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Canada

THE NATURE OF THE CONTROL ROLE IN COMBATING  
TERRORISM:

SHOULD THE USE OF FORCE BE ASSIGNED TO LAW  
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OR SPECIAL UNITS OF THE  
ARMED FORCES?

Submitted to Ronald Crelinsten  
Professor of Criminology  
University of Ottawa

Submitted by Gilles Larochele  
270000

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Masters of Criminology  
Degree Program



UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA  
UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

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Gilles Larochelle.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to Terrorism

## Prologue

Terrorism is the weapon of the weak. However, like war, terrorism disturbs the peace and tranquility of any country. Its purpose is to create a certain impression on the government and others and to reflect a deeper cause. It constitutes a menace to the security of the host country and involves the high cost of maintaining that security. Terrorism is expensive in terms of lives lost and pain suffered and is a serious economic, social and moral problem. (Ciale, 1965).

Terrorists try constantly to undermine the government. If the government retaliates too strongly, its citizens protest. If it does nothing, it shows weakness.

If the government does not provide protection for the public, the members of the public might turn to vigilantism as a means of protection, self defence. This has happened in Ireland and, more recently, in the Philippines where many vigilante groups under different names - Nation Watchers, People's Movement Against Communism - have been organized to protect themselves against rebel communists since President Aquino appears powerless to do so. (Time, May 11, 1987: 39). The government wants to avoid this state of confusion and helplessness.

Terrorism remains in the minds of too many as a remote threat, something that happens to other people in

other places, something one sees on the evening news.

Terrorism is not merely a problem for the police, the army, or other intelligence agencies, but for society as a whole. However, the brunt of a counter-terrorist assault will be the responsibility of the police or the army. Once political violence has escalated, this may show how weak the government is, which is one of the terrorist's goals. When the state is seen to have lost its monopoly on force, it will prove increasingly difficult to prevent further terrorist acts. In order to restore confidence in the public, the government challenged by terrorism must be seen to be in control and able to respond head-on to violence.

The Canadian government has the responsibility of protecting its land, its people, its resident diplomats and other dignatories and all of the representatives of other countries. In considering the problem posed by this thesis Should Counter-Terrorist Measures be Assigned to Law Enforcement Agencies or Special Units of the Armed Services?, it is necessary to give the reader as much information on the subject of terrorism as is required to develop an understanding and to form an educated opinion. It is the aim of the writer to provide the reader with a background of information to bring about a comprehensive awareness of what terrorism involves and, as a result, an understanding of the obligations of counter-terrorism.

### Developing a Definition

Before one can consider the problem posed by this thesis, it is important to gain a clear understanding of what terrorism is. Chapter 1 offers many definitions of terrorism, as it deals with concepts like: terrorist or freedom fighter; goals of terrorism; the types of terrorism and the forms they take. Emphasis is placed on agitational and international terrorism, as these are the forms most likely to affect Canada. From the various definitions, a working definition is developed for use in this paper.

To understand the magnitude of the terrorist threat, Chapter 2 provides statistics on terrorism. Furthermore, it discusses terrorism in Canada. This information allows the reader to put the threat of terrorism into perspective.

To aid the reader in understanding the dynamics of a terrorist incident, Chapter 3 identifies the victims of terrorism, the tactics used by terrorists and helps to explain why terrorists are successful. The thesis examines proactive and reactive responses of governments which incorporate intelligence, negotiation and the use of force. Closer to home, Canada has reacted to the threat of terrorism in

a similar fashion. The establishment of the Special Emergency Response Team (hereafter referred to as SERT) provided Canadians with a defence against real and potential problems caused by terrorism. Chapter 3 provides background information on SERT.

Chapter Four, a literature review, outlines the control measures and specifically identifies the problems concerned with the use of force, the way it should be used and by whom - military or police. The practicality of deployment abroad is also examined.

Chapter Five discusses the methodologies used in this thesis. The comparative survey model was used to establish a foundation of relevant information from which the reader can develop an understanding of how other nations have responded to the threats of terrorism. The survey questionnaire specifically focused on the Canadian situation. Canadian experts were utilized to determine which foundation, Military or Police, is best suited to handle Canada's response to terrorism. The results of the two methods used will be examined in the conclusion.

By utilizing the comparative survey method, Chapter Six illustrates what a counter-terrorist team is, as it provides a comparison of the elite teams of nine nations. These nine nations have established a variety of counter-terrorist teams in their reaction to terrorist threats. The (similarity) and differences of these teams

will be outlined. An overview of these teams is provided in Table 1.

In Chapter Seven the results are analyzed and conclusions drawn from the literature review of Chapter 6 and the questionnaire.

### History of Terrorism

Terrorism has existed throughout history. In the Arab world of medieval Islam, a terrorist group called the Assassins killed their political opponents and remained a powerful force in the 12th and 13th centuries, in countries now called Iran and Syria. (Laqueur, 1979: 8). Jewish Zealots used terror tactics in revolt against the Romans and Russian revolutionaries used it against the Czar. (Wilkinson, 1986: 26).

The French Revolution of 1793-1794, came to be known as the Reign of Terror, under Robespierre. (Rapoport, 1977: 442).

World War I was triggered by a terrorist act.

"The Black Hand was a secret Serbian revolutionary organization whose primary aim was to bring about the union of Serbia. The

assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28th, 1914, by Gavrilo Princip, a 19 year old terrorist trained by the Black Hand, was literally a shot heard around the world." (Friedlander, 1977: 35).

In 1921, the British bowed to the terrorist campaign in Ireland and granted independence to the southern part of that country. Irish Protestants in Northern Ireland use terrorism to neutralize the Catholics and the IRA, while the IRA seeks to destroy British rule.

"Following World War II, terrorism re-emerged on the international scene. It became one of the many tools used within the larger arena of nationalist movement for independence."

(Singh, 1977: 7).

"Israelis sought independence from Great Britain; Cubans sought freedom from Dictator Batista and then from Dictator Castro; Algerians sought independence from France." (Mallin, 1977: 92).

Terrorism continues today, with the various Palestinian Arab organizations committing such acts against the State of Israel, and in Northern Ireland where the Catholic-based IRA and the Protestant Defence League are in conflict. Terrorist acts in Ulster and the Middle East are the best known to the general population,

but terrorism has spread worldwide.

"In the 19th century, terrorism was mainly concentrated in despotic regimes; today, terrorism occurs mainly in democratic societies." (Laqueur, 1979: 102).

In a totalitarian society, terrorism is not tolerated. In our democratic society, the Canadian government is cautioned against taking harsh countermeasures, as it may be criticized.

However, Laqueur states that:

"Society can exist without freedom, but it cannot live without some order. One can well imagine that, facing such a challenge, the outcry for the harshest measures and the utmost restriction of personal liberties, would become very strong and this is probably the main threat of terrorism." (1979: 14):

Out of the "Olympic Massacre" were born the many counter-terrorist assault teams, worldwide.

The 1972 Twentieth Olympic Games incident in Munich publicized the Palestinian cause. The Black September Palestinian terrorist group had seized nine Israeli hostages at the Olympic Village. Their demands were the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners in Israel and safe transportation to Egypt. At Furstenfeldbruck airport, German snipers tried to eliminate the terrorists

which resulted in the death of all of the hostages, the terrorists, a police officer and a helicopter pilot. The Olympic attack demonstrated that whenever Israeli citizens travelled out of their country, and no matter what social status they represented, they were targets of terrorism. It also elevated Palestinian morale and encouraged further terrorist attacks, before an audience which was willing to hear and view on television the Palestinian cause. (Mallin, 1977: 94, 95).

#### Terrorist or Freedom Fighter?

The United Nations has been prevented from taking decisive action to reduce terrorism. The difficulty of determining the justness of terrorism involves a political question. Is it terrorism only when used against an unjust regime? There is never likely to be consensus on that issue. (Waugh, 1982: 2). What is called terrorism seems to depend on one's point of view. Governments label as terrorism all violent acts committed by extremists, while extremists suggest they are victims of government terror (Vestermark, 1974: 1)

"Use of the term implies a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label "terrorist" to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys do."  
(Jenkins, 1980: 1).

The cliché "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" implies that there can be no objective definition of terrorism. Afghan mujahadeen, Nicaraguan Contras and Palestinian guerrillas are described in both terms, depending on which government is offering the description.

It is ironic that Israel considers itself a country destined to fight terrorism. Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was once a "terrorist", labelled as such by the British. Begin was one of the leaders involved in the Jewish struggle to end the British reign in Palestine. Begin and Jabotinski founded the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), a secret terrorist group roughly a thousand strong. (Wilkinson, 1974: 89).

The IRA in Northern Ireland is the classic example of a group whose members are viewed as terrorists by some and patriots by others.

President Reagan views Sandinista guerrillas as freedom fighters, while the government of Nicaragua views them as terrorists.

"The most carefully targetted IRA ambushes of British soldiers on country lanes in Northern Ireland are denounced as acts of terrorism, but the indiscriminate planting of land mines on country roads in Nicaragua by the Contras is

rewarded with renewed American financing."

(Pyle, 1986: 67).

U.S. President Reagan approved \$27 million in "humanitarian" assistance for the Contras in 1985; \$100 million in 1986 of which \$70 million would be for military purposes.

(Solarz, 1986: 20).

One defines terrorism to suit one's own purpose! Emotions affect the responses to terrorism, which leaves interpretation to sympathetic or unsympathetic journalists and historians. History also confuses the issues of terrorism. The success of terrorist actions has overshadowed their violence.

"The once-feared revolutionary terrorists have become, in some cases, respectable and, in some instances, national heroes and international cult figures. Menachem Begin of Israel, Che Gueverra of Cuba and Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam are cases in point." (Waugh, 1982: 22).

Jenkins' view is that "One man's terrorist is everyone's terrorist." (1980: 2).

Terrorists recognize no innocent bystanders as everyone is the enemy.

"In some recent Provisional IRA bombing campaigns in London, the bombs contained ball-bearings and coach-bolts to cause maximum death and injuries

to bystanders." (Wilkinson, 1986: 55).

One need only look at the events of World War II, when the countries who, today, vehemently struggle against terrorism were themselves involved in such matters. Both the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) and American OSS (Office of Strategic Operations) against the Japanese and Germans. (Thompson, 1986: 5). Even today, the US Army Special Forces has the primary mission of training nationals to commit guerrilla warfare (terrorism by definition of the target governments) against the occupying invaders.

The French Resistance, seen as heroes in World War II, were the forerunners of today's guerrillas.

#### Goals of Terrorism

By undermining the political will, confidence and morale of the government and its citizens, they are made more vulnerable to political collapse. Bombings and assassinations will create a climate of fear and panic - weapons of psychological warfare. This may cause the state to over-react, creating counter-productive measures.

Terrorists wish to push the state into authoritarianism or into becoming a police state, a mirror image of the terrorism it is supposed to be defeating. This will alienate the public, driving them to sympathize with the terrorist cause. (Wilkinson, 1986:

81). If terrorism persists in a country, a climate of fear hangs over its citizens. Community-police relations become seriously affected. Suspicion, mistrust and even violence may occur. The police find themselves unable to get public co-operation. Their work of gathering intelligence for security purposes, mostly on suspected terrorists, is rendered more difficult. Even if terrorists are caught, if their campaign of terrorism is effective enough, witnesses, juries and even judges may become intimidated, where the Courts are unable to secure the conviction of terrorists.

A repressive response from the government is often what the terrorists seek. An "over-reaction" by the government is dangerously self-destructive and may bring about a state of terrorism in the country, referred to as "state terrorism". This term will be explained later. A military take-over of a civilian government, inept in combatting terrorism, may result - as it did in Turkey in September of 1980.

Terrorists seek to communicate their cause, not only internally but externally to international audiences. They seek popular sympathy and support, while intimidating intended targets. Terrorism, therefore, has two primary aims - to intimidate and to seek support.

Any terrorism of an international nature will seek to publicize the terrorist cause, before the largest

possible audience. This is why most often the victims are highly visible, such as diplomats. "The massacre of the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich attracted an audience estimated to be around 500 million." (Waugh, 1982: 83; Dobson and Payne, 1979: 14). That violent attack was meant to publicize the Palestinian cause.

Second to the media coverage is the objective of disruption. This varies from a minor disruption such as the closing of government offices due to bombings, to more major disruptive events. All have the underlying aim of government change, either on one issue or, at more extreme levels, the complete collapse of the government. These acts of terrorism which cause disruption in varying degrees attempt to demonstrate the inability of the government to maintain civic order and public safety. The disruption of the public's day to day life may alienate a significant portion of the population and, in turn, bring about support for the terrorists' cause. Pressure from the public might bring changes - the changes the terrorist group wants.

Disruption will cause disorientation within a society. Some members of that society will support the government in its actions against the terrorists, while others will align themselves with the terrorist movement. The disruption will damage the morale, not only of

government officials but of the public. However, if terrorist violence becomes reckless, it may lose the support it seeks to gain, or lose the respect of the group it seeks to represent. Terrorist organizations must choose "respectable violence, that is calculated, disciplined and permeated with politics." (Waugh, 1982: 102).

The disruptive impact may extend beyond the boundaries of the country in question. Terrorist acts may affect relations with foreign governments, which in turn may affect diplomatic or economic relations. Terrorism's impact on a country's tourist industry may affect its economy and, in turn, affect its politics and government. For example, many Americans have recently refused to travel to Europe, due to the many skyjackings that have occurred.

People everywhere are disturbed by the dramatic criminal acts committed by various terrorist organizations. Many of the victims are selected randomly for the sole purpose of creating the maximum shock, calculated to attract media coverage. By these actions, the terrorists seek to heighten their "fearsome" reputation. Through their violent behaviour, they try to influence policy change or bring about the fulfillment of certain demands made of the target government. Terrorism is a means of gaining international recognition for its

cause. "Terrorism, by most definitions, is after all violence for effect." (Waugh, 1982: 3). The mass media have responded to terrorist violence, "the spectacle is impossible to ignore". (Waugh, 1982: 2). This violence costs the political group little in terms of personnel and equipment, compared to the cost to governments who are vulnerable in spite of all their security measures. Governments are forced to respond to terrorist violence to keep public order and protect the population. Terrorism will elicit government response.

Terrorist groups have strong ideological orientations which are usually based on ethnicity, religion or race. The masses which the group states it represents are usually, in fact, a minority. If that minority feels that it is maltreated or ignored by the state, there is potential for trouble. "Violent action can bring together such a community." (Waugh, 1982: 80). For example, when three men of Armenian descent were convicted of first-degree murder in November 1986, for the killing of a security guard during an attack on the Turkish embassy in Ottawa, approximately 80 members of the Montreal Armenian community packed the courtroom throughout the three-week trial. Some sobbed, others vowed their cause would never die. The Armenian "cause" has large-scale, ethnic support.

"In analyzing political terrorism, the key factor

becomes the relationship between initiators, victims, targets, objectives and goals."

(Waugh, 1982: 50).

Regarding the Turkish embassy siege, for instance, the initiators were Armenians claiming to belong to the Armenian Revolutionary Army; the victims were the embassy staff and their families, as well as the family of the Turkish ambassador; the target was the victim country, Turkey; the objective was the takeover of the embassy, as well as the failed attempt to capture, and possibly even to kill, the Ambassador; the goal was the recognition of one million Armenians "massacred" by the Turkish government in 1919.

Many researchers use different typologies, based on the goals sought by the terrorists. Some will label them as "communists, revisionists or puppets of a foreign government" while others classify them into different categories: "revolutionaries, global anarchists, psychotics ..." (Waugh, 1982: 79). There is a seemingly infinite number of categories in which to place terrorist organizations.

#### Two Types of Terrorism

This thesis will outline the basic typologies that will divide those acting for the state and those acting against the state.

There are basically two types of political,

terrorism: "State terrorism" where terrorism is used by the state itself as an instrument of repression to control the masses, and "Terrorism against the state" or agitational terrorism as it will be referred to here. A brief explanation of the former will be given; however, the focus of this thesis is on the latter.

Figure I: Two Types of Political Terrorism

(1) - State Terrorism

(2) - Agitational Terrorism:

Domestic

Two

Control

Models:

Two forms:

CJS and

War Model

International

The definition of the term "state" is based on Wilkinson's: "A given territory and its inhabitants; a system of government and laws; the general condition and outlook of values, institutions and citizens."

(1986: 2).

### State Terrorism

State terrorism is the violent repression by the national government of individuals or groups perceived as threats to the state. (Kelly, 1987: 3).

Crelinsten states that the controller (state) turns the country into a state of terrorism where the controller has the personnel, resources and power to accomplish what it has to do. The term terrorism may then be applied to the state. (1987: 9). "The word, terrorism, derives from the era of the French Revolution and the Jacobin dictatorship which used terror as an instrument of political repression and social control." (Friedlander, 1977: 31).

Terrorism was therefore conducted by the state against the populace. "Robespierre and his followers sent many thousands either to jail or to their deaths; one scholar's estimate is 40,000 deaths and 3,000,000 arrests. Yet when retribution came and Robespierre and his group of supporters were executed, it turned out that in all there were only 22 of them. Robespierre was finally overthrown by Joseph Fouché who later became Napoleon's Minister of Police." (Singh, 1977: 7).

The government must be careful to avoid resorting to "sledge hammer methods", such as the implementation of emergency powers, when it has been the victim of low intensity terrorism, e.g., bombings. These powers may be

criticized as unjustified, therefore totally counter-productive. Democracy could be damaged in the name of security. The government could effectively be doing the terrorists' work. As mentioned before, one of the terrorists' major goals is to provoke the government into a repressive over-reaction which will alienate its people and drive them into the arms of the terrorist movement.

Terrorists want to gain popular support and seek to discredit the government by provoking it to adopt severe, perhaps repressive, anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist measures.

"Fidel Castro successfully forced Batista to take desperate repressive actions. Batista's response probably contributed more towards his loss of support in Cuba than the actual battlefield victories of Castro's group."

(Singh, 1977: 12).

At this point, it is important to acknowledge the difference in anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist measures. Anti-terrorism specifically refers to intelligence gathering and the prevention of terrorism. Counter-terrorism is the defence of a nation when confronted with a terrorist act. As Sloan states, the term counter-terrorism refers to "offensive measures taken in response to terrorist acts". (1986: 47). It

is a term that promotes a doctrine of offensive reaction. Although some use these terms interchangeably, the difference between the two is significant and for the most part, the writer will concern himself with counter-terrorism.

---

The response to civil unrest, protest, strikes and even violence by terrorist groups, has brought about the severe violation of citizens' civil rights in an attempt to control the disorder. Such measures have often transformed a democratic government into a repressive dictatorship. It does not help anyone when society's institutions are protected - at all costs - from threats and are then subverted by tough government measures. This has happened in Latin America where the response of such military regimes as that in Uruguay is not appropriate to the challenge facing it.

There is often a fine line between the legitimate and illegitimate use of force. When it is illegitimate, it is viewed by those affected as terrorism; when it is legitimate, it is defined as the proper use of force by authorized agents of the state. Nevertheless, governments have used force illegitimately. When force is used arbitrarily and brutally by government agents, this form of violence is also known as terrorism - state terrorism.

The government rules its people through terror and fear. It now imposes the threat of violence on those

very people it sought to protect. "The state will normally defend itself, whatever its degree of legitimacy, or of public acceptance." (Waugh, 1982: 111) A government must respond to any terrorist threat when challenged; however, it must strive to maintain order in a proper manner. ~~Terrorism must be subdued, but not at the people's cost.~~

The state, therefore, can terrorize its people. History has shown us that this leads to a form of dictatorship, whether it is in the name of the Left, led by Stalin, or the Right, led by Napoleon. (Clutterbuck, 1979: 61).

"State-sponsored terrorism" may also be included in the definition of "State terrorism".

State-sponsored terrorism is defined as occurring when a state provides financial backing, training, intelligence or other support, directly or indirectly, to terrorist groups in order to subvert other state governments.

(Kelly, 1987: 3).

Ideology usually determines the terrorist organization's support. A convicted Palestinian terrorist, Mahmoud Muhammad Issa Mohammad, now living in Canada, stated he received training and financial support in Syria and the Soviet Union. (Bryden, The Ottawa Citizen, 1988: A1).

Agitational Terrorism

The second type of political terrorism is agitational terrorism and involves domestic terrorism and international terrorism. Canada will be involved mainly with international terrorism, or imported terrorism, and this is where the emphasis will be placed. Since terrorist groups are unable to achieve their goals successfully in their own country, Canada may be selected as the battleground for their causes.

The Kelly Report adopted its definition of agitational terrorism from Dr. D. Charters. Briefly, it is defined as the threat or use of violent criminal techniques, in concert with political and psychological actions, by a clandestine or semi-clandestine armed political faction, with the aim of creating a climate of fear, where the ultimate target, usually a government, will be coerced into conceding to their specific demands. (Kelly, 1987: 5). To add to this broad definition, terrorism may be motivated by either past events, such as some form of state repression, present events such as a desire for a native homeland or future events such as the struggle for civil rights.

The Kelly Report identified two forms of agitational terrorism: domestic and international.

"Domestic terrorism includes violent acts or threats of violence by terrorist groups in Canada

against Canadian targets, in order to focus on domestic issues that can be resolved by the Canadian government." (1987: 6).

The more renowned terrorist group operating against the Canadian government was the FLQ in Quebec in the 1960's and early 1970s.

"International terrorism includes violent acts or threats of violence by terrorist groups in Canada, using targets in Canada or using Canada as a base to mount terrorist actions in another country ... the ultimate focus is that other country's people and government."

(Kelly, 1987: 6).

The Sikhs and Armenians - where only a minority have any terrorist involvement - are viewed as two of the main terrorist groups operating in this country. A definition of international terrorism, by L.C. Green (cited in Déchant, 1976: 3), is one where the reader can replace the capital letters and fill in the countries of his choice:

" ... an act of violence by a person who is a national of Country A, who plans his act in Country B, that such act is directed against Country C and committed in Country D, while he himself takes refuge in Country E, or returns to Country A, the state of his nationality."

"International terrorism refers to terrorist acts in this country with foreign funding or direction or which extend beyond our border."

(Webster, 1986: 168).

---

The term international terrorism applies to

"groups or individuals controlled by a sovereign state" and transnational terrorism refers to "the activities of basically autonomous non-state actors such as the Japanese Red Army." (Kellett, 1981: 2).

In this thesis, the term international terrorism will be used because of its familiarity, but, equally, it will incorporate transnational terrorism and "spill-over terrorism" where terrorist battles are fought in another country, such as in the streets of France where Palestinians fight the Israelis. International terrorism will also include the definition of imported terrorism.

Imported terrorism involves international terrorist events. The host government is not the target of the violence; however, it is forced to respond to the violent acts. The responding government is usually unrelated to the whole issue. The victim government has no jurisdiction over the terrorist incident, which leaves the host government in charge of the terrorists and of the response, choosing either police or military mobilization of its commando teams. Nevertheless, communication is essential between the countries involved

and the situation presents different problems for each of the affected governments.

International terrorism then takes the form of imported terrorism for the host government. That government is forced to respond to acts of international terrorism, as an innocent victim of circumstances rather than as the target of the violence. (Waugh, 1982: 4). The host government is faced with acts of violence committed by terrorists from another country on victims who are usually directly related to the target government. However, victims may also be foreigners from a country unrelated to the terrorists' homeland, or innocent citizens of this country.

Figure 2 below illustrates the complexity of international terrorism, (Waugh, 1982: 53):

<u>Location</u>	<u>Terrorist</u> <u>Nationality</u>	<u>Victim</u> <u>Nationality</u>
INTERNAL	Foreign	Foreign
	Foreign	National
	National	Foreign
EXTERNAL	Foreign	National
	National	Foreign

26

Two Models of Control

"On the one hand, he (the terrorist) claims political ends for his criminalized actions, thus breaking down the distinction between crime and politics. On the other hand, he targets civilians and non-military institutions, claiming that there are no innocents and thereby breaks down the distinction between crime and war."

(Crelinsten, 1987: 13).

There are basically two control models used to deal with terrorism and hostage-taking: the criminal justice model and the war model. The CJM treats individual acts of terrorism as crime and uses the criminal justice system to deal with those who commit these acts. This process involves the use of the Criminal Code, the police, the criminal Courts and the penal system. (Crelinsten, 1986: 12). The rule of law predominates.

Terrorism may not be politically motivated. Criminals have used it, for instance, to obtain ransoms in kidnappings and psychopaths have terrorized for unknown reasons. A statement by Taillhade: "Qu'importe les victimes, si le geste est beau!" (Wilkinson, 1986: 51). However, it is politically-motivated terrorism with which the present work is primarily concerned, since the Canadian federal government has stated that it is only to

incidents of this nature that SERT, this country's counter-terrorist assault team, is to respond. The terrorist "views himself as the antithesis of a criminal; he is a patriot, a freedom fighter." (Hassel, 1975: 55).

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~~He views the state as evil and believes that its power~~  
must be taken away by violence and demands sought by the use of terror. His cause must be publicized to an uncaring world. His motives are believed by his followers to be pure. Violence and extortion are the only means of accomplishing his cause. Such rationalizations are necessary for the terrorist to continue his acts (Hassel, 1975: 55).

The "political" terrorist's values are therefore quite different from those of the criminal terrorist. The latter only uses acts of terrorism, such as hostage-taking, to satisfy an immediate goal such as escape from arrest. The political terrorist poses the greater threat because he is often fanatical. Murder and suicide are considered as merely the means of achieving a goal. "The true terrorist is often willing to die, or even resigned to death." (Cooper, 1977: 21).

The "criminal" terrorist usually involves a nervous gunman who, for example, seizes a hostage to aid his escape. He is considered a relatively rational thinker who, after assessing the situation and weighing the odds, in most cases comes to terms with the police

and refrains from unnecessary violence or useless killing. His actions are defined as terror, but his nature is that of a criminal.

Most political terrorists plan the taking of hostages. It is part of a greater goal, to terrorize the government into making specific changes. However, the criminal terrorist's act of hostage-taking happens only by chance. He finds himself trapped at a crime scene. Hostages are seized to use as shields and to strengthen his bargaining position regarding his freedom.

Initially, the hostage-taking incident poses a real threat to the lives of the hostages. The criminal terrorist is caught in an unplanned situation. He is confused and frightened. Until he settles down to negotiate, the conditions are most volatile and dangerous to the hostages.

"The war model treats individual acts of terrorism as tactics in a guerrilla or revolutionary war and makes use of military personnel and weaponry to deal with the perpetrators." (Crelinsten, 1987: 12). The rules of combat prevail. The distinction between combatants and noncombatants becomes important to the guerrilla fighter. "The controlled must be prepared to accept the consequences: apprehension and punishment in the criminal justice model; capture and elimination in the war model if he is caught by the controller."

(Crelinsten, 1987: 9).

Guerrillas and terrorists in their conflicts against governments use similar tactics but guerrillas are not terrorists and terrorists are not guerrillas. Terrorists attack anyone and anything. Their subjects are often civilians. Guerrillas, on the other hand, attack military forces or the police - forces which are superior in numbers. Guerrillas seek recognition from the government and are often "counterstates", insisting on legitimacy. (Kellett, 1981: 4).

"In the liberated zones created by rural guerrilla groups, rudimentary administrative frameworks (fiscal, judicial, educational) are often established." (Kellett, 1981: 4).

Terrorism is usually not a tactic of guerrilla warfare. This is not to say that terrorism is never used but rather that the targetting tends to be relatively controlled, i.e. assassinations of certain individuals closely associated with the government.

Terrorism is not beneficial when it comes to guerrilla warfare, as it often victimizes innocent people who might be useful to the revolution and might provoke public retaliation. Indiscriminate terrorism is not a campaign of terror directed at government officials.

Guerrillas want to awaken popular sympathy and support, not lose the affection of the population. "As

an example, during the Cuban revolution, Castro quickly abandoned widespread bombing attacks in Havana, in order not to alienate potential supporters."

(Kellett, 1981: 4).

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Guerrillas advocate revolutionary change

through armed struggle. They take a military orientation. They see themselves as soldiers, fighting a war against the government.

Terrorists claim to be soldiers at war - privileged, therefore, to break ordinary laws. But, even in war, there are rules. These rules of war grant civilian combatants who are not associated with valid targets at least theoretical immunity from deliberate attack. They prohibit taking hostages. They prohibit violence against those held captive. They define neutral territory. Violations of these rules and those and those responsible are known as war crimes and war criminals.

(Jenkins, 1986: 779). Terrorists, therefore, should not be dealt with as soldiers who commit atrocities.

Terrorism should be dealt with according to the quality of the act and not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.

Terrorist acts are violent acts. Bombings, murders and kidnappings are serious offences under our Canadian criminal code. Terrorists often claim that they are waging a just war. However, "they do not succeed in

providing ethical justification for their deliberate choice of systematic and indiscriminate murder as their sole or principle means of struggle." (Wilkinson, 1986: 66). Killing a person is justified only in the course of fighting on behalf of one's country in a war; in

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self-defence and as a police function in arresting an armed, violent criminal. When brought to the criminal justice courts, terrorists refuse to recognize the legitimacy of those courts. "Terrorists generally claim that their own acts dispense justice and punishment according to a higher law of revolution." (Wilkinson, 1986: 67). Terrorists view the judge, the jurors, the lawyers, the police - all those in the criminal justice system - as part of the enemy, the oppressors, the "rotten order."

One of the advantages in treating terrorists like criminals is that it permits the government to deny the political nature of their violence. To look at the political side of these actions would imply recognition of their political causes. As criminals, terrorists have no political claim to represent a "persecuted minority". Their actions are defined as criminal, not political. A convicted criminal will discredit the terrorist cause in the public's eye.

Ontario Supreme Court Justice D. Watts expressed this view at the trial of the three Armenians convicted.

in the murder of a security guard at the Turkish embassy in Ottawa: that when terrorists are convicted and punished it is not because of their political beliefs, but because they have committed serious criminal offences. Their trial is not a political trial but a criminal one. Their status is not that of "political prisoners" but of ordinary criminals who have committed a criminal act, even though it was for a political motive. Terrorism must be directed to the act, rather than the actor. From this point on, the general term "terrorist" will relate to the "political terrorist".

The government of Northern Ireland has adopted the policy of criminalisation for convicted terrorists instead of giving them a special category status. The government simply describes the terrorists as common criminals. Therefore, the responsibility of dealing with the problem lies with the police and not the army.

"Naturally the terrorists themselves have vigorously opposed this, most notably in the 1980-81 hunger strikes. Perceptions of activists either as freedom fighters or, alternatively, as murderers are a very important part of the propaganda war ceaselessly being waged on the province and abroad." (Gutteridge, 1986: 24).

"The problem may be a police one (Royal Ulster Constabulary); however, great support is given

to them by the army which has nearly 8,000 men deployed to guard key installations and offer reinforcements to the police in arresting suspected terrorists." (Gutteridge, 1986: 21).

Terrorists are not soldiers. They are not involved in a war, as the rules of war grant civilian noncombattants at least theoretical immunity from deliberate attack. They prohibit taking civilian hostages and actions against those held captive. The rules of war recognize neutral territory. Terrorists recognize no neutral territory, no noncombattants, no bystanders. (Jenkins, 1980: 2).

Nevertheless, some countries label terrorists as terrorists. They do not treat them as prisoners of war or as criminals. West Germany treated members of the Baader-Meinhof group as terrorists. Israel labels the PLO as a terrorist organization. The PLO's claim to be at war has never been recognized, since there is no state and no army to which they belong (Green, 1982: III).

Once a group is labelled "terrorist", everything this group does is called terrorism. If it robs a bank, this act is often described as terrorism by government representatives. (Jenkins, 1980: 2). Bank robbery is not necessarily an act of terrorism, as it is not intended to produce terror.

The phenomenon we call terrorism is not just

another crime problem. However, it is a crime that must be dealt with by the criminal justice system. At the disposal of the law enforcement agencies could be a militarized, highly specialized counter-terrorist tactical team, trained in combatting-assaulting terrorism, where only through force can the incident be resolved.

Again, there is difficulty in determining the political nature of terrorism. Within the country in which the acts are committed, namely Canada, the objectives of terrorist groups are political in nature. However, their actions are only recognized as criminal acts. The acts are not given any political character or significance. This country views any political terrorist act as basically a common violation of domestic criminal law, for which the host government has legal jurisdiction for prosecution of the terrorist offenders.

Violent acts against diplomats may be viewed as international terrorism by the target government and as criminal by the host government. Each country responds to the international incident according to its own interpretation.

Various Definitions of Terrorism Leading to a Working

Definition

It is not the intention here to provide an in-depth analysis of the term "terrorism". Nevertheless, a working definition of terrorism will be explained shortly.

