be the exclusive 'debtor' of genuine philosophizing. Derrida, in coining his notion of 'deconstruction', fused Heidegger's notion of *destruktion* with another word, 'Abbau', meaning "to take apart an edifice in order to see how it is constituted." (Derrida, The Ear of the Other, New York: Schocken Books, 1985, p. 87)

58 The notion of the 'unmoved' or 'prime mover' to describe God was developed by Aristotle to denote the first, or original cause of the motion of the universe and to prevent an infinite regress of causes. This definition of God was later examined by Aquinas and Duns Scotus. See J. L. Ackrill (ed), A New Aristotle Reader, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987; McDermott, T. (ed.), Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; Wolter, A. (trans.), Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987.

59 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, New York: Macmillan Co, 1960, pp. 95-96.

senses outlined here.⁶⁰ I believe that the goals of humanity should not include the causal incitation to creativity, nor should they include the destruction of creativity. Rather, human beings are themselves the chief participants in the creativity of the cosmos. Human beings are themselves the 'site' of this creativity, functioning as the mean between God and the World, Everything and Nothing. But, the excessive radical 'instrumental' scepticism seeking advantage in the circle of appropriation and self-realization is constitutive of *evil*.⁶¹ As such, human creativity in all its finitude should be treated neither with radical 'instrumental' scepticism, nor with pity, but rather with *compassion*, recognizing both its immanence in the infinite as well as the immanence of the infinite in it.

The present chapter has had its purpose in pointing out that both Hegel's and Whitehead's perspectives seem to agree that scepticism which implies the positing of nothingness may be legitimately said to be the 'mover' of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. I outlined some main concerns regarding radical 'instrumental' scepticism from both Hegelian and Whiteheadian points of view. And, I showed how both Hegel and Whitehead attempt to provide a balanced perspective on the nature and function of scepticism within their respective speculative philosophies.⁶² It is in this light that this dissertation has made the appeal that the 'sword' of scepticism be wielded in a mature manner.⁶³

60 This statement is not meant to initiate a debate regarding the status of Christ as the Son of God. Rather, from my own 'Buddhisto-Christian' perspective, while this is an indisputably true statement, my point here is merely to suggest the fundamental role and place of humanity in the cosmos. Whitehead himself states, "The besetting sin of philosophers is that, being merely men, the endeavour to survey the universe from the standpoint of gods." (ESP, p. 93) On the other hand, for Whitehead, "God is *in* the world, or nowhere, creating continually in us and around us. This creative principle is everywhere, in animate and so-called inanimate matter, in the ether, water, earth, human hearts. But this creation is a continuing process, and 'the process is itself the actuality,' since no sooner do you arrive than you start on a fresh journey. Insofar as man partakes of this creative process does he partake of the divine, of God, and that participation is his immortality, reducing the question of whether his individuality survives death of the body to the estate of an irrelevancy. His true destiny as cocreator in the universe is his dignity and his grandeur." (Whitehead in L. Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1953, p. 371)

61 However, Whitehead himself suggests that the experience of evil eventually dissolves into the past, where it is only vaguely recollected. He writes that "the revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding, are dismissed into their triviality of merely individual facts; and yet the good they did achieve in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the introduction of needed contrast, is yet saved by its relation to the completed whole." (PR, p. 346)

62 In light of my study on the nature and function of scepticism, I have attempted to make a critical response to the radical 'instrumental' scepticism predominant to our era, unless what the radical sceptic is precisely 'sceptical' of, includes the notions of 'essence' and 'function' themselves.

63 I would like now to close this study of the nature and function of scepticism in speculative philosophy with some further Hegelian reflections made by E. E. Harris in the conclusion to his latest book, The Restitution of Metaphysics, New York: Humanity Books, 2000, p. 284. Here Harris brings out correctly that the fact that 'evil'

and 'error' are aspects of finitude which are progressively overcome *of themselves* by the dialectical development of the Concept, and not by privileging one of its moments. Also, I believe his reflections both re-emphasize the importance of wholeness and connectedness which has been fundamental to this thesis. Harris writes, "Evil and error are incident and consequent upon finitude; they are due solely to privation. However unfortunate an event or depraved a person's conduct and character, the resulting constraint on progress towards perfection (which constitutes evil) is due to limitation, whether of self-control or of insight and knowledge or of both. Suffering in general is the consequence of finitude - although not all suffering is evil - for what is not finite is impassible, and so cannot suffer. Whatever in the unfortunate event or in the delinquent person is positive is not evil. The energy, emotion, or judgment involved is wrong and bad only so far as it is misplaced, distorted, or exaggerated due to lack of knowledge or self-control (i.e., to defect and deprivation). On the other hand, strength in distress and courage in the face of danger are virtues. Error, likewise, is a lack of knowledge or abridged content; the garbled or curtailed information constituting error, in its proper context and full exposition, correct.

