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**The Theory of Neo-Enosis:
The Republic of Cyprus's Eu Membership as an Objective of Pan-Hellenic Nationalism**

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**THE THEORY OF NEO-ENOSIS:
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS'S EU MEMBERSHIP
AS AN OBJECTIVE
OF PAN-HELLENIC NATIONALISM**

A HISTORY

By

James Watson

Thesis submitted to
The School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
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ABSTRACT

THE THEORY OF NEO-ENOSIS: THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS'S EU MEMBERSHIP AS AN OBJECTIVE OF PAN-HELLENIC NATIONALISM

James Watson,
University of Ottawa, 2007

Supervisor:
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The Greek Cypriot struggle for *enosis*, or union with Greece, dominated Cypriot politics until the military *coup* and Turkish invasion of 1974. But the roots of the *enosis* movement maintained their Pan-Hellenic character, later resurfacing with the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 and surviving in the traditional institutions of the Greek Cypriot state. The Orthodox Church, the National Guard, and 'Hellenic-centred' education all identified with the Greek Cypriot struggle for union with Greece. The concept of *neo-enosis*, or new union, is presented as the political objective of the Cypriot Republic from the late 1980s. Its dual objectives were to bring Cyprus politically closer to Greece through the island's application to the European Union and to pressure Turkey into accepting a Cyprus settlement. The Republic of Cyprus's application to the European Union, as argued by the theory of *neo-enosis*, was therefore a political manifestation of the resurgent Greek nationalism on Cyprus post-1974.

The process of European Union accession strengthened the Hellenic bonds between Cyprus and Greece. Cypriot accession was only assured by a Greek threat to prevent any European enlargement unless Cyprus was accepted in the first wave of expansion to Eastern Europe. This joint effort required the

common exertion of both states politically, economically, and militarily. Greek and Cypriot membership in the EU consolidates and strengthens these links. The European Union was therefore used as a vehicle for a Pan-Hellenic nationalist agenda.

The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union also linked potential Turkish EU membership to a Cyprus settlement. The Greek Cypriots could threaten a veto of Turkish EU entry as long as the island remained divided. This second function of the theory of *neo-enosis* produced the 'Annan Plan', rejected by the Greek Cypriots because of its perceived unfavourable conditions. Joint European Union membership provides the Republic of Cyprus and Greece with a forum in which to formalize national policies and devise a final settlement that maintains the territorial integrity of the entire island.

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INTRODUCTION

Enosis and 'Neo-Enosis'

Enosis, a political and popular movement of Greek Cypriots to achieve a political union between Cyprus and Greece, was repeatedly expressed from the outbreak of the Greek rebellion against the Ottomans in 1821 until the Turkish invasion of 1974. Cyprus participated in the Hellenic world's three-thousand-year history that unfolded from the ancient era to the age of the Byzantine Empire, through the period of Ottoman occupation and beyond. This shared history linked Cyprus to a growing Pan-Hellenic nationalism that emerged in the nineteenth century. Strong cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic ties between Greece and Greek Cypriots facilitated the spread of nationalist irredentism. The Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement became an organized political struggle in the late 1870s under British colonial rule, and turned into a military struggle during the 1950s fought by EOKA.¹ Yet the Greek Cypriots were never able to achieve union with Greece. Instead they were granted independence, becoming the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 after a period of armed resistance. Despite independence, Greek Cypriot demands for *enosis* continued. These demands led to a failed *coup* against the Republic in 1974 directed by officers of the Cypriot National Guard and the Greek Junta. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in response to the *coup*, partitioned the island and forced the Greek Cypriot population and political leadership to finally abandon the cause of *enosis* as a viable policy after nearly a century of struggle.

¹EOKA: The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters established in 1951 that began military operations against the British in 1955.

The underlying idea of *enosis* still persisted, but under a new guise. The concept and theory of *neo-enosis*, introduced and developed in this thesis, suggests that Cypriot accession to the European Union became a new form of quest for union with Greece. While *enosis* was an official policy of Greece and the Greek Cypriots, *neo-enosis* is an unofficial political agenda that attempted to create national uniformity between Cyprus and Greece throughout the accession process, which lasted from 1990 to 2004, and then within the European Union, once Cyprus entered. Overwhelming Greek Cypriot support for European Union membership, combined with the resurgence of Hellenic nationalism on Cyprus in the 1980s, lend credence to the idea of *neo-enosis* as a continuation of nationalist policy through an altered form. Moreover, facets of the accession process that would otherwise not be evident or explainable are more clearly understood within the framework of this theory. *Neo-enosis* is not presented as the fulfillment of a ‘pure’ *enosis*, but as a ‘partial’ *enosis*, which has the additional aim of restoring the political sovereignty of the entire island to the Republic of Cyprus.

Failure to understand the history of *enosis*—its overwhelmingly popular appeal and its century-long dominance of Greek Cypriot politics—results in an inability to properly analyze the policies of the contemporary Cypriot state. Greek nationalism in the nineteenth century led directly to the *enosis* movement on Cyprus in the twentieth century. Although the movement encountered repeated obstacles from the onset of British rule in 1878 until the events of 1974 that ensured its ultimate failure, this failure did not lead to an abandonment of the *enosis* ideal. The concept of *neo-enosis* captures the shift that occurred in what was acceptable to the Greek Cypriot community, what was still desired, and what was not acceptable, such

as partition and a foreign military presence. The Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan² in 2004 echoed Archbishop Makarios'³ rejection of the Acheson Plan⁴ forty years before, both of which provided for the legal presence of Turkish troops on the island and a geographic division of the population. The theory of *neo-enosis* suggests that links to Greece through membership in the European Union as well as a settlement deal acceptable to the Greek Cypriot population both represent a further evolution of a long *enosis* policy.

Several factors explain the need to reorient *enosis* activity toward a new approach in a continuing attempt to achieve the unity of Cyprus and Greece. While *enosis* had been pursued through violent confrontation, including kidnappings, executions, 'terrorist' acts, potential genocide and eventually an armed *coup*, the strength of the Turkish occupation eliminated any possibility of further military resistance by Greek Cypriots. The population exchange between Turkish and Greek Cypriots was sealed and finalized with a closed border. The 150,000 refugees were quickly settled by the Republic, rather than remain in temporary camps, which further reinforced the reality of partition. The failure of the 1974 *coup* attempt moreover discredited the armed groups who would have been responsible for organizing resistance to Turkish occupation. Greek Cypriot politics following the *coup* attempted to calm popular outcry rather than ignite indignation and suicidal actions that could have led to further Turkish advances or international recognition

²*The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*: UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus dispute introduced in November 2002 and put to a referendum on all of Cyprus in April 2004.

³Archbishop Makarios III of the Autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church (1950-1977) and President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1977).

⁴Acheson Plan 1964, as discussed in Chapter 1, provided for a permanent Turkish military base on Cyprus.

and legitimation of the partition. The new government in Greece realized that as it was not militarily capable of fighting Turkey, a reorientation of foreign policy was necessary to achieve a political victory over the Turkish occupation. Cypriot accession to the EU represented the only viable means for Greek Cypriots to achieve a closer union with Greece and bring about a Turkish withdrawal.

The move towards EU accession emerged from resurgent nationalist sentiment in the Republic and the intractable position of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in their occupation of the north. The application of Turkey to the EU in 1987 provided Greece and the Republic with a means of circumventing the strength of the Turkish military by making Turkish membership conditional upon a Cyprus settlement.⁵ To ensure that Turkish accession would be delayed and that Cypriot accession might proceed before that of Turkey, Greece threatened to halt all European expansion until Cyprus was included.

The Greek Cypriots, disillusioned with the progress of negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots, needed a way to apply pressure on Turkey to produce a deal and potential EU membership gave them a powerful means. The Turkish position became more entrenched the longer the division of the island persisted. With Turkey's complete dominance of the military situation, no military option was open to the Republic. The geographical division of the population also had the danger of producing a sense of complacency and inaction. While in clear violation of UN Resolutions and condemned internationally for its handling of Cyprus, Turkey attempted to legitimize what it achieved in 1974 by seeking recognition for what it

⁵Neill Nugent, "EU Enlargement and 'the Cyprus Problem'," *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol.38, No.1 (March 2000), p.138.

termed a *de facto* 'state', the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).⁶ The Republic of Cyprus, for its part, repeatedly appealed for action to the international community, to Europe, and to the United States, but with no results. Yet by acceding to the European Union after a process that lasted more than a decade, from Cyprus's initial application in 1990 to the signing of the accession treaty in 2003, the Republic gained veto power over further accessions, including that of Turkey. Cyprus thereby gained a form of political superiority over Turkey, rendering any military disparities irrelevant, and achieved the pressure needed to soften the Turkish stance.

Greek and Turkish Cypriots have both hinted at the underlying motivation behind Cypriot EU accession without clearly defining the methods or policies employed to achieve it. Ioannis Kasoulides, a former Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister,⁷ claimed that Cypriot accession "was the fulfilment of its European vocation and of the aspirations of many generations of Cypriots."⁸ The reference to 'many generations of Cypriots' can only be applied to the Greek Cypriot struggle for *enosis*, which dominated Cypriot politics from the late 1800s until the Turkish invasion. When Kasoulides remarked that "Cyprus has always looked to Europe,"⁹ he conveniently omitted that *enosis* was a purely Pan-Hellenic nationalist movement. Rauf Denktash, former President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has termed Cypriot EU membership a kind of '*quasi-enosis*'. Denktash used the term to describe the eventual effects of EU membership on the TRNC—the possible dismantlement of the Turkish Cypriot state and the end of the cultural homogeneity

⁶TRNC: The pseudo-state on Cyprus recognized only by Turkey

⁷DISY (The Democratic Rally) politician, Foreign Minister from 1997 to 2003.

⁸Ioannis Kasoulides, "Prologue," In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.15.

⁹*Ibid.*, p.17.

that Turkey has achieved in the north. Denktash's fear of a further 'Hellenization' of Cyprus through '*quasi-enosis*' was a fear of a 'de-Turkification' of the north that would be produced by a political settlement. Such views reveal that Cypriot EU membership cannot be adequately understood by the standard historiographical approach to European Union expansion and integration.

The EU accession process itself provided Greece and the Republic of Cyprus with an opportunity to strengthen their political and military ties. Accession under the protection of Greece required a uniform policy between the two countries. The two countries coordinated a 'Joint Defence Doctrine' which established military bases in Cyprus for the potential use of Greek forces and included a Greek promise to protect Cyprus in the event of foreign attack. The potential danger of a Turkish military operation existed, since the Republic pursued a policy of heavy defence spending during the accession process. While unable to challenge a possible Turkish military advance, the Republic attempted to thwart it by maximizing the cost of such an intervention. The Greek threat to veto further EU expansion if Cyprus was not accepted for membership likewise displayed the commitment and common Hellenic bonds between the two states.

Although Greece had failed before and often on the issue of Cyprus, the prospect of Cypriot accession to the EU stood to fulfill the realization of half a century of political, military, cultural, and social effort. The use of the EU as a vehicle for Hellenic nationalism was established from the beginning of Greece's own membership bid.¹⁰ At the same time, failure to act on this opportunity threatened to

¹⁰Ali Mehmet Birand, "A Turkish View of Greek-Turkish Relations," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* Vol.16, No.2 (Fall 1998), p.177.

weaken the position of both the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. If the Republic were to remain outside the EU it could not count on receiving continued and unconditional support from Greece, since the latter would be pressed to follow a common European line towards states outside the union. The potential of Greece and Cyprus to work openly together within the same political union provided both states with the best alternative to outright *enosis*. Within the EU the Republic of Cyprus, though sovereign, could operate as a kind of client state of Greece, supporting Greece on important issues, receiving its support in return, and adding the weight of a second veto to the Pan-Hellenic agenda.

The European Union, having avoided the Cyprus issue before either Turkey or Cyprus applied for membership, had to accept the latter's candidacy so as not to "threaten the largest, and in many ways most important, expansion in the EU's history," namely the accession of Eastern European states following the collapse of communism.¹¹ Once Cyprus was accepted, the EU put collective pressure on Turkey to move towards a settlement based on previous negotiations conducted by successive UN Secretary Generals. Turkey had to comply with EU demands in order for its own membership application to proceed. The EU moreover imposed a time limit to insure that a settlement was reached prior to the date of Cypriot accession, which was scheduled for May 2004. Turkey finally relented just months before Cypriot entry, and the rush to produce a deal after thirty years of inactivity seemed to prove Cypriot claims of Turkish obstructionism. The eventual Annan Plan, supported by the European Union, the United States, Greece (on the condition that it would be acceptable to the Greek Cypriots) and Turkey was accepted by the Turkish

¹¹Nugent, "EU Enlargement and 'the Cyprus Problem'," p.148.

Cypriots but overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Despite enormous pressure from the European Union, the United States and the United Nations, the 'micro-state' of Greek Cypriots refused to sign as the document seemed to 'reward' the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots also worried that the timetable for the phased withdrawal of Turkish troops in the deal, which Turkey had the right to alter, would become linked to stages that matched the Turkish EU membership bid. The Republic of Cyprus was confident that its EU veto over Turkish entry would secure a future deal. Yet this was an enormous risk to take, since the Turkish application to the European Union could stall or be rejected in any number of ways leading to the permanent partition of the island. Although influenced by external powers and competing interests, the Republic had determined its own actions, convinced it could maintain the advantages it had acquired by European Union accession. The theory of *neo-enosis* provides a clearer understanding of recent Cypriot policies and their connection to a much longer history of Hellenic nationalism on Cyprus and its quest for *enosis*.

The Historiography of Cyprus: Problems and Limitations

Cypriot historiography is dominated by an examination of the period under British colonial rule and the struggle for *enosis* before and up to 1974. Part of that history denies any concept of responsibility for *enosis* agitation, seeing the history of the conflict as proof of colonial domination and, later, of the power games of the Cold War. Yet such views run contrary to a large body of research demonstrating that the patterns and strength of the *enosis* movement were an extension of the nineteenth-century Pan-Hellenic movement. A further dilemma within Cypriot

historiography is the inability to connect the nationalism of pre-1974 Cyprus to the policies of the Greek Cypriots following the invasion and partition of the island. While a 'new nationalism' has been identified, its political ambitions have not been illustrated. There is a general agreement that the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly desired membership in the European Union, but there has been no detailed analysis of the Republic's motivations in applying or of the consequent effects on relations between Greece and Cyprus.

The works of Michael Attalides and Brendan O'Malley are among the leading sources that portray the violent history of *enosis* and Hellenic nationalism as a product of the machinations of foreign powers. Michael Attalides states that "Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, it is true, resulted in local squabbles. But the adjudication by self-interested outside powers more than influenced their course."¹² Certainly the influence of outside powers on Cypriot history is clear and identifiable. The British attempted to shape events between the two antagonists, Greek and Turkish, to keep colonial order and control. Foreign powers did at times encourage conflict or create division for their own gain. But to suggest that the primary cause of the Cyprus conflict can be found in the actions of external powers is to overlook the complexity of Greco-Turkish relations and the strength of the irredentist policies of the early Greek government and the *Megali Idea*.¹³ As will be argued in detail in Chapter One, the Greek Cypriots were ultimately the primary agents of events through their continuous calls for union with Greece. The British may have escalated

¹²Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Möhnese: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.180.

¹³*Megali Idea*: The Great Idea was a concept introduced by the Greek government in the early 19th century to define the extent of the Pan-Hellenic world.

disputes between the communities, but they were always reacting to the continuous demands of the Greek Cypriots for *enosis*. The nationalist movement on Cyprus moreover evolved within the context of a close and continuing relationship with the ‘motherland’ and openly accepted its influence.

Brendan O’Malley portrays the Cyprus coup of 1974 primarily as a product of American intrigue and instigation. Yet his claims are supported with questionable evidence based largely on speculative conjecture. O’Malley also ignores the history of American involvement in Cyprus, which prevented a Turkish invasion in 1964, and the Cold War policy of the United States to prevent a war between two NATO members. O’Malley ignores the fact that renewed violence on Cyprus in 1967 and the formation of EOKA B¹⁴—both of which set the stage for the events that led up to the coup—were products of Greek Cypriot nationalists frustrated at the failure to achieve *enosis*.

The approaches of Attalides and O’Malley are problematic interpretations of a long and deep history of Greek irredentist nationalism. The persistence of Greek nationalism on Cyprus after 1974, despite the obvious failures of its earlier policies, calls into question any interpretation that denies the fundamental identity of the Greek Cypriots and sees their struggle as something merely imposed by foreign colonial or neo-colonial powers. As will be argued in Chapter Two, these apologist attitudes are actually a product of the resurgent nationalism of Greek Cypriots, who have attempted to deny any wrongdoing by portraying the Greek Cypriots simply as unfortunate victims of outside conspirators. It will be argued that the Republic’s

¹⁴EOKA B: The second manifestation of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) founded in 1971 and responsible for the coup against Makarios in 1974.

activities since 1974 also are not representative of a community that is simply a malleable recipient of external influences. The policies associated with the theory of *neo-enosis* demonstrate that Hellenic nationalism has persisted within the Greek Cypriot community and that it continues to assert itself actively from within the Greek Cypriot political elite and among the Greek Cypriot populace.

Another relevant trend in Cypriot historiography has been to recognize the persistence of Greek Cypriot nationalism and the overwhelming desire to join the European Union, but without seeing these trends as part of a cohesive strategy of EU accession. Diana Markides agrees that “accession is without a doubt, the overwhelming aspiration of the Greek Cypriots,”¹⁵ but only attributes this support to a belief that it will give the Greek Cypriots a kind of self-determination. EU accession, however, limits the Republic’s economic, social and political sovereignty outside the singular aim and policies accounted for by the theory of *neo-enosis*. Markides also examines the Republic’s close relationship with Greece, stating that the “gap between civic commitment and the restrictions of *realpolitik* has never really been bridged.”¹⁶ This statement implies that Greece has never had much power to act on its commitment to Greek Cypriots. Yet Greek membership in the EU extended Greek political power and ensured Cypriot accession. The European Union acted as the bridge between the two states in cementing their relationship and provided the platform for the pursuit of a joint policy. Through the European Union,

¹⁵Diana Weston Markides, “Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölneseec: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.21.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p.16.

Greece has been able to trump Turkey, a result that was never possible within either NATO or the UN.

The clearest proponent of the persistence of Hellenic nationalism in the Greek Cypriot populace since 1974, Caesar Mavratsas, recognizes the connections between Greece and the Republic but fails to extend his analysis of these connections to the political policies of the 1990s. Mavratsas argues that since “*enosis* is no longer a viable possibility, it may be said that the new Greek-Cypriot nationalism is forced to view the Greek nation as a cultural, rather than a political, entity.”¹⁷ But Cyprus’s EU accession was dependent on Greece’s political ability to ensure acceptance, and Cyprus’s EU membership makes possible a closer, more open political alliance between the Republic and Greece, and even a closer military alliance. Mavratsas also describes the creation of a ‘new nationalism’ among Greek Cypriots, tempered by political realities, but without recognizing its political goals or ends. He claims that “the new Greek-Cypriot nationalist ideology has not yet crystallized, nor has it been systematically articulated.”¹⁸ The theory of *neo-enosis* accounts for a ‘crystallization’ and ‘systematic articulation’ of this resurgent nationalism in a succinct political formula of using European Union membership to draw closer to the Greek state while creating the opportunity for an end to the occupation of the north.

The details of Cypriot accession within European Union historiography address the problems associated with accession and the effects that Cypriot entry will have on the Union as a whole. Yet no attempt has been made to examine the

¹⁷Caesar V. Mavratsas. “The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol.20, No.4 (Oct. 1997), p.728.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p730.

complex methodology of the process and the full motivations behind the Republic's application. The consensus is that membership will somehow produce a settlement of the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but the method of achieving such an agreement and the eventual shape it would take are not explored. The historiography also focuses on the benefits that membership will bring to all the acceding states as a whole, as well as Cyprus in particular. But the benefits that apply to the former communist states do not always apply to the case of Cyprus. Additionally, the benefits identified for Cyprus on its own are either incomplete or reveal a misunderstanding of the motivations and expectations of the Republic. An overemphasis is placed on the economic benefits of membership and on the broad-based support of Europe for Cyprus. As shown below, this interpretation embodies a mistaken faith in the 'internationalization' of the Cyprus issue and on security guarantees offered by the EU, as well as a misinterpretation of the way EU accession affected negotiations over Cyprus.

A Turkish critic of Cypriot entry, Tozum Bahcheli, claims that "Cyprus's EU membership has sharpened ethnic division on the island."¹⁹ But the 'division' produced by membership was more political than ethnic. Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been physically separated since the Turkish invasion of 1974, and the process of EU accession actually provided the isolated communities an opportunity to reintegrate. Bahcheli also states that "the EU issue has complicated rather than helped the prospects for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute."²⁰ In fact, the Cypriot

¹⁹Tozum Bahcheli, "Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus," In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.108.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p.121.

accession process put greater pressure on Turkey and on the Turkish Cypriot leadership to negotiate an agreement and it was this pressure, not Cypriot accession per se, that initially produced a further diplomatic and political split between the south and the north. Cypriot accession has therefore made it more difficult for Turkey to sustain its optimal position on Cyprus, while making it easier for the Greek Cypriots to force Turkey into a softer negotiating position. The Annan Plan—a direct product of the accession process—although seen as flawed to the Greek Cypriots, expanded the possibility for a real settlement.

European Union expansion into Eastern Europe created enormous economic potential for both Western and former communist states. But the economic benefits to Cyprus as an EU member, as examined in Chapter Three, are not clear, while at the same time accession demanded enormous concessions from the Cypriot economy. Yet Bahcheli claims that “Greek Cypriots also expect that full membership will offer economic benefits to Cyprus.”²¹ Not only is the Greek Cypriot populace fearful of the economic results of EU membership as shown in polls conducted by the European Union, but membership and accession attacked the very industries that have supported the Cypriot economy since the partition. The modifications to offshore and shipping companies demanded by the *acquis communautaire*²² will make these industries uncompetitive. Andreas Theophanous extends the idea of economic benefits by claiming that “Cyprus’ application was also a natural outcome of a country’s desire to be part of a group of countries seeking to

²¹*Ibid.*, p.111.

²²Consisting of 31 Chapters of legislation that each of the ten acceding states had to implement.

increase the welfare, prosperity and security of all their citizens.”²³ Cyprus, however, is not joining the EU to increase the welfare and prosperity of ‘all’ its citizens. Not only is membership not a guarantee for economic growth, but Greek Cypriots would prefer the Turkish Cypriots to remain relatively poor,²⁴ enabling the wealthier Greeks to dominate the country economically in the event of an eventual settlement, and to buy back lost property.

Cyprus is also ‘lumped’ into broad statements regarding the economic effects of membership that apply to eastern European states sharing borders with established members and that count on western markets for their goods. Miroslav N. Jovanovic cites three benefits of integration that have little relevance to Cyprus. He claims that “the major benefit for the 5+1 countries would be a secure access to the huge market of the EU.”²⁵ Yet the largest business sectors in the Cypriot economy are service industries such as banking and tourism. He argues that “the second gain would be the possibility of migration of labour into the rest of the EU following the specified adjustment period.”²⁶ But Cypriots have no financial need to go abroad and there is no great desire to migrate while Greeks are engaged in a demographic conflict with Turkey. The third benefit cited by Jovanovic is that “entry includes access to the structural and other funds of the EU.”²⁷ While Cyprus did receive accession funds to cope with the costs of implementing the *acquis communautaire*, it did not participate

²³Andreas Theophanous, “Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a new Constitution,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnesee: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.149.

²⁴The Republic has also pursued international economic sanctions on products from the TRNC.

²⁵Miroslav N. Jovanovic, “Enlargement of the European Union: Economic Dimension,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.51.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p.51.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p.52.

in the large funds established for Eastern Europe. The Republic is also set to become a net contributor to the EU budget within the next decade. Janet Mather, arguing along similar lines, states that EU membership promises not only economic benefits, but also “the reinforcement of liberal democracy.”²⁸ Yet there is no need for Cyprus to reinforce its liberal democracy. Unlike the former communist states of the East, the Republic of Cyprus has been a functioning democracy for decades. When placed into the larger context of EU expansion, the benefits of membership to the East do not apply directly to Cyprus. Cyprus’s push for membership was fundamentally political in nature, and it agreed to follow the EU’s fixed, established guidelines at the risk of damaging its economy.

When dealing with the effects of membership on the Cyprus problem, there has been a tendency to see accession leading to the ‘internationalization’ of the dispute. The Cyprus problem was ‘internationalized’ half a century earlier, however, when the United Nations deployed forces to the island. Yet the presence of UN troops, negotiations conducted under the auspices of the UN, and various UN Security Council Resolutions did very little to sway Turkey’s position. When Christopher Brewin claims that “Cypriot accession was a necessary step in the internationalization of the Cyprus question to counter the proximity and military might of Turkey,”²⁹ he ignores the failures of earlier ‘internationalization’ and the relative indifference of Cyprus’s European partners, apart from Greece. Brewin correctly identifies the need for the Republic ‘to counter the proximity and military

²⁸Janet Mather, “The Citizenry: Legitimacy and Democracy,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (Britain: Palgrave MacMillan), p.111.

²⁹Christopher Brewin, “The Cyprus Question in EU-Turkey Relations,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnese: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.136.

might of Turkey,' but when Cyprus made significant attempts to upgrade its defence capabilities, the international community sided with Turkey. The absence of international support following the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan deal also illustrates the limits of 'internationalization' through EU accession. Only by achieving direct political leverage over Turkish political ambitions through EU membership has Cyprus managed to acquire a powerful counterweight to the Turkish military. In order to enhance this threat, Greece now openly supports Turkish EU membership in order to appear both conciliatory for a Cyprus settlement and because Turkey cannot be vetoed unless it is a candidate for membership.