There is little international consensus on the term "terrorism" and what it constitutes. Terrorism is a phenomenon for which there is neither a consensus nor a common language regarding the issue. (Motley, 1985: 46). Each country is left with its own interpretation. Many nations have a very ambiguous meaning, which does not enjoy broad popular consensus. Many researchers also vary on the definition of terrorism. Kellett offers this definition:

"Terrorism implies the use, or threatened use, of violence, along with the implicit threat of further violence, to create fear and thereby to attain a political (as opposed to a criminal or personal) goal. It is indirect in the sense that it seeks to influence the behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victims."

(1981: 2)

Terrorism seeks to "break the spirit" of the target group. The psychological effects of acts of terrorism exceed the physical damage they cause.

(Kellett, 1981: 2). Kellett adds:

"With the help of the media, acts of terrorism create a sensation."

Poland defines terrorism as "the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem and threatening of the innocent to create fear in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence the audience." (1986: 206).

Wilkinson has described terrorism as "a kind of unconventional war" where it may be briefly defined as "coercive intimidation", involving "the systematic use of murder and destruction" and the threat of these in order to terrorize individuals, groups, communities or governments, into conceding to the terrorists' political demands. (1986: 51-52).

Netanyahu's definition of terrorism is one adopted in Jerusalem in 1979: "Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends." (1986: 9)

Miller's definition:

"A form of political violence not having the sanction of the state or group of states toward which it may be directed, political terrorism involves the acts of destroying property, killing, injuring or kidnapping individuals or

threatening to do the same, for the primary purpose of intimidating persons, organizations, governments or groups of states to modify their behaviour to comply with the politically-oriented desires of the perpetrators." (1977: 67).

Singh states that political terrorism occurs as the result of a conscious decision by ideologically inspired groups to strike back at what their members may perceive as unjust within a given society. (1977: 15).

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Terrorism can be defined by Watson "as a strategy, a method by which an organized group or party tries to get attention for its aim, or force concessions toward its goals, through the systematic use of deliberate violence." (1976: 1).

"The violence of terrorism is a coercive means for attempting to influence the thinking and actions of people." (Watson, 1976: 15).

Ted Robert Gurr (The Politics of Terrorism, p. 23) define political terrorism as "a destructive revolutionary strategy in which sustained campaigns of violent action are directed against highly visible public targets." (cited in Waugh, 1982: 30). Clutterbuck's definition of terrorism: "Terrorism aims, by the use of violence or the threat of violence, to coerce governments, authorities or populations by inducing fear." (1977: 10).

Through the use of media coverage, fear has been expanded worldwide. An old Chinese proverb states "Kill one, frighten ten thousand". In the television age, this might be amended to "Kill one, frighten ten million". (Clutterbuck, 1977: 13 and 21). "Terrorism is carried on to instill fear, not on the victim, but on those watching - the world." (Perez, 1984: 43).

Governments are threatened by this unconventional, psychological warfare. Fear of terrorism has caused high-profile citizens, diplomats and government officials, to alter their way of life. These security precautions are costly, due to the wide range of targets, and almost infringe upon basic freedoms. However, these people must learn to deal with the threat.

Jenkins broadly defines terrorism as incidents that have clear national or international consequences. International from the point of view that terrorists go abroad to strike their targets or stay in their home country but select victims because of their connections to a foreign state. Domestic terrorism implies violence carried out by terrorists within their own country on their own government. Jenkins further defines terrorism as acts involving violence or the threat of violence, sometimes coupled with explicit demands. This violence is usually directed against noncombattants. The purposes are political. The actions are often carried out in a

way which will achieve maximum publicity. Terrorist organizations are by necessity clandestine but, unlike other criminals, terrorists claim credit for their acts. And, finally, these acts are intended to produce psychological effects beyond the immediate physical damage. (Jenkins, 1986: 788).

In the several definitions of terrorism we have seen, there are several aspects which are collectively agreed upon. These involve the use or threat of brutal violence. They also involve political goal-oriented action, where the aim of terrorism is its psychological impact on specific segments of society, not only the immediate victims. "To the layman, terrorism presents no problem of definition." (Cooper, 1977: 27). It has been said that many know it when they see it. However, Senator W. Kelly, Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism found it to be one of the more difficult tasks. The Senate Committee concluded that there is no consensus in international or domestic law on a definition of terrorism. "Trying to distinguish between types of terrorism is a hopeless exercise." (Kelly, 1987: 3). "Terrorism is one of those terms that is easy to use but difficult to define at least so that consensus about the definition can be reached." (Crelinsten et al, 1978: 5).

As Poland suggests, "The search for a definition has to provide an intelligent analytical

premise, yet general enough to obtain agreement by all parties." (1986: 205).

It is probably impossible to develop a noncontroversial definition of terrorism. Simply remember that, as Poland states, "the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize." (1986: 206). To avoid undue confusion in the use of the term, it is necessary at this point to offer a working definition. A comprehensive definition is almost impossible - an operational one is possible:

Terrorism, viewed in a political context, is the use of threat and violence as a communicative tool, designed to pressure a government into addressing or capitulating to specific political goals or demands. Victims of terrorism are often chosen for their symbolic value.

CHAPTER TWO

Terrorism in Canada

### Statistics on Terrorism

Terrorist acts have generated much fear and destruction and, through the publicity they gain, have brought about an awareness of the state of unrest in many parts of the world. We will examine the "statistics" of terrorism and, perhaps more importantly, how these acts have involved Canada. A study of terrorism - the reality of which makes us feel very vulnerable - is important so that we understand where and how Canada stands in the struggle.

One has to be aware that quantifying acts of terrorism should be treated with some caution, as they are often subject to judgemental, rather than purely enumerative classification.

By comparing statistics published by the CIA and by Edward Mickolus in his book Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events: 1968-1979, the reader will find that Mickolus includes some 24 per cent more incidents than the CIA study for the period 1968-1977. (Kellest, 1981: 3). There is a definite lack of consensus on the number of terrorist acts. In a letter written by Peter St. John, a professor at the University of Manitoba, dated June 10th, 1987, addressed to Professor R. Crelinsten, University of Ottawa: "40 per cent of world terrorism is presently in Western Europe, 35 per cent in the Middle East, 20 per cent in Latin and Central America

and the rest in Asia."

With regard to the types of terrorist incidents that have occurred, "During the past twelve years, bombings have been the most frequently used tactic of international terrorism, accounting in 1979 for nearly 54 per cent of all terrorist operations." (Kellett, 1981: 14).

"According to CIA statistics on ~~hostage-~~ taking which included kidnappings, barricade-hostages and hijackings, it accounted for 13 per cent overall for the period 1969 to 1979." (Kellett, 1981: 18).

Hostage takings are rare. Bombings are a favourite terrorist tool.

"According to CIA figures for the 1968-1979 period, most terrorist attacks have involved bombings, with 47.6 per cent of the total number of events being explosive bombings and 13.7 per cent being incendiary bombings." (Waugh, 1982: 189).

The remaining tactics of terrorism, from assassinations to hostage incidents, were in the 2 to 7 per cent range. Hostage taking was about one-fifth of the total number. (Waugh, 1982: 189). There were 11 terrorist incidents in Canada between 1968 and 1972. From 1973 to 1981, Canada suffered another six such attacks. Following

these, from 1982 to 1986 - only four years - Canadians were subjected to 13 more terrorist acts. In less than 20 years then, the existence of terrorism was brought home to Canada in 30 attacks. (Interview with A. Kellett).

[Refer to Figure 3]

FIGURE 3

Terrorist Tactics from 1968-1987	Within Canada	Outside Canada	Total
Bombings	15 (50%)	7 (50%)	22 (50%)
Assassinations	3 (10%)	0	3 (6.8%)
Assaults	5 (16.7%)	0	5 (11.4%)
Kidnappings	1 (3.3%)	6 (42%)	7 (15.8%)
Barricaded Hostage-takings	1 (3.3%)	0	1 (2.3%)
Hijackings	0	1 (7%)	1 (2.3%)
Threats	5 (16.7%)	0	5 (11.4%)
Total	30	14	44

22 bombings clearly demonstrate that the preferred tool of terrorism is the use of bombs. (Interview with Kellett. Data for 1988 publication).

Protective and defensive measures such as metal detectors at airports, guards at embassies, sophisticated alarm systems and so on, have induced terrorists to choose other types of tactics. These usually involve low-risk activities.

"High-risk activities like hijacking and barricade and hostage-taking have the smallest incidence; low-risk tactics like bombings and assassinations have the highest. For example, explosives and incendiary devices were utilized in 69 per cent of terrorist incidents." (Sandler et al., 1983:)

However, these low-risk activities may do substantial damage, not only to property, but may injure or kill innocent people.

Like Canada, the United States has a very low incidence of politically motivated domestic terrorism. Considering the size of the population, high crime levels (e.g., for 1984, 9,970 deaths across the country caused by crimes) (Wilkinson, 1986: 88), the availability of firearms and the mixture of ethnic, religious and other minority groups, in the whole of the U.S.A. there were only 29 acts of terrorism in 1980, 42 in 1981 and 51 in 1982. (Wilkinson, 1986: 107).

This writer feels that this increase in terrorist attacks has made Canadians realize, finally, that they are not isolated from the troubles of other nations: that the trend will likely continue, with the number of incidents in Canada increasing, until Canadians can convince those responsible for the threats that Canada will combat them with decisiveness and effectiveness, thus making Canada an uninviting ground for terrorism.

### Terrorism in Canada

Canada is composed of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. Due to Canada's ethnic diversity, its geography and its international role as a middle power - as well as the fact that Canada's prisons are free of political prisoners - it is relatively free of terrorism compared to Middle Eastern countries and Europe. (Kellett, 1981: 46).

The Kelly Report explains why Canada is relatively free of terrorist attacks, when compared to a number of terrorist events in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and South America. Americans, however, are favourite targets for terrorist attacks. Canada's freedom from terrorist attacks may be referred to its history (relatively free from episodes of insurrection, revolution and domestic warfare); culture (an egalitarian society, without major differences in class or cultural lines and with a healthy respect for institutions, civil rights and the rule of law); economy (a wealthy country, without the major pockets of poverty that lead to internal strife); government (a democratic government); free press (can be an instrument to promote social change); geography (Canada is far away from the main terrorist locations of Western Europe, the Middle East and South America); foreign policy (Canada does not have an imperial past and has undertaken an international peace-keeping role).

(1987: 14). However, there is no reason to believe that Canada is immune to terrorism, especially international terrorism.

RCMP Commissioner Norman Inkster stated:

"Canada's ethnic diversity creates fertile ground for the fermenting of political and religious differences."

He further stated that:

"Acts of violence increased during the 1980s. Most were committed by Canadian residents, in order to draw attention to foreign problems over which Canada has no control or influence." (Barron, Ottawa Citizen, 1987: E15).

Robert Moss, a terrorism expert, stated that "as rebel Middle Eastern political groups advance their presence in North America, Canada will have an increasingly significant position in the realm of international terrorism." (Armstrong, The Sunday Herald, 1986). Moss also stated that, since Canada is neighbour to a country which is hated by nearly all states that support terrorism, it may find itself in situations where terrorists are setting up base in Canada to plan terrorist operations in the U.S.

"In June 1985, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation foiled a Sikh extremist plot to

kill Ghandhi during an American visit."

(The Ottawa Citizen, July 20th, 1987: A3).

Canada is largely a country of immigrants, forged since the Second World War and continuing to be forged by a commendable immigration policy blind to race, colour, ideology or religion. The Kelly Report demonstrates concern, not only about Canada's immigration policies but at the ease with which terrorists may gain entry into this country due to existing immigration procedures and security screening processes. (Kelly, 1987: 73).

"Current procedures cannot or do not, in many instances, effectively and expeditiously identify, deport, detain or block the entry of terrorists or persons suspected of terrorist intentions or associations." (Kelly, 1987: 73).

Such are the circumstances surrounding the case of Mahmoud Muhammad Issa Mohammad, a convicted Palestinian terrorist who is currently fighting deportation proceedings against him by the Canadian government. (Bryden, The Ottawa Citizen, 1988: A1).

India's foreign Minister, Atal Bihare Vajpayee, stated on a visit to Canada, that he fears a connection between the arrival in early July 1987 of 174 East Indians in Nova Scotia. A great number of these "refugees" are Sikhs.

(The Ottawa Citizen, July 20, 1987: A3).

Beginning in the early 1960s, Canada experienced problems with terrorists in the Province of Quebec. The FLQ (Front de Libération du Québec) wished to have a separate nation under "French" rule - French-speaking Québécois would be able to govern themselves in a mainly English-speaking continent. They felt their rights were not recognized in their own province, which was mainly French-speaking.

Bombs were set off throughout the province to terrorize the public into forcing the federal government to accede to their demands. On October 5, 1970, British Trade Commissioner James Cross was kidnapped in Montreal by the FLQ and, on October 10, 1970, Pierre Laporte, the Quebec provincial Minister of Labour, Manpower and Immigration, was also kidnapped. This was the start of what came to be known as the October Crisis.

On October 16th, 1970, the federal government under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau proclaimed the imposition of the War Measures Act, giving authorities almost unlimited power. Next day, Minister Laporte was murdered. Some members of the FLQ were allowed to leave the country while others were prosecuted. Many Canadians were disturbed by the power of the War Measures Act; nonetheless, the FLQ ceased to exist and the separatist movement was voted on through democratic channels. However, if it is ever felt that French rights are being

crushed and separatism comes back into force, domestic terrorism in Canada could reappear.

Canada jailed members of the Squamish Five terrorist group in 1982. This group was involved in an armoured car robbery, the blowing up of a B.C. Hydro substation and an explosion at the Litton plant in Mississauga. They were often referred to by journalists as "Action Directe", a reference to a terrorist group operating in France.

With the suppression of the FLQ and Squamish Five, terrorism in Canada may be limited to the imported variety, involving international groups protesting against their home governments through the carrying out of terrorist tactics in this country. Political violence will be directed at certain government officials, to promote terror in the victim government of a certain country. Since terrorist groups are unable to achieve such goals successfully in their own country, Canada may be selected as the battleground for such causes.

Canada is not a totalitarian state. It is a liberal, democratic country, and this may be where part of the problem lies. It is "open" to terrorism. The Soviet system, for example, has few political terrorists because it stops such terrorist activity at the cost of suppressing liberty. The secret police keep rigid control over the masses. Canada cannot resort to such

repression in its response to political terrorism. It would be a violation of all basic human rights. Terrorism would be controlled, but at the expense of Canadian citizens - state terrorism at its best.

Often, terrorist incidents are not directed against the responding government. Such is the case in Canada with the Armenians and the Sikhs. Their actions are against target governments, Turkey and India. Canada is forced to respond and be involved in negotiations if hostages are involved. This country is also forced to respond, since it is responsible for the protection of diplomats, foreigners and its own citizens, not to mention the maintaining of public order and security. Where conflict between two groups, for example the Arab-Israeli conflict, has simply "spilled over" into another country, Waugh (1982) calls it spill-over terrorism. Others refer to it as imported terrorism.

Most major terrorist incidents which have occurred in this country have involved "émigré politics" of one sort or another, thus are acts of international terrorism. (Kellett, 1981: 46). Kellett refers to émigré politics as the dissatisfaction from a number of ethnic communities in Canada, opposed to the government in their countries of origin. Violence is aimed, therefore, at an external government but often directed at Canadian citizens. Canada presently has two visible émigré groups

opposed to foreign governments; the Sikhs and the Armenians. This thesis does not suggest, in any way, that every member of these two groups is involved in terrorism. The fact is that only a minority are involved in terrorist activities.

"Canada has a 250,000 strong Sikh community where extremists are thought to number only 200 to 300."

(Manthorpe, The Ottawa Citizen, 1988: B5).

However, "Sikhs, members of a 500 year old religion that extols bravery and martial skills, have difficulty condemning violent acts if they are done in the name of protecting the faith." (Tempest, Ottawa Citizen, 1988: A9). Sixteen million Sikhs live in the Punjab, India's richest agricultural state, located near the Pakistan border. Sikh separatists pursue their goal of an independent Sikh state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) in Punjab. The Golden Temple in Amritsar, Sikhism's holiest place, is the headquarters from which Sikh extremists have escalated a campaign of terror against the Indian government. In June, 1984, the Indian army raided the Golden Temple where 83 soldiers and 493 civilians, including the fundamentalist Sikh leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, were killed. The temple buildings were seriously damaged as well, and this incident is believed to have led to the assassination of

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. (Tempest, The Ottawa Citizen, 1988: A9). Atal Bihanie Vajpayee, India's Foreign Minister, stated that lax security has made Canada the leading exporter of Sikh terrorism outside the troubled Indian state of Punjab. "They are collecting money here. They are collecting arms here. They are organizing people to come from India and other parts of the world to Canada."

(The Ottawa Citizen, July 20, 1987: A3).

Joe Clark, Canada's External Affairs Minister, stated in a letter he wrote to seven provincial premiers, that information received from India suggests that every terrorist operation in the Sikh-dominated Punjab state is either planned, financed or carried out with the help of Canadian Sikhs. He further stated that they "have engaged in or promoted violent activities aimed at the Indian interest in Canada and elsewhere ... (they) represent the most serious internal threat that Canada faces today." (Manthorpe, The Ottawa Citizen, 1988: B5).

The views held by Clark and Vajpayee are probably based, among other things, on several instances where Sikhs have been convicted in Canada itself of terrorist related incidents. Among these is the January 1987 conviction in Montreal of two Sikhs for murder; the January 1986 conviction of seven Sikhs for conspiring to bomb the Indian parliament; the May 1986 conviction of

four Sikhs for conspiring to murder an Indian government minister, shot twice on Vancouver Island. He recovered from his wounds before returning to India. There are also current proceedings in Britain to extradite to Canada a Sikh wanted in connection with a 1985 bomb explosion at Tokyo's Narita airport. A portable radio filled with explosives, which had been checked in at the Vancouver airport, exploded prematurely at Tokyo's Narita airport as it was being transferred from a CP Air jet to an Air India aircraft bound for Bombay.

These are only a few of the incidents in which Sikh extremists have used Canada as a haven in which to commit terrorist acts. They are also suspected in the explosion of an Air India Boeing 747, where 329 Canadians - most of Indian origin - were killed over the coast of Ireland. A suitcase filled with explosives was checked in at the Vancouver airport the same day as the Narita airport explosion, where two Japanese luggage handlers were killed. The terrorists responsible for the Air India bombing have not yet been identified by the police.

Once an independent kingdom, Armenia now forms part of Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union. Turkey owns a large share of what was formerly Armenia. Armenians state that Turkey, in 1915, massacred more than one million Armenians in what was the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish government denies that such genocide occurred.

They claim that, when the Armenians were deported from Turkey to Syria, Lebanon and Russia, many died of sickness, famine, cold and internal clashes.

(Hewsen, 1978: 444).

Armenian terrorist groups want the Turkish government to acknowledge that genocide was carried out against the Armenian people.

Livingston states that most terrorists cannot be compared to Armenian terrorists, referring to the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), as "they are bona fide fanatics willing to undertake suicide missions on behalf of their vain cause and this is what makes them so dangerous." (1983: 11).

On April 8th, 1982, Kani Gungor, the Turkish embassy's commercial counsellor in Ottawa, was shot in an ambush in the parking garage of his Riverside Drive apartment. The Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia claimed responsibility. Three Armenians were charged with attempted murder but were later found not guilty. The diplomat's legs were paralyzed in the attack and he lives in a wheelchair.

(Kennedy, The Ottawa Citizen, 1985: B1).

On August 27th, 1982, in the City of Ottawa, Turkish military attache Colonel Atilla Altikat was shot and killed as he stopped for a red light on the Ottawa River Parkway. The attack on Altikat took place in the

midst of heavy, rush hour traffic. He had been followed by two men in a car and, when he stopped at the red light, one of the two terrorists ran up to his car, aimed and fired ten shots at him, striking him in the head and neck. The assassin then threw a 9-mm Browning handgun into Altikat's car and fled into shrubbery, towards Richmond Road, where his partner was waiting. No arrests were made although the police do have suspects. The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide claimed responsibility.

(Kennedy, The Ottawa Citizen, 1985: B1).

At approximately 7 a.m. on Tuesday, March 12th, 1985, three armed Armenian terrorists stormed the Turkish embassy at 211 Wurtemberg Street in the City of Ottawa, killing one security guard and taking eleven hostages before surrendering four hours later. A group calling itself the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack, the third to hit Ottawa in a little over three years.

(BInderman, The Ottawa Citizen, 1988: A9).

To gain entrance to the embassy grounds, the terrorists backed a rented U-Haul truck up to the front of the embassy gates. All three got on the roof of the van and jumped over the iron fence. Shots were fired at an armed Pinkerton guard who had alerted the police to the situation. He was killed when he got out of his

bullet-proof guardhouse to fire on the terrorists. All three fired on him and he died in the exchange of gunfire. Explosives were then set off at the main doors to gain entry.

The terrorists entered the embassy looking for the Ambassador, Coskun Kirca. Unknown to them, Kirca - alerted to the situation by one of his staff members - jumped from his bedroom window to avoid capture, but broke an arm and a leg and suffered an injured pelvis. He lay on the ground next to the embassy, protected by an Ottawa police constable until the terrorists surrendered. Eleven people in the embassy were now hostages to the terrorists.

Upon receiving a radio message from the security guard - "embassy under siege" - more than seventy Ottawa and RCM police converged on the scene, blocking traffic for several blocks to contain the terrorist situation. Operation Red Leaf was also in effect. Area police forces involving Gloucester, Nepean, the Ontario Provincial Police, Military police, forces from Aylmer, Hull, Gatineau and the SQ - as well as police from Ottawa and members of the RCMP - set up roadblocks to all roads and bridges leaving the Ottawa area.

There are different levels of Operation Red Leaf which depict the seriousness of the situation at hand. Red Leaf One alert is issued when a terrorist threat,

assassination or kidnapping of Ottawa politician, ambassador or diplomat is in progress. It was used in 1982 when Colonel Atilla Altikat, the Turkish military attache, was shot dead in his car.

Red Leaf Two is issued when a major crime is in progress. It was used in the police shooting at the Bayshore Shopping Centre in September 1984. Operation Red Leaf, born in the midst of the 1970 FLQ crisis, is co-ordinated from its command unit at the RCMP's "A" Division Head quarters on Cooper Street.

Police negotiators as well as the Ottawa police tactical team arrived on the scene at the Turkish embassy. The terrorists' demands were the recognition of the Armenian genocide and the return of their land by the Turkish government. The police had to communicate with the terrorists through a bullhorn, because the media kept the phone lines to the embassy busy!

The situation ended shortly after 11 a.m. when all three terrorists emerged from the embassy, shielded by two hostages. After lying on the ground, they were arrested and taken away in an armoured truck. With permission from External Affairs who, in turn, obtained permission from the Turkish government, the Ottawa police tactical team entered the embassy and began a room-to-room search. Several shotguns and revolvers, together with six grenades, were found in various rooms.

Convicted of murder were Kevork Marachelian, aged 35 from LaSalle, Quebec; Rafi Titizian, aged 27 from Scarborough, Ontario, and Ohannes Noubarian, aged 30 from Montreal, Quebec. All three are Canadians of Armenian descent and they belong to the Armenian Revolutionary Army.

CHAPTER THREE

Victims and Response Options

Terrorist tactics involve assassinations, skyjackings, bombings, kidnapping and hostage-taking. Yet the act of taking hostages is the terrorist tactic in which it is most likely that a counter-terrorist assault team can respond. It would force a command unit to react directly to the terrorists, as opposed to a bombing or an assassination in which the government counter-terrorist response team would simply react to a fait accompli. Hostage-taking (included in this is a skyjacking where passengers are involved) is the only real terrorist incident where a counter-terrorist assault team could respond, using force to end the crisis.

An understanding of these tactics will be gained through an examination of specific situations, worldwide and those affecting Canada. Also established through such an examination will be a focus on the victim - who becomes one and why.

#### Victims

"A booklet on hostage-taking put out some years ago by the French Minister of the Interior (FMI), introduces the terms 'passive victim' and 'active victim' to refer to the hostage and the party to whom the demands are made, respectively." (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979: 3).

The active victim is usually the target government. The passive victim, however, varies from public figure to private figure to innocent bystander. If

the hostage-taking incident, or any other terrorist threat, occurs on an international level, the host government is forced to be involved in the negotiation process.

Today many hostages are innocent bystanders who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Aston illustrates in a chart - "Nature of Siege Victims" - from 1970 to 1982 in Western Europe, that there were 643 innocents taken hostage compared to 230 diplomats, the second highest. Government officials were in the third category. (Aston, 1986: 70).

Hostages are a symbol used by terrorists. This explains why Jewish people are often murdered or taken as hostages by Arab terrorist groups. In the Israel-Palestinian conflict, they are seen as legitimate targets. Americans are now targets of terrorism in Europe. Innocent American hostages are symbols in the attack against the American system seen as very influential in Europe and the Middle East.

However, diplomats and the more visible corporate executives are preferred "because of their visibility within the host state, their symbolic value as representatives of "exploitative" foreign economic interest, their instrumental value in attracting an international audience." (Waugh, 1982: 27).

The kidnapping of diplomats puts an enormous

pressure on the host government. Terrorists know this and Roberta Wohlstetter, speaking about Raul and Fidel Castro who pioneered political kidnappings, stated:

"They violated not only internal rules of political order, but also the meagre international rules that lend stability to relations among states." (Wilkinson, 1986: 264).

Since then, terrorist kidnappings of foreigners, especially Americans, in Latin America, South East Asia and the Middle East has dramatically increased. North Americans and diplomats are the victims of the highest number of terrorist incidents. (Wilkinson, 1986: 106).

Nonetheless diplomats are not the only desirable targets of terrorism. If the diplomats become a harder and more inaccessible target, there are many more potential targets, such as businessmen, doctors and tourists. There is a wide range of possible targets, ready for extortion and subsequent publicity. Such targets cannot be protected adequately by government security services, intelligence services or the police.

Lynch states that terrorism is symbolic violence. The real targets of violence are mostly unattainable, e.g., heads of government. Their representatives and institutions are, however, at least more readily accessible, e.g. ambassadors and embassies. For the terrorist, attention gained through these acts is an

indirect way of putting pressure on those government officials the terrorist cannot attack directly. By holding civilians as hostages, with the clear threat of violence, the terrorists gain some leverage. (1987: 10).

#### Tactics

Placing a bomb in a public place, or the taking of hostages, sometimes involves the terrorist having no specific victim in mind. This helps to create an atmosphere of fear and helplessness. "Terrorists frequently claim to select the victims of their macabre lust for punishment and revenge: no-one is innocent, all are potentially guilty, if only by alleged association with class enemies, imperialists and enemies of the revolution." (Wilkinson, 1986: 4). Terrorists do not recognize any rules or conventions of "war" for combattants and non-combattants. The reason why bombings are the preferred method among terrorists is that the materials needed to make a bomb are easy to procure and the ability to make bombs widespread; e.g., it is to be found in books. Another important feature is that the risk of getting caught is less than in other terrorist methods, while still wreaking destruction and causing mass fear through the publicity such acts receive. The destruction caused may be minimal - the destruction of a statue, perhaps, as a symbolic act - but the threat produces considerable disruption in people's lives.

Bombs placed in public areas, such as grocery stores and restaurants, create havoc and death. The terrorists have the advantage of initiative and surprise, best described as "hit and run" tactics. They shock the public at large and leave the police in a reactive role, mainly to clean up the offensive mess. These terror tactics are more quantitative than qualitative.

The use of bombings can be related to the following statement on terrorism by H.H.A. Cooper. "It is violent theatre, played to an audience that is tone-deaf, weary and unutterably blasé." (1978: 91). Terrorists try to "orchestrate" violence in a way in which it will be heard worldwide. Since there are many terrorists and many causes, it is often only the more spectacular terrorist act which can capture attention. This usually involves the taking of hostages.

Assassination has been used against rulers, government officials and military officers. It is suited to the elimination of a hated figure. Thus, assassination is directed more towards subversion than towards extortion.

Assassinations, like bombings, are done in secrecy. Only with effective intelligence can such incidents be prevented. Special counter-terrorist assault teams can do nothing to stop covert terrorist acts. Their training is reactive, not proactive.

Skyjacking can be compared to a mobile hostage-taking. The skyjacker has control when the airplane is in the air, adequately fuelled for any destination. However, when the airplane is obliged to land, the balance of advantage is taken by the authorities, unless the plane lands in a place sympathetic to the terrorists' cause. "Take me to Cuba" is a famous statement, known to many airplane pilots.

A skyjacked aircraft brought to rest on an airport strip becomes just another barricaded hostage situation. Due to the numerous skyjackings which occurred in the early 1970s, conventions between countries began to emerge where, today, skyjacking is fought by governments on an international basis. Again, such crisis situations are best left to specialized assault units.

Skyjacking, intended for specific reasons such as the release of "political" prisoners, and certainly a major publicity event, is probably the area in which the most effective remedial action has taken place, on an international level. For example, we now have the Tokyo Convention 1969, the Hague Convention 1970, the Montreal Convention 1971 and the U.S.-Cuban Hijack Pact, 1973.

"Kidnapping is the form of political terrorism most closely linked to ordinary crime, that is to crime for personal gain rather than for political

dividends." (Clutterbuck, 1977: 98).

It has been suggested by Aston that kidnappings are more likely in countries where the terrorists are operating on home terrain and have an underground organization, and hostage-taking incidents are more likely when the terrorists are operating abroad where they lack the capability for sustaining underground operations.

(1984: 2).

Hostage-taking is quite different from kidnapping even though the two terms are often interchanged. Both share a common theme - the taking of hostages - but the principal distinction lies in the covert operation of kidnapping. The kidnapper keeps his location hidden and the transaction is done in secrecy, often beyond the reach or knowledge of the police. The duration of the incident is expected to be lengthy because of the clandestine nature of the operation. This is the strength of the kidnapper's position. A forced response can only be utilized when the location of the hostage and the terrorist is known.

The seizure of property, such as embassies or national museums, and the threat to destroy it if certain demands are not met, cannot be compared to the threat of taking a human life. However, such properties are of great value to everyone concerned and the seizure of

property also demands a specialized force if negotiations fail. Terrorist attacks on diplomatic targets have increased in recent years. The seizure of the United States embassy in Teheran in November, 1979, was one of the most famous, probably due to the longevity of the crisis.

Embassy attacks and sieges are geared towards the securing of the greatest publicity for the cause and for the demands made. Wilkinson states that 1979-1980 saw a new development "the terrorist fashion of seizing whole embassies and their staffs and occupants." (1986: 266). The police have only one key advantage. The terrorists are themselves hostages.

The most heavily publicized terrorist incidents are those of an international and political nature, usually involving the taking of hostages. It is an important tool of politically oriented terrorist groups.

"Hostage-taking involves the act of securing total control over the person of another human being for the purpose of ensuring compliance with a pledge made by those interested or obligated in securing the victim's redemption." (Cooper, 1978: 1).

The act itself is essentially violent, since it takes over total control of another person, disregards the human suffering involved and depersonalizes the victim. His life is placed in jeopardy and he is threatened

constantly if the government involved does not comply to the terrorists' demands. The threat to the hostage's life is designed to give leverage to the terrorist group in securing its demands. The life of the hostage becomes the central issue in the negotiation process.

The value of the hostage is set in the course of the negotiation. "The hostage is only a means to an end. The hostage, truly, is an unfortunate pawn in a limited power struggle." (Cooper, 1978: 92).

The taking of hostages is a sure way to dramatize the causes of the terrorist group, while extorting the government. Hostage-taking seeks to undermine the authority of governments.

"No other tactic is more likely to cause a severe disruption to the normal flow of national and international relations. Governments are truly held to ransom and political order directly threatened." (Aston, 1986: 57).

The host government faces moral and political dilemmas - either to negotiate or to use force as a response. These are the only choices available.

Kellett suggests that hostage-taking may have originated in Latin America and was intended to gain publicity, not as a means of coercion. (1981: 18). For example, in June of 1958, Raul Castro seized nearly 50 Americans and 3 Canadians in Cuba. In a letter sent, he

stated that this act was intended to attract world opinion in general and that of the United States in particular.

(Kellett, 1981: 19).

Hostage-taking puts a government in a terrible dilemma. If force is used to release the hostages, it may involve many dead and wounded hostages. If the government gives in to the terrorists' demands, the terrorists emerge victorious and the government appears weak.