"Error and evil, then, may be equated with finitude, which as the scale of forms unfolds, is progressively overcome. But finitude is inevitable wherever differentiation occurs, and differentiation is indispensable to wholeness. Hence the presence of evil and error in the world is unavoidable. Only in this regard are they attributable to God, who could not create a world at all, the necessary differentiation of the concrete totality, without the mutual limitation of the parts and phases. Nevertheless, although evil and error are necessary in a finite world, as Spinoza asserts: "God did not lack means for the creation of every degree of perfection from the highest to the lowest" (*Ethics*, I Appendix). And the exercise of God's power is the perpetual overcoming of evil, for evil and error are continuously sublated, remedied, and corrected as the dialectic proceeds, and in the Absolute, they are transcended altogether and finally cancelled out. As St. Paul tells us: "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part will be done away" (I Corinthians 13:10).

APPENDICES:

Hegel's Dialectical Logic and Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts

Appendix #1**'One-Term Asymmetrical' Interpretation of the Dialectical Movement of Hegel's Logical Concept**

Moment 1.	$A = A$	'A' is Self-Relating; 'A' is Identical to itself. Simple Self-Identity and Universality. 'Preservation' (<i>preservare</i>) of 'A'.
Moment 2.	$A \neq -A$	'A' is not its Negation; Negation of 'A' and Positing of its Opposite. Distinction in virtue of 'Self-Othering' and Particularity. 'Cancellation' (<i>tollere</i>) of 'A'.
Moment 3.	$A = --A$	'A' is not not 'A'; Negation of the Negation of 'A'. Determinate Identity and Individuality. 'Raising-Up' (<i>elevare</i>) of 'A'.

... 'A' advances to a 'higher' level, but in its conceptual movement returns to the 1st moment ...¹

¹ Thanks to Dr. McCormick of the University of Ottawa and Dr. Burch of the University of Alberta for bringing to light this 'one-term asymmetrical' interpretation of the dialectical movement of Hegel's logical Concept and 'principle of identity' for me. This aspect of Hegel's logical Concept stems directly from Fichte's own *die Tathandlung* (Act, Action) of the I's self-positing, as can be seen from the *Wissenschaftslehre*. See D. Breazeale (trans. and ed.), Fichte: Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. In fact, the concept of *aufheben* is common to both Fichte and Hegel.

Appendix #2**'Two-Term' Interpretation of the Dialectical Movement of Hegel's Logical Concept and Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts: The 'Infinite Symmetry of Opposites'**

Moment 1. A

Moment 2. $A \sim B$

If A, then B

Moment 3. $B \sim A$

If B, then A

Moment 4. $A \equiv B$

If A, then B and if B, then A

Moment 5. $\sim A \equiv \sim B$

If not A, then not B and if not B, then not A

 $\therefore$ Neither A, nor BMoment 6. $(\sim A \equiv \sim B) \equiv (A \equiv B)$ *Iff* (If not A, then not B and if not B, then not A) *then*
If A then B, and if B then A

(Alternatively),

Iff neither A, nor B *then* if A then B and if B then AMoment 7. $\sim(\sim A \equiv \sim B) \equiv \sim(A \equiv B)$ Neither (Neither A, nor B), nor (*Iff* A *then* B)Moment 8. $\sim\sim(\sim A \equiv \sim B) \equiv \sim\sim(A \equiv B)$ Neither (Neither (Neither A, nor B)), nor (nor (*Iff* A *then* B))

... To Infinity and Return ...