Within the context of the 'internationalization' of the Cyprus issue, Janet Mather claims that all new states, including Cyprus, "will achieve a prominence (internationally) unavailable to any single country."³⁰ But the Annan deal belies this claim. The European Union, which backed the Annan deal *en masse* with the notable exception of Greece, was more interested in a quick solution to the Cyprus issue than a principled approach to their fellow European member. Cyprus's subsequent rejection of the proposed settlement was also received coldly by the United States and the United Nations. Achieving international prominence and the 'internationalization' of the Cyprus dispute was neither the aim nor the result of the Cypriot membership bid. Rodrick Pace describes the 'internationalization' benefits to Cyprus more perceptively but still incorrectly:

There is the obvious problem of all small states, namely the lack of human and material resources to carry out their policies effectively. In this Cyprus has to devise strategic alliances to borrow the additional strength

³⁰Janet Mather, "The Citizenry: Legitimacy and Democracy," p.111.

of its EU and Mediterranean partners, and the European supranational institutions and agencies.³¹

The only committed EU and Mediterranean partner that Cyprus has, however, is Greece. Cyprus gains political advantages from EU membership only because Greece is also a member and through their combined veto powers. Outside of these specific veto powers, the bargaining position and political resources of the two states have clear limits within the EU.

The possibility of the European Union providing defensive guarantees to Cyprus through the Common Foreign Security Policy is another common claim in the historiography. Suha Bolukbaski states that "Cyprus' EU membership would enable Greece and Cyprus to be integrated under the EU umbrella."³² But the CFSP does not provide for the automatic defense of a member state. Greece and Cyprus did secure a 'Joint Defense Pact' months after Cyprus was accepted as a potential candidate for European membership in 1993. In this sense, joint membership in the EU strengthened the defensive connections between the two states but not under a common EU umbrella. Neill Nugent, while recognizing the limitations of membership in matters of defense, still maintains that "membership would provide the Greek part of the island with, if not a security guarantee, a measure of soft security in the form of a protective arm in respect of its relations with Turkey."³³ This analysis, while more accurate, does not account for the increase in Turkish military activity on the island that the accession process produced. Cypriot

³¹Rodrick Pace, "Enlargement and the Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union: The Role of Cyprus," In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.36.

³²Suha Bolukbasi, "From Benevolent Detachment to Reluctant Assertiveness: Turkey's Policy Towards Cyprus 1954-2001," In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnese: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.48.

³³Nugent, "EU Enlargement and the Cyprus Problem," p.136.

membership does create the ironic situation of Turkey occupying part of an EU state, but Europe made no concerted efforts to establish a 'protective arm' over the Greek Cypriots, even in the fallout of the rejected Annan deal. Membership does provide the Greek-Greek Cypriot 'Joint Defence Pact' with near absolute legitimacy, but also at the risk of isolating Cyprus within Europe should the Republic come to be seen as the problem. Cyprus's pursuit of a nationalist agenda through European Union membership is only really protected by the relationship between Greece and Cyprus.

The historiography also provides ideas that support the concept of *neo-enosis*, but they are either incomplete or do not address the possibility of a nationalist agenda utilizing the functions of the EU to secure a set political agenda. Tozum Bahcheli, Neill Nugent, and Andreas Theophanous state that EU membership will provide "the most promising leverage,"³⁴ "might provide a stimulus"³⁵ and will "act as a catalyst"³⁶ towards a settlement and the withdrawal of Turkish troops. It is not the European Union itself, however, that will achieve this result. The Republic of Cyprus will have the power to make Turkish EU membership conditional upon a Cyprus settlement. While the Annan deal proved that accession provided the final push for a proposal, the Republic itself was determined to decide what a final deal should be. Neill Nugent also states that the Republic's "motivation was more political than economic,"³⁷ yet he does not describe what those political motivations were, outside of the possibility of a Cyprus settlement, or that accession could even be detrimental to the Cypriot economy. Othon Anastaskis observes that there are

³⁴Bahcheli, "Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus," p.110.

³⁵Nugent, "EU Enlargement and the Cyprus Problem," p.136.

³⁶Theophanous, "Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a new Constitution," p.183.

³⁷Nugent, "EU Enlargement and the Cyprus Problem," p.136.

“conditions within the EU (which) might lead to the forming of coalitions determined by national and regional interests.”³⁸ Cyprus and Greece clearly match the description and the ‘conditions within the EU’ involved the exploitation of the enlargement process to secure Cypriot entry. It is this use of the EU for a nationalist political agenda that European Union historiography has not recognized.

The result of these separate approaches to the history of Cyprus is that the link between nationalism and accession has not been clearly and convincingly made. Cypriot historiography describes a ‘new-nationalism’ without being able to demonstrate its political manifestations. European Union historiography has focused on the ideas of the European project and the benefits afforded to its member states, primarily economic in nature. Both agree that the Greek Cypriots are among the strongest supporters of European integration of all the acceding states, but no attempt has been made to link accession to modern nationalism on Cyprus. Yet the Republic’s EU accession has followed a specific pattern of harmonizing policies with Greece and producing the conditions to force a Cyprus settlement. While the production of a settlement as a result of EU accession has been mentioned, it has not been looked at in detail nor has it been shown to be a part of a larger and very specific policy. The concept of *neo-enosis* accounts for the apparent inability of these two fields to connect the history of nationalist agitation on Cyprus with the strong Greek Cypriot support for European Union membership. The attempt to challenge Turkish military dominance on the island and force a Cyprus settlement, combined with the fusion of military and political policy between Greece and

³⁸Othon Anastakskis, “Greece in the Future Enlarged European Union,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* Vol.22 (1998), p.181.

Cyprus, constitutes the process encompassed by the *neo-enosis* theory. The Greek Cypriot rejection of the 'Annan Plan' in 2004 demonstrated the full effect of this self-identity and the powers that were achieved through EU accession. A Cyprus settlement would have to meet not only the agreement of Turkey, but also the needs of the Republic. With its rejection followed by Cypriot accession a month later, Greek Cypriot nationalism had once again asserted itself.

Methodology and Organization

The theory of *neo-enosis* provides a way to bridge the bifurcated historiography of Cyprus and to understand the Cypriot accession process within the context of a joint Greek-Cypriot political agenda with deep historical roots. Connecting the nationalist movement on Cyprus from its origins in the nineteenth century to the EU accession in 2004 requires a multifaceted approach that includes both narrative (chronological) and thematic elements. In cases where a narrative examination of events best demonstrates the history of *enosis* and lays necessary foundations for the theory of *neo-enosis*, as in Chapter One, a chronological approach is used. When a more detailed analysis of specific themes is needed, as in Chapters Two and Three (see below), a topical approach is used. Chapter Four applies both a chronological and a thematic approach to the events of Cypriot accession to the EU and the reactions they evoked. Both methods are necessary given the scope of the thesis and the need to explore themes that link periods of Cypriot history not covered by the historiography.

The singularity of *enosis* history and the continuation of Greek nationalism on Cyprus provide necessary background to understand the Cypriot application for

European Union membership. Chapter One presents the *Megali Idea*, which encapsulated and gave expression to the Pan Hellenic irredentist nationalism of the nineteenth century. It directly influenced national awareness on Cyprus and started the struggle for *enosis* on the island, the main events of which are reviewed over its long history from the time of the Ottoman Empire, through the period of British rule, to the 1974 *coup* attempt and consequent Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island. Reviewing this history is necessary to reveal the meaning of *enosis* for Cypriots and the set of events and experiences that elaborated and gave new facets to this meaning.

The Turkish invasion and occupation of the north in 1974 produced an intractable dispute that seemed to end the nationalist agitation for union with Greece within the Greek Cypriot population. But as Chapter Two demonstrates, the retreat of Greek nationalism following the Turkish invasion was brief and a reassertion of nationalist sentiment grew as the occupation persisted. In order to demonstrate this crucial point, the chapter reviews the key institutions that contributed to the original *enosis* movement and shows that they remained in place after 1974, with no fundamental ideological change. The Church, the National Guard and the Cypriot education system kept their Pan-Hellenic character. The Cypriot political system also kept its nationalist tendencies after 'Cypriotism' (the emphasis on the Cypriot character of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots) failed to become established.

Chapter Three then examines the reasons for and the results of the Cypriot accession process. The declaration of the TRNC in 1983 and the application of Turkey to the European Union in 1987 provided the impetus for a political approach to the Turkish occupation. The failure to reach a negotiated settlement and the

seemingly dominant position of Turkey could only be countered by achieving the political leverage that EU membership provided. The economic effects of membership, often cited as a primary objective of European integration, are also examined in order to demonstrate that they were more problematic and less beneficial than often portrayed.

Chapter Four details the accession process and how Greece and Cyprus pursued a common policy towards the singular task of achieving membership. The European Union, at times unsupportive of accepting the entrance of a divided state, acquiesced when presented with the threat of a Greek veto on all EU enlargements if Cyprus were not included. The Turkish reaction to Cypriot accession, and Turkey's eventual push for a settlement of the island's division, reveals the significance of EU membership to both Turkey and Cyprus. Pressure to accept a rushed settlement, however, led to the Republic's overwhelming refusal of the 'Annan Plan' for the reunification of the country on the principle that Cyprus will now control Turkish EU membership in exchange for a 'viable' solution to the island's division. The impetus, methods and results of Cypriot accession to the EU demonstrate the relative success of the Republic's project as covered by the theory of *neo-enosis*.

CHAPTER 1:

GREEK NATIONALISM ON CYPRUS TO 1974

1.1 The Rise of Greek Nationalism

From the outbreak of revolt in 1821 against the Ottoman Empire until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Greece pursued an aggressive foreign policy aimed at reconstituting as many Greek settlements as possible into a single cohesive state. While the full extent of the 'imagined' Greece was never achieved, limited to a considerable degree by the military failures of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922, Greece's borders expanded from the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 to the modern state. It is, however, the failures which perhaps most exemplify what that 'imagined' Greece was and which, in the case of Cyprus, did not erase what that 'imagined' Greece might yet become.

The initial question over what actually defined Greece emerged before the first revolt. A map produced in the early 16th century may have "inaugurated the ideological construct of Hellenism as a factor of unifying space,"³⁹ but it only referred to a limited expanse of Greek antiquity. Another map⁴⁰ produced in 1797, and reissued three years later with inserts of Cyprus and Sicily, took a further attempt at defining Greek space. The cartographer of the 'Carta', Rhigas Feraios, stated that "whoever speaks the Greek language, wherever he lives, is a citizen of the Republic

³⁹George Tolias, "Totius Graecia: Nicolaos Sophianos's Map of Greece and the Transformation of Hellenism," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* Vol.19, No.1 (2001), p.17. The map was produced by Nicolaos Sophianos.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p.12. Reissued by Anthimos Gazis in Vienna in 1800.

of Greece.”⁴¹ This Pan-Hellenic definition of Greece, by historical space, present day settlement and linguistic bonds became the definition for the early Greek State.

The mix of Byzantine and Classical cultural background further complicated the earliest concepts of modern Greece. Greek merchants, having spread themselves throughout the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century, formed the *Philiki Hetairia*⁴² in Odessa in 1814 which aimed at “the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire.”⁴³ As large as the design was, it exemplified both the expanse of the Greek project and its reliance on historical identity. Reacquiring the ‘lost capital’ of Constantinople⁴⁴, however unrealistic, was a recurrent theme in Greek nationalist irredentism since the city, along with Athens, was the source of a dual identity that combined a Classical and Byzantine heritage.

The link to a Classical heritage became more pronounced once the battle for Greece began. The “archaeological landscape” of Greece underwent a “major transformation . . . during the War of Independence. It was during these years that the status of classical antiquities changed from commodity to symbolic capital.”⁴⁵ Wherever the ruins of Classical Greece stood, they became symbols of an ancient Hellenic origin. The familiarity of the Western powers with the Classical world also influenced the depth and meaning of this connection as “leading representatives of the Greek Enlightenment, such as (Adamantios) Korais and (Iosipos) Moisiodax,

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p.12.

⁴²The Friendly Society.

⁴³Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2001), p.27.

⁴⁴Constantinople is also referred to simply as ‘The City’ in Greek.

⁴⁵Effie F. Athanassopoulou, “An ‘Ancient’ Landscape: European Ideals, Archaeology, and Nation Building in Early Modern Greece,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* Vol.20, No.2 (2002), p.299.

argued that Europe should repay its cultural debt to the Greeks.”⁴⁶ Great Britain, France and the Russian Empire responded to this call for European support in the establishment and expansion of modern Greece based on a two thousand year old ‘cultural debt.’ Russia’s victory over the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Navarino in 1827 ensured an unhindered Greek advance on the mainland, thereby reinforcing the Classical precedent for modern Greece.⁴⁷ Yet to the disappointment of the Greeks, the reality of foreign involvement was often decided by national self-interest among the intervening powers. For example, they sought to limit the power of the Ottoman Empire in the region without eliminating it entirely.

This dual identity of Greece and the bonds it formed took Greece into separate spheres of influence. The Byzantine and Orthodox links with Russia were a counter-weight to the Classical links with Western Europe. The Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, whereby Russia secured autonomy for Greece from the Ottomans, and the Treaty of Constantinople in 1832 which secured an independent Greece, could not have been achieved without the military and political participation of the Great Powers. Greek independence and the components of any Greek state, no matter what military victories the Greeks themselves could muster, were ultimately reliant on the agreement of the great European powers. Greece’s small size, far short of nationalist aspirations, “was only due to the fact that Britain, France and Austria preferred a malleable Ottoman Empire to a strong Greece dominated by Russian

⁴⁶Dimitris Tziouvas, “Beyond the Acropolis: Rethinking Neohellenism,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* Vol.19, No.2 (2001), p.191.

⁴⁷Exemplified by the ‘Philhellenes’ in general and Lord Byron in particular. ‘Philhellenism’ emerged later with offers of Cyprus to Greece and with EU statements on the importance of Cyprus to European history.

influence.”⁴⁸ While Greece maintained allies across the Concert of Europe, its own abilities to operate were limited by the conditions those allies set.

The clearest expression of the growing Greek nationalist movement came from the Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis in 1844, when he introduced the *Megali Idea*.⁴⁹ Similar to the sentiment of Rhigas nearly fifty years before, Kolettis stated:

The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece, it is only a part, the smallest and poorest, of Greece. A Greek is not only he who lives in the kingdom but also he who lives in Yannia, or Thessaloniki, or Serres, or Adrianople, or Constantinople, or Trebizond, or Crete, or Samos, or in whatever country is historically Greek, or whoever is of the Greek race.⁵⁰

The statement was followed by a policy of inciting revolts in Ottoman-held territory and waging war against the Ottomans to acquire as many ‘Greek’ lands as possible. An 1866 revolt in Crete “turned into a nationalist movement for union with Greece,”⁵¹ which was eventually achieved in 1909 after a period of British administration. Greek victories against the Ottomans led to the cession of Thessaly in 1881 and victory in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 brought Epirus, Thessaloniki and southern Macedonia into the Greek state.

The geographical claims of the *Megali Idea* were vast and included territories with mixed populations. Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, the national historiographer in the late 19th century, conceived “Greek space covering a very wide area: almost the entire Balkan Peninsula, a significant part of Asia Minor, sometimes Cyprus, and even Sicily in southern Italy.”⁵² While Greece successfully expanded into the Aegean and along its European coastline, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne limited the

⁴⁸Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.35.

⁴⁹The *Megali Idea: The Great Idea*.

⁵⁰Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais* (East European Monographs, 1982) p.11.

⁵¹Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.55.

⁵²Tolias, “Totius Graecia: Nicolaos Sophianos's Map of Greece and the Transformation of Hellenism,” p.14.

borders of the Greek state⁵³ after the country's failure in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. Greece's occupation of Smyrna "with strong support from Britain"⁵⁴ was followed by invasion of Anatolia in 1920, with the aim of securing Greek territorial claims and enforcing the Treaty of Sevres which had dissolved the Ottoman Empire. The strength of the Turkish resistance, however, combined with infighting within the Greek army, led to a complete military defeat. The Treaty also included provisions for a population exchange, which resulted in 900,000 Greeks in Anatolia and 400,000 Turks in Thessaly moving to their respective countries,⁵⁵ in addition to the movements of those who had fled during the war. Cyprus, which the Ottomans leased to Britain at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, remained isolated during the most intense period of the irredentist struggle.

1.2 The Rise of Greek Nationalism on Cyprus during the Ottoman Empire

When the British took over administration of Cyprus, the 'awakening' of a Pan-Hellenic movement among the Greek Cypriot population was already underway. Greek Cypriots shared in the duality of a Hellenic and Orthodox identity. The geographical distance of Cyprus to mainland Greece also produced an awareness of being a part of the vast diaspora community that stretched throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The *enosis* movement that emerged among Cypriots, as well as among other communities (e.g. on Crete), was accordingly conceived as a process of return to the 'Motherland'.

⁵³The Treaty of Lausanne 1923: Section I, Article 16 included the renouncement of all territories, including Cyprus, outside the Turkish State as set by the Treaty.

⁵⁴Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.136.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p.164.

While the intensification of the Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement took place during British rule, identity with a wider Greek cause began from the outset of Greco-Ottoman hostilities.⁵⁶ As early as “1821 the Church hierarchy and prominent Christians all over Cyprus were executed on the grounds of preparing to join in the mainland Greek revolt against Ottoman rule.”⁵⁷ Whether this was a pre-emptive move on the part of the Ottoman authorities or retaliation for an actual revolutionary plot, it indicates that the Greek Cypriots were considered a part of the wider Greek world. The apparent extent of the executions also limited the potential activity of the nationalist movement in Cyprus until the arrival of the British.

Under Ottoman rule the *millet system*, based on the organization of the population through religious representation, increased the economic and political power of the Orthodox Church⁵⁸ in Cyprus, the heir and defender of Byzantine culture and faith. It was the Orthodox Church that helped to transform nationalist sentiment into a move for *enosis*, aided by Greek diplomats, teachers, patriotic organizations, the Greek Kings and the Athenian press.⁵⁹ While “the main means of the extension of Hellenic nationalism to the mass of the population was the education system,”⁶⁰ in Cyprus the Orthodox Church controlled education. By the end of the Ottoman period, the Orthodox Church was the political and spiritual representative

⁵⁶George Kourvetaris, “Greek and Turkish Interethnic Conflict and Polarization in Cyprus,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* Vol.16, No.2 (Fall 1988) p.189, and N. Kliot and Y. Mansfield, “The political landscape of partition: The Case of Cyprus,” *Political Geography* Vol.16, No.6 (August 1997), p.496.

⁵⁷Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 18), p.25.

⁵⁸The Orthodox Church operated as the *Ethnarch*, or ethnic leaders, of the Greek Cypriot community.

⁵⁹Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais*, Chapter 2 covers an extensive history of the movements that were formulated in Greece proper and how they were expanded to the populations of Greeks in the Aegean and Cyprus.

⁶⁰Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.25.

of the Greek Cypriot populace with control of the educational system that spread Pan-Hellenic nationalism, as well as holding considerable economic power.⁶¹

1.3 Greek Nationalism on Cyprus under British Rule: 1878 to 1931

The transfer of Cyprus to British control, under the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, presented political obstacles to the Greek Cypriot nationalist cause while simultaneously allowing it the political and cultural space to develop. The British established semi-democratic structures, which were intended to maintain British political control while allowing the resident populations, both Greek and Turkish Cypriot, a part in local policy making. Britain established a Legislative Council in 1882 with eighteen members: nine Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots, and six British officials. While ostensibly designed to prevent political dominance by one side, this solution fostered political deadlock, disagreement, and open resentment between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations.⁶² The British also retained the right to overturn any of the decisions of the Council. Education, on the other hand, was kept under the control of each respective community, but there were periodic attempts to limit its nationalist characteristics. The British authorities attempted to limit the powers of the Orthodox Church and displays of Greek nationalism were forbidden when they did not serve British interests. Yet the British were still “faced with recurrent demands for *enosis* with Greece from the day that Sir Garnet Wolseley stepped ashore at Larnaca on 22 July 1878,”⁶³ and it was London’s consistent refusal

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p.40.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p.24.

⁶³Robert Holland, “Never, Never Land: British Colonial Policy and the Roots of Violence in Cyprus, 1950-54,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol.21, No.3 (September 1993), p.149.

to consider *enosis* that led to growing dissatisfaction and eventually an uprising in 1931.

The connection between Cyprus and the wider Greek world grew during British rule: Greek Cypriots participated in the fight against Turkey in 1880 and in 1897⁶⁴ while Greek officials promoted *enosis* in Cyprus. Nationalism on Cyprus was promoted by schools and cultural association and also by the Greek consulates.⁶⁵ Education, under the control of the Orthodox Church, became increasingly inundated with nationalist identity. Indeed, there was a “complete merging of the Orthodox confession with the Greek national identity.”⁶⁶ The prevalence of the Church in the national struggle continued unabated throughout British rule.

Britain had set a precedent elsewhere for facilitating the transfer of islands to Greece, either by directly transferring them from British rule or by supporting the cause of Greek rebellions in Ottoman lands. The British transferred rule of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864 after fifty years of administration. Crete joined Greece in 1908 after a ten-year Cretan Republic formed by Britain, France and Russia was dissolved and *enosis* achieved. These successful transfers of authority and the conquests of Greece in Thessaly and southern Macedonia served to strengthen the perception among the Greek Cypriots that *enosis* was an eventuality rather than simply a possibility.

Demands for *enosis* intensified and the possible secession of the island by Britain was used to encourage Greek foreign policy to align with British interests.

⁶⁴Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.41.

⁶⁵Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, (New York University Press, 1999), p.229.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p.229.

Britain first offered Cyprus to Greece in 1912 in exchange for military bases in the Ionian Islands and later in 1915 as an incentive for Greece to come to the aid of Serbia in World War I. The Zaimis administration in Greece, however, rejected the later proposal under the pressure of King Constantine.⁶⁷ It is also unclear how sincere the offers made by Britain were, since Cyprus was considered an essential “watch tower”⁶⁸ of British strategic interests in the Middle East. The island’s geographic position provided Britain with military bases, and later air bases, which could rapidly deploy forces to the Levant or Egypt. The transfer of Cyprus to Greece could potentially place that watch tower under Russian influence due to the close political and cultural ties between Russia and Greece, and the vital Suez Canal itself might be threatened.⁶⁹

Greece’s military failures in the Greco-Turkish War and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 greatly affected Greek nationalism on Cyprus and altered the political and legal status of the island. Cyprus was officially annexed by Britain when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I. As a result, the population exchanges that accompanied Lausanne excluded Cyprus, although the Turkish Cypriots were encouraged to emigrate.⁷⁰ After Lausanne, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos “warned the Cypriots that they were on their own”⁷¹ and that they should

⁶⁷Terry Stavros Stavridis, “Greek-Cypriot Enosis of October 1915: A Lost Opportunity?” *Balkan Studies* Vol.37, No.2 (1996), p.300.

⁶⁸John Fisher, “The Cyprus Proposition: Lord Curzon and Cyprus in British Imperial Strategy, 1914 to 1919,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* Vol.23 (1999), p.144.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p.150.

⁷⁰Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.44. Turkish Cypriots could retain Turkish Citizenship if they left the island within two years.

⁷¹Diana Markides and G.S. Georghallides, “British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* Vol.13, No.1 (1995), p.67.

“forget their ‘utopian aspirations’.”⁷² While Cyprus remained “at the bottom of the irredentist agenda”⁷³, Greece continued to encourage and support the possibility of *enosis* with Cyprus after Lausanne and the tenure of Venizelos. Although geography posed an obstacle to a physical attachment with Greece, the Greek Cypriots constituted a large majority on the island. Additionally, the island’s status as a British colony placed it outside the influence of Turkey giving Greek Cypriots hope that they would eventually achieve *enosis*.

After the official annexation of Cyprus by Britain in 1914 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek Orthodox Church began to organize groups of young nationalists, sensing that political reform was unlikely as long as Cyprus remained British. Archbishop Cyril III became chairman of an organization founded in 1922, which was intended to “mobilize all adult male Greek Cypriots to fight for *enosis* by whatever means necessary.”⁷⁴ This organization was the antecedent of the National Radicalist Union⁷⁵ established in 1931, and of the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), which became active in the mid-1950s. It was the National Radicalist Union which led rioters in Nicosia in 1931 after a British ‘Order-in-Council’⁷⁶ overturned a decision of the Legislative Council opposing additional taxation (on a rare occasion that a Turkish Cypriot sided with the Greek bloc). The riot led to the suspension of the Legislative Council, the banishment of several of the riot leaders, and the cessation of municipal elections. Though the ‘Order-in-Council’

⁷²*Ibid.*, p.65.

⁷³Diana Weston Markides, “Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakas and Heinz A. Richter (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 22), p.14.

⁷⁴Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais*, p.33.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p.35. Established on October 18th 1931 and formed by “young activists of the National Organization.”

⁷⁶The Order-in-Council was a direct mandate from the British Foreign Office.

may have been the precedent for action, the uprisings in October 1931 aimed ultimately at *enosis*.⁷⁷ Direct opposition to British rule was therefore instigated by the nationalist organizations that had formed under Church leadership with the singular goal of unification with Greece.

1.4 Greek Nationalism on Cyprus under British Rule: 1931-1960

The riots of 1931 increased British awareness of the potential danger that the *enosis* movement posed to colonial rule. Once the Legislative Council was dissolved, “the symbols of the Greek nation, the flag and the Greek national anthem, were banned in Cyprus.”⁷⁸ The British also attempted to reform the Church-dominated education system by passing a bill in 1933 aimed at de-nationalizing the curriculum and placing it under British control. Though the move quickly failed because of lack of resources, the Orthodox Church interpreted the attempt as a direct attack on national consciousness and began to call for ‘*enosis* and only *enosis*.’ When the British restored the ‘symbols of the Greek nation’ during World War II, nationalist sentiment was still strong. The Greek Civil War that began at the close of the Second World War played out in Cyprus as a struggle for political leadership of the nationalist cause. This struggle pitted the left, represented by The Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL),⁷⁹ and the conservative forces represented by the Church.