Government actions depend on risk attitudes. How much of a risk is the government willing to take? If it uses force, hostages may be hurt in the rescue operation; however, if nothing is done, the hostages may be killed by the terrorists as a result of government inaction. On the other hand, terrorist action also depends on risk attitudes. Siege taking is a high-risk activity but "Jenkins, Johnson and Ronfeldt (Numbered Lives, 1977) reported that hostage-taking terrorists are successful almost 80 per cent of the time." (Sandler et al, 1983: 38). In hostage-taking incidents, the terrorist has:

- an 80 per cent chance that all members of the group will escape punishment or death;
- an 86 percent probability of actually taking hostages;
- a 28 per cent chance of full compliance with demands;
- a 40 per cent chance that all or some demands

will be met in operations where something more than just safe passage or exit permission is demanded;

- an 83 per cent chance of success where safe passage or exit for the terrorists themselves or for others appears to be the primary demand;
- a 100 per cent probability of gaining major publicity whenever that is one of the terrorists' goals. (Lanter, 1985: 49).

Netanyahu describes the taking of hostages as a classic terrorist act, because it reveals two characteristics of terrorism. First, it is a deliberate assault on people who are noncombattants and outside the pale of acceptable conflict. Second, it affords a stage for dramatization and distortion. The prolonged siege is one of the most effective ways in which terrorists propagate their message, through media coverage. What would normally be regarded as criminal extortion is transformed into a political act. (1986: 206).

"Nonetheless, in most cases of hostage-taking, there is little risk to the terrorists and, for that reason, it can be expected that hostage-taking will continue to be a tool of terrorist coercion. (Waugh, 1982: 191, 192)

Qualitative terror is recognized as being the best form of creating a major impact. Terrorists maintain the same level of violence but on a more spectacular level. This involves the use of hostages. Terrorist groups have to compete with each other and with other world news in order to receive media coverage.

At 7.15 a.m. on March 12th, 1985, the Ottawa office of the Canadian Press news service received a telephone call from one of the Armenian terrorists who announced the takeover of the Turkish embassy and asked that the message be relayed to the police. Terrorists seize foreign diplomats as a means of gaining international attention. It is an act of propaganda.

"Holding a hostage guarantees that the kidnapers will be heard ... When the hostage belongs to another government, that that government also must communicate its concerns about the safety of one of its citizens, its policy with regard to political kidnappings and its attitude toward the local government." (Jenkins, 1982: 48).

During the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, eight Black September terrorists were able to execute a carefully planned show of terror. They managed to attract the media and to obtain worldwide attention for their cause. This trend has continued. Terrorist organizations now use professional spokesmen, advertising

agencies, press conferences, press releases and continue to maintain contact with the media. (Weimann, The Ottawa Citizen, 1986: B3). "Don't shoot. We're not on prime time." (Wardlaw, 1982: 76).

Reporters often hinder the effective management of terrorist situations, especially when hostages are involved. In the Turkish embassy siege in Ottawa, communications were tied up at crucial times, with a detrimental effect on negotiations.

It would be preferable to have the media police its own regarding media coverage of major incidents, instead of it being imposed by the courts.

"Any attempt by a democratic government to unilaterally dictate a code of ethics for the media would be a serious mistake. Such a code must emerge from within."

(Kupperman, 1977: 23).

Terrorists are always the outsiders. They are few in number and they use this to their advantage. Their strength lies not in the number of men they have, but in their unpredictability in striking victims and in their creation of terror. Due to their small numbers, they are able to strike, then retire into obscurity.

Success for terrorists is measured by the damage done of "a political nature", not by the physical damage created, or the number of killings. The target

government is made to feel helpless in front of these terrorist groups, unable to protect its embassies and diplomats. Terrorists can, for a short time anyway, hold entire nations to ransom - as in the case of the Turkish embassy siege. Cooper states:

"Wars are won by seeking out the weakness of the enemy and devising and employing tactics which might effectively exploit them to their own advantage." (1978: 289).

Terrorists exploit these advantages well.

Terrorists are also successful because they have "no readily identifiable assets that can be retaliated against." (Crelinsten, 1977). Most terrorists possess no territory or citizens against whom target governments can take revenge.

They have nothing to lose and everything to gain. They are society's outsiders who often seek shelter from other countries. For example, the Palestinian Liberation Organization has sought a safe harbour in Tunisia and continues to commit terrorism against the people of Israel. What the Israeli government has done is to attack the PLO base in that country, stating that any country which harbours the PLO is not safe from retaliation.

Terrorists are also successful because they are devoted to their cause. They see governments as corrupt

and morally wrong. The death penalty is not a deterrence to terrorists. Many terrorists are not afraid to die for their cause. In July of 1983, in Lisbon, Portugal, five Armenian terrorists blew themselves up, killing the wife of a diplomat and a policeman. (Scherer, 1982). In Lebanon, Shi'ite Moslems commit suicide in the car bombings of their victims.

"Forensic experts from the FBI laboratory described the bombing of the Marine Headquarters in Beirut in October 1983 as the largest conventional blast ever seen by the experts: an explosive equivalent to over 12,000 pounds of TNT." (Crabtree, 1986: 5)

#### Government Response Options

Terrorism solicits varying responses from the governments of those countries victimized. We will look specifically at the establishment of counter-terrorist units. As we have seen, these units respond to terrorist acts, when hostages are involved. When force is required to break the stranglehold of a terrorist situation, the unit attempts to terminate that situation through the use of both intelligence and strategy.

Governments also respond through the use of several response options available to them. These vary from economic sanctions to military reprisals. Economic sanctions were utilized when Russia attacked Afghanistan.

Canada reneged on its commitment to export wheat to Russia, greatly affecting the economics of the Canadian wheat business, but making a stand.

Dissolving diplomatic relations is another tool used to publicly voice one nation's disapproval with the actions of another. An example of this will be discussed later.

Extradition is another way a government can demand that justice will be served with respect to terrorism. Extradition is necessary if the terrorist is to be held accountable for his actions.

Countries threatened with terrorism may also enact emergency legislation. This legislation enables the government to extend the "arm of the law". The police and/or the military are given the power to arrest and detain people without trial, to search premises without warrant and to establish curfews. On October 16th, 1970, the Canadian government imposed the War Measures Act to deal with the threat of terrorism in the Province of Quebec. That legislation has now been replaced by the Emergencies Act. Although the name of the legislation has changed, it retains basically the same powers invoked by the federal government, under the War Measures Act, in response to an appeal by Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa to deal with the threat of the extraordinary wartime powers, to deal with the crisis.

It was felt by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau that this was the only weapon available. Now, almost 20 years later, could this new legislation be used to suppress any future domestic threat? Hewitt states "terrorism does not decline as the emergency legislation is made more severe." (1984: 89).

Some societies respond to terrorism by using extreme measures. They perform a full circle and, in turn, commit acts of terrorism on their citizens - state terrorism. Torture and killing is practised and punishment of suspected terrorists and their supporters is severe and ruthless. "The more repressive regimes are more successful in reducing terrorism than the more liberal regimes." (Hewitt, 1984: 94). "A country most successful in eradicating terrorism within its own borders is Uruguay. The terrorist group Tupamaros were completely destroyed in 1972." (Hewitt, 1984: 92).

International terrorism may be combatted only by close co-operation between all countries affected. This will allow a starting point for effective investigation. This, however, may be difficult to achieve because of difficulties in defining the term "terrorism". Difficulties also arise because of differing systems of society, law, organizational structures, jurisdiction of prosecution authorities, political considerations and so on.

West Germany would extradite to the United States a Lebanese man accused of hijacking a TWA jetliner in 1985 and killing one hostage - a U.S. navy diver - but before extradition could be granted, West German law required a guarantee that the suspect, Mohammed Ali Hamadi, not be sentenced to death if convicted. Hamadi was arrested at Frankfurt airport, when Customs agents discovered material used in making explosives. The Ottawa Citizen, January 16, 1987: A6).

Canada is a country made up of people from many different countries and ethnic backgrounds, whose sentiments and empathies will often be divided when it comes to groups fighting for political objectives in foreign countries. It is difficult for some to maintain objectivity when friends and loved ones may be affected in peoples' "mother countries" and homelands. As Canadians, it is important to examine an appeal for extradition with an impartial, dispassionate view of circumstance. The law is used as it is neutral and defends against the employment of immoral means.

The capture and prosecution of an international terrorist is quite difficult. Although there is no problem with the arrest and punishment of a domestic terrorist group, or organizations that attempt to import terrorism to Canada, the situation is quite different with other terrorist groups.

To arrest an international terrorist, Canada, like any other country, must rely on the co-operation of other states, either to extradite the suspected terrorist or prosecute him in the country holding him. This has often proven to be unsatisfactory, leaving terrorist groups almost certain of escaping punishment. Extradition on a world scale is politically impossible. Both countries involved must share a common interest and mutual gain.

An Ottawa newspaper recently reported the arrest of Columbian drug lord Carlos Lehder, aged 37, who is accused of "narco-terrorism", and causing acts of violence in the smuggling of cocaine. He is suspected of providing 80 per cent of the cocaine entering the United States. He was arrested by Colombian authorities, who extradited him to the U.S. Columbians apparently were ashamed of their reputation as the country at the centre of worldwide drug traffic.

(The Ottawa Citizen, February 10, 1989).

Extradition of "rebels and terrorists" among countries is difficult to accomplish. Most countries provide safe haven for political refugees. Alleged "terrorists" who have benefited from this protection could be found in recent years in the United States. These included the late Philippine Opposition Leader, Benigno Aquino, and the late Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi —

of Iran, the less distinguished, late Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza DeBayle (Pyle, 1986: 64), and the deposed Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos.

A policy of legal neutrality towards foreign uprisings is maintained by most countries. However, extradition may be sought if suspects are known and have been proven to be terrorists, therefore criminals.

The United States looks at every case in an extradition enquiry, to see who will be protected and who will be surrendered to the police of the country requesting extradition. "In the 1981 case of Ziad Abu Eain, a Palestinian charged by Israel with planting a bomb in a civilian marketplace, the U.S. Courts refused to shield the accused from extradition, even though the bombing had a political objective ... his alleged action involved an indiscriminate attack on a civilian population." (Pyle, 1986: 68). Many have suggested some form of international economic sanctions, or the breaking off of diplomatic relations, both less dangerous than engaging in a military action. However, economic and diplomatic sanctions do not work unless they are applied by the entire international community. Referring to the U.S. embassy take-over in Teheran, Wilkinson states that no countries acted to freeze Iranian assets held in European banks, nor did they break off diplomatic relations with Iran to protest the hostage-taking.

Iranian diplomats continued to enjoy all normal privileges and immunities, in every West European state. In fact, France, Britain, West Germany and Japan capitalized on the Iranian crisis, in those gaps left by the American boycott. (1986: 286). Western governments "talk tough" against terrorism only often enough to seek a secret deal with states supporting terrorists. Such was the case when France sought a deal with Iran for the freedom of its hostages held in Lebanon. Many other countries have done the same - among them the U.S. and Britain.

By paying off the terrorists in either cash, weapons or even through the restoration of diplomatic relations with a certain country, terrorists will be encouraged to take more hostages. It is a vicious cycle in which most Western countries make the same mistake.

In 1986, eleven of the twelve European foreign ministers accepted Britain's contention that Syria was implicated in a plot to blow up an Israeli jetliner leaving London. The pregnant Irish girlfriend of a Jordanian terrorist - along with 374 other people onboard an El Al flight from London to Israel - were to be killed by a bomb planted in her luggage. The terrorist was willing to kill his pregnant fiancée to make a political point. At the terrorist's trial, it was demonstrated that Syria was involved in the bomb plot. (The Ottawa

Citizen November 10, 1986: A1). All the embassy employees at the Syrian embassy in London were expelled by the British government. The United States withdrew its ambassador from Syria, Canada and Belgium recalled their ambassadors for "consultations".

Referring to the Kuwaiti jet skyjacking in April 1988, in which two hostages were killed and where the terrorists fled through negotiations with Algeria, Rodney Wallis, security official for the Montreal-based International Air Transport Association (IATA) said amnesty for the hijackers was a victory for terrorism. Wallis also stated:

"They have gone back into the mainstream of terrorism and we can expect to hear from them again. . . The terrorists will now have had 15 or 16 days of experience of holding an aircraft. They've now seen how to implement it in practice. These people are now ready to go out and train others or to commit similar acts."

(The Ottawa Citizen, April, 1988: A6).

Wallis called for an International Court to try international crimes against civil aviation, as well as a force to mount a rescue operation if the situation demands.

Guenter Eser, director general of IATA, stated:

"We are asking - demanding - the creation of an international anti-terror brigade ... governments should work together to set up a specialized brigade to fight terrorism."

(The Ottawa Citizen, April 1988: A6).

France's long-term arrangement of granting political asylum and of striking deals with terrorists may have come back to haunt her. By trying to escape terrorist violence, French authorities may have inadvertently invited it. Such is the case of the bombing campaign in September 1986, when France was holding a suspected Lebanese terrorist.

At that time, France suffered at the hands of terrorists, when five bombings in Paris, over a ten day period, killed nine people and wounded more than 150. This resulted from the terrorist group - the Committee of Solidarity for Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners - demanding the release of a Lebanese terrorist leader jailed in France. A conference was held in London, convened at the request of France. It called on European countries to revamp their extradition laws, as a way to combat terrorism. The conference also stressed ways of improving co-operation between intelligence agencies and security services. Since this conference, France has introduced a new visa requirement for visitors to their country. (The Ottawa Citizen, 1986).

France has also decided to end the French Basque country's traditional role as a haven for radicals sought by Spanish police in connection with bombings and assassinations by the Basque Homeland and Liberty group (ETA). More than 50 Basques terrorists captured in France were turned over to the Spanish police. (Cody, The Ottawa Citizen, 1987: B11).

There must be effective international action against countries who continue to provide asylum and even funds to the terrorists. Regarding hijackers, the Group of Seven - Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan - issued the Bonn Declaration, whereby they declared their intention of severing all aerial flights with any country supporting terrorists." (Cohen, 1982: 109).

The diplomatic route must first be adopted condemning hostile acts.

International terrorism would not be possible without the collaboration of governments. "The terrorist must be launched from somewhere and he must go somewhere after his crimes." (Netanyahu, 1986: 211). Therefore, governments must provide the solution to this problem.

Military reprisals against countries which support terrorism is another measure of response. State sponsorship of terrorism has caused the number of terrorist incidents to rise, as well as the

multiplication of terrorists themselves. Lynch's answer to state sponsors of terrorism is military action through pre-emptive strikes and retaliation such as the destruction of training camps and the interruption of supply lines. He recognizes that even this will not deter every terrorist since some are motivated by strong religious beliefs, instilled at birth and reinforced throughout life, which promise eternal salvation to those who die in holy war. (1987: 60). Therefore, terrorists who operate under the umbrella of a state must recognize the fact that every future action on their part could provoke a military response from the victim government.

Regarding state sponsored terrorism, Wardlaw suggests that deterrence through military retaliation "should be aimed primarily at the sponsor, not the sponsored." (1986: 284). But, as Wardlaw argues, is any one victim country really going to do anything about the most important sponsors, such as Iran, Syria and the Soviet Union? If not, it will do nothing to deter terrorism.

U.S. intelligence agencies secured evidence of direct Libyan involvement in the April 5th, 1986, bombing of a West Berlin discotheque that killed an American serviceman and injured more than 200 people. Evidence was also gathered that Libyan agents had been deployed around the world to carry out terrorist attacks against

Y

30 U.S. embassies. )

The U.S. retaliated, on April 14th, 1986, by sending 13 F-111 fighter bombers flying out of Royal Air Force bases in England, accompanied by 12 A-6 attack planes, launched off carriers in the Mediterranean. Simultaneously, all planes struck five military targets in and around Libya's capital, Tripoli. Striking at the Command centre and residence of Quaddafi resulted in the death of his 15 month old adopted daughter. (Rubner, 1987: 204). After that U.S. raid on Libya and the shelling of that country, it was suggested that anti-Western violence was curbed. (The Ottawa Citizen, April 14, 1987: A14). This, however, may be explained by the fact that countries expelled Libyan officials and students in the year following the raids on Tripoli and Benghazi and the carrying out of increased surveillance of Libyans and target areas may have made it more difficult for terrorists to operate.

#### Proactive and Reactive Responses

All actions taken by police and military units in response to terrorism can be categorized as either a Proactive Response or a Reactive Response.

Into the category of Proactive Responses fall those preventive measures that protect against and detect terrorist threats.

Briefly, there are three models of crime control.

The deterrent model may be the first. The severity of punishment may cause the potential criminal not to commit another criminal act. The rehabilitation model is based on the ability of the criminal to readjust his behaviour. His change of behaviour will be accepted by society. The third model of crime control is the preventive model. It reduces the opportunity and capabilities of the potential offender to commit criminal acts. There is in practice a large overlap in the effects of these three models.

(Crelinsten et al, 1978: XII). In terms of preventive measures, agencies mandated with the responsibility of handling terrorist threats use "target hardening". Target hardening is based on "the notion that certain criminal acts are more easily prevented by acting on the targets of such acts than on the potential actors." (Crelinsten, et al, 1978: 16). Examples of target hardening are airport security screening such as mandatory luggage inspection using technologically sophisticated equipment, or embassy security, including reinforced gates and windows, remote controlled television cameras, and guard dogs. This preventative model reduces the terrorist's opportunity to commit violent acts.

There is always the danger that target hardening can bring about the displacement of terrorist acts: for example, the Turkish diplomat gunned down in the parking garage of his Riverside Drive Apartment in Ottawa on

April 8th, 1985, and the murder of another Turkish diplomat, shot dead in his car in the city's west end on August 27th, 1975.

Once diplomats leave the security of their embassy, the risk of a terrorist act increases. As mentioned above, serious incidents occur in the streets of a city. Diplomacy, however, requires that many ambassadors take certain risks and slip away from total security to continue to carry out effectively their duties with other countries. In other words, there is not enough security in the world to protect all the diplomats who might be victims of acts of terrorism. However, "preventive measures can be appreciated as token symbols, directed to the general public or to potential kidnappers." (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979: 30).

Governments must tighten up their responsibilities for the protection of diplomats. This involves improved intelligence and security personnel, under the obligations of the Vienna Treaty on Diplomatic Relations (1961).

After the Turkish embassy siege, then Solicitor General Elmer MacKay requested a fullscale review of security at foreign embassies in Canada. It was felt that Canadian security standards were lower than those of most other countries.

"A spokesman for the Turkish foreign ministry

told The Citizen from Ankara that Ottawa is considered one of the three most dangerous cities for Turkish diplomats to live, along with Vienna and Paris."

(Bindman, The Ottawa Citizen, 1986: B6).

Since the first terrorist attack in the Ottawa area several years ago, the police have awakened to the reality that such crimes may occur, and probably will occur, in the near future. The RCMP has since reviewed its security.

Also in the category of Proactive Responses are information-gathering techniques - intelligence.

"Effective police work against terrorism depends above all on intelligence." (Clutterbuck, 1977: 108).

Canada has an agency designed specifically to gather such intelligence. This is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). CSIS agents, with no enforcement authority, collect, analyse and report information about threats to the security of Canada. All CSIS operations, nationwide, are controlled directly from its headquarters in Ottawa. CSIS agents may try to infiltrate terrorist groups and even to "turn" an actor into a "double agent" working for CSIS.

Intelligence gathered by CSIS agents falls into two categories: strategic and tactical. Strategic

intelligence is information gathered about suspected terrorists and their association with other terrorist groups. This information is processed and dispersed to police agencies and is continually updated.

Tactical intelligence is information gathered at the crime scene. At a hostage taking, for instance, investigators talk with witnesses and analyse evidence to provide tactical units with details such as the number of terrorists involved, their organization, objectives, weapons, and the number of hostages - their characteristics, their location and physical and mental condition.

Background information on trends, modus operandi, patterns and the unique styles of each terrorist group may dictate how the counter-terrorist unit responds.

CSIS is privy to Interpol information and, because of this, to all foreign intelligence. Terrorism extends beyond national boundaries, rendering counter-terrorism dependent on such an exchange of information. Intelligence on terrorists and their whereabouts is a valuable tool. Mutual security may be better guaranteed if strict anti-terrorist measures are adopted and co-operation between countries enhanced.

Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) deals strictly with ordinary law crimes. However, Interpol's policy on terrorism has been stated

as:

"Any country that has developed intelligence which indicates, with a good degree of certainty, that someone is involved in terrorist activity, that information should become public police knowledge." (RCMP Monthly Bulletin, 1985).

There must be close and constant liaison between the police, civilian intelligence agencies such as CSIS, the military and friendly states, regarding intelligence matters. Difficulty in gathering intelligence on suspected terrorists will have adverse effects on counter-terrorist operations:

With proper data on terrorists, government agents may be able to determine when, where and how terrorists are likely to strike. They may also be able to identify the terrorist organization's size, objectives, resources, headquarters, identities, and so on. Intelligence is the most important line of defence in successful counter-terrorist operations. It is truly an effective tool.

An assault team can be tailored to respond to certain terrorist groups, if intelligence is provided. They will know the group's strength - and be able to take advantage of its weaknesses. An assault team can also be used in the arrest, before the terrorist group commits its violent acts. The SAS are used in such cases in the

arrest of IRA suspects in Northern Ireland.

Target hardening and intelligence gathering are components of a Proactive Response to terrorist threats. The second stage encompasses the Reactive Response to terrorism.

This reactive response involves negotiation. In a protracted incident two opposing viewpoints of this stage are: full agreement to terrorist demands or no negotiation.

If there is no successful negotiation, or compromise of demands, then the reactive option is the use of force.

In Canada, great importance is placed on the safety of the hostages; therefore, hostages are of great value to terrorists. The police in a hostage taking incident try to ensure that there are no casualties among them, while not giving in to terrorists' demands. This is where a good police negotiator is required to resolve the situation, avoiding a challenge to the terrorists when demands are not being met.

Negotiators and counter-terrorist assault teams work hand in hand when dealing with terrorists. If negotiations fail, or if the lives of any hostages are in jeopardy, assault teams are called in to regain control of the situation.

Negotiation may be defined as a compromise to

objectives sought by the terrorists; a "give and take" process. Negotiation is used to preserve the lives of the hostages and to terminate the situation before anyone is killed.

Crelinsten's and Szabo's definition of negotiation clearly explains what the term implies:

"Two-way communication between two sides in a dispute or conflict. Without communication, there can be no negotiation. Negotiation also implies a give and take on both sides."

(1979: 41).

Negotiation with terrorists can be compared to a process of bargaining. It centres on finding an appropriate point of agreement. The process is rarely a compromise. One party, usually the terrorists, establish their positions at something in excess of what the police will accept. The negotiator's goal is to influence the terrorist into surrendering or reducing his demands to something more realistic - "winning him over".

Once the terrorist redefines his goals, he has already lost the psychological battle.

Negotiation regarding hostage taking incidents are resolved through two courses of action: surrender or government submission. Force is used only as a last resort, when negotiations fail.

In dealing with terrorists, the government has

two choices - no concessions or concession to terrorist demands.

However, the United States claims, officially, that it has a tough policy but, as seen in newspapers reporting on the Iran-Beirut situation, the tough policy is theoretic when American hostages are being held. Canada has a tough line policy as well. A tougher policy still is Israel's "eye for an eye" philosophy. "The Israelis have repeatedly made it clear, through deeds not words, that the hostages might be sacrificed but that the terrorists would surely be killed." (Buckelew, 1984: 77).

Some countries such as the United States and Canada "officially" have policies of no concessions to terrorists. The argument is that future lives are saved by standing firm now. Greater value is placed on maintenance of social order than on one individual. "Upholding the public order was cited as one motivation for the final assault on the Dutch train held by South Moluccans in June 1977. The public order had to be protected." (Crelinsten, 1979: 35).

This policy also applies to diplomats. "A diplomat accepts that he may have to die rather than sacrifice his country's interest, just as a soldier would not expect his army to abandon a vital position just because his life was in danger." (Clutterbuck, 1979:

83).

Aston states that 60 per cent of all terrorists' demands have been rejected, regardless of the importance of the hostages in Western Europe, between 1970 and 1982. 94 per cent of all hostages have been released regardless of whether demands have been met. (1986: 72-73).

Throughout the negotiation process, the police negotiator at the crime scene should do everything possible to consume time. The longer the negotiation period, the more likely it is that the terrorist group's resistance will weaken. This frequently forces the terrorists to recognize the reality of the situation and often leads to surrender. "Statistically, time is on the side of law enforcement." (Hassel, 1975: 56).

The surrender of the terrorist group may involve the "wearing down" of the hostage takers. This is the real reason for the resolution of a terrorist incident. It really does not involve any type of real negotiation. The terrorist may realize that his efforts are useless and he might just as well give up. Such resignation may be encouraged by the police negotiator. It may also involve spontaneous termination decided upon by the terrorist himself. Such was the case involving the siege of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa, when the three Armenian terrorists suddenly came out of the embassy and surrendered to the Ottawa police tactical team. Cooper

states that this strategy is frequently used by terrorist groups. Once the media freely broadcast their cause to the world, they surrender themselves peacefully to the police. Time is the crucial factor where a crisis situation seems hopeless.

If intelligence provided to the police commander shows that the terrorist group in question is known to kill its hostages and then commit suicide - demonstrating martyrdom for their cause - the police might want to withhold any type of media coverage from the terrorists, thereby eliminating publicity. This terrorist act, which is meant to show great sacrifice for the sake of principle, would not be broadcast around the world to inspire others. "Such sacrifice (suicide) becomes acceptable, even desirable, if it will serve the cause." (Hassel, 1975: 56). A great deal of co-operation would be needed from the media since this would be a matter of voluntary restraint. In such a situation, force would certainly be used if it was established that negotiation would be useless.

"It still is widely felt that the best response strategy involves negotiations, at least as a tactic, and the most common objective is to rescue the hostage and apprehend the offender unharmed." (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979: 18). The use of force is a reactive response to a

terrorist threat. Paramilitary training, weapons and special tactics are used to end - forcibly - a terrorist confrontation.

The use of force is used as a last resort when the terrorists torture, injure or kill their hostages, thereby showing a total disregard for human life. Such disregard justifies the use of deadly force.

"In any hijacking, if there are no killings, one must be patient and negotiate. If someone is murdered, then a rescue attempt must be made."

(Armenic, 1981: 62).

Counter-terrorist assault teams "operate as a finely tuned infantry squad, capable of bringing overwhelming tactical firepower against an individual or small group." (Aston, 1980: 37). They gain maximum control of a situation while employing minimum force (Perez, 1984: 43). "We are the hammer. The investigator is the carpenter." (The Sunday Gazette, April 17, 1988: A4). "The bad guys are allowed one vital decision. They can live or they can die. The level of force is decided by the suspect himself. He dies or gives up ... He knows we may give him the final sentence", says Lieutenant Cardinal, Commander of the Montreal Urban Community Police Department's 26-man Technical Squad. (R. Quig, The Sunday Gazette, April 17, 1988: A1). This philosophy may be applied to every counter-terrorist

assault team.

What justifies the use of force is support within the community for rules which assure the law-abiding that the occasional lawbreaker will be brought to justice. Therefore, the state, through its counter-terrorist team, is justified in using force to uphold its laws, if peaceful pressure is unhelpful. The use of force to meet terrorist violence is usually justified as a way of capturing terrorists and bringing them to a Court of justice for punishment, or as a deterrent. "The state has a right to defend itself and to kill to do so. The democratic state has a better right to do this than any other." (The Ottawa Citizen, September 19, 1988: A1); "The government must instill into the terrorist the same fear he imposes on innocent citizens, that is fear for his life." (Motley, 1985: 48).

Another reason to maintain a counter-terrorist assault team is to reassure the public, as well as diplomats and foreigners, that the Canadian government is prepared to deal effectively with terrorist violence. To reduce the credibility of terrorist actions, the government is probably best served by intelligence and then by the provision of sufficient force to reduce the violence when the assault team is to be used, when negotiation fails.

It is the responsibility of the host government

to guarantee protection to embassies and the many diplomats involved. It must be prepared to deter terrorist plans using special assault teams. Failure to respond effectively to the terrorists can result in a loss of confidence in the government by its citizens and by the other countries involved.


When negotiation has failed, the authorities have to be prepared to call the terrorists' bluff. A response using force may not be the most desirable choice; however, given the circumstances it may be the only workable alternative. Failure to act can only lead to loss of credibility on the part of the government and will probably result in future terrorist incidents.

As Wilkinson states, "If violence becomes the accepted or normal means for groups to gain political objectives within a state, one can say goodbye to liberal democracy." (1986: 43). The state is therefore justified in using force; indeed it may be obligatory at times.

The hostage's survival depends solely at first on the intentions of the terrorists (see Figure 4). If their goal is to enter the premises and kill as many people as possible, there is little the police can do to prevent this. However, after negotiations have begun, the prospect of risks and harm to the hostages often depends on the action of the authorities at the crime scene. If

Figure 4 .

Possibility of a hostage's survival  
(Cooper, 1978: 20)



the hostage loses his trading value and "body shield" element, the risk factor increases and the terrorist may commit murder, then suicide.

At the beginning of the crisis incident, there is a high risk period for the hostage. This is due to the terrorist's uncertainty as to his ability to control his hostages and keep them under control. Once this has been accomplished, and the terrorist is reassured, the danger point is lowered. The terrorist is never sure of his control over the hostages at the start, which explains the use of excessive force. The victim only becomes a hostage when he is under control; if not, he may be eliminated as he is then seen as a threat.

Negotiation is but one option for securing a resolution of the hostage situation. Force is a second, but less preferred, option. "To modern thinking, negotiation is always somehow more civilized than resort to force, even where that force is legitimately vested in representatives of the community." (Cooper, 1978: 20). Negotiation lowers the risk factor and brings a violent incident to a peaceful end.

Where force is resorted to as a response to terrorism, the risk factor is extremely high. However, if force is the only possible option, the assault must be specialized, quick and extremely precise. Time is of the essence.

The assault force must move decisively and maximize the effectiveness of its violence because every additional minute increases the risk of injury to the hostages. (McGeorge, 1983: 62).

Some hostage-taking incidents never intended that the victims should survive. If this is observed, force is needed. This was the case for the Jewish passengers on the Air France airplane, skyjacked by terrorists to Entebbe, Uganda, in June of 1976. "The Arab plotters stated: Do not allow one Jew to escape alive. As soon as our people are safe" (release of Arab prisoners from jail), "fire on the Jewish hostages, even if it means hitting the Red Cross Workers." (Cooper, 1978: 117). "Some groups, such as the United Red Army, have shown a greater tendency to use violence and must be presumed to be more likely to kill their hostages if their demands are not met. (Aston, 1986: 77).

A situation which demands the use of force: In April 1975, six Red Army Faction terrorists seized the West German embassy in Stockholm and held twelve hostages, including the West German ambassador. They shot the military attaché and threw him down the stairs, where he lay bleeding to death. The Swedish police were given permission to carry him out of the embassy, only after an hour had passed. Six hours later, a second hostage was killed. The Swedes then decided to assault

the group. (Clutterbuck, 1978: 35).

Many citizens and victims feel that, unless the terrorists are punished or even killed in an assault, they have "gotten away with it." An infamous police quote explains it all: "He did the crime and he's serving no time."

"It must be acknowledged that the forceful resolution of a hostage-taking episode, especially where it is wholly successful, has a primitive appeal that is hard to resist."

(Cooper, 1978: 95).

Such action receives almost universal applause. The terrorists have been punished for their violent act. Force is seen as justified against such terror.

"That the forceful solution is not the preferred solution represents an extraordinary triumph of reason over emotion." (Cooper, 1978: 95).

"Public fear regarding terrorism and the lack of clearly defined preventive and response measures may produce inordinate overreactions which may bring about stricter laws to combat terrorism and even repressible measures that threaten democratic institutions."

(Smith and Fraser, 1986: 30).

One has to be careful when tactical teams are called to a terrorist hostage incident. There is the

danger of overreaction which may produce a public feeling of hostility towards the police who may be viewed as the aggressors. "Over-spectacular assaults" can serve the cause of the terrorists by drawing attention to their aims.

"Justice without force is impotent: force without justice is a tyranny." Blaise Pascal, Pensées. (Wilkinson, 1986: 1).

However, all democratic nations must remember who they are fighting and what they are fighting for.

"In George Ball's words, we must ... take care that we are not led, through panic and anger, to embrace counter-terror and international lynch law and thus reduce our conduct to the squalid level of the terrorists." (Wardlaw, 1986).

Counter-terrorist units must not use such excessive force as to alienate popular support.

"Government must achieve the almost super-human task of using enough force to deter terrorist aggression while at the same time avoiding any damage or injury to the innocent ..." (Wilkinson, 1974: 138).

Counter-terrorist teams use as much force as necessary. Their main task is the rescue of the hostages and killing the terrorist may provide further protection to the hostages, since booby-traps may have been pre-arranged to kill everyone involved in the incident.

