The East India Company, British Fiscal-Militarism and Violence in India, 1765-1788

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ABSTRACT

The grant of the *diwani* to the East India Company in August 1765 represents a climacteric moment in British imperial histories. Vested by the Mughal Emperor Shah Allam II, this newfound right to collect revenue saddled the Company with the broader and formal economic, judicial and military responsibilities of a territorial empire. Wherefore, in the era of post-Mughal political splintering, the EIC, as an emerging subcontinental state had to contend with internal revolts abetted by ethno-religious and socio-economic crises, but also because of threats posed by the Kingdom of Mysore and the Maratha Confederacy. Nevertheless, in the midst of the American Revolution, the EIC's contentious and contested conduct of imperial governance in India became an ideological, philosophical and pragmatic point of domestic and imperial contention. Thus, confronted with the simultaneous internal and external implications of the crises of Empire between 1765 and 1788, the role of the Company's fiscal-military administration and exercise of violence within the spheres British imperial governance was reconceptualised and in doing so contemporaries underwrote the emergence of what historians have subsequently called the 'Second British Empire' in India. Alternatively, the reconceptualisation of the EIC's fiscal-military administration served to ensure the continuity and preservation of the British imperial nexus as it was imposed upon Bengal. This work, therefore, traces the Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence during the 'crises of empire' as a point of genesis in the development and reformation of British imperial governance. Moreover, it will show that the interdependent nature of the Company's 'fiscal-military hybridity' ultimately came to underwrite further the ideological, philosophical and pragmatic consolidation of imperial governance in 'British India'. Accordingly, this dissertation examines the interdependent role between Parliament's reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of violence and the changing nature of British imperial governance in 'British India'.

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INTRODUCTION

Until its formal acquisition from the Mughal Emperor of the *diwani* — the right to collect revenue — in 1765, the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and its reliance on violence were broadly characterised as guarantors of British imperial and 'corpocratic' interests across the Indian subcontinent. The Bengal campaign led by Robert Clive in the later 1750s not only recaptured the Company's symbolic seat of power, Fort William in Calcutta, but also defeated the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj uh-Daula and his French allies at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and therefore guaranteed British control of eastern Bengal[1]. Therefore, in an age where "*war made the state, and the state made war*" the Company's fiscal-militarism, and more precisely, its exercise of violence as an instrument of conquest was broadly perceived by contemporaries as indispensable to the conduct of the mutually reinforcing principles of British state-formation and empire-building[2]. Although fiscal-militarism and the use of violence as an instrument of conquest remained fundamental to the subsequent expansion of the British Empire, in India, and more specifically in Bengal, the Company's fiscal-military administration and its inherent dispensation of violence found itself profoundly altered by the realities it experienced there but also by the expectations of London — Parliament and India House alike. In particular, the Company's rule of 'British India' created a set of socioeconomic, judicial, political and military realities that met and piqued Indian and Parliamentarian resistance which, in turn, precipitated demands to

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[1] Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A History* (London: Longman, 1993)

[2] Separated by a century, and from different perspectives, John Seeley and David Armitage both see the process of state-formation and empire-building as mutually reinforcing. This is particularly true when considering the Scottish and Irish question and the role they had in forming the modern British State as well as its eighteenth and nineteenth-century ideological conceptions of Empire. For a more in-depth discussion, see: John R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Course Lecture* (London: MacMillan, 1904); David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): 42.

reform the nature of British imperial governance. From 1765 onwards, during the crises of Empire, the Company found itself scrutinised and subjected to reforms that sought to bring its governing practices in line with the imperial expectations of a post-Seven Years War British state. Hence, as it acquired a territorial empire through the formal rule of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765, the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and modes of violence had to reluctantly contend with the changing nature of the post 1760 'corpocratic' and imperial interests of the British Empire[3].

Hence, this thesis examines the interdependent and changing nature of violence and British imperial governance through the prism of the ideological, philosophical and practical reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of India, and more specifically Bengal, from 1765 to 1788. Accordingly, this dissertation situates the adoption of violence in a broader historiographical context. Specifically, it sees violence as instrumental in the processes of state-formation and empire-building proposed by historians John Seeley and David Armitage[4]. Hence, and as this thesis argues, the Company's use and the state's monopolisation of violence in the context of 'British India' between 1765 and 1788 served as a multifaceted instrument that ensured the simultaneous consolidation and formation of the 'Second

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[3] The East India Company's rule is often described as 'corpocratic' as its corporate interests took precedence over the economic and political interests of British imperial governance in India. Its corporatocracy was characterised by an ineffective bureaucratic apparatus subjugated to the pervasive plutocratic influence of the fiscal-military interests. For a discussion on the matter, see Huw V. Bowen, *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War Money and the English State, 1688-1788* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Lawson, *The East India Company*; Nick Robins, *The Corporation That Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational* (London: Pluto Press, 2012); John A. Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy: The East India Company, c. 1757-1825* (London: Routledge, 2017)

[4] Seeley, *The Expansion of England*; Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*.

British Empire'[5]. Nevertheless, the reconceptualisation of Company violence sheds light upon the changing British views on imperial governance as the Empire contended with this transition, a transition that has been traditionally historiographically demarcated by the American Revolution. It does so because of the central role it simultaneously occupies within British imperial ideology and philosophy. In particular, the Parliamentary reconceptualisation of violence came to condition the societal, cultural, economic, ethnic, judicial and political shifts within the notions and conceptions of Empire. Thus, the reconceptualisation of violence and its influence upon the nature of Empire serve as a process that can be examined to chart the evolution of later eighteenth-century British imperialism. Accordingly, and as this dissertation argues, Parliament's reform of the East India Company's fiscal-military apparatus and its administration of violence was a central element that structured the emergence of the 'Second British Empire' in India.

By making the Parliamentary reconceptualisation of Company violence a focal point in the gradual emergence of the 'Second British Empire', this thesis pays particular attention to the seemingly mundane, but crucial, aspects of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of 'British India'. Namely, it addresses the Company's pursuit of revenue extraction, the refinement of its military doctrine and the ensuing development of its recruitment strategies which were based upon, and conducted according to, an orientalist socio-hierarchical reconstruction of Indian society. While individually, these elements might appear historiographically familiar or experientially unremarkable, together, they underwrite the development of increasingly hybridising and indigenising transnational processes that proved key to Company rule and to its influence

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[5] Christopher A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 76; Philip J. Stern, "History and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Present, and Future!" *History Compass* 7, No. 4 (2009): 1149.

over the evolution and reformation of post-1763 British imperialism. As this thesis will demonstrate, these otherwise unassuming, daily run-of-the-mill aspects of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of 'British India', carried a seeping and far-reaching hybridising and indigenising influence that ultimately stemmed from the Indian society's agency and its subversion of British imperial rule. Hence, this thesis ultimately elaborates upon, and reveals the importance of the hybridising and indigenising role Indian society itself had in the emergence of the 'Second British Empire'[6].

Although recent scholarship has considerably elaborated upon the long-established body of works regarding the East India Company and the emergence of the 'Second British Empire', research surrounding the administration of violence in India during the second half of the eighteenth century remains sparse despite its far-reaching cultural, economic, ethnic, judicial, political, religious and social implications. In light of these historiographical omissions, it is timely to reconsider the Company's fiscal-military administration and its use of violence as a medium by which to consider the broader ideological, philosophical and practical processes surrounding the changing nature of British imperial governance. Thus, and as this thesis demonstrates, violence did not serve as a mere facilitator or enforcer of the various other processes that spanned the development of 'British India'. However, that is not to say related and recent areas of study ought to be omitted in an effort to revisit the place violence and its reconceptualisation had in the evolution of British imperial ideology. Instead, by merging these various and often discretely studied

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[6] Bayly, *Indian Society*; Christopher A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaar: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)

subjects relating to the East India Company, a more comprehensive analysis of its administration of violence and its far-reaching implications emerges[7].

The early literature on the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and on its dispensation of violence originated from a particular set of circumstances and, therefore, served equally peculiar means and objectives. Commissioned by the Company itself, the eighteenth-century historiography and the body of literature concerning its fiscal-military and imperial activities were broadly reflective of the righteously self-interpreted and self-serving role the Company served within the Empire. Hence, and although they remain a rich and detailed source of information, the works of Company historians John Bruce and Robert Orme depicted the administration of India as justified to ensure the Empire's long term prosperity[8]. By contrast, and characterising the Company's rule as only seeking "*To increase the revenues was the point to which servants invariably directed their attention; but the means employed defeated their views, and became ruinous to a people whom their arms had subdued*", the piece produced by Alexander Dow in 1772 following his military service as an officer in the Company, is, in the aftermath of the Great Bengal Famine, a broadly belabouring and damning condemnation of British imperial rule in India[9]. As Rama Dev Roy notes, the political motivation driving Dow's piece became increasingly apparent as it was repurposed by the political adversaries of the Company such as

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[7] Stern, *History and Historiography*, 1149.
[8] John Bruce, "Review of the Military History of the Honble. East India Company arising out of the political circumstances of Hindostan and of the French Schemes of acquiring Territories in India from 1744 to 1795/6." 1796, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/91a, British Library; Robert Orme, *A history of the military transactions of the British nation in Indostan, from the year 1745: to which is prefixed a dissertation on the establishments made by Mahomedan conquerors in Indostan: Volume I-III*, (Madras: 1861)
[9] Alexander Dow, *The history of Hindostan, from the death of Akbar, to the complete settlement of the empire under Aurungzebe. To which are prefixed, I. A dissertation on the origin and nature of despotism in Hindostan. II. An enquiry into the state of Bengal; With a Plan for restoring that Kingdom to its former Prosperity and Splendor* (London, 1772): cx.

Philip Francis, John Shore, Charles Cornwallis or more famously, Edmund Burke as he developed the theory of the *Economic Drain* in 1783[10]. Hence, the eighteenth-century writings on the Company drew unrelenting attention to the Company's actions as the administrator of 'British India'. Nevertheless, the diverging views and objectives emanating from these polemical texts reveal political allegiances and provide various opposing, but meaningful interpretations about the reforms imposed upon the East India Company in the 1770s and 1780s.

For its part, writings about the Company during the nineteenth-century regarding the late eighteenth-century remain sparse as Victorian and early twentieth-century historians tended, as Philip J. Stern explains, to treat 'British' history as distinct from its imperial past[11]. Although Seeley's *Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* places the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of 'British India' in the broader context of the creation of a 'Greater Britain' in the aftermath of the American Revolution, it was not until Cyril H. Philips and more notably, Lucy S. Sutherland's more nuanced approach during the 1940s and 1950s that the history of the Empire became part of 'British' history[12]. By examining the intricate role Leadenhall Street played in the politics of Westminster, Philips and Sutherland were able to incorporate the history of the Company into that of the Empire and explain the subsequent emergence of 'British India'[13]. However, and perhaps more importantly, their work also cast the foundations of a larger

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[10] Rama Dev Roy, "Some Aspects of the Economic Drain from India During the British Rule" *Social Scientist* 15, No. 3 (March, 1987): 39; For a discussion on the *Economic Drain* theory otherwise known the *Drain of Wealth*, see Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of the Permanent Settlement* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*.

[11] Stern, *History and Historiography*, 1149.

[12] Cyril H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784-1834* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1940); John R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Course Lecture* (London: MacMillan, 1904); Stern, *History and Historiography*, 1149; Lucy S. Sutherland, *The East India Company in British Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952)

[13] Leadenall Street: Also known as East India House, the East India Company Headquarters were situated on Leadenhall Street. The site is now occupied by the Lloyd's Building.

historiographical net. In particular, a large portion of their works are each dedicated to the politically and imperially debilitating implications of the Company's transformation into a territorial empire for Parliament, and how these same circumstances gradually became centrifugal questions in the politics of Empire and their development[14]. Philips and Sutherland's works diligently casts the Company's fiscal-military administration as a central and influential element in the processes of British politics and imperialism. Accordingly, they provide insight into the interdependent relationships that existed between British politics, an expanding Empire and the East India Company[15].

Perhaps most famously, Vincent T. Harlow effectively recast the interdependent relationships between Parliament, a post 1783 empire and the East India Company as fundamental in the emergence of the 'Second British Empire'[16]. In particular, his work demonstrates that by 1783, this imperial triumvirate led by Parliament had, despite strife between Whigs and Tories, and growing demands for reform, been able to gradually re-establish Britain's imperial nexus in Bengal and effectively dampen the crises of empire unleashed by the American Revolution. There-

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[14] Philips, *The East India Company*, 23; Sutherland, *The East India Company*, 138-176.

[15] Huw V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757-1773* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Richard Connors, "A Storm in a Tea-Cup: Tea and the British Atlantic in the Age of the American Revolution," in Stephen T. Henderson and Wendy G. Robicheau (eds.), *The Nova Scotia Planters in the Atlantic World 1759-1830* (Fredericton: Acadiensis, 2010): 179-205; Richard Connors, "Opium and Imperial Expansion: the East India Company in Eighteenth-Century India" in Stephen Taylor, Richard Connors and Clyve Jones (eds.), *Hanoverian Britain and Empire. Essays in the Memory of Philip Lawson* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1998); Richard Connors and Ben J. Gilding, "Hereditary Guardians of the Nation? The House of Lords and the East India Company in the Age of the American Revolution" in Richard A. Gaunt and D. W. Hayton (eds.), *Peers and Politics, c. 1650-1850: Essays of Clyve Jones* (Oxford: Willey Blackwells, 2020): 159-189; Jonathan Eacott, *Selling Empire: India in the Making of Britain and America, 1600-1800* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Philip Lawson, "Parliament and the First East India Inquiry, 1767" *Parliamentary History* 1, No. 1 (1982): 99-114; Philip Lawson and Bruce Lenman, "Robert Clive, the 'Black Jagir' and British Politics" *The Historical Journal* 26, No. 4 (1983): 801-829; Lawson, *The East India Company*; Philip J. Stern, "Company, State and Empire" in Huw V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid, *Britain's Oceanic Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 130-150.

[16] Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Volume I: Discovery and Revolution* (London: Longmans, 1952); Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Volume II: New Continents and Changing Values* (London: Longmans, 1952)

fore, the consolidation of a 'Second British Empire' ultimately came to underwrite the Company's role as imperial administrator of 'British India'. Hence, Harlow's core argument effectively situates the East India Company's fiscal-military administration within the broader ideological, philosophical and practical Parliamentary reconceptualisation of British imperial governance.

Formally beginning in India in 1947, the changing winds of decolonisation that swept across the British Empire and the globe throughout the second half of the twentieth-century equally altered historiographical approaches to the East India Company's rule. Moreover, the Marxist and Subaltern scholarship, primarily undertaken by exploring India archives, challenged, reappropriated and reinterpreted long-established Eurocentric historiographical narratives of the diminution of the Mughal empire and the emergence of 'British India' and, after 1857, the Raj. Such influences are reflected by the works of Partha Chatterjee, Kirti Chaudhuri, Rajat Datta, Rajat Kanta Ray and Ranajit Guha to mention but a few[17]. Through an analysis of the economic, social, cultural and class-bound implications of the Company's rule, which emphasised continuities, these scholars revealed the importance Indians and Indian societies themselves had in the making of the British Empire. For instance, Guha maintains that despite the disaggregation of the Mughal Empire and the rise of the Company, Indian idioms and notions of power persisted and

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[17] Partha Chatterjee, *The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *The East India Company: The Study of An Early Joint Stock Company* (London: F. Cass, 1965); Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *The Economic Development of India Under the East India Company, 1814-1858* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Rajat Datta, *Society, Economy and the Market: Commercialization in Rural Bengal, c. 1760-1800* (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2000); Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal*; Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1999); Rajat Kanta Ray, *Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, 1875-1927* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); For a more recent and nuanced discussion on the matter, see Michael H. Fisher, *The Politics of the British Annexation of India 1757-1858* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 1-49; Douglas M. Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule, 1700-1885* (Harlow: Pearson, 2006): Chapter 3.

were alternatively reconceptualised by British imperial expectations to subdue Indian society[18]. These, as Guha justifiably claims, depict the centrality of Indian agency within the preservation of the Company's rule. In other words, the Company was unable to rule without Indian participation. By providing Indian society with an active role in its colonisation and then subsequent decolonisation, postcolonial Marxist and Subaltern scholarship has accordingly recast the ideological, philosophical and practical bounds of British imperial rule. In particular, it displays Indian society's hybridising and indigenising influence on the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of 'British India'.

In the vein of postcolonial scholarship, the 'Cambridge School' situated British imperial history in a much broader historiographical context whereby various external forces exerted a degree of agency shaping the Empire[19]. The works of Christopher A. Bayly, Philip Lawson and Peter J. Marshall adapted and revised the approaches and conclusions offered by the 'Cambridge School'[20]. Specifically, their works shed light upon the transnational imperial dynamics that stemmed from the hybridising implications of the East India Company's fiscal-military adminis-

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[18] Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*: 25; Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*: 115.

[19] Emerging during the 1960s, the Cambridge School gradually revised the historiographical approach to the British Empire. Although it retained an imperialist point of view, it did acknowledge that the Empire was part of a much broader sociopolitical, ethno-cultural, economic, judicial and military context that shaped its evolution and devolution. In comparison with more traditional historiography, the Cambridge School accordingly acknowledged the agency of the various peoples of the Empire. For a discussion on the matter, see John Gascoigne, "The Expanding Historiography of British Imperialism" *The Historical Journal* 49, No. 2 (June, 2006): 577-592; Sneh Majahan, "Imperialist Historiography: The Twenty-First Century Twist" *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 17, (2012): 1025-1041; Simon J. Potter, *British Imperial History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2015)

[20] Christopher A. Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Cristopher A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Christopher A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1989); Bayly, *Indian Society*; Christopher A. Bayly, *Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A* History (London: Longman, 1993); Peter J. Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead: Eastern India, 1740-1828* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Peter J. Marshall, *Problems of Empire: Britain and India, 1757-1812* (London: George Allen and Uwin Ltd., 1968); Peter J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Peter J. Marshall, *The Impeachment of Warren Hastings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965)

tration. Thus, in the Indian context, this scholarship situates the Company's transformation into a territorial empire between 1757 and 1765 as the ideological, philosophical and practical genesis of British imperial governance in India[21]. Collectively C.A. Bayly, Lawson and P. J. Marshall consolidate the history of the Company within the broader British imperial experience and within British history itself[22]. In doing so, they have effectively repositioned the hybridisation and indigenisation of the Company and Empire's interdependent notions of socio-cultural, economic, judicial, political and military rule as a focal point in the emergence of the 'Second British Empire'. Such an approach, therefore, emphasises the significance of the East India Company in the Parliamentary debates about imperial governance in Bengal, and India altogether[23].

More recently, however, research upon the East India Company's fiscal-military hybrid administration of Bengal as foundational in development of the 'Second British Empire' has been accentuated by increasingly precise work deconstructing specific aspects of British imperial governance. For instance, Philip J. Stern's notion of a 'Company State' argues that the Company benefitted from the uniqueness of the Indian case to assert, in its own name the sovereignty granted by royal charter in 1600 and establish the politico-legal basis of 'British India'[24]. This basis, as Robert Travers recently argued, was effectively consolidated throughout the second half of the eighteenth-century as Parliament sought to utilise the Company fiscal-military administration for funds to defray debt, and as an intermediary to consolidate imperial governance from a

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[21] Lawson, *The East India Company*: ix.
[22] See the essays in Huw V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid, *Britain's Oceanic Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Philip Lawson, "The Missing Link: the Imperial Dimensions in Understanding Hanoverian Britain" *The Historical Journal* 29, No. 3 (1986): 747-751.
[23] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*; Connors and Gilding, *Hereditary Guardians of the Nation*; Lawson, *The East India Company*.
[24] Philip J. Stern, *The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

legal and judicial standpoint[25]. In a similar vein, Jon E. Wilson examined the influence hybridisation and indigenisation had on the reconceptualisation and reformation of British imperial governance in 'British India' as the Company and British state both sought to assert political and legal imperial authority[26]. Alongside the works of Huw V. Bowen and John Brewer discussing the political implications surrounding the Company's fiscal-military administration, these works explore the emergence of an imperial ideology that sought to legitimise the dispensation of violence as an instrument of imperial rule and consolidation[27]. Thus, the emphasis placed on Parliament's development of an authoritative politico-imperial framework destined to conduct imperial governance in 'British India' simultaneously highlights the reconceptualisation of the role bequeathed to the East India Company's fiscal-military administration, and its dispensation of violence as an instrument of socioeconomic consolidation and regulation.

Finally, recent postcolonial scholarship has considered the socioeconomic, ethno-cultural, politico-religious and legal implications that the East India Company had on Indian society. As Bernard S. Cohn, Maya Jasanoff, Elizabeth Kolsky, Robert J. C. Young or Kathleen Wilson collectively reveal, these aspects of British imperial rule serve as another historiographical entry-point into the hybridisation and indigenisation of the latter[28]. Accordingly, they privilege the

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[25] Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 24.
[26] Jon E. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers: Modern Governance in Eastern India, 1780-1835* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
[27] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*); Huw V. Bowen, *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990)
[28] Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British In India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850* (New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 2005); Elizabeth Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Potter, *British Imperial History*; Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desires: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995); Kathleen Wilson, *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire 1660-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

agency of Indians and more broadly, of Indian society. Indeed, these studies further emphasise the notion that between 1765 and 1788, the British imperial experiences in India transformed the Empire just as much as it changed Indian society. As this thesis demonstrates, this was particularly true of the Company's administrative and military institutions. In particular, and as Seema Alavi and Dirk H. A Kolff have demonstrated, the Company's reinterpretation and appropriation of Indian socio-hierarchal norms was not only based on its own self-interested and self-serving administrative logic but instead, it also reflected the agency Indian society exerted upon the Company's military reforms in the later eighteenth century[29]. Hence, *martial races*, as they came to be known, embodied the hybridising and indigenising influence that subsequently shaped the British colonial and military experiences in India.

Otherwise known as *sepoys*, *martial races* constituted the backbone of the East India Company's armies, and accordingly, profoundly influenced notions of hybridity and indigenisation throughout 'British India'. Hence, several scholars such as Pradeep Barua, Douglas M. Peers, Kaushik Roy and Tirthankar Roy have argued that, the Company's 'military hybridity' effectively ensured its survival[30]. It is perhaps important to note that when discussing 'military hybridity', this thesis defines the concept as the blending of imported British fiscal-military doc-

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[29] Seema Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); Dirk H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

[30] Pradeep Barua, "Military Developments in India, 1750-1850" *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 58 (1994); Douglas M. Peers, "Gunpowder Empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, Hybridity, and the Political Economy of Colonial India, circa 1757-1860" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, No. 2 (2007); Douglas M. Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule, 1700-1885* (Harlow: Pearson, 2006); Kaushik Roy, "Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849" *The Journal of Military History* 69, No. 3 (2005); Kaushik Roy, "The Hybrid Military Establishment of the East India Company in South Asia: 1750–1849" *Journal of Global History* 6, (2011); Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011); Tirthankar Roy, "Rethinking the Origins of British India: State Formation and the Military Fiscal Undertaking in an Eighteenth-Century World Region" *Modern Asian Studies* 47, No. 4 (2013).

trine with Indian military strategies and tactics. Therefore, amidst Parliament's efforts to consolidate imperial governance in 'British India' between 1765 and 1788, the reconceptualisation of the Company's administrative and military structures gradually came to resemble those of a 'Garrison State' which historian Douglas Peers argues was largely achieved by the mid-nineteenth century through processes of 'fiscal-military hybridity'[31]. However, these approaches partially omit the ideological, philosophical and pragmatic implications of the Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence. Yet, merging these approaches the broader historiographical trends enable historians to reposition Parliament's reconceptualisation of the East India Company's 'fiscal-military hybridity' as a cornerstone of British imperial policy and governance in India. Alternatively, it places hybridity and indigenisation as cornerstones of Parliament's ideological, philosophical and practical reconceptualisation of imperial governance. Accordingly, and as this thesis will demonstrate, 'military hybridity' and its broader implications were crucial elements in an era of Parliamentary imperial consolidation succeeding to an otherwise unregulated and unsupervised era of violent commercial and colonial expansion[32].

Ultimately, by examining how Parliament came to reform the governance of the East India Company between 1765 and 1788, this dissertation sheds light upon the ideological and practical place violence itself had upon the development of imperial governance in 'British India'. In doing so, this thesis revisits the meaning and importance of violence by suggesting that it was much more than a mere vector and enforcer of British imperial processes. Although its role in enforcing and asserting Britain's multifaceted rule of the Indian subcontinent has been acknowl-

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[31] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 247-248.
[32] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76.

edged, violence as an imperial dynamic needs also to be appreciated as a transnational marker of imperial development and evolution. Thus, by considering violence as an interdependent imperial dynamic, this work examines how Parliamentary reforms and changing expectations about imperial governance simultaneously, and often ironically, intersected with the socio-political implications stemming from the unregulated and unsupervised administration of Company violence. More specifically, this thesis addresses questions such as: what were the consequences and legacies of violence for the East India Company, British imperialism and Indian society? Furthermore, how did these cross-cultural Anglo-Indian military interactions and mutations shape the development of British imperial governance in India? Thus, how did British and Indian notions of conquest and order become interdependent and essential in the emergence, and in the preservation, of 'British India'?

In answering these questions, this dissertation examines the genesis of one of the significant developments emerging from the imperial crises which struck the East India Company, Parliament and Indian society, namely, the importance of violence in the preservation and consolidation of imperial governance in 'British India'. Hence, this work explores the broader imperial and political considerations of the Anglo-Mysorean and Anglo-Maratha wars as they precipitated a pragmatic reconceptualisation of violence and its role in the consolidation of imperial governance in the 1770s and 1780s. Accordingly, it argues that Parliament's legislative reforms in 1773 and 1784 of the East India Company ultimately came to strengthen and underpin the emergence of the 'Second British Empire' in India. Indeed, parliamentary intervention into the structures of trade and governance of the Company were direct responses to the incessant socioeco-

nomic, judicial, political and martial crises fomented by the Company's despotic fiscal-military administration and exercise of violence since 1765. Exacerbating the imperial crises during a decade between 1775 and 1784, these tendencies influenced the development of an ideologically, philosophically and pragmatically accountable and responsible framework of imperial governance predicated upon notions of hybridity and indigenisation. Hence, through the incorporation by the Company of Indian sociopolitical and judicial mores, the reconceptualisation of the British imperial framework saw the hybridisation and indigenisation of the role violence played within imperial governance. Thus, the administration of violence had transitioned from an instrument of conquest towards an adaptable instrument of socioeconomic control and legitimacy with specific objectives enabling the Company to assert British imperial governance and thus lay the foundations of the British Empire in India.

Covering the period between 1765 and 1773, the first chapter of this dissertation seeks to address the early fiscal-military issues stemming from the East India Company's unregulated and unsupervised dispensation of violence. First, this analysis is grounded in the fiscal-military origins of the Company's administration. More broadly, the origins of the Company's conduct and management of imperial governance can be traced back to Britain's mutually reinforcing processes of state-formation and empire-building[33]. Thus, Parliament's exhaustive search for revenue in the decade after the Seven Years War placed further strain on the Company's fiscal-military capacities[34]. Consequently, this economic strain, the acquisition of the *diwani* and conquest of Bengal collectively emboldened the Company to broaden the dispensation of force as a means

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[33] Seeley, *The Expansion of England*; Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*.
[34] Ben J. Gilding, *Imperial Crises and British Political Ideology in the Age of the American Revolution, 1763-1773* (MA Thesis: University of Ottawa, 2014)

to fulfil its 'corpocratic' and imperial obligations — post 1767[35]. As this chapter reveals, the Company's politico-economic and judicial encroachment by subsidiary alliances set off a series of conflicts which eventually culminated in the First Anglo-Mysore War of 1766. The financial toll on the Company by its defeat in 1769 was exacerbated by the famine it precipitated. Killing an estimated ten million Bengalis, or a third of Bengal's population between 1769 and 1770, the Great Bengal Famine displayed the Company's increasing inability to meet Parliament's imperial expectations and further exacerbated the crises of empire[36]. Hence, it prompted Parliamentary intervention that came in the form of the *Regulating Act of 1773* and which sought to create a legal and administrative framework that would ensure the consolidation of imperial governance in 'British India'. Thus, in the period covered by this chapter, the Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence came to be seen as increasingly incongruent and outright debilitating by Parliament and anathema to its imperial expectations. More importantly, however, the East India Company's military and administrative debacles displayed the limitations and inconsistencies of British imperial governance in the midst of broader challenges and crises in its American colonies[37].

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[35] "Letter Dated 26 April 1765" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 96-97; William R. Thompson, "The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendency of Western Eurasia in the World System" *Journal of World History* 10, No. 1 (1999): 166.

[36] Guha, *Rule of Property*; Marshall, *The British Bridgehead*; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*; Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Depravation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Travers, *Ideology and Empire*; Patrick Tuck (ed.), *The East India Company: 1600-1858: Volume IV: Trade, Finance and Power* (London: Routledge, 1998); Patrick Tuck (ed.), *The East India Company: 1600-1858: Volume V: Warfare, Expansion and Resistance* (London: Routledge, 1998)

[37] Bowen, Mancke and Reid, *Britain's Oceanic Empire*; Jack P. Greene, *Evaluating Empire and Confronting Colonialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jack P. Greene, *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* (Athens, GA.: Georgia University Press, 1986); Lawson, *The Missing Link*; Lawson, *The East India Company*; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking*.

The second chapter begins by examining the East India Company's self-interested, self-serving and self-righteous interpretation of the *Regulating Act of 1773*. Accordingly, the chapter focuses on the First-Anglo-Maratha and the Second Anglo-Mysore War as they encapsulate the consequences of the Company's interpretation of the Act. Hence, this chapter argues that between 1775 and 1784, these two simultaneous conflicts did not only confirm the limitations of the Company's fiscal-military capacities but also, and perhaps more importantly, display the ideological, philosophical and practical limitations and inconsistencies of British imperial governance and effectively forced its reconceptualisation. Thus, through a consideration of *Pitt's India Act of 1784* and the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings in 1788, this chapter will display the changing nature of imperial governance in an era of imperial consolidation. In particular, and as this thesis argues, because of its increasingly debilitating and despotic dispensation of violence, the Company's conduct was seized upon by Parliament as a justification to intervene in Company affairs and assertively reform and reconceptualise imperial governance as to simultaneously consolidate 'British India'. These reformist measures, as this chapter concludes, sought to lay the foundations of a stable 'second' British Empire.

Spanning the entirety of the period between 1765 and 1788, the final chapter incorporates the imperial and political debates of the two previous chapters to retrace the ideological, philosophical and practical evolution of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence within the broader Parliamentary framework concerning imperial governance as it simultaneously emerged from the crises of empire. It reveals that the Mysorean and Marathas ability to appropriate notions of European fiscal-militarism and indigenise them had

proven worthwhile during the Anglo-Mysorean and Anglo-Maratha wars as they successfully contained the Company's armies. Hence, the politico-military implications of these conflicts displayed the Company's fiscal-military sclerosis as an inherent consequence of the equally sclerotic British notions of imperial governance. In the midst of the American Revolution and the ensuing need for imperial consolidation, these administrative, logistical and military weaknesses provided the Crown and Parliament with the motivation and justification to reform the Company and reconceptualise British imperial governance as the locus of empire shifted to 'British India'. Moreover, as this chapter illustrates, this multifaceted process drew legitimacy from the hybridisation and indigenisation of Indian idioms and notions of order. Thus, drawing legitimacy from a largely reappropriated social strata, the economic and military framework of Company governance ironically became increasingly reliant upon Indian society. Therefore, and as this chapter argues, the East India Company's fiscal-military hybridity provides an avenue of analysis by which the reconceptualisation of imperial governance can be traced.

