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**Images of Americans:
The United States in Canadian Newspapers During
the 1960s**

by

Adam J. Green

Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Ph.D. Degree in History

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ABSTRACT

Images of Americans: The United States in Canadian Newspapers During the 1960s

Adam J. Green
University of Ottawa, 2006

Supervisor:
Professor Chad Gaffield

This thesis analyses Canadian newspaper images of Americans during the 1960s. The content of the study is derived from twenty newspapers drawn from four Canadian cities – Halifax, Quebec City, Ottawa, and Vancouver – and covers five specific events during the 1960s which each prompted a flurry of commentary on Americans, American motives, and the Canadian-American relationship. These events are: the election and inauguration of President John F. Kennedy in 1960, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Watts Riot of Los Angeles in 1965, an anti-Vietnam War speech made by Privy Councillor Walter Gordon in 1967, and the voyage of an American oil tanker, the *Manhattan*, into the Canadian arctic in April of 1970. This work seeks to advance the study of Canadian-American relations by questioning the range and methodological treatment of evidence currently used to evaluate Canadian perceptions of the United States. In its place, this study presents a systematic examination of Canadian attitudes and popular opinions in the 1960s.

Combining the investigation of editorial cartoons and the use of the social psychological method of the *Linguistic Intergroup Bias* as a form of content analysis, this thesis finds that newspaper coverage from 1960 through 1970 was

a complex blend of various streams of opinion which fell into three major categories: positive orientations towards Americans, negative orientations towards Americans, and apathy towards the Canadian-American relationship. This range of opinion did not provide substantial evidence of correlated predictors in terms of ideology, geography, or language, and thus suggests the possible need for a revision of previously held conclusions. In particular, this study challenges the notion that most Canadians in the 1960s had negative impressions and opinions of the United States.

The study's final assessment presents three overlapping conclusions. First, the findings suggest that Canadian newspapers were much more willing to express negative opinions concerning the United States at the end of the decade than at the beginning. However, the evidence shows that Canadian newspapers in the 1960s were not "anti-American". Third, the findings suggest that there was no single or dominant "Canadian" perception of the United States. Therefore, this study finds that Canadian newspaper discussion of Americans in the 1960's contained a versatile and diverse range of opinion, much of which was absent of substantial negative sentiment directed towards the United States.

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 2-1	Actions of U.S. Symbol by Newspaper, 1962.....	122
Table 7-1	Positions Adopted by Newspapers, by year and significance.....	287-288
Table 7-2:	Projected Action of U.S. Symbol by Newspaper.....	292
Table A-1	Four Categories of Linguistic Attribution.....	310
Table A-2	Randomly Selected and Typical Stimulus Terms (LIB).....	311
Table A-3	Sample Assessment of a Negative LIB Article.....	313
Table A-4	Sample Assessment of a Positive LIB Article.....	314
Table B-1	Newspaper "Allegiance" according to Ayer's.....	315
Table B-2	Newspaper Circulation Figures, 1960 and 1970.....	328

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
LIST OF TABLES.....	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1: DYNAMISM FOR SOME, DOLDRUMS FOR OTHERS: THE ELECTION AND INAUGURATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY IN CANADIAN NEWSPAPERS.....	44
CHAPTER 2: A CANADIAN COUNTERBALANCE: QUALIFIED SUPPORT AND CAUTIOUS CRITICISM DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.....	89
CHAPTER 3: NOT SO BLACK AND WHITE: CANADIAN PERCEPTIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE WATTS RIOT OF 1965.....	137
CHAPTER 4: THE “GORDONIAN KNOT”: A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE CAN-AM RELATIONSHIP.....	190
CHAPTER 5: PLACING CANADA CLEANLY BETWEEN <i>MANHATTAN</i> AND THE ARCTIC CIRCLE IN APRIL, 1970.....	238
CONCLUSION.....	286
APPENDIX A: LINGUISTIC INTERGROUP BIAS: DETAILED DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY.....	309
APPENDIX B: NEWSPAPERS EXAMINED IN THIS STUDY.....	315
APPENDIX C: CARTOON LISTING.....	331
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	335

INTRODUCTION

Historian Frank Underhill once suggested that, “a Canadian [is] the model anti-American, the ideal anti-American, the anti-American as conceived in the mind of God.”¹ This contention that Canada contains a deep reservoir of anti-Americanism has a long tradition. Whether it is Lawrence Martin’s opinion that “anti-Americanism is a Canadian necessity,”² Gerald Caplan and James Laxer’s concept of “Canada as counter-America”³ or Pierre Berton’s suggestion that “anti-Americanism has always simmered beneath the... surface,”⁴ many historians have explored a variation of the claim that Canada has always contained an important and influential measure of counter-American sentiment. At the same time, the description of a “love-hate” relationship – J.B. Brebner *Rival Partners*,⁵ Thomas Axworthy’s “schizophrenic” reality,⁶ or J.M.S. Careless’s “great cliché... fearing it, resisting it [yet] leaning on it... emulating it”⁷ – has also been a pervasive rubric. Although many of these studies contain evidence concerning the presence of such sentiment in bi-lateral relations and Canadian identity, one is tempted to ask whether or not any of these characterizations is entirely accurate. What evidence has lead researchers to their conclusions concerning Canadian opinions of the United States? Are they are largely informed by anti-American sentiment or by some sort of binary? What methods did they use to evaluate perceptions in Canada? Which segments of Canadian society were considered in their study?

Part of the difficulty in sorting out these questions stems from the fact that many of the conclusions arrived at in the study of Canadian opinion tend to fall

prey to one of two potential limitations to the gathering of their evidence: first, more often than not, much of the evidence employed in these studies originates from within the Canadian political and economic elite. Second, much of the evidence itself is gathered in an unsystematic fashion. Given these concerns – one of conceptualization and the other of methodology – the question then arises as to whether or not a systematic study of popular sentiment in Canada would support the same conclusions. This thesis asks that very question. By systematically analyzing the portrayal of Americans in Canadian newspapers, this study raises the possibility that historians should revisit the depictions explored by Underhill and others.

The research strategy of this thesis has four major components. First, I use a specific time period for investigation, namely 1960-1970. This decade was chosen for its scholarly representation as a period of especially shrill anti-Americanism. Second, this thesis consists of the systematic study of newspaper coverage (articles, letters, editorials, editorial cartoons, columns, special features), and includes the introduction of the Linguistic Intergroup Bias, an analytical tool from the field of Social Psychology. Third, twenty newspapers have been selected from four Canadian cities – Halifax, Québec City, Ottawa, and Vancouver – to make up the content of the study. Fourth, rather than attempting a broad survey, coverage of five specific topics that prompted commentary on Americans, American motives, and the Canadian-American relationship were chosen: the election and inauguration of John F. Kennedy (October 1960 – January 1961); the Cuban Missile Crisis (October – December

1962); the Watts race riot (August 1965); a speech opposing the U.S. war in Vietnam given by Cabinet Minister Walter Gordon (May 1967); and the second voyage of the ice breaker *Manhattan* into the Canadian Arctic (April 1970).

Review of Canadian-American Scholarship

In an unpublished 1967 doctoral thesis entitled *Anti-Americanism in Canada*, Dr. Janet Morchain suggested that there was a major problem in the field of Canadian-American relations. The first problem was an adherence to what she termed the 'classic square' of history: political history, military history, economic history, and social history. What was missing from this equation was any treatment of the psychological, the attitudinal.⁸ As she noted, the study of Canadian-American political, economic, and social relations has a rich tradition, especially in Canada. Indeed, since the 1960s, a large number of works exploring Canadian-American relations have constructed a useful and informative historiography.⁹

The prolific list of these studies, which can span the entirety of the two countries' histories (but can also focus on smaller specific time frames), all take large-scale political and economic decisions, changes, and trends to be the determining factor in differential developments between the two countries.¹⁰ Some examples of how this approach can determine the final analysis include Robert Bothwell's conclusion that in the post-war period, "Canadian governments... shaped Canadians' concept of themselves,"¹¹ John Thompson and Stephen Randall's discussion of the growing tendency for the Canadian "Moose to roar" within federal and business circles;¹² and Stephen Clarkson's

assertion that for Canadians, “[i]ndependence... begins in Washington,”¹³ a statement substantiated only through a review of government foreign policy, ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’ and bi-national economic programs.

A similar trend has emerged within the literature dealing with anti-Americanism. Some authors, such as David Orchard in *The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American Expansionism*, have suggested that being defensive about American incursion is a cornerstone of the Canadian experience.¹⁴ Often, authors have suggested that groups of Canadians use this dynamic to their advantage. J.L. Granatstein, in his work, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism*, concludes that the reason anti-Americanism is one of the staples of Canadian society is because it is “almost always employed as a tool by Canadian political and economic élites bent on preserving or enhancing their power.”¹⁵

More recently, Patricia Wood reviewed a range of campaign material, as well as commentary by contemporary newspapers in order to describe a strategy developed by John A. Macdonald to turn the 1891 election campaign into a binary, with the Liberal Party platform of Commercial Union with the United States posited against the Conservative leader’s staunchly pro-British stance, crystallized in his “A British subject I was born, and a British subject I shall die” speech.¹⁶ This analysis connects with Granatstein’s *Yankee Go Home?*, which presents evidence that the Canadian elite called upon the image of the dangerous, greedy, American mob which the upright, rational, and moral Canadian citizen should fear.

These authors have addressed important questions concerning the views and opinions of political leaders, policy makers, and economic analysts, as well as the ways in which they shape Canadians' views of the United States. What they also create, however, is room for studies to confirm, or deny, the extent to which such trends readily extended themselves among the Canadian population, and whether such examinations represent the full range of Canadian opinion concerning the United States.

Indeed, more and more Canadian scholars seem to recognize the arguments of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin: sources of political and cultural leadership in a society are not fixed and allocated in rigid formats, but are more fluid and continuously influence one another. Whether understood, as Bakhtin suggested, as the social phenomenon of the 'carnival' or else, as others have interpreted his works, as 'circularity', there is a growing awareness that elites and the public inform each other's world views in "a circular relationship composed of reciprocal influences, which travel[s] from low to high as well as from, high to low."¹⁷

In addition to expanding in a conceptual sense, there is also room and opportunity for expanding the range of methodological techniques employed in studies of Canadian opinions of Americans. The literature that engages Canadian-American relations tends to be either a collection of 'testimonials' from prominent academics and politicians, or else a commentary on the major policies (economic, political, military, social) of the relationship. Both arrangements inform, but both tend to lack systematic planning.

For example, in his work *Our American Cousins: The United States Through Canadian Eyes*, Thomas S. Axworthy states that, “only Canada owes its very existence to a conscious rejection of the American Dream – without the United States to rebel against there would be no Canada.” His research strategy involved asking a host of Canadians to “write[...] about their adventures in the United States.”¹⁸ Other ‘testimonials,’ such as Laurier Lapierre’s *If You Love This Country* and Al Purdy’s *The New Romans: Candid Canadian Opinions of the United States*, follow a similar style.¹⁹

The difficulty with an unsystematic approach, of course, is that the reader has little indication of how and why the evidence was selected, leaving behind the challenge of integrating the findings into existing research and conceptions in the ways the author intended. Moreover, without providing a road map to the exploration of the evidence, many studies thus take on the appearance of claiming to provide insight on Canadian perceptions and opinions of the United States by arbitrarily engaging evidence from selected documents. For example, Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein in *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* suggest that at the beginning of Jean Chrétien’s first term as Prime Minister, “Anti-Americanism abounded in the arts and in public discourse, and the media regularly drew unflattering comparisons between the two countries.”²⁰ However, no media studies are cited, nor do they offer any parameters of how public discourse was measured.

In *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America*, Richard Gwyn’s chapter on 1957 – 1968 contains at least 10 separate references to “Canadian” worries,

“Canadian” consciousness, and “Canadian” skepticism, but offers no evidence for these claims. Statements like “most Canadians, if asked about the Nixon ‘shock’ of 1971, would probably guess...” and “Canadians loved Kennedy, but they didn’t care at all for the new Cold War” have no referenced origin.²¹ As such, when Gwyn states that “It’s no less a fact of life that Canadians will forever compare themselves individually to their giant neighbour,” a fact which “cannot be denied,”²² we are left wondering how Gwyn came to these conclusions, and on what evidence his “facts” are based. As another example, when S.F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown examined “The Annexation Movement and Its Effect on Canadian Opinion, 1837-67” in *Canada Views the United States*, there was no real indication of how or why the articles from the fourteen different newspapers in their study were chosen.²³

Both in terms of conceptual issues as well as those concerning methodology, this study builds directly upon the initiatives of other authors. In terms of widening the conceptual base of information, the literature examining Canadian popular perceptions of the United States can be traced back to an example from the 1930s, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s volume on *Canada and Her Great Neighbor*, which collected evidence concerning Canadian opinions of the United States using newspapers, magazines, interviews and circulation of a nation-wide survey.²⁴ Although the work is a self-proclaimed “design[.] to promote the cause of international goodwill” and as such had “some of the more extreme and irresponsible

criticisms of the United States... softened by editorial comment,"²⁵ it examines an extensive range of opinion in Canada, sorted by region, and including analysis of film, radio broadcasting, periodicals, Canadian newspapers, and a nation-wide survey on attitudes towards the United States. Although the sections on newspapers are inconsistent, several distinct portions, such as the review of the Montreal press, provide a detailed and systematic breakdown of the types of articles appearing on different topics (and concerning different countries) over the course of a decade.²⁶ As a result, the study's evidence remains open to specific analysis and allows direct comparisons with other eras.

The "popular" views explored in that project, while then ignored for several decades, were revived in the 1960s in S.F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown's *Canada Views the United States*. Canadians, as depicted in that study, believed they knew more about the U.S. than they actually did, were very critical of American society (for example, in terms of its crime rate and its system of government), and held a sense of moral superiority over Americans as a group, believing Canadians were less materialistic, more tolerant, and less prone to sensationalism.²⁷ In *Canada and Her Great Neighbour*, these attitudes were formed with input from national surveys and a review of the content of radio and the popular press. In *Canada Views of the United States*, these sources are not specifically analyzed, but are cited as informing several of the conclusions.

Moreover, although many studies continue to move in a 'top-down' direction, several other studies that have emerged since the 1960s have begun to recognize the need to add a 'bottom-up' component to the research.²⁸ In

1972, Mitchell Sharp suggested that in the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian-American relations could become more complex, and that this would be due to the fact that the public would “bear more critically on [the Canadian-American relationship] than when the relationship was more relaxed.”²⁹ Michael Bliss also admits that “the era when a comfortable political elite... could run the country from Parliament Hill... ended in the 1980s,” suggesting that the views and priorities of the electorate have become increasingly critical to the day-to-day governance of the day.³⁰

As a last example, we can turn again to Richard Gwyn’s *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America*. In it, Gwyn concludes that the nationalist movement in Canada was ultimately untenable because few Canadians were willing to toss aside the hope for economic and political well-being within the American sphere for the potential of home-grown alternatives. Gwyn’s claims about the opinions of Canadians are based only on the experiences of Walter Gordon, the relations of Diefenbaker and Kennedy, those of Pearson and Johnson, and a brief discussion of Canada’s best-selling authors and artists of the era.³¹ However, his work, along with the other works reviewed above, helped to introduce concepts and trends that lay the foundations for more systematic examination, and a more direct investigation of the range of popular opinions among Canadians.

Developing a Research Strategy for the Study of Canadian Opinion

1. Selecting a Time Frame

Where should a study of Canadian opinion about the United States begin? The alleged “ideological and political convergence” of the 1980s?³² The supposed North American isolation of the 1920s?³³ In fact, the literature on Canadian-American relations suggests that there is at least one decade in Canadian history which, thus far, was arguably the most prolific in terms of its public engagement of Canadian-American relations, the level of public debate concerning the ties between the two countries, and of the public expression of views about Americans: the 1960s. According to J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, and contextualizing the above opening statement by Frank Underhill, in the 1960s “Anti-Americanism had become the Canadian national sport... There had always been some truth in [what historian Frank Underhill had said], but in the 1960s the tone became shrill.”³⁴ Michael Bliss agrees, suggesting that the 1960s witnessed a “resurgence of anti-Americanism” which constituted a large portion of “the mainstream of Canadian opinion.”³⁵

The study of anti-Americanism in the Canadian context began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, just around the time Janet Morchain was lamenting its absence. In part, according to several authors, this was due to a perception that attitudes towards the United States were shifting. Looking back at the 1960s in *Issues for the 70s: Americanization*, Robert Fulford suggested that in Canadian society opinion towards the United States, especially negative opinion, had entered a “new” phase, one vastly different from its predecessors:

The old anti-Americanism was based on the simple proposition that England was good and the United States was bad. England was cultured and the United States was uncultured. Canada, being an extension of England, was therefore better than the United States. Therefore Canadians could look down on Americans. This was useful, because we need someone to look down on.³⁶

This form, he said, disappeared by the mid-60s when it became apparent that Europe and England were becoming more Americanized, and Canada had become much more of a North American nation than a European one.³⁷

In the 1980s, this theme became part of the historical narrative concerning Canada's post-war experience. In *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, John H. Thompson and Stephen Randall examine the antecedents of this shift in the late 1940s and 1950s, which brought the two countries into a new and heightened partnership following WWII. By then, however, Canadians would be influenced by the new realities of the Cold War (and a bi-polar world), a new obsession with pop culture, and the loss of Britain as a counterweight in Canadian foreign policy.³⁸

However, for several authors, the lenses through which to examine this shift would not diverge from Morchain's 'classic square.' Robert Bothwell's *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership*, in which the author labels the 1960s "The Time of Troubles," contemplates the beginning of this "Time" and concludes that "if any single day can be so identified, it was 10 June 1957" when John Diefenbaker, who held anti-American leanings, was elected Prime Minister.³⁹ This echoes an earlier study by Gerald Clark, who, in 1965, was already referring to his own era as "Days of Affluence and Strain."⁴⁰ The same themes dominate J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer's *For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* which labels 1957-1963 as

“The Crisis Years” and 1968-1976 as “The Failed Revolution” because of the poor relationship Prime Minister Diefenbaker had with President Kennedy, and the subsequent efforts of Pierre Trudeau to loosen Canada’s ties with the U.S.

Given all of these authors’ characterizations of the 1960s as the “shrill” decade, there seems no potentially richer source of sustained commentary on Americans by Canadians. Nonetheless, sampling a range of opinions taken throughout the decade would serve only to reproduce some of the very shortcomings that this study is attempting to avoid. As such, the specific strategy employed was to select a number of specific events which 1) remained sensitive to possible shifts of opinion over the course of the decade, and 2) reached beyond local implications and thus stood an excellent chance of being covered more widely.⁴¹ A number of pilot studies revealed five such occasions, and the goal of this thesis is to examine each in a systematic fashion.⁴²

Chapter 1 looks at the campaign, election, and inauguration of John F. Kennedy beginning in October 1960, and continuing through the end of January 1961. This election, which propelled Kennedy into the international spotlight and marked the first election of a Catholic President in the United States, sparked much discussion in Canada. Chapter 2 examines the Cuban Missile Crisis and the subsequent discussion it fostered, beginning on October 15, 1962, and continuing to December 15, 1962. Chapter 3 looks at the Watts Riot in Los Angeles, which took place in August 1965. This riot, among the worst in U.S. history, marked a shift in the struggle for Civil Rights movement in the United

States, and offered an opportunity for Canadians to consider their stance on the goals and meaning of that movement.

Chapter 4 considers the May 13 announcement of Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance in the Liberal Government of Lester Pearson, which openly called for an end to American involvement in Vietnam, and the associated demand that the Canadian government demand that the United States withdraw. Although it was not the first time that a member of the Canadian government criticized American actions in Southeast Asia, this statement came several months before the Pearson government finally decided to officially oppose those actions. Chapter 5 examines coverage surrounding the Arctic Waters Pollution Protection Act presented by the Liberal government to Parliament in April, 1970, a bill which prompted formal objections from the United States and which historians in Canada trumpet as a thinly-veiled attack on the American presence in the Canadian territorial North.

2. Selecting a type of Evidence

The Use of Newspapers

One key feature of historical research is the importance of examining evidence from the time period under question. Although interviews that take place years after the event offer unique perspectives on their meaning, few resources can replace evidence that originated at the time. It is from these direct sources that we can glean immediate reaction and perception in its contemporary context. As a window onto the era under review, this study uses newspapers.

Although several scholars have considered whether public opinion informs the content of newspapers, or newspapers instead lead public opinion, this thesis is more interested in the manner through which newspapers and public opinions inform one other. There are several convincing arguments that suggest that in the end, the goal of a newspaper is to connect with its readers, and that, more than anything else, this goal is the result of economic forces. As Paul Rutherford explains, newspapers since the turn of the twentieth century have evolved into “standardized products,” consumer ventures that seek to maximize profits, mostly by reaching the greatest number of readers and thus taking in the greatest amount of revenue.⁴³ Therefore, newspapers, in an effort to reach those diverse readers, shifted much of their content to the interests of their audience, be it a high degree of local news, or “specialty” pages for women, families, and for the specific coverage of business and sports.⁴⁴

Michael Schudson argues that American newspapers, rather than continuing their nineteenth-century role as ‘party organs’, altered their editorial focus and content in the twentieth century in response to public taste and preference.⁴⁵ The circulation figures for any given city’s or district’s newspapers reveals the tenacity of certain papers in stark contrast to the short-lived character of others, or the need for several papers to amalgamate, either because of outside competition or to pre-empt it.⁴⁶ The formula for a successful newspaper, however, remains clear: if people are not interested in reading the content, the paper does not succeed. For the most part, those papers that survive over long periods of time are able to print news and views that readers can relate to and

are interested in. As Rutherford points out, “the mass media cannot alter, either dramatically or quickly, an individual’s decided views about well-known issues. Indeed, the media seem most effective when they endeavour to reinforce existing opinions.”⁴⁷ As such, the relationship between those who produce a newspaper and those who read is not unlike the “circularity” of Bakhtin’s work; rather than the dynamic being a unidirectional flow of influence and information from one group to another, it is instead more of an interactive process. As a result, the product we analyze – the newspaper – is not an “unmixed expression,” but rather the cumulative result of an ongoing exchange.⁴⁸

Newspapers in Canada are published daily or weekly, within specific regional ranges, and, perhaps most importantly, have specific intended audiences (region, language, gender, segment of the population). Moreover, newspapers, unlike many consumer products, even allow some manner of direct audience feedback in the form of letters.⁴⁹ At times, newspapers certainly do focus on one angle or story for an extended period of time. In these cases, the relationship between newspapers and the public can be said to be one of “priming,” the act of increasing (usually temporarily) the public’s access to a particular set of ideas, and to their own corresponding attitudes. As a study by Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro on elections suggests, this process does not depend on altering an individual’s personal preferences or opinions on the issue (which they and others suggest is actually not only difficult, but unlikely), but on focusing the public’s attention on a particular issue, and then providing the main basis for its evaluation. As such, newspapers may help to “activate”

individual attention to an issue or range of issues without necessarily influencing their specific opinions or judgments.⁵⁰

The goals that influenced my newspaper selection were based on language (English and French), continuity of the paper throughout the period under study, and an attempt not only to include large dailies, but also newspapers printed for smaller (but still consistent) audiences. Whenever possible, I omitted any newspapers which were either very short-lived or which ended publication shortly after 1970.⁵¹ Papers that began in the latter end of the decade were also excluded. Moreover, no newspaper used in this study had fewer than 1500 readers.

The efforts to reach smaller more specialized audiences proved possible for two types of newspapers: newspapers produced by and for particular religious communities, and newspapers produced for and by university students. The religious press was still active in the 1960s, though certainly waning from its prominence in the preceding century (especially, but not exclusively, in Quebec). These papers were often produced and sustained through the efforts and funding of a local religious body; newspapers in this study include the views of Catholic, Anglican, and Jewish communities. The 1960s were also an important era for the university press; given the expansion in size, impact, and enrolment in many Canadian universities in this period, an active student press was a stable characteristic of many local newspaper environments.⁵² Both of these groups displayed a dedication to informing readers through the experiences of a

particular lens, namely either that of a specific religious community or that of a university student.

Choice of Cities

Four cities in Canada were selected for participation in the study. The choice of cities was influenced by three main factors: a desire to depart from the established research focus on Toronto and Montreal, a desire to capture a degree of regional variation, and a desire to include newspapers in both English and French. Firstly, the existing literature on Canadian opinions of the United States, and on Canadian-American relations in particular, is based on Toronto and Montreal's major publications, such as the *Globe and Mail*, *Toronto Star*, *Montreal Gazette*, and *Le Devoir*.⁵³ If one of the goals of this study is to determine whether or not Canadian perceptions of the United States were as unified and "shrill" as several authors have stated, then the investigation would have to be moved away from the main centres of their investigation, namely Toronto and Montreal.

Secondly, my concern was one perhaps typical of a present day Canadian: the role of region. In his article "The Cultural Imagination and the National Questions," Arthur Kroker evokes author George Woodcock's assessment of Canada as a space where identity is drawn from region. "We [Canada] are in cultural terms, as we should be in political terms, a confederation of regions."⁵⁴ As several Canadian scholars began to express in the 1980s and 1990s, region, while a component and key contributor to a sense of personal and

group identity in Canada, is not necessarily a limitation or absolute boundary of identity, but instead may constitute one of several central tenets of identity.

In his review of the emergence and treatment of Ramsay Cook's notion of "limited identities" Phillip Buckner notes that when the rise of Quebec nationalism challenged the post-war consensus among historians to further the aims of a unified identity bound up on a journey from 'colony to nation', Cook and contemporaries like J.M.S. Careless pegged Canada's distinctiveness to a collection of limited identities, rather than to the existence of one homogenous identity.⁵⁵ Buckner also described the post-1980 split among historians in Canada as between those who continued to embrace regionalism as a central basis for constructing national history, and those who rejected it due to its perceived role in dismantling the fulcrum of a national Canadian identity.⁵⁶ The primary axis around which this debate over the merits of regionalism-as-starting-point rotates is the degree to which it either strengthens identity (the argument of its proponents) or destroys identity (the argument of its detractors). In either case, the central goal remains the same: defining identity as it pertains to region. One of the questions asked by this thesis is: Do regional variations constitute a major factor in the representation of the United States in newspapers?

Thirdly, there is the question of language.⁵⁷ This study includes French-language newspapers to address the lack of French-language evidence in several earlier studies, an omission that several authors noted.⁵⁸

Given these three desires, I selected four cities: Halifax, Quebec City, Ottawa, and Vancouver. Halifax was chosen as a city from the Maritime region

and because of its proximity to and historical and cultural connections with the American New England states. Quebec City was selected because of its predominantly French-speaking population and its identity as a provincial and cultural capital. Ottawa was picked because as Canada's capital, it maintains a close eye on the international scene, much of which involves the United States. Vancouver was selected as the fourth city because of its position in Canada's west, and its cultural connections to the western U.S. states of Oregon, Washington, and California.

This thesis draws upon every English and French-language newspaper available to researchers (as of 2001) from Halifax, Québec City, Ottawa, and Vancouver that ran through the 1960-1970 period.⁵⁹ In total, twenty different newspapers provided the content on which this study is based, constituting more than two thousand pages of material, evidence with over two million words of text and over three hundred images. For each of these pages, every item that referred to the United States, Americans, America, or specific American public figures became part of the study, including all words and images in the relevant items.

3. Systematic Research

In her 1967 unpublished doctoral thesis, Janet Morchain noted a second problem with the study of Canadian-American relations. This problem, she wrote, stemmed from a lack of investigation by scholars into the attitudes that Canadians and Americans held of each other. "We have investigated all the

manifold and specific arguments and disagreements arising between our two countries... [but] [w]e have done all this without any real inquiry into the attitudes of the two countries toward each other. We have neglected their psychological histories. We have, in a word, not only been putting the cart before the horse, but using the cart without the horse.”⁶⁰ Yet, as Morchain lamented some thirty years ago, few current historical works take note of the importance of systematically studying and understanding the role of attitudes in Canadian-American relations.

Two approaches, both taken in this study, help to engage these dynamics: First, I investigate Canadian opinions of the United States by operationalizing the debate around them. Second, I employ an analytical technique that can systematically measure one group’s opinions of another.

In *Orientalism*, Edward Said addresses the dynamic of a group’s preconceived or projected preconceptions of another group’s characteristics. When infused with the inevitable power dynamic and the cultural and political agenda of those projecting the image, “Orientalist” thought is able to present the image of the ‘other’ as ‘objective’ ‘knowledge’ rather than as a construction.⁶¹ While Said’s framework – which implies that a dominant power constructs the image of a lesser power – is not directly applicable to the case of Canadians constructing an image of the United States – which is a case of a lesser power constructing an image of a more dominant one – the theoretical implication of his work in terms of the construction of identities by one group of a another group is nonetheless instructive for the present endeavour.

The manner in which these ideas apply is considered in James G. Carrier's *Occidentalism*, a work which expands on Said's original theory by suggesting that a group's image of itself is constructed by combining all of the aspects of self-imagination, the image of the other, and the other's image of self.⁶² Indeed, there is a connection between the construction of the 'out-group' (those who are not like me) and the construction of the 'in-group' (those who are like me), and once established, the perceptions they shape may appear to the in-group as concrete knowledge rather than what they are, namely, circumspection.

The field of Social Psychology has focused a great deal of attention on the importance of a group's image of itself and a group's image of those outside of it. Often referred to as Social Cognition⁶³ (or Social Beliefs⁶⁴), this research field is interested in the underlying process of *attribution*, the ways in which people make sense of others through direct or indirect observation. Those who employ attribution theories are interested in understanding "the cognitive processes by which individuals come to understand each other."⁶⁵ Part and parcel of this exploration, and indeed, of being human, is the tendency for people to make mistakes when attributing other's behaviour, introducing a strong measure of bias in how others are perceived.

The most important of these biases is called the Fundamental Attribution Error. The theory suggests that one of the central goals of perceiving others is to decide whether an action was primarily caused by the other's general disposition, called an *internal* attribution, or caused by the situation itself, called an *external* attribution.⁶⁶ For instance, if a colleague of mine is late for a meeting, I can

believe that it is because he is lazy (internal attribution) or because there was a traffic jam (external attribution).

In general, studies have found that when people do not know with certainty what the cause was, they tend to attribute causation to internal factors such as personality characteristics and personal dispositions.⁶⁷ Thus, the Fundamental Attribution Error is defined as “The tendency for observers to underestimate situational influences and overestimate dispositional influences upon others’ behaviour,”⁶⁸ or “The tendency to emphasize the influence of personal dispositions and to discount situational influences when attributing causes to the behaviour of others.”⁶⁹ Scholars do not agree on the reasons for this tendency. Some explanations point towards the relative simplicity of generating and understanding personal actions as compared to attempting to generate a more complex and multifaceted environmental scenario. Others attributed its existence to the legal, cultural, and social tendency in Western society to emphasize the responsibility and accountability of the individual.⁷⁰ Whatever the reason, however, the theory holds that as observers we tend to believe that people *are* the way they act, regardless of the mitigating situation at hand.⁷¹

As one might expect, this error or bias does not only apply when I, as an individual, perceive you as an individual, but also when I, as a member of a group or community, perceive you as a member of a different, separate group or community: an ‘other.’ This theory suggests that human beings, through sheer genetic evolution as well as thousands of years of shared living, are social

animals, and identify themselves not only as individuals, but also as members of a group or groups, each of which may shift according to the situation at hand. David Berreby illustrated the shifting nature of our identities with an old joke, which has the Lone Ranger and Tonto out of ammunition and surrounded by Native American warriors: “Looks like we’re done for, Tonto!”... “What do you mean ‘we,’ White man?”⁷²

Social Cognition theory suggests that people tend to categorize their understanding of the social world as in-groups and out-groups: An in-group is “my” group, the “us” of my conceptual world, “a group of people who share a... common sense of identity.” An out-group is the ‘other,’ the “them” of my conceptual world, “a group that people perceive as distinctively different from or apart from their in-group.”⁷³

The strategy I use in this thesis, then, is comprised of three overarching concerns: first, I seek to analyze Canadian *perceptions* of Americans as evident during specific events in the 1960s. Secondly, I will examine systematically the newspapers that contain these perceptions. Third, I will systematically examine the content of those newspapers using textual content analysis, cartoon analysis, and a newly-developed technique of linguistic analysis developed in Social Psychology, one which measures the degree of the authors’ identification with the subject revealed within the very choice of words (adjectives, nouns, verbs) used when writing their newspaper articles.

A New Approach to Newspaper Analysis: The Linguistic Intergroup Bias

Every article, editorial, letter, column, and special feature, published in each newspaper within the prescribed timelines of each event, and which mentioned the United States, Americans, America, or specific American figures became part of this study. However, the exploration of American as 'other' required an additional tool. In order to add this component of analysis, I have adopted, from Social Psychology, a new model of exploration which can measure the bias which people exhibit in favour of those like themselves as well as their tendency to negatively bias against those not in their in-group.⁷⁴

Originally explored as a phenomenon dubbed the Ultimate Attribution Error, scholars suggested that individuals represented their world in simplified terms: members of my in-group are similar, are like me, and are favoured by me; members of my out-group are not similar, are not like me and are unfavoured by me. This tendency can be represented by the following chart:

	In-group	Out-group
Positive Action	Internal Attribution	External Attribution
Negative Action	External Attribution	Internal Attribution

75

More recently, researchers began probing the possibility that individuals may express this attributional error in language, such as in the case of newspapers. Developed in the mid-1990s by a small group of Italian researchers led by Anne Maass at the University of Padua, and originally developed to explore the possibility of measuring covert racist attitudes in Italian society,⁷⁶ the

Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) was created in order to help examine “the role that language may play in the transmission and maintenance of positive in-group perceptions and negative out-group perceptions.”⁷⁷ Simply put, the model attempts to identify whether or not there is a systematic bias in the choice of language used to convey the attribution of actions.

There are two categories of language used to describe action: **abstract**, a technical term meaning words that are vague or generalized, and **concrete**, a technical term meaning words that are specific. The predicted relationship is this:

	Positive Behaviour	Negative Behaviour
In-group	Abstract Language	Concrete Language
Out-group	Concrete Language	Abstract Language

78

Thus, for example, in the case of positive behaviour, “an in-group member offering help to a needy person may be described as ‘helpful’ or ‘altruistic,’ whereas an out-group member engaging in exactly the same activity may be described as ‘helping,’” emphasizing the temporary and situational elements of the scenario as opposed to it being a more general indicator of disposition. “In the case of [negative]... behaviours, the in-group member may be described as ‘hurting somebody,’” a temporary and unique state of affairs, “whereas the out-group member may be described as ‘aggressive,’” a negative and more “permanent” attribution.”⁷⁹

More specifically, the LIB model outlines four categories, each of which correspond to 4 levels of abstraction, running from very concrete to abstract: 1) Descriptive Action Verbs (DAV) – these represent the most concrete category, as “they provide an objective description of a specific, observable event.” An example of a DAV would be, “A hits B.” 2) Interpretive Action Verbs (IAV) – these indicate a slightly more abstract level of attribution as they “describe a larger class of behaviours without identifying the specific behaviour to which they refer in a given context.” An example of an IAV would be, “A hurts B.” 3) State Verbs (SV) – these “describe enduring psychological states that generalize beyond a specific situation and behaviour but are referred to a specific object. An example of this would be “A hates B,” with B acting as the specific object being referred to. 4) Adjectives (ADJ) – these are the most abstract terms, and describe a disposition “that generalizes beyond situations and objects” and which provides “generalizations across specific behavioural events, across situations, and across objects.” An example of an ADJ would be “A is aggressive.”⁸⁰

Thus, for example, if the *Ottawa Citizen* prints “U.S. Begins to Move Against Cuba,” it is making a DAV as it is describing and relaying a specific, observable event; if it prints “U.S. Attack is Harming Cuban Economy,” it is making an IAV, as the term “harming” is somewhat more subjective than “Move” in the previous statement (move can be easily corroborated, whereas “Harming” requires some interpretation); if the *Ottawa Citizen* prints “The U.S. Rejects Cuban Sovereignty” it is making an SV because it is pointing to an “enduring psychological state,” a point of view that transcends the immediate situation; if it

prints “U.S. Aggressive,” it is making an ADJ, because this statement moves beyond all specific context and implies a more permanent feature of the subject’s character. The closer its language is to a concrete statement (DAV), the stronger the implication that this action is considered to be *characteristic* of the subject, something which is a stable feature; the closer the statement is to an abstract statement (ADJ), the stronger the implication that this action is not characteristic of the subject, but is exceptional or circumstantial behaviour.

Because we see ourselves, and those like ourselves, as positive, if the *Ottawa Citizen* prints “U.S. Begins to Move Against Cuba,” a concrete statement, in an article that portrays the U.S. positively, then they are saying that the U.S. generally engages in positive behaviour, “just like us.” If the same concrete statement appears in a negative article about the United States, then the *Citizen* is stating that unlike us, the U.S. is portraying negative behaviour. At the other end of the spectrum, if the article presents a positive impression of the U.S. but prints an ADJ statement such as “U.S. Aggression Begins,” they are suggesting that positive action is not characteristic of the U.S., and they are thus negative, and not like us. If an overall negative article, however, describes U.S. actions in the form of ADJ statements, then they are suggesting that negative behaviour is not common, and is an exception to the rule that the U.S. is usually positive, “just like us.”⁸¹

The LIB has already been used to study the Mass Media. One study, for instance, specifically compared the language used by newspaper journalists and those used by television reporters when discussing a range of events, including

outbreaks of anti-Semitism in Italy and the language used to cover losses incurred by the Italian national soccer team.⁸² As a tool, the LIB is meant for looking at collective, not individual psychology, in the sense that it does not specifically attempt to determine an individual's opinion, but tracks how groups of people shift their opinion over time and in reaction to specific historical changes and events.⁸³

The use of the LIB offers two methodological advantages to this study of newspaper perception: it provides a systematic analytical strategy, and it deals with perceptions of the 'other'. Critiques of newspaper studies often concern the implied tendencies to be overly selective about what to include from a very small number of examples, or to 'cherry-pick' data and examples which happen to support certain theories or hypotheses. By using the set scale provided by the LIB, however, an established methodology can be applied to a limited, defined set of material. This systematic approach can then help increase our understanding of the meaning and messages of textual sources.

In terms of the material included for study, there is a substantial difference between those included in general newspaper analysis and those that were part of the LIB analysis. For example, in Chapter 2, any article that contained (among other terms) "Kennedy" was pulled out for future examination. The LIB, however, deals with in-group and out-group perceptions only. Thus, in order to be included in the LIB sample, an article on Kennedy must have included a judgment or an opinion about him. The vast majority (95.5%) of the articles included in the entire study did not contain this kind of commentary; all of those that did were included

in the LIB analysis. As a result, the LIB analysis is a complete set of every article (90) that contained at least some degree of commentary on the United States linked to one of the five events under review.

By examining the type of language used in the newspapers when discussing Americans (abstract or concrete), the LIB can thus be used to measure the extent to which each newspaper (and by some extension, its readership) and various clusters of newspapers (region, language) are presenting or treating Americans as the “other.”

Cartoon Analysis

Michael Adams suggested in *Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada, and the Myth of Converging Values*, that “Americans are reflected in so many funhouse mirrors that it would be remarkable if we saw them, collectively, as anything other than caricatures.” As with the systematic analysis of the newspaper’s text, this thesis systematically analyzes the stereotypes, images, and tropes that have become repetitive depictions of Americans in Canadian cartoons. As such, this study includes all of the newspapers’ editorial cartoons dealing with the five specific events.⁸⁴

As researchers have recently suggested, a cartoon is a unique way of pictorially making a political, cultural, or social statement;⁸⁵ cartoons complement textual opinion with visual description. In the 19th century, the French art critic Champfleury called the cartoon “le cri des citoyens.”⁸⁶ While text has certain advantages for conveying information and formulating arguments, “the visual

image”, as some researchers suggest, “is supreme in its ability to arouse emotions”.⁸⁷ “The cartoonist deals with abstractions, ideas and emotions that are beyond the comprehension of a lens. Ask a photographer to take a picture of [Quebec Separatism or the Just Society] or the Monroe Doctrine, and [they] will be baffled”.⁸⁸

In other words, cartooning is a symbolic art. Symbols in cartoons are like shorthand between the artist and the audience. Cartoonists strive for simplicity, for ideas unencumbered with labels, for the elimination of what one cartoonist called “the need for a program to tell the players one from the other.”⁸⁹

Moreover, the cross-cultural nature of certain characteristics, such as stupidity, canniness, cowardice, boastfulness, and aggressiveness, which are commonly “made fun of” among the majority of the world’s peoples suggests the ability of a cartoon to breach national and linguistic barriers.⁹⁰

The cartoon is an image that specifically engages the viewers’ cognitive ability to perceive and quickly decode a complex scene drawing out the symbols and meaning in a matter of seconds.⁹¹ So, while it is possible to see the purpose of a cartoon as making its reader ‘laugh or groan’ and then move on to the editorials, it is exactly the cartoon’s ability to cut immediately to the point, to immediately access a conception, or a perception, which makes it such a potent tool. As one author puts it, “...a political cartoonist should have in him a little of the clown, the poet, the historian, the artist, and the dreamer.”⁹²

Several methods for interpreting cartoons have been developed in recent years. Cartoons can first be analyzed for what one might call “communicative”


qualities, which are the basic features that the sketch is communicating. This type of analysis takes into account how often a particular symbol or figure is portrayed, what their proportional size is as compared to others in the same sketch, [Fig. 1-1, Fig. 1-2] or what characteristics (aggressive, passive,

U.S. Larger than Canada



1-1

Canada, U.S. (and U.K.) Equal in Size




1-2

benevolent) they tend to exert. [Fig. 1-3 – Aggressive, Fig. 1-4 – Passive, Fig. 1-5 – Benevolent]. Such endeavours would present the artists' conception of how their drawn representations fit into a certain context. Thus, Fig. 1-1 presents a Canada that is at the complete mercy of the United States. Not only is Canada represented by a fish (literally the food of the American cat), depicting an enormous physical size differential, but also in the image, Canada is completely defenceless. Whether or not the American cat decides to do nothing, to drink the Canadian fish's water, or to completely consume the fish itself, there is nothing the fish can do about it. In contrast, Fig. 1-2 suggests that although Canada, the U.S., and England are all different countries, they suffer from the same ailment. The leaders of each country are all stricken with internal problems, each of which threatens the success of their respective political careers, if not the health of the

countries themselves. As a result, the artist suggests that if domestic nationalist minorities are the measure of a society's well being, they are all equals.

Aggressive



1-3

Passive



1-4

Benevolent



"Let's not a look for this thing"

1-5

Figure 1-3, 1-4, and 1-5 all contain a depiction of the same character, John F. Kennedy. What they impart, however, is that there are different manners in which the characteristics, intentions, and emotions of that character, who also often represents the United States, can be expressed. In 1-3, Kennedy charges

towards Cuba menacingly holding an axe over his head, ready to chop. His facial expression suggests an element of rage, perhaps even a maddening one, and the artist may be suggesting that the situation between the U.S., U.S.S.R., and Cuba are quickly getting out of hand. In contrast, Fig 1-4 depicts a Kennedy who is simply bored. This Kennedy is not powerful or dominant, but sits slouched, holding an empty beer mug, completely uninterested in the entertainment offered to him by a German companion. This cartoon suggests very little dynamism and certainly no intent for action. In 1-5, however, Kennedy is indeed acting, and in a way that will benefit others. Having almost released the “monster” of nuclear war, Kennedy, who has a worried look on his face, is ready to work together with Premier Khrushchev, his Russian counterpart, to ensure that the situation comes back under control.

“Communicative” studies offer the analysis of this type of information. One such study conducted by Ofer Feldman surveyed the images of six Japanese Prime Ministers in 2 major dailies over the first parts of their terms, taking note of how often the Prime Minister was featured in cartoons, especially as compared to other prominent figures. The author was then able to observe how the perceptions of Japanese readers shifted as their prime ministers set out their early policy packages.⁹³

A second type of investigation, sometimes referred to as a “sociological” analysis, attempts to tie patterns of image selection to broader social themes, such as nativism and backlash⁹⁴ or class conflict.⁹⁵ One excellent example is a study on images of Hillary Clinton, who, author Charlotte Templin believed was

selected as the representative of a mid-90s backlash against the professional woman, a feeling of resentment shrouded in “comical” cartoons depicting the First Lady as the one actually running the country. However, these same cartoons also depict Hillary Clinton as a ‘radical feminist,’ if not completely ‘masculine,’ a clear violation of gender roles for the woman who symbolically, Templin argued, is basically there to protect the heterosexuality of the President [Fig. 1-6]. In attacking Hillary Clinton, then, Templin suggested that the papers were in fact assaulting the “90s woman,” and the supposed accompanying lack of “family values.”⁹⁶



1-6

More recently, however, scholars like Bruce Rettalack have explored a third and different way to examine these recurring tropes, taking cartoons to be a key part of a community’s hegemonic discourse or what he calls “a potent weapon in [the] discursive arsenal.”⁹⁷ Rettalack is thus considering notions of the ‘other’ in the manner theorized by Edward Said.⁹⁸ According to another cartoon scholar, Stephen Morris, Said believed that “all societies acquire their identities through juxtaposition to another: an alien, a foreigner, or an enemy.”⁹⁹ What Rettalack suggests is that, especially in the era before television and radio, one

could track the communal conversations that different groups of Canadians had with each other, and thus how their ideas evolved, by tracking the symbols in their cartoons. One of Retallack's studies, for instance, focuses on images of the Irish, a group that, as historian Noel Ignatiev suggests in *How the Irish Became White*, slowly moved from an outsider in North American society to an insider, and a part of the dominant white community. [Fig. 1-7] Rettalack is a prime example of this emerging style of cartoon analysis, in this case examining the shift in this "discursive" Irishman by tracking his sketched features, at first drawn in a simian, or ape-like fashion, and then slowly moving towards a more upright and confident posture.¹⁰⁰ Fig. 1-7, which originates in the early period of Retallack's study, depicts a highly simian Irishman, recognizable by his clover-leaf hat and stick, who is observed by the much more human-looking John Bull (England) and Uncle Sam (United States).



1-7

This image of the Irishman was contrasted with the strong and always confidently erect Canadian symbol [Fig. 1-8], establishing the boundaries and

characteristics of both self and other through image, and communicating those boundaries via the cartoon. In Fig. 1-8, Jack Canuck, a common cartoon symbol for Canada around the turn of the 20th century, welcomes a family of Doukhobours, who defer in their posture and demeanor to the strong and confident Jack. As a result of the implicit messages transmitted through form and code, Retallack suggests that even if historians have lost some of the context of the cartoon, and thus can no longer be certain what the cartoons are saying, they can still, by envisioning the cartoon as a 'text,' understand "how they are saying it, to what effect, and for whose purposes."¹⁰¹



1-8

Outline of Thesis

This thesis will explore perceptions of the United States by examining their appearance in Canadian newspapers. It will endeavour to enhance our understanding of how representations, interpretations, and symbols of “Americans” manifested themselves in a range of Canadian newspapers and in response to specific events during the 1960s.

Chapters 1 through 5 constitute the five major case studies that contribute to the general conclusions reached in this thesis. Each chapter begins with the results of the LIB analysis. It then reviews the existing literature concerning the range of interpretations about the event in question, not necessarily in terms of its key actors or chronology, but in terms of what meanings have since been ascribed to that event by Canadian and American scholars. This is followed by detailed analysis of the newspapers' contents and editorial cartoons, and ends with a brief chapter conclusion.

Following all of these case studies, Chapter 6 then offers conclusions based on a complete analysis of the five events under study.

¹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), p.236. Granatstein and Hillmer do not provide the origins of this statement, and I have been unable to find it among Underhill's works, including Frank Underhill, "Canada and the North Atlantic Triangle," *Centennial Review*. 1, no. 4 (1957), which contains a host of similar statements concerning Canadian-American relations. However, a number of other scholars and journalists have since attributed Underhill's words to the Granatstein and Hillmer work.

² Lawrence Martin, *The Presidents & The Prime Ministers – Washington and Ottawa Face to Face: The Myth of Bilateral Bliss, 1867-1982*. (Marham, ON: Paperjacks, Ltd., 1982), p.17.

³ Gerald L. Caplan and James R. Laxer, "Un-American Traditions in Canada," in Ian Lumsden, ed. *Close the 49th Parallel etc.: The Americanization of Canada*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p.308

⁴ Pierre Berton, *Why We Act Like Canadians: A Personal Exploration of Our National Character*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), p.6.

⁵ Carl C. Berger, "Internationalism, Continentalism, and the Writing of History: Comments on the Carnegie Series on the Relations of Canada and the United States," in Richard A. Preston, ed. *The Influence of the United States on Canadian Development: Eleven Case Studies*. (Durham, N.C., Duke University press 1972), p.37.

⁶ Thomas A. Axworthy, ed. *Our American Cousins: The United States Through Canadian Eyes*. (Toronto: James Lormier and Company, 1987), p.ix.

⁷ J.M.S. Careless, "Hurray for the Sears and Gripses," in Al Purdy, ed. *The New Romans: Candid Canadian Opinions of the United States*. (Edmonton: Hertig Publishers, 1968), p.132.

⁸ Janet Kerr Morchain, *Anti-Americanism in Canada, 1871-1891*. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc.) 1967, pp.1-2.

⁹ Among the many ways in which studies of Canadian-American relations could be categorized, those that examine the theme of continuity provide an excellent starting point. Such works include Brebner, John Bartlet. *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966, Hugh Aitken *The American Economic Impact on Canada* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959, G.A. Rawlyk, "Canada and the American Revolution: Two Hundred Years of Realizing That Rejection Was Really Acceptance." *Queen's Quarterly* 83 (1976): 377-87, Pierre Berton *Why We Act Like Canadians: A personal exploration of our national character*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), Edlegard E. Mahant and Graeme S. Mount. *An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations*. (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1989), Seymour Martin Lipset. *Continental Divide: The*

Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada. New York: Routledge, 1990, David Orchard. *The Fight For Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American Expansionism*. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company Limited, 1993, David Haglund. "The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: (Geo)Political Metaphor and the Logic of Canadian Foreign Policy." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 26, no.2 (Summer 1999): 211-235, Michael B. Davie, *Bushwhacked: Coping with the American Superpower and other Post-Cold War Dilemmas*. (Ancaster, Ont.: Manor House, 2002), and Stéphane Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004).

¹⁰ Additional examples of 'political-economic' surveys of Canadian-American relations include Lawrence Martin, *The Presidents and Prime Ministers: Washington and Ottawa Face to Face: The Myth of Bilateral Bliss, 1867-1982*. (Toronto: Paperjacks, 1982), Randall White, *Fur Trade to Free Trade*. (Toronto: Dundurn, 1988), Andrew Axline et al. *Continental Community*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), Lansing Lamont and J. Duncan Edmonds, *Friends So Different*. (Ottawa: U of Ottawa P, 1989), Edelgard E. Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, *An Introduction to Canadian American Relations*. 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Meuthen, 1989), and John W. Holmes, *Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship*. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981).

¹¹ Robert Bothwell. *Canada and the United States: Politics of Partnership*. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992) p. 71.

¹² John H. Thompson and Stephen J. Randall in *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*. 3rd Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), p.214.

¹³ Stephen Clarkson, ed. *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p.3.

¹⁴ David Orchard. *The Fight For Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American Expansionism*. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company Limited, 1993. Orchard's argument remains remarkably consistent throughout the book, whether it is in a discussion of the Alaska Boundary Dispute entitled "The Yankee South of Us Must South of Us Remain," or two discussions concerning the Free Trade Agreement of 1988, one entitled "The Most Critical Date on This Continent" and the other entitled "It is Manifest Destiny."

¹⁵ Granatstein, 1996, op. cit., p.x.

¹⁶ Patricia Wood, "Defining 'Canadian': Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism." *Journal of Canadian Studies*. Vol. 36, No.2 (Summer 2001) Laced within the layers of Conservative anti-Americanism, however, were allusions to both Macdonald's and Britain's manhood, and to the undesirable ethnic components of American society, elements which Wood maintains appealed more directly to a wealthy middle- and upper-class voting base.

¹⁷ Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*. Translated by John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p.xii. For summaries and discussions on Bakhtin's theories, see also M.M. Bakhtin, *The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, and Voloshinov*. (London: E. Arnold, 1994) and Irena R. Makaryk, Ed. *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) p. 242-245, 516-518.

¹⁸ Thomas S. Axworthy, *Our American Cousins: The United States Through Canadian Eyes*. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1987), p.x-xiii.

¹⁹ Laurier Lapierre, ed. *If You Love This Country: Facts and Feelings On Free Trade*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987) and Al Purdy, ed. *The New Romans: Candid Canadian Opinions of the United States*. (Edmonton: Hertig Publishers, 1968.)

²⁰ Norman Hiller and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*. (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994), p.343.

²¹ Gwyn, op. cit., p.103-117.

²² Ibid., p.196.

²³ S.F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown, op. cit., p.44-97.

²⁴ H.F. Angus, *Canada and Her Great Neighbour: Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States*. (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1938).

²⁵ Ibid., p.v-vi.

²⁶ Ibid, p.263-270.

²⁷ This represents a concise summary of the general views that Canadians are expressed to have of Americans in both H.F. Angus, op. cit., and S.F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown, *Canada Views the United States*. (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1967).

²⁸ Recent examples of addressing cultural, legal, and conceptual borders as an addition to geographic ones can be found in Carol Higham and Robert Thacker, *One West: Two Myths: A Comparative Reader*. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004) This is a growing trend to examine Canadian-American relations at the popular level especially marks the “Borderlands” research of the past fifteen years. The Borderlands paradigm attempts to leave the bi-lateral (or tri-lateral when Mexico is included) model of North American relations and instead reconceptualizes them along less political and more cultural/linguistic boundaries. Some notable works in this area include Allan Smith, *Doing the Continental: Conceptualizations of the Canadian-American Relationship in the Long Twentieth Century*. (Orono: Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, 2000), Joel Garreau. *Nine Nations of North America*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), Victor Konrad, *Geography of Canada*, (Washington, D.C.: Association for Canadian Studies in the United States; [Michigan]: Michigan State University Press, 1996), W.H. New, *Borderlands: How we talk about Canada*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), Robert Lecker, *Borderlands: Essays in Canadian-American Relations*. (Toronto, ECW Press, 1991), Norbert MacDonald, *Distant Neighbors*. (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1987), Dean Louder, dir. *Le Québec et les francophones de la Nouvelle-Angleterre*. (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l’Université de Laval, 1991), and J. Stephen Hornsby et al. (eds), *The Northeastern Borderlands: Four Centuries of Interaction*. (Fredericton, N.B.: Canadian-American Centre, University of Maine and Acadia Press, 1989).

²⁹ Mitchell Sharp, “The Third Option,” in Norman Hillmer, ed. *Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman Ltd., 1989), p.142.

³⁰ Michael Bliss, *Right Honourable Men: The Decent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Mulroney*. (Toronto: HarperPerennial, 1994), p.314.

³¹ Gwyn, Richard. *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), p.61-156.

³² Thompson and Randall, op. cit., p.274.

³³ In their chapter “Inaugurating a New Era,” Edlegard E. Mahant and Graeme S. Mount suggest that the 1920s were a time of increasing cooperation between Canada and the United States, with Canada involving Great Britain in their international relations only sparingly. “[N]o longer was the mother country [UK] a counterweight to the powerful neighbour [US].” Mahant and Mount, op. cit., p.130.

³⁴ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, op. cit., p.236.

³⁵ Bliss, op. cit., p.198, 225.

³⁶ Robert Fulford in Hugh Innis, *Americanization: Issues for the seventies*. (Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1972), p.18-19.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Thompson and Randall, op. cit., Chapter 7, especially p.185.

³⁹ Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: Politics of Partnership*. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), p. 71.

⁴⁰ Gerald Clark, *Canada: The Uneasy Neighbour*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), p.393

⁴¹ This would rule some events, such as the developments surrounding the Columbia River Treaty, which was well-covered in the Vancouver area, but received only sporadic attention elsewhere. The need to confine the survey to workable periods also necessitated leaving out trends like the objection to conscientious objectors arriving in Canada from the United States due to the Vietnam War; such a happening was not really an “event” which received elevated levels of coverage all at once, but more of a phenomenon which ebbed and flowed across Canadian newspapers for years.

⁴² Although the idea of a systematic study is a logical one, my use of the word ‘transparent’, a term more often referring to government or other public endeavours, may need some clarification. In a recent H-Canada review, Gary Miedema examined Sam Reimer’s *Evangelicals and the Continental Divide: The Conservative Protestant Subculture in Canada and the United States*. In his review, Miedema notes that Reimer “chose not to attempt a nationally representative study” but opted instead to select a more limited range of potential data. When explaining his subsequent analysis, Reimer, according to Miedema, then walked his readers through his methodology, his comparative analyses, and conclusions in a candid and straightforward manner. It is my goal, when constructing this study, to strive for what Miedema labeled “methodological transparency.” Gary Miedema, 2005 *H-Net Book Review*(*Sam Reimer – Evangelicals and the Continental Divide: The Conservative Protestant Subculture in Canada and the United States*). <H-Canada@h-net.msu.edu> (16 March, 2005).

⁴³ Paul Rutherford, *The Making of the Canadian Media*. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1978), pp.50-53 Though “ideally,” writes Rutherford in *A Victorian Authority*, “mass communication requires the regular and frequent transmission of a uniform message about life and affairs by a small group of experts to a large, anonymous and heterogeneous public,” he admits that ultimately “few papers could claim such an exalted stature” [emphasis mine]. Paul Rutherford, *A Victorian Authority: The Daily Press in Late Nineteenth-Century Canada*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p.2.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.56-64.