For instance, the terrorist may be shot dead to prevent him for detonating a bomb. The SAS prides itself on taking no prisoners. It also prides itself on its toughness - which some may call ruthlessness. When SAS men fire, they shoot to kill. (Webbe, The Ottawa Citizen, September 30, 1988: A1). Critics of the SAS compare their actions in Northern Ireland, and more recently in Gibraltar, to Latin American death squads. SAS soldiers killed three IRA terrorists who were planning to detonate a car bomb as a band of the Royal Anglian Regiment marched along a Gibraltar street.

"The operation, however, was conducted by members of a disciplined force, acting under the specific direction of civil authority instructed by a democratic government. That is why it was not a death-squad episode. ... it is an appropriate response to terrorism." (The Ottawa Citizen, September 19, 1988: A8).

Dobson and Payne made an important point regarding special counter-terrorist assault units and their "counter-terror" raids.

"Thorough training of the assault troops is important, but even the best trained troops in the world are not always victorious ... in some future operation, it is only too likely that some action on a foreign airfield will end in carnage

among innocent passengers as well as the troops involved." (1979: 148).

In September 1985, EgyptAir flight 648 was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists to Malta. The Maltese government agreed to let Egypt's Force 777 into the country to carry out a rescue if needed. Five passengers had been shot, which justified an assault. However, Thompson states that, due to poor intelligence and by assaulting too early in the day - dawn would have been preferred - and by using no stun grenades, the rescue attempt was a failure. 57 hostages were killed during the assault which lasted 90 seconds - a very slow assault. Force 777 snipers kept on shooting escaping passengers in the mistaken notion that they were terrorists. (Thompson, 1986: 55).

The Karachi incident on September 12th, 1986, again resulted in an unsuccessful hostage rescue by the government. If the terrorists did not kill the hostages, the assault team did.

Marginally more siege victims have died during police assaults to save them (3.6%) than during incidents where terrorists have surrendered (2.5%). (Aston, 1986: 62).

Jenkins analyzed 90 hostage situations between 1968 and 1975 and found that:

"35% of these hostages were killed during an

assault by police para-military teams and 79% of all hostages who were killed met their death during the assault." (Shoniker, 1981: 29).

Netanyahu states that "under no circumstances should governments categorically rule out a military response simply because of the risk of civilian casualties." (1986: 205). He explains that a policy of no response using military force will result in many future victims of terrorism. Victims will face death or injury, because the government failed to act in the first instance. He further states that civilians will be used as an "invincible shield" as terrorists will know that government forces will not storm a building if hostages are used.

Terrorism thrives on government weakness. The effort to combat terrorism may require force as a solution. However, a forceful response involves great risk and may result in unavoidable casualties, even then ending in failure and subject, therefore, to public criticism. A forceful response may also involve reprisals. Government officials must be prepared to make difficult decisions.

"There is always an audience in a hostage-taking, if only the relatives of the hostage, and this audience is ready to condemn those who, at least in their eyes, fail to save the hostage."

(Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979: 34).

Either through effective negotiation, or the use of specialized force, the saving of human lives is the greatest priority. Since the chance of losing lives is high when force is used, the assault team must be prepared to meet this challenge.

Canada's Option: SERT

In Canada priority was placed on meeting this challenge when it developed its counter-terrorist assault team.

Under the Security Offences Act, the RCMP have responsibility for the investigation of offences arising out of a threat to the security of Canada. A terrorist incident would fall into this category. The RCMP also have responsibility for internationally protected persons. Such is the case for embassies and visiting dignitaries. Other municipal and provincial forces are responsible for criminal offences not directly relating to "threats to the security of Canada."

(Kelly, 1987: 47).

With the hostage-taking at the Turkish embassy by the Armenian terrorists, it became evident that Canada, and especially the capital Ottawa with so many embassies, needed increased protection. The creation of the RCMP's Emergency Response Team (ERT), on call 24 hours a day, became - as Shoniker (1981) called it - a "control Force"

for such protection.

The ERT unit is responsible for patrolling the embassies and residences of diplomats. 24 hour protection is provided by four units, each consisting of two men.

ERT units are established in 31 centres across Canada, accounting for more than 300 officers. (Kelly, 1987: 48). ERT units can be compared to provincial and municipal tactical teams, where they are trained to use special force in a "criminal" offence, i.e. barricaded person.

The RCMP have also established an elite group of officers trained to handle any terrorist threat in Canada. This unit - the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) - will be discussed later.

Charters and Tugwell recognized the need for a special tactical team in this country. Charters states:

"There is a group (in Canada) called Special Threat Assessment Group (STAG), which includes scientists, physicians, soldiers and security specialists. In 1977, approval in principle was given for the creation of an assault and hostage-rescue force, but nothing came of it."

(Amernic, 1981: 62Z).

On November 30th, 1985, then Solicitor General Perrin Beatty suggested that the RCMP was "in a constant

state of readiness", in dealing with terrorists. But he came under criticism for his statement.

Maurice Tugwell, a Professor at the University of New Brunswick said:

"I don't think the RCMP would claim the state of readiness and training and sophistication of equipment of their existing teams (referring to the ERT unit) ... a permanent anti-terrorist unit would have to involve at least three units of 20 men each, with one group on alert, another on standby and the third in training." (Ottawa Citizen, November 30, 1985: A16).

This criticism, among others, made the federal government review its policy and procedure in combatting terrorism. A permanent counter-terrorist assault team would have to be created.

On March 10th, 1986, Perrin Beatty then announced to the law faculty at the University of Toronto that a permanent counter-terrorist unit would be formed in the immediate future, within the RCMP. A specially trained and equipped police assault team would be created to deal with terrorists operating in Canada, when efforts at peaceful negotiations failed. This team is now called SERT - the Special Emergency Response Team. In French, it is the Groupe spécial d'intervention tactique (GSIT). It was formed as a result of the escalation of terrorist

attacks in this country, especially the Turkish embassy siege in 1985.

SERT's function is "to be called in to resolve incidents beyond the capability of normal protective arrangements." (Malarek, Globe and Mail, March 11, 1986). In other words, when negotiations fail between the terrorists and the RCMP, and when the risk to hostages' lives becomes too great, SERT is to be called in when "sophisticated, armed intervention is required." (Kelly, 1987: 48).

The final decision to employ SERT rests with the federal government, namely the Solicitor General, who will give the order to send the counter-terrorist assault team into action.

It was reported at the time that SERT would cost about \$15.6 million to set up in the first year and about \$4.4 million to run the following year. In general, anti-terrorist operations (RCMP specials providing security for the embassies) would be about \$30.7 million. (Globe and Mail, March 11, 1986). Salaries, equipment and costs for operation and maintenance will amount to \$3.7 million for the fiscal year 1986/87 and \$4.4 million the following year. (Amyot, September, 1986: 11).

Like most counter-terrorist assault units we have examined, SERT members are also trained to react on land, at sea and in aircraft. SERT headquarters is located in

Ottawa; however, training is conducted at various locations in the Ottawa region. At Carleton Place, SERT members practise quick entry techniques and hostage rescue, involving cardboard targets and "live hostages." This wooden building, called the "killhouse", represents the size of an ordinary room in a house, where most hostage rescue work would be done. Other training includes hostage-rescue scenarios in high rise buildings and in aircraft. Since their training involves a great deal of marksmanship, a \$1 million range is to be constructed at Dwyer Hill, just outside Ottawa. In common with all other counter-terrorist assault teams, their training also involves rappelling out of helicopters in situations where they must land on rooftops and the maintenance of strength and endurance through body-building exercises.

A Canadian Armed Forces airplane will be at SERT's disposal, ready to transport the unit to wherever it is needed in the country.

"Recruits will have to be highly disciplined individuals who are not trigger-happy under stress, who are extremely physically fit and able to think quickly. They have to have the judgement of knowing when not to shoot."

(Vienneau, Toronto Star, March 11 1986: A1).

Members of SERT are recruited from volunteers

among the 350 ERT members. There are approximately 49 positions with the SERT unit, under the command of Inspector Al Sabean. All candidates are screened for suitability, then evaluated in a two-week selection process which determines the individual's physical and mental capacities. Recruits then undergo a six-month training course, to be followed by continual maintenance training. Originally, SERT members received training in hostage-rescue techniques from the British SAS, the United States FBI and West Germany's GSG-9. (Amyot, September 1986:7). Originally, it was planned to have SERT units divided into two units: half the squad in training for one month, while the other half participated in routine RCMP duties. Every month, the squads were to switch "to maintain a state of normality and to limit stress." However, this policy was changed and SERT members are now on a full-time basis, on call 24 hours a day, in constant training. After a maximum term of four years, SERT members will be re-assigned to other duties. (Liaison, September 1986: 8). SERT candidates must have a minimum of eight years service with the RCMP and the average age of SERT members is 32. (Liaison, September 1986: 11). The effectiveness of SERT cannot be determined since they have yet to be employed. They have no experience as such. It will take several years before Canada's counter-terrorist assault team reaches the

proficiency of West Germany's GSG-9 or Britain's SAS.

CHAPTER FOUR

Literature Review

CONTROL MEASURES: The Military or the Police

The problem of the right use of force raises difficult questions concerning the way in which force should be used and, more precisely, by whom. Should the police take on the task of combatting terrorism as a natural extension of their law-enforcement function or should the responsibility be that of the armed forces, since they are trained to use whatever force is necessary to defeat the enemy? Should responsibility be shared by police and army, the latter being called in to tackle the more serious outbreaks of political violence and unrest? Or should there be a "third force", specially designated, trained and equipped to tackle domestic political violence? (Wilkinson, 1986: 44). It is essential that the responsibility of each organization - the police and the military - be clearly defined.

When responding to a hostage incident, the first police officer on the scene contains and controls the situation. Once the scene is contained, by establishing perimeters, the situation is controlled to a certain degree. The outer perimeter is established by the patrol police, while the inner perimeter is maintained by the tactical response team.

The outer perimeter is always established at a distance, to allow traffic - vehicle and pedestrian - to proceed without any danger. This also allows the media

to be kept at a fair distance.

The inner perimeter may be considered the danger zone, manned by tactical personnel. Tactical personnel are only used as a last resort, since the

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passage of time tends to calm emotional hostage-takers. If negotiations fail and the hostages are in danger, the commander of the tactical team is expected to assault the premises.

However, "Traditional law enforcement tends to be the principal authority involved in a non-political case, whereas government becomes involved in a political case." (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979: 37). This is the situation in Ottawa. It was decided that any terrorist crisis involving embassies and their staffs is political, which means that negotiation and the use of force is the responsibility of the RCMP.

Former RCMP Commissioner Robert Simmonds stated that, all too often, governments react only after they have learned a bitter lesson. It would be somewhat irresponsible not to be prepared (for a terrorist attack), (Amyot, 1986: 6). As well, Clutterbuck commented that:

"It takes a long time to train a soldier and still longer to build up an efficient army, particularly one to deal with with guerilla warfare and terrorism. If the process is not

begun until the attack is imminent, it will be too late." (1977: 48).

The federal government responded by creating an elite group of police officers, trained in military operations, to respond to any terrorist situation of a political nature.

A major weakness regarding this country's law enforcement response to terrorism is jurisdictional rivalry, which causes confusion and hostility at a hostage scene. Politicians and the various police forces at the municipal, provincial and federal levels must learn to minimize this problem, through co-operation and foresight.

On April 1st, 1986, a hostage drama at the Bahamian High Commission ended peacefully, when a male hostage-taker released a female diplomat. A heated argument, however, had arisen between the Ottawa Police Force and the RCMP as to whose jurisdiction this incident fell under. The incident was concluded to be "not political" in nature and, therefore, fell under the jurisdiction of the municipal police force. This incident has resulted in some "professional jealousy".

"One senior police officer said (at the Senate Committee Hearing on Terrorism in Ottawa) that changing leadership is certainly not like changing lines in hockey. It is difficult and

often disruptive. Personalities and egos get involved." (Kelly, 1987: 38).

Many municipal police forces contend that their own officers have certain special capabilities which generally make their tactical teams better placed to deal with emergencies. It will be the local police who are first notified of a terrorist incident and they are first on the scene. For instance, at the Turkish embassy hostage situation it was an Ottawa police officer who first arrived on the scene and provided protection to the ambassador, not the RCMP who are responsible for embassy patrols.

Arguments have been made that the RCMP SERT is new, untried and inexperienced. Most larger municipalities have experienced, sophisticated tactical teams, well-equipped to handle most emergencies. For example, the Peel Regional Police have a tactical team, trained to respond to terrorist incidents, which trains frequently at the Pearson International Airport found within its geographic jurisdiction. They are trained for aircraft assault.

Most police forces have tactical teams immediately available for emergency situations. SERT, however, may be hours away from incidents outside of the immediate Ottawa area.

Jurisdictional rivalry was also experienced in

the 1970 Quebec Crisis where co-operation between the RCMP, Montreal Police and the Quebec Provincial Police was lacking. The Kelly Report raises another question as to why there should even be a SERT unit. Most large municipalities have their own tactical response teams used in emergency situations. One has only to take Ottawa for example. A terrorist incident could be handled by the Ottawa SWAT unit, OPP ERT, the RCMP ERT or SERT, not to mention the Military Police. "The Committees fail to see the logic of one emergency team (the RCMP) being available to supplant another police emergency response team (the provincial or local police)."

(Kelly, 1987: 67)

The Kelly Report stated in its recommendations, that in cases where federal approval is required to solve a demand, such as one involving any of Canada's obligations through international treaties, or when the local police force does not have the capability to respond, or when such a police force asks for assistance,

"There should be no doubt that the federal government has the right to assume total operational command and responsibility.

Otherwise, the Committee feels that, by agreement, the local police forces should be left with the responsibility." (1987: 40).

The United States also has problems in this

jurisdictional area. When the Hanafis, a Black Muslim terrorist organization, attacked three buildings in Washington, D.C., and held 134 hostages for 36 hours, the FBI special tactical teams were called out to the scene.

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However, it was the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police who controlled the operation. The question of who controls a crisis incident in the Capital area has not been resolved. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 84).

Fundamental to the creation of an effective counter-terrorist team is the perception of a clear chain of command. As McGeorge states: that the internal organization must "extend from the national command authority down to the smallest element leader is a preliminary to all other events." (1983: 61).

The Iran rescue force had this problem. In the aftermath of the disaster, it was learned that some pilots did not know or recognize the authority of those giving orders. (McGeorge, 1983: 6).

"Ewe Dee, the chief of the German anti-terrorist team, GSG-9, explained that anti-terrorist success is dependent upon proper training, the best equipment and a lack of bureaucratic interference." (Olin, 1986: 30).

Wilkinson also commented on this point.

"There are weaknesses of administrative centralization, such as bureaucratic remoteness,

insensitivity and burdening decision-making procedures." (1986: 45).

"Some modern counter-insurgency specialists constantly reiterate their demand for these services to be kept under a single unified control." (Wilkinson, 1986: 45).

The criminal justice system, under which the police are found, would fall under one clear chain of command and authority. "By focusing on the act and not the motive, the tendency to lionize the offender is minimized." (Crelinsten, et al, 1978: 18). The acts of terrorism would clearly be labelled murder, mischief, threats and so on, all offences under the criminal code.

On the other hand, if terrorist activity is considered to be an act of war, the police, acting as commandos, may be inappropriate to combat terrorists when force is necessary. "The challenge, then, is not to push the war analogy very far, since it can have misleading, if not indeed dangerous, implications by overdramatizing or distorting the potential threat of terrorism." (Crelinsten, et al, 1978: 26).

However, can a military elite counter-terrorist unit be under control of the police at a terrorist hostage-taking incident? In England, such is the accepted case. As well, one has to recognize the importance of counter-terrorist assault forces that use

methods loosely parallel to those used by the terrorists themselves. Do we want police officers trained in such a manner?

What role can the military play in countering terrorism? It can provide expert training to specialized and weaponry. Its responsibility is the protection of Canada, maintaining external security, while the police are responsible for internal security. Only as a last resort, when all else fails, should the military be called upon as an aid to the civil power.

"The experience of various European countries has shown that defence force personnel can be employed in criminal/terrorist situations without causing public unease or undermining the authority of the police." (Mackenzie-Orr, 1979: 187).

Responding to a terrorist situation may well be handled best by a group of specially trained commandos because it would not diminish the effectiveness of the military. The public knows that the Armed Forces' primary mission is to exclude or eliminate the enemy once war has been declared. Terrorists are fighting such a war. In military jargon, commando units involved in counter-terrorist activities are called "low intensity conflicts" and "dirty little wars." (Thomas, TIME, January 13, 1986: 10). However, terrorists train like

soldiers, think like soldiers, and are equipped with soldiers' weapons. As Gregory states in the journal Conflict Studies (1986: 2), the problem for democratic countries is not that police forces need suffer from lack of equipment with which to cope with crowd violence and terrorists, but rather what should be used, by whom and under what circumstances. The answers are not as simple as one often imagines.

Gregory illustrates two quotations for considering the military in controlling terrorist incidents. (1986: 2).

"A French CRS company commandant: 'If you want someone shot, call the army.' Field Marshal Lord Carver: '... soldiers must not be allowed to be, or appear to be, merely additional policemen; the significance of their deployment is the introduction of their characteristic weapon, the firearm, which is designed to kill.' Brian Crozier feels that, due to advanced weapons now available to terrorists, such weaponry cannot normally be countered by police forces. "It is in itself a strong reason for creating a special (military) task force." (Skeptic, 1976: 48).

Nevertheless, Olin states that a military response to a terrorist situation "would be analogous to using a machete, rather than a scalpel, to remove a

tumour." (1980: 317).

An argument against having the police assume a counter-terrorist "fighting" role is that the police are trained and are recognized by Canadian citizens as using minimal force. Minimal force means to deter or restrain an individual or to contain a violent situation.

Counter-terrorism does not involve minimal force. Where terrorists are hostile and have already killed, deadly force is necessary.

An armed police counter-terrorist response aim is to rapidly disarm the terrorists and to bring them before the courts on criminal charges. In contrast, the military in wartime shoot their enemies on sight. Minimal force is alien to their military training.

The philosophy of military and police tactical teams resemble each other's, but their goals may be quite different. When deadly force is used against terrorists, there is no rule of law.

"The police are trained in a different fashion and a soldier is, in the nature of things, disposed to be more aggressive than his civilian colleague in uniform." (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 154).

The military's constitution and makeup is based on eliminating the opposition, of imposing "deadly force" and a "final sentence".

Gellner states that soldiers are not "psychologically attuned" to the task of being policemen, as in aid to the civil power, and policemen are not psychologically attuned to the task of being a soldier. (1974: 150).

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A commando group is usually the elite group of any army unit and the police are expected to act as such when a terrorist strikes. Soldiers are not trained to use minimum force - only maximum, in order to survive. The soldier uses deadly weapons and is trained to fight in order to survive, to deliver the fatal blow, to kill before being killed. He reacts automatically to the indication of a threat.

While the police officer's ultimate aim is peace, order and apprehension, the soldier's is victory.

Robert Kaplan, former Liberal Solicitor General, favoured the creation of a counter-terrorist commando unit to respond to hostage situations, but he did not like the idea of locating it in the RCMP. Kaplan would have liked to establish such a team in the military.

Mr. Kaplan on the work of the RCMP's SERT unit:

" ... is not a police function. The police in Canada, even in dealing with crime, are community relations people who are conciliators, who try to use the minimum amount of force and intervention.

This what they are trained to do. On the other hand, the SERT has the job of killing people."

(Malarek, Globe and Mail, March 11: 1986).

Mr. Kaplan continues to state that he has met some members of the "infamous" SAS and they are

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"basically a different kind of person than your RCMP member. They're more instinctive. The killer instinct is nurtured in them." (Malarek, Globe and Mail, March 11, 1986).

Ottawa Deputy Police Chief Tom Flanagan, a senior executive member of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, commenting on the newly formed SERT unit:

"The association would have preferred the team to be a military unit ... the new strike force is only to be called in as a last resort, when all police methods have failed and a military assault would be the most effective way to bring an end to such an incident." (The Ottawa Citizen, March 12, 1986).

John Starnes, a former Director of the defunct RCMP security service from 1970 to 1973, would also have preferred the SERT unit to be a military operation. "The raison d'être of a soldier, his experience and his training seem naturally to fit the anti-terrorist role." (The Ottawa Citizen, March 11, 1986).

As Starnes also stated, it leaves him a "bit uneasy" to have a law enforcement officer use the weapons, equipment and tactics of the military. The RCMP are taking a risk in having trained killers (SERT officers) within their force, therefore under their

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control. This could damage the reputation of the RCMP as a fair police force - a reputation they now enjoy. Remember what happened to the Security Intelligence Unit which was within the RCMP and under their "control"! A 1981 Royal Commission into illegal activities by the old Security and Intelligence Branch of the RCMP (e.g., breaking into the Quebec provincial political party headquarters and stealing the membership list) led to the creation of CSIS.

The character-building of the soldier is much different than that of the police officer. The soldier is trained to survive in a war; survival means the elimination of your opponent before he eliminates you. Commandos are trained killers. Army Brigadier General D. Blackburn stated: "Special Forces (commando units) have always been the bastards of the army." (Thomas, TIME, January 13, 1986: 11). Guerrilla soldiers or terrorists, suggested by many authors in my literature review, are an unorthodox group, trained in the art of sabotage and trained to respond with speed and surprise.

The successful assault by the SAS on the Iranian

embassy in London did not gather a positive reaction from everyone. John Le Carré, the famous author of spy novels, stated:

"It is the courage of the thug put to social use. ... We should indeed be thankful that the extreme recourse succeeded. But we should be scared stiff by the sight of shock troops storming London's streets and a little ashamed of having them billed as our national champions." (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 199).

However, given the circumstances of terrorism, the counter-terrorist assault group does need to use deadly force, no matter how disturbing this may be:

If the licence to kill is to be given, even temporarily, let it be given to soldiers. It is better viewed to see a group of military commandos assaulting a building where terrorists are holding hostages, than to see this being done by police officers. Soldiers are trained to kill and police officers are trained to save lives and to kill only when it is absolutely necessary, as a last resort. The public outcry would be enormous if the police killed every terrorist while, if soldiers did the same, this would be better accepted since the soldier is trained in that role. Commandos are ready to kill and have the right to take no chances with terrorists who possibly have already killed and are ready to kill again.

In a situation where an assault is necessary, it is best to leave it to the military so as not to erode the relationship between the public and the police.

In Canada the police may have problems in adapting to counter-terrorism tactics while maintaining their primary role of law enforcement, based as it is on public support and co-operation. Nevertheless, in West Germany their national counter-terrorist assault team, GSG9, is a para-military police organization trained to combat terrorists and they are very much so respected but that is a situation unique to that country. There are many examples which show the police as unprepared or unable to handle terrorist situations.

In May, 1985, the Philadelphia police SWAT team bombed the fortified house of a "terrorist" group called "MOVE". An explosive apparatus was dropped on the roof by a police helicopter. The result was disastrous: eleven people were killed in the house and fire destroyed neighbouring homes. The Mayor had to order the rebuilding of a whole city block and settle numerous lawsuits. The police were simply not prepared to deal with the situation.

Gregory states that a Dutch police union spokesman, Mr. Leen van der Linden, advised his police members "to pack up and run in case of a terrorist attack, because the police have no training and not

enough weapons." (1986: 3).

In commenting on terrorism being handled by police counter-terrorist assault units, Frackers states:

"It is our opinion (Netherlands policy) that training police officers for such duties would render them unfit for the exercise of normal police duty." (1979: 109).

He also suggests that such personnel would have to be established in barracks to be immediately available, as is done in the military. On the other hand, Buckelew suggests that, in view of the Kent State incident where the National Guard shot and killed several students demonstrating against the Vietnam war, the police should be in charge of any counter-terrorist assault unit.

Terrorists, like the military, have access to radio communications and communications monitoring equipment, a range of surveillance devices and a variety of modern military weapons such as: "... armour piercing, exploding, chemically filled projectiles; grenades that may be hand thrown or projected from adaptors to small arms weapons; anti-tank missiles which can be operated by one person and which have ranges in excess of three kilometres; small, easily portable mortars capable of projecting high explosives up to a range of five kilometres, etc." (Mackenzie-Orr, 1979:

182).

The military devotes enormous resources to the study of weapons and training in the use of weapons of all kinds; exercising in the tactics of defeating well-equipped and organized enemy forces. The techniques and methods of terrorists engaged in guerrilla warfare are well understood by the military. They are also experienced in maintaining the morale and efficiency of personnel when, at times, the chance of an actual operation seems remote.

The danger in having the RCMP in control of a counter-terrorist team lies in the fact that the unit itself may suffer from inactivity. There seems to be nothing to do but to train, and to train again. If this was a military responsibility, the unit could be used in conjunction with other specialized troops in a major operation. The military constantly trains in preparation for war. It is expected of them that they do so. Terrorist fighting may be viewed as an extension of their duties. Referring to the SAS, Dobson and Payne state that they are highly-trained, dedicated soldiers, who fulfill a number of functions. Counter-terrorist work, or counter-revolutionary warfare, is just one of those functions. (1986: 43).

What about a police officer? When this writer who, as a member of the Ottawa police force tactical team

has participated with them, spoke to RCMP ERT officers who patrol embassies on a 24-hours a day basis, they stressed the boredom they experience and admitted their eagerness to get involved "in anything". The RCMP's SERT unit will have a problem in maintaining a high degree of efficiency and alertness, not to mention morale, when terrorist incidents are rare. However, this problem will certainly be experienced by members of the military. It is not a problem unique to police officers.

"The RCMP says the growth of international terrorism and demands for more and better policing are straining the force to the point where morale is suffering and investigations are not being done." (The Ottawa Citizen, February 28, 1986).

There is a danger of displacement of use which could be used to justify a counter-terrorist team, either a police or military organization SERT would be deployed as a counter-insurgency unit in, for instance, street riots.

SERT members, since they are all federal police officers, and the military for that matter, are subject to being used incorrectly. To justify the large amount of money spent on the team and the special elite status accorded its members, SERT officers may be ordered to assist regular RCMP officers in the arrest of suspected

criminals. This could result in resentment on the part of those regular police officers at the intrusion of SERT into these operations, as well as the creation of jealousy among other specialized police units such as ERT.

There is always the danger that the government might make the mistake of relying on SERT to break up industrial strikes or civil protests. This would destroy the reputation of the RCMP for political neutrality. The public might look at the unit with distrust and fear, destroying the relationship of trust and confidence enjoyed by the RCMP in Canada. Elite units, either military or police, create a certain fear among many people. They are often viewed as different, superior and dangerous. (Cohen: 1978: 15). There is the added danger of the counter-terrorist force abusing its power, losing its identification with local communities, losing invaluable trust and support. (Wilkinson, 1986: 45).

"If you train people endlessly to do something, they get frustrated if they are not allowed to do it and, if nobody could provide some convenient terrorism, they might go out and misbehave themselves." (Lord Grey, 1979: 51).

The SERT commando's life consists of constant training of various kinds which, necessary though it is, does not solve the problems of boredom and low morale.

They have yet to experience a call to a terrorist situation. They are affected by inaction, which brings about the danger of "politicking", a term used by Dobson and Payne to explain the army involvement in political plotting. It is doubtful this could happen in Canada; however, there is the danger that this elite police unit could be sent to support ERT members in a non-political operation, for instance bank robbery. Long periods of inaction may also bring about unnecessarily violent assaults and bursts of extreme action. On the other hand, a soldier's life consists of long periods of inaction. In peacetime, one trains in preparation for war. It takes a long time to train a soldier and even longer to create a commando unit efficient enough to combat terrorism. Soldiers, like firefighters, spend very little of their time actually fighting fires, but they are always ready. They have to be prepared before it is too late. The Israeli's Sayaret commando unit commented on the Entebbe mission:

"When they were asked how they felt about being given the green light, they responded by noting that they had trained so long and so hard for such a mission that there was a great excitement in having the opportunity to execute it." (Miller, 1980: 64).

"If you want to find out what's wrong with your

outfit, try it on something important. This has been a statement generally accepted as true since the Roman legions and their wars." (Middleton, The New York Times, April 26, 1980: 9).

The United States Delta team failed in the rescue of 53 American hostages in Iran. It is now learning from its mistakes.

Daskal recognizes that force used against terrorists should be applied quickly, precisely and thoroughly. Counter-terrorist response groups should not be the responsibility of the police as "armed insurgents are not ordinary criminals: they are self-perceived revolutionaries and soldiers. ... Insurgents, unlike criminals, cannot be expected to surrender to an inferior force." (1986: 38). However, West Germany's GSG9, a para-military police unit or the United States FBI's HRT unit is certainly not an inferior force.

Inspector Sabeau states in the Liaison journal that:

"Terrorism is nothing more than a criminal act, therefore it belongs under the jurisdiction of the police. The FBI, the GSG-9 (border guard) and the counter-terrorist units of Italy and France are also functions of police agencies in their countries." (Amyot, 1986: 8).

A review on the issue of classification, e.g., is GSG9 a

police unit, a military unit or a joint police-military unit will be reviewed later in the thesis. The issue of classification of certain counter-terrorist assault teams is not so evident.

Charters was considering the question of who should provide the counter-terrorist team - the Canadian Armed Forces or the RCMP:

"Could the RCMP afford to detach several hundred policemen for long periods to prepare for a task which bears no relation to normal police work? Such long separations might be harmful to the individual policemen's career, but short-term attachments or intermittent training would not produce a unit of the desired high standard."

(1980: 29).

He further states:

"The siege breaking anti-terrorist role is, after all, essentially a military one." (1980: 30).

The RCMP enjoys a great deal of public confidence and co-operation. Why should this be jeopardized by having them assume the role of terrorist fighters?

"It would be possible to train selected squads of policemen to fight like infantry platoons, but it would in that case be wise to second constables to that duty for a limited period, after which

they would return to normal duties. Otherwise, there would be a risk of a rather different type of man emerging in police uniform and creating a rather different image." (Clutterbuck, 1977: 112).

Charters states that the assignment of policemen to an essentially para-military task would raise questions about the sort of public image the RCMP would wish to project. "One is forced to wonder if they would be prepared to accept an even more violent role for the men in scarlet." (1980: 29). On the other hand, the West German people seem to have accepted such a role for the members of GSG9.

"Civilian forces (the police) lack the time, funding, personnel or equipment to engage in military type operations." (Sloan, 1980: 17).

Sloan's comment may be unjustified since Canada has created SERT specifically to combat terrorists. They have been given the time, funding, personnel and equipment to engage in proper "military type operations". The reliance on sophisticated weaponry without the complementary, essential training, is not apparent. However, Sloan further states that "as a matter of public policy, military type operations go beyond the duties of the police." (1980: 17).

Gellner states that Canada would need a force

of about 3,000 police officers, of all ranks, stationed in a central location, close to an airfield of the Canadian Armed Forces, in dealing with counter-terrorist situations. He suggests that the only function of the military would be to convey this unit to its destination. (1974: 178).

If such a large number of men would be needed for this task, due to Canada's huge geographical area, would it not be logical to involve the military since it has installations throughout the country?

Can the RCMP afford to train a great number of men for the sole purpose of counter-terrorism, only to be released to general patrol work after a four year stint? If members of SERT are adequately trained and equipped to counter terrorism, how will they deal with the public once their tour of duty has been completed? Alternatively, the same reasoning may be applied to soldiers, e.g., Vietnam veterans, returning to civilian life.

The military can afford to train a large number of men in counter-terrorist tactics because its purpose is to combat enemies, to defend the country. If a member of such a military commando unit was to be released to another unit, he can always rely on his experience later on in years if he is called on to defend this nation.

There would, of course, be dangers involved in deploying the military to combat terrorist groups. Some would argue as to the unnecessarily high military profile, which could escalate the level of violence. The country could appear to be at war. There could also be an over-reaction by the military, causing hostility against the army by certain sections of the community. The police are well aware of that strain, which is considerable in the eyes of patrol police officers. Also, there is the risk that the government (the civil power) may become overdependent on the military's presence and request them at any level of violence, terrorist or not.

"But the calling-in of troops is a very emotive business; there may be some reluctance of the police to advise it; there will probably be some ministerial hesitation to approve it; and it is always a matter of judgement whether at any particular time the involvement of the Armed Forces will make matters better or worse." (Lord Grey, 1979: 43).

Such a decision will be closely scrutinized, long after the heat of the moment has passed, Lord Grey also stated.

Military counter-terrorist commandos must act within "the tight framework of the law and under very strict government control". An assault is conducted for

a short, limited time, at which the response is a disciplined one. Once the support to the civil power is over, the operation is handed back to the police.

Wilkinson believes that "the Army should be handed the overall task of maintaining internal security and order as a last resort ... and they should be withdrawn as soon as the level of violence has dropped to a level at which the police can act effectively." (1986: 24).