By placing the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence as an imperial dynamic and analysing its role in the crises of Empire between 1765 and 1788, this dissertation fills the historiographical void left between the traditional and 'new imperial' histories. Quite simply, traditional historiography focuses too little on the broader multifaceted dimensions of transnational and imperial governance. Violence is accordingly treated as a uni-dimensional afterthought of British imperial ideologies only to serve as an instrument of conquest. Recent research and scholarship has acknowledged the broader multifaceted implications of the Company's imperial governance of 'British India'. However, many of these 'new

imperial' histories, have tended to discount violence as a mere facilitator and enforcer of British imperial rule. Accordingly, both historiographical trends have a tendency to ignore the importance of violence as ideologically and pragmatically fundamental to British imperial governance. Thus, by focusing upon the changing nature of warfare, this dissertation seeks to examine the role violence had as an imperial dynamic in the reconfiguration of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence and show how they influenced the processes of imperial consolidation and the emergence of a 'Second British Empire' in India.

ONE

The Early Fiscal-Military Issues of the East India Company's Rule and the First Parliamentary Interventions, 1765-1773

Following its formal acquisition of the *diwani* in 1765, the East India Company, now armed with a relationship to the Mughal Emperor, and with the right to directly collect revenue from the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, had effectively become the dominant economic, judicial, political and martial power in these parts of the Indian subcontinent[1]. However, over the next eight years, the Company's supremacy would be tried both in India, and in Parliament following its unregulated and unsupervised fiscal-military administration of violence. In particular, Parliament sought from 1767 to 1773 to understand how "*the general tenor of the Company's orders were not to act offensively… We don't want conquest and power; it is commercial interest only we look for*" had, therefore, embroiled them in the First Anglo-Mysore War and, thereafter, in a series of incessant revolts that would see it subjugate numerous smaller territories in the midst of the Great Bengal Famine[2]. Although the vast majority of Company Officials and Parliamentarians were indeed in accord over the fact that conquests were often adversarial to trade, they manifested very little political impetus to avoid expansive wars against Indian rulers. As seen throughout this thesis, motivational absenteeism was inherently symptomatic with the nature of the Company's fiscal-military rule, and more broadly, with the nature of British imperialism in itself. However, it was not the fiscal-militarism of the Company's administration that was on trial, but rather its cultural predilection to employ what Parliamentarians perceived as a self-

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[1] Douglas M. Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule, 1700-1885* (Harlow: Pearson, 2006): 30.
[2] Robert James's evidence, Brit. Mus., Add, MS. 18469, ff.77, 84. in Peter J. Marshall *Problems of Empire: Britain and India, 1757-1812* (London: George Allen and Uwin Ltd., 1968): 17.

destructive reliance upon violence and coercion. Therefore, from 1767 onwards, Parliament sought to control the East India Company's administration in an effort to preserve the foundations of the British Empire in India.

To thoroughly examine the aforementioned parliamentary enquiries and more importantly what led it to effectively coerce the East India Company into reconceptualising its fiscal-military administration of violence, this chapter will examine the significant developments of the Company's early rule between 1765 and 1773. Firstly, it examines the fiscal-military origins of the Company's rule in India and its perceived role in the broader imperial context. Then, the attention will shift on the Company's fiscal-military practices and methods at the time. Thereafter, the consequences of these coercive methods will be examined through three case studies: the First Anglo-Mysore War between 1766 and 1769, the ensuing Great Bengal Famine of 1769 and 1770, and finally, Parliament's 1773 intervention into the Company's affairs and the subsequent passage of the *Regulating Act*. More broadly, this chapter will cast light on the origins of the East India Company's transformation of its fiscal-military administration of violence, a process that sought to legitimise its rule over Bengal and prevent any further parliamentary interventions into its 'corpocratic' practices.

A Perceived Necessity, the Origins of the East India Company's Fiscal Military Rule

Despite displaying fiscal-military tendencies since its inception in order to defend its commercial activities from European rivals such as the Dutch *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, it was not until the eighteenth-century, and in particular 1765, that the East India Compa-

ny implemented its rule through a clearly structured fiscal-military administration. However, the Company's prosecution of a fiscal-military regime was not a historical coincidence. Instead, these processes find themselves profoundly rooted in Britain's mutually reinforcing and interdependent processes of state-formation and empire-building polities[3]. The basis of these policies can be traced back to Britain's capacity to domestically reform and refine its fiscal-military practices. In particular, Britain's ability to do so dates back to the period of the Protectorate during the 1650s and throughout the early and mid-eighteenth-century[4]. For instance, during the eighteenth century and what can scholars consider as the second Hundred Year War against France, Britain experienced the development of an increasingly professionalised and sizeable civil administration that would harness its fiscal potential[5]. Thus, the professionalisation and institutionalisation of local tax collection officers meant that Britain could effectively mobilise its growing commercial and economic output generated by its increasingly wealthier agricultural and mercantile classes. Hence, Britain was able to subsidise its expanding military expenditures which increased fifteen-folds between 1681 and 1783[6]. Despite their domestic importance, the standardisation and refinements of the British fiscal-military state would prove even far more significant and vital in the broader imperial context. As historian John Brewer explains, Britain's capacity to increase simultaneously its revenue with its growing military expenditure enabled it to counter its European rivals, in particular, France, across the globe throughout the late seven-

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[3] For a discussion on the matter, see John R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Course Lecture* (London: MacMillan, 1904); David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2000)
[4] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990)
[5] John Brewer, "The Eighteenth-Century British State: Context and Issues" in Lawrence Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State of War: Britain from 1619 to 1815* (London: Routledge, 1994): 57; Hamish M. Scott, "The Second Hundred Year War, 1689-1815" *The Historical Journal* 35, No. 2 (1995): 443-469.
[6] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power,* XV, 38.

teenth and eighteenth-century[7]. In other words, it effectively enabled Britain to become an imperial power. Thus, Britain's fiscal-militarism effectively steered its state-formation and empire-building processes and would, therefore, be replicated by its imperial polities as they weathered the same crises as the mother-country did throughout the mid to late eighteenth-century[8]. The East India Company, in particular, would come to perceive the exportation and prosecution of a fiscal-military state in India as a necessity to surmount the political and military realities of the Indian subcontinent[9].

In general, and despite its adverse effects on trade, Britain and its imperial polities had always acknowledged the fiscal-military administration of violence as a fundamental element in the conduct of its commercial activities[10]. Although it had always seen force as a necessity in the conduct of its commercial ventures, the East India Company's acquisition of the *diwani* in 1765 exponentially increased its perception and the complexity of the matter. In particular, its newfound right to levy revenue on behalf of the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam II meant that the Company now had broader and more formal responsibilities surrounding the proper administration of economic, judicial, political and martial powers across Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, but also in its presidencies of Bombay and Madras. However, the Company's newfound role in India was also juxtaposed to its new imperial obligations while also being subordinate to the realities of the Indian subcontinent and Britain, and everything that lay between them. For instance, the Company

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[7] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 40-41.
[8] Peter J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Marshall, *The Problems of Empire*.
[9] Douglas M. Peers, "Gunpowder Empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, Hybridity, and the Political Economy of Colonial India, circa 1757-1860" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, No. 2 (2007): 245-258.
[10] Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 114; Philip J. Stern, *The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

effectively perceived itself as independent and sovereign in the politico-legal sense because of its authority to wage war and trade in India. That being said, Britain, and in particular Parliament, perceived the Company's acquisition of Bengal in 1765 as an extension and consolidation of the British Empire as the former was a British trading corporation[11]. A Company dispatch reflected such expectation as it explained that the "*... Presidencies will annually give their utmost assistance to the China trade, we shall accordingly depend upon a continuance of your care and attention to this great object.*"[12] Nevertheless, Parliament's perception was all the more reinforced by its role as the Company's charter grantor. Thus, being effectively reduced as a subservient of Parliament by the mid-eighteenth-century, the East India Company was expected to conduct itself and the business of Empire with the imperial interests of the mother-country at heart[13].

Marked by the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War and the American Revolutionary War, the period from 1740 to 1783 drove Britain to recast its imperial interests[14]. Moreover, as fiscal-militarism permeated its imperial character, Britain could rely upon a series of imperial possessions as tributaries[15]. As a dispatch from Fort William discussed, the East India Company's monopoly of violence ensured "*Money flowing into your treasury, contentment expressed by the country government and peace defusing her blessings throughout every district of*

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[11] Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*, 59.
[12] "Letter Dated 26 April 1765" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 95.
[13] Philip J. Stern situates the origins of the British Empire in India as being reacquired by Parliament during the mid-eighteenth-century. By then, the combination of the imperial wars with France and the instability of the Company's affairs had obliged Parliament to intervene. Thus, the Company's independence and sovereignty in India would be in decline after nearly a century and a half after it began its activities on the subcontinent. Stern, *The Company State*.
[14] Stephen Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking*; Hamish M. Scott, *British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution* (London: Clarendon Press, 1990); Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 30-31.
[15] Stone, *Imperial State of War*, 10.

the Nabob's dominions, are to us the most pleasing testimonies of the rectitude of the measures we perused when the late grants were obtained."[16] These imperial expectations were exceedingly accurate in the Company's case. Parliament's assertion over India's imperial matters meant that the Company effectively became an extension of the British State that served as intermediary to facilitate the transfer of revenue from India, and particularly Bengal, to London. Ironically, this singular role found itself increasingly intricate by the convergence of various divergent geo-political, geo-strategic and fiscal-military and imperial interests. Although the French *Compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes Orientales* had been defeated by 1765, the French threat in India persisted through the intermediaries of Indian rulers who hired Frenchmen to Europeanise their armies in order to resist the Company[17]. With the continuous wars that persisted throughout the period until the early nineteenth-century, the Company, as Britain's representative in the Far-East, was therefore invariably tasked with fighting its imperial enemies[18]. The Company's new role thus challenged its ability to fulfil its role as a tributary intermediary between Bengal and London and guarantor of British imperial influence and presence in Asia. Therefore, and as John Brewer notes, from 1765 onwards, the Company would task its armies with policing and collecting revenue at an increasing rate[19]. This militarisation of the Company's revenue collection demonstrates that it came to perceive the prosecution of a fiscal-military administration of Bengal as a necessity in adhering to its imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations. Therefore, the imperial

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[16] "Letter Dated 31 January 1766" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I, (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 379

[17] Shelford Bidwell, *Swords for Hire: European Mercenaries in Eighteenth Century India* (London: John Murray Publishers, 1971): 1; François Joseph Ruggiu, "India and the Reshaping of the French Colonial Policy (1759-1789)" *Itinerario* 35, No. 2 (2011); Donald C. Wellington, *French East India Companies: A historical account and record of trade* (Allentown, PA.: Hamilton Books, 2006)

[18] "Letter Dated 26 April 1765" Bhargava and Srinivaschari (eds.), *Volume IV*, 95.

[19] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 54.

role assumed by the Company from 1765 onwards came to form its perception concerning the necessity of implementing a fiscal-military apparatus[20]. In its eyes, the acquisition of the *diwani* and its subsequent granting of revenue collection rights "*... could establish a power sufficient to perpetuate the possessions we hold and the influence we enjoy.*" and therefore sustain its imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations in India in their entirety[21]. Hence, Britain's prosecution of imperial conflicts transformed the role of the East India Company from that of a trader, to one of an imperial fiscal-military administrator[22].

Although the broader implications that arose from Britain's prosecution of imperial conflicts shaped the East India Company's perception on the necessity of a fiscal-military regime in India, it was not the only factor that shaped these perceptions. Devoid of any other administrative system capable of managing the socio-political realities of post-Mughal India, fiscal-militarism provided the Company with the only viable administrative blueprint by which to manage 'British India'[23]. The decline and subsequent fracture of the Mughal Empire in the early to mid-eighteenth century had left the subcontinent socio-politically and economically fragmented, and incapable of resisting the Company's fiscal-military interventions[24]. Despite providing a favourable set of circumstances by which the British could intervene in India's affairs, the period also proved to be quite hostile for the Company's imperial and 'corpocratic' affairs[25]. Principally

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[20] Stern, *The Company State*.
[21] "Letter Dated 31 January 1766" Bhargava and Srinivaschari (eds.), *Volume IV*, 379.
[22] Huw V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757-1773* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking*.
[23] Huw V. Bowen, *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 195.
[24] William R. Thompson, "The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendency of the Western Eurasia in the World System" *Journal of World History* 10, No. 1 (Spring 1999): 144.
[25] Christopher A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830* (London: Taylor Francis, 1989): 58.

found on the frontier with the territories under the direct administration of the Company, smaller Indian states were seen as particularly hostile to Company efforts to consolidate authority and, therefore, subsequently interfered with the Company's ambitions. A dispatch from Governor-General John Cartier addresses in 1770 the political splintering of the post-Mughal era and explains that "*However, you may be assured that if we are so unfortunate as to receive conviction of evil designs in the Vizier we will consult the defence of your possessions with firmness, not officiousness, with the true moderation of self security, not the chimerical spirit of ambition.*"[26] Accordingly, and as P. J. Marshall argues, the Company's challenges primarily stemmed from the *nawabs*' efforts to subvert the obedience and loyalty of British Indian subjects and through this, also violently endangered its authority and sovereignty by interfering with its revenue collection[27]. Hence, Indian rulers exertion of agency effectively coerced a military response by the Company and abetted a series of conflicts on the fringes of its territories[28]. While these conflicts reinforced the East India Company's perceptions of the necessity of implementing a fiscal-military regime, it would be their consequences, to which we now turn, that would confirm its decision to pursue such an administration.

The East India Company's numerous skirmishes with smaller Indian states eventually evolved into full-scale conflicts with the Kingdom of Mysore on four occasions between 1766 and 1799. This pattern repeated itself on three occasions between 1775 and 1818 with the larger

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[26] "Letter Dated 18 February 1770" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence: Volume VI: 1770-1772*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 196-197.
[27] Peter J. Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead: Eastern India, 1740-1828* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 52-53.
[28] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, 54-55.

and more powerful Maratha Confederacy[29]. Serving as intermediaries for the perpetual Anglo-French conflicts of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century, these struggles with Indian rulers drew the Company further into the hinterland of the subcontinent[30]. However, as the campaigns progressed westwards from Bengal, Indian rulers seeking protection would enter into subsidiary alliances either with the Company, the Mysoreans or the Marathas[31]. Thus, from 1765 onwards, the Company found itself embroiled in a series of incessant and financially draining conflicts. Unable to extricate itself from these conflicts, for they secured the expansion of trade, and therefore, of the revenue necessary to fulfil its obligations, the Company saw the prosecution of a fiscal-military administration characterised by a system of subsidiary alliances as a necessity for its own, and for British imperial interests in India[32]. Hence, the Company's defeat in 1769 to an overwhelming Mysorean force confirmed the necessity of prosecuting an expansive fiscal-military regime. Furthermore, acting as mercenaries of a sort, the Company began to offer protection to Indian rulers such as the *nawab* of Arcot, or later, the *nizam* of Hyderabad, as they sought to remain independent from Mysorean or Maratha authority[33]. Therefore, these subsidiary alliances enabled the Company to extract further revenue in order to maintain its fiscal-military regime and imperial obligations through the expansive levy of native troops who waged its wars and administered violence on its behalf[34]. Combined with the broader imperial implications of the

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[29] The Anglo-Mysore Wars are divided in four distinct conflicts that spanned from 1766 to 1799. The First Anglo-Mysore War lasted from 1766 to 1769. The Second, from 1780 to 1784, the Third from 1789 to 1792 and the Fourth from 1798 to 1799 where Tipu Sultan was defeated and killed during the Siege of Seringapatam. The Anglo-Maratha Wars spanned between 1775 and 1818 during three distinct conflicts. The First Anglo-Maratha War lasted from 1775 to 1782, the Second from 1803 to 1805 and the Third, from 1817 to 1818.

[30] Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Volume II: New Continents and Changing Values, 1763-1793*, (London: Longmans, 1952): 13.

[31] Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 33.

[32] "Letter Dated 26 April 1765" Bhargava and Srinivaschari (eds.), *Volume IV*, 96-97; Thompson, *The Military Superiority Thesis*, 166.

[33] I. Bruce Watson, "Fortifications and the idea of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India" *Past and Present* 88, (1980): 70-71.

[34] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 256.

wars against the French and the increasingly antagonistic politico-military climate of post-Mughal India, the Company saw the implementation of a fiscal-military regime as a necessity to ensure its own interests, and those of Britain. However, the realities of hostilities on the subcontinent obliged the Company to adapt and hybridise its fiscal-military approach to empire-building. Seeking to consolidate its political and economic sovereignty, through subsidiary alliances, the Company erected a *cordon sanitaire* that would effectively serve as a fiscal-military fortification for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Therefore, the East India Company relied upon a fiscal-military administration as a necessity to adequately conduct the business of empire in Bengal and India.

While the origins of the East India Company's fiscal-military rule certainly lay in the seventeenth-century, the period from 1765 to 1773 proved crucial in the development of its attitudes regarding the administration of Bengal, and at large, India[35]. In particular, the hostile socio-political, economic and imperial context of post-Mughal India shaped the Company's attitudes not only towards a fiscal-military administration but that of violence itself. As a dispatch from Fort William of 1770 indicates, because of its subsidiary alliances, the Company had to dispense force to not only ensure the protection of its allies but also the stability of its imperial and 'corpocratic' activities. Specifically, the dispatch concerning a local ruler stated that:

> *He would not have been so wanting in common policy as to suffer these people to establish themselves at his own doors if he considered them in their universal character that of the bowed enemies of Indostan, nor could he have avoided apprehen-*

[35] Stern, *The Company State*.

> *sions for himself when he saw that their present attempt was something greater than a hasty incursion made solely for the sake of plunder.*[36]

Accordingly, the Company would, between 1765 and 1773, come to perceive fiscal-militarism and violence as a necessity to fulfil its newly acquired rights and responsibility of economic, judicial, political and martial authority. However, and as it will be seen, the consequences that arose from the Company's administration of Bengal, and India as a whole, provoked pressing challenges that were met with increased militarisation of its fiscal-military regime. Thus, the first eight years of the East India Company's formal rule of Bengal were formative in that its reliance upon an increasingly militarised and fiscal-military regime would become the pattern and precepts by which it would govern Bengal and India.

The East India Company's Fiscal-Military Methods and Practices

Without a practical blueprint by which to apply empire in India, the East India Company's nascent fiscal-military administration of the subcontinent found itself relying upon Britain's ideologically and mutually reinforcing principles of state-formation and empire-building[37]. The Company would, therefore, export and hybridise British fiscal-military practices with those of Indian principalities in an effort to legitimately consolidate its economic, judicial, political and martial authority. Hence, and as historian Robert Travers explains, the Company's implementation of hybridised fiscal-military methods and practices between 1765 and 1772 marked a rationalisation of its role as an imperial administrator. Not only would it encompass that of a vehicle

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[36] "Letter Dated 24 December 1770" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence: Volume VI: 1770-1772*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 260-263.
[37] Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*, 20; Bowen, *Business of Empire*, 195.

for British imperial and mercantile activity but the Company's role would also be that of a harbinger of a post-Mughal socio-political and economic renaissance[38]. Imbued and conditioned by orientalist perspectives, Company officials justified the implementation of British fiscal-military methods and practices as a means to combat Asiatic despotism. Characterised as set of ideas and beliefs about Indians tendency to use corruption, political extortion, abuse of judicial authority as well as cultural and institutional predilection to employ violence, in the eyes of Company officials, Asiatic despotism was an inherited vestige of Mughal rule[39]. Accordingly, Asiatic despotism subverted the Company's claim to sovereignty and its 'corpocratic' interests. Therefore, Company officials believed that British methods and practices centred on the administrative principles of land revenue and the collection of revenue itself inspired fiscal-military stability that thus prevented both war and aggression[40]. Thus, Asiatic despotism provided the Company with a context to justify its takeover of Indian territories. Particularly, and perhaps in a utilitarian mindset, Company officials believed that "*... we shall by your care and attention find the provincial military expenses regulated in such a manner, that as on the one hand, we would not have provinces labor under any oppressive difficulties…*"[41] Thus, using Indian local customs and traditions as precepts to implement British fiscal-military policies, the Company's action demonstrates a clear and distinct effort to consolidate further the authority and legitimacy it had acquired through the grant of the *diwani*. Thus, the Company would benefit from the Indian crises

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[38] Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 67.
[39] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 19.
[40] "Letter Dated 26 April 1765 to Robert Clive" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 100-101; Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*, 131.
[41] "Letter Dated 21 November 1766" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 221.

of the mid-eighteenth-century to further encroach on the socio-economic, judicial, political and martial affairs of India[42]. Ultimately, the implementation of these hybridised and indigenised fiscal-military methods and practices would come to facilitated the East India Company's rule over Bengal and the territories it acquired.

To elaborate upon, the implementation of fiscal-military methods and practices have been divided into two main categories: the organisational and structural principles of land revenue system, and the principles of land revenue collection itself. The prosecution of the British organisational and structural principles of land revenue sought to rectify, between 1765 and 1773, the emerging and pressing financial crises that the Company faced as trade revenue contracted before the overwhelming martial requirements of the period[43]. Already exacerbated by language barriers, these issues were profoundly magnified by Company officials' inability to understand the ideological and philosophical principles that governed Indian land tenure and revenue claims, rights and practices[44]. Combined with its growing imperial and military demands and obligations, and facing a shortage of revenue, the Company deemed the implementation of British principles of land revenue a necessity by which to conduct its affairs in Bengal, and India as a whole. Moreover, Indian officials provided an intermediary by which British physiocratic principles could be successfully engrafted onto Indian socio-economic institutions. Thus, the East In-

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[42] Christopher A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 3.
[43] Peter F. Bang and Christopher A. Bayly (eds.), "Tributary Empires - Towards a Global and Comparative History" in Peter F. Bang and Christopher A. Bayly (eds.), *Tributary Empires in Global History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2011): 1-20; John A. Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy: The East India Company, c. 1757-1825* (London: Routledge, 2017): 231.
[44] Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 235.

dia Company's subsequent practices would theoretically appear more legitimate in the eyes of the Indian population.

Because of its tributary nature, East India Company officials perceived India's land revenue system to be feudal in nature. As John A. Rorabacher points out in his recent work, the structural and organisational principles of the land revenue system of Indian states found themselves anchored in ancient Turkish military feudalism[45]. Thus, *nawabs*, (local rulers) were reliant upon the *zamindars*, (the land proprietors) for revenue. The peasants, or *ryots*, residing on the *zamindari*, (the land owned by the *zamindar*) were expected as the Company rule began and the subsequent crises would demonstrate, to first, meet the quotas imposed by the local government, and, thereafter, provide for themselves. Nevertheless, the *zamindari* system was not universal and only primarily operated outside the immediate control of the Company. Conversely, a second form of land revenue system known as *faujdars* emerged in the territories under the Company's direct control or that of its allies. Administered by military officers with broad judicial and fiscal responsibilities, *faujdars* bore the name of their administrators[46]. This overlap created significant issues that would limit revenue flow and, therefore, require reform.

That being said, both systems shared a highly complex structure of intermediaries through whom the revenue would pass before finding its way into the hands of the ruler. As P. J. Marshall and Rorabacher noted, high ranking functionaries would often pass on the orders to local petty chiefs who would then either directly pass the obligations onto revenue collectors or

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[45] Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 283.
[46] Marshall, *The British Bridgehead*, 55.

the *zamindars* themselves if it were considered small enough[47]. Notwithstanding its ethno-cultural and socio-hierarchical intricacies, Company officials, in an orientalist fashion, consequently interpreted Indian principles of land revenue as being similar to those of Britain. This primarily stemmed from the aforementioned intricacies and the Company's judgement of its agents capabilities "*... to conduct the collection of revenues and follow the subtle native through all his arts to conceal the real value of his country to perplex and to elude payments*", and it was, therefore, necessary to maintain the preexisting administrative structure[48]. A series of reforms were thus far too intricate for the Company to undertake in the 1760s and 1770s. Therefore, in an effort to preserve the system's overall integrity, the Company only involved itself in the practices at their highest level, and this they did through the intermediary of *nawabs*[49]. Although undoubtedly influenced by its administrative considerations and its 'corpocratic' interests in 'British India', the Company did not directly intercede in the system's overall practices and, instead, used Indians as proxies. As Robert Travers notes, the Company's persuasive means of inculcating discipline, loyalty and obedience and coercive violence if necessary amongst its Indian servants effectively streamlined the process by which it levied its revenue[50]. Thus, as the economic, judicial, political and martial authority in Bengal, the Company had theoretically, the capacity to directly or indirectly influence and alter the practices surrounding the structural principles of the land revenue system. However, this would not be achieved without ramifications. Yet, because of the inherent fiscal-military character of its administration and the realities it faced, the East India Company

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[47] Marshall, *The British Bridgehead*, 55; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 286.
[48] "Letter Dated 17 May 1766" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 184.
[49] "Letter Dated 17 May 1766" Bhargava and Srinivaschari (eds.), *Volume IV*, 184-185; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 293-294.
[50] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, 59-60.

would between 1765 and 1773 import and thereafter effectively militarise the practices by which the land revenue system of India was structured.

Similar to the organisational and structural principles of the land revenue system, the principles by which the East India Company would collect land revenue were also based upon coercive and militarised methods and practices. For the Company whose revenue had been steadily declining since 1765, and plummeting in 1768 as a result of the First Anglo-Mysore War, the prosecution of a highly regimented and robust fiscal-military was seen by London as essential[51]. This was particularly true considering that the Company estimated Bengal revenue, which in 1765 stood at £1,650,000, to be three to four times higher if it were not for Asiatic despotism's inherent corruption and subversion of its 'corpocratic' interests[52]. Determined to collect such revenues, the Company, through *nawabs*, therefore, obliged *zamindars* to raise the tax rates. However, they met spontaneous and often erratic resistance on the parts of the *ryots*, and sometimes *zamindars* who refused to bow to the Company's demands. As a report of 1766 indicated, Indian resistance was often characterised as mutinous and "*That this mutiny was greatly encouraged by the civilians stands upon the record of our Consultations…*"[53] Hence, the East India Company's monopoly of violence became essential as it allowed it to coercively persuade Indians into accepting or submitting to its demands[54]. However, in cases where peasants either rioted or failed to pay rent, inadvertently or not, two outcomes proved possible.

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[51] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 55.
[52] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 72-73.
[53] "Letter Dated 6 September 1766" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 432.
[54] Ranjit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1997): 20-21.

Applicable to *ryots* and *zamindars* alike, the first and less violent of these outcomes was the dispossession and immediate auction of the land in question[55]. For its part, the second outcome, used in severe cases of failure to pay rent or what was deemed revolt, which effectively equated to an endangering affront to the East India Company's sovereignty and authority, consisted of small scale campaigns that burned both crop and infrastructures, killed livestock and carried out varying punitive measures against the responsible individuals[56]. Despite having always been an integral aspect of revenue collection, coercion and its elementary component of violence were altered in the early days of the Company's rule. Using imported methods and practices, the British regimented the dispensation of violence not only to facilitate the process by which it extracted revenue, but also to extort supplemental revenue from the indigenous population[57]. The hybridisation of the violence reinforcing the principles of revenue collection would, through the support it provided to the Company's Indian intermediaries, effectively assert the organisational and structural understanding and approach it developed to administer India's land revenue system. More broadly, the introduction by East India Company of these violently enforced methods and practices of revenue collection fastened its fiscal-military regime's grip by effectively creating a self-legitimising framework for the administration of violence.

However, despite its most concerted efforts, the East India Company's imposition of a self-legitimising fiscal-military administration that sustained itself through a culturally institutionalised predilection to employ violence did not attain its objective. By March 1772, the Company's military expenses had reached an untenable threshold and that it "... *must be owning to*

[55] Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 285.
[56] Elizabeth Kolsky, "The Colonial Rule of Law and the Legal Regime of Exception: Frontier 'Fanaticism' and State Violence in British India" *The American Historical Review* 120, No. 4 (2015): 1224-1225.
[57] Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 290.

the inattention of our President and Council as well as to abuses and embezzlements by individuals in the several parts of the Military Department."[58] The Court of Director's damning condemnation of its officials' fiscal-military administration illustrates its two significant shortcomings. Specifically, corruption and the system's inherent reliance upon violence were rampant in the context of the Company's early rule. Thus, and as a dispatch noted in 1765, "*How much must the expectations of your army be raised, when they are suffered without controul to take possessions for themselves, of the whole booty, donation money, and plunder, on the capture of this city?*"[59] Accordingly, and facing ever-growing imperial responsibilities all the while having to meet its obligations to the shareholders in London, officials in India inevitably sought to be modest in their expectations. Thus, the East India Company's unregulated and unsupervised prosecution of a fiscal-military administration between 1765 and 1773 proved to be a rampantly corrupt and violent process that would provoke systematic crises.

Because of its far-reaching implications that grew in parallel with its imperial responsibilities, corruption represented the root cause of the East India Company's issues at the time. Although the conduct of private trade with Indian subjects had always been discouraged by the Company, its cessation was never really enforced. Moreover, at times, some high-ranking Company officials encouraged private trade as a means to supplement faltering revenue collection[60]. Previously established commercial networks and relations with the native populations also facili-

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[58] "Letter Dated 25 March 1772" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VI: 1770-1772*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 153-155.
[59] "Letter Dated 30 September 1765" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 332.
[60] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 53.

tated the practice. Left virtually unregulated and unsupervised, patronage, bribery and corruption permeated the Company's methods and practices of collecting revenue. Despite being present at every level of the Company's organisation, a report published in 1767 observed that collusion with *zamindars* proved to be the most widespread for it allowed Britons to tap into the revenue flow directly[61]. This embezzlement on the part of the British Company servants would see the rise of *Nabobs* who were Britons that had accrued vast personal wealth whilst in India and used them to accede to Parliament and nobility. Combined with the Company's official demands that incessantly rose from 1765, these collusive practices would effectively deplete Bengal of its ability to produce sufficient revenue[62]. Aside from plummeting revenue, British fiscal rapaciousness also fomented resistance amongst Indians. And although it served the Company's insatiable rapaciousness in instances of resistance, dispossession also served to depose corrupt and exceedingly violent *nawabs* and *zamindars* that had passed the exceeding burden onto the *ryots*[63]. A consequence of its corrupted methods and practices, resistance on the part of the Indians would effectively coerce the East India Company into relying even more on violence if it were to restore public order and its revenue.

As previously stated, the East India Company's campaign against insurgent populations often consisted of small scale campaigns meant to maintain the fear-induced authoritarian relationship that the Company developed with Indian populations to preserve their politico-economic

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[61] Alexander Dow, *The history of Hindostan, from the death of Akbar, to the complete settlement of the empire under Aurungzebe. To which are prefixed, I. A dissertation on the origin and nature of despotism in Hindostan. II. An enquiry into the state of Bengal; With a Plan for restoring that Kingdom to its former Prosperity and Splendor, Volume III* (London: 1772): 94.
[62] Dow, *The history of Hindostan*, 95.
[63] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 203.

legitimisation[64]. Well-aware of its reliance upon Indians to govern, the Company acted in an authoritarian manner out of fear. Conversely, it governed in a fear-inducing manner in an effort to maintain its power. However, in the political environment that accompanied its early rule, the Company's campaigns against populations, ambitious *zamindars* and local princes could potentially coerce the Company into broader conflicts with other states in the region. Thus, as a fiscal-military regime, the Company could not realistically avoid these conflicts if it wished to viably meet its growing imperial and 'corpocratic' responsibilities[65]. Fashioned by Britain's fiscal-militarism principles, the Company's fiscal-military methods and practices necessitated an ever-growing revenue if its administration sought to maintain itself and the framework that legitimised the collection of this same revenue. Despite the entirety of the Company's armies being dedicated to the maintenance of its authority over the regions through the monopoly of violence, seven *sepoy* battalions, commanded by British officers were specifically raised to repress any insurgency[66]. Beyond actual acts of repression, the use of *sepoys* marked a departure in the Company's administration of violence. In the immediacy of its rule in 1765, the sociopolitical and military realities of eighteenth-century post-Mughal India had effectively coerced the Company to adapt its dispensation of violence. Specifically, in the case of Company officials in India, the dispensation of violence and the threat of violence was reconceptualised from an instrument of conquest to one of a socio-economic, judicial and political regulator serving to assert British imperial legitimacy, authority and governance. This, as a dispatch explained, became necessary for "*The adjustments of the revenues and the re-establishing proper notions of the Company's power,*

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[64] Kolsky, *The Colonial Rule of* Law, 1224-1225; Watson, *The Idea of Force*, 75-76
[65] Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 159.
[66] Dow, *The history of Hindostan*, 96-97.

moderation, honor and resolution amongst the natives are become objects of the greatest importance since the acquisition of the dewanee."[67] However, and more importantly, the post-Mughal environment in which East India Company's fiscal-military methods and practices emerged created and also provided favourable conditions for the hybridisation and indigenisation of the administration of violence in Bengal.