⁴⁵ Michael Schudson, *Discovering the News: A social history of American newspapers*. (New York: Basic Books Inc: 1978). Mary Vipond also suggests that “[f]or the most part, the mass media have developed in Canada in the private sector as profit seeking enterprises... Governments have intervened only very cautiously.” Mary Vipond, *The Mass Media in Canada*. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1989), p.xi In addition, we should note that the later half of the 20th century did differentiate itself from the early 20th century, when editors remained much more influential than they would eventually be in practice. For examples, see Rutherford, *The Making...* op. cit. and Jeff Keshen, “All the News That Was Fit to Print: Ernest J. Chambers and Information Control in Canada, 1914-19.” *Canadian Historical Review*. 73, no. 6 (1992).

⁴⁵ Michael Schudson, *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers*. (New York: Basic Books Inc: 1978).

⁴⁶ To cite an example Quebec City’s *L’Evenement*, a paper with a circulation of 11,000 already affiliated with *Le Soleil* in 1960, completely disappeared by 1967, despite a formidable increase in *Le Soleil*’s circulation.

⁴⁷ Rutherford, *A Victorian Authority*. op. cit. p.7-8.

⁴⁸ Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 473-475.

⁴⁹ In addition, the 1980 Royal Commission on Newspapers suggested that the Canadian population is comprised of *avid* readers, who consume an average of over 6 newspapers a week, reading for an average of 53 minutes a day, 66 on weekends. Kubas, Leonard, *Newspapers and their Readers*. (Royal Commission on Newspapers) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1981), p.11-13. See also Kubas’ Chapter 1 and Chapter 6 for more specific details.

⁵⁰ Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Poll in Kennedy’s 1960 Presidential Campaign,” *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 88, No.3 (Sep., 1994), p.527-529. As referenced in this article, for some studies on the unlikely ability of newspapers shifting opinion in short periods of time, see Steven Finkel, “Reexamining the “Minimal Effects’ Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns,” *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 55, p.1-21 and Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992)

⁵¹ Both cases suggest they may not have sufficiently resonated with readers.

⁵² Indeed, as will be shown below, several of the papers came in as the fourth- or fifth-largest circulations in their respective cities.

⁵³ For excellent Canadian-American studies which draw mainly on the Toronto and Montreal press for their Canadian newspaper content, see Thompson and Randall, op. cit., Ian Lumsden, op. cit., and S.F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown, op. cit.

⁵⁴ Arthur Kroker, “The Cultural Imagination and the National Question,” *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*. 6, no.1-2, p.6.

⁵⁵ Bucker, P.A. “‘Limited Identities’ Revisited: regionalism and Nationalism in Canadian History,” *Acadiensis*. 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000).

⁵⁶ Ibid. As Bucker suggests, although even some original user of the ‘limited identities’ approach, such as Careless and Cook, no longer had an interest in doing so, this problem received detailed treatment in works like J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed Canadian History?*. (Toronto : HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), Michael Bliss, “Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canada, the Sundering of Canadian History,” *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 26, no.4 (Winter 1991-92) and Doug Owram, “Narrow Circles: the Historiography of Recent Canadian Historiography,” *National History*, 1, 1 (Winter 1997).

⁵⁷ In some respects, there is little need to make this point explicitly; the reasoning behind a healthy sample of French-language newspapers obviously stems from the prominent place that the French-Canadian language, culture and communities have played in Canadian history. For some recent discussions on Quebec and French Canada in the 1960s, see Paul-André Linteau et al. *Le Québec depuis 1930*. (Montreal:

Boréal Express, 1989), Kenneth McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*. 3rd Ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), and Alain-G. Gagnon and Mary Beth Montcalm, *Quebec: Beyond the Quiet Revolution* (Scarborough, Ont. : Nelson Canada, 1990).

⁵⁸ For instance, Richard Gwyn admits that he did not adequately cover the Francophone elements of Canadian society. Gwyn, op. cit., p.11-12.

⁵⁹ In general, the literacy rate in Canada hovers above the 95% range, with according to a 1980 survey, 89% of adult Canadians reading at least one newspaper a week. As a result, it can also be stated with confidence that while linguistic and economic factors did leave some residents out of this study, a strong majority of the residents in those cities are implicated in this study. *Royal Commission on Newspapers*. (Hull Quebec: Minister of Supply and Services, 1981), p.34.

⁶⁰ Janet Kerr Morchain, *Anti-Americanism in Canada, 1871-1891*. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc.) 1967, p. vi, 1-2.

⁶¹ Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).

⁶² James G. Carrier, ed. *Occidentalism: Images of the West*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

⁶³ Susan T. Fiske, *Social Beings: A Core Motives Approach to Social Psychology*. (Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, 2004) p.121.

⁶⁴ David G. Myers and Steven J. Spencer, *Social Psychology*. Canadian Edition. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2001), p.77.

⁶⁵ Colin Fraser and Brendan Burchell, *Introducing Social Psychology*. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), p.218.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.221.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Myers and Spencer, op. cit., p.83.

⁶⁹ Fraser and Burchell, op. cit. p.222.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.221.

⁷¹ One famous example often quoted in the literature (including Fraser and Burchell, op. cit. p.220-223) was the need for actor Leonard Nimoy, who played the logical, cold-mannered *Spock* on Star Trek, to entitle his first book *I Am Not Spock* (Cutchogue, N.Y.: Buccaneer Books, 1975). Nimoy apparently found it difficult to escape having the personality of his T.V. character applied to him as an individual, despite the fact that the average person was well aware that *Spock* was fictional; most simply assumed that Leonard Nimoy himself must, in some measure, reflect the personality of *Spock*, a part he played on television.

⁷² Myers and Spencer, op. cit., p.353.

⁷³ Ibid. Current explanations for why this tendency exists points to what is believed to be the basic nature of human cognition: The human brain, for the sake of even being able to decipher the immense amount of information being received about the world, places everything into one category or another, be it "things that are round" or "cars I have owned" or "salespeople." As an extension of the propensity to categorize, I perceive myself as part of certain groups, and as a result, not part of others.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.353-356. Experiment after experiment has found that even the smallest difference between one group and other groups produces this favouritism. Even randomly dividing people into two groups (and thus having nothing in common except for having been assigned to the same group for the purpose of the study) produces favouritism for one's own group over the other. See the classic study on Realistic Conflict Theory by M. Sherif, *Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology*. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966) or more recent treatments, such as Donald M. Taylor and Fathali M. Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations: International Social Psychological Perspectives*. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).

⁷⁵ Fiske, op. cit. p.410. People tend to view good actions as intrinsic to the in-group's essence (or disposition) and bad actions as fundamental to the out-group's essence; conversely, the in-group's bad actions and the out-group's good actions are viewed as meaningless products of the situation.

⁷⁶ Note that in Chapter 4, I do suggest that this work may still inform the anti-racist history envisioned by Timothy J. Stanley in "Why I Killed Canadian History: Towards an Anti-Racist History in Canada." *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 99, no.65 (2000).

⁷⁷ Anne Maass, Roberta Ceccarelli, and Samantha Rudin, "Linguistic Intergroup Bias: Evidence for In-Group-Protective Motivation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 1996, Vol. 71, No. 3, 512-526.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.512. [P]ositive behaviours are described in more abstract language terms when performed by an in-group member than when performed by an out-group member. The opposite holds for negative episodes... [which are] described in more concrete terms when performed by an in-group member than when performed by an out-group member."

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Anne Maass, Angela Milesi, and Silvia Zabbini, "Linguistic Intergroup Bias: Differential Expectancies or In-Group Protection?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 1995, Vol. 68, No. 1, 116-126 and A.Maass, G. Corvino, and L.Arcuri, "Linguistic Intergroup Bias and the Mass Media," *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*. 1994 1, 31-43.

⁸¹ See Appendix A for additional illustrations and discussion.

⁸² Maass, A., G. Corvino and L. Arcuri. "Linguistic Intergroup Bias and the Mass Media." *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*. 1 (1994): 31-43.

⁸³ Rather than falling prey to the need of what psychologists term homeostasis (consistency in internal conditions that the body must continuously maintain and balance) a group may be composed of completely contradictory elements, a reality which does not necessarily force it to reconcile, but only to find a temporary workable solution (and sometimes not even that). See, for example, Peter Gray. *Psychology*. (N.Y.: Worth Publishers, 1994), p.203-204.

⁸⁴ Adams, op. cit. p.20.

⁸⁵ Some recent works employing cartoons as visual evidence include Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990, Carman Cumming, *Sketches From a Young Country: The Images of Grip Magazine*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), Lisa Yaszek, "'Them Damn Pictures': Americanization and the Comic Strip in the Progressive Era," *Journal of American Studies*, 28 (1994): 23-38, Scott Vokey, "Inspiration for insurrection or harmless humour? Class and politics in the editorial cartoons of three Toronto newspapers during the early 1930s," *Labour*. 45 (Spring 2000), L. Anders Sandberg and Bill Parenteau, "From Weapons to Symbols of Privilege: Political Cartoons and the Rise and Fall of the Pulpwood Embargo Debate in Nova Scotia, 1923-1933," *Acadiensis*. XXVI, 2 (Spring 1997), pp.31-58, Angela Baker, "A Muscular Regionalism: Gender and the 'Manly Appeal' of Maritime Rights in the Halifax Herald of the 1920s," *Nova Scotia Historical Review*. 1996 16(2): 47-70, and Laurence Cros, "Le Canada et la peur de l'annexion américaine à l'époque Victoriennes, à travers les dessins politiques canadiens," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*. 2001 (23): 157-186.

⁸⁶ Peter Desbarats and Terry Mosher. *The Hecklers: A History of Canadian Political Cartooning and a Cartoonists' History of Canada*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979, p.5.

⁸⁷ Bostdorff, Denise M., "Making Light of James Watt: A Burkean Approach to the Form and Attitude of Political Cartoons," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 73 (Feb. 1987), p.43.

⁸⁸ Scott Long, political cartoonist for the Minneapolis *Tribune* in Stephen Hess and Milton Kaplan, *The Ungentlemanly Art: A History of American Political Cartoons*. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p.31.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.33.

⁹⁰ In other words, since humour is constructed in a similar fashion across many different cultures, the reader does not have to learn the "joke", only come to understand the meaning of the specific local symbols and the local figures associated with the expression those attributes. It is only the target that varies from culture to culture. See Christie Davies, *Ethnic Humour Around the World: A Comparative Analysis* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p.4, 322. Also see Lisa Yaszek, "'Them Damn Pictures': Americanization and the Comic Strip in the Progressive Era," *Journal of American Studies* 28, no.1 (1994): p.26-28, which Examining two very early newspaper comic strips, Yaszek uncovered how newspaper editors employed the medium in order to help familiarize and socialize new immigrants to the American value system.

⁹¹ See Anderson, John R. *Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications*. 3rd Ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1990), p.47-84 for a summary of modern theories of human cognitive functioning.

⁹² C.D. Batchelor in Hess and Kaplan, op. cit., p.169.

⁹³ Ofer Feldman, "Political Reality and Editorial Cartoons in Japan: How the National Dailies Illustrate the Japanese Prime Minister." *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*. 72, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 571-580. Other examples of employing cartoons to measure this type of public opinion include William Feaver and Ann Gould, *Masters of Caricature: from Hogarth and Gillray to Scarfe and Levine*. (New York: Knopf (Random House), 1981), and Jennifer Tourcan Rothwell, "Politics and Media: Teaching with Cartoons" *Social Education*. 60 (Oct. 1996): 326-329.

⁹⁴ Examples include Gombrich, E.H. "The Cartoonist's Armoury" (a lecture given at Duke University, North Carolina) in *Meditations On a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the Theory of Art*. London: Phaidon Press Limited, 1962, Alette Hill, "The Carter Campaign in Retrospect: Decoding the Cartoons," *Semiotica*. 23, no.3-4.

⁹⁵ Historian Raymond Morris has offered two monographs that explore Marxist and post-Marxist themes of cartoon content, examining the role that cartoons could play in transmitting the dominant capitalist ideology to minorities, or those who may not fully endorse it. Morris suggests that cartoonists may in fact simply be what he called the "Jesters of the Bourgeoisie", a group who poke fun at politicians so as to draw attention away from the real threat in society, namely the leaders of business and industry. Raymond N. Morris, *Behind the Jester's Mask: Canadian Editorial Cartoons About Dominant and Minority Groups 1960-1979*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) p.28. These idea are also advanced in Raymond N. Morris, *The Carnivalization of Politics: Quebec Cartoons on Relations with Canada, England, and France*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995.

⁹⁶ Charlotte Templin, "Hillary Clinton as Threat to Gender Norms: Cartoon Images of the First Lady," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 23:1 (January 1999).

⁹⁷ G. Bruce Rettallack, "Paddy, the Priest, and the Habitant: Inflecting the Irish Cartoons Stereotype in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Irish Studies* 29, no.1 (Spring 2003) p.127.

⁹⁸ Heller, Steven and Gail Anderson, *The Savage Mirror: The Art of Contemporary Caricature*. (New York: Watson-Guption Publications, 1992), Janis L. Edwards and Winkler, Carol K. "Representative Form and the Visual Ideograph: The Iwo Jima Image in Editorial Cartoons." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 83, no.3 (1997): 289-310. and Réal Brisson, *Oka par la caricature : deux visions distinctes d'une même crise*. Sillery : Septentrion, 2000.

⁹⁹ Stephen D. Morris "Exploring Mexican Images of the United States" in *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*. 16 (1) Winter 2000, p.106.

¹⁰⁰ Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*. (New York, Routledge, 1995).

¹⁰¹ G. Bruce Rettallack, *At Play in the Field of Cultural Production: Editorial Cartooning as Hegemonic Practice*. Unpublished paper, 2005.

CHAPTER 1

Dynamism For Some, Doldrums For Others: The Election and Inauguration of John F. Kennedy in Canadian Newspapers

In the fall of 1960, John F. Kennedy won the second closest election in American history. Canadian newspapers, with very few exceptions, were just as excited about Kennedy's prospects as the millions of Americans who voted for him. These newspapers hooked onto three elements in particular: positive impressions of Kennedy himself, the fact that he would be the first Catholic President of the United States, and the image and aura of his wife, Jacqueline Kennedy. While the intensity of the coverage varied greatly, most of the newspapers tended to be moderate in their characterization of the U. S. during this period. While displaying some regional distinctions, the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) analysis reveals that positive and negative portrayals of the U.S. received relatively similar treatment. Combined with textual analysis and the study of cartoons, the evidence indicates that while a few Canadian newspapers kept some distance from American events, many looked admiringly at the dynamism of the United States. In the end, the evidence suggests that at the start of a new decade, the Canadian anti-Americanism so commonly associated with "the 60s" was just not there.

Observing America

Taken together, Canadian newspapers produced an average score of 2.10 when speaking positively about the U.S. and 2.06 when speaking negatively

(with 1 being the most concrete and 4 the most abstract). This suggests that overall, many Canadian newspapers found positive behaviour to be as characteristic as negative behaviour. Region, however, was something of a predictor: while *within* each region, positive and negative scores varied as little as the national average, differences *between* each region were significant. For instance, while in Ottawa, newspapers scored an average of 2.14 for positive accounts and 2.14 for negative accounts, in Quebec City the newspapers scored 1.55 on the positive side and 1.72 on the negative. This suggests that papers in Quebec City portrayed American actions – both positive and negative – to be part of their character, while those in Ottawa were a little less convinced. Interestingly, Vancouver, likely due to the outspoken support for Republican Candidate Richard Nixon in the *Vancouver Province* as well as sentiments from the *Pacific Tribune*, was the region most willing to question the concreteness of positive American actions. Taken together, Vancouver papers scored 2.29 when evaluating positive American actions, while the *Province* in particular scored 2.43.

What this suggests is that regionally, newspapers in Quebec City more often portrayed Americans as “like us”, while those in Vancouver were less likely to do so. In the larger sense, however, Canadian newspapers seemed much less certain, and were just as ready to see Americans as “like us” as “not like us.”

Advantages in the Kennedy Campaign

Most of the authors who look back at the 1960 presidential campaign stress that Kennedy had at least two major points in his favour and at least two major points working against him. In his corner, Kennedy had a charismatic manner – partly the result of his good looks and partly thanks to the honing of his skills in personal relations – and he was a compelling orator. Working against him, Kennedy had to face the greater degree of executive experience enjoyed by his opponent Richard Nixon (who was Vice-President during 1952-1960) and the fact that Kennedy was a Catholic.¹

The subject of Kennedy's charisma has occupied as great (if not greater) a proportion of the analysis surrounding his success in the years since his death as it did during his initial run for the White House.² Much has been made of Kennedy's 'star' quality, both in terms of its appeal to an increasingly media-driven political age and in terms of his personal appeal to the public. According to Thomas Cronin, an old saying in politics suggested, "a candidate is greatly advantaged if he likes and enjoys people and even more if people know that he likes and enjoys them. Kennedy was advantaged on all scores. He liked himself, he liked politics, and he liked and enjoyed people, and people knew it."³ Moreover, as this became the first presidential contest in which television played a major role, most notably covering three debates between the candidates, the effects of that natural charisma were parlayed into an even stronger positive public impression. Not only did Kennedy look better on television, he and his

team seemed to realize, to a much greater degree than Nixon, that they were addressing a much larger public, and not simply a panel of debate judges.⁴

The relevance of Kennedy's personal charm and perceived dynamic qualities, always a plus for electoral candidates, may have also had the good fortune of coming at a time when Americans needed and wanted a particularly dynamic leader. According to some analysts, many Americans by 1960 had begun to perceive the Eisenhower years as inactive ones, years of executive "drift," a sentiment the Kennedy campaign attacked. As such, political elites, politicians, and journalists had begun "the search for national purpose," an attempt to resolutely redirect and reinvigorate American foreign and domestic policy. In the 1960 Presidential race, Kennedy seemed to be the candidate most able to bring about a new "national purpose."⁵

The analysis of his charm and the effect this had on his legacy for years after his untimely death in 1963 is not one-sided. On the one hand, it is true that several authors suggest that Kennedy not only rode a wave of expectation all the way to the White House, but in fact helped create and then promote "the politics of expectation" as a model more American politics itself; indeed, some suggest his success in the area was so great, that he was forever linked to the idea of grand expectation, promise, and the aura of an inevitability of change with a presidential campaign.⁶ Yet, on the other hand, critics of Kennedy have questioned whether or not his success was instead a victory of the "myth" of the politics of expectation as a model, the success of the "charm-school theory of high politics." As a result, several authors contend that despite the myth of

liberalism surrounding him after his death, Kennedy was, in his own time, much more of a fiscal conservative, a hawk in foreign relations (citing Cuba and escalation in southeast Asia as examples), and a man who essentially blew the lid off of a smouldering domestic racial conflict. As a result, while Kennedy might be credited with helping to bring the liberal counter-revolution to fruition in 1960s America, he might also be primarily responsible for sowing the seeds of the conservative "counter-counter revolution" of the 1970s, 80s and contemporary America.⁷ In part, such observations are a link in the recent re-evaluation of the 1960s, a movement which is beginning to part with the notion that the 1960s spawned only a Liberal revolution in the United States, and is instead embracing the notion that at the very least, it also sowed the seeds of the conservative American ideologies of the Reagan-Bush era. At most, this new emphasis suggests that the America of the early 21st century is much more the result of the conservative, rather than the liberal, impulses of that earlier era.⁸

Disadvantages in the Kennedy Campaign

Kennedy, over the course of his campaign, was able to develop strategies to deal with both of his major weaknesses, namely his inexperience as compared to Nixon and his Catholic identity. In dealing with Nixon, Kennedy's campaign used his youthful image to turn his initial lack of experience into a positive. Rather than presenting themselves as inexperienced, Kennedy and the Democrats ran against a record of tired, slow action by the Eisenhower administration of the previous 8 years.⁹ Although Nixon would eventually take

his place (for better or worse) in American history, and although he was, as Thompson and Randall argue, “the most formidable Cold Warrior of his generation,” in 1960, the presidential campaign placed the image of a cold, hard, un-photogenic Richard M. Nixon against the young, dynamic John F. Kennedy.¹⁰ Thus, much of the excitement and expectation that would eventually characterize the Kennedy campaign was generated by breaking with the “tired” politics of the Eisenhower administration, a comparison which Kennedy made at every opportunity.¹¹ As a result, heading into the debates against his Republican rival Richard M. Nixon, Kennedy’s biggest weakness, his youth and inexperience, became his greatest appeal.

Dealing with his Catholic heritage was more of a challenge. As early as 1956, John Kennedy’s father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was “dubious” about the prospects of his son running for Democratic national politics; he felt that if John lost, Catholics would be blamed for the defeat.¹² Indeed, that the United States had never elected a Catholic president was a factor that would bear on his campaign from start to finish, lingering on at his inauguration in the corporeal form of a ceremonial bible.

Some authors have since suggested that Kennedy’s handling of the Catholic issue ultimately helped boost his appeal, especially among Democratic supporters,¹³ while others suggest that on voting day it may have been his greatest hindrance.¹⁴ As pointed out by William Gudelunas and Stephen Couch however, whether or not one comes to the conclusion that Kennedy won *because* he was a Catholic, or that he won *in spite of* it, the sheer volume of

opinion on the role of religion in the presidential campaign reveals the salience of the question itself.¹⁵

According to Alonzo Hamby, anti-Catholicism, while not the worst or most severe prejudice in the United States, was still alive and well in the 1960s, especially in the fundamentalist and Protestant-dominated areas of rural and small-town America. These twentieth-century Americans built their anti-Catholicism upon a tradition that had been passed down through waves of English and German immigrants, and reaching back to the Reformation period some 500 years earlier. Part of several American political traditions, including the “Know-Nothing” movement of the 1840s – a founding section of the Republican Party established by Abraham Lincoln, during the 1850s – anti-Catholicism had established itself in twentieth-century politics in the late 1920s. “[A]fter the defeat of [Democratic Presidential candidate] Al Smith in 1928, it had become a commonplace of American political commentary that Catholicism in effect disqualified one from the presidency.”¹⁶ Indeed, fears of “Popeism,” of being directed by a foreign religious leader, combined with older portrayals of Catholics as “anti-democratic, superstitious, intolerant and statist” led many to the conclusion that being Catholic was anti-American.¹⁷

Most of the literature suggests that Kennedy’s approach for dealing with this issue was a two-pronged strategy: the goal was to convince the American public that he was fully capable of maintaining the separation of church and state (in other words, that his religion would not pre-determine his political decision-making) and to turn the anti-Catholic forces against him into religious bigots in

the public eye. Kennedy had faced the same problems when pursuing his party's nomination for the Presidential ticket and the strategies had worked.¹⁸ His advisors thus continued this approach on the national scale once his campaign for president began. Kennedy repeatedly stressed that he was not "the Catholic candidate for president" but "the Democratic Party's candidate for president, who also happened to be Catholic."¹⁹ He addressed the "Papist" fears of many anti-Catholics – who remained fearful of outside Catholic influence, and even of an inability to handle the separation of Church and State so fundamentally guarded in the American Constitution – by repeating, time and again, that as President and Commander-in-Chief he would never "bow" to the wishes of the Pope in international matters; "I would not take orders from any Pope, Cardinal, Bishop or Priest... If any Pope attempted to influence me as President I would have to tell him it was completely improper."²⁰ Additional promises would follow, including a promise to make his decisions "in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be the in the national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressure or dictate."²¹

Moreover, Kennedy worked to turn anti-Catholicism into a boost for his image, a boon to his call for change and an end to old divisions within American society. Kennedy, in a televised interview, equated a vote against his candidacy based on the religious issue as "a vote for intolerance." As such, when Kennedy began to address the issue of religious bigotry head-on, and while he may have had only limited success convincing anti-Catholic Protestants to reform their ways, he more importantly mobilized and inspired droves of other groups (such

as liberal Protestants, religious minorities) to make him their “emotional” choice on election day.²²

A final element in Kennedy's image was his wife, Jacqueline Kennedy. Resonating particularly with women and the middle class, JFK's campaign would receive an immeasurable boost from the charm, intelligence, and beauty of Mrs. Kennedy. Certainly matching JFK's Hollywood looks, and likely surpassing him in sheer knowledge and education, Jacqueline Kennedy was able to contribute a highly favourable reflection of the President as a man with a successful family life. Quite articulate herself, Jacqueline Kennedy would speak to crowds (often of women) on the virtues of her husband, be it his service to his country in WWII, his work in Congress, or how much he really did care about the future of the country.²³

Jacqueline Kennedy was also able to place herself as an extension or as a magnification of JFK's most popular qualities; over the course of the campaign, she “proved able to extend [JFK's] knowledge and sensibility” while at the same time intensifying his image as a hard-working leader by working hard herself.²⁴ She reinforced JFK's ‘star’ quality, adding “glamour [which] was a commodity singularly lacking in contemporary American politics and, indeed, in American life east of Hollywood.” While at first, Mrs. Kennedy's education and worldliness was perceived by his inner circle almost as a threat – Americans more often looked for the “nice, matronly, dowdy, Midwestern American mother” in their Presidential wives – her gifts for language which could resonate with English-as-second-language voters, her unwavering support of her husband and his image, and her

sheer popularity, especially among women, made her a welcome if latent addition to JFK's campaign strategy.²⁵

Jacqueline Kennedy's appeal would increase exponentially as she began the transformation to First Lady. Her upbringing and honed public instincts allowed her to develop an exceedingly positive rapport with the media. Rather than treat her first official interview as a question-and-answer period, Mrs. Kennedy stated, "I'd prefer that we just all go inside and I'll just walk around and you can all talk to me personally, and ask me anything you want."²⁶ All of these abilities would not only enhance the positive expectations and excitement around JFK, but would lead to substantial public interest, both in the United States and Canada, in Jacqueline Kennedy herself. For much of the campaign, but especially afterwards, many Canadian newspapers, most overtly in the "women's" section of their newspaper, would provide continuing coverage of Mrs. Kennedy's pregnancy, her life in the White House, her devotion to her husband, and her day-to-day activities as the incumbent First Lady.

Thus, John Kennedy's electoral victory represented, according to author Alonzo Hamby, "the ultimate coming of age of the ethnic-religious minorities [and] the ascendancy of youth and all the attractive qualities that go with it."²⁷ As a result, it is of little surprise that high expectations, exuberance, and dynamism, all traits of youth and the novel, were all qualities that remained with Kennedy months after his election.

Kennedy and Canadians

The 1960s are hardly ever discussed without treating the subject of the quickly-deteriorating relationship between the brash, young Kennedy with the "older", more suspicious John Diefenbaker,²⁸ two leaders who held each other in "hearty contempt" from their first meeting in early 1961.²⁹ Similarly, there have been numerous accounts of an alleged or at least suspected involvement by the Kennedy administration in Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's ascension to power. This account most often involves a self-interested American regime that, either explicitly or implicitly, backed Pearson's Liberals in the 1963 election.³⁰

However, this 'legend' of Canadian-American relations does not preclude the existence of a positive pan-Canadian impression of JFK. Indeed, secondary which evaluate the impact of Kennedy's election offer similar contemporary positive impressions of him: young, inspirational, and electric. In *The Presidents and the Prime Ministers*, for example, Lawrence Martin quotes the impression of Canadian ambassador Arnold Heeney on the day of Kennedy's inauguration that "something was being born," that the new president, unlike the tired Eisenhower, "seemed to rank with Lincoln."³¹ J.L. Granatstein concurs. In *Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism* he suggests that Kennedy's youth and attractiveness had captivated Canadians as much as it had Americans.³² Michael Bliss also notes how the election of Kennedy "instantly gave the United States an image of being on the move again,"³³ a sentiment, as will be seen, many Canadian newspapers shared. Indeed, providing a sweeping

characterization of many Canadians' impressions of the era, Lawrence, in fact, states "[a] person could have diligently searched the Canadian landscape in 1960 and had trouble finding many who strongly disliked Kennedy."³⁴

However, what the newspaper evidence presented below also suggests is that we take those implications to their logical conclusion: that many Canadians not only liked Kennedy, but seemed (within reasonable limits) not to dislike, and even to admire, Americans. Kennedy was not only well-liked and often compared favourably with Canadian leaders, but much of the positive sentiment towards him was indicative of an extension or intensification of the positive (or at least optimistic) attitudes many Canadian newspapers expressed towards Americans.

The Greatest President Since Lincoln?

Indeed, coverage of John F. Kennedy in the newspapers was particularly positive in its outlook. While a handful of newspapers remained sceptical, or shifted attention after the inauguration to the demands he was bound to face in the coming months, most newspapers gave a positive impression of JFK both during the campaign and following it. Among those newspapers, it should be pointed out that some remained detached from endorsing Kennedy until after he was elected; however, they enthusiastically endorsed him once he had been chosen, despite his winning with one of the slimmest majorities in American history.³⁵

It was the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* which presented the strongest endorsement of Senator Kennedy. The disparity between the two candidates in the Halifax paper was enormous: Kennedy had the better personality, was more of a leader, and his assets were discussed as much more useful. Whether it was because he was better at swaying a society that admired the rich,³⁶ because of his appeal to women, because of his intellect, or because of his “instinct for the crucial point,”³⁷ Kennedy was “The Boy Wonder.” Nixon, by contrast, was a somewhat boring career politician. Matching him against Kennedy was like matching a “leader versus a conference caller.” The *Chronicle-Herald's* readers also expressed the same exuberance following Kennedy's election victory. “Jack [Kennedy] is... young, brilliant to the 'nth degree, handsome, with a marvellously cultured accent and a world of words,” whereas “Nixon is a bird-brain and so is Lodge [Nixon's running mate].”³⁸ Raymond Vickery in a letter to the University of British Columbia's student newspaper, the *Ubyyssey*, added that he was pleased to see that “Mr. Nixon is continuing his triumphant march across the pages of the *Ubyyssey*, pen in hand, foot in mouth and brain in neutral.”³⁹

This difference in Halifax newspaper opinion regarding both candidates was best expressed by the *Dalhousie Gazette*, which featured a poll conducted among 383 students from 11 universities in Canada. According to the article, when asked to assign characteristics to one candidate or the other, Kennedy was well ahead in “leadership”, “decisive”, “foresighted” and especially in “organized.” He was also favoured by 233-67 in “warmth” and 207-104 in “initiative.” Nixon, on the other hand, received the most votes for “cold” by a margin of 207-85,

though he did get the benefit of the doubt in the realm of “shrewdness” and especially for “experience”, 272-104. Kennedy’s only major negative showing was under “naive.”⁴⁰ In terms of supporting the candidates, Kennedy was again much more favourable, and most (266) thought he would win and would vote for him (231) vs. 107 for Nixon, a much greater spread than in the American vote. The dominant undercurrent in these perceptions of Kennedy was the air of optimism. Moreover, the vast majority of those polled (303 out of 383), believed that Kennedy was arriving at just the right time, given that the U.S. had recently been losing prestige on the international stage.⁴¹

Two other newspapers which provided a fairly strong pro-Kennedy perspective were *Le Soleil* of Quebec City, and the *Jewish Western Bulletin* of Vancouver. Although unwilling to predict one candidate’s victory leading up to the election, *Le Soleil* became one of Kennedy’s most vocal supporters once he was elected. Expectations around Kennedy were portrayed as highly elevated, his first hundred days were expected to be like those of Franklin D. Roosevelt,⁴² and his new government announced a new march towards peace.⁴³ In addition, *Le Soleil* noted that the charm and romanticism emanating from the new President had literally hypnotized millions of Americans over the course of the campaign, “une chose tout de même naturelle dans un pays où le succès, la jeunesse et la beauté sont révéérés.”⁴⁴

It would seem from the volume and earnestness of much of the coverage that many Canadians were also taken by these qualities. In the *Jewish Western Bulletin*, an ethnic monthly that offered sustained commentary on Kennedy, it

was the freshness of the new President's policies that lead to the heralding of "a new chapter" in American history. A beacon for "the relaxation of religious discrimination," an obvious concern for the Jewish community served by this paper, Kennedy "will illuminate the way to lasting peace."⁴⁵ Both in international affairs (Kennedy was said to be taking a greater interest in the middle-east) and in North America, Kennedy was a bright new face.

Kennedy, With A Big 'If'

Of course, not every newspaper was adamant about endorsing one of the candidates. Conveying a sense of uncertainty about the future direction of Canada and the U. S., several papers discussed Kennedy's prospects with low expectations. *Le Droit*, for instance, kept a fair distance from either supporting a candidate, or subsequently raising expectations after Kennedy's victory. The newspaper did recognize, and even appreciated, the exuberance around Kennedy, noting that when it came to celebrating and rallying around a victor, few could equal the Americans. However, the editors also noted that in the United States, nothing fails like success. "[L]e peuple américain, passé maître dans l'art de bâtir des idoles, peut également les briser."⁴⁶

Another example of a paper that kept itself disconnected from the whole process was the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*. Having provided an even allotment of coverage to both candidates,⁴⁷ the paper keyed into a more cynical interpretation of what was occurring south of the border. Cases of heckling were well documented on both campaign trails,⁴⁸ and coverage of the election itself

tended to focus on the small margin of victory. The paper's editorial "Kennedy in the White House" immediately sought to deflate any optimism surrounding the new President and by stating that while he may have an "engaging personality," "[i]t remains to be seen whether he [Kennedy] will have the forceful persuasion that will win renewed respect around the world for his country." Simply put, Kennedy's attributes "may not be enough."⁴⁹

This is not to say the *Chronicle-Telegraph* had nothing positive to say about Kennedy. For instance, although the paper suggested that its readers might not be very interested in Kennedy's victory, it did imply that the Russians were. The *Chronicle-Telegraph*, while keeping its feet grounded,⁵⁰ suggested that the tone of communication was, "much more friendly and cordial than anything else that has reached Washington from Moscow in recent years," and that at that particular juncture in time, "[i]t is a rare Soviet citizen... who does not express hope that relations with Kennedy will be better – and immediately."⁵¹

The *Ubysey*, which exhibited very little preference for either candidate throughout the period, also eventually offered Kennedy some credit for creating an atmosphere of optimism, stating, "[f]or the first time in eight years, America and the world can look forward to a bright and prosperous future." Moreover, following the election the paper characterised Kennedy as, "an American in the truest, most profound sense of the word... courageous... an example to the world of self-sacrifice and devotion beyond the call of duty... Above all, he embodies the basic ideals of democracy and the equality of all men."⁵²

At the other end of the spectrum, however, were the *Vancouver Province* and the *Vancouver Citizen*. In contrast to most of the newspapers under study, these two newspapers clearly favoured Richard Nixon for the presidency. The *Vancouver Citizen* suggested that only Nixon's experience would be able to rise to the challenges of the day. One *Citizen* columnist endorsed Nixon because he had "more than held his own with Khrushchev" during a recent visit and "has shown that he is quite prepared to take a firm stand on any of the issues now engaging the attention of the United States government." In a subsequent column, she then lambasted Kennedy, "Kennedy was born with a silver spoon in his mouth and has never known what it is to lack money." Nixon, the columnist wrote, was the better candidate but, "The question is whether the [American] voting public appreciates this."⁵³

The *Province* covered Nixon as in the midst of a dynamic campaign, as constantly on the attack; in short, the *Province* depicted Nixon the way most of the other newspapers depicted Kennedy. Although the newspaper did not deny that Kennedy's drive for the presidency was indeed energetic and popular, it continuously ran stories with titles like "Dick outshines Jack..." and "Nixon: The Man and the Image." Moreover, while most newspapers, when offering two accompanying articles about each candidate, tended to put the article on Kennedy first and that on Nixon second, the *Province* put Nixon's first and Kennedy's second.⁵⁴ This favouring of Nixon continued into the election coverage, which kept hope of a Nixon victory alive as long as possible ("Kennedy hailed as president; Nixon concedes - with a big 'if'", "Kennedy preparing for

White House after shaky presidential victory," "Nixon's popularity increases in defeat"). Once elected, the *Province* then became quite leery of Kennedy's prospects for leadership,⁵⁵ and depicted international reception of his victory as mostly mixed. The starkest example of this mixed reaction was that of Great Britain, which was portrayed in most papers as having offered hearty congratulations to Kennedy on his victory, but was said in the *Province* to have greeted Kennedy's election "favorably but cautiously."⁵⁶

However, what is most striking about this quasi-rejection of Kennedy is that the *Province's* and *Citizen's* alternative was to support Nixon, not reject the country that Kennedy wished to lead. According to their arguments, if Americans chose Kennedy they may be taking an unnecessary leadership risk with their precarious domestic and international situations; nonetheless, the American stance on those situations was not heavily criticized. Moreover, the editorials appearing in the *Province* projected a different attitude, involving a much more positive image of Kennedy than was expressed in the articles. Following both the election and the inauguration, the *Province's* editorials suggested that great expectations did indeed surround Kennedy, and that while it was "far too early to attempt any assessments of young Mr. Kennedy... he has made a good beginning. He sounds like a president who will be remembered."⁵⁷ Again, there is a measure of faith that, although presented with great difficulties, Americans as a nation will get through them successfully.

You can fool some of the people some of the time...

As a final commentary on the degree of these high expectations, one paper, the *Ottawa Journal* was most willing to call the excitement around Kennedy the result of hype. A regular *Journal* columnist, discussing the nature of the Kennedy election campaign, suggested that the Democrats had promised, “pie-in-the-sky...and most people vote for pie-in-the-sky.” “[T]he nation that made Elvis a millionaire because he was sexy... that sells toothpaste and beer and cigarettes with pretty girls and handsome men” had found a home among the Democratic campaign.⁵⁸ This style was, according to *Journal* coverage however, contributing more to a boring campaign than to something genuinely exciting. “Kennedy, Nixon Flog Dead Horses” was one headline, while an editorial “That TV ‘Great’ Debate” suggested that while many were talking about the “tempest” stirred up by the candidates’ war of words, this campaign was far tamer than those of the past. Instead, it had degenerated into “debating facial make-up and theatrical tricks, asking whether the camera doesn’t paint circles under Mr. Nixon’s eyes or blacken his beard.”⁵⁹ What the *Journal* editors were suggesting was that Canadians, at various levels, were engaging their preference for, or disdain towards, that hype.

Such depictions highlight a unique message: as a result of particular interests or attitudes, Canadians could choose not to engage the election and its implications, but if they did so, they might be placing Canada in a precarious position. “Canadians must expect to have to deal with changes in U.S. policy. We should accept them or protest them with courtesy in either case. The least

useful comment is that the U.S. election does not really make much difference to Canadians. This disregards the obvious.”⁶⁰ In other words, the *Journal* claimed that Canadians had the right to dismiss what the *Dartmouth Free Press* called “The American Circus”⁶¹ as interesting entertainment, but to carry that attitude to the level of more generalized sentiment towards the United States was foolhardy. Tellingly, given both the fact that such a statement was obviously necessary, and given the lesser degree of attention afforded to the election in papers such as the *Ottawa Citizen*, *Le Droit*, and to some extent the *Chronicle-Telegraph*, the *Journal's* opinion was obviously not the attitude championed by all Canadians.

A Catholic Candidate

John F. Kennedy was the first Catholic to be elected as an American president. As discussed above, in both the United States and Canada, the potential effects of this factor were discussed and weighed throughout the campaign. American authors remain unsure about what the effects of religion were on the ultimate results. While always confident that it was among the factors in voters' minds, and that the issue promoted both instinctual support from American Catholic communities and historic rejection from some American Protestant communities, many authors suggest as a tentative, if obvious, conclusion, that Kennedy must have been able to overcome those barriers in order to have gained as much support as he did.⁶²

In one of the clearest examples of differences in perception in this thesis, papers in Canada presented almost diametrically opposed interpretations of the

effects of Kennedy's religion on voting behaviour. While some offered evidence that it was the decisive issue, others concluded that religion had had very little effect on the outcome.

Those newspapers whose readership was primarily directed towards religious communities were split on its place in the campaign. The *Diocesan Times*, Halifax's Anglican newspaper, wrote that religion was a part of the campaign, but an unsuccessful one. "The frenzied efforts of certain Protestant groups in the United States did not succeed in keeping Senator Kennedy out of the White House."⁶³ Likewise, one of Quebec City's Catholic newspapers, *L'Action*, maintained that "[l]es enquêteurs disent que le grand point d'interrogation est la question religieuse... Le sentiment anticatholique a été exprimé dans plusieurs endroits du pays au cours de la campagne, particulièrement dans les Etats du Sud où les forces de Nixon ont dit qu'ils remporteront probablement les forteresses démocrates, ce qui permettrait à Nixon de se rendre à la Maison Blanche."⁶⁴ Though the newspaper did not completely endorse Kennedy until much later, his election was greeted with the headline "Président Catholique," the only paper to carry such a by-line, pointing to their belief in the strong relevance of the religious element.

In taking a stance on the importance of the religious issue, no paper suggested that it was a fundamental element of the 1960 election with more conviction than Quebec City's *Le Soleil*. While the paper, as suggested above, was reluctant to favour either candidate until the election was over, it did cover the religious angle with more depth, more breadth, and with much more urgency

than any other paper in the study. *Le Soleil* covered a range of angles concerning the religious issue, from its impact on the vote, to Kennedy's reluctance to appoint a Vatican ambassador,⁶⁵ to the fact that Kennedy would make use of a Catholic bible during the inauguration.⁶⁶ Much more than treating Kennedy's religion as an "interest" story, or even one of a list of "special interests" which would play themselves out on election day,⁶⁷ *Le Soleil* noted that this issue presented itself "à un très mauvais moment," and that should it play a major role in the election, that the resulting resentment and division would only multiply "les problèmes du pays voisin."⁶⁸ Once the election was over, *Le Soleil* ran an article stating that the president of the Democratic National Party declared the religious issue to be "un facteur décisif" in the election of Kennedy; asked whether Kennedy would have received more votes were he Protestant, the Democrat responded "c'est certain."⁶⁹

What makes this attention to religion so interesting is not that the *Diocesan Times*, *L'Action*, and *Le Soleil* allotted central importance to the religious in the election, but that they did so in such obvious contradiction to other Canadian newspapers. The *Vancouver Province*, for instance, suggested in an article entitled, "Bible belt vote buries old beliefs," that the voting pattern in the American South proved that the religious issue had not translated into votes, and that the Kennedy platform had carried 7 of the 12 states.⁷⁰ Likewise, an election day editorial in the *Ottawa Journal* singled out, "the happy fact that the old bugaboo of religious prejudice has for the present at any rate been routed."⁷¹

Moreover, the *Journal* stated in a post-election editorial that it was not clear that JFK, “would have got more or less votes had he been a Protestant.”⁷²

This split also characterized the university press. Laval University’s *Le Carabin* (Quebec City), reminded their readers that in American history, “liberté religieuse” had often meant defence against both liberalism and “papisme,” the fear that Catholic immigrants would bring with them the dominance of the will of the Pope (the same fears which Kennedy had to quell during his campaign). On the one hand, Kennedy’s declaration that he would handle all touchy political issues along the lines of majority opinion “devrait être suffisante”; on the other hand, the surfacing of the religious issue was unavoidable “[étant] donnée la préférence de n’importe lequel peuple (sic) pour ceux qui lui ressemble[nt] le plus.”⁷³ Moreover, the newspaper suggested that rather than being so smug about the American’s inability to get past the religious issue, Canadians could unfavourably compare the U.S. Catholic minority to the Anglophone minority in Quebec:

Combien de gens croient réellement que les Québécois sont prêts à élire comme premier ministre un Anglais protestant de Montréal ou un Irlandais catholique de la Gaspésie. Le fait est que les Etats-Unis auront un président catholique depuis longtemps quand le Québec aura un Premier ministre anglican.⁷⁴

Standing in direct contrast to this assessment was the University of Ottawa’s *Fulcrum*. One of its articles began by stating that, “Perhaps at this point it is expected of us, being a Catholic university, to express an opinion as to the results” of the Presidential election. They suggested, however, that religion was not the main factor of being pleased with the results, that, “it is extremely doubtful as to whether this is the main cause of the general feeling of content about the

campus as to the election results.” According to the authors, this was because “Religious prejudices, fortunately, did not win out.” They further decreased the role of religion by adding that the assumption that “prejudice was the only factor putting a Republican President in” was untrue, and the presumption that all Catholics would vote as a bloc was equally untrue. Indeed, they commended the Catholic Church for staying out of politics, and keeping its mouth shut during the election campaign.⁷⁵

These contradictions open a series of interesting questions which probe the nature of the range of opinion within Canadian newspapers. Why would the papers from Quebec City suggest that religion was a key factor and others exclaim the exact opposite? From the preponderance of religious sentiment that still existed in Francophone Quebec in 1960, could there be a cultural or linguistic paradigm at work? Such a conclusion would be hard to prove, given that *Le Droit*, a French-language newspaper published in Ottawa, Ontario, agreed with the likes of the *Journal* and the *Province* and their conclusion that the religious issue had been cast aside by American voters.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, *Le Droit* had followed the religious issue closely right up until the election itself, suggesting that it could be a factor (“Est-ce qu’il existe un vote catholique?”).⁷⁷ Could this then signify a general interest that was unique to the political landscape in Quebec? While this idea is a possibility, the reality seems a bit more complicated.

In addition to the conversation on religion that occurred in the *Ottawa Journal* at least one other example contradicting such an assumption existed.

The *Vancouver Sun*, although it eventually suggested that votes cast specifically for a Catholic candidate would be cancelled out by those cast specifically against one,⁷⁸ engaged the issue at length. The paper entertained an almost violent week-long conversation between the Canadian Protestant League and its supporters, and those who opposed their stance on Catholics in politics. Dr. Arthur R. Pyke, head of the League, asked all Canadians to “pray for ‘the defeat of Rome’ in the U.S. presidential election.”⁷⁹ While some readers reacted strongly to Dr. Pyke’s charges, others wrote in to defend him, stating that he, “has a genuine love for Roman Catholics,” but had a strong aversion to the Roman Catholic hierarchy, “because of their avowed purpose to control all things civil and religious in Canada, the United States of America, and in every land...”⁸⁰ Although ultimately dismissing the religious issue as the decisive factor in the vote, it seems that neither Francophones, nor Quebeckers, had a monopoly on concerning themselves with the religious disposition of an American leader.

Most importantly, while there appeared ample opportunity to do so, there was almost no suggestion in any paper that religious bigotry was a property of generalized weakness, impropriety, or failure on the part of the American project as a whole. Those who perceived the election as a triumph over religious prejudice praised America (and covered others who praised America) for doing so;⁸¹ those who believed that religious bigotry lingered saw it as an area for future improvement, but not as a more global indicator of American shortcomings. Although the issue produced a highly diverse set of opinions,

Canadian newspapers did not use the potential of religious bigotry as a launching pad for a more general rejection of the United States.

Her Friends Call Her Jackie

The final element of the Kennedy campaign to take an active role in most of the newspapers was the presence of Jacqueline Kennedy, who received more attention than any other figure related to the election save for the candidates themselves. American monographs discussing JFK's election have a tendency to place strong limitations on the effectiveness, or even usefulness of Jacqueline in John's drive for the presidency.⁸² This is perhaps an expression of the conscious attention to the roles played by gender in the family-centred domestic culture that engaged Americans in the post-war era.⁸³ In Canadian newspapers, however, Jacqueline Kennedy was, for the most part, lauded. In almost all newspapers, the "women's column" ran stories on the beautiful and intelligent Mrs. Kennedy who was committed to creating a proper home for her children, even in the White House,⁸⁴ and was in the midst of setting new fashion trends for American women ("The Jackie Kennedy look will sweep the country"⁸⁵). The *Ottawa Journal*, as one especially enthusiastic example, ran full-page stories on the way in which Jacqueline Kennedy reflected her husband's charisma and energy.⁸⁶

For other newspapers, like the *Vancouver Sun*, the comparison between Jacqueline Kennedy and Pat Nixon were, at times, as important a statement about the incoming administration as the personalities of the candidates themselves. In a pre-election cartoon, the *Sun* depicted a scene in which the two

candidates' wives took centre stage in front of a crowd of women, with the candidates themselves left to watch. [Fig. 2-1] In line with the articles stating the increased number of women voters in the election of 1960, is the implication that these women would at times be making their voting decisions by watching the potential First Ladies instead of the potential presidents.



2-1

In *Le Soleil*, special attention was paid to the ways in which Mrs. Kennedy would enhance the environment of the president. She was depicted as responsible, and well aware of the perils of raising children in the spotlight. Nonetheless, she remained open to holding press conferences from time to time, and offered up determination and commitment to both her family and her husband's success.⁸⁷ Such revered qualities were prompting, suggested one article, a run on Jacqueline-esque manikins for department store displays in 1961.⁸⁸ In a rare recognition of all of Jacqueline Kennedy's assets (and not only her brilliant looks), the University of Ottawa's *Fulcrum* noted that "the new first lady of the White House... bring[s] an end to an all-too-prevalent theory that

beauty and brains don't go together." While described as a "radiant beauty", it was noted that "She speaks fluent French, as well as Italian and Spanish... and in college, her marks were among the top 12 in the U.S.A."⁸⁹

This support for Jacqueline Kennedy was, however, not unanimous. While some papers, such as the *Citizen*, chose to gloss over her influence, relegating it mainly to the world of fashion and to details of her second child's birth, the perception of Mrs. Kennedy in *Le Droit* and the *Vancouver Province* bordered on outright criticism. In direct contrast to the cartoon appearing in the *Sun*, the coverage of Jacqueline's fashion sense in the *Province* implied that she spent too much on her wardrobe. Moreover, as with its criticisms of JFK, the *Province* suggested that Jacqueline Kennedy's "tall, dark looks have caused some envious women to brand her overly sophisticated and too chic."⁹⁰

What is striking about this coverage is that in all cases, the incoming wife of an American president became, in her own right, a mini-celebrity; there was a conscious choice by many Canadian newspapers to select Jacqueline Kennedy as, for instance, a shining example of what women could achieve, reflecting an implicit acceptance of an American role model. Even when Pat Nixon's virtues were discussed as preferable to those of Jacqueline Kennedy's, the choice was still to look towards a different American model (much like looking towards Nixon instead of Kennedy for leadership). The willingness to engage Mrs. Kennedy as "Woman of the Year," or "The Best Dressed Woman in the World,"⁹¹ suggests that in the minds of many, there was little resistance to American role models or even American values.

Dictating the terms of existence

The evidence suggests that the most common sentiment expressed Canadian newspapers at this point of the 1960s was one of positive impressions of the United States. However, this is not to suggest that all Canadian newspapers followed that line; one important exception was the *Pacific Tribune*. The Vancouver-published weekly Pacific coast mouthpiece of the Canadian Communist Party directly engaged in what most Canadian papers would not: criticism of the American project.⁹² The *Tribune* favoured neither candidate because it held that neither Kennedy nor Nixon were capable of reversing America's faltering course. Canadian resistance to both candidates wrote the *Tribune*,

"does express a protest against policies which lead the American people, ourselves, and the whole world, to the brink of disaster... In short, they [the candidates] are for "peace": a peace based upon bigger and better H-bombs and "means of delivery." Both are for "peaceful coexistence," providing either in the capacity of president, dictates the terms of "existence."⁹³

This perspective was reflected in the headlines announcing the election's results, "U.S. elects Kennedy in no choice vote"⁹⁴ and, "U.S. Election Branded Tragedy of Democracy."⁹⁵ The newspaper decoded the election of Kennedy over Nixon thus:

"In an election in which the American people had no real choice Democratic candidate John Kennedy was elected President by a narrow margin Tuesday, beating out his rival Richard Nixon. The election was marked by the fact that there were no real basic differences in the program of both candidates and parties... However, it appears clear that millions of people voted for Kennedy thinking he was the "lesser evil."⁹⁶

A handful of contributors to other newspapers also echoed these comments. The editorials of the *Almonte Gazette*, for instance, suggested that

Canada was slowly becoming too controlled by the U.S.: "While we like the Americans as neighbours that is no reason why we should be swallowed up by them." Moreover, it advanced the position, not unlike that in the *Pacific Tribune*, that, "We [Canada] have no adequate means of defending ourselves if war comes and we will be overrun anyway by Russia or the United States whichever gets over our borders first. Peace is our only hope."⁹⁷ Presented in the *Gazette* was the dual position that Canada should not only decrease its dependence on the United States, but that it should stop trying to be as successful as them in the first place. The editor's advice was for Canada to stop trying to be an international power. "Canada is a big country physically but small in population and industrial power. Our capital potential is extremely limited therefore we should get these international illusions of grandeur out of our heads and attend to our own knitting." In this editor's opinion, even Sir John A. Macdonald had at one time "mistrusted the Americans and framed policies to keep them from interfering too much in our affairs. But all that is changed now and we are little better than a vassal of our powerful neighbour."⁹⁸

And yet there were clear limitations to this rhetoric. Although constantly critical of Kennedy, his inauguration did suddenly bring a sense of positive promise. According to the *Tribune*, "On January 20, 1961 the world breathed a little easier, the hopes of millions rose perceptibly, and the taut string of tension, often near the breaking point in past months, appreciably slackened."⁹⁹ Though his convictions remained to be tested, there was hope. Moreover, there remained a distinction between "the United States" and "the American people."

While the United States was called “the world’s most powerful and most ruthless imperialist state,” the American people were said to be “great” and “united in purpose and determination with the peoples of the entire world.” Especially when discussing the prospect of nuclear war, “Americans” were said to be just as concerned as everybody else, while the “United States” is said to be a major, if not the major, harbingers of impending disaster.¹⁰⁰

More often, when newspapers did speak to anti-Americanism, it was to condemn it. In an editorial on the election appearing in the *Dartmouth Free Press*, the editor began by acknowledging, “[t]he favorite indoor sport of most people of the western world seems to be making fun of the United States.” However, citing the sheer size of the U.S. population, and the excessive difficulty in removing a President once elected, the tone, length, and breadth of the American campaign was said to be appropriate. Moreover, the editorial suggested that, “the wonder is not that the candidates make so many mistakes, but that they make so few mistakes” given their ridiculous schedules and intense public scrutiny for such a long period of time. The editorial ended by pronouncing, “Of the thirty-four presidents of the United States, singularly few have been really bad presidents. Perhaps this is the best answer to those who criticize the method of selection.”¹⁰¹

Cartooning the Kennedys

By and large, the cartoons appearing in Canadian newspapers depicting Kennedy and the issues surrounding his election echoed the sentiment

developed in the newspapers' prose. Rather than providing an illustrated repetition of the major arguments, however, the cartoons served to intensify the opinions presented in the articles and editorials. For instance, the editorial cartoons appearing in the *Chronicle-Herald* during the election and inaugural period were just as taken with Kennedy, though there was more of a note of caution concerning his ultimate prospects than there had been in the text. A cartoon appearing less than a week after the election provided a near-parallel of the emphatic support Kennedy had been receiving in the newspaper coverage [Fig. 2-2]. Kennedy was depicted as the champion of all that America stands for. He is exceedingly strong and confident, to the point of literally "radiating". He is claiming both victory and vigor, meaning that he is both a champion and one who is on the move. He rides a Democratic donkey, which means that he did not do it alone, but with the "support" of his party, which he is now steering.



2-2

Still, exercising Canadian prudence, there is a commentary via the personage of Charles de Gaulle, president of France, who is engulfed by both his domestic and international problems. De Gaulle, himself once a vigorous leader who has since fallen from grace, wishes Kennedy well (like many Canadians?), but warns of a "the bigger they are the harder they fall" scenario (as many Canadians may believe?). Things look simply radiant right now, but sooner or later "John D'Hyannis" may be burned at the stake.

This prudence seems to have pervaded many *Chronicle-Herald* cartoons. Another, featured after the inauguration, offered a potential glimpse of what was to come in international relations, specifically Russian intentions surrounding RB-47 planes [Fig. 2-3]. Kennedy, who is depicted as Samson in this case, is resting, though he remains somewhat alert and suspicious. However, the cartoonist suggests that he is not alert enough: Khrushchev is concealing the weapons to cut his hair (as per the biblical story, to cut off his strength), but is distracting him by showering him with flowers (gifts). This could be a commentary on Kennedy's diplomacy, and suggest that he may in fact not be paying enough attention to Russia, and will be duped if not careful.

As it was with the *Chronicle-Herald*, however, the cartoons of *Le Soleil* reveal a bit more cautious qualification of the enthusiasm first expressed in the articles. Kennedy appeared in many cartoons, and was not usually portrayed in a negative way, but his demeanour was childlike. On November 10, following Kennedy's election, his youth and exuberance were seen as his most distinctive characteristics [Fig. 2-4]. Here, his appearance is decidedly that of a child, and

he is in fact riding a toy. Eisenhower, also in the picture, does not appear particularly critical of him (which he was during the campaign), but seems to be slightly belittling him, or is perhaps taking on an "oh, those crazy kids..." mentality. Kennedy himself is transfixed on the head of his toy, the Democratic symbol (and that donkey is clearly demonstrating pride), as if to suggest that he is really a kind of "front-man" for the Democrats, and is looking to them for direction.




2-3



2-4

It is indeed curious that Eisenhower does not seem angry with either Kennedy or the Democrats, but almost hides a bit of admiration for Kennedy's enthusiasm. Unmistakably, however, there is an air of not taking Kennedy too seriously. This perception appears several times, such as on November 15. [Fig. 2-5]. Here we see Kennedy as a bit of a benevolent character. He is holding up a limp Richard Nixon, and stating, "if only you had told me you wanted to win..." This hints at a youthfulness or innocence, as if Kennedy either did not know that

his victory would be Nixon's loss, or that had he realized this, he would have let Nixon win. Again, the scene implies superficiality, or at least an approach of not taking Kennedy too seriously.



2-5

The *Ottawa Journal's* cartoons were a personification of the paper's preoccupation with the "circus" element of the campaign. In a drawing following the inauguration, Kennedy is the central figure in a wild rodeo setting [Fig. 2-6]. Kennedy is leading his cabinet out of the "New Frontier" ranch, which is the White House and Capitol building, while the previous administration takes its leave, Eisenhower happily, Nixon not quite so. The challenges of the world, from economics to politics, are wasting no time, and are charging straight at Kennedy, who is gritting his teeth and readying his donkey (read Democrats) for the charge. In another cartoon, a calm but possibly overwhelmed Kennedy stands at the centre of a flurry of cameras and telescopes, each one representing another challenge or facet of his impending policy [Fig. 2-7]. The caption "Scrutiny" reflects the mood: Kennedy is now in the world's spotlight.