Charters states that it will take years before SERT teams are really honed to perfection. Charters also suggests that he would have preferred to have the counter-terrorist team linked to the armed forces, because it is geared as a military operation, not a police operation. "What you're requiring people to do is engage in a small act of war. ... It's so different from normal policing." (The Ottawa Citizen, March 12, 1986). Inspector Al Sabeau, SERT commander, stated "SERT is always ready for action because of its experience." (Amyot, 1986: 8). What experience? However, a military assault-force would be found in the same situation.

Clutterbuck feels strongly that the military should be responsible for combatting terrorists.

"Thank goodness, we do not have a police force trained to do fire and movement with guns! ... When the situation cannot be handled by two or

three police marksmen, the soldier should be called in." (1979: 68).

This demonstrates the British mentality of not having its police officers trained in weaponry.

"Soldiers should be called in when it seems likely that the attack may lead to a tactical battle involving fire and movement; that is, when two or more widely separated units of armed men have to operate as a team, one group giving covering fire, while others close with the enemy from a different direction. The British police are neither equipped nor trained for such a role and it is better that they should not be."

(Clutterbuck, 1977: 111).

Hocking says that there is provision for the use of armed forces in a civilian matter. She mentions the Australian SAS, a specialized counter-terrorist unit to be used as a last resort in counter-terrorist operations. (1986: 303).

As well, Waugh seems to prefer an assault team under the jurisdiction of the military. "Negotiations may also be used as a delaying tactic to permit the responding government to marshall its forces for a military action. ..." (Waugh, 1982: 148).

Bernard Déchant, in 1976 a sergeant with the RCMP, produced a paper regarding counter-terrorist

procedures involving the police and the military. He recognized that traditional methods used to catch common criminals are not adequate to handle a terrorist situation. It is not a "cops and robbers" affair. He felt that the need for a counter-terrorist assault team in Canada is not entirely apparent but if it ever came to that we should benefit and borrow from the professionalism of others who have studied and experienced terrorist problems.

" ... because terrorism is a form of unconventional warfare that our military make greater efforts to acquaint themselves with the problem of terrorism. Military assistance may become a requirement, especially if we are confronted by sophisticated terrorist technology." (1976: 11). He goes on to state that any terrorist act involving nuclear materials could be entrusted to the military.

Sir John Hermon, commenting on the Royal Ulster Constabulary of Northern Ireland, a para-military police organization states that "It is in an effort to combat terrorism and it is clear that there is not in our situation a police or law and order solution. ... The Army are tasked and deployed in a detailed way that best services police purposes and is governed by police objectives." (1985: 137).

Warner states that the "unity of command" must

be maintained when the army is called in.

"If an ongoing anti-terrorist operation requires resources beyond the capability of the police and the military are brought in, responsibility shifts from the police to the military commander until the situation is under control." (1987: 31).

Mallin feels that the military should handle terrorist incidents only when the police are unable to control the problem. He states that one must "observe the level of intensity of terrorist acts." (1977: 101). He goes on to say that if terrorism is rampant, with the government in danger of being overthrown, and is being used as a military weapon such as guerrilla warfare, it is beyond the means of the police.

Israel, Cyprus, Algeria and Northern Ireland were mentioned by Mallin as having the military as their main force in countering terrorism.

Clutterbuck states that if such a force is to be created, it should be the military "such as England's SAS, as they are trained to do this kind of work anyway." (1979: 68).

"It (terrorism) cannot be countered by police who view terrorism as simply one more type of criminal activity: identify the criminals, arrest them, throw them in prison or perhaps

shoot them and the problem is solved." (Mallins, 1977: 93). On the other hand, can the military handle the situation differently?

Epstein states that the military can play a role in combatting terrorism; however, they should only be called out to meet threats of great severity beyond the capability of the reinforced counter-terrorist police. He mentions attacks by ten or more men with automatic weapons, mortar barrages on police stations or mined road ambushes as not being normal police encounters. (1986: 50)

Samuel Huntington, referring to elite military units of the commando genre, where their specialty consists in guerrilla warfare and counter-terrorism, states that:

"These elite units are distinguished by the fact that they seem to be both more military than regular military forces, in terms of traditional military virtues and skills and also, at the same time, more political than regular military forces in the extent to which they capture the interest and imagination of politicians and the public and also in the nature of the tasks which they are often called upon to perform." (Cohen, 1978: 12).

Jenkins comments on the utility and feasibility

of the military option in combatting terrorism. He defines the military option as the supplanting of the regular police by the military and as a temporary support for the police. The military may be required for the rescue of nations held hostage abroad and the recovery of "sensitive facilities" which have been seized by terrorists, such as nuclear facilities, offshore platforms and ships. The military, as suggested by Jenkins, could also be used to attack the bases of a terrorist group operating from another country. (1977: 153). He further suggests that any action taken outside a country should be a military operation, as should certain operations within one's own borders. However, West Germany's GSG9 have been used successfully abroad and they are a para-military police organization.

Under certain United States legislation, posse comitatus, a law which prohibits the use of the Armed Forces in a law enforcement function, may now be suspended where the military responds to a threat to the lives of diplomats in the United States. (Jenkins, 1977: 152).

Contrary to the statements of others, Netanyahu comments that the rescuing of hostages requires the need for minimizing firepower. If the military are to be given the job, they should recognize this point.

"In storming a building or an enclosed space held

by an enemy, the normal military procedure is to shoot (or detonate) first and look later. But in rescuing hostages, the soldier's job is exactly the opposite: he must look first and shoot later." (1986: 209).

Netanyahu believes in military force when such action is needed to resolve a problem. He further states that, for years afterwards, the countries of West Germany, Holland and England experienced no further acts of hostage-taking as they successfully applied military force. (1986: 208). However, police counter-terrorist assault teams train in the use of "military force", which implies military-type training.

Wolf suggests that both organizations should be utilized in counter-terrorism.

"Democratic States should carefully consider the development and utilization of specially skilled units of both their police and armed forces to suppress terrorist actions in progress." (1981: 101).

The Kelly Report, however, "feels it is more logical to locate SERT within the Department of National Defence." (1987: 67). The Kelly Report's reasoning is based on the following arguments: the RCMP will continue to rely on transportation, logistical training such as research capability to evaluate and apply new assault

tactics, weapons, explosives and equipment technology, as well as other support, from DND. Would SERT, under the RCMP, be able to respond effectively to two or more incidents happening simultaneously across Canada? Even if there is only one such incident, would they be able to respond in time to that incident if it is happening at the other end of the country?

The Kelly Report recommends that RCMP SERT officers be seconded to DND until their normal SERT duty has been completed, so as to avoid unnecessary waste of resources used to train them. Therefore, the counter-terrorist unit would gradually comprise only armed forces personnel. (1987: 68).

The Kelly Report recognizes that terrorists are criminals; therefore, it has concluded that SERT, under DND, should remain under the Department of the Solicitor General, as this is the "proper location for co-ordinating the federal counter-terrorism structure." (1987: 68). Since the RCMP and CSIS (the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service - a counter-terrorist agency) report to the Solicitor General, and in view of the fact that terrorism is a function of internal security, such a recommendation is wise. In this way, resources and intelligence will come under one line of clear communication. There is no potential for duplication or "turf battles", as the Solicitor General

will have the final say.

The roles of other agencies playing a part in counter-terrorism will have to be specifically legislated. Criticism between agencies (police and military) within this structure should be reviewed clearly to determine the effectiveness of having SERT under DND.

The Kelly Report strongly suggests that if SERT is to remain within the responsibility of the RCMP, there should be joint training exercises between the RCMP and the provincial and local police forces in at least some of the major municipalities. Such co-operation would resolve jurisdictional disputes between police forces at an actual terrorist incident and would acquaint each police force with the capabilities, qualifications and training of the other.

The Kelly Report criticized the RCMP's inflexible attitude on joint training. SERT has suggested that "joint training would be of limited utility, as the SERT represents a qualitatively different response from local teams or from RCMP's ERT. ... (It would be understood) that the final assault would only be undertaken by SERT." (Kelly, 1987: 40).

Canada must wake up to the threat of a maritime terrorist attack, since a great deal of our exports and imports are moved by sea.

"An internationally famous expert (not named) on maritime law enforcement claims that a tanker in a harbour is a bomb waiting to go off and predicts there will be a tanker take-over somewhere in the world during this decade."  
(Matt, 1981: 65).

Not too long ago, an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists. An American passenger was murdered and the other passengers were held captive for several days. Ships may be poor targets for hijacking, compared to aircraft. However, if terrorists are seeking publicity for their cause as a primary objective, the uniqueness of a ship hijacking has great appeal.

It is probable that we may face take-over attempts involving tankers, drilling rigs and offshore oil drilling platforms in the near future.

The military as well must be aware of terrorism and be ready to combat it, more particularly the navy. Admiral Harry Train of the United States Navy states:

"Whether or not terrorism at sea becomes a reality is not the issue. The issue is whether or not we ignore the potential for terrorism and fail to act now." (Barnett, 1983: 470).

Maritime counter-terrorism is only an extension of the navy's role in protecting our nation and the

responsibility should be given to them.

In our country, the protection of the public and the detection and prevention of crime is the function of the police. The fight against terrorism, however - because of its military ramifications - may involve a non-law enforcement agency such as the military. This would require an elite military troop of commandos, such as England's SAS, specifically trained to combat terrorism.

#### Responding Abroad

A government has primary jurisdiction within its own borders. Its responsibility for the protection of its people and its guests requires it to respond to any terrorist act or hostage-taking. However, maintaining security does not apply only to lands within its borders but may involve the crossing of boundaries. Counter-terrorist assault groups may be required to respond outside territorial jurisdiction.

The fight against terrorism cannot be limited to domestic measures. Many acts of terrorism are of an international nature and must be addressed as such. This requires an exchange of intelligence on terrorists between countries and, as a last resort, the use of force to stop terrorist actions. However, host countries must either possess their own expert counter-terrorist assault teams or invite victim governments to bring their

specialized teams to combat the terrorist threat. A possible scenario could be Canada's SERT unit being invited to a small African country where an Air Canada 747, with a few hundred Canadian passengers on board, has been skyjacked. This incident is a direct challenge to the Canadian government where the maintenance of authority, security and even public order is threatened.

Another situation which would require a counter-terrorist assault team to respond abroad would be if the country in which the incident is occurring blatantly refuses to help. The decision to send a team abroad would be determined by the degree of help being received from the country in which the terrorist act is being committed. The responding counter-terrorist team would have to assess the element of threat.

It is difficult for a counter-terrorist team to enter another country in order to rescue its hostages, unless it is invited to do so by the government of that country. The international community is sensitive about such matters. "States must respect each other's political sovereignty and territorial integrity unless by its conduct a state forfeits this right." (Nadin, 1984: 300). A state which collaborates with terrorists or fails to act properly in safeguarding the lives of hostages exposes itself to the rightful efforts of other countries to rescue their citizens from the hands of terrorists. A

rescue attempt in another country is complicated further when the terrorists are sponsored by the state. Unlike committing their act in a democratic country where they must be concerned about avoiding arrest, obtaining supplies and weapons and gathering intelligence on their targets, terrorists are relatively free in state-sponsorship countries. Consider the Iranian hostage crisis, for example. The Iranian government did not work to attain the release of the American hostages. They sought only to prolong their captivity, thereby escalating the crisis. For logistical reasons, a rescue attempt by the American Delta Unit would have been far easier had the Iranian government not been aiding the "terrorists".

Iran, under the guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini, defied the norms and conventions of diplomatic relations when it failed to provide protection for United States personnel and property when the U.S. embassy in Teheran was seized on November 4th, 1979. In fact, Iran embarrassed the Carter administration by holding the Americans hostage for 444 days.

"Countries which do not have the ability to act on their own may be prepared to make use of such a force when this proves necessary. As well, there may be sufficient support for such action that the world will recognize the right of the force to act against a state

which refuses to take any action against terrorists or offers such persons haven". (Green, 1982: 110).

Netanyahu suggests that when a hijacking or a piracy occurs, it should be the responsibility of the government on whose ship or plane the incident takes place. If a government cannot or will not undertake to forcibly end a hostage situation when negotiations have failed, it forfeits its jurisdiction over the crisis. The country whose plane or ship is held hostage has the right to act when the host country cannot or refuses to do so. (1986: 215).

In regard to the issue of sending an elite rescue force to another country, Wilkinson states it would be wiser not to employ military intervention, "especially if the delinquent state is both fanatically ruthless and heavily armed. The resulting loss of innocent life and danger of triggering a major war may rule out the possibility of a military rescue force option." (1986: 273). The country under attack might call on its allies, perhaps even the Soviet Union, to protect it. The conflict may draw in the two Superpowers. Wilkinson feels there are other measures that may be undertaken, such as diplomatic and economic sanctions. However, Wilkinson states that there are occasions, as exemplified at Entebbe, when a military option is both "feasible and desirable."

A commando response outside the country must be well calculated so as to preserve popular support, within and outside the country.

"Definition of the status of the terrorists, the validity of their grievances and the relationship of the violence to government authority, is the fundamental prerequisite to government action."

(Waugh, 1982: 116).

The assumption, under diplomatic rules, is that governments, within their own jurisdictions, will offer at least some resistance to terrorists, either through negotiation or through the use of force. That resistance, passive or active, is an attempt to respond quickly to the present situation and, by example, to eliminate any terrorist activity in the near future. If governments do not respond quickly enough, or are in collusion with the terrorist group or are not prepared to deal with the situation, the target government ultimately must respond, not only for its own sake but for the sake of its nationals if those people are threatened.

If a counter-terrorist assault unit is to be sent abroad, there has to be a set, clear policy on what is needed to approve such an operation. Diplomatic preparation has to be made for such a raid, if possible, between the host and target country. Governments must clearly communicate. Failure to do so will result in

greater failure. Such was the case at Larnaca airport in Cyprus, where, in February 1978, two Palestinian terrorists took hostages at the Hilton Hotel and later killed a personal friend of then Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. They demanded an Air Cyprus airplane, which the Cypriots provided. Every airport in the Middle East was closed to the terrorists; therefore, they were forced to return to Larnaca. President Sadat ordered a crew of special commandos dispatched to Larnaca. President Spinos Kyprianon of Cyprus did not give authorization to the rescue mission. This resulted in an exchange of gunfire between Egyptian commandos and Cypriot National Guard when they approached the skyjacked plane. The Egyptians lost 15 commandos. (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 149).

"What is required is a European Community anti-terrorist group to work under the direction of the Council of Ministers." (Wilkinson, 1974: 150).

Wilkinson feels it is too easy for terrorists to confuse each national police force by moving their operations from one country to another. "The governments of Europe will find strength through unity." (Wilkinson, 1974: 151).

Hutchinson suggested that "globally, an international police force, perhaps under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA), could be

mandated to respond to terrorism." (1977: 310). Such an organization could be composed of military or police personnel. Hutchinson is referring to crises where terrorists have seized control of a nuclear plant or situations where countries with nuclear facilities are not co-operating with the IAEA. In these cases, the international police force would respond. While visiting Canada and the United States, former Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel put forward a recommendation to create a "Transnational Counter-Terrorist Commando Force". This group would be composed of several nations experiencing problems with terrorism and could include moderate Arab countries like Egypt and Morocco. This proposal would allow small "worldwide alliance assault groups" to cross boundaries. Such an alliance would also stress the sharing of intelligence. (The Ottawa Citizen, September 20, 1986; Robb, The Ottawa Citizen, September 18, 1986).

Countries experiencing terrorist activity have formed their own counter-terrorist assault units to deal with terrorist incidents. The United States, France, West Germany and England for instance all have experienced commandos, trained to combat terrorists. This duplication of effort questions Peres' suggestion. As well, a country enjoying a high profile and excellent reputation for its assault force, such as Britain's SAS,

would lose its deterrence effect - not to mention the logistical problems of having several countries wanting to control the Transnational Commando Force. For example, not all countries even agree on the definition of terrorism and such a unit may be used extensively in one country and never in another. These would be but a few of the problems involved.

Connie de Boer conducted a poll regarding the solution and prevention of terrorism. Both a group representing the United States and another representing Britain were asked the following question. "A Special World Force (not specified if either military, police or both) should be organized which would operate in any country of the world and which would investigate terrorist groups, arrest them and put their leaders and members to death." 55% in the U.S. were in favour and 66% in Great Britain. 29% in the U.S. were opposed and 19% were opposed in Britain. The rest were not sure. Surprisingly enough, a high percentage echoed Peres' suggestion of creating a world counter-terrorist team. (De Boer, 1979: 414).

"Certain appropriate forces for hostage rescue could be earmarked by the U.N." (Wilkinson, 1986: 273). The U.N. could enlarge their peace enforcement to that of a highly specialized hostage-rescue unit, acting on behalf of a victim state. In theory this is appealing, but in practice may be difficult to achieve. Again, many

countries do not agree on the definition of terrorism. Many use the term out of context or to their own advantage. A firm policy would have to be clearly spelled out as to when such a team may be used. There is also a feasibility problem. Countries which have fewer terrorist activities "will try to free ride on nations with more incidents. Overall, contributions will be sub-optimal", (Sandler et al, 1983: 49), as countries with high level terrorist activities are more apt to contribute to the maintenance of a counter-terrorist assault unit.

There are, however, certain advantages to be gained if such a unit came into existence. Repeated use of the same unit would increase its effectiveness. Many countries which maintain their own force do not gain any experience, i.e., Canada's SERT. There would be a better exchange of intelligence, as the transnational force would receive information from countries having a share in this unit. "Moreover, the associated communication and information linkages formed by the club can be used to co-ordinate other efforts in deterring terrorism." (Sandler et al, 1983: 51). Sandler also suggests that an individual country set up such a unit and charge "user fees" for its use; therefore no transnational force is even required. That brings a whole new set of problems, namely administrative complexity - i.e. who will control

them? - and moral issues, i.e. will they be used in South Africa to combat "freedom fighters"?

One has to balance the challenge and the response. If no action is taken, the government appears weak, but if the government overreacts, it may be exactly what the terrorists are seeking. If nothing is done to secure a terrorist situation in a foreign country by that country's government, and Canadian interests are involved, then it is Canada's responsibility to act.

The Kelly Report supports the stand that Canada should have an assault force available and ready to rescue Canadians in hostage-taking incidents outside Canada. The government would likely intervene in an incident taking place in another country only as a last resort and only after being invited to do so by the host government.

Having SERT under the direction of the RCMP limits the police powers of the RCMP in Canada. Under the RCMP Act, as now constituted, the RCMP would have no police powers outside of Canada. The Kelly Report states that "it is concerned that the government has not already made a policy decision on this matter ... the government should avoid being confronted with a terrorist emergency abroad without having worked through how to respond." (1987: 34).

In 1986, when SERT was given the mandate to combat terrorism within Canada, no known study had been conducted to determine which organization - military or police - should deal with terrorist incidents, more specifically hostage takings. This author, aware of this fact, was concerned that the alternatives had not been considered. This concern led the writer to research the topic for the thesis requirement in the Master of Criminology Program.

In 1987, one year after the decision to make the RCMP (SERT) responsible, a Senate Committee was set up to study the issue.

In investigating a phenomenon, the method chosen is usually determined by the problem to be solved and the resources available. (Barker, 1985: 16). To answer the question posed: "Who should be responsible in Canada for establishing a counter-terrorist team - military or police", it became evident two methods were appropriate.

The comparative survey was used in Chapter Six to give the reader some knowledge of what terrorism and counter-terrorism involve. This comparison can offer Canada a number of alternatives; but no absolutes.

The second method appropriate to examine this issue, for Canadians in Canada, was the survey method. To facilitate this, a questionnaire was developed.

CHAPTER FIVE

Methodology

The use of questionnaires and interviews has been used extensively regarding subject input. It is a technique that has long been used in sociological research and involves asking a sample of relevant subjects a fixed set of questions. (Juliani et al., 1983: 7). The questions may be conducted in the form of personal interviews, by telephone or through a questionnaire mailed to them.

Some questionnaires use "naive" subjects. The use of questionnaires is only successful if those involved have some background in the subject and can provide "educated" responses.

Due to the nature of the RCMP organization, it would be difficult to interview members of SERT. As well, it would be impossible to interview members of a terrorist group to obtain input on what force they would prefer to deal with!

The problem, then, is to determine who might provide those "educated" responses and who is available to answer such a questionnaire. A variation of the Delphi Method was used to provide such respondents. The Delphi Method is characterized by the use of individual experts in a certain field, where their knowledge and opinion is used to answer a problem. To aid the researcher in drawing conclusions from the questionnaire the respondents are asked to provide pertinent answers

and opinions to a series of questions. The researcher then compiles the responses and reaches an understanding of how the group views the issue. Significant agreement or disagreement can then be explored. Dalkey defines this technique as an extraction of information from a number of persons, said experts, and putting it together to form a more reliable opinion. (1972: 15).

An expert is defined as one having some degree of general background knowledge in his field of specialization. One way to test an expert's performance is through proven reliability. "The more often he proved himself correct, the greater would be his authority as an expert." (Quade, 1982: 188). An expert's qualifications can also be based on his accuracy regarding predictions, as well as years of professional experience in a certain field, number of publications, academic rank, etc. Therefore, in the Delphi Method, it is up to the researcher to decide, based on what was said, who is an expert and who is not.

The handling of a complex problem usually calls for the judgement of experts. It is only normal that the more expert the judgement, the greater likelihood that the advice will be sound. (Quade, 1982: 186).

As Olaf Helmer, (1966: 11), states, it is an absolute necessity that:

"Expert opinion must be called on whenever it

becomes necessary to choose among several alternative courses of action in the absence of an accepted body of theoretical knowledge that would clearly single out one course as the preferred alternative." (Quade, 1982: 187).

The Delphi Method was originally used in 1950 in a U.S. Air Force-sponsored Rand Corporation study - Project Delphi. It sought to determine what Soviet strategic planners might consider an optimal U.S. target system, as well as to estimate the number of atom bombs the U.S. would need to reduce the munitions production. (Juliani et al., 1983: 9; Oalkey and Helmer, 1963). The Delphi Method today is used to "estimate the answer to an uncertain question for which there is no well defined way of finding a definitive answer at the time of the exercise." (Quade, 1982: 204).

What determines the application of the Delphi Method? What makes it the more desirable choice for data collecting? Linstone and Turoff list one or more of the following properties which lead to the need for employing Delphi. The first one is that the problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques but can benefit from subjective judgements on a collective basis. The second property is that time and cost make frequent group meetings unfeasible and the third is that the "heterogeneity" of the participants must be preserved to

assure validity of the results. (1975: 4). A mixture of respondents will avoid domination by quantity known as the bandwagon effect.

"There is a growing recognition of the need to incorporate subjective information directly into evaluation models dealing with the more complex problems facing society: environment, health, transportation, etc." (Linstone and Turoff, 1975: 11).

The Delphi Method has a wide area of application. Extensive use has been made by industrial and urban planners, research managers and policy-makers for technological forecasting, corporate planning, organizational decision-making and policy making. (Quade, 1982: 205). It was used in 1968 by former U.S. President Richard Nixon regarding drug abuse. It is also being used by the U.S. Air Force regarding technology in the future and by Bell Canada for expert knowledge in the field of communications.

In order to allow the experts the freedom to answer the questions without restriction, this writer chose to use the open-ended questionnaire format. The respondent is asked to provide his own answer (rather than choosing from a number offered him) and it is hoped the respondent will give detailed opinion and comments, based on his expert knowledge.

The original use of the Delphi Method was to seek a consensus among a group of experts. However, it was recognized that generating a consensus is not the prime objective. What is significant is that "every Delphi inquiry can be expected to produce results of some kind." (Scheele, 1975: 68). With the evolution of the Delphi Method, it is significant to recognize that a difference of opinion has to be respected, especially if it comes from an expert.

A consensus on any particular topic can never be guaranteed. The respondent group may just never reach a consensus. However, Quade states "whereas a true consensus is not always achieved, a convergence towards a consensus almost always takes place." (1982: 205).

The Delphi is a decision-analysis tool and not a decision-making tool. (Turoff, 1975: 100). The objective of the Delphi Method is to provide the best possible information on a stated problem and to ensure that all the options are forwarded to the researcher.

A response from several terrorism experts will give the best informed opinion, based on specialized knowledge in the field of terrorism. Regardless of the differences in answers between individual expert respondents, it is hoped that feedback provided to them from other terrorist experts will result in some type of consensus being reached on the subject matter. If no

group consensus is reached, the researcher will still retain expert group opinions in which he will add to his final evaluation in the study. Due to a lack of time, only one round was utilized. This writer was still provided with useful and informative responses. The consensus part of this Method was never attempted. Nevertheless, the questionnaire became an effective means of arriving at an answer to an uncertain question. The establishment of SERT prior to the questionnaire may have influenced the answers given by the respondents since they may feel that the decision has already been made. For this reason, the comparative survey was also utilized in the methodology research. As discussed earlier, this writer used experts as his sample population. Each expert involved has a background in the field of criminology, policing or terrorism.

In total, 55 experts were contacted. Breaking this down, 34 were academics - professors and researchers - and 21 were operationals - military or police officers.

Of the 55 questioned, 22 experts responded, which is a very good response rate.

The sample population, all experts, is as follows:

Governments  
and  
Academics

CHARTERS, David, Centre For Conflict Studies, New Brunswick.

THOMPSON, John, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies,  
Toronto, Ontario.

MITCHELL, Thomas, Conference Board of Canada, Ottawa,  
Ontario.

DEWITT, David, Strategic Studies Research program, York  
University, Toronto, Ontario

HAMIZRACHI, Colonel Yoram, Counter-Terror Study Centre,  
University of Manitoba

ST. JOHN, Peter, Counter-Terror Study Centre, University  
of Manitoba

KELLETT, Anthony, Department of National Defence, Ottawa,  
Ontario

KELLY, Senator William, Senate Committee on Terrorism,  
Ottawa, Ontario

FARSON, Stuart, Centre of Criminology, University of  
Toronto, Ontario

WALLACK, M., Department of Political Science, Memorial  
University, St. Johns, Newfoundland

SHEARING, Clifford, Centre of Criminology, University of  
Toronto, Ontario

RUSSELL, Peter, Political Science Department, University  
of Toronto, Ontario

HENDERSON, Robert, Political Science, University of  
Western Ontario, London, Ontario

BRODEUR, Jean-Paul, School of Criminology, University of  
Montreal, Montreal, Quebec

TURK, Austin, Sociology Department, University of  
Toronto, Ontario

JORGENSEN, Birthe, University of Toronto, Ontario

GREEN, Leslie, Department of Political Science,  
University of Alberta.

Operationals

BARSS, Cpl. Bob, Halifax Police, Halifax, N.S.

COTTRELL, S/Sgt. Randy, Calgary Police, Calgary, Alberta

SHYKITA, Inspector M.G., Regina Police, Regina,  
Saskatchewan

CHARBOT, S/Sgt. Terry, Ottawa Police, Ottawa, Ontario

DEEVY, Superintendent J.C.K., R.C.M.P.

What is meant by terrorism depends largely on who is using the term and in what reference. Therefore, in the questionnaire, it was necessary to provide a working definition. This was explained in the covering letter to each participant. A copy of the covering letter and questionnaire follow.

Monday, May 25, 1987

Dear

My thesis advisor, Professor Ronald Crelinsten, and I request your assistance in providing your insights and knowledge on the subject of counter-terrorism, more specifically on the question of a counter-terrorist assault team. Which organization in Canada is best suited to combat terrorist groups when force is needed to resolve a crisis situation, the police or the military?

After the police recognize that negotiations have failed or are futile with a certain terrorist organization or that the hostages, if any are involved, are seriously threatened, it decides to use force. However controversial the decision has been, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was assigned the responsibility of combatting terrorists in this country. They created a counter-terrorist assault team called Special Emergency Response Team or SERT. Some criticism has been levelled to suggest that any commando actions are not a police role but a military one.

The purpose of this study is to investigate which organization should respond to terrorist incidents, when force is necessary.

You have been chosen to answer a questionnaire relating to counter-terrorism. Knowledgeable individuals were chosen from a variety of fields and disciplines in order to provide a well-balanced set of perspectives on the subject. This will provide me with the best possible information which I will then analyse.

I hope you will take the time to answer the questionnaire. I would appreciate receiving your reply before July 1st, 1987, as I need the months of July and August to analyze my data.

(Letter continued)

A final word: May I quote from your answers in my thesis?

- A. Yes, with personal attribution
- B. Yes, without personal attribution (e.g. one leading Canadian terrorist expert ...)
- C. No, information is only for background.

Please send your reply to the following address:

Dr. Ronald Crelinsten  
Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa  
75 Laurier Street East  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1N 6N5

(tel. 564-7850 or 564-4070).

You may use the enclosed stamped envelope.

Yours truly,

(Signed) Gilles Larochelle

Name:

Present Occupation:

Institutional Affiliation:

Mailing Address:

Nature of Main Interest in Subject of Terrorism:

N.B.: Please return this completed sheet with your replies to the four questions on the following page.

Terrorism is one of those terms that is easy to use but difficult to define, at least so that consensus about the definition can be reached. (Crelinsten, Terrorism and Criminal Justice, 1978: 5)

There are basically two types of terrorism. Terrorism used by the State as an instrument of repression to control the masses and the second type is terrorism against the State. This study will focus on the latter. To avoid undue confusion in the use of the term terrorism, it is necessary at this point to offer a tentative definition. A comprehensive definition is almost impossible while an operational definition is possible. Terrorism, viewed in a political context, is the use of threat and violence as a communicative tool designed to pressure a government into addressing or capitulating to specific political goals or demands. Victims of terrorism are often chosen for their symbolic value.

Questions:

1) Do you feel that terrorism is a problem in Canada today?

If yes, what is the nature of the problem?

If no, do you feel it may become a problem in the near future?

2) Do you think it is cost-effective to maintain a counter-terrorist assault team, in constant readiness, in view of the degree and nature of the terrorist threat in Canada?

3) Given a terrorist threat, there are two types of organizations which traditionally are prepared to use force to control a crisis situation: the police and the military. In your opinion, which organization is better suited to combat terrorists in the country and why?

4) If Canadians travelling abroad are taken hostage by a terrorist group, do you think that Canada's counter-terrorist assault team should respond to such a threat? Why or why not?

CHAPTER SIX

Ten Counter-Terrorist Assault Teams

As the threat of terrorism has grown, so has the interest of many nations in creating an elite force to combat terrorist attacks. What will follow is a comparison of how nine different Western Block countries have met the challenge of establishing counter-terrorist assault groups. The nine nations have their own permanent counter-terrorist assault response teams, with unique qualities, names, weaponry and tactics. This chapter, then, provides an overview of these nine teams.

All of the counter-terrorist assault response teams we are about to examine are "elite". What is understood by elite units? All units consider themselves elite, or superior to others. To paraphrase George Orwell, "some units are more elite than others." (Cohen, 1978:17). Cohen suggests three criteria which necessitate the designation of a unit as "elite": first, duties that are extremely dangerous; second, missions which require only a few men who must meet high standards of training and, third, the achieving of a reputation. (1978:17). To perform successfully, all elite units utilize a common tactical ideology. This ideology includes three factors: mobility; surprise; and assault in small units where force is specialized and controlled.

These assault units do not derive their elite status solely from technical and strategic manoeuvres, but also, and perhaps more importantly, from the

camaraderie and teammanship cherished by their members. The training is specifically valuable only to the specialized function they perform. The men of these teams must possess a highly-developed sense of responsibility, for themselves and their comrades; they must meet the challenge of life-threatening situations with an almost fearless sense of duty. In warfare, their tasks are reconnaissance and guerrilla fighting, while in peacetime they are counter-terrorists. To be prepared to meet these commitments, the unit requires its members to maintain high levels of stamina, coolness under fire and audacity, not technical virtuosity (Cohen, 1978:35).

Cohen states that there is an almost universally observed characteristic of elite units - their lack of formal discipline. This has even been observed in their officers. However, an informal style of leadership makes for superior fighters as the men rely on the officers' example and charisma for motivation. Cohen states this may be one of the reasons why elite troops often prove superb in combat (Cohen: 1978:74).

Another characteristic of elite units is the protection of secrecy. Secrecy for a counter-terrorist unit is necessary for obvious reasons. Surprise is an important tool of any commando unit. Protecting the "tricks of the trade" is a priority which affords the unit some protection from terrorist threats and from the

often ambivalent view the public takes of counter-terrorist units. The people of Western Block countries demand safety and protection from the trauma and violence of terrorism, but often view negatively the finality and aggression used by elite teams or military units working to provide such safety. Often the actions necessary to ensure protection are perceived and often are a repressive tool of the State, especially in Third World countries.