As the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and its imperial geo-political, strategic and military implications both progressed through the first eight years of its formal rule, violence and tax collection matured into a *raison d'être*[68]. In doing so, as historians Ranajit Guha and John Seeley ironically note from entirely different perspectives, the Company grew increasingly reliant upon Indian elites to control and regulate the society's order[69]. However, and as has been noted in the last few pages, the implementation of British methods and practices of revenue collection, which had been perceived as necessary for the Company to meet its imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations did not produce the intended outcomes. Instead, the widely unregulated and unsupervised prosecution of these methods and practices ensured the Company became inherently violent and corrupt. Exacerbated by racial dimensions, these tendencies staged the nature of the Company's rule through to 1858[70]. Seeking to consolidate its authority, these violently and self-righteously imposed tendencies reinterpreting and reappropriating Indian socio-hierar-

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[67] "Letter Dated 1 February 1766" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 392-393.
[68] Patrick Tuck (ed.), *The East India Company: 1600-1858: Volume V: Warfare, Expansion and Resistance* (London: Routledge, 1998) 15; Gerald J. Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013) 179.
[69] Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2002); Antoinette Burton, *The Trouble with Empire: Challenges to Modern British Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*, 100-102; Thomas R. Metcalfe, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 53, 68-69.
[70] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 151.

chal customs from orientalist standpoint had an immediate and far reaching immediate denouement[71]. Necessitating the expansion and intensification of the administration of violence, in turn, inadvertently meant that the Company's expenditures ballooned as the revenue potential of Bengal steadily shrunk. These concerns were expressed by a report which explained that Britain's "*... great and national object is not to be secured and perpetuated without your unremitting attention to our military establishment, and maintaining a force proportioned to the risk incurred by the extension of your influence and possessions.*"[72] Thus, the Company's administration of a fiscal-military regime whose methods and practices were pervasively violent created an environment in which it had to reform its dispensation of violence. Specifically, the consequences which will be addressed shortly, were addressed in Parliament for it saw the need to intervene in the Company's affairs. In particular, Parliament sought to induce an accountable and responsible administration of violence, for until then, its actions abetted imperial crises of unprecedented magnitude as the Thirteen Colonies in America undoubtedly descended into revolution[73]. Hence, the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of inherently violent and corrupt methods and practices of revenue collection would also prove to be the *raison d'être* behind the reconceptualisation of its dispensation of violence[74].

The First Anglo-Mysore War, 1766-1769

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[71] For a discussion on the British socio-hierarchical reinterpretation and reappropriation of Indian society, see Joseph Sramek, *Gender, Morality, and Race in Company India, 1765-1858* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011)
[72] "Letter Dated 5 December 1766" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 473-474.
[73] Jonathan Eacott, *Selling Empire: India in the Making of Britain and America, 1600-1830* (Chapel Hill, NC.: University of North Carolina Press, 2011): 168-226.
[74] Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A History* (London: Longman, 1993): 103-125; Marshall, *The British Bridgehead*; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*.

Because of its increasingly pervasive and violent fiscal-military methods of collecting revenue, the East India Company found itself incessantly intervening in the affairs of various, smaller Indian states. As historian Douglas Peers states, the assertion of the Company's authority in the Indian hinterland through these conflicts would indeed put it on a path of collision with the Kingdom of Mysore, and this only a year after its assumption of the *diwani*[75]. Although numerous, the principal cause of the conflict would be the Company's attempt of 1766 to annex the Northern Circars, a territory standing between Orissa, an extension of Bengal, and the Carnatic under Madras's control. Under the rule of Hyder Ali, Mysore benefitted from an extensive set of subsidiary alliances that allowed it to maintain and mobilise a substantial army. His armies consisted of some 18,000 cavalrymen and 20,000 infantrymen supplemented by an additional 8,000 Maratha-Pindari mercenary cavalrymen[76]. As historian Kaushik Roy recently noted, these troops benefitted since the 1750s from the support and presence of French officers and troops to train Hyder Ali's troops[77]. French aid was predominately centred upon techniques in artillery warfare, and not in common infantry tactics or combat[78]. However, this lacuna did not prove to be decisive in the outcome of the conflict as the Mysorean could rely upon their extensive network of subsidiary alliances. By late 1768, Hyder Ali's troops decisively outnumbered the Company's troops to the extent that the Company's superior discipline and capacity to inflict casualties did not alter the progression of the conflict[79]. Although this could be interpreted as a strategic victory

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[75] Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule*, 26.
[76] Gholam Mohammed, *The History of Haider Shah, Alias Hyder Ali Khan Bahadur: and Son Tippoo Sultan, by M.M.D.L.T. General in the army of the Mughal Empire*, revised and corrected by His Highness Prince Gholam Mohammed the only surviving son of Tippoo Sultan (1855 reprint, Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1976): 157-58 in Pradeep Barua "Military Developments in India, 1750-1850" *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 58, 1994, 601.
[77] Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011): 77.
[78] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 78.
[79] Tirthankar Roy, "Rethinking the Origins of British India: State Formation and the Military Fiscal Undertaking in an Eighteenth-Century World Region" *Modern Asian Studies* 47, No. 4 (2013): 1128.

by the Company for it did not lose any territory, nor had it been decisively beaten in battle, the First Anglo-Mysore War marked the first time where an Indian power had successfully and effectively resisted and coerced the British into submission. Hence, the East India Company would have to adapt and rethink how it waged war and administered violence.

The First-Anglo Mysore War was a masterful display of Mysorean, and more broadly, Indian cavalry warfare that befuddled the East India Company's troops who had been trained in European ways of conducting war[80]. As Jos Gommans argues, the ability of the Mysorean and later other Indian powers to resist the Company originated from their ability to integrate the long-range and mobile principles of Indo-Afghan and Persian warfare with the recent innovation of concentrating firepower[81]. Thus, it would have been logical for the Company to revisit its training principles and the doctrine in which it conducted its military campaigns. However, the Company did not fundamentally alter or revisit its strategic approaches to warfare. Instead, as historian Gerald J. Bryant explains, the East India Company would instead proceed with an intensification of its doctrine and that of its fiscal-military administration[82].

Two essential principles led the East India Company's military and strategic decision-making. From a purely militaristic point of view, the First Anglo-Mysore War, like every significant conflict that predated it since Child's Wars from 1686 to 1690 in Bombay and those against the French in eighteenth-century were characterised by decisive battles and sieges fought in a

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[80] Barua, *Military Developments in India*, 603
[81] Jos Gommans, "Indian Warfare and Afghan Inovation During the Eighteenth Century" *Studies in History* 11, No. 2 (1995): 279; Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*; Kaushik Roy,"The Hybrid Military Establishment of the East India Company in South Asia: 1750–1849" *Journal of Global History* 6, (2011).
[82] Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India*, 204-205.

European manner[83]. Hence, it seemed logical for the Company not to alter its doctrine, and instead, proceed with the expansion of its armies for its defeat could only be attributed to numerical inferiorities, and not its wartime doctrines or battlefield tactics. These had always proved to be efficient in inflicting casualties to its adversaries[84]. That being, the expansion of the Company's army would require both a substantial revenue base and the necessary manpower. However, as the Court of Directors stated in its correspondence with Fort William, the Company would have to rely upon its expansive networks of subsidiary alliances for Indians "*... being trained and well exercised in arms...*" for Britain could not dispatch troops for it faced revolutionary disturbances in the Atlantic[85]. Hence, the East India Company's doctrine and conduct of its military operations effectively reinforced its dependence upon its fiscal-military administration, and particularly on the dispensation of violence.

From an administrative and particularly fiscal perspective, the recruitment of Indian soldiers or *sepoys* instead of Britons to bolster the East India Company's military ranks became a natural and economically shrewd decision by the end of the First Anglo-Mysore War. Indeed, *sepoys* were not only readily and cheaply available, but they also happened to be naturally accustomed to the terrain and biome[86]. Furthermore, in the eyes of the Company, *sepoys* appeared to be more legitimate than British soldiers in that they shared ethno-cultural characteristics with the

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[83] Named after the Governor of the East India Company, Sir Josiah Child, Child's Wars sought to expand the Company's influence beyond its coastal enclaves, and this between 1686 and 1690. Child's campaigns ultimately failed, and the Company was forced to pay a fine to the Mughal Empire. For further details and a discussion on the matter, see Harlow *The Second British Empire: Volume II*; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 199.
[84] Gommans, *Indian Warfare*, 261; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1128; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 82.
[85] "Letter Dated 25 March 1772" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad (eds.), *Volume VI: 1770-1772*, 143, 153-155; For a discussion on the matter of recruitment during the American Revolution, see Gerald J. Bryant, "Officers of the East India Company army in the days of Clive and Hastings" *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 6, No. 3 (1978); Arthur N. Gilbert "Recruitment and Reform in the East India Company" *Journal of British Studies* 15, No. 1 (1975).
[86] Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking*, 70; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 204.

populations from whom they were expected to extract revenue or with whom they would engage in combat[87]. Hence, with Indian elites serving as intermediaries, the use of *sepoys* would, theoretically, at least, increase the legitimacy of the Company's mounting demands to the Indian population[88]. More specifically, "*As the Security of our Valuable Possessions depend so much on the Keeping up a good Discipline and a Martial Spirits in the Troops.*" the *sepoys*' embodiment of idiomatic notions of authority served to consolidate the Company's legitimacy[89]. Often wholly dependent on the conduct of Indian intermediaries, this legitimacy remained inherently corrupt and extortive. Moreover, in the broader set of mounting imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations it faced, the Company's recruitment of *sepoys* from Indian states also initiated an intensification of the fiscal-military administration of violence that would, in turn, necessitate more troops to ensure the stability and extraction of revenue. The East India Company hence faced a self-perpetuating and increasing reliance upon the administration of violence.

The redoubling of the East India Company's fiscal-military regime, its demands and its increasing reliance on force in the aftermath of the First Anglo-Mysore War, therefore, serve as the point of genesis for the subsequent crisis it would face from 1769 onwards. Moreover, the Company's inability to break with its fiscal-military *mentalité* meant that it accordingly understood the security of 'British India' as laying within its singular administration of violence[90]. Thus, the Company's prosecution of an increasingly violent fiscal-military administration per-

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[87] "Letter Dated 10 April 1771" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VI: 1770-1772*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 86-87.
[88] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 256; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 290.
[89] "Letter Dated 11 November 1768" K. D. Bhargava and Narendra Krinsha Sinha (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume V: 1766-1769* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 155.
[90] Tuck, *Volume V*, 102.

petuated the conditions which prompted this implementation in the first place. In particular, the Company's decision to further intensify the prosecution of its fiscal-military administration to fight the First Anglo-Mysore War can be interpreted as the tipping point which plunged Bengal into the great famine of 1769 and 1770. Prompting a Parliamentary inquiry and intervention which would result in the *Regulating Act of 1773*, the East India Company's actions were the ones that would oblige it at the insistence of the Crown and Parliament to reconceptualise and regulate its administration of violence to preserve the integrity of 'British India' and the Empire[91].

The Great Bengal Famine, 1769-1770

Killing an estimated ten million Bengalis, or one-third of the province's population between 1769 and 1770, the causes of the Great Bengal Famine lay at the confluence of the excessive monsoon rains and the East India Company's fiscal-military policies[92]. As C. A. Bayly and P. J. Marshall point out, the destruction of agricultural lands during the Company's continuous wars with Indian states and its subsequently rising demands to subsidise the cost of these same conflicts forcefully plunged Bengal in crises[93]. Specifically, four factors exacerbated the Company's role in the famine. First, the Company's collusion with local officers to extract personal revenue put the excess tax burden on both the land and *ryots*. Tied to this burden, the second exacerbating factor stemmed from the Company's failure to curb collusion and the artificially rising costs of provisions that would have enabled Bengalis to harvest and subsist[94]. The third factor

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[91] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 32-38; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*.
[92] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 32-38; Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Depravation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981): 39; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*.
[93] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 65; Marshall, *The British Bridgehead*, 70-92.
[94] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 72-73.

exacerbating the crisis stemmed from the Company's inability and unwillingness to translate the ideologies of conquest into what Travers describes as languages of rule[95]. In particular, the Company's self-interested and self-serving 'corpocratic' logic and orientalist interpretation of Indian society meant it resorted to conquest in order to consolidate its rule instead of relying on a set of ideological, philosophical and practical idioms of rule[96]. And finally, the fourth factor that exacerbated the crisis was that of the Company's fiscal-military paranoia. Specifically, fearing that the famine would serve as a pretext for insurrection and a subsequent Maratha intervention, Company officials deemed it necessary to further militarise revenue extraction in Bengal and on its frontiers[97]. Again, the Company's increasingly violent fiscal-military administration of Bengal fomented a socioeconomic and political cycle of resistance and military repression. The East India Company's destabilising and debilitating conduct was interpreted as an imperial crisis that thus set the stage for Parliamentary intervention and regulation in 1773[98].

The answer as to 'How' and 'Why' Parliament interpreted the East India Company's fiscal-military mismanagement and debilitation of Bengal between 1765 and 1773 owes much to its definition of sovereignty. Specifically, this stemmed from Parliament's interpretation and as-

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[95] Guha, *Dominance Without Hegemony*, 25; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*, 257-258; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 98.
[96] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76.
[97] "Letter Dated 9 May 1770" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VI: 1770-1772*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 200-204; "Letter Dated 31 August 1770" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VI: 1770-1772*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 220-223.
[98] James M. Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III: The East India Company Crisis and the Transformation's of Britain's Imperial State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019): 110-111.

sumption of sovereign authority over imperial governance in India[99]. However, in an age of mounting demand for accountability and responsibility, Parliament's claims of sovereign authority and expectations of imperial governance were reinforced by the turpitude of the Company in India. Therefore, North's administration and Parliament interpreted the Company's fiscal-military failure as an inability to assume imperial governance and responsibility[100]. Lord North and Parliament's interpretation of Company mismanagement stems from the post-1763 context of imperial governance. In particular, since 1763, Parliament viewed its various imperial polities, including India as tributaries expected to contribute to paying off the national debt accrued during the Seven Years War. Alternatively, as long as these entities met their imperial expectations, Parliament refrained from forceful intervention. Thus, as the East India Company's fiscal-military conduct represented a danger to the foundations of the British Empire in India, and it openly resisted and defied Parliamentary sovereign authority over the matter of imperial governance, Parliament had no choice but to intervene.

Parliament's 1767 inquiry into East India Company conduct would thus serve as a blueprint for how it would subsequently intervene in Company affairs in 1773 and again in 1784[101]. Moreover, William Bolts and Alexander Dow's public claims concerning the Company's despotic conduct emboldened Parliamentary intervention. A piece by Bolt described the Company as "*... an absolute government of monopolists', which were impoverishing Bengal, and working*

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[99] For further details and a discussion on the matter, see Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*; Stern, *The Company State*; Lucy S. Sutherland, *The East India Company in British Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); Travers, *Ideology and Empire*; For a discussion on the matter of Parliamentary sovereignty, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, *The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
[100] Bowen, *Business of Empire*, 35; Huw V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*.
[101] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*, 30-31; Lawson, *The East India Company*.

against long-term British interests in the region.", and this through violence and usurpation[102]. For his part, Alexander Dow would expose the Company's reliance upon repressive battalions who "*... carried ruin and terror in the country...*" in order to extort every pence from Bengal[103]. And although corruption and collusion had always been commonplace in the Company's conduct, the Great Bengal Famine starkly revealed to Parliament the severity of the crisis faced in Bengal. Moreover, the famine came to characterise and embody the consequences of the Company's inherently corrupt and violent fiscal-military administration of Bengal that had virtually destroyed the gains it had made since 1765[104]. In Metropolitan and parliamentary eyes, the Company was ideologically and practically an Asiatic despot who desperately required reform. The famine thus illustrated the way by which the Company's fiscal-military administration had siphoned off and literally starved what was seen as the wealthiest province of the Mughal Empire and deprived the British State of the post-*diwani* promises made by Clive and the directors[105]. Ultimately, the Great Bengal Famine would come to demonstrate the corrupt and violent prosecution of the Company's fiscal-military administration. Indeed, the East India Company effectively failed to meet its imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations, and in doing so endangered 'British India'.

The Great Bengal Famine would ultimately serve two primary purposes. It first served as a window into the East India Company's failing prosecution of a fiscal-military state that would, in turn, demonstrate that Bengal's revenue and capacity to endure British rapaciousness, was in-

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[102] William Bolts, *Consideration on Indian Affairs; Particularly Respecting the Present State of Bengal and its Dependencies, Volume I* (London: 1772): VII; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 61.
[103] Dow, *The history of Hindostan*, 96-97.
[104] T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British* India, 1137-1138; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 98.
[105] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 51; Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire*, 219.

deed finite[106]. Together, these circumstances effectively set the stage for Parliament's 1773 intervention and regulation of the Company[107]. The Company's corrupt and violent fiscal-military administration had proven itself incapable of facing the self-perpetuating conundrum that it produced. Specifically, the Company's own rapaciousness and mismanagement of Empire had left it virtually bankrupt by the late 1760s and early 1770s as this and the Famine would effectively put its practices in Parliament's crosshairs. Hence, the Great Bengal Famine would mark the beginning of Parliament's inevitably necessary involvement in the broader reform that the East India Company's administration of violence in Bengal was undergoing since 1765.

The Regulating Act of 1773

At its core, Lord North's *Regulating Act of 1773* sought to bring the East India Company's increasingly corrupt and violent fiscal-military administration of Bengal under parliamentary control amid the latter's defeat in 1769 to the hands of Hyder Ali's Mysorean Kingdom, and the subsequent Famine. To achieve this, the Act vested the entirety of the British territories in India in the central authority of the Governor-General of Bengal, and the Council nominated by the Court of Directors with Parliament's influence. Furthermore, in an effort to regulate the legal bounds and maintain oversight of the Company's fiscal-military administration, the Act oversaw the establishment of the Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William. Thus finally, armed with politico-legal authority, the Act prohibited any Company officials of engaging in private trade with Indians, and this in any circumstances. That being said, the politico-legal and imperial impetus displayed by Parliament in regulating the Company's conduct was not conducive to a pro-

[106] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 118; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*, 247.
[107] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*, 30-31; Lawson, 120.

found transformation of the fiscal-military administration of violence in Bengal[108]. Instead, and knowing that violence and its administration were integral elements of fiscal-militarism, Parliament sought through the Act, to find a balance between the Company's extortive and violent excesses, and what was considered to be the appropriate and necessary coercion to administer Bengal. Indeed, it was an attempt to preserve and consolidate the Company's fiscal-military administration of Bengal. Despite its failure, the *Regulating Act of 1773* would, through its provisions and interpretation, reconceptualise both the ideological and structural framework by which the East India Company administered violence in Bengal and India.

In an attempt to ensure the durability and viability of the East India Company's central politico-legal authority in Bengal, the Court of Directors passed a series of provisions meant to supplement those of the *Regulating Act of 1773*. These provisions centred upon the professionalisation of the Company's service in India. Yet, they would have a long-lasting influence on violence and its administration. Concretely, Leadenhall Street approved fixed salaries for the Governor-General, the Councillors, Chief Justice and Judges as a medium by which to prevent any form of private trade and excesses on the part of the high-ranking officials[109]. For the Directors, these provisions, coupled with the fixation of salaries for the vast majority of officials and troops, were conducive in creating a well-disciplined and professional administration that would not ascribe to Asiatic despotism[110]. In particular, these efforts demonstrate an attempt on the part of the Company's leadership to recruit well-trained and professional soldiers to fill its rank. The

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[108] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*; Bayly, *Indian Society*; Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*; Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 54; Lawson, *The East India Company*; Marshall, *The British Bridgehead*.
[109] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 241, 242.
[110] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*, 84-102; Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 54; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 140.

elimination of what can be considered 'dregs' from the Company's service would in the mind of Parliament and Directors, effectively curb abuses and punish any transgressions[111]. More importantly, the use of well-trained and professional Europeans on the battlefield and in revenue collection would ensure "*... the preservation of Peace throughout India, and to the Security of the Possessions and Revenues of the Company.*"[112] Hence, in the midst of Parliament's intervention, the Company's pay provisions would seek to create a well-disciplined and professional military nucleus to administer violence and enable it to meet its imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations. The *Regulating Act of 1773* would confirm Parliament's increasing assertion over the Company's affairs by influencing and guiding its administration of violence. More particularly, it would alter the framework by which the East India Company's administration of violence from one of conquest and excess to that of socioeconomic, judicial and political regulation and enforcement.

As previously noted, the *Regulating Act of 1773* precipitated a reconceptualisation and alteration of the framework by which the East India Company administered violence. More specifically, with the establishment of the supreme court of judicature in Bengal, Parliament would effectively extend Britain's legal principles and authority over its Empire in India[113]. Thus, the Company's politico-legal claims to authority and its practices would be challenged and regulated by Parliament's expanding influence through the Council and the supreme court of judicature. Thus, Parliament oversaw and influenced violence and its administration in the context of imperial governance. As a dispatch described in 1774, the said Act and its provisions were "...

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[111] Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*, 212.
[112] Court of Directors, "Instructions from the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the East-Indies, to the Governor-General and Council of Fort-William, in Bengal" BL, General Reference Collection DRT Digital Store, 8022.h.25 (London: 1774): 2.
[113] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 181.

to which you will refer yourselves, with respect to the execution of such powers, and the observance of such rules and directions therein contained, as are incumbent on you to excuse and perform…"[114] Therefore, Lord North's measures created a politico-legal framework that held the Company accountable for its fiscal-military administration of violence[115]. Yet, as the Company's administration in both London and Bengal was inextricably pulled into Parliament's orbit, the latter would inevitably reform and reconceptualise the administration of violence. Seeking to stabilise the extractive process which had been deregulated by the Company's excessively coercive and extortive revenue collection methods and practices, Parliament would recast, reform and reconceptualise the violence and its administration played in revenue extraction. In particular, violence and its administration were reconceptualised as an instrument of socioeconomic, judiciary and political regulation that sought to stabilise revenue extraction in Bengal and India. Hence, Lord North's *Regulating Act of 1773* had effectively reformed the framework by which the Company administered violence. Moreover, it confirmed Parliament's political and legal sovereignty over the East India Company and held the latter's fiscal-military administration accountable for what had effectively become 'British India'[116].

Despite its failure to prevent the First Anglo-Maratha War in 1775 and a second conflict with Mysore in 1780, the *Regulating Act of 1773* nonetheless played an essential role in the development of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of Bengal, and subsequent-

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[114] "Letter Dated 29 March 1774" K. D. Bhargava and R. P. Patwardhan (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence: Volume VII: 1773-1776* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 49.
[115] Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*, 212-213.
[116] Christopher A. Bayly, "The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance: India, 1750-1820", 332, in Lawrence Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London: Routledge, 1994): 322-354; Lawson, *The East India Company*, 116-124.

ly other parts of India. From an ideological and practical standpoint, Parliament's first formal intervention in the Company's affairs marked a turning point insofar that it asserted its sovereignty over imperial governance in 'British India'[117]. However, what did it mean for the administration of violence itself? The *Regulating Act*'s had conclusively proven the imprecise nature of the Mughal constitution as a basis for British imperial rule in India, and the Company's reliance upon its interpretation of the latter rendered it unable to administer Bengal without being inherently corrupt and violent[118]. Thus, to redress the Company's position and that of the Empire in India, Parliament virtually, albeit gradually from 1773 onwards, replaced the Mughal constitution with a hybridised and indigenised set of British politico-legal ideologies, philosophies and principles[119]. Thus, the reconceptualisation, hybridisation and indigenisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration sought to inculcate British notions of constitutional and administrative law in an effort to institutionalise Indian fiscal, judicial, political and martial practices as to meet Parliamentary expectations concerning responsible and accountable imperial governance.

Thus, the *Regulating Act*'s adaption and re-adaption of India's socioeconomic, judiciary, political and ultimately martial realities would create a self-legitimising framework in which the Company would continue to extract revenue through the regulation of Indian society and the stability that ensued[120]. However, and as historians Mahesh Gopalan and William Pettigrew argue,

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[117] Bankey B. Misra, *The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773-1834* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959): 18-22; Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*; Bowen, *The Business of Empire*; Lawson, *The East India Company*; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking*.
[118] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 195.
[119] Thomas Metcalfe, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 193-194; Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[120] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 53.

the new ideological framework that would govern and regulate the Company's administration of violence emboldened by a particular political and judicial familiarity, and knowledge of their increasingly vital role as a British intermediary in India, to become far more aggressive under the governorship of Warren Hastings, and this right from 1775 onwards[121]. Nonetheless, the *Regulating Act*'s failure remains bound in the opposing interpretation that the Company made of Parliament's interpretation. Thus, perhaps, the *Regulating Act of 1773* can be interpreted as enabling the Company to legitimately pursue an expansive fiscal-military administration of violence like it had since 1765, only this time, under the vague but official auspice of Parliament. Nevertheless, it had a discernible influence in that it effectively forced the East India Company to reconfigure its administration of violence and began transforming it from an instrument of conquest to that of socio-political consolidation.

Conclusion

The resort to inherently corrupt and violent methods plagued the early creation and prosecution by the East India Company of a fiscal-military administration of Bengal. As this chapter as shown, these issues stemmed primarily from the circumstances in which the Company found itself. Specifically, the ever-increasing imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations and their business and revenue extraction strategies combined with the lack of regulation and supervision on the part of Parliament created the propitious conditions that perpetuated the Company's increasingly corrupt and violent conduct. However, in the age of Parliamentary accountability and responsibility, these conditions were equally propitious for the latter to intervene in the Company's affairs

[121] Mahesh Gopalan and William A. Pettigrew (eds.), *The East India Company, 1600-1857: Essays on the Anglo-Indian Connection* (London: Routledge, 2017): 3.

and assert its authority in India's affairs[122]. More specifically, in fiscal-military matters where the Company's conduct and the ensuing crisis had proven to be warning on the burden that could be bestowed upon Bengal and India as a whole[123]. Hence, in the broader reconceptualisation that violence and its administration would undergo between 1765 and 1788, the early fiscal-military method and practices of the Company's administration of Bengal, would prove to be the point of departure for Company rule and the genesis of the crises that it and 'British India' would endure and necessitate Parliamentary intervention and regulation. Simply put, the East India Company's conduct in the eight years following its acquisition of the *diwani* in 1765 perpetuated the conditions that coerced Parliament into recasting and ultimately reconceptualising the ideological, philosophical and practical framework of violence and its administration in an imperial context, particularly that of Bengal[124].

However, and as seen in the next chapter, this reformation of violence and the new imperial direction for the East India Company and India substantiated by the *Regulating Act of 1773* did not go far enough[125]. Specifically, the Act's failure arose from the fact that it had simply transposed the ideological, philosophical and practical framework for the administration of violence to India, and consequently replicated the conditions that had enabled the Company to continue to administer and behave as it had between 1765 and 1773. In other words, by way of Parliament's implementation of British politico-legal authoritative principles over Bengal and India, the Act in 1773 effectively created a framework that further facilitated and legitimised the Com-

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[122] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*; Lawson, *The East India Company*; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking*; Marshall, *Problems of Empire*.
[123] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 98.
[124] Lawson, *The East India Company*; Marshall, *The Bengal Bridgehead*.
[125] Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 35-36.

pany's administration of violence[126]. Thus, it can be concluded that during the 1760s, the East India Company's rule over an increasingly malleable, but British conceptions of Bengal created the conditions that would necessitate violence and its administration to eventually undergo yet again, a reconceptualisation of Company role and responsibility that would effectively culminate in *Pitt's India Act* in 1784.

[126] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*; Gerald J. Bryant, "Pacification of the Early British Raj, 1755-85" *Journal of the Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 14, (1985): 3-19; Marshall, *The Bengal Bridgehead*; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking.*

TWO

The East India Company's Fiscal-Military Administration and its Trial of Empire, 1773-1788

The passage of Lord North's *Regulating Act* in June of 1773 signalled the beginning of Parliament's formal oversight of the 'Bengal revolution' and its political implications that had been brought forth by the East India Company. However, the Company's merchants, as ignorantly versed as they were in the politics and peculiarities of Empire strangely bequeathed to them, had since 1765, established an increasingly robust and expansive fiscal-military administration across the vestiges of Mughal Empire, and particularly in Bengal[1]. Therefore, through the *Regulating Act*, Parliament sought to impart a sense of responsibility and more importantly, of imperial accountability, to the Company's administration. Alternatively, it meant that ideological, philosophical and practical principles of the 'Second British Empire' lay in Parliament's sovereign imposition of a responsible and accountable framework of imperial governance. From a fiscal and military standpoint, these principles sought to avoid protracted and expensive wars. Thus, only going to war when necessary or on a defensive basis. Moreover, from a judicial standpoint, Parliament sought to impose judicial accountability and responsibility in an effort to extend British constitutional and administrative law and, therefore, limit abuse. Thus, Parliament's principles of imperial governance were ideologically and practically motivated to consolidate EIC authority and ensure its accountability. However, and as briefly discussed in the previous chapter, Lord North's intervention in the Company's affairs ultimately failed to produce its intended ef-

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[1] Christopher A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Lord Clive" (1840), in his *Critical and Historical Essays contributed to 'The Edinburgh Review'* (London: 1884): 526, in Philip J. Stern, ' "A Politie of Civill & Military Power": Political Thought and the Late Seventeenth-Century Foundations of the East India Company-State' *Journal of British Studies* 47, No. 2 (April, 2008): 254.

fects. Instead, its provisions conflated the Company's fiscal-military abilities, attitudes and behaviour with the politico-legal authority vested in them by Parliament as its intermediary in India. Thus, the Act produced a loosely self-legitimising and perpetuating framework by which the Company could wage war in the name of imperial and 'corpocratic' preservation[2]. In other words, Parliament's intervention both reinforced and emboldened the East India Company to pursue its fiscal-military administration of Bengal for it ensured the survival of the British Empire in India, but more importantly, in its eyes, the process of revenue extraction, and Parliamentary expectations notwithstanding its wars against Indian polities.

Thus, in hindsight, it was not surprising to see the "mere merchants" of the East India Company enmeshed in yet another series of conflicts, and this only two years after the enactment of the *Regulating Act*. Starting a month before the American Revolutionary War in 1775, the First Anglo-Maratha War saw the Company fighting the Maratha Confederacy until the ratification of the Treaty of Salbai in May of 1782[3]. However, from 1780 onwards, the Company fought a second war against Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan of the Kingdom of Mysore. The conflict ended in the spring of 1784, only a few months after the war with the American Colonies. Therefore, for nearly a decade, in both the Atlantic and in the East, a series of tumultuous sociocultural, economic, ideological, judicial, political, philosophical and martial conjunctions plunged Britain in a crisis of Empire. However, the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings in 1788 arguably

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[2] Maesh Gopalan and William Pettigrew (eds.), *The East India Company, 1600-1857: Essays on the Anglo-Indian Connection* (London: Routledge, 2017): 3.

[3] Signed on 17 May 1782, the Treaty of Salbai would bring an official end to the First Anglo-Maratha War. It saw the Company hold onto Sashti, a rich and fertile island and a suburb of Mumbai and Broach near the estuary of the Narmada. More importantly, the treaty would guarantee Maratha intervention along the Carnatic against Hyder Ali. For a discussion on the matter, see M. R. Kantak. *The First Anglo-Maratha War, 1774-1783: A Military Study of the Major Battles* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1993)

marked the end of a fifteen-year period whereby the trials of Empire were embodied by the imperial implications of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of Bengal.