 ∞ Moment -8. $\sim\sim(\sim B \equiv \sim A) \equiv \sim\sim(B \equiv A)$ Neither (Neither (Neither B, nor A)), nor (nor (*Iff* B *then* A))Moment -7. $\sim(\sim B \equiv \sim A) \equiv \sim(B \equiv A)$ Neither (Neither B, nor A), nor (*Iff* B *then* A)Moment -6. $(\sim B \equiv \sim A) \equiv (B \equiv A)$ *Iff* (If not B, then not A and if not A, then not B) *then*
If B then A, and if A then B

(Alternatively),

Iff neither B, nor A *then* if B then A and if A then BMoment -5. $\sim B \equiv \sim A$

If not B, then not A and if not A, then not B

 $\therefore$ Neither B, nor AMoment -4. $B \equiv A$

If B, then A and if A, then B

Moment -3. $A \sim B$

If A, then B

Moment -2. $B \sim A$

If B, then A

Moment -1. B

Note: An articulation of Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts, similar to the latter, may be pointed to in The Aims of Education, New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 109-110, where he states:

"The first section (of the departments of logical theory) - namely, the arithmetic stage - deals with the relations of definite propositions to each other, just as arithmetic deals with definite numbers. Consider any definite proposition; call it 'p.' We conceive that there is always another proposition which is the direct contradictory to 'p'; call it 'not-p.' When we have got two propositions, p and q, we can form derivative propositions from them, and from their contradictories. We can say, 'At least one of p or q is true, and perhaps both.' Let us call this proposition 'p or q.' I may mention as an aside that one of the greatest living philosophers has stated that this use of the word 'or' - namely, 'p or q' in the sense that either or both may be true - makes him despair of exact expression. We must brave his wrath, which is unintelligible to me.

We have thus got hold of four new propositions, namely, 'p or q,' and 'not-p or q,' and 'p or not-q.' Call these the set of disjunctive derivatives. There are, so far, in all eight propositions, p, not-p, q, not-q, and the four disjunctive derivatives. Any pair of these eight propositions can be taken, and substituted for p and q in the foregoing treatment. Thus each pair yields eight propositions, some of which may have been obtained before. By proceeding in this way we arrive at an unending set of propositions of growing complexity, ultimately derived from the two original propositions p or q. Of course, only a few are important. Similarly we can start from three propositions, p, q, r, or from four propositions p, q, r, s, and so on. Any one of the propositions of these aggregates may be true or false. It has no other alternative. Whichever it is, true or false, call it the 'truth-value' of the propositions.

The first section of logical inquiry is to settle what we know of the truth-values of these propositions, when we know the truth values of some of them. The inquiry, so far as it is worth while carrying it, is not very abstruse, and the best way of expressing its results is a detail which I will not now consider. This inquiry forms the arithmetic stage."

Appendix #3**'Half-Term' Interpretation of the Dialectical Movement of Hegel's Logical Concept and Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts: 'Asymmetry in Symmetry'**

Here, I 'resolve the tension' between the 'one-term asymmetrical' interpretation in Appendix #1 and the 'two-term symmetrical' interpretation in Appendix #2. In order to come to the standpoint of 'Asymmetry in Symmetry', I note three points:

- 1.) In Appendix #1, the dialectical movement is described as 'A', '- A', '- - A'. Here, 'A' is only 'A' in virtue of the negation of '- A', leading to '- - A'. It is to be noted that the second 'moment', i.e., the 'sceptical moment' or, alternatively the 'first negation': '- A' only represents one third of the whole movement.
- 2.) In Appendix #2, '- A' is represented by 'B' and '- B' is represented as 'A'. Thus, either 'A' or 'B' exclusively are equivalent to 'one half' of the infinitely symmetrical unity of 'A' and 'B', which we may symbolize as:

$$\infty$$

$$A = B$$

- 3.) In this 'half-term' interpretation, the symmetry of Appendix #2 may be broken up into its two asymmetrical components, i.e., 'A' and 'B'.

$$A = A + - A + - - A$$

$$A = 2 A + (- A)$$

$$\therefore A = A$$

$$B = B + - B + - - B$$

$$B = 2 B + (- B)$$

$$\therefore B = B$$

Therefore, each asymmetrical component: 'A' or 'B' represents the 'leaf-side' of the other, within the 'infinite symmetrical' interpretation. Hence, here, I advance the notion of 'asymmetry in symmetry' with respect to the dialectical movement of Hegel's Logical Concept and with regards to Whitehead's Logic of Contrasts.²

2 What I have tried to point out here regarding asymmetry in symmetry is what Whitehead suggests regarding exclusion and inclusion, as he states, "this fact, that every event is known as possessing the quality of exclusion, shows that exclusion is as positive a relation as inclusion. There are of course no merely negative relations in nature, and exclusion is not the mere negative of inclusion, though the two relations are contraries. Both relations are concerned solely with events, and exclusion is capable of logical definition in terms of inclusion." (The Concept of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186-187)