Rancher Kennedy takes over with some of his 'hands' and begins a roundup of problems. Key below.


2-6



2-7

Reflecting those newspapers that took a more measured approach to the election were a set of measured cartoons. The *Ottawa Citizen* provided several examples: in one (albeit slightly racist) cartoon appearing on November 8 [Fig. 2-8], the Nixon-Kennedy debate reaches all the way to the very remote North, but the message has been somewhat lost in the process. This could be an attempt to comment on the reach of American issues, making their way, even if superficially, into the furthest reaches of its spheres of influence. On the other

hand, this may signal that some Canadians are not taking the election too seriously, or perhaps should not take it too seriously, or that Canadians have their own issues to worry about.



2-8

The landscape (harsh arctic desert, cruel sun, approaching polar bear) suggests that there are other issues up here to worry about. Moreover, this may be a "tongue-in-cheek" play on the classic stereotype Americans have of Canadians (that they are all northern Inuit). Most striking is that the American election here is very distant in every sense of the word, though it is a topic of conversation. This sense is embodied by the way the newspaper appears at the end (or beginning) of a trail of fading sunlight, as if to signify the "dimness" of the awareness. This posture of maintaining a distance from the election and its effects, as reflected in *Le Droit*, the *Citizen*, and the *Chronicle-Telegraph*, seems to have been an acceptable stance.

An October 11th cartoon appearing in the *Chronicle-Telegraph* offered the best representation of the existing preoccupation with the religious issue [Fig. 2-9]. The drawing displays Uncle Sam embarking on the road of the American election. This symbol of the U.S. must choose between "tolerance and justice" and "bigotry and prejudice". However, at the fork in this road is a massive Christian cross, which suggests that it is via religious convictions that one must make this decision. Indeed, the gravity of the religious issue is reflected both in the caption, "America at the crossroads", implying that there could be a decision to flout Christianity and head down the path of bigotry, and by the writing on the back of Uncle Sam's jacket stating "One Nation Indivisible", suggesting that whatever choice is made, it will take everyone with it. In this depiction, the United States is clearly looking at the Cross for guidance, after having realized that the election is forcing that kind of a choice.



2-9

Even the role of Jacqueline Kennedy received considerable attention in editorial cartoons; the cartoons in *Le Soleil* offer a reflection on the association

between the perception of Mrs. Kennedy and that of JFK. In one of two images depicting Jacqueline Kennedy, she is receiving a lecture from Mrs. Khrushchev, and is referred to as "la jeune Madame K" [Fig. 2-10]. Most strikingly, this scene is one of an elder scolding a child, another throwback to Kennedy's youth. Mrs. Kennedy also has a bit of an impertinent look on her face, one which is reinforced by the direction to "surtout, surveillez mes souliers", to which she is responding to by looking as far away from the feet as she can, almost glancing upwards. Youth, confidence, and determination are all qualities being projected about Jacqueline Kennedy.



2-10

Moving Towards an Understanding

Two main conclusions can be drawn from the evidence examined in this chapter. Firstly, among the papers in this study, there seems to be little in the way of consistent patterns. Whether grouped by region, by "orientation" of paper, or by language, each paper took its own stance on how to perceive the image of Kennedy himself, the impact of religion, and the symbolic depth of Jacqueline Kennedy. Even though the LIB revealed some small differences between

regions, differences were more striking between newspapers within each region. What these findings demonstrate is that it would be exceedingly difficult to speak about “Canadian newspaper perceptions of the United States” as a homogeneous block at this time. The diversity of opinion, both within and between regions and orientations, resulted in a highly diverse range of Canadian newspaper opinions of the United States.

Secondly, however, some noticeable commonalities between all newspapers did arise. Through the newspapers’ expectations and perceptions of Kennedy and what they believed the arrival of Kennedy would launch, most endorsed an actively moderate stance on American criticism, stating that there was little to gain from buying into an anti-American program. This indicates a common set of boundaries or limitations to the discussions taking place in Canadian newspapers. Moreover, The LIB suggests that Canadian newspapers as a group were certainly not anti-American at the outset of the decade. Indeed, it suggests a similar conclusion to the textual analysis presented in this chapter, namely, that while some groups of Canadians were highly engaged in Kennedy’s election and victory, others were quite disengaged from the process as a whole.

In general, three main reasons explain why the newspapers were not anti-American. First, they were worried about the implications for national defense and the possible advantages a split among Western nations would give the Communists. Thus, even amid the occasional warning of impending American cultural takeovers, and criticism of a class-based political system south of the border,¹⁰² came strongly-worded reminders that Canada should remain close to,

and supportive of, the United States, so as not to, "allow the Communists to achieve their objective of divide and conquer."¹⁰³ Second, many editorials and columns intimated that they did not think anti-Americanism was a very positive reflection of Canada and Canadians. In several papers, both editors and readers suggested that rather than, "whining about the big boy next door," Canadians might instead use such comparisons to strive for loftier goals for their country, and endeavour to create "A Positive Canadianism."¹⁰⁴

Third, many of the opinions were reflecting a real and honest admiration for the United States. Hence came an editorial opinion in the *Vancouver Sun* that "a neighbourly and necessary" economic and political alliance is of the foremost importance in Canadian policy, and that moreover, Canadians should, "remember with thankfulness and respect that our great neighbour pulled us through two world wars and that its powerful influence has stood off the Communists for 20 years."¹⁰⁵

Although they had different reasons for doing so, and although many of them were critical of some American presence in Canada and some American policy stances, Canadian newspapers did not take the stand that Canada should reject wholesale the American project. Without feeling pressure to do so and in the absence of any significant disdain towards the American project, Canadian newspapers did not engage any intense or aggressive anti-Americanism. In late 1960 and early 1961, Kennedy was cautiously admired.

¹ For a general overview of these competing forces, see Thomas J. Carty. *A Catholic in the White House? Religion, Politics, and John F. Kennedy's Presidential Campaign*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Thomas E. Cronin, *Inventing the American Presidency*. (Lawrence, Kan: University of Kansas Press, 1989), p.10-11. In addition, one can note that at least according to one source, Kennedy's advisors during

his campaign told him he had three minor problems in his drive for President: the American public had never elected someone as young as 43 years old, it had never elected a Catholic, and only once in the twentieth century had it selected a senator to be President. Peter Schwab and J. Lee Schneidman, *John F. Kennedy*. (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1974), p.87.

² Peter Schwab and J. Lee Schneidman, op. cit., Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), John Hellman, *The Kennedy Obsession: The American Myth of JFK*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Henry Fairlie, *The Kennedy Promise: The Politics of Expectation*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), and Thomas Brown, *JFK, History of an Image*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

³ Cronin, op. cit., p.9.

⁴ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Liberalism and Its Challengers: From F.D.R. to Bush*. 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p.201.

⁵ Joan Iversen, "The Ugly American: A Bestseller Reexamined," in Paul Harper and Joann P. Kreig op. cit., p.162. Examining Iversen's source, John W. Jeffries, "The Quest for National Purpose of 1960," *American Quarterly*. 30 (Fall 1978) p.451-470 is also instructive.

⁶ Henry Fairlie, *The Kennedy Promise*. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1973).

⁷ Hebert S. Parmet, "The Kennedy Myth and American Politics," *The History Teacher*, Vol. 24, No.1 (Nov 1990), p.31-32.

⁸ Recent projects include J. Richard Piper, *Ideologies and Institutions: American Conservative and Liberal Governance Prescriptions Since 1933*. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), and Godfrey Hodgson, *America in Our Time: From World War II to Nixon – What Happened and Why*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁹ Hamby, op. cit.

¹⁰ John H. Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*. 3rd Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), p.214-15

¹¹ James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.459.

¹² Schlesinger, op. cit., p.6-7.

¹³ Arguments suggesting that religion helped Kennedy to win his narrow victory in 1960 appear in William Gudulunas and Stephen R. Couch, "Would a Protestant or Polish Kennedy have won? A local test of ethnicity and religion in the Presidential Election of 1960," *Ethnic Groups*. Vol. 3, 1980.

¹⁴ Arguments suggesting that the religious component hurt Kennedy's run for the White House are presented in Lawrence H. Fuchs, *John Kennedy and American Catholicism*. (New York: Meredith Press, 1967).

¹⁵ Gudulunas and Couch, op. cit., p.2-3. The authors also provide an excellent executive summary of much of the scholarly work completed on this question prior to 1980.

¹⁶ Hamby, op. cit., p.199-201.

¹⁷ For a quick summary of anti-Catholicism see Timothy J. Sarbaugh, "John F. Kennedy and the West: Presidential Politics and the Religious Issue in 1960," *Journal of the West*. 34, no. 2, (1995), p.67.

¹⁸ Lord Longford, *Kennedy*. (London: Weinfeld and Nicolson, 1976), see in particular p.46-56.

¹⁹ For example, Cronin, op. cit., p.10.

²⁰ Schwab and Schneidman, op. cit., p.92-93.

²¹ Ibid., p.95-96. See also Longford, op. cit. p.52.

²² Hamby, op. cit., p.201.

²³ Ralph G. Martin, *A Hero For Our Time: An Intimate Story of the Kennedy Years*. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), p.150-152.

²⁴ Schlesinger, op. cit., p.102-104.

²⁵ Sarah Bradford, *America's Queen: The Life of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis*. (Middlesex, England: Viking Penguin, 2000), p.120-135. The desire to exert this "dowdy" matriarchal image is probably also a major reason why the nickname "Jackie" was used in much of the press coverage of Mrs. Kennedy, rather than the 'fancier' Jacqueline.

²⁶ Schlesinger, op. cit., p.184.

²⁷ Hamby, op. cit., p.202.

- ²⁸ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986) p.101, 112-113.
- ²⁹ This saga is recounted among many of the works cited in earlier chapters, such as in J.H. Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, op. cit., p.215 and Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein. *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World To the 1990s*. Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd, 1994, p.256-257, and in great detail in works like Lawrence Martin, *The Presidents & The Prime Ministers; Washington and Ottawa Face to Face: The Myth of Bilateral Bliss, 1867-1982*. (Markham, Ontario: Paperjacks Ltd., 1983) p. 181-211
- ³⁰ For examples, see Thompson and Randall, op. cit., p.226, Michael Bliss, *Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Mulroney*. Toronto: HarperCollins, 1994., p.210-211, and J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism*. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1996), p.133-141, Pearson, L.B. *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson*. Vol. 3, 1957-1968. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p.111-13.
- ³¹ Martin, op. cit., p.182.
- ³² Granatstein, 1996, op. cit., p.128.
- ³³ Bliss, op. cit., p.206.
- ³⁴ Lawrence Martin, op. cit., p.182.
- ³⁵ The difference in the popular vote was less than one million votes in favour of Kennedy. The difference in the Bush-Gore election of 2000, for comparison, was just under 500,000.
- ³⁶ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, October 7, 1960 p.4.
- ³⁷ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, October 20, 1960. p.4.
- ³⁸ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, November 18, 1960, p.4.
- ³⁹ *Ubysey*, October 13, 1960, p.2.
- ⁴⁰ *Dalhousie Gazette*, Nov 17, p.5.
- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² *Le Soleil*, November 11, 1960 p.10.
- ⁴³ *Le Soleil*, January 20, 1961 p.1.
- ⁴⁴ *Le Soleil*, January 19, 1961 p.5.
- ⁴⁵ *Jewish Western Bulletin*, November 11, 1960, p.2. Gudelunas and Couch suggest that it was exactly Kennedy's appeal to the American public to overlook bigotry that mobilized support among minority groups like Afro-Americans and Jews, both of which voted for Kennedy in greater numbers than Catholics. Gudelunas and Couch, op. cit., p.2-3.
- ⁴⁶ *Le Droit*, January 20, 1961, p.2.
- ⁴⁷ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, Oct 25 1960, p.5.
- ⁴⁸ A great example is the detail surrounding egg-throwing in the *Chronicle-Telegraph* October 28, 1960, p.1.
- ⁴⁹ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, November 9, 1960, p.4.
- ⁵⁰ "It is well to recognize, however, that it is still the United States and the Soviet Union. Substantially, nothing has changed." *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, November 12, 1960 p.4.
- ⁵¹ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, January 18, 1961, p.14.
- ⁵² *Ubysey*, January 26, 1961, p.4.
- ⁵³ *Vancouver Citizen*, Nov 10, 1960, p.12.
- ⁵⁴ *Vancouver Province*, October 18, 1960, p.18, November 7, 1960, p.1 and even in the case of Pat Nixon and Jacqueline Kennedy on October 27, 1960, p.33.
- ⁵⁵ *Vancouver Province*, November 10, 1960, p.12.
- ⁵⁶ *Vancouver Province*, November 10, 1960 p.1.
- ⁵⁷ *Vancouver Province*, January 23, 1960, p.4
- ⁵⁸ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 14, 1960 p.33.
- ⁵⁹ *Ottawa Journal*, October 13, 1960, p.6.
- ⁶⁰ *Ottawa Journal*, November 10, 1960 p.6.
- ⁶¹ *Dartmouth Free Press*, October 20, 1960, p.1, 6.
- ⁶² This is essentially the view taken in White, Theodore H. *The Making of the President, 1960*, (New York: Antheneum Publishers, 1961), James MacGregor Burns *John Kennedy: A Political Profile*, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1960), Aida DiPace Donald ed. *John F. Kennedy and the New Frontier*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966) and, with some reservation, in Albert J. Menendez, *John F. Kennedy: Catholic and Humanist*, (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1978).

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- ⁶³ *Diocesan Times*, December 1960, p.3.
- ⁶⁴ *L'Action*, Nov 7, 1960, p.1.
- ⁶⁵ *Le Soleil*, November 10, 1960, p.23.
- ⁶⁶ *Le Soleil*, November 11, 1960, p.10.
- ⁶⁷ This was the view of the religious issue taken by the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* and the *Ottawa Citizen*.
- ⁶⁸ *Le Soleil*, October 18, 1960, p.4.
- ⁶⁹ *Le Soleil*, November 11, 1960, p.24.
- ⁷⁰ *Vancouver Province*, November 10, 1960 p.1.
- ⁷¹ *Ottawa Journal*, November 9, 1960, p.6.
- ⁷² *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, November 11, 1960, p.6.
- ⁷³ *Le Carabin*, September 29, 1960, p.10.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ *The Fulcrum*, November 16, 1960, p.2.
- ⁷⁶ *Le Droit*, November 9, 1960, p.2.
- ⁷⁷ *Le Droit*, November 5, 1960, p.1.
- ⁷⁸ *Vancouver Sun*, October 24, 1960, p.2.
- ⁷⁹ *Vancouver Sun*, October 14, 1960, p.1.
- ⁸⁰ *Vancouver Sun*, October 24, 1960, p.4.
- ⁸¹ There was a sense that America had succeeded in catching up to Canada, which had buried the prohibition on Catholic leaders with Wilfrid Laurier in 1896. See *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, October 26, 1960 p.4.
- ⁸² Examples of these worries are explored in James MacGregor Burns op. cit., p.233 and Lewis J. Paper, *The Promise and the Performance: The Leadership of John F. Kennedy*, Crown Publishers Inc., New York, 1975 p.261.
- ⁸³ As expressed, for instance, in Elaine Tyler May's discussions on "domestic containment" in *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, Basic Books, New York, 1988.
- ⁸⁴ For example, *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, November 16, 1960, p.7.
- ⁸⁵ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, January 3, 1961, p.6.
- ⁸⁶ *Ottawa Journal*, November 9, 1960, p.23.
- ⁸⁷ *Le Soleil*, January 11, 1961, p.17.
- ⁸⁸ *Le Soleil*, January 16, 1961, p.9.
- ⁸⁹ *The Fulcrum*, November 16, 1960, p.6.
- ⁹⁰ *Vancouver Province*, November 10, 1961 p.29.
- ⁹¹ *Le Soleil*, January 11, 1961 p.26, *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, January 7, 1961, p.6.
- ⁹² The Tribune functioned as a mouthpiece for the Communist movement in Canada (especially that movement's West Coast incarnation), but its concerns also overlapped at times with the concerns of the labour movement. For discussion on the Canadian labour movement in the 1960s, see David Kwavnick, *Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: The Canadian Labour Congress, 1956-1968*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), Irving Martin Abella, *Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) and Bryan D. Palmer, *Working Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1880-1991*. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), 268-339. For discussion on segments of the American labour movement in the 1960s, see George T. Sulzner, "Politics, Politics, Labor Relations, and Public Personnel Management: Retrospect and Prospect." *Policy Studies Review*. 11, no.2: 279-289.
- ⁹³ *Pacific Tribune*, October 21, 1960, p.4.
- ⁹⁴ *Pacific Tribune*, November 11, 1960, p.1.
- ⁹⁵ *Pacific Tribune*, November 11, 1960, p.3.
- ⁹⁶ *Pacific Tribune*, November 11, 1960, p.1.
- ⁹⁷ *Almonte Gazette*, October 13, 1960, p.2.
- ⁹⁸ *Almonte Gazette*, November 10, 1960, p.2.
- ⁹⁹ *Pacific Tribune*, January 27, 1961, p.5.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰¹ *Dartmouth Free Press*, November 17, 1960, p.4.

¹⁰² *Vancouver Sun*, October 14, 1960, p.4.

¹⁰³ *Vancouver Sun*, January 26, 1961, p.4

¹⁰⁴ Examples include *Vancouver Province*, November 22, 1960, p.4, *Vancouver Province*, October 22, 1960, p.4, and *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, January 31, 1961, p.4.

¹⁰⁵ *Vancouver Sun*, January 30, 1961, p.4.

CHAPTER 2

A Canadian Counterbalance: Qualified Support and Cautious Criticism in the Cuban Missile Crisis

"Well we might be understanding of the Americans. Their danger is our danger, their fears our fears and we are bound to them by formal alliance and old association."

– *Ottawa Journal*, October 23, 1962

"All power (political or nuclear) must result in total destruction. Discussion in the Security Council by [Russian ambassador] Zorin and [American ambassador] Stevenson – to find the biggest liar – established a blockade to sanity."

– *Vancouver Sun*, October 31, 1962

Following the fall of Communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, observers in the West pinpointed the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as the closest the East and West ever came to making the Cold War a hot one.¹ Although the Crisis has acquired legendary proportions in the years since, the reaction among Canadian newspapers at the time was both divided and, in many instances, subdued. The brush with nuclear war produced not one, but two extreme positions in some Canadian newspapers: those papers generally gravitating towards the political right, who interpreted the situation as evidence of a need to draw closer to the U.S., and those papers generally gravitating towards the political left, who suggested that only the outright rejection of nuclear weapons – at least in Canada, though ideally in all countries – could be the guarantor of a lasting peace. Moreover, many Canadian newspapers only leaned slightly towards one direction or another, refusing to overtly or

emphatically adopt either position. While many expressed cautious and qualified support for American President John F. Kennedy's actions, in most papers, the Cuban Missile Crisis was treated as a political conundrum. It was an experience that, while disconcerting, was mostly a call to review and perhaps rethink Canada's foreign policies, especially those dealing with the United States.

This balanced approach is evident in the Linguistic Intergroup Bias analysis. The evaluation of both positive and negative Americans was closer to parity than at any time in the 1960s, suggesting that on the whole Canadian newspapers were interpreting Americans as both "us" and "other." Taken as a corpus of information, the cross-section of Canadian newspapers in 1962, whether it was in their editorials and articles, in their choice of language and adjectives, or in the cartoons they displayed, expressed a body of opinion that was essentially split on how to interpret American actions, and on how to perceive the U.S. At the same time, it should be noted that when compared to 1960, more Canadian newspapers in 1962, although still largely supportive of Americans, had begun to question their connections with the United States.

Linguistic Intergroup Bias for the Cuban Missile Crisis

Engaging the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB), which can measure the degree to which the language used to describe someone's actions suggests that they are either part of the observers "in-group" (people like me) or their "out-group" (people not like me) essentially adds evidence to the findings of the textual analysis; Canadian newspapers, overall, seemed to be unsure whether

Americans were “like us” or “not like us.” Six of the newspapers in 1962 offered a particularly rich commentary. From the *Ottawa Citizen*, *Ottawa Journal*, *Vancouver Sun*, and *Vancouver Province*, there were six articles or letters which presented American actions in a positive light, and six which presented them as negative. There were also five articles from the highly critical *Pacific Tribune*, which were measured against five positive articles from *L’Action*.

The method used in the LIB is to identify the type of linguistic expression used when discussing the United States, or the subtle differences in word choice that betray where Americans are placed in these Canadian newspapers’ conceptual maps. Basically, because one sees the positive behaviour of people who are “like me” as stable characteristics (and conversely, one sees their faults as the result of temporary situations), one will tend towards describing positive behaviour as concrete and negative behaviour as abstract. Naturally, it follows that a person interprets the positive actions of people “not like me” as temporary, and their negative behaviour as more permanent or concrete.

At the most concrete LIB level, a newspaper article simply described U.S. action: “The United States has said...” or “Les Etats-Unis ont des alliances militaires avec L’Europe...”² has very little interpretation involved. Slightly less concrete was a phrase such as “To learn how the Americans seized this base...” which is descriptive, but a little less of an objective action.³ Moving into more abstract territory, an author may have described American actions in a way that was detached from observable behavioural, but limited to a particular case: “It was quite another thing for [the Americans] to try and impose U.S. will on

[Cuba].”⁴ At the most abstract level, the behaviour of the United States would be given as a unique characteristic that separated them from other countries. “The United States is quite prepared to destroy the whole world...”⁵ tells us what this author thought the U.S. was all about.

Having scored all of the articles for their level of abstraction? (from 1 to 4, most concrete to most abstract, with the mean score being 2.5), it was found that in almost all cases, the articles and letters in each newspaper averaged to just slightly on the side of concrete statements. On average, positive articles and letters scored 2.1, and negative ones 2.08. This suggests that these newspapers did not find a substantial difference in the root of positive and negative American behaviour. However, an examination of the specific newspapers reveals much more congruence with the patterns found in the text.

The *Vancouver Province*, which supported the U.S. blockade, produced a score of 1.94 on positive articles, and 2.4 on negative ones. This scoring suggests a tendency to view the positive behaviour of Americans as more concrete, and more intrinsic, than negative behaviour. The *Ottawa Journal*, also favourable to the U.S. blockade, scored similarly with a 1.94 on positive articles and 2.18 on negative ones. Again, positive behaviour is seen as more concrete and intrinsic, and negative behaviour slightly more abstract. The newspaper that found negative American behaviour the most intrinsic was the *Pacific Tribune*, whose scathing comments on the U.S. were at times relentless. Scoring a 1.92, the lowest of any newspaper, the articles in the *Tribune* thus associated negative behaviour with the expected actions of the United States.

Overall, however, the level of concreteness associated with either positive or negative behaviour was hardly overwhelming. While staunch U.S. supporters like the *Province* and the *Journal* were adamant that positive U.S. behaviour was expected, they hardly suggested that negative behaviour was unexpected. Similarly, the close average of overall negative and positive portrayals suggests that Canadian newspapers were divided, in this case almost right down the middle, on their opinions of the United States. While giving Americans the benefit of the doubt, the tendency of some newspapers was not to interpret negative behaviour as uncharacteristic. Thus, in Canadian newspapers, in 1962, Americans were expected to act both selfishly or aggressively as well as benevolently.

Interpretations of the Crisis

John Kennedy, who was still in bed on October 16, 1962 when he heard the news of the U-2 photographs, was simply shocked. "Khrushchev can't do this to me" were the first words National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy recalled later. Robert Kennedy, the President's brother and Attorney General of the United States was apparently even more enraged. "Oh S**t! S**t! S**t! Those sons of b*tch*s Russians" was his first reaction.⁶

The degree of emotion first stirred by these American leaders echoed throughout North America, as "the most frightening confrontation of the Cold War," and perhaps "the most frightening military crisis in world history." This characterization of the Cuban Missile Crisis as the epic showdown of its era, as

well as the “*mano a mano* emotionality imparted to Soviet-American relations,” has helped prompt the extensive range of examination and revision of the crisis by historians seeking more accurate accounts, by political scientists testing policy-making models, and by policy-makers seeking examples of crisis management.⁷

According to William J. Medland, whose work on the “Evolving Historical Perspectives” of Cuban Missile Crisis analysis summarizes the state of that analysis prior to 1990, written material on the Crisis can be separated into four areas of interpretation: “1) the basis for Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, 2) the response of the United States to the missiles in Cuba, 3) the leadership of President John F. Kennedy during the crisis, and 4) the consequences of results in the aftermath of the nuclear confrontation.” Medland notes that much of the scholarly work on the crisis has either been written by those he terms the “participants,” that is government figures like Arthur Schlesinger and Theodore Sorensen, or else by “revisionists,” those who have challenged the participants’ interpretations.⁸

In terms of the question surrounding Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, the participants have suggested at least six distinct reasons over time, ranging from specific strategic Cold War concerns such as strengthening the Soviet bargaining position on Berlin to a reassertion of Soviet leadership in global communism.⁹ Medland suggests that regardless of the precise motive, the placement of the missiles was thought by participants to have “either literally or in appearance” changed the balance of power as it stood prior to their placement.

Due to this shift in the status quo, the American administration felt that it was forced to classify the Soviet action as offensive and that it had no alternative but to act. Revisionists, however, suggest that a host of other motives, such as protecting Castro's regime as a toe-hold of communism in Latin America, were instead the prime motivating factors for Khrushchev's USSR. Moreover, they suggest that given U.S. military superiority, the Cuban missiles, despite their proximity, did not significantly alter the military reality of Cold War conflict.¹⁰

Most of the participant commentators on this topic agree that given the aggressive nature of Khrushchev's move, the choice of U.S. action then evolved into a quarantine for a number of reasons: military and international relations problems of a rapid attack or air strike on Cuba, the legal considerations of United Nations protocol, and the fact that a quarantine backed Khrushchev into the compromising position of having to commit the first aggressive act. Revisionists, however, begin from the opposite assumption, that the missiles did *not* represent a military threat. As a result, the reaction of the Kennedy administration was faulty, as it "arbitrarily and superficially made a distinction [one that did not exist] between the Soviet "offensive" missiles in Cuba and the American "defensive" missiles in Turkey." Given this distinction, which portrayed American international efforts as defensive and Soviet international efforts as aggressive, the U.S. was able to paint Khrushchev in a deceptive light, and moved not to a benign "quarantine," but to a blockade, which is an act of war.¹¹

More recent evidence suggests that public opinion also played a critical role in ExComm's decision-making process. Citing American opinion polls,

consultations with business leaders, and the prevalence of certain arguments in American newspapers, Timothy J. McKeown provides evidence that the use of a blockade, rather than either more aggressive military options or less aggressive diplomatic solutions, was ultimately selected by ExComm *because* a blockade was able to garner the most significant level of public support. McKeown argues that while evidence suggests that the use of a blockade was not the best strategic mechanism to solve the military threat of the Crisis, more aggressive behaviour would not have found as much support among the American public. Likewise, however, the public was adamant that the Democrats do “something” about the Cuban problem, and as such anything less than a blockade would have brought charges of weakness.¹²

In terms of Kennedy’s actions, participants in the Crisis, many of whom authored books and papers on the subject for years afterwards, believed it was his finest hour: “The composite perspective of the participants then is one of a President acting courageously, selecting an appropriate response, and managing the crisis to a successful resolution.”¹³ Moreover, lauding Kennedy’s actions was by no means limited to the 1960s and 70s. Alonzo L. Hamby suggests, in *Liberalism and Its Challenges: From F.D.R. to Bush*, that once one accepts Kennedy’s premise that the U.S. global credibility would have been “fatally impaired” by the successful installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the President’s response becomes “difficult to fault.” In response to allegations of excessive machismo or impulsiveness, Hamby suggests that Kennedy’s decision to surround himself with the bevy of foreign relations experts that was Ex-Comm

was what produced the more peaceful options for response that Kennedy eventually embraced. As a result, the old 'demonization' of Khrushchev reappears: "Faced with an act of appalling recklessness [by Khrushchev], [Kennedy] responded with balance and flexibility."¹⁴ However, many revisionists suggest that Kennedy 'personalized' the Crisis to a dangerous degree, and thus converted political issues into "tests of will" between himself and the Soviet leader. As a result, Kennedy rejected diplomacy in favour of public confrontation and shifted into a mode of "crisis politics," even though this course of action significantly increased the chance that it would escalate into all-out war.¹⁵

The effect of the crisis, according to most participants, was quite positive. Indeed, Hamby later adds that the ultimate effect of the crisis was one of a conscious and mutual direction change in American-Soviet relations. With neither side anxious to repeat either the tension or the humiliation of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the diplomatic space for the *détente* of later years was created.¹⁶ For most revisionists, however, the confrontation begat only negative results both in the short and the long term. Rather than initiating some sort of real *détente* between the combatants, it plunged both sides into a new nuclear arms race, making the world "a much more difficult place to disarm." Moreover, many revisionists have suggested that American confidence in the Cuban Missile Crisis would morph into American arrogance in foreign affairs, a stance that helped to escalate its military activity in theatres like Vietnam. "Having enshrined force as an instrument of policy, the United States began to seek military solutions to purely international political problems."¹⁷

Beginning before 1990, but more pronounced since the fall of Soviet communism, other streams of research on the Crisis have emerged from the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree from Cuba. The availability of previously restricted Soviet and Cuban documents, as well as new testimony from ExComm's Soviet counterparts, has not only refashioned the chronology of some of the event's key developments, but has injected alternative understandings of Soviet and Cuban motivations.¹⁸ From the point of view of the Soviet Union, scholars have forced some re-evaluation of both the facts and the implications of the crisis. For instance, although international prestige was a factor, many Soviets, for whom the events of October 1962 are referred to as "The Caribbean Crisis" were so convinced that the U.S. intended to invade Cuba again (following the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion) that beefing up Cuba's defence was a necessity for the long-term success of communism in that country. Instead of provoking military action, in other words, they had hoped to deter it.¹⁹

Perhaps of most interest, and although further analysis remains, the more recent evidence emerging from the Soviet Union is prompting a re-casting of the long-term implications of the crisis: rather than viewing it as an example of successful American policy resulting in the international humiliation of the Soviets, it can be seen as revealing a more mutual vulnerability as both sides attempted to avoid all-out nuclear war.²⁰

The Cuban point of view has also been given, in recent years, some amount of attention. For instance, there has been recent acknowledgement that

whether or not the Kennedy administration *intended* to actually invade Cuba again or not, from the Cuban perspective, it seemed a likely outcome.²¹

“A Pigmy among the Giants”: Canada and the Crisis

For the purposes of this thesis, which examines newspaper opinion of the conflict as it was happening, these new revisions, while enlightening, have little relevance because they only become known in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, both the American public and the Canadian public would have been unaware of many of these non-North American points of view, and instead were privy only to the American and Canadian interpretations available in 1962.

Canada's involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis has received almost no somewhat less attention than the roles played by the United States and the Soviet Union, even in Canada, but it has still produced a significant library of analysis. Most of the subsequent attention given to the Crisis as it played out on Canadian television and among Parliamentarians has focused on the figure of John Diefenbaker, the leader of the Conservative minority government in Parliament and Prime Minister of Canada during the Crisis. Several Canadian scholars looking back at the Crisis have portrayed it as the major turning point in Diefenbaker's tenure as Prime Minister, a point where “[t]he Prime Minister's authority crumbled” and foreshadowed his loss of power and popular support.²²

Indeed, much of the attention in Canadian scholarship surrounds the leadership of the Prime Minister who, notoriously, was the only American ally not

to give his full support to Kennedy at the outset of the Crisis.²³ About ninety minutes before announcing to the world via a televised press conference that the quarantine was to begin, the White House sent an envoy to let the Canadian Prime Minister know what was about to happen. Diefenbaker, (whose personal relationship with Kennedy was explored in Chapter 1)²⁴, was suspicious enough of his ally's motives that he called for a UN inspection of the alleged Cuban missile sites. Adding to Diefenbaker's problems, the Canadian military did not agree with their own Prime Minister's hesitation, and ultimately moved the Canadian military to a state of readiness analogous to the American setting of DefCon 3, the request made by the Kennedy Administration. Diefenbaker, irate at the lack of notice which Canada, ostensibly America's closest ally, was given, defended his position in Parliament by stating that "it was too much to expect any country to react instantly when it learned of a crisis an hour before it became public."²⁵

Canadian scholars have emphasized that given the scope of the danger, and given the military links that the two countries had forged since the end of the War, Diefenbaker's hesitation was simply an unacceptable military and political option. While Canada should have been given more advance consideration, as J.L. Granatstein puts it, "Canada's leader had flunked the test."²⁶ Moreover, the Prime Minister's actions would, by some accounts, help precipitate a whole new cooling of the Canadian-American relationship, if not a new Canadian-American crisis,²⁷ one which would affect the Canadian election of 1963, specifically in the

form of allegations that Kennedy and the Americans backed the campaign of Pearson's liberals so as to remove Diefenbaker from office.²⁸

However, this is not the only interpretation of the events of October 1962. A plethora of literature also focuses on the disappointment of many Canadians, Parliamentarians included, explicitly suggesting that rather than "cooling" relations, reactions in Canada point instead to vast Canadian support and empathy for the American situation. J.L. Granatstein, in *Yankee go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism*, suggests that as they followed the Crisis, Canadians "looked to President John F. Kennedy as their leader, not to the ineffectual, indecisive Diefenbaker."²⁹ This sentiment was underscored in the aftermath of the crisis, when at least one Gallup poll suggested over 80% of Canadians disapproving Diefenbaker's hesitation. For many then, the Cuban Missile Crisis not only left the Kennedy Administration doubting the reliability of Canada as a partner against Communist aggression, but it left many Canadians with the same sentiment as well.³⁰

In *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, Commander Peter T. Haydon endeavoured to address the "unanswered questions" concerning the relationship between government ("civil authority") and the military, as well as what constituted wholly reasonable (or unreasonable) expectations of Canadian defence policy both during the Crisis and in general. Haydon specifically suggests that the Crisis was much more complex in its meaning and effect, and both fundamentally altered the civil-military relationship

in Canada while simultaneously widening the gap between those two communities.³¹

Curiously, however, when summarizing the press's coverage of the Crisis, Haydon suggests that while any condemnation of the government's handling of the crisis was basically withheld until the danger had passed, once it had passed "in typical Canadian fashion, any sense of accomplishment was quickly dashed by criticism. For instance, almost immediately afterwards, the press began to focus on the government's failure to put the Canadian military on alert when asked to do so by the Americans."³² Does this accurately reflect the reaction of the Canadian press? Was its coverage so monolithic? Did most editors agree that Canada had performed poorly in recent events? The short answer to all of these questions is, not quite.

Covering Cuba in Canada

The Cuban Missile Crisis was front-page news in many of Canada's newspapers, and prompted a good deal of discussion, via editorials, letters to the editor, special columns, and cartoons. With the exception of the *Jewish Western Bulletin*, the *Halifax Spryfield Mirror*, and the *B.C. Catholic*, all of the newspapers selected for this study contained commentary on the crisis, some of them extensively. In this way, the Cuban Missile Crisis stands out in the context of this thesis as far and away the most important event, in terms of newspaper coverage, of the five occasions examined in this study.

The Crisis itself, as is well-known thanks to a hit Hollywood movie, lasted thirteen days beginning on October 22.³³ However, the fallout from the Crisis,

and the slow realization of all that had transpired and how Canada had been affected, continued for some time after the imminent threat of war had dissipated. I thus examined coverage from about mid-October 1962 (tracing a few less frequently published newspapers back to the beginning of October) until about mid-December 1962 (again, following a couple forward until the end of the year). For the most part, coverage of the Crisis and its consequences had dissipated by the beginning of December.

Although there are a number of minor discussions that took place over the course of those two months, there were six general themes that emerged in the textual content of most papers. First, most Canadian papers were not especially for or especially against the American blockade of Cuba. Notable exceptions included the *Vancouver Province* and the *Ottawa Journal*, which came out almost dogmatically in favour of American actions, and the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* and Vancouver's *Pacific Tribune*, which found almost nothing admirable in U.S. decision-making. Second, region (engaged through the use of newspapers from Halifax, Quebec City, Ottawa, and Vancouver) did not surface as a salient difference in newspaper coverage. To some limited degree, there may have been a significant difference between a handful of "conservative" papers and some "liberal" papers.

Third, there emerged a limited set of reasons for supporting American unilateral action, most of which centred on a strong disdain for appeasement and the battle against Communism. Likewise, there was a range of opposition towards the blockade. Most often, this opposition was said to be because the

blockade heightened the threat of nuclear war, but opposition also arose because of stated suspicion of unreliable or irrational American motives. Fourth, most papers were reluctant to judge Prime Minister Diefenbaker's first reaction (to call for an eight-nation inspection of Cuba to determine conclusively that the suspected weapons were present), but among those who chose to register an opinion, almost all supported of his suggestions.

Fifth, overall, the tendency was to refer to President Kennedy as the architect of American involvement in the Crisis, most often as a conscious distinction from both "the United States" and from the American public as a whole. Notwithstanding, the French-language papers seemed much more apt to employ the term "americaines" or "Etats-Unis" when referring to motives and actions than the English-language press. Lastly, there was also a considerable lack of uniform opinion presented in almost all papers; no matter what the prevailing view of the papers' editors, dissenting voices in the form of letters to the editor were a common feature of most newspapers.

Reluctant Support Underlined By Fear

In early October of 1962, several Canadian newspapers noted that the potential for an East-West conflict was escalating; most papers expected that it would be over Berlin, the contemporary hot spot of Cold War sabre-rattling.³⁴ To a large extent, although an article or two sometimes appeared on the subject of American-Cuba relations, the newspapers' awareness had been relegated to the

realm of on-going problems that President Kennedy would have to deal with at some point in the future.

This is not to suggest that all groups had become increasingly comfortable at the blooming relationship between Havana and Moscow. The *Vancouver Citizen* suggested that Kennedy should have acted as soon as it became apparent that Castro was acting in concert with Khrushchev,³⁵ while a syndicated column asked that cooler heads prevail, as Cuba seemed only to be defending itself against future American aggression.³⁶ More specifically, Quebec City's *Le Soleil* covered American UN envoy Adlai Stephenson's warnings to the international community that Cuba had become an increasing menace in Central America, and a *Le Soleil* editorial added "Pour ces Américains, Cuba c'est le Kremlin aux portes de leur pays."³⁷ The *Ottawa Journal* went even further: "So far, the weapons reaching Cuba from the Soviet Union apparently would be useful only in fighting off an invasion of Cuba. President Kennedy recently made clear that the U.S. would take firm action if Cuba acquired offensive weapons."³⁸ Nonetheless, for many of these nervous observers, the American action they hoped for was not expected to come until several months, if not years, later, while others suggested that any talk surrounding an invasion of Cuba was more likely meant to rattle Khrushchev on the Berlin issue.³⁹

Once the Crisis erupted (and although most newspapers would feature developments around Cuba as their lead story for almost a week) the articles, editorials, and letters to the editor appearing in at least ten of the newspapers under review put forward what could be termed "cautious" support of the

American blockade. Typical of such views was an *Ottawa Citizen* editorial printed on October 23, which commended Kennedy's courage and chastised Russia for lying to the world community, but suggested that the blockade was wrong because of the dangerous precedent it might set, because of the lack of consultation Washington offered to its allies, and because a unilateral blockade risked a loss of "moral authority" on which the U.S. could appeal to nations not allied to either side of the Cold War.⁴⁰ A poll carried out by the *Vancouver Sun* just as the Crisis broke reported that two-thirds of Vancouverites that Kennedy had no choice to act on Cuba, because it had to ensure that Cuba did not turn into a nuclear arsenal that could menace the United States; however, a third of those interviewed felt there was "a grave danger" and that the Crisis would "trigger a world conflict."⁴¹

Meanwhile, commentary on the Crisis in the weekly *Vancouver Citizen* took the form of a back-and-forth between columnist Christy McDevitt and the newspaper's readers. Mr. McDevitt believed that "the American people... could either face up to the situation or possibly lose their freedom," in part because Khrushchev "thrives on deceit and corruption and the help of people like himself to enslave the whole world."⁴² Several vocal readers, however, wrote back, one of whom stated "I was distressed that you are persisting in your own hate campaign," and asked instead, "If we are really concerned in saving democracy, is it not more reasonable to attempt cohabitation of the globe with other nations, other political systems, as we do with other religions?"⁴³

Two Halifax-based papers served as bookends to this spirit of moderating opinion, the *Dalhousie Gazette* and the *Dartmouth Free Press*. Although serving geographically similar communities, the papers represented the edge of Canadian newspaper coverage, which as a whole did not completely endorse one set of dramatic pronouncements or another. For its part, the *Free Press* placed most of the blame for the U.S.-U.S.S.R. showdown on Khrushchev, a dictator who was testing the limits of his power, instead of on the U.S., who would not have selected an issue that could potentially kick up a whirlwind of domestic turmoil.⁴⁴ Moreover, the editors used the Crisis as a call for Canada to seek closer relations with the United States, a call loud enough to have prompted a reader to write a letter entitled "Opposed to Merger with United States," which pointed to the American South as evidence that uniting with the U.S. would no more solve Canadian problems than it would southern woes.⁴⁵

However, the paper also carried articles that expressed serious doubts about the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba, emphasizing the unlikelihood of Khrushchev risking their discovery so close to the United States.⁴⁶ They took the time to remind their readers that it was up to Canada to decide its own policy in Latin America, and that "Everything in this world does not arise from the Cold War."⁴⁷ Conversely, although the *Dalhousie Gazette* came out against the blockade, presented an image of America's leaders as obsessed with "doing something" about Cuba, and sympathized with the need for Cuba to accept more arms shipments from the Soviet Union to deter another U.S. attack, it consciously refrained from blaming the American public as a whole. Indeed, the *Gazette*

drew a clear distinction between the public itself and those in a state of war mongering by stating, “*Under these conditions* it is no wonder that the American public is gripped with hysteria. [emphasis mine].” The general appeal made by the *Gazette* was for the U.S. to avoid a scenario like the 1956 Soviet invasion of rebellious Hungary, and not to launch a full-scale invasion of Cuba that would not be supported by the majority of the American [the Cuban or the U.S.?] people.⁴⁸

The gap in interpretation between the *Dalhousie Gazette*, which did not support the U.S. blockade, and the *Dartmouth Free Press*, which leaned towards supporting it, underscores the lack of a viewpoint by region in 1962. Highlighting the possibility of a different kind of split, however, were the four distinct exceptions to the otherwise national tendency towards caution. At one end of the spectrum of opinion lay the *Vancouver Province* and the *Ottawa Journal*. Both of these papers, especially the *Journal*, fall into the “conservative” camp, possibly shedding some light on their tendency to offer unqualified support of Kennedy’s military actions, to report on and reject anti-American sentiment in the Canadian press, and to present the Crisis scenario of “a global game of chicken,” in which the U.S. “must not blink first.” The *Journal* suggested that “Most Canadians have sympathy for the extreme decision made by President Kennedy”,⁴⁹ while *Province* editors wrote that the U.S. needed to “take a stand against those things that threaten them, no matter what went before. To do otherwise is to invite further threats and impositions that can have only one end – capitulation and

defeat.”⁵⁰ More importantly, the *Journal* in particular called for Canadians to bury their anti-American tendencies and focus on the battle at hand:

“It is high time, we submit, that a lot of people in the Western world, including some people in Canada, began identifying the enemy – began realizing the true source of their danger, and also the true source of *their salvation*. No hour, this, for petty nationalistic vanities and juvenile jealousy.”⁵¹ [emphasis mine]

At the other end were the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* and the *Vancouver Pacific Tribune*. These newspapers questioned American motives, presented the blockade as unilateral and rash, and pushed peace as the most important goal to be attained. Early on, the *Chronicle-Telegraph* exposed what it felt were the ills of American propaganda, writing that “The Cuban government has every right to regard this blockade for what it is, an act of war. The nations of the world have sought desperately to create the figment of peace.” It called for the triumph of reason in the Canadian government, acknowledging that, “Undoubtedly in this brewing war, Canada will be forced into it alongside the United States” but pleading:

“before the long arm of patriotism seals off objective vision completely, it is well to record that the United States has no monopoly on reason. The United States must bear the blame with the Soviet Union for the unhappy state of affairs into which mankind has fallen.”⁵²

This charge of unilateral aggression was most strongly expressed in the pages of the *Pacific Tribune*, which charged Kennedy with lying outright, with considering the plight of the Cubans as pawns in the fight against Russia, and with adopting a “shoot first, ask questions later” approach. The United States, suggested *Tribune* columnists, was going to drag the world into war, and Canada along with it. “Committed to American policy by NATO and NORAD, and having long since given up its independence in foreign affairs, the Canadian government

supported Kennedy. In other words, it contributed nothing to peace, and everything to war.”⁵³ As an ominous sign of things to come, the *Tribune* wrote:

“So – the lesson of the Cuba crisis is that it revealed as in a lightning flash to millions of Canadians that we are in great danger from the USA not from Cuba or the Soviet Union as the cold war boys would have us believe. It was Cuba yesterday; it might be Berlin tomorrow or some other Latin-American country which takes a stand not to the liking of Mr. Kennedy. Or, if Canada starts trying to free itself from U.S. domination, it could well be Canada’s turn to come under the Yankee gun.”⁵⁴

Missile Bases vs. Moral Basis

Although opinion throughout the country was diverse, and although it is somewhat difficult to pin-down any regional links between each of the papers, a set of common arguments permeated both those articles and letters that supported American actions and those that questioned their effectiveness and validity. The main reasons for supporting the American course of action were finite. Five such reasons continuously emerged: First, there could be no appeasement of Soviet aggression. This rhetoric harked back to the lingering wounds of pre- World War II appeasement of Germany: “As President Kennedy spoke last night thoughts went back to the years before World War II when Hitler made threats and the Free Nations yielded, hoping each demand would be the last.”⁵⁵ Second, some newspapers that were on the fence nonetheless conceded that Kennedy could not just sit back and let Russia build up in the Western Hemisphere unchallenged:

“A Cuba, compte tenu de l’hostilité exacerbée du régime Castro contre les Etats-Unis, du danger des armes nucléaires soviétiques à proximité du territoire américain, on peut difficilement blâmer le président américain de vouloir agir avant qu’il soit trop tard.”⁵⁶

Third, fear that Cuba could become a Soviet nuclear arsenal in the Western Hemisphere signalled the elevation of possible nuclear conflict to a new level:

"The most frightening thing about the present crisis is the powerlessness of ordinary people like you or me and the millions of others throughout the world to intervene in any effective manner. We are all threatened with being blown off the map and we have no say whatsoever."⁵⁷

Fourth, a sense that whether Canadians liked it or not, they would inevitably share the destiny of the U.S. in that conflict:

"America Cracks the Whip – We Jump: The Cuban Crisis left a big question mark over Canadian-American relations. Put bluntly the question is: Should Canada march to war if the U.S. does? The instinctive answer is No. But the answer of reason is that Canada is unlikely ever to remain outside the action if the U.S. does get involved in a war."⁵⁸

Finally, many newspapers implied that it was in fact the job of the United States to defend "freedom," or more accurately, to protect it against the lack of freedom perceived to exist under communist systems: "The U.S. has a moral obligation to defend the liberty of everyone in the world."⁵⁹

In general then, one could write that those who supported Kennedy did so for a very limited set of reasons, revolving around the reality of the U.S.-Soviet conflict. Those who opposed it, however, offered a more diverse range of reasons, among them the following: First was the objection to war, specifically the threat of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers. At times this was laced with fear, but overall it represented a genuine ideological stand against international conflict: "Public opinion stopped war over Berlin, and stayed the hand of the atomaniacs, up to now. ONCE MORE, PEACE CAN BE SAVED – IF

THE PEOPLE ACT!.... We must speak out now, raise our voices before it is too late."⁶⁰

Second, especially in the early days of the Crisis, questions surrounding the legality of the blockade (in terms of the international laws of war) made many newspapers reluctant to accept it as legitimate, while others worried that this would set a dangerous new precedent for both the U.S. and Russia: "*U.S. Sticks Out Tongue at Law*: In imposing what appears to be a military blockade on Cuba, President Kennedy had launched the United States on America's first serious violation of the United Nations charter."⁶¹ Third, the unilateral approach of the United States could create strains in American relationships with their allies because those allies, including Canada, were not consulted before military action began, but nevertheless had to share the risk of the possible resulting war:

"[In Europe], [a]t the government level, the instinctive tendency is to close ranks in a crisis... [b]ut behind this solidarity there are some genuine reservations and a good deal of concern." "The Manchester Guardian, in a story from Paris, suggests that except for Canada, some of the 15 U.S. allies have been reluctant to accept the idea of a blockade. It says this is true particularly of the Netherlands and Norway."⁶²

Fourth, enforcing the naval blockade unilaterally could create a lack of trust internationally, making it difficult to convince Third World countries, especially in Latin America, to support it:

"...by imposing a unilateral blockade of Cuba, the United States may remove the moral foundation on which it appeals to the neutral countries of the world. In the long run, this may prove a greater risk than the danger of a general war arising from the blockade, a hazard so sombrely taken into account by Mr. Kennedy."⁶³

Fifth, the decision seemed simply too irrational:

"The President has gone too far... How can the administration justify even such limited military action? There is at the moment no shred of an excuse which the rest of the world could accept and no sign of one. Cuba is not invading anyone."⁶⁴

Sixth, some believed, especially early on, that the action against Cuba was an attempt to whip up support for the Democrats in the upcoming Congressional elections. Pinned down by many Republicans as being “too soft” on Castro, Kennedy was seen as having been backed into a corner:

“Trois leaders les plus importants de la campagne républicaine affirment dans un communiqué conjoint que Cuba est la principale question en vue des élections au Congrès. Ils prétendent que la politique démocrate au sujet de Cuba est devenue le symbole de l’irrésolution tragique du parti au pouvoir à Washington.”⁶⁵

Seventh, President Kennedy was lying about his evidence:

“The trick he [President Kennedy] uses is to fling unsubstantiated charges at the Soviet Union and Cuba, then to use these charges as his excuse to order the United States navy to shoot and sink vessels of all countries if they fail to submit.” “HAD HE ANY REAL BELIEF IN HIS CHARGES, HE WOULD HAVE THEM IN THE U.N. FIRST.”⁶⁶

Lastly, there was a running concern in a few papers that Canadians ought to be careful not to stand at attention just because the U.S. said so:

“Does Canada support the United States blockade of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba? IN a spate of government pronouncements on the Cuban situation during the last two days, this question has been left unanswered... [b]ut another highly responsible source [in the government] said Canadian support of the blockade should not be taken for granted.”⁶⁷

Diefenbaker’s Canada: The Great International Neuter?

To illustrate just how differently each newspaper can interpret the same set of events, we can use the commentary on the actions of Prime Minister Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker and the Conservative government’s initial reaction to the announcement of the naval blockade was to pause, followed quickly by a call for an eight-nation independent inspection of the site, which was followed almost as quickly by assurances to the United States that this call was not meant to undermine the American position, or to suggest that *Canadians* doubted

American claims, but was to help convince those in other countries who did *not* believe the United States that a real threat existed. We can recall as well the words of Commander Haydon, who stated that, "in typical Canadian fashion, any sense of accomplishment was quickly dashed by criticism... for instance, almost immediately afterwards, the press began to focus on the government's failure to put the Canadian military on alert."⁶⁸

The newspaper evidence only partially supports Haydon's statement. Almost immediately, the *Dartmouth Free Press* and the *Ottawa Citizen* applauded Diefenbaker's call for such an inspection, and an editorial in the *Citizen* wrote, "[f]or the first time in the present Parliament, the House stood united."⁶⁹ Diefenbaker's suggestions were also supported by *Le Soleil*, which suggested that such action "ne pourrait que renforcer la position américaine vis-à-vis des alliés de l'OTAN," and most strongly by *L'Action* which stated that "un principe majeur" of Diefenbaker's foreign policy has *always* been for individual nations to refrain from carrying out military actions unilaterally. "Le Premier ministre a très souvent répété que la seconde Grande Guerre nous a donné une leçon: la nécessité de l'action collective dans les initiatives qui peuvent dégénérer en conflit universel."⁷⁰ The focus, therefore, was not on Diefenbaker's "failure," but on his successful handling of the crisis.

The range of opinion was most striking, however, if we take the example of Vancouver. Only in the pages of the *Sun* and the *Province* do we find the scathing indictment of Diefenbaker's government that Haydon refers to as generalized throughout Canada. As the crisis began to calm down, the

Vancouver Sun assessed Diefenbaker's reaction, which, along with his ministers, had "grudgingly, and somewhat ungraciously, now [come to] realize that Canada and the U.S. are inseparable."⁷¹ Much more critical in its assessment, the *Vancouver Province* charged the Canadian government with having "hid under the diplomatic table; this week Canada was the great international neuter."⁷²

It is also in Vancouver, however, that we find some of the strongest support for Diefenbaker's suggestions. Having interpreted the Prime Minister's caution as "a reminder that the facts should be known before anything further was done, [which] may have stemmed from a half-remembered recollection that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency hasn't always shown itself too well informed where Cuba is concerned", the *Citizen* article noted optimistically that "[n]owhere was there to be found any relic of the 'ready, aye ready' position which formerly reflected Canada's readiness to rally to the side of its traditional allies."⁷³ Adding even greater depth to this folio of opinion, the *Pacific Tribune* saw the Prime Minister's stance as one that firmly supported Kennedy, but believed it to be an *undesirable* position, one that placed Canada "squarely behind the American provocation."⁷⁴

Given all of these opinions, many of them presenting opposing interpretations despite the potential overlap of community readership, it stands to reason that one conclusion to reach concerning Canadian newspapers' opinions on the Cuban Missile Crisis is that – simply put – they were diverse.

“Canadians Chose Kennedy As World’s Most Admired Person”

“Canadians Chose Kennedy As World’s Most Admired Person” was the headline of a December 29 article in the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, which noted that when Canadians were asked whom they admired most (excluding friends and relatives), 21% of them chose President Kennedy. The second-place winner was Winston Churchill, with 13% of admirers. Canada’s Prime Minister garnered 3%. Moreover, the previous time this poll had been conducted, in 1952, the American president at that time, Harry Truman, had received only 4%.⁷⁵

Building on the popularity and admiration which most Canadians exhibited during Kennedy’s election in 1960 (as explored in Chapter 1), many Canadian newspapers, particularly those that supported the American blockade of Cuba, perceived Kennedy, and not necessarily the “United States” or “Americans,” as the architect and prime mover of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Headlines referred to “Kennedy’s Risk,” “Mr. Kennedy and the UN,” and “Kennedy’s Cuban Move.” Supporters of the blockade solidly supported “President Kennedy’s stand on Cuba,” hope for the day when “Kennedy [can] resume trade with Cuba,” and “score Kennedy’s handling of Cuban news.” The *Vancouver Citizen’s* call for action read “President Kennedy should have a showdown now,”⁷⁶ while the *Ottawa Journal*, rejecting claims of stirring the pot to swing votes in the American election suggested that “it was the Russians and the Cubans who selected the timing for this event, not Kennedy.”⁷⁷

Kennedy's prominence in the newspapers' perception of the Crisis was further evidenced not only by the central role given to him by his supporters, but by the same degree of attention he was given from dissenters *against* the blockade. For instance, the *Pacific Tribune*, which was against the blockade from the start, suggested that Kennedy acted aggressively, unilaterally, and without substantial evidence: "[t]he core of the Kennedy 'brinkmanship' ultimatum is not Cuba but the Soviet Union."⁷⁸ Even more direct was an editorial featured in *The Ubysey*, which came out strongly against the blockade from its outset. On October 25, the paper wrote, "We cannot cope with the possibility of nuclear war because – democratic principles be damned – our fate lies in the hands of one man and his advisors. John Kennedy on Monday took not only his own people, but the people of the Western bloc nations and the people of the rest o the world to the brink of war."⁷⁹ Humorous articles appearing in various campus publications also drew attention to the centrality of Kennedy. One paper featured a mock conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev allegedly taking place in September, 1962, at which point they had planed the Crisis in order to increase their respective domestic political fortunes (Kennedy: "Hello Nik... I'm having a spot of trouble here with the Cuban situation", Khrushchev: "Da, I see your problem Jack... Vot vould you say to us putting up a rocket bases in Cuba and den you make a fuss and ve take 'em away again, uh?⁸⁰). Another featured Kennedy shouting at his daughter in the White House ("Not that button, Caroline!"⁸¹).

Moreover, there was often a conscious distinction made between Kennedy and the “American people,” who seem to have been affected separately and in their own right. The *Dalhousie Gazette*, for instance, commented on the current drive by Republicans to force Kennedy’s hand on Cuba, noting as well that, “Under these conditions it is no wonder that the American public is gripped with hysteria.”⁸² This topic, a build-up of frustration among the American public before the Crisis and just as it began, was reflected in several papers (“Kennedy had to make some move over Cuba – the American people were getting a little excited” – *Vancouver Sun*⁸³, “Nobody wants war, but one choice faced the American people” – *Vancouver Citizen*⁸⁴, “Well we might be understanding of the Americans” – *Ottawa Journal*⁸⁵), and suggested an entity of American public opinion which interacted, but was not synonymous, with President Kennedy, who himself remained the focus most of the time.