The experiences of the East India Company reveal these trials of Empire not only because of its transnational fiscal-military characteristics but because these happen to be the same characteristics that would inevitably plunge the British Empire in its crises. In particular, the fifteen-year period that spanned from 1773 onwards to 1788 can be seen as the result of an often loosely if not unsupervised growth of Empire following the Seven Years' War, in which Parliament had to contend with, and address the challenges and discontinuities of its imperial fiscal-military administration[4]. Although past historiography has suggested that Britons came to contend with these questions of Empire through its experience in America, it would instead, be the Company, and India at large that would endure the jolts of the American Revolution and its ramifications. In particular, as Empire transposed itself from the Thirteen Colonies to India, and specifically, Bengal, the Company had to contend with changing Whig and Tory visions of British imperialism[5]. However, being the political football it had been ever since the seventeenth century, the Company would inevitably be drawn into the power struggle between both parties. Invariably, it would be its nearly unsupervised fiscal-military administration of Bengal that found itself at the heart of these debates and ultimately led to a reimagination of this regime's dispensation and exercise of violence. Broadly put, Parliament sought to determine, during this period, how violence was to be administered, under which circumstances and what was deemed necessary to maintain con-

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[4] Kathleen Wilson (ed.), *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 7,11-13.

[5] For a discussion on the matter of the diverging Whig and Tory ideological and philosophical visions of the India question, see Lucy S. Sutherland. *The East India Company in British Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); James M. Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III: The East India Company and the Crisis and Transformation of Britain's Imperial State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019)

trol, but not foment yet another revolution that would see it lose its grip over India. Consequently, between 1773 and 1788, and while Britain was losing its American colonies, the East India Company saw itself not only at the nexus of the trials of Empire but also tasked with the increasingly convoluted task of managing what was effectively becoming the British Empire.

This second chapter examines the period between the passage of North's *Regulating Act* in 1773 and that of Edmund Burke's opening prosecution of Warren Hastings in 1788. In an effort to understand how the crises of the East India Company and its fiscal-military administration of Bengal ultimately forced the reconceptualisation of the Company's dispensation and exercise of violence. To do so, the chapter will initially contextualise the *Regulating Act*'s and its transnational and imperial consequences for Parliamentarians and Company Officials alike. The most obvious of these consequences were seen in the conflicts fought by Company during both the First Anglo-Maratha War of 1775 to 1782 and the Second Anglo-Mysore War from 1780 to 1784. These two conflicts and their implications in the context of the crisis of Empire will form the second and third part of the chapter. Afterwards, attention will shift to the *East India Company Act*, known as *Pitt's India Act*, and how it came to contend with the imperial crises faced by Britain and the Company in 1784. Lastly, the chapter will examine the ideological, philosophical and practical contentions about the Company's fiscal-military administration of violence embodied in the Impeachment Trial of Warren Hastings. More broadly, this chapter examines the connections between the ideological and philosophical crises of Empire abetted by the East India Company's fiscal-militarism and its institutionalised predilection to rely upon violence as a means to administer Bengal and India altogether. Moreover, how it would, in turn, reconceptu-

alise this administration at the same time that Britain found its Empire no longer in America, but alternatively in India, and specifically, Bengal.

Condemned to Fail, the Trial of Lord North's Regulating Act and its Immediate Aftermath, 1773-1775

In theory, Lord North's *Regulating Act of 1773* sought to prevent the East India Company's comeuppance for, since 1765, its ever-expanding fiscal-military responsibilities cannibalised any politico-economic gains it made. This augur, as previously mentioned, had been made evident by the Company's defeat during the First Anglo-Mysore War as well as the socioeconomic devastation caused by its mismanagement during the ensuing Great Bengal Famine. Hence, for Parliamentarians, the Company's behaviour in Bengal represented a threefold problem. First, the two crises it faced during the first eight years of its rule over Bengal were indicative of its inability to attune its fiscal-military administration and attitudes with the realities of governing parts of the Indian subcontinent. For Parliamentarians, this primarily stemmed from the Company's then growing sense of politico-legal autonomy and sovereignty over Indian affairs[6]. This raised a third issue that revealed that the East India Company's ideological, philosophical and practical bearings were increasingly fragmented and consequently disjointed from Britain's imperial principles.

Conscious of the fact that India was salvageable in comparison to the American Colonies, Parliament sought through the *Regulating Act* to steer the Company's affairs back in line with

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[6] For a discussion on the Company's politico-legal autonomy and sovereignty, see Philip J. Stern *The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Sutherland. *The East India Company*; Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Parliament's expectations of imperial conduct[7]. As P. J. Marshall explained, the Act served as a provisional solution until Parliament drew a permanent settlement for India[8]. However, one can justifiably extend Marshall's argument and conclude that the *Regulating Act* was a temporary measure drawn up by Parliament to quell Indian affairs as it and the Empire faced the then larger and more relevant predicament it met in America. Indeed, in the moment of the American Revolutionary War, the Company's affairs in Bengal were set aside by Parliament. The American Colonies, notwithstanding their shared ethnic and socioeconomic relations, were quintessential in the British ideological, philosophical and practical conceptions of Empire. Thus, in such a haste, it is not surprising, as many scholars have since pointed out, that in the midst of an Atlantic imperial crises, the *Regulating Act* failed to appropriately address the issues that arose from the East India Company's unsupervised and violent fiscal-military administration of Bengal.

As discussed in the last chapter, the primary shortcoming of the *Regulating Act* was its interpretation and application by East India Company officials in India. Under the governorship of Warren Hastings, the Company came to interpret both its imperial and political circumstances as increasingly hostile and precarious and thus ultimately one that necessitated the assertion of its fiscal-military administration over Bengal[9]. This primarily stemmed from Parliament's influence in the nomination of Lieutenant-General John Clavering, George Monson, Richard Barwell, and more importantly, Philip Francis to the Supreme Council of Bengal in 1774[10]. Tasked with hold-

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[7] Peter J. Marshall, *Problems of Empire: Britain and India, 1757-1812* (London: George Allen and Uwin Ltd., 1968): 33-36.
[8] Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 35.
[9] Jon E. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers: Modern Governance in Eastern India, 1780-1835* (London: Routledge, 2008): 49-50.
[10] For a discussion on the matter of Warren Hasting and Philip Francis' rivalry, see William Dalrymple, *The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of Empire* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019)

ing the Company and the Governor-General accountable and responsible for its actions, the role of these four men, and in particular that of Francis, was perceived and interpreted as increasingly inimical for they intervened in the conduct of the Company's 'corpocratic' affairs in Bengal. Hence, at first glance, Hastings and the East India Company came to view Parliament's intervention as an assault on its autonomy, and generally speaking, on its sovereignty, and thus its governance of Bengal.

Such an interpretation on the part of the East India Company is not surprising and explains why it seemed compelled to pursue an increasingly aggressive fiscal-military administration, and this to ensure stability and prosperity in Bengal[11]. In other words, the Company deliberately chose to loosely address Parliament's demands and efforts to contend with the ideological, philosophical and practical discontinuities in its imperial direction through, as was seen in the last chapter, a professionalisation of its fiscal-military administration[12]. However, because of its lack of direct control, Parliament could not ensure an effective and immediate sense of responsibility and accountability to the East India Company's fiscal-military administration its reliance on violence. Such developments had to wait until the enactment of *Pitt's India Act* over a decade later in 1784.

Until then, however, the East India Company had to contend with the consequences of its loose interpretation of Parliament's demands, but more importantly, with those of the latter's reluctant but necessary delegation of imperial responsibilities in India. Therefore, the *Regulating*

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[11] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990): 53; Gopalan and Pettigrew (eds.), *Essays on the Anglo-India Connection*, 3.
[12] Peter J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 157-256; J. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers*, 49-50.

Act effectively sanctioned the Company as the guarantor and guardian of territory and revenue by Parliament as "*... having entrusted you with the civil and military government of the said Presidency of Fort William, and also with the ordering, management and government of the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the kingdoms of Bengal, Behar and Orissa…*"[13]. Therefore, in the broader imperial context of the 1770s and 1780s, the Company was officially vested with the responsibility of managing the Empire in India on behalf of the British State and effectively lay the foundations of 'British India'. As P. J. Marshall and Jon E. Wilson assert, this meant, that the Company, by way of its interpretation of the politico-legal legitimacy, authority and more importantly sovereignty, came to see its governance of Bengal as the primary foundation upon which the British Empire in Asia would sit[14]. This perception by the Company was substantiated by the fact that it believed that it should be "*... authorised, by Law, to entertain, regulate, and direct military force, equal to the acquisition and defence of the British Province in India…*"[15]. Hence, the vaguely worded expectations of Parliament granted the Company the official responsibility as imperial guarantor in India while it remained a joint-stock corporation. Such responsibility meant that the Company came to view the growth and further encroachment of its fiscal-military administration as a necessity if it and Britain's interests were to weather the trials and crises of Empire. Thus, the East India Company, as an aggrandising fiscal-military state in Ben-

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[13] "Letter Dated 29 March 1774" K. D. Bhargava and R. P. Patwardhan (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VII: 1773-1776* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 49; Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Volume II: New Continents and Changing Values* (London: Longmans, 1952): 49.
[14] Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 5; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*, 256-257; J. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers*, 49-50.
[15] John Bruce, *Review of the Military History of the Honourable East India Company arising out the Political Circumstances of Hindostan and of the French Schemes of acquiring Territories in India from 1744 to 1795/6*, BL, IOR/H/91a, 5-6.

gal and the Indian subcontinent, met its newfound imperial responsibilities by intensifying its administration of violence in their judicial, political and martial contexts.

Despite the aggrandisement of territory and the intensification of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration, the *East India Regulating Act* had a measure of success in that it did oblige, although subtly and in no way directly force, the Company, post 1773, to reconceptualise the way violence was instrumentalised. It was particularly true in the context of the trials and crises of Empire where the Company, and Britain at large, came to conceive of violence as an instrument of socio-economic regulation complementing that of conquest. As historian Tirthankar Roy points out, the use of violence by the Company during the 1770s and 1780s was primarily rooted and prompted by a desire to limit Parliament's ability to intervene[16]. In his memorandum, Brigadier General Robert Gordon believed that Parliament, by way of the Supreme Council of Bengal would be lacking any grounds of intervention if the Company ensured peace, stability and security across India, but particularly in Bengal[17]. Specifically, he argued "*That the first Article, immediately restoring Peace, is perfectly consistent with the Spirit and Tenor of Colonel Upton's instructions…*"[18] Alternatively, the Company interpreted its fiscal-military administration of violence as wholly legitimate and cohesive with the expectations laid out by Parliament concerning imperial governance. Expressly, it would, in theory, guarantee the survival of the Empire in India while enabling the Company to continue the conduct of its 'corpocratic' affairs with sovereign authority. However, in the context of the crises of Empire, the

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[16] Tirthankar Roy, "Rethinking the Origins of British India: State Formation and the Military Fiscal Undertaking in an Eighteenth-Century World Region" *Modern Asian Studies* 47, No. 4 (2013): 1137-1138.
[17] Brigadier General Robert Gordon, "Letter Dated 1 March 1776" (Fort George, Bombay: 1776): 1-4 *First Maratha War*, BL, IOR/H/240:1773-1783, 153-155.
[18] Gordon, "Letter Dated 1 March 1776" *First Maratha War*, 153.

East India Company's self-legitimising interpretation of the *Regulating Act* proved to be a self-perpetuating conundrum for itself, Parliament and at large, and for imperial governance in 'British India'.

The gradual replacement of the Mughal constitution with a hybridised and indigenised set of British principles of governance articulated in the *Regulating Act* effectively adapted and re-adapted India's socioeconomic, judiciary, political and martial norms to facilitate its control, regulation and ultimately, exploitation of Indian society[19]. Or, put another way, the *Regulating Act* created a politico-legal framework by which the East India Company could claim its fiscal-military behaviour and attitudes as legitimate in that they assured imperial stability in India. In the context of imperial crisis, this administrative logic proved to be satisfactory — and self-righteous — in so far that it could claim to merely be defending the Empire while also justifying its 'corpocratic' conduct. Hence, the Company's 'fiscal-military hybridity' reinforced the pre-existing duality between its imperial role and 'corpocratic' objectives. In particular, such a hybridity was simultaneously dependent on the interdependent relationship existing between the Company and Indian elites concerning fiscal and military matters[20]. As Gerald J. Bryant argues, this was particularly true for Bengal as it was widely seen as being the wealthiest of the Company's possessions, and therefore expected to bear the antes of the British Empire in India[21]. However,

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[19] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 53.

[20] For a discussion on the matter of 'fiscal-military hybridity', see Pradeep Barua, "Military Developments in India, 1750-1850" *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 58, 1994; Douglas M. Peers, "Gunpowder Empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, Hybridity, and the Political Economy of Colonial India, circa 1757-1860" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, No. 2, 2007; Douglas M. Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule, 1700-1885* (Harlow: Pearsons Education, 2006); Kaushik Roy, "Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849" *The Journal of Military History* 69, No. 3, 2005; Kaushik Roy, "The Hybrid Military Establishment of the East India Company in South Asia: 1750–1849" *Journal of Global History* 6, 2011; Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011); T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*.

[21] Gerald J. Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013): 222-225.

in the context of the imperial crises of the 1770s and 1780s, the self-intended logic by which the Company operated its fiscal-military state in Bengal and India proved to be a double-edged sword for both the East India Company and Parliament. Moreover, it would prove that the primary lacuna of the *Regulating Act* lay in its divergent interpretation of its objectives and means by which these had to be achieved.

Parliament believed that holding the East India Company responsible and accountable would see it reform and repurpose its administration of the presidencies in a way that would effectively root out both excesses and corruption, and thereafter ensure "*... the preservation of peace throughout India, and to the security of the possessions and revenues of the Company.*"[22]. At first, the Company justifiably interpreted the Act as a means by which it would be subordinated to Parliamentary authority. However, because of the vagueness and ambiguity of the Act, the Company was ultimately able to reinterpret and subsequently recontextualise the objectives and means laid out by Parliament. In particular, the Company came to reinterpret and reintegrate Parliament's idea of limiting violence and the use of it to achieve Company interests, and adopt it only where it served as a socio-economic and political regulator and stabiliser, with the expectation that it would become part of a broader grand imperial strategy.[23]. As Bryant explains, the Company believed in a 'proactive defence' that ensured socioeconomic and political consolidation and regulation[24]. Such a stance was reflected by the Company concerning the war against the Maratha where it argued "*... the preservation of peace, does in effect make the best provision for carrying on war with success whenever the injustice or ambition of any of the Indian powers*

[22] "Letter Dated 29 March 1776" Bhargava and Patwardhan (eds.), *Volume VII*, 49; Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 33-34.
[23] Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 223.
[24] Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India*, 222-223.

may oblige us to engage in it."[25] Hence, the Company firmly believed and therefore strenuously argued, that the wars it fought were only meant to ensure the stability required to maintain the British Empire in India. The Company had indeed used the context of imperial crises as a means not only to reinterpret the purpose and objectives of the *Regulating Act* but more importantly, the bounds of its authority, legitimacy and sovereignty in the role of Britain's sole Indian intermediary. However, and as it will be seen, the Company chose to interpret that the *Regulating Act* had effectively vested it with the responsibility of Empire in Bengal, and in India as a whole. Alongside this failure to grasp the key reasons why Parliament indeed sought to reform its fiscal-military behaviour and attitudes, the East India Company's subsequent conduct in the 1770s would ultimately set the stage for *Pitt's India Act* in 1784[26].

In conclusion, the *Regulating Act* failed to produce what Lord North and Parliament had hoped would be the fiscal-military and political stability of India, but particularly Bengal. As P. J. Marshall noted and is generally accepted, the Act's failure stemmed primarily from the internal divisions and the overall ambiguity surrounding the Parliament's authoritative capacity over the East India Company[27]. This wilfully 'self-interested' interpretation enabled the Company to reinterpret its role and both the authority and sovereignty it had as Parliament's intermediary in India. However, it must be noted that the Company's decision to redefine and reinterpret its imperial role and responsibilities, as emboldened or coerced as it might have been to do so, emanate not only from the ambiguity of the Act's wording, but also from the circumstances and context

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[25] "Letter Dated 20 July 1776" K. D. Bhargava and R. P. Patwardhan (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VII: 1773-1776* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 428.
[26] Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire* 110-111.
[27] Marshall, *The Problems of Empire*, 39.

surrounding its enactment. Specifically, the Act had called for what can essentially be viewed as a curbing of imperial expansion in India. Hence, because of the superfluous nature and interpretation of the text, it enabled the Company to create and maintain a self-legitimising and self-perpetuating fiscal-military administration that would later serve as the basis of the British Empire in India. Thus, the failure of the *Regulating Act* had the unintended, opposite, and paradoxical consequence of vesting the Company's fiscal-military administration with the imperial responsibility of preparing India to become the Crown Jewel of the British Empire[28]. Nevertheless, contemporaries did not view in such a Whiggish fashion. Instead, they viewed the reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence as an ideological and philosophical revision of imperial governance and sovereignty. Moreover, contemporaries perceived it as reforming the nature of Empire.

The Fiscal-Military Trials of the First Anglo-Maratha War, 1775-1782

The origins of the First Anglo-Maratha War were strikingly similar to the earlier conflicts the East India Company had fought against Indian powers during the 1750s and 1760s to establish its politico-military preeminence across Bengal and the subcontinent. As Douglas M. Peers notes, this meant that with the Company's assumption of power and its growing imperial role from the 1760s onwards, it became far more likely to be involved in Indian affairs, and political intrigue, as it had been the case with the First Anglo-Mysore War[29]. The origins of the First Anglo-Maratha War were similar. Its primary point of contention did not emerge in Bengal or its

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[28] Bankey B. Misra, *The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773-1834* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959): 18-22.
[29] Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule*, 26, 30.

frontiers, but rather north of the Company's Bombay Presidency, on Sashti Island[30]. The island was strategically important because of its proximity to the mainland as well as potential trade and taxation revenue. However, Sashti Island was a Maratha possession. Nevertheless, it did not preclude the Company from making an attempt in acquiring the island as it considered "*that Salset and Basseen, with their Dependencis and the Maratta proportion of the Surat Revenues.*" and therefore essential to its revenue in western India[31]. In 1774, the *Peshwa* of the Maratha Empire, Raghunathrao Bhat was ousted by the regents of Sawai Madhav Rao[32]. Seeing an opportunity, and without the consent of Hastings and the Supreme Council of Bengal's approval, the Bombay Presidency signed the Treaty of Surat in 1775 whereby it offered its military support in reinstating Raghunathrao Bhat in exchange for Sashti Island. The Act as explained by a Company dispatch clearly indicated that such actions were "*As it is now become unlawful for the Presidents and Councils of our other settlements to make peace or war with any Indian powers, conclude any treaties with such powers…*"[33] As historian M. R. Kantak explains, it meant that the Presidency had acted outside of the parameters set by the *Regulating Act* and, in the eyes of Hastings and the Supreme Council, the Treaty of Surat, therefore, constituted a declaration of war on the part of Bombay against the Maratha Confederacy[34]. Following the ratification of the

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[30] Kantak. *The First Anglo-Maratha War*, 24.
[31] "Letter Dated 20 July 1776" Bhargava and Patwardhan (eds.), *Volume VII*, 427.
[32] Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War*, 29-31; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 107; For a discussion on the matter, see Examiner's Office, East India Company, "First Marratta War 1773" *First Maratha War*, BL, IOR/H/240:1773-1783, 237-305.
[33] "Letter Dated 29 March 1776" Bhargava and Patwardhan (eds.), *Volume VII*, 49-50.
[34] East India Company, Instructions from the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the East-Indies, to the Governor-General and Council of Fort-William, in Bengal, BL, General Reference Collection, DRT Digital Store, 8022.h.25 (London: 1774): 3; Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War*, 55-56.

Treaty of Purandar in 1776, the East India Company, and Bengal were drawn into a conflict originating from a Maratha successional vendetta[35].

However, the imperial context of the late 1770s provided Bombay, and more importantly, Warren Hastings, pressured by internal factions of the East India Company who sought to expand their possessions, with entirely justifiable and legitimate grounds on which to renew hostilities. In particular, French intriguing with the chief regent, Nana Phadnavis, incited Hastings to authorise resumption of the war in 1775[36]. The second act of the First Anglo-Maratha War was characterised by a clash between European and Indian methods of war. Moreover, as Kantak notes, it was a clash of civilisations pitting the feudally centralised military organisation of the Marathas and its confederacy against the Company's modern fiscal-military administration[37]. Because of the feudal nature of the Maratha's military organisation, the Company found itself having to fight numerous vassals of the Maratha Confederacy, and this not only in and around Bombay and Sashti Island but across the Deccan Plateau and along the fringes of Bengal in Orissa. Although it is hard to pinpoint the precise number of troops the Confederacy could mobilise, and this because of its sheer size, it was initially able to field cavalry and infantry armies reaching at least 30,000 and 60,000 soldiers, respectively, and thus, represented a formidable threat to the East

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[35] Negotiated between Colonel Thomas Upton, official representative of the East India Company sent by Hastings, and Nana Phadnavis, Chief of the regents of Sawai Madhav Rao, the Treaty of Purandar saw the East India Company's pensioning of Raghunathrao Bhat and the recognition of Sawai Madhav Rao as rightful Peshwa of the Maratha Empire. Furthermore, the Maratha accepted not to recognise the French in India. In exchange, the Company's claims over Sashti were recognised, and they would receive 12 lakh rupees from the Pune Government. Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War*, 55-56; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 107.

[36] Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India*, 272; Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A* History (London: Longman, 1993): 113; Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule*, 40-41.

[37] Barua, *Military Developments in India*, 604-605; Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War*, 5.

India Company[38]. This threat was exacerbated by the fact that the Confederacy had been able to secure an additional 5.7 million pounds of rights from the decaying Mughal Empire[39].

The Marathas, like the Mysoreans, had successfully integrated the long-range and mobile principles of Indo-Afghan and Persian warfare with the elementary principles of Europe's military revolution and therefore were able to withstand the East India Company[40]. Just as Mysore had achieved between 1766 and 1769, the Marathas' overwhelming numbers and use of guerrilla tactics successfully disrupted the Company's ability to conduct European styled military operations. Combined with the persistent and ominous reports of a potential alliance between the Marathas, Mysoreans and various other Indian States to eject the British from the subcontinent as a whole, the Company was effectively coerced into capitulating[41]. Similarly to that of the First Anglo-Mysore War, the war's outcome should have incited the Company to redress the military training of its armies and the doctrinal principles by which they conducted operations. Moreover, the war should have signalled to the Company the pressing need to reconceptualise its fiscal-military administration and address its overwhelming reliance upon violence. Yet, because of its interpretation of the *Regulating Act*, the Company believed that the regulation, stability and eventual prosperity of the Company in India was only attainable through a 'proactive defence'[42]. In particular, the Leadenhall Street insisted:

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[38] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 107-108.
[39] Rajat Kanta Ray, "Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1818" in Peter J. Marshall (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 508-529; Douglas M. Peers, "Gunpowder Empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, Hybridity, and the Political Economy of Colonial India, circa 1757-1860" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, No. 2 (2007): 254.
[40] Jos Gommans, "Indian Warfare and Afghan Inovation During the Eighteenth Century" *Studies in History* 11, No. 2 (1995): 279.
[41] Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 244-246; Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War*, 205.
[42] Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India*, 222-223.

> *... that noting but a vigorous and successful prosecution of War will produce an honourable termination of it. With this declaration before us, we deem it absolutely incumbent upon us to direct, in the strongest terms, that measures be forthwith adopted for the reestablishment of Peace between the Marattas and the Company; and also with all other Indian Powers, with whom the Company are present engaged in War.*[43]

Simply put, it meant that the Company, in its self-legitimising and self-perpetuating interpretation of the *Regulating Act*, employed violence as an instrument of conquest. They did so despite being cognisant of Parliament's demand for a limited, responsible and accountable dispensation of violence. Therefore, notwithstanding its capitulation to the Maratha Confederacy, the East India Company's interpretation of parliamentary oversight and the broader imperial issues of crises in the Atlantic served only to reassure and strengthen its assertions on the necessity of pursuing an intensification and aggrandisement of its fiscal-military administration in India, and pointedly Bengal.

Yet, how did the East India Company's interpretation of its capitulation during the First Anglo-Maratha War mean for its fiscal-military administration of Bengal? From a purely militaristic perspective, the Company interpreted the Treaty of Salbai as a capitulation. However, aside from its imposing size, which was bolstered by its confederal organisation and its cavalry, the Marathas administrative, doctrinal and tactical conduct of military operations proved to be inferior in every way when compared to those of the Company[44]. Moreover, the Company's successful use of European technology and tactics combined its ability to field numerous, and well-disciplined *sepoy* armies had proven the superiority of its fiscal-military administration[45]. In oth-

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[43] "Letter Dated 30 April 1782" Cyril H. Philips and Bankey B. Misra (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence: Volume XV: Foreign and Secret, 1782-1786* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1963): 5
[44] Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War*, 222-223.
[45] Barua, *Military Developments in India*, 607; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishmen*t, 199-200.

er words, the Company did not interpret its capitulation as a result of the bellicose behaviour and attitudes of its fiscal-military administration, but instead of its need to further grow in size and ability to conduct 'proactive defence' against any entity proving threatening to the stability, prosperity and survival of the Empire. Company correspondence reveal that this attitude was steadfast and it justified and required the need to "*... field all the force you possibly can, and if you deem it necessary, to levy a Body of fresh Sepoys for the Duty and defence of your own garrisons...*"[46]. Therefore, the war provided a pretext by which "*... conquest, honor and acquisition of Revenue and influence in the first state of India...*" became a justifiable and legitimate pursuit by the Company as it all but ensured the consolidation of 'British India'[47]. Moreover, in the context of imperial crises and the East India Company's interpretation of its role as the guarantor of Empire in India, effectively persuaded it of the need to pursue an intensification and aggrandisement of its fiscal-military administration across its three presidencies, but specifically Bengal.

From an administrative perspective, the East India Company's decision to implement an increasingly robust and encroaching fiscal-military state in Bengal, and India as a whole had a hybridising, indigenising and professionalising effect upon its administration of violence. In a diary entry of 1779, Brigadier-General John Carnac noted "*That in justice to the Troops, both Europeans and Sepoys, they with pleasure declare, that they behaved with the utmost intrepidity and alacrity during the whole attack...*" in what reflects the Company's ability to discipline its increasingly hybridised and indigenised armies[48]. This was tacitly reflected in the Company's use

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[46] Fort William, "Letter Dated 7 March 1776" (Fort William, Calcutta: 1776): 3-4 *First Maratha War*, BL, IOR/H/240:1773-1783, 201-202.
[47] Bengal Secret Consignment "Letter Date 5 October 1775 to Colonel Thomas Upton" (Fort William, Calcutta: 1775) *First Maratha War*, BL, IOR/H/240:1773-1783, 70-71.
[48] John Carnac, "Diary Entry, 13 January 1779" (1779): 39-40 *First Maratha War*, BL, IOR/H/240:1773-1783, 385-386

of violence in revenue collection and control. As Company officials noted, the hybridity and cohesion amongst European and *Sepoys* instilled a sense of professionalism and loyalty and thus, indirectly, but effectively created as seen in Carnac's diary entry, an *esprit de corps* necessary in the fiscal-military administration of Bengal, and India at large[49]. Thus, the hybridised and indigenised *sepoy* armies of the Company underpinned the various socio-cultural as well as doctrinal and military processes distinguishing them as a unique fighting force on the subcontinent. More specifically, it was understood that the Company's use of hybrid armies proved to be useful and necessary in the conduct of its increasingly aggressive intervention in Indian affairs[50]. Overall, it viewed the process of hybridisation and indigenisation as successful in so far that it proved to inculcate a sense of professionalisation and duty within its armies. Accordingly, from an administrative point of view, the process vindicated the East India Company's decision to pursue robust and expansionist fiscal-military administration over its possessions and their frontiers.

The East India Company's interpretation of the First Anglo-Maratha War proved similar to preceding wars against India powers, namely the Kingdom of Mysore between 1766 and 1769. However, in the aftermath of the *Regulating Act* and the imperial crises that emerged during the 1770s and 1780s, the war spawned a new self-supporting and self-perpetuating fiscal-military rationale based on the Company's interpretation of these aforementioned imperial circumstances. For the Company, in the broader context of imperial crises, the war had indeed legitimised its pursuit of a fiscal-military administration, and its role as the Empire's intermediary in India. Such an attitude was reflected by a memoranda describing Parliament's expectations as a "...

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[49] "Letter Dated 27 March 1779" (1779) *First Maratha War*, BL, IOR/H/240:1773-1783, 447-455.
[50] "Draught of Report on Bombay Affairs" (1780): 1-15 *First Maratha War*, BL, IOR/H/240:1773-1783, 339-353.

paradox, to those only who were ignorant of the events and circumstances which required such military force, or of the acts of legislature…"[51] From a Company perspective, these processes were not only symbiotic but more importantly, mutually inclusive. Combined with the processes of hybridisation and indigenisation, the Company's self-referential logic and understanding of the politico-legal framework of Empire became increasingly unassailable, as historian Philip Lawson notes[52]. Hence, the First Anglo-Maratha War perpetuated in the Company's mindset the necessity of leading a 'proactive defence' and this, despite the financial woes it potentially spelt for the Empire at large[53]. By doing so, the circumstantial interpretation of the war perpetuated an ominous pattern whereby the Company's conduct of the business of Empire could hardly be held accountable and responsible by Parliament. Broadly put, the Anglo-Maratha War of 1775 to 1782 effectively set the East India Company on an inevitable warpath with the Kingdom of Mysore, and the inescapable intervention in 1784 by what had become an increasingly outraged Parliament.

The Fiscal-Military Trials of the Second Anglo-Mysore War, 1780-1784

French intervention in the American Revolutionary War and the ensuing global contest for imperial supremacy effectively embodied a sequel to the Seven Years' War[54]. Thus, as it had been the case between 1756 and 1763, India, and specifically the Carnatic and Bengal, proved yet again, to be decisive battlegrounds in which the East India Company, because of its growing

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[51] John Bruce, "Review of the Military History of the Honble. East India Company arising out of the political circumstances of Hindostan and of the French Schemes of acquiring Territories in India from 1744 to 1795/6." 1796, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/91a, British Library, 6.
[52] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 114.
[53] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 122.
[54] Hamish M. Scott, *British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution* (London: Clarendon Press, 1990).

imperial role and responsibility, found itself inextricably drawn. The Company justifiably interpreted French political and fiscal-military aid to Haider Ali as part of France's broader imperial designs over India, and therefore justified the resumption of hostilities with Mysore[55]. However, since 1769, and in part because of French assistance, Haider Ali was able, by way of an intensive process of Europeanisation, to coordinate and consolidate its extensive set of subsidiary alliances in an increasingly centralised fiscal-military state capable of fielding expansive and well trained armies[56]. Moreover, a 1781 report by Lieutenant-General Eyre Coote described Haider Ali's soldiers as exemplary by European standards "*As the Behaviour of the Officers and the Men has been such as deserve my highest Commendation.*"[57] Embodying what is arguably the first hybridised and Europeanised Indian fiscal-military state, Mysore presented a new and severe threat to an obstinate East India Company who refused to address the shortcomings of its own fiscal-military administration, and specifically the training and doctrinal principles concerning the conduct of its military operations.