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Sources Consulted and Cited in this Project

I. Bibliography: Hegel Primary Sources

- Hegel, G. W. F. The Encyclopedia Logic (1830), Translated and Edited by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Vol. 20 of *Gesammelte Werke*, Edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Science of Logic (1812, 1816, 1832), Translated by A. V. Miller, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Wissenschaft der Logik (1812, 1816, 1832), Vols. 11, 12, and 21 of *Gesammelte Werke*, Edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Vol. 1-3), Translated and Edited by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, New Jersey: The Humanities Press, 1983.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (1840), Vols. 18 and 19 of *Sämtliche Werke*, Edited by H. Glockner and C. Michelet, Stuttgart: Fromman, 1928.
- Hegel, G. W. F. "The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy," in Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Translated and Annotated by G. di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1985.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Jenaer kritische Schriften (1801), Vol. 4 of *Gesammelte Werke*, Edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Translated by A. V. Miller, Analysis by J. N. Findlay, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Vol. 9 of *Gesammelte Werke*, Edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Faith and Knowledge (1803). Translated and Edited by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1977.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, Edited by E. Behler, Translated by S. A. Taubeneck and A. V. Miller, New York: Continuum, 1990.
- Hegel, G. W. F. The Philosophy of Nature (Vol. 1-3), Translated by M. J. Petry, New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1970.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Philosophy of Nature, Translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
- Hegel, G. W. F. The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (Vol. 1-3), Translated by M. J. Petry, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1978.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1827), Vol. 19 of *Gesammelte Werke*, Edited by W. Bonsiepen and H.-C. Lucas, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1989.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Vol. 1-3), Translated and Edited by P. C. Hodgson, R. F. Brown, J. M. Stewart and H. S. Harris, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.

- Hegel, G. W. F. On Art, Religion, Philosophy: Introductory Lectures to the Realm of Absolute Spirit. Edited by J. G. Gray, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Translated by B. Bosanquet, Analysis by M. Inwood, New York: Penguin Books, 1993.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art (Vol. 1-2), Translated by T. M. Knox, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Hegel, G. W. F. The Essential Writings. Edited by F. G. Weiss, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974.
- Hegel, G. W. F. The Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree, Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michelet, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction. Translated and Edited by H. B. Nisbet, and J. Hoffmeister, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820), Translated by H. B. Nisbet and Edited by A. W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Philosophy of Right (1821), Translated by S. W. Dyde, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Political Writings. Edited and Translated by L. Dickey and H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Three Essays 1793-1795. Edited and Translated by P. Fuss and J. Dobbins, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
- Hegel, G. W. F. Notes et Fragments. Translation and Commentary by C. Colliot-Thélène, J.-P. Labarrière, *et al.*, Paris: Editions Aubier, 1991.

II. Bibliography: Hegel Secondary Sources

- Althaus, H. Hegel: An Intellectual Biography. Translated by M. Tarsh, Bodmin, Cornwall (U. K.): Polity Press, 2000.
- Banguay, S. Truth and Beauty: A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Barnett, S. (ed.), *et al.* Hegel After Derrida. New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Berthold-Bond, D. Hegel's Grand Synthesis. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1989.
- Berthold-Bond, D. Hegel's Theory of Madness. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1995.
- Beiser, F. C. (ed.), *et al.* The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Burbidge, J. W. Real Process: How Logic and Chemistry Combined in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.