⁷⁷Diana Markides and G.S. Georghallides, “British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus,” p.69.

⁷⁸Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.27.

⁷⁹AKEL: The Progressive Party of Working People, a communist party which formed as the KKK, the Communist Party of Cyprus, in 1926.

In August 1945, the Fourth Congress of AKEL agreed on *enosis* “as the ultimate goal of the national liberation struggle.”⁸⁰ AKEL differed from the Church on how to achieve *enosis*, however. By the 1950s AKEL sought to internationalize the conflict by going to the United Nations, and it considered possible constitutional arrangements that would eventually lead to a plebiscite on *enosis* after a period of self rule. AKEL saw *enosis* as a way “to assist *democratic* forces in Greece in their effort to overturn the conservative regime established after the Civil War.”⁸¹ It was this stance which distanced AKEL from the Church and from the right wing forces which would eventually make up EOKA.

The Orthodox Church, having termed *enosis* “sacred and holy,”⁸² utilized its role as the traditional head of the Greek Cypriot community, in conjunction with its control of Greek Cypriot education, to achieve a political consensus. A plebiscite held in 1950 by the Orthodox Church on the question of *enosis* produced a “plurality of 96.5 percent favouring integration with the Hellenic Motherland.”⁸³ The result was presented to the British as a confirmation, rather than a revelation, of the will of the Greek Cypriots. To further mobilize the Greek Cypriot populace, Archbishop Makarios III formed the Pan-Cyprian National Youth Organization (PEON) in 1952, having “tapped the resources of Sunday schools and secondary education”⁸⁴ for its members. PEON’s members were then “induced” to join the Orthodox Christian

⁸⁰Agop Garabedjan, “The Struggle for Enosis and the Efforts to Achieve Political Unity in Cyprus (1945-1947)” *Etudes Balkaniques* Vol.21, No.2 (1985), p.14.

⁸¹Agop Garabedjan, “The Liberation Movement in Cyprus in the Early 50s” *Etudes Balkaniques* Vol.27, No.4 (1991), p.24.

⁸²Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, p.229.

⁸³Holland, “Never, Never Land: British Colonial Policy and the Roots of Violence in Cyprus, 1950-54,” p.149.

⁸⁴Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, p.240.

Union of Youth (OHEN) in 1953, “which assumed a more militant character.”⁸⁵ The Church persisted in its unwavering call for ‘*enosis* and only *enosis*’, fearing that an alternative would compromise its leadership of the national cause, and it organized the youth groups that later provided EOKA with a wealth of militant nationalists.

Greece’s active involvement in the question of Cypriot *enosis* emerged in the early 1950s following the end of the Greek Civil War. The interest of Greece was “to build a new ‘national politics’ . . . taking up anew the *Megali Idea* of integrating the Greek-speaking diaspora.”⁸⁶ Greek involvement included consultations between Makarios and the authorities in Athens, in addition to direct Greek negotiations with Britain over the future status of the island. Although “the Greeks offered bases anywhere in Greece (to Britain), including Crete, in return for gradual steps towards *enosis*,”⁸⁷ British intractability eventually led Greece to conclude that only by recourse to the United States and then the United Nations could the issue of Cypriot *enosis* be resolved. Being aware of the geopolitical considerations involved, Greece was more conciliatory than the Greek Cypriot leadership and was willing to consider a staged process of unification.

The EOKA campaign began thanks to a combination of increasing Greek Cypriot frustration with the British over their implacable stance on *enosis* and growing impatience among militant nationalists. Georgios Grivas, “a seasoned warrior and die-hard nationalist of Cypriot descent,”⁸⁸ was enlisted as the military leader of the movement in 1951, while in 1953 Makarios joined “the Struggle

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p.240.

⁸⁶Robert Holland, “NATO and the Struggle for Cyprus,” *The Journal of Modern Greek Studies* Vol.13 (1995), p.34.

⁸⁷Markides, “Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty,” p.15.

⁸⁸Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus*, p.245.

Committee in taking an oath to support *enosis* unto death.”⁸⁹ Makarios was “recognized as the supreme authority”⁹⁰ of the political struggle in Greece and among the Greek Cypriot populace, whereas Grivas organized and implemented the activities of EOKA. In 1954, Grivas “methodically set about organizing small guerrilla groups, which he trained in the use of arms and explosives. For manpower, Grivas tapped the reservoir of former PEON members.”⁹¹ The campaign, initiated on April 1st 1955,⁹² was the culmination of over a century of Greek Cypriot agitation for *enosis*.

The EOKA campaign attempted to destabilize colonial rule in Cyprus by attacking the British military and killing pro-British Greek and Turkish Cypriots, thereby forcing the colonial authorities to implement harsh counter-measures. Hunting down EOKA fighters brought the British military into direct and sometimes violent contact with the Greek Cypriot populace. To politically challenge EOKA and therefore *enosis*, the British took over the education system, long considered a sacred institution of Greek Cypriot identity, and forbade public displays of Hellenic nationalism. But Greece’s internationalization of the Cyprus problem, combined with the outbreak of EOKA violence, also convinced Britain that including Turkey in the discussions would temper Greek demands. Turkey, until the British invitation, had been seemingly uninterested or unwilling to be involved in Cyprus. The Treaty of Lausanne⁹³ directly forbade Turkish acquisition of former Ottoman lands, but the

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p.245.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p.245.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, p.246.

⁹²The original date was March 25th, Greek Independence Day, but was delayed by logistical complications.

⁹³Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne: Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands

concept of *taksim*⁹⁴ emerged as a counter-weight to Greek calls for *enosis*. The possibility of partition was first aired publicly by the British in December 1956⁹⁵ because “although Britain wanted to improve relations with Greece, it had ‘no intention of presenting Turks with a united Cyprus in foreign hands, offering a threat to the southern ports of Turkey’.”⁹⁶ Greece also had to balance its case for Cyprus with the status of Greeks residing in Istanbul and Alexandria. The Greeks in Istanbul were held as ‘hostages’⁹⁷ in discussions over Cyprus, threatened by Turkey if a decision on Cyprus was deemed insufficient. The Suez Crisis also created a rift between Greece and Britain since the Greeks supported Egypt’s position in order to secure the vulnerable Greek community of Alexandria.⁹⁸

By 1959 Greece had compromised its ‘reliability’ as an ally of Britain while Turkey had increased its own importance and hardened its position on Cyprus. Within this new context, Britain promoted the idea of an independent Cypriot state as an alternative either to partition or to annexation by Greece. The idea was to insure that the interests of both Turkey and Britain would be protected.”⁹⁹ The result was the Zurich Agreement, signed in 1959 by Greece, Great Britain, and Turkey, which made Cyprus an independent republic.¹⁰⁰

other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.

⁹⁴Taksim: ‘Division’ in Turkish, which described a partition of the island.

⁹⁵Holland, “Never, Never Land: British Colonial Policy and the Roots of Violence in Cyprus, 1950-54,” p.174.

⁹⁶Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus Question, March – December 1956,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol.19, No.2. (May 1991), p.258.

⁹⁷Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The Suez Crisis, Cyprus and Greek Foreign Policy, 1956: A view from the British Archives,” *Balkan Studies* Vol.30, No.1 (1989), p.114.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, p.119.

⁹⁹Agop Garabedjan, “The Conflict Between the Ethnic Communities in Cyprus in December 1963 and the Attempts of its Settlement,” *Etudes Balkaniques*, Vol.28, No.2 (1992), p.10.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p.10.

The Zurich Agreement was presented to Archbishop Makarios as a *fait accompli*. Delegations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were present, but they relied on their 'mother countries' to formulate the composition and division of powers for the new Republic. While previously "Turkey would not accept self-government without partition being mentioned; (and) Greece would not agree without self-determination being mentioned,"¹⁰¹ pressure from Britain and the US, hoping to avert a Greco-Turkish war, combined with Britain's need to 'pacify' the island, led to compromise and the creation of the Republic of Cyprus. EOKA had fought for *enosis* but was instead outmanoeuvred geopolitically and forced to accept the 'victory' of an independent country, an outcome neither Greeks or Turkish Cypriots believed would function. Whether the *enosis* movement, which had developed over at least a century, was expected to dissipate by self-rule is unclear, but a system was put in place with the idea of preventing any attempt towards either *enosis* or *taksim*. The Treaty of Guarantee, an attachment to the Constitution, maintained that Cyprus could not seek "in whole or in part, any political or economic union with any State whatsoever or partition of the Island."¹⁰² To uphold the Constitution, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey were each given status as guarantor powers and reserved "the right to take action"¹⁰³ against violations of the Constitution. Under these ominous provisions the Greek Cypriots held the hope that independence was simply a transitional stage towards full union at a later date.

¹⁰¹Hatzivassiliou, "Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus Question, March – December 1956," p.256.

¹⁰²Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960).

¹⁰³Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960).

1.5 Greek Nationalism in the Republic of Cyprus: 1960-1974

When the Cypriots were left to govern themselves, hostility broke out between the two communities on a scale never before seen. While Makarios had signed the Zurich Agreement, as President of the Republic he attempted to revise the Constitution by giving more legislative powers to the Greek Cypriots and negotiated potential deals that would transfer the island to Greece. Dissatisfied members of EOKA attacked Turkish Cypriot communities with increasing frequency, eventually culminating in the coup against Makarios in 1974 for betraying the national cause by abandoning *enosis*. The Turkish Cypriots under Rauf Denktash, who had formed the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT)¹⁰⁴ in 1958 as a counter to EOKA, increasingly isolated themselves into enclaves¹⁰⁵ throughout the island, suspending all economic ties and movement between the two communities. That the system set up at Zurich failed so quickly and so thoroughly was perhaps predictable. But the failure also reflected the intransigent desire for *enosis* that still dominated extreme circles with the willing acquiescence of the Greek Cypriot populace.

After 1960 Cyprus turned into a proxy battlefield between Greece and Turkey, both of whom supplied arms, money and soldiers to the ongoing conflict. When Makarios presented his 'Thirteen Points' in December 1963, aimed at a Constitutional revision to eliminate many of the powers of the Turkish Cypriot political representatives, inter-communal violence broke out. This situation led Turkey to threaten military intervention¹⁰⁶ and renewed hope among the Greek

¹⁰⁴TMT: Türk Mukavemet Teskilati, Turkish Resistance Organization.

¹⁰⁵Leonard W. Doob, "Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.30, No.2 (June 1986), p.384.

¹⁰⁶Markides, "Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty," p.18.

Cypriots that a conflict might pave the way towards *enosis*. While both groups formed paramilitary wings, the Cypriot National Guard was exclusively Greek and both Greece and Turkey, by right of the Treaty of Guarantee, kept armed contingents on the island. The fear of a Turkish invasion, however, encouraged moves towards reconciliation, particularly after the Turkish Cypriots established enclaves setting a precedent for partition. *Enosis* was still the desired status for Cyprus among the Greek Cypriots, but not at the expense of *taksim*.

In 1964, in response to the ongoing unrest and in an effort to pre-empt a Greco-Turkish conflict, the United States presented the Acheson Plan to Makarios. The deal, an altered form of *enosis*, provided for “a large Turkish military base on the island, the rest of which would be ceded to Greece.” The Turkish and Greek governments were both “somewhat eager to adopt this formula.”¹⁰⁷ The base would have been placed on the Karapathian Peninsula in north-eastern Cyprus, which covered a fraction of the territory that Turkey eventually came to control. Greece’s support for the plan revealed its acceptance of a partial geographical *enosis*, no doubt in part because it offered a means to increase the government’s flagging domestic support. Turkey also supported the plan, indicating that the rights of the Turkish minority on the island were secondary to strategic considerations. Makarios, however, rejected the plan and instead turned to the United Nations, the Non-Aligned countries and even the Soviet Union to find support for self-determination and full *enosis*. The further internationalization of the Cyprus question was meant to place negotiations for *enosis* outside NATO’s sphere, where Turkey had significant influence and where Greece was forced to compromise its demands.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p.19.

While AKEL was supportive of Makarios' initiative to revise the Constitution,¹⁰⁸ the Minister of the Interior presented Makarios with the 'Akritas Plan'¹⁰⁹ in 1963, should inter-communal violence erupt. The plan called for a military operation directed against the Turkish Cypriot minority, surrounding them within "one or two days" of action, in which case "no outside intervention would be either justified or possible."¹¹⁰ Holding the Turkish Cypriot population hostage was intended to prevent Turkey from considering an intervention and, if carried out, aimed at solving the 'Cyprus problem' by committing genocide against the entire Turkish Cypriot population. An immediate declaration of *enosis* would have followed these actions but Makarios rejected the scheme outright for its obvious brutality. The extremity of the 'Akritas Plan' revealed what was possible on Cyprus under the leadership of the nationalist right and was later used by Turkey to justify the 1974 intervention. Rather than resort to these extremities, the Greek Cypriot government attempted to normalize conditions for the Turkish Cypriots. It continued to appeal to the international community for support on Constitutional reform and self-determination as the only means possible for achieving *enosis*.

After further inter-communal violence broke out in 1967 over barricades that the Turkish Cypriots erected around an enclaved village, Makarios took the position that *enosis* was no longer possible. While he had led the *enosis* struggle since the early 1950s, after 1968 he focused on preserving the unity of the Republic in order to preserve Greek culture throughout the entire island. While Makarios may have been

¹⁰⁸ Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.112.

¹⁰⁹ Named after the Byzantine folk hero Digenis Akritas who had repelled a foreign invasion in the Middle Ages. It was also the *nom de guerre* used by George Grivas.

¹¹⁰ The Akritas Plan, Tactis, Paragraph 4, section B.

“preparing for a new stage of the *enosis* struggle in order to avert an armed insurrection,”¹¹¹ he had antagonized the extreme nationalist elements on the island and the Greek Junta which had come to power in 1967. Greek Cypriot militants claimed he had ‘abandoned’ the cause of *enosis*, which he had sworn an oath to pursue until death. His defence was that he had done what ‘is feasible, not what is desired’, an evaluation supported by AKEL. The political weakness of the Junta in Greece, combined with its inherent nationalist interests, provided the Greek Cypriot militants with a loyal ally and the Junta with a politically legitimate cause. Makarios was now viewed by both as an obstacle to *enosis* and plans to remove him from power began to take shape. Internal political pressure was applied against Makarios through the formation of the National Front in 1969, which demanded a ‘policy of *enosis*’.¹¹² In 1971, directly supported by the Junta, George Grivas secretly formed a new organization, EOKA B, in response to the growing rift between Grivas and Makarios caused “by the latter’s abandonment of the claim for self-determination.”¹¹³ While the Greek Junta encouraged political opposition to Makarios and supported EOKA B on Cyprus, it was Greek Cypriot militants who renewed the violent struggle for *enosis* and prepared to sacrifice its most aged and vocal adherent.

The long struggle for *enosis* had been pursued on many levels: through direct appeals to the British; as an anti-colonialist struggle; via Constitutional reform; by appealing to the world community through the United Nations; and by way of negotiations between Greece and Turkey with the support of the United States.

¹¹¹Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.120.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p.131.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, p.126.

Frustrated by the Zurich Agreement and the inoperative state it had created and by Makarios's perceived abandonment of *enosis*, the irredentist struggle of Hellenic nationalism on Cyprus turned to war.

1.6 The Greek Cypriot Coup and Turkish Invasion of 1974

On July 15th 1974, officers of the Cypriot National Guard, supported by contingents of the Greek military on Cyprus, staged a coup and replaced Makarios with a military government to facilitate the union of Cyprus and Greece. Greek officers on Cyprus then pledged the support of the Greek military in the likely event of a Turkish invasion. Popular support for the coup and EOKA B was limited because of the attempt on Makarios' life and the fear of a Turkish reprisal. In the days following the coup, members of EOKA B and officers in the military who had supported the action fought against those loyal to Makarios. While the Junta may have come to accept the idea that some kind of partition would be necessary to facilitate *enosis*, the eventual result of the coup and invasion were not likely what they expected. Makarios, however, had feared that *enosis* had become untenable and that pushing for a military confrontation with Turkey would only result in partition.

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On July 20th the Turkish military, under the orders of Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, entered Cyprus under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee with the claim of restoring the Constitutional order of the Republic. While the Greek military contingent on the island and the National Guard attempted to repel the invasion, the Greek Colonels who had helped to initiate the *coup* were unable to

¹¹⁴Markides, "Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty," p.19.

gather support from the other military branches and the Junta fell within days. The Turkish forces, disregarding a UN Security Council ceasefire,¹¹⁵ initiated Phase II¹¹⁶ of the intervention on August 14th and expanded their control of Cyprus, partitioning the island in violation of their Constitutional mandate. The Turkish forces “halted along a line almost exactly identical with that proposed by Turkey as the demarcation of partition in 1965”¹¹⁷ referred to as ‘The Attila Line’. While protection of the Turkish minority and the restoration of the Republic was the reason given for the intervention, “the threat to the strategic interests of Turkey was greater than that to the security of the Turkish-Cypriot community.”¹¹⁸ The Greek Colonels had badly miscalculated the Turkish response and their own ability to counterattack, leaving Greece, in conjunction with the collapse of the Junta, compromised diplomatically, leaderless and unable to intervene. The Geneva Conferences held during and following the intervention could not mediate the dispute nor compel the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island. The Turkish forces even expanded the conflict and violated the cease-fire by initiating Phase II of the invasion while the first of these conferences was underway. As Turkey’s military position progressed, its diplomatic position became more entrenched. Ecevit claimed that he could not accept the removal of Turkish forces from Cyprus: “I can’t have the Turkish flag lowered from Kyrenia Castle where I had it hoisted. I can’t promise to withdraw the Turkish troops whom I sent there myself.”¹¹⁹ Turkish policy on Cyprus has followed this premise ever since. The coup and invasion produced 200,000 refugees, one third of

¹¹⁵UN Security Council Resolution 353 (1974) of July 1974, paragraphs one and three.

¹¹⁶The second wave of the invasion as termed by the Turkish Military.

¹¹⁷N. Kliot and Y Mansfield, “The political landscape of partition: The Case of Cyprus,” *Political Geography* Vol.16, No.6 (August 1997), p.503.

¹¹⁸M.A. Birand, *30 Hot Days*, (Lodon: K. Rustem and Brother, 1985), p.10.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p.72.

the Cypriot population, by the forced removal of Greeks from the northern third of the country and an exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the south. In addition to the widespread destruction of Greek culture in the north, the conflict left the security of the Republic of Cyprus highly compromised and brought about the defeat of *enosis* in its original form. Yet even though the Greek Cypriots failed in their attempt to achieve *enosis* and found themselves left with a divided country enforced by a foreign military force, they refused to accept partition, maintained their inherent Hellenic nationalist sentiments, and sought other political measures to align the island with Greece.

CHAPTER 2:

CYPRIOTISM VERSUS HELLENISM

2.1 The Challenge of Cypriotism

The coup and invasion, which resulted in the defeat of *enosis* and the partition of the island, immediately discredited EOKA B and redefined the Greek nationalist cause. The Greek Junta, which had toppled the most popular Greek Cypriot leader of modern history and then abandoned the island while Turkish troops advanced, collapsed. Yet the Greek Cypriots, rather than questioning their reliance on the 'motherland' in the wake of the failure, placed an even greater reliance on Greece as the only ally that considered the island's future to be a matter of national interest. Greek Cypriots have since dismissed the Junta as a foreign plot under the control of the CIA, claiming that the "Cypriots involved in EOKA B did not really know the 'grand plan' (partition) but were fighting against Makarios for the ideal of *enosis*."¹²⁰ In the immediate years after 1974, however, Greek Cypriots were faced with the harsh consequences of their pro-*enosis* agitation taken to a radical extreme, and a temporary retreat of nationalist forces took place. Cypriotism, "an ideology that pledged support to the political independence of the island,"¹²¹ emerged as the main challenge to Greek Cypriot nationalist identity. The challenge to national identity, however, was brief and unsuccessful because the main sources of Cypriot Hellenism, the Orthodox Church, the National Guard, and a Hellenic-centered education system

¹²⁰Yiannis Papadakis, "The Politics of Memory and Forgetting in Cyprus," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* Vol.3, No.1 (1993), p.148.

¹²¹Caesar Mavratsas, "The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol.20, No.4 (Oct. 1997), p.717.

remained in place and even strengthened their Hellenic character. The Church, while strictly limited politically, consistently presented itself as the champion of Hellenism on Cyprus and openly called for a struggle of liberation against Turkish occupation. The Cypriot school system, under 'Hellenic centered' education, remained decidedly nationalistic and resisted all attempts at reform. The National Guard, perhaps the most effective institution for the indoctrination of nationalist identity, openly linked Cypriot defence with Greece. Despite the failures of 1974 and the movement towards Cypriotism that followed, these three traditional institutions of Hellenic nationalism have maintained, if not strengthened, their nationalistic character.

The New Cyprus Association, founded in March 1975 by "intellectuals and professionals from the educated elite of the island,"¹²² claimed that the majority of Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish, had been held hostage by a minority of right-wing extremists. The 'Neocypriots' pressured "the official Greek-Cypriot leadership to denationalize the Republic of Cyprus and to assume an explicit policy of independence."¹²³ The Cypriotists claim that while each of the respective communities has a culture and a history connected to either Greece or Turkey, each community also possesses features that distinguish them from their 'motherlands', and that joint settlement has created "some common ground between the two communities of the island."¹²⁴ Greek Cypriots speak a unique dialect of Greek and have acquired cultural peculiarities thanks to centuries of foreign rule. Other populations of Greeks throughout the Mediterranean underwent similar linguistic and cultural transformations. Yet the core of language, culture and religion remained

¹²²*Ibid.*, p.724.

¹²³*Ibid.*, p.725.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, p.721.

Greek for all of them, being a key part of their self-identity. The emergence of Cypriotism and 'denationalization' was therefore not so much a mass movement for the transformation of Greek Cypriot identity as it was a response to the political pressures facing the Republic in negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. Even the single political party that might have been expected to support Cypriotism, AKEL, knew that "any serious challenge, or even qualification, to the assumed Greekness of the island would alienate them from the political mainstream."¹²⁵ A deep process of denationalization would have entailed reforms to the Cypriot National Guard, the education system and the emergence of modern political parties. Yet no such reforms took place; the nationalist character of each of these institutions remained.

While Cypriotism challenged the traditional identity of the Greek Cypriots, new political parties and alliances formed that centered on political figures rather than on political ideology. Before the coup and invasion, Cypriot politics had been dominated first by the Patriotic Front¹²⁶ from 1960 to 1970 and then by the Unified Party and the Progressive Front¹²⁷ from 1970. The Patriotic Front, a collection of right wing groups, included eight ex-EOKA chiefs in the House of Representatives¹²⁸ as well as the future President of the Republic Glafcos Clerides, an ex-EOKA member. The Unified Party, which held the most House seats in 1970, was led by Nikos Sampson, the puppet President of the coup. Among its members was another future President of the Republic, Tassos Papadopoulos, a former member of EOKA who had voted against the Zurich Agreement in 1959. The network of personal

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p.728.

¹²⁶The Popular Front had 30 of the 35 seats allocated to the Greek Cypriots in the House of Representatives.

¹²⁷The Unified Party and the Progressive Front controlled 22 of the 35 seats in the House of Representatives.

¹²⁸Ioannis A. Papaioannou, *Politics in Cyprus Between 1960 and 1981* (Theopress Cyprus 1984), p.49.

contacts built up within EOKA had left “both clientage ties and traditional nationalist appeals (which) were used by mainstream clientist political parties”¹²⁹ such as the Patriotic Front and the Unified Party. Clientage ties were initially based “on the organization of the underground anti-colonial fight.”¹³⁰ At the same time, former EOKA members had a natural populist attraction in politics as a result of their direct involvement in the struggle for *enosis*. Although the extreme right had been discredited following the coup and invasion, the 1976 elections saw the formation of DISY, the Democratic Rally led by Glafcos Clerides. DISY took control of the main body of the Unified Party and invited “many pro-coup elements” into it.¹³¹ Yet DISY, which has since become the main rival to AKEL, did not acquire a single seat in the 1976 House elections despite recording 26% of the popular vote because the “electoral law was politically manipulated”¹³² to exclude DISY entirely. The right’s exclusion was an attempt to silence any semblance of Greek nationalist ideology within the politics of the Republic while negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots over the formation of a new system and an end to partition remained underway. Both the attempt to stifle the nationalists and the attempt to create an artificial identity through Cypriotism failed, however, and the cultural predominance of Hellenism remained.

The survival of Greek nationalism on Cyprus led eventually to increasing political representation and the electoral success of the Greek Cypriot right. DIKO, the Democratic Party led by Spyros Kyprianou (who became President of the Republic following the death of Makarios in 1977), followed a centre-right policy

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.17.

¹³⁰ Michael Attalides, “Forms of Peasant Incorporation in Cyprus During the Last Century,” In *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (Duckworth, London, 1977), p.147.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p.25.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.27.

and dominated the House in the 1976 elections, winning 21 of the 35 seats. (DIKO became the political home of Tassos Papadopoulos in 1991.) Even EDEK, a left of centre party that later became KISOS,¹³³ which initially provided a counterweight to nationalist extremism through support for Cypriotism, was taken over “by nationalist elements and eventually transformed itself into what is today perhaps the most extreme nationalist Greek-Cypriot political party.”¹³⁴ This transformation followed the victory of PASOK in Greece during the 1981 Parliamentary elections. PASOK was a left wing party that promised to “make the Greeks the true masters of their country.”¹³⁵ The close connection between elections in Greece and the political direction of a party in Cyprus reveals a kind of dependence that embodied Pan-Hellenism and contrasted with Cypriotism. Political dialogue in Cyprus focused on how to approach the Cyprus problem, the reason why Clerides first broke away from Makarios, and on economic policies regarding the resettlement of 200,000 displaced citizens, fully one third of the population. But the adoption of a purely Cypriotist platform that extended past the elections of 1981 never emerged, even within AKEL.