One possible exception to this pattern was the slightly elevated tendency of the French-language papers to engage the terms “Américain” and “Etats-Unis” more regularly. *L’Action*, for instance, was more likely than its English-language counterparts to refer to the blockade as “le blocus imposé par les Etats-Unis.” *Le Droit*, rather than expressing Canadian support as “backing Kennedy,” was also just as likely to state “Le Canada appuie sans réserve les Etats-Unis,”⁸⁶ and to credit Americans as the danger subsided, “l’unité des pays d’Amérique autour des Etats-Unis.”⁸⁷

Canadians and Cuba

One feature of nearly all Canadian newspapers throughout their coverage of the Cuban Missile Crisis was their willingness to print points of view which clearly ran counter to the paper's stated editorial position. The most common form this "counterbalancing" took was via letters to the editor. The *Vancouver Province*, a staunch supporter of the blockade from the outset, printed letters asking "[i]n view of the affirmation of President Kennedy's concern for the welfare of the Cuban people, why did the American government not support President Castro in his attempt to clean up the moral of such places as Havana, created largely by the help of American business."⁸⁸ The equally vocal support coming from the *Ottawa Journal* was also tempered with the words of David J. Weston who wrote, "A thinking person will realize that... [i]f the U.S. had not supported a dictator (Batista) then the present circumstances would certainly not be the same."⁸⁹

At the other end of the spectrum, the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, which came out squarely against the blockade, nonetheless reported opposition leader Lester B. Pearson's support of the blockade.⁹⁰ Even the dogmatic *Pacific Tribune*, which saw only aggression in the Cuban affair, admitted that it prompted Canadians, via their letters, to call for peace: "Never before have Canadians spoken so eloquently for peace as in these letters."⁹¹ More typical of this tendency to counterbalance was the following-up of a moderate stance in one direction with the expression of a moderate opinion in the other direction. Some poignant examples included the *Dalhousie Gazette*, which published a report on

a Young Liberal club meeting at which a motion to aid the U.S. blockade passed by a count of 14-1, but then published an article by the lone dissenter entitled "Voice of the Underdog."⁹²

The Ubyyssey, which published only anti-Kennedy articles for the first few days, was then bombarded for nearly a week with letters written by students who not only rejected the paper's stance, but also stated that its criticisms of Kennedy had been greatly exaggerated. The *Vancouver Province*, which on October 30 published "Canada Stands With Kennedy," criticizing the NDP rejection of the government's stand, also published a letter entitled "Traitors," which called the Canadian protests against American embassies "sedition" and "deplorable," ran an opposing letter to the editor the following day. Written by Betty Iredale, the letter suggested that

"[t]he present state of mass conditioning in hostility of public thought, combined with a fast finger on the button, must be shelved in favour of rational thought and creative programming, less dramatic though this may be. Along with the inspection team to Cuba must be organized a team for inspection and study of the invasion build-up, mounted by the U.S. against Cuba."⁹³

Thus, it seems that most newspapers attempted to publish at least some expressions of views contrary to the one consciously put forth by their editors. But what about the views which the editors put forth "unconsciously"?

Cartoon Analysis

In most of the newspapers covering the Cuban Crisis, cartoonists expressed the same split tendency and the same ambivalence which their journalistic counterparts had expressed in the articles and editorials, and which their readers expressed in their letters. Moreover, most cartoonists also more or

less echoed the points accented and highlighted in their articles and editorials. Among the ten newspapers that featured cartoons, there were a total of seventy-five dealing with aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Of these, 37% featured symbols of the United States, and 48% symbols of the Soviet Union. Equally split was the opinion of who constituted the aggressor; 39% of the American images were of an aggressive nature, while 47% of Soviet images suggested they were on the offensive.

These findings lend further support to the textual analysis, given that most newspapers expressed opinions that fell slightly on the side of supporting the U.S. In terms of Cuba's place in the *Cuban* Missile Crisis, symbols of Cuba – almost always represented by Castro – appeared in 56% of cartoons. The prominence of those appearances suggests another multifaceted perception among the newspapers that, on the one hand, Cuba was at the centre of the crisis (and thus appearing more often than either the U.S. or the Soviets), but was, on the other hand, only a pawn in a U.S.-Soviet game. That uncertainty expressed itself in the behavioural portrayals of Cuba, which was presented as an aggressor 31% of the time, but a victim 36% of the time.

Table 2-1: Actions of U.S. Symbol by Newspaper

Paper	N	U.S. represented	Symbol Aggressive	Symbol Passive	Symbol Benevolent
Dartmouth Free Press	2				
Quebec Chr-Telegraph	10	4	1	3	
Le Soleil	9	2	2		
L'Action	1				
Ottawa Citizen	18	6	2	3	1
Ottawa Journal	11	3	1	2	
Le Droit	3	3		3	
Vancouver Sun	6				
Vancouver Province	10	5	1	3	1
Pacific Tribune	5	4	4		
Total	75	28	11	14	2

As in the written texts, the overall tone of moderation was still privy to particular foci. Emblematic were the majority of newspapers which, while slightly in favour of the U.S. blockade, emphasized specific elements. The *Ottawa Citizen*, the newspaper with the most prolific use of cartoons in 1962 (featuring nearly twice as many as the next closest paper), honed in on the threat of nuclear war, despite the stated (or perhaps because of) belief that it was necessary for Kennedy to risk it. Eight of the cartoons made reference to nuclear war, either via the figure of Mr. Atom⁹⁴ [Fig. 3-1] or featured in those hopeful of a coming test ban. This fear was most clearly expressed by a death-like nuclear cloud hovering over the world, but originating in Washington and Moscow, reflecting again the divided feelings towards the conflict [Fig. 3-2].



3-1




3-2

The *Vancouver Sun* also echoed its “reluctant support underlined by fear” by featuring a number of humorous, if not cynical, cartoons. While one featured a giant Castro coming to the U.S., quite possibly just in time to disturb the elections [Fig. 3-3], another made light of the divided Canadian opinion [Fig. 3-4]. Looking closely at the mix of pro- and anti-Kennedy signs in the crowd, one notices that they are a complete jumble. Beginning on the right hand side and proceeding left, we can see that the second sign reads “JFK is Right,” which is followed by “Ban the Bomb,” followed by “Hands off Cuba,” and then “We’re With Kennedy.” Rather than being two distinct crowds which meet each other head-on, this crowd is a muddle of all opinions, including the protestor turning the corner, who is approaching what he believes is a different protest altogether!




3-3



3-4

Turning to those newspapers whose views were somewhat more emphatic, it can be seen that, for instance, the *Vancouver Province* also reflected the paper's pro-Kennedy stance, and in an interesting way. It featured the U.S. five times, accounting for half its cartoons dealing with the Crisis (well above the proportion of U.S. representation in most papers), but, almost uniquely, portrayed the U.S. several times as vulnerable. Interestingly, the symbol selected for the U.S. in one example [Fig. 3-5] was a group of Puritans, harking back to the founding fathers of the American system, but also meant to draw a parallel to the "witch-hunts" of old. In a way, the cartoon lent credence to the chasing of "shadowy" demons, a not-so-veiled connection to those in the United States who live in constant fear of the "commie under every bed." Given that Castro really was backed by the USSR, and that he is the one we can see (his shadow is only revealed when "illuminated" by the Puritans' lamp), there is almost tacit support for the communist "witch-hunts" which still existed in the United States.




3-5

The equally pro-Kennedy *Ottawa Journal* elected to go in the other direction, portraying an aggressive, selfish, and dishonest Soviet Union [Fig. 3-6, Fig. 3-7, Fig. 3-8]. These cartoons are laced with symbolism; they present a very cold portrayal of the Soviets, be it via the expressionless collector of weapons who stares at a disfigured Castro, the expressionless Russian sailors who have taken all they wanted from Cuba, or the archetypal, slippery salesman. In all three, there is no feeling of remorse or even recognition of all the trouble the Russians have created; they are instead presented as having no real personality of any kind.



3-6



3-7



3-8

The paper whose cartoons diverged more or less from its textual content was the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, one of the two least supportive papers throughout the crisis. Although four of its ten cartoons featured an American symbol, only one displayed an aggressive U.S. symbol, while the other three had


depicted the U.S. as passive elements; the U.S. was never portrayed as dominant, but as frustrated or else as a sitting duck. In fact, the only cartoon featuring Kennedy had the President helping a tense situation by keeping American extremists at bay [Fig. 3-9]. Although the image pre-dates the Crisis, one would expect a paper that had called the crisis "Kennedy's unilateral march towards war" to feature him in a more aggressive stance.



3-9

Very few cartoons appeared featuring Canada in relation to the Crisis, owing perhaps to its admittedly small role. Indeed, one cartoon in particular noted that domestic issues, such as the arrival of Tommy Douglas, the winner of recent by-election and new leader of the federal NDP, were completely overshadowed by events elsewhere, particularly the ominous "Cuba" outside the window. Interestingly, Kennedy appears on a television screen, watched intensively by a gaggle of politicians, dressed as a cowboy. While not necessarily a judgement, it is at least a characterization of the President's

brashness. [Fig. 3-10] One other interesting cartoon appearing in several newspapers is of a poker game between Kennedy and Khrushchev, obviously meant to portray the President's proverbial "raising of the stakes" [Fig. 3-11].⁹⁵



3-10



3-11


Slightly less noticeably are two figures hovering in the background. Behind Khrushchev stands a cigar-smoking Castro, looking on with eyes of steel waiting to see how the game plays out. Looking over Kennedy's shoulder, however, is a buggy-eyed Diefenbaker, who seems more than a little alarmed at the move made by his benefactor. Was the cartoonist suggesting that Canada is to the U.S. what Cuba is to the U.S.S.R.? What did that make Canada? A pawn? A fair-weather friend? A potential hot spot? Were Canadian newspaper readers to understand that, given the President's tactics, they may be re-examining their faith in him?

It is of course that ability to express such complex emotions, to raise so many questions in a single frame, which make cartoons such an added value to our understand of the situation at hand. This is perhaps best illustrated by two

vivid images from Quebec City's *Le Soleil*, which presented its readers with two cartoons of the globe, one at the beginning of the crisis depicting a world being torn apart, and one after the Crisis had passed, featuring an almost palpable reduction of global tension [Fig. 3-12 and 3-13].



3-12




3-13

Using cartoons as an indicator of Canadian newspapers' opinions of the United States, it would seem that, with one strong exception, these papers were not yet ready to be especially critical. In the grand scheme of things, only 15% of cartoons about the Cuban Missile Crisis, which began with the declaration of a naval blockade announced by American President John Kennedy, depicted the U.S. as being aggressive. The exception to this rule was the *Pacific Tribune*. Matching its animated and highly opinionated coverage of the Crisis, cartoons in the *Tribune* presented a host of anti-American cartoons. What is interesting about the *Tribune* is that although we cannot discount its particular bias (namely that it considered itself the voice of communism for Western Canada), its brand of anti-Americanism (which included worry about U.S. domination of the economy and its global imperialism) was a foreshadowing of the brand that

according to the literature, a significant portion of the Canadian left would identify with by the end of the decade. As such, the U.S. appeared hostile, greedy, subversive, paranoid, and even crazed [Fig. 3-14, Fig. 3-15]. Kennedy, in his only appearance, looks simply mad.



3-14



—Tvorba, Prague.

"Here's where it hurts worst"

3-15

Overall, however, the cartoons express opinions of the U.S. that, simply put, counterbalance each other.

Chapter Conclusions

Once the Crisis waned, Canadian newspapers began to contemplate where to go next. From those who did present strong opinions (though there were many that did not) two very different conclusions emerged. These conclusions, given in the wake of what most considered the worst-case scenario

of the Cold War theretofore, helped to form two of the most recognizable, and opposing, views that Canadian newspapers would express over the decade: First, that the dangerous position Canada was placed in during the Crisis was proof that Canada should move *closer* to the U.S. Second, that the dangerous position Canada was placed in during the Crisis suggested that Canada must move *away* from the U.S. For those papers that expressed the latter, two suggestions were given: a) that American presence in Canada, especially in the realm of nuclear weapons, must be reduced, and b) that the growing influence of non-superpowers in global politics presents an opportunity to increase Canada's role in the international community, especially in terms of their relationship with the United States.

Falling into the first general category – that Canada should be placing itself in a closer diplomatic relationship with the United States – was the *Vancouver Province*, which said the Crisis had proved it was time to cast aside Canada's burgeoning sovereignty, and admit that "In the defence of North America, there is only one sovereignty and that is the sovereignty of the people living and working in our continental landmass." The "luxury" of national identity, wrote the editors, could not be afforded in times of danger, "nor can it be jealously treasured in times when we plan for predictable emergencies." According to the *Province*, Canada was now faced with a choice, and "should decide whether it wants to become in any foreseeable conflict another Belgium, bleeding to death with the dignity of asserted neutralism, or protecting our living space with the best weapons at our command."⁹⁶

The weapons they referred to, naturally, were nuclear. The *Vancouver Sun* put the choice facing Canadians much more simply: Canada was at a crossroads, and had to decide what it wanted to be. Would Canada be "A Free Trade Nation" or would be "Manchuria with Hockey Players." The editors believed that it was time to "move the country to the next level" and try a continental union with the United States. "[I]f we gamble, we might lose but we will probably win. If we play it safe, we can only lose."⁹⁷

Right across town, though, the editors of the *Pacific Tribune* emphasized that "gambling" was exactly what Canada was doing, only it was of the Russian Roulette variety, with Canadians crossing their fingers and nervously hoping that the nuclear explosion would not be triggered. "The lesson of the Cuba crisis is that it revealed... that we are in great danger from the USA not from Cuba or the Soviet Union as the cold war boys would have us believe. It was Cuba yesterday; it might be Berlin tomorrow or some other Latin-American country which takes a stand not to the liking of Mr. Kennedy." The only solution was for Canada to rid itself of all nuclear weapons, and all U.S. bases within the country. More than this, however, Canadians needed to take steps away from American ownership, from U.S. domination of Canadian industries, to try and get out of the way of the "Yankee gun."⁹⁸

While the *Tribune* was, at least for the moment, "ahead of its time" in terms of the tenor (and ferocity) of its anti-Americanism, and though it would be a few more years before a substantial portion of the Canadian public was ready to call for such a drastic course of action, some newspapers were ready to take

steps distancing themselves from the United States, even if they were baby steps. The *Ottawa Citizen* suggested in “A lesson from the crisis” that while its commitment to the U.S. was never in question, Canadians could no longer simply stand “aye, ready, aye” whenever the U.S. called them to attention; Canadians needed time to make up their own minds.⁹⁹

Other papers offered more concrete suggestions. *Le Soleil* imparted that “il est de notre devoir de ne pas encourager nos alliés américains à déclencher à la légère des opérations militaires susceptibles de provoquer un conflit. Il appartient surtout aux Canadiens de ne pas tomber dans l’hystérie anticubaine qui s’est emparée d’une partie de l’opinion publique et des militaires américains.”¹⁰⁰ *The Fulcrum*, the student newspaper of the University of Ottawa, challenged its readers to rethink Canada’s place in the world. The Crisis, they wrote, had taught Canadians that they could no longer expect the U.S. to simply fight communism *for* them, but that they must be committed to that fight. As such, Canadians should stop trying to have their cake and eat it too: “We shouldn’t always look at trade and foreign policies in terms of domestic gains, but in terms of national importance, and importance to international and moral commitments and ideals. We should [for example] carefully re-examine our Chinese and Cuban sales.”¹⁰¹

An *Ottawa Journal* article on October 31st asked, in reflecting upon the Cuban Missile Crisis, “Do Canadians Talk Too Much?,” instead of acting. The editors of *The Fulcrum*, of *Le Soleil*, and of the *Ottawa Citizen*, as much as those at the *Pacific Tribune* and the *Vancouver Province* were all asking the same

question. Canadians, so comfortable for some seventeen years in the warm protection of the United States, were beginning to divide themselves over the future of that relationship, and over their views of Americans.

¹ For examples of characterizations of the Crisis in this manner, see Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October: historians, political scientists, policy-makers and the Cuban missile crisis," *International Affairs*. Vol. 70, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), p.659, James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.498-499, and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On The Brink: Americans and Soviets Re-examine the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989) p.4.

² *L'Action*, Oct 8, 1962, p.4.

³ in other words, did they really "seize" the base, or was it abandoned in front of them, did they get it in a treaty, etc.

⁴ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 24, 1962, p.7.

⁵ *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 25, 1962, p.6.

⁶ White, op. cit. p.79.

⁷ Patterson, James T. op. cit., pp.498-499; Lee Scott and Steve Smith op. cit., p. 659.

⁸ William J. Medland, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Evolving Historical Perspectives," *The History Teacher*. Vol. 23, No.4 (Aug., 1990), p.433-434.

⁹ Ibid., p.434. Medland suggests that the most "plausible" reason was that Soviet Premier Khrushchev was likely seeking to repair his own missile gap.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p.434-436.

¹² Timothy J. McKeown, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and Politics as Usual," *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 62, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), p.70-87.

¹³ Medland op. cit., p.435.

¹⁴ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Liberalism and Its Challengers: From F.D.R. to Bush*. Second Edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.219.

¹⁵ Medland, op. Cit., p.436-437.

¹⁶ Hamby op. cit., p.220.

¹⁷ Medland op. cit., p.437.

¹⁸ For an excellent "case by case" analysis of how the availability of Soviet and Cuban documentation and testimony has altered basic understandings of the Crisis's chronology, see Lee Scott and Steve Smith, op. cit., pp.667-677.

¹⁹ See Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "Essence of Revision" Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No.3 (Winter, 1989-1990), pp.136-172, Raymond L. Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70 (Fall, 1988), pp. 61-80 and Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*. (Princeton University: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.112-118.

²⁰ Lee Scott and Steve Smith, op. cit., p.684.

²¹ J. Allyn et. al., op. cit., pp.144-146.

²² View presented in J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism*. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1996), p.132.

²³ White, op. cit. p.105.

²⁴ For an excellent exploration of this dynamic, which takes on various dichotomies (young vs. old, dynamic vs. static) see Knowlton Nash, *Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border*. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990).

²⁵ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Commander Peter T. Haydon, RCN, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. (Toronto: Canadian Printco Ltd., 1993), p.3.

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- ²⁸ Alvin Finkel and Margaret Conrad. *History of the Canadian Peoples: 1867 to the Present*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1993, p.604.
- ²⁹ *Yankee Go Home?* Granatstein, op. cit., p.132.
- ³⁰ Granatstein, J.L. et. al. *Nation: Canada since Confederation*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990, p.471.
- ³¹ Haydon, op. cit. pp.220-221.
- ³² Haydon, op. cit. p.33.
- ³³ Roger Donaldson, director. *Thirteen Days*. (2000 – New Line Cinema).
- ³⁴ For example, *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 10, p.6 and Oct 22, p.1.
- ³⁵ *Vancouver Citizen*, Oct 11, 1962, p.12b.
- ³⁶ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 6, 1962, p.9.
- ³⁷ *Le Soleil*, Oct 15 p.7 and Oct 22, 1962, p.4.
- ³⁸ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 16, 1962, p.14.
- ³⁹ *Vancouver Sun*, Oct 15, 1962, p.4.
- ⁴⁰ *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 23, 1962, p.6.
- ⁴¹ *Vancouver Sun*, Oct 23, 1962, p.25.
- ⁴² *Vancouver Citizen*, Nov 1, 1962, p.12 and Nov 8, p.12.
- ⁴³ *Vancouver Citizen*, Nov 14, 1962, p.12.
- ⁴⁴ *Dartmouth Free Press*, Nov 8, 1962, p.4.
- ⁴⁵ *Dartmouth Free Press*, Dec 13, 1962, pp.4-5.
- ⁴⁶ *Dartmouth Free Press*, Oct 25, 1962, pp.1 and 12.
- ⁴⁷ *Dartmouth Free Press*, Nov 22, 1962, p.5.
- ⁴⁸ *Dalhousie Gazette*, Oct 17, 1962, p.4.
- ⁴⁹ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 24, 1962, p.6.
- ⁵⁰ *Vancouver Province*, Oct 23, 1962, p.4.
- ⁵¹ *Ottawa Journal*, Nov 20, 1962, p.6.
- ⁵² *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, Oct 26, 1962, p.4.
- ⁵³ *Pacific Tribune*, Nov 30, 1962, pp.6 and 8.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 23, 1962, p.6.
- ⁵⁶ *Le Soleil*, Oct 24, 1962, p.4.
- ⁵⁷ *The Ubyssy*, Oct 25, 1962, p.3.
- ⁵⁸ *Dartmouth Free Press*, Nov 8, 1962, p.1.
- ⁵⁹ *Dalhousie Gazette*, Oct 31, p.7.
- ⁶⁰ *Pacific Tribune*, Oct 26, 1962, p.1.
- ⁶¹ *Vancouver Sun*, Oct 23, 1962, p.1.
- ⁶² *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 25, 1962, p.7.
- ⁶³ *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 23, 1962, p.6.
- ⁶⁴ *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 23, 1962, p.7.
- ⁶⁵ *Le Soleil*, Oct 22, 1962, p.4.
- ⁶⁶ *Pacific Tribune*, Oct 26, 1962, p.1.
- ⁶⁷ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, Oct 24, 1962, p.9.
- ⁶⁸ Haydon, op. cit. p.33.
- ⁶⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 23, 1962, p.6.
- ⁷⁰ *L'Action*, Oct 24, 1962, p.1.
- ⁷¹ *Vancouver Sun*, Oct 30, 1962, p.20.
- ⁷² *Vancouver Province*, Oct 25, 1962, p.4.
- ⁷³ *Vancouver Citizen*, Nov 15, 1962, p.8.
- ⁷⁴ *Pacific Tribune*, Nov 30, 1962, p.6.
- ⁷⁵ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, Dec 29, 1962, p.4.
- ⁷⁶ *Vancouver Citizen*, Oct 11, 1962, p.12.
- ⁷⁷ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 25, 1962, p.6.
- ⁷⁸ *Pacific Tribune*, Oct 26, 1962, p.4.
- ⁷⁹ *The Ubyssy*, Oct 25, 1962, p.2.
- ⁸⁰ *Dalhousie Gazette*, 1962, Oct 31, p.4.

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- ⁸¹ *The Fulcrum*, 1962, Nov 29, p.3.
- ⁸² *Dalhousie Gazette*, Oct 17, 1962, p.4.
- ⁸³ *Vancouver Sun*, Oct 23, 1962, p.25.
- ⁸⁴ *Vancouver Citizen*, Nov 1, 1962, p.12.
- ⁸⁵ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 23, 1962, p.6.
- ⁸⁶ *Le Droit*, Oct 26, 1962, p.17.
- ⁸⁷ *Le Droit*, Oct 30, 1962, p.2.
- ⁸⁸ *Vancouver Province*, Oct 26, 1962, p.4.
- ⁸⁹ *Ottawa Journal*, Oct 29, 1962, p.6.
- ⁹⁰ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, 1962, Nov 5, p.5.
- ⁹¹ *Pacific Tribune*, Nov 30, 1962, p.6.
- ⁹² *Dalhousie Gazette*, Oct 31, 1962, pp.3 and 6.
- ⁹³ *Vancouver Sun*, Oct 31, 1962, p.4.
- ⁹⁴ Created by Herblock of the St.Louis Post-Dispatch, "Mr. Atom" was an apt representation in the 50s and 60s, but ceased resonating with readers as the threat and guilt over the ultimate power of the Atom Bomb slowly faded – Hess, Stephen and Milton Kaplan. *The Ungentlemanly Art: A History of American Political Cartoons*. New York: Macmillan, 1968, p.33.
- ⁹⁵ This image of the "nuclear poker game" has also since been featured allegorically in analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis. For one example, see Medland, op. cit., p.433.
- ⁹⁶ *Vancouver Province*, Oct 9, 1962, p.4.
- ⁹⁷ *Vancouver Sun*, Nov 2, 1962, p.5.
- ⁹⁸ *Pacific Tribune*, Nov 30, 1962, p.16.
- ⁹⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, Nov 7, 1962, p.6.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Le Soleil*, Oct 25, 1962, p.4.
- ¹⁰¹ *The Fulcrum*, Nov 15, 1962, p.6.

CHAPTER 3

Not so Black and White: Canadian Newspaper Perceptions of Civil Rights and the Watts Riot of 1965

In August of 1965, the Civil Rights movement in the United States took a sudden and fundamental turn. A six-day riot convulsed the Watts district in the heart of Los Angeles, California. Sparked by the suspicious use of force during the arrest of two young Black men, after years of frustration at the slow pace of legal and social advancement for American and unacknowledged police brutality against them, the incident instead gave birth to a wave of civil unrest that North America had not seen in decades. The uprising turned one of America's largest cities into a veritable war zone: over 35,000 rioters (and another 70,000 "close spectators"¹), faced off against Los Angeles and California State police and over 10,000 men from the California National Guard in a riot zone 46.5 square miles large (larger than the area of Manhattan).²

The riot left 34 people dead, 1,032 injured, 4000 arrested (500 of whom were under 18 years old), and caused \$200 million in property damages.³ A departure from the established tactics of non-violent protest (peace marches, sit-ins), the uprising in Watts, Los Angeles "[ended] a previous era and marked the initiation of a new one."⁴ The Watts Riot fundamentally altered, and completely awakened, the public's consciousness; "Civil Rights" replaced, at least for a time, "Vietnam" as the dominant concern of many Americans.⁵

Canadian newspapers would present a layered interpretation of the Riots. Perceptions of the Civil Rights movement followed three courses: those who

treated the movement as a global, “human” phenomenon; those who perceived it as a more intrinsically “American” phenomenon; and those who saw very little validity in the movement at all. In turn, the newspapers’ coverage of Watts was divided into three other camps: those who empathized with the rioters but criticized the United States; those who empathized with rioters, but did not criticize the U.S.; and those who saw no justifiable action in the riots, only wild lawlessness. The cartoons depicting these events, however, would be much more consistent, if only because those who saw no value in the Civil Rights movement may have opted not to print any. Cartoons would display intensity and a conviction of attitude that was more consistent with the bombardment of photographs and television images of these events than with the text surrounding them. When combined with the insights of the LIB, the overall picture of the Canadian newspapers that I examined in this period is one of general reluctance to comment on the United States. Those opinions that did stream from their pages, however, hinted at media debates in the midst, or at least at the start, of a perceptual flux.

Intricacies of the Linguistic Intergroup Bias

The LIB model, applied to coverage of civil rights and the Watts Riots, suggests that Canadian opinions of the U.S. had changed since 1962, and in an intriguing fashion. On the one hand, it seems that Canadians identified with the United States slightly more than they had in 1962. On the other hand, a more salient finding was a marked increase in those newspapers which decided to

forgo any commentary at all. In other words, despite all of the changes occurring in the United States, many Canadian newspapers elected not to comment. Then again, perhaps this choice was made *because* of those changes.

Nationally, the scores obtained by Canadian newspapers equalled 2.23 when evaluating positive behaviour, and 2.55 when evaluating negative behaviour. Since we tend to think of negative behaviour as “temporary” or due to “bad luck” (in other words, as abstract) in our in-group, the score of 2.55, leaning more towards the abstract end of the scale than any previous Canadian average, could suggest a new tendency to see negative behaviour as “abstract,” thus indicating identification with the in-group. On the other hand, that there was a jump in both positive and negative scores as compared to the past two case studies, could also suggest that opinions may have entered a state of flux. While still not exhibiting a clear tendency to identify Americans as “other” or as “one of us,” the slight move towards a more abstract interpretation could have signalled greater uncertainty over the genuineness of American motives, either positive or negative.

What was more interesting was the reluctance to judge Americans at all, which most Canadian newspapers seemed to display. To illustrate, consider the following: The LIB uses descriptions of actions because they are thought to be the best indicators of assigning characteristics. Thus, a phrase such as “the United States is still ‘the home of the brave’”⁶ conveys very strong ideas of what the author believes are intrinsic characteristics of the U.S. However, in so many of the most opinionated articles and editorials in almost every newspaper, the

author was not willing to engage in such a direct description of American actions or qualities. For instance, a *Dartmouth Free Press* column wrote in reference to Watts, "The rioting has been labelled 'America's greatest defeat.'" ⁷ As harsh a judgement as that sounds, the wording is linguistically a very roundabout way of launching criticism at the United States. In a similar example, the *Ottawa Journal* quoted a letter which read, "The recent dreadful events, both immoral and unchristian, cannot but have an adverse effect on... the American image abroad." ⁸ Note that the subject of the sentence is "the recent events" and not "American image abroad." According to LIB theory, those particularities are no accident, but deliberate choices which reflect how the subject is perceived.

According to Walter Stewart, in the mid-1960s, "the American Dream went sour, in the jungles of Asia *and along the hot, black pavements of U.S. cities*, and Canadians began to want something else, a society less dollar-driven than the American one." ⁹ However, the most prevalent finding of the articles reviewed for this chapter is that they did their best *not* to make the United States the subject of their opinions, and not to pass judgement on American society one way or the other. This could have signalled a flux in Canadian opinions of the U.S., or simply confusion over how to identify with the elements of the civil rights movement itself. Either way, both the fragmented opinion appearing in Canadian newspapers and the seeming reluctance to comment on Americans and American society suggests a closer examination of what several Canadian authors have pegged as a key dynamic in the growth of Canadian anti-Americanism.

Burn, Baby Burn...

At approximately 7 P.M. on Wednesday, August 11, 1965, Marquette Frye and his stepbrother Ronald were stopped by Los Angeles police officer Lee Minikus, who believed the pair were driving under the influence of alcohol. Following an altercation with the young Marquette, and his mother, Rena Frye, the growing crowd, shouting claims of police brutality, exploded. One of the worst race riots in American history was underway.¹⁰ The events that took place over the next six days and nights in Los Angeles, and that eventually necessitated the calling in of the California National Guard, stood out because of the nature and intensity of their emotional undercurrents.

The streets were barricaded with bus benches, and pitched battles were fought with policemen. Some policemen were mobbed and had to club their way to safety. Taunting revels tried to pull other police out of their squad cars; still other were lured into traps with false reports and ambushed. Surging through the streets, clashing with police, setting fires, stoning firemen, attacking, scattering, regrouping, passing the word, clutching at rumors, shouting, screaming, crying, the insurgents were transformed by the fire of battle into an awesome power.¹¹

The Watts Riot has been examined in two different traditions, both of which depend upon the observer's interpretation of the motives of the rioters of Los Angeles. In the more widespread of the two, Watts represents a potent moment in the history of the American Civil rights movement, a transition point between the passive resistance of the early 1960s and the aggressive tactics later in the decade. Given the lack of attention given to the economic *de facto* segregation (such as access to jobs and improper housing) facing urban American Blacks in favour of the rampant *de jure* segregation afflicting Blacks in the rural south (such as voting restrictions and segregated public facilities), a cry

came out of the ghetto. From this perspective, Watts was foreseeable, inevitable, and of great importance to the Civil Rights struggle. The second interpretation, however, suggests that Watts was not a popular uprising, but a brutal display of almost incomprehensible violence which set the momentum of the Civil Rights back for years. In terms of this study, it is important to note that both of these interpretations also appeared within Canadian newspapers while the Riot itself was taking place.

According to both contemporaries and historians, Watts had been a long time coming. "Uprisings like those in Watts in 1965 are akin to a toothache in that they alert the body politic that something is dangerously awry."¹² Although it had been over a century since the slaves were freed, and over ten years since Rosa Parks had been arrested in Montgomery, Alabama for refusing to sit at the rear of a segregated bus, many Black Americans, especially outside of the American South, were no closer to real equality than had been their parents and grandparents. Scholars have argued that as with most liberal reforms in North American societies, the focus of Lyndon Johnson's Civil Rights reforms focused on expanding opportunity, not on fighting social inequality. The level of segregation was not changing, the median family income of African-Americans was not rising, and the economic opportunities for Blacks were not arriving. As a result, Johnson's 'Great Society' legislation of the mid-sixties would generate historic and progressive legal changes, such as those which tore down the barriers to Black voting in the American South (Voting Rights Bill), but it would not seriously address the very real economic and social problems which

remained the most immediate problems of urban Blacks in America. Ultimately, "few of the dramatic hard-won gains of the 1960s had reached the lives of many Black urban dwellers beyond the South."¹³

The Watts Riots would also institute the 1960s "pattern" of the "long hot summer," a series of urban revolts which would engulf several American cities (such as Chicago, Newark, and Detroit) each summer through 1968. Although many consider the revolts in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Harlem, New York in 1964 to be the first of these urban revolts because of their links to later uprisings, those disorders neither caused the same scale of damage and casualties nor attracted the type of national and international attention that Watts did. For these reasons, it is Watts that is considered by many as the "prototype" for the Black urban riot of the 1960s.¹⁴

The significance of Watts is not only that it represents a kind of "turning point" between the passive resistance of Martin Luther King and his followers, but also that it revealed the limits of King's message and rhetoric. Although it prompted some genuine legislative change, it did not significantly dissipate the social and economic grievances of the Black masses. For the remainder of a decade anger in the Black community would expand after Watts rather than reduce; new and more aggressive tactics, from Black Power to the Black Panther Party, would replace the peaceful marches of the early 1960s. As a result, reformers like President Johnson, who only months earlier was convinced that racial inequality and anger in the Black community was becoming a thing of the past, would instead, by the end of 1965, throw up his hands and ask "What do

they want?" While future scholars would explore Watts as a marker of the expansion of the Civil Rights movement to the American inner-city,¹⁵ the understanding that these uprisings were often fuelled as much by issues of class as by issues of race were lost on contemporary Americans, the American government and, one could argue, on Canadians.¹⁶

As is revealed in the analysis of Canadian newspaper interpretations of the Watts Riot, however, and unlike the aforementioned conclusions of historians such as Patterson, several scholars have treated Watts as the "époque paradoxale" that it was. At the apparent height of American liberal success, on the heels of the seemingly irreversible momentum generated by national spectacles such as Martin Luther King Jr.'s Selma-to-Montgomery March (explored below), the country's second-largest city suddenly became the site of a riot with a 46.5-mile radius.¹⁷ Allonzo Hamby's assessment of the reforms of President Johnson – while admitting they had some limited effect – places the blame almost entirely on American blacks. According to Hamby, Johnson's Civil Rights legislation was also largely aimed at eliminating poverty, but despite this fact Blacks became more and more violent. "After giving the civil rights establishment almost everything that it had asked for, Johnson found himself facing a new wave of black militance with which he could not communicate."¹⁸ The idea that this "civil rights establishment" did not speak, or did not adequately speak, for large segments of the country's black population, as Patterson, Blumberg, and Sitkoff assert, does not enter Hamby's discussion.¹⁹ Sitkoff adds that ideological American conservatives who preached the need for law and

order as a base, shuddered at the thought of giving into the rioters' demands, lest criminal behaviour be rewarded.²⁰ Hamby does, however, suggest that Johnson at least attempted to be a voice of mediation and moderation in a world of growing extremes (both on the side of whites who were unwilling to recognize the errors of their ways and of blacks who were too impatient to wait for the social change), though in the process he merely "forfeit[ed] his credibility with each side."

As some scholars have pointed out, part of this interpretation could have been due to the lack of exposure most North American Whites had to the problems of inner-city Blacks. For instance, as Paula Johnson, David Sears and John McConahay have suggested, prior to the Watts Riot in 1965, the Los Angeles press contained a degree of "Black invisibility," a lack of press coverage of Blacks and Black community issues.²¹ As a result, while Blacks in the area regarded the riot as an effort to overcome "invisibility" and to attract attention from the majority White population concerning their long-standing grievances, for many White readers the events took them completely by surprise. Authors have since contended, however, that even those who supported Black aims in the long run attained a new awareness due to Watts, an awareness that the liberal solutions proscribed by Martin Luther King Jr. and President Lyndon Johnson were not going to solve all of the problems facing African-Americans.²²

Taken as a whole, the interpretations of the Watts and subsequent riots in the United States were divided. Sociological and attitudinal studies found that

three opinions emerged among contemporary Whites: One-third agreed with the majority of the African-American population, who viewed the Riot as “spontaneous outbursts brought on by years of discrimination and mistreatment”; and another third took Hamby’s view that the Riot was “intolerable lawlessness worthy only of severe punishment”; the final third were caught somewhere in between these two poles.²³ Canadian newspapers would echo that same set of divisions.

Canada and Civil Rights

Although the Black urban uprisings of the mid-1960s did not occur north of the 49th parallel, Canadians were well aware of the developments transpiring in the American South and in American cities. John Thompson and Stephen Randall link the escalation of the Vietnam War and the deterioration of Black/White racial relations, as do several other Canadian authors, as the two fundamental developments in the United States that eventually led to the widening of Canadian disaffection towards the American project. Thompson and Randall cite public fora, including newspapers, where Canadians were told about America’s “failure to deal with the problems of poverty and urban life,” a failure tied to “the rioting and looting by ‘gangs of Negro youths... within a few blocks of the White House’ and the brutal treatment meted out to them if ‘policemen wearing riot helmets equipped with plastic visors, waving rifles, shotguns, and pistols’ arrived to stop them.” The description of such scenes, many of which originated from the photographs of the streets of Los Angeles, contributed to the

seeding of a growing perception among some that the U.S. was “a sick nation [which] tolerates systematic injustice, hatred, [and] poverty.”²⁴

Canada was dealing with the issue of Black participation in society on several levels; given the relatively small Black population who could trace their roots to African-American origin, Canada's increasing number of Black immigrants from Africa and the West Indies, were having as great an effect on raising Canadian awareness of the place of visible minorities in Canadian society. Still, domestic incidents, such as a Ku Klux Klan cross-burning in Amherstburg, Ontario in 1965, and the impending relocation of the Black community of Halifax's ‘Africville’, offered brief domestic occasions where Canadian newspapers could engage the Black question.²⁵

Turning towards the occurrences in the U.S. however, offered Canadian newspapers much more food for thought. Doug Owram's discussion of the ‘moral authority’ sensed by the Anglophone segment of the baby boom generation mid-decade arose in part from their sense that they were not directly involved in many of the events which transpired south of the border, among them the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the American intervention in the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo, April 1965), and the “Watts ghetto riots” in Los Angeles.”²⁶ Likewise, J.L. Granatstein suggests that the Canadian sense “that American society might be reaching a crisis point” was influenced by “the black uprisings in the great ghettos of many American cities,” a concern which Granatstein implies had the Canadian prime minister worried “about the possibility of violence spilling over the border.”²⁷ For all of these authors, the

evolution of the fight for Civil Rights in the United States, and particularly the escalating violence that was becoming associated with it, began to provoke poignant calls for re-examining the Canadian link with the United States. The calls were *not* because there might be consequences for Canada, as was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but because, as would be the case in the later half of the decade, the United States *itself* was viewed with increasing trepidation. The investigation of whether or not Canadian newspapers support this claim is a major focus of this chapter.

Civil Rights: A Canadian Issue, an American Issue, or a Non-Issue?

Given the importance that many Canadian scholars have placed on the deterioration of America's handling of the Civil Rights issue, I expected to discover that most papers would depict the Riots in the same light, with the differences revealing themselves in terms of the degree of blame, criticism, or support for the United States during this trepidacious period. However, as with the other events analyzed in this study, pro- and anti-American sentiment was not the most useful axis on which to measure the newspaper commentary. Instead, Canadian newspapers formed into three groups: First, those that interpreted the fight for Civil Rights as a broader, "human rights" issue, one which transcended all borders. Secondly, there were those newspapers that treated Civil Rights more often than not as an American phenomenon, but more importantly that used Civil Rights issues an occasion for commentary on American society. As will be explored later in this chapter, while those

newspapers in the first group were more likely to point out their own country's shortcomings in the area of racial relations (be it in terms of Blacks, Aboriginals, or French Canadians), those in the second group were more likely to suggest that Canada and Canadians were less racist, violent, and so on, than their American counterparts. Lastly, a much smaller group of Canadian papers' focus was really on neither country, nor the extent of the movement, but instead questioned the validity of the Civil Rights movement itself by focusing on its participants, rather than its motives.

To get a flavour of how Canadian newspapers covered the Civil Rights movement in general, so as to be able to discern any qualities of the Watts Riot in particular,²⁸ I first examined the coverage of the Civil Rights movement from mid-March to mid-April of the same year, 1965. It was in this review that I was able to get a sense of each papers' attitudes towards "Civil Rights" in general, so as to refine my understanding of Watts.

Civil Rights were in the news during that time frame because of events emanating from a huge protest movement against voter registration restrictions in Selma, Alabama. Martin Luther King Jr., having just returned from Oslo, Sweden, where he received the Nobel Peace Prize, led a march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama to protest the arrests of Black activists and the slaying of Civil Rights leader Jimmie Lee Jackson.

The marchers had barely left Selma when they were met by the tear gas and billy clubs of two hundred state troopers. The images of this scene, which

appeared later that day throughout North America on television, shocked both Americans and Canadians, and sent thousands of them to Selma over the next two weeks to join the protest. In particular, the Canadian religious community was moved to action; this is likely due to the fact that during those two weeks, Reverend James J. Reeb, a White Unitarian minister, was one of three religious leaders attacked. Reeb would die because of his injuries. This and other such episodes prompted Civil Rights leaders to ask the governor of Alabama, George Wallace, for protection during the exercise of their constitutional right to peaceful assembly. Though the governor would not grant it, President Lyndon Johnson did, sending U.S. Army troops and federalizing the Alabama National Guard to protect the 40,000 marchers who eventually arrived in Montgomery. Moreover, the events in Selma served as the direct catalyst for Johnson's introduction to the U.S. Congress of legislation to eliminate barriers to the right of Blacks to vote.²⁹

Group 1- What colour is your conscience?

"The civil rights question in the United States is also a Canadian issue and, indeed, one with which the entire free world must be concerned."³⁰ For close to half of the newspapers examined in this section of the study, this quotation from the *Ottawa Citizen* sums up the collective interpretation of events south of the border. To these journalists, editors, and readers, the struggle for the rights of Blacks in the American South was not only "felt in Canada as much as it was in many areas of the United States,"³¹ but in addition, provided "a hitherto undreamed-of plateau in human relations."³²

Several newspapers extended the psychological reach of events in Selma to the Canadian context. An editorial in the *Ottawa Citizen*, for instance, suggested that “The impact of the brutal acts of segregationists in Selma was felt in Canada as much as it was in many areas of the United States,”³³ and related that sentiment by covering many of the protests held by Canadians in Ottawa, Toronto, Kingston, Vancouver and elsewhere.

It was in the Halifax area, home to Canada’s oldest, and perhaps contemporarily largest Black community, however, that the border between Canada and the United States seemed the most irrelevant. Indeed, Nova Scotia seemed to be the only province paralleling events in the United States, be it the escalating cases of public discrimination against blacks, or else the announcements by Premier Robert Stansfield of new provincial social programs aimed at “speed[ing] up the government’s program on human rights.”³⁴ The *Dalhousie Gazette*, Dalhousie University’s student newspaper, suggested that rather than current developments affecting only the United States, “The *North American* Negro has been on the bottom of society for too long for him to permeate it homogeneously the moment he has complete equality”³⁵ [emphasis mine]. No newspaper could have presented the point raised by the *Gazette* in a manner more in tune with rising calls for racial equality than the *Dartmouth Free Press*.

Beginning an editorial by stating that Blacks in Canada “are part of the history of our city and our country,” the *Free Press* charged that in their own community, Blacks were either not hired, or else hired in only one position per

company; “too many feel that this “token” Negro³⁶ absolves them of the charge of discrimination in their hiring practices.”³⁷ According to the *Free Press*’s editorialists, “[w]ith the exception of a very few firms who have employed Negroes in ‘white collar’ positions... the Negro is on the wrong side of the counter, the wrong side of the office desk, the wrong side of most occupations that could afford him chance to show what he can do, and to earn a good living doing it.” Moreover, the paper ended its commentary by adding that one might give consideration to all of these points “before... condemn[ing] those who are involved in this struggle for human equality.”³⁸

Likewise, several other newspapers went well beyond the specifics of any national context, and extolled the applicability of the Civil Rights struggle to all of humanity. The *Ottawa Journal*, which interpreted President Johnson’s reforms as “virtually an open declaration of civil war upon any group or any area which chooses to reject his demand that the right to vote be extended to all Americans – and now,” also extended the relevant arena beyond simply the American South:

As we watch this massive decision being unrolled Canadians will be wise to stir their own consciences to as to the bell that tolls for inequalities here is our own land. We aren’t really on the sidelines – *we are just in another portion of the field of battle and of humanity and civilization.*³⁹ [emphasis mine]

This spirit was expressed in several newspapers, such as the *B.C. Catholic*, which on March 18 quoted the Vatican viewpoint that these events were “finding a deep echo in the entire world and in every man,” and quoted a local Rabbi: “no man – whites included – are really free unless all men are free.”⁴⁰ Ottawa Rabbi Simon L. Eckstein echoed the comment, recounting an episode where Martin

Luther King Jr. was slapped by a segregationist in a Selma hotel. "Whatever our name, whatever our colour," Eckstein wrote, when Dr. Martin Luther King was struck, we all had our faces slapped. It was not an attack upon an individual, but upon human worth and dignity that is part of each of us."⁴¹

Such accounts suggest that many of those who participated in the protests for Civil Rights in Canada had identified with Southern Blacks not as "Americans," but as fellow human beings who were clearly under repression. While cynics did suggest (and probably with a kernel of truth) that Civil Rights certainly became something of a "cause célèbre"⁴², especially among a youth culture that was about to define itself by engaging in causes célèbres, rallying around it did not seem to come implicitly with criticism of American society itself.

Group 2- Home of the Brave... but not Land of the Free

While an editorial in the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* did state that surely "Canadian students... can risk pneumonia while Alabama Negroes are risking broken heads"⁴³, the newspaper, by and large, saw the confrontation over Civil Rights as the sign of a more general breakdown in American society. In a quintessential editorial, the editors of the *Chronicle-Telegraph* identified the two major opportunities for America-bashing that one could find in the Civil Rights contest: the paradox of American democratic rhetoric, and the paradox of American foreign policy. According to the *Chronicle-Telegraph*, "The basic weakness, inconsistencies and paradoxes of the collective American character are there for all the world to see."⁴⁴

These contradictions between America's supposed values and White America's treatment of American Blacks provided endless commentary from several of Canada's newspapers. Ottawa's *Le Droit* suggested that "Devant les événements qui se déroulent en Alabama, on peut se demander comment les Etats-Unis peuvent continuer de poser aux grand défenseurs de la liberté,"⁴⁵ while the *Ottawa Citizen*, featured a letter from Mrs. F. Kelly which read "How can America expect to impress the rest of the world with the democratic way of life with such things going on in their own country?" More starkly, and mostly because it distinguished itself from its Haligonian counterparts, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* wrote "The march [to Montgomery], the death, and people kneeling to pray even while being clubbed show that the United States is still "the home of the brave." But in Selma it has been made evident that, in one state at least, the union is not "the land of the free."⁴⁶

The second of the two America-bashing opportunities highlighted by the *Chronicle-Telegraph* concerned the United States's widening range of foreign interventions, especially its deepening involvement in Vietnam. Although the war will be scrutinized in Chapter 4, it is here important to note that some newspapers were already noticing that conflict. Making a statement echoed by several newspapers, and in particular by several letter-writers, a *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* editorial suggested that:

The US, its critics will take delight in pointing out, shows great concern for the liberty of peoples far away while it exhibits vacillation and impotence in the face of the most obnoxious inroads upon the liberties of its own people. [Specifically, t]he US is engaged on a multitude of fronts to ride the world of despotism while at home it tolerates a tyranny that keeps 18,000,000 of its citizens in perpetual subjugation.⁴⁷

In similar fashion to its earlier criticism of the U.S., *Le Droit* agreed, and told Americans “C’est magnifique d’aller defendre la liberté au Vietnam ou à Cuba, mais combien il vaut mieux la defendre chez soi!”⁴⁸ Many newspapers pointed out that although the United States somehow had difficulty providing troops to protect its citizens on the Selma-Montgomery march, it was nonetheless increasingly able to find more and more soldiers to send to Vietnam. “Here in Canada I have found that Canadians practised democracy while the Americans preached it throughout the world and sent Marines to South Viet Nam [sic] to defend freedom, but could not, or would not protect the rights of their own people in their own country.”⁴⁹

At least one newspaper, the *Vancouver Sun*, interpreted the events surrounding the drive for Civil Rights as a positive reflection of the United States. In an editorial following Johnson’s speech to Congress, the *Sun*’s editors suggested that “The eyes of the world” were on the U.S.; “the president rose to smash the crowning blow against racial discrimination in the United States.”⁵⁰ While several newspapers lauded Johnson’s efforts, few followed up their words of praise for the President with the suggestion that he had “restored the good image of the United States in the hearts of its friends.”⁵¹ In other words, while many newspapers espoused a “good start, but there is still much work to be done” attitude, the *Sun* concluded that the U.S. was back in their good graces.

The rosy perception projected by the *Vancouver Sun* was also playing out over the connection with the Vietnam War. A column entitled “Whatever America Does is Wrong” suggested that while for a time the nation had been

called America the Beautiful, and then America the Ugly, the U.S. was now wrongly being called "America the Guilty," due to a condemnation, especially by its own citizens, of wrong-doings before any evidence was heard. "Not in 20 years of observation have I seen so many Americans so pantingly avid to condemn their own country and its every motive abroad" complained one columnist.⁵² According to the *Sun*, this perception was also increasing among Canadians.

Group 3- Beatniks and other "Unwashed Supporters of Civil Rights"

In separating those newspapers that saw Civil Rights as an "American" phenomenon from those who saw it as a "human" one, we gain much insight into Canadian newspapers perceptions in that era. However, it is in the coverage of those who did *not* endorse the Civil Rights movement that the popular perceptions of some Canadian newspapers revealed themselves most clearly. Most newspapers would only go so far; no matter what their opinions, no Canadian newspaper, with the exception of the *Vancouver Citizen*, was ready to put forward overtly racist views, and all other newspapers, at a minimum, supported the right of American Blacks to vote. However, at least four Canadian newspapers, the *Vancouver Province*, *Le Soleil*, the *Almonte Gazette*, and the afore-mentioned *Vancouver Citizen*, were not very supportive of the drive towards Civil Rights, especially when it involved the participation or backing of Canadians; and none exhibited any real degree of empathy with American Blacks.

The most common way of punching holes in the validity of the movement was to question the appropriateness, the character, or the intentions of those involved in the struggle. Complaining that there were "too many beatniks, habitual agitators and unwashed, unshaved individuals to inspire much confidence in the soundness of their pleas,"⁵³ a column in the *Vancouver Province* suggested that Canadian protesters "have a good deal in common with the Dixie bigots and ruffians they purport to condemn. Both groups use a public issue to work off personal 'kicks'... and, most strikingly similar of all, both groups resort to obstruction, lawlessness and varying degrees of violence to draw attention to their views."⁵⁴ The *Almonte Gazette* also took the opportunity to offer its opinions on why, once the Selma-Montgomery marchers had their governments' protection, Canadian students stopped protesting: "Perhaps the cold weather, the fact that the U.S. consul paid no attention to them, and public interest in their performance was on the wane, had something to do with the decision [to end the protest]."⁵⁵

In addition to having presented alternate interpretations of those involved in Civil Rights, there was also a tendency to shift the focus of their historic grievances. As baffled as Johnson himself, the *Almonte Gazette* mused: "The President of the United States has promised that he will see that all Negroes who are entitled to vote are registered for that purpose. Surely that ought to be enough." In the opinion of the *Gazette's* editors, "These marches only inflame the people who dislike Colored people, cost a lot of money to afford protection for them, and don't seem to accomplish much. People are tired of reading about

them.”⁵⁶ Quebec City’s *Le Soleil* also presented a curious interpretation of Southern history, in which the “plight” of Southern Whites was given equal consideration to that of Southern Blacks. “Certes, ce qui se passe dans les anciens États confédérés peut se comprendre... Vaincus par le Nord, soumis pendant plusieurs années à un véritable régime militaire...les États sudistes dits esclavagistes ont une pente à remonter et un siècle n’y a pas encore suffi.”⁵⁷ Moreover, *Le Soleil*’s editorials suggested that the delay over changes to U.S. law so as to balance out the rights of Blacks was obvious: “M. Johnson pose des problèmes constitutionnels. C’est surtout cet aspect de la question qui a retardé jusqu’à maintenant une action directe de la capitale américaine...”⁵⁸

Again, despite these particular views, the above newspapers supported the notion of electoral gains for American Blacks. The *Vancouver Citizen* alone flirted with extremism when it moved beyond criticism of Civil Rights supporters to a general racist appraisal of American Blacks: “The majority of the Black race was not yet ready to exercise moderation and the results witnessed in the past twelve months... Negroes are emotional and easily aroused and even in a country like Jamaica the educated negroes have difficulty in controlling the trouble makers.”⁵⁹ In a subsequent edition, the same columnist, writing as “The Sidewalk Inspector,” wrote

“[Martin Luther King] appealed to the Federal Government to permit the march from Selma to Montgomery in spite of the fact that that march had been prohibited by the State as was its right. He must have known that the march would cause trouble. Then he called for a country-wide boycott of all goods produced in Alabama... From this it seems obvious that Martin Luther King was not entitled to the Nobel Peace Prize.”⁶⁰

It is important to note, however, that dissenting views in these papers were presented, as was the case in every newspaper in this study. Responding to the

absurdities in the *Vancouver Citizen*, Maureen Cooke wrote, "His [the Sidewalk Inspector's] latest column should not be tolerated by a community that is striving for tolerance and progress... What absolute rot!... Once again he has shown that one can say anything, no matter how hateful, as long as one is swaddled in the sheltering cloak of anonymity. Really, he must be an advertiser – there can be no other explanation for his appearance in the *Citizen*."⁶¹ A letter also counteracted the presumptions concerning student motives as presented in the *Almonte Gazette*: "I was there not to register disapproval of the [American] consulate but to register moral support for the people in Alabama who are actually marching. I cannot be in Alabama and I cannot actively help them, but as proof that I feel what they are doing is important and right I gave up time."⁶²

The example of such extreme positions, however, helps to formulate a general conclusion of how some Canadian newspapers' perceptions were constituted: those newspapers that focused on who was involved in the Civil Rights movement (and thus debated the place of Canadians, or Canadian religious or political leaders in the fight), rather than considering why those individuals were involved, were less likely to see it a paramount cause, and were much more likely to lean towards a very cynical, if not shallow interpretation of the movement itself. Adding this axis to our earlier axis – whether or not this was an opportunity to comment on American society – strengthens our understanding of the full range of perceptions which these Canadian newspapers explored in their discussion of Civil Rights.

Shots, Sirens, Fire, and Fear

Even as they challenged Southern authority in the name of voting rights, the marchers in Selma were already becoming waning symbols of the early Civil Rights movement. Their non-violent strategies were giving way to those, especially in Northern cities, who had not yet joined the fray. Bringing with them “the sharp steel of discontent,” the vote protestors of the South were replaced by “the angry young men of the Korean War and the so-called underclass, the permanently depressed stratum of the Black working class,” the majority of whom were urban.⁶³ Within this group, the anger and impatience of a disadvantaged lot waiting for a change which was materializing too slowly, the stage was set for “spontaneous and unorganized” rebellion, a wave of which “revealed a dawning sense of revolutionary discontent.”⁶⁴

The secondary literature on Canadian reactions to the Watts riots contains shades of its assessment of the Civil Rights movement in general: Whether it was Doug Owram’s sense of “moral authority” which Canadians gained when peering at events in Los Angeles⁶⁵, or else the general disappointment at the American project, growing in part, according to Walter Stewart, to the changes taking shape on the “hot, black pavement” of urban America’s streets⁶⁶, Canadians’ views of the United States were in the midst of taking a sharp negative turn. As was the case for the newspaper coverage of Civil Rights in general, the newspaper coverage of Watts suggests that for Halifax, Quebec City, Ottawa, and Vancouver, these interpretations are partially correct, though not as nuanced as they perhaps should be.

Once again, we can divide the newspaper coverage into three fairly discernable groups. In the case of reaction to Watts, the newspapers in the first and second groups shared the same sociological conclusion: Empathizing with the Black community of Los Angeles, they interpreted the Riot as an act of collective frustration and anger. Most papers in these two groups, while not condoning the violence, at least expressed an understanding of where the hatred came from. From this understanding came two distinct reflections. For the first group, the rampant violence prompted loud praise for the triumph of Canadian values. Columns and letters would recount local stories and anecdotes of acceptance and tolerance in Canadian society, which writers contrasted consciously with American society. For the second group of papers, the empathy towards the struggle of American Blacks did not correlate with a rejection of the United States. On the contrary, for this group, it prompted the reverse: a warning that Canadians should not look at Americans smugly, because Canada had its own racial problems to deal with. In addition to these two views (and as was the case with views of the Civil Rights movement), a third and substantially smaller group of Canadian papers rejected the riots outright as mindless violence and an extreme episode of mob aggression with little or no cause for compassion.

Only Riots? How Lucky!

The volume of coverage of the Watts Riot in Canadian newspapers varied greatly. In newspapers like the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Ottawa Citizen*, reports and commentary on the riots were extensive. In the *Vancouver Sun*, for

instance, articles ranged from testimonials, to “expert” analysis, to statements by police, government, and Civil Rights officials in the U.S., to the comments of a local folk-singer, all of which was splashed over the first three pages of the newspaper for several days. Although many newspapers greatly elevated their level of coverage of the Riot when American comedian Dick Gregory, who had come to try and calm things down in Watts, was shot,⁶⁷ other newspapers, such as *L’Action* and the *Pacific Tribune* featured only a few articles on the riots.⁶⁸ Still, the largest riots in U.S. history, which lasted six days and nights, did not prompt a single editorial from the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, *L’Action*, *Le Droit*, or, surprisingly, the *Dartmouth Free Press*.