- Collins, A. B. Hegel on the Modern World. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1995.
- Cutrofello, A. The Owl at Dawn. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1995.
- Desmond, W. Art and the Absolute. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986.
- Desmond, W. (ed.), *et al.* Hegel and His Critics: Philosophy in the Aftermath of Hegel. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1989.
- Desmond, W. Being and the Between. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1995.
- Forster, M. N. Hegel and Scepticism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Forster, M. N. Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- Fulda, H. F. and Horstmann, R. P. (eds.), Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996. *Thanks to Dr. Moggach for information on this source. However, only recently have these important proceedings of the 1995 Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung in Pisa been located (thanks to Dr. D. Schlitt). As such, this text will be valuable to my further reflections and work on this subject.*
- Gadamer, H.-G. Hegel's Dialectic. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Gallagher, S. (ed.), *et al.* Hegel, History, and Interpretation. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1997.
- Geraets, T. F., *et al.* Hegel: The Absolute Spirit. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1981.
- Geraets, T. F. "Thinking, Dialectic, Logic: A Reading of Hegel"; "Thinking, Being and Idea," and "The Idea: Logic, Nature, and Spirit." *Thanks to Professor Geraets of the University of Ottawa for lending me these unpublished manuscripts.*
- Goutierre, M.-D. Hegel: L'intelligence de la foi? Paris: Fayard, 1997.
- Harris, E. E. An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel. New York: University of America Press, 1983.
- Harris, E. E. The Spirit of Hegel. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993.
- Harris, H. S. Hegel's Ladder (Vol. 1-2). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997.
- Hartnack, J. An Introduction to Hegel's Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998.
- Heidegger, M. Hegel's Concept of Experience. Edited by J. G. Gray, New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
- Heidegger, M. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by P. Emad and K. Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
- Honneth, A. The Struggle for Recognition. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
- Houlgate, S. (ed.), *et al.* Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1998.
- Inwood, M. J. Hegel. Boston: Routledge, 1983.

- Inwood, M. J. A Hegel Dictionary, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992.
- Jaeschke, W. Reason in Religion: The Foundations of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, Translated by J. M. Stewart and P. C. Hodgson, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.
- Kainz, H. P. G. W. F. Hegel, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996.
- Kaminsky, J. Hegel on Art, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1962.
- Kolb, D. New Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1992.
- Krell, D. F. Contagion, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- Küng, H. The Incarnation of God, Translated by J. R. Stephenson, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987.
- Labarrière, P.-J. et Jarczyk, G. Hegel: Le malheur de la conscience ou l'accès à la raison, Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1989.
- Lauer, Q. Hegel's Idea of Philosophy, New York: Fordham University Press, 1983.
- Lauer, Q. A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, New York: Fordham University Press, 1993.
- Léonard, A. Commentaire littéral de la logique de Hegel, Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1974.
- Lukács, G. Hegel's False and His Genuine Ontology, London: Merlin Press, 1978.
- Macherey, P. Hegel ou Spinoza, Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1990.
- Magnus, K. D. Hegel and the Symbolic Mediation of Spirit, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2001.
- Maker, W. Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1994.
- Maker, W. (ed.), et al. Hegel and Aesthetics, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2000.
- O'Neill, J. (ed.), et al. Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1996.
- Pinkard, T. Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Pinkard, T. Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Pippin, R. B. Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Popper, K. R. The Open Society and Its Enemies (Vol. 1-2), London: Routledge, 1962.
- Rapp, C. Fleeing the Universal, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1998.
- Rauch, L. and Sherman, D., et al. Hegel's Phenomenology of Self-Consciousness, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1999.
- Redding, P. Hegel's Hermeneutics, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Roche, M. W. Tragedy and Comedy: A Systematic Study and A Critique of Hegel, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1998.

- Rockmore, T. Before and After Hegel, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993.
- Russon, J. The Self and Its Body in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
- Röttges, H. Dialektik und Skeptizismus, Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1987.
- Schlitt, D. Hegel's Trinitarian Claim, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1984.
- Schlitt, D. Divine Subjectivity: Understanding Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, London: Associated University Press, 1990.
- Schlitt, D. "Trinity and Spirit," in A. C. P. Q. 54, 1990. *Thanks to Professor Schlitt for lending me this manuscript.*
- Simpson, P. Hegel's Transcendental Induction, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1998.
- Stern, R. Hegel, Kant, and the Structure of the Object, London: Routledge, 1990.
- Stewart, J. (ed.), et al. The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1998.
- Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Westphal, K. R. Hegel's Epistemological Realism, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
- Westphal, K. R. "Hegel, Harris, and Sextus Empiricus," in *Owl of Minerva*, Vol. 31, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 155-172.
- Westphal, M. History and Truth in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- Williamson, R. K. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1984.

III. Bibliography: Whitehead Primary Sources

- Whitehead, A. N. Process and Reality (1929): Corrected Edition, Edited by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978.
- Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World (1925), New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Whitehead, A. N. Essays in Science and Philosophy (compiled in 1941), New York: Philosophical Library, 1948.
- Whitehead, A. N. The Function of Reason (1929), Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
- Whitehead, A. N. Symbolism (1927), New York: Fordham University Press, 1985.
- Whitehead, A. N. Adventures of Ideas (1933), New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Whitehead, A. N. Modes of Thought (1938), New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- Whitehead, A. N. Religion in the Making (1926), New York: Macmillan Co., 1960, Introduction, Glossary, and Index by Fordham University Press, 1996.

