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**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PSYCHE AND PERSON
IN THE WORKS OF C.G. JUNG AND W.C. SMITH**

by

Chae Young Kim

Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa in compliance
with the requirements of the program leading to a Ph.D.
in Religious Studies



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To be dedicated to my mother and father
who always wish their son to be well.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea of the present thesis came to me while I was writing my M.A. thesis titled "A Study of Wilfred Cantwell Smith--About His Human Understanding" at Seoul National University in 1986. Professor Smith's personal approach to world religious traditions has always made me think of all religious phenomena as expressions of a person's genuine qualities.

Furthermore, Smith's personal understanding guided me to study the religious life of Mahatma Gandhi at Madras Christian College, University of Madras, India in 1987. As a result, my understanding of Gandhi's personal human qualities was materialized in the thesis titled "The Expressions of Mahatma Gandhi's Religious Principles - A Critical Study."

In addition, Smith's personal understanding made me study how C.G. Jung's depth psychology approached various human qualities, while I took two seminar courses of "Psychology and Religion" with Prof. Naomi Goldenberg at the University of Ottawa. Afterwards I decided to write my doctorate thesis about the similarities and differences between Smith's personal understanding and Jung's psychological understanding of person.

Afterwards, I came to know of the leading Jungian scholar, Prof. John P. Dourley, Department of Religion at Carleton University and adjunct professor in the Department of Religious Studies at University of Ottawa, through his article titled "The Challenge of Jung's Psychology for the Study of Religion". Upon visiting him and expressing my interest of Jung and Smith, Prof. Dourley kindly accepted me as his student and has always diligently and humanely encouraged my work. This dissertation was written under his direction. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Prof. Dourley.

Also I would like to thank my other professors and friends for their support and encouragement, most sympathetically: Prof. Naomi R. Goldenberg, Prof. Roger Lapointe, Prof. Georges Tissot, Mark Ruml, and Gary M. Hunter.

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INTRODUCTION

The overarching concern of my comparative study lies in the understanding of the human being not as a fragmented being but as a total or whole being.

Looking back upon the history of humankind, genuine thinkers, in their life context, have described and understood the human being as a total being, taking into consideration the human being's relation to his or her neighbours, to nature and to transcendental values. However, since the strong impact of the Enlightenment, such relations have been discarded, and are no longer considered important for understanding the human being. As a result, one's fragmentation or alienation from one's self, one's neighbours, nature, and transcendence as "others" has emerged as a modern reality. Furthermore, such fragmentation in life has produced a parochial or provincial view of the human being and history.

The fragmented view of the human being has produced many problems for understanding "others", especially since Western contact with other cultures and religious traditions. Before the contact of Western Christians with non-Western cultures and religious traditions, the Western Christian understood the Western non-Christian and the Western non-Christian understood the Western Christian as "others". The rationalistic attitudes toward Christians and the exclusivistic attitudes toward non-Christians as "others" can be found in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the West. Such a limited perspective toward "others" is readily apparent in the Christian, apologetic, defensive writings for an exclusive "Christianity" and rationalistic,

exclusivistic writings against "religion" as a dimension of human life itself. Both sides do not allow any alternatives. The mode of "anti-alternativism" can be found as the key problem for developing the understanding of marginalities.¹

However, serious modern Western thinkers, in the face of such religious exclusivism and secular dogmatic rejection of "religion", sought alternative perspectives. On the part of religionists the search for a new perspective moved from a sense of other religious traditions and faith as no longer "over against" to a sense of the "togetherness" of diverse religious traditions and faith. Thus they did not defend the exclusive or exhaustive claims of Christianity but sought to show an endemic religious function in human life, but individual and societal. Against the pervasive milieu of early nineteenth century rationalism, Schleiermacher wrote his apology for religion titled On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers.² In the twentieth century, which can be interpreted in part as the rationalistic extension of previous centuries, Rudolf Otto wrote his apology for religion in The Idea of Holy,³ and, recently Paul Tillich wrote his apology for religion in The Courage To Be.⁴ In addition, even though his psychology and philosophy did not fully relate to the above thinkers, William James wrote an apology for religion in The Varieties of Religious Experience,⁵ which identified religion as the necessary foundation of human life. In a word, to these thinkers, over against the general secular milieu of modern life, religion is not an addendum or addition to normal human life, but the foundation of humanity

itself.

I think that, due to their fundamental understanding of the human being as a spiritual or religious being in the strong secular milieu of the twentieth-century, Jung's and Smith's understanding of the human being are related to that of the thinkers mentioned above. Thus, for Jung and Smith, there is no difference between a religious being and a genuine human being. This point as a common comparable ground should be kept in mind when attempting to understand their thinking.

Despite such a fundamental link between Jung and Smith, there are some differences. Jung fundamentally situated his understanding of humanity within the boundaries of the psyche, whereas Smith understood the human being as an historical being from the perspective of global history. This point as the basic difference between Jung's and Smith's understanding of human being will be discussed in this work.

Within this general overview of the common grounds and differences between C.G. Jung and W.C. Smith, I will compare Jung's understanding of psyche with Smith's understanding of person in the following manner.

In the first chapter, I will discuss the problems inherent in the general modern academic and cultural milieu that Smith and Jung have discovered in relation to understanding the human being. I will discuss their new understanding of the human being and their method of verification of their understanding.

In the second chapter, I will discuss how Jung, in his

psychology, understood the human being. Above all, I will discuss Jung's psychological understanding of religion as experience, and how such experience has come out and is expressed in life through the dialectical process between consciousness and the unconscious in the psyche. Furthermore, I will show how Jung understood a human being to become fully human through such a dialectical process of consciousness and the unconscious--a process of individuation.

In the third chapter, I will discuss, in terms of his global view, how Smith, as an historian, has understood the human being. Above all, I will discuss the foundation of humanity as "transcendental awareness", which occurs in the human being's heart in relation to and beyond religious traditions. This outlook is the result of Smith's comparative analysis of human history. After this, I will discuss Smith's understanding of person in relation to tradition and faith. Finally, I will discuss such relations in terms of Smith's understanding of participation.

In the fourth chapter, I will discuss the understanding of history as process rather than as a deterioration or development, because, to Jung and Smith, history is a complex process of deterioration and development. Even though Jung is not an historian, I will attempt to interpret his view of history in terms of history as process.

In the final chapter, on the basis of the aforementioned four chapters, I will discuss some similarities or parallels and some differences between Jung's and Smith's understanding of the human

being. Furthermore, I will express my personal opinion of their understanding.

The thesis is an interdisciplinary thesis relating the disciplines of the history of religion and Jung's depth psychology. The thesis is generally sympathetic to the work of Smith and Jung. I will adopt a comparative method for the development of my work. However, I will not proceed in my comparison between Jung and Smith as a third person moderator. Rather, I will compare Jung's understanding of psyche with Smith's understanding of person in terms of a Smithian perspective. On the basis of Smith's thought, I will summarize Jung's understanding, and then compare it with Smith's understanding.

As the term, comparison reveals, I will articulate several fundamental similarities or parallels, and some differences in the thoughts of C.G. Jung and W.C. Smith. Furthermore, I will suggest that the contributions of Smith and Jung complement each other towards a fuller understanding of authentic human life, at the personal, social and historical levels.

In my research, I have not found any comparative studies of C.G. Jung and W.C. Smith. My dissertation will be the first. However, there have been similar comparative studies between Jung's psychology and other scholars in the field of Religious Studies. The psychology of C.G. Jung, as is now acknowledged, has made a contribution to many disciplines such as Religious Studies, Psychology, Anthropology, Sociology, Theology, History and Philosophy. The representative case, in religious studies, can be

discovered in Van der Leeuw's and M. Eliade's studies of C.G. Jung,⁶ especially regarding the concept of archetype and symbol formation. A more current study of C.G. Jung and the relation of his psychology to "religion" can be found in John P. Dourley's and David Miller's works.⁷

As Huston Smith⁸ and John Hick⁹ commented, Smith as an historian, is the most useful, important living historian of "religion" and his thought has been very influential and powerful in the circle of Religious Studies, Anthropology, Sociology, Theology, History and Philosophy. Furthermore, Smith is recognized in the circle of psychology of religion. The representative case can be discovered in the works of James Fowler's faith development psychology.¹⁰ The fundamental basis of James Fowler's thinking lies in Smith's understanding of Faith. Another representative case can be found in David Wulff's work "Psychological Approaches" in the section on "Psychology of Religion" in Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion. Volume II: The Social Sciences, edited by Frank Whaling. Furthermore, David Wulff, like James Fowler, delineates the psychology of religion in terms of Smith's understanding of religious life in his book Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary Views.¹¹

ENDNOTES: INTRODUCTION

1. One of the leading feminists in Religious Studies, Naomi Goldenberg, critically pointed out two ignored areas of human life in the West as "others". The first one is in the ignorance of "body or flesh" over against mind as "other" in religious traditions. The second one is in the relationship with marginal persons as "others". She stressed that feminism should be developed to correct misunderstanding of such "others" in the West. Naomi Goldenberg, Returning Words to Flesh: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Resurrection of the Body (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), p. 5 and p. 213. Another feminist, Carol Christ, argued that even the future scholarship of Religious Studies should be seriously tackled with the ignored feminist issues. See, Carol P. Christ, "Mircea Eliade and the Feminist Paradigm Shift" in Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion (Fall 1991), pp. 75-94.
2. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultural Despisers, translated by John Oman (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1958), see first speech, "Defence", pp. 3-21.
3. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of Holy: An Inquiry into the Neo-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational (1915), translated by John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), see Chapter 1 "The Rational and the Non-Rational", pp. 1-4.
4. Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).
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6. Jacques Waardenburg, Reflections on the Study of Religion (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1976), p. 222. G. Van der Leeuw, La Structure de la mentalité primitive (Paris: Alcan, 1928) and L'homme primitif et la religion (Paris: Alcan, 1940). Jung's influence on M. Eliade, especially, can be found in the following articles: Mac Linscott Ricketts, "The Nature and Extent of Eliade's Jungianism" in Union Seminary Quarterly Review 25 (1970), pp. 211-234, and "In Defence of Eliade" in Religion (Spring 1973), pp. 24-27.
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Inner City Books, 1984), "The Challenge of Jung's Psychology for the Study of Religion" in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses (1989), pp. 297-311, "Some Implications of Jung's Understanding of Mysticism" in Toronto Journal of Theology (1990), The Goddess Mother of the Trinity: A Jungian Implication (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1990), and "Jung's Impact on Religious Studies" in C.G. Jung and the Humanities: Toward a Hermeneutics of Culture (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 36-44.

David Miller, Christs: Meditations on Archetypal Images in Christian Theology, Volume 1 (New York: The Seabury Press, 1981) and Three Faces of God: Traces of the Trinity in Literature and Life (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).

8. Huston Smith, "Another World to Live In: Teaching the Introductory Course Philosophically" in Teaching the Introductory Course in Religious Studies: A Sourcebook edited by Mark Juergensmeyer (Georgia: Scholars Press, 1991), p. 215.
9. John Hick, "Foreword" in The Meaning and End of Religion by W.C. Smith (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), p. xvii.
10. James Fowler, Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1991), see especially chapter 1.
11. David Wulff, "Psychological Approaches" in Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion Vol. II: The Social Sciences edited by Frank Whaling (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), pp. 21-88, and Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary Views (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991).

CHAPTER 1.

PROBLEMS OF MODERN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING IN THE THOUGHT OF C. G. JUNG AND W.C. SMITH

In his ground-breaking book Truth and Method, Hans Georg-Gadamer clearly states that methodological problems have been the main issue in any kind of study in academia since the nineteenth century.¹ The problems have been especially evident in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Due to this fact, conventional questions such as, "What is God?", "What is humanity?", "What is truth?", etc., have been dropped, and, instead, new questions have been asked. The questions being asked now are: "How can we know God?", "How can we know man?", "How can we know the truth?", and so on. The new questions are not concerned with the object of the study, but rather are interested in the method used to study the object. Due to such new directions, many university departments are distinguished according to the methodology each department has adopted. In the midst of such methodological struggles, C.G. Jung and W.C. Smith have illuminated some of the problems inherent in the study of human beings: Jung in psychology, and Smith in history. Through their studies, these two thinkers discovered that academia treats the human being mechanistically, as a "thing" or object of study, rather than dynamically, as a person or subject equal to the researcher, who is also a subject.

In this first chapter, I will describe the problems of modern human consciousness discovered by C.G. Jung as a psychologist and W.C. Smith as an historian.

1. **Psychotherapeutic understanding and verification of human understanding: C.G. Jung.**
 - i) **Questions and issues of modern human consciousness.**
 - a) **Materialism vs. Spiritualism.**

By examining the Zofingia Lectures, delivered by Jung at University of Basel when he was between twenty-one and twenty-three years of age, one can easily discover how Jung understood the modern materialistic oriented consciousness. In November 1896 Jung delivered his first lecture, after joining the Basel section of "Zofingia" club, titled "The Border Zones of Exact Science." In this lecture, he strongly criticized modern materialistic society as follows:

I consider it disgraceful for an educated man to accept the idea of the preeminent power of money. It is even more disgraceful if he tips his hat and shows his reverence to a sack of gold. But it is most disgraceful of all if he uses--or rather abuses--his knowledge and skills to gain bliss from the one thing that can give it, the personal possession of Mammon.²

Jung especially criticized modern educated people's apathetic heart; an apathy occurring as a result of their indirect involvement in four factors of modern materialistic society. According to Jung, these factors are: an overabundance of inane books; a transformed direction of study (instead of studying to know oneself the emphasis in modern times is studying to make money or to earn a good living); the blind acceptance of scientific explanation; and, the total indifference towards what, how, or why people study.³

In his second lecture, titled "Some Thoughts on Psychology"

(May 1897), Jung pointed out another aspect of materialism in the realm of psychology. Here, he pointed out the vital principle of life beyond the level of consciousness--his concept of soul. Jung defines soul as "the intelligence independent of space and time."⁴ Even though it is beyond the level of consciousness, it plays an important role in maintaining the dynamic functions of the body. Thus, he thought that modern materialistic consciousness could be cured through recognition of the soul beyond finite, mundane, consciousness, that is, he thought that the modern ravages of materialism could be redressed through the experience of the soul in an individual's life.

In the third lecture titled "Inaugural Address, Upon Assuming the Chairmanship of the Zofingia Club" (Winter Semester, 1897/98), Jung urged the members of the club to reflect upon the club's cause.

The Zofingia must form human, not political animals, human beings who laugh and weep, human beings conscious of their minds and wills, human beings who know that they are living among other human beings and that they must all put up with each other because they are all condemned to be human.⁵

Here, Jung clearly indicates that the club should focus on the study or the understanding of the human being as a dynamic human being. He does not seek to understand the human being according to their material possessions (the "to have's" of Erich Fromm).⁶ He wants himself and the club to develop "the way of learning to know man as man and not as some lovable form of social livestock".⁷

In his fourth lecture, Jung delivered his essay titled "Thought on the Nature and Value of Speculative Inquiry" (Summer

1898). In this lecture, Jung indicted widespread materialism in relation to external things; that is, he pointed out that the happiness of modern people is dependent upon external circumstances, for example, financial security.⁸ In opposition to the materialistic or external criteria, Jung thought that "happiness is purely subjective and bears no necessary relationship to anything external."⁹ Furthermore, he suggested that the subjective aspect of happiness develops into the basis of metaphysics or religion.

As described above, in Jung's early thought materialism in modern society was a critical problem needing to be solved. Against such one-sided consciousness--materialism--Jung suggested the compensatory consciousness of a spirituality, one of whose faces the early Jung explored in spiritualism.¹⁰ This early search for spirituality as manifest in spiritualism is found in his dissertation for the medical degree: "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena" (1902). It is this study which adumbrated very much of his later work. The subject of his study was his cousin, Miss H el ene Preiswerk (pseudonym S.W.), a young fifteen and a half year old Protestant girl. The study was based on Jung's observations of the cousin's spiritualistic medium activity from 1899 to 1900.

After observing the seven-seances conducted by her, Jung found no physical evidence for hysterical stigma. Instead, he discovered many psychological aspects of the seances. He especially came to realize that the influence of the "spirits" was indeed operative in

the seances. However, in his dissertation Jung did not fully develop his psychological theory about spirits. Instead, he only described the seances phenomenologically by accepting his cousin's understanding of the spirits rather than his own later understanding of the spirits as being projections of the archetypal dimension of the psyche.

The world of gods and spirits is truly "nothing but" the collective unconscious inside me. To turn this sentence round so that it reads "The collective unconscious is the world of gods and spirits outside me," no intellectual acrobatics are needed, but a whole human lifetime, perhaps even many lifetimes of increasing completeness."¹¹

Jung described his cousin's mental state during her possession by the spirits in a somnambulistic state.¹² During her vision, she was led by the spirits to a distant place. Jung came to realize that Miss S.W. was an excellent medium after he observed that she could control the external world, for example, her feat of table turning in July 1899,¹³ and Jung later discovered her to be fraudulent. At the same time, he discovered that she could see and hear her spirits who were walking or standing among those who participated in her seances.¹⁴ During the period of the seance, she showed her deep religious feeling but revealed no hint of a pietistic attitude. Her speech, in the middle of the seance, did not contain Biblical jargon, but rather, the jargon of her guide or spirit.¹⁵

According to Jung, the controlling spirit was without exception her grandfather. Many other spirits, in addition to this spirit, were also working with her; for example, Mr. P.R. and many Miss S.W.'s dead relatives were playing a role in the seances as

spirits. When she worked with the spirits, she operated under the name of 'Ivenes'; that is, the spirit Ivenes controlled S.W.'s state of semi-somnambulism. Ivenes, according to the dialogue with her, was a spiritual being who was of higher rank than the other spirits. Ivenes had to embody himself every two hundreds years, in contrast to other spirits who were concretized in the course of centuries. According to Miss S.W., two other human beings, in addition to her, received the spirit Ivenes; namely, Swedenborg and Miss Florence Cook.¹⁶

When Jung talked with S.W. about Kant's Natural History, theory of the Heavens, also of the laws of the conservation of energy and of the different forms of energy, Jung realized that she thought that "the primary force is the original cause of creation and is a spiritual force."¹⁷

As I said before, Jung, in this work, treated the phenomena of occultism strictly in terms of the patient's own explanation and urged modern medical intellectuals to spend their time studying the phenomena not as superstition but as real phenomena. In contrast to the study of spirits in terms of the patient's view, Jung insisted upon the reality of spirits from his own intellectual and psychological perspective in a later article titled "Psychological Factors Determining Human Behaviour." (Originally published in English at The Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences, 1936.) He insisted upon the reality of spirit as a hypothetical category in comparison to the accepted hypothetical existence of matter in physics:

...just as matter is ultimately to be conceived of merely as a working hypothesis of physics, so also spirit, the subject of religion and philosophy, is a hypothetical category in constant need of reinterpretation. The so-called reality of matter is attested primarily by our sense-perception, while belief in the existence of spirit is supported by psychic experience.¹⁸

In the article, "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits," Jung also shows that the reality of spirits are universal in the history of humankind:

...a universal belief in the existence of phantoms or ethereal beings who dwell in the neighbourhood of men and who exercise an invisible yet powerful influence upon them. These beings are generally supposed to be the spirits or souls of the dead.¹⁹

Although Jung regarded spirit as existing in the history of humankind, the reality of spirit has been denied in modern Western culture because of the influence of rationalism and scientific enlightenment over the last one hundred and fifty years.²⁰ Due to such influences on education, Western educated people have suppressed the transcendental or the metaphysical aspects of life, according to Jung.

Jung explained the existence of spirit in the light of psychology rather than in philosophical or theological discussions. Thus, Jung did not try to answer a metaphysical question of whether spirits really exist or not, or what the spirits are, but, rather, Jung was interested in how the psyche generated the **consensus gentium**, humanity's widespread consensus about the reality of the spiritual world, which itself may entail Plato's metaphysics. According to Jung,

Spirits, therefore, viewed from the psychological angle, are unconscious autonomous complexes which appear as

projections because they have no direct association with the ego.²¹

Jung described three characteristics of spirit in "The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales." They are:

firstly, the principle of spontaneous movement and activity; secondly, the spontaneous capacity to produce images independently of sense perception; thirdly, the autonomous and sovereign manipulation of these images.²²

The psychological understanding of the spirit as psychic manifestations implies that the reality of spirit is of an archetypal expression of the psyche.²³ In other words, the existence or the phenomena of the spirit derives from the primordial imagery generated by the collective unconscious in which an individual inheres or participates. A concrete description of the image making process will be presented in the second chapter.

b) Provincialism vs. Universalism

In his autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung reflects on his life as "a story of the self-realization of the unconscious."²⁴ According to him, the life of consciousness is a small but significant part of the whole life of the psyche. The other half is the unconscious which is the root of consciousness. Above all, Jung has thought that the neglect of the unconscious or the suppression of the unconscious by rationalism or scientific enlightenment results in understanding the human being in a truncated manner or only within the boundary of consciousness, rather than as a whole being.

Jung has shown the lost or suppressed part of the Western educated human being through his comparative analysis of other cultures: the Indian, the Chinese, the Native American, the African and so on. For example, in an article titled "What India Can Teach Us", published in English 1939, Jung clearly showed that the Indian life does not ignore the unconscious part of life but realizes it in the daily cultural life. In relation to the study of 'thinking', he described the Indian life as follows:

...an Indian, in as much as he is really Indian, does not think, at least not what we call "think". **He rather perceives the thought.** He resembles the primitive in this respect. I do not say that he **is** primitive, but that the process of his thinking reminds me of the primitive way of thought-production. The primitive's reasoning is mainly an unconscious function, and he perceives its result. We should expect such a peculiarity in any civilization which has enjoyed an almost unbroken continuity from primitive times.²⁵

According to Jung, Indians can appreciate the whole of the human being instead of understanding only one aspect--consciousness. In other words, they could avoid the fatal dissociation between the conscious part of the psyche and the unconscious through consciousness which retains a living link to the 'primitive' natural unconscious.²⁶ Through such a link between consciousness and the unconscious, the Indians have shown "the other way of civilizing man, the way without suppression, without violence, without rationalism."²⁷

In "Yoga and the West" (1936), Jung criticizes the Westerner's conscious suppression of the unconscious:

What he lacks is conscious recognition of his inferiority to the nature around and within him. He must learn that he may not do exactly as he wills.²⁸

Jung also warned against the tendency of turning everything into a technique in the West:

Since Western man can turn everything into a technique, it is true in principle that everything that looks like a method is either dangerous or condemned to futility. In so far as Yoga is a form of hygiene, it is as useful to him as any other system. In the deepest sense, however, Yoga does not mean this but if I understand it correctly, a great deal more, namely the final release and detachment of consciousness from all bondage to object and subject. But since one can not detach oneself from something of which one is unconscious, the European must first learn to know his subject. This, in the West, is what one calls the unconscious.²⁹

Against a simple adoption of Eastern Yoga, Jung asks the West to recover muted or missing parts of the western tradition and would include western mystics, gnosticism, and alchemy.³⁰ This compensatory spirituality produces its own Yoga.

In "The Psychology of Eastern Meditation," (1943), Jung compared the Western understanding of religion with the Eastern, especially, the Indian. In a word, he sees that the West has emphasized the world of appearance, whereas the Indian has emphasized the soul.³¹ Such an emphasis in the West has been especially prevalent since the Renaissance and the Great Schism, because the Western Church, due to the effect of the Renaissance, suppressed the Western experience of the soul in Gnosticism and Alchemy.³² As a result of such suppression, the Western understanding, in contrast to the Indian, has been perceived as follows:

We speak of religious uplift and exaltation; for us God is the Lord of the universe, we have a religion of brotherly love, and in our heaven-aspiring churches there is a **high altar**. The Indian, on the other hand, speaks of **dhyāna**, of self-immersion, and of **sinking** into

meditation; God is within all things and especially within man, and one turns away from the outer world to the inner.³³

In relation to the principle of causality, Jung indicates another aspect of a one-sided rationalism-consciousness which ignores the synchronicity principle found in the East, especially in Chinese philosophy. In his "Foreword to the I Ching" translated by the German missionary, Richard Wilhelm, who was working in China, Jung compared Western causality with Chinese synchronicity based on the unconscious:

While the Western mind carefully sifts, weighs, selects, classifies, isolates, the Chinese picture of the moment encompasses everything down to the minutest nonsensical detail, because all of the ingredients make up the observed moment.³⁴

To summarize, Jung asserts that the Western mind has been familiar with mechanistic and efficient causality which describes the sequence of events, but the Chinese mind has been more familiar with synchronicity and formal causality which deals with the coincidence of events, naturally.

So far I have described Jung's comparative study between the Western mind and the Eastern mind. At this point, it could be understood that Jung has thought of the Eastern mind as "a sort of compensatory symbol" to the Western mind. As such, Jung is interested in demonstrating the Western mind's suppressed part--the unconscious--through the study of the Eastern mind. It does not mean that he wants to adopt the Eastern mind in the West blindly, but that he wants to revive the lost wholeness or totality of the human in the historical religious development in the West. Hence,

Jung declares,

...I would not identify our attempt at compensation with Eastern psychology as it actually is, because I reject the political and social conditions as they are in China or India, and I would not even like to have the same kind of mind.³⁵

Because Jung believes that simple adoption of Eastern meditation or theosophy is unhealthy for the Western mind, he does not urge Westerners to accept the Eastern way of life but, rather, to think of it as a momentum or symbol which enables the Western mind to revive the lost part of its total being. Jung illustrates this point in the following quote:

A beggar is not helped by having alms, great or small, pressed into his hand, even though this may be what he wants. He is far better helped if we show him how he can permanently rid himself of his begging by work. Unfortunately, the spiritual beggars of our time are too inclined to accept the alms of the East in bulk and imitate its way unthinkingly. This is a danger about which too many warnings can not be uttered, and one which Wilhelm (the German missionary, Richard Wilhelm) felt very dearly.³⁶

According to Jung, the difference between the Western mind and the Eastern mind lies in the way that each relates to the unconscious. One significant aspect of Jung's attempt to understand the unconscious through his cross-cultural analysis of the mandala. To Jung, the mandala, which is a universal phenomenon, is a primary expression of the unconscious; it is a symbolic expression of the unconscious in consciousness. Jung concluded that although the expressions or the forms assumed by the mandala are different between different cultures they are all from the same area of the psyche, the unconscious. Thus, they can be seen as universal expressions of a universal quality inherent in

human beings, the unconscious.

Jung, in the article titled "Concerning Mandala Symbolism", informs us that "the Sanskrit word 'mandala' means circle and it is the Indian term for the circle drawn in religious rituals."³⁷ In psychotherapy, the mandala can be found in the patient's efforts to express something on paper. In modern times, many of the patient's spontaneous drawings of the mandala, usually in the recovery of the stability of relating to one's divine centre, can be compared to the paintings of the mandala in the East or to those occurring in other cultures. Through the mandala drawings, the patients try to express the deeper meaning of their inner experience, and especially their need for integration.

As Jung informs us about the Eastern mandala, in his article titled "Concerning Mandala Symbolism", the mandalas of India are Yantras and play a role as "instruments of meditation, concentration, and self-immersion, for the purpose of realizing inner experience."³⁸ At the same time, they show an inner order after "the chaotic, disordered states marked by conflict and anxiety."³⁹ In other words, they produce "the idea of a safe refuge, of inner reconciliation and wholeness;"⁴⁰ that is, they indicate some hints of self-healing in the case of the patients. The self-healing does not come from conscious reflections, but from an instinctive, spiritual impulse, as is the case with religious mandalas.⁴¹ Furthermore, due to the natural occurrence of the mandala from the inner experience, Jung has concluded,

...that there must be a transconscious disposition in every individual which is able to produce the same or

very similar symbols at all times and in all places. Since this disposition is usually not a conscious possession of the individual I have called it the collective unconscious, and, as the basis of its symbolical products, I postulated the existence of primordial images, the archetypes.⁴²

c) Objectivity vs. Objective Subjectivity

Looking back upon Jung's academic life, it can be seen that he struggled with the scientific and objective surroundings of the medical tradition to which he belonged in the early period of his intellectual life. First of all, he had struggles with psychiatry. According to him, psychiatry, ultimately, did not concern itself with the state of the psyche or the mind but with the state of the body or the brain. Thus a dogma was formed and accepted in text books and the circle of psychiatry:

Thus was laid the foundation of the dogma which you will find repeated in every text-book of psychiatry: "Mental diseases are diseases of the brain."⁴³

Due to its concentration on the physical aspect of mental diseases, Jung charged psychiatry with "gross materialism."⁴⁴ According to Jung, the fundamental problem of psychiatry is its inability to recognize the unconscious. Thus, to Jung, the fundamental first step of curing psychiatry is to recognize the existence of the unconscious in the psyche of the human being.

In one article called "On Psychological Understanding" (1914), Jung concretely describes how he understands the existence of the unconscious. His understanding of it is not the same as Freud's. While Freud emphasized the emancipation of the suppressed part of

early childhood experience, through the investigation or the search for the ultimate meaning reductively, Jung employed the synthetic and constructive method on the basis of the future. Jung referred to the Freudian understanding as "retrospective understanding" and named his own "prospective understanding."⁴⁵ In other words, Freudian understanding is based on the modern scientific explanation of mental diseases--the relationship between cause and result--but Jungian understanding is beyond the general scientific principle of causality, because Jung argues that mental diseases can not be understood or cured by this approach alone.

Jung also sees understanding on the basis of causality as objective understanding. Objective understanding is accomplished through mechanistic or technical causal explanations. However, according to Jung, all understanding is fundamentally the product of the subjective process of the subject or the researcher. Thus, objective understanding can not be perfectly established without the researcher's own subjective perspective. Unfortunately, modern understanding is fully based on the scientific objective validity or verification irrespective of the recognition of the subjective process of the subject. In this sense, Jung wants to establish not dry objective but rather objective-subjective understanding which does not ignore the subjective aspect.

Jung compares simple objective understanding with objective-subjective understanding through his study of Goethe's Faust. Jung concludes that the objectivity of those who understand Faust on the basis of causality, is like the objectivity of those who understand

a Gothic cathedral on the basis of the historical, technical and mineralogical study of the cathedral. This type of understanding fails to consider the aesthetic, religious meaning of the cathedral in itself and for those individuals who participated in the construction of the cathedral and who come to the cathedral to worship or to visit. In other words, objective understanding ignores the psychological or the subjective process which has occurred through participation in the cathedral as worker, devotee or visitor.

According to Jung, the meaning of Faust is not to be found in the work itself but in the experience of the work by the reader. As Jung puts it,

A causal understanding of **Faust** tells us very clearly how it came to be a finished work of art, but it does not show us its living meaning. That meaning only lives when we experience it in and through ourselves. In so far as our actual life, the life we live here and now, is something essentially new and not just a continuation of the past, the main value of a work of art does not lie in its causal development but in its living effect upon ourselves. We should be depreciating a work like **Faust** if we regarded it merely as something that has come to be, and is finished and done with. **Faust** is understood only when it is apprehended as something that becomes alive and creative again and again in our own experience.⁴⁶

This does not mean that Jung's understanding of the psychic process denies the scientific, objective and analytical study. Jung wanted to find out, through his synthetic and constructive method, how the psyche has developed and how the present psyche transforms individual and culture through religious symbols or art. In other words, he wants to study the psychic process in individual cases in two ways.⁴⁷ On the one hand, he wants to study the experience of

the past individual's (what has been) as it is manifest through the analysis of the individual psyche, here and now. On the other hand, on the basis of past experience, he wants to outline what the future state of the individual's psyche will be. Thus it can be said that, to Jung, the state of the individual's present psyche is the result of the past psychic or subjective process and, at the same time, the psyche yields the symbolic expression which lead into the future. As a result of the mixture between the past and the future in the present, his understanding is called constructive understanding.

Jung's constructive understanding is not based on fixed goals or universal validity (as scientists in general claim for their understanding). The goal and validity of constructive understanding is not immediately known, due to the complexity of the psyche and the unique character of the individual psyche. As Jung informs us,

The constructive method, working with highly complex material, has to build up towards an unknown goal. This obliges the investigator to take account of all the forces at work in the human psyche. The reductive method tries to replace the religious and philosophical needs of mankind by their more elementary components, following the principle of "nothing but," as William James nicely says; but the constructive method accepts them as such and considers them indispensable ingredients of its work.⁴⁸

Through rejecting the reduction of psychic phenomena into the physical--as the psychiatrists frequently did in the field of medicine--Jung tried to show that, ultimately, the concern of psychiatry should not only be with the problem of the physical aspect but with the mental as well. In fact, for Jung, the

psychological aspect, as well as the physical, is an equally, if not more, important factor in the origin of the psychological disease. According to Jung, the main reason why the physical aspect is emphasized in psychiatry, is the blind adoption of the premise that "medicine is a natural science, and the psychiatrist as a physician is a natural scientist."⁴⁹

If Jung rejected traditional scientific validity for the study of the psyche, the question, "What is his criteria for determining the validity of his study?" must be asked. Jung does not establish a general or universal verification rule from the perspective of the researcher, while ignoring the perspective of the object of study, the patient. His verification is not from the imposition of his framework or theory on the patient or other human beings. He indicates two factors which have contributed to the position which ignores the perspective of the patient and other forms of human suffering in the current West.⁵⁰ The first factor is from medieval scholasticism. Medieval scholasticism projected its own understanding of the human being from its own framework and applied its own universal validity to the study of the human being. The second factor is from modern scientism, which understands human beings on the basis of scientific materialism, the principle of causality. Jung's main reason for rejecting these two verifications arises from his psychological understanding of the human being; namely, that the human being can not be judged only from the outside, according to appearance. As Jung says,

One can judge the subjective mental process from the outside as one can judge everything else. But such a

judgment is inadequate, because it is of the nature of the subjective that it can not be judged objectively. The subjective can only be understood and judged subjectively, that is, constructively.⁵¹

The human being (the patient) is fully involved in his or her own subjectivism distinct from the objective world or the society. He or she, at the same time, does not understand himself or herself in relation to others, because he or she understands himself or herself only subjectively. This is true of a full psychosis. The subjective aspect prevents the individual from having intelligible communication with not only the coming of consciousness, the ego, but with other persons, including the analyst.

In order to have real communication, the analyst tries to establish the language and mental range of the patient and to make this understanding intelligible to the patient⁵² as well as to the analyst. If the understanding is not accepted by the patient, the understanding is not proper. Thus, Jung concludes his verification understanding quoting Feuerbach's words:

As Feuerbach says, understanding is real and effective only when it is in accord with that of other reasonable beings. Then it becomes objective and connects with life.⁵³

d) Monologue vs. Dialogue

As it was described in the previous part of this present chapter, the modern method of understanding the human being has been founded on the scientific and objective principle of efficient

and technical causality. This principle is imposed on the objects of study according to the researcher's own will or technique. By imposing its own theory or method on the objects of study this principle excludes the dialogical aspect between the subject and the object. In this principle, it is very difficult to think about the dialectical relationship between the subject and the object. Due to the fact of the researcher's method oriented study, the opinion or the meaning of the object is ignored, and so the study can be called a monological study rather than a dialogical study.

Jung studies the human being from the dialogical perspective as opposed to the monological. In his autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections Jung clearly identifies his own understanding as a dialogue:

I maintained that psychiatry in the broadest sense, is a dialogue between the sick psyche and the psyche of the doctor, which is presumed to be 'normal.'⁵⁴

Of course, Jung's understanding of the human being does not focus solely on the mental diseases or neuroses but, rather, the whole human being. Thus, Jung says that, "my aim was to show that delusions and hallucinations were not just specific symptoms of mental diseases but also had a human meaning."⁵⁵ In this sense, Jung thinks that in therapy the important point is to realize that the problem is not caused from the symptoms themselves but from the whole person, with roots in consciousness as well as the unconscious. Because of his humane trust in the human being (or the patient), Jung clearly rejects mechanically imposing any universal theoretical or methodological assumptions for

understanding or curing the human being. Not only does he criticize the use of a general, universal methodology, but, he also criticizes the employment, by an individual doctor, of a favourite method. According to Jung, all human beings are different from each other and uniquely created. Thus, in treating human beings, a unique language and method must be developed through dialogue between the analyst and analysand in order to understand the individual. In order to understand the unique individual, Jung thinks that, first of all, a trust or rapport must be developed between the analyst and the analysand. If this first step is not reached, the dialogue is not only ineffective but also meaningless and superficial:

For psychotherapy to be effective a close rapport is needed, so close that the doctor can not shut his eyes to the heights and depths of human suffering. The rapport consists, after all, in a constant comparison and mutual comprehension, in the dialectical confrontation of two opposing psychic realities. If for some reason these mutual impressions do not impinge on each other, the psychotherapeutic process remains ineffective, and no change is produced. Unless both doctor and patient become a problem to each other, no solution is found.⁵⁶

At the same time, when the analysis is in process through dialogue between the analyst and analysand, the analyst and the analysand sit facing each other, eye to eye, and they exchange their dialogue one to the other. The reason for such an exchange is that not only does the analyst have something to say to the analysand, but also the analysand can have something to say to the analyst. When the analysand says something, the analyst must accept it as it is and place much value on the analysand's statements, without ignoring what the analysand says.

If psychotherapy is a dialectical process which can be formed through a dialogue or a discussion between the analyst and the analysand, then it is necessary to maintain "the reciprocal reaction" between the two persons. Without the mutual reaction, a real dialogue between the two is impossible. For the construction of a real dialogue, Jung fundamentally rejects adopting an attitude of superiority over the analysand. As Jung puts it:

If I wish to treat another individual psychologically at all, I must for better or worse give up all pretensions to superior knowledge, all authority and desire to influence. I must perforce adopt a dialectical procedure consisting in a comparison of our mutual findings. But this becomes possible only if I give the other person a chance to play his hand to the full, unhampered by my assumptions. In this way his system is geared to mine and acts upon it; my reaction is the only thing with which I as an individual can legitimately confront my patient.⁵⁷

First of all, Jung sees the individuality of every human being as the indispensable element for respecting all human beings. For Jung, individuality is something "absolutely unique, unpredictable, and uninterpretable."⁵⁸ Due to this fact, he abandons "all the preconceptions and techniques and confines himself to a purely dialectical procedure, adopting the attitude that shuns all methods."⁵⁹ In other words, according to Jung, the psychotherapist should not regard himself or herself as "the agent of treatment but a fellow participant in a process of individual development."⁶⁰ At the same time, the therapist should be aware of the possibility that his or her own personal attitude prevents the patient's recovery. Thus, to Jung, the therapist should not become a superior agent:

The demand that the analyst must be analyzed culminates in the idea of a dialectical procedure, where the therapist enters into relationship with another psychic system both as questioner and answerer. No longer is he the superior wise man, judge, and counsellor; he is a fellow participant who finds himself involved in the dialectical process just as deeply as the so-called patient.⁶¹

To Jung, the role of the therapist is sufficient enough to act as a "signpost" for the patient and, at the same time, the therapist must admit that there is a possibility that "in intelligence, sensibility, range and depth the patient's personality is superior to his own."⁶² Furthermore, Jung asks the therapists to be always checking his or her own mental conditions very honestly; for psychoanalysis, the therapist's condition is as important as the patient's for the process of curing.

Because of the restrictions placed on the therapist to prevent any interference with the patients, Jung says that "the best thing the doctor can do must leave the individual way to healing open, and then the cure will bring about no alteration of personality but will be the process we call 'individuation.'⁶³ Here, Jung puts trust in the individual patient's ability, because the patient knows the way of curing which is necessarily peculiar to him or her self. Thus, the therapist's role, to some extent, is "a necessary evil," in Jung's understanding of the human being.

Between this Scylla and this Charybdis lies the peril, but also the healing power.⁶⁴

As Jung says in his article titled "What is Psychotherapy?", in the process of healing, the most important factor is the patience of the therapist and the patient, for time is an

irreplaceable factor in healing.⁶⁵ With strong patience as a principle, the doctor should always keep in mind that for the healing process nature should rule and influence the patient's own philosophical, social and political bent, rather than the interference of the doctor. Thus, to Jung, this form of healing can be called "self-healing", naturally, through the dialogical process.

e) Psychoanalysis: A therapeutic tool for the improvement of modern human consciousness.

Jung clearly indicated three aspects of the modern spiritual problems in his article titled "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man." The first one is spiritual impoverishment. According to him, the modern human being has lived with the renouncement of sanctified or spiritual life. To Jung, this aspect stands opposite the history of human kind because history proves that the human being of history has lived with the strong sense of the sanctity of spiritual life. Thus, Jung criticizes modern human consciousness as "unhistorical" and calls it the promethean sin.⁶⁶ The second aspect is the complete disregard of "all the metaphysical certainties" that were rooted in medieval times.⁶⁷ Instead of such certainties of the meaning of life, modern human consciousness is taking "to ideals of material security, general welfare and humanitarianism." The third aspect is the lack of religious experience. Modern consciousness is longing for the religious experience through the person's own psyche, independent of the outer world; that is, the modern human being wants to have some

experiences which the outer world can not give. Traditionally, the expectations have been met through participation in religious traditions as expressions of and access to the life of psyche. However, to Jung, the modern religious forms or traditions have been perceived as not something from within but something from without like other items in the external world. Thus, there is no real experience of the Christian tradition in modern consciousness:

For him [modern man] the various forms of religion no longer appear to come from within, from the psyche; they seem more like items from the inventory of the outside world. No spirit not of this world vouchsafes him inner revelation; instead, he tries on a variety of religions and beliefs as if they were Sunday attire, only to lay them aside again like worn-out clothes.⁶⁸

In fact, the three aspects discussed above can be seen as indicating the lack of religious experience from within (the psyche) in modern consciousness, and culture. Due to this fact, Jung, ultimately, understands psycho-neurosis as the suffering of a soul which can not find its place or its meaning in modern consciousness. In other words, it is caused from spiritual stagnation or psychic sterility. Stagnation means that the living spirit in the psyche does not grow or else it outgrows the varieties or forms of the earlier religious experience inherent in the Christian tradition. If the spirit does not find a way to express itself, then psychological problems will occur. Thus, modern stagnant or sterile consciousness should be extended into allowing the spirit to develop freely.

According to Jung, those who come to him as a result of some psychic problem come fundamentally due to the absence of a

religious outlook or sense in their life. Thus, Jung thinks that, to cure the soul of his patients, such an absence should be remedied by the revival of the spiritual energies in the unconscious psyche.

The cure of souls can only be practised in the stillness of a colloquy, carried on in the healthful atmosphere of unreserved confidence. Soul must work on soul, many doors be unlocked that bar the way to the innermost sanctuary. Psychoanalysis possesses the means of opening doors otherwise tightly closed.⁶⁹

In other words, the work of doctors and patients must focus on the hidden and unmanifest "whole" man which means the archetype of the God-image. Furthermore, their work should lead the unmanifest to express itself in life. If not allowed to do so, the soul, which has no place to express its own "faculty of relationship to God" in the process of life, will be sick mentally or spiritually.⁷⁰ Thus, to Jung, the role and goal of psychoanalysis is to allow the soul to express its own faculty of relationship to God. If modern consciousness does not respond to religious traditions, the living traditions should be developed in order to serve religious life. Thus, the idea of religious vitality is primary and the traditions are, actually secondary, in the service of that life. Due to this fact, the concept of archetype is very important in Jung's understanding of the psyche. This concept will be discussed in the next chapter in greater detail.

Psychoanalysis, according to Jung, is a psychological technique, as already discussed in the early part of the present chapter, which has focused on laying bare the contents of the unconscious to consciousness. Thus, Jung urges that psychoanalysis

study more "the realm of the collective unconscious, the natural matrix of the human mind, the very soul of humanity," rather than restrict itself to the study of the conscious area:

The great decisions in human life usually have far more to do with the instincts and other mysterious unconscious factors than with conscious will and well-meaning reasonableness. The shoe that fits one person pinches another; there is no universal recipe for living. Each of us carries his own life-form within him--an irrational form which no other can outbid.⁷¹

2. Personal understanding and verification of human understanding: W.C. Smith

1) Questions and issues of modern human consciousness.

a) Externalism vs. Personalism

In his article "Thinking about Person", Smith notes that human existence, individual or social, has been historically lived through the process of participation in three inter-connected worlds: the natural world; the personal world; and, the transcendent world, which is the source of human values.⁷² This process has been the rule of human life, traditionally. However, the rule, according to Smith, has been broken down in the modern Western world. The traditional role of the transcendent world is no longer functioning as the source of human values. Furthermore, the relationship between the natural world and the personal world has been broken down in modern Western and, to some extent, Eastern life. Moreover, the traditional values from the transcendent world have been totally ignored and have been seen as the least important of modern human values. As Smith puts it well,

In virtually all human history and every culture other than our own, the world has been perceived in inter-relation with man and in inter-relation with value. The recent West is an exception. Our innovation, differing from our own past and from all other human communities, has been to separate off the natural world from man and to view it "objectively," impersonally, unrelately. At the same time, we reversed the hierarchical order of levels: also for the first time, Western man has perceived the natural world of things as the basic or primary reality, the world of man as derivative and secondary, and the transcendent realm - the world of value of religion, of art and poetry, of the imagination, of the ideal and paradoxically, even of the intellect itself, and its apprehension of truth, as tertiary, or even all together fanciful, unreal: a frill, or bogus.⁷³

Smith has observed such a separation as being morally or historically wrong, and furthermore has identified the separation as the main cause of externalism or impersonalism, which emphasizes the external phenomenon itself, ignoring those who have been involved in such phenomena.

Before developing my understanding of Smith's ideas with some examples, Smith's unique term "person" should be defined, so that his personalism can be more clearly understood. Smith distinguishes his concept of "person" from that of "individual". According to him, all individuals have become persons "through being inter-involved with other persons."⁷⁴ In other words, all individuals become persons in society. Furthermore, to him, the society can become a community by being involved with persons genuinely, and, in reverse, it can become "dehumanized, a juxtaposition or congeries of alienation,"⁷⁵ by ignoring the personal involvement. In this sense, Smith thinks that, if there is no consideration of "human involvement" in human affairs, a genuine understanding of human affairs cannot occur; the understanding becomes impersonal or

external.

Smith articulated his "personalistic understanding" of human affairs in his article "Objectivity and the Human Sciences," delivered in Toronto at the 1974 meeting of the Royal Society of Canada, with three examples.

First of all, Smith describes his "personal" understanding of the Minakshi temple in Madurai, India. External or impersonal understanding would focus upon the structures of the temple itself--architecture, paintings, qualities of stones and so on--but personal understanding would concentrate upon "persons worshipping within it, and their worship."⁷⁶ According to Smith, the locus of "meaning" of the temple is not located in the building itself, objectively, but in the heart or consciousness of the persons who participate in the building, as devotees. Thus, to Smith, the genuine meaning of the building lies in the person's relation with that building. The relational meaning, of course, does not ignore the understanding of the building itself but, the meaning is extended in terms of "what it means, has meant, in the lives and consciousness (including the subconsciousness) of persons."⁷⁷ The same type of understanding--personal understanding--can be applied to an understanding of the moon. If the moon is "explained away" scientifically, externally, the explanation cannot satisfy poets' hearts and others who have perceived it differently.

Secondly, Smith elaborated his personalistic understanding over against a behaviourist's understanding. Smith identifies the behaviourist's understanding as that of being "externalistic and

explicitly out of consideration for the self-consciousness of those involved."⁷⁸ For Smith, in order to understand the human being, it is necessary to understand not only what the human being does, like the behaviourists do, but, more than that, "What he refrains from doing; what he dreams of doing, what he fears to do; what he does with exultation, hesitation, guilt or boredom."⁷⁹

As pointed out above, Smith does not ignore the study of objective facts--buildings, texts, hymns, paintings and so on--but, rather, he urges the observer to see how those physical facts have been perceived in self-consciousness, from the devotees' involvement with those facts. Furthermore, for example in the case of the temple, Smith urges one to observe how shopkeepers around the temple, how iconoclastic Muslims or Christians and how atheists or Marxists have perceived the temple.

Thirdly, Smith reveals his understanding of, nineteenth-century Christian Missionary, Bishop Reginald Heber's understanding of other religious traditions. According to Smith, Bishop Heber does not have a proper understanding of the Hindu tradition because Heber simply concludes that the participant in the tradition "bows down to wood and stone." In other words, Heber's understanding is the same as the behaviourist's understanding, which focuses upon the external phenomena, ignoring the devotee's self-transcendent sense through such physical objects. As such, "in his externalist observation Heber was a forerunner of modern behavioral scientists."⁸⁰

In his recent article, "Idolatry in Comparative Perspective,"

Smith further articulated his own understanding in relation to Bishop Heber's perception of physical objects. In this article, Smith points out that the meaning of any idol or sacred object comes from the devotee's relationship or involvement with that idol or object. Therefore, if the study is restricted simply to the analysis of the idol or sacred object itself, the relational meaning would be missed, and the devotees would be further stigmatized as idol worshippers. Due to this reason, Smith urges the observer "to dismiss 'idolatry' as a concept."⁸¹ Smith's dismissal should be seriously considered when interpreting the other's religious life.

Smith, fundamentally, thinks that the meaning located in the self-consciousness of persons in relation to any sacred objects is bigger, wider and deeper than the explicit meaning of the objects. Smith clearly articulates this point in his article "The World Church and The World History of Religion: The Theological Issue."

Yet evidently it would differ from Rahner in any sense of ontological priority here. He would seem to suggest that explicit Christianity as expressed in creeds and dogmas and institutions is at a higher level than the prior implicit faith and grace and the salvific life of God within human life that he seems to think of as at a lesser level. I on the other hand would hold that the grace, that mystery, that divine self-giving in human lives, however imperfectly apprehended and responded to and lived, is yet closer to the truth, to reality, to God Himself, than are the ideas and statements and doctrines and forms to which it has given rise and by which then too it has been nurtured. My reason for striving, as an intellectual to intellectualize what one learns is so that those intellectualizations can in turn serve both myself and others to introduce us to the realities of which they are never more than subordinate representations. Explicit Christianity is for me less noble, less divine, less eternal than the implicit personal life in God (which I call faith) that -

approximately only- it at times articulates.⁸²

Due to Smith's serious search for the meaning of "persons" in relation to religious traditions, Smith has seen the history of religion as that of persons, and clearly identified his understanding of "religion" as personalist in his famous book, The Meaning and End of Religion, as follows:

The irreverent, even insensitive studies of certain scholars have done little to refute this [the studies of ignoring the references of symbols]. Such scholars might uncharitably be compared to flies crawling on the outside of a goldfish bowl, making accurate and complete observations on the fish inside, measuring their scales meticulously, and indeed contributing much to a knowledge of the subject but never asking themselves, and never finding out, how it feels to be a goldfish.⁸³

b) Parochialism vs. Pluralism

As political or economic isolationism has disappeared in the modern world, religious isolationism is also vanishing. In the modern world, the isolated or parochial opinion or understanding has been corrected by the personal or global perspective, in all areas of life. Smith has devoted his whole lifetime to articulating his new understanding of the human being in the light of personalism and globalism.

In his article, "The Christian in a Religiously Plural World," Smith clearly announced that the traditional, parochial or isolationistic understanding of "religious" persons should be transformed into a pluralistic or global understanding. His critical evaluation of the great twentieth-century philosopher and

theologian, Paul Tillich, shows Smith's clear awareness of the religiously plural world as follows:

... probably Tillich belongs to the last generation of theologians who can formulate their conceptual system as religiously isolationist. The era of religious isolationism is about to be as much at an end as that of political isolationism already is. The pith of Tillich's exposition has to do with its deliberate aptness to the intellectual context in which it appears: the correlation technique, of questions and answer. But that context as he sees it is the mental climate of the Western world; and he has spoken to it just at the end of its separatist tradition just before it is superseded by a new context, blowing in from the other parts of the planet. The new generation of the church, unless it is content with a ghetto, will live in a cosmopolitan environment, which will make the work of even a Tillich appear parochial.⁸⁴

The self-consciousness of religious pluralism is a unique phenomenon in the modern religious world. Traditionally, scholars have looked to India as a model of religious pluralism. However, India is religiously plural but idealized not in terms of its actual historical situation but in terms of its metaphysics. Smith identifies China as exemplifying the pluralistic religious situation. This is reflected in the title of a chapter in his book The Faith of Other Men (a compilation of lectures originally given on the CBC radio program "University on the Air" in 1962), where he discusses "Chinese Religion" rather than "Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism."⁸⁵ However, more recently, China has opted for a Marxist oriented ideology, ignoring its traditional value of religious pluralism. Nevertheless, Smith has discovered "various resources"⁸⁶ for the study of religious pluralism in the traditional Chinese concept of **San Chiao** (three religious traditions: Taoistic tradition, Buddhist tradition and Confucian

tradition). Compared to the Eastern traditions, in the Jewish and Christian or Greco-Roman tradition religious pluralism is a very unique or strange modern phenomenon.

However, in the modern global setting, religious pluralism is not only the problem of the West but also a practical problem of the East. In fact, it is a world problem,⁸⁷ a problem for humanity which modern Western intellectuals, for Smith, especially must tackle. However, he does not fail to challenge modern Eastern intellectuals to seriously reflect upon practical pluralism based upon historicity and modernity. As I have pointed out, in the East, especially India, the problem of religious pluralism has been solved metaphysically but not practically or historically. The problem of the caste system is an example of how religious pluralism has not been solved practically. Smith clearly indicates the relative lack of a practical, historical consideration of religious pluralism in the Hindu tradition in his article "Study of Religion in Indian Universities."