The *Ottawa Citizen*, in two early editorials, summed up the viewpoint that all of the newspapers in the first two groups would express, namely, that the riots were due to the condition and treatment of Blacks in the United States:

They must serve as a warning that despite the progress towards improving racial relations in the United States, large sections of the Negro population still feel deeply aggrieved, and explosions can still come without notice. The Los Angeles riots... stem from years of frustration caused by economic and social discrimination...[B]ecause of the effective, if not legal, housing segregation to which Negroes are subjected in these and large Northern cities, they suffer de facto segregation in schools and in social life... When white citizens are prepared to accept Negroes as their next-door neighbors, the revolution will have been won, and the sense of indignity and deprivation which stifles the Northern Negro will have been dispelled.”⁶⁹

The *Citizen’s* editors did not deny that Watts constituted a full-scale rebellion; they just argued that this was not the point. “The need for greater speed in removing the causes of rebellion – and that, in essence, is what the rioting constitutes – is underlined by the fact that the violence in Los Angeles was not unexpected.” The solution, then, was plain: “The immediate task is to work in three fields: education, employment, and relations between Negroes and the

police in large Northern cities.”⁷⁰ This was echoed by a *Citizen* reader, who wrote, “Without orientation, education, employment opportunities, housing, and above all, acceptance as equal human beings, we can all be well assured that Los Angeles, under different names perhaps, will occur once again.”⁷¹

Across town, the *Ottawa Journal* came to a similar conclusion: “The rioters were revolting against good order itself, against authority, against discipline – [but] no less than against the standards of a society which has pent them up in black ghettos.”⁷² Indeed, while expressing difficulty in justifying the violence, the *Journal* was ultimately able to do just that. “The wanton anarchy in Los Angeles is a setback to the Negro’s struggle towards equality... But behind the anarchy there is poverty and injustice and prejudice – and this too must be repudiated.”⁷³ This set of conclusions, however, would lead in two opposite directions.

The Myth of Northern Liberalism (Group 1)

For some newspapers, the proof was now in the pudding; America was coming undone. The *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* quickly launched one of the more ferocious attacks on the United States.

Because the northern liberal does not go on cross-burning binges or lynch Negroes, he is automatically considered as a person without racial prejudice, and a strong champion of desegregation. But the Negro ghettos that have been springing up all over northern and western US in the last fifty years tell a different story. They tell a story of economic and social segregation which is just as vicious (and much more difficult to eradicate because of the subtlety of the discrimination) as the southerner’s frank rejection of the Negro.⁷⁴

The editors at the *Chronicle-Telegraph* concluded that the riot had “drawn attention to a barely publicized aspect of American life: it is the oddly double standard that White inhabitants in the northern parts of the US adopt to judge their counterparts in the south. Hence the convenient myth of a pathological,

nigger-hating, bible-carrying and cross-burning southerner; hence the myth of northern liberalism."⁷⁵

For the *Chronicle-Telegraph*, the riots not only provided an opportunity for America-bashing, but a chance to compare the United States unfavourably to Canada. Thus while they acknowledged that riots could occur anywhere, and had occurred even in Canada in the past, the tendency to riot "is aggravated in the United States by a tradition of lawlessness quite foreign to Canada, England, or Northern Europe." Americans, according to one columnist, "are accustomed to the exercise of brute force to a degree unheard of here [in Canada]; the bullying policeman and the bigtime hoodlum are accepted institutions of U.S. society. The rule of law is not so cherished, as in Canada, by Americans accustomed to direct action and conditioned to accepting the end as justification of the means."⁷⁶

The positive connotation for Canada as constructed through negative connotations about the United States was an association made all too easily by several Canadian newspapers. Predicting the line taken in the *Chronicle-Herald*, a *Vancouver Province* columnist had written

Unlike their less fortunate contemporaries in the United States, the young men and women of Canada's new generation have grown up in a society which venerates the rule of law. In this country, policemen are traditionally the servants of the public and its defenders against disorder, not the truculent strong-arm tyrants all too common in some sections of the United States. Unlike the United States, we do not share a tradition of violence here, nor do we consider a brutal constabulary an essential counterweight to public toleration of mob rule and disorder.⁷⁷

The University of Ottawa's French-language student newspaper *La Rotonde* offered similar conclusions. In an editorial about the United States and its treatment of Blacks, the editors wrote, "Ici à Ottawa un Noir est notre ami. Ici,

sans arrière-pensée, on accepte de lui tenir la main. Pourquoi là-bas dans le Sud, ce même Noir serait-il inférieur à nous?" The editors added that Americans were all the more shameful for failing to recognize Blacks in their society, even though Blacks died in WWII for the U.S. just as did Whites.⁷⁸

For a number of Canadian newspapers, therefore, the plight of Blacks in Los Angeles was evidence of the need for a re-evaluation of America and its values. Rather than placing the blame on Southern "segregationists," the riots, they believed, "may help take the scales off the eyes of white Americans in the north, of those who smugly assume that anti-Negro sentiment and racial prejudice are the monopoly of the south."⁷⁹ This is not the entire story, however, but only a part of it; for several other newspapers, it was Canadians who needed to cast off their smug assumptions.

Canada: Not Exactly the "Moral Superpower" (Group 2)

As far back as 1960, the *Pacific Tribune*, which promulgated the party line of Canada's Communist Party, had been taking every opportunity to attack the United States as an imperialist, self-serving power which would dominate everything it could, including Canada, if given enough leeway. This was not the case when it came to Civil Rights. Rather than cloaking itself in the connections, some in the press argued existed between communism and the Civil Rights movement, the *Pacific Tribune* insisted that the fight of American Blacks was even larger. "The issue facing the Negro people is not 'Communism', but the common rights of citizenship."⁸⁰ When it came to the Watts riot, the *Tribune*,

rather than taking the opportunity to simply lash out at the United States, also turned inwards:

There is another aspect to this sad affair which shouldn't escape the notice of thoughtful Canadians. Our own skirts are far from clean. The Native Indians and Eskimos of Canada exist in conditions every bit as deplorable as those of their black brethren to the south. And fully one-third of our country – all of French Canada – is a subjugated nation with its cultural, economic, social and political rights denied to it by the English power structure.⁸¹

This equal culpability in terms of the treatment of minorities was not only expressed in the *Tribune*, but reaffirmed in the *Vancouver Sun*, the *B.C. Catholic* as well as in the brief coverage of the *Dartmouth Free Press*. The *Sun*'s first editorial on Watts began in a similar fashion to the *Chronicle-Telegraph*'s: "Not that rioting and burning and shooting compensate for generations of repression; they don't. They do, however, betoken the fury of a race deprived of liberty and denied equality in a society supposedly devoted to both in constitutional principle." However, *Sun* editors did not use this as a pretext to launch charges of rampant American violence, and to criticize Americans' complacent acceptance of such conditions. Instead, it offered the opposite: "Canadians have no cause to be smug. Under similar conditions, the troubles would have bred here in much the same way that they are developing in the United States." Indeed, they went one step further, adding "Even England, the mother of personal liberty, is experiencing racial strains under the stress of immigration from former colonies and dependencies."⁸² As was the case for many newspapers during Selma, the problem was not an American one, but a human one. To a *Sun* columnist, what was needed now was not Acts of Congress, "but social and economic acts that will no longer wait for the convenience of a complacent white society."⁸³

The call for Canadians, along with Americans, to take a good look at their respective arenas of social malaise was also part of the message delivered in the *B.C. Catholic*. In an editorial entitled "... but closer to home", the editors wrote,

Most of us were quite smug, felt righteously indignant at the benighted US, and knew that discrimination just doesn't happen in Canada. Indians who get elbowed into the gutter, orientals who can't buy property in the more exclusive areas, and Jews who are ridiculed for being Jews just might demur. Besides, it's a lot easier to be fearless and thirsty for justice and love when the action is thousands of miles away.⁸⁴

This message, which would colour the *Catholic's* coverage of Watts, had also been adopted by the *Dartmouth Free Press*, which recognized the plight of Canadian Aboriginals, and the "disregard of the right of French Canadians to their own public schools in the province of Ontario." And yet, despite these facts, the editors of the *Free Press* suggested that the Civil Rights activists had it right, even in Canada. "We suggest the most obvious causes of all is our own maltreatment of Canadian Negroes who are placed in the category of second-class citizens, and after a century or more of such treatment have so far to catch up that they need special help in the way of housing, education, job-placement and quality of opportunity."⁸⁵

As is the case in all newspapers, these conclusions did not go unchallenged. In the aftermath of Watts, the *Dartmouth Free Press* ran an article from a correspondent in Moscow, who was keeping track of the coverage in the renowned Communist newspaper, *Pravda*. According to the reporter, "A new word has appeared in the Soviet Union, which stands for everything despicable about the United States – everything brutal, unsavoury and unjust. The word: Lost Angeles." Pointing out that Canadians did not have the monopoly on predicting the massive deterioration of American society, *Pravda* suggested that

"In Los Angeles they are applying the same tactics used in Vietnam." As a final note, the reporter related an encounter with a Russian, who upon seeing the photos of Watts observed, "Los Angeles in 1965 looks to me very much like Hungary in 1956." The Canadian signed off by agreeing: "Looking west from half a world away, the comparison seems depressively valid."⁸⁶

"We Are On Top" (Group 3)

The papers above either engaged in a fairly concerted attack on American values, or chose to see Watts as a broader, North American, if not "human" problem; but all displayed a considerable degree of empathy with the rioter. Separating themselves from this debate entirely were the brief comments about Watts made by the third group of papers covering this event, namely the *Halifax Chronicle-Telegraph*, *Le Soleil*, and to some extent the *Vancouver Province*. The *Chronicle-Herald*, for instance, prepared a report that "Combined law enforcement agencies finally seized control from the rioters" and packaged it with an infamous quote made by L.A. Police Chief William Parker: "We are on top and they are on the bottom."⁸⁷ This would infuriate many Civil Rights activists who interpreted the statement as a typical White metaphor for their struggle. In its only editorial on the riot, *Le Soleil's* editors seemed simply baffled as to why the riots could come on the heels of Johnson's new electoral reform bill. "C'est d'autant plus incompréhensible que les émeutes en Californie... surviennent au moment où le Congrès de Washington adopte des lois de plus en plus radicales pour l'émancipation des Noirs." Blaming extremist groups like the Nation of

Islam for the riot, the editors stated that “les “pacifistes” [Noirs] doivent neutraliser l’action des extrémistes fascistes et communistes qui s’infiltrèrent dans les quartier noirs... Il faut souhaiter que les Noirs reviendront à la raison sans que les autorités aient à recourir à la coercition.”⁸⁸

This difference in blame was also prevalent in the *Vancouver Province*, which, while offering articles that searched for blame in attitudes of White society, also ran a column which extolled discrimination as “a virtue, not a vice.” Proceeding with a purely semantic argument concerning the usefulness of cognitive “discrimination” for everyday objects and children’s learning, the author lamented that “today the idea of discrimination has become so equated with evil that governments, politicians, and do-gooders continue in their attempts to pass laws that rob man of his right to discriminate.” To the columnist, the extension of this mindset meant that “if we were to carry today’s ‘fair employment practices’... to their logical conclusions, we might well expect ‘fair ownership laws’ that would compel all home owners to share their homes with non-owners of the government’s choice (as in the U.S.S.R.) in order to equalize ownership.”⁸⁹

“The Nuns are our Shocktroops...” and so are our Rabbis

Discussion of Civil Rights and the Watts Riot did not seem to have a particularly regional quality (even in Halifax, the views in the *Chronicle-Herald* greatly differed from papers like the *Dartmouth Free Press*), nor did any significant differences emerge along linguistic lines. Moreover, as mentioned in endnote 62, unlike earlier investigations in this thesis, the input from University

papers was limited, mostly because the Watts Riot took place in August. One group of newspapers did stand out as particularly committed to coverage and a similar strong point of view – that the fight for Civil Rights was global and that the riot was understandable – namely, the “religious” papers. The official publication of the Nova Scotia Anglican Church, the *Diocesan Times*, the Catholic community and Jewish Community papers of Vancouver, the *B.C. Catholic* and *Jewish Western Bulletin* respectively, and to some extent one of Quebec City’s Catholic-community-based newspapers, *L’Action*, all strongly identified with the cause of Civil Rights, and with the community of American Blacks.

The Anglican *Diocesan Times* relayed to its readers the particularly strong sense of righteousness which they saw in the movement. This sentiment was based in large part upon a sense that aiding the oppressed was “the call of Christian consciousness.” American blacks were part of the same human family, and “what was being done to the Negroes of Alabama was being done to people who are part of the body of Christ.”⁹⁰ This idea was prevalent throughout the newspaper’s coverage of the Civil Rights issue, which itself offered a chance “to show in word and deed a respect for the dignity of all men whether they be black, white, yellow, brown or any other colour of skin... Pious statement and sentimental feelings are not enough.”⁹¹ The *Times* also supported the view that the time for action was now; indeed, the time for action was always now. When asked in an interview if he thought “now is the right time for a drive for voting rights in the southern United States,” an Anglican Bishop who was the first to

take part in a Civil Rights demonstration, responded "When is the 'right time' for any measure of progress?"⁹²

The contributors to the *B.C. Catholic* and the *Jewish Western Bulletin* also felt that the movement was a religious calling. The *Catholic*, responding to some opinions that church officials had no business becoming protest leaders, countered such objections by suggesting that doing so was in fact the exact spirit of Vatican II. "We know that this new Mass of ours is intended to bring people of God out of their self-centred seclusion, bring them together as the people of God... That's what those nuns were doing, accomplishing their mission as Christians."⁹³ An editorial in the *Bulletin* suggested the mission of Jewish religious leaders was the same, and recounted the story of hundreds of Black protesters who wore yarmulkes (skullcaps) "in respectful emulation of rabbis who joined Alabama demonstrations." The connection started when a Rabbi, asked about the significance of the head covering, explained that "one's head must be covered in the presence of the Lord [which is why it is worn in houses of worship]. The Negro response was that 'wherever the freedom movement is, God is to be found there.'"⁹⁴

According to these newspapers, for both Jews and Catholics in Canada, there was a unique sense of identification with the Black community as a disadvantaged minority. One preacher recounted a story from his youth, where he noticed a sign when visiting a small Southern town which read "Welcome To Our Thriving Community..." but continued "... Unless You Are a Nigger or a Catholic."⁹⁵ The Jewish community also found commonalities with the fortunes of

American Blacks. As they had expressed with the election of President John Kennedy, anything that decreased the marginalization of a minority community in North America would usually benefit other minorities by extension. As one piece of evidence, they noted two of the more vocal enemies of Black rights were the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party, both of whom, of course, also targeted Jews. "Alabama may be a far-distant state where Negroes are struggling for equality; it is also a state which permits white Nazis to print and disseminate millions of hate pamphlets."⁹⁶ Moreover, the *Bulletin* noted that the first official complaint filed under the 1964 American Civil Rights Act was not lodged by African-Americans but by the B'nai B'rith against a Florida hotel which refused to rent rooms to applicants whose names were Jewish.⁹⁷

When reviewing Watts, therefore, it may not be surprising that these papers gave the Black community the benefit of the doubt. The *B.C. Catholic* in particular quoted a local Los Angeles preacher who stated that most of the rioters were "young people, very young people," while another commented "I am grieved that the splendid spirit and high moral integrity of the Negro people in our beloved city of Los Angeles is being besmirched by the happening of recent days" suggesting that it was a minority of L.A. Blacks who were involved.⁹⁸ Strikingly, another article following the Riots lent support to the claim that the treatment of the Black community by the L.A. police was part of the problem, a conclusion few were willing to make, and which the Mayor of Los Angeles flatly denied, even after the riots. "I suspect there is something to the allegations about police brutality" wrote the priest, "the police don't handle the Negroes the

way they handle white people.”⁹⁹ Added to the views presented in the articles, columns, and editorials of these newspapers would be the visual commentary in Quebec City’s *L’Action*. While the textual coverage in *L’Action* was brief, its cartoons constituted one of the more vigorous examples of newspaper images.

Consistency in Canadian Cartooning

Unlike the many philosophical and perceptual differences that appeared in the textual content of Canadian newspapers, the impressions projected by the cartoons in all papers were strikingly similar. Although a smaller group than in other periods covered in this study, twenty-two cartoons on the Watts riot specifically and on the Civil Rights movement generally appeared among seven newspapers. The cartoons’ appearance and general message were (as was the case in other parts of this thesis) linked to the content of the text. However, unlike previous examples, the cartoons in 1965 tended to be more forceful, more aggressive, and “edgier” than the tone taken in the articles and editorials.

Of those favouring the Civil Rights movement, most cartoons were featured in the newspapers from Group 1, those who did not use Civil Rights as an opportunity to comment on the United States; of the cartoons that came from Group 2, most nonetheless dealt with “global” Civil Rights themes and not particularly anti-American ones. The correlation between the cartoons and the papers’ views on the Watts Riot was even greater: nearly all the cartoons came from newspapers that sympathized with the rioters, and no cartoons came from a newspaper that did not.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, absent from the cartoon portion of the

analysis were those papers that either presented views opposing the movement, or who saw nothing positive to be gained from the experience of the Watts Riot; in other words, the newspapers from Group 3 self-selected themselves out. Thus, in this case, identification with the cause of Civil Rights, and an understanding of the Watts Riot which placed the blame on the same external causes, were the strongest predictors of featuring a cartoon on the subject.

Visions of Americans

Taken together, this cartoon set forth five major images. First, the cause of Civil Rights was laden with a tangible sense of nobility and righteousness. This was contrasted with the image of the brutal force used by police and military forces in the United States, who were depicted as the primary enemy of the movement, a perception not unlike the mounting frustration over repeated, yet unheeded charges of police brutality levelled by the Los Angeles Black community. Second, the American southerner was depicted as a backwards, illiterate, 'ignorant' redneck. Third, President Johnson was shown as a hero, a towering figure in the fight against discrimination. Fourth, discrimination against Blacks was relayed as an unfortunate but unmistakable reality in North America. Finally, several cartoons engaged a serious level of criticism directed towards the United States that emerged directly from the handling of Watts.

Given that the cartoons came only from papers that empathized with the Civil Rights movement, it is thus hardly surprising that several depicted the struggle artfully, seriously, and almost serenely. Lacking the characteristic burst

of humour, several cartoons quietly paid tribute to the battle being waged by Blacks in the United States. Typical of this type was a cartoon in the *Ottawa Citizen*, depicting a line of Black men and women waiting outside a building marked "Register Here to Vote." [Fig. 4-1] The caption, "Continuation of a march" alludes to the ultimate realization of showdowns in places like Selma. Those in line stand peacefully, hands in their pockets or clasped in front of them, while the man at the front of the line walks confidently forward into the building.



Of striking note is the American ⁴⁻¹ flag fluttering in the breeze, a prominent feature in the foreground of the cartoon. While the *Ottawa Citizen* did not often take the occasion to comment on the United States in its text, it is clearly portraying a positive image of it in this cartoon. Added to this is another, even more solemn *Citizen* cartoon, which is a simple sketch of a tombstone with the name of James Reeb, the Anglican priest killed in Selma, etched on the stone [Fig. 4-2]. The combination of the "crown of thorns" sitting on the grave, however, along with the reference to the year in the caption, "A.D. 1965," is a Christological allusion to the self-sacrifice association with Jesus Christ.



4-2

Moving from the solemn to the surreal, and projecting what was a purely heartless attitude on the part of the police, a cartoon on the heels of Selma displayed an Alabama “Special Storm Trooper” washing what can only be blood off a billy club [Fig. 4-3]. The muscle-bound trooper was a common characteristic of those cartoons featuring southern police, a symbolic reference to “authority” and to their ability to “stamp out” and “crush” resistance. The imposing figure is laughing, his statement, “I got one of em’ just as she almost made it back to the church” could likely have sent only shivers down the spine of the reader. The particular implications, that the officer hit a woman, and that she was attempting to gain sacred sanctuary, only deepened its impact.



4-3

Made quite intentionally comical, however, were the various appearances of “southerners” in the cartoons. In one quintessential depiction, an overweight, unshaven man wearing suspenders and a straw hat had just finished painting a sign which he handed to his son [Fig. 4-4]. The sign, which reads “Us White Kids Don’t Want No Inner-grashun,” features not only incorrect grammar and misspelled words, but letters that are printed backwards, a classic symbol for the weak proficiency in literacy usually associated with children (of the “Lemonade for sale” variety). The man, who tells his son in stereotypical southern phrasing “Now hurry up, child – you’ll be late for school,” is being presented as a small-minded racist. The suggested intellectual weakness of southerners is also the subject of another cartoon, this one featuring another imposing police officer who is staring up at a giant sign [Fig. 4-5]. The sign, which bears the seal of the President of the United States, reads, “...Every American citizen must have an equal right to vote. There is no reason which can excuse the denial of that

right..." The image carries the caption "Literacy test", but is about much more than reading. The officer, who is expressing a cartoonish "duh..." look on his face, and has his hand extended as if reading the giant letters by passing his index finger over each one, is not only having trouble "reading," he is also "illiterate" as to the meaning of the words.




4-4



4-5

Not all southerners were depicted as dupes, however. Lyndon Johnson, the Texas-born president of the United States, was presented several times as a champion of righteousness. Several cartoons in particular address Johnson's commitment, as part of his efforts on Civil Rights, to stamp out the Ku Klux Klan. The most flattering image of Johnson, however, comes from *L'Action*, which although not very supportive of him in its text did present the President as a force of change in the fight against discrimination in their cartoons. Giving life to a reference made in a couple of other newspapers, Johnson, the dominant figure in

this cartoon, projects the shadow of Abraham Lincoln, the 1860s American President who introduced the first Civil Rights legislation a century earlier [Fig. 4-6]. Seen by many as finally completing Lincoln's work, Johnson stands proudly over a scale, each side of which is an American flag. On one side of the scale stands a White man, and on the other side a Black man. The scale sits at a perfect equilibrium.



4-6

The fourth major theme was much more disheartening, but quite in line with the opinions stated by many of the newspapers. It essentially spoke to the callousness, if not the indifference of many Canadians to North American Blacks. In one cartoon appearing in the *Vancouver Sun*, the top half depicts a White man, and a host of signs reading "Help Wanted," "For Rent," and "For Sale," extolling the endless possibilities available to him in North America. The lower half, however, depicts a Black man; those same employers and shopkeepers now display signs which read "No Help Wanted," "Sorry, Space Occupied" and "Sold." In several cases, the negative words have been scribbled or pasted onto

the sign, as if to suggest that they were changed when the Black man was seen coming [Fig. 4-7].



4-7

The best example, and perhaps the most daring one of all, comes from the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*. Its message is surprising not because it expresses a strong opinion – the *Chronicle-Telegraph* was vocal throughout the period – but rather because of the negative commentary the cartoon launched at Canadians, which did not match the fairly anti-American-centred sentiment in the text. The cartoon depicts a group of White men and women protesting against discrimination [Fig. 4-8]. The signs read “All Men Were Born Equal” and “Canadian Citizens! Down with Discrimination”. Yet, at the bottom of each sign, in symbolically smaller print, are the words “In the U.S.A.” Adding that caveat to the signs suggests the artist wished to imply that while Canadians were quite ready and willing to call for change in the U.S., they had no such desires for Canadian society. Making this point even more starkly, a Black family approaches the picket line to participate.



"YOU COULD WALK WITH US - BUT WHATEVER WOULD MY FRIENDS THINK?"

4-8

Instead of inviting them to join, a man in the protest cautiously whispers "You could walk with us – but whatever would my friends think?" Again, this statement suggested that in their hearts, Canadians are not looking to include Blacks in their society either.

The final group of cartoons were, in a way, both unexpected and yet a precursor of the more ardent views which came later in the decade. Representative of the general dissatisfaction with American society which many Canadian authors discuss in relation to this period, but still somewhat absent from the majority of Canadian newspapers in 1965, a handful of cartoons did indeed reflect such a sense of general malaise. In one cartoon from *L'Action*, two scenes are juxtaposed: One half of the cartoon, labelled "Los Angeles, Samedi, 14 Aout" depicts a scene replete with buildings ablaze, angry and armed


mobs of Black men, a dead figure lying on the ground, and a swarm of armed policemen closing in. The other half, labelled "New York, Samedi, 14 Aout" depicts one of the nation's seminal entertainment events, the final of three appearances by The Beatles on the Ed Sullivan show. The drawing, a fuzzy rendition of the band dancing and exuberantly playing music in front of a massive crowd, suggests a bizarre juxtaposition between the celebration and the horror taking place in the country that evening [Fig. 49]. Entitled "Amérique insolite," the cartoon asks the question "What goes on in America?" and offers the chance to ponder how it is that some Americans can carry on with their partying while so much anger and hatred is consuming their nation.




4-9

Echoing the two-pronged attacks on American society of Civil Rights and Vietnam, two cartoons from the *Pacific Tribune* blatantly criticized the U.S. Again, only surprising because of the lack of such sentiment expressed in the paper's

prose, these two images both present the exact same scenes as taking place inside and outside the U.S. One image has four gravestones, two which read “Napalm” and “Vietnam Deaths” and two that read “Shot” and “Civil Rights Death” [4-10]. The other depicts a scene where a soldier fires at unarmed men and women. The generic scene is repeated identically three times, with the captions reading “Vietnam,” “Santo Domingo,” and “Los Angeles.”¹⁰¹ All three references are united by the cartoon’s title, “U.S. defending the ‘Free World’” [4-11]. Not only is there an ambiguity here in the “Free World” term which is quoted (suggesting that the world is actually at the mercy of the powerful), but the implication is that the U.S.’s method for “defence” is to shoot innocent civilians.



4-10



4-11

Other than the blatant racism of the *Vancouver Citizen* there was nothing as severe as the implications presented in these images. With many Canadians' exposure (and ultimately their understanding) of the Civil Rights movement and the Watts riot coming via images, perhaps the "edginess" of this paper's content can be explained. Whether it was the footage of the vote protesters in Selma being beaten back by police, or the constant stream of violent photographs that lacquered the front pages of many Canadian dailies during Watts, Canadians certainly saw their share of graphic images depicting the struggles. Perhaps then the ferocity of the cartoons, which taps into a very different stream of consciousness than the more measured and calculated written article or editorial, is in fact not as surprising as it seems.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the unexpectedness of the riot, at least from the perspective of those newspapers that had not fully realized the extent of the growing anger of American Blacks, could partially account for the lack of full commentary and reflection in Canadian papers. Perhaps it would take several more "long hot summers" before many more newspapers would more strongly express their disenchantment with American domestic affairs. And yet, the coverage given to occasions like the events in Selma, Alabama, suggest not only that Canadian newspapers were aware of the problems of discrimination in the United States, but also that they were already expressing strong opinions on the subject. Moreover, the very tumultuousness and ferocity of Watts should itself

have quickly incited emotional responses from Canadian newspapers either way. Indeed, the intensity of that event, combined with the percolation of the civil rights movement into Canadian newspapers' consciousness over the course of the previous years, were all the preparation most Canadians would have needed in order to formulate opinions.

Thus, the evidence presented above concerning the split between those newspapers which interpreted the Civil Rights issue as a larger phenomenon versus those who saw it as an occasion to comment on American society, suggests that it would be useful to qualify the statements made by several Canadian authors that the Civil Rights movement constituted one of the two major reasons why Canadians became increasingly anti-American over the course of the decade. This suggestion for revision receives further backing if we take a close look at another cross-section of newspapers; taken as a whole, there were just as many Canadian papers who suggested that in terms of Civil Rights, Canada and Canadians were much better off (more tolerant, less aggressive) as there were newspapers who took the opportunity to tell Canadians that they had little reason to feel superior to the United States.

At a rally on March 14, 1965, outside the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa and attended by close to 4,000 men and women, Liberal Member of Parliament for Carleton Lloyd Francis read a prepared statement from Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson commenting on the state of the drive for equality in the United States. Pearson's statement said that he honoured "those in Alabama or anywhere else

who are fighting within the law for their rights as free citizens.” Added to this comment, however, was a statement of support for the United States. “I know that the United States government is deeply concerned and is striving to remove the causes of this concern through its civil rights legislation.”¹⁰²

The carefully-worded message from the Prime Minister sparked an editorial in Quebec City’s *Chronicle-Telegraph* that pointed out the similarity between Pearson’s muzzled comments on the United States and what the editors felt had become the pattern for Canada’s international relations: both were weak. “It [Canada] has squandered away the chance of being a real moderating influence simply because it has been too scared to speak up.” The piece admitted that because Canada had “size without real strength and dependence upon our neighbour” the country was forced into postures that are liable to be misunderstood abroad.” However, they closed the editorial by stating that even if muzzled, Pearson still felt confident enough to highlight and comment on what was obviously such a sensitive topic for the American government: “One hopes that this is the beginning of a new attitude in Ottawa and a new era of genuine independence.”¹⁰³ Two years and many Southeast Asian casualties later, the government would still not be ready for that independence, but many more Canadian newspapers would.

¹ Gerald Horne, *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s*. (Charlottesville and London, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1995), p.3.

² *Ibid.*, p.82.

³ Paul Bullock, “Watts: The Aftermath” in Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines eds. “*Takin’ it to the streets: A Sixties Reader*.” (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.143

⁴ Gerald Horne, *op. cit.*, p.282.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.41

⁶ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, March 13, 1965, p.4.

⁷ *Dartmouth Free Press*, August 26, 1965.

⁸ *Ottawa Journal*, March 21, 1965.

⁹ Walter Stewart in Hugh R Innis, ed. *Americanization*. (Toronto, New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972), p.86.

¹⁰ The sequence of events offered in this paragraphs comes from Cohen, Jerry and William S. Murphy. *Burn, Baby, Burn! The Los Angeles Race Riot, August 1965*. (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 23-63.

¹¹ Bennett Jr., Lerone. *Before the Mayflower: A History of Black America*. Sixth Edition. (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p.419.

¹² Horne, op. cit., p.41.

¹³ Patterson, James T., *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.587, Horne, op. cit., p.282, Howard Schuman, Charlottee Steech, Lawrence Bobo and Maria Krysan, *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.28-35, Harvard Sitkoff, *The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1980*. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), p.205-206.

¹⁴ Rhoda Lois Blumberg, *Civil Rights: The 1960s Freedom Struggle*. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984) pp. 143-149, Sitkoff, op. cit., p.200-203. The nomenclature "long hot summer" is also a reference to the temperature; In the case of Watts, which had already seen three days of very humid 36° weather, temperatures would remain between 32° and 34° for the duration of the riot, never dipping below 23°, even in the middle of the night. Typically, the urban riots coincided with a substantial heat wave, a fact that would hardly go unnoticed in the plethora of psychological explanations that followed.

¹⁵ Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin, "Multiculturalisme et Marginalisation à Los Angeles: De Watts (1965) à South Central (1992)," *Vingtième Siècle*, Vol. 40, 1993, p.23-31.

¹⁶ Patterson op. cit., pp. 588-590 and 663-665.

¹⁷ Statistic given in Cohen and Murphy, op. cit., p.317.

¹⁸ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Liberalism and Its Challengers: From F.D.R. to Bush*. Second Edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.262.

¹⁹ Blumberg also notes that Black rioting was added to a host of other new expressions against Black oppression, such as Black student protests, black protests in prisons and in the U.S. armed forces, a Black caucus movement in professional organizations, and a rise in Blacks seeking political office. Blumberg, op. cit., pp.148-149.

²⁰ Sitkoff, op. cit., pp.205-206.

²¹ Paula Johnson, David O. Sears, and John D. McConahay, "Black Invisibility, the Press, and the Los Angeles Riot," *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 6, No.4 (1971), p.716-717. Indeed, the authors suggest that press coverage of Black activities was actually *decreasing* in the years leading up to Watts.

²² For example, Antoine Coppolani, "Hubris et Nemesis? Politique Sociale et Émeute Raciales: Watts, 1965," *Vingtième Siècle*, 77, janvier-mars 2003, p.19-31.

²³ Schuman et. al., pp.32-33.

²⁴ Quotes taken from John Herd Thompson and Stephen Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*. p.245. Similar allusions, while often brief ones, are made in J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), Richard Gwyn, *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), several authors in Ian Lumsden, ed. *Close the 49th Parallel, Etc.*, (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1971), and Hugh R. Innis, *Americanization*. (Issues for the seventies) (Toronto, New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972).

²⁵ Althea Prince, *Being Black: Essay by Althea Prince*. (Toronto: Insomniac Press, 2001), pp.27-38, and Ken Alexander and Avis Glaze, *Towards Freedom: The African-Canadian Experience*. (Toronto: Umbrella Press, 1996) pp.192-201. According to authors Alexander and Glaze, Black groups fighting for Civil Rights in Canada had actually begun to make headway in the 1950s by adopting a tactic American Reverend Jess Jackson would later dub "rainbow coalitions," that is, forming alliances with other persecuted populations.

²⁶ Doug Owsam, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996, p.170.

²⁷ J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism*. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1996), p.180.

²⁸ I wanted to address, for example, the possibility that because it was a "riot" a paper's coverage of Civil Rights might construct itself out of distaste for violence rather than as a commentary on the rights of Blacks in the United States.

²⁹ See Bennett Jr., op. cit. pp. 413-414, Blumberg, op. cit., pp. 111-116 and Sitkoff, op. cit., pp. 198-209 for more specific details of the events surrounding Selma.

³⁰ *Ottawa Citizen*, March 27, 1965, p.6.

³¹ *Ottawa Citizen*, March 16, 1965, p.6.

³² *Diocesan Times*, April 1965, p.8.

³³ *Ottawa Citizen*, March 16, 1965, p.6.

³⁴ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, March 17, p.1. There was at least one lengthy case of discrimination charges launched at an area school board for failing to hire a teacher because she was black. The story consisted of several articles containing statements from the victim and the school board, as well as community members.

³⁵ *Dalhousie Gazette*, March 19, 1965.

³⁶ In my own prose, I have elected to use the term "Black" when discussing Canadians of African origin. My choice of this term, rather than the more recently conceived "Afro-American", is a decision made to suggest possible parallels between Americans of African descent and Canadians of African descent, many of whom would not consider themselves "African-American".

³⁷ *Dartmouth Free Press*, March 11, 1965, p.4.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ *Ottawa Journal*, March 17, 1965, p.6.

⁴⁰ *B.C. Catholic*, March 18, 1965, pp.1-2.

⁴¹ *Ottawa Citizen*, March 19, 1965, p.6.

⁴² For example, a column in the *Vancouver Province* on March 18 (p.4) suggests that many clergy may have begun heading for the South because it has become fashionable to do so.

⁴³ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, March 23, 1965, p.4.

⁴⁴ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, March 13, 1965, p.4.

⁴⁵ *Le Droit*, March 15, 1965, p.6.

⁴⁶ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, March 13, 1965, p.4.

⁴⁷ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, March 13, 1965, p.4.

⁴⁸ *Le Droit*, March 15, 1965, p.6.

⁴⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, March 24, 1965, p.6.

⁵⁰ *Vancouver Sun*, March 17, 1965, p.4.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² *Vancouver Sun*, April 1, p.4.

⁵³ *Vancouver Province*, March 18, p.4. As a side note, though rather rudely made, the *Province* may have had a point. The student newspaper the *Ubyssy* ran an editorial on March 19 (p.4) asking protestors to "dress for the occasion," not because they should conform, but because it allowed media (like the *Province*) to misrepresent them, and ultimately harm the cause.

⁵⁴ *Vancouver Province*, March 23, 1965, p.4.

⁵⁵ *Almonte Gazette*, March 25, 1965, p.2.

⁵⁶ *Almonte Gazette*, April 1, 1965, p.2.

⁵⁷ *Le Soleil*, March 17, 1965, p.4.

⁵⁸ *Le Soleil*, March 25, 1965, p.4.

⁵⁹ *Vancouver Citizen*, March 24, 1965, p.10.

⁶⁰ *Vancouver Citizen*, April 14, 1965, p.10.

⁶¹ *Vancouver Citizen*, March 31, 1965, p.12.

⁶² *Almonte Gazette*, March 23, 1965, p.4.

⁶³ Bennett Jr., op. cit., pp.411-412.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ O'ram, op. cit., p.170.

⁶⁶ Walter Stewart in Hugh R Innis ed., op. cit., p.86.

⁶⁷ It was actually not so odd that Gregory was there. The comedian had brought national attention to the civil rights movement as an activist in 1963, when he joined a demonstration march in Mississippi.

⁶⁸ I should also note here that there was very little comment from the student newspapers, but this was because the riot occurred in August, a time when, as a general rule, university papers do not publish.

⁶⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, August 16, 1965, p.6.

⁷⁰ *Ottawa Citizen*, August 19, 1965, p.6.

⁷¹ *Ottawa Citizen*, August 26, 1965, p.6.

⁷² *Ottawa Journal*, August 17, 1965, p.6.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, August 17, 1965, p.4.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, August 21, 1965, p.4.

⁷⁷ *Vancouver Province*, March 23, 1965, p.4.

⁷⁸ *La Rotonde*, March 18, 1965, p.3.

⁷⁹ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, August 17, 1965, p.4.

⁸⁰ *Pacific Tribune*, March 10, 1965, p.5.

⁸¹ *Pacific Tribune*, August 20, 1965, p.1.

⁸² *Vancouver Sun*, August 17, 1965, p.4.

⁸³ *Vancouver Sun*, August 23, 1965, p.4.

⁸⁴ *B.C. Catholic*, March 18, 1965, p.4.

⁸⁵ *Dartmouth Free Press*, April 1, p.4.

⁸⁶ All quotes in this paragraph are taken from the *Dartmouth Free Press*, August 26

⁸⁷ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, August 16, 1965, p.1.

⁸⁸ *Le Soleil*, August 18, 1965, p.4.

⁸⁹ *Vancouver Province*, August 17, 1965, p.4.

⁹⁰ *Diocesan Times*, April 1965, p.5.

⁹¹ *Diocesan Times*, April 1965, p.4.

⁹² *Diocesan Times*, April 1965, p.5.

⁹³ *B.C. Catholic*, March 18, 1965, p.4.

⁹⁴ *Jewish Western Bulletin*, March 26, 1965, p.1.

⁹⁵ *B.C. Catholic*, March 25, 1965, p.7.

⁹⁶ *Jewish Western Bulletin*, March 19, 1965, p.2.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *B.C. Catholic*, August 19, 1965, p.1.

⁹⁹ *B.C. Catholic*, August 26, 1965, p.9.

¹⁰⁰ A few cartoons originated in papers that featured exceedingly little coverage of Watts, so little that no informed determination of their appraisal on of the Rioters could be attempted.

¹⁰¹ "Santo Domingo" refers to the American incursion into the Dominican Republic during the spring of 1965. Continuing a long history of intervention in the Republic's political environment, U.S. troops, eventually backed up by a contingent of soldiers from the Organization of American States, landed on the island in the attempt to protect American citizens and promote a ceasefire between two factions involved in a virtual civil war battling in the country's capital, Santo Domingo. As of May, 1965, there were 14,000 American soldiers on the island, and 38 American warships off of its coast.

¹⁰² *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, March 15, 1965, p.1.

¹⁰³ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, March 15, 1965, p.4.

CHAPTER 4

The “Gordonian Knot”: A Call for Change in the Can-Am Relationship

“For all of its anxiety to contribute to the ending of the [Vietnam] conflict, the Canadian government until now has never questioned the morality of the United States government. That is why it must clarify its reaction to the shattering statement made by a man of Gordon’s rank.”

- *Vancouver Sun*, May 16, 1967

Denis Smith’s authorized biography of Walter Gordon, *Gentle Patriot*, focuses on the rapid deterioration of Gordon’s personal friendship with Prime Minister Lester Pearson. One of the final episodes came in May 1967, when Gordon gave a speech that directly criticized American military involvement in Vietnam, demanded for a withdrawal of American troops, and called on Canada to persuade the American government to do so.

Gordon’s speech went well beyond the position of Canada’s Liberal government, which hoped to convince Americans to end the war through “quiet diplomacy” through the framework of a Canada-U.S. Cold War “partnership,” built upon Canada’s political support for U.S. military action. Some of the newspaper discussion of Gordon’s speech centered on his breach of cabinet solidarity; a minister was not, by parliamentary tradition, supposed to contradict a policy that cabinet had already decided. A substantial number of Canadian newspapers, however, concentrated on the content of Gordon’s speech rather than on its implications for Parliamentary democracy. For these newspapers, Gordon’s speech offered an occasion to link the increasingly vocal objection to America’s war in Vietnam with the swelling public call for increased Canadian political,

economic, and social independence from the United States. The conversation engendered by Gordon's speech allowed an explosion of commentary from an expanding segment of the public that had tired of the Liberal government's unwillingness to distinguish itself from the United States on the world stage. In this way, the discussion surrounding Gordon's speech symbolized a more general shift in the boundaries of many newspapers' conception of where the Canadian relationship with the United States was, where it should instead be going, and why.

Gordon, Vietnam, and the Linguistic Intergroup Bias

Using the Linguistic Intergroup Bias as an indicator of sentiment in Canadian newspapers, the results suggest the gap between those who expressed a positive image of the United States (considered Americans members of their in-group) and those who expressed negative opinions of the United States (considered them members of their out-group) had grown considerably. Both those who supported the U.S. as well as those who rejected it displayed more extreme positions than they had only five years earlier. One major feature of this growing gap was that there were few newspapers left that were willing to take up the positive extreme.

In the case of reaction to Gordon's speech on the Vietnam conflict, the selection of positive portrayals of American involvement were somewhat hard to come by, and thus limited the number available for analysis. Nonetheless,

balanced comparisons from several different newspapers, with all four cities represented, as well as in both official languages, were completed.

The method, as before, included those instances where “the United States” was spoken of like a person or “Americans” as a monolith, and did not include statements pertaining to “U.S. Policy,” or “the U.S. government,” as such caveats could imply the characterization of only a specific program or a specific institution, rather than opinion on “the United States.” At the most concrete level of the four-point scale, a journalist would simply describe a U.S. action, as in, “Are the Americans going to make arrests...?”¹, scoring a 1. Slightly less concrete would be a phrase such as “M. Ronning a dit que l’arrêt des combats pourrait être accéléré si les Américains acceptaient un désengagement par étapes...”²; this phrase is still descriptive, but presents somewhat less of an objective action (for instance, we can ask what exactly constitutes “acceptance”), and scored a 2. At the abstract end of the scale, an author might describe American actions in a way that was detached from observable behavioural events, but limited to a specific case, as in “It would be a mistake to assume that a heavy majority of Americans do not support the war in Vietnam as a necessary evil.”³ This type of statement scored a 3 - The action of “support” is abstract enough, but it is limited to support of “the war in Vietnam,” and cannot be transferred to opinions of how Americans act in general. “They [Americans] are stubborn by nature”⁴ can, and is an example of the most abstract type of statement in the scale, thus scoring a 4.

As compared to previous cases throughout the decade, the overall difference between the scores of negative articles and of positive ones was large, the former averaging a score of 2.15 and the later 1.94. This indicates the possibility that a turning point had been reached sometime between 1965 and 1967 in terms of Canadian newspaper perceptions of the United States. While the perception of positive American action had not significantly altered, the interpretation of negative American actions leaned towards the concrete more so than at any previous time. This suggests that some Canadian newspapers in 1967 perceived Americans as "other" more often than they had from 1960-1965. Whether this new, and more negative, interpretation of the United States was temporary, or whether it signalled a more stable turning point in Canadian perceptions would remain to be seen.

Conversely, in terms of scoring positive American actions – and although scores were similar to previous intervals – the newspapers that most vocally supported American foreign policy headed in the concrete direction, firming up their view of Americans as "us." We can compare these findings with those from 1962: In 1962, the most noticeable anomaly was the negative content of the *Pacific Tribune*, which not only scored a 1.94 (heading towards the concrete end of the scale) but was the only paper to score under 2.00 in any category at all. By 1967, the picture had changed; both extremes of the debate, whether support for the U.S. and dismissal of Gordon or rejection of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and approval of Gordon's actions, produced scores which were much more concrete. For example, *Le Soleil*, one of the harshest critics of those who

protested against the war – the paper had criticized a Radio-Canada broadcast for being “absolument partiale, remplie de préjugés et hypercritique à l’endroit des Américains dans cette guerre”⁵ - and one of Gordon’s strongest critics (“Or, la déclaration de Gordon ne peut que blesser violemment les Etats-Unis”⁶) expressed positive American actions as firmly concrete, scoring a 1.56.

However, those newspapers which were most outspoken against U.S. involvement in Vietnam (and most supportive of Gordon’s message), such as the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Pacific Tribune*, and the *Dartmouth Free Press*, tended to also view negative American actions as firmly concrete. Providing a potent negative example was the LIB content of a group of negative letters to the editor. What I found was that taken together, the letters in these newspapers, which suggested that “The U.S. again symbolizes a kind of decay by the type of army it has sent to Vietnam”,⁷ and that Canada should have “no complicity in this horrible war,”⁸ scored a 1.7 on their negative views of Americans.⁹

What these results suggest is that the opinions of some Canadian newspapers moved a little further towards the extreme in the years since 1962. Whereas in 1962, those who supported and those who rejected the aims and goals of the United States were not incredibly far apart, the gap between them had grown considerably by 1967. It is also true that by 1967 those supporting the United States were much more adamant that it was, in effect, *just like us*; however, only three such examples remained. *Le Soleil*, the *Vancouver Province*, and Halifax’s *Suburban Mirror* were the only remaining newspapers willing to state that degree of positive identification with the United States.

Indeed, while a substantial majority of newspapers struck some sort of balance in between the two extremes, those speaking out against Americans – and there was a noticeable handful that did – were more convinced than ever that Americans were “not like us.”

This helps us understand the context in which Walter Gordon made his speech. That speech, which was labelled by supporters and detractors alike as anti-American, also interpreted negative actions as *characteristic* of the United States. Analyzed for the concreteness of its negative comment, the speech produced a score of 1.7.

Canada and Vietnam

Given the divisive experience of the Vietnam War in the United States, it is somewhat obvious that the war – “the most corrosive public issue within America in the 1960s” – would also affect that country’s relationship with Canada. Most scholars agree that American involvement in Vietnam presented a challenge to Canadian-American relations in general, and to Canadian foreign policy and Canadian perceptions of the United States in particular. The conflict was one of the greatest strains on the relationship between Ottawa and Washington during the Cold War, and as such it prompted reevaluations of that relationship in most official and non-official circles. In 1967, that strain had reached the breaking point.

In part, the divergence that was taking place was due to the different perspectives with which both partners approached their relationship; mutual

interests (both at home and abroad) did not necessarily mean that both countries prioritized those interests in the same order, something which Canadian politicians and policy-makers were more readily recognizing than their American counterparts.¹⁰ In part, however, the increasing perception of divergence was due to the mounting criticism of the Vietnam War in the U.S. and in Canada; for example, in 1967, students, professors, and activists were starting to mobilize in much more organized and visible ways, literally shouting at President Johnson when he visited Expo '67 in late May.¹¹ In that year, the Vietnam War was making some Canadians "feel their separateness from the U.S... [due to] their consciousness of the Vietnam war, and their desire not to be involved."¹² In many ways, Gordon would become both a lynch-pin and a symbol of rising government discontent as well as rising public discontent over Canada's relationship with the United States.

Debate about the effect of the Vietnam War in Canada has also included consideration of the direct roles played by Canada during the conflict, such as its identity as the 'safe haven' for war resisters, the destination of thousands of draft dodgers during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These political refugees helped to exacerbate evolving trends concerning opinion about the war in Canada and in the United States. Several works have attempted to provide both testimony and commentary on the effect of this unique wave of American immigration.¹³ Some of these new arrivals would bring an intensified level of political anti-war activism to Canada, leading protests in front of American consulates and organizing services and information for future and fellow exiles; others would be content to

leave their old life behind and begin anew in Canada, but would carry with them a bitter disposition towards the U.S. and the American project nonetheless.¹⁴

Perhaps most relevant in terms of its relation to the newspapers explored in this chapter, scholars since the end of the Vietnam conflict have repeatedly criticized Canada for failing to sufficiently challenge the American intervention in Southeast Asia. Emboldened by subsequent evidence which suggests American actions greatly harmed the political development and stability of Southeast Asia, several authors have since criticized both Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau for not taking the necessary political risks to effectively intervene.¹⁵ For his part, Charles Taylor criticized Ottawa's strategy of "Quiet Diplomacy" – a diplomatic strategy which maintained that Canada's influence is contingent upon the muted and infrequent nature of its commentary – as having failed to achieve significant results because in the case of Vietnam, it was simply too timid. As a result, suggests Taylor, Canadian politicians had to be satisfied with a record of "good intentions and limited achievements undermined by bungling and political misjudgment, leaving behind a legacy of futility and guilt."¹⁶ As the evidence explored in this chapter suggests, many Canadian newspapers were already stating as much in 1967.

"Maverick"

Walter Gordon, a prominent Canadian businessman and close personal friend of Lester Pearson, finally moved beyond the backrooms of the Liberal Party organization in 1963, and into the cabinet of the newly-minted Liberal

government, which was, despite being a minority, the first of the Liberal variety in over 7 years. Throughout his career, both before and after his stint in politics, Gordon's driving focus was simple enough: foreign investors, specifically Americans, controlled too much of the Canadian economy. Gordon, who had written two books on the subject by 1966, attempted to push that focus into Liberal policy several times during his tenure as Finance Minister from 1963 to 1965. Having failed to secure enough support, and placing much personal blame on himself for the inability of the Liberals to win a majority in a hastily-called election in 1965, Gordon left cabinet.¹⁷ Gordon however, had become a symbol of the new nationalist left wing of the Liberal party (especially among its younger members), the very political dynamic that would help bring Pierre Trudeau to power a few years later. Given Gordon's sway within the party, Pearson did his best to convince him to remain involved, eventually bringing Gordon back to cabinet in January 1967. After serving for a few months as a Minister Without Portfolio, Gordon became President of the Privy Council on April 4, 1967.¹⁸

On May 13, 1967, at the Sixth Arts and Management Conference of Professional Women in Toronto, Ontario, Gordon spoke out against American involvement in Vietnam. In addition, he emphasized that Canadians, including his own colleagues in government, had to stop the American bombing, or else "must be prepared to share the responsibility of those whose policies and actions are destroying a poor but determined people."¹⁹

Gordon's speech was the logical outcome of two complimentary trends: on the one hand, Gordon's personal negative view on American involvement in

Vietnam, and on the other, a slowly escalating criticism of that involvement which had been building strength within segments of the Canadian government (especially by Pearson himself), and more importantly among the Canadian population.²⁰ In his speech, Gordon outlined four reasons why he felt Canada had to be immediately concerned with the Vietnam War - four "grave dangers." While focusing on separate elements, each of these four "dangers" related to the state of Cold War diplomatic relations in the world, and Canada's role within that global set of alliances. It specifically mentioned, for instance, the possibility that the war in Vietnam might escalate to directly involve Russia or China, creating a larger conflict which Canada would be forced into given their international treaties and obligations.²¹

More than concerns about global political alliances, however, it was Gordon's characterization of the United States that drew so much attention to his speech. "The U.S., for its part," said Gordon, "has become enmeshed in a bloody civil war in Vietnam which cannot be justified on either moral or strategic grounds."²² Gordon, an experienced politician, did at least attempt to soften the fierceness of his speech by expounding the benefits of the bi-lateral relationship and inserting early caveats like, "No Canadian likes to criticize the United States or the policies of its government." Nonetheless, political niceties and lip service did little to dull the ferocity of comments like "it might not be any worse for the Vietnamese to be allowed to fight things out among themselves than it is to be bombed, burned and exterminated by a foreign power."²³

Gordon's speech ignited a symbolic, if short-lived, controversy within the Liberal cabinet, peaking within a couple of days of the speech itself when rumours began circulating that the Prime Minister would ask for Gordon's resignation (an outcome Gordon himself acknowledged as a possibility²⁴). According to Denis Smith, there were five major reasons why this controversy erupted. First, Gordon had defied a government practice, instituted since it had come to power in 1963, that "left the elaboration and conduct of foreign policy" to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Gordon was well aware of this practice, but had always been critical of it. Second, Gordon's speech spoke of Canada's need to share "the responsibility of those whose policies and actions are destroying a poor but determined people," thus crossing an implicit moral boundary on behalf of the Canadian government. Again, government convention had stayed clear of judging the morality of cabinet and cabinet decisions, and again, Gordon was conscious that he was crossing that line.

Third, Gordon's speech specifically implicated two of the government's key figures: "I hope Canadians in all walks of life and in all political parties – including *especially* Mr. Pearson and [Secretary Of State for External Affairs] Mr. Martin – will continue to do everything in their power to press the Americans to stop the bombing." [emphasis mine] Fourth, more than simply criticizing the Canadian government for 'doing nothing' on the Vietnam issue, Gordon's speech disrupted an established cabinet pattern of dealing with this hot issue through quiet diplomacy, and by always preserving cabinet solidarity. Gordon, wholly

unsatisfied with such positions, “disrupted the complacency of Mike Pearson and Paul Martin.” Fifth, and perhaps most deliberate, Gordon’s opinions on how to address American action in Vietnam amounted to “much more” than the Canadian government had ever publicly called for.²⁵

Gordon had made his speech on a Saturday. By Monday, May 15th, editors around the country were already ringing in on his pronouncements. It was also on that Monday when, according to Gordon’s account, Paul Martin began “trying to line up support to have me fired from the cabinet.”²⁶ A special meeting of Cabinet was held on Wednesday, May 17th to discuss the issue. The Prime Minister was heavily critical of Gordon at the meeting, reading a prepared statement on Vietnam that dressed him down. This rebuke was then followed by a scathing attack in the privacy of caucus, which was then, once the meeting was over, broadcast to the public. Given the growing dismay of Pearson with politics (his retirement was expected imminently and jockeying for his succession had already begun) as well as the quick deterioration of both Gordon’s involvement in the government and of the men’s personal relationship, a full-scale war between government factions could have easily been the result.

But as quickly as the whirlwind began, it suddenly subsided; by the end of the cabinet meeting, Pearson – who repeated the government’s position on Vietnam and reminded everyone (read: Gordon) that no minister should speak against such established positions – released a statement to the press that Gordon had accepted to maintain the government line. This acceptance was in

part due to the inclusion in the statement of “a request to the United States ‘as the strongest of the warring parties’ to end the bombing and enter negotiations,” which proved to be a satisfactory addition for Gordon.²⁷

However, according to several authors who have written on the subject, and based on Gordon's own observations, the main reason why the potential for a long and divisive battle was never realized was because the public, expressing itself largely via a letter-writing campaign to Gordon's office, seemed almost overwhelmingly to support his views.²⁸ The major importance of this event, beyond even the impact it had on future Liberal strategy, was that it stood out as clear evidence of the weight and importance of public opinion as one of the shapers of government policy. While not negating the “unwritten rules” which Gordon had clearly broken, the public's acceptance of what he had to say simply trumped such procedural and parliamentary concerns.

Rather than being horrified by the breach of parliamentary tradition, what disturbed many “was the horror of the war in Vietnam.” Thus, “the public responded with relief when someone in a position of seniority protested against it in language everyone could understand.”²⁹ According to Gordon, his office received in excess of twelve hundred letters in the days following the speech, almost all of which were in staunch agreement with the positions and suggestions he outlined in his speech.³⁰ Gordon also made the plausible claim that “[t]his was an extraordinary amount of mail and an extraordinarily high degree of support for any cabinet minister to receive on any single issue.”³¹ Moreover, that figure did not take into account the unknown number of letters of

support for Gordon mailed to Pearson and Martin. Serving as a veritable mouthpiece for frustrated Canadians, Gordon, “an icon to those who wanted to resist the increasing influence exercised by the United States over Canada,”³² had forced the government to finally deal with mounting public pressure to bring about decisive change in Canada’s relationship with the United States.

Gordon’s “Haymaker”

In order to understand coverage of Gordon’s speech in Canadian newspapers, we should consider three specific elements:

- 1) Each newspaper’s perspective on the Vietnam War
- 2) Whether or not each paper agreed or disagreed with Gordon
- 3) The reasons *why* they agreed or disagreed with Gordon

In general, those who were more favourable towards American involvement in Vietnam were unfavourable towards Gordon’s speech. This is not, however, to imply that conversely, there was a direct link between those who opposed the war and those who endorsed Gordon’s views. In almost all cases, the critical factor that determined whether or not a paper that rejected the war would support Gordon stemmed from whether they interpreted his speech primarily as a breach in cabinet solidarity, or if they set aside that aspect and concentrated on his message. In other words, every newspaper that interpreted Gordon’s speech primarily as a breach of cabinet solidarity proceeded to reject his message, regardless of their stance on the war itself.

Most, but certainly not all of the papers reviewed, came out against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. This rejection of America's campaign in Southeast Asia ranged from the lightly disenchanted to the heavily critical. Those on the light end of the scale, such as Quebec City's *L'Action*, pointed out the contradiction of Canada supplying materials for arms while at the same time sitting on the international commission meant to evaluate the conflict³³; others simply found the conflict maddening, such as the *Vancouver Province* who called it "a confused and illogical struggle."³⁴ Those who came out strongly against the Vietnam War, though, pulled no punches, stating that "Canadians can – indeed must – voice their deep concern that the Federal Government seems to be backing this foolish, utterly impossible adventure"³⁵ or that Canadians, when they get the chance, must "add their voices to the millions in the U.S. and around the world to demand an end to the cruel, unjust, and immoral war waged by the U.S. in Vietnam."³⁶ Added to such revulsion was the perceived danger which the American presence in Vietnam could lead to, namely, the possible creation of a virtually permanent state of war with China; according to several newspapers, the fear was that this could potentially make a Cold War thaw impossible, which in turn could cause an ideological break in the Atlantic coalition and collective security in the West.³⁷

Offering a different perspective on the war, Quebec City's *Le Soleil* and Halifax's *Suburban Mirror* greatly favoured American involvement in Vietnam. Indeed no view of the conflict could have been more favourable towards the U.S.

than *Le Soleil*, which blamed North Vietnam unilaterally for the diplomatic impasse. “Tant que le gouvernement du Nord-Viêt Nam continuera à interpréter ‘l’agression’ au Viêt Nam dans des termes qui lui seront favorables, il sera difficile d’exiger une réciprocité de compromis indispensable à l’établissement de la négociation... [d]ès lors la voix des armes sera la seule à se faire entendre.”³⁸ In a slightly different take, the *Mirror* suggested that most of the anti-war rhetoric surfacing from high profile peacemakers and “obvious leftists” was not necessarily because of the information they were getting about the war, but because “knocking the Yanks is the go-go thing to do these days. Anybody who doesn’t is strictly square.”³⁹ This matched *Le Soleil*’s charge that the CBC, especially the broadcast of “Seven Days” had adopted a position “absolument partiale, remplie de préjugés et hypercritique à l’endroit des Américains dans cette guerre.”⁴⁰

At one point, a *Mirror* columnist reminded readers that the communist regime in the Soviet Union had committed a great number of atrocities in the early Cold War, warning the paper’s audience with a quote from Vincent Massey, who once said the definition of a sentimentalist was “one whose heart is so warm it has melted his backbone.”⁴¹ Such recollections of Communist flaws blurred lines and perhaps impeded the willingness of some newspapers to choose a side, leading a handful down the ambivalent path of neither wholly embracing American nor wholly rejecting it.