- Whitehead, A. N. The Concept of Nature (1919), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Whitehead, A. N. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955.
- Whitehead, A. N. Introduction to Mathematics (1910), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Whitehead, A. N. A Philosopher Looks at Science, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965.
- Whitehead, A. N. The Aims of Education (1929), New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Whitehead, A. N. A. N. Alfred North Whitehead: An Anthology (Compiled), Edited by F. S. C. Northrop and M. W. Gross, New York: MacMillan Co. 1961.
- Whitehead, A. N. and Russell, B. Principia Mathematica to *56 (1910), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Whitehead, A. N. The Axioms of Projective Geometry, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., Inc., 1960.
- Whitehead, A. N. The Axioms of Descriptive Geometry, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., Inc., 1960.

IV. Bibliography: Whitehead Secondary Sources

- Browning, D. and Myers, W. T. (eds.), *et al.* Philosophers of Process, New York: Fordham Press, 1998.
- Christian, W. A. An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Cobb, J. A Christian Natural Theology, London: Lutterworth Press, 1966.
- Connelly, R. J. Whitehead Versus Hartshorne: Basic Metaphysical Issues, Washington: University Press of America, 1981.
- Fitzgerald, J. Alfred North Whitehead's Early Philosophy of Space and Time, Washington: University Press of America, 1979.
- Ford, L. S. and Kline, G. L. (eds.) Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy, New York: Fordham University Press, 1983.
- Ford, L. S. The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics 1925-1929, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1984.
- Ford, L. S. Transforming Process Theism, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2000.
- Franklin, S. T. Speaking From the Depths: A. N. Whitehead's Hermeneutical Metaphysics of Propositions, Experience, Symbolism, Language, and Religion, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990.
- Griffin, D. R. (ed.), *et al.* The Re-enchantment of Science, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1988.
- Hammerschmidt, W. W. Whitehead's Philosophy of Time, New York: Russell and Russell, 1975.
- Hartshorne, C. Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1970.

- Hartshorne, C. Whitehead's Philosophy, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.
- Hartshorne, C. and Peden, C. Whitehead's View of Reality, New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1981.
- Hartshorne, C. Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1983.
- Hartshorne, C. Creativity and American Philosophy, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1984.
- Hosinski, T. E. Stubborn Fact and Creative Advance, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1993.
- Hurtubise, D. Relire Whitehead: Les concepts de Dieu dans *Process and Reality*, Laval: Les presses de l'Université Laval, 2000.
- Jentz, A. Whitehead's Philosophy, Lanham: University Press of America, 1985.
- Jones, J. Intensity: An Essay in Whiteheadian Ontology, Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 1998. *Reviewed by J. W. Felt in *Process Studies*, Vol. 28 / 3-4, Fall - Winter 1999, pp. 344-356.*
- Kane, R. and Phillips, S. H. Hartshorne, Process Philosophy, and Theology, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1989.
- Kline, G. L. (ed.), *et al.* Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.
- Kraus, E. M. The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead's *Process and Reality*, New York: Fordham University Press, 1998.
- Leclerc, I. Whitehead's Metaphysics, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1958.
- Lowe, V. Whitehead: The Man and His Work (Vols. 1-2), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990.
- Lucas, G. R. The Genesis of Modern Process Thought, Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1983.
- Lucas, G. R. The Rehabilitation of Whitehead, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1989.
- Martin, G. M. Whitehead's Cosmological Scheme and Other Papers, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- McHenry, L. B. Whitehead and Bradley: A Comparative Analysis, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1992.
- Neville, R. C. and Kasulis T. P. (eds.) *et al.* The Recovery of Philosophy in America: Essays in Honor of John Edwin Smith, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1997.
- Neville, R. C. The Cosmology of Freedom, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1995.
- Nobo, J. L. Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986.
- Odin, S. Process Metaphysics and Hua-Yen Buddhism: A Critical Study of Cumulative Penetration Versus Interpenetration, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986.
- Pedraja, L. G. "Whitehead and Postmodernism," in *Process Studies*, 28/1-2, Spring-Summer 1999, pp. 68-84.
- Price, L. Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1954.
- Rapp, F. and Wiehl, R. (eds.), *et al.* Whitehead's Metaphysics of Creativity, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1990.