As historian Raymond Callahan notes, the most significant shortfall of the East India Company's armies during the Second Anglo-Mysore War was its infantry-centric armies and lack of a dependable cavalry of its own in comparison with Mysore and the Marathas[58]. Hence, the Company's armies found themselves yet again unable to rival Indian mobility on the battlefield This, as Coote noted, meant that the enemy, because of its superior mobility, was able to over-

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[55] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 77-78; For a discussion on the matter of French patterns of aid to Indian states and their use of subsidiary alliances, see Shelford Bidwell, *Swords For Hire: European Mercenaries in Eighteenth Century India* (London: John Murrary Publishers, 1971); Donald C. Wellington, *French East India companies: A historical account and record of trade* (Allentown, PA.: Hamilton Books, 2006)
[56] Barua, *Military Developments in India*, 601-602; Peers, *India Under Colonial* Rule, 26; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis* 668-669.
[57] Eyre Coote, "Letter Dated 27 September 1781" *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 81.
[58] Raymond Callahan, *The East India Company and Army Reform, 1783,1798* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1972): 4-6

whelm the Company's troops as "*... the Enemy Cavalry at the same time marching towards us in large Bodies to cause a Diversion...*" and by overwhelming his troops, prevented them from supporting one another[59]. Thus, it was no surprise that early on, Haider Ali made extensive use of some 20,000 cavalrymen to disrupt the Company's lines of communication and encircle any Company forces, while some of his 20,000 infantrymen and 15,000 peons laid siege to isolated British strongpoints[60]. Yet, more frightening for the Company was the Mysoreans' ability to effectively coordinate their cavalry and their artillery to decimate tightly grouped Company *sepoys* during engagements such as it was the case at the battle of Pollilur in 1780. There, Lieutenant-Colonel William Baillie's troops were surrounded by Mysorean cavalry and effectively isolated from Major-General Hector Munro's troops sent to reinforce his positions. They were decimated by Haider Ali's rocket artillery[61]. Baillie was taken prisoner alongside 7,000 of his soldiers in what was until then, the Company's most significant defeat[62]. Indeed, the Battle of Pollilur not only revealed the East India Company's tactical and doctrinal limitations but more broadly and importantly, it had exposed its progressive fiscal-military sclerosis and its subsequently onerous position on the battle battlefield.

The East India Company proved able to recoup the majority of its early losses because of Lieutenant-General Coote's campaign in the Carnatic and Bengal's fiscal-military assistance to Madras and Bombay. Thereafter, the three Presidencies coordinated a three-pronged offensive against Mysore[63]. However, as the American Revolutionary War ended in 1783, the Anglo-

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[59] Eyre Coote, "Letter Dated 22 August 1781" *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 49-50
[60] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 83.
[61] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 84-85. For a discussion and vividly engrossing description of the Battle of Pollilur and its immediate aftermath, see Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 251-256.
[62] Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 256.
[63] Callahan, *Army Reform*, 3.

French rivalry for imperial supremacy diminished and the French consequently ceased their support to Haider Ali. Thus, having reached a politico-military stalemate, the impetus for British and Mysoreans to pursue hostilities all but faded. Moreover, Mysore was now also at war with the Marathas and the Nizam of Hyderabad. The war had laid waste across to large swathes of Southern India and the Company's territories ravaged after peasant producers had either been killed or evicted by Haider Ali's advancing armies[64]. Consequently, the Company's revenues were severely depleted as the war had essentially created a wasteland from the frontiers of the territories under its direct control as well as those of Mysore. As Coote explained, "*... under such Circumstances, be absolutely impossible for me to take the responsibility of, leading troops invariably exposed to ruin and destruction.*"[65] This, alongside the dismay following the Battle of Pollilur, the Battle of Tanjore and the Battle of Caleroon River, which despite smaller losses, confirmed the Company's tactical and doctrinal ineptitudes and limitations when faced with a hybridised and Europeanised enemy. The *status quo ante bellum* was the only judicious outcome of the conflict and was thus realised following the ratification of the Treaty of Mangalore in March of 1784[66]. Hence, the Second Anglo-Mysore War did little in terms of fiscal-military gains for the Company. However, in the Indian contexts of 1783 and 1784, the war had far broader implications for the East India Company's fiscal-military administration in Bengal.

In March 1784, the Treaty of Mangalore effectively marked the end of the third war the East India Company had been embroiled in since 1765. In those conflicts the Company had been

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[64] Eyre Coote "Letter Dated 30 September 1781" *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 85-89; Eyre Coote "Letter Dated 10 October 1781" (Alamancherry: 1781) *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 97-100; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 83
[65] Coote "Letter Dated 10 October 1781" *Second Mysore War*, 98.
[66] Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 318-319.

successfully defied, if not beaten, by Indian powers. However, in the broader imperial contexts of the 1770s and 1780s, and in the eyes of British parliamentarians and the public alike, the Company's fiscal-military mismanagement also imperilled the British Empire. Its defeat to the Marathas and subsequent near defeat by Haider Ali had, in Parliament's eyes, endangered and jeopardised the British Empire's ability to subsist altogether. The simultaneous loss of the American Colonies compounded Parliamentary challenges. Specifically, Parliament became increasingly wary of the Company's inability to repay its loans and feared that it might cause yet another war in India[67]. Their fears were justified, for Lieutenant-General Coote's account of the devastation laid by the war, and the Company's inability to extract revenue despite resorting to increasingly violent coercion was ominous. Indeed, he noted that "*I consider the security of our possession in Bengal as the object which claims our attention, being the vital support of the interests of the nation and the Company in every other part of India.*"[68]. In other words, Parliament became increasingly concerned by the Company's inability to conduct and manage the business of Empire, especially at a point in time where the Empire was in already in its practical sense transmuted on the subcontinent, and more importantly in the process of an ideological and philosophical transmutation to India. Hence, the Second Anglo-Mysore War had displayed the contextual and circumstantial limitations of the *Regulating Act* and therefore, effectively coerced Parliament to regulate the East India Company.

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[67] For a discussion on the matter of the East India Company's debt, see Huw V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757-1773* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking*; Sutherland. *The East India Company*

[68] Eyre Coote "Letter Dated 16 October 1781" (Alamancherry: 1781) *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 109-110; Eyre Coote "Letter Dated 20 October 1781" (Alamancherry: 1781) *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 113-114.

What did the East India Company's failure to defeat the Kingdom of Mysore during the Second Anglo-Mysore War and Parliament's interpretation of these events mean for its fiscal-military administration? As Raymond Callahan points out, the fiscal-military capacity of the Company had proven far more limited and sclerotic than previously believed[69]. Primarily, it proved the shortsighted and unsustainable nature of the Company's pursuit of an increasingly robust and expansionist fiscal-military administration. Anchored in the self-legitimising and self-perpetuating interpretation the *Regulating Act*, the Company became increasingly reliant on the dispensation of violence as an instrument of conquest to meet its imperial and 'corpocratic' obligations. By 1780, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Company had failed to address the dereliction of duty in its fiscal-military administration that set it on a path of self-destruction with far broader imperial implications. In 1782, the Governor of Madras, George Macartney, described the situation of the Company as facing "*Many Enemies, few resources, an impoverished treasury; a threatened Famine; An invader whom repeated victories over him do not enable Us to expel. The possibility of a combined hostile fleet on these seas; the likelihood of a union between Indians and Europeans…*"[70] Hence, the Company's conduct had not only imperilled the preservation of 'British India', but more importantly, imperilled the transmutation of the British Empire from the Atlantic to India in the aftermath of the American Revolutionary War. Thus, following the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Mysore, it became increasingly clear to Parliament that the *Regulating Act* had failed. In particular, it had effectively failed to submit the Company to Parliamentarian authority and expectations embodied in reforming the fiscal-mili-

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[69] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 60; Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1798*, 42.
[70] George Macartney, "Letter Dated 30 September 1781" (Fort St. George, Madras, 1781) "Second Mysore War." 1782, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/246:1781-1782, British Library, 331.

tary administration which was supposed to adopt a sense of responsibility and accountability that ensured socioeconomic and political regulation, stability, security and eventually, prosperous survival. Parliament, therefore, had to resort to a forceful intervention and subordination of the East India Company's interests by *Pitt's India Act* of 1784.

Parliament's Second Trial of the East India Company's Fiscal Military Administration, 1784

Although political opposition to the East India Company's conduct of the Second Anglo-Mysore War was nowhere near that of the American War in the early 1780s, demands for a responsible and accountable imperial administration grew as both the tax burden and the national debt reached unprecedented levels[71]. Nevertheless, with the loss of the American Colonies in 1783 and the increasingly dire state of the Company's affairs in India pessimism grew about the Empire's growth. Thus, it became evident that the growing discernment stemmed from the imperial discontinuities surrounding the exercise of governance, justice and violence in the context of Parliament's growing expectation of the Company's fiscal-military administration of Bengal. As Robert Travers explains, this meant that both Pitt and Parliament quickly realised the necessity of addressing these discontinuities for Bengal, and India at large, constituted the nucleus on which the British Empire would reconstruct its ideological, philosophical and practical principles[72]. Specifically, it had to contend with the Company's corrupt and violent trading practices, its unsupervised dalliances with politico-military expansions and intervention across India, its subsequently wretched finances and increasingly pervasive intrusion in Parliament by way of

[71] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 84; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*, 369.
[72] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 25-26.

Nabobs[73]. However, and more importantly, Pitt's government had to subordinate the Company to Parliament's oversight and subsequently rid it of its self-serving and self-interested interpretation of fiscal-military administration. In the first instance, this meant that the *Regulating Act* of 1773 had to be repealed and replaced with an increasingly radical, forceful and direct regulation that would subordinate the East India Company's affairs to Parliament's authority and sovereignty.

In order to successfully bring an end to the East India Company's increasingly dubious and rogue conduct as imperial administrator of India, *Pitt's India Act* had to inculcate a sense economic, judicial and martial responsibility and imputability. It did so with the introduction of two measures. First, the Act introduced a Board of Control, otherwise known as the *India Board*. Through the appointment of six privy counsellors including both the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the *India Board* oversaw the interest of both Parliament and the Company in India[74]. Therefore, the *India Board* effectively served as the means by which to secure Parliament's direct influence and control of the Company's governance of India. Secondly, and although the Board already ensured the Governor-General's allegiance and direct accountability to Parliament by way of its appointment process, the Act vested the role with considerable prerogatives in an increasingly narrow scope[75]. Expressly, as Philip Lawson explains, alongside the significantly and increasingly extensive powers granted in matters of diplomacy, revenue and military, the Governor-General was vested with the authority to veto any decision taken by Bombay or Madras[76].

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[73] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 125; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 217.
[74] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 124; Cyril H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784-1834* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1940): 41; John A. Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy: The East India Company, c. 1757-1825* (London: Routledge, 2017): 149.
[75] Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule*, 36; Philips, *The East India Company*, 57.
[76] Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 206; Lawson, *The East India Company*, 124.

Complementary in nature, these measures enabled Parliament to have direct and immediate oversight as well as control over the Company's administration and governance of Bengal and its other possessions in India. Nevertheless, in a sense, it can be argued that the Act's unquestionable subordination of the Company enabled Pitt and Parliament to have sufficient ideological, philosophical and practical leeway to inculcate a degree of responsibility and accountability by way of reforms to the fiscal-military administration of violence. Hence, and as C. A. Bayly argues, the Act asserted Parliament's designs over an administrative consolidation that served as a continuation of British territorial and imperial expansion that had until then, been under the auspices of the East India Company[77]. In other words, *Pitt's India Act* enabled Parliament to assert its authority and sovereignty over what had effectively become the British Empire.

From a military perspective, both Pitt and Parliament deemed the East India Company singularly unfit and unlikely able to redress the management of its fiscal-military administration of violence and address its consequences[78]. Moreover, in part because of its unwillingness to acknowledge and address tactical and doctrinal shortcomings and despite their discipline, its armies had proven inadequate when facing a hybridised and Europeanised rival such as the Marathas and Mysoreans[79]. And as Kaushik Roy points out, by the end of the eighteenth-century, the frequency with which Indian states adopted varied forms of hybridised and Europeanised fiscal-military tendencies increased quite drastically[80]. Hence, it became increasingly apparent by the 1780s that the Company's military required a major overhaul if it were to ensure the security and survival of the British Empire in India. Whereas *Pitt's India Act* did not immediately address mil-

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[77] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76-77.
[78] Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 193; Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire*, 214-215.
[79] Callahan, *Army Reform*, 42-43.
[80] Bayly, *Indian* Society, 79; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis in South Asia*, 660.

itary reform, the aforementioned leeway it offered enabled Pitt and his acolyte, Henry Dundas to reform the East India Company's armies to inculcate professionalism, responsibility and accountability through a reconceptualisation of the fiscal-military administration of violence.

Pitt and Dundas' reform of the East India Company's armies mirrored their interpretation of India's role as the nexus of the British Empire[81]. Since 1783 and in an increasingly paternalistic fashion, Parliament had interpreted India's, and specifically Bengals' role as that of the cornerstone on which a post 1783 British Empire would rest. However, the Company's armies had until then essentially been the antithesis of responsibility and accountability, and the key reason as for the dire circumstances the Company faced in India. Hence, it was not only financially debilitating that Bengal was protected and administered by two armies of which one had pillaged and sacked the subcontinent, but from a practical and philosophical standpoint, the idea of martial governance was inconceivable[82]. For example, a revealing report by Lieutenant-General Clavering noted in 1777 "*... An Officer in Capt. Brownes Battalion of Sepoys [...] had dispossessed a farmer of the revenue...*" and when discovered, the officer in question received no punishment[83]. In another instance, the Nawab Wallajah Bahauder described that he had:

> *... drained the very Dregs of Misery and your Lordship had forced upon me the bitter Draught, and after such suffering is your Lordship surprised that I should use the Language of ones indignation and resentment to explain my Injuries and procure Justice from the English Nation.*[84]

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[81] Callahan, *Army Reform*, 46.
[82] Callahan, *Army Reform*, 51.
[83] John Clavering, "Letter Dated 11 February 1777" (Fort William, Calcutta: 1777) *Army Reforms Instituted By Sir Eyre Coote*, BL, IOR/Z/E/4/A268, 243-250.
[84] Wallajah Bahauder, "Letter Dated 1 December 1783" "East Indies Series 97." 1784, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/189:1781-1784, British Library, 460.

Thus, it was increasingly clear that East India Company's armies were used to assert its ever-increasing despotic fiscal-military administrative tendencies.

Therefore, and as historian Raymond Callahan explains, the East India Company's European units would be incorporated in the British Army while *sepoy* battalions would be reorganised along British military principles and used in India alone, and this all the while their officers would hold a King's commission[85]. Pragmatically, the reform effectively subordinated the Company's armies to those of the Crown in an effort to curb the former's despotic and inherently corrupt and violent tendencies. Moreover, Parliament was confident "*... that the number* (of troops) *now going out are necessary to kept up in addition to the force actually there.*" and this would not only ensure the superintending powers of Parliament by way of the *India Board* over revenue but furthermore ensure the Company's financial and political accountability to the former[86]. By insisting that "*Whenever it becomes necessary to oversee the Army of any of the Presidencies, beyond what is settled for the Peace Establishment, no Alterations must take place in the proportion of officers settled for the different Corps of the Presidency...*", the military reforms ensured a continuous oversight on the part of Royal Officers[87]. Parliament, therefore, believed that subordinating the Company's military authority to that of the Crown would inculcate a sense of discipline and professionalism within the Company's armies. Specifically, the Act anticipated that its renewed sense of martial discipline and professionalism would imbue a patriotic and perhaps institutional culture opposed to corruption and despotic tendencies[88]. Hence, Pitt and

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[85] Callahan, *Army Reform*, 51.
[86] Lord Sidney, "Letter Dated 11 February 1788" (London: 1788) *Proceeding relative to sending of four of His Majesty's regiments to India*, BL, IOR/MIL/17/1/2134:1788, 33-40.
[87] Major General Archibald Campbell, "Plan of the Establishment for the Indian Army" *Military establishments in India 1785*, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/361:1781-1785, British Library, 229-230.
[88] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 24-25.

Dundas' reform of the East India Company's armies sought to concurrently address despotic fiscal-military administrative tendencies and the dire state of imperial affairs in Bengal and India altogether. This was to be accomplished after 1784 through a series of reforms aimed at the professionalisation and rationalisation of the administration of violence.

Although the reforms to the doctrine, structure, tactics and recruit of the East India Company's armies, and therefore its ability to dispense violence echeloned themselves throughout the remainder of the eighteenth and nineteenth century as British Empire in India evolved, *Pitt's India Act* had provided Parliament with long-lasting authoritarian assertion of its sovereignty and subordination of imperial governance in India. This was achieved by the adaptability of the Act's wording that provided Parliament with a margin of interpretation to exert its authority and expectations onto the Company. Notwithstanding limitations imposed on the number of His Majesty's troops the Company had to accept and the revenue they could use, these troops embodied Parliament's direct and immediate authority in commandeering Bengal and Indian affairs[89]. Moreover, this sense of martial discipline and professionalism that gradually seeped through the Company's armies precipitated a reconceptualisation of violence and its role in the conduct of the British Empire's fiscal-military administration of Bengal, and over time, India altogether. However, the success of *Pitt's India Act*'s reforms to the Company's conduct of martial affairs was also reliant on its ability to reinterpret and reform administrative principles from an ideological, philosophical and practical standpoint as to facilitate fiscal-military administration. In particular,

[89] Callahan, *Army Reform*, 96-97.

the hybridisation of British and Indian notions of governance became central in the efforts to consolidate British imperial governance in India[90].

The success of the military reforms set out by *Pitt's India Act* was partially dependent on its contemporary ideological, philosophical and practical reinterpretation of the administrative principles of the realities the East India Company's fiscal-military state faced in Bengal. Ultimately, it relied on Parliament's ability to hybridise and imbue Indian politico-legal and socioeconomic norms with British conceptions of governance. Thus, and unsurprisingly, the Act was in part inspired by Pittite reform programme and ensured the protection of private property[91]. Thus, it provided a basis on which the Company could draw numerous parallels between Indian and British society. Moreover, it enabled the reconfiguration of Indian society on the grounds of British politico-legal and socioeconomic conceptualisations and interpretations. As Ranajit Guha explains, this logic became indispensable to Parliament's efforts since, in theory, it would preclude Asiatic despotism through a series of legal and administrative reforms that would imitate Britain's physiocracy and consequently mould, hierarchise and Anglicise Indian society[92]. Parliament believed that the local politico-economic authority and influence provided by landownership would incentivise *zamindars* to curb despotic tendencies and instead encourage their collaboration with British Officials, and thereafter effectively reconfigure itself a caste capable of

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[90] For a discussion on the matter of British imperial governance and its hybridisation, see Travers, *Ideology and Empire*.

[91] For a recent discussion of the contributing political combinations of these events, see Richard Connors and Ben J. Gilding, "Hereditary Guardians of the Nation? The House of Lords and the East India Company in the Age of the American Revolution" Richard A. Gaunt and D. W. Hayton (eds.), *Peers and Politics, c. 1650-1850: Essays of Clyve Jones* (Oxford: Willey Blackwells, 2020): 159-189; J. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers*, 56-57.

[92] Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of the Permanent Settlement* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995): 161; For a discussion on asiatic despotism and its preclusion through the hybrid Anglo-Mughal political and legal system, see Robert Travers. *Ideology and Empire.*

socioeconomic regulation[93]. Thus, Parliament was effectively referencing and ensuring Indian continuities in a British ideological, philosophical and practical politico-legal as well as the socioeconomic interpretive context that enabled the emergence of a new and more pacific and accountable regime in Bengal and India. From an administrative perspective, *Pitt's India Act* provided the East India Company with a reconceptualised, and more importantly, Anglicised interpretation of Indian economic, judicial and social norms to guide its fiscal-military administration.

How did *Pitt's India Act* influence the Company's dispensation and exercise of violence? In practice, and as historian Jon E. Wilson notes, it meant that the introduction of new directives by Parliament by way of the new Governor General Lord Cornwallis in 1786. Cornwallis sought to introduce a system and order that effectively precluded the Company from disorder or misrule[94]. Hence, *Pitt's India Act* and subsequent reforms established that the legitimacy of the Company's fiscal-military administration of Bengal and India altogether, lay in the progressive narrative of a hybrid Anglo-Mughal constitution that stemmed from Parliament's interpretation of imperial responsibility and accountability[95]. Indeed, it meant that Parliament's increasingly hybridised interpretation and conceptualisation of Indian and imperial affairs generated an ideological, philosophical and practical framework legitimising the East India Company's fiscal-military administration.

The importance of *Pitt's India Act* lays in its ability to simultaneously provide Parliament with an increasingly assertive but yet, adaptable interpretation of the East India Company's im-

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[93] Christopher A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaar: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1997): 20-21.
[94] J. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers*, 45.
[95] Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal*, 21; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 25.

perial and fiscal-military role in Bengal[96]. By expressly shifting the politico-legal legitimacy of imperial governance in the fluidity of a progressive narrative of a hybrid Anglo-Mughal constitution, Parliament reduced the Company's ability to produce a self-legitimising and self-perpetuating framework justifying what was now seen as despotic governance[97]. Thus, as Philip Lawson explains, the Act sought to prevent the emergence of misrule and more importantly, mismanagement of the business of Empire by regulating diplomacy and Indian affairs responsibly as Parliament expected[98]. As Thomas Kingscoke explained in 1783, the local military officers "*... is to attend to the welfare of the inhabitants without any deviation and all representations concerning good, or bad conduct - will be attended too [...] He is to take care to prevent Robberies and Theft on the Road, and will punish such as may Hurt or Molest the inhabitants and travellers.*"[99] Hence, the Act effectively put the ideological, philosophical and practical framework by which imperial governance in India was to be legitimately conducted and regulated by Parliamentary oversight going forward. Simply put, it ensured Parliament's vision and version of the British Empire in India. However, and more importantly, *Pitt's India Act* reflects the broader imperial circumstances caused in part by the Company's fiscal-military administration of violence. Indeed, it reflected the urgency in 1784 and thereafter, to continuously reform the East India Company's administration in so far that it would preclude it from routinely utilising violence as an instrument of conquest, and instead use it as a mechanism of socioeconomic control and regulation ensuring the survival and consolidation of the British Empire in India[100].

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[96] Huw V. Bowen, *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 78-79.
[97] Gopalan and Pettigrew (eds.), *Essays on the Anglo-India Connection*, 3.
[98] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 128.
[99] Thomas Kingscoke, "Letter Dated 1783" "East Indies Series 97." 1784, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/189:1781-1784, British Library 688-690.
[100] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 128; Rorabacher, *Land, Revenue and Policy*, 151.

The Impeachment Trial of Warren Hastings and the East India Company's Fiscal-Military Administration of Bengal, 1788

Arising from the imperial crises of the 1770s and 1780s, the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings was Parliament's prosecution of the East India Company's fiscal-military blundering of the business of Empire in Bengal and across India. Moreover, it can also be seen as a trial on the capacities of the fiscal-military administration of violence in the governance of the British Empire. Although the Hastings trial might have stemmed from the moral duty Parliament felt apropos its Indian subjects following their abuse and usurpation by the Company; its primary role sought to assert the basis and principles on which India ought to be governed following the loss of the American Colonies[101]. Thus, the trial served a dual purpose in simultaneously seeking to consolidate the Empire's interpretation and perception of fiscal-military administration and the role it had in imperial governance. Hence, the impeachment of Hastings served in a way to assert Parliament's *Pitt's India Act* and its authority over Indian affairs following the crises of Empire[102]. Additionally, it served as another instrument to demonstrate and substantiate the needfulness of changing the East India Company's administrative conduct by way of the inculcation of responsibility and accountability in its imperial governance of Bengal and India altogether.

Simultaneously embodying Whig imperial ideology and the guiding principles in Charles James Fox's failed East India Bill of 1783, Edmund Burke led the prosecution of Warren Hastings. Despite redrafting, twenty of the twenty-two charges brought against Hastings by Burke,

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[101] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 128 ; Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 57.
[102] Peter J. Marshall, *The Impeachment of Warren Hastings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965): 15; Rorabacher, *Land, Revenue and Policy*, 232.

were accepted and passed by Parliament[103]. Vast in nature, the charges brought against Hastings touched upon his prosecution of the Company's military affairs, the conduct of political affairs, revenue and judiciary policy, and lastly, the responsibility of its fiscal policies[104]. Although important in their legal precedent, the significance of the charges presented by Burke lays in their condemnation of Hastings governance of 'British India'. Burke held Hastings responsible and accountable for virtually squandering the foundations of the British Empire in India[105]. However, Burke's views originated from his ideological interpretation of imperial circumstances surrounding the East India Company's crises of Empire in India. Nevertheless, Hastings defence effectively countered Burke's arguments.

As Travers notes, Hastings based his defence in sociopolitical, judicial and constitutional continuities and discontinuities as a means to justify his use of violence[106]. This was particularly true considering the charges brought against him surrounding the quelling of the Benares Rebellion in 1781. Hastings explained that following the refusal of the vassal of the Benares Zamindari, Chait Singh, to contribute to the Company's war effort amidst the Anglo-Maratha in 1778, "*... extraordinary means were necessary, and those exerted with a strong hand, to preserve the Company's interests from sinking under the accumulated weight which oppressed them.*"[107]. In a prime example of its interpretation of 'proactive defence', Hastings believed the incorporation of

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[103] Marshall, *The Impeachment*, xvi-xv.
[104] For a discussion and analysis on the entirety of the charges laid against Warren Hastings by Edmund Burke and Parliament, see Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 307-333; Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Peter J. Marshall, *The Impeachment*.
[105] Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 310 ; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 223.
[106] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 223.
[107] Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire*: 100-10; Warren Hastings, *A narrative of the insurrection which happened in the zemeedary of Benaris in August 1781, and of the transaction of the Governor-General in that District: with the Appendix of Authentic Papers and Affidavits* (Roorkee: 1853) BL, IOR.V.27/281/1:1853, 12; Marshall, *The Impeachment*, 88-90, 131.

Benares in the Company's territories to be necessary as to ensure its stability, prosperity and subsequent survival[108]. Hastings defence effectively lay in the interpretation of his role and responsibility as Governor-General. Britons generally accepted the fact that imperial governance in India required 'non' British governance. Accordingly, these nuanced interpretation of the role of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence within the broader framework of imperial governance can therefore broadly explain both the length and Hastings' eventual acquittal in 1795[109].

When it comes to the East India Company's fiscal-military administration, the importance of the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings is that it revealed an overwhelming reliance upon the extrajudicial dispensation and exercise of violence on the part of Company officials and servants. Specifically, the trial came to shape imperial attitudes in Britain, and moreover, attitudes surrounding the use and the role violence had in the governance of the Empire[110]. Alongside the presentation of cases similar to that of the tax farmer Raja Debi Singh who extorted illegal taxes through the torture of the population, the Company's involvement in the Rohilla War of 1773-1774, and participation in the subsequent genocide even by contemporary standard confirmed the violent abuses and usurpations of indigenous power in India under Hastings governorship[111]. As historians Huw V. Bowen and William Dalrymple recently noted, British outrage and horror at the litany of abuses committed under the Company's auspices certainly shifted the nar-

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[108] Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India*, 222-223.
[109] For a discussion on Warren Hastings acquittal all charges and the ideological, philosophical and legal implications of the trial, see Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2006); For a more measured analysis, also see Peter J. Marshall, *The Impeachment of Warren Hastings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965)
[110] Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule*, 36-37.
[111] Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire*, 313-315; Gerald J. Bryant, "Pacification of the Early British Raj, 1755-85" *Journal of the Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 14, No. 1 (1985): 7.

rative surrounding the administration and exercise of violence from one of necessity to one of despotism[112]. Burke had, therefore, forcefully confronted Britons with the harsh realities of the Company's fiscal-military administration of Bengal. Specifically, it meant that not only should Hastings be tried for is behaviour, but more importantly, the administration of violence had to be examined and judged on the grounds of Britain's national character being undermined by the Company's despotic behaviour[113]. Indeed, this effectively enabled Burke and Parliament to pose themselves guarantor of Empire, and, therefore, reform the Company's rule into British imperium and remedy the nation's moral character[114]. Thus, by confronting Britain with the realities of the East India Company's fiscal-militarism and its extrajudicial dispensation and exercise of violence, Parliament had successfully raised the necessity of reforming the administration of violence and thereafter serve as the authority ultimately responsible for the regulation of Indian affairs.

Although the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings ultimately served as an instrument to legitimise *Pitt's India Act* and any subsequent Parliamentary intervention in the East India Company's affairs, a significant feature of its feat was its recontextualisation and reconceptualisation of what violence meant within the Empire. In practice, the Hastings trial had effectively enforced the idea that the Company's fiscal-military administration of violence and imperial role indeed came with both responsibility and an accountability to both Parliament and Britons. Thus, by 1788, responsibility and accountability became synonymous with Parliament's imperial definition of survival which in turn happened to be grounded in the principles of socio-economic pros-

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[112] Bowen, *The Business of Empire*, 17; Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 310.
[113] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 217-218.
[114] Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire*, 314; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 13.

perity and stability. Lord Cornwallis's introduction of a regime based on order, regulation and the dispensation of justice instead of disorder and misrule confirmed Parliament's steeping influence over imperial governance in 'British India'[115]. Concretely, it meant that violence was administered in an increasingly precise fashion meant to ensure the regulation, stability, preservation and prosperity of the British Empire in India. Thus, the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings marked an essential and conclusive ideological transformation of the Company's principles surrounding the fiscal-military administration of Bengal. In particular, and although it did not immediately alter the situation, it did change the framework by which the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence was expected to abide.

Conclusion

In the context of the imperial crises between 1773 and 1788, the East India Company's self-interested and self-serving interpretation of Lord North's *Regulating Act* seeped its imperial role and responsibilities with an inherently corrupt and violent fiscal-military administration of Bengal and India as a whole. Specifically, its self-legitimising and self-perpetuating interpretation of the Act had yielded a simultaneous intensification and aggrandisement of its fiscal-military administration but also its reliance upon violence and, rather ironically, Parliamentary interventionism. As the previous pages revealed, the increasingly hybridised and Europeanised nature of warfare during the conflicts against Maratha Confederacy and Kingdom of Mysore displayed the sclerosis of its fiscal-military administration. Nevertheless, in the dire context of the American Revolutionary War and the ensuing renewal of the Anglo-French rivalry for imperial su-

[115] J. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers*, 45.

premacy, the Company's inability to bring a successful closure to its increasingly expansive and expensive wars placed what was becoming the nucleus of Empire in an increasingly dubious fiscal-military and political position. The precariousness of the imperial situation subsequently coerced Parliament to intervene in the East India Company's conduct of the fiscal-military administration of Bengal which now served as a basis for the ideological, philosophical and practical reformation of the British Empire[116].

More importantly, these reforms generated polemical debate surrounding the place of violence in the nature of British imperial governance. In an era where administrative consolidation served as a continuation of territorial conquest and expansion, the nature of violence and its fiscal-military administration was consequently bound to undergo a reconceptualisation that reflected Parliamentary expectations[117]. Indeed, through *Pitt's India Act*, the East India Company's ability to exert politico-legal authority and legitimacy, violence and its fiscal-military capacities were effectively reconceptualised. The fiscal-military administration of violence was theoretically thereafter permeated with a sense of responsibility and accountability which was subordinated to Parliament's increasingly assertive authority and sovereignty over imperial governance. Thus, by reconceptualising and reinterpreting the fiscal-military administration of the three Presidencies, *Pitt's India Act* had effectively precluded the East India Company of having any pretext for war without Parliament's approval[118]. Therefore, Parliament had laid the foundations that would, in theory, ensure the maintenance of authority and good governance in 'British India'.

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[116] Marshall, *The Impeachment*, 15; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 24-25.
[117] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76-77.
[118] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 128; Rorabacher, *Land, Revenue and Policy*, 151.

THREE

Hybridisation and Indigenisation: The Gradual Reform of the East India Company's Martial Rule, 1765-1788

Beginning in 1788, the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings all but confirmed Parliamentary expectations of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of Bengal and what was to become, 'British India'. Compounded by the increasingly plenipotentiary measures it had respectively passed in 1773 and 1784 through the *Regulating Act* and *Pitt's India Act*, Parliament had effectively sought to bring the Company completely under its authority. It did so by realigning the Company's fiscal-military administrative conduct with the emerging Parliamentary perceptions on the nature of imperial governance. Inspired by the tenets of an accountable, imputable and responsible administration capable of consolidating the processes of British imperial expansion, these same emerging perceptions were the products of the crises and problems of Empire[1]. As P. J. Marshall notes, the Company's conduct in Bengal and across India exacerbated the ideological, philosophical and practical crises the British Empire faced during the American Revolutionary War[2]. Despite maintaining territories and by making moderate gains, the Company's campaigns against the Mysoreans and Maratha had nevertheless proven disastrous from a socio-economic, political and military standpoint. Depopulated by these conflicts, vast swathes of the Indian subcontinent lay in ruins and, therefore, left the Company devoid of tax revenue[3].