Indeed, both the right and the centre left (the latter with the acquiescence of AKEL) became participants in reinvigorating Greek national identity less than a decade after the failure of the coup and invasion. The failure to reach a negotiated compromise with the Turkish Cypriots contributed to the growing political strength of nationalism. The ‘High Level Agreements’ between Makarios and Denktash in

¹³³EDEK, the Unified Democratic Centre Union, became KISOS, the Movement for Social Democracy, for the 1996 House of Representative elections.

¹³⁴Mavratsas, “The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity,” p.726.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, p.726.

1977 followed by the 'Ten Point Agreement' of 1979¹³⁶ between Makarios's successor, Spyros Kyprianou, and Denktash, produced the basis for a settlement that was not actualized until the 'Annan Plan' of 2004. The lack of progress after 1979 only reinforced the idea among Greek Cypriots that Turkey's goal was a permanent partition. Having proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975, the Turkish Cypriots showed little intention of giving up a *de facto* autonomy in favour of a reintegrated Cyprus. If Turkey, as a guarantor power, had restored the Republic of Cyprus with new safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots, the move to the right may have enjoyed far less support and appeal among Greek Cypriots. Turkish rapprochement at an early date could have encouraged the realization of Cypriotism in the face of extreme nationalism. Instead, the partition of the island entrenched the Greek nationalist position that Turkey was an aggressive foreign power which threatened Greek culture on Cyprus and which had 'stolen' a third of the island.

As "the demise of Greek-Cypriot nationalism was temporary and, one can say, rather superficial," the Greek Cypriot nationalists "have again started to represent the political mainstream of the Greek Cypriot community."¹³⁷ Successive governments of the Republic since the early 1980s have not only been tolerant towards Greek Cypriot nationalism but have increasingly and openly supported Greek national identity. The continued presence of 32,000 Turkish troops¹³⁸ in the north contrasts sharply with the 10,000 to 13,000 National Guardsmen¹³⁹ serving at any one time in the south. The enormous demographic, economic, political and military imbalance

¹³⁶The content of these Agreements will be discussed in Chapter 3.3.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, p.725.

¹³⁸Aristos Aristotelous, *The Military Balance: 1995-1996* (Cyprus Centre for Strategic Studies 1995), p.66.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, p.56.

between Turkey and Cyprus, along with the failure to reach an early Cyprus settlement, persuaded Greek Cypriots to return to the policy of relying on Greece for support. While the political manifestation of this new stage of Greek nationalism will be explained in the following chapters using the concept of *neo-enosis*, the institutions of the Church, the education system and the National Guard must first be examined to illustrate how the Hellenic identity of the Greek Cypriots has persisted since 1974. Caesar Mavratsas describes some of its elements as follows:

The new Greek-Cypriot nationalism continues to thrive on the symbolic dominance traditionally associated with nationalist ideology, stressing, among other issues, the inherent qualities (and superiority) of Greek culture, the '3000-year-old history of the Greek Cypriots', the value of Greek education, and 'the Hellenochristian ideals' which have imbued Western civilization.¹⁴⁰

These organizations have remained inherently Greek, openly expressing nationalist tendencies, at times revising the history of the coup or justifying it as part of the battle for *enosis*. When measuring 'national pride', a 2002 Eurobarometer poll found that 94% of the Greek Cypriots "feel (very or fairly proud)"¹⁴¹ of their nationality, compared to a 57.1% average in the EU-15. Hellenic national pride clearly permeates the society's institutions, political leadership and population.

2.2 The Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church

The history of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus places it at the fore in representing national identity and the inseparable bonds between Greece and Cyprus. Having sheltered Greek culture throughout Ottoman rule, having been the most vocal

¹⁴⁰Mavratsas, "The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity," p.729.

¹⁴¹*Eurobarometer: Report 2002.2*, Figure 2.1, [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb58/eb58_en.pdf], March 2003.

supporter of *enosis* during British rule, and having produced the most prominent and revered figure of Greek Cypriot political leadership in Archbishop Makarios, the Church's claim to be the true defender of Greek nationalism carries significant symbolism. But the political power of the Church in terms of being able to implement any kind of political agenda declined with the growth of secularization. In an atmosphere of growing nationalism, however, "nationalist agitation provides the Church hierarchy with an excellent opportunity to reassert its lost eminence and to act as an agent of national unity."¹⁴² Archbishop Chrysostomos, the successor to Archbishop Makarios, has frequently made extreme comments on the Cyprus problem and the role that the Orthodox Church should have in Cypriot society. Additionally, Greek Cypriots continue to have a considerable degree of trust in the Orthodox Church as an institution, measured at 67%¹⁴³ by Eurobarometer, only behind the National Guard (another haven of Greek nationalism), and 'Charity' groups. With its claim to being the historical guardian of Greek national identity and with the persistent respect it evokes in Cyprus, the Orthodox Church has clearly contributed to the surge of nationalism since 1974.

Archbishop Chrysostomos attempted, following the election of Glafcos Clerides as President in 1993, to expand the influence of the Church in politics and education. In 1993 Clerides consulted "the Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus concerning the person whom he was to appoint as minister of education."¹⁴⁴ Chrysostomos' involvement in education is connected to the traditional role played

¹⁴² Mavratsas, "The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity," p.729.

¹⁴³ *Eurobarometer: Report 2002.2*, Table 1.4b.

¹⁴⁴ Persianis Panayiotis, "The Greek Cypriot Educational Policy in Cyprus as an Expression of Conflict at the Political, Cultural and Socio-Economic Levels," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* Vol.10/11 (1994/95), p.95.

by the Church in education since British rule, which was to impart Hellenic identity among Greek Cypriot youth. He “laid down as the first aim of education the cultivation of a strong fighting spirit to prepare the young to liberate the territory enslaved by the Turks.”¹⁴⁵ This warlike rhetoric, in stark contrast to official government policy aimed at assuring the Turkish Cypriots of peaceful reconciliation, is consistent with other statements by Chrysostomos. In his Easter speech of 2000, the Archbishop, using vivid religious language, claimed:

The high priests of unfairness, the modern-day Pharisees still plot and conspire against our people. They continue to maintain the ongoing crucifixion of justice and freedom in our land. Others, who say they have been illuminated by our Greek Christian civilization, ignorant and ungrateful for everything we have offered, and just like the mob of Judeans against Christ, are calling for the crucifixion of Hellenism and the acquittal of the thief.¹⁴⁶

While the references are metaphorical, the use of victimization to describe the fate of Hellenic nationalism on Cyprus is also a pardon for the actions of EOKA B, which overthrew Makarios. The statement also linked Cyprus to the historic ‘Greek Christian civilization’ of Byzantium and Classical Greece, and the betrayal of the ‘western world’ which is culturally indebted to Hellenic civilization. Archbishop Chrysostomos also presented himself as “the most ardent enemy of federation . . . who time and again tries to convince his ‘flock’ that a federal settlement ‘will mean the complete destruction of Cypriot Hellenism on the island’.”¹⁴⁷ A federal settlement of the Cyprus problem is what the Cypriot government itself has leaned towards in contrast to the Turkish Cypriot proposal for a confederation. For the

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p.97.

¹⁴⁶Easter Speech of Archbishop Chrysostomos 2000. [<http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/church%20message%202000.htm>].

¹⁴⁷Mavratsas, “The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity,” p.727.

Orthodox Church, under the leadership of Chrysostomos, nothing less than a full restoration of the Republic was acceptable.

The Church, despite its political limitations, has made attempts to reassert itself in government. In February 1995, Archbishop Chrysostomos proposed a “restoration of the ‘Ethnarchic Council’,”¹⁴⁸ which would have restored the political involvement of the Church. Though the suggestion was “firmly rejected by President Clerides who stressed the importance of the separation of church and state,”¹⁴⁹ the cultural power of the Church and its unrepentant nationalism still contribute to the persistent Pan-Hellenic spirit on Cyprus. Its symbolic power, strengthened by its historical representation of the Greek Cypriots, and through the figure of Makarios, gives the Church “a role which it continues to play in the new nationalism that emerged in the mid-1980s.”¹⁵⁰ Greek and Byzantine flags are displayed at places of worship throughout the Republic, a fusion of religion and unrepentant nationalism which sanctifies the position of the church.

2.3 Hellenic Centred Education

Throughout British rule, the Greek Cypriot education system was a central institution in the spread of Hellenic nationalism. Since 1974 the dominance of ‘Hellenic centred’ education has been challenged by Cypriotists and by the pressures of economic modernization. But the ‘Hellenic centred’ education system, which aims at “the cultivation by educational means of a strong belief in the Greek national

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p.729.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p.729.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p.729.

traditions and culture, in the Greek national ideas, and in Greece itself,”¹⁵¹ has been the official education policy of the Greek Cypriot government since the Zurich Agreement. Greece also stressed the importance of maintaining ‘Hellenic centred’ education on Cyprus despite reforms presented in all potential UN deals¹⁵² which stressed the need to revamp a large part of the system. As a result, from Church institution to State institution, education in Cyprus has remained strongly nationalistic in character and has resisted all attempts at reform.

At the same time that Cypriotism was emerging as a political rival to traditional nationalist parties, a conflict between “Cypriot-centered and Hellenic-centered education”¹⁵³ emerged, between 1974 and 1980. Nationalists supported the continuation of Greek flag-day and the display of the Greek flag in schools despite the political implications it would have for negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. A seemingly intractable and unrepentant display of loyalty to Greece after 1974 showed the importance nationalists placed on maintaining the school system as a vehicle for national survival. As the Minister of Education in Cyprus during the early 1990s, Claire Angelides stated: “The fact that we are and feel to be Greeks, living in a motherland cut in half and soaked in blood by the wounds of Attila, is a matter of sheer survival.”¹⁵⁴ The continued threat of Turkish military occupation and partition therefore contributed to the persistence of Hellenic-centred education, “which forms

¹⁵¹Panayiotis, “The Greek Cypriot Educational Policy in Cyprus as an Expression of Conflict at the Political, Cultural and Socio-Economic Levels,” p.90.

¹⁵²*The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem* proposed by Kofi Annan in 2004, and discussed in Chapter 4. Article 50, outlining secondary education as compulsory in both official languages: Greek and Turkish. [<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/annanplan/annanplan.pdf>], March 31st 2004.

¹⁵³Panayiotis, “The Greek Cypriot Educational Policy in Cyprus as an Expression of Conflict at the Political, Cultural and Socio-Economic Levels,” p.93.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p103.

the core of the curriculum at present (1995), and also formed the core of the curriculum then (during British rule)."¹⁵⁵ The result was that the same education system that presided over generations of Greek Cypriots agitating for *enosis* was in place when Cyprus began the process of European Union membership.

As Hellenic-centred education was used throughout modern Cypriot history to strengthen the call for *enosis*, the continued presence of the system after 1974 serves a similar aim. There is a perceived "need for the citizens, especially the young, to cultivate their national spirit so that the Greek community can defend itself against the dangers that threaten their national and physical survival."¹⁵⁶ This position, similar to statements made by Archbishop Chrysostomos, goes further than protecting Cyprus against Turkey. Entrance to the European Union, in which Greece is only one of 24 other members, also presents problems for 'Hellenic-centred' education. A conflict over the language of instruction at the University of Cyprus between English and Greek emerged in 1990s when "the government of Greece played a significant role in the decision of the House of Representatives to drop English as a medium of instruction at the University of Cyprus."¹⁵⁷ Ignoring the practical demands that participation in a European-wide economic and political union implies, Greek-Cypriot nationalists, with the direct support of Greece, resisted any alteration of the Republic's education system. Greece's ambassador to Cyprus, Efthymios Stophocophoulos, commented in March 1988 that adopting English or any other language as an instrument of instruction at the University level would result in "a kind of cancer (that would) spread quickly and inevitably throughout the educational

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p.103.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p.99.

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p.94.

body.”¹⁵⁸ The strength of nationalist ideology in the Greek-Cypriot education system has been unchanged for over a century. Not only does it strengthen the nationalist identity of Greek Cypriot youth, it also operates as a direct political link between Greece and Cyprus. While it was utilized during the British period to strengthen *enosis*, it has been utilized since 1974 to maintain the Hellenic character of Greek Cypriots living in a divided country and seeking, still, a closer union with Greece.

2.4 The Cypriot National Guard

The National Guard of the Republic of Cyprus is one of the key institutions of the Cypriot state which reinforces and defines Greek nationality on the island, through its use of Hellenic nationalist symbols, its reliance on the Greek military, and its level of public support. National Guard service is compulsory for a length of over two years for every Greek Cypriot male, excluding Turkish Cypriots, Armenians and Maronites,¹⁵⁹ who also reside in the Republic. Officers of the National Guard are sent to Athens or Crete for their initial officer training, and officers of the Hellenic Army serve in exchange programs with the National Guard. The 1993 Mutual Defence Agreement¹⁶⁰ with Greece, which states that any attack on Cyprus will be treated as an attack on Greece, creates a link between the two countries in terms of identity through common defence. Military exercises on Cyprus frequently involve the deployment of the Greek Air Force and the Greek Navy to display Greece’s continued commitment to Cypriot security.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p102.

¹⁵⁹The Maronite and Armenian communities on Cyprus choose to be classified in the Greek Cypriot division of the Republic in 1960.

¹⁶⁰Explained in detail in Chapter 3.2.

The symbols used by the National Guard are indicative of the close relationship that is fostered between the Cypriot and Greek military forces. The crest of the National Guard is nearly identical to the crest of the Hellenic Army, a double headed Byzantine eagle on a yellow background, facing east and west, with a blue shield in the middle decorated with a white cross. The badges of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions of the National Guard feature ancient Greek hoplites, and the badge of the Naval Command in the National Guard features the Greek flag itself.¹⁶¹ The Greek flag is raised daily with the Cypriot flag on National Guard bases. The military handbook¹⁶² displays direct references to Hellenic national history. Military ties with Greece are illustrated with a map showing both Greece and Cyprus and an overlay of two hands grasped together, citing the campaign of the Athenian Cimon who liberated Cyprus from Persian rule in 449 BC.¹⁶³ The handbook also shows a Greek liberation fighter of 1831 in front of a silhouette of a Classical Greek hoplite.¹⁶⁴ Portraits of EOKA 'martyrs' line the walls of National Guard barracks. Central among these heroes is Grigoris Afxentiou,¹⁶⁵ whose last words echoed the reply of the Spartan King Leonidas at Thermopylae. When Xerxes asked the Spartans to surrender their weapons, Leonidas replied 'come and get them.'¹⁶⁶ When the British, in 1957, surrounded Grigoris Afxentiou and demanded his surrender, Afxentiou replied 'come and get me'. This fusion of ancient, Byzantine, and modern history is

¹⁶¹National Guard Handbook, *Serving My Country*, p.67-69.

¹⁶²*Serving My Country*, Υπηρετώντας την πατρίδα, distributed by the National Guard to every recruit in basic training.

¹⁶³*Serving My Country*, p.8.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p.16.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p.32.

¹⁶⁶Plutarch, "Apophthegmata Laconica," In *Moralia*. 225c.11.

[http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/Sayings_of_Spartans*/main.html]

central to Greek national awareness and clearly prevalent in the symbols and history deployed by the Cypriot National Guard.

Popular support for the National Guard is also a feature unique to Cyprus among the ten states that acceded to the European Union in 2004 as well as the three other candidate countries. Eurobarometer polls rated the National Guard as the ‘most trusted institution’ in Cyprus, being highly trusted by 88% of respondents in 2002 and 87% in 2003, the highest rating for any institution among all 13 candidate countries.¹⁶⁷ The extent and length of service in the National Guard, a cultural ritual of service to the Cypriot state that is nevertheless inundated with Hellenistic national symbols and direct contacts with the Hellenic Forces, is a perpetual contributing force to Greek national identity among male Greek Cypriot youth. Proposed solutions to the division of the island, including the ‘Annan Plan’,¹⁶⁸ have called for the demilitarization of the island so as to prevent both armed conflict between the two communities and nationalist indoctrination. A map of Cyprus found on military bases and in the National Guard handbook,¹⁶⁹ which shows an outline of the island with the southern area colored in blue and the northern half bleeding red, is accompanied with the phrase Δεν Ξεχνώ: ‘I don’t forget’. This statement, in a militant context, refers both to the national crisis of partition and to the Greek Cypriot version of national history that is endorsed by the Cypriot National Guard.

¹⁶⁷*Eurobarometer: Report 2002.2*, Table 1.4b; and *Report 2003.4*, Table 1.3b.

¹⁶⁸*The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*. Article 8, Points 1-6, p.11-12.

¹⁶⁹*Serving My Country*, p.96.

2.5 The Survival of Pan-Hellenism

Cypriotism, although politically expedient in the years following the coup and invasion when it offered a means to appear conciliatory, ultimately failed because of the combined strength of the institutions of Hellenic nationalism. Cypriotism's short-lived appearance was followed by policies that focused on restoring the prevalence of nationalist identity. Even the failures of EOKA B were forgiven, and its former members experienced a political revival that:

is evident in that EOKA B members are not only becoming increasingly more vocal - appearing, for example, on television and proudly proclaiming that 'they would act no differently if they had to' - but also, and more significantly, a number of them have returned to positions of political power, especially in the governing Democratic Rally.¹⁷⁰

The Orthodox Church, the National Guard, the education system, and nationalist political parties continued to receive popular support and indeed increased in importance as the division of Cyprus persisted. There was no serious movement to reform these institutions (other than to remove the Church from direct involvement in politics), and they continued to operate closely with their counterparts in Greece. The Orthodox Church, portraying itself as the ancient defender of Greek Cypriot Hellenism, maintained an uncompromised nationalist position. Greece directly influenced the Greek-Cypriot education system, while Cypriot political parties worked in tandem with their Greek counterparts to formulate common positions. The National Guard remained a highly politicized instrument of Hellenic culture, closely linked with the Greek military in training and operational exercises. All these institutions, although calling for national sacrifices and the physical survival of Greek Cypriot culture, utilized the symbols of Byzantine-Classical history to

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p.733.

reinforce the images of continued national existence and the unbreakable bonds between Greece and Cyprus.

Since the early 1980s, Hellenic-centred education has continued to impart “the cultivation of a determination and a spirit to fight for the liberation of their country from Turkish occupation in the hearts of students.”¹⁷¹ The rise of DIKO and DISY, both led by former EOKA members, kept the political balance within the nationalist arena even when AKEL, the major opposition party, supported Greek-Cypriot nationalism.¹⁷² The former EOKA leaders “still have a near monopoly on that inexhaustible resource in Greek Cypriot political encounters – the claim to be the only true fighters for enosis.”¹⁷³ After 1960 they transferred their EOKA ties into political support. The Greek Cypriot National Guard, with compulsory military service, imparted a nationalistic, fighting spirit among Greek Cypriot youth. This atmosphere of nationalism in religion, education, politics and military service maintained the links between Greek Cypriots and Greece despite the consequences of *enosis* agitation. In the political atmosphere of the 1980s and 1990s, as the memories of Turkish aggression were still visible and present, and as partition of the island seemed ever more likely, the resurgence of Hellenic-nationalism became ever more apparent. The election of the former EOKA member Glafcos Clerides in 1993, who had been instrumental in the Republic’s EU membership application in 1990,¹⁷⁴ signified the triumph of Hellenism over Cypriotism. Hellenic nationalism persisted in all major facets of Cypriot political and cultural life. Yet with a direct union with

¹⁷¹Panayiotis, “The Greek Cypriot Educational Policy in Cyprus as an Expression of Conflict at the Political, Cultural and Socio-Economic Levels,” p.94.

¹⁷²Mavratsas, “The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity,” p.718.

¹⁷³Papaioannou. *Politics in Cyprus Between 1960 and 1981*, p.48.

¹⁷⁴Examined in Chapter 3.1.

Greece no longer possible, Cyprus turned its attention to membership in the European Union.

CHAPTER 3:

THE THEORY OF NEO-ENOSIS AND THE REASONS FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

3.1 The Politics of Neo-Enosis

The Republic of Cyprus's application to the EU in 1990 helped to revitalize and reorient the nationalist momentum that had been lost after the Turkish invasion of 1974. The concept of *neo-enosis* allows us understand this nationalist resurgence as a political strategy with the dual aims of reuniting the island into a single state and producing a partial union with Greece through EU membership. While the Turkish Cypriots saw the invasion and partition as a final solution to the Cyprus problem, the "Greek Cypriots did not attain narrative closure" because the 1974 division opened up a new problem of how to reintegrate the island.¹⁷⁵ Restoring the Republic's territory thus became an absolutely essential aspect of *neo-enosis* policy beyond the earlier goal of achieving *enosis* with Greece.

The possibility of accession to the European Union offered the Greek Cypriots hope for a way to force Turkey to reach a settlement and reunite the island. The accession process also promised to safeguard Hellenic identity on the island and cement the political and military links between Greece and Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot political leadership understood that "small states, with weak economies, on

¹⁷⁵Yiannis Papadakis, "The Politics of Memory and Forgetting in Cyprus", *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* Vol.3, No.1 (1993), p.151.

the periphery hardly have much power of initiative at the European level.”¹⁷⁶ But with both Greece and Cyprus in the EU, it would become easier to raise the issue of Turkish occupation and allow the Republic to confront Turkey head on, despite the enormous military, demographic and economic disparities between them.

The Greek Cypriot political leadership began to focus on EU accession immediately after Turkey’s own application to the EU in 1987. Turkey’s application, combined with Greece’s membership in the European Community, suggested a new strategy to the Greek Cypriot policy makers. The Turkish military victory of 1974 had emboldened Turkey to go “from the minimum objective of trying to prevent *enosis* or the creation of a second Greek state in Cyprus, to the maximum position of trying to maintain the strategic control of the whole of Cyprus.”¹⁷⁷ Despite numerous efforts over the years, the Republic of Cyprus had been unable to counter this growing strategic control. However, Turkey’s 1987 application to the EU opened a new path: if the Republic of Cyprus could enter the EU prior to Turkey, it could hold the threat of a veto over the latter’s entry. Such a policy might backfire, of course: it could lead to the annexation of northern Cyprus by Turkey, while eliminating any possibility of Turkish EU membership. But since the ongoing occupation already suggested a permanent status, this appeared to be an acceptable risk.

¹⁷⁶Spiros Kaminaris and Panagiotis Panagopoulos, “The Birmingham conference on Greece as a member of the European Union: sixteen years after its accession,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* Vol.22 (1998), p.130.

¹⁷⁷Andreas Theophanous, “Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a new Constitution,” In *Cyprus and Europe, the Long way home*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnesee: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.152.

In 1988, the three largest Cypriot parties aside from AKEL (communist)—that is, DISY (right), DIKO (centre) and EDEK¹⁷⁸ (left centre)—“put pressure on President Vassiliou to apply for membership.”¹⁷⁹ (AKEL, whose opposition to accession rested on opposition to the extension of global free-market capitalism,¹⁸⁰ finally accepted the prospect of EU membership in 1995.) Cyprus’s application received a favourable opinion from the European Commission in 1993, and formal accession negotiations began in 1998. By the time these negotiations were completed in 2003, the strong political consensus among Greek Cypriot political parties in favour of the EU strategy resulted in a unanimous vote for membership within the Cypriot House of Representatives.¹⁸¹

Though no public referendum¹⁸² on accession was held in Cyprus for Constitutional reasons,¹⁸³ the process also enjoyed the clear and overwhelming support of the Greek Cypriot public. Their support for EU membership, which stood at 72% according to a poll conducted in 2003 by the European Commission’s Public Opinion Analysis sector, was higher than any of the acceding countries and lower only than Luxembourg and the Netherlands (by one percent).¹⁸⁴ This level of public agreement reflected more than generic support for the EU: it embodied popular

¹⁷⁸ AKEL: Progressive Party of Working People, DISY: Democratic Rally, DIKO: Democratic Party, EDEK: Movement for Social Democracy.

¹⁷⁹ Stelios Stavrides, “The International Role of the Cypriot Parliament and Cyprus’ Accession to the EU,” In *Cyprus and Europe, the Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis Fouskas and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnese: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.178.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.178.

¹⁸¹ Lonias Efthymoulou, “House Ratifies Cyprus’s EU Accession Treaty,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 18-24, 2003, p.7.

¹⁸² “EU public awareness Campaign, or lack of it,” *The Financial Weekly*, June 20-26, 2003, p.2.

¹⁸³ Angelos M. Syrigos. “Cyprus and the EU: Sovereign State, Negotiations and Objections from an International Law Point of View,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.97.

¹⁸⁴ *Eurobarometer: Report 2003*, Spring, Table 6.2 and Table 3.6a.

[http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/cceb2003.4_full_report.pdf], February 2004.

support for the political policies linked to the concept of *neo-enosis*. Even though EU accession would place new economic and political limits on Cyprus, particularly with its obligation to meet the requirements of the *acquis communautaire* (explained below), these limits were widely accepted because of the understanding that accession would bring the Greek Cypriots closer to Greece and the possibility of using EU membership to help bring about the reunification of Cyprus.

The unified support of all political parties for membership allowed the Republic to pursue a comprehensive strategy during accession negotiations and in talks with the Turkish Cypriots over a Cyprus settlement. A key body in this process was the ‘Symvoulío’, or National Council,¹⁸⁵ an advisory body to the President set up after 1974 to handle the Cyprus problem and affiliated matters, including defence and foreign policy.¹⁸⁶ For the accession process, the Symvoulío was expanded in order to facilitate “the harmonization of Cypriot laws with the *acquis communautaire*.”¹⁸⁷ Through this expansion, the Turkish occupation and non-settlement of the Cyprus issue became directly linked to EU accession within the political bodies of the Republic. This was a natural extension of the Symvoulío’s role, since, as will be shown, EU accession involved all three components of the National Council’s policy mandate: military armament, foreign policy, and resolution of the Cyprus problem.