Most units in a counter-terrorist assault team can be compared to a family: commandos work closely together in dangerous situations and depend on each other for the security of their lives.

Perhaps the family bond can be explained as such: "I wouldn't buy a house without reading the fine print, but I'll say to a man in combat 'You cover me while I pop a grenade in the hole.' The only thing that's at stake there is our lives. I'll do that, have that trust, because I've seen the man perform in adversity. It's a secret bond that no-one else can share. It's highly emotional, very inarticulate." (Just, 1970:10). When any group is faced with danger, especially the elite team, the adrenalin rises as they are "ready and waiting". Elite groups, used for delicate and precarious assignments, "psyche up" for the task with an almost gruesome sense of excitement. An example of this need

for danger to perform effectively is demonstrated in a French commando's prayer:

"Give me my God what you have left  
Give me what no-one else would ever ask  
I don't want riches  
Nor success, nor even health ...  
I want insecurity and unquiet  
I want torment and chaos". (Cohen, 1978:69).

Elite counter-terrorist assault teams enhance the effectiveness of their manpower by the employment of sophisticated weaponry. The weaponry used often consists of high-powered automatic precision instruments capable of destroying a target quickly and effectively. These tools are expensive and difficult to obtain, but help keep the counter terrorists as well armed as the terrorists. The more popular and frequently used assault tools are described below.

The German Heckler and Koch 9 mm. submachine gun is favoured by most counter-terrorist tactical units worldwide. The gun is light to carry, while having fully automatic capabilities and is less prone to overpenetration, i.e., the bullet will stay in the target's body and not exit, possibly striking the hostage.

The United States has developed a new weapon which should prove to be an invaluable tool in counter

terrorism. It is the 180 Laser submachine gun. The laser beam sight renders marksmanship skills unnecessary. This beam, once focused on the enemy, often intimidates the target into surrender without a shot being fired. (Wilkinson, 1986:150).

The stun grenade is a widely used weapon. Its usefulness results from the generation of a bright flash and loud explosion upon detonation. The stun grenade is used to create a diversion, as the flash and noise are severe enough to disorient the terrorist temporarily and, hopefully, will enable the entry team time to neutralize him. Simply, the stun grenade is used to allow the team to capitalize on the element of surprise, since - in this situation - every second counts.

Chemicals such as tear-gas are commonly employed, since they are effective weapons in hampering the adversary's ability to fight. Tear gas causes a painful reaction when in contact with the skin and the resulting agony can only be neutralized by washing the affected area. Thus, the individual's concentration shifts from his objective to the pain the chemical is causing his body.

Small-scale explosives which are used solely to create a disturbance permit an assault team to enter quickly and gain access to a stronghold.

Regardless of the technology employed, the

success of a rescue operation rests on the ability of the assault force members to act with determination and to use their individual weapons without hesitation or remorse.

In preparation for examining the Western Block countries' ten prominent counter-terrorist teams, it is important to recognize that these groups have evolved generally from several foundations: the military, the military police, the civilian police or from a co-operative joint effort where the expertise and responsibility is shared by civilian police and military personnel.

The following chapter consists of a descriptive comparison of ten counter-terrorist assault teams. Each country's team is examined through their organizational background and analysis of these teams, similarities and differences, will be dealt with in the final chapter. A chart has been provided at the close of this chapter to aid the reader in identifying major points of the comparison.

THE UNITED STATES (Response Abroad)

The United States has identified various military forces as having counter-terrorist capabilities. These are the Army Rangers (Light Infantry), Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team (Air), USMC Marine Amphibious Unit (Sea), Army Special Forces (Delta Force is one unit with language training which is desired for communication with foreigners and parachute qualifications), Navy SEAL platoons (scuba, submarine, boat) and the Air Force Support (special missions). The size of the military forces above will depend on the nature of the mission. Generally, these units within the forces are small in size, usually under 1,000 men trained to do a special kind of job. However, in comparison to the European counter-terrorist teams, they are heavy in manpower, firepower and equipment. Their basic function is to operate as a counter-terrorist team. Their training is specialized for employment abroad. The use of the

military domestically, would require special permission from the President and a waiver of the "Posse Comitatus Act". This Act prohibits the military from acting within the U.S. or any security threat, except in war-time, e.g., WW II.

The various elite services compete with each other to combat terrorism. "The Army's candidates were the Special Forces (Green Berets). But the Navy touted its Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) teams, the Air Force publicized its Air Commandos and the Marines loudly complained that for years they had fought guerrillas in Latin America and the Philippines". (Cohen, 1978: 87). To add further to this confusion, the Army created two Ranger Battalions (approximately 1,000 - 2,000 men), trained for rescue missions. This was done as the Army disliked the Green Berets for their lack of discipline, elitism and refusal to obey orders unless they were given by an officer of the Special Forces. (Cohen, 1978: 88).

The U.S. Special Forces were formed in 1952 and changed in mandate over the years. Because of the Vietnam War, the Green Berets were better known. Their goal was to train Vietnamese villagers for guerrilla warfare. They also served as counter-guerillas and, in 1970, they attempted to free American prisoners of war from Son Tay prison camp in North Vietnam. (Cohen, 1978: 18).

The U.S. Special Forces, of which the Green Berets are part, work closely with the C.I.A. They went to Vietnam as advisers and later were involved in clandestine operations. Military officers were often detailed to the C.I.A., where the lines of accountability remained vague. They were not often under direct military discipline or the direct military chain of command.

Just (1970) states that the Green Berets probably had more sheer talent than any unit in the American Armed Forces - Army, Navy or Air Force. Many of the Berets were European emigrés who possessed the knowledge of many languages. (Just, 1970: 200). Languages are important in an assault to tell the hostages to lay down for example and to tell the hostage-taker to surrender in his own language.

Referring to Fort Bragg and the Special Forces, "they want the [army] officer of the future to be part soldier, part secret agent, part engineer, part diplomat and part political adviser, equipped with languages, advanced history degrees and other academic impedimenta". (Just, 1970: 199). Although Just (1970) is being sarcastic, his statement demonstrates the qualifications of special assault forces.

"The Reagan Administration has given top priority to building up Special Forces, increasing their budget from \$441 million in 1982 to \$1.2 billion this year, and

the number of troops from 11,000 to nearly 15,000."

(Thomas, 1986: 10)

President Reagan has taken seriously the threat of terrorism, because Americans abroad have become targets of terrorist attacks, not to mention the political reasons involved. Reagan wishes to have a quick and certain response, wanting to avoid any repetition of the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission of 1980.

The U.S. Rangers have as founder Colonel Robert Rogers, who created the unit during the French-Indian War of 1756-1762 in New York and Canada. (Cohen, 1978: 27). After the Korean War, the unit was disbanded but was reactivated in 1974. They are sometimes referred to as the "Black Berets".

The U.S. Air Force's 8th Special Operations Squadron, based at Hurlburt Field at Fort Walton Beach, Florida, has pilots and paratroopers trained in counter-terrorism as well. (Wolf, 1981:103). Among the Navy's counter-terrorist units, established in November 1980, is one called SEALs (Sea, Air and Land Forces). It is only one among the Navy's Special Forces which has such capabilities. They have a strength of approximately 100 men, working in 4-man teams. Their main goal is hostage rescue by sea. In wartime, SEAL units are sent ahead to blow up bridges and ships. (Wolf, 1981).

They were used in the Grenada invasion. One SEAL unit was sent to take over a radio station but was pushed back by enemy fire. Their only alternative was to blow up the station. Another SEAL unit, specializing in "quick getaways" was sent to rescue the island's Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon.

Now, even the Coast Guard stated it would be involved in any maritime coastal incident involving terrorists. They have already conducted various exercises, especially in the protection of off-shore oil facilities. However, due to their limited manpower, it is doubtful they will assume a further role, such as that of combating terrorists. The U.S. Army is already prepared to train its soldiers in counter-guerilla warfare. "Objectives of the program are to develop officers who can assist foreign countries with internal security problems and can perform functions having socio-political impact on military operations." (Just, 1970: 191). "Internal security problems" means insurgencies and "functions having socio-political impact" means military advice and possibly action. Guerrillas often use terrorism to fight their cause and the U.S. army offers its expertise on countering it. It was not until 1977 that President Carter gave orders for the formation of a special counter-terrorist military force. The United States accounts for such a high number

of victims because it has diplomatic, military and industrial personnel and facilities in many countries around the world. It has the reputation of a rich Superpower, where Americans and their property are symbols of "imperialist and exploiting power." Attacks against Americans occurred in 78 different countries and 45 per cent of them took place in Western Europe. (Wilkinson, 1986: 106).

General J. Dozier, explaining why Americans are subject to being taken hostage by terrorists states: "in Europe, Americans are leaders in the NATO Alliance; and, as a result of our leadership role and our exposure, we are singled out for special attention from some of these groups." (1983: 41).

Training for a special counter-terrorist assault team to respond abroad was conducted at Fort Bragg, under the code name Blue Light. A prison stockade was converted into a counter-terrorist training centre and headquarters. The force commander, Colonel Charles Beckwith, a Green Beret who had served with England's S.A.S., also experienced soldiering in Vietnam and knew the tactics of guerrilla war. Commandos for Blue Light were recruited from the Special Force, also stationed at Fort Bragg. The Green Berets who had experience in the Delta Units in Vietnam were "naturals" in guerrilla warfare. However, their task had changed from

counter-terror operations to an emphasis on hostage rescues. They also recruited young men with new talents. (Cohen, 1978: 101). Raines describes them as the "super elite of the elite" (Raines, New York Times, 1980: 9).

There were not more than 60 or 80 trained commandos working as Blue Light. No official figures exist on the present size of the force; however, Dobson and Payne stated the unit would consist of not more than 150 (1986: 87). The actual unit is now referred to simply as the "Delta" Force. It would take five years to have the team fully prepared for counter-terrorist activities. Wolf states that Blue Light consisted of approximately 200 Green Berets (1981:103). Even though numbers differ somewhat, the Green Berets were chosen from the U.S. Army's Special Forces, elite units in themselves.

The Delta Force was looking for fairly extroverted men, self-sufficient, cunning and not over-trusting. All volunteers, who were of senior NCO rank and above, went through several psychological tests (Dobson and Payne, 1986:86). The unit wanted to avoid the selection of those of "motion picture hero" mentality.

The unit's training needed to add instruction in handling "anti-terrorist" weapons, such as the stun grenades, special firearms for use in the enclosed space of an airliner and the techniques for entering hijacked

aircraft and for disposing of bombs. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 86).

The selection process was patterned on the British SAS course which is very tough. Delta recruited its commandos from the Special Forces; however, all branches of the Army were eligible.

Training involves all of the counter-terrorist commandos courses, such as assault/entry tactics, explosives training, combat fighting, rappelling, airborne training, small boat manipulation and so on. However, their sniping training is very strict and the standard set is very high. "At 600 yards they were expected to score 100 out of 160, while at 1,000 yards 90 out of 180 was the minimum". (Thompson, 1986: 102).

The Delta unit has been provided with a 727 airplane, since skyjacking was foreseen as a primary threat. These scenarios are practised at all the major U.S. airports to permit the Delta commandos to become aware of the area and its buildings. They are also allowed to visit foreign cities to view possible terrorist targets. While travelling abroad, Thompson states they took the opportunity to exchange training with members of the British SAS, West Germany's GGSG9, and France's CIGN and the Israelis' Sayaret Matkal. (Thompson, 1986: 103).

In April, 1980, however, the unit was involved in

the failed rescue attempt of American hostages held in the U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran. Taubman states that the reason for the rescue was: "With the steady unravelling of authority in Iran and the mounting danger that was posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely", President Carter stated. Also, "with the onset of summer in Iran, the rising temperature made an operation more difficult; in addition, the nights get shorter. If they were to move, it was now." (Taubman, New York Times, 1980: 1). Another reason was that President Carter felt political pressure to act - to appear to be doing something.

The code name of the mission was "Operation Eagle's Claw" and involved Colonel Beckwith leading 90 of his commandos across the Iranian desert. Six airplanes and eight helicopters met at a designated location in the desert, code named Desert One. From that rendezvous, half of the team would seize the Teheran embassy compound and hold it, while another team would free Chargé d'Affaires Bruce Laingen and his colleagues from detention in the Iranian Foreign Ministry. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 89).

Problems began as soon as the operation got under way. There were mechanical defects in the helicopters. Only 5 of the expected 8 arrived at the rendezvous. At this location, they had to detain a busload of Iranians,

as the rendezvous was located near a highway. In addition, there was the collision at the site of a helicopter and an airplane which cost the lives of 8 men.

An investigation into "Eagle's Claw" showed that the readiness of the Special Forces was below acceptable levels.

The United States has many military forces with counter-terrorist capabilities and hostage-rescue specialization. It may be that this is where the problems lie. Instead of coming together to form one cohesive, elite, anti-terrorist response team, each of these different forces from the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force, experiences rivalry and jealousy towards the others. For example:

"The Marine's is studying hostage rescue, something both the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's SEAL Team Six have been working on for years." (Thomas, 1986: 12)..

Another example of interservice rivalry, which apparently has not changed since the Iranian hostage crises, is the insistence of every service area of the Special Forces "on a piece of the action" regarding a major rescue operation. Concerning the operation to save American hostages held in Iran:

"The Delta Force was flown in Air Force transports to its Desert One rendezvous and then

to the outskirts of Teheran in Navy helicopters, piloted by Marine and Air Force aviators."

(Thomas, 1986: 12).

Confusion was inevitable. A clear case of too many Chiefs and not enough Indians!

Time magazine suggests that there are too many special forces among the military, creating duplication. The Air Force is equipped to transport commando units, but so is the Army. The Rangers see themselves as the elite light-infantry unit, but so do the Marines - not to mention the Army's Green Berets. "Other nations have far fewer branches of their special forces and much better track records. Britain has just two: the Special Air Service (SAS), which fights on land, and the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), deployed at sea." (Thomas, 1986: 12).

Thompson states that Delta was on alert during the 1984 Olympics and that, in certain extreme situations, they might be employed in a counter-terrorist operation within the United States. As mentioned earlier, this would require special permission from the President and a waiver of the Posse Comitatus Act. (Thompson, 1986: 109).

The Delta Force was used in June of 1985 to respond to the seizure of the TWA Flight 847, but the team was too late for a successful rescue operation. They were

also sent in during the "rescue of Americans" in the 1983 invasion of Grenada when the government was overthrown by a coup.

The team was also deployed in the case of the hijacked passenger ship Achille Lauro, where an American was killed. The Egypt Air Boeing 737, carrying four hijackers of the Italian ship, was forced to land at the Signolla air base in Sicily by four U.S. F-14 jet fighters. Upon landing, the plane was surrounded by 50 Delta Force commandos.

#### HOLLAND

One company of the Royal Dutch Marines, known as "Whiskey Company", is the nation's counter-terrorist assault team. They are also known as Marine Close Combat Unit. Clutterbuck refers to them as the Special Aid Unit (BBE). This elite team was formed, like most other counter-terrorist assault teams around the world, following the Olympic massacre in Munich in 1972.

Whiskey Company has a strength of 113 men and is divided into three 33-men platoons. While two platoons are on standby, the third acts as a training unit. The introductory training program for a recruit is 16 weeks, after which they join an operational platoon for a 32-week period of training, as part of a 5-man team. (Thompson, 1986: 79).

The Dutch volunteer for service in the counter-terrorist assault unit and stay for an unlimited period.

The selection process is somewhat different than other counter-terrorist units worldwide. Emphasis is placed on how the commando and his family's life will be affected by having him perform such a dangerous role. A psychologist observes the stability of men in stressful situations. The wives of potential candidates are interviewed to see if they are in agreement with their husbands' dangerous tasks. Team members train hard in combat situations involving "hostages", and also participate in various sports activities which create a close unit. They are led by "competent, thorough, sturdy and experienced officers". (Frackers, 1979: 109).

Their training also includes the usual counter-terrorist methods of rappelling, close combat fighting, weapons, entry techniques, parachute and scuba training. They train at Sahiphol International Airport and at Holland's many ports, where scenarios are conducted to deal with marine hijackings.

About 40 commandos of the company are trained as snipers, where the policy is to assign three snipers to a target to assure a kill. However, the Dutch are reluctant to take the life of an armed terrorist. (Thompson, 1986:79). Because of this philosophy,

hand-to-hand combat is greatly stressed.

Another unit of 40 men from the State Police Force also supports the Close Combat Unit of Marines. The police remain anonymous, as do the Marine Commandos. "They can go back to their own village as a policeman, not a terrorist fighter." (Thompson, 1979: 140). The main task of the State Police is to contain the terrorists, e.g., in a building, until the Marines are called in.

The commandos are taught the technique of fighting in buildings and various types of aircraft. Physical training is intense: "ju-jitsu to yellow belt standard; karate up to second degree; and boxing ...". (Thompson, 1979: 142).

The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps is controlled by the Minister of Justice, since the government regards terrorism as crime. However, if a terrorist crisis occurs, the Minister of Justice meets the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Home Affairs at a "Crisis Centre" at The Hague. They make plans, together with the Commander of the Marine Corps as well as with various Chiefs of Police in the area. However, the Minister of Justice is the only one who can give orders to the commandos. "The Dutch government has one of the best records in the world for handling hostage situations where special force is needed for the release of the

hostages." (Clutterbuck, 1978: 141). The Dutch government may use the counter-terrorist unit abroad. As Captain E. Kloppenberg states: "After a year, we have at our disposal a man who is very well trained and motivated to fight against terrorists from anywhere in the world." (Thompson, 1979: 142).

On the morning of December 2nd, 1975, seven Moluccans hijacked the Groningen-Zwolle train near Beilen, killing the train conductor. Two train-cars of passengers were held hostage.

Whiskey Company, accompanied by sharpshooters, was called in and an inner ring formed around the train. Later in the afternoon, one hostage was "executed" in plain view of the authorities. Two others were later killed.

The Moluccans demanded, among other things, an airplane at Schipol Airport and the release of a number of imprisoned Moluccans. Negotiations followed for almost two weeks. "A termination of the situation by use of force was seriously contemplated by the government." (Frackers, 1979: 118). But no assault occurred due to the Dutch philosophy of taking terrorists alive. Time took its physical and mental toll on the terrorists and, on December 14th, they surrendered to the police.

A second train hijack occurred on May 23rd 1979. Nine Moluccans hijacked a train and another 5 seized a

school. The Dutch government responded by sending its BBE (Counter-terrorist unit composed of Marines) as well as trained police/negotiators. The terrorists demanded the release of imprisoned Moluccans and to be flown out of the country.

On the 19th day (June 11th), it was decided to assault the train and the school simultaneously.

Negotiations were going nowhere and authorities did not want the release of the convicted terrorists who had murdered three hostages at Beilen.

The assault on the school by the Marines went well. There was no resistance. However, the Marines knew the terrorists on the train were more determined, as listening devices had been inserted along the length of the train. The assault force knew where the terrorists and the hostages were located. Light explosives were placed along the train during the night. At dawn, these explosives were set off, six fighter aircraft flew low over the train, and machine gun fire was poured into the two compartments where the terrorists were known to be. The noise of the cover fire, and the smoke grenades which had been thrown along both sides of the train, caused a great deal of confusion on the part of the terrorists. In all, two hostages and six of the terrorists were killed, while two marines, one terrorist and five other hostages were wounded. The other two terrorists had hidden from

the attack. The whole operation had taken 22 minutes. (Clutterbuck, 1979: 146).

The British S.A.S. were also on hand to give them tactical advice. Stun grenades were offered to throw the terrorists off balance, but the marines preferred to use low-level flights where pilots cut in their afterburners, creating a loud noise, (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 147).

On September 13th, 1974, three terrorists attacked the French embassy, capturing 12 hostages. In this event, two Dutch police officers were injured. The terrorists demanded the release from one of France's prisons a member of the terrorist group which had been arrested earlier that year. On the third day of the negotiations, some hostages were released. France, therefore, released the terrorist from jail. At first, however, he refused to join his associates, fearing reprisals for speaking to the police.

The Dutch deployed their counter-terrorist assault team, as well as a platoon of Marines, around the embassy. The commandos had gained access to the interior of the building and were ready to storm the terrorists. However, the Dutch acceded to French pressure for a soft-line approach. The outcome was a capitulation to the terrorists' demands and no attempt was made to pressure the terrorists into submission. All of the terrorists escaped to Syria with part of a ransom and

letters originally seized when the terrorist was arrested. (Wilkinson, 1986: 14).

The Dutch government has had to deal with South Moluccan terrorists on several occasions. South Moluccans are exiles living in Holland because they fear retribution from the Indonesian government because they remained loyal to the Dutch during the war of independence in 1949. They were former soldiers of the Dutch East Indies Colonial Army. However, today, young South Moluccans have spent all their lives in Holland. (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 187).

South Moluccans sought independence from Indonesia but their nationalist movement was crushed by the Indonesian Army. South Moluccans in turn sought revenge on the Dutch government, since they felt betrayed and abandoned by Holland.

The first train hijack on December 2nd, 1975, was mainly to publicize the South Moluccans' claim for the independence of their islands from Indonesia, over which they felt that the Dutch had let them down. (Clutterbuck, 1979: 142).

#### BRITAIN

The British depend on the Special Air Service (S.A.S.) to combat terrorism. They are an elite military unit. "Philip Warner in his book Special Air Service describes the S.A.S. as a combination of minimum manpower with maximum possibilities of surprise. Four men could

cover a target previously requiring four troops of a Commando - about 200 men." (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 45). Because of the numerous terrorist incidents during the mid-seventies, one full squadron of 78 S.A.S. commandos were assigned to counter-terrorist duties and operate under the name of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Squadron (C.R.W.). As their title suggests, their duties include more than counter-terrorism. They also operate under the name of SP Team (Special Projects Team). (Thompson, 1986: 57).

It is best to describe the background of the S.A.S., since the S.A.S.'s C.R.W. is only an extension of its duties.

The British S.A.S. was founded in North Africa in 1941, under the leadership of a young Scottish lieutenant, David Stirling. The Special Air Service was named as such to confuse the German military intelligence, since it has nothing to do with airplanes. (Cohen, 1978: 22). In WW II they were used in infiltration, intelligence gathering and carrying out commando raids behind enemy lines. (Manthorpe, The Ottawa Citizen, 1986: 36).

The S.A.S. has also gained experience in "subversive warfare during the colonial wars", (Malaya, Kenya, Oman), which is why the British chose a specialized military unit already in existence to cope

with terrorism. (Dobson and Payne, 1974:145). "The S.A.S. has been at war almost constantly for 45 years. Its acquired skills are not theoretical. They have been learned and tested in the field.

The S.A.S. was used in the Falklands War where they operated behind enemy lines, blowing up planes on the ground and carrying out commando raids and sniper shooting on Argentinian soldiers. They also gathered intelligence on the military to pinpoint enemy positions.

Britain deploys some commandos of the nine hundred man Special Air Service to combat terrorists in Northern Ireland. In January of 1976, the S.A.S. were sent to Northern Ireland following the killing of ten Protestants in Armagh County. (Cohen: 1978:64). This move was meant to deal more seriously with the Irish Republican Army, given the reputation of the S.A.S. The IRA want British rule eliminated in Northern Ireland and favour violent action to achieve their goal of a united Ireland.

In Britain, the army - namely the S.A.S. - assists the police in defence against armed attack, either from criminals or terrorists. "It is the normal role of the army and is accepted without demur by the public." (Clutterbuck, 1977:111). The British authorities feel that if a threat by criminals can be dealt with by a small number of individual police

marksmen, that's fine. However, if force is needed to terminate a crisis where "it seems likely that the attack may lead to a tactical battle involving fire and movement, then armed men operate as a team."

(Clutterbuck, 1977:111). The British police, unarmed and untrained in the use of various weapons (apart from a few marksmen in the Special Patrol Group D11) are not prepared for such a role. They are mainly a containment team, until negotiations begin. However, the S.A.S. are fully prepared for an assault and enjoy an unprecedented degree of public confidence.

"If a siege is an exercise in terrorism - that is, an attempt to coerce government for political reasons - then direction of the affair is in the hands of a government committee known as COBRA (Cabinet Office Briefing Room). This committee is chaired by the Home Secretary and includes junior Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers, with advisers representing the police, MI5 and the S.A.S." (Geraghty, 1981:169).

This committee is the decision-making machine which is linked to the police on the scene. The S.A.S. are merely on standby to assist the police, who remain in charge. The S.A.S. is a military aid to civil power, used only as a last resort because its force is deadly.

Such was the case when, on December 6th, 1975, four I.R.A. terrorists attempted an armed attack on a restaurant on Balcombe Street in the City of London. The police, expecting such an attack, chased them into an apartment owned by an elderly couple. After the sixth day of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the police. They had heard on the radio that the S.A.S., the army's special assault team, had been called to the scene.

Stirling, the commander of the S.A.S., was Scottish and Catholic and tended to draw on volunteers from the same background, as he felt they were similar to himself. It was also felt that, since the Scots are very secretive due to persecution by the Protestant English, they would make excellent guerrilla fighters. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 47).

S.A.S. are volunteers drawn from two other military regiments, the Grenadier Guards and the Paratroopers, elite regiments in themselves. However, S.A.S. qualifications are more difficult to meet. "Not only is the physical stamina required at the limits of human endurance, but psychological testing is rigorous." (Manthorpe, The Ottawa Citizen, 1986: B6). The S.A.S. are probably looking for a soldier able to kill another man, either on the direct order of his commander or on his own initiative, without a moment's notice and without

any feelings of guilt.

On an assault, members of the S.A.S. wear masks or hoods - not to frighten the terrorists but to preserve secrecy. It is expected of an S.A.S. commando that he will not discuss with anyone the affairs of the "family". They believe that their greatest weapon lies in secrecy and surprise, working hand in hand. S.A.S. activities, training and numbers - even the names of its soldiers - are classified information. Photographs of the men are forbidden. The unit wishes to remain anonymous and secretive in order not to provide any intelligence to terrorists.

The average S.A.S. commando is 27 years old and no-one is accepted over the age of 34. Part of their initial test requires the recruits to march across hills and mountains for four weeks, carrying 25 pounds of equipment on their backs.

The final test puts each recruit on his own, with a 55 pound pack, challenging him to cover 37 1/2 miles of rough country in a twenty four hour period. The course has killed a few. However brutal, this hardening prepares the recruit for his duties in counter-terrorism. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 50). This is only the initial test. The recruit is then sent away for 14 weeks of general training. This training is an extension of the skills they have already acquired as

trained soldiers. Emphasis is placed on weapon training, as well as parachute training.

Of all the men who apply, only 19 out of 100 meet the physical and mental requirements. (Dobson and Payne: 1986:52). Marksmanship is a factor on which the S.A.S. places great stress. The basic shooting course lasts for six weeks. They learn to shoot from unconventional positions, using all of the various weapons available to them. The firearms training stresses not only marksmanship but also assault tactics.

They learn to handle explosives, medicine, communications, languages, scuba diving and mountaineering. Even though these are required in guerrilla warfare they may be useful for counter-terrorism. Each new S.A.S. candidate is placed within a four-man group, where he becomes a member of the "family". Each man in the group is specialized in one of the four required areas: medicine, demolition, communications and languages.

The S.A.S. offers a unique military democracy in which the guerrilla soldier "exchanges his former class and even identity for membership of a caste as binding as any family and expulsion from which, therefore, becomes the only sanction he really fears." (Geraghty, 1981:8). The members of this elite commando unit discipline themselves.

All ranks in the S.A.A. are of "one company" where, as a group, they seek excellence. While on training they often, for several months, live in conditions of isolation. This creates a strong bond which keeps the "family" united.

Training scenarios duplicate all types of possible hostage situations, such as on trains, planes, ships and in various types of buildings. Members of the S.A.S. often play the part of "hostages" during live-fire tactical exercises, where they are very close to the terrorist targets. (Thompson, 1986: 58).

"The S.A.S. trains its close-quarters marksmen to an extraordinary degree of skill, honing their reflexes in action as if they were tennis stars being groomed for the men's final at Wimbledon." (Geraghty, 1981: 167).

On May 5th, 1980, the S.A.S. dealt very effectively with the situation at the Iranian embassy in London, because they had prepared for such a siege. All of the terrorists were killed, except for one. For at least seven years, Geraghty states that the S.A.S. had trained "relentlessly" for just such a situation. Each month, "terrorists seize hostages" exercises were practised. The scenario and its location varied. They would practise rescuing "hostages" from buildings, airplanes, trains, buses and ships.

In the cities, the S.A.S. use counter-terrorist

weapons that fire rapidly, precisely on target and at low velocity, hitting the target without penetrating one body and striking another. Geraghty suggests that the intention is to wound, but one wonders about the truth of this theory in view of the S.A.S.'s reputation for elimination. This will be examined later in the Iranian Embassy siege in London.

Many of the skills taught to counter-terrorist units, such as parachuting, scuba diving, mountaineering, rappelling, hand-to-hand combat, field medicine, marksmanship, communications, demolition, and so on, are skills the commandos of the S.A.S. have already acquired by the time they are assigned to Counter Revolutionary Warfare (C.R.W.) duties.

The S.A.S.'s C.R.W. Squadron is broken into four operational teams and each of these teams is broken down further into four-man operating units. For assaults, this four-man unit operates in pairs as two-man teams. Each of the operational teams is divided into snipers, assault groups and surveillance specialists. As referred to earlier, each S.A.S. member can perform virtually any of the functions. (Thompson, 1986:57).

Each of the S.A.S.'s squadrons perform their counter-terrorist duties for a period of six months, on a rotation basis, and when called out are referred to as the S.A.S.'s C.R.W. They remain on alert at Hereford,

where vehicles and aircraft are made available to them if needed.

The S.A.S. have a Research Unit which greatly assists members of the counter-terrorist assault unit. This unit's best-known invention is the stun grenade, used worldwide by counter-terrorist units and by police tactical teams like that of the Ottawa Police.

It is the April 30th, 1980, siege at the Iranian embassy in London which brought the S.A.S. to public attention and fame. The Palestinians holding the embassy were backed by Iraq which was opposed to the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. The terrorists demanded, among other things, the freedom of 91 prisoners in Iran. During the negotiations, five of the hostages were released but the hostage-takers threatened to execute the remaining hostages and to dynamite the embassy if their demands were not met.

The S.A.S. assault, which lasted eleven minutes, began on May 5th, at 7:25 p.m., after the body of the Iranian press attaché had been dumped on the embassy doorstep. The terrorists announced that a hostage was to be killed every 30 minutes, unless their demands were met - safe conduct out of Britain for them and their now twenty-four hostages. The British government was given permission to storm the embassy. Their mission was to halt the hostage taking and the murder of the hostages.

The assault on the embassy was carried out on a live broadcast before a worldwide television audience.

The embassy had 50 rooms and the hostages were separated into two groups. This made the rescue even more difficult. Surprise assaults on both the front and the back of the building, carried out simultaneously, was thought to be the best possible plan to gain maximum search and entry. The armour plated glass, off the front balcony, had to be blown off with explosives. At the rear, other S.A.S. commandos rappelled from the roof of the embassy to another balcony. Both teams then entered the embassy in search of the hostage-takers. S.A.S. teams operated in two-man units and systematically cleared the embassy, room by room, shooting any terrorists they encountered. Some who resisted were shot, while others dropped their weapons and pretended to be hostages themselves. They were identified as terrorists by the hostages.

"When the last two of the terrorists who had been holding 24 hostages in the Iranian Embassy surrendered, they may have imagined that the majestic process of British justice would give them another platform for their propaganda. They were wrong. The S.A.S. officer, whose men had just stormed the building and already killed four of the seven terrorists, had other ideas. He placed his pistol

against the head of each man in turn and blew their brains out." (Manthorpe, The Ottawa Citizen, 1986: B6).

The S.A.S. acted as if they were in a war - and it could be said they were. This is, possibly the only way to survive. "As dead men, they would have no chance to blow up the building by booby-traps or attempt to surrender while carrying concealed grenades." (Geraghty, 1981: 180).

Contrary to what was reported in The Ottawa Citizen, one terrorist survived, but only because the S.A.S. permitted him to live. The hostages felt he was a young "boy", the nicest of the terrorists, and wanted no harm brought to him.

As soon as an incident, such as the Iranian embassy situation, is over, authority is handed back to the police and all S.A.S. members "slip away" quietly. However, if the terrorists ever escape, Dobson and Payne state: "The S.A.S. are ready to follow and hunt the terrorists anywhere in the world." (1986:146). Thompson states that the S.A.S. has very good relations with most of the countries who have counter-terrorist units. He mentions the U.S. Delta Team, West Germany's GSG9, the Royal Dutch Marines and Spain's GEO. However, relations with the Israelis have been strained, due to an incident shortly before Israel became a state in 1948, under

British control, where a letter bomb from Jewish extremists killed the brother of a former S.A.S. member. Since then, the S.A.S. distrust the Israelis. (1986:59).