- Rescher, N. Process Metaphysics. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1996.
- Rescher, N. Process Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000.
- Ross, S. D. Perspective in Whitehead's Metaphysics. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1983.
- Rust, A. Die organismische Kosmologie von Alfred N. Whitehead. Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1987.
- Sherburne, D. W. (ed.), A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- Schmidt, P. F. Perception and Cosmology in Whitehead's Philosophy. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967.
- Schilpp, P. A. (ed.), *et al.* The Library of Living Philosophers (Vol. 3): The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1941.
- Smith, J. E. (ed.), *et al.* The Spirit of American Philosophy. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1983.
- Wallack, F. B. The Epochal Nature of Process in Whitehead's Metaphysics. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1980.
- Weiss, P. Philosophy in Process (Vol. 10), Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1987.

V. Bibliography: Conjoint Hegel and Whitehead Secondary Sources

- Bogaard, P. A. and Treash, G. (eds.), *et al.* Metaphysics as Foundation: Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1993.
- Christensen, D. E. "Whitehead's 'Prehension' and Hegel's 'Mediation': Parallel Dynamical Concepts at the Service of Different Methodologies," in *Review of Metaphysics*, 38, n. 150, 1984 / 85.
- Christensen, D. E. The Search for Concreteness. New Jersey: Susquehanna University Press, 1986.
- Christensen, D. E. Hegelian / Whiteheadian Perspectives. New York: University Press of America, 1989.
- Lucas, G. R. Two Views of Freedom in Process Thought: A Study of Hegel and Whitehead. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1978.
- Lucas, G. R. (ed.), *et al.* Hegel and Whitehead: Contemporary Perspectives on Systematic Philosophy. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986.
- Mandt, A. J. "Aristotle, Whitehead, and Hegel on the Problem of Creativity," in *Modern Schoolman*, 59, n. 3, 1982.
- Nussbaum, C. "Logic and the Metaphysics of Hegel and Whitehead," in *Process Studies*, 15, 1986, n. 1, pp. 32-52.
- Rockmore, T. "Whitehead et Hegel. Réalisme, Idéalisme, et Philosophie Spéculative," in *Archives de philosophie*, 53, n. 2, 1990, pp. 261-269.
- Whitmore, R. C. "The Need of Philosophy and its Satisfaction: Speculative Thought in Hegel and Whitehead," in *Owl of Minerva*, v. 17, n. 1, 1985.
- Williams, D. D. "Philosophy and Faith: A Study in Hegel and Whitehead," in Our Common History as Christians.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

VI. Bibliography: Tertiary Sources

- Ackrill, J. L. (ed.), A New Aristotle Reader, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Allard, J. W. and Stock, G. (eds.), Bradley: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Alexander, S. Space, Time, and Deity, New York: Macmillan Co., 1934.
- Baynes, K. (ed.), *et al.* After Philosophy: End or Transformation? Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
- Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1998.
- Bergson, H. The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, New Jersey: Replica Books, 1999.
- Bergson, H. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.
- Bergson, H. Matter and Memory, New York: Zone Books, 1991.
- Bergson, H. Time and Free Will, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001.
- Bradley, F. H. Essays on Truth and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914.
- Breazeale, D. (trans. and ed.), Fichte: Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of Nature, London: Oxford University Press, 1945.
- Cooper, D. E. (ed.), *et al.* Metaphysics: The Classic Readings, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000.
- Cooper, J. M. and Hutchinson, D. S. (eds.), *et al.* Plato: Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997.
- Derrida, J. Of Grammatology: Corrected Edition, Translated by G. C. Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997.
- Derrida, J. The Gift of Death, Translated by D. Wills, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Derrida, J. The Ear of the Other, New York: Schocken Books, 1985.
- Dicker, G. Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics, New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Dombrowski, D. A. Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1996.
- Dreyfus, G. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1997.
- Etheridge, S. G. (trans.) and Hallie, P. P. (ed.), Sextus Empiricus: Selections From the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man, and God, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985.