The Republic’s overall strategy had multiple facets and depended upon strong political, diplomatic and military commitments from Greece. Working in tandem,

¹⁸⁵The National Council: consists of members from each party and works between the Parliament and the President.

¹⁸⁶Stavrides, “The International Role of the Cypriot Parliament and Cyprus’ Accession to the EU,” p.180.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p.182.

Greece and Cyprus attempted to outmaneuver Turkey politically. As will be shown, the Republic of Cyprus engaged in a major military build-up that was accompanied by a new military agreement in which Greece “publicly accepted the role of the protector of Cypriot Hellenism.”¹⁸⁸ Greece also used its EU membership to block \$480 million in EU aid to Turkey in 1996 as well as \$940 million from the European Investment Bank. Cyprus attempted to isolate the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus politically and economically by boycotting goods from the TRNC and by trying to prevent other states from trading with the north.¹⁸⁹ But by adding the prospect of EU membership for the entire island, the Greek Cypriots also hoped to gain the direct support of the Turkish Cypriots in settlement negotiations. The EU accession process itself also became a direct tool of political pressure: by setting a definite time limit for Cypriot EU entry, the accession process overcame the previous strategy of non-activity that had benefited Turkey and Northern Cyprus.

The political details and immediate historical context of the accession process will be examined in the last chapter (Chapter Four). The present chapter, in order to reveal the broader historical context of the accession process and its link to a policy of *neo-enosis*, will analyze three key aspects of the complex political and military situations that preceded and accompanied the EU membership bid. These include the repeated failures of the international negotiations aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem, which occurred between 1977 and 1990. Also examined is the evolving military context that interacted with these political events and developments. The

¹⁸⁸Mavratsas, “The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity,” p.727

¹⁸⁹Tozun Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option, and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.124.

third context is an exploration of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot positions on Cyprus and the EU since the 1970s. This thematic organization—although necessitating chronological overlap—is essential to bring out the underlying tensions and forces that shaped Cyprus’s EU accession process. Finally, the chapter closes with an analysis of the economic implications of EU membership for Cyprus, in order to demonstrate that its application cannot be accounted for merely by the economic benefits it would receive.

3.2 Negotiation Failures on Cyprus and Turkish Dominance: 1977-1990

The long process of negotiations that began after the events of 1974 produced a range of ideas on the Cyprus dispute but little action toward implementation. In 1977, ‘High Level Agreements’ were reached in discussions conducted by Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktash, which produced “guidelines (that) consisted of four points, the primary one being that the parties were seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic.”¹⁹⁰ The Greek Cypriots, who had dropped any hope of keeping majority rule, foresaw a relatively quick transition to the implementation of a final deal. Numerous UN Resolutions repeated calls for a withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island, while the United States suspended arms transfers to Turkey. But the Turkish Cypriots later “hardened towards insistence on a confederation of two sovereign states,”¹⁹¹ even though other parts of ‘The High Level Agreements’ related to the “freedom of movement,

¹⁹⁰Ronald J. Fisher, “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.38, No.3 (May 2001), p.314.

¹⁹¹Diana Weston Markides, “Cyprus since 1878: A Permanent State of Uncertainty” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnese: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.20.

settlement, and ownership for the Greek Cypriots” and to “the central government safeguarding the unity of the state while respecting its bi-communal character.”¹⁹²

The Turkish Cypriot transition to demands for a confederation of two states remained a constant feature of all inter-communal negotiations up to and including the Annan Plan of 2002-4, despite its constant rejection by the Greek Cypriots and UN mediators. The ‘Ten Point Agreement’ signed in May 1979 by Denktash and then Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou called “for the resumption of inter-communal talks.”¹⁹³ These talks went on from May 1979 to April 1983 and ended without any significant progress. In response, the Turkish Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on November 15, 1983. The TRNC’s establishment, recognized only by Turkey, emphasized the Turkish insistence on a two state solution.

UN ‘Proximity Talks’ were held from 1984 to 1986 and again from 1988 to 1990. The Greek Cypriots felt they had “made considerable concessions which not only were not reciprocated but also led to the further hardening of the Turkish position.”¹⁹⁴ High-level meetings in New York in January 1985, mediated by the UN, produced what Kyprianou called a “document as a basis for further negotiations.”¹⁹⁵ But the Turkish Cypriots rejected the document and continued to call for the TRNC’s recognition. Another draft in March 1986, which the Turks

¹⁹²Fisher, “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse,” p.314.

¹⁹³Suha Bolukbasi, “From Benevolent Detachment to Reluctant Assertiveness: Turkey’s Policy Towards Cyprus 1954-2001,” In *Cyprus and Europe, The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnese: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.45.

¹⁹⁴Andreas Theophanous, “Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a new Constitution,” In *Cyprus and Europe, the Long way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter (Mölnese: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.147.

¹⁹⁵Fisher, “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse,” p.315.

accepted, was rejected in turn by Kyprianou who called for “an international conference”¹⁹⁶ to deal with the Greek Cypriot points. By 1988 George Vassiliou, then President of the Republic, “reaffirmed the high level agreements of 1977 and 1979, but did not take the drafts of 1985-86 as a more substantive starting-point.”¹⁹⁷

A ‘Set of Ideas’ formulated from 1988 to 1990 was “taken forward by the new UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali in 1992 as the basis for an overall settlement, but with continuing Turkish-Cypriot resistance.”¹⁹⁸ The Turkish Cypriots continued to view the only substantive starting point as the recognition of two states “that would remain sovereign in the federation, and as such could presumably secede.”¹⁹⁹ For the Greek Cypriots, however, any such solution only reinforced the perception that the Turkish invasion had been solely to achieve *taksim*, the permanent division of the island into separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot states. The declaration of the TRNC and the lack of progress over fifteen years of negotiation, with the Turkish Cypriot insistence on two states, convinced the Greek Cypriot leadership that delays only worked to the advantage of their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. The Turkish position on Cyprus seemed to follow the idea that “the longer the present situation persists the better is the chance that the current state of things will become a *de jure* situation.”²⁰⁰ The Greek Cypriots essentially had no effective way to counteract this strategy, and the longer the division remained in place the more likely that the TRNC would become a permanent feature on the island.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p.316.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p.316.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*, p.316.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p.316.

²⁰⁰Mehmet Ali Birand, “A Turkish View of Greek-Turkish Relations,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 16, (Fall 1988), p.174.

The Cypriot application to the European Union, which took place in June 1990, complicated negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Turkey immediately reverted to the formula that had created the Republic of Cyprus in the late 1950s, suggesting “that quadripartite talks should be held between Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities.”²⁰¹ Rejecting the idea, Vassiliou instead called for “an international conference at which five permanent members of the UN Security Council would also take part.”²⁰² The Greek Cypriots hoped that Turkey, in breach of numerous UNSC resolutions, would find it increasingly difficult to maintain its insistence on a two-state confederation. In the June 1992 Proximity talks held by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, the major issues were narrowed down to “territorial settlement and the three freedoms, ignoring the sensitivities of the Turkish side on the constitutional issues.”²⁰³ The Turkish position, however, hardened when the Cypriot application for EU membership was accepted in June 1993. EU pressure on Turkey to restart talks led to Kofi Annan’s initial efforts in 1997. But these also “ended in stalemate as the Turkish Cypriot side protested the emerging EU decision to begin accession negotiations with the government in the south.”²⁰⁴

This was the turning point in negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and showed the risk of pursuing a strategy of *neo-enosis*. The closer Cyprus came to becoming an EU member, the more Denktash resisted discussing a settlement. Additionally, if Turkey’s EU bid failed, permanent partition would

²⁰¹Bolukbasi, “From Benevolent Detachment to Reluctant Assertiveness: Turkey’s Policy Towards Cyprus 1954-2001,” p.46.

²⁰²*Ibid.*, p.46.

²⁰³*Ibid.*, p.48.

²⁰⁴Fisher, “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse,” p.317.

become a very real possibility. Since “the long succession of mediation efforts has done little more than strengthen the status quo on the island,”²⁰⁵ Cyprus needed to put direct pressure on the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to entertain solutions that did not include a two-state confederacy.

Turkey attempted to make the north as visibly Turkish as possible throughout this period of failed negotiations. Settlers from mainland Turkey were brought to Northern Cyprus in “a deliberate attempt at 'Turkification' of the north.”²⁰⁶ Though the numbers vary, UN and EU estimates place this ‘foreign’ population at around 60,000 to 80,000²⁰⁷ out of a total of 250,000 inhabitants in the north. These ‘settlers’ further complicated the dispute by becoming voting citizens of the TRNC, often supporting a hard-line position on negotiations. A constitutional declaration of the TRNC in 1985 maintained “that the Turkish Cypriot people are an inseparable part of the great Turkish nation.”²⁰⁸ The destruction of Greek culture in the north was another feature of Turkish rule. Turkey attempted “to obliterate any signs of Greek presence in the north in matters such as place-names, Greek language and script, art works, churches and symbols of worship.”²⁰⁹ Orthodox Churches were converted into Mosques and their religious symbols were plundered and traded.²¹⁰ Without a settlement, or with a two-state confederacy, these changes to the landscape and culture of Cyprus would become permanent.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.322.

²⁰⁶ Y. Mansfield and N. Kliot, “The political landscape of partition: The Case of Cyprus,” *Political Geography* Vol.16, No.6 (August 1997), p.506.

²⁰⁷ *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession, 2000*. European Commission. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/cy_en.pdf], November 2000.

²⁰⁸ Mansfield and Kliot, “The political landscape of partition: The Case of Cyprus,” p.507.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.511.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.511.

The consistent failure to reach even the preliminary stages of an agreement, combined with a consolidation of the north by the Turkish Cypriots, led the Republic to pursue a policy aimed at overcoming its ineffectiveness in relations with Turkey. EU membership provided the Republic with a means to achieve a significant political advantage “since there would be two ‘Greek’ vetoes cast against Turkey’s future membership”²¹¹ as long as the island remained divided. The Republic was determined to prevent Turkish entry without a prior Cyprus settlement. With a veto over Turkish entry, the Greek Cypriots might not only force the Turkish Cypriots into negotiations but might also be able to achieve a favourable deal. The Republic wanted a settlement based on the early agreements reached after the coup and invasion, not a deal that legitimized Turkish Cypriot dominance in the north and maintained a geographic division of the population.

The initial agreements reached in 1977 thus remained stagnant until the Annan Deal of 2002-2004 (examined in Chapter Four), as each side made moves to enhance its position before reaching a final settlement. While the Turkish invasion was successful in dividing the island into separate zones of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, its ‘pseudo-state’ lacked international legitimacy. The Greek Cypriots had the support of UN Resolutions and general international opinion, but their relative political insignificance compromised their negotiating capital. Though Turkish and Greek Cypriots agreed in principle to reestablish a single political entity on the island, the specific status of the Turkish Cypriots produced deadlock. Whenever the negotiations stalled, Turkey continued to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot position by

²¹¹Tozum Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.118.

changing the demographic balance of the island. As long as the status quo remained, the Turkish position strengthened. This imbalance was overturned with the Republic's EU application. Although the application initially caused an even greater rift in negotiations, the pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots increased as the EU accession process moved forward under a set timeline.

3.3 Greek and Greek-Cypriot Military Weakness and Political Isolation: 1974-2000

From the 1974 invasion until EU accession, Cyprus was faced with a compromised military situation and relative isolation in terms of its ability to achieve political leverage over Turkey. The Republic, besides being territorially compromised since 1974, was dwarfed militarily by Turkey. Moreover, apart from its ties with Greece, Cyprus remained outside the framework of any international security blanket until EU accession, which then brought it under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).²¹² Cyprus is not a member of NATO, and it gained no practical security benefits from its UN membership. UN security resolutions were passed without consequences and the third guarantor power of the Cypriot Constitution, the United Kingdom, avoided any involvement in the dispute outside the framework of the UN or the EU.

Greece could give little support to the Republic in the years following the Turkish invasion because its own position was also compromised after 1974. Greece withdrew from NATO immediately after the invasion, leaving both Greece and

²¹²The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union established as the second pillar of the EU at Maastricht in 1992.

Cyprus with little international support and no security framework. While Greece sought to rejoin NATO in 1975, eventually returning in 1980, Turkey had achieved an indisputable territorial gain while ignoring all UNSC resolutions calling for the removal of Turkish forces. Indeed, Turkey had proven to be quite successful in its Cyprus strategy with its “three main phases [of] invasion, partition, and colonization.”²¹³ In view of this success, which was only strengthened by the passage of time, Greece recognized that “a change of policy was vital, and during the first months of 1976 [began] negotiations for Greek entry into the EC.”²¹⁴ Since Turkey was a strategically important member of NATO, and because the UN could do little more than mediate based on post-invasion realities, Greece needed alliances that extended beyond Turkish influence.

Further disputes in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey in 1987 and 1996 nearly led to war between the two countries,²¹⁵ thanks to ambiguities in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and in international definitions concerning airspace and territorial waters. Collectively, these disputes were seen by Greece “as part of a militant and expansionist policy which has existed since 1974 at the expense of Greece’s sovereign rights.”²¹⁶ Greece hoped to respond to these challenges to its sovereignty by winning political advantages and by achieving an enhanced military balance, and the accession of both Greece and Cyprus to the EU aided in this strategy.

²¹³Kourvetaris, “The Southern Flank of NATO: Political Dimension of the Greco-Turkish Conflict since 1974,” p.434.

²¹⁴Constantine Symeonides-Tsatsos, “The United States and the Greek Accession to the European Community,” *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* Vol.7 (1991), p11.

²¹⁵Kourvetaris, “The Southern Flank of NATO: Political Dimension of the Greco-Turkish Conflict since 1974,” p.435.

²¹⁶*Ibid.*, p.433.

The Republic of Cyprus, even more than Greece, was at a significant military and strategic disadvantage in relation to Turkey. The UN force (UNFICYP) stationed on the island since 1974 is “not allowed to oppose a conventional military attack by military means,”²¹⁷ and can only operate “to prevent any small incident or misunderstanding from escalating into a politically dangerous confrontation or conflict.”²¹⁸ A direct military confrontation involving Turkey would clearly fall outside their ability to act and would leave Cyprus entirely exposed to attack. According to a poll taken before the start of the accession process in 1992, roughly 74% of Greek Cypriots “felt threatened by the Turkish military presence in Cyprus,”²¹⁹ knowing that the UN forces, while welcome, are powerless to intervene.

Both Greek and Greek Cypriot military forces were at a numerical and armament disadvantage relative to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot military forces well into the 1990s. In 1998 the Greek Cypriot National Guard numbered 19,500, with 100,000 reserves,²²⁰ possessed 104 main battle tanks²²¹ but with a complete “absence of naval and air forces.”²²² Greece had a regular armed force of 201,500 soldiers,²²³ 291,000 reservists²²⁴ and 2,250 main battle tanks, although Greece only kept 2,000 troops in Cyprus “to provide for the training of the army of the Republic of

²¹⁷Edward Furdson, “UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus,” *Conflict Studies* 232, reprinted from *Defense & Diplomacy* 1989, p.14.

²¹⁸*Ibid.*, p.14.

²¹⁹Aristotelous, “The Military Balance: 1995-1996,” p.88.

²²⁰*Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus’ Progress towards Accession, 1998*. European Commission. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/cyprus_en.pdf], November 1998, p.12.

²²¹Aristotelous, “The Military Balance: 1995-1996,” p.56.

²²²*Ibid.*, p.69.

²²³Kourvetaris, “The Southern Flank of NATO: Political Dimension of the Greco-Turkish Conflict since 1974,” p.439.

²²⁴Aristotelous, “The Military Balance: 1995-1996,” p.22.

Cyprus.”²²⁵ In contrast, the Turkish military numbered 507,000 men²²⁶ with 4,250 main battle tanks, and keeps “some 40,000 Turkish troops equipped with 450 US-made M-485A Main Battle Tanks”²²⁷ in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot security force, reporting directly to the Turkish command, numbered 4,500.²²⁸ The Turkish forces, as well as possessing a numerical advantage, have “an entirely offensive deployment, and are kept permanently at 100% wartime strength.”²²⁹ While the Greek military is forwardly deployed in the Aegean, the Republic of Cyprus has a “total absence of strategic depth,” meaning that “landing operations and air strikes can be directed at nearly every part of the island.”²³⁰ Turkey has also established a pattern of regularly violating Cypriot airspace and of occasionally staging ground operations that threaten the relative calm of the Green Line.²³¹

The prospect and process of EU accession gave the Republic of Cyprus, with strong Greek support, the possibility of more effectively countering Turkish military superiority. The options open to “a small country that is a consumer and not a producer of security”²³² are limited, but Cyprus pursued a number of military and political strategies within the context of its application to the EU in order to achieve greater leverage over Turkey. These included the signing of a formal joint-defence

²²⁵ *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession, 1998*. p.12. The Greek forces on Cyprus are known by the acronym ELDYK.

²²⁶ Aristotelous, “The Military Balance: 1995-1996,” p.40.

²²⁷ “US pressures Cyprus on American arms,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 4-10, 2003. p.7.

²²⁸ *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession, 1998*. p.11.

²²⁹ Aristotelous, “The Military Balance: 1995-1996,” p. 71.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

²³¹ *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession, 2000*. European Commission. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/cy_en.pdf], November 2000, p.21.

²³² Rodrick Pace. “Enlargement and the Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union: The Role of Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.35.

pact with Greece,²³³ accompanied by increased military expenditure,²³⁴ and by a proposed demilitarization of the island. All of these measures were linked to the accession process. In June 1993 Cyprus was accepted as an EU applicant by the European Commission without the prerequisite of a conclusion of the Cyprus issue. Within months of this decision, in November 1993, Greece and Cyprus concluded a 'Joint Defence Doctrine,' often referred to as the 'Dogma of Joint Defence.' This agreement "places Cyprus in the 'unified defence space of Hellenism'"²³⁵ by stating that "Greece will provide air, naval and ground support to Cyprus in the event of Turkish aggression."²³⁶

A month after the Joint Defence Doctrine was signed, Cypriot President Clerides, in a letter to the UN Secretary General, called for the demilitarization of the island. He proposed to disband the National Guard of the Republic in exchange for the withdrawal of all Turkish forces from the island and the elimination of the Turkish Cypriot National Guard. If Turkey refused, Clerides claimed that:

the massive presence of Turkish military forces in the occupied part of Cyprus imposes on the Government of the Republic the need to increase the defensive capabilities of the country by purchasing arms. Further it makes it necessary to request military help from Greece and to include Cyprus in the Greek defensive plans.²³⁷

This proposal was likely designed with the foreknowledge that it would not be accepted, since it was contrary to Turkish strategic interests in Cyprus and to the

²³³ Menelaos Hadjicostis, "The Defence Pact will not waver," *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 11-17, 2003, p.4.

²³⁴ Yorgos A. Kourvetaris, "The Southern Flank of NATO: Political Dimension of the Greco-Turkish Conflict since 1974," *East European Quarterly* Vol.21, No.4 (January 1998), p.435.

²³⁵ Mavratsas. "The Ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1994: politics, social memory and identity," p.727.

²³⁶ Aristotelous, "The Military Balance: 1995-1996," p.54.

²³⁷ Letter from President Clerides to the UN Secretary General. *Proposal of the Greek side on the Demilitarization of Cyprus*. [<http://www.pio.gov.cy/docs/other/demilitarization.htm>], December 17, 1993.

Turkish approach in political negotiations over Cyprus.²³⁸ While the expected rejection indicated the extent to which the Turkish military dominated the political situation on the island,²³⁹ the proposal must be seen above all as an attempt by the Cypriot Republic to reinforce its own international position as a non-aggressor and to justify a subsequent increase in arms spending.

The modernization of the Cypriot National Guard had begun after the TRNC's unrecognized declaration of independence in 1983, but heavier spending, averaging 5% of GDP, began after the conclusion of the Greek-Cypriot Joint Defence pact.²⁴⁰ Following the demilitarization proposal, the Republic invested in military bases²⁴¹ that facilitated direct Greek military support as envisioned in the Defence Doctrine. Cyprus, with Greek support, also began to invest in advanced weapons systems such as French EXOCET anti-ship missiles and Russian S-300 anti-air missiles in order to maximize "the cost to Turkey in the event of a new attack against the Republic."²⁴² The S-300 missiles, ordered in early 1997 before formal accession negotiations with the EU began, had the possibility to "overturn Turkish air superiority on the island."²⁴³ They had a 140-kilometer range, enabling Cyprus to "threaten Turkey itself."²⁴⁴ In response, Turkey threatened to launch air assaults on Cyprus as soon as the missiles arrived on the island. The Republic therefore backed out of their deployment on the island, but the missiles were instead delivered to Crete as part of the Joint Defence pact. It must be understood that this defence build up was not

²³⁸ Discussed further in Chapter 3.5.

²³⁹ Aristotelous, "The Military Balance: 1995-1996," p.106.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.64.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.56.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p.54.

²⁴³ Erik Goldstein, "Greece: The Imperatives of Geopolitics," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* Vol.22 (1998), p.168.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.168.

unilateral. At the same time, Turkey was also planning to “spend the incredible sum of 150 billion US dollars”²⁴⁵ over 25 years to upgrade its own military forces. Greece was also an active participant in this ongoing militarization. Since the 1970s, military spending in both Greece and Turkey has consistently remained near 5% of GDP,²⁴⁶ ranking the two nations second only to the United States in NATO.

The political aims of the Cypriot rearmament program were not confined to direct security issues, however. If control of northern Cyprus was essential to the security of southern Anatolia, as the Turkish military maintained,²⁴⁷ then turning the Republic of Cyprus into a potential military threat through a military union with Greece increased the financial and political costs to Turkey of maintaining the island’s division. The alternative, as Clerides proposed, was a demilitarized island that posed no threat to Turkey and was preferably united and internationally protected. Understood in the context of the theory of *neo-enosis*, Cypriot military investment, progressing with each stage of EU negotiations, was also directed at convincing Turkey that an agreement on Cyprus would be the best way to protect the island from Greek domination.

Cyprus’s security strategy and its defence pact with Greece must also be understood in relation to the EU’s CFSP. Established under the 1992 Maastricht treaty, the CFSP was “a common, not a ‘single’, foreign policy and it remains in the intergovernmental domain rather than under the control of the Union’s Community

²⁴⁵Heinz A. Richter, “Policy of Ankara towards Cyprus and the EU,” In *Cyprus and Europe, the Long way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakis and Heinz A. Richter. (Mölnesee: Bibliopolis, 2003), p.162.

²⁴⁶Aristotelous, “The Military Balance: 1995-1996,” p.26.

²⁴⁷Examined in Chapter 3.5.

institutions.”²⁴⁸ Without the agreement of individual member states, therefore, EU membership does not itself internationalize the defence of Cyprus, but it does help to cement the defence links between Cyprus and Greece. It also places direct political pressure on Turkey, because with Cypriot accession Turkey will be formally occupying territory of an EU member state.

Greece had also attempted to acquire more direct mutual defence commitments from fellow EU members by joining the Western European Union (WEU), a mutual defence pact established in 1948 (and amended in 1954 to include Germany and Italy).²⁴⁹ Article V of this treaty provided for support by member states in the event of an attack on one state. Greece therefore had an obvious advantage in becoming a full participant of this pact, but the pressure it applied led instead to a change in the WEU treaty:

When Greece threatened to veto the Maastricht treaty unless it was made a full member [of WEU] . . . the Petersberg Declaration removed the legal obligation to give military assistance under its Article 5 in wars between members, associates and partners.²⁵⁰

EU states remained relatively quiet on the military pact built between Greece and Cyprus, however, and came to accept Greek political demands on Cyprus. But other EU members refused to be caught in a potential military conflict between two NATO states over a candidate EU country. Still, EU membership offered a strategic advantage. In the event of a conflict with Turkey—assuming Cyprus remained outside the EU—Greece would have to weigh its response only in accordance with

²⁴⁸Clive Archer, “The European Union as an International Political Actor,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.241.

²⁴⁹WEU: The Western European Union, established in 1948 with the Treaty of Brussels and now in the process of being absorbed into the CFSP.

²⁵⁰Christopher Brewin, “Reluctant Commitment: Past Aloofness and Present Problems in European Attitudes to Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.146.

its NATO membership and international support, as was the case in 1974. However, with Cyprus as a fellow EU member, direct Greek military support in response to an attack on Cyprus would carry significant political legitimacy within the EU.

Since the nature of the CFSP allows member states to pursue national agendas, the Greek-Greek Cypriot 'Joint Defence Doctrine' was strengthened by the prospect of EU membership for Cyprus. It became a formal link between two EU states and brought both into the common arena of European defence. The military build up of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the formalization of links between Greece and Cyprus also forced Turkey to reevaluate its own position on the island, and the proposal for a demilitarized island under European law enhanced the possibility that Turkey would eventually accept a final settlement on the island. Turkish EU membership prospects, a core element of Turkish national policy, would in any event not be aided by the continued presence of Turkish troops on the territory of an EU member state. The Cypriot accession process thus helped it to achieve a more equitable military balance, to challenge the Turkish military position on the island politically, and to strengthen defence ties with Greece, all essential policies within the concept of *neo-enosis*. For the Republic of Cyprus no security solution outside of EU membership could provide this degree of military and political support.