In 1973, 40 members of the S.A.S. were trained at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. They have also attended U.S. army programs at Fort Hood, Texas. (Wolf, 1981:101). They were also involved in assisting the R.C.M.P. to train members of the SERT, Canada's newly formed counter-terrorist assault unit.

Twice a year, the S.A.S. hold joint exercises with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. They practise assaulting an oil rig, supposedly held by terrorists.

The S.A.S. also provided assistance - in what form Thompson does not specify - to the U.S. Delta Team, prior to the Iranian mission in April of 1980.

#### ISRAEL

Israel, having seen more than its share of terrorist attacks, believes strongly in the military as a counter-terrorist force. Israel's philosophy is simple when dealing with terrorists: in retaliation to any attack, it inflicts more fear and pain than were inflicted on it. The Sayaret Matkal is Israel's counter-terrorist assault force. It is also known as the

General Staff Reconnaissance Unit 269, a military unit which specializes in counter-terrorism. (Wolf, 1981: 102). It is believed to have been in existence since 1968. "If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first." (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 100). This has become the watchword of the Sayaret Matkal.

They believe that, when a siege occurs, they should strike their enemy before being struck. They argue the case for pre-emptive strikes as such: "It is better to kill their enemies in their own bases and so prevent them from mounting their operations, rather than conduct elegant sieges inside Israel." (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 100).

Therefore, in its mandate of counter-terrorism, Sayaret Matkal involves a vast array of responsibility. It is involved in retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes and assassinations. (Thompson, 1986:129). However, when do counter-terrorist tactics of this kind become terrorism in themselves?

Israel has also termed any actions by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as terrorism. Therefore, any actions by Israel are labelled counter-terrorist.

The root problem of the Middle East conflict, therefore, grew from the territorial argument over Palestine. With the establishment of Israel in "Arab

Palestine" on May 14th, 1948, the Jewish State became a target for many Arab countries. "It was viewed as a foreign malignancy in the heart of the Arab world." (Alexander, 1977: 176). The aim of all Palestinian terrorists and their Arab allies is to reoccupy

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Palestine. Palestinians exist as a distinct group in the Arab world. However, they have been unable to form a common ideological base. The defeat of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six-Day War of June of 1967 made the Palestinians realize that the achievement of their goal depends on their own efforts. The Arab States can only provide political and financial aid. The rest is up to them.

The Israeli government does not believe in negotiation. They will use negotiation only as a "stalling out" tool to prepare their assault. They prefer to attack with speed and decision to overwhelm the terrorists.

The Sayaret Matkal are responsible only to the Chief of Intelligence, even though they are Army personnel. They are based near an airfield in the centre of Israel and their normal strength is approximately two hundred. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 98). Thompson adds that this group of two hundred men is divided into twenty man units. (1986: 29).

Unlike most comparable military counter-

terrorist assault units, the Sayaret Matkal does not recruit its commandos from trained military personnel, but from "raw" recruits called up for military service. The major complaint from other branches of the Israeli armed services suggests that the Sayaret Matkal pick the "cream of the crop."

There is great competition to get into the counter-terrorist unit. However, the candidates must pass the initial training. What makes this training particularly dangerous is that much of it is carried out in enemy territory. The team starts with reconnaissance missions into neighbouring Arab countries. As the unit gains experience, it is given more difficult tasks. It is believed that the recruits will learn more quickly when they know real bullets are being used.

Members of the Sayaret Matkal have to be extremely fit, since they undergo marches in the desert and mountains to learn to live in this milieu. Like every other unit we have dealt with, they become marksmen, receive close combat training and learn how to use explosives. They also learn parachuting, communications, how to drive a tracked vehicle, and so on - all the skills required in the environment of making a counter-terrorist fighter.

Because there are many immigrants in Israel, most of the recruits already know how to speak Arabic,

Hebrew and English. Knowledge of these languages is a pre-requisite to recruitment into the unit.

When the unit has completed its training period, the average number of recruits has fallen from 20 to 10 commandos. Like the British S.A.S., men have become members of a family. The best men are sent away on an officer's course from which they will emerge leaders of their own Sayaret team. They will pick and choose recruits at the recruit depot and start the process again.

After their length of service is over, due to their high calibre of training and experience, many commandos become members of hit teams which eliminate Israel's enemies abroad, or serve on the "007 squad", sky marshals who fly with El Al, Israel's national airline. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 99).

Sayaret Mathal do not limit their duties to counter-terrorism. In October, 1968, following Israel's policy of pre-emptive strikes, the Sayaret Matkal flew deep into Egypt, blew up two bridges and destroyed a power station. This raid was an attempt to convince Egypt to stop its shelling of Israel. (Dobson and Payne, 1986:102). They also conducted a similar raid into Lebanon in December of 1968, to prevent the Arab terrorists from mounting their attacks from that country. The Sayarets detained passengers at the Beirut

International Airport and blew up 13 Arab-owned aircraft. (Thompson, 1986: 130). On April 10th, 1973, the Sayarets were utilized as a "hit team". They entered Beirut, under darkness, and killed Abu Youssef, Yasser Arafat's deputy, one of the men who planned the Munich massacre.

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Listed below are two incidents which are more directly associated with the Sayaret Mathal's counter-terrorist duties. In May of 1972, the Sayaret Matkal assaulted a hijacked airliner, in a hostage-rescue mission. A Sabena 707, with 90 passengers onboard, had been hijacked to Israel by four members of Black September, an Arab terrorist group. Disguised as mechanics, the Israeli commandos killed two terrorists and freed all of the hostages but one who was killed during the assault. (Thompson, 1986: 130).

Another incident which has echoed throughout the world was the Entebbe Operation. A Hollywood movie was made, based on this successful rescue mission. In July, 1976, 103 Jewish hostages had been held captive for approximately a week by seven Palestinians, called Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and a gang of German terrorists related to the Baader-Meinhof Group. They had hijacked an Air France airplane on the Tel Aviv to Paris flight.

The hostages were held captive in Uganda, where the President, Idi Amin, supported the Palestinian cause. "The terrorists demanded the release and delivery of 53

convicted terrorists who were imprisoned in Israeli (40), West German (6), Kenyan (5), Swiss (1) and French (1) jails." (Winkates, 1979: 215).

The commandos, 280 paratroopers from the 35th Airborne Brigade, a counter-guerrilla force combined with members of Sayaret Matkal, departed from Tel Aviv and flew 3,000 kilometers. The force was comprised of four cargo transport planes, a Boeing 707 command plane, a tanker jet, a Boeing 707 hospital plane and Phantom escort jets. They descended on the Entebbe airport headquarters of the Ugandan Air Force. The commandos killed all the hijackers and "some 100 Ugandan soldiers". They also destroyed a number of military planes to prevent pursuit. During the forty minute gunfight, two of the hostages and one commando leader were killed. (Thomspon, 1986: 132).

The Entebbe mission was never condemned by world governments, perhaps in part because Uganda's President Idi Amin was feared and despised by most. Public opinion was in favour of the mission - perhaps because of the mission's success. Also, there had been lengthy negotiations with the terrorists and diplomatic efforts had been made, which demonstrated a serious intent on the part of the Israeli government to bring about a peaceful resolution to the problem. However, as mentioned before, the Israelis do not believe in

negotiation. Perhaps negotiation was only used as a tactics.

Since the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, Sayaret Matkal has enjoyed a very close relationship with West Germany's GSG-9. Israel wanted to send the Sayaret Matkal over to rescue the Israeli athletes from the Black September group but was denied permission. Since West Germany failed miserably in the rescue attempt, it has sought Israel's forgiveness ever since. GSG-9's technology has been made continuously available to the Israelis. (Thompson, 1986: 132).

#### AUSTRALIA

In 1979, Australia created a counter-terrorist-assault team, under the responsibility of the army. This team is known as S.A.S., like the British S.A.S. which helped form and train the Australian group. Australia's S.A.S. has since been involved in exchange training with West Germany's GSG-9 and the United States' Delta Team.

Australia's S.A.S. is based at Swanbourne, near Perth. Its responsibilities are not only counter-terrorism, but protection of offshore oil and gas platforms and the provision of the national SWAT team when hostages are involved.

For the purpose of this thesis, Australia's S.A.S. will be referred to as A.S.A.S. in order not to

confuse them with the British S.A.S.

The A.S.A.S. leaves its commandos on counter-terrorist duties for one year, before rotating them to other assignments.

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The selection process for the Australian S.A.S. is similar to that of the British S.A.S. They have a "killing house" which permits the soldiers to practise their shooting in a hostage-taking scenario. The killing house is meant to represent a building, or a house, in which the interior can be changed around, i.e. walls, furniture, targets. "Hostages" are often prominent people used in these scenarios. (Thompson, 1986: 114).

Once the candidate has been accepted as a member of the A.S.A.S., he must complete a three-month course in close combat, shooting and fighting, before being involved in counter-terrorist duties. This training is carried out not only in buildings but in aircraft.

Since the A.S.A.S. has wide responsibilities, it is trained in parachuting and rappelling, scuba diving and small boat operations, "hard entries" and sniping. Hard entry involves a small squad, possibly a five man team, entering a building and rescuing hostages, when the terrorists refuse to comply with the negotiator. There are no known incidents associated with this team.

ITALY

In Italy, there are two police groups which are in conflict with each other. One group is the Carabinieri, a military police corps, and the other is the Public Security Police, a uniformed civilian force.

It seems that the Carabinieri, once used by the Kings of Savoy to unify Italy and to establish control over the South, were not trusted by Mussolini. He therefore organized the Public Security Police, as a civilian-led counterforce. (Wolf, 1981: 120).

There has been a failure to establish close liaison between these two organizations, each conducting its own separate police investigations. Clutterbuck states that whichever organization arrives on the scene first normally takes charge of a case. This has kept terrorism flourishing in Italy, due to police confusion in enforcement itself and has resulted in confusion, misunderstanding and poor intelligence of terrorist organizations. (Clutterbuck, 1978: 45).

Terrorists in Italy seem to confine themselves tactically to assassinations and bombings, or the crippling of their victims by shooting them in the legs. For this reason, the government felt less pressure to create a special counter-terrorist team. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 149). Such a team may only be involved in hostage-rescues or the in the arrests of suspected

terrorists. In addition, the fragile, democratic Italian government felt it had to proceed with caution in creating a special force. The government was suspicious of any elite force which might be involved in its

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overthrow. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 49).

In September, 1973, the Italians used a counter-terrorist team, composed of military police personnel, to raid an apartment which had been rented by Arab terrorists. The apartment was located near an airport in Rome and they had planned to use missiles to attack an El Al airliner. (Wolf, 1981: 101).

A counter-terrorist team was created, however, and the members were recruited from the paratroopers of the Carabinieri and called the Special Intervention Group (GIS). Their strength is approximately 46 men (Thompson, 1986: 80) and they are responsible to the Minister of Defence.

In 1981, the GIS achieved fame due to their rescue of kidnapped American General James Dozier from the terrorist group, the Red Brigades. They came into being after the kidnapping and murder of the Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, in 1978. The Red Brigade, imbued with Marxist-Leninist philosophies, is the most menacing terrorist group operating in Italy.

(Pisano, 1986: 169).

Great emphasis is placed on physical condition

and GIS members run and swim daily, as well as practising hand-to-hand combat. Thompson states that members of GIS are among the world's best "combat swimmers" and would have been prepared, should they have had to carry out an assault on the hijacked Italian ship, Achillo Lauro. (1986: 81).

#### FRANCE

France has basically two counter-terrorist forces, one with the police (CRS) and the other within the military police (GIGN). However, GIGN is recognized as the main police commando unit.

France turned to the military police for a counter-terrorist assault team. It feared that the regular Army could turn on the government, as it had in the past. In April of 1961, elite troops seemed to be on the verge of overthrowing the government, through an airborne assault on Paris. (Cohen: 1970: 65). However, this attempt failed as a result of the lack of co-operation between the Air Force, the Army and the Navy and their leaders. "The French Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS) was formed specifically to avoid the army being called out in such circumstances, because of the long record of military intervention in French politics." (Clutterbuck, 1977: 110).

The CRS numbers about 15,000 in a headquarters, a

training establishment and 60 companies of five officers and 225 other ranks. (Gellner, 1974: 177). The officers receive a police education at the National Police College, while the CRS men are only given a basic police background instruction. Special courses are given, as men advance in rank. However, the members of the CRS have served at one time in the military where they receive most of their weapons training.

The CRS is not only a counter-terrorist response team, but also deals with civil disturbances - a counter insurgency team. "Constant exercises give them mastery of the art of handling civil disturbances with as little force as possible and thus with a minimum of bloodshed." (Gellner, 1974: 177).

The CRS is a special police unit which was designed in the late forties to deal with industrial strikes and has also specialized in controlling street riots.

It is also involved in safety and rescue work on inner waters, off-shore and in the mountains. This provides practical experience and training for their main duties: internal security, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as a response team. However, Dobson and Payne state that the CRS do not provide the ideal answer to counter-terrorists. (1986: 1973). This is due to the fact that their mandate is mainly to deal

with civil disturbances. Therefore, since 1973, the Gendarmerie Nationale, a 60,000 strong militarized police force under the control of the Ministry of Defense and the oldest regiment in the French Army, has been assigned the task of intervening in any terrorist incident. Its special assault unit is known as the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group (GIGN), pronounced "Gigene". However, GIGN's attitude is a police attitude, deriving from the civilian law and order role of the Gendarmerie Nationale, rather than from its military traditions. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 142).

GIGN strength is about 52 men, composed of four 12 man teams of NCOs. Each team has an officer in charge. The team is composed of a team leader, a dog handler and two 5-man assault forces. (Thompson, 1986: 71). They are on alert permanently, 24 hours a day, and can only be used on government orders.

The selection process is basically the same as other counter-terrorist assault units. After several interviews, the candidate is introduced to the physical portion of the selection process. For example, Thompson clearly illustrates the hardship involved: "8 kilometre runs (5 miles) with full combat gear in under 40 minutes, a 50 meter swim in under 15 seconds, etc. 'Surprise tests' based on the British S.A.S. training are also done. These are described as 'sickener' factors to

evaluate the candidate's ability to think on his feet and weed out those without the heart for GIGN." (1986: 72). Weapons testing is also conducted. Thompson states that ~~this preliminary testing of about one week usually~~ results in about one man out of a hundred selected to undergo 8 months training.

As with Germany's GSG-9, martial arts training is stressed for members of GIGN. They want a commando who will react "instantly and unflinchingly" in action.

In addition to receiving ski and mountain training for possible operations in the Alps, GIGN commandos are expert swimmers, all qualified in scuba diving. One of their tests requires the swimmer to dive to the bottom of an 18-meter deep ditch, read a question on a tablet, write the answer with a waterproof pen and then return to the surface - all without breathing apparatus." (Thompson, 1986: 73). This exercise develops endurance and the ability to stay calm and think, all qualities needed for an underwater assault on a target.

Scuba equipment is of "closed circuit" to avoid bubbles which betray a swimmer's presence, in order to assault a hijacked ocean liner or a beachside hotel.

GIGN commandos also receive parachute training, where their "wings" are attained. A helicopter is often used in parachuting and rappelling training.

Thompson states that GIGN not only advocates

scuba training, but stresses rappelling as well. They consider rappelling as one of the most important methods of entering a building under siege, normally in conjunction with commandos ramming the door.

GIGN has other duties. They provide special VIP protection in high-risk situations and provide security for certain sensitive buildings if a threat is likely. In addition, they transport extremely dangerous criminals. GIGN is also involved, like many other top counter-terrorist units (the S.A.S., GSG-9, Sayaret Matkal) in training friendly countries who want their own assault teams. Many of these countries are France's former colonies.

Training involves simulated raids, involving ways to free hostages in all possible situations. Each team which embarks on an eight month training course is composed of trained parachutists, as well as skilled rappellers. They receive training in martial arts, as well as in the handling of explosives. However, poorly equipped as are France's other police agencies, the GIGN is "lavishly equipped" with electronics, listening devices, night scopes and various weapons.

(Thompson, 1986: 73)

Colonel Henri Ray, referring to GIGN: "Since its creation, this group has been called upon more than 100 times. It succeeded by itself in 13 operations in

freeing 40 persons whose lives were directly threatened." (Thompson, 1979: 144). Thompson states that GIGN remains one of the world's four-star counter-terrorist assault units. (1986: 78). Referring to the GIGN and their battles, Cohen states that "the elite units" did "fight well. Their esprit de corps and experience in counter-guerrilla war made them extremely effective." (Cohen, 1970: 65)

On February 3rd, 1976, GIGN responded in Djibouti, the former French colony in Africa, where several members of the Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast (FLSC), had seized 30 children on board a school bus. The bus was stopped trying to cross into Somalia. The next day, after negotiations had failed, five marksmen fired simultaneously and killed four of the hostage-takers. Two others were killed shortly after. One child died and five were wounded. (Wolf, 1981: 102).

In 1980, the GIGN succeeded in getting the release of hostages held by Corsican extremists at Hotel Fesch at Ajaccio, in France. The operation was successful in arresting them, without firing a single shot. Swift action seemed to have prevented bloodshed. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 147).

France has a tradition of opening its doors to political refugees and exiled heads of State seeking a safe place to live - for example, Haiti's former

"President for Life" Duvalier. "Around 120 different nationalities are represented among the inhabitants of France ... where the vast majority of political refugees respect the condition that political asylum excludes political activism, let alone political violence."

(Moxon-Browne, 1986: 111). Nevertheless, French hospitality is often abused. Ferdinando Imposimato, the Italian Judge in charge of the enquiry into the kidnapping of Aldo Moro by Red Brigade terrorists in 1978 stated, "We in Rome have had evidence that terrorism has rooted itself in France and that Paris has become a remarkably well-organized base for terrorist operations."

(Moxon-Browne, 1986: 111). When terrorists are driven out of some countries, they seem to take refuge in France where they recover only to pursue their terror further.

France suffers not only from imported terrorism, but from indigenous terrorism. The Corsican National Liberation Front (FNLC) and the Breton Liberation Front (BLT) are the two main terrorist groups operating directly against France, in support of a separate homeland.

Action Directe, a terrorist group knowledgeable in computer operations, uses this knowledge to destroy computer firms. (Wolf, 1981: 176). They have a broad range of ideological themes, causing them to bomb police stations, banks and hotels.

THE UNITED STATES (within its borders)

The United States law enforcement response to counter-terrorism relies on the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) within its borders. The military has been directed to assist the FBI in combatting acts of terrorism, but the FBI has full overall jurisdictional responsibility at the scene of a terrorist incident. As mentioned earlier, because of the "Posse Comitatus Act", the military cannot be used in a law enforcement role inside the country, unless Presidential authorization is given under aid to the civil power. The military can only assist the FBI in an advisory capacity.

The FBI's Hostage Response Team (HRT) is comprised of a 50-man unit which is responsible within the boundaries of the United States, coast-to-coast. Thompson describes it as a "Super-SWAT" team (1986: 109). They have received all the necessary counter-terrorist training. Some members of HRT are skilled scuba divers, or possess other specialized skills. They even use live "hostages" in their "killing house", similar to the S.A.S. They are often called upon to provide other police agencies with technical advice and training.

Due to budgetary restraints, this counter-terrorist unit is no longer maintained on a full-time basis. In addition to the national HRT team, regional FBI stations have their own tactical teams, also

on a part-time basis, where agents are brought together only for training or for a crisis situation.

The FBI is an excellent investigative and intelligence-gathering agency. It is not a combat unit, but since any terrorist incident is a federal incident by law, the FBI had to incorporate a tactical unit for an armed assault. But "the specialized weaponry available to the FBI is even more limited than that of the military." (Olin, 1980: 319).

The FBI has highly trained teams ready for fast deployment. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 2). However, Dobson and Payne also state that these federal police assault teams do not have the aggressive military training to handle things so "expeditiously". (1986: 200).

Thompson feels that the problem the United States may face in dealing with terrorism may be political. "There was a great deal of squabbling over whether the FBI or the Los Angeles SWAT team would handle a terrorist incident." (1986: 111 - at the Olympics in 1984).

This sounds familiar! The same problems may occur with the Delta Team where there is interservice rivalry between Rangers, Marines, Air Force and Delta.

Among the many ethnic groups who have expressed their disagreements through terrorist organizations, Omega-7, an anti-Castro group, may be regarded as the

most dangerous of terrorist groups operating in the United States. The Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN) is another terrorist group, operating within U.S. borders and demanding Puerto Rico's independence. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 74).

#### WEST GERMANY

On September 5th, 1972, when eight Palestinians under the name of Black September Organization, seized the dormitory occupied by Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games, killing two of them and taking nine as hostages, this event was watched by a worldwide television audience. A bungled rescue attempt at the airport resulted in all of the hostages being killed by the Palestinians of which three were captured alive.

As a direct result of the Munich incident, the Federal Republic of West Germany, along with many other countries, improved its ability to deal with terrorists. A few weeks later, on September 26th, 1972, the government formed a counter-terrorist response unit. It was formed within the Federal Border Police, a para-military organization, and named Grenzschutzgruppe 9 - or GSG-9. This commando force is under the direct control of the Federal Minister of the Interior. Terrorism is the responsibility of the federal police rather than that of the military because, since World War II, the military has not been allowed to expand for

reasons other than limited defence.

West Germany is now organized into semi-autonomous states in an attempt to avoid a strong, central government like that of Nazi Germany. Each state has its own police force.

The Federal Border Guard was chosen as the organization under which its counter-terrorist assault team would be formed. Apart from the army, it is the only force in West Germany which is directly under the control of the central government. The Federal Border Guard was set up after the war to guard the country's border. It also protects federal agencies, as well as offering support to provincial police forces, if assistance is required.

Because of the organization's structure, it was chosen to set up a counter-terrorist assault unit. "The new unit from the GSG-9, have a strength of 188 men and are stationed at St. Augustin, just south of Bonn." (Thompson, 1986: 63).

When GSG-9 began its operations, the Commander of the unit, Colonel Ulrich Wegener, now a Brigadier General, in preparation for his special duties underwent extensive training which he was able to teach to others. He attended an counter-terrorist course in Israel; police assault team training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and training with the U.S. Special Forces.

(Fulton, 1976: 33).

The command staff of GSG-9 has been kept small to ensure tight control, where the officers, under the same training program, train with the enlisted men who are all volunteers. (Fulton, 1976: 34).

GSG-9 is organized into four teams, called "strike units", backed up by support units such as communications, intelligence, engineers, weapons, research, equipment, training and so on. A strike unit consists of 30 to 42 commandos (Thompson, 1986: 64), and each unit is broken down into five-man "sets", each set organized into an assault or sniper set. The numerous bombings and other terrorist activities of the Baader-Meinhof gang, and hijackings by Palestinian terrorists have caused terror and insecurity in the Federal Republic of West Germany. Commander Wegener, the founder and commander of GSG-9, stated that:

"The available police forces were not capable of effectively combating the terrorist attacks with their conventional methods and equipment. This was seen particularly well in the employment of police forces against the Black September commandos after their attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich." (Thompson, 1979: 133).

Commander Wegener feels that the Munich disaster

was due to the fact that "at the time there were no special units with unconventional, highly trained and selected personnel, highly motivated by their mission, and there was a lack of equipment and weapons and an absence of tactical concepts." (Thompson, 1979: 134).

One phase of the training has included a thorough re-examination of the Munich Olympic massacre. It was determined that they were lacking in four areas: intelligence, snipers, close combat units and negotiation teams. "At the Fuerstenfeldbruck ambush site, the police employed five snipers to ambush eight terrorists. It was too few." (Chapman, 1980: 135). There was also no formal plan.

"GSG-9 has concluded that the best point to have attacked the terrorists was when they exited the Israeli quarters to enter the bus which was to take them to the waiting helicopters. Two assault teams, one from each side of the doorway, would have to rush the group and, in hand-to-hand combat, overpower the terrorists and rescue as many hostages as possible." (Fulton, 1976: 34).

The function of GSG-9 is its employment in crises which require force, especially crises which involve terrorists.

As part of their training, members of GSG-9 study

Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla and analyse the tactics of leadership utilized by terrorist groups in Europe. (Thompson, 1979: 135).

The training of a member of GSG-9 involves everything from swimming to karate to knife fighting. Various indoor and outdoor activities keep them exceptionally fit. "Their training more than lives up to the rigorous super-Boy Scout instruction to which Marighella thought his terrorists ought to be subjected." (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 146). As Commander Wegener states: "We had to learn a lot from our opponents." (Thompson, 1979: 136).

The GSG-9 philosophy is to attempt to take prisoners, if possible. Therefore, emphasis is placed on the martial arts and hand-to-hand combat. "GSG-9 members become very efficient at wielding the butts of their MP5s." (Thompson, 1986: 66).

Some teams are composed of explosive experts, while others are specialized in underwater diving and so on. Obviously, not every situation will demand the use of these specialists. Therefore, with cross-training they may directly assist the tactical team, such as when they station themselves on a rooftop and act as extra snipers.

To ensure fast mobilization, they have their own helicopters, which are used not only for

transportation but for tactical purposes. They are capable of rappelling from helicopters on to rooftops, which assures them flexibility and the advantages of surprise.

Dobson and Payne suggest that every commando becomes his own James Bond. GSG-9 is equipped with the most modern weaponry. (1986: 113). They have a nine million dollar underground range, at their headquarters, which even includes aircraft mockups.

(Thompson, 1986: 66). Commandos learn the various airport installations, as well as airport operations. They receive training in various airport jobs, especially those of pilots and stewards, so that they can easily infiltrate a hijacked airliner by passing as crew members.

Commandos of GSG-9 are hand-picked volunteers from the Border Guard with an average age of twenty-five. They serve with the counter-terrorist unit for a five to seven year period and then usually return as Border Guards or join one of the police forces in the provinces or one of the various intelligence agencies. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 113).

The selection process is basically divided into three phases. The candidate must have served over two and a half years as a Border Guard. There is a psychological aptitude test, a physical-fitness test,

commonly known as a stress test, and intelligence and general knowledge test and a firearms test. An interview with GSG-9 officers is also conducted. The overall preliminary process eliminates "about two-thirds of the candidates." (Thompson, 1986: 65).

The next two phases consist of five months of general training and the next and final phase a 2-3 month specialization. (Fulton, 1976: 33). Phase II involves a basic training course, which seeks to make the candidate physically fit, as well as psychologically sound, for any assignment given him by his commander. The third phase brings more advanced training, where the recruit is trained with his team unit and where he specializes as a sniper, communicator and technician. He is trained in close combat fighting and with firearms.

Training for special crises - such as skyjacking - is practised. "Every member of the operational unit is trained in handling of airport equipment, like catering vehicles, and ten men of the unit are trained as cabin personnel." (Thompson, 1979: 138).

Members of GSG-9 also undertake other special tasks, such as the guarding of VIPs and the provision of security at German embassies or other buildings. The number of threats against NATO officers in Germany has brought about an increase in GSG-9 VIP use.

Joint exercises are held with the various special

police units of ten West German States. With other countries, Wegener states GSG-9 "adopts a co-ordinated approach", as emphasis of tactical exercises for the counter-terrorist assault team practise in various locations. The Munich massacre involved the deployment to West Germany of two advisers of the Sayaret Matkal, Israel's counter-terrorist unit. However, the unit was denied entry. When Germany's GSG-9 came into existence shortly after that incident, it turned to the Israelis for advice. There has been close co-operation between the two counter-terrorist units ever since. GSG-9 exchanges training with such renowned counter-terrorist units as Britain's S.A.S., the United States Delta Force and the U.S. FBI's Hostage Response Team, France's CRS and GIGN and Israel's Sayaret Matkal. The success of Mogadishu brought GSG-9 international fame, with more than 40 countries requesting assistance in forming their own counter-terrorist units. (Thompson, 1986: 68).

The Red Army Faction (RAF) is the best known and most active terrorist group operating in West Germany. The first generation of terrorists from the RAF was also known as the Baader-Meinhof group, its leaders Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. They operated from 1968 to 1972. The ideology of this group called for a revolutionary change in government. (Horchem, 1986: 199). The student protest against the establishment in

the late 1960's and early 1970's served as the justification for their violence against society. "Their aim was to bring their society into such a state of chaos that the people will cease to believe that the existing system can maintain an orderly life for them in any case." (Clutterbuck, 1977: 85).

The revolutionary struggle continued with the second generation of RAF members operating between 1974 and 1976 and ending with the failure at Entebbe. The third generation of RAF terrorists dates from 1977. (Clutterbuck, 1978: 34).

The Red Army Faction has focused its efforts against the United States and West Germany, considered by the group to be the world's two main imperialistic powers. Its particular targets are the staff and facilities of the American Army, NATO and the national institutions and public figures of West Germany. (Lochte, 1986: 17).

On October 13th, 1977, Arab and RAF terrorists skyjacked a Lufthansa 737 aircraft carrying 79 passengers and a crew of five. The terrorist demand was the release of eleven RAF members. GSG-9 was dispatched and, after travelling through several Arab countries following the skyjacked plane, finally landed in Mogadishu, Somalia. When the airplane captain was shot dead, permission was granted to GSG-9 for the assault of the plane. Stun

grenades were used and three of the four hostage-takers were killed, the fourth injured. There were no hostages or commandos injured.

After five years of careful operation under Wegener, their first big operation at Mogadishu lasted seven minutes and was totally successful." (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 146).

"The kidnapping of Berlin politician Peter Lorenz, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Olympic massacre and the abduction/murder of Hans Martin Schleyer has forced the government to develop and maintain an anti-terrorist response team which is recognized by many authors I have read as the best in the world." (Olin, 1980: 322).

0 SPAIN

Spain's counter-terrorist assault force is the Special Operations Group (GEO). This is a para-military unit whose members are recruited from the national police force (40,000 men) and the civil guard (60,000). (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 166). The military is assigned counter-terrorist duties in the northern provinces in combatting Basque terrorists, but the GEO are responsible to the Prime Minister who heads a crisis control committee.

GEO was formed in 1978, quite late compared to

other European counter-terrorist units. It has a strength of about 120 men, divided into twenty-four, five-man teams. Each member of the team is a specialist in one of the five areas of expertise: small arms, demolitions, communications, combat swimming or sniping. However, like any counter-terrorist unit, each member is trained in various techniques and is expected to handle sniping, as well as an entry requiring an assault. As in any counter-terrorist unit, at least one five-man team is on standby. (Thompson, 1986: 83).

Thompson states that Germany's GSG-9 assisted in setting up GEO, which resulted in the unit being equipped primarily with German weapons. (1986: 84). However, Dobson and Payne state that GEO called upon the British SAS for help in the art of counter-terrorist operations. (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 166). In reality, it was probably the combination of assistance which resulted in the training and organization of GEO.

Spain has a second counter-terrorist unit, called UEI (Unidad Especial de Intervencion), whose members are recruited from the Civil Guard. The Guardia Civil, a militarized national police force, comes under the control of the Ministries of the Interior and Defence. UEI was also formed in 1978, with assistance from France's GIGN. Its responsibilities are not limited, however, to counter-terrorism. Kidnappings, the

rescuing of hostages, hijackings, prison riots, VIP protection and the search for dangerous escaped criminals are but a few of its duties - but all involve an element of danger.

Its training, based on that of GIGN, is very rigid and involves every aspect of counter-terrorism training. However, due to UEL's training being very broadly specialized, GEO continues to be Spain's main counter-terrorist assault team.

In May of 1981, a band of approximately 24 right-wing extremists seized a bank in Barcelona and took more than 200 hostages. This operation was the first fullscale assault conducted by the 60 GEO commandoes. The hostage-takers demanded the release of an army officer who had attempted a coup in the Cortes, the Spanish Parliament, three months earlier. If the authorities refused to give in to this demand, the hostages would be killed one at a time.

The siege began early on Saturday and on Sunday night the GEO assaulted the building. The Spanish government wanted to show the hostage-takers and the world that it had "the will and the trained men to force them to surrender." (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 177).

Only one hostage-taker was killed and one of the hostages was wounded. "If the operation had been conducted by less skillfully trained troops, the number

of casualties would have been much greater." (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 178).

Spain has its problems in the Basque region, located in the north-west area of that country where ethnic Basques constitute only 60% of the population. (Hewitt, 1984: 16). Under the rules of Spain's dictator, Franco, Basque nationalism was repressed. A resistance movement emerged, therefore, when a group calling itself Euskadi ta Askatasuna led terrorism strikes against the government.

ETA consider themselves Marxists engaged in a Basque struggle to liberate themselves from Spanish rule.