- Farr, D. "The Later Heidegger's Critique of Metaphysics," McMaster University, 1999. *Thanks to David Farr for lending me this manuscript.*
- Gadamer, H.-G. Truth and Method. Translated by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall, New York: Continuum, 1998.
- Guenther, H. V. Wholeness Lost and Wholeness Regained. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1994.
- Hankinson, R. J. The Sceptics. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Harris, E. E. The Restitution of Metaphysics. New York: Humanity Books, 2000.
- Hartshorne, C. A Natural Theology For Our Time. Illinois: Open Court, 1967.
- Hartshorne, C. Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1987.
- Hawking, S. A Brief History of Time. New York: Bantam Books, 1988.
- Heidegger, M. "What is Metaphysics?" and "The Question Concerning Technology," in Basic Writings. Edited by D. Krell, New York: Harper San Francisco, 1977.
- Heidegger, M. "What is Metaphysics?" in Pathmarks. Edited by W. McNeill, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Heidegger, M. Being and Time. Translated by R. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, New York: Harper San Francisco, 1962.
- Heidegger, M. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by A. Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- Heidegger, M. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Translated by M. Heim, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- Heidegger, M. Identity and Difference. Translated by J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
- Heidegger, M. Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning. Translated by P. Emad and K. Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
- Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by E. C. Mossner, New York: Penguin Books, 1969.
- Hume, D. Selected Essays. Edited by S. Copley and A. Edgar, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Hume, D. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
- Hume, D. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948.
- Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations. Translated by E. Cairns, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
- Hylton, P. Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Jamspal, L. (trans.), Nāgārjuna's Letter to King Gautamiputra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

- Johnson, O. A. The Mind of David Hume. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995.
- Kalupahana, D. J. (trans. and ed.), Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1986.
- Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and Translated by N. K. Smith, New York: Macmillan & Co., 1965.
- Kant, I. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Edited and Translated by G. Hatfield, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Kant, I. Critique of Judgment. Translated by J. H. Bernard, New York: Hafner Press, 1951.
- Locke, J. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952.
- Luk, C. (trans.), The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra. Berkeley, Shambala, 1972.
- Mander, W. J. An Introduction to Bradley's Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Mander, W. J. (ed.), *et al.* Anglo-American Idealism (1865-1927). Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.
- McDermott, T. (ed.), Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by C. Smith, New York: Routledge, 1962.
- Merril, K. R. (ed.), *et al.* David Hume: Many-Sided Genius. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976.
- Nagao, G. The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy. Translated by J. P. Keenan, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1989.
- Nagao, G. Madhyamika and Yogācāra. Translated by L. Kawamura, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1991.
- Nishida, K. Nothingness and the Religious Worldview. Translated by D. A. Dilworth, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.
- Nishida, K. An Enquiry Into the Good. Translated by M. Abe and C. Ives, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
- Nishitani, K. Religion and Nothingness. Translated by J. Bragt, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982.
- Norris, C. Deconstruction: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Organ, T. W. The One: East and West. New York: University Press of America, 1991.
- Peirce, C. S. The Essential Peirce (Vol. 1-3), Edited by N. Houser and C. Kloesel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Peirce, C. S. Reasoning and the Logic of Things. Edited by K. L. Ketner, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Popper, K. R. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- Russell, B. Our Knowledge of the External World. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1929.

- Russell, B. Sceptical Essays. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Russell, B. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell. Toronto: George Allan & Unwin Ltd., 1968.
- Russell, B. The Philosophy of Leibniz. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Santayana, G. Scepticism and Animal Faith. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929.
- Sartre, J.-P. Existentialism and Human Emotions. New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990.
- Saunders, J. L. (ed.), Greek and Roman Philosophy After Aristotle. New York: The Free Press, 1966.
- Scarfe, A. "Towards A Philosophical Cognition-Only," Property of the Library of the Buddhist Association of Canada, Toronto, as of September, 1997.
- Schelling, F. W. J. "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801)," in Schriften von 1801-1804. Edited by J. G. Cotta, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.
- Schlitt, D. M. Theology and the Experience of God. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Ltd., 2001. *Thanks to Dr. Schlitt for lending me this text.*
- Strawson, P. F. Individuals. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1959.
- Tanabe, H. Philosophy as Metanoetics. Translated by Y. Takeuchi, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986.
- Veitch, J. (trans.), Descartes: A Discourse on Method, Meditations and Principles. Vermont: Orion Publishing Group, 1994.
- Verdu, A. Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought. Kansas: University of Kansas, 1974.
- Watsuji, T. Rinrigaku. Translated by Y. Seisaku, Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1996.
- Winks, R. W. (ed.), *et al.* A History of Civilization (Vol. 2 - 1648 to the Present), Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1992.
- Wolter, A. (trans.) Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987.
- Wood, D. The Deconstruction of Time. New Jersey: Humanities Press International Inc., 1989.