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[1] Christopher A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 76-77; Peter J. Marshall, *Problems of Empire: Britain and India, 1757-1812* (London: George Allen and Uwin Ltd., 1968): 33-34.
[2] Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 35-37.
[3] Eyre Coote "Letter Dated 30 September 1781" *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 85-89; Eyre Coote "Letter Dated 10 October 1781" (Alamancherry: 1781) *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 97-100; Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011): 83.

Yet, more ominously, these wars had displayed the sclerosis gripping the Company's fiscal-military administration and consequently limiting its capacity to govern Bengal and India as Parliament expected[4]. In other words, following the loss of the American Colonies, the Company's behaviour effectively threatened the foundations of 'British India', and, therefore, the Empire itself[5]. Accordingly, Parliament felt compelled to reform the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and sought to temper its dependence on violence.

Parliament was aware that the dispensation of violence was an integral element not only to the East India Company's fiscal-military administration, but of imperial governance for that matter. Hence, throughout the period, Parliament sought to guide, and eventually impose in 1773 and 1784 upon the Company what it deemed an appropriate framework by which it could administer the necessary coercion required to govern Bengal and India. Imbued with the Parliament's emerging expectations of imperial governance, these reforms held the Company's administration of violence and fiscal-militarism to a growing sense of accountability and responsibility. These, goals, as seen in this chapter, were expected to have a transformational effect on the administration of 'British India'. In particular, Parliament anticipated that the reforms of the administration of violence would theoretically ensure socioeconomic and political stability that would translate itself into relative peace and prosperity. Alternatively, it eliminated or at the very least limited the grievances created by the East India Company's inherently corrupt, indiscriminate and debilitating administration of violence which was a root cause of both the Company's, and the British

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[4] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 60; Raymond Callahan, *The East India Company Army Reform, 1783-1798* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1972): 42.
[5] Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 24.

State's imperial crises of the 1770s and 1780s. In turn, these reforms, with their hybridising and indigenising characteristics, ultimately sought to preserve and develop 'British India'.

The origins of the hybridising and indigenising characteristics permeating the reforms surrounding the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and the nature of British imperial governance originated from their respective experiences of the Bengal Revolution[6]. As historians Bernard S. Cohn and Maya Jasanoff explain, the second half of the eighteenth-century, and in particular the period from 1770 to 1785 when the British began to appropriate Indian vocabularies, marked a period where the Company developed mechanisms and institutions of governance that relied on indigenous collaboration[7]. Through this collaborative rule, the British were able to construct composite identities sequentially casting and facilitating their rule of Indian society[8]. With a growing, and albeit orientalist understanding and knowledge of Indian societal norms, the Company reconfigured the latter as to mirror the precepts of English civil society and, therefore, serve as instruments of rule. In other words, the hybridisation and indigenisation of the Company's institutions of governance enabled a degree of efficiency and legitimacy to its fiscal-military administration. This was particularly true when it came to the politico-judicial legitimacy of the Company's dispensation of violence, and the administration of violence itself[9]. Hence, hybridity and indigenisation complemented, sustained and ultimately, coalesced the Company's fiscal-military organisational and technical superiority. Thus, through hybridisation and indigeni-

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[6] For a discussion of the East India Company's hybrid fiscal-military administration, see Chapter 2, pages 65-66.
[7] Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British In India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 20-21; Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850* (New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 2005): 47.
[8] Kathleen Wilson, *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire 1660-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 7.
[9] Elizabeth Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 30-32; John A. Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy: The East India Company c. 1757-1825* (London: Routledge, 2017): 290; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 69-70.

sation, it was believed that the East India Company's administration of violence could be adapted to meet the tenets of accountability, imputability and responsibility found in Parliament's emerging expectations of imperial governance.

Covering the period from 1765 to 1788, this chapter casts light upon the formal and informal implications of these processes for Britons and Indians alike, but also for the nature of British imperial governance. The first part of the chapter examines the military implications of the European hybridity of the Mysoreans. Similarly, the second part explores the implications of the Europeanisation on the Marathas military. Then, the third part considers how the East India Company came to contend with the hybridity of the Mysoreans and the Marathas fiscal-military reforms. Thereafter, the fourth part analyses the consequences of the hybrid and indigenous reconceptualisation of the Company's administration of violence on the Indian polities and how it ultimately enabled the British to consolidate political influence and power on the subcontinent. Finally, the fifth part of this chapter examines the politico-military implications of the fractured Indian society and how the Company reconfigured it based on the principles of modern English civil society. Hence, this chapter examines these processes through the gradual reform of the East India Company's administration from an instrument of conquest to that of socioeconomic and political control. Nevertheless, and more broadly, this process reflects an equally gradual and significant reconceptualisation of British imperial governance. Therefore, this chapter serves to highlight the compounding effects and implications of the hybridisation and indigenisation of violence and its administration in the creation of 'British India'.

The Europeanisation and Hybridisation of Mysore's Fiscal-Militarism

The East India Company's acquisition of the *diwani* in 1765 also precipitated the genesis of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan's efforts to centralise Mysore's fiscal-military capacities along broad European principles. Specifically, it was the growing threat arising from the influence and territorial expansion of the Company's subsidiary alliances with the *Nawab* of Arcot and the *Nizam* of Hyderabad that incited the rulers of Mysore to undertake the process of Europeanisation and hybridisation of its troops and its fiscal-military apparatus[10]. Thus, the First and Second Anglo-Mysore Wars of 1766-1769 and 1780-1784 respectively served as an impetus for the changes that enabled the Kingdom to resist the Company's fiscal-military hegemony until 1799. However, Mysore's alliance with the French facilitated the process. As historians Shelford Bidwell and Kaushik Roy note, the French had provided Haider Ali with advisors and instructors such as Joseph François Dupleix ever since the 1740s and 1750s and had effectively trained some 400 loyal *sepoys*[11]. The French did not only provide Mysoreans with valuable fiscal-military doctrine, but more importantly, and ultimately, they helped Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan to consolidate their authoritative influence and grasp over the Kingdom through their various alliances and channels of power.[12]. This marked the first efforts on the part of an Indian state to construct a centralised fiscal-military apparatus. Specifically, by cultivating what can now be de-

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[10] Pradeep Barua, "Military Developments in India, 1750-1850" *The Journal of Military History* 58, No. 4, October 1994, 600-601; Gerald J. Bryant, "Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India" *The Journal of Military History* 68, No. 2 (April, 2004): 437.

[11] Barua, *Military Developments*, 601 ; Shelford Bidwell, *Swords For Hire: European Mercenaries in Eighteenth Century India* (London: John Murray Publishers, 1971): 11-12; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 71; For a detailed account of French uses of subsidiary alliances in India and of their inner workings, see Francois Joseph Ruggiu, "India and the Reshaping of the French Colonial Policy (1759-1789)" *Itinerario* 35, No. 2 (2011); Donald C. Wellington, *French East India Companies: A Historical Account and Record of Trade* (Allentown, PA.: Hamilton Books, 2006)

[12] Christopher A. Bayly, "Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India" *Modern Asian Studies* 27, No. 1 (1993): 17, 22; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 71.

scribed as a cult of personality anchored in ethno-cultural and religious principles, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan pacified the 'tribal' zones on the fringes of the Kingdom and thereafter created an artificially homogenous society[13]. In other words, the militarisation, Europeanisation and hybridisation of the Mysorean Crown served as the foundation on which both Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan constructed a fiscal-military state akin to the one built by the British[14]. Hence, and more broadly, this process underlines the necessity for the East India Company and Mysoreans alike to reconceptualise their administration of violence in order to retain socioeconomic and political authority during the exponential growth of warfare and fiscal-militarism that marked the Indian subcontinent from 1765 onwards.

Like the East India Company and the Marathas, Mysore understood the interdependent nature of fiscal and military capacities[15]. Thus, from the early 1760s onwards, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan recast socioeconomic and military relations in what was the second developmental phase of Mysore's European-like fiscal-militarism. Partly inspired by Wodeyar state's fiscal-military reforms, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan's own reforms sought to blend indigenous fiscal-military reforms with French and British fiscal-military principles[16]. From a fiscal standpoint, Mysore had an advantage, the luxury of an increasingly diverse set of socioeconomic opportunities that could bankroll part of their expanding military apparatus. Mainly, the vast majority of Mysore's commercial activities centred specifically on agricultural, animal and mineral re-

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[13] Christopher A. Bayly, "The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance: India, 1750-1820" in, Lawrence Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London: Routledge, 1994): 335-336; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 74.
[14] Aron Graham and Patrick Walsh (eds.), *The British Fiscal-Military State, 1660-c.1783* (London: Routledge, 2016)
[15] Tirthankar Roy, "Rethinking the Origins of British India: State Formation and Fiscal-Military Undertakings in an Eighteenth Century World Region" *Modern Asian Studies* 47, No. 4, 2013, 1131-1132.
[16] Douglas M. Peers, "Gunpowder Empires and Garrison State: Modernity, Hybridity, and the Political Economy of Colonial India, circa 1750-1860" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, No. 2 (2007): 253.

sources[17]. However, these commercial activities remained dwarfed by the land revenue that generated the vast majority of Mysore's revenue. Covering some 80,000 square miles inhabited by some six million individuals, Mysore, could on average, generate Rs.23.7 million or some £2.1 million[18]. By appointing his revenue collectors, redistributing lands of absentee landlords and implementing tax remissions for planters cultivating certain cash crops while simultaneously putting an end to granting *jagirs* to his officers, Tipu Sultan's reforms effectively accentuated Mysore's capacity to generate revenue[19]. Physiocratic in nature, these culminating reforms enabled Mysore to establish the fiscal capacities required to pursue its military interests. In other words, Mysore emulated the East India Company's fiscal-military reorganisation and mobilisation of socioeconomic resources as a means to counter its influence and aggression[20].

Ultimately, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan's socioeconomic and fiscal reforms allowed Mysore to introduce broad military reforms loosely based on the East India Company's fiscal-militarism. The sophistication of the Mysorean land revenue system, as well as the banking and legal infrastructure, enabled the Kingdom to mobilise increasingly large standing armies[21]. The creation of standing armies marked an important departure in patterns of Indian warfare. Until then, Indian armies were primarily composed of peasants, or irregular soldiers, as well as mercenaries, and, therefore, received little in the way of regular pay. Yet, the reforms to the Mysorean

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[17] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 72, 76.
[18] Lakshmi Subramanian, *Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion. Bombay, Surat and the West Coast* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 317; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 74-75.
[19] Mohammad Moienuddin, "Role of Tipu Sultan in the Progress of Mysore State" in Annirudah Ray (ed.), *Tipu Sultan and his Age: A Collection of Seminar Papers* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 2002): 25, in Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011): 75-76.
[20] Bayly, "The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance" Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War* 336; Peter J. Marshall, "Britain without America; A Second Empire?" in Peter J. Marshall (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 576-595.
[21] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 253.

fiscal apparatus enabled it to provide its soldiers with a semi-regular cash salary who until then had been paid through booties[22]. Thus, Mysore's introduction of a salary for its soldiers ensured a certain degree of allegiance and retention reinforcing its ability to maintain standing armies similar to those of the Company. For example, during the First Anglo-Mysore War, Haider Ali mobilised some 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers[23]. In comparison, by the end of the Second Anglo-Mysore War in 1783, the Kingdom fielded an overwhelming force of 144,000 regular troops and some 180,000 militiamen[24]. Moreover, the French had pledged "*... 300 Pieces of Cannon for Hyder on the fleet. 60 mortars in one ship and the shells in another and near 5000 men including 1000 officers and some 300 sepoys from Mauritius.*"[25] According to the historian Gerald J. Bryant, such an overwhelming force enabled the Mysoreans and Marathas alike to strategically neutralise the Company's armies[26]. Alternatively, Mysore's ability to finance professional standing armies highlights its gradual implementation of a hybridised and indigenised European fiscal-military apparatus in India. More importantly, it demonstrates Mysore's capacity to reconceptualise socioeconomic mobilisation and organisation to contend with the military realities generated by the East India Company.

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[22] Francis Buchanan, "Tipu Sultan as a Modernizer: A Contemporary British Critic" Irfan Habib (ed.), *Resistance and Modernization under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan* (Delhi: Tulika, 1999): 125, in Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011): 75.

[23] *The History of Haider Shah, Alias Hyder Ali Khan Bahadur: and Son Tippoo Sultan, by M.M.D.L.T. General in the army of the Mughal Empire*, revised and corrected by His Highness Prince Gholam Mohammed the only surviving son of Tippoo Sultan (1855: reprint, Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1976): 157-58, in Pradeep Barua "Military Developments in India, 1750-1850" *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 58, 1994, 601.

[24] *The History of Haider Shah, Alias Hyder Ali Khan Bahadur: and Son Tippoo Sultan, by M.M.D.L.T. General in the army of the Mughal Empire*, revised and corrected by His Highness Prince Gholam Mohammed the only surviving son of Tippoo Sultan (1855: reprint, Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1976): 31-32, in Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011): 79.

[25] E. Fallofield, "Letter Dated 6 March 1782" (Cuddalore: 1782) *Second Mysore War 1782,* India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, British Library, 393-394

[26] Bryant, Asymmetric Warfare 463-464, 468.

Despite overwhelming the East India Company's armies by 10 to 1 at times, Mysorean armies sustained heavy casualties because of their inability to effectively counter European discipline, doctrine and technical superiority[27]. Hence, Mysore quickly came to realise that to counter the Company's *sepoys*, it had to address its soldiers' disciplinary, doctrinal and technical weaknesses. The solution lay in its ability to enlist French advisors, Company deserters and various other foreign mercenaries. Combined with its fiscal reforms and socioeconomic reorganisation, European advisors enabled Mysore to undertake and finance vast military reforms resulting in the professionalisation of Mysorean soldiers and the improvement of their weaponry.[28]. In particular, advisors such as Dupleix established units modelled and operated along European standards[29]. These units effectively incorporated European doctrinal and technical organisation with indigenous conduct of warfare. In other words, the European hybridity of the Mysorean armies enabled them to properly field and employ Western military hardware to address the lapses they had when compared to the Company's *sepoy* armies[30]. Mysorean artillery is an example of such effective hybridity. With French expertise, *bans*, traditional Indian rocket artillery, were modernised with iron casting instead of bamboo[31]. Yet, and perhaps more importantly, it was under French guidance that Mysoreans began to concentrate the *bans*' firepower with devastating effectiveness as proven during the Battle of Pollilur in 1780[32]. Hence, Mysoreans reforms and their

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[27] Gerald J. Bryant, "Indigenous Mercenaries in the Service of European Imperialists: The Case of the Sepoys in the Early British Indian Army, 1750-1800" *War In History* 7, No. 1 (January 2000): 5; Jos Gommans, "Indian Warfare and Afghan Inovation During the Eighteenth Century" *Studies in History* 11, No. 2 (1995): 261; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1128; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 82.
[28] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 253; Kaushik Roy, "The Hybrid Military Establishment of the East India Company in South Asia: 1750–1849" *Journal of Global History* 6, (2011): 200.
[29] Barua, *Military Developments*, 601; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 213.
[30] K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 213.
[31] K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 201-202.
[32] Barua, *Military Developments*, 601, 603; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 202; For a detailed account of the Battle of Pollilur, see William Dalrymple, *The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of Empire*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2019): 251-256.

successes encapsulate indigenous military abilities to counter the Company following Europeanisation and hybridisation of their capacities. Specifically, the centralising reforms made to the Mysorean fiscal apparatus enabled it to transform its feudal military organisation into a modern fiscal-military state able to rival the Company[33]. Hence, it was not so much a technological revolution as it was a doctrinal and organisational adaption of its martial structures. Alternatively, Europeanised military hybridity ultimately enabled Mysore to compete with the emerging realities wrought by the East India Company's expanding fiscal-military administration.

Nevertheless, how did the Mysorean's Europeanised military hybridity translate itself in battle against the East India Company? Traditionally, the Mysorean armies consisted of irregular cavalry, otherwise known as light cavalry[34]. Like its European counterparts, light Mysorean cavalry was characterised by its capacity to travel relatively lightly, as having an inherent lack of officers and having to rely on foraging and plunder to sustain themselves[35]. Although they proved efficient when raiding the Company's possessions and its troops, their lack of officers and heavier equipment remained a deficiency in the eyes of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan. As historians Pradeep Barua and Kaushik Roy explain, the doctrinal, organisational and structural reforms introduced by the French addressed these shortcomings by training officers according to European standards and instituting a heavier, regular cavalry corps alongside the traditional irregular light cavalry[36]. The introduction of trained officers in the Mysorean chain of command had two beneficial effects. In a first instance, it allowed Mysorean troops, mainly the cavalry, to effectively

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[33] Barua, *Military Developments*, 615; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 214; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1149.
[34] Barua, *Military Developments*, 601; Gerald J. Bryant, "The Cavalry Problem in the Early British Indian Army, 1750-1785 *War In History* 2, No. 1 (March, 1995): 14.
[35] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 439-440, 463.
[36] Barua, *Military Developments*, 601-602; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 80.

coordinate increasingly long-range guerrilla raids onto revenue-bearing villages deep inside East India Company's territories in the Carnatic and Bengal[37].

Yet, these officers proved to be far more beneficial during engagements with the East India Company's armies. Mysorean officers were keenly aware of the fact that the Company's *sepoy* armies would defeat them in an open pitch battle. Therefore, and secondly, Mysorean officers aptly avoided being drawn into such engagements, and this they did to preserve the effectiveness and mobility of their cavalry[38]. Combined with the Company's lack of cavalry, Mysorean commanders deftly retained the advantage of mobility which ultimately enabled them to dictate the pace and character of the first two Anglo-Mysorean conflicts[39]. For instance, Eyre Coote described the Mysorean's ability to effectively isolate British armies and forts with large bodies of cavalry as decisive as "*... Hyder will in all probability continue to Managiment of this part of the Country.*"[40] Hence, French Europeanisation and hybridisation of Mysore's military enabled it to resist and to coerce the Company into seeking peace on two separate occasions. As Coote explained in a 1781 letter "*In short, neither you nor I can perform impossibilities, and we must submit to the miserable situation of the Times, which I have experienced longer than I hope your lordship.*"[41] More broadly, the success of the processes of military hybridity allowed it to blend long-range mobile principles of Indo-Afghan and Persian warfare with European doctrinal, or-

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[37] Bayly, *Knowing the Country*, 29 ; Gerald J. Bryant, "Pacification in the early British Raj, 1755-1785" *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 14, No 1. (1985): 15-16; Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 14; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 197.
[38] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 456-457; Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 16; Bryant, *Indigenous Mercenaries*, 5.
[39] Barua, *Military Developments*, 604.
[40] Eyre Coote, "Letter Dated 22 August 1781" *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 49-50; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 83.
[41] Eyre Coote, "Letter Dated 12 September 1781" (Tripassore: 1781) *Second Mysore War*, BL, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, 69.

ganisational and technical principles[42]. In particular, French assistance enabled Mysore to effectively merge mobility and firepower in an effort to exploit the East India Company's lack of a dependable cavalry[43]. These hybridising strategies addressed Mysorean fiscal-military shortcomings that arose in the face of the Company's expansion following the Battle of Plassey in 1757. Specifically, the aforementioned processes of European hybridity meant Mysore could replicate the East India Company's patterns of fiscal-militarism and, at times, threaten what was to become 'British India'.

Despite its capacity to implement hybridised fiscal-military structures similar to the East India Company's, Mysore's efforts would ultimately collapse. As Pradeep Barua notes, Mysore transitioned from a feudal based system of polities to a full-fledged fiscal-military state in little less than thirty years in order to counter the Company's expansion[44]. In order to accomplish this, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan had to enforce drastic socioeconomic reforms. Notwithstanding their initial successes, the scope of these reforms proved to be short-sighted as they did not provide the necessary long-term solvency required to sustain capital intensive European fiscal-military regimes[45]. Furthermore, Mysore's limited ability to generate revenue ultimately prevented it from financing its fiscal-military apparatus. Therefore, Mysore found itself unable to keep up with the Company's ability to generate increased revenue from its expansive territorial acquisition. In other words, the Company's extensive network of subsidiary alliances enabled it to starve Mysore from any further revenue, and therefore, gradually and effectively limited the Kingdom's

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[42] Gommans, *Indian Warfare*, 279.
[43] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1798*, 4-6
[44] Barua, *Military Developments*, 614.
[45] Kaushik Roy, "Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849" *The Journal of Military History* 69, No. 3 (2005): 668; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1149.

fiscal-military capabilities[46]. As such, it enabled the Company to gradually fiscally and militarily overwhelm Mysore's increasingly dispossessed state, and ultimately defeat it by 1799. Hence, Mysore's defeat was not the result of a lacklustre performance on the part of its troops. Instead, Mysore's defeat in 1799 is the result of the East India Company's administrative and bureaucratic superiority that had the ability to maintain a robust, efficient and consistently expansive fiscal-military regime capable of an overwhelming and enduring response to the threats posed by enemies such as the Mysoreans[47].

The Europeanisation and Hybridisation of the Maratha's Fiscal-Militarism

Similarly to Mysore, the Maratha Confederacy came to see the East India Company's territorial annexations and expansive revenue as a growing threat, and this despite its adoption of elementary aspects of European fiscal-militarism before the rise of British power on the subcontinent[48]. Alternatively, the Marathas were preoccupied with their loss of land revenue to the Company. As historian Stewart Gordon explains, this concern derived from the fact that the Marathas remained a rudimentarily feudal and tributary fiscal-military state undergoing a progressive sophistication ever since the 1730s.[49] Inherited from the Mughals, these characteristics had been administratively and militarily consolidated by the Marathas as to assert their political and territorial independence[50]. Specifically, it was the confederacy's organisation into five distinct chieftainships that allowed it to consolidate its authority over Maharashtra and into what is

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[46] Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 18.
[47] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 254-256; Douglas M. Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule, 1700-1885* (Harlow: Pearsons Education, 2006): 38, 40.
[48] Barua, *Military Developments*, 607, 613; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 200.
[49] Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, And State Formation in Eighteenth-Century India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 32, 138.
[50] Bayly, "The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance" in Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War*', 336; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 133, 158.

now Uttar Pradesh and Rajastan[51]. However, despite centrifugal tendencies, the nature of the confederacies meant that the Marathas ultimately preserved their tributary characteristics, making it similar to a centralised fiscal-military state. In other words, the Marathas institutionalised and regimented the tributary nature of the Mughal rule. Therefore, from the 1760s onwards, the Maratha fiscal-military state was, in a sense, hybrid. It meant the Marathas integrated elementary aspects of European fiscal-militarism to the feudal tributary nature of Mughal rule in order to create a hybridised fiscal-military apparatus. Accordingly, by not submitting themselves to a central governmental authority like the Mughals and therefore being "*... the only nation of note now existing under the dominion of Hindoo princes.*" the Maratha's loosely federated and harmonised fiscal-military confederacy rendered it difficult to dismantle[52]. Thus, it enabled the Marathas to routinely threaten and ultimately encouraged Parliament to overtake and frame the hybridisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and its dispensation of violence.

Unlike the Mysorean, the Marathas never undertook broad reforms to improve and refine their fiscal capacities. However, that is not to say that they were not aware of the important interdependence existing between the development of fiscal and military capacities[53]. Instead, the Marathas relied upon territorial expansion to yield the necessary revenue to develop its military capacities simultaneously. Thus, in such an instance, the Maratha Confederacy functioned as any fiscal-military state. Nevertheless, how exactly did the Marathas practise this? As Kaushik Roy

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[51] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 658.
[52] Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 4; Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, And State Formation*, 18; "The origin and authentic narrative of the present Marratta War; and also, the late Rohilla War, in 1773 and 1774; whereby the East-India Company's troops (as mercenaries) exterminated that brave nation, and openly drove them for asylum and existence into the dominions of their former most inveterate enemies. To which is added the unaccountable proceedings in the Military Store-Keeper's Office, in Bengal." 1781, General Reference Collection, 583.e.4.(3.), British Library, 1
[53] Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 13; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1131-1132.

recently explained, the Maratha's fiscal-military *modus operandi* was geared to syphon the wealth from enemy territories to sustain itself[54]. In particular, it meant that "... *in judging of the Marratta force, that it is invariable custom among them, when an expedition is concluded, for the troops to retire with what plunder they may have seized to their respective abodes.*"[55] Alternatively, it meant that Maratha soldiers resorted to extortion from peasants or hiring themselves as mercenaries in an effort to make up their pays [56]. Such processes were made all the more common because of the Confederacy's ability to independently extract revenue and rely upon what Gerald J. Bryant describes as a highly militarised society readily able to take-up soldiering[57]. Thus, from the East India Company's perspective, the discontinuous, fractured and centrifugal nature the Marathas fiscal-military administration represented a dynamic despotism which endangered the Company's 'corpocratic' and imperial interests across India.

However, the Marathas ability to expand fiscal capacities did not solely rely upon the ostensibly chaotic nature of the Indian military labour market. Indeed, a network of bankers came to finance the Confederacy's campaigns through loans[58]. Alongside these abilities lay the Maratha State's ability to outright and forcibly tax its populations through *sebundies* who served to enforce tax collectors' demands[59]. Therefore, the Marathas had what can be described as a rudimentary semblance of a fiscal-military administration. With their ability to field increasingly

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[54] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 96.
[55] *The origin and authentic narrative of the present Marratta War*, 3.
[56] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 437; Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, And State Formation*, 58-59; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 98.
[57] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 438; Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, And State Formation*, 9-10; Dirk H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 7; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 658; For a discussion on the Indian military labour market, see Seema Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
[58] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 99; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1140.
[59] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 98-99.

expansive armies through the hybridisation of elementary European fiscal-militarism and the institutionalisation of the Mughals feudal tributary regime, the Marathas had little impetus in reforming their fiscal capacities[60]. In other words, the Confederacy's partially Europeanised and hybridised indigenous fiscal-military administration was seemingly able to develop its interdependent fiscal and military capacities simultaneously as it was estimated that "... *they enjoy n annual revenue, equal to about twelve millions sterlings.*"[61] Hence, the fragmentary nature of Maratha polities enabled it to sustain itself politically, fiscally and militarily for the members of the Confederacy functioned somewhat independently from one another and Pune's central authority[62]. Thus, from a fiscal standpoint, the Marathas represented for the East India Company, an entirely different opponent to the Mysoreans. Primarily, Marathas's ability to coalesce loosely independent and expanding sources of land revenue through an equally loose, and hybridised fiscal-military apparatus made it increasingly difficult for the British to gradually starve the Confederacy of any revenue as it did with Mysore. Hence, the Marathas had found an equilibrium whereby fiscal expansion was proportional to its military demands and contrariwise. Alternatively, the Europeanisation and hybridisation of Mysore's fiscal-military apparatus enabled it to effectively contain the East India Company during three successive wars lasting through to the nineteenth-century.

The socioeconomic and political cleavages that arose from the decaying Mughal Empire, and the East India Company's encroachment in Indian polities, conditioned the predatory nature of the Marathas fiscal-military expansion[63]. Furthermore, the Maratha's lack of a centrally insti-

[60] Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 4.
[61] *The origin and authentic narrative of the present Marratta War*, 2-3.
[62] Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 13.
[63] Bryant, *The Cavalry Problem*, 4.

tutionalised military administration exacerbated this same predatory nature. Practically, it meant that Maratha soldiers had to rely upon plunder to supplement their pay which was often in arrears[64]. Compounded by the military nature of the Indian society in the eighteenth-century, it meant that the Maratha soldiers resorted to increasingly predatory and violent methods to extract revenue. Hence, from a martial standpoint, the Marathas conducted what was seen by the British as irregular warfare based on mobile and guerrilla tactics. The Confederacy predominantly relied upon light, highly mobile cavalry capable of long-range raids into enemy territories[65]. Like the Mysoreans, the mobility of Maratha cavalry enabled it to dictate the pace and nature of the engagements against the Company's *sepoys*. This was particularly true because of the Company's inability to field an efficient cavalry corps capable of neutralising the mobile advantage of the Marathas[66]. However, for two reasons, such an advantage was short-lived and never indeed exploited. First, as Kaushik Roy explains, the Marathas neglected to form an expansive and extensively train officer corps capable of exploiting the mobile advantages provided by its cavalry[67]. Moreover, the Company's ability to draw the Marathas into pitched battle where its highly disciplined and trained *sepoys* could effectively coordinate infantry and artillery to counter cavalry exacerbated the Marathas lack of trained officers[68]. Therefore, the First Anglo-Maratha War embodied what can only be described as a civilisational clash where the Company's modern fiscal-military capabilities enabled it to prevail on the battlefield against the Marathas feudally organ-

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[64] Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, And State Formation*, 21; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 670; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 96-98.
[65] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 442; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 213; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 659.
[66] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1798*, 4-6.
[67] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 671, 673.
[68] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 659, 671; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 199-200.

ised tributary fiscal-militarism[69]. Henceforth, the conflict against the East India Company highlighted for the Marathas, the necessity of relying upon a Europeanised and hybridised fiscal-military apparatus.

As Pradeep Barua and Kaushik Roy assert, the Marathas had introduced elementary aspects of European fiscal-militarism to the traditional methods of indigenous warfare before the First Anglo-Maratha War and for that matter, the East India Company's rise to preeminence during the 1750s and 1760s[70]. For instance, the Marathas had long acquired and perfected the use of gunpowder which enabled indigenous artillery, such as *bans* to rapidly match the effectiveness of the Company's traditional use of modern European artillery[71]. Hence, like Mysore the Marathas refined and bolstered the effectiveness of indigenous weaponry through processes of Europeanisation. This was particularly true when it came to the doctrinal and tactical use of these weapons as Kaushik Roy notes. Like Jean François Dupleix had done in Mysore during the 1740s and 1750s, Benoît de Boigne, a French military officer and adviser, reorganised Maratha units during the late 1770s and early 1780s to coordinate the use of concentrated firepower in order bolster their effectiveness and match that of the Company's *sepoys*[72]. However, European hybridisation did not limit itself to artillery. As such processes made pitched battles more frequent, it compelled the Marathas to make use of sturdier horses from Central Asia and, therefore, effectively introduced heavy cavalry armed with European weaponry within its armies[73]. Despite their limited use because of sparse availability, their use in such a role underlines the fact that the Marathas

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[69] M. R. Kantak, *The First Anglo-Maratha War, 1774-1783: A Military Study of the Major Battles* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1993): 5.
[70] Barua, *Military Developments*, 607, 613; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 200.
[71] K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 200-201.
[72] Barua, *Military Developments*, 607; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 662.
[73] K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 211.

were increasingly and dangerously reliant upon Europeanisation and hybridisation to counter the Company. Yet, relying upon the integration of European doctrinal, organisational and technical fiscal-militarism to indigenous warfare was flawed because European expertise was consistently required[74]. In other words, it meant that the Marathas became increasingly dependant on European officers, advisers and mercenaries to maintain the effectiveness of their forces against the Company. However, the rudimentary nature of the Marathas feudal fiscal-military administration and its "*... continued neglect of industry and agriculture...*" meant that it was unable to sustain the highly intensive nature and pace of modern fiscal-militarism[75]. Hence, failing to extensively and thoroughly implement Europeanising reforms to its fiscal-military apparatus, it was only a matter of time before the East India Company would overcome the Maratha Confederacy[76].