Table I provides an overview of ten counter-terrorist assault teams. The table is divided into eleven categories including: country, foundation, date of establishment; assault teams' formal names, responsibility of control, recruitment, special training, length of secondment, joint training, famous incidents, and the terrorist threats each responds to. The table summarizes the specifics of each counter-terrorist assault team.


TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF TEN COUNTER-TERRORIST ASSAULT TEAMS FROM NINE COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	(Response United States)	Holland	England	Israel	Australia	Italy	France	(Domestic.) United States	West Germany	Spain
FOUNDATION	Military	Military	Military	Military	Military	Military Police	Military Police	Civil. Police	Para-Mil. Police	Joint: Civil Police Mil Pers.
DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT	1977	after 1972 Olympics	W.W. II	1968	1985	1978	1974	early 1970's	1972	1978
ASSAULT TEAMS (Counter-terrorists)	DELTA FORCE	ROYAL DUTCH MARINES (Whisky Co.)	S.A.S. (Counter Revolution. Warfare)	SAYARET MATKAL	S.A.S.	G.I.S.	G.I.G.N.	F.B.I. H.R.T.	G.S.G.9.	G.E.O.
RESPONS. OF CONTROL	President of U.S.	Crisis Ctr. Min. Justice Min. Def. Min. HomeAffs	C.O.B.R.A. Home Sec. Defence, MI5 S.A.S. For. Affairs	Minister of Intelligence	Minister of Defence	Minister of Defence	President	Att. General via Director F.B.I.	Federal Minister	Prime Minister
RECRUITMENT	Special Forces	Marine Corps	Grenadier Guards Paratrooper	Recruit Depot National Service	Soldiers	Paratrooper of the Carabinieri	Gendarmerie Royale	Civilians	Border Guard and Military	Civil Guard Security Police
SPECIAL TRAINING	based on S.A.S. training	one year 16 wks. basic 32 weeks special	4614 weeks airplanes 1 year probation	behind Arab lines	3 months firearms 1 year general	Physical -swim -run	8 months	F.B.I.	3 1/2 month general 3 1/2 month specialized	similar to G.I.G.N.
LENGTH OF ASSIGNMENT	indefinite	minimum 2 years maximum indefinite	indefinite	2 years	1 year	indefinite	indefinite	indefinite	5-6 years then transfer to Police/Intel	indefinite
JOINT TRAINING	Special Forces G.S.G.9	S.A.S.	most other countries	G.S.G.9 S.A.S.	G.S.G.9 S.A.S. Delta Force	nil	most other countries	other U.S. Police Orgs.	S.A.S./GICM Delta Force F.B.I. H.R.T. Sayaret Mat.	former colonies Germany
FAMOUS INCIDENTS	failed Iranian rescue	-train -school -Embassy	-Iran Embassy -Balcombe St.	Entebbe	nil	Kidnapping General Dozier	Djibouti	nil	Mogadishu skyjacking	Barcelona hostage-taking
ERRORIST THREATS	international incidents against	South Moluccans	I.R.A.	P.L.O.	imported	Red Brigade	Corsican Lib.Front Breton Lib.	imported terrorism	Baader-Meinhof imported	Basque E.T.A.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Results and Conclusions



The conclusions drawn from the questionnaire are based on the results tabulated from the 22 respondents' comments on the counter-terrorist assault team in Canada. It is important to analyse the data. To facilitate this, the questionnaire will be discussed question by question.

1) Do you feel that terrorism is a problem in Canada today? If yes, what is the nature of the problem? If no, do you feel it may become a problem in the near future?

Thirteen of the twenty-two respondents felt terrorism is a problem in Canada today. Concerns about third party targets and the effects of target hardening in other countries attracting terrorists to Canada were shared by many. St. John identifies three terrorist threats to Canada as being 1) the internal threat of multicultural groups fighting ancient wars; 2) the external threat of international terrorism, aimed at the United States for example but using Canada as a base and 3) the external threat of international terrorism aimed at Canada itself.

Turk suggests terrorism in Canada at present is mainly imported, using the Sikhs and Armenians as examples. Turk identifies terrorism as being leftist and rightist. He feels that, given prolonged economic distress and political uncertainties, a resurgence in some degree of FLQ activity can be expected in the face

of continuing tensions between Quebec and the federal government and among interest groups within the province. Some version of Direct Action, perhaps arising on the fringes of the peace movement, may appear in reaction to greater continentalism in Canada and U.S. relations and to the upgrading of the Canadian military. Racist attacks from the right are to be expected, in so far as unemployment and living costs remain high.

Thompson also feels that terrorism is a problem and that internally it exists through ethnic communities' grievances in their homelands and with Canadians of Japanese, native or Quebecois nationalist origins who have real or perceived grievances against Canada itself.

Cottrell identifies the terrorist problem as being involved with the Armenians, Sikhs, Direct Action, American Indian Movement and animal rights activists.

One respondent suggests that Canada is caught up in a problem of non-Canadian origin and that it has become an innocent victim of foreign battles staged in this country. He continues that until the underlying cause is resolved in the country of origin, the potential for such problems continuing to manifest themselves criminally in Canada will remain high.

Of the nine respondents who replied that terrorism is not a problem in Canada, most felt the potential for it to become one rests on whether Canada

will continue to be regarded as a "safe haven". Perhaps, as Mitchell states, terrorism in Canada has been highly episodic and that, compared to the rest of the world, Canada's terrorist problem seems relatively minor.

All but one acknowledged its potential for the future is high.

2) Do you think it is cost-effective to maintain counter-terrorist assault team, in constant readiness, in view of the degree and nature of the terrorist threat in Canada?

Twenty one out of twenty-two respondents felt that, although they would not necessarily agree that the maintenance of such a team would be cost-effective, the existence of such a team was absolutely necessary.

As Charters put it - the question cannot be answered on a purely cost-effective basis, simply because its effectiveness or ineffectiveness cannot be so measured. If such a team is never used, it may be because there was no threat or it may be because those who may have terrorized were deterred from doing so by the existence of this force. However, one thing is clear. If lives are lost because no force existed, or because it was poorly prepared or badly employed, the political costs to any government would be very severe. Only one respondent felt the maintenance of such a unit is impractical, stating that local police would find the

means to deal with the situation before such a force could be brought in, due to Canada's large geographical area.

3) Given a terrorist threat, there are two types of organizations which traditionally are prepared to use force to control a crisis situation: the police and the military. In your opinion, which organization is better suited to combat terrorists in the country and why?

The responses to this question all focus on the need for specially equipped, highly trained and effective and efficient logistical preparedness, leading eleven of the twenty-two respondents to say that the military is better suited to combat terrorism. Shearing adds that pragmatic reasons exist in favour of the military, pointing to the fact that their weaponry and training would be useful in any military operation and that the team itself would fight in the event of war. If the police had the mandate, these weapons and that manpower would rarely be used and could not be adapted to a wartime situation.

Nine respondents felt it should be the police who are mandated with the fight against terrorism. Turk feels the police use restrained, focused use of force which minimizes risks to noncombattants. He states further that police have a clearer and yet more flexible legal mandate for handling civil threats, short of

massive insurrections or invasions. He feels the police have the trust of the public in their discretionary use of power to counter small-scale internal violence and he questions if the military enjoys the same trust.

Russell states that the police should be entrusted with the fight against terrorism since they are more likely to be sensitive to civil liberties and less likely to transform the nature of a terrorist event into a political event.

Thompson feels it should be the police. SERT, as part of the Solicitor General's department, together with CSIS, simplifies the command and control structure in handling a crisis. Thompson adds that the public may accept more readily seeing armed police officers than armed soldiers. The soldier is trained to use violence as a tool to fulfill his tasks and to meet his objectives. The police officer is trained not to seek violence, but to end it. The unconscious priority of a military commando storming a hijacked aircraft is the death of the terrorists. The police officer would think first of rescuing the hostages.

Mitchell, concerned with combatting terrorism in a manner consistent with civil liberties and the due process of law, feels it should be the police, since they have access to the intelligence capabilities of the RCMP and CSIS and they are conditioned to the selective use of

force.

Cottrell feels it should be the police, as the military expects to lose a number of people in engagements and is also prepared to have an acceptable number of civilian casualties. The police attitude is the exact opposite - any loss of innocent lives is unacceptable.

Funds should be made available to existing ERT teams, instead of pouring all monies into the one spot - SERT - due to the expansiveness of Canada. Kellett did not state a preference but stressed instead the necessity of proper training and said he would like to see a "secret service" funded for said mandate. Wallack also did not specify a preference but offered the opinion that use overseas would seem to suggest a military framework.

4) If Canadians travelling abroad are taken hostage by a terrorist group, do you think that Canada's counter-terrorist assault team should respond to such a threat? If not, why not?

The group seemed to be split on the question. Eleven respondents felt that the Canadian counter-terrorist team should respond to such an attack. Many added, however, that the capability should be there but that, ultimately, the decision rests on where the attack is and how sympathetic the host country is to Canadians. Kelly adds that it should be by invitation

only and that should this team be police he would have further reservations. If the team was military, he feels it would be easier to launch a rescue and assault operation overseas.

Shearing also feels that endorsement from the state concerned is a must, in order not to violate nation-state respect.

Turk feels that to undertake such a task there must be co-operation with the Americans and/or other relevant forces, thus shifting from national to international teams. St. John feels the team should go abroad if given the O.K. from the host country and if it is within Canada's capabilities. He feels that military experience abroad is more suited to such a mission than that of the RCMP's team which would be out of its depth.

Russell feels that, theoretically, Canada should go. However, it lacks the commitment for defence at this time and its armed forces are already thin.

Charters notes that the use of a Canadian team abroad should be used as a last resort, where the victims are official delegates whose official duties gave them no choice but to place themselves at risk.

Mitchell considers this use of a Canadian team, although desirable, as highly problematic since Canada does not have an independent foreign intelligence service and has a limited military capability. However, joint

effort with the assault team of an ally, such as the U.S. Delta Force, U.K. SAS or West Germany's GSG-9, is a realistic option.

One respondent stated that, at the very least, Canada should have persons present in an advisory capacity.

Those eight respondents who answered "no" to the question, added that it should be handled by the jurisdiction in question, as SERT is a police force and therefore not intended for use abroad. Many also felt that the Canadian military does not have a strong logistical support group overseas, nor the expertise required for such a mission. One felt there is no requirement for overseas action and, if one should occur, the U.S. will probably be there. Cottrell agrees with this and states as well that we do not have the logistics nor the influence to operate beyond our own shores.

The answers outlined in the questionnaire by no means exhaust the views concerning which organization is best suited in combatting international terrorism. There is disagreement among the respondents, as well as among government officials, politicians, police and the military as to which agency, the police or the military, should be responsible for responding to terrorist incidents, if force is to be used.

In summary, more than half the respondents felt

that terrorism is a problem in Canada. Of those who felt it is not a major problem, most acknowledged that the threat of terrorism is real and could become actual in the future. As Henderson states, violence is an option for groups, since weapons and explosives are reasonably available and expertise is obtainable due to ongoing warfare in the world. Many felt that the problem in Canada has to do with the nature of our "umbrella nation" makeup; with many cultures and ethnic backgrounds people have varied commitments to the problems in their respective homelands.

The respondents were closest to consensus on the question of maintaining a counter-terrorist team. All but one felt it was a necessary tool and that the establishment of such a team, despite the high cost of keeping such a team well armed, well developed and well trained, was beneficial as a deterrent and as a last resort. On the question of who should be responsible to combat terrorism, the decision is split. Eleven respondents feel the military is more able to meet the commitment, due to a better logistical system, better employment and manoeuverability and specialty training, consistent with a philosophy conducive to the use of deadly force.

The nine respondents who favour the police centre their arguments on the mentality of the police officer - trained to end violence with as little force as is

necessary. Often the respondents spoke of the public's ability to accept the visibility of armed police officers versus armed soldiers. Perhaps with great optimism, these respondents feel the police can end a terrorist incident without jeopardizing the due process of law.

How far are we prepared to go, in terms of the sacrifice of civil liberties, to defeat terrorism? Counter-terrorist units should go only as far as they can carry public opinion with them. Over-reacting and being unduly harsh will bring about a loss of sympathy for the government.

"Additional training for British security forces in the area of anti-terrorist psychological warfare skills have been helpful. 'We've got to be behaved better than the IRA and be more concerned about people', a British platoon leader in Belfast once remarked." (Wolf, 1981: 110).

It is important not to lose the support of the people you want to protect. If the country's citizens support terrorists, it will be difficult for the police to even find them. The city can then be compared to a jungle, from which the terrorist emerges to commit further acts. The terrorist will rely on the people to provide him with food and shelter in the form of "safe houses", as well as intelligence information.

The problem with counter-terrorist assault

teams, especially here in Canada, is that they operate within the constraints of morality and legality, to provide a democratic society's idea of justice.

"In seeking to fight international terrorism, democracies are particularly anxious to ensure that their responses are lawful and just. Lawful means compliance with the doctrines of international law and the rules of war."

(Netanyahu, 1986: 131).

However, is today's law capable of addressing a new type of war - terrorism?

The general public should not experience any difficulty in taking a stand against terrorism as a political tool. No-one can approve murder, bombings, hostage-takings, damage to property and other terrorist acts. These are serious crimes which for whatever reason - social, political or economic - cannot be accepted as long as there are avenues of political expression. Every nation can take a stand against terrorism, maintaining its integrity by refusing to support it.

The courts must support military or police counter-terrorist assault team when it is engaged in rescuing hostages and arresting terrorists. An assault will involve controlled force, however - possibly deadly force. Such a team needs political support if it is to develop into a highly confident, professional and

country-wide counter-terrorist team. Even the best trained team in the world will receive opposition due to the manner in which it carries out its rescue missions, e.g., SAS and the Iran embassy situation.

An open court provides the opportunity to study the tactics, weapons and organization of the counter-terrorist assault team. Fortunately, England was prepared to protect its terrorist fighters. "Even then, the whole story did not emerge. The S.A.S. soldiers were allowed to keep their identity secret, the finer points of their tactics were not discussed and the verdict of justifiable homicide did not erase doubts that the soldiers could have captured rather than killed more of the terrorists." (Dobson and Payne, 1986: 38). The S.A.S. attitude is it is better that all the terrorists should die rather than risk the life of another hostage or a member of the assault force.

(Dobson and Payne, 1986: 43)

Earlier this year, S.A.S. soldiers were acquitted of criminal wrong-doing in the killing of three I.R.A. members in Gibraltar. The I.R.A. were preparing a car bomb which would have been detonated as the Royal Anglican Regiment marched by. The police commander formally requested that the S.A.S. commander act. He in turn ordered the S.A.S. soldiers to arrest the three I.R.A. members. The soldiers believed themselves

recognized as they approached the terrorists, ordered them to stop, and as they did not instantly do so, killed them to prevent them setting off the bomb.

(PFAFF, The Ottawa Citizen, 1988: A8).

The public must remember that the terrorists are aware of media effects. Any over-reaction by military or police commandos, any excess of brutality, will be used by the terrorists. If the terrorist group can convince the Canadian people that the SERT unit was brutal, they have won part of the battle since the Canadian government will be portrayed as having infringed upon human rights.

The writer must pose the question: are terrorists ever concerned with the civil liberties of their hostages; the answer must be no. The question of how far the counter-terrorist assault team members are entitled to go in putting aside normal legalities in response to a terrorist incident involving hostages is a difficult one. Can commandos shoot on sight? What if, upon entering the building, terrorists are found to be unarmed - are the shootings justified?

Strong government support for either a military or police assault force is needed in order that a country can maintain a professional counter-terrorist assault team. This support should involve moral support and not simply the provision of funds and manpower. The unit must be allowed to operate freely when it is given the

"green light" to use force. In order to carry out extremely difficult and dangerous operations, it has to retain government support, thus public support.

When asked if a Canadian counter-terrorist team should be used abroad, half of the respondents replied yes. However, most added that this would be a difficult task with the team as it exists today. Many offered that problems in employing such a team are based on the logistical and expertise requirements of such a task. It appears that many feel the Canadian team would need the assistance of more well-established teams, such as those employed by the United States and the United Kingdom, both military teams, and by West Germany, a para-military police unit.

This writer is forced to conclude that the concerns of those who replied "no" rest in a low level of respect for a Canadian team. It is believed that, should the Canadian team be made ready for such an undertaking, bringing about a trust in these respondents for its effectiveness, their answer might change.

It seems, through the analysis of the questionnaire, that the major concern of the respondents lies with the effectiveness of a Canadian team, the issues of civil liberties, government and public support. The problems are real. To establish a team which can accomplish tasks as difficult and as hazardous as

rescuing hostages, at home or abroad, these concerns will have to be overcome.

FIGURE 5: Foundations of the Ten Counter-Terrorist Assault Teams.

MILITARY	MILITARY POLICE	CIVILIAN POLICE
1. UNITED STATES "Delta Force"	6. ITALY "Special Intervention Group" (GIS)	8. U.S. "F.B.I. Hostage Response Team" (H.R.T.)
2. HOLLAND "Royal Dutch Marines"	7. FRANCE "National Gendarmerie Intervention Group" (G.I.G.N.)	
3. ENGLAND "Special Air Service" (SAS)		
4. ISRAEL "Sayaret Matkal"		
5. AUSTRALIA "Special Air Service" (SAS)		
JOINT FORCE		PARA-MILITARY POLICE
9. SPAIN "Special Operations Group" (G.E.O.)		10. WEST GERMANY "Grenzschutzgruppe 9" (G.S.G.9)

The writer reviewed the practice of nine countries in the location of their national counter-terrorist assault teams. The countries were chosen by virtue of their past experience with terrorist attacks and available literature on the existing teams. As can be seen from Figure 5, in five countries the principal responsibility is found within the armed forces, in two countries it is located within the military police and a cross-section of civilian police and military police personnel can be found in one country. A special category was created for West Germany as it was difficult to categorize its assault force in the existing foundation. The United States was mentioned twice, as it has two teams - one from the military police personnel and the other from the federal police organization. Therefore, only one counter-terrorist unit is composed solely of police personnel. All of the others have a military background and training.

The nature of the counter-terrorist forces varies from one country to another. For example, the Army's SAS is Britain's main force in the war on terrorism, as is Australia's SAS, the Royal Dutch Marines' Whiskey Company, Israel's Sayaret Matkal and the United States' Delta Force. All of these elite forces are composed of military personnel.

In Italy and France, the responsibility is given

to the military, but through their military police forces. In Spain's counter-terrorist force, the GEO is a combination of military police and civilian police. Therefore, GEO can be described as a "Joint Force", specifically designed to combat terrorism. The only exception is the use of the military in the Basque region. However, all are recognized as police units, as is West Germany's GSG-9, Italy's GIS, France's GIGN, and Spain's GEO, although the GSG9 draws its recruits from the Border Guards. These units are of a police-background nature.

Only the United States' FBI's Hostage Rescue Team can be compared to Canada's SERT. Both are teams composed solely of civilian police personnel, assigned to respond to any terrorist threat within the country.

Some countries actually have two counter-terrorist assault teams. Spain has GEO and UEI, the first a Joint Force and the second a police force. France has CRS, a civilian police force, and GIGN, a militarized police unit. However, GIGN and GEO are the main elite forces. This is probably due to the fact that the secondary forces (UEI and CRS) are broadly specialized in their duties.

CRS is involved in safety and rescue work on inner and off-shore waters and mountains. They also act as a counter-terrorist response team and as a

counter-insurgency team. UEI is not only involved in counter-terrorism, but in giving protection to V.I.P.s, searching for dangerous criminals and responding to prison riots. On the other hand, GIGN and GEO's duties are mainly restricted to responding to a terrorist situation, e.g., hostage-taking. Nevertheless, every assault team mentioned has a wide field of responsibilities and are given rotation of duties. It seems only Canada's SERT team is not involved in such duties, e.g., V.I.P. security or training with other elite regiments such as the United States' Delta Force with its Navy's SEALS unit.

It may be regarded that too many special forces exist already, creating duplication. This is the case in the United States with its many special forces and even in Canada where ERT and SERT closely resemble each other in training.

The United States also has two main counter-terrorist forces: one to respond outside the country, the Army's Delta Force, and the other to respond within the country, the FBI'S HRT unit.

In West Germany, France, Spain and the United States, units are responsible directly to the federal government, Prime Minister or a President. Each of these countries are, however, classified in different categories of foundation. Holland and England are

responsible to a government committee while Australia and Italy are responsible to the Minister of Defence.

There appears to be an international preference for the location of counter-terrorist assault teams within the military. Of these teams, usually ranked in the top ten in terms of efficiency, five are located in the military, three are located within militarized police forces and two are located within national police forces. (Kelly, 1987: 68). However, the Kelly Report fails to identify these teams by their respective countries.

In his book, The Rescuers, Thompson, a private security consultant, ranks the world's best counter-terrorist units. Ranking the groups on command, training, personnel, weapons, intelligence and resourcefulness, Thompson gave the British Special Air Service the top rating. The rest of his top ten are West Germany's Grenzschutzgruppe 9, ranked second; France's National Gendarmerie Intervention Group, third; Australia's Special Air Service, fourth; Israel's Sayaret Matkal, fifth; United States' Delta Force, sixth; Spain's Special Operations Group, seventh; United States' FBI Hostage Rescue Team, eight; Italy's Groupe Interventional Speciale, ninth and Holland's Royal Dutch Marines, tenth. The Delta Force, while "technically

masterful" were marked down because of the cumbersome bureaucracy that slows their effectiveness. Thompson downgraded the Israelis, widely considered the world's top counter-terrorists, saying "their commandos too often are organized on an ad hoc basis ... forced to handle unrelated duties that dull their anti-terrorist edge." (Thompson, The Ottawa Citizen, Thompson, 1987).

All counter-terrorist assault teams reviewed train constantly to maintain that "keen edge" needed should they be deployed. The only (e)sception is the United States FBI's HRT which functions as a part-time unit. The major portion of assault forces' training includes weapons, tactics and continuous physical conditioning.

Thompson suggests a full-time permanent counter-terrorist unit is essential. "If a unit is split and only brought together periodically to train, the razor edge is dulled, as is its rescue capability." (1986: 2).

Are counter-terrorist teams a necessity? A quote from James Schlesinger says it all: "Bad luck can destroy any operation, but careful planning will enhance the probability of success. Luck smiles on the prepared." (McGeorge, 1983: 59).

With the exception of Israel and the United States FBI, all members of these special assault forces

are recruited from established military or police units - elite organizations in themselves. The competition to join any of these assault forces, however, is intense.

It is important to note that many countries were not able to choose between military or police organizations from which to create a special assault force to combat terrorists holding hostages.

In France, the police were chosen because the army has a history of military intervention in French politics. It is interesting to note that their militarized police force has been assigned this task. GIGN's attitude, however, is a police attitude rather than a military one.

West Germany was also forced to turn to the police because the military has not been allowed to expand for reasons other than limited defence since World War II. Britain turned, however, to the military, namely the SAS, for its special assault force, since the British police are unarmed and untrained in the use of various weaponry.

In most of the nine countries examined, counter-terrorist assault teams were established in the 1970s. This was the direct result of the 1972 Olympic incident at Munich, where the government's assault forces were ill-prepared to rescue the hostages. The only exceptions are Israel, who established such a team in

1968 and Australia who waited until the middle of the 1980s to do so. Britain merely expanded the duties of the SAS, an elite force established in World War II.

Italy felt no real pressure to create a counter-terrorist assault team, since terrorist tactics in that country seemed to be limited to assassinations, bombings or the crippling of victims. Nevertheless, a special assault force was created where the government felt that such a team could be used proactively, e.g. involved in the arrest of suspected armed terrorists and the rescue of kidnapped diplomats. In some degree, the same may be said for the United States Delta Force, who changed its mandate from counter-terrorist operations in the Vietnam war to focus on hostage rescue. The SAS were picked because of their experience in subversive warfare and are now involved in hostage-rescue as well.

In many countries, among them the United States and Britain, the police have full jurisdictional responsibility at a terrorist-hostage situation. Such is the case for Canada also. The RCMP are responsible for any crisis situation of a political nature.

Analogous to all of the counter-terrorist assault teams we have examined is the matter of their training. All recruits are skilled in the tactics of fire and movement, explosives, close combat fighting and marksmanship. Some are even trained in parachuting from

helicopters on to roof tops and in scubadiving. They receive cross-training in all fields, which is geared to assure them flexibility and the advantage of surprise. Various indoor and outdoor activities keep them in exceptionally fit physical condition.

A knowledge of several languages is an asset as it enables the rescue teams to communicate with hostages and their captors in their own language, even if only to be able to tell them to lie down in an assault. In Israel the knowledge of languages is a prerequisite to recruitment into the Sayaret Matkal. Only in Israel does training actually involve the recruits gaining experience by crossing into enemy territory. The recruits gain experience quickly in cover and fire techniques as they "train" in neighbouring Arab countries.

Commandos of all elite assault forces mentioned - policy or military - become members of a family. Their comrades in arms are closer than brothers. Dangerous training and situations make the members of these teams work closely together - their lives depend on each other. Their tour of duty in these teams is indefinite, as long as each commando continues to excel in his training. Only in Israel and Australia is the period of secondment predetermined, i.e. two years and one year respectively. Members of these special assault forces are then assigned new duties. In West Germany, after five to six years'

service with GSG9, members are transferred to one of the various police or intelligence agencies.

West Germany's GSG9 and the Dutch Marines seem to be reluctant to kill terrorists when an assault occurs. They stress hand-to-hand combat and martial arts. However, it is quite clear that this is not the policy of the British SAS. Their commandos are trained to kill without a moment's hesitation, either on the direct order of the commander or on the commando's own initiative. The same may be said about Israel's Sayaret Matkal where the assault force is involved in retaliatory and pre-emptive strikes and assassinations. It seems that the use of aggressive training, e.g the killing of suspected terrorists, does not reflect on the foundation of the counter-terrorist assault teams. Both the military and the police assault forces of the countries examined train in the use of deadly force.

Except for the United States' HRT and Australia's SAS, all have been involved in a famous hostage-rescue incident. The most celebrated appears to be the Entebbe incident conducted by Israel against Uganda. Not all, however, have been successful - for instance, the United States' failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran.

What follows are the similarities found within the two organizations - military and police - and their respected assault forces. Every team appears to suffer

from morale problems due to long periods of inactivity. All of their time is spent on training, yet some members of these units may never experience a real-life hostage rescue operation. One point which might be added is that, with the military, the assault team can be used effectively in wartime behind enemy lines in the rescue of friendly soldiers. This is a natural extension of their duties. Police officers are civilians, however, and are not required to engage in war.

There is a danger of displacement - for example, the use of the team as a counter-insurgency unit. This can be found within the military and the police. As well, long periods of inaction may bring about unnecessarily violent assaults and bursts of extreme action. Both military and police organizations could create fear in the public, as did the Nazi S.S. units.

There is also the question of elitism, which might lead commandos to refuse to train with other forces or to obey the rules. This is the situation in Canada where SERT does not even train with its fellow officers, the members of the ERT units. The experience is that rivalry and jealousy are reflected in all forces, either military or police.

Most counter-terrorist assault teams have found themselves called upon to assist in the training of new assault teams in other countries. Canada's SERT team,

under the direction of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, received training from Britain's SAS. Israel and France, both countries having personnel from the military, have also been involved in organizing other countries' counter-terrorist assault teams. Germany's GSG-9 is also involved in this process. These elite forces, therefore, are in a position to spread their influence.

The major counter-terrorist teams have also loaned their expertise and training to various other countries seeking assistance. Indicated below is some idea of the influence wielded on the response teams being trained in smaller countries. (Thompson, 1986).

West Germany's GSG-9:

Australia, Korea, Morocco, Egypt, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Japan.

Britain's SAS:

Australia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Morocco, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Greece, Japan.

Israel's Sayaret Matkal:

Sri Lanka, Sweden, Japan.

U.S. Delta Force:

Australia, Korea, Denmark.

Holland's Royal Dutch Marines:

Greece.

France's GIGN:

Morocco, Egypt, Belgium, Finland, Denmark,

Japan.

In implementing counter-terrorist assault teams, a government can make use of law enforcement agencies, military forces or a specialized "Joint Force".

The degree of sophistication of the counter-terrorism unit will reflect the seriousness of the terrorist threat and the government's experience with previous terrorist incidents. As we have seen, the organizations chosen by governments to counter terrorism when force is needed, vary greatly among countries. Many have specialized units, trained to react to terrorist events, which is a reflection of the government's willingness to deal with any terrorist organization, not to mention their fear of being next on the terrorists' list.

Many other countries have permanent counter-terrorist assault teams, but there is little available literature on these existing teams. New Zealand's SAS, South Korea's Commandos, Pakistan's Special Service Group (SSG), India's Special Counter-Terrorist Unit (SCTU), Sri Lanka's Army Commando

Squadron (ACS), Denmark's Royal Navy, Turkey's Jandara Suicide Commandos (JSC), Jordan's 101st Special Forces Hostage Rescue Unit and Egypt's Force 777 are military. (Kelly, 1987: 65).

Countries which have chosen the police are Belgium with its ESI (Escadron Special D'Intervention), Sweden's SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics), Norway's Beredskapstop, Greece's Athens City Police, Japan's SAU (Special Action Units) and Morocco's GIGN. (Kelly, 1987: 65).

Training and organizing these elite teams were Germany's GSG-9, England's SAS and France's GIGN. Israel, Holland and the United States were also involved, but France, England and West Germany were very influential in spreading their techniques.

Despite the training, manpower and money spent on counter-terrorist units, there have been few major operations carried out by such units throughout the world. Many governments and their citizens find it difficult to justify the expense of keeping these units of highly trained commandos, whether they are police or military personnel, for terrorist incidents which may never come.

Thompson feels that, despite the limited number of operations (he estimates the number of major, successful operations at about a dozen), commando units

are necessary. "Much of the value of such units is in deterrence and there is no objective way to evaluate how many hostage incidents have been avoided because of the existence of a unit." (1986: 19).

Are counter-terrorist teams a necessity? A quote from James Schlesinger says it all: "Bad luck can destroy any operation, but careful planning will enhance the probability of success. Luck smiles on the prepared." (McGeorge, 1983: 59).

As reviewed, both the military and police foundations are affected by the problems in maintaining an effective counter-terrorist assault team. Both foundations will have lengthy inactive periods which tend to test morale; both will need to establish superior training to allow members the expertise required in weapons handling, hand to hand combat, survival, tactics, physical preparedness, languages and so forth.

Neither foundation, it seems, has more potential than the other at doing this and, whether or not the member is a policeman or soldier, he will need the equipment, training and strategy to handle the danger of the tasks assigned him. The findings of the questionnaire support this. There is no clear cut choice when deciding who is best suited to countering terrorism - the military or the police. Without qualitative data taken from actual incidents, it is impossible to predict

who would be the most successful in Canada, the military or the police, in this role.

The only determining factor in preparing such a counter-terrorist team to be successful is to ensure that the members are trained thoroughly and are well equipped. If the training is superior, the team will be also - from either of the foundations. The comparison showed how other countries have responded to the terrorist threat, either by issuing the mandate to the police or to the military, but their choices do not establish which of the foundations is best for Canada.

One question which was answered more decisively related to a response abroad. It is apparent that Canada's counter-terrorist assault team should be prepared to respond abroad should its intervention be necessary and appropriate for the rescue of Canadians outside Canada.

Another point clarified by this thesis is that, whatever the foundation of a counter-terrorist assault team, it is imperative that its scope and network be developed to ensure it can cope with the extensive terrorist ties which exist among countries and their peoples around the world. This requires liaison, communication and co-operation among police and intelligence agencies. Perhaps this dictates that a central headquarters is not the most appropriate, but

rather that the counter-terrorist assault force be deployed in smaller units across Canada, in order to facilitate coverage, response and intelligence.

In the researching of this thesis and the consideration of options available, coupled with the writer's personal experience, the writer has formed a conclusion - a personal opinion. As a police officer and a member of the Ottawa Police Tactical Response Team, I have been trained to deal with the threats often imposed by criminals on the citizens of Ottawa. Considering the magnitude of the terrorist threat, I feel it is outside the mandate of the police, even the national police force. From the knowledge I have gained of the issue of terrorism, I must acknowledge that it is my belief that the military is better prepared to assume responsibility for combatting terrorism, within Canada and abroad. Should the decision be made to task the military in this respect, much further research is required before establishing how it would accomplish this.

Some questions to be raised in such a study must include:

- 1) Which unit of those currently in existence in the Canadian Armed Forces should be given the mandate, i.e. the Airborne Regiment or a regular infantry battalion?
- 2) Should neither of these be utilized, but

rather a new unit formed?

Many other questions remain to be answered and extensive consideration given to the logistics of setting up such a command.

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