The *Vancouver Sun* exemplified this position, suggesting, “[d]iligence is the *devil*’s only virtue. This necessitates that forces of peace and

humanitarianism must be equally diligent, lest *wrong* should win by default [emphasis mine].”⁴² For the *Sun*, the time for Canadians to protest loudly against the war had passed, not because the U.S. was necessarily right, but because they were in too deep (and because they were the lesser of two evils when compared to Communism). This attitude that the conflict in Vietnam was simply more complicated than deciding who was right and wrong was reflected in a letter sent to *B.C. Catholic*. Roy Darcus, its author, criticized a columnist who had written that while he objected to the war, he was nonetheless against “allow[ing] aggressors to take over the earth by brute force.”⁴³ Darcus wrote that the conflict was precisely so complicated because it was too difficult to sort out who exactly the “aggressor” was. Moreover, he noted that even objections to the war were increasingly complicated because “pacifists do not condemn the modern Vietnam war, but modern war itself.”⁴⁴ The *Ottawa Journal* problematized matters further by noting that “Americans will rally around their men in battle,” but that this should not be interpreted to mean that “the majority of Americans want [the war] ended at any price.”⁴⁵ The *Citizen* thus reminded their readers that substantial resistance to the war existed in the U.S., but so did a groundswell of support.

Canada’s Batman

By May 13th, most newspapers already had a well-formed opinion as to where they stood in relation to American involvement in Vietnam; enter Gordon’s charges of Americans “enmeshed in a bloody civil war” which “[could not] be justified on either moral or strategic grounds,”⁴⁶ along with his charges of

Canadian complicity in this battle. For most newspapers, the reaction that the speech triggered in the government and its opposition warranted at least a few days' coverage as the lead story. The immediate reaction was best gauged by the *Vancouver Sun*, which in three days offered four variations, two of which faded quickly away and two which remained to frame later opinion

First, there was an immediate pouncing by Tory leader John Diefenbaker, followed by other Conservatives, especially hopeful candidates for the upcoming leadership review, in order to gain some measure of political advantage over the Liberals.⁴⁷ Papers like the *Ottawa Journal* covered leadership hopeful George Hees' call for Gordon to recant or resign,⁴⁸ and similar comments by Davie Fulton, another hopeful, who said Gordon's speech represented "a mischievous, harmful and irresponsible utterance by a man who has shown a proclivity to these tendencies in the past."⁴⁹ Gordon, the "bête noire du cabinet," had stirred the pot yet again, but thankfully Pearson had once again made the peace between him and Sharp.⁵⁰ Most papers also covered the barrage of motions that Diefenbaker presented in the House of Commons over the next few days calling on the government to open a wider debate on the issue of Vietnam.

Second, there was a charge by some of those close to cabinet that Gordon was attempting a "thinly disguised power play to change government policy."⁵¹ The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* bashed Gordon for seeking too much exposure, one of the "quipster and the go-go left wing idealist" who stole the limelight on Parliament Hill from the "unsung heroes", the "more practical-minded ministers and backbench legislators" like Mitchell Sharp and Robert Winters.⁵²

Gordon was "the Batman of the Pearson cabinet. Nobody knows just where and when he's going to strike next."⁵³ Alternately, the *Vancouver Province* took a somewhat more positive spin, suggesting that Gordon, who never supported the cabinet's stand on Vietnam, was trying to mobilize public opinion to achieve change, rather than trying to force change from inside cabinet.⁵⁴

Yet, both the comments by Conservatives jockeying for leadership and, by Liberals accusing Gordon of doing the same, would peter out within a few days. Instead, it would be two other interpretations noted by the *Sun* in those first few days of coverage that would receive the most attention in the weeks following Gordon's speech. These two views would ultimately divided almost all subsequent commentary on the subject. For all the speculation of political manoeuvring, it would instead be Canadian newspapers' understanding of Gordon's speech which would frame the rest of the discourse on this subject. A newspaper's future opinion would thus depend on whether they perceived Gordon's speech primarily as a breach of cabinet solidarity, or else as a cry for a fundamental shift in Canadian policy towards the U.S., a cry "shared by many in the government, and many of the people in Canada."⁵⁵

All the King's Horses and All the King's Men

The 'system' in Canada is a sound system and it requires the formulation of nation and international policy by consultation of Cabinet members with the Prime Minister and the adoption therefrom of a unified policy which becomes the policy of the Government of the day and the policy of the country itself so long as that Government retains the confidence of the electors.⁵⁶

Although it was the only newspaper to state this understanding explicitly, the interpretation of the principle of Cabinet solidarity presented by the *Almonte*

Gazette was in fact the implicit assumption of the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, the *Ottawa Journal*, *Le Soleil*, and to a great extent, the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* and *L'Action*. "Can a Minister flourish his own views in public if they differ with those of the government of which he is a member? If he can, then our system of government responsibility is in for a severe test" wrote the *Ottawa Journal*.⁵⁷ Seizing the opportunity to attack Gordon by highlighting his record of publicly contradicting positions (he was said to have done this at least twice before⁵⁸), these newspapers pronounced Gordon's disrespect for the established protocol of parliamentary democracy as the greatest evil of his actions. None of these newspapers had come out sharply against American action in Vietnam in the days before Gordon's speech.

It was from this perspective that Gordon was painted as a "Maverick", a "loose cannon" who had always spoken his mind regardless of the consequences, constantly giving Liberal ministers "jitters" because they could never know what he would do next. "[L]e silence et la politique... tranquille, ça n'est pas pour Walter Gordon!"⁵⁹ More than simply flaunting convention, these newspapers vocalized the fear that such remarks, despite Gordon's assurances that they were made as a "private citizen," would leave the international community (and especially the United States) questioning Canadian resolve on the Vietnam question. "En plus de susciter une crise à l'intérieur du cabinet Pearson, il a risqué de causer un tort irréparable à tout le Canada... Or, la déclaration de Gordon ne peut que blesser violemment les Etats-Unis. Somme toute, le ministre a fait un tort irréparable à la cause de la paix elle-même."⁶⁰ In

addition, Gordon's comments were said to be undermining Pearson's push for a U.S. bombing halt, which prompted *Le Soleil* to warn that such a tactic "pourrait prendre aux yeux d'Hanoi la signification d'un aveu de faiblesse et accroître son intransigeance en vue d'emporter tout le morceau."⁶¹

To several of these newspapers, the solution was simple: if Gordon wished to publicly criticize government policy, he should quit cabinet and become a backbencher. "Individual Cabinet members, who as a matter of principle feel that they cannot go along with general Cabinet policy, have recourse to an alternative – they can resign as ministers. Therein lies Mr. Gordon's course"⁶² wrote the *Almonte Gazette*. "Rather than changing the 'system' to suit Mr. Gordon, we respectfully submit that Prime Minister Pearson might find it more profitable all around to "change" Mr. Gordon."⁶³

That being said, the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* asserted on May 19 that Gordon's breach was not the end of the story, but the beginning. "Officially, the Gordon incident is closed. But the mere fact that a cabinet minister felt impelled to contradict publicly government policy raises some interesting speculation."⁶⁴ Why would such a tactic be taken? "According to the prime minister, this country's policy on Vietnam has been made clear to cabinet. Yet it is apparent that it is only clear in the minds of Mr. Pearson and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin."⁶⁵ It is on this path that we discover one of the fundamental undercurrents of the Gordon event: Walter Gordon may have broken with his party's official policy on Vietnam, but the truth was many Canadian newspapers

did not understand that policy, did not agree with it, or were simply unsatisfied of where it left Canada in relation to the United States.

If Canadians were confused by the government's policy on Vietnam, it was, according to some newspapers, understandable. The editorial board at the *Quebec Chronicle-Herald* explained that Pearson's vague, if not "cryptic," definition of Canada's Vietnam policy was a political necessity, given Canada's ties (economic and military) to the United States. "Politically, Mr. Pearson is wise to take this course. One can hardly see what other course he can take unless he is prepared to jeopardize international relations."⁶⁶ What this produced was a stance to "[neither] publicly condemn nor publicly proclaim"⁶⁷ American involvement in Vietnam, and instead to offer "general support for the American position while deploring escalation."⁶⁸

This was the essence of quiet diplomacy; the problem was many Canadian newspapers were beginning to doubt its effectiveness. "In the Throne Speech debate the other day, Prime Minister Pearson defended quiet diplomacy. But it has obviously failed to bring peace," wrote the *Ottawa Citizen*. The Canadian position of trying to get the U.S. to stop "has been stated publicly, and presumably even more forthrightly in private discussions...Yet it seems to have had no effect. Nor has it swayed Hanoi." Thus, "[i]nstead of simply expressing its concern perhaps the time has come to deplore openly the actions of both sides."⁶⁹ Indeed, rather than concluding as did *Le Soleil* that Hanoi would interpret Gordon's differences of opinion as a sign of weak commitment to the war, *L'Action* concluded that it was Canada's ambiguous and timid position which

had caused all of its peace proposals to be rejected by Hanoi in the first place. According to *L'Action*, this problem of timidity had gotten so bad that Martin, Canada's spokesman on international affairs, simply refused to openly comment on Vietnam anymore. "Cela est inconcevable; en effet, à une époque où le principal problème international est celui du Viêtnam, notre ministre des Affaires extérieures ne parle même pas de l'attitude du Canada devant ce problème dans un discours sur les nouvelles dimensions de la politique étrangère du pays."⁷⁰

Thus, concluded papers like the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Dartmouth Free Press*, the *Pacific Tribune*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Vancouver Citizen*, a new point of view was needed. One letter to the editor read, "Since Canada's "quiet diplomacy" has so obviously been a "quiet failure" the time has come for plain speech such as Mr. Gordon's. President Johnson's escalator is carrying mankind towards eternity and Canada must now quite plainly and clearly add its voice to those who say "Stop!"⁷¹ The *Ottawa Citizen* added, "The whole argument for quiet diplomacy rests on the premise that it is more likely to get results than any noisy posturing. When that premise proves faulty in any given international case, the argument is undermined."⁷²

At its centre, Gordon's speech touched a nerve with many Canadian newspapers because it broke through all of the diplomatic barriers and highlighted a growing frustration. From this point of view, in all its attempts to "carefully refrain[...] from branding the U.S. as the troublemaker" Canada's official stand had become "splendidly and forthrightly ambiguous."⁷³ This frustration most strongly expressed itself in letters to the editor: a reverend, also

a historian at Carleton University wrote, "From the moral standpoint one of the most disturbing elements in the Vietnamese war is the loss of American self-respect... We will share in this shame... as a nation, we do little to check the drift of the American nation into moral self-destruction."⁷⁴ A letter by C.P. Valentine read, "There are undoubtedly very many of us who are opposed to the U.S. attacks on the people of Vietnam and who are unhappy that our Canadian government has not taken a clearer stand of opposition to this U.S. war."⁷⁵ Likewise, many letters praised Gordon's words. "No thinking man could possibly deny the truth of his statements"⁷⁶; "...Walter Gordon... is one of the few Canadians in public life who has the courage to speak out plainly and truthfully about the American-made mess in Vietnam."⁷⁷

For these newspapers, "Walter Gordon has pushed Canada's Humpty-Dumpty off the wall. But it remains to be seen who will be hurt by the fall – Humpty-Dumpty or Mr. Gordon." Moreover, "[e]verybody who has been wondering just what this government's attitude is towards a conflict in which a powerful neighbour appears to be inextricably involved will applaud Mr. Gordon. He said things that should have been said long ago but could not be said for one reason or another."⁷⁸

Love Letters

The *Ottawa Citizen* summed up Gordon's impact thus: "[t]hose who would crucify Mr. Gordon are attaching far more significance to the maintenance of cabinet solidarity and diplomatic protocol than to the prime problem of existence".

Judgments of belief, of war or peace are everybody's business."⁷⁹ This essential split, the public battle between those who supported the American war and those who rejected it, played out noticeably in the letters of each newspaper. As was usually the case, all newspapers would regularly include those written from the opposite point of view.

In this popular battle, no newspaper allowed more even-handed coverage than the *Vancouver Province*, which, around the same time as the Gordon incident, was dealing with an intense local manifestation of the Vietnam debate. As was common in 1967, local community and church groups were doing their best to raise money to send to the civilian victims of the war, both those in South Vietnam where U.S. troops were stationed as well as those in North Vietnam. A recent broadcast of a drive to raise money for medical supplies had featured a plea to the public by Mrs. Burns-Miller and Father Roberts which was then swiftly and publicly countered by Vancouver Mayor Tom Campbell, who denounced any efforts to pour money into North Vietnam. Reader reaction was both vivacious and divided. One reader charged Campbell with "immaturity, rudeness, inhumanity, and bad manners," while another condemned his "disgraceful exhibition" and chastised his inability to see such fund-raisers as anything but communists. Several others, on the other hand, praised the Mayor.

Thank you Mr. Campbell. As the representative of Vancouver's citizens we wish to congratulate His Worship Mayor Campbell on his dignified and orderly handling of the interview on the 7 O'Clock Show. We regret he was exposed to the hysteria and bad taste of those interviews [with Mrs. Burns-Miller's and Father Roberts]... Viewers are not interested in ill-mannered publicity-mongering.⁸⁰

Letters on Vietnam were often emotionally charged and belayed the bubbling undercurrents of the issue. Those against the war were unabashed –

"Our government must dissociate itself completely from [American] policies of disaster, and must make absolutely certain that Canadians serving in Vietnam on the International Control Commission are absolutely trustworthy and loyal to the world community."⁸¹ Moreover, it seemed that following Gordon's speech, these Canadians could tie in his views with their own:

I think [Gordon] speaks for a large segment of descent-minded people of this country who will have to sacrifice their sons to war through the blind support of U.S. aggression by men who should know better. Our country right or wrong is drummed into the people by hatchet men who are afraid to express their own opinions, even when they know what the U.S. is doing is unpopular.⁸²

Those in favour of U.S. intervention were no less dramatic: two letters in the *Vancouver Province* expressed support for American involvement because "the alternative to war is worse than the war itself", ⁸³ and criticized Gordon because it seemed the Privy Councilor would "rather be Red than Dead."⁸⁴

Still, the *Ottawa Journal*, which supported the U.S. position, printed at least two letters opposing that view, one which suggested that it was "Canada's duty to the world in the role of peacemaker" to help stop the war and added, "[w]e should not be afraid of offending a regime which is so ruthless that even the prospect of a dreaded nuclear war does not deter it." The other asked flat out, "[w]hat is [American President Lyndon] Johnson trying to prove?"⁸⁵

At the other end of the spectrum, *The Ubysey*, which had wholly rejected American involvement in Vietnam, nonetheless published a letter from Pete Conway and Lorne Dunn that read, "There are probably many students on campus who would like to be sympathetic to your [anti-war] cause. Unfortunately, it would seem that to support your cause one must be prepared to

join the ranks of Hungarian peasants who leap from second-storey windows with strait-jackets on."⁸⁶

A Unique Space for Debate

The letter from Conway and Dunn serves as a contradiction to the prevalent coverage in another way: to a remarkable degree, the university press, as well as the religious press, offered a forum for frankness and clarity, but also fostered open discussion and debate in a way that allowed some of the most creative considerations of what Vietnam meant for Canadians and their relationship with the United States. All the university papers carried ads for rallies for and against (mostly against) the Vietnam War, while each paper in the religious press ran posters for local discussions and debates open to the public. The *B.C. Catholic*, for instance, ran a story about an upcoming public discussion whose organizer described it as a way "to allow people to find out what is happening in the world and what Canada's position is on many of these things."⁸⁷

More than simply rejecting the war, which papers like *The Fulcrum* did emphatically ("The war machine of the most powerful nation in the world is in action against the Vietnamese people's struggle for self-determination"⁸⁸), the latitude afforded to creativity produced some of the most intense, but also the most insightful views of the conflict. Reprinting a poem from an American professor, students at the University of Ottawa in April read the following:

Only a pacifist, saint or fool
Believes in stuff like the Golden Rule...
You know the answer – you know it well -
"This is a war and war is hell!"

...
 It's time to consider the Human Race
 And see ourselves in the other man's place.⁸⁹

What is remarkable about this work is the last line, "And see ourselves in the other man's place." Not only did this mirror a similar drive to "humanize" the "enemy" in *La Rotonde*, the university's French-language newspaper, but it echoed the opinions of politicians 30 years hence, who suggested that the Americans' fatal flaw in Vietnam was the inability of ever identifying with the struggle of the Vietnamese, who saw the war as a struggle of liberation.⁹⁰ *La Rotonde's* article entitled "Si tu étais né là-bas"⁹¹ prompted the reader to ask themselves what they would do had they been born into the situation of the North Vietnamese.

The moral dimension of the conflict – as noted in one of the most quoted phrases of Gordon's speech, "The U.S., for its part, has become enmeshed in a bloody civil war in Vietnam which cannot be justified on either moral or strategic grounds" – was also of great importance to the religious press.⁹² Canadian church publications, as part of the debate on the centrality of morality in the war, offered up a number of statements, some of which supported Pearson's viewpoint and some of which supported Gordon's. On the one hand, a well-publicized comment by a United Church minister had him calling Pearson "a puppy dog on President Johnson's leash," and pronouncing that Canadians "can't be on the side of the Americans who are bombing the hell out of those poor people."⁹³ At the same time, however, the *Ottawa Journal* reported that the United Church had passed a resolution which "Supports Gov't on Vietnam,"

expressing a desire to back up the Prime Minister's stance on preventing further escalation.⁹⁴

These conflicting opinions could co-exist within some churches because, at least in the case of the United Church, not only was the moral debate explored, but so was the debate over the issue of institutional solidarity. While it was true that the United Church of Canada voted to press the Canadian government not to send troops to Vietnam and to oppose further escalation of the conflict, some ministers rejected that position, and expressed their outrage at the war. When pressed as to how this difference in opinion was possible, one minister responded, "there is no rule of 'cabinet solidarity' in the United Church."⁹⁵

What the university papers, as well as the religious papers and the coverage of religious institutions helped reveal, was that many Canadian newspapers and their readers were unsatisfied with the constraints of their government's official position, one which adhered to an increasingly obsolete prism of Cold War North American diplomacy, and was unable to express the varieties of opinion which they held about Americans. In the wake of his speech, the *Dartmouth Free Press* interpreted Gordon as expressing the view, "that Canada's foreign posture must begin to reflect the reality of our – and humanity's – self interest, and not merely the inertia of perpetuating a policy because it is less trouble to do so than to launch new initiatives."⁹⁶

A Familiar Cast of Characters

Given that the Gordon incident receded from active discussion among Canadian politicians in only a few short days, the fact that seven of the ten newspapers which featured cartoons commenting on the Vietnam War also included at least one cartoon (and in many cases several cartoons) dealing with Gordon's speech reinforces the strong degree of newspaper interest in the story. Coupled with a series of anti-Johnson and anti-Vietnam war (if not increasingly anti-American) cartoons, the elevated interest in a discussion around the United States' relationship to Canada was evident. Moreover, although humorous, there was a negative underlying tone to all of the commentary on Vietnam, and among representations of the United States.


More often than not, the newspapers' cartoons echoed the positions explored in their textual content. The *Vancouver Sun*, for instance, which agreed with Gordon's message but not with his breach of cabinet solidarity, ran a cartoon portraying Gordon as beginning his speech "[s]peaking as an ordinary Canadian..." while standing in front of a door which clearly reads *The Privy Council – Government of Canada – Honourable Walter Gordon President* [Fig. 5-1].



5-1

This implication that Gordon could not speak as an “ordinary Canadian” because he was not one was compounded by the presence of a bust of Lester Pearson just behind him, and a plaque on the wall which reads *Honourable Walter Gordon, Member of Her Majesty's Cabinet*. As an extra shot at Gordon's motives, he is speaking directly to a group from the media.

The *Ottawa Citizen*, which had been a strong supporter of Gordon's suggestions, featured a cartoon soon after he had “reconciled” with the Liberals in which Gordon was being reluctantly pushed by Paul Martin and other Liberal cabinet ministers to participate in a group sing-a-long of “solidarity forever” [Fig. 5-2]. Tellingly, Pearson, who is the smallest character in the frame, is not participating in forcing Gordon's hand, though he is singing along with the rest of the Liberals.



5-2

This apparent weak portrayal of Pearson in relation to his cabinet is again exhibited in a reprint of a Duncan Macpherson cartoon [Fig. 5-3], and is extended to his dealings with the United States. In this cartoon, Pearson is unsure of how to deal with President Johnson, who is waiting on the telephone; instead, he must act as a mediator between Johnson, Gordon (represented by the copy of his speech sitting next to the phone) and Paul Martin.



5-3

Rather than presenting Paul Martin as a source of progressive ideas, however, an earlier cartoon instead paints him as a superfluous figure in the

Vietnam saga. In this cartoon [Fig. 5-4], Martin explains to UN Secretary General U Thant that he is fully aware that the Vietnam peace process has become stalled. This is represented by a broken-down automobile and a (peace) dove that, sitting as a hood ornament, has literally been shot and is in its death throws.




5-4

Martin proceeds to explain to U Thant that Canada's latest set of peace proposals "may not do it, but it keeps us [Canada] busy." When coupled with a pair of exceedingly dark cartoons [Fig. 5-5 and Fig. 5-6] which depict a U.S. President who is not only attempting to brainwash his dissenting public, but is at heart a mere puppet of the American military, the interpretation becomes clear: the conflict in Vietnam, was proceeding unimpeded by anyone in either the American or the Canadian government.



5-5




General Westmoreland comes to Washington

5-6

The general cynicism towards both the war and the Canadian government's unwillingness to adequately address the problem was also reflected in two cartoons appearing in *L'Action*. The first, a commentary on the progress of the peace process, featured a wounded dove which the reader is to surmise has recently returned from attempting to foster peace in Vietnam. The bird councils another dove, itself about to attempt the same mission of bringing "la paix", and recommends that he not bother; in Vietnam, "personne ne comprend le sens du mot." [Fig. 5-7] The second *L'Action* cartoon perhaps best represents the frustrations and opinions of many Canadian newspapers concerning how their government was handling Canada's involvement in the war. [Fig. 5-8] In the cartoon, a group of journalists asks the Prime Minister a direct question, "Le Canada prendra-t-il position, au sujet de la guerre au Viêt Nam?"



5-7



5-8

The asking of that question in this cartoon, which was printed almost two weeks after Gordon made his speech, suggests that the cartoonist believed Pearson had not yet done so, at least not explicitly enough to avoid the question being asked. The PM's response reflects the cynical, if not disappointed view of many Canadian newspapers. "Quelle guerre?" answers Pearson.

Naturally, this view did not go uncontested. The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, which had gone some lengths to explain and support Pearson's stance on Vietnam by pragmatically recognizing Canada's political and economic relationship to the United States, presented a cartoon in which Canada was


depicted as occupying a critical position in the international community [Fig. 5-9]. Perched in a tree labeled "Vietnam," a Canadian soldier, proudly identified as so with at least two markers, guards a benevolent bird and her helpless chicks from a ravenous black vulture who is literally salivating at the chance to consume the birds. The Canadian soldier, whose facial expression is one of courage and ferocity, is suitably assigned and equipped to help keep this predator, presumably the ugliness of war itself, at bay.



5-9

In another example, *Le Soleil*, a strong supporter of the American position in Vietnam, featured a cartoon in which Walter Gordon emerges from a basement through a window, as if uncomfortably and perhaps forcibly hidden, while a helicopter carrying President Johnson departs [Fig. 5-10]. While Gordon must become, perhaps symbolically, a quasi-contortionist in order to emerge from the 'tight situation' in which he was placed, Pearson smiles and waves a

very comfortable and friendly goodbye to Johnson while he allows Gordon to emerge from his hiding place.




5-10

The *Ottawa Journal*, which supported the status quo of Ottawa's "quiet diplomacy" approach, offered a cartoon in which a sudden deterioration of Canadian-American relations, represented by a wrecked airplane falling from the sky, was the direct result of Walter Gordon's attacks [Fig. 5-11]. While the U.S., represented by an eagle, is not presented as munificent (the eagle carries a bomb in its talons), it is clearly Gordon's fault that Pearson and Canadian-American relations are now in peril. The *Journal* did not let Pearson completely off the hook, however; in a cartoon which followed soon afterwards, Pearson, who is presenting himself to Johnson as an "expert" on peace-keeping, is flanked by a violent mob of protesters demanding "Action! Not Talk," and who are in the midst of breaking his window and about to overrun his Mountie security [Fig 5-12].



5-11



5-12


In this *Ottawa Citizen* cartoon, Johnson is portrayed as exceedingly passive, and almost benign, a portrayal that could only appear in a newspaper which took a pro-American stance. By contrast, all six of the cartoons commenting on Vietnam which appeared in the *Pacific Tribune* chose Johnson as their subject, and while he was twice portrayed as a tragic figure, he was much more often presented as a reckless cowboy [Fig. 5-13] who played games with the future of the world [Fig. 5-14].



ROUGH GOING!

Z. BOYD [in Dissent!]


5-13



5-14


As in the text, the newspaper which had presented views as extreme as, "The difference between Hitler's ovens and the U.S. is that the U.S. cremates men,

women and children from the air with flaming gasoline"⁹⁷ also compared Johnson's program for the Vietnam War to Mussolini's program for 1930s Italy [Fig. 5-15].



5-15

More commonly among Canadian newspapers, however, the Vietnamese conflict was referred to via images of failed or injured doves (indicating a distinct lack of peace), and Pearson was characterized as a somewhat uninspiring figure. In addition, a handful of newspapers featured cartoons that highlighted a growing preoccupation with an American "invasion." A select group of images suggested that Walter Gordon, perhaps more hysterically than prophetically, was attempting to warn Canadians of the increased and menacing presence of Americans on Canadian soil [Fig. 5-16 and Fig. 5-17]. While Gordon in all cases is the only one panicking, the viewer is left unsure of whether his excitement is solely humorous. In the background of one, Parliament is clearly on fire, while in the other, Americans are indeed sneaking more investment capital into Canada. At the very least, the mere presence of these cartoons, which carry a tone of impending danger not often expressed throughout the decade, suggest a growing prominence of this fear in the public mind.




5-16



5-17

Perhaps the shifting trends were best represented by a cartoon appearing in the *Ottawa Journal* which took as its setting the year's seminal event, Expo '67 [Fig. 5-18]. In the image, a vendor is selling signs, balloons, and other assorted paraphernalia to tourists entering the Expo site. Having put aside (?) his "Russky Go Home" signs and his Canadian-American combination flags, the vendor now sells "Yankee Go Home" and "Boycott Vietnam" signs. While the image offers no

certain conclusions, the presence of so many different signs, coupled with balloons reading "Vote F.L.Q." suggests at the very least that times have become immensely more complicated.



5-18

Chapter Conclusion – The State of Canadian Newspaper Opinion

In the first few days following Gordon's speech, much of the debate concentrated on his explicit contradiction of the conventions of parliamentary democracy. Gordon, the "Maverick" of the Liberal party had done it again. While the Prime Minister had stated views very closely aligned with Gordon several times before, and had pressed the Americans towards similar goals, he had done so in private, not in public contravention of established party policy.⁹⁸

Newspapers that had already come out against American intervention in Vietnam immediately praised Gordon's words (with the exception of the *Almonte Gazette*), while those which had expressed support for the American initiative condemned

him. Many of the newspapers that espoused a softer criticism of the war (that is, the position of a conflict under review) found themselves at first focusing on cabinet solidarity. However, as the crisis passed, and as it became more obvious that large segments of the public (as well as a handful of muted voices in the government) agreed with Gordon's message, the content of his speech began to resonate among many Canadian newspapers.

What emerged from this episode was a discussion concerning the degree to which many Canadians had simply become frustrated with their government's position – or more accurately its lack of position – towards American foreign policy. Given that most newspapers in this study revealed a more negative than positive opinion of American involvement and American motives in Vietnam, which stood in contrast to the contemporary policy of the Canadian government, it was likely only a matter of time before this incongruity would have to be addressed.

Therefore, the main legacy of Gordon's speech was that it provided an occasion for Canadian newspapers to engage (and more often express their displeasure) with that incongruity. "Ottawa refuse de prendre position quant au Viêtnam"⁹⁹ wrote *Le Droit*; the *Ottawa Citizen* printed, "[o]n Vietnam: Isn't it time we spoke out?";¹⁰⁰ "On Vietnam: Canada should speak out"¹⁰¹ echoed the *Dartmouth Free Press*. Indeed, the *Pacific Tribune's* call for, "[e]ncouragement of public debate on Vietnam in Canada,"¹⁰² was no longer a fringe cry, as expressed by the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*:

Perhaps the time has come for the government to tell both parliament and the country just where it stands on the Vietnam conflict: a simple and straightforward statement and the reasons for pursuing such a line. This would receive far better public backing than

the spurious attempts now being made to pretend that Canadian policy is clear as crystal.¹⁰³

In his 1970 work *The 49th Paradox*, Richard Gwyn wrote: "In his detached way, Gordon had struck a chord. From 1967 on, nationalists widened the scope of their attacks on foreign ownership... The nationalists added now the accusation that hand in hand with foreign capital came foreign influence, the influence, moreover, of a power turned militarist and imperialist."¹⁰⁴ Gordon had provided a small touchstone for those who rejected America's war in Vietnam and shifting American global aims. A number of university and college professors quickly seized on the momentum and issued public letters to Pearson urging the Canadian government to call for an end to the bombing.¹⁰⁵ Within two weeks of his speech, NDP MP David Lewis introduced a proposal in the House of Commons that was "taken word for word from the admirable speech made on May 13 by the president of the Privy Council."¹⁰⁶ Social Credit leader R  al Cou  tte was also quick to make a public demand that the U.S. follow the example of Russia and China, and leave Vietnam.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, by the end of the month the *Pacific Tribune* was announcing a speaking tour by the leader of the Communist Party of Canada, William Kashtan, the title of which would be: "Canada and Vietnam: Gordon or Martin – Who's Right?"¹⁰⁸

Arguably, Gordon may have even encouraged those who supported the war to shift their understanding of the protest movement against it. As the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* noted, Gordon's speech, "at least convince[d] some people on both sides of the border that not all those who do not support the

senseless killing are commies, peaceniks, and drifters.”¹⁰⁹ “In any case,” added the *Pacific Tribune*, “[Gordon] has now added his voice to that of the peace movements, university faculties, the NDP, the Communist Party, trade union, church and other bodies in the demand that the Government end its bankrupt quiet diplomacy and advance a truly independent position...”¹¹⁰

This growing trend, as it has been explored in this chapter, was also closely associated with the youth movement of the later 1960s. That important connection helps locate this occasion of debate within the larger drama of the Liberal party. The party, “badly torn” on nationalistic questions (with the split exemplified by Gordon and his followers’ economic nationalism on one side, and the status quo enforcers lead by Robert Winters and Mitchell Sharp on the other¹¹¹), was about to embrace the nationalistic impulses that younger Canadians were internalizing, and which in turn would help propel Pierre Trudeau into office for the next decade.

For the time being, the speech’s importance in policy circles was unmistakably influential; above all, according to Smith, “the speech contributed to a moderate stiffening of Canada’s critical posture on the war.”¹¹² Shortly afterwards, the Liberal government in general and Paul Martin specifically would begin to see America’s involvement in Southeast Asia as simply unnecessary and harmful. As Gordon himself pointed out when American Secretary of State Dean Rusk “slapped down” comments made by Paul Martin in June, Rusk had made it abundantly clear that “when it comes to foreign policy, the United States

sees things in blacks and whites; there is nothing between, certainly no place for grey."¹¹³

Gordon's speech, but more importantly the widespread newspaper endorsement of its principles, suggests that many Canadian newspapers had reached their limit. "There is a time for silence and a time for speech. As Mr. Gordon suggested, it is high time Canada spoke."¹¹⁴ Yet another opportunity to speak would arise three years later.

¹ *Vancouver Sun*, April 26, 1967, p.5.

² *L'Action*, April 26, 1967, p.28.

³ *Ottawa Journal*, May 2, 1967, p.6.

⁴ *Vancouver Province*, May 27, 1967, p.4.

⁵ *Le Soleil*, April 17, 1967, p.14.

⁶ *Le Soleil*, May 17, 1967, p.4.

⁷ *Dartmouth Free Press*, May 11, 1967, p.8.

⁸ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 4, 1967, p.1.

⁹ This analysis is instructive, even though there was no equal reservoir of positive letters to compare them to, because it reinforces the findings from the overall LIB scores.

¹⁰ Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies: Canada & the United States, 1963-1968*. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 200), p.111.

¹¹ John H. Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*. 3rd Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), p.236 and J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism*. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1996), p.180

¹² Granatstein, op. cit., pp.190-191.

¹³ Examples of testimonials include Alan Haig-Brown, *Hell No We Won't Go: Vietnam Draft Resisters in Canada*. (Vancouver: Raincoast Books, 1996) and Jim Christy, ed., *The New Refugees: American Voices in Canada*. (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Limited, 1972). For analysis of the arrival of the war resisters, see "The Anti-American Americans," in Granatstein, op. cit. and John Hagan, "Cause and Country: The Politics of Ambivalence and the American Vietnam War Resistance in Canada," *Social Problems*. Vol. 48, No.2 pp.168-184.

¹⁴ Granatstein, op. cit., pp.182-189.

¹⁵ Douglas A. Ross, "'Casualties of war': myth and misperception in the American debate on Vietnam – and why it matters to Canada," *International Journal*. XLIV (Autumn 1989), pp. 899-900. Ross notes that beyond the obvious civilian and military casualties, the political independence of Laos and Cambodia was likely stalled by the American intervention. Moreover, in hindsight, there seemed little for Russia and even China to gain from Vietnamese Communists: "The domino theory was disproved by events, not confirmed."

¹⁶ Charles Taylor, *Snow Job: Canada, the United States, and Vietnam (1954-1973)*. (Toronto: Anansi, 1974) pp.v. See also Ross, op. cit., pp.917-918 and James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. V: Indochina: The Roots of Complicity*. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1983), pp.219-234.

¹⁷ Gordon was the main proponent of calling an election to try and gain enough seats to form a majority.

¹⁸ Denis Smith, *Gentle Patriot: A Political Biography of Walter Gordon*. (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1973), and Stephen Azzi, *Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism*. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999).

¹⁹ Smith, op. cit., p.323.

²⁰ In May of 1966, Gordon published *A Choice for Canada: Independence or Colonial Status*. In it, he imparted that "Canada should not hesitate to express her concern over what is happening in Vietnam." Although this course of action was ultimately in the best interests of the United States, and meant to "aid" the U.S. in retreating from a battle it could not win, Gordon was clear that it had to be said even if the Americans did not want to listen. "This is one of the occasions when Canada should be prepared to risk the displeasure of the United States by speaking out." Walter L. Gordon, *A Choice For Canada: Independence or Colonial Status*. (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966), p.10.

²¹ Azzi, op. cit., p.156.

²² Walter Gordon, *A Political Memoir*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1977), p.366.

²³ Ibid, p.367.

²⁴ Ibid, p.324.

²⁵ All of the points and quotations in this and the preceding paragraph were taken from Smith, op. cit., pp.322-323.

²⁶ Gordon, 1977, p.283.

²⁷ Smith, op. cit., p.324.

²⁸ Granatstein, op. cit., pp.163-164, Donaghy, op. cit., pp.113-117, Smith op. cit, p.324, and Richard Gwyn, *The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), p.71.

²⁹ Gordon, 1977, op. cit., p.284.

³⁰ Stephen Azzi places the number at 1,081, of which "only 19 were unfavourable." Azzi, op. cit., p.157.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Granatstein, op. cit., p.168.

³³ *L'Action*, May 9, 1967, p.4.

³⁴ *Vancouver Province*, May 12, 1967, p.4.

³⁵ *Vancouver Citizen*, June 1, 1967, p.2.

³⁶ *Pacific Tribune*, April 7, 1967, p.1.

³⁷ *Almonte Gazette*, June 1, 1967, p.2.

³⁸ *Le Soleil*, April 20, 1967, p.4.

³⁹ *Suburban Mirror*, 1967, April 6.

⁴⁰ *Le Soleil*, April 17, 1967, p.14.

⁴¹ *Suburban Mirror*, April 20, 1967, p.2.

⁴² *Vancouver Sun*, April 7, 1967, p.5.

⁴³ *B.C. Catholic*, May 4, 1967, p.5.

⁴⁴ *B.C. Catholic*, May 18, 1967, p.5.

⁴⁵ *Ottawa Journal*, May 2, 1967, p.6.

⁴⁶ *A Political Memoir*, op. cit. p.366.

⁴⁷ *Vancouver Sun*, May 15, 1967, pp.1-2.

⁴⁸ *Ottawa Journal*, May 15, 1967, p.20.

⁴⁹ *Ottawa Journal*, May 16, 1967, p.2.

⁵⁰ *L'Action*, May 17, 1967, p.28.

⁵¹ *Vancouver Sun*, May 16, 1967, p.2.

⁵² *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, May 19, 1967, p.1.

⁵³ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, May 22, 1967, p.5. Contrary to some common characterizations of Batman as a hero analogous to Superman or Spiderman, Batman, also known as the "Dark Knight" is more of a vigilante, a man driven by his desire for revenge. Rather than confronting and apprehending criminals because he wishes to make society safer or because of a desire to protect the helpless and innocent, the alter ego behind Batman, Bruce Wayne, seeks to exercise the personal demons he acquired in childhood when his parents were killed by a random thief. Thus, while coming to the aid of those in need, Batman's motives, unknown identity, and pattern of disappearing into the night after his prey have been caught, all create an aura of both mystery and unpredictability which surrounds him.

⁵⁴ *Vancouver Province*, May 17, 1967, p.5.

⁵⁵ *Vancouver Sun*, May 17, 1967, p.1.

⁵⁶ *Almonte Gazette*, May 25, 1967, p.2.

⁵⁷ *Ottawa Journal*, May 16, 1967, p.6.

- ⁵⁸ There are many such articles, with one excellent review featured in the *Ottawa Journal's* story "Walter Gordon- Three Strikes and He's Out?" on May 16, 1967, p.33.
- ⁵⁹ *Le Soleil*, May 18, 1967, p.3.
- ⁶⁰ *Le Soleil*, May 17, p.4.
- ⁶¹ *Le Soleil*, May 27, 1967, p.4.
- ⁶² *Almonte Gazette*, May 25, 1967, p.2.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, May 19, 1967, p.4.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ *Vancouver Sun*, May 11, 1967, p.1.
- ⁶⁸ *Ottawa Journal*, May 18, 1967, p.2.
- ⁶⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, May 12, 1967, p.6.
- ⁷⁰ *L'Action*, May 24, 1967, p.4.
- ⁷¹ *Vancouver Sun*, May 20, 1967, p.5.
- ⁷² *Ottawa Citizen*, May 20, 1967, p.6.
- ⁷³ *Vancouver Province*, May 17, 1967, p.4.
- ⁷⁴ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 17, 1967, p.6.
- ⁷⁵ *Vancouver Citizen*, April 13, 1967, p.6.
- ⁷⁶ *Vancouver Province*, May 25, 1967, p.4.
- ⁷⁷ *Vancouver Sun*, May 19, 1967, p.5.
- ⁷⁸ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, May 16, 1967, p.4.
- ⁷⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, May 18, 1967, p.6.
- ⁸⁰ All quotes in this paragraph were taken from p.4 of the *Vancouver Province* on May 16. The best commentary was probably from a North Vancouver "Viewer" who wrote "Congratulations to Tom Terrific, a meddling priest, and an hysterical woman for giving TV audiences the best show of the year. They're all nuts."
- ⁸¹ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, May 15, 1967, p.4.
- ⁸² *Vancouver Sun*, May 20, 1967, p.5.
- ⁸³ *Vancouver Province*, April 1, 1967, p.6.
- ⁸⁴ *Vancouver Province*, May 25, 1967, p.4.
- ⁸⁵ *Ottawa Journal*, May 17, 1967, p.7.
- ⁸⁶ *The Ubysey*, March 21, 1967, p.4.
- ⁸⁷ *B.C. Catholic*, May 4, 1967, p.5.
- ⁸⁸ *The Fulcrum*, Feb 8, 1967, p.3.
- ⁸⁹ *The Fulcrum*, April 12, 1967, p.2.
- ⁹⁰ Although this stance became part of journalistic comparisons once the United States invaded Iraq in 2002, one of the more dramatic examples of this reflective realization came from Robert McNamara in the documentary *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons From the Life of Robert S. McNamara* (dir. Errol Morris, 95 min., Sony Pictures Classics, 2003, DVD). In the film, McNamara contrasts the actions of the American government during the Cuban Missile Crisis with those of the subsequent regime's decisions in regards to the Vietnam intervention. McNamara states that while the Kennedy administration was able to empathize with Khrushchev's position, especially his need to save face in his own country, the subsequent administrations of Johnson and Nixon were never able to understand that what they faced in Vietnam was more nationalism than communism.
- ⁹¹ *La Rotonde*, April 4, 1967, p.6.
- ⁹² Gordon, 1977, op. cit., 1967, p.366.
- ⁹³ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, May 19, 1967, p.1.
- ⁹⁴ *Ottawa Journal*, May 10, 1967, p.3.
- ⁹⁵ *Ottawa Journal*, May 20, 1967, p.21.
- ⁹⁶ *Dartmouth Free Press*, May 25, 1967, p.7.
- ⁹⁷ *Pacific Tribune*, May 5, 1967, p.1.
- ⁹⁸ Indeed, according to Gordon, Pearson agreed with "ninety-eight per cent" of the *content* of his speech, just not the very public nature in which those messages were presented. Gordon, 1977, op. cit., p.284.

⁹⁹ *Le Droit*, May 13, 1967, p.1.

¹⁰⁰ *Ottawa Citizen*, May 12, 1967, p.6.

¹⁰¹ *Dartmouth Free Press*, May 25, 1967, p.1.

¹⁰² *Pacific Tribune*, May 26, 1967, p.3.

¹⁰³ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, 1967, May 19, p.4.

¹⁰⁴ Gwyn, op. cit., p.71.

¹⁰⁵ Azzi, op. cit., p.157.

¹⁰⁶ *Ottawa Citizen*, May 24, 1967, p.14.

¹⁰⁷ *Le Droit*, May 23, 1967, p.17.

¹⁰⁸ *Pacific Tribune*, May 26, 1967, p.1.

¹⁰⁹ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, May 16, 1967, p.4.

¹¹⁰ *Pacific Tribune*, May 19, 1967, p.1.

¹¹¹ Granatstein, op. cit., p.160. This split came to its most overt expression at the Liberal policy conference of October 1966. At that conference, a number of "economic nationalist" motions were presented by Gordon, all of which were defeated. Following this, Gordon prepared to simply disengage from politics altogether, resigning his seat in Parliament. According to Granatstein, however, Pearson, who noted how strongly Gordon's brand of nationalism resonated with young English-Canadians, was reluctant to lose him, and thus began an internal campaign to bring him back into cabinet.

¹¹² Smith, op. cit., p.325.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ *Ottawa Citizen*, May 20, 1967, p.6.

CHAPTER 5

PLACING CANADA CLEANLY BETWEEN MANHATTAN AND THE ARCTIC CIRCLE IN APRIL, 1970

The Arctic, Canada's "great, white north," could not last as any kind of potent symbol unless its relevance was refreshed from time to time; such an opportunity arose at the end of the 1960s. In April of 1970, the refitted oil tanker *Manhattan* left its home port in Texas. It journeyed north along the Eastern seaboard and west through the Canadian Arctic to its final destination – Alaska. The voyage of the *Manhattan* tested the feasibility of permanent sea-based oil shipment by tanker from Alaskan oilfields to U.S. refineries. Within a week, Jean Chrétien, Canadian Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, announced two new parliamentary bills that would extend Canada's territorial jurisdiction into its surrounding oceans, most notably into the Canadian Arctic. Many authors have interpreted this episode of "Arctic Sovereignty" as part of an aggressive Canadian nationalism which, they suggest, had infiltrated both public and government circles by the end of the 1960s. However, a closer examination of Canadian newspapers reveals that three other principles motivated the new legislation: a drive to increase Canadian international influence, vocal public concern over pollution, and an elevated level of distrust concerning American interests in Canadian territory.

And yet, the Linguistic Intergroup Bias suggests that in 1970, many Canadian newspapers resoundingly perceived negative Americans actions as a permanent part of American character, and believed positive behaviour to be a fleeting characteristic. Given a complimentary orientation in the editorial

cartoons, which depicted the most confident and aggressive “Canada” than at any point in the previous ten years, it seemed that, with some exceptions, Americans were becoming a starker “other” in Canadian public opinion. What this chapter suggests, however, was that this increased confidence in Canadian self-image and growing reluctance to praise the United States was not the only dynamic at work in 1970. Instead, those perceptions were greatly tempered by both an increased awareness of the need for environmental regulation and a desire to construct a more permanent, and independent, international Canadian identity. Moreover, these developments would be bolstered by a more confident opinion of Canada’s independent place in the world, and not only as compared to the United States.

The LIB Plots a Course

By 1970, Canadian newspaper opinions of the United States were becoming increasingly negative. This conclusion comes from several indicators. First, articles that spoke positively about the United States were less common than they had been in previous years. Nationally, the sample featured over two and a half times as many negative articles about the U.S. as it did positive ones; Vancouver in particular featured no positive articles at all.¹ This feature in itself speaks to the altered mood of Canadian public discussion.

Second, the national scores were among the starkest in this project: when speaking positively about the United States, the average score was 2.24; when speaking negatively, it was 1.95. What the findings suggest when combined with

the results from 1967 and compared to the earlier portions of the decade, is that by 1970 many Canadian newspapers favoured a perception that negative behaviour and actions were characteristic of the United States. Looking back to 1962, a time when the national interpretation between positive and negative behaviour was negligible, it was only the *Pacific Tribune* that scored under 2.00 when evaluating negative behaviour. By 1967, and certainly by 1970, it seems, many more newspapers in the country had come to agree with them.

Third, the overall score for positive American behaviour reached its highest (most abstract) level in the study. This suggests that more than at any other point in the decade, Canadian newspapers believed that positive American behaviour was *not* a characteristic of the United States as a whole. Indeed, the disparity between the positive and negative scores had become the largest in this study by 1970. For example, the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* scored a 1.77 on negative portrayals, and a 2.38 on positive ones. Across town, *Le Soleil* also offered large differences by scoring 1.81 on negative portrayals and 2.13 on positive ones. The *Ottawa Citizen*, while somewhat kinder when evaluating positive portrayals (scoring a 2.00), was unmatched by other newspapers in its negative score of 1.75. What this suggests is that unlike 1960, 1962, and 1965, many Canadian newspapers perceived a noticeable difference between positive American behaviour, whose sincerity they somewhat questioned, and negative American behaviour, which they more often believed.

However, there were some important exceptions: The *Ottawa Journal*, for instance, scored a 2.06 for negative behaviour and a 2.00 for positive behaviour,

suggesting that its readers interpreted little difference between the two. Moreover, as stated above (endnote 1), the lack of complete samples available from Vancouver, leaves open the question of a different possible outcome. Nonetheless, the LIB evidence overall suggests that in 1970, many Canadian newspapers were less inclined to see positive actions as part of the American identity than they had been at any other point in the decade. Even more resolutely, many Canadian newspapers had come to believe that negative actions were part of the American identity, more so than they had been for at least ten years. Entering the 1970s, according to the LIB, many Canadian newspapers increasingly viewed Americans as the “other.”

The True North Strong and Free

The Arctic is a rich source of symbolism in the collective mythology of Canada, both for Canadians and for those looking at Canada from beyond. Outside the country, images of the Arctic intertwined with Canadian identity from Nanaook of the North to Sergeant Preston of the Yukon have helped generations of onlookers to construct a truly “northern” impression of life in Canada. Inside the country, the Arctic’s status as mythology has taken seemingly contradictory status. On the one hand, the Arctic has placed itself, squarely within traditional Canadian self-conception. Since the days of the Northwest Passage, the Arctic has, been analogous to Canada’s “last frontier,” a peripheral, “generally vague and often romanticized” conception; this notion has arguably only harmed the actual inhabitants of the region, but has still fixed it as a realm to protect and

secure.² On the other hand, given its geographical location, this most *hinter* of hinterlands is most often beyond both the physical reach and daily awareness of many Canadians, which means that outside the experience of a public altercation every decade or so, the Arctic remains out of mind.³ As a result, while many Canadians have been “frustrated and worried” by the Canadian north, and while it has served as a concern for the Canadian military from time to time,⁴ the traditional pattern of its periodic emergence from “relative obscurity to public prominence” and back again has largely held true. This, some suggest, is also due to the regions’ sparse population, lack of easily extractable resources, and the relatively minor attention paid to circumpolar issues by most governments.⁵

However, as a symbolic entity – especially in relation to the United States – the Canadian North possesses a unique history. William R. Morrison’s review of Canadian-American relations in the North serves as an ideal gateway towards developing an understanding of Canadian interactions with conceptions of the North. Morrison suggests that the question of sovereignty has always been at the center of these relations.⁶ While the attitude of Americans towards their North is traditionally one shaped in developmental terms (based on resource exploitation and commercial development), “the kind of sovereignty which Canada has traditionally exercised in the North may be called ‘symbolic’ sovereignty.”⁷

Morrison explains that while Canadian governments have effectively dealt the practical elements of the North in much the same way as did their American counterparts, the Canadian public has always symbolically pressed their

connection to it. In other words, in practice it has been sufficient for the Canadian population to simply have the North recognized in international law, which can subsist on as little as “operating a post office, collecting customs duties, and conducting a census.”⁸ From a cultural perspective, however, many Canadians have been much more concerned with the “meaning” of the North as part of their national identity, than with the actual reality of what they did with that highly symbolic territory. Moreover, as Morrison explores, it has only been when Americans have challenged this concept, opening the possibility that Canadians might “lose” a critical element of their self-perception, that the Canadian public was motivated to take direct action in the North.⁹ Through this lens, it is little wonder that the Canadian national anthem, adopted in the 1960s, contained the passage “true North strong and free”. Free from whom? From the Americans of course.

Arctic Sovereignty

In 1968, large reserves of oil were discovered in and around the American state of Alaska. Given Alaska’s remote position and geography, oil companies based in the southern United States began to consider different ways in which they could more easily export the Alaskan oil directly to the eastern seaboard.¹⁰ As part of this effort, in September 1969, the American ship *Manhattan*, owned by the Humble Oil Co. of Texas, crossed the Arctic in a record 15-day voyage.¹¹ Although accompanied part of the way by the Canadian icebreaker the *John A. Macdonald*, the American government turned down an official Canadian

government request to ask for permission to pass through the Northwest Passage; indeed, the U.S. government specifically told the *Manhattan* not to fly the Canadian flag on its courtesy deck so as not to recognize Canadian sovereignty of the arctic passage.¹² This decision was not a jab at Canada specifically; the United States feared the precedent such recognition of national claims to international waters might set, potentially limiting American naval and commercial movements around the world as countries from Indonesia to Spain began claiming sovereignty of waterways off of their coasts as well.¹³

As the spring of 1970 approached, Humble Oil announced that the *Manhattan* would again tread in Canadian waters. For many scholars studying Canadian-American relations, this episode concerning "Arctic Sovereignty" often represents a sharp flashpoint of Canadian nationalism and an incident of ardent resistance to the desires of the United States.¹⁴ E.J. Dosman suggests that "[i]t was the most serious crisis in Canadian-American relations since the nuclear-arms débâcle under Diefenbaker."¹⁵ For other scholars, the *Manhattan* episode also revealed the extent to which Canadian public opinion could influence government action. Some authors suggest, in fact, that it was the sheer weight of public opinion to protect the North that pressed the federal government into a position where it had to act, lest it appear too complacent in the face of the American threat.¹⁶

However, as we have seen throughout this thesis, the reaction of Canadian newspapers is often much more nuanced. As such, three separate developments had contributed to the increased attention which the second

voyage of the *Manhattan* (which was hardly noticed the first time around) received: First, within Canadian foreign policy circles, a concerted attempt to “[break] decisively with the liberal-internationalist traditions that had dominated Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War” was underway, and the assertion of a Canadian-born interpretation of Arctic jurisdiction seemed the appropriate litmus test.¹⁷ Second, environmentalists, but also large segments of the Canadian population, had helped propel concerns over pollution to the top of many Canadians’ list of pressing concerns. More specifically, many Canadians were still reeling from a March, 1970, oil spill off of Nova Scotia caused by the Greek oil tanker the *Arrow*, whose massive clean-up brought images of oil-strewn waters and suffering wildlife to the pages of many local papers. The freshness of that incident left many in Canada shuddering at the possibility of such damage in the fragile Arctic ecosystem.¹⁸

Third, the physical penetration of an American oil tanker in the ‘pure’ Canadian Arctic was a potent symbol of the widening discontent in many Canadian circles concerning American political, economic, and cultural intrusion and dominance over Canada. Thus, while Ottawa’s reactions to the first *Manhattan* voyage were “largely defined by the perceptions of Canadian officials,”¹⁹ the tanker’s second voyage was more a test of “the government’s ability to withstand the sustained pressure of an assertive Canadian public demanding considerably more ambitious actions.”²⁰

The reaction in Canadian newspapers would be made up of various combinations of each of these three developments, namely the growing creativity

and independence of the Canadian government's foreign policy in its own right (and not only in reference to Canadian-American relations), the mounting public concern over environmental pollution, and the rising degree of suspicion surrounding American interests in what was considered (in Canada) to clearly constitute Canadian territory.

The centerpiece of all these concerns would be the dual legislation presented to Canadian Parliament on April 8th, 1970. The first bill, Bill C-202, the *Arctic Waters Pollution Protection Bill*, declared the right for Canada to take action to prevent the pollution of waters within one hundred miles of any of its shores. The companion bill, C-203, constituted an amendment to the *Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act*, and extended Canadian territory beyond the traditional three-mile offshore limit to a distance of twelve-miles.²¹ Although it did not fundamentally alter the course of events in April of 1970, by April 15 the United States, via its Ambassador to Canada, officially protested Canada's proposed legislation, lest it be seen as setting a precedent of unilateral declarations of maritime jurisdiction around the globe.²²

Two's a crowd, three's company

Broadly speaking, the newspapers' coverage and interpretation of the release of the two bills concerning Arctic jurisdiction and pollution can be placed into three categories:

- 1) Newspapers that interpreted the Canadian government's aggressive stance in the Arctic as an expression of Canadian sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States²³
- 2) Newspapers that viewed the release of the bills through the prism of pollution prevention; these newspapers focused their opinions on the innovation of the new anti-pollution measures.
- 3) Newspapers that interpreted the vents as a sign of Canadian sovereignty based *not* on its position vis-à-vis the United States, but vis-à-vis the international community as a whole.²⁴

No matter which interpretation one selected, however, there was a common theme running within them all: Years of complaints by many Canadian newspapers over the inaction and seeming inability of the federal government to make bold decisions, especially when it could raise the ire of the United States, was finally on the retreat. Thus, whether interpreting the legislation as a stab at American control, as an attempt at controlling pollution, or as a broader and more multilateral expression of Canada's role in the world, the days of Canadian newspapers perceiving that their government was simply echoing American points of view seemed, for many, to be over.

Le Lion et Le Rat

Throughout the month of April, 1970, The *Ottawa Citizen*, presented an almost unwavering interpretation of the importance of Trudeau's Arctic

legislation: defense of Canadian sovereignty versus the encroaching dominance of the United States. The first *Citizen* editorial on the subject declared “It remains for the international community to accept Canada’s assertion of sovereignty over Arctic waters. *That is what the Arctic anti-pollution bill is.* Clear determination by Canada to protect the Northwest Passage from pollution *is simply the first step.* [emphasis mine]”²⁵ Three days later, a second editorial exasperated, “Finally, in grasping this sea bull by the horns, the Canadian government has taken another step toward establishing its creeping sovereignty over the Arctic area.” Moreover, they confirmed their assessment of the legislation’s success by suggesting that the Canadian government’s determination “has not yet been undermined by American pressure.”²⁶

Previously, in early April, the *Ottawa Citizen* had taken a keen interest in the progression of the *Manhattan*’s second journey, and had suggested that the voyage would not only serve as a assessment of the long-term feasibility for sea-bound shipment of oil via the Arctic, but would constitute a “Big Test” for Canada. “[T]he Canadian government, which has been attempting to provide a basis for sovereignty claims through pollution control measures, has gone to some lengths to make the point that the *Manhattan* would not be making this voyage until she measured up to Canadian requirements [emphasis mine]” stated the *Citizen*.²⁷ For the newspapers’ editors, the safeguards being put in place for the *Manhattan*’s voyage were indeed there for environmental safety, but more importantly, they served as a symbol of Canadian sovereignty from the United States. Foreshadowing its coverage of Trudeau’s bills, the *Citizen* helped

set the tone by using aggressive metaphors to describe the tanker putting to sea: "The tanker Manhattan is steaming towards the ice of the Canadian Arctic as though anxious to renew battle."²⁸

Moreover, the *Citizen* was the only newspaper to provide a U.S.-centered article just opposite the announcement of the new legislation; "Loud howl from U.S. expected," appeared on April 9th, the day after the bill was released, and carried the full weight of the perception of a national threat/confrontation.²⁹ Indeed, by that point, the *Citizen's* editors had already decided what the government's motive was: "The preservation of Canada as an independent, sovereign nation has undoubtedly been his [Trudeau's] ultimate purpose, though he may not have seen it quite so clearly at the beginning."³⁰

Following this thread of opinion, though perhaps not as emphatically, were both the *Ottawa Journal* and Quebec City's *L'Action*. Just as its cross-town competitors had done, the *Journal* pre-empted their coverage of the bills by setting the stage for a Canadian-American showdown.