3.4 Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot Strategies on Cyprus and Turkey's EU Membership Bid: 1970-2000

During the 1970s Turkey, which experienced four *coups* from the 1960s to the 1990s,²⁵¹ “was governed by weak coalition governments”²⁵² that feared making concessions in Cyprus. The government of Bülent Ecevit, which rose to power after the coup of 1971, “was faced with overwhelming pressure to draw on popular nationalist sentiment and to use the Cyprus crisis as a means of maintaining national unity and remaining in power.”²⁵³ The military, always strongly present in internal Turkish politics and policy making, was front and center on the decision to invade Cyprus. The presence of the military on the island has gone nearly unquestioned since the Turkish invasion and its role in national politics has not subsided. The safety of the Turkish Cypriots has consistently been used “to foster national unity and appease the military (along with) the role of public opinion and the press in constraining the choices of the political elites.”²⁵⁴

During the process of Cypriot accession to the EU, the Turkish governments continued to face the same difficulties. They could not ‘abandon’ Cyprus without gaining anything in return, as that would signal weakness in relations with Greece specifically and with Europe in general. Turkey used its own EU application to strengthen its position on Cyprus, maintaining that only a guarantee of Turkish EU membership would provide the circumstances for a Cyprus deal. At the same time,

²⁵¹ Military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 along with a ‘post-modern’ coup in 1997.

²⁵² Bolukbasi, “From Benevolent Detachment to Reluctant Assertiveness: Turkey’s Policy Towards Cyprus 1954-2001,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakas and Heinz A. Richter (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 22), p.44.

²⁵³ Fiona B. Adamson, “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” *Political Science Quarterly*, (Summer 2001), p.285.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.299.

however, the Turkish military maintained a consistently bellicose approach to the situation. The Commander of the Aegean army, Hursit Tolon, remarked as late as early 2004 that “those who say let us give [Cyprus] away are nothing but traitors . . . The children of this nation will not give away even a pebble. We are watching.”²⁵⁵

Turkey has remained steadfast when confronting criticism from the international community over Cyprus. Despite the overwhelming opposition it faces on the Cyprus issue within NATO, the UN and the Arab world, Turkey has strengthened its position on the island rather than take any conciliatory measures. The Turkish government has also used broader, veiled threats to advance its bid for EU membership, tacitly suggesting that a rejection of its EU ambitions would prompt “a shift in Turkey’s ‘pro-western’ foreign policy”²⁵⁶ towards the Middle East. To this end, “Ankara has exploited its strategic relationship with the United States and key European countries in order to minimize the political/diplomatic burden of its policy of maintaining its military presence in support of the TRNC.”²⁵⁷ Turkey has also levelled threats at the EU regarding Cypriot accession. It warned that as Cyprus fulfilled the accession criteria, the TRNC would become even more integrated with Turkey and that “the responsibility will belong to the European Union.”²⁵⁸ Yet these threats mask Turkish insecurity over the changing diplomatic landscape: the inclusion of the EU in the Cyprus issue is precisely what Turkey had long sought to

²⁵⁵ Andreas Hadjipapas, “Turkey’s Rulers meeting to hammer out Cyprus Policy,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, January 23-30, 2004, p.41.

²⁵⁶ Yavuz M. Hakan, and Mujeeb Khan, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Duality and the Development (1950-1991),” *Arab Studies Quarterly* Vol.14, No.4 (Fall 1992), p.92.

²⁵⁷ Tozum Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.117.

²⁵⁸ *Resolution of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, [http://www.kibris.gen.tr/English/photos/documents/resolution18.html] 21 January 1997.

prevent. It did not want the involvement of another and potentially more powerful international organization (relative to the UN) on the Cyprus issue.

Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987, three years before the Republic of Cyprus. The economic advantages associated with its massive labor market and the potential for European investment have made the possibility of membership attractive to Turkey. EU entrance would also consolidate its policies of westernization and its security role as a member of NATO. Since the Cypriot application, however, Turkey's EU membership bid has been inevitably linked to the Turkish stance on the island. Greece refused to allow any progression of the EU-Turkish talks until Cyprus was included as a member of the next EU expansion round. Once Cyprus was accepted for membership, Greece allowed an earlier Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU, which it had previously blocked, to go into effect, in December 1995.²⁵⁹ Greece then changed tack and went from being an ardent opponent of Turkish EU membership to a clear supporter of it, much to the disappointment of those in Western Europe who had counted on an automatic Greek rejection of Turkey. Placing Turkey on the path to membership was essential for both Greece and Cyprus if the two were going to force the Cyprus issue.

At the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the EU "rejected Turkey's bid for inclusion in the list of (eleven) countries that are eligible for membership, while placing Cyprus on a fast-track for accession."²⁶⁰ The decision was a massive setback

²⁵⁹While this was a significant step in Turkish-EU relations, it has been argued that "the Customs Union with Turkey was promoted by the foreign services of the larger [EU] states as necessary and enough to keep Turkey pro-European while denying membership." See Christopher Brewin, "Reluctant Commitment: Past Aloofness and Present Problems in European Attitudes to Cyprus," In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.144.

²⁶⁰Bahcheli, "Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus," p.108.

for Turkey, curbing its own EU ambitions while Cyprus was accepted. The EU's rejection was meant to force Turkey into negotiations for a Cyprus settlement, but the Turkish position only hardened further. The 1999 Helsinki Summit resulted in a softening of the EU position, making Turkey a candidate country in order to encourage progress on the island. Because for Turkey, "the Cyprus problem is just too useful a bargaining chip to be given up except in exchange for something that Turkey values extremely highly."²⁶¹ Yet despite warnings from the EU that Ankara's "EU ambitions should not be used as a trade-off for a Cyprus settlement,"²⁶² that is precisely how Turkey has approached the situation. And this was exactly what the Republic of Cyprus counted on in its own strategy of linking the Cyprus problem with EU accession.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, long dependent on Turkey financially and militarily, also faced a new dilemma as Cypriot accession approached. As the TRNC was being used by Turkey to further its own EU ambitions, the Turkish Cypriots had two options: remain separated from the membership bid of the Republic of Cyprus and support Turkey; or enter into settlement negotiations, paving the way for a unified Cypriot entry. The situation in northern Cyprus was complicated by the presence of large numbers of Turkish settlers who strongly identified with the Turkish state and had no connections to the island as a whole. According to reports by the Council of Europe, Turks outnumber Turkish Cypriots in the north by a 3 to 2 ratio with a population estimated at

²⁶¹Nugent, "EU Enlargement and the 'Cyprus Problem'," p.142.

²⁶²Bouli Hadjioannou, "Verheugen fails to bend Denktash," *The Cyprus Weekly*, June 20-26, 2003. p.16.

115,000.²⁶³ It is estimated that over “55,000 indigenous Turkish Cypriots have left the country since 1974,” while over 49,000 settlers have been made citizens of the TRNC.²⁶⁴ These population adjustments greatly affected the political position of the north as a whole and relegated the Turkish Cypriot population to being a minority within their own self-proclaimed Republic. For Rauf Denktash, the settlers have been a constant source of electoral support, endorsing his hard-line positions on the perpetual division of the island. His re-election in 2002 suggested “that Turkish Cypriot [voters] support his refusal to participate either in inter-communal talks or in accession negotiations unless Turkish Cyprus is first recognized as a sovereign state.”²⁶⁵ His governance is also entirely dependent on Turkish financial assistance, as “more than 60 percent of the north’s annual budget has been covered by Turkey since the partition in 1974.”²⁶⁶

Defence considerations are also a central feature of the Turkish Cypriot position. Having lived with the highly visible Turkish military for over thirty years, Turkish Cypriots assume that a withdrawal of Turkish troops “would be exploited by the more numerous Greek Cypriots to threaten the Turkish community in the future.”²⁶⁷ However, the process of Cyprus’s EU accession has brought new proposals to ameliorate these fears. As explained above, the Greek Cypriots proposed a demilitarization of the island that was rejected by Denktash. The more recent Annan Plan also envisioned a demilitarized Cyprus once all phases of its

²⁶³ Menelaos Hadjicostis, “Duduran party tries to block settlers from voting,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 18-24, 200, p.2.

²⁶⁴ Philippos Stylianou, “CoE reports on Cyprus ‘fall like bombs’ for Turkey,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, June 27-July 3, 200, p.5.

²⁶⁵ Christopher Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.36, No.1, (January 2000), p.32.

²⁶⁶ Kliot and Mansfield, “The political landscape of partition: The Case of Cyprus,” p.515.

²⁶⁷ Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” p.114.

implementation were carried through. Turkish Cypriot security concerns could also be met with a redeployment of Turkish forces to Mersin in Turkey, “30 minutes away” from Cyprus, which would “ensure an adequate deterrent to a Greek strike.”²⁶⁸ While the Greek Cypriots were convinced that EU membership would eventually provide more security for the island, Turkish Cypriots feared that their security concerns would be compromised by membership.

The addition of the EU into Cypriot affairs in fact caused considerable resentment in the north. The Turkish Cypriots saw it as an invitation to an outside party they had not agreed to include, particularly since the EU seemed to favour the Greek Cypriot position. Even before the Republic’s EU bid, the “Turkish Cypriots had been troubled by what they viewed as European solidarity with the Greek Cypriot government.”²⁶⁹ But European ‘solidarity’, if it existed, was based on UN conclusions: Turkish violations of UNSC resolutions and the illegal establishment of the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots, however, remained “adamant that the EU should accept that there is contested sovereignty on Cyprus.”²⁷⁰ Nevertheless, Greece’s EU membership has bound the union at large to the Greek Cypriot position.²⁷¹

To encourage the TRNC to take part in the Republic’s membership, the EU sought to stress the advantages of membership for the Turkish Cypriots. Given a European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in August 1994, that exports from northern Cyprus to the EU were illegal, which forced goods to be sent through Turkey to reach markets abroad, the EU tried to stress “the considerable economic benefits that

²⁶⁸Birand, “A Turkish View of Greek-Turkish Relations,” p.175.

²⁶⁹Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” p.112.

²⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p.112.

²⁷¹The Council of Europe, entirely separate from the EU, is a general grouping of 46 European states. It is responsible for the European Convention on Human Rights.

membership would bring”²⁷² to the north. Unlike the southern part of the island, the per capita income of the north was 67%²⁷³ below that of the Republic in 1993, and entirely dependent on Turkey for its survival. Precisely because of that disparity, however, the Turkish Cypriots feared that EU membership—which would open up the free movement of labour, capital, goods, and services—would allow the “Greek Cypriots to ‘swamp’ the north and turn the Turkish Cypriots there into a minority.”²⁷⁴ These fears seem unsubstantiated, however, since all potential settlement deals include restrictions on the proportion of Greek Cypriots allowed to resettle in what would become the Turkish zone of a unified state.

In summary, Turkey’s position on the Cyprus problem was linked to both its internal politics and its foreign policy agenda. Turkish governments consistently used a strong stance on the Cyprus problem as a source of political potency. Both the populace and the military backed a strong policy on the island, the former for national sentiment, and the latter for strategic considerations. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, for its part, was entirely dependent on Turkish financial assistance and the Turkish military. Turkey continued to ‘colonize’ the TRNC in violation of the Geneva Convention to bolster its claim for two separate states and to maintain strong political support on the island. The European Union’s reluctance to provide Turkey with a set time frame for EU membership, combined with its appearance of favoring the Greek Cypriot cause, contributed to a seemingly intractable position on the part of the Turkish Cypriots. And throughout the course

²⁷²Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” p.108.

²⁷³Mehmet Ugur, “EU Membership and the North-South Development Gap in Cyprus: A Proposal,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakas and Heinz A. Richter (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 22), p.127.

²⁷⁴Tozum Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” p.114.

of Cypriot accession, until three months before the Republic's entry, Turkey was unprepared to enter meaningful negotiations over the island's future until some promise of eventual membership was made. Placating the demands of the military, appeasing national sentiment and seeking to secure EU entry without jeopardizing its control of Northern Cyprus have all been at the center of Turkey's policies on Cyprus.

3.5 The Economic Effects of EU Membership for the Republic of Cyprus

Most claims about the benefits of EU membership involve the economic advantages it will bring to the acceding countries. Such an analysis may prove correct for the vast majority of the ten acceding states in 2004, and for northern Cyprus. But for the Republic "the net effect is unknown and difficult to estimate."²⁷⁵ A large majority of Greek Cypriots fear the economic consequences of EU membership, believing that unemployment rates and the cost of living²⁷⁶ will rise dramatically. Yet despite these fears, Greek Cypriots are far more supportive of EU membership than any of the ten countries that acceded to the EU in May 2004. Just as *enosis* appealed to emotion rather than economic concerns, the policies associated with the concept of *neo-enosis* are supported despite the significant negative economic consequences of EU accession. Greek Cypriots have been allowed "to work in Greece both in the private and in the public sector"²⁷⁷ since 1960. As such,

²⁷⁵Michael S. Michael S. "Cyprus under the Common Agricultural Policy: The Impact Effect," *Journal of Economic Studies* Vol.19, No.6 (1992), p.23.

²⁷⁶"Cypriots think life is getting more expensive," *The Financial Weekly*, June 20-26, (2003), p.5.

²⁷⁷Persianis Panayiotis, "The Greek Cypriot Educational Policy in Cyprus as an Expression of Conflict at the Political, Cultural and Socio-Economic Levels" *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* Vol.10/11, (1994/95), p.105.

the implementation of the EEA²⁷⁸ freedoms is only essential if extended to the occupied areas of northern Cyprus. Implementing those freedoms and adjusting the entire economic foundation of Cyprus as a result of EU 'harmonization' criteria poses significant threats to the Cypriot economy. The obligation to reform key industries and allow free movement of capital (which was always highly restricted on the island) threaten the rapid, sustained growth that Cyprus achieved on its own throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Cypriot accession cannot therefore be explained simply by a desire for the economic benefits and development normally associated with EU membership.

The events of 1974 devastated the Cypriot economy for both Greeks and Turks. Fully one third of the population had to be resettled and reintegrated into an economy where the unemployment rate stood at 29.1%.²⁷⁹ To offset the crisis and "to prevent either 'anarchy' or a lurch to the left, the rapid incorporation of the refugees into society, economy, and polity was essential."²⁸⁰ Before the coup and invasion, the north had supplied "70 percent of the total gross production"²⁸¹ of the island, derived primarily from mining and tourism. The Republic of Cyprus, confined now only to the south, became an international offshore centre in 1975 and concentrated on tourism and shipping. While Cyprus had already negotiated a Customs Union Agreement with the EC before the coup and invasion, its implementation was

²⁷⁸EEA: European Economic Area. Free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the EEA.

²⁷⁹Mansfield and Kliot, "The political landscape of partition: The Case of Cyprus," p.513.

²⁸⁰Ioannis A. Papaioannou, *Politics in Cyprus Between 1960 and 1981*, (Nicosia: Theopress Cyprus, 1984), p.19.

²⁸¹Mansfield and Kliot, "The political landscape of partition: The Case of Cyprus," p.504.

delayed until 1988²⁸² as a result of the Cyprus problem. In fact “the Community was not generous in trade concessions to the tiny hard-pressed Cypriot economy.”²⁸³ By the time accession negotiations began in 1998, Cyprus had the healthiest economy of all acceding states, and it also outperformed the economies of some EU member states, including Greece and Spain. Cyprus had acquired the fifth largest merchant fleet in the world, and had developed a vibrant offshore banking sector and a valuable tourist industry. Unemployment hovered at under 3%,²⁸⁴ annual growth rates ranged from over 2% to over 5% of GDP during the 1990s,²⁸⁵ and the Cypriot currency had remained stable for decades. During EU accession, the only key financial criterion not fully satisfied was the public deficit, which temporarily rose above the maximum permitted level of 3% of GNP. Overall, Cyprus had “managed well.”²⁸⁶ But the costs associated with accession put tremendous pressures on the economy and on the very sectors that had helped to propel the Republic out of financial disarray in the period after 1974.

Once Cyprus’ application to the EU was accepted, the state was eligible to receive direct financial assistance and begin participation in EU programs. Excluded from PHARE,²⁸⁷ ISPA²⁸⁸ and SAPARD,²⁸⁹ which were “meant to support the CEEC-

²⁸²Freyer Eckhard, “European Financial Integration: Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Accession of Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.73.

²⁸³Christopher Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.36, No.1 (January 2000), p.25.

²⁸⁴Freyer, “European Financial Integration: Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Accession of Cyprus,” p.73.

²⁸⁵Nickos Baltas, “The Economy of the European Union,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (Britain: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.151.

²⁸⁶Freyer, “European Financial Integration: Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Accession of Cyprus,” p.74.

²⁸⁷PHARE: Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy, later extended to the CEEC.

²⁸⁸ISPA: Structural Policies for Pre-Accession.

10 in complying with the political and economic criteria for membership as well as the “*acquis communautaire*,”²⁹⁰ Cyprus received separate funding. The Republic received €57 million in aid from 2000 to 2003²⁹¹ and was also offered loans to meet accession costs through the European Investment Bank and the MEDA²⁹² programme (the same system that Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority use). While the pre-accession funds were sparse, the benefits of full membership offered significantly more. As a member, Cyprus was set to receive €500 million in financial assistance from 2004 to 2006.²⁹³ During the same period, another €54 million from the cohesion fund was to be spent “to co-finance infrastructures in the environment and transport sectors.”²⁹⁴ Investment for “financial and technical co-operation”²⁹⁵ amounted to € 210 million, of which €142 million were European Investment Bank (EIB) loans.

While Cyprus gained significant financial assistance to cope with accession costs and harmonization, the Republic stands to gain little from the EU budget itself and may soon become a net contributor. In its first year of membership, “Cyprus will absorb around 35m euros” while contributing “105m euros,” with the difference made up by the EU, which will also offer an “additional provision of 30m euros.”²⁹⁶

While the Cypriot economy was at 80% of the average GDP for the EU-15, well

²⁸⁹SAPARD: Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development.

²⁹⁰*The Phare Programme*. The European Commission’s Information Centre on Enlargement. Brussels, May 2003.

²⁹¹“500,000 to cover cost of attending meetings,” *The Financial Weekly*, July 18-24, 2003. p.17.

²⁹²MEDA: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership programme.

²⁹³Eleanor E. Zeff, “The Budget and ‘the Spending Policies’,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.179.

²⁹⁴“Cyprus and EU agrees on Structural Funds,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, December 19-26, 2003.

²⁹⁵Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus’ Progress towards Accession: November 1999, p.19.

²⁹⁶“Cyprus’s slice of Community Budget,” *The Financial Weekly* July 18-24, 2003. p.4.

above the average of the EU-25, at the time of entry its GDP growth rate was significantly higher than the growth rates of many of the EU-15 states. At the present rate of growth, which has been sustained for nearly twenty years, by 2013 "Cyprus will have achieved a per capita GDP that is 108 per cent of the EU-15 average."²⁹⁷ Cyprus will then become a net contributor to the EU budget on the strength of its growing economy, with its strong rates of growth achieved before the application for EU membership was submitted. Any temporary gains from the EU budget will also be offset by "direct income transfers from Cypriot consumers to the rest of the Community's producers."²⁹⁸ Cyprus has an annual trade deficit with the EU of around €2.2 billion²⁹⁹ while membership is "unlikely to generate significant additional export opportunities in the EU market for locally-owned firms."³⁰⁰ Even if direct income transfers from Cypriot consumers to EU producers remained at the same levels, Cyprus would soon see a net loss as the Cypriot share of the EU budget declined in accordance with a steadily growing GDP in relation to the EU-15.

The rate of economic growth in Cyprus, however, may be short lived as a result of European structural reforms to the very industries and policies that produced the long period of sustained development. Liberalization of a highly subsidized economy,³⁰¹ the loss of banking sovereignty, the flight of offshore and shipping companies, the high costs to SME's (Small and Medium Enterprises), capital flight and price hikes are all predicted results of implementing the structural reforms

²⁹⁷Michael Baun, "Intergovernmental Politics," In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.134.

²⁹⁸Michael, "Cyprus under the Common Agricultural Policy: The Impact Effect," p.29.

²⁹⁹"Cyprus Faces 2.2B Euro Deficit in trade with EU," *The Financial Weekly*, July 11-17, 2003.

³⁰⁰"Firms must be more forward looking says PwC: PricewaterhouseCoopers," *The Financial Weekly*, July 11-17, 2003.

³⁰¹Rodney Wilson, "The External Economic Relations of the Republic of Cyprus," *The Round Table* Vol.329 (1994), p.47.

required by the EU for membership. The achievements that Cyprus was able to make in a short period from the Turkish invasion until EU accession were the result of “economic and social planning” carried out by the government. The Republic’s ‘Planning Bureau’ “not only produces the plans but controls the development budget which enables them to be implemented.”³⁰² The loss of this mechanism and the balance between state and industry in Cyprus, an extremely small economy with very limited political clout in Brussels, will certainly have an impact on the economic health of the country. Regardless of the final effects, which cannot be accurately predicted, the outlook at the time of entry to the European Union was not favorable to the strengths of the Cypriot economy.

The EU has targeted Cypriot government policies supporting offshore investment for reform. Within the framework of the EU’s Competition Policy, an agreement was made “with Cyprus and Hungary for the phasing-out of incompatible fiscal State aid for offshore companies by the end of 2005.”³⁰³ In addition to attacking state subsidies for Cyprus’s “large ‘offshore’ banking sector,”³⁰⁴ the EU wants an end to “the ship-management companies’ privilege for state subsidies.”³⁰⁵ While Cyprus has argued that any “change to tax facilities would prompt shipping companies to leave Cyprus and move to third countries, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines,”³⁰⁶ the practice is incompatible with EU regulations. It is

³⁰²Costas Apostolides, “What’s in store after EU membership,” *The Financial Weekly*, July 18-24, 2003, p.2.

³⁰³Neill Nugent, “The Unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.53.

³⁰⁴Gerhard Michael Ambrosi, “The Operation of the Internal Market,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.165.

³⁰⁵Nicos Bellos, “Cyprus and EU discuss ship-management companies’ tax status,” *The Financial Weekly*, July 25-31, 2003, p.3.

³⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p.3.

unlikely that Cyprus will be able to retain the fifth largest merchant fleet in the world under the new conditions. These two industries, central to the growth of the Cypriot economy after 1974, are clearly and immediately under threat by EU membership.

As a small state within the European Union, Cyprus will play an extremely limited role in setting economic policy and hence it will be subject to decisions made by larger states. Yet participation in the Eurozone (EMU)³⁰⁷ was an essential political step for Cyprus, and every effort was made by the Republic to enter the Eurozone as quickly as possible. Within the EMU, the Central Bank of Cyprus will be a member of the governing structure of the European Central Bank (ECB). The governing structure of the ECB, which passed a series of reforms in May 2004 to cap the number of voting governors at 15, “groups states according to economic size, progressively reducing the voting frequency of the NCB [National Central Bank] governors of the smaller states over time.”³⁰⁸ Cyprus was placed in Group 3, with a voting frequency of 50%, to be reduced as the EU expands further. The Central Bank of Cyprus, which had controlled monetary policy and supported the economic policies of successive Cypriot governments in order to achieve consistent GDP growth, thereby lost its ability to act independently and is now subject to the rulings of the ECB in which it has a very limited say. The reform of the ECB, which coincided with Cypriot accession, “will make it more difficult for smaller countries to voice national and regional concerns at the European and international level.”³⁰⁹ The stability of the Cypriot economy and currency and the rates of growth achieved

³⁰⁷EMU: European Monetary Union

³⁰⁸Michele Chang, “Economic and Monetary Union,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.189.

³⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p.192.

before membership do not explain the Republic's decision "to join the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) immediately after accession on May 1st 2004 and to enter the Eurozone on January 1st 2007"³¹⁰ when "the two primary rationales for monetary union focus on price stability and increased influence in monetary policy-making."³¹¹ Cyprus, on the contrary, saw price instability as a result of membership and, as mentioned above, a significant loss of influence in monetary policy upon entering the EMU.

EU membership also required Cyprus to allow 'capital liberalization.' Monetary stability in Cyprus was in part maintained by restrictions on capital movement, but "with capital liberalization on Cyprus' accession to the EU on May 1 [2004], a lot of funds may move abroad . . . there is a danger that there will be a flight of capital."³¹² Considering that the CSE (Cypriot Stock Exchange) indices "exhibited a downward trend"³¹³ from 235 points at the beginning of 2001³¹⁴ to 80.58 points by the end of 2003, a 66% drop in the three years prior to accession, low investor confidence at the time of Cypriot entry was conducive to capital flight. The Consumer Price Index also increased as Cyprus moved closer to accession as a result of 'harmonization'³¹⁵ with the EU criteria. An increase of the VAT (Value Added Tax) was set to coincide with the date of Cypriot accession,³¹⁶ while levies adopted

³¹⁰"Devaluation Rumours quashed: Cyprus to join eurozone in January 2007," *The Financial Weekly*, July 18-24, 2003, p.4.

³¹¹Chang, "Economic and Monetary Union," p.188.

³¹²Bouli Hadjioannou, "CSE Unveils plan to avoid capital flight," *The Financial Weekly*, July 18-24, 2003, p.1.

³¹³*Annual Fact Book of the CSE 2003*. [<http://www.cse.com.cy/en/default.asp>], p.3.

³¹⁴*Annual Fact Book of the CSE 2001*. [<http://www.cse.com.cy/en/default.asp>], p.5.

³¹⁵Bouli Hadjioannou, "Accession blamed for spiraling prices in Cyprus," *The Cyprus Weekly*, January 9, 2004, p.2.

³¹⁶Bouli Hadjioannou, "VAT Blow for Consumers as Cyprus prepares to join EU," *The Cyprus Weekly*, January 9, 2004, p.2

on certain imported products had to be removed “giving local producers a run for their money.”³¹⁷ EU rules also forced Cyprus to adjust tariffs³¹⁸ in line with European-wide standards, opening up the internal market, which was long protected from heavy competition from the rest of Europe.

Small and medium sized enterprises, making up “99.9% of all local companies,”³¹⁹ will also be negatively affected by EU membership. Tourism, the largest sector of the Cypriot economy, has remained stable but with little room for expansion. The SMEs faced “new obligations and significant costs”³²⁰ as a result of the accession process. Manthos Mavrommatis, chairman of the Nicosia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, informed local companies that the benefits from European programs aimed at SMEs in the enlarged Europe would exclude Cyprus because “SMEs here do not have the difficulties that their European counterparts face in securing bank loans.”³²¹ For local businesses, this meant that the costs of implementing the ‘harmonization’ criteria had to be borne by the businesses themselves through loans and without the assistance of the Cypriot government or the European Union.