Now Professor Mahadevan will of course say that the Hindu intellectual world, with its concept of the essential unity of all religions, has already done this. In a sense, this is true; and the Christian must come to understand this. In another sense, it is not true; and the Hindu must come to understand that. Forgive me for speaking frankly: but I do feel strongly, and not glibly, that anyone who believes that our problem has already been solved is in danger of appearing to be an isolationist. The belief can itself be divisive. It is, admittedly not so divisive as the contrary, Western, Christian, error - yet divisive nonetheless.⁸⁸

Moreover, Smith criticized the metaphysical solution to the problem of pluralism as being an obstinate obstacle rather than a practical solution to the problem in human life.

Doctrinal unity, therefore, may be an obstacle to real unity. It is our historical convergence that to a Western mind is the foundation for the intellectual and spiritual unity of mankind; and it is not metaphysically, but has to be constructed by us here on earth. What is metaphysically given is not our unity, but the imperative and the capacity to achieve it.⁸⁹

Modern religious pluralism, to Smith, is really a modern problem, so that, in order to understand the problem, one must carefully understand this modern religious context. Precisely speaking, as Gordon E. Pruetz rightly comments in his recent article,⁹⁰ to Smith, the meaning of the problem, at present, does not lie in the solution, but in a new awareness of the problem in the modern world. This new awareness should not ignore traditional self-awareness of one's own tradition, but, rather, it should extend the horizon of such awareness or reform the traditional self-awareness, in relation to other traditions, globally. However, the new awareness of modern pluralism will not be focused upon producing a fixed form of awareness of other traditions in terms of one's own community, or ideology.⁹¹

Given Smith's emphasis upon collaborative awareness, the comparative understanding of religious pluralism, what is the criterion to proceed with such a perspective? Smith has suggested his own alternative criterion. He has been well aware of the problem of the criterion, and the fact that if the traditional criterion is modified, a kind of scepticism or absolute relativism would come about as the criterion. As a historian, Smith very strongly rejected such an attitude or criterion for religious pluralism. He suggests a kind of "relative relativism," which

means that all religious traditions should be subordinated to the history of human and divine relationships. That is, to him, all traditions have been and are part of human history. Thus, compared to previous times, the self-consciousness of one's own tradition as part of the history of humanity is slowly being realized in modern pluralism.

Absolute relativism is to be rejected, on multiple grounds: it is unhistorical, irrational, unchristian, unislamic, even unhindu.... Being an historian I am interested in the movement in our day of each traditional system into, through, and perhaps beyond what one might call a relative relativism--without which each is closer to its limited and now inadequate past than to what we may surely hope to construct as our more comprehensive future. The problem, one might say, is how to be pluralist without being simply relativist.⁹²

On the basis of relative relativism, Smith rejects any intention "to absolutize its own premises, its own channels of interpretation."⁹³ To Smith, "the truth has always transcended any human interpretation of it."⁹⁴ Due to this reason, Smith criticized modern positivistic, linguistic philosophy's absolutized understanding of religion.

The polemical tone of the intellectual assault, the self-confidence in the group's own ideational scheme, the lack of imaginative sympathy or appreciation, are to me startlingly similar in this sort of modern linguistic analysis to, for instance, nineteenth century Christian missionary writing about Islamic or Hindu theology.⁹⁵

Smith correctly criticizes the mainstream philosophy, that is, the modern analytic philosophy. As Smith indicates in his introduction to, Indian philosopher, J.L. Mahta's book, India and the West,⁹⁶ the self-awareness of pluralism in philosophy is not yet established in comparison to the religious thinker's or the

cultural anthropologist's awareness of religious or cultural pluralism. Furthermore, in his recent article, "Religious Pluralism and Theology in Canada" (1990), Smith points out that modern secular philosophy does not listen to theology as theology has done in the West. To Smith, such an attitude of modern secular philosophy is very "disparaging", for "fully mutual respect" between philosophy and theology.⁹⁷

Smith, also, has accurately recognized the problem of "mission" in a religiously plural world. He articulated his understanding of mission in his article "Mission, Dialogue and God's Will for Us," delivered at the 50th anniversary of the International Missionary Fellowship, in 1988 at Madras Christian College. In this article, Smith points out three transformations in the understanding of "mission" in the twentieth century. These transformations are as follows: from a theologically explicit operation to a policy of social service and human welfare; from direct evangelism to an emphasis on helping sister Churches or younger Churches in other countries; and, lastly, from the Church's mission to God's mission, with an emphasis upon one's own area rather than a distant area as the place of mission.⁹⁸

Smith, generally, evaluated these transformations positively, but criticized the limited relation between old and young Churches within the boundary of the Christian tradition. Rather, he suggested that the boundary be further extended into other traditions as follows:

I myself take evangelism, in the Greek sense of the word if not in some of its modern senses, much too seriously

to abandon or to by-pass the matter of talking with persons outside the church on the deepest spiritual and human and eternal matters. I have been blessed through this by being able also to listen: for instance, to the good news that Buddhists and the others manifestly have to share."⁹⁹

c) Monologue vs. Dialogue and Colloquy.

In contrast to the general tendency to study "dead" and "primitive" religious traditions, in the beginning of Religious Studies, Smith has uniquely directed researchers to reflect upon living religious traditions, especially, world religious traditions, and, further, to seriously participate in a dialogue with living persons who practice their own traditions in their daily or intellectual life. In a word, Smith has extended the horizon of religionswissenschaft from the study of "dead" or "primitive" traditions to the study of living traditions, and from the study of external things of each tradition--rituals, symbols, beliefs, architectures, scriptures and so on--to the study of the internal state of living persons who participate in such traditions. Even in the study of dead traditions or persons, Smith does not simply study "the observable manifestations of some human concern as if they were the concern itself."¹⁰⁰ Instead, he tries to penetrate into the manifestations to see the self-consciousness which is expressed through the manifestations, by "inference."¹⁰¹

Throughout his whole academic career, Smith has articulated the dynamic qualities of persons; qualities which have been expressed through their traditions. The dynamic qualities have

been located in the hearts of persons, so that, in order to understand other traditions or persons, Smith has thought that the best way to see the qualities is through direct encounter or sympathetic or imaginative inference. Furthermore, Smith has tried to realize his general rule or principle "that an outsider cannot understand a civilization or a great religion unless he approaches it with humility and love."¹⁰² Smith, of course, does not push his principle to be applied to an inhumane phenomenon such as Fascism or Nazism, in the name of sympathetic understanding.

Over against a neo-orthodox Christian scholar, Hendrik Kramer's understanding of other traditions simply from the perspective of "distant or objective" observer (as can be seen in Kramer's book The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World), Smith, quite differently, suggested that religious scholars participate in living encounters among persons; as a collaborator, a chairperson (or mediator in the meeting of two religious traditions) or a participant in real living dialogue in daily life.¹⁰³ Smith succinctly summarized his evaluation of an understanding of other traditions in pronominal terms as follows:

The traditional form of Western scholarship in the study of other men's religion was that of an impersonal presentation of an "it." The first great innovation in recent times has been the personalization of the faiths observed, so that one finds a discussion of a "they." Presently the observer becomes personally involved, so that the situation is one a "we" talking about a "they." The next step is a dialogue where "we" talk to "you." If there is listening and mutuality, this may become that "we" talk **with** "you." The culmination of this progress is when "we all" are talking **with** each other about "us".¹⁰⁴

The above quotation can be identified as the development of

personalistic understanding of other traditions in terms of a researcher or as the development of monologue (the first and second stage) into the dialogue (the third), and the colloquy (the fourth). The monologue stage does not consider the personalistic understanding of other traditions, but the stages of dialogue and colloquy are involved with the personalistic study of other traditions. I will expand upon these four stages over the next few pages.

Smith regards the history of the understanding of other religious tradition as the history of dialogue and has described it from the perspective of a comparative historian of humankind in four ways.¹⁰⁵ The first dialogue is the dialogue between the researcher or religionist and 'it' (the object of study). This dialogue is not concerned about the religious people who expressed the 'it' religiously, but about the 'it' itself as thing. This dialogue has been done especially by: the early circle of comparative religion; the early circle of Christian missionaries or Western travellers; and, negative secularists of modern culture. Reflecting upon the early history of comparative religion, the early religionists have been strongly influenced by the early period of the nineteenth-century--'past' oriented Romanticism, and by the middle period of the nineteenth-century--evolutionary theory. Thus, they focused on the study of the origin of religion, ignoring the living meaning, experience, and function of religion.¹⁰⁶ Also, due to the search for the historical origin of religion, they placed much value on comparative religion in

relation to the 'primitive' religious traditions or 'dead' traditions, rather than living religious traditions.¹⁰⁷ They did not include much of the elements of meaning and faith in their data. They did not even try to understand religious traditions, but only concerned themselves with the origin of religion itself in the light of the very positivistic and evolutionary perspectives.

Next, in the case of missionaries and travellers, they were quite interested in the strangeness of other religious traditions or curiousness of other cultures. But, to them, the meaning of such traditions in relation to the devotee was not much of a concern. The last circle is that of negative secularists who criticize the religious people as irrational, superstitious and 'out of step' with modern times. This position has been rapidly spreading in the modern Western consciousness and begins to see religious people in the light of a sectarian perspective.

The second dialogue is the dialogue which causes the religionist to find a slight meaning from the data to be dealt with. It makes the religionist discover the religious consciousness from the data. However, this does not mean that it directly aims for dialogue with those who made the data. It only guesses the slight meaning through the inference of the data, and so it ends in the recognition that the data is not 'it' but is 'they'; that is, it transforms the religionist's consciousness of the data as 'it' (or thing) into the consciousness of the data as 'they'. This transformation of consciousness indicates that the other traditions are not simply seen as 'things' unrelated to the

human beings of those traditions. Instead, they are seen as personal 'somethings' related to the human beings who participate in those traditions which are different from the religionist's tradition.

The third dialogue is dialogue through participation in the religious tradition concerned in the study. The second dialogue is usually done in the armchair of the ivory tower of academia but the third is done through the direct participation in the observation of the concerned tradition in the light of the religionist's own framework or theory rather than that of the tradition. In this dialogue, the religionist still tries to impose his own method on the observed religious tradition and approaches other traditions as others not related to himself but separated from his own traditions--academic tradition and religious tradition. Even though the researcher sees the concerned tradition not as a thing but as 'they', the 'they' is not related to the religionist's tradition except for his own academic interest.

The above three ways of dialogue are not dialogue precisely speaking because the religionist does not participate religiously in the dialogue with the tradition examined. Thus, it is more appropriate to refer to it as a 'monologue', initiated by the religionist who imagines the 'they' aspect in his or her own perspective.

The fourth dialogue is contrasted to the above three dialogues. The three dialogues are indirectly done but the fourth one is directly proceeded through mutual exchange of opinions

between the religionist and the representative (devotee) of the religious tradition concerned. W.C. Smith has lived his academic life according to the principle of direct dialogue. In fact, Smith organized the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University according to the principle of direct dialogue. Half the Institution is composed of Western staff and student members while the other half is non-western staff and students. This direct dialogue has also played a major role in the development of The Centre for the Study of World Religions at Harvard University.

Despite Smith's emphasis on direct dialogue for human understanding intellectually, the direct dialogue is not the primal dialogue in his thought. Smith sees the direct dialogue as the dialogue from the relation between 'we' and 'you'. This dialogue suggests a formal dialogue for solving the problems of doctrine or for understanding other traditions through listening to the other party in the dialogue--'you'. This kind of dialogue has significantly contributed to helping people understand other traditions more honestly. At the same time, it has lessened the internal problems of each religious tradition. For example, in the case of the Christian tradition, the gap between Catholicism and Protestantism has been reduced since the middle of the twentieth-century, resulting in the formation of the Department of Dialogue in the World Council of Churches (for Protestantism) and the development of Vatican II (for Catholicism).¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, through such departments, traditional understanding of "others" has been modified at the present time.

However, Smith sees the above four dialogues as remaining in a self-oriented or confrontational idea of a "we - they" or "we - you" encounter, without considering the possibility of a triologue or a tetralogue such as the tetralogue exemplified in medieval Spain (Jewish tradition, Christian tradition, Islamic tradition, and Philosophical tradition),¹⁰⁹ and in the East. Furthermore, people engaged in one of these four dialogues do not consider the mutual transformation seriously through their encounters. Smith fundamentally thinks that, through encounter, the potential self of each party can be realized and can come true. This point will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

Due to the idea of "two" in the term, dialogue, Smith does not agree with the term but suggests a new term, colloquy - his final stage, "we" talk about "us".¹¹⁰ This awareness of "we talk about us" in any encounter cannot be easily realized if not considered in terms of a global perspective rooted in the history of humanity, from the perspective of a world-community.

**d) Objectivity, Methodology vs. Cooperate
Critical Self-consciousness.**

In his provocative article, "Methodology and the Study of Religion: Some Misgivings" delivered at the University of Iowa, Smith clearly indicated why, in modern scholarship, the problem of methodology has been so often discussed, and further points out why he did not follow a fixed methodology in his scholarship.

Smith described three reasons why methodology has been wrongly perceived as an important concern of modern scholarship.¹¹¹ The first reason lies in the influence of German technically oriented education on the modern American education system, rather than that of philosophic idealism. In the development of American life, philosophic idealism is not perceived as important but the pragmatic outlook has been developed in relation to German technical emphasis.

The second reason why methodology has been seen as important, lies in the radical transformation in academic studies "from **subject matter** to **discipline**."¹¹² According to Smith, traditionally, each department or faculty member of a university is accustomed to being divided in accordance with their objects of study rather than their methods of study. However, at the present moment, the situation is the reverse of the past situation, so that the importance of the object of study has been reduced to that of methods.

The third reason lies in the influence of science and its emphasis upon "abstract theory rather than in concrete actuality, in universal generalization rather than particular facts."¹¹³ According to Smith, in the fields of the humanities or social sciences, the validity of one's research is dependent upon whether it is scientific or not, in accordance with the procedure of science. Smith thinks that the study of the human being should proceed differently from the simple application of scientific methodology upon the study of the human being as is done in the

behavioral sciences. Smith thinks that such a naive application is not even approved by natural scientists, as he puts it:

... the position on the study of man that I champion is in fact more scientific, than the one I reject: both in the sense of being a closer parallel to the natural sciences' studies, and in the sense of being more likely to be acknowledged as such by natural scientists.¹¹⁴

Smith's proposal to distinguish humane studies from scientific study in the natural sciences does not mean ignorance of a rigorous, systematic approach. As Smith says,

I am not against method; I am sorry if I give that impression. I do not think one can do anything without doing it in some fashion. And I am certainly not against being rigorous, systematic, critical, and so on.¹¹⁵

Rather, Smith thinks that the duty of human understanding is "not to be scientific, but to be rational--in ways appropriate to our subject matter--and effective."¹¹⁶ Smith, fundamentally, thinks that "the goal of the humanities is to know and to understand", so that "to perceive persons as entities, contributing to more rarefied theories, is inherently to misunderstand those persons."¹¹⁷ He thinks that the problem of method should be always subordinated to the object of study, so that, to him, method is not a fixed tool, but, always, a dynamic tool to be modified, depending upon the situations of the study. As he well puts it,

Sensitivity, openness, creative response to new awareness, are inimical, so far as I can discern, to the pre-articulated methodological neatness, Western-derived and Western-controlled, that wins the heart of the methodological school.¹¹⁸

Smith, especially, has thought that a dogmatic methodology itself does not allow room for the transcendental or spiritual dimension, which has been experienced in human life, historically.

Furthermore, dogmatic methodology prevents researchers from realizing that their object of study always "transcends" their previous knowledge or present interpretation of the object, especially in the case of human understanding.

Now my suggestion is that maybe it is relevant to our concerns that the modern intellect has tended to deny transcendence, and therefore to stultify itself. Of course, specifically in the study of religion an openness to transcendence might be thought to be the inescapable prerequisite. I am speaking not solely or even primarily about the study of religion, however, and certainly our speaking about an openness not to the **idea** of transcendence but rather to transcendence itself--and in the first instance, to the transcendence of reality over the known. The interest in epistemology, method, and disciplinary control is in some measure a confining of the intellect to what is already known, or is about to be known, and therefore to ideas, and grows out of a failure to recognize that the proper object of our intellect is something that transcends our knowledge: namely, the real world. We must have the courage to recognize that in the university, as in all true intellectual inquiry, we are oriented to a transcendence itself, which is simply reality itself. If we are not more concerned with our subject-matter, which we do not know, than with our methods, which we do, we have ceased to be true inquirers. (When I say that we do not know our subject-matter, I mean of course that we do not know it except partially, inadequately).¹¹⁹

Furthermore, Smith, in his recent article, "Theology and the World's Religious History", thinks that "ultimately, methodology, ...is a modern form of atheism",¹²⁰ due to the dogmatic exclusion of the interpretation of transcendental values in the modern academic world.

If Smith does not agree with a fixed or dogmatic methodology, what is Smith's method for understanding the human being or for human knowledge?

Although there are a number of places in his writings which

indicate his perception of human understanding, Smith clearly articulates his mode of human understanding in his article, "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: A New Proposal" and in the second part of his book, Towards a World Theology, "The History of Religion: Academic, Rational."

Smith has observed that human knowledge has been developed in three areas in the modern academic tradition: the natural sciences (including the life sciences), which studies nature and the biological aspect of living beings; the social sciences, which studies the relationship between society and human beings; and, the humanities, which studies the mental and spiritual aspects of human beings.¹²¹ Smith distinguishes the natural sciences from the social sciences and humanities by the lack of a personal understanding of the human being in the natural sciences. Smith also distinguishes 'human' knowledge from 'humane' knowledge.¹²² Human knowledge aims for the study of the person as an object like the objects of study in the natural sciences. In this knowledge, the subject sees the object of study--person--as a 'thing', just as scientists see nature as a thing which has no consciousness. Thus, the subject reduces the meaning occurring in the heart of the object to the framework of the subject. However, humane knowledge is the study of the object not as a thing but as a subject equal to the researcher who is also a subject. According to Smith, "It is our knowledge of man that I am calling humane knowledge--that is knowledge of man [the object] by man [the subject]."¹²³

Smith has strongly suggested that two basic premises be

maintained for humane knowledge in the social sciences and humanities. The first one is the premise that the object of study in humane knowledge is different from other objects.

... man [as object of study] is patently different, in ways highly significant, from material objects, and from other forms of life known to us; so that any ideas from man to underestimate his uniqueness or downplay his humanity are **prima facie** inadequate or worse. Human qualities such as self-transcendence, a sense of justice, a creative and destructive imagination, a capacity to respond to and to create beauty, a capacity for wickedness and also for dignity, freedom, compassion, rationality; a cunning capacity to deceive and also a drive or aspiration towards intellectual and moral integrity; the pursuit of truth; a sense of remorse, an ability to forgive; moral responsibility; and so on and on and on: these are manifest facts; and frankly, it strikes me as rather stupid either to propound or to put up with theories that, whether in their presuppositions or in their conclusions, or often both, fail to do justice to these facts.¹²⁴

The second premise is the fact that,

... the knowing mind [the subject] is human; is not outside, and cannot get outside, the human race to look at it externally, objectively.¹²⁵

On the basis of these two premises, Smith criticized very strongly the weak points of a modern academic tradition's understanding of the object and suggested his own understanding of the object. One weak point of modern academic tradition, identified by Smith, concerns the establishment of objective knowledge or objectivity, even in the social sciences and humanities. Smith sees the establishment of objectivity as a kind of "sacred symbol"¹²⁶ in modern academic tradition and notes that "perfect objectivity would be a good thing if only we could be innocent enough or clever enough to achieve it."¹²⁷

The natural sciences have been studied according to the

principle of objectivity. But the social sciences and humanities can not be understood only by the principle of objectivity, because the object of the social sciences and humanities is dynamic. It is the person who lives in the society. Objectivity can not be applied to the dynamic process of meaning coming out of the heart of the object.

In contrast to medieval times (in which a theological criterion was the only rule for the study of the human being, society and even the world of nature), in modern times science has been the criterion of study; increasing its influence even on the study of human beings and society in the social sciences and humanities.

As Smith recognizes, in the scientific method, objectivity has contributed to "explain" the true natural world but has not been sufficient enough for a comprehensive "understanding" of the human world. Thus, for precise understanding of the human being, as Dilthey and Polanyi did,¹²⁸ Smith has insisted on overcoming the limitations of objectivity.

The second weak point of modern academic tradition lies in the opposite direction of objectivity--subjectivism. Smith thought that the new method, subjectivism, "is no royal road to truth, either."¹²⁹ Smith asserts this because, as he says,

Of much that goes into our actions, our feeling, our moral choices, our thinking, we are ignorant; and of what we know, much we distort. We deceive ourselves, as well as others. We elude ourselves, not only outsiders.¹³⁰

Smith has sought to overcome the limitations of objectivity and subjectivism for the humane understanding of the human being,

and has suggested his own unique understanding of the human being, which he calls "corporate-critical self-consciousness." In the following pages, I will discuss and summarize this concept in two parts: corporate self-consciousness and critical self-consciousness.

(a) Corporate self-consciousness.

In Smith's thought, the fundamental first step for the humane understanding of the object is that the subject should not treat the object as a static "thing", and, furthermore, should not impose his or her own presupposed methodology on the dynamic object. This first step should be maintained in order to understand the consciousness of the object without any bias or presuppositions by the subject. It demands a lot of effort from the subject to understand the object. Smith sees the relationship between the subject and object as a mutual relationship which can be established through the process of genuine or existential contact between the subject's consciousness and the object's consciousness. The contact is not superficial but very deep and personal. Thus, the relationship between the subject and the object can not be separated at the level of mutual understanding.

Corporate self-consciousness is an indispensable, fundamental consciousness for understanding other religious traditions. If we understand other traditions in terms of Smith's consciousness, we will come to realize that the relationship between the subject--the

religionist--and the object--the devotee--is not in a subordinate relationship but in an equal humane relation between the subject and another subject.

In the search for humane knowledge, Smith insists that, when attempting to understand the consciousness of the object, the subject should always be sensitive to the object; not in terms of the subject's perspective, but in terms of the object's perspective. In this sense, Smith's sensitiveness is very similar to Raimundo Panikkar's "dialogical dialogue" in human understanding.¹³¹ Furthermore, the subject's pre-suppositions about the object should be given up for Smith's humane understanding of the object. In addition, the subject's understanding of the object should be approved by the object replying in the affirmative to the subject's study by saying 'yes.' On the basis of the humane relationship, corporate self-consciousness should be employed in modern social sciences and humanities, in order to fully understand the human being.

(b) Critical self-consciousness.

After the establishment of corporate self-consciousness, Smith says that corporate self-consciousness should be extended into new transformed self consciousness through the process of critical self-consciousness in relation to "others". This point also is very similar to Panikkar's "mutual enrichment and fecundation".¹³² This consciousness is, individually, the turning point in life to

make individual human beings more mature and, in terms of knowledge, to develop scientific knowledge in modern times.¹³³

Secondly, critical self-consciousness should be developed in three relationships: the first one is the relationship between the subject's tradition and the object's tradition; the second one is the relation between the subject and the academic tradition; and, the last one is in the relation between the subject and his own religious tradition. Thus Smith's corporate critical self-consciousness should be created from the corporate perspectives of the subject's own tradition, the object's tradition, and the subject's academic intellectual tradition. This relationship can be interpreted as the process of the humane verification of the study of the object.¹³⁴ The study is not only verified by the subject's own tradition, but also by the object's tradition and by the subject's academic tradition.

If every human knowledge of the object were to be developed through corporate verification, the knowledge would contribute to developing the humane world community and would review traditional human knowledge more critically. At the same time, it will be the key which will make modern fragmented consciousness into global self-consciousness so that eventually the division between the subject's consciousness and the object's consciousness would be coalesced. In this self-consciousness, the subject (religionist) will never see or approach the object (devotee) as different from the subject (religionist) but as a relational subject to the subject. Smith summarizes his concept of corporate-critical self-

consciousness as follows:

By corporate-critical self-consciousness I mean that critical, rational, inductive self-consciousness by which a community of persons, constituted at a minimum by two persons, the one being studied and the one studying, but ideally by the whole human race, is aware of any given particular human condition or action as a condition or action of itself as a community, yet of one part but not of the whole of itself; and is aware of it as it is experienced and understood simultaneously both subjectively (personally, existentially) and objectively (externally, critically, analytically; as one used to say, scientifically).¹³⁵

e) Comparative Study of Religion as a Humane Tool for the Understanding of Self-consciousness of Humanity.

As pointed out earlier in this work, Smith's fundamental principle of humane learning is that humane learning is not achieved through the application of a methodologically fixed framework, but in an understanding of what human beings have been, truly or ultimately in their own life, historically. Thus, to Smith, humane learning is the process of becoming one's self more truly through the process of humane understanding. In other words, to study human beings in humane knowledge is to study ultimately "oneself," even though there is a big gap of cultural or geographical distance or time between the researcher and the object of study--human beings or human ideas. Due to this conviction, Smith thinks that the researcher of humane learning,

is therefore exposing his actual self to his potential self; is participating in that process of self transcendence in which being human in part consists.¹³⁶

The actual self of the researcher is extended through the process of realization of the potential self in humane learning, so that "knowing something new" can be the foundation for becoming "a new kind of person."¹³⁷

Furthermore, Smith thinks that, through humane learning of human beings' ideas--arts, religion, politics and so on--common humanity would be awakened from its dormancy inherent in the researcher's heart, and in the case of living conversation between researcher and the person or devotee, the two person's common humanity would be revived more truly.

On the basis of humane learning, Smith clearly points out the task of the religionist as follows;

The student of religious history is engaged in the task of discovering, and of making intelligible to others, how each of the data of man's religious life here or there across the centuries and across the globe constitutes one more clue for our deepening awareness of the incomprehensible, yet herein manifest, humanity of man.¹³⁸

Due to the study of humanity, Smith has referred to the study of religion as that of persons, and, furthermore, he has thought that the history of religion is the history of persons. In so doing, ultimately, the task of comparative religion is to cultivate "the profound self-awareness of man in his and her unintegrated wholeness,"¹³⁹ or "the disciplined self-consciousness of man's variegated and developing religious life."¹⁴⁰

In order to understand common humanity through the study of religious phenomena, the religionist should always be aware of not the religious phenomenon itself but the persons who have expressed

such phenomena. Smith, due to his fundamental and ultimate principle of humane or personalistic understanding, is not satisfied with the so called phenomenology of religion. He clarifies this in the following quotation.

The modern upsurging study calling itself phenomenology of religion, which is certainly generic enough, is also object oriented in that it has addressed itself to religious phenomena but hardly to the persons who relate themselves to some or other among these and thereby makes them religious.¹⁴¹

Smith concretely suggests three stages¹⁴² for human understanding in comparative religion, in his book The Faith of Other Men.

The first stage is that of information gathering. In this stage, the various traditions themselves are examined; that is, the language, the scripture, the ritual, the socio-political structure and history of each tradition should be mastered. According to Smith, such study of traditions themselves have been quite well developed in the field of history of religion. Despite such good development, Smith discovers that the study of tradition itself does not give a thorough understanding of the tradition in relation to the devotees who have participated in the tradition. Thus, he urges a second stage, that of interpretation. In this stage it is the task of the subject to interpret how the meaning of the tradition has been accepted in the heart of the devotee through the devotee's participation in his or her tradition, and, further, how transcendental reality has been experienced in the devotee's own personal life through their own tradition. Due to the search for discovering or interpreting the meaning, Smith clearly states that

the locus of religious experience, or meaning, is not in the tradition itself but in the heart of the devotee. Thus, Smith has insisted that the comparative study of religion should be the study of the human being.¹⁴³ Finally, Smith suggests a third stage, that of generalization of the interpretation, 'World Theology'. In this stage the task of the religionist is to see the unified history of humankind as the process of interaction between human beings and transcendental reality or truth.

On the basis of the above three suggestions for the direction of comparative study of religion, Smith has tried to extend modern fragmented consciousness into the unified or corporate consciousness critically. He has found two forms of fragmented or parochial consciousness in relation to "others" in the modern world. They are the consciousness of negative secularists and of theologians. Because of such parochial consciousness the comparative study of religion has been confronting a lot of difficulties in the development of the study. However, in contrast to the early period of modern comparative study of religion, the present period is one of reconciliation between Theology and Religious Studies. In the period of the nineteen-sixties, the conflicts between theology and religious studies were extreme but since the period of the nineteen-eighties the conflicts have been resolving and listening to each other.¹⁴⁴

However, still the negative secularism is the most obstinate obstacle for development of human understanding. According to Smith, the exclusion of the transcendent aspect of life from the

modern academic tradition is an anomaly in terms of the history of human kind, because, historically or ontologically, all human beings have lived with the experience of transcendence or truth in their life. This is an empirical fact. Thus, to Smith, the modern tendency to exclude the transcendent aspect of life in modern academic tradition has produced a fragmented understanding of the human being.

Smith, in his recent article, "Theology and the Academic Study of Religion", points out that such a modern academic tendency has come from the incorrect conviction that "enlightenment rationalism" is the final value. As he puts it,

Certain early conclusions of enlightenment rationalism had become accepted and critically as final with alternatives dismissed as not worth consideration. The present recognition is that, instead, our understanding of the human scene is by no means final, that secular orthodoxy is no more sacrosanct than any other rigid orthodoxy, and that it has once again become the task of intellectuals ... specifically, of humanists... to think through carefully and with considerable humility what human life and society are ultimately all about. Humanists have right along earned their bread and butter partly by questioning from time to time the entrenched orthodoxies of their day; and at the present moment the orthodoxy that is beginning to be questioned is the confident inherited assertion that there is no transcendence, that metaphysics and religion are bunk, that the almost universal human recognition is not allowed to be considered seriously that we human beings are in touch however remotely with a realm of value higher than ourselves.¹⁴⁵

To summarize, for Smith, comparative religion has been a profound humane tool used to explore human history integrally. Furthermore comparative religion has allowed for corporate critical self-consciousness in the history of humanity. Through a comparative analysis of modern academic understanding of human

beings, Smith has noted that human beings have been interpreted as fragmented in the modern academic tradition, and, further, that such interpretation has produced impersonalization in modern life. In order to correct such impersonalization, Smith has urged modern academia, especially in the West, to seriously reflect upon modern fragmentation of life, and, moreover,

... to heal the split in Western soul, to overcome the split in Western civilization. Ours is the only civilization, incidentally, that has been consciously built on two distinct sources, Greece and Rome on the one hand, Palestine on the other...which is the ultimate basis of our odd Western polarity between something that we call "religion" and the rest of culture. The two components have been, over the centuries, at times in harmony, at times juxtaposed, recently in conflict, never fully fused though at times integrated in a larger well functioning whole.¹⁴⁶

ENDNOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1. Hans George-Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by Garret Barden and William G. Doerprel (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 1.
2. C.G. Jung, The Zofingia Lectures (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 9.
3. ibid., p. 11.
4. ibid., p. 31.
5. ibid., p. 56.
6. Psychoanalyst and social critic, Erich Fromm, articulates two modes of living in contemporary life. The first one is the "having" mode which concentrates on material possession, acquisitiveness, power, and aggression, so that it produces the universal evils - greed, envy, and violence. In contrast, the second one is the "being" mode which has been founded on love, the pleasure of sharing and meaningful activity of life. Fromm has warned that the modern "having" mode of life produces contemporary problems - psychological and ecological - and furthermore urged that the modern "having" mode should be changed into the "being" mode. Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1976), pp. 76-77, and pp. 105-106.
7. C.G. Jung, op.cit.
8. ibid., p. 62.
9. ibid.
10. Francis Xavier Charet, "Spiritualism and the Foundations of C.G. Jung's Psychology" (Ph.D. Dissertation, at the University of Ottawa, 1988.), See Chapter 3, especially p. 73.
11. C.G. Jung, "On 'The Tibetan Book of The Dead'" (1942) in CW. 11, p. 525.
12. According to Encyclopedia of Occultism and Parapsychology, 2nd ed. vol. 3 by Leslie A. Shepard (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1985), Somnambulism is "a state of sleep, or half-waking trance, spontaneously or artificially induced in which subconscious and faculties take the place of normal consciousness and direct the body in the performance of erratic (sleep walking) or highly intellectual actions (solving problems)" p. 1242. "The somnambulistic state was the discovery of the Marquis Chastenet de Puse'gur in 1784 in the context of Mesmerism and "animal magnetism". He induced it by

passes, and finally, by a simple act of will, the Abbe Faria brought it on by shouting, Barberyn by praying, James Braid by staring at a bright object, usually his lacet case." p. 1243.

13. C.G. Jung, The Collected Works of G.G. Jung, 20 Vols., ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R.F.C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-), "on the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena" (1902). It was Jung's dissertation for his medical degree at the faculty of medicine, University of Zurich. Vol. 1: Psychiatric Studies, p. 19. Dates of publication for the first edition of specific papers and for specific volumes are indicated in the bibliography. All subsequent references to the Collected Works will appear as CW, followed by the volume number and the specific pages.
14. ibid., p. 24.
15. ibid.
16. ibid., p. 36.
17. ibid., p. 40.
18. C.G., Jung, "Psychological Factors Determining Human Behavior" (1937) in CW, 8, p. 120.
19. C.G. Jung, "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits" (1920) in CW, 8, p. 301.
20. ibid.
21. ibid., p. 309.
22. C.G. Jung, "The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales" (1945) in CW, 9i, p. 212.
23. ibid., p. 214.
24. C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, edited by Aniela Jaffé and translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 3.
25. C.G. Jung, "What India can teach us" (1939) in CW, 10, p.527.
26. ibid., p. 528.
27. ibid.
28. C.G. Jung, "Yoga and the West" (1936) in CW, 11, p. 535.
29. ibid.

30. ibid., p. 537.
31. C.G. Jung, "The Psychology of Eastern Meditation" (1943) in CW, 11, p. 560.
32. "The interpretive projections we have been examining are, with the exception of the last, identical with the psychic contents that dropped out of their dogmatic framework at the time of the Renaissance and the Great Schism, and since then have continued in a state of secularization where they were at the mercy of the "immanentist" principle of explanation, that is, a naturalistic and personalistic interpretation. The discovery of the collective unconscious did something to alter this situation, for, within the limits of psychic experience, the collective unconscious takes the place of the Platonic realm of eternal ideas. Instead of these models giving form to created things, the collective unconscious, through its archetypes, provides the **a priori** condition for the assignment of meaning." C.G. Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis, CW, 14, p. 87.
33. C.G. Jung, op.cit.
34. C.G. Jung, "Foreword to the 'I Ching'" (1950) in CW, 11, p. 591.
35. C.G. Jung, Dream Analysis: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1928-1930, edited by William McGuire (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 623.
36. C.G. Jung, "Richard Wilhelm: In Memoriam" (1930) in CW, 15, p. 58. (bracket is present writer's own words).
37. C.G. Jung, "Concerning Mandala Symbolism" (1950) in CW, 9i, p. 355.
38. ibid., pp. 383-384.
39. ibid., p.384.
40. ibid.
41. C.G. Jung, "Appendix: Mandalas" (1955) in CW, 9i, p. 388.
42. C.G. Jung, op.cit., CW, 9i, p. 384.
43. C.G. Jung, "The Content of the Psychoses" (1914) in CW, 3, p. 159.
44. ibid., p. 160.

45. C.G. Jung, "On Psychological Understanding" (1915) in CW, 3, p. 181.
46. ibid., p. 183.
47. ibid.
48. ibid., p. 192.
49. C.G. Jung, "On the Problem of Psychogenesis in Mental Disease" (1919) in CW, 3, pp. 211-212.
50. C.G. Jung, op.cit., CW, 3, p. 185.
51. ibid., p. 187.
52. Thomas Munson criticized psychoanalytic understanding of religion, especially, Freud's understanding, due to the fact that his theory is almost based on the analysis of "patient" rather than normal persons. Thomas Munson, Religious Consciousness and Experience, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p.8., footnote 7. However, psychoanalysts' word, "patient" should be carefully examined. Especially, to Jung, this is very important. Mental illness can be identified by "dissociation of the personality: mental health by integration". To Jung, "lesser degrees of division within the personality are an inescapable part of the human condition." Thus, all human beings are not completely integrated. In this sense, all human beings are "patients". Anthony Starr, "Individuation and the creative process", in Journal of Analytical psychology (1983), p.342.
53. C.G. Jung, op.cit., CW, 3, p. 189.
54. C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 110.
55. ibid.
56. ibid., p. 143.
57. C.G. Jung, "Principles of Practical Psychotherapy" (1935) in CW, 16, p. 5.
58. ibid., p. 7.
59. ibid., p. 8.
60. ibid.
61. ibid.
62. ibid., p. 10.

63. ibid.
64. ibid., p. 19.
65. C.G. Jung, "What is Psychotherapy?" (1935) in CW, 16, p. 24.
66. C.G. Jung, "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man" (1931) in CW, 10, p. 76.
67. ibid., p. 81.
68. ibid., p. 83.
69. C.G. Jung, "Psychoanalysis and the Cure of Souls" (1928) in CW, 11, p. 351.
70. C.G. Jung, "Introduction to the Religious and Psychological Problems of Alchemy" (1944) in CW, 12, p. 11.
71. C.G. Jung, "The Aims of Psychotherapy" (1931) in CW, 16, p. 41.
72. W.C. Smith, "Thinking about Person" in Humanitas: Journal of the Institute of Normative Spirituality (May 1979), p. 149.
73. ibid.
74. W.C. Smith, "An Historian of Faith Reflects on What We are Doing Here" in Christian Faith in a Religiously Plural World. edited by Donald G. Dowe and John B. Carman (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1978), p. 148.
75. W.C. Smith, Belief and History (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1977), p. 6.
76. W.C. Smith, "Objectivity and the Humane Science: A new proposal" in Religious Diversity: W.C. Smith edited by W.G. Oxtoby (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 167.
77. Ibid., p. 168. This point is very similar to Michael Polanyi's understanding of personal knowledge as follows:
- ...nothing that is said, written or printed, can ever mean anything in itself: for it is only a **person** who utters something - or who listens to it or reads it - who can mean something **by** it.
- Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 22.
78. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p. 168.

79. ibid., p. 169.
80. ibid., p. 170.
81. W.C. Smith, "Idolatry in Comparative Perspective" in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions edited by Paul Knitter and John Hick (New York: Orbis Books, 1987), p. 57.
82. W.C. Smith, "The World Church and the World History of Religion: The Theological Issue" in Catholic Theological Society of America: Proceedings. 39 (1984), p. 60.
83. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion: A Revolutionary Approach to the Great Religious Traditions (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1978), p. 7.
84. W.C. Smith, "The Christian in a Religiously Plural World." in Religious Diversity, p. 8.
85. W.C. Smith, The Faith of Other Men (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1962), see Chapter 5.
86. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 152-153.
87. W.C. Smith, "The Christian and the Near East - A Canadian View" in British Weekly (December 20 1956), p. 5.
88. W.C. Smith, "University Studies of Religion in A Global Context" in Study of Religion in Indian Universities: A report of the consultation held in Bangalore in September, 1967, (Bangalore: Bangalore Press, 1967). p. 84.
89. ibid., pp. 86-87.
90. Gordon E. Pruet, "World Theology and World Community: The Vision of Wilfred Cantwell Smith", in Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 19 (1990), pp. 401-402.
91. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 152.
92. W.C. Smith, Belief and History, pp. 23-29.
93. ibid., p. 31.
94. ibid.
95. ibid., p. 33.

96. W.C. Smith, "Introduction" in India and the West: The Problem of Understanding Selected Essays of J.L. Mehta. Written by J.L. Mehta (California: Scholar Press, 1985), p. XIII.
97. W.C. Smith, "Religious Pluralism and Theology in Canada" in Canadian theological society newsletter / Communiqué de la société théologique Canadienne Vol.9/2 (April 1990), p. 3.
98. W.C. Smith, "Mission, Dialogue, and God's Will for Us" in International Review of Mission. Vol. LXXIII, (July 1988), pp. 362-363.
99. ibid., p. 365.
100. W.C. Smith, "Comparative Religion: Whither-and Why?" in The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology. edited by Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959). p. 35.
101. ibid. and p. 43.
102. ibid., p. 50. see footnote 39.
103. ibid., pp. 50-51.
104. ibid., p. 34.
105. Smith, "Whither," p. 57.
106. Jan de Vries, The Study of Religion: A Historical Approach, trans. by Kees W. Bolle (New York: Harcourt, 1967), pp. 40-42. E.J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion: A History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975) pp. 47-48.
107. Smith, op.cit., p. 37.
108. See, especially, Robert B. Sheard, Inter-religious Dialogue in the Catholic Church Since Vatican II: A Historical and Theological Study (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), p. 17.
109. W.C. Smith, "Mission, Dialogue, and God's Will for us", p. 369.
110. W.C. Smith, Towards A World Theology: Faith and Comparative History of Religion (Philadelphia: New Westminster Press, 1981), p. 193.
111. W.C. Smith, "Methodology and the Study of Religion: Some Misgivings", pp. 4-8.
112. ibid., p. 5.

113. ibid., p. 8.
114. ibid.
115. ibid., p. 29.
116. ibid., p. 9.
117. ibid., p. 11.
118. ibid., p. 19.
119. ibid., pp. 19-20.
120. W.C. Smith, "Theology and The World's Religious History" in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion edited by Leonard Swidler (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1987), p. 63.
121. W. C. Smith, "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: A New Proposal" in Religious Diversity, ed. by W.G. Oxtoby (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 160.
122. ibid., p. 161.
123. ibid. (The information in the brackets has been added by the present writer).
124. ibid., pp. 164-165.
125. ibid., p. 165.
126. ibid., p. 161.
127. ibid., p. 162.
128. Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences: Selected Works. Volume 1., edited, with an introduction, by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 439. Polanyi especially thinks that "complete objectivity as usually attributed to the exact sciences is a delusion and is in fact a false ideal", due to his fundamental thinking that science has been also the expression of scientist's person spirit. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 17-18. and p. 65.
129. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p. 162.
130. ibid.

131. Panikkar insists that his understanding of dialogue should not be limited to mutual meetings of "logics" of both sides as partners of dialogue but beyond that "logical" level as follows:

"Dialogue seeks truth by trusting the other, just as dialectics pursues truth by trusting the order of things, the value of reason and weighty arguments. Dialectics is the optimism of reason. Dialogue is the optimism of the heart. Dialectics believes it can approach truth by relying on the objective consistency of ideas. Dialogue believes it can advance along the way to truth by relying on the subjective consistency of the dialogical partners. Dialogue does not seek to be primarily **duo-logue**, a duet of two **logoi**, which could still be dialectical; but a **dia-logos**, a piercing of the **logos** to attain a truth that transcends it.

We call this **dialogical dialogue...**"

Raimundo Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics: Cross-Cultural Studies (New York: Paulist, 1979), p. 243.

132. Raimundo Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 26.
133. W.C. Smith, "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: A New Proposal", p. 163.
134. ibid., p. 164.
135. ibid., p. 163.
136. W.C. Smith, "Methodology and the Study of Religion", p. 23.
137. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p. 178.
138. W.C. Smith, Belief and History, p. 7.
139. W.C. Smith, Towards A World Theology, p. 48.
140. W.C. Smith, "Comparative Religion: Whither - and Why?", p. 55.
141. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief., p. 7.
142. W.C. Smith, The Faith of Other Men, p. 14.
143. Smith, "On the Comparative," pp. 186-87.
144. Walter H. Capps, "Religious Studies/Theological Studies: The St. Louisie Project." In Journal of the American Academy of Religion, LII/4 (April 1984), pp. 729-730.

145. W.C. Smith, "Theology and the Academic study of Religion" in Illiff Review: Denver, Colorado, 44 #3(Fall, 1987), pp. 16-17.
146. ibid., pp. 17-18.

Just as Edgar Sheffield Brightman described human experience as the meaning of "all the data and processes of consciousness,"¹ C.G. Jung thought that human experience occurs through consciousness, even though it is rooted in the unconscious. In this chapter, what I have tried to articulate is not the human experience itself but the place where human experience is rooted and how human experience maintains human life, meaningfully. This place is not only the place in which human experience is created, but, it is also the location of re-experiencing the accumulation of human experience. It is in this sense that I use the term locus. In other words, my main focus of this chapter lies in the articulation of how the human psyche plays a role as the basis of the deepest human experience which is religious experience. First of all, I will describe Jung's understanding of religion in relation to the human psyche, and then, I will describe consciousness and the unconscious which constitute the human psyche. Finally, I will discuss the process of individuation which proceeds through the dialectical relation between consciousness and the unconscious.

1. Meaning of Religion as Experience.

C.G. Jung discussed his understanding of religion as immediate, numinous experience, following Rudolf Otto's understanding of religion as the experience of *numina*, in the

Terry lectures held at Yale University in 1937.

Religion, as the Latin word denotes, is a careful and scrupulous observation of what Rudolf Otto aptly termed the **numinosum**, that is, a dynamic agency or effect not caused by an arbitrary act of will. On the contrary, it seizes and controls the human subject, who is always rather its victim than its creator.²

The experience can not be controlled by the individual consciousness or will, but, rather, possesses the individual. The experience of the numinosum can occur through two media:³ one is through "a quality of visible object" and the other one is through "an influence of invisible presence" such as spirits or grace. In other words, the experience can happen naturally or unconsciously at the moment of touching or seeing the visible object. In the case of the absence of the visible object, the affect of the invisible presence can cause an individual to have the experience or the feeling. For Jung this experience is quite similar to Schleiermacher's understanding of religion as "the feeling of absolute dependence".

Jung explored his understanding of religion in relation to the numinous experience in the following three aspects. First Jung shows a metaphysical understanding of religion. He describes his understanding of religion in the second section of "The Undiscovered Self" (1957), 'Religion as the Counterbalance to Massmindness', as follows: "Religion... teaches another authority opposed to that of the 'world'."⁴ In the same section, Jung calls the authority a "transcendent authority",⁵ because it does not come from the mundane surroundings, but from,

...simply and solely the empirical awareness, the

incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the 'world' and its 'reason'. This formation will not please either the mass man or the collective believer.⁶

Thus, Jung understands religion as "a subjective relationship to certain metaphysical, extramundane factors."⁷ It should be understood in the context of his total work that the relation of consciousness to these extramundane powers transcends the ego but remains intrapsychic. In other words, the meaning and purpose of religion,

lie in the relationship of the individual to God (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) or to the path of salvation and liberation (Buddhism).⁸

Furthermore, Jung locates the individual's autonomy in relation to the extramundane factor as follows:

Just as man, as a social being, can not in the long run exist without a tie to the community, so the individual will never find the real justification for his existence and his own spiritual and moral autonomy anywhere except in an extramundane principle capable of relativizing the overpowering influence of external factors. The individual who is not anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own resources to the physical and moral blandishments of the world.⁹

Secondly, Jung shows us how religion functions in individual life. According to him, the function of religion is to maintain the state of balance of the psyche against the interruptions of the repressed feeling from within and the unfortunate events from without.

Its [religion's] evident purpose is to maintain the psychic balance, for the natural man has an equally natural 'knowledge' of the fact that his conscious functions may at any time be thwarted by uncontrollable happenings coming from inside as well as from outside.¹⁰

Thirdly, Jung shows his understanding of religion in relation to faith, belief, and creeds. The ecclesial, institutional, formulations of faith is the self-perception of a prior religious experience, and so it is a secondary phenomenon. Jung understood two kinds of faith: one is the faith rooted in religious experience and the other one is the faith rooted in the authority of tradition, irrespective of experience.¹¹ Jung puts much value on the first one but does not ignore the second one. However, Jung identified many dangerous possibilities in the second kind of faith, in spite of the fact that "the power of tradition embodies an experience whose importance for the continuity of culture is beyond question."¹² The faith rooted in the authority of tradition tends to lead the devotee to follow his or her tradition blindly without reflection or thinking and to remain in the spiritual status quo. As Jung puts it,

But with this kind of faith there is always the danger of mere habit supervening--it may so easily degenerate into spiritual inertia and a thoughtless compliance which, if persisted in, threatens stagnation and cultural regression.¹³

This mechanical dependence forces the devotees to rely on "the psychic regression to infantilism,"¹⁴ and to memorize the formalities of tradition without the experience which gave rise to the tradition which should influence the devotees' life. In this case, the infantile dependence upon tradition would prevent the very continuous religious experience, which the tradition exists to mediate. Jung denounces today's spiritual state in the West as one of infantile dependence on the authority of tradition. In a word,

Jung sees faith inherent in experience as "legitimate" faith.¹⁵ He sees that faith occurs from the awareness that,

...something happened to us in the first place which instilled πίστις into us--that is, trust and loyalty.¹⁶

On the basis of the definition of religion as the experience of the **numinosum**, Jung also distinguishes his understanding of religion from that of creeds. The main reason for such a distinction arises from his understanding that religion is an immediate experience, whereas creeds are not the first experience but the intellectual expressions of the original experience. The creeds are originally based on "loyalty, faith and confidence in a certain experience of a numinous nature and in the change of consciousness that ensues."¹⁷ In the Christian tradition, the representative case is that of Saul's transformation from a persecutor into St. Paul; that is, the numinosum changed Saul's peculiar conscious attitude, and persecution of Christians, into one of endorsement. Thus, the numinous experience has the power to transform an individual's conscious attitude.

The original experience is preserved in creeds and reactivated through sacrament and ritual or practices for inducing and recreating the same experience. Some experiences have been practised by many peoples in the process of history for thousands of years, without any alteration to the experience. Even though there have been some changes to the original experience, the changes usually have been done within the boundary of the original experience. The lack of an additional or alternative interpretation of creeds in relation to the original experiences

has maintained the present creeds and dogmas, even though they no longer mediate the experience that gave rise to them.

Jung, as a psychologist, is not primarily concerned with the value of creeds or dogmas as unique or eternal truths, but, rather, he seeks to interpret the psychological meaning of creeds or dogmas focusing on the original religious experience. Due to such psychological understanding, he puts his first emphasis on psyche in which the original religious experience occurs in the history of humankind. In other words, he does not argue the history of creeds or dogmas from the perspective of theology but from that of "the psychology of **homo religiosus**."¹⁸ He argues his fundamental position of the understanding of the original experience as follows:

As a matter of fact, the only form of existence of which we have immediate knowledge is psychic. We might well say...that physical existence is a mere inference, since we know of matter only in so far as we perceive psychic images mediated by the senses.¹⁹

This does not mean that Jung disregards creeds or dogmas themselves in religious traditions, but that he wants to see the psychological meaning through the process of relationship between the devotee and creeds or dogmas; that is, he tries to understand how the devotee has sensed or experienced his or her own deep structure of the psyche (the unconscious) through the medium of creeds or dogmas. Jung refers to the real experience, through this medium, as "living mystery" or "numinosum of divine experience."²⁰

In contrast to the experience of the **numinosum** through immediate experience of the unconscious, if the medium does not

allow the devotee to experience his or her own deep structure of the psyche, then the medium will not give any energy, meaning or moral affect to the life of the devotee. In this case, there is only "religious sentimentality"²¹ or blind obedience divested of religious experience, the numinosum.

In the case of the absence of religious experience in the devotee's life through participation in the medium, of creed or rite there is another means to compensate for this absence, namely, through dreams. To Jung, dream analysis is very important because such analysis reveals the compensation toward wholeness urged by the self in relation to the dreamer's or devotee's present life. Furthermore, if there are many similar dreams which would indicate some compensation of collective consciousness, each religious tradition should seek to incorporate such compensation in its myth rather than abandon the myth itself. Usually, the construction can be done through new interpretation of the present religious medium which allows the present devotee to recover his or her own experience of the numinosum within his or her own psyche.

In a summary statement of the compensation which Jung saw in a number of contemporary dreams moving toward a new myth he writes of their specifically religious import. As a representative compensatory dream of the modern devotee, Jung shows the indication of quaternity as follows:

But the quaternity as produced by the modern psyche points directly not only to the God within but to the identity of God and man.²²

The concept of quaternity does not presume that the traditional

idea of trinity should totally disappear but presupposes that the idea of trinity should be extended into the lost or the repressed realm of trinity, a conception of divinity which would include the aspects of material, the feminine and evil in the case of the Christian trinity. These three aspects should be sanctified and so included in the symbol of trinity. To Jung, this change would mean a compensation from the collective unconscious which, effectively, would create a new myth with a more inclusive symbol of God through divinizing elements in creation excluded from the Christian Trinity.

From the perspective of compensation of the present state of the devotee's psyche, in his third lecture of Terry lectures (1937), "The History and Psychology of a Natural Symbol," Jung sees dreams as revelations of the deeper psyche. As Jung writes,

Revelation is an 'unveiling' of the depths of the human soul first and foremost, a 'laying bare'; hence it is an essentially psychological event, though this does not, of course, tell us what **else** it might be.²³

As indicated above, Jung does not ignore the medium of the dream, but urges us to see the dynamic aspect of the medium in light of its development, that is, it is not a static thing but always preserves its own dynamic realm in relation to the devotee's consciousness which the dream compensates toward wholeness. In this sense, even though the medium of the dream is playing the role of an agent which enables the devotee to sense the deeper psyche as a universally operative agency, it is always historically and individually determined. Thus though it is universally operative the unconscious and its expressions are always relative and time-

bound in relation to the individuals they address. In a word, to Jung, the meaning of the dream, as medium depends upon the individual's consciousness, which it seeks to compensate toward wholeness:

A dogma is always the result and fruit of many minds and many centuries, purified of all the oddities, shortcomings, and flaws of individual experiences. But for all that, the individual experience, by its very poverty, is immediate life, the warm red blood pulsating today.²⁴

For Jung, neither belief nor faith can be the substitute for experience or feeling. Creedal dogmatic belief is the intellectual expression of the collective convictions of faith, and faith is the individual's awareness and conviction of his or her original experience. Thus, the fundamental aspect of religion lies in the realm of experience, and the last in the realm of belief, creeds or dogmas. In this sense Jung does not put his primary emphasis on traditional, social and cultural expression. Rather, he is mainly concerned with the individual's numinous experience.