The start of the second voyage of the huge United States tanker *Manhattan* in Arctic waters irritates Canadians sensitive about their claim to sovereignty in the North... [N]othing has set off Canada's alarms so loudly as the discovery of oil by American companies in the North, in both Alaska and Canada's Northwest Territories. Exploiting the huge deposits... could mean American domination of Canada's last frontier, and could bring disastrous pollution damage to the Arctic. The voyages of the *Manhattan* in the Northwest Passage, which Trudeau now says cautiously is Canada's, symbolizes Canada's national anxiety.³¹

In an almost parallel sentiment to the *Citizen's* depiction of the *Manhattan* "steaming towards" Canada "as though anxious to renew battle," the *Journal* called the ship's voyage a symbol of "Canada's national anxiety."³² While the discussion below questions the extent to which this anxiety was "national," the symbolism underscored by the giant supertanker thrusting its way through the

Arctic – lead almost comically by the Canadian ice-breaker *Louis St. Laurent*, a size comparison *L’Action* would term “Le Lion et le Rat”³³ – constituted for some newspapers a physical embodiment of the pressure they felt had been building from the United States for the last decade, if not since the beginning of the Cold War. This time, however, according to these newspapers, the Canadian government was not standing idly by, nor was it trying to sell the Canadian public on an American-centered plan. “Canada will reject, firmly but politely, a formal American complaint against this country’s new jurisdictional claims at sea.”³⁴

Moreover, Canada would stand up to whatever opposition the U.S. could dish out, such as the words of the *New York Daily News*, which, according to the *Journal*, enjoyed the largest mass circulation of any paper in North America at the time, and which wrote in an article entitled “Let’s Lean On Trudeau” that

Canada’s Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau is big-mouthing about extending Canadian jurisdiction 100 miles northward in the Arctic Ocean for pollution-control purposes. We’re as anti-pollutant as anybody, but we think that in this case Lucky (up to now) Pierre is mainly intent on snooting Uncle Sam for the Canadian home folks edification.”³⁵

This brought on a ‘tough’ retort from Liberal MP James Walker who said that “If anyone down there figures to lean on the prime minister... let them not forget he has a judo brown belt” and they had “better not come face-to-face with him...”³⁶

When the Arctic bills were introduced in the pages of *L’Action*, the centrality of the American factor was also immediately felt. Early reporting on the bills contained the comments of at least one MP who stated that American objections “rejette[nt] en fait la souveraineté du Canada sur L’Arctique.”³⁷ A second article appearing on the same day recapped the potential showdown with Washington, noting their historic dislike of both unilateral declarations of territorial

sovereignty and limits to the reach of their naval power.³⁸ After fading from coverage for a few days, that angle returned on the heels of official American protest. The U.S. objection was painted in the light of U.S. policy, but at least one warning came from an Ottawa MP: “[PC MP] M. [Gerald] Baldwin avait fait état d’une note ‘très raide’, brandissant des ‘sanctions sévères’ contre cette quasi-affirmation de souveraineté canadienne.” (although the government was quick to counter: “mais des porte-parole du ministère des Affaires extérieures ont refusé d’endosser ce point de vue.”³⁹)

L’Action also presented some very fresh (in terms of what we have seen in the context of the 1960s) ideas about how Canada related to the United States. In its pages, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp was quoted as having noted that “sans qu’un anti-américanisme soit en jeu, le Canada ne pouvait s’imposer le carcan ‘de toujours agir multilatéralement et jamais unilatéralement.’

Washington prétend qu’Ottawa aurait dû attendre un accord international avant de présenter sa législation.”⁴⁰ This sort of statement represented a significant shift in rhetoric, a viewpoint that aggressively asserts Canadian sovereignty in relation to the United States. For a newspaper to clearly state that “the U.S. assumed that Ottawa should have waited for an international accord” before making a decision, implied that Canada did not have to wait for “international” (read: American) approval, but could pass its own laws on its own terms.

According to papers like *L’Action*, the *Ottawa Citizen*, and the *Ottawa Journal*, the Canadian government was projecting an air of sovereignty, and much of it

was aimed at the U.S. The question for this study is: were most Canadian newspapers in step with those views?

As mentioned above, unlike the *Ottawa Citizen*, both the *Ottawa Journal* and *L'Action* presented its readers with other possible avenues of interpretation. In an editorial entitled "Let's Keep Our Cool Over American Protest", the *Journal's* editors stated that the American objection was predictable, completely justifiable, and "far too respectable to deserve any shrill anti-American cries," promising in addition that the Americans "are not trying to dictate to Canada;" "no one should be either surprised or excited," emphasized the editors.⁴¹ It seems that at a certain point, and although the *Journal* editors supported Canada's sovereign claim, they preferred that it not tread too heavily on Canadian-American relations. That point was solidified by an article covering the support of a U.S. Senator, who stated that the Canadian plans demonstrated "a strong sense of concern for the safety of our Arctic environment... [and] If it takes a unilateral political act such as the Canadian declaration to focus our attention on the issues, then that act is well worth the ruckus."⁴² Another *Journal* article quoted a *New York Times* which wrote, "the United States rejected 'with unseemly sharpness' Canada's bid to extend its control over the Northwest passage to prevent pollution of the Arctic."⁴³ Indeed, both of these articles help to begin problematizing the existing "us-them" construction of the debate.

Like the *Ottawa Journal*, *L'Action* presented some alternate messages concerning the intentions of the United States. For example, during their coverage of the bills' second reading *L'Action* emphasized that the U.S. was not

attempting to undermine Canadian-American relations. This conclusion was evidenced by an American State Department press release which was provided to the paper's readers, and which concluded: "L'histoire des relations entre les Etats-Unis et le Canada est unique dans les affaires internationales par l'étroitesse des liens de coopération. Nous sommes persuadés que, dans cet esprit, nos deux pays continueront à résoudre amicalement leurs divergences par la compréhension mutuelle."⁴⁴

Overall, for both *L'Action* and the *Journal*, as well as for the *Citizen*, the Arctic issue was indeed all about the United States; readers could choose to see them as aggressors or not, but it was a conscious decision which they had to make. However, for many other newspapers, this was not the case.

Deux voisins mal à l'aise

Before investigating those other newspapers, it is worth stopping to take a look at the coverage in one particular newspaper, Quebec City's *Le Soleil*. In part I am doing so at this point in the chapter because *Le Soleil* featured some of the most incendiary prose concerning Canadian-American relations in 1970, but more specifically because *Le Soleil*, unlike most of the other newspapers, presented an extraordinary range of views within its own pages, and mere days apart. As such, it constitutes an extreme example of one of the major themes of this thesis, namely, that Canadian opinion of the United States is incredibly diverse.

After first establishing the position of the Arctic bills as related to sovereignty, the editors of *Le Soleil* seemed instead to be building a base for the bills' status as a real non-issue in terms of bilateral relations. The first reference to the U.S. protest was, in fact, Prime Minister Trudeau stating "que son gouvernement n'avait reçu aucune protestation officielle du gouvernement américain."⁴⁵ In addition, a *Soleil* correspondent from Washington offered a report on the *lack* of coverage of the *Manhattan* issue (in terms of the corresponding territorial questions it was said to have raised) in the American media.⁴⁶

This was followed by a rather positive assessment of U.S. reaction, which was not only foreseen by Ottawa, but attested to the "ton modéré des Américains" which constituted "le moins auquel on pouvait s'attendre" given their well-known international position on navigation rights.⁴⁷ However, the author then suggested that "l'unilatéralisme, ce qui a parfois aussi été la faiblesse de Washington dans le passé, pourra faire remarquer à son tour le gouvernement canadien." As the issues examined throughout this thesis have demonstrated, such a perspective is uncommon. This position not only constructed Canadian-American relations to be among the most open and honest in the world, but also implied that the United States publicly recognized unilateralism as a state weakness (and to a degree that would require that it offer other states latitude to fall prey to their own "weakness" for unilateralism from time to time).⁴⁸

In addition, within a week, *Le Soleil* suddenly did an about-face and began discussing the Canadian-American relationship as if it were at a fundamental

crossroads. It began by noting that friction was beginning to rub at bi-lateral relations and, “risquent de perturber le tranquille coexistence qui caractérisait depuis longtemps les relations entre les deux pays.”⁴⁹ The article went on to list several recent points of contention, such as the Arctic issue, but also longer-standing ones, such as Canada's recognition of China and its desire to lessen its commitment to NATO. The author then mused on the writings of a journalist who contemplated the benefits of a possible hot war between the two nations, “[qui] pourrait contribuer à l'unification du pays et combler un vide dans l'histoire canadienne qui ne compte ni conflit important, ni révolution sanglante.” A reminder from a Liberal MP followed, and stated that should armed conflict be needed to back up Canadian policy, “le peuple canadien serait prêt”. While the article concluded by suggesting there is no conflict in sight over the Arctic issue, the reader was left wondering how tongue in cheek, or how serious, this piece really was.⁵⁰

Indeed, by the end of the month, it seemed like *Le Soleil* had shifted into a completely different orientation. A separate article discussed the degree to which Canada and the United States had become “deux voisins mal à l'aise vis-à-vis l'un de l'autre.” Unlike the previous generation of Canadians, the Canadian Minister of Energy J.J. Greene suggested, “Le rêve américain s'est dissipé et les jeunes Canadiens veulent construire quelque chose qui leur soit propre et qui ne relèté pas nécessairement l'image américaine.”⁵¹ Moreover, a third article added that according to an American expert, “La discrétion diplomatique qui a toujours été de tradition dans les relations entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis est


en train de se muer... en une politique d'affrontement." In part, the same source suggested that a portion of this shift was due to the choice of differentiation between the two countries, differences that could be seen as growing.⁵²

Issues for the Seventies: Pollution


For another, larger set of newspapers, however, the message would not shift over time, but would remain remarkably consistent, if (according to the existing literature) unexpected. According to least one newspaper in each of the four regions, the two bills introduced in parliament served only one clear function: to curb pollution. While for a couple of these newspapers, this did not conflict with an otherwise increasingly unfriendly attitude towards the United States, the fact that the *Manhattan* was an American vessel, and could potentially represent the impact and reach of American commercial dominance, was not enough to overpower their larger concern, namely the state of the environment.

Looking at the evolution and recent prominence of pollution as a disquieting phenomenon, it is in many ways hardly surprising that so many Canadian newspapers would be paying more attention to its actual dangers than to vague warnings of American domination. "Bombarded with pollution stories in newspapers, on radio and television, the public has become not apathetic, but more aware," stated an article in the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*.⁵³ As evidence, the article (based on research in the U.S.) cited pollution's rise from fourteenth on a list of "areas of public concern" in 1968, to fourth in 1969, behind only law and order, race relations, and the Vietnam War.⁵⁴ This rise in attention

is evidenced by the fact that in the single month observed for this chapter, every newspaper without exception featured articles in almost every section of the paper covering legislation, protests, community projects, and tips on how to deal with pollution. Most newspapers also featured editorial cartoons on pollution [Fig. 6-1, Fig. 6-2, and Fig. 6-3]. Indeed, while a couple of newspapers, did not really cover the Arctic bills at all, they nonetheless contained many articles and columns on pollution (see below).



6-1



6-2



6-3

Typical of this growing preoccupation with pollution was the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*. The sub-title of the article introducing the Arctic bills to its

readers was "Pollution Control Bill; No Sovereignty Claim" and it began "*Without claiming its sovereignty over Arctic waters*, the Canadian government moved Wednesday to impose pollution controls on..." It continued

Outside the Commons, Prime Minister Trudeau said *the Arctic bill is to be regarded only as an anti-pollution measure*. It should be compared with the powers now exercised by Canada and the United States over aircraft approaching their coastlines. 'These controls now go out hundreds of miles over the Atlantic *but no one is saying they are an assertion of sovereignty*. [emphasis mine]."⁵⁵

From this perspective, we also gain insight concerning charges launched by both the Conservatives and the NDP criticizing the government for not going far enough, a view shared by the *Pacific Tribune*. The *Tribune*, although unexpectedly unwilling to really engage the Arctic issue (despite its history of criticizing the United States and despite the opportunity for criticism this issue offered), demanded that Trudeau not back down from his government's position on Arctic Sovereignty. In the *Tribune's* only substantial engagement of the issue, an editorial stipulated that Trudeau go even further and, "assert full sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic... The government should immediately declare the Canadian Arctic a nuclear free zone and block passage of U.S. nuclear submarines through Canadian waters."⁵⁶

The emphasis on the anti-pollution aspect of the bills coloured most of the coverage of the Arctic issue in the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*. For instance, in their article on Washington's reaction, they wrote "The passage of the icebreaking tanker Manhattan through the Northwest Passage last summer spurred Canadian interest in protective legislation on ground that international law does not carry sufficient safeguards against pollution." In a report on the formal US Complaint, the point was made again: "Canada took the action on its

own because of the slow progress being made on international agreements for the control of pollution.”⁵⁷

Two of the Halifax papers, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* and the *Dartmouth Free Press*, also took on a very pollution-centred view of the Arctic bills.⁵⁸ As mentioned above, the Halifax environment featured an additional twist. Only weeks earlier, the Greek oil tanker *Arrow* had crashed just off the coast of Nova Scotia spilling vast amounts of oil into the Atlantic Ocean. Its cleanup was featured in newspapers around the country, but especially in Halifax, where the Canadian Navy had been called to aid in the clean up. In the hopes of gaining some perspective from the Canadian military on the issue of Arctic Sovereignty, I examined some issues of the *Maritime Command Trident*, the official bulletin of the Canadian Maritime Command, started in 1966. The newspaper did not seem to find the Arctic issue of much interest, and did not feature any articles on the subject in the period under investigation. However, the *Maritime Command Trident* did feature several articles on the military involvement during the clean-up of the *Arrow* oil spill, including several photographs.⁵⁹ This coverage, and the preoccupations it spoke to among the Halifax naval community, could have served to enhance public awareness of the dangers emanating from large-scale oil shipments by sea-going vessels near Canadian territory.

For its part, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald's* introduction of the bill did not even mention the word “sovereignty.” Instead, it focused almost exclusively on the environmental aspects of the bill, and the right of coastal states to “protect their marine environment and the living resources of the sea adjacent to their

coasts.”⁶⁰ While the *Chronicle-Herald* editors did subsequently acknowledge the questions concerning arctic sovereignty that surrounded the new bill, they continued to give prominence to “the new national concern about the environment.”⁶¹ The *Chronicle-Herald* placed this new environmental concern at the center of its commentary on the Arctic debate, rather than as a ‘gateway’ or ‘first step’ to additional goals. For instance, one editorial placed the onus on the Canadian government to do what it could to prevent future oil spills, the kind they were in the midst of witnessing during the clean-up from the from the *Arrow* spill. The editorial emphasized that this kind of disaster would be a grave risk from the heavy traffic that was to begin in the Northwest passage, whose route, incidentally, would take ships rounding the eastern seaboard past Nova Scotia on a regular basis.⁶² Moreover, the editors asked the important question of whether Canada was even able to enforce the regulations and fines it was setting out in this new bill.⁶³

This environmental focus also appeared in the *Dartmouth Free Press* whose major editorial on the Arctic bills discussed them only in environmental terms, and specifically did *not* interpret the bills as an obvious point of contention with the U.S: “There will probably be little international opposition to the prime minister’s announcement... President Nixon has already announced that the United States will support an international agreement establishing the 12-mile limit as a new world standard.” Although they recognized that the U.S. would have problems with Canada’s intention to assert control over areas it wishes to protect from damage, and did not ignore the diplomatic issue of territoriality, the

prime motive assessed in the *Free Press* was an environmental one. "Until international law catches up to the needs of environmental protection, Canada must be prepared to go it alone."⁶⁴

Moreover, a separate article in the *Free Press* which focused on how pollution law development would play out legally, was absent of criticism covering the U.S., and absent of any mention of Canadian sovereignty; instead, it interpreted the passage of the *Manhattan* in purely environmental terms. Indeed, the article had no notion of how the story would end, stating only, "[I]t is a developing situation with the rest of the world watching to see how these "good neighbours" resolve this impasse."⁶⁵

Given that the Arctic bill was released in April, and given, as we have seen in earlier chapters, that most University papers did not publish between the end of March and the beginning of September, there was no direct commentary to be found. Nonetheless, the first issues of the 1970-71 school year (the earliest issues available following the introduction of the bills) did reflect the concern for pollution established in other newspapers. The University of Ottawa's *Fulcrum* ran two features in its first issue of the year on what it called "anti-pollution," one which dealt specifically with the creation of a new graduate program which would study methods for reducing water pollution (an indication of increased public interest in the subject).⁶⁶

Even the often controversial *Almonte Gazette* adopted a pollution-based interpretation of the Arctic issues, failing to involve the United States, or even the

question of Canadian sovereignty at any point. The *Gazette's* most explicit commentary came in the form of an editorial on April 16, when the paper came out very strongly against pollution, offering both the actual experience of the *Arrow* and the possible experience of a crashed *Manhattan* as evidence: "It is in our power, if we act resolutely, to reduce to a tolerable level every form of pollution of air, soil, and river."⁶⁷

Promoting a Diversity of Opinion

As was the case for the newspapers that interpreted the legislation as concerning sovereignty, those newspapers centrally concerned with pollution also allowed for multiple avenues of interpretation, especially in regards to perceptions of the U.S. For example, the United States was not completely absent from the *Chronicle-Telegraph's* environmentally-based coverage; when the bill was finally adopted in Parliament, both the PC and NDP leaders were said by the newspaper to be saddened that the Liberals would not go all the way and declare sovereignty, and NDP leader Tommy Douglas was quoted as stating, "We want to make it clear to our friends south of the border that we will not tolerate anyone pushing the Canadian government around – this is a privilege which we reserve for ourselves."⁶⁸ In its coverage of Parliamentary debates on the subject, the *Chronicle-Telegraph* quoted one PC MP who questioned Canada's true expressions of sovereignty in the North (for example suggesting there were not enough defence posts, and that scientific stations were manned by both Canadians and Americans) and stated that "In attacking

the Arctic bill, the U.S. was attacking the one country that knew it and liked it best.”⁶⁹

In fact, wherever the U.S. was mentioned in the *Chronicle-Telegraph*, it was mentioned negatively; another article quoted a Canadian response to the U.S. which stated that “U.S. nuclear tests are a greater interference with freedom of the high seas than Canada’s proposed 100-mile pollution protection zone...” and then challenged the U.S. interpretation that the 3-mile jurisdiction must be held in all cases (citing numerous times, going as far back as 1790, when the U.S. itself elected not to respect that boundary).⁷⁰

Even the University of British Columbia’s *Ubyyssey*, which had no commentary on Arctic Sovereignty specifically, but ran several articles in March of 1970 on pollution as a major problem, contained several other articles on the menace of American capitalism (which was presented in direct contradiction to Canadian nationalism), and included a report on a panel in which the idea that Canada needed American investment was “a myth. There is more money going out of Canada than there is going in.”⁷¹

In addition to its environmental focus, the *Dartmouth Free Press* also offered its readers options. An article entitled “New nationalism alters our image” suggested that Trudeau’s “new nationalism”, as seen through the Arctic issue, had altered Canadian-American relations in a fundamental way: An American professor was discriminated against while teaching in Ontario; Canadian content regulations were applauded; the Canadian Secretary of State (Gerard Pelletier) stated “The Point, I believe, is that whether we think of the family life of

individuals or the family life of man in North America, a healthy existence entails maintaining some distance among the adult members.” Still, having attempted to minimize the pervasiveness of such views, but on the other hand basically inflaming them, one article suggested the Americans were quite calm about the whole Arctic issue. “One reason for American calmness is the feeling [among Americans]... that the U.S. holding all the cards. One American remarked “economic sanctions – hell, we own the country – the sanctions would be against ourselves.”⁷²

The mood suggested that there was no going back to the way it was. “...[T]he images of a peacekeeping legalistic Canada and the longest undefended boundaries have been deposited in the graveyard where the singing red-coated Mounties and the wood axes are resting.” The article ended with one of the starkest questions it could put to its Canadian readers: “*Do the Americans recognize this new Canadian image?*”⁷³

The Third “Way”: Is it time for an independent Canada?

The *Dartmouth Free Press* may have been keying into a larger phenomenon, for beyond both the Canadian-American sovereignty viewpoint and the environmental focus lay a third, and in many respects new (at least in the context of this thesis) interpretation of Canadian actions. This third group did see the Arctic bills as reflective of Canadian sovereignty, but not in relation to the United States. Instead, several newspapers would interpret the bills as

representative of a new confident and even aggressive Canadian position in the realm of global politics.

Ottawa's *Le Droit* presented the most expressive range of articles on this new viewpoint. At first, it seemed as if *Le Droit* had opted against the pollution-centred view of newspapers like the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* and *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* and towards the sovereignty concerns of others; directly contradicting Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's explanations of the bill, *Le Droit* wrote "S'il n'a pas pour but d'établir la souveraineté du Canada dans l'Arctique, le bill au sujet de la pollution intensifiera sans aucun doute la présence canadienne dans cette région du pays."⁷⁴ The article immediately focused on the international elements of the case, stating that Canada, anticipating resistance from other nations (an assessment which directly contradicts, for instance, the expectations of the *Dartmouth Free Press*), would not consider any international court ruling as binding.

Again, at first glance, this international element seemed to be implying the United States; after all, as established in several newspapers, while some sixty nations had already taken similar measures to extend their country's maritime jurisdiction, it was the United States which had expressed extreme reticence and which (at least most vocally) feared the setting of a new international precedent. However, the argument built by the articles and editorials in *Le Droit* over the next few weeks headed in a different direction.

C'est un véritable défi que le Canada vient de lancer... Défi à l'autorité de la Cour internationale de justice, défi aux Américains. Le gouvernement canadien... [a] établi un précédent dans notre histoire... Nous étions si habitués à suivre les autres à la remorque dans le domaine maritime que cette audacieuse, mais nécessaire décision a pris par surprise amis comme adversaires."⁷⁵

In subsuming the United States into a complicated stew of international pressures, what the editors began to construct was a new paradigm which combined the two streams, suggesting that Canadians should exert their international sovereignty in the area of pollution. According to *Le Droit*, in 1970, pollution – which could join defence and fisheries as areas of Maritime jurisdiction where Canada already exerted some independence – had become a burgeoning example of how Canadians had to re-commit to asserting their sovereignty on a global scale. Moreover, much of the justification for this independence originated in the swelling public demands for an increasingly independent Canada, and, in this case, for some real commitment to do something about pollution.

Notre souveraineté dans ce domaine implique non seulement des problèmes de défense, de pêcheries, de droits miniers et pétroliers, mais aussi la protection de l'écologie de la vie sous-marine de cette région vulnérable. Pressé par les circonstances et par l'opinion publique, le gouvernement fédéral ne pouvait se laisser gâter une situation exposée à se détériorer rapidement, même au risque de déplaire aux Etats-Unis.⁷⁶

Although the United States was still singled out, this issue had become at once a pollution issue and a sovereignty issue, not a “sovereignty from the United States.”

This orientation was also expressed in coverage of comments by Gérard Pelletier. Speaking to an American audience, he stated, “[une] certaine diversité n'est pas un mal en soi... “Nous nous rendons compte qu'il est inutile d'élever des murs contre le progrès humain, et nous n'avons pas l'intention d'essayer. Mais nous croyons cependant, a-t-il précisé, que nous devons tenter de vous égaier, sinon de vous surpasser, en utilisant vos propres instrument.”⁷⁷ Whether this was a genuine grassroots shift in some Canadian newspapers' conceptions

of their place in the world, or whether it was overblown political bravado, statements like these certainly constituted one of the biggest breaks in this study. These comments were a far cry from the cautious attitude of many newspapers at the beginning of the decade, and from the Quiet Diplomacy of Pearson in 1967. By 1970, after a decade of caution and measured responses, some Canadian newspapers were perhaps ready to move beyond how Canada expressed itself at that moment in time. Given the position adopted in *Le Droit* and the gradual introduction of a similar orientation appearing towards the end of the month in both *L'Action* and *Le Soleil*, one could posit that this shift was more rapidly taking shape within the French-language press than among English-language newspapers. Indeed, a tendency towards multilateral views of Canada rather than bilateral views seemed to have been more quickly evolving among several (though not all) of Canada's French-language papers.

That possible general tendency aside, however, a similar drive for moving away from the old and towards the new was expressed in the *Vancouver Citizen*. The *Vancouver Citizen* was one of the few newspapers that explained to its readers that the justification for the older three-mile jurisdiction was that it had been "as far as a heavy gun could fire a single cannon ball."⁷⁸ Perhaps one of the best metaphors for abolishing the old three-mile limit and accepting the new twelve-mile version was the recognition that in 1970, countries had the technological capabilities that allowed them to effectively monitor and thus protect much farther than three miles off of their coast. The article, which also combined the needs of both sovereignty and pollution, suggested that Canada

would meet little international resistance because of rising global concerns about pollution and fish conservation.⁷⁹

Another *Vancouver Citizen* article covered the American objections, but cited a host of previous anti-pollution treaties and measures which many countries, but not the U.S., had accepted in the past; moreover, even given that context, the article suggested that the type of protection in the Arctic bill was something without any real precedent.⁸⁰ This newspaper painted a picture of an international context that was drawing American ire, yes, but more so because the U.S. was lagging behind other countries' efforts to deal with the new realities of ocean pollution. The Arctic bills then were not presented as a Canadian-American issue *per se*, but something Canada was doing on its own, a projection of its sovereignty not because of the Americans, but because it represented steps the country had to take, and which many other countries around the globe were themselves in the midst of taking. The United States was still present and still a barrier, but it was being subsumed, or perhaps singled out, as one major and proximate example of a larger set of problems.

As mentioned above, the two largest Vancouver papers experienced a major publication halt during April of 1970, but the *Vancouver Sun* did feature some coverage of the issue in May. Because of the later timeframe, the *Sun* also offered a taste of how the new Canadian international stance was being received. In an article covering a major press conference held by Humble Oil Co. (owners of the *Manhattan*) that concerned the long-term feasibility of an oil-shipping project, a spokesman for Humble foresaw "no difficulty tied to the

question of Canadian authority over Arctic waters.” According to the piece, the company had interpreted the new Canadian legislation as appropriate and anticipated. “Humble has assumed Canada would want to exert some control over the ships coming into the Arctic.” While the article noted. “[t]he U.S. government has protested both the proposal for the Arctic pollution protection and the declaration of the 12-mile territorial limit,” the *Manhattan* itself flew the Canadian flag when it docked at Baffin Island despite its government’s position. The company’s spokesman said they always flew the Canadian flag whenever they were at a Canadian port, and the article noted “There was no real requirement to fly it on this occasion... .”⁸¹

Standing in as a post-script to the *Manhattan* story, it appeared as if the company responsible not only had no objections to Canadian assertions of sovereignty, but also actively respected them, and almost promoted them. This coverage almost made the United States appear as the backward-looking party, the country, unlike Canada, which desired to cling to a legal framework based on centuries-old military weapons, rather than on the realities of the twentieth century. Was this what Prime Minister Trudeau had meant when he “emphasized the move was not anti-American... it is positive and it is forward-looking?”⁸² Was he suggesting, at some level, that bringing the U.S. into the equation was negative and regressive?


Portraits of Dominance

Among the newspapers studies in 1970, a total of fifteen cartoons dealt directly with the Arctic issue, and another ten provided commentary on the issue of pollution. Among those concerning the Arctic, two-thirds presented the issue as a bilateral one, and only three could be said to plausibly suggest otherwise. That the third perceptual orientation from the text (a new Canada in the international community) did not emerge in cartoons is not surprising given that the papers that most strongly advocated that perspective did not run cartoons. As such, it was the importance of the first two viewpoints in that were strongly underscored by the visual evidence.

However, more so that most of the other time periods explored in this thesis, the focus and message of many of the cartoons did not always directly follow all of the papers' textual orientations. For instance, although the *Ottawa Citizen* (which had presented the voyage of the *Manhattan* as an American incursion) featured four cartoons on the Arctic issue, two of them did not even include representations of the United States. Two other such newspapers followed similar diverse patterns: the *Ottawa Journal*, a newspaper with a strong 'incursionist' focus, featured four cartoons depicting the Arctic issue, but also featured three dealing with pollution; the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, which had held to an anti-pollution interpretation in the text, produced four cartoons dealing with that topic, but also featured three on the Arctic issue, two of which were unambiguously presenting the Arctic issue as one of bilateral sovereignty. Even more noticeable was the fact that of the fifteen cartoons that dealt specifically

with the Arctic issue, only four presented the United States as the dominant figure. By contrast, seven depicted Canada in a position of major influence: two presented Canada as equal to the U.S., three as larger than the U.S., and two without even an American presence in the frame.

What is most interesting about these images is that by most measures, the dominant depictions of the U.S. symbol were technically correct: not only was the American economy, population, and world influence significantly greater than the Canadian, but even the physical size of the ships actually involved seemed to echo that discrepancy. Thus, a cartoon appearing in the *Ottawa Citizen* just after the release of the bill depicting a simply monstrous *Manhattan* about to run over a tiny vessel marked "Canada" was probably closest to physical reality [Fig. 6-4].



6-4

The cartoon, which also features two tiny igloos in the foreground marked "RCMP" and "HBC", poked fun at the seeming ridiculousness of Canadian claims. In a way that almost echoed the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald's* questioning

of whether or not Canada would even be able to enforce its new rules, the Canadian vessel, which is not much bigger than the *Manhattan's* anchor, is "Claiming the Right of Way."

A similar imbalance of power was presented in a cartoon that appeared in both the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* and the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*. In it the *Manhattan* is being pushed forward by a gargantuan Uncle Sam [Fig. 6-5].

Acting as more of a nuisance than a threat is a pocket-sized Pierre Trudeau, who, peeking out from Uncle Sam's pants with a pin (which appears as a sword due to his small size), states, "I may not be able to stop you but at least I can make you squirm."



6-5

It is useful to note that even in this somewhat "classic" depiction of American power versus a flailing Canadian symbol, there are implications of the pollution aspect of the bills. For instance, the pin in Trudeau's hand reads "Arctic Control Legislation," which is a reference to the 100-mile pollution bill, not the 12-mile limit legislation. More telling is the massive cigar in Uncle Sam's mouth, which

stands out because cartoon depictions of Uncle Sam do not usually have him smoking. Moreover, the trail of smoke coming from his cigar is a thick, black stream that trails off into the distance, more reminiscent of a smokestack than of the cloudy puff of smoke usually associated with tobacco.

Taking a look at the two cartoons that presented Canada and the United States as equals, some subtleties emerge. The cartoon from the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* is surprising only in that the paper was committed to an anti-pollution interpretation of events. Instead, we have a more quintessential bilateral scene: an aggressive and determined parka-wearing Pierre Trudeau is busy hammering a Canadian flag down into the Arctic soil, while at the base of the flagpole, a relentless (and likewise parka-wearing) Richard Nixon continues to shake it out of the ground [Fig. 6-6]. In the background we see several other flagpoles, each adorned with Canadian flags, and each bent out of shape because of a recent wrangle between these two figures. Neither figure, then, is willing to give up their fight.



6-6



6-7

On the other hand, we have a similar Arctic scene in the *Pacific Tribune*; both Trudeau and Nixon sit at an ice-fishing spot, adorned in parkas [Fig. 6-7]. It seems that this cartoonist, however, elected to present the more negative interpretations of Western leaders that most often appeared in the *Tribune* (even though this was not really the case in April of 1970). Looming behind both figures is a massive polar bear with “American initiative” marked on its back. Trudeau is clearly scared by the bear, and offers tiny yelp of “scat,” to which a huckster-faced Nixon replies “Not so loud. We might frighten it.” The message here may be that although potential an equal to Nixon, Trudeau is letting the American president convince him that he is in fact defenseless against America’s plans.

Most surprising due to a sheer defiance of frequency were those cartoons depicting Canada in a dominant position versus the U.S. In one from *Le Soleil* – its only cartoon on the subject – the *Manhattan*, which in other cartoons was usually was usually the dominant object in the frame, is dwarfed by an iceberg in the shape of Pierre Trudeau’s head [Fig. 6-8]. The Trudeau representation, despite the size of the ship, is clearly calling the shots, and there seems no way for the tanker to circumvent it.



6-8


As another reference to environmental protection, a small group of Arctic animals have gathered on the top of the iceberg-head, and all gaze or motion confidently at the oil tanker as if emboldened by Trudeau's protection. In another, even rarer depiction, this one appearing in the *Ottawa Citizen*, Trudeau and Nixon are presented as children who have just fought over an ice cream bar (whose stick is marked "Arctic Sovereignty") [Fig. 6-9]. Trudeau, who is clearly both the dominant figure and the victor, is walking away from Nixon, happily licking the ice cream, which he has taken from him. Nixon is instead licking his wounds; with one hand left empty and the other on his hip, he is literally pouting like a child, powerless to do anything but stare in sadness at his lost prize.



As Canadian as Eskimo pie

6-9


The power and dominance afforded to Trudeau in these depictions carried over into images that were completely absent of the United States. In one striking example from the *Ottawa Citizen*, Trudeau⁸³ is a toga-wearing, trident-holding Roman god, riding a chariot over the waves of the ocean [Fig. 6-10]. The chariot, which is adorned with a Maple Leaf, is being pulled by two horses labeled "Twelve-mile Limit" and "Arctic Pollution Bill," references to bills C-202 and C-203. Muscular and holding the reigns of his horses in only one hand, Trudeau has the look of invincibility on his face.



6-10

This type of image suggests a confidence that is not dependent on any other national point of reference than its own.

Whether this independent confidence could have carried over into other cartoons is left unknown; what is missing in this sample is a significant entry from those papers that most strongly pushed the “newer”, more global Canadian perspective. Given the strike at the *Vancouver Sun*, and the usual reticence of *Le Droit* to publish cartoons on a regular basis, we are left with only the single *Vancouver Citizen* image to stand for an entire group, and that image was concerned with pollution, not the Arctic legislation. It is pointless to attempt any guesses at what *might* have been included in papers like the *Sun*, and only one cartoon in the sample – originating from the *Dartmouth Free Press* and depicting a not-so-politically-correct encounter between some Inuit and a passing Russian submarine [Fig. 6-11] – suggests the type of multilateral consciousness some newspapers were flirting with in the text.



6-11

However, even if we examine only those cartoons depicting both an American and a Canadian symbol, it is striking, again due to its rarity, to discover that there are just as many images depicting a dominant Canadian representative as there are depicting a dominant American one, and that two others represented them as equals. Compared to earlier events, when even one depiction of a Canadian as dominant over or equal to an American was rare, and coupled with the confidence imbibed in many of those Canadian symbols, it seems possible that a symbolic shift in many Canadian newspapers' perceptions of Americans and of Canada's relationship to the United States, or else to the world itself, was underway.

Conclusion

A news report filed on April 10, 2004, provided coverage of the latest exploits of Canadian soldiers involved in the Enhanced Sovereignty Patrol. This group, consisting of teams on snowmobiles and equipped to set up a nightly

arctic camp, was on route from Resolute to Alert, Nunavut, the Northern-most outpost in Canadian territory. The price tag of sponsoring this high-profile mission into the most inhospitable reaches of the Canadian Arctic, the third such endeavour since 2002, was \$500,000, a significant percentage of the Canadian military's annual budget. What was the reason offered by the Canadian government for spending this kind of sum to drive around a desolate and nearly unpopulated stretch of Canadian land? Asserting Canadian presence in the North. These soldiers, so said the report, were literally placing Canadian "footprints" where there may not have been any before. This was absolutely crucial, believed the soldiers, because many nations, such as Russia and Denmark, did not necessarily agree with Canada's claim over so much Arctic territory. More importantly, given that the land could yield few resources, the adjoining waterways had become the primary focus. Given the level of present technology, these waterways could now be more easily navigated. The availability of a shortcut between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans had become the region's most precious commodity.⁸⁴

The desire to control the Northwest Passage, a quest reaching back several centuries, has dotted Canadian international policy for over a hundred years and, as evidenced by this CBC report, continues to play itself out. What proved most intriguing in the 2004 version, was that Canada's international competitors for control of those frigid waters, came from Europe and from Asia. From the perspective of the 1970s, that political environment was years away, and before it would come to pass, Canada would tangle several more times,

most notably in 1985, with the United States over Arctic jurisdiction.⁸⁵ The events of 1970, however, offer something of a preview of what could come to pass. Part and parcel, it seemed, with many Canadian newspapers' weakening identification of the U.S. as "us," came an awareness both of broader concerns, and a more acute awareness of the existence of a truly international community.

The evidence in this study revealed two notable tendencies. First, it suggested that several newspapers, especially those based in Halifax, adhered to a more anti-pollution interpretation. The recent crash of the Arrow and the planned route of the Manhattan, which threatened to bring waves of massive tankers by the Nova Scotia coast each year, surely influenced this focus. Rather than lash out at the United States for supporting this danger, many Haligonians instead focused on the overall environmental danger, appealing to a broader sense of community responsibility that could, and should, include the United States.

Second, several newspapers, but especially (most) French-language newspapers, tended to be more open to the growing multilateral prospects of Canada in international politics. Other regional tendencies were not apparent, nor did the religious press significantly engage in the Arctic issue in favour of any particular interpretation.⁸⁶ Whether or not the more multilateral-friendly orientation of the French-language press was the result of the significant changes occurring in Canada's Francophone community is beyond the purview of this study. What was striking, however, was that these components of the French-language press were not alone, but represented only the leading edge of

this broader new perspective. Unlike some of the conceptual splits featured in previous chapters, Canadian newspapers featured not only a split between those who interpreted the issue as endemic of Canadian-American relations and those who interpreted the bills via their anti-pollution elements (in a manner similar to, for example, those who focused on Civil Rights versus those who focused on the character of the United States in Chapter 3), but encouraged the emergence of a third interpretation which emphasized Canada's independent role in an increasingly multilateral global environment.

Was all of that rhetoric simply a new way to defy the United States? Were some Canadian newspapers attempting to break free of growing American dominance by feigning increased interest in Canada's global image and contributions? Perhaps. But even if this were the case, this represents an unmistakable break from the rhetoric we seen in the newspapers of this study throughout most of the 1960s. It thus is possible to suggest that the ultimate motivation for many Canadians' desire to become a more multilateral country was to break free of increasing bilateralism. In the end, rather than focusing on combating and curbing American influence, some Canadian newspapers headed in a new direction, forging new international goals that, at least in theory, superceded the bilateral relationship, or at least subsumed it in a more nuanced web of international relations.

Given the steadily increasing demands which many Canadian newspapers had expressed over the course of the decade for their government to finally take a stand on international issues, given the presence of some decreasing opinions

of the United States, and illustrated by the tendency over the course of the decade for some newspapers to view Americans more often as "other" than as "us," this new rhetoric for an independent Canadian place in the world was perhaps a logical consequence. Either way, what the evidence suggests is that although the "us/them", pro-/anti-American rubric informed perceptions of this issue in 1970, it was only one of several dynamics that did.

¹ As explored later in the text, both the *Vancouver Province* and the *Vancouver Sun* were on strike during the month of April 1970. It is reasonable to assume that had they not been, some positive press about the United States would have surfaced. Nonetheless, in the material examined in May, as in the other newspapers in the Vancouver area, none featured positive commentary on the United States, and were at best neutral.

² E.J. Dosman, ed. *The Arctic In Question*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp.58-61,121

³ John Honderich, *Arctic Imperative: Is Canada Losing the North?*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp.4-5.

⁴ In the age of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, North American military experts feared a Russian attack which would come towards the United States via the shortest route possible, over the North Pole and Canada. Though not explored in this work, much has been written on the military preoccupation with the Canadian Arctic. Some excellent starting points for that discussion are R.B. Byers and Michael Slack, eds. *Strategy and the Arctic*. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986) Gail Osherenko and Oran R. Young. *The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) especially Chapter 8, Dosman, ed. op. cit., and C.G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategic Interests and Canada's Northern Sovereignty* (Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 1978).

⁵ R.B. Myers and Michael Slack, eds. *Strategy and The Arctic*. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986), p.3.

⁶ William R. Morrison, "Eagle over the Arctic," in Coates, Kenneth S. and William R. Morrison. *Interpreting Canada's North*. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1989), p.170. See also International Insights, *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty*. Proceedings of the Ronald St. John Macdonald Symposium, 1986, p.14.

⁷ Morrison, op. cit., p.17.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p.171. This is also the chain of public reaction explored in Honderich, op. cit. Honderich notes that subsequent analysis of the government's reaction to the American incursion is evidence that its efforts have been faulty, ad-hoc, and weak. p.26.

¹⁰ Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p.116, Dosman ed., op. cit., pp. 38-50.

¹¹ Bothwell, op. cit., p.117. The shortest time to that point, save for submarines, had been about 8 weeks long and was considered extremely dangerous. For a more detailed chronology of the first voyage of the *Manhattan* in 1969 and the subsequent Canadian response, see Griffiths, ed., *Politics of the Northwest Passage*. (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), pp.70-84 and Dosman Ed., op. cit., pp. 42-52. For an excellent map and geographical description of that route, see Donat Pharand, *Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.204-207, and Honderich, op. cit., pp.42-43.

¹² Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, *Arctic Diplomacy: Canada and the United States in the Northwest Passage*. (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1998), p.141 and Edelgard E. Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, *An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations*. (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1989), p.254

¹³ Ibid., p.253.

¹⁴ For examples, see Mahant and Mount op. cit., Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the world to the 1990s*. (Toronto: CoppClark Longman Ltd: 1994) and Shelagh D. Grant, *Sovereignty or Security?: Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950*. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), p.378.

¹⁵ Dosman, ed., op. cit., p.41.

¹⁶ For example, Elliot-Meisel, op. cit., p.142, Dosman, op. cit., p.53 and Morrison, op. cit., p.179.

¹⁷ Dosman, ed., op. cit., pp.122-123, Honderich, op. cit., p.51 and John Kirton and Don Munton, "The *Manhattan* Voyages and Their Aftermath" in Franklin Griffiths, op. cit., p.70.

¹⁸ International Insights, pp.10-12, Honderich, op. cit., p.51.

¹⁹ Griffiths, ed., op. cit., p.72.

²⁰ Ibid., p.70. However, Kirkton and Munton maintain that the real story of this event is its policy angle, writing that the episode "reveals a government whose physical assets, creative professionalism, and internal debates were ultimately more important in determining Canadian behaviour and international outcomes than the strong, competing pressures exerted by actors at home and abroad." (p. 96).

²¹ For a description of these bills, see Griffiths, ed., op. cit., pp.91-92 and Pharand, op. cit. p.235; for a more detailed discussion of their legal basis, see Pharand, op. cit., pp.215-238. Beyond the obvious objections the Americans would raise against this legislation, namely the potential for other nations to claim the same territorial rights, these two bills gave birth to a number of very specific implications. Most notably, while at various points much larger in width than 100 miles, both entrances to the ends of the Northwest passage were only 24 miles wide, effectively bringing the entire waterway under the reach of the anti-pollution measures. As another aside, because Canada has the biggest coastline in the world, the extension of the limit from 3 to 12 miles would mean a 10% increase in the effective dimensions of the country, and constituted one of the largest extensions of jurisdiction in history in terms of sheer size.

²² Dosman, ed., op. cit., pp.53-55, Griffiths, ed., op. cit., p.93.

²³ As is discussed below, this could be prompted either because the *Manhattan* was a delegate of an American oil company, because of expanding global American interests, or because of growing American (economic and military) ambitions in the Arctic circle.

²⁴ In other words, as is subsequently reviewed, rather than gauging the degree of Canada's independence on some sort of imaginary scale where close ties to and emulation of Americans and American policy constituted less independence, and the opposite indicated more, several newspapers seemed to be judging Canada's independence in terms of how it voiced itself in the world community, and the degree to which it was willing to forge its own path, and even become a leader, without the assent of *any* nation, the United States or otherwise

²⁵ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 10, 1970, p.6.

²⁶ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 13, 1970, p.6.

²⁷ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 3, 1970, p.7.

²⁸ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 7, 1970, p.23.

²⁹ Most newspapers waited either until official opposition arose from Washington, or at least until there were rumours of such opposition in Ottawa.

³⁰ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 8, 1970, p.6.

³¹ *Ottawa Journal*, April 7, 1970, p.6.

³² *Ottawa Journal*, April 15, 1970, p.3.

³³ *L'Action*, April 13, 1970, p.6.

³⁴ *Ottawa Journal*, April 15, 1970, p.3.

³⁵ *Ottawa Journal*, April 20, 1970, p.9.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ *L'Action*, April 10, 1970, p.1.

³⁸ *L'Action*, April 10, 1970, p.8.

³⁹ *L'Action*, April 15, 1970, pp.1-2.

⁴⁰ *L'Action*, April 18, 1970, p.2.

⁴¹ *Ottawa Journal*, April 16, 1970, p.6.

⁴² *Ottawa Journal*, April 18, 1970, p.1.

⁴³ *Ottawa Journal*, April 20, 1970, p.20.

⁴⁴ *L'Action*, April 16, 1970, p.18.

- ⁴⁵ *Le Soleil*, April 11, 1970, p.5.
- ⁴⁶ *Le Soleil*, April 13, 1970, p.13.
- ⁴⁷ to appear in the least bit consistent, they needed at least to object officially to the Canadian legislation.
- ⁴⁸ *Le Soleil*, April 15, 1970, p.4.
- ⁴⁹ *Le Soleil*, April 25, 1970, p.5.
- ⁵⁰ *Le Soleil*, April 25, 1970, p.5.
- ⁵¹ *Le Soleil*, April 25, 1970, p.7.
- ⁵² *Le Soleil*, April 29, 1970, p.3. For instance, making different decisions on oil imports and Arctic sovereignty carried much more weight on the relationship than NATO participation or multilateral forces in Nigeria.
- ⁵³ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 9, 1970, p.14.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁵ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 9, 1970, p.1.
- ⁵⁶ *Pacific Tribune*, April 24, p.4. Even in that editorial, the Arctic issue was somewhat couched in a host of other, seemingly more important Canadian-American issues of sovereignty, such as demands that Ottawa "Stop the Sell-out of Canada's Energy Resources," and "Provide Jobs by Developing Our Natural Resources for the People." In short, the Arctic issue was not the galvanizing call for Canadian independence from the United States that it was in newspapers who had begun fighting for that cause much more recently than the *Tribune*.
- ⁵⁷ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 10, 1970, p.1.
- ⁵⁸ Providing potentially different forum of opinion was the newly-established *4th Estate*. Given its novelty, absence in other time periods, and general lack of coverage on the Arctic issue, I did not cover it in the text, though it was included in the LIB calculations. An examination of this newspaper would be advisable for any study of Halifax in the 1970s, however; its promise is reflected in comments such as "it should be interesting over the next few years to watch an internationalist and anti-nationalist Prime Minister [Trudeau] cope with an increasing nationalistic public attitude on the Arctic..." (*4th Estate*, April 23, 1970).
- ⁵⁹ *Maritime Command Trident*, April 2, p.4, April 16, 1970, p.1, 3.
- ⁶⁰ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, April 9, 1970, p.1.
- ⁶¹ One does note a large number of articles in both papers dealing not only with arctic pollution, but a multitude of articles discussing everything from damage to the Great Lakes to new concerns over littering and noise pollution.
- ⁶² On its second voyage, the *Manhattan* met its Canadian escort for the trip, the *St. Laurent*, only 70 miles Southeast of Halifax (*Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, April 6, p.2). In addition, the editors noted that some estimates put the potential size of a spill from a ship the size of the *Manhattan* at fifteen times what was lost from the *Arrow*.
- ⁶³ *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, April 13, 1970, p.6.
- ⁶⁴ *Dartmouth Free Press*, April 23, 1970, p.4.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁶ *The Fulcrum*, September 29, 1970, p.4.
- ⁶⁷ *Almonte Gazette*, April 16, 1970, p.2.
- ⁶⁸ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 17, 1970, p.1.
- ⁶⁹ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 18, 1970, p.11.
- ⁷⁰ *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 20, 1970, p.1.
- ⁷¹ *Ubysey*, March 3, 1970, p.12.
- ⁷² *Dartmouth Free Press*, April 30, 1970, p.10.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁴ *Le Droit*, April 9, 1970, p.1.
- ⁷⁵ *Le Droit*, April 13, 1970, p.6.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁷ *Le Droit*, April 18, 1970, p.2.
- ⁷⁸ In other words, coastal forts could not do anything about ships beyond that point anyways, so it was considered the "high seas". *Vancouver Citizen*, April 15, p.12.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁰ *Vancouver Citizen*, April 22, 1970, p.22.
- ⁸¹ *Vancouver Sun*, May 26, 1970, p.18.

⁸² *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 16, 1970, p.14.

⁸³ Trudeau was indeed the overwhelming choice to represent "Canada" in this set of cartoons. While that choice may appear as an odd one, given that the bills were actually introduced by Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Jean Chrétien, that support came from many different government sources, and given the criticism Trudeau himself received along the way, it may be a reflection of a broader identification with Trudeau as the leader capable of creating a more independent, confident Canada.

⁸⁴ "Enhanced Sovereignty Patrol," *CBC News: The National*. CBC, April 10, 2004.

⁸⁵ The voyage of an American icebreaker, the *Polar Sea* through the Northwest Passage in August of 1985 would re-open the Arctic debate in a major way; this time, the American ship proceeded on the declaration that the passage was an international straight. As a result, the Canadian government would enclose the channels of the Arctic archipelago, making them Canadian waters as of January 1, 1986. A good starting point for specific details, including the full text of the resulting 1965 Canadian "Statement on Sovereignty" would be Franklyn Griffiths "Beyond the Arctic Sublime" in Franklyn Griffiths, op cit.

⁸⁶ While none of the religion-based papers significantly engaged the Arctic issue per se, there was at least some circumstantial evidence that the North was making an appearance in Canadians consciousness. The *Diocesan Times*, for instance, ran an article on Evangelism in the Arctic, focusing on a gathering of Inuit who, with the help of an "Eskimos interpreter," discussed matters of faith. (*Diocesan Times*, April 1970, p.6).

CONCLUSION

This thesis has systematically examined the news stories, editorials, letters, and cartoons of twenty different Canadian newspapers in four widely separated urban areas about five different events over the course of a decade. Each of these events – the 1960 U.S. election, the Cuban missile crisis, the Watts riot, Walter Gordon's criticism of the Vietnam war, and the arctic voyage of the *Manhattan* -- elicited commentary on the United States. If placed together, what does analysis of these five events suggest? How does an entire decade of LIB analysis add to our understanding of Canadian newspaper opinion? While each chapter suggested distinct patterns and insights for each event, an examination of the overall scores as they spanned the decade emphasizes the similarity among positive scores, with the partial exception of a noteworthy difference between the score from 1962 and 1965. In other words, many Canadian newspapers articulated positive views of American behaviour over the course of the decade; such views that some of the Canadians who wrote or drew cartoons in these newspapers thought of Americans as part of the in-group.

At the same time, however, the LIB analyses reveal much more significant differences in negative scores across the decade. The evidence indicates that Canadian views of American behaviour of which they disapproved underwent considerable change after 1962. Initially, many Canadian newspapers described such American actions in more abstract terms, using language that placed them firmly within the Canadian in-group. By 1967, however, newspaper coverage of U.S. behaviour of which they disapproved had moved markedly towards the

	1960		1962		1965		1967		1970	
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
La Rotonde										
Almonte Gazette										
B.C. Catholic										
Jewish Western Bulletin										
Vancouver Province										
Vancouver Sun										
Pacific Tribune										
Vancouver Citizen										
Ubyyssey										

Note: An empty box suggests that newspaper displayed no overwhelming preference either way in that year

Legend:

P = "Pro" American Policy

A = "Anti" American Policy

The table illustrates that some newspapers strongly advocated a pro-American policy while others strongly advocated an anti-American policy. But the persistent decision of many newspapers not to advocate either policy suggests that Canadian perceptions of the United States during the 1960s cannot be understood in terms of a simple binary of "pro-" and "anti-"American. For example, during both Kennedy's election and during the discussion of the two Arctic Protection bills, many newspapers did not pass judgment on the United States one way or the other; in contrast, almost every paper offered some commentary on Walter Gordon's economic nationalism in 1967. This tendency was particularly noticeable among certain papers. The *Ubyyssey*, the *Almonte Gazette*, and the *Dartmouth Free Press*, all of which had opposed American policy in 1967, did not do so in 1970, although other newspapers did (instead, these three newspapers made pollution their primary concern). This tendency to fall outside the binary of pro- and anti-Americanism agrees with recent research by Michael Adams. In *Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada, and the Myth of*

Converging Values, Adams suggests that the Canadians who answered his surveys showed themselves neither to be strongly pro-American, nor strongly anti-American, but instead demonstrated “a more subtle and nuanced orientation.”¹

The views expressed in the newspapers reviewed in this project were not only diverse among newspapers, but changed over time within the same newspaper; no paper either consistently supported or consistently criticized the United States throughout all five events examined in this study. For instance, the *Vancouver Province*, *Le Soleil* and the *Ottawa Journal*, all of which had supported U.S. positions in 1962 and 1967 had become in 1970 among the most outspoken supporters of Canadian assertion of Arctic sovereignty versus the U.S. The *Ottawa Citizen* seems to have made that shift much earlier; it supported the United States in 1962, and yet was one of its most vocal opponents in both 1967 and 1970.

Diversity of opinion was also characteristic of the editorial cartoons reviewed in this study. In all, seventy-nine cartoons dealt with the events under study and featured a depiction of the United States. In order to examine exactly how cartoonists interpreted the intentions and actions of the U.S., I placed each cartoon into one of three categories based on three traits: (1) aggressiveness, (2) benevolence, or (3) passivity. Thus, the questions were:


(1) whether the U.S. was portrayed as a threat (in other words, acting selfishly, provocatively, or deviously) [Fig. 7-1];

(2) whether the U.S. appeared to be benevolent (in other words, acting unselfishly in the interests of others) [Fig. 7-2], or

(3) whether it was simply "a cast member", one figure among many in a complex scenario [Fig. 7-3].




7-1



7-2

Quel langage. -!



7-3

Fig 7-1 depicts an aggressive President Kennedy, one who is going after Khrushchev with a weapon and is outraged at his mere proximity, despite the fact that he barely has a toe on the continental U.S. Fig. 7-2 features a proud, strong President Johnson who stands protectively over the "scales of justice." In the

spirit of Abraham Lincoln, whom the artists suggest Johnson echoes, Johnson has helped restore equilibrium to the racial balance of the United States. Fig 7-3, an example of a passive depiction, has a delighted JFK listening in on a fight between the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and China in the other room. Unlike the other leaders a horrified French President de Gaulle, or British Prime Minister Macmillan who spies through the keyhole, or German Chancellor Adenauer who sticks his fingers in his ears, Kennedy's emotional state is barely animated. Moreover, although he is enjoying the internal battle in the other room, he is doing nothing to influence their actions.

The results of the cartoon analysis [Table 7-2] suggest that, over time and across regions, aggressiveness and passivity occurred with almost the same frequency. In 94% of the cartoons, the United States was depicted as either the instigator or the bystander in virtually an identical number of cases. Only in 6% of the cartoons was the United States represented as a benevolent character.

There were three significant exceptions to this pattern. First, Ottawa newspapers represented the U.S. as passive 62% of the time, by far the most often in any city, and this was the case for the *Ottawa Citizen*, the *Ottawa Journal*, and *Le Droit*. Second, the only systematic over-representation of incidences of benevolence occur in the French-language newspapers, which present such an image 10% of the time, a trend also reflected in Quebec City's breakdown, which featured benevolent images 11% of the time. Third, a significant difference over time emerges if we compare the beginning of the

decade with the end; though they began on even ground, by the end of the 1960s, depictions of the United States shifted away from a balance between aggressive and passive to a 67% incidence of aggressiveness. The best predictor of depicting aggressive behaviour – the general shift towards negative portrayals of the U.S. seen in the LIB results – is reflected here.²

Table 7-2:
Projected Action of U.S. Symbol by Newspaper

Paper	U.S. represented	Symbol Aggressive	Symbol Passive	Symbol Benevolent
Ottawa Citizen	17	6	9	2
Quebec Chr-Tel	9	4	4	1
Halifax Chr-Hld	8	7	1	0
Le Soleil	5	3	2	0
Vancouver Province	8	3	4	1
Pacific Tribune	13	8	5	0
Ottawa Journal	9	3	6	0
Vancouver Sun	4	2	2	0
L'Action	2	1	0	1
Dalhousie Gazette	1	1	0	0
Droit	3	0	3	0
Total	79	38	36	5
Total Percentage		48%	46%	6%
Region				
Halifax	9	89%	11%	0%
Quebec City	16	50%	38%	12%
Ottawa	29	31%	62%	7%
Vancouver	25	52%	44%	4%
Language				
English-Language	69	49%	45%	6%
French-Language	10	40%	50%	10%
Time Period				
1960	15	53%	47%	0%
1970	12	67%	33%	0%

Canada and the U.S. both have a symbol representing them in the same cartoon 20 different times throughout the sample. In those incidences, the U.S.

appeared as the dominant symbol 11 times, and as equal with Canada 4 times. The Canadian symbol is dominant 5 times. In almost all cases, the United States was represented by either the American President in a standing position, or by a version Uncle Sam, one of the most pervasive cartoonist's tropes for the United States in the 20th century.³ Uncle Sam and most presidents represent dominant, powerful, masculine figures, a clear symbol of how many Canadians in the 1960s saw the U.S., especially when compared to other countries.

In many of the appearances of both Canadian and American representatives, the Canadian symbol was diminutive, sometimes positioned awkwardly [Fig. 7-4], or powerless and at the mercy of the Americans [Fig. 7-5]. In Fig. 7-4, both John F. Kennedy and John Diefenbaker are presented as cowboys. Kennedy (despite the fact that he was from Massachusetts) resembles the archetypal western American cowboy: lean, sturdy, confident, and heavily armed. In contrast, Diefenbaker is not only smaller and less confident, but stands awkwardly and is dressed in attire that makes him look more like a tourist at a dude ranch rather than like someone who is actually qualified for the role. Fig. 7-5 presents an even starker contrast in power between the two countries.