Tourism, which “has become the dominant activity in the Cyprus economy and the main engine driving economic growth,”³²² is largely dependent on the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet the Republic was willing to create

³¹⁷ Evripidou, “Eurofile,” p.10.

³¹⁸ Adrian Van Den Hoven, “The European Union as an International Economic Actor,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.219.

³¹⁹ Costas Apostolides, “Liberalisation policy requires urgent attention,” *The Cyprus Weekly: Financial Weekly*, June 13-19, 2003, p.1

³²⁰ Bouli Hadjioannou, “Business Leaders turn spotlight on EU funding for SMEs,” *The Financial Weekly*, July 25-31, 2003, p.2.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p.2.

³²² Wilson, “The External Economic Relations of the Republic of Cyprus,” p.52.

instability itself by its military build-up and the subsequent Turkish responses. The tourism industry itself has no room to expand, except in the Turkish Cypriot north, and has “been stuck at a proportion of 22% of Gross Domestic Product.”³²³ While EU membership may have no direct negative or positive effect on the tourism industry, Cyprus’s broader EU accession strategy threatens at least the short-term security of the island and, by extension, tourism.

Cypriot participation in the European Union has required the adoption of ‘harmonization’ criteria of the Cypriot economy that in many cases directly harmed its industries, governing structures and core business sectors. But implementing these criteria was a necessary requirement of pursuing EU membership. While accession in a grouping of eastern European states may not have been economically ideal,³²⁴ it was the only method that Cyprus and Greece could use to ensure membership for Cyprus. But it was necessary:

To meet the harmonization criteria so that Cyprus is the best performing accession country in May 2004. This is a political criterion more important than any others and should override all other considerations.³²⁵

While the EU had removed the precondition of a Cyprus settlement, the Republic still had to appear as favorable as possible to ensure accession and that required “increased expenditure, not reduced expenditure.”³²⁶ It was for this reason—and more specifically because of accession costs and delayed entrance to the Eurozone—that the Cypriot fiscal deficit and public debt as a percentage of GDP rose above the

³²³Costas Apostolidies, “The Council of Economic Advisors had difficult role,” *The Financial Weekly*, July 11-17, 2003, p.1.

³²⁴Miroslav N. Jovanovic, “Enlargement of the European Union: Economic Dimension,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.61.

³²⁵“Economic Growth and the Maastricht criteria,” *The Cyprus Weekly: Financial Weekly*, July 4-10, 2003, p.2.

³²⁶*Ibid.*, p.2.

Maastricht convergence criteria. Clearly “the political benefits [were] felt to outweigh any economic costs which the island’s industry and agriculture might have to bear.”³²⁷ The impetus for accession was not ultimately economic and the period of adjustment was not economically beneficial. The Republic sacrificed economic capital for political capital and traded economic self-sufficiency for financial assistance in the pursuit of the overarching political agenda associated with the idea of *neo-enosis*.

³²⁷Wilson, “The External Economic Relations of the Republic of Cyprus,” p.47.

CHAPTER 4:

THE THEORY OF NEO-ENOSIS AND THE CYPRIOT ACCESSION PROCESS

4.1 Prelude: Greece's EU Membership and *Neo-Enosis*

Negotiations for Greek membership in the EU opened in July 1976 and Greece entered on January 1st 1981. Constantine Karamanlis, then President of Greece, had been anti-NATO and anti-EC as the head of PASOK.³²⁸ But despite PASOK's ideological objections to entering Europe, the very real dangers of a powerful Turkey required a pragmatic approach to Greek foreign policy. Any move to close down American bases in Greece, which PASOK had considered, "would have enhanced Turkish military capabilities."³²⁹ The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the non-involvement of Europe and the United States had convinced the Greeks that participation in an outside alliance was necessary if they were to reach political parity with Turkey. Greece's entry was not only necessary to stabilize the fractious political and economic conditions that had followed the Junta's collapse, but was also crucial for Greco-Turkish relations and, as a result, for the Greek Cypriots.

The political and diplomatic weight Greece achieved by membership strengthened its position in relations with Turkey, as membership "gives some

³²⁸PASOK: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement.

³²⁹Erik Goldstein, "Greece: The Imperatives of Geopolitics," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* Vol.22, (1998), p.164

foreign policy leverage: a clout that would not otherwise be available.”³³⁰ Greece favours deeper EU integration through support of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and EU enlargement. This pro-EU policy, however, stems from an attempt by Greece to secure a prominent position within the EU and thereby bolster its foreign and defence options. Greek participation in the EMU also provides security guarantees since monetary union makes the defence of Greece necessary. Greece also seeks “a communitarised CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) system that will be able to protect the territorial integrity and the external frontiers of the EU, and adopt the principles of solidarity and mutual defence assistance.”³³¹ NATO membership does not provide this protection as Turkey maintains a prominent position in the organization and Cyprus is not a NATO member. Enlargement of the EU to the Balkans also promises to serve the security interests of Greece³³² by providing greater stability in the region and through the possible creation of new EU allies in relations with Turkey. Greece’s interest in integration and enlargement clearly serves Greek national interests and support of Cyprus.

The financial benefits of EU membership for Greece include Structural and Cohesion Funds which pay “\$16.5 million dollars . . . each day from the EU.”³³³ EU expansion may limit those funds in time as they would increasingly go to new member states in Eastern Europe. But the accession of eastern European states and

³³⁰Spiros Kaminaris and Panagiotis Panagopoulos, “The Birmingham conference on Greece as a member of the European Union: sixteen years after its accession,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* Vol. 22, (1998), p.133.

³³¹Othon Anastakskis, “Greece in the Future Enlarged European Union,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* (1998), p.177.

³³²*Ibid.*, p.179.

³³³Kaminaris and Panagopoulos, “The Birmingham conference on Greece as a member of the European Union: sixteen years after its accession,” p.128.

potentially the Balkans also opens up markets, labour supplies and investment potentials for Greece. Clearly “it is very much in Greece’s interests that CEEC accessions do proceed, for it will reduce its geographical separation from the rest of the EU, may well give it political allies, and is likely to offer considerable opportunities for Greek business.”³³⁴ The European Commission also stated that “Greece stands to reap the largest projected gains within the EU from successful economic reform in the former communist countries.”³³⁵ Yet Greece was willing to challenge the entire accession process of 2004 unless Cyprus was included. As PASOK had compromised its political ideology for EU membership, so Greece was willing to sacrifice potential economic benefits over the cause of Cyprus.

Securing Cypriot EU membership was the overriding European policy of Greece throughout the 1990s. Cypriot membership would also guarantee Greece a permanent “ally in the future process of European integration.”³³⁶ But the lengths that Greece went to in securing Cypriot accession, and the risks it took as a result, can best be understood by the concept of *neo-enosis*. Greece was willing to sacrifice other national interests and to curb its ability to receive concessions outside of the Cyprus issue in pursuit of a modern Pan-Hellenic movement. Popular opinion in Greece was also supportive, as it has always been, on a strong Cyprus policy. Any “softening of its stance on Cyprus would inevitably be portrayed by opponents as a climb-down and a defeat for the Hellenic people engineered by Turkey.”³³⁷ As a result of these political considerations “no Greek Parliament will ratify the accession

³³⁴Neill Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol.38, No.1 (March 2000), p.144.

³³⁵Kaminaris and Panagopoulos, “The Birmingham conference on Greece as a member of the European Union: sixteen years after its accession,” p.119.

³³⁶Anastaskis, “Greece in the Future Enlarged European Union,” p.178.

³³⁷Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’,” p.144.

of Poland if the EU has not first admitted Cyprus.”³³⁸ The unity of Greek political parties on the accession of Cyprus to the EU, as with the unity of Greek Cypriot political parties, demonstrates the overarching influence of modern Pan-Hellenism. The theory of *neo-enosis* provides the clearest understanding for Greece’s apparent exploitation of the European Union to achieve Cypriot membership.

4.2 The Cypriot Accession Process

Relations between the Republic of Cyprus and the EC began shortly after the Republic came into existence. The Republic was given the option of becoming a full member or an associate member as early as 1962³³⁹ and it chose “to negotiate for full membership.”³⁴⁰ At this early stage, the Republic pursued entry because its major trade partner, the UK, also sought membership. When French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed British entry, the Cypriot application “lapsed”³⁴¹ and no further interest was shown until the UK again attempted to join in the early 1970s. Instead of pursuing full membership in the European Community, the Republic sought an Association Agreement, by which a customs union was agreed upon “after a ten-year transitional period.”³⁴² In part, the decision to seek Association status was made so that it “would be supported internally by AKEL and externally preserve its standing in the Non-Aligned Movement.”³⁴³ Participation in the Non-Aligned Movement was

³³⁸Christopher Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.36, No.1 (January 2000), p.29.

³³⁹*Ibid.*, p.22.

³⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p.22.

³⁴¹*Ibid.*, p.22.

³⁴²Tozum Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.109.

³⁴³Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” p.22.

seen as essential for Cyprus to acquire support at the United Nations. AKEL, the Cypriot communist party, was initially opposed to European membership for ideological reasons. The two-stage Association Agreement between Cyprus and the European Community allowed “free access for Cyprus’s agricultural products to UK markets.”³⁴⁴ This measure effectively protected Cyprus’s previous “Commonwealth Preference”³⁴⁵ that it enjoyed with the UK, since the latter had itself acceded to the EEC in 1973 and had to follow the common tariffs of the Community.³⁴⁶ Since there were no political incentives at the time for the Republic to become a full member of the Community, there were no further attempts to seek a closer union until the dynamic of Greco-Turkish relations had changed.

Three events caused a shift in the Republic’s approach towards European alignment, along with the “deepening of European integration.”³⁴⁷ Greece acceded to the Community in 1981, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared independence in 1983, and Turkey applied for EEC membership in 1987. In the same year, 1987, a Customs Union Agreement between Cyprus and the EU entered its first phase. Additionally, the Community supported UN plans on reunification and had condemned the establishment of the TRNC. The Cypriot decision to move

³⁴⁴Michael, Michael S, “Cyprus under the Common Agricultural Policy: The Impact Effect,” *Journal of Economic Studies* Vol.19, No.6 (1992), p.22.

³⁴⁵Christopher Brewin, “The Cyprus Question in EU-Turkey Relations,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakas and Heinz A. Richter (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 22), p.133.

³⁴⁶Despite later misgivings, at this stage the “EEC chose not to make difficulties about the right of the UN-recognized government to sign the Agreement on the ground of instability requiring the presence of UN forces, seeing the issue as purely economic in nature.” Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” p.22.

³⁴⁷Miroslav N. Jovanovic, “Enlargement of the European Union: Economic Dimension,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.45.

towards membership began “by the late 1980s,”³⁴⁸ even though the Republic’s President George Vassiliou was informed:

by both British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and (west) German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that there was no need for such an application as it would have led to a rejection and would have unnecessarily tied Cyprus’ application to that of Turkey.³⁴⁹

But that was, in part, the Republic’s plan. The European Union took the position that Cypriot membership “would have to await the settlement of the island’s communal dispute.”³⁵⁰ Turkey, perhaps coming to that conclusion as well, postponed any moves towards a settlement as a result. However, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe proved a decisive event for Cypriot entry. As the EEC looked to incorporate the former communist states of the East, Greece and Cyprus took the opportunity to quickly attach the island to the process.

The Republic applied for full membership to the EEC on July 3rd 1990, though Cyprus had to wait another three years before the European Commission³⁵¹ gave its opinion on the island’s status. In June 1993 the Commission stated “that it did not favour allowing the partition of Cyprus to be a reason for permanently excluding the accession of Greek Cyprus.”³⁵² This was a significant step for Cypriot membership hopes but it was not a guarantee that the island could proceed without a prior settlement. The December 1993 Copenhagen Summit extended invitations to Eastern European states, provided they met the necessary criteria, which in turn

³⁴⁸Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the Cyprus Problem,” p.136.

³⁴⁹Stelios Stavrides, “The International Role of the Cypriot Parliament and Cyprus’ Accession to the EU,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakas and Heinz A. Richter (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 22), p.178.

³⁵⁰Tozum Bahcheli, “Turkish Cypriots, the EU Option and Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.109.

³⁵¹European Commission decision of June 1993.

³⁵²Nugent, “The Unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round,” p.38.

allowed Greece to use its power to veto any enlargement plans should Cyprus not be included within them. The Corfu Summit in June 1994 stated “that the next phase of enlargement of the Union will involve Cyprus and Malta.”³⁵³ But the Corfu Summit also recalled the Commission decisions of October 4th 1993 and April 18th 1994, stating that there was a:

need, presumably prior to accession, for a settlement of the Cyprus problem that would respect ‘the territorial integrity and unity of the country, in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and high-level agreements.’³⁵⁴

These decisions represented another significant step for the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. Since the EU had come to the conclusion that the Turkish Cypriot position was untenable, the closer Cyprus came to membership the more calls for a solution seemed directly aimed at Denktash and Turkey.

The final step towards membership came in March 1995 when Greece lifted its veto of an EU-Turkish Customs Union in exchange for France agreeing to “persuade the other member-states to set a date for beginning an accession process with Cyprus without requiring a prior settlement of the Cyprus problem.”³⁵⁵ The Republic of Cyprus, despite the enormous political obstacles it faced, had manoeuvred itself exactly where it needed to be. The island’s EU membership was accepted without preconditions and the road from Ankara to Brussels, and presumably a Cyprus settlement, now passed through the divided capital of Nicosia. A statement by the Commission³⁵⁶ in July 1997, requested by the December 1995 Madrid European

³⁵³Ibid., p.38.

³⁵⁴Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” p.25.

³⁵⁵Ibid., p.21.

³⁵⁶European Union Commission, *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union*.

[http://www.infoeuropa.ro/ieweb/imgupload/1997_Agenda_2000.pdf], July 13th 1997, p.74.

Council, recommended opening accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus, later adding Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. The Commission's decision mentioned that the EU did "not expect any major problem regarding the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* in the areas under the control of the Republic of Cyprus."³⁵⁷ The first wave of negotiations began on March 31st 1998, and a second round began in February 2000, working towards a 'Big Bang' of all ten states acceding before the June 2004 European Parliamentary (EP) elections. The Republic easily eclipsed the other acceding states in terms of its economic performance and its implementation of all the accession chapters. The Cypriot accession process needed to remain as flawless as possible in order to secure European support with respect to the Republic's relations with Turkey.

The Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 accepted Cypriot accession despite the lack of a settlement. That decision, though expected, had significant consequences for Turkey. If no agreement were reached before May 2004, then "in legal, though not practical, terms the whole of the island of Cyprus would be joining the EU, and a foreign power, Turkey, would be occupying EU 'territory'."³⁵⁸ The Accession Treaty was signed in Athens on April 16th 2003, as Greece held the EU Presidency, and the Cypriot House of Representatives made their unanimous vote in July 2003 in favor of EU membership. President Tassos Papadopoulos³⁵⁹ remarked

³⁵⁷Jovanovic, "Enlargement of the European Union: Economic Dimension," p.55.

³⁵⁸Nugent, "The Unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round," p.39.

³⁵⁹Assumed office as the President of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2003.

that “the EU appreciated ‘the wide popular and political support of this act’”³⁶⁰ despite the non-participation of the Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, Cyprus did not meet all the entrance criteria for an applicant state as the EU required that a country “should have achieved reasonable relations with its neighbours and, where applicable, traditional adversaries.”³⁶¹ Greece’s commitment to the Republic was the key factor that ensured accession while the rest of Europe simply hoped for positive steps towards a settlement on the island. To offset concerns about the entry of a divided and militarily occupied state, President Papadopoulos stressed “his involvement in bringing peace and stability to the region.”³⁶² The Republic had achieved EU membership and began to position itself for the final push towards realizing the policies illustrated by the *neo-enosis* theory: producing an acceptable Cyprus settlement.

4.3 The EU on Cypriot Accession

The European Union’s acceptance of the Cypriot application for membership presented legal difficulties and revealed an “institutional weakness”³⁶³ in the organization. The Republic of Cyprus would never have been accepted for membership without Greek support. The prospect of importing a foreign conflict within the borders of Europe, a conflict from which Europe had remained notably aloof, was not welcomed by any EU member apart from Greece. The Cyprus issue

³⁶⁰Lonias Efthymoulou, “House Ratifies Cyprus’s EU Accession Treaty,” *The Cyprus Weekly* July 18-24, 2003. p.7.

³⁶¹Janet Mather, “The Citizenry: Legitimacy and Democracy,” In *European Union Enlargement*, ed. Neill Nugent (Britain: Palgrave MacMillan: 2004), p.115.

³⁶²Annie Charalambous, “Farewell to Miguel Angel Moratinos,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 4-10, 2003. p.14.

³⁶³Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” p.29.

complicated the process and standards of accession, the formation and extent of EU institutions, such as the CFSP, and revealed the underlying disunity among member states. The Republic of Cyprus maintained that “it would be wholly unreasonable for both Cyprus and the EU to be held hostage by an illegal ‘government (that of the TRNC) and an uncompromising non-Member State (Turkey).”³⁶⁴ Yet the desire for membership in a union where the vast majority of states felt “little guilt”³⁶⁵ for their non-involvement in dealing with the Cyprus problem reveals the real nature of the Cypriot application. The only member to offer direct and substantial support to the Republic on the Cyprus issue was Greece. And as the concept of *neo-enosis* suggests, accession brought the island still closer to Greece.

The European Parliament (EP) was the only EU institution that gave constant support to the Republic’s position. The major EU member states attempted either to prevent Cypriot entry or they saw the island’s membership as a mistake, but one that had to be accepted because of the Greek veto threat. The European Parliament, however, fully supported “the accession of the Republic of Cyprus with or without a settlement.”³⁶⁶ This was consistent with a number of measures passed by the EP throughout the accession process that recognized the legitimacy of the Cypriot application and primarily placed blame on Turkey for obstructing a settlement. The Communists within the EP, who regularly vote against EU enlargement, abstained in the case of Cyprus due to their associations with AKEL. Aside from the EP, however, there is a “lack of enthusiasm in the European institutions and in most

³⁶⁴Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’,” p.137.

³⁶⁵Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” p.26.

³⁶⁶Stavrides, “The International Role of the Cypriot Parliament and Cyprus’ Accession to the EU,” p.192.

member states for getting involved in the Cyprus problem.”³⁶⁷ France, particularly, “feared integrating a deep-rooted security dispute within its borders.”³⁶⁸ Even though the French believed that “it was correct to start negotiations,” it also believed that “it would be a ‘mistake’ to grant EU membership to a divided country.”³⁶⁹ But if France wanted a Customs Union with Turkey and the accession of Eastern Europe, it would have to acquiesce on Cyprus. National governments around Europe shared the French view, but realized that as ‘Spain always wins on fish, Greece always wins on Cyprus’. Once Cyprus was accepted, the European Union collectively attempted to stimulate the settlement process by linking Turkish membership to a Cyprus deal.

The EU attempted to ensure that the *acquis communautaire* was carried out thoroughly in each acceding country by a system of checks and progress reports. In the case of Cyprus, despite the irregular status of northern Cyprus, the EU gave favourable reports on the Republic and supported its accession. Yet the very nature of the Cyprus problem should have blocked accession from the outset. The Republic of Cyprus’s mandate in the north was prevented by the illegal occupation of the area by another EU aspirant. Cyprus was also the only candidate of the 8+2 round to not hold a referendum on accession. The EU was assured by Greek officials that Turkish Cypriots favoured union and that no referendum was needed on accession. Since the House of Representatives still represented the whole of the Republic of Cyprus in theory, the empty seats assigned to Turkish Cypriots could not vote in the process. The real Turkish Cypriot check on the powers of the House of Representatives was the office of the Vice-President. Constitutionally, the Turkish Cypriot Vice

³⁶⁷Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” p.21.

³⁶⁸Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’,” p.134.

³⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p.134.

President had the power to veto any law passed in the House of Representatives. It was a power exercised before 1963, when the seat was vacated, and it was a main cause of the growing rift between Greek and Turkish Cypriots preceding the coup and invasion. But the division of the island meant that Turkish Cypriot political participation in the Republic's institutions did not exist. Yet The EU Enlargement Commissioner, Guenther Verheugen, remarked himself that "no objection was raised by its Turkish Vice president,"³⁷⁰ despite Turkish Cypriot protests that the sovereignty of Cyprus was contested. The European Union had clearly begun to take a stand on the Cyprus issue.

Nonetheless, Cyprus was the only candidate country faced with such internal turmoil – politically, geographically and militarily. Without the patronage of Greece, Cypriot accession would not have been possible. Cypriot membership also "infringes on article 185 of the Cyprus Constitution of 1960 which states that 'the integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State . . . is excluded.' The EU is a 'union' with its member states."³⁷¹ Turkey, however, had already violated the Treaty of Guarantee by establishing the TRNC and maintaining an enormous military presence in the north. The Republic of Cyprus maintained that these circumstances should not bind the Greek Cypriot side from conducting foreign policy when the status of the Cypriot Constitution of 1960 was clearly in question. The European Union considered the Cypriot application as representing "the whole island, (though)

³⁷⁰Christopher Brewin, "Reluctant Commitment: Past Aloofness and Present Problems in European Attitudes to Cyprus," In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.140.

³⁷¹Angelos M. Syrigos, "Cyprus and the EU: Sovereign State, Negotiations and Objections from an International Law Point of View," In *Cyprus and the European Union*, ed. Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis and Andreas Ioannou (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999), p.92.

in practice it is dealing only with the south.”³⁷² During the accession process President Clerides extended “an invitation to the Turkish-Cypriot community to nominate representatives to be included as full members of the Cypriot team negotiating accession.”³⁷³ This invitation was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots. The EU also tried to dismiss Turkish Cypriot protests by claiming that since the Turkish Cypriots only compromise a small portion of Cyprus their votes, in a referendum, would be negated by the overwhelming support of the Greek Cypriots. This explanation seemed an incredibly undemocratic approach to EU membership and revealed the shift in EU policy towards pressuring Turkey into concessions. But Greece had calculated correctly that no member state would sacrifice enlargement over Cyprus. This placed the EU in a position to justify their acceptance of the Republic however contrary to European policy that acceptance was.

Commission reports on Cypriot entry also attempted to clarify and support the European stance on Cyprus once membership was accepted. The Commission claimed that accession would encourage a “just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem.”³⁷⁴ In actuality, as illustrated by the Annan Plan, the EU was prepared to accept any solution that Turkey showed interest in. The Commission also attempted to ensure the Turkish Cypriots that membership for the whole island would provide “the guarantee of fundamental democratic and human rights including the respect of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity,” and it mentioned that there was “a

³⁷²Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’,” p.140.

³⁷³Syrgios, “Cyprus and the EU: Sovereign State, Negotiations and Objections from an International Law Point of View,” p.103.

³⁷⁴European Union Commission, *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus’ Progress towards Accession: November 2001*, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/cy_en.pdf], p.14.

window of opportunity for reaching a settlement.”³⁷⁵ While the EU attempted to convince the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to seek a settlement before the island’s accession, the Greek Cypriots watched the results of their membership bid with enthusiasm. When the EU declared that “Cyprus’ accession to our Union is already creating favourable conditions for the two communities to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem,”³⁷⁶ it was, in actuality, taking credit for Greek Cypriot policies aimed at the goals of *neo-enosis*.

Once it is secure within the European Union, the Republic of Cyprus’s greatest asset will be its hold on Turkish membership progression. Greece and Cyprus both “agreed that every possible effort should be made to link Turkey’s European path with the Cyprus problem.”³⁷⁷ Within EU institutions, Cyprus will be able to choose a Commissioner, to occupy six seats in the European Parliament (or .82% of the 732 total) and it will cast 4 of 321 votes, or 1.25%, in the Council of Ministers. Its real power, however, will be in its veto which, it is assumed, will only be used to accomplish the set goal of producing a ‘viable’ settlement. The Republic also “regularly aligned its positions with those of the Union and when invited to do so has associated itself with the Union’s joint actions and common positions”³⁷⁸ in order to facilitate the possible use of its contentious veto power. Participation in the CFSP and the EMU came quickly, with Cyprus attempting to join the Eurozone by 2006.³⁷⁹ Although the European Union took a decidedly pro-Greek stance once

³⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p.23.

³⁷⁶“Excerpt on Enlargement,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, June 27-July 3, 2003. p.31.

³⁷⁷“Entry should be linked to the Cyprus Problem,” *The Cyprus Mail*, December 14, 2004, p.5.

³⁷⁸European Union Commission, *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus’ Progress towards Accession: November 2001*, p.86.

³⁷⁹“Cyprus to Comply with Maastricht Economic Criteria,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 11-17, 2003, p.13.

Cyprus was accepted for membership, there were no guarantees of its continued support or whether it would sacrifice the Greek position for expediency in the production of an eventual settlement.

4.4 The Turkish Reaction to Cypriot Membership

The Republic of Cyprus's membership bid to the European Union and the subsequent accession process placed the TRNC on tenuous ground. The TRNC, which relied entirely on Turkey for its existence, realized that Turkey's EU membership bid was being connected to the Cyprus issue. It became clear that if the Turkey wanted into Europe, it would have to make concessions on Cyprus. If a settlement proposal was inevitable as a result of Cypriot EU membership, the Turkish Cypriots would need to appear intractable in order to secure the best possible alternative to unrecognized independence. Denktash's approach to negotiations over the island's future had always been obstructionist. The Turkish Cypriot leadership drew out negotiations endlessly and backed their positions with seemingly unreasonable demands. They concentrated on phased agreements and a step by step approach to reach a final settlement. The logical conclusion of this approach was that a final settlement would only arrive when Turkey secured EU membership, not when Cyprus acceded to the Union.