To summarize, for Jung, the meaning of religion as experience is generated by the psyche, because the meaning can not be experienced without the basis of religious experience, in the psyche. Thus Jung fundamentally understood the human being as **homo religiosus**, and further saw religion not as an addition to a human being's life but as an essential component of it. As Jung says,

Religion...is an **instinctive** attitude peculiar to man, and its manifestations can be followed all through human history.²⁵

2. Consciousness as the Expression of Human Experience

i) The Ego as the Agent of Consciousness

I have argued that, to Jung, religious experience is the source of religious traditions--myths, scriptures, religious organisations, symbols, forms of worship and so on. In other words, all religious traditions are the expressions or forms of religious experience, which, in turn, originates in the psyche.

In this section, the results of the experience will be discussed in relation to the level of consciousness. The understanding of symbols will be described later.

The main reason that this section is titled "Consciousness as the Expression of Religious Experience," is the fact that religious experience occurs through the impact of the archetypal unconscious on consciousness. According to Jung, the experience itself, though intensely personal, cannot be fully understood except through examining the relation of the experience to its conscious and historical variants. Thus, the understanding of religious experience should start from the level of religious consciousness perceptible in religious traditions.

According to Jung, the psyche is composed of two realms: one is the realm of consciousness and the other one is that of the unconscious. The latter will be discussed in the next section of the present chapter. These two realms, in fact, can not be separately understood because they are organically, dialectically related to each other. Consciousness can not be understood without

the consideration of the unconscious. The same holds true in the case of the unconscious because without consideration of consciousness, which is the expression of the unconscious, the unconscious can not be known. However, for the sake of necessity, in comparing Jung's idea of psyche and Smith's idea of person, the relationship will be separately described.

Generally speaking, as the realm of the unconscious is "...by definition unlimited...", and "...of indefinite extent with no assignable limits...",²⁶ the realm of consciousness is not easily limited because it functions to express the limitless unconscious. It is very difficult to draw the boundary of consciousness, because "it is capable of indefinite extension."²⁷ However, the realm of consciousness "always finds its limit when it comes up against the unknown."²⁸ Thus, it is understandable that the West especially since the Enlightenment believed that the field of consciousness was everything, absolute and dominant. However, a pre-Enlightenment philosopher Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann discovered the realms of the psyche beyond consciousness, and further, in modern times, thanks to Sigmund Freud's development of the subjective and personal unconscious (mainly suppressed consciousness) and C.G. Jung's cultivation of the transpersonal collective unconscious, the understanding of consciousness has been relativized and wider circles of current culture have begun to see the relationship between the two realms.

As there is a center in the field of the unconscious referred to as the self, there is also a center in the field of

consciousness referred to as the ego.²⁹ The ego is the centre of consciousness in the psyche. Thus, to Jung, consciousness in terms of self-awareness means the ego. As Jung said,

We know of no other kind of consciousness, nor can we imagine a consciousness without an ego. There can be no consciousness where there is no one to say: "I am conscious."³⁰

The ego is, also, an agent which can actively lead individuals to adapt to or decide upon their surroundings or behaviours.³¹ Thus, to some extent, it is related to the will. However, it does not mean that the ego is the center of the whole personality, it is just the center of the consciousness and has free-will within the boundary of consciousness. It is just part of the whole personality. In other words, will also is dependent upon "the qualities of this 'extra-conscious' psyche,"³² the unconscious. Thus, it also is limited in its freedom in relation to the unconscious.

Upon examining the roles of the ego, we see that the ego is "not a simple or elementary factor but a complex one which can not be described exhaustively."³³ The ego, specifically, is rooted in two realms;³⁴ the first one is the realm of the somatic basis. Here, the ego is developed in relation to "the totality of endosomatic perceptions." The second one is the realm of the psychic basis. Here, the psychic basis means the milieu in which the instinctual processes can be modified or reflected from the perspective of the will. In other words, the ego relates to two realms: consciousness and the unconscious as endosomatic and as psychic. The foregoing means that the expression of the

unconscious in the conscious ego is the only way in which the unconscious becomes conscious and so actualized in consciousness. The process of how the unconscious is expressed in the realm of consciousness will be described in the next section.

ii) Symbol as Conscious Form of the Unconscious

In his famous book, Symbols of Transformation, Jung describes the importance of symbol as a conscious form. He especially insists upon this importance in the section titled, "Two Kinds of Thinking."

Jung explored his understanding of symbol in relation to the two types of thinking. The first one is "the directed and adopted" thinking.³⁵ It usually operates for the purpose of dialogue or communication. It is very conscious or reflective thinking. Thus, it operates according to the individual's will and so can be changed at will to be better adapted to reality. In contrast to the former, the second one is "dreaming or fantasy thinking."³⁶ It does not come from the intellectual or conscious effort of reflection but from natural, spontaneous and unconscious motives. Thus, it does not adapt to reality and correct its previous opinion or thinking according to the individual's will. Rather, it addresses reality from its own perspective in the unconscious and builds its own subjective world.

The two types of thinking should compensate each other, and move toward synthesis. If directed thinking is dominant, life in

modern Western society will become technological or mechanical.

History shows that directed thinking was not always as developed as it is today. The clearest expression of modern directed thinking is science and the technique fostered by it.³⁷

In reverse, if the dreaming or fantasy thinking is dominant, the world would be perceived as an illusion, as a schizophrenic or psychotic would see the world. As Jung says,

This state of mind has been described in the first place as infantile and autoerotic, or, with Bleuler, as 'autistic,' which clearly expresses the view that the subjective picture, judged from the standpoint of adaptation, is inferior to that of directed thinking. The ideal instance of autism is found in schizophrenia, whereas infantile autoeroticism is more characteristic of neurosis.³⁸

Jung does not agree with the separation of these two worlds that would develop from the two types of thinking. The reason is, in the case of the first, that a directed thinking oriented society would keep individuals from the link with the realm of the unconscious, and so it would be a dry society. Jung saw modern Western society as being on the way to this type of a society. In the case of the second, the reason lies in the fact that the overwhelming explosion of the unconscious would result in the formation of an abnormal society which has no ideal form through which the unconscious can be refined and extended into the realm of consciousness.

Jung thought that the emergence of the two worlds could be overcome through the formation of symbols. To him, the first world results from the lack of symbols which would help make the conscious link to the unconscious. It does not mean that there is

no symbol in the first world. Even though there are some symbols, they are no longer playing a role as symbols, but, rather, as allegories or signs. According to Jung, such consciousness divested of living symbols should be transformed by being recharged by the energies of the unconscious working, for example, through dreams or fantasies which engage archetypal energies.

Through fantasy-thinking, directed thinking is brought into contact with oldest layers of the human mind, long buried beneath the threshold of consciousness.³⁹

The second world is filled with the unconscious energies but can lack the medium or form provided by the symbol which would carry such energy to consciousness and so make such energy available to consciousness in a disciplined manner. Jung puts it as follows,

It has no meaning whatever unless it strives against the resistance of instinct, just as undisciplined instincts would bring nothing but ruin to man if the symbol did not give them form.⁴⁰

The form should be built according to the collaboration between consciousness and the unconscious. Such collaboration can produce many possible forms which would be able to receive the unconscious.

The symbols it creates are always grounded in the unconscious archetype, but their manifest forms are moulded by the ideas acquired by the conscious.⁴¹

Symbolization can be done through the process of giving form to the energy which is flowing in the instinct. This energy is generally called libido. In the case of Freud, in his book, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, he defined the libido as sexuality. In the case of Adler, it is defined as power. Jung does not deny the sexual and the power aspect of libido, but he

does not agree with a narrow definition of the libido which equates it solely with sexuality or power.

Jung, in his earlier work, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, gave a general definition of libido as "psychic energy."⁴² Also, in relation to the modern physics, he gave his understanding of the libido as follows:

...the concept of libido in psychology has functionally the same significance as the concept of energy in physics since the time of Robert Mayer.⁴³

Thus, just as energy is natural to the world of physics, so is libido natural to the psyche. As Jung says,

The latter term [libido] denotes a desire or impulse which is unchecked by any kind of authority, moral or otherwise. Libido is appetite in its natural state. From the genetic point of view it is bodily needs like hunger, thirst, sleep, and sex, and emotional states or affects, which constitute the essence of libido.⁴⁴

Furthermore, Jung identifies his concept of libido with Schopenhauer's concept of will. According to Schopenhauer, the perception of the outside world is not the perception of the world itself but is "the manifestation of an inner will or desire;"⁴⁵ that is, just as alchemists project their own psyche into matter to transform that matter into gold, Schopenhauer sees the grasp of the outside world as a psychological movement into the world rather than a world movement into the psyche. This movement is recognized as "introjection" in philosophy. Through the process of introjection, the individual's world perception is interiorized and, at the same time, from the perspective of psychology, the physical world can be recognized as it is in itself when projections are withdrawn. In a word, Jung's concept of libido can

be understood as "an interpretation of the process of psychic energy, which we experience precisely in the form of an appetite."⁴⁶ Libido, thus understood, is not limited to specific areas such as sexuality, power, hunger and hatred. Rather, for Jung, libido is initially undetermined and can move in many directions, including those cited above. In his mature writing Jung came to understand the movement of libido to be toward that wholeness the experience of which he identified with religious experience.

As early as his groundbreaking work with Freud, Jung posited a power in the unconscious which he called "spirit", possibly the basis of his later conception of the self. "Spirit", thus understood, could transform sexual energies into more usable forms of energy through the formation of symbols, which effected the synthesis of the spiritual with the power of the sexual. In relation to the realm of religion, the energy could be shared in religious form, by the "spirit" as follows:

I readily admit that the creation of symbols could also be explained from the spiritual side, but in order to do so, one would need the hypothesis that the 'spirit' is an autonomous reality which commands a specific energy powerful enough to bend the instincts round and constrain them into spiritual forms.⁴⁷

In an extended sense the spirit came to mean the numinous energy grounded in the archetype which gave such overwhelming energy to religious symbols. As Jung clearly says,

The archetypes are the numinous, structural elements of the psyche and possess a certain autonomy and specific energy which enables them to attract, out of the conscious mind, those contents which are best suited to themselves.⁴⁸

If the libido is the raw energy for the formation of symbols, how does the energy transform itself into symbols? According to Jung there are four ways which enable the transformation of the libidinal energy into symbols.⁴⁹ The first one is through "comparison by analogy." As we have seen in the above discussion of various definitions of the libido, to Jung, the outside world is perceived as the projection or introjection of the libido. Many similar elements in the world are symbolized through analogy. For example, the concept of sun and fire as energy can be compared to the libido and thus they can be seen as symbolic representations of the libido.

The second one is through "causative comparison," which is concerned with objects. In causative comparison the libido is symbolized by its object, for example, the health-giving sun. The sun is symbolizing the aspect of health in relation to the libido.

The third one is the same as the second. However the elements or forms are not found in the outside world but in the body of the individual. For example, the libido is symbolized by the phallus or its analogue, the snake.

The fourth one is through "functional comparison." For example, the libido is able to be interpreted as the energy which shows fury like the bull, danger like the lion or boar, lustfulness like the ever-rutting ass and so on.

The four ways of symbolization have produced the limitless images of libido through various symbols. However, the various symbols can be perceived not as the expressions of many sources,

but those of a single source, the libido. Thus, in the light of psychology, it can be said that, in relation to religious symbols, the history of religious symbols is that of the libido. As Jung puts it,

these comparisons represent so many possible ways of symbolization, and for this reason all the infinitely varied symbols, so far as they are libido-images, can be reduced to a common denominator--the libido and its properties. This psychological simplification is in accord with the historical attempts of civilization to unify and simplify, in a higher synthesis, the infinite number of gods.⁵⁰

As I have indicated, the libido is always flowing in the unconscious and it is able to be canalized into the level of consciousness through the media or form of symbol. Here, the important thing which should be kept in mind, very carefully, is the fact that, to Jung, primarily, the transformed thing is not the flowing libido in the unconscious, but symbol itself. In other words, the conscious forms--symbols--are always changing according to "the intentionality of the libido."⁵¹ Due to this fact, if the libido is not properly canalized or carried into consciousness, the libido will be prevented from finding expression and will result in psychological suffering. Jung describes the blocking of libido in the following quotations:

What we call the 'blocking of libido' is, for the primitive, a hard and concrete fact: his life ceases to flow, things lose their glamour, plans, animals, and men no longer prosper...modern man, in the same situation, experiences a standstill ('I am stuck'), a loss of energy and enjoyment ('the zest-libido--has gone out of life'), or depression.⁵²

In order to overcome "the blocking of libido," symbols always

maintain the dynamic characteristics of symbols rather than the static dimension of signs. If libido is not reaching consciousness and the individual is undergoing what the primitives call loss of soul and moderns call depression, symbols can reconnect the individual with the libidinal unconscious by hearing its energies to consciousness for the purpose of its revitalization. In this sense the work of the symbol is always religious because it bears life's energies to consciousness. In fact, to Jung, the religious libido itself is trying to search for new religious forms according to the directions of the numen, "the specific energy stored up in the archetype."⁵³ Thus, the libido is not searching for outside objects as symbols which are not related to the inner forms as archetypes, but for the inner archetypal forms which give rise to new symbols in consciousness. Jung clearly outlines this point in the following paragraph,

We are thus forced to conclude that the external object simply **can not** be loved, because an overwhelming proportion of the libido prefers an internal object that rises up from the unconscious as 'a substitute for the missing reality.'⁵⁴

Religious symbols, especially, are laden with numinous energy, and so, as far as they maintain the character of the numinosity, they will preserve the conviction or the spontaneous will of the whole personality of the devotee. The experience of the numinosity would give an indescribable and a thorough possessive feeling to the devotee.

The symbol works by suggestion; that is to say, it carries conviction and at the same time expresses the content of that conviction. It is able to do this because of the numen, the specific energy stored up in

the archetype. Experience of the archetype is not only impressive, it seizes and possesses the whole personality, and is naturally productive of faith.⁵⁵

In a word, to Jung, consciousness is the living expression of the unconscious through symbol formation as a conscious form.

3. The Unconscious as the Matrix of Human Experience

1) The Personal Unconscious and Personal Experience

By examining Jung's early article titled "On the Importance of the Unconscious in Psychopathology" (1914), it can be shown that Jung concentrated his understanding of the unconscious in terms of the personal unconscious. As such, during his early period of study his understanding of the unconscious is almost the same as that of his mentor, Sigmund Freud. According to Freud, the unconscious is the suppressed consciousness of early childhood experience. To him, the unconscious is not formed from outside the boundary of personal experience but from early and personal experience. On the basis of the personal unconscious, Freud explained away the meaning of religious experience as an illusion in his book, The Future of an Illusion, as wishes compensating for the dissatisfaction of reality. Freud's research into the unconscious has strongly influenced the psychological school of "object relations," which is represented by such thinkers as Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Winnicott, Fairbain.⁵⁶ They share Freud's understanding of the unconscious as formed in early childhood

experience. Thus they also see the formation of the unconscious in relation to early experience, even though there is a difference in the age of the early experience between Freud and the others, and among themselves.

Jung's early understanding of the unconscious does not differ from the general understanding of the unconscious followed by the Freudian psychologists. According to Jung, "the conception of the unconscious is the sum of all psychic processes below the threshold of consciousness."⁵⁷ Furthermore, he insisted that "everything in the personality that is not contained in the conscious should be found in the unconscious."⁵⁸ He concretely defined the personal unconscious in his article titled "On the Psychology of the Unconscious."

The personal unconscious contains lost memories, painful ideas that are repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose), subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness. It corresponds to the figure of the shadow so frequently met with in dreams.⁵⁹

The personal unconscious is not inherited from somewhere outside of personal experience, but limited to the individual's own experience. According to Jung, the experience is confined mainly to that of "infancy." Thus, the personal unconscious is filled out in the process of the lifetime of an individual human being. In other words, the personal unconscious is that of "here and now." Furthermore, it is a private unconscious, and so it differs substantially according to each individual's personal experience. It can not be interpreted as general or homogeneous forms, ideas or

structures except for its interpretation as complexes. As Jung puts it,

...the contents of the personal unconscious are chiefly **the feeling-toned complexes...**; they constitute the personal and private side of psychic life.⁶⁰

Jung, furthermore, developed his understanding of the personal unconscious in relation to the idea of compensation⁶¹ as a Freudian psychologist, Melanie Klein did her idea of reparation.⁶² In other words, he was concerned with the idea in light of the function of the personal unconscious. To Jung, the concept of compensation is not spontaneously derived from the side of the conscious, but from that of the unconscious, because consciousness is the expression of the unconscious. However, the personal unconscious, in fact, has a past history as consciousness, because it is an experienced, forgotten consciousness. Thus, to Jung, the personal unconscious is not only a partial but significant influence on the consciousness, but also the suppressed expressions or suppressed consciousness of the infantile experience; that is, it is playing two roles as "receiver and sender" at the same time. These two roles are always maintaining their dynamic relationships. The role of "receiver" is mainly formed in the period of infancy even though Jung does not ignore the later period as Sigmund Freud and the psychologists of object-relations did and do. But the role of "sender" is that of compensation which fulfils a necessary quality lacking in consciousness.

Jung clearly describes the role of the personal unconscious as one of compensation in two ways. The first one is the description

of mental disease as being due to a disruptive invasion of consciousness by the unconscious. In this case, even though there is a failure of unconscious compensation, in reverse, the function of consciousness, which should be able to assimilate the rough invasion of the unconscious into the realm of consciousness, is not operating properly. In other words, this case is that of the absence of the indispensable function of consciousness; the psychoses are the representatives of this case. The second one is the case of consciousness extremely resisting the unconscious, and its preferred compensation towards wholeness. This case is not that of the over-explosion of the unconscious like the first one, but the state of blocking the unconscious with extremely resistant consciousness. The representative cases are those of the neurosis and mental diseases. Jung clearly indicated that modern Western consciousness was neurotic in this second sense.

Even though many modern dreams have shown that modern consciousness should be compensated by the unconscious in mental disturbances, the function of consciousness is still dominantly that of governing the psyche. However, the suppressed unconscious is always appearing in a "distorted" form, especially through dreams. As Jung puts it,

To sum up, one could say that the function of the unconscious in mental disturbances is essentially a compensation of the conscious content. But because of the characteristic one-sidedness of the conscious striving in all such cases, the compensating connectives are rendered useless. It is, however, inevitable that these unconscious tendencies will break through, but in adapting themselves to the one-sided conscious aims, it is possible for them to appear only in a distorted and unacceptable form.⁶³

Thus, to early Jung, to find out the meaning of life, the cure of soul, the most important thing is to maintain the dynamic "balance" between the conscious and the personal unconscious.

ii) The Collective Unconscious as the Matrix of Human Experience

Compared to other psychologists of his day, Jung's greatness lies in the fact that he discovered the realm of the collective unconscious as the most extended and deepest realm in the psyche. In fact, his discovery of the collective unconscious differentiates him from Freud's conception of the unconscious. As I have pointed out in the previous part of the present chapter, Freud's idea of the unconscious is limited to the boundary of the personal unconscious which means the early personal or private experience which is suppressed in an individual's life.⁶⁴ However, Jung's idea of the collective unconscious goes far beyond Freud's idea.

Jung amplified his idea of the collective unconscious, through his cross-cultural studies of psyche--the Native American Indian, the Black American, the white American and European, the Chinese, and the Indian--and through his study of alchemy and Gnosticism in the West, after he separated from his mentor, Sigmund Freud, and through his personal experience of the collective unconscious in the wake of his break with Freud.⁶⁵ His development of thought has contributed to the formation of his original idea of the collective unconscious.

Jung, in his short article titled "On the Psychology of the

Unconscious," in contrast to the definition of the personal unconscious, defined the unconscious as,

...an **impersonal** or **transpersonal unconscious** because it is detached from anything personal and is common to all men, since its contents can be found everywhere, which is naturally not the case with the personal contents.⁶⁶

In his article titled "The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," he also defined the collective unconscious as follows:

The collective unconscious, being the repository of man's experience and at the same time the a priori condition of this experience, is an image of the world which has taken aeons to form.⁶⁷

The collective unconscious is the sum of "the historical collective psyche" of humankind, as such each individual carries the potential history of humankind in his or her own psyche. In other words, individuals are in living connectedness spontaneously or unconsciously with the past collective experience of humankind. As Jung puts it,

In so far as through our unconscious we have a share in the historical collective psyche, we live naturally and unconsciously in a world of werewolves, demons, magicians, etc., for these are things which all previous ages have invested with tremendous affectivity.⁶⁸

In the same article, he gave us another general definition of the collective unconscious:

But this personal unconscious rests upon a deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn. This deeper layer I call the **collective unconscious**. I have chosen the term 'collective' because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. It is...identical in all men and thus constitute a common psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is

present in every one of us.⁶⁹

The collective unconscious is not the product of an individual's life experience, but is present at the moment of birth. Thus, the collective unconscious does not owe its existence to the individual's own experience, but to the previous experiences of humankind in history. As Jung says,

...the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity.⁷⁰

...there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited.⁷¹

Furthermore, due to the fact that the collective unconscious is essentially inherited, Jung developed the idea that it is instinctual.

...instincts are impersonal, universally distributed, hereditary factors of a dynamic or motivating character, which very often fail so completely to reach consciousness...Moreover, the instincts...are specifically formed motive forces which.. pursue their inherited goals.⁷²

Thus, as can be seen in his article titled "Concerning the Archetypes, With Special Reference to the Anima Concept" (1936), due to his strong confidence in the instinctual aspect of the collective unconscious, Jung does not agree that a newborn baby's mind is empty .

It is in any view a great mistake to suppose that the psyche of a new-born child is a **tabula rasa** in the sense that there is absolutely nothing in it. In so far as the child is born with a differentiated brain that is predetermined by heredity and therefore individualized, it meets sensory stimuli coming from outside not with any aptitudes, but with **specific** ones, and this necessarily

results in a particular, individual choice and pattern of apperception. These aptitudes can be shown to be inherited instincts and preformed patterns, the latter being the *a priori* and formal conditions of apperception that are based on instinct. Their presence gives the world of the child and the dreamer its anthropomorphic stamp.⁷³

Instinct is an essentially collective, i.e., universal and regularly occurring phenomenon which has nothing to do with individuality.⁷⁴

We now turn to address the relationship between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. Jung compares the relationship of the personal unconscious to the collective unconscious to the relationship between the individual and society. Just as the individual remains an individual in relation to wider society, so is the personal unconscious transcended or encompassed by the collective unconscious which remains transpersonal in relation to it. Furthermore just as the individual must, on occasion, bow to the demands of society, so also must the individual ego bow to the demands of the collective unconscious and especially to the power of the self which presides over the regulation and balance of psychic life in both its conscious and unconscious dimensions.

...our personal psyche bears the same relation to the collective psyche as the individual to society...just as the individual is not merely a unique and separate being, but is also a social being, so the human psyche is not a self-contained and wholly individual phenomenon, but also a collective one. And just as certain social functions or instincts are opposed to the interests of single individuals, so the human psyche exhibits certain functions or tendencies which, on account of their nature, are opposed to individual needs.⁷⁵

...the personal grows out of the collective psyche and is intimately bound up with it.⁷⁶

Jung does not ignore the social aspect of life because he does not ignore the collective aspect of psyche. Jung clearly says that human beings can not exist apart from social relationships the ego's relation to self and other are two faces of one process.

Self-knowledge is not an isolated process; it is possible only if the reality of the world around us is recognized at the same time. Nobody can know himself and differentiate himself from his neighbour if he has a distorted picture of him, just as no one can understand his neighbour if he had not a relationship to himself.⁷⁷

Of course, it does not mean that an individual is subordinated to society, because Jung fundamentally believed that society was the expression of the collective psyche, and that the individual is the only bearer of consciousness.

If the collective unconscious is primary in Jung's understanding of the unconscious, how is it possible to distinguish between the personal unconscious and the collective? Due to the spontaneity of the unconscious, it is very difficult to distinguish them. Jung, on occasion, tries to distinguish the personal from the collective unconscious according to the extent of the imbalance between consciousness and the unconscious. If the imbalance is limited to a few individuals, or it is a personal neurosis, it is personally compensated. However, if it is societal in extent, such imbalance is compensated by the collective unconscious, which then functions to generate a new myth or cause social disruption where such compensation is resisted or improperly assimilated.

So far as a neurosis is really only a private affair, having its roots exclusively in personal causes, archetypes play no role at all. But if it is a question of a general incompatibility or an otherwise injurious condition productive of neurosis in relatively large

numbers of individuals, then we must assume the presence of constellated archetypes. Since neuroses are in most cases not just private concerns, but **social** phenomena, we must assume that archetypes are constellated in this case too. The archetype corresponding to the situation is activated, and as a result those explosive and dangerous forces hidden in the archetype come into action, frequently with unpredictable consequences.⁷⁸

To summarize, just as the personal unconscious is playing two roles as "receiver and sender," the collective unconscious is playing the same roles. As the role of receiver, it carries the past experience of humankind and, at the same time, it is operating itself as the indicator of the possibility of the future.

The unconscious has a Janus-face: on one side its contents point back to a preconscious, prehistoric world of instinct, while on the other side it potentially anticipates the future--precisely because of the instinctive readiness for action of the factors that determine man's fate.⁷⁹

iii) The Concept of Archetype

a) Jung's Historical Understanding of Archetype

As I have said, Jung's greatness lies in his theory of the collective unconscious in the psyche. His theory of the collective dimension of the unconscious implicates the archetypes and their energies. These energies in turn are indispensable for his understanding of human religiousness. In a word, the idea of archetype, for Jung, points to the deepest level of the human psyche and at the same time identifies the origin of religious experience in the psyche. It is to the archetypal origin of religious experience in the psyche itself that Jung refers when he

writes of "...my demonstration of the psychic origin of religious experience."⁸⁰ It is to the same archetypal powers native to the psyche that Jung refers again when, in his Terry lectures, he appeals to "...facts which demonstrate the existence of an authentic religious function in the unconscious."⁸¹

However, as King Solomon declared in the Book of Ecclesiastics, "there is nothing new under the sun." The meaning of Solomon's saying can be applicable to Jung's idea of archetype. It means that Jung did not create his idea of the archetype **ex nihilo**. It had a certain precedent in the wisdom of humankind and in this sense it is not absolutely new and original.

In his analysis of the history of humankind, Jung shows that the idea of the archetype has been articulated by great sages and philosophers. Jung first used the term "archetype" in his early article, titled "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919).⁸² Before he adopted this term he had mainly used Burckhardt's term, "primordial image" (Urbild).⁸³ In the same article, Jung amplified his idea of archetype, historically, in relation to the philosophers of the West. According to him, the actual term "archetype" can be discovered in the work of Dionysius the Areopagite and the corpus Hermeticum.⁸⁴ For his Terry lectures at Yale University, Jung did his research more about the ancient concept of archetype used by Cicero and Pliny, quoting the corpus Hermeticum: "Thou knowest in thy mind the archetypal form (Τὸ ἀρχετυπὸν εἶδος), the beginning before beginning, the unbounded."⁸⁵ Furthermore, in ancient times, he found the idea in Plato's thought. Thus Jung could point to

philosophical precedents to his concept of archetype and insist that his psychology is not a metaphysically constructed idea⁸⁶ but based on psychic evidence he would call "empirical". According to Plato, the paradigm is the model from which the real world is imitated. The paradigm is the primary idea and the imitation of the paradigm is its expression. Jung implies that his psychology has revealed the empirical basis in the psychic archetype of Plato's paradigm or "eternal ideas". More, Jung reverses the Platonic dialectic in so much as Plato would flee the bodily world to the idea while Jung would argue that only in the world of embodied consciousness does the archetype realize itself.

In this discussion, after discussing Plato's paradigm, Jung introduces his research in medieval philosophy. He especially notes that he borrowed his idea of archetype from St. Augustine's idea of archetype.⁸⁷ He continues his historical survey with a brief discussion of the thought of Bacon (1561-1626) and Malebranche (1638-1715), even though Malebranche like Descartes reduced the archetype to a thought, whose thought he understands to be continuous with Plato's idea of paradigm.⁸⁸ He also explained that, in the scholasticism of Medieval times, archetypes were described as "natural images engraved on the human mind, helping it to form its judgments."⁸⁹ He quoted Herbert of Cherbury in order to show the idea of archetype in scholasticism as follows:

Natural instincts are expressions of those faculties which are found in every normal man, through which the common notions touching the internal conformity of things, such as the cause, means, and purpose of things, the good, bad, beautiful, pleasing, etc...are brought into conformity independently of discursive thought.⁹⁰

Furthermore, Jung describes Anselm's ontological proof of God as simply an expression of the experience of archetypes rooted in the psyche.⁹¹ Lastly, after finishing his sketchy research into medieval times, he explained the modern idea of the archetype in modern philosophy. In contrast to the ancient and medieval times, he discovered the deterioration of the idea of archetype in modern times. He found that the living metaphysical idea of archetype was changed, in the philosophy of Spinoza, into "a thought, and internal condition of cognition." According to Spinoza, the idea is "a conception of the mind which the mind forms by reason of its being a thinking being."⁹² Jung found, furthermore, that the process of the deterioration of the idea was clearly seen in the thought of Immanuel Kant, because Kant reduced the idea of archetype to "a limited number of categories of understanding."⁹³ Jung also appreciated Schopenhauer's idea of archetype. Even though Schopenhauer was corroborating the process of the deterioration as simply "Will", which was equivalent to archetype, Jung praised him because Schopenhauer introjected the Platonic sense into the idea of archetype in modern philosophy.⁹⁴ Against the early modern philosopher's understanding of archetype, Jung put much value in, a French philosopher, Henri Bergson's idea of "durée créatrice" and "élan vital" which means for Jung the "example of the revival of primordial image."⁹⁵

Jung, in his later article titled "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1936), tried to relate his idea of the archetype to modern ideas derived from anthropology, the study of

mythology and comparative religion. From the side of modern anthropology and the studies of mythology, he found the idea of "motifs" which could be equivalent to his own idea,⁹⁶ and discovered Lévy-Bruhl's idea of "representations collectives"⁹⁷ and Janet's idea of "l'abaissement du niveau mental".⁹⁸ In comparative religion, he found Hubert's and Mauss's idea of archetypes or "categories of imagination" and Adolf Bastian's idea of "elementary or primordial thoughts" to have affinity with his idea.⁹⁹

b) Nine Characteristics of the Archetype

Even though Jung saw precedents for his idea of archetype in the history of philosophy and anthropology, he was not satisfied with a metaphysically oriented study of archetype, and so he wanted to conduct his research more in the light of empirically oriented study. In other words, he tried to show the existence and the function of archetype empirically and psychologically. The most important thing to be kept in mind is the fact that Jung himself does not put much discussion on archetype itself but on the expressions of the archetype or the symbols. In this aspect, Jung's understanding is phenomenological and empirical, even though there are obvious metaphysical implications.

In his article "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1936), Jung showed three ways in which the existence of the archetype could be proved.¹⁰⁰ The first one is through the analysis of daily dreams. According to Jung, although the dreamer

himself or herself might have no personal knowledge of the historical precedents of archetypal motifs in dreams, through dream analysis it can be shown that these motifs continue to play a dominant role in the dreams of contemporaries. The second way of proving the existence of archetype is through the products of "active imagination", which means "a sequence of fantasies produced by deliberate concentration,"¹⁰¹ most effectively through the reactivation and amplification of what appears initially in dreams. Jung thought that, as dream analysis is the important means to go into the avenue of the archetype, analysis of fantasies is also an important access to archetypal images especially when such fantasies are keyed to dreams. The last way is through the analysis of paranoid delusions, fantasies in trance-states, and early childhood dreams (from the third to the fifth year). With these three means, among others, Jung devoted his whole life to understanding the complexities of the archetypes and their expressions. His understanding of the empirical basis of archetypal theory would thus include direct analysis of dreams and their amplification through active imagination and fantasy, all forms of neurotic and psychotic expression, as well as archetypal literatures and the religious traditions of all ages. On the basis of empirical research, Jung showed nine characteristics of the archetype.

First, in his article, titled "On the Psychology of the Unconscious," Jung begins by describing his understanding of archetype as Jacob Burckhardt's "primordial images." Of course, as

I said, Jung did not use the literal term, archetype but, instead, adopted Burckhardt's idea, primordial images. According to Jacob Burckhardt, the primordial images are "the inherited possibilities of human imagination" from immemorial times.¹⁰² Jung agreed with Burckhardt's definition of primordial images. Jung explained his idea of primordial image in relation to the idea of energy and its conservation which had been developed by nineteenth century physicist, Robert Mayer. Jung patterned his understanding of the flow of energy in the collective unconscious on Mayer's understanding of the law of the conservation of energy.¹⁰³ Thus for Jung there are powerful, fundamental, archetypal energies which archetypal symbols or primordial images carry into consciousness.

Jung linked his idea of energy within primordial images to his understanding of religious traditions. He especially had an appreciation of so called "primitive" religious traditions. This appreciation led him to criticize certain anthropological understanding of primordial religion which he thought devalued the archetypal expression to found in the primordial images in such religious traditions. Thus, he did not agree with anthropological approaches to primitive religious traditions that interpreted these traditions as pointing to something without rather than within the psyche.

These are the so-called dynamistic religions whose sole and determining thought is that there exists a universal magical power about which everything revolves. Taylor, the well-known English investigator, and Frazer likewise, misunderstood this idea as animism. In reality primitives do not mean, by their power-concept, souls or spirits at all, but something which the American investigator Lovejoy has appropriately termed 'primitive

energetics.' This concept is equivalent to the idea of soul, spirit, god, health, bodily strength, fertility, magic, influence, power, prestige, medicine, as well as certain states of feeling which are characterized by the release of affects.¹⁰⁴

In contrast to Taylor and Frazer, who, as positivists, understood the evolution of religious traditions hierarchically from the lower primitive forms to the higher and later development, Jung tried to understand all religious traditions as expressing primordial images. This understanding would undermine hierarchical theories of later religious expressions superseding more "primitive" expressions. Thus Jung's fundamental attitude toward religious traditions is very distinct from the general attitude of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries which was rooted in scientific or hierarchical evolutionary understanding of religious traditions.

If Jung does not agree with anthropological understanding of religious tradition which would locate the origin of religion beyond the participant, at least in the mind of the anthropologist, where does the archetypal basis of the primordial image originate? On this point Jung takes divergent positions. Thus he will argue that the archetypal basis of primordial imagery originates in the repeated experiences of human beings from time immemorial. As he puts it,

I have often been asked where the archetypes or primordial images come from. It seems to me that their origin can only be explained by assuming them to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity.¹⁰⁵

In this passage Jung argues that the archetypal basis of

primordial experience is itself formed by repeated experience. In this explanation repeated experience external to the individual when internalized becomes the major contributor to the formation of the archetype. But the external explanation of the origin of the archetype must be taken in conjunction with Jung's insistence on the internal priority of the archetype as giving rise to primordial experience. When addressing the priority of the archetype in the generation of archetypal energy and imagery Jung describes the archetype as a **facultas praeformandi**,¹⁰⁶ that is, as a faculty, formless in itself, but naturally vested with the energy which appears to consciousness in the limitless primordial and divine forms it generates. "As **a priori** conditions of all psychic events, they are endued with a dignity which has found immemorial expression in godlike figures."¹⁰⁷ The **a priori** nature of the archetype leads again to the question of their origin and at times Jung will revert to a causal and external explanation describing them as imprinted on the psyche as if by a divine imprinter.¹⁰⁸

Second, Jung also describes the archetype as psychoid. By this term he meant to convey the idea that they were unknowable in themselves, were present in the body, though not reducible to the physical, and were in some sense inherited. To this side of his understanding of archetype could be added his understanding of the archetype in its relation to history. Here Jung strives to show a karmic side to the archetypal in so much as the archetypes work for a human totality realized progressively in history. Consequently, where archetypal compensation fails in a prior age or culture, the

problems of that age become the burden or problem, for consecutive ages. This is true of personal life and collective history. Jung implies all of this when he writes:

This admixture is not a piece of unintentional obscurantism, but a deliberate extension of the archetype by means of the karmic factor, which is so very important in Indian philosophy. The karma aspect is essential to a deeper understanding of the nature of an archetype.¹⁰⁹

Jung, in relation to the concept of soul, also describes the karmic aspect of primordial images. Just as Buddhists or Hindus think that soul is always transmigrating through the process of human history, Jung thought that the primordial images functioned from time immemorial.

According to the old view, the soul itself is this power; in the idea of the soul's immortality there is implicit its conservation, and in the Buddhist and primitive notion of metempsychosis--transmigration of souls--is implicit its unlimited changeability together with its constant duration.¹¹⁰

Third, since Jung regards the archetypal dimension of the psyche as somehow eternal or operative from time immemorial he locates it in that transpersonal stratum of the collective psyche which transcends personal experience.

When fantasies are produced which no longer rest on personal memories, we have to do with the manifestations of a deeper layer of the unconscious where the primordial images common to humanity lie sleeping. I have called these images or motifs 'archetypes', also 'dominants' of the unconscious.¹¹¹

Fourthly, Jung thought that the nature of archetype is always in the state of producing in variation similar forms or images according to circumstances, as it was in the past; that is, it is always "ready" to produce a "form" to carry new contents according

to new situations. Jung outlines this as follows:

The archetype is a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas. Here it seems as though what is impressed upon the unconscious were exclusively the subjective fantasy--ideas aroused by the physical process. We may therefore assume that archetypes are recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions.¹¹²

The archetype itself is not filled with any content, but is just an empty form, according to Jung. It comes out in relation to the spirit of the age concerning it spontaneously. Thus the archetype itself is always in the state of "potentiality" which seeks its realization in consciousness. As he puts it in "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1936),

Endless repetition has engraved these experiences into our psychic constitution, not in the form of images filled with content, but at first only as **forms without content**, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action. When a situation occurs which corresponds to a given archetype, that archetype becomes activated and a compulsiveness appears, which, like an instinctual drive, gains its way against all reason and will, or else produces a conflict or pathological dimension, that is to say, a neurosis.¹¹³

The archetype itself, as we have seen, is an empty form which is "...nothing but a **facultas praeformandi**, a possibility of representation which is given a priori".¹¹⁴ Thus, it can be said that the unconscious forms are filled with potential conscious material or contents.

Archetypes are not determined as regards their contents, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience.¹¹⁵

Fifth, Jung thought of the idea of archetype as the source of

religious power or numinosity. According to Jung, the power of the archetype has a specific energy which can possess an individual's mind totally, irrespective of the resistant consciousness of the individual.

The archetype, as a glance at the history of religious phenomena will show, has a characteristically numinous effect, so that the subject is gripped by it as though by an instinct. What is more, instinct itself can be restrained and even overcome by this power...¹¹⁶

The archetype behind a religious idea has, like every instinct, its specific energy, which it does not lose even if the conscious mind ignores it.¹¹⁷

Sixth, in his article titled "Concerning Mandala Symbolism,"¹¹⁸ Jung thought that the archetype had the quality of "transconscious disposition." He discovered this quality after he examined the pictures of mandalas, including his patients' own pictures. According to Jung, then, the archetype, as an unconscious potential, in order to be perceived or experienced, had to cloth itself in a symbolic form.¹¹⁹ Symbolic expression of archetypal energies are always historically bound but at the same time reveal a trans-historical dimension. This means the archetypal expression or symbol originates in the archetypal stratum of the collective unconscious beyond the personal and historical but can be known only within personal and historical experience. Due to this fact, Jung thought that the archetype can only be known through the study of the symbols to which it gives birth as its expression in conscious and historical life.

I could produce many more pictures from all parts of the world, and he would be astonished to see how these symbols are governed by the same fundamental laws that can be observed in individual mandalas. In view of the

fact that all the mandalas shown here were new and uninfluenced products, we are driven to the conclusion that there must be a transconscious disposition in every individual which is able to produce the same or very similar symbols at all times and in all places. Since this position is usually not a conscious possession of the individual I have called it the collective unconscious, and, as the basis of its symbolical products, I postulated the existence of primordial images, the archetypes.¹²⁰

Seventh, Jung thought that the archetype is not a fixed psychic structure but "a living idea" which means a dynamic power. The archetype is not static and dry but is always demanding new expressions and realizations in relation to circumstances, that is, the archetypal image is always developing itself through the ceaseless transformations of symbolic forms. As Jung puts it,

The demand that arises under such conditions is for a new interpretation, in accord with the spirit of the age, of the archetypes that compensate the altered situation of consciousness...The archetype is a living idea that constantly produces new interpretations through which that idea unfolds.¹²¹

Eighth, Jung thought that the quality of archetype was very highly "intuitional" and "instinctual."

...We also find in the unconscious qualities that are not individually acquired but are inherited, e.g., instincts as impulses to carry out actions from necessity, without conscious motivation. In this "deeper" stratum we also find the **a priori**, inborn forms of "intuition", namely the archetypes of perception and apprehension, which are the necessary **a priori** determinants of all psychic processes. Just as his instincts compel man to specifically human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his ways of perception and apprehension into specifically human patterns. The instincts and the archetypes together form the "collective unconscious."¹²²

The collective unconscious, as the above quotation shows, is instinctual and formless. However, the collective unconscious is

structured by archetypes as potentialities for expressions in consciousness. As conscious behaviour is determined by instinct, the instinct is determined and formed by the thrust or telos of the archetype in the collective unconscious. Thus, the archetype's expression, the symbol is "the instinct's perception of itself," or "the self-portrait of the instinct."¹²³ Furthermore, the instinct made conscious in its symbolic expression becomes the object of intuition. As Jung says,

Just as conscious apprehension gives our action form and direction, so unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct. If we call instinct 'refined,' then the 'intuition' which brings the insight into play, in other words the apprehension by means of the archetype, must be something incredibly precise.¹²⁴

Finally, there are two functions of archetype. As I have said in the section of the collective unconscious, the formal contents of the collective unconscious, archetypes, are playing two roles as "receiver and sender." As a receiver, the archetype is playing a role to receive the inherited repeated experience from immemorial time on in order to make "formal" images. At the same time, as a sender or agent, the archetype is causing the production of the ever-repeated experiences in the present individual's psyche.

Not only are the archetypes, apparently, impressions of ever-repeated typical experiences, but, at the same time, they behave empirically like agents that tend towards the repetition of these same experiences. For when an archetype appears in a dream, in a fantasy, or in life, it always brings with it a certain influence or power by virtue of which it either exercises a numinous or a fascinating effect, or impels to action.¹²⁵

4 Individuation as the Way of Becoming Human.

1) The Generic Meaning of Individuation.

Jung clearly pointed out the modern problems of the West which were caused by the deterioration of traditional Western values, especially in the areas of philosophy and the Christian tradition. In contrast to the traditional role of philosophy as "a way of life," modern Western philosophy deteriorated into "an exclusively intellectual and academic exercise."¹²⁶ Likewise, Christian tradition no longer is strongly meaningful to modern Westerners. According to Jung, the statements of the Christian tradition no longer mediate or carry a religious meaning or power.

Behind the deterioration of traditional values, Jung located this problem in "the separation" of the individual's consciousness from its rootedness in the unconscious. This left the individual either removed from life's energies flowing from the unconscious or in danger of being overwhelmed by them when they erupted into personal or collective life.

The modern removal of the individual from the unconscious has produced a societal pathology of an intellectualism which severs reason's organic connectedness with the unconscious. In Christian tradition this pathological rationalism took the form of the separation of faith as an experience from the intellectual knowledge or content of Christian dogma. Jung thought that this phenomenon was discernible in theologies of demythologization. As Jung puts it,

Indeed, it is the theologians themselves who have recently made the attempt--no doubt as a concession to 'knowledge--to 'demythologize' the object of their faith while drawing the line quite arbitrarily at the crucial points. But to the critical intellect it is only too obvious that myth is an integral component of all religions and therefore can not be excluded from the assertions of faith without injuring them.¹²⁷

Jung, fundamentally, suggested that the best way to keep the separation from developing more, is to teach modern individuals to recover the experience of the unconscious. In other words, he wanted to help modern individuals experience the deep layer of the unconscious in their own psyche. This process was referred to as "individuation" which is itself a religious experience for Jung.

Individuation as understood by Jung is very different from the modern phenomenon of individualism. Individualism emphasized the selfish-ego features, ignoring the responsibility or obligations of the individual as a social being, but the task of individuation is to fulfill the individual's responsibility as a social being without throwing his or her self into society blindly. Jung clearly indicated the differences as follows:

Individualism means deliberately stressing and giving prominence to some supposed peculiarity rather than to collective conditions and obligations. But individuation means precisely the better and more complete fulfilment of the collective qualities of the human being, since adequate consideration of the peculiarity of the individual is more conducive to a better social performance than when the peculiarity is neglected or suppressed.¹²⁸

Thus, to Jung, individuation is "a process of psychological development that fulfils its individual qualities."¹²⁹ Without the subjective development of the individual which honours the uniqueness of the individual, it is impossible to change society.

The most important step towards individuation is to recognize the unconscious and realize the hidden self in the unconscious as the dominant archetype seeking realization in consciousness.

Individuation means becoming an 'individual,' and, in so far as 'individuality' embraces our inner most, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one's own self. We could therefore translate individuation as 'coming to selfhood' or self-realization.¹³⁰

In other words, individuation is the process of discovering the hidden and sometimes suppressed self in the unconscious which can be prevented from appearing for a variety of reasons including "the false wrappings of the persona."¹³¹ The persona was the product resulting from the compromise between the individual and society. Thus, the persona is a mask that everyone must wear in meeting the legitimate demands of society. But when an individual identifies with the personal they can lose their individuality to it and so identify totally with whatever role the collective asks them to play. Jung puts it as follows:

It is only because the persona represents a more or less arbitrary and fortuitous segment of the collective psyche that we can make the mistake of regarding it *in toto* as something individual. It is..only a mask of the collective psyche, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks.¹³²

Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be.¹³³

It does not mean that Jung ignored the social aspect of the human being's life. Jung always urged us to see the relationship between the individual and society. However, he did not agree with a society oriented individual but an individual oriented society.

The latter means that the individual is primary in relation to society. If the society is primary, the individual is unduly forced to put his or her persona on his or her self. In the case of putting on the social mask, persona, the individual can not develop the real process of individuation. Thus the unique and peculiar individuality should be maintained in relation to social life. For Jung, then, processes of individuation affected all relations from family to society to the human community itself.

The processes of the collective unconscious are concerned not only with the more or less personal relations of an individual to his family or to a wider social group, but with his relations to society and to the human community in general.¹³⁴

To Jung, the primary relation in process of individuation is that between the individual's consciousness and the self seeking realization in it. This primary relation is not in tension with the individual's relations with others beyond the psyche because the quality of the relation of the ego with the self is the ultimate determinant of the quality of the relation of the individual with others. Jung stressed the importance of the balance between consciousness and the unconscious as follows:

I am neither spurred on by excessive optimism nor in love with high ideals, but am merely concerned with the fate of the individual human being--that infinitesimal unit on whom a world depends, and in whom, if we read the meaning of the Christian message aright, even God seeks his goals.¹³⁵

How does the modern individual restore his or her own individuality? Jung suggested that the split between consciousness and the unconscious be united through the process of recovering a new centre of the whole personality--the self. To Jung, the

induction of the self into conscious life is the process of individuation. Furthermore, the process is that of moving to approximations of an ideal human being, where the ideal is one of becoming complete or whole. In this respect, the process is quite religious, in and of itself.

It was not easy for the human being to approach fuller realizations of the self in life. To realize the self, two archetypal powers in the psyche should be recognized: the power of the shadow and the reality of the anima or animus. These realities are the archetypes in the unconscious which possess peculiar powers to disturb or influence the ego in consciousness. However, they are frequently suppressed or ignored by the ego. The suppression is effective, to some extent, but is not healthy.

11) Shadow

Jung, first of all, approached the shadow from the perspective of morality. The shadow is usually suppressed by the ego of the personality. The shadow itself can not be conscious because it is in the unconscious. In order to become conscious of it, one should recognize that the shadow is the dark aspect. Without recognizing this it is impossible to seek for self-knowledge. The recognition of the shadow demands a lot of moral suffering because of the resistance against the shadow from the ego.

To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with

considerable resistance. Indeed, self-knowledge as a psychotherapeutic measure frequently requires much painstaking work extending over a long period.¹³⁶

The main reason why the ego is resistant against the shadow is due to the fact that "it represents first and foremost the personal unconscious, and its content can therefore be made conscious without too much difficulty."¹³⁷ The shadow, mainly, consists of personal "inferiorities" which,

reveals that they have an emotional nature, a kind of autonomy, and accordingly an obsessive or, better, possessive quality.¹³⁸

The inferiorities are affective or explosive when the resistance of the ego is weak and the ego loses the capability of moral judgment.

Affects occur usually where adaptation is weakest, and at the same time they reveal the reason for its weakness, namely a certain degree of inferiority and the existence of a lower level of personality. On this lower level with its uncontrolled or scarcely controlled emotions one behaves more or less like a primitive, who is not only the passive victim of his affects but also singularly incapable of moral judgment.¹³⁹

In cases where the ego can no longer contain the personal shadow, the individual can project the shadow onto another person. This projection amounts to an immoral demeaning of its recipient on the part of the projecting individual.

Jung understood the negative aspects of the shadow but at the same time he did not overlook the positive aspects of the shadow. As he puts it,

...the unconscious man, that is, his shadow, does not consist only of morally reprehensible tendencies, but also displays a number of good qualities, such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative impulses, etc.¹⁴⁰

Jung especially insisted that creative thinking comes from the

shadow. "The really creative thing in man always comes from the place where you least expect it, from the small thing the inconspicuous thing. Hence the shadow is a very important part of man."¹⁴¹

Jung also indicated the collective aspect of the shadow in the collective unconscious. Jung has shown the double aspects--evil and greed--in human nature. They are inherent in human nature, and they can be easily experienced because they are usually personal.

Human nature is capable of an infinite amount of evil, and the evil deeds are as real as the good ones so far as human experience goes and so far as the psyche judges and differentiates between them.¹⁴²

Jung referred to the personal aspect of the shadow as "relative" evil. However, he also refers in one instance to the depths of the shadow in the collective unconscious where its archetypal power makes it perceived in one's person and in human nature but the absolute shadow or evil is rare and if experienced the experience is very powerful according to Jung.

In other words, it is quite within the bounds of possibility for a man to recognize the relative evil of his nature, but it is a rare and shattering experience for him to gaze into the face of absolute evil.¹⁴³

Jung, furthermore, developed his understanding of absolute evil in relation to the Christian tradition. In doing this Jung appeals to the heretical lost part of the Christian tradition on evil, through his study of the Christian understanding of evil as developed by St. Augustine. According to Augustine, evil is not substantial but the lack of good. Thus, Augustine established the basic understanding of evil as the "privatio boni", and later the

Christian tradition accepted Augustine's understanding as orthodox.

Against the traditional understanding of evil as the shadow, Jung suggested his own understanding from the perspective of psychology. His understanding is very similar to that of the Gnostics. In contrast to the Church fathers, the Gnostics understood evil as having its own substantial reality from their perspective of psychic or spiritual experience. For example, "...the thought was that Christ cast off his shadow from himself."¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, Jung understood Jesus Christ in relation to the anti-Christ. As he puts it,

The antichrist develops in legend as a perverse imitation of Christ's life. He is...an imitating spirit of evil who follows in Christ's footsteps, a shadow following the body.¹⁴⁵

To some extent, Jung's understanding is very similar to Freud's except for the positive aspect of shadow and the collective shadow. While recognition of the shadow which has been suppressed is the first step towards curing the soul in the case of Freud, to Jung, it is the first step in the process of individuation. However, the main difference between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung lies in the fact that, for Freud, the power of the shadow can be controlled by the power of reason, while, for Jung, the power can not be controlled by reason alone but with the aid of the self, a power manifest in world religious traditions. Here, when Jung referred to the self's higher authority as religious in nature, he is not referring to doctrinal affirmation but to the experience of the numinosity of the self, which can control evil.

Freud's efforts to bring the shadow to consciousness are

the logical and salutary answer to the almost universal unconsciousness and projection-proneness of the general public. It is as though Freud, with sure instinct, had sought to avert the danger of nation-wide psyche epidemics that threatened Europe. What he did not see was that the confrontation with the shadow is not just a harmless affair that can be settled by 'reason'. The shadow is the primitive who is still alive and active in civilized man and our civilized reason means nothing to him. He needs to be ruled by a higher authority, such as is found in the great religions. Even when reason triumphed at the beginning of the French Revolution, it was quickly turned into a goddess and enthroned in Notre Dame.¹⁴⁶

Thus the fundamental step to avoid the evil of either projecting the shadow or being possessed by it unconsciously is first to perceive it in oneself and then assimilate it into consciousness transforming it from an unconscious enemy into a conscious ally and resource. Jung, in his Dream Analysis: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1928-1930, clearly indicated that the rejection of the shadow was not healthy psychologically.