7-4

7-5

Intriguingly, several of the images where the Canadian symbol dominated reversed the roles, placing the Canadian symbol as the dominant, masculine figure while emasculating the American representative. In Fig. 7-6, it is Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau who exudes the signs of strength and victory, while his American counterpart, Richard Nixon, is powerless. In this image, all Nixon can muster is a pouting expression of childhood sadness, and a longing look at Trudeau's prize. Instead, it is often only when both symbols are presented as equals that they are allowed to appear as passive or weak. As an example, Fig. 7-7 presents both Canada and the United States as participants at a conference following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both these countries (as well as several others outside of the frame) are depicted fairly passively, trapped behind mountains of papers and procedures, which they hope will help inform them about the problem and a potential solution. Instead, it is only the Russian representative who is active.



As Canadian as Eskimo pie



7-6

7-7

Potential Role of Region and Language

The findings of the LIB analysis also reveal the role played by language and region in Canadian portraits of the U.S. Surprisingly – given all of the attention scholars have focused upon regional variation in Canada⁴ – region was not an indicator of how Americans would be perceived. The regions' assessments of positive and negative behaviour were not significantly different. The only exception was Vancouver, in which positive behaviour was perceived more often than negative behaviour, with the result that Vancouver's score for positive behaviour was the highest of any city. Again, the fact that regional identification did not play a determining role in newspaper perception is one we can comprehend. As Philip Buckner has suggested, "Canadians, like other peoples, hold multiple identities simultaneously"; rather than region being the paramount identity, it is its role in the interrelationship between region and other forms of identity, "such as gender, ethnicity, class, age and sexual orientation" that matters.⁵

The results across linguistic groups were also consistent. In the case of the French-language papers, the difference between portrayals of negative and positive behaviour was small. For English-language newspapers, the scores for positive behaviour were slightly higher, suggesting more identification of the United States as "other" within English-language communities than French-language communities. While this finding lends support to established

discussions of English-Canadian identity, the difference in scores is, in fact, quite small.

Indeed, there was no strong, and certainly no uniform, position taken among the French-language papers that significantly differentiated them from the range of views expressed in the English-language papers about the United States. Moreover, more of the articles that I examined used the French-language identity as a marker that differentiated Canada from the United States than used it to that differentiate French-Canadians from English-Canadians. For example, in April of 1970, *Le Droit* featured an article on the comments of Jean-Louis Gagnon, co-chair of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, who stated that, "Le bilinguisme constitue un rempart contre l'annexion du Canada aux Etats-Unis" and that as Canadians, "[n]ous sommes des Américains avec une autre dimension..."⁶ In another instance, as a Parti Québécois victory impended in the Quebec provincial election of 1970, an editorial in *Le Soleil* expressed a conviction that "[p]ar la force de la volonté et l'union de ses deux grands groupes ethniques, il s'est édifié d'est en ouest afin de mieux résister à l'attraction naturelle qui l'inclinait vers le grand voisin du sud." Thus, by working together, French- and English-Canadians had created a space in which they could join to resist the U.S. (a space which, *Le Soleil* warned, would be in jeopardy if the PQ were elected).⁷

Fundamental to understanding Canadian newspapers' perceptions of the United States, however, is the extent to which many newspapers perceived

Americans *both* as “one of us” *and* as “one of them”. Different regions, ideologies, classes, ethnicities, and language groups within Canada did, from time to time, hold different ideas of where Americans could be fitted into their understanding of the universe, and that place shifted from time to time. However, taken together, the textual analysis, the LIB, and the cartoon analysis all suggest that in the context of this study, neither region nor language, stand out as a determinant of Canadian newspapers’ perceptions of the United States, at least during the 1960s. The only slight exception to this pattern was again Vancouver: Combining a higher-than-average incidence of positive LIB attribution, the highest rate of Americans portrayed as passive in the cartoons, and the tendency for the *Vancouver Province* and the *Vancouver Sun* to more readily present positive views of American policy, Vancouver newspapers were, relative to those in Halifax, Quebec City, and Ottawa, pro-American.

Political ideology (conservative vs. liberal) more than region or language, appears to have accounted for certain small differences. Although not significant in the LIB analysis, conservative-minded papers such as the *Vancouver Province*, the *Ottawa Journal*, and smaller papers like the *Vancouver Citizen* did often give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt. However, just as the *Pacific Tribune*, furthest on the ideological left, did not always present negative portrayals of the U.S. , neither did the conservative papers always praise Americans. In 1965, the *Province*, unsupportive of African-American demands for Civil Rights, interpreted the problem as an American one, due in part to the American “tradition of violence” and their misguided need to establish “a brutal constabulary [as] an

essential counterweight to public toleration of mob rule and disorder,” none of which was said to be characteristic of Canada.⁸ In 1970, the *Ottawa Journal* joined the chorus of those who felt the presence of the *Manhattan* in the Arctic endangered Canadian sovereignty, and “could mean American domination of Canada’s last frontier.”⁹ In the end then, there was no consistent relationship between a newspaper’s political orientation and its views of the U.S.

General Conclusions

What are Canadian newspapers’ perceptions of the United States? The concluding analysis of this question can begin with the same quote presented at the beginning of this thesis, namely Frank Underhill’s suggestion that “a Canadian [is] the model anti-American, the ideal anti-American, the anti-American as conceived in the mind of God.”¹⁰ To this claim, J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer added “[t]here had always been some truth in that, but in the 1960s the tone became shrill,” that anti-Americanism, in the 1960s, “had become the Canadian national sport.”¹¹

Two claims in this statement are relevant to the 1960s: 1) that anti-Americanism had become the “Canadian national sport,” and 2) that in the 1960s, the tone of anti-Americanism had become “shrill.” On both counts, the evidence in this study does not support the words of Frank Underhill or of scholars such as Granatstein and Hillmer. Yes, it is true that at the end of the decade, Canadian newspapers seemed to be more willing to express negative opinions concerning the United States; however, the expressions were, for the

most part, neither extreme nor pervasive. Indeed, the evidence presented in this study suggests instead 1) that Canadian newspapers, at least in the 1960s, were not “anti-American” and 2) that there is no single “Canadian” perception of the United States.

The findings offer evidence in the following three areas: A) the extent of anti-Americanism in 1960s Canadian newspapers, B) the types of opinion on the United States circulating among Canadian newspapers, and C) the lack of effect which region and language had on newspaper opinion. They also suggest several avenues for further research.

Unlike what was suggested by several of the authors reviewed in the introduction, this study suggests that overall, Canadian newspapers in the 1960s were just not that anti-American. This is not to say that some in Canada were not critical of the United States, and is certainly not meant to suggest that most Canadians support the United States most of the time. As the evidence in this study suggests, many Canadian newspapers have actively promoted separation, both political and cultural, from the United States. What it does suggest, however, is that many Canadian newspapers did not treat Americans poorly when reporting on events in the 1960s. “Anti-Americanism,” was muted; Canadian newspapers did not actually give Americans a rough ride. In this study, the evidence suggests that many Canadian newspapers were more willing to see Americans as “other” by the end of the 1960s than they were at the beginning of the decade, but anti-Americanism was not the dominant attitude, even in 1970. Rather, in the words the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, Canada

and the United States were entering a state of “uncomfortableness”, and had become something of “uncomfortable neighbours.”¹²

Then again, optimism about the relationship remained present; an editorial on the same day predicted that the Arctic dispute would be resolved amicably: “The history of U.S.-Canadian relations is unique in world affairs for its closeness and cooperation. We are confident that, in this spirit, our two countries will continue to resolve our differences.”¹³ Perhaps the willingness of the paper to entertain both points of view simultaneously helped to blunt the possible effects of anti-American viewpoints.

Indeed, the above example from the *Chronicle-Telegraph* illustrates how Canadian-American relations were so often perceived by and discussed in Canadian newspapers; within the same space, only 3 pages apart in this case, two different articles spoke of, on the one hand, a deterioration of Canadian-American relations, while the other expressed confidence that it was business as usual. As is explored in this thesis, some of the most informative analysis emerges from engaging the grey line between a newspaper’s most explicit and reinforced commentary and the constant pushing back by columnists and readers writing to the editor. As a result, it is not contradictory to note that Canadian-American trade can boom at times when the popularity of the United States is at an all time low, or actual trade or policy barriers can exist in times when Canadians are quite receptive to and in admiration of U.S. initiatives. In other words, it may not be unusual for the priorities and needs of the United

States in Canada to be in sync and to vary from location to location and group to group, even within a particular city at any given time.

Is that the case of all international relations between any two given nations? Perhaps. But for Canada and Canadians, it would make little difference, because their relationship to the United States is so important to their economic, political, military, and social development and position, that any commonalities it may share with other countries has long been lost in the whirlwind of North American development.

Perhaps some Canadian newspapers, in their perpetual grappling with the question of Canadian identity, latched on to the idea of anti-Americanism as something solid and with a well-developed rhetoric flowing from all over the world (much of it from the United States itself), but never actually believed or internalized the rhetoric they tapped into. Perhaps, on the other hand, the findings in this study will meet with much resistance from some Canadians because it robs them of one of the strongest parts of their identity, their supposed shared dislike for all things American. One article claimed in 1960 that "The determination and desire to preserve and develop a separate identity" was a major feature of several of Canada's post-Aboriginal immigrant groups: the French settlers after the Revolution; the Highland Scots after the defeat of Bonnie Prince Charles; the Loyalists; even more recent groups like the Ukrainians and Jews who looked to start a new life, not to simply to repeat the old one. This cross-cultural desire, which may be one of the only things all of

these disparate cultures had in common, could have helped shape the subsequent national obsession with identity.¹⁴

Future Research

There are several possibilities for future research which this study suggests; these include expanding the research strategy to study other eras, newspapers, or regions, and following up on some of the more subtle but pervasive currents in the newspaper evidence, such as examining the influence of the United States on Canadian perceptions and the domestic need for what has been called “A Positive Canadianism.”

Expanding this study

One immediate possibility would be to expand the model of this study to examine additional evidence. According to the secondary literature, this study focused on a decade that should have produced some of the most vocal and vigorous negative portrayals of the United States. Given that this was not the case, and that the portrayals were cautious, balanced, and qualified, future research is called for on other time periods. As for immediate projects, taking this study into the 1970s would be a logical next step for this research. Was newspaper coverage different during the era of the “Third Option?” Did more newspapers come out against the U.S.? A comparison to the present day would also be instructive: what are the similarities and differences between Canadian

newspaper opinion on American intervention in Vietnam and Canadian newspaper opinion on American intervention in Iraq?

Another possibility would be to extend the study of newspapers into the ethnic press. Mark Stolarik's 1992 study *Slovaks in Canada and the United States, 1870-1990* suggests that Slovak ethnic communities in Canada, for example, did not create many newspapers because they subscribed to American ones.¹⁵ This not only informs our understanding of the lack of ethnic press found in the urban centres in this study, but speaks to notions of possible ethnic regional variations which would be an additional axis along which to extend this study. Thus, one strategy for gathering further evidence concerning the topics gathered in this thesis would be to study the newspapers of other linguistic and ethnic communities to examine any differences that such factors might account for when dealing with the Canadian-American relationship.

Moreover, this study could be extended would be to conduct a similar investigation of American perceptions of Canadians. How did Americans, for instance, conceptualize their largest neighbour and trading partner during the 1960s? Although consciousness of Canada in the United States is much less important in the U.S. than Canadians' consciousness of the U.S. is to Canada, there is nonetheless an American tradition of stereotyping Canada that has been studied by several authors.¹⁶ Systematic research in this area would help enhance our understanding of Canada and the United States by exploring and then integrating the manner in which both Canadians and Americans represent, discuss, and view each other.

Findings that point to further study

This study also revealed several patterns that suggest the need for further research. Running throughout this study was a minor, but palatable undercurrent of desire for a definition of Canada in the world that did not employ the United States as the key point of reference. That this dynamic appeared within the context of issues which concerned Canadian-American relations suggests that we need to enlarge our understanding of that dynamic, which is usually presented as a binary. During the election of Kennedy, this definition of reference point for Canadian identity appeared as a barely audible call for a "Positive Canadianism." In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was a reluctance by many to either endorse or condemn American actions too strongly, and an increased awareness of the new possibilities presented by the growing influence of non-superpower countries.

During the Watts Riot of 1965, several newspapers, especially those in the Halifax region, noted that Canada had some racial discrimination hurdles of its own to overcome, but that if it were honest and earnest, it could create a welcoming environment for all to reside. By 1967, many Canadian papers were honing in on the values they wished to project to the world, and started to expect their leaders to emulate them. Rather than "Quiet Diplomacy," some Canadian newspapers would push a new and "truly independent" position for Canada on the world stage.

By 1970, the rhetoric behind the push for a Canadian position became strong. Breaking away from the pattern of ups and downs that had come to characterize the bi-lateral relationship with the United States, some now actively pushed for a new international arrangement in which Canada participated not as part of an American alliance, but as a state independent of mind and goals. Bursting with confidence, this new outlook would, for some, finally realize the conceptions of "Positive Canadianism" that had developed throughout the decade.

The tendency for some newspapers to follow neither of the major American models of interpretation (positive or negative), and ignore the debate on an American topic also begs further exploration. Much of the writing on Canadian-American relations has tended to present opinion on the U.S. in Canada as a binary, suggesting either that a particular group or set of groups of Canadians identifies with the United States, or that a particular group or set of groups do not. A rhetorical space whereby U.S. as "other" (be it in a positive or a negative sense) does not exist, is rarely taken into account in Canadian-American relations.

In addition, there is the question of American influence on Canadian opinion. One might ask, for instance, the degree to which opinions expressed in Canadian newspapers actually originated among different segments of American society. Consider a quote presented in Chapter 3: a column in 1965 suggested that while the U.S. was for a time called "America the Beautiful," and then "America the Ugly," it was being called "America the Guilty" by 1967, with the

country condemned, especially by its own citizens, of wrong-doings before any evidence was even heard. "Not in 20 years of observation have I seen so many Americans so pantingly avid to condemn their own country and its every motive abroad."¹⁷ This self-imposed tendency among segments of the American population is surely part of the context within which Canadian newspapers' opinions were formed; given the fact that so many Canadian newspapers complained about bombardment from American magazines, radio, and television, and given the degree of self-criticism present in those media, Americans' own critical opinions of themselves must have been picked up by Canadians as well.¹⁸

As the evidence in this study has suggested, some Canadian newspapers did engage in an increasing anti-Americanism; many, however, did not, and even those who did would not really do so until the end of the decade. Moreover, by examining the opinions generated in four cities within four regions, it becomes evident that anti-Americanism was not the Canadian "national" sport in the 1960s.

In a 2005 address, Canada's ambassador to the United States, Frank McKenna, suggested that Canadians and Americans should endeavour to better understand one another so that they would more successfully weather the periodic storms that characterize international relations. From the Canadian side, policy-makers might also wish to examine the types of evidence presented in this thesis to see, for instance, if Canada is being portrayed as confident (as when, for example, it is drawn equal to or larger than the U.S.) or as vulnerable

or threatened (as when, for example, it is drawn as smaller, or else as a symbolic victim). When Canada is depicted as confident, policymakers could be more confident in proceeding with riskier plans; when Canada is represented as vulnerable, a more cautionary policy would be more politically popular. McKenna and other enthusiasts of Canadian-American relations may also benefit from including the recent methodological approaches used in this study, be it the examination of editorial cartoons or the use of the Linguistic Intergroup Bias to measure popular opinions.

Having systematically examined evidence from four Canadian cities throughout the 1960s, this study has found that Canadian newspaper discussion of Americans contains a versatile and diverse range of opinion, much of it without substantial negative sentiment directed towards the United States. As such, it encourages those who study Canadian-American relations to reexamine their understanding of that relationship, and to encourage an environment in which evidence, rather than only anecdote, helps both Canadians and Americans better understand the associations and links of their common North American realities.

¹ Michael Adams *Fire and Ice : The United States, Canada, and the Myth of Converging Values*. (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), p.142.

² The vast differential attained in the Halifax sample is interesting, but is probably due to the small sample size more than any real local pattern.

³ For discussion of Uncle Sam as a symbol, see Thomas H. Bevens, "The Body Politic: The Changing Shape of Uncle Sam," *Journalism Quarterly*. 1987, 64 (1): 13–20, John Higham, "America in Person", *Amerikastudien-American Studies [Germany]* 1991 36(4), p.481, and Stephen Hess and Milton Kaplan. *The Ungentlemanly Art: A History of American Political Cartoons*. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p.34–37.

⁴ For example, Joel Garreau, *The Nine Nations of North America*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), Edward Grabb and James Curtis, *Regions Apart: The Four Societies of Canada and the United States*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005), Gerald Freisen, "Homer's *Odyssey* and a Region of Rednecks: What Communication History Can Tell Us About Canada as a Country of Regions." *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 15, no.1-2 (2002): 27–41, John C. Hudson, *Across This Land: A Regional Geography of the United States and Canada*. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), and Phillip A. Buckner

and John G. Reid, eds. *The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History*. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994).

⁵ Bucker, P.A. "'Limited Identities' Revisited: regionalism and Nationalism in Canadian History," *Acadiensis*. 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000), p.12.

⁶ *Le Droit*, April 15, 1970, p.16.

⁷ *Le Soleil*, April 21, 1970, p.4.

⁸ *Vancouver Province*, March 23, 1965, p.4.

⁹ *Ottawa Journal*, April 7, 1970, p.6.

¹⁰ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), p.236.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Quebec Chronicle Telegraph*, April 24, 1970 p.1.

¹³ *Quebec Chronicle Telegraph*, April 24, 1970 p.4.

¹⁴ Inspired by *Vancouver Sun*, November 23, 1960, p.5 .

¹⁵ M. Mark Stolarik, *Slovaks in Canada and the United States, 1870-1990: Similarities and Differences*. (Ottawa: Chair in Slovak History and Culture, University of Ottawa, 1992), p.11-12.

¹⁶ See James Doyle, *North of America: Images of Canada in the Literature of the United States, 1775-1900*. Toronto: ECW Press, 1983 and Greg Gatenby, *The Wild is Always There: Canada Through the Eyes of Foreign Writers*. Toronto: Vintage Books, 1994, for examples.

¹⁷ *Vancouver Sun*, April 1, 1965, p.4.

¹⁸ One persistent example of the presence of American ideas in the Canadian media would be Walter Lippman's column, which regularly appeared in a good portion of the dailies. Lippman was an extremely vocal American critic of the United States, with outspoken stances on issues like Vietnam, which he was against.

APPENDIX A: Linguistic Intergroup Bias – Detailed Description and Methodology

As reviewed in the main text, the key in utilizing the LIB is to extract phrases where “the United States” is treated like a person, or where “Americans” are treated as a monolith. This characterization differs greatly from references to “the U.S. Congress” or “American *policy*,” each of which is much more qualified and specific. These distinctions were important to make as the articles’ contents were analyzed, and placed in the four LIB categories. At the most concrete level, a journalist simply described U.S. action. Phrases such as “The United States has said...” or “... les Etats-Unis avaient demandé d’en retarder l’échéance jusqu’à la fin de mars”¹ have very little interpretation involved. Slightly less concrete would be a phrase such as “The U.S. seems to have ended its reign as the nation of progress”² which is descriptive, but contains more than a simple objective action (for example, the word “seems” is somewhat subjective, and the message of the phrase must involve a measure of interpretation; the overall meaning is not patently obvious.)

Moving into more abstract territory, an author may have described American actions in a way that was detached from observable behaviour; it was indicative of motivation, but limited to a particular case. For example, take the following sentence: “By destroying the freedom of its own people... the U.S. hopes to impede the march of Communism;”³ This phrase, especially the word “hopes” does denote a characteristic, but it is limited in time, and suggests a specific American strategy which may or may not be a permanent fixture of the

country. At the most abstract level, the behaviour of the United States would be given as a unique characteristic that could separate it from other countries. The assertion that "The U.S. is a wealthy and rather vociferous country... It is big and generous, young and sure"⁴ tells us exactly what characteristics this author suggested motivates the U.S. itself.

Table A-1: Four Categories of Linguistic Attribution

	Category	Characteristic Features	Examples
1	Descriptive Action Verb (DAV)	Objective description of a specific and observable behaviour with clear beginning and end; refers to specific situation and specific object; usually does not positive or negative connotations	Kiss Look Run Visit Call
2	Interpretive Action Verb (IAV)	Describes a general class of behaviours (including various possible behavioural acts), but refers to a specific action with clear beginning and end, to a specific object situation; provides an interpretation beyond the mere description; has positive or negative semantic connotations	Help Offend Inhibit Cheat Threaten
3	State Verb (SV)	Enduring states (emotional, affective, mental) beyond specific behaviours or situations; reference to specific object; no clear beginning and end; provides interpretation beyond mere description; does not readily take the progressive form or imperative	Believe Love Admire Desire Envy
4	Adjective (ADJ)	Describes highly abstract person dispositions; no object reference or situation reference; highly interpretive, detached from specific situations	Honest Impulsive Reliable Helpful Creative

Table A-2 features a reference chart provided in the work of Anne Maass et. al. for classifying LIB statements. Classification of the individual statements within each newspaper article employed a combination of this reference chart and the guidelines summarized in Table A-1.

Table A-2: Randomly Selected and Typical Stimulus Terms (LIB)⁵

Linguistic category			
DAV	IAV	SV	Adj
Randomly selected stimulus terms			
call†	attack†	abhor	altruistic†
catch	blackmail†	admire†	brutal
find†	correct†	accept†	fair†
hold†	command	commiserate	foolish
lift†	denigrate†	envy†	ignorant†
phone†	deride	fear	friendly
photograph†	denounce†	desire†	jealous
prepare†	encourage	hate	offensive
pull aside†	excite	hold in contempt	patient†
stare	harrass†	like†	peaceful†
stop	hurry	love†	quiet†
summon	intervene	mourn for	shrewd
take something			strange
from	hurt†	prefer†	stubborn
tickle†	manipulate†	respect†	successful†
touch	mislead	recognize	sympathetic
visit	restrict†	suspect	youthful†
wake up†	thank	understand†	vain†
watch	threaten†	worry	virtuous†
Typical stimulus terms			
dance	amuse	detest	aggressive
dial	betray	dread	anxious
drive	cheat	envy	charismatic
hug	deceive	esteem	impulsive
kiss	disobey	like	intelligent
push	flatter	loath	moody
shout after	harm	notice	outgoing
touch	help	pity	pessimistic
wash	save	remember	reliable
wave	warn	trust	reserved

Note. DAV = descriptive action verb, IAV = interpretive action verb, SV = state verb, and Adj = adjective. Terms with a dagger were used in the experimental study.

Below are featured two specific articles and the manner in which they were scored:

LIB Sample Article (Negative)

U.S. won't recognize it

The U.S. yesterday termed "regrettable" the proposed Canadian legislation to control Arctic waters, and warned it does not recognize jurisdictions of other countries over its ships on the high seas.

The statement Thursday by state department spokesman Robert McCloskey, the strongest yet on the Arctic sovereignty issue, made clear the U.S. will stick to the three mile territorial limit now in force by both Canada and the U.S.

"The U.S. does not recognize the right of any state unilaterally to establish a territorial sea of more than three miles, or to exercise more limited jurisdiction in any area beyond 12 miles . . .

"The U.S. does not recognize any exercise of coastal states' jurisdiction over our vessels on the high seas."

The statement followed by one day the announcement of the proposed Canadian legislation to extend sovereignty 12 miles out, to sea and establish jurisdiction up to 100 miles offshore over shipping in Arctic waters.

McCloskey said both governments had discussed the issue over a long pe-

riod and "the Canadian government is fully aware of our views."

"Like Canada," McCloskey said, "The U.S. is aware of dangers to marine environment in the absence of international guarantees to protect against pollution."

"For this reason we take particular note of the remarks of Prime Minister Trudeau . . . that Canada is prepared to participate actively in multilateral

efforts to develop agreed rules for the protection of the environment."

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp told the Commons yesterday in Ottawa that Canada has agreed with the U.S. to press for an international conference on the rules of the sea in an effort to extend international law to the issue of pollution.

(Editorial comment, page 6)

Tin plate price hike slapped

By The Canadian Press

The prices and incomes commission said today Dominion Foundries and Steel Ltd., of Hamilton, failed to observe the spirit of price restraint when it raised tin plate prices by five per cent this spring.

The commission headed by Dr. John Young said both Dofasco and the Steel Company of Canada, Ltd., also of Hamilton, were within the letter of price restraint arrangements when they raised their prices. But Dofasco

already had a good profit position and went too far.

The report said this type of move weakens the restraint program, making it harder to achieve moderation in cost increases essential to fighting inflation.

"This increase for tin plate will trigger an increase in the price of containers and raise food and beverage prices at the retail level," the report stated.

The report said that until cost increases are moderated "changes of this kind will continue."

6

This article constituted an overall negative opinion of the United States because of its aggressive tone towards the U.S., its suggestions of American stonewalling on the Arctic issue, its mention of "strong" talk by Canada against the American position, and the stated U.S. assessment a situation Canada supports as "regrettable." The article featured eight distinct LIB characterizations, which were characterized thus:

Table A-3: Sample Assessment of a Negative LIB Article

	Statement in Newspaper Article	Linguistic Category	Score (1-4)
1	U.S. <i>won't recognize</i> it	State Verb	3
2	The U.S. yesterday <i>termed</i> "regrettable"...	Descrip. Action Verb	1
3	... and [the U.S.] <i>warned</i> it does not...	Interp. Action Verb	2
4	[the U.S.] <i>does not recognize</i> jurisdiction...	State Verb	3
5	The U.S. <i>will stick</i> to the three mile limit...	Interp. Action Verb	2
6	The U.S. <i>does not recognize</i> the right...	State Verb	3
7	The U.S. <i>does not recognize</i> any exercise...	State Verb	3
8	The U.S. <i>is aware</i> of dangers	State Verb	3

LIB Sample Article (Positive)

Let's Keep Our Cool Over American Protest

The U.S. note protesting Canada's unilateral assertion of jurisdiction in the Arctic was entirely predictable, and from the American point of view, completely justifiable.

The Americans are not much concerned over how Canada would exercise sovereignty to the 12-mile limit. They are agreeable to pollution control.

The worry was put clearly by the U.S. State Department statement yesterday:

"We are concerned that this action by Canada, if not opposed by us, would be taken as precedent in other parts of the world, for other unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas."

That position is far too respectable to deserve any shrill anti-American cries. The Americans are not trying to dictate to Canada. They are submitting an understandable dissent to the Canadian Government's position that laws covering jurisdiction over oceans and coastlines should be made unilaterally. The U.S. has directed this protest to Canada—but Russia, Sweden, Brazil and perhaps other nations are expected to take notice.

No doubt it would have been preferable if Canada could have acted through the international court. Every time a country serves notice that it does not recognize the authority of the International Court of Justice the whole concept of international law is weakened. But since international law offers no real direction to the obviously desirable goal of protecting the Arctic seas from pollution, Canada has a strong case for filling a vacuum.

Prime Minister Trudeau calmly and lucidly argued that case in a Toronto speech last night. Had he been as forthcoming to the Commons when the Canadian policy was first announced last week the Government's position would have been better understood from the start. His concern over the implications of the Canadian action upon international law is particularly welcome.

The Canadian Government obviously anticipated the U.S. protest before deciding to proceed in asserting Arctic jurisdiction. The Americans have merely put in writing what they have been saying all along in private consultations. No one should be either surprised or excited.

The reports that the United States had threatened economic "sanctions" against Canada show not only an incredible misunderstanding of the nature of that drastic step, but remarkable insensitivity to historic good relations and mutual understanding between the two countries.

This article constituted an overall positive opinion of the United States because it downplays the conflict between the two countries, it suggests that the U.S. reaction was both predictable and reasonable, and criticizes those who are using the imaginary threat of American retaliation to ignore “historic good relations” and “mutual understanding” between Canada and the United States. The article featured seven distinct LIB characterizations, which were characterized thus:

Table A-4: Sample Assessment of a Positive LIB Article			
	Statement in Newspaper Article	Linguistic Category	Score (1-4)
1	The Americans <i>are not much concerned</i> ...	State Verb	3
2	The Americans <i>are not trying to dictate</i> ...	Interp. Action Verb	2
3	[The Americans] <i>are submitting</i> an...	State Verb	3
4	The U.S. <i>had directed</i> this protest...	Interp. Action Verb	2
5	The Americans <i>have merely put in writing</i> ...	Descrip. Action Verb	1
6	What [the Americans] <i>have been saying</i> ...	Descrip. Action Verb	1
7	... the United States <i>had threatened</i> ...	State Verb	3

¹ *L'Action*, Jan 26, 1961, p.1

² *The Ubyyssey*, Nov 22, 1960, p.2

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 25, 1960, p.6

⁵ Tables A-1 and A-2 derive from Anne Maass, G. Corvino, and L. Arcuri. “Linguistic Intergroup Bias and the Mass Media,” *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale* 74, no.1 (1994).

⁶ *Ottawa Citizen*, April 10, 1970, p.1

⁷ *Ottawa Journal*, April 16, 1970, p.6

Appendix B: Newspapers Examined in this Study

The specific newspapers from which the content of this study was drawn were not the 'party organs' of the late nineteenth century and were much more interested in their own success than in party politics. As outlined by the *Ayer Directory: Newspapers, Magazines and Trade Publications*, by 1970 very few newspapers continued to retain official allegiance to one set of political principles or another [Table B-1]. Rather than competing political agendas, the newspapers of the 1960s competed in the much more immediate realm of fiscal success.

Table B-1: Newspaper "Allegiance" according to Ayer's¹

Newspaper	Allegiance
Halifax Chronicle-Herald	Independent
Dalhousie Gazette	Collegiate
Diocesan Times	Episcopal
Dartmouth Free Press	Independent
Suburban Mirror	Independent
L'Action	Independent
Le Carabin	Collegiate
Chronicle-Telegraph	Independent
Le Soleil	Ind. Lib. / Ind (70)
Ottawa Citizen	Independent
Le Droit	Independent
Fulcrum	Collegiate
Ottawa Journal	Ind. Conserv.
Rotonde	Collegiate
Almonte Gazette	Independent
B. C. Catholic	Catholic
Jewish Western Bulletin	Jewish Int
Vancouver Province	Independent
Vancouver Sun	Ind. Liberal
Pacific Tribune	Independent
Ubysey	Collegiate

The lack of formal connection to one political party or another does not deny, of course, that many of the daily newspapers published in Canada tended to either favour a particular political or social perspective, or else draw upon a history that had (at least at one point) linked them with one segment of popular opinion or another. For example, according to a collection of ex-editors of various Canadian newspapers, the *Ottawa Citizen* by the late 1960s was endorsing an approach which rejected its early 20th century “flirtation” with Social Credit and Christian Science, adopting instead “something of a closer adherence to the establishment line.”² This, for most of the 1960s, meant leaning towards the side of the Liberal party. By contrast, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* was running in the opposite direction. Not only was the newspaper considered to be “Tory-tinged” in the early 1970s, but it had a strong tradition of supporting Robert Stanfield (the ex-Premier of Nova Scotia and leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition in the House of Commons from 1967 to 1976).³ This inclination was inherited from the newspaper’s direct predecessor, the *Herald and Mail*, which bought out the rival (and Liberal) *Chronicle and Star* in 1949, subsuming all printing and production operations on the *Herald* premises.⁴

The early 1970s witnessed the cresting of the battle for readership between the *Ottawa Citizen* and the *Ottawa Journal*, while the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* had fought its way to becoming, along with its afternoon counterpart, the *Mail-Star*, Atlantic Canada’s biggest newspaper. The *Citizen/Journal* rivalry, which coloured Ottawa journalism for much of the 20th century, was largely based

on their overlapping goals. According to at least one insider, both newspapers had a fairly obsessive tendency to favour local news, such as the activities of the civil service, over either national or international items, which most readers had to glean from other Canadian sources.⁵ They also shared a nearly equal circulation hold on readers in the Ottawa area. However, the *Journal* found more success in the (albeit less profitable) Ottawa Valley countryside, while the *Citizen* was the prominent newspaper in the city. Both were also controlled by companies headquartered in Toronto, the *Citizen* by Southam, and the *Journal* by FP Publications. In the long run, it would be the respective long-term strategies of each chain would eventually ensure the success of the *Citizen* and the demise of the *Journal*.⁶ Ultimately, the *Journal*, a conservative contrast to the *Citizen*, would see its owners discontinue its publication in a wave of larger corporate downsizing.

In a similar fashion to the battle staged by the *Ottawa Citizen* and the *Ottawa Journal*, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Vancouver Province* (at least prior to 1957) had endured a fight for first place among readers in the Vancouver area. The *Sun* approached the challenge by practicing a somewhat "sensational" brand of journalism, and by painting itself as "Vancouver's Only Home-Owned Newspaper," a reference to the fact that the *Province* was owned by the Toronto-based Southam chain. In truth, both newspapers guarded their stories very carefully, competed viciously for the next "scoop," and attempted to outbid each other for subscription and advertising prices.⁷

However, the ultimate fate of the two newspapers was not akin to what had occurred in Ottawa, or in many other newspaper towns across the country. Having lost first place to the *Sun* during a vicious labour dispute in 1946, still unable to make up that ground a decade later, the *Province* publishers at Southam took a decision to end Vancouver publishing's "war of attrition" and to propose to *Sun* owners that the two newspapers enter into an equal partnership, an arrangement which had many precedents in the United States. Southam suggested that such an arrangement would be profitable to both newspapers as they could then re-direct (or stop spending) the millions of dollars they had been spending, attempting to outdo each other.⁸

The resulting creation of the Pacific Press company, however, was at best "bizarre," and at worst, financially ridiculous. With the end of competition came, some suggested, the end of incentive. . Most readers in the Vancouver area simply gravitated towards the *Sun*, which retained its comfortable lead in circulation, while the *Province's* readership continued to decline. Run on the same budget, the *Sun* returned five times its investment in profit, while the *Province* lost half of what it spent.⁹ Moreover, a combination of continuing labour strikes at both newspapers (one of which prevents treatment of *Sun* and *Province* coverage in 1970 in this thesis) and a series of federal investigations into possible federal competition violations, all served to stammer the growth of both Pacific Press newspapers. Indeed, as Marc Edge points out in *Pacific Press: The Unauthorized Story of Vancouver's Newspaper Monopoly*, the case of

Vancouver is unique in that despite the lack of competition from other dailies, the Pacific Press newspapers performed exceedingly poorly.¹⁰

One other factor also cut into the potential profits of the *Sun* and the *Province* in Vancouver. Due to the proliferation of labour strikes and the resulting lack of newspapers in readers' hands, a number of smaller, local newspapers were allowed to take advantage of the gaps in the Vancouver market; moreover, each new local newspaper was credited with being able to provide much more regular and more extensive local coverage. One such newspaper was the *Vancouver Citizen*, a North and West Vancouver "community weekly" which, according to its own figures, became the weekly with the "largest (by far) circulation" in Canada by 1967.¹¹ Backed by Horizon Publications Ltd., this often conservative newspaper enjoyed a reasonable market share in what was a vibrant and growing city. That market was also supplemented with the *Pacific Tribune*, the standard newspaper for the western faction of the Communist Party of Canada.¹²

The markets in Halifax and Ottawa also had their share of competition from outside the ranks of the major dailies. Just outside Ottawa, the citizens of Lanark County, who figured into the *Ottawa Citizen's* and *Ottawa Journal's* circulation numbers, could also choose to read the *Almonte Gazette*. Originally a supporter of the Liberal party, at least until it came under the lengthy watch of Johnny Graham beginning in 1930, the *Gazette* dates back to 1867. Largely the product of its chief editor during the time period covered in this study, the *Gazette* nonetheless provided a local perspective that the *Journal*, during its heaviest

days of competition with the *Citizen*, was itself attempting to capture, especially through its distribution networks in the Ottawa Valley.

In Halifax, the dominance of the *Chronicle-Herald* was never seriously threatened, but a small number of local newspapers enjoyed a measure of success during the 1960s. Serving the specific community across the bay, the *Dartmouth Free Press* maintained prolific publication throughout the period under study, generating its own columnists, experts, and cartoonists. Strongly attuned to the particularities of life in central Nova Scotia, the *Free Press* often offered a level of local flavour that surpassed the *Chronicle-Herald*, which was instead concentrating on attracting a broader province-wide audience. Unlike the *Free Press*, however, the *Spryfield/Suburban Mirror* was one of a string of local newspapers which met with only limited success. Surviving four incarnations in thirteen years (*Spryfield Mirror* – 1959-1963, *Suburban Mirror* – 1963-1968, *Halifax Suburban Mirror* – 1968-1972, *Halifax Metro Mirror* – 1972) the *Mirror*, while producing original editorials, never attained the success or regional audience of a newspaper like the *Free Press*.

Meanwhile, in Quebec City, a handful of older French-language newspapers were on the decline during the 1960s, due in part to the rising success and broad appeal of Montreal-based newspapers such as *La Presse*, but also due to the popularity of Quebec City's own *Le Soleil*. That newspaper – originally founded by an interest group that included future Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier in order to fill the “gap” of Liberal press coverage in Quebec – appealed to French Quebecers in the 1960s not because of the Liberal political

connection (which it formally dropped in 1958), but because of its other distinct qualities. For instance, *Le Soleil* was often on the leading edge of technological advancements, and was one of the first Canadian dailies to come into the electronic age, employing the technique of “photocomposition” to reproduce its advertising in 1964; three years later, in 1967, it began using computers to keep track of all of its accounting. Moreover, the newspaper’s owners were committed to maintaining local control of the newspaper, fending off offers from outside buyers and retaining majority control even when portions of the newspaper were finally sold off in 1969. Quebeckers rewarded this combination of dedication and innovation by making *Le Soleil* the most widely read local newspaper, with more than double the circulation of all other local newspapers put together.¹³

The *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, Quebec City’s only remaining English-language daily, built itself up over the course of nearly one hundred years on the financial amalgamation of earlier and separate entities, the most vocal of which had been the *Morning Chronicle*, a major mouthpiece of John A. Macdonald’s Conservatives in the last quarter of the 19th century. More specifically, the *Chronicle-Telegraph* was tied to the Conservative Anglophone community of Quebec City. By 1959, the many re-organizations of the newspaper’s administration and capital support joined the growing Thompson chain of newspapers, but effectively remained the predominant English-language voice in Quebec City throughout the second half of the 20th century, a time when the English-speaking population of the city was in substantial decline.

Alternative Voices: College and Religious Newspapers

As discussed in the main text, I also included newspapers which constitute two particular sub-groups: “collegiate” newspapers and “religious community” newspapers. Halifax’s *Diocesan Times* fell squarely into the latter category, and labeled itself “the Official publication of the Anglican Diocese of Nova Scotia.”¹⁴ Although dealing with local issues, the *Times* maintained its links to the wider concerns of the Canadian Anglican Church by supplementing its pages with a larger insert consisting of stories and sections from *Canadian Churchman*, a national Anglican newspaper published monthly in Toronto.¹⁵ The publication, according to its editors, “never speaks on behalf of the Anglican Church of Canada... [but] provides a forum for Canadian Anglicans to speak for themselves.”¹⁶

In the case of Quebec City, which experienced the most vibrant and prolific religious press environment among the four cities in this study, the attention of many local newspapers was often *too* focused on religious issues. For example, although local residents read *Semaine Religieuse*, *L’Étincelle du Sacré-Cœur*, or a handful of monthly religious journals (which reached combined circulations of about 50,000¹⁷), the content of these publications was composed entirely of either internal religious commentary (interpretation of scripture, meaning of specific prayers) or else tiny community services (such as announcing yard sales or other small church events). Standing apart from this crowd, however, was *L’Action*.

L'Action Catholique was founded in 1907 in concert with the larger "movement de L'Action social catholique." By 1962, and despite the rising tide against traditional conservatism that characterized the Quiet Revolution era, the newspaper's editor Louis-Phillipe Roy headed an attempt to keep the newspaper relevant to the youth of Quebec. Its name was formally altered from *L'Action Catholique* to *L'Action* (with *Quotidienne Catholique* relegated to a subtitle printed underneath), and its mission – as stated by the editor – was to have a journal, "*qui porte dans chaque foyer une opinion saine sur les problèmes complexes du monde moderne, un journal qui nous aidera à éduquer les jeunes dans une optique chrétienne et les empêchera de glisser insensiblement dans une neutralité ambiguë.*"¹⁸ Although by the end of the period of this study its influence was beginning to decline, its circulation remained close to 30,000 in 1970.

The final two weeklies within the sub-group of religious newspapers consist of the *B.C. Catholic*, and the *Western Jewish Bulletin*, both published in Vancouver. Although not appearing until mid-decade, the *Catholic* represented the voice of one of Canada's largest religious groups in what became the country's third largest city. Anxious to challenge the implication that the Church should not comment on "things of this world," but only spiritual matters, the *B.C. Catholic* represented a marriage of the newspaper's mandate to inform, and the Church's mandate to spread the gospel. Thus, its purpose was, "[t]o keep people informed of what is happening in this world of ours, [and] to make them

'aware-Christians'", to "see what is being done" and to "help them see what they can do."¹⁹

Evolving out of the earlier *Jewish Centre News*, the *Jewish Western Bulletin* offered the west coast Jewish community (itself largely centered in Vancouver) a weekly newspaper covering issues from a Jewish perspective. The Jewish community of Vancouver, though it experienced a religious revival in the 1960s, created strong links with fellow British Columbians rather than with the national Jewish community. According to Stuart Rosenberg's *The Jewish Community in Canada*, "[t]he open style of life practiced on the Pacific Coast is suggested both in the very high rate of mixed marriages among Jews living there and in fact that Jews continue to be elected to political posts in areas where there are practically no Jews on the voters' lists except the candidates themselves."²⁰ Moreover, "[d]espite their formal links to country-wide Canadian organizations like the Zionist organization and the Canadian Jewish Congress, the self-image of Vancouver Jewry was as a 'West-Coast' community, allied to other American Jewish communities in the Pacific Northwest."²¹ In the course of my research, I attempted to add to this perspective by examining similar publications in Ottawa (using, for example, the *Ottawa Jewish Bulletin* and the *Ottawa Hebrew News*) but was unable to secure sufficient quantities.²²

The other sub-group focused upon the student university press of the four cities in this study. According to much of their material, most student university presses were funded and run by the students themselves, and thus enjoyed substantial freedom in terms of their content. This latitude, however, was a

double-edged sword: because of the lack of any formal funding and thus any formal support from the university administration, each school's students were often charged a fee to support the newspaper, a tenuous relationship which would sometimes result in a newspaper's financial demise. Nonetheless, their arms' length from the administration often produced candid material which, in the decade under study, would usually include expressive political overtones.

The *Dalhousie Gazette*, which started at Halifax's Dalhousie University in 1869, was by the 1960s squarely within the tradition of "rabble-rousing" usually associated with both youth and university campuses, and especially with the intersection of the two. At the outset of the period under study, the waging of a Fall 1960 campaign to draw attention to the hastened departure of many of the university's most notable professors (such as George Grant) due to policy disputes with the university, became an embarrassing phenomenon through the use of half-page headlines which drew the ire of most of the university establishment.²³ The following year saw coverage of a visit by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker highlighted by an article with the title "Mr. Diefenbaker said:" which was followed with three blank newspaper columns.²⁴ Although one may be tempted to relegate the occurrence of such events to the general fold of 'typical' student action, doing so would not remain true to the actual effects they had on their communities and their times. For instance, the above coverage of the Diefenbaker story was reprinted in other areas newspapers, and infuriated Diefenbaker himself, who phoned the Chairman of Dalhousie University, forcing the university president to deal publicly with the *Gazette's* content.²⁵

The student press of the University of Laval, “comme l’ensemble de la presse étudiante québécoise” abandoned its position as “très traditionnel[le] et passablement mièvre” in the 1950s in favour of a more “contestataire” position in the 1960s, and expanded its content to include comment on both national and international problems.²⁶ *Le Carabin* continued a strong tradition of student newspapers at Laval dating back to 1916, and boasted a high profile in the community, several awards including Montreal-based *Le Droit*’s trophy for “Outstanding Publication” among French-language newspapers in 1960,²⁷ and complete student control under Editors-in-Chief such as future Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard. Unfortunately, due to funding problems likely associated with fundamental internal changes at the university, the newspaper finally gave out in 1969 and the editors directed its readers to the local *Hebdo* instead.²⁸

The most interesting venue for the student press, it could be argued, was the University of Ottawa. The University of Ottawa is Canada’s fully bilingual university with two regular student-run newspapers, *La Rotonde*, a French-language publication founded in 1932, and *The Fulcrum*, an English-language newspaper founded 10 years later.²⁹ The presence of these two linguistic groups was not, however, simply confined to the range of reading available on campus; in the 1950s and 1960s U. of O. found itself smack in the middle of Quebec’s “Quiet” Revolution. By second half of the 1950s, *La Rotonde* in particular had already developed a penchant for running articles and covering stories which enraged the University administration, an administration which was, it should at least be noted, a strictly Catholic body. By 1956, the Canadian University Press

declared *La Rotonde* the most censored student newspaper in Canada.³⁰ *The Fulcrum*, traditionally much less critical than its French counterpart, did nonetheless often criticize University administration when it acted too aggressively against the controversial *Rotonde*.

The last collegiate newspaper used in this study, the *Ubyyssey*, was the regular publication of the students at the University of British Columbia. Started in 1918 and entirely supported by a \$2 student fee, its list of editors included Earle Binney and Pierre Berton, who lead the newspaper during WWII. Alan Fotheringham wrote a weekly column, a tradition he continued decades afterwards, and Prime Minister John Turner served as one of the newspaper's sports editors. A host of local journalists, many of whom moved on to Vancouver's weeklies and dailies, also gained their formative experience in the *Ubyyssey* newsroom. One potent example of this fostering of local talent was the emergence of the counter-culture *Georgia Straight*, a weekly alternative newspaper.³¹

Table B-2 offers the circulation figures at the beginning and end of the period under study for each of the twenty newspapers engaged by this study. The city's population is also provided for consultation.

Table B-2: Newspaper Circulation Figures, 1960 and 1970

CITY	Newspaper	Pop. 1961*	Pop. 1971*	Circ. 1960+	Circ. 1970+
Halifax	Chronicle-Herald	183,946	222,637	65,309	69,481
	Dalhousie Gazette			1,700	??
	Diocesan Times			??	??
	Dartmouth Free Press			7,246	9,494
	Suburban Mirror			1,500 (1962)'	5,000
Quebec City	L'Action	357,568	480,502	56,821	29,330
	Le Carabin			3,500	15,000
	Chronicle-Telegraph			5,501	4,214
	Le Soleil			115,453	161,390
Ottawa-Hull	Citizen	429,750	602,510	69,085	84,518
	Le Droit			31,884	39,020
	Fulcrum			2,800	4,410
	Journal			69,032	81,012
	Rotonde			3,000 (1962)'	6,200
	Almonte Gazette			1,850	2,050
Vancouver	B.C. Catholic	790,165	1,082,352	9,987	8,600
	Jewish			1,642	2,178
	Western Bulletin				
	Pacific Tribune			3,500 (1966)'	3,500
	Province			106,762	110,677
	Sun			210,505	254,033
	Ubysey			6,500	16,000

* = Figures taken from 1961 and 1971 *Census of Canada*

+ = Figured taken from 1960 and 1970 edition *Ayer Directory: Newspapers, Magazines and Trade Publications*.

' = Figure from the closest available year

¹ All taken from Leonard Barry, ed. *1970 Ayer Directory: Newspapers, Magazines and Trade Publications*. (Philadelphia, PA: Ayerpress, 1970). There is no specific definition of what the designations as such are supposed to mean, though it is presumably associated with political affiliation, given that the more voluminous entries for cities in the United States contained in the same volume carry designations which include "Democratic" and "Republican".

² Charles King, "The Profits of Parochialism" in Walter Stewart, *Canadian Newspapers: The Inside Story*. (Edmonton: Hurtig Publisher, 1980).

³ Harry Fleming, "God, the Queen, & Highway Safety" in Stewart, op. cit., pp.52-54.

⁴ Raddall, Thomas H. *Halifax: Warden of the North*. (Doubleday & Company, Inc.: Garden City, N.Y.) 1965, p.319.

⁵ Stewart, op. cit., p.85.

⁶ The *Ottawa Citizen* moved out to the Ottawa suburbs in 1973 and gambled on the creation of one of the largest electronically-based typing and editing systems to date for a circulation of that size, while *Journal* simply updated its traditional letterpress facilities. Ibid, p. 90.

⁷ Marc Edge, *Pacific Press: The Unauthorized Story of Vancouver's Newspaper Monopoly*. (Vancouver: New Star Books, 2001), p.7

⁸ Ibid, p.8. According to author Walter Stewart, the Southam chain was also likely influenced by the fact that across North America, the trend had become the disappearance of second-place newspapers in favour of single-market dominance by first-place papers. The owners felt it a much better prospect than losing the publication altogether. Stewart, op. cit.

⁹ Edge, op. cit., pp.8-11.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ *Vancouver Citizen*, May 25, 1967, p.6.

¹² There is really very little published on the *Pacific Tribune*. Informed sources with whom I have had conversations suggest that the paper was the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Canada, though it may have identified slightly more readily with the communist movement as it evolved on the West Coast, which was slightly more radical than its Eastern counterpart.

¹³ Most of the information on *Le Soleil* was obtained in Beaulieu, *Presse Quebecoise Des Origines A Nos Jours* Vol. 3 pp.13-14. Circulation numbers were taken from Barry, op. cit.

¹⁴ National Library and Archives Canada, z6954 C2 US2 1987.

¹⁵ The fact that *Canadian Churchman* was a much larger publication suggests that local guidelines helped establish which sections and articles were to be included and which were not.

¹⁶ *Diocesan Times*, April 1967, p.4 (insert).

¹⁷ William F. McCallister, ed. *1960 Ayer Directory: Newspapers, Magazines and Trade Publications*. (Philadelphia, PA: Ayerpress, 1960) and Leonard Barry, ed. *1970 Ayer Directory: Newspapers, Magazines and Trade Publications*. (Philadelphia, PA: Ayerpress, 1970).

¹⁸ Beaulieu, *Presse Quebecoise Des Origines A Nos Jours* Vol 4, pp. 263-264.

¹⁹ *B.C. Catholic*, April 27, 1967, p.3.

²⁰ Stuart E. Rosenberg. *The Jewish Community in Canada, Volume I: A History*. (Toronto and Montreal: Maclelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970) pp.123-125.

²¹ Ibid.

²² In general, the only remaining repository for these papers had only sporadic issues for the 1960s, at times locating only one/year. This was explained as being the state of affairs for two reasons: 1) The owners of the papers did not secure long-term editors during the 1960s, making one paper/year possibly all that was produced, and 2) The papers themselves were not necessarily well archived at the time of production, leaving few available for current consultation. As a note to other researchers, other eras, both preceding and following the 1960s, quite likely produced a good quantity of material.

²³ P.B. Waite, *The Lives of Dalhousie University: Volume Two, 1925-1980 – The Old College Transformed*. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), pp.231-233.

²⁴ Op. cit., pp.242-243.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ If the case of the *Dalhousie Gazette* is any indication, this was indeed occurring across the country.

²⁷ *The Fulcrum*, January 23, 1961, p.5.

²⁸ Beaulieu, *Presse Quebecoise Des Origines A Nos Jours Vol VII* (1935-1944), pp. 222-223

²⁹ Archives of the University of Ottawa, Fonds 96 – Collection de documents historiques sure les journaux étudiants, 1888-1992 - Michel Prévost, *Les Journaux Étudiants de L'Université En Fete!*.

³⁰ Ibid. An article appearing in the *Fulcrum* in March of 1988 also noted that it, along with *La Rotonde*, was one of three newspapers singled out by the Canadian University Press as among the only student newspapers in Canada *not* enjoying freedom of the press.

³¹ However, despite an editorial board replete with *Ubyyssey* alumni, the paper, best known for its multiple obscenity convictions, was actively banned from campus by the student society; failure to comply had *Ubyyssey* staff individually removing each edition of the *Georgia Straight* by hand from campus. This information includes content from www.ubyssey.bc.ca/issue.shtml?/about , www.bcla.bc.ca/ifc/censorshipbc/1970.

Appendix C: Cartoon Listing

- 1-1. *Ottawa Citizen*, April 16, 1970, p.6
- 1-2. Charles and Cynthia Hou. *Great Canadian Political Cartoons: 1820-1914*. (Vancouver, B.C.: Moody's Lookout Press, 2004), p.168
- 1-3. *Le Soleil*, October 26, 1962, p.4
- 1-4. *The World of McNally: A Decade of History By a Great Canadian Cartoonist*. Montreal: The Montreal Star, 1972. p.217
- 1-5. *Vancouver Province*, November 21, 1962, p.6
- 1-6. *Daily News (U.S.A.)*, 1993.
- 1-7. G. Bruce Retallack, "Paddy, the Priest, and the Habitant: Inflecting the Irish Cartoons Stereotype in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Irish Studies* 29, no.1 (Spring 2003)
- 1-8. Charles and Cynthia Hou. *Great Canadian Political Cartoons: 1820-1914*. (Vancouver, B.C.: Moody's Lookout Press, 2004), p.95
- 2-1. *Vancouver Sun*, October 25, 1960, p.5
- 2-2. *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, November 14, 1960, p.4
- 2-3. *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, January 31, 1961, p.4
- 2-4. *Le Soleil*, November 10, 1960, p.4
- 2-5. *Le Soleil*, November 15, 1960, p.4
- 2-6. *Ottawa Journal*, January 24, 1961, p.17
- 2-7. *Ottawa Journal*, January 25, 1960, p.4
- 2-8. *Ottawa Citizen*, November 8, 1960, p.6
- 2-9. *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, October 11, 1960, p.4
- 2-10. *Le Soleil*, December 7, 1960, p.4
- 3-1. *Ottawa Citizen*, October 29, 1962, p.6
- 3-2. *Ottawa Citizen*, October 24, 1962, p.6

- 3-3 *Vancouver Sun*, October 25, 1962, p.5
- 3-4 *Vancouver Sun*, 1962
- 3-5 *Vancouver Province*, October 20, 1962
- 3-6 *Ottawa Journal*, November 9, 1962, p.6
- 3-7 *Ottawa Journal*, November, 1962
- 3-8 *Ottawa Journal*, November 17, 1962, p.6
- 3-9 *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, October 19, 1962, p.4
- 3-10 *Vancouver Sun*, October 26, 1962, p.6
- 3-11 *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, October 24, 1962
- 3-12 *Le Soleil*, 1965
- 3-13 *Le Soleil*, 1965
- 3-14 *Pacific Tribune*, November 30, 1962 p.6
- 3-15 *Pacific Tribune*, December 14, 1962, p.6
- 4-1. *Ottawa Citizen*, August 14, 1965, p.4
- 4-2. *Ottawa Citizen*, March 16, 1965, p.6
- 4-3. *Ottawa Citizen*, March 18, 1965, p.6
- 4-4. *Vancouver Province*, March 1965, p.4
- 4-5. *Ottawa Citizen*, March 20, 1965, p.6
- 4-6. *L'Action*, August 14, 1965, p.4
- 4-7 *Vancouver Sun*, August 28, 1965, p.6
- 4-8. *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 5, 1965, p.4
- 4-9. *L'Action*, August 23, 1965, p.4
- 4-10. *Pacific Tribune*, April 9, 1965, p.4
- 4-11. *Pacific Tribune*, September 3, 1965, p.3

- 5-1. *Vancouver Sun*, May 18, 1967, p.4
- 5-2. *Ottawa Citizen*, May 19, 1967, p.6
- 5-3. *Ottawa Citizen*, May 23, 1967, p.6
- 5-4. *Ottawa Citizen*, April 13, 1967, p.6
- 5-5. *Ottawa Citizen*, May 1, 1967, p.6
- 5-6. *Ottawa Citizen*, May 4, 1967, p.6
- 5-7. *L'Action*, May 20, 1967, p.4
- 5-8. *L'Action*, May 24, 1967, p.4
- 5-9. *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, April 21, 1967, p.4
- 5-10. *Le Soleil*, May 29, 1967, p.4
- 5-11. *Ottawa Journal*, May 23, 1967, p.6
- 5-12. *Ottawa Journal*, May 30, 1965, p.6
- 5-13. *Pacific Tribune*, April 14, 1967, p.6
- 5-14. *Pacific Tribune*, April 14, 1967, p.2
- 5-15. *Pacific Tribune*, May 19, 1967, p.6
- 5-16. *Ottawa Citizen*, May 16, 1967, p.6
- 5-17. *Ottawa Journal*, May 11, 1967, p.6
- 5-18. *Ottawa Journal*, May 1, 1967, p.6
- 6-1. *Ottawa Journal*, April 15, 1970, p.6
- 6-2. *Ottawa Journal*, April 30, 1970, p.6
- 6-3. *Vancouver Citizen*, April 24, 1970, p.6
- 6-4. *Ottawa Citizen*, April 11, 1970, p.6
- 6-5. *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, April 13, 1970, p.4

- 6-6. *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 30, 1970, p.4
- 6-7. *Pacific Tribune*, April 24, 1970, p.2
- 6-8. *Le Soleil*, April 22, 1970, p.4
- 6-9. *Ottawa Citizen*, April 10, 1970, p.6
- 6-10. *Ottawa Citizen*, April 27, 1970, p.6
- 6-11. *Dartmouth Free Press*, May 7, 1970
- 7-1. *Le Soleil*, October 25, 1962, p.4
- 7-2. *Ottawa Citizen*, November 5, 1962, p.6
- 7-3. *Le Droit*, November 23, 1962, p.2
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