The fragmented socioeconomic and political nature of the Maratha Confederacy proved to be a double-edged sword. In particular, its fragmentation provided it with a degree of independence that rendered it onerous for the East India Company to dismantle from a fiscal-military standpoint. However, it simultaneously prevented the Marathas from implementing a cohesive fiscal-military strategy. From a political standpoint, the fragmentary nature of Marathas politics inherited from the break-up of the Mughal Empire saw various rulers within the Confederacy vying to assert their singular authority in Pune[77]. As Tirthankar Roy recently explained, the competition over Pune's throne became increasingly tense, quarrelsome and militarised as rulers, no-

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[74] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 664, 682; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 213.
[75] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 668; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 213-215; K. Roy, *War, Society and Culture*, 101; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1144-1146, 1149; *The origin and authentic narrative of the present Marratta War*, 1.
[76] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 464.
[77] T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1139, 1149.

bleman, warlords, landholders and peasants alike, each sought a share of power[78]. Thus, it was unsurprising to see an inability on the Confederacy's part to coordinate itself nor politically or militarily against the Company[79]. In practice, it meant that the Marathas were incapable of replicating the Company's rigorously discipline fiscal-military administration. Specifically, it meant they were unable to implement a bureaucratic infrastructure capable of a cohesive fiscal-military administration of the Confederacy[80]. Therefore, the Maratha's defective revenue collection often resorted to excessive violence [81]. However, Marathas deficiency and inadequate fiscal administration stemming from socioeconomic and political fragmentation had broader implications for its military capacities.

Marathas socioeconomic and political inability to sustain the financially intensive process of a Europeanised fiscal-military state meant its armies were gradually left under-funded, undermanned and more importantly, unpaid as cash flow remained sporadic[82]. This had two mutually-reinforcing consequences. Firstly, it meant that revenue collection became increasingly predatory and violent as Maratha soldiers sought recompense for their arrears through booties. Such revenue extraction was ultimately unsustainable over any prolonged period as it was economically decimating to Marathas dominated territories[83]. However, it had a compounding and equally exacerbating effect because the Marathas became increasingly reliant upon irregular soldiers. In particular, irregular cavalry, otherwise known as *pindaris*, came to form the bulk of the Maratha

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[78] T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1127, 1129.
[79] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 437.
[80] K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 214.
[81] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 682-683.
[82] Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, And State Formation*, 147.
[83] Mahesh Gopalan and William A. Pettigrew (eds.), *The East India Company, 1600-1857: Essays on the Anglo-Indian Connection* (London: Routledge, 2017): 46; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 659.

armies as they were readily available and did not have to be compensated[84]. Thus, because of their lack of training and ensuing discipline, *pindaris* were seen as particularly violent and predatory.[85] Therefore, a self-replicating pattern emerged whereby the Marathas irregular soldiers violent and predatory methods of revenue collections never yielded the necessary resources for the Confederacy to maintain a unified standing army with the capacity to retain a degree of socioeconomic control required for fiscal-militarism. The compounding effects of these political, fiscal and military discontinuities, meant that the Confederacy was unable to prosecute a cohesive fiscal-military strategy with the capacity to rival the East India Company's expansive fiscal-militarism.

Ultimately, the Marathas ability to integrate elementary aspects of European fiscal-militarism to create a feudally hybridised tributary fiscal-military administration was not enough to counter the East India Company. Instead, *realpolitik* proved to be the Confederacy's Achilles heel[86]. Despite being useful, the Marathas ability to act independently of one another proved to be debilitating and ultimately fatal for it resulted in a lack of a centrally institutionalised bureaucracy required to properly organise, mobilise and manage the socioeconomic resources required by modern fiscal-militarism. Alternatively, it meant that the Company, despite its numerical inferiority, was bound to eventually overwhelm the Marathas armies, primarily because of its ability to properly manage and sustain its fiscal-military administration over a long period of time. Thus, the Marathas defeat during the First Anglo-Mysore War, and its eventual downfall in 1818,

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[84] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 675; T. Roy, *Rethinking the Origins of British India*, 1153.
[85] Barua, *Military Developments*, 115; Bryant, *Cavalry Problem*, 4; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 675; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 102.
[86] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 664; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 215.

demonstrates the importance and implications had by the fiscal-military revolution as the East India Company came to understand and experience.

The Hybridisation and Indigenisation of the East India Company's Fiscal-Militarism

The Mysorean and the Maratha's rapid assimilation of European fiscal-militarism and subsequent hybridisation of indigenous warfare successfully and repeatedly highlighted the progressive institutional sclerosis and limitations of the East India Company's administration[87]. Thus, the Anglo-Mysore and Anglo-Maratha Wars, as well as the conflicts with smaller Indian polities, highlighted the Company's fiscal and military inability to adequately counter Europeanised and hybridised indigenous warfare. Moreover, peasant insurgency across the Company's territories in Bengal and India began to reveal the limitations of violence in the process of revenue extraction[88]. For instance, a dispatch dating from 1781 explained that widespread peasant revolt meant that:

> *The Nabob can no longer be considered as the Proprietor of the Carnatic, while every part of it, not immediately protected or contested from his Enemy by our troops is in the hands of foreign Power, and all his Hopes of recovering it depend entirely on our arms.*[89]

However, in 1780, the Battle of Pollilur displayed, from a more traditional military standpoint, the potency of Indian warfare against the Company[90]. Thus, the reform of the Company's fiscal-military administration became increasingly necessary to ensure the preservation of 'British In-

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[87] Bayly, *Indian Society,* 60; Callahan, *Army and Reform, 1783-1798*, 42; William Dalrymple, *The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of Empire* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019): 318-319.
[88] Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1997) 55; Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1999): 155.
[89] Governor General and Council of Bengal, "Letter Dated 26 February 1781" "Second Mysore War." 1782, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/246:1781-1782, British Library, 41.
[90] Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 250-253; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 84-85.

dia' from external and internal threats alike. At the same time, Parliament's emerging reformist expectations effectively reconceptualised the ideological, philosophical and practical principles of imperial governance and ultimately served to guide the fiscal-military and administrative reforms of the Company. In turn, it served to reconfigure the East India Company's administration with a sense of accountability and responsibility. Hence, reform became essential for the preservation of 'British India'[91].

The East India Company's defeat during the Battle of Pollilur in 1780, had all but confirmed the Mysoreans ability to restrict and even neutralise the *sepoys* disciplinary and technical effectiveness by integrating its standing native cavalry with the principles of European artillery[92]. Thus, the defeat of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's troops at Pollilur illustrated the exigency of reforming the Company's fiscal-military administration. In particular, it highlighted the Company's lack of a permanent and professional cavalry capable of countering indigenous cavalry to enhance the overall disciplinary and technical superiority of its *sepoys*. Therefore, and as Charles Cornwallis noted, an effective cavalry was becoming imperative "*... as a good Body of Cavalry may be of great value for protecting the National Interests in this Country.*"[93] Alongside the professionalisation of the officer corps and the subsequent elimination of the grievous oppression of Indian populations, these reforms illustrate the notion that the hybridisation and professionalisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration was conducive in countering the Mysoreans

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[91] Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A History* (London: Longman, 1993): 116-131.
[92] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 463-464; Bryant, *Cavalry Problem*, 13,16; Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1798*, 4-6; Dalrymple, *The Anarchy*, 250-253; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 84-85.
[93] Bryant, *Cavalry Problem*, 19; Charles Cornwallis, "Letter Dated 4 November 1788" (Fort William, Calcutta: 1788): 1-3 *Military Papers*, BL, IOR/H/85:1783-1796, 11-13.

and the Marathas indigenously hybridised fiscal-militarism[94]. However, despite the self-destructive consequences of its predilection to rely upon violence as a means to meet its 'corpocratic' and imperial responsibilities, the Company obstinately resisted Parliament's implementation of professional reforms. For instance, in 1785, Warren Hastings described Major-General Archibald Campbell's plans as impossible and unfeasible on the basis that:

> *The Utility and Expediency of his plan can only be seen in a Comparison of them, with the Establishment which are in actual use, and with some new arrangements made by your Honourable Court, to which he addresses as the models to which he has accommodated his own. […] For these Reasons my Remarks upon these papers, can be best incomplete, and will be chiefly confined to Points of Political, or merely Official Relation.*[95]

Hence, as the threat from the Mysoreans and the Marathas rose, it became increasingly apparent that Parliament would have to impose its ideological and philosophical reforms and expectations of imperial governance and its framework on the East India Company fiscal-military administration to ensure the preservation of 'British India'.

As P. J. Marshall explains, Parliament's gradual reform of the East India Company, therefore, sought to ensure it would not face comparable politico-economic and military crises emerging since 1765[96]. Specifically, Parliament sought to address the Company's fiscal-military mismanagement of Bengal, but more importantly, also impose its expectations concerning the nature of imperial governance. Parliament, like the Company, was aware of the importance of the interdependent relationship existing between the fiscal and military capacities as well as their role in

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[94] Barua, *Military Developments in India*, 601-602; Charles Cornwallis, "Letter Dated 18 August 1787" (Ganges Valley, 1787): 4, K. D. Bhargava, and Raghubir Sinh (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume X: 1786-1788*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1972): 513; Peers, *India Under Colonial* Rule, 26; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 668-669.
[95] Warren Hastings, "Letter Dated 15 August 1785" "Military establishments in India" 1785, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/361:1781-1785, British Library, 234-235.
[96] Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 33.

conserving order and imperial authority[97]. Thus, the reforms to the Company's fiscal-military administration drew their inspiration from the tenets of Parliament's reform of imperial governance. However, without an appropriate framework to guide these reforms, the administrative, ideological, philosophical and technical practices of revenue collection, the dispensation of violence and the conduct of warfare would not ensure the fiscal and imperial stability of 'British India'. Therefore, it became crucial for Parliament to create an ideological and philosophical framework that would serve to guide the reforms of the Company and serve to reconceptualise its fiscal-military administration and its nature of imperial governance. Hence, the impetus for reform ultimately stemmed from the Company's culturally and institutionally conditioned recalcitrance to adapt its fiscal-military administration to the imperial and Indian realities despite finding itself increasingly vulnerable to the Mysoreans and the Marathas. These realities as Eyre Coote described them, were "*... almost insufferable difficulties that surround us on all sides [...] I can no longer reconcile to myself to delay going thitherto, to give my own personal aid towards the averting of that destruction*..."[98] Thus, by gradually exposing the East India Company's pro-

[97] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990): 53.
[98] Eyre Coote "Letter Dated 20 October 1781" (Alamancherry: 1781) "Second Mysore War." 1782, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/245:1781-1782, British Library, 113.

gressive fiscal-military sclerosis, the Mysoreans and the Marathas, directly and indirectly, exerted a capacity to influence the evolution of imperial governance in 'British India'[99].

Parliamentary reform of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration was, therefore, generally reactionary. Both the *Regulating Act* in 1773 and *Pitt's India Act* in 1784 indicated Parliament's desire to forcibly impose an ideological and philosophical administrative framework to the Company in the hope of aligning its fiscal-military administration with the emerging principles of imperial governance that arose from the crises of Empire[100]. As discussed, tenets of an accountable and responsible imperial governance had progressively emerged during the Company's mismanagement of the fiscal and military imperial affairs in Bengal as the British Empire oriented itself towards India following the loss of the American Colonies[101]. Alternatively, these tenets served as the ideological and philosophical foundations for the fiscal-military reforms and reconfiguration of violence and its dispensation in the exercise of imperial governance. Therefore, the reforms to the Company's armies and its fiscal-military administration would mirror these Parliamentary beliefs and expectations and effectively institutionalise these

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[99] Christopher A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830* (London: Taylor Francis, 1989); Bayly, "The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance" Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War*, pp. 322-354; John Brewer, "Revisiting The Sinews of Power" in A. Graham and P. Walsh, (eds.), *The British Fiscal-Military State, 1660-c.1783* (London: Routledge, 2016): 27-34; John Brewer "Servants of the Public - Servants of the Crown: Officialdom of Eighteenth-Century English Central Government" in John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth, *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 127-148; John Brewer, "The Eighteenth-Century British State: Context and Issues" in Lawrence Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State of War: Britain from 1619 to 1815* (London: Routledge, 1994): 52-71; Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*; Javier Cuenca-Estaban "Fiscal-Dimensions of Britain's Regulated Trade with Asia, 1765-1812" in Rafael T. Sanchez (ed.), *War, State and Development: Fiscal Military States in the Eighteenth Century* (Navarre: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2007): 69-87; Steven Pincus and James Robinson, "Challenging the Fiscal-Military Hegemony: The British Case" in A. Graham, and P. Walsh, (eds.), *The British Fiscal-Military State, 1660-c.1783* (London: Routledge, 2016): 229-261.

[100] "Letter Dated 29 March 1774" (London: 1774) K. D. Bhargava and R. P. Patwardhan (eds.) *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VII: 1773-1776*, BL, OIR354.54I, (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 49-60; John R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Course Lecture* (London: MacMillan, 1904): 30-31; Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 33.

[101] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76-77; Marshall, *Problems of Empire*, 33-34; Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*.

under direction from Parliament and the Crown too[102]. Thus, the reforms that followed the *Regulating Act* in 1773 and *Pitt's Act* in 1784 served to reform and reconfigure the Company as an effective mechanism to rule and preserve 'British India' according to Parliamentary expectations[103]. Hence, the aforementioned Acts endeavoured to gradually submit and incorporate the Company's *sepoy* armies into the British Army and restore National and imperial moral character. Concretely, *Pitt's India Act* enabled Parliament to impose a series of reforms that subordinated the Company's military authority to Royal Officers and their subsequent institutional reorganisation to its fiscal-military administration[104]. Accordingly and as a dispatch clearly stated in 1786, the:

> *... Act passed in this session of Parliament has enabled the Company to Unite in the same person the Office of Governor General and Commander in Chief and Lord Cornwallis having undertaken the Office of Governor General, we think it may be attended with the most beneficial consequences, at this time to invest his Lordship with Supreme Power both Civil and Military [...] and from the personal Character of Lord Cornwallis to promise the most salutary effects, and testify the strong sense we retain Lieutenant General Sloper's Zeal and merits towards the Company in undertaking his present situation...*[105]

Thus, and as Gerald J. Bryant notes, Parliamentarians believed that reforming the East India Company's armies on the basis of the Country's armies would ensure the diplomatic, economic, political and strategic stability and security of 'British India'[106]. Such reform highlights Parliament's reconceptualisation of the nature of imperial governance and the place violence had in its

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[102] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1798*, 46; Vincent T. Harlow. *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Volume II: New Continents and Changing Values, 1763-1793* (London: Longmans 1952): 193.
[103] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1798*, 46; Peter J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 214-215.
[104] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1798*, 50-51.
[105] "Letter Dated 12 April 1786" K. D. Bhargava and Raghubir Sinh (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume X: 1786-1788* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1972): 120-121.
[106] Gerald J. Bryant,*The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013): 225, 228.

process. Thus, British perception of violence, of its role, and its objectives, came to change between 1765 and 1788[107].

Nevertheless, how did the reconceptualisation and hybridisation of British fiscal-militarism and imperial governance manifest itself? To ensure stability and legitimacy in the eyes of Indian populations, Parliament institutionalised indigenous fiscal, judicial and martial practices to inculcate it with its expectations of accountability, imputability and responsibility[108]. Specifically, the reforms enabled the institutionalisation and hybridisation of indigenous socioeconomic norms and practices as to become compatible with Parliamentary expectations and offer a degree of uniformity to the East India Company's fiscal-military administration[109]. Therefore, the Company came to appropriate itself Indian socio-hierarchal norms and recast them to create a set of ideological, philosophical and practical set of idioms on which it could legitimately control and regulate indigenous populations[110]. Hence, the process of indigenisation and hybridisation slowly translated ideologies of conquest into a language of rule on which rested the ideological and philosophical framework of the fiscal-military administration and the dispensation of violence. Anchored in British politico-judiciary standards imposed by institutions such as the Supreme Court of Judicature and broader efforts to inculcate British notions of constitutional and administrative law, Parliament's reconceptualisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration gradually generated a language of rule and idioms of order. Used in direct opposition of the per-

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[107] Bankey B. Misra, *The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773-1834* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959): 110.
[108] Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 218-224 ; Misra, *The Central Administration*, 24-27.
[109] Bayly, *The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance*, 332-333; James M. Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III: The East India Company and the Crisis and Transformation of Britain's Imperial State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019): 228.
[110] Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*, 100-102; Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 53, 68-69; Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire*, 228.

ceived crude and orientalist stereotypes of Indian depravity, this hybridised and indigenised British language of rule gradually facilitated British imperial governance in India[111]. Thus, and as Eyre Coote noted in 1781, the sociocultural authority and legitimacy embodied by *sepoys* enabled the Company to consolidate such a framework as "*These are considerations which ought to have great weight in inducing us to seek of an accommodation, especially as our reasons for carrying on the War are totally exhausted both here and in Bengal.*"[112] Consequently, the expansive and predatory nature of the Company's fiscal-militarism and its administration of violence changed and was, therefore, gradually replaced by what can be characterised as a socioeconomic regulator and stabiliser[113]. Aligned with Parliamentary expectations of imperial governance, the indigenisation of the East India Company's hybridised military apparatus proceeded as did its capacity to ensure the preservation of 'British India'[114].

As manpower demands soared throughout the 1770s and 1780s because of the expansive nature of imperial warfare on the Indian subcontinent, the East India Company found itself increasingly reliant upon *sepoys*. However, in an age of emerging Parliamentary expectations regarding the institutionalisation and professionalisation of the administration of violence, these expectations obliged the Company to reconceptualise the broader roles *sepoys* had to fulfil within its fiscal-military apparatus. Ultimately, it compelled the Company to develop a series of racial

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[111] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010): 5-7; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 98.
[112] Eyre Coote, "Letter Dated 26 June 1781" "Second Mysore War." 1782, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/246:1781-1782, British Library, 65.
[113] Huw V. Bowen, *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 43-45; Huw V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757-1773* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 7; Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*, 113-114.
[114] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 51-53; Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India*, 328; Misra, *The Central Administration*, 8-9.

characteristics that served to classify subsets of the Indian society into martial or non-martial races based on their deemed military attributes[115]. Stature, ruggedness and what the Company considered to be 'innate' loyalty were the sought after characteristics of an ideal *sepoy*[116]. However, the effects were far broader as *martial races* came to constitute a genteel subset of Indian society which occupied an influential and authoritative societal capacity. Alternatively, the British creation of *martial races* served to recast Indian socio-hierarchical norms and customs. As historian Seema Alavi explains, this was predominantly achieved through the cultivation of the idioms of militaristic ethno-cultural lineages and traditions which enabled the East India Company to project authority and power through *sepoys* and ultimately achieve imperial designs[117].

Nevertheless, it reinforced the East India Company's legitimacy and the imposition of its fiscal-military administration as it ensured a degree of socioeconomic and political stability. Therefore, through *sepoys* who primarily belonged to high-castes, the Company had repositioned itself in Indian social order and readapted them to function per the parameters as well as expectations of British imperial governance and colonial society[118]. Hence, *martial races* served the simultaneous purpose of ensuring the expansion of the Company's fiscal-military administration all the while ensuring its socioeconomic and political stability[119]. This role fulfilled by *sepoys* underpins the processes of reconceptualisation that the Company's fiscal-military ad-

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[115] Pradeep Barua, "Inventing Race: The British and India's Martial Races" *The Historian* 58, No. 1, Autumn 1995, 107; Gavin Rand and Kim A. Wagner. "Recruiting the 'martial races': identities and military service in colonial India" *Patterns and Prejudice* 46, No. 3-4 (2012): 243; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 50.
[116] Barua, *Inventing Race*, 111, 115; Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 453; Rand and Wagner, *Recruiting 'marital races'*, 243.
[117] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 95, 113; Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 181.
[118] Rand and Wagner, *Recruiting 'marital races'*, 233.
[119] Bryant, *Indigenous Mercenaries*, 5; Rand and Wagner, *Recruiting 'marital races'*, 237

ministration and exercise of violence underwent during the 1770s and 1780s. Specifically, it highlights the transitional nature of the role violence had as an instrument of conquest and fiscal-military expansion to one of socio-economic regulation and stabilisation. Finally, the *sepoys'* dual-purpose illustrate the increasingly hybrid and indigenised nature of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration as it came to experience and understand the realities of the Indian subcontinent.

Despite their desirable militaristic attributes, *martial races* were always perceived with an underlying and persisting apprehension by East India Company Officials who feared an eventual mutiny. Moreover, these long-predating fears were compounded by the fact that "*... the continuous military operations at Bengal and on the Coromandel Coast have diffused the European discipline in a very great degree among the natives.*" could therefore enable populations to effectively take arms[120]. This fear compelled the Company, and eventually Parliament, to develop an increasingly robust officer corps maintained by an equally robust set of judicial and martial institutional powers to oversee and discipline *sepoys*. Alongside the introduction of uniforms, specialised training and regular pay, European oversight and enforcement of discipline assured a degree of professionalism through the creation of an ethos that revolved around idioms and symbols of social stature and authority[121]. Hence, "*As the Security of our Valuable Possessions depends so much on the Keeping up a good Discipline and a Martial Spirits in the Troops.*" it was imperative for the Company to inculcate a measure of professionalism and loyalty to

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[120] "Letter Dated 15 February 1765" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume IV: 1764-1766* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 77.
[121] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 43, 180-181; Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*, 65; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 652-653; K. Roy *War, Culture and Society*, 46-48, 54.

its *sepoys*[122]. Yet, with the Company's growing mismanagement of the Anglo-Mysore and Anglo-Maratha wars in the context of imperial crises, Parliament became increasingly convinced by the necessity of further subordinating and professionalising officers and *sepoys* alike. Therefore, the successes of professional officers and *sepoys* came to buttress Parliament's decision to undertake broader reforms to subordinate the Company's armies furthermore as to ensure the overall stability of Bengal and India[123]. With the arrival of Royal Officers, these reforms yielded two interdependent advantages to the Company's army[124]. First, these officers instilled a standard of accountability, imputability and responsibility per Parliamentary expectations to the Company's armies. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, their professionalism allowed for a more complete and homogenous hybridisation and indigenisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration. Thus, the gradual professionalisation of the East India Company's officer corps enabled it to structure and adapt its fiscal-military administration to meet parliamentary expectations and the circumstances of the Indian subcontinent.

The professionalism of the King's Officers gradually facilitated the process of hybridisation by seemingly incorporating indigenous tactics and principles of warfare into the Eurocentric structure and doctrine of the East India Company's armies. The most obvious case of such influence and achievement came from their ability to raise a professional and permanent cavalry

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[122] "Letter Dated 11 November 1768" (London, 1768) K. D. Bhargava and Narendra Krinsha Sinha (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence: Volume V: 1766-1769*, BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 155-156.
[123] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1793*, 54; "Letter Dated 27 March 1779" (1779) *First Maratha War* BL, IOR/H/240:1770-1783, 447-448; George Macartney, "Letter Dated 24 January 1784" (Fort St. George, 1784) *Military Matters Including Second Mysore War, Treaty with Tipu Sultan and dealings with Nawabs of Arcot* BL, IOR/H/247:1782-1786, 222-225; "Letter Dated 27 March 1787" (London, 1787) Bisheshwar Prasad (ed.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence And Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto (Military Series): Volume XIX: 1787-1791* BL, OIR354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1975): 32-33.
[124] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1793*, 50-51.

corps as to effectively counter the Mysoreans and the Maratha, and supplement the effectiveness of *sepoys*[125]. Specifically, a report by Thomas Parkison, a Company servant, called in 1785 for the creation of one European cavalry regiment and nine well-chosen indigenous cavalry regiments led by European officers as a single 750 men regiment "*... commanded and disciplined by Company officers, and having parted from their Infantry and Artillery by Order of General Smith, attacked with Success, between 1500 and 2000 Tanjore Horses, sword in hand.*"[126]. The inclusion of experienced cavalryman under the command of professional British officers eased the integration of their tactics and, therefore, facilitated the process of hybridisation and indigenisation of the Company's armies[127]. Kaushik Roy concurs with Gerald J. Bryant's assertions by noting that the hybridisation and indigenisation of the Company's disciplined and technologically superior armies enabled it to eventually overcome the Mysoreans and the Marathas[128]. Thus, as Charles Cornwallis indicated in 1788, cavalry had become an essential military asset in the preservation and security of 'British India'[129]. Similarly to *sepoys*, officers came to have a dual purpose. Not only did they ensure the obedience and loyalty of their soldiers, but they also served as a vector for the implementation of professional standing cavalry, which in turn, facilitated the hybridisation and indigenisation of the Company's armies. Hence, the professionalism of these officers became instrumental in the reforms to the East India Company's fiscal-militarism and its institutionalisation of the administration of violence.

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[125] Barua, *Military Developments*, 604; Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 448 Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1793*, 4-6.
[126] Thomas Parkison, "Letter Dated 4 January 1785" (Hackney: 1785) *Military Establishment in India*, BL, IOR/H/361, 61-79.
[127] Bryant, *Cavalry Problem*, 10.
[128] K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 682; K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 58-59.
[129] Cornwallis, "Letter Dated 4 November 1788" 1-3 *Military Papers*, 11-13.

Although the implementation and integration of a professional and standing cavalry corps was a significant doctrinal contribution on the part of the East India Company's officers, their ability also to integrate elementary aspects of indigenous guerrilla warfare was equally important. In particular, during the 1770s as the Company expanded, it encountered the 'Hill People' characterised by their ability to conduct extensive guerrilla warfare[130]. Proving their effectiveness against Indians and British troops alike, Augustus Clevland, the Collector of Bhagalpur in Bihar, began recruiting 'Hill People' and reorganised them into Mountaineering Corps, responsible for patrolling the hills of Bihar, Orissa and Bengal[131]. Hence, the subsequent integration of their guerrilla tactics and weaponry effectively hybridised the Company's ability to conduct guerrilla and mountain warfare[132]. In other words, the Company's officers had institutionalised indigenous guerrilla warfare into the broader Eurocentric structures of their *sepoy* armies. This, as historians Joseph Sramek and Kaushik Roy explain, stemmed from the professionalism of the Company's officers who displayed deference to religious and cultural sensibilities and consequently cultivated a degree of loyalty from their *sepoys*[133]. Therefore, the professionalism displayed by the Company's officers was instrumental in the adoption of indigenous warfare principles into the broader conduct of British fiscal-militarism. However, it further underscores their pivotal role in the hybridisation and indigenisation of the East India Company's armies which happened to be indispensable elements in the preservation of 'British India'.

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[130] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 170; Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 453.
[131] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 170-175; Bryant, *Pacification in the Early British Raj*, 10-11.
[132] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 180-181; Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 453.
[133] K. Roy, *War, Culture and Society*, 47; Joseph Sramek, *Gender, Morality, and Race in Company India, 1765-1858* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2011): 71-75.

Nonetheless, what did the hybridisation and indigenisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration mean for the broader context of Britain's capacity for imperial governance and its implications? In particular, the processes of hybridisation and indigenisation underscore Parliament's ability to reform imperial governance. Such a reconceptualisation reflects a broader adaptive and evolutionary capacity. As Seema Alavi argues, Britain's ability to reappropriate and weaponise sociocultural, economic, political and ethno-hierarchical norms reflects a capacity of fiscal-military evolutionary adaptation and reform reflecting the broader implications of its imperial governance in India[134]. Moreover, it reflects Parliament's success in grafting British notions of constitutional and administrative law onto Indian socio-cultural and politico-judiciary institutions in order to generate language of rule and idioms of order. Namely, the Company's creation and use of *martial races* as *sepoys* reveals this ability to generate idioms of power and authority as to exploit India's military labour market. In turn, the reappropriation of the military labour market enabled the Company to gradually demilitarise Indian society and its capacity to resist it and the subsequent encroachment of its fiscal-military authority over the subcontinent[135]. Moreover, the Company interpreted the instance of treaties as a demilitarisation of Indian society and provinces as it "*... stipulates for the surrender to me of all the Districts of my Country in Six Months after the Date of the said Treaty.*"[136] Thus, the Company's progressive hybridisation and indigenisation illustrate a fundamental element in the reconceptualisation of British imperial governance, but also within British fiscal-militarism and its inherent reliance upon violence. Specifically, as fiscal-militarism became a guarantor of 'British India' and vio-

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[134] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 302.
[135] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 25; Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 25.
[136] W. G. Wasey, "Letter Dated 2 December 1783" (Fort St. George, Madras: 1783) "East Indies Series 97." 1784, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/189:1781-1784, British Library, 192.

lence ensured its socioeconomic and political stability as well as regulation, the processes of hybridity and indigenisation implemented and supervised by the King's Officers served to ensure the emerging Parliamentary expectations of imperial governance[137]. Therefore, the nature of the hybridising and indigenising reforms served to effectively reconceptualise the East India Company's fiscal-military administration through the inculcation of Parliament's expectation regarding imperial accountability and responsibility.

The Political Implications of Fiscal-Military Europeanisation, Hybridisation and Indigenisation

Despite being anchored in violent fear-inducing authoritarianism, the political relationship between the East India Company and Indian rulers of varying importance remained based on their mutual interdependence as to exert authority and legitimacy[138]. For Indian rulers, the need to rely upon the Company to prop up their authority and legitimacy came from the sociopolitical fracture following the disaggregation of the Mughal Empire. Without the capacity to police India's highly militarised society of the eighteenth-century, Indian elites of all strata became dependant on the Company's fiscal-military apparatus to enforce a state-sanctioned monopoly of violence[139]. Thus, the nature of post-Mughal sociopolitical realities placed the Company in a position where it was increasingly able to project its authority outside of Bengal and across India as

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[137] Lawson, *The East India Company*, 116-131; Michael H. Fisher (ed.), *The Politics of British Annexation of India 1757-1857* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 1-49; Peter J. Marshall, "Presidential Address: Britain and the World in Eighteenth Century: III, Britain and India" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 10, 2000, 1-16; K. N. Panikkar, *The Evolution of British policy Towards Indian States, 1774-1858* (Calcutta: S. K. Lahiri, 1929)

[138] Elizabeth Kolsky, "The Colonial Rule of Law and the Legal Regime of Exception: Frontier 'Fanaticism' and State Violence in British India" *The American Historical Review* 120, No. 4 (2015): 1124-1125; Bruce I. Watson, "Fortifications and the 'Idea' of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India" *Past and Present* 88, 1980, pp. 75-76.

[139] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 253; K. Roy, *Military Synthesis*, 656; K. Roy, *The Hybrid Military Establishment*, 196; William R. Thompson, "The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendancy of Western Eurasia in the World System" *Journal of World History* 10, No. 1, 1999, 150.

indigenous rulers sought protection from Mysorean and Maratha influence[140]. In other words, Indian rulers perceived the Company's fiscal-military capacities as a guarantor of socioeconomic and political stability. In spite of this self-interested logic, the Company still relied on Indian rulers, particularly Mughal authority, as its source of legitimacy[141]. Hence, *nawabs*, *nizams*, *zamindars* and other Indian elites, effectively toiled as intermediaries by which the East India Company could simultaneously control Indian populations and expand its fiscal-military administration in legitimacy.

Yet, despite its mutual necessity, the political relation between the East India Company and Indian rulers was bound to be adversarial because of the fundamentally coercive, racially charged, self-interested, self-serving and self-righteous nature of British fiscal-militarism. In other words, the subsidiary alliances between the Company and Indian elites can be characterised as wholly unequal and outright extortive. This relationship was embodied in the Company's incessantly extortive demands of land revenue which were enforced by what amounted per Alexander Dow as an indiscriminate use of repression[142]. As mentioned, this stemmed primarily from a lack of Parliamentary oversight which had left the Company's fiscal-military administration mostly unregulated and unsupervised. Thus, as C. A. Bayly asserts, the Company's indiscriminate use of violence to meet increasingly extortive fiscal demands were directly and proportionally met by

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[140] Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 33; Thompson, *The Military Superiority Thesis*, 70-71.
[141] Bryant, *Pacification in the Early British Raj*, 4; Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 123; Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 252, 256; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 290; Thompson, *The Military Superiority Thesis*, 150; Watson, *Fortifications and the 'Idea of Force*, 70-71.
[142] Bryant, *Pacification in the Early British Raj*, 7; Alexander Dow, *The history of Hindostan, from the death of Akbar, to the complete settlement of the empire under Aurungzebe. To which are prefixed, I. A dissertation on the origin and nature of despotism in Hindostan. II. An enquiry into the state of Bengal; With a Plan for restoring that Kingdom to its former Prosperity and Splendor, Volume III* (London: 1772): 94-97; Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*, 20-21.

the rise of local insurgencies[143]. Moreover, the threat of these insurgencies was compounded by the growing capacity of larger *zamindaris*, such as Benares, to finance peasant armies capable of mobilising the broader communal aspects of insurgency[144]. Accordingly, cases such as Benares necessitated immediate and direct military intervention not only to ensure the insurgency did not generalise and destabilise 'British India', but also "*... as a political necessity for curbing the over-grown power of a great member of their dominion, and making it contribute to the relief of their pressing exigencies.*"[145]. Hence, because of their desire to maintain stability and control, the political rapport between the Company and Indian elites was conditioned and conducted based on coercion and violence. Alternatively, by imperial expectations of the 1770s and 1780s, the political relations between the East India Company and Indian rulers became untenable.