If you get rid of qualities you do not like by denying them, you become more and more unaware of what you are, you declare yourself more and more non-existent, and your devils will grow fatter and fatter.¹⁴⁷

iii) Anima and Animus

Whereas the shadow usually appears to consciousness in dreams as the same sex as the subject, anima and animus manifest in dreams as the opposite sex. According to Jung, every human being has a contra-sexual archetype in his or her own unconscious. In the case of men, there is a feminine power in his unconscious. Likewise, women have a masculine power in their unconscious. These opposite factors are hidden in the unconscious. They are not formed through

the process of life but are given to or inherited by all human beings. Because of their nature as given as **a priori**, they are revealed as archetypes of the masculine image or the feminine image in the unconscious.

It is quite natural for the individual to choose his or her love as a projection of the anima or animus. Thus, to the extent they remain unconscious of the power of the anima, men can unconsciously relate to women as externalizations of the anima as can women to men as externalizations of the animus. This is a general description of how anima and animus work in sponsoring male-female love relations. Such projections can also have negative connotations when a male's anima leads him to project negatively onto women or a woman's animus leads her to project negatively onto men. Such projections account for much of the enmity between the sexes. Generally, most human beings do not consciously recognize the presence of the contra-sexual archetype in the unconscious, except in projection and so it is difficult to realize the process of individuation as inner process. As with shadow assimilation the recognition and conjunction with the inner contra-sexual is another necessary step in processes of individuation. If the recognition, differentiation and conscious appropriation does not occur, the individual risks being possessed by the contra-sexual power of one's own psyche. In order for an individual to individuate, the individual should consciously relate to his or her own anima or animus. As Jung puts it,

Just as, for the purpose of individuation, of self-realization, it is essential for a man to distinguish

between what he is and how he appears to himself and to others, so it is also necessary for the same purpose that he should become conscious of his invisible system of relations to the unconscious, and especially of the anima, so as to be able to distinguish himself from her.¹⁴⁸

The anima and the animus usually project themselves in male and female relationships. They appear in dreams, visions and fantasies. When a male dreamer dreams, the anima appears in the dream as a woman; the same is true, in reverse, for the female. They are not inventions of consciousness but spontaneous productions of the unconscious.

The main reason why such personified forms appear in dreams or visions, is to compensate or balance the present nature of the psyche. In the case that an individual has a strong masculine nature, in his dream the anima comes to compensate his masculine oriented nature. In the case of the woman, the animus comes to compensate her feminine oriented nature. Through the analysis of the personified forms, individuals should change their personality to maintain the balance between the conscious personality and the unconscious anima or animus, in a movement toward conscious androgyny.

Jung, furthermore, developed his idea of the anima and the animus in relation to the idea of eros and logos. Men possess a well developed function of logos and women a well developed function of eros. In order to integrate the unconscious qualities of eros (in the case of men) and logos (in the case of women), the consciousness of the individual should develop the unconscious qualities. Though these values may be culturally determined,

Jung's basic point is that, however defined, masculinity and femininity must unite in the realization of the self in both genders. As Jung puts it:

Thus the animus is a psychopomp, a mediator between the conscious and unconscious and personification of the latter. Just as the anima becomes, through integration, the eros of consciousness, so the animus becomes a logos; and in the same way that the anima gives relationship and relatedness to a man's consciousness, the animus gives to woman's consciousness a capacity for reflection, deliberation, and self-knowledge.¹⁴⁹

However, the anima and the animus also have the negative characters as when they function as the basis of the negative projections on women by men or on men by women. The positive qualities work as the source of love and the negative as the source of hatred between the sexes. He outlines this as follows:

Presumably this situation is grounded on instinct and must remain as it is to ensure that the Empedoclean game of the hate and love of the elements shall continue for all eternity. Nature is conservative and does not easily allow her courses to be altered; she defends in the most stubborn way the inviolability of the preserves where anima and animus roam.¹⁵⁰

Jung does not limit his understanding of the anima and the animus to the realm of the personal unconscious. Anima and animus can give rise to images of male or female gods and goddesses, and in certain mythologems to the idea of love making with deity in the service of individuation. But even when the anima and the animus are working at the personal level they transcend personal consciousness and can easily take it into their service. Thus in his discussion of the marriage quaternio¹⁵¹ Jung distinguishes six levels of reciprocity in any anima-animus relation; the relation between the masculine subject and the feminine subject; the

relation between the masculine subject and his own anima; the relation between the feminine subject and her animus; the relation between his anima and her animus; the relation between the masculine subject and the feminine subject's animus; and the relation between the feminine subject and the masculine subject's anima.

The anima and the animus are always vested with numinous powers. Thus, the anima was expressed through the feminine deities and the animus through the masculine deities. As he puts it,

Although, to begin with, we meet the anima and animus in their negative and unwelcome form, they are very far from being only a species of bad spirit. They have, . . . , an equally positive aspect. Because of their numinous, suggestive power, they have formed since olden times the archetypal basis of all masculine and feminine divinities and therefore merit special attention, above all from the psychologist, but also from thoughtful laymen. As numina, anima and animus work now for good, now for evil. Their opposition is that of the sexes.¹⁵²

His reflection on the nature of the anima and the feminine so deeply embedded in the psyche was a major factor in moving Jung to a quaternitarian understanding of God. He was struck by the fact that the symbol of the Trinity in the Christian tradition was divested of the feminine, the bodily or material, and the demonic. It should be noted that here he links the feminine, demonic and bodily only through what they share in common, exclusion from the one-sidedly spiritual symbol of the Christian God, the Trinity.¹⁵³ Though Jung can understand the need for a religion such as Christian tradition providing much needed spiritual compensation to the society it entered, Christian tradition's one-sidedness is, in his opinion currently the object of the compensation the

unconscious now profers to individuals and society in the West.

The absence of what was so evidently real in creation in the Christian symbol of the creator drove Jung to reconceive the creative power as the great Goddess in whom all the opposites would be latent, then differentiated in historical processes through the discriminatory power of reason and united in that consciousness toward which the psyche naturally moved in processes of individuation. In a radical extension of the Christian understanding of eschatological completion Jung would envision the psyche moving to a wholeness in which such opposites as male-female, Christ-Satan and body-spirit would be united in a **complexio oppositorum** or an **apocastastasis** which Jung consciously relates to Origen's conception.¹⁵⁴

In this manner the desacralization or devaluation of the body, the demonic and the feminine, would be overcome in a Goddess religion. Effectively she would symbolize the unconscious as the source of all opposites which demands their differentiation and synthesis in history. All of this is implied when Jung writes:
As he put it,

...the unconscious is often personified by the anima, a feminine figure. Apparently the symbol of the quaternity issues from her. She would be the matrix of the quaternity, a θεοτόκος or **Mater Dea**, just as the earth was understood to be the mother of God. But since woman, as well as evil, is excluded from the Deity in the dogma of the Trinity, the element of evil would form part of the religious symbol if the latter should be a quaternity.¹⁵⁵

Furthermore, Jung studied the aspect of anima in his cross-cultural studies. He especially had much interest in classical

Chinese philosophy. In his article, titled "Concerning the Archetypes, With Special Reference to the Anima Concept" (1936), he identified the concept of "P'o or Kuei" of Chinese philosophy with the concept of anima.¹⁵⁶ According to him, P'o or Kuei are playing a role of anima as, "the feminine and chthonic part of the soul" in Chinese classical philosophy.¹⁵⁷ He, also, found the concept of anima in the two principles of cosmos: Yang and Yin. He identified the role of Yin as that of anima.¹⁵⁸

To summarize, to Jung, in general, the anima and animus were "the personification of the unconscious" and, at the same time, the functional bridge between consciousness and the unconscious. In other words, to Jung, the conscious assimilation of the positive energies of anima and animus is the indispensable step towards the wholeness of the personality. As Jung concluded his understanding,

Therefore, anyone who wants to achieve the difficult feat of realizing something not only intellectually, but also according to its feeling-value, must for better or worse come to grips with the anima/animus problem in order to open the way for a higher union, a **coniunctio oppositorum**. This is an indispensable prerequisite for wholeness.¹⁵⁹

iv) Self

To Jung, the integration of the shadow, and the psychic marriage of the ego with the anima/animus is worked by the self as the process by which the self is actualized or realized consciousness. Thus, the ideal image of the human being is the individual who has discovered the hidden treasure in the

unconscious--the "self" and made it conscious. Jung, generally, sees the conscious process of individuation--towards searching for the wholeness of the self--as beginning later in life. This understanding of the self as profering the experience of wholeness is very religious and the most important concept of Jung's total psychology. Jung's psychological understanding of self can be summarized as follows.

Jung gives a mature description of self in his later work, Mysterium Coniunctionis. Here he described the process of individuation as that of discovering the self in relation to the study of alchemy. The self is "the hypothetical summation of an indescribable totality, one half of which is constituted by ego-consciousness, the other by the shadow."¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the self makes itself known intuitively and is a composite of ego-consciousness, shadow, anima/animus, and collective unconscious. In a word, the self, to Jung, is the synthesis between thesis and anti-thesis--or between conscious and unconscious in consciousness as the "coincidentia oppositorum."¹⁶¹

As many religious ideas are fundamentally dialectical or non-rational from the perspective of the human being, Jung's idea of self, too, is very dialectical and non-rational. Due to this fact, Jung's idea of self is also religious. The self is a "numinous" and "universal" quality. As he puts it,

...there is no ground for the assumption that human beings in other epochs produced fantasies for quite different reasons, or that their fantasy images sprang from quite different *idées forces*, from ours ...at least the universal human facts were felt and thought about in very much the same way at all times.¹⁶²

Jung defined "self" "as the totality of the conscious and unconscious psyche, but this totality transcends our vision; it is a veritable lapis invisibilitatis."¹⁶³ However, just as Kant's idea of Ding an Sich can not be known in itself, except for the phenomenological understanding of it in the phenomena, likewise, Jung's idea of self can not be known in itself either but only in its symbol expression in consciousness. The power of the self becomes conscious throughout the individual's lifetime. Even though it is experienced progressively in the world of consciousness, it can not be exhaustively realized because it remains transcendent to whatever degree it is realized in consciousness. For Jung individuation can only be approximated but never completed. As Jung said,

The totality can only be experienced in its parts and then only in so far as there are contents of consciousness; but qua totality it necessarily transcends consciousness.¹⁶⁴

He approached the study of alchemy from the perspective of psychology, that is, he did not take it literally. This is very important for understanding the meaning of the archetype of the self in Jung's thought. Jung, fundamentally, thought that the alchemist's goal was not the chemical transformation of lead into gold but the transformation of the matter of the unconscious, the **prima materia**, into the gold of the self made real in consciousness, the **aurum non vulgus**.

Jung, furthermore, described the alchemist's understanding of matter in relation to the understanding of the sacraments (bread and wine) in Catholicism. As the priest derived the sacraments

from the imperfect created materials by pronouncing his sacred words, the alchemist, also, derived the substance of gold from the matter of his unconscious. In relation to the sacraments, Jung interpreted the process of the sacraments not in the light of transforming matter into sacred matter (bread and wine into Christ or lead to gold) but of deriving or redeeming the sacred matter of the self from the unconscious, that is, Jung thought that through the process of psychological participation in the matter by the priest or the alchemist, the imprisoned sacred or the self would be liberated from **prima materia** in the unconscious. Furthermore, the redemption of the sacred self or gold is accomplished through the process of projecting the participant's (the alchemist's or devotee's) own archetypal self or divinity upon the chemical matter or the bread and wine.

Due to the psychological interpretation of the sacrament or of alchemy, Jung thought that the redemption of gold or the self is the liberation of the individual investigator's or devotee's archetypal experience from its immersion in the unconscious often with pathological consequences. In other words, the gold (God) should be liberated from the unconscious to consciousness through the media of chemical matter (in the case of the alchemist) and sacraments (in the case of the devotee). As Jung puts it,

For the alchemist, the one primarily in need of redemption is not man, but deity who is lost and sleeping in matter. Only as a secondary consideration does he hope that some benefit may accrue to himself from the transformed substance as the panacea, the **medicina Catholica**, just as it may to the imperfect bodies, the base or 'sick' metals, etc. His attention is not directed to his own salvation through God's Grace, but to

the liberation of God from the darkness of matter. By applying himself to this miraculous work he benefits from its salutary effect, but only incidently. He may approach the work as one in need of salvation, but he knows that his salvation depends on the success of the work, or whether he can free the divine soul.¹⁶⁵

Even though, to Jung, the misconceived false physical aim of alchemy lies in the fact of finding "the gold, the panacea, the elixir of life" through the transformation of matter, the spiritual aim is "the rebirth of the (spiritual) light from the darkness of physis: healing self-knowledge and deliverance of the pneumatic body from the corruption of the flesh."¹⁶⁶

He also described the qualities of self in relation to the mandala. The centre of the mandala is the expression of the self or the divine in the unconscious.

The mandala symbolizes, by its central point, the ultimate unity of all archetypes as well as of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world, and is therefore the empirical equivalent of the metaphysical concept of a **unus mundus**.¹⁶⁷

Jung, furthermore, saw the centre of the mandalas, as divine which the ego was called to approach but with which it should never identify. The centre had the 'religious' power which is able to draw everything into its boundary and which relates to everything.

That psychological fact which wields the greatest power in your system functions as a god, since it is always the overwhelming psychic factor that is called 'God.'¹⁶⁸

Thus, to Jung, the centre of the mandala is not the ego which is the centre of the consciousness. It does not mean that the centre ignores the realm of the ego but takes it into its service in order to preserve it from the disintegration or explosion of the unconscious. As he puts it,

Thus the mandala denotes and assists exclusive concentration on the centre, the self. This is anything but egocentricity. On the contrary, it is a much needed self-control for the purpose of avoiding inflation and dissociation.¹⁶⁹

The representation of the self in the mandala shows the "propaedeutic action" of the self and remains always the mere anticipation of its realization."¹⁷⁰ In other words, the Mandala symbolizes the formation of order from disorder or of cosmos from chaos. The world of order or cosmos is not easily achieved, and so occasionally the self will take serious efforts to realize it. Through the process of such efforts, the unity is formed not in the outside world but the inside world which is the ultimate ground of life.

The creation of unity by a magical procedure meant the possibility of effecting a union with the world--not with the world of multiplicity as we see it but with a potential world, the eternal ground of all empirical being, just as the self is the ground and origin of the individual personality past, present, and future.¹⁷¹

Further, in his article, "The Development of Personality" (1932), Jung developed his idea of the self in relation to Chinese philosophy; that is, he correlates the undiscovered treasure in the psyche with "the interior way 'Tao'."¹⁷² In classical Chinese philosophy, the concept of Tao is not an abstract or dry concept but a living concept. As the water is flowing according to the natural way, the Tao is moving towards its goals without any resistance. This idea, also can be correlated with that of Atman in Indian philosophy. Jung also articulated the same idea in his book Aion, in relation to experience. As Tao and Atman are not, ultimately, metaphysical concepts, likewise, the concept of self is

not abstract either; it is the result of the archetypal experience of wholeness which occurs spontaneously in the unconscious. As he puts it,

Like the related idea of Atman and Tao in the East, the idea of the self is at least in part a product of cognition, grounded neither on faith nor on metaphysical speculation but on the experience that under certain conditions the unconscious spontaneously brings forth an archetypal symbol of wholeness. From this we must conclude that some such archetype occurs universally and is endowed with a certain numinosity.¹⁷³

Jung further developed the idea of self through his psychological study of Jesus Christ and the images of God in the Christian tradition. Jung did not deny the historical basis of the myth that grew around the personage of Jesus. Rather Jung addressed the phenomenon of the Christ event from his preferred perspective, that of the symbolic meaning of the event and the myth it generated. Against contemporary scientific historicism, Jung studied the Christ figure as a symbol of the self whose parallels could be discovered in other religious traditions beyond Christian tradition. He outlined this fact clearly in his book, Psychology and Alchemy.

The accent has always fallen on the "historicity" of the Saviour's life, and because of this its symbolical nature has remained in the dark, although the Incarnation formed a very essential part of the **symbolon** (creed). The efficacy of dogma, however, by no means rests on Christ's unique historical reality but on its own symbolic nature, by virtue of which it expresses a more or less ubiquitous psychological assumption quite independent of the existence of any dogma. There is thus a 'pre-Christian' as well as a 'non-Christian' Christ, in so far as he is an autonomous psychological fact.¹⁷⁴

This is not surprising since even today most of us have not got round to understanding Christ as the psychic reality of an archetype, regardless of his historicity.

I do not doubt the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth, but the figure of the Son of man and of Christ the Redeemer has archetypal antecedents. It is these that form the basis of the alchemical analogies.¹⁷⁵

The main reason that Jung emphasized the archetypal aspect of Jesus Christ does not lie in his criticism of the historical reality but in the fact that he wanted to show the symbolic truth of the Christ figure's life in the movement from death to resurrection which truth, for Jung, describes archetypal processes of psychic death and renewal. As he puts it,

The life of Christ is understood by the Church on the one hand as an historical, and on the other hand as an eternally existing mystery. This is especially evident in the sacrifice of the mass. From a psychological standpoint this view can be translated as follows: Christ lived a concrete, personal, and unique life which, in all essential features, had at the same time an archetypal character.¹⁷⁶

Jung also developed his psychological understanding of Jesus Christ as a symbol of self in his book, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self. There, he saw Jesus Christ as "the cultural hero who..., embodies the myth of the divine Primordial Man, the Mystic Adam, and the centre of the Christian Mandala."¹⁷⁷ To Jung, Jesus Christ was the example of the self-archetype. That is, Christ represents

a totality of a divine or heavenly kind, a glorified man, a son of God **sine macula peccati**, unspotted by sin.¹⁷⁸

Jung sought historical precedent and so validation for his understanding of Christ as a symbol of the self from the Christian tradition. He especially found a similar interpretation of Christ from Origen (184-254) and St. Augustine (354-430). According to

Origen, the image of God (the *imago Dei*) is not imprinted on the physical body but on the soul of the human beings. The image of the human being is not a directly imprinted image from God but the image of Christ's image from God.¹⁷⁹ Thus, to Origen, Christ only received the image of God. Human beings get an image from Christ, "after whose likeness our inner man is made, invisible, incorporeal, incorrupt, and immortal."¹⁸⁰ St. Augustine, also, distinguishes God's direct image--Christ--and the image of the human being "which is implanted in man as a means or possibility of becoming like God."¹⁸¹

As Jesus Christ fulfilled his image of God through the process of redemption--going to hell, returning to earth and going to heaven--which symbolizes the universal process of totality or wholeness, likewise, the process of individuation is that of integration between consciousness and the unconscious which means the restoration of "the image of Christ," in terms of Origen and Augustine. Jung discovered that originally the images of God embodied in Christ and human beings were "all-embracing totality that even includes the animal side of man."¹⁸²

As I have said earlier, Jung thought of the process of individuation as a religious process and saw the consequential production of the individuation process as the self. The self, to Jung, is the image of God. Thus the ultimate goal of individuation is the production of the image of God within, through experience of numinosity. What one should be careful to remember, for Jung's understanding of the image of God, is the fact that Jung did not

proclaim the image of God as "God himself." Jung only indicated that the self is an indication of the image of God psychologically

It would be a regrettable mistake if anybody should take my observation as a kind of proof of the existence of God. They prove only the existence of an archetypal God-image, which to my mind is the most we can assert about God psychologically.¹⁸³

Due to his psychological understanding of the image of God as the self, his understanding is different from the theological or metaphysical understanding, though he appreciates Anselm's ontological argument. Jung did not try to prove the existence of God from the perspective of the traditional arguments in theology and philosophy, even though Jung's understanding can not be fully outside the metaphysical realm. His statement in Psychology and Alchemy would clarify my statement of his understanding.

Accordingly when I say as a psychologist that God is an archetype, I mean by that the 'type' in the psyche. The word 'type' is, as we know, derived from (τύπος), 'blow' or 'imprint';, thus an archetype presupposes an imprinter. Psychology as the science of the soul has to confine itself to its subject and guard against overstepping its proper boundaries by metaphysical assertions or other professions of faith.¹⁸⁴

Jung thought that the process of individuation can not be accomplished with the help of others but must be achieved only by one's self. Thus, Jung describes it as a rigorous and lonely process in his book Alchemical Studies.

...the goal of the philosophical alchemist was higher self-development, or what I would call individuation. This goal confronts the alchemist at the start with the loneliness which all of them feared, when one has 'only' oneself for company. The alchemist, on principle, worked alone. He formed no school. This rigorous solitude...was sufficient to activate the unconscious and, through the power of imagination, to bring into being things that apparently were not there before.¹⁸⁵

In his article titled "The Significance of the Unconscious in Individual Education," (1925), Jung put much value on education, focusing on the discovery of individuality or self-development. He identified three kinds of education.¹⁸⁶ The first one is education through the ideal model or example. The second one is the one through "the given rules, principles and methods;" Jung called this education "collective education." He thought that the two educations were very important to train the human being, but, at the same time, discovered that they were not sufficient enough to restore the individuality of the human being. So he suggested a third kind of education--individual education. It is focused on respecting the uniqueness of each individual, as he emphasizes in the following quote:

...all rules, principles, and systems must be subordinated to the one purpose of bringing out the specific individuality of the pupil. This aim is directly opposed to that of collective education, which seeks to level out and make uniform.¹⁸⁷

ENDNOTES: CHAPTER TWO

1. Edar Sheffield Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p.413.
2. C.G. Jung, "Psychology and Religion" in CW, 11, p. 7.
3. ibid.
4. C.G. Jung, "The Undiscovered Self" (1957) in CW, 10, p. 256.
5. ibid., p. 258.
6. ibid.
7. ibid., p. 257.
8. ibid.
9. ibid., p. 258.
10. ibid.
11. C.G. Jung, Symbols of Transformation, CW, 5, p. 232.
12. ibid.
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
15. ibid.
16. C.G. Jung "The Undiscovered Self" (1957) in CW, 10, p. 265.
17. C.G. Jung, "Psychology and Religion" in CW, 11, p. 8.
18. ibid., p. 9.
19. ibid., p. 12.
20. ibid., p. 32.
21. ibid.
22. ibid., p. 61.
23. ibid., p. 74.
24. ibid., p. 50.
25. G.C. Jung, op.cit., CW, 5, p. 259.

26. C.G. Jung, "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass" (1942) in CW, 11, p. 258.
27. C.G. Jung, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, CW, 9ii, p. 3.
28. ibid.
29. ibid.
30. C.G. Jung, "Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation" (1939) in CW, 9i, p. 283.
31. C.G. Jung, op.cit., CW, 9ii, p. 6.
32. ibid., p. 7.
33. ibid., p. 3.
34. ibid.
35. C.G. Jung, Symbols of Transformation, CW, 5, p. 28.
36. ibid.
37. ibid., p. 19.
38. ibid., p. 28.
39. ibid., p. 29.
40. ibid., p. 228.
41. ibid., p. 232.
42. ibid., p. 135.
43. ibid., p. 131.
44. ibid., pp. 135-136.
45. ibid., p. 136.
46. ibid., p. 137.
47. ibid., p. 228.
48. ibid., p. 232.
49. ibid., p. 97.
50. ibid.

51. ibid., p. 137.
52. ibid., p. 170.
53. ibid., p. 232.
54. ibid., p. 175.
55. ibid., p. 232.
56. For a general introduction to objective relations, see Jay R. Greenberg and Stephen A. Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory (Massachusetts, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
57. C.G. Jung., "On the Importance of the Unconscious in Psychopathology" (1914) in CW, 3, p.204.
58. ibid.
59. C.G. Jung, "On the Psychology of the Unconscious" (1917) in CW, 7, p. 66.
60. C.G. Jung, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious" (1934) in CW, 9i, p.4.
61. C.G. Jung, op.cit., CW, 3, p. 206.
62. Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt, and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (London: Hogarth Press, 1975), pp. 311-312 and pp. 342-343., and C. Fred Alford, Melanie Klein an Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art, and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), see especially Chapter Five, "Reason and Reparation", and Chapter Six, "Reparation and Civilization".
63. C.G. Jung, "On the Importance of the Unconscious in Psychopathology" (1914) in CW, 3, p. 210.
64. Certain of Freud's works suggest a Jungian-like archetypal dimension of the psyche, such as the prevalence of the Oedipal myth, its ritual reenactment, and his late reference to humanity's "memory trace". Cf. S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London, Hogarth Press, 1969), p. 6. However, his discounting of the oceanic feeling in section one of this late work indicates an acknowledged insensitivity to and rejection of the experience of the Great Mother which grounds Jung's CW 5. This work served to differentiate Jung from Freud throughout the remaining lifetime of both and became Jung's first expression of the reality and power of the collective unconscious. To imply that Freud was open to such a dimension of the psyche would

be to ignore this key section of Civilization and Its Discontents and to imply that Freud's understanding of the psyche needs completion by Jung's. Such an implication could be an imposition and is beyond the scope of this thesis.

65. Especially see the chapter titled as "Confrontation with the Unconscious", in C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Glasgow: Collins Fount, 1982).
66. C.G. Jung, "On the Psychology of the Unconscious" (1917) in CW, 7, p. 66.
67. ibid., p. 95.
68. ibid., p. 93-94.
69. C.G. Jung, op.cit., CW, 9i, pp. 3-4.
70. C.G. Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1936) in CW, 9i, p. 42.
71. ibid., p. 43.
72. ibid.
73. C.G. Jung, "Concerning the Archetypes with Special Reference to the Anima Concept" (1936) in CW, 9i, p. 66.
74. C.G. Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919) in CW, 8, p.134.
75. C.G. Jung, "The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious" (1928) in CW, 7, p. 147.
76. ibid., p. 154.
77. C.G. Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis, CW, 14, p. 520.
78. C.G. Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1936) in CW, 9i, p. 47.
79. C.G. Jung, "General Aspects of Dream Psychology" (1916) in CW, 8, p. 279.
80. C.G. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, CW, 12, p. 9.
81. C.G. Jung, "Psychology and Religion" (1938) in CW, 11, p. 6.
82. C.G. Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919) in CW, 8, p. 133.

83. ibid., footnote 7, p. 133.
84. ibid., p. 136.
85. C.G. Jung, "Psychology and Religion" (1938) in CW, 11, footnote 15, p.51.
86. C.G. Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919) in CW, 8, p: 135.
87. ibid, p.136.
88. ibid.
89. ibid.
90. ibid.
91. C.G. Jung, Psychological Types, CW, 6, pp. 40-42.
92. C.G. Jung, op.cit., CW, 8.
93. ibid.
94. ibid.
95. ibid., p. 137.
96. C.G. Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1947) in CW, 8, p. 165ff.
97. C.G. Jung, "Psychological Factors Determining Human Behaviours" (1937) in CW, 8, p. 122.
98. C.G. Jung, "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle" (1952) in CW, 8, p. 436.
99. C.G. Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1936) in CW, 9i, p. 43. In the case of searching for the study of archetypal theory after Jung's understanding, see, Naomi R. Goldenberg, "Archetypal Theory After Jung" in Spring (1975), pp. 199-220.
100. C.G. Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1934) in CW, 9i, pp. 48-50.
101. ibid., p. 49.
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141. C.G. Jung, Dream Analysis: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1928-1930 edited by William McGuire (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 259.
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149. C.G. Jung, Aion, CW, 9ii, p. 16. Cf. Naomi Goldenberg, The Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), for a feminist critique of Jung's position on anima/animus. For an extension of Goldenberg's views cf., Demaris S. Wehr, Liberating Archetypes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). The thesis takes the position that, read organically and totally, Jung's psychology is not demeaning of the feminine. Rather the guiding principle of Jung's psychology is the unity of opposites, in particular, the unity of the conscious and unconscious dimensions of the psyche. This foundational unity, necessary for maturation, demands the unity of ego with anima or animus in whatever form such union might take and in whatever cultural diversity it might operate. Some of Jung's formulations of the pathology that attach to a negative anima or animus are abrasive, especially when he universalizes traits that can surface justifiably critiqued by feminism. However, from a clinical perspective, no description of the negative power of anima or animus in Jung's works is without empirical foundation then and now.
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154. ibid., pp. 185-187.
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182. ibid., p. 41.
183. C.G. Jung, "Psychology and Religion" (1938) in CW, 11, pp. 58-59.

184. C.G. Jung, "Introduction to the Religious and Psychological Problems of Alchemy" (1944) in CW, 12, p. 14.
185. C.G. Jung, "Paracelsus as a Spiritual Phenomenon" (1942) in CW, 13, p. 179.
186. C.G. Jung, "The Significance of the Unconscious in Individual Education" (1928) in CW, 17, pp.149-151.
187. ibid., p. 151.

CHAPTER 3. PERSON AS THE LOCUS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE: W.C.SMITH

As I have emphasized in the second chapter, my concern in this work does not lie in the discussion of human experience itself but, rather, my concern is with the role of the person who is not only the locus of the occurrence of human or religious experience but also the locus of the re-experiencing of the accumulated human religious experience. Thus, the focus of this chapter is on the articulation of the role of person. This point should be kept in mind while reading this chapter. In this chapter I will discuss Smith's "personal" understanding of religion, and, then, Smith's understanding of tradition and faith. Furthermore, I will discuss the relation between faith and belief, and, on the basis of faith, how the human being participates in transcendence, truth, or God, through the contexts of his or her life, in order for the human being to become fully human.

1. The Meaning of Religion as a Way of Life

In his modern classic book, The Meaning and End of Religion: A Revolutionary Approach to the Great Religious Traditions, Wilfred Cantwell Smith articulates his understanding of 'religion' in terms of its personal and social function.¹ Before developing a discussion of his idea of 'religion', it would be helpful to understand how the concept or term religion has been developed in various studies of religion. According to Smith, the term religion has been adopted in four quite distinct senses.² In the first

sense, the term religion has been used to represent piety. In the second instance religion is employed to represent 'the overt system' (of beliefs, rituals, value systems, etc.); this understanding has been developed by theologians or philosophers in the light of the ideal abstract point of view rather than the personal actual point of view. The third sense is used to indicate an empirical, mundane and social phenomena by historians or sociologists; this understanding excludes the transcendental aspects of human life, it only refers to mundane phenomena. The fourth sense is employed to refer to a mixture of all three. Smith insisted that each sense of the term religion taken separately is insufficient for interpreting the complex whole of the individual's religious life. For example, the first sense fails to reveal the difference between piety and indifference to life or piety and rebellion against life. Smith has tried to articulate the relationship of personal piety to the individual's total context of life, rather than understanding the pietistic sense as something separate from life itself. The second and the third sense of the term religion describe the differences between each religious tradition but not the connections. The fourth sense does include the three senses but does not seriously link with other aspects of human life, such as that of art, economics, politics, and even science. Thus the term religion leaves the impression that religion is not related with the other aspects of life.

Furthermore, Smith clearly indicates that the process of intellectual or abstract reification of the meaning of religion,

since the influence of the Enlightenment, has produced the modern mentality which perceives the meaning of religion as a static entity or thing apart from the individual's living, dynamic life.

...a process of reification: mentally making religion into a thing, gradually coming to conceive it as an objective systematic entity.³

Due to the process of reification of religion, the meaning of many concepts and terminologies have been reduced to refer to the abstract thing, the religious institution itself, and furthermore, the names of religion--so called, Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on--have been created to indicate this abstract entity, without any consideration of the devotee's personal faith in relation to the tradition. Even the term Christianity has lost its dynamic, living meaning, so that the term is used to refer just to the tradition.

By the end of the eighteenth-century the term Christianity had come to be used primarily and almost without question as the name of a systematized 'religion'.⁴

The negative aspect of the Enlightenment, especially secularism, has cut the coherent meaning of life, religion, into a fragmented meaning, which is no longer meaningful or rational to the human being's whole personal and social life. For example, a special time of devotion is set aside by going to church one day a week.

The rise of what is called secularism (the term was coined in Europe 1851) and its spread throughout the world are indeed a symptom of an evolving sociological situation in which an earlier cohesiveness or integrity of man's social and personal life, once religiously expressed and religiously sanctified, has been fragmented. In this situation those who wish to preserve that quality of their existence to which their religious tradition nurtures their sensitivity, are often able to

do so only as one item in an otherwise heterogeneous or distracted life. The concept 'religion' as designating, how vaguely, one aspect of life among others bears testimony to this differentiation.⁵

Furthermore, this fragmented notion of religion has produced a view which sees religion as the addendum or 'useful something' to normal life rather than normal life itself.

The notion that religion is a nice thing to have, even that it is useful, has arisen, as it could arise only, in a secular and desperate society. Such a notion is a kind of blasphemy, to those whose faith is sensitive. One has even reached a point today where some Christians can speak of believing in Christianity (instead of believing in God and in Christ); of preaching Christianity (instead of preaching good news, salvation, redemption); of practising Christianity (instead of practising love). Some even talk of being saved by Christianity, instead of by the only thing that could possibly save us, the anguish and the love of God.⁶

Also, this understanding has produced another view which sells or markets religion as one element rather than as 'a pattern' of life.⁷ This notion has misled many Western scholars to approach other religious traditions from the perspective of abstract systematization or reification. Thus, there has been a large gap between the observer's understanding and the devotee's understanding of religion. Smith has devoted his whole life to articulating the differences and has asked the observer to consider religiously, in their research on other traditions, the devotee's understanding. He presents several examples of misunderstanding of other traditions as follows;

...originally 'Islam' named not something that God gave to men, as is now widely imagined but rather something that God asked them to give to Him--a quite different matter.⁸

Again, for the devout Jews, revelation proclaims not

Judaism but justice; and man's proper response is an ultimate loyalty not to a system but to a community and to the most High. Similarly, in the Bhagavad Gita, when Krishna the Lord, previously disguised as Arjuna's charioteer has led Arjuna to a point where he is capable of receiving a divine revelation, he does not reveal 'Hinduism' to him, but reveals Himself, a personal God.⁹

The participant is concerned with God; the observer has been concerned with 'religion'. I propose now to contend that this later concept, despite appearances and despite usage, is inadequate also even for the observer. In the first contention, that the concept was inappropriate for the man of faith himself, I have had, despite recent Western custom, the support of sensitive representatives of various communities in their protest against the use of the term for their own faith, and the support of rather massive historical evidence showing that in the Orient men have on the whole not used such a concept for their own faith, and not even in the Christian West until the rise of unbelief. In this second contention, however, that the concept is inadequate also for the outside observer, for the student, I shall appear to be proceeding more alone.¹⁰

This later misunderstanding could be also found in the application of the term religion to the Christian tradition, especially in the period of the Deistic movement in Europe. This movement did not consider the numinous aspect of the human being's life, but limited itself to the realm of reason which had been accepted as the authority of life. As Smith clearly shows,

In the European age of Reason, when these concepts were developed and flourished, men might think to conceptualize their world without much tremulous sense of the numinous or much dissolvent sense of historical flux. Now that the presuppositions of that particular time and place are superseded or outflanked, we may well seek more appropriate terms than theirs in which to depict man's variegated and evolving encounter with transcendence. In our final synthesis we shall argue that the two considerations are two faces of a single issue, with both of which my essentially personalistic interpretation will endeavour simultaneously to cope.¹¹

The new development of conceiving 'Christianity' as one religion among many, was, as we have said a notion

derived in significant part from deist-humanist thought, where it served the 'natural religion' people, who envisaged the Christian and Jewish 'religions' as aberrations from a generic ideal. It was in large part appropriated by the Church rather than generated by it. Yet alongside it the older sense of faith persisted among Christians who rejected the new. Thus, a number of serious thinkers have asseverated that other groups around the globe are involved in religions but what Christians are concerned with is faith.¹²

According to Smith, such a naturalistic approach to religion has been predominant in the modern academia, and, such an approach itself was established to stand as one alternative ideology to world religious traditions as follows;

...the virtually official academic stand on religion constituted in effect a given ideology at best naturalist not merely by conclusion but by starting point, which was explicitly an alternative to 'the various religions of the world.' Enlightenment rationalism was constituted in significant part by a negative critique of 'religion'.¹³

Due to the historical fact of misunderstanding religion, Smith has strongly suggested that even the term 'religion' be dropped.

My own suggestion is that the word, and the concepts, should be dropped--at least in all but the first, personalist, sense. This is on the grounds not merely that it would be helpful to do so; but, more strongly, that it is misleading to retain them. I suggest that the term 'religion' is confusing, unnecessary, and distorting--confusing and unnecessary especially in the first and fourth senses, distorting in the second and in the third.¹⁴

Furthermore, due to the dynamic and dialectic experiences in the devotee's heart in relation to traditions, Smith says that

"the definition of religions are impossible."¹⁵

What exists can not be defined. What obstructs a definition of Hinduism, for instance, is precisely the richness of what exists, in all its extravagant variety from century to century and from village to village.¹⁶

Due to such complexities of religious traditions, Smith has

strongly suggested to understand religious traditions in relation to the devotee's participation, especially, from the perspective of the personal and functional aspect of religion. This is the most original idea of Smith's human understanding. In other words, Smith has tried to understand the actually experienced transcendence in the context of life. Thus Smith's understanding of religion is not an idealistic or pure concept of religion but an actualized or historically experienced concept of religion.

A Christian theologian who attempted to define Christianity would be attempting to define it as it truly is in an idealistic sense, up in the sky; not as it historically has been in concrete actuality. The definable is the pure; and purity is to be found only in theory and in God. Whatever exists mundanely can not be defined; whatever can be defined does not exist.¹⁷

In other words, Smith does not put much emphasis upon the ideal nature or ideal essence of religion as traditional theologians or philosophers have done but the realized, functional meaning of religion in the devotee's life. Thus, Smith's understanding of religion is fundamentally based upon the individual devotee's life which has the experience of transcendence, in his or her historical context.

What have been called man's religions, then, are as any historian can see involved in history; that is, in change, in imperfection, in the hurly-burly of the mundane. Yet also, as any participant can testify, they involve the transcendent--the abiding, the ideal. How is one to handle this dilemma intellectually?¹⁸

In his recent article, "Theology and the World's Religious History," Smith further articulated his personal and historical understanding of religion in relation to the sense of transcendence as the source of human life, as follows:

To speak truly about God means henceforth to interpret accurately the history of human religious life on earth...It is, frankly, preposterous to imagine that anyone insensitive to the presence of God can understand or interpret human history in any but drastically inadequate ways, given the extent to which human lives have been lived in that presence. Human beings have acted the way that they have acted, have been the persons that they have been, in the light of many other and finally less important, more mundanely, reasons; but also, most of them quite consciously, also in the light of this.¹⁹

Smith's understanding of religion as a way of life could be more clearly understood through his idea of the meaning of truth. Smith, very uniquely and originally, has approached the idea of truth in his first public lectures as a theologian (Taylor lectures for 1963 at Yale University). The lectures were published under the title Questions of Religious Truth. In the general milieu of avoiding the idea of truth in the scholarship of the so-called field of History of Religion, Smith has contributed a new chapter to the understanding of truth in terms of realization or actualization rather than in an abstract or metaphysical point of view.

Smith, especially, tackled the issue of truth in his second lecture titled "Can Religions be True or False?" There, Smith clearly pointed out his main argument of the issue with the question "Where does it (truth) lie?" He developed the issue with the historical and personal conviction that the locus of truth or the meaning of truth is not in the religious traditions themselves but in the heart of the devotee's experiences of the traditions and, furthermore, in the process of the concrete actualization of the experiences in his or her own real context of life. If one

simply or mechanically repeats creeds or scripture readings, like a parrot, he or she does not interiorize, according to Smith, the meaning of them in his or her heart and does not live the meaning in the context of his or her life. In this case, the meaning of them does not occur to him or her truthfully. Smith shows the case of Christian life as follows;

Christianity, I would suggest, is not true absolutely, impersonally, statistically; rather, it can become true, if and as you or I appropriate it to ourselves and interiorize it, insofar as we live it out from day to day. It becomes true as we take it off the shelf and personalize it, in dynamic actual existence.²⁰

Thus, in the case of Smith's understanding, the criterion of truth does not lie on the theoretical or intellectual systems themselves but the personal realization of their real meaning in the context of daily life. Due to the personal aspect of truth, Smith's idea of truth can not be generalized, because the meaning of truth in relation to personal actualization is always differently, individually experienced in different ways, depending upon the individual's involvement of life. Thus, to Smith, the truth of Christianity is not located in a belief system but in the actualization of Christian belief in life.

Religious life is no theoretical pattern or intellectualist abstraction, independent of personal involvement and of day-to-day moral life. Therefore to say that Christianity is true is to say nothing significant; the only question that concerns either God, or me, or my neighbour is whether my Christianity is true, and whether yours is. And to that question, a truly cosmic one, in my case the only valid answer is a sorrowful "not very." By my Christianity I mean my actual, living Christianity, my Christianness, the specific religion of my personal life. If I escape, by grace, the situation where that Christianity of mine can be described only as false, even so the best to which I

can rise, alas, is that it is not so true as it ought to be. Anything less realistic is glib.²¹

Furthermore, Smith thought that even the personal meaning of truth, in relation to Christianity, varies. Sometimes the personal meaning of Christianity was more truthful in the individuals' past life than the present and vice versa. Frequently, the meaning of Christianity yesterday morning was more truthful than this morning and vice versa. Similarly, in the case of the relationship among individuals, one individual's meaning of Christianity one morning is more truthful than the other individual's meaning of Christianity and vice versa.

...my Christianity may be more true this morning than it was yesterday afternoon. It may collapse altogether in some crisis tomorrow morning; whereas one day ten years ago in some particular encounter its truth may have risen for a moment to serious significance. Again, one man's Christianity may be (must be) more false than another's. Your Christianity may be truer than the Christianity of your next-door neighbour. I know two Christians of whom the religion of one is more true than the religion of the other.²²

Smith, at the same time, developed the personal truth of other religious traditions and the personal falsehood of Christianity, depending upon the degree of actualization or personalization of the religious tradition, in the context of a person's life. For example, if a Christian goes against the teachings of Christianity by being dishonest in his business world, at that moment of dishonesty his or her Christianity is not realized and hence is not true. On the other hand, if a Hindu or a Muslim becomes "a good Samaritan", so to speak, by saving a Christian from drowning in the sea, at that moment his or her own Hindu or Islamic tradition was

truly actualized, and hence at that moment true. Thus, to Smith, the fundamental concern of truth in each religious tradition does not lie in the traditions themselves but in the private, personal realization of religious traditions.

The truth of his religion in its actual, living quality--the private, personal religion that is really and significantly **his**--is a different question from, and again I would say a more interesting question to God Himself, as well as to you and me, than, any question of the truth or otherwise of "his religion" in the abstract, formal, systematic sense of the religion of his historical community generally. We talk blandly of the religion to which he belongs; ought we not rather to concern ourselves with the religion that belongs to him? God is interested in persons, not in types.²³

Smith has consistently observed the meaning of religion in human being's existential actualization of one's tradition in one's life. For Smith, moreover, all human beings--whether they are Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jew, Christian or whatever--try to become truly human through their traditions rather than becoming a sectarian Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jew, Christian and so on. Thus, to Smith, there is no difference between a truly religious life and a truly human life, as he puts it:

To live a true religious life, which means to live a truly human life, which means to live a life truly responsive to God, which means to live a life truly responsive to man and to one's total situation--in short, to live truly, may be more easily done if you are brought up in one tradition than in other, just as it may be more easily done if you are poor rather than rich, or rich rather than poor, or clever rather than stupid, or humble rather than clever or born into a godly and loving family rather than born unwanted in a broken home. No one has argued, I suppose, that all contexts are equal. All that I am arguing is that all contexts are contexts. To Hindu tradition, or that branch of it that pertains to a given village, the Buddhist tradition or some particular segment of it in the twentieth century, the Episcopalian tradition, the Shintoist--all these are various contexts

in one or other of which a man is born. They are exceedingly interesting, consequential, conditioning environments. Yet religious **truth** is a function of a personal life in that context, not of the context itself.²⁴

Smith, fundamentally, sees religion as a way of becoming human, and so religion is not an addendum to life, as has been understood generally, but ordinary life itself. Thus, Smith, in his presidential address in the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (1983) and in "Shall Next Century be Secular or Religious?" in his Tenri lecture (1988), even opposes the idea of **homo religiosus**; an idea which has been developed against the attack of secularism. Rather, for Smith, a human being is just plain **homo sapiens**.

Religion is in fact not something special, the historian can now see; it is secularism that is odd. "Religion" is a secularist notion, a conceptual element in that particular worldview but a misleading one, setting up a dichotomy that secularists need in order to justify their own separate peculiarity, but normal people do not and can not. The dichotomy is retained, in inverted form, in that phrase **homo religiosus**. Actually, there is rather just plain **homo sapiens**, and then a minority of those not quite sapienses enough to have sensed what kind of universe we live in and what kind of being we are.²⁵

The fact is that for human beings, and doubly so for human communities, to be in one way or another what has misleadingly come to be called "religious" is altogether normal. It is inherently right and proper, the standard everyday human situation. It is what one would expect, if one understands what it means to be human. To think of it as odd or bizarre, as something extraneous, over and above the ordinary, is inapt".²⁶

To summarize, Smith's understanding of religion is not based on his observation of the human being's effort to be religious but from the human being's struggle to become a human being and "to take the question of living well, seriously".²⁷ That is, such

struggles themselves are "the very foundation, both of our humanity and of history itself."²⁸ However, becoming a human being is not easy, in the same way that "for a crocodile, it is easy to be a crocodile."²⁹ It demands a lot of effort to become human and realize the genuine calling as a human being on earth. As he puts it,

...for us,..., it is easy not to be fully human, easy for us to slip away from our true calling. Man can fail to be human, can fail to be him-or herself; and can fail properly to recognize the authentic humanity of one's neighbour, can treat other men and women as if they were less than human.³⁰

...to be Jewish has been the Jewish way of being human; to be Hindu has been one or other of the various Indian ways; to be Buddhist has been the way of many hundreds of millions of persons; for the Church, Christ died in order that we might be human properly. The various religious systems of the world are not fancy elaborations tacked on to human history as curiosities over and above the standard human. They are, rather, the principal attempts at being human. Put in another way, they are the salient responses to being human.³¹

2. Cumulative Tradition as the Expression of Faith

As I have indicated in the previous part of this present chapter, Smith's understanding of 'religion' focuses on the human life maintained by the sense or experience of transcendence. Smith thinks that the commonly understood meaning of the term religion does not reveal personal experience and so he suggests that the term religion be dropped in the field of academia. Instead, he has suggested two terms--cumulative tradition and faith--in order to properly understand the human being.

In the last part of his book The Meaning and End of Religion, Smith outlines his understanding of cumulative tradition and faith. Before proceeding to a discussion of what Smith understands by faith, I will delineate his understanding of cumulative tradition.

Smith describes his idea of cumulative tradition as an observable religious phenomenon in the following passage:

By 'cumulative tradition' I mean the entire mass of overt objective data that constitute the historical deposit, as it were, of the past religious life of the community in question: temples, scriptures, theological systems, dance patterns, legal and other social institutions, conventions, moral codes, myths, and so on; anything that can be and is transmitted from one person, one generation, to another, and that an historian can observe.³²

To Smith, the cumulative tradition, even though it is an observable phenomenon, is not "inflexible or final, either in content or in form."³³ The cumulative tradition proceeds with the participation of the outstanding intellectuals of each religious tradition. Thus, it is not static but, always in process. As Smith puts it:

By the very words 'cumulative' and 'tradition' I have meant to stress that the concept refers in a synthetic shorthand to a growing congeries of items each of which is real in itself but all of which taken together are unified in the conceptualizing mind, by process of intellectual abstraction. Like the total religious tradition of mankind, so each particular tradition has, is composed of, parts, and for many intellectual purposes it is convenient or necessary, and certainly legitimate, to abstract and synthesize at a lower level of generality...³⁴

However, to Smith, the cumulative tradition, historically, has been formed not only by distinguished intellectuals but by the involvement of "ordinary" people. Although the new items of the

cumulative tradition are introduced to the general folk by the intellectuals, if the ordinary devotee does not actualize them, they will not be sustained historically. Thus, Smith interprets the cumulative tradition as that which has developed through the process of history. The tradition becomes historically recognized by the descendants of the tradition through the process of actualization. Of course, some items of the cumulative tradition are subtracted from the tradition and, in reverse, some new factors are added. Occasionally, it may happen that the subtracted item is revived at a later point in history. This process has occurred repetitively throughout human history. In some cases, the original insight of religious leaders or thinkers has been mistranslated or misinterpreted, producing a misunderstanding among the general folk.

Furthermore, although changes that are creative advances are perhaps largely the result of the work of outstanding individuals, there is another type of change, historically hardly less important, which perhaps more usually is brought about by the action of quite ordinary folk, often acting together in numbers. This is the change of neglect, decline, and retrogression. Elements in a cumulative tradition may be dropped as well as added; customs disappear, observances are not observed, temples fall into ruin. Lofty insights are degraded, warm spontaneities are gradually institutionalized, novelties become traditions. The community not only preserves the insights of its leaders, it can also misinterpret or lose them.³⁵

Smith offers a Hindu example which is helpful for understanding the concept of cumulative tradition.³⁶ While the traditional interpretation of Christianity or Islam has been developed from the presuppositional fact, an historical starting point, to some extent, the historical origins of the Hindu

tradition can not be identified. Among the Hindus, their tradition has already been perceived as a diverse phenomenon. Even the ancient Hindu perceived his or her tradition as diverse. For example, the well-known creation hymn "Book X" of the Rg Veda was composed by a Hindu who could not be identified except as someone who had the talent of a poet. In this case, the Hindu was born into a historical context patterned by the Hindu tradition which he or she had inherited. Thus, the historical context of the Hindu tradition played a role as background to the poet's composition. Through the poem, the tradition was extended and, since then, has been affecting those who read the poem. Of course, when the poet lived, the creation hymn was not attached to the Rg Veda but later was added to the collection.

Here, what we should carefully understand about the author of the creation hymn, is that,

he received, external to himself, in the form of rites and practices, norms, ideas, group pressures, family influence, vocabulary, social institutions, and what not, a religious tradition; and that he changed that tradition by adding to it. He added to it something that emerged from the interaction within his personality between that external tradition and some personal quality of his own that we may cheerfully leave undetermined. Orthodox Hindus may believe that he 'heard'; Christians may believe that either Logos or the devil was at work; literary critics may apply the same explanations that they use for poetic creation wherever they find it. However one may choose to interpret how it took place, the fact is, and on this surely all may agree, that inside that man's person something unobservable happened of which the outward consequence was a new hymn. And this product of his faith was thereupon added to the cumulative tradition, which has therefore never been quite the same since.³⁷

In other words, the tradition's later form became "the prolongation

and enrichment of its earlier existence as modified by the intervention of the faith and activity of this man."³⁸

As did this person, other creative leaders added new elements to the cumulative tradition. At the same time, although the effect is small, the humble folk also contributed to the cumulative tradition through interiorization and actualization of the tradition.

A Sankara or a Ramanuja, on the one hand stimulated and conditioned by an inherited cumulative tradition, and on the other inspired by his own understanding of its meaning and his own vision of a transcendent truth, conceived something new and bequeathed to the subsequent ongoing tradition an objective, public formulation of that private vision. Yet in the same way, though of course on a drastically smaller scale, some remote village mother receives that little segment of the cumulative tradition that attains just then in her small corner of India, interiorizes it to make what she can or will of its meaning, translating the outer forms into a personal faith, petty or profound; and then in turn she hands it on to her son, modified in an outward sense perhaps only minutely or negligibly, yet personalized. If it meant nothing to her inside, the historian may be sure that the next generation would handle even its externals differently. No less important, in the religious history of man, than creative faith of innovating leaders is the preservative faith of receptive followers.³⁹

The case of the Hindu example can be discovered in the other religious traditions, as well. That is, other traditions have developed in a gradual and complex historical process with the active involvement of the intellectual and general devotees of each tradition. In a word, the cumulative tradition, to Smith, is the participants' historical, mundane construct which is never finished.⁴⁰

Smith's understanding of the role of the cumulative tradition

in human life, can be further summarized in five ways. First, as he points out in his article "Religion as Symbolism", Smith sees the religious tradition as symbol.⁴¹ According to Smith, the cumulative tradition, as symbol, has the power which not only raises the deep awareness of humanity but also develops and corresponds to this deep awareness. Furthermore, a symbol has the power to make persons reflect on the conscious and unconscious quality of their own humanity, coherently.

Such symbols, it turns out, have the power not merely to express man's otherwise inchoate awareness of the richness of what lies under the surface, but also to nurture and to communicate and to elicit it. They have an activating as well as a representational quality, and an ability to organize the emotions and the unconscious as well as the conscious mind, so that into them we may pour the deepest range of our humanity and from them derive an enhancement of the personality.⁴²

Thus Smith interpreted symbols as the way of becoming human. As Smith puts it,

Without the use of symbols, including religious symbols, man would be radically less than human.⁴³

Second, Smith frequently interprets religious traditions as windows which make persons sense the transcendental dimension of their own life. That is, persons experience the transcendence in their heart through the cumulative traditions.

It is because the materials of a cumulative tradition serve each generation as the ground of a transcendent faith that they persist. The objective data of a tradition exist in this world and are observable by an historian; but they continue to exist and to be observable because for the men and women who use them they serve as windows through which they see a world beyond.⁴⁴

Third, in contrast to human beings' use of the cumulative

tradition as a window, Smith, in his article "The Christian in a Religiously Plural World," has interpreted the cumulative tradition as God's means for participating with human beings.