In March 1995, when Greece lifted its veto over the EU Customs Union with Turkey in exchange Cypriot accession, Turkey threatened to respond with a similar approach towards the TRNC. Turkey's foreign minister, Murak Karyalcin, claimed that "Greek Cypriot integration with the EU would be matched step by step by the

integration of northern Cyprus with Turkey.”³⁸⁰ While any move towards fully ‘integrating’ the TRNC by Turkey would have ended the Turkish EU membership bid, the threat was intended to produce the hard-line position that the UN and EU would have to work from in forming a settlement plan. In an open letter to President Clerides in March 1998, Denktash outlined the ‘basic parameters and principles of a final settlement’ which included the recognition of “two sovereign and equal states.”³⁸¹ The TRNC President also stated that “EU membership of Cyprus will be entertained after a settlement and simultaneously with Turkey.”³⁸² The recognition of ‘sovereign and equal states’ was not a part of the High Level Agreements of 1977 and was never recognized by the United Nations as a starting point for a Cyprus settlement. Connecting Cypriot to Turkish EU membership in this way was a curiosity, since the Republic had just opened negotiations on the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*. Denktash sought to counter the shifting balance of power that EU membership produced by increasing his demands for the parameters of a solution.

As the final date of EU accession approached, Turkey voiced a new concern regarding Cypriot membership. In November 2000 Bülent Ecevit,³⁸³ Turkey’s Prime Minister, “blamed the EU for the lack of a solution in Cyprus and added that the EU intended to break the ‘TRNC’ away from Turkey, admit it into the EU and mass

³⁸⁰Brewin, “The Cyprus Question in EU-Turkey Relations,” p.135.

³⁸¹*Documents given by Rauf Denktash to the UN Secretary General during their meeting in Geneva, March 28, 1998*, [<http://www.kibris.gen.tr/English/photos/documents/documents16.html>].

³⁸²*Ibid.*

³⁸³Bülent Ecevit, as mentioned in Chapter 1, was also Turkish Prime Minister in 1974 and ordered the invasion of Cyprus.

troops there.”³⁸⁴ These accusations, directed at the EU, were an attempt by Turkey to remove the perceived advantages that the Greek Cypriots had acquired as an acceding state. If Turkey could ‘frighten’ Europe by appearing victimized or unstable, then perhaps the EU would begin to distance itself from the Greek Cypriot position and formulate a deal that placated Turkish concerns. The general lack of interest in Europe for the Cyprus problem, as discussed earlier, strengthened the Turkish position.

On April 16th 2003, the ten acceding states signed their membership agreement for entry into the EU on May 1st of the next year. EU leaders maintained their support for the Greek Cypriot position and rejected the confidence-building measures proposed by Denktash “as a substitute for a comprehensive settlement.”³⁸⁵ The confidence-building measures, established by the UN in the early 1990s as a way of bringing the communities closer together, included opening the border between the north and south and jointly reducing the military presence along the ‘Green Line’. These measures, however, were used by Denktash as a staged approach towards beginning negotiations. They embodied his approach of calling for a prior recognition of ‘sovereign states’ before settlement, and then in linking Turkish and Cypriot EU membership.

In June 2003, Denktash informed the EU Enlargement Commissioner Guenther Verheugen that “he would not accept the blueprint presented last November by Kofi Annan as a framework for talks, saying this would ‘land the

³⁸⁴Heinz A. Richter, “The Policy of Ankara towards Cyprus and the EU,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakas and Heinz A. Richter (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 22), p.167.

³⁸⁵“Excerpt on Enlargement,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, June 27-July 3, 2003. p.31.

Turkish Cypriots in devastation.”³⁸⁶ Denktash instead repeated his call for the recognition of ‘sovereign states’. With Cypriot EU accession less than a year away, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had presented nothing new and had not even entertained the possibility of working within the Annan ‘framework’. Verheugen informed “Denktash and political leaders in the north that holding off on Cyprus until the December 2004 review on whether Turkey was ready to launch accession talks, would be very, very dangerous.”³⁸⁷ Verheugen’s comment reveals that the European Union had now taken up the Greek Cypriot position and linked the future of Turkey’s EU membership directly to a Cyprus settlement.

Denktash and Turkey knew that any potential Cyprus deal would be formulated in a similar manner to the original Cypriot state, giving Turkish Cypriots the Vice Presidency and, accordingly, veto power over Cypriot legislation. Conceivably, the power would allow the Turkish Cypriots to prevent a Greek Cypriot veto of Turkish EU membership in the future. But Denktash and Turkey stalled for time before finally negotiating a settlement. Their requirements for a deal also “hardened as the EU accession process proceeded.”³⁸⁸ If they appeared intractable, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan would have to offer additional incentives to sway the perceived opinion of the Turkish Cypriots. The Kofi Annan ‘blueprint’ did not change from November 2002 to January 2004. Yet what had not been acceptable to Turkey or the TRNC during the entire process of Cypriot accession suddenly became acceptable four months before official Cypriot membership.

³⁸⁶ Andreas Hadjipapas, “EU committed to Cyprus solution,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, June 20-26, 2003. p.40.

³⁸⁷ Bouli Hadjioannou, “Verheugen fails to bend Denktash,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, June 20-26, 2003. p.16.

³⁸⁸ Nugent, “EU Enlargement and the ‘Cyprus Problem’,” p.143.

4.5 The Annan Plan and the Greek Cypriot Oxi³⁸⁹

The 'Annan Plan' that the UN Secretary General introduced in November 2002 was accepted by Clerides and rejected in December by Denktash. During the December 2002 EU Summit in Copenhagen, the accession process was completed and the Republic of Cyprus was accepted as an EU member. Reacting to Denktash's rejection, the EU "issued an invitation to Cyprus to become a member, and asked the two sides to settle their conflict by the end of February 2003."³⁹⁰ In January 2003, Turkey signaled its 'determination' to end the stalemate on Cyprus and attacked Denktash for his refusal to negotiate. Turkey informed Kofi Annan that it was willing to let him 'fill in the blanks' on the outstanding issues and hold a referendum on the deal in northern Cyprus. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan proclaimed that he was "not in favour of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30-40 years."³⁹¹ The sudden shift from increasing the demands on Cyprus during the accession process to a complete willingness for full negotiations after thirty years of occupation was linked to the conclusion of Cyprus's membership status and the upcoming talks on potential Turkish membership. But it was also a policy designed to delay. Denktash and Turkey had never wavered from their joint positions on the Cyprus problem during the entire course of the occupation, and while Turkey was now portraying itself as receptive to a deal, the Turkish Cypriot leader still refused to support the 'Annan Plan.'

³⁸⁹The Greek Cypriot 'no' vote.

³⁹⁰Andreas Hadjipapas, "I have the only mandate, says Denktash," *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 18-24, 2003, p.40.

³⁹¹*Ibid.*, p.40.

By mid 2003 the 'Annan Plan' was pulled from the table based on Denktash's rejection. President Tassos Papadopoulos, who had succeeded Clerides in February 2003, shifted the Greek Cypriot position claiming:

that he would strive for a 'European' solution to the Cyprus problem and that the Annan plan cannot be accepted 'as it is' since it amounts to 'acceptance of the *faits accomplis* created by the Turkish invasion and occupation.³⁹²

A 'European' solution presumably meant utilizing the threat of a Cypriot veto to acquire a deal more acceptable for the Greek Cypriot side. While the statement caused an irregular stir among the Greek Cypriot political parties, the indications that Papadopoulos already preferred the option of negotiating from a position of strength was clear. The European Union attempted to apply further pressure on Turkey by claiming that "Turkey must meet the Copenhagen criteria and contribute to efforts for a Cyprus settlement in order to move on in its European path."³⁹³ Despite Denktash's rejection, the EU believed that Turkey could force the Turkish Cypriots into settlement talks.

Elections in northern Cyprus in December 2003 shifted the political balance in the TRNC. Mehmet Ali Talat, head of the pro-European Republic Turkish Party (RTP), became Prime Minister in an evenly split Parliament. Though Denktash remained President, the Turkish Cypriots, for the first time in decades, had indicated a willingness to end the Cyprus stalemate. The EU immediately stepped up pressure for the resumption of talks even though Cypriot accession was four months away. In February 2004 Papadopoulos began to speak of safeguarding Cypriot Hellenism. The Greek Cypriots were pressured to negotiate an end to the thirty-year division of

³⁹²*Ibid.*, p.40.

³⁹³"Turkey must make effort on Cyprus – Rapporteur," *The Cyprus Weekly*, July 4-10, 2003. p.17.

the island in less than two months. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus had engineered EU entrance under the premise that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were the obstacles to a peace settlement. If the Greek Cypriots had rejected talks after an entire accession process that aimed at producing a settlement, it could have produced a crisis in the Republic's EU membership. Accordingly, on February 18th 2004 the Greek and Turkish Cypriots locked themselves into a three-step process with a Referendum set for April 21st 2004. They were given a single month to reach a joint agreement, after which Greece and Turkey would step in before Kofi Annan was to be given the authority to decide what could not be decided jointly. When Cyprus was asked to become a member, the EU established a settlement deadline of February 2003. But the Turkish Cypriots waited a full year later, only several months before the May 1st entry date, to agree to negotiations. The Turks were aiming for a hasty completion of talks and a quick final negotiation stage to create an atmosphere of conciliation and crisis.

The 'United Republic of Cyprus' that was envisioned in 'The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem'³⁹⁴ consisted of a 'bi-zonal' federation of two constituent states. These two constituent states, a Greek Cypriot State (GCS) and a Turkish Cypriot State (TCS), would be "of equal status" and "exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government."³⁹⁵ Though a single citizenship would apply to all Cypriots, each citizen would also have "internal state

³⁹⁴*The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, or the 'Annan Plan', was the final draft presented by Kofi Annan to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus on March 31st 2004.

³⁹⁵*The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, Foundation Agreement: Article 2, Point 1, Paragraph C, p.7, [<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/annanplan/annanplan.pdf>], March 31st 2004.

citizenship status.”³⁹⁶ This provision was used to limit the number of residents who could reside in one constituent state, measured on a municipal level, while ‘hailing’ from the other constituent state. The Parliament of the proposed United Republic of Cyprus contained a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, each with 48 members, which would exercise legislative power. The Senate would be divided equally between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, while the Chamber of Deputies would be organized by proportional representation with a minimum guarantee of 25% representation.³⁹⁷ Decisions of the Parliament would require a simple majority in both Chambers, along with one quarter of voting Senators from each constituent state. The Presidential Council, operating as the Head of State, would consist of six voting members with at least one third from each constituent state. Presidential Council decisions would require a simple majority with at least one member from each constituent state voting with the majority.³⁹⁸ Additionally, the Heads of the Departments of External Relations and European Union Relations could not come from the same constituent state. In essence the Greek Cypriots, representing anywhere from 70% to 80% of the total population,³⁹⁹ would share nearly equal political power with the Turkish Cypriot minority under the provisions of the ‘Annan Plan’.

The ‘Comprehensive Settlement’ also addressed the issues associated with the thirty-year division of the island and the security features of the proposed United

³⁹⁶*Ibid.*, Article 3, Point 2, p.8.

³⁹⁷*Ibid.*, Article 5, Point 1, Paragraph A, p.9.

³⁹⁸*Ibid.*, Article 5, Point 2, Paragraphs A and B, p.10.

³⁹⁹No complete census has been carried out since the invasion and any estimation is complicated by the presence of an unknown number of Turkish ‘settlers’.

Cyprus Republic. The Treaty of Alliance⁴⁰⁰ and the Treaty of Guarantee,⁴⁰¹ both features of the 1959 Zurich Agreement, would remain in force. The ‘Annan Plan’ called for the eventual demilitarization of the island and the immediate dissolution of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot Defense Force.⁴⁰² Additionally, no “paramilitary or reserve forces or military or paramilitary training of civilians”⁴⁰³ would be allowed. However, Greek and Turkish military contingents would remain on the island until both sides agreed to a full withdrawal. Each contingent would consist of 6000 troops until 2011, phased down to 3000 in 2018 “or the European Union accession of Turkey.”⁴⁰⁴ The UN was entrusted with monitoring the situation and promoting compliance with the military withdrawal, but it had no authority to enforce the measures.⁴⁰⁵ The adjustment of territory between the constituent states was also directly connected to the Treaty of Alliance. The constituent state boundaries envisioned in Article 9 of the Foundation Agreement⁴⁰⁶ would transfer territory to the Greek Cypriot State (GCS) over a 42 month period in six phases. While the transfers would take place under UN supervision, as with the phased military withdrawal, there was no direct way of enforcing Turkish compliance in the settlement plan. In the areas transferred to the Greek Cypriot State, properties would be reinstated to the dispossessed owners. In areas outside of

⁴⁰⁰The Treaty of Alliance provided for contingents of Greek and Turkish troops on Cyprus.

⁴⁰¹The Treaty of Guarantee provided the guarantor powers (Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey) the right to a military intervention in order to maintain Cypriot Constitutional order.

⁴⁰²*The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, Foundation Agreement: Article 8, Point 1, p.12.

⁴⁰³*Ibid.*, Article 8, Point 2, p.12.

⁴⁰⁴*Ibid.*, Article 8, Point 1, Paragraph B.ii, p.12.

⁴⁰⁵*Ibid.*, Article 8, Point 1, Paragraph D, p.12.

⁴⁰⁶*The Foundation Agreement* was the first of six parts of *The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*.

the territorial adjustments, the 'Annan Plan' introduced a complicated procedure of compensation packages to be paid by the United Cyprus Republic.

Greek Cypriot dissatisfaction with the settlement was based on a wide range of issues. The events of 1974 had displaced one third of the population and the settlement envisioned very little in the way of compensation for lost property. Because of the economic disparities between the two communities, the Greek Cypriots within a United Cyprus Republic would end up paying the bulk of the compensation packages to themselves for the Turkish invasion. While the Republic of Cyprus had invested heavily to fulfill the accession process, the cost of the 'Annan Plan' was "conservatively estimated at between 20-40 billion Euros,"⁴⁰⁷ an enormous burden on the Cypriot economy. The division of Cyprus into constituent states, even if they were united in a federation, appeared as a kind of 'partition' of the island – exactly what both *enosis* and the concept of *neo-enosis* sought to prevent. The settlement also denied the Four Freedoms⁴⁰⁸ of EU membership to Greek Cypriots within their own country, with heavy restrictions on where they could reside in the Turkish Cypriot constituent State. The 'Annan Plan' also resembled the 1959 Zurich agreements in a number of ways. The strict division of political power, investing the Turkish Cypriot minority with equal status at all levels of government, was similar to the 1960 Constitution. Papadopoulos claimed that "the plan would have established a 'complicated and dysfunctional state' which could lead to deadlocks and

⁴⁰⁷Van Coufoudakis. "The Case Against the Annan Plan" In *The Case Against the Annan Plan*, ed. Van Coufoudakis and Klearchos Kyriakides (London: Lobby for Cyprus, 2004), p.10.

⁴⁰⁸The Four Freedoms of the EU include the free movement of goods, services and establishment, persons, and capital.

paralysis,”⁴⁰⁹ the same conditions that led to the disintegration of governance in the Republic throughout the 1960s. The manner in which the settlement was finalized, from an external authority, and the manner in which it was presented, as a *fait accompli*, also resembled the process that Archbishop Makarios was presented with in 1959.

The continued presence of Turkish troops on the island sanctified by the ‘Annan Plan’ was a crucial factor in the Greek Cypriot referendum. The phased withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island was directly connected to Turkey’s membership bid. The first staged withdrawal, scheduled to take place six months after the implementation of the deal—on May 1, 2005—coincided with a decision on Turkey’s EU applicant status in December 2004. Subsequent withdrawals, it was feared, could be held back in order to ensure the progression of Turkey’s EU bid.⁴¹⁰ In the ‘Comprehensive Settlement’, as mentioned above, the UN forces lacked any authority to enforce Turkish compliance. When the connection between the implementation of the settlement and Turkish EU membership was brought together, the Greek Cypriots would have been left hostage to Turkish accession. If the EU were to reject Turkish accession in December 2004 or December 2005, parts of the ‘Annan Plan’ could remain un-enforced. In the final week before the referendum, the UN Security Council attempted to pass a vote designed to enforce the Turkish withdrawal according to the time frame provided in the plan. Russia, at the request of the Greek Cypriot President, vetoed the SC Resolution.⁴¹¹ While the UN and the

⁴⁰⁹“Tassos criticized by Pendergast,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, April 30 - May 7, 2004, p1.

⁴¹⁰*Ibid.*, p.1

⁴¹¹Apostolis Zoupaniotis, “Russia Vetoes US-British backed resolution on Cyprus,” [<http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2004/04-04-22.cna.html>], April 22nd 2004.

EU roundly condemned the President's request and his rejection of the 'Annan Plan', the Greek Cypriots maintained that UNSC Resolutions on the Turkish occupation had been passed many times before without consequence. Additionally, the Treaty of Guarantee, preserved in the settlement, maintained Turkey's legal right to conduct a military intervention on the island to uphold the Cypriot Constitution.⁴¹² Since the 'Foundation Agreement' stated that the 'United Cyprus Republic' "shall support the accession of Turkey to the Union,"⁴¹³ any action by the Greek Cypriots to prevent potential Turkish EU membership as a reaction to Turkish non-compliance of the phased withdrawal would give Turkey the right to invoke the Treaty of Guarantee.

The 'Annan Plan', while a product of the accession process, did not meet Greek Cypriot requirements for a fair and comprehensive settlement. With the single exception of DISY, itself divided internally, all Greek Cypriot political parties sided against the settlement and the referendum result of April 2004 yielded a vote of 75% against. Neither the Republic's political leadership nor the Greek Cypriots generally could accept a plan that maintained a system reminiscent of the Zurich Agreement, allowing for a continued Turkish military presence and an effectively partitioned island. When examined within the context of the *neo-enosis* theory, these conditions negated the entire purpose of a Cyprus settlement. By acceding to the EU, the Republic had enhanced its relationship with Greece and its ability to negotiate from a position of strength. As a result, President Papadopoulos and the majority of Greek Cypriots placed their faith in the new-found power of EU membership: a veto over Turkish EU membership. Accepting the 'Annan Plan' would have negated the

⁴¹²Van Coufoudakis, "The Case Against the Annan Plan," p.11.

⁴¹³*The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, Foundation Agreement: Article 1, Point 5, p.7.

Republic's veto, created a pseudo-'partition' of the island, and distanced the Greek Cypriots from Greece. The policies associated with the concept of *neo-enosis* had proved to be as uncompromising as *enosis* in their set political objectives.

The European reaction to the Greek Cypriot vote was notably cold. At the first meeting of European foreign ministers in the 25 member European Union, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister endured a barrage of indictments. The Greek Cypriot rejection of the deal was an affront to the self-perception of EU enlargement "as an instrument of peace and reconciliation."⁴¹⁴ The divided 'micro-state' that no EU member had really wanted to accept, except Greece, had just faced down the United Nations, the European Union and Turkey by its refusal to accept what the Republic considered was an unfair settlement. EU policy makers had assumed that by the simple virtue of the Union's presence it could undo centuries of mistrust, and decades of actual hostility, between Greeks and Turks. This false belief was reinforced by the assumption that the Greek Cypriot government, in recognition of its privileged status to be admitted to the EU, should pay tribute to the major European powers by acquiescing to 'their' deal. While the Cypriot rejection challenged these European self-perceptions, the European reaction itself relayed the true nature of its members. They roundly condemned the democratic results of a referendum that no EU member would have accepted if the same conditions had applied to their own state. Greece alone remarked that it was a decision of the Greek Cypriots and not of the other member states to make. As a result, the general European condemnation of Cyprus put the Greek Cypriots into an even closer relationship with Greece.

⁴¹⁴Mather, "The Citizenry: Legitimacy and Democracy," p.114.

The result of the positive Turkish vote, 65% in favour, encouraged the EU “to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community.”⁴¹⁵ The Greek Cypriots accepted the decision, in large part to placate their European partners, but also to build trust between the two communities in the wake of the settlement rejection. But the collapse of the ‘Annan Plan’ did not end the Cypriot attempt to reach a ‘viable’ solution to the Cyprus problem. Papadopoulos stated that:

it would be for the benefit of Cyprus for Turkey to become a European state, with the precondition that it will behave as a European state and comply with all the principles on which the EU was founded, and with the EU *acquis*.⁴¹⁶

EU membership allowed Greece and Cyprus to take a harder stand on the Cyprus dispute. Confident in the Republic’s position as an EU member, Papadopoulos called for the quick resumption of talks with the north since Turkish EU membership and a Cyprus settlement were now inevitably linked. Even without utilizing veto power over the Turkish application the Greek Cypriots had strengthened their position. Turkey was now maintaining an illegal military occupation on European Union territory.

Failure to understand the Greek-Cypriot rejection was a failure to understand the policies associated with the concept of *neo-enosis*. The accession of Greece to the European Community in 1981 shifted the balance of power in Greco-Turkish relations. Increased influence in Europe and deeper integration of the EU

⁴¹⁵Bouli Hadjioannou, “EU ruling opens Green Line to Trade,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, April 30 - May 7, 2004, p.40.

⁴¹⁶Alex Efthymou, “Joint Cyprus-Greece Strategy adopted,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, April 30 - May 7, 2004, p.1.

strengthened the Greek position. The Turkish application to the EU in 1987 was countered by the Republic of Cyprus's application in 1990. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe that followed gave Greece the opportunity to push the Greek Cypriot application through. While the EU was not anxious to entertain the membership of a divided state with real security concerns, the Greek threat to veto EU enlargement ensured the acceptance of the Cypriot application. The resulting policies associated with this common goal brought Greece and the Republic even closer together. The strength of the Turkish position on Cyprus could only be broken by achieving leverage over a focal point of Turkish national policy. When Greece allowed the Turkish-EU customs union to proceed in 1995 for a guarantee of Cypriot membership, the trap had been set. The Turkish application to the EU rested on negotiations over the Cyprus problem. While Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots stalled as long as possible to strengthen their negotiating position, as they had since 1974, the resulting 'Annan Plan' was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The initiative had shifted. Risking isolation within Europe, the Republic of Cyprus was determined to follow its own path towards a settlement while maintaining the constant and continued support of Greece.

CONCLUSION:

The resurgence of Greek nationalism on Cyprus after 1974 can be attributed, in part, to the intractable nature of the Turkish position. If an early settlement had been produced while 'Cypriotism' was gaining ground a resurgence of nationalist sentiment, as presented in this thesis, would have struggled to define itself. The Greek Cypriots have genuine cultural, linguistic and religious bonds with Greece. These had been maintained by the Orthodox Church during foreign rule and were actively fostered by the Pan-Hellenic movement until the mid-twentieth century. Greek nationalism, however, resurfaced with the continued Turkish occupation. The destruction of Hellenic culture in the north, the forced division of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations, and the introduction of a significant number of 'foreign' Turkish settlers pressed the Greek Cypriot Republic to preserve the island's cultural identity. The relative international isolation of the country, where UN resolutions were passed but not enforced, placed the Greek Cypriots in a nearly impossible position. With the perception that *enosis* had always been the 'sacred' rite and will of the people, and that whatever the crimes of the coup were, the actions of Turkey had far outweighed them, the Republic pursued a policy of action. The policies associated with the theory of *neo-enosis* produced a partial political and military union with Greece while achieving a political aim that Turkey itself sought. If the Republic could gain control over Turkey's EU membership, then the Republic could challenge the Turkish occupation of the north.

Potential Turkish EU membership is vital to the Greek Cypriots. The power of a Cypriot veto over Turkish membership aspirations is only possible so long as

Turkey is committed to achieving accession itself. The intractable position of the Turkish Cypriots in the north, however, convinced the Greek Cypriot Republic that waiting for a solution would result in permanent partition. While the theoretical pursuit of *neo-enosis* constituted an enormous risk, as with *enosis*, it was the only observable method for fulfilling a long-held aspiration while providing the formula for a victory over the enormous power wielded by the Turkish military. The Republic of Cyprus, devoid of alternative actions, was ushered into the European Union by the patronage of Greece and subsequently rejected the first settlement offer after thirty years of partition – fully confident in its capability to produce a ‘viable settlement’. The road from Ankara to Brussels now runs through Nicosia.

Participation in the European Union, however, requires a great deal of compromise. While the purpose of Cypriot accession has been presented, like many of the policies brought forward within the EU “the outcome may be different from that initially formulated nationally.”⁴¹⁷ A growing dependence on the Union for relations with Turkey could place the Greek Cypriots on a track towards a solution that they could not afford to reject a second time. While the former President of the Republic, Glafcos Clerides, supported the ‘Annan Plan’ practically alone, his support was born out of a realization that a second chance may never arrive. The Turkish application to the European Union is also dependent on the support of all other European states. And the growing xenophobia in legitimized political parties across the continent could spell the end of the Turkish bid before Cyprus would even be given a chance to utilize its veto power.

⁴¹⁷Rodrick Pace, “Enlargement and the Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union: The Role of Cyprus,” In *Cyprus and Europe: The Long Way Back*, ed. Vassilis K. Fousakas and Heinz A. Richter (Bibliopolis, 2003, Peleus; BD. 22), p.26.

Overlooking the importance of Cyprus to Greco-Turkish relations and the importance of Greco-Turkish relations to Europe as a whole, however, benefits no one. The model of Cyprus itself, torn between Christian and Muslim, is perhaps representative of a larger ongoing conflict. But the island is also divided by a choice between mutual acceptance or continued division. Mutual acceptance involves a compromise that both sides can implement, and not one that is forced into place. The continued division of the island is an option that may initially bring security, but at the same time creates an ongoing distrust that strengthens over time. The conflict in Cyprus could be seen as an extension of that ancient conflict between Byzantine and Ottoman, with the island as its last field of battle. Or the Cyprus issue can be seen as an opportunity, for both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to accept the shared space afforded them and set a precedent for cooperation in a region vital to world security. While the theory of *neo-enosis* represents the fruition of a concerted political effort to achieve a historical goal, its eventual results could produce the foundation of a new historical narrative.

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