Mainly, it was because of parliamentary expectations of imperial governance that the political relations maintained by the East India Company through subsidiary alliances with Indian rulers were deemed to be unsustainable and parlous for the preservation of 'British India'. Nonetheless, the reconceptualisation of the administration violence arising from Parliament's interventions in 1773 and 1784 ultimately came to regulate the Company's political relations with Indians. Practically, the Company's idiomatic and practical reinvention and reinforcement of identity and tradition surrounding the 'gentlemen trooper' served as an equipoise to the propitious con-

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[143] Christopher A. Bayly, "The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance: India, 1750-1820" in Stone, *Imperial State at War*, 322-354; Patrick Tuck (ed.), *The East India Company: 1600-1858: Volume V: Warfare, Expansion and Resistance* (London: Routledge, 1998): 218-219; Rand and Wagner, *Recruiting 'marital races'*, 240.
[144] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 57-60; Bayly, *The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance*, 340; Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power*, 253; Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*, 115; Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 175.
[145] Warren Hastings, *A narrative of the insurrection which happened in the zemeedary of Benaris in August 1781, and of the transaction of the Governor-General in that District: with the Appendix of Authentic Papers and Affidavits* (Roorkee: 1853) BL, IOR.V.27/281/1:1853, 12.

duct of fiscal-militarism[146]. But, and more importantly, they served as a sociopolitical linchpin for the Company as:

> *... a greater influence would be preserved by us over the neighbouring powers, and we might possibly be relieved from the necessity of keeping up so large and expensive a military establishment as we have at present in Bengal. [...] you must use your utmost endeavours to acquire by friendly means what could not be retained by violence.*[147]

Because of the distinct and privileged socioeconomic status they occupied, which was only reinforced by military service, *sepoys* became intermediaries by whom the Company could govern at a local level for communal polities had until then, remained independent and unaffected by British rule[148]. These villages became enclaves of influence on which the Company could rely to effectively counter the influence of *zamindars* and rulers altogether by effectively mapping and reclassifying Indian society to fit imperial designs[149]. Notwithstanding the singular case of villages, *martial races,* therefore, appeared far more legitimate in the process of revenue extraction and governance because of their shared ethno-cultural characteristics with the populations they administered[150]. Hence, the Company's utilisation of *martial races* who had been professionalised, but more importantly, Anglicised, enabled it, at a local level, to govern with Parliamentary expectations in mind. Therefore, the reform of the East India Company's fiscal-military structures simultaneously came to alter and regulate political relationships across the subcontinent.

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[146] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 4, 6-8; Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 181; Rand and Wagner, *Recruiting 'marital races'*, 237; Sramek, *Gender, Morality, and Race*, 81.
[147] "Letter Dated 10 April 1771" K. D. Bhargava and Bisheshwar Prasad, (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondance: Volume VI: 1770-1772* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1949): 86-87.
[148] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 114-117; Bayly, *Knowing the Country*, 33-34; Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders, And State Formation*, 121.
[149] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 106-109; Barua, *Inventing Race*, 107-108; Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire*, 26.
[150] "Letter Dated 10 April 1771" Bhargava and Prasad (eds.), *Volume VI*, 86-87.

Nonetheless, the *Regulating Act* in 1773 and *Pitt's India Act* in 1784 both also provided Parliament and the East India Company with expectations of how it could regulate Indian polities. This stemmed from the fact that the *Regulating Act* had concluded that the Mughal Constitution was an imprecise and unreliable basis for British imperial rule in India[151]. The establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in 1774 served as a partial remedy. While loosely tasked with the oversight of the Company's 'corpocratic' and imperial behaviour, the Court primarily task served to reinterpret Mughal law in an effort to supplant it with Britain's legal corpus to regulate and frame the fractured nature of Indian polities and its diverse power-holders[152]. Although it remained largely self-interested and self-serving, British understanding of Mughal and post-Mughal politics came to gradually outline and classify despotic and non-despotic conduct. For instance, the arrears of the Nawab of Arcot were deemed a debilitating and despotic by the Company as they "*... accumulated difficulty and danger, you should have seen any thing in the Nabobs conduct of a tendency to have imperil you with such serious apprehensions, or extorted from you severe reflections upon it.*"[153] As Robert Travers recently explained, imbued with orientalist stereotypes which perceived Indian rulers as inherently morally corrupt and, therefore, arbitrary in their dispensation of law and violence, the Courts' process sought to delegitimise the latter while reinforcing British interventions and authority[154]. Practically, it thus enabled the British to create a self-serving narrative to remove or support an Indian ruler. For instance, it could arbitrarily interpret peasant's insurgency as a result of a ruler's despotic tenden-

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[151] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 195.
[152] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76-77; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 181; K. Wilson, *A New Imperial History: Culture,* 7.
[153] John Macpherson "Letter Dated 5 April 1782" (Fort William, Calcutta: 1782) "Military matters including Second Mysore War, treaty with Tipu Sultan and dealings with Nawab of Arcot." 1786, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/247:1782-1786, British Library, 71-74.
[154] Bryant, *Asymmetric Warfare*, 433; Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire*, 26; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 19, 50.

cies and subsequently remove him. Conversely, the Company could prop an Indian ruler it deemed favourable to its rule against its population despotic ochlocracy. By replacing idioms of conquest with idioms of imperial order as Ranajit Guha explains, the process gradually institutionalised the political use of violence and regulated 'British India'[155]. Alternatively, the routinisation of Indian notions and conduct of political power within the broader framework of imperial governance and Parliamentary expectations effectively enabled the Company to decide what was deemed appropriate behaviour. Therefore, by concluding what despotic or non-despotic behaviour entitled, the Company justified and more importantly legitimised its actions as a regulatory and stabilising authority. In other words, the East India Company was artificially creating a narrative whereby its administration of violence was wholly legitimate both to Indian populations and Parliament because it "... *prevent the confusion and oppression that have sprung from the abuses practices in it of late years*..." and therefore assured the preservation and stability of 'British India'[156].

As seen, the reform of the East India Company's administration and exercise of violence had broader implications which conclusively altered the conduct of political relations on the Indian subcontinent. In particular, the hybridisation and indigenisation reforms to the Company's fiscal-militarism had favoured and facilitated the integration of Indian institutions into maxims of British imperial governance[157]. However, as Travers subsequently notes, the integration remained

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[155] Guha, *Dominance Without Hegemony*, 25.
[156] "Letter Dated 26 April 1765" K. D. Bhargava and C. S. Srinivaschari (eds.), *Indian Records Series Fort William India House Correspondence*: *Volume IV: 1764-1766*, BL, OIR 354.54I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, for the National Archives of India, 1962): 100-101.
[157] John Bruce, "Historical View of Plans for the Government of British India & Regulation of Trade to the East Indies, & Outlines of a Plan of Foreign Government, of Commercial Economy & of Domestic Administration for the Asiatic Interests of Great Britain" (London: 1793): 6, 14, 38; Travers, *Ideology and Empire*: 246-247.

predominantly self-interested and self-serving considering its subordination to the British ideological and philosophical framework who discarded Indian political principles proved to be an impediment[158]. Hence, the political relations on the subcontinent were effectively Anglicised and conducted per British and Parliamentary expectations regarding the nature of imperial governance. The Company's artificial creation of *martial races* and its appropriation of Indian socio-hierarchical norms effectively Anglicised Indian political relations. Although the tactical and technical adaptions of the Company highlighted the cultural and institutional dichotomy between Britain and India from a military standpoint, these also served to illustrate the sociopolitical adaptions[159]. Specifically, the process underscores British ability to institutionalise, from a cultural standpoint, the exercise of violence as to adapt and reform sociopolitical relations in its interest and per imperial designs. More broadly, this process reflects the East India Company's reform of fiscal-military administration and the exercise of violence from an instrument of conquest, to an instrument of regulation and stability for the imperial governance of 'British India'.

The Social Implications of Politico-Military Europeanisation, Hybridisation and Indigenisation

Similarly to the politico-military spheres, the intersection of processes of Europeanisation, hybridisation and indigenisation gradually altered social norms across the Indian subcontinent. Yet again, the East India Company's appropriation of Indian socio-hierarchical norms as a means to artificially create intermediaries became central to this process. Hence, *martial races* became integral in the Company's efforts as it sought to classify and fixate Indian society

[158] Travers, *Ideology and Empire*, 248.
[159] Gommans, *Indian Warfare*, 268.

as to establish an albeit, artificial degree of homogeneity[160]. Orientalist in nature, these efforts originated from the Company's self-interested and self-serving understandings of Indian societal realities and circumstances. Hence, they rendered Indian society and customs malleable and, therefore, flexible to imperial circumstances and designs[161]. In practice, and similarly to Britain, caste and race enabled the Company to identify intermediaries acting on its behalf and its interests. Whether they were *sepoys*, *zamindars*, local rulers or Indian rulers such as *nawabs* or *nizams*, these intermediaries' authority was reinforced and legitimised by the infusion of European idioms and notions of power that subsequently reaffirmed their subordination of indigenous populations[162]. However, reinforcing these intermediaries went beyond the simple control and subordination of Indian populations. Instead, they offered unparalleled access to the Indian military labour market that subsequently enabled the Company to use it as required by 'corpocratic' and imperial circumstances[163]. Therefore, by appropriating itself the military labour market, the East India Company controlled the militarisation of Indian society, but more importantly, it could justify its administration of violence based on a socially constructed organisation of a castes systems bound by racial axioms. Consequently, the process came to gradually reconfigure the administration of violence as to render it not only compatible with the socioeconomic, ethno-cultural and political realities of the Indian subcontinent, but also, and perhaps more importantly, with Parliament expectations of imperial governance.

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[160] Barua, *Inventing Race*, 116; Bayly, *Empire and Information*, 34.
[161] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 247; Rand and Wagner, *Recruiting Martial Races*, 237, 243.
[162] Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company*, 95, 113; Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*, 100-102; Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 119; Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, 53, 68-69; Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire*, 228.
[163] Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 187.

By ensuring its simultaneous compatibility with India's socioeconomic, ethno-cultural as well as political realities, and Parliamentary expectations, the reformation of the East India Company's administration allowed it to gradually condition Indian society to the maxims of British imperial governance. In particular, the Company, had conditioned Indian elites to administer violence on its behalf and according to British fiscal-military expectations[164]. As Gerald J. Bryant and Ranajit Guha explain, this was primarily achieved through the Company's creation of ethno-cultural and sociopolitical idioms of authority that legitimised its coercively persuasive domination of Indian society through the intermediary of Anglicised indigenous elites[165]. Accordingly, these processes conditioned and normalised the authoritarian and violent nature of the Company's rule[166]. In particular, the dispensation of violence was self-interestingly and self-righteously interpreted as "*... equally necessary for the Service of the Nabob and of the Company, and the future Security of their common interests, and therefore must be equally the desire of both.*"[167] More broadly, it meant that from the top, Indian society was gradually conditioned to function according to and within British expectations or face reprisals. Although it retained its self-serving and imperious nature, the conditioning and normalisation of the administration of violence took on an increasingly regulatory as well as stabilising character. Thus, in most instances, for most Indians, the reconceptualisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration, did not alter their lives. Furthermore, the reconceptualisation of the East India Company's

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[164] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 54; Bryant, *Pacification in the Early Raj;* Dow, *The history of Hindostan*, 96-97; Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 256.
[165] Bryant, *Pacification in the Early British Raj*, 3; Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*, 21; Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy*, 119.
[166] Kolsky, *The Colonial Rule of Law*, 1124-1125; Watson, *Fortifications and the 'Idea of Force*, 75-76.
[167] E. Hay "Letter Dated 16 May 1782" "Second Mysore War." 1782, India Office Record and Private Papers, IOR/H/246:1781-1782, British Library, 251-254.

fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence highlights the broader changes British imperial governance experienced from 1765 onwards as it sought to Anglicise Indian society.

The East India Company's anglicisation of Indian society, therefore, served an integral and natural evolutionary element of its imperial rule as it gradually established the foundations of 'British India'. Specifically, the creation of an increasingly 'British' cast of Indian elites required the reconceptualisation and reappropriation of indigenous socioeconomic and ethno-cultural principles. Accordingly, the creation of an Anglicised Indian society mainly drew upon the archetypes of English middle-class conservatism as well as masculine respectability and reputation which were synonymous with the values inculcated in *sepoys* following the reform of the Company's fiscal-military administration[168]. In other words, these archetypes served as a basis on which the Company reorganised and hybridised Indian society to meet British imperial needs and expectations. Thereafter, the administrative structure of 'British India', mainly comprised of Indian soldiers, policemen, revenue collectors and various officers, was subordinated to the increasingly monolithic politico-legal authority of Parliamentary expectations and imperial governance embodied by the transformation of the Company's fiscal-military administration[169]. Moreover, this monolithic structure served to replace India's pluralistic social character with an increasingly 'British' collective identity embodied by Indian elites[170]. These changes, as P. J. Marshall notes, established a British 'law and order' regime to remedy Indian 'anarchy' and theoreti-

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[168] Douglas M. Peers,'"The Habitual Nobility of Being": British Officers and the Social Construction of the Bengal Army in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Modern Asian Studies* 25, 1991, 545-70; Douglas M. Peers, "Colonial Knowledge and the Military in India, 1760-1860" *The Journal of Imperial Commonwealth History* 33, No. 2 (2005): 168.

[169] Peter J. Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead: Eastern India, 1740-1828* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 180; Rorabacher, *Property, Land, Revenue and Policy*, 111-112.

[170] Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*, 115; K. Wilson, *A New Imperial History: Culture*, 7.

cally at least replace Asiatic despotism with socioeconomic security and stability[171]. Hence, the reconfiguration of Indian society through Indian elites serving as intermediaries of the East India Company did not only display the broader designs of British imperialism which sought to regulate Indian society, but it also revealed the increasingly hybridised and indigenised nature of its administration as it sought to contend with the imperial challenges of the 1770s and 1780s.

The reform of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration had, therefore, enabled it to condition Indian society so that it could conduct itself according to the expectations of governments in London[172]. Moreover, it meant that the precepts of Indian society were largely reappropriated by British rule, which subsequently repurposed them within the fiscal-military framework to fit its imperial designs. Thus, the hybridisation of the way by which Indian society was subjected, served a dual purpose in ensuring the preservation and self-righteousness of British imperial rule over India. Superficially preserving its characteristics, the conditioning and hybridisation of Indian society effectively assimilated and Anglicised its foundations. Accordingly, it enabled the Company to reappropriate and weaponise Indian resistance and effectively turn it against itself. Therefore, the Company's monopoly over, and use of, violence was seen as wholly authentic and legitimate as it regulated Indian society[173]. In other words, the hybridisation of Indian society to reflect British ideological and philosophical expectations of imperial governance conditioned it to perceive the Company's monopoly of violence as increasingly justifiable in the context where it provided socioeconomic and political order. This new order was artificial-

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[171] Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead*, 137-138.
[172] David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2000): 27, 117.
[173] Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India*, 228; Guha, *Dominance Without Hegemony*, 25; Harlow, *The Second British Empire: Volume II*, 223.

ly constructed by the East India Company's reappropriation of Indian rulers as intermediaries of British rule.

Ultimately, Parliament's reformist interventions into the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and its politico-military relationships with an artificially created caste of Indian rulers came to gradually reorganise the political nature of social relations in India. As P. J. Marshall explains, the reformation of the Company's fiscal-military administration and the politico-military relations it maintained with Indian rulers not only Anglicised notions of rule and authority but, and perhaps more importantly, institutionalised these notions with the self-legitimising and imperial expectations of successive governments in London[174]. Hence, this institutionalisation effectively locked Indian society into a pattern where the Company's monopoly of violence and imperial subordination was self-legitimised and self-perpetuating[175]. In general, it enabled the creation of an increasingly 'British' Indian society regimented by the Company's reconfigured political, legal and military authority. Therefore, Indian society had been effectually conditioned and hybridised to be compatible with the East India Company's fiscal-military of Bengal and India. However, and more importantly, it had conditioned Indian society to be compatible with the broader imperial expectations of 'British India'.

Conclusion

The period from 1765 onwards marked the progressive reconceptualisation of the Company's dispensation of violence as an instrument of socioeconomic and political control, regula-

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[174] Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead*, 180.
[175] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 200.

tion and stability, ensuring the preservation of 'British India'. The process underpinned the Company's understanding and experience of the Bengal revolution and its implications. Concretely, the reform of the Company's use and reliance on violence and its acquisition of a monopoly of violence in its role as an imperial administrator reflects the broader administrative consolidation of British expansion[176]. As Robert Travers explains, the administrative consolidation of British imperial expansion originated because of the loss of the American Revolutionary War and the ensuing reconceptualisation of the ideological and philosophical foundations of Empire at the same time that Bengal became its new nucleus[177]. Furthermore, the Company's experience and understanding of the Bengal revolution, as well as its implications, tainted the ideological and philosophical revivification of Empire. In particular, the hybrid nature of Anglo-Mysorean and Anglo-Maratha wars highlighted its growing fiscal-military sclerosis and its inability to manage the post-Plassey business of Empire and reconcile it with Parliamentary expectations [178]. Alternatively, the imperial circumstances arising within India forced the East India Company to hybridise and indigenise its fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence.

Hence, the hybridisation and indigenisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence became a fundamental necessity for the preservation of 'British India'. Embodied by the professionalisation of its *sepoys* and officer corps, the hybridisation and indigenisation of the Company's fiscal-militarism provided it with an enduring and eventually, overwhelming response the Mysorean and Marathas could not match as they failed to implement European fiscal-military doctrine. However, and perhaps more importantly,

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[176] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76-77; Sramek, *Gender, Morality, and Race*, 18.
[177] Travers, *Ideology of Empire*, 25-26.
[178] Callahan, *Army Reform, 1783-1793*, 42.

the hybridising and indigenising reconceptualisation of the Company's armies also necessitated a degree of Europeanisation and institutionalisation that was effectively achieved through the professionalisation of *sepoys*. Alongside the partially preexisting European institutions left by the Myrsoreans and the Marathas amongst other Indian states, the institutionalisation of fiscal-military professionalism facilitated the expansion of 'British India' since the foundations were, as Douglas M. Peers has noted, already present[179]. Therefore, the institutionalisation and Europeanisation of the hybridised, as well as indigenised armies of the Company, provided an ideological, philosophical and practical structure for Company rule. As such, it created a political and social structure that effectively recasted Indian society as to be receptive to the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and established the socioeconomic, judicial and political foundations essential to the preservation of 'British India'.

[179] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 253

CONCLUSION

The Fiscal-Military Reconceptualisation of Violence and its Imperial Implications

The history of the East India Company is as fundamental to the history of the British Empire as the Empire is an intrinsic part of British history itself[1]. Accordingly, the reconceptualisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence between 1765 and 1788 played an integral role in the development of 'British India' and imbricate itself in the course of British imperial history and governance. Alternatively, the Company's recourse to violence in Bengal and throughout India was an integral element in the conduct, expansion, consolidation and preservation of British imperial interests in the region to which its own 'corpocratic' interests were intrinsically dependent[2]. However, as recent scholarship has revealed in 'the new imperial histories', the exercise of violence was indeed, not as uni-dimensional as earlier historiographical trends have suggested. Instead, the Company's dispensation of violence bequeathed a broader set of ethno-cultural, socioeconomic and politico-religious implications that to this day, mark Indian society[3]. Although this is duly proven by such scholars as Maya Jasanoff, Elizabeth Kolsky, Joseph Sramek and Kathleen Wilson, the East India Company's administration of vio-

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[1] For a discussion on the seeping influence of the Company in eighteenth century British politics and its implications, see Huw V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757-1773* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Huw V. Bowen, *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Peter J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empire: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Cyril H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784-1834* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1940); Lucy S. Sutherland, *The East India Company in British Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); James M. Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III: The East India Company and the Crisis and Transformation of Britain's Imperial State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019)

[2] John R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Course Lecture* (London: MacMillan, 1904): 114.

[3] For examples of such recent scholarship, see Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850* (New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 2005); Elizabeth Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) Joseph Sramek, *Gender, Morality, and Race in Company India, 1765-1858* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2011); Kathleen Wilson, *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire 1660-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

lence should not be perceived as only a mere vector that facilitated and enforced the sociocultural, economic, ethnic, judicial and political assertion of British rule over the subcontinent. Instead, the reconceptualisation of violence that emerged from the reconfiguration of imperial governance overseen by the East India Company in 'British India' in the decades after the Seven Years War recognises the importance hybridity played in simultaneously and interdependently shaping British imperialism and Indian society[4].

Similar to C. A. Bayly's seminal work on the importance of Indian society itself in the making of the British Empire, this thesis has argued that the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and its cultural predilection and dependence upon, and gradual reconceptulaisation of, violence was reflective of its profound influence over the evolution of British imperialism in India[5]. Alternatively, and in light of Charles Tilly's observation that "*war made the state, and the state made war*", this dissertation as argues in the first and second chapter that the Company's administration of violence can be seen to have gradually shaped Empire as Parliament sought to contend with the EIC's increasingly imperialistic and pervasive fiscal-military conduct through a series of measures embodied by the 1773 *Regulating Act* and *Pitt's India Act* of 1784[6]. Thus, violence and Empire came to evolve interdependently, reflecting mutually inclusive cir-

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[4] Christopher A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Douglas M. Peers, "Gunpowder Empires and the Garrison State: Modernity, Hybridity, and the Political Economy of Colonial India, circa 1757-1860" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, No. 2 (2007); Kaushik Roy, "Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849" *The Journal of Military History* 69, No. 3, 2005; Kaushik Roy, "The Hybrid Military Establishment of the East India Company in South Asia: 1750–1849" *Journal of Global History* 6, (2011); Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740-1849* (London: Routledge, 2011); Tirthankar Roy, "Rethinking the Origins of British India: State Formation and the Military Fiscal Undertaking in an Eighteenth-Century World Region" *Modern Asian Studies* 47, No. 4 (2013); Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desires: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995)

[5] Bayly, *Indian Society*.

[6] Douglas M. Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 246; Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): 42.

cumstances and implications. The period between 1765 and 1788 presents such an instance since a pre-1760 absence of Parliamentary oversight helped spawn the Company's mismanagement of 'corpocratic' and imperial affairs and abetted the subsequent crises of Empire in 'British India'. Moreover, and as this dissertation examines, the period also presented an ideological and philosophical context of self-serving, self-interested and self-righteous interpretation of the nature of imperial governance. Consequently, seeking to preserve India, and more importantly Bengal amidst the loss of the American Colonies, Parliament endeavoured through enquiry in the later 1760s, and legislation in 1773 and again in 1784 to inculcate within the Company a sense of accountability and responsibility that would effectively reconceptualise the Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence and reflect emerging Parliamentary expectations concerning the nature of imperial governance[7].

Despite its pragmatic nature, the reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence also carried equally important ideological and philosophical perspectives which interdependently shaped imperial governance and 'British India'. Indeed, the Parliamentary reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administrative apparatus marked an ideologically, philosophically and pragmatically hybridising reformation of the Empire imbued by accountability and responsibility in an effort to consolidate Britain's imperial nexus in Bengal. In particular, this reconceptualisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration enables the examination of the interdependent processes of British

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[7] Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 24-25

state-formation and empire-building from an ideological, philosophical and practical standpoint[8]. Moreover, and as this dissertation suggests that these transformative processes precipitated a shift in the way Britain viewed and managed its Empire — a shift that others also argue characterised the progressive emergence of the 'Second British Empire'[9].

As C. A. Bayly has argued, the development of the 'Second British Empire' was characterised by an administrative and near technocratic consolidation that ensured the continuation of imperial expansion and, thereafter, its preservation[10]. In particular, and as the second chapter of this thesis argued, the crises of Empire in the Atlantic and Indian world displayed the inconsistencies of British imperial policy and their subsequent implications. Specifically, with the eventual loss of the American Colonies, the Anglo-Maratha and Anglo-Mysore wars of the 1770s and 1780s incited an imperial consolidation of India, and in particular Bengal as it became the matrix of a 'second' British Empire. Hence, in practice, it meant that violence, served an increasingly narrow and precise function whereby its exercise served to maintain law and order within 'British India'[11]. Furthermore, it meant that the Company's administration of violence was reconceptualised as an instrument of socioeconomic, judicial as well as political regulation and stability characterising the emerging notions of an accountable and responsible imperial government. Moreover, the reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administra-

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[8] Seeley, *The Expansion of England*; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2000)

[9] For a traditional interpretation and discussion on the Second British Empire, see Vincent T. Harlow *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Volume I: Discovery and Revolution* (London: Longmans, 1952); Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Volume II: New Continents and Changing Values* (London: Longmans, 1952). For a recent interpretation and discussion on the Second British Empire, see James M. Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III: The East India Company and the Crisis and Transformation of Britain's Imperial State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019)

[10] Bayly, *Indian Society*, 76.

[11] Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire*, 116.

tion served to establish the foundations of Parliamentary oversight and impress its expectations of British imperial power upon the Company itself, but over India through the creation of increasingly Anglicised Indian society[12].

The challenges the East India Company faced in 'British India' and more specifically in Bengal, were the result of the direct and indirect abilities of Mughal, Indian princes and their intermediaries to exert agency and subversively resist British fiscal-military imperialism. Specifically, the Company's monopoly and exercise of violence and use of warfare to attain 'corpocratic' and imperial objectives ironically initiated economic, judicial, political and social resistance on the part of Indian populations, which ultimately undermined its legitimacy and left it virtually bankrupted in the late 1760s and early 1770s. These debilitating fiscal-military debacles subsequently compelled Parliamentary intervention. However, the hybridising and indigenising effects of Indian resistance gradually necessitated the reconceptualisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence[13]. Consequently, and as the third chapter addressed through the British reinterpretation and appropriation of Indian socio-hierarchical norms and the subsequent creation of *martial races* as imperial intermediaries, from the late 1760s onwards, questions of social hierarchy gradually became a fundamental dimension of the Compa-

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[12] Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 65; Philip J. Stern, "History and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Present, and Future!" *History Compass* 7, No. 4 (2009): 1160.

[13] Seema Alavi, *The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India 1770-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 57-60; Christopher A. Bayly, "The British Fiscal-Military State and Indigenous Resistance: India, 1750-1820", 340, in Lawrence Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London: Routledge, 1994): 322-354; Gerald J. Bryant, *The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013): 253; Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999): 115; Dirk H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market of Hindustan, 1450–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 175.

ny's ability to legitimately exercise its monopoly of violence to control Indian society[14]. Alternatively, as British rule gradually extended across the subcontinent from its enclaves of Bombay, Madras and Bengal, it found itself increasingly reliant upon Indians to administer 'British India'. However, and perhaps more importantly, British rule and the reconceptualisation of the Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence became dependent upon the ideological, philosophical and pragmatic notions of Indian societal, judicial and political regulation and order[15]. As this dissertation argued, these elements gradually served to legitimise and consolidate the Company's administration to Indians thereafter meet Parliament's expectation concerning an accountable and responsible governance of 'British India'. Thus, notions of British imperial governance and order were consequently hybridised and indigenised with Indian notions of sociopolitical and judicial regulation. Accordingly, the East India Company's fiscal-military administration of 'British India' was reconceptualised on the basis of indigenised and hybridised British notions of imperial governance. Moreover, idioms of conquest associated with violence were gradually replaced by a language of rule and order as its dispensation became an instrument of societal control and regulation.

The Parliamentary reform of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration effectively hybridised and indigenised what Douglas M. Peers has accurately described as a 'Garrison State'[16]. Hence, as novel tenets of imperialism began to emerge alongside those of the 'Sec-

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[14] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 247;Gavin Rand and Kim A. Wagner. "Recruiting the 'martial races': identities and military service in colonial India" *Patterns and Prejudice* 46, No. 3-4 (2012): 237, 243.

[15] For a discussion on Indian ideological, philosophical and practical influence over British imperial ideology, see Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jon E. Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers: Modern Governance in Eastern India, 1780-1835* (London: Routledge, 2008)

[16] Peers, *Gunpowder Empires*, 246; For a discussion on the idea of 'Garrison States' and its evolution, see Douglas M. Peers, *Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in Early-Nineteenth Century India* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995)

ond British Empire', the Company's 'Garrison State' became gradually antiquated as the era of expansive trade subsided in favour of that of imperial consolidation in accordance with Parliamentary expectations[17]. Thus, Parliament's ideological idioms of an accountable, responsible and orderly apparatus of imperial governance superseded the Company's expansionist and conquering ideology of Empire. Hence, the arrival of Charles Cornwallis as Governor-General in 1786 confirmed that the Company's 'Garrison State' had all but been reduced to a policing force tasked with ensuring the consolidation and preservation of Parliamentary imperial governance over India. With the beginning of the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings in 1788, these elements came to conjointly mark the reasons as to "why" violence ought to be administered. However, and perhaps more importantly, the reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence had, albeit temporarily, brought a degree of stability to 'British India'.

Nevertheless, despite Parliament's reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration and dispensation of violence, a self-interested, self-serving and self-righteous character lingered as Governor-General Richard Wellesley displayed through his turn of the nineteenth-century conquest of Southern and Central India following renewed hostilities with the Mysoreans and Marathas, respectively. Similarly to what Warren Hastings had earlier done during the 1770s and 1780s, Wellesley justified the exercise of violence as an instrument of conquest as a response to the destabilising effects of Indian resistance which ultimately stemmed from the imposition of British imperialist rule. Consequently, the Company's self-aggrandising patterns of fiscal-militarism and empire-building proved, in the short run, to be limited in so far

[17] Stern, *History and Historiography*, 1149.

that they required a continuous and expansive administration of violence. However, bound by the continuously expansive administration of violence, in the long run, these patterns proved to be ultimately unreliable and unsustainable as the Sepoy Mutiny duly displayed between 1857 and 1858[18].

Hence, and as this dissertation has argued, between 1765 and 1788, the reconceptualisation of the East India Company's fiscal-military administration seeped into every aspect of British imperial governance in 'British India'. More broadly, Parliament's reconceptualisation of the exercise violence as an instrument of sociopolitical control and regulation subsequently informed its imperial policies regarding ethno-cultural and socioeconomic relations, shaped judicial and religious authority and virtually every aspect of imperial administration of 'British India'. Despite facilitating and enforcing the gradual sociocultural, economic, ethnic, judicial and political assertion of British imperial rule over India, violence in itself and in its reconceptualisation became intrinsically important to Empire. Accordingly, from an ideological, philosophical and utilitarian standpoint, the reconceptualisation of the East India Company's administration of violence served to strengthen and underwrite the self-interested, self-serving and self-righteous nature of the 'Second British Empire' as it emerged in India.

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[18] Bayly, *Indian Society*; Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A* History (London: Longman, 1993); Eric Stokes and Christopher A. Bayly (eds.), *The Peasant Armed: The Indian Rebellion of 1857* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)

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“The origin and authentic narrative of the present Marratta War; and also, the late Rohilla War, in 1773 and 1774; whereby the East-India Company's troops (as mercenaries) exterminated that brave nation, and openly drove them for asylum and existence into the dominions of their former most inveterate enemies. To which is added the unaccountable proceedings in the Military Store-Keeper's Office, in Bengal.” 1781, General Reference Collection, 583.e.4.(3.), British Library.

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