Those of us who, after our study of Islam or Indian or Chinese religion, and after our fellowship with Muslims and other personal friends, have come to know that these religious traditions are not that, but are channels through which God Himself comes into touch with these His children...⁴⁵

Fourth, in his article titled "Traditional Religions in Modern Culture", presented at the XIth International Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (1965), Smith described the cumulative tradition as the investment of previous persons' faith and, at the same time, as the cause of faith for the present person in the tradition. As he puts it,

Traditions now extant are the deposit of earlier men's faith. At best, they can be the efficient cause of faith of man today. Yet if there is one quality characteristic of our modern age, it is the possibility of dislocation between faith and inherited formulation. An investigation concerned only with formulation, not with faith, will all too probably miss the heart of the matter.⁴⁶

Finally, Smith, in his book Questions of Religious Truth, interprets the cumulative tradition as 'fact', and articulates the position that the fact is meaningful or truthful according to the degree of realization in life.

The religious traditions of mankind are facts, not theories. Some have theories that go with them, though not all; and even those that do, such as the Christian, are a trifle less sure today than yesterday that the theories are primary or ultimate (or exhaustive). What are called the 'religions' exist. They are simply there, like Mount Everest. Like Mount Everest, you may like them, or you may not; you may decide to climb them, or you may not; you may feel that you can trust them to hold your weight or not, or the weight of those who, unlike

you, have pitched their tents on their slopes. Yet whatever your attitude to them, they are more like Mount Everest than they are like a proposition in science. The latter may be true or false, but historical facts and social institutions are existent actualities.⁴⁷

As I have discussed, to Smith, the meaning of the cumulative tradition is not found in the tradition itself but in those who participate in the tradition, existentially. Thus, the cumulative tradition is not a static entity but is always in a state of process. Furthermore, the tradition is "ever changing, ever accumulating, ever fresh",⁴⁸ according to the participants' involvement. Smith has dedicated his life to articulating the dynamic process between the historical, objective tradition and the participants' meaning of the tradition, and, further, the participants' sense of transcendence, which is, for Smith, the foundation of humanity, through the tradition. Ultimately, to Smith, all cumulative traditions are expressions of faith. Such faith occurs through the dialectical process of human beings' participation in transcendence and, at the same time, transcendence's participation in human beings, through the medium of the cumulative traditions. Thus, for Smith, the fundamental locus of the meaning of cumulative tradition lies in the relationship or involvement not in impersonal, systematic or metaphysical belief systems or transcendence but in the personal heart of the human being engaged in his or her own tradition.

3. Faith as the Matrix of Human Experience

In this part of the present chapter, Smith's original concept of faith will be discussed. Three aspects of his idea of faith that I will focus on are: the generic meaning of faith, the expressions of faith, and, the relationship between belief and faith.

1) The generic meaning of faith

Smith developed his idea of faith in the context of a modern global perspective. He does not articulate his idea of faith just through an analysis of Christian materials, but, rather, he analyzes all world religious traditions--the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Chinese (Taoistic, Confucianistic, Buddhist), the Jewish, the Christian, the Islamic, and, to some extent, tribal religious traditions and the Western classical philosophical tradition. As we have seen, Smith's approach is primarily historical and empirical, not philosophical. Thus, his thinking does not come from an armchair or detached study of faith but from historical and empirical field-work and careful reflection on the numerous primary materials of almost all of the world's religious traditions. His careful reflection on the primary materials can be seen through his use of extensive endnotes. In fact, most of his major works have longer endnotes than the text itself. If one considers the historical foundation of Smith's concept of faith, the understanding of Smith's concept of faith would be clear.

In one of his major works, Faith and Belief, produced after more than ten years of careful study, Smith states that 'faith' is "the essential human quality."⁴⁹ That is, to him, faith is seen as a generically human quality. Thus, faith is not something added to humanity. Essentially, humanity is constituted by faith. Furthermore, faith is not only the foundation of humanity in the Christian tradition but also that of all human beings in every tradition, including the positive-humanistic tradition. Thus, the standard human being is the human being of faith, for faith is universally operative in human life.

If Smith's idea of faith makes of it the foundation of humanity and so the essential human quality of human life, what features does this human quality have? Unlike Rudolf Otto's numinous feeling,⁵⁰ Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence⁵¹ and, recently, Paul Tillich's ultimate concern,⁵² Smith does not define faith narrowly but leaves it open as just the essential human quality. As I indicated, Smith sees the religious essence of humanity as human rather than **homo religiosus** (a phrase coined in response to the Enlightenment). However, even though he deliberately does not define the metaphysical nature of faith, he has shown and articulated various features of the human quality of faith, drawn from the appearance of religious traditions in history.

First of all, Smith understands that, historically, from ancient times until now, all human beings have had a potentiality which has been expressed in religious traditions all over the world

irrespective of the differences of the traditions.

Our quest is to understand faith as a characteristic quality or potentiality of human life: that propensity of man that across the centuries and across the world has given rise to and has been nurtured by a prodigious variety of religious forms, and yet has remained elusive and personal, prior to and beyond the forms.⁵³

Also, Smith sees the potential quality as inherent "propensities"⁵⁴ which need symbolic forms in order to express themselves in life. As Smith says in his article "Responsibility":

If my first point, then, is that the concept 'responsibility' is derivative from, and perhaps finally dependent upon, the Day-of-Judgement motif, my second point is that this motif is in its turn derivative from, and dependent upon, an inherent quality of man. It is evidence for such a quality. That quality, like other human qualities, may require symbolic expression in order to become widely evoked, rather than remaining latent, and corroborated rather than feeble, and may require conceptual expression in order to be thought about. Yet ultimately it lies within us, prior to all expression.⁵⁵

Secondly, Smith extends this quality to the devotee's active involvement which has maintained the religious traditions and which has understood the cosmos coherently through the traditions.

To live religiously is not merely to live in the presence of certain symbols, but to be involved with them or through them in a quite special way--a way that may lead far beyond the symbols, that may demand the totality of a person's response, and may affect one's relation not only to them but to everything else: to oneself, to one's neighbour, and to the stars. It is that special involvement that pleads to be elucidated.⁵⁶

Here, the word "involvement" must be carefully understood. In order to be involved with something or someone, the person must subordinate his or her will to that something or someone. Even though a person is involved in religious activities, if there is no will actualized upon this involvement then that person's faith will

not be realized. Smith sees this involvement as the important feature of faith, necessary to actualize the demands of religious tradition. As he puts it:

Further, if I sing a hymn or observe a liturgy or repeat a creed mechanically, nothing happens; but if I do it as an expression of faith, however weak, it becomes in turn an evocator of faith both for me, since my own faith is therefore enlarged, and for my neighbour or for my children. The forms of any tradition function as occasions for faith not in themselves, but insofar as persons are actively involved with them. The temples of ancient Egypt once served to inspire and to crystallize the faith of men and women, though now they are but tourist attractions. The ideas of the Manichees once served as channels of faith for millions; now they are but the subject of doctoral dissertations in history.⁵⁷

Smith, further, articulates this involvement in terms of engagement. According to him, ultimately, because humanity is an engagement of God, truth, neighbours, traditions and whatever, to understand the engagement authentically is to understand "oneself involved." Without the self-understanding of engagement, it is impossible to understand humanity.

Faith, then, is an engagement: the involvement of the Christian with God and with Christ and with the sacraments and with the moral imperatives and with the community; the involvement of the Hindu with caste and with the law of retributive justice and the maya-quality of this mundane world and with the vision of a final liberation; the involvement of the Buddhist with the image of the Buddha and with the moral law and with an institutionalized monastic order and with the dream of a further shore beyond this sea of sorrow; the involvement of the primitive animist with the world perceived in poetic, if bizarre, vitality and responsiveness.⁵⁸

Thirdly, Smith understands this quality as a personal quality. It has been nurtured or touched by so-called religious traditions but the tradition does not constitute primarily his or her humanity, because his or her personal quality itself is humanity.

Due to the fact that this quality is personal, all human beings' faith is various and always is living. As he puts it,

For if faith is personal, then even in principle it is not a generic entity, but a living quality. It is not a fixed something, but the throbbing actuality of a myriad of someones. There is no such thing, I have argued, as religion or a religion; and when one divides what has been called that into two parts an overt tangible tradition on the one hand and a vital personal faith on the other, neither of the resultant parts is a thing either, definite, stable, static, complete, definable, metaphysically given. To see faith truly is to see it actually, not ideally.⁵⁹

Since faith, fundamentally, is personal, the meaning of faith varies according to the person's actualization of his or her own faith in life. Faith cannot be lively, deep and furthermore true until it is actualized. Thus, to Smith, there is not, for example, a generic Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish or Islamic faith. There is, however, the personal faith of Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews and Muslims; my, your, our friend's, your friend's, his or her friend's faith.⁶⁰ Even each person's faith is different, as Smith shows:

Faith varies. Some have faith that is large, rich, strong, serene, and that renders them generous, courageous, compassionate, patient, noble, creative. Others have a version of faith that is meagre, or stunted, rendering them narrow-minded or distracted, unimaginative or bitter, self-righteous or hypocritical. Both extremes of faith, and every gradation between, are to be found, we now can see, in every community across the globe. The historical fact is that faith both in its good and in its unseemly occurrences, its truer and its less true instances, has been found quite across the planet.⁶¹

Here, it is important to realize that, for Smith, "faith differs in form, but not in kind."⁶² "This applies both within community and from one community to another."⁶³

Fourthly, Smith, in his article titled "Traditional Religions and Modern Culture," shows that faith is not one unit or item of life like political, social, economic items, but the pattern in which all items of life are rendered meaningful and, furthermore, organized according to the faith.

Faith is not a factor in a man's life, along side others. It may be engendered and nurtured primarily (though never exclusively) by one factor in the social complex. Yet once it has arisen in personal life (which is the place that it can arise), if it is authentic, it embraces, and colours, all. It is not one element in the total pattern of the person's life; rather, it is the pattern that the other elements form.⁶⁴

In other words, faith as a pattern has power to cohere every factor of life into a comprehensive meaning of life. Thus, if someone loses his or her own faith, although all of the factors in their lives remain, life loses its coherence and meaning. In reverse, if he or she has a strong faith as the pattern of life, all factors of life would be coming to him or her meaningfully, and so he or she would feel at home even in the face of disaster and, furthermore, would show a hint of "serenity and courage and service."⁶⁵ No matter what may happen in their lives, they would "face catastrophe or confusion, affluence or sorrow, unperturbed, face opportunity with conviction and drive, and face others with self-forgetting charity."⁶⁶

Fifthly, in his article, "Interpreting Religious Interrelations: An Historian's View of Christian and Muslim",⁶⁷ Smith described a further feature of faith as the spirit in humanity. In this article, Smith sees the Christian and Islamic traditions as "movements of the human spirit." Ultimately, Smith

sees the history of tradition as a dialectical movement between the human's spirit and symbols in historical context (including the tradition) of each human being. As he puts it:

Our adventure is much more demanding: to discover and to report how far and wherein those inherited symbols are today performing their earlier function as one part of one's side of the complex dialectic between man's spirit and his material environment; and insofar as they are performing it only partially or haltingly or are perhaps no longer performing it then how far and wherein that spirit is starved or stifled or momentarily suppressed or latent, and also how far and wherein it has found or is finding or is searching for new symbols; and how far and wherein the spirit of man in various particular parts of the globe is in fact doing what some observers despondently or triumphantly suggest: namely, learning to live without symbols, expressing its hopes and fears and aspirations and resolutions and its visions and courage and love directly, replacing poetry with prose.⁶⁸

In contrast to earlier times, the contemporary devotee is not satisfied with the old symbols, and so is finding new symbols or, more widely, showing colorless or phenomenon-less spirit as human faith in the context of life, according to Smith. Thus, in order to understand the colorless spirit, the understanding of person should be primarily emphasized rather than the study of religious phenomena themselves, due to the fact that human faith is located in a person's heart even beyond religious phenomenon.

...the religiousness of contemporary man may conceivably be, at least in part, without phenomena (as Hammarskjöld's almost was). Dietrich Bonhoeffer's "religionless Christianity" is perhaps a straw in what one might perhaps call the possibility of a wind of phenomenon-less religion--or better, a religionless faith.⁶⁹

Sixthly, Smith has described the human quality as an assent or agreement to the truth which transforms the individual's attitude to himself or herself, to transcendence, or to his or her

neighbour. In other words, faith ultimately is the response to transcendence or truth.

It is 'assent' to the truth as such, in the dynamic and personal sense of rallying to it with delight and engagement. It is the exclamation mark in saying not merely 'Yes' but 'Yes!' to the truth when one sees. It is the ability to see and to respond.⁷⁰

Concerning the transformation of the individual's attitude, faith, for intellectuals,

involves...the will; and...the will to know and to understand. It requires--or confers--...., integrity; and...the utmost intellectual honesty.⁷¹

In other words, in the intellectual dimension of faith, faith should cause one to answer "yes!" to truth and conceptualize the yes quality in prose (belief). Furthermore, this conceptualization should be approved by his or her own faith subjectively and, at the same time, objectively recognized in the intellectual circle. This matter will be further discussed later in the section of the relationship between faith and belief.

Seventhly, Smith refers to the human quality as self-commitment which makes the human being cultivate himself or herself truthfully.

Man is free to do as he or she likes; and there is nothing in the nature of the empirical world, or of man, that requires one to commit oneself to the transcendent quality from which, according to this view, both are derived. It is reasonable, in this interpretation of the universe, for man to choose a transcendence-oriented destiny for him- or herself; yet it is not strictly unreasonable not to do so. Commitment ("faith") is not rationally inescapable. If one does so choose, it is because the final truth beyond the natural world and beyond oneself is somehow inherently attractive, cogent, and somehow helps one to rise above oneself and above one's empirical environment to go out in pursuit of that higher reality. It is not merely that once one dedicates

oneself..to ultimate reality one finds oneself transformed into something more than a purely natural phenomenon, something better than an empirical organism reacting to its environment. Rather, the very ability so to dedicate oneself, the human capacity to commit oneself to what is better than, greater than, truer than, either oneself or the empirically given: this itself involves a transformation.⁷²

Eighthly, Smith indicates the feature of faith as the time bounded product which means to show the specific context directly. According to Smith, faith is always related to the present context.

...human faith has always, everywhere, been limited. Historical criticism shows that the faith of any person, however open it may be to transcendence and the infinite, however much it may be a divine gift, however ideally absolute, yet in actual fact has always been limited by psychological, sociological, and other contextual factors, by the knowledge and the temperament and the situation of the man or woman whose it is. Every person is the child of his or her times; and this truth applies to every person of faith, even though one's having faith is another way of saying that one is not totally a child of one's times.⁷³

Lastly, for Smith, the human quality of faith plays two roles in the history of humankind. On the one hand, faith has played the role of receiver, through the cumulative tradition, of "the vision, the norms, the wholeness by which at best they live",⁷⁴ and, on the other, as the role of sender, into the cumulative tradition, of "the highest aspirations, the noblest dreams, the truest ideas and grandest feelings to which their mind and hearts have in fact been able to rise."⁷⁵ Thus, the human quality is always dialectically moving according to the human being's will.

In contrast to these nine broad characteristics of faith, Smith describes the narrow dimension of faith and the opposite of faith. Regarding a too narrow faith, Smith acknowledges that,

historically, a narrow faith has been expressed through the various religious traditions; for example, the violence of 'Brahmanism', the distortions of caste in the Hindu tradition, the violence of the Buddhists in Sri Lanka, the Buddhist's persecution against Shamans and the Confucianist's against the early Christians in Korea, the violence of the Islamic tradition, the Christian crusades and Inquisition, and so on. This perversity of faith has produced "the arrant stupidities, rigidities, (and) fanaticisms," exhibited by all religious traditions.⁷⁶ Physical perversity and mental perversity have both been playing a role in the production of narrow faith. As he puts it:

The historian notes, no doubt, the recurrent capacity of men and women of faith across the world to fasten on some expression of their faith, even a perverted one, and its name to ignore, to suppress, or to demolish not only other expressions but even that of which it itself has been meant to be the symbol. One need hold no brief for **homo religiosus perversus**. The only requirement here is to give heed to the fact, obvious to historical observation, that the perversity, also, appears in a global context.⁷⁷

Thus, the naive understanding that the Christian tradition is the only tradition that has produced perversity should be corrected in the popular consciousness of the West and in the intellectual consciousness of the East.⁷⁸

Smith draws special attention to the narrow understanding of faith in the Christian tradition towards other religious traditions. He has shown three obstacles⁷⁹ to breaking through the misunderstood aspect of faith, which perceives that only Christians have faith and ignores other traditions or criticizes other traditions as being 'religions'. The first obstacle has been

geographic isolation. Isolation has led many Christian intellectuals to understand the world, or the human being, or transcendence, only from its own parochial framework. However, fortunately, due to scientific or technological development in communications, Christians have been able to see, directly, the actual practices of other religious traditions.

The second obstacle has been the exclusivistic theological dogma of the Judaic, the Christian and the non-Sufi Islamic tradition. However, in the present situation, sensitive intellectuals have seriously pondered over the problem of other religious traditions (a situation quite different from the past). Even fundamentalists do not simply or blindly criticize other traditions like nineteenth century missionaries did. In the history of humankind, this is a significant theological and moral development in our understanding of transcendence and the human being.

The third obstacle is the negative-secularistic dogma which has regarded religion as 'excrescence'⁸⁰ and, so, has produced the consciousness which seeks to get rid of religion in society.⁸¹ Recently, this consciousness has strongly spread into so-called Anglo-american analytic philosophy, in order to reject traditional metaphysics and idealism. According to Smith, this obstacle has been the most obstinate or dogmatic obstacle.⁸²

The religious self-consciousness which validates other traditions, is the most unique type of awareness in modern times. Smith has suggested that modern religious or philosophical

intellectuals articulate this new awareness in relation to their own traditional intellectualization. Here, Smith discovers the real meaning of modernity as the ability to relate the self-awareness of other traditions to one's own tradition.

Smith describes as the opposite of faith, nihilism, which is unable to discover any meaning in life, in the following passages:

...a bleak ability to find either the world around one, or one's own life, significant; an absence of mutuality, in that one can not respond either to the universe or to one's neighbour knowing that one will be responded to; an almost total dependence upon immediate events coupled with a sense that immediate events cannot really or for long be depended upon; a sense of lostness. The current terms for this are alienation, loss of identity, uncommittedness.⁸³

The opposite is nihilism. If faith is insight plus commitment, lack of faith is superficiality plus anomie. If faith is the capacity to recognize worth and to live in terms of it, unfaith is perhaps described by the only instance where I would allow the word 'believing' to be introduced: life without faith is the inability to believe in anything. If faith is confidence and trust, lack of faith is anxiety. If faith is integration of the person, is wholeness, its absence has in our secular day been given the name ego diffusion.⁸⁴

Thus, Smith defines "the secular as the incoherent. Any part of life is secular if it does not cohere with the rest of life."⁸⁵ Smith also sees the extreme fundamentalist position as a kind of nihilism in which "stands the mean, cramping faith of blind and fanatical particularism."⁸⁶

Reflecting upon several characteristics of Smith's concept of faith, it can be easily known that Smith's concept of faith does not come from a philosophical or theological definition, form, or content of faith. Rather, it is from his study of the role of faith as an important quality of life in the history of humankind.

In fact, Smith's focus of his concept of faith does not lie in abstract discussion but in the locus of faith as experience in the heart of the person.

Due to the quite new quest of faith, not from the perspective of theology but from that of personalism, Smith has been accused, by Eric Sharpe⁸⁷ and Smith's student, A.R. Gualtieri,⁸⁸ of holding to a vague concept of faith. However, if Smith's concept of faith is understood from his historical and personal point of view, the accusation is rendered ineffectual. In his article "On Dialogue and 'Faith': a Rejoinder", Smith clearly articulated his main concern in the study of faith as follows:

I have been at great pains to try to insist that I am not 'defining' faith and especially not specifying its content, nor even its shape. I have endeavoured to suggest a concept explicitly open to various forms and perhaps even to varying 'content', certainly to varying proximate objects. All that I have specified is its locus; namely, in persons (not in 'systems' or the like). And I have ventured to suggest what it is not. The Meaning and End is calculated to say, in *neti, neti* fashion, that whatever faith be, it is not 'a religion'. I also argue that it is not belief, a doctrine. Nonetheless in any given case it is clearly coloured and given contour and the like by such; yet it seems to me never to be exhausted by them.⁸⁹

Also, in response to Sharpe's criticism, Smith clearly shows why he does not want to identify the specific content of his concept of faith.

A.R. Gualtieri, too, was disappointed that I had been inconclusive in any delineation of the content of faith. Yet surely that is precisely the point. For we can not operate with a conception of human faith that is defined, specified, given precision, either if on the one hand we are going to lead a religious life ourselves in its constant pilgrimage into the unknown, its constant involvement in mystery (my own faith in God would be sadly underestimated by any formulation; **définir Dieu,**

c'est définir Dieu, or (and) if on the other hand we are going to discourse with Muslims or Hindus or others for whom any preconceived notions of ours of what their faith is or ought to be are surely inadequate. (A Christian might even feel sure that he knows what his own faith is, and even ought to be, but not what the Hindu's will turn out to be and therefore not what faith in general is.) Therefore, I have tried to suggest 'faith' as an explicitly open category, or **generic** (not specific) concept, open to differing specificities in differing instances.⁹⁰

In response to Sharpe's identification of Smith's concept of faith with that of an English intellectual missionary in India, Alfred George Hogg, Smith clearly shows the difference between Hogg and himself. According to Hogg, the faith behind all phenomena of religious traditions is the same and one. If one does not read carefully Smith's idea of faith, it could be easily misunderstood that Smith, like Hogg, regarded the faith of all religious traditions as the same. This misunderstanding has been the obstacle to appreciating Smith's understanding of faith. As mentioned above, except for the universal role of faith in every human being's life, faith has been and is different, depending upon the individual's participation in his or her own tradition, as colouring universal faith.

You approvingly cite A.G. Hogg as saying.. that although 'the divergencies between the intellectual beliefs by which men seek to preserve' their faith are 'an immensely important matter, yet 'the inner most faith of all religions...must be one and the same.' I agree with him and you that the divergencies are 'an immensely important matter'; I do **not** agree with him that the innermost faith is or even must be 'one and the same.' In as much as for me faith is a relationship between men and God, what is the same in every case is at most one end of that relationship, not the relationships themselves, which vary with the particular men at the other end. Hindu faith differs from Christian faith in immensely important ways (and indeed Hindu faith notoriously differs from

Hindu faith).⁹¹

Until now, Smith's idea of faith has been discussed by focusing upon his historical and personal understanding of faith. However, the content of faith has not been described, even though there are many examples of Smith's usages such as transcendence, God, or truth. We now move to a description of Smith's understanding of transcendence.

As Eric Sharpe, A.R. Gualtieri, and Frank Whaling rightly indicated, Smith does not put much emphasis on the understanding of transcendence itself, because all definitions or abstract study of it are inclined to narrow down or reduce the realm of transcendence.

What I **mean** by Transcendence is a quite minor question; it is transcendence itself, rather (which **inter alia** transcends what I and all of us mean by it/Him), that is of cosmic importance (and whose love and anguish saves us all).⁹²

What in the universe and in human life is higher than man, was ruled out of consideration by definition.⁹³

Another reason why Smith does not want to define transcendence lies in human beings' inability to comprehend transcendence completely; as can be seen through the humanities' and social sciences' partial, reductionistic understanding of transcendence. He summarized it very clearly in the following passage:

Whether the transcendence is the human imagination at work or the fantasy of subconscious neurosis, or the meaningless pattern of language gone awry, or the ideological superstructure of a particular economic situation; or whether it is a real world, or more real than this immediate one, or is this immediate one perceived more truly; and whether, if it is real, it is personal, Jesus-like, rational, formless, moral, punitive, unknowable--all these are questions on which

intelligent men have taken varying stands.⁹⁴

In contrast to the above queries, Smith has developed a unique inquiry into transcendence. He does not study it from the traditional systematic or philosophical perspective, but from the historical and personal. He clearly articulates his novel approach as follows;

Our academic and intellectual skills are not capable of letting us climb over a mountain whose summit is in the skies. While staying on the ground we may, if the road that I discern does not deceive me, quietly outflank it, and so get on with our task.⁹⁵

In other words, Smith has identified his intellectual understanding of transcendence with that of the experience of transcendence in the heart of the human being and in their total context of life. Thus, to Smith, "to speak truly about God means henceforth to interpret accurately the history of human religious life on earth."⁹⁶

On the basis of the personal approach to transcendence, Smith examines how the idea of transcendence or God has been perceived in the life of humanity.

First of all, Smith has understood that the idea of God is different from God and the idea is actualized differently depending upon the personal life of all human beings. The actualization of the idea in life itself is not the same as God or transcendence itself. Thus, human beings' experience of God is not an exhaustive or complete understanding of God, but always partial. As he puts it,

This idea [of God] has been more dominant, more central, in the Islamic case than the Christian. Yet even the

most Christophile or most Christocentric could hardly deny that the idea of God has been decisive for the Church. I should not wish to make the naive mistake of confusing God with the idea of God. Nonetheless it would be difficult to deny that the idea of God has played a central role both in Islamic and in Christian history; and by this I mean in the spiritual life, the moral action, the community practice, and every other facet of both Muslim and Christian being. The theologian might wish to recognize the justice of this observation by saying that God has mediated Himself to Muslims and Christians through, *inter alia*, their idea of God. I myself will say this in a forthcoming book. Here I wish only to press this point; that the Christian idea of God, to take that instance, in its course over the centuries has been a part of the world history of the idea of God on earth, the historian can now see; Christians receiving from, contributing to, and participating in that total history.⁹⁷

As Smith has said, he owes his idea of God to many ideas of God from the various world religious traditions. Smith articulated his special indebtedness to the Sufi tradition, in the article "Muslim and Christian: Faith Convergence, Belief Divergence", which was delivered in front of an audience of intellectual Muslims.

...Jalalu-d-Din-Rumi, by whom and by other Persian Sufi's I have been profoundly influenced. The mystics, including Iqbal though he was chary of the name, have taught me that all mundane forms can be pointers to the divine, and despite their diversity have served men as the channel through which their own encounter with the divine is mediated...⁹⁸

His indebtedness to world religious traditions can also be found in his book, Belief and History.

The proposal owes something to the Brahman/Isvara distinction, to the 'God-beyond-God' notion, to Plotinus, as well as to Christian sacramentalism.⁹⁹

Secondly, due to the various senses or experiences of transcendence or God, Smith has also perceived the concept of God as that of sacrament or symbol in the human being's life.

There seems to be merit in proposing that we think of the concept 'God' as a sacrament. As an historian, I can observe the rise of this concept in the ancient near East, its gradual development, its special elaboration by the Jewish, then the Christian, then the Islamic movements over half the earth; its vicissitudes, its evolutions, its present-day...shall we say, doldrums. It has been one of the most magnificent of divine-human complexes. Yet as a concept, however complex and however open to the divine, like other things human, it has been and will remain mundane and in motion.¹⁰⁰

One of the most powerful symbols in human history has, without question, been the concept 'God.' This concept, like other religious and other human symbols, has demonstrably meant different things to different persons and groups and ages...¹⁰¹

Thirdly, Smith understood the idea of God or transcendence as "a reality that transcends the immediate mundane."¹⁰² According to Smith, all great religious intellectuals have seen or experienced the transcendent reality and have tried to articulate their experience in their intellectual work. To them, their articulation of their experience has been perceived as incomplete intellectual work. However, they never have doubted the existence of the transcendent itself, as the sceptical philosophers have done, and, further, they never have doubted their ability to study the partial understanding of transcendent reality. In other words, they have recognized that the transcendent reality has always transcended their intellectual perception but can be described partially.

Fourthly, Smith interpreted the idea of transcendence as truth in his "Review Article" of The University: The Anatomy of Academe written by Murray G. Ross. There, Smith criticized modern Western education which is no longer concerned with transcendence or truth, as can be seen in the following quote:

Transcendence generally has been banished from the Weltanschauung of modern intellectuals. Truth can no longer be spelled with a capital T, there is nothing higher than man, and knowledge therefore becomes (in disparate bits) our understanding. Purposes replace ideals. Society is impelled by needs, to whose requirements its institutions respond; human beings are driven by drives, by motivation, and insofar as their wills are free they are totally free, to will whatever each may choose, with only practical restraints but not the theoretical impingements.¹⁰³

Here, Smith's understanding of truth does, of course, recognize the transcendent feature, but puts more emphasis upon the idea of truth which has been historically and personally experienced. As he says in Towards A World Theology:

In so far as the truth is apprehended by persons, it is apprehended within history; yet in so far as it is true, it transcends history (and any particular formulation). It is therefore inherently a transcendent as well as a humane concept.¹⁰⁴

Fifthly, due to his personalistic understanding of meaningful values as the transcendent, Smith has suggested that, although the beliefs in the Buddhist tradition do not reveal the idea of God in the same way as the Christian or the Islamic tradition, Buddhists have sensed or experienced the coherently valuable reality. Dharma as reality can be interpreted as transcendence or God, as can be seen in his article, "Religious Atheism? Early Buddhist and Recent American" delivered at Australia, July, 1966 as the Charles Strong Memorial lecture.

...it is a gospel, an evangel, a joyous proclamation of a discovery of a truth without which life is bleak, is suffering, but with which there is not merely serenity but triumph. It is indeed fortunate for man that he has been born into a universe where evanescence is not the last word. Because there is Dharma, he can be saved.¹⁰⁵

Through their systems of beliefs, they were enabled to

live lives of faith. They tasted transcendence; and accordingly their lives were touched by compassion and coherence and courage and serenity and ultimate significance.¹⁰⁶

Smith further developed the idea of Dharma as that of transcendence or God in the chapter "The Buddhist Instance: Faith as Atheist?" in Faith and Belief. According to Smith, Buddha discovered Dharma and actualized the life of Dharma. To Buddha, "Brahman and the Gods, while not neglected, became part of this world; while dharma was elevated to finality, to absolute transcendence."¹⁰⁷

Though Nirvana was a distant reality, indescribable, not profitable of discussion, yet the Buddha saw and preached another absolute reality immediately available to every man. This is the moral law. The Buddha taught that in the universal flux, one thing is firm. In the chaos of events, one pattern is permanent. In the ebb and flow of human life, one form is absolute, is supreme, is reliable, is effective for salvation. Ideas come and go; religious institutions rise and fall; the gods themselves have their histories; men's and women's goals are frustrated, and anyway are themselves historical; all human strivings, whether to construct something on earth, or through piety or asceticism to try to escape from or to dominate early ambitions, are doomed sooner or later to pass away. Yet through it all one thing is certain, stable, firm, enduring--and is always immediately to hand. That is Dharma: the truth about right living.¹⁰⁸

Sixthly, as Oxtoby rightly commented, Smith does not only observe transcendental meaning in the relationship between religious traditions and devotee but also observes the transcendental meaning in non-religious traditions, for example, Marxist and Socialist's moral vision or classical Western philosophical vision.¹⁰⁹

On the basis of the above six interpretations, Smith's idea of transcendence, or God, can be summarized in two ways. The first

one is that Smith has thought that all interpretations of transcendence themselves are not transcendence itself and can not comprehend transcendence completely. The second one is that all sources of life which can maintain life meaningfully or coherently are truth or transcendence. Smith shows the second factor in his recent article, "Theology and the World's Religious History."

If we think of differences over time rather than over space, we might note that some of us now are more at ease with the concept 'transcendence', in our day the term 'God' having shifted for many to designating a particular concept--that of theists--rather than a cosmic reference. In this paper, and otherwise, I still use the word 'God.' If there be readers who do not like or understand it (yet in the modern world we all have to understand each other's usage of terms of cosmic import, whether we like them or not), I would ask that such persons substitute for the term 'God' in my presentation something like 'transcendent reality', or everything that one recognizes as valuable, plus the transcendence and coherence of their value, or ultimate truth and beauty and goodness and various other such things.¹¹⁰

ii) The Expressions of Faith

Smith articulates the role of faith in the history of humankind from the perspective of the function of faith in life, because faith itself can not be defined or understood except through an analysis of the expressions of faith. In this respect, Smith has identified himself primarily as an historian rather than as a philosopher.

According to Smith, human beings have expressed their own personal faith observably and historically in many forms from ancient times on;

In words, both prose and poetry; in patterns of deeds, both ritual and morality; in art, in institutions, in law, in community, in character; and in still many ways.¹¹¹

a) **The Expression of Faith in Art**

According to Smith, the works of religious art themselves are expressions of the faith of the persons who made them. They also generate the faith of those who reverently perceive the works. Smith has tried to articulate the dimension of faith in relation to an analysis of the materials which have been used for artistic creations. Furthermore he has suggested that those who study the world of art approach artistic creations with,

the appropriate qualities of human sensitivity and disciplined imaginative insight and appreciation--along with, of course, all pertinent historical scholarship.¹¹²

The work of art itself, to Smith, reveals an imperfect and mundane aspect, because the artist is an imperfect human being. However, the important aspect of the work of art is in the fact that "it points beyond itself, to the spirit of the man who framed it and beyond him to the transcendent vision that he saw."¹¹³ For example, the statue of the Buddha clearly has been made with mundane materials--stones, instruments and so on--but the statue has been made out of the deep insight or vision of the agent of the statue, the artist. The insight or vision has been the faith of the artist, and furthermore the faith has made those who see the statue or the devotees to have the transcendent vision more than a mundane statue. Smith reveals his view of art as follows:

Yet it is not art if these concrete particulars do not

serve to express something to which man has access while these particularities in themselves do not.¹⁴

Smith's view of art can be more clearly understood in his article "The True Meaning of Scripture: An Empirical Historian's non-reductionist Interpretation of the Qur'an". Actually, this article was the presidential address to the 1978 annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America.

To some extent I think that a good poet always manages somehow to get more into his poem than he himself is conscious of. McLeish, you will remember, said, "A poem should not mean, but be". Similarly, Socrates is portrayed near the beginning of Plato's **Apologia** as complaining that poets and artists, when he asked them about their works of art, could not clearly tell him what they signified. Yet I think that when a sculptor produces a sculpture, if someone asks him what he meant by it, all that he can do is to point to the sculpture and say, "**That** is what I meant." A great artist, as distinct from an indifferent one, is he or she who can create a work that in its turn will elicit or generate in others, in response, a movement of the spirit.¹⁵

Smith's view of art can be applied to all works of art--sculpture, poetry, temple architecture, and music--except those works of art that exclude the faith dimension. A further examination of Smith's understanding of art reveals that according to Smith, works of art exemplify an historical and timeless, transcendent aspect. All works of art reveal the historical and the contextual meaning, and, at the same time, the transcendental and the universal meaning, but good art reveals the transcendent meaning more than the historical. Smith, clearly articulates his understanding of art in the light of faith in his article "Islamic History as a Concept" given to the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America in 1975.

Each painting or sculpture, each piece of music, each poem that human beings produce has a context. In addition, each has also an intrinsic meaning; or shall we say, a human meaning. The former quality is never missing. No artistic creation but emerges out of and reflects its particular time-and-place setting (often called its historical setting). Nonetheless, if it does not transcend that setting, then it is of little interest, and of little worth. The difference between great art and ephemeral is not that great art has less of the historical, but rather that it has more of the timeless. In truly great art, the contextual is not neglected; it is used, is subsumed, and is transcended.¹¹⁶

In the same article, Smith also related human life to that of art. According to him, all human beings have expressed the transcendent dimension of life from their own historical context. Likewise, works of art come out of an historical context, yet, at the same time, transcend their given context. Thus, to Smith, the life of art is the same as the life of the human being. In other words, art is not an additional activity to becoming a human being, but is a way of being human.

...human life, individual and corporate is a work of art, less or more effectively wrought; so that to study its affairs at any lower level is to distort, or to understand inadequately...Art is intrinsically human. It is not an addendum tacked on to human life, nor an ornament. It is not an extra frill that may be dispensed with in the apprehension of human affairs, of interest only to those who happen to be interested in it, as one among other aberrant extras. Rather, to fail to appreciate art is to fail to appreciate humankind.¹¹⁷

b) The Expression of Faith in Community

Smith thought that all human beings' faith has been expressed in their own religious communities throughout the history of

humankind. For example, Christians have expressed their faith in the Christian community, the Church, the Muslims in the Ummah, the Hindus in the Caste, the Buddhists in the Sangha and so on. Of course, Smith does not ignore the fact that, in reverse, each community has also allowed each devotee to express faith. However, to Smith, the fundamental and primary emphasis is on the role of personal faith, which has formed each community originally and which has maintained it. Furthermore, faith has also produced the doctrine of community, as can be demonstrated in the Christian tradition.

Neither the original existence nor the continued history of religious communities can be understood apart from the personal faith of their members. In highly articulate and intellectualist instances this corporate quality is theoretically formulated, into, for instance, a doctrine of the Church; in the case of a Polynesian or African tribe this may be virtually absent, while the social cohesion and felt loyalty are certainly no less.¹¹⁸

According to Smith, the existence of religious communities has frequently overlapped with that of other social institutions. The phenomenon of overlapping can be easily found especially in the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Islamic, and the Christian medieval communities. It is almost impossible to distinguish the difference between community and society, except for "their faith that constitutes their society as a community."¹¹⁹

In this respect, Smith does not agree with Durkheim. According to Smith's interpretation, Durkheim regarded religion as the product of society or as society itself. In other words, he saw "religion as the expression, the symbolization, of community."¹²⁰ In contrast to Durkheim, Smith has seen "community,

perhaps all society, as the expression, even the symbolization, of faith (although not necessarily of explicit religious faith)."¹²¹

Smith has indicated two concrete weak points of Durkheim's understanding of society as the matrix of religion. According to Smith, historically, society does not produce the consistent meaning of life as religion but, rather, it produces the opposite. As he puts it:

We know about **anomie** and the potential disintegration in place of community. Society in Durkheim's cohesive meaning, is not 'natural' in the sense of being able to give a naturalistic explanation for both. Rather, vice versa. Faith is (in part!) the capacity that persons have to enter into, and to sustain, and to let themselves be sustained by, a group..Faith..is what turns a society into a community.¹²²

Durkheim derived religion from society; being Jewish, he took social cohesion for granted. Today, alas, we know better. He spoke much sense; but one could equally well turn his thesis around and affirm that faith is what turns a society into a community. It is the cause, and not only the result, of corporate solidarity of persons.¹²³

The second reason lies in the fact that Durkheim's understanding of religion is not sufficient enough to understand the historical renovators in each community, because, for the renovators, the communities no longer give the matrix of meaning of religion. Smith describes this point as follows;

For it is an exaggeration to see them as ultimate or elemental. If one takes the community as a prime concept in one's attempt to understand man's story, one can not reckon with a social rebel in the name of the Lord like Amos, or with a hermit or forest dweller, or with an innovator like Jesus or Muhammad from whom communities arise.¹²⁴

Furthermore, Durkheim's ultimate concern with community does not help us understand the modern pluralistic phenomena of life.

The contemporary person does not fully stay in his or her own traditional community but either participates in a variety of communities or else does not belong to any community. Smith shows the contemporary broken sense of community from his own experience of life.

It seems to me that one of the things that has been happening in our day is precisely the waning of communal religious traditions and the relaxing of individual or personal faith. I was brought up a Presbyterian, but I think that although there is a Presbyterian Church, there is no longer a Presbyterian community. There was at one time. Even if there were one, I am not a member. This is part of what the ecumenical movement is about. The foundations of our communities are dissolving. They are being replaced by different kinds. My own personal attempt to find meaning in the world includes reading what Buddha has to say and what other non-Christians have to say. The closed boundary group from which one derived religious vision of the world is no longer so operative as it once was.¹²⁵

The contemporary human being, according to Smith, has found the meaning of life not only in his or her own community but also in other communities. This is a quite different and new phenomena in modern life.

Nor, for that matter, can one reckon with the modern man who feels his way towards a faith but adheres to no community, or who belongs to one community but finds his faith not confined within it: the Presbyterian who reads Methodist books, the Methodist who reads Buber or the **Bhagavad Gita**, the Muslim who is a sincere Indian nationalist, and, indeed, any religious man who sees the value of human brotherhood. Further, one can not understand the situation in China, where, as we have seen, the compartmentalization of men into boundaried religious communities around one religious tradition, on the Western pattern, hardly obtains.¹²⁶

Smith, on the basis of the universal presence of faith in each community or religious and humanistic tradition, has suggested that we transform the modern fragmented society into a human community

which does not ignore the sub-communities of each tradition.

...one of our modern problems is to construct a world-wide community even though it be composed of a diversity of religious traditions...our faith impels us towards a fellowship larger than that of the denominated group of which we are members. The community expression of the faith of a Chinese has not on the whole been of that kind that Europe has manifested in the Thirty Year's War, and Christendom in anti-Semitism and Apartheid, and India in Hindu-Muslim riots.¹²⁷

Perhaps the single most important challenge that mankind faces in our day is the need to turn our nascent world society into a world-community.¹²⁸

Even though, to Smith, each community has been very important, it is not the final or the ultimate in a human being's life. Rather, the faith of the human being is more important and the ultimate criterion needed to form and maintain the community of humankind. Thus, to Smith, faith "is an act that one makes in community; but is not one that any community can make for one."¹²⁹

c) The Expression of Faith in a Human Being's Character

According to Smith, many human beings have expressed their faith not "in formal statements of belief, in formal patterns, in formal community membership, 'but' in character."¹³⁰ To them, the ultimate concern of their faith does not lie in the abstract discussion of belief systems but in character. Due to this fact, Smith has emphasized that,

Certainly to assess a religious tradition by the kind of character that its faith produces would seem more legitimate than to do so on grounds of reason, or revelation, or any impersonal standard, were it not that none of us is in a position to judge.¹³¹

d) The Expression of Faith in the Patterns of Behaviour

Smith thought that faith was expressed in two behaviours: ritual and morality.¹³² Primarily, the rituals themselves have been formed and sustained as expressions of faith, only secondarily have they functioned as a behaviour which nourishes individual faith. Regarding moral behaviour, Smith has asserted that each individual's expression of faith through their own behaviour reveals the moralistic and ethical aspects of their life. Furthermore, historically, moral behaviours are "systematically arranged into a formal pattern, as in the Jewish Torah and the Islamic shari'ah, where morality is ritualized."¹³³ Smith, more than anybody else, has emphasized the moral dimension of life which is derived from each individual's faith. In other words, he has tried to understand how human faith has been playing a role in individual behaviour, not only practically but also intellectually.

...all three of these traditions (Judaean-Islamic and Christian understanding) have seen right action as the will of a personal God, and all have found great difficulty in appreciating the still more immediate formulation of, for instance, the Theravadin Buddhist tradition, where ultimate reality as dharma is itself a transcendent pattern of right conduct, so that even the intellectual expression of faith, let alone the practical, is in ethical terms.¹³⁴

e) The Expression of Faith in Ideas and Words

Smith argued for a long time that human faith is expressed in the intellectualization of ideas or thoughts. According to Smith,

there are two reasons why the expression of faith in intellectual works has not been clearly understood or confused. The first one lies in the fact that the language tool of the expression of faith is prosaic rather than poetic. That is, "from the Apostle's Creed to the most recent volume of Tillich's systematic theology," faith has been expressed in prose.¹³⁵ Due to this fact, faith has been misunderstood as the prosaic expression itself. Furthermore, much attention has been focused upon the content of the expression of faith rather than the fact that faith has come from the human being's heart or sense of transcendence and has played the role as the matrix of life. Because of this fact, especially, the intellectualization of faith as belief rather than the experience of transcendence has been emphasized in the Christian tradition. (I will treat the relation between belief and faith in the next section of the present chapter.) Of course, here, it can not be ignored that the Greek philosophical framework also contributed to form the intellectual expression of faith.

Smith fundamentally insisted that intellectual expression itself be understood in relation to personal faith rather than as being separate from personal faith. Furthermore, he insisted that the faith dimension of intellectual expression itself in the West be understood in the wider context of the human being's experience in other religious traditions.¹³⁶

The second reason is in the fact that

neither Latin nor modern Western languages have a verb to go along with the technical term 'faith' (fides, foi, etc.), and have made do with words for 'believe' (credo, croine, etc.).¹³⁷

Furthermore, the original meaning of 'believe' has been reduced to refer to the impersonal expression itself in the contemporary usage of belief. This kind of approach is easily discovered in a modern language philosophers' fundamental principle that "words and sentences mean something."¹³⁸ According to them, meaning lies in the expression of faith itself rather than the heart of the person who was first involved in the expression as the first to express it or the participant in the expression since the expression was made.

My particular hypothesis here is that religious statements express the faith of persons, who as persons are involved in transcendence...The proper way to understand a religious statement is to endeavour not to see what its words and clauses mean (which may too easily become, what they mean to me), but to see what they have meant to the man who first uttered them and what they have meant to those since for whom they have served as expressions of their faith.¹³⁹

As in the case of art, Smith has perceived that human language has been used as the instrument or the carrier of human faith. Language has been used to express the human experience of transcendence as faith. Language can not carry faith completely but only incompletely. Smith's emphasis has been on the fact of the human language's inability to completely express the experience of transcendence in the heart of the devotee.

Ultimately and indirectly they are statements about transcendence. Primarily and immediately they are about persons, whose faith means that they are involved in such a transcendence. The transcendence, and even the involvement, are something to which their statements may be an attempt to give intellectual expression, but which those statements can not capture but only indicate.¹⁴⁰

f) The Expression of Faith in Philosophy and Science

Smith articulated philosophy as the expression of personal faith. According to him, the individual's faith makes the philosophical systems in history, and so the primary emphasis is in the faith, not in the philosophies. To him, the so-called philosophical systems have been the belief systems which mean the cumulative expressions of philosophers' personal faith. As he puts it,

It is not what a philosopher believes that makes him or her a philosopher but rather his or her faith, the faith out of which the beliefs, the particular "philosophy", are born and by which they are sustained...The relation between the belief of individual philosophers (which is their philosophies) and the faith of all philosophers (of which their philosophies are the expressions, varied and un-co-ordinated and always inadequate) constitutes a tricky but potentially fruitful question.¹⁴¹

Smith, especially, has pointed out four aspects of philosophy which have played a role as faith in the human being's life in the West, in his article "Philosophia, as One of the Religious Traditions of Humankind: The Greek Legacy in Western Civilizations, Viewed by a Comparativist." The four aspects are

humanism, idealism, metaphysics, and the idea of rationality, as over the centuries they have been articulated and re-articulated in our life in the legacy that stems from Greece, have provided persons and society with a complex of patterns in terms of which they have been able to organize their lives, and to find them meaningful; to find coherence in the universe, to attain coherence within themselves, and to coordinate these two; to dedicate themselves to goals discerned as worth striving for, with courage and loyalty and discipline strong enough to overcome both external and internal pressures of lesser worth. This, a comparativist well knows, is the stuff of faith.¹⁴²

Smith, also, articulated that scientists have expressed their

spirit in the field of science, as follows:

...a comparable question as to the faith of scientists. I mean their faith in science, in the spirit of science: in science not as an objective actuality in disparate parts, but as an elusive and integral dynamic of which the outward expressions at any given moment, although worthy, are always and in principle inadequate and to be superseded--a dynamic that is both demanding and rewarding, in which they delight to be involved, and in which their involvement gives meaning to their work and even in some degree to their life. This faith undergirds and informs and elicits and transcends their work. Their beliefs (the concrete parts of the specific sciences of the day) come and go; but their faith, with all its ultimate ineffability, persists. As long as it persists the scientific tradition will creatively flourish.¹⁴³

Smith, further, has confirmed his fundamental thinking that science has been one of the human activities or expression of human spirit in his recent article, "History in relation to both science and religion" (1981) as follows:

The new view, just emerging, changes not the details of this, which in fact remain; but the framework and overall structure. Rather than seeing man as a minuscule item in the universe of science, we can rather look at science as one of the items in the historical attainment of man. Science is not a minor human achievement. Yet human it is: a human construct. It is one expression of one aspect of the human spirit.¹⁴⁴

In other words, just as Michael Polanyi thought of science as the expression or belief system of the scientist's personal faith,¹⁴⁵ so Smith understands science as the expression of the human spirit and its desire to know.¹⁴⁶

iii) The Relationship Between Faith and Belief

In his article titled "Muslim and Christian: Faith Convergence, Belief Divergence," Smith notes that, in Western

religious thought, belief has been incorrectly perceived as the most important idea in the process of religious life; he gives three main reasons for such an erroneous perception.¹⁴⁷ The first one is derived from the modern situation in life which is quite different from that of earlier times. According to Smith, the emergence of religious pluralism, the predominant influence of scientific thought, and the appearance of conflicting ideologies have led many Western intellectuals to articulate the concept of belief rather than faith. Thus, they have focused more on the abstract or impersonal understanding of belief. The second reason is discovered in the position of Western theology in Western life. According to Smith, theology played a more important role than faith, historically. Thus, belief as articulated in theology has been regarded as the fundamental category of Christian life. This fact is due to the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy on Christian intellectual life. The third reason is manifest in the historical transformation of the meaning of 'believe' or 'belief' in the English language. Smith is the first person to have paid much attention to the transformation of the meaning and to identify the modern confusion between belief and faith as the most important factor contributing to the impersonalistic understanding of human beings.¹⁴⁸

Smith, especially, has developed an analysis of the third reason intensively in his two important books, Belief and History which was delivered as the Richard Lectures for 1974-1975, in the University of Virginia, and Faith and Belief.

As Smith thoroughly analyzed the term 'religion' in his book The Meaning and End of Religion, he examined the usage of 'believe' or 'belief', from early modern periods to modern contemporary times, in his book Belief and History. In this book he indicates three transformed aspects of the term "believe".

The first transformed aspect lies in the grammatical object of the verb 'believe' from the personal to the propositional.¹⁴⁹ According to Smith's analysis of the Bible, the verb 'believe' is used in the following ways: "with no object 34%; personal object 41%; and, things as object (including word, promise, etc.) 12%. Literally, the verb believe in English means "to hold dear, to belove, to treasure." Smith emphasized the point that the usage of the Bible's verb 'believe' was not used with the propositional object, as the verb 'believe' is used in contemporary life.

Smith, also, examined the works of Shakespeare and certain English philosophers'. According to Smith, the verb believe was mainly used to indicate "The relation to a person." Smith started to examine the works of Shakespeare. Shakespeare mostly used the verb believe to indicate or refer to "a direct personal object." In the period after Shakespeare, Smith explores the meaning of "belief" in the works of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Ayer. According to Smith, Bacon used the verb believe or belief in relation to persons. Hobbes used the verb in relation to a person's word with strong assertion, and Locke in relation to assent or opinion or trust of the proponents. Hume, also, does not use belief in relation to a

propositional usage ("that..." clause). However, the situation changed in the works of John Stuart Mill. Mill, in the nineteenth century, used the verb believe in relation to propositions. In the twentieth century, in most cases, believe or belief have been used not in relation to 'belief in' a person, personal opinion, ideas and so on, but in relation to 'belief that', in the form of a proposition. Smith indicated the modern philosopher, Ayer as representative of this usage and, directly, quoted Ayer's use of the propositional form 'belief that' as follows: "until we have an intelligible proposition before us, there is nothing for faith to get to work on."¹⁵⁰ The meaning of the 'belief that' propositional form has been really different from the original meaning of 'believe' or 'belief in'. According to Smith, the original meaning of 'believe' can be related to the concept of faith rather than 'believe that.' As he put it,

Historically, most men's and women's faith has been in a person, a moral imperative, a transcendent reality (or simply: in reality), or other non-propositions.¹⁵¹

The second transformed aspect of the verb 'believe' refers to the subject of the verb 'believe'.¹⁵² Smith, again, shows the usage of Shakespeare's 'believe' in relation to the subject of the verb 'believe.' According to Smith, Shakespeare mainly used 'believe' with the first person subject in the form of 'self-engagement' or 'interpersonal relationship' frequently with the second person subject in the form of 'the personalized imperative' - 'Believe me,' but never used it with the third person subject. Smith, also, described the same results from his analysis of Bacon,

Hobbes, Lock, Hume and Kant. However, in the modern usage of 'believe', the subject has been transformed into the third person subject, in relation to other religious traditions, and so the focus is on the abstraction rather than inter-relation between the self of the examiner and the self of the believer.

The third transformed aspect of the term 'believe' lies in the fact that the usage of 'believe' means not truth but falsity, in contemporary consciousness.¹⁵³ Originally, the word 'believe' was used to refer to a relation to truth, but the original meaning has degenerated to the meaning of "neutrality and then uncertainty," and further 'falsehood.' Thus, generally, the usage of belief shows uncertainty or doubt.

Smith indicates the representative case of the shift of the meaning of 'believe' in the modern philosopher H.H. Price's article in Encyclopaedia Britannica III (1973 edition). Smith sees the shift as the most substantial one and quotes directly from Price's article.

It is never a contradiction to say 'What A believes is false,' but it is, of course, a contradiction to say 'What A knows is false.'¹⁵⁴

Smith summarizes the three shifts in the meaning of the verb believe in relation to subject and object as follows:

- I. He recognizes that A is B.
- II. He is of the opinion that A is B.
- III. He imagines that A is B.¹⁵⁵

As the quotation shows, usually, the meaning has been changed from right judgement (I), to neutral judgement (II), to wrong judgment (III). Comparatively, the verb 'believe' is mainly used

with the third person subject, and the object is formed with the propositional form, "that...clause." Smith extends the above quotation in relation to listeners more carefully as follows:

- I. Mr. X reports that M recognizes that P.
- II. Mr. Y reports that M is of the opinion that Q.
- III. Mr. Z reports that M imagines that R.¹⁵⁶

The first one means that the speaker or the writer X and the listener and the reader have the assent that P is correct. The second means that Y reserves judgement on whether Q is right or wrong. M's opinion does not matter, and neither does Mr. Y's. The third means that Mr. Z has his own position to judge that R is wrong and, further, Mr. Z and the listener or the reader would agree. In other words, the English word 'believe' is used originally as:

The verbal sign designating allegiance, loyalty, integrity, love, commitment, trust and entrusting, and the capacity to perceive and to respond to transcendent qualities in oneself and one's environment--in short, faith; the Christian form of God's most momentous gift to each person.¹⁵⁷

However, the term, "belief" or "believe" has come to mean the "term by which we designate rather a series of dubious, or at least problematic, propositions."¹⁵⁸

Due to these shifts, "to believe in God" no longer designates the original meaning of dedicating oneself to God without any doubt of God's existence, but instead, designates doubt in the existence of God and the opinion of those who assert God's existence. Furthermore, the modern usage of 'belief' does not consider the personal meaning of the devotee's use of the term in his and her life but instead views the meaning in terms of a propositional

understanding of the word belief. Smith has said that this shows "the growing impersonalism both of the object and of the subject of our verb; and the growing abstraction,"¹⁵⁹ in the contemporary world.

Even the impersonal noun 'belief' is not found in the Bible, according to Smith's analysis of the Bible, except for one case in II Thessalonians 2:13.¹⁶⁰ Even there, the meaning is not the modern propositional meaning of belief. Smith examined the word belief in the 1611 King James Authorized Version of the Bible in English. According to his analysis, the word 'faith' is used 233 times, the verb 'believe' 285 times, and 'believing,' 'unbelief', 'believer' and other forms 321 times. As a result, the modern "propositional" usage of 'belief' is not scriptural, according to him.

Due to such shifts in meaning of 'belief,' two kinds of consciousness have been formed. Smith described the two kinds of consciousness¹⁶¹ in his book Faith and Belief. The first one is the fact that belief has become "self-consciously the yes-or-no passport to faith," and further, the question of belief does not focus on "What one believed, religiously, but whether [they have beliefs or belief systems]". Thus, many arguments or studies of 'belief' have not focused on the object of belief but whether or not people of other traditions have had belief systems. The existence of 'belief' itself has become a primary category of understanding the devotee, in the modern world. The second one lies in the fact that, especially in the Christian tradition,

religious discourse is no longer concentrated on the Transcendent or God, or the relation of the human being to the Transcendent or God, but on the "conceptualizations: on believing." According to Smith, at the present moment, the primary category for understanding the human being has been "belief" rather than faith, or transcendence.

Faith is not to be subordinated to belief, nor to anything else mundane. To it, all religious forms are to be seen as at best strictly secondary--as faith itself is secondary to, derivative from, answerable to, transcendent reality and final truth.¹⁶²

The misrepresented category of human understanding has prevented the intellectual, personal understanding of the human being.

To a significant degree, the very concept 'believing/belief' had become an integral aspect of the new detranscendentalized ideology: an intellectual instrument for secularizing one's understanding of the human. 'Believing' had become a category of thought calculated to denature the religious life.¹⁶³

Smith clearly articulates the three differences between faith and belief.¹⁶⁴ The first difference is discovered in the object of faith and belief. "The object of faith used to be a person or God (God and Christ in the Christian case) but belief has come to be an idea, a thing." In the state of faith, there is "a decision, the taking of a step, of cosmic self-commitment," but in the state of 'believing,' there is "a descriptive if not positive, condition." The third one is derived from the mood of faith and believing. The mood of faith involves "one's relation to absolutes, to realities of surpassing grandeur and surety", but the mood of belief or believing, "one's relation to uncertainties, to matters of

explicitly questionable validity."

In conclusion, to Smith, the fundamental error of human understanding is derived from the exclusive, one-sided, unbalanced, reductive, conscious perspective of belief rather than faith. This error has greatly contributed to the impersonalistic understanding of the human being and the modern spiritual crisis. In other words, the traditional, unconscious acceptance of one's own presuppositions, or beliefs has been questioned, and, further, beliefs have been studied objectively without considering the person who is involved with belief, the devotee. Finally, beliefs have become the ultimate category of human understanding in all traditions. As he puts it:

The religious crisis of the modern world has arisen in that presuppositions, which had been virtually unconscious, or at least had been accepted as manifest and stable, were raised to the level of consciousness. Or perhaps we should speak not of levels, up or down, but of horizontal distance from the perceiving self; should speak not of raising ideas or patterns of ideas to consciousness, nor even, maybe better, of lowering them to such a level, but rather of objectifying them and removing them to a distance; the transforming transition in the realm of religion from consciousness to self-consciousness.¹⁶⁵

4. Participation as a Way of Becoming Human

Smith, in his book Questions of Religious Truth, declares that no individual can become a religious human being "in vacuum."¹⁶⁶ According to him, an individual can only become a religious person-or human being--through participation in their historical religious tradition. However, it does not mean that only those who

participate in a religious tradition can become a human being, because, to Smith, an individual can also, as I have pointed out, become human through the secular humanistic tradition (especially in the philosophical tradition of the West). I have also discussed, in the first section of the present chapter, that, to Smith, there is no difference between the struggle to become religious and the struggle to become human, and so Smith has announced that the individual, essentially, has tried to become human rather than religious. Furthermore, to Smith, participation in a tradition does not presuppose that, in advance, all individuals can become human by simply mechanically following the life pattern of their tradition. Rather, it means that an individual's decision to choose to participate in their specific tradition, a decision which must be reaffirmed throughout their lives, is the key to becoming a human being. Thus, to Smith, the fundamental decision to be human is made by individuals.

According to Smith, although almost all individuals have chosen their traditions through willful participation, if one examines the history of humankind one would note that almost all individuals have directly or indirectly been participating in their neighbour's traditions as well, and ultimately in transcendence. Mutual participation forms the history of humankind. Thus, to Smith, pure participation in one tradition has never happened in the history of humankind. In other words, all participation has taken place in the inter-connected historical forms. Thus, even mystical participation reveals the historical social and cultural

context.

At the highest mystical level, also, to be a Muslim...is to have communion with God through participation in the forms and patterns, channelled through the poetry and institutions, that constitute on earth the historical process...¹⁶⁷

According to Smith, above all, all individuals have not only participated in transcendence through their traditions and other traditions, but, in reverse, transcendence participates in "the hearts" of all individuals in all human affairs. As he puts it:

The attribute (living religiously) arises not because those persons participate in some entity called religion but because they participate in what I have called Transcendence.¹⁶⁸

God's best efforts to give Himself/Herself/itself through the sacraments, Christian or other, through His/Her/Its son, through the Bhagavad Gita, through the Torah, and to participate in our lives to save us in this or that century, on this or that continent, have often been but meagrely successful, at least, God knows--and we should know it too. To study history--that is, to have one's intellect participate in broad reaches of the life of humankind over time and space--is to know more fully the grandeur and the pathos of man in his and her relation to God.¹⁶⁹

What one should carefully understand is that Smith's emphasis is not on transcendence itself but on the participation of transcendence in human beings' lives, and furthermore on the locus of the participation of transcendence, the hearts of human beings. This is the most important key to Smith's original, personal understanding of religious life.

Smith, due to his unique human understanding, has understood the history of religion as the locus of human beings' participation in transcendence and transcendence's in the human being. Thus, to Smith, history is the most important fact for understanding the

human being and transcendence as co-subjects in history, and so Smith has always identified himself as a historian. His understanding of history will be discussed in the next chapter.

Here, also, what one must carefully understand is the fact that Smith's understanding of transcendence's participation in the hearts of human beings does not limit that participation to a specific tradition but, rather, it asserts that the transcendence participates in all living traditions. This point is very clearly described in the following passages:

Through Islamic patterns God across the centuries has been participating in the life of Muslims; through Buddhist patterns in the life of Buddhists; through Hindu modes in the life of India: through Jewish forms, also after the first century, in the life, individual and social, of Jews; and some of us know, through Christian forms in our lives. It is through His participation in the religious history of the world (and in the Western case, also the history of the Graeco-Roman tradition) that He has chiefly entered human lives to act in human history. Right now, He is calling us to let Him act through new forms, continuous with the old, as we human beings across the globe enter our strange new age.¹⁷⁰

And the religious history of the world is the record of God's loving, creative, inspiring dealings with recalcitrant and sinful but not unresponsive men and women. Christian He has saved through Christ's death and resurrection, through membership in the Church, through the sacraments, through the myths and rituals and the art and music and the theology and the vicissitudinal history of the Christian Church. Buddhists He has saved through the teachings of the Buddha; through the imaginative memory of His person; through the scriptures, and the temples, and perhaps especially those superbly powerful and serene statues of the Buddha-image; and through the addenda to the ever-growing Buddhist process that innovative men and women have introduced in various parts of the world. Jews He has saved through that Torah that Christians have made a point of misunderstanding, and through the changing complex of Judaic minutiae, and through a Testament that form them (and for Him, in His relation to them) is not old. Hindus He has saved, inspired, encouraged, made creative, through the poetry

of the Gita and also through forms and doctrines and structures that many Christians find odd, but that God has found effective. God is more imaginative than we Christians used to think. And man more responsive. God has participated more richly in human affairs, man has participated more diversely in God, than we once knew.¹⁷¹

Smith has emphasized the co-participation of human beings and God in the making of human history, as we have seen, but he does not ignore the aspect of transcendence as the "great other."

...human history and especially the history of religion, in our non-bifurcationist discernment, has been the locus of man's intercourse with transcendence, of his and her participation in it and its in them...my emphasis on corporate self-consciousness might seem to lend itself to a charge of collective subjectivism, despite my disclaimers, were there not dramatically included within it that historically persistent consciousness of a surpassingly great other. Hence the insistence that the understanding that we seek, call it theology or not is not simply of the history of religion, but of that to which the history of religion has at its best been a response.¹⁷²

In a word, to Smith, the heart of the human being is the locus of their faith. On the basis of the locus in the heart of the human being, Smith has shown two types of participation in the context of history. The first one is participation in their own tradition and the second one is the mutual participation in all traditions. According to Smith, all human beings have become human through mutual involvement, directly or indirectly. Through mutual encounters, an individual can become human in their own tradition but also in relation to other traditions.

The person is a person through being inter-involved with other persons. And it turns out that we are Christians, those of us who are so, not only in ourselves, but in relation to others on earth.¹⁷³

Thus, to Smith, the reflected or perceived other element in

human relations has been indispensable for becoming human.

A more reflective stance, and a truer appreciation of the way that God enters human life, leads one to recognize that such differences are inherent in human spirituality--or, we may say, in divine providence.¹⁷⁴

Smith has provided examples of this mutual participation. Here, Smith's contemporary examples from the contact between the Christian tradition and others, will be discussed. Smith has understood the missionary movement of the Christian tradition in nineteenth-century Asia as participation in the development of other religious traditions rather than in the history of Christianity, solely. The representative case can be found in the historical background of the modern philosopher of India, S. Radhakrishnan. He could not be properly understood without considering his education in Madras Christian College founded by missionaries from England. Here, his intellectual development of understanding his own tradition--the Hindu--and another tradition--the Christian--was especially matured through the participation of his mentor, Alfred George Hogg, in order to make Radhakrishnan reflect on his own tradition and react against the Christian interpretation of his own tradition. At the same time he, also, participated in his mentor's mature understanding of the Hindu tradition through ceaseless discussions with A.G. Hogg. Thus, it can be said that S. Radhakrishnan and A.G. Hogg participated in each other rather than a simple uni-directional interpretation which recognizes Hogg's influence on Radhakrishnan. This interpretation can also be applied to the relation between M. Gandhi and C.F. Andrews.

Smith gives another good example through the thought of the Jewish writer Martin Buber. According to Smith, Buber's thought has played an important role in the development of twentieth-century Christian thought. His thought has been participated in by Christians, and so his famous book, Ich und Du was translated into English by a Presbyterian pastor. Furthermore many Christian theologians or philosophers have studied his thought. Thus it can not be doubted that Buber has participated in the development of modern Christian thought. At the same time, we should not forget that the Christian thought of Nicholas of Cusa and Jacob Böhme's mystical thought, have contributed to the development of Buber's thought and so, he submitted his doctoral thesis on the two mystics' thought. Later, he also studied the thought of Meister Eckhart and published his edition of Meister Eckhart's thought. In this way, Buber and Christian thinkers have participated in the development of each other's thought.

Traditionally, the word 'missionaries' has been used to mean the Western missionaries. But, in modern times, 'missionaries' means not only the Western but also the Eastern or African missionaries. Non-Christians have begun to establish their own tradition in the milieu of the Western Christian tradition. It has been quite common to see mosques, synagogues, temples and so on next to the building of the Church in the West. This phenomenon metaphorically signifies the fact that non-Christians have participated in the development of the Christian tradition. Of course, during the process of participating in the development of

the Christian tradition, non-Christians--as Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and so on--have also had some converts in the West, even though their goals or purposes have not been the seeking of converts. The representative case can be found in the case of the Ramakrishna missionary movement.

Smith, also, interpreted the relationship between writers and critics as a participation in the development of their intellectual works in the same tradition or in other tradition. Smith indicated that even Karl Barth has participated in many critics' critical view of his neo-orthodox Christian thinking and at the same time, many critics of Barth's thought participated in "the formation of that new phase of Christian theology that Barth, for better or worse, initiated."¹⁷⁵ In this way, Charles Darwin, Marx, and Freud also participated in the intellectual development of the Christian thought in many ways. At the same time, Christian thought has also participated in the formation of their critical radical thoughts.

For Smith, all human beings have been historically interconnected through their conscious participation in their own traditions and through their indirect or unconscious participation in other traditions. Further, Smith observed such interconnections as the indications that ultimately all human beings have participated in the transcendent reality through their own traditions and other traditions in history.

To be a Christian means to participate in the Christian process, just as to be a Muslim means to participate in the Islamic process; to be a Jew, in the Jewish; and so on, and on. My own considered view, and I am prepared to argue for it later in our study, is that each of these processes has been and continues to be a divine-human

complex. To fail to see the human element in any would, I shall argue presently, be obtuse. (To fail to see the interrelatedness of all is, I suggest, old fashioned.)¹⁷⁶

This point of interconnectedness has always been an historical reality but it was not recognized in academic circles in the past. However, at the present moment, such interconnectedness, for Smith, is a modern, urgent, global reality which should be tackled in intellectual circles.¹⁷⁷ For a long time, Smith has urged all religious intellectuals in each tradition to reflect upon the reality self-consciously and, furthermore, to participate in the intellectual, theoretical construction, for the wider community of humankind, as Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Christians, Muslims, Humanists and so on.

...I spoke of my aspiring to participate Christianly in the one spiritual community of all humankind, and in the constructing of a theory of it - a community of communities, and a theory of pluralism; and I invited others to do so as Hindus, Buddhists or whatever.¹⁷⁸

In conclusion through proper participation in their own tradition, and indirectly in other traditions, all persons can sense or experience transcendence in order to become more fully human, and furthermore, actualize transcendence's participation in their life. Thus, to Smith, the ultimate locus of transcendence's participation in person and individual's participation in transcendence is the same, the heart of the human being. Furthermore, all individuals ultimately participate in the human-divine dialectical relations which have produced "the only community there is, the one to which I know that I truly belong, is the community, world-wide and history-long, of humankind."¹⁷⁹

ENDNOTES: CHAPTER THREE

1. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion: A Revolutionary Approach to the Great Religious Traditions (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), P.12.
2. ibid., pp. 48-49.
3. ibid., p. 51.
4. ibid., p. 76.
5. ibid., p. 124.
6. ibid., p. 127.
7. W.C. Smith, Belief and History (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1977), p. 25.
8. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p. 126.
9. ibid., pp. 127-128.
10. ibid., p. 131.
11. ibid., p. 134.
12. W.C. Smith, Towards A World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981), p. 117.
13. ibid., p. 122.
14. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 50.
15. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 146.
16. ibid., p. 144.
17. ibid., p. 146.
18. ibid., p. 153.
19. W.C. Smith, "Theology and the World's Religious History." In Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, edited by Leonard Swidler (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1987), p. 55.
20. W.C. Smith, Questions of Religious Truth (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1967), p. 68.
21. ibid.

22. ibid., pp. 68-69.
23. ibid., p. 71.
24. ibid., p. 81.
25. W.C. Smith, "The Modern West in the History of Religion." In The Journal of the American Academy of Religion, (LII/1, 1984), p. 9.
26. W.C. Smith, "Shall Next Century be Secular or Religious?" in Tenri International Symposium '86: Cosmos, Life, Religion: Beyond Humanism (Tenri, Japan: Tenri University Press, 1988), p. 142.
27. W.C. Smith, "The Introductory Course, The Most Important Course" in Teaching The Introductory Course in Religious Studies: A Source Book edited by Mark Juergensmeyer, (Georgia: Scholars Press, 1991), p. 184.
28. W.C. Smith, "An Historian of Faith Reflects on What we are Doing Here." In Christian Faith in a Religiously Plural World, edited by Donald G. Dowe and John B. Carman (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1978), p. 147.
29. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 137.
30. ibid.
31. ibid., p. 138.
32. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, pp. 156-57.
33. ibid., p. 168.
34. ibid.
35. ibid., pp. 160-61. As John Hick correctly remarked Smith's scholarship as "always thorough and exact" thinker in his foreword to his student's doctoral thesis about "The Global Philosophy of Wilfred Cantwell Smith", Smith has been very sensitive and alert to the misused or misconceived usage of important religious terms for understanding religious phenomena, and, furthermore, has articulated many terms to be analyzed in terms of original meaning, for example, the meaning of "belief" or "religion" or "faith". Smith especially has analyzed many book titles that have been mistranslated. See, W.C. Smith, "On Mistranslated Booktitles" in Religious Studies (March, 1984). In relation to Hick's remark, John Hick, "Preface" in Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A Theology for the World written by Edward Hughes (London: SCM

- Press, 1986).
36. ibid., p. 157.
 37. ibid., p. 158.
 38. ibid., p. 159.
 39. ibid., p. 160.
 40. ibid., p. 165.
 41. W.C. Smith, "Religion as Symbolism" introduction to propaedia, part 8, 'Religion,' in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990), vol. 30, p. 299.
 42. ibid.
 43. ibid.
 44. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 160.
 45. W.C. Smith, Religious Diversity edited by Williard G. Oxtoby (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982), p. 18.
 46. ibid., p. 70.
 47. W.C. Smith, Questions of Religious Truth, pp. 78-79.
 48. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 186.
 49. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 129.
 50. Rudolf Otto argues that, traditionally "holiness" -the holy- has served as a category of interpreting and evaluating the uniqueness of religious phenomena. However, the modern meaning of "holiness" has been schematized to indicate ethics or morality, rather than a reality beyond ethical meaning. Rudolf Otto argues that the original meaning of "holiness" is more than ethical or moralistic, so that he suggests a new term which can cover the meaning of Holiness beyond the meaning of moral goodness. The new term, etilogically comes from a Latin word for divinity, "numen", but Otto coined a new word "numinous" which describes a state of mind, **sui generis** and can be applied to religious phenomena. In so doing to him the "numinous" state of mind is the fundamental category of understanding religious phenomena. See, Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy translated by John W. Harvey, second edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp.5-7. Also see, Philip C. Almond, Rudolf Otto: An Introduction to His Philosophical Theology (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), Chapter 3 and 4.

51. F. Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers translated by John Oman (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1958), see especially the second speech, "The Nature of Religion", and The Christian Faith, Volume 1 edited by H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 12ff.
52. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1958), p. 1.
53. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p. 3.
54. W.C. Smith, "Responsibility" in Modernity and Responsibility: Essays for George Grant (University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 80.
55. ibid.
56. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 3.
57. ibid., p. 18.
58. ibid., pp. 5-6.
59. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 189.
60. ibid., p. 191.
61. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 131.
62. W.C. Smith, Towards A World Theology, p. 168.
63. ibid. .
64. W.C. Smith, "Traditional Religions and Modern Culture" in Religious Diversity, p. 72.
65. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 12.
66. ibid.
67. W.C. Smith, "Interpreting Religious Interrelations: An Historian's View of Christian and Muslim" in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 6/5 (Summer 1976-77), P. 521.
68. W.C. Smith, "Traditional Religions and Modern Culture.", pp. 74-75.
69. ibid., p. 76.
70. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 168.

71. ibid.
72. ibid., pp. 93-94.
73. ibid, p. 131.
74. W.C. Smith, "The True Meaning of Scripture; An Empirical Historian's Non-reductionist Interpretation of the Qur'an" in International Journal of Middle East Studies I (1980), p. 493.
75. ibid.
76. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 131.
77. ibid.
78. See. Robert N. Minor, "Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan on the Nature of 'Hindu' Tolerance" in The Journal of the American Academy of Religion (June 1982), p. 287. Minor clarifies that Radhakrishnan has become the main contemporary Hindu philosopher who announces the virtue of Hindu tolerance to the Western intellectual world, but, at the same time, he points out that Radhakrishnan's understanding of tolerance is very partial and limited as follows;

...his approach limited tolerance to appreciation and acceptance of other religious positions, especially theistic positions, only **as they fit into** his own religious stance. His own position alone was treated as absolute, without having its absolute status ever questioned. Thus, Radhakrishnan's tolerance always affirmed exclusively his own position and protected him from the challenge of other positions. It functioned as dogma, as an unchallengeable creed. p.276.

I think that Minor's evaluation of Radhakrishnan's understanding of tolerance which was expressed especially, in The Hindu View of Life (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1927) is right and fair. Minor's evaluation can be substantiated by his well known books about his reductionistic (advaitin) understanding of Christian tradition. As Coward rightly indicated, intolerance in World religious traditions can be easily and globally detected, even though the ideal teaching of World religious traditions has emphasized tolerance towards 'other' traditions and persons. "Tolerance has been a myth rather than a reality." He critically analyses the reason why human life has been frequently intolerant towards 'others' against ideal human life, in four ways - a biological, a psychological, a philosophical, a scriptural, and a theological basis of intolerance. See, Harold Coward,

- "Intolerance in the World's Religions," in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses (1986), p.419.
79. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p. 133.
80. ibid., p.135.
81. W.C. Smith, "Secularity and the History of Religion", in The Spirit and Power of Christian Secularity (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p.53.
82. W.C. Smith, op.cit., pp. 133-134.
83. ibid., p. 13.
84. W.C. Smith, Belief and History, p. 93.
85. W.C. Smith, "Secularity and the History of Religion" in The Spirit and Power of Christian Secularity (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 62.
86. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 13.
87. See, Eric J. Sharpe, "Dialogue and Faith" in Religion, Volume 3 (Autumn, 1973).
88. Antonio Roberto Gualtieri, "Faith, Tradition, and Transcendence: A Study of Wilfred Cantwell Smith" in Toronto Journal of Theology 15:2 (1969), p. 106, and p. 110. See also, "'Faith, Belief and Transcendence' According to Wilfred Cantwell Smith" in Journal of Dharma 6 (1981).
89. W.C. Smith, "On Dialogue and 'Truth': A Rejoinder" in Religion 3 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 108-109.
90. ibid., p. 109.
91. ibid., p. 110.
92. ibid., p. 113.
93. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 150.
94. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 155.
95. ibid., p. 156.
96. W.C. Smith, "Theology and the World's Religious History" in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion. edited by Leonard Swidler (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1987), p. 55.

97. W.C. Smith, "Interpreting Religious Interrelations: An Historian's View of Christian and Muslim" in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 6/5 (Summer, 1976-77), p. 521.
98. W.C. Smith, On Understanding Islam, p. 280.
99. W.C. Smith, Belief and History, p. 98.
100. ibid., p. 97.
101. W.C. Smith, "Religion as Symbolism," p. 300.
102. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 161.
103. W.C. Smith, "The University", of "Review Article": Murray Ross, The University: The Anatomy of Academe (New York, 1976), in Dalhousie Review, 57 (1977-78), pp. 546-547.
104. W.C. Smith, Towards A World Theology, p. 190.
105. W.C. Smith, "Religious Atheism? Early Buddhist and Recent American" in Comparative Religion: The Charles Strong Trust Lectures 1961-1970 edited by John Bowman (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), p. 62.
106. ibid., p. 66.
107. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 30.
108. ibid., p. 26. However, Smith's understanding of dharma as a transcendent reality has been criticized by Harold Coward, due to the absence of the idea of God or transcendence, especially, in Hynayana Buddhist tradition. See, Harold Coward, Religious Pluralism: A Challenge to World Religions (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1985), p. 33. However, in contrast to the above criticisms, John Ross Carter, Frederick Franck and George D. Bond defended Smith's understanding of dharma as the right understanding, on the basis of devotee's life. See John Ross Carter "A History of Early Buddhism" in Religious Studies 13 (1977), and Dharma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddhist Interpretations - A Study of a Religious Concept (Tokyo: Horkuseido Press, 1978). Frederick Franck, "The Basic Constituent" in The Eastern Buddhist 13 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 118-119. George D. Bond, "The Buddha as Refuge in the Theravada Buddhist Tradition" in The Threefold Refuge in the Theravada Buddhist Tradition edited by John Ross Carter (Chambersburg: Anima Books, 1981), pp. 16-32.
109. Smith, in his late teens and twenties, strongly attached to Marxist thought and, on the basis of Marxism, later he first published one book titled Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1946). However, after

- observing the realities of the past Soviet Union--the moral and ethical bareness of Marxism--Smith changed his mind to criticize Marxism. See, W.G. Oxtoby, "Editor's Introduction" in Religious Diversity: Essays by Wilfred Cantwell Smith by W.C. Smith, edited by W.G. Oxtoby (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. XX. However, as Gordon Pruetz correctly indicated, Smith does not give up the socialist goal of world community. See Gordon Pruetz, "World Theology and World Community: The Vision of Wilfred Cantwell Smith" in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses (Fall 1990), p. 398.
110. W.C. Smith, "Theology and the World's Religious History", pp. 52-53.
111. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 171.
112. ibid., p. 172.
113. ibid., p. 173.
114. ibid.
115. W.C. Smith, "The True Meaning of Scripture: An Empirical Historian's Non-reductionist Interpretation of the Qur'an," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, II (1981), p. 502.
116. W.C. Smith, On Understanding Islam (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1981), p. 7.
117. ibid., p. 9.
118. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 175.
119. ibid.
120. W.C. Smith, "Divisiveness and Unity" in Food / Energy and the Major Faiths. edited by Joseph Gremilliar (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1978), p. 75.
121. ibid.
122. ibid., p. 76.
123. W.C. Smith, Belief and History, p. 85.
124. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 176.
125. W.C. Smith, "Secularity and the History of Religion" in The Spirit and Power of Christian Secularity (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 64.

126. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 176.
127. ibid., p. 177,
128. W.C. Smith, Religious Diversity, p. 11.
129. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 177.
130. ibid., 178.
131. ibid.
132. ibid.
133. ibid.
134. ibid., p. 179.
135. ibid., p. 180.
136. ibid., p. 181.
137. ibid.
138. ibid., p. 182.
139. ibid., p. 183.
140. ibid., p. 185.
141. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 16.
142. W.C. Smith, "Philosophia as one of the Religious Traditions of Humankind" in: Jean-Claude Galey, ed., Differences, Hiérarchie: Textes offerts à Louis Dumont (Paris: Éditions de l'école des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1984), p.268
143. ibid.
144. W.C. Smith, "History in relation to both Science and Religion" in Scottish Journal of Religious Studies (1981), p.5.
145. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 171., and Science, Faith and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 73.
146. W.C. Smith, On Understanding Islam, p. 9.
147. ibid., p. 267.

148. Smith's criticism of modern understanding of "belief" has also been done by a sociologist of religion, Robert Bellah and a cultural anthropologist, R. Needham. See, Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) and R. Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (Blackwell, 1972). Smith, Bellah and Needham's criticism of the understandings of other traditions in terms of belief or belief system, has been well accepted in modern Western and Eastern interpretations of others. However, their new understanding has been counterattacked by Donald Wiebe. However Wiebe's accusation of the above thinkers is, in my opinion, wrong because it lacks sensitivity for other religious traditions, especially in relation to "others". See Donald Wiebe, "The Role of 'Belief' in the Study of 'Religion': A Response to W.C. Smith" in Numen 26 (1979), and W.C. Smith, "Belief: A Reply to a Response" in Numen 27 (1980).
149. W.C. Smith, Belief and History, p. 46.
150. ibid., p. 51.
151. ibid.
152. ibid., pp. 52-55.
153. ibid., p. 60.
154. ibid., p. 57.
155. ibid., p. 60.
156. ibid., p. 76.
157. ibid., p. 69.
158. ibid.
159. ibid., p. 58.
160. ibid., p. 71., "But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and **belief** of the truth." (in King James Authorized Version of the Bible, stress placed upon "belief" is that of my own)
161. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 123.
162. ibid., p. 125.
163. ibid., p. 144.

164. W.C. Smith, On Understanding Islam, p. 277.
165. ibid., p. 278.
166. W.C. Smith, Questions of Religious Truth (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1967), p. 79.
167. W.C. Smith, Towards a World Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981), p. 33.
168. W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), p. 195.
169. W.C. Smith, "Theology and the World's Religious History." In: Toward a Universal Theology of Religion. Edited by Leonard Swidler (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1987), pp. 71-72.
170. W.C. Smith, Towards a World Theology, p. 194.
171. ibid., pp. 171-172.
172. ibid., p. 186.
173. W.C. Smith, "An Historian of Faith Reflects on what we are Doing Here." In: Christian Faith in a Religiously Plural World. Edited by Donald G. Dawe and John B. Carman (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1978), p. 148.
174. W.C. Smith, "Mission, Dialogue, and God's Will For Us." In: International Review of Mission, volume LXXVIII, no. 307 (July 1988), p. 370.
175. W.C. Smith, Religious Diversity edited by Williard G. Oxtoby (New York: The Cross Road Publishing Company, 1982), p. 126.
176. W.C. Smith, Towards a World Theology, p. 34.
177. ibid., p. 123.
178. ibid., pp. 131-132.
179. ibid., p. 44.

1 C.G.Jung and the Conscious-Unconscious Dialectical Relationship

Even though Jung himself is not primarily identified as an historian, his thought has opened a new dimension in the understanding of history and historical materials. In the early period of his academic life his concern was limited, as a psychologist, to the study of the individual's psyche and dreams. However, after his break with Freud, he extended his concern beyond the scope of his early studies of the individual psyche or dreams, to the study of historical materials--mythological texts, alchemical texts, archetypal literature, philosophical texts, and religious scriptures of many traditions. This point can be detected in his Symbols of Transformation.

Psychological investigations have hitherto turned their attention mainly to the analysis of individual problems. But, as things are at present, it seems to me imperative that they should broaden the basis of this analysis by a comparative study of the historical material... For, just as psychological knowledge furthers our understanding of the historical material, so, conversely, the historical material can throw new light on individual psychological problems. These considerations have led me to direct my attention more to the historical side of the picture, in the hope of gaining fresh insight into the foundations of psychology.¹

Thus he encouraged the amplification of symbols appearing in the dreams of individuals through a knowledge of the prior historical appearances and variants of such symbols in his Dream Analysis.

We need to consider the historical connotations in trying to explain dreams; we can not understand them on the personal basis only.²

Jung's psychological understanding of the historical materials

was appreciated by the twentieth century historian of world civilizations, A.J. Toynbee. Toynbee praised Jung's psychological understanding of history in his article "The Value of C.G. Jung's work for Historians" (1956), and in his message to the memorial meeting honouring Jung following Jung's death (1961), as follows:

As an historian, I can speak only for myself, but, to my mind, Jung has added a new dimension to history by opening up , for historians, an entry through which they can explore the subconscious depths of the psyche.³

When I read some of Dr. Jung's writings for the first time I felt as if a new dimension had been added to my picture of the world. This first feeling of mine has been confirmed by further study. What I find particularly inspiring in all Dr. Jung's work is the way he brings out the same fundamental elements of human psychology in many different contexts which might seem, at first sight, to be unrelated to each other. An acquaintance, however inadequate, with Dr. Jung's thought can not fail, I should say, to enlarge and clarify one's vision of human nature and human affairs.⁴

Furthermore, Toynbee, in the same article (1956), placed a great deal of respect upon Jung's wholistic understanding of history in contrast to Karl Marx or Sigmund Freud's narrow view.

One outstanding negative virtue of Dr.Jung's approach to the study of human nature delighted me then and delights me still. Dr.Jung has always refused to pick out a nostrum and run it to death. Freud sets himself to reduce everything in human activity and experience to terms of sex, Marx to reduce everything to terms of economics. Jung refuses to impoverish the evidence and warp the interpretation of it by trying, as Marx and Freud try, to explain away the infinite variety of human nature and motives.⁵

In other words, Jung, according to Toynbee, does not reduce historical materials to one fixed idea--eg., sex, economic structure, or power--but tries to comprehend historical complexes wholistically, on the basis of a more total humanity.

Arnold J. Toynbee's praise of Jung's perception of history does not cease with his article of 1956. In 1958, in his critical review article of Jung's book The Undiscovered Self, Toynbee once again confirmed Jung's understanding of history not from the perspective of "collective consciousness" but from the perspective of the subject of history, the unique individual human being.

The only realities are individual human beings. The world itself exists only in human consciousness; and the consciousness that is aware of it is always some individual's. There is no collective consciousness; and if we personify the collective products of relations between individuals--states, churches, and other institutions--we are making false and dangerous myths.⁶

Toynbee, in his article "Aspects of Psycho-history: Higher Forms of Civilization Successfully Balance the Dynamic and the Stable Modalities of Human Existence" (1972), more forcefully propounded the psychological perspective of history as "a promising" perspective as follows:

Psycho-history seems to me to be a promising way of looking at civilizations, religions, and all other human institutions and activities. It is true that the only form in which we ever catch a human being alive is psychosomatic, but the psychic component of the amphibious creature is his essence, for he has ceased to be a human being when his physical component has become a corpse.⁷

Just as Toynbee, as an historian, praised Jung's perception of history as promising, so, Jung, as a psychologist, expressed his interest in Toynbee's understanding of history, in his dialogue with American psychologist, Richard I. Evans.

Dr. Evans: In your dealings with Professor Toynbee, have you gotten rather interested in his ideas of history?

Dr. Jung: Ah, yes, particularly his ideas about the life cycles of civilizations and the way that they are ruled

by archetypal forms. Toynbee has seen what I mean by historical functions of archetypal developments. That is a mighty important determinant of human behaviour, and can span centuries or thousands of years. It expresses itself in symbols, sometimes symbols that you would never think of at all.⁸

Why did a famous, well respected historian such as Toynbee draw attention to Jung as the most important psychologist for understanding history? As Goldwert rightly commented, Toynbee's and Jung's fundamental concern with history is not with the external aspects of history but with "the spiritual-religious side of human nature"⁹ as the subject of history. In other words, the external aspects of history come and go physically but all historical phenomena have been accumulating in the psyche of the human being and playing an important role as an agent or a possibility of history.

Whereas civilizations 'die,' the propagation of peoples persists and time builds up within the human psyche while outward manifestations disappear. It is clear, then, that Jung's historical conception of the collective unconscious is pertinent to such psychic permanence.¹⁰

Jung analyzed human history as consisting of processes (interconnections) formed by three stages of personality: the stages of "participation mystique", differentiation and individuation.

1) Participation Mystique

French anthropologist, Lévy-Bruhl has described the "primitive" consciousness as "participation mystique," "état prelogique", from which "representation collective"¹¹ emerges into consciousness. According to him, primitive consciousness, and,

indeed the consciousness of any member of a society unconscious of that society's bonding power, is vulnerable to possession or identification with the powers of the unconscious which bond that particular society. Thus to primitive peoples as well as to unconscious Europeans or Westerners there can be a lessened or muted differentiation between the individual's consciousness and the unconscious. This psychic state at the same time connects individuals to community and nature even as it lessens the individual's sense of individuality, and critical consciousness.

Even though Lévy-Bruhl developed his idea of primitive mentality in relation to psychic states, many ethnologists have seriously criticized his idea. Jung summarizes three reasons why Lévy-Bruhl's idea of primitive mentality has been rejected in some contemporary circles of ethnology, and goes on to defend these ideas. The first one lies in the fact that, like "civilized" mentality, the primitive mentality, also, has the ability of differentiating between object and subject.¹² The second one lies in the fact that, contrary to Lévy-Bruhl's "état prelogique", the primitive mentality is not pre-logical.¹³ The third one lies in the fact that the term "mystique" is not an accepted term in the intellectual circle of ethnology.¹⁴ Jung acknowledges that such serious criticisms of Lévy Bruhl's idea led Lévy-Bruhl himself to doubt his idea of primitive mentality and to reject his formulation, "participation mystique", in later life.¹⁵

In spite of such harsh criticism of Lévy-Bruhl's ideas and terms which Jung summarizes above, he found Lévy-Bruhl's ideas and

terms to be very useful, and incorporated them into his psychological understanding of the human being. Furthermore, to some extent, he counter-attacked the criticisms against Lévy-Bruhl's ideas and terms and defended them on three grounds. The first one comes from the fact that, even though the primitive mentality can differentiate between consciousness and the unconscious, the psychological process of the ego's identification with the unconscious is more powerful in the primitive mentality than the civilized (Western civilization).¹⁶ Furthermore a process similar to that of the primitive also can be easily found in the so-called modern or civilized mentality, in the form of 20th century political "isms" and their capacity to bond political communities while depriving members of such communities of their autonomous critical capacity. Jung's fundamental concern is not with placing a value-judgement on the primitive mentality but with the fact that, in the primitive mentality, the unconscious plays a role which can diminish consciousness. As such, the term "primitive" is used in the sense of primordial; as can be clearly seen in his Inaugural lecture delivered at the Federal Polytechnic Institute (1934), "A Review of the Complex Theory.",

I would like to take this opportunity to remark that I use the term "primitive" in the sense of "primordial", and that I do not imply any kind of value judgement.¹⁷

Jung's second point of counter-attack lies in the fact that Lévy-Bruhl uses the term "pre-logical" in the sense of contradicting Western positivistic rationalistic logic,¹⁸ rather than in the sense of an absence of logic. Thus, Jung thinks that

the term pre-logical could be understood more positively as "irrational" (pre-rational).¹⁹

The third point lies in the fact that, for Jung, the term "mystique" reveals the "peculiar quality of 'unconscious identity'",²⁰ or closeness to the archetypal power. To Jung, the critics of the term "mystique" do not supply an alternative term to express the unconscious dimension of the psyche. Hence, he criticized the criticism as "rationalistic superstition."²¹

As we have seen, there has been a lot of criticism or counter-criticism of Lévy-Bruhl's view of the primitive mentality. Nevertheless, Jung continuously used Lévy-Bruhl's understanding and term, because he felt that there was no adequate alternative wording to Lévy-Bruhl's idea. He qualifies as above described.

If so, how does Jung adopt "participation mystique" into his psychological understanding? This question is very important to understand some aspects of history; because, to Jung, history is a process based on the complex relationship between participation mystique, differentiation and individuation.

Jung understood the psychological process of participation mystique in three ways. The first understanding is in terms of identity between consciousness and the unconscious. According to Jung, in comparison with the more rational West, the primordial mentality is inclined to partially identify consciousness with the unconscious, because such consciousness is less removed from its unconscious origin. Consequently there is no clear distinction between ego and the archetypal. As Jung explains in his definition

of participation mystique in his Psychological Types:

Participation mystique is a term derived from Lévy-Bruhl. It denotes a peculiar kind of psychological connection with objects, and consists in the fact that the subject can not clearly distinguish himself from the object but is bound to it by a direct relationship which amounts to partial **identity** (q.v.). This identity results from an **a priori** oneness of subject and object. **Participation mystique** is a vestige of this primitive condition.²³

According to Jung, this identity is not limited to the primordial mentality but can be found in the civilized mentality as well. Collectively such unconsciousness appears in political guise, bonding communities of political commitment. At the political level such unconsciousness is found especially in the relationship between an individual leader and the community which projects such power upon him or her, rather than between persons and objects as in the primordial mentality. The relationship between Hitler and his followers, in recent history, exemplifies the counterpart to the primordial mentality in Western civilized mentality, whereby the individual is ruled by unconscious response to the person, in this case, Hitler.

Furthermore, according to Jung, the primitive mentality does not make a distinct differentiation between the individual and the community or tribe. It expresses only the basic common ground of humanity, which means the collective unconscious.

The outstanding fact about the primitive mentality is this lack of distinctiveness between individuals, this oneness of the subject with the object, this **participation mystique**, as Lévy-Bruhl terms it. Primitive mentality expresses the basic structure of the mind, that psychological layer which with us is the collective unconscious, that underlying level which is the same in all. Because the basic structure of the mind is the same in everybody, we cannot make distinctions

when we experience on that level. There we do not know if something has happened to you or to me. In the underlying collective level there is a wholeness which can not be dissected.²³

Jung's second understanding of participation mystique comes from his idea of collectivity. Jung's idea of collectivity is related to Lévy-Bruhl's **representations collectives**.²⁴ Jung thinks that the primitive mentality does not foster the individual's wilful response but submits it to social norms (conventions) or feelings. This also can be discovered in the civilized mentality, for example, collective concepts of justice, the state, religion, science and so on. The collective mentality does not allow one's peculiar individuality to be expressed in the life of the human being but, rather, it suppresses the individuality.

The cultural wealth of the collectivity, also, comes from the collective unconscious, which expresses itself in collective consciousness, and the norms of society. If a culture is not bonded under its symbols, it would lose its cohesiveness and risk disintegration. According to Jung, the protection against the misuse of social convention has been effected by the "**droits de l'homme**".²⁵ The protection against the negative forms of unconsciousness invading the collective has been effected, on occasion, by the church to the extent of its power. In the case of the primordial mind ritual enactment provides a similar protection against the powers of the unconscious. Above all, to Jung, the creation of symbols and the conscious relation to them is very important for protection against blind submission of individual consciousness to the overwhelming powers of the unconscious and

against the position of collective consciousness by the powers of the unconscious.

The third understanding of "participation mystique" is from Jung's understanding of projection. According to Jung, the psychological process of participation mystique occurs through the projection of the unconscious content onto the object so that the unconscious content reaches the level of consciousness. In this state, there is no distinction among the projecting subject, the unconscious content and the object. The subject thinks of the object itself as the unconscious content.

In the case of primordial mentality, examples of projection can be discovered in the "primitives'" experience of natural objects. Jung provides examples of projection in his article "Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams" (1961) as follows:

Many primitives assume that, as well as his own, a man has a "bush-soul," incarnate in a wild animal or a tree, with which he is connected by a kind of psychic identity. This is what Lévy-Bruhl called **participation mystique**. In the case of an animal it is a sort of brother, so much so that a man whose brother is a crocodile is supposed to be safe while swimming across a crocodile-infested river. In the case of a tree, the tree is supposed to have authority over the individual like a parent. Injury to the bush-soul means an equal injury to the man.²⁶

Thus, the collective oriented mentality is "quite incapable of thinking and feeling in other ways than projection,"²⁷ according to the norms of society or group life.

Just as the psychic and social life of mankind at the primitive level is exclusively a group life with a high degree of unconsciousness, among the individuals composing it, so the historical process of development that comes afterwards is in the main collective and will doubtless remain so.²⁸

In the case of civilized mentality, the same psychological process of projection can also be discovered. Jung describes the process in relation to group movements, and social trends. According to Jung, the civilized person no longer projects his or her own unconscious contents, in terms of "magic with medicine bag, amulets, and animal sacrifices" like the primitive person, "but with tranquilizers, neuroses, rationalism, cult of the will, etc."²⁹ Furthermore, if projection is used for the purpose of political gain then the danger of another "Hitler" could arise. In order to avoid such danger, projection should be resolved through symbol formation, and conscious relation to the symbol.

The resultant projection creates a dangerous situation in that the disturbing effects are now attributed to a wicked will outside ourselves, which is naturally not to be found anywhere but with our neighbour **de l'autre côté de la rivière**. This leads to collective delusions, 'incidents,' revolutions, war--in a word, to destructive mass psychoses.³⁰

Above all, Jung discovered the danger of a so-called cure of social problems through mass organization or action based on statistical analysis which neglects the individual. As he says in "The Undiscovered Self" (1957):

A million zeros joined together do not, unfortunately, add up to one. Ultimately everything depends on the quality of the individual, but our fatally shortsighted age thinks only in terms of large numbers and mass organizations, though one would think that the world had seen more than enough of what a well-disciplined mob can do in the hands of a single madman. Unfortunately, this realization does not seem to have penetrated very far--and our blindness is extremely dangerous. People go on blithely organizing and believing in the sovereign remedy of mass action, without the least consciousness of the fact that the most powerful organizations can be maintained only by the greatest ruthlessness of their leaders and the cheapest of slogans.³¹

I am convinced that 99 percent of politics are mere symptoms and anything but a cure for social evils.³²

Jung even criticized religious mass movements,³³ because these movements prevent individuals in the mass from discovering genuine individuality. Furthermore, in relation to the contemporary "isms"--materialism, existentialism, scientism, rationalism and so on--Jung criticized any kind of collective category which keeps individuals from discovering their own unique personality. In a word, Jung rejects any kind of organization which ignores individuality.

Jung also rejected contemporary sexual morality as being a kind of degeneration which ignores the peculiar individual freedom, as can be seen in his article "The Complications of American Psychology" (1930):

But the more a so-called unprejudiced freedom and easy promiscuity prevail, the more love becomes flat and degenerates into transitory sex interludes. The most recent developments in the field of sexual morality tend toward sexual primitivity, analogous to the instability of the moral habits of primitive peoples, where under the influence of collective emotion all sex taboos instantly disappear.³⁴

Due to his fundamental conviction that all human problems can only be solved by curing the individual rather than the mass or mob, Jung emphasized an education which leads people to discover their own peculiar self rather than to imitate a conventional persona in social life. If individuals do not pursue a search for their own individuality, their psychic state will remain in the state of participation mystique.

ii) Differentiation

Jung does not see the state of participation mystique as an ideal state of personal or historical development. Rather, he suggests that this state be overcome in order to achieve the ideal state through the process of individuation. According to him, before this process is realized in an individual's life, an intermediate stage must be developed; he calls this intermediate stage the process of differentiation or awareness of individuality. This state is characterized by the egression of a strong ego from its unconscious origin.

As I have said in the introductory part of this chapter, for Jung, the primary concern of history is not with historical, objective phenomena but with historical, subjective phenomena, which means the subject of history, human beings. How can human beings become the genuine subjects of history? In order to become the subjects, first of all, the individual must develop their personality, grounded in a strong ego development.

Jung describes the process of this development in his book, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. In this process, the first step is for the individual to differentiate himself or herself from the collective psyche, very strongly and clearly. If differentiation is not properly accomplished then the individual would revert back to a former stage of identification with the collective psyche. As I pointed out earlier, the collective psyche comes from without and within. If the individuals are controlled

according to the commands of the without they would be machines following the dictates of their operators. In contrast, if they are controlled by the commands of unconscious complexes, they would evaluate other individuals in accord with these commands whose projection on others fails to perceive the individuality of the others. Furthermore they would invest their view with divine authority.

Through his identification with the collective psyche he will infallibly try to force the demands of his unconscious upon others, for identity with the collective psyche always brings with it a feeling of universal validity--"godlikeness"--which completely ignores all differences in the personal psyche of his fellows.³⁵

According to Jung, the original locus from which individuality comes about is in the unconscious. In this primal unconscious state the individual does not make any strong distinction between differing objects and differing individuals. In order to distinguish themselves from objects and other individuals the person must become consciously aware of his or her own individuality in relation to other individuals and objects. As Jung says,

The psychological individual, or his **individuality**, has **an a priori** unconscious existence, but exists consciously only so far as a consciousness of his peculiar nature is present, i.e., so far as there exists a conscious distinction from other individuals.³⁶

However, what must be carefully understood about Jung's idea of differentiation, is the fact that he does not absolutely ignore the ceaseless pulse of the unconscious in relation to consciousness. In other words he stresses that the impulse of the unconscious should be assimilated consciously to extend the realm

of consciousness. If not properly integrated or if suppressed by consciousness, the drive of the unconscious to become conscious could explode resulting in the destruction of individuals or society. The process of assimilation will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Through the process of differentiation from the unconscious, the individuality of the person can be consciously recognized. Jung defines individuality as follows:

By individuality I mean the peculiarity and singularity of the individual in every psychological respect. Everything that is not **collective** is individual, everything in fact that pertains only to one individual and not to a larger group of individuals. Individuality can hardly be said to pertain to the psychic elements themselves, but only to their peculiar and unique grouping and combination.³⁷

As the above quotation shows, individuality can occur according to the proper "combination" of psychic elements. This point is very important, because the process of the combination fully depends upon the individual's ceaseless efforts towards the development of personality. To Jung, all human beings have common psychic "qualities," but the degree of the development of these qualities are unique, peculiar, depending upon individuals. Jung describes this point very clearly in his lecture of "Psychology and National Problems" (1936):

Thus individuals are like each other in as much as they have qualities in no way different from those of others, but unlike each other in as much as they develop qualities and achievements that can not be compared with those of others.³⁸

According to Jung, the process of differentiation or individual-discovery has, historically, been developed more fully

in the context of religious traditions, than the secular context. To him, religious traditions have contributed to the development of the individual's ability to differentiate one's individuality from "the purely natural, or 'carnal' tie to parents" or to "the unconscious".³⁹ In the case of "primitive" peoples, several forms--for example, the institution or rite of initiation from boyhood into manhood--have been established to help the process of differentiation. In this sense, Jung feels that religious traditions and rites have been very important for leading individuals to discover their individuality in mass society. Moreover, he thinks that there is no powerful alternative available to help the process of differentiation from natural ties to the unconscious other than "religious truth." As he puts it in "Analytical Psychology and Education" (1924):

Once we have lost the capacity to orient ourselves by religious truth, there is absolutely nothing which can deliver man from his original biological bondage to the family, as he will simply transfer his infantile principles, uncorrected, to the world at large, and will find there a father who so far from guiding him, leads him to perdition.⁴⁰

This citation means that all religious traditions can function as guiding principles or means for the realization of differentiation. Thus, to Jung, all religious traditions when functioning properly can be interpreted as symbol systems which have helped individuals develop their unique personality in a collective context, without being absorbed by the collective. Due to this reason, Jung criticized very harshly the policies of state or society which totally ignore the aspect of individuality.

Anyone, therefore, who thinks in terms of men minus the individual, in huge numbers, atomizes himself and becomes a thief and a robber to himself. He is infected with the leprosy of collective thinking and has become an inmate of that insalubrious stud-farm called the totalitarian state. Our time contains and produces more than enough of the "crude sulphur" which with "arsenical malignity" prevents man from discovering his true self.⁴¹

Here, what must be carefully understood is that, Jung's understanding of individuality is different from the so-called modern Western concept of individualism. Jung was aware of this extreme differentiation or consciousness in the modern Western way of life, and clearly distinguishes individualism from his own ideal process of individuation. In fact, Jung has expressed his negative reaction to individualism, because Western extreme consciousness "is inclined to swallow up the unconscious, and if this should not prove feasible we try to suppress it."⁴² This is the opposite of the primordial mentality swallowed up consciousness and conscious differentiation, because of its partial immersion in the unconscious.

Jung criticized at length the absence of critical reflection in consciousness severed from the unconscious by the development of science or technology. Such consciousness was a danger because the unconscious could not find a place in such consciousness.⁴³ According to Jung, paradoxically enough, if the unconscious is not allowed into consciousness, the unconsciousness explodes into the realm of consciousness, so that consciousness could be destroyed by the explosion. These tragic events happened, as history has shown, in political holocausts or wars.

In spite of the lessons of history, the over-inflation of the

ego leads to a collective egocentricity which results in an inability to reflect upon the history of humankind except in terms of collective viewpoint.

An inflated consciousness is always ego-centric and conscious of nothing but its own existence. It is incapable of learning from the past, incapable of understanding contemporary events, and incapable of drawing right conclusions about the future.⁴⁴

Such collective or social egocentricity is not without personal consequence. Jung diagnosed the expression of "ego-centric" concern for oneself as individualism in the modern West, and strongly criticized it as follows:

But individualism is not and never has been a natural development; it is nothing but an unnatural usurpation, a freakish, impertinent pose that proves its hollowness by crumpling up before the least obstacle. What we have in mind is something very different...That is why the cry of "individualism" is a cheap insult when flung at the natural development of personality.⁴⁵

iii) Individuation

Jung identifies the ideal history-making personality as one not caught in the stage of participation mystique or the extreme differentiation of individualism but in the stage of individuation. He thinks of this personality as a genuine subject of history, through whose consciousness history is ideally made.

He especially sees the contemporary mental suffering of individuals as that of splitting the unconscious and consciousness in their personality, so that the result is collective neurosis or psychic stress following from consciousness severed from the

unconscious. Above all, he thinks that the modern fragmentation or dissociation of consciousness from the unconscious should be cured. In this sense, Jung, as a psychologist, sees his duty, as a healer of a cultural wound attempting to restore a truncated psychic state to a greater approximation of its totality, wholeness. He, of course, thinks that the final performer of the process of restoration is the individual rather than the psychologist. Thus, to Jung, the role of the psychologist lies in "inducing" individuals to recover this wholeness and so "to take an active part in the strenuous work of carrying on its [civilization's or culture's] development."⁴⁶

What is the recovered psychic state of reconnection between the unconscious and consciousness in Jung's idea of individuation? Does the state revert back to the state of participation mystique which means the state of non-differentiation? These questions are very important to understand Jung's concept of the individuation process.

Jung does not think of the process of individuation as the state of non-differentiation. In his later writing, "Answer to Job" (1952), Jung clearly describes two kinds of individuation processes.⁴⁷ The first one is the "natural" individuation process, which runs its course unconsciously", so that, even though the process is operative, consciousness does not consciously realize it. The second one is the process which is consciously realized or actualized. Jung sees the second way of individuation as preferred. In other words, even though the process is operative

naturally, consciousness should consciously engage the unconscious. If the process proceeds without the participation of consciousness, the process could fail and become one of residual non-differentiation as in the participation mystique, or the life of an addict. In this residual sense, Jung distinguishes his individuation process from any state of ecstasy which does not value the preservation of ego-consciousness.

One hopes to control the unconscious, but the past masters in the art of self-control, the Yogis, attain perfection in **samadhi**, a state of ecstasy, which so far as we know is equivalent to a state of unconsciousness...the fact remains that in this case the unconscious has swallowed up ego-consciousness.⁴⁸

Jung developed his idea more concretely in his Eranos Jahrbuch paper, "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass" (1940). In that paper, he clearly described individuation as a new synthesis of ego consciousness and self. As he puts it,

Conscious realization or the bringing together of the scattered parts is in one sense an act of the ego's will, but in another sense it is a spontaneous manifestation of the self, which was always there. Individuation appears, on the one hand, as the synthesis of a new unity which previously consisted of scattered particles, and on the other hand, the revelation of something which existed before the ego and is in fact its father or creator and also its totality.⁴⁹

Jung calls this new synthesis, which is different from the stage of non-differentiation, "conscious wholeness"⁵⁰ or a "synthetic process"⁵¹ which is synthesizing ego with the unconscious in the conscious self. The process can not be accomplished within short periods but needs "a whole life time in all its biological, social, and spiritual aspects."⁵²

Individuation demands not only a whole lifetime but also the

patience of "suffering, a passion of the ego" inflicted by self. Jung compared the individuation process in relation to Christ's passion in his paper, "A Psychological Approach to The Dogma of the Trinity" (Eranos-Jahrbücher 1940-41).

The analogous passion of Christ signifies God's suffering on account of the injustice of the world and the darkness of man. The human and the divine suffering set up a relationship of complementarity with compensating effects.⁵³

Furthermore, Jung describes the individual's realization of the individuation process as "the incarnation" of the divine, the self,⁵⁴ in consciousness after the suffering process of the ego entering into the realm of the unconscious, and returning from it. In this process the self also suffers as it incarnates in consciousness throughout its incorporation in the ego. This makes the ego, the father of the self. The creation of the self in consciousness is the truth behind Jung's appropriation of the alchemical phrase describing the self as **filius philosophorum**.⁵⁵

As was said, individuation is not an easy, shortly accomplished process. It is a prolonged internal and subjective process of synthesization or integration. Here, it could be asked, what are Jung's criteria for distinguishing pseudo-process from genuine process?

Jung has articulated two criteria for experiencing the individuation process. The first one is determined through the analysis of symbol formation in dreams and their amplification in, for example, painting, active imagination, or sculpting. All contents of the unconscious can assimilate or reach consciousness

through the process of symbol formation revealed primarily or preferentially in the dream. If the contents of the unconscious can not attain symbolic expression in consciousness, the process fails. As he well puts it in his Alchemical Studies:

The unconscious can be reached and expressed only by symbols, and for this reason the process of individuation can never do without the symbol. The symbol is the primitive exponent of the unconscious, but at the same time an idea that corresponds to the highest intuitions of the conscious mind.⁵⁶

The second criterion is a responsible relation to the human community, consequent to processes of individuation. If the individuation process remains only in the subjective (individual integration of the unconscious and consciousness) the process is not genuine. The processes should be related to social life for the enhancement of the human community as a responsible member. He addresses the relationship between the individuation process and the community in his lecture in "Psychotherapy Today" (1941).

...the natural process of individuation brings to birth a consciousness of human community precisely because it makes us aware of the unconscious which unites and is common to all mankind. Individuation is an at-one-ment with oneself and at the same time with humanity, since oneself is a part of humanity.⁵⁷

Furthermore, Jung thinks that if the individual is not morally responsible to the construction of a sound human community, the individual's individuation process could not be identified as a genuine one.

Although every act of conscious realization is at least a step forward on the road to individuation, to the "making whole" of the individual, the integration of the personality is unthinkable without the responsible, and that means moral, relation of the parts to one another, just as the constitution of a state is impossible without

mutual relations between its members.⁵⁸

Jung also thinks that, regarding the creation of values in social life, each individual's individuation process should remove the individual from an unconscious attachment to the collectivity and provide the individual with responsible values which the individual then imparts to society. If one's individuation does not contribute to a new consciousness, the individual might as well remain in the state of attachment to the collectivity. To Jung, without the creation of values for society, the final result of individuation is immoral. Thus, Jung says:

Hence Individuation is possible only so long as substitute values are produced. Individuation is exclusive adaptation to inner reality and hence an allegedly "mystical" process. The expiation is adaptation to the outer world. It has to be offered to the outer world, with the petition that the outer world accept it.⁵⁹

Individuation remains a pose so long as no positive values are created. Whoever is not creative enough must re-establish collective conformity with a group of his own choice, otherwise he remains an empty waste and windbag. Whoever creates **unacknowledged** values belongs to the condemned, and he has himself to blame for this, because society has a right to expect **realizable** values. For the existing society is always of absolute importance as the point of transition through which all world development passes, and it demands the highest collaborative achievement from every individual.⁶⁰

Due to the production of positive values for the human community, generally, the process of individuation does not deny the "collective norm"⁶¹ in the maintenance of community. However, if the norm does not allow the development of the process of individuation, the norm would be repressive. Thus, to Jung, immersion in the collective, or its opposite, an isolated

individualism, remains the main obstacles to the ideal relation between an individuating consciousness and community. In the former case there is no individuality; in the latter, no relationality. The harmonious, middle path which incorporates both extremes is the optimum for individual and community.⁶² Furthermore, Jung thinks that morality and the ideal life lie in the wisdom of harmony between the unconscious and consciousness in the individual and between individual and community in the external life.

Morality is not a misconception invented by some vaunting Moses on Sinai, but something inherent in the laws of life and fashioned like a house or a ship or any other cultural instrument. The natural flow of libido, this same middle path, means complete obedience to the fundamental laws of human nature, and there can positively be no higher moral principle than harmony with natural laws that guide the libido in the direction of life's optimum. The vital optimum is not to be found in crude egoism, for fundamentally man is so constituted that the pleasure he gives to his neighbour is something essential to him. Nor can the optimum be reached by an unbridled craving for individualistic supremacy, because the collective element in man is so powerful that his longing for fellowship would destroy all pleasure in naked egoism. The optimum can be reached only through obedience to the tidal laws of the libido, by which systole alternates with diastole--laws which bring pleasure and the necessary limitations of pleasure, and also set us those individual life tasks without whose accomplishment the vital optimum can never be attained.⁶³

As James L. Henderson and Eric Neumann rightly indicated, to Jung, history is the place of the growth of human consciousness through the conflictual process "between the pull of the past and the unconscious on the horizontal and the future and the conscious on the vertical".⁶⁴ Jung described the historical development of consciousness and society in the light of the conflictual

processes: participation mystique, differentiation and individuation. He does not think that the processes have been separated in each stage of history but inter-connected as processes toward historical or conscious development. Thus understood, individuation is the goal of history, personally and collectively. His highest value is the synthesis of the unconscious with consciousness. The greatest threat is thus an unconsciousness which consumes consciousness or a consciousness severed from the unconscious. And this is true of all epochs and cultures. Furthermore, he does not feel that modern times are better than medieval or ancient times. Rather, any period which so unites consciousness with the unconscious and through this union unites individual with society is preferable to the impaired consciousness of the participation mystique or the uprootedness of an individualistic consciousness severed from the unconscious. Processes of individuation in any culture, epoch or tradition are thus appreciated by Jung. Any superiority which modernity might enjoy would lie in persons' becoming consciously aware of the unconscious energies at work in personal or collective history.

In a word, Jung sees 'history' as a process or continuity of the unconscious revealed "in slightly different forms" throughout human history. That is, Jung has tried to demonstrate that, from ancient times until now, the unconscious of humanity has expressed itself in historically conditioned forms. Thus, to Jung, the substance of the unconscious is the same and universal but the expressions or forms of the unconscious in historical consciousness

are various and particular, depending upon individuals, race, times and so on. And in all its expression the unconscious seeks the wholeness of the consciousness it addresses.

In other words, to Jung, history is the dialectical movement or process towards the development or the deterioration of consciousness in relation to its response to the whole-making intent of the unconscious. In a letter to Victor White O.P., Jung sums up the meaning of history attached to his understanding of the psyche as the creator of history in the simple sentence: "The state of the Holy Spirit means a restitution of the original oneness of the unconscious on the level of consciousness."⁶⁵

2. W.C. Smith and Human-Divine Dialectical Relationship

As discussed earlier in this dissertation, Smith's fundamental understanding of the human being does not come from a philosophical or theological quest. He does not understand the human being, through the study of the idea of the human being metaphysically. Rather, Smith attempts to understand the human being historically. Thus, Smith does not express a metaphysical understanding of human beings but explicitly opts for an historical understanding of human being. In other words, Smith has not explicitly thought over the question "What is the nature of human being, metaphysically?" but "What has the human being been or become historically?" Through the historical quest, he shows the implicit nature of the human being. In this sense, Smith's historical understanding of humanity is very similar to Dilthey's, because, to Dilthey,

...history is our most powerful meaning for giving voice to our inner life, for expressing and explicating it. What human beings find in themselves they can see above all in history, which brings to light and to clear perception everything that exists in them.⁶⁶

What does the historical human being mean to Smith? This question is very important for understanding Smith's idea of history. Smith has observed that the human being, ultimately, has struggled to become human, historically. As I have described in the third chapter, this struggle can be identified as a "religious" struggle. According to Smith, all human beings live in an historical setting with the sense or experience of transcendence, weakly or strongly. As he puts it well:

Every human life has a timeless dimension, the more salient the more truly human the person. Human history is the arena of the interplay between the temporal and the timeless--between the mundane and the eternal, the transcendent, or however one wish to call it. Human beings are self-transcending beings--a perplexing fact, admittedly; indeed, mysterious: yet an observational fact, nonetheless. One facet of this is that human beings are free: not fully, certainly, and yet not negligibly. We are conditioned by our past and by our environment; that is, by mundane history. Yet we are not altogether determined by them, by it. The minority of thinkers who disagree with this do so out of dogmatic pre-conception, not on the basis of evidence. To be a human being means to be partially open to sources of inspiration, aspiration, courage, loyalty, love, imagination, obligation, rationality, integrity, not given in one's mundane environment.⁶⁷

As the above quotation shows, even though all human beings have had the sense or experience of transcendent reality in their life, they are always conditioned by their historical surroundings. In this sense, Smith thought that even the experience of mystics, in contrast to their description of their mystical, timeless experience, is bounded in history.

I do not dogmatically rule out ahead of time a possibility that through religion man has been in touch with a reality transcending history; but I do insist, and demonstrate, that that relation to transcendence, whether putative or real, has taken place within history, and has been conditioned by the historical situation, and is to be understood historically.⁶⁸

It is sometimes said that certain types of Hindu, Buddhist, and Western mystics are not (lege: have not been) interested in history. One can even find such sentences as, "History is not important for him or her who experiences satori." This is a short-hand way of saying that the range of history that interests such persons is exceptionally narrow: namely, perhaps only the moment during which the experience of satori occurs. My own observation is that virtually all human beings on their way through time are aware however dimly of what some call the timeless.⁶⁹

Due to his historical understanding, Smith does not agree with any dogmatic understanding of transcendent or timeless experience as the absolute and universal. According to Smith, historically, many followers of philosophers or theologians have absolutized their transcendent experience or revolutionary thinking, so that they have not only ignored the historical condition of such experience or thinking but have also imposed them upon others. For example, "Muslims may do this of Al-Ghazali, Catholic Christians of an Aquinas, Protestants of a Luther, Marxists of a Lenin."⁷⁰ It can be discovered not only in the West but in the East. To Smith, the occurrence of transcendent experience is itself universal, because all human beings have had the experience, weakly or strongly. But the experience has been bounded in an historical context, so that it is very particular. Thus, for Smith, universality is located in the experience itself but particularity is located in the form of such experience.

Smith, on the basis of his understanding of history, has tried to solve the traditional, philosophical, theological problem "of the relation between the many and the one, between time and eternity, existence and essence, process and reality, historical change and abiding truth, the world and God."⁷¹ In other words, Smith does not see history as inseparable from transcendence but as the locus of mundane and transcendent life:

Fundamentally, I am saying that I do not accept the dichotomy that would polarize history and transcendence. There is a transcendent dimension to human life--so far as I can see, there has always been, from palaeolithic times.⁷²

Due to such a synthetic understanding of history, ultimately, to Smith, "human history is essentially the history of religion."⁷³ Furthermore, Smith sees the history of religion as "the one true basis of theology," as "Heilsgeschichte."⁷⁴ Throughout his life, Smith has devoted himself to articulating the synthetic understanding of history in relation to all human beings' religious life. In his later work, Towards A World Theology, Smith articulated his understanding of history in relation to the human being. In the early part of the book, Smith clearly shows his ultimate concern with history:

The history of religion, by which I understand the history of men and women's religious life, and especially of their faith, lived always in a specific context, is intrinsically the locus of both the mundane and the transcendent, unbifurcated.⁷⁵

To Smith, history is "the locus of the mundane and the transcendent," but the mediator between them is the person who has lived in history. Thus, to Smith, it is impossible to understand

the human being apart from the study of history or, in reverse, to understand history apart from the study of the human being as the agent of history. In this sense, human beings have been "the creators of history" (the subjects) rather than "the victims of history"⁷⁶ (the objects). Thus, the understanding of history is that of the human being, and furthermore that of transcendence which is the root of the human being's experience of life. In this sense, Smith's understanding of "the unity of humankind" or "the unity of God" or transcendence can be meaningfully understood.⁷⁷ Here, the meaning of unity should be very carefully understood. Smith does not have any intention to insist that "all religions are the same," because of the fact of the unity of humankind and God; this has been misunderstood. Rather, Smith has observed religious diversity in history.

The more I study, the more variegated I find the religious scene to be. I have no reason to urge a thesis of unity among 'the religions of the world'. As a matter of fact, I do not find unity even within one so-called 'religion', let alone among all. The unity that I see and whose vision I am advocating is not of religion, which is varied, but of religious history--a different matter.⁷⁸

Moreover, Smith does not plan to articulate a unified philosophical or theological abstraction of humanity or God.

The historian must stand guard against a vitiation of man's actual religious living by enthusiasts for emaciating abstractions. He or she must stand guard, in the name of actuality and of the unique, and of human dignity.⁷⁹

If Smith's intention is not located in the simple "unification of religions" or the abstraction of God or the human being, what does he intend the term, "unity" to mean?

To Smith, "unity" refers to a new awareness that sees all religious traditions or faiths as being interconnected--among denominations, among different traditions, among religious people and so on--under the umbrella of the continuum of the human-transcendence dialectic in history. In other words, all traditions or human faiths have been respectively parts of the whole complex of the history of religion. My understanding of "unity" will be seen more clearly through the following direct quotation:

History is the domain of the specific the multifarious; of recalcitrant fact; of the human. It is the domain of personal faith , in its depth and vitality and diversity. For the historian, then, unity is not at all to suggest that **A** equals **B**, or even resembles it. Rather, it is to affirm that they are historically interconnected; that they have humankind's religious history, which is the vision of this presentation, is not to propose that all men and women have been religious in the same way. That would be absurd. No two centuries have been religious in the same way; certainly, no two communities; in the end, no two persons. It is, rather, to discern that the evident variety of their religious life is real, yet is contained within an historical continuum. To say that **A** and **B** share a common history is not at all to suggest that **A** equals **B**, or even resembles it. Rather, it is to affirm that they are historically interconnected; that they have interacted with the same things or with each other, or that one has 'grown out of' or been 'influenced by' the other ; more exactly, that one can be understood only in terms of a context of which the other forms a part.⁸⁰

According to Smith, an awareness of "unity" does not come from a onesided perspective on history but from that of a global perspective on history, which means the development of a human-transcendent dialectic. In other words, reflecting upon the history of humankind, to Smith, all human history has proceeded towards the construction of human-transcendent relationality. Thus, to Smith, each moment, each period, each century is

historically important, because it has become a part of history, and furthermore, each time is not a strictly fragmented part but a related or connected part with the whole history of humankind. Due to this fundamental awareness of inter-connection in history, Smith has perceived the meaning of history as process or becoming.

Even though an historical moment was finished in the past, the moment, to Smith, is not a finished, cut past but a process from an earlier past of that past towards the finished moment, and, furthermore, the past is the background of the present and the future. As he well puts it in his article, "the Ulama' in Indian Politics":

History is development, transition: not merely sequence of events but a process of becoming. To understand history, is to see the evolution by which something is gradually transformed into something else; by which one situation becomes (the word is beguilingly simple!) another situation.⁸¹

It can also be found in his article, "The True Meaning of Scripture: An Empirical Historian's Non-reductionist Interpretation of the Qur'an":

History is not the past; history is process. The study of history is the study of process. To understand history is to understand movement--forwards.⁸²

Due to such an understanding of history as process, Smith does not agree with the past-origin oriented history which asserts that the meaning of history can be discovered only in the original cause of events. Smith refers to such a past oriented historian as a "big-bang theory"⁸³ oriented historian. According to such an historian, regarding 'religion', the meaning of 'religion' is found only in the origins of 'religion'. Smith gave an example of

reformers from the period of Reformation. Reformers only emphasized the original or earliest aspects of the Church, and so overlooked the Christian development through the history of the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, in spite of their emphasis on God's participation in the 'present' history of 'here and now', they did not have much interest in God's "having participated in" the process of history over the centuries, so that, they put a limitation on God's participation in history, to "once for all in Christ".

According to Smith, such origin-oriented understandings of history is still dominant in the modern secular historical research since the Enlightenment in the West, after being affected by the historiography of Church history.⁸⁴ Thus, even to the secular historian, the task of historiography was to find the "beginnings" of events. Furthermore, in nineteenth-century Europe, the origin-oriented study of history was employed as the absolute key to understanding other religious traditions

Over and against such backwards-oriented scholarship, Smith has insisted on a synthesized understanding of history--the study of origin and the study of consequences from the origin in history--as process.

Both origins and consequences are part of the truth of any historical fact. Put in dynamic terms, anything is what it is as a moment in an on-going process of which it is a part. Neither antecedents nor consequences, however, nor both together, are the full truth of any historical fact, and should not be allowed to displace from our awareness the moment itself, as fully real. The historian's task is to reconstruct, not merely to analyze; and especially not to analyze away.⁸⁵

As the quotation shows, to Smith, the origin and sequences of history are not the absolute truth of historical fact but are parts of truth. The truth of an historical fact has been unearthed through the process of history, and, in the future, it will be unearthed further. To Smith, no theory or method can comprehend the historical fact, which always demands new interpretation through the process of history. In other words, to Smith, historical facts have been identified in the process of history. Thus, ultimately, historical facts themselves have been in flux, according to the interpretation of them, so that historical facts can be identified as process.

By the word 'history' some mean an account of past events; but I mean those events themselves, and the dynamic process in which they are embedded; the course of human affairs, which we historians attempt, always inadequately, to discern, to understand, and as historiographers to make knowable to others, and intelligible. It is important that our concept of history formally and explicitly transcend our awareness of its content. Just as the world of nature is a reality to which scientific knowledge approximates, so too the reality of history is something to which our historiography only approximates, less or more closely.⁸⁶

Here, Smith shows two processes and two historical facts. All historical facts are related to each other and can not be perfectly comprehended, so that, the understanding of the facts are partial rather than complete in terms of global historical facts. All historical facts are parts of global history. Furthermore, each process of each historical part has been part of a global process, which means the history of humankind. Thus, to Smith, all particular historical facts and processes have been subordinated to globally accumulated facts and global processes, so that the

fundamental category of history, ultimately, is the global human history. Due to this understanding, Smith has always understood history not as a closed system or process but as an open, dynamic process. In his article "Thoughts on Transcendence", actually delivered at the Ingersoll lecture at Harvard (1988) he calls history "a transcending process":

When I say that history is a transcending process, I am diverging from the current (recent; positivist) habit of thinking of it rather as something finite: namely, as what I call, rather, "historiography". As I have on another occasion remarked, the history of Canada is long, complex, and embedded within the history of Europe and North America and beyond; whereas a **History of Canada** may be short, over-simplified, and weigh two pounds. In other words, there are two usages for our word "history"; and the second of these is logically derivative from the first, and it is to be judged by it. A written or perceived history approximates, always distantly, to the actual historical. Our awareness of the past, or of the current transformations of the world, is always a very partial apprehension of the reality of that past, or of that present. Yet many in the modern West seem increasingly to be concentrating on that partial apprehension; on the report about the reality, the ideas in someone's mind of what has been and is happening. A surprising number of persons, especially in academia, when they hear the term "history" these days, think of the finite, concrete, story that is told of or thought about the past--at times even to the exclusion of attending to the transcending reality of which it is an always inadequate though serviceable representation. It is one more instance of our de-transcendentalizing thrust.⁸⁷

Here, it would be helpful to understand the locus of meaning in relation to process. As has been discussed in the third chapter, to Smith, the meaning of a tradition is located in the heart of the devotee who has participated in the tradition. All traditions have been participating in the formation of the history of humankind, because, ultimately, to Smith, the traditions have

respectively contributed some part to the history of humankind through individual members of each tradition. Thus, to Smith, the meaning of the process of history is located in the heart of persons, and furthermore, the process has always been moving in the heart.

...the mundane traditions persist only in so far as they are refreshed, each generation anew, by the faith of each of the participants, and that this faith being personal, is not confined to what lies within history. The cumulative tradition is wholly historical; but history is not a closed system, since as agent within it stands man, his spirit in some degree open to the transcendent.⁸⁸

In this sense, all particular histories of all cumulative traditions have been subordinated to the history of humankind, and, ultimately, history itself has been subordinated to humanity's total vision,⁸⁹ the ideal of history, that is, all devotees have tried to actualize in history the intention or reference of their tradition. Smith shows his understanding very well in relation to the Islamic tradition.

...the Islam towards which men have reached out has been greater than the Islam that the observer encounters. Since this is human history, the perceptive historian must and will recognize that the actual Islam that he or she observes is an approximation to an ideal Islam, by which Muslims across the centuries have been inspired and towards which they have at times grandly and at other times haltingly, gropingly, often ineptly, humanly faltered.⁹⁰

Due to this understanding of vision as coming from the heart of human being, Smith has insisted upon the personal meaning of all traditions. To Smith, all meanings, ultimately, have been personal. As he puts it well:

The basic point is that everything is process. Therefore, of any given statement we would ask not: What

does it mean, inherently, statistically, absolutely; but rather: What has it meant. What has been its meaning in this or that century; in this or that part of the world; to this or that community? And eventually, perhaps, but only eventually: What does it, may it, shall it mean to me?"⁹¹

Thus, it can be said that, to Smith, history is the complexity of meanings which are primarily located in the heart of persons in relation to the components of history--"the accumulating religious tradition, the particular personality, the particular environment and the transcendent reality."⁹² The meanings occur through the complex interactions of the aforementioned four components. Hence, the meanings have always been moving dynamically or dimly in relation to persons, never ceasingly. In this sense, as Smith indicates, the genuine history of meaning in relation to persons is not yet written.

The true history of religion, not yet written, is the history of the depth or shallowness, richness or poverty, genuineness or insincerity, splendid wisdom or insane folly, with which men and women and their societies have responded to such symbols as were around them. It is also, however, the tale, and to some degree this can be told, of when and in what fashion they have forged new symbols, or neglected or found themselves unable to respond to old. And nowadays it is also the story of how they deal or fail to deal with a plurality of symbolisms.⁹³

Regarding the place of the meaning of religious traditions, Smith proposed two interconnected meanings.⁹⁴ For example, in the case of creeds, the first one is the meaning of the creeds that the devotees who speak or write it intend. The second one is in the meaning which those devotees who hear or read it understand. The initial creeds contain the original meaning which are prior to their interpretation, but even the initial creeds do not come **ex**

nihilo but are historically contextualized formulations of faith. Thus, to Smith, all meanings have been located in the dialectic process from the background of the past to the foreground of meaning in the future, in the moment of the present. Ultimately, to Smith, the movement of past and the potential movement of future is in the present movement of meaning. In this sense, Smith thinks that the history of religion is that of meanings.

I am an historian, and am interested in the history of meanings. Important words, phrases, doctrines, especially in the religious field, demonstrably and significantly have a history of meanings.⁹⁵

It is not only the original meaning that is significant but the continuing development of that meaning from era to era, from class to class, from milieu to milieu.⁹⁶

As Smith has usually analyzed concepts, ideas, symbols in terms of a global perspective, he has also studied all religious scriptures in terms of a global perspective, which means the capital letter "Scripture", in relation to human beings' involvement with scriptures. Furthermore he has uncovered, he claims, the basis for the global understanding of "religion" in the heart of the human being, the locus of the religious "propensity."

...the true meaning of any scripture--and by that I mean the empirically real, objectively valid, historically given meaning--is a long, and an on-going, process of which the original meaning is only the starting point, and which is constituted by what the scripture has in fact meant to various persons, groups, movements, over the centuries since: a process that still proceeds.⁹⁷

On the basis of various meanings of scripture, Smith has tried to articulate the general meaning of scripture in his later article, "Scripture as Form and Concept: Their Emergence for the Western World."

An historian of religion, entranced to find scripture of one or another varied sort--but how varied!--virtually across the civilized world, and entranced to find human beings virtually throughout the world evincing apparently some almost common human propensity to scriptualize, is inclined to feel that the **content** of this or that scripture, however interesting and however diverse, needs supplementing in scholarly study by this other inquiry into the **concept** of scripture; generically, and in particular cases. It has been an amazing idea, an astonishing form. Moreover, this is no antiquarian inquiry: both our Church and our civil society to-day need an improved understanding of scripture.⁹⁸

In the past, such a general understanding of the human being as the locus of meaning has been limited to provincial perspectives --Hindu, Muslim, Jewish, Chinese, Christian and whatever--but, in the contemporary pluralistic setting, the genuine general understanding of the human being can be more clearly perceived in terms of divine-human dialectical relations of global history.

Smith's new understanding of the human being in terms of global history is not only the challenge to the Christian tradition but also to other traditions. Seriously, Smith has urged them to transform their traditional perceptions of history as absolutely systematized views into the relative, dynamically moving process in the light of a global perspective on history. It does not mean that Smith has ignored such traditional views, totally, but he asks individuals to see them in relation to other views, moreover, in relation to global history. In this sense, Smith has searched throughout his whole academic life for a new paradigm for understanding history, on the basis of the understanding of humanity globally.

ENDNOTES: CHAPTER FOUR

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So far I have discussed Jung's understanding of humanity based upon 'psyche' and Smith's understanding of humanity based upon 'person'. In the preceding chapters I made no comparison of the ideas of these two thinkers. In this chapter, I will compare their ideas, focusing upon similarities or parallels as well as differences. In addition, I will further express my personal opinion of their ideas.

1. New Awareness of Human Understanding

C.G. Jung, as a psychologist, and W.C. Smith, as an historian, devoted their whole academic lives to searching for a proper understanding of the human being in the twentieth century. They came to realize that their contemporary epistemological or methodological understanding of the human being exposed a number of problems preventing a proper understanding of the human being. These problems can be summarized as follows: the problem of materialism or externalism; the problem of monologue; and, the problem of objectivity. Further, they suggested a new understanding of humanity.

1) The Problem of Materialism or Externalism

Jung seriously tackled the modern materialistic culture from his student days, when, as I have discussed in the first chapter of

this work, Jung criticized materialism in his Zofingia Lectures. In his mature days, he was more concerned with the pathological effects of materialism on modern consciousness, rather than on an economic analysis of materialism and its basis in greed. Jung, in his book of cultural criticism, Civilization in Transition, pointed out two modern materialistic types of consciousness,¹ which totally ignore the authenticity of individuality in modern life. The first one lies in the consciousness that sees all human beings as being the products of "natural causes." The second one lies in the consciousness that sees all human beings as being the products of "chance occurrences". According to Jung, these two types of consciousness have excluded the possibility of seeing the human being as a unique being and have further ignored the metaphysical aspects of life,² so that only the materialistic dimension of life is seen as significant.

Jung diagnosed such materialistic tendencies in modern life as dangerous positions to hold for a proper understanding of the human being. As a doctor, he urged modern intellectuals to understand the human being, beyond his or her materialistic dimension, as moved by the psyche to a potential wholeness.³ Jung's lifelong attempt to understand the "whole" human being was his main task as a doctor.

Even though Smith does not use the same term to indicate the modern problem of materialism, Smith's critical point of modern society is the same as Jung's. Instead of "materialism", Smith has used the term "impersonalism" or "externalism" to refer to the

modern materialistic understanding which totally ignores the 'personal' and inner dimension of human life; a dimension which reveals the transcendental dimension of life. Smith has diagnosed such depersonalized or impersonalized consciousness as being prevalent in modern Western society. To Smith, any kind of human understanding which is based upon the exclusion of the 'personal' aspect of life, thus understood, is morally and intellectually wrong.

Furthermore, Smith equated such external or impersonalistic understanding with modern negative secularism, which has insisted upon the premise that "what human beings have in common is the non-religious, the non-transcendent".⁴ This attitude has become a kind of "modern orthodoxy". Smith writes that the holding to such a premise of negative secularism "...is developing into tragedy internally in Western life, engendering a pitiably dehumanised society."⁵

Smith keenly observed the abundance of 'personal' life in the major world civilizations. On the basis of his observations he has diagnosed the modern impersonalistic attitude as being an anomaly with few cultural precedents. Furthermore, due to the diversity of personal life, he does not agree with simple generalizations or definitions--such as the materialistic or impersonalistic--of human self-understanding, because such generalizations or definitions can result in the reification of all human phenomena.

In the process of observing people, not from the viewpoint of rigid metaphysical presuppositions but from an empirically

psychological or historical viewpoint, Jung and Smith came to see the reference to transcendence as the key to proper human self-understanding. They suggest that proper human self-understanding be situated in humanity itself, based upon psyche for Jung and person for Smith.

ii) The Problem of Objectivity

In this section, I will summarize Jung's criticisms of scientific rationalism, causality and dogmatic methods under the umbrella of objectivity. Jung criticized the strong influence of nineteenth century science upon medicine. He especially pointed out modern medicine's limiting of its realm to the search for physical causation, a limitation rooted in the scientism of the nineteenth century.⁶ Furthermore, he criticized the blind, dogmatic refusal of scientific research in medicine to recognize any psychic causal connection with the physical one. He urged modern medicine to extend its realm of study from its limited focus on the physical dimension, to the area of the psyche as well.

Jung thought that dogmatic scientific rationalism had a negative influence on contemporary cultural consciousness. Many educated people, in modern times, excluded the psychic or spiritual dimension of life from their self-understanding. In his later article, "The Undiscovered Self" (1956), Jung criticized such consciousness when he wrote that "scientific rationalism robs the individual of his foundations and his dignity".⁷ Such foundations

and dignity for Jung mean the psychic and spiritual dimension of life.

Jung, concretely, pointed out why such scientific rationalism was a powerful influence on modern people. To Jung, the reason lies in the intelligible explanation of many human phenomena in terms of scientific causality--the relation between cause and effect. He does not deny that the explanation of human phenomena in the light of the principle of scientific causality is helpful but he also found that a great many human phenomena can not be explained away or reduced analytically through the principle of scientific causality. He especially indicated that such causal explanations of subjective psychological phenomena are inadequate. Due to the limitations of causal understanding, Jung refused a simple imposition of scientific method for understanding psychological development. As he well puts it:

Personal and theoretical prejudices are the most serious obstacle in the way of psychological judgement.⁸

Smith also identified the problem of objectivity in relation to methodology for human understanding. As I have pointed out in my discussion of the limitations of objectivity for human understanding in the first chapter of this work, Smith saw that the principle of objectivity is founded on the universal or general validity in natural phenomena, so that it is limited in its use for fully understanding human phenomena.

Smith advanced two major arguments about why the principle of objectivity is problematic for an adequate human self-understanding. The first one lies in the analysis of doctrines,

rituals, symbols and so on for the sake of understanding human beings independent of the human beings who expressed such religious expressions. In other words, such understanding does not relate such religious expressions to persons who have produced such doctrines, rituals, symbols--from or through which they have sensed or experienced the transcendental dimension of life. Thus, to Smith, such a principle does not embrace fully the inner experience of persons which is "greater than, not less than, the systematic abstraction".⁹ Furthermore, it has been the main obstacle to understanding other persons.

The second reason why the principle of objectivity is the problem for human understanding lies in the fact that the extreme principle of objectivity has been used for manufacturing "the knowledge industry"¹⁰ in academia, so that the traditional quest for the "understanding of man and the universe and what it means to seek the truth," has been replaced with a practical, vocational program which can easily produce the knowledge industry and so "...increase power, pleasure or profit."¹¹ Furthermore, Smith criticized the use of such a pragmatic principle for understanding other persons, because, through such a principle other persons have been misinterpreted and manipulated rather than appreciated. As he well puts it in "The Place of Oriental Studies in a Western University",

There is the danger of "being used"; of subordinating knowledge to policy, rather than vice versa. There is the subtler danger of acquiring seeming knowledge that is, in fact, false. For it happens to be a law of this universe in which we live that you can not understand persons if you treat them as objects. You misinterpret

a culture if you approach it in order to manipulate it. A civilization does not yield its secrets except to a mind that approaches it with humility and love. Knowledge pursued *ad majorem Americae gloriam* will, in the realm of oriental, as indeed in all human studies, fail to be sound knowledge. The reverence and humility before the facts of nature which the natural scientist had to learn, before objectivity as an inviolable principle, must be supplemented by the orientalist with a reverence and humility before civilizations other than his own.¹²

Due to this manufactured or prejudicial understanding of the human being, as I discussed in the first chapter, Smith does not believe that methodology is a primary concern of human understanding.

Jung and Smith have deeply penetrated the modern problems inherent in the process of objectivizing when dealing with human beings, because, to them, the human being can not be explained away as is done in the studies of natural things. In this sense, Jung's and Smith's arguments are in the same line as Dilthey's when the latter argues that the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) should be different from or independent of the natural sciences, and that "the encroachment of the methods of [natural] science are therefore the worst enemies of the proper development of the human sciences."¹³

iii) The Problem of Monologue

To Jung, materialistic, objective or scientific understanding of the human being has proceeded through the imposition of the researcher's methodology or framework without sufficient

consideration given to the fact that the so-called "objects" of study are also subjects like the researcher whose subjectivity can not be interpreted fully in terms of a fixed methodology. Thus, to Jung, the researcher's consciousness-oriented understanding can be identified as that of a monologue which ignores the consciousness of the "objects" of their study. Jung has criticized researcher-oriented understanding and, instead, has suggested a dialogical understanding.

Jung's conviction about dialogical understanding mainly comes from his direct dialogue with his patients undertaken not only to discover symptoms or pathology but to assist in the emergence of the whole person. Later, in his Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung identified psychiatry or psycho-analysis, as a dialogue¹⁴ between the analysand and the analyst. In order to have an effective and wholistic understanding of the human being, Jung thought that even the dialogue between the consciousness of the analysand and the consciousness of the analyst should engage the relation of both to the unconscious. Jung especially realized that an understanding of symbolism should accompany the dialogue, because the unconscious expresses itself in symbols and can not be understood except through the understanding of symbols. As a result, from 1909 onward Jung began to study mythology.¹⁵

In fact, to Jung, such a dialogue between two persons affects not only the analysand but also the analyst. Thus, psychoanalytical dialogue can be said to be the process of becoming for both participants in the dialogue. Furthermore, Jung thought that the

analyst is no longer a "superior, wise man, judge, and counsellor" but "a fellow participant" in a process of individual development.¹⁶

Like Jung, Smith also criticized a monological understanding of the human being. In his article, "Non-Western Studies: The Religious Approach," Smith indicates two main failures¹⁷ of an understanding which employs a monological approach to other persons. The first failure can be found in the nineteenth century missionaries' attempt to understand other persons or civilizations in terms of their own Christian framework. In so doing, they subjected other persons to the framework of the Christian tradition. The second failure can be discovered in present day Western secularists' attempts to understand other persons or civilizations in the light of their own secular perspective, ignoring the religious dimension of life in the West and in other traditions.

Smith has urged modern intellectuals to exchange such monological understanding for a dialogical. At the same time, he has suggested that a new understanding be articulated with new terms through the process of dialogue.

Even though Smith propounds the employment of a dialogical understanding, he does not think that it is the final direction of human understanding.¹⁸ Rather, he sees it as a stepping stone for a wider or deeper understanding rooted in the history of humankind. According to Smith, the term dialogue implies two persons, two groups, two nations or two traditions. The term does not seem to

refer to more than "two" and therefore fails to adequately signify all human beings or all traditions which have constructed human history.

Due to such a dichotomous implication of the term "dialogue," Smith has referred to the final direction of human understanding by the multilateral and collaborative term "colloquy".¹⁹ To Smith, an awareness which sees "others" as partners of a colloquy rather than of a dialogue, can be identified as the culmination of human understanding--"we all" are talking with each other about "us". Ultimately, such an awareness can be the foundation for perceiving all human beings not as separate but as mutual beings of a world community in the history of humankind.

iv) A New Human Understanding

Jung thought that due to the lack of consideration of the subjective meaning in the psyche of the analysand, the verification of human understanding through the imposition of scientific rationalism, objectivity or methodology by the analyst upon the analysand, is very manipulative and, further, very prejudicial. To Jung, understanding or verification itself can not proceed without considering the subjective psychological process,²⁰ because the truth of the self emerges through a dialectical relationship between the analyst and the analysand, taking its direction from the symbolic yield of the analysand. This means that Jung, in his understanding of the human, does not endorse an extreme subjective

understanding on the part of the analysand, who benefits from the input of the analyst in the interpretation of the analysand's symbolic matter and its implications for the analysand's reaction to the external world.²¹ On this issue, Jung pointed out the critical role of the analyst.

Jung, over against "retrospective understanding" which finds final meaning in the origin of the psychic problem, suggested a new understanding which does not reduce the process of "becoming" simply to the origin. In this sense, Jung identified his new understanding as "prospective, synthetic or constructive" understood in contradistinction to a reductive process concerned only with origins.²² Jung's understanding is more future oriented [prospective] rather than past oriented [retrospective], even though he does not ignore the latter. Here, Jung's understanding is different from Freud's. As Paul Ricoeur rightly commented, Freud's understanding is very destructive of "becoming,"²³ due to the location of final meaning, or origin of the present problem, in the past. In contrast, Jung's understanding focuses upon how a bridge can be built for the future psyche of the analysand out of the present psyche.

Like Jung, Smith also deeply observed the problem of truncated human understanding in the West. Smith noted that Descartes was the first modern philosopher to search for indubitable and absolute knowledge based upon the model of mathematics.²⁴ Due to such a mathematical model Descartes approached human understanding based upon logical constructs, ideas or pure theory, ignoring the

personal dimension of life or empirical reality of human beings' existence. To Smith, Descartes was fundamentally a non-scientific and a non-humble researcher before a vast and complex human world. Recently, due to the influence of Bacon's practical or utilitarian philosophy rooted in Aristotle's practical intellect--Bacon's fundamental premise that knowledge is power rather than Socrates' premise that knowledge is virtue--modern human understanding has focused primarily upon methods or methodology itself.²⁵ This is the key problem of human understanding, according to Smith.

Smith thinks that even the best modern scientists have begun to doubt their own fundamental premises. Such doubt is evident in Michael Polanyi's new awareness that "personal involvement is central even to the natural sciences"²⁶ and in Thomas Kuhn's endorsement of "a relativising and making human of what is claimed to be absolute."²⁷

As I discussed in the first chapter over against such speculative, contemplative or utilitarian human understanding as Descartes' and Bacon's, Smith has proposed a new awareness of human understanding--corporate critical self-consciousness. Smith thinks that human understanding is ultimately self-understanding, but such self-understanding should be verified in "others." On this point, Smith has established a moral and intellectual imperative, "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you," as the "highest authority"²⁸ for human understanding.

Smith has urged that an intellectual understanding of other traditions and faith proceed with those other traditions and faith

and, ultimately, with a strong awareness of a "world audience",²⁹ rather than with the researcher's limited awareness of his or her own tradition and faith. Furthermore, such understanding should be approved in the researcher's own academic and religious or humanistic tradition as well as the tradition which is the object of his or her study. At the same time, to Smith, the rigorous, faithful participation of researchers in their own traditions--as opposed to simply ignoring their own traditions due to a strong appreciation of other traditions--is very important for the study of other traditions.

To learn to understand, with imaginative sympathy and objective validity, the other cultures of the world, must not be at the expense of appreciating our own culture, or keeping loyalty to it. On the contrary, it must be grounded rather in the recognition that it is of the genius of our culture (and in this it would seem to be alone among man's systems) to understand the world in which we live, including the civilizations which have preceded and those which surround us. And on the practical side also it is only so that we can serve our culture; for only so can our society learn to live with (not to dominate) others who share the planet and its problems with us.³⁰

Smith has urged modern intellectuals to see the point of his new human understanding in modern academia. Smith thinks that traditional understanding based upon the relationship between subject and object as a polarity is wrong. For example there are "...the study of the condition of blacks in the United States by white scholars; of the role of women by male scholars; of homosexuality by heterosexual investigators."³¹ Such a polarity between subject and object should be overcome through inter-participation towards corporate critical self-consciousness. This

point can be illustrated very clearly in Smith's understanding of librarianship.

My thesis, then, is that the development of good Islamic libraries, and of good Islamic librarianship, is an intellectual task of the first order--one that requires technical skill in the librarian's craft, plus an authentic understanding of Islamic culture and civilization and even faith, plus an ability to synthesize these creatively.³²

As Frank Whaling rightly commented upon Smith's thinking,³³ Smith's fundamental concern is located in the present condition of human understanding, and, further, how the future possibility of global human understanding can be established.

Thus far, I have discussed similar points of Jung and Smith's human understanding. To them, fundamentally, the most important key of human understanding does not lie in methodology, theory, scientific objectivity or rationalism, but in a dialectical relationship between the analysand and analyst or the devotee and religionist. Such a relationship develops dialectically, depending upon the situation or personality, so that a fixed methodology can not be employed. Rather, theory or method should always be revised according to the developing dialogical situation and to the personalities involved. Thus, to them, theories or methods are secondary for human understanding.

Even though there are fundamental similarities between Jung and Smith, there remain two major differences between them in their understanding of the human being as person and as imbued with psyche.

The first difference lies in their concepts of "psyche" and

"person." Jung, primarily, observed the human being as a psychological being. He understood the human being within the boundary of the psyche. Therefore, he did not put an initial emphasis upon the social and historical dimension of the human being. He primarily focused his understanding of the human around the study of psyche, empirically, even though the consequences of his study of the psyche are not without metaphysical and social import. Thus, Jung's understanding of human beings can be identified as a psychological understanding which is grounded on an intrapsychic, dialectical relationship between consciousness and the unconscious in which the unconscious constantly transcends consciousness and seeks ever fuller expression in it.

Relative to Jung, Smith does not put much emphasis upon the psychological individual. Rather, his emphasis is on the social and historical being. He has tried to understand the socially or historically conditioned/bounded human being, as 'person'. In this sense, Smith's understanding of the human being can be identified as an historical and personal understanding which has proceeded through a dialectical and horizontal relationship between the person and the world and a dialectical and vertical relationship between the person and transcendence in history.

The second difference between Jung and Smith's thought lies in this area of understanding of "other" people. Jung's primary concern is with understanding modern Western people and their spiritual plight. Even though he researched widely in 'other' cultures--Africa, Asia and Native America--the aim of his research

was to show the split between consciousness and the unconscious in modern Western technological and scientific culture, in contrast to other peoples and cultures. Furthermore, Jung showed how the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious had been balanced or maintained in other peoples and cultures, in terms of his psychology. Jung did not explore the relationship between Western and non-Western people with the purpose of appreciating non-Westerners in themselves. Rather he saw, in Eastern religious traditions natural connectedness with the unconscious from which the West was severed. As a result of this analysis, he did not think that the West could simply import Eastern religiosity but rather must recover an Eastern sense of interiority from its own neglected or repressed traditions ranging from gnosticism to alchemy. This strategy is evident in the later sections of Psychology and Religion, especially in his two works on the books of the liberation and the dead.³⁴ It is also evident in the following citation.

But with the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well. For this reason we can not transplant the spirit of a foreign race *in globo* into our own mentality without sensible injury to the latter, a fact which does not, however, deter sundry natures of feeble instinct from affecting Indian philosophy and the like.³⁵

Due to the imposition of his own psychological interpretation on other religious traditions devoid of the perspective of these traditions themselves, Jung's understanding has been criticized by Harold Coward³⁶ and Richard Hubert Jones.³⁷

In contrast to Jung's understanding, Smith does not understand

'other' persons as simply 'others' in terms of a polarity between the West and the East. Rather, he has seen that all human beings can be observed as members of a world community, rather than as members of separate communities. This point has been a consistent, fundamental, and personal commitment and vision for Smith's whole lifetime. It can especially be clearly sensed in his small article published in The Canadian Forum (1936) even when he was twenty years old.

...that the youth of Canada is tending implicitly to renounce a manner of life based on personal acquisitiveness and selfish competition, a system which results in materialism and the lowering of cultural values as well as in unemployment and war; that, instead, youth desires to co-operate and to contribute, to struggle as a community for the betterment of the community, and the betterment of its relations with the world: the individual wants primarily to work, and secondly to work with others and for others, towards a common and an ideal goal.³⁸

Smith has challenged not only the traditional Western perspective towards 'others', but also he has challenged non-Westerners' traditional perspective towards a world community, not in terms of a Western perspective, but, from a global perspective.

Stage five arrives when we recognize that the we/they business is today outgrown: we are all in this together, and can all learn from each other. "We" now means "us human beings"--in our diversity and yet our overriding humanity, even community. We are all heirs now of many cultures and we face the future together: our common future, multi-cultural.³⁹

The future of India will be Hindu, in an unrecognized form yet to created; the future of Buddhists will be Buddhist, not in any past sense but in some future one; the future of Muslim world will be the next novel chapter in the religious history of an Islamic evolution now vigorously in process.⁴⁰

2. Consciousness and Cumulative Tradition as Symbol-- The Expression of Religious Experience.

Jung and Smith have seen the importance of a symbolic understanding of the human being as the indispensable key to overcome the objectivistic, positivistic and propositional understanding which is based upon scientific rationalism and belief systems for human understanding. In this sense, they have a fundamental common ground for understanding human beings.

Jung, in his seminar talk "Symbolic life" on 5 April, 1939 to the Guild of Pastoral Psychology in London, clearly pointed out that the human being has always been able to appreciate and to live meaningfully with symbols throughout human history.⁴¹

Despite symbolic life as the basis for becoming human, scientific, rationalistic understanding does not place much value upon understanding symbolic life, because, to the scientific mind,

such phenomena as symbolic ideas are most irritating, because they can not be formulated in a way that satisfies our intellects and logic.⁴²

Smith, also, in his introduction to part eight of the Encyclopaedia Britannica titled "Religion as Symbolism", indicates that "without the use of symbols, including religious symbols, man would be radically less than human."⁴³ Due to symbolic life as the basis of becoming human, Smith further articulated, in his latest book, that

it is a simple fact of observation that one can not understand human history, unless one recognize that certain things have functioned symbolically.⁴⁴

On the basis of this general common ground of symbolic

understanding as contributing to human totality, I will discuss three similarities between Jung's and Smith's understanding of symbol, and, then, develop some differences as well.

The first similarity lies in their understanding of the formation of symbols. As I discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation, to Jung, the primary quality of the psyche is libido grounded in archetypal energy. This libido expresses itself through the formation of symbols which bear to consciousness the archetypal energies of the unconscious. On this point, it should be carefully understood that, to Jung, the libido is constantly flowing but, frequently, archetypal images are formed carrying a peculiarly intense energy, that of the numinous. In summation, to Jung, religious symbol-formation proceeds through the interaction of archetypal, numinous images generated by the unconscious and "the ideas acquired by the conscious mind,"⁴⁵ in its conscious assimilation of the numinous symbol. Due to such indispensable combinations, both elements of symbol formation--unconscious origin and conscious reception--should always be maintained and balanced.

Like Jung, Smith also understands that the inner, deeper quality of the human being is expressed through the process of conscious assimilation of the deeper quality. Smith refers to such a process as "the symbolization process,"⁴⁶ in the article "Symbols in Religion," delivered at the Royal Society of Canada Symposium in memory of George Whalley.

To Smith, such a deep, inner human quality is the key to transforming the objective thing into a symbol:

Quite diverse types of things have served the purpose: a beaver, the sky, a ceremonial procedure, silence; erotic love, or austere asceticism; the Qur'an; the historical figure; reason. The variety has been immense, different groups having chosen different things to serve them as symbols not all equally successful. Virtually universal, however, is that men have found it possible to designate some item from within the visible world and to sacralize it in such a way that it becomes then for them the symbol or locus of the invisible, the transcendent.⁴⁷

No building is objectively a temple. No space is objectively sacred. No object is objectively a symbol, in and of itself: an object becomes a symbol in the consciousness of certain persons.⁴⁸

The second similarity between Jung's and Smith's understanding of symbol lies in the function of symbols. Jung thought that symbols function as powerful "transformers" which can "convert libido from a 'lower' into a 'higher' form," and furthermore, due to the numinous quality, can give the "conviction and at the same time express the content of that conviction."⁴⁹

Even though symbols have their own autonomous, numinous quality, if they are not properly accepted by individuals, they will not adequately function in their life. Thus, to Jung, the conscious attitude is very important; it is the key to the individual's receptivity to the symbolic world. As he well puts it,

Whether a thing is a symbol or not depends chiefly on the **attitude** (q.v.) of the observing consciousness; for instance, on whether it regards a given fact not merely as such, but also as an expression for something unknown. Hence it is quite possible for a man to establish a fact which does not appear in the least symbolic to himself, but is profoundly so to another consciousness.⁵⁰

In a word, Jung understood symbol, functionally, as the carrier of archetypal energies contributing to a meaningful life.⁵¹

Like Jung, Smith, also, observed the function of symbol not only as the carrier or representative of a human quality but also as the activator of human life, giving it living meaning.

Such symbols, it turns out, have the power not merely to express men's otherwise inchoate awareness of the richness of what lies under the surface, but also to nurture and to communicate and to elicit it. They have an activating as well as a representational quality, and an ability to organize the emotions and the unconscious as well as the conscious mind, so that into them men may pour the deepest range of their humanity and from them derive an enhancement of the personality.⁵²

The third similarity between Jung and Smith lies in the transcendental meaning of symbol. Jung thought that symbols were not signs or semiotics which expose "known things." Nor did he think of them as allegories which paraphrase the known thing intentionally. He thought that symbols are "...the best possible formulation of a relatively unknown thing, which for that reason can not be more clearly or characteristically represented..."⁵³ In other words, to Jung, the meaning of a symbol lies in the "yet unknown and incomprehensible fact of a mystical or transcendent, i.e., psychological nature".⁵⁴ Thus, to Jung, the symbol is identified as a "bridge or pointer"⁵⁵ towards "something divined but not yet known to the observer."⁵⁶

This point can also be detected in Smith's understanding of the meaning of symbols. According to Smith, the materials of symbols are mundane or historical but the meaning of such symbols always transcends their mundane or historical aspect; that is, the meaning is transcendental. As I have emphasized, of course, to

Smith, the transcendental meaning is rooted in history rather than in abstract metaphysics, so that there is no separation of mundane and transcendental but, rather, there is an overlap.

..always contemporary symbols throughout human history have in fact symbolized a metaphysical or transcendent order that in turn has symbolized, no doubt in purified and isolated form, a dimension of actual human life that is both real and authentic, that has been empirically present in history and is empirically evinced.⁵⁷

The fourth similarity lies in Jung's and Smith's observation of the negative function of symbolic life in relation to "others". Jung especially indicated the negative function of symbolic life as bonding communities against each other in the form of competing "isms" or ideologies which can so easily victimize the modern mass mind severed from the unconscious and, as such, vulnerable to such "epidemics". As he well states in several places,

Alienation from the unconscious and from its historical conditions spells rootlessness. That is the danger that lies in wait for the conqueror of foreign lands, and for every individual who, through one-sided allegiance to any kind of -ism, loses touch with the dark, maternal, earthy ground of his being.⁵⁸

This magic word [archetypal energy], which always ends in "ism," works most successfully with those who have the least access to their interior selves and have strayed the furthest from their instinctual roots into the truly chaotic world of **collective consciousness**.⁵⁹

Smith, like Jung, observes, with equal profundity, that, in the history of humankind, the same negative function of symbolic life can be very easily discovered. He has pointed out that such a negative symbolic life can be detected in relationships with "other" people. In other words, symbolic life has been very positive within one community, but it has been transformed into a

very negative or destructive life in relation to other communities.

Of course, religious symbols and sets of symbols have been used also for mean and destructive purposes. Man's wickedness, not just his or her capacity for virtue, has been expressed and even encouraged by the symbol system at times. Through it persons have found their freedom, their transcendence of the immediately given, their ability to move beyond being merely an organism reacting to the environment; but sometimes they have used it destructively, or have become victims of its inherent ambiguities. Nothing has turned a society into a community so effectively as has religious faith: to share common symbols is about the most powerful of social cohesions. And yet few gulfs have been greater than those that separate differing religious communities, few hostilities so fierce as those between groups whose symbols differ.⁶⁰

Even though there are some similarities (similar although not identical), as I have discussed, there are also some differences, between Jung and Smith, in their understanding of symbol.

The first difference is in the perception of symbol. To Jung, the understanding of symbol was "the" key for understanding an individual through the individual's dreams as the prime bearer of the personal symbols that provide the basis for the individual's symbolic life.⁶¹ Thus, to Jung, the objective study of symbols complements and can be used to amplify the analysands' subjective understanding of their own symbols. This point does not mean, as I have emphasized in previous chapters about Jung's understanding of the human, that Jung ignored the analysand's rough understanding of the analysand's dream symbols. On the contrary, for Jung, a legitimate analysis proceeds first on the basis of the analysand's personal associations to the dream symbols prior to their amplification by either analysand or analyst. Only when personal associations to the individual's dream symbols are exhausted would

the analysis move to amplify personal symbols through their relation to their possible variants in the history of symbolic expression. Thus, Jung did think that the analysand's understanding of symbol should be amplified in the interests of its conscious assimilation through the analyst's more extensive experience of the dream world and study of the history of symbols.

The essence of hermeneutics, an art widely practised in former times, consists in adding further analogies to the one already supplied by the symbol: in the first place subjective analogies produced at random by the patient, then objective analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge.⁶²

Jung's "absolute" emphasis on symbolic understanding for human understanding can be more detected in his understanding of the "Protestant" and Islamic traditions. He harshly criticized these two traditions in his seminar on "the symbolic life", because he thought that they removed their constituencies from the source of the symbolic in the unconscious.

The splitting up of Protestantism into new denominations--four hundred or more we have--is a sign of life. But, alas! It is not a very nice sign of life, in the sense of a church, because there is no dogma and there is no ritual. There is not the typical symbolic life.

And when you look at the ritual life of the Protestant Church, it is almost nil. Even the Holy Communion has been rationalized. I say that from the Swiss point of view: in the Swiss Zwinglian Church the Holy Communion is not a communion at all; it is a meal of memory. There is no Mass either; there is no confessions; there is no ritual, symbolic life.⁶³

We do not know whether Hitler is going to found a new Islam. (He is already on the way; he is like Mohammed. The emotion in Germany is Islamic; warlike and Islamic. They are all drunk with a wild god.)⁶⁴

As I have said, Smith, also, perceives the study of symbol as

an important factor for human understanding, but he does not regard it as the 'absolute' key for human understanding like Jung or Eliade. Rather, Smith sees it as only one of many keys including the history of religions.

Furthermore, in contrast to Jung's perception of a life devoid of symbols as a possible cause of a neurotic life, Smith argues that there have been many cases of meaningful, moral, or coherent lives without the effective presence of symbols; especially among Muslims or Christians.

At most times and most places, morality has been an integral part of the religious complex (although situations have on occasion arisen when the two have become historically dislocated--when a given form of religion has seemed not good; or to put it another way, when man's sense of what is worthwhile, and the inherited symbols by which worth used to be formulated, have no longer converged.⁶⁵

The second difference between Jung and Smith's understanding of symbol, can be discovered in the meaning of symbol. That is, Jung and Smith, respectively, have placed a different emphasis upon the meaning of symbol. As I said earlier, Jung did not ignore the analysand's opinion or the general people's opinion of the meaning of a symbol in relation to their life. However, for Jung, the first level of symbolic interpretation is that given by the analysand's personal associations. Only then on the basis of a more general or encompassing understanding of the symbol would the wider associations in the history of any given symbol be used to amplify the symbol as it appears in an individual's dream. Jung succinctly explains this point by using the example of the symbol of an eagle which initially appeared in a dream. No doubt the

symbol meant something in the dreamer's personal associations but this meaning could be deepened through a knowledge of what meaning content the symbol of the eagle has carried in this symbol's historical appearances. All of the foregoing is implied when Jung writes:

In my view, then, the task of the interpretation is to find out what the eagle, aside from our personal fantasies, might mean. I would therefore advise the dreamer to start investigating what the eagle is **qua** eagle, and what general meanings may be attributed to it. The solution of this task leads straight into the history of symbols, and here we find the concrete reason why I concern myself with researches which are apparently so remote from the doctor's consulting room.⁶⁶

Due to the emphasis of the archaic or general meaning of symbols, Jung's interpretation of symbols strengthens the analysands' understanding of symbols to conform with their life, by showing the power that the personal symbol has carried in the history of its appearances. His hermeneutic for the interpretation of symbols points to what Jung called the "objective unconscious", the archetypal basis of the unconscious which sponsors symbols sharing a like meaning but appearing infinite variation to consciousness across human history. The objective basis for the always relative manifestation of symbols in personal and collective life leads some commentators to see in Jung's hermeneutic a classical form of phenomenology because this hermeneutic rests on "...objective general patterns, coming down to basic mental or philosophical structures in the world of religious phenomena".⁶⁷ This understanding of the symbolic differs from Smith's.

To Smith, "since there are no meta-personal meanings, there

can be no meta-personal symbols."⁶⁸ As I said, according to Smith, nothing can become objectively or inherently a symbol in and of itself. Something becomes a symbol only in relation to persons in their concrete historical context of life. Thus, Smith does not even try to identify or generalize "the" meaning of any given symbol, objectively, since various meanings of a symbol can occur, depending upon not the history of symbol itself but upon the person's involvement with it. This point can be more understood in Smith's observation of three levels of symbols in relation to devotees.

On the fundamental principle of personal or relational meaning of symbols, Smith has articulated three levels of symbols in relation to personal meaning. He refers to these levels as second-level, first-level, and zero-level symbols.⁶⁹ A second-level symbol is related to the observer's awareness that the symbol is simply a living symbol perceived by the devotee in faith consciousness as symbolic, even though the symbol is not accepted as symbolic by the observer or religionist. A first-level symbol is located in the devotee's recognition of the symbol as a symbol through their self-involvement with the symbols, which also can be shared by or involved with the observer or religionist.

Here, Smith, has further articulated different grades of meaning of first-level symbols, even in the same tradition, depending upon groups, persons, a person or situations--century by century, place by place and so on.

There are many ways of perceiving the world; and, as the history of religion makes clear, there are many ways,

differing in place and time, of perceiving transcendence immanent within it. If, however, one is to understand iconoclasm, as a major chapter in that history, let alone much internecine strife, one must bear in mind that the role of symbols is always particularized. P may be a symbol to one man or woman, and not to another. Q may symbolize something more forcefully, more limpidly, in one age than in another. R may be a symbol of something to one person, or class, or community; and of something quite else, even something contrary and perhaps fiercely colliding, to another.

A crucifix may for certain Roman Catholics represent love; for certain Protestants, superstition; for certain Jews, oppression.⁷⁰

Within the boundary of second and first-level symbols, religionists will have no difficulty communicating with persons or devotees, because the devotees do not feel uncomfortable even though the religionist may interpret something to them as symbolic which they have taken as literal. Smith identified such second and first-level symbols as "minor" symbols.

However, there are "cosmic absolutes to those involved, such as the Real Presence, or the Person of Christ, or the Qur'an," which devotees do not regard as "symbols," even though scholarly observers see them as "human and contingent symbols."⁷¹ Smith calls such symbols zero-level or "major" symbols.⁷² Regarding to Hindu or Buddhist traditions, Smith shows the further gradations of major symbols.

We can understand Sankara perhaps if we say that Siva was a symbol for him, but not Ramanuja if we say that Vishnu was; and even Sankara if we say that Brahman was.⁷³

...of a modern Nagarjuna on the relation of **dharma** as a symbol and **dharma** as ultimate reality for the Buddhist.⁷⁴

Thus, for Smith, the interpretation of symbol is primarily proceeded in relation to a person's engagement with his or her

symbol; while as, for Jung, the interpretation of symbol is strengthened and proceeded in relation to the history of symbol beyond Smith's personal interpretation. Furthermore, for a long time, Smith has argued that the study of symbols should be accompanied with the study of iconoclasm, especially in the context of religious pluralism, for example the relations between the Hindu and the Muslim in India, due to the different various meanings of symbols, depending upon religious groups.

The notion (symbol) has contributed to human understanding, especially of Indian but also of archaic and of Buddhist and of much other religious experience; and has contributed to self-understanding. Yet it does not quite serve to explain the Islamic. To understand India (and, I would argue, to understand man), one has to understand both symbolism and iconoclasm.⁷⁵

We are all iconoclast, but also all iconodule, to use the technical terms for both sides of that classical controversy: we would shatter others' symbols or icons that we do not understand, but we slavishly submit, even unwittingly, to our own.⁷⁶

To summarize, I think that Jung's analysis of symbol is of considerable significance for understanding the human being, especially in the analysis of symbol-formation. But, relative to Smith, he did not show sufficient studies of the diverse levels which persons have experienced in relation to any given, objective symbols in their life. This is a different emphasis from Smith. Due to this difference, it can be said that Jung's primary concern is in the genesis and structural function of the symbol in the individual, psychologically, but Smith's is in the personal, functional and diverse meanings through person's relation with symbols as they appear in history and in the history of religion.⁷⁷

3. Archetypal Experience and Faith as the Matrix of Religious Experience

Jung and Smith have articulated the indispensable core of human self-understanding in their empirical research of the human being. Jung called it archetypal experience and Smith has identified it as "faith." Jung and Smith have perceived them as the matrix of religious experience or religious life. In this section of the present chapter, I will compare the fundamental characteristic of archetypal experience as numinosity in the thought of Jung and faith as the fundamental human quality in the thought of Smith. Furthermore, I will distinguish some differences between them in terms of their understanding of 'human will.' Since I have already described several characteristics of the two concepts--archetype and faith--in the second and the third chapter, I will avoid long quotations to support my interpretation of these concepts and, instead, provide frequent short quotations.

The first similarity between Jung's understanding of archetypal experience and Smith's understanding of faith can be discovered in the locus of the two concepts. Smith and Jung do not place the locus of these two concepts outside of the human being. Jung identified the locus of archetype in the inner depths of the human being, through his empirical research of "primitive" or dead religious traditions, and, to some extent, living world traditions, and in contemporary dreams. Smith, also has articulated the locus of faith, not in religious doctrines themselves, but in the heart of the human being, through his empirical, historical and

dialogical research of, mainly, living world traditions, and, to some extent, "primitive" or dead religious traditions. This is a general common ground between them.

The second similarity lies in the fact that they do not think that their concepts are limited to some peoples or cultures and not to others. Rather, they see these human qualities--archetypal experience and faith--as universal, irrespective of race, religion or culture. Jung thinks that archetype has a "collective, universal, impersonal nature."⁷⁸ Likewise, Smith, also, thinks that, even though the expressions of faith have been diverse, the common ground of such diversity is rooted in "an evidently universal quality."⁷⁹

The third similarity lies in the fact that they, both, do not identify the concrete contents of archetype and faith. Due to this fact, Jung thought that archetype itself did not have any concrete contents or ideas which have been inherited from ancient times on. Rather, he thought that archetype is "the inherited quality to be something like the formal possibility of producing the same or similar ideas over and over again."⁸⁰ The archetype's "specific content only appears in the course of the individual's life, when personal experience is taken up in precisely these forms."⁸¹ In this sense, James L. Henderson's comment upon Jung's archetypal contents, depending upon "the horizontal, sequential time - track of an individual's brief span of existence between birth and death",⁸² is quite accurate.

In almost the same way, Smith has thought that faith is a

potentiality of human life or a propensity of the human being which "across the centuries and across the world has given rise to and has been nurtured by a prodigious variety of religious forms, and yet has remained elusive and personal prior to and beyond the forms."⁸³ In other words, to Smith, faith is the quality of "impulse"⁸⁴ which has maintained the religious traditions or all human life but, also, subtracted or enlarged some parts of them, creatively. Thus, Smith's primary concern of "potentiality, propensity or impulse" in human life correlates to Jung's archetypal "possibility," as the fundamental human quality. Furthermore, such a human quality has been expressed with specific contents which have been different or diverse in human history.

The fourth similarity can be discovered in their awareness that all human languages and expressions are not sufficient enough to define or generalize or exhaust such creative possibility as philosophers, theologians or objective scientists have attempted. Jung and Smith do not attempt to "explain away" their understanding of an inexhaustible fecundity as the basis of religion, but, fundamentally, try to "understand" it in relation to human life, phenomenologically. Smith, especially, has adopted two terms in his understanding of the human being's life--"comprehension and apprehension."⁸⁵ He has thought that faith and its source can not be "comprehended", fully but, partially, "apprehended".

The fifth similarity lies in the role of archetype or faith in human experience or human life. Jung, in his "On the Psychology of the Unconscious" (1917), in one instance pointed out that

archetypes are the "impressions of ever-repeated typical experiences" or "deposit[s] of experiences that have already taken place."⁸⁶ Archetypes are the effect of former human experiences and also, at the same time, "the agents that tend towards the repetition of these same experiences"⁸⁷ as the cause of such experiences. Due to this double role of archetype, I have interpreted archetype, in the second chapter, as the receiver of the effect of human or religious experience and at the same time as the sender or the cause of human and religious experience, in present human life.

Even though Smith, like Jung, does not say that faith is the same human or religious experience for all human beings, he has articulated that faith has been not only the effect through which the person or the devotee participates in his or her own tradition--the expressions or deposits of faith--but also the cause which prompts persons to have his or her own personal experiences, as did his or her forefathers in the past. Thus, as with Jung, I can say that, to Smith, faith has been the receiver of genuine human experiences--the expressions of faith--and, at the same time, the sender of their own personal experience in their human life.

The sixth similarity can be discovered in their awareness of the paradoxical aspects of archetype and faith. Jung and Smith have thought that archetype and faith have, at the same time, revealed temporal and eternal aspects. Thus, for Jung, the expressions of archetype are culturally and historically conditioned, but "ultimately, every individual life is at the same

time the eternal life of the species."⁸⁸ Of course, dialectically speaking, Jung emphasizes the eternal aspect of archetype, which can become real and conscious only in the temporal. This point will be discussed further in the section of this chapter dealing with the differences between Jung and Smith.

In a similar way, Smith pointed out, in his paper, "Traditional Religions and Modern Culture" delivered at the 11th International Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (1965), that faith has two paradoxical qualities: timelessness and time-boundedness, or eternity and historicity.⁸⁹ As I have emphasized, to Smith, such paradoxical qualities are not separate qualities but inter-linked qualities in history. According to Smith, the human being has been conditioned "by his or her past and by his or her environment, that is, by mundane history," yet, always, the human being is "not altogether determined by them, by it."⁹⁰ Thus it can be said that, to Smith, the self-transcending quality of faith is always expressed in time-bound form.

To summarize, archetype and faith have an eternal or transcending quality but they can not be expressed apart from a specific place or time. In other words, they can not be identified without considering the historicity of the two concepts.

The seventh similarity lies in the key characteristic of the two concepts. Jung identified the key characteristic of archetype as numinosity. He especially confirmed the key feature of archetype as "numinosum" or numinosity--as articulated by Rudolf

Otto in Das Heilige (The Idea of the Holy)--in: his inaugural lecture "A Review of the Complex Theory," delivered at the Federal Polytechnic Institute (1934),⁹¹ his "Lectures on Religion in the Light of Science and Philosophy," at Yale University (1937),⁹² and, his later address "Good and Evil in Analytical Psychology," to the Stuttgarter Gemeinschaft "Arzt und Seelsorger" (1959).⁹³

Like Rudolf Otto, Jung interpreted numinosity or numinosum as the "dynamic agency or effect not caused by the arbitrary act of will"⁹⁴ or "an experience of the subject independent of his will."⁹⁵ Due to the independent character of the numinous power of the archetype, it can not be controlled by the ego or consciousness. Rather the ego should be subordinated to the power of numinosity.

I can not 'conquer' a numinosum, I can only open myself to it, let myself be overpowered by it, trusting in its meaning. A principle is always a subordinate thing, mightier than I am. I can not even 'conquer' the ultimate principles of physics, they simply confront me, loom over me, as sheer facts, as laws that 'prevail'. Here there is something that we can not conquer.⁹⁶

To Jung, the quality of numinosity is not a thinking-value but a "feeling-value that is highly effective in practice."⁹⁷ Such a "feeling-value" as numinosity has not only a negative aspect but a positive aspect. Those who are possessed by an archetype in either its negative aspect or positive, are susceptible to psychosis, personally or collectively.

Not only has the great civilized Germany disgorged its primitivity, but Russia also is ruled by it, and Africa has been set on fire. No wonder the Western world feels uneasy, for it does not know how much it plays into the hands of the uproarious underworld and, what it has lost through the destruction of its numinosities. It has lost

its moral and spiritual values to a very dangerous degree. Its moral and spiritual tradition has collapsed, and has left a worldwide disorientation and dissociation.⁹⁸

In reverse, the humanizing quality of numinosity is a "divine or sacred"⁹⁹ quality which can transform, under the direction of the self, "the subject into the state of rapture, which is a state of will-less surrender."¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, this quality can create a "spiritual" dimension in human life, such as "myths, religions, and philosophical ideas that influence and set their stamp on whole nations and epochs."¹⁰¹ At the same time, it "mobilizes philosophical and religious convictions in the very people"¹⁰² who are involved in religious activities.

Even though, relatively speaking, Smith does not use the terms, numinousum or numinosity as often as Jung did, his key point of faith is very similar. In his major book, The Meaning and End of Religion, he seriously criticized the reification of the term 'religion' caused by the European age of reason. He especially indicated the conceptualization process of the term religion; a process which failed to consider sufficiently the "...much tremulous sense of the numinous or much dissolvent sense of historical flux."¹⁰³

Like Jung, Smith, also, sees two aspects of faith in relation to other traditions or persons. The first one is the negative aspect of faith. In his other major book, Faith and Belief, Smith has indicated that faith is not everywhere admirable. Rather, "a perversity of faith--the arrant stupidities, rigidities, fanaticisms of faith"¹⁰⁴ can be easily found in the history of

religion or the history of the human being. Smith very keenly observed that such perverse faith which has fastened onto points of tradition--especially doctrine--has "ignored, suppressed, or demolished"¹⁰⁵ the understanding of other persons involved with other traditions. According to Smith, this is not a limited, particular phenomenon but a global phenomenon. Due to this global aspect, Smith has coined a new term "homo religiosus perversus".¹⁰⁶

Smith, in his recent article "Fundamentalism in the Modern World," has critically pointed out the reason why fundamentalism and secularism as negative forms of faith, again, have strongly come out around the world. Smith has discovered, as I point out in the third chapter, the main reason for the negative secularism which has been prevalent around the world. To Smith, such negative secularism has come out of the "Western intellectual's inability to recognize the spiritual ground of their own positive secular tradition," and their failure to understand that "human beings have demonstrably been, and continue to be, spiritually oriented creatures."¹⁰⁷ As a result, negative secularism has exposed itself as a "non-(or anti-) religious" movement. As a reaction to negative secularism, modern fundamentalism has emerged as a movement which considers itself as separate rather than inter-linked or inter-related in the pluralistic setting of modern life.

However, as an historian, Smith has observed that negative secularists and fundamentalists do not have the answer to proper understanding of the human being; they must modify or reform their

own traditional understanding of other "persons."

In the Christian case as also in the Islamic and Jewish and to some degree in all world religions, there is exclusivism and the tendency to denigrate others. Western secularism too has denigrated its alternatives. All that has got to go. We have got to find ways whereby we can respect each other's very different traditions but also where we can modify our own to fit into a complex interrelated world. India has classically thought more about pluralism than any other civilization; but India today is as swayed by fundamentalism as any other country in the world."¹⁰⁸

The second aspect of faith is a positive one. Like Jung, Smith has observed that, in human history, faith, when properly functioning, provides the key to maintaining and developing a proper religious or human life. To him, positive faith is able "to steel men and women against the impending doom, giving them the courage to face the coming catastrophe."¹⁰⁹ This point can be more clearly summarized in the following quotation:

Faith is a quality of human living, which at its best has taken the form of serenity and courage and service; a quiet confidence and joy that enable one to feel at home in the universe, and to find meaning in the world and in one's own life, a meaning that is profound and ultimate, and stable no matter what may happen to oneself at the level of immediate event. Men and women of this kind of faith face catastrophe or confusion, affluence or sorrow, unperturbed, face opportunity with conviction and drive, and face others with self-forgetting charity.¹¹⁰

To summarize, for Jung and Smith, archetypal sustenance and faith have been the key to living a religious and so fully human life. In other words, to Jung, the experience of the self is the ultimate support of the individual in existence.¹¹¹ In the same way, to Smith, faith is "a constitutive ingredient of what it has meant to be human,"¹¹² or a person. Archetypal experience and faith are the foundational condition of becoming "human," so that,

to them, there is no distinction between religious experience and the fullness of human maturation. Moreover, for both, archetypal sustenance and faith should always express itself or seek verification in relation to "others" or society to avoid its negative possibilities such as fanaticism or isolation in private truths.

In spite of the fact that there are some compatible similarities or parallels between Jung's understanding of archetype and Smith's understanding of faith, there are some significant differences. These differences centre on their respective understandings of archetypal nature of experience and faith.

The first difference lies in the instinctual or natural quality of archetypal experience for Jung and the personal quality of faith for Smith. Jung thought, as discussed in the second chapter, that the unconscious was instinctual, by which he means "natural". Such instinct was regulated by a specific agency, the self, which was, also, natural, and sought the unity of archetypally based opposites in consciousness. In this sense the symbols which appear in dreams are authored by the self and are the images of the instincts available to consciousness.¹¹³

Like Jung's extended understanding of nature and instinct, Smith thinks that "...human nature is inherently aware of, sensitive to, responsive to, what I am calling transcendence in **its environment and within itself** [human nature]..."¹¹⁴ but he does not identify nature itself as regulative of natural instinct.

...I do not glibly mean that faith is "natural." Certainly it is not automatic. Faith is normal: but to

abnormality man is naturally prone.¹¹⁵

Faith is neither rare nor automatic. Rather, it is ubiquitously astonishing. It is the prodigious hallmark of being human.¹¹⁶

Rather, Smith understands the regulative power as a personal quality. By "personal" Smith means an interior quality which occurs through or in one's involvement with society and religious traditions. As he puts in his address "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences" in the meeting of the Royal Society of Canada (1974), and in his Belief and History:

I hope that it is hardly necessary to insist that by "personal" I do not mean "individual". Personality is profoundly social. The opposite of individual is social; the opposite of personal is impersonal.¹¹⁷

If we start with the religious, I could be asked what I mean by that; and I should be tempted to answer that I mean, virtually, the human quality--except that historicity also is an inherent human characteristic, as is also cultural variety. I would say, then, that by "religious" I mean personal, so long as one is not so individualistic still as to imagine that **personal** is over against social. On the contrary: the counterpart of social is individual, the counterpart of personal is impersonal. An individual becomes a person in society; and a society becomes a community by being personal just as it becomes dehumanized, a juxtaposition or congeries of alienations, by being impersonal. By "religious", then, I mean nothing mysterious; except insofar as the human is mysterious. I do insist that to understand persons one must not reduce them to something less; one must recognize what they do and say as fully human, fully personal.¹¹⁸

The second differentiation lies in the structural or formative interpretation of archetypal experience and expression for Jung and the personal interpretation of faith for Smith. Comparatively, Jung put much emphasis upon the empirical search for the common ground of humanity as the archetypal dimension of the unconscious, though this common ground would manifest empirically in symbols

which bear a discernible sameness,¹¹⁹ from ancient times on, in the variations of race, culture, religious traditions and mythic-symbolic expression of all kinds.

Due to the hypothesis that archetypal experience produces expressions, which are infinitely variable in their similarity because of their basis in the structures of the unconscious, Jung concentrated more upon empirical symbolic modes or structures in order to understand "the inborn mode of psychic apprehension," "the primordial images, types or motifs"¹²⁰ themselves. This point is a significant difference with Smith's understanding of faith.

Even though Smith thought that faith, like archetypal experience for Jung, is a universal quality, in contrast, Smith does not think that faith as a structural dynamic generating symbolic forms can be identified as Jung identifies it. Rather, Smith observes that faith differs or varies not in terms of "kind" but in terms of "degree", from century to century, from place to place, from tradition to tradition, from community to community, from person to person and even from moment to moment for a single person. Of course, according to Smith, faith "does not vary as much as, nor quite in accordance with, the variations of overt religious pattern."¹²¹ However, Smith avoids a systematic, structural view of faith. To Smith, faith is very personal.

Faith is deeper, richer, more personal. It is engendered and sustained by a religious tradition, in some cases and to some degree by its doctrines; but it is a quality of the person, not of the system. It is an orientation of the personality, to oneself, to one's neighbour, to the universe...¹²²

The third difference can be found in their understanding of

"will" in relation to archetypal experience and faith. Jung thought that archetype was an "inherited or pre-existent form" which did not have contents but did have its own "psychic life" which was an ever present and active, objective or transpersonal quality, that did not subordinate itself to the caprices of the "will", or any conscious faculty.¹²³ Rather, according to Jung, "volition, intention, and all personal differentiations are acquired late."¹²⁴

Even though Jung did not totally ignore the relation of the will or the environment to the development of archetype, Jung, primarily, thought archetypal experience had its own autonomous quality.

I regard the will as the amount of psychic energy at the disposal of consciousness. Volition would, accordingly, be an energetic process that is released by conscious motivation. A psychic process, therefore, that is conditioned by unconscious motivation I would not include under the concept of the will. The will is a psychological phenomenon that owes its existence to culture and moral education but is largely lacking in the primitive mentality.¹²⁵

...it is a controversial point whether the inner images, or collective representations, are merely suggested by the environment, or whether they are genuine and spontaneous experiences. The first view simply begs the question, because it is obvious that the content suggested must have come into existence somehow and at some time.¹²⁶

Comparatively, Smith has placed a great deal of emphasis upon the relation of faith to will. As I have said in the third chapter, the characteristics of faith--involvement, response to truth, aspiration, decision or capacity to see truth--are all related to the will of persons. If persons do not will to respond

to symbols, rituals, worships, or daily life, such practices, symbols, or life will not appear meaningful to the detriment of individual and society. As he well puts it,

...it (faith) arises in part from outside oneself, but insofar as the person is himself or herself involved, both will and mind play a part.¹²⁷

...faith is making what is right and true in principle come true in practice--or at least the commitment to doing so.¹²⁸

...St. Augustine, who championed the notion of faith as a divine gift, not available to man's own choice except through grace, was on occasion quite explicit that it is a matter of will.¹²⁹

The fourth difference can be found in Jung and Smith's understanding of human "evil" or "falsehood". Jung very clearly identifies evil with the loss of harmony or balance between conscious and unconscious in the life of the psyche. For Jung the only sin is ultimately unconsciousness. Evil for Jung is primarily that form of unconsciousness which renders the ego unaware of the self and the conscious integration of the unconscious which the self seeks also to work in the ego. In comparison to Jung, as Edward J. Hughes rightly indicated in his doctoral thesis titled "The Global Philosophy of Wilfred Cantwell Smith", Smith does not articulate the problem of evil "in the way of a subtle analysis of depravity",¹³⁰ even though he does observe global "**homo religiosus perversus**" and stresses his awareness of evil in human history in his recent article "Muslim - Christian Relations: Questions of a Comparative Religionist" (1987).

I am not so naive as to be unaware that religious history is replete with gory details, with political power plays, military conquests, forced and hypocritical so-called

conversions, and much else. Yet neither am I so out of date, so insensitive, so reductionist, so poor an historian, as to imagine that the great religious movements of human history have arisen, survived, and prospered on no other bases than these, or that religious history over the past millennia and around the globe can be explained in terms of economic or social or neurotic or other such factors.¹³¹

To summarize, in spite of several differences of degree between Jung's understanding of archetypal experience and Smith's understanding of faith, the fundamental common ground of archetypal experience and faith as the foundation of human consciousness and religious experience for Jung and of human faith for Smith remains the basis of a common affinity. For both, human nature cannot realize its full truth if human nature is divested of religious experience.

4 Unconscious and Transcendence as the Source of Religious Experience

As is generally known, Jung's understanding of God or transcendence as being rooted in the unconscious, was criticized by the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber¹³² and by the Roman Catholic priest and Dominican theologian, Victor White O.P.¹³³ Their criticisms focused upon Jung's fundamental search for God in the realm of the human psyche. Likewise, Smith's understanding of God or transcendence has been criticized by Erich Sharpe and Antonio Gualtieri,¹³⁴ and recently by Langdon Gilkey and Iswaradevan Rasiah.¹³⁵ Their criticism focused on Smith's ambiguous use of the term God or transcendence which does not clearly give content to the term "God" or "transcendence".

In this section, I will try to articulate, in a comparative fashion, Jung's and Smith's understandings of God, transcendence or truth. First of all, I will compare three similarities between them, and then, show a fundamental difference in their understanding of transcendence.

The first fundamental similarity lies in the fact that Jung and Smith, primarily, do not search for their understanding of transcendence in metaphysical "ideas" of transcendence as found in doctrines, though Jung does affirm that doctrinal ideas once were alive with religious meaning. Instead, they search for meaning in the locus of religious experience--the psyche or the person. Thus, their understanding has primarily come from empirical researches which centre on how transcendence has been meaningfully experienced or functions in human life. This is the key point of similarity in their understanding of transcendence.

Jung, in his Alchemical Studies, pointed out that, in relation to the understanding of God or transcendence, even "the so-called 'metaphysical' comes within the range of human experience."¹³⁶ In a similar way, in his article "Spirit and Life" delivered to the Literary Society of Augsburg, (1926), Jung announced that "God is a psychic fact of immediate experience, otherwise there would never have been any talk of God."¹³⁷ Due to his fundamental concern with the experience of God, Jung thought that the needful thing in modern life is "not to know the truth but to experience it."¹³⁸

As Smith confessed in his Ingersoll lecture at Harvard in 1988, even though he does not attempt to write explicitly about

transcendence as a metaphysical idea, over his fifty years of teaching and writing, he has indeed expressed his understanding of transcendence implicitly.¹³⁹ He expressed this understanding of transcendence in his position that the study of religion is that of the person involved with the world and with transcendence. In other words, he has consistently argued that the human being, fundamentally lives with the experience or awareness of transcendence in daily life. Thus, to Smith, there is no dichotomy or polarity between humanity and transcendence. Smith thinks that the person participates in transcendence and transcendence participates in the person in history. Therefore, the study of a person can not proceed without considering the experience of transcendence in daily human life, because, to Smith, the understanding of person is the fundamental core of understanding transcendence. In a word, as the image of God, to Jung, is a psychic fact, so, to Smith, the experience of God is a personal or historical fact in daily human life.

The second similarity lies in their discovery, after their empirical or historical research, of the impossibility of defining God or transcendence. Jung, in his lecture "Psychology and Religion," clearly indicates that all human expressions of God are not God himself or herself or itself but images of God.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, Jung, in his controversial book, Answer to Job, indicates that, even though he does not doubt the existence of God behind or beyond images or ideas of God, images or ideas of God are "dependent upon human imagination and its temporal and local

conditions"¹⁴¹ in the process of human history. Also, in his Psychology and Alchemy, Jung points out that the image of God is "imprinted" in archetypes, so that the imprinted image "presupposes an imprinter,"¹⁴² God.

As Jung explicitly said, he tried to limit his understanding of God to the study of images as derived from archetypal imprints rooted in the psyche and expressed in human experience. Even though Jung does not deny the existence of God behind all human images and ideas, for his psychological understanding he tried to avoid "overstepping its proper boundaries by metaphysical assertions or other professions of faith."¹⁴³

In a similar way, Smith also has discovered the impossibility of human beings, who are finite, defining God or transcendence, who or which is infinite. Rather, as Kaufman thinks, Smith has thought of transcendence as a "mystery"¹⁴⁴ which can not be comprehended fully or exhaustively. Due to the impossibility of complete "comprehension" of God, Smith thought that "theologies are conceptual images of God."¹⁴⁵ Like Jung, Smith has distinguished the idea or image of God from God himself or herself or itself and, as a result, Smith has focused upon understanding ideas or images of God located in the heart of the person or devotee.

In a word, Jung and Smith do not attempt to define transcendence or explain away the mystery of transcendence but, rather, they attempt to describe or understand the experience or meaning of God or transcendence in human life, in terms of "apprehension" rather than "comprehension."

The third similarity between Jung and Smith lies in the fact that both believe that the experience of God or transcendence is the experience of the ground of human life, so that absolute or pure atheism can not be imagined by either of them. Jung especially criticized two modern atheistic principles which remain insensitive to the ground of human experience. The first one is the scientific materialism which believes that God does not exist because God's presence is unobserved in the galactic system. The second atheistic principle is the psychologism which identifies God as an illusion derived from certain motives--from the will to power, for instance, or from repressed sexuality.¹⁴⁶

In a similar way, Smith, also, thought that pure or absolute atheism is not possible, due to the fundamental, historical fact that all human beings have lived with the experience of transcendence in the context of their historical life. Thus, in his book Questions of Religious Truth,¹⁴⁷ Smith criticized the modern theological "death of God" movement as an attempt to ignore the fact that throughout history normal human life has been lived with a sense of transcendence.

The fourth similarity lies in the fact that Jung and Smith do not establish any absolutized interpretation of the God-experience as the criteria for understanding "other experiences." They, fundamentally, think that all human experience is conditioned or bounded in the context of life, so that they urged intellectuals to understand human experience contextually and so to contextualize the experience of transcendence. As he well puts it,

All our statements about the unconscious are 'escatological' truths, that is, borderline concepts which formulate a partially apprehended fact or situation, and are therefore only conditionally valid.¹⁴⁸

Jung has shown a representative case of the imposition of an absolutized religion or faith upon another culture. Jung criticized nineteenth century Christian missionaries' ignorance of others' God-experience, so that they "overthrew the idols of heathen gods",¹⁴⁹ to the detriment of native peoples. Furthermore, he criticized the contemporary Christian's lack of the God-experience due, on the one hand, to the iconoclasm of Western philosophical rationalism and, on the other hand, to the sentimentalism of externalistic understanding of God.¹⁵⁰

In the same way, Smith also has criticized absolutized interpretations of God or transcendence,¹⁵¹ through his fundamental conviction that all interpretations or ideas of transcendence can never be wholly independent of a contextually bounded God-experience. Thus, to Smith, no interpretation or experience of transcendence can be discussed without considering the condition of life, and, further, no interpretation can be imposed upon other experiences which are set in different contexts. Rather, new perspectives should be developed in relation to each condition of life or experience, in terms of the principle of corporate-critical self-consciousness.

In spite of Jung's and Smith's common ground they have both focused upon the ceaseless experience or sense of transcendence or God as the ground or matrix of human life--a difference can be indicated in their understanding of God or transcendence.

The difference lies in the degree to which each recognizes God as "the Great Other." Jung did not totally reject the "Great Other". This point can be discovered in Jung's reply to Martin Buber's accusation of Jung's understanding of God as being a form "psychologism" or "gnosticism".

So if I hold the view that all statements about God have their origin in the psyche and must therefore be distinguished from God as a metaphysical being, this is neither to deny God nor to put man in God's place.¹⁵²

Jung's perception of God as a "Great Other" or imprinter behind the images of God can be detected in his interview about religious beliefs.

We find numberless images of God, but we can not produce the original. There is no doubt in my mind that there is an original behind our images, but it is inaccessible. We could not even be aware of the original since its translation into psychic terms is necessary in order to make it perceptible at all. How would Kant's Critique of Pure Reason look when translated into psychic imagery of a cockroach? And I assume that the difference between man and the creator of all things is immeasurably greater than between a cockroach and man. Why should we be so immodest as to suppose that we could catch a universal being in the narrow confines of our language?¹⁵³

Jung's recognition of the "imprinter" can also be found in his article, "Why I am not a Catholic" which was written, but not sent, as part of a letter to H. Irminger of Zurich (1944).

You will naturally remonstrate that, after all, I talk about 'God'. I do this with the same right as humanity has from the beginning equated the numinous effects of certain psychological facts with an unknown primal cause called God. This cause, and indeed with the same logic by which one may conclude from the disturbance of a planets course the existence of a yet unknown heavenly body."¹⁵⁴

As the above three quotations show, Jung did not doubt "God" beyond the images of God, but, rather, he recognized "God".

However, as one of the leading Jungian religionists, John P. Dourley correctly notes, Jung's psychology is itself the bearer of a myth "which locates the sacred in the depths of the human."¹⁵⁵ Jung primarily tried to understand the God rooted in the depths of the psyche as "transcendence within." Thus, Jung devoted his whole lifetime to articulating the "depths of the human" in relation to the images of God, rather than the God beyond the images as Himself, Herself or Itself. In this sense, as Victor White rightly pointed out, Jung's psychological view of God is very similar with Kant's epistemological dismissal of a traditional metaphysical view of God.¹⁵⁶

Jung, throughout his work, focused on the God-image archetype which is experienced in the psyche. Jung thought that the "God-image is a complex of ideas of an archetypal nature," which bear a great amount of libido.¹⁵⁷ Thus the God image is always experienced as carrying great energy. In later works he added the essential note that the God image is always a "**complexio oppositorum**" which unites all opposites in configurations of totality.

Similarly, Smith put much emphasis upon the images, experiences, senses or meanings of God in human life, but he does not weaken the independent, "Great Other" aspect, the transcendent aspect of God. Rather, Smith has tried to understand the relational meaning of God in a person's life, which can occur through an inseparable, ceaseless relationship between God and the person, as an independent Being and being. In this sense, Smith's

view of "person" is the same as St. Augustine's view of the "restless heart".¹⁵⁸

Due to the emphasis upon the relational meaning, Smith identified the "reality that transcends the immediate mundane"¹⁵⁹ as transcendence which has been sensed or experienced by great sages or by ordinary humble persons in their mundane life. In other words, Smith's concern with transcendence primarily does not lie in so called metaphysical Being but in "the meta-physical consciousness of the person [which] is eternal".¹⁶⁰ Due to the recognition of the Transcendent reality, Smith, frequently, describes faith as a response or a saying "yes" to transcendence.

In a word, Jung's understanding of God is more focused upon the "depths of the human" as transcendence within or intra-psychic transcendence but Smith's understanding of God is more focused upon the inseparable, ceaseless relations between persons and God as transcendence in relation or without.

5 History as Process of Individuation and Participation

As I have described in the fourth chapter, to Jung individuation is the psychological process or way of becoming fully human, while to Smith, participation in the transcendent within the historical processes is the way of becoming fully human. Of course, according to these two thinkers, individuation for Jung can only be approximated as can full participation in divinity for Smith.¹⁶¹ However, it does not mean that individuation and participation can not be partially realized in the context of life,

here and now. According to them, partial realization has and does occur as the history of humankind has shown and demanded.

Jung and Smith thus understood the history of humankind to be the process of the realization of individuation and participation. On the basis of such understanding, Jung and Smith have understood the history of humankind as process of the partial realization of individuation and participation in the varieties of religious traditions and their cultures. In this sense, Jung and Smith have a fundamentally common ground in their understanding of the human being and the history of humankind. Thus there is a general similarity between Jung's understanding of history and Smith's understanding of history.

In addition to such a general understanding of history, two specific similarities can be identified. The first specific similarity lies in the fact that the meaning of history is not situated exclusively in the past or the future but in the present. While Freud emphasized the past as the key to understanding the present, Jung emphasized the present as always autonomous in the historical continuity of humankind,¹⁶² because the unconscious seeks greater consciousness in each age. In other words, Freud saw the event or experience of the past, especially the times of childhood as the cause of the present state of the psyche. Furthermore, Freud felt that if the cause could be clearly detected, the present neurotic state of the psyche could be cured. In contrast, Jung does not exclusively regard the experience of the past as the absolute cause of the present. Instead, Jung sees the

experience of the "present", to the extent that it is informed by the power of the self as moving toward unity with the totality: past, present, and future.

In the same way, Smith has emphasized each historical moment as a unique and autonomous part of history, rather than placing exclusive emphasis on the past or the future. In other words, Smith understands the deepest meaning of each historical moment as a part of the total history of humankind, so that the meaning of history is not simply or exclusively found in discrete events of the past or the future itself but in relation to the present as a continuity or process toward a global history of humankind. Here, Smith's understanding of history is quite different from Eliade's understanding. To Eliade, history has been the accumulation of the "terror" of profane history against the primordial experience of the Sacred, so that the meaning of the present should be subordinated to the "primordial experience",¹⁶³ if it is again to become sacred. Smith unites the sacred and profane in "present" historicity against Eliade's splitting of the sacred (**ahistory**) and profane (**history**), and against Eliade's assumption that the sacred is recovered through a return to a primordial and sacred past.

Thus, contrary to popular opinion, Eliade's understanding of access to the sacred is quite different from Jung's, in so much as Jung understands that each centre of consciousness has immediate access through its continuity with the unconscious to the totality of the human past which access prompts consciousness towards future totalities. Rather Eliade's understanding of history is very

similar to Freud's understanding, even though the meaning of "sacred" is different for Freud, in so much as he locates the sacred or ultimate determinant of the present in the past.

The second similarity lies in the fact that the meaning of history is not focused on the making of historiography but the discovery of the invisible quality, archetypal experience or faith which has been expressed in all human affairs--religion, arts, philosophy, science and so on.

To Jung, history is not limited to the observed, external fact which has been constructed in the realm of human consciousness, but is constituted by the ongoing dialectical development or process of the unconscious incarnating in consciousness. Jung clearly shows this in his article "The Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams" (1961):

By 'history' I do not mean the fact that the mind builds itself up through conscious tradition (language, etc.), but rather its biological, prehistoric, and unconscious development beginning with archaic man, whose psyche was still similar to that of animal.¹⁶⁴

To Jung, the idea of history is not restricted to the area of the personal unconscious but, extends to the interplay of the collective unconscious with consciousness as the meaning of history. History is not the so-called recorded history of historiography or monuments, but the accumulated record in the unconscious of humanity, which connects humanity with its past as it impels humanity toward a greater future wholeness. Due to this understanding, Jung does not always view historical events themselves as they are but always observes the invisible origins of

the events in relation to the human psyche, that is, he interprets history in terms of the archetypal content any period of history reveals. In other words he is concerned with the expressions of the unconscious in the life of individual and society. As he states in his article "The Meaning of Psychology for Modern Man" (1933):

When we look at human history, we see only what happens on the surface, and even this is distorted in the faded mirror of tradition. But what has really been happening eludes the inquiring eye of the historian for the true historical event lies deeply buried, experienced by all and observed by none. It is the most private and most subjective of psychic experiences.¹⁶⁵

Due to such an emphasis on the invisible origin of the historical event, Jung says that "wars, dynasties, social upheavals, conquests, and religions are but the superficial symptoms of secret psychic attitudes unknown even to the individual himself, and transmitted by no historian."¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, Jung strongly suggests that historians or psychologists seriously consider the psychological aspects of contemporary events, as can be seen in his article "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies" (1958):

Even our historians can no longer make do with the traditional procedures in evaluating and explaining the developments that have overtaken Europe in the last few decades, but must admit the psychological and psychopathological factors are beginning to widen the horizons of historiography in an alarming way.¹⁶⁷

In almost the same way, Smith has stressed that the task of the historian is to identify the invisible human quality through the study of the observable historical phenomena or dialogue. According to Smith, as I have discussed in the third and fourth

chapters, this quality has been identified as faith, and, furthermore, is the foundation of becoming human in the deepest sense. In fact, Smith has devoted his intellectual life to showing how the sacred ground of humanity has manifested in history through his comparative studies of human history. This point can be illustrated in his address titled "Taking Goodness Seriously" (1987) at the convocation for the School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto.

The course of human history shows the persistence, and the virtual universality, of our human propensity to reach out towards--or shall we say, to be reached by--what is higher than ourselves. Feeble it may be; distorted it may become; manipulated it easily is. Nonetheless, the propensity is there.¹⁶⁸

In the same address, Smith articulates "what is higher than ourselves" as follows:

...A major dose of human sensitivity to what is good and true and beautiful, to use Greek terms; to what is right and wrong, to use another vocabulary; to transcendence, to use still another. Without this, human history would be quite incomprehensible; and certainly would not have got even this far. Without it, civilizations would have fallen apart as soon as they arose. What I have called the human capacity to recognize goodness and to respond to it is simply an empirical fact.¹⁶⁹

To summarize, Smith's understanding of "propensity" as cited above and Jung's understanding of numinosity are similar. Smith locates the propensity in the human heart and Jung locates the origin of the experience of the numinous as occurring in the impact of the archetypal on consciousness. Furthermore, propensity, for Smith and numinosity, for Jung, both argue, give birth to the creation and maintenance of human civilizations and meaningful history.

The third similarity lies in the fact that the human quality-- archetypal experience and faith--can only be expressed, not in a vacuum, but, within the bounds of history, so that each historical expression of such human qualities contributes to total human history. Due to this fact, all small, provincial histories are moved by their own originating agency to a total or a global human history. This history is the process of the unity of conscious and unconscious for Jung, and of the divine human relationship, for Smith.

Jung especially saw archetypal experience itself as the source of extending consciousness and advancing civilization or culture.¹⁷⁰ Thus, to Jung, as Marie-Louise von Franz correctly points out, the advance of culture does not lie in a geographical expansion, but in "a development to a higher level of spirituality, of which autonomy is the most characteristic feature."¹⁷¹ Jung refers to this development as "individuation." Ultimately, to Jung, all world civilizations are an expression of the process of individuation, so that the analysis or study of civilizations should focus upon the study of the human psyche.

In a similar way, Smith regards participation as the source of the development of a culture or civilization. He also thought that the study of world civilizations should focus upon the study of persons as the agents of the creation or maintenance of civilizations. Furthermore, Smith also sees all world civilizations as part of global human history.

In contrast to these three similarities between Jung and

Smith, fundamental differences can be articulated. The first difference lies in the fact that Jung's individuation is situated in the unconscious-conscious relationship within the psyche but Smith's participation is located in the divine-human relationship. In other words, for Smith, participation proceeds through the person's voluntary participation in transcendence and, furthermore, transcendence's participation in persons. Thus, it can be said that individuation proceeds in the psyche itself but participation is done in the cooperation between a person's propensity towards transcendence or faith as a vision, and transcendence's participation in person. In other words, Jung's individuation proceeds "in" the psyche, but Smith's participation proceeds "with" or "between" the person and transcendence which can not be separated.

The second difference lies in the establishment of a global perception of human history. Like Smith, Jung saw clearly that the process of individuation was the key to history, and tried to articulate such a process through his cross-cultural study of cultures or religious traditions. However, due to his emphasis on the basis of consciousness and so of history in the collective unconscious, Jung's psychology is less concerned with specific comparisons of religions and their cultures than with their archetypal content. In this sense his structural morphology of the psyche can control his appreciation of archetypal expressions historically. Jung's appreciation of specific "religions" and cultures is controlled by this understanding of the psyche which

would appreciate all "religions" as partial expressions of an archetypal totality which the psyche works to realize consciously in history. In this sense all of history is an effort on the part of the collective consciousness to realize itself in consciousness. This all-encompassing dialectic and its morphology controls and may limit much of Jung's appreciation of specific "religions".

Relatively, Smith has tried to avoid a morphological, typological or structural formation of participation but, instead, has dwelt on the search for historicity in the specific, "personal" manifestations of humanity's experience of participation. In this sense Smith's understanding of the human being as the historical being, is very similar to Michel Foucault's understanding:

...since the human being has become historical, through and through, none of the contents analyzed by the human sciences can remain stable in itself or escape the movement of History.¹⁷²

However, unlike Foucault, Smith has identified transcendental awareness as an empirical and historical reality in human life. Furthermore, on the basis of historical participation in the divine, he points to a current movement toward global history formed by various provincial traditions and faith. In a word, Smith articulates a new historical global paradigm which embraces processes of diverse forms of religious participation in human history. This paradigm works to show various religious traditions contributing to a global consciousness which includes their truth even as it surpasses their provincialism.

ENDNOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

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However, such a strong, friendly relationship between Jung and White changed into hostility, due to "Jung's Job-apology." Since An Answer to Job (1952) was published, Victor White publically criticized Jung's naive understanding of theological matters. Jung also criticized White's accusation of Jung as a Manichaeian dualist in terms of his view of the unity of self as a Complexio Oppositorum even though Jung, up to the end, respected Victor White's scholarship and furthermore tried to understand Victor White's situation as a priest. C.G. Jung, Aion, CW, 9ii, p. 61, See footnote 74, C.G. Jung, CW, 11, See p. 394, and C.G. Jung, Letters, vol. 1: 1906-50, pp. 540-41.

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158. St. Augustine, The Confessions, translated by E.B. Pusey (London: Everyman's Library, 1966), p. 62ff.
159. W.C. Smith, Faith and Belief, p. 161.
160. Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences, p. 219.
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history as a "terror" against the existence of human being. See chapter four "the terror of history" in Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return translated from the French by Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1959) and The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 52-53.

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CONCLUSION

The overarching concern of my comparative study, which has centred upon the concept of psyche in the works of C.G. Jung and the concept of person in the works of W.C. Smith, is to examine how the human becomes fully human for both Jung and Smith. In my analysis of C.G. Jung's understanding of human beings, I have worked to show that Jung understands that the human being becomes fully human through the dialectical process of individuation, the process in which the unconscious and the conscious unite in the progressive realization of the self in consciousness. For Jung the self works this process preferentially through the dream as the bearer of the symbols which move the individual to a greater conscious wholeness as the self becomes conscious and so real, in individual consciousness. In my analysis of W.C. Smith's works, I have attempted to articulate the point that the human being becomes fully human through the dialectical process between tradition and faith which results in participation in God transcendence or truth. This comparative point is a basic conclusion of my study of the concept of psyche and person.

In order to further develop my general concern, I have divided my dissertation into five chapters. The first four chapters have focused upon a description of Jung's psychological understanding of the human being and Smith's historical understanding of the human being. I have dealt with this material in separate sections prior to making comparison between them. In the final chapter, the fifth chapter, I have compared Jung's understanding with Smith's

understanding.

In the first chapter, I described Jung's and Smith's problems with modern human self-understanding. Both were shown to identify modern self-understanding as severed from the religious dimension of being human and so contributing to a truncated self-understanding of humanity in the contemporary West. I then continue to describe counter paradigms of humanity preferred by Jung and Smith which each felt in his own way would contribute to a human self-understanding that would at once be more integral and would recover a religious dimension as the depth dimension of human life, individual and societal.

In the second and the third chapter, on the basis of the first chapter, I have articulated how Jung and Smith understand the human being to be constituted, psychologically and historically.

In the final chapter, I have articulated some similarities, parallels and differences between Jung's understanding and Smith's understanding of human beings. The fundamental similarity between them lies in the fact that, even though Jung works from a primarily psychological perspective and Smith works from a primarily historical perspective, they share a conviction that human life remains truncated and impaired when removed from archetypal experience and its symbolic expression which Jung equates functionally with religious life, or when divested of that experience which Smith terms "faith" as operative universally in the human heart. Even though they might understand the phenomena through theories of different generative agencies, both affirm that

humanity living within the confines and relativities of history, cannot escape the experience of a relation to transcendence.

The difference between Jung and Smith lies in the fact that whereas Jung has articulated the psychological genesis or process of archetypal experience as the process of individuation, Smith dwells on the historical process of human response to or awareness of Transcendental reality which cannot be separated from the human condition, historically. Furthermore, whereas Jung limits his understanding of religion to the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious within the psyche, Smith has developed an historical understanding of religion based on the relationship between tradition and person, and ultimately the relationship between person and transcendental reality through one's own tradition. Another difference lies in the fact that Jung identifies the unconscious as it transcends the ego as the source of the origin of the ego and of its religious experience. Whereas Smith identifies the source of human life as both in and beyond human life.

I am aware that Smith's work can be criticized in so much as it concentrates wholly on the nature of religion as manifest in the religious traditions appearing in history and consciously divests itself of any effort to define or delineate, however softly, what religion is. On the other hand Jung provides a most compelling understanding of the psychogenesis of religion and to some extent can use this understanding to comment on the transformation of consciousness and religious consciousness. However, Jung lacks the

detailed knowledge of the historical religious traditions that Smith so well controls. In this context the critique of each thinker can be used as the basis to show their mutual need and complementarity.

Therefore, I think that Jung's psychological understanding and Smith's historical understanding of the human being can be used to complement each other for a fuller understanding of the human being. Smith's global and historical perspective for understanding the human being is very helpful for developing Jung's archetypal experience in history. In reverse, Jung's archetypal understanding is helpful for developing Smith's personal and historical understanding of the human being.

As Richard Rorty presents his philosophy as "therapeutic" or "edifying," I suggest that Jung's and Smith's understanding of humanity are not only forms of "therapeutic" or "edifying" thinking as opposed to monological or impersonal thinking but they also provide an indispensable category of humanity's commonality, rooted in psyche for Jung and person for Smith. Furthermore, I think that Smith's global view of human history can allow for a healthy pluralism which reflects the modern setting of human life; a view not rooted in doctrines, beliefs or philosophical metaphysics but in humanity itself.

ENDNOTES: CONCLUSION

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